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CABINET TWO  
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Confidential Filing

The Appointment of Security Coordinator  
in Northern Ireland - Sir Maurice Oldfield

The Appointment of a successor to Sir Maurice  
Oldfield - Sir Brookes Richards.

IRELAND

September 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>9.10.79</del>							
<del>15.5.80</del>							
<del>11.6.80</del>							
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<del>27.1.81</del>							
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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

8 April 1982

NORTHERN IRELAND SECURITY COORDINATOR

The Prime Minister has noted without comment your letter to me of 5 April.

I am copying this letter to John Halliday (Home Office), David Omand (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A. L. COLES

Mike Hopkins, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

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*RJ*

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NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

John Coles Esq  
PS/Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1

*[Handwritten signature]*

5 April 1982

Prime Minister

To note

*[Handwritten initials]* 5/4

Dear Tom,

NORTHERN IRELAND SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR

In his minute to the Prime Minister of 17 December, my Secretary of State commented on the Security Co-ordinator's report on the situation at that time, and pointed out that we should have to review his position in the Spring.

Sir Brooks Richards has attended the periodic Security Policy Meetings in Belfast up till the end of March. He did not think it necessary to contribute any further written report. Work has gone forward in the areas to which Sir Brooks drew particular attention in his last report and on which Mr Prior commented in his minute. That will be a continuing necessity, if the response is to remain appropriate and adequate to the threat at all times.

Having taken careful stock of the current security scene, and of the relationship of those responsible for dealing with it - RUC, Army and NIO - Mr Prior has concluded that the Security Co-ordinator has fully discharged his responsibilities and that there is no further role for him to play in present circumstances. Sir Brooks Richards has accordingly stepped down.

We would see no advantage in making any public announcement about this, and indeed we should regard the post as being in abeyance (though it will disappear from the establishment). The circumstances in which we might wish to revive it are less likely, insofar as we can ensure that the lessons instilled by Sir Brooks and his predecessor Sir Maurice Oldfield are not forgotten; but they are not inconceivable. If they should recur, my Secretary of State would have no hesitation in seeking the Prime Minister's authority to reinstate the post, and believes that it should be possible to find a suitable incumbent without any unacceptable delay.

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I am sending a copy of this letter to John Halliday in the Home Office, David Omand in the Ministry of Defence and to David Wright in Sir Robert Armstrong's Office.

Yours sincerely  
Mike Hopkins

M W HOPKINS

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Prime Minister

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PRIME MINISTER

NORTHERN IRELAND SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR

You will recall the arrangement made in the spring for further reports from the Security Co-ordinator. There was to be an interim one in the autumn, which I now enclose, and a final one next spring, at which time we would review the arrangement with a view to discontinuing it.

2. The enclosed report covers the period of the Republican hunger strikes at the Maze Prison with accompanying disturbances, and the immediate aftermath: a period in which you and other colleagues have followed the Northern Ireland security scene closely. As envisaged in the spring, the report's first concern is with the co-ordination of the security effort, and on this Sir Brooks Richards finds that the tripartite machine - RUC, Army and NIO - stood up well to the strains put upon it: civil government also played its part in dealing with the consequences of the disturbances. In the field of counter-terrorist operations, especially in relation to co-ordination of intelligence, the report shows some progress but, as might be expected, higher performance in some areas than others. Those responsible will continue to work for better results. But it is important to maintain continual vigilance about the state of these relationships; co-ordination between the various agencies is not an altogether natural function, and needs positive attention all the time.

3. From a wider point of view, however, we face problems both of substance and of presentation. The substance is that there is a limit to the extent to which even highly efficient and numerous security forces can prevent a relatively small number of dedicated terrorists from committing some acts of murder and violence - and it may be that in Northern Ireland we are not now very much above that level. The presentational problem is that, even though arrests, charges and convictions may continue at their current high rate, the Northern Ireland public is in practice unlikely to experience from

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
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now on an appreciably lower level of terrorist activity unless the terrorists decide to give up violence of their own volition.

4. The Co-ordinator looks at a number of ways in which various of our Unionist critics advocate or demand that our present security policy be modified, but concludes that none of them, even if they produced short-term advantages, is likely to lead in the longer term to a marked reduction in the level of terrorism and that many are likely to prove counter-productive; I certainly see no reason to disagree with him. However, given the seriousness of the problem - and particularly given the present understandably strong feelings among Unionists about the security position - I think this is an appropriate moment to take stock. Furthermore, RUC and Army force levels are now approaching those judged, five years ago, to be appropriate for the long term and it is sensible to test that judgement against the prospects as we now see them. I have set work in hand accordingly. In the meantime, I think it would be unwise to close our minds to all the options which the Co-ordinator has identified. Affairs could develop to a point where we might, for example, need to enlist Dublin's support for a joint re-introduction to detention. That said, I shall be surprised if a case can be made for any major shifts in the near future. In that case the problem will be one of justifying, in Northern Ireland, in Parliament and elsewhere, our determination to stay on our present course. At that level, it becomes part of our overall approach to the other problems of the Province: political advance, relations with Dublin, and the recovery of the economy.

5. I am sending copies of this minute and the report to the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence.



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REVIEW OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN  
NORTHERN IRELAND: NOVEMBER 1981

Report by the Security Co-ordinator to the Secretary of  
State for Northern Ireland

INTRODUCTION

1. When I presented my report 'The Way Forward' on the co-ordination of the Security effort in Northern Ireland to your predecessor last March it was envisaged that I should return in the autumn to report on progress made subsequently in the development and in particular the co-ordination of the security effort. Since then I have attended the Secretary of State's Security Policy Meetings and have seen the key papers on security matters. This report is the product of a week of briefing and visits to the organisations involved in the development and implementation of the security policy in Northern Ireland. I have been helped in its preparation by a small team specially assembled for the purpose but it has no claims to be an intensive investigation of current security issues. Such an investigation would not have been possible in the time available. The Review took place against the background of the challenge mounted by the Rev Ian Paisley MP in the wake of the Anglo-Irish summit. The murder of the Rev Robert Bradford MP took place half-way through our work.

2. The present paper reviews progress on the issues covered by my final report in March. It does not try to cover the more detailed matters which were dealt with in the Area Reviews conducted between 1979 and 1981 by the Planning Staff established by my predecessor, the late Sir Maurice Oldfield. In preparing this Report I have looked particularly at how the co-ordination of the various elements of the security forces, as well as the civil government and agencies, have come through the stormy events of last summer; I have focussed on certain problems which will need to be addressed in the coming months and finally I have considered possible alternative security options, including some of those put forward by "Loyalists" as a panacea to the terrorist problem.

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THE IMPACT OF RECENT EVENTS

The Main Events

3. Key events in the Province since my last Report were the hunger strike which was renewed on 1 March, the success of the H-Block candidates in the two bye-elections in Fermanagh, the change of Government in the Republic, the November talks between HMG and the Irish Government and the appointment of a new Secretary of State. By and large the first two tended to emphasise the polarisation of the communities and the first also put considerable pressure on the Security Forces, the Prisons and the Government, the third had a mildly beneficial effect, the fourth aroused some fears among the Loyalists and the fifth was well received in the Province.

Terrorist and Paramilitary Organisations

4. The hunger strike was a mixed blessing for the Provisionals. On the one hand, it gained for them in the early stages increased sympathy in the Province, gave international prominence to the Republican cause and produced potential recruits for PIRA and INLA and some money. On the other, the street violence which followed the death of each of the 10 hunger strikers was confined to Republican areas and became increasingly unpopular, the needless deaths attracted more and more adverse comment from Roman Catholics, the political campaigns used up much of the money collected in the Province and in the USA and the Security Forces' successes in West Belfast affected morale.

5. The possibility of sectarian violence after the death of Sands was prevented by firm action on the part of the Security Forces and a responsible attitude by the Loyalist paramilitaries, whose leaders succeeded in exercising a large measure of control over their men throughout the period of the hunger strike.

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6. In the longer term the hunger strike will become part of Republican folk history but in practical terms its immediate benefit to the terrorists is limited. A summary of the current threat appears in paragraphs 16-23.

Flow of Intelligence

7. In this Review I have been primarily concerned with intelligence to pre-empt PIRA and INLA operations. The hunger strike had little lasting impact on the available coverage. During the rioting it was often impossible to meet and obtain information from agents and the surveillance teams found it difficult to operate within Republican areas. Once the streets were cleared and life returned to normal, intelligence again became available. In the summer PIRA instigated a rigorous 'tout' hunt following the Security Forces' successes in Belfast. Many members of PIRA were interrogated and a few murdered as alleged informers. Although this had an inhibiting effect on some potential agents it also resulted in disaffection among PIRA activists and has not significantly stemmed the flow of information. Nevertheless, good intelligence remains hard to come by. As far as Loyalist terrorism is concerned there has been good preventive intelligence.

Security Forces' Operations

8. As a direct repercussion of the second hunger strike there was a significant increase in street violence and in Republican terrorism. The Security Forces successfully met both problems. Terrorism was countered by a continuation of the intelligence-based attack on the terrorist organisations backed by overt defensive measures designed to frustrate the terrorist and to reassure the population. Street violence was primarily contained by the RUC with the Army available to assist where necessary. This assistance was required to a greater or lesser extent for most of the summer in Belfast and in Londonderry. The

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Spearhead battalion was deployed from England in May, for a month, largely as a contingency measure, to maintain reserves, to prevent units from becoming over-tired, to ensure that the street violence could be controlled without a lessening of the anti-terrorist effort, and to demonstrate the Army's ability to reinforce to meet changing levels of violence.

9. Once again, the use of the plastic baton round was an important factor in controlling the riots within limited areas and in reducing the number of Security Force and civilian casualties by keeping the rioters beyond 'arms'-length'. Though baton rounds caused some unfortunate deaths, there is no doubt that this relatively selective anti-riot weapon is the best available to meet riots in Northern Ireland. This effectiveness is reflected, in part, by the active Republican PR campaign mounted this summer against the use of 'plastic bullets'.

10. This successful containment of a temporary increase in violence had several by-products:

- a. Police confidence and morale was improved and their command and control methods were vindicated.
- b. The RUC gained confidence in the Army support available from a resident presence, backed by an ability to reinforce from England. The anti-terrorist effort was sustained throughout the period.
- c. The switch of limited RUC resources to countering street violence did, however, result in a reduction in the manpower available to counter non-terrorist crime.
- d. Inevitably, progress towards the return of 'normal policing' in hard Republican areas was reversed during the months of rioting. The use

of the RUC in a riot-control role in these areas ran contrary to the relationship which had been fostered between the Catholic community and the RUC in the preceding period. However, the ground lost was regained faster than might have been expected. In Belfast, the situation is now comparable to that in the first quarter of this year. Elsewhere in the Province greater progress has been made and additional areas are being policed without direct military support.

Cross Border Co-operation

11. Cross border co-operation between the Garda and the RUC steadily improved. There was concern that the new Government might adopt a different attitude but it soon became clear that they were if anything anxious to improve the level of co-operation. The hunger strike had no discernible effect in this area except perhaps to cement the liaison between two professional forces (which was further demonstrated when they worked closely together over the Dunne kidnapping in October).

Inter-Community Relations

12. The hunger strike inevitably caused considerable strains on the relationship between the two communities in Northern Ireland. Its effect in two respects was enhanced by its co-incidence with the District Council elections in March and the bye-elections in Fermanagh and South Tyrone; in these elections the prison issue was the dominant theme, though on the Unionist side the Anglo-Irish talks gave scope for competitive opposition. The council elections as a result showed increasing polarisation: moderate parties lost heavily. The veneer of tolerance, which had existed in some local councils at least, disappeared and even the formerly moderate parties came under pressure to adopt a more extreme position in order to survive electorally. The elections

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also saw the movement of paramilitary supporters and their nominees from both sides into electoral politics, in several cases successfully.

13. Within the minority community the hunger strike, with its strong emotional appeal, gave rise to feelings of bitterness and alienation from the Government and the forces of law and order. This does not seem to have been lasting. As the deaths continued there was increased disillusionment with the campaign, reflected in the turn-out at the later funerals. Since the end of the hunger strike a feeling that the political situation has changed substantially has led to a greater confidence amongst all Republicans that the realisation of their aspirations is now nearer.

14. The same perception of approaching change which has boosted Republican morale has unsettled Protestant opinion. The Protestants, however, remained quiet while the hunger strike marches were taking place and serious sectarian confrontations were avoided by re-routing demonstrations, by strong Security Force deployments along interfaces, by the successful containment of the rioting within the areas in which they originated, and in part by the deliberate policy of restraint, notably by the UDA. The potential dangers were nonetheless graphically underlined by the discovery and disposal on 13 July of an 800lb bomb on the route near the assembly point for the main Belfast Orange march, due to take place that day.

15. There have been regional variations. In Belfast, where polarisation has been long established, there has been little change; in Londonderry, where there had appeared to be growing co-operation, particularly at District Council level, there have now been considerable setbacks. In other areas continuing attacks on members of the part-time Forces have combined with the hunger strike to prevent any moves towards better relations. This was shown most clearly by the two bye-elections in Fermanagh and South Tyrone which increased Protestant

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suspensions of the attitude to terrorism of their Catholic neighbours. Against this background, the continued rise in unemployment, which is now affecting both communities, contributes to social unease.

THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE

THE THREAT

Republicans

16. As a result of their electoral successes this year North and South of the border the PSF decided to 'adopt a positive approach' to all future elections; this probably means contesting them all but not taking up seats at Westminster. Their ability to run a good political campaign should not be under-estimated though it will be much harder to win votes without an issue such as the hunger strike to help them. However, the measures announced when the hunger strike ended appear to have resolved the dispute and the campaign is unlikely to be re-started. An important result is that since then there has been no recurrence of street violence of any consequence by the Republicans but it could erupt again if they found a cause to latch on to.

17. The political campaign will, however, go forward in tandem with PIRA's terrorist campaign. The Provisionals see both as essential to their cause. As Danny Morrison (PSF) put it to the Ard Fheis: "Who will object if with a ballot paper in this hand and an Armalite in this hand we take power in Ireland". This clearly puts paid to any consideration of a ceasefire in the immediate future.

18. Liaison Staff have recently circulated a threat assessment which concludes that both PIRA and INLA have the capacity and the will to sustain indefinitely the pattern of activity of recent months. This has taken the form of the murder of off-duty members of the Security Forces by both organisations. PIRA has also been responsible for cross-border attacks, command detonated bombs and attacks on commercial premises.

*Paragraph 19 deleted and closed, 40 years,  
under FOI Exemption.*

*Wayland  
2 October 2012*



20. Although the general level of terrorist activity has fallen over recent years, this is not always obvious: periods when little happens are interspersed with others of intense terrorist activity which tend to spark off Loyalist reaction. In fact, terrorism has declined to a level at which the Security Forces can do little to bring about the sort of transformation which will change public perceptions of terrorist activity. It takes only a handful of terrorists to sustain a successful campaign and paradoxically the less terrorist activity there is, the more notice is taken of anything which does happen.

21. INLA has always been fissiparous but with the emergence of Steenson in Belfast it is beginning to show signs of cohesiveness. The number of INLA terrorists is small and they are not at present well equipped. The picture appears to be changing, however, and INLA's capacity to mount serious terrorist attacks, particularly in Belfast, must not be underrated.

#### "Loyalists"

22. Protestant fears about the content of the Anglo-Irish talks will at least lead to forms of passive protest and could at any time erupt into disorder; at the time of writing, their doubts about HMG's willingness to tackle terrorism in the manner they deem most appropriate provide the justification to protest not only about the murder of the Rev Robert Bradford but also about the talks. However, the "Loyalists" are not united; each of the political and paramilitary organisations distrusts the leaders of the others. Much of the threat in fact comes from Paisley (basing his claim to leadership of the Protestants on the advances made by the DUP in the local elections in May). He attacks the Chief Constable whom he sees as the head of the Security Forces and has stated publicly that he is prepared to act unlawfully if he fails to get the Government to change policies which he feels are leading to eventual unity with the Republic; this unlawful activity he has made clear could include 'armed resistance' in order to 'preserve the Province' but it is

difficult to judge what sort of following he would get; much would depend on what he chose as his issue and how the Government handled the matter and also the extent to which he had the Protestant work force on his side. A recent statement includes the phrase 'making the Province ungovernable'.

23. It remains the policy of the Ulster Freedom Fighters, fully endorsed by its parent organisation the UDA, to kill identified Republican targets. The Ulster Volunteer Force/Red Hand Commando are less discriminate, choosing their Catholics almost at random. "Loyalist" killings in either category are likely to provoke some sort of retaliation.

SECURITY FORCES DEPLOYMENT

24. Army Force levels have been reduced by one Roulement battalion this year and are now based on 6 Resident and 3 Roulement major units plus the UDR. The RUC continue to recruit towards their established target of 7,500 Regulars and 2,200 full-time Reservists. This target will be achieved by 31 March 1982. There have been minor changes in deployment since April 1981. The key changes are:

- (a) the number of Brigade Headquarters has been reduced from three to two. 39 Brigade is now responsible for the East of the Province, including Belfast and 8 Brigade is responsible for the West of the Province including Londonderry and the border with the Republic. This is a rationalisation of command and control arrangements and has not affected the number of units deployed;
- (b) the extension of UDR tactical areas of responsibility (TAORs). Each UDR battalion now has its own TAOR and there are plans to extend these areas further. This allows the Regular units to concentrate in those areas where they are most needed to counter terrorism;
- (c) The removal of a regular Army presence from such towns as Newry, Coalisland, Cookstown, and, in the future, Dungannon;

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- (d) a new police station has been established in the predominantly Republican town of Carrickmore in East Tyrone. As additional resources become available, new Divisional Mobile Support Units (DMSUs) are being deployed in border areas.

OPERATIONAL BALANCE

RUC/Army

25. The RUC's growing confidence and capacity has speeded the return of armed policing to most areas. However, the security situation limits the use of their increased manpower in the maintenance of law and order in two ways. Firstly, major periods of civil disturbance such as we have had this year divert police resources from non-terrorist crime. Secondly, police stations must be guarded against attack and even such a simple task as serving a summons requires at least two vehicles and four men in many areas. Thus a direct numerical comparison of the RUC with police forces in Great Britain would be invalid. An additional difference is that, whereas in Great Britain a police force can call on neighbouring constabularies for reinforcements to control public order situations, this option is obviously not open to the RUC. Although the RUC therefore require relatively greater resources than other UK constabularies, they must ultimately rely on the Army to provide reinforcement.

26. The Army is needed to support the RUC in two separate fields, counter-terrorism and the maintenance of public order. These two roles require very different approaches, the first necessitating a continuous presence on the ground in certain areas, the second demanding considerable manpower available for relatively short periods of time. The present balance of Resident and Roulement battalions meets these requirements. The Resident units contribute to the counter-terrorist effort at a level of activity sustainable for their two-year tour of duty whilst providing a local capacity to reinforce the RUC to counter civil disorder. The Roulement battalions provide concentrated counter-terrorist forces in those areas where this

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is still necessary (West Belfast, South Armagh and Fermanagh), but in the case of West Belfast they are also available to counter civil disorder.

27. In the counter-terrorist role the overt Army presence is essentially defensive and is deployed as patrols, vehicle check points and observations posts but in those areas where normal policing is still being re-established the Army presence serves the valid purpose of providing a secure environment in which the RUC can re-establish a working relationship with the local population. In some rural areas, in particular Fermanagh, the Army adopts tactics which are specifically designed to reassure the local Protestant community, while at the same time having some deterrent effect.

28. In UDR areas of responsibility they supply first-line military support to the RUC and provide a useful level of deterrence and reassurance. In a few areas, however, the terrorist threat is now so reduced that there is no obvious role for the UDR. Despite this, it has been decided that in the current political climate no major changes in the UDR organisation should be made in the immediate future.

#### Overt/Covert Operations

29. The terrorist organisations have now been refined into relatively small and secure groups. Faced by this threat, the role of the overt elements of the Security Forces is largely defensive and deterrent in nature. The successful attack on the terrorist organisations comes from intelligence-based covert operations. Such methods result in the conviction of key terrorists following "red-handed" arrests and may achieve local, short-term reductions in violence but they do not often result in a lasting cessation of terrorism in an area. The regenerative nature of Irish terrorism makes this inevitable and the key "godfathers" who direct the campaign ensure that they are normally sufficiently distanced from terrorist operations not to be caught red-handed. I am satisfied, however, that selective, intelligence-based operations leading to convictions still provide the most effective counter to

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the current forms of terrorism and, linked to some change in the political balance, offer the best hope of a long-term solution.

30. Operationally the success of an intelligence-based attack depends on the sophisticated co-ordination of RUC Special Branch, Army Intelligence units and various other agencies. At Province level I am satisfied that this is proceeding well. At Regional level the co-ordination which can be achieved is exemplified by the Tasking and Co-ordination Group (TCG) in Belfast, which has co-ordinated a large number of successful operations. This level of co-ordination has not been achieved in other areas of the Province and I believe that, as such operations form the main plank of the Government's attack on terrorism, it is important that they should be accorded the highest priority in co-ordination, manpower and resources. In this field the current level of Army specialist support will be required for the foreseeable future.

31. This policy does create presentational problems. The nature of the operations and sub-judice rules has inhibited the Government from claiming credit for Security Forces' successes and the Government has largely relied on an unprompted public realization of an overall reduction in the number of terrorist incidents. As recently seen, a few successful terrorist attacks can dramatically change this perception without the Government being easily able to counter with the other side of the security story. I believe, however, that the time has come when greater prominence can be given in general terms to this aspect of Security Force operations without paying a security penalty.

THE FUTURE STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITY FORCES

32. The key issue of security policy which must be resolved in the near future is the long-term size and structure of the Security Forces. Inevitably this has to be planned against a forecast of terrorist violence which includes many imponderables, but the future strength, nature and roles of the RUC, regular Army and UDR are inextricably linked. As the Army and UDR are both committed in support of the RUC, it is right that the

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desirable future strength and capability of the RUC should be considered first. This process has been initiated by the Manpower Review conducted at the request of the Chief Constable and is shortly to be considered by an NIO-chaired Working Party.

33. At present it is envisaged that future reductions in the Army Roulement units will take place as the security situation allows. There is currently no pressure from the Ministry of Defence for a further reduction in the Roulement commitment. However, there is still some limited scope for a further handover of responsibilities from Army to police in some rural areas without any major change in the security situation.

34. In the longer term the Army will obviously continue to provide the necessary technical specialist support such as helicopters, bomb disposal and some intelligence related agencies. The overt commitment of uniformed troops will only be reduced as the security situation allows and therefore this reduction should not need to be matched by a further increase in the RUC. Even when the Army has 'returned to barracks' there will be six resident battalions in the Province ready to provide military support to counter civil disorder or a resurgence of terrorism. I do not believe their presence should be discounted when considering the long-term strength of the RUC.

35. The UDR also provides valuable support for the RUC but because of the political implications of any change in the force it is very much harder to make rapid adjustments to their organisation. However, in the medium and long-term the size, capability and role of the UDR will also have an obvious impact on the necessary size of the RUC and must be reviewed. Both the UDR and the regular Army effectively provide a buffer in times of heightened violence which avoids the necessity of developing a police force which is too large or too paramilitary for use in more normal times.

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CROSS BORDER CO-OPERATION

36. Co-operation between the Garda and the RUC has improved. And although this has had little effect on the level of cross border terrorism from the Dundalk area it has led to some successes against terrorists from the Monaghan salient. It is extremely difficult for the RUC and other agencies seeking intelligence to penetrate these PIRA gangs and obtain any, let alone pre-emptive, intelligence from people who are based on the other side of the border; but it is important that efforts in this direction should continue. The Garda also, despite their improved effectiveness, have not had a great deal of success in acquiring pre-emptive intelligence but they have provided useful information about movements or terrorists which has saved lives and enabled them to make arrests. They have also arrested two of the Crumlin Road Gaol escapees and charged them under the extra-territorial legislation with serious offences.

37. Although co-operation on security matters is a sensitive issue for the Irish Government, the improvement has been praised by Ministers on both sides of the Border. It is important that these excellent relations at which the RUC have worked hard should continue to evolve. I was told that political interference from the Irish Government - the possibility of which I outlined in my previous report - was now less likely because the relationship has developed into a solid professional link at many levels with both parties engaged in a common fight against crime and terrorism.

38. The Government of the Republic continues to be subject to political inhibitions in relation to co-operation in a number of legal areas, as became evident from the Taoiseach's line on extradition during the recent summit talks. Although the record of the extra-territorial legislation has been unimpressive since it came into force in 1976, there have been recent signs that it may now begin to achieve some successes. A man was convicted this autumn in Belfast of the murder of a UDR man in the Republic (only the second successful case under the legislation in Northern Ireland) and three cases, including the two cases against the escapers mentioned above, are pending

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in the Republic. In each of these there are good prospects of achieving convictions.

39. The new Irish Attorney-General is notably keener than his predecessors on making use of the extra-territorial legislation. Following the recent decision to remit these juridical problems to the two Attorneys-General, it is to be welcomed that their meeting is to take place as soon as possible.

CO-ORDINATION

40. Within the scope of this Report I have only been able to examine in any detail the extent of co-ordination at senior levels between the different organisations involved in the security effort. It is nonetheless apparent that co-ordination between the RUC, the Army and the NIO has improved considerably. All concerned seem to be aware of the importance of keeping in touch with colleagues in other organisations and there is a general feeling that co-ordination is now better than it has ever been. It is clear that at senior levels informal meetings are arranged frequently and flexibly and that matters of mutual interest are discussed without fuss as they arise.

41. When necessary there have also been daily meetings to ensure that public services are maintained as far as possible and to co-ordinate activities such as clearing debris from riot areas. On the whole, both the formal and informal co-ordination machinery works well and the hunger strike period has consolidated the habit of regular contacts between the different agencies.

42. In my Final Report in March I recommended that the civil departments should take care that the security implications of their actions were taken fully into account in reaching decisions. Some progress has been made in this area. There is still room for some improvement, though it is a fact of life that officials in some areas are subject to intimidation.



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It is important, for instance, that in such fields as the development of housing plans the views of the police should be obtained at an early stage. In present circumstances, anything positively helpful to Police morale deserves sympathetic consideration by civil departments.

43. Prisons play an important role in the implementation of security policy. The past six months has seen one armed escape of eight important terrorists from the Belfast Prison (Crumlin Road) and a second case in which a weapon was used by a Loyalist prisoner in the same gaol. Two men prisoners in the Maze Compound made their way through or over eight security fences before they were detected by an alert dog-handler and it was clear that a mass escape had been intended. Crumlin Road at present appears to contain nearly twice as many high-risk terrorist prisoners on remand as there is suitable high security accommodation for; there appears to be an urgent need either for a more selective classification of prisoners in terms of security risk or of more satisfactory arrangements to hold high-risk prisoners once they are remanded for trial. I was glad to hear that these problems were being tackled.

44. It is necessary that all concerned should continue to take co-ordination very seriously. The present good co-ordination needs to be worked at to be sustained, the more so as personal links forged in the past will have to be renewed as the personalities change.

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ARE THERE ALTERNATIVE SECURITY POLICIES?

45. It has been unfortunate that to date the Anglo-Irish talks have taken place against the background of the political tensions associated with the hunger strikes and a difficult security situation. As a result, the Unionists' fears of any links with Dublin and their frustrations at the lack of visible advances against terrorism, culminating in anger at the murder of Mr Bradford, have developed into a crisis which is above all political. However, because of the sense of insecurity prevalent in the majority community, the Government's security policy is also under attack. The security measures which have already been taken as part of our response to this crisis are in fact of greater political than security significance. The present raised profile of the Security Forces, though in line with what Unionist opinion wants, will do little to improve the fundamental security situation. Indeed this is particularly true at a time when the current posture of Unionist leaders makes further attacks on UDR and RUC(R) targets more attractive than ever to PIRA and INLA.

46. The present policy of selective, intelligence based operations, leading to convictions has inevitable limitations: above all it will not achieve results quickly. Even in the absence of juries, intimidation will remain a frustrating obstacle to the successful prosecution of identified terrorists and terrorist 'godfathers'. Complaints from Unionists range from sweeping and emotional demands that "something must be done" to the advocacy of specific alternative policies. Many of the more concrete suggestions are minor detailed grievances which are in some measure adduced to give credence to the general complaint rather than being the root cause of dissatisfaction. These include matters such as the calibre of personal protection weapons issued to members of the UDR and RUC(R); complaints that the Police or Army have failed to attack PIRA

men on particular occasions when they have appeared publicly in uniform or flaunting weapons; that the UDR should be given a more active role within the security effort; and other matters relating to detailed deployment and operations. For the most part these are cosmetic issues in terms of the overall security policy which have been frequently examined and deemed to be impracticable or not cost-effective. However, in the current climate, it is obviously right that some of the more acceptable of these detailed measures are being examined again. In other cases the reasons for their impracticability could be spelled out more clearly than before. Some more fundamental alternatives have also been regularly demanded. I discuss here briefly six of the commonest demands.

Detention

47. There is understandable frustration at the impossibility of convicting in court a small number of very important men, including some who organise much of the terrorism without getting operationally involved. Detention could be implemented by Order, with endorsement within 40 days by Parliament; it would be much more selective and based on more and better intelligence than in 1971. Detention played a conclusive part in bringing under control the terrorist campaign of 1956-62 when parallel action was taken south of the Border. Unless the same complementary action were taken in the Republic in the future, detention would have only a short term operational effect within Northern Ireland. On the assumption that the present Irish Government is not in a position to follow suit even if they so wished, it is a measure that would almost certainly cost us their future co-operation in security matters.

48. The use of detention in 1971 on a wide scale but without Dublin's co-operation proved counter-productive both in political and security terms. As a result of this, detention is now a trigger word which evokes highly charged memories and its

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re-introduction would be exploited by the Republicans in the same way as the hunger strike. There is the further serious complication that in order to appear politically even-handed we would find it necessary to detain leading 'Loyalist' terrorist organisers. This would remove certain figures who have proved to be restraining influences and would unite our 'Loyalist' opponents as nothing else would. Though a recent editorial in the "Daily Telegraph" asserted that detention was an option supported by my predecessor, the late Sir Maurice Oldfield, I know this to be untrue. The objections to this course seem to me to be equally valid today.

Further pressure on Irish Republic

49. The role of the Border in terrorist activity is perhaps the most recurrent theme in Unionist complaints. The perception of the Republic as a safe haven, the lack of effective extradition and the lack of hot pursuit facilities are all part of this. It should be recognised that the support of the Irish authorities against terrorism has been as essential in the reduction of violence to current levels as it has been in dealing with previous campaigns. Further pressure from us and, above all, any hint of the sanctions which many Unionists would like to see in the absence of further progress would undoubtedly risk setting back the progress which has been achieved. It is self-contradictory to argue, as many Unionists do, that security can be restored whilst reversing HMG's policy of developing links with the Republic.

Sealing off Republican Areas

50. Unionists have from time to time demanded that Republican areas of Belfast should be sealed off completely with all access and egress strictly controlled. The political repercussions of such action would quickly feed back into a worse security situation by alienating minority opinion. It is also operationally impractical, would tie up large numbers of Security Forces indefinitely, and would not solve the problem of rural and cross border terrorism.

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A "Third Force"

51. Unionists have for a decade deprecated the abolition of the Ulster Special Constabulary (the "B Specials") which had been seen as an important element in the maintenance of the "Protestant ascendancy". Current Unionist threats to create a "Third Force", though they lack precision and appear to mean different things to different people, have to be seen against this background. The least objectionable version of the "Third Force" is the voluntary communications network suggested by Mr Molyneaux which might provide some assistance for the existing security forces. There are also advocates of "community defence groups": that is, vigilantes equipped with some form of weapons. Thirdly, there have been calls for some development of the present Protestant paramilitary capability to enable operations to be mounted against those whom they suspect to be supporters of Republican terrorism. Finally, Mr Paisley's hillside demonstrations of paramilitary strength specifically evoke the precedent of the 1914 Ulster Volunteer Force with which Lord Carson intended to resist attempts by a Westminster Government to break the Union.

52. The existing Ulster Defence Regiment and the RUC Reserve are intended to provide outlets for the legitimate involvement of the community in the security effort. Both are being employed as important parts of the present heightened security force profile. However, there is no scope for further expansion of these forces in an attempt to divert current demands for a "Third Force" into disciplined lawful bodies. Recent experience has underlined the fact that the part-time security forces tend to increase the number of targets without a commensurate contribution to the security effort. In any case, the disciplined nature of these forces detracts from their appeal to many extreme "Loyalists".

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Capital Punishment

53. Capital punishment is also often advocated as a key to future progress. Apart from the wider issues involved, including the question whether there would be a Parliamentary majority for the introduction of such a measure in the United Kingdom as a whole, capital punishment would carry very particular risks in the context of Northern Ireland. Irish history demonstrates how damaging it is for a British Government to create Irish martyrs. The impact of the self-imposed 'martyrdom' of Sands gives some indication of what could be expected if a terrorist were executed.

A Substantially Increased Long-Term Deployment of the Regular Army

54. Though the presence of Army units is normally reassuring to the majority community and has some effect in deterring terrorism it does not of itself contribute to the long-term reduction of terrorism. The main offensive thrust against terrorism comes from intelligence-based operations which are of their nature covert. It follows that there would be little correlation between any increase in the long-term overt presence of more soldiers and a reduction of terrorism. In fact in two major respects a greatly increased deployment could be expected to lead to an increase in violence: there would be more targets; and an operationally unnecessary increase in the contacts between the minority community and the Army would risk additional friction which could only too easily be exploited by Republican terrorists. Although there are countervailing presentational advantages in deploying more troops as a sop to Unionist opinion, experience shows that such resources are more easily committed than withdrawn. In the past an important justification for the deployment of the Army in large numbers was the relatively low strength of the RUC. The RUC is now considerably larger and it would be a retrograde step to commit expensive Army resources on a long-term basis without genuine operational advantage.

55. There is a 'Loyalist' tribal belief in the effectiveness of 'SAS-type' operations, by which they appear to mean covert operations in general. I am satisfied that all the troops trained for covert operations are adequate for the tasks which they are required to perform.

*Passage deleted and retained under  
Section 3(4). DWayland  
2 October 2012*

56. I am in no doubt that such of the options discussed above as are practicable offer at best short term political and operational advantage but in the long term they are likely to give rise to even greater security problems. Politically, too, it is important that HMG should not appear to be taking steps of this kind as a result of threats by the extreme Protestants. The likely results of the options most stridently demanded by our "Loyalist" critics would be the total alienation of the minority community and the ending of co-operation on the part of the Irish Government. This reinforces my belief that the existing security policy offers the best prospect of achieving long-term progress against terrorism while the search for a political settlement continues. I am sure that all concerned, however, would agree that there is still scope for further refinement of the intelligence based attack on which that policy rests.

DR.  
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS


57. The substantive conclusions of my review of security are:

- (a) The Security Forces coped well with the simultaneous challenge of street violence engendered by the hunger strike and an upsurge in Republican terrorism. The RUC gained in efficiency and confidence but paid a price in two respects: their developing relationship with the Catholic community received a reverse and they diverted resources from combatting non-terrorist crime. The lost ground has been regained faster than might have been expected. (Paragraphs 3-10).
- (b) Since my last review cross border co-operation between the Garda and the RUC has steadily improved despite changes in the Irish government and the hunger strike. (Para 11).
- (c) In 1981 there has been a movement in both communities towards the political extremes. (Paras 12-15).
- (d) PIRA and INLA are able and likely to continue indefinitely the present pattern of terrorist activity. In PIRA's case this can be expected to be linked with a political campaign. (Paras 16-21).
- (e) Apart from reactive terrorism by Protestant paramilitaries there is a danger that Loyalist fears about the implications of the Anglo-Irish talks could at any time manifest themselves in the form of more violent action. (Paras 22-23).
- (f) The RUC are now firmly in the lead and the present Army Force level has proved capable of providing the required military support. (Paras 25-28).
- (g) Selective, intelligence-based operations leading to convictions still provide the most effective counter to the current forms of terrorism. (Para 29).



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- (h) There is still scope for further improvement in the application of this policy. (Para 30).
- (i) Greater prominence might now be given in general terms to the covert aspect of Security Force operations without paying a security penalty. (Para 31).
- (j) The long-term size and structure of the Security Forces must be resolved in the near future. In this respect the future strength, nature and roles of the RUC, regular Army and UDR are inextricably linked. (Paras 32-35).
- (k) RUC/Garda relations will remain of critical importance but urgently needs to be underpinned by improvements in co-operation in the legal sphere. (Paras 36-39).
- (l) At the highest levels co-ordination between RUC/Army/NIO has improved considerably. There has also been an improvement in co-operation between the Security Forces and Northern Ireland civil departments. Prison security for terrorist inmates has become increasingly important and requires co-ordinated attention. (Paras 40-44).
- (m) The more fundamental alternatives to our present policy offer at best short term political and operational advantages. In the long term they could all give rise to even greater political and security problems. (Paras 44-55)
- (n) Undeterred and vigorous pursuit of our present security policy offers the soundest prospect of achieving long term progress against terrorism, while the search for a political settlement continues. (Para 56).



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Ireland

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

13 April 1981

Dear Roy,

NORTHERN IRELAND SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR

The Prime Minister has seen the joint minute of 8 April 1981 from your Secretary of State and the Secretary of State for Defence about the post of Security Co-ordinator in Northern Ireland.

She is content that they should proceed as they propose in paragraph four of their minute, subject to a firm understanding that the new arrangement will be reviewed in a year's time with a view to discontinuing it completely then.

She has also commented that the provision in the arrangement proposed by Mr Atkins and Mr Nott that the Security Co-ordinator and his supporting staff should be available to report urgently in the interim if circumstances require it is particularly important following the result of the Fermanagh by-election.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Halliday (Home Office), George Walden (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).


Yours sincerely,

John Major

Roy Harrington Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

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Mr Whitmore

Northern Ireland: Security Coordinator

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland's  
minute of 8 April.

2. The fact is that Sir Maurice Oldfield  
and Sir Brooks Richards have done what  
was required to be done. The job was  
always seen as finite. It is no longer  
needed.

3. There are two reasons for not winding  
it up immediately but keeping it in  
mothballs as proposed:

(a) it will reassure the Chief Constable  
of the RUC to know that the  
Coordinator is still there in the  
background, and could be wheeled

in if he (the Chief Constable) were to run into the same sort of trouble with the GOC as his predecessor encountered;

(b) it enables the Secretary of State not to announce the winding up of the  post at a time when it would be politically inconvenient to do so.

4. On this basis I think that the Prime Minister can agree with what is proposed; but I suggest that the agreement should be subject to a firm understanding that the arrangement will be reviewed in a year's time with a view to discontinuing it completely then.

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PRIME MINISTER

NORTHERN IRELAND

SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR

**SECRET**

Prime Minister

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Agree - but we may have to revise our view depending on what happens or follows up the election.

There is no need for you to read Sir Brooks Richards' report.

Adm' from Sir Robert Armstrong is

Agree with Mr NSH's and Mr Atkins' proposals for Sir Brooks Richards' future, subject, a

Sir R. Armstrong suggests, to a firm understanding that the arrangement is reviewed in a year's time with a view to ending it then?

AMH  
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You will recall that, when the late Sir Maurice Oldfield retired from the post of Security Co-ordinator in Northern Ireland last year, we debated whether a replacement was then really necessary but concluded that Sir Brooks Richards should be appointed for a limited period to consolidate and complete the progress which Maurice Oldfield had achieved. Sir Brooks Richards, as agreed with him at the time, wishes to end his assignment this month. As his final task he has carried out a review of all aspects of the security operation in Northern Ireland, building on the work done in the Area Reviews, of which you are aware, and in his report (copy attached) has concluded that the work of the Security Co-ordinator and Planning Staff is now done. He sees no need for a full-time resident successor, or for the continuation of the Planning Staff function in its present form. John Nott and I agree with this conclusion.

2. Sir Maurice Oldfield, and Sir Brooks Richards were appointed "to assist the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in improving the co-ordination and effectiveness of the fight against terrorism in accordance with the Government's security objectives". They have progressively supplemented their own efforts to this end by using multi-disciplinary groups of senior staff, meeting regularly, as the main instruments of security co-ordination. The Army, Royal Ulster Constabulary, Northern Ireland Office (with NI Departments as necessary) and the (Intelligence) Liaison Staff are all represented on these groups. The top security policy group with Security Co-ordinator, Chief Constable, GOC, and Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence (DCI) meets under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and is supplemented by official meetings at this level; the operational policy group (concerned with operational matters) meets under the chairmanship of the Deputy Chief Constable; the intelligence policy group meets under the chairmanship of the \* ~ \* and the public relations co-ordinating group under the chairmanship of the NIO Under Secretary responsible (Mr Wyatt). They meet frequently and regularly, and their existence has encouraged informal co-operation. The representatives of the different disciplines have not only effectively worked together, but their team approach to the job has been mirrored all the way down the line to the level of the local Police Division and Army unit. The Security Co-ordinator has in consequence been able increasingly to allow the Army, the RUC, the Liaison Staff and the NIO to sort out problems as they arise within this system, to the point where Sir Brooks Richards thinks his role and that of the Planning Staff (which is already reduced in size) can virtually disappear.

\* ~ \* Name deleted and retained under Section 3(4).

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Wayland  
2 October 2012

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3. We share this view, which is also supported by the Chief Constable and the GOC, and by the Chief of the General Staff. But we are concerned that there should be no reversion to the far less satisfactory state of affairs that prevailed in 1979, and that a ready means of dealing with such a problem should be available if it arose again. We believe that the best defence against this lies in full and regular use of the co-ordinating groups described above, firmly based on the clarity of policy we now have and to which we all subscribe. This view has the full support of the Chief Constable, GOC, the Liaison Staff and the NIO.

4. Nevertheless, given the uncertainties and hazards of the community relationships in Northern Ireland and the undoubted potential of PIRA, INLA and protestant terrorist organisations to arouse new anxieties, we believe it is essential to retain our capability for monitoring the co-ordination of security policy and operations in the Province as between the RUC, the Army and the Civil Administration, and for intervening urgently if circumstances so require. We propose, therefore:

i) that the Security Co-ordinator post should be retained on a stand-by basis in London until Spring 1982 for the purposes at (iii) and (iv) below;

ii) that he should be supported by appropriate staff from the Army, RUC, NIO, MOD and Liaison Staff similarly designated on a stand-by basis;

iii) that the Security Co-ordinator, supported as at (ii), should in any event submit short follow-up reports on the co-ordination of security in the Province in October 1981, and April 1982; and

iv) that the Security Co-ordinator and his supporting staff should be available to report urgently in the interim if we judge that circumstances require it.

*Important since the bye-election result. not*

The Chief Constable and the GOC support this proposal.

5. Sir Brooks Richards has indicated that he would be willing to continue to make his services available for these purposes, and in particular to produce the further reports required in October 1981 and April 1982. Supporting staff can be designated in Northern Ireland.

6. On this basis, it would be unnecessary to announce formally either that Sir Brooks Richards has left or that he has not been replaced, and in any case undesirable because such an announcement would be bound to be criticised as evidence of complacency about the current security situation. Sir Brooks' departure will become public knowledge in due course, when we would let it be known that,

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as announced at the time, he had gone to Northern Ireland full-time only for a limited period to complete Sir Maurice Oldfield's work, but was continuing to assist the Government as necessary to ensure that the progress made is sustained.

7. This minute is being copied to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Home Secretary and Sir Robert Armstrong.

JN

JN  
Ministry of Defence

HA


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8 April 1981

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Copy No 1 of 40

CO-ORDINATION OF THE  
SECURITY EFFORT IN NORTHERN IRELAND

THE WAY FORWARD

REPORT BY THE SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR TO  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND

Stormont Castle  
Belfast

March 1981

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CO-ORDINATION OF THE SECURITY EFFORT IN  
NORTHERN IRELAND: THE WAY FORWARD

Report by the Security Co-ordinator to the Secretary of  
State for Northern Ireland

Introduction

1. My predecessor, the late Sir Maurice Oldfield, was appointed Security Co-ordinator on 3 October 1979, soon after the murder of 18 soldiers by PIRA at Warrenpoint, "to assist the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in improving the co-ordination and effectiveness of the fight against terrorism in Northern Ireland". He started work in the Province on 8 October 1979 and shortly afterwards established the Planning Staff (a joint staff drawn from the RUC, the Army and the Civil Service) to assist him in his task. Regrettably, ill-health compelled Sir Maurice to relinquish his appointment prematurely on 12 June 1980, at which date I succeeded him in the post. It was made clear at the time that my task would be to finish off work begun by my predecessor and to consolidate what had already been achieved. My appointment was to be "for a limited period".

2. The Warrenpoint ambush, mounted and controlled from the other side of the border, was the work of a PIRA Active Service Unit whose members killed Lord Mountbatten off the West coast of the Republic on the same day. This spectacular double achievement by a group whose increasingly sophisticated operational techniques had long been a thorn in the flesh of British Army units deployed near the border, raised to a level requiring urgent political decision by the new Conservative Cabinet two distinct issues, which the then GOC had already put formally to you in a letter dated 12 July 1979. These issues were, firstly, the use being made by PIRA and INLA of the territory of the Republic as a relatively safe base for training, planning, developing and supplying

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weapons, mounting operations and resting between them; secondly, the question whether the "primacy of the police" policy introduced in January 1977 was being implemented properly to deal with the continuing threat to security within Northern Ireland itself. Though personality factors played some part in bringing matters to a head, the demand for the joint command and control of security resources through the appointment of a Director of Operations on the Malayan model reflected a well-defined strand of Army thinking about earlier internal security commitments. The Cabinet decided to maintain the existing policy, but appointed a Security Co-ordinator to help implement it. They also made a fresh attempt to enlist the co-operation of the Dublin Government in tackling the situation on, and south of, the Border.

3. Eighteen months after Sir Maurice's appointment, I have no hesitation in saying that there has been considerable progress. The co-ordination and effectiveness of the RUC, the Army, the Security and Intelligence agencies, the Northern Ireland Office and civil government have greatly improved; and there have also been welcome changes of attitude and approach on behalf of those responsible. I now feel confident that, provided certain safeguards are maintained, all concerned are well set to carry out their respective tasks effectively and harmoniously without the oversight of a full-time resident Co-ordinator and Joint Staff. My reasons for this belief are set out in the paragraphs below, which summarise the salient features of the current security situation in the Province as I see it and put down a few markers on points to be watched carefully in the future.

Violence in Northern Ireland - a Historical Perspective

4. Ireland's history, that "register of crime, folly and misfortune", has bequeathed her a tradition of violence as a means to political ends. It is a legacy that lies heavily

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on Northern Ireland today. The roots of present troubles stretch back into the folk-lore of both communities: on the Republican side, through the civil war of 1922 to the fore-doomed blood-sacrifice of Easter, 1916, and thence back into the secret revolutionary nationalism of nineteenth century Ireland; on the Unionist side, to Carson's defiance of Westminster in 1912, and to the Ulster Presbyterians who, under the impact of the American and French Revolutions, rebelled against British rule in 1798 and were deemed too subversive for service in the Royal Navy at an hour of need when the sweepings from other British gaoles were readily accepted in the fleet.

5. Outsiders can find Ulstermen of both traditions moral but cruel. W. B. Yeats' 'Meditations in Time of Civil War' apply well enough today to the attitudes of many people in the North:-

'We had fed the heart on fantasies,  
The heart's grown brutal from the fare;  
More substance in our enmities  
Than in our love;  
O honey-bees,  
Come build in the empty house of our stare'

6. Irish violence has always had a sociological as well as a political dimension. In rural areas, it has historical roots dating back to the seventeenth century plantations and the re-distribution of farming land. In the urban ghettos, endemic unemployment, twice as high among Catholics as in Protestant working-class districts, is a good recruiting-sergeant for paramilitary causes and one that binds its adepts to violence as a way of life.

7. The 1916 Rising and Partition in 1921 were the prelude to fifty uneasy years in relations between Belfast, Dublin and London. The civil war of 1922 in the Free State was fought around the issue of whether any Dublin government that

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accepted Partition could be considered legitimate and this quarrel has continued to smoulder on across the Border. The 1930s saw isolated acts of violence, both in Northern Ireland and on the mainland. In 1935, the Belfast IRA caused riots in which 5 died and were narrowly foiled in an attempt to raid an armoury at Campbell College. In 1936, the IRA obtained 400 sub-machine guns from the United States. In 1939, they dispatched letter bombs to English addresses, let off tear gas bombs in cinemas, set fire to hotels, pillar boxes and mail vans; and blew up station cloakrooms. An explosion in Coventry killed 4 and injured 60. The IRA Northern Command ran a "Freedom Radio" in the Second World War and there were some bombing attacks, mostly in Belfast.

8. The post-war decade was relatively quiet, but in December 1956 the Army Council of the IRA announced the advent of a "decisive stage" against "British rule in occupied Ireland"; and, over the following six years, the IRA waged a low-intensity campaign, mostly concentrated on targets near the Border. In the course of this, 6 members of the RUC were killed and 32 members of the Security Forces were wounded. This sporadic violence was dealt with by the RUC, which, though less than 3000 strong, had a paramilitary capability and the backing of a force of 1000 full-time, and 11,600 part-time, armed 'B' Specials. Only very limited Army support was necessary. The selective internment of IRA suspects both in Northern Ireland and in the Republic eventually brought operations to a halt. In February, 1962 the "Campaign of Resistance to British Occupation" was called off and arms and material were dumped, amid popular indifference.

#### The Present Troubles

9. The scale and nature of the disturbances since 1969 have been of an order and type not previously experienced in the Province. In 1968, the Civil Rights Movement, with echoes of the wave of militant protest which in that year swept continental universities, led to demonstrations and

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the building of street barricades by members of the minority community. These manifestations provoked violent reactions by Protestant extremists. The British Army had to be deployed to contain public disorder which had proved to be beyond the capacity of the numerically small RUC, which was perceived by the minority as associated with partisan Protestantism. Although the Army was initially welcomed by the Catholic community, the IRA soon exploited the 'occupation' of Catholic areas by the Army, stoked the dormant fires of militant Republicanism - and a terrorist campaign began.

10. In 1971 violence reached such a level that the Northern Ireland Government introduced internment, with HMG's approval. Internment was, however, not particularly selective, as intelligence was not as good as it now is; and the internment process itself had the effect of providing the IRA with an immediate propaganda advantage and of broadening support for the IRA within the Catholic community. The prorogation of Stormont in March 1972 and the imposition of direct rule fuelled resentment in the Protestant community and led to the formation of the UDA and UVF. Though the Official IRA at this point declared a ceasefire and committed themselves to seeking a political solution, the Provisional wing of the movement (PIRA) extended and intensified their campaign of violence. Terrorism on both sides of the community reached its peak during 1972, with 450 deaths in the Province. During the first half of the year, Republican 'No-Go' areas were established in the cities. Operation 'Motorman' reimposed Security Force control of these areas and provided a starting-point for the long process of restoring normal policing throughout the Province - a process still continuing today. But, at the time, it was the Army which provided the effective Security Force presence on the ground in most Republican areas and combatted PIRA on a basis of intelligence-derived detention.

11. Detention was ended in December 1975; the attack on terrorism has, since then, been based solely on convictions obtained through due process of law. However, terrorist intimidation made it nearly impossible to obtain witnesses willing to give evidence (as indeed is still the case today in the Republic as well as in Northern Ireland); the RUC were therefore forced to place great emphasis on the use of interrogation to obtain incriminatory statements from terrorists. This approach proved very effective and, combined with increases in RUC strength and changes in community attitudes to PIRA, led to progressive reductions in terrorism in subsequent years. The successful use of interrogation allowed police confidence to develop to the extent that the policy of "police primacy" could be formulated and introduced, but it did also lay the police open to charges of violation of human rights; and the Republican movement capitalised on this. Public concern led to the production of the Bennett report, which temporarily reduced police confidence. On the operational side, PIRA's response was to regroup into a more secure cellular system, which is less prone to intelligence penetration (though it has had the incidental effect of weakening their links with wide sections of the Republican community). They also trained their members in resistance to interrogation. These two factors, among others, led to a slowing of the attrition of PIRA by the Security Forces.

12. Though it took time to perfect, the RUC's reaction to this changing situation was to develop, in collaboration with the Army, a sophisticated method of operation based on good intelligence and surveillance leading to the 'red-handed' capture of active terrorists. This is backed by the extremely professional use of forensic evidence. Interrogation still plays an important, but less central, role. Attrition of the terrorist organisation on this basis continues today and seems likely to remain the key-stone of 'offensive' counter-terrorist operations. It is proving an



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extremely effective way of disrupting, one after another, the tight-knit terrorist groups within the Province; there is, however, an important category of 'godfather' figures who are difficult to bring to book on this basis, since they are normally careful to avoid handling weapons and to distance themselves from actual operations.

13. By the summer of 1979, when the present Government assumed office, the Army had been continuously involved in operations in Northern Ireland for almost a decade. During that period violence had claimed almost 2000 victims, including 570 from the Security Forces themselves. At the time of 'Operation Motorman' in 1972, no less than 30,000 (22,000 regulars plus 8,000 UDR) troops had been operationally deployed. Already in 1977, the overall level of incidents had fallen to about a fifth of its 1972 peak, but it had then remained obstinately at about the same level for a further two years. PIRA seemed to HQNI in 1979 to be a more effective, more secure and more controlled force than it had been two years previously, with increasing operational and technical sophistication. An assessment made at that time judged that PIRA had the resources, organisation and motivation to maintain operations for the foreseeable future at a fluctuating level. The Army saw itself as engaged in a low-intensity war, which it was not winning and could conceivably lose. It was against this background of gloom and professional frustration that 18 soldiers were killed at Warrenpoint. The coincidence of this attack with the murder of Lord Mountbatten brought to a head feelings that security policy was either wrong or was at least being pursued in too doctrinaire a manner. The Army, in particular, believed that more effective co-ordination was required.

14. In fact, by mid-1979, despite differences in approach between the RUC and the Army, the foundations had been laid both for major intelligence-based inroads into PIRA's and INLA's structure and also for re-establishing acceptable policing throughout the minority community. However, the

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Army's force levels were, in some areas, too high. A large number of soldiers had been deployed in the Province during the 1970s to hold the ring while the RUC re-organised and expanded. In 1979 this process was largely complete, but reductions in Army strengths lagged behind the increase in RUC capability. In parts of the Province, a uniformed Army presence was not now contributing significantly to the defeat of terrorism and was, at the same time, providing a focus for community animosity. Reductions were required to ensure that force levels were the minimum necessary to support the re-introduction of normal policing. Above all, what was needed was to pull together into a new relationship the resources of the police, the Army and the civil power.

The Situation Today

15. Statistically there was less terrorist violence in 1980 than at any time for a decade. Despite this, at the beginning of 1981 the attitudes of the two communities appear in some respects in greater danger of polarisation than for several years. The hunger strikes, the Dublin meetings, the localized increase of cross-border attacks, the 'failure' of the political initiative and the heavy incidence of economic recession have all in turn been exploited by the more extreme politicians. Dr Paisley, in particular, seems to have calculated that Unionist opinion, divided but suspicious of Westminster policies, is ripe for an appeal to traditional and extreme reflexes; and that he can on this basis best hope to maintain at the May District Council elections the leading position he secured when he was elected to the European Parliament.

16. Potential for Public Disorder. Demonstrations, by supporters of Dr Paisley on the Loyalist side and by supporters of the renewed hunger strike on the Republican side, are taking place in parallel, but have so far been non-violent and well disciplined. As long as both sides confine their marches to their own traditional areas this is likely to continue, although there may be some stone-throwing by

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hooligan elements in the aftermath of peaceful demonstrations. Republican marchers, however, always have the option of seeking violent confrontation with the Security Forces as a means of advancing their cause. This is easily done by selecting march routes which are not acceptable to the Loyalist community, thus forcing the Security Forces to block the route to prevent an inter-sectarian riot. Dr Paisley's rabble-rousing electoral tactics make a Loyalist counter-demonstration all too likely in such circumstances. The number of marchers on both sides is currently not large by Ulster standards, but the crowds could rapidly swell, once an element of confrontation of the 'opposing' community entered the motivation for demonstrations. Assassinations construed by either side as sectarian would, against such a background, heighten emotions and increase the likelihood of violence.

17. PIRA. Encouragingly, despite this political background, PIRA lost ground in 1980. There was continued Security Force success on both sides of the border and there are now few parts of the Province where PIRA can operate with ease. This is reflected in a general movement of the incidence of terrorism towards the border areas and adjacent towns and away from Belfast in particular. With the ending of the pre-Christmas hunger strikes, PIRA have resumed their terrorist campaign, at something like the intensity which obtained during the latter half of 1980. The Security Forces are already breaking up the groups responsible for this revival, but internal terrorist violence is likely to continue - though with peaks and troughs, probably of diminishing intensity as terrorist groups are dispersed or weakened by the action of the Security Forces and smaller and less experienced groups re-emerge; and the process is repeated. Cross-border terrorism of the traditional type has proved more intractable, as the terrorist structure south of the Border remains largely intact, despite considerable Garda seizures of weapons and explosives.

18. The tactics used by PIRA have now been refined by years

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of experience and are likely to remain basically unchanged. These require relatively few terrorists, arms or explosives; and the PIRA organisation can logistically sustain a fluctuating level of violence, at least in the short term. Two possible changes of emphasis, rather than tactics, are the renewal of attacks on the mainland or in Europe and a switch from low-level members of the Security Forces to VIPs as targets for assassination.

19. PIRA future strategy is unclear. The Provisional movement has so far failed to re-enlist broad-based public support on the hunger-strike issue. There are elements within PIRA who are considering a ceasefire and a switch to a political campaign and there are undoubtedly war-weary and disillusioned Republicans who would support such a move. However, it would be difficult for the Provisionals to tread the road taken earlier by the Official IRA and to abandon their commitment to violence, particularly in the current extreme economic situation. The urban terrorists live within socially deprived communities and many of them would find it difficult to turn from a well-established way of life and the attractions of lawlessness. A ceasefire if it came might well be preceded by an increase in terrorism, as PIRA would wish to demonstrate that they quit in strength and not in weakness. The Provisionals' eventual decision will depend on a variety of factors, including the outcome of the present hunger strike and political developments in both the Republic and the Province. If a ceasefire is declared in the future, it is likely that a few active PIRA terrorists, unable to accept the decision of their leadership, would switch their allegiance to INLA.

20. INLA. INLA is a numerically small organisation unable to maintain a high level of activity. It has, however, been responsible for sporadic outbreaks of terrorist crime, in Belfast in particular, concentrating its attacks on individual members of the Security Forces. It continues to pose a threat, both to the Security Forces and to VIPs. INLA's success in killing

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Mr Airey Neave still colours their planning. The political aspirations of INLA centre around the establishment of a 32 counties Socialist Workers' Republic and this, taken with their connections with various international terrorist organisations, means that they tend to be viewed by the Garda and the Irish Government as a more sinister long-term threat than PIRA.

21. Loyalists. The Loyalist terrorist groups - Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Red Hand Commandos (RHC) - all see themselves as reactive terrorists, fighting Republican terrorism with counter-terror. The UVF and RHC are currently small and ineffective and concentrate on poorly-targetted random attacks on 'Republicans'. The UVF leadership, however, is still intact and there are indications that they are attempting to rebuild their organisation, aided by the present polarised climate. The RHC have no such leadership and are largely criminally motivated, but they continue to pose a sporadic threat to RUC and prison officers. The UFF is a better organised and more political group, which has mounted well-planned and successful attacks on various prominent Republicans. Terrorists from all three organisations have been arrested and charged in the last year, but the assessment is that attacks on the same patterns will continue. Any future expansion of Loyalist paramilitary activity will draw heavily on criminal elements in the community.

22. These types of attack can affect the overall situation in two ways. Firstly, they are likely to provoke direct Republican terrorist retaliation. Secondly, they result in more moderate Republicans feeling at risk; and this in turn provides PIRA with the opportunity of presenting itself once again as the defenders of "beleaguered" Catholic communities against Loyalist "aggression and repression". It is to be hoped that recent RUC successes against Loyalist terrorists, coupled with the extension of conventional policing, will minimise Catholic reaction to any such future assassinations.

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23. In summary, in spite of much heartening progress against terrorism within the Province in recent years, the sectarian attitudes that gave rise to the 'Troubles' of the past decade are still present. It is true that PIRA today lacks the capability to raise the level of terrorist violence and sustain it. Despite this, however, I believe that in the long-term the risk of a resurgence of more widespread violence remains high, starting from some as yet unforeseen flashpoint. It is, therefore, essential that the Security Forces remain balanced and organised to meet such a threat.

Roles of the RUC and the Army

24. The prime aims of Government in the security field continue to be the elimination of terrorism, the establishment of law and order and the extension of policing throughout the Province on a basis acceptable to the community, the Government and to Parliament. The Army in Northern Ireland operates in support of these aims; and this support is provided in three main fields - (a) anti-terrorist operations; (b) the containment of public disorder when the situation is beyond the capacity of the RUC; and (c) the provision of specialist support such as helicopters and bomb disposal teams.

RUC

25. The RUC continues to make progress, with great courage and dedication, in extending acceptable policing throughout Northern Ireland - though the rate of progress understandably varies considerably from area to area. Particularly heartening progress is being made in the Republican areas of Belfast and Londonderry, and in many other towns and districts throughout the Province. Border areas do, however, pose a special problem. 'Normal policing,' although hampered by the terrorist threat, is carried out along those sections of the Border where there is a mixed population; but in the almost totally Republican South Armagh, there is little prospect of the RUC making much headway in the near future without a major improvement in Garda effectiveness in Co Louth.

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26. The RUC is now coming close to achieving its target strength of 7500 full-time regulars (supported by 2200 full-time and 3000 part-time reservists) and is the second largest police force in the UK. These extra resources are already playing an important part and will provide scope for greater flexibility both in the temporary local concentration of police strength to deal with specific events and, on a more permanent basis, to increase police manpower in those parts of the Province where it is most needed. A major inhibiting factor in this latter process is the lack of police stations (or accommodation that can serve the purpose until permanent stations can be built) in several key locations in the Province. At the present time, the construction of new police stations (from conception to occupation) is geared to a normal "peacetime" situation and takes many years. In several crucial areas this is now seriously delaying the operational progress of the Security Forces. A much more flexible system is needed, which produces practical (if not perfect) results on the ground fast. The issue is being tackled by the Chief Constable; it is now for Government to lend its active support. Accommodation is the most crucial aspect of a wider problem which in my view merits further attention - viz the matching of a civilian-based support infrastructure to the RUC's operationally intensive role. Improvements of this kind will, I recognise, involve difficult decisions over priorities, since the RUC is no longer able to operate within the relatively generous and flexible financial limits of recent years.

27. The future size, shape and capability of the RUC need at all times to be carefully matched to the policing needs of the Province. Ensuring this is, firstly, the responsibility of the Chief Constable and, secondly, of the NIO. The Chief Constable is at present reviewing the Force's structure and manpower requirements. In the longer term, these must reflect the changing pattern of violence and criminality and must also keep pace with changing attitudes in the community. The temptation for the RUC to become independent of Army support and to develop paramilitary capabilities too far must continue to be resisted. On the other hand, the RUC will for the

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foreseeable future continue to need some specialist resources beyond those of any other UK Constabulary. There is a careful balance to be struck.

28. The problems of policing the Province are in some ways untypical of those which confront other UK Constabularies. There have, I am sure, been valid reasons in the past for the appointment of a Chief Constable from outside Northern Ireland, but the last year has demonstrated the many advantages of an Ulsterman filling the post. The Chief Constable and his Chief Officers will play key roles in the coming years, and it is essential that close attention is paid to the career development of senior members of the Force, including the broadening of their experience in a UK context. In most cases this will probably best be achieved by sending selected RUC officers to serve at some stage in their career in some other force, but I believe that some measure of two-way exchange is also a desirable objective.

The Army

29. Within urban areas, the major role of the Army in Northern Ireland today is to make possible the extension of normal policing in Republican districts, against the background of a reducing terrorist threat. In rural areas and along the Border, the Army still plays a prominent role in anti-terrorist operations; the level of Army support provided in many of these areas is, however, often dictated as much by the need to reassure Protestants in these communities as by the strict operational requirement. Province-wide the uniformed overt units of the Army play an essentially defensive role, allowing specialist units, in conjunction with the RUC, to attack the terrorist structure on the basis of intelligence.

30. Anti-terrorist operations demand a continuing level of military support. In addition, the Army is from time to time required to assist the RUC in controlling public disorder;



E. P.

and this means that a rapid reinforcement capability also has to be available from within the Province. These different types of military support are provided by a mix of roulement and resident battalions (from April 1981 three roulement and six resident units). The roulement units are deployed in the anti-terrorist role in West Belfast and on the southern Border; while the resident units play a less intensive part in anti-terrorist operations, but also provide in an unobtrusive and flexible form the reinforcement capability to meet public order demands. Army force levels have been progressively reduced in recent years; the force level now envisaged is, I understand, sustainable without incurring serious operational penalty elsewhere.

31. Any future reductions in Army force levels will be in response to further improvements in the security situation. Hitherto, reductions in force levels have reflected both reductions in the terrorist threat and increases in RUC strengths. No further increases in RUC strengths are, however, planned; and it will accordingly be important to ensure that any future force level adjustments do not impose an unacceptable burden on the RUC.

32. The Army's role in Ulster is now finely tuned, but there is still a considerable military presence in the Province. For good reasons the Army increasingly operates out of the public eye; but it must not be forgotten that, day by day, large numbers of soldiers in the Province are carrying out dangerous, demanding, though at times very tedious, tasks in an exemplary fashion. Their contribution is invaluable. Further, the Army is a large and complex machine, which, although highly flexible in its reaction to operational problems, requires time to adjust to major policy changes.

UDR

33. An important element of the Army in Northern Ireland is the Ulster Defence Regiment. The Regiment was formed in 1970, following the disbandment of the Ulster Special Constabulary,

E.

to provide Ulster men and women with the opportunity to contribute personally to the security of their own Province. The Regiment is now more than 95% Protestant and this has the effect of making the UDR the least acceptable arm of the Security Forces to the Catholic community; this in turn imposes major limitations on the Regiment's use. Conversely, the continuing existence and strength of the UDR is a matter of great concern to Unionists.

34. The UDR consists of 11 battalions (some 7000 men and women), recruited Province-wide. The areas of strongest recruitment do not, however, match the areas of greatest operational need. From its original part-time concept, the Regiment has developed into a force made up of approximately one third full-time (permanent cadre) and two thirds part-time. There are opportunities for very limited redeployment within the Province of the full-time element, but the UDR battalions are still essentially local defence units, operating primarily in their areas of recruitment.

35. In certain parts of the Province, UDR units have their own areas of responsibility and provide first-line military support to the RUC. Both in these and other areas, the UDR releases Regular Army units from commitments such as static guards - and also provides a valuable level of deterrence and reassurance. However, in a few areas, the security situation is now such that there is no obvious role for the Regiment and UDR soldiers are deployed on quasi-deterrent operations solely because the units exist and must be employed.

36. The future role, size and shape of the UDR is a matter of great importance and sensitivity. There is a clear case for making changes in the future; but it has recently been decided, rightly in my view, that political considerations make such changes inadvisable at the present time. I believe, however, that the strength of the Regiment must be kept under continuous review, with a view to making changes once the political situation permits. In the meantime, I am sure

E. P.

it is right that the GOC should continue to make detailed adjustments as and when circumstances allow.

Intelligence Operations

37. Intelligence operations are the key element in the attack on the terrorist organisations. It is, however, an area which involves not only the Army and RUC but also other agencies, and therefore requires the most detailed integration and rationalisation. As in other fields, in 1979 there was dissension as to the best line of advance in intelligence matters. These policy issues have now been largely resolved. There is now full recognition of the need for co-ordination and all Army intelligence effort is committed in support of the Special Branch - on the one hand to supplement the RUC effort where necessary and, on the other, to provide specialist skills and forms of support not available within the police force. Local commanders must, however, continue to ensure that the agreed policy is put into practice.

38. Co-ordination is required at all levels. The more reduced and refined the terrorist organisation becomes, the more considered, precise and co-ordinated must be the response from the intelligence agencies. At Province-level the key post is the Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence (DCI). Although an appointment within the Northern Ireland Office, DCI has responsibilities extending to all the intelligence agencies, including the Army and the RUC. At a Regional level the introduction of Tasking and Co-ordination Groups (TCGs) has been a major advance and has ensured that all useable intelligence is better exploited. The greatest success has been achieved in Belfast and I think it is important that the experience gained there is now effectively applied elsewhere in the Province.

39. Although a much strengthened Special Branch are now firmly in the lead, there will for the foreseeable future be a continuing requirement for military specialist agencies and other UK-based agencies to provide support. I believe

that it is essential to maintain these elements through any short cessation of violence; and that any proposals to reduce the level of such support must be carefully considered, in order to ensure that we continue to provide a better intelligence base than was available in 1969. As 'normality' returns, it is right that Army involvement in intelligence acquisition should reduce. I believe, however, that it is essential that the Army remain fully briefed on available intelligence and involved in the assessment process. This should ensure that any Army redeployment will be done in a sensitive and informed manner.

40. Though there is no doubt still room for improvement, the intelligence effort in Northern Ireland is now relatively well co-ordinated. Indeed, on the basis of what I saw of these matters when serving as Intelligence Co-ordinator in the Cabinet Office prior to my appointment to Northern Ireland, and what I have observed since my arrival at Stormont, I would compare the degree of co-ordination achieved here favourably with that in Great Britain.

#### The Cross-Border Dimension

41. As the Security Forces continue to make progress against terrorists within the Province, so the continuing and intractable nature of the cross-border terrorist threat assumes greater operational significance and is thrown into higher political profile.

42. Co-operation between the RUC and the Garda is now good and has come a very long way since the mid-1970s. Further, during the last 2 years, there has undoubtedly been a significant increase in the effectiveness of the Garda themselves against terrorism in border areas. They do, however, have a long way still to go. They have made some useful finds of arms and explosives, but there have been very



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few convictions in the Republic of terrorists from border areas.

43. Garda shortcomings are sometimes attributed to a combination of a lack of willingness to proceed against PIRA and sometimes to a lack of professional capability. However, there appears to be little recent justification for criticisms of lack of will. The most significant deficiencies in this technically unsophisticated and basically unarmed force include a lack of resources to acquire and process intelligence, an inadequate surveillance capability and general shortages of manpower and material. Improvements in these fields are being made, but cannot be achieved quickly; the British experience in Northern Ireland during the last decade illustrates very clearly that it will take the Garda several years to reach our own current level of skill - even assuming that the resources and will to do so are both there. It must not be forgotten that Irish politics play a large part in senior Garda appointments and that the force as a whole is sensitive to changes in political leadership and policy. The Garda wisely, therefore, prefer to deal with terrorism as part of a general campaign against organised and armed crime and to present their co-operation with the RUC as part of this overall drive. They are extremely sensitive to any comment which could be interpreted as external criticism. I am sure that the best way to maintain the present level of RUC/Garda co-operation and to achieve the desired improvement in Garda performance is to continue with the professional liaison between the two police forces, with minimum political intrusion and publicity.

44. We shall, of course, continue to need co-operation with Dublin in the security field as long as we share a common border; and this is a factor to be constantly borne in mind in other wider dealings with the Dublin government. However, the security co-operation we seek from the South goes beyond RUC/Garda liaison alone; it also has a political dimension. It extends to such areas as the attitudes of the Irish judiciary, the impediment of the Irish constitution,

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extradition, the working of the extra-territorial legislation and the incompatibility of North/South laws and procedures. I believe there is merit in maintaining pressure on the Republic in these areas, but this will have to be done with discretion and finesse if it is not to prove counter-productive, given Irish hyper-sensitivity about the London-Dublin relationship.

Co-ordination

45. Close and continuous co-ordination is essential to success in formulating security policy in Northern Ireland. As in Great Britain, the Chief Constable is, constitutionally, answerable solely to the law in operational law enforcement matters. There are, however, special circumstances affecting the maintenance of law and order in the Province - in particular, the close involvement of the Army and the political implications of Security Force activity - which require full co-ordination and an integrated approach. I would emphasise that I am talking about co-ordination, not command; the Chief Constable and GOC do, of course, retain autonomous command of their own forces.

46. Co-ordination of security policy must involve not only both elements of the Security Forces, but also the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) and appropriate Northern Ireland Government Departments and agencies. So far as co-ordination with the NIO is concerned, what is required is a team effort, involving the three complementary partners (RUC, Army and NIO) working closely together on all security issues.

47. Further, to be wholly effective, this co-ordination in the formulation of policy at Headquarters level must be, and is, supported by close co-ordination of operations between the Security Forces, down to Police divisional level and below. At the present time, the situation is healthy and there is obvious goodwill on all sides. But I feel strongly that it is essential to maintain a basic formal co-ordination

E. R.

machinery, both to ensure that contact is maintained at periods of reduced terrorist activity and to surmount changes in personalities and relationships.

48. The centre-piece of this machinery must continue to be the monthly Security Policy Meetings (SPM) chaired by the Secretary of State; and, at executive level, it is important that the Operational Policy Committee and the Intelligence Policy Committee continue to meet regularly and to be used productively. The equivalent committees at regional and divisional level should also be actively maintained. Regular contacts are necessary to complement this formal committee structure. Specific arrangements are being made to ensure future regular contacts at a policy level in response to a general recognition of the need to replace the Security Co-ordinator's Informal Meetings. It is important in this and other ways to ensure that, as the intensity of Army operations reduced, the flow of intelligence and political information from Stormont to the Security Forces continues. Unless this is done there is a risk that they (in particular, the Army) will become isolated from the wider scene and inadequately briefed. This will remain necessary for the foreseeable future, irrespective of the Army's future level of involvement.

49. Another important aspect of co-ordination concerns the involvement of civil government (particularly the Northern Ireland Departments). In the more difficult areas of the Province, improvement in the security situation and progress in the work of civil government are interdependent and react on each other. Further, as normality returns to the Province, there is an increasing responsibility on civil government to ensure that it supports the Security Forces in every way it can and provides a sympathetic Government presence to balance the imposition of normal standards of law and order. In particular, as the tide of terrorist violence recedes, it leaves behind on the beach a great deal of ordinary criminal and anti-social activity, with which it is the permanent task

of the RUC to deal. The extent and nature of this problem is such, however, as to place it beyond the capacity of the RUC to tackle effectively without the active co-operation of the whole range of Government agencies. Conversely, some of these agencies have problems that can only be resolved with the co-operation of the RUC.

50. Provision of adequate resources is an essential ingredient in this process (and this poses a particularly acute problem in the current recession and with the present public expenditure reductions). But attitudes and perceptions are also important. Civil government must, in my view, have a fuller understanding both of security policy and of the law and order implications of the policies for which it is responsible. In recent months, I have been encouraged by an increasing awareness on all sides that the problems of the Province must not be compartmentalised and viewed in isolation - and that security factors must be fully taken into account. I consider it important that this cross-fertilisation process continues; the NIO has a big role to play here, both in furthering this development and in setting its own example.

51. Continuity in NIO posts is important in dealing both with a police force indigenous to the Province and an army in which most key personnel have served several times in Ulster during the present emergency. The NIO, as a small department created to deal with what was envisaged as a short-term emergency, has a considerable problem in providing comparable continuity. Responsibility for contact with the Security Forces rests within the NIO on the holders of a very small number of posts: unless these are filled by individuals of suitable quality and experience, there is a danger that the level of mutual confidence which has been built up recently will decline. Northern Ireland is a small stage on which individuals loom large. This is an area in which the NIO needs active and sympathetic support from other Whitehall Departments, particularly the MOD, the FCO and the Home Office.



Conclusion - The Way Ahead

52. Predictions about the likely development of the security situation in Northern Ireland must, inevitably, be as speculative and uncertain as forecasts of the Province's political future. There is no doubt that the Security Forces now "sit more lightly" on the Province than at any time in the past decade and that they continue to make good progress in the erosion of terrorism and the extension of normal policing to all parts of the six counties. It is, however, a process in which there will be both successes and setbacks. The recent capture in Fermanagh of an armed PIRA ASU led by two seasoned cross-border terrorists typifies recent intelligence-based successes by the Security Forces. However, on the following day, ten soldiers of the Scots Guards travelling in an unmarked commercial vehicle on a Fermanagh road they had not previously used had the narrowest possible escape when a home-made PIRA detonator failed to explode a large wire-controlled culvert mine. Had the mine functioned, we might have had the biggest Army loss of life in a single incident since Warrenpoint. But it would have occurred against a background of a very different relationship between the component elements of the Security Forces. Luck may not be with us next time; and, if the Security Forces do suffer heavy casualties in a sensational incident, Ulster politicians will certainly over-react, exploit the situation for their own purposes and demand changes in the Government's security policy. In such circumstances, it is vital that we keep our nerve; isolated incidents must not divert us from a policy which we believe to be right.

53. If present progress is sustained, there is clearly a chance that, sooner or later, PIRA will settle for some form of ceasefire. There is good intelligence of a growing feeling in the movement that the time has come to call a halt - at any rate for a time; and support for PIRA within the Catholic community is as unenthusiastic now as it has been at any time during the last 10 years. Further, much of Ulster is undoubtedly war-weary; to many people, unemployment, housing

E. R.

and electricity prices are of greater concern than Republicanism.

54. But I do not think we should be over-optimistic. The events of the last decade have stirred up community hatred and bitterness in an appalling way and have confirmed many traditional fears and resentments; and it is a lesson of Irish history that the passage of time can entrench, rather than erase, extreme political stances. Thus I think it is true that, for the foreseeable future, so long as "the British remain in Ireland" and there is no satisfactory arrangement with the Republic (or indeed even if there is), Republicanism will prosper and violent dissent will continue - although efforts at community reconciliation are, of course, much to be welcomed. This might be so even if the PIRA leadership could bring themselves to take a considered view to call a halt to military operations. For it is by no means certain that all local PIRA groups would immediately follow such a lead; and INLA are, of course, already a law unto themselves.

55. Further, one cannot avoid the fact that hardened terrorists will be returning to the community from their prison sentences in increasing numbers in the years ahead; even inside prison, they can provide an awkward challenge and a threat to community peace, as the dirty protest and hunger-strikes have demonstrated.

56. The potential for the return of widespread violence will remain and we must therefore be prepared for a fairly long haul. The way ahead for the Province must surely lie in continuing to try and develop political structures on the London-Belfast-Dublin axis which will allow the two communities in Northern Ireland (and Ireland as a whole) to live together in comparative peace; but the last few years have shown that this process is unlikely to be a quick or easy one. And the economic prospect is daunting. In the interim, the role of the Security Forces must be to create a stable environment for the promotion of law and order, to

E. R.

contain terrorism and violence to a minimum and to control any public disorder professionally and dispassionately. The Security Forces alone cannot achieve "victory"; the problem demands a far wider solution.

57. The task of the Security Forces is, in such circumstances, a demanding one. But we are fortunate in having in Ulster a police force and an army that, tempered in the fire of the last 10 years, are now well-prepared to meet the challenge. The balance between the various arms and agencies of the Security Forces must remain fluid and adapt to a changing situation. I am happy to say, however, that the approach is now highly professional, experienced and well-balanced; the present Chief Constable and GOC, if I may say so, set a most admirable example and morale is high.

58. Finally, I am satisfied that all concerned with security in the Province are now well seized both of the rightness of the policy they are implementing and of the need for close, effective and continuing co-ordination. I believe that the creation of a Security Co-ordinator and a Joint RUC/Army/Civilian Staff has had a beneficial catalytic effect; but I also believe that both I and they have now accomplished all that we can usefully do, at least on a resident, whole-time basis. The agreed cycle of work is complete: to add to it artificially at this stage would forfeit essential goodwill by impinging unwarrantably on the operational and functional responsibilities of others; nor can one keep staff of the requisite quality merely to monitor the situation on a contingency basis. The situation in the summer of 1979 called for a cramp and some glue of a rather special kind to prevent the RUC/Army/NIO tripod falling apart; but the joints are now firmly sealed and the cramp can, in my view, now be removed. A tripod must always have three sound, mutually supportive legs if it is to remain upright, particularly on uneven ground; it is then a most useful structure. I believe that this particular carpentry lesson has now been well learnt.

E. R.

59. I therefore conclude that there is no longer a requirement for a full-time, resident Security Co-ordinator and Joint Planning Staff. I do, however, feel that special attention must continue to be given to the following subjects in particular:-

- (a) The maintenance of the existing formal machinery to provide both:-
  - (i) the necessary RUC/Army/NIO co-ordination of security policy, and
  - (ii) RUC/Army co-ordination of operations. (Paras 45-48)
- (b) The maintenance of regular contacts to supplement the formal committee structure both at the highest policy level and at lower levels to co-ordinate operations. (Para 48)
- (c) The maintenance of a regular flow of intelligence and political information to the Security Forces - in particular, the Army. (Paras 39 and 48)
- (d) The extension of civil government's understanding of security policy and of the law and order implications of civil policies. (Paras 49-50)
- (e) The future size, shape and capability of the RUC; the provision of suitable civilian support to the RUC; and the career development of senior members of the force. (Paras 26-28)
- (f) The future level of support provided by the Army to the RUC, including the future strength, organisation and role of the UDR. (Para 31 and Paras 33-36)
- (g) The need for continuity in key NIO posts. (Para 51)

E. R.

- (h) The integration and rationalisation of the overall intelligence effort, including application of the TCG concept. (Paras 37-38)
- (i) The continuing need for military specialist agencies and other UK-based agencies to provide support in the intelligence field. (Para 39)
- (j) Security co-operation with the Republic, based on the professional relationship between the RUC and the Garda. (Para 43)
- (k) The need to maintain carefully-judged pressure on the Republic in various security-related fields. (Para 44)

*Brooks Richards.*

20 March 1981

SIR BROOKS RICHARDS



*1st kind*

*Top Copy  
Required*

Ref. A04104

PRIME MINISTER

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I have just heard that Sir Maurice Oldfield has had to be taken to hospital. He has not been at all well, and (reading between the lines) it does not sound as if the prognosis is very good. But I don't think that he knows that.

2. I think that it might do his morale a power of good if you felt able to write him a little line of good wishes, something on the following lines:

"I was so sorry to hear that you were not well and had had to go into hospital. I hope that the doctors will be able to deal with the trouble, and I send you my very best wishes for a return to good health".

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

27th January, 1981

Copy ✓

to Mr Harrington (NIO)

Mr Wright (Cabinet Office)

6 MARSHAM COURT

MARSHAM STREET

LONDON SW1P 4JY

~~888 9269~~

834.3721.

Prime Minister **MS.**

MHW

25.6.80

Ireland

25 June 1980

My dear Prime Minister,

Thank you more than I can write for the letter you sent me on my return from Belfast. It was, if I may say so, a very gracious, understanding and touching gesture. I apologise for the delay in writing but I wanted first to go to the country and attempt to recollect in some tranquillity.

I shall not attempt to write a valedictory. As you say, some things have been done, but there remains a lot to be achieved. I'm certain the tasks are clearly understood and the framework is right. I only wish I could have done more myself.

May I take this opportunity to thank you, the Secretary of State, and all my colleagues who have given me unstinting help and support? I have told them that if ever I can give any help or advice on an honorary basis I am ready to do so. That on a few most important and immediate tasks.



Again with many thanks and  
all respects.

Yours sincerely,

Walter. Stapleton

---



Ireland

JS  
cc NIO  
MOD

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

17 June 1980

Dear Sir Maurice

As you leave Northern Ireland for the last time as Security Co-ordinator, I wish to send you on behalf of my colleagues and myself our warmest thanks for what you have done. When I asked you to take on this burden last September, we were deeply troubled by the security situation in Northern Ireland and concerned to make our operations more effective. All of us - and you perhaps more than any - are aware of how much there is still to be done, but I know from Francis Pym and Humphrey Atkins how effectively you have established a co-ordinated security team in the Province, boosted their morale, and achieved significant progress.

I know something of what this has cost you by way of days and weeks on end overseeing the Planning Staff in Stormont. I trust that you will now enjoy to the full a second retirement richly earned.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

Sir Maurice Oldfield, KCMG, CBE.

JS

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

*Ireland*



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

*Type for signature. 13 June 1980*

M Pattison Esq  
10 Downing Street  
SW1

*PM's*

PRIME MINISTER

*Dear Mike*

*Draft attached*

SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR

*MA 13/1*

In Clive Whitmore's letter of 11 June he asked for a draft letter of thanks to Sir Maurice Oldfield (whose retirement was, as you know, announced yesterday).

I attach a draft for the Prime Minister's consideration. When the letter has been signed, can I suggest it be sent to me for onward transmission?

*Yours sincerely  
Mike Hopkins*

M W HOPKINS

*Approved  
mt.*

DRAFT LETTER

FILE NUMBER.....

ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE.....

<p>To</p> <p>Sir Maurice Oldfield KCMG CBE</p> <p>(Full Postal Address)</p>	<p>Enclosures</p>	<p>Copies to be sent to</p> <p>(Full Address, if Necessary)</p>
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
LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY .....the Prime Minister.....  
(Name of Signatory)

As you leave Northern Ireland for the last time as Security Co-ordinator I wish to send you on behalf of my colleagues and myself our warmest thanks for what you have done. When I asked you to take on this burden last September we were deeply troubled by the security situation in Northern Ireland and concerned to make our operations more effective. All of us - and you perhaps more than any - are aware of how much there is still to be done, but I know from Francis Pym and Humphrey Atkins how effectively you have established a co-ordinated security team in the Province, boosted their morale, and achieved significant progress.

I know something of what this has cost you by way of days and weeks on end overseeing the Planning Staff in Stormont. I trust that you will now enjoy to the full a second retirement richly earned.

/With my thanks and good wishes/

13 JUN 1980



Sir,  
RICHARD

The Prime Minister

I am sorry to hear that you have to leave Northern Ireland for the last time as Secretary of State. I wish to send you on behalf of my colleagues and myself our warmest thanks for what you have done. When I asked you to take on this burden last September we were deeply troubled by the security situation in Northern Ireland and concerned to make our operations more effective. All of us - and you perhaps more than any - are aware of how much there is still to be done, but I know from Francis and Humphrey Atkins how effectively you have established a co-ordinated security team in the province, boosted their morale, and achieved significant progress.

I know something of what this has cost you in days and weeks on and over the last few months. I hope that you will now enjoy to the full a well-earned retirement which is well earned.

With my thanks, I am, Sir, yours faithfully,



WITH  
THE COMPLIMENTS OF THE  
PERMANENT SECRETARY  
  
NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

CONFIDENTIAL

Ireland



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Permanent Under Secretary

12 June 1980

K R Stowe CB, CVO

4676/PUS/L/

① cc Mr Gaffin  
② Mr Whitmore O/R  
M. to see  
13/6 MS  
12/6

David Wright, Esq.,  
PS/Sir Robert Armstrong,  
Cabinet Office,  
LONDON SW1

Dear David,

SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR

As I told you on the 'phone, in the light of press speculation in The Times this morning, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has decided to bring forward to 4pm this afternoon the announcement of the appointment of Sir Brooks Richards to succeed Sir Maurice Oldfield as Security Co-ordinator in Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister has agreed the terms of the NIO Press Notice and attributable background press guidance, and is being consulted about the change in timing of the announcement.

...  
In dealing with the press we intend to use not only the attributable background press guidance but also the attached unattributable Question and Answer brief, the terms of which have been agreed with No. 10.

Our Press Office will be dealing with enquiries on this matter and I would be grateful if you and other recipients of this letter could ensure that any enquiries to your Departments are referred to us. It would clearly create great difficulties if any briefing took place which diverged even fractionally from the line we are taking.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to Sir Ian Bancroft, Sir Frank Cooper, Sir Michael Palliser, Sir Brian Cubbon and to Nick Sanders at No. 10.

Rob

R.L. SMITH  
Private Secretary

yours sincerely

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UNATTRIBUTABLE

QUESTION & ANSWER BRIEF

Question: Why this timing?

Answer: Sir Maurice has carried out a major part of the task for which he was appointed. He has other interests mainly academic and is satisfied, as are the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, that now is the appropriate time to return to them. It was always envisaged that his appointment would be for a comparatively short period.

Question: Health?

Answer: Sir Maurice is 64. He has had a recurrence of some minor ailments. There is nothing seriously wrong with him but he doesn't feel 100% fit at present. He thinks that the job of Security Co-ordinator is so important - and onerous - that it should be filled by someone who is 100% fit. So with some regrets he is handing over to successor.

Question: Why a successor at all?

Answer: A job of this importance does not come to a clear cut end. His successor will be involved in ensuring that consequential measures are carried forward.

Question: Why a Foreign Office man?

Answer: Sir Brooks Richards was the most suitable person available. There is no particular significance in the fact that he was formerly in the Diplomatic Service.

Question: Another intelligence officer in disguise?

Answer: No.

Question: Duties of the post?

Answer: The title of Security Co-ordinator explains the job. For obvious reasons we are not prepared to be more specific.

**CONFIDENTIAL**





→  
Ireland

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

~~B/F 16-6-80.~~

11 June 1980

Security Co-ordinator

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 6 June 1980 about the replacement of Sir Maurice Oldfield.

She agrees that Sir Brooks Richards should be appointed to succeed to Sir Maurice Oldfield with effect from 16 June. She is generally content with the draft press notice and the attributable background press guidance. She has suggested, however, that the last sentence of the draft press notice should be deleted: she does not think it sensible for us to go out of our way to draw attention to the fact that Sir Brooks Richards is married and has a son and a daughter.

The Prime Minister would like to write herself to Sir Maurice Oldfield to thank him for what he has done in Northern Ireland and she would be grateful if your Secretary of State could let her have a draft letter.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Chilcot (Home Office), George Walden (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

( C A WHITMORE )

Roy Harrington, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

→



Prime Minister

*Agreed  
not*

Agree to:-

- ✓ (i) Sir Brooks Richards' appointment;
- ✓ (ii) the draft press notice and background guidance;
- ✓ (iii) sending a personal letter of thanks to Sir Maurice Oldfield?

PRIME MINISTER

*10vi*

We agreed at your meeting on 15 May that we should try to secure the services of Sir Anthony Duff or, failing him, Sir Brooks Richards to succeed Sir Maurice Oldfield for a limited period. Sir Anthony Duff, for personal reasons felt obliged to decline the appointment. Sir Brooks Richards was therefore approached and he had indicated that he would be willing to take on the task. Both Francis Pym and I have interviewed him and we think he would be a suitable successor; in particular, he would bring to the post not only his wide experience and authority as a diplomat but his recent expertise as the Intelligence Co-ordinator in the Cabinet Office; and he would wish to operate in the same style of imaginative but sensitive leadership which has contributed so largely to Sir Maurice Oldfield's success. We propose therefore, if you agree, to appoint him to succeed from Sir Maurice Oldfield with effect from 16 June.

Sir Brooks Richards would have preferred that no formal announcement of his appointment should be made since he wishes the measures necessary for his personal protection in Northern Ireland and Great Britain to be minimal. It is clear however that the Security Authorities would feel obliged, irrespective of any formal announcement, to give him the protection appropriate to the potential PIRA target; and I am in no doubt that it is politically desirable to make the Government's commitment to the post and the person doing it unequivocally clear. I propose therefore to issue a press notice, with attributable background briefing, to announce his appointment. There are particular personal reasons why Sir Brooks Richards, with Sir Robert Armstrong's support, would wish this to be deferred until the day he takes up his appointment i.e. 16 June. I see no difficulty about this and propose therefore that the announcement be made in terms of the attached drafts at 1430 on that date.

I shall of course inform the Opposition spokesman and the relevant leaders of the political parties in Northern Ireland of the appointment shortly in advance of the announcement.

The terms of the announcement have been agreed with Francis Pym, Sir Robert Armstrong and with Sir Maurice Oldfield himself.

2/Contd...

APPOINTMENTS - IN CONFIDENCE

Sir Maurice has expressed a wish that his departure should not be marked by any formal occasion. I shall make clear to him informally the Government's appreciation for all that he has done in Northern Ireland at great personal cost to himself. You may feel that since you saw him yourself to ask him to take up the post you will wish to write him a personal letter of thanks. If so, I will be pleased to furnish a draft letter.

I am copying this minute to Willie Whitelaw, Peter Carrington, Francis Pym and Sir Robert Armstrong.

*R. A. Harrington.*

pp. H A

6. JUNE 1980

APPOINTMENTS - IN CONFIDENCE

DRAFT NIO PRESS NOTICE

SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR - NEW APPOINTMENT

The Secretary of State, the Rt. Hon. Humphrey Atkins MP, with the approval of the Prime Minister, has appointed Sir Brooks Richards KCMG, DSC as Security Co-ordinator, in succession to Sir Maurice Oldfield GCMG, CBE. The appointment will take effect from [16 June 1980].

Sir Brooks was born in 1918 and served in the Royal Navy during the 1939-45 war. He joined the Diplomatic Service in 1944 and served in a variety of posts abroad and in London, becoming HM Ambassador to Greece in 1974. Since 1978 he has been serving in the Cabinet Office. ~~He is married with a son and a daughter.~~

SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR: ATTRIBUTABLE BACKGROUND PRESS GUIDANCE

The background to the appointment of Sir Maurice Oldfield as Security Co-ordinator was set out in attributable background press guidance issued by the Northern Ireland Office on 2 October 1979. This guidance still holds good today ... (copy attached)

Sir Maurice Oldfield was asked to return to the public service from retirement for a limited period of a few months in order to assist the Secretary of State by establishing a new Joint Staff; reviewing all current security measures; and making immediate improvements in the co-ordination and effectiveness of the security forces in accordance with the Government's security objectives. He has made substantial progress in achieving these objectives and the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State are very grateful to Sir Maurice for all that he has done to make more effective the security effort against terrorism in Northern Ireland. There is still work to be done to consolidate what has already been achieved. Sir Maurice regrets, however, that for health reasons his appointment should not be extended. Hence the appointment of Sir Brooks Richards to succeed him for a further limited period.

SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR: ATTRIBUTABLE BACKGROUND PRESS GUIDANCE

In connection with the appointment by the Secretary of State, Rt Hon Humphrey Atkins MP, of a security co-ordinator in the Northern Ireland Office, journalists may wish to make use of the following background information on an attributable basis:-

The bravery and increasing effectiveness of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the courage and professionalism of the Army have together made great progress in dealing with terrorism in Northern Ireland. The Government is determined to give them the maximum possible support in their efforts. The relevant defence and "law and order" public expenditure programmes have been exempted from the Government's recent measures on government expenditure; and it was announced only on 30 August 1979 that a further increase of 1,000 men had been authorised for the Royal Ulster Constabulary.

The Government intends to maintain and increase the pressure by the security forces on the terrorists so as to bring them to justice. They have no doubt that their determination to defend the citizens of Northern Ireland against terrorism, murder and violence by upholding the rule of law is totally supported by the vast majority of people in Northern Ireland irrespective of their religious and political differences.

The measures adopted by the Government and the security forces in the fight against terrorism are continually evolving to

achieve greater effectiveness. Recent events have underlined the need for sustained initiatives, including the current discussions with the Government of the Republic who have to deal with the same threat. This new appointment of a Security Co-ordinator in the Province is a further measure in the Government's attack on terrorism.

The object in appointing the Security Co-ordinator is to assist the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in improving the co-ordination and effectiveness of the fight against terrorism in accordance with the Government's security objectives. He will be based in Northern Ireland and be supported by a joint staff drawn from the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the Army and the Civil Service which will be operational 24 hours a day. Security objectives, political and constitutional development and economic and social policy interact on each other in Northern Ireland and need to be carefully linked together in HMG's total Northern Ireland policy so that each is pursued consistently with the others. The aim of the Government's security policy continues to be to eliminate terrorism and to extend normal policing throughout Northern Ireland. This policy will continue to be implemented through the application of the machinery of law and order prevailing in Northern Ireland. The Army will continue to operate in support of the police. The Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Army will remain under the command of the Chief Constable and the General Officer Commanding respectively.

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, supported by Minister of State Mr Michael Alison as his immediate deputy and by his other Ministers, is personally responsible for all aspects of HMG's policy for Northern Ireland. The Security Co-ordinator will be a full member of the Secretary of State's staff and

/will .....

will contribute to the determined pursuit of all aspects of that policy. His first priorities will be to set up the new joint staff on a 24 hour operational basis and to review all current security measures.



6 JUN 1940

11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12  
11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12



9 Ireland

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

15 May 1980

Dear John,

SUCCESSOR TO SIR MAURICE OLDFIELD

The Prime Minister discussed the question of a successor to Sir Maurice Oldfield as Security Coordinator in Northern Ireland after Cabinet this morning with the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Sir Robert Armstrong, Sir Frank Cooper and Mr. Stowe were also present.

1. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said that Sir Maurice Oldfield's health was becoming increasingly a matter for concern and he should be replaced as soon as possible. He had done an excellent job in setting up arrangements for coordination between the security forces in Northern Ireland and he had won the complete confidence of the Army and RUC. The system he had introduced now had to be carried forward and would have to be adapted as and when circumstances changed, as they quite certainly would. There was therefore a clear requirement for someone of suitable standing to take Sir Maurice Oldfield's place. There was, however, no need to appoint the new man for more than 12 months in the first instance. Moreover, because the arrangements introduced by Sir Maurice Oldfield were now well established and running smoothly, it would not be necessary for his replacement to devote quite so much time and energy to the job as Sir Maurice Oldfield had done. One possibility might be to appoint someone who would both act as Security Coordinator and fill the Deputy Secretary post in the NIO in Belfast. Another was to choose someone who had either just retired or would be retiring in about a year's time.

3. The Secretary of State for Defence said that he agreed about the need to continue with the post of Security Coordinator. We had invested Sir Maurice Oldfield's appointment with considerable significance and it would be misunderstood in Northern Ireland if he were not replaced.

4. The Prime Minister said that she agreed that Sir Maurice Oldfield's post should be continued, though it might be desirable to ask his replacement to go to Northern Ireland for only six months in the

/first instance.

AD

- 2 -

first instance. She had reservations, however, about the suggestion that the post might be combined with the Deputy Secretary post in the NIO. This might lower the status of the job in a way which could undermine its effectiveness. It was important that the post should be filled by someone of the necessary personal standing and that would in turn need to be reflected by the rank of the post.

5. The meeting then discussed candidates to succeed Sir Maurice Oldfield. It was agreed that the best replacement, if he were prepared to take the job, would be Sir Antony Duff. The best alternative was probably Sir Brooks Richards. Another good candidate would be Sir Alan Campbell, who was until recently HM Ambassador in Rome. Sir John Paul, Lieutenant Governor of the Isle of Man, was also worth considering, although it was not known how much security and intelligence experience he had gained while in the Colonial Service. Sir Arthur Hockaday would be a good replacement but his appointment as Security Coordinator would be a considerable loss to the MOD, and there might be difficulties about re-absorbing him on his return from Northern Ireland. If, notwithstanding the objections, it was eventually decided to appoint a Deputy Secretary to be Security Coordinator, Mr. Hastie-Smith of the Cabinet Office would be a strong contender.

6. The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that Sir Robert Armstrong, in conjunction with Mr. Stowe, should now approach Sir Antony Duff urgently to see whether he would be prepared to accept the appointment of Security Coordinator for six months. If Sir Antony Duff declined the offer, the other candidates would need to be considered further.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Norbury (MOD), Roy Harrington (NIO) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

John Whitman.

J.A. Chilcot, Esq.,  
Home Office.



8

Prime Minister.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

\_\_\_\_\_

PM.

Ref. A 02177

PRIME MINISTER

\_\_\_\_\_

*ms*

14.v.

At a meeting after Cabinet tomorrow you are to discuss the succession to Sir Maurice Oldfield.

2. Since the Chief of the General Staff and others at the Ministry of Defence have been pursuing an idea that Sir Maurice Oldfield might continue in Northern Ireland for a further period on a part time basis, you will wish to say that, when he was appointed, you envisaged that it was for a term of about six months; that he has been there rather longer than that; that he has succeeded in putting the co-ordination of security on a sound and durable footing; and that you are clear that the strain of the job upon him and his own ill health are such that it would not be right to ask him to continue beyond next month. You could add, for good measure, that you doubt whether he would want to do so, even if invited.

3. The two front runners to succeed him are Sir Arthur Hockaday (54), Second Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, and Sir Brooks Richards (61), the Intelligence Co-ordinator at the Cabinet Office since his retirement from the Diplomatic Service in 1978.

4. Sir Arthur Hockaday has much going for him. His career has been spent wholly in the Ministry of Defence, and he is well known to and respected by the military. He is an energetic and effective manager with a somewhat abrasive manner. If the need had been to set up a new system, he would have been very much the better choice. He remains the first choice of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. The Defence Secretary is, however, very reluctant to part with him: he relies heavily on Sir Arthur Hockaday in the management of the Department. Sir Ian Bancroft has also said that he thinks that, if Sir Arthur Hockaday were taken out of the Ministry of Defence, even if only for a year, he would have a difficult "re-entry" problem. He would be on any short list of successors to Sir Frank Cooper (who is due to retire in December 1982); and his chances might be adversely affected by a move. I understand that there would be no family complications about his serving in Northern Ireland.



SECRET AND PERSONAL

5. Sir Brooks Richards's experience has not been confined to the Diplomatic Service. He is familiar with the intelligence scene from his time as Secretary to the Joint Intelligence Committee from 1965 to 1969. He has less of a "cutting edge" than Sir Arthur Hockaday; but he is a competent and well liked man, who would certainly be able to maintain in good order the system now firmly established by Sir Maurice Oldfield. The Generals would be less satisfied with him than with Sir Arthur Hockaday, but would I believe find him perfectly easy to work with. He would bring qualities of outside experience and judgment to the job in very much the same way (though of rather a different kind) as Sir Maurice Oldfield himself. There would be no re-entry problem, since he has already retired from the Diplomatic Service. He is not due to leave the Cabinet Office until next year, and if he were chosen I should have to find a replacement as Intelligence Co-ordinator; but I certainly would not want to let that stand in his way, if he were chosen for the Northern Ireland job and willing to do it. He is the preferred choice of the Secretary of State for Defence (who does not want to lose Sir Arthur Hockaday) and of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

6. I know that the view of Sir Maurice Oldfield himself is that he does not need to be replaced: that he has established the new system on a secure footing, and that it will go along perfectly well without him. I think that that may well be right as a matter of fact, but I do not see how politically we can do otherwise than replace him: if there was a need for somebody last October, it is hardly possible to argue that the security situation has so improved that there is no longer a need for somebody now. This does suggest, however, that we are not looking for somebody to change the system but to keep the newly established Oldfield system going. For this purpose (as I have already suggested) Sir Brooks Richards would be perfectly good: perhaps even better than Sir Arthur Hockaday, who is undoubtedly much needed at the Ministry of Defence. If the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland expresses a decided preference for Sir Brooks Richards, I think that you can perfectly well go along with that.



SECRET AND PERSONAL

7. Neither man has been told that he is being considered for this appointment, and we do not know if either of them would accept it. I believe that Sir Brooks Richards's children are all grown up. I doubt whether he would want to spend seven days a week in Northern Ireland, as Sir Maurice Oldfield did at first; but I do not think that he would need to do so.

RA

(Robert Armstrong)

14th May, 1980

SECRET

Ireland. 7

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

Appointment of Security Coordinator  
in Northern Ireland

The following is a summary record of the events leading up to the appointment of Sir Maurice Oldfield as Security Coordinator in Northern Ireland.

Thursday 30 August

Cabinet decided in a discussion on Northern Ireland generally that a new Security Directorate should be set up in Northern Ireland in order to improve cooperation between the various elements of the security forces. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland was to find someone suitable to head the Directorate.

Tuesday 18 September

The Defence Secretary came to see the Prime Minister to complain of the lack of progress in finding a Security Coordinator. The Prime Minister agreed to see him, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, as soon as possible to try and settle upon a name. She said that she thought that Sir John Killick was the best candidate. Another possibility was the appointment of an additional Minister of State in the Northern Ireland Office who would be responsible for security.

Later that day Mr. Atkins indicated that he would be ready to accept a Minister of State to provide greater coordination of the security effort.

Wednesday 19 September

The Prime Minister saw the Home Secretary and discussed the names of various serving and retired officials who might be suitable for the new post. The possibility of appointing a new Minister of State was also discussed, but it was recognised that there were difficulties about this solution. First, because the quota of Minister of State appointments was completely taken up, a new appointment would have to be created by transferring an existing post from elsewhere. Second, a sixth Ministerial post at the NIO would give the Department too many Ministers. Finally, there was no obvious candidate.

/Later

SECRET

B.R.

**SECRET**

- 2 -

Later that day Sir John Hunt chaired a meeting with Sir Michael Palliser, Sir Frank Cooper, Sir Brian Cubbon and me in preparation for the Ministerial meeting the following day.

Thursday 20 September

The Prime Minister met Lord Carrington, Mr. Pym and Mr. Atkins at 0900. They agreed that there was no suitable Minister of State readily available for the appointment and that the best candidate amongst the various officials who had been mentioned, including Sir Oliver Wright, Sir Donald Maitland, and Mr. Donald (HM Ambassador Kinshasa), was Sir John Killick.

The Prime Minister saw Sir John Killick at 1700 and offered him the appointment of Security Coordinator.

Friday 21 September

Sir John Killick 'phoned me to say that, after a great deal of reflection, he had decided not to accept the job. He was writing to give his reasons in detail.

The Prime Minister met the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary later that evening to discuss other candidates, and the name that emerged was that of Sir Arthur Hockaday. It was left that I would discuss this possibility further with Sir Frank Cooper and let the Prime Minister have a view before she had lunch the following day with Mr. Whitelaw and Lord Carrington.

I duly spoke to Sir Frank Cooper who said that he would like to consult the CGS.

Saturday 22 September

In a series of telephone conversations between Sir Frank Cooper, Sir John Hunt, Sir Brian Cubbon, Sir Michael Palliser and me the name of Sir Maurice Oldfield emerged as the leading runner with Sir Arthur Hockaday as a fall-back candidate. I subsequently passed this on to the Prime Minister who telephoned me later to say that she had agreed with Mr. Whitelaw and Lord Carrington that Sir Maurice Oldfield would be a good candidate.

/Monday 24 September

**SECRET**



E.R.

**SECRET**

- 3 -

Monday 24 September

The Prime Minister saw Mr. Pym and Mr. Atkins at 0930 and obtained their agreement that the post should be offered to Sir Maurice Oldfield.

Tuesday 25 September

The Prime Minister saw Sir Maurice Oldfield at 1730 and offered him the appointment. He asked for 36 hours to think about it.

Wednesday 26 September

Sir John Hunt held a meeting with Permanent Secretaries, the heads of the Security Service and the SIS and me to discuss with Sir Maurice Oldfield various aspects of the job.

Thursday 27 September

Sir Maurice Oldfield telephoned me at 1200 to say that he was ready to accept the post.

The Prime Minister, accompanied by Mr. Atkins and Mr. Stowe, saw Sir Maurice Oldfield at 1645. She thanked him for taking on the job, and most of the subsequent discussion dealt with the announcement of his appointment. It was decided that the best day would be Wednesday 3 October. By then the Pope's visit would be over and the foreign journalists accompanying him would have left Ireland. In addition, an announcement then could be coupled with the announcement of the name of the new Chief Constable in Northern Ireland.

Immediately following the Prime Minister's meeting, Sir John Hunt held a meeting of Permanent Secretaries together with Sir Maurice Oldfield to discuss further the terms of the announcement and the approaches to be made to the American and Irish governments to let them know what was being done. It was agreed that the NIO should submit a draft announcement and guidance to the Prime Minister before the weekend.

Friday 28 September

The NIO explained that the drafts would be delayed because the FCO, with the agreement of the other Departments concerned, wished to consult HM Ambassador in Dublin who was to be in London the following Monday.

/Monday 1 October

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

- 4 -

Monday 1 October

The Prime Minister approved the draft press announcement and the accompanying attributable guidance and defensive brief.

Tuesday 2 October

The news of Sir Maurice Oldfield's appointment began to leak in the course of the day and, with the agreement of the Prime Minister, the announcement was brought forward from Wednesday, 3 October and made at 1700.

JWS.

9 October 1979**SECRET**



6

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

2 October 1979

*Dear Mike,*

SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR

Thank you for your letter of 1 October 1979 about the appointment of Sir Maurice Oldfield as Security Co-ordinator.

The Prime Minister has seen the draft press announcement, the attributable press guidance and the defensive brief for unattributable use attached to your letter and, as I have already told Roy Harrington in Belfast, she is content with them.

As regards the timing of the announcement, the Prime Minister agrees, in the light of the various considerations set out in your letter, that this should be at midday tomorrow, Wednesday.

I am sending copies of this letter to George Walden (FCO), John Chilcot (HO), Brian Norbury (MOD), Richard Prescott (Privy Council Office), and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,*

*Steve Whitmore.*

M.W. Hopkins, Esq.

**SECRET**

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ



Prime Minister.

C A Whitmore Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

The draft announcement and the attributable guidance are virtually the same as the version you saw last week. The attributable defence brief is not. Are you content with the drafts?  
1 October 1979

All those concerned with this appointment are now agreed that the announcement should be made on Wednesday at midday. Do you agree?

Dear Chive,

SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR

Seen + agreed by the  
Prime Minister  
JAH lx.22

JAH  
lx.22

The Secretary of State had an initial discussion with Sir Maurice Oldfield on Friday.

Sir Maurice has agreed to start work in Belfast on 8 October. No term has been fixed for the appointment. We will be making all the necessary administrative and other arrangements for the new appointment in consultation with him. We are paying particular attention to his personal protection.

The Secretary of State has agreed with Sir Maurice that he should spend the first week or so in his new appointment talking to all those concerned with Security in Northern Ireland and coming to his own conclusions as to how he should set about his new task. They will then discuss these conclusions and decide on the way ahead. On further consideration, and having consulted the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, our Ambassador in Dublin and the Ministry of Defence, the Secretary of State sees no reason to dissent from the Prime Minister's view that the public announcement should be made earlier rather than later this week. In particular, we are satisfied that the Prime Minister's statement issued on the Pope's departure will be seen as the Government's response to what the Pope has said, and that Sir Maurice's appointment, if announced on Wednesday, would not conflict with that. Such an announcement would be early enough to give the Irish Government a little time to digest the news before the Secretary of State's meeting with Mr O'Kennedy on Friday. We will be able to couple an early announcement with the announcement of the appointment of the new Chief Constable as part of the Secretary of State's new Security team. We will be able to refer to the Security Co-ordinator's appointment as well as to the announcement on 30 August of the increase of 1,000 men for the Royal Ulster Constabulary in the communique following the Secretary of State's talks with Mr O'Kennedy so as to achieve a desirable balance in the communique between action on cross border security which we are taking and that which the Irish are taking. The Secretary of State is very conscious of the need not to be pre-empted by a premature leak, but equally conscious of the need to manage the announcement of the appointment of the Security Co-ordinator so that it has the maximum desirable impact. This will entail widespread prior and careful

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briefing of those concerned inside and outside the Province. As a result, although it would be possible to make the announcements tomorrow at 4.00p.m. if leaks made it necessary to do so, the ground work for this sensitive announcement could be done better if it took place at midday on Wednesday.

... I attach a draft press announcement, attributable press guidance and a defensive brief for unattributable use and would be grateful for the Prime Minister's approval to the Secretary of State's proceeding as he proposes.

It has been agreed that all press inquiries will be dealt with by the Northern Ireland Office and that appropriate instructions will be issued by all Departments concerned to ensure that nothing is said publicly, formally or otherwise, to vitiate the impact of the announcement.

I am copying this letter to George Walden (FCO), John Chilcot (HO), Brian Norbury (MOD), Richard Prescott (Privy Council Office), and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely*  
*Mike Hopkins*

M W HOPKINS

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DRAFT PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, with the approval of the Prime Minister, has appointed Sir Maurice Oldfield, GCMG, CBE as Security Co-ordinator. The appointment will take effect from 8th October.

2. Sir Maurice Oldfield will assist the Secretary of State in improving the co-ordination and effectiveness of the fight against terrorism in Northern Ireland. He will be based in Northern Ireland and be supported by a joint staff drawn from the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the Army and the Civil Service which will be operational 24 hours a day.

3. Sir Maurice Oldfield was born in 1915 and served in the army during the 1939-45 war. He joined the Foreign Office in 1947 and served in Singapore and Washington as well as in London. He retired in 1978 and for the past year has been Visiting Fellow at All Souls College, Oxford. He is unmarried.

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**ED**

SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR: DRAFT PRESS GUIDANCE (ATTRIBUTABLE)

1. The Security Co-ordinator in the Northern Ireland Office was today appointed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, with the approval of the Prime Minister, with effect from 8 October.
2. The bravery and increasing effectiveness of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the courage and professionalism of the Army have together made great progress in dealing with terrorism in Northern Ireland. The Government is determined to give them the maximum possible support in their efforts. The relevant defence and "law and order" public expenditure programmes have been exempted from the Government's recent measures on government expenditure; and it was announced only on 30 August 1979 that a further increase of 1,000 men had been authorised for the Royal Ulster Constabulary.
3. The Government intends to maintain and increase the pressure by the security forces on the terrorists so as to bring them to justice. They have no doubt that their determination to defend the citizens of Northern Ireland against terrorism, murder and violence by upholding the rule of law is totally supported by the vast majority of people in Northern Ireland irrespective of their religious and political differences.
4. The measures adopted by the Government and the security forces in the fight against terrorism are continually evolving to achieve greater effectiveness. Recent events have underlined the need for sustained initiatives, including the current discussions with the Government of the Republic who have to deal with the same threat. This new appointment of a Security Co-ordinator in the Province is a further measure in the Government's attack on terrorism.
5. The object in appointing the Security Co-ordinator is to assist the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in improving the co-ordination and effectiveness of the fight against terrorism in accordance with the Government's security objectives.

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6. Security objectives, political and constitutional development and economic and social policy interact on each other in Northern Ireland and need to be carefully linked together in HMG's total Northern Ireland policy so that each is pursued consistently with the others. The aim of the Government's security policy continues to be to eliminate terrorism and to extend normal policing throughout Northern Ireland. This policy will continue to be implemented through the application of the machinery of law and order prevailing in Northern Ireland. The Army will continue to operate in support of the police. The Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Army will remain under the command of the Chief Constable and the General Officer Commanding respectively.

7. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, supported by Mr Alison as his immediate deputy and by his other Ministers, is personally responsible for all aspects of HMG's policy for Northern Ireland. The Security Co-ordinator will be a full member of the Secretary of State's staff and will contribute to the determined pursuit of all aspects of that policy. His first priorities will be to set up the new joint staff on a 24 hour operational basis and to review all current security measures.



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DEFENSIVE BRIEF FOR UNATTRIBUTABLE USE

WHY APPOINTED

Because of his outstanding qualities of mind, personality and integrity. He is considered the best man available to help the Secretary of State to achieve the Government's security objectives.

WHY THIS PARTICULAR MAN

He has the breadth of vision, the foresight and the drive to help the Secretary of State to get the best out of the security forces in day to day operations where quick and co-ordinated decision taking is essential and to develop security strategy in co-ordination with the government's overall policy for the Province.

WHY EMPLOY FORMER HEAD OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

No comment.

Any particular past experience he may have had is incidental to this appointment. As we have already said, the appointment is based on the man's outstanding personal qualities, and not because of any particular expertise and experience that he may have acquired in the past.

AN INCREASE IN INTELLIGENCE EFFORT

The security forces naturally depend heavily on intelligence in dealing with terrorism. The more

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
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2.

they have the better. But this is not the reason for Sir Maurice Oldfield's appointment. As we have said in the attributable press guidance the Government's aim continues to be the extension of normal policing by the RUC throughout Northern Ireland. The Army will continue to operate in support of the police. And the Security Co-ordinator's particular responsibility will be to improve the co-ordination of the efforts of the Police and the Army.

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F1 OCT 1979



DRAFT PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, with the approval of the Prime Minister, has appointed Sir Maurice Oldfield GCMG, CBE, as Security Coordinator. The appointment will take effect from

Sir Maurice Oldfield will assist the Secretary of State in improving the coordination and effectiveness of the security effort in Northern Ireland. He will be based in Northern Ireland and be supported by a joint staff drawn from the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the Army and the Civil Service which will be operational 24 hours a day.

Sir Maurice Oldfield was born in 1915 and served in the army during the 1939-45 war. He joined the Foreign Office in 1947 and subsequently served in Singapore and Washington. He retired ~~from the Public Service~~ in 1978 and for the past year has been visiting fellow at All Souls College, Oxford. He is unmarried.

File No. ....

Department .....

Drafted by .....

(Block Capitals) .....

Tel. Extn. ....

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

A

Security Classification	
CONFIDENTIAL	
Precedence	
IMMEDIATE	
DESKBY .....	Z

FOR  
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USE

Despatched (Date).....  
(Time).....Z

POSTBY .....Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin).....Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix) .....

(Security Class.)...CONFIDENTIAL.....

(Caveat/

Privacy Marking) .....

(Codeword).....

(Deskby).....Z

TO .....IMMEDIATE DUBLIN.....Tel. No. .... of .....  
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post).....IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (FOR BULLARD).....

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) .....IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.....

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR, NORTHERN IRELAND

1. MIFT gives text of press announcement to be issued by Northern Ireland Office at on

. My second IFT gives guidance for use with the press. My third IFT gives some further unattributable background for use with the press in answer to questions.

2. This appointment will need to be carefully explained to the Irish Government, and we should like to give them some advance warning. You should accordingly seek an appointment at an appropriately high level in the DFA, (or the Taoiseach's Office if you think this preferable), but not before on

. You should hand over the text of

CONFIDENTIAL

/the

Copies to:-

the press announcement and draw as appropriate on the guidance in my second and third IFTs, supplemented by the more detailed oral briefing which we hope to give you.

3. Meanwhile in New York, and subject to the same timing constraint, Bullard should convey text of the press announcement to O'Kennedy, the Irish Foreign Minister. He should draw as appropriate on the accompanying guidance, but should also convey the following personal message from the Northern Ireland Secretary.

Begins:

I want you to know how grateful I was for what you said in your speech to the General Assembly about terrorism and the need for reconciliation. I am much looking forward to our forthcoming meeting in London on 5 October, in preparation for which I understand our officials will be meeting in Dublin on 27 September.

Meanwhile I want to let you have an advance copy of the announcement we are making today about the appointment of a Security Co-ordinator for Northern Ireland. Our Ambassador will be giving your people in Dublin a full account of the thinking underlying this appointment. It is my hope and belief that it will enable us to tighten up our own security operations, both in the border areas and elsewhere.

Ends

File No. ....  
Department .....  
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OUTWARD  
TELEGRAM  
B

Security Classification	
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Precedence	
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Despatched (Date).....  
(Time).....Z

POSTBY .....Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin).....Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) .....  
(Security Class.) **CONFIDENTIAL** (Caveat) .....  
(Codeword)..... (Privacy Marking) .....  
(Deskby).....Z

TO **IMMEDIATE DUBLIN** Tel. No. .... of  
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) **IMMEDIATE UKMISS NEW YORK (FOR BULLARD)**

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) **IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON**

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

MIPT: SECURITY COORDINATOR, NORTHERN IRELAND

1. Following is text of Press announcement:

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, with the approval of the Prime Minister, has appointed Sir Maurice Oldfield GCMG, CBE, as Security Coordinator. The appointment will take effect from

Sir Maurice Oldfield will assist the Secretary of State in improving the coordination and effectiveness of the security effort in Northern Ireland. He will

/be

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be based in Northern Ireland and be supported by a joint staff drawn from the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the Army and the Civil Service which will be operational 24 hours a day.

Sir Maurice Oldfield was born in 1915 and served in the army during the 1939-45 war. He joined the Foreign Office in 1947 and subsequently served in Singapore and Washington. He retired from the Public Service in 1978 and for the past year has been visiting fellow at All Souls College, Oxford. He is unmarried.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



File No. ....  
Department .....  
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OUTWARD  
TELEGRAM  
**C**

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(Time).....Z

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(Time of Origin).....Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) .....  
(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/  
Privacy Marking) .....  
(Codeword)..... (Deskby).....Z

TO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN (precedence) (post) Tel. No. .... of .....

AND TO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE UKMISS NEW YORK (for Bullard)

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

MY TEL NO **A** : SECURITY COORDINATOR, NORTHERN IRELAND

1. The following is guidance for use with the Press

A - B

Copies to:-

File No. ....  
Department .....  
Drafted by  
(Block Capitals) .....  
Tel. Extn. ....

OUTWARD  
TELEGRAM

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Security Classification  
**CONFIDENTIAL**  
Precedence  
DESKBY ..... Z

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched (Date) .....  
(Time) ..... Z

POSTBY ..... Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) .....  
(Security Class.) **CONFIDENTIAL** (Caveat) .....  
(Codeword) ..... (Privacy Marking) .....  
(Deskby) ..... Z

TO **IMMEDIATE DUBLIN** Tel. No. .... of  
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) **IMMEDIATE UKMIS, NEW YORK (for Bullard)**

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) **IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON**

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

MY TEL NO **A** : SECURITY COORDINATOR NORTHERN IRELAND  
1. The following is an unattributable line to take  
in response to questions about the Security Coordinator's  
background.

Q. Was he not formerly head of M16/SIS/the Secret Service?

A. As you know we <sup>do not</sup> cannot comment on such matters. But I  
think Sir Maurice's former position is fairly well

/known

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known; he is a distinguished former public servant and has been picked for his personal qualities and extensive experience.

---

Q. Does this mean that the Intelligence Service is being given a greater role in Northern Ireland?

A. No. The Government's aim continues to be the extension of normal policing (by the RUC) throughout Northern Ireland. The army are in support of the RUC. The Security Coordinator's particular responsibility will be to improve police/army coordination.

Q. Is there not a serious shortage of intelligence on PIRA? Does this appointment mean that a greater emphasis is being placed on intelligence?

A. The Security Forces naturally depend heavily on intelligence dealing with terrorism. The more they have the better. But this is not the reason for the appointment.

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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Department .....

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(Block Capitals) .....

Tel. Extn. ....

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

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Security Classification	
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Precedence	
IMMEDIATE	
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COMMS. DEPT.  
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Despatched

(Date).....

(Time).....Z

POSTBY .....Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin).....Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix) .....

(Security Class.) **CONFIDENTIAL**

(Caveat) .....

Privacy Marking) .....

(Codeword).....

(Deskby).....Z

TO **IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON** ..... Tel. No. .... of .....  
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) **IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (FOR BULLARD)**

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) **IMMEDIATE DUBLIN**

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

MY TELS NO **A-D** TO DUBLIN: SECURITY COORDINATOR, NORTHERN IRELAND

1. Liaising as necessary with Bullard, please convey to Vance (but not before on ) the text of the press announcement in my tel no to Dublin, drawing as appropriate on the accompanying background guidance. Please tell him that I would have wished to inform him myself had my own travel arrangements made this possible.

Copies to:-

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4



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Deputy Under Secretary

25 September 1979

C.A. Whitmore, Esq.,  
Prime Minister's Office,  
10 Downing Street.

834 - 3721

*Dear Clive,*

SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR

I enclose a copy of a draft Press Announcement and of supplementary Press Guidance which would be issued by the Northern Ireland Office about the appointment of the Security Co-ordinator as soon as possible after his acceptance of the task.

These two drafts have been prepared in close consultation with the Ministry of Defence and each has the approval and support of the respective Secretaries of State, Permanent Under Secretaries and, in the case of the Ministry of Defence, the CGS. Taken together with the memorandum agreed between Mr Atkins and Mr Pym which was annexed to their Cabinet Paper (C(79)34) they constitute the definitive prescription for the Security Co-ordinator and his joint staff.

There has also been an exchange of views between myself and Sir Frank Cooper, in connection with the preparation of the Press handouts, about how the Security Co-ordinator and his team will work in practice and our agreed conclusions on certain important points are set out in the attached copy letter to me from Frank Cooper of 24 September.

If, as we profoundly hope, we shall have a Security Co-ordinator by this evening, the way is now clear, subject to the Prime Minister's approval, for the announcement to be made during the course of Wednesday morning. Contingent

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**SECRET**

preparations have been made to ensure that the Chief Constable and GOC in Northern Ireland, the Opposition and Dublin are each informed in appropriate terms before the announcement.

*Bryanor John*

I am copying this letter to Sir Frank Cooper, Sir Ian Bancroft and Sir John Hunt.

*Your man.  
Ken Stowe.*

K.R. STOWE

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

24 September 1979

DRAFT PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, with the approval of the Prime Minister, has appointed ----- as Security Co-ordinator. The appointment will take effect from [            ].

2. ----- will assist the Secretary of State in improving the co-ordination and effectiveness of the security effort in Northern Ireland. He will be based in Northern Ireland and be supported by a joint staff drawn from the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the Army and the Civil Service which will be operational 24 hours a day.

[Personal Background]

**SECRET**

SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR : DRAFT PRESS GUIDANCE

1. The Security Co-ordinator in the Northern Ireland Office was today appointed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, with the approval of the Prime Minister, with effect from [ ] [ ].
  
2. The bravery and increasing effectiveness of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the courage and professionalism of the Army have together made great progress in dealing with terrorism in Northern Ireland. The Government is determined to give them the maximum possible support in their efforts, with no limitations on the resources needed. The relevant defence and "law and order" public expenditure programmes have been exempted from the Government's <sup>measures to stabilise</sup> public expenditure [cuts]; and it was announced only on [date] that a further increase of 1,000 men had been authorised for the Royal Ulster Constabulary.
  
3. The Government's response to the problem of terrorism is to maintain and increase the pressure by the security forces on the terrorists so as to bring them to justice. There is no doubt that this response has the total support of the vast majority of people in Northern Ireland irrespective of their religious and sectarian differences.



**SECRET**

4. The measures adopted by the Government and the security forces in the war against terrorism are continually evolving to secure greater effectiveness. Recent events have underlined the need for sustained initiatives, including the current discussions with the Government of the Republic who have to deal with the same threat. This new appointment of a Security Co-ordinator in the Province is a further measure in the Government's attack on terrorism.

5. The object in appointing the Security Co-ordinator is to assist the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in improving the co-ordination and effectiveness of the security effort in accordance with the Government's security objectives.

6. Security policy, political and constitutional development and economic and social policy interact on each other in Northern Ireland and need to be carefully linked together in HMG's total Northern Ireland policy so that each is pursued consistently with the others. The aim of the Government's security policy continues to be to eliminate terrorism and to extend normal policing throughout Northern Ireland. This policy will continue to be implemented through the application of the normal machinery of law and order in Northern Ireland. The Army will continue to operate in support of the police.

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The Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Army will remain under the command of the Chief Constable and the General Officer Commanding respectively.

7. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, supported by Mr Alison as his immediate deputy and by his other Ministers, is personally responsible for all aspects of HMG's policy for Northern Ireland. The Security Co-ordinator will be a full member of the Secretary of State's staff and will contribute to the determined pursuit of all aspects of that policy. His first priorities will be to set up the new joint staff on a 24 hour operational basis and to review all current security measures.

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2119 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)


PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE

SIR FRANK COOPER GCB CMG

PUS/79/870  
30/2

24 September 1979

K R Stowe Esq CB  
Northern Ireland Office  
Great George Street



*Dear Sir,*

SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR

I should like to put it firmly on record that we are in no doubt that the Security Co-ordinator would act on behalf of the SSNI, that he is accountable to SSNI, and that he would have no powers of Command.

Equally, we would expect him to speak and act with the authority of SSNI, that it would be publicly known that he had the central role under SSNI in the Security field, that he had authority to call meetings (where necessary involving the Chief Constable and/or the GOC and relevant agencies) and to call for information and plans in all areas affecting security - including in particular intelligence and the forward plans of the Security Forces. He would be entitled to visit the Security Forces as he thought appropriate. He will concern himself with the security aspects of public relations which will have an important part to play in the Co-ordinator's field of activity.

We also attach great importance to his having powers of initiative and to his being required to examine security policy targets and priorities. We regard it as of primary importance that he should concentrate on security matters and not on issues which should be dealt with by the normal administrative arrangements. The joint staff of the Security Co-ordinator will be responsible to him and the level of the most senior members of that staff should be 1-star.

We recognise that security relations with the Republic of Ireland are at present under review. We believe that the Security Co-ordinator should take the lead, in conjunction with those concerned, in advising SSNI on the improvements needed and that the way should be left open for him to play a direct and personal part in securing any such improvements.

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Finally, subject to the points made above, we agreed the draft press announcement as at present drafted and stressed the need for it to be adhered to firmly in London and Northern Ireland by all concerned.

*Yours wv.*

*Frank Cooper*

FRANK COOPER

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SECRET



# Northern Ireland Office

Great George Street, London, SW1P 3AJ

Telephone: Direct Dialling 01-233.....8857

Exchange 01-233 3000

---

Mr Whitmore

*With Compliments*

K.R. STOWE

R.

*M. Whitmore  
No 10.*

*2*

~~SECRET~~

24 September 1979

DRAFT PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, with the approval of the Prime Minister, has appointed ----- as Security Co-ordinator. The appointment will take effect from [ ] [ ].

2. ----- will assist the Secretary of State in improving the co-ordination and effectiveness of the security effort in Northern Ireland. He will [operate *be based* from and reside] in Northern Ireland and be supported by a joint staff drawn from the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the Army and the Civil Service which will be operational 24 hours a day.

[Personal Background]

DUS/SC/1

~~SECRET~~

R. SECRET

SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR : DRAFT PRESS GUIDANCE

1. The Security Co-ordinator in the Northern Ireland Office was today appointed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, with the approval of the Prime Minister, with effect from [ ] [ ].

2. The bravery and increasing effectiveness of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the courage and professionalism of the Army have together made great progress in dealing with terrorism [and crime] in Northern Ireland. The Government is determined to give them the maximum possible support in their efforts, with no limitations on the resources needed. The relevant defence and "law and order" public expenditure programmes have been exempted from the Government's public expenditure cuts; and it was announced only on [date] that a further increase of 1,000 men had been authorised for the Royal Ulster Constabulary.

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R. SECRET

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SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

24 September 1979

Dear Sir John,

I have seen your letter of 21 September to Clive Whitmore.

I know that the request which I put to you on Thursday evening was a very difficult one and I understand your reasons for declining it.

I am grateful to you for coming to see me so promptly and for giving such careful thought to my proposal. Kind regards.

Yours sincerely,

(SGD) MT

Sir John Killick, KCMG.

Prime Minister.

PENNYCROSS  
17 PARK ROAD  
LIMPSFIELD  
SURREY RH8 0AN  
OXFORD ~~OX10 3DC~~ 640L

As expected.

JWH

24 ix.

21 September  
1979.

Dear Clive,

Perhaps I should have followed my immediate instinct in my talk with the Prime Minister yesterday and reacted more negatively. For, having thought over very carefully what she proposed, I have to say 'No'. However, I feel I must make a reasoned reply to such an important proposition.

As I expected, my wife's reaction was firmly opposed. This is not the sole factor for me, but is obviously of the highest importance. Not least because she is rather older than I; I have dragged her round the world to some extremely unpleasant places for 30 years; and she has pinned so much on the prospect of living in her own country again.

Then there is the practical fact that I am committed in so many ways to moving to South Africa at the end of next month that it would now be impossibly difficult to put things into reverse. I have sold this house - with possession on 1 November; I have arranged a mass of documentation which only remains valid for a limited period; I have put financial transfers in hand; I have a commitment to join Dunlop South Africa which virtually amounts to a contract and which might well not be flexible. All this, again, might not be the decisive factor on its own.

It is above all on the nature of the task - and my fitness for it - that I have reflected. I am sure I shall not be suspected of being scared of

the personal threat involved; though that is a real consideration for my wife. The prospect that the assignment might last only six months is not much consolation for her given the risk that I might not survive it!

It really is a question of substance. The need is very clear, and was cogently put to me in all respects by the Prime Minister. I myself made the analogy with the kind of thing we had to do in Malaya under Sir Robert Thompson. The very real difficulty I see is that I have no experience whatever of either Ireland or Malayan-type counter-insurgency. I accept what the Prime Minister said about the impact of personality and ability to inject a sense of purpose. But I have the greatest doubt whether that alone would suffice to do the trick in a situation in which the two parties who would have to work with me would be liable to regard me as seriously inadequate on either or both the other counts. I would be totally dependent on them for the facts, let alone advice, and while I might succeed in establishing the former to my satisfaction, and forming valid judgements on the latter, ~~and~~ I am extremely sceptical of my ability to do so, and consequently to deliver any effective results, within the sort of timescale the Prime Minister has in mind.

There is the further problem that I might be seriously misled, or that there could be wide and irreconcilable differences in approach between the other two parties. In a colonial-type situation such as existed in Malaya, it was presumably both

X So, I suspect, would the media!

politically and legally possible to cut Gordian knots in fairly arbitrary fashion; but on my limited knowledge of the Irish situation it seems both actually and potentially far less clear-cut. For example, if it appeared desirable to go to something of a 'martial law' situation, would this not scupper the prospect of the kind of cooperation we so badly need from the authorities in the Republic, and would we not run into unmanageable political problems, both domestically and in the European and other human rights fields? Not to mention the Americans.

I realise that it is not really for me to make an assessment of these complications - which underlines my point about my incompetence in Irish affairs - but although I have never been conspicuously reluctant in the past to 'have a go', I have to form a view not only of my own limitations, but also of the 'doability' of what I am asked to 'have a go' at. So, all in all, and without neglecting what I do not regard it as old-fashioned to refer to as the 'call of duty', I arrive at the conclusion that, if the task is 'doable' at all, it is not 'doable' by me. And it must surely be a matter of supreme importance to the Prime Minister to have somebody with demonstrable confidence.

I realise that she will inevitably be disappointed by this response from somebody in whom she has shown such striking confidence herself. I am deeply conscious of that, and the more sorry that I should have to come to this conclusion. I would only add that I have reached it on my own, and without seeking, or being offered, advice from anybody else.

Yours ever,  
John Hinch  
(J.E. KILLICK)

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APPOINTMENTS - IN CONFIDENCE

Northern Ireland Office  
Great George Street,  
London SW1P 3AJ



Permanent Under Secretary of State  
Sir Brian Cubbon KCB

19 September 1979

PUS/488/L

Sir Frank Cooper GCB CMG  
Permanent Under Secretary of State  
Ministry of Defence  
Main Building  
Whitehall  
London SW1

*Dear Sir Frank,*

As you have sent to John Hunt and Michael Palliser a copy of the job description for the Ministry of Defence version of a Co-ordinator of Security in Northern Ireland, I am sending them with this letter a copy of the note giving the Northern Ireland Office version (which is basically the one I left with you and CGS on Monday morning).

Your job description has confirmed me in my view that the concentration on the search for "a name" has masked a deeper difference of view about the scope of the new central security arrangements in Belfast. Your document, by giving the Co-ordinator powers of direction, takes us way beyond anything we had envisaged in the original papers about a Security Directorate.

It may provide a helpful background to this evening's meeting between Mr Atkins and Mr Pym if I summarise the options as we see them.

Option 1.: greater SoSNI involvement supported by a strong official beavering away on operational matters.  
No extra powers and no change in policy.

This is the existing NIO proposal, as set out in the attached note.

Possible candidates for the new post:

Alan Donald  
(presently Ambassador in Kinshasa)

*Passage deleted and retained under  
Section 3(4).*

*CA Wayland*

*2 October 2012*

1.

/Option 2.

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APPOINTMENTS - IN CONFIDENCE

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## APPOINTMENTS - IN CONFIDENCE

Option 2. : a Co-ordinator directly responsible to SoSNI, to be deputy chairman of the Security Policy Meeting and to have some powers of direction and a roving role over security and related matters.

This is the MOD job description.

We see these disadvantages:-

- i. Whatever the Chief Constable or the GOC said when consulted, the Co-ordinator could in the end give them directions. This "Director of Operations" role would be unacceptable to the Chief Constable on legal and policy grounds. The new role would be wholly counter-productive with the Royal Ulster Constabulary who would see it as a reversion to earlier arrangements long since discarded. (And would the GOC accept directions where he thought that they were militarily unsound, without his present right of appeal to the Chiefs of Staff?)
- ii. Even if the Co-ordinator had no powers of direction, the grand roving and inevitably interventionist role which is envisaged is more for a Minister answerable to Parliament. Security in Northern Ireland is not just a professional matter. The handling of incidents is highly political. Take the recent incidents which have caused operational disagreement (the PSF internment parade on 9 August, Carrickmore on Easter Monday, Dunloy etc) : a Minister would have to be directly involved if someone was interfering operationally on his behalf. Also the RUC would accept a "prompting and cajoling" manner from a Minister more easily than from a "British" official.
- iii. From a publicity point of view, the appointment could have a 24 hour impact, but thereafter the Co-ordinator would be very exposed personally within Northern Ireland.

Your candidates for the post are:-

Wright  
(Ambassador in Bonn)

Moran  
(Ambassador in Lisbon)

/Duff

/Killick

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APPOINTMENTS - IN CONFIDENCE

Option 3. : if Ministers find Options 1 and 2 unsatisfactory and still want some new special arrangements, they may wish to consider the appointment of a Peer as a resident Minister of State in Northern Ireland dealing only with security matters. He would combine, under SoSNI, the gingering role envisaged for SoSNI in Option 1, together with getting about and working with the security forces and being seen to give some leadership. He would still need extra support from within the NIO organisation, but we agreed on the telephone that the Police and Army members of the new security unit (alias Directorate) within the NIO might be of Colonel and Chief Superintendent rank in view of the extra input at Ministerial level.

Such an appointment would avoid the disadvantages of Option 2 and could certainly add to a feeling of cohesion, momentum and leadership in the security effort. The disadvantage is the duplication with the SoSNI who would still be in charge of security and need to be seen to be in charge, in Cabinet, Parliament and Northern Ireland. The SoSNI would still chair the Security Policy Meeting for example. Present experience suggests that if the Police or the Army disliked the view taken by the Minister of State, the issue would quickly escalate at least to the Secretary of State himself. This duplication of role would contain the seeds of embarrassment if we were not very careful.

I am sending copies of this letter to Sir John Hunt and Sir Michael Palliser.

*Yours sincerely,  
N. C. Sanderson.*

Dictated by Sir Brian Cubbon and signed in his absence

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7/13  
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6/ 18 SEP 1979  
Dusk by 4:15



MUFAXED

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2119 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 8000 (Switchboard)

PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE

RCM/79/1382  
30/2

PUS/ 486  
17 SEP 1979  
N.I.O. LONDON

Mufax: to Puss's office  
Bel fast  
fr: Puss's office (L)

17 September 1979

cc Mr. Mayne

N Sanderson Esq  
Private Secretary to  
Sir Brian Cubbon KCB  
Northern Ireland Office  
Great George Street  
London SW1

Dear Nick,

At the meeting this morning, Sir Brian Cubbon put forward a suggested approach to the work of the co-ordinator of Security Operations. Sir Frank thought Sir Brian might find of interest the attached draft job description which we had worked up here.

V  
R C MOTTRAM  
R C MOTTRAM  
Private Secretary

NORTHERN IRELAND  
CO-ORDINATOR OF SECURITY OPERATIONS  
JOB DESCRIPTION

1. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (SSNI) remains fully responsible for HMG's overall policy for Northern Ireland.
2. The Co-ordinator of Security Operations (CSO) would be a public servant of seniority, experience and standing, would be resident in Northern Ireland, and would be directly responsible to SSNI for:-
  - a. advising and assisting SSNI in the formulation of security policy objectives;
  - b. on behalf of SSNI, giving guidance and, as appropriate, direction to the Security Forces (SF);
  - c. on behalf of SSNI, identifying and co-ordinating those activities of departments and agencies in Northern Ireland required to support the total security effort.
3. The CSO would be a member, and vice-chairman, of the Security Policy Committee (SPC) which is chaired by SSNI.
4. The CSO would not command any elements of SF, which would remain under the command of the Chief Constable (CC) and the General Officer Commanding (GOC) respectively. Nevertheless, after consultation with them, the CSO would be empowered, on behalf of SSNI, to give directions to ensure the proper co-ordination of pla

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and operations to give effect to the agreed security policy. However, the CC would not be accountable to either SSNI or CSO on matters of law or its interpretation.

5. To assist him in the discharge of these responsibilities and tasks the CSO would have a small joint staff drawn from the Northern Ireland Office (NIO), the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the Army. His principal staff officers would be an Assistant Secretary, an Assistant Chief Constable, and a Brigadier.

6. The Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence (DCI) would advise the CSO on intelligence matters and be responsible through him to SSNI for the direction and co-ordination of all intelligence activities concerning security.

7. The Under Secretary (Information and Political Affairs) would advise the CSO on the public relations handling of security operations, and would ensure that information activities are consistent with security policy and responsive to security considerations.

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## OUTLINE OF ADDITIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND

The Secretary of State will involve himself more in security matters and spend significantly more time in Northern Ireland. His object will produce greater cohesion and momentum in the security effort and to demonstrate the Government's concern and involvement. There is a particular need for an operational plan for the border areas (3 brigade).

2. The Secretary of State will operate by prompting and gingering the Chief Constable and GOC through SPM, visits and other close contacts. He will have no extra powers. MOD will give the necessary general instruction to the GOC to operate the new arrangements.

3. The Northern Ireland Office will be strengthened by an extra pair of hands at senior /DUS7 level, who will enjoy the Secretary of State's confidence and act with his authority -

- a. visiting and acquiring a detailed, personal operational knowledge;
- b. directing a central planning unit;
- c. handling particular crises of a sort which require the Secretary of State's personal attention;
- d. playing a leading role at SPM, proposing policies, initiatives etc.;
- e. for these purposes, maintaining a 24 hour a day capability;

1.

/f...

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- f. generally cajoling the RUC and the Army in order to secure implementation of the Secretary of State's security policy;
4. He will be called the Security Co-ordinator. He will not be a Director of Operations, in <sup>the</sup> name, powers, style or appearance. The RUC will continue to be in/lead in operational matters, tasking the Army to operate in support. The Government's security policy will continue unchanged.
5. The specification for the Co-ordinator is therefore:-
- i. a strong personality, able to operate by persuasion and in a style appropriate to dealing with both police officers and soldiers;
  - ii. having planning and operational experience and ingenuity;
  - iii. but not a "commander";
  - iv. and not a public figure.

10 DOWNING STREET

Dear Clive.

My intelligence is that the Pyne / Atkins meeting was fairly inconclusive (Pyne later described the situation as a heuristic one) : but that 1567 were both disposed to accept Marland if the Prime Minister did not want to appoint a Minister. In the meantime the FCO are busily collecting arguments as to why Marland is not suitable.

Curiously enough I find that Frank Cooper would himself still rate Bill Pile very highly for this job (a good manager, ex-Director of Prisons, helped Thatcher on his resignation etc). But I take it he is completely unquoted with the P.M. ?

Tom

Tom

18.9.79

Personal.

R. Whitmore

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



Northern Ireland Office  
Great George Street,  
London SW1P 3AJ

Permanent Under Secretary of State  
Sir Brian Cubbon KCB

Personal

18. 9. 79

Dear Clive,

I could not reach you  
this evening, and I shall  
be out of the office tomorrow  
morning. I wanted to let  
you know that Mr. Atkins is  
quite clear that an  
'ambassadorial supreme' would be



completely wrong. But he  
would, I think, now accept

a resident peer as M. Z. S.

(cf. Strattona of MR.). (There  
would be some consequential  
adjustment to the Security Directorate  
agreed by Cab: F. Cooper accepts  
this.)

He is having a preliminary  
word with F. Lyon but fears that  
F. L. will not dare to depart from  
the "Killick" solution, though F. Cooper &  
Cab now prefer a resident Mrs S.

I can speak further tomorrow  
afternoon. Yrs. Brian

