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886

PREM 19/641

RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA
 POSITION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
 THEIR REHABILITATION AND FUTURE
 SHACKLETON REPORT + FOLLOW UP.

ARGENTINA

PART 1: SEPT 1979

PART 30: OCT 1982.

PART 30.

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
4.10.82							
11.10.82							
12.10.82							
14.10.82							
15.10.82							
18.10.82							
19.10.82							
20.10.82							
21.10.82							
25.10.82							
27.10.82							
28.10.82							
1.11.82							
30.10.82							
- ends -							

PREM 19/641

PART 30 ends:-

October 1982.


PART 31 begins:-

November 1982

GRS 320
CONFIDENTIAL
FM PARIS 301230Z OCT 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1026 OF 30 OCTOBER 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, UKREP BRUSSELS,
COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, ROME, DUBLIN, BONN, TOKYO.

Argentina


UKMIS NEW YORK TELS NOS 1765 AND 1766 (NOT TO ALL):
FAKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. I SPOKE TO GUTMANN, SECRETARY - GENERAL AT THE QUAI, TO REMIND HIM OF THE REPRESENTATIONS I MADE ON 22 OCTOBER AND TO DRAW HIS ATTENTION TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO MITTERRAND, WHICH HE CONFIRMED HE HAD SEEN.

2. GUTMANN SAID HE COULD NOT PREDICT HOW MITTERRAND WOULD RESPOND AND DID NOT EXPECT TO HEAR ANYTHING BEFORE TUESDAY AS MITTERRAND WOULD BE INACCESSIBLE OVER THE LONG HOLIDAY WEEKEND.

3. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTIONS GUTMANN SAID THAT HE HAD REPORTED HIS CONVERSATION WITH ME TO CHEYSSON WHO HAD DECIDED THAT FRANCE 'WOULD PERSIST IN ITS POSITION'. ACCORDING TO GUTMANN THIS MEANT THAT WHILE FRANCE HAD BEEN A FAITHFUL ALLY DURING THE CONFLICT IT NOW HELD THAT THE ONLY WAY FORWARD WAS BY NEGOTIATIONS. I REMINDED HIM OF THE VERY STRONG CASE WE HAD PUT AGAINST VOTING FOR THE ARGENTINE RESOLUTION AND OF THE FACT THAT THE VOTE WAS DUE ON THE DAY OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S ARRIVAL FOR THE BILATERAL SUMMIT. HE REPLIED THAT THE FRENCH HAD WEIGHED WHAT I HAD SAID ABOUT THE IMPACT ON BRITISH OPINION AND DID NOT UNDERESTIMATE ITS IMPORTANCE BUT BELIEVED NEVERTHELESS THAT THEIR DECISION WAS THE RIGHT ONE. HE COULD NOT HOWEVER PREJUDGE IN ANY WAY WHAT THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION WOULD BE, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE COINCIDENCE OF THE VOTE WITH THE SUMMIT.

4. WHEN FIRST SECRETARY (CHANCERY) SPOKE THIS MORNING TO THE DEPUTY DIPLOMATIC ADVISER AT THE ELYSEE, GAILLARD SAID ON A PERSONAL BASIS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE CAUSED MITTERRAND TO WAVER IN HIS INCLINATION TO AUTHORISE A FRENCH VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE ARGENTINE RESOLUTION. MITTERRAND HAD NOT ACTUALLY SEEN THE MESSAGE BUT HAD BEEN TOLD OF ITS CONTENTS. GAILLARD EXPECTED ME TO BE TOLD UNOFFICIALLY WHAT MITTERRAND'S CONSIDERED REACTION WAS ON TUESDAY, 2 NOVEMBER.

FRETWELL.

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FAKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 653 OF 30/10/82

AND TO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, BONN AND PARIS.

OUR TEL NO 645: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

1. MINISTER CALLED ON KADOTA, DIRECTOR- GENERAL OF THE UN BUREAU, ON 29 OCTOBER, TO FOLLOW-UP YOUR MESSAGE TO MR SAKURAUCHI, WHICH I DELIVERED ON 27 OCTOBER.
2. WHITEHEAD DREW ON GUIDANCE TEL 204 AND EMPHASIZED THAT THE JAPANESE POSITION ON THIS RESOLUTION WOULD BE SEEN BY US AS A TEST OF THE IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACHED TO GOOD FUTURE RELATIONS WITH THE U K.
3. KADOTA GAVE AWAY NO MORE ON THE JAPANESE ATTITUDE THAN AT THE PREVIOUS MEETING (OUT TELNO 613). BUT HE CONTINUED TO EXPRESS INTEREST IN EUROPEAN VIEWS. HE SPECIFICALLY SUGGESTED THAT THE FRENCH HAD DECIDED TO SUPPORT THE RESOLUTION. WHITEHEAD REPLIED THAT WE EXPECTED MOST IF NOT ALL OF THE E C TO ABSTAIN AND ONE OR TWO TO VOTE AGAINST.
4. COMMENT: WE HAVE LOBBIED A NUMBER OF OTHER SENIOR M F A OFFICIALS IN RECENT DAYS AND THE JAPANESE CAN BE IN NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR POSITION OR THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THEIR VOTE. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THERE IS A REASONABLE CHANCE OF THEIR ABSTAINING. BUT THEIR POSITION IS LIKELY TO BE BASED MORE ON A CALCULATION OF HOW OTHERS WILL VOTE THAN ON AN APPRECIATION OF THE PRINCIPLES INVOLVED. THIS MEANS THEIR RESOLVE MIGHT CRUMBLE IF IT APPEARED THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THE AMERICANS, GERMANS AND FRENCH, MIGHT SUPPORT THE RESOLUTION. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE HELPFUL IF WE COULD BE KEPT CLOSELY INFORMED OF EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN ATTITUDES IN THE RUN-UP TO THE VOTE. IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL (A POINT KADOTA HIMSELF STRESSED) IF WE COULD KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE JAPANESE DELEGATION IN NEW YORK.
CORTAZZI

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELNO 3501 OF 29 OCTOBER 1982,
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 1881: FALKLANDS UN RESOLUTION.

I WENT OVER THE GROUND BRIEFLY WITH EAGLEBURGER THIS EVENING.
HE SAID THAT NO CONCLUSIONS HAD YET BEEN REACHED ABOUT HOW THE
AMERICANS SHOULD PROCEED. THEY HAD OUR CONCERNS VERY MUCH IN
MIND AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD
BEEN TIMELY IN REINFORCING THEM. EAGLEBURGER DID NOT CONCEAL
THAT THE AMERICANS FELT THEY WERE IN A DIFFICULT DILEMMA.
HE UNDERTOOK TO BE IN TOUCH AGAIN AS SOON AS THEY GOT ANY FURTHER
IN THEIR THINKING.

WRIGHT

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PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
LORD N G LENNOX
~~MR EVANS~~
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

HD/PUSD (2)
HD/S AM D
HD/FID (2)
HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/ERD
HD/ECD(E)
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
PS/CHANCELLOR)
MR ILETT) TREASURY
MR LITTLER)
~~MISS DICKSON~~ D/ENERGY
SIR R ARMSTRONG)
A D S GOODALL) CABINET OFFICE
DIO)

ROOM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET
MR M. PATTISON ; FID
MR ~~C. P.~~ D. LAWLESS ; ODA

MR A TITCHENER ; DOT
MR C W ROBERTS , IAT)

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ADVANCE COPY

FROM PORT STANLEY 291200Z OCT

IMMEDIATE

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 439 OF 29 OCTOBER

YOUR TELNO 234: SHACKLETON REPORT

1. ALL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILLORS EXCEPT FOR PECK, WHO IS STILL ABSENT FROM THE ISLANDS, CONSIDERED THE SHACKLETON RECOMMENDATIONS IN DETAIL FOR THREE HOURS ON 24 OCTOBER AND ALL EXCEPT LUXTON AND PECK DISCUSSED THEM WITH NEEDHAM, CHAIRMAN OF COALITE, FOR TWO HOURS ON 26 OCTOBER. ELECTED COUNCILLORS WERE CONFIDENT THAT THEY REFLECTED ACCURATELY THE VIEWS OF THE MAJORITY OF THEIR CONSTITUENTS.

OF THEIR CONSTITUENTS.

2. THEY REASSURED NEEDHAM THAT THEY HAD NO INTENTION AT PRESENT

OF PRESSING FOR LEGISLATION TO OBTAIN COMPULSORY POWERS TO

PURCHASE ABSENTEE-OWNED FARMS. THEY WERE CONTENT TO ALLOW A FREE

ECONOMY TO OBTAIN AND TO WAIT AND SEE WHAT ABSENTEE OWNERS INTENDED

TO DO. NEEDHAM FOR HIS PART REASSURED COUNCILLORS THAT HE HAD THE

BEST INTERESTS OF FALKLAND ISLANDERS AT HEART AND WAS AS KEEN AS

THEY WERE TO INVEST IN THE ISLANDS AND REVERSE THE DRAIN IN

POPULATION. HE OUTLINED HIS IDEAS FOR OFFERING SMALL HOLDINGS

OF 50 TO 100 ACRES ALONG THE DARWIN ROAD TO ISLANDERS AND SUITABLE

APPLICANTS FROM THE UK, AND SAID THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO SELL, LEASE

OR SHARE-FARM OTHER PARTS IF FICO FARMS IF THE COMMERCIAL TERMS

WERE SATISFACTORY (NO MORE GIVE-AWAYS LIKE GREEN PATCH). HE HAD

HOWEVER SUSPENDED PLANS FOR EXPANDING HIS SHARE-FARMING SCHEME

PENDING HMG'S DECISIONS ON SHACKLETON. HE WAS QUITE PREPARED TO

SEE FICO'S SHARE OF THE SHEEP-FARMING INDUSTRY REDUCED FROM 43 PER

CENT TO 33 PER CENT OR EVEN 23 PER CENT, SIMILARLY FICO'S OTHER

ACTIVITIES IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS COULD BE REDUCED. BUT THIS HAD

TO BE DONE COMMERCIALY AND NOT BY PRESSURE FROM GOVERNMENT.

HE STRESSED THAT HE WAS SPEAKING OFF THE RECORD AND EXPECTED THE

CONFIDENTIALITY OF HIS REMARKS TO BE RESPECTED.

3. COUNCILLORS TOOK HIM AT HIS WORD AND WERE PREPARED TO SEE HOW

FICO WOULD PERFORM IN THE FUTURE (I SUSPECT THAT PECK, HAD HE BEEN

FICO WOULD PERFORM IN THE FUTURE (I SUSPECT THAT PECK, HAD HE BEEN PRESENT, WOULD NOT HAVE AGREED AND WOULD HAVE PRESSED FOR OUTRIGHT NATIONALISATION).

4. THERE WAS A FEELING AMONG COUNCILLORS THAT FIG HAD ALREADY BITTEN OFF AS MUCH AS THEY COULD CHEW WITH GREEN PATCH, ROY COVE AND NOW FOX BAY EAST (SEE MY TELNO 434). THE MAIN OBJECTIVE WAS TO ENSURE THAT ALL FARM OWNERS (NOT ONLY ABSENTEE OWNERS) WERE SEEN TO BE MAKING A CONSCIOUS EFFORT TO REINVEST AND TO PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES TO GIVE PEOPLE A STAKE IN THE LAND. THEY CONSIDERED THAT FIG SHOULD BE GIVEN ADEQUATE FUNDS TO BE ABLE TO BUY ANY FARM THAT CAME ONTO THE MARKET AND IF IN TIME IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE DEMAND FOR LAND EXCEEDED THE LAND COMING ONTO THE MARKET, THEN CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO PASSING THE LEGISLATION NECESSARY TO ACQUIRE IT.

5. I SHOULD ADD THAT THE GENERAL MANAGER OF FICO IN THE FALKLANDS, BROOK HARDCASTLE, IS STRONGLY OF THE OPINION THAT FIG SHOULD BUY OUT THE FICO IMMEDIATELY AND RUN ALL THEIR ACTIVITIES. HE CONSIDERS THAT ALL FICO STAFF IN THE ISLANDS WOULD WELCOME THIS AND THAT IT IS THE ONLY WAY TO ENSURE THAT THE PROFITS ARE CHANNELLED BACK INTO THE ISLANDS.

6. AS FOR SHACKLETON'S OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS, COUNCILLORS HAMMERED OUT THE FOLLOWING LIST OF PRIORITIES:

INFRASTRUCTURE

INFRASTRUCTURE

- (A) A RUNWAY CAPABLE OF TAKING MEDIUM-HAUL AIRLINERS IMMEDIATELY AND WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR IMPROVEMENT AND EXTENSION TO TAKE WIDE-BODIED JETS.
- (B) AN EXTERNAL CIVIL AIRLINE (COUNCILLORS FAVOURED MONTEVIDEO OR SOUTHERN BRAZIL RATHER THAN PUNTA ARENAS, FROM WHICH THE COST OF ONWARD TRAVEL TO EUROPE WOULD BE MUCH MORE EXPENSIVE).
- (C) A NEW SCHOOL HOSTEL (NOT COVERED BY SHACKLETON BUT VITALLY NECESSARY IF SECONDARY EDUCATION FOR CAMP CHILDREN WAS TO BE RESUMED).
- (D) A DEEP WATER JETTY FOR STANLEY.
- (E) EXPANSION OF THE ROAD NETWORK WITH A FERRY ACROSS FALKLAND SOUND.
- (F) INVESTIGATION OF OTHER ARRANGEMENTS FOR AN EXTERNAL SHIPPING SERVICE (THIS WOULD COME HIGHER ON THE LIST IF NO EXTERNAL CIVIL AIRLINE COULD BE ESTABLISHED).
- (G) ENERGY SUPPLIES.
- (H) A NEW HOSPITAL (NOT IN SHACKLETON).
- (I) A NEW SCHOOL (NOT IN SHACKLETON).

DEVELOPMENT

- (A) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FALKLAND ISLANDS DEVELOPMENT AGENCY (FIDA) WITH ADEQUATE FINANCE.

- AGENCY (FIDA) WITH ADEQUATE FINANCE.
- (B) THE EXPANSION OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT, GRASSLANDS TRIALS UNIT AND THE INTRODUCTION OF FARM IMPROVEMENT SUBSIDIES.
- (C) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A 200 MILE FISHERIES LIMIT AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WITH AN EXPLORATORY FISHING PROJECT.
- (D) A FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR A SALMON RANCHING PROJECT.
- (E) A SURVEY OF A SHELL-FISH FISHERIES AROUND THE COASTS.
- (F) THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DISTINCTIVE FALKLAND ISLANDS KNITWEAR INDUSTRY.
- (G) THE DEVELOPMENT OF A WILDLIFE TOURIST VENTURE.
- K(H) THE BUILDING OF A NEW HOTEL IN STANLEY (SUBJECT TO THE BUILDING OF A RUNWAY TO TAKE WIDE-BODIED JETS).
- (I) ESTABLISHMENT OF A 200-MILE FISHERIES LIMIT AROUND SOUTH GEORGIA, THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS AND SHAG ROCKS, AND INVESTIGATION INTO KRILL FISHERIES.
- (J) A GEOPHYSICAL SURVEY AND EXPLORATION DRILLING FOR HYDROCARBONS IN THE OFFSHORE AREAS AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE

- (A) THE APPOINTMENT OF AN OFFICIAL TO RUN FIDA (WHO SHOULD HOWEVER BE RESPONSIBLE TO THE HEAD OF THE ADMINISTRATION IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS GOVERNMENT).

IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS GOVERNMENT).

(B) THE APPOINTMENT OF A FARM MANAGEMENT OFFICER.

(C) THE RETENTION OF A PHYSICAL PLANNER.

(D) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE.

(E) THE ESTABLISHMENT IN THE UK OF A FALKLAND ISLANDS
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AGENCY.

(F) RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMUNITY COUNCILS
AND THE RESTORATION OF STANLEY TOWN COUNCIL IN THE LIGHT OF
THE INVESTIGATION CURRENTLY BEING UNDERTAKEN BY A SELECT
COMMITTEE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL INTO THE CONSTITUTION AND
COMPOSITION OF EXCO AND LEGCO.

7. COUNCILLORS WERE MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN SHACKLETON ON THE
POSSIBILITIES FOR EXPORTING MUTTON AND DEVELOPING KELP AND
SUGGESTED THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIORITIES MIGHT BE ALTERED
IN THE LIGHT OF SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE DEVELOPMENT
OFFICER, ONCE HE HAD ESTABLISHED HIMSELF HERE.

8. THEY RECOGNISED THE NEED FOR NEW BLOOD AND URGED THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A FALKLAND ISLANDS GOVERNMENT OFFICE IN LONDON
AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO PROCESS AND SELECT PROSPECTIVE SETTLERS
WHILE INTEREST IN THE FALKLANDS WAS STILL STRONG. THEY ALSO URGED
THE ALLOCATION OF FUNDS FOR ASSISTED PASSAGES.

HUNT

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

I have seen the content of the speech & it looks all right

29 October 1982

Paul Munster:

Attached is the draft as amended by the Foreign Office.

Dear John,

Falklands at the General Assembly

JF

Sir John Thomson has sent us (UKMIS New York telno 1755) the draft of the speech he expects to deliver on 2 November, towards the beginning of the debate.

29/10

We believe it must be primarily for Sir John Thomson to decide what kind of speech would be effective in the tactical situation he faces in New York. The Mission had spoken to a hundred delegations in the last few days and will now have a clear idea of what would help to secure our objective of the maximum number of abstentions and negative votes. There are a number of additional points about Argentina's behaviour that it might be right to make in a different context and before a different audience but we should not press Sir John Thomson to make such points in his opening statement if he judges it inadvisable given the mood of delegations. Sir John Thomson will have other opportunities to speak (in right of reply at the end of each day and in explanation of vote before the vote) when he could make other points as the occasion demands.

There are however a number of points which we think need to be adjusted, particularly in the first half of the draft speech. The most important point is at the end of paragraph 23 where Sir John Thomson should not say that when there has been a change of heart on the part of Argentina 'then it will be appropriate to talk about negotiations.' We propose that he should say that there will then be 'hope that this dispute can be put behind us.' Some of the other amendments we propose are designed to remove any suggestion that our perception of the principles at stake was different before the crisis or that emotion and 'political realities' account for our position on negotiations. We have also filled out the historical material in paragraph 12 dealing with the period before 1833. Sir J Thomson will have discretion to use this if, as expected, the Argentine statement goes into detail on these points.

what does that mean? We are not going to negotiate about sovereignty at all - unless the people of the Falklands want to

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/ I enclose our revised version of the speech. We shall be sending Sir J Thomson's instructions by Monday evening, 1 November. If the Prime Minister has any comments it would be helpful to receive them as soon as possible on Monday. Mr Pym is also looking at the speech over the weekend.

*Yours ever
for Holmes*

(J E Holmes)

Private Secretary

Mr A J Coles
10 Downing Street

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FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. Draft Speech for delivery by Sir J Thomson on 2 November.

Mr President

1. This is the first time on which I have had the honour to speak from this rostrum. It is a privilege to address what may be called the Parliament of the World. If it is to develop as the founding fathers hoped and if it is to avoid the pitfalls to which the Secretary-General has recently drawn attention this Assembly will wish to proceed on the basis of a common respect for the principles of the UN Charter. We are all by virtue of our membership of the UN dedicated to upholding international law and to maintaining decent standards of behaviour in inter-state relations. I am proud to re-iterate my Government's commitment to these principles and to state that we take our obligations seriously.

2. I am sad however that the occasion of this first speech should be in the context of a quarrel. May I

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say it is not a quarrel of our choosing? The whole Assembly knows the events of last April, to which I refer. I will not rehearse them. Instead I would rather dwell on the long ties of friendship and mutual interest which have existed between Britain and Argentina, and indeed more widely between Britain and Latin America.

3. Numerous memorials and statues all over Latin America eloquently bear witness to the fact that Britain played an important role in the liberation of Latin America in support of just that principle of self-determination which is at issue here today. There are few if any countries in Latin America with which Britain has older or closer links than with Argentina.

4. Mr President, Britain is proud of her relationship with the countries of Latin America and places a high value on their unique contribution to our common civilization.

5. Hence, our sense of sadness to find ourselves unwillingly in a state of confrontation with the present Government of Argentina and I emphasise that it is not with the people of Argentina, let alone the people of Latin America, but with the regime in Argentina.

6. In April a military confrontation was forced upon us by this regime in despite of a mandatory resolution of the Security Council calling for an immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces. Now an unnecessary political confrontation has been forced upon us. We will no more run away from the one than from the other.

7. We considered carefully whether this political confrontation could be avoided. However we concluded that it could not. Everyone knows that it is seven months to the day since Argentina invaded the Falklands against the resistance of a tiny but valiant garrison. Everyone knows that the life of the Islanders was totally and brutally disrupted. It will take time to restore the damage both materially and psychologically. Everyone knows of the depth of feeling that was aroused in Britain and the determination not to allow aggression to be rewarded. Many women saw their sons and husbands leaving their homes abruptly to fight a war they did not seek in very difficult and dangerous conditions. They fought in defence of noble principles which are not to be brushed aside as being of no account. Everyone knows that there were grave casualties and that the dead are still being mourned. Lives are still in peril from the mines so indiscriminately scattered by the Argentine occupying forces.

8. It is not surprising Mr President that in these circumstances the people of my country and the people of the Falkland Islands should feel very strongly. It is evident that emotion in Argentina likewise is running high. In these circumstances, so soon after the Argentine invasion, it is unrealistic to expect that a resolution could be devised which could be accepted by my country and by Argentina.

9. Since we did not seek this political confrontation our next thought was whether we could reduce its effect. It seemed to us that the requirements and emotions of all parties might be satisfied by making their positions clear to this General Assembly. We took soundings to see whether there was any possibility that we could have a debate without a resolution and a vote. The answer was no. We were told that such a possibility did not realistically exist. We were told that Argentina would not accept it. Subsequently we heard that Argentina had launched a major campaign against us in the capitals of most of the countries represented here.

10. However, we did not oppose the proposal that this year the Falklands item should be considered in the General Assembly instead of the Fourth Committee as has been the practice in the past. We felt that a

matter which involves such fundamental principles, the decent conduct of international affairs and the rights of people should be given the serious attention it deserves in what I have called the Parliament of the World.

11. We believe with total conviction that we are standing for principles and codes of behaviour that matter to all of us. I will come to this in a moment, Mr President, but first I am obliged to deal with some of the misconceptions about the history of the dispute which have been put around.

12. I note that the Argentine Foreign Minister set special store by the question of who first landed there and who first settled on the Islands. Of course, these matters may have some relevance for the question of abstract sovereignty. Whoever first sighted the Islands, there is no doubt that the first landing was British, and the first attempt at settlement was made by a Frenchman - in 1764, followed closely by Britain in 1765. The Foreign Minister had his facts wrong. But of far greater significance for consideration of the Falkland Islands by the General Assembly now, in 1982, are other facts: the fact that a permanent settlement was eventually established in the Islands only in 1833 and the fact that that settlement has continued ever

since to the present day. These 149 years of continuous, peaceful settlement have led to a vigorous, firmly rooted community, stretching back to six generations, of people who know the Islands as their only home. Though it is a small community it has its own distinct culture. It has its own educational, social and political institutions. This afternoon two democratically elected Members of the Falkland Islands Legislative Council will be testifying on behalf of the Falklanders to the Fourth Committee. These facts have profound consequences, which I shall come to in a moment. Before I do, I must pause for a moment, in order to nail, once and for all, four persistent myths which have been a perennial feature of Argentine propaganda.

First: that Argentina inherited title from the Spanish empire. The Islands were abandoned by Spain in 1811, five years before Argentina's declaration of independence. After that and until 1820 the Islands were mostly deserted apart from occasional visits by whalers and sealers of various nationalities.

Second: that Argentina settled the Falklands after 1820. In the years following 1820 various colonising ventures from Buenos Ayres were planned but these were essentially private in nature and were never effectively carried out. In 1829 the Buenos

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Ayres Government issued a decree purporting to appoint a Governor of the Islands. This evoked a firm British protest which was repeated in 1832. Vernet's activities in the Islands from 1829 onwards were again of an essentially private nature and enjoyed no more than the paper backing of the Buenos Ayres Government. He received no salary as 'Governor' and the Islands paid no taxes. Vernet's authority in the Islands was not recognised by any other powers as is evidenced by the dispersal of his venture in 1831 by the Captain of the United States vessel the Lexington. It will be apparent that the Falkland Islands were never in any sense part of the territory of Argentina.

Third: that there was a settled Argentine population in the Islands in 1833. The Islands were practically devoid of settlement when Captain Onslow arrived at East Falkland in January 1833. The small military garrison had mutinied and murdered their commander. Of the few other people of Buenos Ayrean or other origin around Port Louis the majority asked to be repatriated to Buenos Ayres. Only eighteen could be persuaded to stay behind. When HMS Challenger arrived at Port Louis in January 1834 the township was deserted: there were no Argentine settlers of any description.

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Fourth: there is the perennial myth of the British "act of force" in 1833. As is already implicit~~ed~~ in what I have just said, there was no act of force. British reoccupation of the Islands in 1833 and 1834 was effected without a shot being fired.

13. I have only gone into the history in order to give some of the factual reasons why some of the misleading assertions put around should not be taken at face value.

14. I now turn to the real subject of this unfortunate dispute and to the resolution which has been put forward by several sponsors with Argentina at their head. We find this resolution objectionable both for what it says and, if anything, still more for what it does not say.

15. First of all let me list some, though in the interests of brevity not all of our objections to the draft resolution. Many distinguished delegates will have read a well known book entitled "How to win friends and influence people". One thing that is clear is that the way to win friends in the Falklands

and to influence people in the UK is not by insulting or threatening them. The second preambular paragraph of the resolution does both these things with its reference to colonial situations being incompatible with universal peace. Is this a suggestion that the peace is going to be broken again by the same people who undertook the invasion earlier this year? Is this a sensible prelude to seeking negotiations? It is true that the resolution talks about finding a "peaceful solution" but this is the very same phrase that has been used in previous resolutions and in other communications to which the Argentine Government has put its name and look what happened. Then is it sensible, if you want genuine negotiations, to drag in references to documents to which it is well known my Government has taken exception. Is the purpose not to prejudge negotiations before they start?

16. The word negotiations is important in international problems. In very many cases it is the right way to deal with differences. But all good words can be subverted. There is a proverb in my country that even the devil can quote scripture. Let us look at the meaning of this word in the particular context of the Falklands dispute.

17. Unfortunately in this context the word

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negotiations has a loaded meaning. Successive Argentine Governments have made it abundantly plain diplomatically and have rammed home the point to their own public opinion that negotiations are only to achieve one result, namely the transfer of the administration of the Islands from Britain to Argentina. They have stressed that for them negotiations mean discussions about the date on which they will acquire control of the Islands. They do not admit that negotiations can have any other outcome.

18. That is a peculiar and loaded definition of negotiations, a point which the draft resolution underlines by referring to "the sovereignty dispute". For the rest of us, negotiation means a process in which the result is not predetermined and in which many outcomes are possible.

19. We reject the idea that negotiations can have only one outcome. There is so much more in dispute than just the question of sovereignty over land. We have no doubt about the validity of our case on sovereignty. But we are more concerned - and, Mr President, I believe most of this Assembly is too - about the wishes of the people, the inhabitants of the land. Surely the people have a right to determine their own fate.

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20. Some persons suggest that negotiations could be resumed where they were broken off last April. That shows remarkable insensitivity to human emotions. By what right does anyone ask mothers and widows to forget their sons and husbands? The wounded are still in hospital. At this very time some of the dead are being re-buried. What are we to make of people who said their purposes were peaceful and then seized territory and people by force? How can anyone, let alone the Falklanders, have confidence in the good faith of these people. Even now, they refuse to renounce the use of force.

21. Things cannot go back to where they were when the Argentines broke off negotiations and invaded the Islands. They have only themselves to blame for this. After the invasion, they again rejected the path of negotiation and they chose the path of violence. It is naive to suppose that the illegal use of force has no effect. Once bitten, twice shy. It would be contrary to human nature to try to force the Falklanders or my Government on their behalf to act as if no invasion had occurred.

22. What happened last April brought out the real nature of the problem. Delegations will now understand that we are not faced with a small dispute

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in a distant place which can be wished away by some clever drafting. It is clear that fundamental principles are at stake. I have found that, whatever positions various groups may have adopted in the past, there is growing recognition here of the importance and relevance of these fundamental principles to the Falklands problem. Delegations at the United Nations increasingly recognise that when a solution to the dispute is reached it will have to be firmly based on those principles.

23. And on these fundamental principles, Mr President, there can be no compromising, no redrafting and no negotiating to make them mean something else. We stand by the Charter principles and reject the negotiations - loaded negotiations - for which some people call, what is needed is a basic change of attitude, perhaps one should call it a change of heart, on the part of the Argentine Government. When we see that this has happened, then there will be hope that this dispute can be put behind us.

24. These are some of the reasons why my Government opposes the resolution that has been tabled. But that is not all. It is, even more what the draft resolution omits than what it includes that is objectionable. There is no question of tinkering

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with the language to mend the defects of the resolution, some of which I have just described. We would need not only to take things out of the resolution. We would also need to put a lot into it. When one thinks about what would have to go into the resolution it is clear that the dispute is by no means restricted to sovereignty. It covers fundamental points of principle. On such matters it is not useful to paper over cracks in order to create a bogus consensus.

25. The draft resolution carefully omits the people. It is the inhabitants of the Falklands whose future and whose children's future is at stake. They are not slaves to be transferred at the stroke of a pen, to be bought or sold by bribes, to have their aspirations and wishes brushed aside without even a chance of expressing them.

26. If anyone thinks that these are harsh words let them reflect on the reality of the situation. Whenever I have put it to any of my colleagues here that the Falkland Islanders should not be compelled against their will to become citizens of another country and moreover of a country which as already ill-treated them I have never found anyone to dispute it.

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27. Mr President, the people of the Falklands are entitled like other people to the protection of the Charter, to the good will of the world community and to rely upon the obligations which my Government has undertaken and which the Falklanders have in the free exercise of their democratic rights asked us to maintain. The purpose and principles of the Charter are clear. I am thinking for example of the principles of the non-use of force and of self-determination. They apply to the Falklanders as to other peoples. In fact, they apply more closely to the Falklanders than to most of the rest of us.

28. The reason is that the Falklands Islands is a territory covered by Article 73 of the Charter. There can be no dispute about this. Since General Assembly Resolution 66(1), passed at the first session of this Assembly, my Government has reported annually to the Secretary-General in accordance with Article 73E. The Secretary-General has year after year accepted these reports. They have been published, they have been the subject of debates, references to them have appeared in a huge number of official UN documents including some in the last few weeks. Thus indubitably the Falklands are an Article 73 territory.

29. Under Article 73 we have accepted the

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obligation to "recognise the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount". They are of course the best judges of their own interests. But under the Article my Government is enjoined to accept as a "sacred trust" the obligation "to promote to the utmost within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well being of the inhabitants of these territories". The Article continues that to this end we "must ensure with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, educational advancement, their just treatment and their protection against abuses." (The Falklanders have indeed suffered abuses recently).

30. Furthermore Article 73 lays on my Government the obligation to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions". In doing all this we are obliged inter alia to have regard to the particular circumstances of the territory, and the character of the people. When the shocks of recent events have faded and normal conditions are restored, the Falklanders will want to give careful thought to their constitutional and political future. If the Falklanders wish to strengthen their own political

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institutions, we will encourage and assist them in this, but nothing can or will be imposed on them.

31. Article 73 confers rights on the Falklanders and lays obligations on my Government. We intend to go on fulfilling these obligations and we are entitled to the support of the international community in so doing. When we began to report to the Secretary-General on non self-governing territories under Article 73 there were more than 60 of them. The list has now been reduced to about a quarter of that total. Those who are no longer on the list are now independent sovereign states or have chosen some other future. They have benefitted from Article 73 and the exercise of their right of self-determination. There is no reason why the Falklanders should not do so to. Surely neither those countries which have benefitted from Article 73 nor their fellow members of this General Assembly are going to ask us to do so or to deny their rights to those people who remain our responsibility under Article 73? To do so would be applying double standards with a vengeance.

32. As I said at the outset, we would like friendly and good neighbourly relations with Argentina. Article 74 of the UN Charter states that members of the UN agree that their policy in respect of

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non-self-governing territories must be based on the general principle of good neighbourliness, due account being taken on the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic and commercial matters. Consistent with this, we recognise the need for the people of the Islands to construct a stable and harmonious relationship with their neighbours. This is important both for peace in the region and to allow the full development of its economic potential. It is what we have sought over the years. We are more than willing to live at peace with Argentina and get back to a more normal relationship. We have already taken a number of steps to that end. We acted quickly to return all the Argentine prisoners of war following the Argentine surrender. The recent reciprocal lifting of financial measures was another step forward. And we are looking for early progress on the reciprocal lifting of the remaining economic restrictions. So far however there has been a disappointing lack of reciprocation from Argentina.

33. Mr President I do not in any way say that there is no dispute between Britain and Argentina. We are all too conscious of this unfortunate fact. But I do say that it is not only between Britain and Argentina. The most important parties in this dispute are the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands.

It is their livelihood and their future which is at stake. Britain can look after herself but she has an obligation to look after the Falkland Islanders as well. We very much hope that the people of Argentina will recognise this and that in accordance with law and fair play they will extend a helping and friendly hand to the Falklanders not a menacing fist. Is it too much to ask that the dispute involving the Falklands should be resolved in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter?

File

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Argentina



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 October 1982

BF

I attach a copy of a message from the Australian Prime Minister in response to her letter of 29 October seeking Australia's support at the United Nations debate on the Falklands. I assume that no reply is required, but should you consider one necessary, I should be grateful if you could provide a draft.

Timothy Flesher

John Holmes Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

ko



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 October 1982

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of today's date in which you conveyed the text of a letter from the Prime Minister of Australia to Mrs. Thatcher.

I will ensure that this is placed before the Prime Minister on her return from Bonn this evening.

Timothy Flesher

The Hon. Sir Victor Garland, K.B.E.

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AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION • LONDON

Prime Minister

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
The Hon. Sir Victor Garland, KBE

29 October 1982

Excellent
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29/10

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE**
SERIAL No: T 201/82

Joe Boniehurst

A telegram from my Prime Minister asks me to convey to you the following text of a letter, the original of which is en route by diplomatic bag:

se. transcript set
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Begins -

"My dear Margaret,

Thank you for your letter of 26 October asking for Australia's support in the vote on the Argentine Resolution on the Falklands.

My Government has carefully considered your letter. I am pleased to be able to say that Australia continues to support Britain in this matter, and will abstain in the vote on the Argentine Resolution.

We would be happy for you to refer to our position in representations your Government may make to others on this matter.

With all good wishes,

Malcolm Fraser."

Ends.

Se. Casey
[Signature]

R.V. GARLAND

The Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister,
No. 10 Downing Street,
LONDON SW1.

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LOD

28 October 1982

Falkland Islands Government Office

The Prime Minister saw overnight your letter of 26 October in which you explained that the Falkland Islands Executive Council has decided in principle to establish a Falkland Islands Government Office in London and to pay for it themselves. The Prime Minister has commented: "I just do not see how they can afford it. I really think that we should give them a 75% subsidy."

I should be grateful if you could consider this point and, in consultation with the Treasury, supply advice.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the members of OD(FAF) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Argentina
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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

28 October 1982

Dear John,

ARGENTINE WOOL

Thank you for your letter of 25 October about Argentine wool, which I have shown to the Prime Minister.

Yours sincerely,

Robin Butler

John Rhodes Esq.,
Department of Trade.

LW

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 272315Z OCT 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1743 OF 27 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MY TELNO 1717: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. I HAD NINETY MINUTES WITH MRS KIRKPATRICK THIS MORNING (27 OCTOBER) ABOUT HALF OF WHICH AT HER REQUEST WAS DEVOTED TO ARAB/ ISRAEL AND NAMIBIA. ON THIS I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY. SHE LIKED THE CONVERSATION ON NAMIBIA AND THIS PROVIDED A USEFUL BACKGROUND TO THE FALKLANDS.

2. MRS KIRKPATRICK SHOWED NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE AND SO I DID NOT MENTION IT. BUT I MADE CLEAR THE STRENGTH OF BRITISH OPINION FROM THE PRIME MINISTER DOWNWARDS. I SAID THAT AS A RESULT OF THE ARGENTINE ACTIONS EARLIER THIS YEAR THE QUESTION WAS NO LONGER ONLY A DISTANT AND MINOR DISPUTE (AS MANY PEOPLE SAW IT) BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES WHICH OTHERWISE GET ON PRETTY WELL TOGETHER. EVENTS EARLIER THIS YEAR HAD RAISED THE SANCTITY OF FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IN THE UN CHARTER AND DECENT STANDARDS OF BEHAVIOUR IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. SINCE COMING TO NEW YORK I HAD FOUND A MUCH HIGHER LEVEL OF SYMPATHY WITH THE BRITISH POSITION THAN MOST OF OUR FRIENDS SEEMED TO SUPPOSE. FOR EXAMPLE NEARLY EVERYONE THOUGHT THE ARGENTINES WERE WRONG TO PRESS THE MATTER SO SOON AFTER THEIR ILLEGAL AND ABOMINABLE BEHAVIOUR; MANY DELEGATIONS WERE SAYING THERE SHOULD BE A COOLING OFF PERIOD. THERE WAS EQUALLY WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR OUR STAND ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE. THERE WAS ALSO GREAT SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA THAT PEOPLE MATTERED AS MUCH IF NOT MORE THAN LAND AND THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION MUST BE OBSERVED IN THIS AS IN OTHER CASES. MOREOVER THE FALKLANDS WAS INDUBITABLY ARTICLE 73 TERRITORY AND THAT ARTICLE APPLIED IN ITS ENTIRETY. OUR LEGAL CASE LIKE OUR MORAL ONE WAS IMPECCABLE. GIVEN THIS AND OUR CLOSE ALLIANCE THERE WOULD BE GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT IN THE UK IF THE US GOVERNMENT DID NOT VOTE AGAINST THE LATIN RESOLUTION.

3. MRS KIRKPATRICK SAID THAT BECAUSE OF OUR FRANK AND CORDIAL RELATIONS SHE WOULD LIKE TO EXPOSE TO ME HER PERSONAL THINKING ON THE WHOLE SITUATION. SHE WAS ABSOLUTELY FED UP WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WHO HAD BEHAVED NOT ONLY BADLY BUT ALSO STUPIDLY AND WERE EVEN NOW CONDUCTING THEIR CASE POORLY. SHE DID NOT CARE ABOUT THEM. IN ANY CASE THEY WOULD FALL PROBABLY WITHIN A MONTH. WHAT SHE DID CARE ABOUT WAS AMERICAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE REST OF THE LATIN AMERICAN WORLD. WE SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT THAT EVEN THE MOST SENSIBLE AND DEMOCRATICALLY INCLINED GOVERNMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA, EG PERU, VENEZUELA AND BRAZIL, FELT PASSIONATELY THAT THE US MUST VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE LATIN DRAFT. IF THE FALKLANDS WERE AS I HAD

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/SAID

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SAID A SYMBOL OF FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES THEY WERE ALSO A SYMBOL OF THE FUTURE US-LATIN RELATIONSHIP. THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE HAD ALREADY CAUSED A SERIOUS CHANGE IN THE COMPLEXION OF LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL THINKING. THE WHOLE HEMISPHERE HAD BEEN PUSHED IN THE DIRECTION OF CUBA AND NICARAGUA WHO HAD THUS ACQUIRED AN INFLUENCE THEY WOULD NOT OTHERWISE HAVE ACHIEVED. WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE ENORMOUS PRESSURE WHICH ALL LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES (EVEN CHILE SHE SAID) WERE EXERTING IN WASHINGTON OFTEN AT THE TOP LEVEL. SHE HOPED WE WERE SPEAKING TO SHULTZ (I ASSURED HER THAT OLIVER WRIGHT KEPT CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH HIM). THE LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL TEMPERAMENT HAD A DUAL ASPECT: ON THE ONE HAND THERE WAS A STRONG ANTI-YANKEE STRAIN WHILE ON THE OTHER THERE WAS ADMIRATION FOR MACHISMO. THE LATIN AMERICAN BUREAU (WHO WERE RUNNING THE OPERATION IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT) WERE PARTICULARLY INFLUENCED BY THE FORMER. SHE HERSELF HALF THOUGHT (AND BY THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION DECLARED HERSELF TO BE MORE OR LESS CONVINCED) THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE AS MUCH RESPECTED IN LATIN AMERICA FOR BARING ITS BREAST AND STANDING UP FOR ITS PRINCIPLES. HOWEVER IT WAS ALL VERY DIFFICULT AND PARTLY BECAUSE OF HER PERSONAL EMOTIONAL INVOLVEMENT SHE HAD ABSTAINED FROM ANY ACTION ON THE FALKLANDS QUESTION SINCE SHE HAD TOLD SHULTZ AND EAGLEBURGER SOME WEEKS AGO THAT THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT AS IT STOOD WAS IN HER OPINION UNACCEPTABLE. SHE HAD SAID NOTHING ABOUT THE QUESTION TO THE WHITE HOUSE. SHE WAS HESITATING WHETHER TO JOIN IN THE DISCUSSION NOW TAKING PLACE IN WASHINGTON OR WHETHER TO LET THE 'WAVES WASH OVER HER' AND ALLOW WASHINGTON TO RUN THE AFFAIR.

4. WITHOUT REFERRING EXPLICITLY TO THE ENDERS/ARGENTINE EXCHANGES DESCRIBED IN WASHINGTON TELNO 3463 MRS KIRKPATRICK SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH THE LATIN RESOLUTION WAS UNACCEPTABLE AS IT STOOD, SOME RELATIVELY MINOR CHANGES COULD MAKE IT ACCEPTABLE. SHE MUST TAKE ISSUE WITH MY COMMENT THAT IT WOULD BE VERY SURPRISING IF THE AMERICANS VOTED FOR IT: IT WOULD NOT TAKE MUCH FOR THIS TO HAPPEN AND SHE BY NO MEANS EXCLUDED A YES VOTE. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF A NO VOTE. IN ANSWER TO MY COMMENTS SHE ACCEPTED THAT OUR POSITION WAS LEGALLY IMPECCABLE: BETTER, SHE SAID, THAN OUR POLITICAL ONE. SHE ALSO ACCEPTED THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER IF THE ARGENTINES HAD REFRAINED FROM PRESSING A RESOLUTION BUT THERE WAS NO HOPE OF THIS. SHE FURTHER ACCEPTED THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF NON-USE OF FORCE AND SELF-DETERMINATION WERE RELEVANT BUT SHE COULD NOT AFFORD TO ADMIT (BEARING PALESTINE AND OTHER PROBLEMS IN MIND) THAT SELF-DETERMINATION NECESSARILY MEANT SELF-GOVERNMENT. SHE AGREED THAT ARTICLE 73 APPLIED. NEVERTHELESS IF THE ARGENTINES WOULD DROP ANY REFERENCE TO A TIME LIMIT AND TO LANGUAGE WHICH WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WHO COULD OPPOSE NEGOTIATIONS? IF THE RESOLUTION WAS AMENDED ACCORDINGLY THE US WOULD HAVE TO VOTE FOR IT.

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5. I SAID THAT ALTHOUGH WE DID INDEED HAVE A PROBLEM ABOUT THE WORD NEGOTIATIONS THE BIGGEST PROBLEM FOR US WAS THE ATTITUDE OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES NOTABLY THE US AND THE TEN. MRS KIRKPATRICK SAID THERE WAS NO CHANCE THAT THE NINE WOULD AGREE ON A COMMON ABSTENTION. FOR EXAMPLE IT WAS CERTAIN THAT FRANCE WOULD VOTE FOR THE RESOLUTION AND GREECE TOO. I CORRECTED HER ON THE LATTER AND CAUTIONED HER ON THE FORMER. SHE SAID THAT IT HAD OCCURRED TO HER TO WONDER WHETHER THE UNITED STATES MIGHT NOT WORK FOR A TEXT WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE US AND THE NINE ALTHOUGH WE MIGHT HAVE TO ABSTAIN ON IT. I SAID THAT I ASSUMED SHE MEANT A TEXT WHICH WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ARGENTINES. SHE SAID ON THE CONTRARY SHE MEANT ONE ACCEPTABLE TO THEM. I TOLD HER THIS WOULD IN NO WAY BE A HELPFUL ACTION AND I MUST ASK HER TO DESIST FROM IT. SHE AGREED NOT TO PURSUE THIS COURSE.

6. I ASKED HOW THE US WOULD SPEAK IF THEY DECIDED TO ABSTAIN. SHE HAD NOT DISCUSSED IT WITH WASHINGTON AND REALLY DID NOT KNOW. BUT AT THE MOMENT HER INCLINATION WAS TO BE ABSENT HERSELF FROM THE DEBATE. WE THEN DISCUSSED THE SORT OF SPEECH WHICH THE US DELEGATION MIGHT MAKE. SHE EVENTUALLY AGREED THAT IT SHOULD SUPPORT NON-USE OF FORCE, SELF-DETERMINATION AND ARTICLE 73. BUT IN MY VIEW IT WOULD NOT BE SAFE TO DEPEND ON THIS OFF THE CUFF DECISION AND WE SHALL HAVE TO WORK HERE AND IN WASHINGTON TO MAKE IT STICK. A GOOD SPEECH IN THE DEBATE OR AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE BEFORE THE VOTE COULD BE INFLUENTIAL WITH A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS. MRS KIRKPATRICK HAS ALMOST GOT TO THE POINT OF WASHING HER HANDS OF THE WHOLE PROBLEM. SHE MIGHT NOT OBJECT TO A CLEAR INSTRUCTION FOR HER DELEGATION TO DELIVER A SPEECH WHICH WOULD HELP US. BUT THIS OF COURSE WOULD HAVE TO BE WRITTEN BY SOMEONE OTHER THAN ENDERS AND THE LATIN AMERICAN BUREAU.

THOMSON

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 3463 OF 27 OCTOBER 1982,
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

CRABBIE'S TELELETTER OF 25 OCTOBER TO FEARN: US/FALKLANDS

1. FOLLOWING OUR CONVERSATION YESTERDAY WITH SMITH (STATE DEPT DIRECTOR FOR ARGENTINA AND CHILE), ENDERS SUMMONED THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON TO EXPLAIN CURRENT US THINKING ON THE DRAFT UNGA RESOLUTION. WE HAVE NOW BEEN SHOWN IN STRICT CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) THE RECORD OF THAT MEETING.

2. ENDERS HANDED THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR A DETAILED PAPER SETTING OUT THE US POSITION. THE POINTS CONTAINED IN THE PAPER WERE:
 - A. THE US WAS NEUTRAL ON THE QUESTION OF WHO HAD SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS:
 - B. THE US HAD SUPPORTED INSCRIPTION OF THE FALKLANDS ITEM ON THE UNGA AGENDA:
 - C. THE US COULD (REPEAT COULD) SUPPORT A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR NEGOTIATIONS PROVIDED THAT THE RESOLUTION DID NOT (NOT) PREJUDGE SOVEREIGNTY AND THAT IT DID NOT (NOT) IMPOSE AN UNREALISTIC TIMETABLE FOR SUCH NEGOTIATIONS:
 - D. THE US NOTED THE '' CONSTRUCTIVE AMENDMENTS'' WHICH THE ARGENTINES HAD ALREADY MADE TO THE RESOLUTION: HOWEVER THESE DID NOT FULLY MEET US CONCERNS:
 - E. THE PRESENT DRAFT WOULD THEREFORE NOT (NOT) ATTRACT US SUPPORT BECAUSE OF (I) ITS PERJORATIVE REFERENCES TO COLONIALISM IN THE PREAMBLE, (II) ITS REFERENCE TO UNGA RESOLUTIONS WHICH HAD THE EFFECT OF PREDETERMINING THE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS, (III) THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF REFERENCES TO NAM RESOLUTIONS WHICH UNJUSTLY DESCRIBED THE SITUATION, AND (IV) UNNECESSARY AND COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE REFERENCE TO ''SOVEREIGNTY'' IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1.
 - F. THE US WOULD BE HAPPY TO REVIEW WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT ANY FURTHER CHANGES IN THE DRAFT IF THAT WAS CONSIDERED HELPFUL BY BOTH PARTIES.

3. IN HANDING OVER THE PAPER, ENDERS SAID THAT THE US COULD SUPPORT ''A SIMPLE CALL TO NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT ALL THE CONTENTIOUS AND UNHELPFUL RHETORIC'' CONTAINED IN THE PRESENT DRAFT. THE US COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT CONDEMN THEIR BRITISH ALLIES AS ''COLONIALISTS''. ENDERS ASKED WHETHER ARGENTINA WANTED THE US TO VOTE FOR A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD ACTIVELY HELP RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OR MERELY EXACERBATE IT: IF THE LATTER, THE US WOULD NOT (NOT) OBLIGE.

4. THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR CLAIMED THAT ARGENTINA HAD ASSEMBLED A CLEAR MAJORITY IN SUPPORT OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION. SPEAKING UNOFFICIALLY, HE ACCEPTED THE AMERICAN POINT ON THE NEED TO AVOID IMPOSING AN UNREALISTIC TIMETABLE FOR NEGOTIATIONS: HE

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/DID

DID NOT BELIEVE THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR SOME TIME TO COME. HOWEVER ON SOVEREIGNTY, HE COULD NOT SEE WHY THE AMERICANS OPPOSED WHAT HAD BECOME STANDARD PART OF THE NORMAL UN LEXICON ON THE SUBJECT. REFERENCE TO UNGA AND NAM RESOLUTIONS WAS, HE THOUGHT, ESSENTIAL FOR ARGENTINA'S POSITION. THERE COULD BE NO RETREAT FROM THIS GIVEN THE EFFORT WHICH THE ARGENTINES HAD MADE OVER MANY YEARS TO BUILD UP A SOLID POSITION IN THE UNITED NATIONS. THE AMBASSADOR THOUGHT THAT THE US REQUIREMENTS WHICH ENDERS HAD EXPLAINED WOULD BE RECEIVED 'LIKE AN ICY SHOWER' IN BUENOS AIRES. HE FORESAW LITTLE POSSIBILITY OF MAJOR CHANGES BEING MADE TO THE EXISTING RESOLUTION TO ATTRACT US SUPPORT, NOTWITHSTANDING THE GREAT IMPORTANCE WHICH ALL MEMBERS OF THE JUNTA IN BUENOS AIRES ATTACHED TO GAINING US SUPPORT.

5. THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WAS SERIOUSLY WORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE UK WOULD INTRODUCE SPOILING AMENDMENTS WHICH PLACED THE DISPUTE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION. HE CONCEDED THAT SUCH AMENDMENTS WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO HANDLE; BUT THEY WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO ARGENTINA SINCE IN CONFERRING THE RIGHT OF SELF DETERMINATION ON THE ISLANDERS, THE RESOLUTION WOULD EFFECTIVELY PREJUDE THE OUTCOME OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS (SIC). HE URGED THE AMERICANS TO OPPOSE BRITISH ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE SUCH AMENDMENTS. ENDERS REFUSED TO COMMIT HIMSELF ONE WAY OR ANOTHER.

6. WE HAVE HEARD FROM A SEPARATE STATE DEPARTMENT SOURCE THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT IS UNDER STRONG PRESSURE FROM THE PEONISTS ACTUALLY TO 'TOUGHEN' ITS RESOLUTION RATHER THAN SOFTEN IT TO ATTRACT WIDER SUPPORT.

7. COMMENT: IN THANKING SMITH FOR THIS FULL AND EARLY ACCOUNT OF ENDERS' MEETING, WE REPEATED THE POINT THAT WE DID NOT (NOT) WELCOME OUR FRIENDS DISCUSSING WITH THE ARGENTINES WAYS OF 'IMPROVING' THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. NEVERTHELESS, WE WERE GLAD TO SEE THAT THE ARGENTINES FOUND GREAT DIFFICULTY IN MEETING THE AMERICAN REQUIREMENTS, AND ALSO THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBLE TACTICS WE MIGHT ADOPT: WE COULD GUARANTEE THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME IN THE DEBATE. WE AGREED TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE STATE DEPT AS THE DEBATE APPROACHED.

WRIGHT

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Argentina 38

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 October 1982

FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Thank you for your letter of 26 October. The Prime Minister does not wish to send a message to Mrs. Gandhi on this subject. Otherwise, she agrees that the proposed messages should be despatched but the words at the foot of the first page of the enclosure from "To support her" to "thinking in Argentina" should be deleted and the following should be substituted: "This would be an outright denial of the principle of self-determination and should not be encouraged in any way."

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JD



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Prime Minister

FCS/82/169

A.S.C. 27/10.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY

Falkland Islands and the Potential for Offshore

Hydrocarbons

Thank you for your letter of 18 October and your thoughts on this aspect of the Falkland Islands' future development.

I agree this is an area which we must keep firmly in mind. Once our immediate response to the Shackleton Report is out of the way, I hope our officials can get together to review the case for a geophysical survey. As you know, one of the main problems in the past has been the difficulty of attracting serious interest by oil companies. It may be that they will continue to want guarantees of long-term political stability before getting involved in exploration themselves.

But we have recently had approaches from two companies (one British) interested in carrying out further seismic survey work in the area and preliminary discussions will be held this week with one of them.

I am copying this letter to colleagues in OD(FAF).

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

27 October 1982

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Prime Minister

The Islanders want to have their own government office in London which they will finance. This seems the best arrangement.

Agree?

Dear John,

A.J.C. 27/10

Falkland Islands Government Office (FIGO)

At the OD(FAF) meeting on 6 September, the sub-committee invited the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to examine the possibility of the functions of the proposed Falkland Islands Government Office being discharged by the FCO and to make revised proposals to that effect.

When the FCO's report on the setting up of a FIGO was submitted in August (my letter to you of 31 August refers), it was not expected that the Falkland Islands Government would be in a position to make more than a token contribution to the annual running costs. Two subsequent developments have changed the situation. Firstly, it emerged that the Islands Executive Council had decided in principle on 25 August to establish a FIGO in London and to appoint an ex-Islander, Mr Adrian Monck, as its head, earmarking two supporting staff at the same time. Secondly, the Chairman of the Falkland Islands Committee in London has informed the Civil Commissioner that due to financial and administrative difficulties, the Falkland Islands Office will be closed down on 13 November.

Following discussions with Mr Onslow during his recent visit to the Islands, the Joint Councils decided on 8 October to meet all the costs involved in setting up and running a FIGO in London. This decision is expected to be confirmed at the next meeting of the ExCo and the necessary funds voted at the next meeting of the Standing Finance Committee.

Any dependent territory may establish its own office in London provided it can pay the costs involved, and, as the report referred to above explained, most have already done so. With the imminent demise of the privately-funded Falkland Islands Office, the early establishment of a FIGO to represent the interests of the Falkland Islands Government and to provide a focal point for those in Britain interested in the Islands has become more pressing. The Civil Commissioner is aware of ministerial concern that a FIGO should not be mis-used by lobbyists and has stressed that the proposed Office will be responsible to the Falkland Islands Government.

In these circumstances we see no point in considering

/further

I just don't see how they can afford it.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 October 1982

I really think we should give them a 75% subsidy

attached

P+28



further how the FCO might discharge the functions of the proposed office. The Islanders are clear that they should have their own office, staffed and paid for by themselves and representing their Government's interests. I think we can only accept their decision.

If Ministers agree in the context of the Shackleton Study that a Falkland Islands Development Agency (FIDA) should be established by the Falkland Islands Government (and this is being considered separately), the cost of any tasks undertaken by FIGO in London on behalf of FIDA in Port Stanley could be reimbursed by the latter from its promotional budget.

I am copying this to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD(FAF) and to Sir R Armstrong.

Yours ever
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

26 October 1982

To note.

New York

mf

A.J.C. 27/10

Visit by the Prime Minister of Mauritius

In your letter of 11 October you asked us to follow up two points arising from the Prime Minister's conversation with Mr Jugnauth. The question of the Ilois claims has been followed up separately. I am sorry that we have been a little slower in responding to the question about scholarships in this country.

The number of training awards offered to Mauritius under our government to government aid programmes varies from year to year depending on the money available within the country programme, and the demands on it by 'continuers', that is existing award-holders who continue on to second or later years of courses. The awards also vary in value according to the length of the courses they cover. The 1982-83 allocation of £200,000 enabled 34 new awards to be offered to Mauritius; there were three continuers. For 1983-84 a sum of £225,000 has been earmarked for Mauritius which should enable 25 new awards to be offered. In addition the British Council, who administer the ODA training programme, offer Mauritius one scholarship from their own resources (the funds have stretched to two scholarships in 1981-82 and 1982-83).

When the Prime Minister mentioned to Mr Jugnauth a £10 million fund for overseas students she perhaps had in mind the additional aid funds (rather less than £10 million in fact) which were allocated to training programmes in 1981-82 and which were intended to restore the numbers of new awards for that year under certain schemes to approximately the levels of 1978 and 1979. Mauritius did not, in the event, draw from these extra funds. This was because the Mauritian Government were slow in taking up all the 33 awards which had been offered to them in 1981-82 under the existing allocation. Indeed, at the end of that financial year, the programme was £10,000 underspent.

I should perhaps add that Mr Jugnauth may have been referring to difficulties faced by undergraduate students from overseas, to whom of course these training awards under government to government aid programmes do not apply.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Mauntius

visit of PM

January 1980

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 October 1982

Dear Idm,

Falklands at the General Assembly

In my letter of 22 October I said that we would be recommending that the Prime Minister send messages to Community Heads of Government once the results of the discussion in the margin of the Foreign Affairs Council on 25 October were known. You will have seen that Mr Pym went over the ground again in Luxembourg very firmly. We now recommend that the Prime Minister should send messages to the other Heads of Government and I enclose a draft, tailored for the various countries, for this purpose. To have the maximum impact, these should issue on 27 October, to allow time for a proper consideration in capitals.

You may have noticed the omission of India from the list of countries in my letter of 22 October. Our High Commissioner was doubtful about the utility of a message to Mrs Gandhi. We have reflected on this further and are inclined to think that the Prime Minister might nevertheless like to consider sending a message. It seems right, at a time when we are intervening at the highest level with so many other Commonwealth and Non-Aligned countries, that we should make our views plain to India, as a leading member of the Commonwealth and as the in-coming Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement. I enclose a draft for the Prime Minister's consideration.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

[TO EC PARTNERS EXCEPT GERMANY]

' . Next week sees the start of a debate on the Falkland Islands at the United Nations General Assembly with the vote due on 4 November. I am writing to ask you for your understanding and support.

[GERMANY ONLY]

Although we are to meet in only a few hours time I thought I should send you this message about next week's debate on the Falkland Islands at the United Nations since I am writing today to the Heads of other Community governments on the same subject.

[TO ALL]

2. The Argentine draft resolution calling upon us to enter into negotiations about the sovereignty dispute is wholly unacceptable to the British Government and the British people after the events of the Spring. Argentina envisages only one possible outcome to any such negotiations: the transfer of the Islands to herself against the wishes of the people who live there. ~~To support her in the vote would be to encourage her in this unprincipled ambition and to delay the prospect of putting an end to the dispute. The way forward does not lie through the passage of such resolutions but through the encouragement of an evolution of thinking in Argentina.~~

This ~~is~~ would be an outright denial of the principle of self-determination and should not be encouraged in any way.

[FRANCE, ITALY,

[FRANCE, ITALY, NETHERLANDS]

3. There is much support for our position in many parts of the world. But I have been most concerned to learn that consideration is being given in France/Italy/The Netherlands to voting with Argentina on 4 November. Voting with the aggressor in the recent conflict in this debate would simply not be understood in this country and would inevitably be widely seen as unfriendly. [FRANCE ONLY: We would never take sides against France in a vote on an issue of comparable concern to France at the United Nations.] I urge you most strongly at least to abstain when the vote is taken. [FRANCE ONLY: We were most grateful for French support during the conflict itself. I very much hope that you will not abandon the principles to which you held then, whatever reasons may be advanced for a change.]

[IRELAND]

There is much support for our position in many parts of the world. I very much hope I can look to Ireland not to side with Argentina against Britain in the coming debate.

[GERMANY, DENMARK, BELGIUM]

There is much support for our position in many parts of the world. But I have been most concerned to hear that some of our partners may be considering voting with Argentina. This would simply not be understood in this country and would give a most unfortunate impression of the meaning of the Community and the willingness of partners to stand by each other when vital interests are at stake. I feel sure I can rely on the Federal Republic/Denmark/

Belgium not to lend its weight to this hypocritical Argentine manoeuvre. I hope you will use your influence with other Community partners to discourage them from doing so either.

[LUXEMBOURG, GREECE]

There is much support for our position in many parts of the world. But I have been most concerned to hear that some of our partners may be considering voting with Argentina. It is good to know of the robust attitude that Luxembourg/Greece is taking. I shall be most grateful to you if you can use your influence with other Community partners to discourage them from voting with Argentina.

TO MRS GANDHI

I greatly appreciate your kindness in inviting me to stop in Delhi on my return from the Far East and I very much valued the talk we had. I hope it will not be long before we can find another opportunity to meet again, however informally.

I know that you will not mind my taking the opportunity to ask for your help in a matter of importance to me. Argentina has ^{had} tabled a draft resolution at the United Nations which calls on us to enter into negotiations about the future of the Falkland Islands. You will understand that after the events of the spring this is wholly unacceptable to the British Government and people. Argentina envisages only one possible outcome to any such negotiations: the transfer of the Islands to herself against the wishes of the people who live there. To support her in the vote would be to encourage her in this unprincipled ambition and to delay the prospect of putting an end to the dispute. The way forward does not lie through the passage of such resolutions but through the encouragement of an evolution of thinking in Argentina.

There is much support for our position in many parts of the world, including many Commonwealth and Non-Aligned countries. I feel sure that you share my attachment to the principle of self-determination, which Argentina refuses to recognise, and I hope that

/ you will

you will instruct the Indian representative in New York
to abstain on, if not vote against, the Argentine draft.

Argentina : Relations



From the Secretary of State

Robin Butler Esq
Principal Private Secretary
to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London
SW1

Prime Minister

The views expressed by the representatives of the Trade are contradictory. They say both that the sanctions are pointless because they can get the wool through the EC and that they are being damaged because they can't get the wool. Both can't be true.

MT

But x / is the point you were most interested in -
25 October 1982

FEBB

25.10

Dear Robin,

ARGENTINE WOOL

.... You spoke to me about a piece on this morning's "Today" programme about imports of Argentine wool. I attach a transcript.

The industry's complaint, as reported, is that it is placed at a competitive disadvantage by being unable to import cheap Argentine wool. The point has previously been raised with both this Department and the Department of Industry by both the industry's trade association, the Confederation of British Wool Textiles, and Sir Russell Sanderson writing on behalf of a particular company. Our reply has been to regret any difficulties which the continuing trade embargo may be causing the United Kingdom industry, but explaining that we are doing everything possible to secure an early return to normal peaceful trade with Argentina. Such agreement has to be on a reciprocal basis, and depends of course on Argentine willingness to negotiate.

It is quite possible that Argentine wool is finding its way into the United Kingdom after initial processing in the EC. We do not believe it would be in our negotiating interests to lift the embargo. This could in turn bring demands for lifting the embargo on other Argentine products, such as grain, and stiffen the Argentines' resolve not to negotiate.

It is also worth noting that when the United Kingdom embargo was imposed, about 80% of the United Kingdom's requirement for the year was already in transit and thus qualified for entry permits. In short, the industry's deprivation is not as significant as they might wish some to believe.

X | Finally, Mr Timpson's final remark - "we did approach the Department of Trade for answers to these points but they declined to comment" - is incorrect. The BBC contacted our Press Office late last Thursday, 21 October, requesting an interview with



From the Secretary of State

either the Secretary of State or the Minister for Trade. Neither was available. The Department's Press Office did, however, give a full explanation of our policy of reciprocity on lifting the embargo, and said their statement could be quoted on the programme. I understand that the BBC, whom we contacted today, accept this and that arrangements are being made for the Minister for Trade to be interviewed on the point this evening in Luxembourg.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN RHODES
Private Secretary

....
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PARKER BISHOP

PLEASE PASS FOR THE URGENT ATTENTION OF MIKE GRIFFITHS

BBC RADIO 4 'TODAY' 7.10.A.M. 26/10/82

JOHN TIMPSON: WELL, NOW ACCORDING TO THE BRITISH WOOL INDUSTRY WHEN BRITAIN IMPOSED SANCTIONS AGAINST THE IMPORT OF ARGENTINE WOOL BECAUSE OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS, WE MIGHT WELL HAVE SAID - THIS IS GOING TO HURT US MORE THAN IT HURTS YOU - BECAUSE THEY SAY THE ONLY DAMAGE THAT'S BEEN DONE IS TO BRITISH WOOL COMPANIES AND NOT TO ARGENTINA. WELL NOW THAT OTHER EEC COUNTRIES HAVE LIFTED THEIR SANCTIONS THEY WANT BRITAIN'S TO BE LIFTED TOO. HUGH SYKES HEARD THE ARGUMENTS.

H.SYKES: THE BRITISH WOOL FEDERATION CAN'T UNDERSTAND THE POINT OF THESE SANCTIONS NOW, THEY SAY THAT THEY'RE DAMAGING BRITAIN A LOT AND ARGENTINA NOT AT ALL. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE WOOL FEDERATION, BOB JOWETT, SAYS THE SANCTIONS ARE RIDICULOUS AND COMMERCIAL LUNACY. I ASKED HIM TO EXPLAIN.

MR. JOWETT: VERY SIMPLY BECAUSE THE WOOL WHICH WE ARE PROHIBITED FROM IMPORTING BY THE GOVERNMENT'S EMBARGO, CAN STILL REACH OUR UNITED KINGDOM CUSTOMERS SIMPLY BY THOSE CUSTOMERS BUYING THE PRODUCE OF THE WOOL, EITHER THE SCOURED WOOL OR THE TOPS OR THE YARN, FROM ANY OF OUR COMMON MARKET PARTNERS, THEY HAVE NO EMBARGO ON SOUTH AMERICAN WOOL AND THEREFORE ONCE THAT WOOL HAS BEEN MANIPULATED ON THE CONTINENT, IT BECOMES OF EUROPEAN ORIGIN AND THEN IT'S PERFECTLY LEGAL FOR OUR SPINNERS AND CUSTOMERS TO IMPORT THOSE GOODS FROM FRANCE OR ITALY OR GERMANY OR WHEREVER YOU LIKE. I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT THE OBJECT OF SANCTIONS WOULD BE TO PENALISE THE OFFENDING PARTY, THIS ONLY PENALISES THE BRITISH PARTY.

H. SYKES: THE MAIN CUSTOMERS FOR ARGENTINE WOOL ARE THE IMPORTERS THEMSELVES AND THE EARLY PROCESSORS, THE PEOPLE WHO DEAL WITH THE RAW WOOL, GREASY FROM THE SHEEP'S BACK: YORKSHIRE WOOL COMBERS AT LEEDS ARE ONE EXAMPLE OF A COMPANY LIKE THAT. THEIR 58 PEOPLE TURN THE RAW WOOL INTO TOPS, LONG ROPES OF FIBRES THAT ARE SENT ON TO THE SPINNERS AND THOSE TOPS NORMALLY HAVE A LOT OF CHEAP ARGENTINE WOOL IN THEM. I WONDERED IF THE MANAGING DIRECTOR OF YORKSHIRE WOOL COMBERS, STUART TWITCHELL, ALSO FELT THAT THE SANCTIONS WERE MEANINGLESS.

MR. TWITCHELL: WELL, I CERTAINLY DO, YES.

H. SYKES: WHAT'S IT DOING TO YOUR COMPANY AT THE MOMENT?

MR. TWITCHELL: ARGENTINE WOOL IS USED AS A CHEAPENER IN WOOL BLENDS AND THIS COULD AFFECT TRADE, EXPORT TRADE QUITE ADVERSELY. IT COULD BE THE LAST STRAW THAT BREAKS THE CAMEL'S BACK IN MANY CASES.

H.SYKES: HOW CLOSE DO YOU THINK YOU ARE TO HAVING YOUR BACK BROKEN?

MR.TWITCHELL: OH, EVERY TEXTILE FIRM IN THE TRADE IS FIGHTING VERY HARD FOR SURVIVAL AND IT'S OBVIOUSLY WELL KNOWN THAT AN AWFUL LOT OF FIRMS HAVE ALREADY GONE DOWN. IT IS A VERY HARD FIGHT AND WE CAN DO WITHOUT ANY FUTHER DIFFICULTIES.

H.SYKES: WHAT WOULD YOU LIKE THE GOVERNMENT TO DO NOW TO HELP YOU?

MR.TWITCHELL: IT'S VERY DIFFICULT, OUR COMPETITORS IN EUROPE ARE BEING ASSISTED IN VARIOUS WAYS, I DON'T LIKE GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE PERSONALLY BUT WE'VE OBVIOUSLY GOT TO BE GIVEN EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES TO SURVIVE- SURELY WE'RE NOT ACHIEVING ANYTHING BY THE SANCTIONS, THE WOOL IS BEING SOLD TO EUROPE INSTEAD OF THE UK, ONCE AGAIN GIVING THEM AN ADVANTAGE.

J.TIMPSON: WELL, NOW WE DID APPROACH THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE FOR ANSWERS TO THESE POINTS BUT THEY DECLINED TO COMMENT.

SENT 1242/25/10/82 JFP

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FM COPENHAGEN 25/1540Z OCTOBER 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 343 OF 25 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK PRIORITY OTHER EC POSTS

ms

MY TELNO 340: FALKLANDS AT THE UN

1. EIGIL JOERGENSEN TOLD ME TODAY THAT, IN A TALK AFTER MY CALL ON HIM ON 21 OCTOBER, THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAD ACCEPTED HIS OWN VIEW THAT DENMARK SHOULD AIM FOR A SITUATION IN WHICH THE UK VOTES AGAINST THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION WHILE THE REST OF THE COMMUNITY ABSTAIN. THIS WAS WHAT THE DANISH PRESIDENCY WOULD BE WORKING FOR. EIGIL JOERGENSEN, WHO WAS SPEAKING BEFORE HE HAD ANY REPORT OF THE LUNCHTIME DISCUSSION IN LUXEMBOURG, ADDED THAT THE DANES HAD NOTICED A CERTAIN CHANGE IN THE FRENCH ATTITUDE. THEY WERE NOW INCLINED TO DOUBT WHETHER FRANCE (AND ITALY) WOULD REALLY VOTE FOR THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. HE DISCOUNTED A SUGGESTION THAT THE FRG MIGHT DO SO. WHILE JOERGENSEN STILL DID NOT SAY IN TERMS THAT DENMARK WOULD DEFINITELY ABSTAIN, HE WAS CERTAINLY NOT ENVISAGING A POSITIVE VOTE. HE ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE BEST IF THE UK WERE TO ABSTAIN TOO. I REPEATED THAT, FOLLOWING THE DISCUSSION IN THE FCO LAST WEEK I SAW NO POSSIBILITY AT ALL OF THAT, WHICH HE ACCEPTED.

WARBURTON

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*There is a JIC assessment
in the hot box.*

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FM MONTEVIDEO 252015Z OCT 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 735 OF 25 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE CIVIL COMMISSIONER PORT STANLEY (PERSONAL), MODUK

*A.J.C. 26/10*NOTT'S VISIT TO FALKLANDS: POSSIBLE ARGENTINE REACTIONS

FROM JOY VISITING MONTEVIDEO

mf

1. BEFORE I LEFT BUENOS AIRES YESTERDAY IT WAS SUGGESTED TO ME BY A CLOSE ARGENTINE FRIEND, LUIS VERNET (DIRECT DESCENDANT OF GOVERNOR VERNET) THAT THE ARGENTINES MIGHT WISH TO MARK IN SOME WAY MR NOTT'S VISIT TO THE ISLANDS. HE EVEN SUGGESTED IN A HALF JOGULAR FASHION THAT AN ATTEMPT TO KIDNAP THE MINISTER AND BRING HIM TO BUENOS AIRES MAY BE MADE.

2. HE SAID A HIGH-RANKING RELATION IN THE AIR FORCE HAD EXPLAINED TO HIM THE TACTICS ADOPTED TO KEEP BRITISH ISLAND DEFENCES ON THEIR TOES BY SENDING INTO THE FIRST CIRCLE OF PROTECTIVE RADAR COVER SLOWER CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT THAN THE MIRAGES, CAPABLE OF PENETRATING THE FIRST CIRCLE AND TURNING BACK TO AVOID PENETRATING THE INNER CIRCLE AND SETTING OFF THE ATTACK ALERT.

3. HE AND HIS FATHER, ALSO LUIS VERNET, HAD, STRANGELY, BEEN SUMMONED TO A MEETING IN THE MFA AT 2000Z HOURS, TODAY MONDAY IN WHICH ANOTHER HIGH-RANKING AIR FORCE OFFICER WAS INVOLVED. VERNET SPECULATED THAT SOMETHING WAS IN THE WIND. HE SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD MY WIFE AFTER ABOUT SIX WHISKIES AT OUR AFTERNOON BARBEQUE THAT HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED OVER THE FALKLANDS QUESTION DURING THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. QUOTE IF WE CAN GET OVER THE PERIOD 25 OCTOBER TO 15 NOVEMBER WITHOUT PROBLEM, THE GOING WILL BE EASIER THEREAFTER. UNQUOTE.

4. ALTHOUGH A GOOD FRIEND, VERNET, LIKE MANY ARGENTINES, DOES TEND TO OVER-STATEMENT AND TO OVER RATE HIS OWN ROLE. MUCH OF THE ABOVE MAY HAVE LITTLE OR NO FOUNDATION BUT IT SEEMS TO ME IMPORTANT THAT YOU SHOULD BE AWARE OF IT.

HUTCHINSON

BT

(Repetition to PORT STANLEY
referred for departmental decision,
repeated as requested to other posts.)

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FM FCO 251130Z OCT 82

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 895 OF 25 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA, OTTAWA, WELLINGTON, WASHINGTON
YOUR TELNOS 1696 - 7: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. THANK YOU FOR THESE FURTHER VIEWS. MY COLLEAGUES AND I FULLY UNDERSTAND AND ACCEPT THAT THE ARGENTINE DRAFT, IF PUT TO THE VOTE IN ITS PRESENT FORM, WILL BE CARRIED BY A LARGE MAJORITY, AND THAT THIS IS LIKELY TO CAUSE US PROBLEMS IN FUTURE YEARS BY PUTTING US ON THE WRONG FOOT IN UN TERMS. WE ARE AWARE OF THE DISADVANTAGES OF THIS, EVEN IF THE IMPACT ON THE GROUND AND IN DOMESTIC TERMS IS RELATIVELY LITTLE. BUT LEAVING ASIDE ANY RESERVATIONS OF DETAIL, OUR MAIN CONCERN IS TO AVOID FINDING OURSELVES IN ANOTHER UN MORASS OVER THE FALKLANDS, WITH AMENDMENTS AND COUNTER-AMENDMENTS FLYING, AND NO GUARANTEE THAT WE WILL NOT FINISH UP IN A WORSE MESS THAN WHEN WE STARTED. WE CANNOT CONTEMPLATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARGENTINA ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY AND WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT WHAT IS NEEDED IS A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE OF HEART BY ARGENTINA INCLUDING ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE NON-USE OF FORCE.

2. IT IS CLEAR THAT WE CANNOT HOPE TO AMEND THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, INCLUDING THE PREAMBLE, IN A WAY THAT WOULD ACCORD UNMISTAKABLY WITH THIS POSITION AND WHICH WOULD REMOVE ALL OBJECTIONABLE FEATURES. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO SHIFT THE DRAFT IN OUR DIRECTION AND TO MAKE IT UNACCEPTABLE TO ITS AUTHORS IS FRAUGHT WITH DANGERS AND UNCERTAINTY. I DO NOT THINK WE COULD MISLEAD THE OLD COMMONWEALTH AND OTHER FRIENDS ABOUT OUR VOTING INTENTIONS EVEN ON AN AMENDED DRAFT. I AM ALSO NOT CONFIDENT THAT ONCE WE START DOWN THE AMENDMENT ROAD WE COULD COUNT ON THEM TO RESIST SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER COMPROMISE.

WOL 26/10
f.a.

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GIVEN OUR GENERAL APPROACH I DO NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED IN A PROCESS THAT WE CANNOT CONTROL AND WHICH COULD TURN OUT VERY UNSATISFACTORILY. IT WOULD FOR EXAMPLE BE DAMAGING IF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WERE SEEN TO VOTE DOWN A REFERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION.

3. WE NOW PROPOSE TO STEP UP OUR CAMPAIGN TO SECURE THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF NEGATIVE VOTES AND ABSTENTIONS. HIGH LEVEL MESSAGES ARE LIKELY TO ISSUE IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS AND POSTS WILL BE ASKED TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE RIGHT UP TO THE MOMENT OF THE VOTE. I AM IN FACT REASONABLY ENCOURAGED BY THE RESPONSES TO OUR TELNO 150 TO ABIDJAN, ALTHOUGH THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS REMAIN A MAJOR CONCERN. AND I AM ALSO NOT TAKING THE AMERICANS FOR GRANTED. ON THE OTHER HAND I BELIEVE WE MADE A USEFUL IMPACT ON GENSCHER WHEN HE WAS HERE ON 19 OCTOBER.

4. I KNOW HOW MUCH THOUGHT YOU HAVE GIVEN TO THIS AND I AM SORRY THAT CONSIDERATIONS HERE HAVE LED US TO A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION FROM YOURS. I AM OF COURSE AWARE THAT THE PICTURE MAY CHANGE AS THE DEBATE GETS CLOSER AND I SHALL BE READY TO BE FLEXIBLE IF THE CIRCUMSTANCES CHANGE RADICALLY.

PYM

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From the Private Secretary

25 October, 1982

FALKLANDS: UN TACTICS

Thank you for your letter of 22 October.
The Prime Minister agrees that the messages to
Heads of Government which you enclosed should be
despatched.

A. J. COLES

J. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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GRS 220
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Argentina

FM PARIS 221804Z OCT 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELGRAM NUMBER 1004 OF 22 OCT 82
INFO PRIORITY BONN ATHENS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN LUXEMBOURG
ROME THE HAGUE UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS

mf

YOUR TELNO 564: FALKLANDS AT THE UN

1. I WENT OVER THE GROUND THIS EVENING WITH GUTMANN, SECRETARY GENERAL AT THE QUAI. I TOOK HIM THROUGH THE OBJECTIONABLE ELEMENTS IN THE ARGENTINE TEXT, STRESSED THE PARALLEL BETWEEN THE FALKLANDS AND FRENCH OVERSEAS POSSESSIONS AND THE LIKELY EFFECT THAT THE FRENCH VOTE WOULD HAVE ON WAIVERERS IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE, AND ENDED BY SAYING THAT A FRENCH VOTE AGAINST BRITAIN (ACTUAL OR ENVISAGED) WOULD CAST A SHADOW OVER THE BILATERAL SUMMIT. APPARENT ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE ARGENTINE CLAIM BY FRANCE AFTER THE BLOODY CONFLICT IN THE FALKLANDS WOULD BE DEEPLY RESENTED. I LEFT A COPY OF MY SPEAKING NOTE.

2. GUTMANN SAID HE FULLY REALISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION TO BRITAIN. HOWEVER FRANCE, WHICH HAD STOOD SOLIDLY BY BRITAIN DURING THE FIGHTING, HAD ALWAYS SAID THAT IT FAVOURED A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. HE RECALLED IN THIS CONNECTION RESOLUTION 502. HE ADMITTED THAT SOME POINTS IN THE ARGENTINE TEXT WERE UNSATISFACTORY BUT SAID IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR FRANCE TO ABSTAIN IF BRITAIN COULD OFFER SOME PROSPECT OF AN ALTERNATIVE WAY FORWARD TO A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. THERE HAD BEEN NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE THE CONFLICT: WHY NOT NOW? WITHOUT NEGOTIATIONS FRANCE FEARED THAT THERE WOULD BE CONTINUING TENSION. FINALLY HE SAID THAT HE FULLY REALISED THE IMPORTANCE OF MY DEMARCHE AND THAT THE FINAL FRENCH DECISION WOULD TAKE IT INTO ACCOUNT. I EXPLAINED AGAIN WHY NEGOTIATIONS WERE NOW INCONCEIVABLE AND REMINDED HIM THAT IN A SIMILAR SITUATION THE FRENCH WOULD SAY THEY WERE PRECLUDED BY THEIR CONSTITUTION.

3. AS I WAS LEAVING HE TOOK ME ASIDE AND SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT THERE WAS A CHANCE OF A FRENCH ABSTENTION. I WOULD NOT READ TOO MUCH INTO THIS BUT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE FRENCH ARE BEING GIVEN PAUSE IN PARTICULAR BY THE THOUGHT OF THE EFFECT OF THEIR DECISION ON THE BILATERAL SUMMIT.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO UKREP BRUSSELS (REPEATED AS REQUESTED)
FRETWELL

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FM BONN 221158Z OCT 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 903 OF 22 OCTOBER

AND TO ^{INFO} IMMEDIATE ATHENS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN LUXEMBOURG
ROME THE HAGUE PARIS

~~INFO IMMEDIATE~~ UMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS

YOUR TELNO 564 TO PARIS: FALKLANDS AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

1. BY THE TIME TUR ARRIVED HERR GENSCHER HAD ALREADY GIVEN YOU HIMSELF, IN LONDON ON 19 OCTOBER (YOUR TELNO 458 TO BONN, PARA 1(E)), A REACTION TO YOUR REMARKS ON THE FALKLANDS AND A STATEMENT ON THE GERMAN POSITION.

2. HEAD OF CHANCERY SOUGHT TODAY FROM SCHAAD (HEAD OF RELEVANT UN DEPARTMENT, MFA) AN ELABORATION OF THE POSITION EXPLAINED BY HERR GENSCHER. BUT SCHAAD HAD LITTLE TO ADD. THE GERMANS HAD NOT YET DECIDED HOW THEY WOULD VOTE, AND HE DID NOT KNOW WHEN THEY WOULD DECIDE - PROBABLY NOT UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE.

3. HUNTER POINTED OUT THE STRENGTH OF FEELING IN THE UK OVER NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE UNACCEPTABLE PASSAGES IN THE ARGENTINE DRAFT RESOLUTION. SURELY THE LATTER GAVE THE GERMANS GROUNDS AT LEAST TO ABSTAIN. SCHAAD SAID HE PERSONALLY HOPED THE NINE WOULD AGREE TO ABSTAIN, AND THAT OUR ALLIES WOULD DO THE SAME. BUT ABSTENTIONS WOULD NOT BE POPULAR WITH THE LATIN AMERICANS, AND THE GERMANS WOULD NOT BE HAPPY ABOUT ABSTAINING IF OTHERS DID NOT. THE FRENCH HAD ALREADY SAID THEY WOULD VOTE FOR, AND THE AMERICANS SEEMED STILL UNDECIDED (SCHAAD HAD RECENTLY BEEN IN WASHINGTON, AND FOUND THEM IN THE SAME DILEMMA AS THE GERMANS).

4. SCHAAD THOUGHT THE ANSWER MIGHT LIE IN AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT - REMOVAL OF OFFENSIVE CLAUSES (EG ON COLONIAL STATUS) AND INSERTION OF A REFERENCE TO NON-USE OF FORCE. HE HAD WANTED TO PROPOSE THE LATTER AT AN EARLIER STAGE, BUT HAD BEEN INHIBITED BY OUR SAYING THAT WE WOULD NOT WELCOME AMENDMENTS. HUNTER SAID SUCH AMENDMENTS WOULD HELP, BUT WOULD BE NOWHERE NEAR ENOUGH. IT WOULD BE BETTER IF OUR ALLIES WOULD ABSTAIN ON THE EXISTING RESOLUTION.

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/S. AS

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5. AS SO OFTEN, THE GERMANS' CHIEF CONCERN IS TO STAY IN THE MIDDLE OF THE PACK. THEY SEEM LIKELY TO BE SWAYED BY THE EVENTUAL AMERICAN POSITION (AS WELL AS, OF COURSE, BY COMMUNITY PARTNERS, ESPECIALLY THE FRENCH). IT WOULD HELP OUR CONTINUED LOBBYING IF WE COULD BE KEPT AS CLOSELY INFORMED AS POSSIBLE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN THINKING.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS.

TAYLOR

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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Prime Minister

Wrote doing & think.

Agree that messages may be sent?

A.J.C. 22/10

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 October 1982

Agreed mo.

Dear John,

Falklands: UN Tactics

Your letter of 19 October recorded the Prime Minister's agreement that high-level messages should be sent to appropriate countries as part of our campaign to muster support for the coming debate.

We suggest that the question of messages to European Community Heads of Government should be left on one side until we can take account of the discussion which is to take place during the Foreign Affairs Council in Luxembourg on 26-27 October. It would however be desirable to despatch messages to countries in other parts of the world at the beginning of next week. We are very conscious of the undesirability of devaluing the currency of high-level messages and expending too much credit on one issue. But having consulted our Posts, it is clear that in many cases a message from the Prime Minister may well make a decisive difference. We believe it is worth making a major effort to deny Argentina positive votes. We therefore recommend that the Prime Minister should send messages to Heads of Government in the following countries:

- a. United States
- b. Australia, Canada and New Zealand
- c. Portugal, Jordan and Pakistan
- d. Botswana, Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, St Lucia, St Vincent, Trinidad, Vanuatu
- e. Cameroon, Gabon.

Mr Pym envisages sending messages to his Nordic colleagues and to Japan and a wide range of Arab, African and Asian countries.

I enclose a draft for the messages to President Reagan, Mr Fraser and Mr Trudeau; another for Mr Muldoon, Ratu Mara and Mr Price, whose support is already assured; a draft for Lee Kuan Yew in terms recommended by our High Commissioner; and a slightly different version of the first draft which

/might



might serve for the other recipients. We would propose to make small additions or adjustments to this core message to suit particular recipients, taking account of the nature of our relations, any action they have already taken in the Falklands context and so forth.

You may have seen (UKMis New York telnos 1696-7) that Sir J Thomson remains convinced that our interests would be better served by an attempt to amend the Argentine draft. We are looking again at his detailed arguments. If this leads to any change in our view about the undesirability of going down this road I will of course let you know.

It is most unlikely that the Foreign Secretary will agree with Sir J. Thomson.
A.F.C. 22.12.

Yours ever
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, MR FRASER AND
MR TRUDEAU

[TO WASHINGTON AND CANBERRA]

1. We are now approaching a debate on the Falklands at the United Nations General Assembly with the vote expected on or about 4 November. This is, as you will appreciate, of considerable importance to us and I wanted to let you know personally how strongly we feel about it.

[TO OTTAWA ONLY]

1. Francis Pym has told me of his most useful exchange of views with Allan MacEachen during his recent visit to Ottawa. I know that you will therefore be aware of the importance to us of the forthcoming debate on the Falklands at the United Nations General Assembly. But I wanted nevertheless to ask once again for your personal understanding and support.

2. The Argentine draft is wholly unacceptable to the British Government and to the British people. It suggests that the maintenance of the present status of the Islands is a threat to world peace and must be ended whatever the people of the Islands may want; it recalls three earlier ~~Ag~~ Argentine-inspired resolutions which were unacceptable to us and which the United

/States

States/Australia/Canada also declined to support; it refers to pronouncements of the Non-Aligned Movement which prejudged the dispute in Argentina's favour and dismissed the legitimate rights of the inhabitants of the Islands; and it calls upon us to resume negotiations.

3. Negotiations were of course in progress earlier this year when Argentina launched her military assault on the Islands without provocation or warning. Argentina subsequently ignored the appeals and instructions of the Security Council. Her action was widely condemned as a breach of the most important provisions of the UN Charter.

4. I am sure that you will understand how offensive it is to us that Argentina now comes before the General Assembly to seek a resumption of the negotiations which she herself broke off. The hypocrisy of this approach is shown up by the determination of the authorities in Buenos Aires (whatever their spokesmen may say in New York) to keep open the option of a resumption of hostilities. Moreover it is clear that Argentina still contemplates only one possible outcome to negotiations with Britain - the transfer of the Islands to Argentina in defiance of the wishes of the people. To support her in the coming debate would be
/to encourage

to encourage her in this unprincipled ambition and thus to set back the cause of peace. There can be no resolution of this issue until there is a fundamental change of heart on the part of Argentina. You will understand our insistence that the principles of the United Nations Charter, including those of self-determination and the non-use of force, are as applicable to this as to other international problems.

5. We have deeply appreciated the great help and understanding which we have received from the USA/the consistent support of Australia/Canada/ since the crisis burst upon us at the beginning of April. I now ask for your help once more in supporting us in the vote on the Argentine Resolution at the UN.



DRAFT MESSAGE TO THE NEW ZEALAND, FIJIAN AND BELIZEAN
PRIME MINISTERS

1. We are now making our final preparations for the debate in the United Nations on the Falkland Islands and seeking the understanding and support of our friends in many parts of the world in our rejection of the Argentine demand that we should enter into negotiations. Our people in Wellington/Suva/Belmopan and New York have been keeping us in close touch with your thinking and I wanted to let you know what a great source of strength and encouragement it is to me to know that you will once again be giving us robust support.


[FIJI ONLY]

2. I am most grateful to you for responding as you did to my request that you should bring our views to the attention of our colleagues at the recent regional meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government. This seems to have been a useful discussion and we shall be building on it in the days ahead.

DRAFT MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF SINGAPORE

1. I am asking for your help over the Falkland Island resolution in the United Nations. We simply cannot accept a call to negotiate with a country which only a few months ago brutally invaded the islands, which has still not renounced the use of force to have its way, and which obstinately rejects the right of the Islanders to self-determination.

2. In deciding our votes on the many issues debated at the United Nations we all constantly have conflicting considerations to bear in mind. But for each of us there is an issue where we really need to be able to count on the support of our friends. For us the Falkland Islands is such an issue.



CORE OF MESSAGE TO OTHER RECIPIENTS.

1. We are now approaching a debate on the Falklands at the United Nations General Assembly with the vote expected on or about 4 November. This is, as you will know, an issue of great importance to Britain and I thought that I should let you know personally how we see it and ask you for your understanding and support.

2. The Assembly will have before it a draft prepared by Argentina. This draft is wholly unacceptable to us. It suggests that the maintenance of the present status of the Islands is a threat to world peace and must be ended whatever the people of the Islands may want; it recalls three earlier Argentine-inspired resolutions which were unacceptable to us [and which your country also declined to support]; it refers to pronouncements of the Non-Aligned Movement which prejudged the dispute in Argentina's favour and dismissed the legitimate rights of the inhabitants of the Islands and it calls upon us to resume negotiations.

3. You will recall that negotiations were in progress earlier this year when Argentina launched her military assault on the Islands without provocation or warning. Argentina subsequently ignored the appeals and

/instructions

instructions of the Security Council. Her action was widely condemned as a breach of the most important provisions of the UN Charter. The consequences of this attack will be with us and the Islanders for a long time to come and we have lost many lives in our resistance to Argentine aggression.

4. I am sure that you will understand how offensive it is to us that Argentina now comes before the General Assembly to seek a resumption of the negotiations which she herself broke off. The hypocrisy of this approach is shown up by the determination of the authorities in Buenos Aires (whatever their spokesmen may say in New York) to keep open the option of a resumption of hostilities. It is clear that Argentina still contemplates only one possible outcome to negotiations with Britain - the transfer of the Islands to Argentina in defiance of the wishes of the people. To support her in the coming debate would be to encourage her in this ambition and thus to set back the cause of peace. There can be no resolution of this issue until Argentina accepts that the principles of the United Nations Charter, including those of self-determination and the non-use of force, are applicable to this as to every other international problem.

5. The British Government and the British people
/would

would now find it difficult to understand how friendly and responsible governments could side with the aggressor. We have been greatly heartened by the understanding our position has received from countries in many parts of the world since the crisis burst upon us at the beginning of April. We now ask that that understanding should be given practical expression in the vote at the United Nations. [In the spirit of/the good relations between our two countries, which we both hope to foster and develop,/our close ties/our close relationship in the Commonwealth/I ask you for your help.] [I have been much heartened by what I have heard of your attitude to the coming debate. I look forward to having your most valued support.]

ms

22 OCT 1982

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CONFIDENTIAL

*I do not think the
F.C.O. are likely to find
Sir John Thomas's arguments
persuasive.*

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 211946Z OCT 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1696 DATED 21 OCTOBER 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WELLINGTON, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, WASHINGTON

*A.F.C. 22.
10*

YOUR TELNO 382: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

mt

1. IN ORDER TO CONDUCT THE CAMPAIGN HERE IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER IT IS IMPORTANT THAT I SHOULD FULLY UNDERSTAND YOUR THINKING AND CONVERSELY THAT I SHOULD MAKE SURE THAT THE TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS WHICH APPLY HERE ARE GIVEN WHATEVER WEIGHT THEY DESERVE. I AM THEREFORE GRATEFUL FOR THE INVITATION IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE TO LET YOU HAVE FURTHER THOUGHTS. MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM CONTAINS MORE DETAILED COMMENTS IN CASE YOUR DIFFICULTIES STEM AS MUCH FROM THE DETAILED WORDING AS FROM PURSUING THE WHOLE STRATEGY OF AMENDING THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION.

2. I AM NOT SURE HOW MUCH GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS MATTER INTERNATIONALLY, STILL LESS HOW MUCH THEY MATTER DOMESTICALLY. BUT TO THE EXTENT THEY DO, THE VOTE ON THE FALKLANDS IS IMPORTANT. THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT AS IT STANDS WILL BE CARRIED BY A SUBSTANTIAL MAJORITY. IF THEY ARE PREPARED TO TRIM IT HERE AND THERE TO GAIN YET FURTHER VOTES (AND PERHAPS EVEN IF THEY DO NOT) THEIR VOTE COULD EASILY BE AROUND A HUNDRED, IE THE SORT OF VOTE WE OBTAINED IN JANUARY 1980 AGAINST THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. AS YOU SAY, THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR HMG TO REGARD THIS AS A DIPLOMATIC 'DEFEAT', BUT THE ARGENTINES WOULD TREAT IT AS A SIGNIFICANT 'VICTORY'. THIS WOULD HAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FUTURE. WHAT INCENTIVE WOULD THERE BE, FOR EXAMPLE, FOR THE PRESENT ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT (OR A SUCCESSOR) TO CHANGE COURSE IF ALREADY THEY CAN GATHER VOTES IN THESE NUMBERS FOR A CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON SOVEREIGNTY WITH THE PROSPECT OF STEADILY INCREASING THEIR MAJORITY IN THE YEARS TO COME?

3. THERE IS A MORE POSITIVE SIDE, HOWEVER, IN PAST YEARS WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY BEEN ON THE WRONG FOOT IN THE UN OVER THE FALKLANDS (AND OTHER COLONIAL QUESTIONS). THE PRESENT MOMENT, WITH MEMORIES OF THE ARGENTINE INVASION STILL FRESH, OFFERS A CHANCE WHICH WILL NOT RECUR TO CHANGE THE PATTERN FOR THE FUTURE. IF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, FAR FROM ADOPTING A RESOLUTION IN ARGENTINE TERMS, WERE TO VOTE FOR AN AMENDED VERSION WHICH FOR THE FIRST TIME CATERED FOR OUR ESSENTIAL INTERESTS AND THOSE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS, OUR POSITION OVER THE FALKLANDS AND OUR PROSPECTS OVER EG GIBRALTAR WOULD BE GREATLY IMPROVED.

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4. TO MY MIND, THE CRUCIAL ELEMENT OF THE DRAFT AMENDMENT IS NOT THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN 'SEARCH' AND NEGOTIATIONS, NOR ANY OF THE OTHER PERFECTLY VALID DOUBTS YOU EXPRESS, BUT THE FACT THAT IT TURNS THE LATIN DRAFT INSIDE OUT. FIRSTLY, THERE IS THE FUNDAMENTAL SUBSTITUTION OF ARTICLE 73 FOR SOVEREIGNTY. SECONDLY, WHAT WAS ONCE A CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS BECOMES A RECOGNITION BY THE UN THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOT (NOT) POSSIBLE AS MATTERS STAND. THE EFFECT OF THE AMENDMENT, IF ADOPTED, WOULD BE TO SUPPORT OUR POLICY THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE EXCLUDED UNTIL ARGENTINA CHANGES HER POSITION. THE ONUS WOULD BE ON HER, NOT ON US.

*And they
are excluded
even then.*

5. I SHALL REPORT FURTHER ONCE I AM ABLE TO ASSESS MORE ACCURATELY LIKELY VOTING FIGURES ON THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT. MEANWHILE I CANNOT STRESS TOO MUCH THAT THE CONSIDERABLE FUND OF SYMPATHY FOR US HERE WILL BEST BE MOBILISED BY GIVING DELEGATIONS SOMETHING RESPECTABLE AND POSITIVE TO VOTE FOR. THERE ARE MORE VOTES TO BE MOBILISED IN FAVOUR OF ARTICLE 73 THAN CAN BE GATHERED SIMPLY TO ABSTAIN ON A CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

THOMSON

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Argentina

From the Secretary of State

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N.B.P.R.

The Rt Hon Francis Pym MC MP
Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London
SW1A 2AL

A.J.C. 27
/w.

21 October 1982

Dear Francis,

THE FALKLANDS: UN TACTICS

Thank you for sending me a copy of your minute of 18 October to the Prime Minister.

As my Office has already told yours, I agree with your assessment that we should, on balance, steer clear of sophisticated UN tactics and go for a straight negative lobbying exercise. The alternative of seeking to amend the text is a high risk strategy, and my own view is that it would fail. If it did fail and the original Resolution were passed, we would be in an even more difficult and prejudicial position than if we had never attempted to amend the Resolution.

I am copying this to the recipients of your minute.

Yours,
Arthur

LORD COCKFIELD

CONFIDENTIAL

Argentina, Relations, 1730

22 OCT 1982



ARGENTINA

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30494 - 1

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

OO WASHINGTON

OO OTTAWA

A.S.C. 2/10
h.a.

GRS 432

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 201010Z OCTOBER 82

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 382 OF 20 OCTOBER,

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON

YOUR TELNOS 1637 - 1640: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. I HAVE CONSIDERED YOUR PROPOSAL WITH CARE. BUT YOUR AMENDMENT FALLS SOME WAY SHORT OF MEETING MY CONCERNS. WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO JOIN IN PROMOTING IT AS WE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE PRESSED TO DO AND IT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY STILL BE NECESSARY FOR US TO VOTE AGAINST THE DRAFT RESOLUTION EVEN IF AMENDED AS YOU ENVISAGE.
2. I AM NOT SURE ARTICLE 73 IS AN ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION. THE OBLIGATION 'TO TAKE DUE ACCOUNT OF THE POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLES' IS TOO WEAK OF ITSELF. 'PARAMOUNT INTERESTS' IS ALSO INSUFFICIENT: THE ARGENTINES THEMSELVES HAVE LONG ACCEPTED REFERENCES TO THE NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE 'INTERESTS' OF THE ISLANDERS, WHILE DENYING ANY PLACE FOR THEIR WISHES. BUT IN ANY CASE WE CANNOT EXPECT THAT MANY DELEGATIONS WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT THAT ARTICLE 73 WAS A SUITABLE 'FRAMEWORK' FOR THE SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT. WE COULD NOT RULE OUT THAT ARGENTINA MIGHT SUCCEED WITH A SUB-AMENDMENT REMOVING THE FINAL PHRASE OF YOUR AMENDMENT.
3. YOUR PHRASE 'THE SEARCH ... FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THEIR DIFFERENCES' IS VERY CLOSE TO NEGOTIATIONS AND WOULD GIVE RISE TO CONCERN HERE AND IN THE ISLANDS ABOUT OUR INTENTIONS. THE REFERENCE TO THE PARTICIPATION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ISLANDERS DOES NOT GIVE THEM A VETO. THE ARGENTINES HAVE ACCEPTED ISLANDER PARTICIPATION IN PREVIOUS TALKS (AS PART OF THE BRITISH

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DELEGATION) AND I AM NOT CONVINCED THAT THE PASSAGE OF YOUR AMENDMENT WOULD FORCE THEM TO VOTE AGAINST OR ABSTAIN ON THE RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE, IF YOUR FINAL PHRASE HAD DISAPPEARED. THE ARGENTINES WOULD BE HELPED BY THE SECOND AND THIRD PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS. THESE DO NOT MERELY CHARACTERISE THE SITUATION AS A COLONIAL ONE BUT STATE THAT COLONIAL SITUATIONS ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH PEACE AND THAT THE COLONIAL STATUS OF THE FALKLANDS MUST BE ENDED.

4. I CONCLUDE THAT WE MUST ABANDON THE IDEA OF AMENDING THE ARGENTINE DRAFT. THERE IS NO WAY OF CONTROLLING THE EXERCISE ONCE THE AMENDMENT IS TABLED AND IT COULD EASILY BACKFIRE. WE CAN ONLY MAXIMISE OUR EFFORTS TO SECURE ABSTENTIONS AND NEGATIVE VOTES. WE WILL MAKE A PARTICULAR EFFORT TO DENY THE ARGENTINES THE AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN VOTES. IF WE SUCCEED IN THAT, AND IF A REASONABLE NUMBER OF OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES ALSO ABSTAIN, I SHALL NOT ATTACH MUCH SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ARGENTINE 'VICTORY'.

5. PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF YOU HAVE ANY FURTHER THOUGHTS.

PYM

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285
Argentina

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 October 1982

FALKLANDS: UN TACTICS

The Prime Minister has seen the minute of 18 October by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on this question.

Mrs. Thatcher agrees with Mr. Pym's conclusion that we should not try to amend the Latin American draft, but simply lobby hard against it and, by high level messages, urge our friends to support us.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to other members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PM/82/83

A.J.C. 15/10

PRIME MINISTER

Mr Cranley Onslow's Visit to the Falkland Islands: 3-8 October

- /
1. You may be interested to see a copy of Cranley Onslow's report to me following his recent visit to the Falkland Islands. I mentioned this in Cabinet on 14 October.
 2. We still await the Islanders' own reaction to the Shackleton Report and, as Cranley himself stresses, it would be premature to take final decisions on the major issues until this is available. But I should say that I find his views convincing and sensible and believe that, coming as they do from recent first-hand knowledge, they should be given all due weight.
 3. I am copying this to the other members of OD(FAF) and to Sir R Armstrong.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

18 October, 1982

Secretary of State

SHACKLETON REPORT : COMMENTS ON RECOMMENDATIONS

Falkland Islands Development Agency (FIDA) (2.9)

1. I am in principle in favour of setting up a FIDA. But I have considerable reservations about the paternalistic role that Shackleton assumes it should play. I ~~hope~~ that it would be possible to rely rather more on individual initiative and private enterprise to bring change to the Islands: I would not, for instance, wish to see FIDA regarded as an exclusive source of advice or funding, to the exclusion of the Standard Chartered Bank (which will shortly be opening in Stanley). We must be clear what we want it to do, and for this reason I strongly endorse Shackleton's caveat (2.9.5) that a careful study be prepared of the optimum capital structure and financing of the FIDA before we move ahead.

2. I see no need for a FIDA office in London. The Falkland Islands Government Office shortly to be established here can perfectly well take care of any FIDA responsibilities on a repayment basis.

Transfer of Farm Ownership (2.10)

3. I doubt whether the takeover and splitting up of absentee-owned farms would have the effects that Shackleton envisages. This is an emotive issue in the Islands. Clearly there is room for improvement in the pattern of farm ownership. Equally clearly, some of the younger and more talented farm managers, who form the backbone of the community, must be given a chance to own their own land: otherwise, many of them will leave and the Islands will lose men on whom the future critically depends. But Shackleton appears to have confused two objectives: preventing the remittances of profits out of the Islands by absentee landlords; and encouraging the growth of population on the land. And, in doing so, he has recommended a way forward which is likely to create problems of its own without necessarily fulfilling either purpose satisfactorily.

4. The problem of overseas remittances could more easily and equitably be dealt with by imposing a tax which would make the exercise unprofitable. This would hit the absentee landlords who have been soaking the Islands for years, while leaving the better absentee landlords (among whom I would include the FIC) who have been ploughing profits back relatively unscathed. This is a matter for the Islanders themselves to pursue, but I have left this thought with them.

/5. On the

5. On the second objective, having discussed the matter extensively with the Islanders, I am clear that breaking up the big farms will not lead to an increase of population on the land. Rather, the reverse. Those farms which have already been split up now provide employment for less people than they did before, and this pattern seems bound to continue, with owners dispensing with farm labour and running the show single-handed themselves.

6. It follows that any population increase will have to be sought outside the farming sector, eg through the setting up of service and other small industries in the main population centres. (On which see paras 11-14 below.)

7. These fundamental objectives apart, there are practical problems associated with the implementation of Shackleton's recommendations. The legal basis for compulsory purchasing of farms would have to be carefully looked into; and we would need to be sure that there were in fact enough takers for the plots that would become available. Putting the land into FIDA's hands for an indefinite period would solve nothing.

8. In sum, there is scope for restructuring the farming sector, albeit for reasons other than those advanced by Shackleton. But it should be approached piecemeal and on a pragmatic basis, bearing in mind the limited extent of likely Islander demand. It should be possible on this basis to proceed by mutual agreement, buying up farms (or assisting individuals to do so) as they become available, without resort to compulsory purchase. As part of this process, some thought should be given to the possibility of the Falkland Islands Government retaining suitable sites for the setting up of population centres outside Stanley, for preference co-located with and catering for the needs of the garrison, and to splitting up land near Stanley into much smaller plots than envisaged by Shackleton (eg 50 acres) which would be suitable for market gardening (see also paras 26-27 below). It follows that we should not proceed with Shackleton's recommendation (2.10.3) to purchase all farms owned by absentee landlords as soon as is practically feasible.

Development (2.11)

9. Agriculture (2.11.1). The recommendations in this sector all seem sensible, and I would support them. In particular, I hope the introduction of a farm subsidy scheme can go ahead at an early date.

10. Fisheries (2.11.2). I am in favour of implementing the recommendations relating to coastal fisheries with all speed. I see no reason why we should not move ahead with

/the salmon

the salmon ranching pilot scheme straight away. The recommendations on offshore fisheries on the Patagonian shelf on the other hand are all dependant on the introduction of a 200-mile economic zone around the Falklands. Apart from the political considerations, it is not clear to me how we would enforce this. If, however, satisfactory ways can be found to get around this problem, I would be in favour of implementing them also. In the long term, I suspect that the main bonus to the Islands is likely to accrue from fishing for krill in the Southern Ocean. This should be looked at again, with further thought being given to the use of krill in processed form for animal feed rather than directly for human consumption.

11. Tourism (2.11.3). I am sure we should press ahead with encouraging tourism based on visits by tour ships. But I see no imminent prospect of an external air service being established which would be sufficiently attractive to persuade tourists to come to the Islands by this means, and it would be unrealistic to make firm plans on this assumption.

12. On hotel accommodation, it would be pointless, and could create much bad blood in the Islands, to spend large sums of money building a new hotel in Stanley to standards much higher than those already available (eg the Upland Goose). There may be a case for another hotel, but I cannot believe that it should cost anything like as much as £1 million (2.11.3(b)).

13. Promotion of tourism is surely a job for the Falkland Islands Government Office, not the BTA (2.11.3(c)). The BTA may, however, be able to offer advice on promotional techniques from time to time.

14. Knitwear (2.11.4). There is already a move on the Islands to revitalise their cottage knitwear industry. It will at the outset have a ready market in the garrison and, provided that the labour can be found, should be viable. A small grant-in-aid (£20,000) may be worth considering: but Shackleton's figure of £0.2 million is much too high.

15. External Air Services (2.11.5). Provision of a new runway seems to me to be essentially a matter for MOD to decide (and finance). It is, I fear, also too soon to hope for the establishment of any regular air links with mainland countries. But we must obviously aim at setting up some services to and from Chile and/or Uruguay as soon as we can.

16. External Shipping Service (2.11.6). I agree that a more flexible shipping service is likely to be required in future; its frequency will depend to some extent on what

/arrangements

arrangements can be made on the external air service, but I support the recommendation that detailed studies now be put in hand. We should also, as a matter of urgency, see what can be done to rationalise shipping movements via Ascension.

17. Roads (2.11.7). The need for roads will depend very largely on the future pattern of life on the Falklands. As things stand, I am far from certain that we should concentrate on building up a network of roads which the Falkland Islands Government would then be committed to spending large amounts of money on in order to maintain them in a fit state. The terrain in the Falklands is such that roads are unlikely to become a principal means of internal communication. It is right that the Stanley-Darwin road should be completed. Thereafter we would do better to wait until it becomes clearer what roads the garrison will require for their own purposes and whether demand would justify any further civilian works. Meanwhile, I suggest that we should investigate in rather more detail what can be done to increase the use of internal air communications (see para 28 below).

18. Deep Water Jetty (2.11.8). All the jetties in Stanley are in a bad way. Indeed, two of the three main jetties are close to physical collapse. But the first step must be a feasibility study of the harbour as a whole, and I recommend that this be set in hand urgently.

19. Energy Supplies (2.11.9). I agree with 2.11.9(a) and understand that it is already being implemented. On 2.11.9(b), the installation of wind turbines or other generators using locally available sources of energy has much to commend it, provided that this would be economically justifiable. But no-one in the Islands was able even to hazard a guess as to whether this would be so, and further ground work is clearly necessary before a decision is taken.

20. The Garrison (2.12). As far as composition of the garrison is concerned, I support Shackleton's recommendation that as many servicemen as possible should be accompanied by their wives. The arrangement now followed in Belize (by which the Commanding Officer and other senior officers and NCOs are posted on 18 month accompanied tours) would seem to be the obvious model.

21. The question of how far the garrison should be self-sufficient is more difficult. Clearly there must be some physical separation from the main centres of Islander population, and the garrison will need to provide many of its own facilities if the servicemen are not to swamp Islander life. But at the

/same time

same time it can play a central role in revitalising the Islands' economy and should be encouraged to do so. Garrison demand alone should keep a substantial souvenir industry going. The garrison could also usefully look to the Islanders to provide much of their essential food supplies. This would both save money and provide a major shot in the arm for the process of rural diversification. There are, I know, problems in guaranteeing supplies to the troops but I see no reason why these should not be overcome.

22. For the other recommendations on the garrison, I found liaison between the Civil and Military Commissioners to be good, and consider that the existing machinery is fully adequate to the task. It is too early to consider what use could be made of spare capacity in the Royal Engineers for general infrastructure development over and above those projects already identified (eg putting back in order those roads in Stanley which military vehicles have been largely responsible for destroying). But the limited capability of the Sappers to help should not in itself be allowed to hinder rehabilitation and development work. Other means should if necessary be found to implement important civil projects.

Government Structure (2.13)

23. The recommendations in this section are essentially for the Falkland Islanders themselves to carry forward. But it was quite clear to me that there is an urgent need for a development officer on the spot and I consider it most important that the man that the ODA have identified for this position should take up his post as soon as possible.

24. I also cannot let pass the implicit assumption (2.13.4) that it will fall to the public sector alone to provide the financial expertise that the Islanders now lack. We should not encourage the Islanders to think that the Government alone will provide. As I have indicated above, I would see the Manager of the local branch of the Standard Chartered Bank as another key source of advice and finance, and indeed encouraged the Islanders during my visit to talk their projects out with him when he arrives. Commercial advice and credit can and should be allowed to play a vital role in the future development of the Islands.

Finance

25. I have no specific comments on the financial aspects of the report other than those already subsumed above.

/IDEAS NOT

IDEAS NOT CONSIDERED BY SHACKLETON

Population Centres outside Stanley

26. There is only one town as such in the Falkland Islands: Port Stanley. For the rest, there are settlements, each related to an individual estate and built on estate land. All housing is tied to employment. The result has been to prevent the formation of new villages/population centres and, incidentally, to oblige all retired people to live in Stanley, as the only place where small freehold plots are available.

27. Given the difficulties of communication in the Falklands, this has obvious drawbacks. West Falkland, being further away from Stanley, is most affected. The possibility of buying a suitable area of land on West Falkland and setting it aside for development as a nucleus of population with its own shops and service industries should therefore be urgently investigated. The Fox Bay East farm on West Falkland, which I visited, is currently for sale, and we should not overlook the possibility of separating off the settlement area from the farm and using it for this purpose. At a later stage, we might profitably consider doing the same at Darwin/Goose Green and possibly also at San Carlos.

Internal Air Transport

28. Internal air costs are high and, given the extent to which the Islanders have to rely on air transport to get around, a considerable barrier to communications. I would like the idea of increasing the subsidy to be examined. The cost of schemes such as offering each family in Camp a free return ticket once a year to Port Stanley should also be looked at; this would be a good way of pulling the Island families together, and creating a sense of greater cohesiveness in what is inevitably a very diffuse community.

Cranley Onslow

13 October 1982

Secretary of State

FALKLAND ISLANDS VISIT

1. I visited the Falkland Islands from 3 to 8 October. ✓ 7/0.
I had useful talks with the Civil and Military Commissioners; held discussions with the Councillors, both informally, and formally at a joint meeting of the Councils; met many Islanders at a number of settlements in the Camp and addressed a public meeting in Port Stanley.

2. The process of reconstruction and rehabilitation is going ahead well and I am confident that the momentum can be maintained. Compensation to the value of £0.5 million has already been paid - most of the claims in Stanley have been met but the estimates of losses in the Camp are more difficult to establish. The mine fields have been marked and care is being taken to keep the people informed of what progress has been made and of future policy. By and large, there is a high degree of co-operation between the military and civil authorities at all levels. There are, of course, areas of potential friction over internal communication, accommodation for the Camp children attending school in Stanley, at the hospital which is very over-crowded, and about the state of the roads in Stanley which have been seriously damaged by military traffic. But both Commissioners are aware of the dangers and I am sure they are doing everything possible to keep things running smoothly.

3. The Islanders' first reaction to the Shackleton Report is that it should be implemented lock, stock and barrel. But they are not unresponsive to the argument that the report is not holy writ and, with encouragement, are prepared to establish priorities within Shackleton's recommendations and even to add ideas of their own. The holding of land is an emotive issue but not everyone I met wanted to own land even if they could obtain the necessary capital. There is certainly not unanimity in the view that sub-division of the large outside-owned holdings would lead to more productive farming. And, more worrying, there is evidence to suggest that the sub-division of farms, far from increasing the number of people employed on the land, would actually reduce it. New enterprises outside the farming sector are therefore required which will assure new immigrants if Shackleton's target of a population of 2,500 is to be achieved.

4. A constant theme among the people to whom I talked was that the present situation offered a last chance to assure the Islands' economic development. I agree that it is a chance that will not recur. But, outside the farming sector, there does not seem to be much self-confidence or initiative

/to build on

-2-

to build on, and it may take some time before there is a general response to the new opportunities afforded by the post-occupation situation. And although I repeatedly stressed to them the necessity of commitment by the Islanders to the future of their Islands, I think we shall have to take prompt action to improve the level of enterprise and available skills in Port Stanley.

5. A good deal more work needs to be done on possible development projects and much more information is needed about Islander aspirations and the Islands' economic potential. I have encouraged the Civil Commissioner and the Island Councillors to undertake this work and, in particular, to study the likely implications of Lord Shackleton's proposals and to set them in priority with their own suggestions for the future.

6. I have two further comments on the Shackleton Report. I believe that his consideration of the effects of the garrison fails to recognise that the presence of a large number of troops offers the Islanders a new, substantial and consequently changing and comparatively affluent market. They should be encouraged to exploit that market's demand for local produce and souvenirs. I am also concerned that the much higher salaries of imported contract labour will cause widespread local discontent, even if steps are taken to prevent a movement of labour from the land.

7. I have drawn up a commentary on the Shackleton recommendations as I see them after my visit. This is attached as Annex A. I hope that an early decision can be taken to set in hand those that do not involve undue difficulty or expense, since I am anxious that we should be able to show the Islanders and Parliament that we are getting on with it.

8. As for the longer term, it is absolutely clear that the Islanders want no political truck with Buenos Aires, though the more thoughtful of them understand that economic co-existence must be a desirable objective. But they are not in any hurry to discuss any of this in depth, and are content to get on with putting their lives together again under the protection and with the active help of the garrison.



Cranley Onslow

13 October 1982

cc: PUS
Mr Giffard
Mr Ure
FID

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PM/82/84

PRIME MINISTER

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Prime Minister

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Agree (para. 7) that we should not try to amend the Latin American draft but simply lobby hard against it and urge, by high-level messages, our friends to support us.

Yes

A. J. C. 15/10

Falklands: UN Tactics

1. The General Assembly debate on the Falklands is now likely to take place at the beginning of November. I enclose the text of the Latin American draft Resolution which has now been tabled. As you will see, it is drafted in a way likely to attract a large number of positive votes, since at first sight it is a simple call for negotiations with no timetable and no pre-judgement of the sovereignty question. Nevertheless, it is clearly quite unacceptable to us: its references to colonialism are offensive; it refers to non-aligned statements and communiqués which endorsed the Argentine sovereignty claim; and the ideas either of direct negotiation with Argentina following the events of this summer or of a renewed mission of good offices by the Secretary-General are non-starters.
2. There is no doubt therefore that we should vote against the Resolution in this form.
3. Our Mission in New York estimate that, on the most favourable assumptions for us, the draft will attract 104 positive votes, about 48 abstentions and a handful of negative votes. On the worst assumptions it would receive 131 positive votes and about 22 abstentions. We have always known that the Argentines could command a large majority. Their dilution of their draft has naturally increased their prospects. The political significance of their majority will depend to a considerable extent on whether they can attract any of the Europeans (and we suspect that the French are playing a dirty game and may intend to vote for) - or the Americans.
4. We and the Mission in New York have given considerable thought to our best tactics in this situation. We have concluded that the choice lies between maintaining and stepping up our current lobbying exercise against the text as it now stands and an attempt to amend the text in such a way that, while inoffensive to us, it would force Argentina either to vote against her own draft or to drop

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/the



the idea of a Resolution altogether.

5. My view is that with vigorous lobbying, and a very strong pitch at the French, we may yet succeed in getting the Europeans, the Americans and a significant number of other friends to abstain. This would make the result respectable for us and not a triumph for the Argentines. Given the nature of the UN, it is not surprising that we should be unable to muster the support for our position on negotiations that we had for our position on use of force earlier. But this would still leave us facing a UN resolution calling on us to negotiate, which could pave the way for further pressure on us next year and beyond, when our arguments for support from our friends will be weaker than they are now in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. This would not of course affect the situation on the ground or have much political impact here. But it would leave us in a somewhat uncomfortable position at the UN.

6. As far as possible amendment of the Resolution is concerned, we have concluded that simple attempts to insert references to self-determination or the non-use of force into the resolution would be likely to fail. Sir J Thomson has therefore proposed a more sophisticated amendment which we could persuade others to sponsor and which could be expected to attract a lot of positive votes and to embarrass the Argentines. He suggests that we should replace operative paragraph 1 of the draft with the following:

'requests the governments of Argentina and of the United Kingdom to bring about conditions which would permit a resumption of the search, with the participation of representatives of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), for a peaceful solution to their differences within the framework of Article 73 of the UN Charter'.

However I see three drawbacks:

- (i) There is no way of controlling the General Assembly debate or voting once the amendment is launched, and we might find such an exercise backfiring on us as counter amendments were tabled;



- (ii) the offensive paragraphs in the preamble and the reference to the Secretary-General's good offices would remain;
- (iii) to give the manoeuvre any impetus we should have to be willing ourselves to contemplate abstaining or even voting in favour of the amended draft. This would be interpreted as a weakening of our position and as preparation for negotiations in future, even if we cannot agree to them now.

7. On balance, my conclusion is that we should steer clear of sophisticated UN tactics and go for a straight negative lobbying exercise, accepting that the Latin American resolution will nevertheless pass and remain on the record to our future disadvantage. In my view, this should be done through messages from you and me to our ^{opoids} numbers in a wide range of friendly countries. These would say simply that the Argentine-inspired Resolution on the Falkland Islands is deeply offensive to us, both because of its prejudicial comments on colonialism and its references to the decisions of the non-aligned movement and because it is a blatant and hypocritical attempt by Argentina to achieve by diplomatic means what she has so recently failed to achieve by force. Having seen previous negotiations with Argentine unilaterally broken off and followed by an unprovoked armed attack on the Islands, in defiance of international law and international opinion, the British people would simply not understand how any friendly and responsible government could vote for such a Resolution.

8. If you agree, we will recommend in due course appropriate messages. We will need to lean particularly heavily on our European partners.

9. In the meantime we will send appropriate instructions to our Mission in New York and to a wide range of other posts.

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10. I am copying this to OD colleagues and to Sir R Armstrong. It would be helpful to have any comments very quickly, since Sir J Thomson needs instructions as soon as possible.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'FP', with a horizontal line underneath.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
18 October, 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

ARGENTINE DRAFT RESOLUTION

The General Assembly,
having considered the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),
realising that the maintenance of colonial situations is incompatible with the United Nations ideal of universal peace,
considering that its resolution 1514 of 14 December 1960 was inspired by the coveted goal of ending colonialism in all areas and in all forms, one of which encompasses the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),
recalling its resolution 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 3160 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 and 31/49 of 1 December 1976,
recalling further Security Council resolutions 502 (1982) of 3 April 1982 and 505 (1982) of 26 May 1982,
taking note of the statements and communiques of the Movement of Non-Aligned countries on the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),

1. requests the Governments of Argentina and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute relating to the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);
2. requests the Secretary-General, on the basis of this resolution to undertake a renewed mission of good offices in order to assist the parties in complying with the request made in paragraph 1 above;
3. requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session on the progress made in the implementation of this resolution;
4. decides to include in the provisional agenda if its thirty-eighth session the item entitled 'Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)'.

Sir J Thomson's amendment to operative para 1

1. requests the Governments of Argentina and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to bring about conditions which would permit a resumption of the search, with the participation of representatives of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), for a peaceful solution to their differences within the framework of Article 73 of the United Nations Charter.

Article 73

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:

- (a) to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;
- (b) to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;
- (c) to further international peace and security;
- (d) to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to co-operate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialised international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and
- (e) to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.

18 OCT 1982

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A.J.C. 15/10

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 October 1982

Dear John,

Falkland Islands: Rehabilitation

I enclose a further progress report on the programme of rehabilitation, which updates the report sent to you on 1 October.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Offices of all members of OD(FAF) and to the Private Secretary to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever
J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

FALKLANDS REHABILITATION: PROGRESS REPORT

Visit by Mr Onslow

1. Mr Onslow visited the Falkland Islands from 3-8 October. He held talks with the Civil and Military Commissioners and discussions with the Councillors, both informally, and formally at a joint meeting of the Councils.

He also met many Islanders at a number of settlements in the Camp and addressed a public meeting in Port Stanley. He found that the process of reconstruction and rehabilitation was going ahead well and maintaining momentum. There was a high degree of cooperation between the military and civil authorities at all levels and the numerous points of possible friction were being carefully managed. The visit enabled him to give attention to progress on a number of rehabilitation issues covered below.

Finance

2. The rehabilitation grant is close to being fully committed on housing, aircraft, building materials, fuel equipment and plant. Transport costs and bills for tasks undertaken by the Royal Engineers in support of FIG could well absorb the remaining sum. Financing of further rehabilitation work (see paragraph 10 below) will need to be considered in the near future.

Shipping of rehabilitation supplies

3. There continues to be no significant problem in securing shipping for all rehabilitation supplies. The inadequate unloading facilities at Port Stanley have caused some delays but these are now being overcome with the very active assistance of the military authorities. Future shipments will be carefully coordinated to reduce unloading difficulties to an absolute minimum.

Recruitment

4. The ODA's special programme of recruitment for new staff for the FIG is effectively complete and staff are being posted to the Islands.

/Housing

Housing

5. Materials for the first 27 of the planned 54 new housing units will reach Port Stanley on 2 ships early in November. It is planned that an advance party of the construction team should fly to the Islands in mid November followed by the remainder of the contractors' staff. One representative of the construction firm has flown to the Islands earlier this week to reconnoitre the project.

Mobile Homes

6. A ship carrying all 10 mobile homes sailed for the Islands on 15 October. Five of the homes will be initially used as accommodation for the contractors' staff for the housing project.

Replacement aircraft for Falkland Islands Government Air Service

7. One Beaver aircraft and 2 Islander aircraft have been ordered. The Beaver is due to arrive in UK from Canada on 21 October for onward shipment to the Falklands, and should arrive by late November. The Islanders will also need to be delivered by sea and should be available for shipping in about 6/8 weeks.

Hard and soft furnishings

8. Hard and soft furnishings for 24 existing government houses are required and tenders are presently being evaluated by the Crown Agents. Local labour will be available to fit the furnishings in due course.

Compensation

9. The Falkland Islands Company's claim is now being considered; an interim payment of £800,000 has been authorised by the Claims Officers, and full details are being sought from the Islands so that this payment can be carefully reviewed. The compensation scheme continues to function without significant problems. Over £500,000 has now been paid out. It is estimated that about £4.8 million will be paid in the current financial year, which will account for the majority of claims.

/Further

Further rehabilitation work

10. The Islanders will now be looking ahead to decisions on the future development programme. Their concerns cover both the ideas in the Shackleton study, and further renovation/improvement of existing services not considered by Shackleton. These include the inadequate power and water systems; the school hostel and the Stanley hospital where military needs have led to requisitioning of civilian facilities; and social/entertainment facilities now that all larger buildings are under military control as temporary accommodation.

General

11. No major problems affecting the rehabilitation programme have arisen in the period under review.

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OW

Prime Minister


A.J.C. 15/10

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
11, BRISTOL PLACE, LONDON, W1P 9DT

01 211 6402

The Rt Hon Francis Pym MC MP
Secretary of State for Foreign &
Commonwealth Affairs
FCO
King Charles Street
LONDON SW1

18 October 1982





FALKLAND ISLANDS: POTENTIAL FOR OFFSHORE HYDROCARBONS

Eddie Shackleton's recent exercise prompted me to reconsider the scope for promoting the development of offshore hydrocarbons on the Falkland Islands Continental Shelf. Although he did not recommend this area for support (as it is unlikely to contribute to the Falkland Islands economy over the next 10-15 years), I think we should keep it in mind for the future.

If the British Government is to demonstrate that our exercise of Sovereignty over the Falklands is being responsibly undertaken we will, at some stage, have to assess the hydrocarbon potential of the area. For the present, I accept that more immediate tasks have priority. However I hope that, when these are more advanced, the case for a geophysical survey to evaluate further the hydrocarbon potential of one of the most promising areas of the Falklands Continental Shelf can be reviewed.

I am copying this letter to colleagues on OD.



NIGEL LAWSON

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*Arg. ma.
Relation*

Argentina

JD

15 October 1982

FALKLANDS AT THE UN

Thank you for your letter of 8 October in which you explain that you expect to recommend that the Prime Minister should send messages to certain Heads of Government, including Mr. Fraser, nearer to the time of the debate on the Falklands at the United Nations General Assembly. The Prime Minister is content with this procedure.

AJC

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

14. October 1982

N.B. I.R.

AR 13/10.

Dear Sir,

Thank you for your letter of 7 October about the repatriation of the bodies of Service personnel from the Falkland Islands. I note that present plans are that the bodies should arrive on board RFA Sir Bedevere at Marchwood Military Port, Southampton about the end of November.

I think the best plan will be for my officials to arrange for the coroner to attend a meeting either at the Home Office or at MOD to discuss his requirements with both MOD and Home Office officials, and I have accordingly asked for a meeting to be arranged as soon as possible.

Please do not hesitate to get in touch with me again if any points of difficulty arise.

I am copying this to the Prime Minister, Francis Pym, John Biffen and Michael Jopling.

Yours ever,

John Nott

The Rt. Hon. John Nott, MP.

Argentina, Relations, Pt 30



AUG 1982



N. B. P. R.

FCS/82/156

A. J. C. 14/10

CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

f.a.

Falkland Islands Rehabilitation

1. Thank you for your minute of 2 September about the way in which we should finance Falklands rehabilitation expenditure in 1982-83.

2. I think that I can find savings on non-aid votes which can be used to cover the £4 million cost of the settlement with the Ilois people to compensate them for moving from Diego Garcia. This will release the £4 million we have been earmarking in the aid programme for this purpose; and (although the aid programme's contingency reserve for this year is now more or less exhausted) we can - with a number of other changes - finance allocations in such a way as to:

- i) cover the first £3 million of the Falklands rehabilitation expenditure as you propose;
- ii) cover between £4 million and £7 million of extra costs arising from changes beyond my control in the amount of European Community aid attributed to the aid programme; this is contrary to our previous expectation and I need no longer press (as in my minute of 16 July) for extra funds to cover these amounts;
- iii) cover the £2.7 million extra for the Tanzania road this year about which I minuted you recently.

There are also, of course, a number of other specific allocations from this contingency reserve which have been agreed between our officials. In total they now exhaust the funds available for allocation for this year. I will, of course, aim to resist any further claims for spending this year or, if they are inescapable, absorb them by savings elsewhere. But if any of these claims are

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sizeable I may need to approach you with a proposal to draw on the Central Contingency Reserve.

3. Indeed there is already one particular case, that of Jamaica, where I think we should provide more aid this year. This would need to be financed from Central Contingencies. I am minuting to you separately on the details.

4. Finally, I think it is useful that a separate subhead has been agreed within the aid vote for Falklands rehabilitation expenditure. It may be, however, that when we come to financing some of the proposals in the Shackleton Report and longer term development work in the Falklands there will be political advantage in using a separate vote. I would like to keep this option open.

5. I am copying this minute to other members of OD(FAF), and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
14 October 1982

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Argentina, Relations, P+25

Secretary of State

SHACKLETON REPORT : COMMENTS ON RECOMMENDATIONS

Falkland Islands Development Agency (FIDA) (2.9)

1. I am in principle in favour of setting up a FIDA. But I have considerable reservations about the paternalistic role that Shackleton assumes it should play. I hope that it would be possible to rely rather more on individual initiative and private enterprise to bring change to the Islands: I would not, for instance, wish to see FIDA regarded as an exclusive source of advice or funding, to the exclusion of the Standard Chartered Bank (which will shortly be opening in Stanley). We must be clear what we want it to do, and for this reason I strongly endorse Shackleton's caveat (2.9.5) that a careful study be prepared of the optimum capital structure and financing of the FIDA before we move ahead.

2. I see no need for a FIDA office in London. The Falkland Islands Government Office shortly to be established here can perfectly well take care of any FIDA responsibilities on a repayment basis.

Transfer of Farm Ownership (2.10)

3. I doubt whether the takeover and splitting up of absentee-owned farms would have the effects that Shackleton envisages. This is an emotive issue in the Islands. Clearly there is room for improvement in the pattern of farm ownership. Equally clearly, some of the younger and more talented farm managers, who form the backbone of the community, must be given a chance to own their own land: otherwise, many of them will leave and the Islands will lose men on whom the future critically depends. But Shackleton appears to have confused two objectives: preventing the remittances of profits out of the Islands by absentee landlords; and encouraging the growth of population on the land. And, in doing so, he has recommended a way forward which is likely to create problems of its own without necessarily fulfilling either purpose satisfactorily.

4. The problem of overseas remittances could more easily and equitably be dealt with by imposing a tax which would make the exercise unprofitable. This would hit the absentee landlords who have been soaking the Islands for years, while leaving the better absentee landlords (among whom I would include the FIC) who have been ploughing profits back relatively unscathed. This is a matter for the Islanders themselves to pursue, but I have left this thought with them.

/5. On the

5. On the second objective, having discussed the matter extensively with the Islanders, I am clear that breaking up the big farms will not lead to an increase of population on the land. Rather, the reverse. Those farms which have already been split up now provide employment for less people than they did before, and this pattern seems bound to continue, with owners dispensing with farm labour and running the show single-handed themselves.

6. It follows that any population increase will have to be sought outside the farming sector, eg through the setting up of service and other small industries in the main population centres. (On which see paras 11-14 below.)

7. These fundamental objectives apart, there are practical problems associated with the implementation of Shackleton's recommendations. The legal basis for compulsory purchasing of farms would have to be carefully looked into; and we would need to be sure that there were in fact enough takers for the plots that would become available. Putting the land into FIDA's hands for an indefinite period would solve nothing.

8. In sum, there is scope for restructuring the farming sector, albeit for reasons other than those advanced by Shackleton. But it should be approached piecemeal and on a pragmatic basis, bearing in mind the limited extent of likely Islander demand. It should be possible on this basis to proceed by mutual agreement, buying up farms (or assisting individuals to do so) as they become available, without resort to compulsory purchase. As part of this process, some thought should be given to the possibility of the Falkland Islands Government retaining suitable sites for the setting up of population centres outside Stanley, for preference co-located with and catering for the needs of the garrison, and to splitting up land near Stanley into much smaller plots than envisaged by Shackleton (eg 50 acres) which would be suitable for market gardening (see also paras 26-27 below). It follows that we should not proceed with Shackleton's recommendation (2.10.3) to purchase all farms owned by absentee landlords as soon as is practically feasible.

Development (2.11)

9. Agriculture (2.11.1). The recommendations in this sector all seem sensible, and I would support them. In particular, I hope the introduction of a farm subsidy scheme can go ahead at an early date.

10. Fisheries (2.11.2). I am in favour of implementing the recommendations relating to coastal fisheries with all speed. I see no reason why we should not move ahead with

/the salmon

-3-

the salmon ranching pilot scheme straight away. The recommendations on offshore fisheries on the Patagonian shelf on the other hand are all dependant on the introduction of a 200-mile economic zone around the Falklands. Apart from the political considerations, it is not clear to me how we would enforce this. If, however, satisfactory ways can be found to get around this problem, I would be in favour of implementing them also. In the long term, I suspect that the main bonus to the Islands is likely to accrue from fishing for krill in the Southern Ocean. This should be looked at again, with further thought being given to the use of krill in processed form for animal feed rather than directly for human consumption.

11. Tourism (2.11.3). I am sure we should press ahead with encouraging tourism based on visits by tour ships. But I see no imminent prospect of an external air service being established which would be sufficiently attractive to persuade tourists to come to the Islands by this means, and it would be unrealistic to make firm plans on this assumption.

12. On hotel accommodation, it would be pointless, and could create much bad blood in the Islands, to spend large sums of money building a new hotel in Stanley to standards much higher than those already available (eg the Upland Goose). There may be a case for another hotel, but I cannot believe that it should cost anything like as much as £1 million (2.11.3(b)).

13. Promotion of tourism is surely a job for the Falkland Islands Government Office, not the BTA (2.11.3(c)). The BTA may, however, be able to offer advice on promotional techniques from time to time.

14. Knitwear (2.11.4). There is already a move on the Islands to revitalise their cottage knitwear industry. It will at the outset have a ready market in the garrison and, provided that the labour can be found, should be viable. A small grant-in-aid (£20,000) may be worth considering: but Shackleton's figure of £0.2 million is much too high.

15. External Air Services (2.11.5). Provision of a new runway seems to me to be essentially a matter for MOD to decide (and finance). It is, I fear, also too soon to hope for the establishment of any regular air links with mainland countries. But we must obviously aim at setting up some services to and from Chile and/or Uruguay as soon as we can.

16. External Shipping Service (2.11.6). I agree that a more flexible shipping service is likely to be required in future; its frequency will depend to some extent on what

/arrangements.

-4-

arrangements can be made on the external air service, but I support the recommendation that detailed studies now be put in hand. We should also, as a matter of urgency, see what can be done to rationalise shipping movements via Ascension.

17. Roads (2.11.7). The need for roads will depend very largely on the future pattern of life on the Falklands. As things stand, I am far from certain that we should concentrate on building up a network of roads which the Falkland Islands Government would then be committed to spending large amounts of money on in order to maintain them in a fit state. The terrain in the Falklands is such that roads are unlikely to become a principal means of internal communication. It is right that the Stanley-Darwin road should be completed. Thereafter we would do better to wait until it becomes clearer what roads the garrison will require for their own purposes and whether demand would justify any further civilian works. Meanwhile, I suggest that we should investigate in rather more detail what can be done to increase the use of internal air communications (see para 28 below).

18. Deep Water Jetty (2.11.8). All the jetties in Stanley are in a bad way. Indeed, two of the three main jetties are close to physical collapse. But the first step must be a feasibility study of the harbour as a whole, and I recommend that this be set in hand urgently.

19. Energy Supplies (2.11.9). I agree with 2.11.9(a) and understand that it is already being implemented. On 2.11.9(b), the installation of wind turbines or other generators using locally available sources of energy has much to commend it, provided that this would be economically justifiable. But no-one in the Islands was able even to hazard a guess as to whether this would be so, and further ground work is clearly necessary before a decision is taken.

20. The Garrison (2.12). As far as composition of the garrison is concerned, I support Shackleton's recommendation that as many servicemen as possible should be accompanied by their wives. The arrangement now followed in Belize (by which the Commanding Officer and other senior officers and NCOs are posted on 18 month accompanied tours) would seem to be the obvious model.

21. The question of how far the garrison should be self-sufficient is more difficult. Clearly there must be some physical separation from the main centres of Islander population, and the garrison will need to provide many of its own facilities if the servicemen are not to swamp Islander life. But at the

/same time

-5-

same time it can play a central role in revitalising the Islands' economy and should be encouraged to do so. Garrison demand alone should keep a substantial souvenir industry going. The garrison could also usefully look to the Islanders to provide much of their essential food supplies. This would both save money and provide a major shot in the arm for the process of rural diversification. There are, I know, problems in guaranteeing supplies to the troops but I see no reason why these should not be overcome.

22. For the other recommendations on the garrison, I found liaison between the Civil and Military Commissioners to be good, and consider that the existing machinery is fully adequate to the task. It is too early to consider what use could be made of spare capacity in the Royal Engineers for general infrastructure development over and above those projects already identified (eg putting back in order those roads in Stanley which military vehicles have been largely responsible for destroying). But the limited capability of the Sappers to help should not in itself be allowed to hinder rehabilitation and development work. Other means should if necessary be found to implement important civil projects.

Government Structure (2.13)

23. The recommendations in this section are essentially for the Falkland Islanders themselves to carry forward. But it was quite clear to me that there is an urgent need for a development officer on the spot and I consider it most important that the man that the ODA have identified for this position should take up his post as soon as possible.

24. I also cannot let pass the implicit assumption (2.13.4) that it will fall to the public sector alone to provide the financial expertise that the Islanders now lack. We should not encourage the Islanders to think that the Government alone will provide. As I have indicated above, I would see the Manager of the local branch of the Standard Chartered Bank as another key source of advice and finance, and indeed encouraged the Islanders during my visit to talk their projects out with him when he arrives. Commercial advice and credit can and should be allowed to play a vital role in the future development of the Islands.

Finance

25. I have no specific comments on the financial aspects of the report other than those already subsumed above.

/IDEAS NOT

-6-

IDEAS NOT CONSIDERED BY SHACKLETON

Population Centres outside Stanley

26. There is only one town as such in the Falkland Islands: Port Stanley. For the rest, there are settlements, each related to an individual estate and built on estate land. All housing is tied to employment. The result has been to prevent the formation of new villages/population centres and, incidentally, to oblige all retired people to live in Stanley, as the only place where small freehold plots are available.

27. Given the difficulties of communication in the Falklands, this has obvious drawbacks. West Falkland, being further away from Stanley, is most affected. The possibility of buying a suitable area of land on West Falkland and setting it aside for development as a nucleus of population with its own shops and service industries should therefore be urgently investigated. The Fox Bay East farm on West Falkland, which I visited, is currently for sale, and we should not overlook the possibility of separating off the settlement area from the farm and using it for this purpose. At a later stage, we might profitably consider doing the same at Darwin/Goose Green and possibly also at San Carlos.

Internal Air Transport

28. Internal air costs are high and, given the extent to which the Islanders have to rely on air transport to get around, a considerable barrier to communications. I would like the idea of increasing the subsidy to be examined. The cost of schemes such as offering each family in Camp a free return ticket once a year to Port Stanley should also be looked at; this would be a good way of pulling the Island families together, and creating a sense of greater cohesiveness in what is inevitably a very diffuse community.



Cranley Onslow

13 October 1982

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MR GILLMORE

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Ms Alan Titchener AUs. DOT
MR CW ROBERTS IAT/DOT

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DESKBY 140800Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 132353Z OCT 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1636 DATED 13 OCTOBER 82

read - free
M

MY TELSNOs 1561 AND 1566, PARAGRAPH 7: ARGENTINE STATEMENT IN GENERAL DEBATE

1. I DELIVERED MY RIGHT OF REPLY TO AGUIRRE LANARI IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS EVENING (13 OCTOBER). THE ARGENTINE REPRESENTATIVE RESERVED HIS RIGHT TO REPLY AT SOME LATER DATE.
2. FOLLOWING IS MY TEXT:

ON 1 OCTOBER THE DISTINGUISHED FOREIGN MINISTER OF ARGENTINE TREATED THIS ASSEMBLY TO A DISTORTED ACCOUNT OF THE 18TH AND 19TH CENTURY HISTORY OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. HIS STATEMENT CONTAINED SEVERAL OTHER TENDENTIOUS OR MISLEADING ASSERTIONS. IT IS NOT MY DELEGATION'S PURPOSE TO RESPOND IN DETAIL NOW: THE PROPER TIME FOR THAT WILL BE NEXT MONTH WHEN THE DEBATE WHICH ARGENTINA AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES HAVE ASKED FOR TAKES PLACE IN THIS ASSEMBLY. AT PRESENT I WILL RESTRICT MYSELF TO CORRECTING ONE OR TWO DISTORTIONS OF THE FACTS.

THE DISTINGUISHED FOREIGN MINISTER SOUGHT TO MAKE OUT THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD NEVER VOLUNTARILY OBSERVED THE CHARTER PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION. THAT ASSERTION WILL AMUSE IF NOT AMAZE

OF SELF-DETERMINATION. THAT ASSERTION WILL AMUSE IF NOT AMAZE MANY DELEGATIONS OF SOVEREIGN COUNTRIES WHICH WERE ONCE BRITISH COLONIES. THE BRITISH EMPIRE EXISTS NO MORE. INSTEAD THERE IS THE COMMONWEALTH. THIS CONSISTS OF INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE EXERCISED SELF-DETERMINATION. IF ARGENTINE WOULD CHANGE HER ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PRINCIPLE AND EXERCISE OF SELF-DETERMINATION WE MIGHT NOT HAVE ANY DISPUTE OVER THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS.

THE DISTINGUISHED FOREIGN MINISTER HAS SOUGHT TO OBSCURE BOTH THE POSITION OF MY GOVERNMENT AND THAT OF HIS OWN IN REGARD TO SELF-DETERMINATION BY TRYING TO DRAW ANALOGIES BETWEEN 150 YEARS OF CONTINUOUS PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE FACTS ARE AGAINST HIM. THE PRESENT POPULATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ARE DESCENDANTS OF PEOPLE WHO ESTABLISHED THE FIRST AND ONLY SETTLED POPULATION OF THE ISLANDS. THE MAJORITY OF THEM ARE DESCENDANTS OF PEOPLE WHO SETTLED THERE BEFORE 1850. THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON THE OTHER HAND ARE OF RECENT DATE AND HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED IN FACE OF THE NEARLY UNIVERSAL CONDEMNATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON TERRITORY OVER WHICH ISRAEL NEITHER CLAIMS NOR EXERCISES SOVEREIGNTY AND WHICH ALREADY HAD A SETTLED POPULATION. MY GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS. SO TOO DOES THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. WHY THEN DO THEY CLAIM THAT THERE SHOULD BE A SPECIAL EXCEPTION SOLELY IN THE CASE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS TO THE UNIVERSAL AND FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION?

THE DESCRIPTION GIVEN BY THE DISTINGUISHED FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE EVENTS OF LAST APRIL IS A TRAVESTY OF THE FACTS. I NEED NOT REHEARSE THESE FACTS BECAUSE THEY ARE ALL IN RECENT MEMORY. BUT IT IS NOT TRUE THAT THERE WAS ANY BRITISH ACTION WHICH JUSTIFIED THE ARGENTINE INVASION OF THE ISLANDS IN TOTAL DISREGARD NOT ONLY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT ALSO OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NON USE OF FORCE. I BELIEVE ALL DELEGATIONS WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO SQUARE WITH THE TRUTH THE DISTINGUISHED FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT THAT 'THE RECOGNITION BY ARGENTINA OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN THIS DISPUTE WAS MADE QUITE CLEAR IN MANY STATEMENTS BY MY GOVERNMENT IN FAVOUR OF AN EFFECTIVE AND FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 502 (1982).'

I LEAVE IT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ITSELF TO JUDGE WHICH OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAS STRIVEN BY EVERY MEANS TO OBSERVE ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 73 OF THE CHARTER AND WHICH OF THEM CHOSE, BY ILLEGAL RECOURSE TO ARMS A MERE SIX MONTHS AGO, FORCIBLY TO SUPPRESS THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE PEOPLE OF A NON SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORY AND TO SUBJECT THEM TO ALIEN DOMINATION. IT IS STRANGE THAT WHILE THE DISTINGUISHED FOREIGN MINISTER OF ARGENTINA ATTACKS COLONIALISM HIS GOVERNMENT SHOULD TRY TO CREATE A NEW COLONY BY FORCE OF ARMS.

Secretary of State

FALKLAND ISLANDS VISIT

1. I visited the Falkland Islands from 3 to 8 October. I had useful talks with the Civil and Military Commissioners; held discussions with the Councillors, both informally, and formally at a joint meeting of the Councils; met many Islanders at a number of settlements in the Camp and addressed a public meeting in Port Stanley.

2. The process of reconstruction and rehabilitation is going ahead well and I am confident that the momentum can be maintained. Compensation to the value of £0.5 million has already been paid - most of the claims in Stanley have been met but the estimates of losses in the Camp are more difficult to establish. The mine fields have been marked and care is being taken to keep the people informed of what progress has been made and of future policy. By and large, there is a high degree of co-operation between the military and civil authorities at all levels. There are, of course, areas of potential friction over internal communication, accommodation for the Camp children attending school in Stanley, at the hospital which is very over-crowded, and about the state of the roads in Stanley which have been seriously damaged by military traffic. But both Commissioners are aware of the dangers and I am sure they are doing everything possible to keep things running smoothly.

3. The Islanders' first reaction to the Shackleton Report is that it should be implemented lock, stock and barrel. But they are not unresponsive to the argument that the report is not holy writ and, with encouragement, are prepared to establish priorities within Shackleton's recommendations and even to add ideas of their own. The holding of land is an emotive issue but not everyone I met wanted to own land even if they could obtain the necessary capital. There is certainly not unanimity in the view that sub-division of the large outside-owned holdings would lead to more productive farming. And, more worrying, there is evidence to suggest that the sub-division of farms, far from increasing the number of people employed on the land, would actually reduce it. New enterprises outside the farming sector are therefore required which will assure new immigrants if Shackleton's target of a population of 2,500 is to be achieved.

4. A constant theme among the people to whom I talked was that the present situation offered a last chance to assure the Islands' economic development. I agree that it is a chance that will not recur. But, outside the farming sector, there does not seem to be much self-confidence or initiative

/to build on .

to build on, and it may take some time before there is a general response to the new opportunities afforded by the post-occupation situation. And although I repeatedly stressed to them the necessity of commitment by the Islanders to the future of their Islands, I think we shall have to take prompt action to improve the level of enterprise and available skills in Port Stanley.

5. A good deal more work needs to be done on possible development projects and much more information is needed about Islander aspirations and the Islands' economic potential. I have encouraged the Civil Commissioner and the Island Councillors to undertake this work and, in particular, to study the likely implications of Lord Shackleton's proposals and to set them in priority with their own suggestions for the future.

6. I have two further comments on the Shackleton Report. I believe that his consideration of the effects of the garrison fails to recognise that the presence of a large number of troops offers the Islanders a new, substantial and consequently changing and comparatively affluent market. They should be encouraged to exploit that market's demand for local produce and souvenirs. I am also concerned that the much higher salaries of imported contract labour will cause widespread local discontent, even if steps are taken to prevent a movement of labour from the land.

7. I have drawn up a commentary on the Shackleton recommendations as I see them after my visit. This is attached as Annex A. I hope that an early decision can be taken to set in hand those that do not involve undue difficulty or expense, since I am anxious that we should be able to show the Islanders and Parliament that we are getting on with it.

8. As for the longer term, it is absolutely clear that the Islanders want no political truck with Buenos Aires, though the more thoughtful of them understand that economic co-existence must be a desirable objective. But they are not in any hurry to discuss any of this in depth, and are content to get on with putting their lives together again under the protection and with the active help of the garrison.

S.

Cranley Onslow

13 October 1982

cc: PUS
Mr Giffard
Mr Ure
FID

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FM MADRID 131150Z OCT 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 527 OF 13 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK

INFO SAVING TO BOGOTA, BRASILIA, BIS BUENOS AIRES, CARACAS, HAVANA, LA PAZ, LIMA, MEXICO CITY, MONTEVIDEO, PANAMA CITY, PORT STANLEY, QUITO, RIO DE JANEIRO, SANTIAGO, SAO PAULO.

FALKLANDS PARADE IN CITY OF LONDON

1. THE SPANISH PRESS REPORT THE LONDON MILITARY PARADE UNDER FRONT PAGE HEADLINES "BRITISH AFFRONT TO THE HISPANIC WORLD", DIARIO 16: "THE ENGLISH INVENT ANTI-HISPANIDAD" YA: "LONDON COMMEMORATES VICTORY IN THE MALVINAS ON THE DAY OF HISPANIDAD", ABC: "GRATUITOUS OFFENCE TO HISPANIC PEOPLES BY LONDON" ALCAZAR. "YESTERDAY THERE WERE TWO CELEBRATIONS OF 12 OCTOBER. ONE IN LONDON IN THE MOST EXTREME NATIONALIST STYLE WHICH IS ANACHRONISTIC AND SHAMEFUL TO CELEBRATE THE BRITISH VICTORY IN THE MALVINAS. IN THE OTHER THE KING OF SPAIN LOOKING TOWARDS THE FUTURE AFFIRMED THAT ONLY LIBERTY AND DEMOCRACY UNITED CAN GUARANTEE THE FUTURE", DIARIO 16.

2. THE REPORTS FROM LONDON CORRESPONDENTS QUOTE NEWS DEPARTMENT AS SAYING THAT THE DATE WAS AN UNINTENTIONAL COINCIDENCE. THEY ALSO REPORT EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN FROM LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND A UCD DELEGATION WHICH ATTENDED THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONGRESS. THE PARADE IS REPORTED FACTUALLY WITH EXTRACTS FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH WHICH IS DESCRIBED

CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONGRESS. THE PARADE IS REPORTED FACTUALLY WITH EXTRACTS FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH WHICH IS DESCRIBED AS TRIUMPHALIST. TV AND RADIO HAVE ALSO GIVEN THE EVENT SIMILAR FULL AND CRITICAL COVERAGE.

3. AT THE MAJOR CEREMONY HELD IN SPAIN TO MARK THE DAY OF HISPANIDAD AT WHICH THE KING AND QUEEN AND ALL LATIN AMERICAN AMBASSADORS WERE PRESENT, ROBLES PIQUER, PRESIDENT OF THE IBER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR COOPERATION, EXPRESSED SORROW AND IRRITATION ABOUT THE MILITARY PARADE IN LONDON TAKING PLACE ON THE SAME DAY.

4. EDITORIALS AND COMMENTARIES ARE EVEN MORE CRITICAL. "MRS THATCHER HAS TAKEN A GIANT STEP TOWARDS BEHAVING LIKE GALTIERI". "THE BRITISH WHO DURING CENTURIES WERE THE MODEL FOR LIBERTY HAVE NOW LAID ON A SHAMEFUL NINETEENTH CENTURY SHOW TO CELEBRATE A PYRRIC VICTORY IN THE FALKLANDS".

5. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT THE STRONGEST CRITICISM IS FROM DIARIO 16 AND CAMBIO 16 WHICH WERE THE MOST CRITICAL OF THE ARGENTINE INVASION AND SUPPORTED BRITAIN'S RIGHT TO RECOVER THE FALKLANDS.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

PARSONS

HNNN

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 October 1982

SHACKLETON REPORT

I attach a copy of a letter which I have received from Lord Shackleton, together with a copy of its enclosures. The first enclosure presents in a different way figures which appeared in Lord Shackleton's study and which enabled per capita expenditure in the Falkland Islands to be compared with expenditure in the Highlands and Islands.

You may think that this information should be circulated to members of OD(FAF).

A. J. COLES

Richard Hatfield, Esq.,
Cabinet Office.

GRS 260
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FM PARIS 121915Z OCT 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 965 OF 12 OCTOBER 1982
INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK ATHENS BRUSSELS UKREP BRUSSELS
COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE LUXEMBOURG ROME DUBLIN AND BONN
INFO SAVING TO WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIALS/ NO. 10, DOWNING STREET.

Prime Minister

*We are reaching the point
where decisions on tactics
are needed. I have
therefore asked the F./C.O.
to put recommendations to
you over the weekend.*

UKMIS NEW YORK TEL NO 1601: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

A.F.C.

1. WHEN FIRST SECRETARY (CHANCERY) CALLED ON THE HEAD OF SOUTH AMERICAN DEPARTMENT AT THE QUAI ON 11 OCTOBER TO TAKE ACTION ON GUIDANCE TEL NO 186 FOUQUET VOLUNTEERED THE INFORMATION THAT FRANCE "WILL VOTE FOR NEGOTIATIONS". FORD EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AND ASKED IF CONSIDERATIONS AT LEAST OF COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY MIGHT NOT SWAY THE FRENCH INTO FOLLOWING THE MAJORITY LINE. FOUQUET SAID THAT IF NEED BE FRANCE WOULD AGAIN BREAK RANKS AS IT DID OVER THE ARMS EMBARGO BECAUSE THE DOMINANT STRAIN IN FRENCH POLICY AT THE MOMENT WAS "THIRD WORLDISM".

2. GIVEN THIS EVIDENCE THAT THE FRENCH POSITION HAS HARDENED I ENDORSE SIR J THOMSON'S RECOMMENDATION THAT WE SHOULD WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY ACT IN PARIS AND PERHAPS OTHER EC CAPITALS TO EXPLAIN WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE ARGENTINE DRAFT AND WHY WE HOPE OUR PARTNERS WILL COOPERATE WITH US. IN TACKLING THE FRENCH I WOULD SEE NO OBJECTION TO ALLUDING TO OUR POSITION ON MAYOTTE AND THE ILES GLORIEUSES (PARA 4 OF UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1582). WE CAN ALSO MAKE THE GENERAL POINT THAT IF THE STATUS OF THE FALKLANDS IS HELD TO BE UNCERTAIN AND A PROPER SUBJECT FOR NEGOTIATION AFTER 150 YEARS OF PEACEFUL ADMINISTRATION, THE STATUS OF MOST OF FRANCE'S OVERSEAS POSSESSIONS MUST BE REGARDED AS DISTINCTLY QUESTIONABLE. ONE OTHER ARGUMENT WHICH MIGHT GIVE THE FRENCH PAUSE IS THAT IF THE DEBATE AND VOTE TAKE PLACE IN THE WEEK BEGINNING 1 NOVEMBER A FRENCH VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE ARGENTINE DRAFT WOULD CAST A SHADOW OVER THE BILATERAL SUMMIT ON 4-5 NOVEMBER. I WOULD PROPOSE TO MAKE THIS POINT TO THE ELYSEE AS WELL AS THE QUAI.

FCO PASS SAVING TO WASHINGTON.

FRETWELL

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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SW

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 October, 1982

City of London Salute to the Task Force

The Prime Minister was grateful for your letter of 7 October, the contents of which she has noted.

A. J. COLES

Colin Walters, Esq.,
Home Office

do

Argentina

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GRS 672

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FM FCO 111245Z OCT 82

TO PRIORITY SUVA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 203 OF 11 OCTOBER

INFO CANBERRA, WELLINGTON

MIPT: FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO RATU MARA

BEGINS:

1. AS I AM SURE YOU KNOW, THE STAUNCH SUPPORT WHICH YOU AND OTHER COMMONWEALTH LEADERS HAVE GIVEN US SINCE THE ARGENTINE INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS HAVE BEEN A SOURCE OF INSPIRATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT TO ME AND TO MY COLLEAGUES, AND HAVE REMINDED US ALL OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES WHICH COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS HOLD IN COMMON. I WAS PARTICULARLY GRATEFUL TO LEARN OF THE OUTSTANDING EFFORTS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE BY YOUR DELEGATION IN NEW YORK. THEIR EXTENSIVE LOBBYING AND THE ENCOURAGING RESPONSE ACHIEVED AS WELL AS THEIR DECLARED INTENT TO VOTE AGAINST THE LATIN-AMERICAN RESOLUTION, EPITOMISE THE ROBUST SUPPORT WHICH FIJI AND OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES HAVE GIVEN US IN THE CRISIS AND I AM GLAD TO BE ABLE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO THANK YOU PERSONALLY.

2. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO BE VERY GRATEFUL FOR ANY SUPPORT THAT YOU AND YOUR COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES CAN GIVE US IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD PARTICULARLY LIKE TO EXPLAIN OUR THINKING TO YOU BEFORE YOU COME TO CHAIR THE FORTHCOMING MEETING OF COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE ASIA/PACIFIC REGION. BRITAIN IS NOT, OF COURSE, REPRESENTED AT THESE MEETINGS, BUT IF THE MATTER ARISES, I SHOULD LIKE OUR VIEWS, AND THE STRENGTH WITH WHICH WE HOLD THEM, TO BE FULLY UNDERSTOOD. I SHOULD IN ANY CASE BE HAPPY FOR YOU TO PASS COPIES OF THIS MESSAGE TO THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IF YOU SEE FIT, SO THAT THEY HAVE ACCESS TO AN EXPLANATION OF OUR POSITION AT THE MEETING AND WHEN, LATER, THEY ARE CONSIDERING THEIR OWN POSITION AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

3. YOU PROBABLY ALREADY KNOW THAT ARGENTINA IS CURRENTLY SEEKING SUPPORT FOR A DRAFT GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION CALLING ON US TO

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ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH HER ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS. AS I AM SURE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND, THE UK WILL OPPOSE ANY OTHER RESOLUTION. WE CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO RESUME - AS IF NOTHING HAD HAPPENED - THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ARGENTINA HERSELF BROKE OFF WITH NO WARNING EARLIER THIS YEAR IN ORDER TO INVADE. OUR LOSSES WERE CONSIDERABLE DESPITE OUR SUCCESSES. THE INVASION WAS A TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCE FOR THE ISLANDERS. THEY NOW HAVE TO LIVE WITH THE TERRIBLE AFTERMATH OF WAR, INCLUDING UNEXPLODED MINES, SCATTERED INDISCRIMINATELY THROUGHOUT THE ISLANDS. THE DAMAGE WILL TAKE CONSIDERABLE TIME, EFFORT AND MONEY TO REPAIR. TIME WILL ALSO BE NEEDED TO ENABLE THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS TO RECOVER AND THINK ABOUT THEIR FUTURE BEFORE EXPRESSING THEIR VIEWS. WHAT IS MORE, DESPITE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT'S VARIOUS ATTEMPTS TO PERSUADE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT HOSTILITIES HAVE CEASED DE FACTO, THEY HAVE STILL FAILED TO ISSUE AN UNAMBIGUOUS DECLARATION THAT HOSTILITIES WILL NOT BE RESUMED. OUR EFFORTS TO END THE CONFLICT AND START THE PROCESS OF GETTING RELATIONS BACK TO NORMAL HAVE MET WITH LITTLE OR NO UNDERSTANDING OR COOPERATION. ARGENTINA APPEARS TO SEE NEGOTIATION SOLELY AS A ROUTE TOWARDS THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY.

4. IF THERE IS ANY DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT AT YOUR MEETING IN SUVA, I SHOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL IF YOU AND OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES WOULD UNDERLINE THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER WHICH ARGENTINA CALLED INTO QUESTION BY HER INVASION, PRINCIPLES WHICH HAVE ALWAYS RECEIVED THE COMMONWEALTH'S FIRM SUPPORT. I HOPE IN PARTICULAR THAT YOU WILL ALL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION TO BE GIVEN FULL WEIGHT IN THE CASE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS, WHO ARE AS FULLY ENTITLED TO IT AS ALL OTHER PEOPLES AND WHOSE RIGHTS IN THIS, AS IN MANY OTHER RESPECTS, ARGENTINA SEEKS TO DENY. I WOULD ALSO ASK THAT YOU AND THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO BE REPRESENTED AT THE MEETING SHOULD REFRAIN - AS MANY OF THEM DID IN 1976 - FROM SUPPORTING ANY RESOLUTION AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY WHICH CALLS ON US TO NEGOTIATE. ALTHOUGH THE TIMING IS NOT YET CLEAR, I UNDERSTAND THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY MAY BE DISCUSSING THE FALKLANDS SOME TIME IN MID-NOVEMBER.

PYM

LIMITED	SEAD
CCD	PS
FID	PS/MR ONSLOW
UND	PS/PUS
SAD	SIR J LEAHY
SPD	MR SQUIRE

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TO PRIORITY SUVA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 202 OF 11 OCTOBER.

AND TO PRIORITY CANBERRA, WELLINGTON

INFO ROUTINE NEW DELHI, PORT MORESBY, DHAKA, KUALA LUMPUR,
SINGAPORE

INFO SAVING NUKU'ALOFA, COLOMBO, UKMIS NEW YORK

POSSIBLE DISCUSSION OF FALKLANDS DURING CHOGRM

1. WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR RESPONSES TO FCO TELNO 131 TO SUVA.
2. IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THESE COMMENTS, AND OF FURTHER ADVICE FROM RAMPHAL, THE PRIME MINISTER HAS DECIDED TO SEND A MESSAGE TO RATU MARA SETTING OUT OUR POLICY AND ENCOURAGING HIM TO PASS A COPY TO OTHERS PRESENT AT THE MEETING SO THAT THEY ARE AWARE OF OUR VIEWS. RAMPHAL HAS UNDERTAKEN TO SUGGEST TO RATU MARA THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER BE CONSIDERED DURING THE WEEKEND RETREAT.
3. FOR SUVA ONLY. MIFT (NOT TO ALL) CONTAINS TEXT OF PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO RATU MARA. PLEASE ARRANGE FOR ITS EARLY DELIVERY. YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT RAMPHAL IS AWARE OF THE MESSAGE (THOUGH HE HAS NOT SEEN THE TEXT), AND WOULD BE GLAD TO ADVISE RATU MARA ON HOW IT MIGHT BE HANDLED. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT YOU YOURSELF WOULD BE GLAD TO EXPLAIN FURTHER DETAILS OF OUR FALKLANDS POLICY TO RATU MARA IF HE WOULD FIND THIS HELPFUL. (PLEASE LET US KNOW IF YOU REQUIRE FURTHER INFORMATION YOURSELF).
4. FOR CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON ONLY. PLEASE EXPLAIN TO YOUR HOST GOVERNMENT, AT WHATEVER LEVEL YOU THINK BEST, WHAT WE ARE PLANNING TO DO, ADDING THAT OUR ACTION IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ADVICE WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM RAMPHAL. PLEASE PASS TO THEM, IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE, A COPY OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO RATU MARA AND SAY THAT WE WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL IF THEIR DELEGATION COULD TAKE WHATEVER STEPS AT SUVA ARE NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT OUR VIEWS ARE CLEARLY PROPOUNDED AND ADEQUATELY DEFENDED THERE.

PYM

LIMITED	SEAD
CCD	PS
FID	PS/MR ONSLOW
UND	PS/PUS
SAD	SIR J LEAHY
SPD	MR SQUIRE

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Argentina FILE SW

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 October, 1982

Falklands at the United Nations


The Prime Minister was grateful for your letter of 8 October, the contents of which she has noted.

A. J. COLES

J. E. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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FM FCO 111300Z OCTOBER 82
TO PRIOROTY ABIDJAN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 143 OF 11 OCTOBER
AND TO CERTAIN MISSIONS.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 129: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. THE LATIN AMERICANS HAVE NOW FORMALLY TABLED THEIR DRAFT RESOLUTION. IT IS A SOMEWHAT DILUTED VERSION OF THE DRAFT DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TUR. THE PREAMBLE NO LONGER LISTS THE VARIOUS STATEMENTS OF THE NON-ALIGNED NOR DOES IT QUOTE FROM THEM. THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS NO LONGER SUGGEST THAT THE PROPOSED NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS OR NON-ALIGNED PRONOUNCEMENTS. THE DRAFT STILL CONTAINS A NUMBER OF CONTENTIOUS FEATURES IN THE PREAMBLE (WE FIND THE REFERENCES TO COLONIALISM PARTICULARLY INSULTING AND INAPPROPRIATE) BUT WE BELIEVE THAT SOME OF OUR FRIENDS MAY NOW REGARD IT AS A FAIRLY REASONABLE TEXT. FULL TEXT IN MIFT.
2. THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT HAVING BEEN POSTPONED UNTIL NEXT YEAR, NON-ALIGNED FOREIGN MINISTERS ADOPTED A COMMUNIQUE AT A MEETING IN NEW YORK WHICH BEGAN ON 4 OCTOBER. AFTER A PROLONGED BATTLE IN WHICH ARGENINA AND CUBA WERE RESISTED (UNUSUALLY) BY AFRICAN AND ASIAN DELEGATIONS AS WELL AS CARIBBEAN MEMBERS OF THEIR OWN GROUP, AN AGREED TEXT HAS EMERGED, ON WHICH A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS HAVE ENTERED RESERVATIONS (WE AWAIT DETAILS OF THESE).
3. THE TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS:
BEGINS: THE MOVEMENT REITERATED ITS SUPPORT FOR THE RIGHT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA TO OBTAIN THE RESTITUTION OF THE MALVINAS ISLANDS TO ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND ASKED THAT NEGOTIATIONS BE RE-INITIATED, WITH THE PARTICIPATION AND GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, WITH THE AIM OF ACHIEVING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE A SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PRINCIPLES AND DECISIONS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS 1514, 2621, 3160 AND 31/49. ENDS
4. WHILE THE SUBSTANCE IS OF COURSE ENTIRELY UNACCEPTABLE, A Milder text adopted with less controversy could well have done more damage to our campaign to maximise abstentions on the

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ARGENTINE DRAFT RESOLUTION. WE HOPE THAT MANY OF OUR FRIENDS WILL DECLINE TO REGARD THEMSELVES AS BOUND IN ANY WAY BY THIS COMMUNIQUE.

5. THE LINE TO TAKE IN PARAS 6-9 TO MY TUR REMAINS VALID. POSTS SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE SMALL CHANGES IN THE ARGENTINE TEXT DO NOTHING TO AFFECT OUR ATTITUDE TO IT. WE HOPE OUR FRIEND WILL NOT BE SEDUCED BY THEM. WE CANNOT TRUST ARGENTINE GOOD FAITH. ARGENTINA WANTS NEGOTIATION FOR ONE PURPOSE ONLY, THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY TO HERSELF WITHOUT REGARD FOR THE WISHES OF THE POPULATION. THE NON-ALINGED TEXT MAKES THIS CLEAR ONCE AGAIN. THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IS DEFECTIVE IN MAKING NO REFERENCE TO THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION. THE ARGENTINES HAVE NO RIGHT TO COME FORWARD WITH A DRAFT RESOLUTION OF THIS KIND WHEN ONLY SIX MONTHS AGO THEY WERE USING FORCE IN DEFIANCE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TRY ILLEGALLY TO ENFORCE THEIR CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY, AND WHEN THE STILL REFUSE TO DECLARE A DEFINITIVE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

6. WE EXPECT THE DEBATE TO START AT THE BEGINNING OF NOVEMBER. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS AND HIGH-LEVEL MESSAGES ARE LIKELY TO BE SENT TO CERTAIN POSTS. MEANWHILE, YOU SHOULD KEEP IN TOUCH WITH YOUR HOST GOVERNMENTS AS YOU JUDGE APPROPRIATE, MAKING CLEAR THE IMPORTANCE I AND MY COLLEAGUES ATTACH TO THIS MATTER AND URGING THEM AS NECESSARY TO REFRAIN FROM SUPPORTING THE NEW DRAFT. WE HOPE THAT A GOOD NUMBER OF NEGATIVE VOTES WILL BE FORTHCOMING BUT WE EXPECT AT LEAST ABSTENTIONS FROM AS MANY OF OUR FRIENDS AS POSSIBLE.

7. LATIN AMERICAN POSTS RECEIVE THIS TELEGRAM FOR INFORMATION ONLY. EC POSTS NEED ALSO TAKE NO ACTION AT THIS STAGE.

PYM

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GRS 299

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FM FCO 111330Z OCTOBER 82

TO PRIORITY ABIDJAN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 144 OF 11 OCTOBER 82

AND TO CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS.

MIPT: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ARGENTINE DRAFT RESOLUTION AS NOW
TABLED:

BEGINS: THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
HAVING CONSIDERED THE QUESTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS),
REALISING THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF COLONIAL SITUATIONS IS
INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS IDEAL OF UNIVERSAL PEACE,
CONSIDERING THAT ITS RESOLUTION 1514 OF 14 DECEMBER 1960
WAS INSPIRED BY THE COVETED GOAL OF ENDING COLONIALISM IN ALL AREA
AND IN ALL FORMS, ONE OF WHICH ENCOMPASSES THE QUESTION OF THE
FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS),
RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 2065 (XX) OF 16 DECEMBER 1965, 3160
(XXVIII) OF 14 DECEMBER 1973 AND 31/49 OF 1 DECEMBER 1976,
RECALLING FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 502 (1982) OF
3 APRIL 1982 AND 505 (1982) OF 26 MAY 1982,
TAKING NOTE OF THE STATEMENTS AND COMMUNIQUE OF THE MOVEMENT OF
NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES ON THE QUESTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
(MALVINAS),

1. REQUESTS THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO RESUME
NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO FIND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE A PEACEFUL
SOLUTUON TO THE SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTE RELATING TO THE QUESTION OF
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS):
2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, ON THE BASIS OF THIS
RESOLUTION TO UNDERTAKE A RENEWED MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES
IN ORDER TO ASSIST THE PARTIES IN COMPLYING WITH THE
REQUEST MADE IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE:
3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT A REPORT TO THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION ON THE PROGRESS

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MADE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION:

4. DECIDES TO INCLUDE IN THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA OF ITS THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION THE ITEM ENTITLED 'QUESTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS)'.
ENDS

PYM

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 October, 1982.

The Falklands: Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting

Thank you for your letters of 4 and 8 October.

The Prime Minister agrees to send a message to the Prime Minister of Fiji. The text would be as in the first draft telegram annexed to your letter of 4 October, subject to the following amendments:

(a) Page 1, line 13

Delete "goodwill and".

(b) Page 1, line 25

Substitute "should" for "would".

(c) Page 2, line 14

After "invade" add a new sentence reading "Our losses were considerable, despite our success."

Then delete in lines 15-17 all from "and for the British people" to "of the Falkland Islands", so that the next sentence begins "They now have to live with "

(d) Page 3, line 10

Substitute "should" for "could".


(e) Add the wording in your letter of 8 October.

A. J. COLES

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

GRS 295
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM PORT STANLEY 081745Z OCT 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 377 OF 8 OCTOBER

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YOUR TELNO 295: VIP VISITS

1. IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT WE WERE NOT CONSULTED OVER THE VISIT OF THE ALL-PARTY GROUP FROM 28 OCTOBER TO 6 NOVEMBER, GIVEN THAT WE SHALL HAVE HAD TWO MINISTERIAL VISITS DURING OCTOBER. THE NUMBER OF MPS INVOLVED WILL MEAN THAT THE LOGISTICS OF TRANSPORTATION WITHIN THE ISLANDS AND ACCOMMODATION WILL CAUSE A SEVERE STRAIN.
2. WE HAVE AGREED LOCALLY THAT THEY WILL BE FIELDLED MAINLY BY THE MILITARY WHO WILL GIVE FULL BRIEFING ON THE PROGRESS OF THE AIRFIELD, MINE CLEARANCE AND SO ON. I SHALL BRIEF ON CIVIL MATTERS.
3. MR ONSLOW CONSIDERS IT WILL ALSO BE NECESSARY TO BRIEF THE PARTY ON THE SHACKLETON REPORT VERY CAREFULLY BEFORE THEY LEAVE LONDON. FOR REASONS THAT YOU WILL APPRECIATE, THIS WILL NEED TO BE HANDLED WITH CONSIDERABLE TACT.
4. AS FOR TIMING OF VISIT OF DEFENCE COMMITTEE, I UNDERSTAND THAT THE REINFORCEMENT EXERCISE IS LIKELY TO BE RE-SCHEDULED FOR LATER IN 1983 (BUT MOD WILL BE ABLE TO ADVISE ON THIS) THE 150TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS ARE SCHEDULED FOR 20 TO 26 FEBRUARY. 6 TO 12 FEBRUARY WOULD ACCORDINGLY BE MOST SUITABLE FROM CIVIL POINT OF VIEW.
5. ON THE GENERAL TOPIC OF VISITS BY VIPS AND JOURNALISTS, WHILST WE UNDERSTAND THE PRESSURES YOU ARE UNDER TO FACILITATE SUCH VISITS, YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT IN A SMALL COMMUNITY SUCH AS THIS THERE ARE ONLY A DOZEN (AT MOST) CIVIL OFFICIALS TO WHOM THEY CAN USEFULLY TALK. ALL ARE HEAVILY ENGAGED IN RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION WHICH WILL INEVITABLY BE INTERRUPTED BY CONSTANT FLOW OF VISITORS. HOWEVER WE SHALL CONTINUE TO DO OUR BEST TO ARRANGE SUITABLE CIVIL CONTENT FOR PROGRAMMES FOR VISITORS IN THESE CATEGORIES, BUT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE SHOULD BE CONSULTED WELL IN ADVANCE, IF ONLY TO ENSURE THAT BEDS ARE AVAILABLE. (SEE MIFT FOR DETAILS OF CIVIL ACCOMMODATION IN STANLEY).
6. GRATEFUL FOR NAMES ETC OF ALL-PARTY GROUP AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE.

HUNT

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PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
LORD N G LENNOX
MR EVANS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

ED/PUSD (2)
ED/S AM D
ED/FID (2)
ED/DEFENCE DEPT
ED/NEWS DEPT
ED/ERD
ED/ECD(E)
ED/UND
ED/PLANNING STAFF
RESIDENT CLERK-

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
PS/S CF S FOR DEFENCE
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
PS/CHANCELLOR)
MR ILETT) TREASURY
MR LITTLER)
MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY
SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR A D S GOODALL) CABINET OFF
DIO)

ROOM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

Mr. COLIN ROTH, LAEPD, ODA
Mrs. M. PATTISON, LAEPD, ODA.

Mr. Alan Titchener AUSD: DOT
MR C W ROBERTS IAT/DOT

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IMMEDIATE

FM PANAMA CITY 082332Z OCT 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 139 OF 8 OCTOBER
INFO ASUNCION BOGOTA BRASILIA CARACAS LIMA MONTEVIDEO MEXICO CITY
LA PAZ QUITO SAN JOSE TEGUCIGALPA SANTIAGO WASHINGTON NEW YORK.

FOR RESIDENT CLERK.

SALUTE TO THE TASK FORCE

1. I WAS SUMMONED TO THE MFA TODAY BY THE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER, JOSE CABRERA, WHO ASKED THAT I SHOULD CONVEY TO MY GOVERNMENT THE DEEP CONCERN AND REGRET OF THE PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT THAT A FALKLANDS VICTORY PARADE IS TO BE HELD IN LONDON ON 12 OCTOBER, A DATE OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE FOR 500 MILLION SPANISH LATIN AMERICANS. THE MINISTER EMPHASISED THAT A CELEBRATION OF THIS NATURE ON THAT PARTICULAR DATE COULD ONLY DEEPEN EXISTING WOUNDS.
2. I ASSURED THE MINISTER THAT THE CHOICE OF DATE WAS ENTIRELY A COINCIDENCE, AND IN NO WAY WAS IT OUR INTENTION TO OFFEND THE SUSCEPTIBILITIES OF THE PEOPLES OF LATIN AMERICA AND SPAIN. I THEN DREW UPON THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF GUIDANCE 180.

SUSCEPTIBILITIES OF THE PEOPLES OF LATIN AMERICA AND SPAIN. I THEN
DREW UPON THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF GUIDANCE 180.

3. A COPY OF THE NOTE HANDED TO ME BY THE MINISTER EXPLAINING MORE
FULLY THE CONCERN OF THE PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT WILL BE SENT BY BAG
ON 13 OCTOBER.

FCO PASU INFO ADDRESSEES.

WHITE

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FM QUITO 082130Z OCTOBER 1982

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 137 OF 8 OCTOBER

INFO ROUTINE ASUNCION, BRASILIA, CARACAS, LIMA, MEXICO CITY, PANAMA CITY, LA PAZ, MONTEVIDEO, SAN JOSE, TEGUCIGALPA, SANTIAGO

SALUTE TO THE TASK FORCE

1. I WAS SUMMONED BY THE UNDER-SECRETARY (POLITICAL) OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TODAY AND WAS TOLD THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO INFORM ME THAT THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESIDENT HAD HEARD WITH SURPRISE AND DISPLEASURE THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED TO HOLD A VICTORY PARADE ON 12 OCTOBER. THIS WAS A DATE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO ALL COUNTRIES OF THE AMERICAS AND ITS CHOICE FOR THE PARADE COULD ONLY BE REGARDED AS AN UNFRIENDLY ACT.

2. VEINTIMILLA MADE CLEAR THAT THE ECUADOREAN GOVERNMENT WAS NOT OBJECTING TO THE HOLDING OF THE PARADE BUT TO THE DATE. THERE WOULD BE NO OBJECTION HAD 13 OCTOBER OR ANY OTHER DATE BEEN CHOSEN.

3. I SAID THAT THE CHOICE OF DATE HAD BEEN UNINTENTIONAL AND HAD BEEN MADE NOT BY HMG BUT BY THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF LONDON TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT ISSUE ORDERS IN SUCH A MATTER. VEINTIMILLA SAID THAT THIS MADE SOME DIFFERENCE BUT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE PARADE WOULD BE ATTENDED BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT. IT WOULD MAKE A BAD IMPRESSION IN LATIN AMERICA.

4. I UNDERTOOK TO TRANSMIT TO YOU THE ECUADOREAN GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN.

5. FCO PLEASE PASS INFO TO ALL ADDRESSEES

SUXTON

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

(Repetition to PANAMA, SAN JOSE
referred for departmental decision,
repeated as requested to other posts.)

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From: The Rt. Hon. Lord Shackleton, KG., PC., OBE.,
6 St. James's Square, London, S.W. 1



8th October, 1982

A. J. Coles, Esq.,
Prime Minister's Office,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W. 1

Dear Mr. Coles,

We spoke on the telephone regarding certain figures that appear on Page 25 of our Falkland Islands Economic Study 1982 giving per capita expenditure on an annualized basis, as compared with expenditure in the Highlands and Islands.

There is a danger that too literal an interpretation of these figures could give rise to misunderstanding. We were, however, at pains to make sure that the costs of our recommendations were in no way minimized. These figures could be presented in a somewhat different way, which perhaps allows a fairer comparison. I think this ought to be in the hands of Ministers who may be faced with questions on this particular aspect. I now enclose a note on this.

There is also a numbering error on Page 25, 2.14.7. - Line 7. The figures 2.14.3, 2.14.4 and 2.14.5 should read Tables 2.14(a), 2.14(b) and 2.14(c). A correction has been circulated to Cabinet Office.

I am copying this letter also to Sir Anthony Acland and Roger Westbrook in the Falkland Islands Department at the FCO.

I also thought it was just worthwhile enclosing a copy of a letter I wrote to the Economist, in reply to a particularly silly article (also attached).

SHACKLETON

Encs.

PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE FOR THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

On the last page of the Recommendations section (2.14.7, page 25), the Report computed annualised per caput expenditure from total development expenditure of £30.6-35.6 million [1] recommended for the 1983-88 period in relation to the Falkland Islands' population. This figure was compared with that aid/ recurrent expenditure support provided by Government for St Helena and for the Western Isles of Scotland. In doing so it was recognised, and pointed out, that the figures were not directly comparable, but it was felt that such an indicator did set the recommended development expenditure in some context, and made the point that the sums were not inconsiderable in relation to the size of the population.

However, in spite of the caveats entered in the second paragraph on page 25, we believe there is a danger that the figures given and comparisons drawn may give rise to too literal interpretations and misleading conclusions. Certain points should therefore be made.

First, as well as certain of the £30.6-35.6 million monies being for non-development expense such as restoring the external air service, over half the £3,245-3,786 per Falklander figure derived from the costs £14-19 million estimated (see 2.14.3) for effecting transfer of farm ownership. This expenditure cannot really be considered in the same light as other grant aid, since it would be money used by FIDA for purchasing an asset. This asset would over time generate revenue, either through farm sales or tenancy rent income. Only £0.5 million of such return was shown to be recovered in the 1983-88 period - perhaps a rather conservative estimate. Such revenue would, after 1988, provide a source of locally generated funds for future development expenditure. Some of it could even be repatriated to the UK Exchequer.

If the cost of achieving transfer of farm ownership is excluded, the annualised per caput expenditure figure is equivalent to about £1,875 per Falkland Islander.

Secondly, we have subsequently been able to refine our estimate of per caput public expenditure figure for the Western Isles. For 1982-83 the figure is likely to be near to £900 per person (the report states £645 for 1980-81), and this figure does not include £20 million for agriculture/ fisheries development funded from the EEC available for the 1982-87 period (equivalent to about £115 per head).

We believe that awareness that such modifications could reasonably be made to the report's figures on per caput expenditure is necessary if the recommended Falklands expenditure programme is to be evaluated in a proper light. It does underline the dangers of drawing too close comparisons of such figures. As was mentioned in the Report, expenditure on exploratory fishing in the offshore Falklands and South Georgia areas was not included, as such expenditure should be assessed in a wider economic context than simply the development of the Falkland Islands.

[1] The section reference to 2.14.5 on line 7 is wrong. It should be 2.14.2, followed by 2.14.3 and 2.14.4.

LETTERS

Welfare

SIR—You write that housing played no part in the Lambsdorff or the think-tank papers (September 25th) and argue “money would be switched from financing inflation of secondhand property to financing new employment if tax subsidies on future mortgage contracts would apply only to new-built houses”.

Is this reform supposed to apply to all mortgages? If it is, then you are advocating the massive redistribution via falling house prices from those who currently own houses, and you will probably increase significantly the price of new houses.

Or are you advocating that existing mortgages should continue to draw existing subsidies, and the policy should only apply to new mortgages? If you are doing this then you are disenfranchising many of the young and those on lower earnings who at some stage in their lives hope to buy a home.

Wouldn't it be fairer to begin a policy of cash ceilings on amounts of money given to subsidising mortgages and all the other non-personal tax allowances?

I have tried to argue the case for this approach in *Inequality in Britain: freedom, welfare and the state* (Fontana 1981). Such an approach gives a transitional period where any redistribution between different groups of the population is made over time. In

the case of the subsidy to house purchasers by way of mortgage interest relief the policy would work in the following way. The government would tell the building societies that it was prepared to continue a subsidy of £2 billion a year or whatever this year's sum turns out to be. From next year, and every succeeding year, building societies would have to spread this sum amongst an ever-growing number of mortgagees.

If such a policy was applied to all non-personal tax allowances the sum raised would be considerable, and the amount of personal income coming into tax would grow cumulatively each year. This would give the government the opportunity of raising the tax threshold, increasing child benefit and cutting the rates of tax.

The advantages of adopting a non-paternalistic tax system are considerable. It allows people to choose what they spend their money on rather than influencing their pattern of expenditure by way of tax bribes. You have often pointed out what a difference this approach can make to the granting of tax cuts. By way of illustration you cite a standard rate of 13p in the pound paid for by the abolition of all tax allowances. While not advocating that policy, your figure does illustrate the room for manoeuvre a chancellor can gain from a policy of cash ceilings on non-personal tax benefits.

FRANK FIELD

House of Commons, SW1

The asbestos lawsuits

SIR—You will forgive us drawing attention to your facile, cosmetic treatment (September 18th) of the problems of the asbestos industry. Your lead sentence—“That asbestos fibres cause mesothelioma and other killing diseases is no longer disputed”—leaves the casual reader with the impression that perception has burst very recently into the consciousness of the medical profession and the asbestos industry. But:

● Life insurance companies in America stopped offering life policies to asbestos workers in 1918 because of their documented, short-life expectancies.

● By 1931, the British government of the day had become sufficiently concerned to intro-

duce the asbestos industry regulations and to implement a form of compensation.

● Asbestosis aside, researchers were studying the links between exposure to asbestos and cancer in the 1930s.

Colombo,
Sri Lanka

GLENYS &
WARNER TROYER

The Falklands

SIR—It is not, I think, very desirable for the author of a published report to react to every criticism that may appear in the press. However, since some of your readers may take seriously your rather frivolous article (Down Mexico's Way, September 18th), I feel bound to correct some of the more misleading statements.

The article speaks of pouring in “development money” of £30m-35m, and implies that this is rather an expensive way of creating 200-240 new jobs. The writer cannot really have read the report where it is made perfectly clear that the object is to preserve and develop the economy, which otherwise is in danger in due course of collapse, and is not for the purpose of creating new employment. The report, however, does go on to say that “if all the projects come to commercial fruition, and such optimism is probably not justified”, this might create a further 190-240 jobs altogether, in several years' time and after the end of the major construction period. This job increase could only arise if the population drain is reversed, and some immigration is allowed. In any case, about 50% of the proposed expenditure is for the purchase of farms, and about £8m is for infrastructure (roads, etc)—the absence of which is a major constraint on development.

Referring to the proposal for a Falkland Islands Development Agency you suggest that the islanders would be “larded with British overgovernment in 1984-88”. It is precisely at this time that the Falkland Islands government will need strengthening professionally if the changes we propose are to be effective.

In referring to absentee landlords you say that they “unsurprisingly have not been investing enthusiastically during the wool slump”. This ignores the simple fact stated clearly in this report (as also in our 1976 report, when wool prices were high), that very little investment had taken place in the previous ten years.

The reference to the annual “salary” of £55,000 for the chief executive is also misleading for,

in addition to the accommodation expenses which are mentioned, it fails to refer to pensions, insurance, holiday fares to and from the islands, etc. General experience in industry is that the ‘on cost’ upon salary for overseas postings is often at least 100% of basic salary. In referring to the apparently enormous injection of spending arising from the presence of the garrison, you have failed to note the closely argued section on the garrison in which the total effect is calculated to be of the order of only £300,000-500,000.

The article rightly refers to the problems outlined in the report arising out of the presence of the garrison, and also to the revenue from philately, but I find it hard to believe that *The Economist* is serious in its recommendations for action to regenerate the internal economy dangerously near to collapse. Particularly barmy is the suggestion that soldiers on six month tours of duty would be expected in their spare time to establish local industries such as salmon runs. The islanders, we are told, would “buy any of the soldiers' enterprises that work”. One is bound to speculate over the reaction in the Scottish Highlands, let alone the Falkland Islands, to this novel approach to economic development to small islands. Perhaps, on reflection, I have taken the article altogether too seriously.

House of Lords, SW1 SHACKLETON

Euro-quangos

SIR—The economic and social committee of the European communities was attacked in your columns (September 11th) in the fashionable hunt for quangos to be axed. The economic and social committee groups representatives (24 of them from Britain) of employers, trade unions, farmers, trade, consumers and the professions. It advises the commission and the council of ministers on European draft legislation.

It thus has the possibility of exerting influence at a crucial stage. The committee's cost averages out to less than 5p per citizen per annum.

It is surprising that *The Economist* should encourage a policy which implies that the citizen, who, God knows, has little enough access to influence on community decision-making, will lose even this lever and should leave a clear field to privately-financed lobbies.

Brussels

ROGER LOUET

EIU The Economist Intelligence Unit

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ZAMBIA

Even with further aid from its friends, the government will have to adopt most of the harsh measures proposed by the IMF, including a large devaluation. QER No. 4—1982 discusses the problems which lie ahead.

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BRITAIN

Foot, in which she refused to recall parliament, Mrs Thatcher points out correctly that average nurses' pay has risen 61% between March, 1979 and April, 1982—which is 12% above the inflation rate for these years and well above average wage increases in private industry. However 31% of the nurses' rise was a result of an award by the Clegg comparability commission whose reports Mrs Thatcher learned to rue.

More recent pay awards to the nurses have barely kept pace with inflation. One reason why the nurses are holding out for more than the government's 7.5% offer is that they have seen big "comparability" rises eroded before. Nevertheless, most of those "striking for them" next Wednesday will not know that the nurses have done better than most during the past three years (the possibility that the day-of-action might be averted flickered on Thursday afternoon amid confused reports that the government was about to make a new offer).

The other part of the government's case is that 41,000 more nursing staff have been taken on during the Thatcher years and that the standard working week has been reduced from 40 hours to 37.5 hours. There is some cheating here. The government uses an artificial measure of nurses employed, calculated by dividing the total number of hours clocked on (by full and part-time nurses) by the number of hours in a "standard" week. In the jargon, this gives a "whole-time equivalent" number of nurses. The department of health and social security, however, has not compensated for the 1980 reduction in the standard week to 37.5 hours. When that is done, the increase in nurses employed becomes 11,000, or a 2.6% increase compared with the government's claim of a 9.5% rise.

Even so, 11,000 extra nurses—at a time when unemployment has been soaring over 3m—means that this is not a profession which market forces in 1979-82 have been grinding into the ground. Even the more accurate, modified version of the government's figures does not suggest that the nurses should be any more of a special case than the government has already made them.

Falklands

Down Mexico's way?

British blood and treasure were rightly poured out to save the Falkland Islands from the aggression of Argentina's military dictators. Even British doubters coalesced behind Mrs Thatcher when one of



Now for hyper-inflation?

the compromise proposals mooted by the then American secretary of state, Mr Alexander Haig, was that an Argentine brigade should participate in the policing of islands which until then had had two policemen and no crime. Now Lord Shackleton's report to Britain's prime minister this week suggests that the islanders should be larded with British overgovernment in 1984-88 during what must be the wrong five years.

In this time there will anyway be a military garrison of around 4,000 imposed on the 1,813 islanders who in 1980 had an estimated national income of £4.2m or £2,319 per head. The impact of the garrison will not only be felt on the 26 single women under 30 on the island, but on local wage inflation, demand for services, materials, the lot. The local spending power of 4,000 troops alone will presumably be above the previous £4m-odd capacity of gdp, and about £6m a year of reconstructions as new construction is also to be suddenly piled on top of that. This is pre-eminently a period when other activity on the Falklands should not be force-fed.

Instead Lord Shackleton wants these to be years when the British taxpayer will also pour in "development money" of £30m-35m. He estimates this would create about 200-240 jobs in what will temporarily be these grossly overemployed islands, which means around £150,000 per job or £16,500 per islander or (as Lord Shackleton prefers to put it) £3,245-3,786 per islander per year. He wants a Falklands Islands Development Agency (Fida) to be established to buy up all the sheep farms from the absentee landowners, who, unsurprisingly, have not been investing enthusiastically during the wool slump; Fida would sell or lease the farms to islanders or new outsiders who would be expected to invest during the wool

slump at a time of maximum local inflation of every sort of cost.

Fida would also import a chief executive at an annual salary (including accommodation expenses) of £55,000 and a development officer at £35,000 a year; they are urged to busy themselves with "drawing up development objectives, plans, priorities and budgets", and advise on "broad fiscal policy".

Their first piece of fiscal advice should be to put a lot of the Shackleton report in to a pending tray. Their second should be to ask London (as Shackleton sensibly hints) that as many of the troops as possible should be married and that many of the ancillary services, like the Naafi, should be staffed by volunteer single women. Preferably, any new industries and immigrants attracted should also be biased towards women's work.

The Falklands should take some advantage of the opportunities the war has created: for example, the islands already get over 14% of national income from selling stamps. Tourism should expand (including, before 1988, allowing Argentines to visit the places where their sons fell).

Some of the soldiers should be encouraged to set up local industries in their spare time; maybe building that salmon run, other fish ranching, acting as contacts back home for a new and distinctive Falklands knitwear industry. Because of their early retirement, soldiers need to be encouraged to learn to run small businesses. There should also be schemes to allow the islanders to buy any of the soldiers' enterprises that work. But, after General Galtieri failed to turn the Falklands into an Argentina, there is a danger that implementation of any plan with the full inflationary potential of Lord Shackleton's could explode the islands into a miniature Mexico.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 October 1982

Dee John,

Possible Discussion of Falklands at Commonwealth Heads of
Government (Asia/Pacific) Regional Meeting: Suva, 14-18
October 1982

- mPM's Box
I wrote to you on 4 October to recommend that the Prime Minister send a message to the Prime Minister of Fiji. You may by now have seen UKMIS telno 1602 (copy enclosed) which recommends that we should send a message of gratitude to Fiji for her support for us in the non-aligned movement. This could be covered by the insertion, at the end of paragraph 1 of the draft telegram to Suva (enclosed with my letter of 4 October), of the following two sentences:

'I was particularly grateful to learn of the outstanding efforts which have been made by your delegation in New York. Their extensive lobbying and the encouraging response achieved as well as their declared intent to vote against the Latin-American resolution, epitomizes the robust support which Fiji and other Commonwealth countries have given us in the crisis and I am glad to be able to take this opportunity to thank you personally'.

The regional meeting begins in Suva on 14 October. I therefore hope that the Prime Minister's message to Ratu Mara can issue soon if she agrees.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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NY 0172

PP FCO

PP SUVA

RR VILA

CR 250

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 080022Z OCT 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1602 OF 7 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY SUVA ROUTINE VILA

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON

SUVA TELNO 206: FALKLANDS AT UNGA 37

1. I CALLED TODAY (7 OCTOBER) ON THE FIJIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND THANKED HIM FOR THE SUPPORT FIJI HAD GIVEN US IN THE COMMITTEE OF 24. THE MINISTER SAID THAT FIJI'S POSITION WAS THAT THEY WOULD VOTE AGAINST THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION (MY TELNO 1567 NOT TO ALL). THE VIEW OF THE INFORMAL SOUTH PACIFIC GROUP HERE, WHICH INCLUDED AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, WAS IN LINE WITH THE POSITION FIJI HAD TAKEN UP IN THE COMMITTEE OF 24, BUT WITH A QUESTION MARK OVER VANUATU. MOST DELEGATIONS WERE LIKELY TO SPEAK IN THE DEBATE ON THE FALKLANDS.
2. FIJI HAD ALSO BEEN DRUMMING UP SUPPORT AMONGST THE AFRICANS FOR OUR POSITION "BEGINNING WITH THE EASIEST" AND HAD HAD A FAVOURABLE RESPONSE FROM KENYA, MALAWI AND THE SUDAN.
3. FIJIAN EFFORTS ON OUR BEHALF ARE MOST ENCOURAGING ALTHOUGH THEY MAY BE OVER-ESTIMATING THE RESPONSE THEY HAVE HAD. THEIR UNEQUIVOCAL COMMITMENT TO VOTE AGAINST THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION IS THE FIRST OF ITS KIND AND AS SUCH IS IMPORTANT, WHETHER OR NOT IT SURVIVES IF THE DRAFT IS AMENDED. I RECOMMEND A MESSAGE OF GRATITUDE AT PRIME MINISTERIAL LEVEL. THIS COULD HELP MAINTAIN FIJIAN ROBUSTNESS.
4. IT MIGHT ALSO BE WORTH MAKING A DEMARCHE IN VILA. THE VANUATU REPRESENTATIVE HERE IS STILL THE UNRELIABLE VAN LIEROP (GOULDING'S LETTER NO25/1 OF 2 DECEMBER 1981 TO WILLIAMS, UND).

025312



18 OCT 1992



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MFJ


8 October 1982

Argentina/Falkland Islands

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 6 October about our current deployments in the Falklands area.

JC

N.H.R. Evans, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 October 1982

Prime Minister

Content to wait until nearer the
time of debate before sending personal
messages to Mr. Fraser and others?

Dear John,

Falklands at the UN

Yes on A.S.C. "No"

Thank you for your letter of 4 October reporting
the Prime Minister's reaction to Canberra telegram
No 424.

We are grateful for the Prime Minister's offer to
take the matter up with Mr Fraser. As I mentioned in my
letter of 4 October, we expect to recommend that the Prime
Minister send messages to certain Heads of Government,
including Mr Fraser, nearer to the time of the debate on
the Falklands. For the present, Mr Pym considers that
we should concentrate on putting our case across to the
Australians as firmly and convincingly as we can at
official level. Instructions to the High Commissioner
in Canberra, in reply to his telegram No 424, are issuing
today. Mr Fraser will in any case be made aware of the
Prime Minister's personal concern through his copy of the
message we have recommended Mrs Thatcher send to the Fijian
Prime Minister about the Commonwealth Regional Heads of
Government meeting in Suva.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 October, 1982

Prime Minister

A.J.C. 5/10

Dear John,

Falklands at the United Nations

You asked for a report on the position we have reached on the Falkland Islands at the United Nations.

The General Assembly approved the proposal of the Latin American countries that the item should be inscribed. We did not contest this but were able to ensure that the Falkland Islands will be correctly referred to in UN documents and that arrangements will be made for Island Councillors to be heard during the debate. The Latin American countries will be able to determine when the debate should be held: the present expectation is that it will be early November.

The Latin American draft Resolution has now been tabled. The text is in Sir John Thomson's telegram number 1567 (copy attached). The change from earlier Argentine drafts to make it more acceptable is an indication of the success so far of our lobbying. It means, of course, that it will now be harder to persuade others to abstain on the Argentine text, but the Argentines themselves will get less of political value from it. Language prejudicing the outcome of negotiations has now been removed from the operative section, though it remains in the preamble and the draft also fails to include language on non-use of force and self-determination. And the call on us to negotiate in any case remains entirely unacceptable.

We have been monitoring the Non-Aligned Movement's activities carefully and Mr Pym sent messages to his colleagues in most of the more friendly non-aligned countries in preparation for their meeting in New York which began on 4 October. We feared that Argentina, whose tactics have been to show reasonableness and moderation, might go for little more than what is now in the UN draft resolution. In that event it might have been difficult for our friends not to commit themselves to it and they would then have felt tied when the resolution came to be voted on in the General Assembly. Fortunately, however, Argentina went for another clear endorsement of her claim to sovereignty (UKMIS New York tel 1592, copy attached) and the controversy which the discussion on it generated should be helpful to us.

/We



/our

We believe that/campaign to explain the reasonableness of our refusal to enter into negotiations has met with some success in the Third World. Surprisingly and unsatisfactorily, we are having rather more difficulty with our friends in the developed countries. Mr Pym went over the ground with many of his colleagues in New York. Our impression is that we have had some success in stopping the rot in Washington, though we are by no means sure of an American abstention yet. Argentina's vote against the United States over Puerto Rico should help. I have written separately about Australia. The position in the Community remains worrying. You will have seen Sir John Thomson's account of the comments of Community Foreign Ministers in the General Debate in New York. We shall, as he suggests, make a special effort with the Nordic countries.

We may wish to recommend that the Prime Minister should send messages to European heads of government (or, in the case of France and Germany, speak to them at the forthcoming summits), to President Reagan and to key leaders elsewhere, shortly before the vote is taken, when they will have the greatest impact.

We are attracted by Sir John Thomson's suggestion of tabling amendments about the non-use of force and self-determination to the Argentine draft, but we can only decide on the right tactics nearer the time. We shall of course keep you informed.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street



Inine Divilas
To note.

AN 5/10

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

TELEPHONE 01-218 9000
DIRECT DIALLING 01-2182111/3

MO 5/21

7th October 1982

Dear Willie

mf

P429

Thank you for your letter of 22nd September about inquests on the bodies of Service personnel repatriated from the Falkland Islands. This is clearly a very delicate matter which will need careful and sensitive handling. I would be grateful for all your help in ensuring that essential formal procedures are completed quickly and without causing additional distress to the next of kin.

The present position is that a team of undertakers has arrived at the Falkland Islands on board RFA SIR BEDEVERE and exhumation and preparations for repatriation of the bodies will shortly begin. The necessary processes are being carried out on board the ship and on completion RFA SIR BEDEVERE will sail for the UK with the team and coffins on board. Our present plan is that she should return to her normal base at Marchwood Military Port at Southampton about the end of November. This has a number of advantages in that Marchwood has the necessary facilities, and is convenient for the mainly southern based Headquarters of the units concerned, and to Tidworth Military Cemetery where, it seems likely, many of the casualties will be re-interred. Officials are going ahead with planning, and hope to have early information about the Coroner's requirements, and meet them in so far as is possible, before the bodies arrive.

The Rt Hon William Whitelaw CH MC MP



MOD Personnel branches will inform the next of kin of the Coroner's interest, and of the possibility of financial assistance if families wish to be present at any inquest. This will not cover the costs of legal representation at the inquest which is a matter for the family in consultation with the Coroner. MOD will ask the Treasury Solicitor to arrange legal representation to look after Defence interests and this, and the good sense of the Coroner, should offer some safeguard against the risk of an attempt to turn the inquest into a public inquiry into events and policies of the Falklands Campaign. We do not regard this as a likely possibility but I agree that it has to be borne in mind.

I should mention that we have discussed with the FCO the possibility of holding an inquest at Port Stanley. However I understand that there is no experienced Coroner available and, in any case, it might only serve to complicate matters, particularly as the deaths have already been registered and death certificates issued. This brings me to a point which is being taken up with our legal advisers. Under the provisions of the Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages (Special Provision) Act, 1957 (Chapter 58), Service Registers are kept on the deaths abroad etc of members of Her Majesty's naval, military or air forces; the provision also covers support personnel and dependants with the forces abroad. The relevant Orders-in-Council are 1959/406 Service Departments Register Order and 1963/1624 Service Departments Register (Amendment) Order.

In practical terms this means that in each case of known death on the Falkland Islands identification for the purposes of registration and issue of a death certificate, showing cause of death, has already been properly and legally carried out. Our legal advisers are now examining, and perhaps, in consultation with the Coroner, the acceptance of the 'de facto' position of identification and cause of death already established legally in the Falklands. The



UK Coroner may be entitled to question the validity of the registration but only if he has good grounds for doubting the position on the basis of hard evidence. I appreciate that on this basis the inquest might not be more than a formality but in the circumstances this may be desirable.

I have asked my officials to begin work on the details without further delay in concert with our legal advisers. I would hope that in any consultations with the Coroner, particularly on the Registration point, MOD officials could participate. I intend to keep in touch on progress and would hope to raise at once any point of difficulty which might be distressing to next of kin.

I am grateful for your help in this matter. A copy of this letter goes to the Prime Minister, Francis Pym, John Biffen and Michael Jopling.

John Nott
John

John Nott

-8 OCT 1982

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1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9

SECRET

3



HOME OFFICE
 QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
 LONDON SW1H 9AT

Prime Minister

7 October 1982

Dear John
Thompson A.S.C. 2/10.
mt

CITY OF LONDON SALUTE TO THE TASK FORCE

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 4 October in which you report the Prime Minister's enquiry, inter alia, about contingency plans for possible Argentine action on 12 October in London. *with ASL?*

Police precautions are extensive but there is no specific intelligence to suggest that there will be any violent protests or demonstrations at the City of London salute to the Task Force on that day or elsewhere in London.

The only significant threat is considered to be posed by Irish terrorist groups. PIRA have the ability to gather together an experienced team at short notice and their bitter resentment of British success in the Falklands would make the Parade an attractive target.

The 12th of October is a national holiday in Argentina (Colombus Day) and while the possibility that individual Argentinians may stage a symbolic gesture of defiance cannot be discounted, they are not judged to have the capability or organisation to pose a serious threat.

A pacifist group London Peace Action is expected to organise a peaceful demonstration of some 30 people dressed in white and carrying banners.

As to policing arrangements, the Metropolitan Police and the City of London Police are in close touch with each other and, jointly, with the military authorities. The Metropolitan Police have responsibility for some 400 yards of the route and, with the military, for arrangements for transporting servicemen to the point from which the procession is to start. The City of London Police have charge of the majority of the route, including the two major focal points, the Mansion House and the Guildhall. The arrangements of both forces will be on a par with those made for the Royal Wedding last year. Before both the rehearsal in the early morning of 9 October and the procession itself, buildings along the route will be swept. The rehearsal will have a police presence. On the day of the

/contd ...

A J Coles, Esq.

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procession, the overt policing will be by uniformed officers deployed at the major points. Other officers will survey the route from rooftops. The route will be divided into sectors, each under the command of a senior officer, with central co-ordination and ready access to an armed capability in both the Metropolitan and City areas.

I am copying this to John Holmes (FCO), Nick Evans (MOD), and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely
C J Walters

C J WALTERS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

27503 - 1

OO CIVIL COMMISSIONER PORT STANLEY
GRS 170
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 061530Z OCTOBER 82
TO IMMEDIATE CIVIL COMMISSIONER PORT STANLEY
TELEGRAM NUMBER 295 OF 6 OCT
MPS' VISITS

1. MR NOTT HAS INVITED AN ALL-PARTY GROUP OF 10 MPS, HEADED BY MR ANTHONY BUCK, CHAIRMAN OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY DEFENCE COMMITTEE, TO VISIT THE ISLANDS FROM 28 OCTOBER TO 6 NOVEMBER. WE ARE SORRY FOR THE SHORT NOTICE OF THIS VISIT BUT IT HAS ONLY JUST BEEN REFERRED TO US. MEMBERSHIP OF THE GROUP IS NOT YET KNOWN. THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN ASKED TO ARRANGE THE PROGRAMME THOUGH YOU WILL WISH TO LIAISE WITH THEM ON A SUITABLE CIVIL CONTENT.
2. THE HOUSE OF COMMONS DEFENCE COMMITTEE ALSO WISH TO VISIT THE ISLANDS IN FEBRUARY 1983. THEIR PARTY COULD HAVE UP TO 14 MEMBERS, IE 11 MPS, A CLERK, AN ADVISER, AND AN MOD LIAISON OFFICER.
3. MOD HAVE ASKED US FOR URGENT DETAILS OF ANY CIVIL ACCOMMODATION AVAILABLE FOR THESE AND ANY OTHER VIP VISITS. GRATEFUL ALSO FOR VIEWS ON DIFFICULTIES WHICH MAY ARISE ON THE TIMING OF THE SECOND VISIT GIVEN THE 150TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS AND THE REINFORCEMENT EXERCISE'

PYM

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RESIDENT CLERK-

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Mr. COLIN ROTH, LAEPD, ODA
Mrs. M. PATTISON, LAEPD, ODA.

Mr. Alan Titchener AUS. DOT
MR CW ROBERTS IAT/DOT

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FROM UKMIS GENEVA 061435Z OCT 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 503 OF 6 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE CIVIL COMMISSIONER PORT STANLEY, PRIORITY UKMIS
NEW YORK, BIS BUENOS AIRES, MONTEVIDEO, MODUK (DS11 DS14)

ms

read in full

FALKLANDS: ARGENTINE DEAD

1. THE ICRC HAVE TOLD US UNOFFICIALLY TODAY (6 OCTOBER) THAT THE ARGENTINES AFTER THEIR INITIAL FAVOURABLE REACTION TO OUR PROPOSAL THAT THEIR DEAD BE REPATRIATED (ADAMS' LETTER OF 19 AUGUST NOT TO ALL) HAVE NOW APPARENTLY CHANGED THEIR LINE.
2. JOSSERON SAID THAT ICRC DELEGATES IN BUENOS AIRES HAVE REPORTED THAT THE ARGENTINE MILITARY AUTHORITIES ARE NOW VERY CAUTIOUS AND THAT THEIR FORMAL REPLY, EXPECTED SHORTLY, WILL 'ALMOST CERTAINLY' REJECT THE PROPOSAL.
3. JOSSERON SAID THAT THE ICRC WOULD BE VERY DISAPPOINTED AS AS THEY HAD WARMLY WELCOMED THE IDEA. THEIR FIRST CONCERN WAS THE FAMILIES WHO ARE SAYING PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY THAT THEY WANT THE

FAMILIES WHO ARE SAYING PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY THAT THEY WANT THE BODIES RETURNED. HE REGRETTED THAT ARGENTINA APPEARED TO BE MAKING A POLITICAL ISSUE OF A HUMANITARIAN OFFER AND THOUGHT THAT THE CHANGE OF HEART WAS DUE TO THE CHANGES TAKING PLACE WITHIN ARGENTINE MILITARY CIRCLES.

4. THIS REGRETTABLE DEVELOPMENT MAY HAVE REPERCUSSIONS ON NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE NEXT OF KIN VISITS (YOUR TELNO 515 TO MONTEVIDEO).

MARSHALL

DNNNN

SENT AT 06/1450Z IM/
TC

6
6

010

2



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~330 7872~~ 218 2111/3

MO 5/21

6th October 1982

Dear John,

Prime Minister
To note

A.J.C. $\frac{6}{10}$

ARGENTINA/FALKLAND ISLANDS

Thank you for your letter of 4th October concerning two questions which the Prime Minister raised on the section on Argentina and the Falkland Islands in JIC(82)(WSI)39.

I can confirm that we do still have one SSN, HMS SPLENDID, in the Falklands area. In addition, a Carrier Battle Group is currently patrolling the Protection Zone of 150 nautical miles around the Falklands. This comprises HMS ILLUSTRIOUS together with a Type 42 destroyer and three frigates. A further Type 42 destroyer and a Type 22 frigate are on picket duty in the western area of the Protection Zone. Maritime surveillance is currently being undertaken two or three times a week by Hercules C130 aircraft, which are flying night operations within and outside the Protection Zone from Port Stanley airfield. Nimrod aircraft operating from Ascension Island are also flying maritime reconnaissance sorties to within 500 miles or so of the Falkland Islands. In short, therefore, we still have a substantial maritime presence in the South Atlantic.

The Commander in Chief Fleet has been alerted to the Prime Minister's concern about possible Argentine action in the Falklands area on 12th October. He will ensure that our forces in the area are at the necessary state of readiness to meet any likely contingency.

I understand that the Home Office will be replying separately on the question of security arrangements for the City of London Salute to the Task Force. The police would, of course, be able to call in the normal way upon assistance from the Army in the event of an emergency.

I am copying this to John Holmes (FCO), John Halliday (Home Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever
Nick Evans

(N H R EVANS)

A J Coles Esq

GR 250

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DESKBY 070800Z
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 062245Z OCT 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1592 OF 6 OCTOBER 1982
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

MY TELNO 1497: FALKLANDS: NAM COMMUNIQUE.

1. AFTER THREE DAYS OF HEATED ARGUMENT, THE NAM FOREIGN MINISTERS REACHED AGREEMENT THIS AFTERNOON (6 OCTOBER) ON THE FALKLANDS PARAGRAPH FOR THEIR COMMUNIQUE, THOUGH THE COMMUNIQUE AS A WHOLE HAS NOT YET BEEN ADOPTED. WE BELIEVE THE AGREED TEXT TO READ:
''. . . REITERATED ITS SUPPORT FOR THE RIGHT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA TO OBTAIN THE RESTITUTION OF THE MALVINAS ISLANDS TO ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND ASKED THAT NEGOTIATIONS BE REINITIATED, WITH THE PARTICIPATION AND GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, BETWEEN THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, WITH THE AIM OF ACHIEVING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE A SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PRINCIPLES AND DECISIONS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS 1514, 2065, 2621, 3160 AND 31/49''.
A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS ENTERED RESERVATIONS ON THIS TEXT. IT MAY YET BE REOPENED AS THE NAM MEETING WILL RESUME TOMORROW TO TRY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE PASSAGE ON AFGHANISTAN.

2. I WILL REPORT MORE FULLY TOMORROW (7 OCTOBER) WHEN MORE DETAILS WILL BE AVAILABLE. BUT THIS PROLONGED BATTLE, UNPRECEDENTED HERE SINCE THE ARGUMENTS OVER AFGHANISTAN IN 1980, HAS CAUSED A STIR HERE AND, WHATEVER THE COMMUNIQUE MAY ACTUALLY SAY, HAS MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE ARGENTINES TO ARGUE THAT THE NAM ARE LINED UP IN SUPPORT OF THEM.

THOMSON

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TEL NO 1582 OF 5 OCTOBER 1982

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WELLINGTON OSLO STOCKHOLM HELSINKI REYKJAVIK

Lead in file.

FALKLANDS AT UNGA 37: THE TEN

1. THE FIRST TWO WEEKS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAVE CONFIRMED THAT A SERIOUS WEAKNESS IN OUR POSITION HERE IS THE LUKEWARM SUPPORT (TO PUT IT AT ITS BEST) WHICH WE RECEIVE FROM OUR PARTNERS IN THE TEN. THIS EMBARRASSES THIRD WORLD DELEGATIONS WHO WOULD SUPPORT US ON THE PRINCIPLES AT STAKE AND PROVIDES A READY LET-OUT FOR THOSE WHO WOULD PREFER TO SIT ON THE FENCE (IF YOUR FRIENDS IN EUROPE WILL NOT SUPPORT YOU, YOU CANNOT EXPECT US TO DO SO'').

2. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE DANISH POLITICAL DIRECTOR WILL TODAY (5 OCTOBER) BE GIVING HIS COLLEAGUES AN ACCOUNT OF THE DISCUSSION AT THE PRESIDENCY DINNER ON 28 SEPTEMBER. YOU TOLD ME AT THE TIME THAT YOUR COLLEAGUES SHOWED DISTRESSINGLY LITTLE UNDERSTANDING OF, OR SUPPORT FOR, OUR POSITION. THE CONVERSATION IN THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES/POLITICAL DIRECTORS ROOM WAS EQUALLY BAD: THE ONLY SUPPORT CAME FROM MY LUXEMBOURG COLLEAGUE AND THE IRISHMAN WAS CONSTRUCTIVELY UNHELPFUL. BULLARD AND I HAD TO SPEAK PRETTY FIRMLY.

3. YOUR COLLEAGUES SPEECHES IN THE GENERAL DEBATE HAVE ALSO BEEN VERY DISAPPOINTING. ONLY MME FLESCH (LUXEMBOURG) MADE A SATISFACTORY STATEMENT, POINTING OUT THAT A PARTNER HAD BEEN THE VICTIM OF GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF THE CHARTER AND CONDEMNING RESORT TO FORCE AND ANY VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. VAN AGT (NETHERLANDS) CRITICISED THE USE OF FORCE BUT SAID NOTHING ABOUT SELF-DETERMINATION AND CONCENTRATED ON THE IMPORTANCE THE NETHERLANDS ATTACHED TO ITS RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AMERICA. COLLINS (IRELAND) DESCRIBED THE CONFLICT AS AN UNNECESSARY ONE AND DEPLORED THE USE OF FORCE, THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SCR 502 AND THE FACT THAT 'A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OFFERED THROUGH THE U.N. DID NOT PROVE POSSIBLE'. HE HOPED 'THAT THE PARTIES WILL BE ABLE TO PURSUE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THEIR CONTINUING DISPUTE'. ITALY WAS BAD: COLOMBO CONDEMNED THE ACT OF AGGRESSION BUT CALLED FOR A RESUMPTION OF THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN LONDON AND BUENOS AIRES WITHIN A U.N. FRAMEWORK AND WITH POSSIBLE RECOURSE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERALS GOOD OFFICES. WISCHNEWSKI (F.R.G.) WAS THE WORST, SAYING NOTHING ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE OR SELF-DETERMINATION AND CALLING FOR A POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS. MAUROY (FRANCE) CONFINED HIMSELF TO A PASSING REFERENCE TO 'THE ABSURD WAR IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC' WHICH SHOWED THAT THE USE OF FORCE WAS NEVER A PERMANENT SOLUTION TO A QUARREL. BELGIUM AND GREECE DID NOT MENTION THE SUBJECT.

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/4. WHEN

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4. WHEN BULLARD WAS HERE LAST WEEK HE ASKED WHETHER WE COULD THINK OF ANY ISSUES AT THE U.N. ON WHICH OUR POSITION HAD BEEN DICTATED BY COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY RATHER THAN U.K. NATIONAL INTERESTS. IF THERE WERE SUCH, WE COULD CHIDE THE PARTNERS CONCERNED FOR NOT RECIPROCATING OUR SUPPORT AND EVEN THREATEN TO CHANGE OUR POSITION IF THEY DID NOT HELP US OVER THE FALKLANDS. THIS HAS NOT PROVED A VERY PRODUCTIVE SEAM. THE MOST COMPARABLE ITEMS ARE MAYOTTE AND THE ILES GLORIEUSES, TWO "DECOLONISATION" ISSUES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, ON WHICH WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED THE FRENCH. ON MAYOTTE, WE HAVE ABSTAINED ANNUALLY ON VERY MILD RESOLUTIONS CALLING UPON THE FRENCH TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS UNDER U.N. AUSPICES. ON THE ILES GLORIEUSES, WE HAVE ANNUALLY VOTED AGAINST EQUALLY MODERATE RESOLUTIONS WHICH TOOK NOTE OF NON-ALIGNED AND O.A.U. DECISIONS AND INVITED FRANCE TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH MADAGASCAR. THESE ARE USEFUL EXAMPLES TO DEPLOY IN DEBATE WITH THE FRENCH, THOUGH WE ARE OF COURSE OPEN TO THE REJOINER THAT IF WE HAD NOT SUPPORTED THE FRENCH WE WOULD HAVE COMPROMISED OUR POSITION ON SELF-DETERMINATION (MAYOTTE) AND BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE B.I.O.T. (ILES GLORIEUSES). THE ONLY OTHER POSSIBILITY I CAN THINK OF IS OUR RELUCTANT SUPPORT IN RECENT YEARS FOR THE HALF-BAKED AND POINTLESS GERMAN INITIATIVE ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO AVERT NEW FLOWS OF REFUGEES. THE GERMANS ARE PROBABLY AWARE OF OUR LACK OF ENTHUSIASM AND THIS COULD BE CITED AS A CASE WHERE WE SUPPORTED THEM ONLY OUT OF COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY.

5. THERE IS ONE OTHER IDEA, WHICH I MENTIONED TO YOU WHEN YOU WERE HERE LAST WEEK. WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO PERSUADE THE SCANDINAVIANS AS A GROUP TO SUPPORT US, AT LEAST TO THE EXTENT OF UNDERTAKING TO ABSTAIN ON THE ARGENTINE DRAFT? NONE OF THE SCANDINAVIAN SPEAKERS IN THE GENERAL DEBATE HAS CALLED FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THE DANE WAS OF COURSE SPEAKING FOR THE TEN. THE NORWEGIAN AND THE FINN MADE THE BRIEFEST OF REFERENCES TO THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE PRESENT PARLOUS STATE OF THE WORLD. THE ICELANDER DID NOT MENTION THE SUBJECT. THE SWEDEN HAS YET TO SPEAK. OSLO TEL NO 176 REFERS TO NORDIC CONSULTATION. IF THAT CONSULTATION RESULTED IN A POSITION HELPFUL TO US IT WOULD BIND THE DANE AND WOULD PROVIDE AN EXAMPLE WHICH WE COULD COMMEND TO THE WEAKER SISTERS IN THE TEN.

F.C.O. PSE PASS ALL SAVING EXCEPT WASHINGTON AND OTTAWA
THOMSON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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FALKLAND ISLANDS

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GRS 300
UNCLASSIFIED

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 042322Z OCT 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1567 OF 4 OCTOBER
INFO WASHINGTON,
INFO SAVING ATHENS BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN THE HAGUE
LUXEMBOURG PARIS ROME UKREP BRUSSELS, OTTAWA CANBERRA AND
WELLINGTON.

Prime Minister

The F/C.O. will provide an
assessment of the situation at
the U.N. for the weekend.

A.S.C. $\frac{6}{10}$

MIPT: FALKLANDS: DRAFT RESOLUTION.
1. FOLLOWING IS OFFICIAL U.N. TRANSLATION OF THE LATIN AMERICAN
DRAFT RESOLUTION:

BEGINS

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
HAVING CONSIDERED THE QUESTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS),
REALIZING THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF COLONIAL SITUATIONS IS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH THE UNITED NATIONS IDEAL OF UNIVERSAL PEACE,
CONSIDERING THAT ITS RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) OF 14 DECEMBER 1960 WAS
INSPIRED BY THE COVETED GOAL OF ENDING COLONIALISM IN ALL AREAS
AND IN ALL FORMS, ONE OF WHICH ENCOMPASSES THE QUESTION OF THE
FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS),
RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 2065 (XX) OF 16 DECEMBER 1965, 3160
(XXVIII) OF 14 DECEMBER 1973 AND 31/49 OF 1 DECEMBER 1976,
RECALLING FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 502 (1982) OF 3
APRIL 1982 AND 505 (1982) OF 26 MAY 1982,
TAKING NOTE OF THE STATEMENTS AND COMMUNIQUE OF THE MOVEMENT OF
NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES ON THE QUESTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
(MALVINAS),
1. REQUESTS THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS IN
ORDER TO FIND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE SOVER-
EIGNTY DISPUTE RELATING TO THE QUESTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
(MALVINAS):
2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, ON THE BASIS OF THIS RESOLUTION
TO UNDERTAKE A RENEWED MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES IN ORDER TO ASSIST
THE PARTIES IN COMPLYING WITH THE REQUEST MADE IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE:
3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT A REPORT TO THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY AT ITS THIRTY-EIGHT SESSION ON THE PROGRESS MADE IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION:
4. DECIDES TO INCLUDE IN THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA OF ITS THIRTY-
EIGHTH SESSION THE ITEM ENTITLED "QUESTION OF THE FALKLAND
ISLANDS (MALVINAS)".

ENDS

FCO PASS SAVING TO ALL (EXCEPT OTTAWA).

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

THOMSON

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 October, 1982

Yes
not
 Dear John,
Prime Minister
Agree to send attached message to
Prime Minister of Fiji?
A.J.C. $\frac{5}{10}$

The Falklands: Possible Discussion at Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting, Suva, 14-18 October 1982

When Mr Onslow discussed with Sonny Ramphal in August how best to secure continuing Commonwealth goodwill for our policy on the Falklands, Ramphal made three suggestions:

- (a) He volunteered to talk to the Permanent Representatives of Commonwealth countries in New York. (He duly did this on 16 September, and Sir J Thomson has reported that he spoke effectively and robustly).
- (b) He suggested that it might be useful for us to arrange for our position to be explained at the meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government from the Asia/Pacific region (CHOGRM) to be held in Suva from 14-18 October.
- (c) He suggested that it would be helpful if the Prime Minister were to send messages to a wide range of Heads of Commonwealth Governments, taking them as much as possible into her confidence, explaining British objectives, and also the constraints under which we had to operate.

The Commonwealth is continuing to prove a valuable asset in our campaign at the UN. Mr Ramphal's suggestions, furthermore, chime with our own ideas on lobbying other governments, particularly as regards obtaining support for our no-negotiations policy, in preparation for the Falklands debate at the General Assembly. So far, the following actions have been taken:

- (a) The Secretary of State has sent messages to his colleagues in the Ten and to the Americans about their attitude to any draft resolution calling for negotiations.
- (b) He has also sent messages to his counterparts in friendly countries in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) - many of them are of course members of the Commonwealth - seeking their help in obstructing an extreme, pro-Argentine section in the communique issuing after the NAM Foreign Ministers meeting in New York on 4-5 October.
- (c) He has sent messages to the Foreign Ministers of Thailand and the Philippines [the only ASEAN countries not in the NAM and thus not included under (b)]; to



facilitate the achievement of a coordinated ASEAN view favourable to the UK, prior to the UN debate.

- (d) Our Embassies/High Commissions have been lobbying friendly governments world-wide; and
- (e) there have also been lobbying exercises over particular aspects of the debate at the UNGA, eg regarding the Committee of 24 in August and the General Committee on 22 September.

CHOGRM is an important Commonwealth forum. Seventeen governments from the Asia/Pacific region are eligible to attend (including Australia, Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Sri Lanka). So far as we know Mrs Gandhi is likely to be the only major Head of Government not attending in person. The meeting traditionally considers both regional and global issues, and the question of the Falklands is almost bound to come up. This being so, Mr Pym believes that we should do what we can to ensure that participants are exposed to an authoritative and sympathetic account of our position.

We have consulted our High Commissioners in the posts concerned, who are generally in favour of our trying to ensure that our views are reflected at the meeting. Our High Commissioner in Suva believes that the Prime Minister of Fiji, Ratu Mara, who will be Chairman of the meeting, is likely to be responsive. Mr Wade-Gery in New Delhi has commented that he sees 'advantage in the Indians being exposed at Suva to a full and well argued explanation of our position with appropriate emphasis on the rule of international law and the right of self-determination'.

Ramphal has suggested that the best way forward would be for the Prime Minister to write to Ratu Mara, asking him to raise the matter as appropriate with his colleagues at the meeting. Ramphal would then suggest to Ratu Mara that the Prime Minister's letter be considered during the weekend retreat.

Mr Pym believes that this is sensible advice. Since CHOGRM is by definition a meeting of Heads of Government, a message at Prime Ministerial level is inescapable. The exercise is unlikely to bring us substantial dividends; but it could just persuade one or two participants to take a more sympathetic view of our position at the UN General Assembly. We would also not wish Ramphal (who remains very helpful on this issue) to feel that we first asked his advice and then ignored it.

//

I attach two draft telegrams for the Prime Minister's consideration, the first containing instructions to our High Commissioners and the second containing the text of a draft message from the Prime Minister to Ratu Mara.

/Mr Pym

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Mr Pym considers that we should wait a little longer before deciding whether to pursue Ramphal's separate suggestion that the Prime Minister should send messages to a wide range of Heads of Commonwealth governments. The best time might be towards the end of October; and I shall write separately about this later.

Yours ever
J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

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OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL .

Precedence/Deskby
PRIORITY

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO
PRE/ADD	7	TO PRIORITY SUVA
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	RFI CANBERRA, WELLINGTON
	10	MIPT: FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO
	11	RATU MARA
	12	BEGINS:
	13	1. As I am sure you know, the goodwill and staunch support
	14	which you and other Commonwealth leaders have given us since
	15	the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands have been a
	16	source of inspiration and encouragement to me and to my
	17	colleagues, and have reminded us all of the importance of the
	18	principles which Commonwealth members hold in common.
	19	2. We shall continue to be very grateful for any support that
	20	you and your Commonwealth colleagues can give us in the months
	21	ahead. In this connection, I would particularly like to
///	22	explain our thinking to you before you come to chair the
//	23	forthcoming meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government from
/	24	the Asia/Pacific region. Britain is not, of course, represented
	25	at these meetings, but if the matter arises, I ^{sh} would like our

NNNN ends telegram		BLANK	Catchword views
File number		Dept	Distribution Limited CCD FID UND SAD SPD SEAD PS PS/Mr Onslow PS/PUS Sir J Leahy Mr Squir
Drafted by (Block capitals) PRIVATE SECRETARY			
Telephone number 233 4641			
Authorised for despatch			
Comcen reference	Time of despatch		
			cc: No 10 Downing St

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

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Page

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1 views, and the strength with which we hold them, to be fully
2 understood. I should in any case be happy for you to pass
3 copies of this message to the other participants if you see
4 fit, so that they have access to an explanation of our position
5 at the meeting and when, later, they are considering their own
6 position at the United Nations.

7 3. You probably already know that Argentina is currently
8 seeking support for a draft General Assembly resolution calling
9 on us to enter into negotiations with her about the future of
10 the Islands. As I am sure you will understand, the UK will
11 oppose any such resolution. We cannot be expected to resume -
12 as if nothing had happened - the negotiations which Argentina
13 herself broke off with no warning earlier this year in order to
14 invade. *Our losses were considerable, despite our success.* The invasion was a traumatic experience for the
15 Islanders. ~~and for the British people as a whole. Our losses~~
16 ~~were considerable, despite our success. The peaceable population~~
17 ~~of the Falkland Islands~~ now have to live with the terrible
18 aftermath of the war, including unexploded mines, scattered
19 indiscriminately throughout the Islands. The damage will take
20 considerable time, effort and money to repair. Time will also
21 be needed to enable the people of the Falkland Islands to
22 recover and think about their future before expressing their
23 views. What is more, despite the Argentine Government's
24 various attempts to persuade the international community that
25 hostilities have ceased de facto, they have still failed to
26 issue an unambiguous declaration that hostilities will not be
27 resumed. Our efforts to end the conflict and start the process
28 of getting relations back to normal have met with little or no
29 understanding or co-operation. Argentina appears to see
30 negotiation solely as a route towards the transfer of
31 sovereignty.

32 4. If there is any discussion of this subject at your meeting
33 in Suva, I should be most grateful if you and other Commonwealth
34 countries would underline the fundamental principles of the

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Catchword

UN

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
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1 <<<<
 2 UN Charter which Argentina called into question by her invasion,
 3 principles which have always received the Commonwealth's
 4 firm support. I hope in particular that you will all
 5 continue to press for the principle of self-determination to
 6 be given full weight in the case of the Falkland Islanders,
 7 who are as fully entitled to it as all other peoples and whose
 8 rights in this, as in many other respects, Argentina seeks to
 9 deny. I would also ask that you and the other governments to
 10 be represented at the meeting ^{sh}ould refrain - as many of them
 11 did in 1976 - from supporting any resolution at the UN General
 12 Assembly which calls on us to negotiate. Although the timing
 13 is not yet clear, I understand that the General Assembly may
 14 be discussing the Falklands some time in mid-November.

15 ENDS
 16
 17 PYM
 18
 19 NNNN



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Precedence/Deskby

PRIORITY

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO 051330Z OCTOBER 82
PRE/ADD	7	TO PRIORITY SUVA
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	AND TO PRIORITY CANBERRA, WELLINGTON
	10	AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO ROUTINE NEW DELHI, PORT MORESBY,
	11	DACCA, KUALA LUMPUR, SINGAPORE
	12	AND SAVING FOR INFORMATION TO NUKU'ALOFA, COLOMBO, UKMIS NEW YORK
	13	POSSIBLE DISCUSSION OF FALKLANDS DURING CHOGRM
	14	1. We are grateful for responses to FCO telno 131 to Suva.
	15	2. In the light of all these comments, and of further advice
	16	from Ramphal, the Prime Minister has decided to send a message
	17	to Ratu Mara setting out our policy and encouraging him to pass
	18	a copy to others present at the meeting so that they are aware of
	19	our views. Ramphal has undertaken to suggest to Ratu Mara that the
	20	Prime Minister's letter be considered during the weekend retreat.
	21	3. For Suva only. MIFT (not to all) contains text of personal
///	22	message from Prime Minister to Ratu Mara. Please arrange for
//	23	its early delivery. You should explain that Ramphal is aware
/	24	of the message (though he has not seen the text), and would be
	25	glad to advise Ratu Mara on how it might be handled. You should

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File number	Dept	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals)		LIMITED CCD, FID, UND, SAD, SPD, SEAD, PS, PS/MR ONSLOW, PS/PUS, SIR J LEAHY, MR SQUIRE
Telephone number		CC: No 10 Downing Street
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

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PRIORITY

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1 <<<<
 2 add that you yourself would be glad to explain further details
 3 of our Falklands policy to Ratu Mara if he would find this
 4 helpful. (Please let us know if you require further information
 5 yourself).
 6 4. For Canberra and Wellington only. Please explain to your
 7 host government, at whatever level you think best, what we are
 8 planning to do, adding that our action is in accordance with
 9 advice we have received from Ramphal. Please pass to them, in the
 10 strictest confidence, a copy of the Prime Minister's message
 11 to Ratu Mara and say that we would be most grateful if their
 12 delegation could take whatever steps at Suva are necessary
 13 to ensure that our views are clearly propounded and adequately
 14 defended there.
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NNNN ends
telegram

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Catchword

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(FM BERNE 051100Z)

FM BIS BUENOS AIRES

TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 395 OF 04 OCTOBERINFO PRIORITY MONTEVIDEO SANTIAGO BRASILIA WASHINGTON
UKMIS NEW YORK PORT STANLEY

PRESS SUMMARY AND COMMENT

1. SATURDAY'S PAPERS WERE DOMINATED BY REPORTS OF AGUIRRE LANARI'S PRESENTATION AT THE UN AND THE INSTALLATION OF ADMIRAL RUBEN FRANCO AS NEW NAVY COMMANDER. THE SPEECHES, BOTH AT THE UN AND AT PUERTO BELGRANO, WERE UNIFORMLY HARD-LINE. THE FORMER MINISTER'S WILL HAVE BEEN REPORTED FROM ELSEWHERE BUT BOTH ANAYA AND FRANCO PREDICTABLY STRUCK A SIMILAR TOUGH NOTE : ANAYA: QUOTE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S ULTIMATUM THREATENING TO REMOVE ARGENTINES BY FORCE WAS THE SPARK STARTING THE SOUTH ATLANTIC OPERATION.... WE LOST THE BATTLE OF PUERTO ARGENTINO BUT WILL FIGHT WITHOUT TRUCE UNTIL WE RECOVER OUR TERRITORY UNQUOTE, FRANCO: QUOTE WE HAVE NOT SURRENDERED: WE HAVE ONLY BEEN MOMENTARILY BEATEN BY THE ENEMY UNQUOTE. THIS CHIMES WITH THE WMPRESSIONS OF PEOPLE CLOSE TO THE MILITARY THAT THERE IA A SUBSTANTIAL GROUP OF NATIONALISTS, IN PARTICULAR IN THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE, WHO WOULD LIKE TO HAVE ANOTHER CRACK AT THE ISLANDS. IT IS HOWEVER OUT OF HARMONY WITH POPULAR SENTIMENT IN THE CAPITAL AND PROBABLY ALSO IN THE COUNTRY, WHICH IS DECEIVED, DISILLUSIONED, AND GETTING DAILY MORE DESPERATE OVER THE ECONOMY.

2. ADVANCE INFLATION FIGURES FOR SEPTEMBER REPORTED TODAY INDICATE A RETAIL PRICE INDEX RISE OF 17 PER CENT AND A WHOLESALE OF 20 PER CENT, THE LATTER GIVING A LAST 12-MONTH WHOLESALE INFLATION FIGURE OF CLOSE ON 300 PER CENT. THE HEADLONG CAREER TO HYPER-INFLATION CONTINUES AND PROJECTS SO FAR ANNOUNCED FOR QUOTE REACTIVATING THE ECONOMY UNQUOTE - PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME, ETC, SEEM DESIGNED TO ACCELERATE THE PROCESS.

3. THE PRESIDENT HAD TALKS WITH THE NINTH GROUP OF POLITICANS TO VISIT THE PRESIDENTIAL RESIDENCE DURING THE PAST SIX WEEKS : THE PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRATS LED BY RAFAEL MARTINEZ RAYMONDA, RUMOURED EARLIER TO HAVE BEEN ONE OF THE PROPOSALS FOR VICE-PRESIDENT. THE GROUP DEMANDED QUOTE ELECTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BUT NOT BEFORE IT IS POSSIBLE UNQUOTE.

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4. A LEADING ARTICLE IN TODAY'S "LA NACION" BY BONIFACIO DEL CARRIL, ONE-TIME MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, URGES AN IMMEDIATE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO REDUCE THE PRESIDENTIAL PERIOD OF OFFICE FROM SIX TO FOUR YEARS WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A SECOND TERM IF RE-ELECTED (COPYING THE US). ARGENTINE IMPATIENCE WITH BAD GOVERNMENTS CANNOT STAND A SIX-YEAR PERIOD, HE CLAIMS : FOUR YEARS WOULD ENCOURAGE CONSTITUTIONAL RATHER THAN VIOLENT CHANGE.

5. THE MAIN WORRYING NEWS OF THE WEEK-END WAS THE DISAPPEARANCE OF A SURPRISE WITNESS IN THE ELENA HOLMBERG MURDER CASE. MARCELO DUPONT DISAPPEARED LAST THURSDAY EVENING ON HIS WAY TO VISIT HIS LAWYER. A POLICE INVESTIGATION HAS BEEN OPENED BUT THERE IS NO INDICATION SO FAR OF HIS WHEREABOUTS. THE FIRST POST-FALKLANDS DISAPPEARANCE.

JOY

LEE

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ARGENTINA. JD



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 October 1982

BF

FALKLANDS AT THE UN

The Prime Minister saw Canberra telegram No. 424 over the weekend. She has expressed considerable surprise at the attitude adopted by the Permanent Secretary at the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs towards the forthcoming debate on the Falklands in the UN General Assembly. Mrs. Thatcher has asked whether she can usefully take the matter up with the Australian Prime Minister. I should be grateful for early advice on this point.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

↙

GRS 335

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FM CANBERRA 010545Z OCT 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 424 OF 1 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

*I am
embarrassed - can't
do any more with
France?*

FALKLANDS AT THE UN

1. WE ARE IN DANGER OF LOSING AUSTRALIAN SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION ON NEGOTIATION WITH ARGENTINA OVER THE FALKLANDS UNLESS WE CAN SPELL OUT TO THEM WITH UTMOST CLARITY THE REASONS FOR OUR POSITION.

2. THIS MESSAGE WAS CONVEYED IN TERMS TO MR PATRICK WRIGHT (IN CANBERRA FOR TRI-NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MEETING) WHEN HEAD OF CHANCERY TOOK HIM YESTERDAY TO CALL ON PETER HENDERSON, PERMANENT SECRETARY AT THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

3. MR WRIGHT REHEARSED THE LOGIC OF THE BRITISH POSITION ALONG FAMILIAR LINES, STRESSING THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF OUR AGREEING TO NEGOTIATE SO SOON AFTER ARGENTINA HAD HERSELF DELIBERATELY BROKEN OFF NEGOTIATIONS AND INVADED THE FALKLANDS. BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION WAS CLEARLY ALSO AN IMPORTANT FACTOR.

4. HENDERSON REJOINED THAT COOL LOGIC WAS NOT ENOUGH. IT WAS A MATTER OF PERCEPTIONS. THE FACT OF ARGENTINE AGGRESSION HAD BEEN COMPLETELY CLEAR-CUT AS HAD AUSTRALIA'S SUBSEQUENT SUPPORT FOR THE SOUTH ATLANTIC OPERATION. BUT A CALL FOR THE PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE WAS A DIFFERENT MATTER. IF A RESOLUTION WERE PERCEIVED BY FAIR-MINDED AND REASONABLE PEOPLE TO BE A FAIRMINDED AND REASONABLE PROPOSAL, AND ALWAYS SUPPOSING THAT IT DID NOT CONTAIN OTHER ELEMENTS TO WHICH AUSTRALIA MIGHT TAKE EXCEPTION, SHE WOULD FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO VOTE AGAINST SUCH A RESOLUTION. WE SHOULD NOT TAKE AUSTRALIAN SUPPORT FOR GRANTED. AUSTRALIA'S TRADE AND OTHER INTERESTS IN SOUTH AMERICA AND IN THE THIRD WORLD HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT (HENDERSON ADDED, IN STRICT CONFIDENCE, THAT ALTHOUGH AUSTRALIAN SUPPORT FOR THE SOUTH ATLANTIC OPERATION HAD BEEN PROJECTED AS UNANIMOUS AND TOTAL, NATIONAL COUNTRY PARTY MINISTERS IN THE GOVERNMENT COALITION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND RESOURCES HAD BEEN LESS THAN ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE EXTENT OF AUSTRALIA'S EXTREMELY HELPFUL STANCE AT THE TIME) HENDERSON INDICATED FURTHER THAT IF AUSTRALIA WAS NOW ANXIOUS ABOUT BEING ASKED TO SUPPORT US ON THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATIONS, HOW MUCH MORE DIFFICULT MIGHT IT BE FOR OTHERS, LESS COMMITTED THAN SHE HAD BEEN DURING THE CONFLICT, TO GIVE US THE SUPPORT WE WERE LOOKING FOR. GRATEFUL PERSUASIVE AND EXTENSIVE SPEAKING NOTE BY TELEGRAM.

MASON

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FILE

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 October 1982

Argentina/Falkland Islands

The Prime Minister saw over the weekend the section on Argentina and the Falkland Islands contained in JIC(82)(WSI)39.

With regard to the first paragraph which refers to Argentinian naval exercises to the north of the Falklands, the Prime Minister has asked whether we still have nuclear submarines in the area. Could you please let me know the exact position urgently?

The Prime Minister also noted the possibility that Argentina might take some action on 12 October (the day of the Task Force parade), either in London or in the Falkland Islands area. She has asked whether contingency plans are ready. I should be grateful for a reply on this point as quickly as possible.

I am copying this letter to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office). *Also copied to Home Office.*

A. J. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

TOP SECRET

Q

RESTRICTED

GRS 270
RESTRICTED
FM LIMA 011700Z OCTOBER 1982
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 341 OF 2 OCTOBER

SALUTE TO THE TASK FORCE

MAYOR OF LIMA HAS TOLD ME THAT TOGETHER WITH 20 MAYORS FROM OTHER LATIN AMERICAN CAPITALS HE HAS BEEN INVITED TO VISIT SPAIN FROM 7 TO 13 OCTOBER. HE HAS HEARD THAT THE OPPORTUNITY WILL BE TAKEN TO REGISTER IN SOME WAY A COLLECTIVE PROTEST AT THE CHOICE OF DATE FOR THE VICTORY PARADE IN LONDON. HE THOUGHT THIS MIGHT EMERGE EITHER DURING OR AS A RESULT OF A DINNER WHICH HE BELIEVES THE KING OF SPAIN IS OFFERING TO THE VISITING MAYORS ON 12 OCTOBER. HE EMPHASISED THAT WE WERE PERFECTLY JUSTIFIED IN HAVING A PARADE TO CELEBRATE THE FALKLANDS VICTORY BUT DESCRIBED THE CHOICE OF DATE AS QUOTE QUITE PROVOCATIVE UNQUOTE.

2. I GAVE HIM SOME OF THE BACKGROUND, TOLD HIM THE DATE COULD NOT (NOT) BE CHANGED AND ASKED HIM TO DO WHAT HE COULD TO PLAY THINGS DOWN.

3. FCO PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY.

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AK-7/10

h.a.

As per attached distribution list

COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS' REACTIONS TO FALKLANDS CRISIS

1. Attached is a list of Commonwealth Governments' reactions to the Falklands crisis as at 1 October. Reactions from the Dependent Territories have also been noted.

1 October 1982

COMMONWEALTH COORDINATION DEPARTMENT

COUNTRIES' REACTIONS TO FALKLANDS CRISIS

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- *Antigua and Barbuda Robust statement by PM copied to Commonwealth SG. Full support to UK initiative. Support in OAS/UN. Remain "strongly pro-British" after recapture of S. Georgia.
- *Austria Recalled Ambassador. He returned 28 April, delivering strongly worded message to Galtieri. Ban on imports; ban on credit. Robust statements/messages of support before and after recapture of S. Georgia. Statement at Security Council. PM wrote to President Reagan/lobbied with VP Bush. But quoted as saying that unlikely to be drawn into "hostilities": "outside our sphere of influence and our region". Private message of congratulations to PM and congratulatory public statement following Argentine surrender. Governmental contribution of A\$250,000 to national appeal to assist families of British servicemen and Falkland Islanders. Diplomatic effort in BA to ensure fast return of Argentine prisoners. Offer to reconsider purchase of Invincible. Spoke robustly in Committee of 24.
- Bahamas Robust reply to PM's letter, to be referred to in Government statement. Note to Argentine Government urging compliance with SCR 502. Robust statement. PM and Foreign Minister refused to see Argentine lobbying delegation travelling in Caribbean: seen by senior official.
- Statement condemning "use of force in settling disputes". Robust statement privately to High Commissioner from Permanent Secretary Foreign Affairs. Helpful in NAM.
- *-Barbados "Full and complete support to any Commonwealth protest and initiative". Prime Minister delivered statement during televised budget debate ensuring maximum coverage. Support in OAS. Although sympathetic to UK position, PM said Barbados would be unlikely to vote against Argentine resolution (28 September).
- *-Belize Reply to PM. Telegram to UNSG. Robust statement. Message to Caricom ministers urging support for SCR 502. Continued support after recapture of S. Georgia and further hostilities. Sustained pro-British attitudes throughout the hostilities, in the press, at home and abroad (eg meeting in Costa Rica in May). Further message to some Commonwealth colleagues urging them to rally Caricom and Commonwealth countries to support UK at UN. In. actions to support us in NAM and UN.
- /*Botswana

Country

- *Botswana Statement "strongly condemns" Argentine action. No specific mention of support for UK. Replied to SG's letter. "Likely" to continue support following recapture of S Georgia (BHC). *Helpful in NAM*
- *Canada Robust and helpful line and statements. Recalled Ambassador. Returned 21 April. Passing reports from BA and other information to UK. Banned military shipments. Cancelled Defence College visit. Ban on imports and export credit. Helpful statement on recapture of S. Georgia. Canadian House of Commons motion. Canadians will urge interlocutors to abstain as far as possible.
- Cyprus After long silence prior to recapture of South Georgia, initially declined to make "an independent statement" but undertook not to say anything "adverse". However statement published on 24 May referred to SCR 502 but condemned "the retention at the end of the 20th century of the last remnants of colonialism". We remonstrated, and the speech subsequently made by the Cyprus Foreign Minister in Havana was apparently in milder language although the message remained essentially the same. A further statement, issued on 21 June and quoting the Havana speech, confirmed that this remained the Cyprus Government's position. Instructions to abstain in General Committee vote (21 September).
- *+Dominica Robust letter to Prime Minister. Robust message to UNSG.
- *+Fiji Robust statement by PM. "Understanding and support" at official level after recapture of South Georgia. Helpful in Committee of 24. UK can count on "continued support at UNGA and in Committee of 24".
- The Gambia Robust Government statement. Helping with refuelling and overflights of Task Force planes. Mrs Thatcher sent personal message in April. Entered reservation on NAM communique.
- Ghana Response unlikely because of domestic crises. But Ghana "would not condemn Britain, nor support Argentina". Instructions to Missions on these lines. Entered reservation on NAM statement. After Argentine lobbying, MFA said "now was not the time to open a debate on sovereignty".

/Grenada

G. ada

Unhelpful statement supporting Argentine's territorial claim but disapproving of use of force.

*+Guyana

Strong statement by Guyana Government. Voted for SCR 502. Robust reply to Ramphal's letter. Robust reply PM letter. Assurance of support from PM in UN/NAM before and after recapture of S. Georgia. Entered reservation on NAM statement after some attempt at Havana to amend it. Keen to help us. Not optimistic that support in NAM would affect pro-Argentine tilt, but thought that likely to be more effective in UNGA.

India

Lukewarm; appealing to 'all parties' to seek a 'peaceful resolution'. PM privately does not approve either of Argentine or UK action over South Georgia. BHC thinks in public India 'will probably try to maintain some sort of balance', but that Indian sympathies 'essentially with us'. This could change if international opinion turned against UK. India would 'try (repeat try) to ensure a moderate consensus' in NAM, but would find it difficult not to support call for negotiations (15 September). PM 'made no particular response' to Mr Nott's personal appeal during his visit.

*+Jamaica

Robust statement. As deputy PM recently told Mr Onslow, maintained firm stance in OAS. Some attempt at Havana to change language of NAM statement subsequent reservation. Continued 'general sympathy and support'. Glad to see 'resumption of contact' with Argentina not ruled out'. 'Ready to speak right' in NAM and UNGA (17 September), provided not isolated.

*Kenya

Robust statements (one in UNGA). Entered reservation on NAM statement. Kenya would support in UN even if NAM position different; President also continuing chairman of OAU.

*Kiribati

Robust statement in message to Argentine Government condemning invasion (made public).

*+Lesotho

Response to SG expressing 'deep concern'. Helpful in NAM. PM 'saw no difficulty about support' over S. Georgia but would need to consult. Statement in National Assembly in support of S. Georgia. Entered reservation on NAM statement. Lesotho's support for Britain reiterated by Lesotho High Commissioner on 25 May. No reason why Lesotho's 'basically pro-UK attitude' should change. Agreed Argentine demand for negotiations leading to sovereignty inappropriate.

*+Malawi

President's robust reply to PM: moral backing for use of force if necessary. Robust statement. President assured that he 'fully supported British action in S. Atlantic' following recapture of S. Georgia and further hostilities. President's 'deep sorrow' at losses of HMS 'Sheffield' and Harriers. Personal message of congratulations from President following Argentine surrender. Senior Official at MFA 'took on board' UK points but no significant reaction. (17 September)

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Country

● Malaysia

Weak statement although "deeply disturbed". Little prospect of "official reaction" to recapture of S. Georgia; but UK points conveyed to PM. "No encouragement to think that Malaysia will be any more helpful in UNGA" (20 September).

Malta

Government remained aloof throughout and made no statement. Avoided participation in Council of Europe vote; but in conversation with BHC Foreign Minister said Malta "committed in support". During televised debate at beginning of May, however, he said that too much attention was being given to the issue. Expected to "remain unhelpful" at UNGA.

*+Mauritius

Robust reply to Ramphal quoting Security Council instructions. Robust statement. Congratulated on recapturing S. Georgia. PM "sympathetic" after further military action. Did not attend NAM and do not know if reservation entered. Will support UK over non-resumption of early negotiations.

Nauru

*New Zealand

Robust statements/messages of support. Broken diplomatic relations. Support at UN. Cancelled Argentine flight schedule. Ban on trade, supply of arms/military material, export credits. "Support of (NZ) Government" for action taken to recapture S. Georgia. Loan of frigate. Congratulatory private message to PM and positive public statement following Argentine surrender. New Zealand prepared to vote against UN Resolution on 22 September.

*+Nigeria

Message to PM, acknowledged by her. Helpful statement. Instructions to be helpful in NAM; Support for "genuine negotiations", self-determination, appreciation of UK mood. Official "foresaw instructions" sent accordingly to UN.

*Papua New Guinea

Robust statement by PM PNG. To make feelings known through international bodies. Responded to SG quoting statement. Told Argentine Government that unless complies with SCR 502 PNG will break off diplomatic relations. Assurance of continued support after recapture of S. Georgia. New Government confirmed would follow similar (sympathetic) line to predecessor. Agreed to be helpful in UNGA and "to give support to Argentine resolutions".

*+Saint Lucia

Strong statement. Helpful statement in OAS.

*+Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Robust statement. Copy sent to SG

/*Seychelles

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*Seychelles

Response to PM letter deploring aggression: made public. Unwilling to give indication of "likely Government reaction" after recapture of S. Georgia. Believe did not attend NAM. Do not know if entered reservation.

*+Sierra Leone

Statement views developments 'with great concern'. Mrs Thatcher sent personal message in April. Ambassador UN instructed to 'condemn Argentine action in strong terms'. SLG providing extensive facilities for bunkering and refuelling etc of Task Force. Support after recapture of S. Georgia. Helpful in NAM. Presidential message welcoming cessation of fighting, acknowledged by Mrs Thatcher. Very helpful statement in Committee of 24.

*+Singapore

Fairly robust statement although no specific mention of support for UK. Robust reply from PM to PM's message. Entered reservation in NAM statement.

*+Solomon Islands

Robust statement. Government has also sent message to SG of UN and to SG of Commonwealth. "Assurance" of support to Prime Minister. Robust reply to PM letter. "Wholly sympathetic" over action to recapture S. Georgia. Cabinet has endorsed continued support for UK position.

Sri Lanka

Message to Prime Minister "condemns use of force" but no specific support for UK. Helpful in NAM.

*+Swaziland

Statement expressing "great concern" at invasion and supporting SCR 502. Instructions on similar lines sent to New York. Following S. Georgia and other hostilities PM and FM gave assurances of continued support in UN and generally. Entered reservation on NAM statement.

Tanzania

Statement regrets Argentine military actions but no specific mention of support for UK. Letter to PM from President expressing "sympathy" over Falklands problem. "Wholly sympathetic" response from Foreign Minister after recapture of S. Georgia and "no tendency" at highest level to criticise even if force used to remove Argentines. NAM position not known. President privately expressed pleasure at Falklands outcome.

/*Tonga

Country

- Tonga
Robust reply to PM letter: would support "any action" by us to reassert sovereignty. Robust public statement. Argentine citizens banned from Tonga. "Sympathetic understanding" of UK position after recapture of S. Georgia.
- *+Trinidad and Tobago
"Feeble" public statement, but helpful in OAS. Twice abstained in votes to invoke Rio Treaty. Likely that Trinidad would maintain in OAS its support for SCR 502. No reaction to recapture of S. Georgia. PM's message thanking for help in OAS made public. Senior Minister privately expressed strong support for UK position. Entered reservation on NAM statement after some attempt at Havana to amend it.
- *+Tuvalu
Robust reply to SG and Secretary of State. Congratulatory message from PM following Argentine surrender.
- *Uganda
Voted for SCR 502. Helpful with Non-Aligned. Replied to PM letter: "great concern". Statement condemning aggression. Support after recapture of S. Georgia and continued support in UN. Supported UNSCR 505 but no reservation on NAM. Appeal for support at UN to be given "sympathetic consideration".
- *Vanuatu
Statement "strongly condemns" invasion, but also calls upon UK to "reconsider" military retaliation. Copied to SG, PM, Argentine Government, UN. PM "most receptive" and "entirely satisfied" over recapture of S. Georgia.
- Western Samoa
- *Zambia
Statement by Acting President deploring invasion. Support in NAM. Continued support after recapture of S. Georgia. Foreign Minister expressed "very deep sorrow" at loss of life in HMS Sheffield. High Commission told Mr Onslow on 25 May that no change in Zambia's attitude to British stance on Falklands. Entered reservation on NAM statement.
- Zimbabwe
Inadequate statement but urging UK and Argentine to abide by SCR 502. No reaction to recapture of South Georgia further hostilities.

/DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

Anguilla	Message of support.
Ascension	Message of support.
*Bermuda	Public statement: Premier "deplores" invasion; supports self-determination. Offered facilities. Ministers urged trade ban. Fund opened for donations to Atlantic Fund.
British Virgin Islands	Import ban. Message of solidarity and support.
Cayman Islands	Public subscription to be sent to UK with "appropriate message from government and people". Trade ban. Contribution of \$ $\frac{1}{2}$ million to Atlantic Fund.
Gibraltar	Robust resolution in House of Assembly in support of UK following recapture of S. Georgia. Congratulatory message following Argentine surrender.
Hong Kong	Imports ban. Imposed visa requirement on Argentines. Argentine Consulate-General closed.
Montserrat	"Public consider Britain is right". "Pleased with S. Georgia news". Congratulatory message following Argentine surrender.
Tristan da Cunha	"Sympathy for Falkland Islanders" and "total support for measures ... to recover island". Message of support.
Turks and Caicos Islands	Statement by Chief Minister: "We are behind Mrs Thatcher".
St Helena	"Fully supports UK action".

Notes:

- * Countries which have explicitly (or implicitly through support for SCR 502) in public or in private condemned Argentina's invasion and/or called for withdrawal of Argentine forces.
- + Countries which have expressed support for the principles of self-determination in relation to the Falklands.

Distribution

Private Secretary

Mr Warren-Gash

PS/PUS

Sir Ian Sinclair

Sir J Bullard

Sir J Leahy

Mr Wright

Mr Giffard

Lord Bridges

Mr Ure

Mr Squire

Mr Gillmore

Mr Aust

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GRS 279

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FM FCO 011530Z OCT 82

TO IMMEDIATE CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 180 OF 1 OCTOBER 1982

'SALUTE TO THE TASK FORCE': ARGENTINE PROPAGANDA

1. A PARADE TO SALUTE THE TASK FORCE WILL BE HELD IN LONDON ON 12 OCTOBER. THIS IS ALSO 'COLUMBUS DAY', WHICH IS A NATIONAL HOLIDAY IN SPAIN AND MOST LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, INCLUDING ARGENTINA (MY TELNO 107 TO ASUNCION - NOT TO ALL). THIS IS AN UNFORTUNATE COINCIDENCE (TO WHICH ATTENTION SHOULD NOT OF COURSE BE DRAWN) BUT THE DATE CANNOT BE CHANGED.

2. IN LATIN AMERICA AND ELSEWHERE THE ARGENTINES MAY WELL SEEK TO CAPITALISE ON THE COINCIDENCE OF DATES AND TO REPRESENT THE PARADE AS A DELIBERATE INSULT TO ALL LATIN AMERICANS.

LINE TO TAKE

3. IN ANSWERING LOCAL CRITICISM YOU SHOULD TRY TO PLAY THE MATTER DOWN, AND SHOULD DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS AS APPROPRIATE FOR YOUR PARTICULAR AUDIENCE:

(A) THE DATE OF THE PARADE WAS SELECTED BECAUSE IT WAS ONE WHICH WAS CONVENIENT FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS. IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN HELD SOONER BECAUSE SOME KEY ELEMENTS OF THE TASK FORCE (EG HMS INVINCIBLE) HAVE ONLY RECENTLY RETURNED TO THE UK. ONCE THEY WERE ALL BACK, IT MADE SENSE TO HOLD THE PARADE AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE.

(B) THE PARADE IS ORGANISED BY THE CITY OF LONDON AND NOT BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

(C) WE HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO WISH TO OFFEND OUR LATIN AMERICAN FRIENDS.

4. IF YOU THINK IT WOULD HELP YOU COULD MENTION THE PART BRITISH FORCES PLAYED IN THE 19TH CENTURY IN HELPING LATIN

/AMERICAN

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AMERICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, BUT IT IS A POINT THAT SHOULD
OBVIOUSLY BE USED WITH CARE.

5. THE COI AND BBC EXTERNAL SERVICES HAVE BEEN ASKED TO PLAY
THE EVENT DOWN.

PYM

BY TELEGRAPH

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Prime Minister

I have asked the F/C.O.

to a full assessment of
where we stand at the U.N.
You will be able to read it
next weekend.

A.F.C. 1/10.

GRS 130

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FM OTTAWA 011730Z OCT 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 479 OF 01 OCTOBER

INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, UKREP BRUSSELS AND ALL EC POSTS

UNGA: FALKLANDS

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD A SHORT PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH VAN AGT OVER DINNER ON THE EVENING OF 30 SEPTEMBER. VAN AGT THOUGHT THAT BOTH THE FRENCH AND THE ITALIANS WOULD VOTE FOR THE ARGENTINE RESOLUTION. HE ADDED THAT THE FRENCH WERE TRYING TO NEGOTIATE LANDING RIGHTS FOR AIR FRANCE IN BUENOS AIRES. THE GERMANS MIGHT WANT TO DO THE SAME. IF THEY DID, VAN AGT WOULD HAVE TO FOLLOW SUIT ON BEHALF OF KLM. IF SO, THIS WOULD PUT HIM IN A DIFFICULT POSITION OVER THE ARGENTINE RESOLUTION. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAW IN THIS A CLEAR IMPLICATION THAT THE DUTCH MIGHT FEEL UABLE TO ABSTAIN, AS VAN AGT HAD PREVIOUSLY INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD.

MORAN

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

MS.

1 October 1982

Prime Minister

To note.

Dear John,

MS 10.

Falkland Islands Rehabilitation

I enclose a further progress report on the programme of rehabilitation, which updates the report sent to you on 15 September.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Offices of all members of OD(FAF) and to the Private Secretary to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

FALKLANDS REHABILITATION: PROGRESS REPORT

Visit by Mr Onslow

1. Mr Onslow is to visit the Islands from 3-9 October. His programme will include a review of progress in rehabilitation work and will enable him to discuss points of detail and any difficulties with the civil administration. He intends to visit a number of smaller communities in the Islands and to review their rehabilitation problems.

Visit by ODA Engineering Adviser

2. The ODA Engineering Adviser visited the Islands from 15-23 September. He undertook a comprehensive review of rehabilitation problems in the Islands with particular attention to the ODA's housing project. He has prepared a report on longer-term requirements for the rehabilitation of power and water supplies, the sewerage system and roads. Preliminary studies and costings for these projects are under way.

Finance

3. With the extension of the housing project firm commitments to date will absorb £7.5million of the existing £10million rehabilitation grant. Financial requirements for further rehabilitation projects are being established and a provisional allocation for the next financial year has been requested.

Shipping of rehabilitation supplies

4. Several consignments of rehabilitation supplies have arrived or are about to arrive in the Falklands. No significant difficulties have been encountered in securing shipping space for all consignments and a number of shipping companies are eager to supply further vessels as required. There is some delay in unloading goods in Port Stanley, but the difficulties, and a range of possible solutions, are being urgently examined.

Recruitment

5. The ODA's special programme of recruitment for new staff for the FIG is effectively complete and the special unit established for this purpose has been disbanded. Officers are being transported to the Islands as rapidly as possible.

/Housing

Housing

6. The turnkey contract for 27 units of prefabricated housing has been increased, following discussions with the Civil Commissioner, to 54 units, and is being placed with James Brewster Associates Ltd. The contract will have a 75% UK content. The contractor will supply all accommodation and facilities for his staff. The buildings required will be left in the Islands and turned to other use. It is intended that the houses will be handed over, fully furnished in 5 different colour schemes, one by one by the end of May/early June 1983.

Mobile Homes

7. 10 mobile homes have been ordered. The first consignment of 5 will be shipped in early October. The remaining 5 are in production.

Replacement of aircraft for Falkland Islands Government Air Service (FIGAS)

8. One Beaver aircraft and 2 Islanders are being supplied. Firm orders have now been placed for all 3. The Beaver is due to be shipped from Canada to UK on 9 October for forwarding to the Islands, and should arrive by late November. It seems likely that the Islanders will also need to be delivered by sea once they have been manufactured. They should be available for shipping in about 8 weeks.

Furnishings

9. Hard and soft furnishings for 24 existing government houses are required. Tenders are being evaluated. The Falkland Islands Government are being asked to provide detailed specifications and a guarantee that labour will be available to fit the furnishings in due course.

Compensation

10. The team of MOD assessors in the Islands continues to make good progress with settling civilian claims. Over £250,000 has been paid out mainly for claims in Stanley. The assessors have been authorised to pay straightforward claims from the Falkland Islands Company though claims from commercial organisations relating to facilities of communal interest and claims for loss of trading or profit may prove more difficult and have to be referred to London. The bulk of remaining claims relates to areas outside Stanley. The MOD have been asked to advise on any additional expertise they may require to settle agricultural claims expeditiously.

/Coordination with the
military

Coordination with the military

11. The Royal Engineers are concentrating on work on Stanley Airport. It is hoped that an extension to 6,100 feet will be completed by mid-October and allow 2 daily flights by Hercules aircraft. A further extension of an additional 1,000 feet is planned thereafter. The joint Military/Civilian Planning Committee in the Islands is assisting liaison on all civil engineering projects to ensure that civil and military needs are carefully coordinated. Some part of the new civil power and water, sewerage and road systems may be amalgamated with facilities to serve military needs. A similar Whitehall group has been established to assist interdepartmental liaison on civil engineering projects, notably the new airport.

12. The new airport project is being managed on behalf of the MOD by PSA. They are making arrangements for representatives of 3 contractors to visit the Islands and it is intended that the contract should be concluded and work commenced before the end of the Falklands summer.

General

13. No major problems affecting the rehabilitation programme have arisen in the period under review. The limitations on unloading facilities at Port Stanley may become irksome and the need for additional lighterage and possibly new jetty facilities is being examined.

30 September 1982

Argentina, Relations, P427

1914

PART 29 ends:-

AJC to FCO 30/9/82.

PART 30 begins:-

FCO to AJC 1/10/82.

