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PREM 19/8/16

Situation in Northern Ireland

IRELAND

Force levels

PT1: May 1979

PART 12

PT12: July 1982

PREM 19/816

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
23.7.82							
2.8.82							
5.8.82							
29.7.82							
4.8.82							
25.8.82							
26.8.82							
27.8.82							
1.9.82							
8.9.82							
16.9.82							
24.9.82							
1.10.82							
4.10.82							
5.10.82							
21.10.82							
25.10.82							
28.10.82							
6.11.82							
12.11.82							
ends-							

PART 12 ends:-

Wash Tel 3676 12-11-82

PART 13 begins:-

1. Gow to FERB |

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
E(82) 62	31.8.82
E(82) 63	1.9.82
E(82) 20th Meeting, Minutes	8.9.82
CC(82) 45th Conclusions, Min.2 (extract)	28.10.82

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES**

Signed Wayland

Date 2 October 2012

PREM Records Team

Ireland

PS (6)

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR GOODISON

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HD/RID

HD/PUSD (2)

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RESIDENT CLERK

PS/S of S Rm 66 A/2 GOGGS

MR WOODFIELD)

MR BRENNAN)

MR ANGEL)

MR BOYS SMITH)

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SIR R ARMSTRONG)

DIO)

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PS/No 10 DOWNING STREET (2)

IMMEDIATE

CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 122308Z NOV 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3676 OF 12 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST NIO LONDON BIS NEW YORK

PRIORITY CG NEW YORK

INFO SAVING ALL CG'S USA

NORTHERN IRELAND: VISIT OF SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVE TO THE USA

1. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED FROM SAN FRANCISCO THAT A MEMBER OF THE SINN FEIN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, MARTHA MCCLELLAND, IS IN THE UNITED STATES ON A SPEAKING TOUR ORGANISED BY NORAIID. SHE IS TO ADDRESS A NORAIID MEETING IN SAN FRANCISCO TOMORROW (13 NOVEMBER). WE HAVE ALSO HEARD THAT SHE IS TO ADDRESS THE DALLAS PRESS CLUB ON 24 NOVEMBER.

2. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION PUT OUT BY NORAIID, MCCLELLAND IS A RESIDENT OF LONDONDERRY, AND A MEMBER OF THE PSF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. SHE IS SAID TO BE A NATIVE OF CALIFORNIA AND, AS SUCH, WOULD NOT REQUIRE A VISA TO ENTER THE UNITED STATES.

3. WE HAVE ASKED THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO CHECK URGENTLY THAT MCCLELLAND IS INDEED A US CITIZEN AND THAT SHE IS NOT THEREFORE HERE ILLEGALLY. WHILE WE CANNOT DO ANYTHING ABOUT THE SAN FRANCISCO MEETING (WHICH IS A NORAIID AFFAIR), WE SHALL DO WHAT WE CAN TO DISSUADE THE DALLAS PRESS CLUB FROM GIVING HER A PLATFORM. WE SHOULD THEREFORE BE GRATEFUL FOR INFORMATION ABOUT MCCLELLAND WHO WE UNDERSTAND, IS A FORMER INMATE OF ARMAGH PRISON.

WRIGHT

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LIFE-LONG FOUNDED ONE OF HIS MEMBERS.
IN HIS OWN MIND
HE WOULD BE A FELLOW OF HIS OWN
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SIR J BULLARD

MR GOODISON

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RESIDENT CLERK (see footnote)

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MR WOODFIELD)

MR BRENNAN)

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SIR R ARMSTRONG)

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CABINET OFFICE

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FM WASHINGTON 130035Z NOV 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3677 OF 12 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST NIO LONDON

INFO IMMEDIATE BIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING DUBLIN ALL C G 'S IN THE USA

NORTHERN IRELAND: VISIT OF MR PRIOR.

1. LAST WEEK'S GUN-RUNNING TRIAL IN NEW YORK (MY TELNO 3614) PROVIDED PUBLIC CONFIRMATION FROM THE MOUTHS OF THE ACCUSED THAT THE U S A HAS BEEN USED FOR GUN-RUNNING FOR THE I R A FOR AT LEAST THE LAST 25 YEARS. HARRISON ADMITTED THAT HE HAD BEEN GUN-RUNNING TO THE I R A FOR A QUARTER OF A CENTURY WHILE FLANNERY (A FOUNDER AND DIRECTOR OF N O R A I D) TESTIFIED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED MONEY BOTH FOR N O R A I D AND FOR THE I R A.

2. THE CASE HAS SO FAR ATTRACTED RELATIVELY LITTLE PUBLICITY HERE. MR PRIOR'S VISIT WILL PROVIDE A USEFUL OPPORTUNITY, E G IN INTERVIEWS AND AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE, TO DRAW ATTENTION TO SOME OF THE FACTS THAT EMERGED IN THE CASE AND TO THE OTHER INDICTMENTS AND FORTH COMING TRIALS INVOLVING GUN-RUNNING OFFENCES. THE AIM MIGHT BE TWO-FOLD.

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AND FORTH COMING TRIALS INVOLVING GUN-RUNNING OFFENCES. THE AIM MIGHT BE TWO-FOLD.

- A. TO BRING HOME TO AMERICANS THE SERIOUSNESS OF WHAT IS INVOLVED AND TO UNDERLINE, AND THEREBY REAFFIRM, OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO COMBAT ILLEGAL GUN-RUNNING WITH ALL THE RESOURCES AT THEIR DISPOSAL AND
- B. TO DEMONSTRATE THAT, WHATEVER THE VERDICT IN THE TRIAL MAY HAVE BEEN, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ARE COMMITTED TO FIGHTING TERRORISM (AND HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN DISRUPTING THE I R A 'S OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES).

3. M I F T CONTAINS A FACTUAL SUMMARY OF THE VARIOUS I R A GUN-RUNNING AND OTHER CASES WITH WHICH WE ARE CURRENTLY DEALING. ALTHOUGH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAVE DENIED ANY COLLUSION IN THE GUN-RUNNING OPERATION INVOLVING FLANNERY, HARRISON, GEORGE DEMEO ETC, WE CAN EXPECT THE DEFENCE IN FUTURE TRIALS TO DRAW ON THE ALLEGATION ALREADY MADE IN COURT TO CLAIM THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS CONSISTENTLY EITHER COLLUDED IN GUN-RUNNING OR, AT THE VERY LEAST, TURNED A BLIND EYE TO IT. MR PRIOR MIGHT FIND IT HELPFUL, IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH KENNETH DAM, TO SEEK CONFIRMATION (ON WHICH HE COULD DRAW IN SPEAKING TO THE PRESS) THAT THE U.S. IS TOTALLY COMMITTED TO COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: REGARDS THE I R A AS AN INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANISATION (STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS HAVE SO TESTIFIED IN A RECENT EXTRADITION CASE): AND WILL CONTINUE VIGOROUSLY TO OPPOSE THOSE WHO SEEK TO USE U.S. TERRITORY TO FURTHER TERRORISM AND WILL CONSISTENTLY PROSECUTE VIOLATIONS OF U.S. LAW.

4. WHAT IS DIFFICULT TO ESTABLISH IN AMERICAN MINDS IS THE LINK BETWEEN THE DOLLAR THAT PEOPLE GIVE AT A PUB OR IN A PARADE AND THE CONSEQUENCES IN TERMS OF HUMAN SUFFERING WHICH MOST OF THEM ABHOR, WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING THE USES TO WHICH SUCH CONTRIBUTIONS ARE PUT. TO THE EXTENT THAT WE ARE ABLE TO CITE SPECIFIC INSTANCES WHERE WEAPONS EMANATING FROM THE UNITED STATES HAVE BEEN USED FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS, THIS WILL HELP BRING HOME THE POINT MOST EFFECTIVELY.

RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE ENSURE COPY OF THIS TELEGRAM AND M I F T REACHES MR PRIORS PRIVATE SECRETARY BEFORE DEPARTURE ON SUNDAY, 14 NOVEMBER.

F C O PASS SAVING DUBLIN

WRIGHT

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IMMEDIATE

PS (6)

PS/S of S Rm 66 A/2 GOGGS

PS/MR HURD

MR WOODFIELD)

PS/PUS

MR BRENNAN)

NIO

SIR J BULLARD

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IMMEDIATE

HD/RID

SIR R ARMSTRONG)

CABINET OFFICE

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RESIDENT CLERK

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3678 OF 12 NOVEMBER 1982

AND TO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST, NIO LONDON

INFO IMMEDIATE BIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING CGS IN USA, DUBLIN

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MIPT: NORTHERN IRELAND: VISIT OF MR PRIOR

1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF IRA GUN-RUNNING AND RELATED CASES IN THE UNITED STATES

GUN-RUNNING

A. THE MEGAHEY/DUGGAN/MEEHAN CASE, DUE TO COME TO TRIAL IN NEW YORK ON 14 FEBRUARY 1983. THE ARREST OF GABRIEL MEGAHEY AND ANDREW DUGGAN ON 21 JUNE 1982 FOLLOWED AN OPERATION IN WHICH BOTH MEN HAD NEGOTIATED WITH AN UNDERCOVER FBI AGENT, POSING AS AN ARMS DEALER, THE PURCHASE OF WEAPONS INCLUDING 5 RED-EYE SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES (VALUE 10,000 DOLLARS EACH): AK1BS, MI4S AND M1BS. THE MISSILES WERE TO BE USED AGAINST BRITISH HELICOPTERS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. MEGAHEY, AN IRISH CITIZEN, CLAIMED HE WAS THE LEADER OF

MISSILES WERE TO BE USED AGAINST BRITISH HELICOPTERS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. MEGAHEY, AN IRISH CITIZEN, CLAIMED HE WAS THE LEADER OF PIRA IN THE UNITED STATES AND THAT HE HAD 1 MILLION DOLLARS AVAILABLE TO SPEND ON WEAPONS.

B. COLM AND EAMON MEEHAN (BROTHERS: US CITIZENS) WERE ALSO ARRESTED IN NEW YORK ON 21 JUNE. CHECKS ON MEGAHEY (SEE ABOVE) LED TO THE DISCOVERY ON 27 MAY OF A CONSIGNMENT OF ARMS, AMMUNITION AND ELECTRIC COMPONENTS AND REMOTE CONTROL DETONATORS IN A CONTAINER OF BLANKETS AND ROLLER SKATES BEING SHIPPED FROM NEWARK DOCKS TO LIMERICK VIA ROTTERDAM. MOST OF THE WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION WERE SEIZED BEFORE SHIPMENT. BUT A SMALL QUANTITY WAS MARKED AND ALLOWED TO BE SHIPPED TO IRELAND WHERE THREE MEN WERE ARRESTED ON 18 JUNE. THE MEEHAN BROTHERS ARE DUE TO BE TRIED WITH MEGAHEY AND DUGGAN NEXT FEBRUARY.

C. THE MURPHY/TONER CASE. A PRE-TRIAL HEARING, TO ESTABLISH THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE ETC (NEW YORK TELNO 43) IS BEING HELD TODAY. NEW YORK WILL REPORT THE OUTCOME. INVESTIGATIONS BEGAN IN NOVEMBER 1981 WHEN THREE INLA MEMBERS (GERAD STEENSON TERRY GEORGE AND HARRY KIRKPATRICK) CAME TO NEW YORK ON AN ARMS PURCHASING MISSION DURING WHICH THEY ASSOCIATED CLOSELY WITH COLM MURPHY. MURPHY AND SOME ASSOCIATES INCLUDING VINCENT TONER SUBSEQUENTLY TRIED TO NEGOTIATE THE PURCHASE OF A VARIETY OF WEAPONS INCLUDING 20 M16 AUTOMATIC RIFLES, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND SAM MISSILES FOR USE AGAINST BOTH BRITISH AND IRISH SECURITY FORCES.

D. THE MCKEON CASE. IN OCTOBER 1979, 151 WEAPONS ORIGINATING IN THE UNITED STATES WERE FOUND BY THE IRISH POLICE IN DUBLIN DOCKS. SHIPMENT OF THE ARMS WAS TRACED TO AN ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS IN NEW YORK, BELONGING TO BERNARD MCKEON, A NORAIID OFFICE HOLDER WHO HAD ALSO BEEN ACTIVE IN THE IRISH NATIONAL CAUCUS. MCKEON WAS IMPRISONED BRIEFLY IN 1981 FOR REFUSING TO TESTIFY BEFORE A GRAND JURY INVESTIGATING THE SHIPMENT. IN SEPTEMBER THIS YEAR HE WAS CHARGED WITH ATTEMPTING TO PROVIDE ARMS TO THE IRA, IE THE 1979 SHIPMENT. HIS CASE IS SCHEDULED TO COME TO COURT ON 22 NOVEMBER BUT IS LIKELY TO BE POSTPONED.

2. IN ALL, THE EVIDENCE POINTS TO PIRA HAVING PURCHASED OVER 1,000 WEAPONS IN THE USA OVER THE LAST DECADE (INCLUDING AUTOMATIC RIFLES, CANNON AND FLAME THROWERS). ATTEMPTED PURCHASES INCLUDE SAM MISSILES. MANY OF THESE WEAPONS HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN RECOVERED IN IRELAND (NORTH AND SOUTH). IN ADDITION, LARGE QUANTITIES OF AMMUNITION HAVE BEEN EXPORTED. THE DUBLIN ARMS HAUL OF 1979 ALONE WAS RECKONED TO CONTAIN ENOUGH AMMUNITION (60,000 ROUNDS) TO KEEP PIRA SUPPLIED FOR FIVE YEARS. OVER THE LAST DECADE, THE US AUTHORITIES HAVE BROUGHT PROSECUTIONS AGAINST SOME 40 PEOPLE FOR ILLEGAL ARMS TRAFFICKING TO THE IRA. OF THESE 26 HAVE BEEN CONVICTED, WITH CASES PENDING AGAINST 7. THE US IS THUS THE SINGLE BIGGEST SOURCE OF

TRAFFICKING TO THE IRA. OF THESE 26 HAVE BEEN CONVICTED, WITH CASES PENDING AGAINST 7. THE US IS THUS THE SINGLE BIGGEST SOURCE OF PIRA'S MODERN WEAPONS.

EXTRADITION

3. WILLIAM JOSEPH QUINN WAS FOUND EXTRADITABLE BY A SAN FRANCISCO COURT ON 29 SEPTEMBER. HE IS WANTED IN BRITAIN FOR THE MURDER OF A BRITISH POLICEMEN AND ON A CHARGE OF CONSPIRING TO CAUSE EXPLOSIONS. QUINN IS IN JAIL PENDING HIS APPEAL AGAINST THE COURT FINDING. HIS LAWYER MUST FILE ON THIS BY 8 DECEMBER.

ILLEGAL ENTRY

4. CHARGES OF ILLEGAL ENTRY INTO THE US ARE STILL OUTSTANDING AGAINST (I) OWEN CARRON MP AND DANIEL MORRISON OF PROVISIONAL SINN FEIN WHO WERE ARRESTED TRYING TO ENTER THE UNITED STATES ILLEGALLY IN JANUARY 1982. BOTH WERE RELEASED ON BAIL AGAINST UNDERTAKINGS TO RETURN TO THE US TO STAND TRIAL. THEIR LAWYERS ARE CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN A WRANGLE IN WHICH THE DEPENDENTS CLAIM THAT THEY ARE VICTIMS OF SELECTIVE PROSECUTION. NO EARLY CONCLUSION IS EXPECTED. (II) DESMOND ELLIS. ELLIS, A LEADING PIRA MEMBER, WAS ONE OF 5 MEN ARRESTED ON 6 FEBRUARY 1982 TRYING TO ENTER THE UNITED STATES ILLEGALLY FROM CANADA. THE OTHER FOUR WERE RELEASED ON BAIL. ELLIS DID NOT ATTEMPT TO POST BAIL SINCE HE IS WANTED IN BOTH NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE REPUBLIC ON MURDER CHARGES. IF RELEASED ON BAIL HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY BE EXCLUDED FROM THE UNITED STATES, HIS REQUEST FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM HAVING BEEN DENIED. ELLIS IS DUE TO STAND TRIAL IN THE UNITED STATES ON ILLEGAL ENTRY CHARGES ON 19 APRIL 1983. IN THE MEANTIME, HIS LAWYERS ARE CONSIDERING BRINGING A CASE FOR SELECTIVE PROSECUTION. THEY ARE ALSO SEEKING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE PERMANENT EXCLUSION ORDER MADE AGAINST HIM AND OF US DENIAL OF HIS REQUEST FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM. A HEARING ON THIS MAY BE HELD IN BUFFALO ON 22 NOVEMBER. IN PRACTICE, ELLIS IS LIKELY TO REMAIN IN GAOL UNTIL HIS TRIAL.

NORAID CASES

5. NORAID HAVE REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH A US COURT ORDER REQUIRING THEM TO NAME THE PROVISIONAL IRA AS THEIR FOREIGN PRINCIPAL UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT. IN DEFIANCE OF THE LAW THEY HAVE FILED NO RETURN UNDER THE ACT FOR NEARLY A YEAR. THE US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ARE PREPARING CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST NORAID. IF SUCCESSFUL, THESE COULD LEAD TO A FINE FOR EVERY DAY THAT PASSES IN WHICH NORAID FAIL TO COMPLY WITH THE ACT.

THE IRISH PEOPLE

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7. ALL OF THE ABOVE MAY BE USED ON THE RECORD AS NECESSARY.

FCO PASS SAVING DUBLIN

WRIGHT

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weekend box 5

Prime Minister

A lot of reading here, I'm afraid. Mr. ~~Prior~~ and Ian Gow will look at

these papers over the weekend.

The key passage you should look at is at the end of the second draft letter, which contains a statement which would carry your and Mr. Prior's authority.

Subject to Mr. Prior's comments, are you content that Sir R. Armstrong should write as proposed?

See comments: I will have a word with Ian to see what Flag A

Ref. A082/0077

MR BUTLER

He has spotted any other matters which have missed Discussion between Mr Geoffrey Sloan and Mr Clive Abbott. It will have even detail not

In your minute of 4 October you confirmed that the Prime Minister was content that I should agree to see Mr Enoch Powell as he had requested. **FARR**

12.11.

2. Mr Powell came to see me on 1 November; Mr Gow was with me.
3. Mr Powell started by apologising in advance for talking rather a lot, and then set out at length his perception of events since 1979 and his reasons for thinking that there was and had for long been a conspiracy (of which Mr Abbott's responses to Mr Sloan were illustrative) among Northern Ireland Office officials to bring about the re-establishment of a power-sharing executive in Northern Ireland and a Council of Ireland on the Sunningdale model, and that in pursuance of this objective those officials had not been candid with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland or with his colleagues in the Cabinet about their contacts with the Irish Government and about the extent of their commitment to consult the Irish Government on constitutional developments in and proposals for Northern Ireland.
4. I said that it had not been part of my instructions from the Prime Minister to inquire into relations between the NIO and Dublin; that it was for the Secretary of State to answer for the policies and management of his Department; but that he had made very serious charges which would, if true, be of concern to me as Joint Head of the Civil Service as well as to the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister. I said that I would take this aspect of our conversation further with the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State.
5. As to the Sloan-Abbott conversations, I told Mr Powell the extent of my own inquiries into the matter since the Prime Minister had asked me to investigate it. Mr Powell disclosed two interesting points which were not known to us before:

* Mr Powell



- (1) The manuscript notes by Mr Sloan, copies of which were sent to Mr Gow in September, were not (as both Mr Gow and I understood them to be) the notes which Mr Sloan made at his interview with Mr Abbott on 26 January 1981, but notes made after that date from the original notes (and presumably before the typed notes sent to Mr Gow by Mr Molyneaux on 29 June 1982). Mr Powell showed us a copy of Mr Sloan's original notes, which were indeed very scrappy and disjointed.
- (2) Directly after each of his meetings with Mr Abbott, Mr Sloan had given an oral account of the meetings, on the first occasion to Mr Molyneaux and on the second occasion to Mr Powell. I pointed out to Mr Powell that, though Mr Payne had asked Mr Sloan in some detail about his dealings with Mr Molyneaux over these meetings with Mr Abbott, Mr Sloan had said nothing about going to see Mr Molyneaux and Mr Powell directly after the meetings: on the contrary, he had replied that Mr Molyneaux was not told about the meetings until he was given the typescript notes in May 1982, and he had told Mr Payne that he had met Mr Powell only once, and then only socially, with Mr Molyneaux.

6. I explained to Mr Powell why I had reported to the Prime Minister that I could see no way of resolving with certainty the conflict between the testimony of Mr Sloan and that of Mr Abbott, and why in my judgment Mr Sloan's notes could not be relied upon as an account of what Mr Abbott had said, or as satisfactory evidence upon which to call in question Mr Abbott's integrity and the veracity of his rebuttals of Mr Sloan's account of his answers to Mr Sloan's questions.

7. Mr Powell did not challenge these conclusions; but he reverted to the more general points with which he had opened the discussion. I repeated that I would take these further with the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister.



8. Mr Powell subsequently wrote and suggested that in all the circumstances I should feel it right for him to have a copy of the shorthand transcript, to which he would assign whatever security rating I would think right. I presume that this is intended to refer to the notes of my meeting with Mr Powell, and not to the transcript of Mr Payne's meeting with Mr Sloan. We did not make a verbatim note of the meeting with Mr Powell, but my Private Secretary took detailed notes, and produced a note for record. I propose to offer to send a copy of that to Mr Powell on a Privy Counsellor basis, inviting him to suggest any amendments he wishes to its account of what he said, and asking him to treat it as personal and confidential, but agreeing that he may show it to Mr Molyneaux.

copy attached

9. I think, and the Northern Ireland Office agree, that I should write to Mr Powell, in pursuance of my undertaking to take further the matters he raised with me; the letter would get on record the two new points about Mr Sloan's proceedings mentioned in paragraph 5 above (the second of which in particular is important evidence that Mr Sloan's accounts cannot be regarded as the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth); would summarise what Mr Powell said to me, and what I said to Mr Powell; and would counter his allegations about a conspiracy and lack of candour of Northern Ireland Office officials. I have drafted such a letter; the draft submitted herewith follows consultation with and reflects the comments of Mr Woodfield.

10. I accordingly attach:

- (a) a draft letter to Mr Powell responding to his request for a shorthand transcript;
- (b) a longer letter to Mr Powell on the lines indicated in paragraph 9.

I should be grateful for the Prime Minister's authority to proceed accordingly, subject to the views of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, to whose Private Secretary I am sending copies of this minute and its attachments. I am also sending copies of these papers to Mr Gow.

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

11 November 1982



DRAFT LETTER FROM SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG TO
THE RT HON J ENOCH POWELL MBE MP, HOUSE OF COMMONS

Thank you for your letter of 2 November.

I presume that, when you write of a "shorthand transcript", you have in mind a record of the meeting which you and Ian Gow and I had on 1 November. We did not make a verbatim or shorthand record, but my Private Secretary was making notes, and has produced a record of the meeting. I should be very ready to send you a copy of that record, if we could agree that you were sent it on on Privy Counsellor basis. I would understand that you would want to show the record to Mr Molyneaux for his private information; I hope you would agree to regard it otherwise as for your and his eyes only.

In that event I should of course be glad if you would feel able to let me know if you thought that in any respect it misrepresented what you said; we could then take account of your corrections and suggestions in revising the note.

I shall be writing to you separately a letter on which I shall not put any security classification and which incorporates inter alia a summary account of our discussion.

DRAFT NOTE FOR RECORD

On 1st November 1982, Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr Ian Gow MP, saw the Rt Hon J Enoch Powell MP, at his request, to discuss the outcome of the investigation which the Prime Minister had asked Sir Robert Armstrong to conduct into the allegations made by Mr Geoffrey Sloan concerning his conversations with Mr Clive Abbott of NIO.

2. Mr Powell said that he hoped to be able to discuss not simply the precise details of the conversations between Mr Sloan and Mr Abbott. The Government in considering its future policy [towards Northern Ireland] would need to do so in the context of events since it came to office, of which the Sloan/Abbott conversations provided a graphic illustration. Sir Robert Armstrong said that he would be glad to listen to what Mr Powell had to say and would, if possible, comment on any further issues that were raised, but pointed out that his instructions from the Prime Minister had related only to the verification of Mr Sloan's account of his conversations with Mr Abbott, and his inquiries had been related to that matter. Mr Powell said that he understood this, but his primary concern was the whole context of the affair which, he believed, involved some of Sir Robert Armstrong's broader responsibilities as well as the Prime Minister's specific instruction.

3. Mr Powell said that when the present Government took office in 1979 they had not followed the policies on Northern Ireland which they had foreshadowed while in Opposition a policy of eschewing new political initiatives unless these would bring clear benefit to the Province. In particular the Manifesto had been drafted in terms of action to strengthen the institutions of local government in Northern Ireland. There was what he considered to be a significant statement contained in the Advice to [Conservative Party] Candidates issued on 26th April 1979 to the effect that a Conservative Government would be under pressure not to adopt the policies foreshadowed in Opposition but, instead, to follow the policy that had, in fact, been adopted. Mr Powell said that the new Conservative Secretary of State did not, from the very start, have in his mind the pre-Election policy and that the reason for this was aptly summed up in the statements which Mr Sloan attributed to Mr Abbott that the pursuit of the party's pre-^{Election?}decision policies would have lost the co-operation of the Republic over security and would have run counter to understandings with the Irish Government [Answer A2, 17th Nov. 1981]; this was the significance of Mr Abbott's answer, even if he had not used precisely those words. The terrorist attacks of August 1979 [the assassination of Earl Mountbatten and Warrenpoint] which had both been triggered from south of the Border had had a deep effect on the Irish Government and had led to the intensification of communications between Dublin and Her Majesty's Government,

5th OCTOBER, 1979

particularly the Northern Ireland Office. Mr Powell said that the outward demonstration of this new attitude was the communiqué of the meeting held on 7th October 1979 which had not been published in full in Britain at the time - although he did not see this as sinister. Later, following up a remark by Sir Kenneth Stowe that the Government's new policy initiative had flowed from that meeting, he had elicited the ~~test~~^x of the communiqué in response to a Parliamentary Question to the Prime Minister. The crucial paragraph was paragraph 8 which referred to "the urgency and importance of proceeding with all speed to re-establish a power-sharing executive". Mr Powell said that the White Paper which accompanied the initiative had only become available five weeks after it was launched; that demonstrated the haste with which the initiative had been prepared. In passing, Mr Powell said that Mr Merlyn Rees had predicted in conversation with him that there would be an attempt to establish an Assembly although Mr Rees had also said that, as yet, even the Cabinet was not aware of it.

4. Mr Powell stated that, following the replacement of Mr West as leader of the Ulster Unionist Party by Mr Molyneux, Northern Ireland Office officials had infiltrated the party. Sir Robert Armstrong asked Mr Powell if he would elaborate on this. Mr Powell said that officials had approached disaffected members of the Ulster Unionist Party and had fostered discontent in order to forward the policies of the NIO.

Is this
correct?
May I see
the
communiqué

As background, Mr Powell said that in 1975 he had received evidence that NIO officials had been acting as agents provocateurs and had provided Mr Rees, who was then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, with the names of the people concerned, and that Mr Rees had later told him that the people were FCO officials rather than NIO officials. Sir Robert Armstrong said that this was a very serious charge to make.

5. Continuing his resumé of events, Mr Powell said that the political initiative of the winter of 1979-80 had been abandoned about April 1980 because of the abstention of the OUP and the exposed position of the DUP. There had then grown up a widespread belief that a devolved Assembly would be set up before the end of the year. However, before that could happen, the IRA hunger strike had begun in October. This had ended temporarily on 8th December, after a meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr Haughey which marked an epoch. The Government's plan before that meeting had, Mr Powell said, been to create by working with people within the Province some form of devolved Parliament to which a power-sharing element could later be added. This approach had been adopted as a result of the lesson learnt in 1974 but after the meeting - although its outcome was interpreted slightly differently by the Prime Minister and Mr Haughey - the new approach was to work "from outside inwards". The IRA leaders had been very sensitive to the behaviour of HMG at that time, and had called off the hunger strike which had

allowed the re-establishment of security co-operation between the NIO and the Dublin Government. When the hunger strike was resumed, it was defeated, largely by the personal resolve of the Prime Minister, but not until what might be described as "the second edition" of the Anglo-Irish agreement was available in early December 1981.

6. In response to a question from Sir Robert Armstrong, Mr Powell agreed that he had intended to refer to the meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr Fitzgerald which actually took place on 6th November 1981.

7. Mr Powell said that the implications of the communique issued after that meeting had provoked an explosion in the Province and Mr Fitzgerald had made it clear that the institutional framework for closer relations between the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic could not be fully implemented until there was a Northern Ireland Assembly which could provide a Northern Ireland ^{Component?} in the "parliamentary tier" of Anglo-Irish relations. From what followed it was clear that, although Mr Prior had only recently (September 1981) become Secretary of State, there was already an NIO scheme available which would fit the Fitzgerald plan. The importance of the Sloan/Abbott conversations was as corroborative evidence of this: they established that the notion of an Assembly with progressive devolution by agreement with the Irish Government was in existence by January 1981.

8. Mr Powell said that Mr Sloan's report of his conversation with Mr Abbott showed the relationship between the setting up of an Assembly, agreement with the Republic, and some form of Anglo-Irish organ. He said that this was considered an improvement on 1974 because it did not mention power-sharing, but it was presumed that, once Northern Irish politicians were persuaded to participate and could see the advantages of an Assembly, this would be the next step. As the plan already existed in January 1981 it was clear that Mr Prior's package was not a new invention but was on a preconceived NIO plan. However, by the beginning of 1982, the co-operation of the Republic had been lost because, so it was said, Her Majesty's Government had not fulfilled their commitment to proceed in consultation with the Irish Republic. Again, Mr Sloan's record showed that this commitment was considered in January 1981 to be a precondition of co-operation by the Republic. Although it was subsequently denied by the Prime Minister on 27th July 1982, Mr Powell considered that it had been implicitly supported by admissions from the Secretary of State and also explicitly by references by the Irish Government. None of this had surprised Mr Powell or his colleagues. He was, for example, supported by a conversation which an NIO official had had with an ex-member of the Faulkner Government earlier in the year about what would happen if Mr Molyneaux took part in the Assembly: "Wait till he is in the Assembly and can see which side his bread is buttered."

9. Mr Powell apologised for recounting at such length his perception of events since 1979 but he said that he considered that it was essential context for discussing the significance of the conversations between Sloan and Abbott.

10. Sir Robert Armstrong said that he wished to be certain that he had fully understood the significance of Mr Powell's account. Mr Powell appeared to be saying that there was a determination, almost a conspiracy, among NIO officials to work to recreate something like a "Council of Ireland" on ~~the~~ lines of the Sunningdale agreement as a first step towards an implied ultimate aim of a change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. In pursuit of these aims, it was suggested that officials were in constant contact with the Government of the Republic and were working to undermine existing Northern Ireland institutions and create new ones. It was further suggested that this policy existed in the Northern Ireland Office before May 1979 and that the incoming Conservative Administration had been brought to abandon the policies they had formed in Opposition in favour of this policy. In such a context, the conversations between Mr Sloan and Mr Abbott were important not so much in themselves but as revealing this hidden policy.

11. Mr Powell accepted Sir Robert Armstrong's re-statement of his thesis; he said that the Sloan/Abbott conversations should be regarded as illustrative if not probative of this thesis.

12. Sir Robert Armstrong said that it was clear that Mr Powell was implying that two Conservative Secretaries of State and other Ministers had been diverted from their party's policy by the improper activity of officials. He was sure that Mr Powell would accept that Ministers sometimes changed their policies on taking office and discovering facts of which they had not previously been aware. However, while there might be an element of such legitimate change in this case, what Mr Powell was alleging went well beyond that.

13. Mr Powell said that if the change in policy had been due simply to an incoming Secretary of State faced with new evidence, he (Mr Powell) would still have had the duty of exposing the advice given to Ministers if he disagreed with the policy that resulted. Clearly advice must have been given to the new Conservative Ministers, including information on pre-existing agreements with the Irish Government and officials' own views on how to proceed and Ministers may have considered that there was no alternative to continuing with the existing NIO policy; but they could not have known some of the means by which that policy was being promoted.

14. Sir Robert Armstrong asked if Mr Powell was suggesting that officials had been in contact with the Irish Government without the knowledge of Ministers. Mr Powell said that, even if Ministers were aware of the contacts, they might not have been aware of the full content of the discussions. Sir Robert Armstrong said that he had no reason to believe that this was true. Mr Powell said that his view was

supported by recent statements about the extent of the Government's commitment to consult and, if possible, agree with the Irish Government; there had been a contradiction between the statements of the Prime Minister and Mr Prior. Sir Robert Armstrong pointed out that the Prime Minister had denied the existence of an obligation to consult the Irish Government. Mr Gow added that no valid obligation could have been entered into by officials without the backing of Ministers. Mr Powell said that he was not convinced that there had been no commitment, but there was sufficient ambiguity about its extent to allow an apparent verbal contradiction.

15. Concluding this part of the discussion, Sir Robert Armstrong said that he could not speak of the extent of relations between the NIO and Dublin: it had not been part of his instructions from the Prime Minister to inquire into that, and it was in any case for the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to answer for the policy and management of his Department. Nevertheless, Mr Powell had made some very serious charges about the behaviour of officials: even if they were for the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to consider as NIO officials were answerable to him, they would, if true, be of great concern to him as Joint Head of the Civil Service.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

16. Turning to the Sloan/Abbott conversations themselves, Sir Robert Armstrong said that he had devoted considerable time to the case since the Prime Minister had asked him to investigate it. He had read the verbatim transcript, which made at Mr Sloan's request, of Mr Sloan's meeting with Mr Payne. He had also read Mr Sloan's typed accounts of the two interviews with Mr Abbott which had been supplied by Mr Molyneaux, and Mr Gow had let him have a photocopy of the manuscript from which these typescripts had been made. Mr Powell interrupted to explain that that manuscript was not a facsimile of the notebook Sloan had used during the actual talks with Abbott but he had recently sent Sir Robert and Mr Gow another photocopy of the typescript version with underlinings which indicated words that had occurred in Mr Sloan's notes made during the talks. Mr Powell explained that these rough notes with marginalia such as "VIA" - very important admission - had been used by Mr Sloan on the day after each interview to produce the longer manuscript note. He then showed Sir Robert and Mr Gow a copy of a page of the original notes which neither had previously seen.

17. Mr Powell said that on the evening of the first interview Mr Sloan had used his notes made at the interview to brief Mr Molyneaux orally about what had taken place. Mr Molyneaux had made his own notes of what Sloan told him and had used these to brief Mr Powell. Mr Sloan had similarly

briefed himself (Mr Powell) shortly after the second interview.

18. Sir Robert Armstrong said that Mr Sloan had given Mr Payne the impression that he had not told Mr Molyneaux about the interview until much later when he realised its political implications. It was clear from Mr Sloan's interview with Mr Payne that Mr Sloan had said that Mr Powell and Mr Molyneaux had not seen the typescript accounts until about May 1982. Mr Powell said that that was correct with regard to Mr Sloan's written up transcript, but Mr Sloan had not disclosed the fact that he had made a verbal report to Mr Molyneaux on the day of the first interview and to himself on the second occasion. Until this year neither Mr Molyneaux or himself had intended to make public use of what they had been told; it was only the crisis in Northern Ireland affairs earlier in the year that had caused them to do so. The typescript had been given to Mr Molyneaux to draw on in the debate on Mr Prior's Bill but had not in the event been used. Finally, in June, Mr Powell had decided, as a result of the revelation by Sir John Biggs-Davison about the Advice to Candidates to which he had referred earlier, that he must reveal the Sloan/Abbott conversations in the House to show that what had been happening was not as portrayed by the Government.

19. Sir Robert Armstrong said that, although Mr Sloan might have told the literal truth to Mr Payne, he had failed to mention his first report to Mr Molyneaux. Nor had he told Mr Abbott of his relationship with Mr Molyneaux, though it was clear that he was already employed by Mr Molyneaux to undertake research at the time of the first interview, and had presented himself purely as an academic. When Mr Payne saw Mr Sloan, Mr Sloan had said that he had been an unpaid researcher for Mr Molyneaux from about October 1980. His conduct to Mr Abbott in this regard seemed to be rather disingenuous.

20. Mr Powell said that Sloan had not contradicted himself. He could quite understand that Mr Sloan might not wish to tell Mr Abbott about his connection with Mr Molyneaux; in Northern Ireland it was often wise not to disclose one's political connections. Mr Powell said that it would be for Mr Molyneaux to confirm the details of Mr Sloan's relationship with him.

21. Sir Robert Armstrong said that he had talked to Mr Abbott himself and had taken him in detail and at length through both the typescripts provided by Mr Sloan. There was agreement that the interviews had taken place and that the questions were as stated by Mr Sloan. However, there the agreement ended. Apart from what he considered to be two minor errors of detail Mr Sloan had stood by his account of Mr Abbott's answers. Mr Abbott, who had not made notes at the time, said that Mr Sloan's version of his answers was inaccurate, incomplete, misleading and distorted. Abbott had given details of these shortcomings and had explained how what he had said might have been misinterpreted.

22. Mr Powell said that the contemporaneous notes, as represented in the red underlinings, in the typescript endorsed with his letter of 21st October, were solid evidence of what had passed. It was very improbable that Mr Sloan had invented them. Sir Robert Armstrong said that they were very incomplete notes: the discussions had lasted over an hour in each case - Mr Sloan's pass showed that the second interview lasted about an hour and a half - and Mr Abbott talked very fast. Mr Powell agreed that the notes were

fragmentary. Sir Robert pointed out that they also contained at least two errors - the Christian name of Derek Trimble and the reference to Mr Biaggi (described as Biaggio) as one of the "Four Horsemen". Mr Powell said that the first error occurred in writing up the long version of the interview and was understandable: the contemporaneous note only used the initial D. After some discussion it was agreed that the reference to Biaggi(o) was also a clear mistake. Sir Robert Armstrong said that someone as well informed as Mr Abbott would not have made such an elementary mistake and could have had no motive for misleading Mr Sloan on the point. Nevertheless, Mr Powell thought it was unlikely that Mr Sloan had made a mistake about the name, given its place in the middle of the otherwise correct list of the "Four Horsemen", and, in any case, such a mistake could not be used to discredit the whole document. He asked whether Mr Abbott denied the important points, such as that there had been an understanding with the Irish Government.

23. Sir Robert Armstrong said that Abbott had denied this and many of the other statements attributed to him in Mr Sloan's notes and had given a very different version of the discussion. For example, Mr Abbott had said that the observations attributed to him in the note of the interview on 26th January 1981 which Mr Powell had said demonstrated pre-knowledge of Mr Prior's Bill had in fact been related to Dr Brian Mawhinney's proposals for "rolling devolution", which were in the public domain at the time of the Sloan/Abbott interview.

24. Sir Robert said that he could see no way of reconciling the two conflicting versions of the discussions or of deciding definitely between them, as there was no independent record. Although it might be said that Mr Abbott would be bound to deny Mr Sloan's version, there was no other reason to call in question his veracity or integrity. There was certain circumstantial evidence which suggested that Mr Sloan could have misunderstood some of what was said, but no clear evidence on which one could base a conclusive judgement. Sir Robert said that on the very limited evidence available he had to remain agnostic. He had been unable to shake Mr Abbott; although he had not himself met Mr Sloan, one or two things, raised certain doubts about his account.

Passage deleted and closed, 60 years, under FOI Exemption.

Wayland. 2 October 2012

It was simply not possible to say with any certainty what had passed between Mr Sloan and Mr Abbott, and it would clearly be unfair to take any action against Mr Abbott as a result.

25. Mr Powell said that he understood that conclusion so far as possible disciplinary action was concerned. What was more important was that the conversations should be seen in the context he had described. Mr Sloan's report offered an illustration of what had happened and why policy had been different from the pre-election Conservative policy.

26. Sir Robert pointed out that all the questions Mr Powell had raised in his description of events in Northern Ireland would arise even if the Sloan/Abbott conversations had not taken place. Mr Powell accepted this. Sir Robert went on to say that although, on what he had seen, he could not conclude that the Sloan/Abbott conversations supported Mr Powell's wider contentions, these were very serious charges in their own right. As a result, he would take further this aspect of their conversation, although if successive Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland had been satisfied with the conduct of their officials it would be difficult to go beyond that. Mr Powell said that he understood that constitutional point, although there was also a question of the collective responsibility of the Government as a whole.

27. In conclusion, Mr Powell thanked Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr Gow for giving him the opportunity to discuss the wider picture. He knew that they were seized of the significance of the possibility of a difference between the actual and alleged causes of Government policy and between the methods employed and those that ought to have been employed to further it. What he had described questioned the integrity of the information and advice offered to Ministers and on which they would have to base future policy.

28. Sir Robert Armstrong said that others might place a different interpretation on events to what might be termed the conspiracy

theory advanced by Mr Powell. If Ministers accepted Mr Powell's view, it would raise grave concern about the professional integrity of the civil servants concerned and he would be reporting the outcome of this discussion to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and to the Prime Minister

DRAFT LETTER FROM SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG TO
THE RT HON J ENOCH POWELL MBE MP, HOUSE OF
COMMONS

I have been reflecting on our conversation on 1 November.

2. On the particular matter of Mr Sloan's conversations with Mr Abbott, I gave you an account of the inquiries which I had made. You were able to add to my knowledge in two respects:

- (1) The manuscript notes, photocopies of which Mr Molyneaux sent to Mr Gow, were not (as Mr Gow and I both understood them to be) the notes which Mr Sloan made during his interviews, but they were an intermediate stage between the notes made at the time of the interviews and the typescripts which Mr Molyneaux sent to Mr Gow on 29 June and 18 August 1982. You told me that you had copies of Mr Sloan's original notes - indeed you showed me a copy of one page from them - and you said that you had worked from those notes in producing the copy of the typescript with red underlinings which you sent to Mr Gow and to me on 21 October.

(2) Mr Sloan had given an oral account of his interview with Mr Abbott on 26 January 1981 to Mr Molyneaux on the evening of that same day, and an account of his interview on 17 November 1981 to you on or very shortly after that day. I told you that this had not emerged from Mr Sloan's discussion with Mr Payne, in which Mr Sloan indicated that he did not give Mr Molyneaux the typescript notes until May 1982, but said nothing about oral briefings immediately after the interviews. Indeed in the discussion Mr Sloan told Mr Payne that he had met you only once, and then only socially on an occasion when he was seeing Mr Molyneaux and you came into the room.

3. As I told you, as a result of my inquiries I was faced with a clear conflict as between on the one hand Mr Sloan's notes of his interviews with Mr Abbott, and Mr Sloan's assertions as to their accuracy as a record of what Mr Abbott said, and on the other hand Mr Abbott's assertions, which I myself tested in two long discussions with him, that Mr Sloan's notes are so inaccurate, incomplete, misleading and distorted as

to bear little relation to what he actually said. They could not both be right; there was of course no verbatim record of either of the interviews; and I could see no way of resolving this conflict with certainty. I hope that I was able to say enough to make clear to you why, given other circumstances, including the way in which Mr Sloan's notes came to be made, the failure to check them with Mr Abbott at the time, and the long delay before they were produced, I had reported to the Prime Minister as my conclusion that those notes could not be relied upon as an account of what Mr Abbott said, or as satisfactory evidence upon which to call in question Mr Abbott's integrity and the veracity of his rebuttals of Mr Sloan's account of his answers to Mr Sloan's questions.

4. You explained to me that you had regarded Mr Abbott's answers to Mr Sloan's questions, as reported by Mr Sloan, not so much as significant in themselves as illustrative (if not probative) in a more general context of what you saw as a persistent determination - one might

even say a conspiracy - on the part of Northern Ireland Office officials over a long period of years but particularly since May 1979 to bring into being the institutions of a devolved and at least potentially "power-sharing" government in Northern Ireland, against the wishes of many people in Northern Ireland, in pursuance of agreements or understandings reached between them and by officials of the Irish Government in Dublin wholly or partly without the authority or knowledge of British Ministers. You drew attention in this context to changes in the policy of members of the present Government as between the statements made by the Conservative Party on Northern Ireland before the Election in May 1979 and the policies they followed and the statements they made after they took office; and you attributed those changes of policies, which you thought mistaken, to the advice which Ministers had received from Northern Ireland Office officials, and specifically to what you described as a lack of candour on the part of those officials in the advice which they gave to Ministers in the British Government and in particular in the information which they gave to Ministers about the

contents of their contacts with officials of the Irish Government in Dublin. You believed that Northern Ireland Office officials had been determined to work for the establishment of an assembly in Northern Ireland, in order that such an assembly might provide a Northern Ireland component for the so-called "parliamentary tier" of Anglo-Irish relations which successive Taoiseachs in Dublin had been known to favour. (In that connection you reminded me that in a speech which you made on 25 September you had said that in his interview with Mr Sloan on 26 January 1981 Mr Abbott had made observations which could not have been made without foreknowledge of the Bill which Mr Prior (not then yet Secretary of State for Northern Ireland) was subsequently to introduce; I told you that Mr Abbott had said that the observations which he had made - which were not as reported by Mr Sloan - had not been based on a foreknowledge of Mr Prior's Bill, which was not at that time under consideration and of which he had no such

foreknowledge, but were related to proposals for "rolling devolution" which had been advanced some months earlier by Dr Brian Mawhinney and were in the public domain and on the table at Mr Atkins's conference which ended in the autumn of 1980).

5. These are of course serious charges. I am not privy to all the Secretary of State's dealings with his officials, and it must be for him to say whether he has reason to believe that his officials have been less than candid or less than fair, balanced and comprehensive in their provision of advice and information to him or in briefing him for discussions with his Ministerial colleagues, or less than unqualifiedly loyal to the policies of Her Majesty's Government in their dealings with representatives of the Irish Government in Dublin. But I accept that the charges, if well founded, would constitute a serious reflection on the professional integrity of the civil servants concerned and as such would be of much concern to me, as

the Joint Head of the Civil Service, as well as to the Prime Minister and to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

6. It is for the Secretary of State to answer for the policies and management of his Department and the conduct of his officials; but I have discussed the matter with him, as I told you I would, and with the Prime Minister. What follows is written on their authority and with their agreement.

7. At no time have Ministers of Her Majesty's Government taken the view or been advised by officials that their freedom of action with regard to constitutional arrangements for Northern Ireland is limited by agreements or understandings, open or secret, with the Irish Government. Ministers have not entered into any such agreements or understandings, and they have every confidence that officials of the Northern Ireland Office and of other Departments of Her Majesty's Government have not sought or made any such agreements or understandings with officials of the Irish Government.

This is a special fact.

This is opinion - delete.

8. There have of course been over the years many contacts at many levels and in many Departments between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the Republic, which have had the objective either of improving co-operation between the two Governments on matters where such co-operation was or could be of common interest (notably on the question

of cross-border security and on economic links of various kinds), or more generally (and particularly between December 1980 and November 1981) of improving relations between the two Governments and between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. In the course of such contacts both Ministers and officials of the British Government have on occasion informed representatives of the Irish Government about political developments and prospects in Northern Ireland, and those representatives have expressed their views on those matters. [That that should happen is surely inevitable and hardly surprising, given the realities of life and the relationships which exist not only between the two Governments but also between each of them and various persons and parties in Northern Ireland; and perhaps it might be regarded by many as sensible and prudent, if the Government's policies in respect of Northern Ireland affairs are to be founded on as comprehensive a knowledge as possible of the relevant considerations.] It does

not follow, nor is it the case, that Her Majesty's Government, or officials of that Government, are in some sense dancing to the tune of the Irish Government.

9. Her Majesty's Government's objectives and intentions in proposing the establishment of an assembly in Northern Ireland were explained by the Secretary of State and his colleagues in the Parliamentary proceedings on the Bill to give effect to that proposal. The proposal was not made for the purpose of providing a Northern Ireland component for some Anglo-Irish inter-Parliamentary body. In any case, as the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State have made clear, it is not for Governments but the Parliaments concerned to consider and decide whether or not such a body should be set up.

10. It is the fixed policy of Her Majesty's Government, and of Parliament, as enshrined in the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, that there can and shall be no change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom except by the agreement of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. At all times this fact has informed and continues to inform the conduct of policy in the Northern Ireland Office and Her Majesty's Government's dealings with the Government of the Republic of Ireland.

IMMEDIATE 4

PS (3)	PS/S of S Rm 66 A/2 GOGGS	
PS/MR HURD	MR WOODFIELD)
PS/PUS	MR BRENNAN)
SIR J BULLARD	MR ANGEL)
MR GOODISON	MR BOYS SMITH)
...	...	
...	...	
HD/RID	SIR R ARMSTRONG)
HD/PUSD (2)	DIO)
HD/INFO D	...)
HD/NEWS D	...)
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RESIDENT CLERK		

CABINET OFFICE

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3614 OF 8 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NIO LONDON NIO BELFAST HMC6 NEW YORK BIS NEW YORK
PRIORITY DUBLIN

BIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO 14: NORTHERN IRELAND: NORAIID GUNRUNNING TRIAL

1. AS REPORTED IN TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE FIVE MEN, INCLUDING THE DIRECTOR OF NORAIID (MICHAEL FLANNERY), WERE ACQUITTED ON 5 NOVEMBER OF CHARGES RELATING TO THE SHIPMENT OF ARMS TO THE IRA. THE FIVE HAD BEEN INDICTED IN OCTOBER 1981 (MY TEL NO 2956) FOLLOWING A SUCCESSFUL UNDERCOVER OPERATION BY THE FBI. THE FBI HAD BEEN TIPPED OFF THAT ONE OF THOSE LATER CHARGED (HARRISON) HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN GUN RUNNING TO THE IRA. THE FBI USED AN UNDERCOVER AGENT TO NEGOTIATE A SALE OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION TO HARRISON, WHO IN TURN OBTAINED THE 17,000 DOLLARS TO PAY FOR THE WEAPONS (WHICH INCLUDED 47 MACHINE GUNS) FROM FLANNERY. HARRISON INDICATED TO THE UNDERCOVER AGENT AT THE TIME THAT...

INCLUDED 47 MACHINE GUNS) FROM FLANNERY. HARRISON INDICATED TO THE UNDERCOVER AGENT AT THE TIME THAT HE WAS EXPECTING A FURTHER 50,000 DOLLARS TO PAY FOR MORE ARMS. ONE OF THOSE USED BY THE FBI TO SET UP THE DEAL WAS A WELL KNOWN GUN DEALER NAMED GEORGE DEMEO, WHO WAS CONVICTED IN 1980 OF ILLEGAL ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE IRA BUT WHOSE SENTENCE WAS REDUCED IN RETURN FOR HIS WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE US AUTHORITIES.

2. IN COURT, THE ISSUE WAS WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS HAD BREACHED US LAW GOVERNING THE POSSESSION OF UNREGISTERED WEAPONS AND THEIR EXPORT. THE REPREHENSIBLE NATURE OF THE DESIGNATED RECIPIENT WAS NOT, LEGALLY, A FACTOR. NONE OF THE DEFENDANTS CONCEALED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE IRA AND HARRISON ADMITTED THAT HE HAD QUOTE SUPPLIED ARMS TO THE REBELS IN NORTHERN IRELAND FOR A QUARTER OF A CENTURY UNQUOTE. FLANNERY, WHILE DENYING THE CHARGES, SAID THAT HE HAD AVAILABLE TWO FUNDS - ONE FOR NORAIID AND ANOTHER TO BUY ARMS. THE DEFENCE RESTED ITS CASE ON THE CONTENTION THAT IN SHIPPING ARMS THE ACCUSED DID NOT VIOLATE ANY US LAW BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED THEY WERE ACTING WITH AND THROUGH GEORGE DEMEO WHO, THEY ALLEGED, WAS AN AGENT OF THE CIA AND THEREFORE ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE US GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH THE US AUTHORITIES DENIED THAT DEMEO EVER HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE CIA (AND WE HAVE BEEN PRIVATELY ASSURED THAT HE HAD NO SUCH CONNECTION), THE JURY IN THE END ACCEPTED THE BIZARRE ARGUMENT THAT, FOR PURPOSES OF ITS OWN, THE CIA, AS AN AGENCY OF THE US GOVERNMENT, WAS ENGAGED IN, OR AT LEAST PREPARED TO COUNTENANCE, THE UNAUTHORISED SMUGGLING OF ARMS TO THE IRA. THE US PROSECUTOR ALSO BELIEVES THAT THE JUDGE (WHOSE NAME WAS MCLOUGHLIN) WAS BIASED FROM THE START AND TWO OF THE JURORS HAVE SINCE SAID THAT THE JURY LEANED TOWARD ACQUITTAL FROM THE OUTSET. THE AGE OF THE DEFENDANTS (FLANNERY IS 80) MAY HAVE PLAYED A PART IN THIS. UNDER US LAW THE US AUTHORITIES ARE PRECLUDED FROM APPEALING THE COURT VERDICT.

3. AMERICAN LAW LEANS OVER BACKWARDS IN FAVOUR OF THE DEFENDANT AT THE BEST OF TIMES (VIZ THE VERDICT IN THE CASE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ASSAILANT, JOHN HINCKLEY) AND IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN WELL KNOWN IMPOSSIBLE TO SECURE CONVICTIONS ON IRISH QUESTIONS IN THE NEW YORK COURTS. THE SUCCESSFUL ARMS PROSECUTION IN 1980 (AGAINST DEMEO AND OTHERS) TOOK PLACE IN NORTH CAROLINA (WHERE DEMEO LIVED). THE UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES MADE CLEAR TO US AT THE TIME THAT THE LOCATION OF THE TRIAL IE IN A STATE WHERE THERE ARE FEW IRISH AMERICANS, WAS A MAJOR FACTOR IN ITS SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. FRANK DURKAN, THE LAWYER FOR THE DEFENDANTS IN THE PRESENT CASE, IS CLOSE TO PIRA AND HAS OFTEN BEEN A VISITOR TO NORTHERN IRELAND. HE REGULARLY APPEARS FOR NORAIID AND IRA DEFENDANTS. HIS FIRM REPRESENTED DESMOND MACKIN IN A RECENT IRA EXTRADITION CASE. WE

REPRESENTED DESMOND HACKETT IN A RECENT IRA EXTRADITION CASE. WE HAVE HEARD FROM RELIABLE US SOURCES THAT A NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF THE NEW YORK JUDICIARY OWE THEIR POSITIONS TO DURKAN'S PATRONAGE. WHILE THERE IS EVERYTHING TO BE SAID FOR REGISTERING OUR DISAPPOINTMENT AT LAST WEEK'S OUTCOME, IT WOULD NOT HELP THE PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE ARMS TRIALS (SEE BELOW) FOR US TO SUGGEST ON THE RECORD THAT THE TRIAL WAS A TRAVESTY, TEMPTING THOUGH IT IS TO DO SO.

4. THERE IS TO BE A PRE-TRIAL HEARING IN ANOTHER ARMS CASE LATER THIS WEEK (BEING REPORTED BY SEPARATE TELEGRAM FROM NEW YORK). THAT APART THERE WILL NOW BE A GAP UNTIL THE NEXT IRA ARMS TRIAL OPENS IN NEW YORK ON 24 FEBRUARY. THIS IS THE TRIAL OF FOUR MEN CHARGED WITH CONSPIRACY TO PURCHASE AND EXPORT WEAPONS, INCLUDING 5 SAM MISSILES (MY TEL NO 1124). ALSO DUE TO STAND TRIAL (AT A DATE YET TO BE SET) IS BERNARD MCKEON, WHO WAS FIRST ARRESTED IN 1979 FOLLOWING THE DISCOVERY BY THE IRISH POLICE AT DUBLIN DOCKS OF 151 WEAPONS ORIGINATING IN THE US. MCKEON IS BELIEVED TO HAVE PROVIDED THE WAREHOUSE IN NEW YORK IN WHICH THE WEAPONS WERE STORED BEFORE SHIPMENT. HE HAS LINKS BOTH TO NORAID AND TO THE IRISH NATIONAL CAUCUS.

5. IN BRIEFING BRITISH PRESS REPRESENTATIVES HERE, WE ARE DRAWING A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE ROLE OF THE US COURTS (OVER WHICH NEITHER WE NOR THE US AUTHORITIES HAVE ANY CONTROL) AND THAT OF THE US AUTHORITIES THEMSELVES, MAKING CLEAR THAT THEIR PURSUIT OF GUNRUNNERS HAS BEEN VIGOROUS AND SUCCESSFUL. WE HAVE POINTED OUT THAT THE IRA'S GUNRUNNING OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN SEVERELY DISRUPTED BY THE FBI'S EFFORTS AND THAT WE HAVE BEEN GETTING GOOD COOPERATION FROM THE PRESENT US ADMINISTRATION. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT WE ARE IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH THE US AUTHORITIES AT EVERY LEVEL ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND IN AN EFFORT TO REDUCE THE FLOW OF WEAPONS AND MONEY TO THE TERRORISTS. WE HAVE NOT, HOWEVER, ALLUDED TO THE INTENSIVE WORKING COOPERATION WITH THE FBI WHICH HAS LED TO THEIR RECENT SUCCESSES IN ARRESTING IRA GUNRUNNERS. WERE THE DEFENCE IN SUBSEQUENT TRIALS TO BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE WHAT THEY ALLEGED IN THE FLANNERY TRIAL - NAMELY THAT THE US AUTHORITIES HAD BEEN IMPELLED BY OUR REPRESENTATIONS TO BRING THE CASE - ANY CHANCE OF CONVICTION WOULD EVAPORATE AND THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FBI (WHICH HAS BEEN THE MAIN FACTOR IN DISRUPTING IRA GUNRUNNING) WOULD BE IMPAIRED.

FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET.

WRIGHT

RESTRICTED

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HS
Telephone 01-218 2452 (Direct Dialling)
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

Copy Duty Clerk No 10 -
29 October 1982

PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE ARMED FORCES

D/US of S(AF) 24/17/1/2

The Lord
Parliamentary Under Secretary
of State
Home Office
50 Queen Anne's Gate
London
SW1

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Dear Rodney,

CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION FOR SERVICEMEN'S WIDOWS

I have seen a copy of the correspondence between the Home Office and No 10 last August arising from the Hyde Park and Regent's Park bombings in which your Department explained that the dependants of the victims were entitled to apply for compensation under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme and that the Board had so advised those concerned. What the letter did not - understandably - explain was that under the existing terms of the scheme the Board's assessment may well as I understand it result in little or no compensation for the widows of the Servicemen killed in these incidents.

In that event it is not difficult to imagine how the public will react; but since the absence of compensation will have resulted from the favourable pension arrangements for Service widows, it should be possible to deal reasonably convincingly with the kind of questions and criticism which are likely to arise. We do, however, face a more considerable problem over the fact that if the incidents had occurred in Northern Ireland the widows would have been likely to receive a substantial discretionary award. My ministerial colleagues here and I am concerned about the effect of this difference between the two schemes and the public, press and parliamentary outcry to which it is bound to give rise, with potentially damaging political consequences for the Government. I am sure that you will share our concern about this situation and the impossibility of explaining it in a way likely to convince or satisfy public opinion. I hope that you will therefore be able to agree that appropriate action should be taken to forestall the problem.

The problem arises because in the case of Service widows the benefits payable by the Ministry of Defence and the Department of Health and Social Security equal or exceed

the anticipated income of the Serviceman during his career. This is generally the case for those with average expectations and is therefore likely to apply to those killed in the London bombings. In this situation the GB Board's assessment would result in "nil award" of compensation, while the Northern Ireland scheme makes provision for a discretionary payment of £5,000 to the widow and £500 to each eligible child. (These sums are about to be doubled, with retrospective effect to December 1981). This difference - or anomaly as it will seem to those concerned - was of largely academic concern in the absence of any significant level of terrorist attacks on Servicemen in this country; but the London bombings make it a matter of real and pressing practical significance. This is highlighted by the fact that the bandsmen involved came from a regiment stationed in Northern Ireland: although their widows may be no worse off financially with their Ministry of Defence and Department of Health and Social Security benefits than if their husbands had not been killed, that is cold comfort when they would have been £10,000 better off if the incident had occurred in Northern Ireland. It will be impossible to explain away or justify this distinction to them and it will be seen - and no doubt portrayed by the media - as heartless bureaucracy at its worst.

I am aware that the Administration of Justice Bill currently with Parliament makes provision for a £3,500 bereavement award in the cases to which it applies and the GB Board can presumably be expected to take this into account in its assessment. But since that applies only in relation to incidents occurring after 1 January 1983 it will be of no benefit to the widows of those killed in the July bombings. Moreover, while £3,500 may be regarded as appropriate in the majority of civil cases, it falls far short of the level of discretionary award payable under the Northern Ireland scheme, and this is clearly an important consideration in the case of Servicemen. I understand that the Northern Ireland arrangement was introduced largely in order to ensure that the widows of Servicemen received compensation in circumstances where they would not otherwise have qualified for an award and that they are the main beneficiaries of it.

It seems to us that the factors which made it necessary to institute these arrangements for Northern Ireland now have equal validity here and that arrangements should therefore be made to ensure comparable provision under the GB Scheme in comparable circumstances. I realise that a special arrangement on these lines involves a departure from the basis on which the GB Board has been required to operate hitherto whereby it follows the practice and precedents of the courts in determining what level of compensation would be appropriate. But I should not have thought that this would be an insuperable problem. After all, the Northern Ireland scheme operated on a

similar basis until the special arrangement for discretionary awards was introduced and in all other respects continues to follow the pattern for levels of damages established in the courts. I appreciate that such a provision could probably not in practice be confined to Servicemen and that there are extra cost implications which neither you nor Treasury Ministers would welcome. But perhaps its application could be limited to, say, deaths caused by the actions of terrorist organisations. This would at least ensure that it catered for most, if not all, of the types of case which require the exercise of the discretionary award provision in Northern Ireland.

I hope that you will be able to devise some means of adapting or extending the GB scheme so as to dispose satisfactorily of the problem I have described.

I am copying this letter to Leon Brittan and Gray Gowrie.

Yours ever

Jerry

Jerry Wiggin

CONFIDENTIAL

*This visit is
of doubtful wisdom.
It will be recalled very
rally here.*

31505 - 1

Ireland

GRS 261
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 260930Z
FM FCO 251838Z OCT 82
TO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 108 OF 25 OCTOBER

Issued with P-D.

Visit to proceed.

MR 27/10

MR HURD'S VISIT TO DUBLIN : PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT

1. IN LINE WITH PREVIOUS PRACTICE

WE SHALL NOT ANNOUNCE MR HURD'S VISIT UNTIL 3 NOVEMBER.
WE ENVISAGE THAT ANNOUNCEMENTS WOULD THEN BE MADE IN LONDON AND
DUBLIN AND PROPOSE THAT NEWS DEPARTMENT SHOULD MAKE THE
FOLLOWING STATEMENT AT THAT DAY'S 1230 NEWS CONFERENCE:

'THE RT HON DOUGLAS HURD CBE MP, MINISTER OF STATE AT THE FCO,
IS TODAY VISITING DUBLIN FOR TALKS ON A NUMBER OF EC ISSUES WITH
THE IRISH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MR GERRY COLLINS TD.
THE VISIT IS ONE OF A SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS ON THESE SUBJECTS
WHICH HE AND MR PYM HAVE BEEN HOLDING WITH COMMUNITY PARTNERS
IN ADVANCE OF THE NOVEMBER FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL.'

2. IF ASKED WHETHER MR HURD WILL DISCUSS ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS
OR NORTHERN IRELAND, NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL SAY UNATTRIBUTELY THAT
THE VISIT IS INTENDED AS ONE OF A SERIES OF BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS
WITH OUR EC PARTNERS ON PURELY COMMUNITY ISSUES - MOST

IMPORTANTLY THE EC BUDGET. THEY WILL ADD THAT MR HURD HAS HAD
SIMILAR DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS DUTCH, FRENCH AND GREEK COUNTER-
PARTS AND THAT I HAVE MET THE OTHER EC FOREIGN MINISTERS AND
THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION TO DISCUSS THESE QUESTIONS. IF
ASKED WHY MORE NOTICE OF MR HURD'S VISIT WAS NOT GIVEN NEWS
DEPARTMENT WILL SAY THAT FOR SECURITY REASONS IT IS NOT OUR
PRACTICE TO ANNOUNCE MINISTERIAL VISITS TO IRELAND IN ADVANCE.

3. PLEASE PUT THE TEXT IN PARAGRAPH 1 TO THE DFA ADDING THAT
WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY COMMENTS BY THE END OF THE WEEK.

PYM

NORTHERN IRELAND
LIMITED

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
NORTHERN IRELAND

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MR URE

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL

*Pl. file on papers about
Mr. Abbott*



From: The Rt. Hon. J. ENOCH POWELL, M.B.E., M.P.,

IRELAND

House of Commons,
London, S.W.1.

A09673

21st October 1982

Dear Sir Robert,

Thank you for your reply of 7th October. Our talk has now been arranged for 10.45 a.m. next Monday, 25th October.

Before we meet, I thought you would like to know that since last writing I have obtained photocopies of the notebook leaves on which Mr Sloan made his notes during the two interviews with Mr Abbott, in February and November 1981, of which you have his transcripts. These confirm beyond any rational doubt the veracity of the statements and of the crucial expressions attributed to Mr Abbott in the transcripts and reported by Mr Sloan, within a few hours of the interviews taking place, to Jim Molyneux (in the case of the first) and to myself (in the case of the second).

To illustrate this, I have underlined in red in the enclosed transcript of the first interview the words which appear in the notebook as written down at the time. (The questions, which were prepared beforehand, are of course verbatim.)

I should perhaps add that Jim Molyneux has physically inspected the notebooks and authenticated in writing the genuineness of the photocopies.

Yours sincerely,

Sir Robert Armstrong, KCB, CVO,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

February 1981

Q1 What has been the influence of the AD Hoc Committee on Northern Ireland vis à vis the State Department's attitude to Northern Ireland?

A1 There are only 132 members of the committee. It is not an official Committee, tends to be dominated by the 'four horsemen' (Kennedy, Carey, Biaggio and Moynihan). Kennedy's attitude since the mid-seventies has [mellowed] considerably. It still has strong connections with Noraid and the Irish National Caucus, which is the leading propaganda organisation. The main figure is Father Sean McManus, brother of Frank McManus. Money is still flowing to the I R A via Noraid, but on a much reduced scale. It is possible to trace the amounts through the Foreign Charities Register at the State Department. Haughey went as far as far as to condemn this flow of money in a speech made on 27th July, 1980. There still exists in the United States a monumental ignorance about Northern Ireland. John Hume is in Washington at the minute. He will be giving a briefing at the Council of Foreign Relations, at which General Haig will be present.

"changed"

Q2 Is it true to say that between May and October 1979 there was consultation between the two governments on Northern Ireland and that after coming to power the Tory Party changed its policies on Northern Ireland?

A2 Before the Conservative Party came to power in 1979 it had promised that local government functions would be returned to local councils. [We had to tell them that it was just not on. In terms of the future government of Northern Ireland integration is a non-starter for two main reasons. First, we would automatically lose the co-operation we are getting from Haughey over border security. Secondly, we couldn't break certain undertakings we have given to the Irish government over the constitutional future of Northern Ireland.

"bla"

Q2a Is not the proposal to introduce a number of extra seats in Westminster for Northern Ireland a move towards integration?

A2a Firstly, the Unionists will not get all the five seats. We would see that this does not happen by gerrymandering the boundaries. I think one can say the SDLP will take at least three of the new seats. I look forward to seeing John Hume, who is a personal friend, establishing a power base in the House of Commons as well as in the European Parliament. For its part the United States government will not interfere in or attempt to prescribe any solution. As I have said before, a devolved government with power returning to local councils is not on. But an assembly which controlled such things as housing, through our already established quango, NIHE, given preliminary powers which would be extended progressively is a possibility. But any such developments would have to involve close consultation with the Irish government. Some of these proposals would be accepted by enlightened Unionists (like) Derek Trimble of Queen's University. He also is a personal friend, and has kept us well informed about what is going on inside Jim Molyneaux's party for a number of years. On the demand for integration, Molyneaux recently picked up on this [aspect] by putting forward a Scottish dimension.....

"2.9"

"point"

(Phone rings)

Q3 In a statement before the House of Representatives Sub-committee on Europe and the Middle East on 12th July, 1979 Mr George West stated: "the Irish discussion took place in the course of an afternoon when they started on Africa". Can one infer from this that the Northern Ireland conflict is seen as an international conflict similar to that of Rhodesia or South Africa, which demands co-operation and consultation between the two governments?

A3 Due to Carrington's attitude to Northern Ireland it has become swept up in the international problems. It has been suggested that Carrington should go to Northern Ireland. Abroad, Northern Ireland is the only part of the shoe which pinches. It causes us many problems at the U.N. However, under the Reagan administration, the influence of the Irish-American lobby will probably decline. Reagan's mother was an Ulster Protestant; Reagan himself has many of the Ulster Protestant virtues.

Q4 What evidence is there that there has occurred a revival of links between Senators and Congressmen and groups supporting the IRA that were established during the last campaign of 1956-63?

A4 The main link has been Congressman (Ulster) Wolf who has recently been advocating official Senate hearings. Unfortunately at the end of the 1960s in the United States we were put on trial. Looking at the whole thing historically the 1921 treaty was a sound deal in which Northern Ireland should never have existed. The Boundary Commission of 1925, whose papers were not released until 1968 certainly confirms that proposition.

Q5 Have there been any incidents where disagreement between the two governments has arisen over Northern Ireland?

A5 Obviously incidents such as Bloody Sunday resulted in a certain amount of friction being generated. Generally there have been good relations between the two governments. When accusations have been made against RUC officers, this has resulted in us having to sit fast. In any final settlement we have to realise that the United States will be given a discreet role to play especially in the financial field. Generally the two bureaucratic machines of the State Department and the Foreign Office work close together.

Q6 There have recently been a number of statements coming from Unionist politicians accusing the Foreign Office of trying to undermine the Union. Why do you think they made these accusations?

A6 This type of statement has come mainly from Powell and is considered cranky by the Foreign Office. However, the Official Unionists have always homed in on the Foreign Office; luckily we have escaped most of their attentions. They have also failed to pick up on the fact that successive British governments were primarily responsible for the situation that came to a head in 1968, not the Stormont government. Powell also seems to be leading the official Unionists up a political cul-de-sac. We shall be watching very very closely the results of the May local elections and their outcome will

determine very much what we do. Although it can be said that Paisley has dropped a few catches recently. This policy of integration will only guarantee more violence here and in Northern Ireland. Roughly speaking, one bomb in the United Kingdom is worth 100 in Northern Ireland. We cannot allow further violence in the U.K. In the end I think that there will be a confederal Ireland, one could call it an honourable draw, in which a package would be put together whereby Protestant rights would be guaranteed. There would be some re-alignment with the Commonwealth and the Irish Republic and a defence agreement would also be made. There is less certainty than there has been in the past about the strategic irrelevance of Southern Ireland. You know that a submarine can be used for more functions than the launching of missiles! The Americans would sleep easier in their beds if the Irish Republic was a member of NATO. The Irish Republic will not enter into any defence agreement until the issue of partition is resolved. It is a very similar position to that which existed during the Second World War, though I doubt if the Unionist politicians would realise this, as they have no credible research departments in their party structures. It is also possible that a future left-wing Labour government would go for a confederal Ireland and it was one of the options put forward in a Labour party pamphlet published recently. As to what the phrase "the totality of the relationships between these islands" means, I just do not know what it means. It is something that Thatcher and Haughey cooked up together. Both Irish and British Civil Servants were left in the dark as to how exactly to interpret it.

"U.S."
"in"
"finished"

"no"

"meaning"

"don't know meaning"

CF pps?

B

15 October 1982

Thank you for your letter of 13 October to Mr. Scholar, the contents of which have been noted.

TIMOTHY FLESHER

T. Carlin, Esq.

bre

IRISH CONGRESS OF TRADE UNIONS NORTHERN IRELAND COMMITTEE

13 October 1982

1/9 Castle Arcade Belfast BT1 5DG. Tel: 0232-241452

H1/1/tc/mt


Mr. I. Scholar
Office of the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London S.W. 1

Dear Mr. Scholar

The Northern Ireland Committee considered your letter of 16 September, and I am writing to inform you that the Committee does not accept the rejection by the Prime Minister of the request to meet with her to discuss the extreme economic plight of the Province.

The Northern Ireland Committee is currently preparing a programme of interim measures in relation to the economic situation here, and will be renewing its request for a meeting when the document is finalised.

Yours sincerely



T. CARLIN
NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICER

Mr. Fletcher
over to you.
ack
MCS 14/10
GA
Re attach to pps
and hite Kay 24/10
14/10

NORTHERN IRELAND: ADVANCE COPIES 20

18

Ireland

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
~~SIR J BULLARD~~
~~MR GOODISON~~

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MR MARSHALL) N I O
MR ANGEL)
MR HARRINGTON)

SIR R ARMSTRONG) CABINET OFFICE
D I O)

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET (2)

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CHALLENGE TO MR HAUGHEY'S LEADERSHIP

1. MR HAUGHEY IS TO FACE A CHALLENGE TO HIS POSITION AS TAOISEACH AND LEADER OF FIANNA FAIL AT A MEETING OF THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY ON 6 OCTOBER WHICH WILL DISCUSS THE MOTION 'THAT THE FIANNA FAIL MEMBERS OF DAIL EIREANN HAVE NO CONFIDENCE IN CHARLES J. HAUGHEY AS LEADER OR TAOISEACH'.

2. THE MOTION WAS SUBMITTED LATE ON THE EVENING OF 1 OCTOBER BY A BACKBENCH TD AND SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN THE TAOISEACH'S SUPPORTERS BY SURPRISE. IT IS THE SECOND CHALLENGE TO MR HAUGHEY'S LEADERSHIP THIS YEAR: IN MARCH, AN ATTEMPT BY MR DES O'MALLEY FIZZLED OUT WHEN MR HAUGHEY LAUNCHED A VIGOROUS COUNTER-ATTACK. SO FAR, NO ALTERNATIVE CANDIDATE FOR THE LEADERSHIP HAS COME FORWARD, BUT IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED THAT IF THE CHALLENGE TO MR HAUGHEY IS SUCCESSFUL, THE BACKBENCH TD MR GEORGE COLLEY WOULD BE NOMINATED TO SUCCEED HIM.

3. DISSATISFACTION WITH MR HAUGHEY'S LEADERSHIP WITHIN THE PARTY HAS BEEN GROWING FOR SOME MONTHS. UNREST HAS BEEN CAUSED BY THE GOVERNMENT'S FREEZE ON PUBLIC SECTOR PAY AND SPENDING CUTBACKS AND THE SCANDALS INVOLVING THE FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE BROTHER-IN-LAW OF THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE. THE GOVERNMENT'S

AND THE SCANDALS INVOLVING THE FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE BROTHER-IN-LAW OF THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE. THE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO TACKLE THE COUNTRY'S SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS HAS ALSO CAUSED DISQUIET. ON 1 OCTOBER, MR HAUGHEY WAS FORCED TO TELL THE SENATE THAT THE CURRENT BUDGET DEFICIT WAS LIKELY TO BE IN EXCESS OF IR POUNDS 900 MILLION COMPARED WITH THE PROJECTED TOTAL OF IR POUNDS 679 MILLION ANNOUNCED IN THE BUDGET. A PUBLIC OPINION POLL PUBLISHED ON 18 SEPTEMBER REVEALED THAT 67% OF THOSE QUESTIONED WERE DISSATISFIED WITH THE GOVERNMENT, AND THAT THE GAP BETWEEN MR HAUGHEY AND DR FITZGERALD IN TERMS OF PREFERENCE FOR TAOISEACH HAD WIDENED TO 20 PERCENTAGE POINTS. A GENERAL ELECTION IS REGARDED AS POSSIBLE WITHIN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS, AND MR HAUGHEY'S CRITICS MUST HAVE CONCLUDED THAT FIANNA FAIL'S SLIM CHANCE OF FORMING THE NEXT GOVERNMENT WOULD BE IMPROVED BY MR HAUGHEY'S DEPARTURE.

4. IT IS TOO EARLY TO PREDICT THE OUTCOME OF THIS CHALLENGE. IT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY PLANNED, AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE WILL HAVE LEARNT SOME LESSONS FROM THE FAILURE IN MARCH. BUT MR HAUGHEY IS A SHREWD AND CLEVER POLITICIAN WITH A STRONG DESIRE TO STAY IN POWER. MUCH WILL DEPEND UPON THE MANOEUVRES WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE BEHIND THE SCENES OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS AS EACH SIDE ATTEMPTS TO WIN A MAJORITY IN THE PARTY.

FIGG

NNNNN

SENT/RECD AT 04:0820Z CB/BW

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IRELAND,

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File A4
ce lan Gow

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN
MR GEOFFREY SLOAN AND MR CLIVE ABBOTT

Thank you for your minute of 1 October (A09621) which followed up your discussion with the Prime Minister about the request from Mr Enoch Powell for an interview with you.

I confirm that the Prime Minister is content that you should see Mr Powell and make to him the points which you suggest. As you know her view is that what is really necessary to convince Mr Powell is to establish that the substance of the statements attributed by Mr Sloan to Mr Abbott is false.

F.R.B.

4 October 1982

SECRET

Ref. A09621

MR BUTLER

Yes

Following your conversation with Sir R. Armstrong this morning, shall I reply that you agree that he should see Mr. Powell and take the line he suggests, adding your comment that what is really necessary to convince Mr. Powell is to establish that the allegations ^{about} the transactions with the Dublin Government are fake?

Discussions Between Mr Geoffrey Sloan and Mr Clive Abbott

FERB

1.10.

On 27 July I sent your predecessor a memorandum reporting the results of the inquiries which had been made about the discussions between Mr Geoffrey Sloan and Mr Clive Abbott of the Northern Ireland Office.

2. Since that time Mr Molyneux has sent to Mr Gow Mr Sloan's notes of his second discussion with Mr Abbott on 17 November 1981. Mr Sloan has also provided photocopies of rough notes which were the basis of his summary of his first meeting with Mr Abbott on 26 January 1981.

3. Mr Enoch Powell MP remains unhappy with the written answers which the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has given him on this subject, and in successive public speeches he has reverted to the suggestion that relations between Northern Ireland Office officials and Dublin are closer than has been made public and are compromising the future of the union between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom. In these speeches he has continued to refer to the Sloan-Abbott conversations as evidence, and there is a suggestion that the response to the Prime Minister's instructions to me to "verify" Mr Sloan's account of those conversations has been a cover-up.

4. Mr Powell has now written to me, asking if I will be open to the suggestion that he and I should meet personally to talk about this subject. I attach a copy of his letter. In the Prime Minister's absence I have discussed this with Mr Gow, who has urged that I should see Mr Powell, and that he (Mr Gow) should be present when I do. He thinks that, if I were to refuse Mr Powell's request, Mr Powell would ask to see the Prime Minister herself; and she could hardly refuse to see him.

5. I do not think that it will be a very easy interview; but on balance I think that the right course is for me to agree to see Mr Powell. That would give me an opportunity of explaining that I have myself interviewed Mr Abbott at considerable length, to test his denial that he said many of the various things, and all the objectionable things, attributed to him in Mr Sloan's notes. The only

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conclusion to which I can come is that it is not now possible to establish exactly what Mr Abbott did say to Mr Sloan in meetings which undoubtedly took place. It is very possible that in his notes Mr Sloan attributes to the Government or to Mr Abbott as the Government's or Mr Abbott's own views things which Mr Abbott was citing as the views of other people outside Government. The evidence is also capable of bearing more sinister hypotheses; either that Mr Abbott did indeed say the things which Mr Sloan alleges he said, and is now denying them; or that the whole thing is a "frame-up" by Mr Sloan, with or without the connivance of members of the official Unionist Party. But I shall have to say to Mr Powell that I can see no possibility of establishing what actually happened; that Mr Abbott strenuously denies what is attributed to him; that it seems to me to be very possible that there were considerable misunderstandings between Mr Sloan and Mr Abbott in the course of the interviews; and that on the evidence available is not possible either to disprove Mr Sloan's allegations or to refute Mr Abbott's denials.

6. I mentioned this briefly to the Prime Minister at our meeting this morning, when I showed her Mr Powell's letter; she was inclined to agree that I should see Mr Powell but I should be grateful if you could confirm that.

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

1 October 1982

SECRET

GR

CONFIDENTIAL

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FM WASHINGTON 292335Z SEP 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3195 OF 29 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY).

BIS NEW YORK NIO BELFAST NIO LONDON DUBLIN

INFO SAVING CGS IN U S A.

NORTHERN IRELAND: EXTRADITION OF WILLIAM JOSEPH QUINN

1. AFTER 4 MONTHS OF DELIBERATIONS, THE SAN FRANCISCO MAGISTRATE DELIVERED HIS VERDICT TODAY IN THE CASE OF WILLIAM JOSEPH QUINN, THE PIRA TERRORIST WHO IS WANTED IN BRITAIN FOR THE MURDER IN 1975 OF A POLICE CONSTABLE AND FOR CONSPIRACY TO CAUSE EXPLOSIONS. THE COURT HAS FOUND QUINN EXTRADITABLE ON BOTH COUNTS. QUINN WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY APPEAL AND THE LEGAL PROCESS COULD DRAG ON FOR SOME TIME. BUT THIS IS NONETHELESS A MAJOR SUCCESS, THE FIRST TIME AN IRA CASE HAS GONE OUR WAY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MAY WISH TO TAKE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MENTION THE CASE TO MR SHULTZ AND THANK HIM FOR THE VIGOROUS WAY IT HAS BEEN PROSECUTED BY THE US AUTHORITIES.

2. WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED THE COURT'S FINDING WHICH RUNS TO OVER 100 PAGES. THE US ATTORNEY IN SAN FRANCISCO TELLS US THAT IT IS CAREFULLY WORDED WITH A VIEW TO LIMITING QUINN'S CHANCES OF A SUCCESSFUL APPEAL. AS IS NORMAL IN SUCH CASES, THE COURT FOUND THAT IN ORDER SUCCESSFULLY TO INVOKE THE POLITICAL OFFENCES EXCEPTION CLAUSE OF THE US/UK EXTRADITION TREATY QUINN WAS OBLIGED TO DEMONSTRATE

- (A) THAT THERE WAS AN UPRISING OR CIVIL REBELLION AT THE TIME OF HIS CRIME;
- (B) THAT HE WAS A MEMBER OF A GROUP DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE UPRISING AND
- (C) THAT HIS CRIME WAS DIRECTLY RELATED TO FURTHERING THAT UPRISING.

THE COURT DECIDED THAT THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND AT THE TIME (1974/5) DID CONSTITUTE A VIOLENT POLITICAL UPRISING OF SUFFICIENT MAGNITUDE TO BRING INTO PLAY THE POLITICAL OFFENCE EXCEPTION. HOWEVER, THE SAME WAS NOT TRUE OF LONDON, THE SCENE OF QUINN'S CRIME. THE COURT WENT ON TO DISMISS QUINN'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS A PROVEN MEMBER OF THE IRA OR THAT THERE WAS A CLEAR CHAIN OF COMMAND WHICH SHOWED THAT HE WAS ACTING ON PIRA ORDERS. QUINN HAD NOT HIMSELF GONE INTO THE WITNESS BOX AND THERE WAS NO CLEAR EVIDENCE OF POLITICAL COMMITMENT ON HIS PART OR EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT HE WAS ANYTHING BUT A HANGER-ON OR COMMON CRIMINAL. FINALLY, THE COURT FOUND THAT THE MURDER OF POLICE CONSTABLE TIBBLE (WHO WAS IN CIVILIAN DRESS AND OFF DUTY AT THE TIME AND THEREFORE NOT IDENTIFIABLE AS A POLICEMAN) WAS CRIMINAL AND

CONFIDENTIAL

REMOVED FROM THE POLITICAL AIMS OF THE PROVISIONAL IRA. EQUALLY, IT WAS THE NATURE OF THE CRIME, RATHER THAN THE RESPONSE OF HMG TO IT, WHICH DETERMINED THE EXISTENCE OF A POLITICAL OFFENCE.

3. AS REGARDS THE BOMBING ATTACKS, THESE WERE ANARCHIST IN NATURE AND DIRECTED AGAINST INNOCENT PEOPLE. THERE COULD BE NO DIRECT LINK BETWEEN THEM AND THE SUPPOSED POLITICAL GOALS OF THE IRA.

4. THE US ATTORNEY HAS TOLD US THAT THE COURT'S FINDING CONTAINS SOME AMMUNITION THAT WOULD BE USEFUL TO US IN ANY FUTURE CASE, AND IT HELPS TO SET A DESIRABLE PRECEDENT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THIS CASE, WHICH HAS GONE OUR WAY, AND THE PREVIOUS CASES WHICH HAVE NOT, DOES NOT LIE IN A CHANGE OF VIEW BY THE US COURTS ABOUT THE PROVISIONAL IRA BUT IN THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF QUINN'S CRIMES. IT IS CLEAR FROM THIS RULING THAT IF WE WERE AGAIN TO FACE A CASE LIKE THAT OF DESMOND MACHIN (AN ATTACK ON A SOLDIER IN NORT ERN IRELAND) WE SHOULD STILL FACE AN UPHILL TASK IN SECURING EXTRADITION. NONETHELESS THIS RESULT WILL BE A BIG BLOW TO PIRA AND THEIR AGENTS HERE. IT ENABLES US TO SAY THAT THE US COURTS HAVE REJECTED THE CONTENTIONS OF A PIRA TERRORIST THAT HIS CRIMES WERE SOMEHOW EXCUSABLE BY VIRTUE OF POLITICAL MOTIVATION. THE VERDICT MAY ALSO HELP DETER PIRA FROM TREATING THE UNITED STATES AS A SAFE HAVEN.

WRIGHT.

NORTHERN IRELAND

LIMITED

RID
NAD
INFO D
WED
MAED
NEWS D
SEC D
PUSD
PS
PS/MR HURD

PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
LORD N GORDON LENNOX
MR GIFFARD
MR ADAMS
MR GOODISON
MR URE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

NORTHERN IRELAND

2

CONFIDENTIAL

OO HONG KONG

GRS 382

UNCLASSIFIED

FM F.C.O. 271913Z SEP 82

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 780 OF 27 SEPTEMBER

AND TO HONG KONG (FOR PM'S PARTY)

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPARTMENT

WAS RECEIVED FROM DUBLIN TELEGRAM NUMBER 267 OF 27 SEPTEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE N I O BELFAST

INFO SAVING BIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

*Ireland**mt*NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY: STATEMENTS BY THE TAOISEACH.

1. MR HAUGHEY HAS MADE FURTHER UNHELPFUL STATEMENTS ABOUT THE NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY IN THE PAST FEW DAYS. THE IRISH TIMES OF 25 SEPTEMBER REPORTED AN INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN THE NEW YORK TIMES OF THE PREVIOUS DAY IN WHICH THE TAOISEACH IS QUOTED AS SAYING:

"WE ARE BITTERLY DISAPPOINTED BY THIS LATEST BRITISH INITIATIVE. WE BELIEVE IT IS UNWORKABLE AND DOOMED TO FAILURE. AND AFTER IT HAS FAILED, THE SITUATION WILL BE FAR WORSE THAN BEFORE."

THE CATHOLIC MINORITY FACED THE "APPALLING" PROSPECT OF A RETURN TO ONE PARTY UNIONIST RULE.

2. MR HAUGHEY MADE A FURTHER ATTACK ON THE ASSEMBLY AT THE ANNUAL FIANNA FAIL COMMEMORATION OF THE IRISH PATRIOT WOLFE TONE AT BODENSTOWN ON 26 SEPTEMBER. AFTER SPEAKING OF TONE HE SAID:

"OVER MOST OF IRELAND THERE IS A FREE AND SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT DETERMINED BY LEGITIMATE MEANS TO UPHOLD THE RIGHTS AND SUPPORT THE JUST DEMANDS OF THOSE WHO WISH TO BE RE-UNITED WITH US IN FREEDOM AND IN PEACE."

"TODAY WE FACE A RENEWED POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN IRELAND, ARISING FROM THE PRESENT ATTEMPT IN THE WORDS OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY OF STATE 'TO TIE NORTHERN IRELAND INTO THE UNITED KINGDOM' FOREVER. IN THIS PART OF THE ISLAND THERE ARE THOSE WHO URGE US TO ACCEPT AND TO COLLABORATE IN THIS FRUITLESS AND INHERENTLY DETRIMENTAL PROJECT. ON THE OTHER HAND THERE ARE THOSE WHO DESECRATE OUR IDEALS BY STEALTHY AND HORRIBLE ACTS. BUT FIANNA FAIL WILL PURSUE A STRAIGHT COURSE BETWEEN THESE TWO EXTREMES AND CONTINUOUSLY ASSERT THE RIGHT OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF IRELAND TO INFLUENCE DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND TO PURSUE ITS OWN SEPARATE ENLIGHTENED POLICY ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. OUR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE IS NOT FOR SALE."

3. COPIES OF THE BODENSTOWN STATEMENT FOLLOW BY BAG TO R I D, NIO/SIL AND NIO/PAB.

4. SEE M I F T FOR COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

5. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO BIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

FOHO 45/27

28 0600

OO HONG KONG

GRS 200

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F C O 271958Z SEP 82

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 779 OF 27 SEPTEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY.

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPARTMENT
WAS RECEIVED FROM DUBLIN TELEGRAM NUMBER 268 OF 27 SEPTEMBER.

FM DUBLIN 271200Z SEP 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 268 OF 27 SEPTEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO BIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

MIPT: MR HAUGHEY'S STATEMENTS.

1. EVEN BY MR HAUGHEY'S STANDARDS AND ALLOWING FOR THE
REPUBLICAN VENUE, THIS IS AN UNHELPFUL AND OFFENSIVE SPEECH.
I RECOMMEND THAT I SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO TAKE IT UP WITH THE DFA.
I COULD REMIND DONLON OF HIS ASSURANCE THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT
WOULD NOT INTERFERE IN THE PROCESS WE HAD STARTED (MY TELNO 249)
AND REFVER TO MR PRIOR'S ROTARY SPEECH OF 20 SEPTEMBER TO CORRECT
THE MORE OBVIOUS DISTORTIONS. IN VIEW OF THE REFERENCE TO THE
PROSPECT OF ONE-PARTY UNIONIST RULE (MIPT PARA 1) YOU MAY
WISH TO CONSIDER WHETHER A MINISTERIAL RESPONSE IS ALSO NECESSARY.
2. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT MR NICHOLAS SCOTT'S
PROPOSED VISIT TO DUBLIN ON FRIDAY, 1 OCTOBER SHOULD PROCEED
(NIO BELFAST TELNO 003 TO DUBLIN - NOT TO FCO). IT WOULD APPEAR
DISTINCTLY ODD FOR HIM TO ATTEND A FUNCTION AT WHICH MR HAUGHEY
IS THE LEAD FIGURE SO SOON AFTER HIS BODENSTOWN REMARKS.
3. I ALSO RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD DELAY RAISING MR HURD'S
PROPOSED NOVEMBER VISIT WITH THE IRISH UNTIL THE DUST HAS
SETTLED. WE DO NOT WISH TO APPEAR TO BE RUNNING AFTER THEM
REGARDLESS OF REBUFFS AND AS THERE IS PLENTY OF TIME THERE IS
NO REASON WHY THE VISIT ITSELF SHOULD BE DELAYED.

FIGG.



From: The Rt. Hon. J. ENOCH POWELL, M.B.E., M.P.,

House of Commons,
London, S.W.1.

PERSONAL

Dear Sir Robert,

CABINET OFFICE
A 8567
27 SEP 1982
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

24th September 1982.

I enclose a speech which I am delivering tomorrow. I did not find it possible to say what I had to say without conveying, at least by implication, a reflection upon yourself; but I am not happy to have found this necessary, and I would rather be in the position of supporting and defending the servants of government than of exposing them to public criticism and attack.

This leads me to wonder if you would be open to the suggestion of our meeting personally to talk about this subject. I hope you would. In view of the involvement of the Prime Minister's responsibility, I am sending a copy of this to her P.P.S.

Yours sincerely,
Enoch Powell

Sir Robert Armstrong, K.C.B., C.V.O.,
10, Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

EMBARGO: Time of Delivery

Speech by the Rt. Hon. J. Enoch Powell, MP, to the Annual Dinner of the Young Newspapermen's Association at the Culloden Hotel, Belfast at 8 p.m. Saturday, 25th September, 1982.

It was Walter Bagehot who, by a brilliant characterisation, once described his countrymen as "deferential". I do not think there is room for doubt about the general aptness of the epithet; but the public and the newspaper profession itself would probably not choose "deferential" as the most obvious description to apply to the Press. On the contrary, it is ruthless pursuit and exposure of the truth, uninhibited by fear or favour - and least of all by fear or favour of politicians or governments - that is assumed to distinguish the British Press.

It would be in the public interest if that assumption were always well-founded. We, however, who are in the business of politics learn by experience that the assumption is often sadly wide of the fact, and that the Press is capable of turning a blind eye to matters even of deep public concern when the possessors of political power and patronage prefer they should not be perceived or investigated. I want to illustrate that proposition in the recent context of Northern Ireland, not so much because the venue of your meeting tonight is in this province as because "deeds ill done" in this part of the kingdom deeply touch the honour, the well-being and the safety of the nation as a whole.

I am not, and I emphasise this, directing what I have to say at the press of this province itself. It is natural and understandable that, where so much of the information and briefing is bound to come from government - from "Stormont", as we say - those who are dependent upon this material should not court excommunication by indiscreet disclosure or by impertinent curiosity. It is also natural, if a political party, believed important enough to affect circulation, were to express dissatisfaction with the coverage or presentation being received, steps should be taken to remedy the cause of discontent. Such considerations, however, do

not extend to the national press, where evidence of uninquisitiveness would give more occasion for surprise and anxiety.

In June this year, in the course of debate on the Bill to establish an elected assembly in Northern Ireland, I took, after long deliberation, a serious and unusual step, and one which a privy councillor would not take without grave cause and good reason. I quoted from an interview given privately in February 1981 by a named civil servant in the Northern Ireland Office, which cast a vivid but sinister light upon the motives and context of the legislation and verified a prediction made at the time of the last Election by a Conservative Party adviser as to the course of events which would follow in Northern Ireland after the change of government.

The statements in the interview amounted to a demonstration that successive Secretaries of State and the Prime Minister herself had been and were the witting or unwitting executors, stage by stage, of a consistent and continuing process devised by officials, which was designed to result in an all-Ireland state embracing Ulster.

The full note of the interview was communicated by the Leader of my Party to the Prime Minister and thus to the Secretary of State, and copies were available to the Press and to interested members of the House of Commons. I am not going to overindulge in quotation; but the nature and importance of the material may be illustrated by one long excerpt from a subsequent interview given in November 1981 in the same circumstances, the full text of which has been similarly communicated by Mr. Molyneux. I quote (Mr. Clive Abbott, the civil servant in question, is speaking):

The Heath Government in March 1973 acknowledged the Irish Dimension. Rees helped to keep up momentum in the first 3/4 months of his office. After the fall of the power-sharing government we had to rethink it all. Roy Mason stopped all political movement. All the emphasis was on security co-operation

and nothing else. Anglo/Irish relations in other areas were not very good. On the security side the IRA came near to total defeat. Thatcher, when she first came to power, wanted to continue this emphasis on security co-operation only, and she wanted to bring to fruition the Neave idea of a return to local government. In the past 2½ years it has come to be recognised by No. 10 that the Republic must have some sort of say in the constitutional position of N.I. One should not get too excited over Fitzgerald's proposals to change articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution. It will be hard to get them changed in terms of domestic rule. But it is a way of holding a pistol to H.M.G.'s head and putting pressure on us for further movement. I don't think Fitzgerald has thought it through. It won't change Protestant opinion. The Dublin Summit of December 1980 was really about high visibility. Thatcher wanted a lot of gold braided in front. Howe and a few other ministers didn't really know why they were there, he and others were told just to shut up and smile. Thatcher recognized in that Summit that she now aims to act in the interest of the United Kingdom as a whole, not just N.I. and unionists are going to have to recognize that she is entitled to have this view taken seriously. The hunger-strike showed what advances have been made. Fitzgerald, by and large, kept his side of the bargain. He slapped down O'Leary when he was inert. He didn't want to upset the apple-cart, because he knew there was a summit coming up. The hunger strike resulted in a lot of diplomatic pressure being put on us especially from France and the Irish-American lobby."

That is one excerpt - here is the other.

"In any final settlement for the island of Ireland the entire Irish situation will have to be re-written. There will also be a considerable degree of autonomy in any future federal Ireland, although it will be a lopsided federation with one 26-county unit and one 6-county unit. But a political settlement for the island will have to be fudged, and there are a number of ways this can be done. (1) A new federal republic which would come into existence would join NATO; if partition is removed, then the Dublin Government have said that this would be no problem. (2) Alongside this the Commonwealth can be brought into practice. It is in effect a loose federation of English-speaking states, and we can play up the Crown or play it down, depending on who we are talking to. We can say to the Unionists: look, the Queen is the head of the Commonwealth, and let them fly their flags on certain occasions and keep them happy. Then we can say to the Republic that India is a republic with a president, yet a member of the Commonwealth."

I need not underline the intense interest and importance of this material, provided only that it is substantially genuine. That it is so, has been doubted by no political correspondent at Westminster to whom I have spoken. Indeed, there is no room for doubt, for a number of distinct and independent reasons. In particular, the interviews made reference to certain events which could not have been known to the interviewer. They tallied with

information from independent, confidential sources, which was not available to him. They outlined the contents of Mr. Prior's Bill six months before he even came into his present office. Above all, they supplied the intelligible key to a course of events which over the years have baffled those outside government who participated in them. The hypothesis of fiction or forgery is simply not visible.

The interest and importance of the material is not confined to Northern Ireland. It is a matter for national concern if one or more departments of State are conducting the international policy of this country behind the backs of the responsible Ministers and the Cabinet, or alternatively if responsible Ministers are concealing from Parliament and the public the true nature of the policies on which they are engaged. The parallelism and relevance of the investigation now being carried out into events leading up to the invasion of the Falkland Islands is too obvious to need pointing out.

One would have felt entitled to assume that, as responsible for the Civil Service, the Prime Minister would have insisted upon getting at the truth of a matter brought to attention in the way I have described. Indeed, the head of the Civil Service, Sir Robert Armstrong, was instructed to make such an enquiry on her behalf. One would also have assumed that unless the Secretary of State was himself aware of, and party to, the implications of the interview given by one of his departmental civil servants, implications flatly contradictory to his statements and assurances in the House of Commons, he would not have rested until he had extracted a full disclosure.

As it is, an informal talk with Mr. Abbott's interviewer by a comparatively junior official and a bland disclaimer issued by Mr. Prior in a parliamentary written answer on the eve of the

Recess, dutifully but obscurely printed by some of the newspapers, is the sum total of what happened. No confrontation, no cross-examination, no interrogation of other officials, no acceptance of the offer made by Mr. Molyneux and myself to place ourselves at Sir Robert Armstrong's disposal.

When government is so uninquisitive, the duty of inquisition might be thought, in a free society, to devolve upon the Press. These are matters, it might be thought, about which the public are entitled to know and to expect that the relentless curiosity of the Press, which so often pursues the private affairs and personal griefs of humble folk in order to drag into the light truth however distasteful or unswoury, will be put at their service, in order to prevent government from successfully taking refuge behind a screen of nonchalant 'know nothing'. It is little wonder if the unworthy suspicion is sometimes entertained that when the firedoors close in the corridors of power, the newspaper world is liable to take the hint and leave unturned the stones which hide embarrassment for the purveyors of patronage and the holders of authority.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 September 1982

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 3 September in which you ask to meet her to discuss employment and the prospects for the Northern Ireland economy.

The Prime Minister is fully alive to many problems, both economic and social, which exist in the Province, and appreciates the great difficulties which its people have had to face for such a long time. Indeed she remembers that at your last meeting with her, you presented the case for Northern Ireland most forcibly.

Mrs. Thatcher regrets, however, that, because of her existing commitments, she will not be able to meet you on this occasion. Rather, she would like to suggest that the points which you wish to make be put directly to the Secretary of State who, she understands, has a meeting with you at Stormont Castle on Monday.

M. C. SCHOLAR

Terry Carlin, Esq.

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

John Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

16 September 1982

Dear Tom,

Your letter of 6 September asked for advice as to whether the Prime Minister should meet the Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions. I am sorry not to have been able to reply sooner.

As you will see from the draft, we consider that a meeting at No 10 would serve no useful purpose at this stage and would suggest that any points that NIC/ICTU wish to raise ought to be put to Mr Prior at their meeting on Monday (arranged some time ago to discuss youth training provision).

*Yours sincerely
Mike Hopkins*

M W HOPKINS

Pl type

DRAFT LETTER

FILE NUMBER.....

ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE.....

To	Enclosures	Copies to be sent to
<p>Terry Carlin Esq Northern Ireland Officer Northern Ireland Committee Irish Congress of Trade Unions 1/a Castle Arcade, Belfast BT1 5DG</p> <p>(Full Postal Address)</p>		<p>(Full Address, if Necessary)</p>

LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY PS./PRIME MINISTER
(Name of Signatory)

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Mrs Thatcher regrets however that, because of her existing commitments, she will not be able to meet you on this occasion. Rather, she would like to suggest that the points which you wish to make be put directly to the Secretary of State who, she understands, has a meeting with you at Stormont Castle on Monday.

BB

16 SEP 1982

16 SEP 1982



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

May Tony Newton
represent Norman Fowler at
E tomorrow?

MUS 7/9

PRIME MINISTERNORTHERN IRELAND: A NEW ECONOMIC INITIATIVE

Mr Prior's proposals fall unhappily together, and to some might tend to give the impression of a province whose tax system is halfway to declaring UDI from the mainland. Such a combination of measures seems scarcely politically wise, either from his own point of view or from that of the Government as a whole. Reaction in the rest of the UK might be: "I thought Northern Ireland was supposed to be part of Britain. If these measures are good for them, why can't we have them too?"

1. That is a pity, because there is much to be said for the reduction in the National Insurance Surcharge, applicable only to private sector firms in especially depressed areas. This improved version of the Regional Employment Premium was first suggested in this office. It attacks the distortion in the present labour market in these areas which discriminates against employment of the unskilled and low-paid. It would help to remove the bias against labour-intensive firms, particularly in the services sector. We originally hoped that such a scheme could be financed through the European Regional Development Fund, but the FCO said there were legal difficulties. Now the FCO is re-examining the idea. By any standards, Northern Ireland with its desperate employment problem ought to be entitled to a generous scoop from the pool.
2. I am not convinced that the Corporation Tax Relief Grant would be much of an improvement on the present system, assuming it is envisaged as a replacement and not an addition. And here Mr Prior's reasoning is a little muddly. He declines to say what would be reduced to pay for it, on the grounds that he cannot precisely estimate the cost so far ahead. But at the very least, the Treasury is entitled to a statement of intent. Uncovered commitments are the bane of modern British Government.
3. Mr Prior rightly draws back from his officials' third proposal, for a full-blown incomes policy to operate in Northern Ireland - and, they urge, on the rest of the UK. This somewhat mischievous suggestion masks one or two sensible detailed proposals for breaking the link between national wage agreements and Northern Ireland rates of pay. These ought to be pursued piecemeal and not merged into an SDP-type incomes policy.

4. The Northern Ireland Office notes that there has been very little growth in services employment in the province as compared with the number of industrial companies attracted there. Does the 75% derating of industrial property and the lack of any derating for commercial property have something to do with this? A "rates holiday" for service firms providing new jobs would surely be a more attractive reduction in unavoidable costs than Corporation Tax relief on profits which have not yet been earned.

It might be preferable to tinker with a rating system which is already substantially different from that on the mainland, rather than tamper with a national tax like Corporation Tax.

5. We certainly do not wish to appear to be unreasonably frustrating Mr Prior's attempts to bring jobs to Northern Ireland. But in order to make sure that his Ulster initiative is seen to be a consistent part of a national campaign, we suggest that the Committee should confirm:
- (a) that regional reductions in NIS should not be confined to Northern Ireland but should be directed to other depressed areas in the context of the Quinlan review;
 - (b) that the FCO should make every effort to ensure that the cost is met out of the European Regional Development Fund;
 - (c) that the Government should welcome efforts by the Northern Ireland Office to encourage unions to bargain in accordance with regional and not national conditions, and that the Secretaries of State for Scotland, Wales and Employment should also point out the advantages of regional realism in their areas;
 - (d) that the Corporation Tax relief grant should be further considered and compared with other methods of assisting industry, particularly the services sector; and
 - (e) that any such measures ought to be accompanied by clear statements of how they are to be paid for.

fm

FERDINAND MOUNT

PRIME MINISTER

NORTHERN IRELAND - A NEW ECONOMIC INITIATIVE

1. Following our talk last evening, I have looked at the Memorandum dated 31st August, prepared by Jim Prior.
2. It is not quite as bad as I expected it to be.
3. In particular, I note that even he says that he will need to consider further the suggestion of statutory (?) wage control.
4. It is certainly the case that the tax climate for new businesses in the Republic is much more favourable than in Ulster.
5. I am extremely sceptical about the assertion made in paragraph 15 when Jim says:-

"I am seeking ways of redistributing my expenditure to make it more effective, not to increase it".

6. In the introduction to the White Paper "Northern Ireland - a Framework for Devolution", presented to Parliament in April 1982 Jim stated:-

"Political stability, economic recovery and the defeat of terrorism go hand in hand. Political instability discourages the domestic and international investment so vitally needed to create confidence, prosperity and jobs. There is a direct link between the creation of a durable and fair system of Government and the ending of the violence which has brought so much suffering to Protestant and Catholic alike. Confidence in political institutions and in the political process generally would further isolate the terrorist, and sharpen the contrast between terrorist crimes and the pursuit of political goals by peaceful means".

7. In his speech on 10th May, introducing the Second Reading of the Northern Ireland Bill, Jim said this:-

"My right and hon. Friends in their amendment say that the Bill will do nothing to achieve the defeat of terrorism or revive the economy of the Province. Of course the introduction of an Assembly will not directly and immediately achieve either objective. It would be naive to suppose that it could. But that does not apply if we lift our eyes to a longer time span. Few will doubt that political stability would have a beneficial effect upon investment and therefore employment in the Province, and this is an essential element in economic revival. Similarly, few would doubt that the willingness of all parts of the community to associate with the institutions of law and order would, in time, improve the supply of information and strengthen active and positive resistance to terrorism.

/Continued ...

7. (cont) "The Assembly is a necessary preliminary to political stability. The Bill does not deliver a better economy or better security, but without it we cannot proceed to later stages. Much patience and further negotiations will follow, and it will take time, but without the Assembly we cannot set out along this road. Of course, that makes for a different approach from that to the rest of the United Kingdom and as such raises constitutional issues and fears, but I ask the House most earnestly to consider the following proposition.


"Let us suppose that, for whatever reason, a sufficient measure of agreement were struck between the parties in Northern Ireland so that they were prepared to work together within an acceptable constitutional structure. Is there really any hon. Member here who would turn down that benefit simply to avoid restoring a constitutional anomaly which Northern Ireland has enjoyed for 50 years? Are we really saying that the admitted difficulties that arise from devolution and the so-called West Lothian question are not a price worth paying for a degree of political cooperation and harmony in Northern Ireland?"

8. As you know, I believe that the Northern Ireland Act, and the Election which will take place on 20th October will increase and not diminish political instability, and will heighten and not reduce the prospect of violence. I believe that future events will bear out this prediction.
9. Nevertheless, apart from the proposal for a statutory wages freeze, I am not as hostile to the proposals set out in the Memorandum dated 31st August as I expected that I would be.

10. I THINK THAT THIS IS WORTH A BATTLE
BUT NOT A WAR.

Ian

7th September 1982


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P.0846

PRIME MINISTER

Northern Ireland: New Economic Initiative

E(82)62 and 63

BACKGROUND

FLAG A
FLAG B
In E(82)62 the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland puts forward proposals for a new economic initiative in Northern Ireland based on the report by officials circulated as E(82)63.

2. The Secretary of State's main proposals are:

(a) that the National Insurance Surcharge (NIS) should be at least one percentage point lower in Northern Ireland than in Great Britain;

(b) that the Northern Ireland Department of Commerce should be empowered to pay a Corporation Tax Relief Grant which would repay probably 80 per cent of the Corporation Tax levied on profits earned in Northern Ireland.

The Secretary of State makes it clear that he is not asking for additional resources: the effects of the proposals on public expenditure and the PSBR would be offset by reductions in the Northern Ireland programme. This is in accordance with your summing up of the E(NI) discussion which led to the setting up of the studies in E(82)63.

3. The Secretary of State says that he wishes to consider further the third major proposal in the report by officials: ie, that the Government should attempt to reduce wages in Northern Ireland relative to those in Great Britain, for example by directing assistance only to private sector firms which restrain wages and by trying more directly to break the link between Northern Irish and mainland pay rates in the public sector.

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4. The Secretary of State wishes to announce the establishment of a lower Northern Ireland NIS and of a Corporation Tax Relief Grant in the near future together with other proposals made in the report by officials (which involve rationalising or changing the emphasis of the existing arrangements for assistance in Northern Ireland, and should not need discussion).

5. The Ministerial Steering Group on Government Strategy (MISC 14) has commissioned a study by officials of regional economic policy which is due to be available around the end of this year. The Secretary of State accepts that the Northern Ireland position will need to be reviewed in the light of its conclusions, but argues in effect, that action on the lines he recommends cannot and need not await them. The precise timing which Mr Prior has in mind is not clear. He refers to the fact that the elections for the new Assembly will take place on 20 October. For various reasons which are explained below it would be difficult to announce the two main proposals before then, even if they are eventually found to be acceptable. It may be however that Mr Prior would still see political advantage in announcing a new economic initiative for Northern Ireland in the late autumn after the Election.

MAIN ISSUES

6. You will want the discussion to cover the following points:

a. The case for some improvement, now, in the incentives to business in Northern Ireland.

b. The specific proposals for a differential NIS and a Corporation Tax Relief Grant.

c. Possible action to hold down wages in Northern Ireland relative to those in Great Britain.

General case for improved incentives

7. The Secretary of State puts forward two arguments for new economic measures in Northern Ireland:



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a. economic: Northern Ireland suffers higher unemployment than any other part of the United Kingdom; the disparity is likely to increase unless new action is taken;

b. political: the Government needs to show its continuing commitment to Northern Ireland.

8. The main general arguments against further measures appear to be as follows:

i. Northern Ireland already has more generous investment incentives than anywhere else in the United Kingdom (for example 30 per cent capital grants, compared with 22 per cent in mainland Special Development Areas); it is not clear that further improvements will bring much benefit.

ii. It may be difficult to justify yet further preferential treatment for Northern Ireland: while the average level of unemployment is higher than in any mainland region there are comparable 'black spots' throughout much of Great Britain; further special measures for Northern Ireland might therefore lead to calls for similar changes in Great Britain.

iii. It is premature to change the arrangements for industrial assistance in Northern Ireland before the Review of Regional Economic Policy is completed.

9. There are also particular difficulties about the two main proposals - for a differential NIS and a Corporation Tax relief grant. Although Mr Prior's proposals are based on the report (circulated as E(82)63) of an Official Working Party, on which the Treasury was represented, we understand that the Treasury consider that important issues, both of principle and of administration, affecting these proposals need to be more fully examined.

Differential NIS

10. The NIS, previously at 3.5 per cent, was reduced to 2 per cent from August this year to next April when it will rise to 2.5 per cent. This follows the decision announced in the last Budget. The lower rate from August 1982 to April 1983 was designed to compensate for the fact that, for administrative reasons, the reduction announced in the Budget could not take effect until several months later; there was



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thus a reduction of 1.5 per cent for two-thirds of a year in 1982-83 and a reduction of 1 per cent for the full year 1983-84. Any further reduction in the NIS generally to take effect from next April would need to be announced in early November following this year's public expenditure discussions.

11. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland argues that a rate of NIS at least one percentage point lower than in Great Britain would reduce the level of taxation on labour and would thus be particularly well suited to the circumstances of Northern Ireland where there is a need to shift the emphasis of the incentives away from fixed investment and towards employment.

12. There are however considerable difficulties about the proposal:

i. It would break new ground in charging a different rate of national tax in one part of the United Kingdom.

ii. As has been seen, in discussion of proposals to reduce the NIS generally, some are sceptical of the industrial benefits and believe that some or most of the reduction may leak into higher wages.

iii. Others who see merits in the reduction or abolition of NIS are likely to argue that such action should be taken generally and not confined to Northern Ireland; the announcement of a differential lower rate of NIS for Northern Ireland as part of a package of economic incentives would be seen as implying the continuance of NIS for the United Kingdom generally for some considerable time.

iv. The DHSS are likely to see administrative problems in charging two different rates of NIS on companies which have activities in both Northern Ireland and Great Britain.

v. It would be awkward to announce a differential lower rate of NIS for Northern Ireland until the Government has taken decisions about the rate of NIS generally in the context of the public expenditure discussions. (The report argues that if the NIS were abolished or if its rates were significantly changed, the impact on Northern Ireland's incentives would need to be reviewed; this implies some readiness to substitute a new incentive for the differential



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lower NIS at a later stage; it is not clear however what this might be and the Government would lack credibility if it announced a differential NIS for Northern Ireland but had to compensate for an erosion of its value soon afterwards).

Corporation Tax Relief Grant

13. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland argues that a Corporation Tax relief grant at the rate of 80 per cent would be particularly helpful in enabling Northern Ireland to compete for inward investment with the Republic of Ireland where there is a 10 per cent corporation tax for incoming firms.

14. This proposal is however open to one of the same objections as that to a differential rate of NIS. In effect, although not in form, it would mean that a lower rate of national tax would be levied in one part of the United Kingdom.

15. The Chief Secretary, Treasury, is likely to argue that Mr Prior seriously underestimates the administrative difficulty of introducing a Corporation Tax Relief Grant. Mr Prior argues that a grants scheme, administered by the Northern Irish Department of Commerce as part of a selective financial assistance package, would avoid the complex legislation and major administrative difficulties that would be required for an explicit reduction of corporation tax in Northern Ireland. But a tax relief grant would still require difficult judgements about the proportion of a company's profits which were deemed to be earned in Northern Ireland. It would also seem difficult to justify selective tax reductions - and the more selective the scheme is the less well it will look by comparison with the Irish Republic's 10 per cent rate of corporation tax.

16. The Chief Secretary may also argue that the tax relief grant would represent an undesirable public expenditure commitment in the longer term. For the proposed differential NIS which it has been possible to cost at £12.5 million a year, Mr Prior would find offsetting savings from his other expenditure. He considers however that any estimates of the cost of a Corporation Tax relief grant are too arbitrary and uncertain to justify offsetting cuts in the existing incentives package, although he makes it clear in paragraph 15 of his paper that he is not seeking agreement to an automatic addition to his programme total for the Corporation Tax relief grant, for the differential NIS or for any other proposal in the report now or in the future.



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European Community

17. The proposals would almost certainly require notification to the European Commission as regional aids; and it is unlikely that the Commission would decide before 20 October whether they should be authorised. Any early announcement would therefore have to be conditional on Commission authorisation. If the Committee supports the proposals, it would therefore be best to instruct officials urgently to consider the question of notification, to sound out the Commission informally, and to advise Ministers in the light of the Commission's reaction whether an early announcement should be made.

Northern Irish wage levels

18. Although there are obviously limits to the extent to which the Government can influence private sector wage levels in Northern Ireland, it would be fully in accordance with Government policy to advocate lower relative wages in an area of high unemployment and low productivity (see, for example, paragraph 1.13 and Annex IV of the note by officials circulated with E(82)63); and many industries and institutions in Northern Ireland have, or easily could have, separate wage-bargaining arrangements from those in Great Britain. Mr Prior says (paragraph 7 of his paper) that he supports this recommendation particularly where companies are in difficulty and seeking Government assistance or where they are in public ownership, but that it will be a highly sensitive issue and that he will need to consider it further. You may therefore wish to press him to come forward with positive proposals in this area.

HANDLING

19. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will want to introduce his proposals. The Chief Secretary, Treasury, will wish to comment generally on his proposals, as will other Ministers with responsibilities for economically depressed parts of the United Kingdom - the Secretary of State for Industry and the representatives of the Secretaries of State for Scotland and Wales. The Secretary of State for Social Services will probably want to comment on the proposal for a differential NIS; and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on the European Community aspects of Mr Prior's proposals. Mr Sparrow will also wish to contribute to the discussion.

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CONCLUSIONS

20. You will want the Committee to reach conclusions on the following points:

i. whether a new package of economic incentives for Northern Ireland should be announced this autumn in advance of the conclusions of the review of regional economic policy;

ii. in respect of the proposal for a lower rate of National Insurance Surcharge for Northern Ireland whether this:

a. is acceptable in principle, subject to further detailed work by officials;

b. should be ruled out now; or

c. should be examined further, for later consideration by the Committee;

iii. in respect of the proposal for a Corporation Tax relief grant whether this:


a. is acceptable in principle, subject to further detailed work by officials;

b. should be ruled out now; or

c. should be examined further, for later consideration by the Committee;

iv. whether the timing of any announcement should be considered further, bearing in mind any further work which may need to be done on ii. and iii. above and the need to consult the European Commission;

v. whether the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland should be invited to bring forward proposals to promote a reduction in wage levels in Northern Ireland relative to those in Great Britain.


P L GREGSON

7 September 1982

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Qa 06054

To: PRIME MINISTER

From: JOHN SPARROW

6 September 1982

Industrial Incentives in Northern Ireland

1. The memorandum by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland shows that the prospects for the economy and for jobs in the province are extremely gloomy. A fundamental improvement is required in the performance of the Northern Ireland economy. At present, it suffers from a legacy of weak traditional industries (like shipbuilding), low productivity, uncompetitive wage levels and an excessive dependence on public sector employment. The measures proposed by the Secretary of State should begin to move the economy in the right direction.

2. A number of the proposals will reduce the bias in the present package of industrial incentives towards subsidising capital as against labour. Such changes should encourage more profitable labour-using investment, and hence generate more jobs efficiently (a theme in our unemployment report, likely to be followed up in the Quinlan review of GB regional policy). Both major proposals are of this type:
 - A reduction in the National Insurance Surcharge for Northern Ireland would inject a regional dimension in what has hitherto been a uniform tax. The unique circumstances of Northern Ireland mean that it need not be viewed as a precedent; the Quinlan review will be examining whether there is a case for regional differentiation of such taxes in the rest of the United Kingdom.

 - The proposed Corporation Tax Relief Grant has a number of attractive features, in particular the fact that it will act as a reward for success. Thus while it may not increase the total investment in Northern Ireland, it should help to increase its quality. The CPRS supports its introduction.

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esv
Prime Minister (2)

Support for Mr Prior.

MUS 6/9

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There are of course still technical problems with the proposal, for example companies may seek to boost artificially their profits in Northern Ireland in order to gain tax advantages, but officials should be asked to tackle these when working out the details of the scheme.

3. Clearly the Secretary of State is right in saying that the public expenditure implications for the late 1980s can only be highly speculative, in such uncertain circumstances. Nevertheless there is one principle worth noting: if savings are needed at a later date, they should be found by means of a reduction in the rate of the Standard Capital Grant - as the officials' report points out, this would be consistent with the strategy of shifting the balance from capital to labour subsidies.

4. Reducing labour costs by exerting pressure on wages in the Province is also supported by the Secretary of State. The officials' report makes a number of specific suggestions about how this might be done (para 2.35), although it points out that there would be merit in applying most of the measures throughout the United Kingdom. The Secretary of State points out that this will be a highly sensitive issue (although less so if it is done less overtly) and wishes to consider it further. He might be asked to report back on the results of his further consideration at the same time as he presents a detailed scheme for a Corporation Tax Relief Grant.

5. I am sending a copy of this minute to Sir Robert Armstrong.

JS.

CONFIDENTIAL



FILE SW

Ireland: Situation
on R/V 8/9

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 September, 1982

BF

Economic Situation - Northern Ireland

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mr. Terence Carlin of the Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions. He recalls the Prime Minister's meeting with the Committee in August, 1980 and seeks a further meeting now to discuss the prospects for the Northern Ireland economy and employment in the Province. I should be grateful for your advice as to whether the Prime Minister should agree to such a meeting.

A. J. COLES

M. W. Hopkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office

so

IRISH CONGRESS OF TRADE UNIONS
NORTHERN IRELAND COMMITTEE

C/F PPS

1/9 Castle Arcade Belfast BT1 5DG. Tel: 0232-241452

3rd September, 1982.

Rt. Hon. M. Thatcher MP.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1.

26/9

Dear Prime Minister,

M

Economic Situation - Northern Ireland


^{P+2}
You will recall that you met the Northern Ireland Committee, ICTU in August, 1980 for a discussion on the economic situation then prevailing in the Province.

The unemployment situation has deteriorated ever since, and the unemployment register now stands 40% higher than when we last met you two years ago.

The Northern Ireland Committee would like to again discuss with you the prospects for the Northern Ireland economy and employment in the Province.

The Committee would be grateful if you would respond positively to our request.

Yours sincerely,



T. Carlin

Northern Ireland Officer.

TC/RMcC

1. ~~Mr. Fisher~~

2. P. a. Ireland

Ian Gow

Frank Miller from Jim Molyneaux's Office phoned.

Mr Molyneaux had asked two questions.

1. He requested the recall of Parliament to discuss the Northern Ireland Constitutional Bill.

He had heard that Jim Prior's Office would write to him about this.

2. He requested a meeting with the Prime Minister to discuss the SDLP's boycott of the Assembly.

Mr Molyneaux wanted to know the answer to his second request.

I spoke to Robin Butler who said that the Prime Minister had asked that Jim Prior should deal with both points, and he said that it would be all right for me to tell Frank Miller this, which I did.

Sally

Sally Dickson

27th August 1982

cc Robin Butler

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Tim Flesher Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

27 August 1982

Dear Tim ^{WV 27/8}

Thank you for your letter of 26 August relaying Mr Molyneaux's message to the Prime Minister.

... I attach for your information a copy of Mr Prior's reply (which was handed to Mr Molyneaux yesterday evening).

Yours sincerely
M W Hopkins

M W HOPKINS



e Gow Ireland/da
Press office

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 August 1982

As I mentioned on the phone, Jim Molyneaux's Personal Assistant phoned Ian Gow here earlier today with a message from Mr. Molyneaux which he said was likely to be released to the Press. The message is as follows:

"Following the SDLP decision to boycott the Northern Ireland Assembly I urgently request you to advise Mr. Speaker to re-call Parliament for the purpose of amending the Northern Ireland Act of 1982 by removing the Cross Community Consent requirement and inserting a firm undertaking that Her Majesty's Government will give effect to any resolution of the Northern Ireland Assembly carried by a majority of those present and voting thereby removing the SDLP and other Republican veto over all progress and policies in Ulster."

Mr. Millar also requested that the Prime Minister should see Mr. Molyneaux.

The Prime Minister was not minded to see Mr. Molyneaux and would be grateful if Mr. Prior could respond to Mr. Molyneaux's message and to see him if necessary.

Timothy Flesher

Mike Hopkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

da



Prime Minister ✓
Gow

Northern Ireland Office
Stormont Castle
Belfast BT4 3ST

LM
27/8

James Molyneaux Esq JP MP
41 Ballynadrentagh Road
Aldergrove
CRUMLIN
BT29 4AR

26 August 1982

Dear Mr. Molyneaux,

The Prime Minister has asked me to reply to the message which Mr Millar passed to No 10 earlier today on your behalf, and which was released to the Press this afternoon. I have noted the decision of the SDLP at their meeting yesterday to take part in the Election which will take place on 20 October but not to participate in the work of the Assembly.

Parliament considered the Northern Ireland Act very carefully. All experience shows that no scheme of devolution will work effectively unless it is likely to command widespread acceptance throughout the community. As the Government's White Paper said, in forming a judgement on this, the Government would only consider a proposal to command sufficiently widespread acceptance if it appeared to be acceptable to both sides of the community. Government policy on this fundamental point could scarcely be clearer.

I have taken careful note of your request, but I believe that the right course is for the Election to proceed. I therefore cannot support your view that Mr Speaker should be advised to recall Parliament or that the Government should recommend to Parliament that the Northern Ireland Act should be amended.

I am as always available to talk to you if that would be helpful.

Yours Sincerely,


Roberta Curran
for JAMES PRIOR

[APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY OF
STATE AND SIGNED IN HIS ABSENCE]

Faint handwritten text at the top left of the page.



JUL 1982
27 AUG 1982



Main body of the document containing several paragraphs of extremely faint, illegible text.

MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM JIM MOLYNEAUX

(Text to be released to the Press)

"Following the SDLP decision to boycott the Northern Ireland Assembly I urgently request you to advise Mr Speaker to re-call Parliament for the purpose of amending the Northern Ireland Act of 1982 by removing the Cross Community Consent requirement and inserting a firm undertaking that Her Majesty's Government will give effect to any resolution of the Northern Ireland Assembly carried by a majority of those present and voting thereby removing the SDLP and other Republican veto over all progress and policies in Ulster."

26.8.82

Prime Minister

LM
27/8

GRS 180
UNCLASSIFIED
FM DUBLIN 261445Z AUG 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 244 OF 26 AUGUST 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE NIO (B)

PS TO PM, NO 10 DOWNING STREET,

NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY: SDLP

1. THE GOVERNMENT PRESS SECRETARY ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT THIS MORNING FOLLOWING THE SDLP'S DECISION TO CONTEST THE ELECTION BUT BOYCOTT THE ASSEMBLY:

BEGINS

THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE SDLP IN DUNGANNON LAST NIGHT REGARDING THEIR PARTICIPATION IN FORTHCOMING NORTHERN ELECTIONS IS ENTIRELY A MATTER FOR THE SDLP. THE GOVERNMENT RESPECT THE DECISION TAKEN. IT IS FURTHER PROOF, IF SUCH WERE NEEDED, THAT THE PROPOSED SCHEME IS BOTH UNACCEPTABLE AND UNWORKABLE.

ENDS

2. A STATEMENT 'ON BEHALF OF FINE GAEL' WAS ALSO ISSUED:

BEGINS

FINE GAEL WELCOMES THE DECISION OF THE SDLP TO STAND FOR THE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION IN THE ASSEMBLY AFTER THE ELECTIONS IS A MATTER FOR THE PARTY. HOWEVER THE DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTION WILL ENSURE THE PROVISION OF AN ADEQUATE AND REPRESENTATIVE PARLIAMENTARY BASE FROM WHICH TO DRAW PART OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND MEMBERSHIP OF THE PARLIAMENTARY TIER OF THE ANGLO-IRISH COUNCIL.

FINE GAEL WILL SEEK DISCUSSIONS IN THE AUTUMN WITH THE OTHER PARTIES IN THE OIREACHTAS ON THE STRUCTURE AND POSSIBLE FUNCTIONS OF THIS TIER OF THE ANGLO-IRISH COUNCIL TO BE ESTABLISHED BY THE PARLIAMENTS OF IRELAND AND THE UNITED KINGDOM.

ENDS.

FIEG

NORTHERN IRELAND
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RID
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PS/MR HURD

PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
LORD N GORDON LENNOX
MR GIFFARD
MR ADAMS
MR GOODISON
MR URE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
NORTHERN IRELAND

Prime Minister

NORTHERN IRELAND

1. You will have heard of the decision by the SDLP to contest the Northern Ireland Assembly elections which are to be held on Wednesday, 20th October, but to take no part in the proceedings of the Assembly.
2. Mr Frank Millar, who is Jim Molyneux's Personal Assistant, telephoned on Jim's behalf this morning with a request that you should see Jim Molyneux, in order to discuss the new situation which has arisen following the SDLP decision.
3. Mr Millar also passed on a request from Mr Molyneux that Parliament should be re-called in order that the Northern Ireland Act 1982 should be amended, because if the SDLP does in fact refuse to participate in the new Assembly then ^{THE} cross community support provisions will become farcical.
4. Of course Jim Prior will be hoping that once the elections have taken place, the SDLP Members will participate, after all.
5. I suggest (subject to Jim Prior's views) that we should:-
 - (a) Reject the request that Parliament should be re-called.
 - (b) Suggest that Jim Molyneux should see the Secretary of State, rather than you.

6. I remind you that this request was made on the telephone by Frank Millar on Jim Molyneaux's behalf. It would really be best if Jim Molyneaux was to write a letter and I could certainly suggest to Frank Millar that this is what should be done.
7. I would not be in the least surprised if the request made on Jim Molyneaux's behalf will be released to the Press.

(Note for the file: Frank Millar's telephone number is Belfast 224601)

26.8.82

IAN GOW

cc. Robin Butler
Willie Rickett



Ireland
fle Me

e

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 August 1982

Thank you for your letter of 19 August reporting on Mr. Prior's visit to the USA. The Prime Minister was very pleased with this account of what she considers to have been a very successful trip.

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

T. FLESHER

M. W. Hopkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Tim Flesher Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

August 1982

*Thank you very much.
- a successful visit. 19*

Pauline Murrell

Dear Tim,

2078

VISIT TO USA: 19-21 JULY 1982

In his letter of 17 February to all Private Secretaries, Willie Rickett indicated that the Prime Minister would like to see reports from Ministers on visits overseas : Mr Prior has therefore asked me to send this account of his recent visit to the USA.

The Secretary of State visited Washington and New York between 19-21 July. The object was two-fold; to explain to American opinion-formers the thinking behind the Northern Ireland Act 1982 and to discourage the American public from contributing either financially or by moral support to the Provisional IRA. These two objectives are of course connected insofar as signs of political movement in Northern Ireland will assist moderate Irish-American leaders in their attempts to persuade Irish-Americans not to contribute to the Provisional IRA or its agents. The London bombings of 20 July gave special point to these messages.

Washington

Mr Prior's programme in Washington involved a number of media interviews, a series of meeting with members of the Congressional Friends of Ireland Group, and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, as well as the Secretary - Treasurer of the AFL/CIO. He also attended a dinner hosted by Sir Nicholas Henderson for members of Congress and senior Administration figures, including Clark and Eagleburger.

The views expressed resembled those expressed by President Reagan in his message to the Prime Minister following the London bombings. Americans were both shocked and sympathetic and Mr Prior was able to make the point forcefully that contributions to NORaid and its supporters were used to buy guns and bombs which were used to kill and main innocent people.

Conversations with Congressman and Members of the Administration naturally focused on the political initiative in Northern Ireland. Mr Prior explained the British Government's responsibility to uphold the wishes of the majority in Northern Ireland in regard to the constitutional position of the Province, and also our concern that the rights of the minority be fully safeguarded. He expressed the view that, while the proposals may not have been liked by any of the Northern Ireland

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parties, they did offer the best prospect available of promoting political activity there and that it was in the interests of all parties, especially the SDLP, to take part in October's elections.

These views were received with interest on the Hill and with warmth in the Administration. Judge Clark and Deputy Secretary of State Stoessel, on behalf of the Administration, expressed support for the initiative. There were promises of continuing strong support from the Administration for the FBI's successful efforts to stem the flow of funds and weapons to the PIRA. The Friends of Ireland and other Congressional leaders with Irish-American constituents seemed impressed; and while one would not expect them to come out openly in favour of the initiative, they should be less disposed as a result of these meetings to accept uncritically the views of the SDLP on what we are trying to achieve.

New York

The main aim in New York was to give a series of radio and television interviews pressing home the arguments about financial support for the Provisional IRA and stressing that we would not be deflected from our policy in Northern Ireland by terrorist violence. The most important interviews were:-

NBC - TV:	The Today Show (Audience approximately 6.5 million)
ABC - TV:	Good Morning America (Audience approximately 6.5 million)
Cable News Network	
National Public Radio "All Things Considered" (250 stations)	
<u>ABC Radio Network:</u>	"Michael Jackson" (Live phone-in programme in approximately 20 major cities)
<u>CBS Radio Network:</u>	"Mike Wallace at Large" (500 stations)
ABC - TV:	"Nightline" (Audience approximately 15 million)

As a result of the London bombings, there was excellent media coverage and the message will have got across to a wide spectrum of Irish-Americans and may even have an effect on some of that minority who give active support to the Provisional IRA.

Mr Prior also undertook two engagements in support of inward investment in the UK and in Northern Ireland in particular. These were a meeting with industrialists and bankers (and some resident British journalists) over drinks, and a call on American Home Products, a major US

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Corporation considering an expansion of its factory at Ballymoney in Northern Ireland.

Summary

The visit was worthwhile and, within the context of our continuing efforts to put across our view of the Northern Ireland situation in the USA, achieved more than we had initially hoped for. This was in part due to the coincidence of the London bombings of 20 July which heightened interests in Northern Ireland affairs in the USA and produced a spate of condemnations of the Provisional IRA in the American media and from political figures.

.... I attach copies of the reporting telegrams from Washington and New York.

The Secretary of State wishes to express his particular gratitude to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Ambassador, and to the staffs of the posts involved, for the hard work which they put in to make the visit a success.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretary to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to HM Ambassador in Washington.

Yours sincerely
Mike Hopkins

M W HOPKINS

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FROM BTDO NEW YORK 222041Z JUL 82
 TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 14 DATED 22 JULY 82
 AND TO IMMEDIATE F C O, NIO BELFAST, NIO LONDON

YOUR TELNO 2501 TO FCO: NORTHERN IRELAND: VISIT OF
 MR PRIOR TO NEW YORK : 20/21 JULY

MR PRIOR'S MAIN PURPOSE IN NEW YORK WAS TO GIVE A SERIES OF RADIO AND TELEVISION INTERVIEWS. ALTHOUGH MOST OF THESE HAD BEEN ARRANGED BEFORE THE IRA BOMBINGS (WITH TWO IMPORTANT ADDITIONS MADE ON 21 JULY) INTENSE MEDIA INTEREST IN THE EVENTS IN LONDON ON 20 JULY GAVE HIM AN OPPORTUNITY TO FURTHER PRESS HOME THE POINTS REPORTED IN PARAS 1 AND 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, AND GAVE ADDED URGENCY TO HIS MESSAGE ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF HIS POLITICAL INITIATIVE.

2. THE INTERVIEWS INCLUDED:

NBC -TV: THE TODAY SHOW (AUDIENCE APPROXIMATELY 6 AND A HALF MILLION)
 ABC -TV: GOOD MORNING AMERICA (AUDIENCE APPROXIMATELY 6 AND A HALF MILLION)

CABLE NEWS NETWORK (EXTRACTS USED THROUGHOUT THE DAY AND ON
 "PRIME NEWS 120")

NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO "ALL THINGS CONSIDERED" (250 STATIONS)

ABC RADIO NETWORK: "MICHAEL JACKSON SHOW (LIVE PHONE-IN PROGRAMME
 IN APPROXIMATELY 20 MAJOR CITIES)

CBS RADIO NETWORK : "MIKE WALLACE AT LARGE (500 STATIONS)

ABC-TV "NIGHTLINE" (AUDIENCE APPROXIMATELY 15 MILLION)

3. IN ADDITION, A BIS LUNCH FOR MR PRIOR WAS ATTENDED BY 18 MAINLY HEAVYWEIGHT EDITORIAL WRITERS, INCLUDING THE NEW YORK TIMES, THE NEW YORK DAILY NEWS (EDITORIALS FROM BOTH WERE REPORTED ON 21 JULY, NOT TO ALL), THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, TIME AND NEWSWEEK.

4. MR PRIOR ALSO UNDERTOOK TWO ENGAGEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF INWARD INVESTMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND - A MEETING WITH INDUSTRIALISTS AND BANKERS (PLUS RESIDENT BRITISH JOURNALISTS) OVER DRINKS, AND A CALL ON AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS, A MAJOR U S CORPORATION CONSIDERING AN EXPANSION OF ITS FACTORY IN BALLYMONEY, NORTHERN IRELAND.

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 PS/MR RIFKIND

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
 NORTHERN IRELAND

SIR J BULLARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR GIFFARD
 MR ADAMS
 MR GOODISON
 LORD N G LENNOX
 MR URE

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FROM WASHINGTON 202345Z JUL 82.

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2501 OF 20 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST, NIO LONDON, DUBLIN,

C.G. NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK.

INFO SAVING ALL C.G. U.S.A.

NORTHERN IRELAND: VISIT OF MR PRIOR TO WASHINGTON: 19/20 JULY.

TODAY'S MURDERS IN LONDON BY THE PROVISIONAL IRA GAVE POIGNANT IMMEDIACY TO THE APPEALS MR PRIOR HAS MADE HERE IN WASHINGTON IN A NUMBER OF TELEVISION INTERVIEWS AND IN MEETINGS WITH THE FRIENDS OF IRELAND GROUP IN CONGRESS AND THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE THAT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES SHOULD REALISE THAT ANY MONEY SENT TO THE PROVISIONAL IRA WILL ONLY BUY ARMS AND BOMBS WHICH WILL BE USED TO KILL AND MAIM INNOCENT PEOPLE.

2. IN INTERVIEWS AND IN PRIVATE MEETINGS, MR PRIOR HAS STRESSED THAT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PROVISIONAL IRA WILL NOT DETER THE GOVERNMENT FROM PURSUING ITS POLITICAL INITIATIVE AND THAT TERRORIST ATTACKS, IN LONDON, AS IN NORTHERN IRELAND, WILL NOT FRIGHTEN THE PEOPLE OF BRITAIN INTO PURSUING ANY COURSE OF ACTION OTHER THAN THAT WHICH THEY HAVE FREELY CHOSEN.

3. SPEAKER O'NEILL THIS AFTERNOON ISSUED A STATEMENT CONDEMNING THE BOMBINGS AS OUTRAGEOUS AND ADDING "SUCH ACTS OF TERRORISM MUST BE CONDEMNED BY EVERYONE WHO TRULY CARES ABOUT IRELAND. ONCE AGAIN I URGE AMERICANS NOT TO SUPPORT ANY ORGANISATION THAT ENGAGES IN THIS KIND OF TERRORISM. THE IRA IS A TRULY REPREHENSIBLE ORGANISATION." A SIMILAR STATEMENT WAS MADE BY CONGRESSMAN FOLEY, ONE OF THE LEADERS OF THE FRIENDS OF IRELAND, ON THE FLOOR OF THE HOUSE, AND CONGRESSMAN JIM SHANNON (D-MASSACHUSETTS), WHO VISITED NORTHERN IRELAND RECENTLY, ISSUED A STATEMENT SAYING: "IRISH AMERICANS RECOGNISE THE IRA FOR WHAT IT IS EXCLAMEN WHO ARE DEDICATED TO DESTRUCTION AND DEATH AND ANARCHY - NOT TO PEACE, NOT TO THE OLD DREAM OF AN IRISH REPUBLIC".

4. AT A DINNER AT MY HOUSE LAST NIGHT ATTENDED BY SENATORS MOYNIHAN, DODD AND LUGAR AND CONGRESSMEN FOLEY AND SHANNON AS WELL AS BY JUDGE CLARK, AND LARRY EAGLEBURGER, MR PRIOR EXPLAINED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S INTIATIVE, MAKING CLEAR THAT,

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/ ALTHOUGH

10/27/74

ALTHOUGH NONE OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES LIKED WHAT HE WAS DOING, HE BELIEVED THAT THEY WOULD TAKE PART IN ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS AND THAT THE HABIT OF WORKING TOGETHER ONCE THE ASSEMBLY WAS FORMED COULD CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH POWERS COULD BE DEVOLVED TO NORTHERN IRELAND. HE GAVE A DESCRIPTION OF THE DIVISIONS WITHIN THE PROVINCE AND EMPHASISED, NOT JUST THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO UPHOLD THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSENT WITHIN A DEMOCRACY, BUT THE FACT THAT THE UNIONISTS WERE AS DETERMINED AS THE NATIONALISTS TO FIGHT FOR WHAT THEY SAW AS THEIR CAUSE. HE DESCRIBED RECENT DIFFICULTIES IN RELATIONS WITH THE IRISH REPUBLIC BUT SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT THESE WOULD NOT ENDURE AND THAT, ONCE THE ASSEMBLY WAS ESTABLISHED, IT MIGHT BE EASIER FOR NORTHERN IRISHMEN TO DEAL WITH DUBLIN WITHOUT THE SUSPICION THAT LONDON WAS COOKING THINGS UP BEHIND THEIR BACKS. JUDGE CLARK EXPRESSED THE ADMINISTRATION'S SUPPORT FOR MR PRIOR'S EFFORTS AND WISHED HIM SUCCESS. STOESEL AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKE IN SIMILAR TERMS AND PROMISED CONTINUED SUPPORT FROM THE ADMINISTRATION IN TRYING TO STEM THE FLOW OF FUNDS AND WEAPONS TO THE PROVISIONAL IRA.

5. IN MEETINGS ON CAPITOL HILL, THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS, EVEN FROM BIAGGI AND ONE OR TWO MEMBERS OF HIS COMMITTEE WHO WERE PRESENT. THERE WERE QUERIES WHETHER THE POSITION OF THE MINORITY WAS ADEQUATELY PROTECTED AND WHETHER THERE WAS ANY GUARANTEE THAT THE ASSEMBLY WOULD NOT SIMPLY BE A TALKING SHOP. MR PRIOR SAID THAT HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE THE SUCCESS OF THE ASSEMBLY THOUGH IT WAS DESIGNED TO OFFER THE MAXIMUM POSSIBILITIES OF PARTICIPATION AND THE RIGHTS OF THE MINORITY WOULD BE FULLY SAFEGUARDED, PARTICULARLY BY THE CHANGES MADE IN THE BILL DURING ITS PASSAGE THROUGH THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. BOTH AT THESE MEETINGS AND AT A LUNCHTIME MEETING WITH JOURNALISTS, MR PRIOR STRESSED THAT, IF DEMOCRACY MEANT ANYTHING, IT MUST HAVE EVEN MORE TO DO WITH THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES THAN WITH THE RIGHTS OF MAJORITIES.

6. MR PRIOR'S VISIT CAME AT A TIME WHEN, ON THE DOMESTIC FRONT CONGRESS IS FOCUSING ITS ATTENTION ON THE BUDGET (ESPECIALLY THE DEFENCE BUDGET) AND, ON THE FOREIGN FRONT, IS CONCENTRATING ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. TODAY'S BOMBINGS IN LONDON BROUGHT HOME, HOWEVER, TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS BOTH THE WANTON NATURE OF THE PROVISIONAL IRA AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE US AS A SOURCE OF WEAPONS AND MONEY AS WELL AS THE FACT THAT THE PROBLEMS OF NORTHERN IRELAND HAVE NOT GONE AWAY EVEN IF THEY ARE NOT HIGH ON THEIR CURRENT LIST OF PRIORITIES. MR PRIOR WAS ABLE TO EXPLAIN THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS SEEKING TO FILL THE CURRENT POLITICAL VACUUM IN THE NORTH AS A MEANS OF BRINGING STABILITY TO THE PROVINCE AND TO REASSURE CONGRESS THAT WE WILL

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PURSUER OUR GOALS UNDETERRED BY TERRORISM. MR PRIOR MANAGED TO DEMONSTRATE TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION THAT, ALTHOUGH HIS PROPOSALS MAY NOT BE LIKED BY ANY OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PARTIES, THEY DO OFFER THE BEST PROSPECT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE SDLP, TO TAKE PART IN OCTOBER'S ELECTIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE FRIENDS OF IRELAND MAY NOT COME OUT IN SUPPORT OF OUR PROPOSALS BUT AS A RESULT OF THESE MEETINGS, THEY MAY BE LESS DISPOSED TO ACCEPT UNCRITICALLY THE VIEWS OF THE SDLP ON WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE. EQUALLY, I THINK MR PRIOR WAS ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE THE GOOD FAITH OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN TRYING TO ESTABLISH A FAIR SOCIETY IN THE NORTH AND THAT IF, FOR EXAMPLE, WE DO NOT PROSCRIBE ORGANISATIONS LIKE THE UDA (AS SOME IN CONGRESS WOULD WISH) THIS IS FOR GOOD REASONS - WHICH MR PRIOR DEPLOYED - AND NOT BECAUSE WE SOMEHOW ARE BIASED IN FAVOUR OF ONE SECTION OF THE COMMUNITY.

HENDERSON

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19th August 1982

Many thanks for your letter of 18th August together with its enclosure.

I hope that you are having a good Recess.

IAN GOW

James H Molyneaux Esq JP MP

(Dictated by Mr Gow and signed in his absence)

bcc. The Rt Hon James Prior MP
Sir Robert Armstrong KCB CVO
Robin Butler Esq

RECS

From JAMES H. MOLYNEAUX, J.P., M.P. for Antrim, South



House of Commons,
London S.W.1.

18.8.82

Dear Ian

I enclose a
copy of the typescript
of Sloan's second
interview with Abbott,
on 17.11.81 which
makes interesting
reading.

With kind regards

Ever

Jim

Ian Low, Esq. M.P.

- Q1 To what extent would you agree that from 1922 to the end of the 2nd world war Britain was engaged in a financial withdrawal from the South of Ireland? There is evidence to show that after 1925 there was a large scale British land disinvestment in the South while financial and commercial investment was maintained, the value of property sold off before 1939 exceeded new investment.
- A1 After the separation there was a certain amount of military co-operation between Britain and the Free State. Britain then wanted a Free State which was virtually an independent client state for all intents and purposes to evolve into peaceful co-existence.
- Q2 Would you say that N. Ireland has become insulated economically and politically through the practices of the Treasury and Home Office? In the past the Treasury seemed to have enjoyed a lot of autonomy with respect to N.I. In 1940 Churchill was prepared to offer N.I. to De Valera on the condition that he joined Britain in the war against Germany. What is your reaction to the Unionist claim that N.I. is still being economically isolated today?
- A2 In 1930 the Stormont Government had the opportunity to raise revenue and have a large degree of resource control over N.I. They declined to take up this opportunity. In many respects the Ministry of Finance acted as an agent for the Treasury, provided they dispensed the money in a particular way. The Unionist claims of economic isolation are pure rhetoric. For instance, the EEC money which is allocated to N.I. is done on the principle of additionality that money is given on the condition that the government takes up a commitment to meet a certain proportion of the funds allocated. This happens in Scotland, Wales as well as in N.I. but these plans must be prepared in advance. N.I. is still heavily funded.
- Q3 In terms of the relationship between civil servants in Whitehall and Stormont there was isolation, in that as late as 1971 Joe Haines in his book "Politics of Power", page 121-122, states that a senior civil servant assisting Wilson and himself on a trip to Ireland, had never been to the South. Such visits were "not encouraged" by the Home Office. Would you say that this was an accurate reflection on Joe Haines' behalf?
- A3 The Home Office being a domestic department was responsible to the central government and therefore could not be seen to be engaging in talks of a constitutional nature with Dublin. The Unionist government could have accused us of undermining them. In that period there was contact between the Home Office and Dublin on explosives and policing matters. When we finally got rid of Stormont it made it easier for us to engage in talks with Dublin about constitutional matters.
- Q4 If the last anecdote was an example of the state of Anglo-Irish relations ten years ago how would you react to the sceptic's assertion that the prime motivating force for attempting to improve Anglo-Irish relations has been violence in N.I.?
- A4 That is a perfectly reasonable assumption to make. The opportunity that direct rule gave us in 1972 was the opportunity to establish a power-sharing devolved government. If this can be established then the aspiration of half a million catholics could be taken into consideration. Once this is established it is a half-way point to recognizing the interest of the Republic

in N.I.'s future in a constitution sense. The mistake we made at Sunningdale was that we didn't rein in Fitzgerald enough over the Council of Ireland. On the Irish side he was the chief strategist and architect. Cosgrave for all intents and purposes was just window dressing. There are a number of areas where co-operation is vital:- (1) Security (2) Extradition.

By and large the Criminal Justice Act was designed to circumnavigate the problem of extradition but this has failed to a large extent. There are also problems over witnesses crossing the border. The RUC has problems with respect to the preparation of cases to be tried in the Republic. Also, in the Republic judges are political appointees to a much greater extent than they are in the U.K. This would mitigate against the resolving of the problem.

- Q5 What emphasis do both the British and the Irish governments place on a functionalist approach to co-operation? Mitrany's theory maintains that you diminish the relevance of borders by increasing the traffic across it. In the Joint Studies Report reference was made to electricity links between Wales and Wexford and across the land boundary. How serious are these proposals?
- A5 Economic co-operation of any kind is overlaid by political consideration and this is the problem. Unionist fears must be dealt with. We want to present it in such a way that there appears something tangible for the North; and at the same time co-operation economically must not appear to induce any dependence on the South. The Kinsale gas pipe-line is one project which will be pushed forward as the N.I. gas industry is on its knees. As for the Wales-Wexford electricity link there remains a lot of work to be done on the project before it becomes viable. The North-South electricity link is one project which could be advanced. The Wales-Wexford is seen important for the South, not because they want to be linked to us, but because they want access to the continental grid.
- Q6 In terms of the initiation of a greater degree of Anglo-Irish co-operation under which Government in the last ten years have the major changes come about; was it primarily under the present government with the Dublin Summit last December or was it before? In the book "the State in N.I." by Beu, Gibbon and Patterson they assert that it would require a major strategic departure to implement or even formulate a reformist strategy for Ireland. Is one under way?
- A6 The Heath Government in March 1973 acknowledged the Irish Dimension. Rees helped to keep up momentum in the first 3/4 months of his office. After the fall of the power-sharing government we had to rethink it all. Roy Mason stopped all political movement. All the emphasis was on security co-operation and nothing else. Anglo/Irish relations in other areas were not very good. On the security side the IRA came near to total defeat. Thatcher, when she first came to power, wanted to continue this emphasis on security co-operation only, and she wanted to bring to fruition the Neave idea of a return to local government. In the past 2 1/2 years it has come to be recognised by No. 10 that the Republic must have some sort of say in the constitutional position of N.I. One should not get too excited over Fitzgerald's proposals to change articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution. It will be hard to get them changed in terms of domestic rule. But it is a way of holding a pistol to H.M.G.'s head and putting pressure on us for further movement. I don't think Fitzgerald has thought it through. It won't change Protestant opinion. The Dublin Summit of December 1980 was really about high visibility. Thatcher wanted a lot of gold braid in

front. Howe and a few other ministers didn't really know why they were there, he and others were told just to shut up and smile. Thatcher recognized in that Summit that she now aims to act in the interest of the United Kingdom as a whole, not just N.I. and unionists are going to have to recognize that she is entitled to have this view taken seriously. The hunger-strike showed what advances have been made. Fitzgerald, by and large, kept his side of the bargain. He slopped down O'Leary when he was inert. He didn't want to upset the apple-cart, because he knew there was a summit coming up. The hunger strike resulted in a lot of diplomatic pressure being put on us especially from France and the Irish-American lobby.

Q7 To what extent do you think that a return to local government in N.I. would enhance co-operation between local Councils on both sides of the border, with adequate safeguards of course?

A7 We don't want to give more power to the Unionists. More importantly the SDLP don't want any return of local government. Dublin's attitude is by and large guided by what the SDLP wants. What we want to do now is to calm down the Unionists and push for a devolved power-sharing government. It is recognized in No. 10 that this is the way forward. Although Thatcher has still got this return to local government in the back of her mind. As well there has been a change in mind of N.I. mainly by other people in the Cabinet which she now recognizes.

Q8 In Dr. Fitzgerald's book "Towards a New Ireland" he talks about the necessity of making several constitutional changes "but few doubt that these changes would be carried without difficulty in the context of specific proposals for reunification if indeed they are not implemented well in advance". Would it be accurate to see this as the blue-print for Dr. Fitzgerald's Constitutional Crusade?

A8 It is a mistake for Fitzgerald to see constitutional changes as any precursor for a United Ireland. In any final settlement for the island of Ireland the entire Irish situation will have to be re-written. There will also be a considerable degree of autonomy in any future federal Ireland although it will be a lopsided federation with 26 county unit and one six county unit. But a political settlement for the island will have to be fudged, and there are a number of ways this can be done (1) a new Federal Republic which would come into existence would join NAT; if partition is removed then the Dublin Government have said that this will be no problem. (2) Alongside this the Commonwealth can be brought into practice. It is in effect a loose federation of English speaking states, and we can play up the Crown or play it down depending on who we are talking to. We can say to the Unionists: look the Queen is the head of the Commonwealth, and let them fly their flags on certain occasions and keep them happy. Then we can say to the Republic that India is a Republic with a President yet a member of the Commonwealth.

Q9 How difficult is it going to be to bring the Unionists into the process. Even before the last summit I found reference in the Belfast Telegraph of 8th August; when Molyneaux in Edinburgh asserted the Scottish Dimension; the social, culture and economic characteristics which set N.I. apart from the rest of Ireland, he then maintained "Irish Dimension invented by modern civil servants is no more than a cynical sham and smokescreen to hide their schemings: Also the Council for the Union - What is your reaction to that?

- A9 Both the Scottish Dimension and the Council for the Union are examples of how monumentably difficult Molyneux is being. As in 1973 the unionists are bitterly opposed to my Council. What we intend to do is to show how effective and beneficial the Anglo-Irish Council can be, and how it is in the interests of all people. The unionists have to be forced to see that they must live with all the people on the island of Ireland; despite what the IRA may do and what their aims may be.
- Q10 Prior to the last summit there was a large article in the Sunday Times. It said that an Anglo-Irish Council with a Parliamentary Tier will be set up. I noticed that about 48 hours before the Summit various newspapers then said that a Parliamentary Tier wouldn't be in the agreement. What actually happened during that period.
- A10 Obviously I can't answer that in detail, but in general there were no last minute changes in what would be on the table. The work for this summit was set up 10 months ago. The Irish under Haughey and Fitzgerald wanted to move faster than us, we have to be more cautious.
- Q11 As you see the setting up of an advisory council would help generally in Anglo-Irish relations and co-operation, to what extent do you see functional economic co-operation being one of the ones where North-South relations can be moved forward using schemes such as facilitating Irish students cheaper even to higher education in N.I.
- A11 The advisory council is not a second rate substitute but something which was advocated in the joint studies. It is not a precursor to an Anglo-Irish intergovernmental Council. With respect an Irish student gaining access to higher education in N.I. an arrangement would be made whereby Irish undergraduates would not be classified as overseas students. The Irish Government would be a reduced rate and they would then pay us.
- Q12 Anglo-Irish relations have been compared to the story of the leaking roof, when storm made attention imperative the climate was against anything other than temporary repair. When the weather was clear the problem could be forgotten. Would you like to comment on this maxim?
- A12 I think that it is a fair reflection of the state of Anglo-Irish relations up until the end of the last Labour Government. However the roof has been blown off and a new political shape of the island of Ireland will have to be worked out, or else there will never be any fair weather ever again. Under Thatcher there has been a significant change in attitude of the Government towards N.I. In addition both Fitzgerald and Haughey have the bit between their teeth. Any future election in the south will be decided largely on the partition issue. Any general election in the north will be decided on the partition issue as well.

reland ②



Prime Minister

To note, pending the Attorney's
reply.

A.S.C. 29/7.

MO 5/21/3

ATTORNEY GENERAL

ms

THE SOUTH ATLANTIC FUND

The Trustees of the South Atlantic Fund are anxious to make immediate interim payments of £10,000 to all widows of those who died with the Task Force, and smaller sums in respect of each child or for other dependants. The figures are equivalent to payments made under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act for deaths in Northern Ireland.

2. I fully support the Trustees in this and so does the Prime Minister. I understand however that the Treasury Solicitor has some doubts about whether such payments are fully in accordance with the Trust Deed. I hope that these difficulties can be quickly resolved. Those who contributed so generously to the fund will I am sure welcome such payments and it would be unfortunate if they were held up on a legal nicety.

3. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister and Sir Robert Armstrong.

SW

Ministry of Defence
29th July 1982

I assume that those recently injured or killed in the IRA bombings in London will attract some under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act?
ms

Ireland

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NORTHERN IRELAND: ADVANCE COPIES ~~20~~

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MR MARSHALL) N I O
MR ANGEL)
MR HARRINGTON)

SIR R ARMSTRONG CABINET OFFICE
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FM DUBLIN 271255Z JULY 1982

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 221 OF 28 JULY

AND TO INFO IMMEDIATE N I O (BELFAST)

YOUR TELNO 37: DR KENNEDY'S MEETING WITH MR HURD.

1. THE MEETING BETWEEN THE IRISH AMBASSADOR, AND MR HURD ON 26 JULY IS FRONT PAGE NEWS IN TODAY'S DUBLIN DAILIES. THE HEADLINES ARE :

- " BRITAIN SEES NO NEED TO CONSULT DUBLIN ON NORTH" (IRISH TIMES)
- " COLLINS GETS A BLUNT REPLY" (IRISH INDEPENDENT)
- " BRITISH HANDS-OFF ON NORTH" (IRISH PRESS).

mt

Read in file.

" BRITISH HANDS-OFF ON NORTH" (IRISH PRESS).

2. THE IRISH TIMES REPORTS

" THIS DIPLOMATIC REBUFF SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, ALREADY BADLY HIT BY THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE, MAY EVEN BE DETERIORATING FURTHER. DIFFICULTIES EXIST AT PRIME MINISTERIAL LEVEL, AT FOREIGN OFFICE LEVEL AND ALSO IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE. ALL THESE DEPARTMENTS, WITH SLIGHTLY DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES, ARE NOW ON BAD TERMS WITH THE REPUBLIC AND NO SERIOUS EFFORTS APPEAR TO BE ENVISAGED BY EITHER SIDE TO IMPROVE MATTERS"

THE IRISH TIMES ALSO QUOTES A D F A "STATEMENT" (IN FACT JUST BRIEFING) WHICH WHILE MAKING THE IRISH POINTS PLAYS DOWN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INTERVIEW.

3. THE IRISH INDEPENDENT SAYS:

" THE BRITISH RESPONSE WAS BEING REGARDED LAST NIGHT AS MUTED. THE FOREIGN OFFICE WENT NO FURTHER THAN TO PUT ON RECORD AGAIN THE TRADITIONAL BRITISH VIEW THAT IT IS FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ALONE TO DECIDE ON INTERNAL AFFAIRS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE FACT THAT IT TOOK SO LONG FOR BRITAIN TO REACT HAS BEEN TAKEN IN DUBLIN AS AN INDICATION THAT MRS THATCHER'S GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WANT ANY FURTHER DETERIORATION IN ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS".

4. THE IRISH PRESS REPORTS FEELING IN DUBLIN THAT :

" THE MEETING CALLED AT THE REQUEST OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE IN NO WAY DETRACTED FROM A GENERAL DESIRE OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO GET RELATIONS BETWEEN IRELAND AND BRITAIN BACK ON A GOOD FOOTING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE MEETING IS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE BEEN LOW KEY AND AMICABLE AND TO HAVE INDICATED AGAIN THE ANXIETY ON BOTH SIDES TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH COULD HOLD UP MOVES TO GET RELATIONS ON AN EVEN KEEL AGAIN".

THE PRESS ALSO SPECULATES THAT THE MEETING HAS THE RESULT OF PRESSURE FROM CONSERVATIVE BACKBENCHERS AND NORTHERN UNIONISTS.

5. EDITORIAL COMMENT APPEARS IN THE IRISH TIMES AND IRISH PRESS. THE TIMES STATES:

... " NOT ONLY DOES DUBLIN HAVE A RIGHT TO BE CONSULTED ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND, IT IS NOTHING LESS THAN FOLLY FROM BRITAIN'S OWN VIEWPOINT FOR A BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO FAIL TO CONSULT DUBLIN

NORTHERN IRELAND, IT IS NOTHING LESS THAN FOLLY FROM BRITAIN'S OWN VIEWPOINT, FOR A BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO FAIL TO CONSULT DUBLIN. ANY EVENTUAL NORTHERN SETTLEMENT HAS TO BE WORKED OUT IN PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NORTHERN COMMUNITIES, THERE IS NO OTHER WAY."

THE IRISH PRESS PICKS UP THE SECURITY COOPERATION THEME FROM EARLIER EDITORIALS (MY TELNO 198 PARA 2) :

... " WE HAVE FOR SEVERAL YEARS BEEN CONSIGNED TO THE ROLE OF A VERY JUNIOR PARTNER INDEED IN THE NORTH-SOUTH, DUBLIN-LONDON DIALOGUE WHEREAS IN FACT THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND IS A MAJOR FIGURE IN THE DRAMA - AND NOT MERELY IN A SECURITY ROLE. HOWEVER, IF BRITAIN WANTS TO CAST IN THIS ROLE ONLY, THE TWO-EDGED NATURE OF THIS SWORD CAN VERY EASILY BE MADE APPARENT IN ANY FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON CROSS BORDER SECURITY ... "

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Ireland



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

RESTRICTED

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN MR GEOFFREY SLOAN
AND MR CLIVE ABBOTT

I have shown the Prime Minister your minute A09139 of 28 July 1982, together with your minute A09116 of 27 July 1982, and she is content with the Written Answer which the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is proposing to give today to Dr Brian Mawhinney's Question.

JAW . . .

28 July 1982



Ref. A09139

MR WHITMORE

The Sloan Affair

attached — With my minute of 27 July (Ref. A09116) I sent you a memorandum reporting on the verification of the notes of discussion between Mr Geoffrey Sloan and Mr Clive Abbott of the Northern Ireland Office. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland would like to give a written answer to an arranged Parliamentary Question on this matter. He is anxious to make his reply before the Recess, and before he answers oral questions on Thursday 29 July (tomorrow). He is, therefore, anxious to give the written answer today.

--- 2. I enclose a draft of the answer, which is an amended version of a draft prepared in the Northern Ireland Office. You may wish to show it to the Prime Minister.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG
(Approved by Sir Robert Armstrong
and signed in his absence)

28 July 1982Note.

The Prime Minister decides in the note to suggest the changes to the text shown working.

28/7/82

DRAFTThe Sloan Affair: Draft Written Answer to Arranged PQ

Q. To ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland whether the right hon Member for South Down has provided evidence to substantiate the account he gave on the 29th June of a conversation between a Northern Ireland Office civil servant and an academic researcher.

A. No. The right hon Member quoted, ~~(as if it were an authoritative record)~~, from a typescript purporting to record in direct speech Mr Abbott's answers to questions put to him by an academic researcher. It emerged that the typescript was a summary prepared by the researcher from notes taken during the interviews ~~and was not authorised by or agreed with Mr Abbott,~~ ~~who denies that it constitutes a remotely accurate record of his answers.~~


2. The right hon Member stated that his hon Friend, the Member for Antrim South, would send the Prime Minister "all relevant particulars and identifications". The hon Member's letter to No 10 contained ~~nothing more of substance than~~ the plain paper typescript already distributed to some Members of the House - and three additional sentences presented as a quotation from a further talk with Mr Abbott on the 17th November 1981 - together with the name of the researcher who was said to be prepared to make himself available to verify the information contained in his notes.

3. / The hon Member for Antrim South wrote on 15th July that he and the right hon Member for South Down would be available separately to offer evidence and information and were asked to send me as soon as possible any relevant evidence or information they possessed which had been omitted from the letter of 29th June./

4. The researcher has accordingly been interviewed. He explained that, in October 1980 he started work, which he emphasised was not paid work, on a series of research projects for the hon Member for Antrim South. He explained that he was a graduate research student who since 1978 had been engaged on research into United States foreign policy since 1945, and that it was in connection with that work that in January 1981 he wrote to the Northern Ireland Office seeking an interview which took place with Mr Abbott on 26th January 1981. He also said that in 1979 he had offered to do research work for the hon Member for Antrim South. This offer was accepted in October 1980, and he had since undertaken a number of research projects for the hon Member. He stated that his approach to the Northern Ireland Office in January 1981 was in no way connected with those projects and was made without the knowledge of the hon Member. He did not mention his work for the hon Member in the course of his three interviews and correspondence with Northern Ireland Office officials. He confirmed that the interview notes were his own summary of points made by Mr Abbott in an interview which lasted more than an hour. He made longhand notes while Mr Abbott was speaking, elaborated these notes the same evening on his return to university, and wrote up the summary account quoted by the right Hon Member the following day. He sent a copy of his notes to the hon Member for Antrim South in May 1982. He did not bring his longhand notes to the recent interview. When asked to make them available he agreed to do so, but nothing further has yet been received. Although that typescript appears to be a verbatim record, even to the extent of including the words "Phone rings" as an interruption in one of Mr Abbott's replies, the researcher stated that the notes were not a verbatim record. He maintained that, save for one or two manifest inaccuracies which he was prepared to acknowledge, the notes were an accurate record of what Mr Abbott said. When his attention was drawn to the inaccuracies and absurdities on matters of fact which were pointed out in the House, he maintained that they were correctly attributed to Mr Abbott.

5. Mr Abbott has also been interviewed in the light of this discussion with the researcher concerned. He continues to assert that the notes are incomplete and misleading or inaccurate to such an extent that they bear little relationship to what he had said to the researcher. I have no reason to doubt the integrity of Mr Abbott or to disbelieve his denial of having made the crucial remarks attributed to him. Moreover, from the internal evidence of the purported record itself, and given the way in which it was prepared and the failure to check it with Mr Abbott either at the time or subsequently it cannot in any way be regarded as a reliable account in detail or in substance.

6. Nothing has been produced to alter the view I expressed on 29th June when the allegations were made that they were unjustified and irresponsible.



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>816</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Minute from Armstrong to Whitmore dated 27 July 1982, with attachment</i>	
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NORTHERN IRELAND: VISIT OF MR PRIOR TO WASHINGTON: 19/20 JULY.

TODAY'S MURDERS IN LONDON BY THE PROVISIONAL IRA GAVE POIGNANT IMMEDIACY TO THE APPEALS MR PRIOR HAS MADE HERE IN WASHINGTON IN A NUMBER OF TELEVISION INTERVIEWS AND IN MEETINGS WITH THE FRIENDS OF IRELAND GROUP IN CONGRESS AND THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE THAT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES SHOULD REALISE THAT ANY MONEY SENT TO THE PROVISIONAL IRA WILL ONLY BUY ARMS AND BOMBS WHICH WILL BE USED TO KILL AND MAIM INNOCENT PEOPLE.

2. IN INTERVIEWS AND IN PRIVATE MEETINGS, MR PRIOR HAS STRESSED THAT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PROVISIONAL IRA WILL NOT DETER THE GOVERNMENT FROM PURSUING ITS POLITICAL INITIATIVE AND THAT TERRORIST ATTACKS, IN LONDON, AS IN NORTHERN IRELAND, WILL NOT FRIGHTEN THE PEOPLE OF BRITAIN INTO PURSUING ANY COURSE OF ACTION OTHER THAN THAT WHICH THEY HAVE FREELY CHOSEN.

3. SPEAKER O'NEILL THIS AFTERNOON ISSUED A STATEMENT CONDEMNING SUCH ACTS OF TERRORISM

3. SPEAKER O'NEILL THIS AFTERNOON ISSUED A STATEMENT CONDEMNING THE BOMBINGS AS OUTRAGEOUS AND ADDING "SUCH ACTS OF TERRORISM MUST BE CONDEMNED BY EVERYONE WHO TRULY CARES ABOUT IRELAND. ONCE AGAIN I URGE AMERICANS NOT TO SUPPORT ANY ORGANISATION THAT ENGAGES IN THIS KIND OF TERRORISM. THE IRA IS A TRULY REPREHENSIBLE ORGANISATION." A SIMILAR STATEMENT WAS MADE BY CONGRESSMAN FOLEY, ONE OF THE LEADERS OF THE FRIENDS OF IRELAND, ON THE FLOOR OF THE HOUSE, AND CONGRESSMAN JIM SHANNON (D-MASSACHUSETTS), WHO VISITED NORTHERN IRELAND RECENTLY, ISSUED A STATEMENT SAYING: "IRISH AMERICANS RECOGNISE THE IRA FOR WHAT IT IS EXCLAMEN WHO ARE DEDICATED TO DESTRUCTION AND DEATH AND ANARCHY - NOT TO PEACE, NOT TO THE OLD DREAM OF AN IRISH REPUBLIC".

4. AT A DINNER AT MY HOUSE LAST NIGHT ATTENDED BY SENATORS MOYNIHAN, DODD AND LUGAR AND CONGRESSMEN FOLEY AND SHANNON AS WELL AS BY JUDGE CLARK, AND LARRY EAGLEBURGER, MR PRIOR EXPLAINED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S INITIATIVE, MAKING CLEAR THAT, ALTHOUGH NONE OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES LIKED WHAT HE WAS DOING, HE BELIEVED THAT THEY WOULD TAKE PART IN ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS AND THAT THE HABIT OF WORKING TOGETHER ONCE THE ASSEMBLY WAS FORMED COULD CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH POWERS COULD BE DEVOLVED TO NORTHERN IRELAND. HE GAVE A DESCRIPTION OF THE DIVISIONS WITHIN THE PROVINCE AND EMPHASISED, NOT JUST THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO UPHOLD THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSENT WITHIN A DEMOCRACY, BUT THE FACT THAT THE UNIONISTS WERE AS DETERMINED AS THE NATIONALISTS TO FIGHT FOR WHAT THEY SAW AS THEIR CAUSE. HE DESCRIBED RECENT DIFFICULTIES IN RELATIONS WITH THE IRISH REPUBLIC BUT SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT THESE WOULD NOT ENDURE AND THAT, ONCE THE ASSEMBLY WAS ESTABLISHED, IT MIGHT BE EASIER FOR NORTHERN IRISHMEN TO DEAL WITH DUBLIN WITHOUT THE SUSPICION THAT LONDON WAS COOKING THINGS UP BEHIND THEIR BACKS. JUDGE CLARK EXPRESSED THE ADMINISTRATION'S SUPPORT FOR MR PRIOR'S EFFORTS AND WISHED HIM SUCCESS. STOESSEL AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKE IN SIMILAR TERMS AND PROMISED CONTINUED SUPPORT FROM THE ADMINISTRATION IN TRYING TO STEM THE FLOW OF FUNDS AND WEAPONS TO THE PROVISIONAL IRA.

5. IN MEETINGS ON CAPITOL HILL, THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS, EVEN FROM BIAGGI AND ONE OR TWO MEMBERS OF HIS COMMITTEE WHO WERE PRESENT. THERE WERE QUERIES WHETHER THE POSITION OF THE MINORITY WAS ADEQUATELY PROTECTED AND WHETHER THERE WAS ANY GUARANTEE THAT THE ASSEMBLY WOULD NOT SIMPLY BE A TALKING SHOP. MR PRIOR SAID THAT HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE THE SUCCESS OF THE ASSEMBLY THOUGH IT WAS DESIGNED TO

MEMBERS OF HIS COMMITTEE WHO WERE PRESENT. THERE WERE QUERIES WHETHER THE POSITION OF THE MINORITY WAS ADEQUATELY PROTECTED AND WHETHER THERE WAS ANY GUARANTEE THAT THE ASSEMBLY WOULD NOT SIMPLY BE A TALKING SHOP. MR PRIOR SAID THAT HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE THE SUCCESS OF THE ASSEMBLY THOUGH IT WAS DESIGNED TO OFFER THE MAXIMUM POSSIBILITIES OF PARTICIPATION AND THE RIGHTS OF THE MINORITY WOULD BE FULLY SAFEGUARDED, PARTICULARLY BY THE CHANGES MADE IN THE BILL DURING ITS PASSAGE THROUGH THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. BOTH AT THESE MEETINGS AND AT A LUNCHTIME MEETING WITH JOURNALISTS, MR PRIOR STRESSED THAT, IF DEMOCRACY MEANT ANYTHING, IT MUST HAVE EVEN MORE TO DO WITH THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES THAN WITH THE RIGHTS OF MAJORITIES.

6. MR PRIOR'S VISIT CAME AT A TIME WHEN, ON THE DOMESTIC FRONT CONGRESS IS FOCUSING ITS ATTENTION ON THE BUDGET (ESPECIALLY THE DEFENCE BUDGET) AND, ON THE FOREIGN FRONT, IS CONCENTRATING ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. TODAY'S BOMBINGS IN LONDON BROUGHT HOME, HOWEVER, TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS BOTH THE WANTON NATURE OF THE PROVISIONAL IRA AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE US AS A SOURCE OF WEAPONS AND MONEY AS WELL AS THE FACT THAT THE PROBLEMS OF NORTHERN IRELAND HAVE NOT GONE AWAY EVEN IF THEY ARE NOT HIGH ON THEIR CURRENT LIST OF PRIORITIES. MR PRIOR WAS ABLE TO EXPLAIN THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS SEEKING TO FILL THE CURRENT POLITICAL VACUUM IN THE NORTH AS A MEANS OF BRINGING STABILITY TO THE PROVINCE AND TO REASSURE CONGRESS THAT WE WILL PURSUE OUR GOALS UNDETERRED BY TERRORISM. MR PRIOR MANAGED TO DEMONSTRATE TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION THAT, ALTHOUGH HIS PROPOSALS MAY NOT BE LIKED BY ANY OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PARTIES, THEY DO OFFER THE BEST PROSPECT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE SDLP, TO TAKE PART IN OCTOBER'S ELECTIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE FRIENDS OF IRELAND MAY NOT COME OUT IN SUPPORT OF OUR PROPOSALS BUT AS A RESULT OF THESE MEETINGS, THEY MAY BE LESS DISPOSED TO ACCEPT UNCRITICALLY THE VIEWS OF THE SDLP ON WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE. EQUALLY, I THINK MR PRIOR WAS ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE THE GOOD FAITH OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN TRYING TO ESTABLISH A FAIR SOCIETY IN THE NORTH AND THAT IF, FOR EXAMPLE, WE DO NOT PROSCRIBE ORGANISATIONS LIKE THE UDA (AS SOME IN CONGRESS WOULD WISH) THIS IS FOR GOOD REASONS - WHICH MR PRIOR DEPLOYED - AND NOT BECAUSE WE SOMEHOW ARE BIASED IN FAVOUR OF ONE SECTION OF THE COMMUNITY.

HENDERSON

[We passed NIO Belfast & Dublin]

Ireland



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

C A Whitmore Esq
Principal Private Secretary
to the Prime Minister
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

Miss Edmonson
I fear the truth is that when he made
his comment, Mr Prior was unaware that the
press in N. Ireland already got the BSM
via the N. Ireland clasp.
NBPM + NFA. 19 July 1982

*AWJ
19 vii*

Dear Clive

You asked me to clarify some of Mr Prior's remarks which he made to the Press in the gallery at Westminster on Wednesday 14 July.

Mr Prior's intention, firstly, was to express his own pleasure, not only at the success achieved jointly by the armed forces in the Falklands, but also at the generous recognition which has been given to their achievements by the British public - recognition which has been crystallised by the Government's announcement that a South Atlantic Medal is to be struck. Without wishing to detract in any way from the credit which the British forces deserve for their conduct throughout the Falkland's campaign, he also wished to remind the British public, through the Press, of the continuing debt of gratitude which we owe to our armed forces for their less spectacular but nonetheless heroic service in Northern Ireland over the past 13 years.

As his comments were made in the wake of the announcement of the striking of the South Atlantic Medal, he was asked whether he would wish to see similar recognition being given to those members of the armed forces who had served, and in some cases given their lives, in Northern Ireland. Mr Prior made it clear that this was not a matter for him, but that, speaking personally, he would like to see the recognition which the armed forces richly deserved for their service in Northern Ireland take some tangible form. In retrospect it would have helped to put this remark into perspective if it had been made clear that members of the armed forces who have served the 30 days in Northern Ireland receive the General Services Medal with the 'Northern Ireland' clasp, and that they are also eligible for the whole range of gallantry and distinguished service awards while serving in the Province. However, this remark was peripheral to Mr Prior's main point which was that it would be a comfort and support not only to our armed forces serving in Northern Ireland but also to their families to know that their service in the cause of freedom and the sacrifice of those who had died in that cause has been and will be recognised and appreciated by the British public in the same wholehearted and generous manner which they have recently displayed.



None of this in any way affects the forthcoming announcement on medals for the RUC and UDR.

Yours sincerely

J. Stephens

pp

S W BOYS SMITH



9 JUL 1982

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ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS: SPEECH BY IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER

1. MR COLLINS OPENED THE ADJOURNMENT DEBATE IN THE DAIL YESTERDAY (15 JULY 1982) EVENING WITH A PREPARED SPEECH WHICH HAD A LONG SECTION ON ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS. AFTER SUMMARISING THE FIANNA FAIL VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE 1980 SUMMIT, THE MAIN POINTS WERE:

"I REGRET THAT IN RECENT MONTHS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN LESS THEN WHOLEHEARTED IN THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE APPROACH WHICH THEY HAD AGREED WITH US. EARLIER THIS YEAR THEY EMBARKED ON A MISGUIDED AND UNILATERAL INITIATIVE WHICH IN EFFECT IGNORES THE WIDER ANGLO-IRISH DEMENSION WITHIN WHICH THE TAOISEACH AND PRIME MINISTER HAD AGREED TO TACKLE THE PROBLEM OF THE NORTH - A PROBLEM WHICH AFFECTS BOTH OUR COUNTRIES SO MUCH. MR PRIOR'S FAILURE TO PROPERLY CONSULT WITH THE GOVERNMENT HERE IN THE ELABORATION OF HIS PROPOSALS HAS ALREADY BEEN PUT ON RECORD BY ME - AND INDEED ADMITTED BY HIM IN A RECENT PARLIAMENTARY REPLY IN WESTMINSTER - AND I WISH TO STATE MY VIEW THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH ON THIS MATTER HAS BEEN CONTRARY NOT ONLY TO THE SPIRIT BUT ALSO TO THE LETTER OF OUR NEW ARRANGEMENTS. THE DEGREE OF REASONED OPPOSITION TO THE BRITISH PROPOSALS, AND AS DEPUTIES ARE FULLY AWARE THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN UNABLE TO APPROVE OF THEM, OUGHT TO HAVE MADE MR PRIOR THINK AGAIN. INSTEAD THEY HAVE NOW COMPLETED THEIR PAINFUL PASSAGE THROUGH THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND MR PRIOR SEEMS DETERMINED TO FORECE HIS SCHEME ON NORTHERN IRELAND BY WHAT CAN ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS DESPERATE MEANS."

"THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY MADE CLEAR OUR FEAR AT THE CONSEQUENCES WHICH MAY FOLLOW FROM YET ANOTHER FAILED BRITISH GOVERNMENT INITIATIVE. WITH THE ANNOUNCMENT IN THE LAST FEW DAYS OF VOTING IN THE AUTUMN FOR THE PROPOSED NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY, OUR APPREHENSION GROWS GREATER. THIS INSTITUTION IS TO BE IN AND FOR NORTHERN IRELAND ALONE, AND ITS INTENDED ROLE IS TO RESTORE A DEVOLVED EXECUTIVE IN AND FOR NORTHERN IRELAND ALONE. FEW DEPUTIES I BELIEVE WILL NOT SEE SUCH A CONCEPT AS RETROGRADE AND INSUFFICIENT, AND FEW IN THIS HOUSE WILL LIKEWISE FAIL TO DEPLORE THE RETREAT BY THE PRESENT BRITISH GOVERNMENT FROM THE COMMITMENT TO PRESCRIBED POWERSHARING IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THIS COMMITMENT HAS BEEN A CONSTANT IN THE POLICY OF VARIOUS BRITISH GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1973. INSTEAD, THE EVOLUTION OF AFFAIRS WITHIN THE NEW ASSEMBLY IS TO BE LEFT TO THE FREE PLAY OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES. EVERYBODY KNOWS WHICH POLITICAL TRADITION WILL DOMINATE IN SUCH A SITUATION, AND WE HEAR ALREADY THAT DOMINANT UNIONIST INTEREST DECLARE ITS ATTITUDE - AN ATTITUDE WHICH HAS NOT VARIED OVER SIXTY YEARS AND WHICH, NOT SURPRISINGLY, IS MARKED BY CONTEMPTUOUS REJECTION OF THE PRESENT BRITISH PLAN. IRISH NATIONALIST OPINION IS ALERT TO THE DANGERS AHEAD. THEY ARE THE SAME DANGERS NATIONALISTS THOUGHT THEY HAD LEFT BEHIND THEM QUITE A LITTLE TIME AGO."

"I REGRET

"I REGRET THE PRESENT LINE OF POLICY OF BRITISH MINISTERS BUT DESPITE THIS WE ARE DETERMINED TO USE AND TO PURSUE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK ESTABLISHED BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. IT IS STILL THERE AND IN FACT HAS BEEN FUNCTIONING NORMALLY IN RECENT MONTHS WITH FIVE MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETING SINCE THIS GOVERNMENT CAME TO OFFICE."

"..... WE ANTICIPATE FUTURE MEETINGS OF THE ANGLO-IRISH INTER GOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL IN THIS SPIRIT OF CONSTRUCTIVE CO-OPERATION AS APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY, AND AT EVERY LEVEL. BUT LET ME MAKE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT CO-OPERATION IS BY DEFINITION A TWO-WAY PROCESS. IN THE FIELDS OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY CO-OPERATION THIS GOVERNMENT IS DETERMINED TO PLAY ITS FULL PART IN BRINGING PEACE, STABILITY AND RECONCILIATION TO OUR PEOPLE. AND WE EXPECT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO DO THE SAME - WHATEVER OUR TEMPORARY DIFFERENCES WE IN THESE TWO ISLANDS HAVE SO MUCH IN COMMON THAT ANGLO-IRISH CO-OPERATION IS VITAL IN OUR JOINT INTEREST. BUT IT MUST BE FULL AND WHOLEHEARTED IN ITS INSPIRATION AND IN ITS WORKING. WE CANNOT ACCEPT A SELECTIVE OR INCONSISTENT APPROACH TO MUTUAL CO-OPERATION."

"..... WE HAVE MADE EFFORTS TO OBTAIN THE UNDERSTANDING OF ALL OTHER CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS FOR OUR OBJECTIVES. THERE ARE ENCOURAGING SIGNS THAT OUR POSITION IN GAINING UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS IN THE UNITED STATES....."

"..... IN OUR CONTACTS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS TOO, PARTICULARLY AMONG OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS, THERE IS INCREASING UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POLICIES ON NORTHERN IRELAND AND IN PARTICULAR A READY SUPPORT FOR A JOINT ANGLO-IRISH APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM."

STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

Discussed with Ian Gow. He agreed that there was no point in pursuing XI below since, even though it was meetings involving a representative of the present Prime Minister which were at issue, any records of such meetings could be the property of the former Administration and their contents could not be revealed to the Prime Minister. The better line of enquiry was therefore Y1 below, but we agreed that Ian Gow was not likely to be helpful. What could be gained if it was possible to show that Airey Neave talked to the NIO and was then talked to by the Irish Government? We should be no further forward. And it was very likely that the planning for the IRA to target Airey Neave for attack was more complex than it

Clive ✓

J.E.P.

1. Herewith:- *Pratt was promising.* *HW 26 vii*
 - (a) My note to the Prime Minister dated 13th July, plus the documents referred to in paragraph 1 of that note.
 - (b) Transcript of an interview given by the Foreign Minister of the Irish Republic on BBC Radio Ulster on 3rd July.

2. J.E.P. came to see the Prime Minister in her room at the House at 9.30 p.m. last evening.

3. Presumably it would be possible to find out, from official sources, what meetings Airey Neave had with Roy Mason and/or officials of the Northern Ireland office, within six months of his assassination.

4. I have asked Joy Robilliard whether, from her records she is able to provide any assistance about this.

5. May we please have a word?

X |
Y |

15th July 1982

IAN GOW

Prime Minister

YOUR MEETING WITH JEP AT 930 P.M. ON WEDNESDAY 14TH JULY

1. Herewith his letter to you dated 1st July, plus enclosures, which you have seen already.
2. You will see that, in the final sentence of his letter, Enoch suggests that "the circumstances surrounding Airey Neave's death will now be considered further, in the light of what has become known."
3. Enoch believes that, fairly shortly before he was murdered, Airey had a meeting either with Roy Mason, or with very senior civil servants in the Northern Ireland Office, or both; that he was informed that it would not be possible to implement our Party's policy towards Northern Ireland in the event of a change of Government because of undertakings or understandings reached with Dublin; that Airey asserted that the policy of a Conservative Government in regard to a part of the United Kingdom would be fashioned in London and not in Dublin; that any undertakings or understandings reached by the then Government (or its predecessor) would not deflect a Conservative Government from its chosen path; and that this response of Airey was communicated, directly or indirectly, to Dublin or to unfriendly sources in Belfast.

.../...

4. Enoch believes Airey's determination to pursue a Unionist policy in regard to Northern Ireland was then communicated to the Irish National Liberation Army which then decided to eliminate the man whom it perceived to be the threat to the prospective unity of the Island of Ireland.
5. Enoch says that evidence in support of his belief about these events has come to light because of:-
 - (a) The Daily Notes issued in April 1979, which you have read.
 - (b) The Sloan/Abbott episode.
6. In accordance with your authority, I have written to Jim Molyneaux today, letting him know that you have agreed that the Secretary of the Cabinet should investigate the Sloan/Abbott affair.

13th July 1982

IAN GOW

NB Top copy filed
in date order.

From: The Rt. Hon. J. ENOCH POWELL, M.B.E., M.P.,



Prime Minister.

House of Commons,
London, S.W.1.

AM
2 in

1st July 1982

Dear Margaret,

May A

I believe your attention will have been drawn to Hansard of 29th June, colns 767 - 772, with special reference to coln 770, and I understand that you have received from Jim Molyneaux the details there promised. He will of course also be available to furnish or obtain any further evidence known to him that may be required in the course of the enquiry which I anticipate will be held.

To make sure
of this you
have to read
colns 350-353,
not just coln
353. Know
as May B

May I take the opportunity respectfully to draw your attention also to coln 353 of Hansard 23rd June (where "May" in line 17 should read "March"), and express the hope that the circumstances surrounding Airey Neave's death will now be considered further in the light of what has become known.

Yours ever,

Enoch.

The Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

...down to the time when Brian Faulkner was leading the Unionists, the Council of Ireland was recognised as a reasonable aim for both parts of the island of Ireland. Businesslike co-operation has always taken place ever since partition. At the moment, that seems to centre on energy. The argument goes on about whether power should be delivered to the North from Kinsale or whether, which seems both economically and politically desirable, gas should be piped to Northern Ireland from Scotland.

It is in those spheres of practical businesslike co-operation that the Irish dimension or the unique relationship is visible. I do not particularly quarrel with what is said in paragraph 23 of the White Paper, which states:

"The Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council, which was established following the Anglo-Irish talks and Joint Studies which began in 1980, gives institutional expression to the unique relationship between the two governments without affecting national sovereignty".

Paragraph 24 states:

"Relations between the United Kingdom and the Republic will in general continue to be conducted within the ambit of the Council".

I think that the hon. Member for Hammersmith, North was speaking about something different from relations between the United Kingdom and the Republic. He was speaking much more about relations between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. That is what makes Unionists so suspicious of the Anglo-Irish talks and the working of the officials in the service of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council. They think that both the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council and the Bill are designed to provide an Assembly that can be the northern end of an eventual fused institution for the whole island of Ireland. That is their fear, and the hon. Gentleman's speech reinforced every fear that a Unionist may have in that regard.

Viscount Cranborne (Dorset, South): What effect does my hon. Friend think the hon. Gentleman's speech has had on what I still understand to be the Labour Party's policy of a bipartisan approach to Northern Ireland? Time and again, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has reiterated that he is for the Union of Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom. It seemed to me that the speech of the hon. Member for Hammersmith, North (Mr. Soley) tended to go in exactly the opposite direction. Does that mean the end of the bipartisan policy?

Sir John Biggs-Davison: My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State thinks that the Bill will reinforce the Union and make Northern Ireland more stable and peaceful and a more profitable area of investment. I am sure that my right hon. Friend believes that. On the other hand, the Opposition have been supporting my right hon. Friend because they believe that it will lead to a united Ireland. They do not mean a united Ireland under the Crown or within the British Commonwealth, but a united Irish Republic. Either the bipartisan policy is at an end or it is in a state of some confusion.

Mr. Soley: The Labour Party's policy is a united Ireland with consent, and we have been pursuing that policy for a considerable time. The fact that the Conservative Party is asking for unity within the United Kingdom is another matter.

Everything that the hon. Gentleman has said so far has suggested that the Northern Ireland Assembly ought to

have closer contacts with the Republic to discuss security and economic matters. Otherwise, he is implying that in some way it is happening secretly. We are arguing that it should happen openly.

Sir John Biggs-Davison: I shall answer the second part of the interjection first. I think that the correct way to proceed to build on the unique relationship, or to improve it, is for Northern Ireland Members to be associated with any contacts that there may be between parliamentarians of the United Kingdom and the Republic. That is something quite different from asking Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly to enter into a direct dialogue with a foreign State, and a foreign State that does not recognise the sovereignty of the United Kingdom in Northern Ireland.

Did the hon. Gentleman say that the Labour Party had always stood for a united Ireland? In 1949, when Southern Ireland became a republic and left the Commonwealth, it was the view of Clement Attlee and his Cabinet colleagues that, even if Northern Ireland wished to leave the United Kingdom, it should not be allowed to do so. We should not go as far as that. We should say that if the people of Northern Ireland wish to leave the United Kingdom, that should be their right, but they do not wish to do so. The position of the Labour Party is different. As I understood it, the position of the right hon. Member for Barnsley, when he was Secretary of State, was also different.

It seems to me that there are two main obstacles to the improvement of relations between the two sovereign States within the British Isles.

Mr. Fitt: It should be placed on record that the Attlee Government did not lay down that if Northern Ireland wished to depart from the United Kingdom it should not be permitted to do so. The Ireland Act 1949 provided that if the Parliament of Northern Ireland—not the people of Northern Ireland—decided to leave the United Kingdom, that would be the overriding factor.

Sir John Biggs-Davison: I was speaking of the Cabinet views and papers that are now available in the Public Record Office, where the hon. Gentleman can consult them. The position of the Government of that day, like the position of the present Government, was that it rested then on the Parliament and now on the will of the people of Northern Ireland. The hon. Gentleman is formally correct, but he would do well to study the papers that have been published about the views of the Labour Government at that time.

There are two impediments to the development of what should be a beneficial relationship between the two sovereign States within the British Isles. The first is the demand, or the claim, of the Southern Ireland Government to the sovereignty of Northern Ireland.

The second is this Bill, because it is arousing so many fears among Unionists in Northern Ireland. They have heard about and read these debates. They have heard the interpretation of the hon. Member for Hammersmith, North, that the Bill will lead to a united Ireland. They know that the Government are being supported by the Labour Opposition because of the belief that the Bill will lead to a united Ireland.

Mr. Soley: I do not think that the hon. Gentleman should go that far in his interpretation. The Labour Party has made it clear that there is nothing in the Bill that will

[Mr. Soley]

inhibit its policy. The Bill would be helpful in certain ways. The hon. Gentleman, the Unionists and other Right-wing Members of the Conservative Party have to face the fact that, if the Bill fails, they can rest assured that Labour Members will be back here arguing even more strongly that their policy is the real alternative.

Sir John Biggs-Davison: If we want to build a better relationship within these islands, we must reassure the people of Northern Ireland that there is no danger to their position within the United Kingdom. We must consolidate that position. Those of us who have expressed a view, which is contrary to that of my right hon. Friend, as to how that should be done, believe that the Bill, as it stands, is injurious to the reassurance of the people of Northern Ireland that their position is secure.

It is not possible to have a united Ireland. What is possible is to have united islands on the basis of the sovereignty of the two powers within these islands—the Republic and the United Kingdom. Perhaps I can modify that slightly. If, and it is most improbable, Southern Ireland were to end its secession from the United Kingdom; a united Ireland would be possible. Meanwhile, we should strive for what is possible—the unity of the British Isles, recognising the sovereignty of the Republic and of the United Kingdom.

4.45 pm

Mr. J. Enoch Powell (Down, South): I am happy to follow the admirable formulation that has just been offered to the House by the hon. Member for Epping Forest (Sir J. Biggs-Davison). This is the last day on which the House will be allowed to debate the Bill. As we enter upon the last day there is a certain piquancy in the House having before it a new clause tabled by the Labour Party. It has recently affirmed—going not so far as the hon. Member for Hammersmith, North (Mr. Soley) went this afternoon—that it would like to see a single all-Ireland State, provided that that comes about by the consent of the people of Northern Ireland.

When the hon. Member for Hammersmith, North was asked why, as a democratic party, the Labour Party did not argue for, seek that consent from a majority of the electorate in Northern Ireland he said "You know perfectly well the reason why. It is that if we put up a candidate on that policy we should be beaten." In other words, what the hon. Member really wants—whether his party as a whole wants it or not I am not sure—is unification brought about without consent. He knows, and has said this this afternoon, that not only is that consent not available, but that he cannot foresee it. That was the result of the exchange between the hon. Member and myself.

As the hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. Robinson) pointed out, on the face of the new clause is written compulsion. What it means, if it were to be written into the Bill, is that there should be no such Assembly and no such constitution, unless the Assembly does this thing. It is a "shall" clause and not a "may" clause.

In putting this clause on paper, I do not know whether by a kind of tactlessness or clumsiness, the Opposition have done a service. They have reminded us in the most graphic form, by something placed on the Order Paper, what is the underlying purpose and concept behind the Bill. Indeed, before I looked at the drafting of the clause,

which is more than a number of respects, the thought crossed my mind that this might be one of the clauses that was originally in an early draft of the Bill and had been dropped out in case it should cause any difficulties in the passage of the Bill. However, I cannot believe that a clause drafted in these terms ever occupied that position, although, having regard to what is in it, it might have done. The genesis of the Bill lies in the successive stages of the evolution of an Anglo-Irish institution; the successive stages in the agreements—or the meetings, because there were more meetings than there was agreement—between the right hon. Lady the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of the Irish Republic at the end of 1980 and the end of 1981.

What was agreed upon, and what appeared in the latter communiqué, was not an Anglo-Irish council in the sense of an institution spanning the Irish Republic and the United Kingdom. It was not an institution, such as the hon. Member for Epping Forest was referring to, in which two sovereign powers, mutually recognising their respective rights and territories, would seek to co-operate on matters of mutual interest. It was not that at all.

It was clear from the beginning that it was to be a tripartite arrangement. There was to be an element which was called the parliamentary tier in which the Irish Republic would be presented, in which the United Kingdom, as represented by the House, would be represented, but which would also embody a separate and third representation of that part of the United Kingdom which is Northern Ireland.

After that meeting took place we were all able to read of the regret of the Prime Minister of the Irish Republic that his work was unfinished. Unfortunately, it could not be finished as there did not exist a representation of Ulster separately from the rest of the United Kingdom that could throw up the tripartite participation destined to lead to a dual participation, as between what is called the North and South, which had been envisaged as part of that plan.

Mr. Fitt: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that written into the Sunningdale agreement was the power of veto by any of the three participating parties? Had any member of the Unionist Party in Northern Ireland felt that its position was endangered, that veto could have been used. The same veto could have been used by either the British or the Irish Government. Therefore, there was at all times a protection of the Unionist point of view in Northern Ireland.

Mr. Powell: That is the Sunningdale member's defence of the Sunningdale constitution and the Sunningdale agreement. However, the essential point, upon which the intervention does not touch, is that from the start the arrangements deliberately treat Northern Ireland as an entity separate from the United Kingdom. It was envisaged, at any rate by one side of the talks that took place last November between our Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of the Irish Republic, that the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland are to be separately represented in the parliamentary tier.

The Opposition have put upon the Order Paper, subject to any deficiencies, just such a clause. The hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Stanbrook) was right to point out the telltale fact that the relations referred to are not those between Her Majesty's Government in the United

Kingdom and the Government of the Irish Republic, but between the provincial Assembly inside the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland.

Not only are the two "unequally yoked", in St. Paul's famous words, in that it is a combination of a State or nation—the Republic of Ireland is undoubtedly a nation—and an internal institution in another country, but the purpose of using the elected Assembly as a means to further the move towards a federal unification of Ulster and the Irish Republic appears upon the face of the new clause.

It is a thousand pities that this is our last day together. Despite some rather late sittings, the Government and the House have been learning. We might even comfort ourselves with the notion, however remote from probability, that those out of doors have been learning.

One of the most important forms of progress that has been made in our learning was due to the hon. Member for Epping Forest and the evidence that he produced, which has since echoed throughout our debates. Before the last election in 1979 an organ of the Conservative Party warned that a Conservative Government would be under great pressure to overturn the policy that it was offering to the electorate and promising to Northern Ireland, and—I quote the words again because they are of inestimable value—"to launch a new, high-powered political initiative on Northern Ireland, with the object of establishing another 'power-sharing' government in the province"—

then followed the significant words—

"which could pave the way for a federal constitution linking Ulster to the Irish Republic."—[Official Report, 8 June 1982; Vol. 25, c. 52.]

Considering that that was written in 1979, it was not a bad shot at the contents of the communiqué of the Thatcher/Fitzgerald talks of November 1981. Many hon. Members must have been impressed, if not with the prescience, at any rate with the knowledge that was displayed by whoever wrote those words. They are clearly words not written without authority nor in detachment from the considerations inside the Conservative Party prior to the election as to what should be its attitude and policy in Northern Ireland.

The Conservative Party has learnt that in the Bill it is witnessing that prophesied subversion or inversion of its policy towards Northern Ireland. It has also learnt the reasons for and the purposes of that. The information which the hon. Member for Epping Forest placed before the House in Committee, and its implications for the nature and purposes of the present Bill, are corroborated by information of which it is right the House should be put in possession. In doing so, I have no alternative but to implicate officials.

The reasons why, in the general course, the actions and opinions of officials are not brought into question in the House are well understood. Ministers take responsibility for advice and information on which they decide to act, and it is the Ministers who are answerable to the House. However, there is one exception to that rule. It arises where there is reason to suppose that the advice tendered to Ministers has not been bona fide and that the information supplied to them has been misleading or incomplete. If that were so, it would be right and necessary for the House to look beyond the Ministers who answer to it directly.

The Secretary of State will be familiar with the name of an official in his office, one Clive Abbott, who had a large part in the work leading up to the present Bill, and

who, if not the "onlie begetter" of the Bill, has been closely concerned with its production and passage. It may well be that his was the briefing on which the Secretary of State assured the House of his belief that the Bill would promote political stability in Ulster and strengthen the Union.

5 pm

During the past year or two, Mr. Abbott has supplied to academic research information in response to questions put to him, and I wish to quote from the note of certain replies which in the course of that activity, he gave on an occasion some 16 months ago, because they are particularly germane to the Bill and to the context in which it has been placed by the disclosures of the hon. Member for Epping Forest. I shall, of course, provide the Secretary of State with a copy of the whole text after the close of this debate and I have asked my hon. Friend the Member for Antrim, South (Mr. Molyneux) to furnish all necessary details to the Prime Minister forthwith, in view of her special responsibility for the Civil Service and of the investigation on security and as well as other grounds, which I anticipate will be ordered by her. The following question was put:

"Is it true to say that between May and October 1979 there was consultation between the two governments—the Government of the Republic and this Government—on Northern Ireland and that after coming to power the Tory Party changed its policies on Northern Ireland?"

A. "Before the Conservative Party came to power in 1979 it had promised that local government functions would be returned to local councils. We had to tell them that it was just not on."

Mr. Fitt: Hear, hear.

Mr. Powell: The hon. Gentleman will have an opportunity to cheer later.

"We had to tell them"—

hon. Members should note the word "we" "that it was just not on. In terms of the future government of Northern Ireland integration is a non-starter for two main reasons. First, we would automatically lose the co-operation we are getting from Haughey over border security. Secondly, we couldn't break certain undertakings we have given to the Irish government over the constitutional future of Northern Ireland."

Mr. Fitt: Did not the right hon. Gentleman say that that document was concocted, or written, in 1979? In 1979, Haughey was not Prime Minister—

Mr. Powell: I did not say that. The hon. Gentleman did not hear me. I said that the replies were given about 16 months ago. The hon. Gentleman should listen more carefully. As I promised, the Secretary of State will have every facility.

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Mr. James Prior): Will the right hon. Gentleman repeat the second reason, as I did not quite get it?

Mr. Powell: I shall gladly repeat it. As I promised, the Secretary of State will be given the text at the end of the debate. The second reason why it is "not on" to treat Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom is that

"we couldn't break certain undertakings we have given to the Irish government over the constitutional future of Northern Ireland."

I pause before proceeding to further quotation. In the course of the proceedings on the Bill, the Secretary of State has repeatedly explained to the House why the fulfilment of the Conservative Party's election policy or indeed any instalment of local government is "not on". He

[Mr. Robinson]

but who are prepared to go into the Assembly and, although the possibility of achieving meaningful devolution will be difficult, if not impossible, will have the courage to try.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell: One need not prove, or argue, after this debate, the importance of the SDP amendment and the issues attached to it. Perhaps the narrowest of them is raised by the amendment of the hon. Member for Harborough (Mr. Farr) which innocently but effectively substitutes "or" for "and" in line 30. If "and" remains, the subsection is a declaration that the indefinite continuance of an Assembly that will not arrive at acceptable devolution proposals is nevertheless in the public interest. The amendment alters it to say that the purpose of the Assembly is to arrive at devolution within the terms of the Bill, but, if it cannot, it is not in the public interest that it should continue to exist indefinitely.

The hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. Robinson), despite the declaration with which he concluded his speech, said that he would have no interest in being a Member of an Assembly which, after three years, or some other period, failed to arrive at acceptable proposals. He would not be interested in an Assembly which found itself at a dead-end on devolution.

Mr. Robinson: What I said was that I would not be interested in being a Member of an Assembly after three years if it did not hold out the prospect of achieving devolution.

Mr. Powell: That is good enough, because we are talking about a visible prospect. I do not say that the hon. Gentleman would not have the patience to carry on if he could see an acceptable solution six months after the initial three years. I am not dealing with the length of the period. The hon. Gentleman has confirmed that there would be little point in belonging to such an Assembly if it could do only what is set out in clauses 3 and 4.

We invite the Government to accept, by substituting "or" for "and", what they have professed all along. This is a rolling devolution Bill. The Secretary of State did not say "I shall set up a scrutinising Assembly without responsibility". He said "I shall give an Assembly the opportunity to arrive at devolution, either in one leap or gradually". To substitute "or" for "and" is to accept that an Assembly that has no visible prospect of achieving the intentions of the Bill is not in the public interest. If it is in the public interest, we need a different approach, a different Assembly and a different concept. I hope that, if they can do no more, the Government can accept the amendment, because it appears to correspond to their intentions and view of the Bill.

What period should we set which would provide a reasonable expectation of achieving the Government's objects? The hon. Member for Belfast, East says that we should leave it to the Assembly because the Assembly will not continue its existence if it sees no prospect of success. The hon. Gentleman is relatively young and of a generous disposition. He thinks the best of and imputes the purest and most noble motives, unsullied by personal or pecuniary interest, to his fellow men. However, the belief that an Assembly will terminate its existence, the belief that it flows from its existence and the privileges and influence that might attach to its members, simply

because it honestly declares that it will not get anywhere with an acceptable form of power sharing that would persuade a Government to create a devolved Assembly, is not realistic. Neither of us can prove our conjecture. He has his view of human nature and I have mine.

Mr. Robinson: It was said earlier that the right hon. Gentleman might stand for election to the Assembly. The right hon. Gentleman did not deny it, so some hon. Members may suspect that his silence was assent. If we forget about my generous disposition and the fact that I am not three score years and ten, if the right hon. Gentleman were elected to the Assembly and the three years elapsed, would he not take the proper and honourable course of pulling up stumps and saying "Let us go home"?

Mr. Powell: I do not say that an individual Member might not fail to seek re-election, but he might decide to apply for the Assembly equivalent of the Chiltern Hundreds. No doubt some Member may be of a resigning disposition who, bored and frustrated after one year or three years, would say "I shall have no more of this." However, I doubt the likelihood of an Assembly of 78 or 85 Members terminating its existence by resolution. That is improbable and, in this House, we legislate on probabilities. I conclude that it is for the House, having brought the Assembly into existence, to provide that if it cannot perform its function within a reasonable period its existence should be terminated.

The question then is what is the reasonable period? We have a choice in the two amendments between three years and one year. I am slightly inclined to think that one year might, in all circumstances, be cutting it too fine, but my view is that three years is unrealistically long. If the Government accept the principle that there should be a specific terminus in the clause, I for my part would not cavil if they arrived at an intermediate position between one year, which I would think is the minimum and three years, which seems irrationally long.

8 pm

It seems unrealistic to suppose that it could take as long as three years for an Assembly to become aware of whether it would agree upon anything that was likely to commend itself in the terms of the Bill to a Secretary of State or, as the terms of the Bill may eventually be, to the House of Commons. I believe that in principle the SDP's amendment is right, but I think that the figure written into it is too large rather than too small.

I shall address myself to the question posed by the hon. Member for Southend, East (Mr. Taylor) and posed yesterday by the hon. Member for Bebington and Ellesmere Port (Mr. Porter), whom I seem always to lose at the moment when I want him most. Both hon. Members have asked "What is the harm in a lame duck Assembly? What is the harm in the continued existence of an Assembly which knows, and which everyone else knows, will not achieve the purpose for which it was created by statute?"

To understand why my hon. Friends and I are convinced that such a survival would be dangerous, it is necessary to understand the purpose behind the Bill on the part of those who were working away at it long before the Secretary of State had any notion that he would have the misfortune to find himself at the Northern Ireland Office.

The intention is to have an Assembly for the sake of having an Assembly, but that was not always so. It is a

Government that was arrived at after certain experiences and failed attempts. We had an earlier version of the plan. I am sorry that it is necessary for this purpose again to refer briefly to the immortal passage in the daily notes for candidates. I must confess that as a recipient in years gone by of daily notes for candidates during elections I never treasured them on the assumption that hidden inside them there might be, if not a time bomb, an immortal jewel or a torch which in two or three years' time would illuminate the dark corners of politics. However, it has happened and it is a reality.

The document exists, and it can be verified. It referred to the new Government coming

"under considerable pressure to launch a new, high-powered political initiative on Northern Ireland with the object of establishing another 'power-sharing' government in the province, which could pave the way for a federal constitution linking Ulster to the Irish Republic."

That was Mk. I, and we have Mk. II. I anticipate that Mk. II was introduced at some time in 1980. It is really the crude Mk. II. The crude Mk. I is the unimproved version which did not learn from 1974, the version which intended to rush the Sunningdale fence. After contemplating for some time the unlikelihood of obtaining a power-sharing Executive which could do the dirty work, which was the idea behind Sunningdale, and which was why the Sunningdale Executive perished, someone asked—I do not know quite who he or she may have been—"Why do we need an Executive to do the job? Surely we can do it with an Assembly. Nothing can prevent us from getting an Assembly elected. If we have elections for an Assembly, everybody must take part. Therefore, we can always get an Assembly elected."

The true purpose behind the Bill, as illuminated by the notes for candidates of 25 April 1979, is the creation of an Assembly. In the immortal words of the right hon. Member for Leeds, South-East (Mr. Rees) in October 1979 "I can tell you, Enoch, there will be an Assembly and you know how I know that there will be an Assembly." It is the Assembly which is now the working piece for paving the way for a federal constitution linking Ulster to the Irish Republic. Between Mk. I and Mk. II the development which facilitated the transition from Mk. I to Mk. II was the Anglo-Irish Council and its parliamentary tier, which is the new version or expression of what was crudely expressed three years ago as the federal constitution linking Ulster to the Irish Republic.

That has been elaborated in the three successive meetings which the Prime Minister has had with successive Irish Prime Ministers. That has now become the Anglo-Irish Council with its parliamentary tier in which Ulster, via an Ulster Assembly, is to be represented as a third finger. That is the mischief of an idle Assembly. It will do the work that Satan has intended for it. It will "pave the way for a federal constitution"

by entering into a federal institution. The Anglo-Irish Council, with the parliamentary tier is a federal institution. It is because that is understood by people on both sides in Northern Ireland that my hon. Friends and I, alas, are all too sure that we are right when we say that moves in that direction, with legislation which could have that effect, will be the cause of additional and avoidable bloodshed.

It is not, as the hon. Member for Belfast, East suggests, that the IRA requires an excuse for murder, but it needs encouragement. It needs the encouragement of faith that it will get its way. It needs the encouragement of being able to tell itself colourably that that is what Her

Majesty's Government want too. It needs to think that the Government of the United Kingdom, the hated English, are themselves about the business of paving the way for the entry of Ulster into a federal constitution linking it with the Irish Republic.

All terrorism thrives on hope. All terrorism dies where hope is removed. The damage of the Bill and the damage of an Assembly without an overt purpose—I am answering directly the question of the hon. Member for Southend, East—is that it inspires a justified hope on the part of those who, if this is to happen, mean to be on the bandwagon in circumstances which will give them and terror the upper hand when the bandwagon is rolling.

Mr. Teddy Taylor: I cannot recall an earlier occasion when I have disagreed with the right hon. Gentleman, but is he honestly saying that an Assembly packed with Members of the sort that we have in the House of Commons, of great quality and conviction, would be used as vehicles to bring about Republicanism? Bearing in mind the convictions that Northern Ireland Members have expressed and the personal bravery that they have shown, does he think that they could be foxed, misled or used to become vehicles for Republicanism?

Mr. Powell: That is exactly what I am saying. That is exactly what is being said by those who, for the purpose stated, intend that there shall be an Assembly, whatever else there is. "Power-sharing Executive or not" they say "let us have an Assembly".

Let me put one simple proposition to the hon. Gentleman. Let us suppose that there is an invitation to such an Assembly to participate. Why not? There will be one-third of that Assembly who will go off like larks. There will be one-third or one-quarter who will say, "Yes, of course, let us book our tickets". What will the remainder do? Will they remain sitting there and say, "Good riddance to them", or will they say, "We shall not allow those people to speak for Ulster. We shall be in on the act. We shall go along and see what happens. If Ulster is to be discussed in this Anglo-Irish Assembly, as the Prime Minister arranged, which is a fair implication, in her conference with FitzGerald last November, we ought to be there as well". That is how it will happen. That is one of the ways in which it will happen. It is not difficult to envisage.

Therefore, the answer to the question by the hon. Member for Southend, East, "What is the hope and what is the harm in an Assembly in vacuo?", is that an Assembly in vacuo is what Satan wants. It might be thought that even for one who sometimes mistakes the Foreign Office for a nest of vipers, the reference to His Satanic Majesty is inappropriate. If so, I should like to leave a thought for the Committee to ponder.

Whoever wrote—it must have been written before 25 April—what was published on that day in the notes for candidates was aware already of what was said to the right hon. Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Atkins) when he entered upon the office that the present Secretary of State now occupies. He was told, "You ought to understand that you cannot carry out your election manifesto, because there is an agreement in existence already with which it is incompatible".

Whoever wrote those words and sent them to be printed during the election knew that that would happen. But how did he know that it would happen? It was because he knew

Mr. Powell
 that it had already happened. The Civil Service has a habit, when it suspects that there might be a change of Administration—some of us who observed the political scene during the early months of 1979 had a vague notion that there might be a political change of Administration—of getting in touch in advance with those who might be their new political masters to prepare to carry out their wishes in accordance with their election manifesto. Great students of election manifestos are the civil servants.

Therefore, it is not beyond probability that the late Airey Neave, who was murdered at the end of March, had already been told what the right hon. Member for Spelthorne was told early in May. It is for us to decide what reply the late Airey Neave made when he was briefed. All that we know is that he was murdered before ~~Mr~~ ^{Mr} was out. All that we know is that whoever was assisting and working with him in the Conservative Party organisation, whether he did it in pian memoriam or for other purposes, wrote those words into a place where in due course they would be found.

Perhaps those who think that there is no harm in the Bill—no good, but perhaps no harm—might reflect on those matters.

8.15 pm

Mr. Maurice Macmillan (Farnham): I support the amendments in the belief that the Government could accept, if not the details set out on the Order Paper, at least the intention and purpose that underlie them. The Government could accept them without doing violence to their ideas or the internal consistency of clause 5 and without modifying, except a little for the better, their admission in the clause that the Assembly may be unworkable. For there is no point in any part of the clause unless it is to provide for circumstances in which the Assembly will be unlikely to achieve the purposes of devolution, move away from direct government, covered by clauses 1 and 2, and operate in a way that is contrary to the public interest.

Moreover, the intention behind the amendments should be acceptable to a wide range of opinion in the Committee. It is acceptable to the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell). The amendments are acceptable to my hon. Friend the Member for Southern, East (Mr. Taylor) who, broadly speaking, perhaps a little reluctantly, supports the Bill. They are acceptable to me and to the Social Democratic Party. Even among those who are seeking different forms of devolution, the general intention of the amendments should be acceptable.

The amendments alter the clause only in altering the timing of the Secretary of State's consideration of the success or otherwise of the new Assembly. The criteria for dissolving the Assembly are left entirely to the Secretary of State. There is no attempt to constrain him in any way. It is still his judgment, as it is in the clause unaltered by the amendments.

The only constraint on the Secretary of State is to force him to consider the proposition of dissolving the Assembly within a certain time limit. The right hon. Member for Down, South suggested two years as a happy mean between the one year suggested in one amendment and the three years suggested in another. I am prepared to leave the period to the Government. Whatever the period

chosen, it is not stated that the Secretary of State must act within that period. It is stated only that the Secretary of State must consider the situation within that period. The Assembly is put under some pressure to seek the objectives in clauses 1 and 2 coherently and not to dilly-dally and waste time in seeking to fulfil the objectives of the Bill.

The wording of the amendment at present also constrains the Secretary of State slightly in the opposite direction. It seems to imply that he would not be able to consider dissolving the Assembly under the terms of the amendments before the period stated in the amended clause. If it forces him to consider the viability or otherwise of the Assembly within a given period—thereby putting pressure on the Assembly itself—it also prevents him from prejudging the Assembly in advance of the period stated—whichever one may be chosen—should the Government accept the amendments.

The only other point that I wish to make is about the wording suggested by amendment No. 104. That would change the preposition from "and" to "or" linking clause 5(1)(a) and (b). As it stands now it seems possible to argue that if the Assembly is not moving at all to the position provided for under clauses 1 and 2 it is necessary at the same time for it to be contrary to the public interest that it should continue. It is almost impossible for it to be in the public interest for a failing Assembly to continue. Equally, as it links the ability of the Assembly to move towards devolution with it being within the public interest, it is possible that leaving "and" would place an undue restraint upon the Secretary of State at a marginal period when the other roles given to the Assembly were being adequately and successfully carried out within the period but had not yet arrived at the point where one could say that a private agreement had almost been reached on the devolved role.

Giving a date would place a limited restraint on the Secretary of State. Changing "and" for "or" would give him greater freedom of action than the present clause does. I ask the Government to consider seriously the arguments that have been put forward. I can see no way in which the amendments damage the Government's intention, much as I may disapprove of it. The amendments remove some of the hazards that the Assembly could bring to the national interest of the Province and the United Kingdom, and give slightly greater freedom of action to the Secretary of State in his appallingly difficult task.

Mr. Budgen: I shall be brief because I recognise the reality of the debate that we are having. We have been brutally and effectively crushed by a cynical guillotine, and it is plain from the lack of passion that the Government know that they can disregard what we say and need not bother any further to persuade us or anyone else. They know perfectly well that the bulk of the amendments that were tabled will go undebated.

None of us can prove what the consequences of setting up the Assembly will be. The most optimistic of us are those who support the Secretary of State. For him the setting up of the Assembly will lead not merely to constitutional stability but to a period of unparalleled personal happiness for each of the citizens of Northern Ireland and unparalleled prosperity for Northern Ireland. He unfolds before us a vastly euphoric scene. On the other hand, the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr.

Views from the South

(Broadcast by BBC Radio Ulster; July 3, 1982. Interview with Mr Gerry Collins, the Republic's Foreign Minister.)

A Government initiative during our previous term of office resulted in a new Anglo-Irish structure, which we're still completely confident can be developed as a means of resolving the underlying political problem in Northern Ireland.

I regret that in recent months the British Government have been less than whole-hearted in their commitment to the institutions which they agreed with us. Earlier this year, they embarked on a misguided and unilateral initiative which, in effect, ignores these wider Anglo-Irish dimensions, within which the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister had agreed to tackle the problem of the North.

Indeed, Mr Prior's failure to consult the Government here in the elaboration of his proposals has already been put on record by me and I wish to state my view that the British Government's approach on this matter has been contrary not only to the spirit but also to the letter of our new arrangements.

Now, we made it very clear that we feared the consequences which would follow from yet another failed British Government initiative. But I do say that we are determined to pursue the development of the framework which was established by the two governments. It is still there and, in fact, has been functioning normally in recent months. And, indeed, I can recollect at least five ministerial further meetings since our Government came to office less than four months, or so, ago.

I believe it offers the hope of providing an effective and clear way forward, and it remains our conviction that a joint approach offers the only hope of ultimately resolving the situation in Northern Ireland.

(There then follows an entertaining, but not strictly relevant, diversion on the Falklands)

I believe that the most serious thing that has happened in recent times in our relationship has nothing whatsoever to do with the Falklands crisis. I believe the difficulties we are now in are as a result of Mr Prior's initiative, which we and many others, including all the political parties in Northern Ireland, believe will not succeed. We believe that the consequences of another failure in this area is (sic) going to take us back.....(lost end of sentence)

Where do we go from here? I would like to think that both governments can be mature and face up to the task that faces them, and I would like to think that the Anglo-Irish parliamentary tier would be given the break that it needs and given the impetus that it deserves from the British Government.

more.....

Views from the South 2.

The view that they hold - that this initiative should be taken by the British Parliament rather than the British Government - that's not good enough. I say that because I am a parliamentarian I understand how the system works and I know that Government has responsibility to Parliament and if government is seriously anxious in getting something through Parliament, well then, the government must take the initiative.

And if the British Government will take the initiative to get this parliamentary tier going, then it would succeed. The Government has a majority. It is a strong Government and I believe that if they want to use whatever measures are open to them to get Parliament and the House of Commons to make a decision, to get the parliamentary tier put into operation, they can do that if they want.

But if they want to leave it in abeyance, well then, they'll leave it to Parliament to do it, and if somebody doesn't take the initiative, well then, you understand as well as I do that it is not going to get off the ground.

ends.

Ireland

~~Cave~~

KW
Kw

f.y.i.

15th July 1982

Thank you for your letter of today's date.

I have passed on to the Head of the Civil Service the contents of the final paragraph of your letter.

IAN GOW

James Molyneaux Esq JP MP

bcc. Sir Robert Armstrong KCB CVO

From: JAMES H. MOLYNEAUX, JP., MP. (Antrim, South)



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

15 July, 1982.

Dear Sir

Thank you for your letter of 13 July, 1982,
about the information supplied by Mr Sloan.

I am glad to know that the Prime Minister
has asked the Head of the Civil Service
to arrange for Mr Sloan to be seen to verify
the information.

May I add that Enoch Powell and I will be
available seperately to offer evidence
and information if this would be considered
helpful?

Ever

Jim

Ian Gow Esq MP
10 Downing Street
London, SW1.



*Ireland
Jee 10/5*

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Thank you for your minute A08996 of 12 July 1982 about Mr Molyneaux's letter of 29 June about the Sloan/Abbott exchanges.

I have shown the Prime Minister your minute, and she agrees that we should proceed as you propose.

I attach copies of my reply to Mr Hopkins's two letters of 12 July and of Mr Gow's answer to Mr Molyneaux's letter of 29 June.

JAW.

13 July 1982

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ces CO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

13 July 1982

Dear Mike,

Thank you for your two letters of 12 July 1982 about the documents which Mr James Molyneaux sent to Ian Gow about Mr Sloan's discussions with Mr Clive Abbott.

I have shown both your letters to the Prime Minister, and as I told you on the telephone this morning, she is content that we should proceed as your Secretary of State proposes. The way is accordingly clear for Mr Prior to answer Mr Enoch Powell's Written Question for today in the terms of the draft attached to your letter.

Ian Gow has now written to Mr Molyneaux, and I attach a copy of his letter. This differs from the draft you provided only in the last paragraph which has been amended to take account of the fact that Mr Molyneaux has already told us that Mr Sloan's address is 60 Myrtlefield Park, Belfast 9.

Yours sincerely,

Mike Whinnery.

M W Hopkins Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

AH



cc CO

10 DOWNING STREET

13th July 1982

Dear Jim,

Thank you for your letter of 29th June enclosing notes which Mr Sloan made following discussions he had with Mr Clive Abbott of the Northern Ireland Office.

You said in your letter that Mr Sloan was prepared to make himself available to verify the information contained in his notes. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has suggested to the Prime Minister that she should ask the Head of the Civil Service to arrange for Mr Sloan to be seen for this purpose and she has agreed.

We are arranging to get into touch with Mr Sloan at the address which you kindly provided.

IAI GOW

James Molyneaux Esq JP MP

copy to Mr Gow.

A

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

*My draft letter
should reply*

Clive Whitmore Esq
10 Downing Street
London, SW1

12 July 1982

Dear Clive

Thank you for your letter to Stephen Boys Smith of 5 July about the documents which Mr Molyneaux sent to Ian Gow.

My Secretary of State has not finally decided whether to recommend the establishment of some form of independent enquiry into the incident. In addition to reports in national newspapers there have been articles in the Irish Times and the Belfast Telegraph throwing doubt on the credibility of Mr Sloan's notes and also linking him with the Official Unionist Party. It is however important to take up Mr Molyneaux's statement in his letter to Mr Gow that Mr Sloan is prepared to make himself available to verify the information contained in the notes.

Mr Prior would be grateful if, in the first instance, the Prime Minister would agree that Sir Robert Armstrong, as Joint Head of the Civil Service, should arrange for Mr Sloan to be seen. We understand that if the Prime Minister agrees, Sir Robert would propose to invite Mr Denis Payne to conduct the interview.

My Secretary of State is of course willing to write to Mr Molyneaux with this proposal, but since he sent the notes to Ian Gow it might be thought better that he should reply.

.... I therefore enclose a draft letter from Mr Gow to Mr Molyneaux.

*Yours sincerely
Julie Hopkins*

M W HOPKINS

DRAFT LETTER

FILE NUMBER.....

ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE.....

<p>To <i>S.C.</i></p> <p>James Molyneaux Esq, MP House of Commons London SW1</p> <p>(Full Postal Address)</p>	<p>Enclosures</p>	<p>Copies to be sent to</p> <p>(Full Address, if Necessary)</p>
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LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY Mr Ian Gow
(Name of Signatory)

Thank you for your letter of 29 June enclosing notes which Mr Sloan made following discussions he had with Mr Clive Abbott of the Northern Ireland Office.

You said in your letter that Mr Sloan was prepared to make himself available to verify the information contained in his notes. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has suggested to the Prime Minister that she should ask the Head of the Civil Service to arrange for Mr Sloan to be seen for this purpose and she has agreed.

~~Would you therefore kindly let me know how we can best get in touch with Mr Sloan to make the arrangements.~~

We are arranging to get into touch with Mr Sloan at the address and you kindly find it.

MS

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

B



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Clive Whitmore Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

12 July 1982

Dear Clive,

I wrote to you this afternoon about the documents which Mr Molyneux sent to Ian Gow about discussions with Mr Clive Abbott of this Department.

Mr Enoch Powell has now put down a Parliamentary Question for Written Answer tomorrow.

.... I enclose a copy of the Question and the proposed answer (which has not yet been seen by my Secretary of State).

I would be grateful if you would let me know whether Mr Gow will have written to Mr Molyneux in time for the draft answer to be correct and if so whether you are content with what it says.

Yours sincerely
Mike Hopkins

M W HOPKINS


PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION - FOR WRITTEN ANSWER ON TUESDAY 13 JULY 1982

Mr J Enoch Powell (South Down): To ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland further to his statement on 1 July, Official Report, column 1025, if he has completed his consideration of the letter of the honourable Member for Antrim South on the conduct of Mr Clive Abbott; and if he will make a statement.

The letter sent to No 10 Downing Street by the honourable Member for Antrim South stated that the author of the notes was prepared to make himself available to verify their contents.

My Rt Hon Friend the Prime Minister has agreed to my request that the Head of the Civil Service should arrange for the author to be seen for this purpose.

I await the outcome.



Ireland

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CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 July 1982

Northern Ireland Assembly: Date of Election

Thank you for your letter of 8 July. I can confirm that we foresee no difficulties with your proposals for announcing the date of the election to the Northern Ireland Assembly. We are content for you to table the draft Parliamentary Question attached to your letter today for Written Answer at 1 p.m. on Wednesday 14 July.

I am copying this to Nicholas Huxtable (Lord President's Office) and Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office).

W. F. S. RICKEFT

M.W. Hopkins Esq
Northern Ireland Office

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

MR. WHITMORE

1

Yvonne Armstrong

(5)

In the light of Sir Robert Armstrong's
advice, agree that:-

a. Mr Gow should write to Mr Molyneux in the terms of the draft of Page A;

b. Mr Prior should answer Mr Powell's written Question on the basis of Page B?

Page C. —

You have received two letters from the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland about the response to Mr. Molyneux's letter of 29th June to Mr. Gow, and the answer to Mr. Enoch Powell's Parliamentary Question.

2. I have discussed this with the Permanent Under Secretary at the Northern Ireland Office (Mr. Woodfield). I agree with him that it is desirable to follow up the statement that Mr. Sloan is prepared to make himself available to verify the information contained in the notes. Apart from the intrinsic incredibility of some aspects of the notes, Mr. Abbott is greatly incensed, and has only with some difficulty been persuaded from other action - a recourse to the courts, or a letter to The Times.

3. There was some inclination in the Northern Ireland Office to think that Mr. Sloan might be seen by the Secretary of State himself, or by Mr. Woodfield. I suggested that it would be injudicious and unsatisfactory for Mr. Prior to undertake such an interview. It is the kind of task better undertaken by someone not so directly involved; and by someone with some experience of the kind of interview that would be involved.

4. Since the conduct of a civil servant (Mr. Abbott) is in question, Mr. Woodfield and I thought that the best course might be that I should be asked, as Head of the Civil Service, to arrange for the interviewing of Mr. Sloan. I said that I should be prepared to do this, and that, if so asked I should request Mr. Denis Payne to undertake the interview. Mr. Payne is one of the panel of people whom we use for the purpose of conducting investigations into leaks of confidential information.

*Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4).
AWayland. 2 October 2012*

5. Mr. Payne is, I fear, currently on summer leave, and will not be back until 2nd August. The Northern Ireland Office do not consider that this delay need be material, provided that the reply to Mr. Molyneux is sent reasonably soon.

REA
Robert Armstrong

E.R.

NIOM (82) 3RD MEETING

NOTE OF A MEETING HELD IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
ON FRIDAY 9 JULY 1982Prime Minister

For information.

A.J.C. 14.

Present:

Mr Marshall)	
Mr Blelloch)	
Mr Angel)	NIO
Mr Burns)	
Mr Abbott)	
Mr Harrington)	
Mr Fisher)	
Mr Burrows)	
Mr Stephens)	
Mr Miller)	MOD
Colonel Morton)	
Major Hughes)	
Major Wynn-Davies)	
Mr Eldon	-	FCO
Mr Pilling	-	Home Office
Mr Colvin	-	Cabinet Office

Security

1. On most criteria, the position remained unchanged. PIRA attacks on security forces continued particularly in the north west of the Province where at least one ASU was operating effectively. There had been a spate of car bombings but anniversaries including those of the deaths of hunger strikers had passed off relatively peacefully. INLA had been active and drawing on explosives stolen in the Republic earlier this year. They had been responsible for individual attacks including that on the Rev. Beattie (Lisburn Borough Council and DUP Executive Member). There had been little Protestant para-military response to the arrest (but subsequent release on bail) of UDA leaders. Generally the rate of RUC arrests and convictions had been good but a corollary of the success of the arrest of some senior men had been that without differences to settle those more junior had been acting more purposefully.

IOR.

members of the Gardai

2. In the Republic, some uniformed / had been transferred from border areas partly to counter the high crime rate in Dublin. The RUC view was that this had not affected border co-operation or counter terrorist operations but there was a need to remain watchful. The trial in Dublin of Gerard Tuite (for explosives offences committed in London) was an encouraging sign of the intent of the Irish to make greater use of the extra-territorial legislation, but the case was a unique one.

Force Levels

3. Secretary of State had agreed in principle to the withdrawal of a roulement unit but a short term holding arrangement would be necessary to avoid this coinciding with the Assembly elections in October. The turn of the year would be the most appropriate time to withdraw the unit as well as to make other changes. After its withdrawal there would be six resident and two roulement units (all infantry) and the Maze Prison Guard Force.

4. Proposals agreed with the Chief Constable and Police Authority were being put to the Secretary of State. Police manpower would be allowed to reach 8,000 at which point it should level off. Certain manpower intensive sections of the RUC were to be looked at by the Inspectorate over the next two years. No difficulty was being experienced in recruiting to the RUC Reserve but recruitment to the part-time reserve was not being encouraged.

Lough Foyle Security

5. Both as a deterrent and to reassure merchant shipping naval patrolling was to be extended. Rules of engagement had been virtually agreed.

*Passage deleted and closed, 40 years, under
FOI Exemption. O'Wayland, 2 October 2012*

The Irish Government would be told of the decision to introduce patrols once Ministerial approval had been obtained; our position (and especially our claim to sovereignty over the whole lough) would however be compromised if the Irish were to know (more than informally) the rules of engagement. Mr Butler is shortly due to meet the Irish Fisheries

E.R.

Minister (Mr Daly) to discuss salmon fishing in the Lough. The meeting should not be allowed to become the opportunity for complaint about the introduction of the patrols. The rules of engagement would need to provide for any confrontation with armed salmon poachers operating in the Lough.

Prisons

7. There were now 200 'no work' protestors in Maze Prison, about half the number there were at the end of the hunger strike. Few new committals had joined the protest. Some hardliners had left it but it was their influence which lay behind Republican prisoners recently refusing to mix with Loyalist prisoners during association and recreation. The issue was being treated in a low key, but could not continue to be if an attempt were made to achieve segregation during work. A modus vivendi along the lines of that existing at Crumlin Road prison might need to be reached.

8. The campaign to repatriate to NI Irish prisoners in GB jails had not intensified. Maghaberry Prison was due to open next year, no announcement had yet been made on the future of special category prisoners at Maze.

Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (EPA)

9. The powers had been debated and renewed in both Houses without major difficulty. Both debates had been dominated by considerations affecting the announced review of the legislation. The review was to be on the same basis as that being conducted by Lord Jellicoe into the operation of ^{the} Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act (PTA), namely to examine the efficacy of and need for the present powers. The Secretary of State had Lord Elwyn Jones in mind to head the review. It would need to take account of the outcome of Lord Jellicoe's report, on which decisions should be possible by March 1983 when the PTA was next due for renewal. It would therefore be well into next year before the report on the review of the EPA would be available.

●E.R.

NI Constitutional Bill

10. The Bill was making progress despite the filibuster in the House of Commons; it had received a Second Reading in the House of Lords and was on course for Royal Assent by the end of July. The substance of the Bill was largely unchanged; but one amendment made to it would enable the Assembly to debate minimum reserved (most law and order) matters. The date for elections to the Assembly would be 20 October. Serious campaigning was unlikely before that month. The SDLP would probably participate in the elections, albeit reluctantly. The elections would be fought on a basis of 12 Parliamentary constituencies. The elected Assembly would meet in early November; it was unlikely that its members would behave in the physically absurd way of its 1973 predecessor but there would be no swift agreement within the Assembly on how devolved functions are to be exercised.

Anglo-Irish Relations

11. Relations with the Government of the Republic of Ireland had been damaged by their recent attitudes but NIO and Irish Ministers were meeting when this was of benefit to NI. The Taoiseach was sensitive about the state of present relations and the Department of Foreign Affairs had expressed a wish to improve them.

Economic and Social Matters

12. Unemployment stood at 20% (24.8% adult male). There was little hope of any early rescue of De Lorean. Shipbuilding order had been placed with Harland & Wolff but there was little immediate prospect of other orders. British Enkalon had closed. There was no new investment on the horizon, but the newly created Industrial Development Board would be intensifying efforts to create incentives and jobs. The real difficulty however lay in the worldwide recession and Northern Ireland's image. Unemployment gave rise to an atmosphere of pessimism and hopelessness which ultimately fuelled the problems of the security forces. Robberies had increased.

SECRET

E.R.

13. No Ministerial decision had been made but the purchase of Kinsale Gas was a commercially viable proposition and increasingly likely. It was hoped that European Community funds would be made available for housing but on public expenditure generally there could be difficulties if unexpected demands arose.

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

JULY 1982

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R.R.

13. No Ministerial decision had been made but the purchase of
Kinross Gas was a commercially viable proposition and increasingly
likely. It was hoped that European Community funds would be made
available for housing but on public expenditure generally there could
be difficulties if unexpected demands arose.

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NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
JULY 1982



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NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Brian Fall Esq
Private Secretary to the Secretary of
State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
LONDON SW1

AR 19/7
h-a-
9 July 1982

Dear Brian,

VISIT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

As you know, plans were at an advanced stage for Mr Prior to visit the United States in April to publicise the Government's political initiative in Northern Ireland. The visit had to be postponed because of the invasion of the Falklands.

Fortunately, the steps we had taken to brief the administration and the State Department early in April on the nature and purpose of the policy set out in the Northern Ireland Bill were successfully completed before the Falklands issue arose. The other main purposes which the Embassy identified in such a visit, namely talking to the Congress and the press, are still outstanding. Mr Prior is anxious to do anything to assist in winning a wider understanding in the US of the Government's efforts in Northern Ireland, and it is also possible that such a visit might cause some members of the Congress to exert helpful influence on John Hume to commit his party to taking part in the Assembly elections.

In recent contacts with American politicians passing through London, Mr Prior has been urged strongly to make a visit in July, and Mr Prior has recently had an opportunity to discuss the matter informally with Sir Nicholas Henderson. Sir Nicholas takes the view that a visit from the afternoon of 19 July to the evening of 21 July, involving a full working day in Washington and another in New York, would be beneficial. We recognise, of course, that a new Secretary of State has only just been nominated and would probably by then not have been confirmed in office, but since as mentioned above the main target of the visit would not be the administration, Mr Prior would not have wanted to press for a meeting with Mr Schultz anyway.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Since time is very short, arrangements for the proposed visit have had to be set in hand in this unorthodox way. I should be grateful if you would confirm as soon as possible to me and to John Coles that your Secretary of State would support this visit. Subject to that, I hope that on the the basis of this letter John Coles would then be able to ask the Prime Minister for her approval. Subsequently there would obviously need to be further discussion between our two Departments about the content of the Secretary of State's programme, the general direction of which I have outlined above.

I am sending a copy of this letter to John Coles.

Yours,
Stephen Bayliff

9 JUL 1962

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

ex Privy Office



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Mr Casson 9/7
Prime Minister

Willie Rickett Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

In this case, the Lord President's Office are content for this procedure to be followed. They see the force of Mr Prior's argument that the attached 8 July 1982 announcement of the date of the elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly should be reported in Northern Ireland at the same time as London, rather than simply being read in mainland newspapers. Agree? WR 9/7

Dear Willie

NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY: DATE OF ELECTION

You may wish to be aware that Mr Prior intends to lay before Parliament on Wednesday 14 July a draft Order-in-Council appointing the date - 20 October - of the election to the Northern Ireland Assembly. He proposes to announce his intention to hold the election on that date by means of a written Parliamentary Question, and would also indicate in his reply that the election would be held on the basis of the existing twelve Parliamentary constituencies. ... The text of the proposed Question and Answer is attached.

The date for laying the draft Order, 14 July, is the earliest practicable one after the second reading of the Northern Ireland Bill in the House of Lords, ie when both Houses will have given their approval to the Bill in principle. However we do not intend to have the draft Order debated until after Royal Assent to the Bill. But time will be short as the Order would have to be affirmed in time to be made at the Privy Council on 30 July if there is to be an Autumn election.

Because we wish to publish the reply to the Question as early as possible in the day, and especially before the Belfast evening paper goes to print, we should like to arrange for the reply to be issued before 1.00 pm, rather than at 3.30 pm, on Wednesday 14 July (in which case the Question will need to be tabled on Monday, notionally for answer on Tuesday 13 July).

I should be grateful if you could confirm that you foresee no difficulties with this course of action.

I am copying this letter to Nick Huxtable (Lord President's Office) and to Murdo MacLean (Chief Whip's Office).

I have asked Lady Young's Office for a reply to his question. WR 12/7

Yours sincerely

Lord Privy Seal
Is the W.P. will be?

Mike Hopkin's given precedence over the Employment Bill in the Lords?

M W HOPKINS

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E.R.

DRAFT, PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION AND ANSWER

To ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, on what date the election to the next Northern Ireland Assembly will be held, and if he can now state how many constituencies will be used for that election.

MR PRIOR


Subject to the progress of the Northern Ireland Bill currently before Parliament, it is the Government's intention that the election to the Northern Ireland Assembly should take place on 20 October. I am today laying a draft Order in Council for that purpose before Parliament. The Order will be subject to affirmative resolution in each House.

An election on 20 October would be held on the basis of the existing twelve Parliamentary constituencies.

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CORPORATION





200 AH
Ireland

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

5 July 1982

Dear Stephen,

Thank you for your letter of 1 July 1982 about the documents which Mr James Molyneaux sent to Ian Gow about conversations between Mr Abbott and Mr Sloan.

I have shown your letter to the Prime Minister, and she has noted that your Secretary of State is considering whether to recommend the establishment of some form of independent inquiry into the incident.

Yours sincerely,

John White.

Stephen Boys Smith Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

AH



From: The Rt. Hon. J. ENOCH POWELL, M.B.E., M.P.,

Prime Minister.

House of Commons,
London, S.W.1.

AKW
2 vi

1st July 1982

Dear Margaret,

I believe your attention will have been drawn to Hansard of
29th June, colns 767 - 772, with special reference to coln 770,
and I understand that you have received from Jim Molyneaux the
details there promised. He will of course also be available
to furnish or obtain any further evidence known to him that
may be required in the course of the enquiry which I anticipate
will be held.

Play A -

To make sure
of this you
have to read
colns 350-353,
not just coln
353. Answer
in Play B

May I take the opportunity respectfully to draw your attention
also to coln 353 of Hansard 23rd June (where "May" in line 17
should read "March"), and express the hope that the circumstances
surrounding Airey Neave's death will now be considered further
in the light of what has become known.

Yours ever,

Enoch.

The Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

In recent years, down to the time when Brian Faulkner was leading the Unionists, the Council of Ireland was recognised as a reasonable aim for both parts of the island of Ireland. Businesslike co-operation has always taken place ever since partition. At the moment, that seems to centre on energy. The argument goes on about whether power should be delivered to the North from Kinsale or whether, which seems both economically and politically desirable, gas should be piped to Northern Ireland from Scotland.

It is in those spheres of practical businesslike co-operation that the Irish dimension or the unique relationship is valuable. I do not particularly quarrel with what is said in paragraph 23 of the White Paper, which states:

"The Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council, which was established following the Anglo-Irish talks and Joint Studies which began in 1980, gives institutional expression to the unique relationship between the two governments without affecting national sovereignty".

Paragraph 24 states:

"Relations between the United Kingdom and the Republic will in general continue to be conducted within the ambit of the Council".

I think that the hon. Member for Hammersmith, North was speaking about something different from relations between the United Kingdom and the Republic. He was speaking much more about relations between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. That is what makes Unionists so suspicious of the Anglo-Irish talks and the working of the officials in the service of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council. They think that both the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council and the Bill are designed to provide an Assembly that can be the northern end of an eventual fused institution for the whole island of Ireland. That is their fear, and the hon. Gentleman's speech reinforced every fear that a Unionist may have in that regard.

Viscount Cranborne (Dorset, South): What effect does my hon. Friend think the hon. Gentleman's speech has had on what I still understand to be the Labour Party's policy of a bipartisan approach to Northern Ireland? Time and again, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has reiterated that he is for the Union of Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom. It seemed to me that the speech of the hon. Member for Hammersmith, North (Mr. Soley) tended to go in exactly the opposite direction. Does that mean the end of the bipartisan policy?

Sir John Biggs-Davison: My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State thinks that the Bill will reinforce the Union and make Northern Ireland more stable and peaceful and a more profitable area of investment. I am sure that my right hon. Friend believes that. On the other hand, the Opposition have been supporting my right hon. Friend because they believe that it will lead to a united Ireland. They do not mean a united Ireland under the Crown or within the British Commonwealth, but a united Irish Republic. Either the bipartisan policy is at an end or it is in a state of some confusion.

Mr. Soley: The Labour Party's policy is a united Ireland with consent, and we have been pursuing that policy for a considerable time. The fact that the Conservative Party is asking for unity within the United Kingdom is another matter.

Everything that the hon. Gentleman has said so far has suggested that the Northern Ireland Assembly ought to

have closer contacts with the Republic to discuss security and economic matters. Otherwise, he is implying that in some way it is happening secretly. We are arguing that it should happen openly.

Sir John Biggs-Davison: I shall answer the second part of the interjection first. I think that the correct way to proceed to build on the unique relationship, or to improve it, is for Northern Ireland Members to be associated with any contacts that there may be between parliamentarians of the United Kingdom and the Republic. That is something quite different from asking Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly to enter into a direct dialogue with a foreign State, and a foreign State that does not recognise the sovereignty of the United Kingdom in Northern Ireland.

Did the hon. Gentleman say that the Labour Party had always stood for a united Ireland? In 1949, when Southern Ireland became a republic and left the Commonwealth, it was the view of Clement Attlee and his Cabinet colleagues that, even if Northern Ireland wished to leave the United Kingdom, it should not be allowed to do so. We should not go as far as that. We should say that if the people of Northern Ireland wish to leave the United Kingdom, that should be their right, but they do not wish to do so. The position of the Labour Party is different. As I understood it, the position of the right hon. Member for Barnsley, when he was Secretary of State, was also different.

It seems to me that there are two main obstacles to the improvement of relations between the two sovereign States within the British Isles.

Mr. Fitt: It should be placed on record that the Attlee Government did not lay down that if Northern Ireland wished to depart from the United Kingdom it should not be permitted to do so. The Ireland Act 1949 provided that if the Parliament of Northern Ireland—not the people of Northern Ireland—decided to leave the United Kingdom, that would be the overriding factor.

Sir John Biggs-Davison: I was speaking of the Cabinet views and papers that are now available in the Public Record Office, where the hon. Gentleman can consult them. The position of the Government of that day, like the position of the present Government, was that it rested then on the Parliament and now on the will of the people of Northern Ireland. The hon. Gentleman is formally correct, but he would do well to study the papers that have been published about the views of the Labour Government at that time.

There are two impediments to the development of what should be a beneficial relationship between the two sovereign States within the British Isles. The first is the demand, or the claim, of the Southern Ireland Government to the sovereignty of Northern Ireland.

The second is this Bill, because it is arousing so many fears among Unionists in Northern Ireland. They have heard about and read these debates. They have heard the interpretation of the hon. Member for Hammersmith, North, that the Bill will lead to a united Ireland. They know that the Government are being supported by the Labour Opposition because of the belief that the Bill will lead to a united Ireland.

Mr. Soley: I do not think that the hon. Gentleman should go that far in his interpretation. The Labour Party has made it clear that there is nothing in the Bill that will

[Mr. Soley]

inhibit its policy. The Bill would be helpful in certain ways. The hon. Gentleman, the Unionists and other Right-wing Members of the Conservative Party have to face the fact that, if the Bill fails, they can rest assured that Labour Members will be back here arguing even more strongly that their policy is the real alternative.

Sir John Biggs-Davison: If we want to build a better relationship within these islands, we must reassure the people of Northern Ireland that there is no danger to their position within the United Kingdom. We must consolidate that position. Those of us who have expressed a view, which is contrary to that of my right hon. Friend, as to how that should be done, believe that the Bill, as it stands, is injurious to the reassurance of the people of Northern Ireland that their position is secure.

It is not possible to have a united Ireland. What is possible is to have united islands on the basis of the sovereignty of the two powers within these islands—the Republic and the United Kingdom. Perhaps I can modify that slightly. If, and it is most improbable, Southern Ireland were to end its secession from the United Kingdom, a united Ireland would be possible. Meanwhile, we should strive for what is possible—the unity of the British Isles, recognising the sovereignty of the Republic and of the United Kingdom.

4.45 pm

Mr. J. Enoch Powell (Down, South): I am happy to follow the admirable formulation that has just been offered to the House by the hon. Member for Epping Forest (Sir J. Biggs-Davison). This is the last day on which the House will be allowed to debate the Bill. As we enter upon the last day there is a certain piquancy in the House having before it a new clause tabled by the Labour Party. It has recently affirmed—going not so far as the hon. Member for Hammersmith, North (Mr. Soley) went this afternoon—that it would like to see a single all-Ireland State, provided that that comes about by the consent of the people of Northern Ireland.

When the hon. Member for Hammersmith, North was asked why, as a democratic party, the Labour Party did not argue for, seek that consent from a majority of the electorate in Northern Ireland he said "You know perfectly well the reason why. It is that if we put up a candidate on that policy we should be beaten." In other words, what the hon. Member really wants—whether his party as a whole wants it or not I am not sure—is unification brought about without consent. He knows, and has said this this afternoon, that not only is that consent not available, but that he cannot foresee it. That was the result of the exchange between the hon. Member and myself.

As the hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. Robinson) pointed out, on the face of the new clause is written compulsion. What it means, if it were to be written into the Bill, is that there should be no such Assembly and no such constitution, unless the Assembly does this thing. It is a "shall" clause and not a "may" clause.

In putting this clause on paper, I do not know whether by a kind of tactlessness or clumsiness, the Opposition have done a service. They have reminded us in the most graphic form, by something placed on the Order Paper, what is the underlying purpose and concept behind the Bill. Indeed, before I looked at the drafting of the clause,

which is unsatisfactory in a number of respects, the thought crossed my mind that this might be one of the clauses that was originally in an early draft of the Bill and had been dropped out in case it should cause any difficulties in the passage of the Bill. However, I cannot believe that a clause drafted in these terms ever occupied that position, although, having regard to what is in it, it might have done. The genesis of the Bill lies in the successive stages of the evolution of an Anglo-Irish institution; the successive stages in the agreements—or the meetings, because there were more meetings than there was agreement—between the right hon. Lady the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of the Irish Republic at the end of 1980 and the end of 1981.

What was agreed upon, and what appeared in the latter communiqué, was not an Anglo-Irish council in the sense of an institution spanning the Irish Republic and the United Kingdom. It was not an institution, such as the hon. Member for Epping Forest was referring to, in which two sovereign powers, mutually recognising their respective rights and territories, would seek to co-operate on matters of mutual interest. It was not that at all.

It was clear from the beginning that it was to be a tripartite arrangement. There was to be an element which was called the parliamentary tier in which the Irish Republic would be presented, in which the United Kingdom, as represented by the House, would be represented, but which would also embody a separate and third representation of that part of the United Kingdom which is Northern Ireland.

After that meeting took place we were all able to read of the regret of the Prime Minister of the Irish Republic that his work was unfinished. Unfortunately, it could not be finished as there did not exist a representation of Ulster separately from the rest of the United Kingdom that could throw up the tripartite participation destined to lead to a dual participation, as between what is called the North and South, which had been envisaged as part of that plan.

Mr. Fitt: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that written into the Sunningdale agreement was the power of veto by any of the three participating parties? Had any member of the Unionist Party in Northern Ireland felt that its position was endangered, that veto could have been used. The same veto could have been used by either the British or the Irish Government. Therefore, there was at all times a protection of the Unionist point of view in Northern Ireland.

Mr. Powell: That is the Sunningdale member's defence of the Sunningdale constitution and the Sunningdale agreement. However, the essential point, upon which the intervention does not touch, is that from the start the arrangements deliberately treat Northern Ireland as an entity separate from the United Kingdom. It was envisaged, at any rate by one side of the talks that took place last November between our Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of the Irish Republic, that the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland are to be separately represented in the parliamentary tier.

The Opposition have put upon the Order Paper, subject to any deficiencies, just such a clause. The hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Stanbrook) was right to point out the telltale fact that the relations referred to are not those between Her Majesty's Government in the United

Kingdom and the Government of the Irish Republic, but between the provincial Assembly inside the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland.

Not only are the two "unequally yoked", in St. Paul's famous words, in that it is a combination of a State or nation—the Republic of Ireland is undoubtedly a nation—and an internal institution in another country, but the purpose of using the elected Assembly as a means to further the move towards a federal unification of Ulster and the Irish Republic appears upon the face of the new clause.

It is a thousand pities that this is our last day together. Despite some rather late sittings, the Government and the House have been learning. We might even comfort ourselves with the notion, however remote from probability, that those out of doors have been learning.

One of the most important forms of progress that has been made in our learning was due to the hon. Member for Epping Forest and the evidence that he produced, which has since echoed throughout our debates. Before the last election in 1979 an organ of the Conservative Party warned that a Conservative Government would be under great pressure to overturn the policy that it was offering to the electorate and promising to Northern Ireland, and—I quote the words again because they are of inestimable value—"to launch a new, high-powered political initiative on Northern Ireland, with the object of establishing another 'power-sharing' government in the province"—

then followed the significant words—

"which could pave the way for a federal constitution linking Ulster to the Irish Republic."—[*Official Report*, 8 June 1982; Vol. 25, c. 52.]

Considering that that was written in 1979, it was not a bad shot at the contents of the communiqué of the Thatcher/Fitzgerald talks of November 1981. Many hon. Members must have been impressed, if not with the prescience, at any rate with the knowledge that was displayed by whoever wrote those words. They are clearly words not written without authority nor in detachment from the considerations inside the Conservative Party prior to the election as to what should be its attitude and policy in Northern Ireland.

The Conservative Party has learnt that in the Bill it is witnessing that prophesied subversion or inversion of its policy towards Northern Ireland. It has also learnt the reasons for and the purposes of that. The information which the hon. Member for Epping Forest placed before the House in Committee, and its implications for the nature and purposes of the present Bill, are corroborated by information of which it is right the House should be put in possession. In doing so, I have no alternative but to implicate officials.

The reasons why, in the general course, the actions and opinions of officials are not brought into question in the House are well understood. Ministers take responsibility for advice and information on which they decide to act, and it is the Ministers who are answerable to the House. However, there is one exception to that rule. It arises where there is reason to suppose that the advice tendered to Ministers has not been bona fide and that the information supplied to them has been misleading or incomplete. If that were so, it would be right and necessary for the House to look beyond the Ministers who answer to it directly.

The Secretary of State will be familiar with the name of an official in his office, one Clive Abbott, who had a large part in the work leading up to the present Bill, and

who, if not the "onlie begetter" of the Bill, has been closely concerned with its production and passage. It may well be that his was the briefing on which the Secretary of State assured the House of his belief that the Bill would promote political stability in Ulster and strengthen the Union.

5 pm

During the past year or two, Mr. Abbott has supplied to academic researchers information in response to questions put to him, and I wish to quote from the note of certain replies which in the course of that activity, he gave on an occasion some 16 months ago, because they are particularly germane to the Bill and to the context in which it has been placed by the disclosures of the hon. Member for Epping Forest. I shall, of course, provide the Secretary of State with a copy of the whole text after the close of this debate and I have asked my hon. Friend the Member for Antrim, South (Mr. Molyneux) to furnish all necessary details to the Prime Minister forthwith, in view of her special responsibility for the Civil Service and of the investigation on security and as well as other grounds, which I anticipate will be ordered by her. The following question was put:

"Is it true to say that between May and October 1979 there was consultation between the two governments"—

the Government of the Republic and this Government—"on Northern Ireland and that after coming to power the Tory Party changed its policies on Northern Ireland?"

A. "Before the Conservative Party came to power in 1979 it had promised that local government functions would be returned to local councils. We had to tell them that it was just not on."

Mr. Fitt: Hear, hear.

Mr. Powell: The hon. Gentleman will have an opportunity to cheer later.

"We had to tell them"—

hon. Members should note the word "we"

"that it was just not on. In terms of the future government of Northern Ireland integration is a non-starter for two main reasons. First, we would automatically lose the co-operation we are getting from Haughey over border security. Secondly, we couldn't break certain undertakings we have given to the Irish government over the constitutional future of Northern Ireland."

Mr. Fitt: Did not the right hon. Gentleman say that that document was concocted, or written, in 1979? In 1979, Haughey was not Prime Minister—

Mr. Powell: I did not say that. The hon. Gentleman did not hear me. I said that the replies were given about 16 months ago. The hon. Gentleman should listen more carefully. As I promised, the Secretary of State will have every facility.

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Mr. James Prior): Will the right hon. Gentleman repeat the second reason, as I did not quite get it?

Mr. Powell: I shall gladly repeat it. As I promised, the Secretary of State will be given the text at the end of the debate. The second reason why it is "not on" to treat Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom is that

"we couldn't break certain undertakings we have given to the Irish government over the constitutional future of Northern Ireland."

I pause before proceeding to further quotation. In the course of the proceedings on the Bill, the Secretary of State has repeatedly explained to the House why the fulfilment of the Conservative Party's election policy or indeed any instalment of local government is "not on". He

[Mr. Powell]

said that it would run counter—I want him to hear what I say—to ingrained prejudices in the Province and that in any case there was in Northern Ireland the 50-year tradition of devolution of a different type.

It is not the first time in our proceedings that I affirm that the Secretary of State was no doubt being completely sincere and candid. Had he known that any extension of local government

“would automatically lose the co-operation we are getting from Haughey over border security”

he would manfully and plainly have told the House and his party, “This is what we had intended to do; but we cannot do it because we are being blackmailed by the Irish government”. He would also have told the House if he knew that his action was constrained because he

“couldn’t break certain undertakings we have given to the Irish government over the constitutional future of Northern Ireland”. He would not have dreamt of concealing that. No Minister could conceal so vital a fact from the House.

Viscount Cranbourne: Is not the House entitled to an explanation of who “we” are? Are “we” the Government of the United Kingdom, or are they officials? Are we not also entitled to an explanation about what the undertakings are, or were, and under what circumstances they were given?

Mr. Powell: I shall come to that point. I am sure that the investigation that cannot but follow the debate will cast light on the meaning of the first person plural pronoun in that sentence. The Secretary of State, it appears, has been placed in a false position, albeit a position foreshadowed from inside his own party organisation three years ago. The Prime Minister, with her repeated repudiation of any external influence, let alone binding obligation as to the constitutional future of Northern Ireland, has been placed in a false position. The Opposition have been placed in a false position because the “unbreakable undertakings” evidently existed before the change of Government, thus raising the question whether the Labour Government or any of their members were a party to them. The right hon. Member for Barnsley (Mr. Mason) has as great a vested interest as the Secretary of State in knowing—I do not believe this—or declaring the truth of the matter. Finally, the House has been placed in a false position by having a Bill commended to it on premises that turn out not to have been the true ones. In case there is any doubt about the relevance of all this to the Bill, I shall proceed to a further—my only further—quotation, for the relative lengthiness of which I apologise. The quotation appeared in an answer similar to that which I have quoted. Mr. Abbott continued:

“As I have said before, a devolved government with power returning to local councils is not on. But an assembly which controlled such things as housing, through our already established quango, NIHE, given preliminary powers which would be extended progressively, is a possibility.”

That is the Bill, is it not? That is what has been put before the House. “But”, Mr. Abbott continued,

“any such developments would have to involve close consultation with the Irish government.”

It is not possible—

Mr. Fitt: Is the right hon. Gentleman telling the House that he is in possession of a Civil Service document given to responsible Ministers, whether in the Labour Government or the present Government? Is he saying that

he has in his possession a document that was the product of the Civil Service when advising the Northern Ireland Office at that time?

Mr. Powell: I am telling the House exactly what I have put on the record and what I have told the House. The hon. Gentleman will recall that I have requested my hon. Friend the Member for Antrim, South to ensure that all relevant particulars and identifications are placed at the disposal of the Prime Minister, as being primarily and personally responsible for the Civil Service.

It is not seriously possible for the Bill to be presented for Royal Assent, whatever happens to it in another place, until these matters have been cleared up; until the House knows, in a manner about which there can be no dispute or prevarication, what were the undertakings which had been given on the constitutional future of Northern Ireland to the Irish Government; and until the House knows whether that briefing was the briefing on which the Secretary of State has commended the Bill to the House. Clearly, it is impossible for the Bill to become law until then.

The House, as well as the Government and their predecessors, are faced with the question that must be resolved publicly before we can proceed. It could just be that what has happened this afternoon was not entirely unforeseen when the attention of the hon. Member for Epping Forest was drawn to the singularly significant words that the Conservative Party itself wrote for its own candidates in 1979.

Mr. Julian Amery (Brighton, Pavilion): The charges that the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) has brought are of such a grave character that I believe that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, would like to postpone the debate until he is in a position to answer. It is difficult to see how we can proceed with any serious discussion after what has been said.

Mr. Powell: The question is not strictly for me, although the right hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion (Mr. Amery) addressed it to me. The right hon. Gentleman will recall that the House passed a motion which forbids any motion interposing during today’s proceedings. The Government have fully within their resources the ability to deal with the matter placed before them this afternoon. It is fully within their resources to ensure that the Bill does not reach the statute book until the matters that have to be resolved have been resolved to the satisfaction of those who support the Government, and of the House as a whole.

Mr. Peter Lloyd (Fareham): Unlike the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell), I shall confine myself undramatically to what I believe will be the effect of the new clause on the working of the Bill. I shall leave aside the genesis of the ideas that may be construed in the clause. It is clear that if the clause is approved, it will be totally mischievous. It is a device that cannot possibly bring the communities in Northern Ireland together. It cannot help to make harmonious, devolved Government in Northern Ireland possible. If it is accepted, it will make the Bill, which was always likely to fail, a certain non-starter. The all-Ireland dimension was the explosive device in the Sunningdale agreement, and it destroyed it.

5.15 pm

A committee of the type proposed would be bound to underline the two different national aspirations which are at the root of the constitutional problem in Northern

[Mr. Robinson]

but who are prepared to go into the Assembly and, although the possibility of achieving meaningful devolution will be difficult, if not impossible, will have the courage to try.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell: One need not prove, or argue, after this debate, the importance of the SDP amendment and the issues attached to it. Perhaps the narrowest of them is raised by the amendment of the hon. Member for Harborough (Mr. Farr) which innocently but effectively substitutes "or" for "and" in line 30. If "and" remains, the subsection is a declaration that the indefinite continuance of an Assembly that will not arrive at acceptable devolution proposals is nevertheless in the public interest. The amendment alters it to say that the purpose of the Assembly is to arrive at devolution within the terms of the Bill, but, if it cannot, it is not in the public interest that it should continue to exist indefinitely.

The hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. Robinson), despite the declaration with which he concluded his speech, said that he would have no interest in being a Member of an Assembly which, after three years, or some other period, failed to arrive at acceptable proposals. He would not be interested in an Assembly which found itself at a dead-end on devolution.

Mr. Robinson: What I said was that I would not be interested in being a Member of an Assembly after three years if it did not hold out the prospect of achieving devolution.

Mr. Powell: That is good enough, because we are talking about a visible prospect. I do not say that the hon. Gentleman would not have the patience to carry on if he could see an acceptable solution six months after the initial three years. I am not dealing with the length of the period. The hon. Gentleman has confirmed that there would be little point in belonging to such an Assembly if it could do only what is set out in clauses 3 and 4.

We invite the Government to accept, by substituting "or" for "and", what they have professed all along. This is a rolling devolution Bill. The Secretary of State did not say "I shall set up a scrutinising Assembly without responsibility". He said "I shall give an Assembly the opportunity to arrive at devolution, either in one leap or gradually". To substitute "or" for "and" is to accept that an Assembly that has no visible prospect of achieving the intentions of the Bill is not in the public interest. If it is in the public interest, we need a different approach, a different Assembly and a different concept. I hope that, if they can do no more, the Government can accept the amendment, because it appears to correspond to their intentions and view of the Bill.

What period should we set which would provide a reasonable expectation of achieving the Government's objects? The hon. Member for Belfast, East says that we should leave it to the Assembly because the Assembly will not continue its existence if it sees no prospect of success. The hon. Gentleman is relatively young and of a generous disposition. He thinks the best of and imputes the purest and most noble motives, unsullied by personal or pecuniary interest, to his fellow men. However, the belief that an Assembly will terminate its existence, the emoluments that flow from its existence and the privileges and influence that might attach to its members, simply

because it honestly declares that it will not get anywhere with an acceptable form of power sharing that would persuade a Government to create a devolved Assembly, is not realistic. Neither of us can prove our conjecture. He has his view of human nature and I have mine.

Mr. Robinson: It was said earlier that the right hon. Gentleman might stand for election to the Assembly. The right hon. Gentleman did not deny it, so some hon. Members may suspect that his silence was assent. If we forget about my generous disposition and the fact that I am not three score years and ten, if the right hon. Gentleman were elected to the Assembly and the three years elapsed, would he not take the proper and honourable course of pulling up stumps and saying "Let us go home"?

Mr. Powell: I do not say that an individual Member might not fail to seek re-election, but he might decide to apply for the Assembly equivalent of the Chiltern Hundreds. No doubt some Member may be of a resigning disposition who, bored and frustrated after one year or three years, would say "I shall have no more of this." However, I doubt the likelihood of an Assembly of 78 or 85 Members terminating its existence by resolution. That is improbable and, in this House, we legislate on probabilities. I conclude that it is for the House, having brought the Assembly into existence, to provide that if it cannot perform its function within a reasonable period its existence should be terminated.

The question then is what is the reasonable period? We have a choice in the two amendments between three years and one year. I am slightly inclined to think that one year might, in all circumstances, be cutting it too fine, but my view is that three years is unrealistically long. If the Government accept the principle that there should be a specific terminus in the clause, I for my part would not cavil if they arrived at an intermediate position between one year, which I would think is the minimum and three years, which seems irrationally long.

8 pm

It seems unrealistic to suppose that it could take as long as three years for an Assembly to become aware of whether it would agree upon anything that was likely to commend itself in the terms of the Bill to a Secretary of State or, as the terms of the Bill may eventually be, to the House of Commons. I believe that in principle the SDP's amendment is right, but I think that the figure written into it is too large rather than too small.

I shall address myself to the question posed by the hon. Member for Southend, East (Mr. Taylor) and posed yesterday by the hon. Member for Bebington and Ellesmere Port (Mr. Porter), whom I seem always to lose at the moment when I want him most. Both hon. Members have asked "What is the harm in a lame duck Assembly? What is the harm in the continued existence of an Assembly which knows, and which everyone else knows, will not achieve the purpose for which it was created by statute?"

To understand why my hon. Friends and I are convinced that such a survival would be dangerous, it is necessary to understand the purpose behind the Bill on the part of those who were working away at it long before the Secretary of State had any notion that he would have the misfortune to find himself at the Northern Ireland Office.

The intention is to have an Assembly for the sake of having an Assembly, but that was not always so. It is a

ishment that was arrived at after certain experiences and failed attempts. We had an earlier version of the plan. I am sorry that it is necessary for this purpose again to refer briefly to the immortal passage in the daily notes for candidates. I must confess that as a recipient in years gone by of daily notes for candidates during elections I never treasured them on the assumption that hidden inside them there might be, if not a time bomb, an immortal jewel or a torch which in two or three years' time would illuminate the dark corners of politics. However, it has happened and it is a reality.

The document exists, and it can be verified. It referred to the new Government coming "under considerable pressure to launch a new, high-powered political initiative on Northern Ireland with the object of establishing another 'power-sharing' government in the province, which could pave the way for a federal constitution linking Ulster to the Irish Republic."

That was Mk. I, and we have Mk. II. I anticipate that Mk. II was introduced at some time in 1980. It is really the crude Mk. II. The crude Mk. I is the unimproved version which did not learn from 1974, the version which intended to rush the Sunningdale fence. After contemplating for some time the unlikelihood of obtaining a power-sharing Executive which could do the dirty work, which was the idea behind Sunningdale, and which was why the Sunningdale Executive perished, someone asked—I do not know quite who he or she may have been—"Why do we need an Executive to do the job? Surely we can do it with an Assembly. Nothing can prevent us from getting an Assembly elected. If we have elections for an Assembly, everybody must take part. Therefore, we can always get an Assembly elected."

The true purpose behind the Bill, as illuminated by the notes for candidates of 25 April 1979, is the creation of an Assembly. In the immortal words of the right hon. Member for Leeds, South-East (Mr. Rees) in October 1979 "I can tell you, Enoch, there will be an Assembly and you know how I know that there will be an Assembly." It is the Assembly which is now the working piece for paving the way for a federal constitution linking Ulster to the Irish Republic. Between Mk. I and Mk. II the development which facilitated the transition from Mk. I to Mk. II was the Anglo-Irish Council and its parliamentary tier, which is the new version or expression of what was crudely expressed three years ago as the federal constitution linking Ulster to the Irish Republic.

That has been elaborated in the three successive meetings which the Prime Minister has had with successive Irish Prime Ministers. That has now become the Anglo-Irish Council with its parliamentary tier in which Ulster, via an Ulster Assembly, is to be represented as a third finger. That is the mischief of an idle Assembly. It will do the work that Satan has intended for it. It will "pave the way for a federal constitution" by entering into a federal institution. The Anglo-Irish Council, with the parliamentary tier is a federal institution. It is because that is understood by people on both sides in Northern Ireland that my hon. Friends and I, alas, are all too sure that we are right when we say that moves in that direction, with legislation which could have that effect, will be the cause of additional and avoidable bloodshed.

It is not, as the hon. Member for Belfast, East suggests, that the IRA requires an excuse for murder, but it needs encouragement. It needs the encouragement of faith that it will get its way. It needs the encouragement of being able to tell itself colourably that that is what Her

Majesty's Government want too. It needs to think that the Government of the United Kingdom, the hated English, are themselves about the business of paving the way for the entry of Ulster into a federal constitution linking it with the Irish Republic.

All terrorism thrives on hope. All terrorism dies where hope is removed. The damage of the Bill and the damage of an Assembly without an overt purpose—I am answering directly the question of the hon. Member for Southend, East—is that it inspires all too justified hope on the part of those who, if this is to happen, mean to be on the bandwagon in circumstances which will give them and terror the upper hand when the bandwagon is rolling.

Mr. Teddy Taylor: I cannot recall an earlier occasion when I have disagreed with the right hon. Gentleman, but is he honestly saying that an Assembly packed with Members of the sort that we have in the House of Commons, of great quality and conviction, would be used as vehicles to bring about Republicanism? Bearing in mind the convictions that Northern Ireland Members have expressed and the personal bravery that they have shown, does he think that they could be foxed, misled or used to become vehicles for Republicanism?

Mr. Powell: That is exactly what I am saying. That is exactly what is being said by those who, for the purpose stated, intend that there shall be an Assembly, whatever else there is. "Power-sharing Executive or not" they say "let us have an Assembly".

Let me put one simple proposition to the hon. Gentleman. Let us suppose that there is an invitation to such an Assembly to participate. Why not? There will be one-third of that Assembly who will go off like larks. There will be one-third or one-quarter who will say, "Yes, of course, let us book our tickets". What will the remainder do? Will they remain sitting there and say, "Good riddance to them", or will they say, "We shall not allow those people to speak for Ulster. We shall be in on the act. We shall go along and see what happens. If Ulster is to be discussed in this Anglo-Irish Assembly, as the Prime Minister arranged, which is a fair implication, in her conference with FitzGerald last November, we ought to be there as well". That is how it will happen. That is one of the ways in which it will happen. It is not difficult to envisage.

Therefore, the answer to the question by the hon. Member for Southend, East, "What is the hope and what is the harm in an Assembly in vacuo?", is that an Assembly in vacuo is what Satan wants. It might be thought that even for one who sometimes mistakes the Foreign Office for a nest of vipers, the reference to His Satanic Majesty is inappropriate. If so, I should like to leave a thought for the Committee to ponder.

Whoever wrote—it must have been written before 25 April—what was published on that day in the notes for candidates was aware already of what was said to the right hon. Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Atkins) when he entered upon the office that the present Secretary of State now occupies. He was told, "You ought to understand that you cannot carry out your election manifesto, because there is an agreement in existence already with which it is incompatible".

Whoever wrote those words and sent them to be printed during the election knew that that would happen. But how did he know that it would happen? It was because he knew

[Mr. Powell]

that it had already happened. The Civil Service has a habit, when it suspects that there might be a change of Administration—some of us who observed the political scene during the early months of 1979 had a vague notion that there might be a political change of Administration—of getting in touch in advance with those who might be their new political masters to prepare to carry out their wishes in accordance with their election manifesto. Great students of election manifestos are the civil servants.

Therefore, it is not beyond probability that the late Airey Neave, who was murdered at the end of March, had already been told what the right hon. Member for Spelthorne was told early in May. It is for us to decide what reply the late Airey Neave made when he was briefed. All that we know is that he was murdered before May was out. All that we know is that whoever was assisting and working with him in the Conservative Party organisation, whether he did it in pian memoriam or for other purposes, wrote those words into a place where in due course they would be found.

Perhaps those who think that there is no harm in the Bill—no good, but perhaps no harm—might reflect on those matters.

8.15 pm

Mr. Maurice Macmillan (Farnham): I support the amendments in the belief that the Government could accept, if not the details set out on the Order Paper, at least the intention and purpose that underlie them. The Government could accept them without doing violence to their ideas or the internal consistency of clause 5 and without modifying, except a little for the better, their admission in the clause that the Assembly may be unworkable. For there is no point in any part of the clause unless it is to provide for circumstances in which the Assembly will be unlikely to achieve the purposes of devolution, move away from direct government, covered by clauses 1 and 2, and operate in a way that is contrary to the public interest.

Moreover, the intention behind the amendments should be acceptable to a wide range of opinion in the Committee. It is acceptable to the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell). The amendments are acceptable to my hon. Friend the Member for Southern, East (Mr. Taylor) who, broadly speaking, perhaps a little reluctantly, supports the Bill. They are acceptable to me and to the Social Democratic Party. Even among those who are seeking different forms of devolution, the general intention of the amendments should be acceptable.

The amendments alter the clause only in altering the timing of the Secretary of State's consideration of the success or otherwise of the new Assembly. The criteria for dissolving the Assembly are left entirely to the Secretary of State. There is no attempt to constrain him in any way. It is still his judgment, as it is in the clause unaltered by the amendments.

The only constraint on the Secretary of State is to force him to consider the proposition of dissolving the Assembly within a certain time limit. The right hon. Member for Down, South suggested two years as a happy mean between the one year suggested in one amendment and the three years suggested in another. I am prepared to leave the period to the Government. Whatever the period

chosen, it is not stated that the Secretary of State must act within that period. It is stated only that the Secretary of State must consider the situation within that period. The Assembly is put under some pressure to seek the objectives in clauses 1 and 2 coherently and not to dilly-dally and waste time in seeking to fulfil the objectives of the Bill.

The wording of the amendment at present also constrains the Secretary of State slightly in the opposite direction. It seems to imply that he would not be able to consider dissolving the Assembly under the terms of the amendments before the period stated in the amended clause. If it forces him to consider the viability or otherwise of the Assembly within a given period—thereby putting pressure on the Assembly itself—it also prevents him from prejudging the Assembly in advance of the period stated—whichever one may be chosen—should the Government accept the amendments.

The only other point that I wish to make is about the wording suggested by amendment No. 104. That would change the preposition from "and" to "or" linking clause 5(1)(a) and (b). As it stands now it seems possible to argue that if the Assembly is not moving at all to the position provided for under clauses 1 and 2 it is necessary at the same time for it to be contrary to the public interest that it should continue. It is almost impossible for it to be in the public interest for a failing Assembly to continue. Equally, as it links the ability of the Assembly to move towards devolution with it being within the public interest, it is possible that leaving "and" would place an undue restraint upon the Secretary of State at a marginal period when the other roles given to the Assembly were being adequately and successfully carried out within the period but had not yet arrived at the point where one could say that a private agreement had almost been reached on the devolved role.

Giving a date would place a limited restraint on the Secretary of State. Changing "and" for "or" would give him greater freedom of action than the present clause does. I ask the Government to consider seriously the arguments that have been put forward. I can see no way in which the amendments damage the Government's intention, much as I may disapprove of it. The amendments remove some of the hazards that the Assembly could bring to the national interest of the Province and the United Kingdom, and give slightly greater freedom of action to the Secretary of State in his appallingly difficult task.

Mr. Budgen: I shall be brief because I recognise the reality of the debate that we are having. We have been brutally and effectively crushed by a cynical guillotine, and it is plain from the lack of passion that the Government know that they can disregard what we say and need not bother any further to persuade us or anyone else. They know perfectly well that the bulk of the amendments that were tabled will go undebated.

None of us can prove what the consequences of setting up the Assembly will be. The most optimistic of us are those who support the Secretary of State. For him the setting up of the Assembly will lead not merely to constitutional stability but to a period of unparalleled personal happiness for each of the citizens of Northern Ireland and unparalleled prosperity for Northern Ireland. He unfolds before us a vastly euphoric scene. On the other hand, the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr.



Prime Minister

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
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This is an internal report
on the papers which know
Cowell referred to in his letter on the
Northern Ireland file on 22nd June.

MS

Clive Whitmore Esq
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

REV
2 vi

July 1982

Dear Clive,

1. Thank you for your letter of 30 June about the documents attached which Mr Molyneux sent to Ian Gow about conversations between Mr Abbott and Mr Sloan.

2. Mr Sloan has been known to us as a post-graduate research student at Keele University. Yesterday we were informed, confidentially by Conservative Central Office, that for a number of years he has been and indeed still is employed by the Official Unionist Party and works for Mr Molyneux. If this is so, it is strange that he did not reveal this connection in his dealings with us, nor indeed does Mr Molyneux refer to it in his note explaining that Mr Sloan got in touch with him.

3. The history of our dealings with Mr Sloan is as follows. He wrote to the Northern Ireland Office on 9 January 1981 saying that he was a post-graduate research student writing a PhD thesis and in particular engaged on a paper entitled "the Northern Ireland Conflict in Anglo/Irish Relations". He asked for a talk with an official "who has to deal with the various political problems of the Northern Ireland conflict on a day-to-day basis".

4. He was seen by Mr Abbott on 26 January 1981 for over an hour on the normal basis whereby academic researchers are given unattributable information of a factual character and at this interview Mr Abbott noticed that Mr Sloan had a Belfast accent. The latter wrote a warm letter of thanks and at his request was seen by Mr Abbott on 17 November 1981 in connection with the next stage of his research which he said was on "Anglo/Irish relations viz a viz Northern Ireland". He had a further talk on 17 February 1982 with another official and followed this up with a letter asking "on a non-attributable basis of course" for further information about views on devolution within Northern Ireland which he received in writing.

5. Turning now to the document, it gives the appearance of consisting of precise answers to questions and furthermore by the insertion of dots at the foot of page 1 followed by the words ("phone rings") conveys the impression that it is a verbatim record.

6. Mr Abbott strongly denies that the document is an even remotely accurate account of his meeting with Mr Sloan. Indeed it is evident from the first words of "Answer 1" that the author has no notion of elementary facts of Irish/American politics. Anybody who can record as the response of an experienced official in the Northern Ireland Office that the Ad Hoc Committee tends to be dominated by the 4 Horsemen and that Mr Biaggi is one of the Horsemen is bound to be in a pretty confused state of mind.

7. Apart from other preposterous statements attributed to Mr Abbott, it is interesting that the expression "at the minute" in Answer 1 - "John Hume is in Washington at the minute" is a Northern Irish usage. Mr Abbott is not a personal friend of Mr Hume (Answer 2a) and doubts whether Mr Hume has the slightest idea who he is; Mr Abbott has never met, nor so far as he knows, spoken to Mr Trimble whom he is also said to claim as a close friend.

8. Some of the absurdities in the document have been pointed out in the House by members not notable for supporting Mr Prior's proposals - see for example Mr Paisley in Hansard for 29 June at cols 837-8 and Sir Philip Goodhart cols 857-8.

9. As to what should be done next, my Secretary of State is considering whether to recommend to the Prime Minister that some independent enquiry, e.g. by a QC, should be set up, but it might be difficult to formulate satisfactory terms of reference and the setting up of an enquiry might itself give an impression that the allegations had substance. Before coming to a decision on this he would propose to see to what extent the matter is further probed in Parliament or in the media and whether any residual doubts or anxieties remain.

*Mans,
Steph*

S W BOYS SMITH



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H 12 1

30 JUN 1982

PART 11 ends:-

CAW to NIO 30.6.82

PART 12 begins:-

NIO to CAW 1.7.82

