


SECRET

# 10 DOWNING STREET

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FILE TITLE: COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AND		SERIES  DEFENCE
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS TALKS (CTB + SALT)		
MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS (M BFR)		PART: 3
PART BEGINS: 25 <sup>TH</sup> AUGUST 1979	PART ENDS: 24 <sup>TH</sup> DECEMBER 1982	CAB ONE: 

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PART  
CLOSED

PREM 19/693

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PART 3 ends:-

FCOTel 297 24/2

PART 4 begins:-

RTAF AJC 1/2/83

Defence

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RR MOSCOW  
GRS 139  
RESTRICTED  
FM F C O 242100Z DEC 82  
TO ROUTINE MOSCOW  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 797 OF 24 DECEMBER  
INFO UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN.

ARMS CONTROL:

1. THE SOVIET CHARGE, ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS, CALLED TODAY (24 DECEMBER) ON HANNAY TO HAND OVER A COPY OF A 'MESSAGE OF PEACE TO THE PARLIAMENTS, GOVERNMENTS, POLITICAL PARTIES AND PEOPLES OF THE WORLD'. THE MESSAGE IS IN THE NAME OF THE SUPREME SOVIET AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE C P S U (BUT NOT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS) AND CONTAINS A FAMILIAR LIST OF SOVIET ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS. IT DOES NOT HOWEVER REPEAT THE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON I N F AND STRATEGIC ARMS CONTAINED IN ANDROPOV'S SPEECH OF 21 DECEMBER.
2. DOLGOV EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DELIVER A COPY OF THE MESSAGE TODAY FOR THE PRIME MINISTER. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE TEXT WILL BE PUBLISHED SHORTLY IN THE SOVIET PRESS.

PYM

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DISTRIBUTION

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PS/MR HURD

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PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR GILLMORE

MR HANNAY

MR GOODISON

CABINET OFFICE

RESTRICTED

DEFENCE

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GRS 320  
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FM BONN 221145Z DEC 82  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1091 OF 22 DECEMBER  
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO MODUK BMG BERLIN  
INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW  
INFO SAVING ANKARA ATHENS EMBASSY BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE  
LISBON LUXEMBOURG OSLO OTTOWA PARIS REYKJAVIK ROME CICC(G)

MY TELNO 1090 : ANDROPOV'S STATEMENT OF 21 DECEMBER:  
FRG PRESS COMMENT

1. TODAY'S FRG PRESS COMMENT ON ANDROPOV'S SPEECH IS UNCOMMONLY CONSISTENT AND SHOWS THE EFFECT OF OFFICIAL BRIEFING. COMMENTATORS SEE THE SOVIET PROPOSALS AS A SIGNIFICANT MOVE WHICH SHOULD BE EXAMINED SERIOUSLY. BUT THEY ARE ALIVE TO THE SNAGS.
2. THE NEWSPAPERS SEE THE PRIOR AIM OF ANDROPOV'S STATEMENT AS PROPAGANDA TO INFLUENCE THE WESTERN PEACE MOVEMENT AND FRUSTRATE NATO'S INF STATIONING DECISION. THEY ANALYSE THE WEAK POINTS IN THE SOVIET OFFER ON SS-20 REDUCTIONS - NO PROMISE THAT THE MISSILES WILL BE SCRAPPED, COUNTING BY LAUNCHERS RATHER THAN WARHEADS, AND THE PROSPECT OF A CONTINUING SOVIET MONOPOLY IN THIS WEAPONS CATEGORY. THE FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ARGUES CONVINCINGLY THAT THE USSR IS TRYING TO DIVIDE NATO INTO TWO ZONES SUBJECT TO DIFFERENT INTENSITIES OF THREAT, ONE INVOLVING THE US GOVERNED BY PARITY IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS, AND ONE OF WESTERN EUROPE CHARACTERISED BY CLEAR SOVIET NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY. MOST COMMENTATORS AGREE, HOWEVER, THAT ANDROPOV'S PUBLICATION OF A SEMINGLY RADICAL OFFER COULD IMPLY MORE SCOPE FOR PROGRESS IN INF TALKS IN EARLY 1983 THAN WAS ORIGINALLY HOPED: AND THEY STRESS THAT THE WEST MUST NOT LET ITSELF BE BRANDED AS IMMOBILE IN FACE OF SOVIET MOBILITY.
3. MOST PAPERS CRITICISE ANDROPOV'S CALL FOR INCLUSION OF FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS IN INF TALKS, MENTIONING THE DIFFERENCE IN NATURE OF THE THIRD-COUNTRY SYSTEMS, THE RISK OF DOUBLE COUNTING ETC. TO BACK THEIR ARGUMENTS, HOWEVER, COMMENTATORS REFER EXCLUSIVELY TO CHEYSSON'S STRONG AND EARLY STATEMENT YESTERDAY ON FRANCE'S

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REFUSAL TO SEE ITS WEAPONS INCLUDED. THIS CONFIRMS OUR VIEW THAT THE ARGUMENTS PROPER TO THE RATHER DIFFERENT BRITISH CASE FOR EXCLUSION COULD WITH ADVANTAGE BE PUT ACROSS MORE STRONGLY WITH THE GERMANS (MALLABY'S LETTER OF 6 DECEMBER TO GILLMORE).

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ABOVE ADDRESSEES EXCEPT CICC(G).

TAYLOR

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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DEFENCE D  
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WED  
RESEARCH D  
EESD  
PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR URE  
MR GOODISON  
MR GILLMORE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
START / INF

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
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GRS450  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FM PARIS 221730Z DEC 82  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1212 OF 22 DECEMBER 1982  
AND ROUTINE INFO TO UKDEL NATO WASHINGTON MOSCOW

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 1209: FRENCH REACTIONS TO ANDROPOV'S STATEMENT

1. FRENCH MEDIA COMMENTATORS ON BOTH LEFT AND RIGHT AGREE THAT ANDROPOV HAS MADE A SHREWD MOVE. THE GENERAL FEELING IS THAT HIS SUPERFICIALLY ATTRACTIVE OFFER WILL APPEAL TO PACIFISTS, PUT THE US IN THE POSITION OF HAVING TO MAKE COUNTER PROPOSALS AND PUT FRANCE AND THE UK ON THE SPOT.

2. LE MATIN (SOCIALIST) COMMENTS THAT THE OFFER WOULD SMACK LESS OF SLEIGHT OF HAND IF IT COVERED CONVENTIONAL AS WELL AS NUCLEAR FORCES, BUT CONCLUDES THAT IF IT WAS THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS A GENUINE NEGOTIATION IT COULD ONLY BE WELCOMED. LIBERATION (SOCIALIST) POINTS TO THE DELICATE POSITION IN WHICH FRANCE FOUND ITSELF: IF IT REJECTS ANDROPOV'S OFFER IT WILL SEEM TO BE ALIGNING ITSELF WITH THE US: IF IT ACCEPTS IT WILL BE PROVING ITS 'INDEPENDENCE'.

3. LE MONDE'S DIPLOMATIC EDITOR, MICHEL TATU, APPARENTLY REFLECTING ELYSEE BRIEFING, GIVES A DETAILED EXPLANATION OF WHY ANDROPOV'S OFFER IS UNACCEPTABLE. THE MAIN POINT, AND ONE WHICH, ACCORDING TO TATU, MITTERRAND MADE FORCEFULLY TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR WHEN THE LATTER DELIVERED TO HIM ON 20 DECEMBER THE ANDROPOV TEXT, IS THAT THE SS20'S REPRESENT ONLY A FRACTION OF RUSSIAN FORCES WHEREAS FRANCE'S DETERRENT IS ALREADY AS SMALL AS CREDIBILITY WILL ALLOW. TATU THEN GOES ON TO SUGGEST THAT OTHER COMPROMISES MIGHT BE POSSIBLE: WIDENING THE ZERO OPTION TO INCLUDE ALL (INCLUDING TACTICAL) NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE: LIMITING THE NUMBER OF (FAST) PERSHING'S BUT INCREASING THE NUMBER OF (SLOW) CRUISE

E  
IN ORDER TO GIVE THE US MISSILES A MORE DEFENSIVE PROFILE: AND TAKING FRENCH AND BRITISH FORCES INTO THE START RECKONING (UNOFFICIALLY PERHAPS) TO THE EXTENT OF LETTING THE RUSSIANS KEEP

/ A QUOTA

A QUOTA OF SUBMARINE MISSILES EQUIVALENT TO THOSE OF FRANCE AND  
BRITAIN. TATU CONCLUDES THAT ANDROPOV'S PROPOSAL AT LEAST PROVIDES AN  
OPPORTUNITY TO REFLECT ON WAYS OF AVOIDING A SERIOUS EAST/ WEST CRISIS .

4. HUMANITE (COMMUNIST) CRITICISES CHEYSSON'S ''PRECIPITATE''  
REACTION.

PETRIE.

THIS TELEGRAM  
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PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
MR BULLARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE  
MR GOODISON

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
START

B.R.

Defense  
SALT

Defence

BRIEF FOR THE PRIME MINISTER: 20 DECEMBER  
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS

Prime Minister, Gentlemen, I will speak for about ten minutes. I will remind you briefly of the background to major international arms control efforts over the past two decades. I will recall the main elements of the US/Soviet SALT and ABM Treaties. I will then rehearse the origins of the present Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), the respective US and Soviet positions, and the stage which the negotiations have currently reached.

Historical Background

2. The present nuclear arms control negotiations have evolved from a pattern of arms control activities over the past two

/decades



decades. Between 1961 and 1979 the negotiated arms control process produced some eighteen separate arms control agreements (not all bilateral and not all exclusively nuclear). The Cuba missile crisis in 1962 created the political conditions which led to the Partial Test Ban Treaty the following year. This, together with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, were the most important landmarks of the 60s. Towards the end of that decade agreement followed in principle between the Americans and Russians to move on to discussions on the limitation of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive weapons. These were postponed when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia. But by the end of 1969 the SALT I talks had begun, against the background of sharply divided views in the US Congress

/and

and public over whether to develop an anti-ballistic missile deployment in the US. This heralded the 70's as the decade for arms control on strategic nuclear weapons opening with the ABM Treaty and the interim agreement limiting strategic offensive arms (SALT 1) in 1972, and closing with the signing of SALT 2 in Vienna in 1979.

3. To complete the arms control picture during the period of "high detente" - I should mention the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972; the initiation of the MBFR negotiations in Vienna in 1973 and the conclusion of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, these latter bearing on conventional force levels and confidence-building measures respectively.

/SALT 1

SALT 1 and ABM

4. The ABM Treaty, together with a subsequent protocol, limits the Russians and the Americans to one ABM deployment each of not more than a hundred ABM launchers, so restricted and located that they cannot provide a nation-wide ABM defence. The Russians chose to put their ABM system around the National Command Authority in Moscow. The Americans chose to defend their ICBM field at Grand Forks, North Dakota, but did not subsequently build the ABM system. The Treaty is of unlimited duration, and reviewed at five year intervals. A routine US/Soviet review of it has just been completed this year. The continuing integrity of the ABM Treaty is a British interest because of the implications for Trident.

5. The SALT I Treaty froze at then existing but unequal levels the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers operational or under construction on each side; while permitting an increase in SLBM launchers up to an agreed level for each party, subject to the dismantling or destruction of a corresponding number of older ICBM or SLBM launchers. US ICBMs were fixed at 1,054 and Soviet ICBMs at 1,618: US SLBMs at 710 (base level of 656 SLBMs) and Soviet SLBMs at 950 (from a base level at that time of 740).

Heavy bombers, in which the US were greatly superior, were not included. In a unilateral statement during SALT I, the Soviet Union asserted that if other NATO allies increased the number of their modern ballistic missile firing submarines, the Soviet Union would have the right to increase its SSBNs accordingly.

The US declared that it did not accept this claim. The SALT 1 Treaty was an interim agreement for five years. But both sides continue to treat it as in force. The Russians honour the relevant dismantling provisions, and regular meetings to discuss the operation of the Treaties are still held of the Joint Standing Consultative Commission (created by the ABM Treaty).

#### SALT 2 Treaty

6. The principle US objective in SALT 2 was to provide equal ceilings on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for each side, that is ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers; to begin the process of reduction; and to impose restraints on qualitative developments which could threaten future stability. The main ceilings were 2,400

/on

on each side to be lowered to 2,250 within eighteen months, with further sub-ceilings on Mirv-ed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers with long-range cruise missiles. The Mirv-ing of ICBMs and SLBMs was also limited. There was a restriction on the development of new type ICBMs (to one new type each); [and in a protocol which expired at the end of 1981, the deployment of mobile ICBM launchers and sea-launched and ground launched cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 kms was prohibited.] SALT 2 also banned the construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers, or the relocation of existing launchers. The Backfire bomber was not explicitly covered in SALT 2, but was the subject of a separate agreement at the time of signature, limiting production to thirty per year. A joint statement of principles charted the pattern for future negotiations under SALT 3, as it then seemed appropriate to call it.

7. Although the SALT 2 Treaty was never ratified by Congress following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Americans have since reaffirmed that they would not be the first to undercut existing arms control agreements. Until the recent controversy over MX basing, neither side has seriously accused the other of so doing in relation either to SALT I or SALT 2.

START

8. The Reagan Administration's position on entering office was that the SALT 2 Treaty was fatally flawed, in particular in relation to its provisions (or lack of them) on heavy missiles, verification and the Backfire bomber.

/It

It was claimed that SALT 2 would do little to prevent the theoretical vulnerability of US ICBMs to a disarming but limited first strike by Soviet ICBMs, particularly the Mirv-ed heavy SS18. (A modern heavy ICBM missile is defined as any ICBM with a launch weight and throw-weight greater than 90,000 kgs and 3,600 kgs respectively, which are estimates based on the Soviet SS19. The only modern heavy ICBM on either side is the SS18. The MX would fall below these weight ceilings.) The President initially concentrated on modernising the US strategic armoury. In fact none of the strategic programmes he inherited - MX, B1, D5 - would have been precluded by SALT 2. By the time of his November 81 speech to the Washington Press Club, President Reagan had made clear his readiness to resume arms control negotiations with the Russians. Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) began in Geneva in

/June



June 1982. President Reagan stated as his goal significant reduction of the most destabilising systems (ICBMs), the number of warheads they carry and their overall destructive potential.

8. The essential elements of the US negotiating position are as follows. Phase 1: each side to reduce from the present upwards of 7,500 warheads to 5,000 warheads on no more than 850 ICBMs and SLBMs. Because the Soviet Union deploys more missiles (2,400) than the US (1,700), the Soviet Union would have to cut twice as many missiles. Further restraints would limit the Russians to a maximum of 110 SS18 heavy ICBMs within this total. Of the 5,000 warheads permitted to each side, no more than 2,500 should be on ICBMs. All these

/reductions



reduction from SALT 2 levels down to equal ceilings on each side of 1,800 ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers by 1990. The Russians have however not disclosed how they would break down their figure of 1,800 as between the relevant categories. They have also proposed unspecified limits on warhead numbers; no increase in deployments of US forward-based systems in Europe including Pershing 2 and GLCM; a ban on long-range cruise missiles and limits on numbers of deployed modern SSBNs. Other elements in the Soviet position are proposals for ASW-free sanctuaries for SSBNs, limitations on the operating areas of aircraft carriers and of bomber aircraft, and compensation for Chinese nuclear systems.

10. Although the START negotiations have been going for a shorter period of time than the INF

/talks,

talks, the scope for agreement, on the face of it, may be greater. Subject to a resolution of the primary counting unit (warheads versus launchers) and of the position on heavy bombers (separate or integrated ceilings, a decision on Backfire) it would seem as if the progression from SALT 2 ceilings of 2,250 through Soviet ceilings of 1,800 to US ceilings of 850 missile launchers (plus provision for bombers) is well within the field of the negotiable. The possibility that President Reagan might aim for the swift conclusion of a simple framework agreement on START nearer the elections (like the Vladivostok Agreement in 1974) should certainly not be excluded. At the heart of the matter agreement would probably have to involve some

/trade

trade off between the US interest in limits of aggregate Soviet missile throw-weight and the Russian desire to curtail the full potential of US cruise-missiles, especially longer range SLCMs. To sum up, viewed as a series, strategic talks mark a progression: from a crude freeze on missiles in SALT 1; through equal ceilings and marginal reductions on missiles and heavy bombers in SALT 2; toward steep cuts and the inclusion of Backfire in START I; with the prospect, in START 2, of also limiting aggregate missile throw-weight and more definitive arrangements for strategic cruise missiles. But for the moment the American assessment is that the Russians are holding the START negotiations hostage to progress over INF. Which is perhaps the convenient point for me to hand-over to Mr. Gillmore.

Ref: B06662

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Briefing on Nuclear Issues

We have made the following arrangements for the briefing on nuclear issues which you will be having at 2 pm on Monday, 20th December, together with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary.

2. Sir Robert Armstrong will introduce the speakers. Mr Facer of the Cabinet Office will describe the understandings we have with the Americans over the use of nuclear weapons and touch on the NATO and Anglo-German understandings. He will be followed by Mr Blelloch of the Ministry of Defence who will describe United Kingdom and United States nuclear forces based in the United Kingdom, and their roles, and the background to the United States nuclear presence here. At this point you may like to pause for questions and discussion, before moving on to the final part of the briefing on arms control aspects, which will be in the hands of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. After a brief introduction from Mr Patrick Wright, Mr Weston will describe the strategic arms reduction talks (START) and Mr Gillmore the intermediate nuclear force reductions negotiations (INF). The Foreign and Commonwealth Office presentations will cover the background to these negotiations, the present state of play and the attitude to them of the other main member countries of the Alliance.
3. We do not propose to use visual aids; but by way of background I attach six tables showing various aspects of the nuclear balance between East and West.
4. Also present will be the Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Frank Cooper, Sir Antony Acland, Sir Robert Armstrong and myself, and Group Captain Chandler from the Defence Staff.
5. I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Defence Secretary and Sir Robert Armstrong.

David Goodall

17th December 1982


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A D S GOODALL


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SALT 1 LIMITS


(a) SALT 1 CEILINGS




(b) SYSTEMS DEPLOYED 1972



(a) SALT II CEILINGS



(b) SYSTEMS DEPLOYED 1979






STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. DEPLOYED - 1982

3


(a) AS DEFINED UNDER SALT II



\*Includes mothballed B52s and excludes FB111s

'Excludes Backfire bombers

(b) AS DEFINED BY US IN START




CURRENT NUCLEAR BALANCE


IN NON-STRATEGIC SYSTEMS

(4)

(a) INF




(b) Short Range Systems




LRINF MISSILES ONLY (WARHEAD NUMBERS)


a) 1982



b) ZERO OPTION IN LRINF MISSILES



c) NO INF AGREEMENT; FULL NATO MODERNISATION



6

THE SOVIET CLAIM OF A EUROPEAN BALANCE IN  
'MEDIUM RANGE SYSTEMS'

NATO'S  
MEDIUM RANGE  
SYSTEMS  
(ACCORDING TO THE RUSSIANS)

986

144	FRENCH MISSILES AND BOMBERS
119	UK MISSILES AND BOMBERS
490	NATO'S SHORTER RANGE (F4) AND MARITIME (A6/A7) AIRCRAFT (EXCLUDED BY NATO FROM THE LRINF BALANCE)
233	LONGER RANGE INF AIRCRAFT (F111 and FB111)

*F 4 with.*

*Not multi-variant systems.*

SOVIET UNION'S  
MEDIUM RANGE  
SYSTEMS  
(SOVIET FIGURES)

975

475	LONGER RANGE INF AIRCRAFT (BADGER, BLINDER, BACKFIRE)
500	LONGER RANGE INF MISSILES (SS20s, SS4s, SS5s)

*555 Fencer SU 24. Not a variant comparison*

*333 (1000)*

*1250 variant*

## PRESENTATION TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON INF

Prime Minister, Gentlemen

We now come to INF, the most actual and politically complicated of current arms control issues. I will deal with this under six headings:

- (a) the essential background;
- (b) the basic negotiating position of the two sides;
- (c) recent developments in the negotiations;
- (d) the criteria which we consider must be met if we are to reach a satisfactory outcome;
- (e) the position in other European basing countries;
- (f) short assessment of the prospects.

The Essential Background

1. John Weston has described developments in the 1970's which lead towards a formal agreement fixing contractually US/Soviet strategic parity. As the Europeans watched this process, doubts began to grow about the implications for the American nuclear umbrella over Europe (known in the *jargon* as 'extended *deterrence*'). The umbrella looked solid and credible enough *when* the American strategic forces were superior to those of *the Russians*; it looked more threadbare and unreliable in the new situation of strategic parity.

2. Although these European anxieties were not entirely new - in the 1960s General de Gaulle had questioned whether any American President would, as he put it, risk Chicago for Paris - they were compelling. In particular they were reinforced by two additional factors:

/(a)

(a) NATO's only long range nuclear systems based in Europe (that is systems capable of striking Soviet territory) were bombers <sup>Bombers</sup> (Vulcans and American F111 aircraft). They were old and because they were aircraft, increasingly vulnerable;

(b) The Soviet Union was known to be developing and in <sup>the mid 1970's</sup> began deployment of a new sophisticated Soviet long range INF system, the SS20, a highly accurate missile with three independently targettable warheads.

3. Thus it seemed to many in Europe that, while the SALT process was becoming a solid barrage across developments in strategic systems, the flow of the massive Soviet effort in missile programmes was sweeping around the dam in the area of sub-strategic systems, that is systems which fall just below the ranges and types covered by SALT. The risks of the European nightmare - the decoupling of the defence of Europe from the defence of the United States - were growing.

4. These anxieties reached a wider public in the autumn of 1977 in Chancellor Schmidt's Alistair Buchan memorial lecture in London. When Heads of NATO Governments met in Washington in the following spring and agreed a long term defence programme, one of the key items was the modernisation of NATO's INF. A special NATO group (HLG) was established to make recommendations on what was to be done. At the Guadeloupe Quadripartite Summit in January 1979 the four Heads of Government gave general endorsement to a modernisation programme which, the HLG's studies were beginning to show, was likely to focus on systems based on the territory of Europe: Cruise Missiles and the /Pershing

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- 3 -

Pershing II. But already there were growing concerns about European public opinion. Simply to proceed with modernisation without producing an arms control complement seemed increasingly unrealistic. Accordingly a second group (SCG) was established to work in parallel with the HLG on the arms control aspects. The work of these two groups was combined in November 1979 in an integrated decision document. This document which set out the basic principles of the Allied approach to both aspects formed the basis on which Ministers took the double track decision in December 1979. [~~Outline of decision~~].

5. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan immediately afterwards, President Carter's increasingly tenuous political position in the election year of 1980, the failure to get SALT II ratified, the change of Administration in Washington at the beginning of 1981 and the new Administration's comprehensive review of arms control policy, it was not until the end of 1981 that serious negotiations with the Russians began in Geneva. Meanwhile the SS20 programme continued and the imbalance worsened. Figure 4(a) shows the situation in intermediate non-strategic systems of all types. Immediately prior to the start of negotiations and after rapid consultations in the Alliance, President Reagan announced that the American negotiating objective would be the complete elimination of all land based long range missiles on both sides (the so-called zero option). Figure 5 shows (a) the current situation in ~~Europe~~; (b) the outcome at zero; and (c) the consequences of no agreement but the full implementation of NATO's programme.

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/The

The Negotiations

6. In February 1982 the United States tabled a draft treaty in Geneva. This was based on the objective of a zero outcome and followed closely the principles agreed in the Alliance in the IDD. Essentially these principles (6) are:

- (a) A step by step approach with the first step focusing specifically on long range land based missiles;
- (b) Counting rules based on warheads on launchers;
- (c) Aircraft to be dealt with at a later stage;
- (d) Equality of ceilings and of rights and obligations;
- (e) Third party systems to be excluded;
- (f) Global (not geographical) scope.

7. The Russians responded in May with their own draft treaty. This established clearly their main negotiating objectives. As I see it, there are three:

- (a) To retain to the greatest extent possible their SS20 deployments;
- (b) To prevent the deployment of the new American systems;
- (c) To accentuate to the maximum the process of decoupling.

8. In substance the Russians proposed the following (5):

- (a) A moratorium on further deployments;
- (b) A reduction to 300 systems (missiles and aircraft) per side in five years;
- (c) A geographical zone (ie not a global approach);
- (d) The inclusion within the 300 ceiling of third party systems;
- (e) The inclusion from the outset of aircraft.



9. The key to the Soviet position is the way in which they count the forces on each side. As far as the United States is concerned they have included not only French and British missile systems (162) and aircraft but a vast range of US systems while similar systems on their own side have been excluded. If you look at the statistics in figure 6 you will see how the Russians have contrived to produce  $\neq$  so-called parity in what they describe as medium range systems.

You will note that the left-hand column includes UK and French systems, shorter range US aircraft (the F4s) whose range of operations is well below the 1000km floor, and US maritime aircraft based on carriers (the A6 and A7) as well as US FB111s which are based in the United States under the control of strategic air command. This artificially contrived counting base <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ essential to the Russians for two inter-related reasons:

(a) in order to justify the existing SS20 programme they have to sustain the claim that approximate parity already exists. This claim was for example repeated only yesterday in Pravda:

(b) similarly only by including, as it were, the kitchen sink on the American side can they argue that the US modernisation programme is unnecessary. Thus they can maintain a position which, if carried through, will bring about their objective of decoupling.

#### Later Developments

10. The formal position in the negotiations has remained deadlocked between these two vastly different approaches. However, as we have learnt from the Americans, there has /been

been a number of back channel contacts in the margins of the negotiations. In the summer the two Ambassadors exchanged highly informal ideas about the possibility of fixing ceilings of 75 systems on each side which would allow for the retention by the Russians of some of their number of SS20s and for the deployment of an equivalent number of GLCMs. An arrangement of this kind could be restricted to <sup>land</sup> systems capable of reaching Europe and allow the Russians to maintain existing level of SS20 deployments in the Soviet Far East while the Americans stockpiled, say, Pershing 2 missiles in the United States. This arrangement might also provide for high ceilings on aircraft numbers at least at the first stage. However at the beginning of this last autumn round there were clear indications that the Soviet negotiator had been told by Moscow not to pursue, even informally, this approach.

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11. More recently the Russians, however, floated the idea of a separate sub-ceiling on missiles <sup>targeted on Europe</sup> (ie within the overall ceiling of 300 systems including aircraft and missiles). At first no precise figure was attached to this sub-ceiling but, subsequently and highly informally, the Russians mentioned two possible figures: 162 (which happens to equate exactly with the Soviet count of UK and French missile systems) or 150. ~~It was~~ <sup>A</sup> somewhat garbled report of these Soviet ideas which ~~was~~ leaked in the New York Times on 12 December.

12. The Russians confirmed and published these ideas in Mr Andropov's speech of 21 December. Starting from the false equation of roughly 1,000 so-called medium range systems in Europe for NATO and the Soviet Union respectively (to be reduced to 300 systems on each side) he now proposed that Soviet SS20s in Europe should be reduced to match exactly the number of French and British missiles (162), and reduced beyond that pro rata if French and British systems were subsequently to be cut down. As always with the proviso that no Pershing or cruise missile deployment should take place.

13. There are at present 234 Soviet SS20s (out of a total of 333) situated within range of NATO Europe. Thus the reduction of SS20s necessary to reach a missile sub-ceiling matching French and British systems would be of the order of 70 to 80 (Andropov's words 'several dozen'). But we do not know whether they would be scrapped or merely withdrawn east of the Urals, from where a large part of NATO territory can still be targetted. Nor do first reports of Andropov's speech appear to imply any limitation for the deployment of the highly mobile SS20s elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless this is the first time that the Russians have been brought to the point of making proposals that admit the necessity of actual reductions in the number of deployed SS20s.

/CRITERIA

## CRITERIA

14. If an outcome is to be satisfactory, it will have to meet most if not all of the list of the West's basic criteria. Essentially these are the principles which were established in the IDD, and which have been endorsed by the Alliance as a whole. They fall under the five following headings:

- (a) The types of systems to be included;
- (b) The bilateral nature of the arrangements: i.e., total exclusion from the counting base of French and British systems;
- (c) The ceilings (our strong preference remains zero on missiles) must be based on equality expressed in warheads on launchers;
- (d) Aircraft should be dealt with subsequently to missiles;
- (e) The geographical scope should be global.

First three essential. May be some room for manoeuvre on last two.

The Position in Other Basing Countries

15. A brief word now about developments in other basing countries:

- the Italians appear to remain solid. Work on their base in Comiso in Sicily continues. Deployments slightly behind UK and FRG.
- the new German Government originally stuck firmly to the agreed NATO line, i.e. deployments will go ahead unless there is an arms control agreement in the meantime. But large section of public is hostile. Much will depend on the election in March.

/the Belgians

- the Belgians while carefully avoiding any publicity, have agreed with the Americans on a site and may have begun limited work on the infrastructure. But they must still be considered a doubtful starter.

- the new Dutch Government maintain the position of their predecessors (i.e. that a decision will be taken in Holland in the light of progress in the negotiations). But they have now said that, while Parliament will be consulted, the decision will be taken by the Government.

#### THE PROSPECTS

16. The chances of an arms control agreement before the end of 1983 are problematical. The Russians have every incentive to continue to sit tight in Geneva and to hope that Western European public opinion, no doubt with encouragement from Moscow, will be sufficient to prevent deployment and make concessions in negotiations unnecessary. They will have taken heart from the impact that the Andropov speech of 21 December and the Prague Communiqué of 5 January have had. It is unlikely that they will negotiate seriously until they have concrete evidence that the deployments are going ahead. But there are now some signs that they may if necessary be prepared to pay a genuine price in negotiations. We believe, however, that it will be important in terms of Western public opinion to be seen actively to explore any positive elements in the Soviet position: to make clear that negotiations will continue as long as necessary in order to arrive at an agreement; and to stand by

/our

SECRET

- 10 -

our statement in 1979 that we are ready to adjust our deployment programme in the light of results in Geneva. We must take every opportunity to bring home to public opinion the seriousness with which Allied Governments are pursuing the negotiations and the need for consistency and firmness over deployments if we cannot achieve a satisfactory outcome. But public opinion in Western Europe will undoubtedly be a third party at the negotiating table in 1983 - and perhaps beyond.

PP for  
Min. Cab 2

Deference

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 December 1982

Dear John,

Notes.  
M 5/12.

Arms Control and Disarmament

With his letter of 29 November Roger Bone enclosed a copy of the current NATO booklet comparing Warsaw Pact and NATO forces and said that the figures were up-to-date. This remains true of the greater part of the booklet but, since its publication six months ago, some of the figures have changed. In particular it would be worth making an amendment to figure 12, on page 49, which sets out the facts about Soviet long range INF missiles. The figure for the number of SS20s is now 324 and for SS4s and SS5s the combined figure is now 275. The total figure for long range INF missile warheads has increased from 1200 to about 1250.

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Defence 245

Nuclear Settlement Call

1957-58-59







Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 December 1982

*Jan S. ...*

Arms Control and Disarmament

Please refer to my letter of 29 November about the disarmament or confidence-building measures which the UK has proposed or is supporting.

I regret to say that an error slipped through in the section on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces. Please would you amend the final sentence to read:

'This proposal, if implemented, would eliminate the missiles of most concern to both sides'.

*Yours faithfully*  
*R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



CONFIDENTIAL

*Reference*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 November 1982

*I have kept the envelopes.*

*Don John*

*M 30*

Arms Control and Disarmament

In your letter of 26 November to Brian Fall, you asked for a comprehensive set of facts and figures to demonstrate the extent of the Soviet threat, both nuclear and conventional.

The best set of figures on the Soviet threat which we can provide for the Prime Minister in the time available is contained in the enclosed booklet which was put out by NATO this year. The figures are up-to-date and unclassified. The Prime Minister might be particularly interested in the following:

- Flag a) Figure 2 compares NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Europe. Particularly striking are the figures on main battle tanks (Warsaw Pact superiority 3 - 1), artillery/mortars (3 - 1) and armoured personnel carriers.
- Flag b) Figure 4 combat aircraft: the total number of Warsaw Pact aircraft in Europe is 7,240, as opposed to 2,975 for NATO. Most of this discrepancy is accounted for in the imbalance (almost 6 - 1) in interceptors, most of which can be used in offensive ground/attack roles.
- Flag c) Figures 6 and 7 compare Warsaw Pact and NATO forces in the North, Central and Southern regions.
- Flag d) The nuclear balance: Figure 9 compares strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and categorises each side's forces into ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers. 'Strategic' forces are defined for US/Soviet purposes as those which have 'homeland-to-homeland' ranges. They include US forces committed to NATO and the UK submarine force (but French forces are excluded from this and other figures in the booklet). The Russians have, since the late 60s, had the advantage in total destructive power and 'throw weight', and the number of delivery vehicles. The current figures show that they have 2,704 strategic systems to 1,958 for the US; their lead in ICBMs is 1,398 to 1,052. The modernisation of Soviet ICBMs (particularly the introduction of SS18 and SS19) have greatly improved their accuracy and with MIRVing, the number of warheads. Thus NATO's traditional advantage in strategic warheads
- Flag e) has been rapidly diminishing - as illustrated by Figure 10.

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- Flag f) Figure 12 categorises the Soviet longer range landbased INF missile systems, of which NATO have none. The number of Soviet INF missile launchers has not gone up in recent years but the warheads have doubled to about 1,200 with the replacement of SS4s and SS5s by the MIRVed SS20. The Warsaw Pact also has a 3 - 1
- Flag g) advantage in INF aircraft (Figure 18; this chart does not include the Backfire Bomber which has been counted in strategic systems on account of its intercontinental capabilities).

/ I also enclose the chart (which the Prime Minister may have seen before) which we have prepared which compares Warsaw Pact and NATO strategic and INF systems under three headings:

- a) current comparisons;
- b) as proposed by the US in START/INF talks; and
- c) as proposed by the Russians in START/INF.

I shall be writing separately in reply to paragraph 2 of your letter concerning the disarmament or confidence-building measures which the UK has either proposed or is supporting.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD).

*Yours ever*

*RB* (R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



29 NOV 1982

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*Defence  
UK  
CAB-1*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 November 1982

*Dear John,*

*A.J.C. 30/11*

Arms Control and Disarmament

In paragraph 2 of your letter to Brian Fall of 26 November you asked for a list of the disarmament or confidence-building measures which the UK has proposed or is supporting.

I enclose a note covering the period 1979 - 82.

I am writing separately in answer to paragraph 3 of your letter covering statistics for the Soviet nuclear and conventional threat.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD).

*Yours ever,*

*pd*  
(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

**CONFIDENTIAL**



## DISARMAMENT AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH THE UK HAS PROPOSED OR IS SUPPORTING: 1979 - 1982

### Strategic Nuclear Forces

Since 1980 the UK has actively encouraged the renewal of the strategic arms control talks.

In June 1982 the US and Soviet Union opened negotiations (Strategic Arms Reductions Talks - START). We strongly support President Reagan's proposal for substantial reductions in the total numbers of ballistic missile warheads held by both sides.

### Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF)

December 1979: NATO took its 'double decision' to modernise its INF by introducing Cruise and Pershing II into Europe, and to offer to negotiate reductions in such weapons with the Soviet Union.

November 1981: UK welcomed NATO agreement to pursue the 'zero option' in the negotiations between the US and Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear forces. This proposal, if implemented, would eliminate ~~this type of weapon from Europe~~ *the missiles of most concern to both sides.*

### Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban

1979-80: The UK participated in the trilateral negotiations with the US and Soviet Union. Following a policy review by the new American Administration, the US announced in March 1982 that a test ban, which was seen as damaging to their security interests, nevertheless remained a long-term objective. The UK strongly supported the subsequent US proposal to set up a new working group in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament to examine the verification aspects of a test ban. It was in this area that outstanding difficulties remained. The working group was established in April 1982 and the UK plays an active part.



### Nuclear Confidence-Building Measures

We welcome President Reagan's new proposals for nuclear confidence-building measures, which are designed to reduce further any risk of miscalculation by either side or misjudgement of the other's intentions.

### Non-proliferation

August-September 1980: UK participation in the Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970 which aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to states without a nuclear weapons capability.

### Chemical and Biological Weapons

March 1980: The UK played a leading part in the Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 which bans the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons.

February 1982: The UK tabled a paper on the verification and compliance of a chemical weapons ban under discussion in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament.

### Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) Talks (Vienna)

December 1979: The UK participated in the preparation of a package of proposals in the mutual and balanced force reductions talks in Vienna.

July 1981: The UK participated in the preparation of NATO's proposals for resolving differences over data.

July 1982: The UK participated in the preparation of NATO's draft treaty for the mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Europe.



### Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE)

We support the French proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe. The aim would be to agree a series of binding and verifiable confidence and security building measures for the whole of Europe. By increasing the openness of military activity and thereby breaking down suspicion and mistrust, such measures could improve the prospects for disarmament in Europe.

### Inhumane Conventional Weapons

1980: The UN Weaponry Convention banning certain inhumane weapons was agreed. It was based to a large extent on a draft put forward by the UK and the Netherlands. The Protocol on mines is also based on a British draft. The UK signed the Convention in April 1981.


### UN Study on Conventional Disarmament

In her speech to the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament the Prime Minister called for a deeper and wider effort in the search for measures of non-nuclear arms control and disarmament. A British expert (Dr Simpson) plays an active part in the UN study now in preparation on Conventional Disarmament.





29 NOV 1982



RESTRICTED

Mr Weston  
Parliamentary Unit

*This does not amount to very much, I am afraid. Burtin 26/11*

*ATC / ADL 26/11 / To see*

*Wm 26/11*

SOVIET SS-20 PROGRAMME: STATEMENTS BY MR FOOT

1. No 10 have asked, through the Parliamentary Unit, for us to track down any occasion when Mr Foot criticised the Soviet SS-20 programme and which would have been brought to the Prime Minister's attention.
2. It is difficult for us to give anything like a complete picture of what Mr Foot has said since we do not normally keep a record of speeches or press conferences made by Members of the Opposition in this country. We have, however, looked at the papers on Mr Foot's visit to Moscow in September 1981 and what he said at that time.
3. As far as we are aware, Mr Foot did not, whilst still in Moscow, make any direct public criticism of the SS-20 programme although he did, according to the agreed TASS statement about the visit, express the strong desire of the Labour Party to see the negotiations about medium range missiles succeed and looked for progress on the basis of both sides 'being prepared to revise their plans'. Once back in Britain, however, Mr Foot was, according to the press, more explicit. Interviewed on the BBC's 'World This Weekend' on 20 September Mr Foot said, according to a report in 'The Guardian' on 21 September, that Labour would use its influence to try to make the negotiations (on medium range systems/INF) successful, to try to get the SS-20s and a lot of other weapons out of Europe.

26 November 1982

*R.H.G. Gozney*  
R H Gozney  
Defence Department

[Private Secretary] ✓  
cc [PS / Mr Hurd] ✓ [Mr Wright] ✓  
EESD  
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## Labour leader demands proof of 'previous commitment'

# Foot challenges hoodwink claim over Russia's SS-20 promise

By Michael White  
Parliamentary Correspondent

Mr Michael Foot returned to the attack yesterday over the Foreign Office's jibe that he had had the wool pulled over his eyes in Moscow.

He challenged Lord Carrington to produce evidence of the last time the Russians had offered to withdraw some of their SS-20 missiles.

Stung by the patronising remarks of the Foreign Office Minister, Mr Douglas Hurd, about his visit, the Labour leader declared on BBC radio's World This Weekend: "If they say that the same proposal was made by Mr Brezhnev to reduce SS-20s, prior to 1979 — and that is their charge against me — I would like to know the date, the proposition itself, and, even more, what was the answer of the British Government or even the NATO powers?"

At the heart of the row is Mr Foot's claim that his talks with the Russians constituted a breakthrough, a word his entourage now say was first introduced by a journalist, not by him.

Both Mr Foot and Mr Denis Healey, who accompanied him, believe that this unequivocal offer to withdraw some SS-20s in return for a NATO change of heart on cruise and Pershing missile deployment, is an important development which should not have been dismissed so lightly by the Government on the eve of the Haig-Gromyko talks in New York.

Yesterday Mr Foot pointed out that recently Mr Brezhnev had been offering no more than a moratorium on SS-20

deployment, a view echoed by Mr Healey in a Sunday Times article on the visit.

Mr Foot said in his radio interview that he and his deputy had cooperated "perfectly sincerely, genuinely and effectively" on the issue, and predicted that Labour would use its influence to try to make the negotiations successful, to try to get these SS-20s and a lot of other weapons out of Europe.

"And if we can succeed I think we can—maybe even in opposition—change the atmosphere," he said.

The government view is that the Russians have only agreed to talk at all on theatre nuclear weapons deployment as a result of the NATO decision in December 1979 to start deploying cruise and Pershing missiles in 1983.

Last night the Foreign Office said it was unable to give an immediate answer on Mr Foot's challenge, though Mr Hurd said on Friday that Mr Brezhnev's offer was simply an old one dressed up again for gullible European socialists.

Mr Foot said at a rally in Trafalgar Square yesterday that the next Labour Government would withdraw the British ambassador to Chile and stop arms sales to the country.

He made his promise at a rally to mark the eighth anniversary of the right-wing coup which ousted President Salvador Allende.

Mr Ron Hayward, the Labour Party general secretary, called for the cancellation of a visit to Britain next month of Chile's Minister of Mining, Mr Pinera.



Jo - R  
bc WFSK

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

26 November 1982

Arms Control and Disarmament

It is clear from recent exchanges at Prime Minister's Question time that, over the coming weeks and months, questions on disarmament issues are likely to be raised frequently with the Prime Minister in the House.

During a talk which the Prime Minister had with the Foreign Secretary this morning it was agreed that it would be useful for the Prime Minister to take an opportunity in the House to list the disarmament or confidence-building measures which the UK has proposed or is supporting. From the point of view of public opinion, it will be necessary to describe them in the simplest possible terms, avoiding so far as possible the use of technical jargon and abbreviations.

Secondly, the Prime Minister would like to be armed with a set of figures designed to demonstrate the Soviet threat, both nuclear and conventional. You helpfully supplied some at my request just before yesterday's exchanges in the House. I should now be grateful for a more extensive set of facts and figures, accompanied by any warning that might be necessary as to the pitfalls in using them (eg throwweight as opposed to missile systems).

It would be most helpful if the material described above could reach us by Monday evening.

Finally, since disarmament issues in general seem likely to become a major preoccupation of the Government in the next year or so, it would be most helpful if the Prime Minister could receive on a regular basis rather fuller information about these matters, including the state of various negotiations on arms control.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



*see Press*

*Wm  
Wm*

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

26 November 1982

*Dear Mr. Foot,*

Thank you for your letter about our exchanges in the House yesterday.

I hope you did not misunderstand me when I said you had not criticised the Soviet Union for deploying SS20s. I know the Labour Party used to call for multilateral disarmament, including theatre nuclear forces such as the Cruise and SS20 missiles. As you say, your statement "Peace, Jobs, Freedom" called in 1980 for new agreements to "ensure that Cruise missiles and Soviet SS20s are both withdrawn"; and I do not think anyone doubts your desire to see a reduction in the numbers of nuclear weapons deployed. But calling for multilateral disarmament is surely not the same as directly criticising the Soviet Union for deploying SS20s. Your statement says the Labour Party "opposes the manufacture and deployment of Cruise missiles", but it does not say that you similarly opposed the deployment of SS20s.

I think this is important because no Cruise missiles have been deployed and none would be if the Soviet Union accepted the United States' proposals made at the current talks in Geneva. Meanwhile, SS20 missiles have been deployed on the ground in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since at least 1979 and there has been a steady build-up in these weapons ever since.

I think it is also important because you have now adopted a policy of unilateral disarmament. It may give people the

/ impression

impression that you are solely concerned to eliminate the NATO deterrent, without any thought for the enormous nuclear capability of the Soviet Union. That is why I was glad you took the opportunity of yesterday's exchanges to criticise the Soviet Union for deploying SS20s. As your 1980 statement said, the safety of the world "will be best secured by multilateral mutual disarmament".

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

---

The Rt. Hon. Michael Foot, M.P.

PRIME MINISTER

Here is a letter from Mr. Foot, maintaining that the Labour Party has in the past criticised the deployment of SS20 missiles. He encloses a Statement as evidence. In fact, it is nothing of the sort. It simply calls for multilateral disarmament, and "agreements that would ensure that Cruise missiles and Soviet SS20s are both withdrawn".

I suggest that you reply as attached. I will, however, check whether there is any other Labour Party Statment that could be said to criticise the deployment of SS20s before this letter is despatched.

*Inty Clerk.*

pp W.R.

25 November 1982

cc: Ian Gow  
25/11



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

From:  
Michael Foot MP

25 November 1982

*Dear Prime Minister*

In the House this afternoon you first of all claimed that I had not criticised the siting of SS20 missiles in Eastern Europe and then said that my statement in the House this afternoon was the first time you had ever heard such criticism.

I should like to draw your attention to the statement "Peace Jobs Freedom" approved by the Labour Party's Special Conference at Wembley on 31 May 1980 in which you will see that our call then was for the British Government to enter into East/West negotiations with a view to reaching new agreements that would ensure that Cruise missiles and Soviet SS20s were both withdrawn.

I am sorry that this has not been drawn to your attention by those who serve you. I now enclose a copy which you may care to study.

I hope you will concede that the Labour Party's criticism over the whole period has been on both the siting of the SS20s and the intention to site Cruise missiles in Western Europe.

*Margaret Thatcher*

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher MP



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**Peace  
Jobs  
Freedom**

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**Labour's call to the people**

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Statement presented by the  
National Executive Committee  
to the special conference  
Wembley May 31 1980

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20p.

# PEACE, JOBS, FREEDOM

## LABOUR'S CALL TO THE PEOPLE

### How to stop the drift to catastrophe

TODAY'S conference allows the Labour Party to present to the British people its plans for overcoming Britain's crisis and proposals for action internationally.

In the advanced, industrialised world, including Britain, mounting unemployment — now standing at more than 17 million — is the price of capitalist economic decline.

In the poor, undeveloped countries the despair of poverty and hunger is deepening and threatens peace.

The spread of weapons, spearheaded by the quickening race in nuclear weapons and their proliferation, makes the dangers of a Third World War very real.

As peoples and countries become more dependent on each other — highlighted by the crucial dependence of the industrialised world on oil — international co-operation becomes more necessary but harder to secure and sustain.

Britain should be playing a full part in making the world a fairer, safer, more co-operative international community. Under this Government it is not.

With Britain's long traditions in manufacturing skills and innovation, and its important indigenous fuels — coal, oil and gas — the country should be facing the 1980s full of hope and confidence. But this is not the Britain of today.

Instead of confidence, we see deepening social divisions. Instead of an expansion in manufacturing wealth, we face recession, spending cuts, unemployment and growing despair, especially among the long-term unemployed and young people without jobs. Instead of a Government committed to the fair treatment of people wherever they live or whatever their circumstances, we confront a Government determined to uphold the harsh attitudes and priorities of the market place, where the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. We oppose cynical

appeals to greed and self-interest enshrined in the last two Tory Budgets.

We denounce the damage being heaped on our economy by blind reliance on monetarist policies and free market economics. We urge the early adoption of Labour's alternative economic strategy based on expansion. We condemn the harm Tory policies are doing in dividing Britain: the employed from the unemployed, the well-off from the less well-off, the healthy from the sick, the increasingly privileged minority from the underprivileged majority.

The Labour movement stands for fairness, equality and justice — and against all forms of discrimination whether on the grounds of race, colour, creed or sex.

We are for a fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance of power and wealth in favour of working people and their families — against propping up the existing order of unfettered capitalism, based on private wealth and privilege.

We are for planning the nation's resources to meet our needs; for public ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange — against the harsh, impersonal values, inefficiency and waste, of production solely for profit.

We are for democratic socialism — at home and overseas. It is the only sane and sensible path for people to decide their own destinies, to enjoy a fair share of the wealth they create, to live out their lives with a real sense of individual fulfilment, to join freely with others in building civilised communities in lasting peace for themselves and for their families.

For these reasons we urge the British people to reject the Tory drift to catastrophe and support our alternative strategy for peace, jobs, and freedom.

## The first Tory year

The first year of Tory Government has been a disaster for Britain. Inflation has doubled; unemployment is set to reach two million; spending has been slashed on our schools, hospitals and social services; interest rates are higher than ever before.

Before the election, the Tories promised that they would help and protect the family. They deceived the people. They **knew** that their policies would hurt the family. They **knew** the first to suffer would be retired and disabled people, families of the unemployed and low paid, and mothers with young children. In

urban and rural communities alike the people are under attack from the Tories.

For the family in work, the Tories are now imposing a cut in the real value of child benefit; for families out of work, even bigger cuts in the value of unemployment benefit. Families with young children will find it impossible to get transfers to homes with a garden — because the Tories are selling off council property. Homeless families will stay homeless — as a result of the Tories' plans to bring council housebuilding to a standstill. Every family will suffer as the Tories dismember our social services — from fewer home helps and meals on wheels, to the closure of day centres for the elderly, cut backs in aid for the disabled and the closure of facilities for the under-fives. Every family will suffer as the Tories cut education, cut spending on schools and school materials, meals, milk and transport and reduce the teaching force by 60,000. **This** is the reality of Tory 'family policy'.

Tory Government means attacks on children. It means attacks on women's rights. It means attacks on the interests and rights of ethnic minorities.

At the heart of this Tory strategy is a foolish and rigid adherence to monetarism — a policy which seeks to remedy our economic problems by promoting massive unemployment, by cuts in our essential social services and by putting heavier burdens on the poor. Nor have the Tories done anything for economic growth. They have cut support for industry and the regions; curbed the NEB, the Welsh and Scottish Development Agencies; cut industrial training; cut essential public investment; they have imposed crippling interest rates and a grossly uncompetitive exchange rate on industry. Little wonder, then, that the Tories themselves now predict that our manufacturing output will be cut by 4½ per cent this year alone and will carry on falling over the next few years — with widespread bankruptcies, closures and redundancies throughout the country.

But this is not all. For Tory Government also means soaring prices — now going up by nearly 20 per cent a year. VAT has been almost doubled. Rents, rates, fares and fuel prices have been forced up — and will go up even faster in the year ahead. The mortgage rate stands at a record 15 per cent. Food prices have been pushed up — directly by the Government; by agreement between Tory Ministers and the EEC; and now by new taxes on food.

Tory Government means greater inequality and social

injustice: huge tax cuts for the rich; higher prescription charges for the sick; big tax concessions on gifts and capital for the wealthy; higher VAT and benefit cuts for the rest.

Tory Government means confrontation: attacks on trade unions, to reduce workers' bargaining power. They plan to take £12 a week from the support given to the families of any workers involved in industrial action. They plan to undermine workers rights in the Employment Bill. They are openly contemptuous of suggestions that they should co-operate and consult with the TUC.

The Tory strategy will fail because it is founded on false economic thinking. It is unfair. It will not work. Its failure will impose heavy sacrifices on the British people: industrial stagnation, social conflict and a poorer and more unequal society.

We are told by the Government — and the media which backs them — that all this is necessary. That there is no alternative to tough Tory measures.

There is. The alternative is democratic socialism. And it is to that we must now turn.

## Labour's alternative

There can be no going back: a powerful **new** economic strategy is needed, based on public ownership, expansion and democratic planning.

The central features of Labour's policy are:

**First**, the restoration and maintenance of full employment. That is the key to the rest of our proposals for transforming Britain's economy and must be the highest priority for the next Labour Government. Major changes will be needed in our society if we are to create the new jobs which will be needed — in the way we work, in how much we work, in how the fruits of our work will be shared. With the right industrial strategy it must be possible to achieve full employment — when thousands of people are crying out for better homes, more hospitals, more help for the elderly and better schools.

**Second**, we believe in economic expansion. This must now be spearheaded by increased public expenditure — to meet pressing social and community needs and to create jobs.

**Third**, we believe that Labour's strategy of expansion will help to curb inflation. Expansion will make it easier for industry to

contain its costs; it will provide workers with rising real wages; it will make it possible for social benefits — such as pensions and child benefits — to be increased in line with prices and earnings. We will also introduce a comprehensive and powerful system of price controls. The closest co-operation between the Labour Government, the party and the trade union movement will be essential to carry out our economic and other policies.

**Fourth**, Labour will work for an international agreement under which all countries are helped and encouraged to expand their economies to the limit of their productive capacity and so stimulate world trade. The expansion of Britain's economy will increase world trade. At the same time, however, we are determined not to allow manufactured imports to continue to destroy our industries and jobs. We will plan our trade in manufactures and our international payments to protect and promote industrial development in Britain. Sensible trade planning can assist Third World development.

**Fifth**, we will introduce strict controls over international capital movements to prevent a flight of capital overseas — and introduce new defences for sterling to help fight off any run on the pound. We shall also work for international agreement to help bring about greater currency stability.

**Sixth**, we reassert our belief, based on experience of recent Labour Governments, in the crucial importance of extending public ownership and planning the economy. We shall establish the machinery and take the powers we need to translate our plans into action. Planning agreements must guide the activities of the huge companies which dominate the economy and be backed by the statutory powers — especially discretionary powers over prices — set out in Labour's Programme. We would aim to make substantial progress towards our target of doubling the level of manufacturing investment within our first Parliament.

We will also extend public enterprise to ensure a significant public stake — and a degree of control — in each important industrial sector; and this will include companies in such sectors as pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, micro-electronics, construction, and building materials. We will support job creating technology and industrial innovation in consultation with the trade unions involved. An Investment Fund would also be established to channel North Sea oil revenues and funds from the financial institutions, into industry. We will take North Sea oil into public ownership; and we will restore to public

ownership, without compensation, the assets of our public sector industries sold off by the Tories.

**Seventh**, we will ensure that there is progress towards genuine industrial democracy in both the public and private sectors; and we shall promote co-operative development in all its forms. We will repeal, entirely, the Tory Employment Bill.

**Eighth**, work-sharing will be needed to combat the economic crisis we will inherit from the Tories — and the loss of jobs which could flow from the unplanned introduction of new technology. Time off for study, longer holidays, earlier voluntary retirement and a progressive move to a 35-hour working week will all have a part to play. This would create more jobs — and give more people proper opportunities to enjoy leisure, rather than enforced, insecure and useless idleness on the dole. We shall expand greatly training and retraining to acquire the skills we need, including a major traineeship scheme for school leavers.

**Ninth**, we are determined to lift the burdens imposed on our economy by the EEC — on food prices, on jobs and on our public finances. We shall amend the 1972 European Communities Act so as to restore to the House of Commons the full control of all law-making and tax-gathering powers now ceded to the European Communities. We will also seek fundamental reforms to the EEC: and we will use every means at our disposal to achieve them, including the use of the veto and withholding payments into the budget. But, should even these measures fail to convince our partners of the need for radical change, the party will be forced to consider again whether continued EEC membership is in the best interests of the British people.

**Tenth**, we accept that these policies cannot be implemented whilst the present unequal balance of wealth and power persists in Britain. We are therefore committed to a whole range of measures involving the strengthening of the powers of the House of Commons, the abolition of the House of Lords, and the introduction of a full Freedom of Information Act to strengthen democracy against privilege and patronage.

## Policy for peace

Ways to secure lasting peace and progress towards disarmament must be first on the agenda. A third world war would destroy civilisation — and the danger of its breaking out is growing alarmingly. Following the steps taken by the last Labour Government in such fields as non-proliferation and the Mutual

and Balanced Force Reduction talks, Britain must again take a lead in disarmament negotiations. The arms race must be halted, war hysteria dispelled.

Détente, in our view, is essential, coupled with universal respect for the rights of all peoples and nations to self determination. Accordingly we condemn the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and warn against all military interventions contrary to the UN Charter.

In 1974, we renounced any intention of moving towards the production of a new generation of nuclear weapons or a successor to the Polaris nuclear force; we reiterate our belief that this is the best course for Britain. Many great issues affecting our allies and the world are involved. The Labour Party opposes the manufacture and deployment of Cruise missiles and the neutron bomb and refuses to permit their deployment in Britain by the United States or any other country.

The Soviet Union has already deployed the SS20 missile and NATO has taken a decision to equip itself with Cruise and Pershing 2 missiles. There will be an interval of three or four years before NATO's new weapons are produced and deployed. We regard it as imperative that this breathing space should be used to prevent a further upward twist in the arms spiral.

The Labour Party calls upon the British Government to enter immediately into East/West negotiations, with a view to reaching new agreements that would ensure that Cruise missiles and Soviet SS20s are both withdrawn. Britain is a prime target. It is our conviction that the safety of the British people, and of the people of Europe both East and West including the people of the Soviet Union, will be best secured by multilateral mutual disarmament in the nuclear and conventional fields. The arms race has already begun. It must be halted. We dedicate ourselves to this objective.

The next Labour Government will reduce the proportion of the nation's resources devoted to defence so that the burden we bear will be brought into line with that carried by our main European allies. A Labour Government would plan to ensure that savings in military expenditure did not lead to unemployment for those working in the defence industries. We shall give material support and encouragement to plans for industrial conversion so that the valuable resources of the defence industries can be used for the production of socially needed goods.

Labour will give every encouragement to those working for the cause of international peace. We will establish a peace research institute. Labour believes that a significant contribution to peace and arms control could be achieved by introducing criteria for the limitation of arms sales abroad. The Labour Government used such criteria to cut off the supply of arms to South Africa, El Salvador and Chile and imposed strict limitations on the supply of arms to a number of other countries. For these actions to be fully effective, it is necessary that there should be agreement by other states not to make up such supplies, and we urge that Britain should seek immediate negotiations with other arms supplying states with a view to reaching agreements that would prevent the supply of arms to countries where such supply would increase the chances of international conflict or internal repression. But we should in any case apply these criteria to our own arms sales.

The Labour Party believes that it is vital to breathe new life into the disarmament negotiations. There are great dangers of nuclear proliferation and these must be reduced. As part of this purpose, we urge the immediate ratification of the Agreement on Strategic Arms Limitation between the United States and the USSR and we regard it as vital that new talks with the purpose of further reducing the number of strategic nuclear weapons held by both sides should be begun at once. We want to see a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We support the UN Committee on Disarmament.

We deeply deplore the fact that so little progress has been made during the last twelve months in the negotiations to reduce conventional weapons. We call upon all the governments concerned to impart a fresh urgency to the negotiations that have been taking place between East and West in Vienna. We will work with all those who want peace, in Europe and elsewhere, to turn away once and for all from the dangerous madness and enormous waste of increasing arms of mass destruction.

Poverty is a fundamental cause of political chaos and even of war. The next Labour Government will give greater emphasis to the North/South dialogue. It will participate constructively in all negotiations seeking to establish a world trading pattern fairer to developing countries. The free market world economy is not in the interests of developing countries. We oppose the International Monetary Fund's austerity measures which are totally unimaginative and inappropriate to the current world

recession and to the developing world. Such policies also impose a heavy political and economic burden on third world countries. We again commit ourselves to the UN target for overseas aid of 0.7 per cent of the GNP, with the emphasis to be put on rural development.

We shall campaign for international peace, international co-operation and international development. These must be our priorities for the 1980s and we call on the whole Labour movement, inside and outside Parliament, to fight for these policies.

### **The task ahead**

The Labour Party is a democratic socialist party and proud of it.

We believe that millions of people in this country are turning to us for leadership.

We shall defend their interests, present our programme clearly and campaign for it boldly inside and outside Parliament. We must campaign for their support now to turn back from the politics of fear and join with us to create a society built upon hope, for peace, for jobs, and for greater democracy.

This support must be built in the constituencies. It means our local parties will need to launch — through leaflets, pamphlets, posters and meetings — a campaign to support the Labour Party and its policies outlined in this document. So we must take the message of this document and the Conference to the country and through the Parliamentary Party to the House of Commons.

We must explain to people worried about unemployment, inflation, housing, cuts in welfare, health, and education services, cuts in the value of social security benefits and pensions, that only through the policies of the Labour Party can these essential services be restored and extended.

We believe that the objectives outlined in this document will attract growing support from the electorate and the task of the party organisation is to see that this support is expressed in active involvement in membership and work for the party.

The ideals and aims of this statement will require not only a Labour Government with a majority in Parliament but one backed by a strong and effective party organisation in the country.

The people and the party want to see an end to the present Tory Government at the earliest opportunity. We want to see it replaced by a Labour Government elected on socialist policies supported and understood by the electorate.

file Bro

Defence,

8 November 1982

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of Mr. Nott's minute of 1 November about Professor Rostow's comments on the Geneva talks.

A. J. COOPER

Richard Mottram, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence

Sub



MO 11/9

Prime Minister

To note.

PRIME MINISTER

I read with interest Francis Pym's minute of 25th October which reported on his meeting with Professor Rostow, the Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

2. Professor Rostow also briefed my officials - I was myself en route for the Falklands. What he had to say to them of course corresponded closely with the account he gave in the FCO, but there are two points worth adding. First, the impression he gave my officials was that the Soviet negotiator took the original initiative, though the substance of that initiative and its subsequent handling and reception were as Francis Pym describes. Rostow clearly felt (and we agreed) that it was a remarkable step for a very experienced Soviet negotiator even to agree to take such ideas back to his Capital.

3. Second, Rostow, when asked, was prepared to indicate to us the numbers involved, though he went to some pains to stress the particular sensitivity of the information. The agreement was for equal quotas of 75 systems for each side for each of the "European" and "Far East" areas; that is, 300 systems in all.

4. I am sending copies of this minute for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

SW

1st November 1982

Ministry of Defence





- 3 NOV 1982



CONFIDENTIAL

*Deployment*

*Pic*

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*Defence*

27 October 1982

INF NEGOTIATIONS

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of the minute of 25 October by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on this subject.

A J COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

*DF*

Prime Minister

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To note.

A.F.C.  $\frac{25}{6}$ PM/82/87THE PRIME MINISTER

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1. You will be interested to know what Professor Rostow, Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, had to say when he briefed me about developments in the INF negotiations on 22 October. His message was one for you and John Nott as well as for me, but he particularly asked that what he had to say should be very closely held.
2. He said that during the second round of the negotiations, in the early summer, he had authorised the US Ambassador to the negotiations, Paul Nitze, to try an alternative solution to the zero option on his Soviet opposite number, Kvitsinsky. Rostow did not go into much detail on what these alternative proposals included, but he did say that they would have meant equal limits on US and Soviet missiles in Europe, or within range of Europe, and similar equal limits for missiles in the Far East. They would have included a compromise over the inclusion of aircraft and some provision to prevent circumvention of an INF agreement by nuclear systems of shorter range. The effect would have been very sharp reductions in the numbers of Soviet SS 20s, 4s and 5s.
3. Kvitsinsky had, on a personal basis, accepted these proposals and taken them back to Moscow during the summer recess. But on his return to Geneva in September, he had told Nitze that his authorities in Moscow had rejected the package and were insisting that the Soviet position should remain that put forward earlier in the negotiations.
4. The interpretation of these exchanges is that a debate is taking place in Moscow with at least some people (and Rostow counts Gromyko amongst them) in favour of an INF agreement, probably



as a political symbol of an improvement in East/West relations. Rostow and I agreed that while the Moscow debate continues it is all the more important that Alliance Governments should speak with one voice when talking in public about the double decision on INF. The private channel between Nitze and Kvitsinsky remains open (both Gromyko and President Reagan having agreed that it should) and Rostow would not be surprised if the Russians refer to it if and when they are ready, perhaps at some stage next year, to offer concessions. It seems unlikely that these would be made before the Federal German elections in March.

5. As I say, Rostow particularly stressed the sensitivity of what he was telling me; he has briefed Foreign Ministers (and some Defence Ministers and Heads of Government) in the INF basing countries only, and has not included any reference to this in his briefing of other NATO colleagues.

6. I am copying this minute to the Secretary of State for Defence and Sir R Armstrong.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

25 October 1982

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TO ROUTINE CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES  
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 149 OF 7 JULY

MBFR: NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE

1. THE FOLLOWING MAY BE USED FREELY, PARTICULARLY THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA 6.

BACKGROUND

2. THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA, DESPITE EIGHT YEARS OF TALKS, STILL HOLD OUT NO PROSPECT OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT. THE MAIN OBSTACLE IS THE EAST'S CONTINUING UNWILLINGNESS:

(A) TO COOPERATE IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE LONG-STANDING DISPUTE OVER THE SIZE OF EASTERN FORCES (NATO ESTIMATES THAT THERE ARE OVER 150,000 MORE EASTERN TROOPS IN THE AREA THAN ARE CONTAINED IN THE EAST'S Tabled FIGURES). THE EAST SAYS THAT THE WEST HAS GOT IT WRONG AND MUST ACCEPT THE EAST'S FIGURES, AND THAT THE WEST'S INSISTENCE ON PRIOR DATA AGREEMENT IS A DEVICE TO DELAY REACHING AGREEMENT. THE FIRST VIEW IS UNACCEPTABLE: THE SECOND SIMPLY UNTRUE.

(B) TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT AN AGREEMENT MUST INCLUDE ASSOCIATED VERIFICATION AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (AM), APPLICABLE TO BOTH SIDES, TO VERIFY NOT ONLY AGREED REDUCTIONS BUT ALSO SUBSEQUENT FORCE LIMITATIONS INVOLVING, AMONG OTHER THINGS, A DEGREE OF PERIODIC ON-SITE INSPECTION.

EASTERN TACTICS

3. THE EAST HAS NOT RESPONDED EITHER FULLY OR CONSTRUCTIVELY TO THE ALLIANCE'S DECEMBER 1979 PROPOSALS ON AM, NOR REPLIED

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AT ALL TO ITS JULY 1981 PROPOSALS ON RESOLVING THE DATA DISPUTE. INSTEAD, IT TRIED TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE BY TABLING A DRAFT 'PHASE I' AGREEMENT IN VIENNA ON 18 FEBRUARY. ALTHOUGH, PREDICTABLY, IT CONTAINS ELEMENTS OF ONE OR TWO LESS IMPORTANT WESTERN REQUIREMENTS, IT IS ESSENTIALLY A COMPILATION OF WELL-KNOWN EASTERN POSITIONS AND IGNORES ISSUES WHICH THE EAST KNOWS ARE CRUCIAL TO THE ALLIANCE, PRINCIPALLY DATA AND VERIFICATION.

THE ALLIANCE APPROACH 1979-1982

4. THE PREVIOUS WESTERN APPROACH (DATING FROM DECEMBER 1979) INVOLVED ESSENTIALLY SYMBOLIC US AND SOVIET PHASE I REDUCTIONS (13,000 AND 30,000 TROOPS RESPECTIVELY) AND POSTPONED ANY COMMITMENT BY OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS UNTIL LATER PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS. THE HOPE WAS THAT AN EARLY PHASE I AGREEMENT WOULD PROVIDE THE POLITICAL IMPETUS TOWARDS A MORE SIGNIFICANT AND COMPREHENSIVE PHASE II AGREEMENT. BUT PROGRESS HAS BEEN STYMIED BY CONTINUING DISAGREEMENT ON DATA AND THE SCOPE OF AM. THE NEW ALLIANCE INITIATIVE

5. THE ALLIANCE HAS ACCORDINGLY DEVISED A NEW PROPOSAL INVOLVING A SINGLE, STAGED AGREEMENT, WHICH WILL BE TABLED IN VIENNA ON 8 JULY IN THE FORM OF A DRAFT TREATY. IT COMPRISES THE SAME ESSENTIALLY SYMBOLIC US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN STAGE 1 (1 YEAR FOR REDUCTIONS, 1 YEAR FOR VERIFICATION). BUT IT ALSO REQUIRES FIRM COMMITMENTS FROM ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AT THE OUTSET TO TAKE A SIGNIFICANT SHARE IN ITS SIDE'S OVERALL REDUCTIONS OVER A 5 YEAR TIMETABLE TO REACH THE AGREED COMMON CEILING OF 900,000 GROUND AND AIR FORCES, SUBJECT ONLY TO STAGE 1 REDUCTIONS BEING SATISFACTORILY VERIFIED. KEY WESTERN REQUIREMENTS (AGREED DATA, EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION, SPECIFIC SUB-LIMITS ON US AND SOVIET FORCES ONLY) STILL OBTAIN.

WHAT IT MEANS

6. WE ARE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT THIS NEW APPROACH WILL BE ANY EASIER TO NEGOTIATE THAN ITS PREDECESSOR. BUT BY TAKING A SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARDS A MAJOR STATED EASTERN REQUIREMENT - FIRM COMMITMENTS BY ALL PARTICIPANTS FROM THE OUTSET - IT DEMONSTRATES ONCE AGAIN THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE ALLIANCE'S COMMITMENT TO REACHING AN EFFECTIVE AGREEMENT, INVOLVING

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SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS, IN CONVENTIONAL AS WELL AS NUCLEAR FORCES.

ADDITIONAL POINTS

7. (A) AN AGREED STARTING POINT IS ESSENTIAL TO ANY ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT - IN THIS CASE, THE SIZE OF EACH SIDE'S FORCES IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA. ONLY THEN CAN EACH SIDE'S REDUCTIONS QUOTA BE DETERMINED, ONLY ON SUCH A BASIS CAN SUBSEQUENT COMPLIANCE WITH RESIDUAL CEILINGS BE PROPERLY VERIFIED.

(B) EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION IS AT THE HEART OF THE MATTER IF AN AGREEMENT IS GENUINELY TO ENHANCE STABILITY AND STRENGTHEN SECURITY. THIS MUST INCLUDE PERIODIC ON-SITE INSPECTION ON THE BASIS OF AGREED GROUND RULES. SUCH VERIFICATION AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES WOULD OF COURSE APPLY EQUALLY TO THE FORCES OF WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

PYM

BY TELEGRAPH

BERNE

HELSINKI

STOCKHOLM

VIENNA

BELGRADE

BUCHAREST

BUDAPEST

MOSCOW

PRAGUE

SOFIA

WARSAW

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UKMIS NEW YORK

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Defence.

10 May 1982

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 7 May.

I am copying this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence), John Kerr (HM Treasury) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

JOHN COLES

S.

Francis Richards, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 May 1982

Dear John,

MS.

Prime Minute

To be aware.

Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB)

A.T.C. 7/5

In his minute of 21 January, Lord Carrington proposed a new approach to negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban. The paper attached to Lord Carrington's minute concluded that the best option would be a step by step approach to a CTB with the comprehensive ban itself being retained as a long term, rather than an immediate, objective. The Prime Minister agreed that these ideas should be put to the Americans.

We had several rounds of discussion with the Americans in January and February. In March the President approved an approach on broadly similar lines to the one we had suggested, placing the immediate focus on verification and compliance issues. The Americans also agreed that, in tactical and procedural terms, the best approach would be to seek agreement in the Committee on Disarmament (CD) to the establishment of a sub-group whose mandate would be carefully framed to ensure that focus on these particular aspects of the Test Ban problem would be maintained.

When we and the Americans put forward our ideas in the Committee on Disarmament, the reaction of the Third World countries (the Group of 21) was surprisingly receptive. Although they had clearly hoped for a more wide-ranging mandate (and will no doubt continue to press for this), they realised that both we and the United States were not prepared to tackle the wider aspects until the verification issue had been fully explored. It soon became clear therefore that the Group of 21 would go along with our ideas. The satisfactory upshot was that it left the Soviet Union and its allies isolated, a situation of considerable discomfort for them in the last week of the Spring Session. It was not until the last day of the Session (21 April) that the Russians and their allies finally gave way and agreed to a mandate on exactly the terms which we had agreed with the Third World group.

This small achievement should have a disproportionately beneficial effect in making it easier for the Americans and ourselves, indeed for the West as a whole, to defend our position on nuclear issues when these are discussed at the Second Special Session in New York. The sub-group will begin work when the CD resumes immediately after the Special Session. Of our allies, only the French appear to have some

/misgivings.



misgivings. They are of course traditionally opposed to the discussion of a CTB and, while it is unlikely that they will participate in the work of the sub-group, we have some reason to hope that they will not make a public issue of their opposition.

I am sending copies of this letter to David Omand (MOD), John Kerr (Treasury) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever.*

*Francis Richards*

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

17 MAY 1982

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THE SOVIET ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS OF 16 MARCH

1. President Brezhnev devoted a large section of his speech at the Congress of Soviet Trade Unions on 16 March to arms control issues. These have been the subject of much subsequent comment in the Soviet and Western media. An eye-catching Soviet initiative to take advantage of the 2 month recess (starting 15 March) in the Soviet/US INF talks in Geneva had been hinted at by Soviet officials and came as no surprise

2. In the event, Mr Brezhnev announced that the Soviet leadership had decided on a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the Soviet Union. They were freezing both quantitatively and qualitatively weapons of this kind already stationed there, and were suspending the replacement of SS-4 and SS-5 by SS-20 missiles. The moratorium would remain in force "either until an agreement is reached with the United States to reduce ... medium-range nuclear systems designed for use in Europe or until ... the United States leaders ... go over to practical preparations to deploy Pershing-2 missiles and cruise missiles in Europe". These proposals, which are in line with previous Soviet initiatives, had been foreshadowed by authoritative Soviet spokesmen including Zamyatin, who claimed that the Soviet Union had suspended deployment of SS-20 missiles since November 1981.

SS-20 Deployments

3. The Soviet Union has built up a completely one-sided superiority in intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). Among these, Soviet SS-20 operational deployments (adding to the SS-4's and SS-5's already in place) have now reached some 300 missile launchers comprising about 900 warheads, with more bases under construction. Roughly two thirds of these could reach Western Europe from bases in the Western and Central USSR.

Implications

4. Mr Brezhnev did not specify what form the moratorium would take. The Soviet freeze on deployments is believed to take advantage of a current technical pause in the SS-20 programme. It is likely to have little or no practical effect on overall Soviet deployment plans. Moreover, Mr Brezhnev's announcement refers only to deployments in the European USSR, whereas most of Western Europe is within range of the SS-20 also from certain sites east of the Urals. Since the "dual" NATO decision of December 1979 to modernise its INF and to pursue negotiations for their reduction, the Soviet Union has markedly increased the number of its intermediate-range land-based weapons, in which it enjoys a monopoly. It now has roughly 200 SS-20s more than were deployed at the time of the dual decision. Even if the Soviet Union were to announce a global freeze on SS-20 deployments, this would do nothing to rectify the present gross imbalance in such systems.

5. Mr Brezhnev made maintenance of the freeze on Soviet deployments conditional on there being no "practical preparations" for cruise (or Pershing-2) missile deployment. His deliberately vague formulation on this could be taken to refer to initial site construction work in Western Europe. This is potentially highly restrictive, as some work on cruise missile site construction has already begun in at least one site in the United Kingdom. Mr Brezhnev has therefore provided himself with a pretext and justification, if necessary, for suspending the freeze at any time suitable to the Soviet Union. He also appears deliberately to have made a distinction in the language used, referring to a freeze on Soviet "deployments" while posing the condition that the West refrains from proceeding with construction.

Soviet Retaliatory Measures

6. Mr Brezhnev also threatened that if NATO deployment plans went ahead, there would be a new strategic situation which would require retaliatory steps which "would put the other side, including directly the United States itself, its own territory, in an analogous position". Although Soviet writers have on occasion warned in the past that if any nuclear missiles were to fly and hit

Soviet territory, US territory would not be immune from retribution, Mr Brezhnev's specific inclusion of the United States in this way is a new element. Previous threats in this context have generally been directed at Western Europe, such as the mention in Mr Brezhnev's interview with Der Spiegel on 2 November 1981 about the need for counterstrikes against mobile missile locations. In the same interview Mr Brezhnev had recalled the Cuba missile crisis but did not develop the argument. There has been much speculation that the unspecific threat of retaliation in Mr Brezhnev's speech of 16 March could have been intended to induce fears that the Soviet Union would be prepared to deploy missiles in or around Cuba, but Soviet spokesmen have since both publicly and privately dismissed such speculation as unfounded. This particular passage in Mr Brezhnev's speech should probably be seen as a generalised warning, intended to sound impressive without committing the Soviet Union to any particular option at this stage. Its aim appears to be to raise the stakes and to feed misgivings among Americans and Europeans alike about the likely political and military costs of proceeding with NATO's deployments.

#### Other Arms Control Initiatives

7. Mr Brezhnev also announced in his speech that the USSR "intends this year ... unless there is a new aggravation of the international situation, to cut its medium-range missiles by a certain number". This presumably refers to the older SS-4 and SS-5 missiles which are in any event being progressively phased out. The conditional nature of the offer leaves so much flexibility in Soviet hands as to make it practically valueless. Mr Brezhnev also called on the West not to deploy sea-based or ground-based long-range cruise missiles and said the Soviet Union would be prepared to discuss the restriction of combat patrol areas of missile submarines on both sides. Echoing an earlier Soviet suggestion, he also said the Soviet Union would be prepared to discuss the extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans, particularly the busiest shipping routes. The Soviet offers on cruise missiles and submarine deployments demonstrate how Soviet arms control overtures reflect known Soviet military preoccupations (in this case their relative disadvantage in the submarine-launched ballistic missile field and in anti-submarine

capabilities:- the USSR relies less than the USA on SSBN's for its strategic nuclear strength).

Conclusion

8. The Soviet proposal for a freeze on deployments of SS-20 systems would not entail any change either in the military imbalance in INF systems (which strongly favours the Soviet Union) or in Soviet deployment plans for some time ahead. If implemented with its intended consequences, the proposal would perpetuate the Soviet monopoly in longer range land-based missiles since not a single SS-20 missile would have to be destroyed, while NATO would be prevented from deploying any such missiles. These missiles, given their range and the ease with which they can be relocated, are a threat to Western Europe wherever they are located. The Soviet proposal would leave the USSR free to continue its build-up east of the Urals, well within range of Western Europe. The Soviet announcement's prime aim is to counter the United States "zero option" proposal announced last year. It is therefore to be seen at this stage primarily as propaganda, aimed at the peace movement in Europe and at opposition within some countries to the NATO modernisation decision. The ambiguity of the language used places a minimum of restriction on the Soviet leadership's room for manoeuvre. In addition, the timing of the proposal allows the Soviet Union to exploit current moves in the USA in favour of a general freeze on existing nuclear weapon levels; to try to regain the propaganda high ground following recent setbacks (the discovery of a Soviet nuclear-armed submarine in Swedish waters; imposition of martial law in Poland, etc); and, perhaps most importantly, to assess reactions in the West before deciding whether to formulate any serious proposals when the INF talks resume in Geneva in about 2 months time.



**CONFIDENTIAL**

THE FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PARTY

1. The Fifth Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party met in Hanoi from 27 to 31 March 1982 in a very different mood from the previous Congress in December 1976. At that time the Party leadership, still enjoying high prestige from its military successes and from the reunification of the country, revealed ambitious plans for the rapid development of Vietnam's economy for which aid from many quarters was expected. Soon afterwards, however, Vietnam's involvement in Cambodia precipitated an open breach with China, a major reduction in aid from the West and from international bodies, and a growing dependence upon the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. These factors contributed to the virtual abandonment of the over-ambitious 1976-80 Five Year Plan. The Party's prestige sank to a low level both internationally and at home. In local Congresses held in preparation for the Fifth Party Congress there was much criticism and debate of Party policies, notably of the more pragmatic economic policy, based on greater incentives for producers and more freedom for managers, which has evolved since 1979.

2. The main report of the Fifth Congress was delivered by Le Duan, the Party General Secretary, who admitted that many serious mistakes had been made during the past five years for a variety of reasons, notably an underestimation of the problems facing the country, lack of economic knowledge and lack of good management. Therefore, he said, "the Central Committee undertakes a severe self-criticism before the Congress...". Nevertheless he insisted that the general and economic lines set out by the Fourth Party Congress were correct and that the Party was successfully tackling the problems which had emerged.

3. Le Duan's political report and Pham Van Dong's economic report endorsed the new pragmatic economic policies and the lower targets set for the 1981-5 Five Year Plan. The rise in national income for example is set at 4.5 to 5% for 1981-5 compared to 13-14% in the 1976-80 plan, and grain production is set to rise to 19-20 million tonnes in 1985 compared to targets of 16 million tonnes for 1977 and 21 million for 1980. The highest total actually produced in

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1977-1980 was 14.4 million tonnes in 1980. Reports from the Congress contain no direct references to the major debate, previously mentioned in the official media, over the new economic policies which many attacked as the "trail end" of capitalism. The opponents of the new policies have been defeated, but they may have been placated to some extent by the pledge to proceed with and "complete in the main" by 1985 the initial collectivisation of the southern peasants. Although the importance of agriculture in general is increasingly stressed, reports to the Congress emphasise that the development of heavy industry is still a priority.

4. As expected the Congress reaffirmed Vietnam's close relations with the Soviet Union. There have been some signs of friction recently in Soviet-Vietnamese relations, partly because the Vietnamese appear to have wanted more aid than the Russians were prepared to give, and because the Russians themselves wanted their aid to be used more effectively and to receive a higher return. Nevertheless the two countries draw too many advantages from their alliance to allow any serious divisions to occur and the Vietnamese, however independent-minded they may be, realise that they have no other significant source of support for the policies they are pursuing in Cambodia.

5. In February, just before the Party Congress, two senior Soviet officials visited Vietnam: Marshal N V Ogarkov, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces and N K Baybakov, Chairman of the State Planning Committee. The leader of the Soviet delegation to the Congress was M S Gorbachev, the Politburo and Central Committee Secretary responsible for agriculture. Presumably during these visits some agreement was reached on the level of Soviet aid and of Vietnamese repayment and the Congress itself was marked by fulsome praise for the Soviet Union from Vietnamese leaders. There was little sign in speeches at the Congress of any problems between the two countries but when Gorbachev referred to the development of economic co-operation between the two "on the basis of the actual possibilities of the Soviet Union and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam" he may have been suggesting that some Vietnamese expectations of aid had been unrealistic. He went on to say that "the turnover of goods between the two countries will double in the

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next five years". Russian comments on previous mistakes made by the Vietnamese in economic management and on the "realistic approach" displayed at the Congress suggest that they fully support the more pragmatic approach of the Vietnamese leaders since an improvement in the Vietnamese economy, notably in agriculture, would reduce the demand for basic aid from the Soviet Union.

6. It is significant that in his speech to the Congress Gorbachev did not repeat the more positive remarks about the Chinese made by Brezhnev in his Tashkent speech on 24 March. Doubtless because of Vietnamese susceptibilities Gorbachev reverted to the more normal level of Soviet criticism of China. Vietnamese statements on China were predictable and there was no sign of any flexibility over Cambodia.

7. At the end of the Congress the new leadership was elected. Contrary to much speculation the ailing Le Duan was re-elected Party General Secretary and there was no change amongst the top five members of the Politburo, but in the largest ever change in Politburo membership six middle ranking members were dropped, including General Giap who had lost his post as Minister of Defence in February 1980. Three of the others were veteran leaders who had lost senior ministerial posts at the same time. All six retained membership of the Central Committee. Four people joined the Politburo, including the Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach (an alternate member) and the general in charge of operations in Cambodia, Le Duc Anh (a full member). The Politburo now consists of 13 full and 2 alternate members, compared to 15 full and 2 alternates before. In the Party Secretariat only 4 out of 10 men retained their seats. The Central Committee was expanded from 101 to 116 full members and from 32 to 36 alternate members. About 40% of members of the old Central Committee were dropped and about one third of the new Central Committee has been elected for the first time.

8. It is difficult to judge how far the changes in leading bodies reflect the varying strengths of any factions within the leadership. The extent of the changes suggest, however, that the top leadership (although it was unwilling to step down itself) may have concluded

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a significant number of senior officials should make way for younger, possibly more able men, in an attempt to improve the Party's performance and assuage some of the criticism from the lower ranks of the Party and from outside.

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SINO/SOVIET RELATIONS

1. In a speech delivered in Tashkent on 24 March while presenting an award to the Uzbek Republic, Brezhnev spoke about Soviet relations with India, Japan and China. His remarks on China were clearly intended to be read as a Soviet olive branch. They follow recent Soviet proposals for renewed border talks, visits to Peking by two senior Sinologists, M S Kapitsa and S L Tikhvinsky, and more positive statements on China earlier this year by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, N A Tikhonov and Politburo member K U Chernenko. Moscow appears to want better relations with the Chinese at state level, including better economic and scientific relations, and would apparently like to re-open border talks. But the Russians are unlikely to be prepared to make the necessary concessions to allow real progress even on border questions, let alone political relations as a whole.

2. Close examination of Brezhnev's statements in Tashkent reveals that they contain little of substance, nor any offer likely to persuade the Chinese of genuine Soviet willingness to start negotiating the fundamental issues. Brezhnev made a pointed reference to Soviet recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan, suggesting that one motive was to capitalise on current differences between Peking and Washington over Taiwan. He contrived to put the Soviet view of China in the best possible light, claiming that Moscow did not deny the existence of a socialist state in China. Soviet comment, however, normally implies that China is no longer socialist, and the term "socialist state" formerly used to describe China (eg in the Yearbook of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia) was dropped in 1973. Furthermore, the Russians have for several years proposed that relations between the two countries be conducted on the basis of "peaceful coexistence" - a term used exclusively to describe relations between socialist and non-socialist countries.

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3. On the border question, Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union had not had and did not have any territorial claims on China, and that the Soviet Union was ready at any time to continue border talks. He added that they were also ready to discuss possible confidence-building measures in the border area. However, the vagueness of this proposal, as with the earlier proposal on CBMs made by Brezhnev at the CPSU Party Congress last year suggests that the Russians do not envisage a positive Chinese response. The Chinese response to Brezhnev's Tashkent remarks was prompt and, not surprisingly, cool, objecting to the attacks on China which the speech also contained.

4. Moscow's overtures to Peking are in part prompted by concern at what it sees as a likely future shift in the strategic and political balance in Asia following the Sino/US rapprochement. Izvestiya on 26 March referred to "dangerous undercurrents that potentially are capable of chipping away at and eroding the security of many Far Eastern states", the most dangerous of which was the "US desire to secure its global interests" in the region. Although Soviet comment has made the most of the differences between Peking and Washington, and made it clear that it hoped the relationship would founder over the Taiwan question, there is a note of realism among some senior commentators that they expect relations to survive the various setbacks. N V Shishlin, Head of the Consultants Group of the Central Committee Department responsible for relations in the Communist countries said on Moscow Radio on 7 March that while there were real disagreements, it was also true that Peking and Washington were showing a desire to overcome them, but at others' expense. There have been a number of articles by senior Soviet commentators on the Sino/US rapprochement since the US offer of arms to China last June. The strategic implications are clearly of concern and Soviet comment has betrayed considerable anxiety at the prospect of a growth in Chinese and US influence in South and South East Asia.

5. An article in last November's issue of Asia and Africa Today by G Trofimenko, Head of Department at the Institute of USA and Canada said US/Chinese relations now bore all the characteristics of an emerging military alliance. Regular military consultation at a high

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level took place. There were agreed positions on foreign policy problems in Asia, exchanges of intelligence and cooperation in intelligence gatherings. US and Chinese strategic interests were now not just parallel but coincided. China had been classified as a "friendly" power. In contrast to the situation in the 60s, any US war in Asia would be waged not against China, but with it, or at the very least with a neutral China. However, US aims would be frustrated, according to Trofimenko, because Washington would not be able to manipulate China and Japan as it liked. Japan would have to take the Soviet factor into account, not just because of the strength of the Soviet Union and its role in the region, but to retain the freedom to decide its own foreign policy. Tokyo was already concerned at the growing military ties between the US and China. Tokyo and Washington would both compete for influence in China. These factors, together with the Soviet strength in Asia, and its ability to resist any US threat in the Far East, limited the great-power ambitions of Washington in Asia. Tensions, however, ought to be reduced before it was too late, by the adoption of Soviet CBMs in the Far East.

6. It remains to be seen whether Soviet hopes that Sino/US relations will be set back by the problems over US arms sales to Taiwan will be realised. A down-grading of diplomatic relations remains a distinct possibility. But even if this happens, it is unlikely to make China reconsider its opposition to Soviet strategic ambitions.

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THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP

1. Age, ill health and death are becoming increasingly important factors in the balance of power among the Soviet leaders.
2. The death in January of Suslov, a Politburo member for 25 years and a Party Secretary for some 33 years, removed a figure of great authority in the CPSU, one who was generally regarded as being instrumental in bringing Brezhnev to power and who certainly supported him thereafter. This departure has deprived Brezhnev of a valued and reliable prop. Suslov was not thought of as a likely successor to Brezhnev, but, had he outlived him, he would probably have had an influential role in the choice of a successor and helped to ensure a smooth succession with a maximum of continuity.
3. As it is, Suslov's death seems to have left the field open to rivalry among potential successors. Brezhnev himself has done nothing to indicate his own preference, nor has he shown any signs of planning to retire. On his 75th birthday last December, he said he wanted to carry on as long as he had the strength.
4. In the absence so far of personnel changes following Suslov's death, the next general secretary still seems likely to be chosen from between the two most senior current secretaries, Kirilenko (75) and Chernenko (70). Hitherto, Kirilenko, who has had a long and varied party career, and has been in the Politburo since 1962, has seemed the natural choice, but Chernenko, a protege of Brezhnev, who has been in the Politburo only since 1978, has recently seemed to take precedence over Kirilenko in protocol rankings. There have been suggestions that he has begun to take over some of Suslov's responsibilities for ideology and foreign affairs, but conclusive evidence for this has yet to emerge. The May Day parade was marked by the return of Kirilenko, who has been absent since 1 March, reportedly ill. At the parade the leadership seems to have made a deliberate decision to evade the issue of precedence between Kirilenko and Chernenko: in a pattern which differed from recent



years they were placed on either side of Brezhnev and at one remove from him.

5. There are, of course, other contenders for the leadership, notably Grishin, head of the Moscow Party Organisation, and Andropov, chairman of the KGB, but it seems unlikely that either of these would be transferred direct to the post of General Secretary without serving for a period as a Central Committee Secretary. By giving the key-note speech at the Lenin anniversary meeting on 22 April, Andropov drew attention to his qualifications for a return to the Secretariat, which he left in 1967 to take over the KGB. These men and their colleagues may also have their eyes on other leading posts, in particular that of President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and of the chairman of the Council of Ministers, at present occupied by a Brezhnev protege, Tikhonov (75). Brezhnev's successor as general secretary will not inherit all the authority that Brezhnev himself has built up over every arm of the Party and Government machine: it is quite possible that the Government side will initially regain something of the authority it had in economic matters and foreign affairs under Kosygin in the early years after Khrushchev.

6. Brezhnev himself suffered some minor affronts to his dignity after Suslov's death. A transparent lampoon on him in a Leningrad journal came to light, and lurid stories of corruption involving his daughter Galina and his son Yury were put about by Soviet sources. Whatever the explanation for these stories, they do not appear to have affected Brezhnev substantially: an old colleague of his was appointed First Deputy Chairman of the KGB, while Brezhnev himself carried out a fairly strenuous round of public engagements in February and March. These, however, took their toll of him, and he was evidently too ill to be shown on television when he returned from a trip to Tashkent on 25 March. He was absent on what Soviet officials called a "winter holiday" until the Lenin anniversary on 22 April. He has since also attended the May Day parade.

7. While attendance at Politburo and Secretariat meetings must have been ever thinner of late, this has had no discernible effect on Soviet policies. The experienced trio of Andropov, Ustinov and

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Gromyko, running the key areas of security, defence and foreign affairs, are still active, and the bureaucratic machine, which has been very stable under Brezhnev, is undoubtedly able to carry on implementing tried policies on the economy and agriculture for the foreseeable future, without the need for dynamic leadership. But the cumulative effect of the lack of such leadership must make itself felt in due course. As long ago as last November, Brezhnev promised a Central Committee plenum to adopt a "food programme", but it still has not been held, and Soviet sources have been putting about that it has been postponed till the Autumn. Meanwhile, a plenum should be held in the first half of 1982 and there are indications that one is planned for the end of May. To the outside observer there is a need for an infusion of new blood into the top leadership, for which the plenum would provide the appropriate occasion. There is not reason to believe, however, that the Soviet leadership will necessarily see things in this way. There is no statutory requirement for Suslov's position as secretary to be filled, nor do the Party statutes lay down any guidelines as to the optimum size of the Secretariat or Politburo.

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

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MO 12/2/5

25th January 1982

Dear John,

N.S.P.R.

A.J.C. 26  
I

h.a.

This is to record that my Secretary of State was consulted in the preparation of the minute of 21st January from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to the Prime Minister on the subject of future attitudes to a comprehensive test ban treaty. The Defence Secretary strongly endorses the approach set out in that minute.

I am copying this letter to Brian Fall (FCO), John Kerr (HM Treasury) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

(D B OMAND)

A J Coles Esq

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 January 1982

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

The Prime Minister has seen Lord Carrington's minute of 21 January. Subject to any views the Defence Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer may have, Mrs Thatcher agrees that the ideas described in Lord Carrington's minute may be put to the Americans as a basis for discussion.

I am copying this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence), John Kerr (H M Treasury) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A.J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PM/82/6

PRIME MINISTERPrime Minister

- I understand that Mr. Nott agrees with this.
2. The main reason for doing something is that doing nothing would be likely to give fresh impetus to the unilateralist / peace movement.
  3. Agree that we should discuss the ideas in para 5 with the Americans?

A.J.C. 22/11

Yes

ms

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

1. It has been British policy for over 20 years to work for the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). By November 1980, the trilateral negotiations between the Americans, the Russians and ourselves had made some small measure of progress. With the arrival of President Reagan's Administration these negotiations were suspended pending a US policy review. The Americans have not got far with this review but they have now told us that they regard a CTBT as, at best, a long term objective.

2. A report by officials in February 1981 on nuclear test ban policy stressed the strength of support at home and, more particularly, abroad for a CTBT as a significant measure of nuclear disarmament. In the meantime the strength of the anti-nuclear lobby has, if anything, increased and, as you know, we and the MOD have undertaken a significant effort to tackle this problem by a vigorous presentation of Government policy. Several of our NATO allies, for instance, are among those who would like to see the trilateral negotiations on a CTBT resume. From what we know of discussions within the US Administration it is most unlikely that the Americans will be prepared to go ahead with these talks. They, like us, believe that a comprehensive ban in the near or medium term could damage Western security interests.

2. On the other hand, I do not think it would be satisfactory merely to allow these negotiations to remain in suspense without exploring less radical approaches to the test ban problem. This is particularly so in the run-up to the United Nations Second Special Session on Disarmament where the nuclear weapons states are bound to come in for a good deal of criticism, and not only from

/third world



third world countries. We in the UK may be a particular focus for criticism given our role in the tripartite negotiations and our decisions on the future of the British deterrent.

4. I believe therefore that we should look at alternative approaches to our test ban policy which, while avoiding the risks inherent in a comprehensive ban, nevertheless go some way towards maintaining a general momentum in the direction of tighter constraints on nuclear weapons testing. In the first instance I suggest that we should discuss our ideas bilaterally with the Americans. We need to do this fairly soon while we are in a position to influence the direction of their own review.

5. The attached paper examines the international and domestic difficulties. It concludes that the best option might be a step by step approach to a CTB, with a comprehensive ban being retained as a long term, rather than an immediate, objective. If colleagues have no objection, I would like officials to be able to put these ideas to the Americans as a basis for discussion.

6. I am copying this minute to the Defence Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Sir Robert Armstrong.

  
(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
21 January 1982

DRAFT

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

1. Earlier this year officials examined policy towards a CTB in preparation for an expected exchange of views with the new US Administration. Their conclusions were contained in MISC I(81)3 of 6 February 1981.
2. Since then, American officials have been reviewing US policy without reaching any interagency consensus, and thus far it has not proved possible to engage them in serious discussion on the subject. CTB negotiations in their existing form are unlikely to be resumed in the foreseeable future. Informally the Americans have told us that the Administration regard a CTB as, at best, a long-term objective. They have told Western delegations to the UN in New York that their approach may be to ratify the 1974 Threshold Test Ban and 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties they negotiated bilaterally with the Russians. In bilateral contacts with us they have shown some understanding of our concern about the impact of a formal abandonment of a CTB on public opinion, our Allies, and on the Third World and others in the Committee on Disarmament.
3. We expect that it will soon be public knowledge that the trilateral (US/UK/USSR) negotiations will not be resumed in the near future. If the result was seen to be the abandonment without any alternative of CTB as a British objective, this would almost certainly provoke a strong reaction and focus public attention on the matter. This could cause some to question the sincerity of our public position on multilateral arms control and disarmament, particularly as it would mean that the UK would no longer be participating directly in any multilateral nuclear arms control activity.



We would be accused of failing to honour commitments arising from signature of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Final Document of the UN First Special Session on Disarmament. The preparations for the Second Special Session, to open in June 1982, would provide a ready focus for our critics.

4. Similar criticisms, probably with more force, could be expected on the international front. The CTB has long <sup>been</sup> held to be the single most significant specific demand in international arms control <sup>such</sup> for <sup>as</sup> the Committee on Disarmament and the UNGA, and is perceived as an obligation of the NWS. We are already strongly criticised for slow progress and for refusing to allow the Committee on Disarmament to set up a working group to draft a Treaty. The UN Secretary-General's assertion that all that is now required for a CTB is political will is widely believed to be correct. By not resuming negotiations we would compound the problems of allies, such as the FRG in particular, at a bad moment. They may understand our motives, but they would not like the timing. Some mileage can be made from the current and prospective Geneva negotiations on INF and strategic arms, but these would only partially relieve the pressure.

5. Even if the US were to contemplate continuing the negotiations, our <sup>own</sup> fundamental problems with a CTB remain. Any test ban arrangement must, if it is to be compatible with present plans, allow the development of a warhead for Trident and for a replacement of the WE 177 theatre nuclear weapon system. There is at present no known way of satisfactorily maintaining a stockpile under a CTB (unless it is of very short duration) since viability depends on experienced staff whose expertise can only be maintained under an active test programme. Problems of reconciling a CTB with our security

needs and in particular of verifying Soviet adherence to a treaty were also unresolved in the negotiations and a successful outcome was far from assured.

6. There is now an urgent need to determine HMG's position and to discuss this with the Americans. This paper considers four possible courses of action:

- i. Inaction, leaving it to the Americans to explain why the negotiations are in suspense.
- ii. Joint Announcement of Suspension of the negotiations, explaining that CTB remains a long term goal but giving priority to START/INF negotiations.
- iii. Active presentation of the case that our security would be impaired by a CTB.
- iv. Step-by-step restrictions on testing aimed at retaining some momentum towards CTB while safeguarding our testing plans.

These are now considered in turn.

7. Course i. Leaving it to the Americans

The Americans do not see CTB as a major issue at present. It is open to us to tell them that they should now bear the prime responsibility, as we bore it during their review last year, of explaining to the world why a CTB is not possible at present. When pressed, domestically or internationally, we might ourselves say that we had sincerely pursued a CTB but that the Americans, for reasons with which we sympathised but did not wholly share, had decided to concentrate on INF and START. This made present discussion of the CTB issues impracticable. For example, the Americans might move ahead by ratifying the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, a bilateral

Soviet agreement, in which case there would be no direct role for the UK. Or the Americans could possibly seek to renegotiate the verification arrangements for a CTB, in which case there could be a role for the UK. But these arguments would not satisfy our domestic critics, and they would annoy the Americans against whom the bulk of international criticism would be directed (although the UK would be by no means immune) at a time when we may need US goodwill in other related areas. The political penalties would also include the risk that the Russians would use the opportunity for wedge-driving.

8. Course ii. Joint Presentation with the US of Suspension

A joint approach would be concerted with the Americans, making the best case we could for suspending the negotiations. In addition to US ratification of the TTBT we would explain that, although a CTB remained a long term goal, difficulties made it impracticable at present, and other negotiations such as START/INF offered greater opportunities for progress in nuclear arms control. This would avoid differences between ourselves and the Americans. But the field would be left open to the Soviet Union publicly and loudly to reiterate its desire for a CTB and to lay the blame for abandoning work on the West.

9. Course iii. Active Presentation of Abandonment

Such an hawkish approach is the line favoured by some in Washington. It could be argued that the unrestrained Soviet military build-up made it essential for the West to maintain and improve the level of defence, including nuclear weapons, and that tests were necessary until arms control measures had restored stability. It could also be said that improvements in verification were a prerequisite for

any test ban treaty. This policy would have the advantage of reflecting more accurately <sup>underlying</sup> the/reality of our position. But domestic and international criticism would be severe. It would mean a change of policy endorsed by successive Governments, which have all supported the aim of a CTB.

10. Course iv. A Step-by-Step Approach

The possibility of a lower threshold test ban treaty was identified earlier this year as a possible compromise between abandonment and continuation of the CTB talks. A threshold as low as 30kt might have no positive advantages in terms of curbing Soviet warhead development, and some significant disadvantages from the point of view of our own programme, but it seemed worthy of exploration with the Americans. However recent statements by the US about the possible need to raise the existing 150kt threshold suggest that they might not be willing to move to a lower threshold at this stage. Nevertheless, it might still be possible, as a development of this approach, to pursue and present credibly in public the goal of a lower threshold by another route. The starting point for the initiative could be the apparent willingness of the US Administration to ratify the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). This could be represented as a necessary first step towards a CTB. With an explanation of the West's concerns over the security consequences of test bans and of the difficulties of verification of a TTBT, it could be proposed that there should be tripartite negotiations to reach agreement as soon as possible, say within five years, on the verification measures, adequate to permit the threshold to be reduced to not higher than 100 kilotons by the end of that period. During that time agreement would also be sought on a joint experimental programme which would give confidence in the effectiveness of the proposed verification measures and,

to setting up verification stations in preparation for the implementation of reduced threshold agreements. Also, during that period, the negotiators should seek agreement to subsequent negotiating stages aimed at reducing the threshold further, and perhaps setting a time-scale for the achievement of such reductions. It could be implied that this process might lead to eventual agreement on a zero threshold, ie a CTB.

11. A stepped approach on these lines would be acceptable in terms of our testing plans. Modifications might of course be necessary to accommodate US testing plans. There is no point in pretending that it would be received with anything but hostility by those who believe that a CTB could and should be implemented immediately. But we would argue that it was a step in the right direction, even though it might be seen by both domestic and international critics as an evasive step. We could make difficulties for the Russians since it would highlight the requirement for verification and so might offer opportunities for deflecting criticism in their direction. In addition, we could claim that it had been shown that a CTB was not attainable in a single step, and that it should be approached gradually. Moreover, we might in explaining the CTB problems, including those of verification, manage to get wider acceptance of the view that a CTB was not the critical issue in arms control and disarmament. The approach envisaged might also provide a breathing space in which to seek means whereby the present reliance on nuclear tests could be reduced. However the search for such means could not be undertaken concurrently with meeting UK warhead requirements unless significant additional resources were allocated and, even then, the best to be hoped for is <sup>a reduction</sup> in the number and/or yields of tests needed.

12. A major weakness of this approach is perhaps that there is little in it to attract the Russians. We do not know whether the Russians genuinely want a CTB, but their political system allows them to claim that they do, and back up that claim, without fear of contradiction. They might much prefer to denounce the suggested negotiations and to continue to call for an immediate CTB. They would probably try to embarrass us publicly if we were using verification as the sole reason for our more deliberate approach by reiterating their willingness to accept seismic stations on Soviet territory, even though they are likely to attach unacceptable conditions to this acceptance.

13. An additional advantage of a phased approach is that it leaves open the possibility of easing pressure in the CD. The continuation of some form of trilateral negotiations could be used to block further CD discussion of a CTB, or it could allow us to agree to participate in some form of CD activity on test bans. It would of course be illogical to dismiss all possibilities of a test ban but participate in a CD work group on this topic. If we choose a phased approach we shall nevertheless come under increasing pressure to allow the CD to address the issue. We have argued in the past that exposure to the real problems of CTB might induce a more realistic assessment of CTB from some countries.

#### Conclusions

14. Each of the options examined for CTB policy leaves the Government exposed to criticism that it is weakening Britain's commitment to a CTB and doing so at a time of widespread concern about nuclear weapons. The phased approach suggested nevertheless seems to represent the best ground on which to stand. But to move to this position we

shall need the full support of the Americans who have yet to determine their position on CTB. The first step for us to take would therefore be for officials to put the case in Washington for a phased approach. 15. The review of CTB policy in Washington has so far proceeded at snail's pace. Our objective should be to bring the Americans to focus more attention on the subject and to ensure that as they do so they have before them a clear British view. There are indications that they would welcome this. Meanwhile, it is recommended that we should continue to hold to the line that a CTB is a British objective and that the trilateral talks are in abeyance pending completion by the Americans of their review.

Subject a France Pt 3: Visit of Mitterrand  
Arms Control Extract PM / Mitterrand tête-à-tête 10.9.81 *Defence*

The Prime Minister said that she regarded it as vital that the deterrent capabilities of Britain and France should remain entirely outside the TNF negotiations. President Mitterrand said he absolutely agreed. The wish of the Russians to drag the British and French deterrents into the negotiations was clear. Earlier in the summer, on the day that Pravda had attacked the French Government brutally for its defence statements and defence policy, the Soviet Ambassador had called on President Mitterrand to deliver President Brezhnev's greetings. The Ambassador had gone on to say that President Brezhnev regarded President Mitterrand's statement on security in Europe as very sensible and that he agreed about the need to examine the military balance in Europe. This

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last phrase had been repeated by the Ambassador no fewer than four times despite the fact that on each occasion he had been corrected by President Mitterrand who had pointed out that what was at issue was the global military balance. After the interview, the Ambassador had told the press on the steps of the Elysee that he had been very happy to see that President Mitterrand agreed about the need to examine the military balance in Europe! The Prime Minister said that it was essential that neither Government should fall for the Soviet line. President Mitterrand said that the fact was that neither country was a super-power and had no margin for negotiation. They could not give up part of their deterrent forces in any negotiation because to do so would bring them below the "threshold of security". Neither country wished to become a football between Moscow and Washington. This was another reason for the two countries to have a close and useful relationship. The Prime Minister said it was clear that both countries intended to pursue a very robust line.

SECRET

EXTRACT FROM DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE P.M. AND  
PRESIDENT GISCARD AT ELYSEE 19 SEPT 1980.

CTB

-7-

Defence

Arms Control

President Giscard asked whether the Prime Minister had replied to President Breznev's recent letter about arms control negotiations. The Prime Minister said that she had and that her letter had been short and unpolemical. President Giscard said that he had replied two days previously. He had told President Breznev that France was, of course, not as concerned as the other recipients of the letter. He had said that the French Government approved the SALT II agreement; that they did not see any justification for the linkage the Soviet Government were trying to establish between forward base systems and theatre nuclear forces; and that they did not consider the American reaction to the earlier Soviet proposals had been so negative. Finally he had said that France would not participate in the SALT III negotiations although the contents of a SALT III agreement would, of course, be of concern to France.

Community Affairs

The Prime Minister said that she did not wish to discuss community matters in any detail but that there were one or two points she wished to make. The British Government hoped that the Article 235 financial agreement could be implemented without delay and without linkage to the negotiations on the Common Fisheries Policy. They would do everything they could to reach an early agreement on the CFP. An early agreement was necessary for the British fishing industry. In any case the British Government had undertaken in May to conclude the negotiations as quickly as possible. HMG were also concerned about the failure so far to conclude a sheepmeat agreement. British sheep farmers had expected an agreement by 1 October and were being increasingly affected by the absence of an agreement. It was to be hoped that the next Agricultural Council would reach an agreement: this would at least allow

/the

SECRET

SUBJECT.

cc: fco  
Defence  
SK  
12/9



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

15 September 1980

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T176/80**

Your Excellency

Thank you for your letter of 23 August on the need to start negotiating on theatre nuclear forces in Europe.

I entirely agree about the gravity of this issue; it goes to the heart of European stability and security. It was to maintain this stability in the face of recent Soviet long range theatre nuclear deployments that we and our NATO allies agreed last December to modernise our own forces. In parallel we supported the United States' offer to negotiate on US and Soviet long range theatre nuclear forces in the framework of SALT III. This was a serious offer to start negotiations well before the US deployments in Europe are scheduled to begin.

Regrettably your Government did not accept this offer at the time and negotiations did not, as we had hoped, begin. I therefore cannot accept that the blame for delay can in some way be laid at the door of the United States as you suggest in your letter. I welcome however the fact that in July your Government dropped the earlier precondition that NATO should suspend its modernisation plans before talks could begin. At the same time you have suggested that American forward based systems be included in the negotiations. For our part we believe that the best hope for early progress lies in setting as the initial objective the establishment of limitations on Soviet and United States long range land based theatre nuclear missiles.

/ I very much hope

278

I very much hope that negotiations can begin soon. We are continuing to work with our NATO partners to that end, as we have done consistently since the proposal for negotiations was first made in December of last year.

Yours sincerely

MT

His Excellency Mr. Leonid Ilich Brezhnev

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 September 1980

*Type for signature.*

*Dear Michael*

THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES

In your letter of 2 September you said that the Prime Minister had agreed that a reply to President Brezhnev's letter of 23 August on theatre nuclear forces should await the outcome of consultations with our allies, all of whom had received similar messages. These consultations have now taken place and the Lord Privy Seal recommends that the Prime Minister should reply along the lines of the enclosed draft.

There is a general consensus among our allies that our replies should be short and unpolemical. In particular, our consultations showed that our thinking was very much in line with that of the Americans and Germans. Our reply reflects a number of points agreed with these allies. We understand the US reply delivered on 3 September proposes that, at their meeting in New York later this month, Mr Muskie and Mr Gromyko should agree on the precise timing and venue for preliminary exchanges (the Americans have suggested early October). The German reply is likely to contain an expression of readiness to continue the dialogue including the possibility of further correspondence .

I am copying this letter and its enclosure to Brian Norbury (MOD) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever*

*Michael Arthur*

M A Arthur

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

12 SEP 1980



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## SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret,  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Unclassified.

To:-

President Brezhnev

From

Prime Minister

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

## PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

Thank you for your letter of 23 August on the need to start negotiating on theatre nuclear forces in Europe.

I entirely agree about the gravity of this issue; it goes to the heart of European stability and security. It was to maintain this stability in the face of recent Soviet long range theatre nuclear deployments that we and our NATO allies agreed last December to modernise our own forces. In parallel we supported the United States' offer to negotiate on US and Soviet long range theatre nuclear forces in the framework of SALT III. This was a serious offer to start negotiations well before the US deployments in Europe are scheduled to begin.

Regrettably your Government did not accept this offer at the time and negotiations did not, as we had hoped, begin. I therefore cannot accept that the blame for delay can in some way be laid at the door of the United States as you suggest in your letter. I welcome however the fact that in July your Government dropped the earlier precondition that NATO should suspend its modernisation plans before talks could begin. At the same time you have suggested that American forward based systems be included in the negotiations. For our part we believe that the best hope for early progress lies in setting as the initial objective the establishment of /limitations on

limitations on Soviet and United States long range land based theatre nuclear missiles.

I very much hope that negotiations can begin soon. We are continuing to work with our NATO partners to that end, as we have done consistently since the proposal for negotiations was first made in December of last year.



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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

2 September 1980

BF 6 10 80

Theatre Nuclear Forces: President Brezhnev's letter

The Prime Minister has seen George Walden's letter of 29 August to Mike Pattison on this subject. She has agreed that the text of President Brezhnev's letter to her of 21 August can be released to our NATO allies if they are doing likewise. She has also agreed that the drafting of a reply to President Brezhnev should await the outcome of consultations with our allies, and in particular with the Americans and the Germans.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

S.J. Gomersall, Esq.,  
Lord Privy Seal's Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister

Agree that

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

(a) text of letter to you from  
Bryghner can be released to NATO

London SW1A 2AH

(b) Drafting of reply should follow  
consultations with Allies, particularly  
US + FRG. ?

29 August 1980

Dear Sir,

RMA 1/9

Yes  
YesTheatre Nuclear Forces : President Brezhnev's Letter

In the course of last weekend your Duty Clerk passed to us the text of President Brezhnev's letter of 21 August to the Prime Minister on theatre nuclear forces (TNF) arms control, and you wrote to Chris Jebb about the matter on 20 August. The letter repeats the latest Soviet position, first spelled out to Chancellor Schmidt during his visit to Moscow on 1 July, ie that the Russians are willing to negotiate on medium range missiles provided American forward-based systems are included (although the Russians have been ambiguous in defining precisely what they mean by such systems). President Brezhnev says that he is sending a letter to President Carter proposing 'without further delay' the start of official talks.

You subsequently agreed that the text of this letter could be passed to the Americans and the Germans. We have now heard from our NATO delegation that most other allies have now received similar letters and there is a proposal to compare the texts of these in NATO. The Germans and the Americans have already circulated summaries of these letters and the former have undertaken to circulate the full text if others do likewise. As one of our major objectives throughout discussions on TNF has been to maintain a united NATO position both on TNF modernisation and arms control, we would welcome this. It would also ensure that opportunities for Soviet wedge-driving tactics are kept to a minimum. I would, therefore, be grateful for your authority to release to our NATO allies a summary of the text (or the full text if others are doing likewise) of the letter to Mrs Thatcher.

In passing a copy of the letter to the FCO, No 10 Duty Clerk asked our Resident Clerk whether he could arrange for a draft reply to reach No 10 this week. In light of the need to consult our allies we would see disadvantages in replying too hastily. We will certainly need to know how the Americans respond before drafting any substantial reply. It has been agreed in NATO (and it is indeed a strong British interest) that the negotiations should be bilateral; the Americans must therefore remain the formal channel of communications with the Russians on matters of substance. We are already in touch with the Americans and the Germans about the timing and contents of any response and there are likely to be further discussions in the alliance

/when

M A Pattison Esq  
10 Downing Street



when the texts have been compared. Our recommendation is, therefore, that we should only consider the text of a substantive reply from the Prime Minister after these consultations.

The substance of the message adds nothing to the position which President Brezhnev expounded to Chancellor Schmidt. Nor does it clarify the ambiguities in that position. The reason for the messages is probably propagandistic, the Russians seeking to bolster an image of sweet reason in nuclear arms control following the Brezhnev-Schmidt Summit and to foster as far as possible divergencies of view in the Alliance.

The existence of the Brezhnev letters has leaked. Our News Department is confirming that Mrs Thatcher has received a letter from President Brezhnev, adding if necessary that we cannot comment further on substance, and that we are consulting our allies about this development.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Norbury in the Ministry of Defence, and to David Wright in the Cabinet Office.

(G G H Walden)  
Private Secretary

- 1 SEP 1980



GRS 670

CONFIDENTIAL

*na* *Defense*  
*MAF*

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BONN 281105Z AUG 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 639 OF 28 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE PARIS AND MOSCOW

INFO SAVING ALL OTHER NATO POSTS BMG BERLIN AND UKDEL VIENNA

M.I.P.T.: BREZHNEV LETTER ON TNF

FOLLOWING IS GERMAN TRANSLATION THE TEXT OF BREZHNEV'S LETTER TO FEDERAL CHANCELLOR OF 21 AUGUST. GERMANS ARE TREATING IT HERE AS VERY SENSITIVE: PLEASE PROTECT. BEGINS:

DEAR FEDERAL CHANCELLOR,

YOU WILL RECALL THAT DURING YOUR RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW WE CONDUCTED AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON A MATTER WHICH IS SURELY THE MOST URGENT AND MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION FOR EUROPE AND FOR THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT AT THE PRESENT TIME: HOW ANOTHER ROUND IN THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE CAN BE PREVENTED.

YOU SHOWED GREAT INTEREST IN MY NEW PROPOSAL WHICH I MADE ON THAT OCCASION FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH ORGANICALLY RELATED PROBLEMS REGARDING BOTH MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE AND US FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH SIMULTANEOUSLY. AS I HAVE ALREADY INFORMED YOU, WE ARE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE RATIFICATION OF THE SALT II TREATY, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MIGHT RESULT FROM THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD, FOR UNDERSTANDABLE REASONS, NOT BE TRANSLATED INTO PRACTICE UNTIL AFTER THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE SALT II TREATY.

WE KNOW THAT YOU - AS AGREED IN MOSCOW - IMMEDIATELY INSTRUCTED THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE FRG, H.-D. GENSCHER, TO INFORM THE AMERICAN SIDE OF THIS PROPOSAL. WE OURSELVES ALSO INFORMED THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA ABOUT IT AFTER OUR MEETING.

SINCE THEN MORE THAN A MONTH HAS PASSED BUT AS YET NO REPLY HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON. THERE ARISES THE IMPRESSION THAT THE AMERICAN SIDE IS OBVIOUSLY FOLLOWING A LINE AIMED AT DELAYING THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS WHILST PRESSING AHEAD WITH PLANS FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF NEW TYPES OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES TO BE DEPLOYED IN WESTERN EUROPE.

IN MAKING THEIR DECISION TO PRODUCE AND DEPLOY MEDIUM-RANGE SYSTEMS, THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE DECEMBER MEETING OF NATO DECLARED THAT THEY LINKED IT ORGANICALLY WITH THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS PROBLEM WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WE, AND NOT ONLY WE, MUST NOW HAVE SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT THE SINCERITY OF SUCH DECLARATIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

/1 HAVP

CONFIDENTIAL

I HAVE TOLD YOU PREVIOUSLY AND WOULD LIKE TO REPEAT IT ONCE AGAIN: NO ONE SHOULD DOUBT THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES ARE IN A POSITION TO TAKE SUITABLE COUNTER-MEASURES TO PREVENT A DISTURBANCE OF THE BALANCE OF FORCES THAT HAS ARISEN IN EUROPE AND ANY CHANGE OF IT IN FAVOUR OF NATO.

BUT THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALWAYS BEEN AND STILL IS OF THE OPINION THAT THE ARMS RACE DOES NOT LEAD TO THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE BUT, ON THE CONTRARY, INCREASES THE DANGER OF WAR. IT IS PRECISELY THE DESIRE NOT TO ADMIT JUST SUCH A CHANGE OF EVENTS WHICH DETERMINES OUR NEW PROPOSAL, THE JUSTIFICATION OF WHICH YOU YOURSELF HAVE NOT DENIED

I AM CONVINCED, MR CHANCELLOR, THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROPOSAL WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE INTERESTS OF ALL EUROPEAN STATES, INCLUDING THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. THIS MUST ALSO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE INTERESTS OF THE USA IF IT ACTUALLY IS, AS ITS LEADERSHIP DECLARES, AIMING TO CONSOLIDATE THE STRATEGIC STABILITY AND NOT TO ACQUIRE MILITARY SUPERIORITY.

IN THIS OVERALL CONTEXT I WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT I SHALL AT THE SAME TIME WRITE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE USA, J. CARTER, TO PROPOSE THAT THE OPENING OF OFFICIAL NEGOTIATIONS ON MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE - NATURALLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE AMERICAN FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS - BE AGREED WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY.

IT IS NOT HARD TO APPRECIATE THAT SPECIAL IMPORTANCE ATTACHES TO THIS QUESTION IN A SITUATION WHERE THE WORLD IS AT A KIND OF CROSS-ROADS: EITHER DEVELOPMENTS RUN IN THE DIRECTION OF AN INTENSIFIED ARMS RACE AND OF SLIDING INTO A DANGEROUS CONFRONTATION, OR REASON WILL PREVAIL AND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS WILL BE FOUND. MY LETTER TO YOU IS DETERMINED PRECISLY BY THE AWARENESS OF THE RESPONSIBILITY WHICH RESTS ON THE STATES AND THEIR LEADERS IN THIS SITUATION. WE MUST NOT ALLOW THIS OPPORTUNITY TO CONSOLIDATE PEACE TO PASS BY.

WITH THIS LETTER I EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT YOU FOR YOUR PART WILL TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS WHICH WILL CONTRIBUTE TO AN AGREEMENT ON THE COMMENCEMENT OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR CONSTRUCTIVE COURSE.

YOURS FAITHFULLY,

L. BREZHNEV

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ALL OTHER NATO POSTS AND UKDEL VIENNA

GOODALL

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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PS/LPS  
PS/PUS  
MR BULLARD  
MR WILBERFORCE

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PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST.

GRS 350

CONFIDENTIAL

*Prime Minister*

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW 270905Z AUG 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 521 OF 27TH AUG

FOR INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO AND MODUK

*To see this account  
of Mr Brezhnev's messages  
to you & others.*

*MP 28/8*

YOUR TELEGRAMS 1415 AND 1416: BREZHNEV MESSAGES

1. BREZHNEV'S MESSAGES HAVE NO DOUBT BEEN DRAFTED WITH AN EYE TO THEIR TACTICAL EXPLOITATION IN THE PROCESS OF ALLIED CONSULTATIONS. THE RUSSIANS MAY EXPECT THAT A SUBSTANTIVE US RESPONSE TO THEIR INVITATION TO START TNF/FBS TALKS WILL NOT BE FORTHCOMING AT LEAST UNTIL THIS CONSULTATION HAS TAKEN PLACE, AND THEY PROBABLY ALSO KNOW THAT THIS IS NOT IN PROSPECT UNTIL MID-SEPTEMBER. THEY MUST ALSO HAVE CALCULATED FROM THE OUTSET THAT DEFINITIVE NEGOTIATIONS COULD SCARCELY BE EXPECTED UNTIL 1981. THEY PRESUMABLY NOW COUNT ON A CLEAR RUN OF A MONTH AT LEAST, AND PROBABLY LONGER, IN WHICH THEY CAN MAKE PLAY WITH THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THEIR OWN PROFESSED READINESS TO TALK AND HESITANCY ON THE WESTERN SIDE. THIS PERIOD WILL CONVENIENTLY COINCIDE WITH THE RUN-UP TO THE MADRID CONFERENCE.

*mt*

2. THE WARNING THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES ARE CAPABLE OF TAKING MEASURES OF THEIR OWN IN RESPONSE TO TNF MODERNISATION IS, OF COURSE, NOT NEW, AND IS COINED IN RELATIVELY MILD TERMS. BUT THE OMISSION OF ANY REFERENCE TO THE ALLEGEDLY NEW AMERICAN NUCLEAR STRATEGY ENshrined IN PD 59 IS INTERESTING, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE SOVIET PRESS HAS BITTERLY CRITICISED THE DIRECTIVE AND BRZEZINSKI AS ITS SUPPOSED INSPIRER. IT WAS NOTEWORTHY, HOWEVER, THAT KOBYSH AT THE END OF A LONG ARTICLE IN IZVESTIA ON 22 AUGUST DEVOTED TO A SCATHING ATTACK ON PD 59, EMPHASISED THAT SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, ON TNF REMAINED FULLY IN FORCE.

3. THIS ROUND OF MESSAGES MAY THEREFORE BE DESIGNED TO SEEK SEVERAL ADVANTAGES SIMULTANEOUSLY. IT COULD HELP TO DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND. IT CAN BE EXPLOITED TO UPSTAGE THE AMERICANS AND, BY CATCHING THE LIMELIGHT, TO SHIFT THE FOCUS OF THE MADRID CONFERENCE FROM HUMAN RIGHTS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY QUESTIONS, AND IT PROBABLY REFLECTS A GROWING RECOGNITION OF THE SOVIET UNION'S NEED TO ENGAGE IN EARLY NEGOTIATIONS AS A MEANS OF SUSTAINING ITS PRESENT RELATIVELY FAVOURABLE STRATEGIC POSITION.

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MRWILBERFORCE

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Defence SS  
8/29/80  
evaluation

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 August 1980

Dear Chris

As you will know, the Soviet Ambassador delivered to No. 10 on 23 August a letter from President Brezhnev to the Prime Minister. I attach a further copy for ease of reference, together with the unofficial translation.

Our Duty Clerk asked your Resident Clerk to provide a draft reply in the course of next week. It would be most helpful if this could reach us by mid-afternoon on Friday 29 August.

I am sending a copy of this letter, and enclosure, to Barry Hilton (Cabinet Office), and David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

Mike Pattison

Christopher Jebb, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Sup



**SECRET**

SECRET  
FM WASHINGTON 262057Z AUG 80  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NO 3842 OF 26 AUGUST

*na*  
*MAJ**16*

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF BREZHNEV LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER.  
BEGINS.

DISTINGUISHED MR. PRESIDENT,

I DEEMED IT NECESSARY TO ADDRESS MYSELF TO YOU ON THE ISSUE WHICH DEEPLY CONCERNS AND AFFECTS THE PEOPLES OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT AND HAS ALSO A SUBSTANTIAL BEARING ON THE PROSPECTS OF USSR AND USA RELATIONS.

I HAVE IN MIND THE ISSUE EMERGED IN CONNECTION WITH PLANS TO DEVELOP AND DEPLOY IN WESTERN EUROPE NEW AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES.

AS IS KNOWN, SEEKING TO PREVENT A NEW ROUND OF NUCLEAR ARMS RACE ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT, WE APPROACHED, AS FAR BACK AS LAST FALL, THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER NATO COUNTRIES WITH A PROPOSAL TO INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, WHILE READINESS WAS EXPRESSED ON OUR PART EVEN TO CUT THE NUMBER OF THESE SYSTEMS DEPLOYED IN THE WESTERN REGIONS OF THE USSR, PROVIDED THERE IS NO ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR

MISSILES OF THAT CATEGORY IN WESTERN EUROPE.

AT THE PRESENT TIME TOO, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE THE MOST CORRECT AND RADICAL SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN EUROPE. WE MAINTAIN OUR PROPOSAL TO THIS EFFECT BUT FOR IT TO BE TRANSLATED INTO REALITY IT IS NECESSARY, OF COURSE, TO RESTORE THE STATUS WHICH EXISTED PRIOR TO THE DECEMBER SESSION OF THE NATO COUNCIL.

IT IS ALSO KNOWN TO YOU, I BELIEVE, THAT IN ORDER TO OVERCOME THE IMPASSE CREATED AS A RESULT OF THE SAID NATO DECISION WE ARE READY TO ADOPT YET ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE, WHEREBY THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS IN EUROPE WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS BUT WOULD BE DISCUSSED, AFTER THE SALT-2 TREATY ENTERS INTO FORCE, IN THE FRAMEWORK OF SALT-3 NEGOTIATIONS AND, NATURALLY, ON THE BASIS OF THOSE PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE AGREED BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES FOR THE SALT-3 NEGOTIATIONS.

ALTHOUGH THERE FOLLOWED NO FORMAL OBJECTION FROM THE US SIDE AND THE OTHER NATO COUNTRIES AGAINST SUCH AN ALTERNATIVE, IT HAS PROVED IMPOSSIBLE OF PRACTICAL REALIZATION SINCE THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT RATIFY THE SALT-2 TREATY.

HAVING THOROUGHLY WEIGHED UP THE EXISTING SITUATION AND BEING GUIDED BY BROADER INTERESTS OF PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY WE DECIDED TO UNDERTAKE ONE MORE STEP.

**SECRET***/without*

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WITHOUT WITHDRAWING OUR FORMER PROPOSALS WE EXPRESSED OURSELVES IN THE COURSE OF THE MOSCOW CONVERSATIONS WITH FRG CHANCELLOR H. SCHMIDT IN FAVOR OF STARTING NEGOTIATIONS TO DISCUSS SIMULTANEOUSLY AND IN ORGANIC RELATIONSHIP BOTH MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN EUROPE AND AMERICAN FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS.

THAT THESE WEAPON SYSTEMS ARE TO BE CONSIDERED AS BEING INTER-RELATED AND ALSO IN CONNECTION WITH THE QUESTION OF THEIR LOCATIONS I.E. THE BASES, IS DETERMINED BY THE FACTUAL STATE OF AFFAIRS. AFTER ALL, THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT DISREGARD HUNDREDS OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR CARRIERS WHICH DUE TO THEIR LOCATION CAN REACH THE TERRITORY OF THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES AND WHICH THEREBY CONSTITUTE A SUBSTANTIAL AND INTEGRAL ELEMENT OF THE GENERAL STRATEGIC SITUATION. THE SAME IS ALSO TRUE OF THE BASES PER SE WHICH NOT ONLY EXPAND OPERATIONAL CAPABILITES OF THE SYSTEMS ALREADY THERE BUT MAKE IT POSSIBLE IN A SHORT TIME, ADDITIONALLY AND ON A GREAT SCALE, TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF SUCH SYSTEMS.

IT IS NOT A NEW QUESTION AT ALL. THIS QUESTION WAS ALREADY SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION IN THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION. IT WAS TOUCHED UPON BY US TOO WHEN WE MET IN VIENNA LAST YEAR.

WE ARE PREPARED TO BEGIN RIGHT NOW THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT WE ARE PROPOSING, WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE SALT-2 TREATY RATIFICATION. HOWEVER, PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENTS THAT COULD BE REACHED DURING THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AS IS UNDERSTOOD, WOULD BE CARRIED OUT ONLY AFTER THE TREATY ENTERS INTO FORCE. THIS IS NECESSITATED BY THE FACT, THAT THE SUBJECT OF THE PROPOSED NEGOTIATIONS IS CLOSELY TIED NOT ONLY TO THE EXISTING BALANCE OF FORCES IN EUROPE BUT ALSO TO THE GENERAL STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA.

I WANT YOU TO UNDERSTAND ME CORRECTLY. MR. PRESIDENT: WE ARE CONFIDENT ABOUT OUR ABILITY TO NEUTRALIZE ANY ATTEMPTS TO DISRUPT THE EXISTING CORRELATION OF FORCES, TO CHANGE IT IN THE NATO FAVOR AND TO ATTAIN MILITARY SUPREMACY OVER US. IN OTHER WORDS, IF THE WEST TRIGGERS A NEW ROUND OF ARMS RACE, WE WILL, ALTHOUGH WITH A HEAVY HEART, ACCEPT THE CHALLENGE.

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/ HOWEVER

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HOWEVER, WE BELIEVED AND CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT FURTHER ARMS RACE IS NOT THE KIND OF A ROAD WHICH CAN LEAD TO A STRONGER SECURITY OF ANYONE: ON THE CONTRARY, THIS ROAD IS FROUGHT WITH SERIOUS DANGER FOR ALL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES WITHOUT EXCEPTION. THIS IS THE REASON WHY WE RESOLUTELY FAVOR NEGOTIATIONS AND ARE CONVINCED THAT ONLY THIS WAY CORRESPONDS TO THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLES OF THE USSR AND THE USA, AS WELL AS ALL OTHER PEOPLES.

SINCE THERE HAS BEEN NO ANSWER FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE TO THE PROPOSAL WE MADE, WE CANNOT BUT HAVE AN IMPRESSION THAT THE US GOVERNMENT TOOK THE COURSE OF DELAYING THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN THE MEANTIME, THE POSSIBILITY, WHICH WE BELIEVE IS THERE, TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION MAY SLIP AWAY AND BE WIPED OUT BY THE MARCH OF EVENTS.

I WOULD LIKE TO HOPE, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT YOU WILL ACCORD ALL DUE ATTENTION TO THIS COMMUNICATION OF MINE AND THAT WE WILL BE ABLE WITHOUT FURTHER DELAYS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE AFOREMENTIONED QUESTION.

SINCERELY,

L. BREZHNEV

ENDS.

FRETWELL

LIMITED  
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DS/TH BLANK  
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TH BULLARD  
TH DICERFOLCE

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

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GR 450

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*MAA*

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SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 262055Z AUG 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NO 3841 OF 26 AUGUST

INFO BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, MODUK

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 330 TO BONN: BREZHNEV LETTER

1. WE HAVE OBTAINED A COPY OF BREZHNEV'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER UNOFFICIALLY FROM A SOURCE IN THE NSC. THE AMERICANS HAVE CLASSIFIED IT "SECRET/SENSITIVE" AND WE ARE PARTICULARLY ASKED NOT TO REVEAL AT THIS STAGE THAT WE HAVE RECEIVED IT. IN SUBSTANCE IT IS SIMILAR TO THE LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER, BUT CONTAINS ARGUMENTS FOR THE INCLUSION OF AMERICAN FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS (FBS) IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. TEXT OF LETTER IN MIFT (NOT REPEATED).
2. PRELIMINARY US THINKING IS TO SEND A FAIRLY PROMPT REPLY, AGREEING THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BEGIN SHORTLY BUT COUNTERING A NUMBER OF POINTS IN THE BREZHNEV LETTER INCLUDING THE ARGUMENTS ON FBS. THE POINT MAY BE MADE THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR MOST OF THE DELAY SINCE THE ALLIANCE ORIGINALLY OFFERED TO NEGOTIATE.
3. THE AMERICANS HAVE NOT YET TAKEN A VIEW ON CONSULTATION IN NATO. THEY EXPECT SOME DISCUSSION THERE, IF ONLY BECAUSE OTHERS HAVE ASKED FOR VIEWS ON THE LETTERS THEY HAVE RECEIVED FROM BREZHNEV. AMERICAN OFFICIALS WOULD LIKE TO GET A STEER FROM THE PRESIDENT ON HOW HE WISHES TO RESPOND BEFORE ANY DISCUSSION IN NATO. THEY WOULD PREFER TO AVOID A DRAFTING SESSION IN THE ALLIANCE AND TO DISCUSS AT MOST THE BROAD LINES OF THE VARIOUS REPLIES. BUT THIS IS ONLY A PRELIMINARY REACTION.
4. WE WERE ASKED WHETHER WE HAD SEEN ANY SIGNS OF SOFTNESS IN THE ALLIANCE IN TERMS OF THE RESPONSE TO THE RUSSIANS ON FBS. THE AMERICANS HAD NOTED WITH SOME DISQUIET THE STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AFTER HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW THAT INCLUSION OF FBS WAS LOGICAL FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW.
5. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD NOT PLANNED TO MAKE ANY ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT RECEIPT OF THE BREZHNEV LETTER, BUT WERE QUESTIONED ABOUT IT AT TODAY'S PRESS CONFERENCE. THE SPOKESMAN CONFIRMED ON THE RECORD THAT MUSKIE HAD SEEN THE LETTER, BUT REFUSED TO BE DRAWN INTO DISCUSSION OF ITS SUBSTANCE. ON DEEP BACKGROUND HE SAID THAT THE

*/press*

SECRET

SECRET

PRESS COULD ASSUME IT DEALT WITH TNF. ASKED WHETHER MUSKIE WOULD DISCUSS TNF WITH GROMYKO NEXT MONTH IN NEW YORK, THE SPOKESMAN SAID ON BACKGROUND THAT THERE WAS A GOOD POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, BUT HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER BY THAT TIME THE US WOULD BE READY FOR PRELIMINARY TALKS ON TNF.

FRETWELL

LIMITED  
ECSD  
ACDD  
DEF. D  
WED  
PS  
PS/PS  
PS/THARD  
PS/THAKER  
PS/PLS  
72 BULLARD  
71 WILBERFORCE

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

2

SECRET

*M*  
*MA*

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 160

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKDEL NATO 261445Z AUG 80

TO ROUTINE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 360 OF 26 AUGUST 1980,  
INFO WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW, MODUK.

YOUR TELNO 330 TO BONN: BREZHNEV LETTER.

1. AT THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETING THIS MORNING FARSTAD (NORWAY) SAID THAT A LETTER FROM BREZHNEV HAD BEEN DELIVERED IN OSLO ON 24 AUGUST SHORTLY AFTER THE NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER HAD LEFT FOR BONN. FARSTAD ASKED WHETHER OTHER ALLIES HAD RECEIVED LETTERS, AND SUGGESTED THAT TEXTS SHOULD IN DUE COURSE BE CIRCULATED AND COMPARED IN NATO AS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS.

2. THE DANISH AND GERMAN REPRESENTATIVES CONFIRMED THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED LETTERS; AND THE GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN KNOWING WHETHER OTHERS HAD RECEIVED THEM. NO-ONE ELSE SPOKE.

3. WE UNDERSTAND (TELECON JANVRIN/HAWTIN) THAT WE MAY NOW SAY THAT WE HAVE RECEIVED A LETTER. GRATEFUL TO KNOW HOW FAR WE MAY GO IN REVEALING TEXT IF OTHERS TAKE INITIATIVE IN DOING SO.

HOWELLS.

LIMITED

EESD  
ACDD  
DEF D  
WED  
PS  
PS/MR BLAKER  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/LPS  
PS/PUS  
MR BULLARD  
MR WILBERFORCE

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CONFIDENTIAL

GR 120  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM FCO 251926Z AUG 80  
TO PRIORITY BONN  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 330 OF 25 AUGUST  
INFC PARIS WASHINGTON MOSCOW UKDEL NATO MODUK

YOUR TELNO 629 - BREZHNEV LETTER

1. YOU MAY GIVE THE TEXT TO THE GERMANS (AND FRENCH IF THEY ASK) IN CONFIDENCE. PLEASE STRESS THAT THE CONTENTS ARE CONFIDENTIAL, AND THAT EVEN THE EXISTENCE OF THE LETTER IS NOT KNOWN HERE EXCEPT TO A FEW PEOPLE.
2. WE WOULD OF COURSE BE INTERESTED IN RETURN TO SEE THE GERMAN (AND FRENCH AND US) TEXTS.

CARRINGTON

LIMITED  
EESD  
ACDD  
DEF D  
WED  
PS  
PS/MR BLAKER  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/LPS  
PS/PUS  
MR BULLARD  
MR WILBERFORCE

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CONFIDENTIAL

FO CAB 001/23

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TO DUTY CLERK NO10 AT REQUEST OF  
RESIDET CLERK

GRS 160

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM WASHINGTON 241850Z AUG 80  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3825 OF 24 AUGUST  
AND TO MOSCOW, BONN, PARIS.  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, ROUTINE MODUK.

FOR RESIDENT CLERK

YOUR TELNOS 1415 AND 1416 OF 24 AUGUST:

BREZHNEV LETTER

1. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO COMBS (OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, SOVIET AFFAIRS) WHO INFORMS US THAT THE SOVIET CHARGE D'AFFAIRES SOUGHT AN APPOINTMENT WITH MUSKIE YESTERDAY TO QUOTE DELIVER A LETTER ABOUT SECURITY IN EUROPE UNQUOTE. MUSKIE IS IN MAINE OVER THE WEEKEND, RETURNING VIA NEW YORK ON MONDAY EVENING (25 AUGUST) OR POSSIBLY TUESDAY MORNING. THE SOVIET CHARGE WAS OFFERED AN APPOINTMENT THIS WEEKEND WITH OTHERS AT STATE BUT DECLINED, SUGGESTING THAT THE MATTER COULD AWAIT MUSKIE'S RETURN.

2. COMBS UNDERSTOOD THAT WE WERE NOT ABLE, AT THIS STAGE, TO RELEASE THE TEXT OF BREZHNEV'S LETTER. HE HOPED, HOWEVER, THAT YOU COULD AGREE TO THIS PRIOR TO THE CALL ON MUSKIE ON 25 OR 26 AUGUST.

3. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

FRETWELL

NNNN

SENT/RECD 24/2020Z DP/JJJJPCM





B/F

28.8.80.

\*||

10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

The attached letter from President Brezhnev was delivered to No. 10 today. The Russian Embassy was particularly anxious that you should see it as soon as possible.

There is, however, no immediate action to take.

\* || A copy has been sent to the Foreign Office asking for a draft reply that you might send early next week.

(SGD) Teresa Rolleston  
Duty Clerk

23 August 1980

PRIME MINISTER'S

Subject

T164/80

PERSONAL MESSAGE

Unofficial translation

SERIAL No. T 164/80

M/faxed to Chequers  
14.15  
23.8.80

Dear Mrs. Prime Minister,

I would like to convey to you some considerations on the matter which is now of a particularly topical value for all states and peoples of Europe.

It is our impression that your country, as well as ours, can not but be interested in averting a new spire in the nuclear arms race on the European continent. On this to the largest extent depend the future development of the whole situation in Europe, the prospects of peaceful cooperation among European states, the ensurance of their security.

You know of course that as early as in the autumn of last year I made a proposal to start negotiations about the medium-range nuclear means on the European continent - and with the Soviet Union being prepared to decrease the number of such means of its own deployed in western regions of the USSR if no medium-range means are additionally deployed in Western Europe.

This proposal remains in force at present too, but to implement it, naturally, it is necessary to restore the situation which existed before the adoption by NATO in December last year of a well-known decision about "supplementary armament", - the very decision in accordance with which it is intended to deploy new American medium-range missiles on the British territory as well.

We expressed our readiness to proceed in another way - the questions concerning the medium-range nuclear-missile means in Europe could be the subject matter not of separate talks, but could be discussed within the frame work of SALT-3 talks after the coming into force of the SALT-2 Treaty.

Formally it seems nobody objects to this option but its implementation in fact turned out to be blocked since the ratification of the SALT-2 Treaty in indefinitely postponed in the United States.

Meanwhile time is getting short especially if we take into account the fact that the United States are obviously accelerating the realisation of plans to create new types of medium-range missiles for deployment in Western Europe. As a result of this the opportunity to find a mutually acceptable solution which, we believe, exists now could be lost, overlapped by further developments.

No one should have any doubts that the Soviet Union together with its allies is capable of taking due measures in return in order not to allow to tip the balance of forces existing in Europe, to change it in favour of NATO. But our country always considered and considers that the arms race is the way not to strengthening peace but - at the contrary - to the growth of the military threat.

Taking into account all these circumstances we have elaborated and tabled recently a new proposal - to proceed to the talks about medium-range nuclear-missile means in Europe without waiting for the ratification of the SALT-2 Treaty but in the organic linkage with the question of the American forward-based nuclear means. The logic of this linkage is perfectly evident, it is determined by the factually emerged balance of forces on the European continent and by the need to observe the principle of equal security of the sides taking into account the strengthening of the strategic stability. The implementation of possible understandings would of course become real after the coming into force of the SALT-2 Treaty.

The essence of our new proposal was conveyed to the US Administration in early July. It would seem that the American government should have responded positively to our initiative if some serious intentions are behind the repeated statements of President J. Carter about the US interest in strengthening strategic stability. However more than a month have passed and we received no reaction to our proposal from the American side. One would have the impression that Washington is aiming at a delay by all means.

Adopting a decision about the production and deployment of medium-range weapons the participants of the December session of NATO stated that they link it organically with the start of negotiations with the Soviet Union on this subject. Now we - and not only we - can not help but begin to have serious doubts in the sincerity of such kind of statements.

I would like to inform you, Mrs. Prime Minister, that in connection with all this I am sending today the letter to President J. Carter proposing to agree without further delay about the start of official talks on the medium-range nuclear-missile weapons in Europe and the American forward-based nuclear means.

We are convinced that the earliest decision to begin such talks and their constructive tenure correspond with the interests of all European states - and not only them alone. I would like to believe that the agreement of your Government within the framework of NATO to deploy in Britain new American medium-range missiles does not restrict its freedom of actions to such an extent that you would have no possibility to support the proposal aimed at the cessation of the nuclear arms race in Europe, at the creation of conditions for a profound military detente.

It is not difficult to understand that this question assumes particular importance in the circumstances when the world has approached a sort of a divide - either events would go along the line of increasing the arms race and sliding to a dangerous confrontation, or reason would prevail and mutually acceptable solutions would be found. I am guided in addressing you by the realisation of the responsibility which falls in this situation on states and their leaders. The chance to strengthen peace must not be missed.

This makes me express the hope that your Government would render practical assistance to the positive solution of the question we have raised.

Yours sincerely,

L. BREZHNEV

21 August 1980

Уважаемая госпожа премьер-министр,

Хотел бы высказать Вам некоторые соображения по вопросу, который имеет сейчас особо актуальное значение для всех государств и народов Европы.

Нам представляется, что Ваша страна, как и наша, не может не быть заинтересована в предотвращении нового витка гонки ядерных вооружений на европейском континенте. От этого в огромной степени зависит будущее развитие всей обстановки в Европе, перспективы мирного сотрудничества между европейскими государствами, обеспечение их безопасности.

Вы, конечно, знаете, что еще осенью прошлого года мною было выдвинуто предложение приступить к переговорам по ядерным средствам средней дальности на европейском континенте, причем Советский Союз был готов сократить количество таких своих средств, развернутых в западных районах СССР, если в Западной Европе не будут дополнительно размещены средства средней дальности.

Это предложение остается в силе и в настоящее время. Но для его реализации, естественно, надо восстановить то положение, которое существовало до принятия в НАТО в декабре прошлого года известного решения о "дovoоружении", того самого решения, в силу которого новые американские ракеты средней дальности предполагается разместить и на территории Англии.

Мы выразили готовность пойти и на другой вариант: вопросы, касающиеся ракетно-ядерных средств средней дальности в Европе, могли бы стать предметом не отдельных переговоров, а обсуждаться в рамках переговоров по ОСВ-3 после вступления в силу договора ОСВ-2.

Формально против этого варианта как будто никто не возражает, но фактическое его осуществление также оказалось блокированным, поскольку ратификация договора ОСВ-2 отложена в США на неопределенный срок.

Между тем, время не ждет, особенно если учесть, что США явно форсируют осуществление планов создания новых видов

ракет средней дальности для размещения в Западной Европе. В результате этого имеющаяся сейчас, по нашему мнению, возможность найти взаимоприемлемое решение может оказаться упущенной, перехлестнутой развитием событий.

Никто не должен сомневаться в том, что Советский Союз вместе со своими союзниками способен принять надлежащие ответные меры, чтобы не допустить нарушения сложившегося в Европе равновесия сил, изменения его в пользу НАТО. Но наша страна всегда считала и считает, что гонка вооружений — это путь не к упрочению мира, а, наоборот, к усилению военной угрозы.

С учетом всех этих обстоятельств мы разработали и выдвинули недавно новое предложение: приступить к переговорам по вопросу о ракетно-ядерных средствах средней дальности в Европе, не дожидаясь ратификации договора ОСВ-2, но в органической увязке с вопросом об американских ядерных средствах передового базирования. Логика такой увязки совершенно очевидна: она определяется фактически сложившимся балансом сил на европейском континенте и необходимостью соблюдения принципа одинаковой безопасности сторон, имея в виду укрепление стратегической стабильности. Претворение возможных договоренностей в жизнь было бы реально, конечно, после вступления договора ОСВ-2 в действие.

Суть нашего нового предложения была доведена до сведения правительства США еще в начале июля с.г.: казалось бы, американское правительство должно было положительно откликнуться на нашу инициативу, если за неоднократными заявлениями президента Дж.Картера о заинтересованности США в укреплении стратегической стабильности стоят серьезные намерения на этот счет. Однако прошло больше месяца, а мы с американской стороны не получили на наше предложение никакой реакции. Складывается впечатление, что в Вашингтоне ведут линию на всемерное затягивание.

Принимая решение о производстве и размещении оружия среднего радиуса действия, участники декабрьской сессии

НАТО заявляли, что органически увязывают его с началом переговоров с Советским Союзом по этой проблеме. Сейчас у нас, да и не только у нас, не могут не возникнуть серьезные сомнения в искренности подобного рода заявлений.

Хочу сообщить Вам, г-жа премьер-министр, что в связи со всем этим я направляю сегодня президенту Дж.Картеру письмо с предложением без дальнейших задержек условиться о начале официальных переговоров относительно ракетно-ядерного оружия средней дальности в Европе и американских ядерных средств передового базирования.

Мы убеждены, что быстрое решение о начале таких переговоров и их конструктивное проведение отвечает интересам всех европейских государств, да и не только европейских. Хотелось бы верить, что согласие Вашего правительства в рамках НАТО на размещение в Англии новых американских ракет средней дальности не связывает его свободу действий в такой степени, чтобы Вы не имели возможности поддержать предложение, направленное на прекращение гонки ядерных вооружений в Европе, на создание условий для глубокой военной разрядки.

Нетрудно понять, что данный вопрос приобретает особое значение в условиях, когда мир стоит перед своего рода водоразделом: либо события пойдут по пути усиления гонки вооружений и скатывания к опасной конфронтации, либо торжествует разум и будут найдены взаимоприемлемые решения. Именно сознанием той ответственности, которая ложится в этой ситуации на государства и их лидеров, и продиктовано мое обращение к Вам. Нельзя упустить шанс на укрепление мира.

Это побуждает меня выразить надежду, что Ваше правительство окажет практическое содействие положительному решению поставленного нами вопроса.

С уважением

Л. БРЕЖНЕВ

21 августа 1980 года

CONFIDENTIAL



Defence

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

NUCLEAR ADVISORY PANEL - ICF RECOMMENDATIONS

The Prime Minister was grateful for the report contained in your minute A02803 of 4 August 1980 of the discussions on Inertial Confinement Fusion between British and American officials.

She agrees that while we await the outcome of the further consideration which the Americans are now going to give to the ICF problem, officials should give further thought to the practical implications of relaxing controls on ICF research in the context of collaboration with other countries.

I am sending copies of this minute to Mr. Walden (FCO), Mr. Norbury (MOD) and Mr. West (Department of Energy).

JWL.

KRP  
C

5 August 1980

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Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

Are you content, subject to the views of your colleagues, for officials to look at the practical implications of relaxing controls on ICF research in a collaborative context?

Yes

AKH

Ref. A02803  
PRIME MINISTER


Nuclear Advisory Panel - ICF Recommendations

4 viii

With my minute A01433 dated 15th February 1980, I submitted to you the Nuclear Advisory Panel's assessment of and recommendations on the implications of Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) research for the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology. One of their recommendations was that the United Kingdom should not immediately act unilaterally on a change in current policy but should first discuss with the United States the lines set out by the Panel. That you accepted, and exploratory discussions have now taken place between officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Office on the one side and State Department, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Department of Defense and Department of Energy on the other side. This minute is to inform you about the outcome.

2. In the discussions, the United States did not seriously challenge the Panel's technical assessment that the effect of ICF scientific research on nuclear weapons proliferation was marginal. They recognised the extent to which the case for a severely restrictive policy on ICF research, particularly in the civil field, has been undermined by public disclosure in the United States of hitherto sensitive weapon design concepts with implications for all ICF research. Nevertheless, they continued to see a need for more restrictive control on civil ICF research than the Nuclear Advisory Panel believed to be desirable.

3. This divergence of view arises much more from United States institutional and legal causes, as they themselves explained, than for scientific reasons. Unlike the United Kingdom, with a neat division of civil and military programmes and responsibilities for them, the United States civil and military programmes are both almost entirely run by their Department of Energy using large and expensive facilities at their weapons laboratories.



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Therefore, they argued, the Panel's proposal to decouple weapon laboratory from non-weapon laboratory ICF research would be impracticable in the United States. Doubt was also expressed as to whether Congress would permit differential restrictions on the civil and military programmes, given the existing legal need to treat workers equally. Moreover, they invoked a legal problem stemming from their 1954 Atomic Energy Act which requires that any information deemed to be 'Restricted Data' must remain so classified unless, by executive action, it is completely declassified i. e. made available for public disclosure. Some categories of ICF information have already been deemed to be Restricted Data and must therefore either remain protected by everyone or be declassified entirely. Aside from these institutional and legal points, they foresaw difficulties with unrestricted co-operation with other countries, which would be a corollary of derestricting civil research at home, and they also advanced geopolitical considerations in support of a more restrictive policy towards ICF research than the Panel considered either justifiable or effective.

4. It was apparent that there were differences of view among the various United States Agencies represented at these discussions with, in particular, the State Department favouring a continuation of the present restrictive policy and the Department of Energy preferring a relaxation. Until these interdepartmental differences are resolved, there is unlikely to be any change in the current United States policy. Our representations may encourage them to review their policy more quickly than might otherwise have been the case, and they indicated that they might now refer the issues to a body like our own Nuclear Advisory Panel for advice. They have undertaken to let us have their further considered comments on the Panel's views in due course, but we cannot expect any early change in their position - certainly not before the Presidential election.

5. Nothing emerged from these exploratory discussions to undermine the technical basis of the Panel's views on the proliferation risks of ICF. While awaiting the outcome of the United States further consideration of the ICF problem, in the light of our representations, officials might usefully give further

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thought to the practical implications of relaxing controls on ICF research in the context of collaboration with other countries. This was a point clearly troubling the United States, and it could be an issue of common political, rather than scientific, concern not only for the United States and ourselves but also for relations with Community countries as well as their and our relations with third countries in this field. Without devoting particular attention to political considerations, the Panel recognised that consideration would have to be given as to how other States, especially the nuclear weapon states, could be influenced to accept and apply a common policy in this field. If this suggested task for officials is agreed, I will arrange for the necessary consultation here to be put in hand.

6. I am sending copies of this minute to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, to the Secretary of State for Defence, and to the Secretary of State for Energy.



(Robert Armstrong)

4th August, 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 AUG 1980



SECRET



Defence  
6



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

30 July 1980

Comprehensive Test Ban: Prototype  
National Seismic Station (NSS) on  
UK Territory

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 28 July and has approved the line which the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary proposes to take.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

You may like to glance at the draft letter attached. The issue is something of an unlambic in Anglo-US relations but clearly to go along with the US proposal on the siting of the prototype would prejudice our overall position. Apex test?

28 July 1980

Dear Michael,

Paul 29/7

Yes - but it requires some work!

Comprehensive Test Ban: Prototype National Seismic Station (NSS) on UK Territory

behind - You will have seen from Washington telegrams nos 2558 and 2559 that President Carter has approved a proposal to offer the UK a prototype NSS for joint UK/US/USSR testing on UK territory. This offer has not yet been disclosed at the trilateral negotiations but a similar offer has been made to the USSR, and the US suggest telling the Russians of the offer to the UK before the end of the round on 2 August. The Americans have suggested that the UK prototype should be installed in a dependent territory in the Southern hemisphere. The equipment would be on a loan basis but we would be required to pay installation costs.

✓ Lord Carrington proposes that we should accept the prototype NSS but that we should offer to site it at Eskdalemuir in Scotland where we already have a seismic installation, rather than on a dependent territory. This would be in line with our undertaking to have one NSS in the UK under a Treaty. Installation on a dependent territory might prejudice our negotiating position, which he sees no reason to change at this stage, that NSS on dependent territories are not justified. On the question of timing, Lord Carrington sees little value in making this offer during this round of the negotiations which end on 2 August. Nevertheless in view of the sensitivity of the NSS issue for US/UK relations, he believes that we should at least reply to the Americans before the end of the round, thereby giving them no grounds for complaint that we have missed their deadline. The cost would probably be at the lower end of a scale £110,000 - £250,000. As you know, it has already been agreed that the MOD would meet the costs of the permanent NSS which we have offered in the UK, and he assumes that they would likewise pay to install a prototype.

I attach a copy of the telegram of instructions to our Embassy in Washington which Lord Carrington proposes to send.

I am copying this letter to Brian Norbury in the MOD.

Yours etc

Paul

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON

File No. ....  
Department ACDD  
Drafted by  
(Block Capitals) .....  
Tel. Extn. ....

OUTWARD  
TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBY .....Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) ..... (Time) .....Z	POSTBY .....Z
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AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) MODUK (DS 17), UKDEL CTB GENEVA

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- Mr Alexander, No 10
- Mr R Press, Cabinet
- Off
- Mrs Alexander, HM Tsy

[TEXT]

YOUR TELNOS 2558 AND 2559: US PROPOSALS ON NSS

1. Please tell Kahan that Ministers have been consulted about the new US proposals on NSS prototypes. We will be happy to play our part in creating momentum in the negotiations by accepting a NSS prototype. We would propose siting this at Eskdalemuir. A site on a dependent territory in the southern hemisphere would cause us difficulty. We believe that the Russians would exploit this in an attempt to extract a UK concession over NSS numbers and that, having departed from a strongly defensive technical position (one NSS in the UK) our hand would inevitably be weakened.

/2.

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2. We also suggest that the announcement of our agreement should be reserved until the next round of the trilateral negotiations. The new US proposals have provided enough substance to sustain the present round to its conclusion on 2 August. An announcement during the next round will help to preserve the momentum.

3. For your information, Kahan's arguments for our accepting an island site in the southern hemisphere are not persuasive for the following reasons:

- a. UK agreement to basing the prototype in a UK dependent territory would undermine our current position that NSS in dependent territories are technically unnecessary.
- b. the only convincing basis on which the Russians could save their faces would be by claiming that the UK had agreed to accept an NSS in the dependent territories on a permanent basis. We might find it difficult to insist on removing the NSS once the technical evaluation was complete.
- c. even in a favourable case, eg the Falkland Islands, the contribution which monitoring could make to non-proliferation is debatable and has to be weighed against the political problems of installing such devices in certain territories.

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FM WASHINGTON 212212Z JULY 1980  
TO PRIORITY F C O  
TEL NO 2559 OF 21 JULY  
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL CTB GENEVA, MODUK (DS17 AND ACSA(N))  
INFO SAVING MOSCOW.

14

MIPT: US PROPOSAL ON NSS PROTOTYPE.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SPEAKING NOTES USED BY KAHAN (STATE DEPARTMENT ) TODAY.

-- OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS, WE HAVE BEEN REVIEWING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER QUESTIONS IN RELATION TO PROVIDING AN NSS PROTOTYPE UNIT TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR JOINT TEST AND EVALUATION -- AS WE INITIALLY PROPOSED ON DECEMBER 5, 1979. PENDING COMPLETION OF THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER STUDY, WE HAVE NOT SOUGHT A SOVIET RESPONSE TO THAT PROPOSAL, AND THERE HAS BEEN NO FORMAL DISCUSSION OF IT IN GENEVA THIS YEAR.

-- THE STUDY OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ISSUES IN CONNECTION WITH PROVIDING NSS EQUIPMENT HAS NOW BEEN COMPLETED AND IT HAS BEEN DECIDED THAT, WITH REPLACEMENT OF TWO COMPONENTS (TAPE RECORDER AND BUBBLE MEMORY), THIS EQUIPMENT CAN BE PROVIDED TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR JOINT TEST AND EVALUATION. WE PLAN DURING THE CURRENT CTB ROUND TO REAFFIRM OUR PROPOSAL FOR JOINT TEST AND EVALUATION OF US NSS EQUIPMENT, AND TO URGE THE SOVIETS TO GIVE US A RESPONSE.

-- BEYOND THIS, WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO EXTEND THE DECEMBER 5 PROPOSAL BY ALSO OFFERING AN NSS PROTOTYPE UNIT (MODIFIED AS ABOVE) FOR JOINT (US-UK-USSR) TEST AND EVALUATION AT A SITE ON UK TERRITORY. THE EQUIPMENT WOULD BE PROVIDED ON A LOAN BASIS, AS WE PROPOSED LAST DECEMBER TO THE SOVIET UNION.

-- WE WOULD NOT, OF COURSE, RAISE THIS IN GENEVA UNTIL THERE IS AGREEMENT ON A BILATERAL BASIS THAT IT WOULD BE A USEFUL AND DESIRABLE STEP TO TAKE.

-- WE BELIEVE THE UTILITY OF A PROTOTYPE TEST FACILITY COULD BE ENHANCED BY LOCATING IT AT A SITE IN THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE.

O THIS COULD GIVE THE SOVIETS A FACE-SAVING BASIS FOR AGREEING TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS ON OTHER OUTSTANDING NSS ISSUES, BUT IT WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE UK ACCEPTANCE OF ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL NSS AND WOULD GIVE THE SOVIETS NOTHING CONCRETE TO QUOTE POCKET UNQUOTE.

O IT WOULD PROVIDE DIRECT EXPERIENCE IN OPERATING A SEISMIC STATION AT A REMOTE ISLAND SITE.

/IT COULD ALSO

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O IT COULD ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO NON-PROLIFERATION MONITORING CAPABILITIES, PARTICULARLY SINCE OTHER INSTRUMENTS FOR MONITORING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS COULD BE ADDED AT THE SAME SITE (ON A BILATERAL BASIS).

-- THE PRESIDENT CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT SHOULD AGREE TO FOUR OPERATIONAL NSS, BUT WE TAKE NOTE OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S CONCERNS REGARDING SUCH A CHANGE IN POSITION AT THIS TIME. WE WISH TO STAY IN CLOSE BILATERAL CONTACT ON THIS PARTICULAR QUESTION.

-- IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE BELIEVE THAT AGREEING IN THE NEAR TERM TO JOINT TESTING OF A PROTOTYPE NSS UNIT ON UK TERRITORY IN THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE WOULD BE A USEFUL STEP IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

-- IF YOU AGREE, WE THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO INTRODUCE THIS INTO THE TRILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE CURRENT ROUND TO GIVE ADDED IMPETUS TO OUR DECEMBER 5 PROPOSAL AND OUR TWO DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA WOULD WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF HOW TO DO THIS. WE THEREFORE URGE THAT THE UK GOVERNMENT GIVE THIS ITS PROMPT ATTENTION.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO MOSCOW.

HENDERSON

[REPEATED AS  
REQUESTED]

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MR ALEXANDER  
NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
DR R PRESS  
CABINET OFFICE  
MRS ALEXANDER TREASURY

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FM WASHINGTON 212210Z JUL 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NO 2558 OF 21 JULY

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL CTB GENEVA, MODUK (DS17 AND ACSA(N))

INFO SAVING MOSCOW

UKDEL CTB TELNO 19: NEW US PROPOSALS

1. HEAD OF CHANCERY WAS CALLED IN TODAY BY KAHAN, STATE DEPARTMENT, WHO OFFICIALLY COMMUNICATED THE US REQUEST THAT WE SHOULD ACCEPT A NSS PROTOTYPE UNIT (MODIFIED AS FOR THE SOVIET UNION) FOR TRILATERAL (US/UK/SOVIET) TEST AND EVALUATION AT A SITE ON UK TERRITORY, PREFERABLY IN THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE. TEXT OF KAHAN'S SPEAKING NOTES IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.
2. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS KAHAM EMPHASISED THAT THIS ISSUE OF SITING A PROTOTYPE ON UK TERRITORY WOULD NOT BE RAISED IN GENEVA UNTIL SUCH TIME AS BILATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN US WAS REACHED, BUT THE US THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO BE ABLE TO INTRODUCE THE IDEA INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE THE END OF THE CURRENT ROUND.
3. THIS ISSUE WAS SEPARATE FROM THE US INITIATIVES ON THE PREAMBLE AND ON THE PROTOTYPE FOR THE SOVIET UNION, OF WHICH WE HAD EARLIER BEEN INFORMED IN GENEVA.
4. THE PROTOTYPE WOULD BE MODIFIED IN TWO RESPECTS, ALTHOUGH THE US HAD TAKEN CARE TO ENSURE THAT ITS PERFORMANCE WOULD NOT BE DEGRADED IN COMPARISON WITH THE EARLIER DESIGN. THE MODIFICATION WOULD BECOME APPARENT TO THE RUSSIANS IN THE COURSE OF THE TEST AND EVALUATION PROCESS.

FCO PASS SAVING MOSCOW

HENDERSON

**THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED**

[REPRIMED AS  
REQUESTED]

## FILES

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CABINET OFFICE  
MRS ALEXANDER TREASURY

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Defence.

Ref: A02659

PRIME MINISTERNuclear Advisory Panel DinnerOrigin of Panel

1. The Nuclear Advisory Panel was appointed by your predecessor early in 1979, to provide independent advice in the nuclear weapons field, and to report to him as occasion arose, (eg in connection with the Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations). It was not to have a roving commission but would have specific matters referred to it at the request of Ministers. Its advice was to be confidential to Ministers; there was no announcement of its appointment. Its membership (Annex A) was to be small in number, and comprised of eminent outside scientists who could be cleared to have access to Top Secret Atomic information.
2. A list of Questions subsequently referred by Ministers for the Panel's advice is at Annex B.

Panel's Responses

3. The Panel first met on 10 May 1979, and its first submission was under cover of (then) Sir John Hunt's minute A/09972, to you, dated 13 July 1979. As you will recall, this covered key questions ((i) and (iv) Annex B) concerning the maintenance of nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, and the possibility of failure in verifying compliance with a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). These were at the time, and as you know remain, very relevant to CTB issues.
4. The essence of the Panel's response to question (i) was that the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE) could not in all circumstances have their present degree of confidence in their ability to reproduce exactly the original design specifications without recourse to nuclear weapon testing but, in some particular circumstances, would be obliged to advise HM Government that a nuclear test was desirable.



5. On question (iv), the Panel concluded that successful clandestine testing at yields of three to five kilotons could give the weapon design authorities, of a potential violator, greater confidence in their ability to design kiloton weapons and greater flexibility in the design of high yield weapons. Furthermore, given the information available about salt domes, the Panel feel that, even with currently proposed enhanced seismic systems, the possibility of carrying out an undetected nuclear explosion with yield up to 5 kilotons in an underground cavity has to be recognised.


6. The Panel's second response, which I submitted to you under cover of my minute A/01433 dated 15 February 1980, dealt with the implications of Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) research for the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology (question (iii) Annex B). This was the issue being discussed by the Panel when you went to one of their meetings last autumn. As you know, it is a question which poses a major difficulty through the overlap of "closed" and "open" science that arises. On this question, the Panel concluded that while ICF research is neither necessary nor sufficient for the development of nuclear weapon technology, it is likely to enable scientists engaged in it to understand the principles of making and assembling thermonuclear weapons. They believed any attempt to control ICF research or publications in civil (or "open") laboratories is likely to be ineffective and, as a result of disclosures which have already taken place (mainly in USA) they recommended a review of current national policies in this respect. They also recommended prior discussions with the United States and on this you agreed. A round of such discussions has just taken place, at official level. At a later stage I shall be submitting on the outcome of these discussions.

7. Finally, with my minute A/02210 dated 20 May 1980, I submitted the Panel's response to the question dealing with the level of nuclear weapons expertise to be maintained so long as we have a nuclear weapon stockpile (question (ii) Annex B). This, like the Panel's first response,

bears closely on the main considerations underlying current negotiations for a possible Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. On question (ii), the Panel took the view that, in the absence of a CTBT, AWRE's nuclear weapon expertise should not be eroded by lack of experimental testing. They accepted that, in the event of a CTBT being negotiated, a programme involving significant investment in new capital facilities could be designed to help AWRE to maintain a measure of scientific competence in verifying the nuclear performance of warheads in the stockpile, prior to a CTBT becoming effective, but they firmly concluded that nuclear testing would be necessary to justify the introduction of a new warhead design into our stockpile.

8. Lord Penney has pointed out that the Panel has now responded to four of the five questions referred by Ministers and that the fifth is a much more general and longer term question which the Panel need not attempt to answer in the near future. He therefore sees the Panel's task as now substantially completed but he has expressed readiness to respond to any further requests for independent advice on similar nuclear matters if Ministers so wish. You have agreed that the Panel's task is now substantially completed but have welcomed Lord Penney's offer.

9. The guest list attending the Dinner for the Panel, in Admiralty House on 21 July, is at Annex C.



ROBERT ARMSTRONG

18 July 1980

**CONFIDENTIAL**

ANNEX A

NUCLEAR ADVISORY PANEL

MEMBERS:

Lord Penney (Chairman)	Former Rector of Imperial College
Sir Samuel Curran	Vice-Chancellor of Strathclyde University
Lord Zuckerman	Former Chief Scientific Adviser to Government
Professor Sir Samuel Edwards	Professor of Physics, Cambridge University
Professor Sir Hans Kornberg	Professor of Biochemistry, Cambridge University, and Chairman of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution

ASSESSOR:

Professor Sir Ronald Mason	Chief Scientific Adviser, Ministry of Defence
----------------------------	---

SECRETARY

Dr. R. Press	Cabinet Office (formerly Deputy Secretary for Nuclear Affairs, Science and Technology in Cabinet Office)
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**CONFIDENTIAL**

NUCLEAR ADVISORY PANEL

QUESTIONS REFERRED BY MINISTERS FOR THE PANEL'S ADVICE

QUESTION (i)

- (a) Against the background of present Western (not only British) warhead technology, what ageing faults are likely to arise in a stockpile of nuclear weapons over successive 3 year periods?
- (b) Which of these would be expected to be amenable to rectification without subsequent nuclear testing of whole weapon operation?
- (c) Which might require subsequent nuclear testing to re-establish confidence in reliability of whole weapon operation?

QUESTION (ii)

- (a) What are the Panel's views on the level of nuclear weapon expertise to be maintained, so long as a nuclear weapon stockpile is retained?
- (b) What scope of experimental nuclear warhead related work would the Panel consider necessary to maintain this level - bearing in mind that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) could prohibit all nuclear weapon tests, but clearly could not ban all nuclear reactions?

QUESTION (iii)

- (a) What implications does Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) research have for the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology?
- (b) What steps does the Panel consider should be taken to minimise possible dangers?



QUESTION (iv)

- (a) What scope does the Panel see for possible evasion of compliance with a CTBT under the current limits of detection and verification?
- (b) What minimum threshold level of verification does the Panel consider would ensure that any Party testing below that level would not acquire a unilateral advantage of military significance?

QUESTION (v)

What implications does the Panel see for the UK if there were to be 'cut-off' in the production of fissile material for weapon purposes?

NUCLEAR ADVISORY PANEL DINNER  
at ADMIRALTY HOUSE on  
MONDAY, 31 JULY 1980  
(7.15 for 7.45 p.m.)

GUEST LIST

HOSTS:

Sir Robert Armstrong  
Sir Frank Cooper

PANEL MEMBERS

Lord Penney (Chairman)  
Lord Zuckerman  
Sir Samuel Edwards  
Sir Hans Kornberg

(Regretably Sir Samuel Curran was unable to accept  
due to commitment overseas)

PANEL ASSESSOR

Sir Ronald Mason

PANEL SECRETARY

Dr. R. Press

Also Mr. D. C. Fakley (Assistant to Sir Ronald Mason)

12A

SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 July 1980

*Prime Minister.  
You may like to  
see this note.*

②

*Print 14/7*

*[Handwritten signature]*

*Dear Michael,*

New Eastern Move in MBFR

The New Eastern Proposals

The Warsaw Pact yesterday tabled and subsequently made public new proposals at the MBFR negotiations in Vienna. Details are attached.

Assessment

Our immediate comments are:

Positive Aspects

(a) The proposal for a 50% sub-ceiling is a step forward. Provided (an important proviso) the 50% arrangement is the only sub-ceiling in Phase II, the Soviet Union would appear to accept for the first time that MBFR will result in a de facto limitation on the size of its forces in Eastern Europe in exchange for a limitation in practice only on German forces. However, the proposal is unlikely to be welcome to the Germans. They already account for 443,500 ground and air force personnel on the Western side (cf the proposal for a final overall ceiling of 900,000).

(b) Although there are still considerable differences in the proposals of the two sides, the latest Soviet proposal brings the frameworks closer together.

Negative Aspects

(a) The proposal does not deal with the central issue of data. An agreed data base in Phase I (at least on US and Soviet forces) must be agreed in order to set residual ceilings on these forces. And in due course agreed data will also be necessary for the operation of the common collective ceiling in Phase II.

(b) The ratio of 13:20 in US/Soviet reductions may not prove acceptable (eg to the Americans), since it does not represent the existing relationship of forces.

(c) The Soviet Union claims that, taken with the unilateral withdrawals of 20,000 Soviet soldiers from the GDR, the new

/proposals

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proposals entail a total Soviet withdrawal of 40,000 men. This claim should be treated with caution. In the absence of agreed verification arrangements we have no guarantee that the men withdrawn unilaterally have left the reductions area or will not be replaced. Furthermore Western intelligence indicates that a new programme of reorganisation of Soviet armoured divisions in Central Europe could mean an eventual increase of 25,000 men in Soviet force totals within the reductions area.

#### Outstanding Questions

Other issues remain to be clarified, eg:

- (a) Is the East still asking for reductions of armaments?
- (b) Does the East still require in a Phase I agreement firm reduction commitments for Phase II by the Western Europeans? The assumption must be yes.
- (c) Does the East also require a no-increase commitment from the Western Europeans in the period between the two Phases, even though we have no East-West agreement on data? Again the assumption must be yes.

#### Timing

The timing of the Eastern move was probably determined by the Soviet desire to:

- (a) use Chancellor Schmidt's visit to make a positive gesture to Western Europe, particularly in the area of arms control;
- (b) strengthen Chancellor Schmidt's prospects in the forthcoming FRG elections;
- (c) demonstrate publicly a positive approach to arms control with a view to diverting attention from Afghanistan and in the run-up to the CSCE Review Conference in Madrid;
- (d) reinforce their revised offer to negotiate on TNF.

#### Conclusions

It is too early to tell whether the new proposals are merely a propaganda move or a genuine attempt to get the MBFR negotiations

/moving.

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moving. The answer will depend on whether the East are prepared to negotiate seriously on the data dispute and on Associated Measures, and on whether the Soviet divisional reorganisation cancels out the unilateral withdrawals. Meanwhile we shall be recommending to our Allies a cautious, but not unwelcoming, response designed to explore the new Eastern proposals.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Norbury (MOD).

*Yours etc*

*Paul*

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

Michael Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London

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ANNEX

SUMMARY OF NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS

The main elements of the Eastern proposals are as follows:

- (a) Phase I reductions would consist of 13,000 US and 20,000 Soviet ground troops;
- (b) the East has dropped its demand that the unilateral withdrawals of 20,000 Soviet troops from the GDR should be counted as part of Soviet Phase I reductions. But the East claims that taken with (a) above this would mean in practice a total Soviet Phase I withdrawal of 40,000 men;
- (c) after Phase II the arrangement for manpower ceilings should ensure that no single direct participant has more than 50% of the permitted total of 900,000 men for the ground and air forces of each side;
- (d) the Eastern proposals do not deal with Associated (verification and stabilisation) Measures. However the Soviet Ambassador said that the East were now defining a 'sensible' package of Associated Measures related primarily to verification;
- (e) the proposals are the East's 'full reply' to the West's proposals of 20 December 1979. (These provided for US and Soviet Phase I withdrawals of 13,000 and 30,000 respectively and a comprehensive package of Associated Measures.)

SECRET

15 JUL 1980



Defence



Ref. A02303

*Miss Stephens* *Wed in diary*

MR. PATTISON

*NAP*  
*10/VI*

Nuclear Advisory Panel Dinner

In your minute of 9th May, you said that the Prime Minister would be prepared to look in at a dinner organised by Sir Robert Armstrong and Sir Frank Cooper for the Nuclear Advisory Panel, provided the dinner could be arranged at a time convenient for her.

2. We have had difficulty in finding a date convenient to all the members of the Panel. The date we have eventually found is Monday 21st July. I see from the Prime Minister's programme that she is giving a cocktail party that evening for Members and their wives. I imagine that she would not therefore be able to look in on the NAP dinner before it started. I wonder, however, whether there is any chance of the Prime Minister looking in on the dinner later in the evening, at say 9.30 pm.

*D. J. Wright*

D. J. WRIGHT

10th June, 1980



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NOTE FOR THE FILE

NUCLEAR ADVISORY PANEL

I spoke to Stephen Pollard on 218-6588 in Professor Mason's office at the Ministry of Defence. He said the only convenient date to hold a dinner for the Nuclear Advisory Panel was 21 July. This is not a convenient date for the Prime Minister as she is entertaining Members of Parliament and their wives that night but I told him not to bother to change the date as it suited all his people.

*ep.*

2 June, 1980

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35  
reference

27 May 1980

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: NATIONAL SEISMIC  
STATIONS ON UK TERRITORY

The Prime Minister has seen and taken note  
of your letter to me of 20 May on this subject.

MA

Paul Lever, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

KRB

CONFIDENTIAL

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

NUCLEAR ADVISORY PANEL

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your minute AO2210 of 20 May 1980.

She has taken note of the Nuclear Advisory Panel's response to the fourth of the five questions originally put to them. She agrees that the Panel's task is now substantially completed but she is glad to learn that they will be ready to provide independent advice on similar nuclear matters if Ministers wish to seek it.

C. A. WHITMORE

27 May 1980

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②

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

To note present position

20 May 1980

Dear Michael,

Comprehensive Test Ban: National Seismic Stations (NSS) on UK Territory

When the Prime Minister and Lord Carrington were in Washington last December, President Carter raised the possibility of US financial assistance for 3 additional NSS on UK dependent territory sites. We had already offered in the negotiations one station in the UK itself. You will have seen from Washington telegrams nos 1727 and 1728 that the President has decided that such assistance would not be appropriate. He had, however, expressed the hope that the UK would nevertheless be able to accept three stations in the southern hemisphere.

Lord Carrington does not consider that the arguments for a change in the UK's position at this stage are compelling. A British offer of some additional stations may well prove to be a necessary condition for the successful completion of a CTB, but he believes that such a concession, if given at all, should be reserved until it becomes clear that the US Administration is determined to carry the negotiations forward.

I attach a copy of our telegram of instructions to our Embassy in Washington which you may wish to draw to the Prime Minister's attention.

Yours ever

Paul

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL

20 MAY 1980



File No.....

Department ACDD.....

Drafted by  
(Block Capitals) A REEVE.....

Tel. Extn. 233 4918.....

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

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  - MR CABINET OFFICE

[TEXT]

WASHINGTON TELNOS 1727 AND 1728 AND EDMCND'S LETTER OF 7 MAY TO REEVE

1. I have carefully considered the arguments. A concession by the UK over NSS at this stage might ease the negotiations forward and improve our position at the NPT Review Conference. But such a concession will not lead to a CTB this year. Wider political considerations - Afghanistan, postponement of SALT ratification, the US Presidential election - make that impossible, and the international community is aware of this. The American position appears virtually immobile. A concession now would only weaken our negotiating position in the longer term without offering any certain short-term gain.

2. You should therefore speak to the Americans, at an appropriate level, on the lines of MIFT, emphasising our /readiness

readiness to hold further discussions as a means of ensuring that we are closely in step during the forthcoming negotiating round.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



File No. ....

Department ACDD

OUTWARD

Drafted by

TELEGRAM

(Block Capitals) I. R. CALLAN

Tel. Extn. 233 3533

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[TEXT]

MIPT: UK NSS

1. Ministers have noted the President's decision that it would not be appropriate for the US to fund equipment for additional UK NSS and have given careful consideration to his hope that we would nonetheless be able to <sup>agree to</sup> accept three stations in the southern hemisphere.

2. We agree that we should continue to pursue a CTB; that the joint UK/US negotiating position should be as defensible as possible; and that <sup>a</sup>our key objective should be to clinch Soviet acceptance of 10 NSS on their territory. However we are mindful of the President's earlier decision that the CTB negotiations should continue 'at a slow pace', reflecting the view, with which we agree, that there is now no prospect of bringing the CTB to fruition this year. This leads us to a different conclusion about the desirability of our agreeing to

/accept

accept 3 additional NSS at this juncture:

- (a) Our overall conclusion in the technical study we handed to the US team in London on 10 January was that the gains in verification capability of NSS in dependent territory sites in the Southern Hemisphere would be marginal, whether for monitoring NWS or NNWS.
- (b) In addition to the technical objections there are political, security and logistical difficulties in finding suitable sites. The Falkland Islands, which appears to be technically the best site, would present us with a ~~real~~<sup>serious</sup> political problem with Argentina. There would be no site in the Indian Ocean if Diego Garcia <sup>is</sup> ~~were~~ ruled out of bounds on security grounds. This would leave only Pitcairn in the Pacific and islands in the <sup>South</sup> Eastern Atlantic.
- (c) It is increasingly widely recognised, especially by our Allies, that the stalemate in the negotiations derives principally from wider difficulties in East/West relations, including particularly the postponement of SALT ratification. Pending a change in the current political atmosphere, real progress on key issues seems unlikely. We have accepted that some of the most difficult, requiring US decisions, may have to wait until after the Presidential election. An isolated concession on UK NSS will not lead to progress on a broad front.
- (d) We are not convinced that an increased UK offer would improve our chances of inducing the Russians to drop their linkages and negotiate seriously on other unresolved issues. Their refusal to do so is already one of the most indefensible aspects of their position. Recognising, as we do, that the negotiations cannot be concluded this year, they may well

/pocket

pocket any concession over NSS and press for a further increase in 1981. However strongly the Americans supported us, there would be no guarantee that a further concession would not be required in order to achieve agreement.

3. In short we consider that any such difficult decision, involving our departure from the only strongly defensible technical position, should be contemplated only when it is likely to achieve a positive result in the form of a complete treaty. Meanwhile our tactic should be to continue to press the Russians to leave numbers of UK NSS aside.

~~NP4~~ We are however concerned to find suitable subjects to occupy the negotiations. Without additional negotiating substance the coming round will be even more strained than the last. At the same time, with the approach of the NPT Review Conference, outside critical attention will concentrate increasingly on the unresolved issues. The combination of these two factors might lead the Russians to assume that we have totally lost interest in a CTB and tempt them into breaking ranks.

5. We believe therefore that we should concentrate on areas of work which do not involve major controversial decisions on the part of the US and the UK but which will maintain some forward momentum. In our view, negotiation of the preamble would fill this role admirably. This issue, as Mr Bartholomew acknowledged, is not of the same political or substantive magnitude as the question of NSS. Precisely for that reason, we think it offers an attractive basis for keeping the negotiations going. The Soviet Union tabled a draft on 26 July 1978 which they reintroduced on 12 June 1979. We gave you a UK draft on 9 October 1978 which conformed to the well established pattern for arms control and disarmament agreements. In view of the many precedents, we do not regard discussion of the preamble as in any way prejudicial to Western interests.

5. We should welcome an opportunity to discuss our joint strategy prior to the beginning of the next negotiating round. The approaching NPT Review Conference makes it highly  
/desirable

desirable that we should be closely in step. A bilateral during the middle part of the week of 9 June, when Moberly will be in Washington on other business, would be best from our point of view.



Prime Minister 10

p/w refs. All you need to do is to take note of the Panel's response to the fourth of the five questions put to them.

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PRIME MINISTER

Handwritten signature/initials

Nuclear Advisory Panel

The remaining question (see X/144) concerns the implications for the UK if there were to be a 'cut-off' in the production of fissile material for weapon purposes.

As regards Y/144, you have already agreed that the Panel should be stood down.

Handwritten initials and date: 22.5.80

In my minute (A.01433) to you dated 15th February 1980, I referred to my predecessor's submission of earlier Panel responses to two key questions. As you will recall, these had particular significance in the context of the Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations. At the same time, I submitted the Panel's response to a third question relating to the implications of Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) research for the proliferation of nuclear technology. The Panel's response which I am now submitting deals with the level of nuclear weapons expertise to be maintained so long as we have a nuclear weapon stockpile.

2. This further response, like the first two, bears closely on the main considerations underlying current negotiations for a possible Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Panel takes the position that, in the absence of a CTBT, AWRE's nuclear weapon expertise should not be eroded through lack of experimental testing. They have accepted that, in the event of a CTBT being negotiated, a programme involving significant investment in new capital facilities could be designed to help AWRE to maintain a measure of scientific competence in verifying the nuclear performance of warheads already in the stockpile (prior to a CTBT becoming effective), but they have firmly concluded that nuclear testing would be necessary to justify the introduction of a new warhead design into our stockpile.

3. Lord Penney, as Chairman of the Panel, has pointed out that of the five Questions referred by Ministers the Panel has now responded to four. The fifth is a much more general and longer term question which the Panel need not attempt to answer in the near future. He therefore sees the Panel's task as now substantially completed but he has expressed readiness to respond to any further requests for independent advice on similar nuclear matters, if Ministers so wish.

X  
Y

Handwritten signature: RA

(Robert Armstrong)

20th May 1980

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20 MAY 1960

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СОНСНЕВО



*[Faint handwritten notes and signatures in the bottom right corner.]*

QUESTIONS REFERRED TO PANEL

- (a) What are the Panel's views on the level of nuclear weapon expertise to be maintained so long as a nuclear weapon stockpile is retained?
- (b) What scope of experimental nuclear warhead related work would the Panel consider necessary to maintain this level, bearing in mind that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would prohibit all nuclear weapon tests, but clearly could not ban all nuclear reactions?

PANEL'S RESPONSE

1. The Panel assumed that the expression 'nuclear weapon stockpile' was intended to cover:
  - (i) weapons currently in stockpile; and
  - (ii) such additions to or replacements in the stockpile as may be made at some future date.

These two categories give rise to significant differences in the issues to be considered.

2. In some respects, category (i) was covered by the Panel's response to an earlier Question I when it was stated that: "it is conceivable that circumstances may arise ... when AWRE would not have their present degree of confidence in their ability to reproduce exactly the original design specification. Under such circumstances, the Panel accepts that AWRE must then advise HM Government that a nuclear test is desirable". Category (ii) could include not only major modifications of an existing and tested warhead design but also completely new basic designs. The latter option could of course be exercised only in advance of a possible CTBT, since an untested nuclear warhead would not be operationally acceptable in a stockpile.

3. The neutron reactions which take place in an advanced nuclear warhead are highly complex. Their earlier phases are not so thoroughly understood as to enable a designer to predict with confidence that his intended functional sequence would occur reliably. Reasonable assurance of the reproducibility of a particular design might, therefore, in some cases, require not just one but many similar if not identical tests. In this respect, whether for a single design or for a number of designs, the Panel noted a very significant disparity between the number of tests carried out in the past year (1979) by the Soviet Union (29), the United States (18), the French (9), and the UK (1). For the whole decade (1970-79) the numbers were (201), (249), (55) and (5) respectively. The yields of these Soviet and US tests, as measured seismically, have been predominantly less than 20 kilotons and are therefore strongly indicative of tests of nuclear trigger mechanisms.
4. The Panel recognised the national political and resource constraints on the UK, as well as the relatively small number of nuclear weapon systems deployed by the UK, but they also recognised the disadvantage in depth of knowledge that must be arising for the UK as a result of such disparity in experimental testing, even allowing for the substantial help received from the US. They took the view that, in the absence of a CTBT, AWRE's nuclear expertise should not be eroded by lack of experimental testing. The continuance of US help depends on our having at least a few tests of significant technical content.
5. With regard to part (a) of the Question under discussion, the Panel concluded:
  - (i) nuclear tests are not necessary to maintain capabilities in material control, fabrication, safety operations for radioactive or explosive processes, inspection and measurement of properties;



- (ii) nuclear tests would be necessary to justify introduction of a new warhead design into the stockpile, if at least as sophisticated as designs in our current stockpile;
- (iii) it can not be assumed that a US tested design would ever be made available to UK. Even if it were, the Panel thinks that a UK copy of it would not be acceptable for the stockpile without testing;

6. With regard to part (b) of the Question, the Panel considered a programme of work proposed by AWRE to help to maintain their expertise in the absence of nuclear tests. The Panel concluded:

- (iv) the maintenance of technological competence in so far as design and skilled industrial staff are concerned is already proving a difficulty for the establishment. The position will not improve unless adequate recruitment measures are taken;
- (v) if the programme proposed by AWRE were adopted, and was permissible under a CTBT, it would enable AWRE to maintain a measure of scientific competence in verifying the nuclear performance of stockpile warheads. It might also facilitate the recruitment of some clever scientists;
- (vi) the programme, as proposed, would involve significant investment in new capital facilities, and additional running costs.

File

Defense.

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MR. WRIGHT

CABINET OFFICE

The Prime Minister has seen Sir Robert Armstrong's minute (A02111) about the Nuclear Advisory Panel.

She is content that the Panel should be stood down on the basis set out in paragraph 1 of Sir Robert's minute.

She does not feel able to offer to host the proposed dinner for the Panel, but she would be delighted to look in at one hosted by Sir Robert Armstrong and Sir Frank Cooper if this can be arranged on a date convenient to her. You will no doubt be in touch with Caroline Stephens about this.

M. A. PATTISON

KAB

9 May 1980

Ref. A02111

MR. WHITMORE



*Yes not*

PRIME MINISTER

- 1 Agree that Nuclear Advisory Panel be stood down?
- 2 Agree to look in at dinner for the Panel hosted by Sir Robert Armstrong and Sir F. Cooper?

*MA*

Nuclear Advisory Panel

The Prime Minister will remember that early last year her predecessor set up the Nuclear Advisory Panel under the Chairmanship of Lord Penney. The Panel reported its answers to two of the matters referred to it in July 1979 and its answer to the third question in February this year. It has now completed the work assigned to it, and it is proposed that it should stand down. If questions were to arise which we wanted to refer to it, we could always reconvene it, with the same or indeed slightly altered membership.

2. I have discussed with Professor Mason how we might fittingly thank the Panel for its work. What is proposed is that a dinner should be given for the Panel, at which we could express the Government's gratitude.

3. If the Prime Minister were disposed herself to give such a dinner, that would of course be marvellous. I know, however, that her diary is already very full for the coming months, and I do not think that we can urge this upon her as a high priority for an additional commitment. What I have in mind, therefore, is that Sir Frank Cooper and I should join forces to host such a dinner. If that is how we proceed, however, I should very much like to arrange the dinner on a date at which the Prime Minister could perhaps look in for a drink beforehand, if she could spare the time. We need not tell the Panel that this is our plan, so as not to raise hopes which the Prime Minister might have at the last minute to disappoint; but we would try to fix it for a date which might look like being possible for her.

4. I should be grateful if you would let me know whether the Prime Minister would be content for me to proceed accordingly. If she is, I will discuss dates with Miss Stephens.

*RA*

(Robert Armstrong)

7th May, 1980



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The following information is being furnished to you for your information. It is classified as Confidential because its disclosure could result in the identification of sources of information and the compromise of the national defense.

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Defence

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PRIME MINISTER

MJS

BY BAG

CONFIDENTIAL

MS

TELEGRAM NO 6 SAVING OF 3 APRIL 1980

TO FCO

FROM UKDEL CTB GENEVA

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION: MODUK (DS17); MODUK (ACSA(N)); WASHINGTON;  
MOSCOW; UKDEL NATO; UKDEL VIENNA

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS: SITUATION REPORT

1. Summary. We have just completed 9 weeks of Anglo/American negotiations with the Russians, against a background of the worst East/West relations since these negotiations began in 1977, and with the approaching US Presidential Election as an extra handicap. We have just about met the requirement to "continue negotiating" but need to be able to give a little more substance to this when we resume in June.

2. The round produced one modest achievement - completion of agreement in principle on the technical characteristics of the borehole equipment for national seismic stations (NSS). The only other substantive discussion was continuation of the long-running debate about the equipment and procedures required for on-site inspections (OSI). It was also agreed that we should produce a much fuller report than hitherto for the Committee on Disarmament (CD) and also for the NPT Review Conference.

The US Performance

3. The US Delegation had to cope with a total absence of fresh instructions, except that the negotiations should continue "at a slow pace". A high level Washington meeting on CTB to consider fresh instructions was repeatedly postponed. The delegation continued to support our position on NSS numbers to the limited extent necessary and concentrated, with us, on trying to make limited progress on verification measures. They were greatly embarrassed by Washington's failure to agree a UK/US draft for the report to the CD in time for it to be handed to the Russians before the end of the round.

The Soviet Performance

4. The Russians seemed relieved that the US and UK had decided to continue these negotiations in spite of Afghanistan. They made a moderate response to our initial reference to the serious implications of their invasion, took the point that we were restricting social contacts, and stuck to CTB business without polemics on external issues. However, they eventually moved over to the offensive on the last day (my telno 5 saving) with renewed accusations of US/UK unwillingness to negotiate on many outstanding issues, plus yet another assertion that UK refusal to accept more than one NSS was the main barrier to progress.

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5. Meanwhile in the CD the Russians supported the non-aligned call for a working group on CTB, on condition that it included France and China and was confined to general discussion as opposed to drafting. This was generally recognised in the CD as a tactical ploy with no serious intentions, and they assured us privately that they did not wish to cut across the tripartite negotiations. It remains to be seen whether this assurance will hold through the next CD session and at the NPT Review Conference. A first test will be their reaction to the UK/US draft report for the CD.

The Immediate Future

6. Even without some improvement in the East/West climate, it seems probable that these negotiations will continue in June-July and again in the autumn. Although really significant progress is improbable before the US Presidential Election, I believe that continued inertia in Washington would give the Russians too much scope for mischief in the months ahead. Proposals for dealing with this are in my letter of 2 April to P H Moberly.

EDMONDS

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

F I L E S

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DEFENCE D  
NEWS D  
LEGAL ADVISERS  
PLANNING STAFF  
PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD

PS/MR BLAKER  
PS/FUS  
SIR D MAITLAND  
  
MR BULLARD  
MR P H MOBERLY  
MR FERGUSSON  
MR EDMONDS  
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

MR ALEXANDER  
NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
DR R PRESS, CABINET OFFICE

MRS ALEXANDER, TREASURY

CONFIDENTIAL



Defence

CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet: Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO

PA.

MW

25' in'

Ref. A01746

21st March, 1980

Nuclear Advisory Panel

In your letter of 26th February, you set out the Ministry of Defence's views on the recommendations of the Nuclear Advisory Panel and on the next steps to be taken to discuss these with the Americans. Paul Lever's letter of 10th March conveyed the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's support for the approach to the Americans which you had suggested.

Since both you and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office believe that the Nuclear Advisory Panel's recommendations should in the first place be "explored" at official level without at this stage the presence of a Panel member we are content to accept the offer made in paragraph 3 of your letter to set up such a meeting. But in doing so, it will be important to ensure that the impact of the work of Lord Penney's panel is not diminished. It would be important, therefore, to ensure that the Panel's proposals are presented to the Americans as the result of a study of a high-level group led by Lord Penney and appointed specifically to advise Ministers. In addition, the exploratory talks would have to be presented as very much a first step with results being, as Paul Lever said, the subject of further advice to Ministers, if necessary with help from the Panel. (The Panel should, in any case, be given an opportunity to comment on any counter-proposals the Americans may make.) We would naturally want Dr. Press of the Cabinet Office to participate in these exploratory talks.

I am copying this letter to Clive Whitmore (No. 10) and Paul Lever (FCO).

**D. J. WRIGHT**

(D. J. Wright)  
Private Secretary

B. M. Norbury, Esq.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 March 1980

P.A.

AW

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Dear David,

Nuclear Advisory Panel

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has seen Sir Robert Armstrong's minute to the Prime Minister of 15 February with the Panel's report on Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF), together with Brian Norbury's letter to you dated 26 February.

Lord Carrington accepts that there is a case for reviewing our policy on ICF research and publication but shares the Ministry of Defence's doubts about the wisdom of going as far as the Panel have proposed. He believes therefore that as a first step talks between British and US officials only should go ahead on the basis suggested by Brian Norbury; and that their results should be the subject of further advice to Ministers, if necessary with help from the Panel, before any final decision is taken on the present recommendations.

I am sending copies of this letter to Clive Whitmore (No 10) and Brian Norbury (MOD).

Yours etc

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

D J Wright Esq  
Cabinet Office

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10 MAR 1980



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*Defence* 9



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone 01-~~9307032X~~ 218 2111/3

MO 12/2/5

26th February 1980

*Dear David,*

*KWJ*  
*26<sup>th</sup>*

NUCLEAR ADVISORY PANEL

We have already explained to you that my copy of your minute to Clive Whitmore of 22nd February has not reached me; I now have a duplicate.

2. I cannot presently consult the Secretary of State, who is abroad, but since you are, I understand, anxious for early advice I think that I should say that MOD officials do have reservations about some of the recommendations of the Nuclear Advisory Panel, in particular those concerning the control of publications (paragraph 5 of Sir Robert Armstrong's minute of 15th February); implementation would lead to a radical change in our current policy. We agree, nevertheless, with the recommendation in paragraph 6 of his minute that the question of the proliferation risks attached to Inertial Confinement Fusion work should be discussed fully with the Americans in the light of developments in this field and related fields over the past months.

3. Our initial requirement is for discussions with the Americans on the technical implications of the public disclosures already made in the United States about the principles of thermo-nuclear weapon design. The Ministry of Defence could arrange for such technical discussions to take place with the United States Department of Energy as soon as the latter have completed their own internal assessment (now known to be in hand). Thereafter, a more widely based Anglo-American meeting is needed to set the technical appreciation in a wider political context; the United Kingdom team should include Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence officials, and we would expect the Americans to field representatives from the State Department,

/the ...

D J Wright Esq  
Cabinet Office

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the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Departments of Defense and Energy. At this meeting - which we should be happy to set up - the merits of the Nuclear Advisory Panel recommendations on policy would be fully explored.

4. I am sending copies of this letter to Clive Whitmore (No 10) and George Walden (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

*Yours truly,*

*Brian Norbury*

(B M NORBURY)

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*Defence*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

MR. WRIGHT

Nuclear Advisory Panel

The Prime Minister has seen and noted your minute A01498 of 22 February 1980 about the Nuclear Advisory Panel's recommendations.

I am sending copies of this minute to Mr. Walden and Mr. Norbury.

C.C.A. WHITMORE

25 February 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref: A01498



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3.  
Prime Minister  
To note x/ files.  
[Signature] 22<sup>nd</sup>

MR. WHITMORE

Nuclear Advisory Panel

X | On the point of detail raised in your reply to Sir Robert Armstrong's <sup>attached</sup> minute A01433 of 15th February to the Prime Minister, we have no information that suggests South Africa has any access to essential lithium (i. e. lithium-6, the essential fusion material) and tritium.

2. If the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence, like the Prime Minister, are content with the Nuclear Advisory Panel's recommendations as summarised in paragraphs 5 and 6 of his minute, Sir Robert Armstrong will now arrange for the necessary follow-up discussions with the United States. It is proposed that they should be led (on your side) by Lord Penney, the Chairman of the Advisory Panel, who would be accompanied by officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Office, and perhaps by Sir Samuel Edwards, who is also a member of the Panel.

3. I am sending copies of this minute to Mr. Walden and Mr. Norbury.

[Signature]

(D. J. Wright)

22nd February 1980

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

NUCLEAR ADVISORY PANEL

The Prime Minister has seen your minute AO1433 of 15 February 1980 and, subject to the views of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence, is content with the Nuclear Advisory Panel's recommendations, as summarised in paragraphs 5 and 6 of your minute.

On a point of detail, the Prime Minister has asked whether it is not the case that South Africa has access to lithium and tritium. I should be grateful if you could let me know what the answer to the Prime Minister's question is.

I am sending copies of this minute to Mr. Walden and Mr. Norbury.

*KW.*

18 February 1980

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PRIME MINISTER

Nuclear Advisory Panel

In May of last year, Sir John Hunt informed you about the Nuclear Advisory Panel which had been set up by the previous Administration. In July he submitted (his minute A09972 of 13th July 1979) the Panel's responses to two key questions which you will recall as having particular significance in the context of the Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations. The Panel subsequently moved on to the third question in the list referred to them by Ministers, for advice. This was the question they were discussing when you went to one of their meetings last autumn, and it is their response to this one that I now submit.

2. The question relates to the implications of Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) research for the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology.

3. The Panel concludes that, while ICF research is neither necessary nor sufficient for the development of nuclear weapons technology, ICF research is likely to enable scientists engaged in it to understand the principles of making and assembling thermonuclear weapons. They would be assisted in this by disclosures already published in the United States about how thermonuclear weapons are made. If a country wanted to make a thermonuclear explosion which would have political implications - by demonstrating capacity to make an H-bomb - it would not necessarily first need to conduct an A-bomb test; if it wanted to use such an H-bomb against an enemy, it would then need to develop a delivery system and test the functioning of the weapon. In either case it would have to acquire not only the necessary fissile material but also essential supplies of lithium and tritium; the fact that it was seeking to do so would probably become known to Anglo-American intelligence (and no doubt to Soviet intelligence).

4. Countries that could thus be in a position to develop thermonuclear weapons technology as a result of ICF research in the next three to ten years include Germany and Japan; and possibly India, Israel and South Africa.

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Prime Minister.  
Content, subject to the views  
of whomever, to accept the Panel's  
recommendations, including the  
proposed conversations with the  
United States?  
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Hasnt S. Minister  
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5. The Panel recommends that there should be no attempt to control ICF research or publications as such - any attempt to do which is likely to be ineffective - but that weapons research laboratories should be decoupled from "open" laboratory research by strict controls on the release of information from weapons research laboratories and the maintenance of vetting controls on research workers who transfer from weapons research to an open laboratory.

6. The Panel recommends, however, that we should not act unilaterally but should first discuss these proposals with the United States. If these proposals were to be adopted, we should not need to sustain our objections to the extension of ICF research on an "open" basis in the European Community.

7. In forwarding their response to me Lord Penney, as Chairman of the Panel, has again commented on the difficulty posed by the overlap of "closed" and "open" science in this particular question. You may recall that he made the same point when you joined their discussion of the subject.

8. As with the previous submission, I am sending copies of this minute and its attachment to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence.

  
RtA

(Robert Armstrong)

15th February 1980

Questions referred to Panel

- (a) What implications does Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) research have for the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology?
  - (b) What steps does the Panel consider should be taken to minimise possible dangers?
- 

The Panel's answer to Question (a) is given in the Appendix to the following Recommendations. The answer to Question (b) is given in the recommendations.

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Recommendations

The UK should not, at this stage, act unilaterally but should first discuss with the US on the following lines:

- (i) As a result of disclosures already made, relevant to nuclear weapon concepts, national policies in respect of ICF research in non-weapon laboratories should now be reviewed.
- (ii) Rather than attempt to control or inhibit ICF research or publications of such, through guidance of the kind we currently exercise at the Rutherford Laboratory, we should argue that there are advantages in allowing research workers in such 'open' or non-weapon laboratories to pursue programmes freely and publish as they wish. This course would avoid indicating areas of weapon interest, stimulating very able scientists' curiosity and would seem no more dangerous in its result than the present situation.

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- (iii) At the same time research workers in weapons laboratories should continue to accept the rigours of restraint appropriate to a weapons laboratory subject to the Official Secrets Act. From such sources there should not emerge any confirmation, denial or other authoritative comment on weapon-related information published or leaked from any other research centre.
- (iv) Particular vetting and security considerations which have always arisen wherever a research worker engaged in weapon research has transferred to research in an 'open' laboratory, should remain unchanged for research workers in the ICF field.
- (v) If it were agreed to decouple 'open' laboratory research and weapon research laboratories as suggested then the efficacy of attempting to deny export of equipment for ICF research should be re-examined.
- (vi) If these various points were agreed the possible need for changes in the broad ICF classification guide already adopted by US, UK and France should be examined, and also the possible need for a 'classified' classification guide for use by weapons laboratories in each of the Nuclear Weapon States. The United States may well say that the present system is the best for them; or they may have some proposals. If the United States were willing to accept our ideas, they should be asked how other states, particularly the weapons states, should be invited to adopt the same or similar practices. If progress could be made, we would have solved the problem that recently arose

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between France and ourselves on the one hand and other members of the EEC on the other. The latter, contrary to our views, were then seeking to extend the current Community programme in ICF research on an essentially 'open' basis.

24 January 1980

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Introduction

The basic science of Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) has similarities with some of the basic science of fission weapons and thermonuclear weapons. They all use implosive compression. For nuclear weapons laboratories, ICF offers great advantages not only through improvements in computer programme development and in study of the behaviour of materials under temperature and pressure conditions arising in thermonuclear warheads, but also in facilitating recruitment of able young scientists. Additionally, the equipment and the experiments used in ICF could be modified to permit 'micro' experiments exploring nuclear weapon ideas and leading to very small nuclear explosions with a yield up to a few tons of TNT equivalent. This possibility would obviously grow in importance in the event of an internationally accepted comprehensive test ban (CTBT), since such small explosions could not be detected by CTBT monitoring and ICF research is in no way denied under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is already well recognised in the deployment of very high powered equipment (Nova Shiva) and studies in the US Livermore (Weapons) Laboratory.

On the other hand, to those working on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, ICF is seen as the early stages of a route which leads to the possibility of obtaining useful energy from fusion processes in light elements. All Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) have found it difficult to control the diffusion of weapons-related information to open ICF work. In any case, ICF researchers in non-weapons laboratories are certainly capable of re-inventing ideas already well developed in weapon laboratories.

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Assessment of Present Situation

The Panel believes that, while ICF research is neither necessary nor sufficient for the development of nuclear weapons technology, ideas currently incubating in, for example, the Science Research Council's ICF group at the Rutherford Laboratory will lead scientists there within a few years from now, if it has not already happened, to understand the principles of the parts of a thermonuclear explosive assembly, how the parts are arranged with respect to each other and broadly how the assembly works. A similar situation applies in Japan, Germany, France and much more so in the United States. Indeed, US open publications in the scientific literature and in some newspaper articles have already placed some scientists in a position to discern ideas which have previously been held as sensitive nuclear weapons information.

The Panel suspects that information about some of the scientific principles of the design of thermonuclear weapons is now diffusing around the scientific centres in many countries. Because of this, plus earlier special information released about atomic weapons and coupled with the fact that the constant advances in science and technology generally have removed many of the earlier difficulties in weapons developments, the Panel considers that several of the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) have the technological ability and the technological resources required to embark successfully on the making of a conservatively designed thermonuclear explosive device without the necessity of having a single atomic test, assuming a perceived national interest in doing so. They recognise, however, that any such state would have to make or obtain the necessary fission and fusion materials and that there would be a high probability of this action becoming known to the other States. The Panel also recognises that a NNWS wishing to build military deliverable

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thermonuclear weapons, as distinct from a thermonuclear explosive 'device' possibly for political impact only, would be under extreme pressure to check functional and operational aspects by carrying out some nuclear weapon tests.

To make a thermonuclear device (without any nuclear tests) the Panel considers that a very advanced technological state, with an already well developed nuclear power programme, might require little more than about three years. A state with good but not outstanding technological resources and only limited nuclear power facilities might require as long as about ten years. The Panel does not think it would be possible for a terrorist group to make a thermonuclear device, not least because of the need to acquire fusion material which is not found in civil nuclear power programmes. It may be found in small quantities in research programmes or in large quantities in military programmes where it would be very closely guarded. In any case the design and fabrication of several of the components would not be within the capability of a terrorist group, even if they were disposed to forego their more readily available options.

The Panel believes that as a result of some recent disclosures in nuclear weapon and ICF concepts, the perceptions or countries could have changed in respect of possible thermonuclear weapon development. They accept that the number of countries whose perceptions may have so changed is probably very limited.

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NUCLEAR ADVISORY PANEL

QUESTIONS REFERRED BY MINISTERS FOR THE PANEL'S ADVICE

QUESTION (i)

- (a) Against the background of present Western (not only British) warhead technology, what ageing faults are likely to arise in a stockpile of nuclear weapons over successive 3 year periods?
- (b) Which of these would be expected to be amenable to rectification without subsequent nuclear testing of whole weapon operation?
- (c) Which might require subsequent nuclear testing to re-establish confidence in reliability of whole weapon operation?

QUESTION (ii)

- (a) What are the Panel's views on the level of nuclear weapon expertise to be maintained, so long as a nuclear weapon stockpile is retained?
- (b) What scope of experimental nuclear warhead related work would the Panel consider necessary to maintain this level - bearing in mind that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) could prohibit all nuclear weapon tests, but clearly could not ban all nuclear reactions?

QUESTION (iii)

- (a) What implications does Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) research have for the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology?
- (b) What steps does the Panel consider should be taken to minimise possible dangers?

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QUESTION (iv)

- (a) What scope does the Panel see for possible evasion of compliance with a CTBT under the current limits of detection and verification?
- (b) What minimum threshold level of verification does the Panel consider would ensure that any Party testing below that level would not acquire a unilateral advantage of military significance?

QUESTION (v)

What implications does the Panel see for the UK if there were to be 'cut-off' in the production of fissile material for weapon purposes?

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 14 OF 3 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, PEKING,  
UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK (FOR DS17 AND DUSP)

*mb*

SALT II RATIFICATION

1. IN A FRONT PAGE ARTICLE IN TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES, BERNARD GWERTZMAN REPORTS PRESIDENT CARTER'S DECISION ON 2 JANUARY TO ASK THE SENATE TO DELAY CONSIDERATION OF THE SALT II TREATY FOLLOWING RECENT EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN. WHITE HOUSE SOURCES ARE QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE PRESIDENT REMAINED CONVINCED THAT SALT II WAS IN THE US NATIONAL INTEREST AND HAD NOT BEEN SIGNED AS A FAVOUR TO THE RUSSIANS. BUT BECAUSE OF THE IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN, THE QUESTION OF THE TIMING OF THE SENATE DEBATE WAS NOW UNDER DISCUSSION WITH SENATE LEADERSHIP. THE ARTICLE SAYS THAT WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS WERE TELLING SENATORS THAT THE PRESIDENT DID NOT CONSIDER THIS A PROPITIOUS TIME TO TAKE UP THE TREATY. SENATOR CHURCH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, IS REPORTED AS SAYING THAT HE INTERPRETS THE PRESIDENT'S ACTION AS MEANING THAT HE QUOTE DOES NOT INTEND TO WITHDRAW THE TREATY, BUT TO LEAVE IT ON THE SENATE CALENDAR PENDING A MORE PROPITIOUS TIME UNQUOTE. PRIVATELY SENATE LEADERS AND THE WHITE HOUSE ARE SAID TO AGREE THAT PASSAGE OF THE TREATY IS IMPOSSIBLE IN THE CURRENT ATMOSPHERE.

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE CONFIRMED TO US THAT THIS ARTICLE IS ACCURATE, AND THAT AS OF NOW THERE IS NO TIMETABLE FOR THE SALT II FLOOR DEBATE. WORK IS NOW BEING PUT IN HAND WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION TO ANALYSE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS SITUATION FOR THE SALT I INTERIM AGREEMENT, WHOSE PROVISIONS HAVE BEEN OBSERVED ON A DE FACTO (LAST TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) BASIS SINCE IT EXPIRED ON 3 OCTOBER 1977, AND FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PROGRAMMES.

HENDERSON

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MR.P.H-MOBERLY

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Subject filed in USA  
Nov 79: visit to US Policy

Extract from Record of Meeting between PM  
and President Carter, Washington, 17.12.79 (14)

Defence

The Prime Minister asked whether the Soviet Union was still expanding its military capacity. The President said that the Soviet Union next year would be spending 13% of its GDP on defence. The American figure was nearer 5%. After the Prime Minister had said that Britain would be going up to about 5.5%, the President commented that he found it less difficult now than two or three years previously to adopt a strong military posture. There was public support for such a policy and less and less disparity between the line advocated by the administration and by Congress. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary noted that the decision to deploy GCLMS had caused no difficulty. The Prime Minister said that the only difficulty on defence in the UK lay within the Labour Party. She said that the American Government were being very generous in providing the GCLMS and thereby helping the UK to defend itself.

The President said that he had been very pleased about the Alliance decision on TNF modernisation. It was a pity that it had been impossible to secure a unanimous decision. But the Belgian position, at least, was reasonably firm. His own conviction, based by now on a great deal of experience, was that one must negotiate with the Russians from a position of strength. The only consequence of negotiating from weakness was that Soviet demands increased.

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/ The President

The President thanked the Prime Minister for the help the British Government had given on SALT II. The Prime Minister asked about the timing of the ratification debate. The President said that Congress was bogged down on a number of very challenging pieces of legislation. He expected to get the SALT treaty on the floor of the Senate in the New Year and that five or six weeks of debate would follow. The issue was still in doubt. He himself thought that the treaty would be ratified but whatever the outcome, it would be March or April before a decision was reached. Mr. Vance said that he thought it might be possible to complete the process by the end of February.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that there would be a timing difficulty if ratification was delayed until March or April. The weaker brethren in NATO, who attached importance to the arms control side of the TNF modernisation agreement, would be upset. It might be necessary to set up an informal internal group. This would be much worse than putting the matter into SALT III. The President described the efforts he was putting in to getting progress. He had been meeting two Senators a day for some time to talk about the problems. But support for SALT was not as strong as it had been. The discovery of a Soviet brigade in Cuba had set matters back for several weeks. However there was now a good chance that Messrs. Kissinger and Ford would rally to support of the treaty. The President said that he had a genuine concern that if the SALT II was not ratified there might be a strong move in Europe towards neutralisation. Recognition of this was affecting the mood of the Senate. Moreover the rumours that Great Britain was not in favour of SALT had been disproved. It would of course be useful if the Prime Minister could make the strongest statement possible in favour of ratification. The Prime Minister said that she had already done this. She had assumed that ratification would take place. The President said that he hoped she was right. But the SALT decision was still in the balance.

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Subject filed in USA <sup>7</sup>  
Nov 79 Visit to US Policy

Extract from Record of Meeting between PM  
and President Carter, Washington, 17.12.79 (Pt 4)

Comprehensive Test Ban

The President asked whether there was any flexibility in the British position on acceptance of National Seismic Stations (NSS) in the context of the Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations. The

Prime Minister said that we could only afford to accept one NSS. If this was an insuperable difficulty, Britain was prepared to withdraw from the negotiations. The President said that he had talked to President Brezhnev in Vienna. Mr. Brezhnev had made it clear that he would object to Britain's withdrawal. The President, for his part, had told President Brezhnev, that it would be impossible for Britain to accept ten NSS. The President asked whether it would be possible for the Prime Minister either to agree to the deployment of four NSS on British territory or to try to induce the Soviet Union to agree to Britain's withdrawal from the talks. The United States would be prepared to help with the costs of the additional NSS. Both the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that four NSS would be out of the question. The Prime Minister added that the United Kingdom had no wish to withdraw from the talks unless our continued presence at them was embarrassing. The President denied there was any question of embarrassment. He enquired about the cost of a NSS and on being told by Mr. Vance that it was about five million dollars per station made it clear that this was not a significant sum.

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*Prime Minister*

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 641 OF 07/12/79

INFO PRIORITY MODUK DS 17 ROUTINE WASHINGTON MOSCOW UKDIS GENEVA IN  
NEW YORK

INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO

*mb*

11.12

MIPT COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS  
FROM EDMONDS CTB DELEGATION

1. I DO NOT THINK THAT IT IS IN BRITISH INTERESTS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS TO REMAIN FOCUSED ON THE NUMBER OF NSS IN UK TERRITORY. THROUGHOUT 1979, THIS HAS BEEN THE MAIN SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION AND USUALLY THE ONLY ISSUE ON WHICH ALL THREE DELEGATIONS HAVE HAD RECENT INSTRUCTIONS.
2. IF THE PRESENT STALEMATE CONTINUES IN 1980, THE RUSSIANS COULD BE TEMPTED TO BREAK RANKS AND MOUNT A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN DESIGNED TO SHOW THAT THE US AND UK WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR FAILURE TO MAKE PROGRESS WITH A CTB. THIS COULD BE COMBINED WITH A REVIVED SOVIET CALL FOR A MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS PENDING AGREEMENT ON A TREATY. THE OBVIOUS DANGER FOR THE UK IS THAT OUR POSITION ON NSS WOULD BE PRESENTED AS THE MAIN OBSTACLE.
3. THE AMERICANS HAVE NOT RENEWED THEIR PRESSURE ON US TO INCREASE OUR OFFER OF NSS ON UK TERRITORY. THIS COULD BE EXPLAINED BY INCREASING RECOGNITION THAT OUR TECHNICAL CASE AGAINST MORE NSS IS VERY SOUND, BUT MORE IMPORTANT BY THEIR NOT BEING READY TO ACCELERATE THE NEGOTIATIONS IN ANY CASE, PRIMARILY DUE TO THE UNCERTAINTY OVER SALT II.
4. HITHERTO WE HAVE CONSIDERED TWO BROAD OPTIONS FOR A POSSIBLE CHANGE IN OUR POSITION ON THE NUMBER OF NSS ON UK TERRITORY. ONE IS TO INCREASE OUR OFFER. WE AND THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THE RUSSIANS

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ARE READY TO ACCEPT LESS THAN 13. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE ADDITION OF TWO NSS IN SELECTED UK DEPENDENT TERRITORIES WOULD BE ENOUGH TO SAVE SOVIET FACE BY AVOIDING THE APPEARANCE OF THEIR TOTAL SURRENDER, BUT WE HAVE NO MEANS OF KNOWING. THE OTHER OPTION IS TO OFFER TO WITHDRAW FROM THE SVA ALTOGETHER. I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE IN BRITISH OR AMERICAN INTERESTS, MAINLY BECAUSE IT WOULD IMPERIL OUR MAIN OBJECTIVE OF GETTING 13 NSS IN THE USSR BY PRESENTING THE RUSSIANS WITH A VERY STRONG CASE FOR SAYING THAT THE WHOLE CONCEPT OF A SVA ( AND ESPECIALLY NSS ) IS UNNECESSARY FOR A THREE-YEAR TREATY AND A WASTE OF TIME.

5. I THEREFORE SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD STICK TO OUR PRESENT POSITION AND ONLY CONSIDER ANY CHANGE IF THE AMERICANS RENEW THEIR PRESSURE ON US. IN ANY CASE AGREEMENT ON THE NUMBER OF UK NSS WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH TO RESTORE MOMENTUM. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT A HIGH LEVEL ANGLO/AMERICAN REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE VERY DESIRABLE BEFORE WE RESUME ON 4 FEBRUARY. IT WOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE CLEAR OUR INTEREST IN GETTING ON WITH ALL THE OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES, MANY OF WHICH ARE FAR MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE NUMBER OF NSS ON UK TERRITORY. WE WOULD REVIEW WITH THE AMERICANS HOW TO HANDLE THE CTB NEGOTIATIONS IN 1980 (WHATEVER THE FATE OF SALTII) AND CONSIDER PARTICULAR OUTSTANDING ISSUES. THESE INCLUDE : THE ROLE OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE (GOVERNING THE FUTURE OF THE TREATY AFTER THREE YEARS); HOW TO DEAL WITH VERY SMALL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS (PERMITTED EXPERIMENTS); AND EVEN THE TITLE AND PREAMBLE OF THE TREATY. WE COULD ALSO ASK THEM WHETHER THEY ENVISAGE ANY CHANGES TO THEIR PRESENT FIRM VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.

6. ONCE WE ARE CONFIDENT OF US INTENTIONS, THE TWO OF US WOULD THEN BE MUCH BETTER PLACED TO PRESS THE RUSSIANS TO STOP ARGUING ABOUT NSS ON UK TERRITORY AND GET ON WITH NEGOTIATING OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES. THERE WOULD STILL BE NO PROSPECT OF A CTB TREATY BEING

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SIGNED , LET ALONE RATIFIED, IN 1980. BUT AT LEAST WE COULD CLAIM TO BE MAKING REALLY SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS TOWARDS TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT AND BE ABLE TO GIVE THE REST OF THE WORLD MUCH MORE CONCRETE EVIDENCE THAT A TEXT BAN TREATY COULD BE EXPECTED IN THE REASONABLE NEAR FUTURE.

FCO PASS SAVING TO UKDEL NATO

MACINNES

## FILES

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FM UKNIS GENEVA 071450Z DEC 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 640 OF 07 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DS 17), ROUTINE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDIS  
GENEVA IN NEW YORK.

INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO,

*Prime Minister*

*11.12.*

*amb*

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS: SITUATION REPORT  
FROM EDMONDS CTB DELEGATION

1. YOU MAY LIKE TO HAVE MY MAIN IMPRESSIONS OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. SOME SUGGESTIONS ON HOW BRITISH INTERESTS MIGHT BEST BE PURSUED ARE IN MIFT.
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
3. US SUPPORT FOR ONLY ONE NSS IN THE UK HAS BEEN MUCH MORE SOLID THAN IN PREVIOUS ROUNDS. IT SURVIVED SOME INDICATIONS TO US AND THE RUSSIANS THAT IT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE PERMANENT, AND ALSO A PLAN TO SOFTEN IT TO MEET EXPECTED INDICATIONS OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY WHICH DID NOT MATERIALISE.
4. THE SOVIET POSITION IN THE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS HAS GENERALLY BEEN ONE OF TSTUBBORN INERTIA. THEY RECOGNISE THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF THE UNCERTAIN FATE OF SALT II IN THE US SENATE, BUT THEY ALSO EVIDENTLY JUDGE THAT IT IS HIGHLY IMPROBABLE THAT THE PRESENT US ADMINISTRATION COULD CONTEMPLATE SUBMITTING A CTB TREATY TO THE SENATE IN 1980, EVEN IF THE USSR ACCEPTED EVERY IMPORTANT US/UK REQUIREMENT NOW. THIS LEADS THEM TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS AT PRESENT NO INCENTIVE FOR SOVIET CONCESSIONS.

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5. HOWEVER, SINCE PETROSSYANTS (SOVIET LEADER) RETURNED IN LATE NOVEMBER FROM THREE WEEKS IN MOSCOW, HE HAS SHOWN INCREASING SIGNS OF IMPATIENCE WITH THE STALEMATE, WHICH HE OF COURSE ATTRIBUTES TO UK REFUSAL TO COMPROMISE OVER THE NUMBER OF NSS AND GENERAL US AND UK UNWILLINGNESS TO GET ON WITH NEGOTIATING A TREATY. HE HAS PROBED YORK (US LEADER) AND ME ABOUT TWO POSSIBLE NEW APPROACHES. FIRST, WHILE DISCLAIMING ANY SOVIET INTEREST, HE EXPRESSED CURIOSITY ABOUT POSSIBLE US AND UK INTEREST IN A LOW THRESHOLD TREATY. YORK AND I EMPHASISED THAT THIS WAS NEITHER US NOR UK POLICY.

6. MORE INSISTENTLY AND EXPLICITLY, PETROSSYANTS HAS ADVOCATED A TWO-STAGE CTB, APPARENTLY ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

- A. THE THREE GOVERNMENTS WOULD NEGOTIATE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE A THREE-YEAR MULTILATERAL TREATY, WITH A PROTOCOL COVERING PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS AND A SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT (SVA) PROVIDING FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION AND A JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, BUT NO NSS.
- B. WE WOULD CONTINUE TO DISCUSS NSS WITH A VIEW TO THEIR INTRODUCTION IN THE SECOND STAGE - IE IF THERE WERE A FURTHER TEST BAN AFTER THE INITIAL THREE YEARS.

7. PETROSSYANTS DESCRIBED THIS AS A QUOTE NEW IDEA UNQUOTE WHICH HE WAS ADVOCATING ON A PERSONAL BASIS, BUT WHICH HE THOUGHT ALL THREE GOVERNMENTS SHOULD CONSIDER. YORK AND I SAID WE WOULD REPORT THIS BUT LEFT HIM IN NO DOUBT THAT OUR REQUIREMENT WAS FOR 10 NSS OPERATING IN THE SOVIET UNION DURING THE THIRD YEAR OF THE TREATY.

8. THIS SOVIET IMPATIENCE AND INTEREST IN QUOTE NEW IDEAS UNQUOTE ARE LINKED TO SOME LEGITIMATE REASONS FOR GETTING A MOVE ON. ALL THREE GOVERNMENTS ARE PUBLICLY COMMITTED TO A CTB TREATY AND WE HAVE NOW BEEN AT IT FOR 2 1/2 YEARS. THERE ARE INCREASING SIGNS OF IMPATIENCE ON THE PART OF MANY OTHER GOVERNMENTS, REFLECTED IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND LIKELY TO BE STILL MORE EVIDENT IN THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT AND ESPECIALLY AT THE

/NPT

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NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE IN AUGUST 1982. THIS MUST BE SOME HANDICAP  
OUR EFFORTS TO DISCOURAGE SUCH AS PAKISTAN , INDIA AND SOUTH AFRICA  
FROM DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

9. I HAVE DISCUSSED THESE IMPRESSIONS WITH THE DEPUTY LEADER  
OF THE US DELEGATION, IN YOGK'S ABSENCE , AND HE AGREES.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO UKDEL NATO.

MACINNES

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

## FILES

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FM WASHINGTON 022347Z NOV 79

TO ROUTINE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3525 OF 2 NOVEMBER 1979,

INFO ROUTINE MODUK (DS17), UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, ROME, HAVANA.

MY TELNO 3406: SALT II HEARINGS

Prime Minister  
md

5.11.

1. THE TREATY IS STILL UNSCATHED AFTER THE THIRD WEEK OF MARK-UP IN THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, BUT THE TIMETABLE FOR FLOOR DEBATE CONTINUES TO SLIP. IT IS NOW GENERALLY AGREED THAT MARK-UP SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK, BUT FLOOR DEBATE BEFORE THANKSGIVING (22 NOVEMBER) SEEMS LESS AND LESS LIKELY. THE PROSPECT FOR A FINAL VOTE BY THE SENATE ON THE TREATY BEFORE THE N A T O MINISTERIAL MEETING IN MID-DECEMBER IS DETERIORATING (MYTEL NO 3431, NOT TO ALL).

2. THE COMMITTEE THIS WEEK APPROVED UNANIMOUSLY:

A. A PROPOSAL BY SENATOR GLENN TO SEEK GREATER CO-OPERATION FROM THE RUSSIANS DURING SALT III ON MONITORING AND GREATER ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT;

B. A MCGOVERN DECLARATION INSTRUCTING THE U S TO SEEK "SIGNIFICANT AND SUBSTANTIAL" REDUCTIONS IN SALT III;

C. AN INSTRUCTION TO THE ADMINISTRATION THAT THE PROTOCOL COULD NOT BE EXTENDED BEYOND 1981 WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF TWO THIRDS OF THE SENATE, NOR THE TREATY BEYOND 1985 WITHOUT A SIMILAR VOTE, AND

D. A PROPOSAL THAT THE LIMITS IN THE PROTOCOL ON MX AND CRUISE MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS SHOULD SET NO PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

THERE WAS ALSO OVERWHELMING SUPPORT FOR A COMPROMISE PROPOSAL BY SENATOR BAKER TO COMMUNICATE TO THE RUSSIANS, WITHOUT SEEKING THEIR ASSENT, THE U S INTENTION TO CONSTRUCT A BASING SYSTEM FOR THE MX COMPATIBLE WITH THE TREATY.

3. TODAY THE COMMITTEE VOTED BY 13 TO 2 TO MAKE FINAL APPROVAL OF THE TREATY CONDITIONAL ON AN AFFIRMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT SOVIET FORCES ARE NOT ENGAGED IN A COMBAT ROLE IN CUBA AND WILL NOT BECOME A THREAT TO ANY COUNTRY IN THE CARIBBEAN OR ELSEWHERE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. ON BEHALF OF THE WHITE HOUSE LLOYD CUTLER SAID THE ADMINISTRATION DID NOT OBJECT TO THIS UNDERSTANDING AND THAT THE PRESIDENT COULD MEET ITS REQUIREMENTS BECAUSE OF ASSURANCES FROM MOSCOW, CONTINUING INCREASED U S SURVEILLANCE OF CUBA, AND

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RECENT U S COUNTER MEASURES AGAINST A CUBAN THREAT TO ANY OTHER COUNTRY. (THIS FOLLOWS A STATEMENT BY VANCE ON 31 OCTOBER THAT CHANGES IN SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS IN CUBA WERE "NOT UNPLEASANT"). THE COMMITTEE ALSO ADOPTED AN UNDERSTANDING INCORPORATING THE U S STATEMENT TO N A T O OF 29 JUNE ON THEATRE SYSTEMS. (OUR TELNO 1855).

4. IN POLITICAL MANOEUVRING OVER S A L T, THE ADMINISTRATION WILL HAVE BEEN CHEERED BY THE MORE POSITIVE NOISES COMING FROM MCGOVERN AND GLENN THIS WEEK, BUT DISAPPOINTED (THOUGH NOT SURPRISED) BY BAKER'S EXPLICIT CONFIRMATION THAT HE WILL VOTE AGAINST THE TREATY. IN FORMALLY ANNOUNCING YESTERDAY HIS CANDIDACY FOR THE REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION, BAKER LINKED HIS BID WITH THE SUCCESS OF HIS ANTI-S A L T FIGHT AND INVITED THE ELECTORATE TO JUDGE HIS LEADERSHIP CAPABILITIES BY HIS EFFORT TO DEFEAT THE TREATY.

5. IN A MAJOR SPEECH TODAY SENATOR NUNN REAFFIRMED HIS DEMAND FOR ANNUAL REAL INCREASES OF 5 PERCENT IN DEFENCE SPENDING BETWEEN 1981 AND 1985 (SEE MY TELNO 3503 - NOT TO ALL- ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS AREA), MADE MORE SPECIFIC HIS CRITERIA FOR AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE FROM THE ADMINISTRATION, AND WARNED THE ALLIES AND JAPAN THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO DO MORE FOR THEIR OWN DEFENCE.

HENDERSON.

FILES

DEF. D

ACDD

EESD

NAMD

NED

PUSD

PS

PS/SIR I GILHOUE

PS/MR HURD

PS/MR AIDLEY

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

SIR A PARSONS

MR GULLARD

MR P. MOGLBY

MR FERGUSON

ADDITIONAL DIST:

SALT

*John ce original filed on 5*

*Germany June 79*

RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR IN THE FEDERAL CHANCELLERY, BONN, AT 1115 ON WEDNESDAY 31 OCTOBER 1979

*PM's meetings with Chancellor Schmidt in Germany.*

Present:

Prime Minister  
Mr. C.A. Whitmore

Chancellor Schmidt  
Dr. Jurgen Ruhfus

\* \* \* \* \*

The International Situation

Chancellor Schmidt said that he was doubtful whether the United States would be able to provide the Alliance with the necessary leadership over the next 12 months. The Soviet Union would be as aware as the NATO allies of the predominance of American domestic issues in the period preceding the Presidential election. When he had spoken to President Carter the previous day, the President had said that the prospects for ratification of SALT II were difficult and he had said no more than that he hoped ratification would take place by Christmas. When the Prime Minister said that she thought that the President's handling of the recent crisis with the Soviet Union over the stationing of Soviet combat troupes in Cuba had been bad, Chancellor Schmidt agreed and said that he should have either ignored the presence of Soviet troupes or made much more of it. As it was, the President had blown hot and cold, and his crisis management had been poor. But the Alliance might well have to learn to live with this, for in his view President Carter had a better than evens chance of being re-elected. He thought that Senator Kennedy's past would prevent him from getting the Democratic nomination, and he did not believe that any of the Republican candidates was a really convincing runner for the Presidency. But President Carter's chances turned on the ratification of SALT II. He believed that President Carter might well be destroyed electorally if he failed to get the Treaty ratified. There were things about the Treaty which he did not like.

/He thought that

*Defense:*



He thought that the Americans had blundered over the non-circumvention clause and the Protocol, for they had received nothing in exchange for these concessions. It was essential that the Protocol was not extended, and he believed that the non-circumvention clause required an official statement of interpretation by the Americans. The Prime Minister said that such a statement existed, but it seemed to her that its language went flatly in the face of the Treaty language. The United Kingdom needed American help with the replacement of Polaris. There were certain things which technically we could do ourselves but which it would be immensely cheaper to do with American help.

Chancellor Schmidt said that looking ahead, he saw as the worst-case situation for the Alliance as one where there was a failure to ratify SALT II and President Carter was re-elected. If this combination of events came about, American leadership of the Alliance would no longer be credible. At the same time the leadership of the Soviet Union would almost certainly be changing. President Brezhnev was obviously very ill, and there were no settled procedures, as far as he could see, for determining the succession. There was likely to be a rough period if the Soviet leadership sought to replace him while he was still alive or even to regulate the succession. Given President Brezhnev's state of health, other leaders must already be taking certain decisions, but it was difficult to know who they were and who would actually come to the top eventually. But he thought that a new leadership would have to build up its authority not only within the Soviet Union and its loyal allies but also with countries like Rumania and Yugoslavia they would have to try to appear tough and self assured. If, at the same time, they were faced with a weak leadership in NATO, this could make them unduly self confident. We could thus rapidly find ourselves in a crisis of "the world's equilibrium system". Indeed he thought that we were already in the early stages of such a development. This raised the question

/whether the

whether the European allies would be steady and perceptive enough to provide some cooperative leadership in those fields where it was lacking most. This concerned not only subjects like the East West balance in strategic and longer range Theatre Nuclear Weapons but also the Middle East and energy. The dependence of the West on Middle East oil was extremely dangerous, and if the supply was seriously disrupted, although the United States might somehow muddle through on the basis of a crash programme to develop their own resources, Germany, Italy and France would be in the gravest difficulties, not short of the collapse of their political and economic systems. The United Kingdom, with its North Sea oil, would be better placed but even so, would be bound to be affected. This was the crisis which he most feared might confront a West without leadership. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, could survive the interruption of oil supplies from the Middle East better than any country apart from the United Kingdom. If this crisis occurred, it would be of the utmost importance that France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic and other Western European countries found ways of living with each other and cooperating on a much more extensive basis than now, and this would require total mutual confidence.

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WASHINGTON 242245Z OCT 79  
 TO ROUTINE FCO  
 TEL NO 3361 OF 24 OCTOBER 1979  
 INFO UKDEL NATO, MODUK (DS17)  
 INFO SAVING MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN.

SENATOR NUNN AND SALT II.

1. IN A PUBLIC SPEECH ON 22 OCTOBER, REPORTED IN TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES, SENATOR NUNN STATED THAT ATTEMPTS BY THE ADMINISTRATION AND ALLIED GOVERNMENTS TO LINK SENATE APPROVAL OF SALT WITH THE TNF MODERNISATION DECISION COULD QUOTE SHAKE THE VERY FOUNDATION OF THE ALLIANCE UNQUOTE (TEXT BY BAG).
2. IN A SUBSEQUENT INTERVIEW WITH RECHARD BURT, NUNN STRONGLY CRITICISED STATEMENTS BY CARTER AND US OFFICIALS THAT A FAILURE TO RATIFY THE TREATY WOULD LEAD TO A POLITICAL CRISIS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, AND HE REJECTED CLAIMS THAT THE ALLIES MIGHT REFUSE TO GO ALONG WITH MODERNISATION IF THE SENATE FAILED TO APPROVE SALT. QUOTE IF THE EUROPEANS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR OWN SECURITY, THE MODERNISATION OF THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES WILL GO ON REGARDLESS OF WHAT HAPPENS TO THE SALT TREATY UNQUOTE. HE ADDED THAT FAILURE OF THE ALLIANCE TO APPROVE THE US PLAN TO MODERNISE TNF COULD LEAD TO A REVIEW OF THE AMERICAN ROLE IN NATO.
3. THESE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT SO FAR BEEN GIVEN MUCH PUBLICITY.

FCO PASS SAVING TO MOSCOW, PARIS AND BONN.

HENDERSON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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NAD	SIR A DUFF
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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NO 3104 OF 10 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA (FOR CTB DEL), ROUTINE MOSCOW,  
MODUK (DS17).

MIPT.

CTB.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT

BEGINS

US/UK RESPONSE TO ANTICIPATED SOVIET MOVEMENT IN THE CTB  
NEGOTIATIONS

SOVIET READINESS TO GET DOWN TO SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF NSS TECHNICAL  
ISSUES WITHOUT PRIOR RESOLUTION OF THE "BRITISH QUESTION"  
FULFILLS A LONG-STANDING US AND UK OBJECTIVE. SINCE WE HAVE LONG  
WANTED TO PROCEED WITH SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS ON NSS TECHNICAL  
CHARACTERISTICS AS OUR FIRST PRIORITY, WE THINK THE US AND UK SHOULD  
NOW CONCENTRATE ON THIS IN GENEVA. WE SHOULD SEND OUR TECHNICAL  
EXPERTS TO GENEVA BY MID-OCTOBER.

AS FOR THE NSS QUESTION, OUR DELEGATION WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT IN  
GENEVA THE BRITISH POSITION OF ONE NSS, AS WE INDICATED TO YOU JUST  
BEFORE THE START OF THIS ROUND. OUR EFFORT NOW OUGHT TO BE FOCUSED  
ON TESTING THE SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON  
TECHNICAL NSS ISSUES AND GETTING THE SOVIETS TO EXTEND THE  
FLEXIBILITY THEY SAY THEY HAVE ALL THE WAY TO ACCEPTING THE UK  
POSITION. OF COURSE WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT IF WE CAN'T GET THE  
SOVIETS TO ACCEPT THE UK NSS POSITION, WE WILL BOTH WANT A SERIOUS  
REVIEW OF THIS ISSUE IN LONDON AND WASHINGTON AT AN APPROPRIATE  
POINT IN THE TALKS.

POINTS TO BE MADE TO SOVIETS

AS FAR AS HOW WE EACH MIGHT HANDLE THIS WITH THE SOVIETS IN GENEVA,  
WE THINK THAT -- TO MAXIMIZE OUR CHANCES FOR MOVING FORWARD NOW --  
THE US AND UK SHOULD: WELCOME SOVIET READINESS TO BEGIN SERIOUS  
DISCUSSION OF NSS TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS; AGREE WITH THE SOVIETS  
THAT THE HIGHEST PRIORITY SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO THIS; AND EXPRESS OUR  
DESIRE TO GET ON WITH IT PROMPTLY AND GET OUR TECHNICAL EXPERTS  
THERE BY MID-OCTOBER.

/WE COULD

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WE COULD WELCOME THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE DROPPED THEIR POSITION THAT THE UK SHOULD ACCEPT TEN STATIONS. WE WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE BRITISH POSITION ON NSS NUMBERS WAS MADE AFTER THE MOST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS. WE WOULD EXPRESS OUR EXPECTATION THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION WILL GIVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO THE SOUND ARGUMENTS UNDERLYING THE BRITISH POSITION WHICH WE FIRMLY SUPPORT AND RESOLVE THE QUESTION ON THIS BASIS.

INSTRUCTIONS TO GENEVA

WE ARE SENDING INSTRUCTIONS ALONG THESE LINES TO OUR DELEGATION IN GENEVA, AND TELLING THEM TO COORDINATE OUR RESPONSE WITH THE UK DELEGATION.

ENDS

HENDERSON

F I L E S

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FM WASHINGTON 102339Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NO 3103 OF 10 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA (FOR CTB DEL.) ROUTINE MOSCOW,  
MODUK (DS17)

*fa. [Signature]*  
(2 lils)

YOUR TELNO 232 TO UKMIS GENEVA. CTB.

1. BARTHOLOMEW (STATE DEPARTMENT) OUTLINED TO ROBINSON THIS EVENING THE US POSITION IN ANTICIPATION OF SOVIET MOVEMENT AT TOMORROW'S PLENARY. US POSITION IS SUMMARISED IN A "NON-PAPER" WHICH BARTHOLOMEW GAVE ROBINSON (TEXT IN MIFT) AND IS ON EXPECTED LINES (MY TELNO 3038.)

2. BARTHOLOMEW ADDED THAT IF PETROSYANTS DID NOT SPEAK AS EXPECTED ABOUT SOVIET READINESS TO NEGOTIATE ON "OTHER ISSUES" (WHICH IN PRACTICE WAS LIKELY TO MEAN OTHER NSS ISSUES), THE US WOULD WISH TO REMIND HIM BILATERALLY, AT LEAST, OF WHAT HE HAD ALREADY TOLD THE AMERICANS ON THIS POINT AND SEEK TO EXPLOIT IT.

HENDERSON

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*Mr Cartledge*  
*no 10 D st*

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FM UKMIS GENEVA 041800Z OCT

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 451 OF 4 OCTOBER 1979

INFO PRIORITY MODUK DS 17, WASHINGTON, ROUTINE MOSCOW.

*Prime Minister*  
*Paul*

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS : US/SOVIET DISCUSSIONS  
FROM EDMONDS CTB DELEGATION

1. YORK, LEADER OF US DELEGATION, AND MARCUM (NSC WASHINGTON) MET ME AND WARNER LAST NIGHT, IMMEDIATELY AFTER A LONG MEETING WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATION.
2. MARCUM SAID THE AMERICANS REGARDED GROMYKO'S STATEMENT TO VANCE IN NEW YORK (MY LETTER OF 2 OCTOBER TO PATRICK MOBERLY) AS A VERY SIGNIFICANT NEW DEVELOPMENT. GROMYKO HAD RAISED THE SUBJECT OF CTB AT THE END OF A LONG DISCUSSION ABOUT CUBA AND SALT ON 27 SEPTEMBER, THE DAY AFTER I HAD CONVEYED TO THE RUSSIANS OUR DECISION TO ACCEPT ONLY ONE NATIONAL SEISMIC STATION (NSS) ON UK TERRITORY.
3. BASING HIMSELF ON GROMYKO'S QUOTE FLEXIBILITY UNQUOTE, MARCUM HAD TOLD PETROSYANTS (USSR) THAT THE US WAS VERY CONCERNED BY THE LONG STALEMATE SINCE NOVEMBER 1978 AND IN PARTICULAR BY SOVIET INSISTENCE THAT NOTHING ELSE COULD BE DISCUSSED UNTIL THE NUMBER OF UK NSS HAD BEEN SETTLED. HE HAD REITERATED FULL US SUPPORT FOR THE PRESENT UK POSITION.
4. PETROSYANTS REPEATED GROMYKO'S ASSURANCE TO VANCE THAT THE USSR WAS READY TO BE FLEXIBLE. HE INTENDED TO SAY AT THE NEXT PLENARY MEETING (PROBABLY ABOUT 10 OCTOBER) THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NO LONGER INSIST ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL NUMBERS OF NSS AND WOULD BE READY TO START SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF OTHER NSS ISSUES. IN RETURN FOR THESE TWO IMPORTANT SOVIET QUOTE CONCESSIONS UNQUOTE, HE WOULD URGE THE UK AND UK TO SHOW SOME FLEXIBILITY OVER THE NUMBER OF UK NSS.
5. YORK AND MARCUM SAID THAT, IF PETROSYANTS SPOKE ON THESE LINES, THE US WOULD WELCOME IT AS A PROMISING DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERTAKE TO CONSIDER IT VERY CAREFULLY. THEY HOPED THE UK WOULD DO THE SAME.

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*16. I SAID*

6. I SAID THAT ALL THIS WAS VERY DIFFERENT FROM THE UK/US PLAN AGREED 19-21 SEPTEMBER. I REMINDED THEM OF THE FIRMNESS OF OUR POSITION AND THAT IT HAD BEEN ASSUMED IN LONDON THAT WE WOULD HAVE FULL US SUPPORT FOR SOME WEEKS AT LEAST. AFTER ONLY ONE TRIPARTITE MEETING, THE AMERICANS WERE ALREADY STARTING TO SHIFT THEIR GROUND. ON THE FACE OF IT, THE RUSSIANS WERE AT LAST PREPARED TO ABANDON QUOTE EQUAL NUMBERS UNQUOTE (10:10:10) AND TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES WITHOUT WAITING FOR ANY FURTHER UK MOVE. BUT IT WOULD VE ESSENTIAL TO WAIT AND SEE EXACTLY WHAT PETROSYANTS SAID IN PLENARY. IN ANY CASE, I WOULD EXPECT YOU TO WISH ME TO MAINTAIN VERY FIRMLY THE POSITION I HAD TAKEN ON 26 SEPTEMBER.

7. YORK AND MARCUM DID NOT DISSENT FROM THIS. BUT THEY EMPHASISED THAT OUR DECISION HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO THE AMERICANS SO LATE THAT IN PRACTICE THEY HAD QUOTE NO OPTION UNQUOTE BUT TO GIVE IT FULL SUPPORT. WE HAD SIMPLY LEFT THEM NO TIME TO ARGUE WITH US. BUT THEY HAD TOLD US THAT THEY DID NOT LIKE OUR POSITION, DID NOT THINK IT WOULD WORK, AND MIGHT WISH TO ADD TO THEIR INITIAL RESPONSE.

8. MARCUM SAID THAT WASHINGTON CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT THE ONLY SATISFACTORY SOLUTION WAS FOR THE UK TO OFFER TO ACCEPT MORE THAN ONE NSS. THE QUOTE NEW SITUATION UNQUOTE REQUIRED SOME POSITIVE MOVE FROM US BEFORE THE END OF THE CURRENT ROUND. THEY WERE NOT SUGGESTING ANY PARTICULAR NUMBER BUT FAVOURED NSS IN A FEW UK DEPENDENT TERRITORIES, ESPECIALLY ON THE WOUTHERN HEMISPHERE. THEIR REAL VALUE WOULD BE FOR MONITORING SUCH COUNTRIES AS ARGENTINA AND SOUTH AFRICA. I SAID THIS IDEA HAD BEEN CONSIDERED BEFORE. SUCH NSS WOULD HAVE A VERY DIFFERENT ROLE FROM THOSE ON US AND SOVIET TERRITORY.

9. YORK AND MARCUM ACCEPTED THAT AT PRESENT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF ANY CHANGE IN OUR POSITION OVER UK NSS AND THAT ALL THIS WOULD REQUIRE MUVH FULLER BILATERAL DISCUSSCON. THEY FAVOURED SUCH DCSSCUSSION IN WASHINGTON OR LONDON, PREFERABLY IN TWO OR THREE WEEK'S TIME, AND THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE PRECEDED BY A HIGH LEVEL MESSAGE FROM THE US ADMINISTRATION TO YOU. MEANWHILE THEY BELIEVE IT WOULD BE A GREAT MISTAKE TO THREATEN UK WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT (I AGREED.)



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COMMENT

11. THE RUSSIANS MUST ALREADY SEE THAT US SUPVORT FOR OUR INSISTENCE ON ONE NSS IS HENCEFORTH GOING TO BE QUALIFIED BY AN ACTIVE INTEREST IN SOME COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND UK POSITIONS. I DO NOT THINK OUR OWN CREDIBILITY NEED BE AT RISK AT THE NEXT PLENARY MEETING BUT BEFORE LONG IT COULD BECOME DIFFICULT TO CONFINE OURSELVES TO MAINTAINING OUR POSITION WITHOUT SHOWING ANY INTEREST IN SOVIET QUOTE FLEXIBILITY UNQUOTE.

12. YOU MAY THINK IT DESIRABLE FOR HM EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON TO EXPLORE THINKING FURTHER. MARCUM RETURNS THERE TO-NIGHT.

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FM UKRIS GENEVA 261645Z SEP 1979

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 432 OF 26 SEPTEMBER

INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DS17), ROUTINE MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKDEL  
NATO.

*Rome*

*Shut*

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS  
FROM CTB DELEGATION

*MT*

1. SUMMARY. THE 77TH PLENARY MEETING, THE FIRST SINCE 11 JULY WAS HELD ON 26 SEPTEMBER UNDER SOVIET CHAIRMANSHIP. THE UK CONVEYED THE GOVERNMENTS'S DECISION TO ACCEPT ONLY ONE NATIONAL SEISMIC STATION (NSS) ON UK TERRITORY. THE US GAVE STRONG SUPPORT. THE USSR DESCRIBED THE DECISION AS QUOTE A BLOW UNQUOTE.
2. PETROSYANTS (USSR) SAID THE THREE DELEGATIONS HAD A CLEAR MANDATE TO BRING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO AN EARLY CONCLUSION. THE MOST COMPLEX PROBLEMS CONCERNED VERIFICATION. PROVIDED ALL PARTIES ADHERED QUOTE STRICTLY TO THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL OBLIGATIONS WITHOUT SEEKING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES UNQUOTE, THESE COULD BE RESOLVED. HE REAFFIRMED SOVIET READINESS TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUE OF NSS ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY, AND HOPED THAT THE UK WOULD MAKE THIS POSSIBLE BY STATING A READINESS TO INSTALL NSS IN QUOTE BRITISH TERRITORIES UNQUOTE.
3. EDMONDS (UK) CONFIRMED THE UK'S WISH TO WORK FOR AN EARLY CTB. THE THREE SIDES RECOGNISED THAT VERIFICATION WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A TREATY, AND THAT NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES (NWS) REQUIRED ENHANCED VERIFICATION. THE UK HAD CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED THAT NSS WERE ESSENTIAL TO MONITOR LARGE LAND AREAS. AFTER CONSIDERING ALL THE RELEVANT FACTORS, THE GOVERNMENT HAD CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR LOCATING NSS IN UK DEPENDENT TERRITORIES AND HAD DECIDED THAT ONE NSS IN THE UK WAS THE APPROPRIATE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION. THEIR MAIN REASONS WERE TECHNICAL. NSS IN THE DEPENDENT TERRITORIES WOULD BE INEFFICIENT AND TECHNICALLY IRRELEVANT, AND THIS WOULD BE OBVIOUS. THEY HAD ALSO TAKEN FULL ACCOUNT OF SOVIET STATEMENTS ABOUT EQUAL OBLIGATIONS, BUT BOTH THE OBLIGATIONS AND RIGHTS OF THE THREE NWS MUST BE RELATED TO GEOGRAPHICAL AND STRATEGIC REALITIES. THE BRITISH POSITION WOULD NOT GIVE THE UK ANY UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

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IT WAS A SENSIBLE AND REALISTIC DECISION WHICH WOULD BE WELL UNDERSTOOD BY ALL THOSE INTERESTED IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A CTB TREATY. HE HOPED IT WOULD LEAD TO EARLY AGREEMENT ON NUMBERS OF NSS AND THAT OTHER MORE IMPORTANT ISSUES COULD BE TACKLED.

4. YORK (US) SAID THE US GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO A CTB. IT STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE UK DECISION TO ACCEPT ONE NSS IN THE UK. THIS WAS A CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS FOR PROGRESS. THE FUNDAMENTAL BASIS FOR NSS MUST BE THEIR TECHNICAL CONTRIBUTION TO VERIFICATION. NSS IN UK DEPENDENT TERRITORIES WOULD MAKE NO SUCH CONTRIBUTION. HE QUOTE COMMENDED THE UK DECISION TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND STRONGLY URGED ITS ACCEPTANCE UNQUOTE.

5. MEANWHILE, YORK URGED ATTENTION WITHOUT DELAY TO OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES, ESPECIALLY NSS CHARACTERISTICS, MANUFACTURE AND INSTALLATION.

6. PETROSYANTS SAID THE UK POSITION CAME AS A BLOW. HIS DELEGATION WOULD STUDY IT CAREFULLY AND CONSIDER HOW THE NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT PROCEED. BUT IT OFFERED NO PROSPECT OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY. HE HAD REPEATEDLY STATED THAT UK DEPENDENT TERRITORIES (WHERE THE UK AND US HAD TESTED IN THE PAST) PROVIDED A LOOP-HOLE FOR NUCLEAR TESTING. THE SOVIET POSITION WAS ALREADY CLEAR AND HE HOPED THAT THE US AND UK WOULD CONSIDER IT CAREFULLY.

7. AT THE SUBSEQUENT RESTRICTED MEETING, PETROSYANTS SAID THE UK POSITION WAS STILL THE SAME OLD STORY. THE USSR, PERHAPS NAIVELY HAD THOUGHT A CONCESSION FIRST BY ONE SIDE (UK), THEN BY THE OTHER (USSR), WOULD LEAD TO A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SOLUTION. TO REPEAT THE OFFER OF ONE STATION WAS NOT A CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL. HIS PERSONAL REACTION WAS THAT WE SHOULD NOW WORK ON THE BASIS OF ONE STATION EACH. HE WOULD REPORT THE UK DECISION TO MOSCOW BUT IT WAS UNEXPECTED AND QUOTE WOULD NOT WASH UNQUOTE. EDMONDS COUNTERED THAT THE DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN BY A NEW GOVERNMENT WHICH HAD GONE BACK TO BASICS AND CONSIDERED ALL THE POSSIBLE OPTIONS BEFORE CONCLUDING THAT ONE STATION WAS ALL THAT WAS NEEDED OR MADE SENSE. YORK SAID THAT THE US HAD KNOWN OF THE UK POSITION FOR LONG ENOUGH TO REVIEW IT AND TO CONCLUDE THAT IT WAS RIGHT. HE COMMENDED IT TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WITH THE FIRM SUPPORT OF THE US GOVERNMENT.

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8. COMMENT. WE AND THE AMERICANS AGREE THAT THE FIRST SOVIET REACTION TO OUR NSS DECISION, WHILE PREDICTABLY NEGATIVE, FELL SHORT OF WHOLESALE REJECTION. THEY MADE ALL THE OBVIOUS POINTS BUT WITHOUT POLEMICS. IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT THEY WILL NEED FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW BEFORE GIVING A FULLY CONSIDERED RESPONSE. MEANWHILE WE AND THE AMERICANS WILL ENCOURAGE DISCUSSION OF SOME OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES.

MARSHALL

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FM F.C.O. 211600 Z SEPT 79

TO ROUTINE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1257 OF 21 SEPTEMBER

INFO UKMIS GENEVA(FOR CTB DELEGATION), MOSCOW, MODUK (DS17)

*ks*  
*Rms*

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS

YOUR TELNO 2749: COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN.

1. THE MINISTER OF STATE EXPLAINED THE BASIS OF MINISTERS' DECISION ON NSS ON UK TERRITORY TO YORK, MARCUM, OKUN, STEINER AND DOBBINS ON 21 SEPTEMBER.
2. MR HURD SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WERE DOUBTS IN SOME QUARTERS IN LONDON, AS IN WASHINGTON, OVER THE BENEFITS TO BE GAINED FROM A CTB ON ITS PRESENT BASIS, IT WAS RECOGNISED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD RUN FOR OVER TWO YEARS AND MINISTERS WANTED TO MAKE THEM SUCCEED. IN REACHING A DECISION ON NSS THE FINANCIAL ELEMENT HAD BEEN SECONDARY TO THE INDEFENSIBILITY OF THE SOVIET DEMAND, WHICH HAD BEEN DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO COUNTER US INSISTENCE ON NSS IN THE SOVIET UNION. IT WAS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO THE CTB WOULD BE DETERMINED BY NSS IN THE UK. BY STICKING TO ONE NSS, THE UK WOULD BE ON STRONG GROUND WITH PUBLIC OPINION. THE DECISION WOULD NOT READILY BE REVERSED, ALTHOUGH THE ALTERNATIVE OF UK WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SVA WAS OBVIOUSLY AN IMPORTANT MATTER WHICH WOULD NEED CAREFUL CONSIDERATION AND UK/US CONSULTATION.
3. THE MAIN POINTS MADE BY THE US SIDE WERE AS FOLLOWS:
  - A) THE US WOULD FIRMLY SUPPORT THE BRITISH POSITION BUT IT WAS NOT WHAT THEY HAD WANTED AND THEY DOUBTED WHETHER IT WOULD WORK.
  - B) A TENABLE TECHNICAL CASE COULD BE MADE FOR TWO OR THREE NSS IN THE UK ITSELF OR FOR ONE OR TWO IN THE DEPENDENT TERRITORIES.
  - C) THE POLITICAL DIMENSION WAS ALSO IMPORTANT. THE US WERE CONCERNED THAT THE UK POSITION WOULD LEAD TO CONTINUING STALEMATE OR EVEN TO UNRAVELLING WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SO FAR (IN DISCUSSIONS WITH OFFICIALS, THE AMERICANS SAID THAT UK WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SVA MIGHT INCREASE THIS RISK.) THEY WANTED A SOLID ACHIEVEMENT BY THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE.

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- D) THE SALT DEBATE IN THE US WAS NATURALLY PRE-OCCUPYING ATTENTION BUT THE COMMITMENT OF PRESIDENT CARTER AND HIS SENIOR ADVISERS TO CTB HAD NOT CHANGED.
- E) WHEN THE CTB NEGOTIATIONS WERE VIEWED IN THE OVERALL CONTEXT OF THE ANGLO/US NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP, THE RELATIVELY VERY SMALL COST OF NSS BECAME MORE EVIDENT.

4. FULL RECORDS OF THIS AND MEETING WITH OFFICIALS FOLLOW BY BAG.

CARRINGTON

## FILES

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2749 OF 19 SEP 79.

INFORMATION MOD UK (DS17), MOSCOW, AND UK MIS GENEVA (FOR CTB DELEGATION).

*Prime Minister**1/2**mt*

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 2721 : C T B.

1. ROBINSON TOOK ACTION WITH BARTHOLOMEW (STATE DEPARTMENT) ACCORDINGLY THIS MORNING.

2. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD HOPED THAT IF WE COULD HAVE MOVED EVEN A VERY LITTLE WAY FROM ONE NSS, THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN AN EFFECTIVE COUNTER TO THE APPEARANCE THAT THE SOVIETS HELD THE HIGH GROUND IN THE NEGOTIATION, AND WOULD HAVE PUT PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS AND TESTED THEIR GENUINENESS ON THIS ISSUE, PUTTING THE WEST IN A BETTER POSITION. COMMENTING ON THE POINTS IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT, DESPITE OUR DISAPPOINTING DECISION, HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD NOW WANT TO MAKE A SOLID FRONT WITH US TO PRESS THE RUSSIANS HARD ON THE BASIS OF OUR DECISION. HE NOTED THAT WE WANTED TO MAKE OUR POSITION KNOWN TO THE RUSSIANS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BUT HOPED THAT, WITH THE PROSPECT THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD JOIN WITH US IN PRESSING THE RUSSIANS, WE WOULD ALLOW THE AMERICANS TIME TO CONSIDER HOW BEST THIS SHOULD BE DONE. YORK WOULD NOT HAVE INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT TOMORROW. BARTHOLOMEW THOUGHT NOTHING WOULD NECESSARILY BE LOST IF OUR POSITION WERE NOT MADE KNOWN TO THE RUSSIANS UNTIL A DAY OR TWO AFTER THE REOPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON 24 SEPTEMBER. BUT IN ANY CASE HE UNDERTOOK TO COME BACK TO US WITH US IDEAS AS SOON AS OUR DECISION HAD BEEN CONSIDERED BY VANCE. BARTHOLOMEW ADDED THAT IF IT LATER CAME TO THE POINT AT WHICH WE CONTEMPLATED WITHDRAWAL FROM THE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT THE AMERICANS WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO US FURTHER BEFORE A FINAL DECISION WAS TAKEN.

3. AS REGARDS RUSSIAN MOTIVES AND PROSPECTS FOR A C T B TREATY ON THE PRESENT BASIS, BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT THE AMERICANS ALSO HAD DOUBTS ABOUT THE REAL WEIGHT WHICH THE RUSSIANS GAVE TO THE QUESTION OF NSS IN UK DEPENDENT TERRITORIES.

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(INDEED IT WAS TO SMOKE THEM OUT ON THIS POINT THAT THE AMERICANS HOPED WE WOULD MAKE A SMALL ADVANCE ON ONE). THERE WAS CERTAINLY NO FEELING IN WASHINGTON THAT AGREEMENT ON NSS WOULD BY ITSELF OPEN THE WAY TO A QUICK C T B AGREEMENT. IT WOULD SIMPLY HAVE ALLOWED THE NEGOTIATORS TO PROCEED WITH THE LONG AND DETAILED GRIND THAT LAY AHEAD. NOR WAS THERE ANYONE IN WASHINGTON IN A SENIOR POSITION WHO FELT THAT A C T B TREATY COULD BE FULLY AND FINALLY WRAPPED UP BY THE TIME OF THE N P T REVIEW CONFERENCE NEXT YEAR. BUT THERE WAS A FEELING THAT THE WEST SHOULD BE AS WELL POSITIONED AS POSSIBLE AT THE TIME OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE, AND THAT PROGRESS IN CONTINUING C T B NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HELP WITH THIS, PERHAPS BY ALLOWING THE POSSIBILITY OF A JOINT DECLARATION CALLING ATTENTION TO WHAT HAD SO FAR BEEN ACHIEVED.

4. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, AFTER HIS NOTE-TAKER HAD LEFT, (PLEASE PROTECT) BARTHOLOMEW TOLD ROBINSON THAT HE FELT THAT THE US HAD PRESSED THE UK RATHER TOO HARD AND RATHER TOO LONG ON THIS ISSUE. HE DID NOT THINK THERE WAS ANY QUESTION OF THE US BREAKING RANKS WITH THE UK IN THE LIGHT OF OUR DECISION. HE WAS CLEARLY ABLE TO CONTAIN HIS DISAPPOINTMENT AT OUR DECISION.

HENDERSON

## FILES

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LEGAL ADVISERS  
PLANNING STAFF  
PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD

PS/MR BLAKER  
PS/FUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR BULLARD  
MR P H MOBERLY  
MR FERGUSON  
MR EDMONDS  
CABINET OFFICE

## COPIES TO:

MR CARTLEDGE  
NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
DR R PRESS, CABINET OFFICE

MRS ALEXANDER, TREASURY

-2-  
SECRET



*Defense* 3*Ls.**Phunt*

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FM FCO 191215Z SEPT 79

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1227 OF 19 SEPTEMBER.

AND TO MODUK (DS 17)

INFO MOSCOW, UKMIS GENEVA (FOR CTB DEL)

YOUR TELNO 2721: COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN (CTB) NEGOTIATIONS:  
NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS (NSS) ON UK TERRITORY

1. MINISTERS HAVE DECIDED THAT AFTER THE NEGOTIATIONS RESUME ON 24 SEPTEMBER, THE UK DELEGATION SHOULD CONFIRM THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT'S OFFER OF ONE NSS IN THE UK ITSELF.
2. PLEASE INFORM THE AMERICANS AT THE HIGHEST APPROPRIATE LEVEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. YOU SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- (A) MINISTERS HAVE GIVEN THE PROBLEM OF NSS ON UK TERRITORY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION, BEARING IN MIND THE IMPORTANCE OF SECURING 10 NSS ON SOVIET TERRITORY AND THE VIEWS OF THE AMERICANS:
- (B) BUT THEY REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIET REQUEST FOR 10 NSS ON UK TERRITORY IS UNREALISTIC AND CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED TECHNICALLY, FOR THE REASONS SET OUT EARLIER THIS YEAR BY OUR DELEGATION. NOR WOULD ACCEPTANCE OF DEMONSTRABLY UNNECESSARY NSS IN SCATTERED ISLAND DEPENDENCIES TO SATISFY THE RUSSIANS BE UNDERSTOOD BY BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY OR PUBLIC OPINION:
- (C) OUR DELEGATION IS THEREFORE BEING INSTRUCTED TO CONFIRM THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT'S OFFER OF ONE NSS AT ESKDALEMUIR IN SCOTLAND:
- (D) IF WE FAIL TO PERSUADE THE RUSSIANS TO ACCEPT OUR RENEWED OFFER OF ONE NSS, THE MOST PROBABLE ALTERNATIVE IS FOR THE UK TO WITHDRAW FROM THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT BUT WE HOPE IT WILL NOT COME TO THAT AND MINISTERS WILL WISH TO CONSIDER THE POSITION BEFORE SVA WITHDRAWAL IS PUT TO THE RUSSIANS.

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3. WE REALISE THE US ADMINISTRATION'S PREFERENCE WOULD BE AN INCREASED UK OFFER OF NSS AS REITERATED BY BARTHOLOMEW ON 17 SEPTEMBER. BUT YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE VERY MUCH HOPE WE CAN COUNT ON THEIR SUPPORT. THIS WILL GREATLY IMPROVE THE PROSPECT OF SECURING RUSSIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE FACT THAT THIS IS AS FAR AS WE CAN GO, OR AT LEAST INDUCING THEM TO NEGOTIATE ON OTHER ISSUES. WE WANT TO PUT OUR POSITION TO THE RUSSIANS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT THE AMERICANS WILL NO DOUBT WISH TO DISCUSS WITH US HOW THIS SHOULD BE DONE.

4. YOU SHOULD STRESS OUR CONTINUING INTEREST IN ACHIEVING AN EARLY AND SATISFACTORY CTB. AT THE SAME TIME WE ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT NSS IN UK DEPENDENT TERRITORIES ARE A DECISIVE ELEMENT IN THE WHOLE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO A CTB TREATY, NOR THAT ACCEPTING MORE NSS WOULD LEAD TO EARLY PROGRESS ON OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES. THE RUSSIANS MAY HAVE BEEN PARTLY USING THE NSS ISSUE TO STALL THE NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL THEY SEE WHAT HAPPENS TO SALT II. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE VERY USEFUL TO HAVE A FULLER ACCOUNT THAN BARTHOLOMEW GAVE ON 17 SEPTEMBER OF LATEST US THINKING ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVING A CTB TREATY ON THE PRESENT BASIS.

5. WE SHALL BE INFORMING YORK AND OTHERS WHEN THEY CALL AT THE FCO ON THE AFTERNOON OF 20 SEPTEMBER.

CARRINGTON

FILES

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LEGAL ADVISERS

PLANNING STAFF

PS

PS/KPS

PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR BLAKER  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR BULLARD  
MR PH MOBERLY  
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

~~MR ALEXANDER, NO 10 DOWNING ST~~  
DR PRESS, CABINET OFFICE  
MR ALEXANDER, TSY

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Ref. A0255

PRIME MINISTER

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MISC 7: Comprehensive Test Ban

✓ — Your Private Secretary wrote to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 17th September to convey your agreement to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's recommendation in paragraph 2 of his minute to you dated 11th September. This letter seems to have crossed with the Secretary of State for Defence's minute to you on the same subject dated 18th September. On 17th September our Ambassador in Washington also sent an interesting telegram (copy attached) about the latest American views. (Washington 2721)

2. In these circumstances the Secretary of State for Defence may raise the subject of the Comprehensive Test Ban in the margins of the MISC 7 meeting tomorrow. There is no significant difference of opinion between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence on this issue. The important point in Mr. Pym's minute is the emphasis he lays on taking full account of the views of the Americans before we move on to the next stage if the Russians react adversely to our repeated offer of one National Seismic Station in the United Kingdom.

ms.  
R  
JOHN HUNT

18th September, 1979

C T B NEGOTIATIONS: ADVANCE COPIES

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11/2/94

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
MR P H MOBERLY  
MR EDMONDS  
HEAD/ACDD  
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
~~SIR C ROSE~~ CABINET OFFICE

FM WASHINGTON 180017Z SEP 79  
TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2721 OF 17 SEPTEMBER 1979  
INFO UKMIS GENEVA (FOR CTB DELEGATION), MODUK (DS17 DSC6), MOSCOW.

MY TELNO 2556: CTB

1. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE MINISTER ON LEAVE, BARTHOLOMEW (POL/MIL) SPOKE TO COUNSELLOR POL/MIL TODAY, SAYING THAT HE DID SO QUOTE ON BEHALF OF SECRETARY VANCE UNQUOTE. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT AFTER A FURTHER INTERAGENCY REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE RECESS THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUED TO ATTACH CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO PROGRESS TOWARD A CTB. AT PRESENT MATTERS WERE HUNG UP ON THE NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS (NSS) QUESTION AND THE RUSSIANS APPEARED TO THINK THAT THEY WERE IN A GOOD POSITION TO PLACE THE ONUS FOR THIS ON THE OTHER NEGOTIATING PARTNERS. THE AMERICANS WERE THEREFORE KEEN TO WORK OUT A JOINT STRATEGY IN ORDER TO SOLIDIFY THE UK/US POSITION, TO BRING THE RUSSIANS IN TURN UNDER PRESSURE TO PROVE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE, AND TO PREVENT THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED SO FAR FROM UNRAVELLING.

2. THE AMERICANS WOULD LIKE US TO CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING STRATEGY WHICH IDEALLY SHOULD BE INTRODUCED VERY EARLY IN THE FORTHCOMING ROUND:

A. THE UK AND US SHOULD CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER IN OPPOSING THE SOVIET POSITION ON EQUAL NUMBERS OF NSS FOR ALL 3 PARTIES:

B. THE UK SHOULD MAKE A QUOTE CREDIBLE STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF THE SOVIET POSITION INCLUDING THE ACCEPTANCE OF NSS IN THE DEPENDENT TERRITORIES UNQUOTE. (BARTHOLOMEW SAID AT THIS POINT THAT THEY HAD IN MIND THE PRIME MINISTER'S UNDERTAKING TO PRESIDENT CARTER IN TOKYO THAT HMG QUOTE WOULD TAKE A SERIOUS LOOK AT THIS MATTER UNQUOTE):

UNQUOTE):

C. THE US WOULD THEN STRONGLY SUPPORT SUCH A STEP, MAKING CLEAR TO THE RUSSIANS THEIR FIRM BELIEF THAT IT REPRESENTED THE FURTHEST THAT THE UK WAS PREPARED TO GO. THEY WOULD PUSH HARD AT A SENIOR LEVEL IN WASHINGTON WITH THE RUSSIANS, AS WELL AS IN GENEVA AND IN MOSCOW, IN THIS SENSE. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE FOR THE AMERICANS OF FULL CONSULTATIONS WITH US BEFORE THE DEPLOYMENT OF ANY NEW U K POSITION IN GENEVA.

i.e. 3  
3. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION AND IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, BARTHOLOMEW SPEAKING PERSONALLY, CHARACTERISED A QUOTE CREDIBLE STEP UNQUOTE BY THE UK AS QUOTE SOMETHING BETWEEN 1 NSS AND HALF WAY UNQUOTE. HE DID NOT RAISE THE QUESTION OF SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT WITHDRAWAL (WESTON'S LETTER OF 15 AUGUST TO REEVE), BUT WHEN ASKED VOLUNTEERED THE PERSONAL COMMENT THAT EVEN IF THIS COURSE OF ACTION TURNED OUT TO BE THE ONE THAT APPEALED TO US MOST AT THE END OF THE DAY, THE BEST WAY TO IT TACTICALLY WOULD BE BY MEANS OF A QUOTE CREDIBLE STEP UNQUOTE ON NSS, IN ORDER TO MAXIMISE THE PRESENTATIONAL ADVANTAGES VIS-A-VIS THE RUSSIANS.

COMMENT

How?  
4. DESPITE THE REFERENCE TO VANCE, BARTHOLOMEW'S APPROACH THROUGHOUT WAS PITCHED IN A LOW KEY. HE KNEW THAT MINISTERS WERE DUE TO CONSIDER THIS QUESTION IN LONDON ON 19 SEPTEMBER. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES HIS APPROACH WAS THE LEAST THAT COULD BE EXPECTED.

HENDERSON

NNNN



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

TELEPHONE 01-218 9000  
DIRECT DIALLING 01-218 2111/3

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UK EYES A

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PRIME MINISTER

*Prime Minister. Has seen. Amds 15/5*  
*This is the expected minute in which the*  
*Defence Secretary ~~comes~~ suggests a pause for*  
*reflection if the USSR rejects the single NSS*  
*option. It does not question Lord Carrington's*  
*road strategy which you have endorsed.*

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

I have seen Peter Carrington's minute to you of 11th September. I agree with his conclusion that the right thing at this stage is to repeat the offer of one National Seismic Station in the United Kingdom. It is, as he says, far from certain that three stations would satisfy the Russians.

2. This decision should also clear the air with the Americans. Unless they are still aiming for a CTB in 1980 (and I agree this is far from certain) it is not entirely consistent of them to press us to increase our offer of one NSS so as to move the negotiations forward. We have, however, to recognise that simply to repeat our offer of one NSS will not be immediately welcome to them. I entirely endorse Peter Carrington's emphasis on the very important issues which are current between ourselves and the Americans. We should therefore make every effort to secure American support for our position, and indeed to ensure that we remain in close touch and sympathy with the United States on all aspects of these negotiations.

3. I am concerned, however, about the handling of the option of withdrawal from the Separate Verification Agreement negotiations if we fail to make acceptable to the Russians our renewed offer of one NSS. The fundamental difficulty of the withdrawal option is that it may well not work; it appears that in Soviet eyes the NSS issue transcends the SVA consideration, so that even if the Russians accepted our withdrawal, they would still demand that we should accept UK NSS. The immediate difficulty is that Soviet rejection of our offer of one NSS may be very quick indeed, and we shall need to be clear about our next move.

/ We shall ...



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UK EYES A

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4. We shall also, I suggest, need to take careful account of American reaction to the withdrawal option before we table it publicly. Accordingly we should indicate to the United States at an early stage that we see withdrawal as our most probable fall-back option. Nevertheless, I share Peter Carrington's view that withdrawal could lessen the influence which we can exert on the later stages of these negotiations. This underlines what I think is our shared belief that our current and longer term interests, both in foreign policy and in defence, are best served if we can so conduct our case as to stay in these negotiations and in close consultation with the Americans. This is especially so as the latter may well believe that for us to make the offer of withdrawal would enable the Russians to retract their offer of ten NSS and thus risk what Peter Carrington rightly identifies as the major gain in American eyes of the negotiations so far.

5. In short I accept that we may need to adopt the withdrawal option in due course. I believe, however, that we do need to consider it further in the light of the Soviet reaction to our repeated offer of one NSS, and that in taking stock before our next move we shall need to take full account of the views of the Americans.

6. Subject to this, I am generally content with Peter Carrington's proposals, and would not, therefore, ask for a discussion before a message is sent to the Americans.

7. I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Home Secretary; a copy also goes to Sir John Hunt.

18th September 1979

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UK EYES A

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Faint, illegible text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.

Red circular stamp containing the date: 11 13 1964



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CONFIDENTIAL



*File 16  
Defence*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

17 September 1979

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 11 September on the line to be taken on the National Seismic Station problem when the CTB negotiations resume next week.

The Prime Minister agrees with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's recommendation as set out in paragraph 7 of his minute.

I am sending copies of this letter to Roger Facer (Ministry of Defence), Tony Battishill (H.M. Treasury), John Chilcot (Home Office) and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

G G H Walden Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

CONFIDENTIAL

*CCM*

*Pami Pinski*

FM WASHINGTON 180017Z SEP 79

TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2721 OF 17 SEPTEMBER 1979

INFO UKMIS GENEVA (FOR CTB DELEGATION), MODUK (DS17 DSC6), MOSCOW.

*Paul*

MY TELNO 2556: CTB

*no*

1. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE MINISTER ON LEAVE, BARTHOLOMEW (POL/MIL) SPOKE TO COUNSELLOR POL/MIL TODAY, SAYING THAT HE DID SO QUOTE ON BEHALF OF SECRETARY VANCE UNQUOTE. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT AFTER A FURTHER INTERAGENCY REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE RECESS THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUED TO ATTACH CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO PROGRESS TOWARD A CTB. AT PRESENT MATTERS WERE HUNG UP ON THE NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS (NSS) QUESTION AND THE RUSSIANS APPEARED TO THINK THAT THEY WERE IN A GOOD POSITION TO PLACE THE ONUS FOR THIS ON THE OTHER NEGOTIATING PARTNERS. THE AMERICANS WERE THEREFORE KEEN TO WORK OUT A JOINT STRATEGY IN ORDER TO SOLIDIFY THE UK/US POSITION, TO BRING THE RUSSIANS IN TURN UNDER PRESSURE TO PROVE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE, AND TO PREVENT THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED SO FAR FROM UNRAVELLING.

2. THE AMERICANS WOULD LIKE US TO CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING STRATEGY WHICH IDEALLY SHOULD BE INTRODUCED VERY EARLY IN THE FORTHCOMING ROUND:

A. THE UK AND US SHOULD CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER IN OPPOSING THE SOVIET POSITION ON EQUAL NUMBERS OF NSS FOR ALL 3 PARTIES:

B. THE UK SHOULD MAKE A QUOTE CREDIBLE STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF THE SOVIET POSITION INCLUDING THE ACCEPTANCE OF NSS IN THE DEPENDENT TERRITORIES UNQUOTE. (BARTHOLOMEW SAID AT THIS POINT THAT THEY HAD IN MIND THE PRIME MINISTER'S UNDERTAKING TO PRESIDENT CARTER IN TOKYO THAT HMG QUOTE WOULD TAKE A SERIOUS LOOK AT THIS MATTER UNQUOTE):

C. THE US WOULD THEN STRONGLY SUPPORT SUCH A STEP, MAKING CLEAR TO THE RUSSIANS THEIR FIRM BELIEF THAT IT REPRESENTED THE FURTHEST THAT THE UK WAS PREPARED TO GO. THEY WOULD PUSH HARD AT A SENIOR LEVEL IN WASHINGTON WITH THE RUSSIANS, AS WELL AS IN GENEVA AND IN MOSCOW, IN THIS SENSE. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE FOR THE AMERICANS OF FULL CONSULTATIONS WITH US BEFORE THE DEPLOYMENT OF ANY NEW U K POSITION IN GENEVA.

/ 3. IN

CONFIDENTIAL

3. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION AND IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, BARTHOLOMEW SPEAKING PERSONALLY, CHARACTERISED A QUOTE CREDIBLE STEP UNQUOTE BY THE UK AS QUOTE SOMETHING BETWEEN 1 NSS AND HALF WAY UNQUOTE. HE DID NOT RAISE THE QUESTION OF SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT WITHDRAWAL (WESTON'S LETTER OF 15 AUGUST TO REEVE), BUT WHEN ASKED VOLUNTEERED THE PERSONAL COMMENT THAT EVEN IF THIS COURSE OF ACTION TURNED OUT TO BE THE ONE THAT APPEALED TO US MOST AT THE END OF THE DAY, THE BEST WAY TO IT TACTICALLY WOULD BE BY MEANS OF A QUOTE CREDIBLE STEP UNQUOTE ON NSS, IN ORDER TO MAXIMISE THE PRESENTATIONAL ADVANTAGES VIS-A-VIS THE RUSSIANS.

COMMENT

4. DESPITE THE REFERENCE TO VANCE, BARTHOLOMEW'S APPROACH THROUGHOUT WAS PITCHED IN A LOW KEY. HE KNEW THAT MINISTERS WERE DUE TO CONSIDER THIS QUESTION IN LONDON ON 19 SEPTEMBER. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES HIS APPROACH WAS THE LEAST THAT COULD BE EXPECTED.

HENDERSON

FILES:

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PS/MR BLAKER  
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MRS ALEXANDER HM TREASURY

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 142251Z SEP 79

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELNO 2697 OF 14 SEPTEMBER 79

INFO ROUTINE MODUK, UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW.

MIPT: SALT II RATIFICATION: SENATE HEARINGS: ROUNDUP

1. COMMITTEE HEARINGS HAVE CONTINUED THIS WEEK IN LOW KEY (OURTEL NO 2615). NEXT WEEK (18 SEPTEMBER) THE COMMITTEE WILL HEAR TESTIMONY FROM OTHER SENATORS (GARN AND HATFIELD AND, POSSIBLY, KENNEDY AND DOLE) AND REPRESENTATIVES (DOWNEY, CARR, BINGHAM, BAUMAN) WHO HAVE EXPRESSED A WISH TO MAKE THEIR VIEWS KNOWN TO THE COMMITTEE, AND ALSO FROM A CONGRESSIONAL PANEL OF THE PEACE THROUGH LAW CAUCUS WHICH HAS AN INTEREST IN NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES. ON 19 SEPTEMBER HAROLD BROWN WILL APPEAR AGAIN BEFORE THE COMMITTEE TO EXPLAIN THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTENTIONS ON THE DEFENCE BUDGET (OURTEL NO 2652). MARK-UP (WHEN THE COMMITTEE CONCLUDES ITS ACTION ON THE DRAFT TREATY AND FORWARDS IT TO THE FULL SENATE), ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED TO BEGIN ON 18 SEPTEMBER, SEEMS LIKELY TO BE PUT OFF AND THE TREATY IS UNLIKELY TO BE REPORTED OUT TO THE FULL SENATE BEFORE 17/18 OCTOBER AT THE EARLIEST. THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE HAS STILL TO REQUEST FINAL WIND-UP APPEARANCES FROM VANCE, BROWN AND GENERAL JONES, AND WILL NEED TO CONSIDER THE REPORT FROM THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE ON VERIFICATION, DUE TO SURFACE ON 23 SEPTEMBER. A FURTHER APPEARANCE BY DR KISSINGER CANNOT BE RULED OUT. NO DATES HAVE BEEN FIXED AS YET FOR ANY OF THESE CONTINGENCIES.

2. MEANWHILE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HAD BEEN DUE TO HOLD HEARINGS THIS WEEK FOR TESTIMONY FROM ROWNY, NITZE, RUMSFELD

/AND

AND LAIRD, BUT THESE HAVE BEEN PUT OFF. THIS COMMITTEE TOO HAS FOR THE MOMENT POSTPONED ITS PLANS TO CALL BACK VANCE, BROWN, GENERAL JONES AND GENERAL SEIGNIOUS FOR FINAL ROUND-UPS IN CLOSED SESSION, BEFORE COMING TO A VOTE EXPRESSING THE SENTIMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SALT II.

HENDERSON

FILES

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PS/MRHURD  
PS/MR RIDLEY  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR BULLARD  
MR. P. H. MOBERLY  
MR FERGUSSON

ADDITIONAL DISTN  
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FM WASHINGTON 142250Z SEPTEMBER 79  
TO ROUTINE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2696 OF 14 SEPTEMBER

INFO MODUK, UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW,

*Prime Minister*

*LA*

*Phut*

*[Handwritten signature]*

MY TELNO 2602: SALT II RATIFICATION.

1. SENATE COMMITTEE HEARINGS THIS WEEK (OUR TELNO 2615) HAVE AGAIN BEEN OVERSHADOWED BY OTHER EVENTS. DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN VANCE AND DOBRYNIN OVER CUBA CONTINUE. THE AMERICANS ARE SAYING VERY LITTLE ABOUT THEM, THOUGH IT IS WIDELY ASSUMED THAT SOME FACE-SAVING FORMULA WILL BE FOUND. VANCE'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO IN NEW YORK LATER THIS MONTH, WHICH MAY BE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM THE ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED 27 SEPTEMBER, WOULD BE THE OBVIOUS MOMENT TO ANNOUNCE A RESULT. PRESIDENT CARTER HAS ATTEMPTED TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE IN THE SALT DEBATE BY SENDING TO CONGRESS HIS PLAN FOR ENHANCING THE DEFENCE BUDGET (OURTEL NO 2652) AND HAS HELD PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH SENATOR NUNN, NO DOUBT DESIGNED TO SHOW THAT HE IS MAINTAINING A DIALOGUE WITH CONGRESS OVER FUTURE DEFENCE PROGRAMMES AND THUS TO PREVENT SENATORS AT PRESENT STILL UNDECIDED OVER SALT FROM COMING TO PREMATURELY ADVERSE CONCLUSIONS BEFORE THE CUBA ISSUE IS RESOLVED. THIS HOWEVER HAS NOT PREVENTED SENATOR RUSSELL LONG (DEMOCRAT, LOUISIANA) FROM DECLARING THAT HE WILL VOTE AGAINST SALT ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT CANNOT BE VERIFIED AND THAT SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN CUBA HAVE DEMONSTRATED SOVIET BAD FAITH. THIS IS CLEARLY A SETBACK GIVEN LONG'S INFLUENCE IN THE SENATE AND ESPECIALLY AMONG OTHER SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS.
2. THE DELAY IN THE SENATE'S TIMETABLE (SEE M I F T) WHICH NOW MAKES A FINAL VOTE ON THE TREATY UNLIKELY BEFORE DECEMBER COULD ALSO HAVE WIDER UNWELCOME IMPLICATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, IT COULD COMPLICATE ATTEMPTS TO REACH ALLIANCE DECISIONS ON TNF BY THE END OF THE YEAR BY PROVIDING THE EXCUSE TO SOME IN EUROPE THAT DECISIONS ON THEATRE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WOULD BE IMAPPROPRIATE SO LONG AS THE FATE OF STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATIONS IS IN DOUBT.

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3. THIS HAS BEEN THE LEAST HELPFUL WEEK FOR THE ADMINISTRATIONS'S  
CASE ON SALT II SINCE THE HEARINGS BEGAN.

4. SEE M I F T

HENDERSON

FILES

DEF. D

ACDD

EESD

NAD

WED

PUSD

PS

PS|LPS

PS|MR HURD

PS|MR RIDLEY

PS|PUS

SIR. A. DUFF

MR BULLARD

MR. P. H. MOBERLY

MR FERGUSSON

ADDITIONAL DISTN

SALT

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER



*1*  
*I agree with*  
*Lord Carrington -*  
*With regard to Mr. Pym's point previous*  
*administration has shown it is vital that the Ban be*  
*Comprehensive Test Ban*  
*not renewed after 3*  
*years*

In his minute to you dated 11th September, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs suggests that you and your MISC 7 colleagues might agree, without discussion, to the policy he proposes. He wishes to tell the Americans early next week that when the CTB negotiations resume on 24th September we have decided to restate to the Russians the previous Government's offer of one national seismic station (NSS) in the United Kingdom; and if this does not resolve the problem, to tell the Russians that the alternative is our withdrawal from the Separate Verification Agreement.

2. Your colleagues are likely to agree with this policy, and on balance (just) I recommend that you do too. But you may wish the final decision to be taken at MISC 7 on 19th September, rather than out of committee. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office confirm that the timing would still just fit. The decision is an important one, with implications for our relations with the Americans which (as Lord Carrington's paragraph 5 points out) could affect the two other issues which MISC 7 will be considering on 19th September: Polaris replacement and Theatre Nuclear Forces.

3. My only hesitation arises from the fact that Lord Carrington's options do not include offering (and paying for) two NSS, although (as he notes) MISC 7 on 24th May did include that as a possibility in its conclusions. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office negotiating judgment is that such an offer would hardly cut more ice than offering one; that it would be harder to defend on technical grounds; and that it would suggest we could be pushed further. On the other hand it is just arguable that we should limit any damage to our nuclear relations with the Americans if we are seen to have made some movement even though it is most unlikely to do the trick and we could not allow ourselves to be pushed further.

*[Signature]*  
(John Hunt)

13th September 1979





PM/79/79

PRIME MINISTER

Comprehensive Test Ban

1. At the restricted meeting on 24 May we agreed to continue to participate in the CTB negotiations and try to find a solution to the national seismic station (NSS) problem which would avoid our having to pull out of the Separate Verification Agreement (SVA). The United States have sought 10 NSS on Soviet territory, and agreed to accept the same number. The Russians have agreed in principle provided that the UK, the third negotiating partner, accepts an equal number. We concluded that the most the UK should accept was 4 NSS (or possibly 5) and that this was dependent on the US paying for all except the one to which we were at present committed, or possibly a second if this were essential to reach agreement.

2. The Americans replied that it was impossible on political grounds for them to contribute to the cost of British NSS. But they had been pressing the Russians to be more flexible on numbers. (President Carter tackled Mr Brezhnev about this in Vienna, but without immediate response). However the Americans believed that the UK would also have to 'move more than half way', ie establish and pay for at least 6 NSS. In Tokyo, President Carter asked you whether the UK could accept 4 or 5. You said that this would still be too many.

3. The Russians have been told that we are reviewing our position. The options appear to be:

OPTION A: MORE THAN ONE NSS ON UK TERRITORY

The best chance of resolving the UK NSS problem and focussing the negotiations on other issues on which the UK would not be seen as obstructing progress, would be to offer more than one NSS. This has been consistently advocated by the Americans and by our CTB delegation. Three NSS is probably the lowest number that could be presented as a serious attempt by the UK to reach agreement.

/ OPTION B:



OPTION B: ONE NSS ON UK TERRITORY

To restate the last government's position that the UK could accept no more than one NSS would bring home to the Russians that we were serious in rejecting their proposal as completely without technical justification. However the Russians are most unlikely to capitulate, and it will be hard to get the Americans to support us.

OPTION C: UK WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT

Although withdrawal from the 3-power SVA would underline our determination not to accept NSS, it has important disadvantages. Even if it eliminated our NSS problem, our influence on the course of the negotiations and on the future of the treaty after three years would be reduced. Mr Gromyko has said that the Soviet Union is not interested in this approach, and exchanges in Geneva suggest that the Russians will argue that, regardless of SVA membership, all three negotiating nuclear weapon states should have NSS since equal obligations carry an equal degree of intrusiveness.

4. It is unclear whether President Carter is still determined to conclude a CTB before the 1980 Presidential election. although he is deeply committed to the objective, he may have concluded that it would lead to a clash with his Chiefs of Staff and with Congress.

5. On the other hand, the Americans realise that non-aligned states regard a CTB as a fundamental part of the non-proliferation bargain and are showing growing impatience. Failure to show results by the time of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in August/September 1980 may create a difficult situation; and the United Kingdom would not want to be seen to hold up the negotiations. For the past twenty years British governments have consistently argued that arms control agreements should provide the best possible verification. In other defence fields, eg Polaris replacement and TNF, we shall need maximum US goodwill.



6. I believe that the US Administration's prime consideration will be that our position should not jeopardise Soviet agreement to verification in the shape of 10 NSS on Soviet territory. Nevertheless it is far from certain that increasing our NSS contribution to, say, 3 stations, would satisfy the Russians. There is no convincing technical justification for any NSS on UK territory.

7. Accordingly I propose that, when the negotiations resume on 24 September, we should restate to the Russians the previous government's offer of one station in the UK (Option B). If that seems unlikely to resolve the problem, then to show our determination not to go beyond one station, we should tell the Russians that the alternative is our withdrawal from the SVA (Option C).

8. If you and our colleagues agree, I should like to inform the Americans of our decision early next week. But if you or other colleagues would prefer a discussion in Misc 7 first, I could wait until after our meeting on 19 September.

9. I am sending copies of this minute to the Defence Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary and Sir John Hunt.

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

11 September 1979

SEP 1979



GR 1200

CONFIDENTIAL

*Defence*  
*Prime Minister* (2)  
*Ans*

CONFIDENTIAL

P S TO P M

FM WASHINGTON 072310Z

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2602 OF 7 SEP 79.

INFORMATION UK DEL NATO, MOSCOW, MODUK (DS12), HAVANA, AND CABINET OFFICE (FOR JIS).

INFORMATION SAVING PARIS AND BONN.

PROSPECTS FOR SALT RATIFICATION. *ant*

1. WHILE SENATE HEARINGS ON THE TREATY RESUMED THIS WEEK IN A LOW KEY, DEVELOPMENTS HAVE OCCURRED OUTSIDE THE COMMITTEE ROOMS WHICH WILL HAVE A MAJOR BEARING ON THE FATE OF THE RATIFICATION DEBATE. OF THESE, THE MOST IMPORTANT HAS BEEN THE CONFIRMATION OF THE PRESENCE IN CUBA OF SEVERAL THOUSAND SOVIET GROUND FORCES, ORGANISED IN A COHERENT COMBAT UNIT (MY TELNOS 2557 AND 2558).
2. THIS DISCLOSURE HAS RAISED DOUBTS ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR RATIFICATION OF SALT II LATER THIS YEAR, FOLLOWING THE FAVOURABLE PROGNOSIS BEFORE THE SUMMER RECESS. SENATORS OF DIFFERENT POLITICAL VIEWS AND DIVERGENT ATTITUDES TOWARDS SALT HAVE SPOKEN OUT STRONGLY AGAINST THE SOVIET PRESENCE. THERE WAS HOWEVER LITTLE SUPPORT FOR A MOVE TO SUSPEND THE RATIFICATION DEBATE UNTIL SOVIET FORCES HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM CUBA, AND A NUMBER OF STATEMENTS BY SENATORS, WHILE AGGRESSIVE IN TONE, HAVE BEEN CAUTIOUSLY WORDED. OTHER THAN CHURCH SENATE LEADERS SUCH AS ROBERT BYRD AND JAVITS HAVE SO FAR STEERED CLEAR OF DIRECT LINKAGE BETWEEN RATIFICATION AND THE CUBA ISSUE. NONETHELESS, THE PROSPECT THAT THE TWO WILL BECOME LINKED IS A REAL AND UNWELCOME DANGER FOR THE ADMINISTRATION. UNLESS IT CAN WIN SOME CONVINCING ASSURANCE FROM MOSCOW REGARDING THE COMBAT FORCES, THE SALT RATIFICATION DEBATE MAY RUN INTO MUCH DEEPER PROBLEMS THAN IT HAS HITHERTO FACED.
3. THIS NEW DIFFICULTY, IN TERMS OF DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY, COMES AT A PARTICULARLY BAD TIME FOR THE ADMINISTRATION WITH THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL STANDING CONTINUING AT A LOW EBB AND WIDESPREAD SCEPTICISM THAT THE ADMINISTRATION UNDER ITS PRESENT LEADERSHIP IS CAPABLE OF COPING WITH THE RANGE OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES FACING THE COUNTRY.

CONFIDENTIAL

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# CONFIDENTIAL

4. THE PRESIDENT HAS JUST MADE A STATEMENT, AN ACCOUNT OF WHICH IS GIVEN IN M.I.F.T. AS YOU WILL SEE, HE REPEATED VANCE'S STATEMENT THAT THE STATUS QUO INVOLVING THE PRESENCE OF A SOVIET COMBAT BRIGADE IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. THE NEXT STAGE IS FOR VANCE TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT (PERHAPS ON SUNDAY) WITH DOBRYNIN WHOSE RETURN, PLANNED FOR TODAY, HAS BEEN DELAYED. PRESUMABLY THE LEAST THE US ADMINISTRATION WILL BE PRESSING FOR IS SOME SOVIET ASSURANCE ABOUT THE CAPABILITY AND ROLE OF THESE FORCES, THOUGH IT LOOKS FAR FROM CERTAIN THAT SUCH ASSURANCES, EVEN IF THEY ARE FORTHCOMING, WILL SATISFY THE DOUBTFUL SENATORS.

5. A GOOD DEAL DEPENDS, I SUPPOSE, ON HOW FAR THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SALT HITHERTO THEY CANNOT HAVE BELIEVED THAT THE PRESENCE OF THEIR TROOPS IN CUBA WOULD HAVE BEEN AN IMPEDIMENT TO SALT BECAUSE IF IT HAD BEEN THE AMERICANS, WHOM THEY MUST THINK KNEW ABOUT THEIR PRESENCE EARLIER, WOULD HAVE SAID SO. MOSCOW MAY HAVE TWO CONTRADICTIONARY REFLECTIONS:-

- A. THAT WHAT HAS JUST HAPPENED HERE WAS INTENDED PRINCIPALLY TO IMPINGE UPON THE NON ALIGNED CONFERENCE IN CUBA AND THEREFORE NEED NOT BE TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY IN THE SALT CONTEXT:
- B. ALTERNATIVELY, THAT IN FACT THE SURFACING OF THIS INFORMATION ABOUT THE TROOPS NOW FOREBODES AN INTENTION BY THE US ADMINISTRATION TO THWART SALT.

6. THE US ADMINISTRATION DENY BOTH THESE INTERPRETATIONS, BUT THIS DOES NOT OF COURSE PRECLUDE THE RUSSIANS BELIEVING THEM. FOR SOME SENATORS, INCLUDING CHURCH, WHO FACE TOUGH RE-ELECTION BATTLES NEXT YEAR, THE TROOPS IN CUBA ISSUE DOES PROVIDE AN ESCAPE HATCH FOR THEM FROM AN EMBARRASSING SALT COMMITMENT. BUT I AM SURE THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION ARE NOT ENGAGED ON ANY DEVIOUS SCHEME TO USE THE PRESENCE OF TROOPS TO STULTIFY SALT RATIFICATION. ON THE FACE OF IT THE RUSSIANS, IF THEY REALLY WANT SALT TO GO THROUGH HERE, SHOULD BE ABLE TO COME UP WITH SOME FORMULA THAT REDUCES THE TENSION IN THE SENATE. THE TROUBLE IS OF COURSE THAT IF ENOUGH SENATORS GET COMMITTED CATEGORICALLY TO THE COMPLETE REMOVAL OF THE SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS, THAT REALLY IS GOING TO MAKE A SOLUTION DIFFICULT.

7. WHATEVER THE RESULTS OF THE US/SOVIET DISCUSSIONS, THESE ARE

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/ LIKELY.

# CONFIDENTIAL

LIKELY TO TAKE SOME TIME TO EMERGE. THIS IN TURN COULD HAVE AN EFFECT UPON THE TIMING OF SALT RATIFICATION WHICH WAS EARLIER EXPECTED TO COME TO A FINAL VOTE BY MID/LATE NOVEMBER. SENATE MAJORITY LEADER ROBERT BYRD SPOKE YESTERDAY OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THE FLOOR DEBATE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN NEXT MONTH BEING PUT OFF UNTIL EARLY NOVEMBER. PRO-TREATY SENATOR BIDEN STATED THAT THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE WAS UNLIKELY TO REPORT THE TREATY OUT FOR FLOOR DEBATE UNTIL THE CUBAN ISSUE WAS RESOLVED. DELAYING THIS DEBATE UNTIL NOVEMBER MIGHT MEAN A FINAL VOTE BEING POSTPONED UNTIL EARLY NEXT YEAR.

8. APART FROM THIS NEW OBSTACLE TO SALT RATIFICATION, THERE HAVE BEEN TWO OTHER DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO THE DEBATE:

(A) THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION, ANNOUNCED TODAY, IN FAVOUR OF THE "SPURRED RACE TRACK" BASE MODE FOR THE MX MISSILE (OUR TEL NO 2590). THIS SHOULD HELP TO PERSUADE SCEPTICS IN THE SENATE OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S DETERMINATION TO PURSUE, AS THE PRESIDENT HAS PROMISED, THE PROGRAMMES NECESSARY TO ENSURE STRATEGIC PARITY WITH THE RUSSIANS.

(B) THE DECISION FORECAST TO BE TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS ON A SUPPLEMENTAL DEFENCE BUDGET TO MEET THE 3 PERCENT TARGET FOR FINANCIAL YEAR 1980 (OUR TEL NO 2452), AND, AT LEAST IN PART, TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF KEY SENATORS FOR INCREASED DEFENCE SPENDING OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS.

F C O PASS SAVING TO PARIS AND BONN.

HENDERSON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FILES

DEF. D.

ACDD.

FESD.

NAMO.

WED

PUSD

PS

PS/SIR I. GILMOUR

PS/MR HURD

PS/MR RIDLEY

PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF.

MR BUKHARD  
MR P HOBEELY  
MR FERGUSSON

ADDITIONAL DIST.

SALT.



JS

Defence

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

3 September 1979

The Prime Minister has read your letter to her of 24 August and its accompanying enclosures with close attention, and is most grateful to you for sending them. I am returning herewith the printed documents that you sent. I have retained the photocopies for our files.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Lord Zuckerman, OM, KCB.



PART 2 ends:-

Zuckerman to PM 24.8.79

PART 3 begins:-

MODBA to Zuckerman 3.9.79

