

PREM 19/635

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PART 24

Confidential File

Relations with Argentina

ARGENTINA

Position of the Falkland Islands

Part 1: Sept 1979

Part 24: June 1982

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
16.6.82							
<del>ends</del>							
<del>X</del> PREM 19/635							

● PART 24 ends:-



16.6.82

PART 25 begins:-

17.6.82



## Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

1. House of Commons Hansard, 14 June 1982, columns 611-615 and 700-702
2. House of Commons Hansard, 15 June 1982, columns 729-741

Signed *AJ Wayland* Date *23 April 2012*

**PREM Records Team**



بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES  
MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM  
& MINERAL RESOURCES

P. O. Box 59 - ABU DHABI



Argentina  
دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة  
وزارة البترول والثروة المعدنية  
ص.ب : ٥٩ أبو ظبي

Date 16th June, 1982

التاريخ .....

Minister's Office

مكتب الوزير

Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
London.

Dear Prime Minister,

I am writing to you concerning the Falkland Islands. I have been following progress there with great interest and I would like to congratulate you on the success of the British Forces. The campaign has been an excellent example of how well trained and disciplined units can overcome many disadvantages and difficulties.

I was very pleased to learn of your success, which was in no small way made possible by your leadership and firm resolve, and that hostilities have now ceased.

With congratulations and best wishes,

Yours ever,

Dr. Mana Saeed Al-Otaiba  
Minister of Petroleum & Mineral Resources

RESTRICTED

10768 - 1

OO WASHINGTON  
RR UKMIS NEW YORK  
GRS 123  
RESTRICTED  
FM FCO 161944Z JUNE 82  
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1188 OF 16 JUNE  
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK



FALKLANDS

1. SENATOR PERCY TELEPHONED ME FROM AIR FORCE 2 ON 16 JUNE ON HIS WAY BACK FROM SAUDI ARABIA. HE WANTED TO PASS ON HIS CONGRATULATIONS ON THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THE FALKLANDS OPERATION. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES WE HAD DEFENDED. VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH ALSO CAME ON THE LINE AND SPOKE IN THE SAME VEIN. I EXPRESSED MY PLEASURE AT THEIR CALL AND THE GRATITUDE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE FOR ALL THE US SUPPORT AND HELP WE HAD RECEIVED. WE HOPED THAT ARGENTINA WOULD AGREE VERY SOON TO A GENERAL CEASEFIRE. I ADDED THAT I HOPED IT WOULD NOT BE TOO LONG BEFORE I WAS ABLE TO MEET BOTH OF THEM.

PYM

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FALKLAND ISLAND GENERAL

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS





FCS/82/88

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

Death of an Argentine Prisoner of War on South Georgia

1. Thank you for your minute of 15 June about the international and public relations aspects of the future handling of the Artuso case.
  
2. I do not dissent from the conclusion which the Attorney-General has reached that there are no grounds for instituting criminal or disciplinary proceedings against the RN officers in charge of the operation in which this regrettable incident took place, although I share the Attorney General's view that there were some unsatisfactory features about the way in which the movement of the submarine was organised and supervised. Likewise, I accept that the evidence in our possession does not point to any breach of Articles 50 or 52 of the Third Geneva Convention.
  
3. Accordingly, I agree in principle with the action proposed in the penultimate paragraph of your minute. As you will be aware, Article 121 of the Third Geneva Convention, in establishing that an official enquiry into the death of a POW should be held by the Detaining Power, provides that "statements shall be taken from witnesses, especially from those who are prisoners of war, and a report including such statements shall be forwarded to the Protecting Power". This is ambiguous, in the sense that it can be interpreted as requiring that all statements, including those of UK personnel involved in the incident, should be forwarded. Nevertheless, and subject to the views of the Attorney-General, I would accept that the narrower interpretation could be defended and that we could confine ourselves to transmitting statements from the prisoners alone and excluding the names of the UK personnel involved. This does mean however that the covering

/report should

CONFIDENTIAL





report should be a detailed one and should, as you propose, include a section dealing with consideration of the report of the Board of Inquiry.

4. I am copying this minute to members of OD(SA), the Attorney-General and Sir Robert Armstrong.

(FRANCIS. PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
16 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

vb

*Argentina*

16 June 1982

Falkland Islands

As I told you on the telephone yesterday, the Prime Minister approved the telegram of instructions to Berne which was enclosed with your letter of 15 June.

AJC

R.A. Burns, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*RB*

16 June 1982

Falkland Islands

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the Australian High Commission which contains a congratulatory message from the Prime Minister of Australia.

The Prime Minister has signed the enclosed reply to Mr. Fraser. I should be grateful if you could arrange for its early delivery.

AJC

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*Sub*



16 June 1982

Falkland Islands

The President of Guyana rang the Prime Minister briefly last night to congratulate her on the Argentine surrender on the Falkland Islands. The Prime Minister reiterated her earlier thanks to Mr. Burnham for his support on the issue.

There was a brief reference to the Venezuela/Guyana dispute. Mr. Burnham said that he was keeping his fingers crossed, given the expiry of the Port of Spain Protocol. But he thought that our action over the Falklands was a lesson to others who might be intending to further their claims by force.

AJC

John Holmes Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
LONDON, ENGLAND

Argentina

June 16, 1982

JOHN J. LOUIS, JR.

Dear Prime Minister,

May I express my profound admiration for your leadership of the actions taken by your country in the crisis of the Falklands. You have ably demonstrated that there is the determination and the will in the West to prevent aggression from being rewarded. The performance of your forces has been exemplary.

I and my associates here mourn the losses of your countrymen who gave their lives in the cause of freedom and self-determination.

Sincerely,

John J. Louis, Jr.



16 June 1982

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of 16 June, containing a message from Prime Minister Adams.

I shall of course place this before the Prime Minister at once.

AJC

His Excellency Mr. A.W. Symmonds, G.C.M.



CF

16 June 1982

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister received yesterday from the Commonwealth Secretary General, and a copy of the reply which Mrs Thatcher has sent.

AJC

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

John

SUBJECT

es Mailer  
Op

Barbados High Commission

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T132/82  
6, UPPER BELGRAVE STREET.....

H E Mr A W Symmonds GCM  
High Commissioner for Barbados  
in the United Kingdom



LONDON SW 1X 8AZ

TEL: 01-235 8686-7-8-9

P. O. BOX 597

Cable: BARCOM London SW1X 8AZ

Our Ref.: INT/119

Your Ref.:

16 June 1982

The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher  
MP  
Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1

Dear Prime Minister

Prime Minister Adams has asked me to forward the following message to you:

Begins:

"I wish to extend on behalf of the Government and people of Barbados our deepest sympathy to those whose relatives and friends made the supreme sacrifice in the struggle in the South Atlantic which has now culminated in recovery of the Falkland Islands.

We believe as always that the creation of a stable international community lies in adherence to certain principles including the right of self-determination and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Only adherence to such principles can protect small and vulnerable societies.

For the future, we trust that a solution will be found which will bind up the wounds inflicted during the last ten weeks. We also hope that the outcome will discourage aggression in the conduct of international affairs."

Ends.

Yours faithfully

  
High Commissioner





Jo JR

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

16 June 1982

Dear Mr. Ramphal

Thank you for your kind letter of 15 June and the most inspiring speech which you enclosed. Our military victory in the Falklands is indeed a proud moment, proud not because we have won but because, as you see so clearly, we have successfully defended a cause which is important to the free world. I am most grateful to you for your own encouragement and support.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Mr. Shridath S. Ramphal, Kt., CMG, QC.

15



CF

16 June 1982

Falkland Islands

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister received from the New Zealand High Commission which contains a congratulatory message from the Prime Minister of New Zealand.

The Prime Minister has signed the enclosed reply to Mr. Muldoon. I should be grateful if you could arrange for its early delivery.

AJC

John Holmes Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Jup



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

June  
16 July, 1982

FUTURE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

Thank you for your letter of 9 June <sup>Part 23</sup> enclosing a paper approved by your Secretary of State on the above subject.

The Prime Minister does not for the present wish Lord Cockfield to follow up the suggestions in his paper, including the idea of a consultancy on the prospects for tourism. Mrs Thatcher believes that it is desirable that Lord Shackleton's updated report should be awaited before further action is taken. But she would be grateful if the Department of Trade would ensure that Lord Shackleton is aware of the various ideas in the paper and discuss them with him should he so wish (before Lord Shackleton completes his report).

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (FCO) and Sir Michael Palliser.

A. J. COLES

J Rhodes, Esq  
Department of Trade



PS  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/MR SLOW  
 PS/PIIS ← PS/MR RIFKIND

SIR J BULLARD  
 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
 LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
 LORD BRIDGES  
 MR URE  
~~MR GILLMORE~~

HD/PUSD (2)  
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 HD/NEWS D  
 HD/ERD  
 HD/ECD(E)  
 HD/UND  
 HD/PLANNING STAFF  
 HD/SAD

~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

PS/No 10 DOWNING ST (2) ✓

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
 MR ILETT } TREASURY  
 MR LITTLER }

MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
 SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
 MR WADE-GERY }  
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
 DIO }

~~ROOM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET~~

[Passed to E.R.]

[Typists a.a.]

RESTRICTED

FM ISLAMABAD 160815Z JUNE 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO. 268 OF 16TH JUNE

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. PRESIDENT ZIA, WHO HAS JUST GOT BACK FROM SAUDI ARABIA, TOOK ME ASIDE AT THE OPENING OF THE PARILAMENTARY SESSION TODAY AND SPOKE IN THE WARMEST TERMS OF OUR VICTORY IN THE FALKLANDS. HE SAID THAT HE WAS ABSOLUTELY DELIGHTED, THAT WE HAD HANDLED THE WHOLE AFFAIR MAGNIFICENTLY AND THAT WE HAD CHARACTERISTICALLY STOOD UP FOR WHAT WAS RIGHT DESPITE THE COST TO US. WOULD I CONVEY HIS WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS TO THE PRIME MINISTER. HE WOULD TRY TO SEND HER A MESSAGE OR TO TELEPHONE.

2. I SAID THAT I KNEW FROM HINTS I HAD RECEIVED THAT HIS HEART AND SYMPATHY HAD ALWAYS BEEN WITH US EVEN THOUGH HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO SAY VERY MUCH IN PUBLIC. THIS PROVOKED HIM TO REPLY THAT THEY HAD COME UNDER THE GREATEST PRESSURE FROM PEOPLE "WHO CLAIM TO HAVE HELPED US 20 YEARS AGO" (HE DID NOT SPECIFY WHO THEY WERE) TO SUPPORT ARGENTINA, IT HAD NOT BEEN EASY TO RESIST THIS PRESSURE. HE DID NOT ELABORATE FURTHER.

Prime Minister

He has had a minor operation for gallstones and is clearly not very well! I do not think you need send a message. A.J.C. 16/6.



PRESSURE. HE DID NOT ELABORATE FURTHER.

3. THE PRESIDENT WAS FOLLOWED BY ALL MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, CHIEFS OF STAFF AND A LARGE NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT WHO SPOKE IN SIMILAR TERMS. THERE IS NO DOUBTING WHERE THE PRIVATE SYMPATHIES OF LEADING PAKISTANIS LIE OR THEIR GENUINE PLEASURE AND RELIEF AT OUR SUCCESS.

FORSTER

NNNN

TO: [faint text]  
FROM: [faint text]  
SUBJECT: [faint text]  
[faint text]  
[faint text]  
[faint text]

↑ post



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (40) 38

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR SLOW  
PS/P... ← PS/MR RIFKIND  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR A SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE  
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HD/UND  
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EMERGENCY UNIT  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/No 10 DOWNING ST (2) ✓  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
PS/CHANCELLOR }  
MR ILETT } TREASURY  
MR LITTLER }

MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO }

**IMMEDIATE**

~~ROOM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET~~

[Passed to E.R.]

[Typists a.a.]

GR 80  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FM LILONGWE 161315Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 212 OF 16 JUN

MY TELNO 209: FALKLAND ISLANDS  
1. NGWIRI, SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT AND CABINET, HANDED THE  
FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BANDA TO ME THIS AFTERNOON  
AND ASKED THAT IT BE TRANSMITTED TO HM GOVERNMENT URGENTLY:  
" WE ARE DELIGHTED OVER BRITISH VICTORY IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.  
GOD SAVE THE QUEEN AND GOD BLESS MRS THATCHER".

SULLIVAN

NNNN



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL ~~140~~ <sup>37</sup>

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PHS ~~←~~ PS/MR RIFKIND  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR J SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
~~MR GILLMORE~~  
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HD/PLANNING STAFF

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PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
MR ILETT } TREASURY  
MR LITTLER }

MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO }

Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

[Passed to E.R.]

[Typists a.a.]

00 FCO DESKBY 161100Z

00 UKREP BRUSSELS

GRS 180

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 161100Z

FM THE HAGUE 160910Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 165 OF 16 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS

INFO SAVING OTHER EC POSTS

YOUR TELNO 149 TO BRUSSELS

FALKLANDS : CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

1. ACTION TAKEN WITH VAN WALSUM, DIRECTOR FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE, MFA, ON 15 JUNE. HE UNDERTOOK TO TELEPHONE THE NETHERLANDS AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATELY.

IMMEDIATE  
ADVANCE COPY



2. VAN WALSUM TELEPHONED HEAD OF CHANCERY THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT THE DUTCH HAD LIMITED THE SCOPE OF THEIR DEMARCHE TO THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE MESSAGE REPEATED IN YOUR TELNO 147 TO BRUSSELS. THEY HAD THUS NOT (REPEAT NOT) MADE ANY REFERENCE TO THE LINK WITH A TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, AND HAD MEREY URGED THAT ARGENTINA SHOULD BE READY TO GIVE BRITISH SHIPS/AIRCRAFT SAFE PASSAGE TO ENSURE THE DIRECT RETURN OF PRISONERS.

3. VAN WALSUM MADE PLAIN THAT FOLLOWING THE DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT BY POLITICAL DIRECTORS OVER DINNER ON 14 JUNE THE DUTCH HAD RESERVATIONS (WHICH THEY THOUGHT WERE SHARED BY SEVERAL OTHER PARTNERS) ABOUT THE WISDOM OF LINKING ACTION CLEARLY NECESSARY ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS TO CONFIRMATION BY ARGENTINA OF A TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES (WHICH IN THE DUTCH VIEW GALTIERI WILL FIND IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO PROVIDE).

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADRESSEES.

HERVEY

NNNN

SENT / RECD AT 16/1 0944Z AW /

AND CAN I HAVE 15 MINS TO CHANGE THE RIBBON PSE KKKKK

JB CERTINLY



DR 161800z

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (40)

PS  
PS/MR ERD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PHS Ps/mr RIFKIND

SIR J BULLARD  
SIR J SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

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Hd/WED.

~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/No 10 DOWNING ST (2)

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
MR ILETT } TREASURY  
MR LITTLER }

MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO }

Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

IMMEDIATE

[Passed to E.R.]  
[Typists a.a.]

GRS 190  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 161800Z  
FM PARIS  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 635 OF 16 JUNE 1982  
INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, BRUSSELS, UKREP BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN,  
THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, ROME, PARIS, DUBLIN, BONN, WASHINGTON,  
UKMIS NEW YORK, AND UKDEL NATO.

MY TEL NO. 631 (NOT TO ALL): FALKLANDS: CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.  
1. DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL AT THE QUAI (MARTIN) TOLD US THIS  
EVENING THAT OUR DEMARCHE HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION  
OF CHEYSSON ON HIS RETURN EARLIER TODAY. THE QUAI WERE FULLY ALIVE  
TO THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF LOOKING AFTER  
THE UNEXPECTEDLY LARGE NUMBER OF ARGENTINE PRISONERS ON THE  
FALKLANDS AND OF ENSURING SAFE CONDUCT FOR THEM AWAY FROM THE  
ISLANDS. THIS SEEMED TO THEM, HOWEVER, A SEPARATE QUESTION  
FROM THE DISTINCTLY POLITICAL POINT ABOUT TOTAL CESSATION OF  
HOSTILITIES. THEY THEREFORE HAD SOME HESITATION ABOUT MAKING  
REPRESENTATIONS IN BUENOS AIRES IN A WAY THAT LINKED THE TWO



REPRESENTATIONS IN BUENOS AIRES IN A WAY THAT LINKED THE TWO ISSUES SO DIRECTLY THOUGH THEY WOULD NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF DOING SO IN SOME OTHER WAY.

2. WE REPEATED THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION AND THE PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE OF CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES . WE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS AMONG OTHERS HAD AGREED TO SPEAK TO THE ARGENTINES. MARTIN SAID THE FRENCH WOULD CONTINUE TO REFLECT ON OUR PROPOSAL.

3. AS AGREED BY TELEPHONE WITH THE CRISES UNIT I SHALL TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION UNTIL INSTRUCTED.

FRETWELL.

NNNN

SENT AT 16/ .1720Z

SORRY LEFT OUT DESKBY ONLY FOR FCO ON CALL OUT K  
OK WILL DO KKK

WASHINGTON

AM BOM

AM BOM

AM BOM

AM BOM

AM BOM

AM BOM

AM BOM

AM BOM

AM BOM



FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES. (42)

PS  
PS/MR HURD ← PS/M' RIFKIND  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE  
MR BARRETT  
HD/S AM D ← H/WED  
HD/DEF D  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/UND  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/ERD  
HD/PUSD  
MR REED, PUSD  
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)  
PS/S OF S DEFENCE  
PS/HOME SECRETARY  
PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)  
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL  
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER  
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG  
PS/SIR M PALLISER  
PS/SIR A DUFF  
MR WADE-GERY  
MR FULLER  
MR COLVIN  
MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-  
MENTS STAFF  
DIO  
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD  
DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

CABINET  
OFFICE

UNCLASSIFIED

FM UKMIS GENEVA 161600Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 331 OF 16 JUNE 1982

INFO ROUTINE BRASILIA, BERNE, MONTEVIDEO.

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

FALKLAND ISLANDS : ICRC

- AS REPORTED TO EMERGENCY UNIT (TELECON LONG/DEW) JOSSERON OF ICRC TELEPHONED AT 1445Z TO MAKE THREE POINTS. THESE WERE THAT :  
(A) THE ICRC WERE CONCERNED FOR THE CONDITION OF THE PRISONERS OF WAR TO WHOM THEY OWED PROTECTION. THEY RECOGNISED HOWEVER THE DIFFICULTIES FACED BY THE BRITISH FORCES IN LOOKING AFTER THEM;  
(B) THE ICRC WOULD BE GLAD FOR AUTHORITATIVE NEWS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINES ABOUT A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE WHOLE AREA;  
(C) DEPENDING ON THE STATE OF THE RUNWAY AT PORT STANLEY, ICRC WOULD BE READY TO SEND ONE OR MORE AIRCRAFT FROM MONTEVIDEO WITH RELIEF SUPPLIES INCLUDING TENTS AND FOOD.
- WE AGREED TO REPORT THE ABOVE TO YOU AND CONFIRMED TO THE ICRC THAT WE HAVE DONE SO. GRATEFUL FOR RESPONSE TO PASS TO ICRC.

MARSHALL



ZZ BERNE

GRS 206

RESTRICTED

FM FCO 161245Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH BERNE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 121 OF 16 JUNE

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK  
AND BRASILIA

MY TELNO 119: FALKLANDS CEASEFIRE

FOLLOWING IS TO CONFIRM TELECON GIFFARD/AMBASSADOR.

1. PLEASE ASK THE SWISS TO PRESS FOR A REACTION FROM THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO THE MESSAGE CONVEYED THROUGH MY TUR, AND TO MAINTAIN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE PRESSURE FOR A REPLY.
2. TO ILLUSTRATE THE URGENCY OF THE MATTER, MIFT GIVES THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT SHOWING THE PROBLEM POSED TO THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER BY THE NUMBERS OF ARGENTINE PRISONERS, AND THE CONDITION IN WHICH THEY CAME INTO OUR HANDS.
3. PLEASE ASK THE SWISS ALSO:
  - A. TO EXPRESS TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT OUR EXPECTATION THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR OWN WILLINGNESS TO BEGIN TO REPATRIATE PRISONERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, THEY WILL ARRANGE IMMEDIATELY FOR THE REPATRIATION OF FLIGHT LIEUTENANT GLOVER: AND THAT THE THREE BRITISH CORRESPONDENTS WHO ARE HELD BY THE ARGENTINES WILL NOW BE RELEASED:
  - B. TO ENSURE THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT ARE AWARE THAT CANBERRA HAS ALREADY EMBARKED 2,000 ARGENTINE PRISONERS IN SAN CARLOS BAY AND IS PROCEEDING TO PORT STANLEY TO EMBARK A FURTHER LARGE CONTINGENT OF PRISONERS, PRIOR TO THEIR REPATRIATION.

PYM

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

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 HD/ECD (E)  
 HD/PUSD  
 DEP HD/PUSD  
 HD/RES D  
 PS  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/MR ONSLOW  
 PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
 PS/PUS  
 MR BULLARD  
 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR GILLMORE  
 MR URE  
 MR BARRETT

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 PS/ S OF S DEFENCE  
 PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL  
 PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG  
 PS/SIR M PALLISER  
 PS/SIR A DUFF  
 MR WADE-GERY  
 MR FULLER  
 MR O'NEILL  
 HD/ASSESSMENTS STAFF  
 MR COLVIN  
 DIO

CABINET  
 OFFICE

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
 ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD  
 SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE  
 DIRECTOR G C H Q

RESTRICTED



**FLASH**

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO  
TYPISTS]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES. (42)

PS  
PS/MR HURD ← PS/M' RIFKIND  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE  
MR BARRETT  
HD/S AM D  
HD/DEF D  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/UND ← HD/WAD  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/ERD  
HD/PUSD  
MR REED, PUSD  
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~  
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)  
PS/S OF S DEFENCE  
PS/HOME SECRETARY  
PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 Dst)  
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL  
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER  
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG  
PS/SIR M PALLISER  
PS/SIR A DUFF  
MR WADE-GERY  
MR FULLER  
MR COLVIN  
MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-  
MENTS STAFF  
DIO.  
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD  
DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

CABINET  
OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BENRNE 161546Z

**FLASH**  
**ADVANCE COPY**

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 168 OF 16 JUNE

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND BRASILIA

MY TELNO 166; FALKLANDS CEASEFIRE

1. AMBASSADOR HUGUENTOBLE HAS INFORMED ME THAT A TELEGRAM HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE SWISS EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES REPORTING A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE HEAD OF THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS DELEGATION AND AMBASSADOR FRANCISCO JOSE PULIT OF ARGENTINE MFA. HUGUENTOBLE PARTICULARLY REQUESTED THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF THIS REPORT SHOULD BE RESPECTED.

2. ACCORDING TO PULIT, ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WAS LIKELY TO TAKE A DECISION ABOUT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION OF 15 JUNE AT AROUND 12.00 MIDDAY LOCAL TIME TO-DAY.



AT AROUND 12.00 MIDDAY LOCAL TIME TO-DAY.

3. PULIT WAS ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAS SOME DIFFICLTIES ABOUT BRITISH COMMUNICATION. THEY WANTED ARGENTINE PRISONERS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED AS PRISONERS OF WAR BECAUSE THIS WOULD SUGGEST CAPITULATION AND INSTEAD WOULD LIKE THE EVACUATION OF THEIR TROOPS TO BE CONSIDERED AS QUOTE WITHDRAWL UNQUOTE LINKED WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502. OFFICIAL CIRCLES IN BUENOS AIRES WERE THEREFORE DISAPPOINTED THAT PRIME MINISTER HAD SPOKEN OF PRISONERS OF WAR IN PARLIAMENTARY STATEMENT YESTERDAY.

4. HUGUENTOBLER ADDED IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTIONS THAT THE ABOVE SHOULD BE REGARDED AS NO MORE THAN PRELIMINARY COMMENTS INDICATING ARGENTINE DIFFICULTIES. THEY WERE CONVEYED FOR OUR INFORMATION AND SWISS DID NOT EXPECT COMMENTS ON THEM BY THE BRITISH GOVERMENT. THE MAIN POINT WAS THAT ARGENTINE DECISION COULD BE EXPECTED SHORTLY (PARA 2 ABOVE ).

FLASH

POWELL -JONES

NNN

SENT AT RED AT 161604Z TWPM/ DP

LT EHE 00408



[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO  
TYPISTS]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES. (42)

PS  
PS/MR HURD ← PS/M' RIFKIND  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE  
MR BARRETT  
HD/S AM D  
HD/DEF D  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/UND  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/ERD  
HD/PUSD  
MR REED, PUSD  
EMERGENCY ROOM  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)  
PS/S OF S DEFENCE  
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PS/SIR A DUFF  
MR WADE-GERY  
MR FULLER  
MR COLVIN  
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MENTS STAFF  
DIO.  
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD  
DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

CABINET  
OFFICE

ADVANCE COPY

URS 410

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRASILIA 161545Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 278 OF 16 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE BERNE, UKMIS GENEVA, SANTIAGO, MONTEVIDEO, MODUK,  
CINCFLEET

YOUR TELNO 196: FALKLANDS CEASEFIRE

IMMEDIATE

DESKBY

1. I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED TO THE HEAD OF THE AMERICAS DEPARTMENT AT THE MFA AT 151430Z, LEAVING WITH HIM A BOUT DE PAPIER. I ALSO SHOWED HIM THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT CONTAINED IN YOUR TELNO 122 TO BERNE. AMBASSADOR RICUPERO UNDERTOOK TO INFORM THE FOREIGN MINISTER IMMEDIATELY. ALTHOUGH I URGED HIM TO PRESS FOR A VERY RAPID REPLY, I DOUBT IF ONE WILL BE FORTHCOMING BEFORE TOMORROW.
2. RICUPERO ENQUIRED WHETHER WE HAD CONSIDERED MAKING A SIMILAR APPROACH TO THE URUGUAYAN GOVERNMENT. I SAID THAT I WAS NOT



INFORMED ON THIS POINT: BUT I ASSUMED THAT BOTH THE URUGUAYAN AUTHORITIES AND OUR OWN EMBASSY IN MONTEVIDEO HAD BEEN PLACED UNDER SOME STRAIN BY THE RECENT OPERATIONS TO REPATRIATE PRISONERS OF WAR, MANY OF THEM SERIOUSLY WOUNDED, AND THE SHEER SCALE OF THE PRESENT REQUIREMENT WAS PROBABLY BEYOND THE RESOURCES THAT THE URUGUAYANS COULD MOBILISE.

3. RICUPERO SUGGESTED ( AS BAENA SOARES HAD DONE YESTERDAY) THAT IT MIGHT BE CONVENIENT TO BRING THE BRAZILIAN RED CROSS IN ON THE GAME, IN THE EVENT THAT APPROVAL WAS GIVEN FOR REPATRIATION FACILITIES TO BE PROVIDED IN BRAZIL. I SAID THAT THE HEAD OF THE BRAZILIAN RED CROSS HAD ALREADY BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE EMBASSY TO OFFER THEIR SERVICES. IT SEEMED TO ME A GOOD IDEA TO ENLIST THEIR HELP, BOTH PRESENTATIONALLY AND BECAUSE ALL HANDS TO THE PUMP WILL BE NEEDED.

4. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE HAS JUST TOLD ME THAT, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON, HE HAD SPOKEN ON THE TELEPHONE LAST NIGHT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER, URGING THAT THE BRAZILIANS SHOULD PRESS THE ARGENTINES FOR A RAPID AND POSITIVE REPLY TO OUR MESSAGE. GUERREIRO HAD SAID FLATLY THAT THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT WISH TO GET INVOLVED IN AN ISSUE WHICH SHOULD BE DEALT WITH BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA.

5. DESPITE THE UNHELPFULNESS OF GUERREIRO'S REACTION, MY IMPRESSION FROM BAENA AND RICUPERO IS THAT THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT THE BRAZILIAN AUTHORITIES WILL DECIDE TO CO-OPERATE OVER REPATRIATION. BUT THEY MAY FIRST WISH TO ASSURE THEMSELVES THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD NOT OBJECT. THEY ARE STILL CAUGHT ON THE HOOK OF THEIR OFTEN-REPEATED SUPPORT FOR THE ARGENTINE CLAIM TO THE FALKLANDS: AND THEY WILL NOT WISH TO MAKE ANY MOVE WHICH MIGHT SEEM TO ENDORSE OUR RE-ASSERTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, SO LONG AS IT IS UNDILUTED BY ANY OFFER OF FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. THEY ARE SCARED STILL OF THE PROSPECT OF A COLLAPSE OF AUTHORITY IN BUENOS AIRES, WITH UNFATHOMABLE RESULTS FOR THEIR OWN SECURITY. WHAT THEY FAIL TO SEE AS YET IS THAT THEIR OWN RELUCTANCE TO CHANCE THEIR ARMS MAY WELL BRING NEARER THE DENOUEMENT THEY FEAR.

HARDING

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BBC B //////////////// U R G E N T ////////////////  
B6/1 PORT STANLEY FIGHTING OVER: GALTIERI =

IN A 13-MINUTE SPEECH TO THE NATION BROADCAST BY BUENOS AIRES  
RADIO AT 0030 GMT, PRESIDENT GALTIERI SAID THE FIGHTING AT PORT  
STANLEY HAD ENDED, BUT PORT STANLEY WOULD NOT BE THE LAST STEP  
IN A NATIONAL ENDEAVOUR BEGUN IN 1833 AND CONTINUED ON 2ND APRIL.  
THE ISLANDS WOULD NEVER RETURN TO WHAT THEY HAD BEEN BEFORE 2ND  
APRIL, GALTIERI SAID.

MF BBC MON 0102 16/6 G. T.



ZC

B6/2 GALTIERI 2: +SURRENDER+ NOT MENTIONED =

GALTIERI SAID ARGENTINE SOLDIERS HAD MADE SUPREME EFFORTS IN FIGHTING FOR THE DIGNITY OF THE NATION. THEY HAD FOUGHT AGAINST INCOMPREHENSION AND HAUGHTY ATTITUDES BACKED BY U.S. MILITARY TECHNOLOGY.

ARGENTINA'S LEGITIMATE RIGHTS IN THE MALVINAS (FALKLANDS) HAD BEEN RECOGNISED, GALTIERI SAID. SOONER OR LATER IT WOULD OBTAIN THEM. THE FUTURE BELONGED TO THE ARGENTINES AND IT WOULD BRING THEM PEACE AND VICTORY.

GALTIERI AT NO POINT USED THE WORD +SURRENDER+.

MF BBC MON 0109 16/6 G. T.

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ZC

B6/3E GALTIERI 3: POLICIES WILL BE CORRECTED =

GALTIERI, WHO WAS SPEAKING FROM GOVERNMENT HOUSE, SAID EVERYTHING NECESSARY WOULD BE CORRECTED IN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY. DEMOCRACY WOULD BE ESTABLISHED AS WOULD HONOUR AND JUSTICE. EVERYONE WOULD STRIVE FOR A HOMELAND DREAMED OF BY ARGENTINA'S SOLDIERS. DEFEATISM WOULD BE TREASON.

THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE WERE STRONG, HE SAID. NOW WAS THE MOMENT TO ASSUME THEIR MATURITY. THEY CALLED ON THE VIRGIN OF LUJAN TO COMFORT THEM, HE SAID.

END BBC MON 0120 16/6 G. T. (ALL)

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BBC B

B9/1E ARGENTINA: POLITICAL PARTIES URGE CONTINUED PATH TO DEMOCRACY=

(TELAM NEWS AGENCY) BUENOS AIRES: THE MULTIPARTIDARIA (ED: A GROUPING OF ARGENTINE POLITICAL PARTIES) THIS EVENING (ED: TUESDAY) CALLED ON ALL ARGENTINIANS +NOT TO HALT THE COUNTRY'S MARCH TOWARDS DEMOCRACY AND INSTITUTIONALISATION+ AND +FAITH IN OUR OWN DESTINY TO ACHIEVE DEFINITIVE NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION+.

THE +RESULT OF THE BATTLE DOES NOT CASE A STAIN ON THE HEROISM OF OUR FIGHTERS, NOR SHOULD THE LIVES SACRIFICED OR WOUNDS SUFFERED BE FOR NOTHING+, IT SAYS. +THE RECONQUEST OF THE MALVINAS ISLANDS FOR THE INTEGRAL SOVEREIGNTY OF THE REPUBLIC WILL BE A PERMANENT NATIONAL OBJECTIVE FOR THIS GENERATION AND THOSE TO COME. +



ZC  
BBC B  
B12/1E ARGENTINA: POLICE ARREST PROTESTERS NEAR U. S. EMBASSY =  
(FOR INFORMATION MNLY: NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION)

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(DIARIOS Y NOTICIAS) BUENOS AIRES: A GROUP OF ABOUT ONE HUNDRED PEOPLE TRIED TO STAGE A DEMONSTRATION OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY THIS EVENING (ED: TUESDAY) BUT WERE DISPERSED BY POLICE, WHO MADE THREE OR FOUR ARRESTS. THE DEMONSTRATORS HAD SHOUTED SLOGANS AGAINST THE U. S. PRESENCE IN ARGENTINA AND AGAINST THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, BUT POLICE ACTED QUICKLY. AN EXPLOSION WHICH WAS HEARD HAD BEEN CAUSED - ACCORDING TO AN UNOFFICIAL SOURCE - BY A DEVICE WHICH DAMAGED THE EMBASSY'S TENNIS COURT. EARLIER, FIREMEN WERE CALLED TO A FIRE AT A FLAT NEAR THE EMBASSY: ONE UNCONFIRMED REPORT SAID AN EMBASSY OFFICIAL LIVED IN THE FLAT.

END BBC MON 0448 16/6 G. T.

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BBC B //U R G E N T //

B6/1 PORT STANLEY FIGHTING OVER: GALTIERI =

IN A 13-MINUTE SPEECH TO THE NATION BROADCAST BY BUENOS AIRES RADIO AT 0030 GMT, PRESIDENT GALTIERI SAID THE FIGHTING AT PORT STANLEY HAD ENDED, BUT PORT STANLEY WOULD NOT BE THE LAST STEP IN A NATIONAL ENDEAVOUR BEGUN IN 1833 AND CONTINUED ON 2ND APRIL. THE ISLANDS WOULD NEVER RETURN TO WHAT THEY HAD BEEN BEFORE 2ND APRIL, GALTIERI SAID.

MF BBC MON 0102 16/6 G. T.

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BBC B  
B471E BUENOS AIRES: STREET SKIRMISHES FOLLOW CLEARING OF MAIN  
SQUARE =

(UPDATES B93 - TEAR GAS)

(FOR INFORMATION ONLY: NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION)

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DIARIOS Y NOTICIAS HAS REPORTED THAT POLICE EVICTED THE CROWD FROM PLAZA DE MAYO IN BUENOS AIRES AT 1915 (LOCAL TIME), BUT GROUPS OF PEOPLE RESISTED THE POLICE IN THE STREETS SURROUNDING GOVERNMENT HOUSE. THERE WERE SKIRMISHES AND PEOPLE LIT FIRES TO COUNTERACT THE EFFECTS OF POLICE TEAR GAS AND PREVENT THE MOVEMENT OF POLICE CARS, THE AGENCY SAID.

THE AGENCY SAID TWO POLICEMEN WERE INJURED WHEN THEY FELL OFF THEIR MOTOCYCLES WHILE CHARGING THE CROWD IN PLAZA DE MAYO.

END BBC MON 0031 16/6 G. T. (HA)

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BBC B " " " " " U R G E N T " " " " "

B7/1 BRITAIN'S TWO OPTIONS: GALTIERI (ADD TO 95) =

AT ONE POINT IN HIS SPEECH BROADCAST BY BUENOS AIRES RADIO GALTIERI SAID:

+BRITAIN MUST NOW RESOLVE ITS ATTITUDE TO THE CONFLICT AND FOR THIS IT HAS THE FOLLOWING POSSIBILITIES: TO ACCEPT THAT THE SITUATION OF THE ISLANDS WILL NEVER RETURN TO WHAT IT WAS BEFORE 2ND APRIL, IN WHICH CASE WE SHALL STICK TO OUR ATTITUDE OF NEGOTIATING A PATH TO THE RECOVERY OF OUR SOVEREIGNTY: OR TO PROCEED TO RESTORE THE COLONIAL REGIME, IN WHICH CASE THERE WILL BE NEITHER SECURITY NOR DEFINITE PEACE AND THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEEPENING THE CONFLICT WILL THEN FALL ON BRITAIN. +

MF BBC MON 0142 16/6 G. T.

" " " " "

ZC

BBC B

B7/2 GALTIERI (ADD) 2: MINORITY MUST NOT DISTURB UNITY =

GALTIERI WENT ON: +IN ALL CASES THE NATION, STANDING UNITED AND SPURRED ON BY A SOLE CAUSE, WILL CONTINUE MARCHING FORWARD. LET US NOT ALLOW THE UNITY ACHIEVED THROUGH A JUST AND HOPED-FOR CAUSE - WHICH HAS BEEN BACKED BY OVER HALF THE WORLD AND WHICH HAS DRAWN COMFORT FROM THE VISIT OF HIS HOLINESS (ED: THE POPE) - TO BE DISTURBED AND DAMAGED BY THE DISRUPTIVE ATTITUDE OF AN UNREPRESENTATIVE MINORITY.

+WITH THE SAME VALOUR WITH WHICH OUR MEN FOUGHT WE SHALL WORK WITHOUT HALT AND WITHOUT PAUSE TO BRING FORWARD WHAT HAS BEEN DELAYED. THEY HAVE FOUGHT THAT WE MIGHT LIVE FULLY. THERE IS A CHANCE IN THE NATION.



''''  
ZC

B8/3 GALTIERI (TEXT) 3: PORT STANLEY +NOT THE LAST STEP+ =

THOSE WHO HITHERTO HAVE NOT WANTED OR BEEN ABLE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE TRUTH OF OUR CAUSE WILL HAVE TO LISTEN TO THEIR CONSCIENCES AND UNDERSTAND THAT THERE MUST EXIST PROFOUND REASONS OF JUSTICE FOR A PEACEFUL NATION TO TAKE UP ARMS TO THE POINT OF HEROISM.

PUERTO ARGENTINO WILL NOT BE THE LAST STEP IN THE NATIONAL ENDEAVOUR WHICH WE BEGAN IN 1833 AND WHICH WE CONTINUED ON 2ND APRIL.

MF BBC MON 0239 16/6 G. T.

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B8/4 GALTIERI (TEXT) 4: LEGITIMACY OF CLAIMS =

(ED: HERE INSERT THE PASSAGES RUN IN OUR 97 SERIAL, PRINTER 0142, BEGINNING +BRITAIN MUST NOW RESOLVE...+ AND ENDING +...ITS DESTINY.+)

LET NOBODY TRY TO DISTURB OR INTERFERE IN THE PATH OF THE ARGENTINIANS. LET NOBODY TRY TO PLAY WITH OUR WOUNDS OR OUR EMOTIONS. LET NOBODY BE MISLED INTO BELIEVING THAT WE ARE TOUGHT IN THE FIGHT BUT WEAK IN SPIRIT.

THE WORLD KNOWS THAT WE ARE NOT A PEOPLE WHICH HAS FORGED ITS EXISTENCE IN THE FIRE OF WARS OF CONQUEST, AND IT IS WELL ATTESTED THAT WE HAVE NEVER SAID 'NO' TO PEACE. THE MAJORITY OF STATES ACKNOWLEDGE THE LEGITIMACY OF OUR CLAIMS TO THE MALVINAS. WHAT WE ARE CLAIMING BELONGS TO US, WILL ALWAYS BE WITHIN OUR REACH, AND SOONER OR LATER WE SHALL OBTAIN IT.

MF BBC MON 0248 16/6 G. T.

''''  
ZC

B8/5E GALTIERI (TEXT) 5: +CONTAIN OUR PAIN+ =

LET US CONTAIN OUR PAIN. LET US LIFT OUR HEADS HIGH. OUR PEOPLE IS AND FEELS ITSELF TO BE STRONG AND HAS ITS LATIN AMERICAN BROTHERS FOR COMPANY.

NOW IS THE TIME TO ASSUME OUR ARGENTINE IDENTITY AND MATURITY TO THEIR ULTIMATE CONSEQUENCES. WHOEVER DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THIS WILL BE OSTRACISED AND BRANDED A TRAITOR. WE CALL ON OUR LADY OF LUJAN TO PLEAD BEFORE GOD OUR LORD FOR THE LIVES AND TRIUMPH OF HIS FAITHFUL. AND LET US GIVE THANKS TO HER THAT OUR SOULS HAVE BEEN COMFORTED BY THE RECENT PRESENCE OF HIS HOLINESS.

DIGNITY AND THE FUTURE ARE OURS, AND THAT WILL BRING US PEACE AND VICTORY.

END BBC MON 0249 16/6 G. T. (ALL)



NNNNZCZ

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B B

B8/1 TEXT OF GALTIERI SPEECH: BATTLE FOR PORT STANLEY +HAS ENDED+ =

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF PRESIDENT GALTIERI'S ADDRESS TO THE ARGENTINE NATION, AS BROADCAST BY BUENOS AIRES RADIO AT 0030 GMT:

THE BATTLE FOR PUERTO ARGENTINO (ED: PORT STANLEY) HAS ENDED.

OUR SOLDIERS MADE SUPREME EFFORTS IN FIGHTING FOR THE DIGNITY OF THE NATION. THOSE WHO FELL WILL ALWAYS BE ALIVE IN THE HEARTS AND GREAT HISTORY OF THE ARGENTINIANS.

WE NOT ONLY HAVE A MONUMENT TO ANCIENT GLORIES: WE HAVE OUR HEROES, MEN OF FLESH AND BLOOD IN THE PRESENT, NAMES WHICH WILL BE ENGRAVED BY OURSELVES AND BY FUTURE GENERATIONS. THE PEOPLES OF LATIN AMERICA IN SOLIDARITY, AND ALL THOSE ABLE TO FORGET THEIR OWN INTERESTS IN THE FACE OF COURAGE AND SACRIFICE, WILL ALSO REMEMBER THEM.

MF BBC MON 0235 16/6 G. T.

ZC

B8/2 GALTIERI (TEXT) 2: BRITAIN'S +OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY+ =

THEY FOUGHT AGAINST INCOMPREHENSION, CONTEMPT AND ARROGANCE. WITH MORE COURAGE THAN ARMS, THEY FACED UP TO THE OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY OF A POWER SUPPORTED BY THE MILITARY TECHNOLOGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, WHICH WAS SURPRISINGLY THE ENEMY OF ARGENTINA AND ITS PEOPLE.

THEY FOUGHT TO REMOVE FROM OUR SOIL THE LAST VESTIGE OF COLONIALISM, THEY FOUGHT FOR THE VERY ESSENCE OF OUR NATIONAL AND AMERICAN IDENTITY, THEY FOUGHT FOR THE SAME CAUSES WHICH PREVAILED OVER THE GLORIOUS BIRTH OF OUR FATHERLAND.

OUR NATION HAS FOUGHT FOR ITS SPIRITUAL AND MATERIAL INTEGRITY, CONVINCED THAT EVER-TOLERATED INSULTS BREAK THE SPIRIT OF PEOPLES AND OF MEN.

MF BBC MON 0236 16/6 G. T.

ZC

B8/3 GALTIERI (TEXT) 3: PORT STANLEY +NOT THE LAST STEP+ =

THOSE WHO HITHERTO HAVE NOT WANTED OR BEEN ABLE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE TRUTH OF OUR CAUSE WILL HAVE TO LISTEN TO THEIR CONSCIENCES AND UNDERSTAND THAT THERE MUST EXIST PROFOUND REASONS OF JUSTICE FOR A PEACEFUL NATION TO TAKE UP ARMS TO THE POINT OF HEROISM.

PUERTO ARGENTINO WILL NOT BE THE LAST STEP IN THE NATIONAL ENDEAVOUR WHICH WE BEGAN IN 1833 AND WHICH WE CONTINUED ON 2ND APRIL.



1977 202

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BBC B

B7/2 GALTIERI (ADD) 2: MINORITY MUST NOT DISTURB UNITY =

GALTIERI WENT ON: +IN ALL CASES THE NATION, STANDING UNITED AND SPURRED ON BY A SOLE CAUSE, WILL CONTINUE MARCHING FORWARD. LET US NOT ALLOW THE UNITY ACHIEVED THROUGH A JUST AND HOPED-FOR CAUSE - WHICH HAS BEEN BACKED BY OVER HALF THE WORLD AND WHICH HAS DRAWN COMFORT FROM THE VISIT OF HIS HOLINESS (ED: THE POPE) - TO BE DISTURBED AND DAMAGED BY THE DISRUPTIVE ATTITUDE OF AN UNREPRESENTATIVE MINORITY. - (

+WITH THE SAME VALOUR WITH WHICH OUR MEN FOUGHT WE SHALL WORK WITHOUT HALT AND WITHOUT PAUSE TO BRING FORWARD WHAT HAS BEEN DELAYED. THEY HAVE FOUGHT THAT WE MIGHT LIVE FULLY. THERE IS A CHANGE IN THE NATION AND NOBODY CAN AVOID IT. TOGETHER WE SHALL SAY 'NO' TO MISGIVINGS AND PREJUDICES, BECAUSE THESE WERE PUT ASIDE WHEN WE WENT SHOULDER TO SHOULDER TO THE BATTLE FRONT.

MF BBC MON SDA 0226 16/6 G. T.

ZC

B7/3E GALTIERI (ADD) 3: DEMOCRACY TO BE RESTORED =

+PAYING HEED TO THE OPINIONS OF THE DIFFERENT SECTORS OF NATIONAL LIFE WE SHALL REVISE AND CORRECT EVERYTHING THAT MAY BE NECESSARY IN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY. WE SHALL RESCUE THE REPUBLIC, RECONSTRUCT ITS INSTITUTIONS, RESTORE DEMOCRACY ON THE IMMOVABLE BASES OF EQUITY AND RESPECT AND WE SHALL LIGHT THE TORCHES OF THE HIGHEST VALUES OF OUR ARGENTINE IDENTITY. (

+HONOUR EXISTS AND THERE WILL BE JUSTICE. NOBODY WILL BE ALLOWED IN HIS CONDUCT TO SHUN THE COLLECTIVE EFFORTS TO ATTAIN THE HOMETOWN IMAGINED IN THEIR BEST DREAMS BY OUR SOLDIERS. THERE WILL BE NO ROOM FOR SPECULATION OR DECEPTION. IDLENESS WILL BE CONSIDERED DISHONEST, AS THOUGH TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION AND AN INSULT TO THE BLOOD OF THOSE WHO FOUGHT, AND DEFEATISM WILL BE TREASON.

+TOGETHER WE SHALL GIVE STRENGTH TO THE NATION AND TOGETHER WE SHALL SEEK THE FINAL GOAL WE ARE PURSUING: WE SHALL BE TOTAL MASTERS OF OUR NATION AND ITS DESTINY. +

END BBC MON SDA 0230 16/6 G. T. (ALL)

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BBC B

B8/1 TEXT OF GALTIERI SPEECH: BATTLE FOR PORT STANLEY +HAS ENDED+ =

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF PRESIDENT GALTIERI'S ADDRESS TO THE ARGENTINE NATION, AS BROADCAST BY BUENOS AIRES RADIO AT 0030 GMT:

THE BATTLE FOR PUERTO ARGENTINO (ED: PORT STANLEY) HAS ENDED.





SW  
be questions

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 June, 1982

Dear John

Falkland Islands

In the course of Prime Minister's Questions and questions following the Prime Minister's statement yesterday, a number of points were raised which will require following up. In fact, additional questions have already been tabled on several of them.

I list the points in question below, together with the Hansard references. I should be grateful if, in consultation with MOD, you could arrange for us to be given lines to take on these issues for Prime Minister's Question Time tomorrow. We will also need to consider when definitive answers can be given to those which cannot be settled immediately.

- Compensation from Argentina for war damage in the Falklands (Mr. Powell, Col. 733).
- Repatriation of those killed in the campaign (Mr. Robertson, Col. 736, and others).
- Repossession of Southern Thule (Mr. Speed, Col. 737).
- Damage compensation arrangements for the Falkland Islanders (Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop, Col. 739).
- Further representations about the three British journalists (Mr. Foot, Col. 740-741).
- Memorial to those lost in the campaign (Mr. Kilfedder, Col. 726).
- National day of prayer and thanksgiving (Mr. Gardiner, Col. 727).

One other point which will need consideration, but by the business managers, is Mr. Steel's request for a opportunity for the House to pay tribute to the forces (Col. 232).

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JK



I am sending copies of this letter to Derek Piper (Ministry of Defence), David Heyhoe (Lord President's Office) and Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office). I am also sending a copy to Michael Pownall (Lords Whips' Office) as any special arrangements in the House will probably need to be duplicated in the Lords.

*Yours ever*

*Mike Pattison*

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP, 0730HRS 16 JUNE

Prisoners of War

1. The Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons that some 15,000 Argentine prisoners of war are now in British hands.
2. Urgent steps are being taken to safeguard these prisoners and to evacuate them as soon as possible from the Islands. A message has been sent to the Argentine Government, via the Swiss, with proposals for their repatriation. A response is still awaited.

Administration

3. The Prime Minister also announced that Mr Rex Hunt and members of the Islands Council at present in this country will return as soon as possible. Mr Hunt will concentrate on civilian matters, General Moore on military matters. They will in effect act as Civil and Military Commissioners.

16 JUNE 1982

EMERGENCY UNIT



FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION)0730 HOURS, 16 JUNE 1982FCO tel 119  
to Berne: A

1. There has been no official response so far to our request to the Argentine Government via the Swiss for confirmation of the total cessation of hostilities, of readiness to accept direct repatriation of Argentine POWs to Argentine ports, and to offer safe passage for ships and aircraft used for this purpose.

UKMis tel no  
1004: B

2. However, Mrs Kirkpatrick has given Mr Urquhart of the UN Secretariat, quoting 'top Argentine friends', details of a 'deal' allegedly concluded between Argentina and the UK. This looks wildly improbable, involving as it does the absence of any 'surrender ceremony', and the withdrawal of Argentine troops with arms and equipment (except for those taken POW before the final assault). The ending of Argentine air attacks against the task force is also mentioned. Sir A Parsons nevertheless considers that this may provide a clue to the counterproposals which the Argentines may try to put forward in response to our approach via the Swiss.

C

3. An Argentine press agency report, containing details of a purported 'agreement signed for the withdrawal of Argentine soldiers from the Malvinas Islands', looks slightly less far-fetched in that it includes provision for a 'transfer ceremony' (albeit without publicity) and the evacuation of Argentine troops 'on board Argentine ships and planes', without specifying whether these are allowed to retain their weapons.

CTG Signal  
151420Z June:D

4. There has been no fresh information overnight regarding the POW situation on the ground. Admiral Woodward's statement yesterday to the embarked press gives a vivid picture of the difficulties which he faces.

FCO Tel no 149  
to Brussels:E

5. In response to the instructions to various posts to make representations to friendly Governments about urging the Argentines to accept our proposals on the repatriation of POWs, Sir A Parsons has expressed reluctance to involve the UN Secretary General, arguing that this might open the way for further unwelcome UN involvement. Sir J Bullard agreed that we should reply accepting Sir A Parsons' recommendation that representations should be confined to bilateral approaches to Governments and to the ICRC. In a further message

UKMIS New York  
tel 1001: F



about responding to Argentine letters to the Security Council, Sir A Parsons has reiterated his view that our prime objective at the UN for the time being should be to avoid any revival of activity by the Secretary-General or in the Security Council.

UKMis tel no  
1003: G


6. Other reactions so far to our representations are summarised in the Annex to this minute.

Comment

7. There are no indications that the Argentines are likely to give a positive reply to our message to them on a cessation of hostilities and repatriation of Argentine forces. Indeed, on the evidence available, it seems more likely that they will be seeking instead for face-saving arrangements in order to present the outcome as a withdrawal rather than a surrender.

8. Sir A Parsons's arguments against involving the UN Secretary General have force. The Brazilian reaction to a possible use of Brazilian ports, though non-committal, is not discouraging and may need now to be followed up more strongly. We still await our Ambassador's view on the possible Uruguayan position. But our Ambassador in Santiago believes that there is a good chance of the Chileans being willing to assist with repatriation through Punta Arenas.

Santiago  
telno 297: M



P R Fearn  
Emergency Unit

16 June 1981



ANNEX

REACTIONS TO REPRESENTATIONS ABOUT UK PROPOSALS  
FOR REPATRIATION OF ARGENTINE POWs

Belgium: Director General MFA told HMA they would 'take  
action immediately' (reported by HMA by telephone.)

Copenhagen  
tel no 163: H

Denmark: Immediate instructions going to Danish Ambassador  
BA to act on 'humanitarian aspects'

Rome tel no  
312: I

Italy: Instructions to be sent to Italian Embassy BA  
as soon as possible (probably early on 16 June) to  
make 'appropriate representations', possibly in  
concert with EC missions.

Washington  
tel no 2136:J

US: No reactions so far to latest démarche. Secretary  
of State Haig confirmed in response to earlier request  
that they are studying possibility of help over logistics  
of repatriation - also emphasised that no US pressure  
on us over 'political follow-up'.

Ottawa tel  
no 322: K

Canada: Sympathetic response but Canadians doubt that  
any action by them will be productive.

Brasilia tel  
no 277: L

Brazil: Brazilians reluctant to intervene beyond their  
Protecting Power responsibilities; but studying possibility  
of involvement if Argentines block direct repatriation.



MR WILSON

DS 11  
+ UNIT

EMERGENCY UNIT

115 JUN 82

*Brantia asked to pass  
copy of message f.i.  
to Brazilian MFA.*

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10339 - 1

ZZ BERNE

**ACTION COPY**

GRS 296

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FM FCO 151100Z JUN 82

TO FLASH BERNE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 119 OF 15 JUNE

AND TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BRASILIA,

**FLASH**

FALKLANDS CEASEFIRE

PLEASE TELL THE SWISS GOVERNMENT THAT FOLLOWING THE ARGENTINE SURRENDER ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CONFIRMATION FROM THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT THAT THERE NOW IS A TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE SWISS WOULD URGENTLY PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND OBTAIN A RESPONSE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BEGINS:

FOLLOWING THE CEASEFIRE IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, THERE ARE A LARGE NUMBER OF ARGENTINE PERSONNEL WHO WILL WISE TO RETURN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THEIR HOMES AND FAMILIES IN ARGENTINA. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO START THE PROCESS OF REPATRIATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, PROVIDED THAT THEY RECEIVE CONFIRMATION FROM THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT THAT THERE IS NOW A TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND AND THAT ARGENTINA IS READY TO ACCEPT THE RETURN OF ARGENTINE PRISONERS OF WAR AND OTHERS FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND DEPENDENCIES DIRECT TO ARGENTINE PORTS ON BRITISH OR OTHER SHIPS OR AIRCRAFT. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD ALSO REQUIRE CONFIRMATION OF SAFE PASSAGE FOR ANY SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT USED FOR THIS PURPOSE. FURTHERMORE ONCE CONFIRMATION OF THE TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IS RECEIVED, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT PROPOSES THAT THE ECONOMIC MEASURES AND EXCLUSION ZONES INSTITUTED BY BOTH PARTIES SHOULD BE LIFTED AND AT THE SAME TIME THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE READY TO ASK THOSE COUNTRIES WHO HAVE IMPOSED ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA TO BRING THEM TO AN END.

1

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10339 - 1

AS SOON AS AN AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE IS GIVEN TO THESE PROPOSALS  
THE DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS FOR REPATRIATION OF ARGENTINE  
PERSONNEL CAN BE NOTIFIED.  
ENDS.

PYM

FALELANDS SELECTIVE [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

LIMITED

HD/EMERGENCY UNIT  
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HD/DEF D  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
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PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONELOW  
PS/LORD BISHOP  
PS/FUS  
MR BURMAN  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILMORE  
MR URE  
MR BARRATT

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PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER  
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PS/SIR M BARNARD  
PS/SIR A DUFF  
MR WALKER  
MR FULTON  
MR C. H. H. H.  
ED/ASSISTANTS STAFF  
MR COLVIN  
DIO.  
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
ADMIRAL SIR RUT BARNARDY DEI MOD  
SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE  
DIRECTOR G O E Q

CABINET  
OFFICE

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NY 029/15

ZZ FCO

GRS 235

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+ reimp.

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 152305Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1004 OF 15 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

YOUR TEL NO 535: FALKLANDS: CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

1. I SAW URQUHART THIS EVENING (15 JUNE) AFTER HE HAD EMERGED FROM A MEETING ON LEBANON BETWEEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND MRS KIRKPATRICK.  
2. URQUHART SAID THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK, QUOTING HER QUOTE TOP ARGENTINE FRIENDS UNQUOTE HAD GIVEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THE DETAILS OF THE QUOTE DEAL WHICH ARGENTINA HAD AGREED WITH THE BRITISH UNQUOTE. THESE WERE AS FOLLOWS:-

- (I) THERE WOULD BE NO SURRENDER CEREMONY.
- (II) ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WOULD TAKE PLACE TO QUOTE IMPLEMENT SCR 502 UNQUOTE.
- (III) ALL ARGENTINE TROOPS WOULD WITHDRAW WITH THEIR ARMS AND EQUIPMENT EXCEPT FOR POWS TAKEN BEFORE THE FINAL ASSAULT, WHO WOULD LEAVE UNARMED.
- (IV) AS PART OF THIS PACKAGE ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT CARRY OUT FURTHER ATTACKS ON THE BRITISH TASK FORCE.

I TOLD URQUHART THAT I KNEW OF NO SUCH DEAL.

3. IT IS CHARACTERISTIC OF MRS KIRKPATRICK THAT SHE SHOULD CHOOSE TO ACT AS A RELAY BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. IF THERE IS ANY TRUTH IN HER STATEMENT - I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT SHE IS IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE ARGENTINES, PROBABLY GENERAL MIRET - IT MAY REPRESENT THE CONDITIONS ARGENTINA WILL TRY TO PUT FORWARD IN RESPONSE TO THE NOTE IN YOUR TEL NO 119 TO BERNE.

PARSONS

NNNN



# ACTION COPY

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15 JUN 1982

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BBC B

B84/1E ARGENTINE AGENCY REPORTS TERMS OF FALKLANDS WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT=



(ED: FOR INFORMATION ONLY, NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION)

(NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS AGENCY, 1934 GMT) BUENOS AIRES: THIS AFTERNOON RELIABLE SOURCES REVEALED THE POINTS ALLEGEDLY CONTAINED IN THE AGREEMENT SIGNED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE SOLDIERS FROM THE MALVINAS ISLANDS THESE CONDITIONSS ARE:

1. THE COURAGE OF THE ARGENTINE TROOPS IS RECOGNISED.
2. A JOINT ARGENTINE-BRITISH COMMISSION IS SET UP FOR THE TRANSFER CEREMONY OF THE ISLANDS' ADMINISTRATION.
3. THE ARGENTINE TROOPS WILL REMAIN UNDER GEN. MARIO BENJAMIN MENENDEZ.
4. ARGENTINE AND BRITISH TROOPS WILL BE INVOLVED IN CLEARING MINEFIELDS.
5. THE FLAG WILL NOT BE TURNED OVER TO THE BRITISH.
6. THE CEREMONY WILL BE HELD BEHIND CLOSED DOORS AND WITHOUT PHOTOGRAPHERS OR NEWSMEN.
7. THE ARGENTINE TROOPS WILL EVACUATE THE ISLANDS ON BOARD ARGENTINE SHIPS AND PLANES

END BB C MON 2042 15/6 AT WA



(94)

ZZ ROME  
ZZ TOKYO  
ZZ CANBERRA  
ZZ WELLINGTON  
ZZ ATHENS  
GRS 303

E.R.

Copy as requested

K/31

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 151930Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH BRUSSELS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 149 OF 15 JUNE

AND TO FLASH ALL OTHER EC POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
OTTAWA, TOKYO, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, OSLO.

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS GENEVA, BERNE.

MY TELNO 147 (NOT TO ALL): FALKLANDS: CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

1. MY TUR (NOT TO POSTS WHICH HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED IT AS MY  
TELNO 119 TO BERNE) CONTAINS TEXT OF A MESSAGE WHICH WE HAVE  
SENT TODAY TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE SWISS  
PROTECTING POWER. THE SWISS HAVE TOLD US THAT IT REACHED BUENOS  
AIRES AT 1330Z.

2. PLEASE APPROACH THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED  
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND URGE THEM TO TAKE WHATEVER ACTION THEY  
THINK POSSIBLE IN BUENOS AIRES TO ENCOURAGE THE ARGENTINE  
AUTHORITIES TO ACCEPT OUR PROPOSALS, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE  
RETURN OF PRISONERS FROM THE ISLANDS. YOU SHOULD DRAW ATTENTION  
TO THE STATEMET BY THE BRITISH COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF THAT HE FINDS  
HIMSELF WITH A MAJOR RELIEF OPERATION ON HIS HANDS. THE TOTAL  
OF ARGENTINE PRISONERS IS SOME 15,000. THIS IS MANY MORE THAN  
WE HAD EXPECTED. THEY HAVE FOOD FOR ONLY TWO OR THREE MORE DAYS.  
MANY OF THEM ARE IN PITIFUL PHYSICAL CONDITION. THERE IS INADEQUATE  
SHELTER AND WE ARE NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE IT - PARTLY AS A RESULT  
OF THE LOSS OF THOUSANDS OF TENTS ON THE ATLANTIC CONVEYOR.  
WE DO NOT LIKE TO THINK WHAT MIGHT BE THE CONSEQUENCES IF  
THERE WERE A DELAY IN GETTING THESE MEN  
BACK TO ARGENTINA.

3. FOR WASHINGTON. THIS MAY HAVE COME UP ALREADY IN YOUR



TALKS WITH HAIG TODAY. PLEASE SPEAK TO HIM PERSONALLY AND SAY THAT THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES WILL NO DOUBT BE A PARAMOUNT FACTOR IN THIS.

4. FOR UKMIS NEW YORK. PLEASE ACT SIMILARLY WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN. THE AUTHORITY OF HIS OFFICE, TOGETHER WITH HIS PERSONAL STANDING IN BUENOS AIRES COULD BE CRUCIAL.

5. FOR ALL POSTS. TIME IS VERY SHORT. PLEASE ACT TONIGHT.

6. FOR EC POSTS. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF YOUR HOST GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE RECEIVED THE TEXT OF OUR MESSAGE TO THE ARGENTINES BY COREU TODAY.

7. FOR UKMIS GENEVA AND UKREP BRUSSELS: MY TELNO 147 TO BRUSSELS IS BEING REPEATED TO YOU SEPARATELY.

PYM



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CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 152025Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH FCC

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1001 OF 15 JUNE,

INFO IMMEDIATE E.C. POSTS WASHINGTON OTTAWA TOKYO CANBERRA WELLINGTON  
OSLO UKDEL NATO UKMIS GENEVA AND BERNE.

YOUR TEL NO 149 TO BRUSSELS: FALKLANDS.

CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

1. I DO NOT WISH TO SEEM INHUMANE, BUT I AM RELUCTANT TO INVOLVE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THIS EXERCISE. WE WOULD IN EFFECT BE ASKING HIM TO PERSUADE THE ARGENTINES TO ACCEPT A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES INCLUDING THE LIFTING OF ECONOMIC MEASURES/EXCLUSION ZONES SO THAT THEIR PRISONERS COULD BE RETURNED IMMEDIATELY.
2. I BELIEVE THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS STAFF WOULD SEE THIS AS A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY TO GET THE UN INTO THE ACT AGAIN. AS SEEN FROM HERE, THERE IS ALREADY A RISK THAT THE NOTE IN YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 119 TO BERNE MAY EVOKE WELL-WORN ARGENTINE COUNTER-PROPOSALS FOR E.G. A RUN DOWN OF BRITISH FORCES, UN SUPERVISION ETC, WHICH WOULD DRAG US BACK INTO THE MORASS.
3. IF WE OURSELVES INVOKE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S HELP AND, HAVING CONSULTED THE ARGENTINES, HE COMES BACK WITH PROPOSALS FOR UN INVOLVEMENT OSTENSIBLY ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS, WE COULD FIND OURSELVES IN A DIFFICULT POSITION. THERE IS ALREADY A STRONG FEELING HERE THAT WE SHOULD ACCEPT SOME KIND OF UN INVOLVEMENT EVEN AT THIS LATE STAGE IN ORDER TO SAVE ARGENTINE FACE, AVOID THE ULTIMATE HUMILIATION ETC. I AM MOST RELUCTANT TO DO ANYTHING TO ENCOURAGE THIS.
4. I ACCORDINGLY RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD CONFINE OUR REPRESENTATIONS TO THE BILATERAL ADDRESSEES IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE AND THAT, AS REGARDS INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT, WE SHOULD STICK TO THE ICRC AS THE CORRECT AGENCY FOR DEALING WITH SUCH SITUATIONS.

PARSONS

NNNN



GRS 235

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 152304Z JUNE 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1003 OF 15 JUNE.

FALKLANDS: NOTIFICATIONS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, THE ARGENTINE MISSION HAS ADDRESSED NO LESS THAN ELEVEN LETTERS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (TEXTS BY FACSIMILE TO THE EMERGENCY UNIT). MOST OF THEM REPEAT COMMUNIQES BY THE ARGENTINE GENERAL STAFF AND CALL FOR NO REPLY. HOWEVER, SOME OF THEM CONTAIN ACCUSATIONS OF ATTACKS UPON THE ARGENTINE HOSPITAL SHIP BAHIA PARAISO, THE USE OF HMS HYDRA FOR TASKS OTHER THAN THOSE OF A HOSPITAL SHIP AND ATTACKS UPON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. I HAVE CONSIDERED WHETHER OR NOT WE SHOULD REPLY TO THESE ACCUSATIONS.
2. I HAVE ALSO CONSIDERED WHETHER I SHOULD NOTIFY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE ARGENTINE SURRENDER, HAVING REGARD TO OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. WE DID THIS FOR SOUTH GEORGIA (S/15002 OF 26 APRIL).
3. AT PRESENT, OUR PRIME OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO AVOID ANY REVIVAL OF ACTIVITY BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OR IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHETHER AT THE BEHEST OF ARGENTINA (THROUGH PANAMA) OR OF THE DO-GOODERS. I HAVE THEREFORE CONCLUDED THAT WE SHOULD DO NOTHING VIS-A-VIS THE COUNCIL, AT LEAST UNTIL WE KNOW THE ARGENTINE REPLY TO THE PROPOSALS IN YOUR TEL NO 119 TO BERNE. I WILL CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITIES AGAIN THEREAFTER.

PARSONS

NNNN



GRS 250

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FM WARSAW 151045Z JUN 82

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELNO 612 OF 15TH JUNE 1982

INFO MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKMISFGENEVA

INFO SAVING: EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE, BUDAPEST, PARIS, BONN, MODUK,

SOFIA, BUCHARRST, BELGRADE, HELSINKI, STOCKHOLM, UKMIS NEW YORK

AND UKREP BRUSSELS

MY TEL NO 610: PARAGRAPH 1.

POLAND : MARTIAL LAW.

1. THE POLISH AUTHORITIES ADMITTED LATE ON MONDAY EVENING THAT THE DISTURBANCES IN WROCLAW AND NOWA HUTA ON SUNDAY 13 JUNE WERE MORE SERIOUS THAN THEY ORIGINALLY REPORTED, AND THAT CONSIDERABLE NUMBERS OF DEMONSTRATORS WERE ARRESTED.
2. ACCORDING TO AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT, THE DISTURBANCES IN WROCLAW BROKE OUT FOLLOWING A NOON MASS ON SUNDAY. ORDER WAS NOT RESTORED UNTIL ABOUT 02.30 HOURS ON MONDAY MORNING. THE MILICJA USED BOTH TEAR GAS AND WATER CANNONS, AND 23 MILICJA WERE INJURED, 6 SERIOUSLY. OVER 120 PEOPLE WERE DETAINED. THE CURFEW IN WROCLAW HAS BEEN REIMPOSED FROM 2300 HOURS TO 0500 HOURS FOR ADULTS AND FROM 2000 HOURS TO 0500 HOURS FOR MINORS. ENTERTAINMENT, CULTURAL AND SPORTS EVENTS HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED AND THE SALE OF ALCOHOL HAS BEEN BANNED.
3. IN NOWA HUTA, NEAR CRACOW, ACCORDING TO THE SAME OFFICIAL STATEMENT, PROCESSION FORMED AFTER MORNING MASS. THE MILICJA ATTEMPTED TO DISPERSE IT BUT NEW GROUPS OF DEMONSTRATORS FORMED AROUND THE TOWN. ONE GROUP ATTACKED A MILICJA STATION SMASHING SEVERAL WINDOWS. BARRICADES WERE RAISED ON A POUPLE OF STREETS. TEAR GAS WAS USED TO DISPERSE THE DEMONSTRATORS AND 118 PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED. FOUR MILICJA WERE INJURED.
4. THE DEMONSTRATION IN GDANSK IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN THE SMALLER OF THE THREE AND THE CROWD IS SAID TO HAVE DISPERSED WITHOUT VIOLENCE AFTER EPEATED CALLS BY THE MILICJA.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

JAMES

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

POLAND SPECIAL

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


15 JUN 82

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM COPENHAGEN 15/2200Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCC

TELEGRAM NUMBER 163 OF 15 JUNE

YOUR TELNO 149 TO BRUSSELS: FALKLANDS: CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

1. ACTION TAKEN WITH DEPUTY POLITICAL DIRECTOR WHO IS TONIGHT ISSUING IMMEDIATE INSTRUCTIONS TO DANISH AMBASSADOR TO ACT "ON HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS" OF OUR PROPOSALS.

WARBURTON

NNNN

SENT AT 15/2204Z MGD

OK SWITCHING OUT



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F.R.

DWF G 222

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OO FCO DESKBY 152300Z

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CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 152300Z

FM ROME 152210Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 312 OF 15 JUNE

~~ACTION COPY~~

15 JUN 82

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YOUR TELNO 149 TO BRUSSELS: FALKLANDS.

CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

1. ACTION TAKEN WITH MFA (BARBARANI AND DUTY OFFICER)

2. AS REPORTED IN TELECON CULSHAW/HOGGER, THE MFA UNDERSTAND THE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM, AND INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE SENT TO THE ITALIAN EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE (PROBABLY EARLY ON 16 JUNE) TO MAKE APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATIONS. THE ITALIANS WOULD PREFER THEIR EMBASSY TO ACT IN CONCERT WITH OTHER EC MISSIONS BUT WILL NOT (NOT) DELAY ACTION IF THIS PROVES IMPOSSIBLE.

3. TUR NOT YET RECEIVED, BUT THE COREU MENTIONED IN PARA 6 HAS JUST REACHED THE MFA.

ARCULUS

NNNN



UNCLASSIFIED

Thought this  
might be of  
interest  
Stefan Chalk

cc Enr Unit  
Distribution

15/6

CXL182 15/1624 16603449

FOR CXK

PRIORITY 151420Z JUN 82

FROM CTG 317.8  
TO CTG 317.0  
CTG 317.1  
MV BRITISH TRENT  
MODUK  
CTF 317

UNCLASSIFIED

SIC EVA

PASS TO EMBARKED PRESS STATEMENT FROM FOF1.

1. HUNDREDS OF ARGENTINE PRISONERS ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS COULD DIE FROM MALNUTRITION, HYPOTHERMIA AND DISEASE UNLESS ARGENTINA DECLARES AN IMMEDIATE END TO ALL REPEAT ALL HOSTILITIES.
2. FIFTEEN THOUSAND ARGENTINE TROOPS WHO SURRENDERED TO BRITISH FORCES YESTERDAY POSE A PROBLEM OF DISASTER RELIEF PROPORTIONS TO THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER, REAR ADMIRAL WOODWARD.
3. BUT WITH HIS 8,000 MILE SUPPLY LINES AND THE TASK FORCE ITSELF STILL THREATENED BY THE ARGENTINE NAVY AND AIR FORCE, THE PROBLEMS OF BRINGING MEDICAL AID, FOOD SUPPLIES, WARM CLOTHING AND SHELTER ARE INCREASED TO THE POINT OF IMPOSSIBILITY, HE SAYS.

PAGE 2 RBDFOHL 063 UNCLAS

4. QUOTE THIS IS A PROBLEM OF THE ARGENTINES! OWN MAKING. IT WAS FOOLISHNESS TO PUT 15,000 TROOPS OUT ON A LINE WHERE THEY COULD NOT BE RESUPPLIED.
5. QUOTE THEY ARE ALREADY SUFFERING FROM MALNUTRITION, EXPOSURE (IN SOME CASES HYPOTHERMIA), TRENCH FOOT, SCABIES AND DIARRHOEA, BROUGHT ON BY LACK OF FOOD AND PURE WATER, PROPER CLOTHING, SHELTER AND SANITATION, UNQUOTE REAR ADMIRAL WOODWARD SAID TODAY.
6. QUOTE THERE IS NO WAY I CAN SHELTER THESE NUMBERS. EVEN FEEDING THEM FOR A WEEK IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTS HUGE PROBLEMS - NOT JUST OF SUPPLIES BUT OF COOKING AND DISTRIBUTION AND HYGIENE AS WELL.
7. QUOTE MEANWHILE CONDITIONS ARE GETTING WORSE AS WINTER ARRIVES. THERE IS A FORCE TEN GALE AT SEA AND BLIZZARDS ON THE ISLANDS.
8. QUOTE THUS I HAVE MY USUAL DEFENSIVE PROBLEM AND NOW A MAJOR DISASTER RELIEF PROBLEM ON TOP. I MUST CONTINUE TO PROTECT THE TASK FORCE AND THE SUPPLY LINES FROM ARGENTINE AIR AND SEA ATTACKS. IF A CHOICE HAS TO BE MADE, HOWEVER, DEFENCE COMES FIRST.
9. QUOTE THUS THE ARGENTINES MUST APPRECIATE THAT I CANNOT KEEP THEIR TROOPS DRY AND WARM AND FED WHILE WE ARE STILL SUBJECT TO ATTACK.
10. QUOTE THEY MUST FACE THE FACTS AND AGREE TO ALL REPEAT ALL HOSTILITIES UNQUOTE



ACTION COPY

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E.R.

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WONFO 059/15

15 JUN 1982

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GRS 222

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 152055Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2136 OF 15 JUNE

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YOUR TELNO 1162: FALKLAND ISLANDS: U.S. HELP WITH THE REPATRIATION PRISONERS.

1. I RAISED THIS TODAY WITH HAIG. EAGLEBURGER WAS ALSO PRESENT. THE AMERICANS HAVE ALREADY BEEN GIVING CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT TO THE LOGISTIC DIFFICULTIES. I BELIEVE THEY COULD ASSIST EITHER BY SEA OR AIR. THEY REALISE THE URGENCY AND GRAVITY OF THE PROBLEM AND AWAIT A SPECIFIC REQUEST. I MENTIONED TO HAIG, ON THE BASIS OF INFORMATION CONVEYED TO ME BY TELEPHONE FROM LONDON, THAT BECAUSE OF THE URGENCY WE MIGHT WELL BE TACKLING THE PROBLEM OURSELVES BY SEA TRANSPORT AT A VERY EARLY DATE.

2. HAIG TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO SAY THAT HE HOPED THAT NOBODY IN LONDON WOULD BELIEVE, WHATEVER THE PRESS WERE SAYING, THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WERE EXERCISING PRESSURE ON THE BRITISH ABOUT THE SITUATION IMMEDIATELY AHEAD. THEY KNEW THAT WE WERE FULLY AWARE OF THE POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE.

HENDERSON

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ACTION COPY

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OTWON 15/15

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GRS 50

CONFIDENTIAL

FM OTTAWA 152045Z JUNE 1982

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 322 OF 15 JUNE

YOUR TELNO 149 TO BRUSSELS: FALKLANDS: CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

1. MESSAGE DELIVERED TO EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. OFFICIAL CONCERNED IS SYMPATHETIC TO OUR REQUEST BUT DOUBTS IF ANY ACTION THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES FEELS ABLE TO TAKE WILL BE PRODUCTIVE.

MORAN

NNNN



ACTION COPY

15 JUN 1982

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GRS

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRASILIA 15:2300Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 160100Z  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 277 OF 15 JUN882

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6

YOUR TELNO 194: FALKLANDS CEASFIRE

1. I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AT 152200Z.
2. BAENA SOARES SAID THAT THE MESSAGE WHICH WE HAD PASSED TO THE SWISS GOVERNMENT (YOUR TELNO 119 TO BERNE), THE TEXT OF WHICH WE HAD EARLIER GIVEN TO THE MINISTRY AT DEPARTMENTAL LEVEL, HAD ALREADY BEEN SENT ON TO THE BRAZILIAN EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT, IN KEEPING WITH THEIR DUTIES AS PROTECTING POWER, IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT TO DO ANY MORE THAN THAT. HE WAS, HOWEVER, OBVIOUSLY IMPRESSED WITH THE ARGUMENTS IN PARA 2 OF TUR THOUGH, IN VIEW OF PRESIDENT GALTIERI'S DECISION TO ADDRESS THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE IN THE PLAZA DE MAYO THIS EVENING, HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT THEY WOULD RESPOND AS WE HOPED.
3. IN VIEW OF THE CRITICAL SITUATION NOW EVIDENTLY OBTAINING IN PORT STANLEY AND THE NEED TO ACT VERY QUICKLY IN THE EVENT THAT THE ARGENTINES BLOCK DIRECT REPATRIATION, I SOUNDED OUT BAENA IN VERY GENERAL TERMS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES, WITHOUT MENTIONING THE PORTS NAMED IN YOUR TELNO 193, AND MAKING IT PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT I WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT. BAENA QUICKLY SAW THAT BRAZIL MIGHT BECOME INVOLVED IN AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE AND INSTRUCTED THE HEAD OF THE AMERICAS DEPARTMENT, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT, TO START CONTINGENCY CONSULTATIONS WITH THIS IN VIEW. THIS ENCOURAGED ME TO MENTION ALSO THE POSSIBILITY (YOUR TELNO 367 TO MONTEVIDEO) THAT THERE MIGHT BE AN URGENT REQUIREMENT TO SEND NON-MILITARY SUPPLIES, ESPECIALLY TENTS, BY AIR TO THE ISLANDS.
4. FUTHER REPLIES TO YOUR TELNOS 193 AND 367 TO MOTEVIDEO WILL FOLLOW.

HARDING



139


E.R. 23c

SANFO 004/16

16 JUN 1982

OO FCO

GRS 85  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM SANTIAGO 152245Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 297 OF 15 JUNE



YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 193 TO BRASILIA : REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR.

1. WE CONSIDER THAT THERE IS A VERY GOOD CHANCE THE CHILEANS WOULD AGREE TO THIS PROPOSAL. IT WOULD GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THEIR NEUTRALITY IN A POSITIVE AND HUMANITARIAN WAY. IT SHOULD BE FEASIBLE TO REPATRIATE THE PRISONERS BY BUS TO RIO GALLEGOS, AND THE CHILEANS WOULD PROBABLY MANAGE THE LOGISTICS COMPETENTLY.

2. DEPENDING ON THE SCALE OF THE OPERATION, WE MIGHT NEED TO CALL FOR REINFORCEMENT TO OUR UK-BASED STAFF.

HICKMAN

NNNN

SENT AT/RECD AT 160042Z P L N //PJH



*117 2000*

PRIME MINISTER

The following message was received this morning from the Commander of Land Forces on the Falkland Islands.

"In Port Stanley at 9 pm (0100 hrs. BST) Falkland Island time tonight, 14th June 1982, Major General Menendez surrendered to me all the Argentine armed forces in East and West Falkland together with their impedimenta. Arrangements are in hand to assemble the men for return to Argentina, to gather in their arms and equipment, and to mark and make safe their munitions. The Falkland Islands are once more under the Government desired by their inhabitants. God Save The Queen"

(signed J.J. Moore)

*Steve Sears*

Duty Clerk  
15 June 1982

Prime Minister,  
MOD say that their arms will not  
be returned with the men to Argentina.  
SPGems



**SUBJECT**  
*est. 10/16*

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE**

*A.S.C. 16  
h.c.*

**SERIAL No. ....**

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND  
PRESIDENT BURNHAM OF GUYANA ON TUESDAY 15 JUNE 1982 AT 2215

PM: Forbes, how are you?

Mr. Burnham: I am fine. I just rang to say congratulations and best of luck.

PM: How marvellous of you to ring. Particularly, with all the things you have to worry about now.

Mr. Burnham: Oh well, never too much to worry about a friend.

PM: Well, that's marvellous of you. You've been absolutely wonderful about it and it's such a comfort to know we've a real friend in the Security Council.

Mr. Burnham: Good, I'm glad you think so. You'll be hearing from me.

PM: All right Forbes. But you yourself are well.

Mr. Burnham: Oh yes, thanks.

PM: And the protocol runs out soon, doesn't it, in a few days.

Mr. Burnham: We'll keep our fingers crossed.

PM: Yes, keep our fingers crossed. I just hope that what we've done already is a little bit of a warning.

Mr. Burnham: I would have put it as a lesson.

PM: A lesson, that's right. Well if the good we've done can extend beyond the Falklands that's just exactly what we wanted

Mr. Burnham: Thank you so much.

PM: Forbes, it's really wonderful of you to ring. Much appreciated.

Mr. Burnham: Not at all Margaret.

GOODBYES



2 M/s

15 June, 1982

*My dear Prime Minister,*

I could not let this morning pass without writing to extend my most sincere congratulations both on the victory of British forces in the Falklands, and on the success it involves for your personal commitment to the principles for which you and your Government stood steadfast in the conflict. In an address to the Commonwealth Press Union a few moments ago, I have attempted to say all this more publicly; I enclose a copy, not for reading, but for your records.

You have had evidence throughout the conflict of genuine support from many quarters in the Commonwealth. I know that today's conclusion of hostilities will bring great rejoicing and deep relief in the capitals of many of your colleague Heads of Government who, I am sure, will convey their own congratulations directly.

I have always believed that this cause was not Britain's alone. What has triumphed, therefore, are the principles for which you stood steadfast on behalf of a wider international community. In the days that lie ahead, when Britain may need to draw upon the involvement of others, I trust that acknowledgement of the service you rendered through bearing the brunt of the conflict will encourage a sharing of the burden of peace. Please be assured of my personal commitment to assisting in all the ways I can in these and other respects.


*Shridath S. Ramphal*

Shridath S. Ramphal

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,  
Prime Minister of Great Britain &  
Northern Ireland,  
10 Downing Street,  
London, S.W.1.

enc.





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# Commonwealth Information

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NOT BRITAIN'S CAUSE ALONE

Extracts from an address by

Mr Shridath S Ramphal  
Commonwealth Secretary-General

to the

Commonwealth Press Union,  
Marlborough House

London, 15 June 1982

COMMONWEALTH  
SECRETARIAT  
Marlborough House  
London SW1Y 5HX  
01-839 3411



Meetings of the CPU are always important events on my calendar. I am delighted that it has become possible for me to be with you this morning even though it looked unlikely a few days ago:

You meet in London - perhaps appropriately in this house - at a time of considerable confidence in our Commonwealth association. It is a time betwixt Melbourne and New Delhi when Commonwealth leaders are confident of their relationships and of the value of their association. A time when the Commonwealth Games are assured and we can be pleased with our own record of conflict resolution - of the smoothing out of difficulties through adherence to principles - which have made the Games possible; a time when I hope we might look forward, through the work of Commonwealth countries both in the Contact Group and among the Front Line States to success at last in the struggle for freedom in Namibia; a time when through an improvement in the financial resources of the CFTC we can pursue our quota of practical work in Commonwealth co-operation on development. These are no small achievements in a world that does not boast very many in the area of relations between nations and almost none in the area of real development.

But I should like to speak to you not on these matters, but of another from which I believe the Commonwealth will ultimately draw even greater strength, the crisis in the Falklands which tested both Britain and the Commonwealth, but in which each has triumphed on the side of principle.

As I speak to you this morning the news was coming in of the success of British forces in the Falklands. I know you will share a sense of great rejoicing and of deep relief - sentiments that will be echoed today around the Commonwealth - indeed around the world. I hope you will permit me a few reflections on what is on any assessment a day of great victory not merely for Britain although that it assuredly is, but for the cause for which she stood steadfast - a cause let us remember above all else which was not Britain's alone.

No state initiates military action save under cover of a cause it asserts - or even believes - to be righteous. But, as Argentina has so painfully demonstrated, a sense of national righteousness is an unreliable guide to what is just or tolerable in these matters; all too often it blurs the line between permissible ends and unacceptable means. Yet the distinction is essential if we are to have any semblance of world order.

In the case of the Falklands, Argentina has attempted to blur that distinction - between claims to sovereignty and the attempt to enforce them by arms - by two arguments. In the first place, it raised the spectre of colonialism.



This in a bid to secure Latin American solidarity and win wider Third World support, for decolonisation is a worthy banner to which many will rally. It was a facile ploy. Argentina did not invade the Falklands to liberate the people of the Islands from British rule, but to impose Argentinian rule over them against their will. The principal impediment to their independence is fear of an irredentist neighbour. There are many countries in the world, a large number in the Commonwealth, especially small countries, who were not taken in by so unlikely a crusader waving the anti-colonial banner. They may have had no ships to contribute, no trade to forego, no loans to embargo, but they did not hesitate to stand up to be counted against Argentina's resort to force by invasion of the islands.

The second argument had the effect of standing on its head the United Nations Charter's acknowledged right of national self-defence. It claimed that by invading the Falklands, Argentina was exercising the right of self-defence against aggression by Britain - aggression which it said was committed in 1833, some 150 years ago. In other words, in an area where successive imperial powers held sway, Argentina said that the forcible assertion of claims inherited from the anterior (Spanish) coloniser over those of the ultimate (British) one is self-defence. What terrible vistas of international conflict this conjures up! It is the 'rights' of Spanish over British conquest in this case; it could be those of the French over the Dutch in another and perhaps of the Portuguese over them all.

Territorial disputes exist in many parts of the world; the attempt to change boundaries by force of arms - and that is the issue here - is fraught with grave danger to world peace. It was this danger that led the Organisation of African Unity, in almost its first resolution after its founding, to assert its acceptance of the boundaries left by the colonial powers at the end of their scramble for Africa - artificial, haphazard and fraught with problems for the future as they were known to be. No other position would have been consistent with the paramount need for stability and security as African nations undertook the crucial tasks of nation-building and development.

For these reasons too, the world, through the United Nations, has set its face against the acquisition of territory by force, proclaimed the integrity of border everywhere and outlawed aggression. The implications of re-staging world-wide the armed contest of colonial powers - under whatever new names - in the age of the missile, not to speak of the nuclear war-head - are too horrendous to envisage.

There are, for example, some 40 or more territorial disputes in Latin America, Africa and Asia. Some of those involved are small countries, new to independence. Few realise that today there are over 60 states with populations of under 1 million; over 30 with populations of less than 200,000.



The temptations to predators are great; only an environment that elevates freedom from aggression to a global ethic and practical international arrangements that secure it are likely to curb those temptations and preserve that freedom.

It is not without significance that the expectation in Buenos Aires, as is now acknowledged, was that Britain would not be drawn into the conflict; that it would be Argentina against the Falklands; that a strong continental power armed with the most sophisticated weapons would easily overrun a defenceless island people before the world could lift a finger or even raise its voice. It was a scenario which assumed the primacy of the law of the jungle over the rule of law.

The fabric of international legal order is a fragile creation: it must be constantly strengthened, layer by layer, if we are to prevent international relations from assuming a Hobbesian character. Each time aggression succeeds that danger looms. Just as only a fractional electoral swing may unseat a government, so small shifts in the prevailing global ethic can tip the balance from relative stability to widespread chaos. Events in the Falklands, and now in Lebanon, are an indication of just how precarious that balance is.

There have been situations, of course, where aggressors have been allowed to have their way; and not only in the post war era. Mussolini's act of aggression against Abyssinia in the autumn of 1935 was a signal the world did not heed. Each such occasion encourages the next and jeopardises global stability. That historical pattern of acquiescence (which on occasion has included Britain) is a sad commentary on the world's nations and on their collective will and capacity to act against aggression. All the more, therefore, has Britain's response in this instance been a service to the world community which condemned the invader but lacked the means to deny him the fruits of aggression, which demanded his withdrawal but was powerless to enforce its demand.

But let us have no illusions that this one act of service in turning back aggression will deter all others for all time. It would certainly help to do so; but there are many would-be aggressors similarly poised. If Britain's response is to contribute effectively to a more peaceful and stable world in which there is respect for international legal order, it is important that that honourable response be seen throughout the world as an act of service in that collective cause. And we must, particularly in the Third World, not hesitate to say so.

But Britain's stand in the Falklands, with all the sacrifice and heart-searching and danger inevitably involved could yet serve an even wider cause if it helps to ensure for

/the



future that the burden of making the world safe for all is shared by all; that the answer to the threat of aggression, indeed of aggression itself, must not depend alone on the capacity and the resolve of the victim to respond. We do not permit it in our national societies; we should not require it in our global society. Aggression in any part of the world is a crime against the whole world. It is time that we ensured, as the UN Charter promised, that the responsibility for security against aggression is a collective dimension as well.

The Charter had envisaged a situation in which all countries could feel secure under the umbrella of an international order backed by the collective strength of the world community and a commitment to use that strength through the machinery of the United Nations. Sadly for the United Nations itself, but also for the world's people, that promise was not kept. The politics and perceptions of the Cold War era effectively frustrated the emergence of a system of law and order worldwide in which security was a shared international responsibility. There are 'warriors' of various kinds still around who take pride in that state of collective impotence.

In its Report just published (Common Security - A Programme for Disarmament), the Palme Commission, whose membership included public figures from East and West, North and South, has called for at least a limited implementation of the original concept of collective security. Its approach which goes beyond the area of 'traditional' disarmament, is essentially pragmatic and evolutionary. It acknowledges that the superpowers would not easily be persuaded against being their own centurions, nor would their strongest allies. But, mindful that since 1945 over a hundred wars have occurred in the Third World, albeit with varying degrees of major power involvement, it puts forward specific proposals for deterring aggression - for preventing hostilities before they erupt.

The proposals envisage fact-finding missions, military observer teams and UN military forces, all in advance of military conflict. The system would be backed up by a political 'concordat' between the permanent members of the Security Council assuring the United Nations of the will and the means to prevent armed conflict rather than leaving it at the mercy of unpredictable political reaction once hostilities had broken out. The Commission's proposals would limit these first steps in a system of collective security to situations of conflict between Third World countries arising out of border disputes or threats to territorial integrity caused by other factors, but without seeking to prejudice the substantive issues themselves.

The Report was completed well before the Falklands crisis erupted. Events in the South Atlantic have now given the recommendations poignancy and a heightened insistence. Essentially, what the Report is urging is that collective

/security



security has become the concomitant of disarmament; that the concept of national security must evolve into a higher one of common security; and that there is no time to postpone making a start.

There will be many difficult questions ahead in relation to the future governance of the Falklands; but I venture to think none more important in the long run than our success in making a start towards a world in which we collectively uphold the law of nations by collectively securing respect for it.



FROM THE CHAIRMAN

216  
P.O. BOX No 21, CHESTERFIELD, DERBYSHIRE S44 6AB  
TELEPHONE: 0246 822281 (10 LINES)  
TELEGRAMS: 'COALITE, BOLSOVER, TELEX: TELEX: 54250



**Coalite Group PLC**

PERSONAL

15th June, 1982

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
London SW1.

*Dear Prime Minister*

Sincere congratulations on getting it absolutely right at all stages. And what a marvellous job has been done by all our forces.

I have not yet been able to restore contact with our people in Port Stanley but know that they will wish me to express to you on their behalf enormous relief to be free again and their appreciation of the immediate action put in hand for that purpose and so courageously carried out on the Islands.

Best wishes.

*Yours Sincerely*  
*John Peckham*





T 130/82  
JL

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

15 June 1982

*Dear High Commissioner,*

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 15 June conveying a message to her from the Prime Minister of Australia.

*Yours sincerely,*

*A. J. Cole.*

His Excellency The Honourable Sir Victor Garland,  
KBE.





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 June 1982

*Please type letter.**A.F.C. 16/**Dear John,*

As you know, the Togolese have been consistently helpful to the UK during the Falklands dispute. As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, they supported Resolution 502 and abstained in the final vote on 4 June, an act of considerable political courage in view of the general non-aligned movement's position. We understand that President Eyadema himself has been instrumental in determining Togolese policy on this issue.

Togo has provided this support despite the fact that she receives no bilateral capital aid from the UK and only a tiny amount of technical assistance, and despite the absence of a permanent British presence in Lome (our High Commissioner in Accra, Mr Mellon, is accredited to Togo on a non-resident basis). So far, our gratitude to the Togolese has been expressed in a letter from Mr Onslow to the Foreign Minister early in May. More recently, Mr Mellon has also conveyed the Secretary of State's personal thanks to the Togolese Foreign Minister. Mr Mellon has now suggested that President Eyadema's continuing co-operation would be more assured if the President were to receive a message of appreciation from the Prime Minister.

Togo will be a member of the Security Council until the end of 1983. We need to keep them on our side in the months to come and a message from the Prime Minister would be an effective and economical way of achieving this. I therefore attach the draft of a message which Mrs Thatcher might wish

/to send



CONFIDENTIAL



to send to President Eyadema. Sir John Leahy is visiting Togo later this month and an opportunity should arise during his visit to hand over the message with due ceremony.

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL





10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

15 June 1982

*Dear High Commissioner,*

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 15 June, enclosing a message from the Prime Minister of New Zealand. Mrs. Thatcher was also most grateful for your own congratulations on the military outcome in the Falkland Islands.

*Yours sincerely*

*A. J. Cole*

His Excellency The Honourable L.W. Gandar



Subst  
ed Mart  
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10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 1310/82

THE PRIME MINISTER

15 June 1982

*Dear Bob*

Thank you so much for your message of congratulations on our success in the Falklands which reached me today. From the beginning, your support has been a constant encouragement. You understood at once the cause for which we were fighting and for which, sadly, many of our young men have died. There are still difficult problems ahead but the worst is behind us. I am sure that we can now give back to the Falkland Islanders the way of life which they want.

*Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher*

The Rt. Hon. R.D. Muldoon, CH, MP.

*VS*



Subsect  
Master  
Ops



10 DOWNING STREET

JR  
PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T131C/8

THE PRIME MINISTER

15 June 1982

Dear Patricia,

Thank you so much for your message of congratulations which reached me today. Throughout these difficult times we have been greatly encouraged by the support of you and your colleagues and have warmly appreciated the messages you have sent to us.

As you say, the immediate goal now must be an end of all hostilities in the South Atlantic. I believe that we can now give back to the Falkland Islanders the life which they wish to lead.

Yours sincerely

Raymond

The Rt. Hon. J.M. Fraser, CH, MP.



*SUBJECT*  
*ca Mark*  
*9/20*



T131/82

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T131/82

NEW ZEALAND HIGH COMMISSION

NEW ZEALAND HOUSE - HAYMARKET - LONDON SW1Y 4TQ

Telephone: 01-930 8422 Telex: 24368

From the High Commissioner  
H.E. The Hon L. W. Gandar

15 June 1982

The Right Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,  
No. 10 Downing Street,  
LONDON.

*Dear Prime Minister*

I have been asked to pass on to you the following message  
from my Prime Minister:

"Dear Margaret,

Now that the fighting on the Falklands has ended in  
success, I want to congratulate you and your Govern-  
ment on the courage and steadfastness with which  
Britain has overcome the challenge of aggression and  
upheld the freedoms of the Falkland Islanders. All  
New Zealanders admire the bravery and dash of the  
Services in achieving these goals. There has been  
an inevitable cost in lives and wounded. Not only  
the Falkland Islanders, but all of us, owe a debt  
to your resolve and their sacrifice.

Yours sincerely,

Rob Muldoon"

May I take the opportunity to add my own warm congratulations  
on the successful achievement of the surrender of the Argentine  
forces on the Falkland Islands.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Heri W. Gandar.*



SUBJECT



PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 130/82

PRIME MINISTER  
CANBERRA

cc Harris  
Ohr

15 JUN 1982

Mr. Lord Mountbatten

I am delighted to learn of the success your Task Force has achieved in action against the Argentine forces at Port Stanley. News of the surrender of the Argentine forces is encouraging. We hope that arrangements for a ceasefire will hold and that the early withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falklands will result.

As you know, my colleagues and I greatly admire the personal leadership you have given to the British people and their armed forces throughout the successful conduct of a difficult campaign whose objectives, while limited, were very important.

We congratulate you on the success which we hope will soon lead to an end of all hostilities in the South Atlantic and to the tragic loss of life.

We salute your courageous and firm leadership.

With best wishes  
Margaret Thatcher

The Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
LONDON



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9/11

CONFIDENTIAL

T130/82



AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION • LONDON

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T130/82

15 June 1982

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

The Hon Sir Victor Garland, KBE

*Just Prime Minister*

A telegram from my Prime Minister asks me to convey to you the following message:

Begins -

"My dear Margaret,

I am delighted to learn of the success your task force has achieved in action against the Argentine forces at Port Stanley. News of the surrender of the Argentine forces is encouraging. We hope that arrangements for a ceasefire will hold and that the early withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falklands will result.

As you know, my colleagues and I greatly admire the personal leadership you have given to the British people and their armed forces throughout the successful conduct of a difficult campaign whose objectives, while limited, were very important.

We congratulate you on the success which we hope will soon lead to an end of all hostilities in the South Atlantic and to the tragic loss of life.

We salute your courageous and firm leadership.

With best wishes.

Malcolm Fraser."

Ends

*Sincerely,*  
*Victor Garland*  
R.V. GARLAND

The Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,  
Prime Minister  
No. 10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1.

CONFIDENTIAL





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 June 1982

A J Coles Esq  
NUMBER 10

A. J. C. 16/6

f-a.

Dear John,

FALKLAND ISLANDS

Following your telephone conversation with Antony Acland, I enclose a draft telegram of instructions to Berne.

Yours ever,  
Andrew

R A Burns  
Private Secretary to the  
Permanent Under Secretary

cc: Private Secretary



OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats <i>v/c</i>	Precedence/Deskby <b>FLASH</b>
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ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO 151100Z JUNE 82
PRE/ADD	7	TO FLASH BERNE
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	AND TO FLASH WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BRASILIA,
	10	RIYADH (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE)
	11	FALKLANDS CEASEFIRE
	12	Please tell the Swiss Government that following the Argentine
	13	surrender on the Falkland Islands, we would like to have
	14	confirmation from the Argentine Government that there now is
	15	a total cessation of hostilities between Britain and
	16	Argentina. We should be grateful if the Swiss would urgently
	17	pass the following message to the Argentine Government and
	18	obtain a response as soon as possible. Begins:
	19	Following the ceasefire in the Falkland Islands, there are a
	20	large number of Argentine personnel who will wish to return as
	21	soon as possible to their homes and families <i>in Argentina.</i>
	22	<del>on the mainland.</del>
	23	The British Government is prepared to start the process of
	24	repatriation as soon as possible, provided that they receive
	25	confirmation from the Argentine Government that there is now a
		total cessation of hostilities between the two countries and

///  
//  
/

NNNN ends telegram		BLANK	Catchword	that
File number		Dept	Distribution	
Drafted by (Block capitals) SIR A ACLAND				
Telephone number				
Authorised for despatch				
Comcen reference	Time of despatch			



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats	Page 2
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<<<<  
 and that Argentina is ready to accept the return of Argentine  
 prisoners of war and others from the Falkland Islands and  
 dependencies direct to Argentine ports on British or other  
 ships or aircraft. The British Government would <sup>also</sup> require  
 confirmation of safe passage <sup>for</sup> ~~from~~ any ships and aircraft used  
 for this purpose. Furthermore once confirmation of the total  
 cessation of hostilities is received, the British Government  
 proposes that the economic measures and exclusion zones  
 instituted by both parties should be lifted and <sup>at the same time</sup> the British  
 Government would be ready to ask those countries who have  
 imposed economic measures against Argentina to bring them to  
 an end.  
 As soon as an affirmative response is <sup>given</sup> ~~made~~ to these proposals  
 the detailed arrangements for repatriation of Argentine  
 personnel can be notified.  
 Ends.  
  
 Agreed mt.

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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Telegrams for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

SUBJECT  
cc Mark  
Ops

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T1316/82

NNNN

15 JUN 1982/2136  
ZCZC DLF0735 LBG394 FLB0589 WAA821 EXF050  
GBXX BY SLFN 085  
FREETOWN 85/82 15 1735

GENERAL MANAGER  
LONDON TELEGRAMS  
15 JUN 1982  
ST. BOTOLPHS ITO  
ENQ 01-836 1222 Ex. 2368

GOVERNMENT  
(PRIORITY)

ETATPRIORITY  
THE RT HON MARGARET THATCHER MP  
PRIME MINISTER AND FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY  
LONDONSW1

NO.46  
I HAVE RECEIVED WITH MUCH SATISFACTION NEWS ABOUT THE END  
OF THE FIGHTING IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IT IS MY SINCERE  
HOPE THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE OTHER PARTIES CONCERNED WILL  
SOON BE RESUMED

COL NO.46

PAGE 2

FOR AN EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES IN THE INTEREST OF  
PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE AREA PLEASE ACCEPT MY DEAR PRIME  
MINISTER THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION

SIKA STEVENS  
PRESIDENT

COL NIL

British TELECOM for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions  
Telegram for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions



Prime Minister : Z

You may like to see this  
telex for Lord Inchcape to the Task  
force which was sent to you for information

0  
27582 CABOFF G  
885551 PENLDN G

TF  
15/6

STF IVY069 151622 TLX133 151623 AC316

COPY TO THE PRIME MINISTER FOR INFORMATION

FLWG TELEX SENT TO TASK FORCE SHIPS FROM INCHCAPE

(FOR ATTENTION OF SHIPS' COMPANIES)

ALL IN P + O REJOICE WITH YOU THAT CONFLICT IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS HAS ENDED WITH THE RULE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW FIRMLY MAINTAINED. WE SHARE THE VIEWS OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT THAT BY STEADFASTLY UPHOLDING THIS PRINCIPLE ONCE AGAIN, OTHER POTENTIAL AGGRESSORS WILL REALISE THE FOLLY OF ACTS OF ILLEGALITY. WE PRAY THAT THIS MOMENT MARKS THE END OF CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

AS SO OFTEN IN THE PAST, SHIPS AND SEAFARERS OF THE P + O FLEET WERE THE FIRST TO BE CALLED UPON IN SUPPORT OF THE ROYAL NAVY AND HAVE PROVIDED THE LARGEST MERCHANT NAVY CONTRIBUTION TO THE TASK FORCE. ALL ON BOARD HAVE CARRIED OUT THEIR DUTIES MAGNIFICENTLY AND IN OUR BEST COMPANY TRADITIONS. YOUR COLLEAGUES IN P + O CRUISES, FERRYMASTERS, P + O FERRIES, DEEP SEA CARGO DIVISION AND ACROSS THE ENTIRE COMPANY ARE IMMENSELY PROUD OF YOUR ACHIEVEMENTS. CONGRATULATIONS AND WELL DONE.

WE PRAY NOW FOR YOUR EARLY SAFE RETURN AND FOR THE RESTORATION TO HEALTH OF THOSE UNDER TREATMENT IN YOUR HOSPITAL FACILITIES.

INCHCAPE

PENINSULAR

885551 PENLDN G

27582 CABOFF G



**IMMEDIATE**

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO  
TYPISTS]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES. (42)

PS  
 PS/MR HURD ← PS/M' RIFKIND  
 PS/MR ONSLOW  
 PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
 PS/PUS  
 SIR J BULLARD  
 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR GILLMORE  
 MR URE  
 MR BARRETT  
 HD/S AM D  
 HD/DEF D  
 HD/PLANNING STAFF  
 HD/UND  
 HD/NEWS D  
 HD/ERD  
 HD/PUSD  
 MR REED, PUSD  
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~  
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

HD WED

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)  
 PS/S OF S DEFENCE  
 PS/HOME SECRETARY  
 PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)  
 PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL  
 PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER  
 PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG  
 PS/SIR M PALLISER  
 PS/SIR A DUFF  
 MR WADE-GERY  
 MR FULLER  
 MR COLVIN  
 MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-  
 MENTS STAFF  
 DIO  
 MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
 ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD  
 DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

CABINET  
OFFICE

RESTRICED

ADVANCE COPY

FM BERNE 151450Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 163 OF 15 JUNE

**IMMEDIATE**

YOUR TELNO 119: FALKLANDS CEASEFIRE

1. I RECEIVED YOUR TUR AT 1215Z TODAY (15 JUNE) AND AT 1255Z HANDED  
 THE MESSAGE FOR PASSING TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO THE ASSISTANT  
 TO THE STATE SECRETARY OF THE FDFA. SHE SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED  
 US THAT IT WAS PASSED TO THE SWISS EMBASSY AT BUENOS AIRES AT  
 1330Z.

POWELL-JONES



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (40)

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR SLOW  
PS/PIIS ← PS/MR RIFKIND

SIR J BULLARD  
SIR A SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

HD/PUSD (2)  
HD/S Am D  
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HD/ECD(E)  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

EMERGENCY UNIT ✓

RESIDENT CLERK

PS/No 10 DOWNING ST (2) ✓

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
MR ILETT } TREASURY  
MR LITTLER }

MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO }

Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

[Passed to E.R.]

[Typists a.a.]

00 MOD

00 FCO

GRS 13579  
RESTRICTED  
FM SANTIAGO 151420Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE MOD  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 151420Z OF 15 JUNE  
AND TO FCO

FROM BRITDEFAT SANTIAGO

SIC 19F

FALKLAND PRESS.

1. AS ANTICIPATED IN FCO TELNO 262 OF 11 JUN AND ANSWERED IN SANTIAGO TELNO 291 OF 11 JUN PRESS IN PUNTA ARENAS MOST ANXIOUS TO GET TO FI.
2. BBC TV NEWS TEAM OF 7 LEAD BY BRIAN BARRON HAVE CHARTERED AIR TAXI TYPE PIPER CHIEFTAIN AND WISH TO OPERATE DAILY AIR SERVICE TO PORT STANLEY. THEY CLAIM TO BE COMPLETELY SELF SUFFICIENT IN ALL RESPECTS.
3. TEAM RESEEK CLEARANCE TO LAND FI. WILL PASS FULL DETAILS NAMES AIRCRAFT REGISTRATION AND OP FREQS IF APPROVAL GIVEN.



AIRCRAFT REGISTRATION AND OP FREQS IF APPROVAL GIVEN.  
4. UNDERSTAND FROM BARROW THAT SIMILAR SIZE ITN AND CBS TEAMS  
ALREADY ATTEMPTING AIR TRANSIT. WE HAVE STRESSED IRRESPONSIBILITIES  
OF ANY SUCH UNAUTHORISED ATTEMPT TO REACH THE ISLANDS.

HICKMAN

NNNN

SENT AT/REC AT 151442Z RPD/DD



PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONLOW  
PS/PIIS *PS/MR RIFKIND*  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR INCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

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*Hd news*  
EMERGENCY UNIT  
RESIDENT CLERK

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PS/CHANCELLOR }  
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MR LITTLER }

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MR WADE-GERY }  
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DIO }

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[Passed to E.R.]  
[Typists a.a.]

ADVANCE COPY

ALGFO 005/15

RR FCO

GPS 130

CONFIDENTIAL

FM ALGIERS 151425Z JUNE 82

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 170 OF 15 JUNE 82

FALKLANDS

1. AT A PRIVATE PARTY LAST NIGHT, THE COMMANDER OF THE ALGERIAN NAVY TOLD OTHER SENIOR ALGERIANS IN MY PRESENCE THAT WHATEVER THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF THE FALKLANDS CAMPAIGN, FROM A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY POINT OF VIEW IT HAD BEEN A QUITE ASTONISHING FEAT OF ARMS.

2. IN THE GENERAL DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWED, I WAS ONCE AGAIN STRUCK BY THE FACT THAT THOSE PRESENT SAW THE ARGENTINE AGGRESSION ENTIRELY IN TERMS OF A HUMILIATION INFLICTED ON BRITAIN WHICH SHE

HAD NO OPTION BUT TO WIPE OUT. THERE WAS NO TALK WHATSOEVER ABOUT RIGHTS OF SELF-DETERMINATION, COLONIALISM ETC. THIS REFLECTS THE

1507



HAD NO OPTION BUT TO WIPE OUT. THERE WAS NO TALK WHATSOEVER ABOUT RIGHTS OF SELF-DETERMINATION, COLONIALISM ETC. THIS REFLECTS THE FIERCE NATIONAL PRIDE OF THE ALGERIAN HIERARCHY ITSELF, WHICH WHOLLY TRANSCENDS ANY IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATION.

STRACHAN

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 151516Z NMG/MNJ

IP 10R1VE ECU  
L 1008/008 101025 0000 03  
1008/008 101025 0000 03



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PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW PS/MR RIFKIND  
PUS  
SIR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
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HD/PLANNING STAFF

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MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
MR ILETT } TREASURY  
MR LITTLER }

MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO }

Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

EMERGENCY UNIT

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

[Passed to E.R.]

[Typists a.a.]

CONFIDENTIAL

FM COLOMBO 150615Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 148 OF 15 JUNE  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 171 TO DACCA

NON-ALIGNED STATEMENT ON FALKLANDS

1. ON MONDAY 14 JUNE, PRESIDENT ASKED TO SEE ME AT HIS HOME IN THE EVENING. FERNANDO AND JAYASINGHE, SECRETARY MFA, WERE PRESENT. PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE HAD READ MY LETTER AND WELL UNDERSTOOD OUR CONCERN. THE NAM WORKED BY CONSENSUS AND WITH CUBA IN THE CHAIR IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR COUNTRIES LIKE SRI LANKA TO PREVENT THE ADOPTION OF STATEMENTS OF THIS KIND. FERNANDO SAID SRI LANKA WAS NOT ON THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE WHICH WAS DOMINATED BY CUBA AND LATIN AMERICANS. I WAS REMINDED OF SRI LANKA'S EFFORTS AT TIME OF EARLIER NAM COMMUNIQUE. PRESIDENT ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO THE PRIME MINISTER HIS PERSONAL ASSURANCE OF SRI LANKA'S SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN OVER FALKLANDS SEMI-COLON HE TOLD ACTING MINISTER THAT SRI LANKA MUST RECOGNISE WHO ITS FRIENDS WERE IN THE WORLD. BRITAIN WAS A QUOTE TRIED AND TRUSTED FRIEND UNQUOTE AND ARGENTINA DID NOTHING FOR SRI LANKA. PRESIDENT WAS THEN SHOWN TEXT OF RESERVATION WHICH WAS COUCHED IN CUSTOMARY BRIEF TERMS. AFTER DISCUSSION HE STRENGTHENED IT BY INCLUDING THAT SRI LANKA DISAGREED WITH PARA-



GRAPH 82 (IE THE SECTION RELATING TO THE FALKLANDS) AND  
ACCORDINGLY ENTERED A RESERVATION.

2. I THEN SPOKE IN TERMS OF YOUR TELNO 177 TO DACCA. PRESIDENT  
INSTRUCTED ACTING MINISTER TO ENSURE THAT IT WAS DISTRIBUTED TO  
ALL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS A SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT.

NICHOLAS

NNNN

SENT:RECD 151011Z RWS:RJ



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PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PHS  
Sir J BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE  
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HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF

HO/S&D

PS/No 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
MR ILETT } TREASURY  
MR LITTLER }

MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO }

~~Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLSET~~

~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~  
RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPY  
[Passed to E.R.]  
~~[Typists a.a.]~~

P 151235Z JUN 82  
FM GIBRALTAR  
TO FCO LONDON  
BT  
UNCLAS

ENCLAIR

FROM GIBRALTAR 151235Z JUN 1982  
TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 36 OF 15 JUNE 1982

1. THE CHIEF MINISTER HAS ASKED ME TO FORWARD THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE THROUGH YOU TO THE PRIME MINISTER:-

GIBRALTAR REJOICES IN YOUR VICTORY OVER AGGRESSION AND OFFERS YOU ITS WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR UNWAVERING AND SUCCESSFUL DEFENCE OF FREEDOM, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION.

JACKSON  
BT



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PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/MR RIFKIND

SIR J BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
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~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/No 10 DOWNING ST (2)

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
MR ILETT } TREASURY  
MR LITTLER }

MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO }

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[Passed to E.R.]

[Typists a.a.]

CB BON / FCO 004/15

RR FCO

RR WASHINGTON

RR TRAFFIC RELAY

GRS 243

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BONN 151553Z JUN 82

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 569 OF 15 JUNE

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON

FALKLANDS

1. THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR HERE ARTHUR BURNS, WHEN ASKING ME TO CONVEY HIS CONGRATULATIONS ON THE PORT STANLEY VICTORY TO YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER, REVERTED TO A SUGGESTION HE HAD AIRED EARLIER ABOUT THE NEED FOR A MASSIVE AID PROGRAMME TO ARGENTINA ONCE HOSTILITIES ARE FINISHED. HE HAS PUT THIS IDEA FORWARD TO PRESIDENT REAGAN AND OTHERS IN WASHINGTON WHO, HE SAID, WERE SUPPORTING THE IDEA BUT UNABLE TO GIVE ANY CONSIDERED REACTION YET. HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD ALSO MENTIONED THIS IDEA TO HERR SCHMIDT WHO WAS VERY INTERESTED; HE HOPED THAT THE GERMANS AND OTHERS MIGHT JOIN IF A PROGRAMME OF THIS SORT WERE PUT INTO EFFECT.

2. IN EXPLAINING HIS IDEAS, BURNS SAID THAT HE HAD TWO OBJECTIVES IN MIND. FIRST, TO AVOID THE SPREAD OF SERIOUS FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE WHOLE OF LATIN AMERICA AND INDEED IN OTHER THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, WHICH HE THOUGHT WOULD FLOW FROM ARGENTINE BANKRUPTCY. HE CLAIMED THAT THERE WERE ALREADY SIGNS THAT MEXICO, VENEZUELA AND OTHERS WERE RUNNING INTO DIFFICULTIES IN ARRANGING LOANS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS A RESULT OF THE SITUATION



...NKING COMMUNITY AS A RESULT OF THE SITUATION  
IN ARGENTINA. SECONDLY, HE FELT THAT AN OFFER OF FINANCIAL  
ASSISTANCE WOULD HELP TO PREVENT ARGENTINA FALLING AGAIN INTO  
THE HANDS OF THE PERONISTS, WITH ALL THE DANGERS THAT SUCH A  
DEVELOPMENT MIGHT ENTAIL. I DREW HIS ATTENTION TO THE VITAL  
IMPORTANCE OF GETTING ARGENTINA TO ABANDON HOSTILITIES TOTALLY AND  
FOR GOOD. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS AND PROMISED TO LET ME KNOW  
IF HE HAD ANY CONSIDERED REACTION FROM WASHINGTON TO HIS  
SUGGESTIONS.

TAYLOR

NNNN

ESENT AT 151639Z LCD



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PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PIIS *PS/MR RIFKIND*  
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SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE  
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HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF

EMERGENCY UNIT  
RESIDENT CLERK

~~PS/No 10 DOWNING ST (2)~~  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
PS/CHANCELLOR }  
MR ILETT } TREASURY  
MR LITTLER }  
MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY  
SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO }  
Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

[Passed to E.R.]  
[Typists a.a.]

CONFIDENTIAL

FM KATHMANDU 151000Z JUNE 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 86 OF 15 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY CBF HONG KONG, DELHI, UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNOS 78 AND 80. FALKLANDS: GURKHAS

MTUR QUOTED PRESS BRIEFING, WIDELY REPRODUCED HERE? BY AUS FOR EUROPE AND AMERICAS IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY (HAMAL). ON 15 JUNE WE ASKED HIM WHETHER SPECULATION (PARA 3 OF MY TELNO 80) THAT THE ARGENTINIAN DEMAND FOR A PULLOUT OF GURKHAS MIGHT AFFECT EARLIER NEPALESE POLICY. HAMAL SAID THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF ANY ALTERATION. NEPALESE POLICY REMAINED AS STATED IN MY TELNO 78. GURKHAS WERE NOT MERCENARIES AND WERE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE BRITISH ARMY. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE NEPALESE LINE THAT QUOTE BRITAIN HAD THE RIGHT TO USE GURKHA TROOPS ANYWHERE UNQUOTE, ATTRIBUTED TO THE PRIME MINISTER IN A BBC INTERVIEW, STILL OBTAINED. HAMAL ALSO THANKED US FOR USEFUL MATERIAL ON THE DEFINITION OF MERCENARIES, WHICH HAD BEEN USED WIDELY.

2. HAMAL ASSUMED THAT BRITISH TROOPS WOULD REMAIN FOR SOME TIME



2. HAMAL ASSUMED THAT BRITISH TROOPS WOULD REMAIN FOR SOME TIME IN THE FALKLANDS BUT ASKED TO BE KEPT WELL UP TO DATE ON NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS. INFORMATION WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IN PREPARING ANSWERS FOR PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS ON THE SUBJECT WHICH HE EXPECTED WHEN THE NATIONAL PANCHAYAT MEETS FROM 23 JUNE.

3. HAMAL NOTED THAT NO GURKHA LIVES HAD BEEN LOST BUT THAT 5 GURKHAS HAD BEEN WOUNDED.

DENSON

BT

NNNN



P R 151406Z JUN 82

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MODUK ARMY

PS/ NO. 10. DOWNING STREET.

TO RBDWDFG/BRITDEFAT KATHMANDU

INFO RBDWDFG/FCO LONDON

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SIC ACA/A2G

PERSONAL FOR CBF FROM CGS PD YOU WILL NOW KNOW AND NO DOUBT BE RELIEVED THAT HOSTILITIES HAVE NOW CEASED IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS PD THE ARGENTINES HAVE SURRENDERED THEIR FORCES PD I AM DELIGHTED TO BE ABLE TO TELL YOU THAT GURKHA TROOPS MADE AN INVALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THIS SUCCESS PD HAVING BEEN TRANS-SHIPPED FROM THE QE2 IN THE AREA OF SOUTH GEORGIA FOR A MOVE INTO SAN CARLOS WATER CMM THE BATTALION WAS LANDED AND TOOK OVER RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DARWIN/GOOSE GREEN AREA FROM 2 PARA PD DURING THE DEFENCE OF THIS ISTHMUS CMM WHICH JOINED LAFONIA TO EAST FALKLAND CMM THEY HAD SEVERAL ENCOUNTERS WITH ARGENTINE PATROLS INVOLVING NOT ONLY THE RESIDUE OF THE ENEMY WHO HAD BEEN IN THE GOOSE GREEN AREA CMM BUT ALSO SOME MARAUDING ENEMY PATROLS FROM FURTHER EAST PD SOME EIGHT PRISONERS OF WAR WERE CAPTURED (WHO INCIDENTALLY WERE EQUIPPED WITH SAM WEAPONS) PD THE BATTALION CLEARLY DID WELL PD SUBSEQUENTLY THE BATTALION WAS DEPLOYED EAST OVERLAND BY A COMBINATION OF FOOT AND HELICOPTER FOR THE FINAL PHASES OF THE MAIN ASSAULT ON PORT STANLEY IN WHICH THEY PLAYED A VERY DISTINGUISHED PART PD DURING THIS ACTION CMM 1/7 GR HAD AS THEIR OBJECTIVE MOUNT WILLIAM CMM BELIEVED TO BE HELD STRONGLY BY A BATTALION OF ENEMY CMM WHICH BY ALL ACCOUNTS CMM FACED WITH THE PANACHE AND REPUTATION OF THE GURKHAS CMM APPEARED TO HAVE TURNED TAIL AND FLED TAKING WITH THEM INTO STANLEY THE NEXT POSITION IN DEPTH CMM SO NO HEADS WERE CUT OFF WITH KUKRIS OR ANYTHING MESSY LIKE THAT EXCLAM BUT THE MERE PRESENCE OF THE GURKHAS ACTUALLY HELPED TO QUICKEN THE FINAL STAGES AND SAVE CASUALTIES PD ALTHOUGH AT PRESENT I HAVE NO FIRM DETAILS OF GURKHA CASUALTIES FOLLOWING THIS LATEST ACTION CMM THEY ARE BELIEVED TO BE VERY LIGHT AND NOT EXCEEDING FIVE OR SO WOUNDED PD I KNOW OF NO FATALITIES SO FAR PD I HOPE THIS WILL BE OF SOME HELP TO YOU PD I AM COPYING THIS TO ALAN DONALD PD I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR ALL YOUR HELP AND SUPPORT THANK YOU

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FALKLAND ISLAND GENERAL

FCO

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

S AM D

FALKLAND ISLANDS

CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL



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(46(38)) ADVANCE COPY

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MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
~~MR GILLMORE~~  
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MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
MR ILETT } TREASURY  
MR LITTLER }

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MR WADE-GERY }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO }

Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~

RESIDENT CLERK

[Passed to E.R.]

[Typists a.a.]

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MEXICO CITY 160030Z JUNE 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 480 OF 15 JUNE

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BRASILIA

MY TELELETTER OF 8 JUNE TO WHITE (NOT TO ALL): MEXICO AND THE FALKLANDS.

1. I SAW MANUEL TELLO (DEPUTY MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTER) THIS MORNING. HE HOPED THAT SUCH COUNTRIES AS VENEZUELA AND GUATEMALA WITH TERRITORIAL CLAIMS HAD TAKEN NOTE OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN THE FALKLANDS.

2. TELLO SAID THAT THE MEXICANS WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR ANY INDICATION OF OUR THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS.

I SAID THAT ONCE HOSTILITIES HAD STOPPED, WE WOULD FIRST HAVE TO CLEAR UP THE MESS LEFT BY THE ARGENTINES, AND RESTORE THE ISLANDERS' DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. A SUBSTANTIAL BRITISH MILITARY PRESENCE WOULD CLEARLY BE NECESSARY. WE DID NOT KNOW WHAT ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE DIRECTING WHAT ARGENTINE POLICY EVEN A WEEK FROM NOW.



3. TELLO SUPPOSED WE WOULD NOT WISH TO MAINTAIN A SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY PRESENCE FOR LONG. IN HIS VIEW TO BRING IN THE AMERICANS AND ESTABLISH A MILITARY BASE IN THE ISLANDS WOULD BE (AS HE HAD SAID TO ME BEFORE) "A HISTORIC ERROR" BOTH FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR BRITAIN IN THEIR FUTURE RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA. THE IDEA OF A WIDER BASED FORCE TO GUARANTEE THE INTEGRITY OF THE ISLANDS BRISTLED WITH DIFFICULTIES. IF SUCH A FORCE WERE TO HAVE INTERNATIONAL BACKING, OR BETTER STILL OPERATE UNDER UNITED NATIONS AUTHORITY, IT WOULD NEED AT LEAST THE ACQUIESCENCE OF ARGENTINA AND HER FRIENDS. IN OTHER WORDS SOME FORM OF NEGOTIATION INVOLVING ARGENTINA WOULD BE NECESSARY SOONER OR LATER. THE CHOICE WAS BETWEEN RESUMPTION OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, AND NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE UN FRAMEWORK. THE LATTER WOULD BE PREFERABLE AS IT WOULD ITSELF ACT AS A DETERRENT TO FUTURE ARGENTINE MILITARY ACTIONS.

4. I SAID THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO THINK ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINES. THEY HAD CAUSED THE LOSS OF MANY LIVES, WASTED VAST RESOURCES AND DONE ENORMOUS DAMAGE. WE WERE MORE INCLINED TO SEND THEM THE BILL THAN TO JOIN THEM IN A COSY CHAT ABOUT THE FUTURE. WE ACCEPTED FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE ISLANDS, IF NECESSARY ON OUR OWN, BUT WOULD NOT RULE OUT ASSOCIATING OTHER COUNTRIES. TELLO SAID THAT MEXICO WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO A MULTINATIONAL FORCE. BUT HE THOUGHT THAT IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES THE BRAZILIANS MIGHT BE WILLING TO DO SO.

5 I LATER GAVE TELLO THE TEXT OF YOUR MESSAGE TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT ON THE CEASEFIRE (YOUR TELNOS 147 + 148 TO LIMA). HE PROMISED TO CONVEY IT IMMEDIATELY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER. THE MEXICANS WOULD CONSIDER URGENTLY WHAT ACTION THEY COULD TAKE TO HELP.

TICKELL

NNNN



ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (40)

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PIIS ← PS/MR RIFKIND

SIR J BULLARD  
SIR A SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

HD/PUSD (2)  
HD/S Am D  
HD/DEFENCE D  
HD/NEWS D  
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HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/WED

~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~  
~~HD/MAD~~  
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

PS/No 10 DOWNING ST (2)

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
MR ILETT } TREASURY  
MR LITTLER }

MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO }

~~Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET~~

[Passed to E.R.]

[Typists a.a.]

on 12

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 152331Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2143 OF 15 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, BERNE. PRIORITY OTHER EC POSTS. UKDEL  
NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK, OTTAWA, TOKYO, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, OSLO,  
UKMIS GENEVA.

YOUR TELNO 149 TO BRUSSELS: FALKLANDS: CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

1. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO HAIG'S OFFICE. THE US AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN  
INSTRUCTED TO SPEAK IMMEDIATELY TO THE ARGENTINIANS: THE US  
AMBASSADOR IN BRASILIA HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO ENCOURAGE THE  
BRAZILIANS ALSO TO ADVISE THE ARGENTINIANS TO AGREE TO AN IMMEDIATE  
CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. IT IS NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, WHETHER THE  
JUNTA IS IN ANY STATE TO TAKE DECISIONS.

HENDERSON





cc wad  
RM

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

15 June, 1982

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 27 May enclosing a proposal for defending our ships against Exocet missiles.

I have shown your paper to our experts in the Ministry of Defence and am informed that much of what you propose is in line with our thinking. In particular we were aware of the principle of seducing the missile by shifting the centre of its target.

I ought to add, however, that the effectiveness of decoys, whether active or passive, depends to a large extent on the conditions which prevail at the time that they are deployed, and they are by no means a guaranteed method of ensuring survival against a missile attack. Nonetheless, correctly deployed in conjunction with other measures, decoys and jammers have an important part to play and we have taken steps to improve this area of our defences. Obviously I cannot go into detail. In addition we have the hard-kill Sea Wolf anti-missile system whose capability is being enhanced to enable it to deal more effectively with sea-skimmers.

Thank you once again for troubling to write.

A. J. COLES

L Jackson, Esq

A





MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2111/3 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MO 5/21

15th June 1982

Dear John,

Type letter pl.

EXOCET MISSILES

A.S.C.  $\frac{5}{6}$

You wrote to me on the 1st June enclosing a letter which you had received from the Ambassador in Luxembourg forwarding a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from Mr Jackson. I now attach a draft reply which you could send.

Pr 22

Pr 20

Yours ever

Nick Evans

(N H R EVANS)

A J Coles Esq



DEPT REPLY TO MR JACKSON

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 27 May enclosing proposal for defending our ships against Exocet missiles.

I have shown your paper to our experts in the Ministry of Defence and am informed that much of what you propose is in line with our thinking. In particular we were aware of the principle of seducing the missile by shifting the centre of its target.

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Thank you once again for troubling to write.

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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JUN 15 1982

Handwritten signature or initials in red ink.



MR WILSON

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+ UNIT

EMERGENCY UNIT

115 JUN 82

*lw*

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x12.

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10 9 8 7 6 5  
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*Annita asked to pass  
copy of message f.i.  
to Brazilian MFA.*

RESTRICTED

10339 - 1

ZZ BERNE

**ACTION COPY**

**FLASH**

GRS 296

RESTRICTED

FM FCO 151100Z JUN 82

TO FLASH BERNE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 119 OF 15 JUNE

AND TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BRASILIA,

FALKLANDS CEASEFIRE

PLEASE TELL THE SWISS GOVERNMENT THAT FOLLOWING THE ARGENTINE SURRENDER ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CONFIRMATION FROM THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT THAT THERE NOW IS A TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE SWISS WOULD URGENTLY PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND OBTAIN A RESPONSE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BEGINS:

FOLLOWING THE CEASEFIRE IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, THERE ARE A LARGE NUMBER OF ARGENTINE PERSONNEL WHO WILL WISE TO RETURN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THEIR HOMES AND FAMILIES IN ARGENTINA. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO START THE PROCESS OF REPATRIATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, PROVIDED THAT THEY RECEIVE CONFIRMATION FROM THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT THAT THERE IS NOW A TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND AND THAT ARGENTINA IS READY TO ACCEPT THE RETURN OF ARGENTINE PRISONERS OF WAR AND OTHERS FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND DEPENDENCIES DIRECT TO ARGENTINE PORTS ON BRITISH OR OTHER SHIPS OR AIRCRAFT. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD ALSO REQUIRE CONFIRMATION OF SAFE PASSAGE FOR ANY SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT USED FOR THIS PURPOSE. FURTHERMORE ONCE CONFIRMATION OF THE TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IS RECEIVED, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT PROPOSES THAT THE ECONOMIC MEASURES AND EXCLUSION ZONES INSTITUTED BY BOTH PARTIES SHOULD BE LIFTED AND AT THE SAME TIME THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE READY TO ASE THOSE COUNTRIES WHO HAVE IMPOSED ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA TO BRING THEM TO AN END.

1

RESTRICTED



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10339 - 1

AS SOON AS AN AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE IS GIVEN TO THESE PROPOSALS  
THE DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS FOR REPATRIATION OF ARGENTINE  
PERSONNEL CAN BE NOTIFIED.  
ENDS.

PYM

PALELANDS SELECTIVE [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

LIMITED

HD/EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/S AM D  
HD/DEF D  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/UKD  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/EDD  
HD/ESD (D)  
HD/FUSD  
DEP ED/FUSD  
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PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONELOW  
PS/LOED BELSHOLD  
PS/FUS  
MR BURMAN  
SIR I SIMON  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILMOUR  
MR URE  
MR BARRETT

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PS/HOME SECURITY  
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PS/ASSISTANT GENERAL  
PS/CHANCELLOR DUKE OF LANCASTER  
PS/SIR P ARMSTRONG  
PS/SIR M PARRISON  
PS/SIR A DUFF  
MR WALKER  
MR FURBER  
MR C'HEENE  
ED/ASSISTANTS STAFF  
MR COLVIN  
DIO.  
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
ADMIRAL SIR BOY HARRISON DGI MOD  
SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE  
DIRECTOR G O E Q

CABINET  
OFFICE



KHLBY

NYFG 029/15

ZZ FCO

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ACTION COPY *ER*

*Copy to MODUK (DSC)*

*+ retrans.*

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 152305Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1004 OF 15 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

YOUR TEL NO 535: FALKLANDS: CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

1. I SAW URQUHART THIS EVENING (15 JUNE) AFTER HE HAD EMERGED FROM A MEETING ON LEBANON BETWEEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND MRS KIRKPATRICK.  
2. URQUHART SAID THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK, QUOTING HER QUOTE TOP ARGENTINE FRIENDS UNQUOTE HAD GIVEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THE DETAILS OF THE QUOTE DEAL WHICH ARGENTINA HAD AGREED WITH THE BRITISH UNQUOTE. THESE WERE AS FOLLOWS:-

- (I) THERE WOULD BE NO SURRENDER CEREMONY.
- (II) ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WOULD TAKE PLACE TO QUOTE IMPLEMENT SCR 502 UNQUOTE.
- (III) ALL ARGENTINE TROOPS WOULD WITHDRAW WITH THEIR ARMS AND EQUIPMENT EXCEPT FOR POWS TAKEN BEFORE THE FINAL ASSAULT, WHO WOULD LEAVE UNARMED.
- (IV) AS PART OF THIS PACKAGE ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT CARRY OUT FURTHER ATTACKS ON THE BRITISH TASK FORCE.

I TOLD URQUHART THAT I KNEW OF NO SUCH DEAL.

3. IT IS CHARACTERISTIC OF MRS KIRKPATRICK THAT SHE SHOULD CHOOSE TO ACT AS A RELAY BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. IF THERE IS ANY TRUTH IN HER STATEMENT - I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT SHE IS IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE ARGENTINES, PROBABLY GENERAL MIRET - IT MAY REPRESENT THE CONDITIONS ARGENTINA WILL TRY TO PUT FORWARD IN RESPONSE TO THE NOTE IN YOUR TEL NO 119 TO BERNE.

PARSONS

NNNN



# ACTION COPY

117

15 JUN 1982

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BBC B

B84/1E ARGENTINE AGENCY REPORTS TERMS OF FALKLANDS WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT=



(ED: FOR INFORMATION ONLY, NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION)

(NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS AGENCY, 1934 GMT) BUENOS AIRES: THIS AFTERNOON RELIABLE SOURCES REVEALED THE POINTS ALLEGEDLY CONTAINED IN THE AGREEMENT SIGNED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE SOLDIERS FROM THE MALVINAS ISLANDS THESE CONDITIONSS ARE:

1. THE COURAGE OF THE ARGENTINE TROOPS IS RECOGNISED.
2. A JOINT ARGENTINE-BRITISH COMMISSION IS SET UP FOR THE TRANSFER CEREMONY OF THE ISLANDS' ADMINISTRATION.
3. THE ARGENTINE TROOPS WILL REMAIN UNDER GEN. MARIO BENJAMIN MENENDEZ.
4. ARGENTINE AND BRITISH TROOPS WILL BE INVOLVED IN CLEARING MINEFIELDS.
5. THE FLAG WILL NOT BE TURNED OVER TO THE BRITISH.
6. THE CEREMONY WILL BE HELD BEHIND CLOSED DOORS AND WITHOUT PHOTOGRAPHERS OR NEWSMEN.
7. THE ARGENTINE TROOPS WILL EVACUATE THE ISLANDS ON BOARD ARGENTINE SHIPS AND PLANES

END BB C MON 2042 15/6 AT WA



UNCLASSIFIED

*Thought this  
might be of  
interest*  
*Stefan Chalk*

*cc En Unit  
Distribution*

*15/6*

CXL182 15/1624 16603449

FOR CXK

PRIORITY 151420Z JUN 82

FROM CTG 317.8  
TO CTG 317.0  
CTG 317.1  
MV BRITISH TRENT  
MODUK  
CTF 317

UNCLASSIFIED  
SIC EUA

PASS TO EMBARKED PRESS STATEMENT FROM FOF1.

1. HUNDREDS OF ARGENTINE PRISONERS ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS COULD DIE FROM MALNUTRITION, HYPOTHERMIA AND DISEASE UNLESS ARGENTINA DECLARES AN IMMEDIATE END TO ALL REPEAT ALL HOSTILITIES.
2. FIFTEEN THOUSAND ARGENTINE TROOPS WHO SURRENDERED TO BRITISH FORCES YESTERDAY POSE A PROBLEM OF DISASTER RELIEF PROPORTIONS TO THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER, REAR ADMIRAL WOODWARD.
3. BUT WITH HIS 8,000 MILE SUPPLY LINES AND THE TASK FORCE ITSELF STILL THREATENED BY THE ARGENTINE NAVY AND AIR FORCE, THE PROBLEMS OF BRINGING MEDICAL AID, FOOD SUPPLIES, WARM CLOTHING AND SHELTER ARE INCREASED TO THE POINT OF IMPOSSIBILITY, HE SAYS.

PAGE 2 RBDFOHL 063 UNCLAS

4. QUOTE THIS IS A PROBLEM OF THE ARGENTINES OWN MAKING. IT WAS FOOLISHNESS TO PUT 15,000 TROOPS OUT ON A LINE WHERE THEY COULD NOT BE RESUPPLIED.
5. QUOTE THEY ARE ALREADY SUFFERING FROM MALNUTRITION, EXPOSURE (IN SOME CASES HYPOTHERMIA), TRENCH FOOT, SCABIES AND DIARRHOEA, BROUGHT ON BY LACK OF FOOD AND PURE WATER, PROPER CLOTHING, SHELTER AND SANITATION, UNQUOTE REAR ADMIRAL WOODWARD SAID TODAY.
6. QUOTE THERE IS NO WAY I CAN SHELTER THESE NUMBERS. EVEN FEEDING THEM FOR A WEEK IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTS HUGE PROBLEMS - NOT JUST OF SUPPLIES BUT OF COOKING AND DISTRIBUTION AND HYGIENE AS WELL.
7. QUOTE MEANWHILE CONDITIONS ARE GETTING WORSE AS WINTER ARRIVES. THERE IS A FORCE TEN GALE AT SEA AND BLIZZARDS ON THE ISLANDS.
8. QUOTE THUS I HAVE MY USUAL DEFENSIVE PROBLEM AND NOW A MAJOR DISASTER RELIEF PROBLEM ON TOP. I MUST CONTINUE TO PROTECT THE TASK FORCE AND THE SUPPLY LINES FROM ARGENTINE AIR AND SEA ATTACKS. IF A CHOICE HAS TO BE MADE, HOWEVER, DEFENCE COMES FIRST.
9. QUOTE THUS THE ARGENTINES MUST APPRECIATE THAT I CANNOT KEEP THEIR TROOPS DRY AND WARM AND FED WHILE WE ARE STILL SUBJECT TO ATTACK.
10. QUOTE THEY MUST FACE THE FACTS AND AGREE A TRUCE TO ALL REPEAT ALL HOSTILITIES UNQUOTE



(94)

ZZ ROME  
ZZ TOKYO  
ZZ CANBERRA  
ZZ WELLINGTON  
ZZ ATHENS  
GRS 303

E.R.

Copy as requested

K/31

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 151930Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH BRUSSELS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 149 OF 15 JUNE

AND TO FLASH ALL OTHER EC POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
OTTAWA, TOKYO, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, OSLO.

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS GENEVA, BERNE.

MY TELNO 147 (NOT TO ALL): FALKLANDS: CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

1. MY TUR (NOT TO POSTS WHICH HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED IT AS MY  
TELNO 119 TO BERNE) CONTAINS TEXT OF A MESSAGE WHICH WE HAVE  
SENT TODAY TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE SWISS  
PROTECTING POWER. THE SWISS HAVE TOLD US THAT IT REACHED BUENOS  
AIRES AT 1330Z.

2. PLEASE APPROACH THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED  
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND URGE THEM TO TAKE WHATEVER ACTION THEY  
THINK POSSIBLE IN BUENOS AIRES TO ENCOURAGE THE ARGENTINE  
AUTHORITIES TO ACCEPT OUR PROPOSALS, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE  
RETURN OF PRISONERS FROM THE ISLANDS. YOU SHOULD DRAW ATTENTION  
TO THE STATEMET BY THE BRITISH COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF THAT HE FINDS  
HIMSELF WITH A MAJOR RELIEF OPERATION ON HIS HANDS. THE TOTAL  
OF ARGENTINE PRISONERS IS SOME 15,000. THIS IS MANY MORE THAN  
WE HAD EXPECTED. THEY HAVE FOOD FOR ONLY TWO OR THREE MORE DAYS.  
MANY OF THEM ARE IN PITIFUL PHYSICAL CONDITION. THERE IS INADEQUATE  
SHELTER AND WE ARE NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE IT - PARTLY AS A RESULT  
OF THE LOSS OF THOUSANDS OF TENTS ON THE ATLANTIC CONVEYOR.  
WE DO NOT LIKE TO THINK WHAT MIGHT BE THE CONSEQUENCES IF  
THERE WERE A DELAY IN GETTING THESE MEN  
BACK TO ARGENTINA.

3. FOR WASHINGTON. THIS MAY HAVE COME UP ALREADY IN YOUR



TALKS WITH HAIG TODAY. PLEASE SPEAK TO HIM PERSONALLY AND SAY THAT THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES WILL NO DOUBT BE A PARAMOUNT FACTOR IN THIS.

4. FOR UKMIS NEW YORK. PLEASE ACT SIMILARLY WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN. THE AUTHORITY OF HIS OFFICE, TOGETHER WITH HIS PERSONAL STANDING IN BUENOS AIRES COULD BE CRUCIAL.

5. FOR ALL POSTS. TIME IS VERY SHORT. PLEASE ACT TONIGHT.

6. FOR EC POSTS. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF YOUR HOST GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE RECEIVED THE TEXT OF OUR MESSAGE TO THE ARGENTINES BY COREU TODAY.

7. FOR UKMIS GENEVA AND UKREP BRUSSELS: MY TELNO 147 TO BRUSSELS IS BEING REPEATED TO YOU SEPARATELY.

PYM



765  
ACTION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 152025Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH FCC

*Reply See*

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1001 OF 15 JUNE,

INFC IMMEDIATE E.C. POSTS WASHINGTON OTTAWA TOKYO CANBERRA WELLINGTON  
OSLO UKDEL NATO UKMIS GENEVA AND BERNE.

YOUR TEL NO 149 TO BRUSSELS: FALKLANDS.

## CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

1. I DO NOT WISH TO SEEM INHUMANE, BUT I AM RELUCTANT TO INVOLVE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THIS EXERCISE. WE WOULD IN EFFECT BE ASKING HIM TO PERSUADE THE ARGENTINES TO ACCEPT A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES INCLUDING THE LIFTING OF ECONOMIC MEASURES/EXCLUSION ZONES SO THAT THEIR PRISONERS COULD BE RETURNED IMMEDIATELY.
2. I BELIEVE THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS STAFF WOULD SEE THIS AS A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY TO GET THE UN INTO THE ACT AGAIN. AS SEEN FROM HERE, THERE IS ALREADY A RISK THAT THE NOTE IN YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 119 TO BERNE MAY EVOKE WELL-WORN ARGENTINE COUNTER-PROPOSALS FOR E.G. A RUN DOWN OF BRITISH FORCES, UN SUPERVISION ETC, WHICH WOULD DRAG US BACK INTO THE MORASS.
3. IF WE OURSELVES INVOKE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S HELP AND, HAVING CONSULTED THE ARGENTINES, HE COMES BACK WITH PROPOSALS FOR UN INVOLVEMENT OSTENSIBLY ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS, WE COULD FIND OURSELVES IN A DIFFICULT POSITION. THERE IS ALREADY A STRONG FEELING HERE THAT WE SHOULD ACCEPT SOME KIND OF UN INVOLVEMENT EVEN AT THIS LATE STAGE IN ORDER TO SAVE ARGENTINE FACE, AVOID THE ULTIMATE HUMILIATION ETC. I AM MOST RELUCTANT TO DO ANYTHING TO ENCOURAGE THIS.
4. I ACCORDINGLY RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD CONFINE OUR REPRESENTATIONS TO THE BILATERAL ADDRESSEES IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE AND THAT, AS REGARDS INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT, WE SHOULD STICK TO THE ICRC AS THE CORRECT AGENCY FOR DEALING WITH SUCH SITUATIONS.

PARSONS

NNNN



GRS 235

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 152304Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1003 OF 15 JUNE.

## FALKLANDS: NOTIFICATIONS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, THE ARGENTINE MISSION HAS ADDRESSED NO LESS THAN ELEVEN LETTERS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (TEXTS BY FACSIMILE TO THE EMERGENCY UNIT). MOST OF THEM REPEAT COMMUNIQES BY THE ARGENTINE GENERAL STAFF AND CALL FOR NO REPLY. HOWEVER, SOME OF THEM CONTAIN ACCUSATIONS OF ATTACKS UPON THE ARGENTINE HOSPITAL SHIP BAHIA PARAISO, THE USE OF HMS HYDRA FOR TASKS OTHER THAN THOSE OF A HOSPITAL SHIP AND ATTACKS UPON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. I HAVE CONSIDERED WHETHER OR NOT WE SHOULD REPLY TO THESE ACCUSATIONS.
2. I HAVE ALSO CONSIDERED WHETHER I SHOULD NOTIFY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE ARGENTINE SURRENDER, HAVING REGARD TO OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. WE DID THIS FOR SOUTH GEORGIA (S/15002 OF 26 APRIL).
3. AT PRESENT, OUR PRIME OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO AVOID ANY REVIVAL OF ACTIVITY BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OR IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHETHER AT THE BEHEST OF ARGENTINA (THROUGH PANAMA) OR OF THE DO-GOODERS. I HAVE THEREFORE CONCLUDED THAT WE SHOULD DO NOTHING VIS-A-VIS THE COUNCIL, AT LEAST UNTIL WE KNOW THE ARGENTINE REPLY TO THE PROPOSALS IN YOUR TEL NO 119 TO BERNE. I WILL CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITIES AGAIN THEREAFTER.

PARSONS

NNNN



15 JUN 1982

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM COPENHAGEN 15/2200Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCC

TELEGRAM NUMBER 163 OF 15 JUNE

YOUR TELNO 149 TO BRUSSELS: FALKLANDS: CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

1. ACTION TAKEN WITH DEPUTY POLITICAL DIRECTOR WHO IS TONIGHT ISSUING IMMEDIATE INSTRUCTIONS TO DANISH AMBASSADOR TO ACT "ON HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS" OF OUR PROPOSALS.

WARBURTON

NNNN

SENT AT 15/2204Z MGD

OK SWITCHING OUT



F.R.

RAF 6 222

LIC 366/15

OO FCO DESKBY 152300Z

OP 119

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 152300Z

FM ROME 152210Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 312 OF 15 JUNE

~~ACTION COPY~~

15 JUN 82

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YOUR TELNO 149 TO BRUSSELS: FALKLANDS

CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

1. ACTION TAKEN WITH MFA (BARBARANI AND DUTY OFFICER)
2. AS REPORTED IN TELECON CULSHAW/HOGGER, THE MFA UNDERSTAND THE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM, AND INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE SENT TO THE ITALIAN EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE (PROBABLY EARLY ON 16 JUNE) TO MAKE APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATIONS. THE ITALIANS WOULD PREFER THEIR EMBASSY TO ACT IN CONCERT WITH OTHER EC MISSIONS BUT WILL NOT (NOT) DELAY ACTION IF THIS PROVES IMPOSSIBLE.
3. TOR NOT YET RECEIVED, BUT THE COREJ MENTIONED IN PARA 6 HAS JUST REACHED THE MFA.

ARCULUS

NNNN



ACTION COPY

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E.R.

WONFO 059/15

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15 JUN 1982

OO F C O

GRS 227

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 152055Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2136 OF 15 JUNE

YOUR TELNO 1168: FALKLAND ISLANDS: U.S. HELP WITH THE REPATRIATION PRISONERS.

1. I RAISED THIS TODAY WITH HAIG. EAGLEBURGER WAS ALSO PRESENT. THE AMERICANS HAVE ALREADY BEEN GIVING CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT TO THE LOGISTIC DIFFICULTIES. I BELIEVE THEY COULD ASSIST EITHER BY SEA OR AIR. THEY REALISE THE URGENCY AND GRAVITY OF THE PROBLEM AND AWAIT A SPECIFIC REQUEST. I MENTIONED TO HAIG, ON THE BASIS OF INFORMATION CONVEYED TO ME BY TELEPHONE FROM LONDON, THAT BECAUSE OF THE URGENCY WE MIGHT WELL BE TACKLING THE PROBLEM OURSELVES BY SEA TRANSPORT AT A VERY EARLY DATE.

2. HAIG TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO SAY THAT HE HOPED THAT NOBODY IN LONDON WOULD BELIEVE, WHATEVER THE PRESS WERE SAYING, THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WERE EXERCISING PRESSURE ON THE BRITISH ABOUT THE SITUATION IMMEDIATELY AHEAD. THEY KNEW THAT WE WERE FULLY AWARE OF THE POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE.

HENDERSON

NNNN



ACTION COPY

129

ER.

WONFO 060/15

OTWON 15/15

23c

15 JUN 82

OO FCO

GRS 50

CONFIDENTIAL

FM OTTAWA 152045Z JUNE 1982

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 322 OF 15 JUNE

YOUR TELNO 149 TO BRUSSELS: FALKLANDS: CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

1. MESSAGE DELIVERED TO EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. OFFICIAL CONCERNED IS SYMPATHETIC TO OUR REQUEST BUT DOUBTS IF ANY ACTION THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES FEELS ABLE TO TAKE WILL BE PRODUCTIVE.

MORAN

NNNN



ACTION COPY

15 JUN 1982

23c

CO FCO DESKBY 160100Z

GRS

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRASILIA 15:2300Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 160100Z

TELEGRAM NUMBER 277 OF 15 JUN882

E  
9  
8  
7  
6

YOUR TELNO 194: FALKLANDS CEASFIRE

1. I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AT 152200Z.
2. BAENA SOARES SAID THAT THE MESSAGE WHICH WE HAD PASSED TO THE SWISS GOVERNMENT (YOUR TELNO 119 TO BERNE), THE TEXT OF WHICH WE HAD EARLIER GIVEN TO THE MINISTRY AT DEPARTMENTAL LEVEL, HAD ALREADY BEEN SENT ON TO THE BRAZILIAN EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT, IN KEEPING WITH THEIR DUTIES AS PROTECTING POWER, IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT TO DO ANY MORE THAN THAT. HE WAS, HOWEVER, OBVIOUSLY IMPRESSED WITH THE ARGUMENTS IN PARA 2 OF TUR THOUGH, IN VIEW OF PRESIDENT GALTIERI'S DECISION TO ADDRESS THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE IN THE PLAZA DE MAYO THIS EVENING, HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT THEY WOULD RESPOND AS WE HOPED.
3. IN VIEW OF THE CRITICAL SITUATION NOW EVIDENTLY OBTAINING IN PORT STANLEY AND THE NEED TO ACT VERY QUICKLY IN THE EVENT THAT THE ARGENTINES BLOCK DIRECT REPATRIATION, I SOUNDED OUT BAENA IN VERY GENERAL TERMS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES, WITHOUT MENTIONING THE PORTS NAMED IN YOUR TELNO 193, AND MAKING IT PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT I WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT. BAENA QUICKLY SAW THAT BRAZIL MIGHT BECOME INVOLVED IN AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE AND INSTRUCTED THE HEAD OF THE AMERICAS DEPARTMENT, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT, TO START CONTINGENCY CONSULTATIONS WITH THIS IN VIEW. THIS ENCOURAGED ME TO MENTION ALSO THE POSSIBILITY (YOUR TELNO 367 TO MONTEVIDEO) THAT THERE MIGHT BE AN URGENT REQUIREMENT TO SEND NON-MILITARY SUPPLIES, ESPECIALLY TENTS, BY AIR TO THE ISLANDS.
4. FUTHER REPLIES TO YOUR TELNOS 193 AND 367 TO MOTEVIDEO WILL FOLLOW.

HARDING



139

E.R. 23c

SANFO 004/16

16 JUN 1982

OO FCO


GRS 85

CONFIDENTIAL

FM SANTIAGO 152245Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 297 OF 15 JUNE



YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 193 TO BRASILIA : REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR.

1. WE CONSIDER THAT THERE IS A VERY GOOD CHANCE THE CHILEANS WOULD AGREE TO THIS PROPOSAL. IT WOULD GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THEIR NEUTRALITY IN A POSITIVE AND HUMANITARIAN WAY. IT SHOULD BE FEASIBLE TO REPATRIATE THE PRISONERS BY BUS TO RIO GALLEGOS, AND THE CHILEANS WOULD PROBABLY MANAGE THE LOGISTICS COMPETENTLY.

2. DEPENDING ON THE SCALE OF THE OPERATION, WE MIGHT NEED TO CALL FOR REINFORCEMENT TO OUR UK-BASED STAFF.

HICKMAN

NNNN

SENT AT/RECD AT 160042Z P L N //PJH



ZZ ROME  
ZZ TOKYO  
ZZ CANBERRA  
ZZ WELLINGTON  
ZZ ATHENS  
GRS 303

ER  
Copy as requested  
K/31

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 151930Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH BRUSSELS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 149 OF 15 JUNE

AND TO FLASH ALL OTHER EC POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
OTTAWA, TOKYO, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, OSLO.

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS GENEVA, BERNE.

MY TELNO 147 (NOT TO ALL): FALKLANDS: CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

1. MY TUR (NOT TO POSTS WHICH HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED IT AS MY  
TELNO 119 TO BERNE) CONTAINS TEXT OF A MESSAGE WHICH WE HAVE  
SENT TODAY TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE SWISS  
PROTECTING POWER. THE SWISS HAVE TOLD US THAT IT REACHED BUENOS  
AIRES AT 1330Z.

2. PLEASE APPROACH THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED  
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND URGE THEM TO TAKE WHATEVER ACTION THEY  
THINK POSSIBLE IN BUENOS AIRES TO ENCOURAGE THE ARGENTINE  
AUTHORITIES TO ACCEPT OUR PROPOSALS, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE  
RETURN OF PRISONERS FROM THE ISLANDS. YOU SHOULD DRAW ATTENTION  
TO THE STATEMET BY THE BRITISH COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF THAT HE FINDS  
HIMSELF WITH A MAJOR RELIEF OPERATION ON HIS HANDS. THE TOTAL  
OF ARGENTINE PRISONERS IS SOME 15,000. THIS IS MANY MORE THAN  
WE HAD EXPECTED. THEY HAVE FOOD FOR ONLY TWO OR THREE MORE DAYS.  
MANY OF THEM ARE IN PITIFUL PHYSICAL CONDITION. THERE IS INADEQUATE  
SHELTER AND WE ARE NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE IT - PARTLY AS A RESULT  
OF THE LOSS OF THOUSANDS OF TENTS ON THE ATLANTIC CONVEYOR.  
WE DO NOT LIKE TO THINK WHAT MIGHT BE THE CONSEQUENCES IF  
THERE WERE A DELAY IN GETTING THESE MEN  
BACK TO ARGENTINA.

3. FOR WASHINGTON. THIS MAY HAVE COME UP ALREADY IN YOUR



TALKS WITH HAIG TODAY. PLEASE SPEAK TO HIM PERSONALLY AND SAY THAT THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES WILL NO DOUBT BE A PARAMOUNT FACTOR IN THIS.

4. FOR UKMIS NEW YORK. PLEASE ACT SIMILARLY WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN. THE AUTHORITY OF HIS OFFICE, TOGETHER WITH HIS PERSONAL STANDING IN BUENOS AIRES COULD BE CRUCIAL.

5. FOR ALL POSTS. TIME IS VERY SHORT. PLEASE ACT TONIGHT.

6. FOR EC POSTS. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF YOUR HOST GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE RECEIVED THE TEXT OF OUR MESSAGE TO THE ARGENTINES BY COREU TODAY.

7. FOR UKMIS GENEVA AND UKREP BRUSSELS: MY TELNO 147 TO BRUSSELS IS BEING REPEATED TO YOU SEPARATELY.

PYM



**FLASH**

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (40)

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PMS ← PS/MR RIFKIND  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR A SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE  
HD/PUSD (2)  
HD/S Am D  
HD/DEFENCE D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/ERD  
HD/ECD(E)  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF

~~PS/No 10 DOWNING ST (2)~~

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
MR ILETT } TREASURY  
MR LITTLER }

MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO }

Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN G FLEET

EMERGENCY UNIT  
RESIDENT CLERK

**FLASH**

~~[Passed to E.R.]~~  
[Typists a.a.]

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 152025Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1001 OF 15 JUNE,

INFO IMMEDIATE E.C. POSTS WASHINGTON OTTAWA TOKYO CANBERRA WELLINGTON  
OSLO UKDEL NATO UKMIS GENEVA AND BERNE.

*attached*  
YOUR TEL NO 149 TO BRUSSELS: FALKLANDS.

CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

1. I DO NOT WISH TO SEEM INHUMANE, BUT I AM RELUCTANT TO INVOLVE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THIS EXERCISE. WE WOULD IN EFFECT BE ASKING HIM TO PERSUADE THE ARGENTINES TO ACCEPT A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES INCLUDING THE LIFTING OF ECONOMIC MEASURES/EXCLUSION ZONES SO THAT THEIR PRISONERS COULD BE RETURNED IMMEDIATELY.
2. I BELIEVE THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS STAFF WOULD SEE THIS AS A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY TO GET THE UN INTO THE ACT AGAIN. AS SEEN FROM HERE, THERE IS ALREADY A RISK THAT THE NOTE IN YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 119 TO BERNE MAY EVOKE WELL-WORN ARGENTINE COUNTER-PROPOSALS FOR E.G. A RUN DOWN OF BRITISH FORCES, UN SUPERVISION ETC, WHICH COULD BRING US BACK INTO THE MORASS.

*Prime Minister*  
*to see*  
*Alan Legg*  
*Duty Clerk 10/1*



PROPOSALS FOR E.G. A RUN DOWN OF BRITISH FORCES, UN SUPERVISION ETC, WHICH WOULD DRAG US BACK INTO THE MORASS.

3. IF WE OURSELVES INVOKE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S HELP AND, HAVING CONSULTED THE ARGENTINES, HE COMES BACK WITH PROPOSALS FOR UN INVOLVEMENT OSTENSIBLY ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS, WE COULD FIND OURSELVES IN A DIFFICULT POSITION. THERE IS ALREADY A STRONG FEELING HERE THAT WE SHOULD ACCEPT SOME KIND OF UN INVOLVEMENT EVEN AT THIS LATE STAGE IN ORDER TO SAVE ARGENTINE FACE, AVOID THE ULTIMATE HUMILIATION ETC. I AM MOST RELUCTANT TO DO ANYTHING TO ENCOURAGE THIS.

4. I ACCORDINGLY RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD CONFINE OUR REPRESENTATIONS TO THE BILATERAL ADDRESSEES IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE AND THAT, AS REGARDS INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT, WE SHOULD STICK TO THE ICRC AS THE CORRECT AGENCY FOR DEALING WITH SUCH SITUATIONS.

PARSONS

NNNN



**FLASH**

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (40)

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PHS  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE  
HD/PUSD (2)  
HD/S Am D  
HD/DEFENCE D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/ERD  
HD/ECD(E)  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF

PS/No 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
MR ILETT } TREASURY  
MR LITTLER }

MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO }

Room 8 FOR MOD/JK C IN C FLEET

**FLASH**

EMERGENCY UNIT  
RESIDENT CLERK

[Passed to E.R.]  
[Typists a.a.]

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 152305Z JUNE 82  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1004 OF 15 JUNE  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

*Prime Minster  
to see  
Alan Lopez  
Subj chh 166*

YOUR TEL NO 535: FALKLANDS: CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

1. I SAW URQUHART THIS EVENING (15 JUNE) AFTER HE HAD EMERGED FROM A MEETING ON LEBANON BETWEEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND MRS KIRKPATRICK.  
2. URQUHART SAID THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK, QUOTING HER QUOTE TOP ARGENTINE FRIENDS UNQUOTE HAD GIVEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THE DETAILS OF THE QUOTE DEAL WHICH ARGENTINA HAD AGREED WITH THE BRITISH UNQUOTE. THESE WERE AS FOLLOWS:-

- (I) THERE WOULD BE NO SURRENDER CEREMONY.
- (II) ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WOULD TAKE PLACE TO QUOTE IMPLEMENT SCR 502 UNQUOTE.
- (III) ALL ARGENTINE TROOPS WOULD WITHDRAW WITH THEIR ARMS AND EQUIPMENT EXCEPT FOR POWS TAKEN BEFORE THE FINAL ASSAULT, WHO WOULD LEAVE UNARMED.

No



WOULD LEAVE UNARMED.

(IV) AS PART OF THIS PACKAGE ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT CARRY  
FURTHER ATTACKS ON THE BRITISH TASK FORCE.

I TOLD URQUHART THAT I KNEW OF NO SUCH DEAL.

3. IT IS CHARACTERISTIC OF MRS KIRKPATRICK THAT SHE SHOULD CHOOSE TO  
ACT AS A RELAY BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. IF THERE  
IS ANY TRUTH IN HER STATEMENT - I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT SHE IS IN  
CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE ARGENTINES, PROBABLY GENERAL MIRET - IT MAY  
REPRESENT THE CONDITIONS ARGENTINA WILL TRY TO PUT FORWARD IN  
RESPONSE TO THE NOTE IN YOUR TEL NO 119 TO BERNE.

PARSONS

NNNN

WJJJJJJ



cc Prep ✓

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730 HOURS, 15 JUNE

Military Action

1. The Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons that talks were in progress between General Menendez and the British Deputy Commander, Brigadier Waters, about the surrender of the Argentine forces on East and West Falkland .
2. Commander Land Forces has subsequently reported that General Menendez has surrendered to him all the Argentine armed forces in East and West Falkland.

Emergency Unit

15 June 1982



1.

PRIME MINISTER

The Speaker told me this afternoon that it had been put to him that there should be a Service of Thanksgiving for the end of hostilities in the Falklands in St. Margaret's, Westminster. Next Tuesday morning, 22 June, is the preferred day.

The Speaker said that before he did any more about this suggestion - and in particular before he sounded out the other parties - he would like to know whether it commended itself to you. I undertook to find out.

I see no objection in principle myself, but such a Service will anticipate in a small way the bigger occasions involving men of the Task Force on their return which you have in mind.

You would be free to attend a Service next Tuesday morning if one were held.

What would you like me to tell the Speaker?

I think we should  
leave it to a bigger  
occasion in St. Paul's.  
JAH.

no

15 June 1982

I passed the Prime  
Minister's view on to the  
Speaker's Secretary. He said  
that the Speaker had  
come to the conclusion since  
his conversation with me that  
this was not a good idea.

JAH  
16/6



SECRET

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION) :  
0730 HOURS, 15 JUNE 1982

1. During the evening of 14 June press reports from Buenos Aires spoke of talks between the Commander of the Argentine garrison at Port Stanley, General Menendez, and the Commander of the British land forces. These were followed by reports that an agreement had been signed and that Menendez would be flying to Buenos Aires for discussions with the Junta: at 1950Z an Argentine military communiqué said that a de facto ceasefire existed at Port Stanley.

2. At about 1800Z the MOD received a signal from the Commander Land Forces saying that 3 Commando Brigade had reached the outskirts of Port Stanley. It was clear that many Argentines were not prepared to fight. At 1505Z the Argentine garrison indicated its willingness to talk. At 1530Z British troops were ordered only to fire in self-defence. At 1550Z the white flag was reported over Port Stanley. Commander Land Forces said that negotiations with the Argentine garrison were at an early stage.

3. At 2115Z the Prime Minister announced to the House of Commons that following successful British attacks and the crumbling of Argentine resistance, talks were in progress between General Menendez and the Deputy Commander of Land Forces, Brigadier Waters, about the surrender of the Argentine forces on East and West Falkland.

4. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in Riyadh and posts with a direct interest have been sent copies of the Prime Minister's statement and Mr Foot's response. UKMIS New York have informed the UN Secretary-General. UKMIS Geneva will keep the ICRC in the picture.

A: (UKMIS New York telno. 997 to FCO)

5. In a signal at 0120Z on 15 June the Land Forces Commander informed the MOD that General Menendez had surrendered all the Argentine armed forces in East and West Falkland. It is not yet clear to what extent the Junta endorse this decision and thus how it affects other Argentine military operations.

B: (CT4 317.1 Signal No. 150120Z)

6. The Task Force also report that Argentine prisoners will number some 14,800 (11,000 Stanley, 2,000 West Falkland, 1,000 Port Fitzroy, 800 Port Salvador). The Argentines have food for 3-4 days but in view of limited tentage and poor weather, various proposals are made by the Task Force for the immediate repatriation of PoWs. The recommended method of repatriation is by means of 'Canberra' directly from Port Stanley to Argentina.

C: (CTG 317.1 Signal No. 050015Z)

D: (CTG 317.8 Signal No. 050058Z)

7. The Prime Minister has agreed that the signal referred to in paragraph 5 may be used as a public statement. MOD are drafting a paper on the question of PoWs for the OD(SA) meeting at 0930.

/Comment

SECRET



Comment

8. The most immediate decision to be taken is how to repatriate Argentine POWs (bearing in mind that the Argentine Government have yet to confirm the surrender). The options would be:


- (a) by British ships to Argentine or neutral ports;
- (b) by Argentine ships;
- (c) by neutral ships.

9. The question of what POWs should be retained also needs to be considered.

10. Other questions are:

- (a) How to get the ICRC involved rapidly;
- (b) How to deal with the expected pressures for press visits.

11. Sir A Parsons informed the UN Secretary General last night of developments at that time. But he may need further instructions today on the formal position which we would wish to take at the UN.



P R Fearn  
Emergency Unit

15 June 1982



NYFO 006/15

OO F C O

GRS 240

E.R.  
~~14 JUN~~

(2)

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 142328Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 997 DATED 14 JUNE 82  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

11 12 1  
D 9 2  
8 7 6 5 4

FALKLANDS: PRESS

1. I SAW THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT 2230Z ON 14 JUNE. WE HAVE TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE MEETING TOOK PLACE AT MY INITIATIVE: AND THAT I WISHED TO INFORM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE STATEMENT WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER HAD MADE SHORTLY BEFOREHAND IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ABOUT THE TALKS BETWEEN GENERAL MENENDEZ AND BRIGADIER WATERS. WE HAVE SAID THAT, AS WE HAVE KEPT IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS, IT SEEMED THE PROPER STEP TO INFORM HIM AT ONCE OF THESE SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS.

2. WE HAVE SAID NOTHING TO ENCOURAGE SPECULATION ABOUT A FUTURE ROLE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS. OUR LINE HAS BEEN SIMPLY THAT A UN ROLE HAS NEVER BEEN EXCLUDED: BUT THAT IT IS TOO SOON FOR DECISIONS OF THIS NATURE TO BE TAKEN.

3. I HAVE RECEIVED A NUMBER OF REQUESTS FOR INTERVIEWS, BUT WILL NOT BE ACCEPTING THEM UNTIL I HAVE HEARD THE FURTHER STATEMENT WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER IS TO MAKE IN THE HOUSE.

PARSONS

NNNN



RESTRICTED

150301 JUN 82

150120Z JUN 82

FM TPS HEREFORD  
TO CTF 317  
CTG 317.8  
CTG 317.0  
CTG 317.9

INFO CTU 317.1.1  
CTU 317.1.2

UNCLAS

SIC 19F

THE FOL IS THE TEXT OF A MSG FROM 317.1 PASSED VIA HEREFORD TO ADDRESSEES ABOVE. MSG BEGINS.

HQ LFFI PORT STANLEY. IN PORT STANLEY AT 9 O'CLOCK PM FALKLAND ISLANDS TIME TONIGHT THE 14 JUNE 1982, MAJOR GENERAL MENENDES SURRENDERED TO ME ALL THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES IN EAST AND WEST FALKLAND, TOGETHER WITH THEIR IMPEDIMENTA. ARRANGEMENTS ARE IN HAND TO ASEMBLE THE MEN FOR RETURN TO ARGENTINA, TO GATHER IN THEIR ARMS AND EQUIPMENT, AND TO MARK AND MAKE SAFE THEIR MUNITIONS. THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ARE ONCE MORE UNDER THE GOVERNMENT DESIRED BY THEIR INHABITANTS.

GOD SAVE THE QUEEN.

SIGNED J J MOORE.

MSG ENDS

RESTRICTED



150015Z JUN 82

FM CTG 317.1

TO CTF 317  
CTG 317,8

INFO CTG 317.0

SIC I9N

OP SUTTON. PW EVACUATION.

1. NEGOTIATIONS IN STANLEY INDICATE THAT A TOTAL OF 11,000 ARG WILL REQUIRE TO BE EVACUATED FROM THE TOWN.

2. UNDERSTAND THAT ARG ARE SELF CONTAINED FOR FEEDING FOR PERIOD 3/4 DAYS BUT HAVE LITTLE TENTAGE. OUR STOCKS LOST IN ATLANTIC CONVEYOR.

3. PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY IN STANLEY HAS BROKEN DOWN.

4. IN VIEW OF THE CONSIDERABLE INCREASE IN FORECAST NO OF PW REQUEST YOU TAKE FOL ACTION:

ALPHA . SAIL CANBERRA TO SAN CARLOS WATER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO ALLOW CLEARANCE OF PW HELD IN AJAX BAY, FITZROY AND WEST FAHLAND. COVERED ACCM CLEARED AT AJAX BAY AND FITZROY CAN THEN BE USED TO REDUCE PROBLEM IN STANLEY.

BRAVO. INVESTIGATE PROVISION OF NEUTRAL SOUTH AMERICAN SHIPPING TO ASSIST MOVE FROM STANLEY.

CHARLIE. INVESTIGATE PROVISION OF NEUTRAL SOUTH AMERICAN C130 TYPE AC TO ASSIST MOVE FROM STANLEY.

DELTA. SAIL NORLAND AT BEST SPEED DIRECT TO STANLEY.

ECHO. CANBERRA TO SAIL AT BEST SPEED TO EVACUATION PORT AND RETURN TO STANLEY FOR FURTHER LOAD.

BT



UK SECRET

150058Z JUN 82

FM . CTG 317.8  
TO. CTF 317  
INFO. CTG 317.1  
CTG 317.0  
SS CANBERRA

SECRET

SIC I9F

OP CORPORATE

1. MENEDEZ REPORT FOLLOWING ARG NUMBERS
    - A. 11000 STANLEY
    - B. 2000 WEST FALKLAND
  2. ADITIONALLY 1000 HELD PORT FITZROY AND 800 PORT SALVADOR.
  3. CANBERRA PROCEEDING WITH ALL DESPATCHE SAN CARLOS TO EMBARK PW, O/C TO STANLEY TO TOP UP TO 5000. THEN FAST PASSAGE TO SANTA CRUZ ROADS (PUNTA QUILLA). THEN RAPID FERRY ALL BUT SPECIAL CATEGORY/TOPMEN TO COMPLETE. HOPEFULLY 2 ROUND TRIPS. NORLAND BACK UP SECOND TRIP.
  4. REQUEST
    - A. ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT INFORMED
    - B. DIPCLEAR ARRANGED
    - C. SAFE PASSAGE GUARANTEE
  5. RUSHING FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS. ARGS HAVE 3 DAYS FOOD, NO TENTS - BLIZZARD CONDITIONS. THE WORLD SHOULD KNOW THIS VERGES ON DISASTER RELIEF.
- BT

UK SECRET





For AJC

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
BONN.

15.6.82

~~Prime Minister~~

AJC.  $\frac{15}{6}$

Dear Prime Minister

Congratulations!

I shall continue to do everything possible with our German allies to get their help and understanding in the future so that the fruits of his magnificent victory may be safeguarded

Yours sincerely  
Jack Tappin









WITH  
THE COMPLIMENTS OF THE  
PRIVATE SECRETARY

Please substitute attached minute  
for minute MO 5/21 dated 11th June  
1982

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, WHITEHALL

Telephone: 01-218 9000  
01 218





MO 5/21

Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

Prime Minister  
 Agree with the action proposed  
 in para. 6 (The Foreign Secretary  
 and the Attorney agree - see attached  
 minutes)?

Yes Mr A. J. C. 16.  
 6

DEATH OF AN ARGENTINE PRISONER OF WAR ON SOUTH GEORGIA

You are already aware of the outlines of this case. I have now received the report of the Board of Inquiry together with the preliminary views of C-in-C Fleet and in view of the serious nature of the case the Attorney-General has been consulted. We now need to decide on the way ahead and how we should handle the international and public relations aspects.

2. In brief the Board of Inquiry reveals that the Argentine prisoner (Artuso) was shot on the day following the reoccupation of South Georgia during the move of the Argentinian submarine SANTA FE across Grytviken Harbour. The SANTA FE was moved because it was blocking the main jetty in the harbour and in danger of sinking from the damage sustained when it was attacked during the operation on the previous day. The Argentine CO and five of his crew were used for the move, guarded by Royal Marines and under the general command of an RN Captain assisted by another officer. The guards were instructed that under no circumstances were the crew to be allowed to touch the main vent levers which would cause the submarine to sink immediately. Unfortunately the control levers which were pointed out to the guards were the low pressure air tank blowing levers. During the move the submarine started to list and lose buoyancy and the Argentine Captain passed orders to blow tanks. Artuso jumped across the control room to reach for the tank blowing levers but was shot dead by the guard who believed he was attempting to open the main vents.





3. The Attorney-General is satisfied that there are no grounds for instituting a prosecution in a civil court against the marine who shot Artuso and he endorses the view of CINCFLEET that he should not face a court-martial. All the evidence indicates that the marine honestly and reasonably believed that he was using the only means of defence available in what he believed were the circumstances.
4. The Attorney-General is equally satisfied that there are no grounds for instituting criminal proceedings in a civilian court against the two RN officers in charge of the operation and he also endorses CINCFLEET's view that they should not face a court martial. As far as possible disciplinary proceedings are concerned the Attorney-General considers that while there were certainly some unsatisfactory features about the way in which the operation was organised and supervised he accepts the view of CINCFLEET that the conduct of the two officers did not fall short of the expected standards to such an extent as to constitute a disciplinary offence.
5. This leaves the question of a possible breach of Articles 50 and 52 of the Third Geneva Convention which prohibit the use of POW's on dangerous work, unless they are volunteers, and limits the categories of work they can be compelled to undertake. The evidence of the Board of Inquiry is not as revealing as we could wish on the question of how far the prisoners were volunteers but there is certainly no evidence pointing unmistakably in the other direction. In these circumstances, and unless further evidence emerges to indicate compulsion, the Attorney-General accepts that there has been no breach of Articles 50 or 52.
6. I believe that the next step is to inform CINCFLEET of the Attorney-General's views and invite him to take the necessary action. Under Article 121 of the Third Geneva Convention we need





to send a report, together with statements from the prisoners, to the protecting power. This report will obviously be based on the Board of Inquiry but will, for example, exclude names of UK personnel and will also include a section dealing with the consideration given to the report. I would suggest that the ICRC should receive a copy of the report. In parallel I propose to inform the House of the outcome of the case by means of a written PQ and by placing a copy of the report made available to Brazil and the ICRC in the Library. Copies would also be available to the press.

7. I am copying this letter to members of OD(SA), the Attorney-General and Sir Robert Armstrong and I would be grateful for any comments my colleagues may have as soon as possible since we are under some pressure from the ICRC to issue the report.

SW

Ministry of Defence

15th June 1982



CONFIDENTIAL



*[Handwritten signature]*

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

DEATH OF AN ARGENTINE PRISONER OF WAR  
ON SOUTH GEORGIA

Thank you for sending me a copy of your minute of 15th June to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. Given the views which I have previously expressed, as described in your minute, I endorse your conclusions and agree with the procedure which you suggest we should follow. I think that it might be prudent if I were given the opportunity to cast my eye over the draft of our report to the Brazilian Government before its terms are finally settled.

I am copying this minute to the members of OD(SA) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

*M.H.*


Law Officers' Department  
15th June, 1982

CONFIDENTIAL





116 JUL 1982



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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (39)

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PS/MR MURD  
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SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

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MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
MR ILETT } TREASURY  
MR LITTLER }

MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO }

Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

[Passed to E.R.]  
[Typists a.a.]

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GRS 100

RESTRICTED

FM WASHINGTON 141730Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2123 OF 14 JUNE

INFO MODUK

FALKLANDS: AWACS

1. NEW YORK TIMES HAVE REPORTED TWICE OVER THE WEEKEND, STARTING WITH A REFERENCE IN AN ARTICLE BY DREW MIDDLETON ON 11 JUNE, THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE APPROACHED THE U.S. FOR LOAN OF AWACS AIRCRAFT FOR AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OVER THE FALKLANDS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE SUNDAY EXPRESS RAN A SIMILAR STORY YESTERDAY.

2. WE HAVE TOLD THE NEW YORK TIMES BUREAU HERE UNATTRIBUTABLY THAT IT IS NOT TRUE THAT WE HAVE APPROACHED THE U.S. ABOUT AWACS. IT



IT IS NOT TRUE THAT WE HAVE APPROACHED THE U.S. ABOUT AWACS. IT  
WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOU OR MOD COULD FIND A SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY  
TO MAKE THE SAME POINT TO DREW MIDDLETON SO THAT IT IS NOT REPEATED.

3. ADVANCE COPIES TO NEWS DEPT. AND MOD PLEASE.

THOMAS

NNNN

TO DIRECTOR

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

RE: MURKIN

10/1/60

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TYPISTS]

*copying*

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (37)

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
MR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE  
MR BARRETT  
HD/S AM D  
HD/DEF D  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
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MR REED, PUSD  
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)

PS/S OF S DEFENCE

PS/HOME SECRETARY

PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DST)

PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL

PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG

PS/SIR M PALLISER

PS/SIR A DUFF

MR WADE-GERY

MR FULLER

MR COLVIN

MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-  
MENTS STAFF

CABINET  
OFFICE

DIO

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD

DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

*Hd (WED)*

GRS 510

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 141446Z JUN 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 624 OF 14 JUN 82

INFO ROUTINE STOCKHOLM

YOUR TELNO 346: ASTIZ.

ADVANCE COPY

*X 1633*

1. LAST FRIDAY MORNING - I.E. BEFORE MY CALL ON GUTMANN, AT WHICH ASTIZ WAS NOT MENTIONED - DORIN, THE DIRECTOR FOR AMERICAN AFFAIRS AT THE QUAI, ASKED THE MINISTER TO CALL ABOUT THE ASTIZ CASE AFTER THE WEEKEND. ALSO ON FRIDAY THE QUAI SPOKESMAN SAID THAT ALTHOUGH ASTIZ HAD BEEN RELEASED THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES INTENDED TO CONTINUE PURSUING THEIR LEGAL ACTION AGAINST HIM.

2. THIS MORNING DORIN SAID HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY HIS MINISTER TO EXPRESS THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE FREEING OF ASTIZ. AFTER REHEARSING THE FRENCH (AND SWEDISH) ACCUSATIONS AGAINST ASTIZ, DORIN SAID HIS AUTHORITIES UNDERSTOOD THAT BRITISH ACTIONS WERE BASED ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, BUT THEY DID NOT AGREE



THAT THERE WAS A LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO TELL ASTIZ IN ADVANCE THAT HE NEED NOT REPLY TO THE QUESTIONS, OR TO INFORM THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT IN ADVANCE, OR TO SET ASTIZ FREE BEFORE THE END OF THE CONFLICT. FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THAT BRITAIN HAD BEEN UNABLE TO HELP FRANCE OVER A RELATIVELY MINOR PROBLEM AFTER THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD GIVEN SUCH FIRM SUPPORT TO BRITAIN ON THE MAIN CASE. DORIN ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE WAS ONLY EXPRESSING DISAPPOINTMENT ON BEHALF OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, NOT MAKING A FORMAL PROTEST SINCE THERE WAS NO SUGGESTION THAT ANY FORMAL UNDERTAKING HAD BEEN VIOLATED. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WISHED TO REGISTER THEIR DISAPPOINTMENT DISCREETLY AND NOT BY A PUBLIC DECLARATION. HOWEVER, DORIN ADDED THAT "IF JOURNALISTS ASKED" THEY MIGHT CONFIRM THAT THEY HAD SPOKEN TO THIS EFFECT.

3. PETRIE AGREED TO REPORT THIS DEMARCHE BUT COMMENTED MEANWHILE THAT:

(A) THE JURIDICAL BASIS FOR EACH OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS HAD BEEN EXPLAINED IN DETAIL AT EACH STAGE TO THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES:

(B) THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD GONE TO THE LIMIT OF - AND PERHAPS BEYOND - WHAT WAS LEGALLY POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO ENABLE THE FRENCH AND SWEDISH QUESTIONS TO BE PUT TO ASTIZ. I HAD UNDERSTOOD FROM MY CONVERSATION WITH DUFOURCQ (MY TLENO 562) THAT THIS WAS THE PRIMARY CONCERN OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT:

(C) IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES BRITISH MINISTERS MIGHT WELL FEEL EQUALLY "DISAPPOINTED" IF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WERE TO TAKE PUBLIC EXCEPTION TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS, FOR WHICH THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT HAD PUBLICLY EXPRESSED ITS GRATITUDE.

4. DORIN INDICATED THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT. HE REPEATED THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO REGISTER "IN MODERATE TERMS" THE REGRETS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO BRING ASTIZ TO BOOK.

#### COMMENT

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5. SUBJECT TO ANY FURTHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IT DOES INDEED SEEM THAT THIS DEMARCHE IS PRIMARILY CONCERNED TO SAFEGUARD THEIR FLANK AGAINST ACCUSATIONS FROM FRENCH PRESSURE GROUPS THAT THEY HAVE NOT DONE ENOUGH. THIS EMBASSY RECIEVED, FOR EXAMPLE, A DELEGATION FROM THE ASSOCIATION DES DROITS SOCIALISTES DE L'HOMME ON 10 JUNE, TO WHOM WE EXPLAINED THE CONSTRAINTS ON BRITAIN'S ACTION.



THE CONSTRAINTS ON BRITAIN'S ACTION.

6. UNLESS YOU WISH TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT ONCE MORE ON THE LEGAL QUESTIONS IN PARA 2 ABOVE, I THINK WE COULD LET THE MATTER REST.

FRETWELL

NNNN

SENT AT 141632Z SM/PA



RESTRICTED

SAPU(82) 32

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

Attached are suggested lines to take on -

1. Civilians in Stanley
2. The Return of the Governor
3. Argentine Prisoners of War
4. Delays in Announcing Casualties in Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram

Also attached is -

5. A transcript of Mr Pym's interview with "News at Ten" on 11 June
6. A transcript of Mr Whitelaw's interview on "The World This Weekend" on 13 June.

Cabinet Office

14 June 1982

RESTRICTED



1. Civilians in Stanley

An editorial in today's Daily Mirror is highly critical of the Ministry of Defence on the grounds that "only now the battle for Stanley has begun has the Ministry of Defence discovered how many Falklanders are there". This report is both inaccurate and unfair.

A primary consideration in all our planning has been the need to minimise the risk to the Islanders. Since the very beginning of the conflict the International Red Cross have been trying, with our strong support, to establish a presence on the Islands in order to make proper arrangements for the Falklanders' safety. It has inevitably been impossible for us to obtain reliable information on the whereabouts of civilians and it was only when the Argentines finally permitted the Red Cross to land a representative at the end of last week that we discovered that there maybe in fact as many as 600 Islanders still in Stanley. We have agreed unreservedly to the establishment of a neutralised zone in Stanley under the supervision of the Red Cross. We understand that the Argentines have now agreed to this as well and we shall be respecting that zone forthwith.

2. The Return of the Governor

The position remains as stated by the Prime Minister in the House on 27 May - viz no decision has yet been taken. See also Mr Pym's remarks on the subject in the attached transcript.

3. Argentine Prisoners of War

There has been some press criticism that we have been putting our forces at a disadvantage by returning Argentine prisoners of war earlier than required by the Geneva Convention.

The Government has always made it clear that we will carry out all our obligations under the Geneva Convention. Under the Convention, prisoners of war (apart from the seriously wounded) may be detained until hostilities end but must then be repatriated without delay. Nevertheless, the retention in present circumstances of large numbers of prisoners of war would pose a



number of logistical and practical problems. They would have to be guarded, kept supplied with adequate food and clothing, provided with quarters not inferior to those of our own troops and given appropriate medical care - in addition, if they were held for a prolonged period we would have to fulfil a number of other requirements under the Convention. The problems involved could well hamper our forces; and since transferring large numbers of prisoners to Britain would pose equally severe problems, we have been returning Argentine prisoners as soon as reasonably possible - but not until we are sure that they are unlikely to be of further help to the Argentine war effort.

No decision has yet been taken on the timing of repatriation of the large number of prisoners likely to be taken following the capture of Stanley. That decision will be taken in the light of the circumstances at the time which may be rather different to those at present. Clearly we wish to ensure that the repossession of the Islands is followed by an end of all hostilities between Britain and Argentina. Our obligation under the Geneva Convention is to repatriate all prisoners of war at the cessation of hostilities, if not before. That obligation will be honoured.

#### 4. Delays in Announcing Casualties in Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad

As Mr Nott made clear at the weekend, the delay in making public details of casualties at Bluff Cove contributed greatly to achieving the surprise which was a major factor in the success of the attack last Friday night. It was clear that the Argentines had greatly overestimated the casualties and the damage caused by their attacks and as Mr Nott explained, "we wished them to remain uncertain about our strength on the ground and our capability to mount an early attack".

In general, the handling of public announcements on casualty figures presents us with very real difficulties. We have to balance the public's demand to be told the truth as soon as possible with operational/security considerations and, of course, with the need to inform the next of kin of the dead and injured before any names are released. Although a public announcement of the details of casualties at Bluff Cove was held back this did not delay the notification of next of kin.



INTERVIEW GIVEN BY MR PYM TO TREVOR McDONALD 'NEWS AT TEN'  
ON FRIDAY 11 JUNE 1982

## FALKLANDS

### Diplomatic Activity

Question: Foreign Secretary, you've always made the point, and the Prime Minister's made the point, that the military and diplomatic pressures in Argentina were quite separate and that they were aimed at getting Argentine troops off the Islands. Does it now concern you that the emphasis now appears to be entirely on the military side with apparently no diplomatic avenues open?

Answer: I'm still in touch with the Secretary-General and he would always be available to help if there was any sign of the Argentines changing their mind. After all, we have been negotiating in various ways for over two months and unfortunately we've always come up with the same non-response from the Argentine side, ~~so it's quite true to say that~~ Diplomatic activity at the moment, unfortunately, is minimal but the Secretary-General is there and if a new opportunity came then, of course, advantage could be taken of it. ~~and~~ If only the Argentines would say now that they would withdraw then any further casualties could be stopped and I think everybody would be much relieved about that. But there's no sign of that happening, sad to say.

Question: In the interests of a long term solution, does that lack of diplomatic activity worry you?

Answer: Well, not immediately. We couldn't have tried harder, could we? What other effort could we have made? We've had a number of proposals - three were positively put and turned down. The last one was publicly revealed by us, the last British position, and I think we've done all that we can. ~~and~~ If they're not prepared to withdraw then we're going to have to repossess the Islands, ~~and~~ Then immediately that happens, of course, ~~there will be a lot of diplomatic activity.~~ There will be activity to rehabilitate and restore the Islanders and to help them get on re-establishing their life; but also we will want to re-establish relations with the countries in that hemisphere. It will be ~~very~~ difficult immediately. I don't think we can do anything with the Argentine itself

/ immediately



immediately but our objective will be to try and bring stability back there because in the long run that's crucially important for the Falkland Islanders. So there will be much diplomatic activity at that time.

#### US Attitude

Question: You told the Americans that we're not quite ready to consider Argentine participation in any long-term future of the Islands at this point. Did the Americans give you any indication about how long they are prepared to wait on our decision upon this?

Answer: Oh, the Americans understand entirely that after what has happened, and after the refusal of all the proposals that we have made and that have been discussed, that it would not be possible for us to contemplate any Argentine involvement on the Islands, at any rate for the time being. Whether, in due course, that will be appropriate remains to be seen, but immediately it isn't practical and the Americans understand that perfectly well.

Question: Would the Americans join Britain in trying to secure the defence of the Islands?

Answer: That is possible. I'm sure it will be a British responsibility in the immediate aftermath of re-possession and perhaps for quite some time, but it's always been my view that it would be in the interests of the Islanders, for their prosperity and their future, if we could establish a broader-based international arrangement involving other countries. I think that might give them greater security and that I shall be trying to achieve. Again, I can't say at this stage with what success or how long it might take. But I see advantage in it from their point of view if other countries agree.

#### Latin American Co-operation

Question: So we're looking at the Americans and we're looking at other countries in Latin America as well?

Answer: Oh yes indeed. The Americans have an interest, but there are plenty of friendly countries in Latin America who hope that this whole argument can be brought to an end quickly and, once it is, once the Islands are re-possessed, of course, we want to re-establish the best relations that we can. I don't think we ought to under-estimate the difficulties, and I shall be setting about it just as soon as that event has taken place, whether by a sudden miraculous Argentine withdrawal or whether by military means.



Question: When you say that event having taken place, Foreign Secretary, are you talking about the fall of Port Stanley to our forces?

Answer: I'm talking about the re-possession of the Falkland Islands.

British Administration

Question: In the short term are we talking about restoring full British administration to the Islands to the point of having the Governor back on the Islands?

Answer: We are indeed talking about the restoration of British administration, we have taken no decision about the Governor himself and his return. Clearly that is a possibility, but there are other possibilities too. I don't think necessarily we will go back to exactly what existed before. There are other possibilities which we are considering and you can't take a final decision about it until we know the exact circumstances in which the Islands are re-possessed. It may be, miraculously, by a withdrawal. It may be after a very short battle with a surrender of troops. It may be after a much longer battle than people are hoping for and we can't tell. And we've got to wait for that moment before deciding exactly what decisions we ought to take in relation to the administration which we shall put back there once re-possession has been achieved.

No humiliation

Question: Foreign Secretary, you've made it very clear that by their backing, their coming down strongly on Britain's side, and by the assurances you've got after this trip from President Reagan and from the Secretary of State, Mr Haig, that the Americans are still supporting Britain in this. May I put to you what I perceive to be one American concern which is that we don't appear to humiliate the Argentines, or Argentina?

Answer: We've never had a wish to humiliate them. I think they should have withdrawn earlier. All we are interested in is re-possessing British territory which is inhabited by British citizens and humiliation isn't in our mind. And we haven't actually got a real argument with the Argentinian people except insofar as they are responsible for having a government with which we are in very deep dispute and military dispute. But "humiliation" has never been any part of our vocabulary, any more than "unconditional surrender" has been any part of our vocabulary.

It's British soil. Argentine forces ought not to be there and if they won't go voluntarily then they will have to be forced to go.



WILLIAM WHITELAW (HOME SECRETARY)

Transcript from BBC Radio 4, The World This Weekend. 13 June 1982.

PRESENTER: GORDON CLOUGH. ... So now Argentina's increasingly tenuous grip on the Falklands may be measured in hours rather than days, certainly in days rather than weeks. British administration is on the point of being restored. So the problem of what happens next is one which must be playing an even more urgent part in the deliberations of the Inner Cabinet. It was that problem I raised, this morning, with the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr William Whitelaw when I visited him this morning at his official home just outside London. But first Mr Whitelaw paid his tribute to the skill and the bravery of the men of the task force.

WHITELAW: It was obviously a remarkable operation and very, very skilful. Clearly, of course, we have got extremely skilful forces and I think this has become clear throughout the whole operation.

CLOUGH: And, as a Guardsman yourself, I should think you're pretty pleased with the way the Guards have come out of it?

WHITELAW: Well I'm hoping to hear even more, maybe, before long, as to how well they've done.

CLOUGH: But with Stanley, now, within only a few miles - presumably one must be thinking more about the future than about the immediate past - it seems very unlikely, doesn't it, that the Falklands can ever, now, return to the status quo ante - to the position that they were in before the Argentine invasion?

WHITELAW: Well, of course, it has been such an upset, clearly, there'll be a lot of stock-taking; a lot of time to sort things out. The Islanders have had a terrible time; they must be rehabilitated; they must be given encouragement for the future; they must be given a chance to say how they want to see their own future. But they won't be able to do that all at once.



Then there will be the security of the Islands and, clearly, that is going to fall on the British in the first instance. We would like to have other people associated with us if they would do so but, of course, we will have to bear, I believe, the main burden of the day.

CLOUGH: You said that you would like to have other countries involved. Do you think there's a real prospect of a multi-national force or anything of that kind?

WHITELAW: Well I wouldn't be sure of that but we have, obviously, hoped that, in various ways, the Americans would feel they could help us and no doubt they will be very prepared to consider what sort way they could help us and I think we've got to try and see that there is security for the Islands and that does involve more than us. We can provide it in defence terms but I think we'd want to see the Islands fitting in to the whole South Atlantic picture and if that could be done, sensibly, the Islanders do need some basic security which we, alone, would find it difficult to give them.

CLOUGH: Well Lord Shackleton's report, on the economic development of the Islands, has been taken off the shelf and dusted off. Could it be that Lord Shackleton, himself, might play some active role in the future of the Falklands; may be as some sort of interim Governor?

WHITELAW: Well clearly his report is very important. He has agreed to update it. What then happens, of course, is a matter between the Prime Minister and Lord Shackleton and it wouldn't be for me to comment.

CLOUGH: But one of the things that he laid great stress on in that report was the need for Argentine co-operation and that Argentina must have a role in the future of the Falklands. Now the Government (various members of the Government) seem to have said that there is



not, now, nor can there ever be - at least for a very, very long time indeed - any role for Argentina in the Falklands?

WHITELAW: Well, clearly, they have made it as difficult as they possibly can. First of all they invaded (an act of naked aggression) when they had been negotiating with us about the future. Then, when they were told by the United Nations to withdraw their forces, they refused to do so, have still not done so and we have had to repossess the Islands by force. That must, inevitably, change the whole situation. Argentina have really forfeited a great deal of the opportunities they had if they hadn't embarked on this mad scheme of invasion.

CLOUGH: It is said, despite that, that there is American pressure for talks - not tomorrow, not next week, but sometime not too far away - between Britain and the Junta about the future of the Falklands and the role of Argentina in it. Do you think we can ignore Argentina as a possible partner, of some kind, in the future?

WHITELAW : I don't think there has been that American pressure. Of course, before all this; and there was certainly American pressure to stop the Argentines ever invading the Islands in the first place on our behalf and on behalf of the world and that was very helpful. Then Mr Haig went through some very considerable efforts: always frustrated by the Argentines. I think they are anxious, of course, to see the whole of South America return to a sensible situation, naturally, but I don't think there's been any sort of pressure that you mention.

CLOUGH: Mr Whitelaw, the proponents of the conventional navy have seen the Falklands operation as a great vindication of their view that Britain needs a large, conventional surface fleet. The Prime Minister, when she was talking in Bonn, appeared to suggest, I think, that there might be a case for Britain taking on a rather different



role in NATO from the one she, at present, fulfills: increasing the fleet and may be withdrawing troops from BAOR. The Prime Minister didn't, in fact, say that in so many words but that could be an implication in what she said?

WHITELAW: We have, I understand, throughout the situation, fulfilled our military commitment to NATO and we are continuing to do so and I think our NATO allies are very grateful for that and it's important to say it. I've been talking about dust settling in the Falklands. Obviously dust has got to settle on defence policy here as well and I think it would be very unwise for the Home Secretary to start, at this moment of time, straying so far out of his area as to speculate on the exact parts of defence.

CLOUGH: There is an awful lot of dust to settle, actually, when it comes down to it, isn't there. When it comes down to it, there's a bit of dust to settle around the conduct of foreign policy over the last 20 years or so. There's a bit of dust to settle over the way that information has been disseminated or not as the case may be. Do you think we're going to get a whole series of rather dragging on inquiries?

WHITELAW: Well I very much hope not. One of the expressions I've always found valuable in politics is when you've had a great action with great stress and indeed taken, as I believe in the Prime Minister's case, with the most fantastic courage of any Prime Minister for a very long time. After it's all successful, as one prays it will be, then everybody gets their courage back. That's when they all start to quibble at one thing and another. It always happens; it's always the same; and they will. But if I was just to say 2 things. First, I think the criticisms of the



Foreign Office are very unfair. I believe everybody makes mistakes. Perhaps there were mistakes but I have a great admiration for the British Foreign Office and I think it ought to be said. As for the handling of news problems, that is immensely difficult. The primary objective of the Government must be for those men who are fighting on the spot; their interests must be paramount; the saving of their lives must be absolutely paramount and that must take precedence over every other piece of news management, in my judgement. There has been difficulty over the announcement of the casualties and much criticism. But that was felt, by those on the spot, not to give those figures of Bluff Cove would help them in the actions they were taking. I believe it is right for all of us - Ministry of Defence, Government and news media - to realise that that is the first objective.

CLOUGH: In just a moment, Mr Whitelaw, I'm going to be talking to a member of the Falkland Islands Council, Bill Luxton. Now he will have heard the reports from Argentina, as you will, that 2 civilians have been killed. It's an Argentine report, we don't know whether it's true. But there must be great anxiety, in the thoughts of Falkland Islanders who are outside the Falklands now, about the safety of their people who are, at the moment, in whatever numbers, in Port Stanley. Is there anything at all that the Red Cross can do or is being asked to do to make sure that those people are safe?

WHITELAW: Well I think that everything that could be done, from the British Government's point of view, is being done. The Falkland Islanders, of course, have endured great hardships and we would deeply regret if any of them were killed in Port Stanley. But these hardships, let's face it, have been imposed on those Falkland Islanders, from the very word go, by the Argentine.



et Plan.

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730 HRS, 14 JUNE 1982

Military Action

1. The Secretary of State for Defence has announced that British forces have been consolidating their successful attack on the high ground to the west of Port Stanley.
2. In the course of a naval bombardment in support of land operations, HMS Glamorgan was hit by enemy fire. Nine members of the ship's company were killed and seventeen injured.

ICRC: Civil Population

3. Argentine sources have reported that two civilians were killed and four injured during the course of recent hostilities around Port Stanley. We cannot be certain about these reports but sadly there is some evidence that they are true.
4. Both the British and Argentine Governments have now agreed to the ICRC's proposals for the establishment of a secure zone for civilians in Port Stanley. It will be based on the Anglican Cathedral.

MV Norland

5. More than 1,000 Argentine prisoners of war have been disembarked in Montevideo from Norland.

Emergency Unit

14 June 1982



CONFIDENTIAL

10276 - 1

OO PARIS  
GRS 565  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM FCO 141812Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE PARIS  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 361 OF 14 JUNE  
INFO PRIORITY BONN, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON.



YOUR TELNO 620: FALKLANDS: FRENCH ATTITUDE

1. THE MAIN LINES OF YOUR DISCUSSION WITH GUTMANN WERE ALL TOO ACCURATELY FORECAST IN YOUR LETTER OF 9 JUNE TO BULLARD (NOT TO OTHERS). IT IS IMPORTANT TO DEAL FIRMLY WITH GUTMANN AND OTHERS WHO ARGUE SIMILARLY.

EVEN IF COMPREHENSIBLE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THEIR OWN SELF-INTEREST, THE FRENCH ATTITUDE IS DEPLORABLE. IT IS ALL TOO LIKELY THAT ONCE PORT STANLEY IS RECAPTURED, THERE WILL BE SIMILAR PRESSURES FROM OTHER ALLIES TO AGREE TO FACE-SAVING FORMULAE. WE SHALL NEED TO MAKE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT SUCH A POLICY IS UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

2. YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE CLEAR THAT OUR OBJECTIVE THROUGHOUT HAS BEEN TO DEMONSTRATE THAT AGGRESSION DOES NOT PAY. THIS OBJECTIVE WILL NOT HAVE BEEN ATTAINED UNTIL THE ARGENTINE FORCES HAVE WITHDRAWN ENTIRELY FROM BOTH EAST AND WEST FALKLAND. WE HAVE NO WISH TO HUMILIATE THE ARGENTINES, WHO CAN END THE FIGHTING AT ANY TIME THEY CHOOSE BY AGREEING TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES WITH DIGNITY. BUT ANY CEASEFIRE WHICH LEAVES THEM IN POSSESSION OF BRITISH TERRITORY WILL BE A VICTORY FOR THE ORIGINAL USE OF ARGENTINE FORCE. WE ASSUME THAT NONE OF OUR ALLIES WOULD ENDORSE THAT, PARTICULARLY THE FRENCH WHO HAVE THEIR OWN OVERSEAS TERRITORIES TO PROTECT, AND WOULD CERTAINLY ACT JUST AS WE ARE DOING IN SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES.

3. A CEASEFIRE BEFORE THE ISLANDS ARE COMPLETELY LIBERATED WOULD ALSO MAKE AN EVENTUAL RESUMPTION OF THE CONFLICT CERTAIN. IT IS QUITE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT THE ARGENTINES, IF LEFT IN POSSESSION OF TERRITORY, COULD THEN BE TALKED INTO RELINQUISHING

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IT VOLUNTARILY. THEY WOULD TRY TO INSIST ON WHOLLY UNACCEPTABLE CONCESSIONS FROM US, AND SUCH POSSESSION WOULD PREJUDICE UNACCEPTABLY THE SAFETY OF OUR FORCES. A CEASEFIRE COULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE AND EFFECTIVE ONCE ALL ARGENTINE FORCES HAVE WITHDRAWN.

4. YOU SHOULD FURTHER MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THERE CAN BE NO PROSPECT OF ANY EARLY RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINES ON THE SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTE AS IF NOTHING HAD HAPPENED. THIS WOULD BE QUITE UNACCEPTABLE AFTER ALL THE BRITISH BLOOD THAT HAS BEEN SHED IN DEFENCE OF THE ISLANDS. THE ARGENTINES HAVE HAD THEIR OPPORTUNITY TO WORK FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT: THEY CHOSE TO USE FORCE INSTEAD.

THE REQUIREMENT NOW IS FOR A PERIOD OF REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION. THE ISLANDERS WILL NEED TO ADJUST TO THEIR NEW SITUATION AND TO CONSIDER THEIR WISHES FOR THE FUTURE. THERE WILL ALSO BE THE ESSENTIAL NEED FOR A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE IN BUENOS AIRES. WE ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE POSSIBLE DANGERS FOR RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA (THOUGH WE BELIEVE THESE TEND TO BE EXAGGERATED) AND WE SHALL NATURALLY BE DOING AS WE CAN TO MINIMISE THESE. BUT OUR FIRST COMMITMENT MUST BE TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS AND TO THOSE WHO HAVE DIED DEFENDING THEM. WE WANT A PEACEFUL AND LASTING SETTLEMENT, AS DO OUR FRIENDS. BUT IT CANNOT BE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PRINCIPLES THAT WE HAVE GIVEN SO MUCH TO DEFEND.

5. WITH REFERENCE TO PARA 6 OF YOUR TUR, WE SHALL BE SENDING YOU SEPARATELY ADDITIONAL HISTORICAL BACKGROUND MATERIAL. HOWEVER YOU SHOULD NOT ENCOURAGE DISCUSSION OF THE RELATIVE MERITS OF THE RIVAL SOVEREIGNTY CLAIMS BEFORE 1833. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THE FACT OF 149 YEARS OF CONTINUOUS AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BY THE BRITISH.

PYM

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

LIMITED  
 HD/EMERGENCY UNIT  
 HD/S AM D  
 HD/DEF D  
 HD/PLANNING STAFF  
 HD/UND  
 HD/NEWS D  
 ED/ERD  
 ED/ECD (E)  
 ED/PUSD  
 DEP ED/PUSD  
 HD/RES D  
 PS  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/MR ONSLOW  
 PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
 PS/PUS  
 MR BULLARD  
 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR GILLMORE  
 MR URE  
 MR BARRETT

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 PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG  
 PS/SIR M PALLISER  
 PS/SIR A DUFF  
 MR WADE-GERY  
 MR FULLER  
 MR O'NEILL  
 HD/ASSESSMENTS STAFF  
 MR COLVIN  
 DIO

CABINET  
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MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
 ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD  
 SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE  
 DIRECTOR G C H Q



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10280 - 1

OO WASHINGTON  
GRS 440  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM FCO 141930Z JUNE 82  
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1168 OF 14 JUNE

FALKLAND ISLANDS: US HELP WITH THE REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS

1. IN DISCUSSIONS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN LAST WEEK, THE PRIME MINISTER RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE REPATRIATION OF ARGENTINE PRISONERS OF WAR (POWS). SHE SAID THAT WE WOULD FACE DIFFICULTIES IN HANDLING LARGE NUMBERS OF POWS AFTER THE RECAPTURE OF PORT STANLEY. SHE ADDED THAT WE HOPED THAT THEY COULD BE USED AS A BARGAINING COUNTER TO PERSUADE THE ARGENTINES TO AGREE TO A LASTING PEACE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. REFERRING TO THE SERIOUS LOGISTIC PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN HANDLING SUCH A LARGE NUMBER OF PRISONERS, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR US ASSISTANCE AND HOPED WE COULD MAKE A DETAILED REQUEST WHEN WE KNOW MORE CLEARLY WHAT HELP WE NEEDED. THE PRESIDENT INDICATED ASSENT.

2. WE HAVE NOT YET DECIDED HOW TO HANDLE THE QUESTION OF REPATRIATION. BUT, GIVEN THE LIKELY NUMBERS INVOLVED, WE MAY WISH TO SEND BACK A SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTION, WHILE FOR THE TIME BEING RETAINING AS POWS CERTAIN CLASSES OF ARGENTINE PERSONNEL (EG OFFICERS, NCOs, SPECIAL FORCES, TROOPS WITH TACTICAL KNOWLEDGE WHICH COULD BE OF USE TO ARGENTINE MILITARY COMMANDERS). IN THE MEANWHILE WE THINK IT WOULD BE WISE TO REMIND THE AMERICANS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WE INTEND TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THEM AS SOON AS THE SITUATION IS MORE CLEAR CUT.

3. GRATEFUL THEREFORE IF YOU WOULD SPEAK ON EARLIEST SUITABLE OCCASION TO HAIG (OR EAGLEBURGER). YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE WELCOMED REAGAN'S EXPRESSION OF READINESS TO HELP US WITH REPATRIATION. GIVEN THE NUMBERS INVOLVED, WE SHOULD CERTAINLY NEED HELP WHEN THE TIME CAME. AT THIS JUNCTURE HOWEVER WE WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO GIVE THE AMERICANS A CLEAR INDICATION OF

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THE NUMBERS OF POWS LIKELY TO BE INVOLVED IN REPATRIATION, NOR OF THE MOST PROMISING COLLECTION POINTS OR TRANSIT ROUTES. MUCH WOULD DEPEND UPON THE CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE TIME, INCLUDING OUR ABILITY TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE AND SUITABLY GUARDED FACILITIES FOR INTERNMENT. NEVERTHELESS, OUR PREDICTION WAS THAT THE NUMBERS COULD BE CONSIDERABLE AND THAT WE MIGHT SEE ADVANTAGE IN REPATRIATING AT A RELATIVELY EARLY STAGE LOW GRADE PERSONNEL, IN PARTICULAR RECRUITS.

3. PLEASE TELL THE AMERICANS THAT AS SOON AS THIS PICTURE IS CLEARER WE SHALL GET IN TOUCH WITH THEM AGAIN. IN THE MEANTIME WE WOULD HOPE THAT THEY COULD GIVE SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHT TO THE LOGISTIC PROBLEMS OF REPATRIATING SEVERAL THOUSAND ARGENTINE PRISONERS. IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL TO KNOW NOW WHAT KIND OF PRACTICAL HELP THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO GIVE.

PYM

FAULKLANDS SELECTIVE [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

LIMITED

HD/EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/S AM D  
HD/DEF D  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/UND  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/ERD  
HD/ECD (E)  
HD/PUSD  
DEP HD/PUSD  
HD/RES D  
PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/LORD BELSTRAID  
PS/PUS  
MR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE  
MR BARRETT

COPIES TO  
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HD/ASSESSMENTS STAFF  
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FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION)  
0700 HRS, 14 JUNE

Civilian Population: Port Stanley

A (FCO telno  
234 to Geneva)

1. We informed the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) of our agreement to their proposal that a neutralised zone be established at Port Stanley. The ICRC subsequently informed UKMIS Geneva that Argentina had also agreed; a copy of the Argentine note will be sent to London later today.


2. UKMIS Geneva understands that in their note the Argentines agree:

- (a) to the zone as proposed by the ICRC; i.e. the Anglican Cathedral and surrounding area;
- (b) to protection in the zone without distinction of person;
- (c) that there shall be no military material or supplies within the zone other than those of casualties carried in;
- (d) to advise the civilian population of the establishment of the zone.

3. The ICRC will make detailed arrangements for the establishment of the zone (including an ICRC presence) as quickly as possible.

B (MOD signal  
132130Z)

4. MOD have informed our Forces in the South Atlantic of the establishment of the neutral zone.



P R Fearn  
Emergency Unit

14 June 1982



DE RBDWC 1720 1042177

ZNY CCCCC

R 132130Z JUN 82

FM MODUK


TO RBDEC/CTF 317

INFO RBDWDF/A/FCC LONDON

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SIC 19F



1. UK AND ARGENTINA HAVE NOW BOTH AGREED TO ESTABLISHMENT OF QUOTE NEUTRAL ZONE UNQUOTE AT PORT STANLEY IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 15 OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1949 PD IN ADVANCE OF ICRC ESTABLISHMENT OF ZONE FOLLOWING SHOULD BE PROMULGATED IMMEDIATELY AS BEING EFFECTIVE:

- A. ZONE WILL COMPRISE CATHEDRAL AND AREA BOUNDED BY ROSS RD AND JOHN, DEAN AND PHILOMEL STREETS.
- B. ZONE INTENDED TO GIVE SHELTER TO WOUNDED AND SICK WHETHER COMBATANT OR NON-COMBATANT, NON-COMBATANT CIVILIANS AND UNARMED ARGENTINE MILITARY PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE FOR ORGANISATION, ADMINISTRATION, CONTROL AND FOOD SUPPLY OF ZONE. UK WOULD REGARD INVOLVEMENT OF ARGENTINE PERSONNEL IN ACTIVITIES CONNECTED WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS AS BREACH OF CONDITIONS OF ESTABLISHMENT OF

PAGE 2 RBDWC 1726 C O N F I D E N T I A L

NEUTRAL ZONE.

- C. ZONE IS NOT TO CONTAIN MILITARY MATERIEL OR SUPPLIES EXCEPT ARMS TAKEN FROM WOUNDED INSIDE ZONE.
- 3. UNDERSTAND STANLEY LOCAL AUTHORITIES WILL NOTIFY THE ABOVE TO THE POPULATION IMMEDIATELY.
- 4. ICRC WILL HAVE PRESENCE IN PORT STANLEY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND DELEGATES FUHRER, DESMEULES AND AVRIL WILL ESTABLISH AND TAKE CHARGE OF ZONE

BT



R.R.  
UNCLASSIFIED

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13 JUN

OO UKMIS GENEVA DESKBY 140800Z

GRS 294

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 140800Z

FM FCO 131715Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 234 OF 13 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (SIC I9F), BRASILIA AND UKMIS NEW YORK  
MY TELNO 232: ICRC PROPOSAL FOR A NEUTRALIZED ZONE IN PORT  
STANLEY

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF OUR FORMAL AGREEMENT TO THIS PROPOSAL WHICH YOU SHOULD DELIVER TODAY TO THE ICRC.
2. QUOTE THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS PRESENTS ITS COMPLIMENTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS AND HAS THE HONOUR TO REFER TO THE ICRC NOTE OF 12 JUNE 1982 REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEUTRALIZED ZONE AT PORT STANLEY IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.
3. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AGREES UNRESERVEDLY TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEUTRALIZED ZONE AT PORT STANLEY UNDER THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS SET OUT IN THE ICRC NOTE OF 12 JUNE.
4. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM UNDERSTANDS AND ACCEPTS THE NEED, IN THE PRESENT SITUATION IN PORT STANLEY, FOR UNARMED ARGENTINE MILITARY PERSONNEL TO BE ABLE TO ENTER THE NEUTRALIZED ZONE FOR THE PURPOSES SET OUT IN THE PENULTIMATE SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 15 OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR OF 12 AUGUST 1949. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM MUST, HOWEVER, MAKE CLEAR THAT IT WOULD REGARD IT AS A BREACH OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEUTRALIZED ZONE IF SUCH PERSONNEL WERE TO ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES CONNECTED WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS.
5. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TAKES THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ASSURE THE ICRC OF ITS COMPLETE SUPPORT AND ACTIVE CO-OPERATION.
6. THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AVAILS ITSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW TO THE ICRC THE ASSURANCES OF ITS HIGH CONSIDERATION. UNQUOTE.

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Trade to  
A/C of  
9/6  
Refers

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Can I take it that you do not  
wish Lord Cockfield to follow  
up the idea of a consultancy on  
projects for tourism and his other  
ideas for the time being?

Await Lord Shackleton's  
report before further action?

Yes - but  
think someone for A.S.C. - 14/6  
Trade should see  
Lord S. before his  
report is completed  
MGB





FWE

RM

10 DOWNING STREET

cc: Ho Def  
FO CO  
CD B.ingham

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

14 June, 1982

RELEASE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE CAPTURE OF DARWIN AND  
GOOSE GREEN

The Prime Minister has seen and noted your Secretary of State's minute of 11 June about allegations in the media that the Government released operational information about the capture of Darwin and Goose Green which was damaging to British Forces in the Falkland Islands.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD(SA) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

C. A. WHITMORE

D Omand, Esq  
Ministry of Defence

285



SITUATION REPORT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER AS AT 1200A SUN 13 JUN 82

1. This brief updates the events in the Falklands reported since 0830A Sat 12 Jun 82.

OWN FORCES

2. Surface. 3 ships carried out Naval Gunfire Support operations night 11/12 June. Glamorgan fired 147 rounds at 6 targets in support of 45 Cdo assault on Two Sisters. Fire was effective with 3 enemy machine-gun nests destroyed, and 4 120mm mortars subsequently captured. Avenger and Yarmouth fired 200 salvos at targets in Port Howard and Stanley area; all were on target, enemy casualties were reported and ammunition dumps exploded.

3. Land

a. Phase 1 of the attack on Stanley began at 120001Z June. It involved a night move and silent attack supported by naval gunfire engaging targets further East. Initial surprise was achieved but there was stiff fighting as final objectives were taken. All units of 3 Cdo Bde are firm on high features Mt Longdon, Two Sisters and Mt Harriet. First, unconfirmed, casualty figures are thought to be 19 killed and 80 wounded. 300 prisoners taken, including CO 4 Inf Regt.

b. Ten enemy were captured 15 miles NE of San Carlos. They were in a poor condition and assessed to be remnants of company flushed from San Carlos on D Day.

4. Air. A Vulcan (supported by 13 Victor tankers and 1 Nimrod) attacked Stanley airfield at 0845Z yesterday with 21 x 1000lb bombs. The crew assessed the attack as good and bombs were seen to detonate. However later photo recce, though limited by cloud, revealed no further damage and it is possible that the target was missed.



INCIDENTS

5. At 0637Z yesterday, whilst withdrawing from the gun-line, Glamorgan was struck by a suspected Exocet from the shore South of Stanley. Fires broke out in the after end of the ship causing damage. These were extinguished and the ship rejoined the main group at 22 kts. There are believed to be 9 dead, 1 VSI and about 13 other casualties.

ACCIDENTS

6. None were reported.

CASUALTIES

7. It is confirmed that 2 civilian women were killed by offensive action at Stanley.

8. The casualty summary in the 24 hours to 1200Z yesterday (excluding the Assault and Glamorgan figures but including those from the LSLs) are:

Killed	59	(Total 282)
VSI	1	(Total 2)
SI	5	(Total 12)
Reported	263	(Total 524)

INTENTIONS

9. Overnight 12/13 June 2 PARA take Wireless Ridge.  
 10. Undertake remaining phases of attack on Stanley (timings not known, but Phase 2 suspended for 24 hours):

- a. Phase 2. Capture of Tumbledown Mt and Mt William by 5 Inf Bde.
- b. Phase 3. Attack Sapper Hill.

OTHER MATTERS

11. Neutral Zone. Although we are signifying our agreement to a Neutral Zone round Stanley Cathedral, Argentina has not yet stated her concurrence.



SECRET

12. Notice. 1st Bn Queen's Own Highlanders has been placed at 48 hrs notice to move from 1200Z on 17 June in case it becomes necessary to reinforce the Land Forces.



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (39)

PS  
PS/MR JURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

HD/PUSD (2)  
HD/S Am D  
HD/DEFENCE D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/ERD  
HD/ECD(E)  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF

EMERGENCY UNIT  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/No 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
MR ILETT } TREASURY  
MR LITTLER }

MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO }

~~Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET~~

[Passed to E.R.]  
[Typists a.a.]

IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 131704Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2118 OF 13 JUNE  
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK.

HAIG/FALKLANDS

1. IN THE COURSE OF A TELEVISION INTERVIEW TODAY WHICH DWELT MOSTLY ON THE MIDDLE EAST (SEE MIFT), HAIG WAS ASKED BRIEFLY ABOUT THE FALKLANDS.

2. HE SAID THAT THE U S POSITION REMAINED FIRMLY BASED ON UNSCR 502, INCLUDING ITS CALL FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION ABOUT INDICATIONS THAT THE UK WAS CONSIDERING FORTIFYING THE ISLANDS AND CONFERRING SOME KIND OF INDEPENDENCE UPON THEM, HAIG SAID THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO SAY HOW BRITISH POLICY WOULD DEVELOP. THERE WOULD BE QUOTE AN OPEN MENU UNQUOTE AFTER THE ARGENTINES HAD WITHDRAWN: HE NOTED THE PRIME MINISTER'S VIEWS ON THE NEED FOR ECONOMIC REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT TOGETHER WITH THE RESTORATION OF THE LOCAL DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURES: HE ADDED THAT THE PROBLEM WOULD ULTIMATELY HAVE TO BE SOLVED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIPS BETWEEN THE US, UK AND LATIN AMERICA AND IN A WAY WHICH ENSURED STABILITY AND JUSTICE.



2. HE SAID THAT THE U S POSITION REMAINED FIRMLY BASED ON UNSC 502, INCLUDING ITS CALL FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION ABOUT INDICATIONS THAT THE UK WAS CONSIDERING FORTIFYING THE ISLANDS AND CONFERRING SOME KIND OF INDEPENDENCE UPON THEM, HAIG SAID THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO SAY HOW BRITISH POLICY WOULD DEVELOP. THERE WOULD BE QUOTE AN OPEN MENU UNQUOTE AFTER THE ARGENTINES HAD WITHDRAWN: HE NOTED THE PRIME MINISTER'S VIEWS ON THE NEED FOR ECONOMIC REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT TOGETHER WITH THE RESTORATION OF THE LOCAL DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURES: HE ADDED THAT THE PROBLEM WOULD ULTIMATELY HAVE TO BE SOLVED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIPS BETWEEN THE US, UK AND LATIN AMERICA, AND IN A WAY WHICH ENSURED STABILITY AND JUSTICE.

THOMAS

NNNN



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (39) 45

PS (6)  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE  
HD/PUSD (2)  
HD/S Am D  
HD/DEFENCE D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/ERD  
HD/ECD(E)  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF

**FLASH**

PS/No 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
PS/CHANCELLOR }  
MR ILETT } TREASURY  
MR LITTLER }  
MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY  
SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO  
Room 8 FOR MODUK ~~CINCPLEET~~

EMERGENCY UNIT  
RESIDENT CLERK

[Passed to E.R.]  
[Typists a.a.]

GRS 160

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS GENEVA 131500Z JUN 82

TO F-L A S H FCO

TELNO 315 OF 13 JUNE

INFO FLASH BRASILIA, IMMEDIATE MODUK (SIC19F) ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 189 TO BRASILIA: CIVILIANS IN PORT STANLEY

1. WE HAVE PUT THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED NOTE UN TUR TO ICRC.

2. IN VIEW OF THE DELICATE STAGE OF THEIR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINIANS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEUTRAL ZONE, ICRC WOULD PREFER US NOT (NOT) TO SEND SUCH A NOTE AT THIS STAGE. THEY RECOGNISE THAT THEY CANNOT PREVENT US FROM DOING SO BUT WOULD WISH US TO BE AWARE THAT THE PHRASE "THE UK HAS BEEN PRESSING" COULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES. ANY HINT OF COLLUSION BETWEEN THE UK AND ICRC WILL AROUSE ARGENTINE SUSPICIONS AND MIGHT CAUSE THEM TO REFUSE THE NEUTRAL ZONE PROPOSAL.

3. ONE ALTERNATIVE YOU MAY HAVE CONSIDERED WHICH WOULD MEET THE REQUIREMENT IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF TUR AND ICRC PREOCCUPATIONS, WOULD BE TO ASK THE BRAZILIANS TO ENSURE THAT THE ARGENTINIANS ARE MADE AWARE IMMEDIATELY OF THE ICRC PRESS RELEASE (TEXT IN MET)



3. ONE ALTERNATIVE YOU MAY HAVE CONSIDERED WHICH WOULD MEET THE REQUIREMENT IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF TUR AND ICRC PREOCCUPATIONS, WOULD BE TO ASK THE BRAZILIANS TO ENSURE THAT THE ARGENTINIANS ARE MADE AWARE IMMEDIATELY OF THE ICRC PRESS RELEASE (TEXT IN MIFT) AND OF OUR POSITIVE REACTION TO THE ICRC NOTE OF 12 JUNE.

4. SEE MIFT

MARSHALL

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 13/1525Z IM/JM

LB 00013 NEW ACW1

OO WODAW (PICTOE)

SS 05081717

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FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP : 0730 HOURS, 13 JUNE 1982

Military Action

1. The Secretary of State for Defence has announced that a night attack was carried out on 11 June on Argentine positions to the west of Port Stanley. Advances of up to 5 miles have been made. British casualties are believed to be light.

ICRC : Civilian Population

2. The ICRC have made further proposals about the establishment of a secure zone in Port Stanley. These are being considered by both the British and Argentine Governments.

13 June 1982

Emergency Unit



FALKLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION) : 0700 HOURS, 13 JUNE

Civilian Population in Port Stanley

1. The Argentines have claimed that two civilians were killed and a further four injured during a British naval bombardment of Port Stanley. The Falkland Islands Office heard from a radio ham in the Islands that two women were killed and one injured. We have been unable to obtain any confirmation.

2. Early this morning, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delivered a Note to UKMIS Geneva in which they sought our immediate agreement to the establishment of a neutral zone in Port Stanley; the zone would consist of the Anglican Cathedral and surrounding area.

3. The Note points out that under the terms of Article 15 two types of persons are entitled to be protected within a secure zone:-

(a) wounded or sick combatants or non-combatants;

and,

(b) members of the civilian population.

However, the Note also included a third category which is not mentioned in Article 15. This would appear to include Argentine personnel who would assist the ICRC Representatives to set up and operate the secure zone. UKMIS Geneva assume that these Argentines would be medical personnel whose main purpose would be to tend the sick and wounded. The presence of Argentines would, however, go against our specific request that no Argentine military personnel should be present within the secure zone.

4. The ICRC have sent a similar request to the Argentine Government and have undertaken to transmit to us Argentine agreement as soon as this is received. They have given a similar undertaking to the Argentines. A copy of this Note has also been transmitted to the three ICRC personnel at present on board 'HMS Hydra'.

5. UKMIS Geneva will telegraph the full text of the Note later this morning. The Note emphasises, however, that the ICRC require an immediate response.

Alleged Attack on Argentine Hospital Ship

6. The Argentines have alleged, in a Note passed to us by the Brazilians, that the hospital ship 'Bahia Paraiso' was attacked in Port Stanley Harbour. An ICRC Representative who was on board the 'Bahia Paraiso' at the time of the alleged attack has now stated that the hospital ship was not attacked.

/ French Attitude

A: (Brasilia  
telno.272 to  
FCO)

B: (Hecla  
Signal No.  
121916Z)

C: (Hydra  
Signal No.  
122220Z)



French Attitude

D: (Paris tel.  
No.620 to FCO)


7. When Sir John Fretwell called on the Secretary-General at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 11 June, M. Gutmann reiterated French views on the need for us to show magnanimity after the recapture of Port Stanley. He said that a time would come when Britain might no longer find friendly understanding. He added that it might be possible for Britain to come to an arrangement with the Argentines without driving them off the last square metre of the Islands. The atmosphere between Europe and Latin America could be poisoned for years if Britain did not seize the right moment to begin working towards a solution. The Argentines would obtain more and more support. The UK would in the end be isolated. What Britain said and did after recovering Port Stanley would be crucial. Sir John Fretwell thinks that there is a feeling abroad, not limited to the Quai, that Britain should call a halt to the fighting after Port Stanley and begin negotiations which will include concessions on sovereignty. There is also a disposition to accept the Argentine case on sovereignty and to regard transfer as a matter of time. The French are likely to continue to argue for early face-saving concessions.

Comment

8. An early response is needed to the ICRC on their formal proposal for a neutral zone. It should be possible to find wording which gives enough flexibility for the organisers in Port Stanley, while ensuring that the Argentines do not gain military advantage from the zone.

9. Unless the ICRC Representative can get ashore again in Port Stanley, it seems unlikely that the ICRC channel will provide us with early information on the possible civilian deaths. There will be intense pressure for Government comment today. Any press release could perhaps make use of our good position on the ICRC and the neutral zone proposal, together with the refutation of the claim that we attacked the 'Bahia Paraiso'.

13 May 1982

  
R M Jackson  
Emergency Unit



MODUK

12 JUN 1982

3  
4

GRS 210


RESTRICTED

FM BRASILIA 121315Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 272 OF 12 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA, MODUK(DS11, DS5 SCPL(1) )



(33)

TELECON PERCEVAL-GOSNEY

FALKLANDS: ARGENTINE PROTEST OVER BAHIA PARAISO

1. FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION FROM SPANISH OF ARGENTINE NOTE NUMBER 935/82 IN WHICH THE BRAZILIAN AUTHORITIES ARE ASKED TO PASS TO HMG THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE:-

QUOTE THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA WISHES TO REMIND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF THE CLEAR DISPOSITIONS OF THE SECOND GENEVA CONVENTION WHICH REFERS IN ITS ARTICLE 22 TO THE PROTECTION TO BE AFFORDED TO HOSPITAL SHIPS.

THE DEEPEST CONCERN OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN AROUSED BY THE ATTACK CARRIED OUT BY BRITISH AIRCRAFT ON THE ARGENTINE HOSPITAL SHIP "BAHIA PARAISO" AT A TIME WHEN THIS WAS MOORED AT PUERTO ARGENTINO, WITH WOUNDED ON BOARD, AND WHILE A COMMISSION FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, WHICH HAD BEEN TRANSPORTED BY THIS HOSPITAL SHIP, WAS CARRYING OUT ITS MISSION IN THE TOWN.

THE BRITISH AIRCRAFT FIRED TWO MISSILES, ONE OF WHICH STRUCK NEAR THE HOSPITAL SHIP, WHILE THE OTHER WENT WIDE, CAUSING SERIOUS DAMAGE TO A NEARBY HOUSE BELONGING TO A LOCAL INHABITANT.

CONFRONTED WITH AN ACT OF THIS KIND, WHICH FAILS TO RESPECT THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND CONSTITUTES A CLEAR VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA IS OBLIGED TO DENOUNCE THIS ACTION. UNQUOTE.

HARDING



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N8710

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1936

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Sat Auto  
DSS  
DOW  
NO60(2)  
8. (BF)

UDUW

O 121916Z JUN 82

FM HMS HECLA  
TO CINCFLEET  
INFO ZEN/SS UGANDA.  
ZEN/HMS HYDRA

BT  
UNCLAS  
SIC 19F

1. REPORT ON BBC RADIONEWS THIS MORNING STATES THAT ARGENTINES SAID A BRITISH AIRCRAFT HAD LAUNCHED TWO MISSILES AGAINST A HOSPITAL SHIP NEAR PORT STANLEY
2. HAVE JUST SPOKEN TO MR EBERLIN (ICRC) WHO WAS ONBOARD BAHIA PARAISO AT THAT TIME. HE STATES THAT THERE WAS NO SUCH ATTACK ON BP BUT THAT ONE MISSILE WAS SEEN TO DESTROY EMPTY HOUSE NEAR HOTEL AND OTHER TO LAND IN WATER. HE IS HAPPY TO BE QUOTED TO THIS EFFECT.
3. MR EBERLIN NOW IN HYDRA AND IF FURTHER INFO REQUIRED SUGGEST HE BE CONTACTED BY MARISAT TELEPHONE LINK.

BT  
ACT FOO 012

LOLP

RUSH

NNNN

25 TO FOO

B15  
121916




**CLAIMED ATTACK ON  
BAHIA PARAISO.**

FOR PREPARATION OF ACTION/INCIDENT MESSAGE  
(SIGNAL/TELEPHONE/IRIDIUM)

*(Handwritten mark)*

- CID
- YON
- ACMS(O)
- ACMS(OP)
- CCP
- ENST
- ETA
- EMV
- POE
- DES
- DUTY CAPT
- DUTY CDR
- NSAG CO-ORDINATOR
- DSC CO-ORDINATOR
- DEARIST
- NORC

12 JUN 82



1 COPIES OF FOO

122349JUN82  
000 0490 FOO

163A1312\* 304 122326 JUN 82 11 MDE

O P 122220Z JUN 82  
FM HMS HYDRA  
TO RDEUC/CINCPAC  
INFO RBDPNT/CIG 317.8  
BT  
UNCLAS  
SIC 14F

FOUR 19F 121943Z JUN 82  
1. HYDRA PASSED WITHIN ONE MILE BAHIA PARAISO AND SHE WAS EXAMINED BY AT LEAST TWELVE MEN THROUGH BINOCULARS. NONE SAW ANY SIGN OF DAMAGE.  
2. HELO CARRIED OUT PHOTOGRAPHIC TRIP. STANDARD OF PHOTOGRAPHS FROM ALL ANGLES GOOD. NO DAMAGE VISIBLE.  
3. ICRC REPRESENTATIVES MR EBELIN AND MR FUHRER WITH BAHIA PARAISO FORWARDING REPORT TO GENEVA WHENCE COPY MAY BE OBTAINED. THEY STATE IN REPORT QUOTE WHEN EVENT OCCURRED BOTH WERE ASHORE AND BAHIA PARAISO WAS OUT OF SIGHT. THEY HEARD SEVERAL EXPLOSIONS AT SHORT DISTANCE. THEY WERE THEN INFORMED THAT ONE HOUSE WAS HIT AND ONE SHELL FELL INTO HARBOUR. AFTER RETURNING TO BAHIA PARAISO ICRC DELEGATES COULD CONFIRM THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO SHIP UNQUOTE.

ACTION \*FOO  
\*\*\*\*\*

\*FLLO \*DIO \*SMZ  
LGC PCC FMC ADC FNF FOU MCD CFI CGS COF FWA(O2) FCO FAD FMO FRM FOA  
FOR FUE FES FOL

UNCLASSIFIED

*(Handwritten signature)*



FO 03/12

AD

OO FCO

RR WASHINGTON

RR BONN

RR UKMIS NEW YORK

GRS 600

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 121115Z JUN82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 620 OF 12 JUN82

INFO WASHINGTON BONN UKMIS NEW YORK

12 JUN 1982

11	12	1
10		2
9	→	3
8		4
7	6	5

28

MY TELNO 610 (NOT REPEATED) : FALKLANDS; FRENCH ATTITUDE

1. IN THE COURSE OF MY CALL ON HIM YESTERDAY (11 JUNE) GUTMANN, SECRETARY GENERAL AT THE QUAI, REITERATED FRENCH VIEWS ON THE NEED FOR THE UK TO SHOW MAGNANIMITY AFTER THE RECAPTURE OF PORT STANLEY.

2. WHEN I WARNED HIM A PROPOS OF THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE ARMS EMBARGO THAT THE ARGENTINES WERE TALKING IN TERMS OF CONTINUING HOSTILITIES AFTER PORT STANLEY, GUTMANN SAID THE FRENCH REALISED THIS. HOWEVER HE HAD TO TELL ME THAT A MOMENT WOULD COME WHEN BRITAIN MIGHT NO LONGER FIND THE SAME FRIENDLY UNDERSTANDING. HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT THE UK ATTITUDE WOULD BE AFTER PORT STANLEY. HE REFERRED TO MITTERRAND'S STATEMENT (MY TELNO 610) THAT THE ARGENTINES SHOULD NOT BE HUMILIATED.

3. I SAID WE HAD NO INTENTION OF HUMILIATING THE ARGENTINES; IT WAS SIMPLY A MATTER OF RECOVERING THE WHOLE OF THE FALKLANDS AND PREVENTING FURTHER ATTACKS ON OUR FORCES. THE QUESTION WAS RATHER ONE OF WHETHER THE ARGENTINES WOULD TRY TO KEEP UP THEIR ATTACKS.



4. GUTMANN QUERIED THIS. IT OUGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR BRITAIN TO COME TO SOME ARRANGEMENT WITH THE ARGENTIVES WITHOUT DRIVING THEM BY FORCE OFF THE LAST SQUARE METRE OF THE ISLANDS. THE ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICAN COULD BE POISONED FOR YEARS IF BRITAIN DID NOT SIEZE THE RIGHT POLITICAL MOMENT TO BEGIN WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION. THE ARGENTINES WOULD OBTAIN INCREASING SUPPORT. LATIN AMERICA AND THE THIRD WORLD WOULD PROGRESSIVELY RALLY BEHIND THEM AND THE UK WOULD IN THE END BE TOTALLY ISOLATED. I SAID THIS WAS A MISREADING OF THE SITUATION. THERE

5. DORIN, DIRECTOR FOR THE AMERICAS, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT, ASKED WHETHER WE WOULD BE READY TO NEGOTIATE ON THE FUTURE OF THE FALKLANDS, OR DID WE NOW INTEND TO KEEP THEM FOREVER? I REPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE NOW THAT WE HAD PAID A HEAVY PRICE TO END THE ARGENTINE OCCUPATION. WE WOULD ULTIMATELY WANT A MODUS VIVENDI IN THE REGION BUT I COULD NOT FORESEE THE FORM OR CONTENT OF AN EVENTUAL NEGOTIATION. GUTMANN COMMENTED THAT IT WAS A MISTAKE TO TRY TO DECIDE IN ADVANCE WHAT WOULD EMERGE FROM A NEGOTIATION; THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO START TALKING. DORIN ALLUDED TO OUR INTENTION TO HOLD ARGENTINE PRISONERS UNTIL A CEASE-FIRE AND ASKED IF WE DID NOT FEAR THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD RETALIATE BY HOLDING BRITISH SUBJECTS IN ARGENTINA. I SAID THAT I HOPED THE REGIME WOULD STILL HAVE SUFFICIENT CONCERN FOR ITS INTERNATIONAL POPULATION TO REFRAIN FROM TAKING CIVILIAN HOSTAGES.

6. GUTMANN REPEATED THAT THE UK MUST NOT HUMILIATE THE ARGENTINES. WHAT BRITAIN SAID AND DID AFTER RECOVERING PORT STANLEY WOULD BE CRUCIAL.

7. COMMENT. THE DEPUTY DIPLOMATIC ADVISER AT THE ELYSEE HAD SPOKEN TO US IN SIMILAR TERMS ON 16 JUNE. THERE IS CLEARLY A FEELING ABROAD, WHICH IS NOT LIMITED TO THE QUAI, THAT BRITAIN SHOULD CALL A HALT TO THE FIGHTING AFTER PORT STANLEY AND THEN INITIATE SOME FORM OF NEGOTIATION WHICH WOULD INCLUDE CONCESSIONS ON SOVERIEGNTY. THERE IS ALSO A DISPOSITION TO ACCEPT THE ARGENTINE CASE ON SOVERIEGNTY AND TO REGARD AN EVENTUAL TRANSFER EVEN NOW AS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME. THE POINTS I PUT TO GUTMANN SHOULD HAVE MADE SOME IMPRESSION ON HIM BUT WE MUST EXPECT THE FRENCH TO CONTUNUE TO ARGUE FOR EARLY FACE-SAVING CONCESSIONS.



B. I DO NOT THINK WE CAN AVOID DETAILED ARGUMENT ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY FOR MUCH LONGER. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE IN RESERVE A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORICAL DOSSIER WHICH WE CAN DRAW ON AS NECESSARY TO REFUTE ARGENTINE ARGUMENTS WHICH EVIDENTLY COMMAND SOME FRENCH SYMPATHY. WE CAN MAKE THE OBVIOUS DEBATING POINTS ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO FRENCH AND OTHER FRONTIERS IF THE HISTORY OF THE LAST 150 YEARS WERE BRUSHED ASIDE, BUT DOCUMENTATION FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO 1833 MAY ALSO BE REQUIRED.

FRETWELL

NNNN

SENT AT 121207Z SM/DA

CAN I HAVE A RERUN OF PARA 4. LINE 10  
TO PARA 5. PSE KKK

YUPP TIC

WERE SIGNS THAT EVEN SOME OF THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES WERE TAKING  
THEIR DISTANCE NOW ARGENTINA'S DEFEAT LOOKED

LIKELY

5. DORIN, DIRECTOR FOR THE AMERICAS, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT ASKED

ETC ETC OK K

THATS GREAT TA KK

OK AND JUST TWO MORE THEN ID PRAPS LIKE TO SEE SOME DAYLIGHT ??  
K IN OTHER WORDS GO HOME BUT ILL LET H OF S DECODE WHILE I SEND



ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

PS C6)  
 PS/HURD  
 PS/MR ONSLOW  
 PS/PUS  
 PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
 MR BULLARD  
 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR GILLMORE  
 MR URE  
 MR BARRETT  
 HD/S AM D  
 HD/DEF D  
 HD/PLANNING STAFF  
 HD/UND  
 HD/NEWS D  
 HD/ERD  
 HD/PUSD  
 MR REED, PUSD  
 EMERGENCY ROOM  
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)  
 PS/S OF S DEFENCE  
 PS/HOME SECRETARY  
 PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)  
 PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL  
 PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER  
 PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG  
 PS/SIR M PALLISER  
 PS/SIR A DUFF  
 MR WADE-GERY  
 MR FULLER  
 MR COLVIN  
 MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-  
 MENTS STAFF  
 DIO  
 MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
 ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD  
 DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

CABINET  
 OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LIMA 121825Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 237 OF 12 JUNE .

1. AT A PRESIDENTIAL RECEPTION LAST NIGHT FOR THE JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER, THE PERUVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TOLD ME THAT COSTA MENDEZ HAD JUST SPOKEN BY TELEPHONE TO SAY THAT THE ARGENTINES WERE READY TO WITHDRAW, IF ONLY QUOTE SOME SUITABLE FORMULA COULD BE FOUND UNQUOTE. DR. ARIAS ASKED ME TO CALL ON HIM THIS MORNING TO SEE IF SOMETHING COULD BE WORKED OUT. I LATER SPOKE TO THE PRESIDENT TO LET HIM KNOW THE MEETING HAD BEEN ARRANGED.

2. WHEN I CALLED ON DR. ARIAS THIS MORNING HE REPEATED THAT COSTA MENDEZ HAD SAID THE ARGENTINES WERE READY TO COMPLY WITH UNSCRS 502 AND 505 FOLLOWING A CEASEFIRE WITHIN THE SORT OF FRAMEWORK EVISAGED IN THE ORIGINAL DRAFT INTERIM AGREEMENT. DR. ARIAS ALSO SAID THAT COSTA MENDEZ WAS READY TO TRAVEL ANYWHERE AND MEET ANYBODY IF A SUITABLE FACE-SAVING FORMULA COULD BE DEvised. IN KEEPING WITH THE POSSIBILITY DR. ARIAS WONDERED IF THERE WAS ANY POINT IN SUGGESTING



UNSATISFACTORY FACE-SAVING FORMULA COULD BE DEvised. IN KEEPING WITH THE POSSIBILITY, DR. ARIAS WONDERED IF THERE WAS ANY POINT IN SUGGESTING THAT A MEETING COULD TAKE PLACE IN PERU WITH A VIEW TO EVOLVING THE KIND OF ARRANGMENT ENVISAGED.

3. I REMINDED DR. ARIAS THAT ALL THE CONCESSIONS MADE IN THE DRAFT INTERIM AGREEMENT HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN AND THAT OUR IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE WAS TO REPOSSESS THE ISLANDS BY MILITARY MEANS IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. WHEN HE SPOKE ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF THE FINAL BATTLE, I SAID THAT WE HAD NOT ASKED FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER NOR DID WE WISH TO HUMILIATE ARGENTINA, AND THAT THE ARGENTINE TROOPS IN PORT STANLEY WOULD BE PERMITTED TO WITHDRAW WITH DIGNITY AND IN GOOD ORDER. AI ALSO GAVE HIM TO READ THE TEXT OF YOUR VERBATIM 103/82.

4. DR. ARIAS THEN ASKED IF A FORMULA COULD NOT BE DEvised WHICH WOULD RECONCILE THE ARGENTINE READINESS TO COMPLY WITH UNSCRS 502 AND 505 WITH OUR OWN WILLINGNESS NOT TO REQUIRE AN UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, TO AVOID A HUMILIATION AND TO PERMIT A DIGNIFIED WITHDRAWAL. HE WONDERED IF IT WAS POSSIBLE TO EVOLVE NEW ARRANGEMENTS ON THIS BASIS.

5. AFTER A LONG AND INCONCLUSIVE CONVERSATION IN WHICH HE SAID OUR POSITION HAD OBVIOUSLY HARDENED, REPEATED MORE THAN ONCE HIS BELIEF THAT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE BEST TO BREAK THE STALEMATE, AND IN WHICH I LEFT HIM IN NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR PRESENT POSITION, DR. ARIAS SUGGESTED I SHOULD REPORT OUR CONVERSATION IF I THOUGHT THIS MIGHT BE USEFUL. I SAID I WOULD DO SO, WHILST MAKING IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT I DID NOT REGARD THIS AS ANOTHER PERUVIAN PEACE INITIATIVE BUT RATHER AS AN INFORMAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS; AND I GAVE HIM NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ANY OF THESE IDEAS WOULD FIND FAVOUR WITH YOU AT THIS STAGE.

6. FCO PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY.



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

42  
~~39~~

**IMMEDIATE**

PS (6)  
 PS/MR D  
 PS/MR ONSLOW  
 PS/PUS  
 MR BULLARD  
 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
 LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
 LORD BRIDGES  
 MR URE  
 MR GILLMORE  
 HD/PUSD (2)  
 HD/S Am D  
 HD/DEFENCE D  
 HD/NEWS D  
 HD/ERD  
 HD/ECD(E)  
 HD/UND  
 HD/PLANNING STAFF  
 HD/WED  
 EMERGENCY UNIT ✓  
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/No 10 DOWNING ST (2) ✓  
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
 PS/CHANCELLOR }  
 MR ILETT } TREASURY  
 MR LITTLER }  
 MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY  
 SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
 SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
 MR WADE-GERY }  
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
 DIO }

~~Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET~~

[Passed to E.R.]  
 [Typists a.a.]

### ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 121115Z JUN82  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 620 OF 12 JUN82  
 INFO WASHINGTON BONN UKMIS NEW YORK

*mb.*

- MY TELNO 610 (NOT REPEATED) : FALKLANDS: FRENCH ATTITUDE
1. IN THE COURSE OF MY CALL ON HIM YESTERDAY (11 JUNE) GUTMANN, SECRETARY GENERAL AT THE QUAI, REITERATED FRENCH VIEWS ON THE NEED FOR THE UK TO SHOW MAGNANIMITY AFTER THE RECAPTURE OF PORT STANLEY.
  2. WHEN I WARNED HIM A PROPOS OF THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE ARMS EMBARGO THAT THE ARGENTINES WERE TALKING IN TERMS OF CONTINUING HOSTILITIES AFTER PORT STANLEY, GUTMANN SAID THE FRENCH REALISED THIS. HOWEVER HE HAD TO TELL ME THAT A MOMENT WOULD COME WHEN BRITAIN MIGHT NO LONGER FIND THE SAME FRIENDLY UNDERSTANDING. HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT THE UK ATTITUDE WOULD BE AFTER PORT STANLEY. HE REFERRED TO MITTERRAND'S STATEMENT (MY TELNO 610) THAT THE ARGENTINES SHOULD NOT BE HUMILIATED.
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2 LIKELY.

5. DORIN, DIRECTOR FOR THE AMERICAS, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT ASKED

ETC ETC OK K

THATS GREAT TA KK



RESTRICTED

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP : 0730 HOURS 12 JUNE 1982

ICRC Visit to Port Stanley

1. An ICRC Representative has visited Port Stanley and has proposed that a neutral zone under ICRC supervision be established in the Anglican Cathedral for the civil population. The ICRC are being informed of our agreement to this proposal.

12 June 1982

Emergency Unit

RESTRICTED



FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION) :  
0700 HOURS, 12 JUNE 1982

Civil Population in Port Stanley

A: (SS Uganda  
tel.111840Z)

1. A Representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has visited Port Stanley to consider means of protection of the civil population. According to a signal from the SS Uganda, the ICRC have proposed the establishment of a neutral zone in Port Stanley Anglican Cathedral for the civil population under ICRC protection. The local Argentine Commander, General Menendez, has agreed to this, subject to the approval of the Argentine and the British Governments. The UK Mission in Geneva has been instructed to inform the ICRC of HMG's agreement to the proposal.

B: (FCO telno.  
227 to UKMIS  
Geneva)

United Nations

C: (UKMIS New  
York telno.  
988)


2. The Secretary-General has informed Sir A Parsons that he has sent a member of his staff to Buenos Aires to give the Cardinal accompanying the Pope a full briefing on the Secretary-General's latest proposals for a settlement. Although the emissary has been instructed not to make direct contact with the Junta he is sure to have some official contact. While this move is awkward, the emissary is aware that the latest proposals are unacceptable to HMG, and Sir A Parsons hopes that he will not be party to the preparation of ceasefire proposals endorsed by the Pope and the Secretary-General which are accepted by the Argentines but which HMG would have to reject. Meanwhile HM Ambassador to the Holy See reports that the Pope seems likely to avoid any political initiative in the context of his visit to Argentina.

D: Holy See tel.  
No.37 to FCO)

Comment

3. The ICRC Representative who visited Port Stanley has also raised the possibility of an agreed evacuation of certain categories of civilians, notably the old, sick and very young. This will no doubt feature in the local discussions on modalities; we have no further information on these.

12 June 1982

  
R M Jackson  
Emergency Unit



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~~ZZ~~ \*\*\*\*\*ZZ RBDW DFA  
RBDNC 185 1621916  
ZNR UUUUU  
Z 111840Z JUN 82  
FM SS UGANDA  
TO RBDEC/CINCFLEET  
INFO RBDWC/MODUK  
RBDWC/MODUK NAVY  
RBDW DFA/FCO LONDON  
RBD FNJ/CTG 317.8  
RBDAPZ/CTG 317.1  
RBDNPB/COMAW  
ZEN/HMS HYDRA  
BT

EK  
ICRC  
146  
W

IC

11 JUN 1982

11 12 1  
5 2  
9 3  
8 4  
7 6 5

UNCLAS  
SIC 19F

REF A. MY 19F 111705Z JUN 82 (ICRC MOVEMENTS EX PORT STANLEY)  
(NOTAL)

1. BP SAILING PORT STANLEY WITH BOTH ICRC REPS EMBARKED (MR EBERLIN/MR FUHRER).
2. PORT STANLEY ARG COMMANDER (GEN. MEMENDES) REFUSES TO ALLOW MR FUHRER TO REMAIN WITHOUT ARG GOV APPROVAL WHICH HAS NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING.
3. ICRC HAVE PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT OF NEUTRAL ZONE IN PORT STANLEY ANGLICAN CATHEDRAL FOR CIVIL POPULATION UNDER PROTECTION OF ICRC. MEMENDES HAS AGREED SUBJECT TO APPROVAL BY HIS AND UK GOVERNMENTS.
4. THEREFORE ICRC MISSION LEADER (MR BERCHTOLD) INTENDS A. MR FUHRER RETURNS UGANDA THROUGH HYDRA WITH MR EBERLIN (REF PARA 2)  
B. WHEN/IF GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT REACHED 3 MEMBER TEAM (MR FUHRER/MR DESMUELES/DR J AVRIL) RETURN PORT STANLEY IN ARG HOSPITAL SHIP TO ESTABLISH NEUTRAL ZONE
5. MR FUHRER ADVISES 590 (4) BRITISH CIVILIANS REMAIN IN PORT STANLEY INCLUDING 100 (1) CHILDREN NO CIVIL CASUALTIES OR SERIOUS ILLNESS. MAJORITY OF CIVILIANS INTEND REMAINING IN PORT STANLEY DESPITE CURRENT SITUATION.

BT



E.R.

ICRC

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RESTRICTED

11 JUN 1982

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FM FCO 112230Z JUNE 82  
TO FLASH UKMIS GENEVA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 227 OF 11 JUNE  
INFO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA, UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUZ (SIC 19F)  
FALKLANDS: CIVIL POPULATION IN PORT STANLEY

1. WE HAVE HEARD FROM SS UGANDA THAT THE ICRC REPRESENTATIVES HAVE PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEUTRAL ZONE IN PORT STANLEY ANGLICAN CATHEDRAL FOR CIVIL POPULATION UNDER THE PROTECTION OF THE ICRC. LOCAL ARGENTINE COMMANDER, GENERAL MENENDEZ, HAS AGREED SUBJECT TO APPROVAL BY HIS AND UZ GOVERNMENTS. IF GOVERNMENT AGREEMENT IS REACHED A THREE-MEMBER TEAM WOULD RETURN TO PORT STANLEY IN AN ARGENTINE HOSPITAL SHIP TO ESTABLISH NEUTRAL ZONE.

2. PLEASE INFORM ICRC THAT HMG AGREE TO THIS PROPOSAL. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR EARLY INDICATION OF THE ARGENTINE REACTION. WE HOPE THAT THE ZONE CAN BE ESTABLISHED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND ARE CONTENT FOR THE ICRC TO WORK OUT THE MODALITIES ON THE SPOT.

3. WE PROPOSE TO ANNOUNCE DURING THE MORNING OF 12 JUNE OUR AGREEMENT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEUTRAL ZONE.

PYM



F0002/12

W F C O


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E.R. / W.N.

PP HOLY SEE

12 JUN 1982

GI 050



23c

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 120015Z JUN 82  
 TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 988 OF 11 JUNE 1982  
 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON,  
 INFO PRIORITY HOLY SEE.

MY TELNO 975: FALKLANDS: POPE'S VISIT TO ARGENTINA.

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SENT ME WORD LATE ON THE EVENING OF 11 JUNE THAT, FOLLOWING A FURTHER TALK WITH CASAROLI AND IN THE LIGHT OF THE POPE'S INTEREST IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S VARIOUS EFFORTS, THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD DECIDED TO SEND DE SOTO TO BUENOS AIRES TODAY (11 JUNE). DE SOTO'S BRIEF WAS TO CONTACT THE CARDINAL ACCOMPANYING THE POPE AND TO GIVE HIM A FULL BRIEFING ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS OF 5 JUNE.

2. DE SOTO HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED NOT (NOT) TO ESTABLISH DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES, BUT THE SECRETARY GENERAL HOPED THAT, THROUGH THE PAPAL PARTY, HE MIGHT OBTAIN SOME INDICATIONS OF THE PRESENT ATTITUDE OF THE JUNTA.

3. THIS IS TIRESOME. IT IS NAIVE TO SUGGEST THAT DE SOTO WILL NOT BE IN CONTACT WITH ROS IN BUENOS AIRES AND IF HIS MISSION BECOMES PUBLIC IT WILL AROUSE EXPECTATIONS ABOUT A NEW INITIATIVE BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL. BUT DE SOTO WAS PRESENT AT THE CONVERSATION REPORTED IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE AND IS IN NO DOUBT ABOUT THE VIGOUR OF OUR OPPOSITION TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS OF 5 JUNE, ABOUT WHICH I COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MORE BLUNT. I HOPE THEREFORE THAT HE WILL NOT BE PARTY TO THE PREPERATION OF CEASEFIRE PROPOSALS ENDORSED BY THE POPE AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL WHICH THE ARGENTINES WOULD ACCEPT BUT WHICH WE WOULD HAVE TO REJECT.

4. I DO NOT THINK THAT THIS IS A DOUBLE-CROSS BY THE SECRETARY



SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS OF 5 JUNE, ABOUT WHICH I COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MORE BLUNT. I HOPE THEREFORE THAT HE WILL NOT BE PARTY TO THE PREPERATION OF CEASEFIRE PROPOSALS ENDORSED BY THE POPE AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL WHICH THE ARGENTINES WOULD ACCEPT BUT WHICH WE WOULD HAVE TO REJECT.

4. I DO NOT THINK THAT THIS IS A DOUBLE-CROSS BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL. MY GUESS IS THAT DE SOTO WHO SEES THE POPE'S VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES AS A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO GET THE ARGENTINES TO ACCEPT AN HONOURABLE WITHDRAWAL HAS PERSUADED THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO LET HIM GO TO BUENOS AIRES IN THE HOPE OF BRINGING THIS OFF.

PARSONS

NNNN



GRS 237

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM HOLY SEE 111425Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 37 OF 11 JUN 82

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, AND ROME (ACTIONED)

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9 1 2  
8 7 6 5 4 3  
ACTION COPY  
POPE

YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS. 22 AND 522 TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

THE POPE'S VISIT TO ARGENTINA

1. TELEGRAMS UNDER REFERENCE REACHED ME ONLY AN HOUR BEFORE THE POPE'S AIRCRAFT WAS DUE TO TAKE OFF. EFFECTIVE ACTION WAS NOT PRACTICAL.
2. ALL THE EVIDENCE HERE SUGGESTS THAT THE POPE WILL ESCHEW ANY POLITICAL INITIATIVE. WE HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT HIS OFFICIAL CONTACTS WILL BE RESTRICTED TO AN ARRIVAL CEREMONY WHICH GALTIERI WILL ATTEND (AND AT WHICH WE ARE TOLD THERE WILL BE NO SET SPEECHES) AND A PRIVATE MEETING AT THE CASA ROSADA.
3. THE NUNCIO IN BUENOS AIRES IS SAID BY VATICAN RADIO TO HAVE TOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 9 JUNE THAT THE POPE'S VISIT WAS EXCLUSIVELY PASTORAL IN NATURE. VATICAN RADIO HAVE ALSO TOLD US THAT DURING THE BRIEF STOP IN RIO THE POPE REFERRED TO HIS VISIT TO BRAZIL IN 1980 AND SAID THAT THAT VISIT, LIKE THE ONE HE WAS ABOUT TO UNDERTAKE TO ARGENTINA, WAS MARKED BY ITS PASTORAL AND ECCLESIAL NATURE, AND HAD NO POLITICAL OVERTONES.
4. WHILST IT WOULD PROBABLY BE USEFUL TO BRIEF CARDINAL CASAROLI DURING HIS STAY IN NEW YORK IT IS NOT CERTAIN THAT HE WILL BE GOING TO BUENOS AIRES TO JOIN THE POPE THERE. VATICAN SOURCES SUGGEST THAT HE IS LIKELY TO REMAIN IN NEW YORK FOR A DAY OR SO.

HEATH

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# Galtieri: no regrets

As the Argentine forces faced up to defeat around Port Stanley last week, President Galtieri gave his first major interview about the conflict to the author and journalist Oriana Fallaci

**Oriana Fallaci:** *President Galtieri, when you think of what you have done, I mean the hundreds of kids who have died and still have to die, I also mean the new detonator you have placed in this part of the planet, so now we haven't only the Middle East and the Persian Gulf as spots where the Third World War could light up, we have the South Atlantic too, tell me: don't you ask yourself if it was worth while; don't you ever say to yourself, maybe I made a mistake, don't you feel a regret?*

**Leopoldo Galtieri:** No, madam journalist.

*No? Yet it seems to me that there are not many reasons for you to be satisfied. In spite of all the triumphal songs and slogans, we hear through the Argentine TV "venceremos," "vamos a vencer," "we shall win," "we are about to win," the islands are practically back in the hands of the British and the time has come to consider the word that nobody here wants to pronounce: the word defeat.* No, madam journalist. The Malvinas are not back in the hands of the British. The British still have to capture them, and the result of the battle which is going to take place at Puerto Argentino is not so sure as you expect. I am much more optimistic than you. However, even if Puerto Argentino should fall as you say, I would not ask myself "was it worth while," even less would I think I had made a mistake. Remember when, in the Second World War, the British were defeated at Dunkirk? Well, in 1945 they were in Berlin.

Listen to me, madam journalist, not even the fall of Puerto Argentino would be the end of this conflict and our defeat. So, not even in such case would I feel regret. In fact I am not alone in believing that what we did on the second of April was right. The whole Argentine people believe it.

Madam journalist, for 149 years the Argentines have denounced the aggression by the British in 1831 when they stole the Malvinas, and for 17 years they have tried to settle the problem through diplomatic channels, through the United Nations. If the military events had not taken place on the second of April 1982, the same thing would have happened in April or May or June next year, or one of the following years. The British colonization

*was the driving necessity, the vital need of going there with the troops?*

A fortuitous event, madam journalist, something which happened during March in the South Georgia islands, the island of San Pedro to be exact, when 40 Argentines belonging to a private enterprise went there with a regular contract which had been accepted by the British. As soon as the 40 Argentines began to work, the British ambassador informed our Ministry of Foreign Affairs that if they did not leave immediately with their ships, they would be expelled by force. Well, it was more than another demonstration that Great Britain did not want to negotiate, to discuss. It was the straw that breaks the camel's back.

*Or a pretext for you, Mr President, a prefabricated one? Pretexts can be used or ignored. You used it because you were already determined to intervene militarily. So I rephrase the question: when did you put it in your head that taking the islands was a necessity, a vital need? When you became President, maybe?*


No, it was a preoccupation I always had. Not as obsessive as you insinuate, yet constant. In fact, not only as president but also as commander-in-chief of the army, before I was President, I used to repeat that nobody could accuse Argentina of having been impatient, of not having shown prudence. So, and as negotiations did not work, we had to find another way out.

*On the prospect of defeat: "Remember when the British were defeated at Dunkirk? Well in 1945 they were back in Berlin"*

*But apart from that underwater terrain, what is it that appeals to you so much in those ugly islands? Is it gold? Is it oil? Or the strategic location which might turn profitable the day the Panama Canal closes like Suez?*

You should ask Mrs Thatcher, who is dealing death to us and to her people because of those islands, and because of those islands has lost half her fleet. Go and ask her.

*Now I am asking you. Madam journalist, it's the sentiment. Not gold, not oil, not the strategic position; the*



*Hadn't your diplomats warned you that instead Mrs Thatcher would care? Or, forgive the frivolous parenthesis, were you encouraged by the idea that a woman would refuse the war? Because, in such case, Mr President, I remind you that Golda Meir and Indira Gandhi made their wars without hesitation and won them.*

No, no. I assure you that no Latin machismo ever touched me. Besides, should I say the contrary, I would also offend you, madam journalist.

*Well, I was asking that with an eye to the prehistoric insults and stupidities that the Argentine press dedicates to Margaret Thatcher: "chicken brain", "go back to knitting", "stay in your kitchen", and so on. And I wondered if you shared them.*

The press can say what it wants. Besides, humour and caricature belong to the Latin temperament. As you may have noticed, though, President Leopoldo Galtieri has never expressed himself in an unrespectful way towards Mrs Thatcher. Nor have the members of his government. Ever. My judgment of Mrs Thatcher is simple: I see her as politically inadequate to the historical moment that humanity is living in. But I say this referring to her as Prime Minister, not as a woman.

*Neither does Mrs Thatcher have a high opinion of you, Mr President. She calls you a*

*Americans is of helping dictatorial regimes like yours and it is a fact that Washington has never let you down. Not even during the Carter administration and its human rights campaigns. So something must have happened with Haig?*


The facts demonstrate that Mr Haig has not been a good mediator.

*Haig claims that the fault is yours because he did not know with whom to deal and when you said one thing the other generals said something else and that in this mess he did not know whom to listen to and he lost time for nothing. Even on the 502 Resolution, the one that asked the Argentines to withdraw, he claims you and your generals had different views. If it were not so, why would he have left in exasperation? Why would your foreign minister Costa Mendez have felt the need to apologize?*

Mr Haig came here with several assistants and we worked in this room or at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In both places we said the same thing: the 502 Resolution contained a series of consequences that we could not accept because Argentina had not shed one drop of English blood to take back the Malvinas and the British instead were attacking us, they went on sending their ships, they continued the hostilities during nego-



# rets, no going back



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opening up other horizons and the development of such openings is indisputable.

*In other words, you are discovering the Third World. You are discovering Simon Bolivar. Shall we believe it? The Argentines have always been so proud to consider themselves Westerners, Europeans, white. They have always felt a superiority complex towards other Latin American countries.*

I share your argument. There is no doubt that we felt very bound to North America and Western Europe. But just because of that we now feel so betrayed, so defrauded. Just because of that we are changing our foreign policy! Partial changes for the moment, maybe. Yet very important as you will see. Do believe it, madam journalist. Let the time flow and you'll see.

*Are you warning the Americans only or the Europeans also?*

We certainly did not expect the Europeans to wage sanctions against us.

*Yet, when one listens to the love declarations that Cuba and Nicaragua now pronounce for you, one remains kind of incredulous. And when one sees Costa Mendez kissing Fidel Castro one cannot help thinking that maybe it's a joke.*

One moment madam journal-

General Galtieri is becoming a member of the party. Nor is Fidel Castro becoming a member of the Argentine junta, I know. Yet he offers the junta his weapons, his help. By the way, will you accept them?

Right at this moment we don't need any military help. But if Great Britain puts Argentina in a situation which calls for military help, we will accept it from anybody.

*Which includes the Soviet Union, if I understand correctly, Mister President, your anti-Soviet crusade seems to be over and it's known that the Soviet ambassador has visited more than once both you and your Foreign Ministry. Does it mean that you would take his weapons too?*

If going that far is necessary, yes. I will turn to them too. Madam journalist, do you think I want to commit suicide?

*No, I don't. In fact you have bought weapons from the most different and extravagant dealers in these days. One is Gaddafi, who gave you the Exocets denied to you by Mitterrand. Another is Israel that has just given you other Mirages and missiles. Then there is Ecuador, there is Peru, there is Venezuela.*

The last ones are all brother countries. But why do you ask me things that for security reasons I cannot

matured both on an individual and a national basis. Freedom has been discovered. But shreds of those empires remain with residues of imperialistic behaviour, traces of colonialism which cannot be admitted in a civilized age, and against which we must rebel.

*Holy words, Mister President. However, they sound rather strange when pronounced by the representative of a regime which has not been shown to care about freedom. Yours is a dictatorship, Mr President, let's not forget it.*

I wouldn't call it dictatorship. Here people talk much more than in a democratic regime. Well, the system is not democratic... I agree. But neither is it as hard as in other countries which call themselves democratic

*A few weeks ago three foreign journalists were kidnapped, here in Buenos Aires, almost in front of the Foreign Ministry. They were robbed and terrorized, then abandoned naked outside the city. You know, everybody knows. Miraculously they returned alive. But very few people return alive from those kidnappings and...*

And such things offend Argentina. And because of this, President Galtieri receives the three journalists at one in the morning. Because of this, he apologizes in the name of the people and of the nation.

*If you think so, why did you put one of those killers' chiefs at the command of an outpost in South Georgia? I speak, just as an example, of the infamous Captain Astiz.*

Captain Astiz belongs to the Navy like the five hundred officers who hold his rank and responsibility. As such he found himself at that outpost in South Georgia when we took back the islands. Accusations against him must be proved, madam journalist, and as a democratic person you should know that.

*The proof exists in abundance, Mr President. If it were not so, Sweden and France would not have asked the British to hold him as a criminal. Sweden, for the sixteen-year-old girl who was arrested by mistake and tortured to death. France for the two nuns who were kidnapped, tortured and mutilated, then thrown into the sea from a helicopter. Because of this Captain Astiz calls them "the flying nuns". Then he laughs.*

Madam journalist, do you want to join the chorus of accusations which are spread abroad for international interests before the case of Captain Astiz is cleared?

*Of course I want, Mr President. But the accusations*

ment of an industrialisation which was not properly absorbed...

*Yes, but how can you establish a democracy after having wiped out thousands and thousands of opponents, after having deprived the country of all those young lives, those fresh brains? And if you really care for democracy, why do you keep saying that the secret ballot boxes are safely stored?*

Because they are: safely stored to be used again. If I didn't want to use them again, I would have burnt them. This is what I mean when I say it. The problem is that the journalists always take what they like or report in such a way that a phrase means the contrary. But let me answer what you said about the young lives, the fresh brains. They did not represent the opposition. Those people did not want to participate in any opposition. Now let's forget the past, madam journalist. Let's face the future instead.

*Well, the future looks rather dark for you, Mr President. Many people say that because of this war you will not remain president for long, so your days are numbered.*

No doubt this conflict will have international consequences also. For each of us, the leaders who are in charge and the leaders who are arising, it represents a source of rethinking which will bear its fruits. One would say that Argentina has matured all of a sudden because of the Malvinas and when the men now at war return, much will change. Because they too, they especially, will be ready for a political life which includes dissidence. I have been designated President until March 1984. Whether I shall remain at my place till then, I don't know. But I believe I will.

**On his own future:**  
"I have been designated President until March 1984. Whether I shall remain at my place until then I don't know, but I believe I will".

*Even if the war ends with a defeat?*

I told you that I don't foresee a defeat and that a military defeat wouldn't change anything. The Malvinas are not a personal aim of mine... of this government or of this regime. They are a national aim on which all the Argentines agree. So, whatever happens militarily, whatever



1982, the same thing would have happened in April or May or June next year, or one of the following years. The British colonization could not last any longer.

*I see. But why do you say colonization? Isn't it a fact that the 1,800 people who lived in the Falklands — pardon, the Malvinas — were and are British. Whom did the British colonize in this case — the penguins?*

They are all British because the British never permitted the Argentines to buy a piece of land there, to start a business, some kind of commerce or presence. If I go to Rome and I have the money to buy an apartment, to open a shop, to stay in Rome, the Italian authorities let me do so. The British instead kept these islands as a personal farm, and did not let any Argentine settle down.

*Listen, with the vast territory you have, the beautiful coasts, the fertile soil you possess, it's hard to understand why you cared to buy a piece of land in these desolate places where nobody likes to live but the sheep, the penguins and those British used to the cold and fog. But, speaking of colonialism, tell me: you are Italian, aren't you?*

Yes, I am of Italian descent. My grandparents were Italians. My grandmother came from Genoa and my grandfather from Calabria. They came here as poor workers with the wave of immigration which took place at the beginning of the century.

*So you are, colonizers too. Mr President, this country did not belong to the Spanish, to the Italians, to the Germans, the English, the French, the Europeans, the whites who came here and wiped out the natives, massacring them till the last tribe as had not been done even in North America. So why do you call the Falklands, pardon, Las Malvinas, colonies?*

Madam journalist, let's not go back that far in the past. Let's look at things as they are since the British stole the Malvinas from us. Let's observe where these islands are situated, how the underwater terrain extends itself in that area and connects the coast with the islands. One can easily see the natural correlation existing between them and the terra firma. Not only historically but geographically the Malvinas belong to us. So ours they must be; ours they will be.

*Mr President, I know that here children grow up learning that the real name of the Falklands is Malvinas, and the Malvinas are Argentine. Yet none of your predecessors had taken the step you took two months ago. Then a question arises: why did Galtieri do what the others had not done? What*

*Now I am asking you. Madam journalist, it's the sentiment. Not gold, not oil, not the strategic position; the sentiment of the Argentine nation since 1833. Don't you believe in the people's sentiment?*

*Mr President, I believe that unfortunately people's sentiment is almost always used as the recipient of less noble truths; political interests, financial or military interests, and more often the personal interests of those who command. Those desolate islands could make a good tool to unify a divided and unhappy country, to make it forget a monstrous international debt of 36 billion dollars, an inflation now almost grotesque, in other words the political and economic failures of the military regime you represent.*

I accept your argument because you are a journalist. If you were not a journalist, I promise you that I would not have permitted you to say all this. Because it hurts my principles, my good name, my military career, all that I have tried to preserve in my life. Never did I make the cold calculation you accuse me of. Never. The debt and the inflation had nothing to do with my decision. As a matter of fact, I can tell you that this conflict does not help the inflation and the debt. It is true instead that the Malvinas has helped to unify the Argentines and that it does so more and more. But the idea of obtaining this unification through war never crossed my mind, I swear and repeat.

*Many others have, Mr President. History teaches that when things go badly in a society, a country, those in power call for some war so the people get excited and forget all the failures, all the crimes, all the guilts of their rulers. Along with his megalomania, in 1940 Mussolini went to war just for this. Does the comparison offend you?*

Yes, madam journalist. It offends me a lot.

*Thank God. But if that cold calculation did not occur, then some miscalculations took place, Mr President. Or should I say illusions? To begin with, the illusion that Great Britain would not react, would not send its fleet so far away from home. Am I wrong?*

No, I'll tell you that though an English reaction was considered a possibility, we did not see it as a probability. Personally, I judged it scarcely possible and totally improbable. In any case, I never expected such a disproportionate answer. Nobody did. Why should a country situated in the heart of Europe care so much for some islands located far away in the Atlantic ocean; in addition, islands which do not serve any national interest? It seems senseless to me.

referring to her as Minister, not as a woman.

*Neither does Mrs Thatcher have a high opinion of you, Mr President. She calls you a fascist tyrant. Parenthesis closed. Now let's see the other miscalculation, the illusion that the Americans would not back up the British. By the way, didn't you know that Great Britain is one of the most important members of Nato?*

Madam journalist, the difference between South America and North America is that we South Americans consider ourselves Americans, that is, part of the American continent; the North Americans instead consider themselves as belonging to another hemisphere, the northern hemisphere. I feel much bitterness towards them, I must say, a tremendous deception. Because the Americans know very well that also as commander in chief of the army, that is, before I was President, I tried very hard to be near them and their administration, to re-establish a mutual understanding that during the previous administration had faded. Given the importance that the American continent has from a global strategy view, this not only in the present, but also in the future, and I would say in the future more than in the present, having good relations was more than indispensable and indeed the rapport I had personally established with the Reagan Government was excellent.

**On the sending of the Task Force:  
"I judged it scarcely possible and totally improbable"**

The same could be said for all the Argentine officials. We got along really well, we were supposed to do many things together in this continent. This is why I accepted without hesitation the name of Mr Haig when he offered to act as mediator. I mean, I didn't expect his approval or his support but I was sure that he would behave with balance and neutrality. What a disappointment then when he aligned himself with the British on the grounds that he couldn't bring the two parties to an agreement. The worst is that Reagan and his staff did the same. Indeed, both the Argentines and I see this as a betrayal.

*Mr President, a betrayal takes place when a promise exists, an obligation. Did the promise exist, an obligation between you and the Americans?*

The obligation was to assist the two parties and not one of the two. This means balance, neutrality.

*Tell me better. Because one of the charges which are often brought against the*

instead were attacking us, they went on sending their ships, they continued the hostilities during negotiations . . .

**On the press insults against Mrs. Thatcher:  
"No latin machismo ever touched me"**

*I still do not see the betrayal unless a promise existed, I mean unless the Americans knew before the 2nd April that you would intervene militarily. Did they? Mr President, it is just because your rapport was so good with the Reagan administration that I cannot believe that you did not inform Washington about your decision. Isn't it true that the Pentagon knew, that you had previously informed Vernon Walters?*

I know Vernon Walters. I am on very good terms with him. Yet I did not inform him. Nor did any members of my government. I am telling you that we never felt the necessity of asking someone else's permission to take back the Malvinas. Neither the Pentagon's permission, nor Reagan's permission, nor Haig's permission. I thought and we thought that we were old enough to take our own decisions, and besides: had the Americans known, we would never have invaded on April 2nd.

*Which means they would have tried to stop you. Or maybe they did and this is the reason why Haig was so annoyed? Mister President, how broken are your relations with the United States now?*

I wouldn't say broken, I would say very seriously damaged. So seriously that it will take a long time to sew them up together again. A long time. Years.

*So you are making new allies. Madam journalist, our natural allies are the Latin Americans. Yes, we look for larger contacts with the world to which we belong for history and cultural background. Political, commercial, financial contacts, and a better understanding. I must admit that until yesterday we didn't pay much attention to Latin America, to the reciprocal advantages that a better understanding with Latin America would have offered. So now we are*





Fidel Castro one cannot help thanking that maybe it's a joke.

One moment madam journalist, one moment. Costa Mendez goes to Havana because that is where the annual meeting of the non-aligned countries takes place, and at Havana Mr Castro is the host. Also, don't forget that Mr Castro has publicly expressed his support for us and our claims as president of the non-aligned countries, not as president of Cuba. So, when we thank him, we do so to the president of the non-aligned countries, not to the president of Cuba. Anyway, what else do you expect us to do while the blood of our soldiers flows? Do you expect us to thank the United States?

I expect nothing but to try to understand what is happening, Mr President. Because these new alliances are very surprising indeed, on both sides. They are not alliances. They are a political resetting of international relations. Alliances are another thing.

If you prefer, Mr President. The fact remains that thousands of people have been eliminated in Argentina under the accusation of being communist, Marxist, and it is rather baffling to see Fidel Castro and Costa Mendez hugging each other as if they had been together on the Sierra Nevada. Those dead must be turning in their graves.

Madam journalist, international relations change for interest rather than for laws. Unfortunately these things are inevitable, as the story of the world demonstrates. If the United States isolate Argentina both militarily and economically, if Europe does the same, if the West turns its back on us, and I say "West" between quotes, what other choices have we?

I don't need to remind you that ideological factors are not determinant motives in international combinations. Think of all the countries which are on good terms with their ideological enemies. The United States and China, for instance. They hug each other exactly as we do with Fidel Castro, and as Fidel Castro does with us. This does not mean that Argentina is turning communist, or that

Venezuela. . . The last ones are all brother countries. But why do you ask me things that for security reasons I cannot talk about?

Because you said that the complete fall of the islands would not mean the end of the war. Because your papers start speaking of total war. And I want to know if total war means internationalization of the war.

Total war means that, however things go militarily, Argentina does not give up her rights on the Malvinas, on South Georgia, and on the Sandwich Islands. It means that Argentina will never accept a return to where she was on the first of April. It means that we will not have peace until we have obtained what we want. I don't want the internationalization of the war, but such internationalization does not depend on me. It depends on Great Britain and the United States.

On the Argentine regime: "I wouldn't call it a dictatorship"

At the cost of involving the nuclear powers, at the cost of repeating what is happening in the Middle East, that is, transforming those islands into an Israel of the South Atlantic?

I am as worried as you are, madam journalist. And much more. Because my responsibilities don't exist only towards the Argentine people, they exist also towards the other countries. To tell you the truth, when I decided to regain the Malvinas, I did not expect to produce an event of world importance, I did not believe that it would have consequences in the international context. Now I see it has and I worry. But such worry should be felt by Mrs Thatcher too, and by Mr Reagan and by Mr Haig. You should say these things to them too. Moreover, Argentina does not attack; she simply answers the British attacks. So why don't Mrs Thatcher and Mr Reagan consider the danger that you ask me to consider?

I hope they do. I guess they do, but you are the one who started it Mr President. You are the one who attacked first. For Christ's sake Mr President, all over the world there are disputes over territories. What would happen if everybody resolved them as you did? We live in the atomic age, remember.

I do, but it is the nuclear powers which must be more open-minded and adapt themselves to the necessity for freedom that people feel today. Things have changed since the Second World War, empires have fallen, and the people's mentality has

erests before case of Captain Astiz is cleared?

Of course I want, Mr President. But the accusations have nothing to do with the international interests, and they don't come from abroad: they come from Argentina where the plague of the desaparecidos is a national shame which has lasted for years.

Madam journalist, in all the wars there are missing persons, desaparecidos. Can you imagine how many desaparecidos I have in this conflict? And think of desaparecidos in the Second World War a the time of Mussolini. What happened here during the obscure decade of the seventies was a war and I'm afraid that you ignore the facts of it. To shape an objective analysis you need to read some books. I'll send you some books on the subject.

I have read all too many books on the subject and you cannot compare the desaparecidos with the soldiers who die in the war, Mr President. A desaparecido is a person who gets kidnapped by paramilitary groups, then brought to some torture chamber of some military police, then tortured to death, mutilated and finally buried without name in a common grave or thrown in the sea, or in the river.

Madam journalist . . . here we are. Aca estamos. June 1982, to face the present and the future of the country.

Then let me say this: aren't you aware that the lack of support for Argentina in the West, in Europe for instance, also comes from the indignation we feel for these facts?

Good question, madam journalist. Good argument, I agree.

Then why do you answer that way? Wouldn't you like to belong to a more respected country where democracy exists and people can think and talk freely without being assassinated by some Captain Astiz?

Democracy is the utmost aspiration of President Galtieri, of his family, and of the majority of the Argentines; I believe. In fact a democratic life will be reestablished soon in Argentina. The law on the political parties has just been promulgated by the government and will pass next month. It will be the first step towards democracy. And when this happens I hope that the armed forces will not have to exercise any more the role they now hold. This is a complex country, you know. One should try to understand why certain things happen and why the military always had to take the situation in their hands — problems which include a sudden immigration at the beginning of the century, the social realities which arose from the world recession of 1930, the too rapid develop-

regime. They are a national aim on which all the Argentines agree. So, whatever happens militarily, whatever regime rules the country in the future, be sure that the Argentines will continue to fight for the Malvinas. They will not give up.

You don't give up, the British don't give up, and both of you get trapped in a mess where there is no way out. Some compromise will have to be reached, instead. What is wrong with accepting, for example, the United Nations flag on those islands?

I shall never get tired of repeating that we prefer a negotiated solution, that we look for a negotiated solution, that we favour a ceasefire, that this waste of lives on both sides must end, that all this must be reached through the United Nations. So many disputes have been settled through United Nations negotiations. Why shouldn't this one? Besides, it would serve other similar cases and avoid situations as unpleasant as the one which now involves Argentina and Great Britain. Yes; the United Nations flag is alright until the negotiations take place. But not after. Not in the future. The future must see the Argentine flag on the Malvinas. And it will.

How far away do you see this future with the Argentine flag?

We are talking about it, madam journalist.

Are you ready to wait for years?

Yes, but not 149 more years.

How many years, then?

We can talk about it madam journalist, we can talk about it. I am not against talking. I have been talking with you for more than two hours and I must go.

Then I'll leave you by going back to the question I put in the beginning. Why, for heaven's sake, why did you start this mess? Why didn't you wait as you now say you can do? The point is . . . Mr President, you are a general. Right? You are a soldier. You wear a uniform, right? So let me ask you: have you ever been in a war?

Well. . . Another kind of war.

No, no, no. I mean the war, the real war where they shoot and die. In combat.

No. . . I haven't. Not the conventional war.

I have. In three wars including the Vietnam war, as war correspondent. So I know what war is. I know what you don't know. The point is that wars are never made by those who declare them. Not even seen.

True enough. But you shouldn't say it only to me.

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Oriana Fallaci is an Italian journalist and author who has specialized in conducting lengthy interviews with some of the most powerful leaders in the world. Her subjects have ranged from General Giap to Henry Kissinger, Colonel Gaddafi to Golda Meir and Lech Walesa to Ayatollah Khomeini. Her most recent work in *The Times* was an interview February with the Polish Deputy Prime Minister, Mieczyslaw Rakowski.



● PART 23 ends:-



11.6.82

PART 24 begins:-

12.6.82



