

S  
806

PREM 19/637

Relations with Argentina

ARGENTINA

Position of the Falkland Islands

Pt. 1: Sept '79

Pt. 26: June '82

PART 26.

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>24.6.82</del> 25.6.82							
<u>- Pt Ends -</u>							
X							
PREM 19/637							

PART 26 ends:-

Berne tel: 189 25/6/82

PART 27 begins:-

Pm Canada to Pm T140/82 27/6/82  
~~FCO to Brussels tel: 171 28/6~~

## Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Document

The following document, which was enclosed on this file, has been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES.

Reference: OD (FAF) (82) 1st Meeting, Minutes,

Date: 22 June 1982

Signed CM Wayland Date 26 April 2012

**PREM Records Team**

file

da

7/7

gc DOT

Alan  
Thinks noted  
Key  
5/7

Sir John CLARK



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 June 1982

Key

Please return

to me [Signature]

Falkland Islands: Plessey

I copied to you earlier the exchange of correspondence between the Prime Minister and Sir John Clark about the rehabilitation and enlargement of the airport at Port Stanley. Copies were also sent to the Ministry of Defence, the Department of Trade and the Cabinet Office.

I shall assume, unless informed to the contrary, that the FCO will take the lead in providing a co-ordinated reply of substance to Sir John Clark. I think the Prime Minister would like to see a draft of this.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

085

CONFIDENTIAL



Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street. SW1P 3AG

01-233 3000

25 June 1982

The Rt Hon Francis Pym MC, MP  
Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary

Prime Minister

I believe that the Foreign Secretary will want to comment further. He felt that the Chancellor has missed the point. Money is being spent now in the Falklands (the MOD will reclaim expenditure on rehabilitation) so a decision on new money is needed now.

Await further minute from

Mr. Pym?

A.S.C. 25/6

New Secretary of State,

*Yes not*

REHABILITATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

I have seen a copy of your minute today to the Prime Minister.

As you say, initial rehabilitation work by the Armed Forces is already in hand. It may well be that further expenditure on rehabilitation of basic services in the Falkland Islands will impose too heavy a burden to be shouldered by the Aid Programme, without the provision of new money. But we can only make a judgement on that when we have a reliable assessment of what needs to be done.

As to expenditure on "urgently needed projects", if by this you mean investment in kelp, mutton, inshore fisheries, krill, etc, I really don't think we are yet in a position to take decisions on the economic and political merits of such major schemes. We must surely await the Shackleton Report, and appraise it carefully, if we are to avoid waste of resources, and consequent criticism.

In short, I think it would be premature to attempt to reach conclusions on these important issues just yet.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister and other colleagues on OD(FAF), and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours sincerely,  
*Geoffrey Howe*

pp.  
GEOFFREY HOWE

(Approved by the Chancellor  
and signed in his absence.)



PM seen

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

You may wish to await  
a comment from the  
Chancellor before intervening.

A.J.C. <sup>25</sup>/<sub>6</sub>

PM/82/50

PRIME MINISTER

Rehabilitation of the Falkland Islands

1. As you will know, Mr Hunt has been instructed to send an early assessment of what urgent action is required, both immediately and in the longer term. Once his assessment has been studied, and priorities established, we must be able to give the go-ahead quickly.
2. The initial rehabilitation work is being undertaken by the Armed Forces. There will clearly be overlap between military and civil programmes but responsibility for the bulk of the purely civil rehabilitation will fall on the budgets for which I am responsible. Initial estimates in OD(SA)(FE)(82)11 put the potential costs at between £10 and £40 million for essential, short-term work, and £80 to £100 million in the longer term. But these are guesses.
3. The FCO cannot cope with extra and unforeseeable financial burdens of any magnitude. There is simply no room in the programmes of the Diplomatic Wing. Nor can the Aid Programme, which would have to bear the lion's share of FCO expenditure, take this sort of strain within its existing provisions. The details are complex, but in brief the £30 million ODA contingency reserve for 1982/83 is already fully allocated: we have also had to use up the savings arising from the postponement of the Indian Steel Mill and smaller programmes. Among the demands we face are the concessions to Mrs Gandhi earlier this year. In 1983/84 and later years, as the Chancellor will know from recent correspondence on the broad Aid Strategy, pressure on the Aid vote will be even stronger.

/4.

CONFIDENTIAL



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4. If we are to avoid delaying urgently needed projects in the Falklands, money must be provided from the outset. This must mean new money for a major new commitment. Just as the principle has been established that the MOD will not be expected to meet from its regular budget the cost of the Falklands campaign and its aftermath, so it is clearly not possible for the regular budgets of the FCO wings to meet new and unexpected expenditure on this scale. I therefore propose that new money be allocated. I hope that you and other OD(FAF) colleagues can agree.
5. There may be advantage in setting up a special development fund (ie a block of money set aside for specific purposes, outside normal departmental votes) to finance proposals in the longer term such as those which Lord Shackleton may recommend. But the purpose of this minute is to concentrate on the much more pressing issue of where the money for immediate rehabilitation is to be found.
6. I am copying this to colleagues on OD(FAF).

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'FP', with a horizontal line underneath.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
25 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL



5 JUN 1982

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FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (42)

**IMMEDIATE**

PS  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/MR RIFKIND  
 PS/MR ONSLOW  
 PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
 PS/PUS  
 SIR J BULLARD  
 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR GILLMORE  
 MR URE  
 MR BARRETT  
 HD/S AM D  
 HD/FALKLANDS UNIT (2)  
 HD/DEF DEPT  
 HD/PLANNING STAFF  
 HD/UND  
 HD/NEWS DEPT  
 HD/ERD  
 HD/PUSD  
 MR REED, PUSD  
 EMERGENCY ROOM  
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)  
 PS/S OF S DEFENCE  
 PS/HOME SECRETARY  
 PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o No 10 DSt)  
 PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL  
 PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER  
 PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
 PS/SIR M PALLISER )  
 PS/SIR A DUFF )  
 MR A D S GOODALL ) CABINET  
~~MR FULLER~~ ) OFFICE  
 MR COLVIN )  
 MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS- )  
 MENTS STAFF )  
 DIO  
 MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
 ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD  
 DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BERNE 251550Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 189 OF 25 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK BRASILIA

INFO ROUTINE UKMIS GENEVA

YOUR TELNO 135: CESSATION OF FALKLANDS HOSTILITIES

1. IN AMBASSADOR HUGUENTOBLER'S ABSENCE ON LEAVE I CALLED THIS AFTERNOON ON HIS DEPUTY, RAMSEIER, AND CARRIED OUT YOUR INSTRUCTIONS, LEAVING MY SPEAKING NOTE.
2. RAMSEIER UNDERTOOK TO TRANSMIT URGENTLY TO SWISS AMBASSADOR THE MESSAGE IN PARA 2 AND 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM FOR COMMUNICATION TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD ALSO CONVEY PARA 4 TO THE AMBASSADOR FOR HIS OWN INFORMATION AT THIS STAGE.
3. SHORTLY AFTER I SAW RAMSEIER THE FOREIGN INTERESTS SECTION TOLD US ORALLY THAT THEY HAD JUST RECEIVED A TELEGRAM FROM BUENOS

3. SHORTLY AFTER I SAW RAMSEIER THE FOREIGN INTERESTS SECTION TOLD US ORALLY THAT THEY HAD JUST RECEIVED A TELEGRAM FROM BUENOS AIRES ABOUT FLT LIEUT GLOVER. THIS WAS TO THE EFFECT THAT , FOLLOWING THE SWISS AMBASSADOR'S LATEST REPRESENTATIONS ON 24 JUNE, KELLER SARMIENTO'S DEPUTY IN THE ARGENTINE MFA HAD INFORMED THE EMBASSY THAT ALL REPRESENTATIONS ABOUT GLOVER HAD BEEN SENT TO THE COMPETENT MILIATRY AUTHORITIES AND THAT IN VIEW OF THE CHANGES TAKING PLACE IN THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES ON THE MILITARY SIDE WERE BEING CONSIDERABLY SLOWED DOWN. THEY THEREFORE DID NOT EXPECT TO BE IN A POSITION TO GIVE A REPLY ABOUT GLOVER BEFORE THE NEW GOVERNMENT TOOK UP ITS FUNCTIONS ON 2 JULY.

4. THE ARGENTINE MFA HAD COMMENTED THAT NOT ALL ARGENTINE PRISONERS HAD BEEN REPATRIATED. THE SWISS AMBASSADOR, HAD CONFIRMED WITH THE LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ICRC THAT ALL WOUNDED ARGENTINE PRISONERS HAD BEEN REPATRIATED AND HAD USED THIS ARGUMENT IN HIS REPRESENTATIONS TO THE MFA.

POWELL-JONES

NNNN

SENT AT RECD AT 251632Z SAJ/MBI

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL 42

PS  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/MR ONSLOW  
 PS/MR RIFKIND  
 PS/PUS  
 SIR J BULLARD  
 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
~~MR WRIGHT~~  
 MR ADAMS  
 LORD N G LENNOX  
 LORD BRIDGES  
 MR URE  
 MR GILLMORE

~~HD/PUSD (2)~~  
 HD/S AM D  
 HD/FALKLANDS UNIT (2)  
 HD/DEFENCE DEPT  
 HD/NEWS DEPT  
 HD/ERD  
 HD/ECD(E)  
 HD/UND  
 HD/PLANNING STAFF  
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
 PS/CHANCELLOR )  
 MR ILETT ) TREASURY  
 MR LITTLER )  
 MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY  
 SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
 SIR M PALLISER )  
 MR A D S GOODALL ) CABINET OFFICE  
~~MR FULLER SAPU/DIO~~ )  
 DIO )

~~ROOM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET~~

(FM BERNE 261025Z)

FM BIS BUENOS AIRES

TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 ALSO TO IMMEDIATE MONTEVIDEO, SANTIAGO, BRASILIA, WASHINGTON,  
 UKMIS NEW YORK  
 RESTRICTED  
 FROM BISBA TELNO 184 OF 25 JUNE

PRESS SUMMARY AND POLITICAL SITUATION

1. BIGNONE'S PROMISE TO LIFT THE PROHIBITION ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY FROM THE DAY HE ASSUMES OFFICE ON 1 JULY AND TO HOLD ELECTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE DOMINATES TODAY'S HEADLINES. HIS MEETING LAST NIGHT WITH THE LEADERS OF FOURTEEN POLITICAL GROUPINGS (ONLY VICENTE SOLANO LIMA, LEADER OF THE PARTIDO CONSERVADOR POPULAR DECIDED NOT TO TURN UP) WAS APPARENTLY A GREAT SUCCESS. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE COUNTRY WOULD BE RETURNED TO DEMOCRATIC LIFE IN THE EARLY MONTHS OF 1984 AND PROMISED CHANGES IN ECONOMIC POLICY,

IMMEDIATE  
 ADVANCE COPY

DECIDED NOT TO TURN UP) WAS APPARENTLY A GREAT SUCCESS. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE COUNTRY WOULD BE RETURNED TO DEMOCRATIC LIFE IN THE EARLY MONTHS OF 1984 AND PROMISED CHANGES IN ECONOMIC POLICY, REFERRING APPROVINGLY TO THE ECONOMIC LINE PRESENTED IN THE MULTIPARTIDARIA'S PROGRAMME PUBLISHED YESTERDAY. STATEMENTS BY THE POLITICAL LEADERS AFTER THE THREE-AND-A-HALF HOUR MEETING AT WHICH EACH GROUP WAS ENCOURAGED TO EXPRESS ITS VIEWS, REFLECTED GENERAL SATISFACTION WITH THE ATTITUDE AND IDEAS OF THE PRESIDENT-DESIGNATE. THE JUSTICIALIST (PERONIST) LEADER DEOLINDO BITTEL IN PARTICULAR DEMANDED A POLITICAL TIME-TABLE FOR A GENERAL ELECTION BEGINNING NOW AND ENDING ON 30 JULY 1983. ALL POLITICAL LEADERS WERE UNANIMOUS IN THEIR DEMANDS FOR AN EARLY RETURN TO DEMOCRACY.

2. LA PRENSA TODAY ALSO REPORTS STATEMENTS BY NICOLAIDES AT A PLENARY MEETING OF GENERALS HELD ON WEDNESDAY PROMISING QUOTE TOTAL SUPPORT BY THE ARMY FOR GOVERNMENT ACTION TO ACHIEVE INSTITUTIONAL NORMALITY IN THE TIME AND ON THE CONDITIONS RECENTLY ANNOUNCED UNQUOTE.

3. CLARIN REPORTS AT SECOND HAND THAT BIGNONE TOLD THE POLITICIANS ON FOREIGN POLICY HE INTENDED TO INTENSIFY RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA AND THE NON-ALIGNED, MAINTAINING PRESENT POLICIES WITH THE EASTERN BLOC AND ADJUSTING RELATIONS WITH THE US TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES. HE REJECTED THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH BRITAIN ON THE ISLANDS, INDICATING THAT ARGENTINA'S SOVEREIGNTY CLAIM WOULD CONTINUE TO BE PRESENTED IN INTERNATIONAL FORA.

4. IGLESIAS ROUCO (LA PRENSA) IS LESS PESSIMISTIC TODAY ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF AN INTERNAL ARMY COUP BUT BELIEVES BOTH WASHINGTON AND LONDON ARE IN A POSITION TO INFLUENCE ARGENTINA'S POLITICAL FUTURE BY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT FOR THE QUOTE DEMOCRATISING UNQUOTE AGREEMENT WHICH MAY BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL PARTIES, THUS INCREASING THE PROSPECT OF STABILITY. QUOTE IF BUENOS AIRES NOW DECREES A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WITHOUT EVEN A MINIMAL NEGOTIATING RECOMPENSE FROM LONDON, THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT'S FUTURE WOULD BECOME MUCH MORE UNCERTAIN STILL UNQUOTE.

5. OVERALL THE SIGNS ARE MORE HOPEFUL THAT THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT MAY HAVE SERVED AS A CATALYST TO ACCELERATE MOVES TOWARDS DEMOCRACY HERE. THE OMENS AT LEAST ARE BETTER TODAY THAN FOR

A

A LONG TIME PAST. JOY.

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO TYPISTS]

42

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

**FLASH**

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
MR ILETT ) TREASURY  
MR LITTLER )  
MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY  
SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
SIR M PALLISER )  
MR A D S GOODALL )  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO ) CABINET OFFICE  
DIO )

HD/PUSD (2)  
HD/S AM D  
HD/FALKLANDS UNIT (2)  
HD/DEFENCE DEPT  
HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/ERD  
HD/ECD(E)  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
RESIDENT CLERK

ROOM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

GRS 700

CONFIDENTIAL

SANTIAGO DESKBY 252100Z

FM BERNE 251750Z

TO FLASH FCO  
TELNO 192 OF 25 JUNE  
AND TO IMMEDIATE SANTIAGO

JOURNALISTS IN USHUAIA

THE FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF A FLASH TELEGRAM WHICH THE SWISS FDFA HAVE RECEIVED FROM THE SWISS AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES AND PASSED TO US AT 1700Z HOURS GMT TODAY (25 JUNE) FOR ONWARD TRANSMISSION TO YOU:

1841

BEGINS

BEGINS

A.

IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FEDERAL PROCURATOR OF TIERRA DEL FUEGO, JUDGE SAGASTUME AT USHUAIA, HAS NOTIFIED BALABAN, THE LAWYER, OF HIS WRITTEN AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE RELEASE ON BAIL OF ONE HUNDRED MILLION PESOS FOR EACH OF THE JOURNALISTS, (IE A TOTAL OF ABOUT TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS AT THE OFFICIAL RATE).

2. THE JUDGE HAS ALSO AUTHORISED THE ABOVEMENTIONED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY ON AN UNDERTAKING TO RETURN AT HIS REQUEST IF THE COURT SHOULD REQUIRE IT, FAILING WHICH THEY WOULD FORFEIT THEIR BAIL AND THE RIGHT TO ENTER ARGENTINA FOR A PERIOD OF EIGHT YEARS.

3. BALABAN, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF MISS J. HILTON CORRESPONDENT OF THE SUNDAY TIMES WHO RECENTLY ACCOMPANIED HIM TO USHUAIA, IS AT PRESENT ENGAGED IN ARRANGING WITH A LOCAL BANK FOR THE NECESSARY FUNDS FOR THE PAYMENT OF BAIL, WHICH HE PROPOSES TO SEND PERSONALLY TO THE JUDGE AT USHUAIA ON MONDAY 28 JUNE, ON WHICH DATE HIS THREE CLIENTS WOULD BE SET FREE.

4. BALABAN WILL SEND US SHORTLY FOR THE ATTENTION OF THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES A COPY OF THE DOCUMENTS IN HIS POSSESSION RELATING TO THESE ARRANGEMENTS.

B.

WINCHESTER, CONTACTED BY TELEPHONE TODAY, HAS GIVEN US THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION. BECAUSE OF THE UNCERTAIN POLITICAL SITUATION, AND LEST THE AUTHORITIES IN BUENOS AIRES MIGHT BRING POSSIBLE PRESSURE TO BEAR TO CHANGE THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE LEGAL AUTHORITIES IN TIERRA DEL FUEGO, WISHES WITH HIS TWO COLLEAGUES TO LEAVE ARGENTINE TERRITORY VIA CHILE, IMMEDIATELY UPON THEIR RELEASE. THEIR PLAN IS AS FOLLOWS: LEAVE MONDAY 28 JUNE BY TAXI FOR SAN SEBASTIAN, (A FRONTIER TOWN WHERE THEY WOULD SPEND THE NIGHT SEMI COLON LENGTH OF JOURNEY ABOUT SIX HOURS ). THEN BY FERRY TO PUNTA ARENAS AND FROM THERE BY AIR TO SANTIAGO (ARRIVAL WEDNESDAY 30 JUNE), FOLLOWED BY DEPARTURE FOR LONDON THE SAME DAY IF POSSIBLE.

THE ABOVEMENTIONED ARE OF THE OPINION THAT TO RETURN TO BUENOS AIRES AND TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY FROM THAT CITY COULD GIVE RISE TO PUBLICITY

THE ABOVEMENTIONED ARE OF THE OPINION THAT TO RETURN TO BUENOS AIRES AND TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY FROM THAT CITY COULD GIVE RISE TO PUBLICITY WHICH COULD CAUSE THEN TROUBLE. WINCHESTER HAS ALSO INDICATED THAT THE LEGAL AUTHORITIES HAVE RETURNED THEIR PASSPORTS AND PERSONAL EFFECTS EXCEPT PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT, WHICH WILL BE RETURNED TO THEM WHEN THEY LEAVE PRISON. THE SUNDAY TIMES IN LONDON IS AWARE OF THIS PLAN AND READY TO MAKE THE NECESSARY RESERVATIONS FOR THE FLIGHT FROM SANTIAGO TO LONDON.

C.

DISCUSSION OF DAYER (COUNSELLOR IN THE SWISS EMBASSY) WITH BALABAN REGARDING THE PLAN FOR THIS JOURNEY.

BALABAN IS PREPARED TO ACCOMPANY HIS CLIENTS AS FAR AS SAN SEBASTIAN AND IF APPROPRIATE TO SANTIAGO. NOR DOES HE FORESEE DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAINING, FROM THE AUTHORITIES IN TIERRA DEL FUEGO, THE NECESSARY PROTECTION ON ARGENTINE TERRITORY, SINCE THESE AUTHORITIES HAVE IN HIS OPINION A GREAT INTEREST IN DISENGAGING THEMSELVES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FROM THIS DELICATE AFFAIRE.

IT SEEMS DESIRABLE THAT IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE MAXIMUM SECURITY ON CHILEAN TERRITORY

THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO SHOULD HANDLE THE ORGANISATION OF THE JOURNEY FROM SAN SEBASTIAN.

*Approved  
not*

D.

IN VIEW OF THE PARTICULARLY UNCERTAIN CONDITIONS HERE THIS PLAN SEEMS TO ME TO OFFER ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD TELEGRAPH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE POSITION OF THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES ON THIS MATTER.

BODMER

ENDS.

PCWELL-JONES

*Approve and do everything  
humanly possible to get the  
journalists home  
not*

NNNN

SENT AT RECD AT 251841Z SAJ/JB





10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

You may like to look at this  
paper again over the weekend.

2. It seems to me to be a  
serious contribution to thinking about  
future policy on the Fallowlands.

Would you like the paper - not  
the minute - to be circulated  
to ODSA or ODFAAF?

A.S.C.  $\frac{25}{6}$

I disagree profoundly  
with the underlying approach  
to the problem, but circulate  
it to ODFAAF for information  
my



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>637</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Coles to Prime Minister dated 25 June 1982.</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
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The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>637</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Letter from Piper to Rickett dated 25 June 1982, with enclosures.</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
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The box described as 'Missing' is for TNA use only (it will apply to a document that is not in it's proper place after it has been transferred to TNA)

File

25 June 1982

MESSAGE TO MR. TRUDEAU

The Prime Minister agrees that the message proposed in your letter of 24 June should be despatched.

A. J. COLES

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

R

*Jup*

25 June 1982

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BANDA

The Prime Minister agrees that the message proposed in your letter of 23 June may be despatched.

A. J. COLES

F.N. Richards, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*A*



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

25 June 1982

Dear John

I felt that I should write to you since I may have misled you during Questions on my visit to the United States of America in the House yesterday.

In answering your Question about Argentina's indiscriminate laying of mines in the Falkland Islands, I referred to a Disarmament Convention forbidding the laying of plastic mines, and said that Argentina was not a signatory of this Convention. I was referring to the United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which is known as the "Weaponry Convention", and I should have made it clear that this Convention is not yet in force, and that Argentina is in fact a signatory.

However, when the Convention comes into force, it will ban the use of plastic weapons intended to injure by fragments not

/ detectable

da



detectable by X-ray; and although what I said in the House yesterday is therefore not correct, I still think it is deplorable that Argentina should use plastic mines in the Falkland Islands when it has signed a Convention of this sort, even if it is not in force.

Yours

Raymond

---

Sir John Biggs-Davison, M.P.

*[Handwritten mark]*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

GRS 115  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM WELLINGTON 250035Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 208 OF 25 JUNE  
INFO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA AND WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 242 TO CANBERRA: ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA.

1. PRIME MINISTER HAS RULED ON THE SUBMISSION TO HIM (OUR TELNO 202) THAT THERE WILL BE NO NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA (IE SANCTIONS WILL REMAIN IN PLACE) UNTIL QUOTE THE BRITISH ARE SATISFIED THAT HOSTILITIES HAVE ENDED UNQUOTE. THERE IS NO OBJECTION TO YOUR SAYING AS NECESSARY, THAT YOU UNDERSTAND THIS TO BE NZG'S POSITION (SUBSTITUTING QUOTE NZG UNQUOTE FOR QUOTE BRITISH UNQUOTE IN PREVIOUS SENTENCE, BUT RECOGNISING NZ RELIANCE ON US TO PROVIDE THE PROOF), ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT YET BEEN EXPLICITLY STATED PUBLICLY HERE. SUBJECT WILL NOT (NOT) NOW GO TO CABINET ON MONDAY (PLEASE PROTECT).

2. AUSTRALIANS WILL BE AWARE OF MR MULDOON'S DECISION.

PRIESTLEY

FAKLANDS SELECTIVE [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

LIMITED

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HD/DEF D  
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HD/NEWS D  
→ HD/ERD HD/WED  
→ HD/ECD (E) HD/ERD  
→ DEP HD/PUSD  
HD/RES D  
PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
PS/PUS  
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SIR I SINCLAIR  
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MR BARRETT

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PS/SIR A DUFF  
MR ADS GOODALL  
MR FULLER  
MR O'NEILL  
HD/ASSESSMENTS STAFF  
MR COLVIN  
DIO

CABINET  
OFFICE

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DEI MOD  
SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE  
DIRECTOR G C H Q

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SECRET

Prime Minister. 5

Agree draft?



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Collyer  
Duty desk  
25/6/82

*Handwritten note:* Nepal - excellent  
mt

25 June, 1982

Dear John,

Falklands: Nepal

The Government of Nepal in its initial public statement on the Falklands condemned Argentine aggression and expressed the hope that the dispute would be settled peacefully and in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants. They have not wavered in this public support in spite of (a) the somewhat different positions taken up by their powerful neighbours, India and China, between whom they are normally careful to balance their interests, and (b) criticism by the Argentines who sought to brand the Gurkhas as mercenaries. The Argentines also made a démarche to them in New York requesting them to 'pull out' the Gurkhas; the Nepalese were annoyed.

Internally, opposition to the participation of the Gurkhas has been confined to a few pro-Soviet politicians and their newspapers (which have been given undue weight in the British press). There has been no significant popular opposition. Privately, the Nepalese, while expressing robust support, have been anxious for maximum information about the deployment of the Gurka troops, for defensive use in their own parliament (which we provided); they were also grateful for the material we gave them to enable them to rebut the 'mercenaries' charge. There have however been some signs of nervousness on their part: they have for example been closely monitoring the world press for all references to the Gurkhas and taking a fresh look at the 1947 Tripartite Agreements (Nepal, the UK and India) which govern our recruitment of Gurkhas. \*

\* Our Ambassador has reported that the Nepalese Prime Minister has exposed himself to some criticism in the country.

To sum up, the Nepalese have been resolutely supportive both in public and private in spite of pressures on them. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary therefore thinks it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister to send a warm message of appreciation to the Nepalese Prime Minister. This might have the additional advantage of pre-empting any tendency in the future for Nepalese support to wobble if for example there were strong criticism of the continued deployment of Gurkhas in the Falklands garrison. A draft is attached, to which MOD have contributed.

\*~\* Passage deleted and retained  
under section 3(4)  
SECRET  
C. Dayland, 26/4/2012

/I

SECRET



I am sending a copy of this letter to David Omand in the  
Ministry of Defence

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street

SECRET


## MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRIME MINISTER OF NEPAL

The restoration of British administration in the Falkland Islands, and the distinguished role played by our Gurkha troops in bringing this about, prompt me to send you this message.

From the beginning of the Falklands conflict I have been deeply conscious of the staunch support we have received from your Government, which revives for us memories of those other great struggles in the cause of freedom during this century in which Gurkha troops have fought with such legendary gallantry alongside their British comrades in arms. My Government, and the British people as a whole, are enormously grateful for that support.

We will not forget the exemplary courage and determination displayed by the First Battalion the Duke of Edinburgh's Own Gurkha Rifles and the crucial part they played. Shortly after landing they assumed responsibility for both the defence of the Darwin/Goose Green area and the surveillance of the Southern half of East Falkland Islands. Subsequently they took part in the recapture of Port Stanley. I am delighted that they suffered only light casualties. This, no doubt, was a reflection of the Gurkhas' reputation as brave, fearless and accomplished soldiers.

I send you, Prime Minister, my renewed thanks and warmest good wishes.



CONFIDENTIAL

12138 - 1

OO BERNE DESKBY 251500Z  
GRS 337  
CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 251500Z  
FM FCO 251000Z JUNE 82  
TO IMMEDIATE BERNE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 135 OF 25 JUNE 1982  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BRASILIA  
INFO ROUTINE UKMIS GENEVA

MY TELNOS 119, 121 AND 122: CESSATION OF FALKLANDS HOSTILITIES

1. PLEASE TELL THE SWISS GOVERNMENT THAT WE REMAIN CONCERNED ABOUT ARGENTINE RELUCTANCE TO RESPOND TO OUR REQUEST FOR CONFIRMATION THAT THEY VIEW HOSTILITIES BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA TO BE AT AN END, AND THAT WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THEY WOULD GO BACK TO THE ARGENTINES AND SPEAK ON THE FOLLOWING LINES.
2. WHILE WE RECOGNISE THAT, IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF SO MANY GOVERNMENTAL CHANGES, IT MAY BE DIFFICULT FOR THE ARGENTINES TO COORDINATE THE DECLARATION OF AN END TO ACTIVE HOSTILITIES, WE HAVE ALSO NOTED THAT EVEN IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS OF A MORE REASONABLE APPROACH. WE HOPE THAT THESE COULD BE FOLLOWED UP BY A STATEMENT OF THE SORT REQUESTED. EVIDENCE OF THIS MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE HAS INCLUDED THE ARGENTINE RESPONSE OVER THE REPATRIATION OF THEIR PRISONERS AND - MORE RECENTLY - THE NEWS THAT THE BRITISH JOURNALISTS ARRESTED ON ESPIONAGE CHARGES ARE TO BE RELEASED ON BAIL. WE HOPE THAT THE ARGENTINES MAY ALSO NOW SEE THEIR WAY TO RETURN FLIGHT LIEUTENANT GLOVER, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT GLOVER IS INJURED AND THEY HAVE NOW RECEIVED BACK FROM US ALL THEIR OWN WOUNDED PRISONERS.
3. WHILE WE RECOGNISE THAT A DE FACTO CEASEFIRE IS IN EXISTENCE, IT WOULD MAKE IT MUCH EASIER FOR US TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TOWARDS NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS (EG LIFTING THE EXCLUSION ZONE AND OUTSTANDING ECONOMIC MEASURES AS WELL

/AS THE

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12138 - 1

AS THE RETURN OF REMAINING PRISONERS) IF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT COULD FORMALLY CONFIRM WHAT NOW APPEARS TO BE THE CASE IN PRACTICE.

4. YOU SHOULD TELL THE SWISS THAT WHILE WE WANT TO RESTORE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE NEW ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION - AFTER WHAT HAS PASSED - OF OUR OFFERING TROOP WITHDRAWALS OR FURTHER NEGOTIATION AS A CONDITION FOR ANY SUCH RESPONSE.

PYM

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DIO  
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
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SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE  
DIRECTOR G C H Q

CABINET  
OFFICE

2

CONFIDENTIAL

UBJECT



PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 138<sup>A</sup>/82

*President of Sri Lanka*

*cc Master  
908*

June 25, 1982.

My dear Prime Minister,

I have been closely following the recent events in the Falkland Islands and I am happy that armed conflict has now ended. I commend you for the patience and resolve that you exercised in the handling of this crisis.

On this issue, Sri Lanka, while committed to the principles of decolonization, at the same time firmly upholds two of the cardinal principles of the United Nations Charter and the Non-Aligned Movement, namely the non-use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The communique that my Government issued in early April, when Argentina forcibly occupied the Falkland Islands, reflected this conviction.

At the Non-Aligned Co-ordinating Bureau Meetings in New York as well as at the Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Co-ordinating Bureau in Havana, Sri Lanka endeavoured to have these principles given due consideration in the deliberations and embodied in the final documents.

As you would be aware, in the Havana Communique the paragraphs relating to the Falkland Islands were drafted by the Regional Group. My Foreign Minister, who participated in this Conference, had spoken to a number of his colleagues on the need for a fair assessment of the issues involved, but the draft produced for the Final Communique was, in its presentation, wanting in this regard and was therefore not acceptable to Sri Lanka.

The Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
Prime Minister  
L o n d o n




Our disagreement with these paragraphs have been communicated in the form of a written reservation to the Cuban Mission in New York and to the Permanent Representatives of the Members of the Bureau, who participated in the Havana Conference. My Permanent Representative in New York will also communicate these reservations to the Permanent Representatives of all United Nations Missions in New York and to the Security Council, as soon as the Havana Communique itself is made available to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

I hope that a permanent solution to this vexed question will be found in the near future, which will be acceptable to all the parties concerned.

With warm personal regards,

Yours sincerely,



J. R. Jayewardene



CONFIDENTIAL  
SAVING TELEGRAM

Ref: ECO 091/13

FM Ottawa

To FCO telno Saving 9 of 24 June 1982.

Our telno 333: CANADIAN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA

1. In the light of Canada's decision to lift her ban on imports from Argentina and permit new export credits, you might be interested in the following assessment of the cost to Canada of imposing sanctions which we have obtained subsequent to your request for such information (your telno 342 to Paris).

2. The overall view at present is that the imposition of sanctions will not have had a very damaging or long lasting effect on Canadian/Argentine economic and trade relations. At the same time there is a feeling that if the measures had remained in place for much longer then the damage could well have been substantial.

/from  
Argentina

3. Canadian officials have pointed out to us that Canada has received less public condemnation for her actions than the European Community. At the same time, CP Air has continued to fly into Buenos Aires during the period of sanctions and Argentina has imposed no counter-ban on Canadian imports. Special circumstances which may have persuaded Argentina to adopt this circumspect approach are that Canada is preparing to ship a consignment of fuel bundles to Argentina in the near future for use in the Canadian built nuclear reactor at Cordoba (Callan's letter of 31 May to Hughes refers). The Canadians claim to have been anxious to avoid giving Argentina an excuse for abrogating the safeguards agreement on the reactor by withholding the fuel rods, but Argentina was most probably as anxious not to give the Canadians an excuse for suspending the fuel rod shipment by imposing even a limited ban on Canadian imports.

4. Nevertheless, the Canadians consider that they have lost one contract directly as a result of the imposition of sanctions. This was an order for turbine generators for the YACYRETA power project, worth \$C100 million, which Canadian General Electric were close to clinching. The Argentinians have told the Canadian Government that CGE will no longer be considered. The Canadians are also concerned that

/contracts



CONFIDENTIAL  
SAVING TELEGRAM  
PAGE 2

contracts for electrical transmission equipment and refurbishing of railway stock worth a total of \$C90 million might be steered away from Canadian companies which were previously well placed to win them.

5. The Canadians expect further examples of lost business to come to light in due course, but appear confident at this stage that damage to trade relations can be repaired fairly rapidly. They have also pointed out to us that, in the aftermath of the Falklands war, a number of major capital projects which were planned in Argentina are likely to be shelved for want of funds. The Canadians hope that by the time these projects are reactivated relations will have returned to normal and Canadian companies will be able to compete for contracts on a fairly equal footing.

6. The Canadians have no evidence as yet of any reverses in their trading relations with other Latin American countries as a result of sanctions against Argentina. They have told us that trade relations with Brazil are particularly good, and active, at present.

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

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①



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 June, 1982

Dear John,

Yes no

Prime Minister  
Content for message to issue?

A.J.C. 24/6

Falkland Islands: Message to Mr Trudeau

As you know, the Canadians have been among the staunchest of our supporters during the Falklands crisis. They reacted swiftly and positively to our requests that they take economic measures against Argentina, and remained firmly committed to our cause. There have been a number of public statements by Canadian Ministers in our support. And on 15 June the Canadian House of Commons passed a unanimous Resolution congratulating the Prime Minister on her success.

The High Commissioner in Ottawa has recommended that it would be well received if the Prime Minister were to send to Mr Trudeau a short message of thanks, the text of which could be released publicly after it had been delivered.

The Secretary of State agrees that such a message would be of benefit to Anglo-Canadian relations. It is important that such good friends do not feel taken for granted, and a message of appreciation, especially if it is made public, would be an advantage, not the least should we need to call on the Canadians again. I enclose a suggested message. A separate response is being sent to the Canadian House of Commons.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street

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OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats  
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Precedence/Deskby  
IMMEDIATE

1 ZCZC  
2 GRS  
3 RESTRICTED

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5  
6 FM FCO 82  
7 TO IMMEDIATE OTTAWA  
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

9 YOUR TELNO 326

10 FALKLAND ISLANDS:

11 1. Please pass following message from Prime Minister to  
12 Mr Trudeau.

13 BEGINS

14 Now that we have successfully recovered the Falkland  
15 Islands, I should like to say how much we in Britain appreciate  
16 the prompt and steadfast support which you and the people of  
17 Canada have given us during the recent weeks. I am very much  
18 aware that your actions have not been without cost, and we are  
19 the more grateful to you for that. There is absolutely no doubt  
20 about the importance of the practical support given to us by our  
21 friends and allies in enabling us to achieve our objective.

22 I sincerely hope that there will be no return to hostilities  
23 (as I write we still await Argentina's confirmation of her  
24 acceptance of the ceasefire), and would like to convey my  
25 warmest thanks to you for Canada's unstinting support. We shall

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword not
File number	Dept Private Office	Distribution Falkland Islands General
Drafted by (Block capitals) J E HOLMES		NAD SAmD Cabinet Office
Telephone number 233 4641		Additional Distribution Falkland Islands
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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Catchword



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister 1

I should have shown you  
the attached. As you will see  
Argentina is a signatory of  
the UN Weaponry convention.  
You did in fact tell Sir John  
Biggs Jarvis in the House today  
that Argentina was not a  
signatory. I could not persuade  
Hansard to alter this. Do you  
feel it is necessary to correct  
what you said? If so,  
we can suggest a way.

WR  
24/6

## UN WEAPONRY CONVENTION

### Plastic Mines in the Falklands

1. We are distressed by reports that plastic mines have been sown indiscriminately in the Falklands. When the UN Weaponry convention comes into force it will outlaw the indiscriminate sowing of mines and any weapon which injures by plastic fragments.

### UK Attitude to the Convention

2. The UK signed the Convention on the date it opened for signature, 10 April 1981. We welcome it as a major contribution to humanitarian law.

### Ratification

3. The UK is studying the texts in preparation for ratification.

### Argentina in Breach of the Convention?

4. The Convention does not come into force until 20 countries have ratified. To date we only have notification of 4 ratifications. In any case neither Argentina nor the UK have yet ratified.

### Napalm

5. Napalm is not banned by international law. As an incendiary its use against civilians would be banned by the Convention when it comes into force.

### Cluster Bombs

6. Cluster bombs are precision weapons for use against armoured military targets. They cannot with justification be criticised as inhumane or indiscriminate.

### Dum-dum Bullets

7. Use of such bullets is banned by the 1899 Hague Convention.



## BACKGROUND

1. The UN Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Weaponry Convention) is not yet in force. For legal reasons we have accordingly avoided the implication that Argentina, though a signatory, is in some way bound by its provisions.
2. The UK has no major problem with any part of the Convention, but will need to make a number of interpretative statements on ratification.
3. The Convention has 3 Protocols as follows:
  - (a) Mines and Booby Traps: this bans the use of these weapons against civilian populations, prevents the indiscriminate use of such weapons and requires the location of minefields, mines and booby traps to be recorded, so as to reduce the danger of accidents to civilians.
  - (b) Incendiary Weapons: this bans the use of incendiary weapons, including napalm, against civilians and the use of air-delivered incendiary weapons against any military target within a populated area.
  - (c) Non X-ray Detectable Fragments: this bans the use of weapons intended to injure by fragments not detectable by X-ray (eg bombs with plastic filling).

Argentina, were the Convention in force, could be criticised under (a) and (c).

4. The UK has in fact itself been accused of breaching the Convention by Panama. The suggestion seems to have been that to use cluster bombs amounts to sowing an aerial minefield. In fact all bomblets from UK cluster bombs in any case detonate on impact. The weapon is extremely accurate.
5. The press have also reported discovery of Argentine dum-dum bullets but there is no suggestion they have been used. These are bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body.

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12055 - 1

GRS 365  
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FRAME DEVELOPMENT  
DESKBY 250700Z  
FM FCO 241700Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 532 OF 24 JUNE  
YOUR TELNO 2555:

EC EMERGENCY AID FOR THE FALKLANDS

1. PLEASE WRITE TO PISANI ON FOLLOWING LINES:

'NOW THAT, AS WE HOPE, ALL HOSTILITIES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC HAVE ENDED, WE ARE SEEKING TO ENSURE A STABLE FUTURE FOR THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. AS A RESULT OF THE TRAGIC EVENTS OF THE PAST TWO MONTHS, MANY ESSENTIAL SERVICES SUCH AS THE WATER, FUEL AND ELECTRICITY SUPPLIES HAVE BEEN BADLY DISRUPTED, THE SEWERAGE SYSTEM AND MANY OF THE HOUSES AND ROADS IN STANLEY ARE BADLY DAMAGED. MEDICAL FACILITIES HAVE ALSO BEEN RAVAGED AND THE MEDICAL SERVICES ARE HEAVILY OVERSTRAINED. IN ADDITION THE EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES ON THE ISLANDS NEED TO BE RESTORED. THE LIVESTOCK ON WHICH THE ISLANDERS DEPEND HEAVILY FOR THEIR INCOME HAS BEEN DECIMATED AND MUCH FARM EQUIPMENT NEEDS TO BE REPLACED. WITH THE ADVENT OF THE BITTER WINTER IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC HELP IS NEEDED QUICKLY TO PREVENT SEVERE PHYSICAL HARDSHIP BEING ADDED TO THE SUFFERINGS OF THE ISLANDERS. WE HAVE TO REPAIR AND RESTORE THE ESSENTIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND, IF WE ARE TO PROVIDE THE GOOD PROSPECTS WHICH THEY NEED FOR THEIR FURTHER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, A GOOD DEAL OF RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION WORK NEEDS TO BE STARTED SOON. OUR FORCES ARE ALREADY ENGAGED IN ESSENTIAL REPAIRS AND IT WILL BE A LITTLE WHILE BEFORE WE CAN ASSESS ACCURATELY THE SCALE OF PERMANENT RECONSTRUCTION WHICH WILL BE NECESSARY. BUT IT IS ALREADY CLEAR THAT THIS WILL BE A MAJOR EXERCISE. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL OF COURSE PROVIDE THE MAJOR PART OF THE ASSISTANCE NEEDED. BUT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE ALSO FOR THE COMMUNITY TO PROVIDE SOME HELP TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WHICH ARE

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/ASSOCIATED

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12055 - 1

ASSOCIATED WITH THE COMMUNITY UNDER PART IV OF THE TREATY AND THROUGH THE OVERSEAS COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES DECISIONS OF 1976 AND 1980. I AM TOLD THAT 920,000 ECU REMAINS AVAILABLE THIS YEAR FOR EMERGENCY AID TO THE OCT. EARLY DISBURSEMENT OF THIS SUM TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WOULD BE OF VERY GREAT ASSISTANCE. I HOPE THE COMMISSION WILL ENDORSE THIS REQUEST AND MAKE THE NECESSARY PROPOSALS. I LOOK FORWARD TO AN EARLY RESPONSE.'

PYM

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MR BAWDEN, LACPD/ODA

GRS 242

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FM FCO 241600Z JUN 82

TO PRIORITY CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES  
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 140 OF 24 JUNE 1982

## LIFE IN THE FALKLANDS BEFORE LIBERATION

1. WE ARE SENDING A BACKGROUND BRIEF ON THIS SUBJECT. MEANWHILE YOU CAN DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS.
2. THE INHABITANTS OF GOOSE GREEN, INCLUDING ELDERLY AND VERY YOUNG PEOPLE, WERE SHUT UP IN THE COMMUNITY CENTRE FOR 30 DAYS: SOME ARE IN POOR PHYSICAL CONDITION AS A RESULT.
3. THROUGHOUT THE COURSE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS TO REPOSSESS THE FALKLANDS, BRITISH FORCES ATTACHED THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO ENSURING THE SAFETY OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF THE ISLANDS. THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF PROTECTING NON-COMBATANTS IS THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEUTRALISED ZONE. WE PRESSED THROUGHOUT FOR AN INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) PRESENCE ON THE ISLANDS. HOWEVER, THE ARGENTINES BLOCKED ICRC ATTEMPTS TO VISIT THE ISLANDS UNTIL 10 JUNE. THE ICRC THEN PROPOSED A NEUTRALIZED ZONE. WE AGREED AT ONCE BUT THE ARGENTINES ONLY DID SO AFTER FURTHER DELAY.
4. CLEARING UP THE DEBRIS LEFT BY THE OCCUPYING FORCES WILL BE A MAJOR TASK. LAND HAS BEEN MINED, BUT THE ARGENTINES FAILED TO MARK MINEFIELDS OR TO KEEP A PROPER RECORD OF WHERE MINES WERE LAID. UNSTABLE AMMUNITION WAS LEFT BEHIND AND ANTI-PERSONNEL DEVICES WERE SCATTERED UNDISCRIMINATELY BY ARGENTINE HELICOPTERS ON HILLS AND BEACHES ROUND STANLEY. PRIVATE HOUSES IN THE CAPITAL WERE USED TO STORE MORTAR BOMBS.

PYM

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DIO }

Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

[Passed to E.R.]

[Typists a.a.]

GRS 120

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FM MADRID 241045Z JUN 82

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 369 OF 24 JUNE

YOUR GUIDANCE TEL NO. 138 : FALKLANDS: ARGENTINE POWS

1. THE MADRID NEWSPAPER ALCAZAR OF 22 JUNE CARRIES A STORY FROM THE SPANISH NEWS AGENCY EFE QUOTING 'NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS' INTERVIEW WITH AN ARGENTINE PRISONER. HE SPEAKS IN THE HIGHEST TERMS OF THE BRITISH TREATMENT OF THE WOUNDED, PARTICULARLY ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND EMPHASISES THAT NO DISTINCTION WAS MADE BETWEEN BRITISH AND ARGENTINE TROOPS.

2. ANOTHER ARTICLE IN EL PAIS (ALSO FROM EFE) DESCRIBES THE POOR HYGIENE CONDITIONS AND LACK OF FOOD SUPPLIES AVAILABLE TO ARGENTINE TROOPS BEFORE THEIR CAPTURE.

3. COPIES OF BOTH ARTICLES WHICH MAY BE USEFUL FOR REPRODUCTION ARE BEING SENT TO INFORMATION DEPARTMENT IN TODAY'S BAG.

PARSONS

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR SLOW  
PS/PS ← PS/MR RIFKIND

SIR J BULLARD  
~~SIR SINGH~~ *Mr. Freeland*  
MR GIFFARD  
~~MR WRIGHT~~  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
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MR ILETT } TREASURY  
MR LITTLER }

MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR ~~WADE GERY~~ *Ms. Goodall* }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO }

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~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~  
RESIDENT CLERK

[Passed to E.R.]  
[Typists a.a.]

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FM MONTEVIDEO 241815Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 523 OF 24 JUNE  
AND TO IMMEDIATE TRAFFIC RELAY.

ARGENTINA: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS.

1. THIS SUMMARY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IS TAKEN FROM THE ARGENTINIAN PRESS OF 24 JUNE 1982.
2. ON 23 JUNE BIGNONE PAID SEPARATE VISITS TO ANAYA AND LAMI DOZO IN THEIR RESPECTIVE HEADQUARTERS.
3. ON 23 JUNE BIGNONE ANNOUNCED HE WOULD MEET LEADERS OF THE 15 POLITICAL PARTIES AT 1900 HOURS (LOCAL TIME) ON 24 JUNE, TO DISCUSS THE POLITICAL SYSTEM TO BE ESTABLISHED FROM 1 JULY.
4. THE 5 MEMBERS OF THE MULTIPARTIDARIA ANNOUNCED THEY WOULD ACCEPT BIGNONE'S INVITATION, PROVIDED THE AGENDA COVERED IMMEDIATE INSTITUTIONAL NORMALISATION AND A REVISION OF THE

IMMEDIATE INSTITUTIONAL NORMALISATION AND A REVISION OF THE ECONOMIC POLICY FOLLOWED SINCE 1976.

THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE INVITATION WAS URGED BY DEOLINDO BITTEL (JUSTICIALIST) AND CARLOS CONTIN (RADICAL) BUT OPPOSED INITIALLY BY OSCAR ALLENDE (INTRANSIGENT), WHO QUESTIONED THE VALUE OF MEETING A REPRESENTATIVE OF ONLY ONE OF THE ARMED FORCES.

5. ON 23 JUNE THE MULTIPARTIDARIA RELEASED A STATEMENT CALLING FOR THE RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL RULE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THEIR DEMANDS ARE OUTLINED IN SEVERAL PAPERS, AND ARE GIVEN IN MOST DETAIL IN ARUBITO FINANCIERO. THEY CALL FOR:
- (A) RECOGNITION FOR THE PROGRAMME OF NATIONAL REORGANISATION.
  - (B) REMOVAL OF ALL REAL AND LEGAL OBSTACLES WHICH PREVENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.
  - (C) RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW.
  - (D) NORMAL FUNCTIONING OF POLITICAL PARTIES, WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS.
  - (E) NORMALISATION OF TRADE UNION ACTIVITIES.
  - (F) INDEPENDENCE IN FOREIGN POLICY AND REAFFIRMATION OF ARGENTINA'S NON-ALLIGNED STATUS.
  - (G) ENCOURAGEMENT OF RESPECT FOR THE OBJECTIVES AND PROPOSALS OF THE U N, THE DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ETC.
  - (H) PURSUIT OF ARGENTINA'S CLAIM TO THE FALKLANDS THROUGH ALL THE MEANS WHICH THE INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE U N AND AMERICAN HEMISPHERE ORGANISATIONS PROVIDE.
  - (I) CONTINUED PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHILE ON THE BORDER DISPUTE, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF PAPAL MEDIATION.

6. THE EXODUS OF AIR FORCE AND NAVY OFFICERS FROM OFFICIAL POSTS HAS CONTINUED, WITH THE RESIGNATION OF SECRETARIES OF STATE AND UNDERSECRETARIES.

IN THE PROVINCES THE FOLLOWING GOVERNORS HAVE RESIGNED:

HUGO DI RISIO: GOVERNOR OF SAN LUIS

JORGE PIASTRELLINI: GOVERNOR OF LA RIOJI

ROBERTO ULLOA: GOVERNOR OF SALTA

RAUL SUAREZ DEL CERRO: GOVERNOR OF TIERRA DEL FUEGO AND THE ISLANDS OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

JULIO A. ACUNA: GOVERNOR OF RIO NEGRO.

THE RESIGNATIONS OF THE SIX NAVY AND AIR FORCE OFFICERS IN THE LEGISLATIVE ADVISORY COUNCIL ARE EXPECTED ON 25 JUNE.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (C N E A), VICE ADMIRAL CARLOS CASTRO MADERO, WILL NOT RESIGN. ANAYA HAS ASKED HIM TO REMAIN IN THE POST.

7. THE ARMY IS MAKING MOVES TO REPLACE THE OFFICERS WHO HAVE RESIGNED. THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY WILL BE GENERAL JORGE MARQUE, CURRENTLY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF FABRICACIONES MILITARES

7. THE ARMY IS MAKING MOVES TO REPLACE THE OFFICERS WHO HAVE RESIGNED. THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY WILL BE GENERAL JORGE MARQUE, CURRENTLY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF FABRICACIONES MILITARES.

THERE ARE RUMOURS THAT GENERAL CARLOS ALBERTO MARTINEZ, THE CANDIDATE TO BE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, IS RELUCTANT TO TAKE THE JOB. RUMOURS SUGGEST THAT THE NEXT MOST LIKELY CANDIDATE IS JUAN RAMON AGUIRRE LANARI, WHO HAS ALREADY BEEN MENTIONED AS A POSSIBLE FOREIGN MINISTER.

HUTCHINSON

NNNN  
SENT AT





10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

24 June, 1982.

The Falklands

Thank you for your letter of 21 June about a reply to President Reagan's recent telegram of congratulations to the Prime Minister. We decided in the event that no reply to President Reagan's message was necessary since the Prime Minister would be seeing him in Washington on 23 June.

**A. J. COLES**

Francis Richards, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

UNCLASSIFIED

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP : 0700 HOURS, 24 JUNE 1982

1. There is nothing to report.
2. This is the last SITREP.

24 June 1982

Emergency Unit

UNCLASSIFIED

*Argentina*

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION):  
0700 HOURS, 24 JUNE 1982

Prime Minister's call on the Secretary-General

1. Discussion was devoted almost entirely to the Falklands crisis. The Prime Minister explained in detail the practical problems we were facing and left the Secretary-General in no doubt that we were not in the mood to be sucked into another negotiation. For his part, the Secretary-General said he realised there was nothing much to be done at present. But he was worried that, if there were no cessation of hostilities, there would be a permanent focus of tension in the South Atlantic: at some stage the UK must restore relations with Argentina and resume negotiations.


2. After the meeting, the Secretariat gave our Mission points which the Secretary-General had intended making to the Prime Minister. No response is required of us.

3. Sir A Parsons judges that the meeting went well from our point of view. Furthermore, Security Council members are showing no disposition to resuscitate the Falklands question and the Secretary-General has not decided when he would need to report again to the Security Council.

Canada: Economic Sanctions

4. The Canadian Government has announced its decision to lift its ban on imports from Argentina and to permit export credits for new transactions. The embargo on arms sales will continue.

NOTE: This is the last SITREP



P R Fearn  
Emergency Unit

24 June 1982

A: (UKMIS  
New York  
telno 1045)

B: (UKMIS  
New York  
telno 1046)

C: (Ottawa  
telno 333)

JUST SEND NG NUMBER 7 NOW

E. R.

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24 JUN 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 232350Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1045 OF 23 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

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FALKLANDS: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK: CALL ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

1. AFTER A VERY BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE LEBANON, THE REMAINDER OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S CALL ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS DEVOTED TO THE FALKLANDS.
2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD A MANDATE FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE REALISED THAT THERE WAS NOTHING MUCH TO BE DONE AT PRESENT, BUT HE MIGHT GET QUERIES FROM COUNCIL MEMBERS ABOUT WHAT IF ANYTHING HE WAS DOING.
3. THE PRIME MINISTER EXPLAINED IN DETAIL THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WHICH WE WERE FACING ON THE ISLANDS. WE HAD REPATRIATED ABOUT 10,000 ARGENTINE PRISONERS, A NUMBER OF WHOM HAD BEEN IN POOR CONDITION. WE WOULD KEEP ABOUT 600 TO 700 TECHNICIANS, PILOTS AND SENIOR OFFICERS PENDING A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. 35 ARGENTINIANS HAD VOLUNTEERED TO CLEAR MINES. THERE WAS A MAJOR PROBLEM OVER UNMARKED PLASTIC MINEFIELDS. THEY WOULD BE A DANGER FOR MANY YEARS. FOUR BRITISH SOLDIERS HAD ALREADY BEEN INJURED WHILE LIFTING MINES.
4. AS REGARDS A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, LIFTING OF EXCLUSION ZONES ETC, WE HAD SENT A MESSAGE VIA THE SWISS BUT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHO WE WERE DEALING WITH. THE PRIME MINISTER DREW ATTENTION TO THE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN PARAGRAPHS 10 AND 11

4. AS REGARDS A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, LIFTING OF EXCLUSION ZONES ETC, WE HAD SENT A MESSAGE VIA THE SWISS BUT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHO WE WERE DEALING WITH. THE PRIME MINISTER DREW ATTENTION TO THE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN PARAGRAPHS 10 AND 11 OF THE ARGENTINE NOTE OF 18 JUNE (MY TELNO 1032). SHE MENTIONED THE EXPERIENCES OF THE ISLANDERS UNDER OCCUPATION AND THAT MR HUNT WAS RETURNING TO THE ISLANDS WITH 100 ISLANDERS. HE WAS WELL KNOWN TO THE ISLANDERS AND WOULD GIVE THEM CONFIDENCE. HE WOULD BE A CIVIL COMMISSIONER WHILE GENERAL MOORE WOULD DEAL WITH MILITARY MATTERS. THE PROBLEMS OF PRACTICAL RECONSTRUCTION WERE ENORMOUS AND WOULD TAKE MONTHS. WE HAD TO TAKE IT GENTLY.

5. WE WERE RETURNING ABOUT 3,000 BRITISH TROOPS TO THE UK ON THE CANBERRA, BUT WOULD BE BRINGING OUT ENGINEERS TO REBUILD THE AIR FIELD AND EXTEND THE RUNWAY. THESE AND OTHER PRACTICALITIES WOULD ABSORB OUR ATTENTION FOR SOMETIME. IN THE MEANTIME, WE WOULD ACCELERATE THE PROCESS OF SELF-GOVERNMENT.

6. IF THERE WERE NO HOSTILITIES FOR A LONGISH PERIOD, WE MIGHT ASSUME THAT THERE HAD BEEN A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, IN THE ABSENCE OF A CLEAR MESSAGE, AND RETURN THE REMAINING PRISONERS.

7. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT WE MUST RESTORE RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA AND RESUME NEGOTIATIONS AT SOME STAGE.

8. THE PRIME MINISTER REITERATED THAT THE FIRST STEP MUST BE A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. WE COULD BUILD ON THAT LATER. AT PRESENT, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHO WE WERE DEALING WITH IN ARGENTINA AND THIS MIGHT REMAIN THE CASE FOR A LONG PERIOD.

9. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WAS WORRIED THAT, IF THERE WAS NO CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, THERE WOULD BE A PERMANENT FOCUS OF TENSION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. BOTH AS SECRETARY-GENERAL AND AS A SOUTH AMERICAN, HE FELT THAT SOME DIALOGUE MUST BE RESUMED AT SOME STAGE.

10. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT WE DID NOT FEEL THAT WE HAD LOST FRIENDSHIP THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA. IT MIGHT BE IN ABEYANCE IN SOME COUNTRIES FOR THE MOMENT. SHE MENTIONED THE VENEZUELA/GUYANA DISPUTE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WAS IN TOUCH WITH VENEZUELA WHOSE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD PROMISED HIM THAT THEY WOULD NEVER USE FORCE. VENEZUELA HAD UNDERTAKEN TO SEND A MISSION TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

UNDERTAKEN TO SEND A MISSION TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION WITH  
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

11. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE WAS AT OUR DISPOSAL AS A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE ARGENTINES WHO TRUSTED HIM. HE REALISED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT. HOWEVER, WE COULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF HIS MANDATE AT A LATER STAGE: NO FRESH UN INITIATIVE WOULD BE REQUIRED.

12. THE PRIME MINISTER EXPLAINED OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE ISLANDERS AND OUR INTENTION TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 73 OF THE CHARTER.

13. AFTER THE MEETING, DE SOTO GAVE GOULDING A PIECE OF PAPER (TEXT IN MY I.F.T.) REPRESENTING POINTS WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD MEANT TO MAKE TO THE PRIME MINISTER. IT DID NOT NEED ANY RESPONSE FROM US AND THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PUTTING PRESSURE ON US NOR OF SETTING NEW DEADLINES FOR A RESPONSE. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD NOT DECIDED WHEN HE WOULD NEED REPORT AGAIN TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL: IT DEPENDED ON DEVELOPMENTS.

14. THIS MEETING WENT WELL FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. THE PRIME MINISTER LEFT PEREZ DE CUELLAR IN NO DOUBT THAT WE WERE NOT IN THE MOOD TO BE SUCKED INTO ANOTHER NEGOTIATION AND, BY MAINTAINING THE INITIATIVE IN THE DISCUSSION, SHE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO DEVELOP ALL THE POINTS IN HIS SPEAKING NOTE. ON THE OTHER HAND HE HAD JUST ENOUGH OF THE BATTING TO FEEL THAT HIS HONOUR WAS SATISFIED. THE PRIME MINISTER ALSO DEALT EFFECTIVELY WITH THE QUESTIONS ABOUT FUTURE UN INVOLVEMENT AT HER PRESS CONFERENCE. HAPPILY, MY COUNCIL COLLEAGUES ARE SHOWING NO SIGN OF INTEREST IN RESUSCITATING THE SUBJECT. I RAKED DORR (IRELAND) AND OTHERS WITH FIRE A FEW DAYS AGO. OTTUNU (UGANDA) ANTICIPATED ME BY SAYING THAT HE IMAGINED THAT THE BRITISH PEOPLE WOULD LYNCH ANYONE WHO TALKED OF NEGOTIATING WITH ARGENTINA FOR AT LEAST A YEAR.

PARSONS

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 232355Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1046 OF 23 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

*E.R.*

*cc/10*

4 JUN 82

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MY I.P.T. FALKLANDS: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK: CALL ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PIECE OF PAPER GIVEN TO US BY DE SOTO AFTER THE MEETING:

-- DESPITE THE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES, RESTORATION OF NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA SHOULD BE ATTAINABLE IN TIME BECAUSE OF COMPELLING COMMON INTERESTS.

-- GIVEN EXISTING SENSIBILITIES, THE UNITED NATIONS COULD FACILITATE COMMUNICATION AND UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

-- THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S GOOD OFFICES ARE, OF COURSE, AVAILABLE AS MANDATED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, TO WHICH HE WILL NEED TO REPORT IN DUE COURSE.

-- THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD BE PREPARED TO EXPLORE WITH BOTH SIDES POSSIBLE WAYS OF RESOLVING IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS AND ACHIEVING A RESOLUTION OF UNDERLYING DIFFERENCES.

-- THE INITIATION OF A FLEXIBLE PROCEDURE FOR THE DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION OF THESE DIFFERENCES AS CALLED FOR BY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 COULD WELL BE THE KEY TO A COMPREHENSIVE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

-- THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD WELCOME ANY IDEAS THE UNITED KINGDOM MIGHT SUGGEST IN THIS CONTEXT.

PARSONS


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FM OTTAWA 231640Z JUN 82

IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 333 OF 23 JUNE

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NATO BRUSSELS, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
MONTREAL, TORONTO, VANCOUVER, EDMONTON, HALIFAX.



## ARGENTINA: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

1. IN A PRESS RELEASE YESTERDAY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ANNOUNCED THAT THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED TO END ITS BAN ON IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA AND TO PERMIT EXPORT CREDITS FOR NEW TRANSACTIONS.
2. THE RELEASE NOTED THAT HOSTILITIES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC APPEARED TO HAVE CEASED AND THAT, IN ITS NOTE OF 18 JUNE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT "IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE IS A DE FACTO CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WHICH ARGENTINA IS NOW OBSERVING". MR MACGUIGAN HOPED THAT THIS SITUATION WOULD BE CONFIRMED BY FURTHER UNDERTAKINGS REGARDING A COMPLETE CESSATION OF ALL HOSTILITIES AND THAT THE LONG-STANDING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD BE SETTLED BY PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS.
3. DR MACGUIGAN WAS QUOTED IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT AS SAYING THAT A CHANGE IN THE CURRENT DE FACTO CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES QUOTE WOULD REPRESENT A NEW SITUATION WHICH COULD REQUIRE THE GOVERNMENT TO RECONSIDER ITS POSITION UNQUOTE. HE ALSO NOTED, IN THIS CONNECTION, THAT THE CANADIAN EMBARGO ON ALL EXPORTS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ARGENTINA WOULD REMAIN IN AFFECT FOR THE TIME BEING.
4. FULL TEXT BY BAG.
5. IF WE DO GET PRESS ENQUIRIES, WE SHALL TAKE THE LINE THAT WE REGRET THAT CANADIAN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN LIFTED SO QUICKLY BUT ARE GLAD THAT THE ARMS BAN WILL CONTINUE AND THAT THE SITUATION WILL BE REVIEWED IN THE EVENT OF A RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES.

MORAN



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FM MEXICO CITY 231951Z JUNE 82  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 497 OF 23 JUNE

MIPT AND YOUR TELNO 136 TO ANKARA: FALKLAND ISLANDS:  
LATIN AMERICAN PRESS COMMENT

1. FOLLOWING COMMENTS FROM THE MEXICAN PRESS MAY BE OF USE. SOME ARE TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT AND DO NOT REFLECT THE GENERAL BALANCE OF THE ARTICLES FROM WHICH THEY ARE TAKEN. IN THESE ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS WE USE THE WORD FALKLANDS, ALTHOUGH THE SPANISH TEXTS, EVEN OF WRITERS SUPPORTING THE BRITISH POSITION, ALMOST INVARIABLY USE THE WORD MALVINAS.

(A) ARTICLE BY PEDRO GRINGOIRE IN EXCELSIOR OF 22 JUNE ... IT SEEMS THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE AT LAST WOKEN UP TO HARSH REALITY. THE INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ON 2 APRIL, LAUNCHED SUDDENLY BY THE ARGENTINE MILITARY, WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PASS INTO HISTORY AS THE MOST GRIEVOUS POLITICAL AND MILITARY ERROR OF THE PAST 30 YEARS. A SUMMARY OF THE FACTS CAN ALREADY BE MADE. WHATEVER OPINION ONE MAY HOLD ABOUT THE LEGITIMATE OWNERSHIP AND SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS, A QUESTION WHICH IN A CIVILISED WORLD SHOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, THE INVASION CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED IN LAW. IT IS NOW CLEARER THAN EVER, AND ESPECIALLY CLEAR FROM THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE JUNTA FOLLOWING ITS DEFEAT, THAT THE REGIME, CONFRONTED WITH AN EXPLOSIVE INTERNAL SITUATION, HAD RECOURSE TO THE INVASION OF THE ISLANDS IN ORDER TO DISTRACT THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE AND ENFORCE ITS SUPPORT ...

THE ISLANDS HAVE NEVER BEEN OF SUCH VITAL IMPORTANCE FOR ARGENTINA, LEAST OF ALL AT THE PRESENT TIME, FOR IT TO BE A MATTER OF LIFE OR DEATH TO SEIZE THEM. THE THEATRICAL STROKE PLANNED BY THE MILITARY IN ORDER TO RETAIN THE POWER WHICH WAS SLIPPING FROM THEIR HANDS, WAS SKILFUL. BUT THE PLAN CONTAINED A TREMENDOUS ERROR OF CALCULATION. THEY DID NOT EXPECT THAT THE OLD LION WHOSE RIBS THEY WERE GOING TO POKE WOULD EVEN GROWL. BUT THE OLD LION NOT ONLY GROWLED BUT STOOD UP AND MOVED INTO THE ATTACK ... WHAT NOW? THE PEOPLE HAVE WOKEN UP TO REALITY. GALTIERI HAS FALLEN. FOR THE TIME BEING THERE IS ONLY A CHANGE AMONG THE MILITARY. BUT THE WIND IS BLOWING AND IT MAY SOON BE THAT THE MILITARY WILL LEAVE THE GOVERNMENT AND RETURN TO THEIR BARRACKS. THE STRATAGEM TO ATTRACT POPULAR SUPPORT WILL HAVE FAILED. AND THE HOLOCAUST OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WILL HAVE PROVED USELESS.

(B) ARTICLE BY XORGE DEL CAMPO IN EL NACIONAL OF 21 JUNE ON REQUESTING A CEASE-FIRE IN THE FALKLANDS, PRESIDENT GALTIERI REVEALED THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF HIS STRATEGY...THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE ARGENTINE GENERAL THROUGHOUT THIS CONFLICT WAS DEPLORABLE, DUE TO THE ILLEGITIMACY OF HIS GOVERNMENT, TO ITS INTERNAL WEAKNESS, TO ITS BAD INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION AND TO

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ITS LACK OF ABILITY AND INTELLIGENCE IN CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS...  
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR OF THE FALKLANDS, IN ITS TRUE CONTEXT,  
HAS BEEN ONLY A SECOND FRONT, A SECOND SCANDALOUS WAR WHICH

HAS ONLY AGGRAVATED THE SITUATION OF THE ARGENTINE CIVILIAN  
POPULATION AND DESTROYED OR SEVERELY DAMAGED ITS ECONOMY... GALTIERI  
HAS MADE IT CLEARER THAN EVER THAT HIS GOVERNMENT LACKS  
LEGITIMACY IN THE DEMOCRATIC EYES OF MANY COUNTRIES AND THAT HIS  
EAGERNESS TO PURSUE AN ARMS RACE HAS BEEN DEPLORABLE... GALTIERI  
HAS BEHAVED IN THE ISLAND CONFLICT WITH THE SUBTLETY OF AN ELEPHANT  
IN A BAZAAR... THIS MAN, OR THOSE WHO SUCCEED HIM, LACK THE  
MORAL SOLVENCY TO PRESENT THEMSELVES BEFORE AN INTERNATIONAL  
TRIBUNAL TO CLAIM RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY. FROM WHERE WOULD THEY  
OBTAIN THEM, IF THEIR HANDS ARE TAINTED WITH THE BLOOD OF THEIR OWN  
PEOPLE?...

(C) ARTICLE BY ADOLFO GILLY IN UNO-MAS-UNO OF 21 JUNE  
... IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SPEAK OUT PUBLICLY WITHIN ARGENTINA IN  
OPPOSITION TO THE WAR... BUT THERE WAS A CLEAR AND VIABLE ATTITUDE:  
TO MAINTAIN SILENCE, NOT TO COLLABORATE, TO RESIST THE PATRIOTIC  
WAVE. THIS WAS DONE IN PRACTICE BY THE MAJORITY OF THE ARGENTINE  
WORKING POPULATION, IN PARTICULAR THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS. UNLIKE  
THE POLITICIANS THEY DID NOT HAVE TO PROTECT THEIR CAREERS AND SO  
THEY MADE THEIR VIEWS CLEAR THROUGH SILENCE AND GLOOM...

(D) ARTICLE BY MARICELA CASTRO FROM EL HERALDO OF 17 JUNE  
... IT IS DIFFICULT TO REASON WHEN ONE IS BURNING WITH THE IDEA  
OF QUOTE RECONQUERING UNQUOTE SOMETHING. IN THIS CASE A TERRITORY  
WHICH MANY ARGENTINES DID NOT EVEN KNOW EXISTED. IF ONLY THEY  
HAD NEVER COME TO KNOW OF ITS EXISTENCE.

TICKELL

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FALKLAND ISLAND GENERAL

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CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

23 June, 1982

Prime Minister

To see.

A.J.C.  $\frac{14}{6}$

*I should like to thank him for his powerful support.*

*Dear John,*

Letter from M. Maurice Schumann and Article Expressing his Views on the Falklands Conflict

M. Maurice Schumann, former French Foreign Minister (1969-73) and now Vice-President of the Senate, has written to our Ambassador in Paris asking that his views on the Falklands conflict, as exemplified by an interview with him in an important Belgian daily, be passed on to Mrs Thatcher.

/ I enclose accordingly a copy of M. Schumann's letter with  
/ translation and a copy of the article in La Libre Belgique  
/ together with a summary and translated key extracts.

The Ambassador has replied to M. Schumann.

*Yours ever,*

*Francis Richards*

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street

MS/JL

SÉNAT

LE VICE-PRÉSIDENT

République Française

Paris le 4 Juin 1982

*Cher monsieur l'Ambassadeur*

Je souhaite que votre Premier Ministre, à laquelle m'unissent des liens d'amitié, sache ce que fut mon attitude dès le début de l'affaire des Malouines.

Comme vous ne l'ignorez pas, depuis que j'ai quitté le ministère des Affaires Etrangères, mon activité politique porte essentiellement, d'une part, sur les problèmes économiques (particulièrement graves dans la région que je représente) et sur les problèmes culturels, d'autre part.

Mais, si je n'appartiens pas à la Commission des Affaires Etrangères du Sénat, j'ai eu maintes fois l'occasion de m'exprimer, notamment à la télévision (TF1 - vendredi 16 avril). L'interview ci-jointe, qui m'a été prise par "La Libre Belgique" le 15 mai, reflète toute ma pensée, que j'exprime avec une égale franchise quelle que soit la question posée.

Je suis trop profondément attaché à la Grande-Bretagne pour ne pas vous communiquer ce témoignage qui, je l'espère, sera porté à la connaissance de Madame Thatcher.

Veillez agréer, *cher monsieur l'Ambassadeur,*

*l'assurance de mes sentiments les meilleurs*

*Maurice Schumann*

Maurice Schumann

S.E. Monsieur FRETWELL  
Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne  
PARIS

TRANSLATION OF LETTER FROM M MAURICE SCHUMANN TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR  
IN PARIS

I should like your Prime Minister, with whom I have friendly ties, to know what my attitude has been since the beginning of the Falklands affair.

As you are aware, since I left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, my political activity has been concerned essentially on the one hand with economic problems (particularly serious in the region I represent) and on the other with cultural matters.

But, although I am not a member of the Senate's Foreign Affairs Commission, I have often had the opportunity of expressing my views, notably on television (TFI - on Friday 16 April). The attached interview with La Libre Belgique of 15 May fully reflects my opinions, which I express with equal frankness whatever the subject in question.

I am too deeply attached to Great Britain not to pass on to you this statement of mine which I hope will be brought to the attention of Mrs Thatcher.

The article starts with a lead-in about current problems in the EC, notably agricultural prices and the budget. M Schumann is asked whether he thinks the European Community might break up. He replies by recalling the original intention of the EC ie postwar conciliation between Germany and her former victims. The second question asks whether, in that case, the EC has fulfilled its purpose and is of no further use. Schumann replies no; the second objective was to work for the economic prosperity of Europe; the need now is for a return to international monetary order and a common European foreign trade policy. The third question asks what this foreign policy amounts to and Schumann says:

'The decision of the Ten to show solidarity with England in her resistance to aggression - I do not say in her conflict with Argentina - is of capital importance. If this solidarity flinches then evil will overcome good. I am employing all the means in my power to ensure that the French government remains the advocate of solidarity with the United Kingdom.'

The fourth question asks whether this solidarity is only one-way.

Schumann replies:

'I consider it inconceivable and even dishonourable to establish a link between the duty of solidarity with England in resisting aggression and the duty of resisting England when it comes to defending the basic principles of the Community. . . .'

Schumann explains his support for Britain over the Falklands thus:

'I have the feeling of defending all Europeans, because if we allow the precedent to be created of rewarding aggression to the detriment of a member of the Atlantic Alliance, let us be in no doubt that that precedent will become law.'

The final question asks whether European solidarity should not be dedicated to seeking a peaceful solution in the Falklands rather than supporting Britain's military action and Schumann replies:

'One cannot discourage aggression unless one is ready to use force. It is on this precise point that I base my solidarity with the English. We should support them by extending sanctions against Argentina. As soon as the Argentine aggressors have left the Falkland Islands we must seek, unconditionally, a peaceful solution. For I do not consider that the question of British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands is a taboo subject. But other things come first. . . .'

# Maurice Schumann : « L'indispensable solidarité avec Londres »

La Communauté européenne parviendra-t-elle, au cours du week-end, à désamorcer la véritable bombe à retardement que sont devenus le problème de la contribution britannique au budget communautaire et ses implications sur la fixation des prix agricoles ? Certains indices permettent de penser, en effet, que Londres s'apprêterait à diminuer ses prétentions financières et pourrait accepter, à tout le moins, un compromis pour l'année 1982. Une telle évolution permettrait aux ministres de l'Agriculture d'arrêter, lundi, les nouveaux prix agricoles et d'apaiser ainsi les tensions qui se manifestent tant au sein du monde rural qu'entre le Conseil et les deux autres institutions européennes. Elle permettrait également à Londres de décriper l'atmosphère au moment où, lundi, les Dix décideront de reconduire ou non les sanctions des Malouines.

Ancien ministre du général de Gaulle, Maurice Schumann était le ministre des Affaires étrangères de Georges Pompidou au moment des négociations en vue de l'adhésion de la Grande-Bretagne à la Communauté. Venu à Bruxelles pour la présentation de son troisième roman - « Le concerto en ut majeur » - M. Schumann a accepté de répondre à nos questions concernant l'évolution de l'Europe communautaire et les répercussions du conflit des Malouines.

- L'Europe est à la dérive. Certains pensent même que l'hypothèse d'un éclatement n'est plus à exclure. Quel est votre sentiment ?

- Aujourd'hui, il est de mode de dire que l'Europe est en état de stagnation et de stérilité. Ce n'est pas faux. Mais en même temps, il faut éviter de laisser les arbres cacher la forêt. L'intention initiale des « pères de l'Europe » était de rendre possible la réconciliation entre les victimes du pangermanisme et l'Allemagne. Cette réconciliation apparaît désormais comme irréversible.

- Est-ce à dire que, selon vous, l'Europe a accompli sa mission, qu'elle n'a plus aujourd'hui d'utilité ?

- Pas du tout. J'indique seulement que le premier objectif a été atteint. Le deuxième but a été la création d'une zone de « coprosperité » par le biais de la Communauté économique européenne. Aujourd'hui, je crois que la cause profonde de la stagnation réside dans le désordre monétaire international.

Selon moi, nous ne remonte-

rons cette pente que par deux moyens. Le premier n'est pas à notre portée, en raison notamment de la situation politique

interne de la France : c'est le retour à un ordre monétaire international, sous une initiative européenne. Le deuxième, c'est l'adoption, par la voie de la concertation et non de la contrainte, d'une politique extérieure commune.

- Vous discernez des progrès dans ce sens ?

- La décision des Dix de se solidariser avec l'Angleterre dans sa résistance à l'agression - je ne dis pas dans son conflit avec l'Argentine - revêt une importance capitale. Si cette solidarité devait fléchir, le mal l'emporterait bien entendu sur le bien. Je m'emploie par tous les moyens en mon pouvoir à faire en sorte que le gouvernement français demeure l'avocat de la solidarité avec le Royaume-Uni.

Ce langage peut vous paraître surprenant de la part d'un Français alors qu'au même moment, nous sommes en désaccord majeur avec la Grande-Bretagne sur le principe même de la Communauté en matière budgétaire. Ma responsabilité dans ce domaine est considérable puisque, en tant que ministre français des Affaires étrangères, j'ai préparé, né-

gocié et conclu l'adhésion britannique.

- En raison de l'attitude de Londres, ne s'agit-il pas d'une solidarité à sens unique ?

- Je tiens pour inconcevable et même pour déshonorante la tentation à laquelle certains paraissent obéir d'établir un lien entre le devoir de solidarité avec l'Angleterre dans sa résistance à l'agression et le devoir de résistance à l'Angleterre dans la défense des principes fondamentaux qui régissent la Communauté. Si j'étais aux Affaires, je me montrerais à la fois le plus ferme adversaire de Mme Thatcher quand elle défend la politique du « juste retour » et le champion le plus intraitable de la solidarité avec

elle dans l'affaire dite - car il s'agit de bien autre chose - des Malouines.

En adoptant cette position, j'ai aussi le sentiment de défendre tous les Européens car si nous laissons créer le précédent d'une agression récompensée au détriment d'un des pays membres de l'Alliance atlantique, soyons assurés que ce précédent ne tardera pas à faire jurisprudence...

- La solidarité européenne ne devrait-elle pas exclusivement viser à promouvoir une solution pacifique du conflit des Malouines ? La Communauté doit-elle soutenir la Grande-Bretagne dans les opérations militaires qu'elle décide unilatéralement ?

- On ne peut pas décourager l'agression autrement qu'en étant prêt à recourir à la force. C'est sur ce point précis que je me déclare solidaire des Anglais. Nous devons leur apporter notre appui par la prolongation des sanctions que nous avons décrétées contre l'Argentine. A partir du moment où les îles Malouines auront été évacuées par les agresseurs argentins, il faudra rechercher de manière inconditionnelle une solution pacifique. Car je ne considère pas que la souveraineté britannique sur les îles Malouines soit un tabou. Mais il y a un préalable. Et pour le moment, il ne faut penser qu'à un préalable.

M. T

LA LIBRE BELGIQUE

15 Mai 1982.

Selon moi, nous ne remonte-

23 JUN 1982



*[Faint handwritten mark]*





FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730 HOURS: 23 JUNE 1982

Argentine Army Assumes Political Leadership

1. Argentine media report states that General Reynaldo Bignone will take office as President on 1 July. Media has also reported communique stating that the Army has assumed responsibility for political leadership of national government.

Norway to Lift Sanctions

2. In press statement on 21 June, Norwegian Government announced intention of lifting economic sanctions against Argentina.

Mr Hunt's Return to Falklands

3. Mr Hunt will leave Brize Norton for Ascension Island today (23 June) en route to Falkland Islands, accompanied by Mr Baker, Councillor Cheek and small party of officials. He is expected to fly to Port Stanley on 25 June.

EMERGENCY UNIT

23 June 1982

*EC decision  
- 20 June: decision  
- implied as from 22/6  
of no further force  
- arms emb. to  
continue in force*

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION): 0700 HOURS:  
23 JUNE

Political Leadership in Argentina

1. Reports in Argentine media late on 22 June seem to show that the Army is assuming responsibility for the leadership of the government and that its own nominee General Bignone will take office as the new President on 1 July. (Earlier on 22 June the Argentine press reported that the Army was insisting that the President must be a retired general: that the Air Force would not accept a general and was threatening to pull out of the Junta unless a civilian president was named: and that the Navy preferred a civilian candidate, but would consider Saint Jean or a retired officer on a trial basis, otherwise it too would opt out of the Junta).

A Montevideo  
tel no 509

U.S.

2. Sir N Henderson reviews the US position on subjects likely to come up when the Prime Minister meets President Reagan. On the Falklands evident US satisfaction with our military victory is accompanied by a desire to limit the damage thought to have been done to US relations with Latin America. Against this background the Americans will continue to maintain their neutral position on the future status of the Islands and will wish to press on us the need to hold out the prospect of talks at some stage. But Sir N Henderson doubts whether the President himself will press such ideas at all strongly on the Prime Minister on this occasion.

B Washington  
tel no 2206

U.N.

3. The Argentines are continuing to make use of their letter of 18 June to the Security Council. Sir A Parsons recommends that we should put on record again our position on a full cessation of hostilities and also reply to slurs against us contained in the Argentine letter. Sir A Parsons submits a draft reply, which if approved, he would wish to despatch today.

C UKMis New  
York tel 1038  
D UKMis New  
York tel 1032  
E UKMis New  
York tel 1039

Economic Sanctions Against Argentina

4. The Norwegian Government has announced publicly its intention to lift sanctions. No mention was made of possible Norwegian action in the event of further hostilities occurring: HM Ambassador reports that the government does not have an agreed line on this particular point. On 21 June the New Zealand Prime Minister said publicly that the Cabinet had not yet considered lifting the trade embargo against Argentina but it might well do so on 28 June. Later the Head of the Prime Minister's Department told the High Commission that he was certain Mr Muldoon would wish to keep in close step with us and that in his view the EC decision would not affect this. In response to the hope expressed in FCO tel no 237 to Canberra that Australia would be able to continue the splendid support it has so far given us our High Commission has asked how much importance we attach to Australia maintaining its import ban. Australian officials need some idea of our likely reaction if Australia were to follow the EC example. The High Commissioner has asked for a reply deskby 242300Z.

F Oslo tel  
no 130

G Oslo tel  
no 129  
H Wellington  
tel no 201

I Wellington  
tel no 202

J FCO tel no  
237  
K Canberra  
tel no 294

UK Relations with Latin America

L Brasilia tel  
no 289

M Montevideo  
tel no 512

5. HM Ambassador Brasilia does not believe that relations with Brazil have been adversely affected by the Falklands crisis to any important degree. HM Ambassador Montevideo reports that the Uruguayans continue to support Argentina's claim to sovereignty. But Uruguay desperately wants the Falklands problem to be settled once and for all and hopes that somehow discussions with Argentina can begin in the not too distant future.

Civil Commissioner's Departure for the Falklands


6. Mr Hunt, Mr Baker, Councillor Cheek and a small party of officials leave today for the Falklands and are likely to arrive there 25 June.

Comment

7. The nomination of General Bignone as President of Argentina from 1 July, backed at the moment only by the Army, would seem to be only the latest stage in the internal argument over the succession. The situation is likely to continue to evolve.

8. Action is required in commenting on the draft letter to the President of the Security Council, which Sir A Parsons has sent us. We need to be careful that the language does not limit our eventual recognition of an effective de facto cessation of hostilities.

9. On economic sanctions, the New Zealand Government seem ready to continue their entirely cooperative attitude. It would appear that the Australians are also open to persuasion in maintaining sanctions for the time being, and further advice to Canberra is needed on the importance which we attach to the Australians staying with us.



P R Fearn  
Emergency Unit

23 June 1982

Note: The Emergency Unit will be closing down later this week. We expect to produce a Sitrep tomorrow but probably not thereafter.

GRS 353A

RESTRICTED

FROM MONTEVIDEO 22154Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCC  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 509 OF 22 JUNE 1982.

22 JUN 1982

AND TO IMMEDIATE TRAFFIC RELAY.

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ARGENTINA: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS.

1. THIS SUMMARY IS TAKEN FROM THE ARGENTINE PRESS OF 22 JUNE.
2. THE JUNTA HAS REACHED NO AGREEMENT ON THE FUTURE PRESIDENT OR ON HOW TO RESTRUCTURE THE GOVERNMENT.
3. THE ARMY STILL INSISTS THAT THE PRESIDENT MUST BE A RETIRED GENERAL. ITS CHOSEN CANDIDATE IS REYNALDO BIGNONE, BUT IT WOULD ACCEPT CRESPI. IT WILL NOT CONSIDER LAMI DOZO OR A CIVILIAN PRESIDENT THE ONLY OPTIONS THE AIR FORCE HAS DECLARED IT WILL ACCEPT.
4. THE AIR FORCE HAS DECLARED THAT-IT WILL NOT SUPPORT THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IF A GENERAL IS NAMED AS PRESIDENT. IT HAS THREATENED TO PULL OUT OF THE JUNTA UNLESS A CIVILIAN PRESIDENT IS NAMED.  
(ACCORDING TO THE URUGUAYAN PRESS THERE IS AN AIR FORCE DOCUMENT ON FUTURE ECONOMIC POLICY ADVOCATING A U TURN FROM CURRENT POLICIES . FURTHERMORE THE AIR FORCE HAS THREATENED TO WITHDRAW ITS OFFICERS FROM ALL GOVERNMENTAL POSTS HELD BY THE AIR FORCE).  
THE AIR FORCE REPORTEDLY SAID THAT BIGNONE WAS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE OF HIS "SUPPORT" FOR THE LIBERAL ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE FORMER MINISTER OF THE ECONOMY, JOSE MARTINEZ. THE ARMY DENIES THIS CHARGE, AND CLAIMS THAT HE (AND THE ARMY ITSELF) DOES NOT SUPPORT ANY ONE ECONOMIC POLICY.
5. THE NAVY REPORTEDLY STILL PREFERS A CIVILIAN CANDIDATE. IT HAS NOMINATED A LIST OF 12 MEN, HEADED BY COSTA MENDEZ. THE ARMY HAS REJECTED THEM ALL FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, RANGING FROM RELIGIOUS BELIEFS TO INVOLVEMENT IN THE FALKLANDS.  
THE NAVY WOULD CONSIDER SAINT JEAN OR A RETIRED OFFICER ON A OP DAY TRIAL BASIS. SHOULD THIS FAIL, THE NAVY WOULD REPORTEDLY OPT OUT OF THE JUNTA.

THE NAVY WOULD CONSIDER SAINT JEAN OR A RETIRED OFFICER ON A  
OP DAY TRIAL BASIS. SHOULD THIS FAIL, THE NAVY WOULD REPORTEDLY  
OPT OUT OF THE JUNTA.

6. REPORTS SAY THAT THE ONLY CIVILIAN CANDIDATE WITH ANY CHANCE  
OF SUPPORT SEEMS TO BE JUAN RAMON AGUIRRE LANARA, AMBASSADOR TO  
VENEZUELA.

7. THE ARMY FORESEES MILITARY GOVERNMENT UNTIL 1984. BOTH THE  
ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE SAY THERE SHOULD BE DEMOCRATIC RULE BY 1983.

8. THE LEADERS OF THE MULTIPARTIDARIA ARE DEMANDING THAT  
COLONIAL INTERESTS SHOULD BE FORGOTTEN FOR THE PRESENT AND URGENT  
ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID TO THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTION.

9. THIS SUMMARY REFLECTS THE OPINION EXPRESSED IN THE PRESS  
ACROSS THE BOARD.

HUTCHINSON


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
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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 220033Z JUN 82 (CORRECTED VERSION)

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2206 OF 21 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK UKREP BRUSSELS

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

1. ON THE SUBJECTS LIKELY TO COME UP WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER SEES PRESIDENT REAGAN, YOU MAY FIND IT USEFUL TO HAVE AN ACCOUNT OF CURRENT US THINKING:

(A) FALKLANDS

WITH EVIDENT SATISFACTION AT OUR MILITARY VICTORY, ON WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAS ALREADY CONGRATULATED THE PRIME MINISTER WARMLY GOES A DESIRE TO TRY TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN DONE TO US RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA. THERE IS A TENDENCY TO EXAGGERATE THAT DAMAGE AND THE EXTENT OF REAL LATIN AMERICAN SYMPATHY FOR ARGENTINA. ON THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS, THE AMERICANS WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A NEUTRAL POSITION AND WILL TRY TO PRESS ON US THE NEED TO HOLD OUT THE PROSPECT OF TALKS AT SOME STAGE. THE STATE DEPARTMENT APPEAR TO REALISE THAT AFTER THE EFFORTS WE HAVE MADE AND THE LOSS OF LIFE ON OUR SIDE IT IS QUITE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT US TO HAVE IN SUCH A POSITION

IT IS QUITE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT US TO MOVE IN SUCH A DIRECTION NOW. BUT THIS WILL NOT STOP THEM BELIEVING THAT EXERTING PRESSURE ON US WILL HELP THEM WITH THEIR RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA: BUT I DOUBT IF THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF WILL TRY TO PRESS SUCH IDEAS AT ALL STRONGLY ON THE PRIME MINISTER ON THIS OCCASION.

(B) LEBANON

THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE CONCENTRATES ON THE NEED TO CONSOLIDATE A CEASEFIRE AND DEFUSE THE SITUATION IN WEST BEIRUT. THERE ARE STILL DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION. WEINBERGER HAS CONDEMNED THE ISRAELI USE OF FORCE IN LEBANON AND IS NOT KEEN ON US PARTICIPATION IN A PEACEKEEPING FORCE. OTHERS, INCLUDING HAIG, SEE THE OPPORTUNITY TO GET THE SYRIANS OUT OF LEBANON AND PURSUE THE IDEA OF LEBANON FOR THE LEBANESE, WHILE BELIEVING THAT THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PLO AS A MILITARY FORCE MAY REDUCE TENSION IN THE AREA. I HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT HAIG'S VIEWS WILL PREVAIL. THE DIFFICULTY IS THAT OF CREATING ANY EFFECTIVE LEBANESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OR AUTHORITY AND THAT, WHATEVER THE DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE PLO, THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WILL NOT GO AWAY.  
~~HABIB IS CONCERNED~~

HABIB IS CONCENTRATING HIS EFFORTS ON TRYING TO STRENGTHEN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT SO THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY CAN BE DEPLOYED IN WEST BEIRUT. THE AMERICANS CONTINUE TO TALK OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AS THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE. HAIG WILL BE LOOKING FOR FURTHER SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AND THE ESTABLISHMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL OF AN EXPANDED KEEPING FORCE TO WHICH HE MAY HOPE THE EUROPEANS MIGHT CONTRIBUTE.

(C) EAST/WEST RELATIONS

HAIG HAD A VERY UNPRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION WITH GROMYKO, ABOUT WHICH HE HAS SENT YOU A MESSAGE. VERY LITTLE PROGRESS WAS MADE, THOUGH HAIG PROFESSED TO DETECT SOME GLIMMER OF A SUGGESTION THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY BE PREPARED TO ACQUIESCE IN A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT IF ONE CAN BE ACHIEVED. THE AMERICANS SEEM TO HOPE THAT THE SOVIETS MAY HELP IN GETTING THE CUBANS OUT OF ANGOLA.

(D) SIBERIAN PIPELINE

THE PRESIDENT WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH THE INADEQUATE RESULTS ACHIEVED AT VERSILLES ON THE QUESTION OF CREDITS FOR THE SOVIET UNION: AND AMERICAN DISAPPOINTMENT WAS COMPOUNDED BY MITTERRAND AND SCHMIDT'S REMARKS AFTERWARDS. THE RESULT HAS BEEN THAT THOSE LIKE HAIG WHO FAVOUR A POLICY OF COOPERATION WITH THE ALLIES AND THE EXEMPTION OF EXISTING CONTRACTS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CARRY THE DAY. THE US VIEW IS THAT WHILE THEY CANNOT PERSUADE THE EUROPEANS TO GIVE UP THE PIPELINE PROJECT, THEY WILL SEEK TO IMPEDE IT TO THE FULL EXTENT THEY CAN. THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF SYMPATHY HERE WITH THE

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GIVE UP THE PIPELINE PROJECT, THEY WILL SEEK TO IMPEDE IT TO THE FULL  
EXTENT THEY CAN. THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF SYMPATHY HERE WITH THE  
PREDICAMENT OF JOHN BROWN (WE ARE RECOGNISED TO HAVE BEEN MORE  
SUPPORTIVE OF US POLICIES OVER POLAND THAN THE OTHER EUROPEANS). BUT  
THE ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT SEEN HOW IT CAN MAKE AN EXCEPTION  
IN ONE CASE WITHOUT AFFECTING ITS GENERAL POLICY. THE STATE  
DEPARTMENT HAVE BEEN MADE WELL AWARE THAT THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE  
TO US. THE PRESIDENT WILL BE EXPECTING THE PRIME MINISTER TO  
RAISE THE MATTER.

(E) STEEL

THE PRIME MINISTER MAY WISH TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY OF IMPRESSING  
ON THE PRESIDENT THE DANGER OF TRIGGERING A REALLY SERIOUS EEC/US  
ECONOMIC CONFRONTATION IF THINGS CONTINUE ON THEIR PRESENT COURSE.

HENDERSON

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E. R.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1038 OF 22 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

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MY TELNOS 1031 AND 1032: FALKLANDS

1. AS THE ARGENTINES CONTINUE TO MAKE PLAY WITH THEIR LETTER OF 18 JUNE, I RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD AGAIN PUT ON RECORD OUR POSITION ON A FULL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. IN ANY CASE, THE ARGENTINE LETTER CONTAINS SLURS WHICH WE SHOULD NOT LEAVE UNANSWERED.

2. MIFT CONTAINS A DRAFT REPLY WHICH, IF YOU APPROVE, I SHOULD LIKE TO DESPATCH ON 23 JUNE.

PARSONS

F.R.

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19 JUN 1982

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1032 OF 19 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

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M. I. P. T. : FALKLANDS

FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT OF ARGENTINE NOTE:-

LETTER DATED 18 JUNE 1982 FROM THE CHARGE D-AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ARGENTINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1 ON EXPRESS INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVERNMENT, I HAVE THE HONOUR TO BRING THE FOLLOWING TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF THE MALVINAS, SOUTH GEORGIA AND SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS:

2 AFTER VETOING THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ORDERING THE CEASE-FIRE, WHICH WAS VOTED BY THE MAJORITY OF THE COUNCIL ON 4 JUNE 1982, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND HAS CONTINUED ITS ARMED AGGRESSION AGAINST MY COUNTRY AND HAS COMPLETED THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF PUERTO ARGENTINO, THE CAPITAL OF THE MALVINAS, ON 14 JUNE. THE SELF-DEFENCE EXERCISED BY ARGENTINA IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY COULD NOT PREVAIL AGAINST THE MILITARY SUPERIORITY OF THE AGGRESSOR.

3 CONSEQUENTLY, THE COMMANDER OF THE ARGENTINE FORCES DEFENDING THE MALVINAS HAD TO SURRENDER THE PERSONNEL UNDER HIS COMMAND IN ORDER TO AVOID GREATER LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE.

4 THROUGHOUT THE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH LED TO THIS SITUATION THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND IGNORED THE DEMAND FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE CONTAINED IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982) OF 3 APRIL 1982 AND ALSO THE EXHORTATION OF THE COUNCIL CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF THAT RESOLUTION TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE BY MEANS OF NEGOTIATIONS.

5 AS IS WELL KNOWN, THE UNITED KINGDOM VETOED THE DRAFT RESOLUTION OF 4 JUNE, SUBMITTED BY PANAMA AND SPAIN, THUS MAKING CLEAR ITS REFUSAL TO CARRY OUT THE CEASE-FIRE AND TO ACCEPT RESOLUTION 505 (1982), ALTHOUGH IT HAD BEEN ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY AND, OBVIOUSLY, WITH ITS OWN AFFIRMATIVE VOTE.

6 ARGENTINA CANNOT AND WILL NOT ACCEPT THE SITUATION OF FORCE WHICH GREAT BRITAIN HAS THUS SOUGHT TO IMPOSE. TODAY, IT IS CLEARER THAN EVER THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM'S AIM IS TO ENSURE BY ANY MEANS THE CONTINUATION OF A SITUATION OF COLONIAL DOMINATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, IN OPEN VIOLATION OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

7 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC IS NOW ADDRESSING THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGAIN TO MAKE CLEAR, AS IT HAS DONE ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, ITS FULL READINESS TO CARRY OUT RESOLUTIONS 502 (1982) AND 505 (1982). MY COUNTRY HOPES LIKEWISE THAT THE COUNCIL WILL CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO SECURE THE FULL COMPLIANCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM WITH THESE RESOLUTIONS.

8 THE UNITED KINGDOM IS MAINTAINING ITS TROOPS ON THE ISLANDS, ITS FLEET IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, THE NAVAL AND AIR BLOCKADE AGAINST ARGENTINA AND ALSO THE ECONOMIC AGGRESSION CARRIED OUT WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES.

9 IN ADDITION, THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS NOW EXTENDED ITS MILITARY OPERATIONS TO THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS, AS THE ARGENTINE MISSION INFORMED THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN NOTE NO. 171 OF 17 JUNE CIRCULATED IN SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT S/15230, BY ATTACKING THE SCIENTIFIC STATION "CORBETA URUGUAY" WHICH THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC HAS MAINTAINED IN THOSE ISLANDS FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS.

10 IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE IS A DE FACTO CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WHICH ARGENTINA IS NOW OBSERVING. HOWEVER, THIS CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WILL BE PRECARIOUS AS LONG AS THE BRITISH POLICY OF CONTINUING THE MILITARY OCCUPATION, THE BLOCKADE AND THE ECONOMIC AGGRESSION CONTINUES.

11 THE TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WILL BE ACHIEVED ONLY WHEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AGREES TO LIFT THE NAVAL AND AIR BLOCKADE AND THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS REFERRED TO ABOVE AND WHEN IT WITHDRAWS THE MILITARY FORCES OCCUPYING THE ISLANDS AND THE NAVAL TASK FORCE AND THE NUCLEAR SUBMARINES WHICH IT HAS DEPLOYED IN THE AREA.

12 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC POINTS OUT, ONCE AGAIN, THAT ONLY NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PERTINENT RESOLUTIONS - NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH ARGENTINA HAS ALWAYS BEEN READY TO PARTICIPATE - CAN LEAD TO A FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE, THUS ELIMINATING A SITUATION OF ILLEGAL COLONIAL DOMINATION, WHICH IS SUSTAINED BY FORCE AND WHICH IN ITSELF CONSTITUTES A PERMANENT THREAT TO PEACE.

I REQUEST THAT THIS NOTE BE CIRCULATED AS A SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT

(SIGNED) ARNOLDO M. LISTRE  
AMBASSADOR

PARSONS

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22 JUN 1982


CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 222012Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1039 OF 22 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.



MIPT:

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

BEGINS

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REFER TO THE LETTER DATED 18 JUNE 1982 (S/15234) FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ARGENTINA ("THE ARGENTINE LETTER") AND, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVERNMENT, TO STATE THE FOLLOWING.

**"AGGRESSION"**

THE ARGENTINE LETTER REFERS TO "ARMED AGGRESSION" ON THE PART OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND CONTAINS SEVERAL OTHER TENDENTIOUS STATEMENTS OF A SIMILAR NATURE. WHAT ARE THE FACTS? FIRST, IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT ON 1 APRIL 1982, THE SECURITY COUNCIL ISSUED AN APPEAL TO ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF FORCE (S/14944). SECONDLY, ACCEPTED THAT APPEAL ON BEHALF OF THE UK (S/PV 2345, P.36). THIRDLY, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA REMAINED SILENT; ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES INVADED THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ON 2 APRIL AND SOUTH GEORGIA ON 3 APRIL. FINALLY, THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IN RESOLUTION 502 (1982), CHARACTERISED THIS USE OF FORCE AS AN INVASION WHICH HAD CAUSED A BREACH OF THE PEACE IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. IT IS CLEAR FROM THE FOREGOING, AS WELL AS FROM THE DEFINITION OF THE TERMS "AGGRESSION" PUT FORWARD BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN ITS RESOLUTION 3314 (XXIX).

GOING, AS WELL AS FROM THE DEFINITION OF THE TERMS "AGGRESSION" PUT FORWARD BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN ITS RESOLUTION 3314 (XXIX), THAT BY ITS FIRST USE OF ARMED FORCE IN DEFIANCE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S APPEAL ARGENTINA COMMITTED ACTS OF ARMED AGGRESSION AGAINST THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THE ARGENTINE AGGRESSION WAS THE MORE SERIOUS BECAUSE NEGOTIATIONS WERE STILL IN PROGRESS, THE LATEST MEETING HAVING BEEN HELD IN A POSITIVE SPIRIT AT THE END OF FEBRUARY 1982. ARGENTINA'S ACTION THUS VIOLATED BOTH THE THIRD AND FOURTH PARAGRAPHS OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CHARTER - THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND NON-USE OF FORCE. ARGENTINA ALSO VIOLATED THE RIGHTS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS (A PERMANENT POPULATION OF BRITISH DESCENT AND NATIONALITY) UNDER ARTICLE 73 OF THE CHARTER. FINALLY, ARGENTINA TOTALLY DISREGARDED THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY WHICH IT SETS SUCH STORE AND ALL OF WHICH CALL FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION, NOT THE USE OF FORCE TO SEIZE THE ISLANDS.

IN THE FACE OF THIS ILLEGAL USE OF FORCE BY ARGENTINA, THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS BEEN EXERCISING ITS INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE RECOGNIZED BY ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. BRITISH FORCES HAVE NOW RECOVERED POSSESSION OF ALL THE BRITISH TERRITORY ILLEGALLY OCCUPIED BY ARGENTINE FORCES.

#### CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

THE ARGENTINE LETTER STATES THAT THE CURRENT CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IS "PRECARIOUS" AND THAT A TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WILL BE ACHIEVED ONLY WHEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AGREES TO SOME PRE-CONDITIONS SOUGHT BY ARGENTINA.

IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT ON 15 JUNE 1982, THE UNITED KINGDOM ADDRESSED NOTES THROUGH THE EMBASSY'S OF SWITZERLAND AND BRAZIL TO ARGENTINA, SEEKING CONFIRMATION OF THE TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BY ARGENTINA. THE BRITISH NOTE WENT ON TO PROPOSE THAT "THE ECONOMIC MEASURES AND THE EXCLUSION ZONES INSTITUTED BY BOTH PARTIES SHOULD BE LIFTED". THE ARGENTINE REPLY, SET OUT IN THE LETTER DATED 17 JUNE 1982 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A. I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ARGENTINA (S/15228), DID NOT ACCEPT THE BRITISH PROPOSALS OF A TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND THE LIFTING OF ECONOMIC MEASURES AND EXCLUSION ZONES. IN HIS FURTHER LETTER OF 18 JUNE 1982 (S/15234), THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES STATED THAT A TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WOULD BE ACHIEVED ONLY IF CERTAIN CONDITIONS WERE FULFILLED, INCLUDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH FORCES FROM THE ISLANDS.

AS THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES ARE AWARE, THAT CONDITION IS TOTALLY

AS THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES ARE AWARE, THAT CONDITION IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. BRITISH FORCES HAVE BEEN PRESENT IN SMALL NUMBERS ON THE ISLANDS FOR VERY MANY YEARS. AT PRESENT, BRITISH FORCES REMAIN ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IN ORDER TO DEFEND THE ISLANDS AND THEIR PEOPLE AGAINST FURTHER ARGENTINE ATTACKS, AND TO HELP THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS TO REPAIR THE EXTENSIVE DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE ARGENTINE INVASION AND OCCUPATION. IT WILL TAKE A LONG TIME FOR LIFE TO RETURN TO NORMAL THERE. THE ISLANDS ARE BRITISH TERRITORY AND THE POPULATION IS BRITISH: THERE CAN THEREFORE BE NO QUESTION OF WITHDRAWING BRITISH FORCES. IT IS NOT A CASE OF "COLONIAL DOMINATION" OR "MILITARY OCCUPATION", AS ASSERTED IN THE ARGENTINE LETTER: THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS TOTALLY REJECTED AND RESENTED THE ARGENTINE INVASION AND OCCUPATION; THEY WELCOMED THEIR LIBERATION BY BRITISH FORCES FROM ALIEN SUBJUGATION.

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE UNITED KINGDOM LOOKS FORWARD TO RECEIVING THROUGH THE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL A POSITIVE AND UNCONDITIONAL REPLY FROM ARGENTINA TO ITS PROPOSALS TRANSMITTED TO ARGENTINA ON 15 JUNE 1982 THROUGH THE EMBASSY OF BRAZIL FOR A TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. THE UNITED KINGDOM STANDS BY THESE PROPOSALS, WHICH COULD BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT DELAY ONCE ACCEPTED BY ARGENTINA.

I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL ETC....

ENDS

PARSONS

NNNN

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OSFO 05/22

22 JUN 1982

~~E.R.~~

PP FCO

PP UKREP BRUSSELS

PP OTHER EC POSTS

GRS

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM OSLO 221455Z JUNE 1982

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 130 OF 22 JUNE 1982

INFO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS, AND OTHER EC POSTS.

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, TOKYO, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON,  
UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK.



(105)

MIPT

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF REMARKS TO THE NORWEGIAN PRESS BY STATE  
SECRETARY EIVINN BERG ON 21 JUNE 1982.

BEGINS

THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THAT AFTER THE DEVELOPMENTS OF  
THE PAST FEW DAYS THE FALKLANDS SITUATION HAS BEEN CLARIFIED  
SUFFICIENTLY TO ENABLE NORWEGIAN ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST  
ARGENTINA TO BE LIFTED. OTHER EUROPEAN NATIONS ARE ALSO  
LIFTING SANCTIONS TODAY. THIS IS DONE IN THE EXPECTATION THAT  
HOSTILITIES WILL NOW BE BROUGHT DEFINITELY TO AN END.

WE ON THE NORWEGIAN SIDE HAD OBVIOUSLY HOPED THAT THE  
INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA TO WITHDRAW, WHICH HAS  
BEEN EXPRESSED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AMONG  
OTHERS, WOULD HAVE BEEN SUCH THAT FIGHTING WITH HEAVY LOSS  
OF LIFE COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED.

IT STILL REMAINS TO FIND A LASTING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT  
OF THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION OF THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE  
FALKLAND ISLANDS. THIS CAN ONLY BE DONE THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS  
AND THE PARTIES NOW BEAR SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR GETTING THESE  
UNDER WAY AS SOON AS CONDITIONS MAKE IT POSSIBLE.

CCN GROUPS 170

ENDS

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

BROWN

NNNN


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PP UKREP BRUSSELS

PP OTHER EC POSTS

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E. R.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM OSLO 221445Z JUNE 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 129 OF 22 JUNE 1982

INFO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS, AND OTHER EC POSTS.

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, TOKYO, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON,  
UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 233 TO CANBERRA : ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST

ARGENTINA

1. MY IFT CONTAINS TEXT OF COMMENT TO THE PRESS MADE BY STATE SECRETARY BERG LATE IN THE EVENING OF 21 JUNE ON THE LIFTING OF NORWEGIAN ECONOMIC MEASURES. RESCINDMENT OF THESE MEASURES REQUIRES AN ADVERTISEMENT IN THE PRESS WHICH WILL PROBABLY APPEAR TOMORROW ACCOMPANIED BY A FORMAL INSTRUMENT OF RESCINDMENT.

2. YOUR INSTRUCTIONS ARRIVED CONVENIENTLY JUST BEFORE A COMMUNITY LUNCH ATTENDED BY STRAY AND BERG, WHEN I CONVEYED YOUR INSTRUCTIONS IN WRITING, DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE OMISSION FROM BERG'S STATEMENT OF ANY REFERENCE TO AN IMMEDIATE REACTION BY NORWAY IF FURTHER HOSTILITIES SHOULD OCCUR AND EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THEY COULD ASSURE US THAT THIS WOULD IN FACT BE THE INTENTION OF THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT IF SUCH AN EVENT TOOK PLACE.

3. I GOT TWO SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT ANSWERS. STRAY MURMURED THAT HE THOUGHT HE COULD GIVE ME THE ASSURANCE FOR WHICH I ASKED AND ONE MIGHT HOPE THAT THE FACT THE EMBARGO HAD BEEN LIFTED IN THE EXPECTATION THAT THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER HOSTILITIES WOULD HELP DETER THE ARGENTINES FROM TAKING FURTHER RISKS. LATER BERG TOLD ME IN PRECISE TERMS THAT HE WISHED THE COMMUNITY HAD NOT ACTED SO QUICKLY IN REMOVING THE ECONOMIC MEASURES. NORWAY WOULD HAVE MUCH PREFERRED TO WAIT SEVERAL DAYS UNTIL THE SITUATION WAS CLEARER. HE HAD DELIBERATED CAREFULLY BEFORE PHRASING HIS REMARKS TO THE PRESS IN THE WAY HE HAD, BECAUSE, WHILE HE COULD ASSURE ME THAT THE NORWEGIANS WOULD IMMEDIATELY RE-CONSIDER THE SITUATION IF THERE WERE FURTHER HOSTILITIES, HE HAD FORESEEN THAT IF THERE WERE ISOLATED INSTANCES IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT FOR NORWAY TO REIMPOSE THE RESTRICTIONS RAPIDLY.

4. I HAVE SO FAR REFRAINED FROM ANY COMMENT ON THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF BERG'S REMARKS TO THE PRESS. THE PRIME MINISTER'S TELEVISION INTERVIEW WITH SCANDINAVIAN JOURNALISTS HAS, HOWEVER, REACHED A VERY WIDE AUDIENCE AMONG THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE POINTS MADE WILL HAVE BEEN NOTED.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

BROWN

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TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELNO 201 OF 22 JUN

FALKLANDS: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS.

1. AT POST-CABINET PRESS CONFERENCE ON 21 JUN, MR MULDOON, IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT LIFTING THE TRADE EMBARGO AGAINST ARGENTINA, INDICATED CABINET HAD NOT YET CONSIDERED MATTER BUT MIGHT WELL DO SO NEXT MONDAY. NZ WOULD BE "MORE GUIDED" BY BRITISH GOVT'S DECISION. HIS LATEST INFORMATION WAS THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN A COMPLETE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND "WE DIDN'T HAVE ENOUGH INFORMATION TODAY TO CONSIDER IT IN CABINET".

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 202 OF 22 JUN

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YOUR TELNO 233 TO CANBERRA: ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA.

1. ACTION TAKEN ON 22 JUN WITH GATES, ACTING HEAD OF AMERICAS DIVISION (ALL OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS CONCERNED ARE ACCOMPANYING MINISTER AT ANZUS TALKS). GATES UNDERTOOK TO INCORPORATE OUR REQUEST IN SUBMISSION TO MINISTERS LATER TODAY (IT WAS DUE LAST FRIDAY WHICH PERHAPS EXPLAINS PM'S REMARKS ABOUT LACK OF INFORMATION - OUR TELNO 201 OF 22 JUN REFERS).
2. HEAD OF PM'S DEPT, WITH WHOM REINFORCING ACTION ALSO TAKEN TODAY, SAID HE WAS SURE MR MULDOON WOULD WANT TO KEEP IN CLOSE STEP WITH US. HE DID NOT THINK EC DECISION WOULD AFFECT THIS.

PRIESTLEY


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22 JUN 1982



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FM FCO 221400Z JUNE 82  
IMMEDIATE CANBERRA  
TEL NO 237 OF 22 JUNE  
AND TO IMMEDIATE WELLINGTON

YOUR TELNO 293: ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA

1. OUR POSITION IS THAT WE NEED TO BE SATISFIED THAT ARGENTINA DOES NOT PLAN FURTHER MILITARY ACTION AGAINST US. THE ARGENTINE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN HAS REFERRED TO A DE FACTO CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. BUT THIS DOES NOT YET GIVE US THE ASSURANCE WE REQUIRE, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE REPRESENTATIVE WENT ON TO STATE THAT IN ARGENTINA'S VIEW THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES COULD NOT BE TOTAL UNTIL THE UK HAD LIFTED THE BLOCKADE AND WITHDRAWN THEIR FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. IN SHORT WE CANNOT YET BE CONFIDENT THAT ACTIVE HOSTILITIES ARE OVER.

2. AUSTRALIA'S IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA WERE INSIGNIFICANT IN COMPARISON TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THEREFORE AUSTRALIA'S ECONOMIC MEASURES WERE IN PRACTICAL EFFECT A LESS IMPORTANT PART OF THE WHOLE THAN THE COMMUNITY'S. BUT THE GREATEST VALUE OF ECONOMIC MEASURES IN THE SHORT-TERM WAS THE POLITICAL SHOCK TO ARGENTINA REPRESENTED BY THEIR IMPOSITION. WE HAD HOPED THAT OUR COMMUNITY PARTNERS WOULD STICK WITH US UNTIL ARGENTINA HAD SATISFIED US OVER THE TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. THEY HAVE HOWEVER AGREED THAT THEY WOULD MEET URGENTLY TO TAKE MEASURES IF ARGENTINA RENEWED HOSTILITIES, SO THAT A CLEAR LINK NONETHELESS REMAINS BETWEEN A LASTING CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND NORMAL ARGENTINE/EC COMMERCIAL RELATIONS. WE HOPE THAT AUSTRALIA WILL FEEL ABLE TO CONTINUE THE SPLENDID SUPPORT IT HAS SO FAR GIVEN US.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM CANBERRA 230002Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 294 OF 23 JUNE

AND TO IMMEDIATE WELLINGTON

FCO TELNO 237 : ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA

1. THANK YOU FOR THIS SWIFT RESPONSE BUT CAN YOU PLEASE BE MORE SPECIFIC THAN IN FINAL SENTENCE OF TUR. HOW MUCH IMPORTANCE DO WE NOW ATTACH TO AUSTRALIA, AGAINST THE GENERAL TREND, MAINTAINING ITS IMPORT BANS? OFFICIALS NEED TO HAVE SOME IDEA ABOUT HOW UPSET WE MIGHT BE IF AUSTRALIA WERE NOW TO LIFT THE BANS WITH A SIMILAR UNDERTAKING TO THAT OF THE COMMUNITY REGARDING RECONSIDERATION IF ARGENTINA RENEWED HOSTILITIES.
2. THERE IS NO NEED FOR ME TO GIVE A FORMAL RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE. BUT IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF I COULD CONVEY INFORMALLY THE QUOTE ATMOSPHERICS UNQUOTE.
3. GRATEFUL REPLY DESKBY 242300Z.

SMART

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DESKBY 230800Z

FM BRASILIA 221745Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 289 OF 22 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING RIO DE JANEIRO AND SAO PAULO

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YOUR TELNO 198: RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA

1. FENCE-MENDING WITH THE LATIN AMERICAN REGION IN GENERAL, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT, MAY WELL BE NECESSARY. BUT IT DOES NOT SEEM TO ME THAT RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL HAVE BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY IT TO ANY IMPORTANT DEGREE. PUBLIC OPINION HWERE HAS BEEN AT LEAST AS CRITICAL OF THE ARGENTINES' PERFORMANCE AS OF OURS: THE PRESS HAS BEEN ALMOST UNIFORMLY ON OUR SIDE: AND THE GOVERNMENT, WHILE HANKERING AFTER A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WHICH IN THE EVENT PROVED UNATTAINABLE, HAS FREQUENTLY EMPHASISED ITS DESIRE FOR CONTINUED GOOD RELATIONS WITH US.

2. THAT SAID, I ENTIRELY AGREE THAT WE OUGHT TO PLAN NOW SOME CAREFULLY-CONSIDERED EFFORTS TO CONTINUE THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL. WE SHALL, HOWEVER, NEED TO BEAR IN MIND NOT ONLY THE BRAZILIANS' NATURALLY PRUDENT AND CAUTIOUS TEMPERAMENT, WHICH WOULD MAKE THEM WARY OF ANY OVER-DRAMATIC INITIATIVES, BUT ALSO THEIR OVERRIDING ANXIETY NOT TO OFFEND ARGENTINA IN HER PRESENT DANGEROUSLY EXCITABLE CONDITION. A DECISIVE FACTOR WILL, OF COURSE, BE THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE CONFLICT ITSELF HAS COOLED TO A RATIONAL TEMPERATURE. IN BRAZILIAN EYES, THIS WILL MEAN NOT ONLY A TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, AND A CONSEQUENT RETURN TO NORMAL TRADING RELATIONS IN THE AREA, BUT ALSO SOME PROSPECT OF A RETURN BY THE PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE BEFORE VERY LONG.

3. SO FAR AS BRAZIL IS CONCERNED, I THINK THAT A PROGRAMME OF VISITS OF THE KIND PROPOSED IN CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR URE LAST YEAR, SUITABLY UP-DATED, WOULD MEET THE NEW REQUIREMENTS VERY WELL.

4. SPECIFICALLY, I WOULD SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING VISITS IN 1982:

OUTWARD TO BRAZIL

(A) SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE (FULFILLING THE CANCELLED VISIT WHICH MR BIFFEN WAS TO HAVE CARRIED OUT IN APRIL),

OUTWARD TO BRAZIL

- (A) SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE (FULFILLING THE CANCELLED VISIT WHICH MR BIFFEN WAS TO HAVE CARRIED OUT IN APRIL),
- (B) MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS (MR ONSLOW),
- (C) FIRST SEA LORD (WHO HAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO COME IN OCTOBER),
- (D) DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE BRITISH COUNCIL (WHOM ITAMARATY PUT OFF EARLIER THIS MONTH BUT SAID THEY WOULD LIKE TO INVITE AFTER THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT ENDED).

INWARD TO THE UK

- (E) MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS (WHO HAS ACCEPTED MR KENNETH BAKER'S INVITATION FOR SUCH A VISIT, POSSIBLY IN SEPTEMBER),
- (F) CHIEF OF BRAZILIAN JOINT STAFF (ALREADY PROPOSED TO CDS).

5. FOR 1983, I SUGGEST:

OUTWARD TO BRAZIL

- (A) THE PRIME MINISTER (WHO HAS AN OUTSTANDING INVITATION FROM PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO, DATING FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT LAST NOVEMBER),
- (B) EITHER THE PRINCE AND PRINCESS OF WALES OR PRINCE ANDREW OR THE DUKE AND DUCHESS OF KENT, WITH A VIEW TO INAUGURATING THE NEW EMBASSY COMPLEX IN MID-YEAR,
- (C) MINISTER OF STATE FOR INDUSTRY AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (RECIPROCATING 3(E) ABOVE),
- (D) A ROYAL NAVY FLEET DEPLOYMENT TO BRAZILIAN PORTS (POSTPONED FROM 1981).

INWARD TO THE UK

- (E) PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO (FOR A WORKING VISIT AFTER (A) ABOVE, IN RESPONSE TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S OUTSTANDING INVITATION),
- (F) MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD (ALREADY AGREED, BUT POSTPONED ON MY ADVICE FROM SEPTEMBER 1982),
- (G) OTHER VISITS OF BRAZILIAN MINISTERS WILL SUGGEST THEMSELVES, OFTEN AT RELATIVELY SHORT NOTICE,
- (H) FURTHER VISITS OF BRAZILIAN SERVICE CHIEFS (EG CHIEF OF AIR STAFF, RECIPROCATING ACM SIR MICHAEL BEETHAM'S VISIT LAST YEAR) COULD ALSO BE ARRANGED.

ALTHOUGH 1983 IS STILL SOME WAY OFF, THESE EVENTS, IF THEY CAN BE AGREED SOON, WILL BEGIN TO HAVE A BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON OUR RELATIONS LONG BEFORE THEY ACTUALLY HAPPEN.

ALTHOUGH 1983 IS STILL SOME WAY OFF, THESE EVENTS, IF THEY CAN BE AGREED SOON, WILL BEGIN TO HAVE A BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON OUR RELATIONS LONG BEFORE THEY ACTUALLY HAPPEN.

6. I HAVE NOT SUGGESTED ANY PARLIAMENTARY EXCHANGES, BECAUSE BRAZIL IS NOW ENTERING A PERIOD OF PRE-ELECTORAL FEVER WHICH WILL LAST UNTIL THE END OF THE YEAR (IE AFTER THE MID-NOVEMBER LEGISLATIVE AND STATE ELECTIONS). WE SHALL NEED TO REVIEW THE BRAZILIAN PARLIAMENTARY AND POLITICAL SCENE THEREAFTER BEFORE MAKING ANY FIRM RECOMMENDATIONS. BUT WE MIGHT USEFULLY THINK NOW IN TERMS OF ENCOURAGING SOME HIGH-LEVEL NON-POLITICAL CONTACTS OF A KIND WHICH WOULD BE CALCULATED TO SPARK A PARTICULARLY KEEN INTEREST IN BRAZIL. THUS, LEADING LIGHTS IN THE LEGAL, RELIGIOUS AND SCIENTIFIC FIELDS (LORD SCARMAN, CARDINAL HUME AND SIR HERMAN BONDI COME TO MIND) COULD MAKE AN IMPACT WHICH, WHILE FAR REMOVED FROM THE FALKLANDS ARENA, COULD USEFULLY SERVE TO GIVE FURTHER DEPTH TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. IT MAY ALSO BE THAT BRAZIL COULD BE INCLUDED ON THE ITINERARY OF ONE OR MORE MAJOR CULTURAL EXHIBITIONS, THOUGH WE HERE DO NOT AS YET KNOW WHAT IS PLANNED IN THIS FIELD.

7. NOR HAVE I SUGGESTED AN OUTWARD BRITISH TRADE MISSION, SUCH AS IS, I GATHER, BEING TALKED ABOUT IN LONDON. OUR TRADE RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL DO NOT LACK DENSITY: WHAT THEY DO LACK IS CAREFUL CULTIVATION BY BRITISH INDUSTRY. THIS MEANS SUSTAINED ATTENTION PAID TO THE MARKET IN THE BOARDROOMS OF THE BRITISH COMPANIES CONCERNED, BACKED BY FREQUENT PERSONAL VISITS HERE BY SENIOR DIRECTORS. ON THE WHOLE, THOSE FIRMS WHO FOLLOW THIS PRECEPT DO WELL: THOSE WHO DO NOT, DO NOT. NO AMOUNT OF HIGH-FLYING TRADE MISSIONS OR EXPENSIVELY-MOUNTED TRADE FAIRS OR EXHIBITIONS WILL ALTER THIS FACT, SO FAR AS BRAZIL IS CONCERNED. NATURALLY, IF A TRADE MISSION IS PROPOSED, WE SHALL DO OUR BEST TO ENSURE ITS SUCCESS: BUT I DO NOT PERSONALLY RECOMMEND IT.

8. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS MUCH TO BE SAID FOR THE OCCASIONAL JUDICIOUS REMINDER TO THE BRAZILIANS OF THE EXTENT OF THEIR DEPENDENCE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE ON THE LONDON MONEY MARKET FOR EURO-DOLLAR AND OTHER LOANS. AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO TOUCH THIS SENSITIVE NERVE WILL BE OFFERED BY THE VISIT TO BRASILIA OF SIR JEREMY MORSE NEXT WEEK. FURTHER VISITS OF PROMINENT BRITISH BANKERS CAN BE TURNED TO SIMILAR GOOD EFFECT. IN VIEW OF THE NATURE OF BRAZILIAN SUSCEPTIBILITIES ABOUT THEIR FOREIGN BORROWING, THE WORDS OF BANKERS WILL TEND TO WEIGH MORE HEAVILY WITH THEM THAN THOSE OF MINISTERS ON THIS SCORE.



NATURE OF BRAZILIAN SUSCEPTIBILITIES ABOUT THEIR FOREIGN BORROWING,  
THE WORDS OF BANKERS WILL TEND TO WEIGH MORE HEAVILY WITH THEM  
THAN THOSE OF MINISTERS ON THIS SCORE.

9. OF SPECIFIC RELEVANCE TO THE FALKLANDS ISSUE MIGHT BE  
VISITS BY THE DIRECTORS OF THE BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY AND/OR  
SCOTT POLAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE. BOTH ENJOY HIGH STANDING IN THE  
RELEVANT BRAZILIAN ACADEMIC CIRCLES. A VISIT BY EITHER OF THEM  
MIGHT USEFULLY SERVE TO HIGHLIGHT AND EXPLORE THE NEW-FOUND  
BRAZILIAN INTEREST IN INSERTING A NATIONAL PRESENCE INTO THE  
ANTARCTIC. THE FACT THAT THIS BRAZILIAN INTEREST CUTS DIRECTLY  
ACROSS THE ARGENTINES' (NOTABLY IN RESPECT OF SOUTH GEORGIA AND  
SOUTH SANDWICH) CAN ONLY BE HELPFUL TO US.

10. BECAUSE OF THE CAVEAT IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE, I WOULD NOT RECOMMEND  
THAT THESE VISITS, OR ANY OTHERS WHICH MAY EVENTUALLY BE  
APPROVED, SHOULD BE LUMPED TOGETHER IN A PUBLICIZED PROGRAMME.  
THOUGH THEIR BENEFICIAL EFFECT WILL IN FACT BE CUMULATIVE, EACH  
VISIT SHOULD BE GIVEN ITS OWN WEIGHT AND ACCORDED ONLY THE PUBLICITY  
APPROPRIATE TO ITS NATURE.

HARDING

NNNN


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RR FCO

RR ASUNCION

RR BRASILIA

RR SANTIAGO



122

GRS 454A

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM MONTEVIDEO 222130Z JUN 82

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 512 OF 22 JUNE 1982.

INFO ASUNCION BRASILIA AND SANTIAGO.

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON PANAMA SAN JOSE TEGUCIGALPA UKMIS NEW YORK  
CARACAS BOGOTA QUITO LIMA AND LA PAZ.

YOUR TELNO 198 TO BRASILIA: RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA.

1. THE URUGUAYAN FOREIGN MINISTER LAST WEEK STATED PUBLICLY THAT URUGUAY WOULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY WAY WITH THE FALKLANDS WITHOUT THE ACQUIESCENCE OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE. A SENIOR MFA OFFICIAL ALSO TOLD THE PRESS THAT URUGUAY CONTINUED TO SUPPORT ARGENTINA'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY. THE BASIC URUGUAYAN POSITION HAS NOT THEREFORE CHANGED.
2. ON THE OTHER HAND, URUGUAY DESPERATELY WANTS THE PROBLEM OF THE ISLANDS TO BE SETTLED ONCE AND FOR ALL AND HOPES THAT SOMEHOW DISCUSSIONS WITH ARGENTINA CAN BE GOT GOING SOMEWHERE IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE. AN INTRANSIGENT AND UNSTABLE NEIGHBOUR IS, TO SAY THE LEAST, UNFAVOURABLE FOR URUGUAY WHILE POLITICAL UPHEAVALS IN BUENOS AIRES COULD CONCEIVABLY HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGIME HERE. FURTHERMORE THE URUGUAYAN ECONOMY CAN ILL AFFORD AN IMPOVERISHED ARGENTINA.
3. THERE IS MUCH WE SHOULD DO TO COUNTER OUR YEARS OF NEAR NEGLECT OF URUGUAY. WE SHALL HOWEVER HAVE TO MOVE CAREFULLY. URUGUAY TOOK CLOSE NOTE OF THE ATTENTION WE PAID TO NEIGHBOURING BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA PRIOR TO 2 APRIL. THEREFORE, ANY SUDDEN ATTENTION ON OUR PART MIGHT WELL BE RECEIVED WITH CYNICISM. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE SHOULD NOT ACCORD MAJOR ATTENTION TO BRAZIL WHILE IGNORING URUGUAY.
4. OUR FIRST MOVE SHOULD BE TO PAY EARLY, GENEROUS AND WELL PUBLICISED TRIBUTE TO URUGUAY'S INVALUABLE HUMANITARIAN HELP

RECEIVED WITH CYNICISM. ON THE OTHER HAND,  
MAJOR ATTENTION TO BRAZIL WHILE IGNORING URUGUAY.

4. OUR FIRST MOVE SHOULD BE TO PAY EARLY, GENEROUS AND WELL PUBLICISED TRIBUTE TO URUGUAY'S INVALUABLE HUMANITARIAN HELP DURING THE FALKLANDS HOSTILITIES. A FURTHER TANGIBLE THANKYOU IN THE WAY OF SAY A GIFT OF A FIELD AMBULANCE WOULD GO DOWN WELL AND IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES COULD NOT BE CRITICISED BY ANYBODY. WE SHOULD THEN LET THE URUGUAYANS KNOW THAT WE PROPOSE TO START A MODEST PROGRAMME OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND PROVIDE A COUPLE OF BRITISH COUNCIL SCHOLARSHIPS. WE WOULD THUS BE RESUMING PROGRAMMES WHICH WERE CUT OFF A FEW YEARS AGO FOR REASONS WHICH URUGUAY NEVER UNDERSTOOD AND WHICH WE HERE HAVE ALWAYS DEPLORED. ONLY THEN SHOULD WE CONSIDER A VISIT TO URUGUAY AND I WOULD SUGGEST THAT A RETURN VISIT BY LORD TREFGARNE OR A VISIT BY THE MINISTER OF OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT IF APPROPRIATE WOULD STAND THE LEAST RISK OF BEING TOO OBVIOUS.

5. ON COMMERCIAL MATTERS WE FACE AN UPHILL BATTLE TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE. THE BRITISH PAVILION AT THIS YEAR'S PRADO AGRICULTURAL SHOW IN AUGUST IS RUNNING INTO TROUBLE AS SOME PROSPECTIVE EXHIBITORS DO NOT WISH TO BE SEEN TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH BRITAIN AT THIS STAGE IN TIME AND WE MAY HAVE TO ASK FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO ENABLE THE REMAINDER TO CONTINUE. THERE IS NO DOUBT IN ANYONE'S MIND HERE THAT SAJ

TIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA HAVE ALSO HURT URUGUAY AND THE DROP IN BRITISH BUSINESS VISITORS TO URUGUAY SINCE EARLY APRIL TELLS ITS OWN STORY. WE HAVE ALSO HAD ONE OR TWO ENQUIRIES FROM BRITISH FIRMS ASKING IF IT IS STILL WORTH TRYING FOR BUSINESS HERE. IF NOTHING ELSE, ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY TO IMPRESS UPON BRITISH EXPORTERS THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING TO CULTIVATE THE URUGUAYAN MARKET EVEN THOUGH THE LOCAL ECONOMIC SITUATION MAKES IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS SLIM AND IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT NOW MORE THAN EVER WE SHOULD BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE WITH CREDIT TERMS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO  
WASHINGTON PANAMA SAN JOSE TEGUCIGALPA UKMIS NEW YORK CARACAS  
BOGOTA QUITO LIMA AND LA PAZ.

HUTCHINSON



covering RESTRICTED  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

23 June 1982

Dear John,

Yes  
no

Prime Minister

Agree to message?

A. J. C. 24/6

Malawi: Response to President Banda's Message of Congratulations on the Falklands Repossession

I enclose a copy of a message from Lilongwe.

President Banda's support throughout the crisis has been particularly warm and staunch. We think that it would be right for the Prime Minister to acknowledge this message personally. I should therefore be grateful if you could seek the Prime Minister's agreement to a message on the lines of the attached draft telegram.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

covering RESTRICTED

DWF G 124

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LBG 114/16

OO FCO

GR 80

UNCLASSIFIED

FM LILONGWE 161315Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 212 OF 16 JUN

NY TELNO 209: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. NGWIRI, SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT AND CABINET, HANDED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BANDA TO ME THIS AFTERNOON AND ASKED THAT IT BE TRANSMITTED TO HM GOVERNMENT URGENTLY:  
" WE ARE DELIGHTED OVER BRITISH VICTORY IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. GOD SAVE THE QUEEN AND GOD BLESS MRS THATCHER".

SULLIVAN

NNNN

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats  
RESTRICTED

Precedence/Deskby  
IMMEDIATE

1 ZCZC

2 GRS

3 RESTRICTED

4

5

6 FM FCO

7 TO IMMEDIATE LILONGWE

8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

9 YOUR TELNO 212: FALKLANDS

10 1. Please convey the following personal message from the  
11 Prime Minister to President Banda:

12 BEGINS: Thank you for your heartwarming message of congratulations.

13 Throughout the last difficult weeks the unwavering support of  
14 old Commonwealth friends like Malawi has been a source of great  
15 comfort. With my best wishes.

16 Margaret Thatcher. ENDS

17 2. Signed original follows by bag.

18

19 PYM

20 NNNN

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25

NNNN ends  
telegram

BLANK

Catchword

File number

Dept  
PRIVATE OFFICE

Distribution

Drafted by (Block capitals)  
F N RICHARDS

LIMITED  
SAFD, EMERGENCY UNIT, SAMD, CCD,  
SIR J LEAHY, SIR L ALLINSON,  
PS, PS/MR ONSLOW/ NO 10

Telephone number

Authorised for despatch

Comcen reference Time of despatch

NYFO003/24

OO F C O

GR 130

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 232355Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1046 OF 23 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

4 JUN 82

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E. R.

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MY I.P.T. FALKLANDS: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK: CALL ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PIECE OF PAPER GIVEN TO US BY DE SOTO AFTER THE MEETING:

— DESPITE THE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES, RESTORATION OF NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA SHOULD BE ATTAINABLE IN TIME BECAUSE OF COMPELLING COMMON INTERESTS.

— GIVEN EXISTING SENSIBILITIES, THE UNITED NATIONS COULD FACILITATE COMMUNICATION AND UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

— THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S GOOD OFFICES ARE, OF COURSE, AVAILABLE AS MANDATED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, TO WHICH HE WILL NEED TO REPORT IN DUE COURSE.

— THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD BE PREPARED TO EXPLORE WITH BOTH SIDES POSSIBLE WAYS OF RESOLVING IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS AND ACHIEVING A RESOLUTION OF UNDERLYING DIFFERENCES.

— THE INITIATION OF A FLEXIBLE PROCEDURE FOR THE DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION OF THESE DIFFERENCES AS CALLED FOR BY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 COULD WELL BE THE KEY TO A COMPREHENSIVE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

— THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD WELCOME ANY IDEAS THE UNITED KINGDOM MIGHT SUGGEST IN THIS CONTEXT.

PARSONS

JUST SEND NG NUMBER 7 NOW

E. R.

0

NYFO002/24

OO F C O


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24 JUN 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 232350Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1045 OF 23 JUNE 1982  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.



FALKLANDS: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK: CALL ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

1. AFTER A VERY BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE LEBANON, THE REMAINDER OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S CALL ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS DEVOTED TO THE FALKLANDS.
2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD A MANDATE FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE REALISED THAT THERE WAS NOTHING MUCH TO BE DONE AT PRESENT, BUT HE MIGHT GET QUERIES FROM COUNCIL MEMBERS ABOUT WHAT IF ANYTHING HE WAS DOING.
3. THE PRIME MINISTER EXPLAINED IN DETAIL THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WHICH WE WERE FACING ON THE ISLANDS. WE HAD REPATRIATED ABOUT 10,000 ARGENTINE PRISONERS, A NUMBER OF WHOM HAD BEEN IN POOR CONDITION. WE WOULD KEEP ABOUT 600 TO 700 TECHNICIANS, PILOTS AND SENIOR OFFICERS PENDING A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. 35 ARGENTINIANS HAD VOLUNTEERED TO CLEAR MINES. THERE WAS A MAJOR PROBLEM OVER UNMARKED PLASTIC MINEFIELDS. THEY WOULD BE A DANGER FOR MANY YEARS. FOUR BRITISH SOLDIERS HAD ALREADY BEEN INJURED WHILE LIFTING MINES.
4. AS REGARDS A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, LIFTING OF EXCLUSION ZONES ETC, WE HAD SENT A MESSAGE VIA THE SWISS BUT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHO WE WERE DEALING WITH. THE PRIME MINISTER DREW ATTENTION TO THE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN PARAGRAPHS 10 AND 11



4. AS REGARDS A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, LIFTING OF EXCLUSION ZONES ETC, WE HAD SENT A MESSAGE VIA THE SWISS BUT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHO WE WERE DEALING WITH. THE PRIME MINISTER DREW ATTENTION TO THE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN PARAGRAPHS 10 AND OF THE ARGENTINE NOTE OF 18 JUNE (MY TELNO 1032). SHE MENTIONED THE EXPERIENCES OF THE ISLANDERS UNDER OCCUPATION AND THAT MR HUNT WAS RETURNING TO THE ISLANDS WITH 100 ISLANDERS. HE WAS WELL KNOWN TO THE ISLANDERS AND WOULD GIVE THEM CONFIDENCE. HE WOULD BE A CIVIL COMMISSIONER WHILE GENERAL MOORE WOULD DEAL WITH MILITARY MATTERS. THE PROBLEMS OF PRACTICAL RECONSTRUCTION WERE ENORMOUS AND WOULD TAKE MONTHS. WE HAD TO TAKE IT GENTLY.

5. WE WERE RETURNING ABOUT 3,000 BRITISH TROOPS TO THE UK ON THE CANBERRA, BUT WOULD BE BRINGING OUT ENGINEERS TO REBUILD THE AIR FIELD AND EXTEND THE RUNWAY. THESE AND OTHER PRACTICALITIES WOULD ABSORB OUR ATTENTION FOR SOMETIME. IN THE MEANTIME, WE WOULD ACCELERATE THE PROCESS OF SELF-GOVERNMENT.

6. IF THERE WERE NO HOSTILITIES FOR A LONGISH PERIOD, WE MIGHT ASSUME THAT THERE HAD BEEN A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, IN THE ABSENCE OF A CLEAR MESSAGE, AND RETURN THE REMAINING PRISONERS.

7. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT WE MUST RESTORE RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA AND RESUME NEGOTIATIONS AT SOME STAGE.

8. THE PRIME MINISTER REITERATED THAT THE FIRST STEP MUST BE A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. WE COULD BUILD ON THAT LATER. AT PRESENT, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHO WE WERE DEALING WITH IN ARGENTINA AND THIS MIGHT REMAIN THE CASE FOR A LONG PERIOD.

9. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WAS WORRIED THAT, IF THERE WAS NO CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, THERE WOULD BE A PERMANENT FOCUS OF TENSION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. BOTH AS SECRETARY-GENERAL AND AS A SOUTH AMERICAN, HE FELT THAT SOME DIALOGUE MUST BE RESUMED AT SOME STAGE.

10. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT WE DID NOT FEEL THAT WE HAD LOST FRIENDSHIP THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA. IT MIGHT BE IN ABEYANCE IN SOME COUNTRIES FOR THE MOMENT. SHE MENTIONED THE VENEZUELA/GUYANA DISPUTE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WAS IN TOUCH WITH VENEZUELA WHOSE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD PROMISED HIM THAT THEY WOULD NEVER USE FORCE. VENEZUELA HAD UNDERTAKEN TO SEND A MISSION TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

UNDERTAKEN TO SEND A MISSION TO DISCUSS THE RESULTS  
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

11. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE WAS AT OUR DISPOSAL AS A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE ARGENTINES WHO TRUSTED HIM. HE REALISED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT. HOWEVER, WE COULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF HIS MANDATE AT A LATER STAGE: NO FRESH UN INITIATIVE WOULD BE REQUIRED.

12. THE PRIME MINISTER EXPLAINED OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE ISLANDERS AND OUR INTENTION TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 73 OF THE CHARTER.

13. AFTER THE MEETING, DE SOTO GAVE GOULDING A PIECE OF PAPER (TEXT IN MY I.F.T.) REPRESENTING POINTS WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD MEANT TO MAKE TO THE PRIME MINISTER. IT DID NOT NEED ANY RESPONSE FROM US AND THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PUTTING PRESSURE ON US NOR OF SETTING NEW DEADLINES FOR A RESPONSE. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD NOT DECIDED WHEN HE WOULD NEED REPORT AGAIN TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL: IT DEPENDED ON DEVELOPMENTS.

14. THIS MEETING WENT WELL FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. THE PRIME MINISTER LEFT PEREZ DE CUELLAR IN NO DOUBT THAT WE WERE NOT IN THE MOOD TO BE SUCKED INTO ANOTHER NEGOTIATION AND, BY MAINTAINING THE INITIATIVE IN THE DISCUSSION, SHE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO DEVELOP ALL THE POINTS IN HIS SPEAKING NOTE. ON THE OTHER HAND HE HAD JUST ENOUGH OF THE BATTING TO FEEL THAT HIS HONOUR WAS SATISFIED. THE PRIME MINISTER ALSO DEALT EFFECTIVELY WITH THE QUESTIONS ABOUT FUTURE UN INVOLVEMENT AT HER PRESS CONFERENCE. HAPPILY, MY COUNCIL COLLEAGUES ARE SHOWING NO SIGN OF INTEREST IN RESUSCITATING THE SUBJECT. I RAKED DORR (IRELAND) AND OTHERS WITH FIRE A FEW DAYS AGO. OTTUNU (UGANDA) ANTICIPATED ME BY SAYING THAT HE IMAGINED THAT THE BRITISH PEOPLE WOULD LYNCH ANYONE WHO TALKED OF NEGOTIATING WITH ARGENTINA FOR AT LEAST A YEAR.

PARSONS

NNNN


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FM OTTAWA 231640Z JUN 82

IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 333 OF 23 JUNE

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NATO BRUSSELS, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
MONTREAL, TORONTO, VANCOUVER, EDMONTON, HALIFAX.



## ARGENTINA: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

1. IN A PRESS RELEASE YESTERDAY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ANNOUNCED THAT THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED TO END ITS BAN ON IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA AND TO PERMIT EXPORT CREDITS FOR NEW TRANSACTIONS.
2. THE RELEASE NOTED THAT HOSTILITIES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC APPEARED TO HAVE CEASED AND THAT, IN ITS NOTE OF 18 JUNE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT "IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE IS A DE FACTO CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WHICH ARGENTINA IS NOW OBSERVING". MR MACGUIGAN HOPED THAT THIS SITUATION WOULD BE CONFIRMED BY FURTHER UNDERTAKINGS REGARDING A COMPLETE CESSATION OF ALL HOSTILITIES AND THAT THE LONG-STANDING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD BE SETTLED BY PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS.
3. DR MACGUIGAN WAS QUOTED IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT AS SAYING THAT A CHANGE IN THE CURRENT DE FACTO CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES QUOTE WOULD REPRESENT A NEW SITUATION WHICH COULD REQUIRE THE GOVERNMENT TO RECONSIDER ITS POSITION UNQUOTE. HE ALSO NOTED, IN THIS CONNECTION, THAT THE CANADIAN EMBARGO ON ALL EXPORTS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ARGENTINA WOULD REMAIN IN AFFECT FOR THE TIME BEING.
4. FULL TEXT BY BAG.
5. IF WE DO GET PRESS ENQUIRIES, WE SHALL TAKE THE LINE THAT WE REGRET THAT CANADIAN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN LIFTED SO QUICKLY BUT ARE GLAD THAT THE ARMS BAN WILL CONTINUE AND THAT THE SITUATION WILL BE REVIEWED IN THE EVENT OF A RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES.

MORAN

PRIME MINISTER

I attach a letter from M. Raymond Barre conveying congratulations to you in connection with the Falklands. M. Barre says:

"Your country has remained faithful to its great traditions. Its attitude is an example and an encouragement for all Europeans. The success of your country is the result of your determination and courage. I am very happy that you obtained the support of my country and of the Community during this difficult period."

I attach a reply which you may like to send to M. Barre.

A.J.C.

22 June, 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

D...1730/22 JUN 82

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 222012Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1039 OF 22 JUNE 1982  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MIFT:

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE  
SECURITY COUNCIL

BEGINS

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REFER TO THE LETTER DATED 18 JUNE 1982  
(S/15234) FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT  
MISSION OF ARGENTINA (''THE ARGENTINE LETTER'') AND, ON  
INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVERNMENT, TO STATE THE FOLLOWING.

''AGGRESSION''

THE ARGENTINE LETTER REFERS TO ''ARMED AGGRESSION'' ON THE PART  
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND CONTAINS SEVERAL OTHER TENDENTIOUS  
STATEMENTS OF A SIMILAR NATURE. WHAT ARE THE FACTS? FIRST, IT WILL  
BE RECALLED THAT ON 1 APRIL 1982, THE SECURITY COUNCIL ISSUED AN  
APPEAL TO ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO REFRAIN FROM THE USE  
OF FORCE (S/14944). SECONDLY, ACCEPTED THAT APPEAL ON BEHALF OF  
THE UK (S/PV 2345, P.36). THIRDLY, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA  
REMAINED SILENT: ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES INVADED THE FALKLAND  
ISLANDS ON 2 APRIL AND SOUTH GEORGIA ON 3 APRIL. FINALLY, THE  
SECURITY COUNCIL, IN RESOLUTION 502 (1982), CHARACTERISED THIS  
USE OF FORCE AS AN INVASION WHICH HAD CAUSED A BREACH OF THE PEACE  
IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. IT IS CLEAR FROM THE FORE-  
GOING, AS WELL AS FROM THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM ''AGGRESSION''  
PUT FORWARD BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN ITS RESOLUTION 3314 (XXIX),  
THAT BY ITS FIRST USE OF ARMED FORCE IN DEFIANCE OF THE SECURITY  
COUNCIL'S APPEAL ARGENTINA COMMITTED ACTS OF ARMED AGGRESSION  
AGAINST THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.  
THE ARGENTINE AGGRESSION WAS THE MORE SERIOUS BECAUSE NEGOTIATIONS  
WERE STILL IN PROGRESS, THE LATEST MEETING HAVING BEEN HELD  
IN A POSITIVE SPIRIT AT THE END OF FEBRUARY 1982. ARGENTINA'S  
ACTION THUS VIOLATED BOTH THE THIRD AND FOURTH PARAGRAPHS OF  
ARTICLE 2 OF THE CHARTER - THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL  
SETTLEMENT AND NON-USE OF FORCE. ARGENTINA ALSO VIOLATED THE  
RIGHTS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS (A PERMANENT POPULATION OF BRITISH  
DESCENT AND NATIONALITY) UNDER ARTICLE 73 OF THE CHARTER. FINALLY,  
ARGENTINA TOTALLY DISREGARDED THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY BY WHICH IT SETS SUCH STORE AND ALL OF WHICH CALL FOR  
A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION, NOT THE USE OF FORCE TO SEIZE THE ISLANDS.

ATM THE

IN THE FACE OF THIS ILLEGAL USE OF FORCE BY ARGENTINA, THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS BEEN EXERCISING ITS INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE RECOGNIZED BY ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. BRITISH FORCES HAVE NOW RECOVERED POSSESSION OF ALL THE BRITISH TERRITORY ILLEGALLY OCCUPIED BY ARGENTINE FORCES.

#### CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

THE ARGENTINE LETTER STATES THAT THE CURRENT CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IS "PRECARIOUS" AND THAT A TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WILL BE ACHIEVED ONLY WHEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AGREES TO SOME PRE-CONDITIONS SOUGHT BY ARGENTINA.

IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT ON 15 JUNE 1982, THE UNITED KINGDOM ADDRESSED NOTES THROUGH THE EMBASSY'S OF SWITZERLAND AND BRAZIL TO ARGENTINA, SEEKING CONFIRMATION OF THE TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BY ARGENTINA. THE BRITISH NOTE WENT ON TO PROPOSE THAT "THE ECONOMIC MEASURES AND THE EXCLUSION ZONES INSTITUTED BY BOTH PARTIES SHOULD BE LIFTED". THE ARGENTINE REPLY, SET OUT IN THE LETTER DATED 17 JUNE 1982 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ARGENTINA (S/15228), DID NOT ACCEPT THE BRITISH PROPOSALS OF A TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND THE LIFTING OF ECONOMIC MEASURES AND EXCLUSION ZONES. IN HIS FURTHER LETTER OF 18 JUNE 1982 (S/15234), THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES STATED THAT A TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WOULD BE ACHIEVED ONLY IF CERTAIN CONDITIONS WERE FULFILLED, INCLUDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH FORCES FROM THE ISLANDS.

AS THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES ARE AWARE, THAT CONDITION IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. BRITISH FORCES HAVE BEEN PRESENT IN SMALL NUMBERS ON THE ISLANDS FOR VERY MANY YEARS. AT PRESENT, BRITISH FORCES REMAIN ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IN ORDER TO DEFEND THE ISLANDS AND THEIR PEOPLE AGAINST FURTHER ARGENTINE ATTACKS, AND TO HELP THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS TO REPAIR THE EXTENSIVE DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE ARGENTINE INVASION AND OCCUPATION. IT WILL TAKE A LONG TIME FOR LIFE TO RETURN TO NORMAL THERE. THE ISLANDS ARE BRITISH TERRITORY AND THE POPULATION IS BRITISH: THERE CAN THEREFORE BE NO QUESTION OF WITHDRAWING BRITISH FORCES. IT IS NOT A CASE OF "COLONIAL DOMINATION" OR "MILITARY OCCUPATION", AS ASSERTED IN THE ARGENTINE LETTER: THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS TOTALLY REJECTED AND RESENTED THE ARGENTINE INVASION AND OCCUPATION: THEY WELCOMED THEIR LIBERATION BY BRITISH FORCES FROM ALIEN SUBJUGATION.

/IN THESE

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE UNITED KINGDOM LOOKS FORWARD TO RECEIVING THROUGH THE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL A POSITIVE AND UNCONDITIONAL REPLY FROM ARGENTINA TO ITS PROPOSALS TRANSMITTED TO ARGENTINA ON 15 JUNE 1982 THROUGH THE EMBASSY OF BRAZIL FOR A TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. THE UNITED KINGDOM STANDS BY THESE PROPOSALS, WHICH COULD BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT DELAY ONCE ACCEPTED BY ARGENTINA.

I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL ETC.....

ENDS

PARSONS

DISTRIBUTION  
MISSION  
CONFIDENTIAL

KOREA

JUNE 1950 - 1953

854 killed  
2,744 wounded

TROOPS INVOLVED

16,020 Army  
17,000 Navy \*

BORNEO

DECEMBER 1962 -  
AUGUST 1966

68 killed  
140 wounded

TROOPS INVOLVED

12,483 (Army only)

FALKLANDS

APRIL - JUNE 1982

252 killed  
125 (seriously  
injured)

TROOPS INVOLVED

Over 26,000  
(Service  
personnel and  
merchant marines)

\* Adding these figures together does not give a true picture of those involved because personnel did several tours of duty.



## CONDITIONS OF ARGENTINE PRISONERS OF WAR

Over 11,000 prisoners of war were taken by British forces on the Falkland Islands following the successful repossession of Port Stanley on 14 June 1982. This corresponds with an early figure of 15,000 Argentine troops on the Islands which was given to the land forces Commander by General Menendez.

Many of the Argentine troops were found to be in a very poor condition. Officers and NCOs were on the whole well fed and clothed but many of the conscripts were not. A large number of cases of malnutrition have been reported as have other conditions associated with neglect such as parasites and enteritis and cases of exposure. As has been well reported by correspondents on the Falkland Islands the medical services of the Task Force have treated both Argentine and British wounded and ill alike. In this way we have been able to relieve much of the suffering.

Accommodation is very limited on the Falkland Islands. Tentage was to have been provided for both British forces and Argentine prisoners but this was lost when the Atlantic Conveyor was sunk. Consequently both British forces and the Argentine prisoners are having to live in very similar conditions. These conditions <sup>are</sup> ~~were~~ far from ideal.

Action has been taken to ensure early repatriation of the vast majority of the prisoners. Since the beginning of the crisis a total of some 10,000 Argentine personnel have been or are in the process of being repatriated to Argentina. Within the next day or so we shall have repatriated all but about 5,000 Argentine personnel (<sup>mainly</sup> ~~mainly~~ Officers and specialists).

The International Red Cross Committee have been given every facility to examine the conditions of the prisoners. They have travelled with them when in transit to Argentina. We have no reason to believe they are dissatisfied with the arrangements we have made.

MR COLES

THE FALKLANDS

1. You might be interested, before the Prime Minister goes to Washington, in the views expressed to me today by Mr Walt Rostow, who is here for a few days as part of a European tour. (You may remember that Rostow was a Harvard economic professor who worked for President Kennedy and then became President Johnson's National Security Adviser, taking a very determined line in particular over Vietnam - a line which, after the end of the Johnson administration, cost him his friendships and position in East Coast universities. He is now at the University of Texas.)
2. His suggestion was of the need to get things back in balance and restore co-operation between the US and Latin America and also between Britain, Europe and Latin America. There could be two tracks:
  - (a) some sort of process of dialogue with the Argentinians which might be protracted and would not immediately solve the issues but would be a long-term process of rapprochement;
  - (b) there should be a second independent dialogue developed from the Herrera Report. (This is the report of the Committee chaired by Snr. Luis Herrera, asked for by the Secretary of the OAS to define an agenda for economic co-operation in the Western hemisphere in the eighties and beyond.)
3. Rostow claimed that the Reagan administration was interested in this approach, or certain parts of it, particularly the emphasis on food and energy; and that Mr Haig had suggested at the Santa Lucia Conference that this should be followed up. He had also found in his talks last week with various Germans, French and Italians a consistent emphasis on the need to "get back on a constructive track". The idea of Europe joining the United States in co-operation over an economic programme for Latin America had a certain attraction: he believed that some sort of dialogue along these lines could be beneficial both to the United States and to Western Europe; and he suggested that it might be worth our bearing this in mind in case it came up during the Prime Minister's talks in Washington.
4. I pass this on for what it is worth and without having seen the briefing that has been prepared for the Prime Minister's visit. But I think there is a grain of interest in this and you might like to keep it up your sleeve for any oral briefing that is given to the Prime Minister.

*M.P.*

22 June 1982.

(Michael Palliser)

RESTRICTED



BRITISH CONSULATE-GENERAL

845 THIRD AVENUE  
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022

22 June 1982

Ms E Jean Ward  
Executive Director  
Sussex County Arts Council Inc  
PO Box 502  
Newton, NJ 07860

A.J.C.  $\frac{22}{6}$

f.a.

Dear Ms Ward

Many thanks for your letter of June 21. I write to let you know that I have duly forwarded Mr Wirths' letter to the Prime Minister's office for her attention. She will be pleased indeed by this further demonstration of American support during the Falklands crisis.

Please convey to Mr Wirths my acknowledgement and thanks on the Prime Minister's behalf.

Your sincerely  
H T A Overton

H T A Overton  
HM Consul-General

cc P...  
CONFIDENTIAL

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP  
0730 HOURS, 22 JUNE 1982

Prime Minister's Press Conference, New York

1. Sir Anthony Parsons reported on 21 June that journalists attending Prime Minister's press conference in New York on 23 June are likely to seek her views on SCR 502, Argentine letter of 18 June and Secretary General's mandate under SCR 505. Argentine journalists may attend.

Argentine Parties urge Return to Democracy

2. Argentine media report that the 'multipartidaria' (grouping of the five main political parties) released a document on 21 June calling for urgent return to democracy. Document is said to be harshly critical of Junta for taking so long to choose new President.

3. Argentine media also quotes 'reliable' report that General Bignone was summoned to Army Command on 21 June. Bignone has been mentioned as possible new President. Junta will meet again today (22 June).

Argentine Propaganda

4. Commander UK Task Force has sent signal suggesting UK should launch public relations campaign to counter any Argentine propaganda about alleged maltreatment of POWs on Falkland Islands and aboard Canberra/Norland.

Journalists Visiting Falklands

5. Our Embassy in Santiago have reported two further TV teams wish to visit Falklands (BBC and CBS). Sixty journalists are already in Punta Arenas. Several journalists have told Embassy that MOD have purportedly announced they are arranging flight from London to Falklands via Ascension or Punta Arenas. We have told Chileans we hope they will agree in principle to allow civil flights carrying journalists from Punta Arenas to Falklands as soon as we inform them that conditions are safe.

22 June 1982

Emergency Unit

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FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION)  
0730 HOURS, 22 JUNE 1982

Cessation of Hostilities

A (UKMis New  
York telno  
1035)

1. Sir A Parsons reports further evidence that the Argentine Note of 18 June may be more significant than we originally thought. A letter from the Argentine Acting Permanent Representative about Southern Thule states 'This action constitutes a clear violation of the cessation of hostilities existing under the terms of my Note No 172 of 19 June (S/15234) and also constitutes a new act of aggression committed by the United Kingdom, in violation of Security Council 502(1982)'.

Argentina Internal

B (Montevideo  
telno 505)

2. Miss Hutchinson reports that in two meetings on 20 June the Junta failed to agree who should succeed Galtieri; they were to meet again on 21 June. The Army have proposed that the Air Force and Navy representatives resign from the Junta, so that a new Junta will be untainted by the Falklands. The Air Force and Navy appear to have rejected the proposal.

3. Lami Dozo has said that if asked to become President he will assume responsibility.

4. General Saint Jean has stated that the Falklands will continue to be a top priority and that Argentina will never renounce its right to sovereignty over the islands. He said there was a de facto cessation of hostilities but that it was for the Junta to decide whether there was to be a definitive end to hostilities.

Prisoners of War

C (Task Force  
Signal  
211535Z)

5. The Commander of the Task Force has expressed concern at the Argentine propaganda offensive. He says that Argentine wounded and those suffering from malnutrition have been well cared for and that any suffering after capture will be insignificant when compared with that caused during the campaign by neglect, self-wounding, incompetence and the caste-system. Argentine officers and most NCOs appear to have been well-fed, while many other ranks may have been short of food. There are many cases of sickness among the POWs.

6. The Commander of the Task Force suggests a number of lines along which a well-structured public relations

SECRET

/campaign

campaign might be developed.

Action at the United Nations

D (UKMis New York telno 1036) 7. Sir A Parsons says that at the Prime Minister's press conference on 23 June journalists will probably concentrate on three points:

- (a) The present status of Security Council Resolution 502;
- (b) Our interpretation of the Argentine letter of 18 June;
- (c) The Secretary-General's mandate under Security Council Resolution 505.

Negotiations under SCR 502

E  
 ↪ 8. Sir A Parsons suggests that the line of questioning will be that SCR 502 remains in force and is mandatory; such Resolution cannot be unilaterally withdrawn. How do we justify our refusal to negotiate? The main points in reply are contained in our Guidance telno 133. It will be important for the Prime Minister not to appear to be unilaterally 'tearing up' SCR 502. She might say that we want a diplomatic solution to our differences with Argentina; SCR 502 lays down no timetable; we did not break off negotiations, nor did we refuse to implement operative paragraph 2, nor are we now refusing to cease hostilities as required by operative paragraph 1. She could say that it is unrealistic to expect us to negotiate with Argentina now: because of Argentina's refusal to withdraw the situation has changed radically since 3 April. Sir A Parsons recommends that the Prime Minister should not give the impression that the resumption of the diplomatic process is ruled out for all time: to do so would put a weapon in our enemy's hands and could lead to a return to Security Council and a further veto.

Argentine Letter of 18 June

9. The Argentines are mounting a publicity campaign over their letter. It may be suggested that the letter constituted an undertaking to cease hostilities and that it is unreasonable for us to insist on a further undertaking before lifting exclusion zones etc. Sir A Parsons recommends that the Prime Minister point out the differences between paras 10 (de facto cessation of hostilities) and 11 (total cessation of hostilities). Para 11 specifies

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- 3 -

|| unacceptable conditions. The Argentines know that if they cease hostilities we will lift exclusion zones and economic sanctions. Their Note is not a guarantee that they accept a cessation of hostilities.

Secretary-General's Mandate


10. The Prime Minister may be asked for her views on the mandate given to the Secretary-General by SCR 505, and whether we expect further initiatives. The Prime Minister will meet the Secretary-General before the press conference and Sir A Parsons recommends that she and Pérez de Cuellar agree on a line to take.

Comment

11. The continuing inability of the Junta to choose a new President underlines the uncertainty and confusion in Buenos Aires on how to deal with the military defeat. The choice of a civilian President would be a major departure for the regime premised on the need to create a wider national unity. But a civilian President would have little power with the Service Commanders continuing to make the decisions.

|| 12. We have as yet seen no great evidence of an Argentine propaganda campaign on the condition or treatment of prisoners, to which the CTF refers. This could however develop following the repatriation and we should perhaps consider now how to deal with such a contingency.

13. Sir A Parsons's advice on dealing with the press in New York is helpful. The most difficult question will be our position on future negotiations in the dispute.



P R Fearn  
Emergency Unit

22 June 1982

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
TO F L A S H FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1035 OF 21 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

21 JUN 1982

38



MY TELNO 1031: FALKLANDS

1. FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT THE ARGENTINE NOTE OF 18 JUNE MAY BE OF GREATER SIGNIFICANCE THAN WE FIRST THOUGHT IS CONTAINED IN ANOTHER LETTER FROM THE ARGENTINE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ABOUT SOUTHERN THULE (TEXT BY FACSIMILE TO EMERGENCY UNIT) WHICH CONTAINS THE PARAGRAPH : "THIS ACTION CONSTITUTES A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES EXISTING UNDER THE TERMS OF MY NOTE NO 172 OF 18 JUNE (S/15234) AND ALSO CONSTITUTES A NEW ACT OF AGGRESSION COMMITTED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM, IN VIOLATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL 502 (1982)."

2. IT IS THEREFORE POSSIBLE THAT THE ARGENTINES BELIEVE THAT, IN LISTRE'S NOTE OF 18 JUNE, THEY NOTIFIED US OF THEIR AGREEMENT TO A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, AT LEAST ON AN INTERIM BASIS.

PARSONS

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ACTION COPY  
21 JUN 1982

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FROM MONTEVIDEO 212022Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 505 OF 21 JUNE 1982.  
AND TO IMMEDIATE TRAFFIC RELAY.



## ARGENTINA: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS.

1. THIS INFORMATION IS TAKEN FROM THE ARGENTINE PRESS OF 21 JUNE 1982.
2. THE JUNTA HELD TWO MEETINGS ON 20 JUNE 1982 TO TRY TO DECIDE WHO TO NAME AS THE REGIME'S SEVENTH PRESIDENT. BETWEEN THE TWO MEETINGS, THE COMMANDERS IN CHIEF DISCUSSED THE VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES WITH THE MOST SENIOR OFFICERS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE SERVICES. HOWEVER, THEY FAILED TO REACH ANY AGREEMENT. THEY WERE MEETING AGAIN AT 9AM, ON 21 JUNE.
3. POLITICAL SOURCES SAID THAT AT LEAST 12 NAMES WERE UNDER CONSIDERATION. THESE INCLUDED JORGE AGUADO, GOVERNOR OF THE PROVINCE OF BUENOS AIRES; AMADEO FRUGOLI, DEFENCE MINISTER; COSTA MENDEZ, FOREIGN MINISTER; ALFREDO SAINT JEAN, INTERIM PRESIDENT; GENERAL EYNALDO BIGNONE AND LAMI DOZO. (BA HERALD).
4. NICOLAIDES IS SAID TO HAVE PROPOSED THE RETIRED GENERAL REYNALDO BIGNONE. AS THE ARMY SECRETARY BIGNONE. AS THE ARMY SECRETARY BIGNONE CONTROLLED THE SERVICE'S PUBLIC RELATIONS AND EXTERNAL POLICY SECTIONS UNDER FORMER PRESIDENTS VIDELA AND VIOLA. THE ARMY HAS ALSO RAISED THE ANAME OF EDUARDO CRESPI.
5. ONE AIR FORCE BRIGADIER GENERAL SAID THAT HIS SERVICE BACKED LAMI DOZO, AS THEIR FIRST CHOICE. LA NACION CITED TWO OTHER POSSIBLE CHOICES FOR THE AIR FORCE: OMAR GRAFFIGNA, LAMI DOZO'S PREDECESSOR OR JOSE MIRET, SECRETARY OF PLANNING.  
IF NONE OF THESE WERE ELECTED, THE AIR FORCE WOULD SUPPORT A CIVILIAN PRESIDENT. THE NAMES SUGGESTED BY LAMI DOZO ARE : AMADEO FRUGOLI, MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND JUAN AGUIRRE LANARI, ONE OF THE LEADERS OF THE PARTIDO LIBERAL DE CORRIENTES.
6. NAVY SOURCES CLAIM THE NAVY WANTS A CIVILIAN PRESIDENT. COSTA MENDEZ IS THE MOST CITED CHOICE. IF IT MUST BE A MILITARY PRESIDENT IT IS SAID THAT THE NAVY WOULD SUPPORT LAMI DOZO OR SAINT JEAN.

PRESIDENT IT IS SAID THAT THE NAVY WOULD SUPPORT LAMI DOZO OR SAINT JEAN.

7. THE ARMY IS TRYING TO PRESSURE THE AIR FORCE AND NAVY REPRESENTATIVES ON THE JUNTA TO RESIGN, SO THAT A NEW JUNTA WILL BE UNTAINTED BY THE FALKLANDS. TOP AIR FORCE AND NAVY SOURCES SAY THERE IS NO REASON FOR THIS TO HAPPEN.

8. LAMI DOZO HAS DECLARED PUBLICLY THAT IF ASKED TO BECOME PRESIDENT, HE WILL ASSUME THIS RESPONSIBILITY.

9. SAINTJEAN STATED THAT THE QUESTION OF THE FALKLANDS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE A TOP PRIORITY; ARGENTINA WILL NEVER RENOUNCE ITS RIGHT TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS. HE SAID THERE WAS A DE FACTO CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BUT IT WAS FOR THE JUNTA TO DECIDE WHETHER THERE WAS TO BE A DEFINITIVE END TO HOSTILITIES. SAINT JEAN'S ROLE AS INTERIM PRESIDENT IS TO BE PURELY ADMINISTRATIVE.

10. THE POLITICAL LEADERS OF THE MULTIPARTIDARIA WILL MEET IN THE EVENING OF 21 JUNE TO DRAW UP A PROPOSAL FOR A PLAN OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE PRESENT EMERGENCY, BY THE JUNTA, BUT WHICH WILL ALSO CATER FOR INTERNAL ELECTIONS WITHIN THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN THE PATH TOWARDS DEMOCRACY.

THE FOLLOWING WILL BE PRESENT:

CARLOS CONTIN, RADICAL; ARTURO FRONDIZI, DESARROLLISTA; OSCAR ALENDE, INTRANSIGENTE; MARTIN DIP, DEMOCRISTIANE AND NESTOR CARRASCO, PERONISTA.

HUTCHINSON

NNNN

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S E C R E T

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1. WITH COMAN I AM CONCERNED BY EVIDENCE THAT ARGs ARE UNLEASHING MAJOR PROPOGANDA OFFENSIVE SEEKING TO EXPLOIT ALLEGED MALTREATMENT PRISONERS.
2. DISPARITY IN NUMBERS BETWEEN FORCES REPORTED IN THE PRESS SURRENDERING AND PWS ACCOUNTED FOR (15000 AGAINST 11500) INVITES

PAGE 2 RBDEC 113 S E C R E T

MISREPRESENTATION. THIS PROBABLY NOT TOO SERIOUS. 15000 WAS MENTIONED BY GENERAL MENENDEZ. LIKELY SOME MISUNDERSTANDING: ON QUESTIONING MENENDEZ NOW SAYS NEVER MORE THAN 13000 ON ISLANDS BUT CONSIDERABLY LESS ON SURRENDER. AS ARG COLONEL(A) STATED 8100 AFTER SURRENDER, IT IS CONSIDERED UNLIKELY ARG WILL DISPUTE.

3. MORE DIFFICULT IS PHYSICAL CONDITION OF PRISONERS, THEIR QUATERING WHILST AWAITING SHIPMENT AND OVERCROWDING IN CANBERRA/MORLAND. SEGREGATION OF OFFICERS, NCOs AND TROOPS WAS CARRIED TO GREATER LENGTHS THAN ARGs ENVISAGED, AND THIS HAS CERTAINLY CREATED ADDITIONAL DIFFICULTIES VICTUALLY/QUATERING. WOUNDED HAVE BEEN WELL CARED FOR, HOWEVER, AS HAVE LARGE NUMBER IDENTIFIED CASES MALNUTRIRION. ANY WIDESPREAD SUFFERING HEREBY AFTER CAPTURE PALES TO INSIGNIFICANCE COMPARED TO THAT SELF-INDUCED DURING CAMPAIGN BY NEGLIGENCE, SELF WOUNDING, INCOMPETENCE AND BY IMPLICIT CASTE SYSTEM. WHEREAS ARG RATION ADEQUATE OVERALL IN QUANTITY, DISTRIBUTION BADLY FLAMED. ALL OFFICERS WERE SLEEK, AND MOST NCOs ALSO. SOLDIERS DIVIDED INTO HAVES AND HAVE-NOTS, OFTEN BETWEEN ADJACENT TRENCHES. LARGE PROPORTION YOUNG CONSCRIPTS HAVE SUFFERED TERRIBLY THIS ACCOUNT

4. ARG PERSONNEL FOUND SUFFERING MANY SCOURGES OF A BADLY RUN ARMY.

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FM UK IS NEW YORK 212135Z JUN 82


IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1036 OF 21 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

21 JUN 1982

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## PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT: FALKLANDS

1. MANY OF THE PRESSMEN AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE AT MIDDAY ON 23 JUNE WILL BE UN SPECIALISTS AND THEY MAY INCLUDE SOME ARGENTINES. THEY WILL PROBABLY CONCENTRATE THEIR QUESTIONS ON THE UN ASPECTS OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS. THERE ARE THREE POINTS ON WHICH THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S VIEWS:

- (A) THE PRESENT STATUS OF SCR 502;
- (B) OUR INTERPRETATION OF THE ARGENTINE LETTER OF 18 JUNE;
- (C) THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S MANDATE UNDER SCR 505.

## NEGOTIATIONS UNDER SCR 502

2. THE LINE OF QUESTIONING HERE WILL BE THAT SCR 502, WHICH WAS DRAFTED BY THE UK, REMAINS IN FORCE AND IS MANDATORY. SUCH RESOLUTIONS CANNOT BE UNILATERALLY TAKEN OFF THE TABLE. HOW THEREFORE CAN WE JUSTIFY OUR REFUSAL TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS AS CALLED FOR BY OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3? THE MAIN POINTS TO BE MADE IN REPLY ARE CONTAINED IN YOUR GUIDANCE TELNO 133. BUT IT WILL BE IMPORTANT THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD NOT APPEAR TO BE UNILATERALLY "TEARING UP" SCR 502. HER LINE MIGHT BE THAT OF COURSE WE WANT A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO OUR DIFFERENCES WITH ARGENTINA. BUT SCR 502 LAYS DOWN NO TIMETABLE FOR NEGOTIATIONS, AND IT WAS NOT WE WHO BROKE OFF THE PREVIOUS DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS, NOR WE WHO REFUSED TO IMPLEMENT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 OF SCR 502, NOR WE WHO ARE NOW REFUSING TO CEASE HOSTILITIES AS REQUIRED BY OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1. THE PRIME MINISTER COULD GO ON TO MAKE THE POINTS ABOUT ITS BEING UNREALISTIC, AFTER ALL THAT HAS HAPPENED, TO EXPECT US TO SIT DOWN AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WITH THE ARGENTINES AT THIS TIME; THE SITUATION HAS RADICALLY CHANGED SINCE 3 APRIL BECAUSE OF ARGENTINE'S REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW AS DEMANDED BY THE RESOLUTION. BUT I RECOMMEND THAT SHE SHOULD AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT RESUMPTION OF THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS IS RULED OUT FOR ALL TIME. AN APPARENT REJECTION BY US OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER SCR 502 WOULD PUT A WEAPON IN OUR ENEMIES' HANDS IN NEW YORK AND COULD EVEN PRECIPITATE AN EARLY RETURN TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, LEADING POSSIBLE TO A FURTHER VETO OR VEToes. BETTER

... WOULD EVEN PRECIPITATE AN EARLY RETURN TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, LEADING POSSIBLE TO A FURTHER VETO OR VEToes. BETTER TO AVOID THIS IF POSSIBLE.

ARGENTINE LETTER OF 18 JUNE.

3. AS REPORTED IN MY TELNO 1031, THE ARGENTINES ARE MOUNTING A PUBLICITY CAMPAIGN OVER THEIR LETTER. IT MAY BE PUT TO THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THIS CONSTITUTED AN UNDERTAKING BY THE ARGENTINES TO CEASE HOSTILITIES AND THAT IT IS UNREASONABLE THEREFORE FOR US TO CONTINUE TO INSIST ON A FURTHER SUCH UNDERTAKING BEFORE LIFTING THE EXCLUSION ZONES, ETC. I RECOMMEND THAT IN REPLY THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD POINT UP THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE ARGENTINE LETTER ("DE FACTO CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES") AND PARAGRAPH 11 ("TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES"). IN PARAGRAPH 11 THE ARGENTINES SPECIFY CONDITIONS FOR A TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES (COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH FORCES) WHICH ARE TOTAL UNACCEPTABLE. THE ARGENTINES KNOW THAT IF THEY UNEQUIVOCALLY AGREE TO CEASE HOSTILITIES WE WILL LIFT THE EXCLUSION ZONES AND OUR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: THAT IS THE ONLY QUID PRO QUO ON OFFER. WE CANNOT ACCEPT THEIR NOTE, HEDGED AROUND AS IT IS WITH TENDENTIOUS RHETORIC, AMBIGUITIES AND UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS, AS A SURE GUARANTEE THAT THEY ACCEPT A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

SECRETARY GENERAL'S MANDATE

4. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE ASKED WHAT VIEW WE NOW TAKE OF THE MANDATE GIVEN TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL BY SCR 505 AND WHETHER WE ARE EXPECTING FURTHER INITIATIVES BY HIM. BY THE TIME OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, THE PRIME MINISTER WILL HAVE HAD HER MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL. I RECOMMEND THAT AT THE END OF IT SHE AND PEREZ DE CUELLAR SHOULD AGREE ON A LINE TO TAKE WITH THE PRESS ABOUT THEIR CONVERSATION.

PARSONS

NNNN

18 JUN 1982

(131)

GF 565

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 181850Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES  
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 133 OF 18 JUNE 1982

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E/R

## FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 AND NEGOTIATIONS

1. WE ARE HAVING GREAT DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING FROM THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT A CLEAR AND DEFINITIVE STATEMENT CONFIRMING A TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. WHILE THEIR REGIME IS UNDERGOING AN UPHEAVAL THIS MAY REMAIN THE CASE, DESPITE OUR CONTINUING AND SUSTAINED EFFORTS. MEANWHILE ARGENTINA HAS NOT MADE PUBLIC THE TERMS OF GENERAL MENENDEZ' SURRENDER (THOUGH WE ARE ARRANGING TO CIRCULATE THE INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER AS A UN DOCUMENT) AND WE MUST EXPECT FURTHER PRESSURE ON US TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINES ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS AS A PRICE FOR OBTAINING A DEFINITIVE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. IN THIS CONTEXT, OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 OF SCR 502, CALLING ON THE UK AND ARGENTINA TO REACH A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION, IS BEING CITED.

2. YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SAID IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 15 JUNE:

'RESOLUTION 502 WAS NOT HONOURED BY THE ARGENTINES. WE HAVE HAD TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT RESOLUTION 502. BECAUSE IT WAS NOT HONOURED, WE DO NOT NEED TO NEGOTIATE IN ANY WAY WITH THE UNITED NATIONS OR ANYONE ELSE ABOUT BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY OF THE ISLANDS. I MAKE THAT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR.'

IN FACT, THE CALL TO NEGOTIATE IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 OF SCR 502 WAS PREDICATED ON A PRIOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WHICH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT PERSISTED IN REFUSING TO CARRY OUT.

3. YOU SHOULD BASE ANY DISCUSSION OF SCR 502 ON THE CONSIDERATIONS IN THE ABOVE PARAGRAPH, WHICH CLEARLY EXPLAINS WHY WE VIEW THIS RESOLUTION AS HAVING BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS. YOU SHOULD HOWEVER BEAR IN MIND THAT SOME EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND OTHER COUNTRIES MAY BE INCLINED TO CITE THE RESOLUTION AS A BASIS FOR

OR JUSTIFICATION OF THEIR SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA. WE ARE ANXIOUS THAT THESE SANCTIONS SHOULD CONTINUE UNTIL A LASTING CEASEFIRE IS ACHIEVED. IF, THEREFORE, YOU FEEL THAT IT WOULD HAVE AN ADVERSE AFFECT ON THE MAINTENANCE OF SANCTIONS YOU SHOULD NOT GO OUT OF YOUR WAY TO SAY THAT RESOLUTION 502 IS DEAD, BUT SHOULD ARGUE AS ABOVE IF THE QUESTION IS RAISED WITH YOU.

4. YOU MAY ALSO SAY THAT WE SHALL NATURALLY CONTINUE TO BE GUIDED BY ARTICLES 2(3) AND 33 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH PROVIDE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS. IT WAS OF COURSE THE ARGENTINES WHO BROKE THE PEACE AND ABANDONED THIS ROUTE. OUR SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS WERE BASED ON THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. IF ASKED WHETHER THIS MEANS THAT WE SHALL NOW RECOMMENCE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARGENTINA ABOUT THIS DISPUTE, YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN FIRMLY THAT - FOLLOWING RESORT TO FORCE BY ONE SIDE IN THE DISPUTE AND THE LOSSES THAT WE HAVE INCURRED - WE CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO SIT DOWN TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS AS IF EVERYTHING WAS STILL AS IT HAD BEEN BEFORE. IN ANY CASE, WE CAN TAKE NO LONG-TERM VIEW ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS UNTIL THERE HAS BEEN A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD FOR THE NECESSARY RE-CONSTRUCTION AND REFLECTION, AFTER WHICH THE ISLANDERS CAN BE CONSULTED. MEANWHILE WE SHALL PURSUE OUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR RE-ESTABLISHING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS ON THE ISLANDS AND ENABLING THE ISLANDERS TO PARTICIPATE INCREASINGLY IN THEIR OWN SELF-GOVERNMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 73 OF THE CHARTER.

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FILE

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

22 June, 1982

Economic Measures against Argentina

The Prime Minister has seen the minute by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on this subject. She has commented, with regard to paragraph 8, that she believes that we should maintain the freeze on Argentine assets for the time being. The Prime Minister made this point during a discussion at OD(SA) yesterday.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the members of OD and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

BK





The National Archives

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John.

MOD have come back to me asking which of the copy recipient of the PM's letter should take the lead in providing and coordinating the reply to Sir John Clark.

MOD think FCO should?

How do you want it done

Alan J.  
21/6



ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Dr. J.M.A.H. Luns, GCMG CH FRGS LLD DCL

LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL  
SECRETARY GENERAL

BRUSSELS, 21 June 1982

*Dear Prime Minister,*

Back in Brussels from a weeklong stay in the United States, I am writing in order to express to you my immense respect for the splendid victory of the British Armed Forces in the South Atlantic.

It was a perfect operation carried out with extraordinary skill and speed to the great admiration of all the NATO military experts and non-experts like myself. Great Britain has set an example to the world and has greatly enhanced the credibility of NATO. No wonder that the prestige of the United Kingdom has soared sky high. Your strong, firm, undaunted leadership is, as everyone knows, at the root of this tremendous success.

*With great respect and  
warm personal regards,  
I remain,*

*Yours sincerely,*

*Joseph Luns*

The Right Honourable  
Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,  
Prime Minister,  
Downing Street 10,  
LONDON.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 June 1982

*attached*  
Did the P.R. sign the  
reply & submitted? Yes.

A.J.C. 24/6.

Dear John,

AR 24/6

h.c.

Letter to Mrs Thatcher from M Raymond Barre

I enclose a letter addressed to the Prime Minister from the former French Prime Minister, M. Barre. Although it is sealed, our Embassy in Paris understands that it is a letter of congratulations.

The Embassy has acknowledged receipt of the letter. I assume you will let us know in due course whether you wish the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to draft a reply.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

1 JUN 1982



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 MR ILETT } TREASURY  
 MR LITTLER }

MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
 SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
 MR ~~WADE-GERY~~ *AS. Goodall*  
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
 DIO }

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~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~  
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[Passed to E.R.]  
 [Typists a.a.]

UNCLASSIFIED

FM CARACAS 211637Z JUN 82

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 215 OF 21 JUNE

INFO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. THE VENEZUELAN AND PANAMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS ISSUED A 7-POINT DECLARATION (TEXT BY BAG) ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ON 20 JUNE AFTER CONSULTATIONS IN CARACAS OVER THE WEEKEND.
2. THE GIST OF THE DECLARATION IS THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CONFIRM THEIR ABSOLUTE SOLIDARITY WITH ARGENTINA AND THEIR TOTAL SUPPORT FOR THE ARGENTINE NOTE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT OF 18 JUNE. THEY ANNOUNCE THEIR READINESS TO CONTINUE THEIR SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA IN ALL FIELDS. THE FINAL DESTINY OF THE FALKLANDS WOULD BE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY. THAT WAS AND WOULD CONTINUE TO BE LATIN AMERICA'S CAUSE. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CALL ON THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE TO MAINTAIN NATIONAL UNITY AS THE BEST GUARANTEE FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THEIR OBJECTIVE IN THE FALKLANDS. THE MINISTERS STATE THEIR READINESS TO CONSULT WITH LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS ON FURTHER ACTION.

F C O PASS TO ALL

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PS ← PS/MR RIFKIND  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR J SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE  
HD/PUSD (2)  
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PS/CHANCELLOR }  
MR ILETT } TREASURY  
MR LITTLER }  
MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE GERY S. Goodall }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO }

Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET/

EMERGENCY UNIT  
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

[Passed to E.R.]  
[Typists a.a.]

RESTRICTED

(FM BERNE 221412Z)

FM BIS BUENOS AIRES

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 173 OF 21 JUNE

AND TO IMMEDIATE MONTEVIDEO SANTIAGO LIMA BRASILIA WASHINGTON  
UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 155 TO LIMA: END TO HOSTILITIES

1. THE SITUATION HERE IS STILL VERY UNCLEAR AND THERE ARE STILL NO FIRM INDICATIONS THAT THE NEW MILITARY JUNTA IS PREPARED TO DECLARE AN END TO HOSTILITIES. WE SHALL BE LUCKY TO GET ANY FORMAL DECLARATION AND IN ANY CASE SHOULD NOT EXPECT ANY STATEMENT UNTIL THE NEW PRESIDENT IS INSTALLED.

2. BUT THE WIDELY-READ AND INFLUENTIAL DAILH "LA NACION" CARRIES THIS MORNING IN ITS LEAD STORY A REPORT THAT THE NAVY, PREVIOUSLY THE MOST BELLIGERENT OF THE TVHREE FORCES, HAS NOW INDICATED THROUGH ITS COMMANDER, ANAYA, THAT THE PERIOD OPENING



~~INDICATED THROUGH ITS COMMANDER, ANAYA, THAT~~ THE PERIOD OPENING WITH THE NEW PRESIDENT QUOTE SHOULD TAKE INTO THE PURELY DIPLOMATIC FIELD THE STRUGGLE UNDERTAKEN IN THE MILITARY FIELD WITH ADVERSE RESULTS UNQUOTE9 THE PAPER POINTS OUT THAT THE NAVY HAS THUS JOINED THE AIR FORCE, WHICH HAS THROUGHOUT THE RRISIS SUPPORTED THE WIDEST POSSIBLE MARGIN OF NEGOTIATION ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT. THE ARMY, IN DEPOSING GALTIERI, HAS TAKEN THE SAME DECISION. THE PAPER NOTES THAT ANAYA'S FAREWELL ADDRESS TO GALTIERI, WITH ITS AGGRESSIVE TONES, DID NOT GO DOWN WELL IN CERTAIN ARMY CIRCLES.

3. IN SUMMARY, LA NACION JUDGES THAT THE PREDOMINANT ATTITUDES PREVAILING IN THE THREE ARMED FORCES APPEAR NOW TO COINCIDE IN BELIEVING THAT WHATEVER THE RESULT OF THE ENTERPRISE BEGUN ON 2 APRIL, THE PRESENT SHOULD BE A TIME OF PEACE. THIS IS THE MOST HOPEFUL INDICATION SO FAR ON AN EMERGING REASONABLE ATTITUDE IN THE JUNTA.

JOY

POWELL-JONES

NNNNN

SENT AT RECD AT 221434Z TWPM

ai  
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 June 1982

Dear John,

During the Prime Minister's visit to New York there will be a number of occasions when she may find it useful to set out how we see the future development of our own and the Falkland Islands' relations with the countries of Latin America.

I enclose a draft text (which I shall be showing to Mr Pym on his return from Luxembourg), from which she may wish to draw in speaking to Latin Americans, and also to the media, in order to emphasise our wish to build up a positive relationship with the countries of Latin America.


Yours ever

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'B J P Fall'.

(B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA

PASSAGE FOR USE BY THE PRIME MINISTER

Historially Britain has enjoyed the warmest of relations with the countries of Latin America. These have been based on a common adherence to the principles of freedom and self-determination. We in Britain value the part we played both in assisting the independence movements in Latin America and, through our companies and individual entrepreneurs, in contributing to the early development of the rich economic potential which so many of the countries of Latin America possess.

The present British Government has been particularly conscious of the growing importance of Latin America, and has made special efforts to build up our political relations with these countries. The many visits by British Ministers have deepened our understanding of the region. We in turn have been glad to welcome many distinguished visitors from Latin America to our own country. We have all been through a difficult period over the past few months. It is our sincere wish that we should now look to developing our co-operation with the countries of Latin America. We have much to offer each other and should work very closely together.

We hope of course that the Falkland Islanders can live in peace and harmony with their geographical neighbours. What the Islanders require immediately is time to return to their normal

/life and to



life and to reflect on their future. We believe not in colonialism but in self-determination. We would welcome it if the Falkland Islanders wished and were able to develop positive and constructive relations with the region, based on mutual co-operation and respect. The development of such links could be an important factor, not only in the security of the Islands but also in the advancement of their economy. If the countries of Latin America wish to extend a hand of friendship towards the people of the Falkland Islands, we would regard this as a most positive gesture and the best augury for a future relationship.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 June 1982

Dear John,

The Falklands

In your letter of 18 June you asked for advice from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary about a reply to the telegram of congratulations which President Reagan sent to the Prime Minister on the same day.

A meeting has now been arranged between the Prime Minister and President Reagan in Washington on 23 June. Accordingly, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary suggests that the Prime Minister need only acknowledge President Reagan's telegram, leaving comment on matters of substance (the second paragraph of the President's telegram) to her meeting with him in Washington on 23 June.

/ I attach a draft telegram along these lines.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

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1 ZCZC  
2 GRS  
3 SECRET  
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5  
6 FM FCO  
7 TO WASHINGTON  
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
9 MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN  
10 BEGINS: Dear Ron, I was most grateful for your telegram of  
11 congratulations about our success in repossessing the Falkland  
12 Islands. I would like to repeat my deep appreciation of the  
13 support which we have enjoyed throughout from yourself and the  
14 American people.  
15 I agree that we must now look to the future. I look forward to  
16 a full discussion with you in Washington on Wednesday.  
17 Warm regards, Margaret. ENDS  
18  
19 PYM  
20 NNNN  
21

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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11 JUN 1952

Ref: B06540

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Possible Future Expenditure Following Repossession  
of the Falkland Islands  
(OD(FAF)(82) 2)

## BACKGROUND

This is the report commissioned by OD(SA) on 2nd June (OD(SA)(82) 49th Meeting, Item 2, Conclusion 2). Its purpose is not to seek specific decisions, but to give Ministers a broad, preliminary assessment of the order of magnitude of the cost of guaranteeing the security of the Falkland Islands and Dependencies, making good the damage, and laying a basis for further long-term development. The assessment is made on the basis of three alternative scenarios, the first two of which assume a hostile, or potentially hostile, Argentina.

2. The section of the report dealing with future force levels (paragraphs 5-8 and Annex A) reflects the Chiefs of Staff's first look at the problem. Their preliminary conclusions will be refined in the light of further study and advice from the force commanders on the spot. But on any of the likely scenarios, the military costs will be substantial: by far the largest item identified in the report. They cannot be considered in isolation from the impact which defending the Falklands in the new circumstances will have on the overall shape of our defence effort.

3 On rehabilitation (paragraphs 9-12 and Annex B) much of the immediate work can be carried out by the garrison, some of it to meet its own needs as well as those of the islanders. But the cost of most of the longer term rehabilitation will be additional to, and separate from, the military costs.

4. On longer term development (paragraphs 18-19 and Annex D), the ground is being covered in detail by Lord Shackleton. This section of the present report is intended only as a tentative indication of the range of possibilities, with a view to putting the garrisoning and rehabilitation costs into some form of perspective.



5. The report does not address the question of how the various costs are to be funded. The problem of defence costs attributable in one way or another to the Falklands crisis was raised in the Defence Secretary's minute to you of 16th June, which you discussed with him and other colleagues on 18th June. Civil rehabilitation costs will presumably be a charge on the FOC/ODA vote: The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is likely to have views on this.

#### HANDLING

6. It might be useful to invite a brief discussion of each of the main sections of the report in turn. The most important questions to be explored are -

##### Assumptions

a. Are these realistic? Do they need further refinement? How soon can one expect to move through the first two (hostile) scenarios to the more benign scenario?

##### Security

b. Do the Chiefs of Staff expect further study to result in major deviations from the composition and cost of the garrison illustrated in the report? If the more benign scenario is likely to arrive soon, could the defence dispositions be made on a more provisional basis and at lower cost?

c. Discussion at OD(SA) today suggested that the numbers of military personnel who could be accommodated on the islands had been over estimated. Is this likely to reduce the estimated costs?

d. When will it be possible to start the process of reshaping the garrison as envisaged?

e. Should there be an examination of what kind of third country participation in protecting the Falklands would be needed to enable the size and cost of the British defence arrangements to be reduced? How big could such a reduction realistically be expected to be?

Rehabilitation

f. Is it agreed that essential work should proceed as quickly as possible on the understanding that, once the costs of the programme can be properly assessed, there can be a review of FCO/ODA cash limits?

Communications

g. How soon can approaches be made to the governments of Chile, Uruguay and Brazil about the possible establishment of air/sea communications links with the Falklands? Has the United States a possible role to play in this connection?

## CONCLUSIONS

7. Subject to the discussion, you might guide the Sub-Committee to the following conclusions -

- i. The report to be approved as an outline basis for preliminary planning and further study.
- ii. The Defence Secretary to keep the Sub-Committee informed of the progress and results of further studies on force levels.
- iii. Officials to examine and report on possible ways in which third countries might in principle be associated with guaranteeing the security of the Falklands, and the extent to which this might make it possible to reduce the size and cost of the British garrison.
- iv. Rehabilitation work on the islands to be pursued urgently, without prejudice to the question of how the costs are to be allocated as between the different Departments concerned, on which further discussion will be needed.
- v. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State for Trade, to consider the timing and content of approaches to the Chilean, Uruguayan and Brazilian Governments about the establishment of commercial air and sea links with the Falklands; and the possibility of enlisting the help of the United States Government in this connection.
- vi. Further work on the longer term development of the islands to await Lord Shackleton's report.

*AD S Goodall*

21st June 1982

A D S GOODALL

Wallace Richard Wirths

WANTAGE HOUSE  
TWIN PONDS FARM  
SUSSEX. R. D. 3. N. J. 07461

June 21, 1982

The Honourable Margaret Thatcher  
Prime Minister of Great Britain  
UNITED NATIONS  
New York, NY 10017

Madam:

On the auspicious occasion of your addressing the United Nations, may I offer my sincere congratulations on the victory won, by your country in the Falklands.

Enclosed may be of interest to you so you may be aware of the support of many Americans in your quest for a just, honourable and peaceful solution to the Falkland Islands challenge.

May you, with God's blessings enjoy many happy and fruitful years as Prime Minister of Great Britain.

Your faithful servant,

Wallace R. Wirths

Wallace R. Wirths.

WRW/jw

Enclosure:

Article written by W.R. Wirths  
Sussex Spectator  
Wednesday, May 19, 1982

---

# *candidly speaking*

by wallace r. wirths

---

The United States should occupy Bermuda at once. A task force of several thousand Marines should be dispatched there before Great Britain realizes what happened.

Our nation has marvelous grounds for annexing the Bermudas. First of all, the islands are occupied most of the time by American tourists who normally comprise a major portion of the British dependency. Some 100,000 visitors take over islands annually.

History would also support our right to sovereignty over Bermuda. Actually the islands were first discovered in the early 1500s by Juan de Bermudez, a Spaniard who was delivering a cargo of hogs to America. Since we later took over the Spanish colonies, we obviously have an airtight case.

But hear this! In 1609, a ship carrying colonists to America was destroyed in a storm off Bermuda and occupied the islands. Two of the passengers stayed and the rest sailed on to Virginia the following year. These two American colonists were the very first permanent settlers on the islands.

There's more! In 1672, the Bermuda became a recognized offshoot of the Virginia Company comprised of 120 persons, 60 of whom, under Henry More occupied the islands and raised Virginia tobacco there.

Wait. That's not all. During World War II the United States sent thousands of Americans to the islands to set up naval and air bases. Our Kindley Air Force Base is only two miles from St. George. We also set up a large naval base there in World War I in order to make the world safe for democracy. NATO is charged with the defense of the islands now and everyone knows we pay most of their bills.

But there's still another reason why we should seize Bermuda. This columnist can report today that there's something very queer going on around those islands - a situation which demands that we seize Bermuda for our own protection!

Ever hear of the Bermuda Triangle? Known also as the Devil's Triangle, it's that expanse of ocean from the Carolinas to Bermuda to southeastern Florida. Since 1854, more than 50 ships and aircraft have vanished mysteriously in that area. Obviously those British interlopers have been up to no good!

In 1918, the USS Cyclops vanished in those waters without a trace. On December 5, 1945, a squadron of five U.S. bombers disappeared forever and one of our seaplanes dispatched to hunt for them was never found!

Our government should act at once to regain what has been

rightfully ours since that hog shipper ran into Bermuda in the 1500s. All Americans should be willing to lay down their lives to get back our land from the British invaders. If England should have the nerve to object, we can haul Mrs. Thatcher before the United Nations. Certainly, Ireland will support our actions.

Our invasion of Bermuda would have many benefits. It would divert attention from our unemployment situation. Further, we could rename Bermuda the Elvis Presley Islands which would cause patriotism in America to soar. In addition, a great military victory there would help us forget our fiasco in Vietnam. It would also provide a new cause for Jane Fonda and the other professional protesters who desperately need a new issue to rally their marchers. At the same time our so-called environmentalists could stage "Save the Coral" days.

So what are we waiting for?

---

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
FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION)  
0800, 21 JUNE

Economic Sanctions

1. The media have reported the decision by EC Foreign Ministers to lift EC economic sanctions against Argentina, while maintaining an arms embargo.
2. We have checked the position by telephone with the delegation. At the Foreign Ministers dinner last night, there was no consensus for continuing economic sanctions. The consensus could only be reached for lifting economic measures in the expectation that no act of force will be committed in the region in the future. If that expectation were disappointed 'a new situation would be created' to which the Ten would be obliged to react. It was agreed that the arms embargo should continue 'for the present'. The Ten took note of Britain's intention to maintain certain national economic measures against Argentina. Foreign Ministers will today consider the text of a regulation on lifting sanctions for publication in the Gazette tomorrow.

Southern Thule

3. MOD have reported that the Argentines on Southern Thule formally surrendered on board HMS Endurance at 201900Z. They consisted of 1 Air Force and 10 Naval personnel under the command of a Lieutenant. At no time were any shots fired by British forces. The MOD are releasing a press statement this morning.



P R Fearn  
Emergency Unit

21 June, 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP, 0730 HOURS, 21 JUNE

Repatriation of Prisoners of War

1. We have asked the ICRC to inform the Argentine Government that the Canberra will be ready to sail again this afternoon with about 2,000 prisoners (ETA Puerto Madryn 22 June). Before the ship sails the Argentine Government must again give an absolute guarantee of safe conduct on inward and outward voyages.

Southern Thule

2. MOD have reported that the Argentines on southern Thule formally surrendered on board HMS Endurance at 201900Z. They consisted of 1 air force and 10 naval personnel under the command of a Lieutenant. At no time were any shots fired by British forces. The MOD are releasing press statement this morning.

Emergency Unit

21 June 1982

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GR 130  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 211430Z JUN 82  
TO F L A S H FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1035 OF 21 JUNE  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 1031: FALKLANDS

1. FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT THE ARGENTINE NOTE OF 18 JUNE MAY BE OF GREATER SIGNIFICANCE THAN WE FIRST THOUGHT IS CONTAINED IN ANOTHER LETTER FROM THE ARGENTINE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ABOUT SOUTHERN THULE (TEXT BY FACSIMILE TO EMERGENCY UNIT) WHICH CONTAINS THE PARAGRAPH : \*\*THIS ACTION CONSTITUTES A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES EXISTING UNDER THE TERMS OF MY NOTE NO 172 OF 18 JUNE (S/15234) AND ALSO CONSTITUTES A NEW ACT OF AGGRESSION COMMITTED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM, IN VIOLATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL 502 (1982).\*\*

2. IT IS THEREFORE POSSIBLE THAT THE ARGENTINES BELIEVE THAT, IN LISTRE'S NOTE OF 18 JUNE, THEY NOTIFIED US OF THEIR AGREEMENT TO A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, AT LEAST ON AN INTERIM BASIS.

PARSONS

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

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HD/ASSESSMENTS STAFF  
MR COLVIN  
DIO  
CABINET OFFICE

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DEI MOD  
SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE  
DIRECTOR G C H Q

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TO FLASH FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 212 OF 21 JUNE  
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BONN ATHENS UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON CANBERRA WELLINGTON  
OTTAWA OSLO  
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INFO ROUTINE STRASBOURG

MIPT: FALKLANDS: EC/ARGENTINA

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE DECISION ADOPTED BY FOREIGN MINISTERS  
OF THE TEN IN LUXEMBOURG TODAY

BEGINS:

IN SPITE OF INDICATIONS WHICH ARE STILL CONTRADICTIONARY, IT CAN  
BE HOPED THAT THE HOSTILITIES ARE NOW DEFINITELY AT AN END  
IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE ECONOMIC MEASURES TAKEN AS REGARDS  
ARGENTINA WILL BE LIFTED AS FROM 22 JUNE 1982, IN THE EXPECTATION  
THAT THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER ACTS OF FORCE IN THE AREA.

SHOULD THIS NOT BE THE CASE, A NEW SITUATION WOULD ARISE TO WHICH  
THE TEN WOULD HAVE TO REACT IMMEDIATELY.

THOSE OF THE TEN WHICH HAVE INTRODUCED MEASURES ON A NATIONAL  
BASIS TO STOP ARMS SUPPLIES TO ARGENTINA HAVE STATED THAT THESE  
MEASURES REMAIN IN FORCE FOR THE TIME BEING.

THE TEN TOOK NOTE OF THE INTENTION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TO  
MAINTAIN CERTAIN NATIONAL ECONOMIC MEASURES AS REGARDS ARGENTINA  
FOR THE TIME BEING.

ENDS.

FCO ADVANCE TO (FCO) PS, PS/PUS, GIFFARD, BRIDGES, URE, FEARN,  
CROWE, (CAB) GOODALL

THOMAS

[ADVANCED AS REQUESTED]

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

21 June, 1982.

Falklands: Australian National Appeal

Thank you for your letter of 18 June. The Prime Minister agrees that the message which you proposed she should send to Mr. Fraser should be despatched telegraphically. There is no objection to its contents being released to the Press.

A. J. COLES

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION), 0730 HOURS  
20 JUNE 1982

## ACTION AT THE UN

A, B UKMis1. Sir A Parsons comments on the Argentine letter to the President  
telno of the Security Council. Against a background of press comment  
1031 & clearly officially inspired in Buenos Aires, Sir A Parsons  
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propaganda. Sir A Parsons points out however that European  
partners will be aware of the Argentine note and that there  
might be no harm in our partners or the Swiss exploring if there  
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
## COLOMBIAN/PERUVIAN/BRAZILLIAN INITIATIVE

C, Bogota  
telno 161  
to FCO  
2. The President of Colombia, after consulting the Presidents  
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three countries to provide transportation to help repatriate  
the remaining Argentine prisoners. His Ambassador thanked  
President Torbay and undertook that HMG would consider it  
promptly. His Ambassador also recommends that notice be  
taken of the Colombian Foreign Minister during his visit to  
New York from 21 to 24 June for the Special Session on  
disarmament.

## COMMENT

3. The Argentine letter has been circulated as a document of  
the Security Council. It seems bound to come up at today's  
meeting in Luxembourg and our Partners may well have had the  
same kind of analysis that Sir A Parsons has sent us. There  
will be intense interest in how we propose to explore the  
possibility that Argentina is offering some kind of South  
Atlantic peace.

20 June 1982

  
R M Jackson  
Emergency Unit

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
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20 June 1982

  
R M Jackson  
Emergency Unit

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 191730Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1031 OF 19 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON



39

MY TELS NOS 1024 AND 1025: FALKLANDS : SECURITY COUNCIL

1. IT LOOKS AS THOUGH COSTA MENDEZ'S PROPAGANDA MACHINE IS MAKING THE MOST OF THE ARGENTINE NOTE (FULL TEXT AS TRANSLATED BY THE SECRETARIAT IN M.I.F.T.) TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES (19 JUNE) CARRIES A LONGISH REPORT DATED BUENOS AIRES WHICH CONTAINS A LOT OF BRIEFING BY MFA OFFICIALS EG THE NOTE WAS MEANT TO BE CONCILIATORY IN CALLING FOR A UN ROLE AND ACKNOWLEDGING THAT HOSTILITIES ARE IN FACT OVER FOR THE TIME BEING: THE COUNTER DEMANDS WERE "TO KEEP A LITTLE DOOR OPEN SO THAT WE CAN MAINTAIN SOME SMALL PRESSURE ON THE BRITISH TO GIVE US THE ISLANDS BACK": IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ARGENTINE "TO GIVE IN AND COMPLETELY SAY THAT ALL IS LOST, BUT IN REALITY THERE IS NOTHING WE CAN DO MILITARY FOR THE TIME BEING" IF THE BRITISH "READ BETWEEN THE LINES, THEY WILL KNOW WHAT WE MEAN". OFFICIALS SAID THAT THE NOTE HAD BEEN APPROVED BY THE RULING THREE MAN JUNTA, INCLUDING GENERAL NICOLAIDES. SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS SAID THAT IT WAS THE RESIGNATION OF GALTIERI THAT OPENED THE WAY FOR THE NOTE. FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS FAVOURED A RESUMPTION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION BECAUSE HE SEEMED FAIR AND WELL-VERSED IN THE ISSUES. ARGENTINA WOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLANDS.

2. WHEN I FIRST READ THE NOTE I WAS STRUCK BY THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PARAS 10 AND 11 I.E. WERE THE ARGENTINES IN FACT SAYING THAT THEY WERE NOW READY FOR A FULL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES (PARA 10), BUT THAT THIS WOULD ONLY BECOME A PERMANENT PEACE WHEN PARAS 11 AND 12 HAD BEEN FULFILLED? PEREZ DE CUELLAR AND I LOOKED AT THIS POINT TOGETHER BUT THOUGHT THAT IT DID NOT AMOUNT TO A SERIOUS OFFER OF AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. FIRST, IT WOULD BE LUDICROUS, EVEN BY ARGENTINE STANDARDS TO TAKE AN IMPORTANT DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE BY CIRCULATING A DOCUMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN A ROUTINE SERIES WHICH HAS NOW TOPPED THE

IMPORTANT DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE BY CIRCULATING A DOCUMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN A ROUTINE SERIES WHICH HAS NOW TOPPED THE HUNDRED MARK OVER THE PAST 2 AND HALF MONTHS. SECONDLY, LISTRE HAD MADE NO ATTEMPT TO MAKE PERSONAL CONTACT WITH EITHER PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE NOTE. IT HAD BEEN DELIVERED IN THE NORMAL WAY AS PART OF THE PAPER BOMBARDMENT WHICH THE ARGENTINES AND I HAVE BEEN EXCHANGING SINCE THE CRISIS BEGAN. WE CONCLUDED THAT THE NOTE WAS PROBABLY PROPAGANDA. BBC RADIO 4 INTERVIEWED ME ABOUT IT LATE LAST NIGHT: I WAS DISMISSIVE.

3. I AM RESOLVED NOT TO PURSUE THE QUESTION HERE AS THE ARGENTINES (AND FOR THAT MATTER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL) WOULD CLUTCH AT ANY STRAW TO MIRE US IN ANOTHER UN NEGOTIATION. BUT I THOUGHT THAT THE ABOVE MIGHT BE USEFUL TO YOU IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR FORTHCOMING MEETING IN BRUSSELS. PROVIDED THAT THEY WERE IN NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR DETERMINATION NOT TO GET DRAWN INTO A FRESH NEGOTIATION WITH ARGENTINA THROUGH THE UN OR ANY OTHER AGENCY, THERE MIGHT BE NO HARM IN OUR PARTNERS, IF THEY WISHED, OR THE SWISS EXPLORING WITH THE ARGENTINES IF THERE IS IN FACT A SERIOUS MESSAGE IN PARA 10 OF THE NOTE REGARDING AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO KEEP ANY FOLLOW-UP AWAY FROM THIS PLACE.

PARSONS

NNNN

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CO FCO

19 JUN 1982

GR 700

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 191800Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1332 OF 19 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

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10	←	2
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8	←	4
7	←	5

M.I.P.T. : FALKLANDS

FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT OF ARGENTINE NOTE:-

LETTER DATED 18 JUNE 1982 FROM THE CHARGE D-'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ARGENTINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1 ON EXPRESS INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVERNMENT, I HAVE THE HONOUR TO BRING THE FOLLOWING TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF THE MALVINAS, SOUTH GEORGIA AND SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS:

2 AFTER VETOING THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ORDERING THE CEASE-FIRE, WHICH WAS VOTED BY THE MAJORITY OF THE COUNCIL ON 4 JUNE 1982, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND HAS CONTINUED ITS ARMED AGGRESSION AGAINST MY COUNTRY AND HAS COMPLETED THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF PUERTO ARGENTINO, THE CAPITAL OF THE MALVINAS, ON 14 JUNE. THE SELF-DEFENCE EXERCISED BY ARGENTINA IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY COULD NOT PREVAIL AGAINST THE MILITARY SUPERIORITY OF THE AGGRESSOR.

3 CONSEQUENTLY, THE COMMANDER OF THE ARGENTINE FORCES DEFENDING THE MALVINAS HAD TO SURRENDER THE PERSONNEL UNDER HIS COMMAND IN ORDER TO AVOID GREATER LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE.



4 THROUGHOUT THE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH LED TO THIS SITUATION THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND IGNORED THE DEMAND FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE CONTAINED IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982) OF 3 APRIL 1982 AND ALSO THE EXHORTATION OF THE COUNCIL CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF THAT RESOLUTION TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE BY MEANS OF NEGOTIATIONS.

5 AS IS WELL KNOWN, THE UNITED KINGDOM VETOED THE DRAFT RESOLUTION OF 4 JUNE, SUBMITTED BY PANAMA AND SPAIN, THUS MAKING CLEAR ITS REFUSAL TO CARRY OUT THE CEASE-FIRE AND TO ACCEPT RESOLUTION 505 (1982), ALTHOUGH IT HAD BEEN ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY AND, OBVIOUSLY, WITH ITS OWN AFFIRMATIVE VOTE.

6 ARGENTINA CANNOT AND WILL NOT ACCEPT THE SITUATION OF FORCE WHICH GREAT BRITAIN HAS THUS SOUGHT TO IMPOSE. TODAY, IT IS CLEARER THAN EVER THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM'S AIM IS TO ENSURE BY ANY MEANS THE CONTINUATION OF A SITUATION OF COLONIAL DOMINATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, IN OPEN VIOLATION OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

7 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC IS NOW ADDRESSING THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGAIN TO MAKE CLEAR, AS IT HAS DONE ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, ITS FULL READINESS TO CARRY OUT RESOLUTIONS 502 (1982) AND 505 (1982). MY COUNTRY HOPES LIKEWISE THAT THE COUNCIL WILL CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO SECURE THE FULL COMPLIANCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM WITH THESE RESOLUTIONS.

8 THE UNITED KINGDOM IS MAINTAINING ITS TROOPS ON THE ISLANDS, ITS FLEET IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, THE NAVAL AND AIR BLOCKADE AGAINST ARGENTINA AND ALSO THE ECONOMIC AGGRESSION CARRIED OUT WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES.

9 IN ADDITION, THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS NOW EXTENDED ITS MILITARY OPERATIONS TO THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS, AS THE ARGENTINE MISSION INFORMED THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN NOTE NO. 171 OF 17 JUNE CIRCULATED IN SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT S/15230, BY ATTACKING THE SCIENTIFIC STATION "CORBETA URUGUAY" WHICH THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC HAS MAINTAINED IN THOSE ISLANDS FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS.

10 IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE IS A DE FACTO CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WHICH ARGENTINA IS NOW OBSERVING. HOWEVER, THIS CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WILL BE PRECARIOUS AS LONG AS THE BRITISH POLICY OF CONTINUING THE MILITARY OCCUPATION, THE BLOCKADE AND THE ECONOMIC AGGRESSION CONTINUES.

11 THE TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WILL BE ACHIEVED ONLY WHEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AGREES TO LIFT THE NAVAL AND AIR BLOCKADE AND THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS REFERRED TO ABOVE AND WHEN IT WITHDRAWS THE MILITARY FORCES OCCUPYING THE ISLANDS AND THE NAVAL TASK FORCE AND THE NUCLEAR SUBMARINES WHICH IT HAS DEPLOYED IN THE AREA.

12 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC POINTS OUT, ONCE AGAIN, THAT ONLY NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PERTINENT RESOLUTIONS - NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH ARGENTINA HAS ALWAYS BEEN READY TO PARTICIPATE - CAN LEAD TO A FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE, THUS ELIMINATING A SITUATION OF ILLEGAL COLONIAL DOMINATION, WHICH IS SUSTAINED BY FORCE AND WHICH IN ITSELF CONSTITUTES A PERMANENT THREAT TO PEACE.

I REQUEST THAT THIS NOTE BE CIRCULATED AS A SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT

(SIGNED) ARNOLDO M. LISTRE  
AMBASSADOR

PARSONS

NNNN

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FM BOGOTA 182230Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 161 OF 18 JUNE

FI (IMMEDIATE) BRASILIA, LIMA, UKMIS NEW YORK (PRIORITY) MEXICO  
CITY, MONTEVIDEO, SANTIAGO, WASHINGTON, CARACAS, UKMIS GENEVA

YOUR TELNO 153 TO BRUSSELS: FALKLANDS: CEASEFIRE AND PRISONERS

1. I WAS SUMMONED TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE AT 1500 HOURS LOCAL TIME TODAY. AFTER GREETING ME TURBAY SAID THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER (WHO HAD JOINED HIM FOR A PREVIOUS FUNCTION) WOULD EXPLAIN WHAT HE WISHED TO BE CONVEYED.

2. CARLOS LEMOS SAID THAT THE COLOMBIANS HAD CONSIDERED THE REQUEST IN YOUR TUR OF WHICH THE SUBSTANCE HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO THE MFA ON 17 JUNE (MY TELNO 160: NOT TO ALL). OVERNIGHT THERE HAD BEEN TWO DEVELOPMENTS. FIRST HE UNDERSTOOD THAT ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN AGREED FOR ARGENTINE PRISONERS TO BE CONVEYED BY SEA TO PUERTO MADRYN. SECONDLY GALTIERI HAD FALLEN AND THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN BUENOS AIRES WAS OBSCURE. WITH THE QUESTION OF REPATRIATION APPARENTLY ON THE WAY TO A SOLUTION AND WITH THE POLITICAL TEMPERATURE IN BUENOS AIRES BOTH RAISED AND UNCERTAIN, HE DOUBTED WHETHER PRESSURE BY COLOMBIA TO DECLARE THAT HOSTILITIES WERE AT AN END WOULD PRODUCE A POSITIVE RESPONSE NOW FROM THE ARGENTINES. TURBAY HAD THEREFORE AGREED WITH PRESIDENT BELAUNDE AND FIGUEIREDO THAT COLOMBIA, PERU AND BRAZIL SHOULD JOINTLY OFFER TO PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION, BY SEA OR BY AIR, TO FACILITATE THE REPATRIATION OF THE REMAINING ARGENTINE PRISONERS. THIS WOULD BE A HUMANITARIAN GESTURE MADE TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS, WHICH COULD BE OF PRACTICAL ASSISTANCE AND HELP POLITICALLY TOWARDS SECURING THE CONFIRMATION ON THE ARGENTINE SIDE OF THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WHICH HE AGREED WAS ESSENTIAL. HE WAS NOW CONVEYING THIS OFFER FORMALLY TO ME ON BEHALF OF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS. HE HAD ALREADY DONE SO BY TELEPHONE TO THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR.

3. I SAID THAT AGREEMENT FOR THE RECEPTION OF ARGENTINE PRISONERS AT PUERTO MADRYN WAS WELCOME, AND THAT TO A CERTAIN EXTENT THE QUESTIONS OF REPATRIATION AND A DECLARATION BY ARGENTINA OF AN END TO HOSTILITIES APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN DISENTANGLED. I UNDERSTOOD THAT SOME 5000 PRISONERS WERE BEING TRANSPORTED UNDER THE PRESENT EXERCISE. I APPRECIATED THE OFFER BY THE THREE GOVERNMENTS TO ASSIST IN REPATRIATING THE REMAINING PRISONERS AND WOULD IMMEDIATELY CONVEY IT TO MY GOVERNMENT. I WAS SURE HMG WOULD CONSIDER IT PROMPTLY AND WOULD WELCOME THE PRACTICAL AND POLITICAL MOTIVES WHICH INSPIRED IT.

4. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE FAILURE OR INABILITY OF THE ARGENTINE REGIME TO CONFIRM PUBLICLY THAT HOSTILITIES WERE AT AN END REMAINED A SERIOUS OBSTACLE AND POSED A PRACTICAL RISK TO OUR FORCES. THE TASK OF RESTORING PEACE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC WAS DAUNTING, NEITHER WE NOR OUR FRIENDS (NOR ARGENTINA'S) COULD EVEN BEGIN TO TACKLE THIS UNTIL THE ARGENTINES BROUGHT THEMSELVES

CONFIDENTIAL

TO AN EXPLICIT CONFIRMATION. WE WOULD WELCOME ANY HELP THE COLOMBIANS COULD GIVE TO SECURE THIS. LEMOS AGREED (BUT OFFERED NO FURTHER SUGGESTIONS). HE REPEATED THE TERMS OF THE JOINT OFFER AND SAID THAT IN PRACTICE COLOMBIAN ASSISTANCE WOULD BE IN THE FORM OF AIRCRAFT.

5. I SAID THAT I WISHED TO KEEP IN TOUCH. LEMOS SAID THAT HE WOULD BE IN BOGOTA ON 19 AND 20 JUNE. ON 21-24 JUNE INCLUSIVE HE WOULD BE IN NEW YORK FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT. HE EXPECTED TO SPEAK ON 23 JUNE, AND MADE THE POINT THAT HE WOULD BE GOING EARLY IN ORDER TO HEAR THE PRIME MINISTER'S ADDRESS. ALTHOUGH THE QUOTE JOINT OFFER UNQUOTE CLEARLY FALLS SHORT OF A FULL RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST IN YOUR TUR (AND MAY NOT BE ONE WHICH YOU WILL WISH OR NEED TO TAKE UP), IT IS A FURTHER DEMONSTRATION OF COLOMBIAN READINESS TO ACT POSITIVELY WITHIN THE LIMITS OF WHAT THEY BELIEVE TO BE THE POSSIBLE FOR THEM. SUBJECT TO THE VIEWS OF HM AMBASSADORS AT LIMA AND BRASILIA, IT WOULD ALSO SEEM TO BE DESIRABLE TO SHOW PROPER ATTENTION TO AN INITIATIVE BY THREE GOVERNMENTS WHICH ARE NICELY BALANCED IN TERMS OF THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARDS HMG AND ARGENTINA OVER THE FALKLANDS. I THEREFORE VERY MUCH HOPE DUE NOTICE CAN BE TAKEN OF LEMOS DURING HIS VISIT TO NEW YORK AND THAT IF AT ALL POSSIBLE HE CAN BE RECEIVED AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL.

FCD PLEASE PASS

ROBSON

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FALKLAND ISLAND GENERAL

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FALKLAND ISLANDS

CABINET OFFICE

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[PASSED AS REQUESTED]

Prime Minister

During the course of yesterday HMS Endurance called upon the occupants of a scientific station on Thule Island (which is one of a group of 3 islands called Southern Thule Islands which are in turn part of a group of islands known as the South Sandwich Islands) to surrender. They did not do so. A Wasp helicopter (either from HMS Endurance or from HMS Parnmouth) deployed in the area together with the Royal Auxiliary "Orneda" and a Trig "Salvage Man" was sent out to re-ascertain the <sup>position</sup> ~~location~~ and it is suspected, although Mod have no confirmation that it was fired upon.

It was then decided to send out a Wessex helicopter to fly low towards the island to give the impression that we were landing personnel.

During the course of this morning HMS Endurance will again call upon the scientific station to surrender and it is believed now that they will do so. However, if it proves necessary we will put forces ashore (supported by gunfire from Endurance or Parnmouth if required) to secure their surrender.

There are no details available at the time concerning number of Argentine Military personnel on the Island. HQ will try to obtain the information and come back to us.

### Aircraft

Contrary to press reports which in the main are based on allegations by the Argentine Government, at no time was the island or its occupants fired upon by either our Naval ships or helicopters.

C in C Fleet will report again at 1300 hrs (our time) and they are confident that it will be over by tea time.

HQ will be thinking about making a press statement on this matter about that time.

As expected Tom Sulpell, as a result of this morning's newspaper reports is calling for a statement in the House tomorrow.

A. L. C. A. L.

25.6.82



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 June 1982

Dear Prime Minister,

I should like to say a sincere and heartfelt thank you from myself, my wife, my daughter and future son-in-law and of course, the people of the Falkland Islands. I was able to pay a public tribute to you on Thursday night at Lincoln's Inn, when I said that, without your resolution, courage and singleness of purpose, victory would not have been achieved. But I should like to add my personal thanks and to say how grateful I am to you for sending me back to Stanley to finish the job I started two and a half years ago.

My wife and I were honoured

and privileged to be invited to your box  
at the Trooping The Colours ceremony last  
Saturday and most touched to be invited  
to stay behind to join your informal  
luncheon party. May I presume to say  
that nothing would give us greater pleasure  
than to return that hospitality by having  
you and Mr Thatcher to stay with us  
at Government House, Stanley?

Yours sincerely,

Rep Hunt



Prime Minister  
 Alan Lodge  
 July 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION)  
 0730 HOURS, 19 JUNE 1982

Repatriation of POWs

1. Confirmation was received from the ICRC that the Argentine government had agreed to permit the Canberra and the Norland to disembark POWs at the Argentine port of Puerto Madryn or Puerto Quilla. The Argentines also set out certain conditions and offered the use of two of their hospital ships and possibly an auxiliary ship to embark POWs at Port Stanley. HMG accepted the Argentine proposals and Canberra and the Norland were ordered to sail to Puerto Madryn. We also gave our agreement to the two Argentine designated hospital ships embarking POWs in the Falklands.

A.  
 (UKMIS Geneva  
 telno 341 to  
 FCO)  
 B. FCO telno 247  
 to UKMIS Geneva)

Cessation of Hostilities

2. We continued to press the Argentines through the Swiss for a total cessation of hostilities and for the release of Glover and the three journalists.

C.  
 (FCO telno 129  
 to Berne)

Action at the UN

3. The Argentines addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council (published in advance in Buenos Aires). The Argentine Note inter alia proclaimed Argentina's readiness to implement resolutions 502 and 505 and called on the Council to pursue its efforts to get the UK to implement them, and contained various castigations about our veto, colonial domination, naval blockade and economic sanctions. The basic Argentine line which seems to be emerging however was set out in the Note, namely that the complete cessation of hostilities will only be achieved when we lift our sea and air blockade, the economic sanctions, withdraw our forces from the islands and the Task Force, and agree to negotiations under the auspices of the UN.

D. and E  
 (UKMIS New York  
 telnos 1024 and  
 1025 to FCO)

4. Sir A Parsons had already arranged to see the Secretary-General before the Argentine Note was circulated because he had heard that the Secretary-General had been under pressure from President Reagan, Chancellor Schmidt and Prime Minister Trudeau to reopen negotiations. Sir A Parsons forcefully explained to Perez de Cuellar that we could not countenance diplomatic negotiations with the Argentines through any third party in order to discuss the future of the islands in the aftermath of the human and material losses. Perez de Cuellar said that he well understood our position but could not ignore his mandate and would like to have an opportunity of discussing it with the Prime Minister.

F.  
 (Washington  
 telno 2190  
 to FCO)

5. Sir N Henderson, in answer to an enquiry received from Haig via Eagleburger, confirmed that there was no future

/in

in the Secretary-General pursuing his negotiations under SCR 502.

Economic Sanctions

G. (Copenhagen telno 169)  
 H. (The Hague telno 168)  
 I. (Paris telno 647)  
 J. (Ottawa telno 330)  
 K. (Brussels telno 232)  
 L. (Bonn telno 581)

6. Reports from HM Ambassadors in Copenhagen, The Hague, Paris, Ottawa, Brussels and Bonn clearly indicate that there is virtually no support from our partners in the Ten for the continuation of the economic sanctions and that Canada's position is contingent on the Community decision. On the other hand our partners do seem to draw distinction between economic sanctions and the arms embargo which they are less inclined to discontinue. Haig has however told Sir N Henderson that the US government will stick by us and that he will get in touch with his European colleagues to urge them to do likewise.

- all to  
 FCO

Invitation to the Prime Minister to Visit Washington

N. (Washington telno 2199)

7. President Reagan would like to invite the Prime Minister to pay a short visit to Washington whilst she is in the US for the disarmament meeting in New York.


Comment

8. The lack of overnight news on the repatriation of POWs could indicate that the arrangements so laboriously made with Argentina for the transfer to the mainland are holding.

9. The Argentine letter to Perez de Cuellar is discouraging in its linking of a cessation of hostilities with withdrawal of our forces from the Islands etc. But it would not seem to rule out completely an Argentine commitment not to be the first one to use force, or something on those lines. We should consider our response early next week.

10. A reply is needed to President Reagan's invitation to the Prime Minister to visit Washington for a talk.

19 June 1982

  
 R M Jackson  
 Emergency Unit

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS GENEVA 181030Z JUN 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 341 OF 18 JUNE

INFO FLASH MODUK, CINC FLEET, IMMEDIATE MONTEVIDEO, BERNE, BRASILIA  
WASHINGTON, SANTIAGO, PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TEL 338 (NOT TO ALL): REPATRIATION OF POWS

1. AS EXPLAINED TO THE EMERGENCY UNIT, ICRC TELL US THAT THEY HAVE RECEIVED TWO NOTES FROM THE ARGENTINE MISSION HERE THIS MORNING. THE FIRST AGREES TO THE CANBERRA AND THE NORLAND DISEMBARKING POWS IN MONTEVIDEO.
2. THE SECOND, RECEIVED ONE HOUR LATER, ACKNOWLEDGES A NOTE FROM THE SWISS EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES, NOTES THAT OUR WISH TO RETURN POWS QUICKLY IS BASED ON HUMANITARIAN CONCERN AND, BEARING IN MIND THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS RELATING TO POWS, OFFERS AN ALTERNATIVE. BOTH SHIPS MAY DISEMBARK POWS AT PUERTO MADRYN OR, IF WE PREFER, THE NORLAND COULD DOCK AT PUERTO QUILLA.
3. THE NOTE CONTINUES BY SAYING THAT DISEMBARKATION AT COMODORO RIVADAVIA WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE AS THERE ARE INSUFFICIENT FACILITIES THERE. THE ARGENTINES OFFER THE USE OF TWO OF THEIR HOSPITAL SHIPS. BAHIA PARAISO AND ARANTE IRIZAR PLUS THE CABO SAN ANTONIO (AUXILIARY SHIP) TO PARTICIPATE IN THE EXERCISE IF WE WISH.
4. THE NOTE LAYS DOWN THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:
  - A) SHIPS FROM BOTH COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT CARRY ARMS
  - B) THEY SHOULD NOT BE ESCORTED BY WARSHIPS
  - C) HOSPITAL SHIPS SHOULD CARRY NORMAL HOSPITAL EMBLEMS
  - D) OTHER SHIPS SHOULD BE MARKED PG OR PW
  - E) DURING THE NIGHT SHIPS SHOULD SAIL WITH LIGHTS ON
  - F) SHIPS WILL BE GRANTED FULL SECURITY BETWEEN PORTS OF DEPARTURE AND ARRIVAL.
  - G) TO FACILITATE IDENTIFICATION FULL DETAILS OF ROUTES AND ESTIMATED ARRIVAL DATES AND TIMES SHOULD BE PROVIDED
  - H) SHIPS WILL BE GUARANTEED USE OF ALL HARBOUR FACILITIES FOR EMBARKING AND DISEMBARKING POWS.
5. THE NOTE ENDS BY CONFIRMING THAT ARGENTINA WILL REQUEST FULL ICRC PARTICIPATION IN THE EXERCISE. IT SEEKS AN EARLY UK REPLY TO THE PROPOSAL.

H) SHIPS WILL BE GUARANTEED USE OF ALL  
FOR EMBARKING AND DISEMBARKING POWS.

5. THE NOTE ENDS BY CONFIRMING THAT ARGENTINA WILL REQUEST FULL  
ICRC PARTICIPATION IN THE EXERCISE. IT SEEKS AN EARLY UK REPLY  
TO THE PROPOSAL.

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FM FCO 181235Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH UKMIS GENEVA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 247 OF 18 JUNE

AND TO FLASH BERNE

INFO FLASH MODUK, CINC FLEET

INFO IMMEDIATE MONTEVIDEO

INFO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO IMMEDIATE SANTIAGO

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 341: REPATRIATION OF POWS

1. PLEASE INFORM THE ICRC URGENTLY THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE ARGENTINE PROPOSALS AND CANBERRA AND THE NORLAND HAVE ORDERED TO SAIL TO PUERTO MADRYN, WE ARE PREPARED TO ALLOW THE TWO DESIGNATED HOSPITAL SHIPS, BAHIA PARAISO AND ALMIRANTE IRIZAR (BUT NOT THE CABO SAN ANTONIO) TO EMBARK ARGENTINE POWS. THE CAPTAINS OF THE TWO ARGENTINE SHIPS SHOULD CONTACT THE COMMANDER BRITISH TASK FORCE IN ORDER TO AGREE DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR PASSAGE, TIMING, POINTS OF EMBARKATION ETC.

2. WE ARE ABLE TO AGREE TO THE CONDITIONS SET OUT IN YOUR PARA 4, BUT REQUIRE A CLEAR ASSURANCE FROM ARGENTINA THAT THE GUARANTEE OF A SAFE PASSAGE WILL APPLY ALSO TO THE RETURN JOURNEY FROM THE MAINLAND. (POINT 4 OF THE STIPULATIONS IN THE SPANISH TEXT IS AMBIGUOUS ON THIS POINT).

PLEASE ASK THE ICRC TO OBTAIN THIS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE GUARDS WILL CARRY PERSONAL WEAPONS, BUT OTHERWISE THE SHIPS WILL BE UNARMED.

3. WE ARE GLAD TO KNOW THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE REQUESTED FULL ICRC PARTICIPATION.

PLEASE REPEAT TO THE ICRC OUR CONCERN ABOUT ADEQUATE

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SUPERVISION AND DOCUMENTATION OF THE REPATRIATION OPERATION (PARA 2 OF MY TELNO 245). YOU SHOULD ADD THAT THERE IS ALREADY EVIDENCE OF THE ARGENTINE MEDIA PUBLISHING GROSSLY INACCURATE STORIES ABOUT OUR TREATMENT OF POWS. IT WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT THE ICRC REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO CONFIRM THE NUMBERS OF POWS REPATRIATED.

4. IN ORDER TO MINIMISE DELAY WE SUGGEST THAT CINC FLEET SHOULD SIGNAL DETAILS OF ETAS, ROUTES AND FINAL NUMBERS OF EMBARKED POWS DIRECT TO YOU FOR THE ICRC, REPEATING AS NECESSARY. WE UNDERSTAND THAT ABOUT 4,500 POWS ARE NOW EMBARKED ON CANBERRA.

5. FOR BERNE. PLEASE ASK THE SWISS TO COMMUNICATE THE POINTS IN PARAS 1 AND 2 TO THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES, SEEKING AN EARLY REACTION OF OUR REQUEST FOR SAFE PASSAGES.

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FM FCO 181215Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH BERNE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 129 OF 18 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BRASILIA, MONTEVIDEO,  
UKMIS GENEVA.

YOUR TELNO 177 (NOT TO ALL): FALKLANDS: CESSATION OF  
HOSTILITIES/REPATRIATION

1. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM UKMIS GENEVA TELNO 241 THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE NOW CONFIRMED AGREEMENT TO DIRECT REPATRIATION TO AN ARGENTINE MAINLAND PORT. THIS IS WELCOME MOVEMENT WHICH WE ARE FOLLOWING UP SEPARATELY AND ON WHICH FIRM ASSURANCES ON THE SAFE RETURN OF OUR SHIPS WILL BE ESSENTIAL.

2. WE NEED MEANWHILE TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINES TO AGREE THAT THERE IS NOW A TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD URGE THE SWISS TO DO THIS WITH THE NEW ADMINISTRATION IN BUENOS AIRES. THE INDICATIONS OF THE ARGENTINE POSITION CONTINUE TO BE CONTRADICTIONARY. ON THE ONE HAND WE HAVE ROS'S HARD-LINE POSITION THAT A CEASEFIRE MUST BE LINKED TO RESUMED SOVEREIGNTY NEGOTIATIONS (YOUR TUR). ON THE OTHER, THERE ARE REPORTS THAT A MAJORITY AMONG THE MILITARY NOW FAVOUR A CEASEFIRE (AND HUGUENTOBLE'S COMMENT IN YOUR TELNO 176 WOULD SEEM TO SUPPORT THIS ASSESSMENT). WE HOPE THEREFORE THAT THE SWISS WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS ON THIS. WE APPRECIATE THAT A FORMAL ACCEPTANCE OF A CEASEFIRE MAY BE DIFFICULT WHILE THE PRESENT INTERNAL POLITICAL FLUX CONTINUES. BUT WE CANNOT LEAVE THIS ESSENTIAL ELEMENT UNRESOLVED AND IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO SECURE AT LEAST PRIVATE ASSURANCES THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION ARE READY TO ACCEPT THAT HOSTILITIES ARE AT AN END.

3. GRATEFUL ALSO IF THE SWISS COULD CONTINUE TO PRESS THE ARGENTINES FOR AN ANSWER ON GLOVER. WE ARE INTENDING TO REPATRIATE IMMEDIATELY OVER 5000 ARGENTINE PRISONERS AND IT IS THEREFORE RIGHT THAT THE ARGENTINES SHOULD SEND BACK THE SOLE

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BRITISH PRISONER WHICH THEY ARE HOLDING. ALSO HE IS INJURED: WE HAVE BEEN RETURNING ALL ARGENTINE CASUALTIES WITHOUT DELAY.

COULD HE NOT BE REPATRIATED THROUGH MONTEVIDEO?

4. WE ALSO HOPE THAT THE SWISS CAN GO ON PRESSING ON THE THREE JOURNALISTS. WE REALISE THAT THEY ARE IN A DIFFERENT CATEGORY TO POWS. BUT, IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO REPATRIATE ARGENTINE SOLDIERS, WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCELERATE THE LEGAL PROCESS TO ALLOW THE JOURNALISTS' EARLY RELEASE.

5. FOR WASHINGTON. PLEASE KEEP THE AMERICANS INFORMED OF THE ACTION WE ARE TAKING THROUGH THE SWISS AND SEEK THEIR CONTINUED SUPPORT IN BUENOS AIRES.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 190240Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1024 OF 18 JUNE 1982  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

FALKLAND ISLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. AT MIDDAY TODAY (18 JUNE) REUTERS CARRIED A REPORT FROM BUENOS AIRES THAT ARGENTINA HAD ASKED THE UNITED NATIONS TO NEGOTIATE A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH FORCES. AS FAR AS WE CAN DISCOVER HERE, THIS IS A REFERENCE TO THE LATEST IN THE SERIES OF LETTERS THE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA (LISTRE) HAS BEEN SENDING TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. A SUMMARY TRANSLATION IS IN MIFT. I DO NOT THINK THAT THIS IS EVIDENCE OF A DECISION BY THE ARGENTINES TO RETURN TO THE COUNCIL; IT CONTAINS A LOT OF RHETORIC AND NO SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR A COUNCIL MEETING. LISTRE HAS NOT SEEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OR THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. NOR DO I THINK THAT THE TWO PARAGRAPHS RELATING TO A CESSATIONS OF HOSTILITIES AMOUNT TO ANYTHING NEW.

... I WOULD IN ANY CASE BEEN INTENDING TO SEE THE SECRETARY GENERAL

2. I HAD IN ANY CASE BEEN INTENDING TO SEE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TODAY TO EXPLAIN TO HIM, WITH BRUTAL FRANKNESS, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF OUR AGREEING TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINES PRESENT. I HAD HEARD THAT HE HAD BEEN DISCUSSING THE QUESTION OF REOPENING NEGOTIATIONS DURING CALLS HE HAD RECEIVED FROM HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS ETC IN CONNEXION WITH UNSSD II AND THAT HE HAD RECEIVED SOME ENCOURAGEMENT. E.G. FROM SCHMIDT.

3. I SAW HIM TWICE THIS EVENING DURING THE COUNCIL'S PROCEEDINGS ON LEBANON. I TOLD HIM THAT, IN ADVANCE OF THE PM'S VISIT, I WANTED TO SPEAK TO HIM. I WOULD NOT MINCE MY WORDS. BRITAIN AND THE ISLANDERS HAD GONE THROUGH A VERY TESTING EXPERIENCE. THERE HAD BEEN AN UNPROVOKED INVASION. THE ARGENTINES HAD REFUSED OR EVADED ALL ATTEMPTS TO GET THEM TO IMPLEMENT SCR 502 PEACEFULLY. WE HAD HAD TO FIGHT. WE HAD SUFFERED SIGNIFICANT HUMAN LOSSES AND LOSSES OF MATERIAL IN MAKING A MONUMENTAL EFFORT WHICH HAD CAUGHT THE IMAGINATION OF THE WHOLE COUNTRY. THE ISLANDERS HAD HAD AN APPALLING EXPERIENCE, DETAILS OF WHICH WERE NOW BEGINNING TO EMERGE. WE HAD BEEN OBLIGED FULLY TO DEFEAT THE ARGENTINES IN THE FIELD IN ORDER TO REPOSSESS THE ISLANDS. EVEN THEN THE ARGENTINES HAD SHOWN AN INDIFFERENCE TO THE WELLBEING OF THEIR OWN TROOPS WHICH HAD FURTHER REVOLTED BRITISH OPINION.

4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND IT WAS ABSOLUTELY AND TOTALLY OUT OF THE QUESTION THAT WE SHOULD SIT DOWN TO DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINES THROUGH ANY THIRD PARTY IN ORDER TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS OR ANYTHING ELSE. THIS REPRESENTED NOT JUST THE FIRM VIEW OF MY GOVERNMENT BUT THE STRONGLY HELD VIEW OF THE BRITISH PEOPLE AS A WHOLE. IT WAS NO GOOD TALKING OF EXCHANGING A FULL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES FOR AN OPENING OF DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS. IF WE COULD NOT GET AN UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES OUT OF ARGENTINA, WE WOULD HAVE TO LIVE WITH THIS. IF ANYONE BROUGHT A RESOLUTION TO THE COUNCIL PROPOSING A START OF DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS. I WAS IN NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER THAT WE WOULD VETO IT, HOWEVER HARD THIS MIGHT LOOK IN UN TERMS. WHAT WE NOW NEEDED WAS A LONG COOLING OFF PERIOD WITH NO OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE WHILE WE RESTORED NORMAL LIFE TO THE ISLANDS.

5. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WELL UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION. HIS PROBLEM WAS THAT HE HAD A MANDATE AND COULD NOT SIMPLY IGNORE IT. HE WOULD HAVE TO SAY SO TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND ASK HER HOW LONG SHE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BEFORE WE COULD CONTEMPLATE ANY KIND OF NEGOTIATION. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION, HE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE ARGENTINES (HE, LIKE ME, REGARDED LISTRE'S LATEST NOTE AS PURELY Rhetorical) AND FROM ANOTHER SIDE IN THE

OF NEGOTIATION. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION, HE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE ARGENTINES (HE, LIKE ME, REGARDED LISTRE'S LATEST NOTE - MIFT - AS RHETORIC) NOR FROM ANYONE ELSE IN THE COUNCIL. BUT THERE WAS NO KNOWING WHEN SOMEONE E.G. THE RUSSIANS, PANAMA, SPAIN, WOULD ASK HIM WHAT HE WAS DOING ABOUT HIS MANDATE. HE ASSURED ME THAT HE WOULD NOT SPRING ANY SURPRISES ON US; HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THE WHOLE SUBJECT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.

6. I TOLD URQUHART AFTERWARDS OF THE ABOVE CONVERSATION. HE SAID THAT HE WAS GLAD I HAD SPOKEN AS I HAD. HE HAD BEEN PRESENT AT ALL PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S RECENT MEETINGS. A NUMBER OF VISITORS, INCLUDING REAGAN/HAIG, SCHMIDT (RATHER OFFENSIVELY TO US), AND TRUDEAU HAD BEEN WRINGING THEIR HANDS ABOUT THE NEED TO HEAL THE BREACH BETWEEN THE WEST AND LATIN AMERICA AND ABOUT THE NEED FOR THE BRITISH TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY ETC. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD TOLD EACH OF THEM THAT, IN HIS JUDGEMENT, THE ARGENTINES HAD BEEN IN THE WRONG FROM THE START, THAT THEY HAD BEEN VASTLY MISTAKEN NOT TO ACCEPT OUR OFFER OF 17 MAY "WHICH INVOLVED MAJOR CONCESSIONS WHICH HE KNEW WE HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO MAKE", THAT ARGENTINA HAD WRECKED HIS NEGOTIATIONS, THUS LEAVING US NO CHOICE BUT TO REPOSSESS THE ISLANDS BY FORCE.

7. SINCE DRAFTING THE ABOVE I HAVE SEEN WASHINGTON TELNO 2190 WHICH REINFORCES MY JUDGEMENT THAT THE TIME HAD COME TO SPEAK PLAINLY TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR.

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
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18 JUN 1982

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 190245Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1025 OF 18 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MIPT: FALKLANDS

1. FOLLOWING IS OUR SUMMARY/TRANSLATION OF THE ARGENTINE NOTE OF 18 JUNE.
2. THE FIRST FEW PARAGRAPHS OF THE NOTE DEAL WITH THE MILITARY OPERATIONS ON EAST FALKLAND, THE ARGENTINE SURRENDER ON 14 JUNE, OUR ALLEGED REFUSAL TO IMPLEMENT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 3 OF SCR 502, OUR VETO ON 4 JUNE AND ARGENTINA'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE PERPETUATION OF A SITUATION OF COLONIAL DOMINATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.
3. THE NEXT PARAGRAPH READS:  
"ARGENTINA COMES BACK AGAIN TODAY TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ESTABLISH CLEARLY, AS IT HAS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, ITS FULL READINESS TO IMPLEMENT RESOLUTIONS 502 AND 505. MY COUNTRY HOPES AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE COUNCIL WILL PURSUE ITS EFFORTS TO GET THE UNITED KINGDOM TO IMPLEMENT THOSE RESOLUTIONS IN FULL".
4. THE NOTE THEN REFERS TO OUR EXCLUSION ZONES AND THE EC SANCTIONS, AND TO YESTERDAY'S NOTE FROM THE ARGENTINE MISSION ABOUT THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN THULE (NY TELS NO. 1001 1982)

4. THE NOTE THEN REFERS TO OUR EXCLUSION ZONES AND THE EC SANCTIONS, AND TO YESTERDAY'S NOTE FROM THE ARGENTINE MISSION ABOUT THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN THULE (NY TELS NOS 1321-1323).

5. THE NOTE CONTINUES:

"THERE EXISTS DE FACTO IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WHICH ARGENTINA IS OBSERVING. BUT THIS CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WILL BE PRECARIOUS AS LONG AS THE BRITISH ATTITUDE, AS SHOWN BY THE MILITARY OCCUPATION, THE BLOCKADE AND THE ECONOMIC AGRESSION, CONTINUES. THE COMPLETE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WILL ONLY BE ACHIEVED WHEN THE UNITED KINGDOM LIFTS ITS SEA AND AIR BLOCKADE AND THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ALREADY REFERRED TO AND WHEN IT WITHDRAWS ITS MILITARY OCCUPATION FORCES ON THE ISLANDS, THE NAVAL TASK FORCE AND THE NUCLEAR SUBMARINES WHICH IT HAS DEPLOYED IN THE WATERS OF THE REGION.

ARGENTINA INDICATES ONCE AGAIN THAT ONLY A NEGOTIATION CONDUCTED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS, FOR WHICH ARGENTINA HAS ALWAYS BEEN READY, CAN LEAD TO THE DEFINITIVE SOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE, REMOVING THE SITUATION OF ILLEGAL COLONIAL DOMINATION, SUSTAINED BY FORCE AND WHICH IN ITSELF CONSTITUTES A PERMANENT THREAT TO PEACE."

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18 JUN 1982

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FM WASHINGTON 182248Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2190 OF 18 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK



## FALKLAND ISLANDS: NEGOTIATION WITH THE ARGENTINES

1. EAGLEBURGER HAS TOLD ME ABOUT A PROPOSITION WHICH WAS PUT TO HAIG THIS MORNING BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN NEW YORK. THIS WAS THAT SINCE PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 OF SCR 522 HAD NOW IN PRACTICE BEEN FULFILLED, THE WAY WAS OPEN FOR HMG AND THE ARGENTINES TO NEGOTIATE A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION UNDER PARA 3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SEEMED TO THINK THAT HE MIGHT NOW HAVE A ROLE IN BRINGING THE TWO TOGETHER.

2. EAGLEBURGER SAID HAIG WOULD LIKE OUR VIEWS. I SAID THAT THERE WAS NO FUTURE IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL TRYING TO PURSUE THIS THOUGHT. THINGS HAD CHANGED FUNDAMENTALLY SINCE THE RESOLUTION WAS PASSED. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT WAS HAIG'S THOUGHT TOO.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM COPENHAGEN 18/1315Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 169 OF 18 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS

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MY TELNO 165: FALKLANDS: EC IMPORT BAN

1. AT A LUNCHEON MEETING TODAY OF EC HEADS OF MISSION, POLITICAL DIRECTOR GAVE US DANISH THINKING IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENCY'S ENQUIRY ABOUT LIFTING THE BAN. IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT THEY SEE AS THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES DE FACTO ACCEPTANCE OF A GENERAL CEASE-FIRE AND OF THE UNCERTAIN POLITICAL SITUATION THERE, THE DANISH GOVERNMENT THINK A MOVE BY THE TEN TO LIFT THE BAN COULD HAVE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE. MOREOVER, GIVEN THAT TWO MEMBERS ARE ALREADY NOT IMPLEMENTING THE BAN AND THREE OTHERS ARE READY TO LIFT IT, THE DANES CONSIDER MOVEMENT IS IN PROGRESS (AND THEY HAVE PREVIOUSLY MADE IT CLEAR THEY COULD NOT THEN STAND ASIDE). THEY THINK IT LIKELY THAT, ESPECIALLY GIVEN OUR POSITION, NO FORMAL POSITION WILL BE TAKEN BEFORE MINISTERS MEET ON SUNDAY. A DECISION THEN IN THE FRAMEWORK OF POLITICAL COOPERATION COULD BE IMPLEMENTED ON MONDAY.

2. IN REPLY TO DYVIG'S QUESTION, I SAID (AS BRIEFED BY TELEPHONE) THAT WE WERE CONSIDERING THE PRESIDENCY'S ENQUIRY BUT WOULD WANT MINISTERS TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION ON SUNDAY. ON A PERSONAL BASIS, I PUT ARGUMENTS TO SUGGEST THAT IMMEDIATE ACTION COULD PROVE PRECIPITATE, WITH UNFORTUNATE EFFECTS. DYVIG REPLIED THAT ONE ELEMENT IN GALTIERI'S DEPARTURE SEEMED TO BE THAT HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT THAT HOSTILITIES WERE CONCLUDED: A MOVE NOW COULD PROVIDE A PRETEXT FOR HIS SUCCESSOR TO DO SO.

BARBURTON

CONFIDENTIAL

FM THE HAGUE 181327Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 168 OF 18 JUNE

TO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS AND LUXEMBOURG  
INFO SAVING OTHER EC POSTS

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FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. I TOOK VAN WALSUM, DIRECTOR FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AT THE MFA, THROUGH THE POINTS SET OUT IN PARA 1 OF YOUR TELNO 153 TO BRUSSELS THIS MORNING. HE STRESSED THAT THOSE IN (I) AND (III) WERE PARTICULARLY WELCOME TO THE DUTCH. I ASKED THAT THE POINTS SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF DUTCH MINISTERS, IN PARTICULAR OF WHOEVER WOULD BE REPRESENTING THE NETHERLANDS AT THE COUNCIL ON 21/22 JUNE (ALMOST CERTAINLY VAN AGT). VAN WALSUM UNDERTOOK TO ENSURE THAT THIS WAS DONE.
2. I ASKED VAN WALSUM ABOUT REPORTS IN THIS MORNING'S PRESS THAT THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT WANTED COMMUNITY SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA LIFTED NOW THAT THE FALKLANDS WERE AGAIN UNDER BRITISH ADMINISTRATION. VAN WALSUM SAID THAT THESE REPORTS CORRECTLY REFLECTED THE DUTCH ATTITUDE. THEY WERE IN LINE WITH WHAT VAN AGT HAD TOLD THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE SECOND CHAMBER ON 17 JUNE, AND WITH DUTCH MESSAGES TO PARTNERS SENT ON THE COREU NET-WORK EG CPE BIL ETR 266 OF 17 JUNE. THE BACKGROUND WAS THAT THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT WAS UNDER VERY STRONG PRESSURE BOTH FROM INDUSTRY AND IN PARLIAMENT TO ENSURE SANCTIONS WERE LIFTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SHOULD ARGENTINA UNEXPECTEDLY RESUME HOSTILITIES, "A NEW SITUATION WOULD ARISE".
3. VAN WALSUM ADDED THAT A FURTHER FACTOR WAS THE CONCERN THE DUTCH FELT ABOUT THE TOUGH ATTITUDE THEY BELIEVED THE UK WAS NOW TAKING IN RULING OUT NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE ISLANDS' FUTURE EXCEPT WITH THE ISLANDERS THEMSELVES. AN ARGUMENT ON THIS POINT LED VAN WALSUM TO STRESS THAT THE CONCERN FELT BY THE DUTCH ORIGINATED WITH VAN AGT. I SUGGESTED THAT THAT MADE IT THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT HE SHOULD HIMSELF ATTEND THE COUNCIL ON 21/22 JUNE WHEN YOU WOULD NO DOUBT WISH TO EXPLAIN IN DETAIL TO YOUR COLLEAGUES THE BACKGROUND TO OUR THINKING.
4. I ALSO TOOK UP WITH VAN WALSUM THE QUESTION OF FUTURE ARMS SUPPLIES FOR ARGENTINA (YOUR TELNO 373 TO PARIS). VAN WALSUM TOOK CAREFUL NOTE. HE AGREED THAT THE QUESTION OF ARMS EMBARGOES WAS DISTINCT FROM THAT OF SANCTIONS. THERE WAS NO REASON AT THIS



CAREFUL NOTE. HE AGREED THAT THE QUESTION OF ARMS EMBARGOES  
WAS DISTINCT FROM THAT OF SANCTIONS. THERE WAS NO REASON AT THIS  
STAGE FOR THE DUTCH TO CHANGE THEIR PREVIOUS POLICY.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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SENT AT 18/1401Z AW

PP UKREP BRUSSELS

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FM PARIS 181630Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 647 OF 18 JUNE 1982

INFO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS

YOUR TELNO 1195 TO WASHINGTON: ARGENTINA: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

1. FOUQUET (QUAI) TOLD HEAD OF CHANCERY THIS AFTERNOON THAT CHEYSSON WOULD IN BRUSSELS ON 20 JUNE BE ARGUING IN FAVOUR OF IMMEDIATELY LIFTING THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA. YOU MAY ALREADY HAVE SEEN A COREU THAT FOUQUET SAID THE FRENCH WOULD PROBABLY SEND, AGREEING TO A DUTCH PROPOSAL TO THIS EFFECT. THE FRENCH CONTENTION WAS THAT LIFTING SANCTIONS WOULD START A PROCESS OF DE-ESCALATION OF THE CRISIS.
2. ARBUTHNOTT ARGUED THAT TO LIFT SANCTIONS BEFORE THE ARGENTINES HAD AGREED TO END ALL HOSTILITIES WOULD TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF THEM TO DO SO. FOUQUET SAID THAT REFUSING TO END HOSTILITIES WAS THE ONLY CARD LEFT IN THE ARGENTINE HAND. IN THE FRENCH VIEW, LIFTING THE SANCTIONS MIGHT WELL GIVE THE ARGENTINES THE OPENING THEY NEEDED IN ORDER TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY AND OPEN NEGOTIATIONS: CHEYSSON WOULD SAY THAT THIS WAS THE NEXT STAGE FORESEEN BY SCR 502 AND SHOULD NOW BE IMPLEMENTED. ARBUTHNOTT REPEATED THE ARGUMENT THAT SINCE SCR 502 HAD NOT BEEN HONOURED BY THE ARGENTINES, THERE WAS NO OBLIGATION ON THE UK TO NEGOTIATE. FOUQUET DID NOT COMMENT FURTHER BUT SAID THAT HE WAS ONLY FORECASTING THE LINE CHEYSSON WOULD TAKE.

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PP ANBERRA

PP WELLINGTON

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PP TOKYO

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM OTTAWA 182157Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 330 OF 18 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS PRIORITY UKDEL NATO EC POSTS CANBERRA  
WELLINGTON OLSO TOKYO

YOUR TELNO 221: CANADIAN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CONFIRM THAT THEY HAVE OBTAINED CONTINGENT AUTHORITY FROM MINISTERS TO ANNOUNCE THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS ON MONDAY 21 JUNE IF, AS THEY EXPECT, COMMUNITY DECIDE ON SUNDAY TO LIFT THEIRS. THEY BELIEVE THAT ALL MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY FAVOUR THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS EXCEPT FOR GREECE AND OURSELVES. THEY HAVE ALSO HEARD THAT ARGENTINA IS MUDDYING THE WATERS BY TAKING THE POSITION THERE SHOULD BE NO FORMAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES UNTIL THERE HAS BEEN A UN SUPERVISED WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH TROOPS FROM THE FALKLANDS.

2. THE DEA CONFIRM THAT THEY DO NOT WANT TO BE LEFT BEHIND. THEY ARGUE THAT IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ARE QUITE EXCEPTIONAL. THEY CONFIRM THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE AN ARMS EMBARGO FOR THE PRESENT.

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GRPS 228

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRUSSELS 181838Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 232 OF 18 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE TO UKREP BRUSSELS AND OSLO

INFO SAVING OTHER ECPOSTS WASHINGTON TOKYO OTTAWA AND CANBERRA

MY TELNO 226: ARGENTINA : ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

1. IN THE COURSE OF TAKING ACTION WITH TINDEMANS' ACTING CHEF DE CABINET, ON YOUR TELNO 153 COUNSELLOR ASKED WHAT THE PRESIDENCY'S PLAN WAS FOR HANDLING THE DISCUSSION ON SACTIONS AT THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL. VAN DER ESPT SAID THAT THE BELGIANS WERE IN A DILEMMA. THEY ACCEPTED THE LOGIC OF OUR CASE FOR A PROLONGATION OF SACTIONS UNTIL AN OVERALL CEASE FIRE HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. BUT, HE SAID, WHEN TWO OF THE LARGER MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY HAD ADOPTED SO STRONG A POSITION IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE PRESIDENCY TO STAND OUT AGAINST THEM. WE URGED THAT THE PRESIDENCY'S POTENTIAL INFLUENCE SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED, REMINDING HIM OF MR TINDEMANS SUCCESS THE PREVIOUS TIME THE MATTER WAS DEBATED. VAN DER ESPT DID NOT APPEAR SANGUINE THAT THE TRICK COULD BE REPEATED.

2. WE ALSO ASKED IF VAN DER ESPT COULD CLEAR UP THE PROBLEM OF THEIR SPOKESMAN'S REPORTED STATEMENTS (MY TUR ). HE SAID THAT THIS HAD BEEN INVESTIGATED AS SOON AS WE HAD BROUGHT IT TO THEIR ATTENTION. THE BELGA REPORT WAS QUITE WRONG AND TO PROVE IT HE HANDED OVER A COPY OF THE SPEAKING NOTES WHICH THE SPOKESMAN HAD USED FOR HIS PRESS CONFERENCE. THESE WERE IN TERMS ALMOST IDENTICAL TO THOSE ATTRIBUTED TO TINDEMANS IN STRASBOURG (TEXT BY BAG).

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

R  
JACKSON

RNNN

SENT/RCVD 181755Z AGP/RJF

ACTION COPY

NR 500

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BONN 181645Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FOO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 581 OF 18 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS WASHINGTON UKRIS REF YORK UKREP BRUSSELS

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G'S  
**ACTION COPY**

NY TELNO 575: FALKLANDS.

1. I SAW HERR BENSCHER THIS AFTERNOON AND TOOK HIM OVER MANY OF THE POINTS I MADE YESTERDAY TO VON STADEN. I SAID THAT IT LOOKED AS IF WE WERE OUT OF THE WOODS ON THE QUESTION OF REPATRIATING PRISONERS, BUT THAT THERE WAS STILL NOTHING REMOTELY SATISFACTORY OVER THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. HERR BENSCHER (LIKE MANY OTHER GERMANS) WAS INCLINED TO THE VIEW THAT ARGENTINA WOULD NOT IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES RESUME ANY FORM OF OFFENSIVE ACTION. I EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS ABSOLUTELY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE COMMANDERS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC TO ASSUME THAT, AND STRONGLY EMPHASISED THE COMMON INTEREST THAT WE AND OUR ALLIES HAD IN OBTAINING A FORMAL RENUNCIATION OF ALL HOSTILITIES. I DREW ATTENTION TO EARLIER CONCERN EXPRESSED HERE ABOUT THE WEAKENING OF NATO'S MARITIME DEFENCES, WHICH WOULD CONTINUE UNLESS WE HAD THE RIGHT SORT OF CREDIBLE ASSURANCES FROM ARGENTINA.

2. IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE CONCERNS I EXPRESSED YESTERDAY TO VON STADEN HAD GOT THROUGH AND I DID NOT LABOUR ALTHOUGH I MENTIONED) OUR CONCERN THAT, FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS AMONGST POLITICAL DIRECTORS ON MONDAY AND BETWEEN MR FORD AND HERR BORTNER THE SAME DAY, THE GERMANS COULD (WITH THE FRENCH) PUT FORWARD THEIR SUGGESTION FOR IMMEDIATE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS WITHOUT EVEN CONSULTING US. HERR BENSCHER DID NOT ATTEMPT TO REFUTE THIS CRITICISM BUT TWICE ASKED ME TO PASS TO YOU HIS GREETINGS, HIS FEELINGS OF SOLIDARITY AND HIS HOPES OF HAVING A GOOD PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH YOU IN LUXEMBOURG ON SUNDAY.

3. INSO FAR AS HERR BENSCHER TRIED TO JUSTIFY THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS BEFORE ARGENTINA HAD AGREED TO A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, IT WAS BY SUGGESTING THAT THE REBUILDING OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND ARGENTINA WOULD ALLOW THE GERMANS AND OTHERS TO EXERCISE MORE INFLUENCE. I EXPRESSED MY

3. INSO FAR AS HERR GENSCHER TRIED TO JUSTIFY THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS BEFORE ARGENTINA HAD AGREED TO A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, IT WAS BY SUGGESTING THAT THE REBUILDING OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND ARGENTINA WOULD ALLOW THE GERMANS AND OTHERS TO EXERCISE MORE INFLUENCE. I EXPRESSED MY DOUBTS ABOUT THIS AND POINTED OUT THAT RESOLUTION 502 DID NOT NOW APPLY AND THAT NEGOTIATION WITH ARGENTINA ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE FALKLANDS WAS NOT AT PRESENT AN OPTION. HERR GENSCHER MADE NO DIRECT COMMENT BUT I HOPE NOW UNDERSTANDS THE POLITICAL REALITIES. HE WAS AT PAINS TO BE FRIENDLY AND REPEATED HIS TOTAL CONDEMNATION OF THE AGGRESSION, WHICH HE CLAIMED TO HAVE STATED TO ALL HIS LATIN AMERICAN INTERLOCUTORS.

*A.* IN THE LIGHT OF THIS CONVERSATION I CAN ONLY HOPE THAT YOU WILL FIND A REASONABLY COOPERATIVE AND SLIGHTLY HASTENED HERR GENSCHER AT THE MEETINGS IN LUXEMBOURG; BUT I FEAR THAT EVEN IF THE GERMANS WERE WILLING TO CHANGE THEIR ATTITUDE ON THE IMPORT EMBARGO (FOR WHICH THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE) IT WOULD ONLY BE ON THE BASIS OF OUR AGREEING TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARGENTINA OVER THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH EARLIER UN RESOLUTIONS. I MADE IT CLEAR TO HERR GENSCHER HOW IMPOSSIBLE THIS WAS, BUT THOUGHT IT BEST NOT TO PURSUE THE POINT TOO FAR TODAY.

5. HERR GENSCHER IS MUCH PREOCCUPIED THIS WEEK WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE COALITION ON ECONOMIC POLICY AND YESTERDAY'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE HESSEN FDP'S DECISION TO TRACK ITS LOT IN WITH THE LOCAL CDU (NY TELNO 580). THIS HAS UNDOUBTEDLY STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN HIM AND HERR SCHMIDT, AND PROBABLY CONTRIBUTED TO HERR GENSCHER'S FAILURES TO CONSULT US. IT MAY ALSO HAVE PREVENTED HERR GENSCHER FROM ARGUING THE POINT PROPERLY WITH HERR SCHMIDT IN CABINET.

TAYLOR

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OO ATHENS

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GR 60

**ACTION COPY**

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 190059Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2198 OF 19 JUNE  
AND TO EC POSTS.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 2175.

ARGENTINA; SANCTIONS AND THE ARMS EMBARGO.

HAIG HAS TOLD ME THAT THE U S GOVERNMENT WILL STICK BY US. HE  
WILL GET INTO TOUCH WITH HIS EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES AND URGE THEM TO  
DO LIKEWISE.

ENDERSON

NNNN

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ACTION COPY

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
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PP UKMIS NEW YORK

118 JUN 1982

GR 130



CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 190102Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2199 OF 19 JUNE

AND TO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK

HAIG HAS TELEPHONED FROM NEW YORK AFTER FIVE ROUGH AND UNPRODUCTIVE HOURS WITH GROMYKO.

HE SAYS THAT HE HAS SPOKEN TO THE PRESIDENT ABOUT THE PM'S VISIT TO NEW YORK. THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE TO INVITE THE PRIME MINISTER TO COME ON DOWN TO WASHINGTON FOR A TALK. HE REALIZES THE PRESSURE ON HER TIME AND WOULD QUITE UNDERSTAND IF SHE COULD ONLY COME TO WASHINGTON FOR A VERY SHORT STAY.

I DO NOT SUPPOSE YOU WANT ANY ADVICE FROM ME. BUT THERE IS NO DOUBT ABOUT THE WARMTH OF THE RECEPTION SHE WOULD RECEIVE HERE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SURRENDER.

HENDERSON

NNNN



CONFIDENTIAL

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP 0700 HOURS, 19 JUNE

Repatriation of Prisoners of War

1. The Argentine Government yesterday agreed that the 'Canberra' and 'Norland' may ship POWs direct from Port Stanley to an Argentine port.
2. 'Canberra' sailed yesterday for Puerto Madryn with 4,200 POWs on board. 'Norland' is at present in Port Stanley, where she will embark 2,000 POWs.
3. Two Argentine hospital ships will be used to transport further POWs.
4. HMG are pressing the Argentine Government for the release of Fl. Lt. Glover, the injured pilot who has been hospitalised on the mainland. We are also pressing for an early release of the three British journalists, although they are in a different category to the POWs.

Cessation of Hostilities

5. Argentina has still not agreed to a total cessation of hostilities. The new Administration in Buenos Aires are being urged to announce their formal acceptance of a ceasefire.

United Nations

6. Argentina has sent a Note to the President of the Security Council, asking the UN to negotiate a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of British forces.

19 June 1982

Emergency Unit

CONFIDENTIAL

INVASION OF THE FALKLANDS

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1. Classification of the whole chronology is Secret although individual pages may have different classifications.

Emergency Unit

- 19 March: A British Antarctic Survey field party report that an Argentine Navy cargo vessel is anchored in Leith harbour. A party of about 60 Argentines have set up camp and an Argentine flag has been hoisted.
- 20 March: The BAS field party informs the Argentines that they have landed illegally and that they must leave.
- The Ministry of Defence instruct HMS Endurance to prepare to sail to South Georgia with a detachment of Marines from Port Stanley.
- HM Ambassador Buenos Aires informs the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs that we are treating the infringement of our sovereignty very seriously. The Argentine Charge d'Affaires is called in to the Foreign Office and told the same. The Argentine Government profess ignorance but agree to look into the matter urgently.
- 21 March: HMS Endurance departs for South Georgia.
- Argentine MFA inform us that the ship will leave South Georgia shortly and that no service personnel are involved.
- 22 March: We receive confirmation that the ship has left but there are doubts about whether all the men have gone.
- News Department issue statement on incident.
- In the evening, BAS confirm that about six men and some equipment remain.
- 23 March: HMS Endurance is instructed to sail on for South Georgia and remove the men, if possible without using force.
- Mr Luce makes a statement to the House of Commons.
- Argentine Government later warns that use of HMS Endurance would be gravely provocative. They are told we wish to avoid this if possible: if they can propose an acceptable alternative method of removing the men, we are prepared to let them do so.

24 March: HMS Endurance ordered to anchor in Grytviken harbour, but not to proceed to Leith.

Argentine MFA say they wish to prevent the situation escalating if possible, but need time to consider.

25 March: Argentine naval vessel is sighted at Leith delivering further supplies.

We ask the Argentines for an early response to our request that they remove the men.

Argentine MFA then say that by deploying HMS Endurance we have made it impossible for them to contain their position.

We reply that we wish to do everything possible to avoid confrontation and propose that if the party request the proper authorisation from Grytviken, it will be given.

27 March: No formal reply from the Argentine MFA. But they issue a press statement announcing that the men will be given all necessary protection and the press reports that several Argentine Navy vessels have been ordered into the area.

28 March: Argentine Foreign Minister sends a message to the Secretary of State making it clear that the Argentines have no intention of agreeing to our proposal.

The Secretary of State sends a message to Mr Haig, asking him to intervene and urge restraint on the Argentines.

30 March: Secretary of State makes statement in House of Lords.

Argentines reject US proposal for a solution based on regularising the men's presence.

*Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4).*

*At Wayland*

*26 April 2012*

- 31 March: British Ambassador, Buenos Aires, meets Argentine Foreign Minister and passes on Secretary of State's offer to send a personal emissary to Buenos Aires. This is later rejected and Costa Mendez says he considers the diplomatic channel is now closed.
- US Government urges Argentines to exercise restraint.
- \* ~ \* indicate that large naval force will be in position by \* ~ \* 2 April to mount attack on Falkland Islands.
- 1 April: UN Secretary General calls in both British and Argentine Representatives and asks them to refrain from threat or use of force. Later we seek Emergency meeting of the Security Council, which results in Presidential statement on similar lines to the Secretary General's appeal.
- The Americans attempt, both through their Ambassador in Buenos Aires and later by direct telephone call between Mr Reagan and President Galtieri, to avert the threat. But they are rebuffed.
- 2 April: 1200 London time, first sighting of Argentine attack force. Operation complete by 1900 London time.
- Diplomatic relations between the UK and Argentina broken off.
- British officials and Marines flown from Falklands to Montevideo.
- Message from Commonwealth Secretary General to all Commonwealth Heads of Government urging condemnation of Argentine action.
- Messages also from Prime Minister and Secretary of State to wide range of governments.
- UK calls immediate meeting of the Security Council.
- 3 April: Emergency debate in both Houses.
- UN Security Council adopts mandatory resolution (502) calling for Argentines to withdraw their forces.
- We announce freezing of Argentine assets in the UK and ending of ECGD cover.

\* ~ \* Words deleted and retained under  
Section 3(4).

SECRET

Wayland

26 April 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

4 April

British officials and Marines expelled from Falkland Islands leave Montevideo for UK.

We receive confirmation that South Georgia has also been attacked and is now in Argentine hands.

Reports that the Marines defending Grytviken have inflicted considerable damage on the Argentines.

Wide-ranging diplomatic action to secure condemnation by other countries of Argentine action and also to persuade other governments to take economic action similar to our own.

5 April

Governor, staff and Marines arrive back in the UK. Debriefings and press conference.

Task force departs from the UK.

Wide-ranging trade sanctions announced.

New Zealand announces breaking of diplomatic relations with Argentina.

British citizens advised to consider leaving Argentina (BBC World Service broadcast)

Canada announces recall of Ambassador in Buenos Aires.

In an impromptu press conference, President Reagan said that the confrontation put the United States in a difficult position as it was friendly with both countries.

Remaining Marines in Falklands captured.

Lord Carrington, Mr Humphrey Atkins and Mr Luce resign.

Requisitioning of Canberra announced.

6 April

Prime Minister sends message to President Reagan.

Australia announces recall of Ambassador in Buenos Aires.

Mr Haig meets British and Argentine Ambassadors in Washington.

Ban on Argentine imports announced (came into effect at midnight).

7 April

Debate in House of Commons.

MEZ announced.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 8 April: Mr Haig has talks in London with the Secretary of State and Prime Minister.
- Most of British Embassy staff from Buenos Aires return to UK; Argentine Embassy staff leave London.
- Australia announces ban on imports from and export credits to Argentina.
- 9 April: Message from Falkland Islands public servants requesting evacuation reaches Montevideo.
- 10 April: EC countries announce agreement to impose ban on Argentine imports, to take effect from 16 April for one month.
- Mr Haig in Buenos Aires.
- Message to Prime Minister from President Figueiredo of Brazil.
- 11 April: Peruvian proposal for 72-hour truce.
- 12 April: Mr. Haig has talks in London.
- MEZ comes into effect.
- Canada announces ban on imports from and export credits to Argentina.
- 13 April: After staying in London overnight, Mr Haig has further talks at No.10.
- Arrival in Montevideo of Chief Secretary and others from Falkland Islands.
- OAS Resolution adopted by consensus following acrimonious argument between Caribbeans and Latin Americans.
- New Zealand announces ban on imports from and exports to Argentina.
- Argentina bans imports from EC and other countries taking sanctions against her.
- 14 April: Debate in House of Commons.
- 15 April: Chief Secretary and party arrive in London.

- 15 April: Mr Haig arrives in Buenos Aires.
- Soviet Ambassador calls on Mr Hurd. Mr Hurd explains HMG's views and need for solution on basis of SCR 502. Mr Popov maintains that Soviet position was 'principled, not opportunist'.
- Statement on HMG's position by Sir Antony Parsons at Plenary Session of ECOSOC.
- 16 April: Mr Haig begins further talks in Buenos Aires. Argentine Permanent Representative to United Nations sends letter to President of the Security Council setting out Argentina's position in the dispute.
- 17 April: It is learnt that three British journalists have been missing in Argentina since 11 April.
- Argentines notify ICAO that permission will have to be sought for overflights of Argentine territory south of Parallel 36S (which includes the Falklands).
- 18 April: Andean Pact countries (Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia; Ecuador and Colombia) announce that they will increase their trade with Argentina to compensate for effect of economic measures by European and other countries.
- Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirm that the three missing British journalists have been arrested.
- Arrival in Montevideo of 29 Royal Marines and 13 BAS personnel.
- 19 April: Norway bans Argentine imports.
- Mr Haig sends text of draft agreement reached with Argentines and returns to Washington. Statement issued from No.10 Downing Street describes the proposals as 'complex and difficult'.
- Soviets launch Salyut 7 satellite which could monitor naval movements in the South Atlantic.



CONFIDENTIAL

20 April:

The 29 Royal Marines and 13 BAS personnel arrive in UK.

Further party of 30, mostly ODA personnel, arrive in Montevideo from Falklands.

OAS agree to hold Foreign Ministers meeting on 26 April.

Meeting in Brussels, the EC Ministers expressed full support for Britain and backed the UN call for the immediate withdrawal of Argentine troops from the Falklands.

21 April:

Mr Haig reports on utter irrationality and chaotic nature of present Argentine leadership.

US assess that on present indications Argentina will obtain two-thirds majority for action under Rio Treaty. US to lobby before meeting due on 26 April.

European Parliament passes Resolution in support of UK position.

Argentine plane intercepted in airspace over Task Force.

22 April

Secretary of State has talks in Washington with Mr Haig and with Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

President Galtieri visits Falklands

In a Note to the EC Council Latin American Ambassadors accredited to the EC protest against the Community's ban on Argentine imports and ask that the measure be revoked.

23 April

Mr Denis Healey calls on UN Secretary-General.

Message communicated through the Swiss Embassy ~~to~~ the Argentine Government warning that Argentine aircraft approaching Task Force vessels will be treated as hostile.

24 April

S of S returns to UK from Washington.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 April Argentine submarine attacked off Grytviken, South Georgia by 2 British helicopters.
- British forces land in South Georgia and successfully take control of Grytviken.
- Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez says in New York that Argentina and the UK are now ''technically'' at war.
- 26 April Argentine contingent at Leith Harbour, South Georgia surrender.
- Argentine prisoner shot dead on South Georgia by Royal Marine
- OAS meeting convened. Argentine representative calls for withdrawal of UK forces and suspension of economic measures against her, but no call for OAS sanctions. Haig makes full speech.
- 27 April Mr Haig passes text of proposals to Argentine government, telling them that he must have an answer, accepting or rejecting them, by midnight Buenos Aires time on 27/28 April.
- 28 April OAS adopt resolution by 17-0-4 which recognizes Argentine sovereignty but insists that SCR 502 must be observed. No call for sanctions.
- Information released about death of Argentine officer on South Georgia.
- Total Exclusion Zone announced (comes into operation on 30 April).
- 29 April Further debate on Falklands in Parliament.
- Details of 151 Argentine military personnel and 39 foreign civilians captured on S. Georgia received and passed to appropriate authorities.
- Letter from Costa Mendez to Haig stating that US proposals fall short of Argentine demands and do not satisfy Argentine aspirations in relation to sovereignty and an interim administration.
- Argentina declares total exclusion zone.

30 April

The British Total Exclusion-Zone comes into force at 1100 GMT. US Secretary of State Haig publicly announces US Government support for the UK in the form of a ban on arms sales to Argentina and financial restrictions on that country. In addition the US will respond positively to UK requests for material support.

1 May

Airfields on the Islands bombed. Task Force later comes under aerial attack: Argentines lose 3 aircraft. Secretary of State flies to Washington.

2 May

Secretary of State calls on UN Secretary-General.

3 May

British submarine torpedoes Argentine cruiser, which later sinks. Argentine patrol vessel fires on British helicopter and is sunk by others. Secretary of State returns from New York.

4 May

Secretary of State and Mr Nott make statements in the House, followed by further statement in the House by Mr Nott. MOD Statement on the loss of HMS Sheffield and one Sea Harrier.

5 May

- Revised version of US/Peruvian proposals for ceasefire and settlement sent to Secretary of State by Mr Haig. UK responds with some suggested amendments. Proposals sent to Peruvian Government for transmission to Argentina.

- Informal Security Council consultations.

- UN Secretary-General announces that Argentina has accepted his 'proposals', i.e. the ideas discussed with Mr Pym on 2 May.

- Secretary of State and Mr Nott make statements in the House.

6 May

- Mr Haig and, later, the Peruvian President, through HMA Lima, inform HMG that the US/Peruvian proposals have been overtaken by Argentina's approach to the UN Secretary-General.

- Sir Anthony Parsons delivers HMG's response to the UN Secretary-General's initiative.

- MOD release statement concerning the loss of two British Sea-Harriers.

- Informal Security Council Consultations.

- Mr Haig sends message to NATO Foreign Ministers about US/Peruvian proposals rejected by Argentina.

- 7 May: Statement in the House by Mr Pym.
- British Government introduces 12-mile blockade of Argentine coast. Sr Ros offers amplification to Secretary-General of Argentina's reply to his proposals.
- Argentine Note to ICRC accusing Britain of neglecting international obligations.
- 8 May: Secretary-General seeks clarification from both sides to his proposals.
- 8/9 May: Informal meeting of EC Foreign Ministers at Villers-le-Temple, Belgium. No decision on renewal of EC sanctions.
- 9 May: MOD statement on attack on military targets at Port Stanley and surrender of Argentine fishing vessel.
- Separate discussions between UN Secretary-General and both parties to find basis of agreement continue.
- 10 May: HMG issues notice to airmen establishing a Terminal Control Area for air traffic within a 100-mile radius of Ascension Island.
- Mr Pym appears before Foreign Affairs Select Committee.
- Further round of separate discussions between UN Secretary-General and the parties.
- 11 May: MOD statement on naval engagement with a 'surface vessel' within the TEZ; 'large explosion' reported in the vicinity of the target.
- Argentine Junta issues Communiqué No.40 warning that British ships sailing through South Atlantic towards 'area of operations' will be considered hostile and treated accordingly. Followed by Communiqué No.41 applying similar provisions to aircraft.

11 May (continued)

Further round of discussions between UN Secretary-General and the parties. Sr Perez de Cuellar says he is 'rather encouraged' by latest developments. Argentinians talk of negotiations without prejudgement of the outcome.

12 May

Ministry of Defence issue two statements about Argentine air attacks on Task Force: 2 Argentine A4 aircraft shot down - no British casualties.

European Parliament adopting resolution reaffirming condemnation of Argentine failure to implement SC resolution 502 and inviting EC Foreign Ministers to renew sanctions.

More discussions in New York between the Secretary-General and the parties.

13 May

188 Argentine prisoners captured on South Georgia handed over to ICRC at Ascension Island; flown to Montevideo for return by sea to Argentina. Lieutenant-Commander Astiz detained at Ascension Island.

MOD statement about crash of third Argentine aircraft in sea during attack on Task Force on 12 May.

Debate on Falklands crisis in the House of Commons.

14 May

Informal consultations at UN. Talks between UN Secretary-General and parties continue.

M. Cheysson sees Secretary of State in London.

Port Stanley airfield and associated military installations attacked by Sea Harriers, and Peeble Island raided.

15 May

Sir A Parsons and Sir N Henderson recalled for discussions.

Political Committee of the Ten, meeting in Brussels, agree to defer decision on renewing EC sanctions to Foreign Ministers meeting in Luxembourg on 16 May.

CONFIDENTIAL

16 May

Sir A Parsons and Sir N Henderson at Chequers. Secretary of State meets Mr Haig in Luxembourg before start of NATO meeting.

Emergency meeting of EC Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg. No decision on renewal of sanctions. Further meeting proposed for 17 May.

MOD statement on Sea Harrier attacks on 2 Argentine vessels in Falkland Sound. No firm indications of damage caused.

17 May

Sir A Parsons hands over text to UN Secretary-General setting out HMG's final negotiating position.

At EC Foreign Ministers meeting in Luxembourg, eight member states agree to extend sanctions regulation for seven days. Italy and Ireland will not apply regulation, but undertake not to allow imports from Argentina during that period. Denmark will continue to apply regulation pending introduction of equivalent national measures.

18 May

Loss of UK Sea King helicopter reported; ditched in sea: accident rather than military action: all four crew members rescued.

NATO Secretary-General reports robust support of NATO Foreign Ministers, meeting in Luxembourg, for UK position.

UN Secretary-General receives initial Argentine response to HMG's final position paper.

19 May

Text of Argentine reply to our proposals handed over by UN Secretariat. Security Council meets informally to hear a report by the Secretary-General on the progress of negotiations. Secretary-General in a last minute bid to avert a breakdown of negotiations presents an aide-memoire to the UK and Argentine Governments setting out his proposals to resolve outstanding questions in negotiations.

Defence Questions and Armaments Committee of Western European Union adopts resolution urging member states to support implementation of SCR 502 and seek peaceful settlement of dispute.

20 May

Secretary-General declares that his peace efforts had come to an end. Argentina fails to respond to his aide-mémoire.

HMG releases details of their final position on the Secretary-General's initiative.

President of Peru hands to the British Ambassador a new peace formula.

21 May

Peruvian President is thanked for his efforts but told that considerable movement on behalf of Argentine Government will be necessary before a peaceful settlement can be reached.

Ministry of Defence releases news of British landing on East Falkland and the establishment of a bridgehead.

UN Security Council meets but no resolution is considered.

22 May

UN Security Council debate continues but no draft resolution is yet tabled.

The Task Force continues to consolidate the bridgehead around San Carlos Water. No enemy action reported.

The Pope sends a message to the Prime Minister calling for an immediate cease-fire.

The North Atlantic Council reaffirms its support for the British position.

The Presidents of Colombia and Dominica both send messages to the Prime Minister. The Peruvian President announces that the Argentines have accepted his peace proposals. The Government of Mexico publicly appeals for an immediate cease-fire.

23 May

UN Security Council debate continues.

Argentine air attacks on ships in the Falkland Sound and San Carlos Water succeed in severely damaging HMS Antelope. Six Argentine planes are shot down.

The Prime Minister replies to the Pope's message.

24 May

UN Security Council debate continues. A rash of draft resolutions emerge. Those of Ireland and Panama are unacceptable. A NAM amended version of the Irish draft and a Japanese draft offer possibilities of avoiding a veto. The Brazilians circulate a letter to the President of the Security Council, building on their President's initiative.

EC Ministers agree to extend the ban on Argentine imports indefinitely.

HMS Antelope sinks and further Argentine air attacks cause some damage to our ships. Eight Argentine aircraft are shot down.

/ 25 May



25 May 1982

UN Security Council debate continues. Irish draft Resolution (as amended by NAM and UK) is likely to be put to the vote on 26 May after further Argentine consideration of the text.

The Norwegian ban on Argentine imports is to remain in force indefinitely.

MOD press statements that three Argentine planes were downed and that one of our ships is in difficulty.

26 May 1982

UNSCR 505 (an amended version of the Irish draft) is adopted unanimously.

MOD press statement on the loss of HMS Coventry and the Atlantic Conveyor in attacks on 25 May.

Mr Nott makes statement in the House of Commons.

Colombian Ambassador delivers oral message to FCO on behalf of the Presidents of Colombia, Brazil and Peru proposing a 5-day truce.

27 May 1982

MOD press statement that the only military development on 26 May was a Harrier raid against Port Stanley airfield.

Rio Treaty Meeting due to begin in Washington later today.

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

17 (22)

IMMEDIATE] copy to PM 20/6

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PS (6)  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
~~MR J LEAHY~~  
MR MOBERLY  
~~MR J BULLARD~~ MR GOODISON  
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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1034 OF 19 JUNE  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV  
INFO ROUTINE DAMASCUS, AMMAN, PARIS, CAIRO, JEDDA.

MIPT: ISRAEL/LEBANON

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SCR 512

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE SUFFERINGS OF THE LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN  
CIVILIAN POPULATIONS,

REFERRING TO THE HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS  
OF 1949 AND TO THE OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM THE REGULATIONS  
ANNEXED TO THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 1907,

REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 508 (1982) AND 509 (1982),

REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 508 (1982) AND 509 (1982),

1. CALLS UPON ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO RESPECT THE RIGHTS OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, TO REFRAIN FROM ALL ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THOSE POPULATIONS AND TO TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING CAUSED BY THE CONFLICT, IN PARTICULAR, BY FACILITATING THE DISPATCH AND DISTRIBUTION OF AID PROVIDED BY UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES AND BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, IN PARTICULAR, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC):
2. APPEALS TO MEMBER STATES TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE MOST EXTENSIVE HUMANITARIAN AID POSSIBLE:
3. STRESSES THE PARTICULAR HUMANITARIAN RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS AGENCIES, INCLUDING THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST (UNRWA), TOWARDS CIVILIAN POPULATIONS AND CALLS UPON ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT NOT TO HAMPER THE EXERCISE OF THOSE RESPONSIBILITIES AND TO ASSIST IN HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS:
4. TAKES NOTE OF THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CO-ORDINATE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES IN THIS FIELD AND REQUESTS HIM TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AND COMPLIANCE WITH THIS RESOLUTION AND TO REPORT ON THESE EFFORTS TO THE COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

PARSONS

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O/B 200800Z

(6)  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
~~SIR J LEAHY~~  
MR MOBERLY  
~~SIR J BULLARD~~ MR GOODISON  
HD/NENAD  
HD/MED  
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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 200145Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1033 OF 19 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV,

INFO ROUTINE DAMASCUS, AMMAN, PARIS, CAIRO, JEDDA.

MY TELS 1026 - 1028: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. DE NANTEUIL (FRANCE), WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE, CALLED A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING THIS AFTERNOON (19 JUNE) TO ADOPT A RESOLUTION ON THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE LEBANESE SITUATION. HE WAS IT SEEMED ACTING ON FIRM INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS.
2. THIS PIECE OF UNTARNISHED FRENCH PROPAGANDA UPSET THE AMERICANS (WITH BEGIN'S MEETING WITH REAGAN ON 21 JUNE IN MIND) AND THE SECRETARIAT (WHO WERE BEGINNING TO HAVE SOME SUCCESS IN PERSUADING THE ISRAELIS INFORMALLY TO ACCEPT UN HUMANITARIAN SERVICES). HOWEVER, BY CALLING THE COUNCIL WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THE AMERICANS AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, DE NANTEUIL, PRESUMABLY DELIBERATELY, CREATED MOMENTUM WHICH COULD NOT BE DEFLECTED. AFTER SOME HOURS OF WRANGLING INCLUDING A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

AMERICANS AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, DE NANTEUIL, PRESUMABLY DELIBERATELY, CREATED MOMENTUM WHICH COULD NOT BE DEFLECTED.

AFTER SOME HOURS OF WRANGLING INCLUDING A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN HAIG AND CHEYSSON THE AMERICANS RELUCTANTLY AGREED TO GO ALONG WITH A TEXT. I ADVISED THEM TO SWALLOW AND GET IT OVER THIS EVENING SINCE THE ISRAELIS WERE LIKELY TO GET MORE DIFFICULT AS THE BEGIN/REAGAN MEETING DREW CLOSER, AND DE NANTEUIL WAS INSISTENT THAT THERE COULD NOT BE A POSTPONEMENT OVER THE WEEKEND.

3. THE COUNCIL EVENTUALLY MET IN THE EVENING AND UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED THE TEXT IN M.I.F.T. AS SCR 512. JAPAN AND THE US SPOKE BRIEFLY AFTER THE VOTE. JAPAN ANNOUNCED A CONTRIBUTION OF US DOLLARS 1 MILLION THROUGH THE ICRC FOR RELIEF EFFORTS. THE US SAID THAT IT WAS GIVING US DOLLARS 15 MILLION FOR RELIEF AND ANTICIPATED GIVING A FURTHER US DOLLARS 20 MILLION. BLUM (ISRAEL) MADE AN UNPLEASANT AND PROVOCATIVE STATEMENT. TUENI (LEBANON) BRIEFLY THANKED THE COUNCIL AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. OVINNIKOV (USSR) LOOSED OFF BRIEFLY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL. BLUM, LICHENSTEIN (US) AND OVINNIKOV EXCHANGED SHOTS AND THE COUNCIL ADJOURNED.

PARSONS

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20/6.

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FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES.

(42)

6  
PS/MR HURD ← PS/M' RIFKIND  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE  
MR BARRETT  
HD/S AM D  
HD/DEF D — Hd/WAD  
HD/PLANNING STAFF.  
HD/UND  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/ERD  
HD/PUSD  
MR REED, PUSD  
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)  
PS/S OF S DEFENCE  
PS/HOME SECRETARY  
PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DST)  
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL  
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER  
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG  
PS/SIR M PALLISER  
PS/SIR A DUFF  
MR WADE-GERY  
MR FULLER  
MR COLVIN  
MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-  
MENTS STAFF  
DIO  
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD  
DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 191800Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1032 OF 19 JUNE  
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M.I.P.T. : FALKLANDS

FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT OF ARGENTINE NOTE:-

LETTER DATED 18 JUNE 1982 FROM THE CHARGE D-'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ARGENTINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1 ON EXPRESS INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVERNMENT, I HAVE THE HONOUR TO BRING THE FOLLOWING TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF THE MALVINAS, SOUTH GEORGIA AND SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS:

2 AFTER VETOING THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ORDERING THE CEASE-FIRE, WHICH WAS VOTED BY THE MAJORITY OF THE COUNCIL ON 4 JUNE 1982, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND HAS CONTINUED ITS ARMED AGGRESSION AGAINST MY COUNTRY AND HAS

2 AFTER VETOING THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ORDERING THE CEASE-FIRE, WHICH WAS VOTED BY THE MAJORITY OF THE COUNCIL ON 4 JUNE 1982, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND HAS CONTINUED ITS ARMED AGGRESSION AGAINST MY COUNTRY AND HAS COMPLETED THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF PUERTO ARGENTINO, THE CAPITAL OF THE MALVINAS, ON 14 JUNE. THE SELF-DEFENCE EXERCISED BY ARGENTINA IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY COULD NOT PREVAIL AGAINST THE MILITARY SUPERIORITY OF THE AGGRESSOR.

3 CONSEQUENTLY, THE COMMANDER OF THE ARGENTINE FORCES DEFENDING THE MALVINAS HAD TO SURRENDER THE PERSONNEL UNDER HIS COMMAND IN ORDER TO AVOID GREATER LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE.

4 THROUGHOUT THE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH LED TO THIS SITUATION THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND IGNORED THE DEMAND FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE CONTAINED IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982) OF 3 APRIL 1982 AND ALSO THE EXHORTATION OF THE COUNCIL CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF THAT RESOLUTION TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE BY MEANS OF NEGOTIATIONS.

5 AS IS WELL KNOWN, THE UNITED KINGDOM VETOED THE DRAFT RESOLUTION OF 4 JUNE, SUBMITTED BY PANAMA AND SPAIN, THUS MAKING CLEAR ITS REFUSAL TO CARRY OUT THE CEASE-FIRE AND TO ACCEPT RESOLUTION 505 (1982), ALTHOUGH IT HAD BEEN ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY AND, OBVIOUSLY, WITH ITS OWN AFFIRMATIVE VOTE.

6 ARGENTINA CANNOT AND WILL NOT ACCEPT THE SITUATION OF FORCE WHICH GREAT BRITAIN HAS THUS SOUGHT TO IMPOSE. TODAY, IT IS CLEARER THAN EVER THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM'S AIM IS TO ENSURE BY ANY MEANS THE CONTINUATION OF A SITUATION OF COLONIAL DOMINATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, IN OPEN VIOLATION OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

7 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC IS NOW ADDRESSING THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGAIN TO MAKE CLEAR, AS IT HAS DONE ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, ITS FULL READINESS TO CARRY OUT RESOLUTIONS 502 (1982) AND 505 (1982). MY COUNTRY HOPES LIKEWISE THAT THE COUNCIL WILL CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO SECURE THE FULL COMPLIANCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM WITH THESE RESOLUTIONS.

8 THE UNITED KINGDOM IS MANTAINING ITS TROOPS ON THE ISLANDS, ITS FLEET IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, THE NAVAL AND AIR BLOCKADE AGAINST ARGENTINA AND ALSO THE ECONOMIC AGGRESSION CARRIED OUT WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES.

9 IN ADDITION, THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS NOW EXTENDED ITS MILITARY

9 IN ADDITION, THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS NOW EXTENDED ITS MILITARY OPERATIONS TO THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS, AS THE ARGENTINE MISSION INFORMED THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN NOTE NO. 171 OF 17 JUNE CIRCULATED IN SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT S/15230, BY ATTACKING THE SCIENTIFIC STATION "CORBETA URUGUAY" WHICH THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC HAS MAINTAINED IN THOSE ISLANDS FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS.

10 IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE IS A DE FACTO CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WHICH ARGENTINA IS NOW OBSERVING. HOWEVER, THIS CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WILL BE PRECARIOUS AS LONG AS THE BRITISH POLICY OF CONTINUING THE MILITARY OCCUPATION, THE BLOCKADE AND THE ECONOMIC AGGRESSION CONTINUES.

11 THE TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WILL BE ACHIEVED ONLY WHEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AGREES TO LIFT THE NAVAL AND AIR BLOCKADE AND THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS REFERRED TO ABOVE AND WHEN IT WITHDRAWS THE MILITARY FORCES OCCUPYING THE ISLANDS AND THE NAVAL TASK FORCE AND THE NUCLEAR SUBMARINES WHICH IT HAS DEPLOYED IN THE AREA.

12 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC POINTS OUT, ONCE AGAIN, THAT ONLY NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PERTINENT RESOLUTIONS - NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH ARGENTINA HAS ALWAYS BEEN READY TO PARTICIPATE - CAN LEAD TO A FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE, THUS ELIMINATING A SITUATION OF ILLEGAL COLONIAL DOMINATION, WHICH IS SUSTAINED BY FORCE AND WHICH IN ITSELF CONSTITUTES A PERMANENT THREAT TO PEACE.

I REQUEST THAT THIS NOTE BE CIRCULATED AS A SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT

(SIGNED) ARNOLDO M. LISTRE  
AMBASSADOR

PARSONS

NNNN



Myfaxed to Cheques  
20/6

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FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES. (42)

PS/MR HURD ← PS/M' RIFKIND  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE  
MR BARRETT  
HD/S AM D  
HD/DEF D  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
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HD/NEWS D  
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HD/PUSD  
MR REED, PUSD  
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~  
RESIDENT CLERK

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PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DST)  
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL  
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER  
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG  
PS/SIR M PALLISER  
PS/SIR A DUFF  
MR WADE-GERY  
MR FULLER  
MR COLVIN  
MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-  
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MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1031 OF 19 JUNE  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

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MY TELS NOS 1024 AND 1025: FALKLANDS : SECURITY COUNCIL

1. IT LOOKS AS THOUGH COSTA MENDEZ'S PROPAGANDA MACHINE IS MAKING THE MOST OF THE ARGENTINE NOTE (FULL TEXT AS TRANSLATED BY THE SECRETARIAT IN M.I.F.T.) TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES (19 JUNE) CARRIES A LONGISH REPORT DATED BUENOS AIRES WHICH CONTAINS A LOT OF BRIEFING BY MFA OFFICIALS EG THE NOTE WAS MEANT TO BE CONCILIATORY IN CALLING FOR A UN ROLE AND ACKNOWLEDGING THAT HOSTILITIES ARE IN FACT OVER FOR THE TIME BEING; THE COUNTER DEMANDS WERE "TO KEEP A LITTLE DOOR OPEN SO THAT WE CAN MAINTAIN SOME SMALL PRESSURE ON THE BRITISH TO GIVE US THE ISLANDS BACK": IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ARGENTINE "TO GIVE IN AND COMPLETELY SAY THAT ALL IS LOST, BUT IN REALITY THERE IS NOTHING WE CAN DO MILITARY FOR THE TIME BEING" IF THE BRITISH "READ BETWEEN THE LINES, THEY WILL KNOW WHAT WE MEAN". OFFICIALS SAID THAT THE NOTE HAD BEEN APPROVED BY THE RULING THREE MAN JUNTA, INCLUDING GENERAL NICOLAIDES. SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS SAID THAT IT WAS THE RESIGNATION OF GALTIERI THAT

IN REALITY THERE IS NOTHING WE CAN DO ABOUT IT.  
IF THE BRITISH "READ BETWEEN THE LINES, THEY WILL KNOW WHAT WE MEAN". OFFICIALS SAID THAT THE NOTE HAD BEEN APPROVED BY THE RULING THREE MAN JUNTA, INCLUDING GENERAL NICOLAIDES. SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS SAID THAT IT WAS THE RESIGNATION OF GALTIERI THAT OPENED THE WAY FOR THE NOTE. FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS FAVOURED A RESUMPTION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION BECAUSE HE SEEMED FAIR AND WELL-VERSED IN THE ISSUES. ARGENTINA WOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLANDS.

2. WHEN I FIRST READ THE NOTE I WAS STRUCK BY THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PARAS 10 AND 11 I.E. WERE THE ARGENTINES IN FACT SAYING THAT THEY WERE NOW READY FOR A FULL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES (PARA 10), BUT THAT THIS WOULD ONLY BECOME A PERMANENT PEACE WHEN PARAS 11 AND 12 HAD BEEN FULFILLED? PEREZ DE CUELLAR AND I LOOKED AT THIS POINT TOGETHER BUT THOUGHT THAT IT DID NOT AMOUNT TO A SERIOUS OFFER OF AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. FIRST, IT WOULD BE LUDICROUS, EVEN BY ARGENTINE STANDARDS TO TAKE AN IMPORTANT DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE BY CIRCULATING A DOCUMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN A ROUTINE SERIES WHICH HAS NOW TOPPED THE HUNDRED MARK OVER THE PAST 2 AND HALF MONTHS. SECONDLY, LISTRE HAD MADE NO ATTEMPT TO MAKE PERSONAL CONTACT WITH EITHER PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE NOTE. IT HAD BEEN DELIVERED IN THE NORMAL WAY AS PART OF THE PAPER BOMBARDMENT WHICH THE ARGENTINES AND I HAVE BEEN EXCHANGING SINCE THE CRISIS BEGAN. WE CONCLUDED THAT THE NOTE WAS PROBABLY PROPAGANDA. BBC RADIO 4 INTERVIEWED ME ABOUT IT LATE LAST NIGHT: I WAS DISMISSIVE.

3. I AM RESOLVED NOT TO PURSUE THE QUESTION HERE AS THE ARGENTINES (AND FOR THAT MATTER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL) WOULD CLUTCH AT ANY STRAW TO MIRE US IN ANOTHER UN NEGOTIATION. BUT I THOUGHT THAT THE ABOVE MIGHT BE USEFUL TO YOU IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR FORTHCOMING MEETING IN BRUSSELS. PROVIDED THAT THEY WERE IN NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR DETERMINATION NOT TO GET DRAWN INTO A FRESH NEGOTIATION WITH ARGENTINA THROUGH THE UN OR ANY OTHER AGENCY, THERE MIGHT BE NO HARM IN OUR PARTNERS, IF THEY WISHED, OR THE SWISS EXPLORING WITH THE ARGENTINES IF THERE IS IN FACT A SERIOUS MESSAGE IN PARA 10 OF THE NOTE REGARDING AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO KEEP ANY FOLLOW-UP AWAY FROM THIS PLACE.

PARSONS

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● PART 25 ends:-

18 June

PART 26 begins:-

19 June

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