PREM 19/814

Situation in Northern Ireland

Force Levels

PART 10.

IRELAND

Part 1: May 79

Part 10: Aug 81

PREM 19/814

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~2.9.81~~		~~3.12.81~~					
~~3-9-81~~		~~14.12.81~~					
~~10.9.81~~		~~22.12.81~~					
~~22.9.81~~		~~24.12.81~~					
~~22.9.81~~		~~30.12.81~~					
~~12.10.81~~		~~6.1.82~~					
~~14.10.81~~		~~8.1.82~~					
15.10.81		~~11.1.82~~					
~~2.11.81~~		~~18.1.82~~					
~~11-11-81~~		~~22-1-82~~					
~~16.11.81~~		27.1.82					
~~19.11.81~~							
~~20.11.81~~							
~~25.11.81~~							
~~24.11.81~~		PARTS					
~~26.11.81~~		ENDS					
~~30.11.81~~							
~~2.12.81~~							

PART 10 ends:-

27.10.82

PART 11 begins:-

4.2.82

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC (81) 37th Conclusions, Minute 4	19.11.81
CC(81) 38th Conclusions, Minute 4	26.11.81
CC(81) 39th Conclusions, Minute 4	3.12.81

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed C Wayland Date 2 October 2012

PREM Records Team

FILE HL/BOK

SUBJECT Copied to Master Set

CC CO Ireland

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary 27 January 1982

Dear Stephen,

Northern Ireland

When your Secretary of State called upon the Prime Minister yesterday evening he gave her a wide-ranging survey of the present situation in Northern Ireland.

Economic situation

Mr. Prior first described recent developments in the affairs of the De Lorean car company. He had had a number of meetings with Mr. De Lorean and had warned him that the De Lorean Board in considering their position would have to take account of the possibility that the firm was now trading from an insolvent position. Sir Kenneth Cork, whom he wanted to put into De Lorean as a pre-Receiver, was already looking through the papers on the company held in the Northern Ireland Department of Commerce. It was likely that Mr. De Lorean would make an announcement to his workforce the following day saying that the company could no longer continue. Once he had done that, Sir Kenneth Cork could go in to De Lorean's works and offices to examine the books. At that stage it might be necessary to appoint Sir Kenneth Cork as a Receiver. Sir Kenneth Cork's preliminary view was that it might be possible to salvage something from the wreck. He recommended that cars already under construction should be completed, and he thought that it was just possible that a restructured company producing, say, 10,000 cars a year instead of the planned 18,000 might be profitable. But he could not take a firm view on this until he had seen the company's books. A total of 4,000 jobs, including those in component manufacturers, was at stake. There would of course be considerable political repercussions if these jobs were lost, but the crash of the firm had been expected for some time and, to an extent, had already been discounted.

Mr. Prior went on to say that Harland and Wolff, where a total of 7,000 people were employed, were also in a difficult position. They had a good chance of securing a big order for container ships from United States Shipping Lines. There would be a preliminary order for six ships: ECGD had agreed to provide cover for four of these and United States Shipping Lines could raise private finance for the other two. There was a prospect of an order for eight more ships in addition to the initial six. But in the interval before this order could materialise it was essential that Harland and Wolff secured an order for an iron ore bulk carrier, and they were negotiating for this with the British Steel Corporation. If Harland

/ and Wolff

and Wolff got the order for container ships, they would have to change their working methods and there would probably be some redundancies. What he did not want to happen was the collapse of Harland and Wolff following the crash of De Lorean.

Shorts, on the other hand, had better prospects, although they had had 1,000 redundancies in the last four months. It looked as though they would get some good orders from Boeing, and their missile sales were going well. They were even getting orders for the elderly Skyvan aircraft.

Your Secretary of State said that he had made the most of the outcome of the Public Expenditure Review as it affected Northern Ireland and it had been reasonably well received. One good sign was the amount of new house building and of renovation that was going on at present. More council houses had been sold in Northern Ireland than anywhere else in the United Kingdom. But the fact remained that the outlook for the economy generally in the Province was bleak.

Security situation

The security situation had improved since November, and December had been the quietest month for ten years. One cause of the improvement was that there had been an increase in the internal struggles within the Protestant and Republican paramilitary organisations. For example, the two Protestants who had been murdered at the weekend had probably been killed by fellow Protestants. As a result of the easing of the security situation he had been able to approve the GOC's recommendation , which had the concurrence of the Chief Constable, that the Spearhead battalion should be allowed to go back to the mainland. He should warn the Prime Minister, however, that he would almost certainly be accused by the Protestants of reducing the security effort just at the moment the Security Forces were getting on top of the terrorists.

Political Situation

Mr. Prior said that in the last four months he had been sounding out the Parties in Northern Ireland about possible political developments. A number of factors - the end of the hunger strike, the Anglo-Irish Summit Meeting and his own appointment as Secretary of State - had all helped to create an expectation that something new in the political field would be tried soon. All the local Parties had responded to his invitation to to talk to him, and he had been concentrating particularly on the Official Unionists and the SDLP.

What he had been floating over the Parties was a form of progressive or rolling devolution. He envisaged that in the first phase an Assembly would be set up which, working through a system of Committees rather like Select Committees, would mark Government Departments in Northern Ireland. The Committees would have powers of scrutiny and powers to call for persons and papers. They might, for example, be able to comment on draft Orders in Council, and the Assembly would be able to have general debates. The Committees would have Chairmen and Deputy Chairmen who would receive a salary in recognition of their roles. The posts of Chairmen and Deputy Chairmen might be split equally between the majority and minority elements of the Assembly, though the membership of the Committees would have to reflect the composition of the Assembly itself. In short, the first phase of the Assembly would be an advisory one, with no legislative or executive powers.

/ The second stage

The second stage was to move to a point where executive and administrative authority was devolved to the Assembly, and this was much more difficult. He had suggested to the Parties that one way of bringing about this development would be for them to form a voluntary coalition which could demonstrate that it commanded support amounting to 70% of the membership of the Assembly. Neither the Official Unionists nor the SDLP had ruled out an approach to devolution on these lines. It might, none the less, take 18 - 24 months or more to get to stage two. Moreover, it might not make sense to devolve all the powers available at once: it might, for example, be better to transfer powers in less controversial areas, such as roads and agriculture, before making changes in more difficult fields like education and housing. As powers were devolved to the Assembly area by area, Assembly Ministers would take over from Northern Ireland Office Ministers, but the Secretary of State would have to remain responsible to Westminster until all powers had been transferred.

Mr. Prior went on to say that he was not, at this stage, asking the local Parties to agree with his ideas in every detail: rather, he was seeking to narrow the area of disagreement. The Official Unionists at the moment were very divided on both policies and personalities, but they were beginning to realise that so long as there was a vacuum in Northern Ireland politics, they would always be worsted by Mr. Paisley. If they were given a role to play, it might pull the Unionists together but it was too early to be certain. He was due to see them again on Monday of the following week to discuss his ideas for political progress with them.

He would be seeing the SDLP on Friday of this week. They were still determined on power sharing, but he had warned them that there was no hope of going back to anything like the 1974 Assembly. They understood that if they did not get back into the centre of the political stage in Northern Ireland, they would lose out to the Provisional Sinn Fein.

When he had seen the SDLP and the Official Unionists, he would have to decide whether to see Mr. Paisley again. Mr. Paisley's support in the Province remained very strong.

In all his consultations with the local Parties he had made it clear that he had not yet put any proposals to the Cabinet. His position would be the same when he saw the Conservative Backbench Committee on Northern Ireland later in the week. He hoped to be able to bring his proposals to OD in the third week in February and to Cabinet thereafter. He then envisaged publishing a White Paper setting out the Government's proposals. If there was any prospect of getting the Assembly off the ground, he would want to move very quickly. A short Bill would be needed to provide powers not already available in existing legislation. But the crucial stage would be the next 10 days when he would be concluding his talks with the political Parties in Northern Ireland.

In reply to a question, your Secretary of State said that he expected some opposition from the Backbench Committee. He would emphasise to them his view that the political status quo in Northern Ireland was not tenable for much longer and that political change was needed. He acknowledged that some backbenchers were afraid that an election now would result in an Assembly dominated by Paisleyites and Republicans and a massacre of the Official Unionists. But he doubted

/ whether the

whether the Unionists would be all that few. In any case, so long as the political Parties in Northern Ireland had no concrete role, Mr. Paisley would always outbid the Official Unionists and an election in 1983 would be likely to lead to a bigger defeat for the Official Unionists than one in 1982. His proposals offered the Official Unionists their best hope of survival. They had to be put in a position where they appeared different from and more moderate than Mr. Paisley, but it was too early to say whether they would seize the opportunity he was offering them.

The Prime Minister thanked your Secretary of State for his full account of how matters stood in the Province at present and she looked forward to seeing his paper for OD.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Steve Wilkinson.

Stephen Boys-Smith, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

1141

Ireland

E.R.

NOTE OF A MEETING HELD IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE ON FRIDAY 22 JANUARY 1982

N.B.P.R.

Present:

Mr Marshall - Chairman		Mr Miller	MOD
Mr Buxton	NIO	Mr Jackson	MOD
Mr Ranson	NIO	Lt Col Bateman	MOD
Mr Harrington	NIO	Maj. Wynne Davies	MOD
Miss Christopherson	NIO	Capt Carter	MOD
Mr Burrows	NIO	Maj. Hughes	MOD
Mr Fisher	NIO		
Mr Bates	NIO		

Mr Pilling, Home Office
Mr Facer, Cabinet Office
Mr Eyers, FCO

Security

The period since the last meeting* had been a mixed one. There had been a high level of violence earlier in the period, with the murder of the Reverend Robert Bradford and attacks on off-duty members of the security forces. Recent weeks had been quieter (December was the first month since 1971 in which there had been no deaths) but this was deceptive and it was unwise to read too much significance into this lack of terrorist activity. In the interest of calming unionists' fears, the Chief Constable had cooperated with Official Unionist councillors in making arrangements whereby the public could do more to help the security forces. These arrangements were mainly for the gathering and passing on of information; no self defence body was envisaged. "Third Force" activity seemed to have lost impetus - a number of people were awaiting trial on charges arising from "Third Force" demonstrations.

2 The security forces had made good progress in the previous 2 months in arresting and charging suspected terrorists. Six of the 8 escapers from Belfast prison last June had now been arrested in the Republic, and 2 had been convicted extra-territorially, and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. In the case of Desmond Mackin, who had been deported from the United States to the Republic, the RUC were consulting the Director of Public Prosecutions as to whether they should seek to have Mackin tried extra-territorially in the Republic. No papers had yet been passed to the Irish.

3 The NIO were grateful for the "high profile" adopted by the security forces, especially the UDR, in recent months. This had been very helpful at a time of extreme tension in the community.

* 30 October 1981.

Other matters mentioned briefly were:

The Spearhead Battalion would be quietly withdrawn next week, and it did not at present seem that any replacement would be needed.

Personal protection weapons: Mr Miller said that it had been decided to increase the calibre of personal protection weapons available to selected UDR members;

Prisons. The situation was quiet, but there had been no break through on the 'no work' protest at Maze. The destruction of 'A' wing in Belfast prison would take 2/3 months to make good following rioting there in December. The transfer of prisoners to Magilligan prison had called for arrangements for the protection of the prison. The completion of Maghaberry prison would give rise to problems over the handling of the remaining Special Category prisoners.

Unionist Delegation's Visit to North America

4. On the question of a visa for the Reverend Paisley, we had been careful to be neutral and had not pressed the United States authorities either way. The same line had been adopted when the Reverend Paisley attempted to secure an interview with the UN Secretary-General. Our posts in the United States had been scrupulously correct in their approach to the unionist delegation, giving them reasonable assistance but avoiding the impression that they had official backing. The visit was likely to pass off without trouble; no great benefit seemed likely to be achieved by the delegation.

Political

5. The Secretary of State was committed to a political initiative. He had ruled out a return to Stormont, complete integration, and independence; and it was clear that power-sharing, in its 1974 form, was not acceptable to the main parties. He was likely to propose a two stage process: an elected Assembly with deliberative

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and monitoring functions but with legislative and executive powers, if it could agree how they should be exercised. Difficulty arose in determining the criteria which might lead to powers being devolved; a weighted majority vote in the Assembly might act as a trigger; the issue was still an open one. Responsibility for law and order would not pass to the Assembly. The Secretary of State was to have further meetings with the main parties in the near future before coming to a firm decision. He would then put his proposals to Cabinet colleagues, with a view to a Bill during the current session but the timetable was a tight one.

SDLP

6. They had always secured about 25% of the vote and were probably recovering some of the ground lost during the hunger strike.

Anglo-Irish Matters

7. The 6 November Summit meeting had resulted in an Intergovernmental Council, in essence largely institutionalising present contacts. Further discussions with the Republic had taken place at official level, with a satisfactory outcome. Irish proposals that the intended inter-Parliamentary body would include representatives of a NI Assembly had been successfully resisted. A paper was soon to be put to the Prime Minister. Discussions between the two Attorneys General had started well, but progress now seemed to be slowing down - apparently through disagreements between Irish departments and their resolution taking second place to decisions on the Irish budget. It had been made clear that we attached great importance to progress in this field, and this would be stressed again at the forthcoming meeting between the Secretary of State and Professor Dooge.

Northern Ireland Office
26 January 1982

Ireland

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 190038Z
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELNO 144 OF 18 JANUARY 1982,
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, CG NEW YORK, NIO BELFAST, NIO LONDON, DUBLIN, OTTAWA, TORONTO.
SAVING TO OTHER CG'S U.S.A.

MY TELNO 111: PAISLEY

1. THE DUP/OUP DELEGATION ARE NOW IN WASHINGTON. MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION HAVE APPEARED ON TWO OF THE MAJOR BREAKFAST TV SHOWS (WITH PAISLEY JOINING IN FROM TORONTO). THE DELEGATION WERE GUESTS AT A NATIONAL PRESS CLUB LUNCH TODAY AT WHICH MRS PAISLEY READ OUT THE SPEECH WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN DELIVERED BY HER HUSBAND. THE OCCASION WILL RECEIVE WIDESPREAD TV AND RADIO COVERAGE. ROBINSON RECEIVED APPLAUSE FROM THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB AUDIENCE OF ABOUT 120 WHEN HE BEGGED AMERICANS NOT TO SEND DOLLARS WHICH WERE ENABLING TERRORISTS TO KILL INNOCENT BRITISH SUBJECTS WITH WEAPONS SUPPLIED BY THE COMMUNIST BLOC. ROBINSON AND TAYLOR LAID GREAT STRESS ON THE IRA'S LINKS WITH OTHER TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS SAYING THAT MR HURD HAD RECENTLY CONFIRMED CLOSE TIES BETWEEN THE IRA AND THE PLO. THE DELEGATION MADE AVAILABLE COPIES OF THEIR BOOKLET ''ULSTER THE FACTS'' CONTAINING GRUESOME PHOTOGRAPHS OF IRA ATTROCITIES. THE BOOK WAS BRIEFLY IMPOUNDED BY US CUSTOMS AT THE WEEKEND ON A TECHNICALITY. WE TOOK THIS UP WITH STATE DEPARTMENT AND ALL COPIES HAVE NOW BEEN RELEASED.

2. THE DELEGATION CALLED ON ME AT THEIR REQUEST THIS AFTERNOON. MEMBERS OF MY STAFF WERE ALSO PRESENT. THEY WERE AT PAINS TO SAY THAT THEIR VISIT WAS NOT DESIGNED TO BE CRITICAL OF HMG (THOUGH AT LUNCH ROBINSON HAD ACCUSED THE GOVERNMENT OF PURSUING A POLICY OF UNIFICATION BY STEALTH). THEY THOUGHT THAT MORE SHOULD AND COULD BE DONE BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO PUT ACROSS THE UNIONISTS' CASE IN THE US AND CLEARLY BELIEVED THAT THE IRA HAD HAD A FREE RUN. I TOLD THEM THAT WE PUT ACROSS OUR CASE VIGOROUSLY AND CONTINUOUSLY AND THAT WE HAD HAD CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS IN SECURING GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEM.

 / 3. THE

3. THE DELEGATION, WHO HAVE CLEARLY NOT BEEN ABLE TO SECURE MEETINGS WITH MEMBERS EITHER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OR CONGRESS, ASKED US FOR HELP, BEHIND THE SCENES, IN TRYING TO SECURE APPOINTMENTS. I SAID THAT THE DELEGATION THEMSELVES HAD WANTED TO AVOID GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP. WE HAD ALREADY TOLD THE ADMINISTRATION AND MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ABOUT THEIR VISIT. WE WOULD, HOWEVER, HAVE A FURTHER WORD WITH ONE OR TWO CONTACTS SIMPLY TO REMIND THEM THAT THE DELEGATION WERE IN THE UNITED STATES. TAYLOR, AS AN MEP, IS PARTICULARLY KEEN TO SEE THE CHAIRMAN OF THE EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. NO MENTION WAS MADE OF A POSSIBLE CALL ON THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL OR HIS STAFF.

4. THE DELEGATION WERE INTERVIEWED BY BRITISH NEWS MEDIA AS THEY LEFT THE EMBASSY. BBC TV WILL BE FOLLOWING THEM ON THEIR TRAVELS IN THE UNITED STATES (ITINERARY IN MY TELNO 1 TO CG NEW YORK). THE DELEGATION WILL CLEARLY GET MORE COVERAGE AT HOME THAN IN THE UNITED STATES THOUGH EVEN HERE, HELPED BY PAISLEY'S AVAILABILITY IN TORONTO, THEY HAVE ALREADY SECURED EXTENSIVE COVERAGE.

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PS/MR HURD
PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR BULLARD
MR GOODISON
LORD N G LENNOX

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NORTHERN IRELAND

GRS 150A
UNCLASSIFIED
FM SANFRANCISCO 190045Z JAN 82
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1 OF 18 JANUARY
MR ROBINSON'S VISIT

1. AT 4.30AM THIS MORNING A FIRE BOMB WAS THROWN AT UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO WHERE MR ROBINSON HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN DUE TO SPEAK ON 19 JANUARY. FIRE BOMB CAUSED MINIMAL DAMAGE AND NO INJURIES. BOTH USF AND THIS CONSULATE RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALLS AT 3.30PM APPROX WHEN IRISH VOICE CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ATTACK AS WORK OF PROVISIONAL IRA. THEY WERE PROTESTING ABOUT VISITORS SUCH AS MR ROBINSON BEING SENT TO THE USA. AS AN INDICATION OF THEIR DISPLEASURE THE CALLER SAID THEY HAD ALSO PLANTED A BOMB AT THIS CONSULATE. THIS THREAT PROVED TO BE A HOAX. WE NOTIFIED POLICE AS USUAL.

2. MR ROBINSON'S APPEARANCE AT USF HAD IN FACT BEEN CANCELLED SOME DAYS AGO. HE IS NOW DUE TO SPEAK AT THE JACK TAR HOTEL IN THE MIDDLE OF THE CITY. WE HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE LOCAL POLICE PROTECTION FOR MR ROBINSON IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE INCIDENT. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THEY WILL HAVE MEN AT THE MEETING IN CASE THERE IS TROUBLE.

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FM OTTAWA 181740Z JAN 82 PS TO PM. NO 10 DOWNING STREET.

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 30 OF 18 JANUARY

INFO NIO LONDON AND NIO BELFAST

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK TORONTO DUBLIN HOLY SEE

MY TELNO 27 : PAISLEY

1. PAISLEY'S VISIT IS STIRRING PREDICTABLE CONTROVERSY AND ATTRACTING WIDESPREAD NEWS COVERAGE. HE WAS GREETED ON ARRIVAL BY A SMALL BUT NOISY GROUP OF DEMONSTRATORS. DANNY MORRISON, PUBLICITY DIRECTOR OF THE PREVISIONAL SINN FEIN ARRIVED ON SATURDAY EVENING TO COUNTER PAISLEY'S PUBLICITY CAMPAIGN. MORRISON WAS DETAINED OVERNIGHT BUT FOLLOWING AN IMMIGRATION HEARING YESTERDAY HAS BEEN LEGALLY ADMITTED. HE HAS CHALLENGED PAISLEY TO PUBLIC DEBATE.

2. PAISLEY HAS SAID TO THE PRESS THAT FOLLOWING THE US GOVERNMENTS REFUSAL TO ADMIT HIM, HE CHOSE CANADA AS A LAUNCHING PAD FOR HIS MESSAGE AND HAS ARRANGED US TELEVISION INTERVIEWS WHILE HERE. HIS MESSAGE TO CANADA IS ON FAMILIAR LINES AND INCLUDES ATTACKS ON AMERICANS GIVING DONATIONS TO IRA FRONT ORGANISATIONS AND AS AN ASIDE, ON BRITISH GOVERNMENT FOR INVITING THE POPE AND FOR APPOINTING A BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO THE VATICAN. ON TELEVISION THIS MORNING HE WAS RELATIVELY MODERATE AND EFFECTIVE. PAESLEY IS REPORTED AS HAVING REFUSED TO SAY WHEN HE WILL BE LEAVING CANADA.

3 THE CONSULATE-GENERAL IN TORONTO HAS BEEN TOLD INFORMALLY BY THE METRO TORONTO POLICE INTELLIGENCE UNIT THAT WHILE AT THE CANADA A.M. CTV STUDIO THIS MORNING PAISLEY RECEIVED A THREATENING TELEPHONE CALL AND ASKED FOR POLICE ESCORT. THE UNIT SAY THAT FOLLOWING THE REQUEST PAISLEY WILL BE PROVIDED WITH A BODYGUARD.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES EXCEPT TORONTO

MORAN

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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MR FERGUSSON
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RM 66 A/2 GGS

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MR ~~WHITFIELD~~ Woodfield
MR MARSHALL
~~MR MORIARTY~~ Mr G L Angel
MR HARRINGTON

CABINET OFFICE - SIR R ARMSTRONG
DIO

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

GRS 40
RESTRICTED
FM WASHINGTON 111727Z JAN 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 83 OF 11 JANUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, NIO BELFAST,
PRIORITY DUBLIN, OTTAWA AND TORONTO

YOUR TELNO 11 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: PAISLEY

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT TOLD US THIS MORNING THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE DECIDED TO REJECT PAISLEY'S NEW VISA APPLICATION.

OTTAWA PSE PASS TORONTO.

THOMAS

NNNN

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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OO DUBLIN DESKBY 081630Z
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DESKBY 081630Z
FM FCO 081551Z JAN 82
TO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 003 OF 8 JANUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO.002 : PROFESSOR DOOGE : VISIT TO NORTHERN IRELAND.

1. THERE IS OBVIOUSLY NO OBJECTION TO PROFESSOR DOOGE VISITING HIS RELATIVES, BUT NIO HAVE SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE WIDER PURPOSES OF HIS VISIT WHICH WOULD INVOLVE VISITS TO POLITICIANS AND CHURCH LEADERS ENTAILING THE PRESENCE OF SENIOR DFA OFFICIALS. GRATEFUL THEREFORE IF YOU WOULD APPROACH THE DFA AT WHATEVER LEVEL YOU THINK APPROPRIATE AND SPEAK IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS.

2. WE WERE GRATEFUL TO BE TOLD OF PROFESSOR DOOGE'S PLANS TO VISIT NORTHERN IRELAND. WE HAVE NO COMMENT TO MAKE ABOUT HIS VISITS TO RELATIVES EXCEPT TO SAY THAT THE RUC WILL BE VERY HAPPY, OF COURSE, TO COOPERATE WITH THE GARDA IN THE USUAL WAY. BUT PROFESSOR DOOGE WILL WISH TO KNOW THAT MR PRIOR, WHO HAS BEEN CONSULTED, HAS SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE PROPOSED TIMING OF THE VISIT, IF PROFESSOR DOOGE INCLUDES DISCUSSIONS WITH POLITICIANS AND IS ATTENDED BY DFA OFFICIALS. MR PRIOR EXPECTS FAIRLY SOON TO TAKE DECISIONS ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND. PROFESSOR DOOGE MAY BE AWARE THAT IN PREPARATION FOR THESE DECISIONS MR PRIOR IS CONSULTING WIDELY POLITICIANS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. FOR THE DFA'S CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION A PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT SERIES OF SUCH MEETINGS BETWEEN MR PRIOR AND THE MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES IS DUE TO BE HELD AT MUCH THE SAME TIME AS PROFESSOR DOOGE PLANS TO BE IN THE NORTH. A VISIT ON THE SCALE AND AT THE TIME PROPOSED

C O N F I D E N T I A L

COULD BE REPRESENTED PLAUSIBLY IN NORTHERN IRELAND AS CONCERNED WITH MR PRIOR'S FORTHCOMING POLITICAL MOVES. THE VISIT WOULD IN CONSEQUENCE DRAW PROTESTS WHICH BY THEIR TIMING COULD ONY BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE VALUE OF THE MEETING BETWEEN PROFESSOR DOOGE AND MR PRIOR IN LONDON A FEW DAYS LATER. HMG, AND ESPECIALLY MR PRIOR IN NORTHERN IRELAND, ARE ANXIOUS AT THE PRESENT STAGE TO ESTABLISH THE NORMALITY OF ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS. MR PRIOR HOPES THAT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, PROFESSOR DOOGE MIGHT BE ABLE TO DEFER VISITS TO POLITICIANS AND CHURCH LEADERS BEYOND AT MOST A DINNER WITH THE LATTER UNTIL SUCH A TIME AS THESE CONTACTS ARE LESS LIKELY TO BE MISINTERPRETED AS INTERVENTION IN NORTHERN IRELAND'S POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS.

CARRINGTON

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Ref: A07092

Prime Minister

A.J.C. 8/1.

SECRET

MR. COLES

I enclose my copy, for return please, of a Report by the Security Service on the Soviet Union's attitude towards the Provisional Irish Republican Army.

2. The Prime Minister may like to glance at it.

3. The conclusion is that the main Soviet interest in the PIRA is one of propaganda; there is no evidence that the Soviet Union finances, arms, or influences Irish Army extremist groups. The Provisionals welcome Soviet Press interest in their activities but are wary of closer dealings with the Soviet Union.

RCA

Robert Armstrong

Sir Robert Armstrong

Thank you.

A.J.C. 11/1

8th January 1982

Ref:

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DESKBY 090900Z
FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 090109Z JAN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 32 DATED 8 JANUARY 82
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY NIO BELFAST, DUBLIN, OTTAWA, TORONTO

YOUR TELNO 11: PAISLEY

1. WE HAVE SPOKEN AS INSTRUCTED TO URQUHART AND TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S OFFICE. THE LATTER SAID THAT PAISLEY'S REPRESENTATIVES HERE HAVE BEGUN TO PRESS FOR A REPLY AND THAT PAISLEY SENT A TELEGRAM TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TODAY STATING THAT HE WOULD ''BE IN NORTH AMERICA IN LATE JANUARY'' AND WOULD LIKE TO MEET THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT, TO TALK ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAS DECIDED THAT HE WILL NEITHER SEE PAISLEY HIMSELF NOR PERMIT ANY MEMBER OF HIS STAFF TO DO SO. THE SECRETARIAT ARE CONSIDERING IN WHAT TERMS TO CONVEY THIS DECISION TO PAISLEY AND WILL NOT TAKE ACTION UNTIL EARLY NEXT WEEK. URQUHART TOLD ME THAT THE PROBABLE GROUNDS FOR REFUSAL WOULD BE THE FACT THAT NORTHERN IRELAND IS NOT ON THE UN AGENDA.

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8 January 1982

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Prime Minister

MCS 11/1

MT

Dear John

The Lord President found the Chancellor's minute of 18 December to the Prime Minister about compensation for victims of terrorist attacks extremely interesting. He does not want to suggest any changes in the existing policy, but he thinks that it would be helpful to colleagues if more detailed guidance could be given on the position of Ministers whose property is damaged as a result of politically motivated criminal attacks.

Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Chancellor's minute explain that there are three possible sources of compensation in these circumstances - private insurance, police funds, and payments by Departments - but do not bring out the relationship between them. In the event of an incident of the kind envisaged, should Ministers look in the first instance to their private insurers or to public funds for compensation? If the latter, it is hard to see how insurance companies could be justified in regarding Ministers as bad risks from their point of view. Do any companies in fact load their premiums for this reason? Should Ministers who took out policies on their properties before assuming office inform their insurance companies of their changed circumstances? And do the arrangements for compensation from public funds apply to ex-Ministers and to Opposition spokesmen whose homes may still be prime targets for terrorist attacks.

I apologise for raising so many detailed points but the Lord President thinks it important that Ministers should be in no doubt of where they stand, so that they can make any necessary arrangements on the basis of the fullest possible information.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the recipients of the Chancellor's minute.

Yours ever

Nicholas Huxtable

N P M HUXTABLE
Private Secretary

John Kerr Esq
Private Secretary
to the Chancellor of the Exchequer

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 062030Z JAN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 17 OF 6 JANUARY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, NIO BELFAST, NIO LONDON,

INFO DUBLIN, OTTAWA, TORONTO.

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IMMEDIATE

WASHINGTON TELNO 27: PAISLEY

1. URQUHART TELEPHONED LATE YESTERDAY (5 JANUARY) TO SAY THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD JUST RECEIVED A TELEGRAM FROM PAISLEY'S REPRESENTATIVE IN THE US (BUTTRAM) ASKING FOR AN APPOINTMENT ON 27 OR 28 JANUARY TO DISCUSS NORTHERN IRELAND. URQUHART, WHO IS FULLY AWARE OF THE UNDESIRABILITY OF SUCH A MEETING, ASKED FOR THE BACKGROUND AND FOR ANY THOUGHTS WE MIGHT HAVE ABOUT HOW THE SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD RESPOND. WE HAVE TOLD HIM THE BACKGROUND BUT HAVE SAID THAT WE CANNOT OFFER ADVICE ON HOW THE SECRETARY GENERAL MIGHT REPLY UNTIL WE HAVE OBTAINED INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOU. URQUHART'S INITIAL REACTION IS THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL COULD DECLINE TO RECEIVE PAISLEY HIMSELF BUT THAT IT WOULD BE VERY

DECLINE TO RECEIVE PAISLEY HIMSELF BUT THAT IT WOULD BE VERY AWKWARD FOR HIM NOT TO OFFER INSTEAD A MEETING WITH A MEMBER OF HIS STAFF, PROBABLY DUFFUM, THE USG RESPONSIBLE FOR GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS. THE SAME CONSIDERATIONS WOULD APPLY IF A REQUEST WERE TO BE MADE BY THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE UNIONIST DELEGATION, GIVEN THAT THEY INCLUDE AN MP AND AN MEP.

2. I HAD HOPED THAT, FOR THE REASONS GIVEN IN MY TELNO 1452 OF 1981, THE UN ASPECTS OF A VISIT BY PAISLEY AND/OR THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GROUP HAD DIED AWAY AND THAT EVEN THE MOST EXTREME UNIONISTS WOULD SEE THAT INVOLVEMENT OF THE UN IN NORTHERN IRELAND WOULD DAMAGE THEIR OWN INTERESTS. IT LOOKS AS THOUGH PAISLEY HAS REVIVED THE IDEA OF A CALL AT THE UN AS A PLOY TO CIRCUMVENT THE AMERICAN CANCELLATION OF HIS VISA. ARTICLE IV, SECTION 11 (5) OF THE HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US AND THE UN PROVIDES THAT THE UNITED STATES SHALL NOT IMPOSE ANY IMPEDIMENTS TO TRANSIT TO OR FROM NEW YORK OF, AMONGST OTHERS, ''PERSONS INVITED ... BY THE UNITED NATIONS ... ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS''. THE US MISSION TELL US THAT TERZI (THE PLO OBSERVER), THE REV MICHAEL SCOTT AND SEAN MCBRIDE ARE THE EXTANT CASES OF ADMISSIONS UNDER THIS SUB-SECTION. ALL HAD BEEN INVITED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OR UN COMMITTEES. ALTHOUGH THE QUESTION HAS NOT BEEN TESTED IN THE PAST, THE US MISSION THINK THAT THE OFFER OF AN APPOINTMENT WITH SOMEONE IN THE SECRETARIAT WOULD NOT AMOUNT TO AN ''INVITATION'' UNDER SECTION 11 (5) BUT THAT IF THE SOMEONE WAS THE SECRETARY GENERAL HIMSELF, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO REFUSE ADMISSION.

3. IT REMAINS MY VIEW THAT IT IS EXTREMELY DESIRABLE TO PREVENT PAISLEY OR FOR THAT MATTER ANY OF HIS COLLEAGUES FROM APPEARING AT THE UN. EVEN IF THEY WERE SEEN BY ONLY A MORE JUNIOR OFFICIAL, THEIR VISIT WOULD GENERATE PUBLICITY AND PROVOKE REQUESTS FOR SIMILAR ACCESS FROM THE PIRA AND THEIR SUPPORTERS. THIS WOULD LEAD TO AN INCREASED RISK OF NORTHERN IRELAND BEING INTRODUCED INTO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION IN FEBRUARY/MARCH AND/OR THIS YEAR'S MEETINGS OF ECOSOC AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. BUT TO JUDGE FROM URQUHART'S INITIAL REACTION IT WOULD NOT BE EASY FOR US TO PERSUADE PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO TURN PAISLEY DOWN FLAT. EVEN IF WE SUCCEEDED, THE SECRETARIAT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY FIND IT NECESSARY AT SOME STAGE TO REVEAL THAT IT WAS AT OUR REQUEST THAT THEY HAD REFUSED A MEETING. I IMAGINE THAT SUCH A REVELATION COULD HAVE WIDE REPERCUSSIONS IN BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND.

4. IT SEEMS TO ME THEREFORE THAT OUR BEST HOPE LIES IN EARLY AND DEFINITIVE REJECTION BY THE AMERICANS OF PAISLEY'S RENEWED

~~AND DEFINITIVE REJECTION BY THE AMERICANS OF PAISLEY'S RENEWED~~ APPLICATION AND THAT MEANWHILE THE SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD BE DISCOURAGED FROM AGREEING TO SEE HIM HIMSELF, THE U THANT PRECEDENT NOTWITHSTANDING. IF THE AMERICAN REJECTION COULD BE DONE QUICKLY ENOUGH, THE UN MIGHT EVEN BE ABLE TO AVOID REPLYING TO PAISLEY AT ALL. IT IS MORE LIKELY, THOUGH, THAT THEY WOULD FEEL THAT, IF ONLY OUT OF COURTESY, THEY HAD TO SAY THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS UNABLE TO RECEIVE HIM BUT THAT HAD HE BEEN ABLE TO VISIT NEW YORK HE COULD HAVE SEEN AN OFFICIAL IN THE SECRETARIAT. THIS INVITATION MIGHT THEN BE TAKEN UP BY ROBINSON, TAYLOR, ET AL. IN THAT CASE, I WOULD HOPE THAT, ONCE IT WAS CLEAR THAT PAISLEY'S PLOY HAD FAILED, THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PARTY COULD BE PERSUADED THAT A CALL AT THE UN WOULD SEVERELY DAMAGE THEIR OWN INTERESTS AND THAT THEY SHOULD THEREFORE ABANDON THE IDEA.

PARSONS

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FM WASHINGTON 061650Z JAN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 27 OF 6 JANUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST AND LONDON, UKMIS NEW YORK
ROUTINE DUBLIN, BIS NEW YORK AND CONSUL-GENERAL NEW YORK, OTTAWA, TORONTO
INFO SAVING OTHER CONSULS-GENERAL IN THE USA.

MY TELNO 3869: PAISLEY

1. WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT PAISLEY TODAY SUBMITTED TO THE U S CONSUL-GENERAL IN BELFAST AN APPLICATION FOR A VISA TO VISIT NEW YORK (TO LOBBY AT THE UN) FROM 26-28 JANUARY. PAISLEY APPARENTLY PLANS TO LEAVE BELFAST FOR CANADA ON 16 JANUARY AND TO ENTER THE U S FROM CANADA ON 26 JANUARY.

2. PAISLEY'S AIM APPEARS TO BE TO JOIN UP WITH THE REST OF THE DUP/OUP DELEGATION IN NEW YORK FOR THE LAST TWO DAYS OF THEIR AMERICAN VISIT. THE NATURE OF PAISLEY'S PROPOSED VISIT, AT LEAST AS DESCRIBED IN HIS VISA APPLICATION, IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH LED TO THE CANCELLATION OF HIS EARLIER VISA. THIS MEANS THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT MUST NOW RECONSIDER ALL THE ISSUES INVOLVED. HOWEVER, AT WORKING LEVEL, STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY

HOWEVER, AT WORKING LEVEL, STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY THINK IT UNLIKELY THAT PAISLEY WILL BE ALLOWED INTO THE UNITED STATES

THOMAS

NNNN

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FROM DUBLIN 061700Z JANUARY 1982.
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 002 OF 06 JANUARY.
AND TO IMMEDIATE N I O BELFAST

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PROFESSOR DOOGE: VISIT TO NORTHERN IRELAND.

1. THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TOLD COUNSELLOR THIS AFTERNOON THAT THEIR MINISTER IS CONSIDERING A VISIT TO NORTHERN IRELAND ON 20/21 JANUARY. HE WOULD GO TO LONDONDERRY AND BELFAST BY CAR TO MEET LOCAL POLITICIANS AND CHURCH LEADERS. HE WOULD ALSO VISIT HIS WIFE'S FAMILY IN BELFAST. THE DEPARTMENT SAID THAT IRISH MINISTERS DID NOT NORMALLY VISIT STORMONT ON THIS SORT OF TRIP AND PROFESSOR DOOGE HOPED TO SEE MR PRIOR IN LONDON ON 29 JANUARY. PROFESSOR DOOGE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE AND BY DONLON OR NELIGAN PLUS A COUPLE OF JUNIOR DFA OFFICIALS.

2. SECURITY AND DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE HANDLED BY THE GARDA/RUC NET. I AM SLIGHTLY SURPRISED BY THIS NEWS BECAUSE WHEN I DISCUSSED THE DATE OF THE MEETING FIXED FOR THE 29 JANUARY WITH PROFESSOR DOOGE I HAD EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS TOO SOON FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW TO THINK OF BELFAST AS A MEETING PLACE.

OF VIEW TO THINK OF BELFAST AS A MEETING PLACE.

3. ALTHOUGH THE DFA WERE NOT ASKING FOR OUR APPROVAL HE MIGHT BE WILLING TO POSTPONE HIS VISIT IF YOU OR THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND CONSIDERED THIS DESIRABLE. IF SO, WE SHOULD ACT BEFORE PLANS BECOME ANY FIRMER. IF I AM TO SPEAK TO THE MINISTER IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM MR PRIOR. ALTERNATIVELY, A PERSONAL TELEPHONE CALL WOULD BE LESS FORMAL AND PERHAPS PREFERABLE.

FIGG.

NNNNN

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FM FCO 061130Z JAN 82

TO PRIORITY CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1 OF 6 JANUARY 1982

PROSECUTION OF TERRORISTS BY THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND

1. TWO OF THE EIGHT PRISONERS WHO ESCAPED FROM CRUMLIN ROAD PRISON, BELFAST, ON 10 JUNE 1981 WERE SENTENCED TO 10 YEARS' IMPRISONMENT IN THE (NON-JURY) SPECIAL CRIMINAL COURT IN DUBLIN ON 23 DECEMBER 1981 ON CHARGES RELATING TO THEIR ESCAPTE. THEY WERE ROBERT JOSEPH CAMPBELL AND MICHAEL JAMES RYAN, BOTH OF WHOM HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN THE REPUBLIC AND CHARGED UNDER THE EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIMINAL LAW JURISDICTION ACT 1976, WHICH ENABLES THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND TO PROSECUTE THOSE WHO HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES IN NORTHERN IRELAND. (THE PARALLEL LEGISLATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND IS THE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION ACT 1975).

2. EACH PRISONER RECEIVED A 10 YEAR SENTENCE FOR USING A FIREARM IN THE COURSE OF THE ESCAPE, 8 YEARS FOR PRODUCING A FIREARM, 8 YEARS FOR POSSESSION OF A FIREARM WITH INTENT TO COMMIT GRIEVOUS BODILY HARM AND 5 YEARS FOR ESCAPING FROM LAWFUL CUSTODY, SENTENCES TO RUN CONCURRENTLY. THEY WERE BOTH ACQUITTED OF ATTEMPTED MURDER. ANOTHER TWO OF THE ESCAPERS ARE IN CUSTODY IN THE REPUBLIC, INCLUDING ONE RECAPTURED ON 3 JANUARY 1982 IN CORK.

LINE TO TAKE

3. THIS IS A WELCOME DEVELOPMENT AS IT IS THE FIRST TIME THAT THERE HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTIONS IN THE REPUBLIC UNDER THE RECIPROCAL LEGISLATION. IT USEFULLY ILLUSTRATES THE CLOSE CO-OPERATION WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN THE POLICE FORCES IN BOTH PARTS OF IRELAND. HOWEVER, WE ARE LOOKING FOR GREATER IMPROVEMENTS WITH ARRANGEMENTS FOR ENSURING THAT SUSPECTED TERRORISTS CANNOT ESCAPE JUSTICE BY FLEEING FROM ONE JURISDICTION TO THE OTHER. THIS ISSUE IS CURRENTLY THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND IRISH ATTORNEYS GENERAL.

CARRINGTON

BY TELEGRAPH

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THE HAGUE
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 20 OF 5 JANUARY 1982
INFO CG NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK, NIO LONDON AND NIO BELFAST
INFO SAVING OTHER CG IN USA, DUBLIN

NORTHERN IRELAND: NORAID COURT CASE

1. THE NEW YORK APPEAL COURT HAS TODAY UPHELD LAST YEAR'S FINDING BY A NEW YORK COURT THAT THE IRISH NORTHERN AID COMMITTEE (NORAID) MUST REGISTER AS AGENTS OF THE PROVISIONAL IRA IN THE UNITED STATES. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HAVE NOT YET SEEN THE DETAILS OF THE RULING BUT UNDERSTAND THAT IT HAS ENDORSED THE FINDINGS AND STIPULATIONS OF THE LOWER COURT IN EVERY RESPECT.

2. THE ONLY RECOURSE NOW OPEN TO NORAID IS AN APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT. THE PRELIMINARY VIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IS THAT THE SUPREME COURT IS QUITE LIKELY TO REFUSE TO CONSIDER THE CASE. EVEN IF THEY DO CONSIDER IT, IT IS MOST UNLIKELY THAT THE SUPREME COURT WILL OVERTURN THE APPEAL COURT FINDING.

3. IN RESPONSE TO PRESS ENQUIRIES, WE HAVE WELCOMED THE APPEAL COURT'S DECISION.

FCO PASS SAVING DUBLIN

THOMAS [REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Prime Minister

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TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2003 OF 30 DECEMBER
AND TO PRIORITY BIS NEW YORK
MY TELEGRAM NO.43 TO BIS NEW YORK : SPEAKING TOUR OF MR AUSTIN CURRIE

1. IN VIEW OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF MR PAISLEY'S VISA, MR PRIOR FEELS THAT IT WOULD BE PRUDENT FOR HMG TO SPONSOR A MODERATE UNIONIST ON A VISIT TO THE US, AND THAT MR CURRIE'S VISIT SHOULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL EARLY SUMMER UNLESS A COMPARABLE VISIT CAN BE ARRANGED EARLIER IN THE YEAR. WE CONSIDER SUCH A VISIT WOULD BE GENERALLY HELPFUL.

2. NIO WILL THEREFORE TRY TO SET UP A VISIT IN THE NEW YEAR, TO TAKE PLACE BEFORE MR CURRIE'S VISIT, IE. CONCLUDING BEFORE 8 MACCH. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO FIND THE RIGHT CANDIDATE. NIO ARE CONSIDERING HAROLD MCCUSKER MP (BUT IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT HE COULD GO) AND JOHN CARSON, FORMER LORD MAYOR OF BELFAST. THE VISIT CAN BE PAID FOR FROM OFFICIAL FUNDS THOUGH IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE IF A WILLING HOST, AS IN MR CURRIE'S CASE, COULD BE FOUND TO FINANCE SUBSISTENCE COSTS.

3. BEFORE NIO MAKE ANY APPROACHES AND CONFIRM ARRANGEMENTS TO MR CURRIE, GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS ON WHETHER YOU AND BIS COULD ARRANGE A SUITABLE PROGRAMME.

CARRINGTON

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TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON TELNO 15 OF 30 DECEMBER 1981

REPEATED FCO
NIO (BELFAST)
BIS NEW YORK.

NORTHERN IRELAND: REVOCATION OF PAISLEY'S VISAM

1. IN RESPONSE TO BOSTON GLOBE EDITORIAL OF 23 DECEMBER CRITICISING REVOCATION OF VISA, SPEAKER O'NEILL AND SENATOR KENNEDY HAVE WRITTEN FOLLOWING JOINT LETTER TO GLOBE PUBLISHED TODAY. BEGINS

+ IN YOUR RECENT EDITORIAL, +PAISLEY'S VISA,+ YOU EXPRESS REGRET THAT WE JOINED IN THE SUCCESFUL EFFORT TO URGE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO INVALIDATE A VISA HELD BY IAN PAISLEY FOR TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES. IN FACT, THIS ACTION WAS ESSENTIAL TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY CONDEMNED THE KILLING AND DESTRUCTION ON BOTH SIDES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, AND WE HAVE CALLED ON ALL AMERICANS TO AVOID ANY ACTION - BY WORD OR DEED OR DOLLAR - THAT CONTRIBUTES IN ANY WAY TO THE VIOLENCE. WE HAVE WELCOMED VISITS TO THIS COUNTRY BY RESPONSIBLE SPOKESMEN FOR BOTH THE IRISH CATHOLIC TRADITION AND THE IRISH PROTESTANT TRADITION.

BUT MR PAISLEY IS NOTORIOUS FOR HIS INCITEMENT OF VIOLENCE AND RELIGIOUS BIGOTRY IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND HIS RESISTANCE TO ANY AND ALL PROGRESS TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT. HE WAS RECENTLY SUSPENDED FROM SERVING IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT BECAUSE OF HIS DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES ON THE FLOOR OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. YOUR EDITORIAL ITSELF STATES THAT PAISLEY WOULD BE +SPEAKING AND RAISING FUNDS FOR WHAT HE CALLS 'THE PROTESTANT CAUSE,' +. THIS COULD PROVE TO BE ONE OF HIS MOST LETHAL ACTIVITIES -IN EFFECT SOLICITING AMERICAN DOLLARS FOR HIS CAUSE OF INTRANSIGENCE AND VIOLENCE AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE DEATHS OF INNOCENT IRISH CATHOLIC MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

/ AS READERS

AS READERS OF THE GLOBE ARE WELL AWARE, NOT ALL FORMS OF SPEECH ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES. IN OUR VIEW, PERMITTING IAN PAISLEY TO SPREAD HIS GOSPEL OF VIOLENCE IN THIS COUNTRY WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO PERMITTING HIM TO SHOUT +FIRE+ IN THE CROWDED THEATER OF NORTHERN IRELAND. WORSE STILL, AVERICANS WOULD NOT SEE THE BLOODY RESULTS IN BELFAST, DERRY AND OTHER CITIES AND TOWNS WHICH WOULD ENSUE FROM HIS VISIT HERE.

WE THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN AND HIS ADMINISTRATION MADE THE RIGHT DECISION TO PREVENT MR PAISLEY FROM SPREADING HIS SECTARIAN MESSAGE OF INTOLERANCE AND BRUTALITY IN THE UNITED STATES.

WHAT IS NEEDED IN NORTHERN IRELAND IS A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT BASED ON RECONCILIATION BETWEEN CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT COMMUNITIES. WHAT IS NOT NEEDED IS MORE OF THE DIVISION, INTIMIDATION AND OPPRESSION ADVOCATED BY EXTREMISTS SUCH AS PAISLEY.

THIS IS AN ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT TIME FOR NORTHERN IRELAND. THE STATESMANLIKE POSITION FOR THE UNITED STATES IS NOT TO STRENGTHEN THE PSOITION OF THE MEN OF VIOLENCE BUT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WE SUPPORT THE PEACEFUL AND MODERATE PATH TOWARDS A JUST SOLUTION FREELY AGREED TO BY BOTH SIDES OF THE COMMUNITY IN THAT LAND''. ENDS.

MCKEARNEY

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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File SAW
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29 December, 1981

Arms from the United States for the RUC

The Prime Minister has seen and noted your letter of 24 December to John Coles about the Sterling AR 180.

I am copying this to Francis Richards. (FCO).

W. F. S. RICKETT

S. W. Boys Smith, Esq.
Northern Ireland Office

X ref please

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Prime Minister

You may wish to see the comment overleaf.

WM 30/12

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FM WASHINGTON 300150Z DEC 81
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3957 OF 29 DECEMBER
INFO ROUTINE BIS NEW YORK, NIO LONDON, NIO BELFAST
INFO SAVING SAN FRANCISCO

MY TELNO 3947: NORTHERN IRELAND: EXTRADITION

1. UNDER THE HEADING: QUOTE WHEN TO SHELTER A MURDERER UNQUOTE, TODAYS NEW YORK TIMES CARRIES AN EDITORIAL ABOUT THE CASES OF THE IRA TERRORIST DESMOND MACKIN AND THE PALESTINIAN TERRORIST ABU EAIN. THE EDITORIAL SAYS ALTHOUGH TERRORISM CAN BE DEFINED AS POLITICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE, THIS DOES NOT MEAN TERRORIST CASES QUALIFY FOR THE POLITICAL EXCEPTION. WHILE SHOOTING A BRITISH SOLDIER ON PLAIN-CLOTHES PATROL IN NORTHERN IRELAND HAS MORE OF A POLITICAL FLAVOUR THAN PLANTING A BOMB IN A CROWDED MARKET (ABU EAIN'S OFFENCE), MACKIN'S ACTION STILL SEEMS UNWORTHY OF RECOGNITION IN AMERICAN OR INTERNATIONAL LAW. THE US HAS ENDOWED BOTH CASES WITH TOO MUCH JUDICIAL SOLEMNITY. GRANTING ASYLUM TO EITHER ABU EAIN

OFFENCE), MAKING ACTION [illegible]
AMERICAN OR INTERNATIONAL LAW. THE US HAS ENDOWED BOTH CASES WITH TOO MUCH JUDICIAL SOLEMNITY. GRANTING ASYLUM TO EITHER ABU EAIN OR MACKIN WOULD DANGEROUSLY LEGITIMISE INDISCRIMINATE TERRORISM. THE NEW YORK TIMES ADDS THAT, IN TRYING TO DECIDE WHETHER THE CRIMES INVOLVED WERE POLITICAL, THE JUDGES WERE DRIVEN TO INCONSISTENT RULINGS. THE COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT THE MACKIN CASE GREW OUT OF A COMMONLY RECOGNISED POLITICAL UPRISING WAS A POLITICAL ONE BETTER LEFT TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT. THE NEW YORK TIMES ENDORSES PENDING LEGISLATION DESIGNED TO TAKE EXTRADITION MATTERS AWAY FROM THE COURTS AND TO LEAVE THE DECISION SOLELY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE. IT COMMENDS A SIMILAR TREND IN RECENT BILATERAL EXTRADITION TREATIES, EG BETWEEN THE US AND THE NETHERLANDS AND COLOMBIA. THE EDITORIAL CONCLUDES THAT, WHILE NO APPROACH WILL ESCAPE CONTROVERSY, LEAVING DIPLOMACY TO DIPLOMATS WILL PROVIDE BETTER AND SPEEDIER JUSTICE.

2. THE US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HAVE AGAIN URGED US TO CONSIDER RENEGOTIATING OUR OWN EXTRADITION TREATY WITH THE US TO BRING IT INTO LINE WITH THEIR CURRENT PRACTICE, IE TO TAKE CONSIDERATION OF THE POLITICAL OFFENCE ISSUE AWAY FROM THE COURTS. THEY ARE AT A LOSS TO UNDERSTAND OUR OBJECTION, NAMELY THAT WE WOULD THEN BE SUBJECT TO THE WHIM OF THE US SECRETARY OF STATE. THEY ARGUE THAT THE DIRECTION OF US POLICY UNDER BOTH THIS ADMINISTRATION AND THE LAST, IE TO CHANGE THE LAW TO MAKE IT EASIER TO EXTRADITE TERRORISTS, AND THE FACT THAT THEY KNOW OF ONLY ABOUT A DOZEN CASES IN THE ENTIRE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES IN WHICH A SECRETARY OF STATE HAS REFUSED TO AUTHORISE AN EXTRADITION, SHOW THAT OUR FEARS ARE ILLFOUNDED. MOREOVER, THE PROPOSED CHANGE WOULD NOT ACTUALLY GIVE THE SECRETARY OF STATE A POWER (IE TO WITHHOLD EXTRADITION) THAT HE DOES NOT ALREADY HAVE.

3. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES I BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A STRONG CASE FOR ADOPTING THE US PROPOSAL OR, AT THE VERY LEAST, FOR EXPLORING IT FURTHER AND IN DETAIL. WE COULD HARDLY BE WORSE OFF THAN AT PRESENT: WE HAVE LOST TWO EXTRADITION CASES (MCMULLEN AND MACKIN) AND RUN A CONSIDERABLE RISK OF LOSING A THIRD (QUINN).

HENDERSON

NNNN

GRS 350

CONFIDENTIAL

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DESKBY 291700Z

FM WASHINGTON 291615Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 3947 OF 29 DEC 81

INFO IMMEDIATE BIS NEW YORK NIO (LONDON) NIO (BELFAST) DUBLIN.

YOUR TELNO 1997 (NOT TO DUBLIN): NORTHERN IRELAND EXTRADITION : DESMOND MACKIN

1. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE U S ATTORNEY (BELOTE). WE SAID THAT, IN THE LIGHT OF THE APPEAL COURT'S DECISION NOT TO REVIEW THE CASE, AND IN THE LIGHT OF ADVICE FROM ALL THE U S AUTHORITIES CONCERNED THAT WE WOULD NOT WIN A NEW HEARING IN THE DISTRICT COURT, WE WERE PREPARED TO AUTHORISE BELOTE NOT TO FILE FOR THE CASE TO BE REHEARD.

2. BELOTE HAS NOW SPOKEN TO MACKIN'S LAWYERS WHO HAVE AGREED THAT MACKIN SHOULD BE DEPORTED. SUBJECT TO A FORMAL DEPORTATION HEARING TODAY, MACKIN WILL BE PUT ON AER LINGUS FLIGHT 104 FOR DUBLIN, LEAVING NEW YORK AT 1945 TOMORROW (30 DECEMBER) AND ARRIVING IN DUBLIN AT 0825 LOCAL TIME ON 31 DECEMBER. HE WILL REMAIN IN CUSTODY IN THE MEANTIME.

3. NEWS OF MACKIN'S IMPENDING DEPORTATION WILL PROBABLY BECOME PUBLIC TODAY. IF QUESTIONED, WE SHALL SAY THAT, IN THE LIGHT OF THE APPEAL COURT'S FINDING THAT IT COULD NOT CONSIDER THE CASE (BECAUSE OF A LEGAL TECHNICALITY) AND IN THE ABSENCE OF GUIDANCE FROM THE APPEAL COURT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CASE IE HOW THE UK/US EXTRADITION TREATY SHOULD BE APPLIED TO TERRORIST CASES, WE HAVE REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WOULD BE NO ADVANTAGE IN A SECOND HEARING, IN DISTRICT COURT, WHICH WOULD MERELY COVER ALL THE GROUND TRODDEN IN THE FIRST HEARING. UNATTRIBUTABLY, WE WILL DRAW ATTENTION TO THE LEGISLATION NOW BEFORE CONGRESS WHICH WOULD TAKE THE WHOLE QUESTION OF EXTRADITION AWAY FROM THE COURTS. WE SHALL ALSO POINT OUT THAT IF, PENDING THE PASSAGE OF THE NEW LEGISLATION BEFORE CONGRESS, THE DISTRICT COURT HAD CONFIRMED THE ORIGINAL DECISION IN MACKIN'S FAVOUR, THIS WOULD HAVE SET AN UNDESIRABLE PRECEDENT IN LAW. THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION, WHILE UNWELCOME, DOES NOT SET ANY PRECEDENTS.

CCN: INFO MO (BELFAST) SHOULD READ NIO (BELFAST)

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PPS

(2)

with the
compliments of

Sir John Biggs-Davison M.P.

Prime Minister

A.J.C. 5/1

p.a.
A.J.C. 6/1.

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

From: Sir John Biggs-Davison M.P.

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SWIA OAA

24th December 1981

I am deeply concerned as are a number of colleagues experienced and keenly interested in Northern Ireland, that in your House on the 17th December you should have rejected out of hand what is called 'integration'.

On previous part

I have spoken and corresponded with Jim Prior and the Prime Minister in protest at the closing of this option and am sending them a copy of this letter. It seems to me as unwise as when Henry Colyton (then Hopkinson) described one 'political solution' for Cyprus as 'never' to be granted.

He wrote in May last year

I enclose a copy of my letter which appeared in the Daily Telegraph on the 23rd December.

The Earl of Gowrie.

DT 23·XII·81

Dispersing pessimism on Northern Ireland

From Sir JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON, M P (Con.)

SIR—Congratulations on your bumper Ulster editorial page!

May you succeed in dispersing the fog of wishful thinking punctuated by pessimism that clouds counsel in Whitehall. Wishful thinking goes to the extent of courting rebuff after rebuff as Convention succeeds Assembly and "economic forum" takes the place of political talks.

The pessimism appears in what you describe as the "highly questionable view" that Roman Catholic "natives" will outbreed Protestant "planters." Demographic forecasts are notoriously uncertain.

What is certain is the preference you mention of a substantial Roman Catholic minority for the Union over the Republic. The poll published in the SUNDAY TIMES on June 28 gave, despite its defeatist misinterpretation of the result, 39 per cent. of Northern Ireland Roman Catholics as finding permanent integration with Great Britain as acceptable while 62 per cent. wanted an "assembly with guarantees for Catholics."

They are ignored, not encouraged, by the media and most politicians. These unionists, with a small "u," may have little love for any Unionist party. Many would support a Conservative-Unionist alliance seen to be non-sectarian and not tied to the Orange Order.

It is not enough for our leaders to repeat the grudging incantation to the effect that the Union will persist while the majority insist.

This frigid attitude encourages terrorism. Unionist fears and IRA hopes feed on an uncertainty bred by fruitless political initiatives about fancy constitutions which would put Northern Ireland at arm's length from Great Britain. One parliament in the United Kingdom is enough.

Given just representation in both Houses, the concern sometimes expressed that Ulster politicians must have scope is surely met. Northern Ireland is a province the size of Yorkshire; Westminster protects minorities better than Stormont did.

So you are right to advocate a "modest restoration" of local government. In some district councils Social Democratic and Labour party work well with Unionists. The Secretary of State has the sticks and carrots to allay minority fears and cure abuses.

You also do well to defend "Anglo-Irish" co-operation and to assert the prime common interest of the two sovereign States within these islands in the defeat of movements vowed to destroy them both.

Put the Union beyond doubt and develop "unique relationship." The secession of the South from the United Kingdom inevitably followed by Northern secession from the South rules out a United Ireland. United Islands are possible.

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON
House of Commons.

NORTHERN IRELAND: ADVANCE COPIES ~~18~~ 26

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MR BULLARD
~~MR FERGUSSON~~
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N IRELAND OFFICE - PS TO SEC OF STATE
RM 66 A/2 GGS

N IRELAND OFFICE [4 copies]

MR ~~WHITFIELD~~ Woodfield
MR MARSHALL
~~MR MORIARTY~~ Mr GLANGEL
MR HARRINGTON

CABINET OFFICE - SIR R ARMSTRONG
DIO

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FM WASHINGTON 242310Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 3929 OF 24 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE NIO LONDON, NIO BELFAST
ROUTINE BIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 3497: NORTHERN IRELAND EXTRADITION: DESMOND MACKIN

1. THE NEW YORK APPEAL COURT DECIDED TODAY THAT IT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE US GOVERNMENT'S APPEAL AGAINST A LOWER COURT'S EARLIER RULING IN FAVOUR OF THE IRA TERRORIST, DESMOND MACKIN. FOR THE TIME BEING, MACKIN WILL REMAIN IN CUSTODY. IF EVENTS FOLLOW THE USUAL COURSE THE APPEAL COURT WILL, WITHIN THE NEXT THREE WEEKS, HAND DOWN A MANDATE IMPLEMENTING ITS DECISION AND THAT OF THE LOWER COURT. THIS WOULD LEAD TO MACKIN'S RELEASE. IT IS HOWEVER PROBABLE THAT MACKIN'S LAWYERS WILL APPLY TO HAVE THE MANDATE IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY, IN WHICH CASE HE COULD BE OUT OF GAOL AS EARLY AS MONDAY, 28 DECEMBER.

2. NOW THAT THE US GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPT TO BREAK WITH LEGAL PRECEDENT, BY GOING STRAIGHT TO THE APPEAL COURT, HAS FAILED, THE

2. NOW THAT THE US GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPT TO BREAK WITH LEGAL PRECEDENT, BY GOING STRAIGHT TO THE APPEAL COURT, HAS FAILED, THE CASE WILL AUTOMATICALLY GO TO THE DISTRICT COURT FOR A NEW HEARING. IT REMAINS THE VIEW OF THE US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE THAT WE ARE UNLIKELY TO WIN THIS CASE. THE ORIGINAL FINDING BY THE NEW YORK MAGISTRATE THAT MACKIN WAS NOT EXTRADITABLE WAS DAMAGING, IN PARTICULAR FOR OUR CASE AGAINST THE TERRORIST QUINN, WHICH IS TO BE HEARD IN SAN FRANCISCO IN FEBRUARY. IF THE DISTRICT COURT WERE TO UPHOLD THE MAGISTRATE'S FINDING, WE WOULD HAVE EVEN LESS CHANCE OF EXTRADITING QUINN, OR ANY OTHER IRA FUGITIVE.

3. THE US LAWYERS HAVE PUT TO US THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS:

(A) WE GO AHEAD WITH A NEW HEARING IN THE DISTRICT COURT, EVEN THOUGH WE WILL PROBABLY LOSE. WE WOULD SEEK TO HAVE MACKIN HELD IN GAOL PENDING THE COURT HEARING BUT THE CHANCES ARE THAT HE WOULD BE ALLOWED OUT ON BAIL. THE MAIN DIS-ADVANTAGES OF THIS COURSE OF ACTION ARE THAT WE WOULD PROBABLY LOSE THE CASE AT THE END OF THE DAY AND THAT, PENDING THE NEW HEARING, MACKIN WOULD BE FREE TO MAKE FUND RAISING SPEECHES ON BEHALF OF NORAID.

(B) THE CASE IS DROPPED AND, IN RETURN, MACKIN'S LAWYERS AGREE THAT HE SHOULD BE DEPORTED, PROBABLY TO THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND. THIS HAS THE ADVANTAGE THAT WE WOULD NOT SUFFER A DAMAGING DEFEAT IN THE COURT. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WOULD BE OBVIOUS THAT WE HAD DROPPED THE CASE BECAUSE WE THOUGHT WE COULD NOT WIN, AND WE COULD BE ACCUSED OF CONNIVING TO ALLOW A TERRORIST MURDERER TO GO FREE.

(C) WHILE MAINTAINING OUR REQUEST FOR EXTRADITION (AND FOR A NEW HEARING IN THE DISTRICT COURT) THE US GOVERNMENT LAWYERS COULD, WITH A NOD AND A WINK TO MACKIN'S LAWYERS, ARRANGE FOR MACKIN TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. THEY CALL THIS SELF-DEPORTATION. THIS COURSE HAS THE ADVANTAGE THAT OUR REQUEST FOR EXTRADITION WOULD REMAIN ON THE TABLE BUT THAT THE CASE WOULD NEVER ACTUALLY COME TO COURT BECAUSE OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE DEFENDANT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE US AUTHORITIES WOULD NOT ADOPT THIS COURSE OF ACTION WITHOUT AT LEAST A HINT FROM US AND THERE IS THEREFORE A RISK OF DAMAGING PUBLICITY AS IN (B) ABOVE.

4. WHEN WE DECIDED TO SEEK MACKIN'S EXTRADITION WE WERE WELL AWARE OF THE RISKS INVOLVED. NONE OF THESE OPTIONS IS ATTRACTIVE. BUT (A) SEEMS TO US TO BE THE MOST STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LEAST OBJECTIONABLE. SHOULD MACKIN SLIP THE COUNTRY WHILE OUT ON BAIL, RESULTING IN THE CASE BEING DROPPED, WE WOULD PRESUMABLY NOT SHED TOO MANY TEARS. BUT THAT WOULD BE QUITE DIFFERENT FROM CONNIVING AT HIS DEPORTATION.

5. BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF EARLY ACTION BY HIS LAWYERS TO

2. BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF EARLY ACTION BY HIS LAWYERS TO SECURE MACKIN'S RELEASE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE A REPLY BY 281700Z.

HENDERSON

NNNN

Prime Minister 2
WM 24/12

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SWIP 3AJ

John Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON WC1

24 December 1981

MT

Dear John,

ARMS FROM THE UNITED STATES FOR THE RUC

In your letter of 14 December you put to us the question that the Prime Minister had raised about the Sterling AR 180.

The view of the Sterling that we reflected was based on an assessment by the RUC of the particular needs they had for rifles in their particular circumstances: largely border patrolling. It should not be taken as a general comment on the Sterling.

As you will know, the AR 180 is manufactured by the Sterling Arms Co., a private company, for a variety of customers and not at all specifically for the particular needs of the RUC in Northern Ireland.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Francis Richards (FCO).

Yours ever
SWBS

S W BOYS SMITH

Ireland

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File

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 December 1981

Northern Ireland

The Prime Minister has read Mr. Prior's minute of 21 December about his meeting with Mr. Molyneaux, Mr. McCusker and some of their official unionist colleagues.

The Prime Minister has commented that her main worry about devolved Government is the effect it would have on Scotland. Furthermore, she sees little prospect of sufficient agreement to secure an effective devolution.

I am copying this letter to John Halliday (Home Office), David Heyhoe (Lord President's Office) and Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office).

A. J. COLES

Stephen Boys-Smith, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

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(13009) Dd.532910 5m 10/69 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863
(14154) Dd.737147 10m 6/70 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863

Ireland

REFERENCES

A : 8 December 1981 : Hansard Vol.14, Col.722

PRIME MINISTER'S QUESTIONS : 22 DECEMBER 1981

NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES : REVOCATION OF MR PAISLEY'S AMERICAN VISA

IS IT PROPER FOR AN ALLY TO REFUSE ENTRY TO AN ELECTED MEMBER OF THIS HOUSE?

1. The decision was a matter for the American Government, just as the question of a visa for anyone wishing to enter the United Kingdom is a matter for the British Government.

DID THE AMERICANS CONSULT HMG?

2. The decision was a matter for the American Government. Our Embassy and the State Department have naturally been in touch on all aspects of the visit. The State Department have been made aware that the Hon Member for Antrim North is a Member of this House and a Member of the European Parliament.

/WILL HMG PROTEST?

WILL HMG PROTEST?

3. It would not be proper for the British Government to seek to influence the American decision. I would not expect any other government to try to influence our decision on the issue of visas to anyone wishing to come to the United Kingdom.

UNITED STATES POLICY ON NORTHERN IRELAND - JUDGE CLARK'S COMMENTS ON IRISH UNIFICATION IN A TV INTERVIEW

4. As I said in reply to a question from the Hon Member for Bebington and Ellesmere Port on the 8th of December, 'The future of Northern Ireland is a matter both for the people of Northern Ireland and for the United Kingdom Parliament.'. I should also make it perfectly clear that in his letter [to Dr FitzGerald], President Reagan said that he equally 'understood that the matter could not be solved in any way by the United States of America but only by those concerned.'.

AMERICAN BAN ON THE SALE OF ARMS TO THE RUC

5. I understand that the RUC are satisfied with the range of weapons at their disposal, but of course requirements are reviewed from time to time.

WILL HMG PROTEST?

3. It would not be proper for the British Government to seek to influence the American decision. I would not expect any other government to try to influence our decision on the issue of visas to anyone wishing to come to the United Kingdom.

UNITED STATES POLICY ON NORTHERN IRELAND - JUDGE CLARK'S COMMENTS ON IRISH UNIFICATION IN A TV INTERVIEW

A 4. As I said in reply to a question from the Hon Member for Bebington and Ellesmere Port on the 8th of December, 'The future of Northern Ireland is a matter both for the people of Northern Ireland and for the United Kingdom Parliament.'. I should also make it perfectly clear that in his letter [to Dr FitzGerald], President Reagan said that he equally 'understood that the matter could not be solved in any way by the United States of America but only by those concerned.'.

AMERICAN BAN ON THE SALE OF ARMS TO THE RUC

5. I understand that the RUC are satisfied with the range of weapons at their disposal, but of course requirements are reviewed from time to time.

BACKGROUND NOTE : REVOCATION OF MR PAISLEY'S AMERICAN VISA

1. The State Department announced yesterday:-

> 'Because of our grave concern about the divisive tone of Mr Paisley's actions and statements in recent weeks, the Department initiated a review about three weeks ago to determine whether anything Mr Paisley had said or done recently had made him ineligible for a visa under our laws. We have concluded that Mr Paisley's presence in the United States is prejudicial to the US public interest and his visa has been invalidated. This obviously means that he may not enter the United States.'.

In addition to the reasons given in this statement, the State Department no doubt considered that to allow Mr Paisley in, only weeks after they had turned down Owen Carron, would have played into the hands of those who want Owen Carron to be issued with a visa and weakened the position of moderates in Congress.

2. When he was in London Judge Clark asked Mr Prior whether he thought Mr Paisley's visa should be revoked. Mr Prior replied that it was a matter for the American Government but that on balance he thought the Americans should not revoke the visa. Mr Paisley is not aware of this. When he called on the Lord Privy Seal on Thursday, 17 December, he was told that the State Department had not consulted the FCO.

/American Policy

American Policy on Northern Ireland

3. In an interview broadcast on Irish TV on 7 December Judge Clark referred to the prayer of all Americans for Irish unfication. The American line since has been that their policy towards Northern Ireland is as stated in
B President Reagan's St Patrick's Day statement and his
C letter to Dr FitzGerald. A State Department spokesman said on 9 December 'The United States has no position on the question of Irish reunification.'.

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Prime Minister

MR 21/12

My main worry about devolved government is the effect it would have on Scotland. Further I see little prospect of sufficient agreement to secure an effective devolution. MT.

Prime Minister

I thought you would like to know of a meeting I had at the beginning of the week with Jim Molyneaux, Harold McCusker and a number of their official unionist colleagues.

As you know, there has been some debate in official unionist circles over whether the Party should seek the establishment of a devolved government or the integration of the Province into Great Britain. Enoch Powell and Jim Molyneaux have been amongst those to hold the view that integration was the right course. Enoch Powell is firmly of that opinion; Jim Molyneaux has recently argued it on the basis that devolution in a form acceptable was not apparently on offer and that integration was the only alternative.

There has been a good deal of dissatisfaction in unionist circles with Jim Molyneaux's leadership, and a growing body of opinion that the Party should press for devolved government. The two questions have become bound up. Harold McCusker - previously an integrationist - is one of those who has made public his support for devolution. At its conference in October the Party rejected an attempt by Jim Molyneaux to commit itself to seeking integration on the ground that an acceptable form of devolution was unobtainable.

In these circumstances it is significant that at my recent meeting Jim Molyneaux unequivocally, though not fullsomely, committed himself to supporting devolved government and did so on behalf of his Party. This leaves Enoch Powell in a very isolated position. It also means that those of our backbenchers, amongst them John Biggs-Davison, who have supported integration can no longer claim to be in line with the official unionist leadership. I have never felt that integration was a practicable policy, and have said so. Some of our colleagues have been unhappy about this, and it is relevant that their views are not now supported by any important political group in Northern Ireland.

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/...

I am sending copies of this minute to Willie Whitelaw, Francis Pym and Michael Jopling.

JP

21 December 1981

VSA

GRS 300 CONFIDENTIAL

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PS TO PM. NO 10 DOWNING STREET

FM WASHINGTON 220040Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 3889 OF 21 DEC 81
INFO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST
PRIORITY DUBLIN BIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING CGS USA.

M I P T : PAISLEY

1. THE DECISION TO REVOKE PAISLEY'S VISA WAS CLEARLY TAKEN BY JUDGE CLARK THOUGH, ACCORDING TO WHAT HE TOLD ME (MY TELNO 3880) HE HAD THE BACKING OF THE PRESIDENT. FROM ONE OR TWO HINTS THAT HAVE BEEN DROPPED TO US WE SUSPECT THAT, AT OFFICIAL LEVEL, THE STATE DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDATION WAS TO LET PAISLEY IN BUT NOT TO RECEIVE HIM AT ANY LEVEL WITHIN THE US GOVERNMENT.

2. PAISLEY WILL NO DOUBT CLAIM THAT THIS DECISION IS A VICTORY FOR THE WILD MEN IN CONGRESS. WHILE CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE WAS UNDOUBTEDLY A MAJOR FACTOR, THE STATE DEPARTMENT WERE ALSO CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT TO ALLOW PAISLEY IN, WEEKS AFTER THEY HAD TURNED DOWN OWEN CARRON, WOULD HAVE PLAYED INTO THE HANDS OF BIAGGI AND WEAKENED THE POSITION OF CONGRESSIONAL MODERATES. THE MODERATES IN TURN HOPE THAT THE FACT THAT HE HAS BEEN DENIED ENTRY TO THE UNITED STATES BY A CONSERVATIVE REPUBLICAN ADMINISTRATION WILL GIVE EVEN MR PAISLEY PAUSE FOR THOUGHT.

3. STATE DEPARTMENT WERE ALSO WORRIED ABOUT THE SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE VISIT. THEY ARE NOW CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF RETALIATORY THREATS AGAINST THEIR CONSUL GENERAL IN BELFAST. I BELIEVE THAT THE US EMBASSY IN LONDON WILL BE APPROACHING YOU ABOUT THIS. WE HAVE TOLD THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT WE ARE SURE THAT THE AUTHORITIES IN BELFAST WILL WISH TO RESPOND AS HELPFULLY AS POSSIBLE.

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FM WASHINGTON 220030Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3888 OF 21 DECEMBER 1981,
INFO IMMEDIATE N I O BELFAST,
INFO PRIORITY DUBLIN, B I S NEW YORK,
INFO ROUTINE C G NEW YORK,
INFO SAVING C GS U S A.

MY TELNO 3880 (NOT TO ALL): PAISLEY

1. STATE DEPARTMENT MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT EARLIER TODAY:

''BECAUSE OF OUR GRAVE CONCERN ABOUT THE DIVISIVE TONE OF MR PAISLEY'S ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS IN RECENT WEEKS, THE DEPARTMENT INITIATED A REVIEW ABOUT THREE WEEKS AGO TO DETERMINE WHETHER ANYTHING MR PAISLEY HAD SAID OR DONE RECENTLY HAD MADE HIM INELIGIBLE FOR A VISA UNDER OUR LAWS. WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT MR PAISLEY'S PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE U S PUBLIC INTEREST AND HIS VISA HAS BEEN INVALIDATED. THIS OBVIOUSLY MEANS THAT HE MAY NOT ENTER THE UNITED STATES''.

2. ASKED WHAT MR PAISLEY HAD SAID OR DONE WHICH HAD MADE HIM INELIGIBLE FOR A VISA, THE SPOKESMAN SAID: ''I CANNOT GIVE YOU ANY OF THE SPECIFIC STATEMENTS THAT HE MADE, BUT THE OVERALL JUDGMENT OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN JUDGE CLARK SQUARE BRACKETS END IS THAT HIS PRESENCE HERE WOULD BE PREJUDICIAL TO THE U S PUBLIC INTEREST''.

3. STATE DEPARTMENT ARE MAKING CLEAR THAT THE EXCLUSION APPLIES ONLY TO PAISLEY AND NOT TO THE OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS GROUP. THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ASKED WHETHEG WE WERE CONSULTED ABOUT THE DECISION BUT PROPOSE TO TAKE THE LINE THAT, WHILE THE U S AND U K AUTHORITIES HAD BEEN IN TOUCH ABOUT MR PAISLEY'S VISIT, THE QUESTION OF A VISA WAS A MATTER FOR DECISION BY THE U S GOVERNMENT. THEY SAY THAT THEY RECOGNISE THAT IT WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL TO OFFER ANY COMMENT ON H M G'-S ATTITUDE.

/4.

4. BOTH SPEAKER O'NEILL AND SENATOR KENNEDY HAVE ISSUED STATEMENTS SAYING THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE MADE THE RIGHT DECISION. O'NEILL SAID THAT, WHILE IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE U S GOVERNMENT TO ADVOCATE A PARTICULAR SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF NORTHERN IRELAND, IT WAS APPROPRIATE FOR THE U S GOVERNMENT TO SUPPORT A PEACEFUL, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND TO OPPOSE THE USE OF VIOLENCE. PAISLEY WAS A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE U S WAS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO GIVE HIM ACCESS TO A FORUM FOR HIS VIEWS IN AMERICA. CONGRESSMAN CARNEY (THE MEMBER OF BIAGGI'S COMMITTEE WHO ORGANISED A LETTER, SIGNED BY 109 OF HIS COLLEAGUES, URGING THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO REVOKE PAISLEY'S VISA) IS CLAIMING THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S DECISION HAS BEEN MADE IN RESPONSE TO CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE.

5. SEE M I F T.

HENDERSON.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 December 1981

Reference

INSURANCE OR COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE VICTIMS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS

The Prime Minister was grateful for the Chancellor's minute of 18 December on this subject.

Subject to the views of colleagues, she is satisfied with the arrangements set out by the Chancellor.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other members of the Cabinet; and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. C. SCHOLAR

John Kerr, Esq.,
H.M. Treasury.

NORTHERN IRELAND: ADVANCE COPIES 21

PS
PS/LPS
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
HD/RID
HD/PUSD (2)
HD/IPD
HD/NEWS DEPT
Hd NAD ...
Mr Davis
Mr Wade ...
RESIDENT CLERK

N IRELAND OFFICE - PS TO SEC OF STATE
RM 66 A/2 GGS

N IRELAND OFFICE [4 copies]
MR ~~WHITFIELD~~ Woodfield
MR MARSHALL
~~MR MORIARTY~~ Mr G L Angel
MR HARRINGTON

CABINET OFFICE - SIR R ARMSTRONG
DIO

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 211541Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3880 OF 21 DECEMBER 1981
INFO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST, DUBLIN

ADVANCE COPY

PAISLEY

1. JUDGE CLARK HAS TELEPHONED ME TO SAY THAT IT HAS BEEN DECIDED TO DENY PAISLEY ENTRY TO THE UNITED STATES. THIS WAS BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED THAT TO ADMIT HIM WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH HIS POLICY OF RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT PARTIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE INTENTION WAS TO MAKE THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN A LOW KEY.

Not true.

2. CLARK ALSO SAID THAT ON HIS RECENT VISIT TO LONDON MR PRIOR AND MR ATKINS HAD SAID THAT THEY DID NOT FEEL STRONGLY ON THE SUBJECT OF PAISLEY'S ADMISSION TO THE USA. I MENTION THIS BECAUSE THE STATE DEPARTMENT MAY LEAK THIS.

HENDERSON

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Ireland

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

John Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

21 December 1981

AR 21/12
p.a.

Dear John,

NORTHERN IRELAND: SECURITY

Thank you for your letter of 11 December (addressed to Stephen Boys Smith) with which you forwarded an extract from a private letter the Prime Minister had received containing a number of recommendations for improving security in Northern Ireland.

The suggestions do not break new ground and, as you would expect, are the sort of matters that the security forces in Northern Ireland consider all the time. We have however referred them to the police and Army in Northern Ireland for study and comment and if any points arise that merit consideration by the Prime Minister, I shall of course let you know.

Yours sincerely
Mike Hopkins

M W HOPKINS

BB

FILE

SECRET

VLB

3

21 December 1981

Northern Ireland Security Co-ordinator

The Prime Minister has seen Mr. Prior's minute of 17 December and the accompanying report by the security co-ordinator and has taken note of their contents.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Halliday (Home Office) and David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

A J COLES

Stephen Boys-Smith, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

SECRET

Not mine
AR 21/12

letter 11pm.d
MCA

With the Compliments
of the
Chancellor of the Exchequer's
Private Secretary

With apologies. This should have been attached to the Chancellor's minute of 18.12.81 about Terrorism and Insurance

Treasury Chambers,
Parliament Street,
S.W.1.

Injury Benefits

A. Civil Service

1. Civil servants who are injured or killed as a result of terrorist attacks, either while they are on duty or simply because they are civil servants, qualify for injury compensation benefits under section 11 of the Principal Civil Service Pension Scheme (PCSPS). Annual allowances and/or lump sums are paid to the civil servant , if his earning capacity is impaired, and to his dependants if he is killed.

2. The annual allowance payable to an injured civil servant tops up any pay or pension and certain of the national insurance benefits to which he may be entitled to provide him with a guaranteed minimum income of up to 85% of pensionable pay.

3. A lump sum of up to 6 months' pensionable pay is payable in addition to the annual allowance and in addition to any lump sum benefit payable under other provisions of the pension scheme.

4. If the civil servant is killed, his widow qualifies for a guaranteed minimum income of 45% of his pensionable pay, regardless of his length of service, and a lump sum of 3 months' pensionable pay in addition to any death benefit that is also payable. The guaranteed minimum income for each child is 10% of pensionable pay, if there is a widow, and 20% of pensionable pay, if no widow's benefit is payable. Similar benefits are payable in respect of a woman civil servant who was contributing for a widower's pension and/or whose children were entirely dependent on her. Benefits may also be paid to dependent parents, brothers or sisters.

B. Armed Forces

1. Personnel invalided from the Armed Forces with a degree of disability assessed at 20% or more and where the cause of invaliding is directly attributable to their service (as would normally be the case with a terrorist attack) are guaranteed a minimum income irrespective of their length of service. With 100% loss of function this is set at the equivalent of 66 2/3rds% of pensionable pay. Unlike the corresponding award to civil servants this is paid tax free. In addition, a terminal grant of 3 times the annual rate of non-attributable invalidity pension is paid together with an additional attributable gratuity.

2. Attributable Forces Family Pensions, which top up the normal widows' and children's pensions, are payable if a member of the Forces dies in service from causes attributable to service. Additional lump sum benefits are also payable. The amount of these benefits depend on the rank held by the husband at the time of his death.

C. Parliamentary Scheme

1. Death Gratuity: If an MP, Minister or office-holder dies in service, the Trustees may pay a gratuity of one year's pensionable salary as an MP at the rate current at death, or (if greater) return the contributions paid by the individual with 4% compound interest. The gratuity is paid to the deceased's personal representatives or to the spouse if so nominated by the MP, Minister or office-holder.

2. Widows', Widowers' and Dependants' Pensions: If a person dies in service as an MP and has 4 years' reckonable service, then for the succeeding three months the widow's pension (including any dependants' pensions payable to her) is supplemented to the rate of a pension equal to an MP's ordinary salary when the MP died. Similar provisions also apply if a widower's pension comes intopayment. The widow or widower's basic pension is at the rate of one half the prospective pension of the deceased MP. The pension for a dependent child is at the rate of $\frac{1}{4}$, up to a maximum of two. If the MP was under 65 his reckonable service will be enhanced for the purpose of calculating the widow's, widower's or dependants' pensions. However, total enhanced reckonable service may not exceed 40 years and the enhancement itself may not exceed the period from retirement to age 65.

3. If an MP dies in service without qualifying for a pension, then a short term pension at the rate of an MP's ordinary salary is paid for 3, $4\frac{1}{2}$ or 6 months according to the number of dependent children (0, 1 or more than 1 respectively).

ANNEX B

Personal Accident Insurance of Members

Arrangements have been made for a personal accident policy the premiums for which will be met from Public Funds, to cover the risk of death or injury on any day on which a Member is engaged on Parliamentary or Constituency business in the United Kingdom or abroad.

The policy does not cover bodily injury

(1) caused by or contributed to by

(a) war, whether declared or not, between any of the following countries, namely France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese Peoples Republic and the United States of America, or

(b) war in Europe, whether declared or not (other than civil war but excluding any enforcement action by or on behalf of the United Kingdom) in which France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese Peoples Republic and the United States of America or any armed forces thereof are engaged.

The exclusions shall not apply where the accident giving rise to a claim occurs whilst the Insured Person is actually on a journey from one country to another or whilst temporarily in any country during the course of a journey.

(2) sustained by an Insured Person while

(a) flying or taking part in other aerial activities except while travelling in an aircraft as a passenger and not as aircrew nor for the purpose of any trade or technical operation in or on the aircraft, or

(b) taking part in international motor rallies, mountaineering necessitating the use of ropes or guides, parachuting, potholing, racing of any kind (other than on foot or while yachting on inland or territorial waters) steeple-chasing or winter sports (other than curling or skating.)

2/....

3. arising from a cause gradually operating upon the Insured Person

4. consequent upon or contributed to by any physical or mental defect or infirmity from which an Insured Person was suffering at the time of the occurrence.

Although the premium is paid from Public Funds, any claims arising must be preferred by the Insured Person, his executors or administrators who, similarly, must prefer any legal action which may be undertaken against the Insurers.

The benefits provided by the policy with effect from 1st July, 1981 are as follows:

Death - a lump sum of £70,000

Irrecoverable loss of sight in one or both eyes;
or loss of one or more limbs;
or permanent and total loss of use of one or both hands or feet - a lump sum of £70,000

Permanent Total Disablement - a lump sum of £70,000

Temporary Total Disablement - £200 per week for so long as such disablement continues subject to a maximum of 104 weeks.

Medical Expenses - 15% of amount paid for Temporary Total Disablement subject to a limit of £500.

In the event of illness not arising from accidents and therefore not covered by the above insurance arrangements Members will wish to be aware of the following :

(i) Should any Member require urgent medical or dental treatment whilst travelling abroad on the business of the House the local Diplomatic Service Mission should be asked to advise about recommended practitioners.

(ii) Members are asked to pay their own medical or dental bills and on return to the House receipted bills should be forwarded to the Fees Office. Members will be reimbursed the costs of treatment and medical facilities normally provided by the U.K. National Health Service.

/ 3 .....

(iii) Members who, for personal reasons, either travel abroad in advance of official visits on the business of the House, or who remain abroad after such visits, are not covered during such periods by the arrangements in (i) and (ii) above and are advised to consider taking out private insurance against the risks involved.

Members will also wish to be aware that there is no provision foro a comprehensive insurance cover against loss or damage of personal property but that claims for compensation for such losses or damage will be considered by the Fees Office in accordance with public service rules. In practice, compensation may be paid where personal property (other than money or luxury articles) is lost or damaged, provided that the loss or damage is not otherwise covered by insurance and that the owner of the property has not been negligent. Members may therefore wish to protect interests by taking out personal insurance cover to guard against possible loss or damage to their personal property.

J. L. G. DOBSON
ACCOUNTANT

July, 1981

PS TO PM. NO 10 DOWNING STREET.

CONFIDENTIAL

41806 - 1

OO WASHINGTON
PP BIS NEW YORK
PP OTTAWA
GRS 608
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 181308Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1958 OF 18 DECEMBER
INFO PRIORITY NIO BELFAST, BIS NEW YORK, OTTAWA
INFO SAVING CONSULATES-GENERAL/USA, CONSULATE-GENERAL TORONTO
YOUR TELEGRAM NO.3825 (NOT TO OTTAWA OR TORONTO)
PAISLEY VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES

1. PAISLEY AND ROBINSON, ACCOMPANIED BY BURNSIDE AND ALLISTER, CALLED ON THE LORD PRIVY SEAL YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. THEY SOUGHT CLARIFICATION OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO THE DELEGATION'S VISIT AND WANTED TO KNOW WHAT ASSISTANCE THEY COULD OBTAIN FROM POSTS. THEY ASKED WHETHER THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD APPROACHED THE 'FOREIGN OFFICE' ON THE QUESTION OF VISAS AND WHAT THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE WOULD BE IF THEY WERE APPROACHED. THEY ASKED WHAT ROLE HMG WOULD PLAY IN SEEKING ADEQUATE SECURITY PROTECTION.

2. IN RESPONSE TO THIS QUESTION THE LORD PRIVY SEAL SAID THAT THE DELEGATION WOULD BE TREATED IN PRECISELY THE SAME WAY AS ANY OTHER DELEGATION CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF A MINORITY PARTY IN PARLIAMENT. THE GOVERNMENT WERE NOT SPONSORING THE VISIT. (MR PAISLEY AFFIRMED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THAT THE DELEGATION DID NOT WISH TO BE SPONSORED BECAUSE THEY DID NOT WANT TO APPEAR TO BE BRITISH GOVERNMENT PROPAGANDISTS.) THE AMBASSADOR WOULD RECEIVE THEM ON ARRIVAL AND HEADS OF SUB-SIDIARY POSTS WOULD ALSO RECEIVE THEM IF THEY WERE AVAILABLE. THE EMBASSY WOULD PASS ON THE GROUP'S SCHEDULE TO SUBSIDIARY POSTS. THE LORD PRIVY SEAL UNDERSTOOD THAT THE EMBASSY HAD PASSED ON TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT THE DELEGATION'S REQUESTS TO MEET MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATION. IF THEY HAD NOT HE WOULD ENSURE THAT THEY DID SO. THE EMBASSY WOULD SAY THAT THE DELEGATION HAD MADE A REQUEST TO SEE A PARTICULAR PERSON AND DRAW THE STATE

DEPARTMENT'S ATTENTION TO WHO THE DELEGATION WERE AND WHOM THEY REPRESENTED. IT WOULD BE UP TO THOSE CONCERNED TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO RECEIVE THE DELEGATION. THE EMBASSY WOULD SPEAK IN SIMILAR TERMS IF APPROACHED FOR ADVICE BY FIGURES OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATION.

3. THE LORD PRIVY SEAL SAID THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD NOT APPROACHED THE FOREIGN OFFICE ON THE QUESTION OF VISAS. IF THEY DID WE WOULD DRAW THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE DELEGATION INCLUDED AN ELECTED MP, AN ELECTED MEP AND ONE WHO HAD BEEN ELECTED TO BOTH PARLIAMENTS AND ASK THEM TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT. WE WOULD NOT OFFER THEM ADVICE AND WOULD NOT EXPECT OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO OFFER US ADVICE IN A SIMILAR SITUATION. WE WOULD NOT TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN APPROACHING THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

4. ON SECURITY THE LORD PRIVY SEAL SAID THAT IT WAS FOR THE AMERICANS TO ASSESS THE THREAT AND MAKE APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS. THE EMBASSY HAD ALREADY SPOKEN TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT ABOUT THIS. WE WOULD CERTAINLY MAKE IT KNOWN TO THE US AUTHORITIES THAT THE THREE PARLIAMENTARIANS HAD BODYGUARD PROTECTION: PAISLEY THROUGHOUT THE UNITED KINGDOM AND WHENEVER HE TRAVELLED IN EUROPE, ROBINSON AND TAYLOR ONLY IN NORTHERN IRELAND, ALTHOUGH TAYLOR SOMETIMES ALSO RECEIVED PROTECTION IN EUROPE. PAISLEY SAID THAT IF THE AUTHORITIES DID NOT GIVE PROTECTION THEN THE DELEGATION WOULD HAVE TO MAKE THEIR OWN ARRANGEMENTS AND THEY WOULD THEREFORE LIKE TO KNOW BEFORE THEY LEFT WHETHER PROTECTION WOULD BE PROVIDED AND WHETHER IT WOULD BE PROVIDED IN ALL TOWNS. THE LORD PRIVY SEAL SAID THAT ONCE IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE VISIT WOULD BE ABLE TO GO AHEAD IT WOULD BE PROPER FOR US TO SEEK TO DISCOVER WHAT LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE WAS TO BE PROVIDED AND PASS ON WHATEVER INFORMATION WE COULD OBTAIN, ALTHOUGH SINCE PROTECTION WOULD BE PROVIDED AT STATE AND CITY LEVEL IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO PROVIDE THE GROUP WITH PRECISE DETAILS.

5. FULL RECORD AND COPY OF THE GROUP'S SCHEDULE FOLLOW BY BAG.

CARRINGTON

LIMITED

RID
NAD
INFO DEPT
WED
MAED
NEWS D
SECURITY D
PUSD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/LORD TREFGARNE
PS/PUS
SIR A ACLAND
CHIEF CLERK
MR ADAMS
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
LORD N G LENNOX
MR BRAITHWAITE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

NORTHERN IRELAND

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

(1)

Are you satisfied with these arrangements, subject to the views of colleagues?

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

Yes mt.

MCS 18/12

PRIME MINISTER

At Cabinet on 19 November I was asked to investigate whether adequate insurance or compensation arrangements exist for the victims of terrorist attacks. We had in mind the increasing possibility of terrorist attacks in Great Britain giving rise to:

a. the risk of death or injury to members of the general public;

b. the risk of death or injury to public servants and office-holders; and

c. damage to property.

I have reviewed the arrangements for each of these areas.

Injury to the general public

2. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Schemes (CICS) are widely drawn to compensate those who suffer death or personal injury "directly attributable to a crime of violence .....". Within certain earnings limits, compensation is assessed on the basis of common law damages and normally takes the form of a lump sum payment. However, to avoid double compensation for the same loss, the amounts under the CICS take into account any social security benefits and benefits payable under an occupational pension or injury benefits scheme, including benefits payable under insurance policies paid for by employers. This would include benefits paid by the State as

employer (paras 3 and 4 below). The Great Britain and Northern Ireland schemes are broadly similar, though the Northern Ireland scheme makes slightly more generous provision in the form of a minimum payment for widows and children.

Injury to public servants and office-holders

3. There are long-standing injury benefit schemes for civil servants and members of the Armed Forces who are killed or injured during, or as a direct result of, their employment in the service of the State. The civil service arrangements also apply to Special Advisers and, with appropriate modifications, to Ministers. Until comparatively recently it was not felt that the Judges needed similar protection. However, in the light of recent events, it has been agreed that, if they are injured or killed as a result of terrorist activities, they should be treated no less favourably than Ministers and civil servants. The arrangements for the judiciary are at present extra-statutory, but the necessary powers will be taken as soon as possible.

4. It has not proved possible to extend these arrangements to Members of Parliament, mainly because the terms of the civil service scheme are simply not applicable to the circumstances of their work. Instead, in February 1980, the House authorities extended the terms of the Group Personal Accident Insurance Policy for Members and it now provides 24-hour protection against almost all risks. The premiums are paid from public funds and the main benefit is a lump sum of £70,000 in the event of death or serious disablement. In comparison, the civil service scheme provides for continuing payments - a guaranteed minimum income of up to 85 per cent of pensionable pay to an injured civil servant, or 45 per cent to the widow of a civil servant. (Annex A summarises the terms under the Civil Service, Parliamentary and Armed Forces Schemes. A note on the Group Insurance Scheme is at Annex B.)

5. Terrorism is not defined as such in the schemes. But in each of them the qualifying conditions are sufficiently widely drawn to cover acts of terrorism. The Civil Service Scheme, for example, applies to a person "who suffers an injury as a result of an attack or similar act which is directly attributable to his being employed, or holding office, as a person to whom the section applies". The CICS refers simply to "personal injury directly attributable to a crime of violence" 'Injury' for these purposes includes death.

Damage to property

6. In general, people are expected to insure themselves against damage to property and this covers damage by criminal acts, including acts of terrorism. However, claims in respect of most riot damage fall upon the Police Fund in the area concerned. The position is different in Northern Ireland where the scale of criminal damage led insurance companies to exclude damage from terrorism from insurance contracts. Because it is not therefore possible to insure against this risk, compensation is provided from public funds for damage and loss of profits. The need for this does not yet arise in Great Britain, because it is still possible to insure against these risks.

7. In the case of Government employees, Departments have discretion to make payments to an officer whose property is lost or damaged during the course of his employment. This would normally be taken to include losses incurred as a direct result of his employment as a civil servant. The same arrangements would be applied to Ministers and will, for example, allow compensation to be paid to Michael Havers and his landlady following the recent bomb attack on his London flat. In addition, it has been agreed that where a Minister or official, because

of his position, is faced with exceptionally high insurance premiums, a "topping-up" payment may be made so that insurance can be obtained.

Conclusions

8. In conclusion, therefore:-

a. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme compensates members of the general public and their dependants for death or injury resulting from criminal acts including acts of terrorism. The compensation payable is broadly equivalent to what the person might be awarded by a Court of Law. It is not thought that the Scheme requires amendment in present circumstances.

b. Terrorist attacks on public servants and office-holders in Great Britain have been mercifully rare. Should such an attack take place in future, however, there are adequate arrangements to pay compensation for death, injury or damage to property incurred during, or as a result of, the person's official duties or position. These arrangements cover Ministers, officials, the judiciary and members of the Armed Forces. There are rather different, insurance-based, arrangements for Members of Parliament.

c. In Great Britain, private insurance is available against criminal damage to property including damage caused by acts of terrorism. Where Ministers and officials are exposed to exceptional risks, special arrangements can be made to assist in obtaining the necessary insurance cover.

9. I am sending copies of this minute to Cabinet colleagues and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(G.H.)

18 December 1981

RECORD OF A CALL ON THE LORD PRIVY SEAL BY THE REV. IAN PAISLEY AT 3 PM ON THURSDAY, 17 DECEMBER 1981

N. L. S. R.

23/12

Present:

Rev. Ian Paisley MP MEP	Lord Privy Seal
Mr Peter Robinson, MP	Lord N Gordon Lennox
Mr Jim Allister	Mr Tom Arnold MP
Mr David Burnside	Mr Eyers
	Mr Gomersall
	Mr Wood
	Mr Thomas

1. Mr Paisley said that he wished to know what was Her Majesty's Government's attitude towards the delegation, which represented the majority of the Unionists in Northern Ireland and would be visiting the USA from 15-28 January 1982. Were the Government against it, neutral or did the delegation have their goodwill? His feedback from the United States suggested that the Government's attitude was one of neutrality and perhaps opposition, but not of goodwill. While they had great differences with the Government, this visit was completely based on an apologetic for the Union and contained no criticism of any British Government, past or present. The delegation would take a strong line against that taken by the Irish Republic and fellow travellers and against terrorism. He had some people 'pretty high up in Washington'. They had said that the American Government had been sounding out the British Foreign Office as to what their reaction would be if his visa was revoked.

2. The Lord Privy Seal replied that the Government's point of view was precisely what it would be for any other representatives in Parliament of a minor party - in Westminster terms. If the Government was sponsoring the visit, which it almost invariably did if a group was mixed and represented all parties, then we would take certain steps to encourage the host government to do certain things. But for a group of MPs travelling privately, the treatment was absolutely standard. What we would do in the case of this delegation was the same as for any other private visit, no more and no less. The Government were not sponsoring this visit,

/Mr Paisley

Mr Paisley said that the delegation did not want to be sponsored: that would ruin their visit. In answer to a question from the Lord Privy Seal, Lord Gordon Lennox reaffirmed that what British posts in North America were doing to help this delegation was exactly the same as it would be for any other similar visit.

3. Mr Paisley asked whether the State Department had approached the Foreign Office about his visa. The Lord Privy Seal said that they had not. Mr Paisley asked what the Government's attitude would be if they did. The Lord Privy Seal replied that if the State Department approached the FCO we would draw their attention to the fact that Mr Paisley was an elected MP and an elected MEP and ask them to take that into account. We would not seek to advise them.

4. Mr Burnside said that the group had received some assistance from consulates in North America, particularly Boston. They needed particular assistance: an official call on the Ambassador when they arrived; that all Consuls-General and Honorary Consuls should be informed of their programme and be asked to give assistance; and they would like the Embassy to make official requests to the State Department for them to be received by those members of the Administration that they had asked to see, including the President and the Secretary of State. Mr Paisley said that they were not expecting the President to receive them, it would only be realistic to expect to be received by the Secretary of State. They would be grateful if the Embassy would lobby. The Administration had met other MPs from Northern Ireland, including Members of the European Parliament, although the President had not himself received John Hume. The State Department had said that they needed the Foreign Office to clear the visitors.

5. The Lord Privy Seal said that the Ambassador would receive them when they arrived and heads of other posts would too, if they were in town at the time. The Embassy would inform other posts in the USA of the delegation's plans. He understood that the Embassy had already passed to the State Department the delegation's requests to meet members of the Administration. But if not, he would ensure that the requests were passed on to the Ambassador and that the latter would pass them on to the State Department, drawing attention to who the delegation were.

6. Mr Burnside handed over an outline programme, and copies of letters he had sent to the President and the British Ambassador (attached). He said that the delegation had also approached leading Americans outside the Administration and it was possible that they would also seek advice from the Embassy. The Lord Privy Seal said that if they approached the Embassy, the latter would inform them of the composition of the delegation, and tell them who the delegation were and what they represented. Whether these figures then received the delegation or not was up to them.

7. Mr Paisley described a new book that would be the basis of their visit. It was a very good book. It answered all the points made by propaganda against the Union; and for the first time contained full colour prints of terrorist atrocities. The Americans had listened too long to another line. The case for the Union was a good one. This book would be an eloquent witness. The Lord Privy Seal said that he would like to see a copy of the book.

8. Reverting to the question of visas, Mr Allister asked whether the Foreign Office would inform the State Department of the delegation's status only if the State Department asked. The Lord Privy Seal said that if the Americans did not approach us we would not say anything. We would not expect other governments to offer us advice in a similar situation. Mr Allister asked whether the Government should not play a more active rôle. The Lord Privy Seal said that they should not and had not done so on a recent similar occasion. Mr Allister asked whether there were any circumstances in which the Government would take the initiative. He thought that there were arguments for taking an initiative on this occasion. The Lord Privy Seal said that there might be a case if no-one knew who Mr Paisley was, or if the delegation was officially sponsored. But Mr Paisley was well known and he had said they did not wish to be sponsored. Mr Paisley said that of course the delegation did not want to be sponsored: they would be accused of being British Government propagandists. The delegation was going to the United States to justify the existence of the Northern Ireland state within the United Kingdom. He thought that the fact that he was

a Member of the European Parliament worried the American Government because they were concerned about their bases in Europe.

9. Mr Robinson asked what rôle the Foreign Office played on security. The Lord Privy Seal replied that we relied on the host country. If the delegation went the Americans would make their own arrangements. Mr Paisley said he had been told that the Foreign Office should point out to the State Department that he had police protection. He often went to the USA to preach and normally did not want protection. But this occasion was more political and it would be in the Americans' interest if he was protected. Lord Gordon Lennox said that we had spoken to the Americans. If they judged that there was a threat they would make appropriate arrangements. The Lord Privy Seal repeated that it was for the Americans to assess the threat. Mr Arnold said that on a visit to New York during the hunger strike the police had told Mr Alison, then a Northern Ireland Office Minister, that they were not disposed to give him protection. Mr Paisley said that the Americans had offered him protection before: in New York he had even had motorcycle outriders. He was genuinely concerned about security. The IRA did not want the delegation to go. He did not believe that there would be many of 'us' left by the end of the year. The delegation would have to know before they left whether or not they were going to receive protection from the authorities because if they did not they would make their own arrangements. The Lord Privy Seal said that we would be unlikely to know any more than the delegation exactly what protection they would get. Mr Eyers pointed out that the decision as to whether to protect would be made at state and city level and that it might be difficult to get precise details. Mr Paisley said that the Foreign Office had to tell the Americans that all three Parliamentarians had bodyguard protection. Mr Paisley was guarded even on the Continent. Mr Robinson and Mr Taylor were only guarded in Northern Ireland, though Mr Taylor had on occasions received protection in Europe. The Lord Privy Seal said that at the appropriate time it would be proper for us to try and discover what level of protection was to be provided and to pass on what information we could give.

/Distribution:

Distribution:

Private Secretary

PS/LPS

PS/PUS

Sir A Acland

Mr Bullard

Mr Fergusson o.r.

Mr Day

Mr Ure

Head/RID

Head/News Department

Head/NAD

D E Tatham Esq,
British Embassy, DUBLIN

J S Wall Esq,
British Embassy, WASHINGTON

Mr Coles,
No.10 Downing Street

Mr Abbott,
Northern Ireland Office
(For further distribution in NIO)

Mr Wenban-Smith
Cabinet Office

256 Ravenhill Road, Belfast Telephone 54255 Telex 748059

c/o Jack E. Buttram Co.
7927 Jones Branch Drive
Suite 400
McLean, Virginia 22102
December 10, 1981

U. S. President's Office
Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President,

I am writing on behalf of a United Unionist delegation of British Members of Parliament and Members of the European Parliament who will be visiting the United States during the last two weeks of January 1982 to present the Ulster Unionist case to the American people.

The delegation will consist of:

Ian Paisley, M.P. M.E.P., Leader of the Democratic Unionist Party.
Peter Robinson, M.P., Deputy Leader of the Democratic Unionist Party
John D. Taylor, M.E.P.,Spokesman for the Official Unionist Party and a member of Her Majesty's Privy Council
and Mrs. Nora Bradford, wife of the late Robert Bradford, M.P. for South Belfast from 1974 to 1981. Mr. Bradford, who was to have been a member of the delegation was assassinated by the I.R.A. in November of this year.

On behalf of the delegation, I wish to formally inform you of the visit and give notice that the delegation will be making approaches through the proper channels to seek a meeting with you.

Operation U.S.A., which represents through its elected members, both in the British House of Commons and the European Parliaments, the vast majority of the Ulster people, would be honoured to receive the opportunity to present the views of the Ulster majority on a subject which has concerned the Executive Branch of the United States Government. I trust you will bear this in mind when we submit our official request for a meeting.

Yours sincerely,

David Burnside
Joint Director Operation U.S.A.

DB:ec

256 Ravenhill Road, Belfast Telephone 54255 Telex 748059

c/o Jack E. Buttram Co.
7927 Jones Branch Drive
Suite 400
McLean, Virginia 22102
December 10, 1981

H.E. Sir Nicholas Henderson, GCMG
British Embassy
3100 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20008

Your Excellency,

I am writing to officially inform you of a visit by a delegation of British Members of the House of Commons and of the European Parliament to the United States during the last two weeks of January.

The United Unionist delegation which intends to present Ulster Unionist case to the American people will consist of:

Ian Paisley M.P. M.E.P.,Leader of the Democratic Unionist Party
Peter Robinson M.P., Deputy Leader of the Democratic Unionist Party
John Taylor M.E.P., Former member of the Northern Ireland Government and a member of Her Majesty's Privy Council
and Mrs. Nora Bradford, wife of the late Robert Bradford, M.P. for South Belfast 1974-November 1981.

The delegation, which plans to arrive on the evening of 15 January, looks forward to having the opportunity to pay a courtesy call on you at our Embassy in Washington.

We would appreciate your assistance in our representation to the American administration and Congress. I am enclosing for your information copies of letters to the President, Vice President and Secretary of State. We have had talks with First Secretary Wall during the last two weeks and are grateful for his assistance and that of many of our Consular officials around the U.S. We will furnish you with details of the delegations' countrywide activities at a later date and we would appreciate if that could be communicated to our Consul Generals and Honorary Consuls in the relevent cities.

Operation U.S.A. would also request the assistance of the British Embassy in ensuringliaison with the relevant U.S. departments on the matter of security arrangements for the delegation during its stay in the U.S. Our representative in Washington, Jack E. Buttram, will provide full details of the itinerary on request.

In conclusion, I would like to state our concern at the reported attempts by a number of American politicians to deny the delegation the right of entry into the United States and therefore to restrict our freedom to directly present the views of the Ulster Unionist people.

We look to you for full protection of our interests and rights.

Yours sincerely,

David Burnside
Joint Director Operation U.S.A.

DB:ec

Enclosures (3)

PETER ROBINSON'S SCHEDULE

			Departure	Arrival
Tuesday	19th	WASHINGTON-PHOENIX	5.35 pm	10.25 pm
Wednesday	20th	PHOENIX-LOS ANGELES	7.45 pm	7.51 pm
Thursday	21st	LOS ANGELES-SAN FRANCISCO	5.35 pm	6.45 pm
Friday	22nd	SAN FRANCISCO-DENVER	4.30 pm	12.37 am (Sat)
Sunday	24th	DENVER-WASHINGTON DC	12.40 pm	7.00 pm

JOHN TAYLOR'S SCHEDULE

			Departure	Arrival
Tuesday	19th	WASHINGTON-TORONTO	4.50 pm	6.48 pm
Wednesday	20th	TORONTO-BOSTON	5.30 pm	6.51 pm
Thursday	21st	BOSTON-CHICAGO	6.35 pm	8.10 pm
Friday	22nd*	CHICAGO-DETROIT	6.45 pm	8.40 pm
Saturday	23rd*	DETROIT-WASHINGTON DC	8.50 pm	10.00 pm

*In the event of it not proving possible to arrange anything worthwhile in Detroit on the Saturday JT will return direct to Washington from Chicago, perhaps at 7.27 pm, arriving 10.00 pm on Fri 22nd, or at 11.45 am on Sat 23rd, arriving at 2.20 pm.

IAN PAISLEY'S SCHEDULE

			Departure	Arrival
Tuesday	19th	WASHINGTON-DALLAS/FORT WORTH	5.30 pm	8.15 pm
Wednesday	20th	DALLAS/FW-HOUSTON	6.15 pm	7.11 pm
Thursday	21st	HOUSTON-ATLANTA	5.35 pm	8.23 pm
Friday	22nd	ATLANTA-GREENVILLE	5.15 pm	6.00 pm
Saturday	23rd	GREENVILLE-BIRMINGHAM via Atlanta	7.35 am	9.10 am
Saturday	23rd	BIRMINGHAM-ORLANDO via Atlanta	4.45 pm	8.37 pm
Sunday	24th	ORLANDO-BALTIMORE*	2.50 pm	4.41 pm

*Then by J Buttram's private plane to Harrisbourg and back to Washington DC.

WASHINGTON DC	Whole delegation 15-19 Jan, 24-26
NEW YORK	Whole delegation 26-28

Mrs Bradford in Jackson, Mississippi 19-24.

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TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1928 OF 14 DECEMBER
INFO PRIORITY DUBLIN
INFO SAVING NIO BELFAST

YOUR TELEGRAM NO.1889 : JUDGE CLARK ON IRISH UNIFICATION

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND SPOKE TO CLARK ON THE TELEPHONE ON 8 DECEMBER. CLARK EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT HIS REMARKS ABOUT IRISH UNITY HAD CAUSED NO PROBLEM AND THAT IT HAD NOT PLACED THE GOVERNMENT IN ANY DIFFICULTY. HE WAS EVIDENTLY ANXIOUS TO REPAIR ANY DAMAGE WHICH THE REMARK MIGHT HAVE CAUSED TO RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. HE ASSURED MR PRIOR THAT HIS COMMENT HAD BEEN AN OBSERVATION NOT AN EXPRESSION OF AMERICAN POLICY. HE INVITED MR PRIOR TO LET HIM KNOW IF AT ANY STAGE HE OR THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT COULD BE OF ANY HELP. MR PRIOR TOLD CLARK THAT THERE HAD BEEN A FAIRLY BRISK REACTION BUT THAT HE EXPECTED IT TO DIE DOWN BEFORE TOO LONG. HE EMPHASISED THAT THE REACTION TO THE INTERVIEW HAD DEMONSTRATED THE SENSITIVITY OF AFFAIRS IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

2. THE LORD PRIVY SEAL RETURNED MR CLARK'S TELEPHONE CALL ON 9 DECEMBER. MR CLARK TRIED TO CLAIM THAT OUR OBJECTIONS TO WHAT HE HAD SAID HAD BEEN EXAGGERATED AND FAILED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CONTEXT OF HIS REMARKS. WHAT HE HAD SAID WAS PURELY AN OBSERVATION OF POPULAR FEELING, NOT OF POLICY. THE LORD PRIVY SEAL EXPLAINED THE PROBLEM CAUSED FOR US BY THE CREATION OF AN APPARENT LINK BETWEEN RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE TWO TRADITIONS IN IRELAND, WHICH WE SUPPORT, AND UNIFICATION, AND REMINDED HIM THAT ANY STATEMENT ON IRELAND BY A LEADING MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION MUST NECESSARILY APPEAR TO REFLECT POLICY. THAT BEING SAID, THE MATTER WAS NOW WATER UNDER THE BRIDGE.

3. IN VIEW OF THESE CONVERSATIONS AND OF THE LINE TAKEN BY

/THE

THE STATE DEPARTMENT (YOUR TELEGRAM NO.3743), MINISTERS ARE INCLINED TO DRAW A LINE UNDER THIS UNHAPPY INCIDENT,AND YOU NEED TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION.

4. WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR EFFORTS IN GETTING THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO USE THE LANGUAGE THEY DID.

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PS/LORD TREFGARNE
PS/PUS
SIR A ACLAND

MR ADAMS
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
LORD N G LENNOX
MR BRAITHWAITE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

NORTHERN IRELAND

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Ireland

JS

cc FCO

B/F

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 December 1981

ARMS FROM THE UNITED STATES FOR THE RUC

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 2 December to Michael Alexander and Roderic Lyne's letter of 10 December. The Prime Minister agrees with your Secretary of State's proposal that he should authorise an order for Ruger rifles to be placed with a fire arms dealer in the United Kingdom and that, if any questions are raised, we should maintain the line that the Police Authority from Northern Ireland purchase arms in the normal way through legitimate dealers in the United Kingdom.

With regard to paragraph 3 of your letter, the Prime Minister has asked why we are manufacturing the Sterling AR 180 if it is not well constructed or robust. You may wish to pass this enquiry to the Ministry of Defence, but I leave it to you to explain the background.

I am copying this letter to Francis Richards (FCO).

A. J. COLES

Stephen Boys-Smith, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

RESTRICTED

JS

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 December 1981

NORTHERN IRELAND: MR. CLARK'S REMARKS

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 10 December.

I am sending copies of this letter to Mike Hopkins (Northern Ireland Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

A.K.C. Wood, Esq.,
Lord Privy Seal's Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Ireland

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 December 1981

A/K

Northern Ireland: Security

The Prime Minister recently received a private letter which contained inter alia a number of recommendations for improving security in Northern Ireland. In replying to the letter, the Prime Minister stated that these recommendations would be studied.

No further reply to the write is necessarily required. But you may care to ensure that the recommendations on security (which are contained in the enclosure to this letter) are looked at in the Department. Should you think that any of them merit further consideration by the Prime Minister, perhaps you would let me have advice in due course.

A. J. COLES

Stephen Boys-Smith Esq
Northern Ireland Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 December 1981

Dear John,

NORTHERN IRELAND: MR CLARK'S REMARKS

I understand that the Prime Minister wishes to know how we responded to the unfortunate reference by Judge Clark, the United States Deputy Secretary of State, on Irish television, to 'reconciliation between the two traditions and certainly the hope, the prayer, of all Americans that this will ultimately lead to the unification.'

As noted in FCO telegram No 1889, Ewen Fergusson telephoned the Minister at the US Embassy early on 8 December to express our concern and indeed, dismay at the reports of Mr Clark's statement. He spoke firmly. The Minister at once reported Fergusson's comment. Later that day Judge Clark, after trying to telephone the Lord Privy Seal and the Northern Ireland Secretary, spoke to Sir Nicholas Henderson (Washington telegram No 3719 of 8 December), distancing himself from what he had said about unification, and making clear that it was not intended to be an announcement of new policy. He also blamed the US Embassy here for his failure to alert us to President Reagan's letter to Dr FitzGerald.

On 9 December the US Embassy, on instructions, clearly to make belated amends, transmitted to us the full text of President Reagan's letter, together with the full text of Mr Clark's remarks on Irish television and also the terms of contingency press guidance which the Americans proposed to use in answer to questions on the subject. I enclose the latter, (the former was contained in Dublin telegrams Nos. 422 and 426 to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office). You will see that it includes the helpful statement that 'The Administration has no position on the question of Irish unification.' This has now been used by the State Department spokesman.

The Lord Privy Seal returned Mr Clark's telephone call on 9 December. Mr Clark tried to claim that our objections to what he had said had been exaggerated and failed to take into account the context of his remarks. What he had said was purely an observation of popular feeling, not of policy. The Lord Privy Seal explained the problem caused for us by the creation of an apparent link between reconciliation between the traditions in Ireland, which we support, and unification, and reminded him that any statement on Ireland by a leading member of the American Administration must necessarily appear to reflect policy. That being said, the matter was now water under the bridge.

/It

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
Whitehall

It appears to us that Mr Clark's remark was made without thought. He was clearly surprised at the importance attached to it. He showed regrettable lack of sensitivity in this, and in his failure to refer to the President's letter. But the Americans have done what they can to make clear that there has been no change in their policy and in particular that they have no position on the question of Irish unification. Streator has just (this afternoon) told us that he has taken the opportunity of telephone conversation with Mr Clark since the broadcast to ram the same point home. He thought that the message had got home.

We for our part have made our position very clear, not least by the Prime Minister's remarks to Mr Weinberger yesterday afternoon. To press the Americans further could be counter-productive. It seems unlikely that Mr Clark will want to blunder on to the ice again soon. In the circumstances, the Lord Privy Seal is inclined to think that we should draw a line under this unhappy incident. I understand that this is the view of the Northern Ireland Secretary also.

I am copying this letter to Mike Hopkins at the Northern Ireland Office and to David Wright at the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever,

Adam

A K C Wood
APS/Lord Privy Seal

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 December 1981

Dear John,

Arms from the United States for the RUC

In his letter of 2 December to Michael Alexander, Stephen Boys Smith wrote that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland proposed to authorise an order for Ruger rifles for the RUC to be placed with an arms dealer in the UK.

We understand that the procedure adopted will ensure that there is no mention of the RUC when the export licence is sought from the US authorities. On that understanding, we see no objection to the order being placed, while hoping that everything possible will be done to avoid publicity which might embarrass the US Administration.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Stephen Boys Smith.

Yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

GRPS 400

U N C L A S S I F I E D

FM DUBLIN 101835Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 433 OF 10 DECEMBER 1981

REPEATED FOR INFO TO IMMEDIATE NIO (B), PRIORITY WASHINGTON AND BIS NEW YORK

NORTHERN IRELAND: STATEMENT BY TAOISEACH

1. THE TAOISEACH, DR FITZGERALD, DELIVERED AN IMPORTANT STATEMENT ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND, ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS AND HIS CRUSADE TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION AT A MEETING OF HIS CONSTITUENCY PARTY IN DUBLIN ON 9 DECEMBER.

2. THE TAOISEACH SPOKE OF THE PROVISIONAL IRA ''CARRYING OUT A CAMPAIGN OF SECTARIAN GENOCIDE'' AGAINST PROTESTANTS IN ORDER TO ''STOP THE POSSIBILITY OF PEACEFUL POLITICAL PROGRESS BY CONSENT. UNITY BY CONSENT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THEM BECAUSE THEY WOULD THEREBY ACHIEVE THEIR AMBITION WHICH THEY DO NOT ALWAYS CONCEAL I.E. TOTAL POWER NORTH AND SOUTH ACHIEVED BY TERROR''. HE THEN WENT ON TO ACCUSE MR PAISLEY OF CREATING HYSTERIA AND DELIBERATELY MISREPRESENTING THE AIM OF THE ANGLO IRISH SUMMIT.

3. AFTER PRAISING THE WAY IN WHICH HMG HAD HANDLED THE CHALLENGES FROM THE PROVISIONALS AND SOME LOYALIST EXTREMISTS, DR FITZGERALD SAID THAT THE ORIGINAL OBJECTIVES OF THE ANGLO-IRISH STRATEGY HAD BECOME ''GROTESQUELY INVERTED IN THE PUBLIC DEBATE. FROM A SYSTEM OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN RELATION TO UNIONISTS, THE ANGLO-IRISH APPROACH BECAME AN AREA OF POLITICAL CONTEST IN DUBLIN IN TERMS OF NATIONALIST ACHIEVEMENT.....'' THERE WAS ALSO A POLITICAL CONTEST IN THE NORTH BETWEEN THE OUP AND DUP, WHO WERE ''VYING WITH EACH OTHER IN THEIR CONDEMNATIONS OF THE ANGLO-IRISH INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH ON THE GROUNDS OF ITS ALLEGED EROSION OF THE UNION.''

/ 4. THE

4. THE TAOISEACH SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT SHARED WITH MOST PEOPLE IN THE STATE ''A STRONG COMMITMENT TO THE ASPIRATION OF UNITY TO BE ACHIEVED BY CONSENT AND ONLY BY CONSENT.'' HE EXPLAINED THAT THIS MEANT THAT ''AS LONG A CONSENT IS NOT AVAILABLE - HOWEVER LONG THAT MAY BE - WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THAT DECISION.'' HE THEN ARGUED THAT ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION WHICH IN HIS VIEW LAID CLAIM TO THE TERRITORY OF NORTHERN IRELAND SHOULD BE RE-STATED: ''IN TERMS THAT WOULD UNAMBIGUOSLY AND ACCEPTABLY STATE OUR UNOBJECTIONABLE AND INALIENABLE ASPIRATION TO IRISH UNITY TO BE ACHIEVED BY CONSENT AND PEACEFULLY.'' DR FITZGERALD CLOSED BY CRITICISING FIANNA FAIL'S OPPOSITION TO THE CRUSADE, AND IN PARTICULAR, MR HAUGHEY'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW FIANNA FAIL REPRESENTATIVES TO SIT ON AN ALL-PARTY COMMITTEE TO BE SET UP TO EXAMINE THE CONSTITUTION.

5. COPIES OF THE STATEMENT FOLLOW BY BAG.

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SIR A ACLAND

MR ADAMS
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
LORD N G LENNOX
MR BRAITHWAITE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
NORTHERN IRELAND

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GRS 570

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 101733Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1902 OF 10 DECEMBER
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK,NIO (BELFAST)
INFO ROUTINE OTTAWA
INFO SAVING CONSULS-GENERAL USA, CONSUL-GENERAL TORONTO

YOUR TELNOS 3657, 3658 AND 3699 AND UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1452:
PAISLEY VISIT TO THE USA

1. MINISTERS HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE HANDLING OF THIS PARTY, WHICH IS NOW TO INCLUDE MRS NORAH BRADFORD. THEY HAVE COME TO THE SAME CONCLUSIONS AS THE PROPOSALS IN YOUR LAST TUR. IN ADDITION WE SHOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION IF AT ANY STAGE YOU THOUGHT IT WOULD BE WISE TO MAKE IT CLEAR PUBLICLY THAT THE MPS DO NOT REPRESENT HMG AND THAT THEY ARE OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE US AUTHORITIES SHOULD PROVIDE APPROPRIATE SECURITY PROTECTION, BUT WOULD WISH TO AVOID HAVING TO MAKE A FORMAL REQUEST TO THE US GOVERNMENT.

2. WE AGREE (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1452) THAT THE VISITORS SHOULD BE DISCOURAGED FROM CALLING ON THE UNITED NATIONS. WE SHOULD PREFER YOU TO ARGUE THAT SUCH A CALL WOULD HARM THE UNIONIST CAUSE RATHER THAN REFER TO THE DAMAGE IT WOULD DO TO HMG OR THE UK AS A WHOLE, SINCE THE LATTER ARGUMENTS ARE UNLIKELY TO CUT MUCH ICE WITH MR PAISLEY.

3. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT MR PAISLEY TELEPHONED MR HURD ON

/8 DECEMBER

8 DECEMBER TO COMPLAIN THAT BURNSIDE AND ALLISTER WERE RECEIVING 'NO CO-OPERATION FROM THE EMBASSY'. HIS PARTY WERE NOT GOING TO THE US TO ATTACK HMG AND HMG'S POLICY, BUT THE IRA. THEY WOULD BE LAUNCHING THERE A NEW BOOK WHICH WOULD SET THE BEST EVER CASE AGAINST THE IRA. HIS AIDES HAD BEEN TRYING TO ARRANGE MEETINGS WITH MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATION, PARTICULARLY THE SECRETARIES OF COMMERCE AND TOURISM, BUT HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE AMERICANS THAT THE BRITISH EMBASSY NEEDED TO CLEAR SUCH MEETINGS BEFORE THEY COULD TAKE PLACE. WHEN THE EMBASSY WAS APPROACHED IT HAD SAID THAT IT WAS ONLY ABLE TO DO THIS FOR VISITING MINISTERS.
MR PAISLEY SAID THAT HE KNEW OF MPS WHO HAD BEEN HELPED BY THE WASHINGTON EMBASSY. IF THE EMBASSY REALLY WAS UNABLE TO OFFER ANY HELP HE WOULD 'NEED TO LOOK AGAIN AT THE POSITION'.

4. MR HURD SAID THAT HE WOULD LOOK INTO THIS. HE KNEW OF THE INTENDED VISIT BUT WAS UNAWARE OF THE DETAILS. HE DID NOT (NOT) SAY THAT HE WOULD CONTACT MR PAISLEY AGAIN.

5. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS. WE PROPOSE THAT WE MIGHT TAKE THE LINE THAT BY PUTTING THE VISIT ORGANISERS IN TOUCH WITH CONTACTS THE EMBASSY AND OTHER POSTS ARE OFFERING AS MUCH ASSISTANCE AS WOULD BE NORMAL FOR A DELEGATION OF MPS REPRESENTING A RESTRICTED RANGE OF OPINION IN PARLIAMENT: THAT THE AMBASSADOR WILL WILLINGLY RECEIVE AND BRIEF THEM: BUT THAT IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE EMBASSY TO TAKE A MORE PROMINENT ROLE SINCE THIS WOULD GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HMG WAS SPONSORING THE VISIT. GIVEN THE PUBLICITY THAT PAISLEY'S RECENT CONTEMPT FOR PARLIAMENT AND VEHEMENT CRITICISM OF HMG HAD RECEIVED IN THE U.S., A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WOULD LOOK STRANGE AND THEREFORE DISCREDIT BOTH EMBASSY AND VISITORS.

6. YU SHOUDL KNOW THAT BEFORE BRADFORD'S DEATH PAISLEY HAD SOUGHT A MEETING WITH THE LORD PRIVY SEAL TO DISCUSS ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS VISIT. THE LORD PRIVY SEAL WROTE TO HIM ON 3 DECEMBER ASKING THAT BEFORE AN APPOINTMENT WAS FIXED PAISLEY SHOULD GIVE AN INDICATION OF THE POINTS HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS. NOTHING FURTHER HAS YET BEEN HEARD.

7. WE HAVE JUST SEEN YOUR TEL 3715. THE LINE YOU PROPOSE SEEMS CONSISTENT WITH THE ABOVE.

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CHIEF CLERK
MR ADAMS
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
LORD N G LENNOX
MR BRAITHWAITE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

NORTHERN IRELAND

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 110010Z
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELNO 3758 OF 10 DECEMBER 1981,
INFO PRIORITY: UKMIS NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK, NIO BELFAST,
ROUTINE : OTTAWA,
INFO SAVING CONSULS GENERAL U.S.A., CG TORONTO.

YOUR TELNO 1902: PAISLEY VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES

1. BURNSIDE AND ALLISTER RETURN TO BELFAST TONIGHT OR TOMORROW. THEY HAVE WRITTEN A LETTER TO ME (WHICH I HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED) SETTING OUT THEIR REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE, PARTICULARLY ON SECURITY.

2. I AM SURE THAT, ON THEIR RETURN, BURNSIDE AND ALLISTER WILL COMPLAIN ABOUT THE LEVEL OF HELP RECEIVED. WE MADE IT CLEAR FROM THE START THAT WE WOULD GIVE THEM THE NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF CONTACTS AND WOULD LET THOSE CONTACTS KNOW THEY WERE HERE BUT THAT WE WOULD NOT ACTUALLY ARRANGE APPOINTMENTS. WE HAVE NOW SPOKEN TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT ABOUT PAISLEY AND CO'S REQUESTS FOR APPOINTMENTS, ADDING THAT WE WERE TRANSMITTING THESE REQUESTS AS WE WOULD ANY OTHER MP'S: AND WE HAVE TOLD BURNSIDE THAT WE HAVE DONE SO.

3. WE HAD HEARD FROM BURNSIDE OF MR PAISLEY'S TELEPHONE CALL TO MR HURD. BURNSIDE WENT ON TO SAY THAT MR ATKINS HAD AGREED TO RECEIVE PAISLEY AND HIS COLLEAGUES BEFORE THEIR VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES.

4. PAISLEY'S PROPOSED VISIT HAS CAUSED CONSIDERABLE AGITATION IN CONGRESS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT SENATOR BAKER (SENATE MAJORITY LEADER), SPEAKER O'NEILL, CONGRESSMAN FOLEY AND SENATORS MOYNIHAN AND KENNEDY HAVE ALL DECIDED NOT TO RECEIVE THE GROUP. O'NEILL, KENNEDY AND MOYNIHAN HAVE WRITTEN TO SECRETARY HAIG ASKING WHETHER PAISLEY'S VISA WILL BE REVOKED, ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE HAS MADE APPEALS TO BIGOTRY AND RELIGIOUS HATRED AND THINLY VEILED EXHORTATIONS TO SECTARIAN VIOLENCE. A LETTER FROM ABOUT 2 DOZEN CONGRESSMEN ASKING HAIG TO REVOKE PAISLEY'S VISA BECAUSE OF HIS ''TERRORIST ACTIONS'' IS TO BE SENT TOMORROW. O'NEILL AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAVE BEEN PUSHED INTO TAKING THIS STAND BECAUSE OF PRESSURE FROM EXTREME GROUPS WHO ARE CLAIMING THAT THE SO-CALLED IRISH AMERICAN LEADERS ARE OPERATING A DOUBLE STANDARD: HAPPY TO SEE A VISA DENIED TO CARRON AND EQUALLY HAPPY TO CONDONE THE GRANTING OF A VISA TO CARRON'S PROTESTANT COUNTERPART. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE IN A QUANDARY AND HAVE NOT YET TAKEN A DECISION WHETHER TO LET PAISLEY IN.

 / 5. AS REGARDS

5. AS REGARDS PARA 5 OF TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, I SUGGEST THAT THE LINE SHOULD BE THAT I (AND CONSULS GENERAL) WILL BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE THE GROUP AND DISCUSS MATTERS OF BUSINESS WITH THEM: THAT BY PUTTING THEM IN TOUCH WITH CONTACTS WE ARE OFFERING AS MUCH ASSISTANCE AS WOULD BE NORMAL FOR A DELEGATION OF MPS REPRESENTING A RESTRICTED RANGE OF OPINION IN PARLIAMENT: AND THAT THIS COMPLIED WITH WHAT HMG REGARDED AS ITS NECESSARY OBLIGATIONS. IF ASKED WHY WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO GIVE A RECEPTION OR GO FURTHER IN HELPING TO ARRANGE THE VISITORS' PROGRAMME, WE WOULD SAY THAT FOR THE EMBASSY OR CONSULS GENERAL TO TAKE A MORE PROMINENT ROLE WOULD GIVE THE MISTAKEN IMPRESSION THAT HMG WAS SPONSORING THE VISIT. IF PRESSED ON THIS POINT, WE WOULD SAY THAT CLOSER INVOLVEMENT ON THE PART OF GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES WOULD GO FURTHER THAN IS USUAL IN A VISIT OF THIS KIND.

6. AT SOME STAGE I THINK YOU WILL HAVE TO GRASP THE NETTLE IN LONDON AND SAY THAT FULFILMENT OF HMG'S OBLIGATIONS DOES NOT REQUIRE US TO PROVIDE ENTERTAINMENT OR SPONSORSHIP FOR SOMEONE WHO HAS BITTERLY CRITICISED HMG.

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MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
LORD N G LENNOX
MR BRAITHWAITE

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NORTHERN IRELAND

PRIME MINISTER

Parliamentary Affairs

I understand that Mr. Heseltine will want to report on progress in re-thinking the approach to controlling excessive rates rises: the Chief Whip will also wish to report on the Parliamentary prospects on this front.

The Canadian Constitution Repatriation issues now seem much easier, following a constructive meeting this morning between the Canadian Minister of Justice and Messrs. Pym and Jopling, but it might be helpful for the Lord President to mention his conclusions on handling.

The one questionmark over next week's business concerns the timing of the Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions (Continuance) Order. Mr. Prior is reported to be most unhappy about the timing proposed, Wednesday evening, but Business managers see no alternative. It would perhaps be better for this to be settled out of Cabinet, but Mr. Prior might raise it.

MAP

9 December, 1981.

GRPS 225

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FM DUBLIN 081320Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 425 OF 8 DECEMBER 1981

AND TO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST

REPEATED FOR INFO TO WASHINGTON AND BIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 423.

CLARK VISIT

1. AFTER AN UNCONTROVERSIAL VISIT, MR CLARK'S INTERVIEW WITH RTE (RECORDED ON 5 DECEMBER BUT ONLY BROADCAST ON 7 DECEMBER) HAS AROUSED COMMENT BECAUSE OF HIS REFERENCE TO IRISH UNIFICATION.

2. THE FULL TEXT OF MR CLARK'S INTERVIEW FOLLOWS (MIFT). MOST OF IT IS HELPFUL BUT AT ONE POINT HE WENT BEYOND THE CAREFULLY PHRASED TERMS OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER (MY TELNO 422) AND HIS OWN FAREWELL STATEMENT (COPY BY BAG) AND SAID M:

'' NO, THERE IS NOT A NEW INITIATIVE: A REAFFIRMATION OF MR REAGAN'S EARLIER STATEMENT BUT AN EXTENTION -- FURTHER HOPE FOR RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE TWO TRADITIONS AND CERTAINLY THE HOPE, THE PRAYER OF ALL AMERICANS THAT THIS WILL ULTIMATELY LEAD TO THE UNIFICATION.''

3. THE U.S. EMBASSY ARE DECLINING TO COMMENT UNTIL THEY RECEIVE GUIDANCE FROM WASHINGTON. PRIVATELY THEY ADMIT (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT CLARK FAILED TO REALISE THE IMPACT SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD HAVE HERE. THEY HAVE RECOMMENDED THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT TAKE THE LINE THAT U.S. POLICY IS AS SET OUT IN THE PRESIDENT'S 17 MARCH STATEMENT AND HIS LETTER TO THE TAOISEACH.

4. THE U.S. EMBASSY CONSIDERED TRYING TO BOWDLRISE THE INTERVIEW BUT CONCLUDED (I THINK RIGHTLY) THAT THEY WOULD PROBABLY FAIL AND WOULD CERTAINLY DRAW MORE ATTENTION TO CLARK'S GAFFE.

5. THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HERE WERE UNAWARE OF THE TEXT OF THE INTERVIEW UNTIL IT WAS RELEASED BUT INTEND TO AVOID COMMENTING IF POSSIBLE.

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MR ADAMS
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
LORD N G LENNOX
MR BRAITHWAITE

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NORTHERN IRELAND

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GROUPS 1150
UNCLASSIFIED
FROM DUBLIN 081600Z DECEMBER 1981. PS TO PM. NO 10 DOWNING STREET.
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 426 OF 08 DECEMBER.
AND TO PRIORITY NIO BELFAST, WASHINGTON, AND BIS NEW YORK

MIPT : CLARK VISIT

FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF CLARK'S TV INTERVIEW BROADCAST ON 07 DECEMBER:

BEGIN TEXT.

Q. MANY PEOPLE IN THE LAST COUPLE OF DAYS HAVE SEEN YOUR VISIT AS INDICATING A NEW INITIATIVE BY THE UNITED STATES IN RELATION TO NORTHERN IRELAND. IS THERE ANY BASIS FOR THAT?

A. NO, BRIAN, NOT A NEW INITIATIVE BUT REAFFIRMATION OF WHAT PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID EARLIER THIS YEAR WHILE VISITING YOUR EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON -- I BELIEVE IT WAS ON ST PATRICK'S DAY APPROPRIATELY THAT OUR HOPE, OUR PRAYERS BUILD TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEMS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. MY VISIT AT THE GOOD INVITATION OF YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER DOOGE AND SEAN DONLON, RECENT AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON AND NOW SECRETARY, I'M HERE TO DISCUSS MANY ISSUES, BILATERAL MATTERS BOTH HERE, IN LONDON, BONN AND, OF COURSE NORTHERN IRELAND IS A PARAMOUNT QUESTION DURING OUR DISCUSSIONS HERE YESTERDAY, TODAY AND PROBABLY INTO TOMORROW BEFORE LEAVING FOR BONN. BUT NO, THERE IS NOT A NEW INITIATIVE, A REAFFIRMATION OF MR REAGAN'S EARLIER STATEMENT BUT AN EXTENSION--FURTHER HOPE FOR RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE TWO TRADITIONS AND CERTAINLY THE HOPE, THE PRAYER OF ALL AMERICANS THAT THIS WILL ULTIMATELY LEAD TO THE UNIFICATION.

Q. DO YOU GET THE IMPRESSION IN LONDON THAT THE EXPECTATIONS, THE HOPES THAT THE TAOISEACH'S DEPARTURE, HIS INSISTENCE ON RECONCILING THE TRADITIONS, THAT THAT IS SHARED IN LONDON AND IN THE UNITED STATES?
A. OH, I BELIEVE SO. THE NEW INITIATIVE BETWEEN MRS THATCHER AND YOUR OWN PRIME MINISTER IS EVIDENCE OF THAT HOPE AND SO THE FEELINGS ARE SHARED THERE AS WELL.
Q. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS SAID IN HIS LETTER TO THE TAOISEACH THAT ITS NOT FOR THE UNITED STATES TO CHART THE COURSE OTHERS MUST FOLLOW. THAT SEEMS TO SUGGEST THAT THERE WILL BE NO DIRECT AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT, PRESUMABLY IT MEANS THAT YOU WILL BE BENEVOLENTLY NEUTRAL AS FAR AS IRELAND IS CONCERNED?

/A. WE FEEL

A. WE FEEL THAT APPROPRIATE, NON-INTERVENTION ON THE ONE HAND AND YET AS MR REAGAN TOLD ME BEFORE LEAVING ''STUDY THE CURRENT SITUATION, COME BACK AND WE WILL ASSESS IT'' (NOTE: FROM THE TONE OF VOICE AND INFLECTION, THE IMPRESSION WAS GIVEN THAT THIS WAS A DIRECT QUOTE.) BUT FOR THE TIME BEING I MERELY STAND BY AND MAKE THE OFFER TO THE BRITISH AND TO YOUR OWN GOVERNMENT TO ASSIST IN ANY WAY WE CAN NOW OR IN ANTICIPATION OF THE PROBLEMS BEING SOLVED. I BELIEVE THAT HAS BEEN THE STANCE OF THE LAST SEVERAL ADMINISTRATIONS.

Q. I SUPPOSE MANY PEOPLE WANT TO KNOW IN THE SHORT TERM IS THERE ANYTHING YOU CAN DO ABOUT CUTTING BACK AID, MILITARY AID, FINANCIAL AID, TO THE PARAMILITARIES?

A. WE ARE AT THE MOMENT DOING SEVERAL THINGS IN THAT REGARD. THERE ARE CERTAIN MISCONCEPTIONS PERHAPS IN AMERICA OVER THE PROBLEMS HERE. AS YOU REALIZE THERE ARE SOME 20 TO 30 MILLION AMERICANS WHO CLAIM IRISH DESCENT. THE FEELING GOES BEYOND THOSE CLAIMING THE IRISH HERITAGE, WE HAVE A WONDERFUL RELATIONSHIP WITH THIS COUNTRY AS YOU WELL KNOW AND AT TIMES IN THIS CONCERN AND LOVE ON THE PART OF MANY FOR IRELAND WE HAVE, IF I MAY SAY SO, BEEN TOLD THAT THIS OR THAT FUND DRIVE ON BEHALF OF PERHAPS WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ON THE ONE HAND WHEN IN FACT THAT MONEY HAS BEEN MISDIRECTED INTO ARMS SALES. WE KNOW THAT, AND WORKING WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO UNCOVER SOME OF THESE DRIVES AND POINT OUT THAT THEY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO TERRORIST TACTICS AND I THINK THAT WE ARE ALL OF ONE MIND IN REALIZING THAT WE MUST ABHOR TERRORISM. I AM GLAD TO SEE THAT THE CHURCH, IN FACT BOTH CHURCHES, BOTH TRADITIONS, HAVE RECENTLY REAFFIRMED THEIR POSITION ON THE MORAL SIDE OF TERRORISM. PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF HIS ADMINISTRATION SET OUT OUR POLICY TOWARD TERRORISM ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD, WHETHER IT IS EVIDENCED BY THE HIJACKINGS OR BY ASSASSINATION WHICH WE HAVE SEEN IN SO MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD. SO WE ARE GOING TO A GREAT EFFORT TO: ONE, EDUCATE THE AMERICAN PUBLIC ON THE NECESSITY OF NOT SUPPORTING EITHER MORALLY OR FINANCIALLY THIS TYPE OF ACTIVITY AND SECONDLY, INVESTIGATING SOME OF THOSE ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE BEEN PERPETRATING THIS CRIME.

/Q. THE

Q. THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION INDICATED THAT IN THE EVENT OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN NORTHERN IRELAND THAT THEY WOULD DO WHAT THEY COULD TO FACILITATE EXTRA AMERICAN INVESTMENT. HOW MUCH FURTHER WOULD THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION GO?

A. YES, BRIAN, ANTICIPATING THAT QUESTION BECAUSE REFERENCE HAS BEEN MADE TO THE CARTER PRONOUNCEMENT AND THERE MAY BE SOME MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT WHAT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION SAID. ANTICIPATING THAT I DID ASK THIS MORNING FOR THE PARTICULAR QUOTE AND MR CARTER STATED THAT IN THE EVENT OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN THE NORTH, WE WOULD JOIN WITH OTHERS ''TO SEE HOW ADDITIONAL JOB CREATING INVESTMENT COULD BE ENCOURAGED''. AND CERTAINLY WE WILL NOT ONLY MAINTAIN THAT COMITMENT BUT PERHAPS GO BEYOND IN ENCOURAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO ASSIST IN THE NORTH IN CREATING MORE JOB OPPORTUNITIES. I THINK WE MUST REALIZE THERE ARE NOW SOME THIRTY FIVE AMERICAN COMPANIES, INDUSTRIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, EMPLOYING I BELIEVE ONE-SIXTH OF THE LABOR FORCE FOR AN INVESTMENT I BELIEVE IN EXCESS OF ONE BILLION DOLLARS. SO CERTAINLY WE ARE ENCOURAGING THAT NOW, ENCOURAGING FURTHER INVESTMENT ON CONDITION THAT THE MARKET-PLACE SETTLES DOWN BECAUSE WE HAVE SEEN IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD, IN EL SALVADOR FOR INSTANCE, WHERE THERE IS NOT AN ORDERLY MARKET-PLACE NOT ONLY WILL INVESTMENT NOT COME IN, NEW INVESTMENT, BUT OLD INVESTMENT IS GOING TO MOVE OUT AS THE SECURITY FACTOR GOES DOWNWARD. SO ALL THE MORE REASON, I BELIEVE, FOR THE SOLUTION IN THE NORTH.
END TEXT.

FIGG.

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PS/LORD TREFGARNE

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MR ADAMS
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MR FERGUSSON
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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
NORTHERN IRELAND

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DESKBY 090900Z
FM WASHINGTON 090015Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3719 OF 8 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST, DUBLIN, UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

YOUR TELNO 1889: CLARK VISIT TO LONDON

1. I WAS ON THE POINT OF GETTING INTO TOUCH WITH JUDGE CLARK WHEN HE TELEPHONED ME THIS MORNING. HE SAID THAT HE HAD WANTED TO SPEAK TO THE LORD PRIVY SEAL ON THE TELEPHONE BUT HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO REACH HIM IN BRUSSELS.

2. CLARK SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD OF FERGUSSON'S COMPLAINT TO THE US EMBASSY IN LONDON (WHICH CLEARLY HAD NETTLED HIM). HE PROCEEDED TO READ OUT TO ME THE EXACT TEXT OF THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS IN DUBLIN. HE SAID THAT HIS REFERENCE TO THE PRAYER OF ALL AMERICANS THAT RECONCILIATION QUOTE WILL ULTIMATELY LEAD TO THE UNIFICATION UNQUOTE OF IRELAND WAS AN QUOTE OBSERVATION UNQUOTE AND WAS NOT INTENDED TO BE AN ENUNCIATION OF A NEW POLICY. US POLICY WAS AS DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT. HE HOPED THAT WHEN THE FOREIGN OFFICE HAD THE FULL TEXT THEY WOULD SEE THAT HE WAS SIMPLY DESCRIBING WHAT WAS A WIDELY FELT WISH IN THE UNITED STATES.

3. CLARK GAVE A LENGTHY ACCOUNT OF THE WAY THE INTERVIEW HAD GONE AND IN DOING SO WAS OBVIOUSLY EAGER TO EMPHASISE THAT THE MAIN POINT HE WAS TRYING TO ESTABLISH WITH THAT PARTICULAR ANSWER WAS THAT THE US WAS NOT (NOT) CONTEMPLATING ANY NEW INITIATIVE. HE ADDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD PAISLEY'S REACTION TO HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY MILD.

4. I TRIED TO EXPLAIN TO JUDGE CLARK THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NOURISHING A HOPE THAT ONE DAY IRELAND MIGHT BE UNITED AND MAKING A STATEMENT IN PUBLIC EXPRESSING THIS POINT OF VIEW. REUNIFICATION WAS A HIGHLY DELICATE SUBJECT AND I MENTIONED THE ARTICLE ABOUT IT BY CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN IN THE CURRENT NUMBER OF (THE AMERICAN) HARPER'S. I SAID THAT I WOULD SEND THIS TO JUDGE CLARK AND WOULD HOPE THAT HE WOULD READ IT. HE PROMISED TO DO SO.

/ 5. I MENTIONED

5. I MENTIONED THE LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO DR FITZGERALD WHICH WE HAD HEARD ABOUT IN THE PRESS. JUDGE CLARK SAID HE HAD LEFT A COPY OF THIS LETTER AT THE US EMBASSY IN LONDON AND HAD FELT IT WAS UP TO THEM TO TRANSMIT IT TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE. HE DID NOT THINK THAT IT WAS FOR HIM TO CONCERN HIMSELF WITH SUCH MATTERS OF BUREAUCRATIC DETAILS. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE MISTAKE SHOULD NOT BE REPEATED.

HENDERSON

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MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
LORD N G LENNOX
MR BRAITHWAITE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
NORTHERN IRELAND

GRS 508
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 081430Z
FM FCO 081400Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1889 OF 8 DEC
INFO : IMMEDIATE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, BELFAST:
IMMEDIATE DUBLIN
CLARK VISIT TO DUBLIN : ANGLO-IRISH MATTERS : RTE INTERVIEW

1. THE MEDIA HAVE CARRIED EXCERPTS FROM AN INTERVIEW GIVEN BY JUDGE CLARK ON IRISH TELEVISION IN THE COURSE OF WHICH HE SAID THAT HIS VISIT WAS NOT A NEW INITIATIVE BUT A REAFFIRMATION OF MR REAGAN'S EARLIER STATEMENT (OF 17 MARCH) AND 'AN EXTENSION OF FURTHER HOPE FOR RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE TWO TRADITIONS AND CERTAINLY THE HOPE AND PRAYER OF ALL AMERICANS THAT THIS CAN ULTIMATELY LEAD TO REUNIFICATION'.

2. THIS STATEMENT IS EXTREMELY UNHELPFUL SINCE IT WILL BE TAKEN AS EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE ALLEGATIONS BEING MADE BY UNIONISTS THAT HMG'S ULTIMATE AIM IS REUNIFICATION OF IRELAND. IT SHOWS A DISCONCERTING LACK OF SENSITIVITY AND IS ALL THE MORE WORRYING GIVEN THAT CLARK GAVE NO HINT WHEN HE WAS HERE THAT HE HAD WITH HIM THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO DR FITZGERALD ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND OF WHICH WE FIRST LEARNED FROM THE PRESS.

3. ACCORDINGLY FERGUSSON TELEPHONED THE MINISTER AT THE US EMBASSY HERE THIS MORNING TO EXPRESS CONCERN AND DISMAY AT THE REPORTS, EXPLAINING THAT THEY WERE UNHELPFUL AND ASKING FOR GUIDANCE ON HOW THEY SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE SHOULD FIND HELPFUL A PUBLIC REAFFIRMATION THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT OF 17 MARCH CONTINUED TO REPRESENT US POLICY. FERGUSSON REPEATED THE POINT MADE TO STREATOR BY EYERS ON 7 DECEMBER THAT WE FOUND IT ODD THAT WE SHOULD FIRST LEARN OF A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO DR FITZGERALD ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND FROM THE PRESS.

4. STREATOR WAS UNABLE TO OFFER ANY EXPLANATION OF WHAT JUDGE CLARK HAD SAID. HE THOUGHT JUDGE CLARK MIGHT SIMPLY HAVE ADDED

/A

A PERSONAL VIEW TO LANGUAGE ABOUT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE TWO TRADITIONS DRAWN FROM THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO DR FITZGERALD.

5. GIVEN THE EFFECT ON PROTESTANT OPINION, WE SHALL CONSIDER IN THE LIGHT OF THE RESPONSE TO FERGUSSON'S REMARKS WHETHER TO COMPLAIN MORE FORMALLY. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD MEANWHILE, UNLESS YOU SEE OBJECTION, RAISE JUDGE CLARK'S REMARK IN AN INTERROGATIVE WAY WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT WE SHOULD FIND HELPFUL A REAFFIRMATION THAT US POLICY REMAINED UNCHANGED.

6. NEWS DEPARTMENT IS TAKING THE FOLLOWING LINE:-

(A) (ON-THE-RECORD)

'WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN A COMPLETE TEXT AND CANNOT COMMENT UNTIL WE HAVE.'

(B) (UNATTRIBUTABLE WITH TRUSTED CONTACTS)

'WE ARE TAKING THIS UP WITH THE US AUTHORITIES TO ESTABLISH WHAT JUDGE CLARK SAID AND WHAT THE STATUS OF HIS REMARKS WAS - WAS WHAT HE SAID AMERICAN POLICY? HMG'S POLICY IS WELL-KNOWN: NORTHERN IRELAND IS A PART OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND WILL REMAIN SO UNLESS THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE IN NORTHERN IRELAND WISH OTHERWISE. WHATEVER MR CLARK MAY HAVE SAID ON IRISH TELEVISION, NOTHING HE SAID DURING HIS TALKS IN DUBLIN LED US TO EXPECT THAT HE WOULD SAY ANYTHING ALONG THE LINES REPORTED OR TO SUPPOSE THAT THERE WAS ANY CHANGE IN US POLICY. WE FIND THE REPORT SURPRISING.'.

CARRINGTON

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CHIEF CLERK
MR ADAMS
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
LORD N G LENNOX
MR BRAITHWAITE

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NORTHERN IRELAND

HL

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

8 December 1981

Dear Professor Wilkinson,

Thank you for your letter of 30 November and for the valuable and thoughtful memorandum which you enclosed. I am aware of your work as an academic student of terrorism and welcome your contribution to our thinking on how that scourge can be attacked and defeated.

Your detailed recommendations will be studied here and my staff will let you know if we wish to take advantage of your kind offer to call and discuss aspects of your memorandum.

I entirely agree that in this complex and dangerous situation in Northern Ireland it is very important that the Government should make sure that its strategy and tactics are absolutely right. I of course take a deep personal interest in the situation and am in the closest touch with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and his colleagues who have my full confidence and support.

Thank you for writing.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Professor Paul Wilkinson

JS

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

1. AJC.
Content? Agreed as amended.
If so,
2 G.R.
Type for PM
cc I.G.

M Pattison Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

7 December 1981

Dear Mike

MAP 9/XII

In your letter of 30 November, you asked us to provide a draft reply to the Rev Dr Ian Paisley's letter of 25 November to the Prime Minister. The draft which I enclose has, as you requested, been discussed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Cabinet Office.

Dr Paisley's letter is more of a speech than a request for information or reassurance and leaps to deductions from false premises. There are already indications that his extravagant language, even by Northern Ireland standards, is causing disquiet among Protestant opinion which might otherwise sympathise with his views. The draft reply is designed to exploit this tendency and therefore does not attempt a lengthy or sympathetic exposition of the Government's security policy. If the Prime Minister were minded to go into detail, it would be better to do so in response to a Unionist or other moderate rather than give Paisley the credit for eliciting substantial statements.

The Prime Minister may find the following background information of interest. There is inevitably criticism of security policy and of the Chief Constable in Northern Ireland. A recent vote of confidence in the Chief Constable by the Central Committee of the Northern Ireland Police Federation was passed by just 10 votes to 9. We know however that a large number of members of the Federation are very unhappy about the way the vote was taken - there had not been the normal prior consultation with their membership. No doubt some members of the force would be in favour of internment, as Mr Eldon Griffiths has claimed publicly. But overall, the Secretary of State is satisfied that the Chief Constable does not face serious problems within his own force.

The references to policy and UDR weapons are obscure: they have what they need for operational duties, and although some members of the UDR do not like the weapons issued to them for their own protection, they know that they could, as some do, apply to the police for a firearm certificate to permit them to possess different weapons. There is nothing to suggest that any of the murders would have been averted by issuing higher calibre weapons.

The offer of the assistance of the "third force" to complement the RUC and UDR, though phrased aggressively, may be consistent with some indications which we have seen that Paisley is retreating from his earlier claims about their role, partly because he does not really know what to do with them. By no means all of the third

./...

force or its sympathisers are Paisley's own political supporters and, with the Secretary of State's encouragement, the Chief Constable is talking to a number of people, particularly from border areas, who may be in a position to influence actual and potential members of the third force to apply their energies in a way which would not infringe the law, would not hinder the efforts of the security forces, would not be seen as a threat by the minority community but would provide a useful way of sifting low grade local intelligence in a realistic manner.

Yours sincerely

Archie Hopkins

S W BOYS SMITH

bn

DRAFT LETTER

FILE NUMBER

ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE

To	Enclosures	Copies to be sent to
The Rev Dr Ian Paisley MP The Parsonage 17 Cyprus Avenue BELFAST BT5 5NT		
(Full Postal Address)		(Full Address, if Necessary)

LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY Prime Minister
(Name of Signatory)

In your letter of 25 November you repeat your public criticisms of security policy in Northern Ireland and of the Chief Constable, again propose a "Third Force", and argue that the London Dublin Summits be ended. [~~You also state that I am responsible for the murders of members of the security forces by the IRA and that I share the aims of the IRA.~~] claim (~~Not worth including if it is not to be repeated somewhere~~ MAP)

Security policy in Northern Ireland is to bring an end to terrorism. There is no restraint upon the activities of the security forces other than the requirement to act within the law. I have full confidence in the security forces and their professional leadership; so I believe ~~do~~ have the vast majority of all those in Northern Ireland who earnestly wish for an end to the violence there. There is no place for self-appointed groups seeking to ~~share~~ exercise authority which can in law ~~only attach to~~ be exercised only by the security forces. The best assistance which members of the public can ~~render~~ give is ~~in the provision of~~ to provide information to the police.

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The communiqué issued after my meeting with Dr FitzGerald on 6 November stated, in reference to the constitutional position of Northern Ireland, "The Prime Minister affirmed, and the Taoiseach agreed, that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would require the consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland". This commitment by the Prime Minister of the Republic to the principle of consent and his acceptance that Northern Ireland is the unit within which that principle is to operate shows that the apprehensions which you are trying to foment are unfounded. The ~~publication of the~~ Joint Studies ~~themselves, (excepting that on security) demonstrated that they~~ demonstrably dealt with particular measures of co-operation between two neighbouring sovereign states. The Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council will facilitate that co-operation, especially in security and economic matters. The relations between the United Kingdom and the Republic are matters for the Government, Parliament and people of the whole United Kingdom and there is clear support in the United Kingdom for the policies set out in the communiqué. Her Majesty's Government will not be deflected from ~~the~~ the ~~se~~ policies described above by calumny or abuse.

which with the exception of the study on security have all been published,

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From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Ireland (1).

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

M Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

2 December 1981

Prime Minister
F.C.O. advice is attached.
2. Agree the line in para. 6.?
A.S.C. 11/12

Dear Michael Yes.

ARMS FROM THE UNITED STATES FOR THE RUC

1. The RUC will reach its present authorised establishment in March or April next year. This expansion has inevitably increased the RUC's requirement for firearms. As you will be aware, the requirement for revolvers has now been met by the US-manufactured Ruger Revolvers which were received both before and after the US Government's cessation of licensing sales to the RUC. (You will recall in particular Roy Harrington's letter of 13 February on this subject.)

2. On some occasions members of the RUC are equipped with rifles during their duty. One of the standard RUC rifles is the Ruger AC-556 manufactured in the United States which was adopted before the firearms ban was imposed. The RUC have 500 Ruger rifles, and require a further 200. Aside from the expansion of the force this reflects the fact that the RUC are now taking the lead in more difficult rural areas. (For urban work they are already equipped with the lower-powered US-manufactured M1 Carbine.)

3. The RUC's assessment is that the Ruger AC-556 is by far the most suitable weapon for rural patrolling. It is compact (important in a vehicle), unmilitary in style and did not develop faults during testing. There is a possible UK-manufactured weapon (the Sterling AR 180 - the "Armalite" made under licence) but the RUC do not give it as high an assessment as the Ruger. It is not well constructed or robust and is military in appearance. Furthermore if the RUC were to adopt the Sterling they would be required, in order to standardise their equipment, to dispose of their existing Rugers and to ~~retain~~ retrain a number of policemen engaged on operational duties. This would be expensive and disruptive. We therefore accept that in policing terms there is a strong case for acquiring further Rugers.

Why are we manufacturing the Sterling if it is "not well constructed or robust"? ./..

MT

CONFIDENTIAL

4. In 1979, in response to an outcry in Congress, President Carter instituted a review of US arms sales to the RUC which effectively prevents the issue of any further licences. In principle this 'review' is continuing and neither we nor the FCO have seen any merit in reopening the issue directly with the US Government. But our experience with Ruger revolvers (cf again Roy Harrington's letter of 13 February) has shown that the Northern Ireland Police Authority's suppliers can and will fulfil orders for Rugers.

5. This issue is quiet at present but if we authorise a further purchase of Rugers it may come to the surface again. The position is more delicate than it was in the case of the Revolvers, to the extent that we would be going further than merely to take up an order placed before the US Government instituted its review. However the Americans know well that we regard the stoppage of imports for the RUC which the review has brought about as quite indefensible; within the Administration itself there is sympathy for our position.

6. The Secretary of State therefore proposes to authorise an order for Ruger rifles to be placed with a firearms dealer in the UK. If any questions are raised about it, we should maintain the line that the Police Authority for Northern Ireland purchase arms in the normal way through legitimate dealers in the UK.

7. I am sending a copy of this letter to Francis Richards in the FCO.

Yours,
S Boys Smith

S W BOYS SMITH

Ireland

(4)

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE DIPLOMATIC REPORT No. 213/81

WLU 051/4

General Distribution

UNITED STATES
1 December, 1981

Prime Minister

A.J.C. 9/12

NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE UNITED STATES

Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

SUMMARY

The Irish Republican movement has deep roots in the US and depends heavily on American support. NORAID, the IRA's agents in America, capitalised heavily on the recent hunger strike (paragraphs 1–3).

2. The US Administration supported our stand on political status for PIRA prisoners. The US Congress proved more difficult, and vociferous. Editorial comment was balanced, but not uncritical, UK/US relations were not seriously impaired by the hunger strike but we could have suffered damage had the hunger strike persisted (paragraphs 4–7).

3. We have learned lessons from the hunger strike. It took a long time, and a change of mood in Dublin, before allegations of British intransigence began to fade. Even so, many Americans will have sympathised with PIRA aims and been prepared to tolerate their methods. PIRA have taken some hard knocks in the US media since the hunger strike ended (paragraphs 8 and 9).

4. There is no Unionist constituency in the US. Most interested Americans believe reunification to be the only answer and are unlikely to be persuaded otherwise. We can take advantage of this attitude, without compromising our own position, by being seen:

(*a*) to work closely with the Irish Government; and

(*b*) to be seriously engaged in the search for political progress in Northern Ireland.

In the light of recent developments, our position on Northern Ireland in the US looks better than for some time (paragraphs 10 and 11).

(Confidential) *Washington,*
My Lord, *1 December, 1981.*

Against the tumult, following the end of the hunger strike, of increased IRA terrorism and Loyalist anger, it may be appropriate to take stock from here; to look at the impact of the hunger strike on US opinion and on Anglo/US relations and at the significance of American opinion on the Northern Ireland issue.

2. The Republican movement in Ireland has deep roots in the US. The massive emigration from Ireland to the US in the famine of the 1840s influenced the character of the movement for Home Rule and ultimately for independence. The Irish men and women who fled to America were not of the Protestant landlord class who had so often led the sporadic movements for greater control over Ireland's affairs. They were Catholic and poor and they banded together for their own protection, particularly on the East Coast of the US whose Establishment was almost entirely confined to Anglo-Saxon Protestants. As they established themselves in the US their thoughts turned back to home. Through the Fenian

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movement they provided a powerful source of moral and practical support to the incipient Republican movement in Ireland. For the first time, the British Government of the day was obliged to acknowledge that there was an Irish nation in America beyond Britain's reach and hostile to her purposes.

3. Today in America there are 20 million people who can claim Irish descent. Perhaps 15 per cent of them are interested in Irish affairs and an even smaller percentage actively involved in trying to promote reunification. The two groups most closely associated with the aim of violent overthrow of the British connection in Northern Ireland are:

(*a*) the Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID), the agents of the Provisional IRA in the US; and

(*b*) the Irish National Caucus who, under the spurious campaign of human rights, give aid and comfort to the advocates of violence.

During the first six months of this year, NORAID reported the collection of about a quarter of a million dollars as a direct result of the passions and sympathy aroused by the hunger strike which they skilfully exploited. This was a bigger haul than they had achieved over any single issue previously. Their success was probably the most damaging outcome of the hunger strike for British interests as far as the US was concerned. NORAID also conducted large, frequent and unpleasant demonstrations outside our Consulates-General in America and our Mission in New York. No one was hurt and, with the exception of Boston, damage was slight. But the intensity of hatred shown by some of the demonstrators, combined with the reluctance of the police in some cities to take effective action, caused us considerable anxiety. A notable improvement in police protection followed your intervention with Secretary Haig in July.

4. NORAID and their dedicated supporters are beyond our influence, or that of the Irish Government. Our efforts during the hunger strike therefore concentrated on three major targets. The most important was the US Government. President Reagan has been happy to make the most of his Irish heritage; oratory about the Emerald Isle comes easily to him. There are many in prominent positions in the present US Administration who describe themselves as having an Irish background—Haig, Clark and Deaver to name three. But the President resisted all attempts to drag the US Government into the hunger strike. In particular, he replied firmly to the letter which Dr. Fitzgerald sent him in July asking him to use his influence with the Prime Minister to seek a solution to the issue; Mr. Reagan said that there were no grounds for the US to get involved. Similarly, his only response to a letter from the Four Horsemen and other Irish American leaders seeking a meeting at the end of August was to send Mr. Walter Stoessel, Under-Secretary for Political Affairs at the State Department, to address the group. The President himself did not respond to the Four Horsemen's letter. Secretary Haig went so far as to say publicly that " if there were not a Great Britain playing the rôle that it's playing there today, we might even have to create one to prevent a blood-bath ".

5. We had uphill work in Congress. An important landmark was the setting up of the Friends of Ireland, an influential group of over 60 responsible Irish American political leaders, dedicated to peaceful progress in Ireland. The Friends were a welcome antidote to the nefarious *Ad Hoc* Committee for Irish Affairs under Congressman Mario Biaggi which is no more than the creature of the Irish National Caucus. At the same time the new group's advocacy of a united Ireland, albeit by consent, made them a potentially significant source of pressure on us. The Four Horsemen (who were the principal founders of the Friends of Ireland) wrote to the Prime Minister in May accusing her of intransigence and the Friends of Ireland as a whole sent a further message in July putting the onus firmly on us to compromise to bring the hunger strike to an end. In their meeting with the Minister of State at the Northern Ireland Office, Mr. Michael Alison, in the same

month, the Friends of Ireland made it clear that while, in theory, they supported our stand on the five demands, they hoped that we would give way on enough of them to bring the hunger strike to an end, to take the political pressure off them and to undercut growing support for NORAID.

6. The third significant group was the press and public opinion. Public opinion was affected by the scenes of violence shot in Belfast and shown on US television. We had no control over this material. Its impact was, however, significant. It created an image of a province in flames and showed scenes of bitter conflict for which our policies were somehow held responsible. Editorial comment, on which we worked hard, was, by contrast, balanced. No major newspaper supported the Provisional IRA's demands and, although some were critical of the British Government for not doing more to bring the hunger strike to an end, this was more a reflection of the widespread feeling that " something must be done " than of well worked out criticism of our position.

7. It is impossible to gauge US public opinion on the hunger strike precisely. Only a minority of Americans—indeed, only a minority of Irish Americans—has any abiding interest in Northern Ireland. It takes dramatic events to get the province into the mainstream of public attention. Bobby Sands became nationally known for a brief period but the impact of successive deaths progressively diminished as time went on and as the futility of the hunger strike became more and more apparent. Overall, I do not think that US/UK relations were lastingly impaired by the hunger strike though, had it persisted, the damage could have been serious. The mood in Congress could have hardened and taken the form of resolutions and measures harmful to our wider interests; NORAID would have continued to raise large sums of money and might have been able to jack up support for their otherwise ineffective boycott of British goods. Even now, the interest of the US labour movement, some of whose members have been consistently hostile to us, is unhelpfully engaged in Northern Ireland as never before. The climate of opinion for inward investment has worsened. The US Government, while supporting our position, had to contend with public and Congressional pressure which brought them up against leading politicians such as Speaker O'Neill with whom they had enough trouble on the domestic front already. They are not out of the wood yet: Irish American organisations are vociferously protesting the Administration's decision to deny a visa to Owen Carron, MP.

8. Could we have done better? Our performance in handling the media in the US has been carefully analysed by Mr. Kelvin White and we shall implement his recommendations following Ministerial approval. Overall, our public position in the US was never as bad as it was made out to be in the British press who drew exaggerated conclusions from ephemeral, if unpleasant, events and measured US opinion by the yardstick of noisy demonstrations rather than by the attitude of the public at large, the press and the US Congress and Government. None the less, we had an enormous disadvantage to overcome. Sands's election to Parliament brought him instantly to prominence and appeared to substantiate PIRA's claims to represent Catholic opinion in Northern Ireland Sands's willingness to die for his cause had the same effect on many Americans as did the immolation of Buddhist priests during the Vietnam war. By constrast with the spectacle of his sacrifice, our own stand appeared to some as casuistical; if we could not grant political status we should at least be flexible and ingenious enough to find some compromise that would bring an end to the deaths. It took the increasingly obvious cynicism of the PIRA campaign, in turn reflected in a change of attitude on the part of Catholic leaders in Northern Ireland and the Irish Government in Dublin, to bring home to Americans that we were taking our stand on a vital issue of principle.

9. In a speech just before he left Washington, the Irish Ambassador claimed as one of his successes here the fact that Ireland was firmly back on the American agenda. While he exaggerated his claim, it has some basis and, in the long run, this may prove to be one of the more important consequences of the hunger strike in terms of Anglo/US relations. It is not helpful to our own policy on Northern Ireland. For just as the embryonic Republican movement in Ireland depended a hundred years ago on American support, so the Provisional IRA of today depend on the US for money, for arms and for political support. The hunger strike gave PIRA an opportunity to portray themselves in America as the victims of oppression and champions of freedom in Ireland. I suspect that many Americans, knowing little about them, will have sympathised with the aims of the Provisional IRA as depicted by NORAID and, as a result, will have been prepared to show some tolerance for their methods. Against that, recent PIRA actions have again shown them in their true colours, and PIRA have taken some significant media knocks—most significantly, a very damaging presentation on CBS TV of their socialist aims and links with international terrorism.

10. But there is one fact of American life that we shall never change. It is rooted in American folk memory of the War of Independence and nurtured by the size, strength and nature of the Irish American constituency in this country. It is that most Americans with an interest in Northern Ireland instinctively feel that the only way to resolve the issue is for Britain to " get out " and for the two parts of Ireland to be reunited. There is no Unionist constituency in America and Unionist politicians have, in contrast with their Catholic counterparts, failed to foster one. Even Americans sympathetic to Britain argue that our best interest must surely be served by removing the albatross of Northern Ireland from around our necks. The behaviour of so-called Loyalist leaders reinforces them in their view. I do not believe that we can significantly change that perception. I realise that it is hard to reconcile it with our own commitments to the people of Northern Ireland. But our position here is immeasurably strengthened to the extent that we are seen to be:

(*a*) working in harmony with the Irish Government whose attitude sets the tone for much Congressional opinion and public comment; and

(*b*) seriously engaged in the determined search for political progress in Northern Ireland.

We stand a better chance of convincing Americans of the rightness and inevitability of our guarantee to the people of Northern Ireland if we demonstrate that we are not prepared to allow it to constitute a veto over all political progress.

11. Northern Ireland will remain a high priority for this Embassy and for our Consuls General in the US. We devoted a major part of our resources to the issue before and during the hunger strike. With the help of the recommendations made by Mr. White and as a result of some new staff dispositions, we are better placed than we were nine months ago to devote a sustained effort to explaining our Northern Ireland policies to the press and public, to maintaining the support of the US Administration for what we are doing and to channelling Congressional interest in Northern Ireland in a helpful direction. Grim as the situation is in Northern Ireland, from the American angle it looks better now than it has done for a year or so.

12. I am copying this despatch to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, to the UK Permanent Representative to the UN, to HM Ambassador at Dublin, to HM Consuls General in the US, and to the Executive Director of BIS New York.

I am Sir

Yours faithfully

NICHOLAS HENDERSON.

Ireland

File

Kay

We will return in cf 1/12

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 November 1981

MR. PAISLEY

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 26 November. She agrees that no reply should be sent to Mr. Paisley's letter to her of 6 November.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Francis Richards (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

M. W. Hopkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

2

10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

Here is a letter from Ian Paisley, following up his "day of action". See 25.11.81

We will let you have a reply but he might possibly raise these matters in the House before you write to him.

MAP

MT.

30 November 1981

UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN

Professor PAUL WILKINSON, M.A.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS
EDWARD WRIGHT BUILDING
OLD ABERDEEN
AB9 2UB

Tel. No. 40241
Ext. 5205
S.T.D. Code 0224

30th November 1981

CONFIDENTIAL

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP.,
Prime Minister,
No. 10 Downing Street,
London W1.

RS/12

Dear Prime Minister,

Last week I visited the border area in Northern Ireland covering the whole of South Armagh and the Fermanagh/Tyrone border and was able to discuss the border security situation in depth with members of the RUC, UDR and local community leaders in church and politics, and later met a gathering of senior civic leaders, lawyers and local politicians in Belfast.

I had the great advantage that as an academic student of terrorism for some years, I have built up good contacts with all these groups and through frequent visits have been able to monitor developments and to get a closer understanding of the situation and the mood on the ground than one can obtain by official tours and press statements.

The enclosed assessment has been prepared exclusively for your use and will not be reproduced or publicised. Please feel free to draw on it as fully as you wish, and if you wish me to discuss any aspects of my report, I will be ready to visit your office at short notice to answer any questions you may wish to put to me.

I admire the courage and commitment which you have brought to bear on this tragic problem. The government has been splendidly firm in standing out to the terrorist campaign and I am sure that the broad framework of policy is sound. However, the recent spate of IRA atrocities and Paisley's moves to set up a private army and his efforts to play on the fears and apprehensions of the Protestant majority have created a situation fraught with pitfalls for the government. The dangers are accentuated by the new Secretary of State's lack of experience in Ulster affairs, and the deep distrust and hostility which has been created towards him as a result of the circumstances of his appointment and some of his less than well considered comments on the Northern Ireland conflict when his appointment was announced.

The government has a matchless opportunity to get both strategy and tactics for bringing peace to Northern Ireland absolutely right and for seeing it through, and therefore I beg you to keep in full control of

the situation, particularly during this critical period, when errors of judgement and the temptations of political opportunism and 'quick-fix' solutions could lead an inexperienced departmental minister into the horrors of civil war.

Yours sincerely,

Paul Wilkinson

Paul Wilkinson.

Encl.

CONFIDENTIAL

Assessment of Political and Security Situation in Northern Ireland, 30th November, 1981.

POLITICAL SITUATION

1. The Anglo-Irish intergovernmental talks inevitably created apprehension and suspicion among moderate Protestant and outright fear and hostility among the Paisleyite militants. Those of us who have been strong advocates of the Dublin-London intergovernmental dialogue fully expected this reaction. A sectarian feeling and resentment, deepened by twelve years of terrorist conflict, is bound to oppose any such attempts at constructive co-operation with the Republic.

2. The majority of Official Unionist and UDA members accept HMG's repeated assurances that the Anglo-Irish summit talks and joint studies are simply vehicles for improved co-operation and relations of mutual benefit and are not a sly diplomatic ploy for selling out the Unionist majority. Moderates in the majority community believe you, Prime Minister, when you repeatedly give your public assurance that the British guarantee to maintain the status of the province as an integral part of the United Kingdom, unless and until a majority of the province's population should decide otherwise. On the other hand Paisley has been exploiting the feelings of outrage and frustration following the murder of the Rev. Robert Bradford, MP, to play on the fears of the less politically sophisticated members of the Protestant community. He and his followers have been portraying the Anglo-Irish Council as the first stage to delivering the entire Ulster community into the hands of unification with the Republic. It matters not a whit to the Paisleyite extremists that the accord published following the Anglo-Irish Council talks

reiterates the guarantee that there will be no change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland without the consent of the majority. They are more interested in inuendo and smear than in the real facts of the situation.

3. If the support and confidence of the sensible moderate Protestant community is to be retained, the Paisleyite propaganda campaign against the Anglo-Irish Council must be forcefully combatted. The most dramatic and effective way of doing this would be for you as Prime Minister to make a speech in Ulster to the Official Unionist and other moderate Protestant groups unambiguously restating the principle that, so long as the Unionist majority wish to maintain the status of Northern Ireland as a province of the United Kingdom, the government of the United Kingdom will fully honour its obligations to maintain their rights and their defence. This declaration would be powerfully augmented by a simultaneous statement by Dr. Garret Fitzgerald repeating his party's promise that there is no question of the Republic attempting to impose the reunification of Ireland against the consent of the Protestant majority in the north. (I heard this principle of consent restated forefully by Irish Government representatives at last week's British-Irish Association Conference in Lambeth Palace. There is little doubt they are so worried about the dangers of civil war in the north that they would be prepared to make this declaration in order to calm passions and undermine Paisley's demagogism). An alternative tactic would be to draw attention to this publicly stated Irish Government position in your own speech. A move of this kind would give a tremendous boost to the morale of the Protestant population and would help to win over more support for the eminently practical and sensible Anglo-Irish Council approach to

intergovernmental co-operation.

4. In the long term however a more tangible means of conciliating moderate Protestant opinion would be to re-establish a devolved government for the province incorporating maximum constitutional guarantees and participation for the minority community. This would have three immediate advantages. First it would remove the political vacuum in which Paisley is able to use his quasi-fascist direct action tactics with such damaging effect. Secondly it would provide all the moderate and genuinely parliamentarian party leaders in the province with an instrument for improving their own co-operation, strengthening the middle ground of compromise and good sense and working constructively to improve the economic and social differences in our battered province. The third advantage is that it would provide a parliamentary tier to the structure of government, thus providing a natural and secure means of Northern Ireland politicians participating on an equal level with their Irish opposite numbers in the intergovernmental discussions on such matters as economic co-operation. (Those who attended the Lambeth Palace Conference on 27th November will, I believe, confirm my judgement that there is a genuine yearning among the SDLP Alliance and Official Unionist groups for this kind of assembly framework. There is absolutely no evidence that Paisley has sufficient support even among the rural Protestant community in the north of the province to 'take over' or even dominate a devolved assembly. Most Protestants I spoke to described Paisley in scathing terms as a big mouth who had done nothing to benefit Ulster people).

5. Finally, I must touch on the delicate matter of the Secretary of State's own position. It was, to say the least, unfortunate that

Mr. Prior's appointment was portrayed as the reluctant exile of a politician with his heart and his ambitions so firmly in Westminster politics. While I do not personally doubt Mr. Prior's honourable intentions and goodwill towards the province, every single Protestant I spoke to in the province does, and their animosity was undoubtedly increased by Mr. Prior's unfortunate comments shortly after his appointment about 'knocking peoples' heads together' and 'hitting them on the backsides.' This was extremely unwise coming from someone with no personal experience or profound knowledge of the complex tragedy of the Northern Ireland conflict. Thus it would be a mistake to assume that Protestant antipathy to Mr. Prior is limited to the Paisleyites. In order to keep the vital confidence and support of moderate Protestants, as I see it, you have two options; either to take the earliest opportunity of moving Mr. Prior to an economic or other post where he will be removed from the Northern Ireland scene, or to take a direct and continuous oversight of the delicate and dangerous situation in the province compensating for Mr. Prior's inexperience and ensuring that he is not carried away by the enthusiasm of some of his officials and the Junior Minister, the Earl of Gowrie, who have somehow obtained the naive notion of a quick-fix solution to the Northern Ireland problem, involving some form of deal with the Irish Republic and a British withdrawal. I may be being unfair about the Earl of Gowrie for he is newly in post and may have already modified his initial views in a more realistic direction, but I have it on good authority that one of his moves when he arrived in the province was to invite journalists to discuss the possibilities of a deal of this kind. You will not be surprised to learn that the moderate Protestant antipathy for poor Mr. Scott and the Earl of Gowrie, is if anything, even greater than the antipathy

to Mr. Prior. It may well be worth considering a total re-shaping of the junior ministerial team at the Northern Ireland office if you decide to keep Mr. Prior on, but to take more direct personal interest in the affairs of the province.

THE SECURITY SITUATION

6. It is a cardinal principle of a liberal democracy's campaign against terrorism that one should not try to mould one's policy in reaction to the latest atrocities. Those who truly understand the nature of terrorist violence, as I believe you yourself do, have always understood that the closer democratic government comes to rational reforms in the political and economic systems, the more the anti-democratic petty tyrannies of terrorist organisations will seek to wreck peace and democracy. Hence it is entirely illusory to believe that merely by establishing a certain devolved framework with an element of minority participation and by strengthening long-term co-operation between the Republic and its north neighbour, that one could cause terrorism to wither away. There is a chance that one would, by maximising consent from the Catholic and Protestant moderates, increasingly isolate the terrorists from the general population. But to some extent this isolation is already happening because of the public revulsion at terrorist atrocities and the increasingly bold stand of Catholic Church leaders against the IRA. However, particularly since its 1977 re-organisation into a terrorist cell structure, the IRA does not need wide public support or participation in order to continue sowing death and destruction. On the contrary, in a sense the IRA's very isolation from the community makes it a more difficult quarry for the police.

7. Hence a cardinal pre-condition of progress towards peace in Northern Ireland must be a determined and effective campaign to eradicate terrorism using all methods compatible with the continuance of democracy and the rule of law.

I know that your own and your government's will to defeat terrorism is more determined than ever following the recent cowardly attacks in London and Northern Ireland. But there is no doubt that the moderate Protestant community and the law-abiding majority of the Catholic community are not convinced that this will is being translated into effective security policy in Northern Ireland, and in order to maintain their confidence and support, it is vital that the government embark on a new security initiative to crack down still harder on terrorism in the province. It must be realised that the main effort for this crack-down must come from the security forces in the north, for although co-operation with the Republic in the form of intelligence sharing has been markedly improved since the security discussions of Autumn 1979, the harsh fact is that the Garda is an unarmed force and that political constraints prevent it from joining in combined operations with the security forces on the north side of the border in the hot pursuit of terrorists. This, combined with the unwillingness of the Republic authority to extradite terrorists, means that terrorists can escape across the border with relative ease and thus are able to continue with their campaign of genocide against the beleaguered Protestant farmers, UDR men, police and reservists in the border area. There is hardly a family in the border areas of South Armagh and Fermanagh that I visited who have not lost a relative or a close friend in this brutal murder campaign.

8. There are a number of practical emergency measures that the government can, and must, take to assist in the protection of the innocent and to help deter the terrorists. None of the measures I suggest would undercut the general principle of police primacy which, in my view, was rightly adopted as the basis of security strategy in the province after 1976.

9. The rate of terrorist murders on the Fermanagh border is relatively lower than is the case in South Armagh and the obvious reason for this is that there are more blocked crossing points and manned checkpoints on the Fermanagh border. Although this does not prevent occasional terrorist penetration, it has been a considerable deterrent. In my view the government's policy of leaving the entire frontier area of H Division of the RUC free and uncontrolled is a disastrous weakness. The Irish Republic Ministry for Justice was fully entitled to complain about the lack of continuous surveillance in South Armagh in the circumstances of the search for the kidnappers of Mr. Dunne. Although there are four RUC stations in the area and a divisional mobile support unit which patrols much of the area in daylight, the harsh fact is that there is no constant police or military patrol on the ground to control the boundary or to provide protection for the inhabitants.

10. Frontier control would be facilitated by closing the Cullaville concession road and the country bridges at Cullaville and Altnamachan. Additionally, minor crossings, particularly over the Fane River, should be effectively blocked.

11. Following the useful example in Fermanagh, regular army units should be introduced in the South Armagh to man the main frontier crossings and other key roads in the county with appropriate vehicle checkpoints. There can be no doubt that this makes the task of the terrorists

all the more difficult by forcing them to abandon vehicles in order to cross the frontier. A further move which would help to seal the frontier would be to introduce more regular army foot patrols in the South Armagh border areas. There has been too much deployment of UDR and regular army for static defence duties and the new spearhead troops consist of units inexperienced in Northern Ireland and are therefore mainly of symbolic importance in restoring morale among the urban population.

12. Careful consideration should also be given to re-establishing a UDR base between Strabane and Londonderry as the frontier area between Donemana and Gartin is now virtually unprotected and isolated. If the regular army had been deployed on the Castlederg sector, the UDR could have been more usefully deployed in other areas.

13. Urgent consideration should be given to providing the RUC and UDR men with better weapons for personal protection when they are off duty. The .22 is a peashooter compared to the sophisticated fire power now available to the IRA. .38 revolvers should be made available to all police and UDR men and reservists for personal protection purposes.

In some areas where the RUC is the force most immediately on hand to respond to a terrorist incident, there should be provision of grenades and machine-guns in order to respond with greater fire power to a major attack. It is believed that the IRA still has M60 machine-gun capability. They are more likely to use this against the RUC than against well-armed troops. RUC mobile vehicles should be equipped with saracen cars mounted with machine-guns.

14. Last, but not least, urgent consideration should be given to increasing the size of the SAS force deployed in the border areas and on undercover duties. The SAS with its unique skills and experience has made a tremendous impact in improving the overall security situation. The benefits of an additional deployment in the province would be out of all proportion to the modest cost of these units. I strongly urge the government to increase these particularly valuable resources for the war against terrorism.

CONCLUSION

It should be stressed that none of these individual political and security measures will be sufficient in itself to stem the slide of the province into civil war and the collapse of confidence among the moderate population. It is urgently necessary for HMG to compliment the wise and constructive development of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council by a suitable and effective devolved governmental structure for Northern Ireland and a determined security initiative along the lines described above. These measures, in combination, would strengthen the middle ground of politics and economic co-operation both within the province and between North and South, while at the same time further isolating and undermining the extremists.

Paul Wilkinson.

30th November 1981.

HL

30 November 1981

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to acknowledge your letter of 25 November.

I will place your letter before the Prime Minister and a reply will be sent to you as soon as possible.

M A PATTISON

The Reverend Ian Paisley, M.P.

cc FCO
CO.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 November 1981

I attach a copy of a letter from Mr. Ian Paisley, M.P. following his "day of action" last week. This is dated 25 November and was received here on Saturday.

You will see that Mr. Paisley formally volunteers his "third force" to support the security forces. He also calls for an end to Anglo/Irish Summits, and the return of democratic government in the Province.

I should be grateful if, in consultation with those to whom I am copying this letter, you could let me have a suitable draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature as soon as possible.

We also have outstanding Mr. Paisley's letter of 6 November. I am not clear whether you wish to advise us that no reply is now necessary to that.

I am sending copies of this letter to Roderic Lyne (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. A. PATTISON

Stephen Boys Smith, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

2.

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Here is a transcript of Sunday's broadcast about reactions to Priestley.

MAP 30/xi.

Thank you

MT

PAISLEY LETTERS - 29 November 1981 - "SUNDAY" Programme

cc Mr Lapham
→ Mr Pattison

JACOBS: Here's a voice from last week's programme.

PAISLEY INSERT: "The Lord Jesus Christ didn't come to send peace, at the expense of truth, for he said 'I came not to send peace but a sword to set people at variance against one another. He meant that those that adhered to the truth will be at variance against those that reject the truth."

JACOBS: The Reverend Dr Ian Paisley from our interview with him the day before his 'day of action' in Northern Ireland. Reactions to that interview have been pouring into our office all week and they're about equally divided for and against Mr Paisley.

Here with some of them is Bernard Jackson.

JACKSON: We received over 80 letters in all which were fairly evenly split for and against what Mr Paisley had to say. It was interesting to note that many listeners sided with Mr Paisley and his views as a result of hearing the interview. Miss Molly Calver of Southend on Sea is typical.

READER: I have always found it difficult to reconcile Mr Paisley's politics and the apparent hatred in some of his remarks with that of a minister of the gospel of Christ. When I heard him speak today to my amazement I found myself agreeing with every word he said. His actions had made me doubt his faith in Christian calling but to hear his clear testimony of his simple faith in Christ has convinced me of his sincerity and I am now one of his supporters.

JACKSON: The interview made a great impression on Mr and Mrs John Harvey from Powys in Wales.

READER: Having heard Brother Paisley on your programme this morning, my wife and I wept for joy to hear such a forthright declaration of scriptural truth and personal testimony stated with such commendable freedom from personal rancour. I would say that Mr Paisley's unrehearsed words did more for the cause of God and truth and righteousness in our nation in the space of a few minutes than all other contemporary politicians put together have done in their whole lives.

JACKSON: Ian Paisley certainly has the knack of dividing an audience. According to our mailbag you either love him or you hate him. And there's no love lost between Mr Paisley and Mrs Jennifer Spragg of Berkhamsted, Hertfordshire.

READER: I would not call Ian Paisley a devil, but he does show how easily that gentleman can cite scripture to his purpose. St Paul's words about magistrates not wielding the sword in vain were not instructions to magistrates themselves or commands from God as to how they should execute the law. They were advise to ordinary Christians. St Paul was saying that the fact that a magistrate was not a Christian did not mean that Christians need not obey him. He was there to deal with evildoers and as far as possible Christians should cooperate with him.

JACKSON: Michael Clutton of Leicester also has strong views on the matter. He objects to Mr Paisley's brand of Christianity.

READER: I should like to say that it is people such as Paisley that have driven me from the church after over 40 years as a practising Christian. I understand that Christ gave two commandments to his followers, to love God and to love their fellow men as themselves. If that is so I can only say that Paisley and his ilk are far from the teachings of Christ.

JACKSON: But as I said most of the letters were split right down the middle. It seems to be Ian Paisley's forthright way of talking which many found attractive. Norman Hayes of Gloucester commends Dr Paisley as both a pastor and a politician.

READER: Hats off to a politican who knows how to say what is right rather than what is convenient! Dr Paisley was not stating what he personally thought mark you, but rather what the Lord Jesus Christ had taught. His reference to kneeling with a terrified man on the IRA Hitlist and pointing him to Christ made me wonder how the Secretary for Northern Ireland or the Prime Minister would have dealt with the case.

JACKSON: The next letter from Warren Kane of London N1 is a criticism of the media in general and the way he thinks that our attitudes come through.

READER: It was fascinating to observe the classic display of double standards exhibited in last week's "Sunday". To contrast the antipathy obviously felt towards the Reverend Ian Paisley with a nauseous eulogy for Bishop Winter. The former fights terrorism in Ulster and so is a sinner, the latter supported it in Southern Africa, and therefore was a saint.

JACKSON: The last letter we're dealing with today comes in telegraphic style from Patrick McGuire of Rathfarnham in Dublin. It seems Satan himself is threatened.

READER: Please warn the Devil immediately that his reputation as Champion Scripture-Quoter is being put at grave risk by an Arch Hypocrite from Northern Ireland called Ian Paisley.

Rev Dr Ian Paisley - Sunday Programme - 25 November 1981

Cue: Today, the congregations of all Church of Ireland churches are being asked to offer special prayers for those in authority to search out new ways of reconciliation. And doubtless one of those for whom they'll be praying will be thundering out from his own fiercely independant pulpit an old-time protestant gospel on which he bases his authority. That man is the Reverend Doctor Ian Paisley who has designated tomorrow his 'Day of Action' and has urged his followers to strike and to close their shops, the start of his campaign to show Westminster that he can make Ulster ungovernable. Mr Paisley's vehement, some would say bigotted political stance stems from his uncompromising theological believes. To understand his theology is to understand his politics. Ted Harrison asked Mr Paisley how he reconciled his actions of the week with his concept of the gospel and peacemaking.

Paisley: The gospel is not my conception, or some theologian's conception, the gospel is what is revealed in the Word of God, and it is clear from scripture that the first thing is purity. It is pure says the scripture, then peaceable. The Lord Jesus Christ didn't come to send peace, at the expense of truth. For he said 'I came not to send peace but a sword to set people at variance against one another'. He meant that those that adhered to the truth will be at variance against those that reject the truth. Now the scriptures make it clear that the magistrate has a duty, he is not to bare the sword in vain. He is to be a terror to evildoers. Unfortunately the magistrate, and that is the Government, has not been a terror to evildoers in this country and all I'm saying as a Christian minister, I'm saying that Government has a Christian duty. It is not to bare the sword in vain, it is to execute proper judgement on acts of crime. It has failed totally to do that. Therefore the people that protest are protesting on scriptural grounds in order that righteousness might prevail and unrighteousness might be punished.

Harrison: What do you understand by Christ's own words to love your enemies?

Paisley: Christ made it perfectly clear that I've to love my personal enemies and that I do. But the Bible makes it perfectly clear — there are those who are the enemies of God and they are to be hated, with a perfect hatred and that brings us into the category of what we've to reject. We've to hate murder, we've to hate falsehood, we've to hate every form of immorality, we've to hate every form that brings dishonour to man, because anything that dishonours God's law ultimately besmirches and stains man. I've no enmity in my heart against any of my own enemies. But I certainly have righteous indignation and anger and hatred against principals that are bringing this community into the state that its in today. Now I was in the home yesterday of that woman that was bereaved. She has a young child of 10 months, her oldest boy is 14. She doesn't drive a car. That means her whole livelihood is finished and of course that is why her husband was murdered, in order that that whole farm might pass into the hands of Republicans. That can be multiplied hundreds and hundreds of times in the border areas. Now I hate that, with a holy hatred, and I hate the people who have accepted that as their principal, and until a man repents there is no forgiveness.

Paisley: God does not forgive people until they repent and turn from their sin and in fact Christ made it very clear that until your brother says to you 'I repent' you're not under obligation to forgive 'em. The IRA has never said to anybody, they repent, in fact they glory in these crimes.

Harrison: If one looks perhaps at the ultimate act of violence that of the murder of God at the crucifixion, the response of the disciples wasn't, well let's make the Roman empire unworkable. It was to go out and preach, again a peaceful gospel.

Paisley: When you say, er, the murder of God, we must get it into its proper context. No man took the Lord Christ's life. The Lord Jesus said, I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again. The murder of the Lord Jesus Christ, you say its murder, I say it was an atoning death, a vicarious death, a sacrificial death, that that has any parallel with what's happening here in Northern Ireland, that to me is blasphemous.

Harrison: I'm not making a parallel in substance, I'm looking to it for advice or guidance as to how to respond to violence.

Paisley: Alright, well say I was murdered, as is very likely I could be, because six prominent Democratic Unionists are to be murdered, according to the information that I have received. Well, say I was to be murdered, the people of my church will not be going out to murder anybody. The people of my church will continue to insist that the Government of this country do the duty that God has placed in their hand. Now if they don't do their duty then other magistrates appointed by the people must do that duty, because God never leaves his people without ministers. And when the church has decayed God has raised up outside the church, ministers. When a state has decayed God has raised up magistrates outside the church. I, I am not talking about people taking the law into their hands and going out and murdering individuals. That I have set my face against and denounced, whether its done by Protestants or Roman Catholics, and I have been denounced by fellow Protestants because of my strong stand on that.

Harrison: Don't you fear though that your strong words might lead people to taking these violent...

Paisley: No! Because my strong words have always been strong words of condemnation and strong words to insist that we do it the right way. And the right way to do it is the way that I am seeking to do it - within the law. But you should be pressing the magistrate to do what is his God-appointed task. Not to bare the sword in vain. Because the responsibili for the situation not only lies on the IRA, who are the murderers, or anybody that does murders whether it be Protestant or Roman Catholic, but the responsibility lies on the Government. If the Government had done the task that they're appointed to do we wouldn't be in the mess we're in today.

Harrison: But how does it help to say we're going to make your job even harder?

Paisley: Because, the way that we're going to make they're job even harder is going to force them to do the job they ought to do. The job that they're doing, that we're going to make harder are really irrelevant today. I mean, people are being killed like flies today. Do you fear your own murder. Oh yes, I mean, I don't fear it, no, because the day I was saved by God's grace I got complete deliverence from the fear of death.

Harrison: So are you seeking martyrdom?

Paisley: No, I'm not seeking martyrdom. I want to live and I think that I will live because I believe that I'm immortal until my works done and I don't think that my work is completed, as yet. And the principal of salvation is that you should live and you should invest your life for the betterment of the people that you serve and I want to serve the people of Ulster, but if its the will of God that I should die then I will die. I have a simple faith in the finished work of Christ. I have come as a guilty hell deserving sinner to Christ, I have received him as my saviour and on the authority of his word, him that cometh unto me I will in no ways cast out, I know that I am born again of the spirit of God. That is my hope for eternity. And last night at twenty minutes to one o'clock a man came to my door and he said, 'I feel I'm under a threat of death, the police have warned me I'm going to be murdered', he said, 'what shall I do?'. I said, 'the only thing you can do is come to Christ'. And last night I knelt with that man as I have knelt with thousands of Ulster men and pointed that man to the peace of the gospel.

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ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHAMBERS

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHAMBERS,
LAW OFFICERS' DEPARTMENT,
ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE,
LONDON, W.C.2.

27 November, 1981

Dear Graham,

MEETING WITH IRISH ATTORNEY-GENERAL

1. I have already given you a brief oral account of the meeting between the two Attorneys-General which took place on Wednesday. I am now writing to fill in some of the details and also to put the account on record for the benefit of the others to whom this letter is being copied.

2. In terms at least of the relationship between the two Governments, and perhaps also in terms of potential concrete results (though this assessment is obviously still very speculative), I think that the meeting was a success. Certainly, the personal links between the two Attorneys-General were strengthened and this can only be helpful in furthering our aim of getting effective measures taken by the authorities of the Republic against the IRA (and, for that matter, other criminals), whether fugitives from the North, or so to speak, natives.

3. At the beginning of the meeting it was suggested by our Attorney-General - and, to avoid confusion, I shall refer to him in this letter simply as "the Attorney-General" and to his opposite number as "Mr. Sutherland" - that, though the two Governments might subsequently choose to describe the meeting and its successors as having some special status in connection with the Inter-Governmental Council, this should in no way inhibit their complete informality. Mr. Sutherland accepted both limbs of this proposition without demur. It was also agreed that the two sides would maintain the strictest confidentiality about the contents of the discussion. They

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further agreed that the discussions (including subsequent talks at official level), would be strictly on a lawyer-to-lawyer or technician-to-technician basis, concerned only with the technical merits and feasibility of the various ideas that might be canvassed, and that nothing said in them would imply any commitment on the part of either Government to adopt any particular course that might be discussed: in this sense, so far as concerned the implementation of what might be agreed to be technically possible, the discussions would be complete ad referendum the politicians on both sides.

4. The Attorney-General then identified the three topics which we thought ought to be covered and Mr. Sutherland confirmed that his interpretation of the remit was the same as ours.

Extradition

5. At Mr. Sutherland's own request we took this first. He expressed the strongest reluctance to do anything which would involve an amendment of the Republic's Constitution. He argued that, in the eyes of many in the South, extradition to the North was tantamount to handing fugitives over to improper interrogation (amounting to "torture") and that this would make it extremely difficult to get the right result in a referendum where that would be seen as what was at stake. It would, in any case, be difficult to justify deleting or amending Article 29.3 of the Constitution which, on the face of it, stated a principle that nobody could find fault with. He expressed equal distaste for anything which would involve asking the Supreme Court to hold that the extradition of political offenders was not contrary to international law and therefore did not engage Article 29.3 of the Constitution. He did agree, but only under pressure and obviously with no conviction that it would be any use, that the subsequent discussions by officials could look at the possibility of referring

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the international law issue to some independent third party determination. But he argued that, even if this were done and the determination was to the effect that there was no such rule of international law as had been contended for, the Supreme Court would not necessarily accept it as authoritative and might indeed resent it as an improper attempt to influence their own decision.

6. Having deployed these objections to what he (rightly) expected us to put forward, Mr. Sutherland then offered us what he thought was a more promsing alternative. This was to build on remarks made by Henchy, J in a very recent Supreme Court case (Hanlon v Fleming) where it was apparently suggested that the courts ought to be more discriminating in characterizing offences as political offences. The test (as I understood what he was saying: I have not seen a report of Hanlon v Fleming but Mr. Sutherland promised to let us have one) should be not the motive or intention of the offender but rather the objective circumstances of the offence. This would mean that where the crime was a crime of pure terrorism against totally innocent members of the public (eg the Wimpey Bar bomb as contrasted with attacks on police or soldiers or government officials), the courts should treat it as outside the "political offence" exception. While this would obviously cover only a small part of the total number of terrorist crimes for which we should like to get the offenders extradited and would require a cautious case-by-case approach, it would be the thin end of the wedge and the psychological and political effect of even one or two terrorists being extradited would be very valuable. If Mr. Sutherland was authorised to pursue this suggestion - and this was something that he would follow up with his political colleagues in Dublin as soon as he returned - he would hope to put the whole weight of the Irish

/Government

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Government visibly behind it by himself conducting the first case before the Irish courts in which the line would be run. He could not guarantee success but he thought that, on present form, two of the Judges of the Supreme Court would support his argument, two would be opposed to it and the attitude of fifth (the Chief Justice) could not be predicted.

7. In effect, Mr. Sutherland made this new approach to the definition of "political offender" the centre-piece of what he had to say on extradition. Without abandoning our own idea of a new look at the international law question, the Attorney-General welcomed what he had said and agreed that it should be followed up.

8. Mr. Sutherland made two other points in relation to extradition:

(a) There might be a need for legislation - probably not difficult or politically controversial - to ensure that there were no problems about "corresponding" offences. I myself am not clear how this arises under the present backing of warrants system, but it may be that he was more concerned with its relevance in the context of (b) below.

(b) The past tendency of the Irish courts to shelter behind the political offence exception was partly due to the fact that extradition was granted through a simple backing of warrants system. Mr. Sutherland thought that the courts might be less sympathetic to fugitives if the request had to be supported by evidence amounting to a prima facie case, as would happen under an ordinary extradition procedure. He therefore suggested that consideration be given to replacing the present backing of warrants system by something on the lines of an ordinary extradition procedure. He at first put this suggestion in unqualified terms but when we pointed out (with visible but inaudible support from Quigley) that the backing of warrants procedure was a very valuable instrument of co-operation in ordinary criminal cases, he readily agreed to limit his suggestion to cases involving political offences. His proposal as it

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therefore eventually emerged was that the requesting authorities should have an option as to which procedure they used. The Attorney-General agreed that this proposal should be pursued by officials.

Extra-territorial jurisdiction

9. We than turned to how we might make the machinery of extra-territorial jurisdiction more effective. The Attorney-General made his bid on our two points: facilities for the RUC to interrogate persons held in custody in the South; and the transfer of exhibits.

10. We made little concrete progress on interrogation. We got a long spiel from Mr. Sutherland about the traditional suspicion with which the RUC were regarded in the South (reinforced by all the allegations associated with the Strasbourg proceedings) and about how the Garda had always kept their distnace from the RUC in the public mind and had, for that reason, never been accepted as legitimate personal targets for the IRA. If, so the argument proceeded, the RUC were given the facility we requested, those members of the Garda who were present would become personal targets and the IRA would, in effect, be given a free hand to attack them without incurring public hostility. In any event, the Garda would be very reluctant to co-operate in this way.

11. Despite these arguments, the Attorney-General pressed Mr. Sutherland on this matter and pointed out the tremendous benefits which could be obtained if IRA suspects in the South were amenable to interrogation by skilled and expert operators from the North - or, indeed, from Great Britain: he suggested that the Metropolitan Police might be used instead of the RUC. Faced with this pressure, Mr. Sutherland agreed to pursue the suggestion with the Minister of

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Justice and with the Garda. But he was very negative about it and I should be very surprised if anything useful comes of it.

12. By contrast, Mr. Sutherland was very forthcoming about the exchange of exhibits. He said that he saw very little difficulty in getting the appropriate authorities in the Republic to do whatever was necessary to operate reciprocal arrangements of the kind we had in mind.

All-Ireland Court

13. Mr. Sutherland then turned to this topic. He explained that what they were now contemplating was (in 1974 terms) the "Single Court" rather than the "Mixed Court". He also made it clear that the court which he envisaged and which would have jurisdiction throughout Ireland would ordinarily sit, for the purposes of a trial, at the place where the offence was committed. Accordingly, a person accused of a bomb outrage in, say, Belfast but ~~xxx~~ apprehended in Dublin would find himself returned to Belfast for trial. If there were witnesses in the South who, for good reason, would not go, and could not be brought, to Belfast, the court would have jurisdiction to hear their evidence in the South. When asked why it was thought that a court of this kind which was so decisively rejected in 1974 was now a runner, Mr. Sutherland and Mr. Quigley both said, surprisingly, that they were not convinced that the constitutional obstacle, which was thought in 1974 to rule it out as a practical proposition offering immediate attractions, really had any substance. They thought that such a court could be set up under the existing constitution (like a Special Court).

14. The meeting did not attempt to get down to a detailed consideration of the various practical problems which might attend the establishment and functioning of a single court. There was no

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disposition to suggest that these problems would not arise but there was general agreement that they should be left for consideration by officials. Nor, of course, was there any disposition to minimise the polticial objections that would certainly be raised to anything which could be represented as a first step towards unification. But this was something which the politicians would have to assess if and when the lawyers and technicians reported that the project was technically feasible.

Future Procedure

14. It was agreed that detailed discussions of the above three topics should now be taken forward by officials on both sides. The aim was for them to get down to work before Christmas and then report back to the two Attorneys-General with a view to these meeting again early in the new year. It was agreed that the two Law Officers' Departments (in effect, Quigley on their side and me on ours) should co-ordinate the exercise, each side fielding such experts from other Departments as the topics might require. I undertook to telephone Quigley on the afternoon of Tuesday next with a view to starting the wheels turning, though the Irish side were not certain whether Mr. Sutherland would by then have got the necessary clearnace from his colleagues on the "political offender" point.

15. This question of the composition of our team and the setting in train of inter-governmental discussions at official level is something that we ought now to look at very urgently. On the extradition side we clearly need a Home Office representative, an FCO representative (to deal both with extradition as such and with the international law argument) and, obviously, a NIO representative. On extra-territorial jurisdiction, we have a slight problem in that the two Attorneys-General

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agreed that their respective DPP's offices should play an active part and that this could best be done at the Deputy level (McCloskey and O'Leary) who apparently have established a good personal relationship. However, Sir B Shaw has strenuously objected to this and the Attorney-General has now agreed that the DPP's office should, so to speak, be represented by my colleague David Haggan. On the All-Ireland Court, I think that it is the NIO and the FCO who have the most direct interest.

16. What I should like to suggest is that we have a meeting of all interested departments very early next week - preferably before I am due to ring Quigley - so as to sort out our team (preferably keeping it as small as possible) and identifying convenient dates which we could suggest for the first meeting with the Irish. Since the physical facilities here are very limited, would it be possible for the meeting to take place in your office (or in the FCO if that were more convenient to all concerned)? I think that I have to say - and you will understand with how little enthusiasm I say it - that I must probably be the formal leader of the team because the exercise has to be regarded as simply the extension of the meetings between the two Attorneys-General and because Quigley and I were personally charged with the responsibility for making progress. But this must not be an obstacle to whatever is the most effective way of getting the work done.

Publicity

17. As you know, as soon as the meeting between the two Attorneys-General broke up, we were given the news that word of its taking place had already got out to the press, apparently in Belfast. We therefore agreed, without difficulty, on the line suggested in

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our own briefing to the Attorney-General and this was passed to the Irish Embassy for their use also. So far as I know, we have come under no pressure yet to go beyond it.

18. I am copying this letter to Patrick Eyers in the FCO, Austin Wilson in the Home Office, Nigel Wenban-Smith in the Cabinet Office and Michael Alexander at No.10. I look forward to a very early response about the meeting next week.

Yours ever,

Henry Steel

H. STEEL

G L Angel Esq
Northern Ireland Office
Gt George St
London, SW1

CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

(1)

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

26 November 1981

Appears further action?

Agreed MT

Dear Michael

I spoke to you on 20 November about the letter of 6 November which the Reverend Ian Paisley MP handed in on the day of the last Anglo-Irish Summit meeting. We agreed that on balance it would be best that no reply be sent at that juncture (with the "Day Of Action" in prospect in Northern Ireland on 23 November) and that probably no reply should be sent at all.

Now that the day of action is behind us we have looked at Dr Paisley's letter again. We adhere to the view that no reply should be sent. The letter does not, on the face of it, call for a reply; and in effect the strictures it contains were dealt with by the Prime Minister in her statement in the House of Commons on 10 November. One might also argue that the publication of the Joint Studies on 11 November constitutes part of the Government's response to the kind of criticisms Dr Paisley makes.

There can be little doubt that if a reply were sent now Dr Paisley, in his present belligerent mood, would seek to turn it to his own advantage. My Secretary of State is therefore of the view that this particular sleeping dog had best be left to lie.

I am copying this letter to Francis Richards (FCO).

Yours sincerely

Mike Hopkins

M W HOPKINS

KW

CONFIDENTIAL

cc Press
GOW

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SWIA OAA
The Parsonage, 17 Cyprus Avenue, BELFAST BT5 5NT.

The Rt. Hon. The Prime Minister,
Mrs. Margaret Thatcher MP,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON.

25th November 1981.

R28

Dear Prime Minister,

Ulster has spoken loudly and clearly. Are you going to heed the message, or do you wish the Ulster people to speak even more forcibly before you will heed their heartrending cry for action against the murderers?

As citizens within the United Kingdom we have demands which we are entitled to make, and once again we spell them out to you.

1. We demand proper security for our people and an all-out war against the IRA murderers. Never before, in an hour of Ulster's crisis, has a large section of the RUC expressed its lack of confidence in its Chief Constable. If the serving members of the RUC have no faith in their Chief how can you expect the people of Northern Ireland to have faith in him? You cannot duck this issue - you must face it. Both the Police and the UDR must be equipped with weaponry better and more powerful than that of the IRA terrorists, and above all, the present political restraints must be removed from the security forces. By refusing to supply this weaponry and to allow meaningful offensive action you are responsible for their slaughter. Honeyed words and pious terms of sympathy will not conceal your guilt. Now is the time for you to give the security forces the backup and local presence which they so desperately need, and therefore I wish to offer to you a vast body of disciplined and dedicated volunteers who could be enlisted in an official 3rd Force to complement the efforts of the RUC and UDR.

2. The London/Dublin Summits in connection with the affairs and destiny of Northern Ireland must be ended forthwith. The Joint Studies provide adequate evidence that what is afoot is a gradual process of all-Ireland integration, and your own U-turn on the oft repeated assurances that the affairs and future of Northern Ireland were a matter only for the people of Northern Ireland, your Government and the Parliament of the United Kingdom, confirms this. Even those opposed to my stand admit that this is what is going on. Whether you care to believe it or not, the people of Ulster are going to resist this to the death.

3. It is quite clear that you have bowed to the bullet and the bomb and that your aim, along with the Dublin Government, is now the same as that of the IRA, namely to bring about an all-Ireland. I must say to you that the people of Northern Ireland reject the bomb and the bullet and demand a return to the ballot and respect for what the ballot comes up with. Why are you so afraid to let the people of Northern Ireland decide their form of Government in a democratic manner? Continued refusal to do this only reinforces the conviction that you are intent on their betrayal.

Except you are prepared to meet the simple and just demands of the Ulster people then they will be left no alternative but to bring home to you their determination not to be slaughtered by Ulster's enemies or to have their heritage within the Union betrayed by you or anyone else.

Sincerely,

Ian R.K. Paisley

IAN R.K. PAISLEY.

cc Mr Ingham

25 November 1981

POLICY UNIT

PRIME MINISTER

I enclose a cutting from the front of the Daily Mirror, a couple of days ago. It is a very good example (especially since it comes from such an unexpected publication) of the presentation of a united Cabinet - something we have discussed before, as of great electoral performance. We shall need repeated examples, suitably publicised, over the next two years, to build up this picture in the public mind.

JOHN HOSKYNS

TAPE

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of Cam- vices is to

EXCLUSIVE by PETER KANE

make a full statement today on his department's handling of the case.

Yesterday a spokesman for the battered wives' hostel said that Caesar got the job because she was well known to the authorities who ran it.

Serious

She had taken refuge in the shelter herself after she parted from her husband James and before she met Clark.

The spokesman said: "We knew Mrs. Caesar and Mr. Clark were to stand trial on serious charges concerning the death of their son.

"But we were under the impression that Jason's death had been a cot accident.

"We presumed at the time of the appointment that it was a case of innocence until proved guilty."

A spokesman for Cambridge social services said the shelter was independently run and was not directly connected with the authority.

But it was possible that it had at some time received financial aid from the social services.

JASON: Bruised, battered and burned

clamouring for concert tickets. A mere 70,000 will be able to see Barry Manilow on stage in London in January. What will the others be missing? Writer Pauline McLeod was in the audience for one of the idol's American shows. She later talked to the man himself. Picture: PETER STONE

MAN IN A MILLION—CENTRE PAGES

Ulster boss Mr. Prior with his wife Jane.

'I've never had to face naked hatred before'

Ulster Secretary James Prior gives a remarkable interview to the Mirror

By CHRIS BUCKLAND

ULSTER Secretary James Prior spoke candidly yesterday about the problems he faces in the province.

He was speaking on the eve of the Rev. Ian Paisley's Day of Action.

And uppermost in Mr Prior's mind was last week's mob protest he met at the funeral of murdered MP Robert Bradford.

He said: "Naturally I am used to political confrontation, but I have never had to face naked hatred before.

"But, God, what worried me more is the effect it had on people in the rest of the UK.

"It must have done some damage to the cause of Northern Ireland.

"I have had hundreds of letters about it, and of course it doesn't make it easier when I go to London and ask for more help for the province."

Mr Prior said he has the complete support of Premier Margaret Thatcher.

"My relationship with Margaret has been strained on the economic side but on this issue we are absolutely together.

"There is no way anyone is going to shake the Government on this. You could not put a blade of grass between us on our policy in Northern Ireland."

Referring to his switch from the job of Employment Secretary, Mr. Prior said:

"I thought at the time that Margaret wanted to get me out of the way.

"But I realised there was an important job to do here. She said she would back me, and by God she has."

Mr Prior made it clear that the Govern-

● Turn to Page Two

Xerox x 6 →

Excellent. "United team"

Ireland
cc FCO
ds

cf

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

24 November 1981

Dear Mr. Howell

CPA Delegation

Thank you for your telegram, sent from Sydney on 19 November, concerning information on the situation in Mr. Ross's constituency and at his home. I understand that the response to your request must have reached you very soon after you sent your telegram.

I assure you that the delegation's request for information was treated as a matter of priority in London and that a response was sent within hours on the day it was received. Regrettably the telegram, although given priority precedence, was delayed for technical reasons in reaching Canberra. Mr. Ross will naturally have been worried about what was happening in his constituency and at home, but I hope that he will have appreciated that we would be doing all that could be done, not only to protect his own family but also to counter the violence and disorder that threaten everyone in Northern Ireland.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

The Rt. Hon. Denis Howell, M.P.

ll

Mike

You should be aware of the attached statement by Mr Prior which is being released today.

WITH

THE COMPLIMENTS OF THE

PRIVATE SECRETARY

Mike Hopkins
24/11

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

GREAT GEORGE STREET

LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Ireland

L32/81

Great George Street
LONDON SW1P 3AJ
Tel: 01-233-4626

November 24, 1981

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
NORTHERN IRELAND, THE RT HON JAMES PRIOR, IN BELFAST

I wish to make a clear and simple statement to all the people of Northern Ireland. HM Government has no plan to push Northern Ireland into a united Ireland and has never had any such plans. Those who claim that such plans exist can produce no evidence of them and only stir up groundless fears.

HM Government is responsible for the conduct of the external affairs of the United Kingdom and will discharge that responsibility in the interest of all the people of the United Kingdom. It is in the interests of the people of the United Kingdom that there should be close and friendly relations with the Government of the Republic of Ireland, particularly on security. HM Government will not be deterred from this policy.

Despite the unremitting efforts of the RUC and the Army, it must be recognised that the security of individual people in Northern Ireland remains at risk. HM Government accepts its responsibility to stand against terrorism and lawlessness in all its forms. The security forces and their commanders have the total confidence of HM Government. The Government will always consider most seriously concrete suggestions from the public and their elected representatives for improvements in security. Generalised criticism or abuse of those responsible for the conduct of security operation only assists the IRA. The Government will not allow private armies to take over the work of the Police and the Army. The Government will not adopt methods

which abandon the rule of law or which are intended to punish the innocent.

It is the inescapable duty of all to give the security forces any information they may have about those who plan or commit acts of terrorism and murder. Those who fail to do this make themselves supporters of terrorism and murder.

The economy of Northern Ireland is at grave risk. There is no hope of its recovery if the Province is a place that its own people wish to make ungovernable. Northern Ireland cannot exist at any tolerable standard of living unless it can demonstrate to the rest of the United Kingdom and the world at large that its population and in particular its elected representatives respect the duly constituted authority of the Government. I pledge myself as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to devote myself unsparingly to the task of bringing peace and prosperity to Northern Ireland and I call on all the people and all their elected representatives whatever their differences to join me in these two fundamental tasks.

You will be interested in
this Globe and Mail editorial.
No acknowledgement is
necessary, please.

With the

Compliments of

K.R. THOMSON

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EXECUTIVE OFFICER

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MONDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1981

f.a.

The moderates persist

The idea of an organic link between the six counties of Northern Ireland and the 26 counties of the Irish Republic is as old as partition itself. When Westminster pushed through, some 60 years ago, the legislation that provided for a separate legislature in the north, the package included provision for eventual establishment of an All-Ireland Council. It was never unwrapped.

One of the most ambitious of subsequent attempts to create at least a framework for all-Irish co-operation was the Sunningdale Agreement put forward by the British Conservative Government of Edward Heath, with the encouragement of moderate Protestants and Catholics and the blessing of the Irish Republic. It provided for power-sharing between Catholics and Protestants in the north and a council to provide a modest link between north and south. It was wrecked by a campaign of terrorism by the Provisional Irish Republic Army and a paralyzing general strike by the militant Protestants of the Ulster Worker's Council.

After the hard men of both camps had alienated the moderates by more years of mindless violence — violence that often owed more to gangsterism than to any national dream — British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Irish Prime Minister Charles Haughey set out to take a fresh look at "the totality of relationships in these islands." But that effort was wrecked by the emotional storm set in motion by the shrewdly-timed hunger strike confrontation, a storm that spilled over destructively into the republic and brought down the Haughey Government.

But, ironically, the upset brought to office in Dublin Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald, a man who has made it his mission in politics to try to heal the poisoned Irish wounds. In a series of attention-getting interviews, Mr. FitzGerald called for change in the constitution of the Republic to separate church from state and to abandon the claim to sovereignty over the six northern counties. If Ireland hoped to win back the people of the mainly Protestant north, he insisted, it would have to change some of its ways and prejudices to make them feel welcome.

In spite of the outcry from diehards in the Republic who saw Mr. FitzGerald as a traitor, and from diehards in Ulster who saw him as the author of a diabolical papist plot, he and Mrs. Thatcher have pushed ahead. They met early this month in London and agreed to establish an Anglo-Irish Council, a modest group of ministers and officials for the moment, but with prospects for growth. They agreed to work toward co-operation in their fight against terrorism. And they set in motion a number of modest but useful economic deals to add weight and scope to their compact.

The IRA's response has been a bloody-minded campaign of murder, savage even by its own savage standards, with the obvious goal of plunging the province into all-out civil war, a war that would be just as obviously welcome to Ian Paisley and his fellow wild men in the Protestant camp. And the attempted lynching of Mrs. Thatcher's Minister for Northern Ireland, James Prior, when he attended the funeral of the murdered Protestant Member of Parliament, Robert Bradford, showed how wild these "Loyalist" wild men are prepared to be.

But Mrs. Thatcher is a lady of strong will. Her unwillingness to yield has not, in all contexts, been universally applauded. But a will and courage that can face down the ranting Paisleys and the murdering Provos will be fighting the right war in the right place at the right time and in the right way. In any other context Margaret Thatcher and Garret FitzGerald might be an odd couple. But in Ireland they seem made for each other.

Ireland

RESTRICTED

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 November 1981

Type for PM
cc CJ

Dear Mike,

William Ross MP

Thank you for your note of 19 November enclosing Mr Dennis Howell's telegram to the Prime Minister about Mr Ross. We had received a request from Canberra for information on 17 November and responded the same day: unfortunately, the replying telegram did not reach Canberra until late on 18 November our time, ie early in the morning of 19 November local time. The High Commission immediately passed the reasurring news on to Mr Ross and have since followed this up with further information and reassurance. We have not been able to contact Mr Howell, who left Sydney late on 19 November our time. You may wish to write to him in terms of the attached draft.

Yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M Pattison Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

Rt Hon Dennis Howell MP
House of Commons

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

CPA Delegation

Thank you for your telegram, sent from Sydney on 19 November, concerning information on the situation in Mr Ross's constituency and at his home. I understand that the response to your request must have reached you very soon after you sent your telegram.

I assure you that the delegation's request for information was treated as a matter of priority in London and that a response was sent within hours on the day it was received. Regrettably the telegram, although given priority precedence, was delayed for technical reasons in reaching Canberra. Mr Ross will naturally have been worried about what was happening in his constituency and at home, but I hope that he will have appreciated that we would be doing all that could be done, not only to protect his own family but also to counter the violence and disorder that threaten everyone in Northern Ireland.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Ireland

20 November, 1981.

Thank you for your letter of 18 November. I have drawn the text of the statement made by the Taoiseach to the Prime Minister's attention.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

His Excellency Dr. Eamon Kennedy

Rodric.

Ireland
27/11

10 DOWNING STREET

We spoke. You agreed to look into Mr Howell's request, to ensure that there is no question of discourtesy in responding to requests for information from members of the CPA delegation now in Australia. The PM should perhaps write to Mr Howell on his return. MCP 19/XI

C.

(1)

Press Release

Fr. Pres

Statement

JIM KILFEDDER M.P. (North Down)

Leader of the Ulster Popular Unionist Party

In view of the intense feelings of desperation and anger in Ulster, which could easily be precipitated into a State of civil war, if the Prov. IRA continue its vicious sectarian campaign of slaughter, I demand that the Prime Minister shows urgently call a meeting together at 10 Downing Street or elsewhere of the Ulster Unionist MPs with G.O.C and the Chief Constable, to discuss new & stronger measures to defeat terrorism, which has cursed N.I. for over 12 years.

I also demand that the P.M. should forthwith arrange for an election to a Constitutional Convention in N.I. to bring about a devolved Parliament at Stormont.

This Government & Parliament at Stormont must have to be entrusted with responsibility for Security.

It is imperative that Mr. Prior should be replaced as Secretary of State for N.I.
He has no credibility with the Ulster people.
He came unwillingly to N.I.
and his pronouncements since then have irreparably damaged his standing in the Province, and he is now generally disliked.

The Province is slipping into a state of anarchy because of the failure of the Government to institute adequate security measures.

Many miles of the Border are left without security for long periods of time, and vast areas have fallen into the hands of the IRA terrorists.

The Ulster people are not prepared to tolerate this situation indefinitely.

Jim Kilfedder

19 November 1981

HU

Ireland

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 November 1981

As I have already mentioned to you on the telephone, Dr. Ian Paisley spoke to me on the telephone this afternoon. He did not ask to speak to the Prime Minister.

Dr. Paisley said that he had just heard that another member of the UDR had been killed. Was there to be one victim every day? How many more would have to die before the Government did something about security? He had driven from Belfast to the border and back yesterday. He had seen not one checkpoint and had encountered only a single armoured personnel carrier with six men in it. The situation had gone beyond what was tolerable. It was "the end of the road". He did not care what the Prime Minister said about him. Abusing him merely "got people's backs up" and generated more support for him.

What did matter was that the people of Ulster were being killed. There would be no holding them. The situation was not helped by statements from the Chief Constable to the effect that police measures had prevented the murder of many other prominent people. This was no consolation to ordinary citizens.

I told Dr. Paisley that I was sure that the Prime Minister would wish me to convey her deep sympathy over the death of yet another member of the UDR. As regards the attitude of the people of Ulster, I told Dr. Paisley that the Prime Minister well understood the emotions which recent events had aroused in the Protestant community. I knew that she hoped that Dr. Paisley himself would play his part in restraining their reaction.

Dr. Paisley replied that I could be assured that he would be urging protests that were non-violent in nature and within the law. But the fact was that the "Chief Magistrate" had ceased to uphold the law. The law itself was king. People were being slaughtered like flies and this had to be brought to an end. (I assumed that the implication of this was that the Government was not enforcing the law and that in these circumstances other

/ people

SRy

people would have to enforce it). Ulster was no longer "in a democratic situation". It was not votes that counted. It was a question of who had the most guns, the most explosives and the biggest purse. Dr. Paisley concluded by asking me to tell the Prime Minister that "it cannot go on".

I have described the above conversation to the Prime Minister. She was content with the line I took.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Mike Hopkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

NOT CS
GR

Ireland
Dennis HOWELL MP

889113 PO SW G
OSEAGRAM LN LFTC

LFT098 CLF9662 OAA616 PF183
SYDNEY 53/49 19 0030

URGENT
THE PRIME MINSTER
10 DOWNINGST
LONDONSW1

EXPRESS GREAT CONCERN REQUEST YOUR INTERVENTION REGARDING LACK OF COMMUNICATION OR RESPONSE HIGH COMMISSION CANBERRA TO CPA DELEGRATION ESPECIALLY CONCERNING INFORMATION FOR WILLIE ROSS MP ON SITUATION AT HOME AND CONSTITUENCY IN ULSTER. STILL NO NEWS 36 HOURS AFTER REQUEST.

DENIS HOWELL

COL 10 36

SENT 1455/18 CRH
889113 PO SW G
OSEAGRAM LN LFTC

AMBASÁID NA hÉIREANN, LONDAIN.

IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON.

17 Grosvenor Place

SW1X 7HR

010

18 November 1981

Dear Principal Private Secretary

I have the honour to enclose the text of a statement made in the Dáil yesterday by the Taoiseach on the murder of the Rev. Robert Bradford MP, of which the Prime Minister may wish to be aware. The Dáil passed a vote of sympathy with the family of the Rev. Bradford and observed a minute's silence.

Yours sincerely

Eamon Kennedy

Eamon Kennedy
Ambassador

The Principal Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Statement made by the Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald, TD in the Dail on 17 November, 1981 on the death of the Reverend Robert Bradford, MP

Before we begin our normal business I would like to refer to the brutal murder, by the Provisional I.R.A., of the Reverend Robert Bradford, MP in Belfast on Saturday last. His death and that of Mr. Ken Campbell, Caretaker at the Finaghy Community Centre, are part of a calculated series of atrocities committed in recent days. I know all the people we represent share the sense of sorrow, anger and outrage felt by the people of Northern Ireland in recent days.

The killing of an elected representative of the people calls for particular condemnation in the strongest possible terms and serves to remind us of the real objectives of the organisation responsible. The IRA has once again shown its utter contempt for human life and for the democratic process which it has recently sought to distort for its own ends. Its true attitude to democracy and freedom was summed up by a recent statement of an IRA spokesman who, when asked by an interviewer for a foreign newspaper about the wishes of the people in this part of the country concerning an aspect of reunification, replied - "we call the shots. We don't really give a damn what they want".

The first clear objective of the killers of Mr. Bradford was to incite vengeance among Loyalist extremists and thus to expose once again to murderous retaliation the innocent among the most vulnerable community in this island, the Catholics of Northern Ireland. This has already begun to happen. The sectarian killings of Belfast and Lurgan are a direct and intended result of the Provisionals' campaign of recent weeks, a campaign itself trenchantly described last Saturday by John Hume as one of "sectarian genocide" directed against Protestants.

I join with those brave and responsible leaders, clerical and lay, in Northern Ireland who have said to the Unionists and Loyalists: Do not become the prisoners of the provisional IRA's strategy, do not respond as they have intended and planned that you should do - in anger and in a manner that could escalate violence to new levels of horror and ultimately undermine your rights and liberties.

The Rev. Mr. Bradford had, for some time, considered an attempt on his life to be a strong possibility. It is a tribute to his courage that he did not flinch from that danger.

On behalf of the House I would ask you, Ceann Comhairle to extend our deepest sympathy to Mrs. Bradford and her family.

Mike Pattison,

MP

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Rod Lyne.
20.11.87

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Pl copy (distribution) to Mr Sargent + repeat to Belfast
DM 17/11

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 50
CONFIDENTIAL
FM CANBERRA 170001Z NOV 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 512 OF 17 NOVEMBER

WILLIAM ROSS ULSTER UNIONIST MP FOR LONDONDERRY

1. MR ROSS VISITING AUSTRALIA AS A MEMBER OF CPA DELEGATION (FCO TELNO 427) IS ANXIOUS ABOUT THE SITUATION IN HIS CONSTITUENCY AND THE SAFETY OF HIS FAMILY THERE.

2. GRATEFUL EARLY TELEGRAPHIC REASSURANCE THAT PROTECTION FOR HIS FAMILY IS CONSIDERED ADEQUATE.

MASON

MINIMAL
RID
PCCU
PUSD

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

CONFIDENTIAL

5204

Mr O'Keeley

CONFIDENTIAL

37152 - 1

PM Inf Effort file

GRS 85
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 171712Z NOV 81
TO PRIORITY CANBERRA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 456 OF 17 NOVEMBER
WILLIAM ROSS MP : YOUR TELNO 512

1. PLEASE ASSURE MR ROSS THAT EXTRA ATTENTION IS BEING GIVEN TO THE SECURITY OF HIS FAMILY AND INDEED TO ALL THOSE RECEIVING VIP SECURITY PROTECTION IN THE WAKE OF THE MURDER OF ROBERT BRADFORD MP. THE RUC WILL BE GIVING AS MUCH ATTENTION AS POSSIBLE TO MR ROSS' HOME WHICH WAS VISITED BY RUC OFFICERS OVER THE WEEKEND. RUC HQ HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH RUC LIMAVADY TODAY FOLLOWING TUR.

CARRINGTON

COPIES TO:

MINIMAL
RID
PCCU
PUSD (3)

MR SARGENT NIO(L)
NIO BELFAST

GRS 200

CONFIDENTIAL
FM F C O 192355Z NOV 81
TO FLASH CANBERRA
TEL NO 462 OF 19 NOVEMBER 1981.

FOLLOWING FROM RESIDENT CLERK.

MR ROSS'S CONSTITUENCY.

I HAVE SPOKEN TO THE N.I.O. WHO SAY THAT RELIABLE INFORMATION ABOUT THE SECURITY SITUATION IN MR ROSS'S CONSTITUENCY WOULD BE AVAILABLE ONLY FROM THE RUC'S DIVISIONAL OFFICES IN THIS CONSTITUENCY. TO OBTAIN INFORMATION AT THIS HOUR WOULD INVOLVE BRINGING A NUMBER OF PEOPLE INTO THEIR OFFICES AND, GIVEN THE CURRENT CRITICAL SITUATION IN THE AREA AND THE PRESSURE UNDER WHICH THE RUC ARE WORKING, THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO DO THIS. THEY WILL OF COURSE SET ABOUT GATHERING THE INFORMATION FOR MR ROSS AS SOON AS WORK BEGINS TOMORROW AND WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO SEND YOU A REPORT IN THE COURSE OF FRIDAY 20 NOVEMBER. THEY REALISE THAT THIS MAY NOT SATISFY MR ROSS BUT BELIEVE THAT THE MINISTERS INCLUDING THE PRIME MINISTER WILL SUPPORT THIS LINE.

CARRINGTON

LIMITED

SPD
RID
PS
PS/LPS
PS/PUS
MR DONALD
MR FERGUSSON

Northern Ireland (Security)

3.48 pm

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Mr. James Prior): I shall, with permission Mr. Speaker, make a statement about recent events in Northern Ireland.

The House has already made clear its sadness and revulsion at the murder of Robert Bradford on Saturday. I should like to add my own tribute to him as a hard working servant of his constituents. As you have already said, Mr. Speaker, all of us here will want immediately to express our sympathy to Mrs. Bradford amd her family—and not only to them, but to the other families in Northern Ireland who have been bereaved in recent days.

This has been a black week in Northern Ireland. On Sunday 8 November in Armagh, Trevor Foster was killed in a booby-trap bomb attack intended to murder his father, a member of the UDR. On Tuesday, another UDR soldier—Cecil Graham—was shot dead while visiting his wife and five-week-old baby. Eustace Kerr of the UDR narrowly escaped death on Tuesday when gunmen shot and wounded him at his farm in Fermanagh. The same day in Armagh Charles Neville, an ex-member of the UDR, was bombed and then shot to death when leaving work.

On Thursday, in Banbridge, Constable Pollock lost both his legs when a terrorist bomb exploded under his car. On Friday, in Londonderry, a terrorist bomb injured very seriously an innocent woman. During the weekend there was the attack in which Robert Bradford and Mr. Campbell, the caretaker at the community centre died; and in separate incidents one man was murdered and another shot and seriously injured in Belfast.

I come now to the murder of the hon. Member for Belfast, South. Robert Bradford arrived at the community centre in Finaghy in his constituency at about 11.15 am last Saturday. He went to the room where he holds a surgery for his constituents. A police officer was on duty with him. At approximately 11.40 am two men wearing boiler suits approached the building carrying a plank of wood. One of the men lowered the plank as he came up to the police officer, revealing a gun. The police officer and the caretaker were forced to kneel and were held at gun point as another gunman went inside the building. He entered Mr. Bradford's room and shot him.

In a scuffle at the entrance to the building, the caretaker—Mr. Campbell—was shot dead by another man. In all, there were five assailants armed with a variety of weapons which included a sub-machine gun. They left the building in a car taken from a family who had been taken hostage and, as they escaped, they fired a shot in the direction of the door to prevent anyone following. The police officer who had been with Mr. Bradford fired a number of shots at them, as did an off duty police officer who was in the area and had heard the shooting.

In the wake of such horrible murders I understand the anger and resentment that have led many people to urge that more must be done to stop such killings. In assessing our response to them, we must be clear about the purpose of all this violence.

The aim is quite deliberately to use murder to provoke further murders. The IRA wants to stimulate and intensify sectarian hatreds, to create the chaos that it believes will help its long-term objectives. We must frustrate that aim.

Any form of divisive action that could make the task of the security forces more difficult should be avoided. The right response is to work calmly, but firmly, under the law and under the guidance of the security forces for the defeat of terrorism.

The Government are resolute in this task and absolutely committed to that aim.

Rev. Ian Paisley (Antrim, North): Nonsense.

Mr. Prior: With the GOC and the Chief Constable——

Mr. Peter Robinson (Belfast, East): The blood of Ulster is on your hands.

Mr. Prior: — in whose professional judgment I have full confidence——

Mr. Peter Robinson: You are the guilty man.

Mr. Prior: — I am looking at ways to make security measures more effective. Let no one be in any doubt that the Government are prepared to commit every available resource that may be necessary in the fight against terrorism.

Mr. Robinson: Rubbish.

Mr. John McQuade (Bellfast, North): Mr. Speaker——

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Mr. Prior: But I have to tell the House——

Mr. McQuade: We have seen——

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Mr. McQuade: The Secretary of State is the guilty man.

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member for Belfast, North (Mr. McQuade) must resume his seat.

Mr. McQuade: I live in the Shankill Road and ——

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member for Belfast, North must leave the Chamber at once.

Mr. Peter Robinson: What about the people of Northern Ireland?

Mr. McQuade: Protestant people are dying in our country.

Grave disorder having arisen in the House, MR. SPEAKER, *pursuant to Standing Order No. 26 (Power of Mr. Speaker to adjourn House or suspend sitting), suspended the sitting for 10 minutes.*

Sitting suspended at 3.51 pm.

4.1 pm

On resuming——

Mr. Speaker: In my judgment the hon. Members for Belfast, North (Mr. McQuade), Belfast, East (Mr. Robinson) and Antrim, North (Rev. Ian Paisley) are guilty of grossly disorderly conduct and of ignoring the authority of the Chair. I therefore name Mr. John McQuade, Mr. Peter Robinson and the Rev. Ian Paisley.

The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. Francis Pym): I beg to move, That Mr. McQuade, Mr. Robinson and the Rev. Ian Paisley be suspended from the service of the House.

Question put:——

The House proceeded to a Division——

past, to put forward the case for people whom he believed were least able to defend themselves. On this occasion he was speaking about the high cost of living in statutory residential homes in Northern Ireland. I listened to Robert Bradford. It was symptomatic that even though he and I were opposed in many aspects of our political beliefs and ideologies we were both concerned about the problems experienced by the people of Northern Ireland.

I got to know Robert Bradford. I first read of him and then listened to him on television. I regarded him as a man who would be inveterate in his opposition to me. However, in the years when he was a Member of this House I travelled with him on aircraft. We sometimes shared a taxi, and sometimes the same television studio when we expressed different points of view.

I found Robert Bradford to be a man of rich humanity and compassion. The brutal, callous and horrific circumstances in which he was killed while trying to look after the interests of his constituents will bring the contempt of us all on those responsible for this callous deed.

It should be put on record that this was not a one-off killing or murder. This was a carefully calculated and meticulously planned murder. The murderers knew where Mr. Bradford would be. They know of, or hoped for, the effect that they thought it would have. They are trying to drive the Northern Ireland community into total conflict and civil war.

The Catholic population, the minority population in Northern Ireland, are appalled by this dreadful deed. In no way do they concur with those who have carried out this terrible act. On behalf of that population, on behalf of Catholicism in the island of Ireland, and as an opponent of Unionism, I express my abhorrence of the terrible deed. I trust that Robert Bradford's wife and young daughter will be able to live and forget about this terrible act.

Mr. David Steel (Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles): May I add a little to what has been said? The Leader of the Scottish National Party has asked that I should say a few words on behalf of the other minority parties in the House to one of our fellow parties which has lost a distinguished Member. It is right that somebody on this side of the water should acknowledge how conscious we are of the risk that all people in public life in the Province run when carrying out their public duties. We are very conscious of that, and we wish to join in the expressions of sympathy to the relatives of the Reverend Robert Bradford.

Since there was an attack during the same weekend on the home of our Attorney-General, it is right to say that both this murder and that attack reinforce the united determination of the House to defeat terrorism.

Mr. James Kilfedder (Down, North): I join in the expressions of deep sympathy to the wife and relatives of the Reverend Robert Bradford. He was one more of the many victims of the Provisional IRA. The IRA has shown that it is totally opposed to democracy and Parliament. The Reverend Robert Bradford will be mourned in Northern Ireland as a person who worked hard for his constituents, and he will be mourned as an active Member of this Parliament. Northern Ireland has seen over 2,000 dead, which if expressed in terms of the population of England and Wales would amount to 19,000 people. Far too many have died.

Hon. Members for Antrim, North and Belfast, East

Mr. Speaker: The House will recall that on Wednesday last I had occasion to refer to the conduct of the hon. Members for Antrim, North (Rev. Ian Paisley) and Belfast, East (Mr. Robinson), and that I gave them notice that they should come to the House today.

In the light of the tragic events that have occurred in Northern Ireland during the past few days, which are fresh in all our minds and to which we have just turned our sad attention, I shall content myself today with reminding both hon. Members and the whole House that the good name of Parliament and its tradition of civilised debate and conduct are part of our parliamentary democracy. I therefore go no further today than to tell the House that I take a very serious view of what happened. I hope that the whole House will respond to the tone of this statement.

Mr. Anthony Berry *and* **Mr. Carol Mather** *were appointed Tellers for the Ayes but no Member being willing to act as Teller for the Noes,* Mr. Speaker *declared that the Ayes had it.*

Question accordingly agreed to.

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Members for Belfast, North, for Belfast, East and for Antrim, North will leave the House immediately.

Rev. Ian Paisley: I shall not be leaving.

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Members will leave immediately. Will the Serjeant at Arms ensure that the hon. Members leave the precincts of the House? I warn the hon. Members that if they have as much as a touch on their arms, they will be suspended for the rest of the Session.

Rev. Ian Paisley: Amen. It is no use our coming here anyway.

The Serjeant at Arms: Mr. Speaker directs that you withdraw forthwith from the House.

Hon. Members: Get out.

Mr. Speaker: Order. I suspend the Sitting for 10 minutes while the hon. Members for Belfast, North, for Belfast, East and for Antrim, North, leave the House.

Sitting suspended at 4.5 pm.

4.15 pm

On resuming——

Mr. Speaker: Order. Before I call the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to continue his statement, allow me to say to the House, and it may be for the benefit of other people, that I believe that the hon. Members for Antrim, North (Rev. Ian Paisley), Belfast, East, (Mr. Robinson) and Belfast, North (Mr. McQuade) came here with the direct intention of ignoring the democratic processes by which the House works. I believe that they made up their minds before they came in that they would so behave until they were named.

Mr. Prior: With the GOC and the Chief Constable, in whose professional judgment I have full confidence, I am looking at ways to make security measures more effective. Let no one be in any doubt that Her Majesty's Government are prepared to commit every available resource that may be necessary in the fight against terrorism.

The Chief Constable and the GOC have told me that they do not need new laws or more resources. What they need is information, positive help and co-operation from everyone in Northern Ireland. Nothing must divert them from their task of thwarting, arresting and convicting the terrorists. I am convinced that the way to defeat terrorism is to gain the support of all people in Northern Ireland, whatever their political or religious convictions, for the simple proposition that murder must be opposed and murderers arrested and brought to trial.

That means more than standing aside or not actively supporting the terrorists. It must involve positive support for the security forces in their fundamental task of protecting life. I appeal now for the active co-operation, particularly from those in Northern Ireland who in the past have hesitated, for whatever reason, to provide information.

After a week such as we have suffered in Northern Ireland, I have no complacency about the security situation and the difficulty of the task that lies ahead of us. I understand and share the revulsion that all of us here feel against these appalling events.

The aim of all of us must be to channel that feeling, not into reactions which provoke one section of the community against the other, but into directions that will maintain calm, will broaden support for the efforts of the security forces against our common enemies and will offer the terrorists what they fear most: a community resolutely united against them.

Mr. J. D. Concannon (Mansfield): I thank the Secretary of State, his junior Ministers and his staff for keeping me so well informed about the terrible events over this traumatic weekend.

The Opposition deeply deplore the cowardly attacks that have taken place over the weekend, particularly the callous murders that have yet again scarred the Northern Ireland landscape. I send my condolences to the family of Mr. Robert Bradford, as I do to all the families who have suffered terrorist attacks here and in Northern Ireland. In my ministerial dealings with Mr. Robert Bradford we had our political differences, but they were without rancour or malice. I found him to be a hard-working and dedicated Member of Parliament for his constituency.

I urge as strongly as I can the people of Northern Ireland to listen to the Secretary of State's appeal for calm and to support the police and the security forces in their difficult task. Meanwhile, we on the Opposition Benches reaffirm our belief that lasting peace and stability will come to Northern Ireland only if the search for a political settlement is pursued. We therefore urge the Government to continue their difficult quest at a difficult time for a workable solution to the ever-deepening problems of that Province.

Mr. Prior: I am extremely grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, as no doubt the whole House is, and certainly my right hon. and hon. Friends are, for what he has said this afternoon. I believe that, if a message can go out from the House to the people of Northern Ireland to remain calm and resolute, that will be the most effective manner in which we can defeat the terrorists. Meanwhile, we shall do all that we can through the security forces to aid that process.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell (Down, South): Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that what he calls the black week for Northern Ireland was the sequel and, to a large extent, the consequence, of what was done at the Downing Street meeting on 6 November? Will he recall that before 6 November the Government were told that that would be the consequence if they went ahead, and that they are, therefore, guilty of the consequences of which they were warned? Will he accept that, instead of listening to the warning, the Government continue to follow the advice of those who have persistently misled the Government and their predecessors over Northern Ireland? Will the Secretary of State at least refrain from pouring petrol on the flames—by referring to things like political progress and agreements, which indicate to people in Northern Ireland that Her Majesty's Government share, if not the methods, at any rate the aims of the IRA.

Hon. Members: Disgraceful.

Mr. Prior: I believe that the right hon. Gentleman's comments will do a great deal of damage to those of us

[Mr. Prior]

who seek the path of peace for all the people of Northern Ireland. Nothing could help more towards the end that we seek than better co-operation on security across the border, which is one of the main objectives that we must always try to promote. Nor do I believe that people in Northern Ireland can afford to turn their backs on economic, social and industrial partnerships with people in other parts of the island. It was those aspects with which the Anglo-Irish talks were concerned with last Friday. Many people made up their minds about the outcome of the talks before they began. If they had perhaps waited a bit longer to see what would happen, the petrol that was poured on to the flames need never have happened.

Mr. Edward du Cann (Taunton): As the best deterrent against acts of terrorism is undoubtedly apprehension, conviction and punishment of criminals by the civil power, will my right hon. Friend, in the words of the Prime Minister, pursue "with the utmost vigour"—I speak as a strong unionist—the aim of obtaining that co-operation across the border and not least insist—for it is long overdue—upon extradition?

Mr. Prior: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that statement. Naturally, we shall continue to press the Government of the Republic on the subject of extradition. In the light of recent events, I hope that the talks that were arranged on Friday of the week before last between my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General and the Attorney-General of the Republic will help to produce a situation in which criminals are brought to justice, whether they are in the North or in the South.

Mr. J. Grimond (Orkney and Shetland): Will the Secretary of State accept that my colleagues and I should again like to express deep sorrow at the crimes and to join in the sympathy that is being sent not to the relatives of Mr. Bradford and Mr. Campbell but to all the others who have suffered in the past week? Is he aware that we support his determination not to be deflected by such crimes from seeking a political solution to the troubles of Northern Ireland and wholeheartedly applaud his resolve that the maintenance of order remains the duty of the security forces and of no one else?

It is clear now that the IRA is bent on creating anarchy in Northern Ireland, and also that certain hon. Members appear to pursue the same aim and in the process to obtain as much publicity as they can. The people of Northern Ireland should be aware that only the security forces stand between them and virtual civil war. They could pay no greater tribute to people of all sorts and in all walks of life who continue to serve them at great personal danger than by giving their full support to the security forces and ensuring that the criminals get no aid or comfort from anywhere in the Province.

Mr. Prior: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his remarks. If a message can go out that everyone should remain calm and that we should not fall into the trap that the IRA is busy setting for us, it may be possible not only to help to win the security battle, but in the long term to move to other objectives that will produce peace and prosperity for the North.

Mr. James Kilfedder (Down, North): I understand that about 16,000 police in London are being directed to search 300,000 garages and workshops for 500 lbs of IRA explosives. Why has not the same systematic and thorough search taken place in Ulster for the enormous quantities of arms, ammunition and explosives that have destroyed so many innocent lives over the past 12 years? The Secretary of State says that he is considering ways to make security more effective, but will he take time this evening to read statements by his predecessors over the past 12 years, which contain the same pompous and meaningless remarks? Has not the crunch now come, and is it not time, at long last, for the Government to root out and destroy these evil sectarian thugs? If the Government fail—I give them this warning—Northern Ireland will move inexorably into a state of civil war.

Mr. Prior: In the past two weeks the Royal Ulster Constabulary has found two large blocks of explosives amounting to about 1,500 lbs, plus many other weapons. The constant search by the Royal Ulster Constabulary and other security forces continues. We have to make certain that in carrying out our searches we keep within the law, and that we intend to do. I assure the hon. Gentleman that the search will go on and will be intensified.

Mr. William Rodgers (Stockton): May I associate myself and my colleagues on this Bench with the remarks made earlier this afternoon about the outrageous killing of Robert Bradford? I repeat that it was an offence not only against an individual and his family, but against representative parliamentary Government. Does the Secretary of State know that he has the sympathy and support of the overwhelming number of right hon. and hon. Members in his impossible task of ensuring security in Northern Ireland? Despite some of the remarks made in the House, and in particular in Northern Ireland, will he continue to seek in the end a lasting peace?

Mr. Prior: I am certain that after 12 years every hon. Member, whatever his views, seeks the path of peace. I believe that peace will come through absolute intensity to root out terrorism wherever it can be found, while seeking political advance within the law. That, too, is vital.

Mr. Gerard Fitt (Belfast, West): Will the Secretary of State accept that last week, with its terrible events, was a repetition of an awful lot of other weeks in the past 12 years? There were five or six deaths last week, but in other weeks the total has been considerably more.

Will the right hon. Gentleman also accept that the Catholic community in Northern Ireland, through its spokesmen--the Catholic Church, political leaders and others--is at one with the right hon. Gentleman and the Government in taking whatever steps are possible to eradicate the cancer of terrorism? The Irish Government and all others allied with the minority in Northern Ireland in no way support the terrible and traumatic events that have overcome the Protestant community. Will the Secretary of State take it from me, as one who has spoken in the House on behalf of my community when it has been subject to such brutality, that the Catholic leaders in Northern Ireland are only too well aware of the situation facing the Protestant community and will do everything in their power to co-operate with the Government to bring the terrible events to an end?

Mr. Prior: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for those remarks, particularly as they come from an hon. Member who himself has been subjected to so many

attacks. Indeed the Catholic community has been unanimous and resolute this week in its condemnation of what happened at the weekend and in the past.

Mr. Ivor Stanbrook (Orpington): Since the morale of the majority of people of Northern Ireland is all-important in the struggle against terrorism, will the Government reconsider their apparent withdrawal of support for the principle of unionism as expressed at the summit conference?

Mr. Prior: I do not think that there has been any withdrawal from unionism. What we have sought to achieve, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has made abundantly clear, is an improved relationship between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, which I believe would be of enormous value to the United Kingdom, to the Republic of Ireland and to the North of Ireland. Everything that has been said during the last few days has been published. Everyone knows what the facts are. I hope that people will not seek to distort the facts in any way, because it is the distortion of facts that sometimes leads people to make emotional responses that are not borne out by the facts.

Mr. Harold McCusker (Armagh): Does the Secretary of State have any concept of what it is like to have had 200 constituents murdered to lose two more last weekend, and then to be lectured today in the House about calmness and moderation? Can he imagine what it is like to be haunted every day by the thought that the sum total of one's political achievements is measured by death, destruction and the endless tramp of yet more funerals to attend?

How much longer do I have to come to the House and demand for my constituents what every other citizen regards as his birthright? If the Minister does not accept my words, the pile of corpses and severed limbs last week say more eloquently than I could that a change in Government policy must come about.

Mr. Prior: I fully understand the feelings of the hon. Member for Armagh (Mr. McCusker). I appreciate the suffering that his constituents have faced for the past 12 years. We are working to bring about a change in that situation, but it will not be accomplished quickly. It can be accomplished only when we can bring about understanding between the minority and majority groups in Northern Ireland. That, combined with the defeat of terrorism in any way that we can, is what we must do. The hon. Gentleman will recognise that the defeat of terrorism in a modern society is a difficult matter for any security force. I hope that he will bear with us in what I understand and appreciate are the very severe pressures that he and his constituents have to face.

Several Hon. Members *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: Order. With respect, I believe it is now in the interests of the House to move on and to leave that matter.

Industrial Training Boards

4.34 pm

The Secretary of State for Employment (Mr. Norman Tebbit): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement on the future of industrial training boards. These boards at present cover just over half the work force. The system has been under review for some considerable time and it is now important to announce decisions so as to end the uncertainty.

In the light of the extensive consultations that have taken place and the recommendations made to me by the Manpower Services Commission, I have decided to retain statutory boards in six of the seven cases unanimously recommended by the Manpower Services Commission and in one other case. The six are the boards for clothing, construction, engineering, hotels and catering, road transport, and rubber and plastics processing. The additional case is a board for the offshore sector only of the petroleum industry. I propose that the other boards should be abolished.

My proposals will therefore reduce the number of boards from 23 to seven, excluding the Agricultural Training Board, which is responsible to my right hon. Friends the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, and the Secretaries of State for Scotland and Wales. Where statutory arrangements are to be removed, I am satisfied that the training requirements of the sector concerned can be met effectively on a voluntary basis with less cost and bureaucracy. I plan to make several changes in the scope of the boards that are to be retained.

Mr. Norman Atkinson Tottenham): Why were the boards set up in the first place?

Mr. Tebbit: If the hon. Gentleman will listen for a moment, he might learn what the changes are to be.

I propose to take the rubber industry out of the scope of the Rubber and Plastics Processing Board and to take road passenger transport, warehouses, agricultural machinery, driving schools and security transport out of the scope of the Road Transport Board. I shall be considering further whether the latter board should be split into two, with one board for road haulage and another for motor vehicle retail and repair. I intend to leave the foundry industry within the scope of the Engineering Board, but to propose to the board that it should revoke its delegation of functions tothe foundry industry training committee. I do not propose any change at present to the Hotel and Catering Board, although I intend to review the position early in 1983. I also propose, as a result of abolishing the Ceramics Board, to bring the brick and pre-cast concrete industries into the scope of the Construction Board. I am still considering certain possible small changes in the scope of the latter board and shall be asking it to consider giving a greater degree of autonomy to individual sectors in its scope.

I am asking the Manpower Services Commmission to take forward the process of abolition or reduction in scope urgently and in parallel with action to establish or develop effective voluntary arrangements, so as to bring about an orderly transition. I intend to time the making of orders accordingly. I wish to ensure that the winding-up process is completed as quickly as practicable for each board in the course of 1982-83.

Where boards are to be abolished, the industries concerned will bear the costs of the alternative voluntary

[Mr. Tebbit]

arrangements. The Government will therefore continue to meet the operating costs of these boards as necessary until the end of the financial year 1982-3, together with any net costs of winding them up.

Where boards are retained, they too, in future will be funded by the industry concerned. Exchequer support for operating costs was planned to cease at the end of this year, but I have decided that it would be right to extend this support until the end of March 1982.

In making these decisions the government have had very much in mind the objectives of the new training initiative, to which I am firmly committed and on which I hope to make a further statement before the recess. We are confident that our decisions on the sectoral arrangements for industrial training are consistent with those objectives and will provide industry with a framework in which it has confidence and within which it is able to meet its training needs in the 1980s.

Mr. Eric G. Varley (Chesterfield): Is the Secretary of State aware that there is not a shred of industrial or economic justification for the main decision that he has made to destroy the majority of industrial training boards? Does he realise that, at a time of unparalleled technological change, it will not only damage training in Britain but will undermine our competitive position even further? When unemployment overall and school leaver unemployment in particular stand at record levels and output has already been reduced by 17½ per cent. since the Government came to power, what possible reason can there be to demolish a large section of our training arrangements?

Is the right hon. Gentleman further aware that at the end of every recession there has been a chronic shortage of skills, and that this recession will be worse than any we have experienced for 50 years? At a time of skill shortages, when apprenticeships are falling and when the need for training opportunities for adults has never been more urgent, is not the path that the right hon. Gentleman has chosen one of great folly? How does the Secretary of State intend to implement this blow to Britain's jobless? Will he lay separate orders for each of the 16 boards that he is abolishing? We shall expect separate orders if he wishes to follow such a course.

Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm that he has ignored the advice of the Manpower Services Commission the members of which have, by a majority, recommended the retention of a strong statutory system? How does he intend to get overall support for the Manpower Services Commission's objectives contained in its document the "New Training Initiative"? Will he inform hon. Members of the true costs of winding up the boards?

Is he further aware that today's decision is not only a shabby, little, mean-minded public expenditure cut, but that it is also a cut at the expense of Britain's jobless, a cut at the expense of school leavers and a cut at the expense of Britain's industrial competitiveness? We shall oppose the orders when they come before the House and, in time, do everything we can to repair the damage on which the Secretary of State is now engaged.

Mr. Tebbit: I must confess that I am not surprised by what the right hon. Gentleman said, but there was very little in it. The right hon. Gentleman said that there is not a shred of reason for what I am doing, and shows thereby that he treats the opinion of the employers concerned with contempt. It is in large measure in response to what industry has requested that I have acted. The right hon. Gentleman may not give a fig for the opinion of industry and the employers in this country. I think, however, that they have something to say on the matter. I regret the fact that the right hon. Gentleman, as ever, distorts what is happening in order to seek to find divisions where divisions do not exist to the extent that he pretends. He knows perfectly well that industrial training boards have only ever covered 50 per cent. of the work force. He must know perfectly well that my proposals reduce the figure to about 30 per cent. There has never been any agreement—*[Interruption.]* I should be grateful if the right hon. Gentleman, having had his say, would listen to what is said to him.

The right hon. Gentleman puts an entirely false gloss on the situation to suggest that the country's training system is being demolished by these proposals. That is simply not true. If I had even wanted to pursue a vendetta against the training boards, I would not have left—as I have—seven boards in being. The right hon. Gentleman referred to the MSC recommendation. He knows that the recommendation was to retain the seven and to consider further the others. Even the latter was a majority decision and not, I understand, an overwhelming majority decision. The right hon. Gentleman says that the training system is being dismantled and destroyed. I have to remind him that expenditure on training in 1979-80 was £683 million, that in 1981-82 it will be £904 million, and that there will continue to be substantial expansion.

Mr. Kenneth Warren (Hastings): I congratulate the Secretary of State on his realistic approach to the needs of training for jobs in the future. Will he bear in mind that the 16 boards that he is abolishing have cash reserves of £40 million? Will that money be returned to those in industry who have contributed? Will he try to ensure that the remaining boards operate and report to him in a standard manner that can be understood, not only in those circles involved in the training boards but in this House that is responsible for their administration?

Mr. Tebbit: I take note of my hon. Friend's comments. The amounts of money held in cash and in reserves by the training boards are quite substantial. The largest sums are held by two of the boards that will remain in being, the construction industry and the engineering industry boards. It is important to bear in mind that in future the employers' side in the boards will set the level of the levy. If it believes that the cash holdings are larger than necessary, it would be sensible for it to take this factor into account in its considerations.

Several Hon. Members *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: Order. As the House can see, a large number of hon. Members wish to ask questions. I am prepared to allow supplementary questions to run until 5.10 pm—that is another 25 minutes. If hon. Members co-operate, all those wishing to put questions should be able to do so.

Mr. Ian Wrigglesworth (Thornaby): When the "New Training Initiative" shows that 50 per cent. of young Germans go into apprenticeships compared to only 14 per cent. of young British people, and when it also shows that 600,000 unskilled jobs were lost between 1971 and 1978,

SECURITY SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND

WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE HOUSE, I SHOULD LIKE TO MAKE A STATEMENT ABOUT RECENT EVENTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

THE HOUSE HAS ALREADY MADE CLEAR ITS SADNESS AND REVULSION AT THE MURDER OF THE HON MEMBER FOR BELFAST SOUTH ON SATURDAY. I KNOW THE WHOLE HOUSE WILL BE REVOLTED AT THE MURDER OF ONE OF OUR COLLEAGUES. I SHOULD LIKE TO ADD MY OWN TRIBUTE TO HIM AS A HARD WORKING SERVANT OF HIS CONSTITUENTS. ALL OF ~~US~~ HERE WILL WANT IMMEDIATELY TO EXPRESS OUR SYMPATHY TO MRS BRADEORD AND HER FAMILY - AND NOT ONLY TO THEM BUT ALSO TO THE OTHER FAMILIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND WHO HAVE BEEN BEREAVED IN RECENT DAYS.

THIS HAS BEEN A BLACK WEEK IN NORTHERN IRELAND. ON SUNDAY 8 NOVEMBER IN ARMAGH TREVOR FOSTER WAS KILLED IN A BOOBY-TRAP BOMB ATTACK INTENDED TO MURDER HIS FATHER, A MEMBER OF THE UDR. ON TUESDAY, ANOTHER UDR SOLDIER - CECIL GRAHAM - WAS SHOT DEAD WHILE VISITING HIS WIFE AND FIVE WEEK OLD BABY. EUSTASE KERR, OF THE UBR, NARROWLY ESCAPED DEATH ON TUESDAY WHEN GUNMEN SHOT AND WOUNDED HIM AT HIS FARM IN FERMANAGH. THE SAME DAY IN ARMAGH, CHARLES NEVILLE, AN EX MEMBER OF THE UDR, WAS BOMBED AND THEN SHOT TO DEATH WHEN LEAVING WORK. ON THURSDAY IN BANBRIDGE CONSTABLE POLLOCK LOST BOTH HIS LEGS WHEN A TERRORIST BOMB EXPLOBED UNDER HIS CAR. ON FRIDAY IN LONDONDERRY A TERRORIST BOMB INJURED VERY SERIOUSLY AN INNOCENT WOMAN. DURING THE WEEKEND, THERE WAS THE ATTACK IN WHICH THE HON MEMBER AND MR CAMPBELL, THE CARETAKER AT THE COMMUNITY CENTRE, DIED; AND IN SEPARATE INCIDENTS ONE MAN WAS MURDERED AND ANOTHER SHOT AND SERIOUSLY INJURED IN BELFAST.

I COME NOW TO THE MURDER OF THE HON MEMBER FOR BELFAST SOUTH. MR BRADFORD ARRIVED AT THE COMMUNITY CENTRE IN FINAGHY IN HIS CONSTITUENCY AT ABOUT 11.15 am LAST SATURDAY. HE WENT TO THE ROOM WHERE HE HOLDS A SURGERY FOR HIS CONSTITUENTS. A POLICE OFFICER WAS ON DUTY WITH HIM. AT APPROXIMATELY 11.40 am TWO MEN WEARING BOILER SUITS APPROACHED THE BUILDING CARRYING A PLANK OF WOOD. ONE OF THE MEN LOWERED THE PLANK AS HE CAME UP TO THE POLICE OFFICER, REVEALING A GUN. THE POLICE OFFICER AND THE CARETAKER WERE FORCED TO KNEEL AND WERE HELD AT GUN POINT AS ANOTHER GUNMAN WENT INSIDE THE BUILDING. HE ENTERED MR BRADFORD'S ROOM AND SHOT HIM. IN A SCUFFLE AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE BUILDING, THE CARETAKER - MR CAMPBELL - WAS SHOT DEAD BY ANOTHER MAN. IN ALL THERE WERE FIVE ASSAILANTS, ARMED WITH A VARIETY OF WEAPONS WHICH INCLUDED A SUB-MACHINE GUN. THEY LEFT THE BUILDING IN A CAR TAKEN FROM A FAMILY WHO HAD BEEN TAKEN HOSTAGE AND, AS THEY ESCAPED, THEY FIRED A SHOT IN THE DIRECTION OF THE DOOR TO PREVENT ANYONE FOLLOWING. THE POLICE OFFICER WHO HAD BEEN WITH MR BRADFORD FIRED A NUMBER OF SHOTS AT THEM, AS ALSO DID AN OFF DUTY POLICE OFFICER WHO WAS IN THE AREA AND HAD HEARD THE SHOOTING.

IN THE WAKE OF SUCH HORRIBLE MURDERS I UNDERSTAND THE ANGER AND RESENTMENT WHICH HAVE LED MANY PEOPLE TO URGE THAT MORE MUST BE DONE TO STOP SUCH KILLINGS. IN ASSESSING OUR RESPONSE TO THEM, WE MUST BE CLEAR ABOUT THE PURPOSE OF ALL THIS VIOLENCE. THE AIM IS QUITE DELIBERATELY TO USE MURDER TO PROVOKE FURTHER MURDERS. THEY WANT TO STIMULATE AND INTENSIFY SECTARIAN HATREDS TO CREATE THE CHAOS WHICH THEY BELIEVE WILL HELP THEIR LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES. WE MUST FRUSTRATE THAT AIM. ANY FORM OF DIVISIVE ACTION WHICH COULD MAKE THE TASK OF THE SECURITY FORCES MORE DIFFICULT SHOULD BE AVOIDED. THE RIGHT RESPONSE IS TO WORK CALMLY, BUT FIRMLY UNDER THE LAW AND UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF THE SECURITY FORCES FOR THE DEFEAT OF TERRORISM.

HMG IS RESOLUTE IN THIS TASK AND ABSOLUTELY COMMITTED TO THAT AIM.

WITH THE GOC AND THE CHIEF CONSTABLE, IN WHOSE PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT I HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE, I AM LOOKING AT WAYS TO MAKE SECURITY MEASURES MORE EFFECTIVE. LET NOONE BE IN ANY DOUBT THAT HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ARE PREPARED TO COMMIT EVERY AVAILABLE RESOURCE WHICH MAY BE NECESSARY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM. BUT I HAVE TO TELL THE HOUSE THAT THE CHIEF CONSTABLE AND THE GOC HAVE TOLD ME THAT THEY DO NOT NEED NEW LAWS OR MORE RESOURCES. WHAT THEY NEED IS INFORMATION, POSITIVE HELP AND COOPERATION FROM EVERYONE IN NORTHERN IRELAND. NOTHING MUST DIVERT THEM FROM THEIR TASK OF THWARTING, ARRESTING AND CONVICTING THE TERRORISTS.

I AM CONVINCED THAT THE WAY TO DEFEAT TERRORISM IS TO GAIN THE SUPPORT OF ALL PEOPLE IN NORTHERN IRELAND, WHATEVER THEIR POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS MAY BE, FOR THE SIMPLE PROPOSITION THAT MURDER MUST BE OPPOSED AND MURDERERS ARRESTED AND BROUGHT TO TRAIL. THIS MEANS MORE THAN STANDING ASIDE OR NOT ACTIVELY SUPPORTING THE TERRORISTS: IT MUST INVOLVE POSITIVE SUPPORT FOR THE SECURITY FORCES IN THEIR FUNDAMENTAL TAKS OF PROTECTING LIFE. I APPEAL NOW FOR THAT ACTIVE CO-OPERATION, PARTICULARLY FROM THOSE PEOPLE IN NORTHERN IRELAND WHO HAVE HESITATED, FROM WHATEVER REASON IN THE PAST, TO PROVIDE INFORMATION.

AFTER A WEEK SUCH AS WE HAVE SUFFERED IN NORTHERN IRELAND, I HAVE NO COMPLACENCY ABOUT THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE DIFFICULTY OF THE TASK WHICH LIES AHEAD OF US. I UNDERSTAND AND I SHARE THE REVULSION THAT ALL OF US HERE FEEL AGAINST THESE APPALLING EVENTS.

THE AIM OF ALL OF US MUST BE TO CHANNEL THAT FEELING, NOT INTO REACTIONS WHICH PROVOKE ONE SECTION OF THE COMMUNITY AGAINST THE OTHER, BUT INTO DIRECTIONS WHICH WILL MAINTAIN CALM, WILL BROADEN SUPPORT FOR THE EFFORTS OF THE SECURITY FORCES AGAINST OUR COMMON ENEMIES AND WILL OFFER THE TERRORISTS WHAT THEY FEAR MOST: A COMMUNITY RESOLUTELY UNITED AGAINST THEM.

Prime Minister

1. I have spoken to JEP on the telephone this morning. He will come in (via the Cabinet Office) at 11.10 a.m. on Tuesday, 17th November.

2. John Brookborough telephoned from Northern Ireland this morning.

3. He and James Moyola (Chichester-Clark) are going to see Jim in Belfast early on Wednesday morning. John Brookborough says that "the whole place is a tinder box". He says that we must stop talking about "a political solution"; to the Protestant and to the Roman Catholic communities alike, these words mean one thing only, namely incorporation into the Republic.

4. John Brookborough said that as many as 40% of the adult Roman Catholic population did not want union with the Republic anyway.

5. John Brookborough had read the Reports of the Joint Studies. He said that they all gave him the impression that the studies would be interpreted by all Unionists as being the precursor to a sell out. He knew that that was not the case. However, the key element in influencing Unionists opinion was not the truth, but that which was perceived by people in Northern Ireland as being the truth. He said that a widespread impression had been created in Northern Ireland that the UK Government no longer really believed in the union and that this was the major contributory factor which lay behind his words that "the whole place is a tinder box".

6. John Brookborough said he would give me a ring after he and James Moyola had seen Jim Prior on Wednesday morning.

16th November 1981

IAN GOW

P.M.'s MESSAGE TO MRS. BRADFORD

~~STATEMENT~~ ON THE DEATH OF ROBERT BRADFORD M.P.

It was with the deepest sorrow that I heard of the death of Robert this morning. His service to his constituents, among whom he was regarded as a friend and counsellor, to Parliament and to the country was marked by the dedication and concern which could not fail to impress all who knew him. It was indeed exemplified by the work upon which he was engaged this morning. / New para
I know the whole nation will be shocked by this dreadful act which has taken the life of an elected Member of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, an honourable family man and a dedicated servant of the community who gave so unsparingly of his time and energies. I extend to you and to your family my personal heartfelt sympathy.

P.M. agreed text, and requested it be telexed immediately to Mrs. Bradford. Told Duty Officer, Stormont to send telegram (1540, 14.11.81)
Signed letter from P.M. to follow, to be sent from London by post on 15/11.
Address:- Mrs. R.J. Bradford (Norah)
31, New Forge Lane
BELFAST 9
(Children — 1 girl about 7 yrs; believed adopted).

S.J. Pike
14.11.81.

Mr. Kenneth Campbell (caretaker) also killed in the shooting. Ian Gow informed (he does not think P.M. should send message).

Mr. Campbell was a single man who lived with his mother, Mrs. Annie Campbell, and sister, Miss Florence Campbell at

51, Geeragh Place,
BELFAST.

N.I.O. Belfast will arrange a suitable message to Mr. C's relatives, following normal procedure (a message from a N.I. Minister?) P.M. not to write.

TEXT OF A TELEGRAM TO MR. JAMES MOLYNEAUX MP

I am shocked and saddened by the murder of Robert Bradford and I send you my deep sympathy in the loss which you have sustained.

I set out the statement which I have issued today:

"I have heard with great shock of the murder of Mr. Robert Bradford MP and Mr. Kenneth Campbell.

The whole Government joins me in sending our sympathy to their families and shares their horror at what has occurred.

We shall pursue with the utmost vigour those who committed this wicked act and will persevere in our overriding duty to cleanse our country of the evil of terrorism."

MARGARET THATCHER

Dictated by Ian Gow.
Ian Kydd told.
Noel Cornich NIO
Belfast will telegram
this to J Molyneaux.
Molyneaux is in Belfast
and will also be told
verbally of telegram content
14.11.

Problems with Post Office meant telegram
could not be aired immediately.
But Mr. Molyneaux has been handed
a typed copy of message by Noel Cornich.
He was very grateful.

STATEMENT OF FACTS FROM THE POLICE HEADQUARTERS

MURDER OF THE REVEREND ROBERT BRADFORD MP

Mr. Bradford arrived at the centre at approximately 11.15 am. He went to the room where he holds a 'surgery' for his constituents. Five people were waiting to see him. Inside the centre a young people's disco was also being held and there were other children in a television room. A police constable was at the front door of the building and with him was a caretaker, Mr. Campbell. At approximately 11.40 am two men wearing boiler suits approached the building carrying a plank of wood. One of the men lowered the plank as he came up to the police officer revealing a gun. The police officer and the caretaker were forced to kneel and were held at gunpoint as the other gunman went inside the building. A third gunman then appeared carrying a sub-machine gun. One of the gunmen entered Mr. Bradford's room and shot him dead. At the same time there was a scuffle at the entrance to the building and the caretaker was shot dead by another gunman. The three gunmen then left covering their retreat with a sub-machine gun. As they escaped they fired a shot in the direction of the door to prevent anyone following. As their car moved away a police officer fired a number of shots at them as did an off-duty police officer who was in the area and heard the shooting. The car used by the murderers was hijacked from a family in West Belfast who were held hostage throughout the incident.

P.M.'s STATEMENT FOR PRESS

I have heard with great shock of the murder of Mr. Robert Bradford MP and Mr. Kenneth Campbell.

The whole Government joins me in sending our sympathy to their families and shares their horror at what has occurred.

We shall pursue with the utmost vigour those who committed this wicked act and will persevere in our overriding duty to cleanse our country of the evil of terrorism.

Dictated by I. Gow.
Passed to Ian Kydd.

1600 14/11

Passed to Resident Clerk
FCO 2300 14/11

File

MFJ

cc NIO

CF Hosel

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

13 November 1981

Dear Mr. Napier,

Thank you for your letter of 30 October. I know of the Alliance Party's constructive attitude towards the development of Anglo-Irish relations from our meeting on 16 January and I was grateful for your further helpful remarks.

Since you wrote, you will have heard that the Taoiseach and I decided on 6 November to publish the report which we had received on the Joint Studies and also the Joint Studies themselves (with the exception of the one on security). The Joint Communique following the meeting set out in some detail what had been discussed, and this has been amplified by my remarks at the Press Conference held after the meeting and by my statement of 10 November to the House of Commons.

I hope that this very considerable degree of openness will demonstrate clearly to the people of Northern Ireland that they have nothing to fear from the further development of Anglo-Irish relations.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Oliver Napier, Esq.

ds

Ireland

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Type for PM's signature

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

11 November 1981

Dear Michael

Your letter of 2 November asked for a draft reply to Oliver Napier's letter on the Anglo-Irish Summit.

Mr Napier has welcomed the development of Anglo-Irish relations, as he did when he met the Prime Minister on 16 January, but has urged the Prime Minister to be more open about her meeting with the Taoiseach. Mr Napier's fears should have been allayed by the fairly detailed Joint Communique issued after last Friday's Summit and also the decision to publish the Joint Studies. By the time that Mr Napier receives a reply from the Prime Minister, he will have received a copy of the Joint Studies which are being published today. I attach a draft reply for the Prime Minister's consideration.

I am sending copies of this letter and the draft reply to Roderic Lyne (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

M W HOPKINS

lf

DRAFT LETTER

FILE NUMBER

ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE

To	Enclosures	Copies to be sent to
Oliver Napier Esq The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland 88 University Street BELFAST BT7 1HE		
(Full Postal Address)		(Full Address, if Necessary)

LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY PRIME MINISTER
(Name of Signatory)

Thank you for your letter of 30 October. I know of the Alliance Party's constructive attitude towards the development of Anglo-Irish relations from our meeting on 16 January and I was grateful for your further helpful remarks.

Since you wrote, you will have heard that the Taoiseach and I decided on 6 November to publish the report which we had received on the Joint Studies and also the Joint Studies themselves (with the exception of the one on security). The Joint Communique following the meeting set out in some detail what had been discussed, and this has been amplified by my remarks at the Press Conference held after the meeting and by my statement of 10 November to the House of Commons.

I hope that this very considerable degree of openness will demonstrate clearly to the people of Northern Ireland that they have nothing to fear from the further development of Anglo-Irish relations.

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Clerk

Rev. Ian PAISLEY MP

17/11

27/11

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 November 1981

Mike
Still nothing
Kay
30/11

We have spoken to NIO.
Something expected
next week.
MAP 20/x.

I enclose a copy of a letter handed in here today by the Reverend Ian Paisley, M.P. I should be grateful for a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature by 17 November.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Francis Richards (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

M. A. PATTISON

Stephen Boys-Smith, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

15

✓ cc. MOSA
1. Lydon
2. Gow

Copy in Meeting with Taoiseach
PTS.

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

6th Nov. '81

Dear Prime Minister,

Before your meeting today with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland I wish to remind you again of your repeated pledge in the House of Commons and elsewhere that the affairs and future of Northern Ireland are the concern only of your Government, the Parliament of this United Kingdom and the people of Northern Ireland.

By and since the Dublin Summit of 8th. December 1980 you appear to me and the Unionist people of Northern Ireland, whom I represent, to have broken that pledge. By embarking upon Joint Studies with Dublin in respect of "the totality of relationships within these islands" the affairs and future of Northern Ireland have inevitably become the subject of negotiation with Dublin. Naturally great constitutional uncertainty and unease have resulted in Northern Ireland, which have not been mitigated by words of assurance as these are repudiated by continuing contrary action.

The people of Northern Ireland ask only to be allowed to live their lives within the United Kingdom in peace and security. We neither seek nor want any say in the affairs or future of the Republic of Ireland and all we ask from Dublin is reciprocation.

I would be failing in my duty if I did not remind you that there are simply no circumstances in which the people of Northern Ireland will either accept or acquiesce in any involvement by the Republic of Ireland in the affairs of their Province. Therefore an Anglo/Irish Council, which has been mooted in recent weeks, would meet with the united, relentless and unqualified opposition of the Unionists of Northern Ireland, as such a body would inevitably confer on the Republic influence and control over the affairs and future upon part of this United Kingdom.

The suggested All-Ireland Court would be equally anathema to my people as they would see it as an overt and giant step towards the creation of an All Ireland State. Since the judicial system is such an inherent

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

part of the administration of any state the creation of an All Ireland Court would destroy the constitutional sovereignty of Northern Ireland as part of this United Kingdom. Therefore no member of the Republic's Judiciary must ever be allowed to exercise any jurisdiction over Northern Ireland. Only straight forward extradition will ever solve the problem of cross border terrorism. I have no doubt that your Government is quite capable of securing this from the Republic and therefore I urge you to concentrate on doing so.

I also wish to take this opportunity to restate to you our opposition to the creation of any all Ireland institution under the guise of economic co-operation. Northern Ireland's natural economic links are with the rest of the United Kingdom and it would be intolerable to foster alternative artifical links with the Republic since such would not be a means in themselves but rather a means to an end of encouraging political unification in Ireland.

Normal economic cooperation between neighbouring states, quite properly has its place, and, indeed, has always existed between Northern Ireland and the Republic, but such does not require the formalised institutions which are reported to have been recommended by the Joint Studies. Cooperation between that two political Units so that eventually the two might be one is utterly unacceptable, and, since this is the self confessed motivation of the Republic in seeking cooperation with Northern Ireland, I trust you will begin to appreciate and respect the views of the people of Northern Ireland on this subject.

I therefore urge you to abandon any motion that through economic fusion in Ireland there can be induced political fusion. The unalterable antipathy of the people of Northern Ireland to any political involvement by or with the Republic of Ireland is absolute and is only too capable of tangible manifestation if you today seek to force Northern Ireland down a road which it will never go.

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

Surely as Prime Minister of this United Kingdom you have a bounden duty to protect the sovereignty and unity of the Kingdom and, therefore, to day I urge you to discharge that duty firmly and unequivocally by refusing to countenance anything which involves foreigners in the affairs of our state or which weakens, or is capable of weakening, Northern Ireland's position as a integral part of the United Kingdom. I can but conclude by saying that should you fail in this your duty then the Ulster Unionists will not fail in their resulting duty to take whatever steps are necessary to defend their citizenship, heritage and rights.

Sincerely

Ian R.K. Paisley

JS
cc FCO
CO

Ireland

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 November 1981

BF

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mr. Oliver Napier about the forthcoming Anglo-Irish Summit. I should be grateful if you could let me have the text of a draft reply which the Prime Minister might send to Mr. Napier.

It would be helpful if your text could reach me by Wednesday 11 November.

I am sending copies of this letter, and its enclosure, to Roderic Lyne (FCO) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Stephen Boys-Smith, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

CS

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 November 1981

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter to her of 30 October about the forthcoming Anglo-Irish Summit. Your letter is receiving attention and a reply will be sent as soon as possible.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Oliver Napier, Esq.

THE ALLIANCE PARTY OF NORTHERN IRELAND

Headquarters:
88 UNIVERSITY STREET,
BELFAST BT7 1HE

Telephone:
Belfast 24274/5

30th October 1981

Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON

Dear Prime Minister

The Alliance Party welcomes the continuation of the Anglo Irish Summit meetings. We believe that these regular meetings between the representatives of Sovereign Governments can be of positive benefit for both the peoples of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland respectively. Social and economic co-operation which does not impinge upon the internal political affairs of Northern Ireland can do nothing but good. Not only is there economic benefit to be gained from co-operation but these meetings can help dispel the myths based upon the historical legacy of bitterness between the people of our own country and those of the Republic of Ireland.

However, there is one aspect which concerns us about these Summits and this is the question of secrecy surrounding the matters discussed. You may remember that when an Alliance delegation met you in January of this year I urged that the issues under discussion should be made public. Indeed we warned of the dangers that might arise if secrecy was maintained. We were fearful that this situation could be exploited unscrupulously by politicians in both the Republic and also in Northern Ireland itself. Extremists were quick to seize upon the opportunities presented by genuine community concern and exploit it for their own selfish ends. We believe the experience of the last year stresses the need for openness and frankness regarding future Summit meetings. We would ask therefore that at your inaugural meeting with the new Premier of the Irish Republic to agree that the discussions would take place openly so that it can clearly be demonstrated that people have nothing to fear and indeed have everything to gain from these talks.

Pps - ||

I should add that when an Alliance delegation recently met Dr. Fitzgerald we also argued that the veil of secrecy surrounding the talks should be dropped.

As a Party which supports the continuation of discussions between both Governments we are worried that the potential value could be jeopardised if the people of Northern Ireland fear that the constitutional future of the Province is under discussion. We accept your unambiguous assurances on this matter but as you well know there are irresponsible politicians in Northern Ireland who will be prepared to deliberately misrepresent what is under discussion in order to heighten community tension and fears.

We would therefore request an end to the secrecy surrounding these talks.

Yours sincerely

Oliver Napier

Oliver Napier

E.R.

1/41

Ref: NIOM (81) 6th Meeting

NOTE OF A MEETING HELD ON FRIDAY, 30 OCTOBER 1981
IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

Present: Mr Marshall - Chairman

Mr Blelloch
Mr Angel
Mr Burns
Mr Harrington
Miss Christopherson
Mr Burrows
Mr Fisher
Mr Bates
) NIO

Mr Miller
Mr Jackson
Col Morton
Lt Col Bateman
Maj Hughes
) Ministry of Defence

Mr Facer — Cabinet Office

Security

1. With the ending of the hunger strike, public disorder - which had already diminished - had virtually ceased. Terrorism continued, however, and was now focussed on attacks on the security forces, sectarian killings and a resumption of bomb attacks in Great Britain. On the positive side one group of sectarian killers had been caught and there had been examples of good and (equally important) well publicised co-operation between the RUC and the Garda over the Dunne kidnapping and the incident at Rosslea in which two men were arrested in the Republic, having planted a wire-controlled bomb across the border. The campaign against plastic baton rounds would probably continue, although their use had diminished greatly. No significant difference existed between the instructions relating to their use in England and Wales and those in

E.P.

Northern Ireland and the RUC were reviewing the specification of their weapons. In two fatal cases under investigation, the Director of Public Prosecutions had found no grounds for prosecution; five other fatality cases were still being dealt with, 3 concerning children. It was pointed out that the IRA had a vested interest in these investigations proving inconclusive and that, therefore, they or their sympathisers put pressure on potential witnesses not to co-operate. Charges for riotingmight be brought against some witnesses, and it was being alleged that this was deliberately intended to deter witnesses from coming forward.

Prisons

2. Measures taken after the end of the hunger strike had been generally welcomed by Catholics but the Protestant response had not altogether been a helpful one. The issue of prisoners' own clothing was now virtually complete. There appeared to have been no attempt to adopt paramilitary uniform. Over the next two or three weeks each prisoner would be interviewed as part of an assessment programme and would, as far as possible, be offered a choice of work - although the final decision would remain in the Governor's hands. Brendan MacFarlane would be among the first to be so assessed. The last day of the 28-day moratorium would be Monday 2 November. The first prisoners to be adjudicated upon after that date would be subject to a revised, and less onerous, scale of loss of privileges.

3. The ICRC report had been received just before the end of the hunger strike, and the Government was committed to publishing it in full. Although it was no secret that the report had been received, there had been little or no outside interest in the Government's plans for publication. It was unlikely to cause a significant problem.

E.R.

Economy

4. Unemployment was unchanged from the previous month at 19.2%; while no large-scale closures were threatened in the immediate future, the longer term prospects did not give any grounds for optimism. The new Secretary of State's known belief in the importance of economic progress was a useful psychological factor, though there was also a risk that too high expectations would be aroused. On the subject of Kinsale gas, the price of the imported gas would be the crucial factor in the scheme's viability. It was hoped that, following the Anglo-Irish Summit, there would be a meeting of Energy Ministers from the North and the Republic to discuss pricing. A gas pipeline would be susceptible to attack, but it would be less vulnerable than the electricity interconnector, and might present a less attractive target to terrorists since its disruption would have a directimpact on the lives of both sections of the community in Northern Ireland. With regard to the alleged financial improprieties at the De Lorean Motor Company no evidence had been found of activities of a criminal nature, nor which might reflect on the way in which public money had been handled.

Constitutional and Political

5. The Secretary of State had announced his decision not to proceed with a Northern Ireland Council for the time being. He had had extensive talks with political leaders but he had not come to any positive decisions on political developments, though he had decided that a return to the old-style Stormont, or full scale integration with the United Kingdom, were not desirable. Earlier attempts at power-sharing had not succeeded. Amongst the possibilities he wished to look at further were the question of whether some powers could be

given to District Councils; and the possibility of an economic forum (on the basis that it might be less difficult for local politicians to work together fruitfully on economic matters than it currently was on political ones). A change in attitudes was needed.

Anglo-Irish Discussions

6. A Summit Meeting was to take place the following week and the Secretary of State had been to Dublin on 20 October for a preparatory meeting. The Irish were keen to set up some inter-Governmental structure, and some inter-Parliamentary grouping; and there was a wish on their part for the UK to put a positive gloss on the essentially negative formulation of the "guarantee". There was also pressure for an All-Ireland Court, and the Summit might remit this idea to the Attorneys General of the two countries. The Taoiseach was expected to press for the five joint studies to be published. The UK's initial view had been that the Summary Report only should be published, but sanitised versions of the 5 reports had been prepared. The meeting was likely to be fruitful.

SIL DIVISION

3 November 1981

Ireland

PS TO PM. NO 10 DOWNING STREET.

GR 280 CONFIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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FM WASHINGTON 152228Z OCT 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3078 OF 15 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST, NIO LONDON AND BIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING CONSULS-GENERAL IN USA

NORTHERN IRELAND: VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES BY OWEN CARRON MP

1. FOLLOWING OUR ENQUIRY THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE CONFIRMED THAT CARRON HAS APPLIED IN BELFAST FOR A VISA TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES. SINCE WE HAVE HEARD SEPARATELY THAT CARRON HAS ASKED FOR AT LEAST ONE MEETING IN THE SENATE ON THURSDAY 22 OCTOBER HE CLEARLY PLANS TO COME HERE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. DECISIONS ON VISAS ARE A MATTER FOR THE US POST CONCERNED, I.E. THE US CONSUL-GENERAL IN BELFAST IN CONSULTATION WITH THE US EMBASSY IN LONDON. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT ADVICE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE GIVING TO THE US CONSUL-GENERAL THOUGH THE POLITICAL BUREAU HAVE RECOMMENDED THAT THE VISA REQUEST BE TURNED DOWN EITHER ON THE GROUND THAT CARRON HAS OPENLY ADVOCATED VIOLENCE OR THAT HIS VISIT WOULD BE PREJUDICIAL TO US NATIONAL INTERESTS.

3 A VISIT BY CARRON, STIRRING THE MUD SO SOON AFTER THE END OF THE HUNGER STRIKE, IS CLEARLY NOT IN OUR INTEREST. WHILE WE HAVE TO BE CAREFUL NOT TO WEIGH IN HEAVY-HANDEDLY ON WHAT IS AN AMERICAN DECISION YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER TELLING THE US EMBASSY IN LONDON THAT WE HAVE HEARD THAT CARRON PLANS TO COME HERE AND REMIND THEM THAT CARRON HAS OPENLY ENDORSED PIRA AIMS AND METHODS.

HENDERSON

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PS/MR LUCE

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MR ADAMS
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
LORD N G LENNOX
MR BRAITHWAITE

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MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY AND IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER DESIGNATE IN LONDON : 14 OCTOBER 1981 AT 09.45 HRS

Present:

UK Side	Irish Side
The Rt Hon Lord Carrington	Senator Dooge
Mr Fergusson	Mr Mackernan
Mr Lyne	
Mr Thomas	

1. Senator Dooge asked the Secretary of State to convey to the Prime Minister the Taoiseach's sympathy over the bomb outrage in London the previous Saturday. The Irish were as horrified as we were. But they had not been surprised. They had no specific information as to whether it was the start of a campaign or a single gesture. Senator Dooge hoped that revulsion against the incident would help towards progress in Northern Ireland. He thought that progress had to go forward in two parallel phases: the violence had to be ended and political progress had to be made. They had already been successful in making a division between the relatives and the hunger strikers. Now the 5% of IRA activists in Northern Ireland had to be isolated from the 20% of sympathisers. The hunger strike had brought them closer together.

2. Senator Dooge said that the Taoiseach thought that it would be useful if there was a Ministerial meeting in preparation for the forthcoming Summit. Senator Dooge would be willing to come over to London to talk to Mr Prior. It was a year since the last Summit. If there had been no change of Government, the Irish would have expected a substantial advance at the next Summit. They recognised that there would not be a substantial advance, but they did want some advance. He would be able to indicate to Mr Prior aspects of the Irish Government's thinking which were not in the public domain. Civil servants could not do that. Lord Carrington thought Mr Prior might well feel that he had not yet been in the Northern Ireland job long enough to be in a position to discuss matters with Senator

Dooge in as much detail as both would wish. But he would put Senator Dooge's proposal to him.

3. Lord Carrington asked Senator Dooge what the Irish expected to get out of the Summit. Senator Dooge replied that, first, the Irish wanted a reaffirmation that the Joint Studies would continue. They hoped the content of the Studies might be made public. The secrecy had been of benefit to Dr Paisley. Perhaps we could agree to publish a summary. Second, there could be thoughts on the start of a political initiative. The Taoiseach had opened a public debate on the Irish Constitution. He did not know where the debate would lead. There would be no early move towards a referendum. How this would fit in with progress in Northern Ireland still had to be worked out. Another question that they were giving thought to was the absence of a representative body in Northern Ireland. Lord Carrington said that the British Government had been trying for the last two and a half years to establish a representative body but the problems of finding something acceptable to both the Catholic and Protestant communities had so far defeated them. In the absence of such a body, there were no new politicians coming forward. Senator Dooge thought that one of the tragedies of the hunger strike was that the morale of the SDLP had been badly affected: but they had now recovered and were ready to go forward again. Mr Fergusson added that it was more or less agreed that a summary of the Joint Studies should be published.

4. Senator Dooge asked what the British expected from the Summit. Lord Carrington replied that the British side did not expect a breakthrough. There were a lot of problems. Mr Prior had to be careful. He did not want to start off his term as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland as being considered hostile by the Protestants - or by the Catholics. Senator Dooge said that his wish for a meeting with Mr Prior was to enable them to get together to see how to get the best out of the Summit. It could be done without publicity. He would be willing to go to Belfast or to London. London would be preferable because it would be easier to keep it private. Lord Carrington said he would put this to Mr Prior.

5. Senator Dooge and Lord Carrington agreed that the Summit should also cover EC and international issues: though the press would inevitably focus on Northern Ireland.

Distribution:

FCO

PS
PS/LPS
PS/PUS
Mr Bullard
Mr Fergusson
Mr MacInnes, Information Department
Mr Baxter, News Department
RID

No.10 Downing Street

Mr Wenban-Smith, Cabinet Office

Mr Harrington, Northern Ireland Office

HM Ambassador, DUBLIN

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3048 OF 14 OCTOBER 1981

INFO NIO LONDON, NIO BELFAST, BIS NEW YORK,

INFO SAVING DUBLIN.

PS TO PM. NO 10 DOWNING STREET.

PS Ireland

MIPT: NORTHERN IRELAND: DAILY EXPRESS COMMENT.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF O'NEILL'S STATEMENT:
BEGINS:

''THE CHARGE BY THE LONDON DAILY EXPRESS THAT IN MY PUBLIC SPEECHES I HAVE GIVEN AID AND COMFORT TO THE PEOPLE COLLECTING FUNDS FOR THE IRA IS TOTALLY UNWARRENTED AND UTTERLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION. JUST THE CONTRARY IS TRUE. UNTIL THE BEGINNING OF THE HUNGER STRIKE THE JOINT ANNUAL APPEALS MADE BY SENATORS KENNEDY AND MOYNIHAN, GOVERNOR CAREY AND ME WERE QUITE SUCCESSFUL IN REDUCING SUPPORT FOR PROVISIONAL FRONT ORGANISATIONS. THOSE EFFORTS, AS WELL AS SCORES OF OTHER STATEMENTS AGAINST THE MEN OF VIOLENCE HAVE BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED BY, AMONG OTHERS, PRIME MINISTER THATCHER AND THE FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, HUMPHREY ATKINS.

(O'NEILL THEN QUOTES FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER OF 14 MAY 1981 AND FROM A STATEMENT BY MR ATKINS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 7 FEBRUARY 1980. HANSARD COL 718):

TODAY IN THE NEW YORK TIMES THE IRISH AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES MENTIONS THAT THERE ARE PEOPLE NOW ALIVE IN IRELAND BECAUSE OF THE POSITION MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE TAKEN AGAINST THE FORCES OF VIOLENCE IN IRELAND. MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE FOR SEVERAL YEARS PUBLICLY AND WITHOUT QUALIFICATION ENCOURAGED THOSE AMERICANS WHO SUPPORT A UNITED IRELAND TO REJECT THE PATH OF THE BOMB AND BULLET.

FALSE CHARGES, SUCH AS THOSE MADE BY THE DAILY EXPRESS, DO NOTHING TO PROMOTE AN END TO AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE MEN OF VIOLENCE. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY ONLY SERVE TO PROMOTE AN UNFORTUNATE CONTROVERSY THAT WILL NOT BENEFIT THOSE WHO GENUINELY DESIRE PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND.''
ENDS.

PLEASE ADVANCE TO RID, NIO AND NO 10 DOWNING STREET.

FCO PASS SAVING DUBLIN.

(ADVANCED AS REQUESTED)
(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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MR FERGUSSON
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MR BRAITHWAITE

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FM WASHINGTON 140100Z OCT 81
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3047 OF 14 OCTOBER 1981
INFO NIO LONDON, NIO BELFAST, BIS NEW YORK.

NORTHERN IRELAND, DAILY EXPRESS COMMENT ON THE FOUR HORSEMEN.

1. TODAY'S DAILY EXPRESS ARTICLE ACCUSING THE FOUR HORSEMEN OF SHARING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE IRA NAIL BOMBING HAS BEEN PICKED UP BY THE PRESS HERE. THE FOUR HORSEMEN THEMSELVES ARE HOPPING MAD, PARTICULARLY SPEAKER O'NEILL, WHO HAS ISSUED A STATEMENT (TEXT IN MIFT) WHICH DRAWS ATTENTION TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO THE FOUR HORSEMEN OF 14 MAY IN WHICH SHE SAID ''I WELCOME YOUR CLEAR RESTATEMENT OF YOUR UNEQUIVOCAL CONDEMNATION OF ALL VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND. I WELCOME TOO YOUR EFFORTS TO DISCOURAGE AMMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE MEN OF VIOLENCE IN NORTHER IRELAND AND TO PROMOTE BETTER UNDERSTANDING AMONG ALL THE PEOPLE OF IRELAND''.

2. THE ARTICLE IS OF COURSE INACCURATE: WHILE SOME OF MAYOR KOCH'S STATEMENTS MIGHT, BY IMPLICATION, HAVE ENCOURAGED SUPPORT FOR NORAID, THE FOUR HORSEMEN HAVE ALWAYS BEEN UNEQUIVOCAL IN URGING AMERICANS NOT TO GIVE FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE PROVISIONAL IRA.

3. IRKSOME AS THEY OFTEN ARE, THE FOUR HORSEMEN HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY TRIED TO DISCOURAGE THE FLOW OF MONEY TO THE PROVISIONALS. IT WOULD BE UNHELPFUL IF THEY WERE TO FEEL THAT THE ONLY RESULT OF THEIR EFFORTS WAS TO BE TARRED BY THE BRITISH PRESS WITH THE SAME BRUSH AS BIAGGI AND HIS COHORTS. IF YOU ARE ASKED FOR ANY COMMENT ON THE DAILY EXPRESS PIECE IT WOULD THEREFORE BE VERY HELPFUL IF THE LINE TAKEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN HER LETTER OF 14 MAY COULD BE REAFFIRMED. THE SAME POINT MIGHT BE MADE IN BRIEFING U.S. CORRESPONDENTS IN LONDON.

PLEASE ADVANCE TO RID, NIO AND NO 10 DOWNING STREET.

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TLEGRAM NUMBER 468 OF 12 OCTOBER
INFO WASHINGTON AND DUBLIN

THE IRA IN MEXICO

RECENTLY THE IRA SEEM TO HAVE TAKEN A SPECIAL INTEREST IN MEXICO AND MEXICAN PUBLIC OPINION.

2. ONE IRA AND ONE SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVE (KIERAN NUGENT AND TOM HARTLEY) WERE IN MEXICO CITY FOR MUCH OF LAST WEEK. THEY GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE AND RADIO INTERVIEWS, BUT DID NOT ATTRACT MUCH PUBLIC ATTENTION. A REPRESENTATIVE OF THIS EMBASSY WAS INVITED TO PVRTICIPATE BY TELEPHONE IN A LIVE RADIO DEBATE, AND GAVE AS GOOD AS HE GOT. ALTHOUGH THE TWO IRISHMEN HAD THE ADVANTAGE OF BEING IN THE STUDIO AND HAVING THE LAST WORD IN A PROGRAMME RENOWNED FOR ITS LEFT-WING BIAS, HE WAS ABLE TO GET ACROSS SOME BASIC POINTS WHICH MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE GONE UNMENTIONED, FOR EXAMPLE THAT THE IRA USES VIOLENCE, AND THAT A MAJORITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND WANT TO REMAIN PART OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. AS A RESULT OF OCCASIONAL ANTI-BRITISH PRESS PROPAGANDA ON NORTHERN IRELAND, SUCH FACTS ARE OFTEN GREETED WITH SURPRISE BY THE MEXICAN PUBLIC, WHICH HAS A TENDENCY TO SEE NORTHERN IRELAND AS ONE OF THE LAST BRITISH COLONIES.

3. A CORRESPONDENT OF THE MEXICAN ENGLISH-LANGUAGE NEWSPAPER, THE NEWS, RECENTLY VISITED NORTHERN IRELAND AND WAS GIVEN AN INTERVIEW BY A QUOTE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE IRA UNQUOTE, APPARENTLY THE FOURTH INTERVIEW OF THIS KIND EVER GRANTED. THE FULL TEXT OF A FOUR DAY SERIES IS BEING SENT BY BAG, BUT YOU MAY BE ABLE TO MAKE SOME IMMEDIATE USE OF THE BRIEF SECTION ON THE FUTURE PUBLISHED TODAY. PLEASE SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

TICKELL

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SIR A ACLAND

MR ADAMS
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
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TELEGRAM NUMBER 469 OF 12 OCTOBER
INFO WASHINGTON AND DUBLIN
MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM: THE IRA IN MEXICO

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS PUBLISHED IN THE NEWS OF 12 OCTOBER.

Q. AFTER THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SIX-COUNTY STATE, WHAT IS THE NEXT STAGE?

A. THE NEXT STEP WILL BE TO DISMANTLE THE STRUCTURE OF THE SO-CALLED FREE STATE. THE IRISH REPUBLIC IS NO MORE THAN A SELF-GOVERNING ANNEX OF RICH MEN'S DUBIOUS NEO-COLONIALISM. WE WANT A DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC FOR ALL IRELAND.

Q. THEN YOUR ARMY WOULD EVENTUALLY BECOME A GOVERNMENTAL BODY?

A. NO. I DIDN'T SAY THAT. BEING A SOLDIER IS NO QAUALIFICATION FOR BEING A POLITICIAN.

Q. WHAT ABOUT THE PROTESTANT FEAR THAT A CATHOLIC-DOMINATED TERRITORY WOULD RESULT IN THE ABOLITION OF SUCH RIGHTS AS DIVORCE AND ABORTION?

A. THERE IS NO PLACE FOR CHURCH IN THE AFFAIRS OF STATE. I HAVE ENOUGH TROUBLE MYSELF ACCEPTING A LOT OF CATHOLIC VIEWS. I WOULDN'T WANT TO IMPOSE THEM ON SOME UNSUSPECTING PROTESTANT.

Q. WHAT IF, AS HAS ALREADY BEEN SUGGESTED BY POLLS AND SURVEYS IN EIRE, AFTER THE SIX-COUNTY STATE IS FREED, THE PEOPGE IN SOUTHERN IRELAND DO NOT WISH TO ACCEPT THE FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL BURDEN OF INCORPORATING THE NEW TERRITORY?

A. WE CALL THE SHOTS. WE DON'T REALLY GIVE A DAMN WHAT THEY WANT. WE HAVE ALWAYS CALLED THE SHOTS.
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CHIEF CLERK
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GROUPS 500
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FROM DUBLIN 231407Z SEPTEMBER 1981
TO ROUTINE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 328 OF 23 SEPT
AND TO ROUTINE INFO N I O BELFAST
SAVING WASHINGTON AND BIS NEW YORK.

NORTHERN IRELAND: INTERVIEW WITH TAOISEACH

1. A MAJOR INTERVIEW WITH THE TAOISEACH, DR FITZGERALD WAS PUBLISHED IN THE CORK EXAMINER ON 22 SEPTEMBER. IT COVERS U.S. ATTITUDES TO NORTHERN IRELAND, CONTACTS BETWEEN THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AND THE UNIONISTS, AND POSSIBLE CHANGES TO THE REPUBLIC'S CONSTITUTION TO MAKE '' THIS STATE A MORE ATTRACTIVE ONE FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE NORTHERN UNIONIST TRADITION TO JOIN''. THE FULL TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG.

2. THE TAOISEACH SPOKE OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM AND OF THE TENDENCY FOR IRISH-AMERICANS TO SIMPLIFY THE ISSUES. THEY FAILED TO SEE '' THAT THE PROBLEM WAS NOT PRIMARILY THE PROBLEM OF BRITISH RULE IN NORTHERN IRELAND BUT HOW DIFFERENT GROUPS OF IRISH PEOPLE ACCOMODATED THEMSELVES TO EACH OTHER AND FOUND A WAY OF LIVING AND WORKING TOGETHER ON THE ISLAND.'' HE DID NOT KNOW THAT THERE WAS MUCH THE US PRESIDENT COULD DO IN RESOLVING THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE BUT HE HOPED THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD UNDERSTAND THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE SITUATION.

3. ON RELATIONS WITH UNIONIST POLITICIANS, THE TAOISEACH WAS ASKED WHETHER HE WAS NOT DISAPPOINTED AT THEIR CONTINUED REJECTION OF HIS OVERTURES. HE REPLIED THAT WHEN HE WAS FOREIGN MINISTER (1973-77) HE HAD VISITED THE NORTH REGULARLY AND MET A WHOLE RANGE OF POLITICIANS, THOUGH NOT MR PAISLEY WHO HAD REFUSED TO SEE HIM. HE REGRETTED THAT THE SUBSEQUENT FIANNA FAIL GOVERNMENT HAD ABANDONED THESE CONTACTS. HE ADDED THAT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO MEET POLITICIANS (E.G. OWEN CARRON MP) WHO OPENLY ESPOUSED VIOLENCE.

4. ASKED WHETHER HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION IN ORDER TO WIN THE CONFIDENCE OF THE UNIONISTS, THE TAOISEACH SAID THAT IT WAS ''SELF-EVIDENT THAT THE CONSTITUTION COULD IN NO WAY BE A CONSTITUTION OF A UNITED IRELAND OR EVEN A PART OF A CONFEDERAL IRELAND. IT IS QUITE UNSUITED TO THAT IN ITS PRESENT FORM. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE RADICALLY ADAPTED.'' HE WOULD BE IN FAVOUR OF MODIFYING ARTICLES 2 AND 3 BECAUSE THEY HAD BEEN INTERPRETED - WRONGLY IN HIS VIEW - AS CONSTITUTING A CLAIM TO TERRITORY WHICH WAS OFFENSIVE TO THE MAJORITY TRADITION IN NORTHERN IRELAND. IN ADDITION TO CONDEMING THE VIOLENCE OF THE IRA, DR FITZGERALD BLAMED THEM FOR THE GROWTH, IN THE REPUBLIC OF ''A CONSCIOUS PARTITIONISM AND A DESIRE TO KEEP THE STATE WE HAVE AND NOT TO DO ANYTHING TO MAKE IT EASIER TO BRING NORT AND SOUTH TOGETHER.''

/COMMENT

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5. THE GENERAL TONE OF DR FITZGERALD'S REMARKS WAS REASONED AND HELPFUL AND THE INTERVIEW CONFIRMS REPORTS WHICH WE HAVE HAD FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TAOISEACH THAT HE WOULD BE TRYING BOTH TO CULTIVATE THE UNIONISTS AND TO BRING HOME TO SOUTHERN OPINION THE NEED TO MAKE THE REPUBLIC MORE ACCEPTABLE TO NORTHERN UNIONISTS.

6. DR FITZGERALD'S OBJECTIVES ARE UNEXCEPTIONABLE BUT I DOUBT:-

I) WHETHER THE SORT OF MEASURES HE HAS IN MIND WILL MAKE ANY SERIOUS IMPACT ON UNIONIST OPINION. SUBJECT TO THE VIEWS OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, UNIONIST OBJECTIONS TO SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF LIFE IN THE REPUBLIC (THE CONSTITUTION, DIVORCE, CONTRACEPTION ETC.) SEEM TO BE EXCUSES RATHER THAT REASONS FOR THEIR DISLIKE OF A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP.

II) WHETHER THE IRISH ELECTORATE WISHES TO CONFRONT THE NITTY GRITTY PROBLEMS WHICH UNIFICATION WOULD ENTAIL , STARTING WITH CHANGES TO THE CONSTITUTION. THERE ARE UNLIKELY TO BE MANY VOTES FOR AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION AND FIANNA FAIL MIGHT RALLY TRADITIONAL NATIONALIST OPINION AGAINST ATTEMPTS TO TAMPER WITH THE CONSTITUTION WHICH DE VALERA INSTALLED.

7. BUT THIS SCEPTICISM NEED NOT PREVENT US FROM WELCOMING THE MODERATE AND REALISTIC TONE OF DR FITZGERALD'S STATEMENT.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO WASHING TON ABND BIS N Y
FIGG

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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WAS NOT
ADVANCED

Ireland

(2)

Prime Minister

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

Thank you for your minute dated 15th September about the case which Mrs. Stewart has brought against the Ministry of Defence.

2. I am grateful to you for letting me have this information. As you say, we shall need to take stock of the situation when Crown Counsel's views are available.

3. As far as the use of baton rounds by police forces in England and Wales is concerned, I have recently issued confidential guidelines to chief officers. These authorise the use of baton rounds only in defined circumstances and in the last resort; they require use of approved (Ministry of Defence) equipment only; and they prescribe the way in which the equipment is to be used so as to minimise the risk of causing any serious injury. To date five forces have taken steps to acquire supplies of baton rounds and launchers.

4. I am sending copies of this minute to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Attorney General, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Leon Brittan

22 September, 1981

vb

Ireland

18 September 1981

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 17 September about the Criminal Injuries (Compensation) (NI) Order 1977. She is content for you to proceed as you propose.

MODBA

M.W. Hopkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

CF

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

12

My dear Philip,

Thank you for your kind letter.

And thank you so very much for everything you have done in Northern Ireland and at the Ministry of Defence. I know you have been devoted to the work and that I have always been able to rely on you completely.

It would have been wonderful for me if I could have carried on with the same junior team but I had to make some changes solely for the purpose of giving some of our younger M.P.s a chance.

I hope you will play a prominent part on the back benches. We shall have need during the coming session of the kind of leadership and experience you can provide.

Yours ever

Margaret.

My warmest thanks to you and to Val.

BI

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

September 17th 1981

The Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1.

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your kind words. It has been a privilege to be a Member of your Government.

When you next consider reshaping your administration, I hope that you will give serious thought to restoring the practice of having one Junior Minister for each of the Armed Services. I quite understand the political problems of appointing a new Minister for the Navy immediately after Keith Speed understandably felt that he had to speak out about the proposed reduction in the size of the surface fleet, but the new Ministerial structure is untidy and does not fit the sensible Service and administrative framework which now exists. There are, I believe, better ways of diminishing inter-Service rivalry.

I am particularly sorry that I was not able to establish a proper scheme for making the superb training facilities of the Armed Forces more widely available to young people. Of course there are problems. Any form of military training is expensive. The Army would prefer to spend any extra money on real recruits, while the Department of Employment wants all the money it can get for its own projects. All that is understandable, but we are now faced with the absurd position where the Armed Services have to increase the current volume of youth unemployment by slashing recruiting quotas at a time when so many of our excellent training establishments are under-used. A number of imaginative proposals have been put forward, and I understood from John Nott that you have supported them. I hope they will not be forgotten now.

Cont..

At the same time, I hope that a proper determination to stick to financial targets will not inhibit the development of sensible policies. To give just one example: the British Forces in Germany employ several thousand foreign civilians on a variety of guarding and transport tasks. Studies show that much of this work could be done more cheaply by British soldiers, but these savings aren't made because it is feared that any change involving the use of more British soldiers would push us above the upper limit set on the size of the British Army on the Rhine, and would encourage the Treasury to demand compensating cuts elsewhere. It cannot make sense to preserve German jobs while potential British recruits are turned away.

I am particularly glad that I am being succeeded by my old friend, Jerry Wiggin, who knows the Territorial Army so well. At a time when we are sensibly planning to substantially increase the strength of our Reserves, it always seemed particularly frustrating to have to impose such tight restrictions on the training time that the Territorials are allowed. Jerry Wiggin will be well placed to see that the expanded Reserve Forces get the resources they need.

During my many visits to the Armed Forces in recent months, I have found wide admiration for your courage, your determination and your evident understanding of the importance of our defences. I share that admiration.

Yours ever

Philip

Philip Goodhart

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
(1) GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Prime Minister
Content that the NIO should, subject to the outcome of inter departmental discussions, proceed as set out below? Yes No
17 September 1981
Rickett - 17/9

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

Dear Michael

In Willie Rickett's letter of 2 September he asked for advice on the Prime Minister's recent suggestion that the maximum discretionary award payable under Article 8 of the Criminal Injuries (Compensation)(NI) Order 1977, which presently stands at £5,000 for a widow and £500 for each dependant child, might be doubled. The Prime Minister felt that the dependants of soldiers killed in Northern Ireland should be treated well.

We are very much in sympathy with the view that these payments should be increased and are consulting the Treasury as a matter of urgency.

The change will require a new Order-in-Council. This means a slot in the Northern Ireland legislative programme and the usual consultation, and will necessarily take some time. However, subject to the outcome of discussions with the Treasury, we have in mind a statement to the House by the Secretary of State indicating his intention to seek Parliament's approval to an increase in the discretionary amounts which would be back-dated to claims arising from injuries incurred from the date of the announcement.

In bringing forward legislation to give effect to the change suggested by the Prime Minister we are conscious of the fact that this will open up the present Order generally for debate. We expect considerable interest in the House in some of these wider aspects. In April we had an adjournment debate on a review provision in criminal injury cases (tabled by Mr William Ross MP), and in July during an adjournment debate on the Army Mr Julian Critchley MP raised the question of index-linking discretionary awards. As you might imagine the question of periodic reviews of individual compensation awards and index-linking are fraught with complications. In the light of this we are taking steps to review the Order generally though this should not impede progress on the Prime Minister's suggestion.

/...

Finally I think you are aware that the present discretionary award provision covers not only soldiers but also police and civilians. Any increase in the awards would need to be on the same basis so as to avoid invidious comparison.

If the Prime Minister is content we will proceed on the basis outlined above.

Yours sincerely

Mike Hopkins

M W HOPKINS

BB

PS TO PM. NO 10 DOWNING STREET.

CONFIDENTIAL

GRPS 350 AMENDED DISTRIBUTION 17 SEPTEMBER 1981

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM DUBLIN 16:1630Z SEPTEMBER 1981

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 324 OF 16 SEPTEMBER 1981

AND REPEATED FOR INFO TO PRIORITY NIO(BELFAST)

MY TELNO 322: BATON ROUNDS

1. I WAS SUMMONED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TODAY TO FOLLOW UP PROFESSOR DOOGE'S CONVERSATION WITH YOU AT BROCKET HALL.

2. BURKE, THE COUNSELLOR IN THE ANGLO-IRISH SECTION, SAID THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WERE CONCERNED BY A NUMBER OF ASPECTS OF THE PRESENT USE OF BATON ROUNDS. THE RATIO OF DEATHS TO ROUNDS FIRED SEEMED TO BE MUCH GREATER FOR PLASTIC BULLETS THEN FOR RUBBER BULLETS (1:3000 FOR PLASTIC AS AGAINST 1:18000 FOR RUBBER). THERE WERE A LARGE NUMBER OF SERIOUS INJURIES, MANY OF THEM TO THE HEAD, AND THE USE OF THIS WEAPON WAS SETTING BACK THE POLICY OF RE-ESTABLISHING NORMAL POLICING AND THE PRIMACY OF THE RUC. THE IRISH REALISED THAT THERE WERE OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS ON THE USE OF BATON ROUNDS AND WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED AT THEIR USE AT SHORT RANGE AND IN NON-RIOT SITUATIONS. THEY ALSO HAD RECEIVED COMPLAINTS ABOUT INDISCRIMINATE FIRING FROM VEHICLES.

3. BURKE SAID THAT THE IRISH BELIEVED THAT THE USE OF THIS WEAPON AT PRESENT WAS BECOMING COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND THAT THEY BELIEVED WE SHOULD ASSERT A TIGHTER CONTROL OVER ITS USE. IF THE SITUATION DID NOT IMPROVE, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE IRISH TO REMAIN SILENT.

4. I UNDERTOOK TO REPORT HIS APPROACH BUT POINTED OUT THAT THE BATON ROUND WAS A VERY EFFECTIVE METHOD OF CONTROLLING RIOTERS, MANY OF WHOM WERE ARMED WITH FAR MORE UNPLEASANT WEAPONS. THE REASON THAT THERE HAD BEEN MANY DEATHS RECENTLY WAS THAT AN EXCEPTIONALLY LARGE NUMBER OF ROUNDS HAD BEEN USED IN CONTROLLING RIOTS AFTER THE HUNGER STRIKE DEATHS. THE RESULT HAD BEEN THAT STREET VIOLENCE HAD BEEN KEPT TO A MUCH LOWER LEVEL THAN WE HAD ORIGINALLY FEARED. WITHOUT WISHING TO IMPUGN THE MOTIVES OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT OR THE SDLP, WE KNEW THAT THE PROVISONALS WERE ORGANISING A CAMPAIGN AGAINST BATON ROUNDS SIMPLY BECAUSE THEIR USE MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO GET CROWDS ON TO THE STREETS. WE HAD A COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF MONITORING DEATH OR SERIOUS INJURY AND COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE IRRESPONSIBLE USE OF BATON ROUNDS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE RUC AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE INVESTIGATED.

5. ALTHOUGH THE PROVISIONALS MAY HAVE LAUNCHED THIS CAMPAIGN, THERE IS GENUINE CONCERN AMONG PEOPLE HERE ABOUT THE IRRESPONSIBLE USE OF BATON ROUNDS THIS WAS PARTLY FUELLED BY RECENT NEWSPAPER ARTICLES AND IS LIKELY TO INCREASE AFTER THE FORTHCOMING IRISH TV PROGRAMME (MY TELNO 322). I SHOULD LIKE TO GIVE THE IRISH A CONSIDERED REPLY WITH DETAILS OF THE USAGE OF BATON ROUNDS OVER THE PAST 6 MONTHS, THE TEXT OF THE RULES ON THEIR USE AND DETAILS OF ENQUIRIES UNDERTAKEN IN RESPONSE TO COMPLAINTS. IF DEATHS AND INJURIES CAN BE SHOWN TO BE RELATED TO RIOTS, AND IF THE SCALE OF STREET VIOLENCE IS NOW ON THE DECLINE, IT MAYBE THAT THIS FOCUS OF PROTEST WILL BE OVERTAKEN. BUT WE CAN SPEAK FULLY AND FRANKLY TO THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, AND I BELIEVE WE SHOULD DO SO.

TATHAM

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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NORTHERN IRELAND

Prime Minister

To note.

MO 19/3/12

cc Mr Taylor

HOME SECRETARY

TL
17/5

You should be aware of a legal case involving the Ministry of Defence which could fuel the controversy over the use of baton rounds for riot control.

2. Mrs Kathleen Stewart is claiming damages against the Ministry of Defence over the death of her 14-year old son in Belfast in October 1976 when he was struck on the head by a baton round fired by a soldier in a patrol which was being stoned. She lost her case in the County Court in 1979. The Court accepted the evidence of the soldiers that there was a serious riot taking place and that the force used in the circumstances was reasonable. Mrs Stewart appealed to the High Court in Belfast and the proceedings were due to begin on 10th September. In the event one of the plaintiff's witnesses failed to appear and her legal adviser sought and obtained an adjournment. Crown Counsel did not object and the appeal stands adjourned until both sides agree on a further listing.

3. Crown Counsel is of the opinion that there is a danger that when the appeal is heard it could result in a judgement in favour of the plaintiff which would be in such terms as to call in question the use of baton rounds in a riot. A complicating factor is that Mrs Stewart is pursuing her case by means of a civil bill which rules out the possibility of an appeal to the House of Lords by the losing party. A judgement against the Ministry of Defence would therefore be binding on the lower courts and would also

strongly influence the attitude of High Court judges, at least until we were successful in a similar type of case. Crown Counsel is now putting his views in writing and when these are available we shall clearly need to take stock of the situation. An out of court settlement would enable us to avoid the danger of wider repercussions provided there was no admission of liability; but there are indications that, mainly perhaps for propaganda reasons, Mrs Stewart would insist on a statement conceding that her son was an innocent party and this would be unacceptable to us.

4. At this stage we cannot be certain what the wider implications of an adverse judgement might be so far as the use of baton rounds is concerned. Much will clearly depend on the way in which the case for the plaintiff is conducted and on the attitude of the appeal judge; and I would certainly hope that even in these circumstances we would not be debarred from using the baton round in Northern Ireland. On the other hand, it is a reasonable assumption that if there is a hearing those who are campaigning against this method of riot control would seek to make as much capital as possible out of this case.

5. I must say that all this reinforces my personal concern about the possible use of baton rounds by police forces in Great Britain.

6. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the Attorney General and Sir Robert Armstrong.

FN.

Ministry of Defence

15th September 1981

OA

E.R.

NIOM(81) 5th MEETING

NOTE OF A MEETING HELD IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE ON FRIDAY 11 SEPTEMBER 1981.

Mr Marshall (Chairman))	
Mr Blelloch)	
Mr Corbett)	
Mr Harrington)	
Mr Burrows)	NIO
Mr Fisher)	
Mr Hall)	
Mr Bates)	
Mr Stephens)	
Mr Miller)	
Mr Jackson)	
Lt Col Bateman)	MOD
Major Langton)	
Major Pheysey)	
Mr Facer	Cabinet Office
Mr Heaton	Home Office

Security

1. Mr Blelloch said that, despite the hunger strikers' deaths and the marching season, public disorder in recent weeks had been at a low level compared with the period following Sands' death. The RUC had taken the leading role in containing it. Terrorism, chiefly in the form of attacks on members of the security forces, but also including a few car bombs, continued at a higher level than in the latter part of 1980. Terrorist groups probably had the capacity to continue activity at this level into the winter. Despite suggestions that Loyalist retaliation was in the offing, no evidence had emerged. There had been no suggestion that the current level of security forces was inadequate; and Mr Miller confirmed that the reduction in the number of Brigade HQs was going ahead as planned.

Hunger Strike

2. Mr Blelloch reminded the meeting that four hunger strikers had been taken off their protest during August by the intervention of their families (- in one case the intervention may have been prompted by the striker himself); and that INLA had said that it was scaling down its involvement. The next striker (McCloskey),

E.R.

an INLA member, was also expected to be taken off. This was obviously a very important development as it made it easier for other families to take the same step. However, it was too early to say that the strike was crumbling; in particular, it was important to see whether ex-hunger strikers would resume the strike when they returned to the wings. It was noteworthy that recently selected strikers had tended to come from West Belfast, where pressure could more easily be put on their families; and one striker's parents were dead. In answer to questions from Mr Stephens, Mr Blelloch said that a concession on clothes was most unlikely to end the strike and, unless it did, the help it would give to our overseas image would be very short-lived - past changes in regime had been quickly forgotten by critics. The best policy for the present was to do and say nothing. As to attitudes inside the Maze, Mr Blelloch said that some prisoners were questioning whether the strike was likely to succeed, but there was strong sense of loyalty to those who had died and no shortage of volunteers. The Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross would be available in 2-3 weeks. This might offer an opportunity to bring an end to the strike, depending on its contents.

Political

3. Mr Marshall reminded the meeting that the Secretary of State had announced the intention of setting up an Advisory Council, and had had preliminary contacts with all the party leaders. The Council would have no executive functions, and was a second-best solution but would provide a forum for local politicians. The proposals had met with little enthusiasm; neither of the Unionist Parties had much of a liking for it and the SDLP had rejected it publicly; it was questionable whether a Council with no SDLP support would be desirable. The timetable had originally envisaged a White Paper soon after the Queen's Speech, but this might slip back.

E.R

Joint Studies

4. Mr Marshall reported that work had been continuing at official level. All the papers but one had been agreed with the Irish and they would go before the Steering Committee of Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr Nally in mid October before a Prime Ministerial meeting, probably in early November. There was great advantage in a further round of studies being agreed; in view of the criticisms of the Government, particularly from overseas, it was most helpful to be seen to stand together with the Irish government, and conduct normal relations with them. On cross-border cooperation, Mr Marshall reported that there had been no sign of any weakening in the Garda's commitment.

Baton Rounds

5. Mr Miller asked whether any action was intended following Porton Down's research into the system used by the RUC. Mr Blelloch explained that the RUC would await the outcome of further tests at Porton, and any comments by the Medical Committee. Although the RUC's system appeared to have some undesirable charactersistics, it was not clear that the differences between it and the Army's system were likely to be significant in practice. More important considerations, arguably, were whether the rules of engagement were satisfactory, whether they were obeyed and whether breaches were adequately followed up. Mr Marshall warned that PIRA might well try to use baton rounds as the basis for an anti-RUC propaganda campaign similar to that against interrogation.

Miscellaneous

6. Mr Corbett said that the BBC had approached Number 10 and the NIO inviting participation in a forthcoming edition of 'Panorama'. It had become clear that the Republican participants would be from the extreme and that the moderate voices would not be heard. The invitations had been declined.

Ireland BK

CF

CNTO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 September 1981

Thank you for your letter of 28 August.

I am naturally concerned not only about the recent bomb attacks you mention but also at the continued attacks on members of the security forces. However I do not accept your view that the Government's policies and the efforts of the security forces to implement them are ineffective. There are no short cuts, and no substitutes for diligence, persistence, calmness and courage. The members of the RUC and the Army have these qualities. Humphrey Atkins and I believe that the Chief Constable and the GOC are deploying their men and their resources in a sensible, intelligent and productive way. We are ready, as I have frequently said, to give them extra help if they need it. Recruitment to the RUC is encouragingly high and the establishment ceiling of the force has not yet been reached. I can quite understand however that the Chief Constable must feel frustrated when his men are diverted from pursuing terrorists by other duties, such as maintaining public order in circumstances where it is being disturbed unnecessarily.

It is important to take a balanced view of the security scene. There have indeed been the terrorist attacks you mention; but the terrorist effort has been hurt too. You will have noticed the arrest by the police of three terrorists in a car in possession of two armalite rifles, following a shooting attack against an

/ Army foot patrol

Army foot patrol in Andersonstown on 20 August. Among a number of good finds was the recovery from a flat in the Shantallow Estate in Londonderry of 500 kilogrammes of explosives on 16 August.

The police and Army rely on the help of ordinary citizens in all parts of Northern Ireland if they are to prevent violent attacks and arrest those who have committed them. There are still opportunities for local people to serve more actively by joining the UDR or the RUC Reserve. I cannot insist too strongly that the energy and willingness which you describe must be channelled into direct help for the police and the Army, whether by part-time service or other means. The creation of another force would be in stark conflict with that principle. For any group to arrogate to themselves the proper tasks of the security forces would be unhelpful, improper and (depending on the circumstances) possibly illegal.

The welfare and safety of the people of Northern Ireland are the responsibility of the Government of the country of which it is a part. We are providing the RUC and the Army with the best means possible to carry out their duties. What the authorities need now is positive support in their efforts to fulfil that responsibility.

(SGD) MARGARET THATCHER

The Reverend Ian Paisley, M.P.

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

CF?

RESTRICTED

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Original ltr still in box?

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

Type for PM's signature.

7 September 1981

R8/9 PLSAT

Dear Michael

You wrote to Stephen Boys Smith on 1 September enclosing a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister had received from Dr Paisley.

In this letter Dr Paisley returns to a theme which he has frequently voiced, early this year in particular. He claims that the Government's security policy is ineffective and that the recruitment of a "Third Force" of local people is necessary to help the security forces and terrorism. When he met the Prime Minister on 25 June Dr Paisley criticised the Government for restricting and hampering the activities of the police and the UDR. The Prime Minister will recall his series of "Carson Trail" demonstrations earlier this year which began with a massed gathering of several hundred men at night on a hillside in Co Antrim. Dr Paisley is seeking now to capitalise on increased tension among Protestants(and indeed Catholics) built up by the hunger strikes and exacerbated by the election of Mr Owen Carron in the Fermanagh and South Tyrone by-election. He has already released the text of his letter to the Prime Minister to the Press in Northern Ireland and the Republic. He will undoubtedly make what use he can of the Prime Minister's reply.

The RUC consider that Dr Paisley's assertion that the Chief Constable has said that he is short of manpower is a piqued reaction to a statement issued by the Chief Constable in the wake of a series of bomb attacks in Northern Ireland towns on 5 August. These attacks coincided with a Loyalist parade in Cookstown - a town with a history of sectarian tension - which seemed to have been deliberately staged to coincide with Republican anti-H Block demonstrations. Large numbers of extra policemen were needed in Cookstown to ensure that the evening passed off quietly. The Chief Constable pointed out that dealing with public events of this nature was a drain on resources which might better be directed to countering terrorist activity.

... I enclose a draft letter which the Prime Minister may care to send to Dr Paisley. It defends the Government's security policy and warns about the danger of encouraging civilians independently to take on the security forces' proper tasks.

Yours sincerely
Mike Hopkins

M W HOPKINS

RESTRICTED

BB

DRAFT LETTER

FILE NUMBER

ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE

To	Enclosures	Copies to be sent to
Dr Ian Paisley MP House of Commons LONDON SW1A OAA		
(Full Postal Address)		(Full Address, if Necessary)

LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY THE PRIME MINISTER
(Name of Signatory)

Thank you for your letter of 28 August.

I am naturally concerned not only about the recent bomb attacks you mention but also at the continued attacks on members of the security forces. However I do not accept your view that the Government's policies and the efforts of the security forces to implement them are ineffective. There are no short cuts, and no substitutes for diligence, persistence, calmness and courage. ~~I am quite confident that~~ The members of the RUC and the Army have these qualities. Humphrey Atkins and I believe that the Chief Constable and the GOC are deploying their men and their resources in a sensible, intelligent and productive way. We are ready, as I have frequently said, to give them extra help if they need it. Recruitment to the RUC is encouragingly high and the establishment ceiling of the force has not yet been reached. I can quite understand however that the Chief Constable must feel frustrated when his men are diverted from pursuing terrorists by other duties, such as maintaining public order in circumstances where it is being disturbed unnecessarily.

/...

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It is important ~~at any time~~ to take a balanced view of the security scene. There have indeed been the terrorist attacks you mention; but the terrorist effort has been hurt ~~and hampered~~ too. You will have noticed the ~~red-handed~~ arrest by the police of three terrorists in a car in possession of two armalite rifles, following a shooting attack against an Army foot patrol in Andersonstown on 20 August. Among a number of good finds was the ~~important~~ recovery from a flat in the Shantallow Estate in Londonderry of 500 kilogrammes of explosives on 16 August.

The police and Army rely on the help of ordinary citizens in all parts of Northern Ireland if they are to prevent violent attacks and arrest those who have committed them. There are still opportunities for local people to serve more actively by joining the UDR or the RUC Reserve. I cannot insist too strongly that the energy and willingness which you describe must be channelled into direct help for the police and the Army, whether by part-time service or other means. The creation of another force would be in stark conflict with that principle. ~~And~~ For ~~anybody~~ any group to arrogate to themselves the proper tasks of the security forces would be unhelpful, improper and (depending on the circumstances) possibly illegal.

The welfare and safety of the people of Northern Ireland are the responsibility of the Government of the country of which it is a part. We are providing the RUC and the Army with the best means possible to ~~protect them~~ carry out their duties. What the authorities need now is ~~the~~ positive support ~~of everyone~~ in their efforts to fulfil that responsibility.

It is important at any time to take a balanced view of the security scene. There have indeed been the terrorist attacks you mention; but the terrorist effort has been hurt and hampered too. You will have noticed the weekend arrest by the police of three terrorists in a car in possession of two grenades and a gun, following a shooting attack against an Army foot patrol in Newcastle on 20 August. Among a number of good finds was the important recovery from a flat in the Shankhill Estate in Londonderry of 300 kilogrammes of explosives on 4 August.

The police and Army rely on the help of ordinary citizens in all parts of Northern Ireland if they are to prevent violent attacks and arrest those who have committed them. There are still opportunities for local people to serve more actively by joining the UDR or the RUC Reserve. I cannot insist too strongly that the energy and willingness which you describe must be channelled into direct help for the police and the Army, whether by part-time service or other means. The creation of another force would be in stark conflict with that principle. And for anybody to arrogate to themselves the proper tasks of the security forces would be unhelpful, improper and (depending on the circumstances) possibly illegal.

The welfare and safety of the people of Northern Ireland are the responsibility of the Government of the country which it is a part. We are providing the RUC and the Army with the best means possible to protect them. What the authorities need is the positive support of everyone in their efforts to fulfil that responsibility.

File Ireland

CCS H.O.
CDLO
Press Office

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

3 September 1981

Dear Mike,

You sent Mike Pattison a copy of your letter of 2 September 1981 to David Heyhoe about the statement Mr Alison proposes to issue on Friday of this week about the report of the inquiry into the escape of eight remand prisoners from HM Prison, Belfast in June.

The Prime Minister is content for Mr Alison to put out the statement attached to your letter, although she has commented that it is a devastating report.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Halliday (Home Office) and David Heyhoe (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office).

Yours ever,

Clive Whitmore.

M W Hopkins Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

David Heyhoe Esq
PS/Rt Hon Francis Pym MP
Chancellor of the Duchy of
Lancaster and Paymaster General
Cabinet Office
Whitehall
LONDON SW1

Prime Minister
Content that Mr Atkins should make the attached statement?

Agreed - but it is a devastating report.
MT

2 September 1981

Dear David

On 11 June 1981 my Secretary of State made a statement in the House announcing the establishment of an urgent inquiry into the escape of eight remand prisoners from HMP Belfast. This enquiry has now been conducted by HM Chief Inspector of Prisons.

Although public interest in the Report of the inquiry will be centred in the Province, it is likely to attract a certain amount of national interest. We have decided not to publish the full Report of the enquiry (since detailed security issues are dealt with) but we are clearly obliged to make some form of public announcement: there would seem to be advantage in our making a short statement now rather than in delaying until Parliament returns. In the Secretary of State's absence Mr Alison therefore proposes to issue the attached statement, referring to the main findings of the Report, on Friday 4 September. I shall assume that you and other recipients of this letter are content unless I hear from you to the contrary by midday on Friday.

I am copying this letter to Mike Pattison (No 10) and John Halliday (Home Office).

Yours sincerely
Mike Hopkins

M W HOPKINS

E.R.

STATEMENT BY MR ALISON, MINISTER OF STATE,
NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

REPORT ON THE ESCAPE FROM HM PRISON, BELFAST - 10 JUNE 1981

On 11 June 1981, the Secretary of State asked Mr William H Pearce CBE, HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, to conduct an inquiry into those aspects of the security arrangements at HM Prison, Belfast, relevant to the escape of 8 prisoners on 10 June. Mr Pearce's report has now been received.

Because of the detailed references to security measures at Belfast Prison in the report it is not proposed to publish it.

The main conclusion of Mr Pearce's report was that the escape resulted both from failure of the security system and from human error. He specifically referred to the lack of adequate and precise written guidance and instructions on security matters at all levels both within the prison, from the Governor to officers, and outside, from the Northern Ireland Office to prison staff, as well as insufficiently rigorous application of the existing security procedures by staff in the prison. Mr Pearce has made a number of recommendations to rectify these deficiencies.

On the most serious issue which was the acquisition of firearms by prisoners, the inquiry did not establish with certainty the route the weapons took but recommendations intended substantially to improve the security precautions against the introduction of firearms, including more rigorous searching procedures for professional visitors, have been made.

The report also concluded that while there was a collective failure by staff of all grades to apply existing security procedures with the fullest rigour, neither the Governor nor any other individual member of staff at Belfast Prison was held to be particularly at fault. Accordingly no disciplinary action will be taken against any individual member of staff in connection with the escape itself. Indeed, the report commended the courage of unarmed members of staff who by their individual actions during the escape reflected great credit upon the Prison Service as a whole.

E.R.

The report and its recommendations are now being given close and urgent study and a number of the recommendations are being, or have been, implemented already.

1-12

Ireland

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 September 1981

Dear Mike

Thank you for your letter of 24 August about the compensation paid to the widows of the soldiers killed at Warren Point in 1979, and to former* ~~~ * who was injured at Newry in 1977. I have shown this to the Prime Minister.

She has commented that the Government should consider revising the maximum discretionary payments that can be made under the Criminal Injuries (Compensation)(Northern Ireland) Order 1977. She feels that the dependents of soldiers killed in Northern Ireland should be treated well, and has suggested that the maximum discretionary payments might well be doubled. I should be grateful for your advice on the Prime Minister's suggestions in due course.

BF

Yours ever
Clive Rickett

Mike Hopkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

— Passage deleted and ~~and~~ closed, 40 years, under FOI Exemption.
CWayland
2 October 2012

file

ds

1 September 1981

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Dr. Ian Paisley M.P. I should be grateful if you could let me have the text of a draft reply which the Prime Minister might send to Dr. Paisley. It would be helpful if your draft could reach me by Tuesday 8 September.

MODBA

Stephen Boys Smith, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

ds

1 September 1981

I am writing on the Prime Minister's behalf to acknowledge receipt of your letter to her of 28 August. Your letter is receiving urgent attention and you will receive a substantive reply as soon as possible.

MODBA

The Reverend Ian Paisley, M.P.

PRIME MINISTER

You asked for a note on the articles in The Guardian about compensation to the widows of the soldiers killed at Warrenpoint in 1979, and to former * ~ * who was injured at Newry in 1977. A note from the Northern Ireland Office is attached. It is a rather complicated story.

Briefly, the compensation paid by the NIO is based on the loss of the injured or deceased persons past and potential future earnings. If these earnings exceed the additional benefits available from social security payments, gratuities, pensions, etc., then the victim or his dependants are paid a lump sum. If the earnings do not exceed the additional benefits, then the NIO can only make discretionary payments: these are subject to a maximum of £5,000 for the widow of the victim and £500 for each child, and the maximum is almost always paid.

In both cases there is provision for interim payments to be made while the final settlement is being worked out.

In the case of * ~ * the NIO explain at A that it may well be in the claimant's interest not to reach a final settlement until some considerable time after he has suffered his injuries. This is because it may take some time for the claimant's medical condition to stabilise, and for the extent of his injuries to be fully established. * ~ * has already had interim payments totalling £12,000. His solicitor and counsel appear to agree with the NIO that the action they have taken is in * ~ * interests.

On the widows, the NIO admit that they have not handled the issue with all the tact that they might have. The problem concerns the six widows whose husbands' potential earnings are unlikely to exceed the additional benefits to which they have become entitled. The NIO told the widows' solicitor that

* ~ * Passages deleted and closed, 40 years, under FOI Exemption. CWayland, 2 October 2012

/ this was

this was the position in August 1980, and in July this year decided to make them an interim payment up to the amount of their maximum discretionary award. The terms of the letter conveying this offer were somewhat bureaucratic, and this may have annoyed the widows. However, the NIO feel fairly strongly that a large portion of the blame for the length of time it has taken to handle this case rests with the widows' solicitor. The solicitor himself has taken exception to hints to this effect in The Guardian article, and is now sueing both the NIO and The Guardian for damages.

WJN

We should consider raising the maximum discretionary payments to a considerably higher figure - even double. We really must treat soldiers' families well.

1 September 1981

MT

2

Prime Minister
I have asked for advice
Mr. Robson.
MT. 1/9

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SWIA OAA

28th August, 1981.

1/9

Dear Prime Minister,

The Protestants of Ulster are exceedingly alarmed at this new wave of IRA terrorism with the heart of Belfast again being attacked and also the heart of provincial towns.

The escalation of killings and attacks on members of the Security Forces and the admission by the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary of his lack of manpower all highlight the fact that security policies pursued since the beginning of this present IRA campaign are not going to win this war.

There is a need now for the recruitment of a Third Force to give local back-up support to the RUC, RUCR, UDR and the Army in order that the campaign of genocide against Protestants, especially in the border counties, can be effectually stopped.

I would make a plea to you on behalf of these families that action along this line be taken immediately. I can assure you that vast numbers of men are now ready and able to come forward to take on this vital task.

If your government is going to continue to pursue security policies that have so evidently failed then the people themselves will have no other option but to proceed, as indeed is not only their right but their duty, to put themselves into a state of self defence.

The election of Owen Carron highlights the gravity of the situation and puts the spotlight on the Protestants in Fermanagh and South Tyrone and targets them, for what the Security Forces are well aware of, a baptism of blood.

Having the largest electoral mandate from across the whole of Northern Ireland I am not prepared to sit idly by, as I told you at our last meeting, and see my people destroyed.

Sincerely

Ian Paisley

The Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
The Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London.

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

William Rickett Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

24 August 1981

Dear Wollie

You asked for a note on the articles in last Friday's Guardian about compensation to the widows of the soldiers killed at Warrenpoint on 27 August 1979 and, in a separate case, to former * * (not named by The Guardian) who was injured at Newry on 13 September 1977.

Under the Criminal Injuries (Compensation)(Northern Ireland) Order 1977 compensation is payable to anyone injured as a result of violence in Northern Ireland, and to the dependants of anyone killed as a result of that violence. For injuries, compensation is based on the loss of the injured person's past and potential future earnings - taking account of potential promotion,for example - together with an element for the pain and suffering experienced. These earnings are then netted against the additional benefits which become payable and the result is converted into a lump sum.

For fatal injuries, the compensation payable to dependants is, again, based on the deceased's past and potential future earnings, but the compensation in this case also takes account of the degree of financial "dependency" that is established. For a widow, this means working out what her late husband's net earnings were and might have become, and assessing what proportion (80 per cent is a typical result) would have been devoted to the surviving dependants. Against the net earnings are then set the additional benefits to which she becomes entitled by way of social security payments and gratuities, pensions etc from her late husband's employer. If the net earnings exceed the additional benefits received then the difference is converted to a lump sum: and if the difference is substantial then it is usual to make interim payments while the final settlement is being arrived at.

A

In the case of injuries, the position of dependency does not arise: we work out the position of the injured person. One other possible point of difference: because any final settlement reached cannot be re-opened, it may well be in the claimant's interests not to reach that position until some considerable time after the injury was suffered, simply to ensure that the medical condition has stabilised, the extent and the effects of the injuries can be fully established, and the prospect can be fully assessed. (This can be a source of distress of which we are well aware: the injured person's tendency is to want to have his claim settled as quickly as possible, so that it will for him at least cease to be a matter of uncertainty. It is not

always easy for officials to put this over and we have to rely a good deal on the tact and persuasive powers of the claimant's family, friends, and professional advisers. In the meantime, of course, interim payments can be, and regularly are, made).

For widows of service non-commissioned officers and other ranks who have children, the position is that the net extra benefits received may exceed their late husbands' net earnings calculated as I have described. If so, then only the discretionary payments provided for under the 1977 Order are available: this is a maximum of £5000 for the widow and £500 for each child, and the maximum is in practice almost invariably paid. In such circumstances it is usually possible to agree final payments without the need to offer interim payments (as happens more often in injury cases).

This is the background. The thrust of the criticisms in The Guardian article is that:

a. the claims in both cases have taken too long to settle and the delay is the consequence of "official bungling" particularly by the NIO; and

b. the compensation offered was inadequate and the manner of the offer was complicated and insensitive.

We agree with The Guardian on why the widows' claims have taken longer than they should: we do not agree with a great deal else. So far as 'a' is concerned the NIO had by early 1980 obtained sufficient information to be able to conclude, necessarily provisionally, that the discretionary payments only were likely to be payable to six of the widows. The office at this stage told the solicitor acting on their behalf of the position as we saw it and after discussions with him had by August 1980 made available, in writing, the relevant calculations and the information to back them, to ensure that the widows' interests were being safeguarded. The matter has since then effectively been in the solicitor's hands though we have made it clear that we want to see the claims properly and fairly settled and have given all the necessary help and information we can.

As to 'b', the six are all widows of NCOs or private soldiers and all have one or two children. As I have explained, in these circumstances compensation under the 1977 Order may be limited to the discretionary awards. Because of the time that had passed, the office did decide in July to make an interim award to each of the six up to the amount of their maximum discretionary award. It conveyed this formally to the solicitor in the terms normally used for interim payments and these do contain safeguards covering the possibility of refunding (which can arise even with discretionary awards). If this has served to confuse or upset the widows, that is something we very much regret: we were already checking at the time to see if the risk of this happening again could be avoided.

There is not a lot to add on * ~~~~~~ * It is quite true that his claim has not yet been finally settled and that he has in

~ Passages deleted and closed, 40 years, under FOI Exemption.

CAWayland, 2 October 2012

the meantime had three interim payments totalling £12,000. I have explained why this may be thought to be in his interests. To the best of our knowledge this is the view taken at the moment by both the solicitor and counsel acting on his behalf.

Yours sincerely

Mike Hopkins

M W HOPKINS

Ambush widows still wait for payments

By David Pallister

A MUCH-HERALDED compensation deal for the widows of soldiers killed in Northern Ireland has proved — after nearly four years — to be fraught with delays, misunderstandings and official blunders.

Two years after 18 soldiers were blown up by the Provisional IRA at Warrenpoint on August 27, only one of the nine widows has had her full claim settled. She is the wife of Lieutenant Colonel David Blair, commanding officer of the Queen's Own Highlanders, who has received a substantial sum, according to the Northern Ireland Office.

The other eight women, whose husbands in the Parachute Regiment ranked from private to major, have been offered an "interim" payment of £5,000. Six received this only within the last few days, one has declined the offer and another has not yet decided whether to accept.

Guardian Extra, page 5; Sterility and death in the Maze, page 15

Their final claims, which are being handled by Carrickfergus solicitor, Mr Terence Shiels, are unlikely to be finished before the end of October.

The delay is causing concern not only to the widows, but also to senior Army officers and Ministry of Defence officials. Colonel Jim Burke of the Parachute Regiment, who has been closely involved with the negotiations, said: "I can't say I am happy with the progress. I would have wished it had been tied up sooner, but I don't want to go into the details."

Two years ago the Army set up a new legal services unit to handle cases where there was unlikely to be any dispute, rather than farm them all out to solicitors. The move was too late for the Warrenpoint widows but a Ministry spokesman said that theirs were the sort of cases which the unit could deal with.

The Ministry said that the establishment of the unit was no reflection on the way compensation cases had been handled previously.

The reasons for the delays begin with the convoluted phrasing of the Criminal Injuries (Compensation) (Northern Ireland) Order 1977. This was introduced by the former Labour Secretary for Northern Ireland, Mr Merlyn Rees, after a series of embarrassing newspaper reports about some widows getting no compensation while known terrorists were getting high awards.

Under previous legislation, the Criminal Injuries to Persons (Compensation) Act (Northern Ireland), 1968 a widow received the difference, if any, between her husband's likely earnings over the next 15 years and the income she received from the Army, gratuities, pension and child allowances and the DHSS war widows' pension. In many cases, particularly for the lower ranks, widows turned out to be better off and ineligible for compensation.

The new order gave the Secretary of State discretion to pay each widow £5,000, plus £500 per child up to a total of £7,000. The Northern Ireland Office which deals with the claims through its Criminal Injuries Division says that in practice all

Turn to back page, col 1

Mrs Karen England, whose soldier husband was killed at Warrenpoint, with daughter Caroline, aged 3



Doctors were trying to save the life of IRA hunger striker Patrick McGeown (pictured above) last night after his family agreed to medical intervention to halt his rapid deterioration. He was in the 42nd day of his fast at the Maze prison when he was taken to hospital. Earlier, the hunger strike claimed its tenth victim, Mickey Devine.

Report, back page

Warrenpoint widows still waiting for compensation

Continued from page 1

widows receive this full discretionary minimum amount.

This, on the face of it, appears to involve a fairly straightforward set of calculations. But over the Warrenpoint widows, matters took a more complicated course.

The Northern Ireland Office in Belfast said that the women were offered the £5,000 last summer but they rejected it in the belief that it was a full, final offer. Three of the women interviewed said that they all discussed it among themselves on the telephone and decided the amount was inadequate. One described it as "insulting."

Mrs Karen England, aged 24, who lost her husband, Robert, said: "We were given no explanation about the 1977 scheme. If we had been told at the time that it was an interim payment we would have accepted it."

Mrs Carol Giles, whose husband, Corporal John Giles, was one of the 16 Paras killed, said: "Nothing was really explained to us. The solicitor came over last July or August and he said we might lose it if we fought."

In July this year, pressure from the Ministry of Defence obliged the Northern Ireland Office to renew the offer, this time described as an interim payment in view of the lapse of time. But the women were also asked to sign an undertaking that "should the final settlement be less than the total of any amount now advanced or to be advanced subsequently, she will refund the amount overpaid to the Secretary of State."

The Northern Ireland Office now agree that the undertaking was an insensitive mistake and should not have been called for.

The new "interim" offer clearly held out the promise of more to come. In a letter to Mrs England on July 9 Mr Shiels wrote: "We are confident that we shall be able to establish a substantial figure of dependancy and obtain appropriate compensation."

At the same time Mr Shiels told her that he had employed a London firm of specialist accountants, Binder Hamlyn, to carry out a full assessment on her claim — nearly two years after the Warrenpoint explosions. The fees were to be paid by the Airborne Forces Benevolent Fund — an arrangement which was made with the help of the Parachute Regument's Colonel Burke.

Six of the women agreed to accept the offer four weeks ago. But, on the basis of earlier cases and an examination of one of the women's cases, the optimism about getting much more than the offer appears to be exaggerated.

Carol Giles, who lives in Stockton-on-Tees, has two children, so she will get £6,000. As a corporal, her husband's income would have been £6,428. Her two pensions with their child allowances comes to £6,782. In addition, she received a gratuity of £6,464 from the Army, a further lump sum of £1,616, and a short pension for the first three months — the equivalent of her husband's wages.

Taken over a period of 15 years, it is probable that her husband would have risen higher up the ranks, but even this addition to the equation would not substantially increase her entitlement to compensation.

Mr Julian Critchley, the Conservative MP for Aldershot, who has taken up the women's cases, would like to see the £5,000 index-linked. He is also pursuing the case of an injured Royal Military policeman, whose story appears on page five.

This policeman, a sergeant, is also represented by Mr Shiels. He has now been waiting four years for a final claim to be presented for serious burns that devastated his life. He has suffered a nervous breakdown, partly, he says because of his anxiety over his claim, and is now umemployed.

Tentative estimates put his final compensation anywhere between £35,000 and £60,000. So far he has received £12,000, largely to cover his expenses in pursuing the claim and the cost of moving his house to be near the military hospital in Aldershot.

Agreement

PART 9 ends:-

Interview with Owen Carron MP

PART 10 begins:-

NIO to WR + encls

24 Aug

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

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