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PREM 19/824

PART 2

Confidential Filing

Internal Situation

Israeli / Lebanese hostilities

UK / Lebanese relations.

LEBANON

Part 1: July 1979

Part 2: Nov 1987

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
17/11/87							
7-12-87							
6-2-82							
17-2-82							
11.6.82							
8.7.82							
ends							
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PART 2 ends:-

Beirut tel 399 10.7.82

PART 3 begins:-

Fco to AJC 12-7-82

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FM DAMASCUS 100845Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 192 OF 10 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, JEDDA.

INFO ROUTINE CAIRO, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS.

MY TELNO 191 OF 8 JULY (NOT TO ALL)

LEBANON.

1. IN ANSWER TO AN INSPIRED QUESTION A SYRIAN OFFICIAL
SPOKESMAN DECLARED ON 10 JULY THAT NO REQUEST FOR THE TRANSFER
OF PALESTINIAN COMBATTANTS FROM BEIRUT TO SYRIA HAD BEEN
RECEIVED FROM THE PLO. SYRIAS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT
DISCUSSIONS IN PROGRESS WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT
CONCERNED THE PLOS HQ AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY,
NOT COMBATTANTS. IN NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES SYRIA WAS THE

HOMELAND OF THE PALESTINIANS AND INDEED OF THE ARABS AS A WHOLE BUT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THERE WAS NO SCOPE FOR THE TRANSFER OF PALESTINIAN COMBATTANTS FROM BEIRUT TO SYRIA SINCE THE NATURAL PLACE FOR THEM TO AWAIT THE RESTORATION OF THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS WAS WHERE THEY NOW ARE.

2. THIS FAIRLY UNEQUIVOCAL DISAVOWAL OF WHAT WAS SAID TO HAVE BEEN AGREED IN TAIF IS NOT SURPRISING. IT COULD, HOWEVER, PRESUMABLY BE OVERTAKEN IF THE PLO, RATHER THAN THE SAUDIS OR THE AMERICANS (REGARDED AS SIMPLY ANOTHER NAME FOR THE ISRAELIS) WERE TO MAKE THE REQUEST. (AS DRAPER MAY ALREADY BE DOING).

3. SUCH A REQUEST WOULD PROBABLY COVER THE COMBATTANTS IN BEIRUT. BUT EVEN IF THE SYRIANS WERE TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS, I WOULD EXPECT THEM TO REFUSE TO BUDGE ON THE REMOVAL OF THE PALESTINIAN UNITS IN THE BEQAA. THESE ARE ESTIMATED TO BE ABOUT 3500 STRONG, BUT COULD BE MORE AND STILL HAVE SOME HEAVY WEAPONS INCLUDING TANKS. (MY DA HAS REPORTED TO MOD). THIS PRESENCE COULD PROVIDE A PRETEXT FOR THE ISRAELIS TO ATTACK SYRIAN FORCES IN EASTERN LEBANON.

4. FCO PLEASE PASS FURTHER AS NECESSARY.

LUCAS

NNNN

Lebanon

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FM BEIRUT 101205Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 399 OF 10 JULY

AND TO DAMASCUS UKMIS NEW YORK TEL AVIV CAIRO AMMAN WASHINGTON
MODUK.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 392: LEBANON.

1. HABIB TOLD ME TODAY (10 JULY) THAT WAZZAN CLAIMED TO HAVE REDUCED THE PROBLEM TO WHETHER MULTINATIONAL FORCES SHOULD COME IN BEFORE PLO START TO MOVE OR HALFWAY THROUGH. HABIB WAS ADAMANT ON LATTER.
2. MEANWHILE HOWEVER IT LOOKED AS IF SYRIA MIGHT HAVE GONE BACK ON THEIR AGREEMENT TO ACCEPT THE PALESTINIANS. DRAPER WAS IN DAMASCUS TO ELUCIDATE.
3. THE FRENCH, MOREOVER, WERE ASKED FOR CONDITIONS FOR THEIR PARTICIPATION WHICH AMERICA COULD NOT ACCEPT. THE AMERICANS

3. THE FRENCH, MOREOVER, WERE ASKED FOR CONDITIONS FOR THEIR PARTICIPATION WHICH AMERICA COULD NOT ACCEPT. THE AMERICANS WOULD NEVER GO IT ALONE: AND HABIB INDICATED THAT THEY MIGHT ASK OTHERS TO HELP. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT AS IT MIGHT ARISE SUDDENLY, ALTHOUGH I HAVE OF COURSE NOTED YOUR TELEGRAM 243 OF 25 JUNE.

4. THERE IS AT THIS MOMENT NO ISRAELI DEADLINE.

5. FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL ADDRESSEES.

ROBERTS

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SUBJECT



Sub
a master

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 July 1982

Arab League Delegation

A delegation from the Arab League called on the Prime Minister at 3.15 p.m. this afternoon. It consisted of the Foreign Ministers of Bahrain and Tunis, the London representative of the Arab League and an Arab League official (Mr. Nasif Hitti) from Tunis. Sir John Leahy was also present.

The Prime Minister directed that no record should be taken of the meeting which lasted for 40 minutes.

A. J. COLES

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 July, 1982

Dear John,

Arab League Delegation

The delegation calling on the Prime Minister at 3.15 this afternoon will consist of Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak, Foreign Minister of Bahrain; M. Caid Essesbi, Foreign Minister of Tunis; Mr Omar al Hassan, London Representative of the Arab League; and Mr Nasif Hitti, Arab League Official (and interpreter) from Tunis. Sir John Leahy will attend from the FCO.

/ M. Essesbi was to have been part of the delegation which called
/ on Mr Hurd yesterday evening, but the Paris airline strike delayed
him. The others all attended that meeting, which lasted for an
hour. I enclose both the telegram summarising the discussion and
the full record. It was a friendly and courteous exchange, mostly
playing on well worn themes, but bringing out the extreme concern
on the Arab side that an evacuation of the PLO from Beirut, which
they accepted must happen, should be carried out through a dignified
international mechanism, preferably with a UN framework. The
delegation appealed strongly for active UK support for the setting
up of such a mechanism. Mr Hurd said he would bring their views
to the attention of the Prime Minister and Secretary of State and
they would be given due weight.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr G. S. H.
W 9/7

INTERVIEW BY MR HURD ON WORLD AT ONE, FRIDAY 9 JULY 1982

Question: What did Mr Qaddumi have to say to you?

Mr Hurd: Well, he came to see me with the Foreign Minister of Bahrain. They were both part of an Arab League delegation. They were very anxious that we in Britain should understand how desperately worried the Arabs were about what's going on in the Lebanon and that Britain, as one of the Permanent Members of the Security Council, would be active in trying to sort it out. They didn't want it left entirely to the Americans to do the negotiating.

Question: Do you think there is a part for Britain to play?

Mr Hurd: I don't think there's a direct part. I don't think we should get involved in the negotiations actually in Beirut. I think that would be too many cooks stirring the broth, but of course we are in close touch with all those concerned, including the Americans, and we do put in our ideas and we are trying to help on the humanitarian side.

Question: What is your view of the American plan, or at least the suggestions which have been put forward by Mr Philip Habib?

Answer: Well, I think it must be right to support what he's trying to do. He's in a very difficult position with all kinds of people who have to reach agreement before anything can be done and I think what he's trying to do is to persuade the Israelis not to attack West Beirut, not to kill a lot more people, on the basis of the PLO having a dignified way out of Beirut and out of their present predicament and he's also trying to build up an effective Lebanese Government which can actually rule the country. In all those things we support him.

Question: What did you make of Mr Brezhnev's stance in all this? Yesterday he was saying for example that while it was up to the Americans to sort things out, Mr Brezhnev was saying that he didn't want American troops on Lebanese soil?

Mr Hurd: I think that's a matter of routine myself. The

Russians have been very prudent in this. They haven't appeared to be stirring things up. I think they want to give a warning to the Americans not to take that too much for granted but I think so long as it's clear that the American involvement is designed only to sort out the immediate crisis in Beirut I think the Russians will understand that.

Question: If the force is to be a multinational one, which is what seems to be on the cards at the moment, would Britain make a contribution towards that force?

Mr Hurd: We haven't been asked to do so and I think it would be very difficult for us to do so. Of course we've still got forces in the Falklands, forces coming back from the Falklands, we've got our NATO commitments. I think it would be hard for us to contribute and we haven't actually been asked to do so. As far as I know, the idea at the moment is that it should be Americans and French.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 092308Z JULY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1110 OF 9 JULY.

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV CAIRO WASHINGTON PARIS DAMASCUS
PRIORITY JEDDA AMMAN AND TUNIS.

WASHINGTON TEL NO 2377: LEBANON.

1. MRS KIRKPATRICK BRIEFED URQUHART TODAY (9 JULY) IN GENERAL TERMS, ABOUT THE PRESENT STATE OF HABIB'S NEGOTIATIONS. SHE MENTIONED IN PARTICULAR THE PROBLEMS THE AMERICANS WERE HAVING WITH THE FRENCH OVER THE LATTER'S WISH TO OBTAIN UN "ACQUIESCENCE" IN DEPLOYMENT OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE. SHE CONFIRMED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT PREPARED TO COURT THE RISK OF A SOVIET VETO AND HAD FIRMLY TOLD THE FRENCH SO. HOWEVER, SHE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IF AN AGREEMENT WAS ACHIEVED, THE AMERICANS AND THE FRENCH WOULD ASK THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO STATION UN MILITARY OBSERVERS IN BEIRUT TO SUPERVISE THE DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES. SHE SEEMED TO THINK THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD BE ABLE TO COMPLY WITH SUCH A REQUEST WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. URQUHART TOLD HER THAT THAT WAS NOT THE CASE: ANY DEPLOYMENT OF UNTSO OBSERVERS TO NEW LOCATIONS REQUIRED THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO CLEAR HIS LINES WITH THE COUNCIL.

2. URQUHART WENT ON TO SAY (I AM SURE RIGHTLY) THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BLOCK SUCH A REQUEST. THEY WOULD TAKE THE

2. URQUHART WENT ON TO SAY (I AM SURE RIGHTLY) THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BLOCK SUCH A REQUEST. THEY WOULD TAKE THE LINE THAT EITHER THE FORCE MUST BE A MULTINATIONAL ONE OUTSIDE THE UN (AS IN SINAI) OR IT MUST BE A UN FORCE: SOME FORM OF HYBRID WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE. URQUHART ADVISED MRS KIRKPATRICK THAT IF THE AMERICANS WISHED TO PURSUE THE IDEA OF UN OBSERVERS, THEIR ONLY CHANCE OF SUCCESS, AND THAT WAS NOT GUARANTEED, WOULD BE TO GET THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO MAKE THE REQUEST WITHOUT RELATING IT EXPLICITLY TO THE US/FRENCH MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 407 OF 9/7
INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON
ROUTINE BEIRUT, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK

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LEBANON: MOSCOW TEL 392. BREZHNEV'S MESSAGE TO REAGAN.

1. THE US EMBASSY HERE BRIEFED US TODAY ON THE BACKGROUND TO BREZHNEV'S MESSAGE AS FOLLOWS. IT WAS DELIVERED BY DOBRYNIN TO STOESSEL ON 7 JULY. THE FORMER SHOWED A STRIKING IGNORANCE OF THE STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS. THOUGH THE THRUST OF THE ACTUAL MESSAGE WAS THE SAME AS THE TASS SUMMARY (TUR), THERE WERE "SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES." THE EMBASSY WERE UNWILLING TO GO INTO DETAIL BUT CONFIRMED THAT THE TASS PHRASE THAT IF US TROOPS ENTERED LEBANON THE SOVIET UNION WOULD "BUILD ITS POLICY WITH DUE CONSIDERATION OF THIS FACT" APPEARED IN THE ORIGINAL. THE MESSAGE WAS TYPICALLY SHARP IN TONE, BLAMING THE UNITED STATES FOR FAILING TO CONDEMN ISRAEL AND EXPRESSING SUSPICION OF HABIB'S ACTIVITIES. BUT IT WAS ESSENTIALLY A CONTINUATION OF THE EARLIER BREZHNEV MESSAGES, AND SOUGHT TO MAKE THE MAXIMUM IMPACT WITHOUT INVOLVING THE SOVIET UNION OR CLOSING ITS OPTIONS. THE AMERICANS WERE NOT

... AND GO ON TO MAKE THE MAXIMUM IMPACT WITHOUT INVOLVING THE SOVIET UNION OR CLOSING ITS OPTIONS. THE AMERICANS WERE NOT INCLINED TO TAKE THE MESSAGE ANY MORE SERIOUSLY THAN THE EARLIER ONES. AS TASS PUBLISHED ITS SUMMARY EARLY ON 8 JULY, THE EMBASSY ASSUMED PUBLICATION HAD BEEN INTENDED FROM THE START.

COMMENT.

2. EVEN PARTIAL PUBLICATION OF THE MESSAGE, AS THIS APPEARS TO BE, SUGGESTS THE RUSSIANS HAVE LITTLE REAL HOPE OF INFLUENCING US INTENTIONS. INSTEAD, THE MESSAGE PROBABLY HAD THREE IMMEDIATE

PURPOSES:

A. TO FURNISH A BASIS FOR FUTURE HOSTILE PROPAGANDA;
B. TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE ARABS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS USING ITS POLITICAL WEIGHT AND TO SHOW MORE WIDELY THAT THE SOVIET UNION REMAINED AN ACTOR ON THE MIDDLE EAST STAGE (POSSIBLY PARTLY IN RESPONSE TO REPRESENTATIONS BY THE RECENTLY VISITING ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

C. TO STIFFEN THE PALESTINIANS.

3. MORE FUNDAMENTALLY, THE PROSPECT OF THE PALESTINIANS VOLUNTARILY DEPARTING FROM LEBANON UNDER US PROTECTION MUST BE DEEPLY GALLING BY THE RUSSIANS AND REAGAN'S OFFER WAS SOMETHING TO WHICH THEY HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO REACT. SOVIET PRESS COVERAGE SEEKS TO SUGGEST THAT THE PALESTINIANS UNUTTERLY REJECT THE OFFER AND ARGUES (PRAVDA 9 JULY) THAT THE PURPOSE OF US TROOPS WOULD BE TO PROVIDE COVER FOR ISRAELI EXTERMINATION OF THE DISARMED PALESTINIAN FORCES. (THE US EMBASSY HAVE COMMENTED THAT DESPITE EFFORTS IN WASHINGTON TO EXPLAIN US MOTIVES THE RUSSIANS SEEM GENUINELY TO MISTRUST

THEM.) IF REAGAN'S OFFER OF TROOPS WERE TAKEN UP, EVEN AS PART OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE, THIS WOULD STRIKINGLY UNDERLINE THE SOVIET UNION'S MARGINAL ROLE IN A CRISIS CLOSE TO ITS FRONTIERS, AND ITS STATUS, AT LEAST IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AS A SECOND CLASS SUPERPOWER.

BROOKE TURNER

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FM WASHINGTON 092255Z JUL 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2391 OF 9 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRIORITY CAIRO,
PARIS, MOSCOW, JEDDA, AMMAN, TUNIS.

LEBANON

1. EAGLEBURGER TOLD ME TODAY THAT BREZHNEV'S MESSAGE TO REAGAN (MOSCOW TELNO 382 - NOT TO ALL) WAS, LIKE THE THREE PREVIOUS SUCH MESSAGES ON LEBANON, IN VERY RESTRAINED TERMS. IN ADDITION TO THE POINTS IN THE TASS STATEMENT, BREZHNEV MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE RUSSIANS FAVOURED A U N PEACE-KEEPING FORCE WITHOUT U.S. PARTICIPATION AND NOT LINKED SPECIFICALLY TO PLO WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT VIEW SOVIET EMPHASIS ON U N INVOLVEMENT REPRESENTS QUOTE THEIR WAY BACK IN UNQUOTE.

2. SOVIET EXPERTS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT DO NOT ATTRIBUTE SOVIET RESTRAINT IN RELATION TO THE ISRAEL/LEBANON CRISIS TO BREZHNEV'S FAILING HEALTH AND QUOTE COMMITTEE MANAGEMENT UNQUOTE IN MOSCOW SO MUCH AS TO SOVIET CAUTION, THE EXTREME DIFFICULTY THEY ARE HAVING IN EXERCISING ANY EFFECTIVE INFLUENCE ON EVENTS, AND AN EXPECTATION ALSO THAT IN THE LONG RUN THE CRISIS WILL TURN TO

HAVING IN EXERCISING ANY EFFECTIVE INFLUENCE ON EVENTS; AND AN EXPECTATION ALSO THAT IN THE LONG RUN THE CRISIS WILL TURN TO THE POLITICAL BENEFIT OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE STATE DEPARTMENT BELIEVE THAT WHEN QADDUMI VISITED MOSCOW (MOSCOW TELNO 387) GROMYKO MADE CLEAR THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD RE-SUPPLY THE SYRIANS BUT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO DO MORE THAN THEY WERE DOING. IN PARTICULAR THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THE RUSSIANS SOUGHT TO DISABUSE THE SYRIANS (AND THE PLO) OF ANY EXPECTATION THAT THEY WOULD SEND SHIPS TO THE AREA.

3. THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT BREZHNEV'S MESSAGE WILL NOT AFFECT THE U.S. INTENTION TO PARTICIPATE IN A SHORT-TERM PEACE-KEEPING OPERATION IN WEST BEIRUT IF HABIB'S EFFORTS ARE SUCCESSFUL. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR CONFIRMED TO ME TODAY THAT THE FRENCH ARE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IF THERE IS A FORMAL REQUEST FROM THE LEBANESE AND THE OTHER PARTIES CONCERNED AGREE. THEY WOULD PREFER THE FORCE TO BE UNDER U N AUSPICES, BUT THIS IS NOT ESSENTIAL, PROVIDED THAT SOME FORM OF U N BLESSING COULD BE OBTAINED.

4. EAGLEBURGER COMMENTED THAT HABIB WAS NOW REASONABLY OPTIMISTIC. IN A SEPARATE BRIEFING OF WESTERN DIPLOMATS, CLUVERIOUS (STATE DEPARTMENT) SAID THAT THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF A PACKAGE DEAL WERE NOW BROADLY AGREED AND THAT THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE MODALITIES OF IMPLEMENTATION. HE ADMITTED IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS THAT AMONG THE ISSUES YET TO BE SETTLED WERE THE PLO'S RESIDUAL PRESENCE IN LEBANON, WHETHER THEY LEFT BY LAND OR SEA AND THE COMPOSITION OF TIMING OF DEPLOYMENT OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE FOR BEIRUT. HE COULD NOT CONFIRM THAT THE SYRIANS HAD AGREED TO SUCH A FORCE, THOUGH THE ISRAELIS EVIDENTLY HAVE.

5. MAIL TO THE ADMINISTRATION AND MEMBERS OF CONGRESS IS SAID TO BE RUNNING STRONGLY AGAINST ISRAEL. BUT EAGLEBURGER DOES NOT THINK THAT THIS WILL BE MORE THAN A PASSING CHANGE IN AMERICAN ATTITUDES; THE UNDERLYING SENTIMENT IN HIS VIEW IS STILL THAT THE ISRAELIS DESERVE SUPPORT. COMMENTING ON RECENT MEDIA COMMENTARIES TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD TAKE A STRONGER LINE WITH ISRAEL, FAIRBANKS TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE TODAY THAT RECENT MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT TO BEGIN HAD BEEN MUCH TOUGHER. FOR EXAMPLE, THE LATEST MESSAGE URGING THE ISRAELIS TO REOPEN THE GALERIE SEMANE CROSSING POINT IN BEIRUT HAD CLEARLY IMPLIED THAT IF WAZZAN WERE UNABLE TO MEET HABIB, THE AMERICANS WOULD BE OBLIGED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THE PLO DIRECTLY.

6. I ASKED EAGLEBURGER ABOUT LONGER TERM AMERICAN GOALS IN LEBANON. HE SAID THAT THEY WERE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN

6. I ASKED EAGLEBURGER ABOUT LONGER TERM AMERICAN GOALS IN LEBANON. HE SAID THAT THEY WERE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A REPRESENTATIVE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT EXCLUDING MAJOR HADDAD. HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THIS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ISRAELIS, (ALTHOUGH BEGIN INSISTED ON TREATING HADDAD AS AN ALLY) AND THAT THE SYRIANS COULD BE GOT OUT. HE NOTED THAT DESPITE THEIR PUBLIC PROTESTS THE ARABS HAD BEEN PRIVATELY CONSTRUCTIVE (HE WAS EVIDENTLY THINKING OF THE SAUDI ROLE IN PERSUADING ASAD TO ACCEPT PLO PERSONNEL FROM BEIRUT). HE ADDED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO PERSUADE QADHAFI TO ACCEPT SOME PLO PERSONNEL.

HENDERSON

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 July, 1982

Dear John,

Arab League Delegation

The delegation calling on the Prime Minister at 3.15 this afternoon will consist of Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak, Foreign Minister of Bahrain; M. Caid Essesbi, Foreign Minister of Tunis; Mr Omar al Hassan, London Representative of the Arab League; and Mr Nasif Hitti, Arab League Official (and interpreter) from Tunis. Sir John Leahy will attend from the FCO.

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international mechanism, preferably with a UN framework. The
delegation appealed strongly for active UK support for the setting
up of such a mechanism. Mr Hurd said he would bring their views
to the attention of the Prime Minister and Secretary of State and
they would be given due weight.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

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FM FCO 092052Z JULY 82

TO IMMEDIATE TUNIS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 55 OF 8 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 090700Z BAHRAIN, TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE AMMAN, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK PRIORITY OTHER ME POSTS, ROUTINE EC POSTS

MY TELGRAM NUMBER 220: VISIT BY ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

1. IN THEIR CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ARAB LEAGUE, THE BAHRAINI FOREIGN MINISTER, SHAIKH MOHAMMAD BIN MUBARAK, AND FAROUQ QADDUMI OF THE PLO CALLED ON MR HURD THIS EVENING. (THE TUNISIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WAS ABSENT, HAVING BEEN DELAYED IN PARIS). THEY WERE ACCOMPANIED BY THE PUS OF THE BAHRAINI FOREIGN MINISTRY AND ARAB LEAGUE REPRESENTATIVES FROM LONDON AND TUNIS. BOTH SIDES SET OUT AT LENGTH THEIR RESPECTIVE VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AND THEIR REQUIREMENTS FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE BROADER BROBLEM IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. THE ARAB SIDE EXPLAINED THAT THEY WERE SENDING DELEGATIONS TO ALL SECURITY COUNCIL PERMANENT MEMBERS TO ASK HOW SCRS 508 AND 509 COULD BE IMPLEMENTED. THE NEGOTIATIONS CONDUCTED BY HABIB HAD LOST THE CONFIDENCE OF THE ARAB PARTIES, IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO ESTABLISH A LEGITIMATE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH THE PLO COULD WITHDRAW IN A HUMAN AND DIGNIFIED MANNER. ISRAELI VIOLENCE COULD NOT BE SEEN TO PAY. IT WAS UP TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND PARTICULARLY ITS PERMANENT MEMBERS, TO WORK ACTIVELY FOR A CEASEFIRE AND DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES AND TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE TO SUPPLEMENT THE US PRESENCE. TIME WAS SHORT AND THE NEED FOR ACTION URGENT. THEY ASKED WHETHER ISRAEL WOULD EVER FACE THE FULL STRENGTH OF UN MEASURES.

3. MR HURD SAID THAT THE UK WAS ACTIVELY CONTRIBUTING TO THE SEARCH

A SOLUTION. OUR POSITION WAS BASED FIRMLY ON THE PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED BY THE TEN. WE SUPPORTED HABIB'S EFFORTS TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE RESOLUTIONS: THERE WAS NO REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE TO US INVOLVEMENT. WE WOULD WORK WITH OTHERS TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES SET OUT BY THE TEN, AND WOULD GIVE DUE WEIGHT TO THE VIEWS OF ARAB LEAGUE MEMBERS, WITH WHOM WE WANTED GOOD RELATIONS. HE MADE CLEAR OUR ATTITUDE TO THE POLICIES OF THE PLO: VIOLENCE HAD BEEN A HANDICAP TO THEIR CAUSE. BUT WE BELIEVED THEY SHOULD BE ASSOCIATED WITH NEGOTIATIONS. WE DID NOT CONSIDER UN SANCTIONS THE RIGHT COURSE WITHOUT UNANIMITY OF PERMANENT MEMBERS. IT WAS BETTER TO SEEK STEP BY STEP IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTIONS.

4. ALL POSTS MAY DRAW ON THE ABOVE IN DISCUSSING THE MEETING WITH CONTACTS AND MAY TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN RAISING IT AT THEIR DISCRETION FOR YOUR INFORMATION ADDITIONAL ARAB LEAGUE POINTS WERE:

(A) THEY WISHED TO SEE A CEASEFIRE AND DISENGAGEMENT BEFORE THE QUESTION OF THE PLO'S POSITION IN LEBANON WAS NEGOTIATED. CALM ATMOSPHERE ESSENTIAL FOR SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME.

(B) THE LONGER THE ISRAELIS STAYED, THE HARDER TO GET THEM OUT. ISRAEL WANTED THE HUMILIATION OF THE ARABS, AND RESENTMENT AND HATRED IN THE REGION WOULD QUICKLY GROW.

(C) (QADDUMI) IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE PLO TO ACCEDE TO THE ISRAELI DEMAND TO LAY DOWN ARMS.

(D) (QADDUMI) US PROPSAL TO USE MARINES TO HELP REMOVAL OF FORCES COULD NOT WORK. WILL BE CONSIDERED PROVOCATION BY BOTH LEBANESE AND PALESTINIANS.

(E) HABIB HAD FROM THE BEGINNING MERELY CARRIED THE MESSAGE THAT THE PALESTINIANS MUST LEAVE. IN RECENT DAYS HE HAD BEEN CONTENT TO CONSULT ONLY ISRAELI OFFICIALS IN LEBANON. THERE COULD BE NO FAITH IN HIM AS NEGOTIATOR.

(F) THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLO MILITARY PRESENCE WAS DESIRED BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND ~~SHOULD~~ WOULD HAPPEN. BUT VITAL TO CREATE A DIGNIFIED MECHANISM.

(G) (QADDUMI) FAILUE OF WEST TO FIND A SOLUTION WAS PUSHING THE PLO INTO THE ARMS OF THE SOVIET UNION

PYM

NNN

CALL BY ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION ON MR HURD:
7.00 p.m. on 8 JULY 1982:

ISRAEL/LEBANON

Present:

Minister of State	Sheikh Muhammad bin Mubarak (Foreign Minister of Bahrain)
Sir John Leahy	Farouq Qaddumi (PLO)
Mr P.J. Goulden	Ali Mahrous (PUS, Bahrain MFA)
Mr J Q Greenstock	Nasif Hitti (Arab League) Omar al Hassan (Arab League)

1. Mr Hurd welcomed the delegation as representatives of the Arab League. Sheikh Muhammad thanked him for receiving them, particularly as Mr Qaddumi was included. The PLO had to be involved. Following the decision of the Arab League meeting at Taif to approach the five Permanent Members of the Security Council, they wished to explain their views on the difficult situation in Lebanon. An Israeli attack on Beirut was an imminent catastrophe: it would affect the whole region. The only fair basis for peace and stability was the UN Charter. If Security Council resolutions could not be implemented, why did the UN exist? As a Permanent Member, the UK had a special responsibility. It must repeat its stand against aggression on the Falklands. A solution had to come through the legal institution of the UN: a state in the area had no right to impose its will. What was needed first was a ceasefire and disengagement of forces; then the position of the PLO in Lebanon could be discussed. Time was running out. The longer the Israelis stayed, the harder it would be to get them out. They wanted humiliation of the PLO and the Arabs. This was no solution: it lead only to increased hatred and resentment.

2. Mr Hurd said people in Britain had been horrified at the
/suffering

suffering of Lebanese and Palestinians alike. We had done our best to help alleviate it. HMG shared much of the Arab League's analysis. We considered the Israeli invasion as wholly unjustified; we supported SCRs 508 and 509; we agreed any action on the ground by the UK and other governments should be within their framework. The European Council communiqué underlined the link between the Lebanese and Palestinian problems: we had drawn attention to it with the Americans. The communiqué also reaffirmed the two main principles of Venice and repeated the need for the PLO to be associated with negotiations. In Beirut the situation was confused: we were not involved, but hoped current negotiations would succeed. It was important to find a dignified solution for all the parties. So we and our partners agreed that forces should be separated before 509 was implemented; then the main aim must be an effective and representative Lebanese Government throughout Lebanese territory, free from illegitimate pressure. Mr Hurd asked what the latest news was from Beirut.

3. Mr Qaddumi said the shelling of civilians was continuing. The PLO had presented many prospects for a settlement, but the Israelis had always started the firing again, presenting fresh demands and preventing an agreement. All they wanted was for the PLO to lay down arms. This was impossible. The Lebanese Prime Minister had suggested a plan and Arafat had been prepared to go to President Sarkis's residence to discuss it. But the shelling went on. What was needed was a mechanism for a solution. The UN Secretary-General could not provide one. A proposal for Observers had been vetoed. Now there was an 'initiative' from the US to send marines to help remove 'foreign' forces. This could not work. Both Lebanese and Palestinians would consider it a provocation. The problem in Lebanon was not the Palestinians. Two thirds of the population were Muslim: the National Forces did not agree to Habib's terms. The UN and its Permanent Members must be active in providing a

/mechanism.

mechanism. The PLO had presented a plan to the Arab League for a Palestinian/Lebanese arrangement. But the Lebanese Government had not agreed to let Muslim representatives come to Taif to discuss it.

4. Mr Qaddumi said France had done its best, with her draft resolution and close contacts with the parties. But the situation was deteriorating. A ceasefire was vital to provide a calm atmosphere for negotiation. The Israelis were attempting the annihilation of Lebanese and Palestinians alike. The US must press Israel at least to give an opportunity for discussions. The PLO were prepared to be flexible; but when they had won the agreement of the National Forces to their plan, Habib had rejected it. The UK and other Europeans must now urge American pressure on Israel to disengage.

5. Mr Hurd said we agreed the need for a durable ceasefire. What did the PLO regard as a dignified exit? UK policy differed from the Americans', but we considered Habib was genuinely trying to achieve a ceasefire and then a solution for Lebanon. It was not realistic to replace the US with the UN Secretary-General or anyone else. It would be wise for everyone to seek a dignified agreement through Habib. We sympathised with the French proposals, but doubted they could be a substitute. So what did the PLO regard as a reasonable definition of their own future?

6. Shaikh Muhammad said Habib had from the beginning merely delivered the message that the PLO must pull out. Recently he had been dealing only with Israeli officials inside Lebanon. There could be no faith in such a negotiator. The point was not that Habib should disappear, but that other parties must join in to produce an atmosphere of confidence. Mr Qaddumi said the Palestinians would exit to their homeland, from which Israel should withdraw. Israeli security did not entitle them to invade others. It was they who had complicated the

/situation

situation: the PLO had an agreement with the Lebanese.

5. Mr Hurd said we believed in the right to self-determination as part of a settlement. The underlying problem could not be solved without it. The PLO should be associated with negotiations. In recent years they had made progress and gained friends, even within the US, through using political means and having a just cause. Their handicap had been their use of arms and the threat of annihilation of Israel. This had not helped us in dealing with others. We had said it before, but conditional recognition was still the best step forward. The advice of those who had long experience of the problem and wanted a just settlement should be heeded. As a Permanent Member we accepted we had a duty to be active. We were in daily touch with the US, who understood our concern at all levels. Israel knew our views. Mr Pym had pointed to the comparison between the Falklands and Arab-Israel. We would help as best we could, working closely with France and with Arab League states. But there could be too many cooks.

6. Shaikh Muhammad said he wished to speak with all frankness about the Palestinian presence in Beirut. What the Lebanese Government wanted should now take place - the withdrawal of the Palestinian military presence. The PLO were willing. But how to implement it? A UN framework was essential. Israeli aggression must not be allowed to pay. It must be done the right way, not with American ships, not through a third party. It was very dangerous for the US to come in, under Israeli pressure. The Israelis must be stopped by the legal methods. It was a fundamental point that the PLO would not submit to the Israeli gun. Let them get away with it and they would do it again. The UK must act. Mr Qaddumi said the UK had done it with Argentina, where 1500 people had been involved. The Palestinians were 4 million. The UN Charter gave them the right to use all means at their disposal: this was called violence, but destroying refugee camps was not. The Palestinians wanted good relations with the West. Stop the

/Israelis

Israelis and the rift between the Arabs and the West would end. Habib was one-sided: a dignified solution needed a UN multilateral force. The PLO heavy weapons were for defensive use against Begin and the other Hitler, Sharon. They could not destroy the Palestinian cause. The UK's roots were deep in the Middle East and Palestine. She must play a more active role: the US was too biased to achieve anything alone. The PLO would otherwise be pushed into the arms of the Soviet Union, into violence and terrorism, even though it had been doing its best to stop fringe group terrorism. The Palestinians had the right to live and the UK must act.

7. Mr Hurd said that after three years of close observation he understood the problem. He felt the PLO's methods were not always appropriate. But he was very grateful to have heard the delegation's strongly held views. He would discuss them with the Prime Minister and Mr Pym and they would be given due weight. We wished to keep the understanding of Arab League countries. We accepted a responsibility, with others, and would work to achieve the objectives our policy statements had set out. Shaikh Muhammad said the question was how to break the vicious circle, how to implement the SC resolutions. He asked whether Israel would ever face the full strength of UN measures. Mr Hurd said a sanctions resolution would not carry without unanimity among Permanent Members. But a step-by-step implementation was possible - and we must all work for it. The US had the means of persuasion, but not through the Security Council.

8. The meeting ended after sixty-five minutes.

Distribution:

PS
PS/Mr Hurd
PS/Lord Belstead
PS/PUS
Sir J Bullard
Sir J Leahy
Mr Moberly
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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 July, 1982.

BF

Lebanon: Letter from the President of
Pakistan

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the Ambassador of Pakistan which in turn conveys a message from President Zia.

I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft reply to the President for signature by the Prime Minister.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SO

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T 142C/82



URGENT.

AMBASSADOR OF PAKISTAN
LONDON

No. Pol-2/20/82

cc Master
Ops

July 8, 1982

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE**

Excellency,

SERIAL No. T 142C/82

I have the honour to convey the following message from the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan:

"Begins:

Excellency,

The tragic plight of the people of Lebanon in the wake of Israel's ruthless military assault on that country and the brutalities perpetrated on the besieged population of Beirut compel me to seek your personal intervention in terminating an intolerable state of affairs.

Thousands of Arab and Palestinian men, women and children have been massacred. Hundreds of thousands who have been uprooted from their homes are reduced to a state of existence unacceptable to a civilised world. West Beirut, totally surrounded by the Israeli Army, is being systematically recuded to rubble and its entrapped people face death by starvation and disease.

The future of our civilisation depends on whether we are still capable of being stirred by such an appalling spectacle. I believe that the moral impulse which keeps the heart of our civilisation beating is alive and will not permit us to remain in a continuing state of inertia induced by the sheer audacity of the Israeli assault on a hapless Lebanon. We are all equally answerable for man's unsurpassed barbarity to man which the people of Lebanon have the misfortune of experiencing before our very eyes. History is the unsparing judge and we must tremble at its verdict if we remain unconcerned with the tragedy of Lebanon.

The world community has a clear duty to stop Israel from pursuing its genocidal war to the bitter end. The primary responsibility to curb Israel rests with the Permanent Members of the Security Council, particularly the Super Powers, who have the ability and the resources to do so. If Israel is not restrained now the consequences for regional and global peace and security will be incalculable and neither the great nor the small will be able to escape the impact of the forces that may be unleashed.

Your Excellency bears a special responsibility to uphold the cause of justice and peace in our tormented world. I, therefore, urge you to use

the power and influence at hour command to bring about an immediate Israeli withdrawal from the Lebanon. I also appeal to you to join in a concerted effort to ensure the restitution of the inalienable national and human rights of the Palestinian people whose unredeemed sufferings constitute a blot on the conscience of mankind.


With my profound personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

(General M. Zia-ul-Haq)

Ends"

I take this opportunity to convey the assurances of my highest consideration.



(ALI ARSHAD)

The Rt.Hon.Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON SW1A

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2377 OF 8 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV CAIRO UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS DAMASCUS
PRIORITY JEDDA AMMAN TUNIS.

LEBANON

1. WEINBERGER REMAINS OPPOSED TO A LONG-TERM US MILITARY PRESENCE IN LEBANON WHICH WOULD ACT AS A BUFFER FOR THE ISRAELIS, BUT ACCEPTS THE NEED FOR SHORT-TERM US PARTICIPATION IN A BEIRUT FORCE TO GIVE HABIB'S EFFORTS A CHANCE OF SUCCESS. CONGRESS SEEMS LIKELY TO TAKE A SIMILAR VIEW.

2. WEINBERGER MADE HIS OWN VIEWS CLEAR YESTERDAY WHEN HE TOLD THE PRESS QUOTE I DON'T THINK THERE'S EVER A SITUATION WHERE A UNILATERAL RESORT TO FORCE ADVANCES THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. UNQUOTE.

3. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HOPE THAT THE FRENCH WILL AGREE WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO TO PARTICIPATE IN THE BEIRUT FORCE. THE FRENCH EMBASSY SAY THAT THEY ARE STILL AWAITING A FORMAL LEBANESE REQUEST AND THE COMPLETION OF PLO AGREEMENT AS WELL AS UN

3. ~~THE STATE DEPARTMENT HOPE THAT THE FRENCH WILL AGREE WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO TO PARTICIPATE IN THE BEIRUT FORCE.~~ THE FRENCH EMBASSY SAY THAT THEY ARE STILL AWAITING A FORMAL LEBANESE REQUEST AND DEFINITE CONFIRMATION OF PLO AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS UN ACQUIESCENCE, PREFERABLY BY A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OR PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, IF NOT FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THE AMERICANS HAVE POINTED OUT TO THEM THE FUTILITY OF COURTING A SOVIET VETO IN THE LIGHT OF BREZHNEV'S MESSAGE TO REAGAN (WHICH THE AMERICANS ARE NOT TAKING TOO SERIOUSLY).

4. MEANWHILE HABIB'S TALKS IN BEIRUT HAVE MADE LITTLE PROGRESS CHIEFLY BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUED CLOSURE BY THE ISRAELIS OF THE CROSSING-POINTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BEIRUT. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SEE THE NEXT STEP AS A DETAILED AGREEMENT BETWEEN ARAFAT AND WAZZAN ON MODALITIES FOR PLO WITHDRAWAL. THEY HOPE THAT THE PLO CAN BE PERSUADED TO DROP THEIR INSISTENCE ON A RESIDUAL MILITARY PRESENCE IN NORTH LEBANON.

5. THE AMERICANS SAY THAT THEY HAVE REJECTED SUCCESSIVE ISRAELI ATTEMPTS TO SET DEADLINES FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT THEY HAVE PROTESTED VIGOROUSLY TO THE ISRAELIS ABOUT THE CLOSURE OF CROSSING-POINTS IN BEIRUT. UNDER US PRESSURE THE ISRAELIS HAVE RESTORED ELECTRICITY AND WATER SUPPLIES TO WEST BEIRUT.

HENDERSON

NNNN



①
Omar al Hassan.

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Call by Bahrain and Tunisian Foreign
Minister (3.15, Friday)

The London representative of the Arab League
would like to come with them

2. I suggest that we agree :-

(a) He is Jordanian ✓

(b) His presence will give added emphasis
to the exclusion of the P.L.O. representative.

Agree? Yes ~~no~~

A.S.C. $\frac{8}{7}$

VISIT BY ARAB LEAGUE REPRESENTATIVES: 9 JULY

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Situation in Lebanon. Grave concern. Short of information. State of negotiations? What is current thinking on where PLO should go?
2. Peacekeeping. Accept need for some peacekeeping force. Have made clear difficult for us to contribute in view of other commitments. But will support efforts to establish UN force, if required by Lebanese.
3. Palestinian Question. Cannot separate problem of Lebanon from wider Palestinian issue. European Council made this connexion clearly. Continue to believe that lasting peace in region can only be achieved on basis of mutual acceptance by Palestinians and Israelis of each other's rights.
4. PLO. European Council reaffirmed PLO must be associated with negotiations. Now more urgent than ever for PLO to take difficult step of public acceptance of Israel's rights, if necessary on conditional basis. Would have dramatic effect on European public opinion, and strengthen our hands with Americans.

Background

1. The decision to send Delegations to all Permanent Members of the Security Council was taken at the Taif meeting of six members of the Arab League on 2 July. The purpose of the Delegation's visit as expressed in the communiqué is to seek the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 508 and 509, and more urgently the lifting of the siege around Beirut. A Delegation including Qaddumi has already visited Moscow where they met Gromyko; Qaddumi also saw Cheysson and Colombo in Paris, but the full Delegation have not yet seen the French. We understand that US are likely to see a Delegation in which an Arab League representative will be substituted for the PLO man.

2. Notes on the Bahraini and Tunisian Foreign Ministers are attached. The Tunisian Foreign Minister was held up by an airline strike in Paris and did not therefore attend the meeting with Mr Hurd on 8 July. The Prime Minister might wish to take the opportunity to thank Mr Essebsi for President Bourguiba's messages of 17 June to The Queen and the Prime Minister about the Falklands. Replies are in preparation.

Israel/Lebanon: Current Situation

3. Agreement in principle for use of US forces for PLO evacuation announced by White House on 6 July. French say they were taken by surprise and have reacted cautiously to idea of their participation.

4. Water and electricity supplies restored 7 July but medical supplies are not allowed in. Israelis still insisting that all PLO must leave Lebanon, while PLO want to retain symbolic presence. President Assad of Syria is reported to have offered to take PLO leadership and guerillas but on what conditions not clear. PLO and Israeli response awaited.



5. At UN Egypt and France ... floating a major resolution on Lebanon and Arab/Israel. No problems for us but US will presumably veto since resolution mentions self-determination and the PLO.

NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA DEPARTMENT
8 July 1982

SHAIKH MOHAMMED BIN MUBARAK

Minister for Foreign Affairs since 1971. Studied history for 18 months at Oxford and law for two years in London. Holds a Diploma in International Law.

Since 1970 his influence on the Ruler of Bahrain has probably been second only to the Prime Minister, Shaikh Khalifa. He is intelligent and articulate in presenting the case for the moderate Arabs, whom he typifies.

He met the Prime Minister during her visit to Bahrain last September and before that at 10 Downing Street in September 1980 when accompanying his Prime Minister, who was on an official visit as Mrs Thatcher's guest.

CAID ESSEBSI

Tunisian Foreign Minister since 1981
Has held a wide range of senior administrative posts and has also been politically active throughout his career. Deputy in the National Assembly, 1969 where he was one of the few liberal voices to be heard until he lost his seat on being expelled from the ruling party in 1974. Rehabilitated into the Party March 1980. Elected to the Central Committee and appointed to the Political Bureau, April 1981.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 July 1982

AL P
h.c.

Dear John,

Arab League Delegation

Mr Hurd now expects to see the delegation this evening (the three will not be assembled before then). You will have seen that the Daily Telegraph already has a story in its Diary column that Mr Pym will be seeing Qaddoumi. We do not intend to announce Mr Hurd's meeting at the normal FCO Press Conference at 12.30, but propose to take the line that we expect the delegation to arrive in London later today and that arrangements for their reception have not yet been finalised. Nevertheless the issue is likely to be raised at Question Time today. I enclose a suggested line for the Prime Minister to take.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street



Arab League Delegation

As the House may be aware, the Arab League are sending delegations to the capitals of the Permanent Members of the Security Council. A delegation representing the Arab League, consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Bahrain and Tunisia and a senior member of the PLO, is expected to arrive in London today. My Rt Hon Friend the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs expects to see this delegation. It is of course for the Arab League to decide the composition of their delegations and we thought it right in present circumstances in Lebanon to receive this delegation.

As far as the PLO itself is concerned, the European Council made clear in its statement on 29 June that they must be associated with peace negotiations and that the Ten wished to see the Palestinian people in a position to pursue their demands by political means. Our policy has been and remains that a ministerial dialogue with them is difficult as long as they have not made clearer their acceptance of Israel's right to live in peace and security and an end to all association with terrorism. Any contacts we have with the PLO are of course used to impress on them the need to take these steps.

-8 JUL 1982

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Prime Minister
for information.

سفارة المملكة العربية السعودية
لندن

SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY
LONDON

Mr. M. Dzely

Mr. F. D.

Mr. Loles (M. 10)

A. J. C. 7.

MH 8/2

The Ambassador of The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia presents his compliments to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and has the honour to inform him that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia -H.R.H. Prince Saud Al-Faisal has authorised to request Her Majesty's Government to be kind enough to receive Mr Farouk Qaddoumi , the PLO representative in the Arab League Delagation , together with the other Members of this Delegation who are visiting the U.K. at the present time .

The Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia avails himself of this opportunity to renew to Her Majesty's - Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs the assuarances of his highest consideration .

London , 8th of July, 1982 .

M. ALMAMOUN

Her Majesty's Secretary of State. for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.
London S.W . 1



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SECRET

FROM AMMAN 081120Z JULY 1982

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 299 OF 08 JULY 1982

AND TO INFO ROUTINE MOD (D14), CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA,
TEL AVIV, UKHIS NEW YORK, AND WASHINGTON.

LEBANON.

1. WHEN SEEING THE JORDANIAN COMMANDER IN CHIEF THIS MORNING,
I ASKED HIM WHETHER JORDAN HAD YET COME TO ANY DECISION ABOUT HOW
MANY AND WHAT CATEGORIES OF PALESTINIANS FROM LEBANON THE
JORDANIANS MIGHT BE WILLING TO RECEIVE IN JORDAN. GENERAL SHAKER
(WHO ASKED THAT HIS COMMENTS BE CLOSELY HELD) TOLD ME THAT THIS
SUBJECT HAD BEEN UNDER INTENSIVE DISCUSSION BETWEEN KING HUSSEIN,
THE PRIME MINISTER, THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR AND HIMSELF
OVER THE LAST DAY OR TWO.

OVER THE LAST DAY OR TWO.

2. THE INFORMATION REACHING THE JORDANIANS FROM INTELLIGENCE SOURCES IN SYRIA WAS THAT PRESIDENT ASAD WAS EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO RECEIVE THE MAIN BODY OF THE PLO IN SYRIA AND WAS ONLY AGREEING TO DO SO UNDER STRONG PRESSURE. ASAD WAS ALSO ANXIOUS THAT THE MAJORITY OF THEM SHOULD GO ON TO OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. HOWEVER, THE JORDANIANS THOUGHT IT MOST LIKELY THAT ASAD WOULD IN FACT KEEP ELEMENTS OF SAIQA, THE FOLLOWERS OF HABASH AND HAWATMEH AND MEMBERS OF OTHER EXTREMIST GROUPS IN SYRIA. A PROBABLE CONSEQUENCE OF THIS WOULD BE AN INCREASE IN ATTEMPTS TO MOUNT TERRORIST OPERATIONS THROUGH JORDAN INTO ISRAEL. HOWEVER GENERAL SHAKER SAID THE JORDANIANS WERE CONFIDENT THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO COPE WITH THIS (THE US AMBASSADOR HAS TOLD ME SEPARATELY THAT, IN THE LIGHT OF THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS, HE IS ASKING FOR INCREASED US ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN IN THE PROVISION OF DETECTION DEVICES TO COUNTER TERRORIST PENETRATION; THIS SUBJECT HAS ALREADY BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE JORDANIANS FOR SOME TIME (SEE MY TELELETTER OF 20 APRIL TO MILES IN NENAD).

3 AS FAR AS JORDAN WAS CONCERNED, GENERAL SHAKER SAID IT HAD BEEN DECIDED BY KING HUSSEIN TO RECEIVE UP TO 2,000 - 3,000 PALESTINIANS, BUT ONLY THOSE WHO WERE JORDANIAN PASSPORT HOLDERS AND AFTER THEY HAD BEEN THOROUGHLY SCREENED TO WEED OUT UNDESIRABLES.

SHAKER EMPHASISED THAT THIS HAD NOT BEEN AN EASY DECISION, BUT THAT HE NOW FELT SURE IT WAS THE RIGHT ONE AND WOULD GIVE THE MODERATE PALESTINIANS SOME WHERE TO GO.

4. SHAKER ADDED THAT THE JORDANIANS BELIEVED ONE RESULT OF THE PLO DEBACLE IN LEBANON WOULD BE A SHARP INCREASE IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. ISRAEL WOULD NOT GET RID OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM BY WHAT SHE HAD DONE IN LEBANON SEMICOLON IT WOULD PERSIST, PERHAPS IN A MORE UNPLEASANT FORM .

5. ABU SITTA, A MEMBER OF THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, IS REPORTED BY THE PRESS TO BE IN AMMAN TODAY AND COULD WELL BE IN DISCUSSION WITH THE JORDANIANS ON THE ADMISSION OF PALESTINIANS TO JORDAN.

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TO FLASH ROME

TELEGRAM NUMBER 197 OF 7 JUL

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

LEBANON: VISIT OF ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

1. THE SAUDI EMBASSY HAVE INFORMED US THAT THEY HAVE RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER, ASKING THAT - IN VIEW OF THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN LEBANON - THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD AGREE TO ACCEPT INCLUSION OF QADDOUMI IN THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION. THE EXACT TEXT OF THE MESSAGE WILL REACH US IN DUE COURSE THROUGH THE EMBASSY, BUT IN VIEW OF THE URGENCY, THEY PASSED ON TO US THE SUBSTANCE ORALLY. THEY DESCRIBE IT AS A QUOTE PERSONAL PLEA UNQUOTE FROM PRINCE SAUD AL FAISAL. THEY HAVE ASKED THAT WE LET THEM KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHAT DECISION IS FINALLY TAKEN.

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FM WASHINGTON 072330Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2368 OF 7 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV CAIRO UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS DAMASCUS

INFO PRIORITY JEDDA AMMAN TUNIS

LEBANON.

1. EAGLEBURGER TOLD ME TODAY THAT HABIB'S NEGOTIATIONS WERE BEING HAMPERED BY ISRAELI ACTION TO CUT OFF CONTACTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BEIRUT. AMBASSADOR LEWIS HAD SEEN BEGIN TWICE TODAY TO PROTEST ABOUT THAT ACTION AND TO DELIVER AN UNEQUIVOCAL WARNING THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD NOT GO INTO WEST BEIRUT. EAGLEBURGER STRESSED THAT THIS SHOULD NOT BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE SO THAT THE PLO WERE GIVEN NO ENCOURAGEMENT TO BELIEVE THAT THEY COULD STAY IN BEIRUT.

2. THE CIA HAVE TOLD US THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE GIVEN HABIB TWENTY-FOUR HOURS TO PRODUCE A SOLUTION, FAILING WHICH THEY WILL THEMSELVES QUOTE DEAL WITH THE SITUATION SEVERELY UNQUOTE.

3. EAGLEBURGER CONFIRMED THAT THE SAUDIS HAD BEEN VERY HELPFUL IN SECURING SYRIAN AGREEMENT TO ACCEPT THE 5-6,000 PLO PERSONNEL NOW

3. EAGLEBURGER CONFIRMED THAT THE SAUDIS HAD BEEN VERY HELPFUL IN SECURING SYRIAN AGREEMENT TO ACCEPT THE 5-6,000 PLO PERSONNEL NOW IN WEST BEIRUT. IT WAS NOT CERTAIN THAT THEY WOULD ALL STAY IN SYRIA; SOME MIGHT BE DISPERSED TO OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES, THOUGH NONE HAD AS YET OFFERED TO TAKE THEM. NOR WAS IT CLEAR WHETHER ALL THE PLO WOULD LEAVE BY SEA. THE AMERICANS WOULD PREFER THIS BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF PROTECTING ANY WHO SOUGHT TO LEAVE BY ROAD, AND OF ENSURING THAT THEY ACTUALLY CROSSED THE BORDER INTO SYRIA. EAGLEBURGER ADDED THAT IT HAD STILL NOT BEEN AGREED PRECISELY WHAT ARMS THE PLO WOULD BE ALLOWED TO TAKE WITH THEM.

4. EAGLEBURGER CONFIRMED THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT FOR THEIR PART, WOULD STILL BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT IN LEBANON AN ARMED PLO PRESENCE OF SOME 300-400 DRAWN FROM PALESTINIANS NOT NOW IN BEIRUT. BUT THE ISRAELIS WERE ADAMANTLY OPPOSED. HABIB WAS THEREFORE TAKING THE LINE THAT THE ARMED PLO MUST ALL LEAVE. THE AMERICANS WERE, HOWEVER EMPHATIC THAT THE PLO SHOULD BE ALLOWED A POLITICAL OFFICE IN BEIRUT. BEGIN IS EQUALLY EMPHATIC THAT THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE.

5. EAGLEBURGER EXPRESSED SOME IRRITATION AT THE FRENCH CONDITIONS FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE PROPOSED BEIRUT FORCE (MY TELNO 2356), WHICH HE WAS ABOUT TO DISCUSS WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR. HE REPEATED THAT IF THE FRANCO/EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL WERE PUT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE AMERICANS WOULD VETO

HENDERSON

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CONFIDENTIAL AND ECLIPSE
FROM AMMAN 061820Z JULY 1982
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 290 OF 06 JULY 1982

AND TO INFO IMMEDIATE ROME (FOR SECRETARY OF STATES PARTY) AND WASHINGTON AND ROUTINE CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, MOSCOW PARIS, TEL AVIV AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 285 AND WASHINGTON TELNO 2349: LEBANON.

1. I HAVE SEEN BOTH THE US AMBASSADOR AND THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IN THE COURSE OF TODAY.

2. AMBASSADOR VIETS (PLEASE PROTECT) HAS GIVEN ME SOME OF THE BACKGROUND ON HOW SYRIA CAME TO BE CHOSEN AS THE DESTINATION FOR THE PLO. THE AMERICANS HAD CONCLUDED 4 OR 5 DAYS AGO THAT EGYPT WAS THE LOGICAL PLACE FOR THE VPO TO GO AND PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD SENT A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK PROPOSING THIS (WASHINGTON TELNO 2340 AND CAIRO TELNO 298). MUBARAK HAD TOLD THE US AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO WHEN DELIVERING THE MESSAGE THAT THE US PROPOSAL WAS UNACCEPTABLE:

MUBARAK CLAIMED THAT HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT HAD ALREADY EXPRESSED THEIR DISMAY AT HIS EARLIER OFFER THAT THE PLO SHOULD ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT IN EXILE IN EGYPT AND ADDED THAT EGYPTIAN PUBLIC OPINION WOULD NOT STAND FOR THE TRANSFER OF THE PLO TO CAIRO. THE REACTION OF BUTROS GHALI HAD BEEN LESS STRONG AND HE ASKED FOR TIME TO CONSIDER THE MATTER.

ON 4 JULY MUBARAK HAD GIVEN AMBASSADOR ATHERTON A FORMAL REPLY, WHICH AMOUNTED TO A MODIFIED REJECTION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSAL. MUBARAK HAD AGREED THAT THE PALESTINIANS WERE AN ARAB PROBLEM AND FAVOURED THEIR DISPERSAL IN DIFFERENT

ARAB COUNTRIES, IN WHICH CASE EGYPT WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE ITS SHARE OF THEM.

3. KING HUSSEIN HAD FOR SOME TIME BEEN TELLING THE AMERICANS THAT EGYPT WAS HIS FIRST CHOICE AS A DESTINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS, BUT HAD INSISTED THAT HE COULD NOT URGE THIS ON MUBARAK WITH GOOD CONSCIENCE UNLESS IT WERE COUPLED WITH A NEW PEACE EFFORT BASED ON RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 SEMICOLON HENCE HIS MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN OF 4 JULY (MY TELNOS 287 TO FCO AND 06 TO ROME). KING HUSSEIN HAD ALSO SENT A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND HAD DESPATCHED HIS FOREIGN MINISTER TO SAUDI ARABIA ON 4 JULY WITH A LETTER TO KING FAHD, BOTH APPARENTLY URGING THE PLO'S ADMISSION TO EGYPT ON CONDITION THAT THE AMERICANS WERE PREPARED TO LAUNCH A NEW MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORT.

4. IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH VIETS, KING HUSSEIN HAD REPEATEDLY SAID HIS NIGHTMARE WAS THAT THE PALESTINIANS MIGHT BE SENT TO EITHER LIBYA OR SYRIA. VIETS MENTIONED IN PASSING THAT FOR A TIME ON 4 JULY LIBYA HAD LOOKED LIKE A POSSIBLE DESTINATION FOR THE PLO, BUT QADHAFI HAD BLOCKED THIS WITH A STRONG PUBLIC DECLARATION SEMICOLON THE FRENCH, WHEN THEY HEARD THAT LIBYA WAS ON THE CARDS, HAD "GONE FRANTIC".

5. IN THE COURSE OF 5 JULY THE US AMBASSADOR IN JEDDA WAS INSTRUCTED TO ASK THE SAUDIS IF THEY WOULD PERSUE WITH PRESIDENT ASAD THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PLO SHOULD GO TO SYRIA AS A STAGING POST ON THEIR WAY TO OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. LATER THE SAME DAY THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER HAD TELEPHONED THE AMERICANS TO SAY THAT PRESIDENT ASAD AGREED TO THIS.

6. WHEN VIETS BROKE THE NEWS TO KING HUSSEIN ON THE EVENING OF 5 JULY (JUST AFTER I HAD SEEN THE KING) THAT THE PLO WOULD AFTER ALL BE GOING TO SYRIA, THE KING'S REACTION ACCORDING TO VIETS WAS "STONY-FACED": HE SAID HIS WORSE FEARS HAD BEEN REALISED AND HE HAD ALWAYS PREDICTED TO HIMSELF THAT THIS WAS BOTH THE MOST LIKELY AND THE LEAST FAVOURABLE OUTCOME.

7. INITIALLY THE SAUDIS HAD APPARENTLY TOLD QASEM, THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, THAT PRESIDENT ASAD WAS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE PALESTINIANS SEMICOLON SUBSEQUENTLY THEY HAD CLAIMED TO HIM THAT ALL THE ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE BY WAZZAN, THE LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER, AND THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAD NOT BEEN INVOLVED (VIETS ASSUMES THAT THE SAUDIS DID NOT WISH TO ADMIT THEIR ROLE TO THE JORDANIANS, KNOWING THE LIKELY JORDANIAN REACTION).

8. VIETS SAID THAT AT PRESENT HE HAD NO INDEPENDANT CONFIRMATION THAT PRESIDENT ASAD HAD FORMALLY CONSENTED TO ALLOWING THE PLO TO GO TO OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES AFTER THEY HAD ARRIVED IN SYRIA (SEE PARAGRAPH 5 ABOVE). VIETS WAS HOWEVER CATEGORICAL THAT ARAFAT HAD SIGNED A DOCUMENT AGREEING TO GO TO SYRIA WITH THE PLO ORGANISATION AND THAT THIS WAS IN THE HANDS OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

9. WHEN I SAW THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER LATE THIS MORNING (IMMEDIATELY AFTER HE HAD SEEN VIETS), QASEM STILL SEEMED SCEPTICAL WHETHER THE PLO WOULD IN THE END GO TO SYRIA. HE WONDERED WHO WAS REALLY BEHIND SUCH A MOVE, WHICH HE SAW AS SERVING BOTH SYRIAN AND ISRAELI PURPOSES. THE PLO

CONFIDENTIAL/ECLIPSE

WOULD FALL UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE SYRIAN BACKED SAIQA SEMICOLON
THE SYRIANS WOULD BE HELPED IN PROMOTING THEIR IMAGE AS THE
DEFENDERS OF THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE AND IN OBTAINING MONEY
FROM OTHER ARAB STATES SEMICOLON SYRIAN FACE IN WITHDRAWING
THEIR FORCES FROM LEBANON WOULD ALSO BE SAVED. QASEM WAS HOWEVER
IN NO DOUBT THAT THE RELOCATION OF THE PLO IN SYRIA WOULD
GREATLY INCREASE THE DANGERS FOR JORDAN: IN PARTICULAR , WHAT
HE TERMED THE SEEPAGE OF PALESTINIAN GROUPS THROUGH JORDAN
INTO ISRAEL WOULD BE MUCH HARDER TO PREVENT THAN HITHERTO.

10. SEE ALSO MIFT.

URWICK

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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CONFIDENTIAL/ECLIPSE

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 17

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/MR HURD
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SIR J LEAHY
MR MOBERLY
SIR J BULLARD
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CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMMAN 060900Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 285 OF 06 JUL

INFO IMMEDIATE ROME (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

AND WASHINGTON: ROUTINE CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, MOSCOW,
PARIS, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEWYORK

LEBANON

1. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN ON THE EVENING OF 5 JULY, HE ASKED ME TO PASS TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF THE TEXTS OF TWO RECENT MESSAGES HE HAD SENT TO PRESIDENT REAGAN DATED 22 JUNE AND 4 JULY (TEXTS IN MY 2 IFTS TO FCO, REPEATED TELEGRAPHICALLY TO WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO OTHER POSTS: I AM REPEATING TELEGRAPHICALLY KEY PART OF MESSAGE OF 4 JULY TO OTHER ADDRESSEES. ORIGINALS FOLLOW BY BAG). THE KING SAID HE WAS LETTING US HAVE THE TEXTS OF THESE MESSAGES IN THE SPIRIT OF THE CLOSE UNDERSTANDING WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN US AND THAT HE WAS ALSO MAKING THEM AVAILABLE TO KING FAHD AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, THE KING

~~BETWEEN US AND THAT HE WAS ALSO MAKING THEM AVAILABLE TO KING FAHD AND PRESIDENT UBARAK. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, THE KING SAID HE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THE PRIME MINISTER LETTING PRESIDENT REAGAN KNOW THAT HE HAD SENT HER COPIES OF THESE MESSAGES, BUT APART FROM THIS THE KING WILL EXPECT US FULLY TO RESPECT HIS CONFIDENCE.~~

2. THE MESSAGE OF 22 JULY CONTAIN A STRONG WARNING AGAINST DRIVING THE PALESTINIANS INTO SYRIA "WHICH WOULD THRIVE ON THEIR SUFFERING AND WOULD FUEL IT AGAINST ALL." THIS WOULD SEEM TO HAVE FALLEN ON DEAF EARS (WASHINGTON TELNO 2349 REFERS).

3. KING HUSSEIN TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT HIS SECOND MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF 4 JULY HAD BEEN PROMPTED BY HEARING FROM THE AMERICANS THAN AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PLO MIGHT BE IMMINENT. THE ACCOUNT HE GAVE IN THE MESSAGE OF HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW IS CONSISTENT WITH WHAT HE HAD ALREADY TOLD ME (MY TELNO 278). IN APPEALING TO THE AMERICANS TO AVOID THE DESTRUCTION OR FURTHER HUMILIATION OF THE PLO, THE KING SUGGESTED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT EGYPT WOULD BE THE BEST DESTINATION FOR THE PLO "TO ENABLE THEM TO BECOME TRULY PALESTINIAN" AND THAT THE RADICALS MIGHT BE ALLOWED TO GO ELSEWHERE SEMICLN PALESTINIANS WITH JORDANIAN PASSPORTS WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO JORDAN. BUT AN ESSENTIAL CONDITION FOR EGYPTIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLO WOULD BE A CLEAR ASSURANCE FROM THE AMERICANS THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO MOVE INTO A NEW PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A TOTAL AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE, BASED ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. ONLY THE AMERICANS COULD SECURE THIS AND THE PALESTINIANS MUST BE A PARTY TO RESOLVING THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. THE KING APPEALED TO THE PRESIDENT FOR A NEW AND BOLD AMERICAN INITIATIVE.

4. AFTER I HAD READ THE TWO MESSAGES, I HAD A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THEIR CONTENTS WITH THE KING. HE ASSURED ME THAT KING FAHD AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK WERE FULLY IN AGREEMENT WITH HIM, ALTHOUGH OSAMA AL BAZ HAD NOT YET COME TO AMMAN. CAMP DAVID WAS FINISHED, BUT THERE WAS JUST A CHANCE AT THIS WORST MOMENT IN RECENT MIDDLE EAST HISTORY FOR A NEW BEGINNING WHICH THE MODERATE ARABS COULD SUPPORT. IF THE KING IS ACCURATELY REFLECTING EGYPTIAN VIEWS, IT WOULD SEEM THAT EAGLEGURGER MAY BE OVER-SIMPLIFYING IN TELLING US THAT THE EGYPTIANS WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE PLO IN EGYPT (WASHINGTON TELNO 2349) SEMICLN BUT THE KING EMPHASISED TO ME THAT IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FOR THE AMERICANS TO CREATE A POLITICAL CONTEXT IN WHICH THE EGYPTIANS FELT ABLE TO DO SO.

5. IF THE AMERICANS PERSIST IN HANDING THE PLO OVER TO SYRIA, THIS IS LIKELY TO GO DOWN VERY BADLY WITH THE JORDANIANS.

6. KING HUSSEIN HAD SEEN GUTMAN, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY, LIVED LATELY BEFORE HE

THIS IS LIKELY TO GO DOWN VERY BADLY WITH THE JORDANIANS.
6. KING HUSSEIN HAD SEEN GUTMAN, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE
FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY, IMMEDIATELY BEFORE ME: HE WAS RATHER
DISMISSIVE OF HIS TALKS WITH THE FRENCH, MERELY CLAIMING THAT THEIR
VIEWS WERE IN LINE WITH HIS OWN, AND IS CLEARLY CONCENTRATING ALL
HIS EFFORTS ON THE AMERICANS AT PRESENT. I SHALL BE COMPAING
NOTES WITH THE US AMBASSADOR, WHO SAW THE KING IMMEDIATELY AFTER
ME, LATER TODAY.

URWICK

CCN PARA 3 LINE 3 FIRST WORD... THAT...

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Middle East

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM BELGRADE 061025Z JUL 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELNO 149 OF 06 JUL 82

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY FOR COLES (NO 10) AND HOLMES.

LEBANON: PROPOSED VISIT OF ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

BEGINS.

THE RECENT MEETING OF ARAB MINISTERS IN TAIF HAS DECIDED TO SEND THREE-MAN DELEGATIONS UNDER ARAB LEAGUE AUSPICES TO TALK TO EACH PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF BAHRAIN AND TUNISIA AND QADDUMI, THE PLO'S FOREIGN MINISTER EQUIVALENT, ARE NOW IN PARIS, WHERE THEY WILL BE RECEIVED BY CLAUDE CHEYSSON AND PERHAPS BY PRESIDENT MITTERRAND,. THEY HAVE ASKED TO COME TO LONDON TO SEE YOU AND ME LATER THIS WEEK. GIVEN ITS LEVEL, I WOULD NOT RECOMMEND YOU TO RECEIVE THE DELEGATION. BUT I DO FEEL VERY STRONGLY IT WOULD BE RIGHT FOR ME, OR IF MY TIMETABLE MAKES THIS IMPOSSIBLE DOUGLAS HURD, TO SEE THEM. NOT TO DO SO WOULD BE TOTALLY INCONSISTENT WITH THE LINE WE HAVE TAKEN EVER SINCE THE INVASION OF LEBANON. I KNOW YOUR VIEWS ABOUT MINISTERIAL CONTACT WITH THE PLO. BUT WHAT IS NOW BEING PROPOSED IS SOMETHING

Mr Coles,
No 10. D.S.

[Mr Holmes]

ARCOU -

Shot in

London

by Arab leadership

ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM THE BILATERAL MEETING BETWEEN
A BRITISH MINISTER AND QADDUMI IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
PLO'S REPRESENTATIVE WHICH WE DISCUSSED LAST WEEK.
HE IS NOW BEING PROPOSED AS A MEMBER OF A DELEGATION WHICH
REPRESENTS AN ATTEMPT BY MODERATE ARAB LEADERS, FOLLOWING
A WELCOME SAUDI INITIATIVE, TO PROMOTE A NEGOTIATED
SOLUTION IN LEBANON. IF THIS INITIATIVE FAILS, I FEAR
THAT THE HAND OF THOSE IN THE PLO WHO HAVE ALL ALONG
PREFERRED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM TO NEGOTIATION WILL BE
GREATLY STRENGTHENED. IF WE REBUFF THE DELEGATION ON THE GROUNDS
THAT IT CONTAINED A PLO REPRESENTATIVE, WE SHALL BE SEEN AS
ADMINISTERING A SNUB TO MODERATION AND TO OUR FRIENDS IN
THE ARAB WORLD. IF WE WERE TO RECEIVE SUCH A DELEGATION,
I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE WOULD HAVE ANY DIFFICULTY IN
MAKING IT CLEAR THAT OUR POLICY TOWARDS THE PLO REMAINED
UNCHANGED. WE SHOULD POINT OUT THAT AS A PERMANENT MEMBER
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WE ARE OBLIGED TO LISTEN TO ALL
POINTS OF VIEW, AND THAT THE COMPOSITION OF THE DELEGATION
WAS ENTIRELY A MATTER FOR THE ARAB LEAGUE. I SHOULD PERHAPS
ADD THAT I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO
OFFER TO SEE SOME MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION BUT NOT QADDUMI.
THIS WOULD BE LIKELY TO BE TAKEN PARTICULARLY BADLY BY THE
ARABS. TIME IS OBVIOUSLY EXTREMELY SHORT, AND I VERY MUCH
HOPE THAT YOU CAN AGREE THAT DOUGLAS HURD SHOULD CONVEY
A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE DELEGATIONS' REQUEST FOR A
MEETING.

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Middle East.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS GENEVA 060830Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 385 OF 6 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, TEL AVIV

LEBANON AND ICRC

1. HOCHE, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS AT THE ICRC HAS JUST CALLED ON ME TO ASK FOR OUR URGENT ASSISTANCE IN THE FOLLOWING MATTER.

2. THE ICRC HAVE BEEN APPROACHED BY "CERTAIN PARTIES" (I DID NOT PRESS FOR DETAILS) TO ASK WHETHER THEY WOULD ORGANISE THE EVACUATION BY SEA OF THE PLO AND THEIR DEPENDENTS FROM BEIRUT TO ANOTHER COUNTRY, PROBABLY SYRIA OR EGYPT. THE NUMBERS INVOLVED WOULD BE UP TO 5,000 "FIGHTERS" TOGETHER WITH THEIR FAMILIES WHO MIGHT ADD UP TO ANOTHER 25,000 PEOPLE. THE IMMEDIATE SOLUTION WHICH OCCURRED TO THE RED CROSS WOULD BE A LARGE SHIP SUCH AS THE CANBERRA WHICH COULD TAKE UP TO 5,000 PEOPLE ON A SHORT TRIP I.E. A TWO-DAY ROUND TRIP FROM BEIRUT TO THE DESTINATION. THE TRIP WOULD HAVE TO BE REPEATED AS MANY TIMES AS WAS NECESSARY TO EVACUATE EVERYONE.

3. I SAID I WOULD OF COURSE RELAY THIS REQUEST IMMEDIATELY. HOCHE FULLY RECOGNISED THE DIFFICULTIES. IF THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF A SHIP BEING READILY AVAILABLE SUCH AS THE CANBERRA, HE WONDERED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE DISCREET ENQUIRIES IN LONDON ABOUT CHARTERING A SUITABLE VESSEL. CONFIDENTIALITY WAS ESSENTIAL.

4. THE IDEA WOULD BE THAT THE SHIP WOULD FLY THE RED CROSS FLAG. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE EVACUATION IN BEIRUT WOULD BE UNDERTAKENT BY THE ICRC WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE LEBANESE ARMY. THE ICRC WOULD ORGANISE RECEPTION AT THE ARRIVAL POINTS. THEY ENVISAGED USING EXISTING CAMPS.

5. HOCHE SAID THAT PAYMENT FOR THE CHARTERING OF THE SHIP WOULD PRESENT NO PROBLEM. HE IMAGINED THE AMERICANS WOULD PAY.

FCO PLEASE REPEAT FURTHER AS NECESSARY.

ADVANCE COPY TO MOBERLY (AUSS)

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMMAN 060938Z JUL 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 287 OF 06 JUL

INFO WASHINGTON

INFO SAVING TO CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, UKMIS
NEW YORK

MY 2 IPTS: LEBANON

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM KING HUSSEIN TO PRESIDENT
REAGAN DATED 4 JULY.

BEGINS.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

I ADDRESS YOU ONCE AGAIN MY GOOD FRIEND COMPREHENSIVELY AND IN
TOTAL CANDOUR DICTATED BY THIS MOST DANGEROUS AND CRITICAL OF TIMES.

I RETURNED A SHORT WHILE AGO FROM THE SOVIET UNION. I HAD TALKS
WHILE THERE WITH THE SOVIET PRIME MINISTER, THE FOREIGN MINISTER
AND OTHER OFFICIALS. IT WAS DURING A FORMAL MEETING THAT FOREIGN
MINISTER GROMYKO PRODUCED THE NEWS HE HAD JUST RECEIVED FROM NEW
YORK OF THE UNITED STATES VETO OF THE FRENCH RESOLUTION AT THE
SECURITY COUNCIL. A LITTLE LATER ON WE RECEIVED THE OTHER STUNNING
ITEM OF NEWS FROM THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WHERE
OUT OF THE TOTAL MEMBERSHIP NONE ABSTAINED AND ONLY ISRAEL AND
THE UNITED STATES STOOD IN OPPOSITION TO THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED ON
ISRAEL IN LEBANON. MY HEART HAS INDEED BEEN HEAVY, MR. PRESIDENT,
WITH SO MANY INCOMPREHENSIBLE EVENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS. BEFORE I
MOVE ON YOU TO GIVE YOU THE GIST OF MY IMPRESSIONS OF THE SOVIET
ATTITUDES ATTAINED DURING MY VISIT I WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT I
CAME BACK CONVINCED THAT MY EARLIER ASSESSMENT OF EVENTS IN THIS
AREA AS THEY PERTAIN TO SOVIET DESIGNS AND ASSETS INCLUDED IN A
LETTER TO YOU WERE TOTALLY ACCURATE.

— THE SOVIETS WERE REVELLING IN THEIR CRITICISMS OF U.S. POLICIES
AND TOTAL UNQUALIFIED SUPPORT TO ISRAEL. NO DOUBT RECENT TRAGIC
EVENTS, PARTICULARLY IN LEBANON, HAVE GIVEN THEM SOME GREAT
OPPORTUNITIES TO ENRICH THEIR ARGUMENTS AND FURTHER THEIR AIMS AND
OBJECTIVES.

— THE SOVIETS HAD AN ACCURATE READING OF FACTS ON THE GROUND IN
CONFIRMING WHAT I WROTE TO YOU IN MY LAST LETTER THAT THE
DESTRUCTION OF THE P.L.O. AND PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON OR INDEED
THE HUMILIATION OF THE P.L.O. TO THE POINT OF ITS TOTAL LOSS OF
CREDIBILITY DOES NOT MEAN THE ELIMINATION OF THE PALESTINIAN

CONFIDENTIAL

/PROBLEM

PROBLEM OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR STRUGGLE FOR THEIR USURPED LAND AND DENIED RIGHTS. THAT FURTHERMORE THE REACTION TO SUCH A SITUATION IS DOUND TO HERALD THE BIRTH OF AN ERA OF UNPRECEDENTED VIOLENCE THE WORLD OVER, PARTICULARLY AIMED AT THE UNITED STATES AND INTERESTS AS WELL AS ISRAEL AND ALL THOSE WHO ARE YOUR FRIENDS. YOU SEE, SIR, WHEN DIGNITY IS TRAMPLED AND HUMAN, INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RIGHTS ARE DENIED, WHEN LAND, HOME, BROTHER, SISTER, PARENT OR FRIEND IS LOST, LIFE BECOMES MEANINGLESS EXCEPT IF IT PRESENTS THE CHANCE TO STRIKE BACK AT AN OPPRESSOR AND ALL WITH WHOM HE IDENTIFIES. THESE ARE THE KIND OF ASSETS THAT THE CRIMINAL ISRAELI EXCESSES HAVE PRESENTED THE RADICALS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN THIS WORLD TO EXPLOIT, PARTICULARLY SINCE ISRAEL'S INVASION OF LEBANON.

— THE SOVIETS HAVE PROCEED MY POINT MADE TO YOU IN A RECENT LETTER THAT THEIR ARMS IN THE HANDS OF THEIR SURROGATES IN THE AREA WERE NOT NECESSARILY MEANT TO COUNTER ISRAEL'S ARSENAL, BUT WERE PLACED IN THE AREA IN PURSUIT OF BROADER SOVIET OBJECTIVES. I SUSPECT THAT THE FIGHTING IN LEBANON BETWEEN THE SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS WAS INITIATED EITHER BY ACCIDENT OR THROUGH THE REACTIONS TO THE ISRAELI ADVANCES BY SYRIAN UNITS ON THE GROUND ACTING ON THEIR OWN. IN ANY EVENT, THE SOVIETS HAVE INFORMED ME THAT THEY HAVE AND ARE ACTING TO REPLACE EVERY ITEM THE SYRIANS CLAIM TO HAVE LOST IN RECENT FIGHTING. SO IT GOES, MR. PRESIDENT, WITH THE UNITED STATES PROVIDING AND HAVING PROVIDED ISRAEL WITH ALL MANNERS OF IMPLEMENTS FOR MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE SOVIETS DOING THE SAME FOR THEIR SORROGATES, WHILE THE REST OF US ARABS ARE STRUGGLING TO SAVE AND RETAIN OUR IDENTITY, FREEDOM AND THE RIGHTS OF OUR FUTURE GENERATION —S. AGAINST US ARE ARRAYED THE COMBINED ASSETS OF ZIONISM AND COMMUNISM IN A CONCERTED EFFORT TO POLARIZE THIS AREA AND POSSIBLY DESTROY OUR WORLD IN THE PROCESS.

— THE SOVIETS CLAIMED THEY EXERTED AND ARE EXERTING THEIR BEST POLITICAL EFFORTS WHILE HAVING MOVED SOME ELEMENTS OF THEIR NAVY CLOSE TO THE AREA IN AN ACT OF SOLIDARITY WITH THE VICTIMS OF "THE ISRAELI-AMERICAN AGGRESSION." THE SOVIETS BLAMED ARAB DISUNITY AND DISARRAY FOR WHAT HAS BEFALLEN THE ARAB CAUSE AND NATION. I ASSURED THEM AS I ASSURE YOU, MR PRESIDENT, THAT I BELIEVED IN THE PEOPLE AND NATION TO WHICH I BELONG, AND IN THE JUSTICE OF OUR CAUSE AND IN OUR ABILITY TO EVENTUALLY OVERCOME ALL OUR ILLS AND RETAIN OUR IDENTITY, HONOUR, DIGNITY AND FREEDOM.

— THE IRONY LIES IN THE FACT THAT I ONCE MORE FOUND NO REASON TO NOTE ANY CHANGES IN THE BASIC SOVIET POLITICAL POSITION, IE ISRAEL IS THERE TO STAY. IT HAS THE RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY

CONFIDENTIAL²

/AS

AS DO ALL OTHERS IN THE AREA. ISRAEL MUST IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE INADMISSIBILITY OF ACQUISITION OF TERRITORIES BY WAR VACATE THOSE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN JUNE 1967 AS OUTLINED IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242. ISRAEL IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION MUST PERMIT THE PALESTINIANS TO EXERCISE THAT SACRED RIGHT IN FREEDOM FROM ISRAELI CONTROL AND OCCUPATION. IN OTHER WORDS, THE SUBSTANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 WHICH WE FORMULATED WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, THE PARTITION PLAN OF 1947 WHICH STIPULATED THE CREATION OF A JEWISH AND A PALESTINIAN STATE IN THE PALESTINE OF THE BRITISH MANDATE, AND THE CLEARER DEFINITIONS OF PARTS OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AFFECTING PALESTINIAN RIGHTS.

— THE SOVIETS WERE MOST DISENCHANTED WITH BOTH EGYPT AND IRAQ, EGYPT FOR THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES WHICH IN THEIR VIEW INCLUDE THE PRESENT LEBANESE DISASTER AND THE PRESENCE OF AN AMERICAN UNIT FROM THE R.D.F. IN SINAI, IRAQ IN MY VIEW FOR REFUSING TO BECOME A SOVIET SURROGATE BUT OSTENSIBLY FOR THE WAR THE SOVIETS HAD PREDICTED THEY WOULD LOSE FROM THE OUTSET. THE SOVIETS DID NOT FEEL UNCOMFORTABLE OR UNHAPPY WITH IRAN WHICH DESPITE IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES HAD THROWN OUT YOUR FORMER BASES OFF ITS SOIL. THE SOVIETS PREDICTED A CONTINUATION OF IRAN'S WAR AGAINST IRAQ AND HAD NO SATISFACTORY ANSWERS TO MY QUERY AS TO HOW SOVIET WEAPONS, SOME PREVIOUSLY POSSESSED BY VARIOUS ARAB AND NON-ARAB STATES (WITH AGREEMENTS SIMILAR TO YOUR'S WITH OTHER COUNTRIES PREVENTING THEIR DELIVERY TO THIRD PARTIES WITHOUT THE SUPPLIER'S APPROVAL) FOUND THEIR WAY TO IRAN AS DID ISRAELI WEAPONS AND SPARE PARTS, THUS ENABLING IRAN TO GAIN THE INITIATIVE OVER IRAQ.

— THE SOVIETS SOUGHT AN URGENT DIALOGUE WITH ARAB STATES WHICH DID NOT AS YET HAVE NORMAL RELATIONS WITH THEM. THE SOVIETS SUGGESTED THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A DIALOGUE AND ASSURANCES OF NO AMERICAN BASES IN THE AREA THEY COULD PULL AWAY SOME OF THEIR REMAINING UNITS ON IRAN'S BORDERS WHICH WOULD MEAN THAT EXTRA IRANIAN DIVISIONS WOULD SOON BE MENACING THE GULF STATES, SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAQ. IRAQ IN MY VIEW MUST THUS BE SUPPORTED URGENTLY AS THE BULWARK IN THE FACE OF THESE POSSIBILITIES. IRAQI SOIL MUST NOT BE VIOLATED.

BEYOND THAT IT WAS A PLEASANT VISIT AND THEY WERE GRACIOUS HOSTS AS USUAL.

3
CONFIDENTIAL

/MR PRESIDENT

MR. PRESIDENT, I HAVE RECENTLY VISITED HIS MAJESTY KING FAHD AND I HAVE BEEN MOST REASSURED BY THE ATMOSPHERE OF A TOTAL TRANSFORMATION, RICH IN PROMISE OF A BRIGHTER FUTURE FOR SAUDI ARABIA. I WAS PLEASED TO REALISE THAT BOTH OF US, AS WELL AS PRESIDENT MUBARAK WITH WHOM KING FAHD HAD HAD A GOOD MEETING AND RESULTANT POSITIVE RELATIONS, HAD THE SAME VIEWS OF EVENTS IN OUR AREA AND WERE ADDRESSING YOU FROM THE SAME PERSPECTIVE OF URGENT, IDENTICAL CONCERNS.

SIR, I APPEAL TO YOU MOST URGENTLY TO INSURE NO DIESTRUCATION NOR FRESH HUMILIATION OF THE P.L.O. IF THEY MUST LEAVE LEBANON, THEN EGYPT IS THE BEST CHOICE FOR THEM TO GO TO. THE P.L.O. WILL THEN BECOME TRULY PALESTINIAN. WE BELIEVE THAT RADICALS WITH LOYALTIES TO RADICAL STATES IN THE AREA WOULD NOT CHOOSE TO GO TO EGYPT. PALESTINIANS WITH JORDANIAN PASSPORTS WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO JORDAN AND I ASSUME THAT OTHER NATIONALS WOULD RETURN TO THEIR COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN.

I WOULD, HOWEVER, FEEL LESS THAN HONEST WITH YOU IF I WERE TO GIVE YOU THE IMPRESSION THAT I AM RECOMMENDING THAT PRESIDENT MUBARAK ACCEPT THE P.L.O. IN EGYPT UNLESS AND UNTIL HE AND WE ALL RECEIVE YOUR CLEAREST ASSURANCES THAT YOU WOULD INITIATE ACTION AND TO INSURE OUR RAPIDLY MOVING ONTO A NEW PHASE WITHIN A NEW PROCESS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TOTAL COMPREHENSIVE AND JUST PEACE. THIS CAN ONLY HAPPEN THROUGH A NEW UNITED STATES INITIATIVE OFFERING THE WORLD COMMUNITY, INCLUDING THE SOVIETS, THE OPPORTUNITY TO JOIN ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED IN THE AREA, OBVIOUSLY INCLUDING THE PALESTINIANS, IN AN UNRELENTING EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE ENTIRE ISRAELI-ARAB PROBLEM. SUCH A NEW INITIATIVE MUST BE FOUNDED ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. THE PALESTINIANS MUST BE A PARTY TO RESOLVING THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF THEIR FUTURE ON PALESTINIAN SOIL. THEIR RIGHTS ARE IMPLIED IN THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. THE CREATION OF TWO STATES WAS ALSO IMPLIED IN THE 1947 PARTITION PLAN.

PALESTINIANS TAKEN PRISONER IN LEBANON MUST RECEIVE HUMANE TREATMENT. IT IS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT THIS IS INSURED. IT WOULD BE TOTALLY UNFORGIVABLE TO HAVE THEM TREATED OTHERWISE.

AT THIS POINT, SIR, THE IMAGE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THIS AREA IS UNFORTUNATELY AT AN ALL TIME LOW. THE UNITED STATES IS IDENTIFIED AS ISRAEL'S PARTNER, BENEFACOR, PROTECTOR TOTALLY COMMITTED AND UNQUESTIONING SUPPORTER. ISRAEL'S ATTITUDE AND EXCESSES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND LEBANON SINCE THE SIGNING OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, AS WELL AS ISRAEL'S UNCHALLENGED MISINTERPRETATIONS OF THE SUBSTANCE AND SPIRIT OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, HAVE TOTALLY DESTROYED THE ACCORDS AS A VEHICLE FOR PEACE. THE STIGMA OF CAMP DAVID WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY DESTROY ANY ARAB WHO WOULD ASSOCIATE WITH IT BEYOND THIS POINT. THAT WOULD BE AN UNWARRANTED TRAGIC WASTE.

⁴
CONFIDENTIAL

/π 15

IT IS ONLY THROUGH A FRESH BEGINNING AIMED AT SECURING A JUST, TOTAL AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE AREA THAT HOPES OF ACHIEVING THIS WORTHIER OF OBJECTIVES COULD BE REKINDLED. IT IS ONLY THROUGH A NEW AND BOLD AMERICAN INITIATIVE WITHIN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD REGAIN ITS CREDIBILITY, NOT ONLY IN THIS AREA BUT IN THE WORLD AS THE PRINCIPLED, CONSTRUCTIVE, FAIR AND UNBIASED POWER I STILL BELIEVE IT TO BE. AFTER ALL, YOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF THE BASIS OF ANY MEANINGFUL SOLUTION AS WE HAVE UNDERSTOOD THEM TO BE OVER THE YEARS ARE ALSO THOSE OF EUROPE AND EVEN THE SOVIET UNION, AS WELL AS THE MAJORITY OF NATIONS IN OUR WORLD.

AT THIS DARKEST AND MOST DANGEROUS OF PERIODS IN THE LIFE OF THIS AREA, I REFUSE TO SUCCEED TO DESPAIR IN YOUR ABILITY, MR. PRESIDENT, AND THAT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO CONTRIBUTE POSITIVELY ALONG THE ONLY OBVIOUS ROAD THAT COULD LEAD TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. NOR MUST THE SOVIETS AND OTHERS BE LEFT OUT OF SUCH A PROCESS WHENCE THEY COULD OBSTRUCT PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE.

A NEW AMERICAN INITIATIVE ALONG THESE LINES WOULD TAKE THE WORLD BY SURPRISE. THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE CLEARLY RECOGNIZED THE WORLD OVER AS BEING THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTOR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE. EGYPT'S POSITION WOULD BE STRENGTHENED, THE P.L.O. WOULD BE PROUD OF THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH EGYPT, AND EGYPT WOULD REOCCUPY ITS RIGHTFUL PLACE IN THE ARAB WORLD AND WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE ITS FULL SHARE IN OUR COMMON STRUGGLE TO SAFEGUARD OUR IDENTITY AND FREEDOM.

OUT OF THE DARKNESS, DEATH, DESTRUCTION, SORROW AND DESPAIR OF LEBANON COULD EMERGE HOPE AND THE PROMISE OF THE BETTER FUTURE WE SEEK. IF THIS IS NOT ATTAINED SOON, IT MAY NEVER HAPPEN. TIME IS PRESSING AND DISASTERS MAY SOON OVERTAKE US ALL. ONLY YOU, MR PRESIDENT, ONLY THE UNITED STATES, COULD AVERT DISASTER AND PRODUCE THE CORRECT ANSWER. I PRAY TO GOD THAT IT BE THE INSPIRING CLEAR AND COURAGEOUS ONE WHICH WE HAVE SO LONG AWAITED.

/ I PRAY

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

I PRAY TO GOD TO GUIDE YOU TO TAKE THE RIGHT STEP, MR PRESIDENT. IT COULD BE THE GREATEST STEP ANY WORLD LEADER HAS YET TAKEN FOR THE FUTURE OF THIS ENTIRE AREA AND POSSIBLY WORLD PEACE. THE MAN WHO TAKE SUCH A STEP WOULD TRULY BE IMMORTAL. I PRAY, MR PRESIDENT, THAT YOU ARE THE MAN WHO COULD PRODUCE THE ANSWER AND TAKE THE BOLD STEP, TOGETHER WITH YOUR GREAT NATION IN THE INTEREST OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE.

WITH MY WARMEST PERSONAL WISHES AND HIGHEST ESTEEM,

YOUR SINCERE FRIEND,

HUSSEIN
ENDS

FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.
URWICK

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

THIS TELEGRAM
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ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

6

CONFIDENTIAL

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M/Case

6 July 1982

LEBANON

As agreed on the telephone yesterday, I should be grateful if you could arrange for the despatch of the enclosed letter from the Prime Minister to the President of Lebanon.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

de

SUBJECT

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c. FCO

cc Master
Ops



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

6 July 1982

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T142B/82

Dear Mr. President.

Thank you for your message of 28 June.

I have been deeply shocked by the scale of suffering and devastation in Lebanon following the Israeli invasion. We have joined our European partners in roundly condemning it and in providing help for those in need. As you will have seen from the recent communique issued by the European Council, we and our European partners are doing all we can to bring home to the Israelis the damaging consequences of their action. We ourselves are also in close touch with the American Administration and very much hope that your joint efforts will succeed in restoring to the Lebanon the peace and prosperity she deserves.

Yours sincerely

Raymond Thatcher

His Excellency Mr. Elias Sarkis

File BOC
middle text

5 July 1982

Thank you for your letter of 2 July about Shaikh Zaid's message to the Prime Minister on the subject of the Lebanon.

The Prime Minister has signed the enclosed letter in reply. I should be grateful if you would arrange for its despatch.

JOHN COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

A

SUBJECT

a master
6PS JR



file

cc: fco

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

5 July 1982

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 142^A/82

Your Highness,

Thank you for your message about the tragic situation in Lebanon. I fully share your deep concern at recent events. Britain has been appalled by the destruction and the suffering of Lebanese and Palestinians alike. Having ourselves been the recent victims of an invasion of our sovereign territory in the Falkland Islands, we are only too aware of the importance of international law and of support for the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination.

You will have seen that the Foreign Ministers of the Ten European Community countries were quick to condemn the Israeli invasion in their statement of 9 June. Since then the Ten have been doing all they can to urge restraint on Israel and prevent further suffering. We have called for the immediate implementation of Security Council Resolutions 508 and 509 in order to prevent further casualties. We have been giving humanitarian assistance to the innocent victims of this conflict both bilaterally and through the European Community. We are suspending the signature of the second Financial Protocol with Israel and postponing a ministerial meeting of the EC/Israel Co-operation Council. We also made it clear at the European Council meeting on 29 June that Israel was not receiving any arms supplies from the Ten. The Israeli Government cannot be in any doubt as to the strength of our feeling.

/ We in Britain

RK

We in Britain are keeping in close contact with the US Government who are fully aware of our views. We have underlined to them the importance of finding a solution to the Palestinian problem if the causes of conflict in the Middle East are to be eradicated. We seek peace and justice for all peoples in the region.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Highness Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan Al Nahayyan, GCMG.

SUBJECT

T

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 1723

PS (6) *cc Mr. Hurd*
eps

PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR MOBERLY
SIR J BULLARD
HD/NENAD
HD/MED
HD/UND
HD/SEC DEPT
HD/...*SEP*...

PRIME MINISTER

PERSONAL MESSAGE

142 *in/sec*
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RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DAR ES SALAAM 041030Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 271 OF 4 JULY 1982

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

INFO SAVING TO PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS

M.I.P.T. LEBANON

IMMEDIATE
ADVANCE COPY

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESIDENT NYERERE'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

BEGINS: 'I AM WRITING TO YOU ON THE SUBJECT OF LEBANON. WITHOUT ANY QUESTION, THE ISRAELI INVASION IS A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORY INTEGRITY OF LEBANON. IT CONSTITUTES AN ARROGANT DISREGARD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OF THE BASIC PRICIPLES OF MANKIND'S COMMON HUMANITY. AND IT CANNOT POSSIBLY BE JUSTIFIED ON THE GROUNDS OF A THREAT TO ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE OR SECURITY BY LEBANON, OR FROM LEBANON BY THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION. NO SUCH THREAT DID EXIST OR COULD EXIST. THE DEATHS FROM GUERRILLA ACTIVITY OR FROM TERRORISM IN ISRAEL, OR OF ISRAELIS ELSEWHERE, CAN NO MORE JUSTIFY

~~EXIST OR COULD EXIST. THE DEATHS FROM GUERRILLA ACTIVITY OR FROM TERRORISM IN ISRAEL, OR OF ISRAELIS ELSEWHERE, CAN NO MORE JUSTIFY THE MASSACRE IN LEBANON THAN THE ASSASSINATION OF ONE NAZI OFFICIAL BY ONE JEWISH YOUTH COULD JUSTIFY THE EXTERMINATION AT LIDICE.~~

THE STATE OF ISRAEL EXISTS AND HAS ALL THE RIGHTS OF A STATE. BUT IS HAS NO RIGHTS OVER OTHER PEOPLES OR OTHER NATIONS, AND IT HAS NO RIGHT TO IGNORE THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH CREATED IT. FOR THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE ALSO EXIST: AND THEY TOO HAVE RIGHTS TO A STATE WITHIN INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED BORDERS. THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS LIVING TOGETHER, EACH IN THEIR OWN HOMELAND, AND ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL RESPECT, IS AN URGENT ONE. THE SUFFERING, MISERY, AND DESTRUCTION CAUSED BY THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON, AND ITS AIR AND SEA ATTACKS ON THE TERRITORY OF THAT COUNTRY, HAVE HAD A DEVASTATING EFFECT UPON THAT SEARCH, AND THEREFORE UPON THE FUTURE SECURITY OF ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE MIDDLE EAST - INCLUDING THE ISRAELIS THEMSELVES. IT IS CERTAIN THAT NEITHER THE CAUSE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, NOR THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE P.L.O. AS THEIR REPRESENTATIVE, CAN BE ELIMINATED BY DEATH AND DESTRUCTION LAUNCHED FROM ISRAEL.

THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN, WOMEN, AND MEN, KILLED AND WOUNDED AS A RESULT OF THIS INVASION OF LEBANON IS AT PRESENT - AND PERHAPS FOREVER - UNCOUNTABLE, FOR RESCUE TEAMS AND MEDICAL SERVICES HAVE BEEN OVERWHELMED. IN ADDITION, THOUSANDS UPON THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE HAVE BEEN FORCED TO FLEE FROM THEIR HOMES AND ARE WANDERING AS REFUGEES WITHOUT FOOD OR SHELTER. YET THIS TRAGEDY HAS LED TO ANOTHER: THE WORLD HAS BEEN LOOKING ON AS IF IT WAS HELPLESS. INDEED ONE WOULD ALMOST THINK THAT WE ARE ALL INDIFFERENT TO THE SUFFERING, AND IGNORANT OF THE DANGER OF AN EVEN GREATER CONFLAGRATION FOLLOWING UPON THIS ISRAELI ATTACK UPON A UNITED NATIONS MEMBER-COUNTRY. AND THERE IS YET A THIRD TRAGEDY. IT IS THAT THOSE WHO SUFFERED FROM THE HOLOCAUST, AND WHOSE STATE WAS ESTABLISHED OUT OF THE WORLD'S SYMPATHY FOR THAT ATTEMPT AT GENOCIDE, SHOULD NOW THEMSELVES BE ENGAGED IN WHAT APPEARS TO BE LITTLE LESS THAN AN ATTEMPT TO EXTERMINATE ANOTHER PEOPLE.

I AM APPEALING TO YOU, MADAME PRIME MINISTER, TO USE THE GREAT INFLUENCE, PRESTIGE AND POWER OF YOUR COUNTRY TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO BRING ISRAEL'S INVASION OF LEBANON TO AN END. IN PARTICULAR, AND WITH THE UTMOST URGENCY, I APPEAL TO YOU TO TAKE SUCH ACTIONS AS WILL DETER ISRAEL FROM CARRYING OUT ITS THREATENED ATTACK AGAINST WEST BEIRUT, AND AS WILL

I AM APPEALING TO YOU, MADAME PRIME MINISTER, TO USE THE GREAT INFLUENCE, PRESTIGE AND POWER OF YOUR COUNTRY TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO BRING ISRAEL'S INVASION OF LEBANON TO AN END. IN PARTICULAR, AND WITH THE UTMOST URGENCY, I APPEAL TO YOU TO TAKE SUCH ACTIONS AS WILL DETER ISRAEL FROM CARRYING OUT ITS THREATENED ATTACK AGAINST WEST BEIRUT, AND AS WILL CAUSE A SPEEDY WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ISRAELI ARMED FORCES FROM THE TERRITORY OF LEBANON.

I AM SENDING A SIMILAR APPEAL TO THE LEADERS OF ALL OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. MY HOPE IS THAT, EITHER INDIVIDUALLY OR COLLECTIVELY, YOU WILL ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY WHICH THIS POSITION GIVES TO YOUR NATION FOR THE MAINTENANCE OR THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD.

JULIUS K. NYERERE. 3 JULY 1982.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING

SANKEY

NNNN

REVISION IN 1987 OF THE 1975 AGREEMENT ON THE PROVISION OF
EXERCISE OF CORRELATIVE RIGHTS. THE AGREEMENT IS A JOINTLY
BY THE STATES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES
IN 1975. THE AGREEMENT IS A JOINTLY BY THE STATES OF THE ORGANIZATION
AND IT SHOULD BE REVISITED ON THE BASIS OF A 1987
AND THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF ANTI-COMMERCIAL COMPETITION
REVISION. THE AGREEMENT IS A JOINTLY BY THE STATES OF THE ORGANIZATION
AND IT SHOULD BE REVISITED ON THE BASIS OF A 1987



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

(1)

Agree to sending

2 July, 1982

This message to President

Sarkis?

Yes

Dear John,

rus 2/7

Message to the Prime Minister from the President of Lebanon

I enclose the text of a message we have received from President Sarkis. Although this is addressed to Heads of State, the Lebanese Ambassador asked that it should be forwarded to the Prime Minister.

There is nothing of substance in the message and Mr Pym would not normally recommend a reply. But with the present conflict in Lebanon still unresolved, a reply to the Lebanese President would certainly be appreciated. I enclose a draft. If the Prime Minister approves it, it would be best to send the reply via the Lebanese Embassy here since communications with our Embassy are difficult at present.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)

Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT SARKIS
OF LEBANON

Thank you for your message of 28 June.

I have been deeply shocked by the scale of suffering and devastation in Lebanon following the Israeli invasion. We have joined our European partners in roundly condemning it and in providing help for those in need. As you will have seen from the recent communique issued ^{by} the European Council we and our European partners are doing all we can to bring home to the Israelis the damaging consequences of their action. We ourselves are also in close touch with the American Administration and very much hope that your joint efforts will succeed in restoring to the Lebanon the peace and prosperity she deserves.

Please type

by P.M.'s

signature.

MM $\frac{5}{2}$.

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RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 July 1982

Dear John,

Israel/Lebanon: Message from President of UAE

// Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan Al Nahayan, the President of the UAE, recently sent a message to the Prime Minister on the subject of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (Abu Dhabi telnos 105, 106, copies attached).

/ I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to Shaikh Zaid. It is cast in the form of a telegram to Abu Dhabi.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats
RESTRICTED

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1 ZCZC
2 GRS
3 RESTRICTED
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6 FM FCO
7 TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO ROUTINE DUBAI, TEL AVIV
10 INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, VIENNA
11 YOUR TELNO 105 AND 106: ISRAEL/LEBANON
12 1. Please pass the following reply to Shaikh Zaid's recent
13 message to the Prime Minister:
14 **BEGINS:** Your Highness,
15 Thank you for your ~~recent~~ message about the tragic situation in
16 Lebanon. I fully share your deep concern at recent events.
17 Britain has been appalled by the destruction and the suffering
18 of Lebanese and Palestinians alike. Having ourselves been the
19 recent victims of an invasion of our sovereign territory in the
20 Falkland Islands, we are only too aware of the importance of
21 international law and of support for the principles of
22 territorial integrity and self-determination.
23 You will have seen that the Foreign Ministers of the Ten
24 European Community countries were quick to condemn the Israeli
25 invasion in their statement of 9 June. Since then ^{the Ten} we have been

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Drafted by (Block capitals) PRIVATE SECRETARY		
Telephone number 233 4641		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

RESTRICTED

Page

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1 <<<<

2 doing all ^{they} we can to urge restraint on Israel and prevent further
 3 suffering. We have called for the immediate implementation of
 4 Security Council Resolutions 508 and 509 in order to prevent
 5 further casualties. We have been giving humanitarian assistance
 6 to the innocent victims of this conflict both bilaterally and
 7 through the European Community. ~~More recently you will have~~
 8 ~~seen that~~ We are suspending the signature of the second Financial
 9 Protocol with Israel and postponing a ministerial meeting of the
 10 EC/Israel Co-operation Council. We also made it clear at the
 11 European Council meeting on 29 June that Israel was not
 12 receiving any arms supplies from the Ten. The Israeli
 13 Government cannot ~~now~~ be in any doubt as to the strength of our
 14 feeling.

15 We ^{in Britain} are keeping in close contact with the US Government ^{who} and they
 16 ^h ~~too~~ ^{fully} are aware of our views. We have underlined to them the
 17 importance of finding a solution to the Palestinian problem
 18 if the causes of conflict in the Middle East are to be eradicated.
 19 ~~Our statement following the European Council likewise~~ ^{We seek}
 20 ~~demonstrates our continuing concern to see progress made towards~~
 21 peace and justice for all peoples in the region.

22 With best wishes, Margaret Thatcher.

23 ENDS

25 PYM

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FM WASHINGTON 030028Z JUL 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
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INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, CAIRO, UKMIS NEW YORK, JEDDA, PARIS AND
AMMAN

MS

ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. EAGLEBURGER HAS TOLD US THAT HE HAS BEEN ON THE TELEPHONE TO HABIB ALL DAY. HABIB BELIEVES THAT THERE IS NOW A POSSIBILITY OF A BREAK-THROUGH, AS THE PLO APPEAR TO HAVE ACCEPTED THAT THEY WILL HAVE TO LEAVE WEST BEIRUT WITHOUT MILITARY EQUIPMENT EXCEPT FOR THEIR PERSONAL ARMS. THE LEBANESE HAVE BEEN MUCH FIRMER IN THEIR RECENT EXCHANGES WITH THEM. THE TA'IF MEETING YESTERDAY HAD NOT SOUGHT TO OPPOSE A SOLUTION ON THESE LINES, THANKS TO THE ATTITUDE TAKEN BY THE LEBANESE, AND BY THE SAUDIS WITH WHOM THE AMERICANS WERE IN VERY CLOSE TOUCH.
2. THERE WERE TWO MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCKS. THE PLAN DEPENDED ON THE AMERICANS BEING ABLE TO PUT TOGETHER A MULTINATIONAL FORCE TO SUPERVISE AND HELP POLICE THE CITY WHILE THE PLO HANDED OVER THEIR ARMS TO THE LEBANESE; AND TO REASSURE THE MUSLIM POPULATION THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED BY THE CHRISTIAN MILITIAS. THE AMERICANS DID NOT ENVISAGE SUCH A FORCE REMAINING IN BEIRUT FOR MORE THAN THIRTY DAYS. THEY WOULD NOT BE PRESSING US TO PARTICIPATE. THE PRESIDENT HAD NOT YET TAKEN A DECISION AS TO WHETHER THE AMERICANS WOULD DO SO: A RECOMMENDATION THAT THEY SHOULD WAS BEING PUT TO HIM THIS EVENING. THE AMERICANS WOULD BE TRYING TO PUT TOGETHER A US/FRENCH FORCE AND WERE IN TOUCH WITH THE FRENCH ABOUT THIS.
3. THE OTHER MAJOR DIFFICULTY WAS WHERE TO PUT THE 5,000 OR SO ARMED PLO. THE LEBANESE WERE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO SENDING THEM TO SYRIA, AS WERE THE AMERICANS, AS THIS WOULD SIMPLY LEAD TO FRESH INFILTRATION. THEY WERE TRYING TO GET MUBARAK TO ACCEPT THEM. AS WITH OTHER ARAB PROTECTORS OF THE PLO, MUBARAK WAS DOING HIS UTMOST TO AVOID HAVING THEM ON HIS TERRITORY. THE SAUDIS AND JORDANIANS HAVE APPARENTLY BEEN URGING HIM TO AGREE.
4. EAGLEBURGER EMPHASIZED THAT ALL THIS WAS AT A VERY DELICATE STAGE. THE AMERICANS DID NOT KNOW IF THE FRENCH WOULD AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN A FORCE; AND IF MUBARAK WOULD AGREE TO RECEIVE THE PLO. THE SAUDIS HAD OFFERED FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE WITH THEIR RE-LOCATION. HABIB COULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT A SOLUTION ON THESE LINES COULD BE ACHIEVED. BUT HE WAS SAYING THAT HE COULD NOT ACHIEVE ONE UNLESS THE PROBLEMS OF THE DESTINATION FOR THE PLO AND A MONITORING FORCE WERE SOLVED QUICKLY.

SECRET

/5.

SECRET

5. WE ASKED ABOUT THE PALESTINIAN DEMAND FOR A RESIDUAL POLITICAL PRESENCE IN WEST BEIRUT. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THE LEBANESE AND THE AMERICANS COULD ACCEPT THIS, THOUGH THERE WOULD BE FIERCE RESISTANCE FROM THE ISRAELIS. THE AMERICANS WERE BEING TOLD BY EVERYONE THAT THE PLO MUST NOT BE HUMILIATED AND MUST THEREFORE BE ALLOWED TO RETAIN SOME RESIDUAL ARMED PRESENCE IN THE LEBANON. THERE WERE ABOUT 300 PLO WITH ARMS IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY. IF THEY RE-GROUPED THE AMERICANS COULD FOR THEIR PART ACQUIESCE IN THEIR REMAINING.

6. EAGLEBURGER SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NOT YET GONE THROUGH ALL THIS IN DETAIL WITH THE ISRAELIS. THEY WOULD HAVE TO BEGIN TO DO SO TOMORROW, BEFORE THE ISRAELI CABINET MET ON SUNDAY. THERE WOULD THEN BE A TREMENDOUS ROW AND ALL SORTS OF LEAKS FROM JERUSALEM. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD BEEN INFORMED OF MOST OF THE ABOVE. IN DOING SO THE AMERICANS HAD MADE CLEAR TO THEM WHAT THEY THOUGHT OF THE FRANCO/EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE IN NEW YORK. IF THE FRENCH CONTINUED WITH IT, THE AMERICANS WOULD VETO. IT WAS CRUCIAL TO AVOID ANY ACTION THAT COULD LEAD TO A BREAKDOWN OF HABIB'S NEGOTIATIONS. THE FRENCH HAD AGREED THAT THEY WOULD NOT PURSUE THIS IN NEW YORK AT ANY RATE UNTIL TUESDAY. THE LEBANESE WERE STRONGLY AGAINST THE FRENCH MOVE, FOR THE SAME REASON AS THE AMERICANS.

7. EAGLEBURGER MADE CLEAR THAT THE AMERICANS SAW HABIB'S EFFORTS, WHICH HAD NOW REACHED A CRITICAL STAGE, AS THE ONLY POSSIBILITY OF AVOIDING A BLOOD BATH IN WEST BEIRUT. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE ABOVE WAS BEING TOLD US IN STRICT CONFIDENCE HE ASKED THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED TO OTHER US OFFICIALS, STILL LESS TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS.

8. FCO PLEASE PASS TO BEIRUT.

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SIR J LEAHY
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*I have covered the issue of
the J.R.'s minute only, &
the F.I.C.O. who will be submitting
advise shortly. A.S.C. 5/7*

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The F.I.C.O. will let us have advice.*

A.S.C. 2/7

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DESKBY 021500Z

FM TUNIS 021135Z JULY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 111 OF 02 JULY

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT DAMASCUS AMMAN JEEDA UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON
ROUTINE OTHER ME POSTS PARIS

LEBANON

1. OMRAN, ARAB LEAGUE ASSISTANT SECRETARY-GENERAL, HAS TOLD ME THAT THE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE IN TAIF HAS APPOINTED DELEGATIONS TO CALL ON THE HEADS OF STATE (OR GOVERNMENT) AND FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. EACH DELEGATION WILL COMPRISE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS AND A SENIOR PLO REPRESENTATIVE. ALL ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING MADE THROUGH THE ARAB LEAGUE. THE DELEGATIONS ARE TO REPORT BACK TO THE COMMITTEE, WHICH IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN IN SESSION IN TAIF

5STATIVE. ALL ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING MADE THROUGH THE ARAB LEAGUE. THE DELEGATIONS ARE TO REPORT BACK TO THE COMMITTEE, WHICH IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN IN SESSION IN TAIF.

2. OMRAN, SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF KLIBI AND THE COMMITTEE, ASKED WHETHER AN APPOINTMENT COULD BE MADE FOR A DELEGATION COMPRISING THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF TUNISIA AND BAHRAIN AND AN AS YET UNNAMED PLO REPRESENTATIVE TO CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF ON THE AFTERNOON OF FRIDAY 9 JULY OR, FAILING THAT, SATURDAY 10 JULY. OMRAN REALISES THAT THESE DATES ARE PROBABLY INCONVENIENT. HE APOLOGISED AND EXPLAINED THAT THE DELEGATION CANNOT ASSEMBLE EARLIER AND IS DUE TO REPORT BACK TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE WEEKEND OF 10/11 JULY.

STIRLING

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 694 OF 2 JULY 1982
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, DAMASCUS,
JEDDA, AMMAN, CAIRO, TUNIS

W

MY TELNO 693 AND TELECOM ARBUTHNOTT/MILES: LEBANON

1. THIS AFTERNOON'S EDITION OF LE MONDE CARRIES THE TEXTS OF TWO STATEMENTS ON THE LEBANESE CRISIS. THE FIRST IS SIGNED BY THREE PROMINENT FIGURES FROM WORLD JEWRY, PIERRE MENDES FRANCE (THE FORMER FRENCH PRIME MINISTER), DR NAHUM GOLDMANN, (LIFE PRESIDENT OF THE WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS) AND PHILIP KLUTZNICK (HONORARY PRESIDENT OF THE CONGRESS AND FORMER MINISTER IN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION IN WASHINGTON). THE SECOND IS IN THE NAME OF DR ISSAM SARTAQUI, A MEMBER OF THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL RESIDENT IN FRANCE.

2. ACCORDING TO LE MONDE THE TWO LINKED STATEMENTS ARE THE RESULT OF SECRET NEGOTIATIONS CARRIED OUT IN PARIS OVER THE LAST 48 HOURS. IT NOTES THAT SARTAQUI HAS ACTED IN THE PAST AS A
... USED BY HIM TO CONDUCT

2. ACCORDING TO LE MONDE THE TWO LINKED STATEMENTS ARE THE RESULT OF SECRET NEGOTIATIONS CARRIED OUT IN PARIS OVER THE LAST 48 HOURS. IT NOTES THAT SARTAOUI HAS ACTED IN THE PAST AS A TROUBLE SHOOTER FOR ARAFAT AND HAS BEEN USED BY HIM TO CONDUCT PARALLEL DIPLOMACY. IT SAYS THAT SARTAOUI CONVEYED THE TEXT OF THE TWO DECLARATIONS TO ARAFAT YESTERDAY, BUT THAT ARAFAT HAS NOT REACTED. IN THE VIEW OF LE MONDE ARAFAT'S SILENCE COULD REPRESENT AN AMBER LIGHT, ALLOWING SARTAOUI TO PURSUE HIS INITIATIVE. IF THIS WAS TO AROUSE THE INTEREST OF FOREIGN POWERS ARAFAT MIGHT BE BETTER PLACED TO PRESERVE FACE.

3. THE FULL TEXT OF THE FIRST STATEMENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

"PEACE IS CONCLUDED NOT BETWEEN FRIENDS, BUT BETWEEN ENEMIES WHO HAVE STRUGGLED AND SUFFERED. OUR SENSE OF JEWISH HISTORY AND THE DEMANDS OF THE MOMENT BRING US TO STATE THAT THE TIME HAS COME FOR THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF THE ISRAELI AND THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. IT IS NECESSARY TO PUT AN END TO THE STERILE DEBATE IN WHICH THE ARAB WORLD CONTESTS THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL AND THE JEWS CONTEST THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS TO INDEPENDENCE.

THE REAL QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER THE PALESTINIANS HAVE THIS RIGHT, BUT HOW TO IMPLEMENT IT WHILE GUARANTEEING THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL AND THE STABILITY OF THE REGION.

CONCEPTS SUCH AS 'AUTONOMY' ARE NO LONGER SUFFICIENT, BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN USED MORE TO AVOID THE ISSUE THAN TO BRING CLARITY. WHAT IS NECESSARY NOW IS TO FIND A POLITICAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN NATIONALISMS.

THE WAR IN LEBANON MUST END. ISRAEL MUST LIFT THE SEIGE OF BEIRUT TO FACILITATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PLO WHICH WILL LEAD TO A SETTLEMENT. MUTUAL RECOGNITION MUST BE SOUGHT WITHOUT RESPITE. NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE ENGAGED TO BRING ABOUT CO-EXISTENCE BETWEEN THE ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN PEOPLES ON THE BASIS OF SELF-DETERMINATION."

4. THE TEXT OF THE SECOND STATEMENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

"THE UNPRECEDENTED DECLARATION PUBLISHED TODAY BY THREE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PERSONALITIES OF WORLD JEWRY HAS A VERY GREAT SIGNIFICANCE. THIS DECLARATION CONTAINS A PROGRAMME TO BRING US OUT OF THE CRISIS WHICH IS RAGING IN LEBANON. IT IS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THE SEARCH FOR A JUST AND HONOURABLE PEACE IN THE NEAR EAST.

THIS PEACE CAN BE CONCLUDED ONLY BY THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE EXPRESSING ITSELF THROUGH ITS LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVES, THE PLO. ONLY A PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP WHICH IS STRONG, PROUD AND INDEPENDENT WILL BE CAPABLE OF CONCLUDING SUCH A PEACE.

MOST IMPORTANT PERSONALITIES OF WORLD JEWRY HAS A VERY GREAT SIGNIFICANCE. THIS DECLARATION CONTAINS A PROGRAMME TO BRING US OUT OF THE CRISIS WHICH IS RAGING IN LEBANON. IT IS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THE SEARCH FOR A JUST AND HONOURABLE PEACE IN THE NEAR EAST.

THIS PEACE CAN BE CONCLUDED ONLY BY THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE EXPRESSING ITSELF THROUGH ITS LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVES, THE PLO. ONLY A PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP WHICH IS STRONG, PROUD AND INDEPENDENT WILL BE CAPABLE OF CONCLUDING SUCH A PEACE.

THE EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE OF THE DECLARATION OF THESE THREE BRAVE JEWISH PERSONALITIES LIES IN THEIR RECOGNITION OF THIS REALITY AND THEIR AFFIRMATION THAT THE PEACE PROCESS MUST BE BASED ON THE JOINT EFFORTS OF THE TWO PEOPLES.

I WANT THEIR URGENT, WISE APPEAL FOR AN HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT TO BE HEARD THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.''

FRETWELL

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SENT AT 02/1817Z AB/JB

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FM TEL AVIV 021300Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 293 OF 02 JUL 82

INFO PRIORITY MODUK, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, DAMASCUS,
CAIRO, AMMAN, JEDDA

M

IMMEDIATE

MY TELEGRAM NO 287 : ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. THE US EMBASSY HAVE GIVEN US AN ACCOUNT OF DRAPER'S VISIT
HERE YESTERDAY.

2. BROWN (MINISTER/COUNSELLOR) SAID THAT IT WAS
ESSENTIALLY A HANDHOLDING EXERCISE , INTENDED TO BUY TIME .
DRAPER HAD ASSURED THE ISRAELIS THAT HABIB STILL BELIEVED A
SOLUTION BY PEACEFUL MEANS WAS POSSIBLE . THOUGH THE ISRAELIS
HAD ACCEPTED THAT HABIB WAS DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE , THE PRE-
DOMINANT MOOD WAS ONE OF SCEPTICISM . THE ISRAELIS CONTINUED TO
BELIEVE THAT THE PLO WERE STRINGING TXALONG AND HAD NO INTENTION
OF LEAVING BEIRUT WITHOUT BEING FORCED OUT . ISRAELI MINISTERS
HAD GIVEN NO ULTIMATUM BUT HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD WISH
TO SEE EARLY SIGNS OF PROGRESS . BROWN BELIEVED THAT THE CABINET
MEETING ON SUNDAY WOULD BE CRUCIAL .

3. BROWN ALSO SAID THAT DRAPER HAD TOLD THE US EMBASSY THAT HABIB

3. BROWN ALSO SAID THAT DRAPER HAD TOLD THE US EMBASSY THAT HABIB HAD THROWN HIMSELF INTO THE JOB OF SALVING SOMETHING IN BEIRUT WITH GREAT DETERMINATION . BUT HE HAD FOUND THE LEBANESE , ESPECIALLY THE MOSLEMS WHO WERE HNDESTEIDLQLY WORRIED AT WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN TO THEM AFTER THE ISRAELIS LEFT IF THE PLO HAD NOT BEEN REMOVED FROM LEBANON , MADDENINGLY RELUCTANT TO SPEAK TO THE PLO IN SUFFICIENTLY FIRM TERMS. INSTEAD OF MAKING PROPOSALS , THEY TENDED TO ASK ARAFAT WHAT HE THOUGHT , WITH PRE-
DICTABLE RESULTS . NEVERTHELESS , HABIB HAD AT LEAST MANAGED TO GET ACROSS THAT THE PLO HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO LEAVE .

4. THE POLITICAL COUNSELLOR AT THE US EMBASSY GAVE A SIMILAR ACCOUNT . HARE BELIEVED THAT IF HABIB HAD PRODUCED CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF PROGRESS BY 4 JULY THE ISRAELI CABINET WOULD ALLOW HIM MORE TIME . OTHERWISE , THERE WAS A STRONG LIKELIHOOD THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD RESORT TO MILITARY ACTION ; HARE THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS MORE LIKELY TO TAKE THE FORM OF FURTHER TURNS OF THE SCREW THAN ALL OUT ASSAULT.

5. HARE COMMENTED THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET WAS UNANIMOUS IN PREFERRING A DIPLOMATIC TO A MILITARY SOLUTION: THE ISRAELIS WERE CONSCIOUS OF THE HIGH COST OF TAKING BEIRUT . BUT ANYONE WHO THOUGHT THAT THEY WERE BLUFFING ABOUT THE MILITARY OPTION WAS MISTAKE THE ISRAELIS SIMPLY COULD NOT AFFORD TO WALK AWAY , LEAVING THE PLO IN POSSESSION OF BEIRUT .

6. HARE CITED BEGIN'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE PLO WOULD BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE BEIRUT WITH THEIR PERSONAL WEAPONS AS EVIDENCE OF THE ISRAEL PREFERENCE FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION . HE BELIEVED THAT SHARON SUPPORTED THE DECISION . BUT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD NOT KNOWN ABOUT IT IN ADVANCE ; SHAMIR HAD INDICATED TO THE US AMBASSADOR THAT , HAD HE BEEN CONSULTED , HE WOULD HAVE OPPOSED IT .

MOBERLY

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DESKBY 011630Z FCO, UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

FM PARIS 011530Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 679 OF 1 JULY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS,
JEDDA, AMMAN, CAIRO AND TUNIS

MY TELSNOs 675-6 AND MIPT: LEBANON

1. ANSWERING QUESTIONS IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY YESTERDAY, CHEYSSON MADE REMARKABLE CLAIMS FOR THE SCOPE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF FRENCH DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE SAID THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WAS PRESENT AND ACTIVE EVERYWHERE IN THE REGION, AND ALSO IN CONTACTS WITH THE SUPERPOWERS. EVERYWHERE GOVERNMENTS WERE TURNING TO FRANCE FOR INTERVENTION, SUPPORT AND GUARANTEES. ALL THE ARAB COUNTRIES, THE PLO AND THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES SUPPORTED THE FRENCH POSITION, WHICH WAS "TOTALLY DIFFERENT" FROM THE ANALYSIS OF ISRAEL AND THE US. HE SAID THAT SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN THE LAST FEW DAYS, NOTABLY BECAUSE THE AMERICANS AND ISRAELIS HAD RECOGNISED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE CLEVER TO HUMILIATE THE PALESTINIAN FORCES IN BEIRUT AT THE TIME OF THEIR RETREAT.

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IT WOULD NOT BE CLEVER TO HUMILIATE THE PALESTINIAN FORCES IN BEIRUT AT THE TIME OF THEIR RETREAT.

2. THE QUAI D'ORSAY HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT GUTMANN, SECRETARY GENERAL AT THE QUAI, ACCOMPANIED BY DELAYE FROM CHEYSSON'S CABINET WOULD BE LEAVING TODAY FOR BEIRUT. HE WOULD BE DELIVERING AN ORAL MESSAGE FROM MITTERRAND TO PRESIDENT SARKIS IN REPLY TO A LETTER WHICH THE LATTER HAD SENT HIM ON 29 JUNE. GUTMANN AND DELAYE WOULD ALSO BE SEEING WAZZAN BEFORE GOING ON TO ISRAEL, AMMAN AND DAMASCUS.

3. CHEYSSON HELD A FURTHER MEETING WITH THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IN PARIS TODAY 1 JULY (SEE MIPT). INTERVIEWED BY AFP, GHALI IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT THE ACTION EGYPT IS UNDERTAKING WAS DESIGNED TO AVOID A LASTING BREAK BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB WORLD WHICH WOULD BE THE RESULT OF AN ISRAELI ASSAULT AGAINST BEIRUT. GHALI DID NOT EXCLUDE EGYPTIAN PARTICIPATION IN ANY INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN THE LEBANON.

4. AFTER A MEETING WITH CHEYSSON YESTERDAY EVENING HABIB CHATTY, THE TUNISIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, TOLD THE PRESS THAT CONFIDENCE WAS BEING RESTORED BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES. "IN THIS PERSPECTIVE THE VOYAGE OF FRANCOIS MITTERRAND TO ISRAEL APPEARS AS A PASSING EVENT, NOT AS A TURNING POINT OF FRENCH POLICY."

FRETWELL

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FM WASHINGTON 010130Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2301 OF 1 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDA, PARIS,
UKMIS NEW YORK

LEBANON.

1. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE THIS EVENING, REAGAN SAID THAT HE HAD HOPED FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEBANON. THE AMERICANS HAD RECEIVED NO PRIOR WARNING OR NOTIFICATION OF THE ISRAELI INVASION. HE PAID TRIBUTE TO HABIB'S EFFORTS IN NEGOTIATING LAST YEAR'S CEASEFIRE WHICH HAD KEPT THE LID ON THE SITUATION FOR 11 MONTHS. BUT IT HAD BEEN BROKEN BY CROSS-BORDER ROCKET AND ARTILLERY FIRE.

2. THE U S GOALS WERE THE END OF BLOODSHED, THE FORMATION OF A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY AND A SINGLE LEBANESE ARMY, A GUARANTEE OF THE ISRAELI BORDER AGAINST ATTACK, AND THE REMOVAL FROM LEBANON OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES SYRIAN, ISRAELI AND PLO. THE PLO HAD TO BE DIFFERENTIATED FROM THE PALESTINIANS. HE HOPED TO DEAL ONCE AND FOR ALL WITH THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS. REAGAN DECLINED TO BE DRAWN ON DETAILS OF THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS OR POSSIBLE AMERICAN

HOPED TO DEAL ONCE AND FOR ALL WITH THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS. REAGAN DECLINED TO BE DRAWN ON DETAILS OF THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS OR POSSIBLE AMERICAN ACTION.

3. ASKED ABOUT THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON 24 JUNE THAT BEGIN HAD PROMISED HIM THAT ISRAELI FORCES WOULD NOT GO INTO WEST BEIRUT (MY TELNO 2247), REAGAN SAID THAT THE SPOKESMAN HAD NOT ATTENDED HIS MEETING WITH BEGIN. BEGIN HAD NOT GIVEN A PROMISE. HE HAD SAID ONLY THAT ISRAEL DID NOT WANT TO GO IN.

4. ON POSSIBLE MIXED SIGNALS TO THE PLO (MY TELNO 2289) REAGAN DENIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN ANY CONFUSION. ALL CONCERNED IN WASHINGTON HAD BEEN KEPT FULLY INFORMED OF WHAT WAS SAID. THEY WERE IN CONSTANT COMMUNICATIONS WITH HABIB AND TAKING THEIR LEAD FROM HIS REPORTING AND ADVICE.

5. REAGAN SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE, AS REQUIRED BY LAW, LOOKING INTO THE USE IN LEBANON OF U S MADE WEAPONS, INCLUDING CLUSTER-BOMBS, AND WOULD REPORT TO CONGRESS IN DUE COURSE.

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FROM RIYADH 301100Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 43 OF 30 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS.

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, CAIRO, TUNIS, JEDDA.

FROM AMBASSADOR IN RIYADH

YOUR TELNO 1246 TO WASHINGTON: LEBANON

1. I HAVE LITTLE TO CONTRIBUTE. PRINCE SAUD AND HIS SENIOR ADVISERS ARE COMPLETELY TAKEN UP WITH THEIR TRAVELS, THEIR VISITORS AND THEIR CONSULTATIONS SEMI COLON AND THE GOVERNMENT IS ANYWAY IN TAIF.

2. BUT IN CONFIRMATION OF THE LAST PHRASE OF YOUR PARAGRAPH ONE, I MUST RECORD THAT THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF COMMERCE TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT THE WHOLE KINGDOM WAS SEETHING WITH ANGER AND SHAME. MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT, LIKE HIM, WERE BEING TREATED WITH CONTEMPT BY THEIR FRIENDS AND THE PUBLIC BECAUSE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S INACTION.

3. ZAMIL HIMSELF WAS HOPING THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD ATTACK BEIRUT. ANOTHER MONTH'S FIGHTING WOULD BRING THE WHOLE ARAB WORLD OUT ON THE STREETS. GOVERNMENTS HAD DONE NOTHING: LET THE PEOPLE TAKE OVER.

4. THIS FROM A MAN WHO, THOUGH ALWAYS TRENCHANT IN HIS OPINIONS, IS A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE ESTABLISHMENT, BOTH POLITICAL AS A DEPUTY MINISTER, AND COMMERCIAL AS A MEMBER OF A LARGE AND RICH MERCHANT FAMILY.

5. AS SEEN FROM HERE THE ATTITUDE OF THE AMERICANS IS PERVERSE. THEIR CLAIM (PARA 6 OF WASHINGTON TELNO 2289) TO BE DOING THEIR UTMOST TO AVOID AN ISRAELI ATTACK ON BEIRUT BUT WITH LITTLE PROSPECT OF DOING SO MUST BE INCOMPREHENSIBLE TO THE SAUDIS UNLESS THEY ARE ARGUING WITH THE ISRAELIS IN A NERVOUS WHISPER.

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FM AMMAN 301730Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 277 OF 30 JUN

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON. ROUTINE CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, PARIS,
TEL AVIV, TUNIS, UKMIS NEWYORK

YOUR TELNO 1246 TO WASHINGTON: LEBANON

1. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN THIS AFTERNOON SHORTLY AFTER HIS RETURN FROM THE SOVIET UNION, THE SITUATION IN LEBANON WAS NATURALLY UPPER MOST IN HIS MIND (I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY WHAT HE SAID ABOUT HIS SOVIET VISIT). THE KING SHOWED ME A PAPER WHICH THE US AMBASSADOR HAD JUST LEFT WITH HIM SETTING OUT THE TERMS MR HABIB WAS APPARENTLY OFFERING TO THE PLO. THESE INCLUDED PLO WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES FROM LEBANON. BUT THE KING MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE THOUGHT THEM ALTOGETHER TOO VAGUE AND UNSATISFACTORY TO FORM THE BASIS FOR A SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION. HE WAS LEAVING ALMOST AT ONCE FOR A MEETING WITH KING FAHD IN SAUDI ARABIA SINCE HE HOPED TO RETURN TO JORDAN LATER TONIGHT.

2. HE SAID THAT THE MAIN PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA WOULD BE TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO PERSUADE THE SAUDIS AND OTHER GULF STATES TO PUT ADDITIONAL PRESSURE ON THE US TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT WITH WHICH THE PALESTINIANS COULD LIVE. IT WAS AN ILLUSION ON THE PART OF THE AMERICANS AND THE ISRAELIS TO THINK THAT THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM COULD BE DISPOSED OF IN THE WAY THAT THEY AT PRESENT SEEMED TO HAVE IN MIND. NOR COULD THE KING UNDERSTAND WHAT THE AMERICANS WERE REALLY TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH.

... THE RELEVANT PROBLEM COULD BE DISPOSED OF IN THE WAY THAT THEY AT PRESENT SEEMED TO HAVE IN MIND. NOR COULD THE KING UNDERSTAND WHAT THE AMERICANS WERE REALLY TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH: WAS THEIR AIM TO DRIVE THE PALESTINIANS TO EXTREMISM AND TO PUT THEM AT THE MERCY OF THE RADICAL ARABS?

3. FARWAN QASEM, THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, WHOM I HAD SEEN EARLIER IN THE DAY, SAID MUCH THE SAME. IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT THE AMERICANS WERE TRYING TO OBTAIN FOR THE ISRAELIS THREE-QUARTERS OF WHAT THEY WANTED; BECAUSE THE AMERICANS APPEARED TO HAVE NO CLEAR IDEA WHAT THEY WANTED THEMSELVES, THE ISRAELIS WOULD END BY PRESSURING THEM INTO PUSHING FOR VIRTUALLY ALL THEIR DEMANDS. WAS A RECONSTITUTED PLO UNDER FAHOUM OR ABU MAZEN ON SYRIAN SOIL REALLY THE US OBJECTIVE? QASEM THOUGHT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT WELCOME AN EXTREMIST TAKE-OVER OF THE PLO AND EVEN THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SYRIAN TROOPS IN PARTS OF LEBANON, EITHER OF WHICH COULD PROVIDE A CONVENIENT CASUS BELLI WHEN THEY NEXT THOUGHT IT EXPEDIENT TO HUMILIATE THE ARABS. BUT IF THE AMERICANS WERE LOOKING FOR THE BASIS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION, THEY WOULD BE BETTER ADVISED TO LEAVE THE MODERATE PLO POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN BEIRUT UNDER ARAFAT.

4. BOTH THESE DISCUSSIONS REFLECT JORDANIAN BEWILDERMENT AT THE TURN OF EVENTS AND UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHAT THEY SHOULD BE TRYING TO DO. NO DOUBT BY GOING TO SAUDI ARABIA TO SEE KING FAHD, KING HUSSEIN HOPES TO DIVERT SOME OF THE CRITICISM HE HAS ENCOUNTERED FOR BEING OUT OF JORDAN AND IN THE SOVIET UNION AT SUCH A CRITICAL TIME. BUT I DID NOT THINK HE WAS PARTICULARLY HOPEFUL THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD AGREE TO PUT ANY FURTHER PRESSURE ON THE AMERICANS OR THAT IT WOULD BE EFFECTIVE IF THEY DID.

5. KING HUSSEIN MENTIONED TO ME IN PASSING THAT PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S ADVISER, OSAMA AL BAZ, WOULD SHORTLY BE VISITING JORDAN.

6. CROWN PRINCE HASSAN HAS CLAIMED TO MY GERMAN COLLEAGUE THAT THE PLO IN BEIRUT HAVE BEEN BEHAVING IRRESPONSIBLY AND IRRESOLUTELY. ACCORDING TO THE CROWN PRINCE, THEY HAD INDICATED THEIR INTEREST IN PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S OFFER TO ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT IN EXILE IN EGYPT SEMICLN THEY HAD THEN HAD SECOND THOUGHTS, GIVING THE SYRIANS AN OPPORTUNITY TO INTERVENE. A STORMY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT ASAD AND ARAFAT HAD ENSUED, AS A RESULT OF WHICH THE PLO HAD DROPPED THE IDEA ENTIRELY. THE PLO HAD THEN MADE A DIFFERENT SET OF PROPOSALS TO MR HABIB SEMICLN HARDLY HAD HE BEGUN TO WORK ON THEM THAN THE PLO HAD CHANGED THEIR POSITION YET AGAIN.

URWICK

PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
~~SIR J LEAHY~~
MR MOBERLY
SIR J BULLARD
HD/NENAD
HD/MED
HD/UND
HD/SEC DEPT
HD/...~~SED~~...

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FM WASHINGTON 302359Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2300 OF 30 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, CAIRO, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, JEDDA,
UKMIS NEW YORK.

ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. WHEN WRIGHT CALLED ON CARLUCCI (DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE) TODAY, CARLUCCI SAID THAT HABIB WAS STILL STRUGGLING ON. HIS DEPUTY, DRAPER, WILL NOW BE GOING DOWN TO TALK TO THE ISRAELIS. BUT THE CLOCK WAS TICKING. IT WAS NO EASY MATTER TO RESTRAIN SOMEONE LIKE SHARON. HE STILL WANTED AN ASSAULT ON WEST BEIRUT, THOUGH HE HAD AT LEAST ACKNOWLEDGED TO THE US AMBASSADOR THAT THIS COULD NOT POSSIBLY SOLVE THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM.

2. CARLUCCI EXPRESSED SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT THE EFFECTS ON THE ARABS GENERALLY. THE ONE GOOD THING ABOUT THE CRISIS WAS THAT IT WAS DRIVING THE EGYPTIANS AND SAUDIS SOMEWHAT CLOSER TOGETHER (THOUGH FURTHER AWAY FROM THE UNITED STATES) THE WHOLE EPISODE WAS LIABLE TO MAKE THE ISRAELIS STILL MORE DIFFICULT OVER THE PEACE PROCESS. THE ISRAELI ACTION WOULD STRENGTHEN THE RADICAL WING OF THE PLO. THERE WERE INDICATIONS OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF A STEPPING UP OF TERRORISM. THE SYRIANS MUST BE SOMEWHAT DISILLUSIONED WITH SOVIET EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT; AND THE RUSSIANS WITH THE MANNER IN WHICH THE SYRIANS HAD USED THEIR EQUIPMENT.

TERRORISM. THE SYRIANS MUST BE SOMEWHAT DISILLUSIONED WITH SOVIET EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT; AND THE RUSSIANS WITH THE MANNER IN WHICH THE SYRIANS HAD USED THEIR EQUIPMENT.

3. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAY THAT HABIB IS CONTINUING TO DISCUSS WITH THE LEBANESE A SET OF GUIDELINES OF WHICH THE MAIN ELEMENTS ARE CONTINUATION OF THE CEASEFIRE, ENDING THE PLO'S MILITARY PRESENCE IN BOTH BEIRUT AND THE REST OF LABANON, DEPARTURE OF THE PLO LEADERSHIP FROM LEBANON, DISARMING OF THE VARIOUS MILITIAS IN WEST BEIRUT, AND THAT THE TERRITORY VACATED BY THE PLO AND MILITIAS SHOULD BE TAKEN OVER BY THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES. THE LEBANESE APPARENTLY ACCEPT MOST, THOUGH NOT ALL, OF THESE OBJECTIVES. IN THE US CONCEPTION IT IS FOR THE LEBANESE TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE PLO COVERING THESE POINTS.

4. KEMP (NSC) HAS TOLD US THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE OBTAINABLE ON THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO LEADERSHIP, AND THE DISARMING OF THE PLO BY THE LEBANESE ARMY WITH THE PLO PROBABLY BEING ALLOWED TO RETAIN PERSONAL ARMS. ONE MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK AT PRESENT IS THE PLO'S INSISTENCE ON CONTINUING TO MAINTAIN A QUOTE PRESENCE UNQUOTE IN WEST BEIRUT. THE ISRAELIS WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS. THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN FINDING GREAT DIFFICULT IN GETTING THE LEBANESE TO TAKE ANY FIRM POSITION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

5. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ALSO SAY THAT CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE BUT THERE IS GREAT DIFFICULTY ABOUT THE MODALITIES AND HABIB HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT TIME WILL BE NEEDED TO WORK THESE OUT. THE PURPOSE OF DRAPER'S VISIT TO JERUSALEM IS TO TRY TO BUY SOME TIME.

6. THE US OFFICIALS GIVING US THIS INFORMATION EMPHASIZED THAT, AS WE WOULD REALISE, IT WAS ESSENTIAL IN THIS VERY DELICATE STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT CONFLICTING SIGNALS SHOULD NOT REACH THE PLO. THROUGH OTHER INTER MEDIARIES. THEY ARE KEEPING THE SAUDIS AND EGYPTIANS CLOSELY INFORMED. THE CURRENT US ASSESSMENT IS THAT IF THE NEGOTIATIONS DO NOT MAKE RAPID PROGRESS, THE PROBABILITY IN THE NEXT STAGE, WILL BE OF A FURTHER TIGHTENING OF THE MILITARY SCREWS BY ISRAEL (BY QUOTE SELECTIVE UNQUOTE BOMBARDMENT ETC) RATHER THAN OF AN ALL-OUT ASSAULT.

HENDERSON

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FILE

SW

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 June, 1982

Beirut

The Prime Minister has considered your two letters of 29 June concerning the possibility of a message to President Reagan about the situation in the Lebanon. Mrs. Thatcher has concluded that she does not wish to send a message of this kind to the President. She very much doubts whether he would be prepared to make it plain publicly that an Israeli attack on Beirut would not have his support. Nor does she believe that the Israelis, if they decide to move into Beirut, would be deterred by an American statement of this kind.

A. J. COLES

J. E. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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6

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 June, 1982

Prime Minister

Dear John,

Beirut

The F.C.O. know of no basis for the optimistic media comment of the last 24 hours. The U.S. will listen to you more than any other European leader. Agree to message?

A.J.C. 29/6.

We discussed my earlier letter of today's date and the enclosed draft message to President Reagan. You told me that the Prime Minister had reservations about sending a message to President Reagan at this stage, but would wish to look at this again overnight. We remain in the dark about the exact position of the Habib negotiations but, in spite of optimistic press reports, we continue to have serious doubts about whether the PLO, or at least all the PLO, will agree to leave Beirut on what amount to surrender terms. What we hear from the Americans and French about the views of the Israelis and PLO respectively suggests that the proposals of either side are not acceptable to the other and that a continuing deadlock must be considered likely. We therefore continue to see value in making our views known at the highest level to the Americans and therefore to believe that a further message to President Reagan would be helpful.

I enclose a revised version of the draft message which Mr Pym has seen and approved.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

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DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT: DRAFT MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I was very grateful for the reply you sent on 18 June to my message about Lebanon. I know how hard your people have been striving to find a formula that will bring the fighting to an end. Without Phil Habib's efforts I do not doubt that there would by now have been fighting in the streets of Beirut. But it seems that the Israelis are maintaining their threat to move into the city by force, unless they get what they want. This would in my judgement not only blacken the name of Israel still further on any objective view, but would also bring far-reaching political consequences for the region and for Western interests there. For example:

1. The capture and destruction by the Israelis of a large part of an Arab capital will do immense damage to Arab-Western, and especially Arab-US, relations. Reactions even of moderate Arab governments will be of a different order from hitherto;
2. The Soviet Union will benefit significantly from

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/this

CONFIDENTIAL

this ill-will;

3. The ~~task~~ of rebuilding Lebanon will be put beyond the reach of the Lebanese;

4. The destruction of the present PLO leadership could leave the field to the extremists and lead to a sharp increase in international terrorism;

5. The position of the Egyptian Government in adhering, as they wish to do, to peace with Israel and friendship with the West, will be dangerously weakened. President Mubarak, in a message to European governments this week, has again expressed his disappointment with US policy and his fears for the future if a just solution to the Palestinian problem is not found;

6. The autonomy talks will lose all prospect of making progress;

7. The ~~acceptability~~ to the states of the region of an international peace keeping force to facilitate Israeli withdrawal will be seriously damaged.

^{The British} ~~My~~ Government are fundamentally committed to Israel's long term security. ^{We} I understand ^{Israeli} their anxieties and their wish to protect their own citizens.

But the methods which they ~~Israelis~~ are using are completely unacceptable to ~~my~~ ^{us} Government and, as I know from our discussions in Brussels yesterday and today, to our European partners.

If peace is to be restored, and all our interests are to be preserved, I hope you may feel able to ^{urgently} signal to the Israeli government ~~without~~ further ~~delay~~ that an attack on Beirut would not have your support. If for example you were to say publicly that


/you

you would not regard it as justified in self-defence (with the implications such a statement would have for Israeli use of US arms), there would be a real hope that Mr Begin and his Cabinet would continue to hold back.

You have your own sources of information and advice in this thoroughly confused situation, and of course I do not know precisely what line you have been taking in your latest contacts with Jerusalem. But I thought it right to let you know that I see this as a real turning point. Action or inaction in the next day or two days may be crucial.



129 JUN 1961



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①

No - not a thriller.

PRIME MINISTER

Contacts with the PLO

→ The PLO will

*still continue their
Lebanon activities - possibly in*

The attached letter conveys the recommendation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that the PLO should be told by officials that a British Minister, probably Mr. Hurd, would be prepared to meet Qaddumi ("the PLO's Foreign Minister"), provided the PLO agree in advance to a statement indicating their commitment to guaranteeing, in the context of a peace settlement, the border between Israel and whatever Palestinian entity emerges.

London &

such

*meeting
would
have*

Jan. meeting efforts

here.

I have told the FCO that, in my view, nothing less than a clear statement to that effect would do. Their alternative suggestions that Qaddumi would endorse the US/Soviet statement of 1977 or the Fahd plan, would not, in my view, suffice to answer criticism.

not

There may be no better time than now for taking this controversial step. Israeli actions in Lebanon have increased sympathy for the Palestinians and moderate forces within the PLO, which Qaddumi represents, need encouragement.

Are you prepared to agree that Mr. Hurd should see Qaddumi, provided the PLO accept in advance the formula which I have sidelined in the attached letter?

No

Alternatively, would you consider agreeing to this if and when the Israelis move into Beirut?

A-J. C.

30 June, 1982

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PS/PUS
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MR MOBERLY
SIR J BULLARD
HD/NENAD
HD/MED
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FM WASHINGTON 292255Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2289 OF 29 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK JEDDA

INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS AMMAN CAIRO TUNIS

LEBANON.

1. HAIG, WHO IS STILL IN CHARGE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT TOLD ME THIS EVENING THAT HE WAS VERY WORRIED AT THE SITUATION IN BEIRUT AND, IN PARTICULAR, AT THE ATTITUDE OF THE PLO. HAIG DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE ISRAELIS WERE GOING TO DO BUT FEARED THAT THEY WOULD GO ON INTO BEIRUT. HAIG ADDED THAT THE OTHER ARABS WERE WILLING TO SEE THE PLO DISARMED PROVIDED THAT IT WERE DONE HONOURABLY. THE LEBANESE WOULD ALLOW THE PLO TO REMAIN IN THE COUNTRY ONCE THEY WERE DISARMED. THE PLO LEADERSHIP DID NOT WANT TO MOVE TO SYRIA AND THE JORDANIANS WOULD NOT ACCEPT THEM: IN HAIG'S VIEW THEY MIGHT GO TO LIBYA.

2. CLARK TOLD ME OVER LUNCH THAT THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF A BREAKTHROUGH WITHIN THE NEXT 24 HOURS INVOLVING A SETTLEMENT IN WHICH PLO CIVILIANS STAYED BEHIND IN BEIRUT. BUT HE GAVE NO DETAILS NOR DID HE EXPLAIN WHAT LAY BEHIND THIS ASSESSMENT.

BREAKTHROUGH WITHIN THE NEXT 24 HOURS INVOLVING A SETTLEMENT IN WHICH PLO CIVILIANS STAYED BEHIND IN BEIRUT, BUT HE GAVE NO DETAILS NOR DID HE EXPLAIN WHAT LAY BEHIND THIS ASSESSMENT.

3. EAGLEBURGER TOLD US SEPARATELY AT LUNCH TIME THAT HE HAD JUST SPOKEN TO HABIB IN BEIRUT. THE ISRAELIS WERE STRAINING AT THE LEASH. SHARON WANTED TO GO IN AND FINISH OFF THE PLO. THE ISRAELIS COULD NOT MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENT FORCE LEVELS IN LEBANON FOR VERY LONG AND WERE LIKELY TO TAKE ACTION VERY SOON UNLESS THE PLO AGREED TO DISARM. THE PLO SEEMED PARTIALLY TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE POSITION WAS HOPELESS BUT WERE HAGGLING ABOUT THE TERMS. THE AMERICANS HAD NO DOUBT THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT BE HELD OFF UNLESS THE PLO ARMED FORCES WITHDREW COMPLETELY FROM LEBANON (IT WAS HOPELESS TO SEND THEM TO TRIPOLI OR ANYWHERE ELSE IN THE COUNTRY). THEY COULD GO TO SYRIA IF THE SYRIANS WOULD HAVE THEM OR EG TO EGYPT, BUT THEY MUST BE DISARMED (EAGLEBURGER SEEMED TO SUGGEST THAT SOME COMPROMISE MIGHT BE POSSIBLE OVER PERSONAL ARMS). THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF THEIR QUOTE WITHDRAWING UNQUOTE TO THE REFUGEE CAMPS (AS THE FRENCH HAD BEEN SUGGESTING); THIS WOULD IN FACT MEAN THEIR ADVANCING TO POSITIONS FROM WHICH THE ISRAELIS HAD ALREADY LARGELY CLEARED THEM AND WOULD PRECIPITATE A BATTLE.

4. EAGLEBURGER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NONE OF THIS WOULD SOLVE THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, AND THAT A STRONG LEBANESE CENTRAL AUTHORITY WAS PROBABLY A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS. HE EMPHASISED, HOWEVER, THAT UNLESS THE PLO ARMED FORCES WERE REMOVED FROM BEIRUT AND LEBANON THROUGH HABIB'S EFFORTS, THE ISRAELIS WOULD REMOVE THEM BY THEIR OWN MEANS. THE SYRIANS AND SYRIAN BACKED PALESTINIAN MILITIA MUST ALSO LEAVE BEIRUT.

5. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN IN DAILY TOUCH WITH THE FRENCH, BUT WAS SCATHING ABOUT THEIR EFFORTS. THE FRENCH OBJECTIVE WAS CLEARLY TO PRESERVE THE PLO. THERE HAD BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF DEVIOUSNESS IN THE MESSAGES THEY HAD BEEN RELAYING, RESPECTIVELY TO THE PLO AND THE AMERICANS. THEIR PERFORMANCE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD BEEN LAMENTABLE. EAGLEBURGER ADDED THAT THE SOVIET REACTION CONTINUED TO BE SURPRISINGLY MUTED. AMONG THE ARABS ONLY THE EGYPTIANS WERE AT PRESENT MAKING A TREMENDOUS FUSS WITH THE AMERICANS ON BEHALF OF THE PLO, (HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE HAD ALSO BEEN SAUDI INTERVENTION ON THE LINES REPORTED IN MY TELNO 2271).

6. YOUR TELNO 1246. THE AMERICANS CLAIM ALREADY TO BE DOING THEIR UTMOST TO AVOID AN ISRAELI ATTACK ON WEST BEIRUT, BUT THAT THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT OF DOING SO UNLESS THE PLO AGREE TO DISARM AND WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON.

IS LITTLE PROSPECT OF DOING SO UNLESS THE PLO AGREE TO DISARM AND WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON.

7. YOUR TELNO 1246, PARAGRAPH 4. THE POSITION IS AS EXPLAINED IN MY TELSNOs 2257 AND 2263 (NOT TO ALL). CLARK CONFIRMED TO ME TODAY THAT THE MIDDLE EAST WAS NOT A PRIME REASON FOR HAIG'S DEPARTURE, ALTHOUGH HE THOUGHT HAIG HAD GONE TOO FAR OUT ON A LIMB WITH HIS PRO-ISRAELI POLICY. FOLLOWING A CALL BY THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR ON CLARK LAST WEEK, THE SAUDIS GAVE THE PLO THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY COULD OBTAIN ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT WITHOUT AGREEING TO DISARM. HAIG MAY NOT HAVE BELIEVED CLARK'S DENIAL THAT HE GAVE ANY SUCH INDICATION. US OFFICIALS ADMIT THAT THE MISUNDERSTANDING, HOWEVER CAUSED, SET BACK THE NEGOTIATIONS IN BEIRUT BY SEVERAL DAYS, BUT, IN BRIEFING THE PRESS ARE NOW TRYING TO PLAY DOWN ITS IMPORTANCE.

HENDERSON

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 June, 1932

Overtaken.

AR 20/c

f.a.

Prime Minister

*Agree to attached message
to President Reagan?*

A.S.C. 29/6

Dear John,

Beirut

We remain very concerned about the possibility of an Israeli assault on Beirut, which could take place if the present negotiations do not give the Israelis what they want. We do not know all the details of the Habib negotiations, but we have no reason to be particularly optimistic that they will succeed. The key to holding the Israelis back still rests with the Americans, and Mr Hurd thinks it would be useful if the Prime Minister would agree to send a message to President Reagan on the lines of the draft enclosed. This would follow naturally from her recent exchanges of messages and conversation with him in Washington, and from the discussions we have just been holding in Brussels. It is possible that Mr Haig's resignation will mean that President Reagan will be more ready than before to intervene with the Israelis.

Mr Pym is being consulted simultaneously in Brussels and I shall relay as soon as possible any comments he may have. If the Prime Minister agrees, you may like to check before the message is despatched that the situation on the ground has not changed in order to ensure that the message is fully up-to-date.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Copies to:

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SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I was very grateful for the reply you sent on 21 June to my message about Lebanon. I know how hard your people have been striving to find a formula that will bring the fighting to an end. But the situation has now become critical; and I think it only right to let you know my deep concern about the possibility of an Israeli attack on Beirut.

Such an attack would have grave political consequences:

- 1) The capture and destruction by the Israelis of a large part of an Arab capital will do immense damage to Arab-Western, and especially Arab-US, relations. Reactions even of moderate Arab Governments will be of a different order from hitherto;
- 2) The Soviet Union will benefit significantly from this ill will;
- 3) The task of rebuilding Lebanon will be put beyond the reach of the Lebanese;
- 4) The destruction of the present PLO leadership could leave the field to the extremists and lead to a sharp

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/increase

increase in international terrorism;

5) The position of the Egyptian Government in adhering, as they wish to do, to peace with Israel and friendship with the West, will be dangerously weakened. President Mubarak, in a message to European Governments this week, has again expressed his disappointment with US policy and his fears for the future if a just solution to the Palestinian problem is not found;

6) The autonomy talks will lose all prospect of making progress;

7) The acceptability to the states of the region of an international peace keeping force to facilitate Israeli withdrawal will be seriously damaged.

Great harm has already been done by the extension of the Israeli campaign beyond their original stated objectives, themselves of doubtful validity in international law. It seems to me essential that the Israeli Government should now understand that in the view of their closest friend they have gone far enough. I was encouraged by the White House announcement on 24 June that Mr Begin had given you an assurance that Israeli forces would not go into Beirut. The Israeli Embassy in Washington, however, has subsequently said that no firm pledge has been made, and Mr Sharon has given the impression that an assault is likely. I should be most grateful if you could let me know what is your understanding of Israeli intentions.

/My

My Government are fundamentally committed to Israel's long term security. I understand their anxieties and their wish to perfect the defence of their northern border. But the methods which the Israelis are using are unacceptable to my Government and, as I know from our recent discussions in Brussels, to our European partners. *Those methods* They are prejudicing the possibilities for reconciliation in Lebanon. They are also a painful blow to Western interests in the Middle East, which an attack on West Beirut would turn into a disaster.

If peace is to be restored, and all our interests are to be preserved, I hope you may feel able to signal without further delay that an attack on Beirut would not have your support. If for example you were to say publicly that you would not regard it as justified in self-defence (with the implications such a statement would have for Israeli use of US arms), there would be a real hope that Mr Begin and his cabinet would hold back.

You have your own sources of information and advice in this thoroughly confused situation. But I thought it right to let you know that I see this as a real turning point. Action or inaction in the next day or two days may be crucial.

CONFIDENTIAL

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FM BEIRUT 29 NFT

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 347 OF 29 JUNE

INFO DAMASCUS AMMAN TEL AVIV JEDDA UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

MY TELNO 345 OF 29 JUNE: LEBANON

1. WHEN I SAW BASHIR QBAYBES ON 29 JUNE HE SAID ARAFAT WAS IRRESPONSIBLY PLAYING FOR TIME. ARAFAT WOULD HAVE MANY LIVES ON HIS CONSCIENCE.

2. BASHIR WENT ON TO SAY FRANKLY HE ONLY WANTED THE AMERICANS, FRENCH AND OURSELVES TO LEAVE THEM IN PEACE. THEY WOULD FINISH THE JOB QUICKLY. AFTERWARDS WE MIGHT WELL HAVE AN EXPLICIT ROLE TO PLAY IN UNITING THE VARIOUS GROUPS OF LEBANESE SINCE HE FEARED THE ACTION THEY WOULD HAVE TO TAKE OVER THE PALESTINIANS WOULD SHOCK AND DIVIDE THE COUNTRY.

3. WHEN I SAW HIM LATER THE SAME DAY HABIB SOMEWHAT DISCOUNTED THE REMARKS OF BASHIR. HE SAID THAT IT COULD BE A FORM OF PRESS-URISING THE AMERICANS AND THAT BASHIR WAS HOPING I WOULD PASS ON HIS REMARKS TO THEM.

4. HABIB ALSO SAID, HOWEVER THAT THEY COULD NOT GO ON LIKE THIS INDEFINITELY. THE PALESTINIANS IMAGINE THAT THEY COULD BARGAIN BUT DID NOT HAVE ANY CARDS IN THEIR HANDS. NEVERTHELESS HE WAS NOT GIVING UP AT LEAST UNTIL THE PRESENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WERE COMPLETE. HE HAD GOT TO THE STAGE OF GETTING THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO PROMISE TO STATE THEIR CASE CLEARLY TO PALESTINE AND HAD ARRANGED A MEETING BETWEEN WAZZAN (WHO IS STILL PRIME MINISTER) AND THE PALESTINIANS.

5. (THE U.S. AMBASSADOR COMMENTED SEPARATELY THAT THE TROUBLE WAS THAT WHEN THE LEBANESE ACTUALLY MET THE PALESTINIANS THEY ALWAYS SAID THAT IT WAS THE AMERICANS NOT THEMSELVES WHO WERE SETTING OUT CONDITIONS).

6. I DO NOT LIKE THE LOOK OF THE SITUATION AT ALL. BASHIR IS OBVIOUSLY IN ISRAEL'S CONFIDENCE.

7. FCO PLEASE PASS ALL ADDRESSEES.

ROBERTS

STANDARD

NENAD
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UNCLASSIFIED
FROM BEIRUT 291100Z JUN
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TEL NO 345 OF 29.6.82
AND TO INFO DAMASCUS, AMMAN, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, UKMIS
NEW YORK

LEBANON

1. SECRETARY GENERAL OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONFIRMED TO ME TODAY THAT IN THE WORKING PAPER SUBMITTED TO THE ARAB LEAGUE THE LABANESE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD CALLED FOR THE END OF ALL MILITARY ACTION BY THE PALESTINIANS IN THE 'LEBANON AND FOR THE UNCONDITIONAL ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT THROUGHOUT LEBANESE TERRITORY. ALL THIS WAS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.

2. LEBAKI ALSO CONFIRMED TO ME THAT THE WORKING PAPER WAS DUE TO BE CONSIDERED IN SPECIAL COMMISSION OF SIX ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING AT TAIF ON THIRTY JUNE. THE LEBANESE REPRESENTATIVE

MEETING AT TAIF ON THIRTY JUNE. THE LEBANESE REPRESENTATIVE
THERE WOULD BE THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(ABU KHATER), WHO HAD LEFT BY ROAD FOR DAMASCUS VIA TRIPOLI AND
HOMS.

3. COMMENT. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT STATEMENT AS AS FAR AS I KNOW
THE FIRST EVER OF ITS KIND. THE LEBANESE EMBASSY IN LONDON WILL
HAVE THE TEXT.

4. PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY.

ROBERTS

NNN

HOW WAS THAT K

PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR MOBERLY
SIR J BULLARD
HD/NENAD
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HD/UND
HD/SEC DEPT
HD/...*SEA*...

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE D10

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RESIDENT CLERK

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM TEL AVIV 291135Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 281 OF 29 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, JEDDA AND CAIRO.

MY TELS NO 277 AND 278: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. IT IS PLAIN TO ALL THAT THE CRUCIAL STAGE HAS NOW BEEN REACHED. WE ARE NOT PRIVY TO ISRAELI THINKING. NOR DO WE HAVE THE BENEFIT OF KNOWING EXACTLY WHAT IS PASSING IN THE HABIB NEGOTIATIONS OR FROM WASHINGTON. BUT I FEEL I SHOULD MAKE THE BEST GUESS I CAN ABOUT THE WAY ISRAELI MINDS ARE WORKING AS REGARDS THE PLO.

2. MY COMMENTS ON ISRAEL'S STATED CONDITIONS FOR THE PLO TO HAND OVER THEIR WEAPONS AND LEAVE BEIRUT AND LEBANON ARE:

(A) DEPARTURE FROM BEIRUT IS AN ABSOLUTE ISRAELI REQUIREMENT. WITHOUT IT THE ISRAELIS RECKON THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE UNABLE TO RE-ESTABLISH THEIR AUTHORITY SEMICOLON

(B) PRIOR LAYING DOWN OF WEAPONS IS ALSO CONSIDERED BY THE ISRAELIS AS ESSENTIAL. THIS IS NOT BECAUSE THE ISRAELIS ARE CONFIDENT THE PLO SOLDIERS WOULD REMAIN DISARMED FOR LONG, BUT RATHER BECAUSE DEPARTURE MUST BE SEEN AS SURRENDER. THE WORLD (NOT LEAST THE PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES) MUST BE CONVINCED THAT THE PLO WERE SO DEFEATED THAT THEY COULD NOT TAKE

RATHER BECAUSE DEPARTURE MUST BE SEEN AS SURRENDER. THE WORLD (NOT LEAST THE PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES) MUST BE CONVINCED THAT THE PLO WERE SO DEFEATED THAT THEY COULD NOT TAKE AWAY EVEN THEIR PERSONAL WEAPONS SEMICOLON

(C) WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. THIS IS CERTAINLY AN ISRAELI OBJECTIVE. BUT JUST AS THE ISRAELIS MAY SETTLE IN THE END FOR A RESIDUAL SYRIAN PRESENCE IN THE BEKAA, SO SOME FORM OF CONTINUED PLO PRESENCE IN LEBANON MIGHT JUST BE NEGOTIABLE IF OTHER ISRAELI CONDITIONS WERE MET. THEY WOULD CERTAINLY INSIST ON THE PLO BEING LIMITED TO THE FAR NORTH OR TO AREAS OF EASTERN LEBANON UNDER SYRIAN CONTROL, AS WELL AS PLO ACTIVITIES BEING TIGHTLY CONSTRAINED BY ANY NEW CONCORDAT WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE LITTLE FAITH IN ANY PLO UNDERTAKINGS. BUT I WOULD NOT EXCLUDE SOME FLEXIBILITY PROVIDED BEIRUT AND MOST OF LEBANON ARE TO COME UNDER THE GOVERNMENT WITH A REASONABLE PROSPECT OF CENTRAL AUTHORITY BEING BUTTRESSED BY THE PHALANGE IN CHRISTIAN AREAS, BY AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN THE 45 KM BUFFER ZONE, AND BY HADDAD/ISRAELI FORCES CLOSE TO THE FRONTIER.

3. I HAVE ALREADY INDICATED TWO REASONS WHICH I BELIEVE MAKE THE ISRAELI INSIST ON THE PLO BEING EXPELLED FROM BEIRUT: FIRST THAT THEY WILL THEREBY CLEAR THE WAY FOR A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, SECONDLY THAT THEY WISH TO DISCREDIT THE PLO AS A FIGHTING FORCE. THEY CANNOT SERIOUSLY EXPECT TO ERADICATE THE PLO FOR EVER SINCE OTHER PALESTINIANS CAN TAKE THE PLACE OF FALLEN COMRADES AND NEW WEAPONS CAN ALWAYS BE FOUND. EVENTUALLY THEY WILL ALSO HAVE TO REPATRIATE IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER THE SEVERAL THOUSAND PLO PRISONERS THEY ALREADY HOLD. BUT HAVING COME THIS FAR THE ISRAELIS CANNOT NOW AFFORD TO LET THE PLO EMERGE WITH ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT BE REPRESENTED AS A DRAW IN BEIRUT. ISRAEL MUST SHOW THAT THE PLO HAS BEEN DECISIVELY DEFEATED.

4. THE OPTIONS FOR ISRAEL REMAIN:

(A) NEGOTIATION. STILL THEIR PREFERRED COURSE BUT TIME IS NOT ON THEIR SIDE SEMICOLON

(B) PROLONGED SIEGE. WOULD NOT SOLVE ISRAEL'S DILEMMA IF MERELY AN EXTENSION OF THE PRESENT CEASEFIRE. ALSO CARRIES ECONOMIC AND INTERNAL POLITICAL PENALTIES FOR ISRAEL WHILE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES BUILD UP SEMICOLON

(C) ALL-OUT ASSAULT. I BELIEVE THE ISRAELIS WOULD STEEL THEMSELVES TO UNDERTAKE THIS IF THEY THOUGHT IT WOULD WORK. BUT INCREASINGLY I DOUBT WHETHER THEY THEMSELVES COULD EXPECT TO ACHIEVE RESULTS QUICKLY ENOUGH TO MAKE THIS DECISIVE SEMICOLON

(D) SALAMI TACTICS. MY OWN GUESS IS THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE MORE LIKELY TO RESUME AIR AND ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT AGAINST SELECTED TARGETS PLUS EDGING FORWARD ON THE GROUND AND INTERDICTION OF

(D) SALAMI TACTICS. MY OWN GUESS IS THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE MORE LIKELY TO RESUME AIR AND ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT AGAINST SELECTED TARGETS, PLUS EDGING FORWARD ON THE GROUND AND INTERDICTION OF WATER AND ELECTRICITY SUPPLIES. THE AIM AS BEFORE WILL BE TO BREAK THE PLO WILL TO RESIST BY INTENSIFYING THE MILITARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURES.

5. ISRELI WARNINGS OF ONLY A FEW DAYS BEING ALLOWED FOR THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD IN MY VIEW BE TAKEN AT FACE VALUE. THE ISRAELIS WILL CLAIM THAT ANY RESUMPTION OF ATTACKS ON THEIR PART IS IN RESPONSE TO AN ALLEGED BREACH OF THE CEASEFIRE SOMEWHERE AROUND BEIRUT OR ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON.

6. REPETITION TO BEIRUT LEFT FOR FCO DECISION.

MOBERLY

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29 JUN 1982		
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29 JUN 1982

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PP TUNIS

GRS 259

RESTRICTED
 FM FCO 281445Z JUN 82
 TO PRIORITY TUNIS
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 51 OF 28 JUNE
 INFO BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKMIS NEW YORK,
 INFO SAVING OTHER M.E. POSTS, WASHINGTON.

526 560

YOUR TELNOS 97 AND 102: ISRAEL/LEBANON: KLIBI'S MESSAGE

1. PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
 TO KLIBI, IN REPLY TO HIS TWO RECENT MESSAGES:
 BEGINS

THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT MESSAGES ABOUT THE SITUATION IN
 LEBANON. I FULLY SHARE YOUR CONCERN AT THE GRAVE SITUATION IN
 LEBANON FOLLOWING THE UNJUSTIFIED ISRAELI INVASION. YOU WILL
 HAVE SEEN THAT, TOGETHER WITH OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS, WE VIGOROUSLY
 CONDEMNED THE INVASION IN A STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE TEN FOREIGN
 MINISTERS ON 9 JUNE. WE ARE COMMITTED TO THE TERRITORIAL
 INTEGRITY OF LEBANON AND WISH TO SEE AN IMMEDIATE AND
 UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ISRAELI FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH
 SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 509. MEANWHILE WE ARE GIVING
 HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE VICTIMS OF THIS TRAGIC EPISODE
 BOTH BILATERALLY AND THROUGH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

WE HAVE LEFT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN NO DOUBT AS TO THE
 STRENGTH OF OUR FEELING ON THIS MATTER. THE TEN HAVE MADE CLEAR
 THAT THEY WILL CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE ACTION
 SHOULD ISRAEL REFUSE TO WITHDRAW. WE ARE ALSO KEEPING IN CLOSE
 CONTACT WITH THE US GOVERNMENT WHO WILL HAVE A CRUCIAL ROLE TO
 PLAY IN EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND A LASTING
 PEACE IN LEBANON. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THEM OUR VIEW THAT THE
 PALESTINIAN PROBLEM MUST ALSO FIND A SOLUTION IF REAL PEACE AND

PP JEDDA

R E S T R I C T E D

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STABILITY IS TO BE ACHIEVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

2
RESTRICTED

SUBJECT

LEBANESE EMBASSY

TELEPHONE: 229-7265/6.
TELEGRAMS: AMBALIBAN LONDON.
TELEX 262048.

21, KENSINGTON PALACE GARDENS,
LONDON, W. 8.

cc PS / Mr. Hunt

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 139 AB / 82

Ref: 315/KM/JS

*re: Hunt
Ops*

The Embassy of Lebanon presents its compliments to Her Majesty's Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has the honour to enclose the text of an appeal by His Excellency the President of Lebanon, Mr Elias Sarkis, to all Heads of State, regarding the military situation in Lebanon following the Israeli invasion of the country.

The Embassy of Lebanon would be grateful to Her Majesty's Foreign and Commonwealth Office if this document could be forwarded immediately to The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP, Prime Minister of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The Embassy of Lebanon avails itself of this opportunity to renew to Her Majesty's Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurance of its highest consideration.



London, 28th June 1982.

subject
LEBANESE EMBASSY

TELEPHONE: 229-7265/6.
TELEGRAMS: AMBALIBAN LONDON.
TELEX 262048.

*get Master
Ops*
21, KENSINGTON PALACE GARDENS,
LONDON, W. 8.

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 139AB/82

The Appeal:

In the darkest hours of the tragedy which has engulfed Lebanon for more than 7 years, and at this time of distress when the Lebanese people are fearfully expecting the final blow of the hideous danger facing the city of Beirut, threatening deadly destruction and devastation, I present to you the appeal of an anguished people, resulting from the deep awareness that the very survival of all that their existence has stood for, is now in mortal danger.

What Lebanon has symbolised for the Lebanese people, the Middle East and the world in general is well-known. Since time immemorial it has stood for values deeply rooted in Lebanese history such as democracy, freedom and tolerance. These qualities form the essence of the Lebanese mission in the region and its contribution to the development of humanity.

We have made every possible effort to save the city of Beirut in particular, from a possible full-scale disaster resulting from the Israeli aggression on Lebanese territories since 6 June 1982.

This disaster, should it occur, will definitely bring to memory the greatest catastrophes of history, which have led to the disintegration of entire civilisations which had such impact on the course of humanity.

In my deep concern to spare hundreds of thousands of innocent lives and Beirut's historical heritage, I appeal to you to come urgently to our aid in participating in our efforts to save this city from sure catastrophe.

In the profound hope that this appeal will meet with your instant response, I present you with my highest esteem and consideration.

في أحلك الاوقات من سنوات المأساة الطويلة التي يعيشها
لبنان منذ أكثر من سبع سنوات وفي الساعات الصعبة التي يحبس فيها
اللبنانيون انفاسهم مترقبين المخاطر التي باتت تنذر مدينة بيروت
بخراب شامل ومميتة ، أوجه اليكم هذا النداء الذي يعبر عن صرخة
نابغة من ضمير شعب معذب أصبح مهدد بأعز ما يرمز الى عظمة
وجوده قف ولا يخفي عليكم ما تمثله مدينة بيروت سواء بالنسبة الى
اللبنانيين ام بالنسبة الى منطقة الشرق الاوسط والعالم الاوسع
من معان متأصلة في التاريخ تعبر عن الديمقراطية والحرية والانفتاح
والتسامح تلك الخصائص المميزة لرسالة لبنان في محيطه ومساهمته
في تطور الحضارة الانسانية قف انكم ولاشك على اطلاع على الاجتياح
الاسرائيلي للاراضي اللبنانية منذ السادس من شهر حزيران الجاري ونحن
في وقت نسعى بازليين كل جهد مستطاع لنجنب مدينة بيروت على
الاخص كارثة حقيقية من شأنها ان حلت ان تعيد الينا ذكرى النكبات
الكبرى التي حصلت في التاريخ قديمه وحديثه واضمحلت بنتيجتها حضارات
كان لها اثرها الدامغ على مسيرة تاريخ الانسانية قف .

ورغبة مني في المحافظة على ارواح الالوف من المدنيين الابرياء
وعلى ما تحتوى مدينة بيروت من معالم انسانية وحضارية جئت اوجه
اليكم نداء عاجلا كي تساهموا معنا في انقاذ بيروت من الكارثة
الاكيدة المحدقة بها قف .

وانني ان ارجو من صميم القلب ان يلقي ندائي هذا لديكم الاستجابة
القنورية اعرب لكم عن اسمي مشاعر اعتباري قف .

TELEGRAM

RESTRICTED

GRS 360

RESTRICTED

FM CAIRO 280715Z JUN 82

DESKBY FCO 280830Z

DESKBY BRUSSELS 280830Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 289 OF 28 JUNE

AND IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

LEBANON

1. REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL WESTERN GOVERNMENTS, MINUS THE US, WERE SUMMONED ON 27 JUNE TO RECEIVE AN ORAL DEMARCHE FROM UNDER SECRETARY IN THE MFA. SIMILAR DEMARCHES ARE BEING MADE TO THE EAST EUROPEAN, AFRICAN, ASIAN AND LATIN GROUPS. ON THE PREVIOUS EVENING THE MINISTER OF STATE HAD CONVEYED TO THE BELGIAN AMBASSADOR AN "ORAL" MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT HUBARAK TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL. TEXT IS IN MIFT.

2. SHAFI ABDUL HAMID SPOKE ALONG SIMILAR LINES. HE ADDED THAT PRESIDENT MUBARAK HAD CONVEYED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN (IN A MESSAGE DATED 25 JUNE) HIS DISAPPOINTMENT AND DISPLEASURE OVER THE US DECISION TO VETO THE SPANISH AND FRENCH RESOLUTIONS WHICH COULD HAVE PAVED THE WAY TOWARDS A SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS. THE AMERICANS HAD ALSO BEEN TOLD (IN CAIRO) THAT THEIR ACTION WOULD BE VIEWED BY MILLIONS AS CONSPIRACY WITH ISRAEL. ADVERSARIES OF THE US WOULD USE THE VETOS TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION IN THE REGION SO AS TO ATTAIN THEIR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES. THESE VIEWS HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO THE AMERICANS IN ALL FRIENDSHIP. A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US WAS A CARDINAL POINT OF EGYPTIAN POLICY.

3. THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WAS NOT SELF-IMPLEMENTING. PRESSURE WOULD NEED TO BE EXERTED ON ISRAEL AND THE US TO COMPLY WITH IT. EGYPT EXPECTED THE EUROPEAN GROUP TO ASSUME A FUNDAMENTAL ROLE IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND WOULD WELCOME SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR DEALING WITH THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION ON THE

EFWU
OCTS OF THE US VETOS. EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WERE ASKED TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS TO BOTH ISRAEL AND THE US MAKING CLEAR THEIR OPPOSITION TO FURTHER ISRAELI AGGRESSION. THE EGYPTIANS HAD BEEN URGING FLEXIBILITY ON THE PLO BUT WOULD NEVER ASK THEM TO SURRENDER. (THE PRESS REPORTED YESTERDAY THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD REFUSED TO CONVEY TO THE PLO AN AMERICAN MESSAGE ADVISING THE PLO TO HAND OVER ITS ARMS.)

4. ABDUL HAMID ALSO SAID THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT FULLY RESPECTING THE APPLICATION OF THE FOUR GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND HAD BEEN GENERALLY EVASIVE WHEN ASKED TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE.

5. COMMENT. THE EGYPTIANS HAVE NOW SATURATED ALL AVAILABLE DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. UNDOUBTEDLY THEY ARE VERY ANGRY OVER THE US VETOS BUT HAVE NEVERTHELESS BEEN CAREFUL TO RESTATE THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US. SIGNIFICANTLY THERE WAS NO MENTION AT ALL OF EGYPTIAN SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL.

REEVE

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IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

FOBU 006/29

OO BRUSSELS

GRS 160

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 281657Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S PARTY)

TELEGRAM NUMBER 169 OF 28 JUNE

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE OFFICE.
WAS RECEIVED FROM DAMASCUS TELEGRAM NO 177 OF 28 JUNE.

BEGINS

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, TEL AVIV,
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
INFO ROUTINE AMMAN. CAIRO, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK

BEIRUT TELNO 334: LEBANON/ISRAEL

1. WHAT THE SYRIANS MIGHT WELCOME (PARA 3 OF TUR) MUST FOR THE MOMENT BE LARGELY A MATTER OF GUESSWORK. BUT OUR BEST ASSESSEMENT IS THAT
 - A. THEY WANT TO AVOID A FUTHER INFLUX OF PALESTINIANS INTO SYRIA, AND PARTICULARLY PLO WHO ARE LIKELY TO BE IN AN EXCITABLE MOOD, RESENTFUL OF SYRIA AND THEREFORE AN ADDITIONAL THREAT TO ASAD'S DOMESTIC POSITION:
 - B. THEY ARE NOT POSITIVELY LOOKING FOR REASONS TO WITHDRAW FROM ANY PART OF LEBANON SINCE THEIR PRESENCE THERE GIVES THEM SOME RESIDUE OF INFLUENCE OVER THE FUTURE POLITICAL ORDER THERE:
 - C. IF THEY HAVE TO ACCEPT PALESTINIAN EXODUS FROM BEIRUT THEY WOULD PROBABLY PREFER WITHDRAWAL TO TRIPOLI WHICH APART FROM ANYTHING ELSE WOULD KEEP THE GUERILLAS AND PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP OUT OF SYRIA ITSELF BUT IN AN AREA WHERE THE SYRIANS COULD STILL HAVE SOME HOPE OF CONTROLLING THEM.

LUCAS

ENDS.

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IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

INWARD TELEGRAM

FOBU 004/29

OO BRUSSELS

GRS 270

UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO 281610Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 167 OF 28 JUNE

FOLLOWING FOR S OF S PARTY

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE OFFICE
WAS RECEIVED FROM TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO 277 OF 28 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT MODUK PRIGORITY DAMASCUS WASHINGTON
UKMIS NEW YORK AMMAN JEDDA AND CAIRO.

MY TELNO 275 (NOT TO ALL): ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER YESTERDAY'S
CABINET MEETING:

QUOTE

- 1) ISRAEL WILL MAINTAIN THE CEASEFIRE IN LEBANON. IF THE ENEMY VIOLATES THE CEASEFIRE THE IDF WILL RESPOND WITH FULL SEVERITY.
- 2) THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL RECOMMENDS THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY ENTER WEST BEIRUT.
- 3) ALL OF THE FIFTEEN TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS OF WHICH THE ROOF ORGANISATION CALLED THE PLO IS COMPRISED WILL HAND OVER THEIR WEAPONS TO THE LEBANESE ARMY. ALL MEMBERS OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS, WITHOUT ANY EXCEPTIONS, WILL LEAVE BEIRUT AND LEBANON.
- 4) THE DEPARTING COLUMN OF THE TERRORISTS, UNDER THE PROTECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS, WILL MOVE ACROSS THE INTERNATIONAL LEBANESE/SYRIAN BORDER ALONG THE BEIRUT/DAMASCUS ROAD. THE IDF WILL ENSURE THAT IN THE SECTOR OF THAT ROAD WHICH IS UNDER ITS CONTROL THE COLUMN WILL HAVE SAFE PASSAGE. IF THE TERRORISTS PREFER AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE, THIS WILL BE MADE POSSIBLE FOR THEM BY THE IDF.
- 5) WITH THE LIBERATION OF WEST BEIRUT AND THE REUNIFICATION OF THE LEBANESE CAPITAL, THE POLITICAL NEGOTIATION BETWEEN ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED WILL BEGIN WITH A VIEW TO REACHING AN AGREEMENT WHICH WILL GUARANTEE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBONON, THE DEPARTURE OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM THAT COUNTRY, ITS INDEPENDENCE, AND THE PEACE OF ITS INHABITANTS. THIS AGREEMENT WILL ENSURE SECURITY AND PEACE OF THE GALILEE AND ITS INHABITANTS, OF ISRAEL AND ITS CITIZENS.
- 6) ISRAEL WILL GLADLY ACCEPT THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE NEGOTIATING PARTIES, IN ORDER TO REACH THIS AGREEMENT.

UNQUOTE

2. SEE MIFT.

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FOBU 003/29

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

OO BRUSSELS

GRS 380

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 281614Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 166 OF 28 JUNE

FOLLOWING FOR S OF S PARTY.

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPT
WAS RECEIVED FROM TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO 278 OF 28 JUNE.

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, MODUK, PRIORITY DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, CAIRO AND JEDDA.

MIPT: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. YESTERDAY'S CABINET COMMUNIQUE AND THE UNATTRIBUTABLE GLOSSES ON IT NOW APPEARING IN THE ISRAELI PRESS TEND TO CONFIRM OUR RECENT ASSESSMENTS. THE SIGNAL WHICH THE ISRAELIS WANT TO SEND TO THE PLO IS THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO GIVE HABIB ANOTHER F2 DAYS TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION SEMICOLON THAT THE CHOICE FOR THE PLO IS SAFE CONDUCT DISARMED OR PHYSICAL ERADICATION SEMICOLON AND THAT THE MATTER CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO DRAG ONLM
2. THE DILEMMA REMAINS OF PRECISELY WHAT MILITARY ACTION COULD BE TAKEN WITHOUT INCURRING UNACCEPTABLE ISRAELI CASUALTIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL ODIUM OF RAZING WEST BEIRUT. SO DOES THE PROBLEM OF MAINTAINING CREDIBILITY. IN THIS CONNECTION, CABINET SOURCES WERE INDICATING TO JOURNALISTS LAST NIGHT THAT THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THE CABINET COMMUNIQUE SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS ISRAEL'S LAST WORD, BUT AS INTENDED TO ELICIT A COUNTER-PROPOSAL FROM THE PLO. SIMILARLY, WHILE DEMANDING THE DEPARTURE OF ALL PLO FORCES FROM LEBANON, ISRAEL WOULD CONSIDER SERIOUSLY A PROPOSAL FOR THE DEPARTURE OF A SMALLER, THOUGH STILL SIGNIFICANT, NUMBER. AND AS REGARDS THE CALL FOR ALL FOREIGN FORCES TO LEAVE LEBANON, CABINET SOURCES ARE ALSO QUOTED AS ADMITTING THAT THE PROSPECT OF A TOTAL SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ENTIRE COUNTRY, INCLUDING THE BEKA'A VALLEY, WAS UNREALISTIC IN THE SHORT TERM.
3. THE PRESS ALSO REPORTS CONTINUING DISAGREEMENT AMONG MINISTERS ON THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE EARLY ASSAULT ON WEST BEIRUT, WITH SOME MINISTERS ARGUING THAT TIME WAS RUNNING OUT BUT THE MAJORITY IN FAVOUR FOR ALLOWING MORE TIME. THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER CASUALTIES SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN A MAJOR FACTOR IN YESTERDAY'S CABINET DISCUSSIONS, ESPECIALLY GIVEN REPORTS OF QUESTIONING BY TROOPS IN LEBANON OF THE SCALE AND PURPOSE OF TDG PRESENT OPERATION. (BUT NO ONE SUGGESTS THAT THE IDF WOULD REFUSE TO CARRY OUT ORDERS TO ATTACK WEST BEIRUT). CRITICISM OF SHARON AND OF MILITARY CENSORSHIP BY DEFENCE CORRESPONDENTS CONTINUE.
4. THE ABSENCE OF ANY DIRECT REFERENCE IN THE CABINET COMMUNIQUE TO THOSE SYRIAN FORCES REMAINING IN BEIRUT IS CURIOUS. LOGICALLY, THEIR WITHDRAWAL TOO SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT THE SAME TIME AS THAT OF THE PLO, BEFORE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF LEBANON. WE HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING WHETHER THE OMISSION IS DELIBERATE OR ACCIDENTIAL.

MOBERLY

PYM

NNNN



File

DSG

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 June 1982

Dear Sir,

ISRAEL/LEBANON: KLIBI'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME
MINISTER

Thank you for your letter of 25 June.
The Prime Minister agrees with the reply
which you propose and I should be grateful
if you could arrange for its despatch.

Yours etc

John Gles.

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

BIC

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 17

DESKBY 26 0900Z

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
~~SIR J LEAHY~~
MR MOBERLY
SIR J BULLARD
HD/NENAD
HD/MED
HD/UND
HD/SEC DEPT
HD/S.E.D. ...

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE D10

HD/CONSULAR DEPT

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PUSD (2)
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RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE
ADVANCE COPY

PP AMMAN

GRS 1850

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 260900Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 260808Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1063 DATED 26 JUNE 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, PARIS,

INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, AMMAN

MY TELNO 1054 AND MY TELECON WITH MILES: ISRAEL/LEBANON

SUMMARY

1. AFTER 17 HOURS OF SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS, UNDER STARTINGLY INCOMPETENT AND ARROGANT FRENCH CHAIRMANSHIP, THE AMERICANS VETOED AN AMENDED VERSION OF THE FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION. I CONSIDERED TABLING A SIMPLE CEASEFIRE-PLUS-UN-OBSERVERS RESOLUTION AFTER THE VETO, BUT MY PREPARATIONS FOR THIS OFFENDED DE NANTEUIL WHO TOLD ME THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTIONS FROM CHEYSSON TO VETO ANY BRITISH DRAFT, I DID NOT THEREFORE PERSIST. ANY COMPLAINT FROM CHEYSSON SHOULD BE VERY FIRMLY DEALT WITH (SEE PARA 11 BELOW).

FROM CHEYSSON TO VETO ANY BRITISH DRAFT, I DID NOT THEREFORE PERSIST. ANY COMPLAINT FROM CHEYSSON SHOULD BE VERY FIRMLY DEALT WITH (SEE PARA 11 BELOW).

DETAIL

2. LATE LAST NIGHT (24 JUNE) THE FRENCH TABLED THE DRAFT IN MY TELNO 1055. I SAW DE NANTEUIL (FRANCE) FIRST THING THIS MORNING AND TOLD HIM FIRMLY OF THE AMENDMENTS WE WOULD NEED IF WE WERE TO SUPPORT HIS DRAFT. DE NANTEUIL INDICATED THAT THE DRAFT HAD BEEN FOISTED ON HIM BY PARIS AND SAID THAT HE REALISED THAT MANY DELEGATIONS, NOT ONLY THE AMERICANS, WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTIES WITH IT. HE THOUGHT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A LONG ARGUMENT ABOUT IT BEFORE IT WOULD BECOME POSSIBLE (IE VIS-A-VIS PARIS) FOR THE COUNCIL TO AGREE A MUCH SIMPLER DRAFT. WHEN THE COUNCIL GATHERED FOR INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS LATER IN THE MORNING: IT WAS CLEAR THAT DE NANTEUIL'S JUDGEMENT WAS RIGHT. EVERY DELEGATION I SPOKE TO HAD DIFFICULTIES WITH THE DRAFT, WHICH WAS VIEWED WITH A MIXTURE OF AMUSEMENT AND CONTEMPT. THIS (PACE PARIS TELNO 668) INCLUDED TERZI (PLO) WHO WAS VERY UNHAPPY WITH OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 1, 2 AND 4.

3. DE NANTEUIL FINALLY CONVENED US IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE COUNCIL AT 1630Z. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DESCRIBED HIS MESSAGES OF YESTERDAY (PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TELNO 1051): THE ONLY RESPONSE HAD COME FROM THE PLO WHO HAD REAFFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR SCRS 508 AND 509 AND THEIR READINESS TO ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE IN THE BEIRUT AREA. DE NANTEUIL THEN INTRODUCED HIS DRAFT RESOLUTION, WITHOUT APOLOGY AND INDEED WITH SOME ARROGANCE. HE HAD ENCOUNTERED SOME CRITICISM OF THE TEXT; BUT HE URGED THE COUNCIL NOT TO BE PERFECTIONIST: IF IT TRIED TO DO TOO MUCH IT WOULD ACHIEVE NOTHING; FRANCE COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY BUT MARGINAL AMENDMENTS; HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF COMMENTS COULD BE BRIEF. GUYANA, SPAIN, CHINA, JORDAN, USSR AND TOGO THEN SPOKE. ALL CRITICISED THE DRAFT FOR BEING UNCLEAR, FOR NOT ADDRESSING THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS (A CEASEFIRE AND COMPLETE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL) AND FOR PURPORTING TO LEGALISE ISRAEL'S PRESENCE IN LEBANON. DE NANTEUIL THEN ADJOURNED THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS FOR THE MONTHLY SECURITY COUNCIL LUNCH.

4. DURING LUNCH NEWS WAS RECEIVED OF HAIG'S RESIGNATION AND OF DISCUSSIONS THE AMERICANS WERE HAVING WITH THE LEBANESE HERE TO PREPARE A NEW TEXT WHICH THEY WOULD LAUNCH DURING THE AFTERNOON (WASHINGTON TELNO 2252). IN THE AFTERNOON, THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WENT INTO AN INTERMINABLE MEETING. THIS IS NORMAL PRACTICE HERE BUT DE NANTEUIL WAS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE DELAY AND RUDELY INSISTED THAT THE COUNCIL RESUME INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE. THIS INFURIATED THE NON-

TO ACCEPT THE DRAFT AND INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE. THIS INFURIATED THE NON-ALIGNED, WHO WERE ALREADY PEEVED THAT DE NANTEUIL SHOULD HAVE TABLED HIS DRAFT WITHOUT ANY CONSULTATION WITH ANY OF THEM. WE DULY MET AT 2200Z. THE REMAINING MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL SPOKE. ALL WERE CRITICAL OF THE FRENCH DRAFT, EXCEPT LICHENSTEIN (USA) WHO DID NOT SPEAK DIRECTLY TO IT BUT SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WERE WORKING WITH TUENI (LEBANON), IN THE CONTEXT OF HABIB'S NEGOTIATIONS, TO PREPARE A DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE AND HELP THE RESTORATION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO "SHARE THESE IDEAS" SHORTLY.

5. IN SUMMING UP DE NANTEUIL MADE NO REFERENCE TO LICHENSTEIN'S INTERVENTION BUT SAID THAT HE WOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE CRITICISMS HE HAD HEARD AND WOULD REVISE THE FRENCH DRAFT. HE REJECTED SUGGESTIONS FROM VARIOUS DELEGATIONS THAT RE-DRAFTING SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY A WORKING GROUP OR BY THE COUNCIL AS A WHOLE; IT WAS UP TO FRANCE TO REVISE ITS OWN DRAFT. HE REPEATED THAT THERE HAD TO BE A VOTE TONIGHT. IT WAS AGREED THAT WE WOULD MEET AGAIN AT 0030Z.

6. WHEN WE RECONVENED, THE FRENCH DISTRIBUTED A REVISED TEXT WHICH MET OUR MAIN CONCERNS AND THOSE OF THE OTHERS WHO HAD SPOKEN AT THE EARLIER SESSION. THERE FOLLOWED THREE HOURS OF INCREASINGLY BAD-TEMPERED DISCUSSION. THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL PRODUCED A HOST OF AMENDMENTS (PARTLY IT SEEMED OUT OF PIQUE AT DE NANTEUIL'S BEHAVIOUR EARLIER IN THE DAY), NUSEIBEH (JORDAN) RAMBLED ON ENDLESSLY AND DE NANTEUIL TRIED REPEATEDLY BUT UNSUCCESSFULLY TO RAILROAD THE COUNCIL THROUGH TO A QUICK VOTE ON HIS TEXT.

7. AT ONE POINT, I PROPOSED A SIMPLE, SHORT RESOLUTION CALLING AS A FIRST STEP, FOR A CEASEFIRE AND STANDSTILL OF FORCES, WITH UNTSO MONITORING. I HAD TRIED THIS OUT IN OUTLINE BEFOREHAND WITH TUENI, URQUHART, DORR (IRELAND) AND TROYANOVSKY (USSR), ALL OF WHO WERE MORE OR LESS ENTHUSIASTIC. BUT LICHENSTEIN (USA) IMMEDIATELY WELCOMED IT, THUS GIVING IT THE KISS OF DEATH: NUSEIBEH SAID SOME ELEMENT OF ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT OR WITHDRAWAL WAS A SINE QUA NON; TROYANOVSKY CHANGED SIDES; AND WE WERE BACK TO CRAWLING OVER THE FRENCH TEXT. LICHENSTEIN'S ONLY OTHER INTERVENTION, RIGHT AT THE END, WAS TO REMIND THE COUNCIL THAT THERE WERE SYRIAN TROOPS IN LEBANON TOO AND THAT FOR THE U.S. THE CENTRAL QUESTION WAS THE "DEMILITARIZATION" OF THE PALESTINIANS. AT 0330Z THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WERE SUSPENDED FOR DE NANTEUIL TO PREPARE A FURTHER REVISED TEXT.

8. WHILE THIS WAS GOING ON, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND URQUHART

8. WHILE THIS WAS GOING ON, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND URQUHART ENCOURAGED ME TO FLOAT MY DRAFT AGAIN AS SOMETHING WHICH COULD BE PUT TO A VOTE IMMEDIATELY AFTER A VETO. I DID SO. MY TEXT IS IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. FIRST I GOT THE RUSSIANS ON BOARD, THEN THE ARABS, THEN THE NON-ALIGNED AND THEN THE AMERICANS. FINALLY I SPOKE TO DE NANTEUIL. BEFORE I COULD EXPLAIN MY PURPOSE, HE ACCUSED ME ANGRILY OF HAVING CONCOCTED A MANOEUVRE WITH THE AMERICANS: THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON HAD BEEN TOLD 3 HOURS BEFORE THAT THE AMERICANS FELT THEY COULD SAFELY VETO THE FRENCH DRAFT BECAUSE A SATISFACTORY BRITISH DRAFT, FOR WHICH THEY COULD VOTE, WOULD BE TABLED IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS. (THIS SIMPLY COULD NOT HAVE BEEN TRUE). THIS HAD BEEN REPORTED TO CHEYSSON, WHO HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO VETO ANY BRITISH DRAFT. I RESPONDED IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS AND HE WITHDREW HIS REMARK WITH PROFUSE APOLOGIES. I WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THAT I HAD KNOWN BEIRUT FOR 40 YEARS: I WAS SICKENED BY THE CONTINUING DESTRUCTION AND LOSS OF LIFE. THIS WAS MY ONLY MOTIVE IN FLOATING THE DRAFT AND I DEEPLY RESENTED HIS SUGGESTION. HE SAID THAT HE HAD NO CHOICE BECAUSE OF CHEYSSON'S INSTRUCTIONS AND FORMALLY ASKED ME NOT TO TABLE THE DRAFT. I SAID THAT I WOULD NOT CONTEMPLATE PUTTING ANYTHING TO THE VOTE WHICH WOULD BE VETOED BY AN ALLY AND PARTNER. THERE WAS A LONG SILENCE.

9. MEANWHILE THE EGYPTIANS AND THE LEBANESE HAD BEEN TRYING UNSUCCESSFULLY EITHER TO PERSUADE DE NANTEUIL TO POSTPONE THE VOTE TO ALLOW MORE TIME OR TO PERSUADE THE AMERICANS TO LET THE FRENCH DRAFT BE ADOPTED. BUT BOTH WERE ADAMANT. DE NANTEUIL INSISTED ON A VOTE TONIGHT AND THE AMERICANS INSISTED THAT THEY WOULD VETO UNLESS THE RESOLUTION PROVIDED EXPLICITLY FOR THE DISARMING OF THE PLO.

10. AFTER ANOTHER ROUND OF INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WE FINALLY VOTED AT 3 AM LOCAL (0700Z) ON THE TEXT IN MY SECOND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. THE RESULT WAS 14-1(USA)-0. LICHENSTEIN BRIEFLY EXPLAINED HIS VOTE: BLUM (ISRAEL) ANNOUNCED THAT THE IDF HAD CEASED FIRE AT 2000 LOCAL ON 25 JUNE AND THE CEASEFIRE WAS HOLDING: AND TUENI THANKED FRANCE FOR ITS INITIATIVE. AND SO A DREADFUL DAY ENDED.

COMMENT

11. THE FRENCH PERFORMANCE THROUGHOUT WAS STAGGERING. I BELIEVE THAT DE NANTEUIL WAS UNDER FIRM INSTRUCTIONS FROM CHEYSSON BUT HE MADE A BAD SITUATION WORSE BY HIS ARROGANT INCOMPETENCE. INCLUDING THE ARABS WHO PLEADED WITH DE NANTEUIL TO

BUT HE MADE A BAD SITUATION WORSE BY HIS ARROGANT INCOMPETENCE. NOONE, INCLUDING THE ARABS WHO PLEADED WITH DE NANTEUIL TO ACCOMMODATE THE AMERICANS, COULD UNDERSTAND HIS IMPLACABLE DETERMINATION TO PRESS ON TO AN INEVITABLE AMERICAN VETO. HIS INSINUATIONS TO ME WERE OUTRAGEOUS AND I LEFT HIM IN NO DOUBT AS TO MY REACTION TO THEM. AFTER THE DEBATE ADJOURNED HE APOLOGISED AGAIN AND ASSURED ME THAT HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY REPORT TO PARIS THAT HE COMPLETELY ACCEPTED MY GOOD FAITH. I SAID THAT I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF HE WOULD, AS I HAD PROFOUNDLY RESENTED WHAT HE HAD SAID EARLIER. IF CHEYSSON COMPLAINS TO YOU I HOPE YOU WILL DEAL WITH HIM VERY FIRMLY. THE STORY WILL PROBABLY APPEAR IN THE PRESS. I DID NOT VOLUNTEER ANYTHING BUT, ON BEING QUESTIONED, I WAS NOT PREPARED TO LET THE IMPRESSION GET AROUND THAT IT HAD BEEN THE AMERICANS WHO HAD BLOCKED MY DRAFT. AT THE END EVERYONE SEEMED TO KNOW -IN THE WAY THEY DO IN THE COUNCIL - THAT IT WAS THE FRENCH.

PARSONS

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 June, 1982

Prime Minister

Background to European Council.

Dear John,

ASL 25/6.

Israeli Invasion of Lebanon: Arms Sales

I wrote to you on 16 June about a possible suspension of arms sales to Israel. In your reply of 17 June, you said that the Prime Minister thought that we should not act alone. We agreed to be in touch about what action our European partners were proposing to take (we are providing briefing for the European Council separately).

Preliminary soundings among our partners in the Ten have revealed that it may be possible to reach a consensus on the suspension of delivery of defence equipment to Israel. We are pursuing this further. Belgium has already suspended arms sales since the fighting began. France and West Germany have not supplied arms to Israel for many years. Dutch policy is not to export arms to areas of tension. The Italians are uncertain about what policy to adopt. The remainder are not arms manufacturers, although the Danes and Irish have told us that they will be acting to stop sales by companies based in their countries to those engaged in the fighting.

There is now a serious danger that the Israelis will invade Beirut over the weekend. We note that Haig told the Prime Minister on 23 June that he thought Sharon would not refrain from entering Beirut unless the PLO made further commitments to disarm, leave Beirut and shed some of their leaders. At present there is little sign that the PLO will make such commitments, and we are inclined to agree with Haig's assessment, the more so as there is no sign that the Americans have done anything to make the decision really difficult for the Israelis.

An attack on Beirut would be an important step in escalating the war. There would be more heavy bloodshed. There would be renewed pressure on Arab leaders to take some action, and to a lesser extent Beirut would also make a deep impression on European opinion, perhaps especially French opinion.

It is therefore possible that Ministers will meet in Brussels on Monday in an atmosphere of sharply increased tension. This would be likely to affect the attitude of our partners both to an arms embargo and to other possible measures against Israel.

Yours ever

John Holmes

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

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
(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 1AA



25 JUL 1982





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister.

Agree draft?

(Duty Desk)
25/6/82

25 June, 1982

Dear John,

Israel/Lebanon: Klibi's Message to Prime Minister

// Mr Chedli Klibi, the Secretary-General of the Arab League has recently sent two messages via our Embassy in Tunis to the Prime Minister on the subject of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

/ I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to Mr Klibi. It is cast in the form of a telegram to Tunis, the headquarters of the Arab League.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

John Holmes

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats
RESTRICTED

Precedence/Deskby
PRIORITY

1 ZCZC
 2 GRS
 3 RESTRICTED
 4
 5
 6 FM FCO 82
 7 TO PRIORITY TUNIS
 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
 9 INFO ROUTINE BEIRUT DAMASCUS UKREP BRUSSELS UKMIS NEW YORK
 10 INFO SAVING OTHER ME POSTS WASHINGTON
 11 YOUR TELNOS 97 AND 102
 12 ISRAEL/LEBANON: KLIBI'S MESSAGE
 13 1. Please convey the following message from the Prime Minister
 14 to Klibi, in reply to his two recent messages:
 15 BEGINS
 16 Thank you for your recent messages about the situation in
 17 Lebanon. I fully share your concern at the grave situation in
 18 Lebanon following the unjustified Israeli invasion. You will
 19 have seen that, together with our European partners, we vigorously
 20 condemned the invasion in a statement issued by the Ten Foreign
 21 Ministers on 9 June. We are committed to the territorial
 22 integrity of Lebanon and wish to see an immediate and
 23 unconditional withdrawal of all Israeli forces in accordance with
 24 Security Council Resolution 509. Meanwhile we are giving
 25 humanitarian assistance to the victims of this tragic episode

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword both
File number	Dept Private Office	Distribution Middle East Standard
Drafted by (Block capitals) J E HOLMES		
Telephone number 233 4641		
Authorised for despatch		
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

RESTRICTED

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
1 ZCZC

2 both bilaterally and through the European Community.

3 We have left the Israeli Government in no doubt as to the
4 strength of our feeling on this matter. The Ten have made clear
5 that they will consider the possibilities for future action
6 should Israel refuse to withdraw. We are also keeping in close
7 contact with the US Government who will have a crucial role to
8 play in efforts to bring about Israeli withdrawal and a lasting
9 peace in Lebanon. We have made clear to them our view that the
10 Palestinian problem must also find a solution if real peace and
11 stability is to be achieved in the Middle East.

12 ENDS

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telegram

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Catchword

GRS 160
UNCLASSIFIED
FM TUNIS 211145Z JUNE 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 102 OF 21 JUNE
INFO ROUTINE BEIRUT
SAVING OTHER ME POSTS UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

MY TEL NO 97: LEBANON

1. KLIBI HAS ASKED ME TO TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING FURTHER MESSAGE
TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

BEGINS

SON EXCELLENCE MADAME MARGARET THATCHER
PREMIER MINISTRE DE GRANDE BRETAGNE
LONDRES

LES DEVELOPPEMENTS DE LA SITUATION AU PROCHE-ORIENT DONNENT A
PENSER QUE LE PERIL QUI MENACE BEYROUTH DANS LES JOURS A VENIR,
VOIRE DANS LES PROCHAINES HEURES, SE PRECISE DE PLUS EN PLUS.
IL SEMBLE QU'ISRAEL APRES AVOIR REDUIT LA CAPITALE LIBANAISE A
UNE SITUATION SEMBLABLE A CELLE DU GHETTO DE VARSOVIE, LORS DE
LA DERNIERE GUERRE MONDIALE, LUI MENAGE UN SORT IDENTIQUE.
CONVAINCU QUE VOUS NE PERMETTEZ PAS DE TELLES ATROCITES, JE VOUS
ADJURE D'USER DE TOUTE VOTRE INFLUENCE POUR QUE LA CATASTROPHE
SOIT EVITEE, QUE BEYROUTH SOIT EPARGNE ET QUE CESSE LA BOUCHERIE.
HOMMAGES ET TRES HAUTE CONSIDERATION
CHEDLI KLIBI
SECRETAIRE GENERAL DE LA LIGUE DES ETATS ARABES
ENDS

FCO PLSE PASS SAVING TO OTHER ME POSTS UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

STIRLING

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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WED	CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

GRS 245

UNCLASSIFIED

FM TUNIS 180900Z JUNE 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 97 OF 18 JUNE

AND TO ROUTINE BEIRUT DAMASCUS UKREP BRUSSELS UKMIS NEW Y

AND TO SAVING OTHER ME POSTS WASHINGTON

LEBANON

1. KLIBI HAS ASKED ME TO FORWARD THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

BEGINS

ON BEHALF OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES I AM ADDRESSING YOUR EXCELLENCY IN YOUR CAPACITY OF PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, ENTRUSTED WITH SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PEACE AND SECURITY, TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES IN ORDER TO PUT AN END TO THE ISRAELI CRIMINAL ACTS WHICH CONSTITUTE AN OPEN VIOLATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

WE HOPE AND EXPECT YOUR DIRECT INTERVENTION WITH ALL AVAILABLE MEANS TO EXERT EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON ISRAEL SO THAT IT MAY CEASE ITS GENOCIDAL WAR AGAINST INNOCENT CIVILIAN POPULATIONS.

THE CONTINUOUS DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION GREATLY ENDANGERS THE STABILITY OF THE REGION AND MAY WELL END UP IN AN EXPLOSION OF UNPREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES FOR WORLD PEACE AND THE VITAL INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES.

HOPING IN THIS CRITICAL CIRCUMSTANCE, THAT YOU WILL SPARE NO EFFORT TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE CURRENT SITUATION PLEASE ACCEPT, YOUR EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGH CONSIDERATION.

CHEDLI KLIBI

SECRETARY GENERAL, LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES.

ENDS

2. KLIBI HAS ADDRESSED SIMILAR MESSAGES TO THE HEADS OF STATE OF OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, TO CHANCELLOR SCHIMIDT, TO THE EC PRESIDENCY, TO THE PRESIDENTS OF THE OAU, THE NAM, AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR.

FCO PLSE PASS SAVING TO OTHER ME POSTS AND WASHINGTON

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

STIRLING

STANDARD

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
~~SIR J LEAHY~~
MR MOBERLY
SIR J BULLARD
HD/NENAD
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CABINET OFFICE D10

HD/CONSULAR DEPT

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IMMEDIATE

PUSD (2)
NEWS D
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

W

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM TEL AVIV 251130Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 273 OF 25 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, PRIORITY BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, JEDDA AND CAIRO.

MY TELNO 268: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. THE MIXTURE CONTINUES AS BEFORE, ONLY MORE SO: INCREASING MILITARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE ON THE PLO AND SYRIANS SEMICOLON A RISING GROUNDSWELL OF CONCERN WITHIN ISRAEL AT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ASSAULT ON WEST BEIRUT SEMICOLON A WIDESPREAD FEELING THAT THE MILITARY SIDE OF THE OPERATION CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO DRAG ON AND MATTERS MUST COME TO A HEAD SOON.

2. THE OFFICIAL ISRAELI LINE IS THAT YESTERDAY'S CLASHES WERE INITIATED BY THE PLO AND SYRIANS. BUT THE ARGUMENT IS ALSO HEARD THAT IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY TO TIGHTEN THE ISRAELI STRANGLEHOLD BECAUSE THE PLO HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE CABINET DECISION (REPORTEDLY REAFFIRMED YESTERDAY) NOT TO ENTER BEIRUT AND BY OPPOSITION CRITICISM OF THE WHOLE OPERATION. ISRAEL IS THEREFORE ANXIOUS TO SHOW THE PLO THAT THIS DECISION IS NOT IMMUTABLE. BEGIN IS REPORTED AS HAVING TOLD THE CABINET THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT OBJECT VOCIFEROUSLY TO PRESSURE ON THE PLO

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3. WHEN SHARON BRIEFED THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE COMMITTEE OF THE KNESSET YESTERDAY HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT THE MINIMUM OBJECTIVE OF OPERATION PEACE FOR GALILEE (THE CREATION OF A BUFFER ZONE) HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. BUT THERE WERE TWO FURTHER AIMS: TO GET ALL FOREIGN FORCES OUT OF LEBANON AND TO HELP BRING ABOUT THE FORMATION OF A NEW LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD SIGN THE NECESSARY POLITICAL AGREEMENTS AND PERHAPS EVEN A PEACE TREATY. SHARON WAS SUBJECTED TO SOME ROUGH CRITICISM FROM THE OPPOSITION, PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE EXPANDED SCOPE OF THE OPERATION BEYOND THE ORIGINALLY DECLARED OBJECTIVES AND THE CONSEQUENT INCREASE IN CASUALTIES. THE LEADER OF MAPAM POINTED OUT THAT THE IDF WOULD HAVE LOST ONLY 25 DEAD HAD THE OPERATION ENDED AFTER 72 HOURS WITH THE ATTAINMENT OF THE ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE.

4. THIS IS NOW ISRAEL'S LONGEST WAR SINCE 1948. THE IDF HAVE SO FAR LOST GETTING ON FOR 300 DEAD. THERE IS A CONTINUING STREAM OF CASUALTIES (16 DEAD AND 47 WOUNDED YESTERDAY). IT IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE THE MOOD IN THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE SEMICOLON BUT THE PROLONGATION OF THE OPERATION HAS LED TO A POLARIZATION OF POLITICAL POSITIONS. OPPOSITION CRITICISM IS INCREASINGLY OPEN: FOR EXAMPLE, EBAN AND RABIN HAVE NOW QUESTIONED THE BASIS EVEN FOR THE ORIGINAL INVASION. THERE IS WIDESPREAD SUSPICION OF SHARON'S MOTIVES IN THE PRESS, WITH THE LEADING DEFENCE CORRESPONDENT ARGUING THAT SHARON WANTS AN ALL-OUT ASSAULT AGAINST BEIRUT AND THE SYRIANS IN LEBANON BECAUSE THE ONLY WAY TO JUSTIFY THE LOSSES SO FAR IS BY MEANS OF AN OVERWHELMING SUCCESS EVEN THOUGH IT MEANS FURTHER CASUALTIES, IE THE DOUBLE OR QUITS ARGUMENT. CABINET DISCUSSION OF WHATEVER PACKAGE HABIB EVENTUALLY BRINGS IS LIKELY TO BE THE MOST CRUCIAL SINCE THE WHOLE OPERATION BEGAN.

5. THE EDITOR OF ONE OF THE MAIN DAILIES GAVE ME THE FOLLOWING VIEWS LAST NIGHT:

(A) IDF ACTION AGAINST THE PLO-DOMINATED REFUGEE CAMP IN BEIRUT

4. THIS IS NOW ISRAEL'S LONGEST WAR SINCE 1948. THE IDF HAVE SO FAR LOST GETTING ON FOR 300 DEAD. THERE IS A CONTINUING STREAM OF CASUALTIES (16 DEAD AND 47 WOUNDED YESTERDAY). IT IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE THE MOOD IN THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE SEMICOLON BUT THE PROLONGATION OF THE OPERATION HAS LED TO A POLARIZATION OF POLITICAL POSITIONS. OPPOSITION CRITICISM IS INCREASINGLY OPEN: FOR EXAMPLE, EBAN AND RABIN HAVE NOW QUESTIONED THE BASIS EVEN FOR THE ORIGINAL INVASION. THERE IS WIDESPREAD SUSPICION OF SHARON'S MOTIVES IN THE PRESS, WITH THE LEADING DEFENCE CORRESPONDENT ARGUING THAT SHARON WANTS AN ALL-OUT ASSAULT AGAINST BEIRUT AND THE SYRIANS IN LEBANON BECAUSE THE ONLY WAY TO JUSTIFY THE LOSSES SO FAR IS BY MEANS OF AN OVERWHELMING SUCCESS EVEN THOUGH IT MEANS FURTHER CASUALTIES, IE THE DOUBLE OR QUITS ARGUMENT. CABINET DISCUSSION OF WHATEVER PACKAGE HABIB EVENTUALLY BRINGS IS LIKELY TO BE THE MOST CRUCIAL SINCE THE WHOLE OPERATION BEGAN.

5. THE EDITOR OF ONE OF THE MAIN DAILIES GAVE ME THE FOLLOWING VIEWS LAST NIGHT:

(A) IDF ACTION AGAINST THE PLO-DOMINATED REFUGEE CAMP IN BEIRUT COULD BE THE NEXT STEP WITHOUT WEST BEIRUT PROPER BEING ASSAULTED (COMPARE END OF PARA 2 OF TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO 268) SEMICOLON

(B) THE SYRIANS WOULD REFUSE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE BEKA'A VALLEY AS PART OF ANY DEAL. IN VIEW OF BEGIN'S STATED POSITION THAT THE IDF WILL ONLY WITHDRAW WHEN THE SYRIANS DO, THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE TO PREPARE FOR A LONG STAY. QUOTE IT IS EASIER TO GET INTO LEBANON THAN TO GET OUT UNQUOTE SEMICOLON

(C) EVEN IF ISRAEL SUCCEEDS IN DESTROYING THE PLO AS A MILITARY FORCE, IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT OF TERRORISM WHICH WILL ACTUALLY BECOME WORSE THAN BEFORE SEMICOLON

(D) ARABS ON THE WEST BANK ARE HAILING THE PLO'S PERFORMANCE AGAINST THE IDF AS A SUCCESS SINCE THE PLO HAS RESISTED THE ISRAELI ONSLAUGHT LONGER THAN OTHER ARAB ARMIES IN PREVIOUS WARS. ALTHOUGH IN THE END WEST BANKERS MAY BE MORE WILLING TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE ISRAELIS AS THE PLO IS SEEN TO BE LESS POTENT, IN THE SHORT TERM THE REVERSE WILL PROBABLY BE TRUE.

6. THE EDITOR'S VIEWS ARE ONLY A STRAW POLL. BUT I WOULD REGARD THEM AS REPRESENTATIVE OF MANY MIDDLE OF THE ROADERS WHO ARE NEITHER WEDDED TO THE GOVERNMENT LINE NOR UNHOPEFUL OF SOMETHING GOOD COMING OUT OF ISRAEL'S ACTION IN LEBANON.


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FM BEIRUT 250820Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.
TELEGRAM NUMBER 328 OF 25 JUNE 1982
INFO DAMASCUS, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDAH,
WASHINGTON, MODUK.

WASHINGTON TELNO 2224 OF 24 JUNE: LEBANON.

1. I CONFIRM THE TEXT KINDLY TRANSMITTED BY THE AMERICANS AND HAVE RETURNED TO THE CHANCERY.
2. ARAFAT AND ABU IYAD HAVE APPARENTLY RECOGNIZED THAT THE GAME IS UP AND HAVE CONTACTED BASHIR GEMAYEL THROUGH SAEB SALAM. THEY HAVE BEEN DENOUNCED BY HABASH AS TRAITORS. SO MUCH IS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. EVEN WALID JUMBLATT HAS APPARENTLY RECOGNIZED THE FACTS OF LIFE. (A MEMBER OF MY STAFF CONFIRMED THIS YESTERDAY WITH FARWAN HAMMADE).
3. THIS I THINK MEANS THAT THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT IN BEIRUT IS IRREVOCABLY SPLIT. TO BE SURE, THE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP IS STILL

BICKERING OVER A PRECISE FORMULA SEMI COLON BUT THERE IS NO GOING
BACK ON INTERCOURSE WITH THE DEVIL. THERE COULD NOW BE FIGHTING
BETWEEN PALESTINIAN FACTIONS WHICH COULD BECOME PARTICULARLY
DANGEROUS TO ALL THE INHABITANTS OF BEIRUT. MOST OF THE PALESTINIANS
(WITHOUT THE HEAVY EQUIPMENT) SEEM TO HAVE LEFT THE CAMPS AND HAVE
REDEPLOYED IN WEST BEIRUT PROPER.

4. IT SEEMS CERTAIN NOW THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE OCCUPIED BHAMDOUN
SEMI COLON AND THE SYRIANS ARE REPORTED TO BE RETREATING FROM
SUQ EL GHARB.

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FM FCO 251918Z JUN 82
TO PRIORITY JEDDA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 178 OF 25 JUNE

ISRAEL/LEBANON: MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE

1. HABIB CHATTY SENT THE PRIME MINISTER A MESSAGE ON 11 JUNE
ABOUT THE ISRAELI INVASION OF THE LEBANON.
2. PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER:
BEGINS: THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 11 JUNE. I FULLY SHARE
YOUR CONCERN ABOUT THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON. BRITISH PEOPLE
HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY APPALLED BY THE LOSS OF LIFE AND THE SCALE OF
SUFFERING AMONG THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THAT
WE AND OUR EUROPEAN COMMUNITY PARTNERS ISSUED A STRONG STATEMENT
ON 9 JUNE VIGOROUSLY CONDEMNING THE ISRAELI INVASION AS A FLAGRANT
VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OF THE MOST BASIC HUMANITARIAN
PRINCIPLES. WE HAVE CALLED ON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW HER FORCES
IMMEDIATELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY FROM THE LEBANON IN ACCORDANCE WIT
SECURITY RESOLUTION 509. WE HAVE ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT SHOULD
ISRAEL FAIL TO DO SO, THE TEN WILL EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR
WE HAVE ALSO MADE OUR VIEWS CLEAR TU THE US ADMINISTRATION.
MEANWHILE WE HAVE MADE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE BOTH
BILATERALLY AND THROUGH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY FOR THE VICTIMS
OF THE CONFLICT IN LEBANON.

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25 June 1982

MESSAGE TO MR. HABIB CHATTY

The Prime Minister has approved the message suggested in your letter of 18 June, subject to the deletion of the words:

"There was no justification for Israel's action."

A. J. COLES

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

A

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DESKBY FCO 221130Z JUN
FM ABU DHABI 220930Z 27, 1982
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 105 OF 22 JUN 1982
INFO ROUTINE DUBAI, BEIRUT AND TEL AVIV
INFO SAVING TO WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS AND VIENNA

ISRAEL/LEBANON.

1. MIFT CONTAINS A MESSAGE FROM THE UAE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER.
2. THE ARABIC TEXT OF THE MESSAGE AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION WERE HANDED TO ME THIS MORNING BY ZAKI NUSSEIBEH, SHAIKH ZAID'S PRESS ADVISER AND INTERPRETER, TOGETHER WITH A COVERING LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL CHAMBERLAIN, SHAIKH SUROUR, ASKING THAT THEY BE FORWARDED TELEGRAPHICALLY. I SUSPECT THAT NUSSEIBEH, WHO IS A PALESTINIAN, WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTUAL DRAFTING, THOUGH I AM SURE THE INITIATIVE AND THE VIEWS EXPRESSED ARE ZAID'S OWN.
3. NUSSEIBEH SAID THAT SIMILAR MESSAGES WERE BEING SENT TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AND CHANCELLOR KREISKY. ANOTHER MESSAGE WAS GOING TO PRESIDENT REAGAN EMPHASISING THE UNITED STATES' RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PRESENT CRISIS.
4. NUSSEIBEH SAID NO PUBLICITY WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE MESSAGE HERE AT THIS STAGE.
FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS AND VIENNA

MACLENNAN

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 136 C / 82

DESKBY 221130Z JUNE 82

FROM ABU DHABI 220926Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 106 OF 22 JUNE

INFO DUBAI, BEIRUT, TEL AVIVI

AND SAVING WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS AND VIENNA.

MIPT.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SHAIKH ZAID'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

BEGINS:

MRS. MARGARET THATCHER,
PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN

AT THIS TRAGIC MOMENT WHEN THOUSANDS OF LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN VICTIMS INCLUDING INNOCENT WOMEN AND CHILDREN ARE BEING DECIMATED, I APPEAL STRONGLY TO YOU MRS. PRIME MINISTER ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES TO WORK TOWARDS STOPPING ISRAEL FROM CONTINUING TO MAKE A MOCERY OF ALL HUMANITARIAN VALUES UPHELD BY THE DIVINE RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD AS WELL AS BY THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM.

THE ENTIRE WORLD LOOKS TO YOU NOW TO WORK TOWARDS PUTTING AN END TO THIS INHUMAN CARNAGE OF THE LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. THE ARAB WORLD WHICH HAS BEEN KEEN TO DEVELOP RELATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION WITH THE WEST CANNOT STAND INACTIVE WATCHING ISRAEL, THE ALLY OF THE WEST, UTILISING ITS ADVANCED WEAPONS TO SOW DESTRUCTION AND DEVASTATION AND TO IMPOSE A POLICY OF BLACKMAIL AND TERROR IN LEBANON AND TO BRING ABOUT THE GENOCIDE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

IN THE NAME OF PEACE AND JUSTICE I APPEAL TO YOU TO PERSONALLY INTERVENE BY EXERCISING PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO CEASE ITS AGGRESSION AND TO WITHDRAW TOTALLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY FROM LEBANON. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE WHOLE WORLD COMMUNITY ESPECIALLY THE ARAB AND ISLAMIC NATIONS PUT ON YOUR SHOULDERS A GRAVE RESPONSIBILITY TO ADOPT A FIRM POLICY THAT ENSURES RESTRAINING THE PERPETRATORS OF INJUSTICE AND AGGRESSION AND BRINGS SUCCOUR TO THE VICTIMS SO AS TO REALISE JUSTICE.

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IF IT IS FOUND THAT THE WEST APPLIES DOUBLE STANDARDS OF JUSTICE AND DISCRIMINATES IN ITS DEALINGS BETWEEN NATIONS THEN THE ARAB AND ISLAMIC WORLD WILL EXPERIENCE GREAT RESENTMENT AND BITTERNESS THAT WILL HAVE NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON THE WHOLE OF ITS RELATIONS WITH THE WEST FOR THE PRESENT AND FUTURE.

ZAYED BIN SULTAN AL NAHYAN

PRESIDENT OF UAE

ENDS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO: WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS AND VIENNA

MACLENNAN

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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RETURN TO PRIORITY ROOM

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R:...1531/22 JUNE 82

U K EYES ALPHA * ~~~~~ *

FM FCU 221600Z JUN 82
TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1220 OF 22 JUNE.
AND TO CERTAIN OTHER POSTS

FOLLOWING WAS RECEIVED FROM SECRETARY JIC AS JICTEL 897 OF 22/6/82.
AND TO: UKMIS NEW YORK OTTAWA CANBERRA (FOR JICREP) WELLINGTON
AMMAN ANKARA DAMASCUS TEL AVIV TRIPOLI CAIRO JEDDA KUWAIT
ABU DHABI BAGHDAD BEIRUT MOSCOW TEHRAN, UKDEL NATO
ACOS(1)SHAPE JIC GERMANY JIG CYPRUS HC 38 GP HQ STRIKE COMMAND
HOUKLF CINCFLEET JARIC.

FROM SECRETARY JIC
WASHINGTON FOR JICREP.
THE FOLLOWING JIC NOTE/JIC(82)(N)64 WAS APPROVED BY THE JIC
AT THEIR MEETING ON MONDAY 21 JUNE.

IMPLICATIONS OF ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON.

(SECRET - UK EYES ALFA - * ~~~~~ *)

1. THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON HAS GIVEN THE MIDDLE EAST
KALEIDOSCOPE A THOROUGH SHAKE AND HAS ADDED TO THE UNCERTAINTY
CAUSED BY IRANIAN SUCCESS IN THE GULF WAR. THE EXACT NATURE OF
THE NEW PATTERN IS NOT YET EVIDENT, BUT WE EXAMINE BELOW SOME
OF THE MORE IMPORTANT LIKELY TRENDS. THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION IN THE CRISIS HAVE BEEN
DEALT WITH SEPARATELY JIC(82)(N)58 DATED 17 JUNE 1982.

* ~ * Passages
deleted and retained
under Section 3(4).

Wayland
11 October 2012

LEBANON

2. BY ITS MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN LEBANON, ISRAEL HAS BOUGHT ITSELF
A CONSIDERABLE MEASURE OF INFLUENCE OVER LEBANON'S POLITICAL
FUTURE. AT THE MOMENT, LEBANON LOOKS AS THOUGH IT WILL BE CARVED
BROADLY INTO THREE ZONES OF INFLUENCE. ISRAEL'S INFLUENCE AND
INTEREST WILL BE STRONGEST IN THE QUARTER OF THE COUNTRY TO THE
SOUTH OF THE +40 KM LINE+. HERE, WHATEVER FORM OF
MULTINATIONAL FORCE OR INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE EMERGES FROM
ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT A RETURN OF PALESTINIAN GUERRILLAS, ISRAEL
ENVISAGES A WIDER ROLE FOR HADDAD'S MILITIA. PROBABLY RECOGNISING
THAT HADDAD'S INNATE ABILITIES AND NUMERICAL STRENGTH ARE
INADEQUATE TO THE TASK OF POLICING THE WHOLE AREA EFFECTIVELY,
ISRAEL'S POLICY SEEMS EVEN MORE THAN BEFORE TO BE TO PORTRAY
HADDAD'S MILITIA AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LEGITIMATE LEBANESE
AUTHORITIES. TO AID HADDAD IN HIS NEW ROLE, ISRAEL WILL NOT ONLY
+CLEAN+ THE ZONE OF GUERRILLAS BUT MAY ALSO PUT PRESSURE ON
PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS TO LEAVE, THOUGH IT IS NOT CLEAR WHERE
THEY COULD GO. THERE ARE SOME SIGNS OF THIS PRESSURE ALREADY .../(E.G.

(EG THE REPORTED DESTRUCTION OF TWO REFUGEE CAMPS). A CONSIDERABLE REDUCTION IN THE PALESTINIAN POPULATION WOULD MAKE INFILTRATION BY GUERRILLAS AND THEIR WEAPONS MORE DIFFICULT. ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THIS ZONE IS LIKELY TO BE A LENGTHY PROCESS AND MAY TAKE PLACE IN SEVERAL PHASES. AS WITHDRAWAL PROCEEDS, AND THE ISRAELI GARRISON IS REDUCED, THE DANGER OF REINFILTRATION AND OF NEW ATTACKS ON THE IDF WILL GROW. EVEN WHEN WITHDRAWAL HAS BEEN COMPLETED, AN ACTIVE IDF ROLE IN THE ZONE AND CONTINUED INFRINGEMENTS OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY CAN BE EXPECTED, UNLESS A POWERFUL MULTINATIONAL FORCE IS ESTABLISHED.

3. THE SECOND ZONE WILL BE THE EXISTING MARONITE HEARTLAND OF EASTERN BEIRUT AND THE AREA TO THE NORTH. HERE, TOO, ISRAELI INFLUENCE WILL BE STRONG. FOR SEVERAL YEARS, THERE HAS BEEN A MEASURE OF CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE MARONITE KATAIB, NOW EFFECTIVELY RUN BY BASHIR GEMAYEL, AND ISRAEL. KATAIB MEN HAVE BEEN TRAINED AND SUBSTANTIALLY EQUIPPED BY ISRAEL AND THERE HAVE BEEN SECRET MEETINGS BETWEEN KATAIB AND ISRAELI LEADERS. THE IDF WERE APPARENTLY WELCOMED BY THE CHRISTIAN POPULATION WHEN THEY ARRIVED IN EAST BEIRUT AND THERE HAS SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN A MEASURE OF MILITARY CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE KATAIB AND THE IDF.

4. THE THIRD ZONE WILL BE THE RUMP OF SYRIAN-DOMINATED LEBANON, CONSISTING OF THE BEKA'A VALLEY AND THE COASTAL AREA AROUND TRIPOLI IN THE NORTH. DEPENDING ON THE EXTENT OF ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION AROUND BEIRUT, THE SYRIAN ZONE MAY ALSO EXTEND WESTWARDS TOWARDS THE CAPITAL. IF THE IDF MOVES TO ERADICATE THE PLO LEADERSHIP AND COMMAND STRUCTURE IN BEIRUT, THE ALREADY DEPLETED SYRIAN FORCE IS LIKELY TO BE PUSHED FURTHER EAST. IN THAT EVENT, SYRIAN INFLUENCE IN THE CAPITAL COULD BE LARGELY ELIMINATED. AT PRESENT, HOWEVER, SYRIA SAYS THAT IT HAS NO INTENTION OF WITHDRAWING FROM BEIRUT OR THE REST OF LEBANON, DESPITE A REQUEST IN THE LAST FEW DAYS FROM PRESIDENT SARKIS TO DO SO.

5. WHATEVER THE FINAL EXTENT OF THE SYRIAN AREA OF INFLUENCE, THE POWER BALANCE IN LEBANON HAS BEEN CHANGED DECISIVELY IN FAVOUR OF THE KATAIB. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE SYRIANS AND WITH THE PLO IN LEBANON SEVERELY WEAKENED, THE KATAIB WILL BE THE STRONGEST SINGLE FORCE REMAINING IN BEIRUT AND WESTERN LEBANON. BEFORE THE ISRAELI INVASION, THE KATAIB AND THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT WERE DISCUSSING POSSIBLE COMPROMISE CANDIDATES FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION DUE BEFORE THE END OF SEPTEMBER. NOW, THE PROSPECTS FOR BASHIR GEMAYEL, THE KATAIB MILITIA LEADER, WHO IS UNACCEPTABLE TO SYRIA, LOOK MUCH STRONGER. EVEN IF HE COULD NOT GAIN SUFFICIENT SUPPORT FOR HIMSELF, HE COULD BE THE POWER BEHIND THE THRONE WITHOUT WHOSE APPROVAL NO OTHER CANDIDATE COULD BE ELECTED. AT THE START OF THE CRISIS, GEMAYEL AND OTHER MARONITE LEADERS WERE RETICENT ABOUT ISRAELI ACTIONS. SUBSEQUENTLY, MARONITE SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL, INCLUDING OCCASIONAL MILITARY INTERVENTION, HAS BECOME MORE OVERT: HOWEVER, .../ ST

SUCH SUPPORT CARRIES THE RISK OF DAMAGING THE CHANCES OF OBTAINING THE ACQUIESCENCE OF MODERATE SUNNI AND SHIA LEBANESE LEADERS IN GEMAYEL'S ELECTION AS THE NEXT PRESIDENT. GEMAYEL IS BITTERLY OPPOSED TO THE PALESTINIAN AND SYRIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON AND COULD CERTAINLY BE EXPECTED TO USE MARONITE MUSCLE, BACKED BY ISRAEL, IN AN ATTEMPT TO PUSH THE PLO OUT. KATAIB LEADERS ARE THOUGHT TO ASCEPT THAT A LARGE BODY OF RESIDENT PALESTINIANS WOULD HAVE TO REMAIN IN LEBANON: THE KATAIB ENVISAGE, THAT THE PALESTINIANS WOULD BE STRIPPED OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL POWER BUT WOULD ENJOY ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL SIGHTS. GEMAYEL COULD EXPECT THE PASSIVE SUPPORT OF MANY CONSERVATIVE MUSLIM LEBANESE FOR THESE AIMS: BUT, EVEN WITH THE PLO WEAKENED IN LEBANON, HE COULD NOT EXPECT TO ACHIEVE THEM WITHOUT A GOOD DEAL OF DISTRESS AND PROBABLY BLOODSHED. ALTHOUGH ISRAELI AND MARONITE INTERESTS MAY EVENTUALLY DIVERGE, FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE THEY WILL COINCIDE.

6. THE EXTENSION OF ISRAELI INFLUENCE NORTHWARDS TO COVER A MUCH WIDER SECTOR OF LEBANON THAN BEFORE 6 JUNE WOULD NOT BE WITHOUT PROBLEMS FOR ISRAEL AND THE KATAIB. ISRAEL'S ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE LEBANESE POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE ELECTION OF THE NEW PRESIDENT IS LIKELY TO BE STRONGEST BEFORE IT AGREES TO WITHDRAW THE IDF. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR EVEN THE MODERATE MUSLIMS TO BE SEEN TO BE ACQUIESCING IN THE IMPOSITION BY ISRAEL OF A NEW GOVERNMENT. THE LEBANESE LEFTISTS DELAYED PRESIDENT SARKIS' ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH A NEW INTER-COMMUNAL NATIONAL SALVATION BOARD BY SEVERAL DAYS BECAUSE OF THE ISRAELI PRESENCE AND POLITICAL DEMANDS. ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, HOWEVER, WILL PROBABLY BE NECESSARY BEFORE THE BOARD CAN MAKE PROGRESS BEYOND PARTICIPATING IN ATTEMPTS TO LIFT THE ISRAELI SIEGE OF WEST BEIRUT. BUT +CLEANING+ THE SOUTH AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE WILL BE LENGTHY PROCESSES, AND WILL IMPAIR ISRAELI ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE INTERNAL LEBANESE POLITICS. MOREOVER, AT LEAST AT PRESENT, THE SYRIAN ARMY IN EASTERN AND NORTHERN LEBANON REMAINS IN POSSESSION OF SEVERAL 'PRESSURE POINTS', WELL AWAY FROM IDF POSITIONS, WHICH COULD BE USED AGAINST THE KATAIB. IN ADDITION, ALTHOUGH SOME SHIA (THE LARGEST SINGLE LEBANESE COMMUNITY) HAVE WORKED FOR HADDAD, THE INFLUENCE AND MILITANCY OF AMAL, THE SHIAS MILITIA, HAS BEEN GROWING. IT DOES NOT HAVE THE STRENGTH TO CONFRONT THE KATAIB, AND IT DOES NOT WANT TO SEE A PERMANENT PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON, BUT ITS MEN FOUGHT DOGGEDLY AGAINST THE IDF. AMAL, PROBABLY ENCOURAGED BY ITS IRANIAN AND SYRIAN MENTORS, IS THEREFORE LIKELY TO BE A PRICKLY PROBLEM, PARTICULARLY SINCE IT REPRESENTS THE HAVE-NOTS IN LEBANESE SOCIETY, AGAINST THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRIVILEGES OF THE MARONITES. OTHER LEBANESE LEFTIST GROUPS, UNDER SYRIAN, IRAQI OR LIBYAN CONTROL, ARE ALSO LIKELY TO RESIST VIOLENTLY ANY STRENGTHENING OF THE OLD ORDER. IN GENERAL GEMAYEL WILL HAVE TO CONVINCCE THE MUSLIMS THAT THE NEW ORDER WILL BE +LEBANON FIRST+ NOT +CHRISTIANS FIRST+. / PLO

THE PLO

7. THE PLO HAS SUFFERED A SEVERE MILITARY DEFEAT. AN UNKNOWN BUT LARGE NUMBER OF GUERRILLAS HAVE BEEN KILLED OR CAPTURED. WHEN ISRAEL HAS RID THE SOUTHERN ZONE OF GUERRILLAS AND DESTROYED THEIR EQUIPMENT THE PLO WILL HAVE LOST MUCH OF ITS ABILITY TO STRIKE AT ISRAEL FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY, ALTHOUGH EVEN WITH A MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN PLACE AND A STRONGER LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, ATTEMPTS AT INFILTRATION INTO ISRAEL BY PLO GUERRILLAS ARE INEVITABLE. SYRIA, EGYPT AND JORDAN ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO PREVENT FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS BEING MOUNTED ACROSS THEIR BORDERS WITH ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE FIGHTING HAS SHOWN UP THE LIMITED DEGREE OF DIRECT ARAB SUPPORT FOR THE PLO, AT LEAST IN THE PRESENT STATE OF INTER-ARAB RELATIONS.

8. ISRAEL'S CLEAR INTENTION IS TO ERADICATE THE PLO COMMAND STRUCTURE IN BEIRUT, EITHER BY MILITARY OR POLITICAL MEANS. AT PRESENT, HOWEVER, THE PLO LEADERSHIP SURVIVES MORE OR LESS INTACT. WITH TIME, AND GIVEN ARAB FINANCIAL RESOURCES, EQUIPMENT CAN BE REPLACED AND NEW GUERRILLAS TRAINED. THE PLO MAY ACQUIRE WEAPONS OF LONGER RANGE. IT COULD REBUILD IN NORTHERN AND EASTERN LEBANON, IN SYRIA OR ELSEWHERE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE INTERNAL PLO DEBATE, HOWEVER, IS LIKELY TO BE ABOUT THE PURPOSE OF RECONSTRUCTION, AS WELL AS ABOUT IMMEDIATE TACTICS. IN THE LAST FEW YEARS, THE PLO GUERRILLAS HAVE MOVED AWAY FROM BEING A TERRORIST ORGANISATION, TOWARDS MORE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES AND A MORE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY APPROACH: QUASI-STATE INSTITUTIONS HAVE GROWN UP WHICH SOME PLO RADICALS ARGUE HAVE DISTRACTED THE MOVEMENT FROM THE TRUE STRUGGLE. ONE CONSEQUENCE OF THE MILITARY DEFEAT, AND OF THE LOSS OF TERRITORY FROM WHICH TO STRIKE ISRAEL, WILL BE TO STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THOSE IN THE PLO, INCLUDING WITHIN THE RADICAL WING OF FATAH, WHO HAVE ARGUED THAT THESE POLICIES WERE LEADING NOWHERE. EVEN BEFORE THE ISRAELI INVASION, ABU IYAD, OF THE RADICAL WING OF FATAH, WAS MAKING PREPARATIONS FOR A RESUMPTION OF TERRORISM OUTSIDE THE MIDDLE EAST, IF ISRAEL MOUNTED A GROUND FORCES OPERATION IN LEBANON. THERE MUST NOW BE A MUCH GREATER RISK OF TERRORIST ACTS, ESPECIALLY AGAINST ISRAELI AND AMERICAN TARGETS. ONE AIM WILL BE TO DEMONSTRATE THE PLO'S CONTINUED POWER. IN ADDITION, THERE WILL PROBABLY BE INCREASED ATTEMPTS TO INFILTRATE INTO ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

9. IT IS TOO EARLY TO SAY HOW ARAFAT'S POSITION HAS BEEN AFFECTED. HE HAS SURVIVED SIMILAR CRISES BEFORE (JORDAN IN 1970, LEBANON IN 1976 AND 1978), BUT HE HAS BEEN CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH THE POLICY WHICH MANY IN THE PLO WILL NOW PERCEIVE TO HAVE FAILED DISASTROUSLY. EVEN IF ARAFAT'S POSITION IS NOT DIRECTLY THREATENED, HE WILL BE OBLIGED TO PAY MORE ATTENTION TO THE RADICALS IN FATAH AND OTHER FACTIONS.

SECRET

10. MANY OF THESE RADICALS HAVE INTENSIFIED THEIR LINKS WITH SYRIA OVER THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS. NOW THAT THE PLO HAS LOST SO MUCH OF ITS MATERIEL AND MUCH OF ITS TERRITORY FOR TRAINING, THE PLO AS A WHOLE IS LIKELY TO COME EVEN MORE UNDER SYRIAN INFLUENCE. THE GUERRILLAS AND ANY NEW REFUGEES WILL COME UNDER CLOSE SCRUTINY FROM THE SYRIAN INTERNAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES. SYRIAN INFLUENCE WILL PROBABLY BE EXERTED IN A RADICAL DIRECTION AND MAY RESULT IN THE INCREASED USE OF PLO FACTIONS FOR SYRIAN-SPONSORED INTIMIDATION IN THE ARAB WORLD. FATAH WILL NOT LIKE GREATER SYRIAN CONTROL AND THERE MAY BE WIDESPREAD PALESTINIAN RESENTMENT THAT THE SYRIAN ARMY ABANDONED THE GUERRILLAS TO FIGHT ON ALONE. A SPLIT IN THE PLO IS NOW QUITE POSSIBLE IF ARAFAT AND OTHER FATAH LEADERS FIND SYRIAN CONTROL TOO ONEROUS.

SYRIA

11. SYRIA TOO HAS SUFFERED A CLEAR MILITARY DEFEAT. IT HAS TAKEN HEAVY CASUALTIES AND LOST A SIGNIFICANT PROPORTION OF ITS AIR FORCE AND A LARGE NUMBER OF TANKS. THE SAM SITES, A SYMBOL OF DEFIANCE OF ISRAEL AND AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN SYRIAN AIR DEFENCE, WERE DESTROYED. BUT THERE ARE ALREADY SIGNS THAT THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT, AS IN 1973, IS SEEKING TO PORTRAY THE MILITARY SETBACK AS A SUCCESS: THE SYRIAN MEDIA, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE ALLEGED THAT, BECAUSE OF ITS HEAVY LOSSES, ISRAEL, WAS OBLIGED TO BEG FOR A CEASEFIRE. THIS VERSION OF EVENTS SEEMS TO BE GAINING POPULAR ACCEPTANCE IN SYRIA.

12. ON THE POLITICAL LEVEL, THE BALANCE OF PROFIT AND LOSS FOR SYRIA IS LESS CLEAR CUT. SYRIA HAS LOST A GOOD DEAL OF ITS ABILITY TO INFLUENCE EVENTS IN BEIRUT. WITH THE SYRIAN ARMY EFFECTIVELY PUSHED BACK AS FAR AS THE BEKA'A AND POSSIBLY, IN DUE COURSE, OUT OF THE LEBANON, VOICES

12. ON THE POLITICAL LEVEL, THE BALANCE OF PROFIT AND LOSS FOR SYRIA IS LESS CLEAR CUT. SYRIA HAS LOST A GOOD DEAL OF ITS ABILITY TO INFLUENCE EVENTS IN BEIRUT. WITH THE SYRIAN ARMY EFFECTIVELY PUSHED BACK AS FAR AS THE BEKA'A AND POSSIBLY, IN DUE COURSE, OUT OF THE LEBANON, VOICES IN THE ARMY AND THE BA'ATH PARTY ARE LIKELY TO QUESTION WHETHER SYRIA'S +SACRIFICE+ SINCE 1976 HAS BEEN FOR NOTHING. ARAB VOICES FAR FROM THE FRONT (IN KUWAIT, IRAQ AND EGYPT FOR EXAMPLE) HAVE CRITICISED SYRIA FOR NOT DOING MORE TO DEFEND LEBANON AND THE PALESTINIANS. THEY HAVE FEW REGRETS OVER SYRIA'S DEFEAT, OTHER THAN THAT IT WAS ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL, AND WILL DO NOTHING TO HELP HER TO RESTORE HER POSITION IN THE LEBANON. BUT IN GENERAL ASAD WOULD HOPE TO GAIN PRESTIGE AT HOME AND IN THE ARAB WORLD FROM HAVING BEEN SEEN TO BE THE ONLY COUNTRY TO CONFRONT ISRAEL. MOREOVER, THE .../ OIL-

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OIL-RICH STATES MAY PERCEIVE AN INCREASED THREAT FROM A RADICALISED SYRIA AND HENCE FEEL MORE DISPOSED TO MAKE SOME GESTURE TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS WITH SYRIA AGAIN, AND TO GIVE IT FINANCIAL HELP IN ORDER TO REPLACE LOST MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THE SMALLER OIL-STATES, WORRIED BY THE BACKLASH AMONG THEIR OWN PALESTINIAN COMMUNITIES FROM EVENTS IN LEBANON, ARE LIKELY TO BE EVEN MORE CONCERNED IF THEY FEAR THAT A RADICALISED PLO UNDER CLOSER SYRIAN CONTROL IS NOW LIKELY TO EMERGE.

JORDAN

13. THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON POSES PARTICULAR PROBLEMS FOR JORDAN. THERE MAY BE PRESSURE FROM THE PLO AND ARAB STATES TO PERMIT ATTACKS FROM JORDANIAN TERRITORY INTO ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES= THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL ATTEMPTS BY GUERRILLAS TO MOUNT SUCH ATTACKS SINCE THE CRISIS STARTED. THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE SUCCESSFULLY THWARTED THESE, AND WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO DO SO= JORDAN CANNOT AFFORD TO OFFER A CASUS BELLI TO ISRAEL. JORDAN WILL BE RELUCTANT TO ALLOW A SUBSTANTIAL INFLUX OF NEW REFUGEES WHICH COULD POSE A SECURITY PROBLEM TO THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS TO ISRAEL. KING HUSSEIN MAY FEAR THAT AN INFLUX OF REFUGEES MIGHT ALSO TEMPT THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT TO PURSUE ACTIVELY SHARON'S KNOWN AIM OF SETTLING THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM BY ALLOWING THE PLO TO OVERTHROW THE HASHEMITE MONARCHY AND TO ESTABLISH A PALESTINIAN STATE ON THE EAST BANK. ON THE OTHER HAND, HUSSEIN DOES NOT WANT THE PLO TO BE TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON SYRIA. UNDER THE STRICTEST CONDITIONS, THEREFORE, HE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO ALLOW THE FATAH LEADERSHIP A GREATER PRESENCE IN AMMAN. ANOTHER OUTCOME OF RECENT EVENTS MAY BE THAT THE MORE EXTREME ELEMENTS IN THE PLO AND THE SYRIANS WILL BE EVEN MORE SUSPICIOUS THAN HITHERTO ABOUT LINKS BETWEEN JORDAN AND MODERATE WEST BANK LEADERS= WE MAY SEE A RENEWAL OF ARAB FEARS THAT JORDAN IS CONSIDERING JOINING THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS, DESPITE JORDAN'S CRITICISM OF US POLICY IN THE RECENT CRISIS.

THE PEACE PROCESS

14. IT HAS BEEN POSTULATED IN ISRAEL THAT THE WEAKENING OF THE PLO WOULD FACILITATE THE PARTICIPATION OF PALESTINIAN RESIDENTS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IN THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT IN DUE COURSE AN AUTONOMY AGREEMENT WOULD BE SIGNED WHICH WOULD UNDERWRITE CONTINUED ISRAELI OCCUPATION. PRESUMABLY ISRAELI THINKING WOULD BE THAT MODERATE MAYORS, AS WELL AS THE STOOGES OF THE SINGULARLY UNSUCCESSFUL VILLAGE LEAGUES, WOULD NOW BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE. IF THIS REALLY REPRESENTS ISRAELI POLICY .../ (AND

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(A IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE CONSISTENT WITH SHARON'S VIEWS), THERE ARE SEVERAL MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCKS. EGYPT, AS IT MAKES ITS WAY GRADUALLY BACK INTO THE ARAB POLITY, IS UNLIKELY TO ACQUIESCE IN ANY ONE-SIDED AGREEMENT. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT DOES NOT APPEAR PREPARED TO OFFER GENUINE CONCESSIONS TO MAKE AUTONOMY MEANINGFUL. ITS POLICY UNDERESTIMATES THE COMMITMENT OF EVEN THE MODERATE RESIDENTS OF THE TERRITORIES TO THE PLO AS THEIR REPRESENTATIVE AND TO RIDDING THEMSELVES OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION - AND ALSO UNDERPLAYS THE ABILITY OF THE PLO TO INTIMIDATE ANY WAVERERS INTO REFUSING TO PARTICIPATE. ALTHOUGH THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY QUIET DURING THE CRISIS, THE EXTREMISTS ARE LIKELY TO HAVE BEEN STRENGTHENED. WE BELIEVE, IN SHORT, THAT THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON HAS MADE AN AUTONOMY AGREEMENT WHICH COULD OBTAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE PALESTINIANS EVEN LESS LIKELY THAN BEFORE.

15. THE INVASION WILL ALSO HAVE DAMAGED THE PROSPECTS FOR ANY ALTERNATIVES OR SUCCESSORS TO CAMP DAVID. IN PARTICULAR, SAUDI HOPES OF RESURRECTING THE FAHD PLAN WILL HAVE RECEIVED A SEVERE BLOW. FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE AND GIVEN THEIR CURRENT SENSE OF HUMILIATION, FEW ARABS ARE LIKELY TO HAVE THE POLITICAL WILL TO FIND COMPROMISE FORMULAE ON RECOGNISING ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST.

INTER-ARAB RELATIONS

16. THE IMMEDIATE RESPONSE OF IRAQ AND THE MODERATE ARAB STATES HAS BEEN TO ACCUSE SYRIA OF FAILING TO DO ENOUGH. IN DUE COURSE, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE INVASION MAY RESULT IN SOME IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WITHIN THE ARAB WORLD IF, AS SEEMS POSSIBLE, THE MODERATES MOVE CLOSER TO ACCEPTING THE HARDLINE SYRIAN VIEW WHICH REJECTS NEGOTIATIONS AT PRESENT IN THE ARAB/ISRAELI DISPUTE. THE INVASION HAS ALREADY HAD A CATALYTIC EFFECT ON RECONCILIATION BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE MODERATE ARAB STATES. EGYPT HAS DECIDED TO SLOW DOWN THE NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND HAS SUSPENDED AUTONOMY TALKS, ALREADY STALLED OVER THE ISSUE OF MEETINGS IN JERUSALEM. IT HAS OFFERED THE PLO LEADERSHIP THE OPPORTUNITY TO SET UP A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IN CAIRO (ALTHOUGH THE INITIAL REACTION OF ABU IYAD WAS TO REFUSE) AND MUBARAK WENT TO RIYADH TO EXPRESS CONDOLENCES FOR THE DEATH OF KING KHALID. THAT REPRESENTED A SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM HIS EARLIER VOW THAT HE WOULD NOT VISIT ANY ARAB STATE WHICH DID NOT HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH EGYPT, AND IS AN INDICATION OF THE DEGREE OF EMBARRASSMENT ISRAEL HAS CAUSED MUBARAK. KING HUSSEIN IS WORKING TO CONSOLIDATE THE IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE MODERATE ARAB STATES. THE ONLY TANGIBLE SUPPORT FOR SYRIA HAS COME FROM RADICAL COUNTRIES LIKE LIBYA AND IRAN.

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ARAB/UNITED STATES RELATIONS

17. MUCH OF THE ARAB WORLD SINCERELY BELIEVES THAT THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION HAS CONNIVED IN, IF NOT POSITIVELY BLESSED, THE ISRAELI INVASION. MANY OF THE MODERATE ARAB LEADERS, INCLUDING THE JORDANIANS, SAUDIS AND EGYPTIANS, ARE DISMAYED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS FAILED TO USE ITS LEVERAGE OVER ISRAEL EFFECTIVELY TO DETER NEW AGGRESSION AND TO PREVENT OCCUPATION OF MORE ARAB LAND. THE PERCEPTION THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS ACQUIESCED IN THE ISRAELI ACTION WILL BE SEEN AS EVIDENCE OF DOUBLE STANDARDS WHEN THE ADMINISTRATION IS CONDEMNING THE USE OF FORCE TO SETTLE DISPUTES IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. IT WILL UNDERMINE FAITH IN UNITED STATES ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO DEFEND OTHER MODERATE ARAB STATES FROM IRANIAN AS WELL AS ISRAELI AGGRESSION. IT HAS ALL BUT DESTROYED, FOR THE TIME BEING, ARAB FAITH IN THE WILLINGNESS OF THE UNITED STATES TO USE ITS LEVERAGE WITH ISRAEL TO OBTAIN A SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WHICH TAKES ACCOUNT OF ARAB NEEDS.

ISRAEL

18. THE FINANCIAL AND HUMAN COST TO ISRAEL OF THE OPERATION HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIAL. BUT BY AND LARGE IT HAS ACHIEVED ITS AIMS. THIS SUCCESS WILL REDOUND TO THE DOMESTIC CREDIT OF BEGIN'S GOVERNMENT, WHICH IS LIKELY TO CALL ELECTIONS LATER THIS YEAR OR EARLY IN 1983 IN ORDER TO TRY TO OBTAIN A CORKING MAJORITY. THE LABOUR OPPOSITION HAS BEEN WRONG FOOTED= IT GAVE GENERAL SUPPORT TO THE OPERATION, BUT HAS CARPED ABOUT ITS EXTENT AND ITS DIPLOMATIC COST. SHARON, IN PARTICULAR, IS LIKELY TO HAVE ENHANCED HIS POLITICAL PRESTIGE AND HENCE HIS CHANCES OF EVENTUALLY SUCCEEDING BEGIN AS LEADER OF THE LIKUD PARTY.

OUTLOOK

19. DESPITE THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON, MANY OF THE CONSTANTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST REMAIN THE SAME. PARTICULARLY WHILE THE PRESENT OIL GLUT CONTINUES, THE PRODUCERS NEED THE OIL CONSUMERS AS MUCH AS THE CONSUMERS NEED THE PRODUCERS. MANY ARAB COUNTRIES ARE DEPENDENT ON WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND MILITARY SUPPLIES. THE SOVIET UNION WILL GAIN SOME BENEFIT FROM THE REINFORCEMENT OF ARAB PERCEPTIONS THAT THE UNITED STATES IS UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO +DELIVER+ ISRAEL. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIET UNION'S RELATIONS WITH SYRIA AND THE PLO WILL PROBABLY BECOME CLOSER. THE FACTORS WHICH HAVE LIMITED SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE REGION ARE HOWEVER LIKELY, IN ESSENCE, TO PERSIST. / 20.

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20. BUT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SHOCK TO THE ARAB WORLD OF THE NEW SITUATION IS ONLY BEGINNING TO SINK IN. BY FORCE OF ARMS, ISRAEL, EVEN IF IT WITHDRAWS ITS ARMY WITHIN A FEW MONTHS, HAS IMPOSED A SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER LEBANON AND HAS UNDERLINED ISRAELI MILITARY SUPERIORITY. MANY OF THE MODERATE ARAB STATES WOULD WELCOME THE DEPARTURE OF THE SYRIAN ARMY FROM LEBANON= BUT THE REPLACEMENT OF SYRIAN BY ISRAELI INFLUENCE IS A PROFOUNDLY WORRYING DEVELOPMENT FOR THE ARABS - AND THE UNITED STATES IS SEEN TO BE TO BLAME. IRAN'S INCREASED POWER IN THE REGION MEANS THAT ITS AGGRESSIVE ANTIPATHY TO THE TWO SUPERPOWERS IS LIKELY TO HAVE AN EFFECT IN THE ARAB WORLD. THIS AND THE RELUCTANCE OF MOST OF THE MODERATES TO SHIFT TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION ARE UNLIKELY TO PROVIDE MANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET MEDDLING, ALTHOUGH KUWAIT MAY PRESS ITS GULF PARTNERS TO OPEN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. RATHER, THE PROSPECT IS FOR MORE MILITANT NON-ALIGNMENT BY MOST OF THE ARAB WORLD.

21. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY SEE ITS INVASION AS A CLEAR MILITARY AND POLITICAL SUCCESS (ALTHOUGH THE INTERVENTION OF IRAN IN LEVANTINE AFFAIRS MUST BE AN UNWELCOME DEVELOPMENT). THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY THREAT RAISED BY THE PLO HAS BEEN REDUCED FOR A FEW YEARS. ANY PLO TERRORISM WILL GIVE ISRAEL A PROPAGANDA SUCCESS. AFTER THE +CLEANING+ OF SOUTH LEBANON, GALILEE SHOULD BE SAFE FOR A WHILE FROM CROSS-BORDER SHELLING. A COMPLIANT GOVERNMENT MIGHT NOW EMERGE IN LEBANON WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE INDUCED TO SIGN A PEACE TREATY. THE ARAB WORLD MIGHT BECOME MORE UNITED, BUT ARAB UNITY IS NORMALLY ACHIEVED BY MOVING IN A RADICAL DIRECTION= FOR THAT REASON THE UNITED STATES IS EVEN LESS LIKELY TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON ISRAEL TO ACCEPT UNPALATABLE SOLUTIONS. ISRAELI RELATIONS WITH EGYPT MAY BE FROSTY, BUT ISRAEL CAN STILL GAMBLE THAT EGYPT WILL NOT RETURN TO THE ARAB WORLD IN A MILITARY SENSE. ISRAEL HAS BOUGHT TIME= BUT ON CURRENT FORM IT SHOWS NO SIGN OF HAVING THE WILL TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THAT EXTRA TIME AS THE BALANCE OF MILITARY CAPABILITY SHIFTS AGAINST IT OVER THE EXT FEW YEARS.

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TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1020 OF 18 JUNE

MIPT: ISRAEL/LEBANON.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY DRAFT STATEMENT:

BEGINS

MY GOVERNMENT IS HORRIFIED BY THE TERRIBLE SUFFERING AND DAMAGE WHICH HAS BEEN INFLICTED UPON LEBANON AND ITS PEOPLE. LARGE NUMBERS OF INNOCENT MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN HAVE BEEN KILLED OR WOUNDED. HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS HAVE BEEN MADE HOMELESS. WHOLE COASTAL CITIES HAVE BEEN DEVASTATED. THE DANGERS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE MUST BE EVIDENT TO US ALL. WE ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE RISKS OF THE CONFLAGRATION SPREADING. ALREADY THERE HAS BEEN BITTER FIGHTING BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES. THE EVENTS LEADING TO THIS AWFUL DESTRUCTION HAVE BEEN CLEARLY SET OUT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS REPORT TO THIS COUNCIL. BEGINNING WITH THE BOMBING OF BEIRUT BY ISRAELI AIRCRAFT ON 4 JUNE, HE HAS DESCRIBED HOW HOSTILITIES

ISRAELI AIRCRAFT ON 4 JUNE, HE HAS DESCRIBED HOW HOSTILITIES ESCALATED DESPITE APPEALS FOR RESTRAINT BOTH BY HIM AND BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL. ON 5 JUNE THE COUNCIL MET AND UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED RESOLUTION 508 CALLING UPON ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CEASE IMMEDIATELY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITHIN LEBANON, AND ACROSS THE LEBANESE/ISRAELI BORDER, NO LATER THAN 0600 LOCAL TIME ON 6 JUNE. THE PLO RESPONDED TO THIS CALL BUT ISRAEL DID NOT. THE FOLLOWING MORNING, 6 JUNE, ISRAELI FORCES INVADDED LEBANON FORCING THEIR WAY THROUGH UNIFIL LINES AT GUNPOINT. THAT EVENING THE COUNCIL MET AGAIN AND UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED RESOLUTION 509 CALLING FOR THE IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. THE PLO AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED THAT RESOLUTION, THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL DID NOT. THE INVADING ISRAELI FORCES HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY ADVANCED TO THE OUTSKIRTS OF BEIRUT LEAVING A WAVE OF DESTRUCTION BEHIND THEM.

MR PRESIDENT, THE FACTS ARE PLAIN. ISRAEL HAS INVADDED LEBANON IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PARAGRAPH 4 OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CHARTER, AS WELL AS IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE DEMANDS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. MY GOVERNMENT REGARDS THE INVASION AND OCCUPATION AS A VIOLATION OF LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND WE CANNOT ACCEPT THAT THE ISRAELI ACTION AMOUNTED TO SELF-DEFENCE. TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, WE HAVE MADE OUR POSITION CLEAR IN A STATEMENT ISSUED IN BONN ON 9 JUNE. IN THIS STATEMENT THE TEN CALLED URGENTLY ON ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 508 AND 509, AND IN PARTICULAR ON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW ALL ITS FORCES IMMEDIATELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY FROM LEBANON AND TO PLACE UNIFIL IN A POSITION TO ACCOMPLISH ITS MISSION WITHOUT HINDRANCE. THE STATEMENT CONTINUED THAT SHOULD ISRAEL REFUSE COMPLIANCE WITH THESE TWO RESOLUTIONS THE TEN WOULD EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE ACTION.

MR PRESIDENT, MY GOVERNMENT STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND NATIONAL UNITY OF LEBANON. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS THE DUTY OF THE COUNCIL TO UPHOLD THESE ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS. WE WANT, AS WE BELIEVE THE LEBANESE PEOPLE WANT, TO SEE A LEBANON FREE FROM THE VIOLENCE AND SUFFERING WHICH HAS BEEN ITS TRAGEDY. AT THE SAME TIME, WE BELIEVE THAT THERE CAN BE NO REAL PEACE OR STABILITY IN THE AREA UNLESS THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE ARE ALSO TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT IS EITHER WISE OR JUST FOR ISRAEL TO SEEK TO DENY PEOPLE THE RIGHT WHICH IT CLAIMS FOR ITSELF. ANY LASTING AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION WILL HAVE TO CONFIRM BOTH ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO PEACE AND SECURITY AND THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. THESE PRINCIPLES HAVE BEEN SET OUT IN THE VENICE DECLARATION. THEY ARE PRINCIPLES WHICH MY GOVERNMENT BELIEVES REMAIN ESSENTIAL TO THE SEARCH FOR PEACE.

ESSENTIAL TO THE SEARCH FOR PEACE.

OUR IMMEDIATE TASK THIS EVENING WAS TO CONSIDER THE FUTURE OF UNIFIL. MY GOVERNMENT WARMLY SUPPORTED RESOLUTION EXTENDING THE FORCE'S MANDATE FOR WE BELIEVE IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO KNOW WHETHER THERE IS A ROLE FOR UNIFIL IN THE NEW AND RADICALLY ALTERED CIRCUMSTANCES IN LEBANON. BUT WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS RIGHT TO PRESERVE THE OPTION FOR SUCH A ROLE, AN OPTION WHICH MIGHT WELL BE LOST IF THE FORCE WERE PRECIPITATELY DISBANDED. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT, IN SO FAR AS CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT, THE FORCE MAY BE ABLE IN THE INTERIM TO PLAY A HELPFUL AND HUMANITARIAN ROLE. IN THIS CONTEXT WE CALL ON THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO SHOW THE FULL RESPECT FOR UNIFIL WHICH IT HAS SO FAR FAILED TO DO.

ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT I SHOULD LIKE TO PAY TRIBUTE TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF UNIFIL AND TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS FOR THE SELFLESS EFFORTS WHICH THEY HAVE MADE, AND ARE CONTINUING TO MAKE, ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WE DO NOT ACCEPT THE MISGUIDED CRITICISMS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE ABOUT THE FORCE'S INABILITY TO PREVENT THE ISRAELI ADVANCE. AS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS RIGHTLY STATED THE FORCE HAD NEITHER THE MANDATE NOR THE MILITARY CAPACITY TO COUNTER AN INVASION. WE ACKNOWLEDGE THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH CONFRONT GENERAL CALLAGHAN AND HIS MEN IN MAINTAINING UNIFIL AND ITS POSITIONS AFTER THE ISRAELI INVASION HAS MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO CARRY OUT THEIR MANDATE. WE SALUTE WITH GRATITUDE THEIR READINESS TO RESPOND TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S WISH THAT THEY SHOULD NEVERTHELESS REMAIN ON THE SPOT UNTIL HAPPIER DAYS WHEN IT MAY AGAIN BE POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO EXERCISE ALL THEIR FUNCTIONS. MEANWHILE THEY DESERVE THE CONTINUED SUPPORT AND APPRECIATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

TONIGHT OUR THOUGHTS, MR PRESIDENT, MUST BE ABOVE ALL WITH LEBANON AND THE PEOPLE WHO LIVE THERE. THE HEARTFELT SYMPATHIES OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE GO OUT TO THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON IN THEIR PLIGHT. MY GOVERNMENT IS CONTRIBUTING TO THE URGENTLY NEEDED HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORT THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES, BOTH BILATERALLY AND VIA THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. WE HOPE THAT ALL COUNTRIES WILL CO-OPERATE IN THIS INTERNATIONAL EFFORT.

ABOVE ALL, MR PRESIDENT, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE FIGHTING SHOULD NOW COME TO AN END, AND THAT ISRAEL SHOULD COMPLY WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 509 AND IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAW ALL HER FORCES FROM LEBANON TO THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED BOUNDARY. THE RULE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW MUST BE UPHELD OR WE SHALL ALL SUFFER THE GRIM CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILURE TO DO SO.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1033 OF 19 JUNE

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MY TELS 1026 - 1028: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. DE NANTEUIL (FRANCE), WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE, CALLED A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING THIS AFTERNOON (19 JUNE) TO ADOPT A RESOLUTION ON THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE LEBANESE SITUATION. HE WAS IT SEEMED ACTING ON FIRM INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS.
2. THIS PIECE OF UNTARNISHED FRENCH PROPAGANDA UPSET THE AMERICANS (WITH BEGIN'S MEETING WITH REAGAN ON 21 JUNE IN MIND) AND THE SECRETARIAT (WHO WERE BEGINNING TO HAVE SOME SUCCESS IN PERSUADING THE ISRAELIS INFORMALLY TO ACCEPT UN HUMANITARIAN SERVICES). HOWEVER, BY CALLING THE COUNCIL WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THE AMERICANS AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, DE NANTEUIL, PRESUMABLY DELIBERATELY, CREATED MOMENTUM WHICH COULD NOT BE DEFLECTED. AFTER SOME HOURS OF WRANGLING INCLUDING A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

AMERICANS AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, DE NANTEUIL, PRESUMABLY DELIBERATELY, CREATED MOMENTUM WHICH COULD NOT BE DEFLECTED. AFTER SOME HOURS OF WRANGLING INCLUDING A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN HAIG AND CHEYSSON THE AMERICANS RELUCTANTLY AGREED TO GO ALONG WITH A TEXT. I ADVISED THEM TO SWALLOW AND GET IT OVER THIS EVENING SINCE THE ISRAELIS WERE LIKELY TO GET MORE DIFFICULT AS THE BEGIN/REAGAN MEETING DREW CLOSER, AND DE NANTEUIL WAS INSISTENT THAT THERE COULD NOT BE A POSTPONEMENT OVER THE WEEKEND.

3. THE COUNCIL EVENTUALLY MET IN THE EVENING AND UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED THE TEXT IN M.I.F.T. AS SCR 512. JAPAN AND THE US SPOKE BRIEFLY AFTER THE VOTE. JAPAN ANNOUNCED A CONTRIBUTION OF US DOLLARS 1 MILLION THROUGH THE ICRC FOR RELIEF EFFORTS. THE US SAID THAT IT WAS GIVING US DOLLARS 15 MILLION FOR RELIEF AND ANTICIPATED GIVING A FURTHER US DOLLARS 20 MILLION. BLUM (ISRAEL) MADE AN UNPLEASANT AND PROVOCATIVE STATEMENT. TUENI (LEBANON) BRIEFLY THANKED THE COUNCIL AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. OVINNIKOV (USSR) LOOSED OFF BRIEFLY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL. BLUM, LICHENSTEIN (US) AND OVINNIKOV EXCHANGED SHOTS AND THE COUNCIL ADJOURNED.

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MIPT: ISRAEL/LEBANON

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SCR 512

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE SUFFERINGS OF THE LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN
CIVILIAN POPULATIONS,

REFERRING TO THE HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
OF 1949 AND TO THE OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM THE REGULATIONS
ANNEXED TO THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 1907,

REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 508 (1982) AND 509 (1982),

REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 508 (1982) AND 509 (1982),

1. CALLS UPON ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO RESPECT THE RIGHTS OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, TO REFRAIN FROM ALL ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THOSE POPULATIONS AND TO TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING CAUSED BY THE CONFLICT, IN PARTICULAR, BY FACILITATING THE DISPATCH AND DISTRIBUTION OF AID PROVIDED BY UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES AND BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, IN PARTICULAR, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC);
2. APPEALS TO MEMBER STATES TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE MOST EXTENSIVE HUMANITARIAN AID POSSIBLE;
3. STRESSES THE PARTICULAR HUMANITARIAN RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS AGENCIES, INCLUDING THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST (UNRWA), TOWARDS CIVILIAN POPULATIONS AND CALLS UPON ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT NOT TO HAMPER THE EXERCISE OF THOSE RESPONSIBILITIES AND TO ASSIST IN HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS;
4. TAKES NOTE OF THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CO-ORDINATE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES IN THIS FIELD AND REQUESTS HIM TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AND COMPLIANCE WITH THIS RESOLUTION AND TO REPORT ON THESE EFFORTS TO THE COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

PARSONS

NNNN



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 June 1982

Dear John,

Yes not

Prime Minister
Content for the message to

issue?

A.S.C. 2/6.

Israel/Lebanon: Message to the Prime Minister from Secretary-General of the Organisation of Islamic Conference

Thank you for your letter of 11 June enclosing a message to the Prime Minister from Mr Habib Chatty, Secretary-General of the Organisation of Islamic Conference.

I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to Mr Chatty. This is cast in the form of a telegram to Jedda, the Headquarters of the OIC.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Classification and Caveats

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TO PRIORITY JEDDA

TELEGRAM NUMBER

ISRAEL/LEBANON: MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE

1. Habib Chatty sent the Prime Minister a message on 11 June
about the Israeli invasion of the Lebanon.

2. Please convey the following reply from the Prime Minister:
BEGINS: Thank you for your message of 11 June. I fully share
your concern about the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. ~~There was~~

~~no justification for Israel's action.~~ British people have been
particularly appalled by the loss of life and the scale of
suffering among the civilian population. You will have seen that
we and our European Community partners issued a strong statement
on 9 June vigorously condemning the Israeli invasion as a flagrant
violation of international law and of the most basic humanitarian
principles. We have called on Israel to withdraw her forces
immediately and unconditionally from the Lebanon in accordance with
Security Resolution 509. We have also made clear that should
Israel fail to do so, the Ten will examine the possibilities for

///
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/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword future
File number	Dept PRIVATE OFFICE	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) J E HOLMES		Middle East Standard Arab/Israel dispute
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

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Page

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1 <<<<
 2 future action. The Ten are keeping in very close touch on this.
 3 WE have also made our views clear to the US Administration.
 4 Meanwhile we have made humanitarian assistance available both
 5 bilaterally and through the European Community for the victims
 6 of the conflict in Lebanon.

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 8 PYM
 9 NNNN

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Catchword



18 JUN 1982

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18 June 1982

Middle East Crisis

I enclose a copy of a reply which the Prime Minister has just received from President Reagan to her message of 15 June. I should be grateful if you would ensure that this correspondence is closely protected.

AJC

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

Master copy

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE**
SERIAL No. T 135/82

T 135/82
②

SUBJECT

MS

Prime Minister

I have sent a copy to
the Foreign Secretary.

A.J.C. 15/6

VZCZCWAG030
TOO WTE24
DE WTE 4196 1691525
O 181500Z JUN 82
FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO CABINET OFFICE
ZEM
S E C R E T VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WH04196

DEAR MARGARET:

I APPRECIATE YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT LEBANON. WE HAVE BEEN HEARING THE SAME STRONG CONCERNS FROM OUR ARAB FRIENDS THAT YOU DESCRIBE. IN ADDITION TO THE MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD IN BONN, KING HUSSEIN HAS TWICE WRITTEN ME ABOUT LEBANON AND THE SUBJECT HAS BEEN A CENTRAL CONCERN DURING MR. HASSAN ALI'S TALKS HERE THIS WEEK.

THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT WE MUST TRY TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE LEBANON TRAGEDY. WE HAVE BEEN MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO CONSOLIDATE A CEASE-FIRE AS A FIRST STEP. THAT HAS BEEN AMBASSADOR HABIB'S FIRST PRIORITY. WE ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED NOW TO AVOID FURTHER FIGHTING IN AND AROUND BEIRUT, WHICH WILL COST ADDITIONAL INNOCENT LIVES IF IT CONTINUES OR ESCALATES. WE ARE ALSO DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO HELP ALLEVIATE THE HUMAN SUFFERING CAUSED BY THIS TRAGIC WAR. I HAVE ASKED CONGRESS FOR SPECIAL FUNDS FOR RELIEF, AND WE ARE WORKING TO PROVIDE A TWENTY-FIVE MILLION DOLLAR PACKAGE TO FINANCE AT LEAST SOME PORTION OF WHAT WE HOPE WILL BE A BROADLY SUPPORTED INTERNATIONAL EFFORT.

BEYOND THE CEASE-FIRE AND RELIEF, HOWEVER, WE TOO BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT TRAGEDY OFFERS THE OPPORTUNITY TO CREATE A BETTER FUTURE FOR LEBANON. THAT COUNTRY'S INDEPENDENCE AND UNITY MUST BE PRESERVED AND ITS GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORITY MUST BE STRENGTHENED.

PHIL HABIB IS PRESENTLY IN BEIRUT. HE HAS MET WITH PRESIDENT SARKIS AND HAS HAD GOOD TALKS. I BELIEVE THERE IS A HOPE THAT THE LEBANESE THEMSELVES ARE WORKING TOWARD RECONCILIATION AND THAT THEY UNDERSTAND THE NEED TO WORK TOGETHER. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THEY SHARE THE DESIRE FOR A FUTURE WITHOUT OUTSIDE MILITARY FORCES IN THEIR COUNTRY. THESE ARE ALSO OUR OBJECTIVES. WE HOPE OTHERS WILL ALSO ENCOURAGE AND SUPPORT LEBANON'S NATIONAL LEADERS AS THEY WORK TOWARD A NEW NATIONAL CONSENSUS.

WE ARE AWARE THAT IT IS VITAL TO CREATE CONDITIONS IN

END OF PAGE 01

WHICH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT CAN ACT WITHIN ITS
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES AND WITHOUT INTIMIDATION FROM
ANY QUARTER. I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF
ISRAELI FORCES AROUND BEIRUT AND THE PROBLEMS THAT CAN
CREATE FOR LEBANON'S LEADERS. PHIL HABIB IS MAKING EVERY
EFFORT TO GAIN ISRAELI COOPERATION IN STEPS WHICH WILL
PERMIT LEBANON'S LEADERS TO ACT FREELY

I AGREE THAT WE NEED TO STAY IN CLOSE CONTACT REGARDING
THIS AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I FULLY
ENDORSE THE IDEA THAT OUR PEOPLE SHOULD CONSULT CLOSELY
IN THE NEAR FUTURE ABOUT HOW WE CAN COOPERATE IN
ACHIEVING A SOLUTION TO THE LEBANON CRISIS AND TO THE
BROADER ISSUES, INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. WE
WILL HAVE TO BE CLOSELY IN TOUCH CONCERNING HUMANITARIAN
RELIEF AND A FORMULA FOR PEACEKEEPING FORCES WHICH WILL
BE ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE RAPID ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

SINCERLY, RON

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SD
Middle East

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 June, 1982.

Israeli Invasion of Lebanon

Thank you for your letter of 16 June. As I told you on the telephone this morning, the Prime Minister does not think that we should act alone in taking the measures against Israel described in your letter. Mrs. Thatcher has enquired what other European States are doing.

We agreed that in the circumstances it would not be possible for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to make the reply you suggest to the Parliamentary Question which he is due to answer today. You undertook to let me have an account of the attitudes of the other European countries so that the Prime Minister can consider this matter again.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD

A. J. COLES

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM BEIRUT 180740Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 305 OF 18 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, CAIRO, WASHINGTON,

UKMIS NEW YORK

SAVING TO OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

MY TELNO 302 OF 17 JUNE: LEBANON/ISRAEL.

1. NOT SURPRISINGLY EVERY LEBANESE OF IMPORTANCE WHOM I NOW SEE (A) PRAISES THE STAND TAKEN BY THE UNITED KINGDOM IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND (B) BEGS US TO HELP THE LEBANON. SOME GO SO FAR AS ACTUALLY SUGGESTING WAYS IN WHICH WE MIGHT HELP. THERE SEEM AT FIRST SIGHT TO BE THREE THINGS WHICH WE COULD DO, ALL OF WHICH HAVE BEEN MENTIONED IN PREVIOUS TELEGRAMS.
2. FIRST, WE COULD CONVEY TO THE PALESTINIANS THAT THEY WOULD BE WELL-ADVISED TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND THE LEBANESE ARMY. ANY OTHER PATH LEADS THEM TO GENERAL SHARON AND A BASHIR GEMAYEL. I CANNOT DO IT HERE SINCE THE PALESTINIAN LEADERS ARE INACCESSIBLE. MOREOVER A VISIT BY ME TO ARAFAT WOULD NO DOUBT CAUSE EXPLOSIONS IN ISRAEL. PERHAPS THE BEST METHOD WOULD BE SIMULTANEOUS APPROACHES IN LONDON AND, SUBJECT TO THE VIEWUAF OF THE POSTS CONCERNED, DAMASCUS AND NEW YORK.
3. SECONDLY WE COULD SURELY AS A COUNTER-PART GET THE AMERICANS TO EXPLAIN TO THE ISRAELIS THAT IT IS NOT IN THEIR INTERESTS TO EXTERMINATE ARAFAT AND HIS COMMAND IN BEIRUT. INDEED IT WOULD BE FAR CLEVERER TO LET THEM OUT. IF THIS DOES NOT HAPPEN THERE WILL BE AN EXTREMIST PLO COMMAND IN DAMASCUS OR SOME OTHER CONVENIENT CAPITAL AND TERRORISM ON A VAST SCALE.
4. THIRDLY, IF A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE, OR FOR THAT MATTER A STRONG UNITED NATIONS FORCE, IS ESTABLISHED, WE MIGHT AGREE TO PARTICIPATE. I REALISE THAT THIS IS A TALL ORDER AFTER THE FALKLANDS BUT THERE ARE STRONG POLITICAL REASONS FOR IT. MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE IT WOULD DEMONSTRATE OUR DETERMINATION TO ENSURE LEBANESE INDEPENDENCE.
5. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM MY TEL. NO. 298 OF 17 JUNE THAT THE LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER COUNTS ON OUR PARTICIPATION. SAEB SALAM, WHO I THINK IS LIKELY TO BE THE NEXT LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER, DID NOT SPECIFICALLY REFER TO A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE. HE DID HOWEVER BEG US TO HELP THE LEBANON, NOW THAT WE HAD BRILLIANTLY DISPOSED OF THE CRISIS IN THE FALKLANDS. HE SPECIFICALLY URGED US TO TAKE THE ACTION I HAVE ADVOCATED IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE. IN THIS, THE WORST EMERGENCY THAT THE LEBANON HAS EVER FACED SINCE INDEPENDENCE, RELIABLE AND IMPORTANT FRIENDS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM ARE DEFINITELY LOOKING TO US. EVEN THE AMERICANS, ALTHOUGH VILIFIED ON ALL HANDS, ARE SEEN TO BE DOING SOMETHING THROUGH HABIB WHILE THE FRENCH ARE PLAYING A CONSPICUOUS PART.

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6. I AM MAKING SURE THAT BOTH OUR ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OUR AID TO THE LEBANESE RED CROSS ARE BECOMING WELL KNOWN HERE. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND ACTION ON THE THREE LINES INDICATED ABOVE, HOWEVER, NOT SO MUCH IN THE INTEREST OF OUR IMAGE HERE (ALTHOUGH THAT IS NOT WITHOUT IMPORTANCE) BUT IN THE INTEREST OF ESTABLISHING A STRONGER AND MORE STABLE LEBANESE STATE. WE MUST SURELY RECOGNIZE HOW MUCH THAT IS IN OUR INTEREST AND HOW MUCH FAILURE IN THE PAST TO ESTABLISH IT HAS COST.

7. FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

ROBERTS

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
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FROM TEL AVIV 171045Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 249 OF 17 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK,
BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, ROUTINE AMMAN AND CAIRO.

ADVANCE COPY
IMMEDIATE

MY TELNO 241: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. I CALLED TODAY ON THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, WHO SPOKE WARMLY ABOUT HIS RECENT VISIT TO LONDON AND HIS MEETINGS WITH MR WALKER WHOM HE HOPED TO WELCOME IN ISRAEL IN DUE COURSE. EHRLICH, WHO IS ACTING PRIME MINISTER IN BEGIN'S ABSENCE, WENT ON TO TALK ABOUT LEBANON.
2. HE CONFIRMED THAT ISRAELI FORCES WOULD NOT (NOT) ENTER BEIRUT. DESPITE PRESS REPORTS THE ISRAELIS THEMSELVES HAD NOT BEEN ENGAGED IN FIGHTING FOR THE PAST 24 HOURS OR SO. NOR DID THEY INTEND TO MOVE ANY FURTHER FORWARD. (SHARON SAID YESTERDAY THAT THEIR HAD BEEN A MAJORITY CABINET DECISION NOT TO ENTER THE CITY.)
3. I ASKED WHAT HE EXPECTED TO HAPPEN NEXT IN BEIRUT. HE REPLIED THAT SYRIAN AND PLO FORCES SHOULD LEAVE. THE ISRAELIS HAD MADE

ISRAELI POSITIONS DISARMED, ALTHOUGH SYRIANS COULD KEEP THEIR PERSONAL WEAPONS. HE ADDED THAT KNOWN PLO MURDERERS WOULD BE REGARDED AS AN EXCEPTION FOR SAFE PASSAGE.

4. I OBSERVED THAT IF ISRAELIS WERE NOT GOING TO MOVE INTO BEIRUT, COULD THEY BE SURE OF THE SYRIANS AND PLO BEING SQUEEZED OUT. EHRLICH ANSWERED "THAT IS A LEBANESE PROBLEM". WHEN PRESSED HE SAID IT WOULD BE UP TO THE LEBANESE ARMY AND THE PHALANGE.

5. AS REGARDS THE LONGER TERM, EHRLICH SPOKE OF AN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 40-45 KM BUFFER ZONE NORTH OF THE FRONTIER. ISRAEL DID NOT WISH THIS TO BE UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS, WHOM THEY REGARDED AS HOSTILE. THE MAIN INGREDIENTS OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE SHOULD BE AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN. HE REMINDED ME OF THE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION TO THE SINAI MFO. SIMILARLY, HE SAID, A BRITISH CONTRIBUTION WOULD BE WELCOME FOR THE BUFFER ZONE IN LEBANON.

6. I ENQUIRED ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE AREA NOW UNDER IDF OCCUPATION BETWEEN THE BUFFER ZONE AND BEIRUT. EHRLICH SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF WHAT HE HOPED WOULD BE A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD NEED THE HELP OF WESTERN GOVERNMENTS. WHAT HELP DID HE HAVE IN MIND? HE EXPLAINED THAT THIS WOULD BE IN BUILDING UP THE LEBANESE ARMY INTO AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL FORCE THROUGH WESTERN MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING. IF AND WHEN THE LEBANESE ARMY BECAME STRONG AND RELIABLE ENOUGH, IT COULD ULTIMATELY TAKE OVER THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN THE BUFFER ZONE. A LEBANESE ARMY PRESENCE IN THAT ZONE COULD BE ENVISAGED MUCH EARLIER ALONGSIDE INTERNATIONAL CONTINGENT.

7. COMMENT: THIS IS THE CLEAREST INDICATION WE HAVE YET BEEN GIVEN OF ISRAELI THINKING BEHIND THE OPTIONS MENTIONED BY THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER IN LONDON EARLIER THIS WEEK (PARA 3 OF YOUR TELNO 194). A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE AND A STRENGTHENED CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ARE SEEN NOT AS ALTERNATIVES BUT AS COMPLEMENTARY TO EACH OTHER. AS WE SUSPECTED, THERE IS A STRONG PREFERENCE FOR A NON-UN FORCE. EHRLICH'S COMMENT ABOUT A POSSIBLE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION WAS NOT OF COURSE A FORMAL PROPOSAL BUT WE CAN TAKE IT AS A POINTER, THOUGH THEIR ATTITUDE MAY CHANGE AS OUR REACTION TO THE INVASION SINKS IN. IT ALSO NOW SEEMS PLAIN THAT THE ISRAELIS DO NOT ENVISAGE AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE OPERATING OUTSIDE THE BUFFER ZONE, YOU WILL NOTICE THAT THIS IS NOW BEING DESCRIBED NOT JUST AS A 40 KM ZONE BUT MORE LOOSELY AS 40-45KM, THE ISRAELIS HAVING APPARENTLY REALISED THAT ONE VERY LONG-RANGE SOVIET GUN COULD REACH ISRAEL EVEN FROM 40 KM AWAY.

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Prime Minister Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Content with X, Y & Z ? London SW1A 2AH

A.F.C. 16
I do not think we should take
measures alone. What are
other options?
16 June, 1982
MS

Dear John,

Israeli Invasion of Lebanon

On 9 June the Foreign Ministers of the Ten issued a statement condemning the Israeli invasion, in which it was stated that the possibilities for future action would be examined. Since then the Ten have decided to postpone the signing of the Second Financial Protocol with Israel. It is possible that other measures may be decided in political cooperation.

X | We have been giving some thought also to the effect of the invasion on our bilateral relations. We have made our attitude abundantly clear in public, through statements made in Parliament and elsewhere. It would be odd if we were now to conduct bilateral business with the Israelis as though nothing had happened. We therefore envisage informing the Israeli Government that the invitation to them to visit the British Army Equipment Exhibition on 21 June will be withdrawn. The official talks agreed upon during Lord Carrington's visit to Israel in April have been Y | postponed at Israeli request and we shall not agree to their reinstatement for the time being.

Mr Pym also considers that it would be wrong to continue issuing licences for arms exports to Israel as long as Israeli troops remain in Lebanon. Although our arms sales to Israel are minimal (amounting to £10 million between 1976 and 1981) and their suspension would have little practical effect on Israel, it would be a significant signal of disapproval to the Israelis and would act as a sign of encouragement to the moderate Arabs. The political message that Israel cannot expect bilateral relations to remain unaffected while her forces remain in Lebanon would be effectively transmitted at little cost to the UK. We have considered the possibility that the likelihood of Israeli arms sales to Argentina will be increased but given what we know of Israel's attitude and practice on this already, we do not believe that this is likely to make much difference in practice.

Z | If the Prime Minister agrees, Mr Pym would wish to announce this decision in the form of a written reply to a Parliamentary Question tomorrow, 17 June, which asks if he will seek to make it the policy of the NATO Alliance that no member state shall sell to Israel any materials suitable for military application. The draft reply reads:

'It is for individual member states of the NATO Alliance to decide their policy on military sales to Israel. I have decided that in present circumstances, in the light of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the continued presence of

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/her

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her troops there, it would be wrong to licence arms exports to Israel'.

We would give the Israeli Government advance warning of this announcement. Mr Pym proposes that the suspension should not be tied to conditions such as Israeli compliance with Security Council Resolutions 508 and 509 on the withdrawal of her forces from Lebanon, though that is our clear object, since this would unduly tie our hands in the future.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of the other members of OD.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

J E Holmes

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

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FROM AMMAN 161115Z JUNE 1982

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 267 OF 16 JUNE 1982

AND TO INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA,
PARIS, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON.

AND SAVING TO ANKARA, HELSINKI AND MOSCOW.

MY TELNO 256: JORDAN/MIDDLE EAST.

1. I SAW KING HUSSEIN LAST NIGHT TO DELIVER THE PRIME MINISTERS MESSAGE ON ISRAEL/LEBANON (YOUR TELNO 145), WHICH THE KING GREATLY APPRECIATED. HE IN TURN GAVE ME A MESSAGE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT THE FALKLANDS (MY TELNO 265)

ISRAEL /LEBANON.

2. THE KING CLAIMED TO HAVE NO CLEAR PICTURE OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING ON THE GROUND IN LEBANON SEMICOLON JORDANS RELATIONS WITH SYRIA REMAINED AS BAD AS EVER. THE KING SAID THAT SO FAR HE HAD NOT RECEIVED ANY REQUEST TO ADMIT PALESTINIANS FROM LEBANON INTO JORDAN, BUT THE QUESTION WAS BOUND TO COME UP SOON AND WOULD POSE VERY DIFFICULT PROBLEMS FOR JORDAN. HE DID NOT WANT THE PALESTINIANS TO BE WHOLLY DEPENDANT ON SYRIA. HE THOUGHT THEIR ENTRY INTO JORDAN WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH ON A CASE BASIS (THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, WHOSE ANTI-PALESTINIAN VIEWS ARE WELL KNOWN, HAS TOLD US THAT NO PALESTINIANS SHOULD BE ADMITTED TO JORDAN). THE KING THOUGHT IT WAS DELIBERATE ISRAELI POLICY TO DRIVE THE PALESTINIANS OUT OF LEBANON IN THE DIRECTION OF SYRIA AND JORDAN, JUST AS THEY WERE ALSO TRYING TO EXPEL THE ARAB INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK.

3. THE KING WENT ON TO REMARK THAT THE US AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN AVOIDING HIM SEMICOLON HE ASSUMED THIS WAS BECAUSE HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT TO SAY. THE KING SAID HE COULD NOT HELP WONDERING HOW THOSE US POLITICIANS WHO HAD FOR SO LONG URGED THE ARMING OF ISRAEL NOW FELT ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE POLICY THEY HAD ADVOCATED; THERE WAS A PARALLEL BETWEEN WHAT WAS HAPPENING NOW IN LEBANON AND THE MASSACRE OF PALESTINIANS AT DEIR YASSIN AND ELSEWHERE IN 1948 SEMICOLON IN BOTH CASES, THE KILLING FORMED PART OF A DELIBERATE POLICY TO DRIVE THE PALESTINIANS OUT.

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/ JORDAN/EGYPT

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JORDAN/EGYPT

4. THE KING SAID THAT HE HAD NOT MET PRESIDENT MUBARAK IN SAUDI ARABIA SEMICOLON HOWEVER MUBARAK'S VISIT HAD BROUGHT ABOUT THE TOP -LEVEL MEETING WITH KING FAHD WHICH THE EGYPTIANS WERE SEEKING (PARA 6 OF MY TUR) . THE IRAQIS HAD ALSO REPONDED POSITIVELY TO THE EGYPTIAN REQUEST TO SEND AN EMISSARY . THE KING SAID HE WAS STILL WAITING TO HEAR FROM THE EGYPTIANS WHEN THEY WOULD BE SENDING A REPRESENTATION TO AMMAN.

5. BOTH WE AND THE AMERICANS HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT JORDAN WOULD BE READY TO RESUME FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH EGYPT AT ANY TIME. WHEN I SUGGESTED TO THE KING THAT EVENTS IN LEBANON AND THE GULF MIGHT SERVE TO ENCOURAGE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CLOSER COLLABORATION BETWEEN EGYPT, SAUDI ARABI, IRAQ, JORDAN AND OTHER MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES, HE READILY AGREED AND SAID THAT THIS WAS INDEED WHAT HE WAS ASKING FOR.

JORDAN/SOVIET UNION

6. THE KING SEEMED UNCERTAIN WHETHER OR NOT HE WOULD BE MAKING HIS PLANNED VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION (MY TELELETTER TO MILES OF 28 MAY). HE TOLD ME THAT IT NO LONGER SEEMED APPROPRIATE TO MAKE A PRIMARILY TOURISTIC VISIT, BUT IF THE RUSSIANS OFFERED A MEETING WITH BREZHNEV HE WOULD STILL GO ALTHOUGH FOR A SHORTER PERIOD. HE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD ALSO BEEN PLANNING TO VISIT TURKEY ON 29 JULY AND MIGHT GO THERE EVEN IF HE DID NOT VISIT THE SOVIET UNION SEMICOLON HE DID NOT REFER TO HIS POSSIBLE VISIT TO FINLAND.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

URWICK

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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FM FCO 161700Z JUNE 82
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 538 OF 16 JUNE
AND TO IMMEDIATE PARIS
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, AMMAN

ISRAEL/LEBANON: EXTENSION OF UNIFIL MANDATE

1. US EMBASSY HAS APPROACHED US ON INSTRUCTIONS FOR UK SUPPORT FOR A QUOTE SIMPLE, PROCEDURAL RESOLUTION UNQUOTE THAT WOULD RENEW UNIFIL'S MANDATE FOR 90 DAYS, WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO DEFINE THE FUTURE OF UNIFIL. THE AMERICANS ARE ASKING THAT THERE MUST BE NO EFFORT TO USE SUCH A RESOLUTION TO CONDEMN ISRAEL, OR OTHERWISE POLITICISE THE RESOLUTION IN A WAY THAT COULD JEOPARDISE ITS ADOPTION, OR TO PRE-DETERMINE ELEMENTS OF A SETTLEMENT IN LEBANON NOT ALREADY PROVIDED IN RESOLUTIONS 508 AND 509. THEY SEE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A RESOLUTION AS BEING:

- (A) REAFFIRMATION OF RESOLUTIONS 508 AND 509:
- (B) A COMMITMENT TO LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY:
- (C) A REFERENCE TO RESOLUTION 425:
- (D) EXTENSION OF UNIFIL'S MANDATE FOR 90 DAYS.

2. WHILE THERE ARE ASPECTS OF AMERICAN POLICY ABOUT WHICH WE HAVE OUR DOUBTS. IT IS CLEARLY SENSIBLE TO PRESERVE THE OPTION OF A UN-BASED PEACEKEEPING FORCE FOR THE NEW SITUATION IN SOUTH LEBANON. WE THEREFORE AGREE WITH THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL THAT A SIMPLE RESOLUTION IS A SENSIBLE WAY TO PROCEED. INDICATIONS ARE (YOUR TELNO 987) THAT THE USSR MIGHT GO ALONG WITH A SIMPLE EXTENSION FOR A MONTH OR SO. NO DOUBT THE AMERICANS WOULD ACCEPT LESS THAN 90 DAYS AS BEING PREFERABLE TO A SOVIET VETO. UNLESS YOU SEE OBJECTION, WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD PROCEED ACCORDINGLY.

3. FOR PARIS. PLEASE CHECK WITH THE FRENCH WHETHER THEY HAVE

CONFIDENTIAL

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RECEIVED A SIMILAR DEMARCHE FROM THE AMERICANS AND WHETHER THEIR
RESPONSE IS LIKELY TO BE SIMILAR TO OURS.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 162215Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1009 OF 16 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, PARIS.

YOUR TELNO 538: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. THE FINAL SECTION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT ON UNIFIL CONTAINING HIS OBSERVATIONS WAS CIRCULATED THIS MORNING (16 JUNE) (DOC S/15194/ADD 2). THE KEY PASSAGE READS AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE:

IF THE TERMS OF RESOLUTION 509 (1982) ARE TO BE IMPLEMENTED, IT IS MY (I.E. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S) VIEW THAT UNIFIL COULD USEFULLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE OBJECTIVES PRESCRIBED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HOWEVER, FOR UNIFIL TO FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY, THERE WOULD NEED TO BE A CLEAR DEFINITION BY THE COUNCIL ITSELF OF THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE FORCE IN THE EXISTING SITUATION, AS WELL AS FULL CO-OPERATION FROM THE PARTIES. THESE ARE MATTERS OF OBVIOUS AND DEEP CONCERN NOT ONLY TO ME BUT TO ALL THE TROOP CONTRIBUTING GOVERNMENTS. I SHOULD MENTION, IN THIS CONNECTION, THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON HAS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT UNIFIL SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE STATIONED IN THE AREA PENDING FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE LIGHT OF

AREA PENDING FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE LIGHT OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 509.

UNQUOTE

THE REPORT ALSO SAYS THAT UNIFIL TROOPS CONTINUE TO MAN THEIR POSITIONS AND ARE ENDEAVOURING, AS FAR AS IS POSSIBLE, TO EXTEND THEIR PROTECTION AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE POPULATION OF THE AREA.

2. THE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS MET THIS MORNING. THE DUTCH PRIME MINISTER AND SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER WERE PRESENT, TOGETHER WITH URQUHART. WE UNDERSTAND THAT ALL OF THE CONTRIBUTORS WERE WILLING TO MAINTAIN THEIR CONTINGENTS IN UNIFIL FOR AN INTERIM PERIOD. THERE WAS NO DECISION ON HOW LONG THIS SHOULD BE BUT THE GENERAL FEELING WAS THAT IT SHOULD BE FOR ABOUT FOUR TO SIX WEEKS. IT WAS ALSO FELT THAT A DEMAND SHOULD BE MADE TO THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM THE UNIFIL AREA (THE DUTCH ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED AT THE PRESENCE OF AN ISRAELI BATTALION IN THEIR SECTOR) AND TO ALLOW UNIFIL TO UNDERTAKE HUMANITARIAN WORK IN ITS AREA AND IN TYRE (THE SWEDES WERE PARTICULARLY ADAMANT ABOUT TYRE WHERE ONE OF THEIR MEDICAL TEAMS HAS BEEN STOPPED FOR A SECOND TIME BY THE ISRAELIS FROM ENTERING THE CITY). THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE LONG-TERM FUTURE OF THE FORCE. ALL WERE AGREED THAT ANY NEW MANDATE WOULD HAVE TO BE BASED ON THE FIRM AGREEMENT OF ALL PARTIES AND SHOULD EXTEND TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER.

3. THE US MISSION HAS SPOKEN TO US ON THE SAME LINES AS YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. THEY ARE ALSO LOBBYING OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL AND DRAFTING A RESOLUTION WHICH THEY HOPE OTHERS WILL SPONSOR. OUR SOUNDINGS CONTINUE TO SUGGEST THAT A RESOLUTION ON THESE LINES STANDS A GOOD CHANCE OF BEING ADOPTED AS LONG AS IT HAS LEBANESE SUPPORT. BUT THE US MAY AS YOU SUGGEST HAVE TO SETTLE FOR LESS THAN 90 DAYS. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL TRY TO INSERT EMBARRASSING AMENDMENTS WHEN ANY TEXT IS CONSIDERED BY THE COUNCIL IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON 18 JUNE.

4. IT IS ENCOURAGING THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE TAKEN THE LEAD IN COMING FORWARD WITH SENSIBLE PROPOSALS AND CANVASSING SUPPORT FOR THEM. THEIR READINESS TO REAFFIRM SCR'S 508 AND 509 AND TO ACCEPT A REFERENCE TO 425 IS IN REFRESHING CONTRAST TO THEIR VERY NEGATIVE POSITION LAST SUNDAY NIGHT (MY TEL NO 993). IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES I AGREE THAT WE SHOULD SUPPORT THE AMERICANS, PROVIDED THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO ACCOMMODATE THE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS' WISHES ON THE LENGTH OF THE EXTENSION.

PARSONS

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FM AMMAN 151140Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 263 OF 15 JUN

INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH (FOR SOSFA'S PARTY); ROUTINE BEIRUT,
DAMASCUS, PARIS, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. I HAVE JUST RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING FURTHER MESSAGE ADDRESSED
TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM KING HUSSEIN DATED 14 JUNE. I HAVE
NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO DELIVER TO THE KING THE PRIME MINISTER'S
MESSAGE IN YOUR TELNO 145, WITH WHICH IT HAS CROSSED.
BEGINS.

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

THE EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS WHICH CULMINATED IN THE OCCUPATION
OF ONE-THIRD OF LEBANON AND THE DESTRUCTION OF HUMAN LIFE AND
PROPERTY ON A MASSIVE SCALE INVITE MANY QUESTIONS.
WHAT DOES THIS MOST RECENT ISRAELI ENGINEERED CRISIS OFFER THE
REGION FOR THE MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM NECESSITIES OF STABILITY?
WHAT WERE THE ISRAELI OBJECTIVES? IF THE OBJECTIVES WERE TO DESTROY
THE ISRAELI OBJECTIVES AND TO POLICE THEM OUT OF LEBANON THIS POLICY

THE PLO INFRASTRUCTURE AND TO DRIVE THEM OUT OF LEBANON, THIS POLICY HAS CLEARLY BACKFIRED. NOT ONLY DOES THIS TRAGEDY GIVE RISE TO RADICALISM, BUT ALSO WEAKENS NATIONALIST MODERATE STATES AND FURTHER BALKANIZES THE REGION. FURTHERMORE, THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE AND PALESTINIAN RIGHTS CANNOT BE DENIED BY THE INVASION OF LEBANON SINCE IT WILL ONLY INCREASE THE FRUSTRATION AND STIFFEN RESISTANCE.

AS RIGHTLY STATED BY THE RT. HON. FRANCIS PYM, "WHAT HAS HAPPENED IS A TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIED INVASION BY THE ISRAELIS... THERE CANNOT BE PEACE AND STABILITY IN THAT AREA OF THE WORLD WITHOUT TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE."

THE FIGHTING HAS UNDOUBTEDLY DEEPENED THE SENSE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL HUMILIATION AND FRUSTRATION FELT BY ALL. A LARGE NUMBER OF VILLAGES HAVE BEEN TOTALLY DESTROYED AND LARGE SECTIONS OF ENTIRE CITIES, SUCH AS TYRE AND SIDON, WERE TOTALLY DEMOLISHED WITH ABOUT 2,500 CIVILIANS KILLED OR WOUNDED AND 600,000 RENDERED HOMELESS.

THE INTEGRITY OF THE U.S. AND HER ALLIES HAS BEEN FURTHER DISCREDITED AND UNDERMINED. THE WESTERN WORLD MUST RAPIDLY ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 508 AND 509 WHICH YOU SUPPORTED, AND THE VERSAILLE DECLARATION OF JUNE 6 WHICH YOU ENDORSED. EFFORTS SHOULD ALSO BE EXERTED TO STRENGTHEN THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCES IN LEBANON TO ENABLE IT TO ACCOMPLISH ITS MISSION.

THIS DIVERSION FROM THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE OF THE FUTURE OF THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL IN JUNE OF 1967 CANNOT BE REDRESSED BY DELAYED "PRESSURE" TO INVITE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON.

THIS CRUCIAL HOUR DEMANDS THAT POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY BE EXERCISED TOWARD THE INTEREST OF THE PEOPLE OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN OBTAINING A SHARED CONCERN FOR JUSTICE, SECURITY AND PEACE FOR ALL PEOPLES.

ENDS

2. ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

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FM WASHINGTON 160100Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2144 OF 15 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, UKMIS NEW YORK,
PRIORITY JEDDA, AMMAN, CAIRO, PARIS

LEBANON

1. THE AMERICANS ARE CONCERNED AT THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE ISRAELIS HAVE MISLED THEM AT EVERY STAGE OF THEIR LEBANESE OPERATION. THERE ARE CONTINUING DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION OVER THEIR TACTICS IN PARTICULAR FOR DEALING WITH BEGIN. BUT IT LOOKS INCREASINGLY LIKELY THAT, AS USUAL, THE PRO-ISRAELI FACTION WILL HAVE ITS WAY.
2. HAIG IS CLEARLY IMPRESSED BY THE EXTENT OF THE ISRAELI VICTORY WHICH HAS NEUTRALISED THE SYRIANS IN LEBANON AND VIRTUALLY ELIMINATED THE PLO AS AN EFFECTIVE FORCE. HE MENTIONED IN PARTICULAR THE ISRAELIS' SUCCESS IN DESTROYING THE SYRIAN SAM SITES AND THEIR EFFECTIVE USE OF TANKS AND E2C AIRCRAFT. HE THINKS THIS HAS CHANGED

THE REAL CORRELATION OF FORCES IN THE AREA. HE WAS STRUCK BY THE RELATIVE MILDNESS OF THE SOVIET AND ARAB REACTION. HE SAID THAT THE SAUDIS HAD BEEN EXCEPTIONALLY MILD TO THE AMERICANS AND THAT THE JORDANIANS WERE SIMPLY TERRIFIED LEST THE PALESTINIANS ATTEMPT TO RETURN TO JORDAN. HE SEEMED UNUSUALLY RELAXED ABOUT THE SITUATION. I DREW ATTENTION TO THE VERY DIFFERENT LINE THE SAUDIS HAD BEEN TAKING WITH US (AS REFLECTED IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN - FCO TELNO 1173).

3. HAIG, AS YOU KNOW, SEES AN OPPORTUNITY TO TRY TO SECURE THE REMOVAL OF SYRIANS AS WELL AS ISRAELIS FROM THE LEBANON, AND OF ANY ARMED PRESENCE ON PART OF THE PLO. BUT HE DEMURRED WHEN I ASKED IF HE WAS SEEKING A CHRISTIAN DOMINATED GOVERNMENT, ON THE GROUNDS THAT SUCH A GOVERNMENT WOULD INEVITABLY BE CRITICISED AS PRO-ISRAELI. THE AMERICANS THINK THE PROCLAMATION OF THE LEBANESE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL SALVATION A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND HOPE THAT WALID JUMBLATT CAN BE PREVAILED UPON TO TAKE PART.

4. HAIG SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE SEEKING THE EXTENSION OF UNIFIL'S MANDATE FOR 90 DAYS. THE ISRAELIS WERE ANXIOUS TO HAVE AN EXPANDED MULTINATIONAL FORCE WITH AMERICAN PARTICIPATION. HABIB HAS MADE IT CLEAR TO BEGIN THAT THE US (AND OTHER POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS) WOULD NOT BE INTERESTED IN PARTICIPATING IN SUCH A FORCE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. HAIG TOLD ME THAT THE PENTAGON WAS OPPOSED TO AMERICAN PARTICIPATION AND THAT BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS WERE UNENTHUSIASTIC. BUT HE THOUGHT THAT IT PROBABLY WOULD COME ABOUT IN THE END ONCE IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THIS WAS THE ONLY WAY OF DEALING WITH THE SITUATION.

5. HAIG ADMITTED THAT HE WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY WITH SOME ELEMENTS IN THE PENTAGON AND THE CONGRESS, ESPECIALLY SENATOR PERCY, ABOUT THE ISRAELIS' USE OF AMERICAN WEAPONS IN LEBANON. BUT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THIS WOULD BE A LASTING PROBLEM. PERCY HAS APPARENTLY ADVISED THE ADMINISTRATION TO DEFER SUBMITTING TO CONGRESS THE PROPOSED SALE TO ISRAEL OF SEVENTY-FIVE F16 AIRCRAFT.

6. EAGLEBURGER, WHO WAS PRESENT WHEN I SAW HAIG, NOTED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE WORRIED ABOUT THE SECURITY OF THEIR EMBASSY IN WEST BEIRUT (THOUGH THE STATE DEPARTMENT TOLD US THIS EVENING THAT THE ATMOSPHERE IN WEST BEIRUT HAS IMPROVED TODAY). HAIG SAID THAT THERE WERE SOME 7,000 PLO PERSONNEL IN WEST BEIRUT AND THE ADJOINING SUBURBS. THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELIS INTEND TO DESTROY THESE FORCES AND THAT THEY HAVE GIVEN THE SYRIANS IN THE AREA AN ULTIMATUM TO LEAVE.

7. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE NOT HAD A FULL REPORT FROM HABIB WHO IS IN EAST BEIRUT WITHOUT SECURE COMMUNICATIONS. BUT THEY SAY THAT WE FOUND SARKIS AND HIS COLLEAGUES IN AGREEMTN ON THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE LEBANESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

HENDERSON

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Sir J Bullard

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FM PARIS 151145Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 627 OF 15 JUNE 1982

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, ROUTINE DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON.

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LEBANON: FRENCH STATEMENT

1. THE ELYSEE ISSUED LAST NIGHT (14 JUNE) THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT (OUR TRANSLATION):

"IN SPITE OF TWO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, FIGHTING IS STILL BRINGING BLOODSHED TO THE LEBANON AND CAUSING THOUSANDS OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. TWO CEASE-FIRES HAVE BEEN ANNOUNCED; THE FIRST BROUGHT ONLY A PARTIAL RESPITE, THE SECOND A RAY OF HOPE WHICH PROVED SHORT-LIVED, FOR FIGHTING HAS AGAIN BROKEN OUT IN THE SUBURBS OF THE LEBANESE CAPITAL, WHERE SEVERAL DISTRICTS ARE BEING RELENTLESSLY BOMBARDED.

-THERZHW

THERE IS ^{Y.} GOOD REASON TO FEAR

~~WWWBTOFGOR~~ AR THAT WE SHALL SHORTLY SEE EVENTS OF AN EVEN MORE TRAGIC NATURE THAN THOSE OF RECENT DAYS: FIGHTING IN THE CAPITAL ITSELF WOULD CAUSE EVEN GREATER SUFFERING THAN HAS BEEN SEEN SO FAR.

FRANCE SOLEMNLY CALLS ON ISRAEL TO BRING THE BOMBARDMENT AND FIGHTING TO A HALT WITHOUT DELAY.

IN COOPERATION WITH THE FRENCH HUMANITARIAN ASSOCIATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS, THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IS CURRENTLY ORGANISING THE DESPATCH OF EMERGENCY AID TO THE INHABITANTS AND REFUGEES IN BEIRUT AND SOUTH LEBANON.

FRANCE HAS DECIDED TO SEND TOMORROW, 15 JUNE, AN ENVOY TO PRESIDENT SARKIS, AROUND WHOM A COUNCIL OF NATIONAL SALVATION HAS JUST BEEN FORMED.

FRANCE REPEATS THAT SHE IS WILLING IF CALLED UPON BY THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTS OF THE LEBANON, TO PROVIDE HER SUPPORT AND GUARANTEE FOR ANY PROCESS THAT WOULD ENABLE THE LEBANON TO RECOVER ITS INTEGRITY, UNITY AND INDEPENDENCE.

FRANCE INVITES THOSE STATES AND ORGANISATIONS THAT SHARE HER VERY GREAT ANXIETY FOR THE LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN CIVILIAN POPULATIONS TO JOIN IN THESE EFFORTS WITH HER."

FRETWELL.

NNNN

SENT AT 15/1212Z AB/
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ALL AFTER RELENTLESSLY BOMBARDED UNTIL THAT WE SHALL
SHORTLY SEE

KK

V

SEVERAL DISTRICTS ARE BEING
RELENTLESSLY BOMBARDED.

THERE IS GOOD REASON TO FEAR THAT WE SHALL SHORTLY SEE EVENTS
OWZAT K

RECD 151215Z TC

SUBJECT

CAB/WTE 001/15

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T131A/82

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OO THE WHITE HOUSE

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FM CABINET OFFICE LONDON 151140Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE WHITE HOUSE
TELEGRAM NUMBER MISC149

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MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

DEAR RON,

PRINCE SAUD, THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER, CALLED ON ME IN LONDON 11 JUNE. I KNOW YOU SAW HIM YOURSELF WHILE IN EUROPE, BUT NEVERTHELESS I WOULD LIKE TO PASS ON TO YOU THE FOLLOWING IMPORTANT POINTS WHICH HE MADE DURING OUR DISCUSSION.

I) THE ISRAELIS WERE GOING BEYOND A JUSTIFIABLE CONCERN FOR THEIR OWN SECURITY, AND WERE USING THEIR MILITARY INTERVENTION TO CHANGE THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF LEBANON AND TO ACHIEVE OTHER POLITICAL OBJECTIVES SUCH AS THE REMOVAL OF SYRIAN INFLUENCE. THIS WAS A DANGEROUS PROCESS AND NO ONE COULD TELL WHERE IT MIGHT LEAD:

II) THE ISRAELIS WANTED TO BOLSTER THE POSITION OF MAJOR HADDAD IN THE SOUTH AND OPEN UP A CHANNEL TO THE CHRISTIANS IN THE NORTH. THIS WOULD BE THE END OF THE STRUCTURE OF LEBANON AS WE KNEW IT AND WOULD LEAD TO THE CATASTROPHE OF RELIGIOUS WAR IN A SIMILAR WAY TO THE RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS OF THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR:

III) WE SHOULD WORK TO STRENGTHEN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, HELP IT TO EXTEND ITS MILITARY CONTROL OVER THE SOUTH AND FOSTER NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND RECONCILIATION WITH THE PALESTINIANS:

IV) IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT THAT THE US SHOULD PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION IN THE ARAB WORLD. IF THE IMPRESSION OF ISRAEL/US COLLUSION GAINED GROUND THIS WOULD MAKE GRAVE PROBLEMS FOR THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS WHO ARE FRIENDLY TOWARDS THE US:

V) THE ISRAELIS WANTED TO POLARISE THE MIDDLE EAST, PRESENTING THESELVES AS THE SOLE PROTECTORS OF WESTERN INTERESTS. THIS WOULD DRIVE THE ARABS INTO THE ARMS OF THE RUSSIANS. THE GULF WAR ALSO PRESENTED GRAVE DANGERS. RELIGION WAS BEING MADE INTO A MESSAGE OF CONFLICT NOT RECONCILIATION. THE ISRAELIS WERE EXPLOITING THIS BECAUSE THEY WANTED THE ARABS TO FIGHT EACH OTHER:

VI) FIRM US ACTION COULD QUICKLY INFLUENCE ISRAELI POLICIES.

THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, MR KAMAL HASSAN ALI, WAS ALSO IN LONDON ON 11 JUNE AND TOLD FRANCIS PYM THAT HE BELIEVED THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN PLANNING THE INVASION OF SOUTH LEBANON FOR THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS. LIKE PRINCE SAUD, HE THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELI OBJECTIVE WAS NOTHING LESS THAN A MAJOR REALIGNMENT IN THE LEBANESE POLITICAL SITUATION. HE ADDED THAT THE INVASION PUT EGYPT IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION AND WOULD SEVERELY DAMAGE PROSPECTS FOR A LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN WHICH EGYPT HAD INVESTED SO MUCH.

KING HUSSEIN HAS ALSO JUST MADE STRONG REPRESENTATIONS TO ME ABOUT THE SITUATION.

YOU AND I DISCUSSED LAST WEEK THE TRAGEDY WHICH HAS OVERTAKEN THE LEBANON. WE MUST NOW TRY NOT ONLY TO DEAL WITH THE PRESENT CRISIS BUT ALSO TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY. THE LATEST FIGHTING HAS ONCE AGAIN DEMONSTRATED THE URGENT NEED FOR A BALANCED POLICY TOWARDS THE ARAB/ISRAEL CONFLICT. BOTH THE ISRAELIS AND THE PALESTINIANS HAVE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS WHICH MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN WORKING FOR A LASTING PEACE. UNLIMITED SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL CAN ONLY LEAD TO GROWING POLARISATION AND DESPAIR IN THE ARAB WORLD. I HAVE TO TELL YOU FROM OUR ARAB CONTACTS THAT ARAB OPINION IS RUNNING VIOLENTLY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE IMPRESSION HAS BEEN GIVEN, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, THAT YOU CONDONE RATHER THAN CONDEMN THE RECENT ISRAELI ACTION. THE LOSS OF LIFE AND DESTRUCTION HAVE BEEN HORRIFYING AND I FEAR THAT THE ARABS, INCLUDING SOME OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA, WILL LOOK INCREASINGLY TO THE SOVIET UNION UNLESS THEY SEE SOME MOVE SOON IN THEIR DIRECTION. ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE OF THE PRESENT CONFLICT, ALTHOUGH URGENT, ARE NOT ENOUGH. WE MUST TACKLE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE WHICH LIES AT THE HEART OF THE DISPUTE: UNLESS WE DO THIS WE SHALL NEVER ACHIEVE A LASTING PEACE.

OUR POLICY TAKES AS ITS POINT OF DEPARTURE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 509, WHICH CALLS FOR THE IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. IT WILL CLEARLY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO RECREATE THE STATUS QUO THAT EXISTED BEFORE THE INVASION: NOR WOULD THIS BE SATISFACTORY. BUT IT IS NOT FOR ISRAEL TO DICTATE THE FUTURE POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL APPLY IN THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF LEBANON. MOREOVER, IN OUR VIEW ISRAEL'S APPARENT INTENTION OF REMOVING THE PALESTINIANS AND THE PLO AS AN ELEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST EQUATION JUST WILL NOT WORK.

I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF OUR OFFICIALS COULD GET TOGETHER TO DISCUSS WHAT THE NEXT STEPS SHOULD BE IN BUILDING A JUST AND LASTING PEACE BOTH IN LEBANON AND THE REGION. OUR PEOPLE HAD ALREADY BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH BEFORE THE LATEST CRISIS ERUPTED. I SUGGEST THAT THIS DIALOGUE SHOULD NOW BE RESUMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

WITH MY WARM BEST WISHES

MARGARET.

NNNN

DE WTE AND QSL QSL UR WIRE AT 1317Z // KKK

DE CAB TKVM AND CUL BIEE KKARAR

File

289

M East

15 June 1982

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER FOR THE KING
OF JORDAN

Would you please refer to Holloway's
two letters of 13 June.

As I told you on the telephone yesterday,
the Prime Minister approved a reply to
King Hussein, the text of which is enclosed.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RJ

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File

289

15 June 1982

ISRAEL/LEBANON


Thank you for your letter of 14 June. As I told you on the telephone yesterday, the Prime Minister agreed to the proposed action by the Ten, subject to the deletions of point 8 in the Statement you enclosed and, if possible, the deletion of the words "on all matters" from point 7.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>824</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>FCO telegram no. 166 to Jeddah dated 15 June 1982</i>	
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister
Agree that message should be
sent over hot-line?

14 June 1982

Or would you wish to send Mr.
Hurd to deliver it?

Dear John,

Message from the Prime Minister to
President Reagan

A.F.C. 14/6

In the course of her discussions with the Saudi Foreign Minister on 11 June, the Prime Minister undertook to send a message to President Reagan drawing the latter's attention to the points Prince Saud had made (the draft record of the discussion is being sent to you separately but I enclose a copy for convenience).

I now enclose a draft message, which takes the opportunity to put our own views to the President as well.

As far as delivery of the message is concerned, the Prime Minister might wish to consider making contact with the President direct while she is in New York on 16 June in order to give it more impact. Another possible way of ensuring that the message is given high level attention in Washington would be to ask Mr Hurd to take it personally. (He returns from a visit to the FRG on 15 June).

We are telegraphing the text of the draft message and the suggestion in the preceding paragraph to Mr Pym in Saudi Arabia in case he should wish to comment from there.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

John Holmes

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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MISC 149

~~DRAFT~~ MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

See Rev,

Prince Saud, the Saudi Foreign Minister, called on me in London on 11 June. I know you saw him yourself while in Europe, but I nevertheless would like to pass on to you the following important points which he made during our discussion. ~~I have also discussed~~

i) The Israelis were going beyond a justifiable concern for their own security, and were using their military intervention to change the political structure of Lebanon and to achieve other political objectives such as the removal of Syrian influence. This was a dangerous process and no one could tell where it might lead;

ii) The Israelis wanted to bolster the position of Major Haddad in the South and open up a channel to the Christians in the North. This would be the end of the structure of Lebanon as we knew it and would lead to the catastrophe of religious war in a similar way to the religious divisions of the Iran/Iraq war;

iii) We should work to strengthen the Lebanese Government, help it to extend its military control over the South and foster national reconciliation and reconciliation with the Palestinians;

iv) It was most important that the US should pay close attention to the trends in public opinion in the Arab world. If the impression of Israel/US collusion gained ground,

/this

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this would make grave problems for the Arab governments who are friendly towards the US;

v) The Israelis wanted to polarise the Middle East, presenting themselves as the sole protectors of Western interests. This would drive the Arabs into the arms of the Russians. The Gulf War also presented grave dangers. Religion was being made into a message of conflict not reconciliation. The Israelis were exploiting this because they wanted the Arabs to fight each other;

vi) Firm US action could quickly influence Israeli policies.

The Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mr Kamal Hassan Ali, was also in London on 11 June and told Francis Pym that he believed the Israelis had been planning the invasion of South Lebanon for the past eight months. Like Prince Saud, he thought that the Israeli objective was nothing less than a major realignment in the Lebanese political situation. He added that the invasion put Egypt in a very difficult position and would severely damage prospects for a lasting peace in the Middle East in which Egypt had invested so much.

King Hussein has also just made strong representations to me about the situation.

Yonard & I discussed last week the tragedy which has overtaken the Lebanon. We must now try not only to deal with the present crisis but also to draw conclusions for future policy. The latest fighting has once again demonstrated the urgent need for a balanced policy towards the Arab/

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Israel conflict. Both the Israelis and the Palestinians have legitimate rights which must be taken into account in working for a lasting peace. Unlimited support for Israel can only lead to growing polarisation and despair in the Arab world. I have to tell you from our Arab contacts that Arab opinion is running violently against the United States since the impression has been given, rightly or wrongly, that you condone rather than condemn the recent Israeli action. The loss of life and destruction have been horrifying and I fear that the Arabs, including some of our friends in the Arabian peninsula, will look increasingly to the Soviet Union unless they see some move soon in their direction. Attempts to limit the damage of the present conflict, although urgent, are not enough. We must tackle the Palestinian issue which lies at the heart of the dispute: unless we do this we shall never achieve a lasting peace.

Our policy takes as its point of departure Security Council Resolution 509, which calls for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces. It will clearly not be possible to recreate the status quo that existed before the invasion: nor would this be satisfactory. But it is not for Israel to dictate the future political arrangements which will apply in the sovereign state of Lebanon. Moreover, in our view Israel's apparent intention of removing the Palestinians and the PLO as an element in the Middle East equation just will not work.

I think it would be useful if our officials could get together to discuss what the next steps should be in building a just and lasting peace both in Lebanon and the region. Our people had already

/ been in close

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been in close touch before the latest crisis erupted. I suggest that this dialogue should now be resumed as soon as possible.

*With my warm best wishes
Margaret.*

A. J. C. $\frac{15}{6}$



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

I have strengthened the message to King Hussein and incorporated references to the U.N. and the U.S.

Agree that it may now
issue?

A.F.L. - $\frac{14}{6}$

Subject

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

T 129A/82

*Master
Bys*

HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN BIN TALAL

SERIAL NO.

14.6.82

Thank you for the message which your Ambassador passed to me on 13 June. I too am appalled at the loss of life and the scale of human suffering, particularly amongst the civilian population. This has been graphically illustrated in television reports from Lebanon, which have caused widespread indignation in this country. I have the greatest sympathy with Lebanon's plight, and fully share your concern that the waste of human life must be stopped forthwith.

There can be no justification for Israel's action. As you will have seen, we and our European Community partners issued a strong statement on 9 June, vigorously condemning the Israeli invasions. We called on Israel to withdraw its forces immediately and unconditionally from the Lebanon in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 508 and 509 and made clear that should Israel continue to refuse compliance with these resolutions, the Ten would examine the possibilities for future action. The Ten are now urgently considering the situation again.


We have been active in pressing the Israelis to allow the International Relief agencies to operate to fullest effect throughout the areas affected by the war. We have remained in close touch with the United Nations. I shall be seeing Mr Perez de Cuellar in New York on 16 June and shall discuss with him how best the United Nations can contribute to restoring the peace and easing the suffering in Lebanon. The Community have agreed to contribute funds to the international relief effort and in addition the British Government have made clear to the Lebanese Government that if they have particular requests for humanitarian aid, we will do our best to respond.

The task of building a just and lasting peace both in Lebanon and the region as a whole is increasingly urgent. The Palestine problem must find a solution. The first priority must be to secure the total withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon in compliance with the Security Council Resolutions. The Americans have a crucial role

/in

in this. I emphasised the importance of Israeli withdrawal to President Reagan in London last week and am ^{now} making further urgent representations to him.

We must remain in close touch about this very serious situation.



CONFIDENTIAL

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 June 1982

Prime Minister

Agree to the action by the Ten
subject to deletion of point 8 and,
if possible, revision of point 3?

Dear John,

Israel/Lebanon

Yes no.

A.S.C. - 14/6

Brussels telegram number 215 (copy enclosed) asks for instructions on a proposal that the Ten should seek an authoritative statement from the Israeli Government covering a number of humanitarian and political points related to the Lebanese conflict.

We have consulted Mr Hurd by telephone in Bonn (Mr Pym is en route to Riyadh). He considers that we should support the proposed initiative by the Ten subject to two points (see below) but thought that the Prime Minister's views should be sought before instructions were sent to Brussels.

Mr Hurd raised questions about two of the points:

- (i) On point 1 he asked whether the Geneva Convention applied to the PLO. The legal arguments are not clear cut. Our view is that the Israelis should, for humanitarian reasons, apply the appropriate provisions of the Convention in any case. The point can therefore stand.
- (ii) On point 3, he asked whether this would be consistent with our practice as regards journalists in the Falklands. The question of handling of journalists following the recapture of Port Stanley is currently the subject of ministerial consideration: there is likely to be a delay of some days before foreign journalists are allowed in. To meet this point, we would propose to instruct our representative in Brussels to work for the insertion of a phrase such as "at the earliest opportunity" in point 3.

/We also

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We also have doubts about point 8, which seems to us not to be a vital ingredient of the package and to leave us open to a charge of condoning a massacre of the PLO. We therefore propose that it be omitted.

I would be grateful to know as soon as possible whether the Prime Minister would be content for us to instruct our representative in Brussels to agree to action by the Ten on these lines. I understand that the other Nine have now agreed to the proposed initiative with the Israelis. The Belgians would like to act this evening if at all possible.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

MR HORNELL
MR BULLARD
HD/RENAD
HD/MED
HD/IND
HD/SEC D
HD/... ..

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RESIDENT CLERK

FLASH

ADVANCE COPY

RR OTTAWA

RR UKDEL STRASBOURG

GRPS

GRPS 4000

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRUSSELS 141030Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 215 OF 14 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, CAIRO,
JEDDA, BONN, ROME, PARIS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG
UKREP BRUSSELS AND ATHENS.

INFO ROUTINE TOKYO, OTTAWA, AND UKDEL STRASBOURG.

INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO. (WE WILL PASS)

EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION: POLITICAL COMMITTEE

BRUSSELS 14 JUNE

LEBANON

1. AT BULLARD'S SUGGESTION IT WAS AGREED AD REFERENDUM THAT THE
TEN SHOULD SEEK AN AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT FROM THE ISRAELI
GOVERNMENT ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- (1) THAT IT WILL APPLY THE RELEVANT GENEVA CONVENTIONS, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS PRISONERS.
- (2) THAT IT WILL ADMIT INTERNATIONAL RELIEF ORGANISATIONS TO THE TERRITORY WHICH ITS FORCES HAVE OCCUPIED, AND WILL FACILITATE THEIR WORK.
- (3) THAT IT WILL SIMILARLY ADMIT AND GIVE NORMAL FACILITIES TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MEDIA.
- (4) THAT IT RECOGNISES BOTH THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF LEBANON AND THE INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL.
- (5) THAT IT HAS NO WISH TO ANNEX OR OCCUPY ANY PART OF THE TERRITORY OF LEBANON.
- (6) THAT IT WILL NOT INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF LEBANON.
- (7) THAT IT WILL COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS OPEN SQUARE BRACKETS ~~ON ALL MATTERS~~, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS UNIFIL) CLOSE SQUARE BRACKETS.
- (8) THAT IT WISHES NO ILL TO THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AS SUCH.
- (9) THAT IT HAS NO AGRESSIVE INTENTIONS TOWARDS ITS NEIGHBOURS, PARTICULARLY SYRIA.
- (10) THAT ITS ARMED FORCES WILL CEASE FIRE AGAINST ALL OTHER COMBATANTS IN THE REGION AT HOURS ON 15 JUNE, AND WILL THEREAFTER REFRAIN FROM ALL WARLIKE ACTIVITY, IF ALL OTHER COMBATTANTS IN THE REGION WILL DO LIKEWISE.

2. IN THE COVERING CHAPEAU THE TEN WOULD REAFFIRM THE BONN STATEMENT AND THEIR COMMITTMENT TO THE RELEVANT SECURITY RESOLUTIONS.

3. IN PUTTING THIS TO ISRAELIS THE TEN WOULD NOT GIVE THEM DEADLINE FOR REPLY. THEY WOULD HOWEVER MAKE THEIR DEMANDS PUBLIC AFTER GIVING THE ISRAELIS A REASONABLE TIME TO REPLY. SOME DIVERGENCE AMONG POLITICAL DIRECTORS HOW LONG THIS SHOULD BE. MANY FAVOUR 48 HOURS. WE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THIS IS TOO LONG.

4. POLITICAL DIRECTORS ARE NOW SEEKING INSTRUCTIONS IN THE HOPE THAT
IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO AGREE ON THIS ACTION DURING THE AFTERNOON.
THE PRESIDENCY WOULD THEN SEND INSTRUCTIONS TO TEL AVIV AND WOULD
CONTACT THE UNITED STATES TO SEEK THEIR SUPPORT.

5. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

JACKSON

NNNN

SENT/RECD 141038 PD/FC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

Prime Minister
has commented that
the proposed reply
needs to be toughened
up. King Hussein will

Duty Clerk
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Your reference
Our reference
Date

be expecting us to
involve the U.N +
Americans.

13 June 1982

Duty
Clerk
13/6

Dear Duty Clerk,

MESSAGE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN

- (attached)
1. Please refer to my earlier letter of today.
 2. I now enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to King Hussein's message. I also enclose a copy of the statement of 9 June by the Ten on the Situation in the Lebanon and on account of the Lebanese Ambassador's call on Mr Hurd.
 3. Please let me know if you wish the FCO to transmit the Prime Minister's reply by telegraph to the Embassy in Amman for delivery.

Tom even

T P Holloway

T P Holloway

cc: PS
PS/PUS
Sir J Leahy
Mr Moberly
Mr Miles
NENAD
(all with copy of draft letter)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

HM King Hussein I
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for the message which your Ambassador passed to me on 13 June. I too am appalled at the loss of life and the scale of human suffering, particularly amongst the civilian population. This has been graphically illustrated in television reports from Lebanon, which will, I am sure, have caused widespread indignation in this country. I have the greatest sympathy with Lebanon's plight, and fully share your concern that the waste of human life must be stopped forthwith.

There can be no justification for Israel's action. As you will have seen, we and our European Community partners issued a strong statement on 9 June, vigorously condemning the Israeli invasions. We called on Israel to withdraw its forces immediately and unconditionally from the Lebanon in accordance with Security Council

/ Resolution

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Resolutions 508 and 509 and made clear that should Israel continue to refuse compliance with these resolutions, the Ten would examine the possibilities for future action. *The Ten are now urgently considering the situation again.*

Since then ~~we~~ we have been active in pressing the Israelis to allow the International Relief agencies to operate to fullest effect throughout the areas affected by the war. We have remained in close touch with the UN in New York.

The Community have agreed to contribute funds to the international relief effort and in addition the British Government have made clear to the Lebanese Government that if they have particular requests for humanitarian aid, we will do our best to respond.

[I look forward to remaining closely in touch with you as we tackle] **The [urgent]** task of building a just and lasting peace both in Lebanon and the region as a whole. **The first priority** must be to secure the total withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon in compliance with the Security Council Resolutions.

The Americans have a crucial role in this. I emphasized the importance of Israeli withdrawal to President Reagan in London last week and am making further urgent representation to him.

We must remain in close touch about the very serious situation.

I shall be seeing Mr. Perez de Cuellar in New York on 16 June and shall discuss with him how best the U.S. can contribute to restoring the peace and seeing the withdrawal in Lebanon.

is increasingly urgent. The Palestine problem must find a solution.

SUBJECT'd 1615 Prime Minister

T129/82

I have asked the Foreign Office for advice on this. Duty Clerk
Foreign and Commonwealth Office 13.6.82



London SW1A 2AH

13 June 1982

Master
Bps

The Duty Officer
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW 1

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 129/82

Dear Duty Clerk,

MESSAGE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN

1. The Jordanian Ambassador telephoned me at 1350 hours today with an urgent telex message from King Hussein of Jordan to the Prime Minister.

2. The message is as follows:-

'Dear Mrs Prime Minister

In the name of human decency I appeal to you to exert your immediate and maximum effort on behalf of your nation to bring to an end the unprecedented holocaust enacted on Lebanon's soil today. The ceasefire observed between the so-called Israeli Defence Forces and the Syrian Armed Forces in the Lebanon is no great achievement if the apparent price exacted by Israel is its continued war of genocide against the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples. Men, women and children are falling by the thousands while the Israeli war machine continues its systematic destruction of life and property. This is indeed one of the darkest chapters in the history of mankind, written by Israel in defiance of the Security Council and its resolutions 508 and 509. The blood of thousands of human beings who have fallen in the Lebanon and in Beirut will never be forgotten. My message to you is an urgent appeal to ensure, before it is too late, through your strongest possible actions that more human life is not wasted and to disassociate yourself and your nation for all time to come from any suggestion of tolerance or acquiescence in the Israeli bloodbath created in Lebanon.

I am, madam,

Your sincere friend,

(signed) Al-Hussein I'

3. The Jordanian Ambassador said that he would deliver the text

/from



from the Embassy on 14 June. But he asked that the message be drawn to the attention of the Prime Minister today.

Your servt.

T P Holloway

T P Holloway
Resident Clerk

cc: Private Secretary
PS/PUS
Sir J Leahy
Mr Moberly AUSS
Mr Miles NENAD

Middle East
S. 42

STATEMENT BY THE TEN ON THE SITUATION IN LEBANON

The member states of the European Community vigorously condemn the new Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

Like the bombardments which preceded it and which caused intolerably high loss of human life, this action cannot be justified. It constitutes a flagrant violation of international law and of the most basic humanitarian principles. Furthermore it compromises the efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the problems of the Middle East and creates the imminent danger of a generalised conflict.

The Ten reaffirm the importance they attach to the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of Lebanon, which are indispensable for peace in the region.

The Ten strongly support the appeals made by the Secretary General of the United Nations. They urgently call on all the parties concerned to act in accordance with Security Council resolutions 508 and 509, and in particular on Israel to withdraw all its forces immediately and unconditionally from the Lebanon and to place the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in a position to accomplish its mission without hindrance.

Should Israel continue to refuse compliance with the above resolutions the Ten will examine the possibilities for future action.

The objective of the Ten is to work for a Lebanon free from the cycle of violence which they have repeatedly condemned in the past. This cannot be dissociated from the establishment of a global, just and lasting peace in the region. They are ready to assist in bringing the parties concerned to accept measures intended to lower the level of tension, reestablish confidence and facilitate a negotiated solution.

The Ten will urgently examine within the institutions of the Community the use of the means at the disposal of the Community to give aid to the victims of these events.

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

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PS/6
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR MOBERLY
MR BULLARD
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RESIDENT CLERK

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ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

*The U.S. int does not
recede the movement
she is coming up in the
Middle East
not.*

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 112115Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2098 OF 11 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS

INFO ROUTINE MODUK, AMMAN, CAIRO AND JEDDA

*17/6
h-a.*

LEBANON

1. I DISCUSSED THE LATEST POSITION THIS MORNING WITH EAGLEBURGER, WHO OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS HAS BEEN THE MOST SENIOR FOCAL POINT IN WASHINGTON ON THIS QUESTION. I ASKED HIM FIRST ABOUT THE REPORTED EXCHANGES WITH BREZHNEV. HE SAID THAT BREZHNEV HAD NOW SENT TWO MESSAGES, BOTH CAUTIOUS AND MODERATE IN TONE. BREZHNEV HAD AVOIDED THREATS BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE RUSSIANS MUST TAKE CARE OF THE INTERESTS OF THEIR FRIENDS, THE SYRIANS. THE PRESIDENT HAD REPLIED TO BREZHNEV'S FIRST MESSAGE IN A SIMILAR MODERATE TONE, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT HE HAD CALLED FOR A CEASEFIRE BUT ENTERING INTO NO COMMITMENTS. A SECOND MESSAGE HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM BREZHNEV LAST NIGHT STILL VERY RESTRAINED IN TONE BUT CALLING ON THE US TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE ISRAELIS TO GET THEM TO STOP. A REPLY TO THIS WAS IN PREPARATION, DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE ISRAELI CEASEFIRE.

2. I ASKED EAGLEBURGER WHAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOW PLANNING TO DO. HE SAID HE SAW THE PROBLEM IN FOUR PARTS. THE FIRST AND MOST URGENT PROBLEM WAS TO TRY TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO MOVE BACK TO THE 40KM LINE WHICH THEY HAD STAKED OUT AS THEIR ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE. I EXPRESSED SURPRISE: WERE THE AMERICANS ACCEPTING THAT A 40KM BUFFER ZONE HAD BEEN A LEGITIMATE OBJECTIVE IN THE FIRST PLACE? WOULD THIS NOT GIVE CREDENCE TO THE DAMAGING IDEA THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN PRIVY IN ADVANCE TO ISRAELI INTENTIONS, AND THAT THEY HAD ONLY REACTED SHARPLY WHEN THE ISRAELIS HAD GONE WAY BEYOND THIS? EAGLEBURGER RECOGNISED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD BE CRITICISED IF THEY DID NOT PRESS THE ISRAELIS TO GO BACK BEYOND THE 40KM BUFFER ZONE. BUT THE AMERICAN VIEW WAS THAT A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE WAS JUST NOT FEASIBLE. NOR DID EAGLEBURGER THINK IT WAS REALLY IN ANYONE'S INTEREST TO TRY. LEGITIMATE OR NOT, THE IMPORTANT THING AS HE SAW IT WAS TO TRY TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO FACE UP TO WHAT THEY HAD SAID WAS THEIR OBJECTIVE OF CREATING A ZONE FROM WHICH ARTILLERY AND ROCKET FIRE AGAINST ISRAELI VILLAGES COULD NOT TAKE PLACE.

3. THE NEXT PROBLEM AFTER THAT WAS THE MEDIUM TERM ONE OF EITHER EXPANDING UNIFIL OR ESTABLISHING SOME SORT OF MFO FOR THE SOUTHERN LEBANON. THIS LED ON TO THE THIRD POINT - THE OPPORTUNITY OF TRYING TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE LEBANON (GETTING A GOVERNMENT WITH STRENGTHENED AUTHORITY, BUILDING UP SOME KIND OF LEBANESE ARMED FORCES, GETTING ALL OTHER FORCES, INCLUDING THE SYRIANS, TO WITHDRAW). IT WAS EARLY DAYS TO SEE HOW BEST TO SET ABOUT THIS BUT IT WAS AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY WHICH MUST NOT BE MISSED. THE ISRAELIS WOULD NEED TO BE VERY CAREFULLY HANDLED OVER ALL THIS.

4. FINALLY, THERE WAS STILL THE PROBLEM OF AUTONOMY ON THE WEST BANK. THE DIFFICULTY OF DOING ANYTHING ON THIS WOULD NOW BE EXACERBATED BY THE LARGE NUMBERS OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES TRYING TO GET INTO JORDAN. ARAFAT'S AUTHORITY HAD BEEN STRUCK A PERHAPS VITAL BLOW.

5 EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THE SORT OF THINKING HE HAD OUTLINED REFLECTED HOW HAIG WAS LOOKING AT THE PROBLEM AT PRESENT. THERE WERE OF COURSE OTHERS IN WASHINGTON WHO, LIKE THE EUROPEANS, WOULD PREFER TO SEE A MUCH TOUGHER APPROACH TO THE ISRAELIS. BUT EAGLEBURGER'S OWN VIEW WAS THAT HITTING THE ISRAELIS WITH A BASEBALL BAT WOULD ACHIEVE NOTHING. THEY HAD PUT THEMSELVES INTO A STRONG POSITION AND WOULD NO DOUBT BE USING WHAT THEY HAD GAINED BEYOND THE 40KM LINE AS BARGAINING CHIPS FOR WHAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONCEDE ON THE ISRAELI SIDE OF IT. EAGLEBURGER THOUGHT THAT WITH IMAGINATION IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO USE THE NEW SITUATION TO BUILD A MORE STABLE BASIS FOR THE FUTURE. MOST OF THE LEADERS WERE

THE 40KM LINE AS BARGAINING CHIPS FOR WHAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONCEDE ON THE ISRAELI SIDE OF IT. EAGLEBURGER THOUGHT THAT WITH IMAGINATION IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO USE THE NEW SITUATION TO BUILD A MORE STABLE BASIS FOR THE FUTURE. MOST OF THE ARABS WERE NONE TOO HAPPY ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF SYRIA IN THE LEBANON. THE LEBANESE, IF THEY COULD BE PERSUADED TO WORK TOGETHER, WANTED NOTHING BETTER THAN TO GET BACK CONTROL OVER THEIR OWN COUNTRY.

PLEASE SEE M I F T.

THOMAS

NNNN

THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE HOW FAR WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO IN ORDER TO GET THE OTHER SIDE OF THE BARRIERS TO WITH- STANDING THE SYRIAN ARMY BUILDING UP SOME KIND OF SYRIAN ARMY TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE LEBANON (GETTING A COOPERATIVE WITH LEBANON) THIS IS THE MAIN POINT - THE OBLIGATION OF TRYING TO BRING ABOUT A RELATIONSHIP SOME SORT OF WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NEXT FORTY YEARS THAT WOULD BE THE MAIN LINE OF EFFORT

THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE HOW FAR WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO IN ORDER TO GET THE OTHER SIDE OF THE BARRIERS TO WITH- STANDING THE SYRIAN ARMY BUILDING UP SOME KIND OF SYRIAN ARMY TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE LEBANON (GETTING A COOPERATIVE WITH LEBANON) THIS IS THE MAIN POINT - THE OBLIGATION OF TRYING TO BRING ABOUT A RELATIONSHIP SOME SORT OF WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NEXT FORTY YEARS THAT WOULD BE THE MAIN LINE OF EFFORT

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

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PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR MOBERLY
MR BULLARD
HD/NENAD
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~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~

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RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 112000Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 983 OF 11 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS,
AMMAN,

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, JEDDA, CAIRO.

MY TELNO 980: LEBANON/ISRAEL

1. I HAD A LONG PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER THIS MORNING (11 JUNE). MARWAN QASIM HAS COME MORE OR LESS TO THE CONCLUSION SET OUT IN PARA 5 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, WITH THE POSSIBLE VARIANT THAT THERE MAY BE A SUBTERRANEAN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS, SYRIANS AND AMERICANS FOR SYRIA TO EXERCISE HEGEMONY OVER THE MOSLEM AREAS OF NORTHERN LEBANON WHILE THE REST OF THE COUNTRY BECOMES A KIND OF VICHY FRANCE IN RELATION TO ISRAEL.
2. QASIM SAID THAT ONE FACTOR UNITED VIRTUALLY ALL ELEMENTS IN THE LEBANON, MOSLEM AND CHRISTIAN, NAMELY DETESTATION OF THE PLO AND THE SYRIANS. IF BOTH WERE REMOVED FROM THE COUNTRY, THERE WOULD BE A CHANCE OF LEBANESE UNITY OF A KIND BEING RESTORED. BUT THIS WOULD NOT COME ABOUT IF THE ISRAELIS HAD A DIRECT HAND IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF LEBANON. THEY MUST EITHER WITHDRAW AND LEAVE IT TO THE LEBANESE (EXTREMELY UNLIKELY) OR SOME MULTILATERAL FORCE MUST BE INJECTED TO HOLD THE RING WHILE THE LEBANESE PUT THEIR OWN HOUSE IN

INJECTED TO HOLD THE RING WHILE THE LEBANESE PUT THEIR OWN HOUSE IN ORDER.

3. HE MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF A GREATLY EXPANDED UNIFIL. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THIS UNLIKELY, UNLESS IT COINCIDED WITH TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL PLUS TOTAL LEBANESE REUNIFICATION IE EXCLUDING HADDAD. EVEN SO, IT WOULD BE A VERY DIFFICULT EXERCISE TO PUT TOGETHER. QASIM AGREED AND SUGGESTED THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT ACT ON A BILATERAL BASIS - IT WAS OBVIOUSLY OUT OF THE QUESTION FOR THE AMERICANS TO DO SO. HE WENT ON TO SUGGEST THAT THE TEN MIGHT PRODUCE A PEACEKEEPING FORCE TO DO THE JOB.

4. I SAID THAT HE MUST NOT THINK OF THE TEN AS AN INTEGRATED ELEMENT WHICH COULD MOUNT SUCH AN OPERATION. FOR EXAMPLE, I WAS QUITE SURE THAT SOME MEMBERS, EG THE IRISH, WOULD NEVER ACT IN A PEACE-KEEPING CAPACITY EXCEPT UNDER UN AUSPICES. APART POSSIBLE FROM THE FRENCH, I THOUGHT THAT THE OTHER UNIFIL TROOP CONTRIBUTORS FROM THE TEN WOULD BE EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO EMBARK ON ANOTHER PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN THE LEBANON OUTSIDE THE UN. EQUALLY, COULD HE IMAGINE THE GERMANS DEPLOYING TROOPS IN LEBANON?

5. THE CONVERSATION CLOSED WITH QASIM BEWAILING THE FACT THAT THE AMERICANS HAD FAILED TO GRASP THE NETTLE OF PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION - HE HAD URGED THIS ON MRS KIRKPATRICK YESTERDAY - AND SUGGESTING THAT THE FAHD EIGHT-POINT PLAN SHOULD BE RESUSCITATED AND PUT TO THE AMERICANS. I SAID THAT I DID NOT THINK THAT THERE WAS THE REMOTEST POSSIBILITY OF THE AMERICANS GRASPING THIS NETTLE, AND THAT RECENT EVENTS IN THE LEBANON WOULD MAKE THEM EVEN MORE RELUCTANT TO DO SO. THEY WOULD SEE NO PRESSURE ON THEMSELVES TO TAKE SUCH A DIFFICULT DECISION, ONE WHICH THEY HAD STEADFASTLY AVOIDED SO FAR. QASIM GLOOMILY AGREED AND SAID THAT HE WONDERED HOW KING HUSSEIN MAINTAINED HIS SANITY IN THE LIGHT OF THE KIND OF MESSAGES HE HAD BEEN RECEIVING FROM THE AMERICANS RECENTLY. LAST AUTUMN, THE KING HAD THOUGHT THAT THE AMERICANS MIGHT BE IMPROVING, BUT HE WAS NOW TOTALLY DISILLUSIONED.

6. AS REGARDS CURRENT EVENTS IN THE UN, QASIM WAS STRONGLY ADVISING THE LEBANESE TO KEEP AWAY FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HE SAW NO GOOD COMING FROM EITHER BODY ONLY HARM. AS REGARDS THE PROSPECTIVE MEETING OF ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS AND/OR AN ARAB SUMMIT, HE SAID THAT HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT THE ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS OR HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WOULD DO THEIR BEST "TO MUTILATE THE ARAB CAUSE EVEN FURTHER".

THEIR BEST "TO MUTILATE THE ARAB CAUSE EVEN FURTHER".

7 MEANWHILE THE ARABS HERE ARE STILL IN A SHELL-SHOCKED STATE AND THE LEBANESE ARE NOT PRESSING FOR A COUNCIL MEETING NOW THAT A CEASE-FIRE HAS BEEN ARRANGED. THE PLO, LED BY KADDOUMI, ARE SITTING IN A SAD LITTLE KNOT IN THE DELEGATES LOUNGE, IGNORED BY EVERYONE EXCEPT THE OCCASIONAL JOURNALIST.

PARSONS

NNNN

*to make set**Subject filed a
S. Arabia
Prince Saud
June 82*

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
FOREIGN MINISTER OF SAUDI ARABIA, PRINCE SAUD, ON
11 JUNE 1982 AT 10 DOWNING STREET AT 1430.

Present

The Prime Minister	Prince Saud, Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia
Mr C Whitmore	
Mr J C Moberly	Mr Mizar Mardani
Mr R O Miles	Mr Najji Mufti

1. The Prime Minister and Prince Saud compared notes on the reported ceasefire in Lebanon. It appeared that there was a ceasefire of sorts, but the conditions were not known. Prince Saud said the Israelis appeared to be demanding Syrian withdrawal. The Prime Minister said their objective was certainly to destroy the Palestinians and make the Syrians withdraw. She was concerned that they were putting conditions of this kind to a ceasefire.
2. Prince Saud said the Israelis were 'mixing their cards' and this was affecting the US attitude. The Israelis were bringing the problems of Lebanon itself in alongside security questions of Southern Lebanon. They were trying to use the pretext of security to influence the political structure of Lebanon. He had told President Reagan and Mr Haig that this was a very dangerous process, and no one could tell where it might lead to in the region. The

/Israelis

Israelis thought that they could use each developing crisis to deal first with the PLO, then the Syrians etc.

3. Yet the obstacle to security in the south had come not from the PLO but from Haddad and the Israelis. The Palestinians had accepted the Cairo agreement which limited their military activities throughout Lebanon, but Haddad had refused any restriction and had shelled UN forces to get his way.

4. Now it was clear why Haddad had been established by the Israelis. The Israelis hoped to open up a channel to the Christians in the north and link Haddad to them. This would be the end of the multi-confessional Lebanon which we knew, and would lead to the catastrophe of religious war (comparable with the religious divisions in the Iran/Iraq war).

5. The Prime Minister said we had been greatly alarmed by Israel's rapid advance first to Tyre and Sidon and then to Beirut. We were concerned at the proximity of this new crisis to the existing dangers of the Gulf war, in which Syria had become embroiled with Iran. She was glad that Prince Saud had pointed these dangers out to President Reagan and Mr Haig, who probably had not seen things this way before, as they had not recognised the threat which the crisis contained eg for Jordan.

6. The Prime Minister said that she had spoken out for respect for the Lebanese Government and Lebanese sovereignty, for example in parliament. Prince Saud agreed that we should work to strengthen legality, to help the government send its troops into the South, to work for national reconciliation and reconciliation between the Lebanese and the Palestinians. We should foster cooperation of the Lebanese army and the

Lebanese national front. Mr Moberly said that we were encouraging the Lebanese army to take over West Beirut, and the Prime Minister said we must all uphold the authority of Lebanon.

7. The Prime Minister said ^{that} ~~that~~ Israel was trying to place political conditions on ceasefire and withdrawal, for example seeking to get the Syrians out of Lebanon; this was dictation. Prince Saud said that, if the Syrians were to leave, it ^{should} ~~would~~ be at the request of the Lebanese Government.

8. Prince Saud welcomed the EC statement of 9 June, in particular the requirement ^{of} ~~that~~ withdrawal and the hint of action to follow. He had to tried to impress on President Reagan that ~~th~~ US must pay attention to public opinion in the Arab world, which was turning against them. Once the suspicion of US collusion with Israel was ^{implanted} ~~implied~~ it would be very difficult to remove, and would make grave problems for Arab governments friendly to the US. The Israelis were trying to polarise the Middle East. They wanted to be the sole champions of Western and US interests. This would simply push the Arabs into the arms of the Russians. At present there were still outlets for the Arabs to work for peace, but US actions such as their veto in the Security Council were closing them off.

9. Prince Saud accepted the Prime Minister's view that there was no US/Israeli collusion, but said that the US must take action to show that they were working for peace. Saudi Arabia had accepted US logic which meant working through Lebanon for a ceasefire as a way of approaching the broader problems of the Middle East. Now they ^{found} ~~thought~~ that Israel had turned everything round; every time Habib came to the area he found he was dealing not with the big issues, but with the latest crisis created by Israel. This was what created the

impression of collusion.

10. The Prime Minister said that she had been with Mr Haig during much of the day on 10 June. He was expecting to leave imminently for Israel if two conditions (not specified) were met. But they had not been met. In reply to the Prime Minister's question, Prince Saud said he thought he had brought it home to the Americans that they must not simply react, but must act. He had pointed out that there might be an Arab summit soon; how were the Americans' friends to avoid escalation of governmental opinion in the Arab world?

11. The Prime Minister said that President Reagan and Mr Haig wanted to do the right things, But they got all their information one-sidedly from the Israeli ~~side~~. For example at Versailles President Reagan had read out a letter from Begin saying that the Galilee villages had been constantly bombarded, and that Israel had to act to protect them. It took time for the others at Versailles to verify and point out to the Americans that this bombardment was a reaction to Israeli bombing raids. The Israeli technique was to get information in quickly. Similarly, the attack on Mr Argov had been used as the occasion of the Israeli invasion, but it could not be the reason. The Americans had a feeling that the Israelis were 'people of the Old Testament' and what they said was true. Prince Saud said he had made the ~~same~~ point to President Reagan about the bombardment of Galilee, and that he had got Mr Haig to confirm that there had been no Palestinian breach of ^{the} ~~a~~ ceasefire whatsoever. The Prime Minister said

/we

we must try to counter the Israeli lobby and get the correct information to President Reagan quickly. He was prepared to stand up for his views when he was convinced, as he had done over AWACS.

12. The Prime Minister said that the Americans were dismayed by the scale of the Israeli action. They had been told that the Israelis would not attack the Syrians, but they had. Now they were told that they would not attack Beirut. President Reagan was affected by this behaviour.

13. Prince Saud said that the cost of the Israeli invasion would be very great to the Arabs but also to the whole world. He agreed with the Prime Minister that the ~~Lebanon~~ ^{Gulf War} also presented great dangers of the ^{spread} of self destruction^{ve} and sectarian policies. The Iran threat was not that Sunni Muslims would start to accept Shia ideas, which they would not, but that continuing bloodshed/ ^{and instability} would result. Religion was being made into a message of conflict, not reconciliation. The Israelis exploited this, ~~not~~

~~but~~ because they wanted the Arabs to fight each other. As they continued to ^{receive unconditional} ~~risk~~ US support they became more and more ^{adventurous}. Sharon was now outbidding Begin in extremism. The Saudis did not question ~~Israel's~~ ^{US motives} or accuse them of collusion, but they were afraid that the US would be too ^{slow} to realise the harm they were doing.

14. The Prime Minister said that Prince Saud's position showed great ^{prudence} and foresight. President Reagan

/and

and Mr Haig had been much shaken by Israeli ~~belief~~ ^{behaviour}.

She had spoken out at the NATO summit for a statement on the lines of the EC ~~Foreign Ministers~~ ^{Statement}, but the situation was moving too quickly.

15. Prince Saud said that the next few days were crucial for ceasefire, withdrawal and help to the Lebanese government.

We should concentrate on positive action to reinforce the government, not such negative requirements as getting the Syrians out. The US should discuss the problem with the Lebanese, and the Lebanese should be more active.

16. The Prime Minister said that withdrawal to ^{within} 40km from Israeli territory was unacceptable, ~~and~~ Prince Saud said that insidious offers such as removal of the Syrians ^{threat} were equally dangerous. There must be no blackmail based on holding Lebanon's territory, which would play into the hands of the extremists.

17. The Prime Minister said we must address the fundamental problem of Palestine. President Reagan had now been in office for nearly two years, but the learning process had not got very far. We must also respect the framework of international law: Lebanon was a separate country with its own rights.

18. Prince Saud said the Americans claimed their influence with the Israelis was limited, and ^{that} they had ~~only~~ military material to do without US support for 11 months (the Prime Minister said Mr Haig had told us six months). The Prime Minister agreed that this was not the point, and Prince Saud said that President Carter's ~~admission~~ ^{restriction} of arms supplies to Israel had quickly reduced Begin's support inside Israel from 70% to 40%. The Prime Minister said that many people

/in

in Israel were alarmed by the latest developments. The Israelis had gone too far and would bring trouble on themselves. Prince Saud said ~~they~~ ^{the thinking people} had no chance in the ^{present} atmosphere in Israel. He agreed ~~that~~ ^{on} the importance of international law and added self-determination. The Argentines had been following the Israeli example.

18. The Prime Minister said she would send President Reagan a message following this meeting. He was already well aware of our views, and she had been with him when the decision was taken that we would vote for ^{the} Security Council resolution which the Americans vetoed.

19. The Prime Minister thanked Prince Saud for his visit and said it was very important that he was acting quickly to keep Western countries informed of Saudi views. Prince Saud emphasised that he spoke as a friend of the Americans, and knowing that we were friends of the Americans. The Prime Minister said she would try to bring his message home to President Reagan, and Prince Saud said that knowing her reputation he was sure she would succeed.

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FM WASHINGTON 112120Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2099 OF 11 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS

INFO ROUTINE MODUK, AMMAN, CAIRO AND JEDDA

M I P T:

LEBANON

1. ALTHOUGH EAGLEBURGER MAY HAVE BEEN TALKING TO SOME EXTENT PERSONALLY, HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH HAIG AND WAS REFLECTING HIS GENERAL VIEWS. THE SCALE OF THE ISRAELI ACTION HAS DISCONCERTED THE AMERICANS AND ITS TIMING HAS CAUGHT THEM AT A MOMENT WHEN IT IS MORE THAN USUALLY DIFFICULT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO REACH COHERENT POLICY DECISIONS. THE IDEAS THAT EAGLEBURGER WAS SKETCHING OUT SMACK SLIGHTLY OF A DESPERATE EFFORT TO SALVAGE SOMETHING FROM THE MESS, BUT IT IS CERTAINLY DEPRESSING THAT THE AMERICANS SEEM AS UNWILLING AS EVER TO TRY TO PUT UP AN EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON ISRAEL

MORE THAN USUALLY DIFFICULT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO REACH COHERENT POLICY DECISIONS. THE IDEAS THAT EAGLEBURGER WAS SKETCHING OUT SMACK SLIGHTLY OF A DESPERATE EFFORT TO SALVAGE SOMETHING FROM THE MESS. BUT IT IS CERTAINLY DEPRESSING THAT THE AMERICANS SEEM AS UNLIKELY AS EVER TO TRY TO PUT MORE EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON BEGIN. THEIR LONG TERM GOAL SEEMS TO BE A QUOTE LEBANON FOR THE LEBANESE UNQUOTE, WITHOUT SYRIAN OR ISRAELI FORCES ON ITS TERRITORY, OR A HEAVILY ARMED PALESTINIAN PRESENCE. BUT THEY DO NOT CLAIM THAT THERE IS MUCH PROSPECT OF THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES GETTING BACK EFFECTIVE CONTROL. NOR IS IT CLEAR WHAT ENTHUSIASM THEY THINK THERE IS LIKELY TO BE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES FROM POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS FOR AN EXPANDED UNIFIL.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 June, 1982

Message from the Prime Minister to
King Hussein of Jordan

Thank you for your letter to John Coles of 9 June. The Prime Minister has agreed that a message of thanks should be sent to King Hussein, and is content with the draft attached to your letter. I should be grateful if you could arrange for it to be despatched.

W. F. S. RICKETT

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

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Prime Minister 2



FCS/82/86

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

 WR
 11/6

Lebanon: Arrangements for the Possible Evacuation of UK Passport
 Holders and other Commonwealth Citizens

1. Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, our officials have been looking at the need to set in hand evacuation plans on a contingency basis for the UK and Commonwealth citizens from Lebanon.
2. The British Community have already been advised (on 9 June) by the Ambassador in Beirut to move to East Beirut, which is Christian controlled and reported to be calm. He has discretion to advise them to move further north into the Christian enclave if the situation deteriorates.
3. Meanwhile a unilateral Israeli announcement of a ceasefire at 1000 GMT today has been accepted by Syria. There is some doubt about the position of the PLO, but the fighting appears to have stopped for the time being. Although the situation in West Beirut may deteriorate further as refugees flood in from the south, I do not believe that there is yet a need to evacuate civilians from Lebanon.
4. The exact number of persons who may need to be evacuated is very difficult for our Embassy to assess. We believe there are some 1800 British passport holders in the Lebanon and, from figures supplied by the Indian, Bangladesh, Sri Lankan and Cypriot High Commissions, that there are 2,500 of their nationals in Lebanon. We do not of course know how accurate any of the latter figures are, nor how many people may in the event wish to leave Lebanon. Contingency plans will remain under review. For the time I am content that the following contingency arrangements, agreed by officials, all based on an evacuation from Lebanon to

/the Sovereign




the Sovereign Base areas in Cyprus, should stand:

- (a) The Department of Trade should continue with contingency planning for the possible Charter of one or more of the British-owned ships now in the Eastern Mediterranean which might be used to evacuate people from Jounieh (in the Christian enclave), should the position deteriorate.
- (b) That one Hercules aircraft at Lyneham should remain on 12 hours' standby.
- (c) That Akrotiri should remain ready to open at 12 hours' notice.
- (d) That HMS Leander, already instructed to sail for the Eastern Mediterranean (ETA 14 June), should proceed. Her duties are likely to be those of an escort, though she could carry up to 200 evacuees.
- (e) We shall make enquiries with airlines operating from Cyprus about the movement of evacuees from Cyprus to their own countries.
- (f) If an evacuation should become imminent, we shall contact the BBC to ask them to make the necessary announcement on their World Service.

5. A breakdown in the ceasefire, which could occur within days in the absence of any Israeli move to withdraw, would make it necessary to review these arrangements urgently. But in my view only a breakdown of law and order in the Christian-controlled enclave would make a full-scale evacuation necessary.

6. We are liaising with the American and French Governments with a view to co-operating with them if that should prove sensible.

7. I am sending a copy of this minute to my OD colleagues.


(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

11 June 1982

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DESKBY TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, 120600Z

DESKBY WASHINGTON 121300Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 120200Z JUN 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 989 OF 11 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON.

TEL AVIV TELNO 235: ISRAEL/LEBANON.

1. URQUHART HAS JUST TELEPHONED ME (FRIDAY EVENING). HE WAS IN A STATE OF GREAT EMOTION AND HAD JUST HAD A BLAZING ROW WITH THE ONLY MEMBER OF THE US MISSION HE COULD GET HOLD OF. HE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD DONE NOTHING WITH THE ISRAELIS ABOUT THE HUMANITARIAN APPEAL THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD MADE TO VICE PRESIDENT BUSH TWO DAYS AGO. THE RED CROSS BELIEVED THAT THERE WERE 300,000 PEOPLE IN ISRAELI OCCUPIED LEBANON, MAINLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN WHO WERE IN URGENT NEED OF RELIEF. UNIFIL COULD NOT EVEN GET TO THE 7,000 CIVILIANS STRANDED ON THE BEACH AT TYRE. THE ISRAELIS WERE SAYING THAT UNIFIL, AS A PEACEKEEPING FORCE, COULD NOT GET INVOLVED IN HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES:

"A LOT OF ISRAELI HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES WERE INTERESTED". MEANWHILE THE ISRAELIS HAD ORDERED THAT ALL JOURNALISTS AND OTHER OUTSIDERS BE KEPT OUT OF THE OCCUPIED AREAS. THEY WERE HUNTING DOWN THE PALESTINIANS MERCILOUSLY AND HAD THIS AFTERNOON SHELLLED AN ORPHANAGE NEAR BEIRUT AIRPORT CAUSING

AFTERNOON SHELLLED AN ORPHANAGE NEAR BEIRUT AIRPORT CAUSING ANY CASUALTIES AMONGST THE CHILDREN.

2. URQUHART, WHO WAS MORE WORKED UP THAN I HAVE EVER KNOWN HIM, SAID THAT HE WAS MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE REPRESENTATIONS WE HAD MADE IN TEL AVIV. HE URGED THAT WE AND OTHER EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BRING ALL POSSIBLE PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE ISRAELIS "SINCE THE AMERICANS AND THE OTHER ARABS WERE APPARENTLY NOT PREPARED TO DO ANYTHING IN THE FACE OF WHAT LOOKED LIKE MASS MURDER OF THE PALESTINIANS BY THE ISRAELIS".

3. URQUHART IS NOT GIVEN TO FLIGHTS OF FANCY AFTER MORE THAN 35 YEARS DEVOTED TO UN PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT WE, AND ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTS OF THE TEN WHICH WE CAN MOBILIZE SHOULD MAKE FURTHER REPRESENTATIONS IN TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON TO REQUIRE THE ISRAELIS TO ALLOW UNIFIL AND INTERNATIONAL RELIEF AGENCIES SUCH AS THE ICRC TO OPERATE IN THE OCCUPIED AREAS FOR PURELY HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES.

PARSONS

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DESKBY CAIRO 111100Z

FM FCO 111011Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 201 OF 11 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT

YOUR TELNO 255 OF 7 JUNE (NOT TO ALL)

ISRAEL/LEBANON: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT MUBARAK

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BEGINS

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. WE TOO ARE EXTREMELY CONCERNED AT THE EFFECT THAT CONTINUED FIGHTING THERE COULD HAVE ON EFFORTS, TO WHICH EGYPT HAS CONTRIBUTED SO MUCH, TO FIND A LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

OUR IMMEDIATE CONCERN IS THEREFORE TO BRING AN END TO THE FIGHTING. WE HAVE MADE OUR POSITION CLEAR IN OUR ASSOCIATION WITH THE VERSAILLES STATEMENT AND IN OUR SUPPORT FOR UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 508 AND 509. YOU WILL ALSO HAVE SEEN THE STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF 9 JUNE WHICH VIGOROUSLY CONDEMNED THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON. WE REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS AND WITH THOSE DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH THE CONFLICT. WE SEE NO JUSTIFICATION FOR ISRAEL ACTING IN THE WAY THAT SHE HAS.

WE HAVE ALSO BEEN ABLE TO MAKE OUR STRONG VIEWS KNOWN TO PRESIDENT REAGAN AND MR HAIG DURING THE TALKS THEY HAVE HAD IN LONDON OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS. WE FULLY SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPECIAL ENVOY MR PHILIP HABIB TO FIND A WAY TO HALT THE FIGHTING.

IN THE MEANTIME WE ARE VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE APPALLING HUMAN COST OF THE CONFLICT AND WE HAVE ASKED THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO LET US KNOW OF ANY URGENT NEEDS THEY HAVE FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. WE ARE READY TO DO WHAT WE CAN. ENDS.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 June, 1982

|| Thank you for your letter to John Coles of 10 June about the message to the Prime Minister from President Mubarak on the situation in the Lebanon. The Prime Minister agrees that a reply on the lines of the draft attached to your letter should be sent to President Mubarak, and I should be grateful if you could arrange for it to be despatched.

W. F. S. RICKETT

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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FROM TEL AVIV 111050Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 234 OF 11 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRIORITY AMMAN AND CAIRO.

MY TELNO 231: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. WE REPORTED TO THE DEPARTMENT BY TELEPHONE THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S ADVANCE WARNING OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT AT 0900Z THAT ISRAELI FORCES WOULD UNILATERALLY CEASE FIRE IN LEBANON FROM 1000Z.

2. I WOULD JUDGE THAT ISRAELI DECISION STEMS FROM (A) AMERICAN PRESSURE, (B) FACT THAT IDF ONLY COMPLETED THE ORIGINALLY STATED OBJECTIVE OF THEIR OPERATION AGAINST THE PLO LATE YESTERDAY, WHEN REMAINING PLO UNITS IN SOUTH EAST LEBANON JOINED SYRIANS IN PULLING BACK BEYOND THE 40 KM BUFFER ZONE WHICH THE ISRAELIS ARE INTENT ON ESTABLISHING, (C) INCREASING COST OF OPERATIONS IN

INTENT ON ESTABLISHING, (C) INCREASING COST OF OPERATIONS IN MILITARY TERMS RELATIVE TO RESULTS, (D) REALISATION THAT SYRIANS WERE DETERMINED TO FIGHT IT OUT AND COULD NOT EASILY BE BUDGED.

3. ISRAEL GOVERNMENT EVIDENTLY CONCLUDED YESTERDAY THAT THE TIME LEFT FOR FURTHER MILITARY GAINS WAS RAPIDLY RUNNING OUT. AT MY RECEPTION LAST NIGHT TO CELEBRATE THE QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY THE EDITOR OF HAARETZ TOLD US THAT SHAMIR HAD BRIEFED GROUP OF EDITORS EARLIER IN THE DAY THAT "THERE WILL BE A CEASEFIRE TONIGHT OR TOMORROW".

4. IT WAS ALSO BECOMING INCREASINGLY EVIDENT OVER THE LAST 48 HOURS THAT THE MAIN THRUST OF IDF ACTIVITY WAS NOW AGAINST SYRIAN FORCES RATHER THAN THE PLO. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NATIONAL SUPPORT FOR ACTION AGAINST THE PLO, PARTICULARLY NEAR THE BORDER WITH ISRAEL, THERE ARE WIDESPREAD MISGIVINGS AT THE SCALE OF THIS WEEK'S OPERATION, WHICH FAR EXCEEDED THE ORIGINALLY ANNOUNCED OBJECTIVE, AND IN PARTICULAR AT THE CONFLICT WITH SYRIA. SOME NEWSPAPERS HAVE BEEN FIERCELY CRITICAL OF SHARON, AND THERE WILL NO DOUBT BE MORE AS THE DUST SETTLES.

MOBERLY
BT

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21/6

Mr Habib CHATTY

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RM



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 June, 1982

I enclose a copy of a telex the Prime Minister has received from Mr Habib Chatty, Secretary General of the Organisation of Islamic Conference.

I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to Mr Chatty by Monday, 21 June.

W.F.S. RICKETT

J Holmes, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RM



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 June, 1982

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your telex which we received today.

This is receiving attention and you will be sent a reply as soon as possible.

F. S. RICKETT

Mr Habib Chatty

British TELECOM for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

889113 PO SW G

.262936 ITGLF G

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SAGHER JEDDAH 400 10 1800 (PART 1 OF 2) PAGE -1

HER EXCELLENCY MADAM MARGARET THATCHER
GOVERNMENT OF THE TUNITED KINGDOM
LONDONS W1

HER EXCELLENCY
MADAM MARGARET THATCHER
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
LONDON UNITED KINGDOM

DEAR MADAM PRIME MINISTER

I SHOULD LIKE TO DRAW YOUR KIND ATTENTION TO THE VERY SERIOUS
SITUATION WHICH HAS RECENTLY DEVELOPED IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND
IN LEBANON FOLLOWING THE AGGRESSION AGAINST THIS SOVEREIGN
STATE BY ISRAEL AS YOUR EXCELLENCY

P2

AND INDEED THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY ARE WELL AWARE THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT
ISRAEL HAS OPENLY DIS REGARDED THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONA
-L LAW IN ITS DEALINGS WITH THE SOVEREIGN
STATES OF THE REGION INDEED SINCE THE VERY CREATION OF
ISRAEL THE WHOLE OF THE MIDDLE

P3

EAST HAS BEEN IN A PERMANENT STATE OF TURMOIL OWING TO THE
RUTHLESS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FORMERS EXPANSIONIST
POLICIES BASED ON CONTINUOUS AGGRESSION AND ON TOTAL DISREGARD
OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION AND THE RESOLUTIONS
OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION TODAY ISRAEAL HAS OPENLY SHOWN
THAT IT DOES NOT DISREGARD WORLD

ADDRESS
Organisation
of Islamic Conference
Kilob 6, Maccab Rd,
P.O. Box 178, JEDDAH

R11/6/82



TELECOM for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

TELECOM for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

British TELECOM

P4
OPINION FOR THE SAKE OF EXPANSIONIST POLICIES ONLY BUT
THEIT IS DETERMINED IF NEED BE TO ANNIHILATE THE WHOLE
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN ORDER TO SEEK A FINAL SOLUTION TO ITS OWN
PREDICAMENTTHE COURAGEOUS AND UNDERSTANDING POSITION OF THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT WHETHER AT THE UNITED NATIONS OR WITHIN THE

P5
CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY HAS BEEN JUSTIFIABLE APPRECIATED BY THE MUSLIM
STATES WHO HAVE ALWAYS ENJOYED A TRADITIONAL RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM AND WHO SEE IN THE BRITISH STAND YET
ANOTHER
EXAMPLE OF THE DEFANCE OF THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION
AND FREEDOM IT ISNOW OBVIOUS THAT

P6
THIS RIGHT IS BLATANTLY DISREGARDED TODAY BY
AN ISRAEL WHICH HAS GROWN ACCUSTOMED TO THE
IDEA THAT ITS ACTIONS HOWEVER OUTRAGEOUS IN THEIR EXECUTION OR
DANGEROUS IN THEIR CONSEQUENCES WILL ALWAYS GO UNPUNISHED BECAUSE OF
THE COMPLAISANT OR EVEN ENCOURAGING ATTITUDES OF SOME OF
ITS FRIENDS IN THE WEST FOR ALL

PAGE 7

THESE REASONS AND IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE RELATIONSHIP
OF THE MUSLIM WORLD WITH THE WEST WE WOULD APPEAL TO YOU AND
TO YOUR GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE PURSUING ITS PRINCIPLED
ATTITUDE AND TO USE ALL THE MEANS OPEN TO IT IN INTERNATIONAL
AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS WELL AS THROUGH DIRECT DILATERAL

P8
CONTACTS IN ORDER TO BRING THIS SY STEMATIC GENOCIDE
PERPETRATED IN A VITAL REGION OF THE WORLD
TO A SPEEDY END

PLEASE ACCEPT MADAM PRIME MINISTER THE ASSURANCES
OF OUR HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM

HABIB CHATTY
SECRETARY GENEARAL ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE

IMMEDIATE

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES ~~15~~ (17)

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR MOBERLY

~~Mr Bullard~~ → HANNAY

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

HD/NENAD
HD/MED
HD/UND

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~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BEIRUT 101130Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 267 OF 10 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV

PRIORITY AMMAN, CAIRO, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, YODUK.

MY TEL NOS 259 AND 266: ISRAEL/LEBANON.

1. AS I HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO SEE LABAKI I CANNOT OBTAIN ANSWERS TO MY QUESTIONS, PARTICULARLY WHETHER IN THE EVENT OF THE ISRAELIS NOT INVADING WEST BEIRUT THE LEBANESE ARMY WOULD BE PUT IN THERE

TO ENSURE LAW AND ORDER. AN OFFICER OF THE ISF WHO CAME TO INSPECT THE EMBASSY PREMISES AT MY REQUEST TOLD ME THAT THIS WAS BEING CONSIDERED AT THE MOMENT AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. AS USUAL THEY WERE TRYING TO SQUARE ALL POLITICAL PARTIES BEFORE DOING IT. HE ADDED HOWEVER THAT SAMI AL KHATIB, THE COMMANDER OF THE ADF HAS ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE ADF WERE TO BE USED IN THE EVENT OF ANY DANGER TO CERTAIN EMBASSIES, INCLUDING THE BRITISH.

2. THIS IS A MOST UNSATISFACTORY STATE OF AFFAIRS. WEST BEIRUT

2. THIS IS A MOST UNSATISFACTORY STATE OF AFFAIRS. WEST BEIRUT IS EXTREMELY TENSE, WITH MILITIAMEN SWARMING ALL OVER THE STREETS. IT WOULD REQUIRE VERY LITTLE TO TOUCH OFF AN EXPLOSION. ONE MUST DISCOUNT RUMOUR AT A TIME LIKE THIS BUT I HEAR OF FLATS BEING FORCIBLY ENTERED AND SQUATTERS INSTALLING THEMSELVES AT GUNPOINT. IT WOULD BE A NATURAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE INFUX OF PALESTINIAN AND SHIA REFUGEES. I HAVE JUST LEARNED THAT THE MUSEUM CROSSING IS CLOSED.

3. AS TO THE GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION, BEIRUT IS AT THE MOMENT QUIET. MY NORWEGIAN COLLEAGUE MOTORED YESTERDAY MORNING AS FAR AS HALF WAY DOWN THE HILL INTO THE BEQAA PAST DHAR EL BAIDAR. ON HIS RETURN HOWEVER ISRAELI ARTILLERY ON JEBEL BAROUK WERE SHELLING THE MDEIRAJ-DHAR EL BAIDAR SECTION OF THE ROAD. IF THEY ARE INDEED ESTABLISHED ON THAT MOUNTAIN IT LOOKS TO ME AS A LAYMAN AS IF THE SYRIANS AND PALESTINIANS IN THE SOUTH BEKA'A ARE IN A PRECARIOUS POSITION.

4. I SHALL TRY TO SEE SAMI EL KHATIB TOMORROW TO CLARIFY THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR WEST BEIRUT.

ROBERTS

BT

NNNN



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 June 1982

Prime Minister !

Yes
no

Content that this message
should be sent to President
Mubarak? WJH 10/6

Dear Idan,

President Mubarak has sent a message to the Prime Minister about the Israeli action in Lebanon (copy of Cairo telegram number 255 of 7 June enclosed). Parallel messages have gone to heads of government of the rest of the Ten and to President Reagan and Mr Begin.

We are discussing Lebanon within the Ten but there has been no suggestion that we should concert a reply to President Mubarak's message. However, the Ten have issued a statement which vigorously condemns the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. I enclose a suggested brief reply from the Prime Minister in the form of a draft telegram to Cairo.

The Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister General Kamal Hassan Ali will be in London briefly on 11 and 12 June. He is calling on Mr Pym on the afternoon of 11 June.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

SUBJECT

OUT TELEGRAM

~~First~~

cc Haris

Ops

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/Deskby

IMMEDIATE

1 ZCZC

2 GRS

3 CONFIDENTIAL

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6 FM FCO JUNE 82

7 TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO

8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

9 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT

10 YOUR TELNO 255 OF 7 JUNE (NOT TO ALL)

11 ISRAEL/LEBANON: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT MUBARAK

12 1. Please deliver the following reply from the Prime Minister
13 to President Mubarak as soon as possible. Begins

14 Thank you for your message about the situation in Lebanon.
15 We too are extremely concerned at the effect that continued
16 fighting there could have on efforts, to which Egypt has
17 contributed so much, to find a lasting peace in the Middle East.

18 Our immediate concern is therefore to bring an end to the
19 fighting. We have made our position clear in our association
20 with the Versailles statement and in our support for UN Security
21 Council resolutions 508 and 509. You will also have seen the
22 statement by the European Community of 9 June which vigorously
23 condemned the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. We remain in close
24 touch with our European partners and with those directly concerned
25 with the conflict. We see no justification for Israel acting

NNNN ends
telegram

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Catchword

in

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Dept

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Private Office

Drafted by (Block capitals)

J E HOLMES

Middle East Standard

NENAD

MED

News Dept

Additional Distribution

Telephone number

233 4641

Authorised for despatch

Comcen reference

Time of despatch

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL

Page
2.

1 ZCZC

2 in the way that she has.

3 We have also been able to make our strong views known to
4 President Reagan and Mr Haig during the talks they have had in
5 London over the past few days. We fully support the efforts of
6 President Reagan's special envoy Mr Philip Habib to find a way
7 to halt the fighting.

8 In the meantime we are very conscious of the appalling
9 human cost of the conflict and we have asked the Lebanese
10 government to let us know of any urgent needs they have for
11 humanitarian assistance. We are ready to do what we can.

12 Ends.

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14 PYM

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FM CAIRO 071401Z JUN 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 255 OF 7 JUNE

MIPT: LEBANON/ISRAEL

1. PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE APPRECIATE YOUR GENUINE CONCERN OVER THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN LEBANON. THE CURRENT ISRAELI OPERATION THERE IS CERTAIN TO HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT THROUGHOUT THE REGION. IT DEALS A DEVASTATING BLOW TO THE EFFORTS WE ARE EXERTING TIRELESSLY IN ORDER TO WIDEN THE SCOPE OF PEACE AND GAIN MORE SUPPORT FOR THE PROPOSITION OF PEACE AND HARMONY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. OUR TASK HAS BEEN MADE MORE DIFFICULT BY THE NEW ISRAELI ACTION.
2. THE PRESENT ISRAELI ATTITUDE IS LIKELY TO WEAKEN THE VOICES OF MODERATION AND REASON WITHIN THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT AND GIVE NEW AMMUNITION TO THE FORCES OF EXTREMISM AND NEGATIVISM. IN OTHER WORDS, THOSE AMONG THE PALESTINIANS WHO WERE WILLING TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL AND SIMULTANEOUS RECOGNITION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WILL FEEL ISOLATED AND BETRAYED.
3. ON THE OTHER HAND, THIS UNWISE POLICY WILL NO DOUBT ENCOURAGE OUTSIDE INTERVENTION AND STIMULATE FURTHER POLARIZATIONS WHICH ARE DETRIMENTAL TO THE INTERESTS OF ALL NATIONS.
4. THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WHICH WAS PROMPTLY ISSUED TODAY WAS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. HOWEVER, FURTHER ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES AND THE REINSTITUTION OF THE VIOLATED CEASE-FIRE.
5. WE EXPECT YOUR FRIENDLY COUNTRY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE TO PLAY A VITAL AND INDISPENSABLE ROLE DURING THE COMING FEW WEEKS. FIRST, PRESSURE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED WITHIN THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNTIL ITS RESOLUTION IS FULLY OBSERVED AND IMPLEMENTED. ANY WEAKENING OF THE COUNCIL'S STAND WOULD BE A SERIOUS SETBACK TO OUR EFFORTS. SECOND, THE UN FORCES OPERATING IN LEBANON SHOULD BE

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DESKBY 101400Z

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MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 15

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PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIR J LEAHY

MR MOBERLY

~~MR HANNAY~~ MR HANNAY

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NEWS D

RESIDENT CLERK

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FROM US SEN HQ
TO MODUK

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CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 101400Z

FROM TEL AVIV 101130Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 231 OF 10 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, BONN (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY,
DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRIORITY AMMAN
AND CAIRO.

MY TELNO 229: ISRAEL/LEBANON/SYRIA

1. FOREIGN MINISTRY TELEPHONED ME THIS MORNING TO JUSTIFY
YESTERDAY'S OPERATION AGAINST SYRIAN MISSILE SITES. THEY CLAIMED
THAT ISRAELI OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON REMAIN UNCHANGED. SYRIAN
INTERVENTION ON THE GROUND AND IN THE AIR PLUS THE MOVE OF

THAT ISRAELI OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON REMAIN UNCHANGED. SYRIAN INTERVENTION ON THE GROUND AND IN THE AIR, PLUS THE MOVE OF EXTGA MISSILES INTO THE BEKAA VALLEY, HAD LEFT ISRAEL NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO UNDERTAKE YESTERDAY'S OPERATION. OTHERWISE THE ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE OF SAFEGUARDING ISRAELI CITIZENS FROM THE PLO ATTACKS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN COMPLETELY ACHIEVED. FOREIGN MINISTRY STRESSED THAT ISRAEL STILL WISHED TO AVOID HOSTILITIES SPREADING MORE WIDELY.

2. IT IS NEVERTHELESS CLEAR THAT THE REAL ISRAELI OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON GO WELL BEYOND THE ORIGINALLY STATED AIM OF PUSHING THE PLO BACK 40 KMS. THE QUESTIONS NOW ARE:-

- A) CAN THE CONFLICT WITH SYRIA BE CONFINED TO LEBANESE TERRITORY SEMICOLON
- B) DID THE ISRAELIS ALL ALONG INTEND TO ATTACK THE SYRIANS ?
- C) WHAT ARE ULTIMATE ISRAELI INTENTIONS ?

3. ON A), MY JUDGEMENT IS THAT IT ALL DEPENDS ON SYRIA. THE ISRAELIS HAVE NO OBVIOUS INTEREST IN A FULL-SCALE WAR WITH SYRIA. THEY HAVE REINFORCED HEAVILY ON THE GOLAN. THEIR DISPOSITIONS TOWARDS SYRIA ITSELF ARE DEFENSIVE SO FAR AS WE CAN JUDGE. WE DOUBT IN ANY CASE WHETHER THEY WOULD TAKE THE INTIATIVE ON THE GOLAN, SINCE SYRIAN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS THERE ARE SO HEAVILY FORTIFIED. THEY COULD I SUPPOSE MOUNT AIR ATTACKS ON TARGETS IN SYRIA INCLUDING DAMASCUS (THEY HAVE DENIED REPORTS THAT THEY HAVE ALREADY BOMBED A SUBURB OF DAMASCUS) SEMICOLON BUT THEY WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST TO START THAT KIND OF EXCHANGE AND MUST ASSUME THE SYRIANS WOULD RETALIATE WITH FROG OR SCUD MISSILES.

4. ON B), THE PICTURE IS MURKY. THE OFFICIAL ISRAELI VERSION OF EVENTS IS THAT THE SAM MISSILES WERE ATTACKED BECAUSE ASSAD DELIBERATELY DECEIVED BOTH ISRAEL AND HABIB BY INTRODUCING LARGE NUMBERS OF SAM'S INTO LEBANON DURING THE NIGHT OF 8/9 JUNE AND THEN LAUNCHING AIR AND HELICOPTER ATTACKS AGAINST AN ISRAELI ARMoured COLUMN UNDER COVER OF THEM, THEREBY PREVENTING ISRAELI AIRCRAFT FROM GIVING SUPPORT. BUT THE PRESS ALSO CARRY REPORTS THAT SHARON PGESSED FROM THE START TO ATTACK THE SAM MISSILES IN THE BEKAA VALLEY AND TO REDUCE OR ELIMINATE THE SYRIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN LEBANON. THE MAJORITY OF THE CABINET, LIKE THE LABOUR ALIGNMENT,

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WERE SAID TO BE ORIGINALLY AGAINST A DELIBERATE CLASH WITH SYRIA, THOUGH THERE WAS RECOGNITION THAT THE PROBLEM OF PLO ARTILLERY IN THE SOUTH EAST OF LEBANON, BEHIND SYRIAN POSITIONS AND SYRIAN MISSILE COVER BUT WITHIN RANGE OF UPPER GALILEE, WOULD HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH SOMEHOW

SYRIAN MISSILE COVER BUT WITHIN RANGE OF UPPER GALILEE, WOULD HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH SOMEHOW.

5. PRESS LEAKS SUGGEST THAT SHARON AGAIN PRESSED THE CABINET ON THE EVENING OF 7 JUNE FOR APPROVAL TO INITIATE A DIRECT ENGAGEMENT WITH THE SYRIANS. ACCORDING TO ONE SOURCE, SHARON WAS TURNED DOWN AFTER A 6 1/2 HOUR DISCUSSION. BUT HE IS SAID TO HAVE PERSUADED BEGIN ON 8 JUNE WITH THE CLINCHING ARGUMENT THAT INTRODUCTION BY SYRIA OF MORE MISSILES INTO THE BEKA'A AND THE MOVEMENT SOUTH OF SOME OF THEM, MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ISRAEL OTHERWISE TO TAKE OUT THE REMAINING PLO ARTILLERY WHICH THREATENED UPPER GALILEE. THE CABINET APPROVED THE DECISION ON THE MORNING OF 9 JUNE AND THE ATTACK ON THE MISSILES TOOK PLACE IN THE AFTERNOON. ACCORDING TO THIS VERSION, NEITHER PERES NOR HABIB WAS INFORMED BEFOREHAND.

6. I CONSIDER IT QUITE ON THE CARDS AS SOME PRESS REPORTS IMPLY THAT SHARON INTENDED ALL ALONG TO PRECIPITATE A MAJOR CLASH WITH THE SYRIANS, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE POSITION OF THE CABINET. IN ANY CASE THE SUCCESS AND RAPID PROGRESS OF THE IDF OPERATION MADE IT INCREASINGLY TEMPTING TO GRASP THE SYRIAN NETTLE. BUT THE EFFECT IS THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL BE SEEN AS HAVING DELIBERATELY LED THE WORLD TO BELIEVE THAT THE INVASION OF LEBANON WAS DESIGNED TO BE MUCH MORE LIMITED THAN IT HAS NOW COME TO BE.

7. ON (C) ABOVE IT IS CLEAR THAT THE ISRAELIS DECIDED AT A FAIRLY EARLY STAGE IN THE PROCEEDINGS, AND PERHAPS EVEN AS PART OF THE ORIGINAL CABINET DECISION, NOT JUST TO CREATE A PERMANENT AND EFFECTIVE CORDON SANITAIRE BUT ALSO TO SMASH THE PLO INFRASTRUCTURE IN LEBANON. I NOTE FROM YOUR TELNO 137 THAT THE ISRAELI MINISTER IN LONDON SAID AS MUCH TO LEAHY ON 9 JUNE. KIMCHE WAS EVEN MORE FORTHRIGHT WHEN THE MIDDLE EAST DIRECTOR OF THE NETHERLANDS FOREIGN MINISTRY CALLED ON HIM YESTERDAY. KIMCHE SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS INTENDED TO ERADICATE THE PLO AS A MILITARY FORCE IN LEBANON. WHEN I ASKED HEAD OF EUROPEAN DEPT THIS MORNING ABOUT DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THIS AND ORIGINALLY STATED AIM, GANOR SAID THAT 40 KM HAD NEVER BEEN INTENDED AS A PRECISE LINE. ISRAELIS WERE DETERMINED NOT TO REPEAT THE 1978 FAILURE TO ACHIEVE A LASTING FREEDOM FROM PLO ATTACKS AFTER THE LITANI OPERATION.

8. AS TO INTENTIONS ON THE GROUND, ISRAELIS ARE CLEARLY DETERMINED TO CONTINUE PRESSING THEIR ATTACKS AS HARD AS THEY CAN. I WOULD JUDGE THEY HAVE THE DUAL AIM OF PERSUADING ASSAD TO WITHDRAW SYRIAN FORCES FROM THE BEIRUT AREA AND FROM THE SOUTHERN END OF THE BEKA'A VALLEY THEREBY ENABLING ISRAELI TO

SYRIAN FORCES FROM THE BEIRUT AREA AND FROM THE SOUTHERN END OF THE BEKA'A VALLEY THEREBY ENABLING ISRAELIS TO DEAL WITH THE REMAINING PLO POSITIONS WHOSE GUNS CAN THREATEN UPPER GALILEE. SUCCESS ON BOTH COUNTS WILL LEAVE ISRAELIS CLOSER, SO THEY HOPE, TO REALISING A NEW STYLE LEBANON FROM WHICH PLO INFLUENCE HAS BEEN ELIMINATED AND SYRIAN INFLUENCE GREATLY REDUCED.

9. ARE ISRAELIS PLANNING ON A TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES FROM LEBANON? AFTER THE SURPRISES OF THE PAST FEW DAYS ONE CAN BELIEVE ALMOST ANYTHING ABOUT THE ISRAELIS. BUT ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD DOUBTLESS WELCOME A SYRIA-FREE LEBANON, THEY ARE PROBABLY REALISTIC ENOUGH TO ACCEPT THAT ISRAELI OBJECTIVES WOULD HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED AND EVEN SURPASSED IF THE SYRIAN PRESENCE WAS EFFECTIVELY LIMITED TO THE EASTERN PART OF LEBANON.

MOBERLY

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FM WASHINGTON 092200Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2074 OF 9 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE BONN (PERSONAL FOR BULLARD) UKMIS NEW YORK TEL AVIV
(PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS)

YOUR TELNO 281 TO BONN: ISRAEL/LEBANON.

1. THE VICE PRESIDENT HELD A QUOTE CRISIS MANAGEMENT UNQUOTE MEETING THIS MORNING. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE PRESIDENT AND HAIG THEY WERE UNABLE TO REACH ANY POLICY DECISIONS. THERE WILL BE A FURTHER MEETING THIS EVENING BY WHICH TIME HABIB WILL HAVE SEEN ASAD. HABIB WAS URGED IN A MESSAGE FROM BEGIN AFTER HE HAD LEFT ISRAEL TO SECURE THE REMOVAL OF THE SYRIAN SAMs FROM THE BEKA'A.

2. SENIOR PENTAGON SOURCES HAVE TOLD US THAT:

(A) THE INSTRUCTIONS ORIGINALLY GIVEN TO HABIB WERE UNLIKELY TO MAKE THE SLIGHTEST IMPRESSION ON THE ISRAELIS AND CLEARLY HAD NOT DONE SO:

(B) THE ISRAELIS, IN THEIR VIEW, COMPLETELY MISLED THE AMERICANS YESTERDAY BY SUGGESTING THAT THEY WERE CONCERNED TO AVOID TAKING ON THE SYRIANS. THERE HAD SINCE BEEN MAJOR AIR ENGAGEMENTS WITH THE ISRAELIS CLAIMING TO HAVE SHOT DOWN TWENTY-THREE MIGs: THEY HAD DESTROYED MOST OF THE SYRIAN SAM SITES IN THE BEQA'A VALLEY AND WERE THREATENING THE BEIRUT TO DAMASCUS ROAD.

3. IN THE OPINION OF PENTAGON OFFICIALS, THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOW HAVE TO FACE VERY DIFFICULT DECISIONS ABOUT THE RE-SUPPLY OF THE ISRAELI FORCES. THE ONLY WAY TO BRING HOME TO BEGIN THE FACT THAT CONDUCT OF THIS KIND, WITH THE MOST SERIOUS POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES FOR US INTERESTS, WAS UNACCEPTABLE, WOULD BE TO GO FURTHER THAN THE QUOTE SLAP ON THE WRIST'' ADMINISTERED WHEN DELIVERIES OF SOME F16S WERE HELD UP FOR A FEW WEEKS A FEW MONTHS AGO. THEY HAD NO DOUBT THAT WEINBERGER WOULD WANT TO TAKE A TOUGH LINE AND WE THINK THE CIA ARE ALSO PRESSING FOR THIS BUT CONFESSED THAT THEY DID NOT KNOW WHETHER HAIG AND: FOR THAT MATTER, THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO GRASP THE NETTLE.

4. THE AMERICANS ARE VERY CONCERNED FOR THE SECURITY OF THEIR NATIONALS IN BEIRUT AND ARE MAKING NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN TO EVACUATE THEM IF NECESSARY.

5. I AM SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE IDEA OF ACTIVE US/ISRAELI COLLUSION AND CERTAINLY IF THERE HAS BEEN ANYTHING OF THE SORT THE PENTAGON HAS NOT BEEN INVOLVED. THE TIMING OF THE ISRAELI ACTION CAN CERTAINLY NOT HAVE BEEN WELCOME TO THE WHITE HOUSE, CROWDING THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO EUROPE OFF THE FRONT PAGES AND DEMONSTRATING HIS INABILITY TO DO MUCH ABOUT IT. I HAS ALSO PUT IN QUESTION THE FUTURE OF UNIFIL. FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH THE NSC STAFF HAVE TOLD US THAT THE AMERICANS ARE NOW TAKING A MUCH TOUGHER LINE IN TEL AVIV.

THOMAS

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 June 1982

Prime Minister

Content that this message
should be sent to King Hussein?

Amman

*WM
9/6*

Dear John,

Message from the Prime Minister to King Hussein of Jordan

As you know, Jordan voted against the Panamanian/
Spanish draft resolution in the Security Council debate on
the Falkland Islands on 4 June. Jordan's position as
representative of the Arab Group in the Security Council
and the personal intervention of King Juan Carlos of Spain
with King Hussein put the King under considerable pressure
to change his vote. It is gratifying, therefore, that in
the face of these pressures, Jordan voted against the
resolution. On the other hand, Jordan's vote at the Non-
Aligned Movement's meeting in Havana was not in our favour,
but we nevertheless recommend that the Prime Minister send
a message of thanks to King Hussein. I enclose a message in
the form of a draft telegram to Amman. This also includes a
short passage about the current fighting in Southern Lebanon.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

OUT TELEGRAM

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5/10/68

Classification and Caveats		Precedence/Deskby
CONFIDENTIAL		IMMEDIATE

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PRE/ADD
TEL NO

1 ZCZC
2 GRS
3 CONFIDENTIAL
4
5
6 FM FCO
7 TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 YOUR TELNO 234
10 1. Please pass following message from the Prime Minister to
11 King Hussein.
12 Begins
13 I should like to thank Your Majesty for the helpful position
14 adopted by Jordan in the Security Council on 4 June, during the
15 debate on the Falkland Islands. The draft resolution before the
16 Council was seriously flawed and, if adopted, would have tied
17 our hands and given the Argentines endless scope for argument *and*
18 *communication* about the conditions on which they ~~would~~ *might* be prepared to
19 withdraw. I was therefore grateful that Jordan took the
20 decision to abstain in the vote.
21 2. I would also like to express my deep concern at the renewed
22 fighting in Southern Lebanon. As our Ambassador at the United
23 Nations has made clear the shooting of Mr Argov was no
24 justification for the Israeli invasion. The fighting will not
25

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
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1 <<<<
2 solve Israel's problems.
3 3. We have given our full support to Security Council
4 Resolutions 508 and 509. We will support Lebanon's sovereignty
5 and territorial integrity. We have also taken advantage of
6 President Reagan's visit here for an urgent discussion of the
7 problem with the Americans. We shall support all efforts to
8 bring the fighting in the Lebanon to an early end and a speedy
9 withdrawal of Israeli forces.

10 ENDS

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12 PYM

13 NNNN



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NNNN ends
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Catchword

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 100800Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 092315Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 971 OF 9 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE BONN (FOR S OF S'S PARTY)

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS,
AMMAN, LAGOS.

INFO JEDDA, BAGHDAD, CAIRO.

NY TELNO 967: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. TUENI TOLD US THAT THE ARABS HAD REACHED NO DECISION TODAY (9 JUNE) ON WHETHER TO PRESS FOR AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION. HE SAID THAT THE LEBANESE CABINET STILL WISHED TO STAND ON SCR 509 FOR THE MOMENT. HE ADDED WRYLY THAT EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSIONS WERE USUALLY POSTHUMOUS AFFAIRS. THE SYRIANS APPARENTLY TOOK THE LEAD WITHIN THE ARAB GROUP IN PRESSING FOR SUCH A SESSION.

2. URQUHART APPEALED TO THE UNIFIL TROOP CONTRIBUTORS THIS AFTERNOON TO CONTINUE TO HOLD FAST. EVERYONE SAID THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS WERE IN AGREEMENT WITH THIS. URQUHART APPEARENTLY ADDED THAT THE OPEN SUGGESTIONS BY THE US OF AN EXPANDED FUTURE ROLE FOR UNIFIL WERE LIKELY TO BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. HE SAID THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD SAID AS MUCH TO BUSH WHEN HE SAW HIM TODAY.

3. URQUHART SAID THAT THE SITUATION IN THE UNIFIL AREA WAS RELATIVELY QUIET EXCEPT THAT ISRAELI ARTILLERY HAD CONTINUED ITS SHELLING FROM THE NORWEGIAN SECTOR DESPITE GENERAL CALLAGHAN'S PROTESTS. THE ISRAELIS HAD SAID THAT THE ARTILLERY POSITIONS WERE STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT TO BLOCK ANY SYRIAN ATTACK. THE ISRAELIS HAD STRICTLY LIMITED UNIFIL'S FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. THEY HAD ALSO OBSTRUCTED THE FORCE'S ATTEMPTS TO PROVIDE MEDICAL AID TO THE POPULATION IN TYRE, STOPPING A UNIFIL EVACUATION OF THE SERIOUSLY WOUNDED FROM THAT CITY. UNIFIL HAD PROTESTED TO THE ISRAELIS ABOUT THIS AND ALSO ABOUT HADDAD'S FORCES HARRASSING THE LOCAL POPULATION IN TYRE. AT ONE POINT, HADDAD HIMSELF HAD ATTEMPTED TO FORCE HIS WAY IN TO THE FRENCH SECTOR OF UNIFIL. HE HAD LEFT IN A RAGE AFTER THE FRENCH BATTALION HAD STOPPED HIM.

4. THE LEBANESE DEFENCE MINISTER HAD TOLD GENERAL CALLAGHAN THAT LEBANON FAVOURED THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF UNIFIL. GENERAL CALLAGHAN HAD BEEN UNABLE TO MEET ARAFAT BUT HAD BEEN TOLD BY PLO OFFICIALS THAT THEY WANTED TO CONTINUE TO CO-OPERATE WITH UNIFIL. TERZI (PLO) HAS APOLOGISED TO THE DUTCH ON BEHALF OF ARAFAT FOR ABDUL RAHMAN'S PUBLIC CRITICISM YESTERDAY OF THE DUTCH BATTALION'S PERFORMANCE.

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5. SINCE THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED, I HAVE DONE A PERSONAL ROUND OF ARAB AND OTHER DELEGATIONS PLUS THE SECRETARIAT. AS THE REPORTS AND RUMOURS POUR IN OF FURTHER ISRAELI ADVANCES, BOMBING RAIDS AS FAR AS THE DAMASCUS SUBURBS, THE WOUNDING OF ARAFAT, THE SURROUNDING OF BEIRUT BY ISRAELI FORCES ETC THE ATMOSPHERE HAS BECOME ONE OF HOPELESS BEWILDERMENT. ONLY THE RUSSIANS HAVE SAID SOMETHING CLEAR, NAMELY THAT THEY COULD NOT CONTEMPLATE THE RENEWAL OF UNIFIL'S MANDATE IN ANYTHING LIKE THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THE SECRETARIAT IS IN COMPLETE DESPAIR - PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD A VERY UNSATISFACTORY CONVERSATION WITH HAIG ON THE TELEPHONE IN LONDON LAST NIGHT - BUT ARE LOYALLY TRYING TO HOLD UNIFIL TOGETHER FOR THE MOMENT. NO ONE HERE BELIEVES FOR A SECOND THAT THERE IS THE REMOTEST POSSIBILITY OF UNIFIL'S MANDATE BEING RENEWED EXCEPT ON TERMS WHICH WOULD BE TREATED WITH CONTEMPT BY THE ISRAELIS IN THEIR PRESENT POSITION.

6. THE ARABS ARE SITTING AROUND IN LITTLE KNOTS ARGUING ABOUT THE MERITS AND DEMERITS OF RECOURSE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. MY SYRIAN COLLEAGUE IS NOW PRESSING HARDER FOR THIS, OR FOR A RETURN TO THE COUNCIL IN THE LIGHT OF ISRAELI ATTACKS ON SYRIAN TERRITORY.

7. MY OMANI COLLEAGUE, WHO IS THE CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE ARAB GROUP HAS TOLD ME GLOOMILY THAT THE GROUP HAD CARTE BLANCHE FROM THE ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS TO CALL FOR A VOTE ON ISRAELI CREDENTIALS AT ANY GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION, IF THEY THOUGHT THAT SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD BE ADOPTED. HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT IT WOULD BE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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FOBONN 069/09

OO BONN DESKBY 091800Z

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CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 091800Z
FROM F C O 091718Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE BONN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 287 OF 9TH JUN.

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPT.
WAS RECEIVED FROM DAMASCUS TELEGRAM NUMBER 148 OF 9 JUN.

CONFIDENTIAL
FROM DAMASCUS 091200Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 148 OF 9 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT AMMAN TEL AVIV WASHINGTON UKMIS NEWYORK
INFO PRIORITY CAIRO JEDDA PARIS
INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS AND OTHER EC POSTS

ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. THERE HAS BEEN A STRIKING ABSENCE OF DIRECT OFFICAL PRONOUNCEMENTS AND OF SENIOR DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS WITH THE SYRIANS. IT LOOKS AS THOUGH THE LATTER ARE CONTINUING TO MAINTAIN THEIR BALANCING ACT BETWEEN CREDIBILITY AND CONFRONTATION BUT ANXIOUS NOT TO ADVERTISE THEIR ANXIETY. MEANWHILE THE ATMOSPHERE IN DAMASCUS REMAINS REMARKABLY CALM.
2. THE MILITARY HAVE, HOWEVER, CONTINUED TO PUT OUT WHAT SEEM TO BE EXAGGERATED ACCOUNTS OF THEIR OPERATIONS AGAINST THE ISRAELIS. THE OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY HAS ADDITIONALLY REPORTED A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN ASAD AND SARKIS ON 8 JUNE IN WHICH THE ISRAELI AIM WAS AGREED TO BE LARGE SCALE TERRITORIAL EXPANSION, AND ASAD CONFIRMED THAT SYRIA "STANDS WITH ALL ITS CAPABILITIES TO DEFEND LEBANON".
3. EC HEADS OF MISSION MET TO REVIEW THE SITUATION THIS MORNING. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE ANALYSIS THAT THE SYRIAN REGIME WOULD DO ITS BEST TO AVOID ESCALATING ISRAELI/SYRIAN HOSTILITIES IN THE INTERESTS OF ITS OWN SURVIVAL, BUT THE LATEST REPORTS OF ISRAELI BOMBING AND SHELLING OF THE BEIRUT - DAMASCUS ROAD REPRESENTED A CRITICAL POINT FOR SYRIAN DECISION-MAKERS.
4. WE AGREED THAT FOR THE MOMENT THERE WAS NO CALL FOR SPECIAL ADVICE TO OUR COMMUNITIES, THOUGH THIS SITUATION COULD CHANGE AND IF IT DID SO, WOULD BE LIKELY TO CHANGE RAPIDLY. MEANWHILE WE ARE ADVISING ENQUIRERS THAT THERE IS NO NEED OT TAKE MORE THAN OBVIOUS BUT LOW-KEY PRECAUTIONS SUCH AS ACQUIRING EXIT VISAS PROVIDED THAT THIS CAN BE DONE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO AVOID THE IMPRESSION THAT A GENERAL EXODUS IS ENVISAGED.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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FOBONN 073/09
OO BONN DESKBY 091800Z

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CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 091800Z
FM FCO 091718Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE BONN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 286 OF 9 JUNE

FOR S OF S PARTY

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPARTMENT
WAS RECEIVED FROM TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO 229 OF 9 JUNE

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY FCO 091500Z
FROM TEL AVIV 091245Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 229 OF 9 JUNE 82
INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BEIRUT,
MODUK, PRIORITY AMMAN AND CAIRO.

MY TELNO 228: ISRAEL/LEBANON/SYRIA

1. HABIB LEFT THIS MORNING FOR SYRIA. MINISTER/COUNSELLOR AT THE US EMBASSY HAS GIVEN US A GUARDED ACCOUNT OF HIS TALKS HERE AND INTENTIONS IN DAMASCUS.
2. BROWN SAID THAT BEGIN'S DESCRIPTION OF THE AIM OF THE CURRENT OPERATION HAD BEEN THE SAME IN PRIVATE AS IN PUBLIC: TO PUSH THE PLO BACK 40 KMS. THE ISRAELIS HAD ALREADY ACHIEVED THEIR AIM EXCEPT AS REGARDS FATAHLAND, WHERE THE PLO WERE ENTRENCHED BEHIND SYRIAN POSITIONS. THE ISRAELIS WERE DETERMINED TO ELIMINATE THE PROBLEM, PREFERABLY BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS BUT BY FORCE IF NECESSARY. THE ISRAELIS HAD DESCRIBED THE BLOCKING FORCES WHICH THEY HAD ESTABLISHED JUST SOUTH OF THE BEIRUT/DAMASCUS ROAD AT ALAYH AND AYN ZHALTA AS BEING FOR PRECAUTIONARY DEFENSIVE PURPOSES. BROWN SUGGESTED THAT, LIKE TALK OF A POSSIBLE LINK UP WITH BASHIR GEMAYEL, THESE MOVES WERE IN FACT MEANT TO PUT THE SQUEEZE ON THE SYRIANS, THOUGH ONE COULD NEVER BE ENTIRELY SURE ABOUT ISRAELI INTENTIONS.
3. BROWN SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSION ABOUT ISRAELI INTENTIONS AFTER THEY HAD COMPLETED MOPPING UP THE PLO, WHICH HE GUESSED WOULD TAKE ANOTHER 48 HOURS. HE SPOKE ELIPTICALLY BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT AN EXTENSION OF UNIFIL NORTHWARDS, ANOTHER MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE OR A WESTERN FORCE WERE AMONG THE POSSIBILITIES THE ISRAELIS HAD IN MIND. BROWN SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS UNDULY PESSIMISTIC TO ASSUME THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD VETO A RENEWAL OF THE UNIFIL MANDATE OR A RESOLUTION CHANGING THE MANDATE IN A WAY UNSATISFACTORY TO THEM: SURELY THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE INFLUENCED BY THE SYRIAN REACTION TO THE POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES. BE THAT AS IT MAY, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT TOLERATE A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE, AND WOULD INSIST THAT ANY FORCE ESTABLISHED SHOULD PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE BUFFER.
4. BROWN SAID THAT THE FIRST AIM OF HABIB IN DAMASCUS, WHERE HE WOULD BE SEEING ASSAD, WAS TO DEAL WITH THE RISK THAT THE PRESENT LOW LEVEL OF CONFLICT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA MIGHT ESCALATE INTO MAJOR EXCHANGES. THE AMERICANS HAD EVIDENCE THAT, FOLLOWING THE MOVE OF THE SYRIAN FIRST ARMoured DIVISION INTO LEBANON, THE THIRD DIVISION WAS NOW PREPARING TO MOVE SOMEWHERE. THERE WERE ALSO INDICATIONS THAT ADDITIONAL SAM 6 MISSILES WERE BEING MOVED INTO LEBANON. HABIB WOULD TRY TO ENSURE THAT THE SITUATION DID NOT GET OUT OF HAND, AND IF POSSIBLE ARRANGE AN EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE.
5. ALTHOUGH BROWN DID NOT SAY SO IN TERMS, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT HABIB WILL TRY TO PERSUADE THE SYRIANS TO DEAL WITH THE PLO ARTILLERY BEHIND THE 12 LINE, WHICH CAN REACH UP TO 20 KMS. BROWN ALSO

5. ALTHOUGH BROWN DID NOT SAY SO IN TERMS, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT HABIB WILL TRY TO PERSUADE THE SYRIANS TO DEAL WITH THE PLO ARTILLERY BEHIND THEIR LINES WHICH CAN REACH UPPER GALILEE. BROWN ALSO HINTED THAT HABIB WOULD BE CONVEYING ASSURANCE THAT THE ISRAELIS DID NOT HAVE DESIGNS ON THE BEKA'A VALLEY.

6. BROWN DID NOT THINK THAT HABIB AT THIS STAGE WOULD BE DISCUSSING WITH THE SYRIANS POSSIBLE LONG TERM SOLUTIONS. HIS AIM WOULD BE MORE TO GET SOME IDEA OF THE BROAD OUTLINE OF WHAT MIGHT BE ACHIEVABLE.

7. MEANWHILE, BROWN THOUGHT THAT BEGIN WAS KEEPING A TIGHT HOLD ON SHARON AND WOULD ENSURE THAT THERE WAS NO "ACCIDENTAL" ESCALATION.

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DATE 08-03-2001 BY 60322

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DESKBY 091800Z
 FM FCO 091718Z JUN 82
 TO IMMEDIATE BONN
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 288 OF 9 JUNE

FOR S OF S PARTY

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPT
 WAS RECEIVED FROM TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO 228 OF 9 JUNE

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM TEL AVIV 091800Z JUN 82
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELNO 228 OF 9 JUNE 1982
 INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BEIRUT,
 DAMASCUS, PRIORITY AMMAN AND CAIRO.

MY TELNO 227: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. THE NEXT 24 HOURS LOOK LIKE BEING CRUCIAL IN DETERMINING THE REAL ISRAELI OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON AND WHETHER ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES ARE GOING TO HIT EACH OTHER SERIOUSLY.
2. WHEN THE COMMUNITY AMBASSADORS MET THE FOREIGN MINISTER YESTERDAY FOR THE USUAL SIX-MONTHLY LUNCH, SHAMIR STONEWALLED HARD. HE INSISTED THAT ISRAEL HAS NO WISH TO OCCUPY LEBANESE TERRITORY INDEFINITELY. ASKED HOW LONG ISRAELI FORCES MIGHT STAY, HE REPLIED SO LONG AS IT TAKES TO WORK OUT NEW POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS. THE SOONER THESE CAN BE AGREED THE BETTER. "WE WILL DO OUR UTMOST NOT TO STAY A DAY MORE THAN IS NECESSARY." BUT HE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN ABOUT THE POSSIBLE OPTIONS FOR AN EVENTUAL SOLUTION OR THE INVOLVEMENT IN IT OF OTHER COUNTRIES.
3. AS REGARDS THE IMMEDIATE SITUATION, SHAMIR WAS EQUALLY RETICENT ABOUT HOW FAR ISRAELI FORCES MIGHT GO BEFORE THEY HALTED. THE AIM WAS TO COMPLETE THE MILITARY OPERATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE REPEATED THE STANDARD FORMULA THAT ISRAEL INTENDED TO PUSH THE PLO BACK 40 KM, WHICH HE SAID MEANT 40 KM FROM THE FRONTIER.
4. ISRAEL HAD NO INTEREST IN WAR WITH SYRIA. IT WAS UP TO THE SYRIANS. WHEN ONE OF MY COLLEAGUES POINTED OUT THAT CLEARING THE PLO BACK 40 KM FROM THE EASTERN END OF THE FRONTIER ABOVE UPPER GALILEE COULD BRING THE ISRAELIS INTO A CLASH WITH SYRIAN FORCES, SHAMIR SAID ONLY THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO FIND A SOLUTION.
5. OTHER POINTS MADE BY SHAMIR WERE:
 - (A) A DISCLAIMER THAT THE ISRAELI ACTION WAS DESIGNED TO CHANGE THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN LEBANON OR TO ENLARGE THE AREA CONTROLLED BY HADDAD'S FORCES. BUT ISRAEL HAD REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR THAT SHE WISHED TO SEE A GENUINELY FREE AND INDEPENDENT LEBANON SEMICOLON
 - (B) THE PLO SHOULD NOT BE LEFT A FREE HAND TO CONDUCT TERRORIST OPERATIONS ELSEWHERE. SO THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD ALSO COVER ATTACKS ON ISRAELI DIPLOMATS ABROAD SEMICOLON
 - (C) A BY-PRODUCT OF WEAKENING THE STRENGTH AND INFLUENCE OF THE PLO WOULD BE TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR ARABS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO PARTICIPATE IN SCHEMES FOR THEIR OWN FUTURE.
6. NEITHER SHAMIR'S BRIEFING NOR BEGIN'S STATEMENT IN THE KNESSET YESTERDAY LEAVE US MUCH WISER. BUT READING BETWEEN THE LINES IT SEEMS INCREASINGLY POSSIBLE THAT ISRAELI OBJECTIVES ARE MORE FAR REACHING THAN STATED AT FIRST. BEGIN HIMSELF SAID YESTERDAY THAT ISRAEL SOUGHT AN AGREEMENT GUARANTEEING THE "ABSOLUTE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY" OF LEBANON. THERE HAVE BEEN PRESS REPORTS

THAT ISRAEL SOUGHT AN AGREEMENT GUARANTEEING THE "ABSOLUTE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY" OF LEBANON. THERE HAVE BEEN PRESS REPORTS THAT THE ISRAELIS INTEND TO CUT THE BEIRUT/DAMASCUS ROAD AND LINK UP WITH THE PHALANGE IN THE NORTH, WITH THE AIM OF CREATING A NEW POLITICAL ORDER IN LEBANON FREE FROM A SYRIAN MILITARY PRESENCE. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN SUGGESTIONS (BY IMPLICATION FROM SHARON) THAT THE SYRIANS WILL SOONER OR LATER GET IN THE WAY OF THE IDF, IN WHICH CASE THERE WOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SETTLE PAST ACCOUNTS AND GET RID OF THE SYRIAN MISSILES IN THE BEKA'A VALLEY. ACCOUNTS OF LABOUR PARTY CRITICISM OF SHARON HAVE BEEN CENSORED. BUT IT SEEMS THAT PERES AND RABIN CALLED ON BEGIN ON THE NIGHT OF 7 JUNE TO SAY THAT THE ALIGNMENT HAD GRAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT SHARON'S VIEWS ON THE FUTURE OF SOUTHERN LEBANON AND TO URGE BEGIN NOT TO ALLOW ISRAEL TO BITE OFF MORE THAN IT CAN CHEW.

7. THE OVERSEAS SECRETARY OF THE LABOUR PARTY TODAY TOLD US THAT THE OPPOSITION HAD SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE SCALE OF THE CURRENT OPERATION, THOUGH THERE WAS LITTLE THEY COULD SAY WHILE FIGHTING CONTINUED. A NATIONAL CONSENSUS EXISTED ONLY ON THE NEED TO REMOVE THE THREAT TO UPPER GALILEE. THE LABOUR PARTY WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED AT THE POSSIBILITY OF A FULL-SCALE CONFRONTATION WITH THE SYRIANS: THE CONTINUING SPORADIC SHELLING OF UPPER GALILEE FROM PALESTINIAN POSITIONS BEHIND SYRIAN LINES WAS WORRYING. PROVIDED THAT COULD BE SORTED OUT, GAT WAS CONFIDENT THAT BEGIN AT LEAST WAS NOT LOOKING FOR TROUBLE WITH SYRIA, THOUGH THE SYRIANS WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE TO CONTINUE TO PUT ON A SHOW OF MILITARY SOLIDARITY WITH THE PLO.

8. AS REGARDS RUMOURS THAT SHARON MIGHT INTEND TO OVERTURN THE APPLE CART COMPLETELY, CLAIMING AS JUSTIFICATION THE MOMENTUM OF EVENTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD, GAT INSISTED THAT THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE COMMITTEE OF THE KNESSET HAD BEEN TOLD OF NO GOVERNMENT PLAN TO CARVE UP LEBANON WITH THE PHALANGE OR PROVOKE A MILITARY SHOWDOWN WITH SYRIA. IT WAS HOWEVER POSSIBLE THAT THE CURRENT OPERATION MIGHT ACT AS A CATALYST TO BENEFICIAL CHANGE IN THE ALIGNMENT OF POLITICAL FORCES AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN LEBANON, AND THE ISRAELIS MIGHT MEAN TO USE COMMAND OF THE BEIRUT DAMASCUS HIGHWAY AS AN ADDITIONAL BARGAINING CARD.

9. AS REGARDS THE FUTURE OF UNIFIL (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 955) YOU WILL RECALL THAT ON 7 JUNE KIMCHE GAVE AN EXTENSION OF UNIFIL NORTHWARDS AS ONE LONG-TERM OPTION: MY TELEGRAM NO 225 REFERS. THIS WAS HOWEVER BY NO MEANS HIS PREFERRED SOLUTION SEMICOLON ON THE CONTRARY, KIMCHE HIMSELF WAS MORE IN FAVOUR OF A THOROUGH-GOING CHANGE IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON FOLLOWED BY EFFECTIVE EXCLUSION OF PLO FORCES FROM THEIR PRESENT AREAS BY THE LEBANESE. THIS COULD HAVE BEEN A GUARDED REFERENCE TO THE MORE RADICAL IDEAS MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 6 ABOVE. I SEE FROM YOUR TELNO 511 TO UKMIS NEW YORK THAT THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELIS ENVISAGE AN ENLARGED BUFFER ZONE, MAINLY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE LEBANESE THEMSELVES, WITH HADDAD PLAYING A LEADING ROLE SEMICOLON BEAUFORT CASTLE WAS HANDED OVER TO HADDAD YESTERDAY. AS I HAVE REPORTED PREVIOUSLY, THE ISRAELIS WOULD TAKE A GREAT DEAL OF PERSUADING BEFORE THEY ALLOWED UNIFIL TO FULFIL ITS PRESENT MANDATE SOUTHWARDS TO THE ISRAELI FRONTIER SEMICOLON AND THEIR CURRENT THINKING SEEMS TO ENVISAGE AN EXPANDED ROLE FOR HADDAD RATHER THAN THE CONTRARY. SEEN FROM HERE HOWEVER HAIG IS RIGHT TO SUGGEST THAT SOME KIND OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE KEEPING FORCE WILL BE NECESSARY FOR SOME TIME. THE ISRAELIS MAY HAVE TO SETTLE FOR ARRANGEMENTS A GOOD DEAL LESS AMBITIOUS THAN THEIR OPENING POSITION AND IT WOULD IN MY VIEW BE A MISTAKE TO REMOVE AN IMPORTANT OPTION IF THE UNIFIL MANDATE WAS ALLOWED TO LAPSE LATER THIS MONTH.

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FM FCO 091738Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE BONN (FOR S OF S PARTY)

TELNO 290 OF 9 JUN

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPT
WAS RECEIVED FROM TEL AVIV TELNO 230 OF 9 JUN

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, PRIORITY DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
MODUK, AMMAN AND CAIRO.

BEIRUT TELNO 259: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT THE ISRAELIS INTEND TO OCCUPY BEIRUT. NOR HAVE THE AMERICANS. THEY AND OTHERS TO WHOM WE HAVE SPOKEN SUGGEST THAT THE IDF IS MOST UNLIKELY TO MOVE AGAINST BEIRUT ITSELF. THE RESOURCES REQUIRED TO DO THE JOB WOULD LEAVE THEM SERIOUSLY OVER-STRETCHED AND THEY WOULD BE BOUND TO TAKE HEAVY CASUALTIES IN STREET FIGHTING ON SUCH A LARGE SCALE. NOR IS THERE ANY COMPELLING MILITARY REASON TO INVEST BEIRUT. THIS WOULD NOT HOWEVER EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF ACTION AGAINST INDIVIDUAL TARGETS BY SPECIAL FORCES. SEE ALSO PARAGRAPH 6 OF MY TELNO 228.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 091525Z JUN 82

TO F L A S H FCO

AND TO F L A S H BONN (FOR S OF S'S PARTY)

TELEGRAM NUMBER 967 OF 9 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, CAIRO.

MY TELNO 965: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. THE FOLLOWING MAY BE OUT OF DATE BY THE TIME IT ARRIVES, BUT I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO PUT DOWN SOME THOUGHTS IN ADVANCE OF THE BONN MINISTERIAL MEETING.
2. THE ODDS ARE STILL IN FAVOUR OF COLLECTIVE ARAB MOMENTUM CARRYING US INTO AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IF SO, THE MODERATES WILL LOSE CONTROL AND WE ARE LIKELY TO BE FACED WITH CALLS FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL, DENUNCIATIONS OF THE US AND AN ATTEMPT TO UNSEAT THE ISRAELI DELEGATION. THE PRESSURE OF AN ASSEMBLY SESSION WILL ALSO PROBABLY BREAK THE NERVE OF THE THIRD WORLD TROOP CONTRIBUTORS TO UNIFIL. I AM THINKING PARTICULARLY OF NIGERIA AND SENEGAL. IF THEY PULL OUT, THE REST ARE LIKELY TO FOLLOW AND THE FORCE WILL COLLAPSE.
3. HOWEVER, ON THE OTHER SIDE, THERE ARE SOME INTERESTING FEATURES. THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN PRODDING THE ARABS FROM BEHIND BUT HAVE NOT ADOPTED A LEADING ROLE. THE SYRIACS ARE KEEPING A VERY LOW PROFILE. THEY DID NOT EVEN ASK TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATES. NOR DID THE OTHER REJECTIONISTS SUCH AS LIBYA, ALGERIA AND IRAQ. TUENI (LEBANON) WAS ALLOWED A REMARKABLY FREE HAND, CONSIDERING THAT THE ISRAELI INVASION HAS CREATED A PAN-ARAB PROBLEM. HE IS DEMONSTRABLY ANXIOUS FOR NOTHING TO HAPPEN IN THE UN WHICH WILL TOTALLY ALIENATE THE UNITED STATES. HE SAID TO ME LAST NIGHT THAT THE SITUATION WAS TOO SERIOUS FOR THE USUAL FLOOD OF ARAB RHETORIC AND UNACCEPTABLE GA RESOLUTIONS: IT WAS NOT THE WEST BANK.
4. ALL THIS MAY RAPIDLY CHANGE FOR THE WORSE. THE ARABS ARE MEETING THIS MORNING AND MAY WELL GET CARRIED AWAY. EQUALLY, IF IT IS TRUE THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE BOMBED THE SYRIAN MISSILE SITES IN THE BEKAA VALLEY AND THAT MAJOR SYRIAN/ISRAELI GROUND ENGAGEMENTS ARE IMMINENT, I CANNOT SEE HOW THE BALLOON CAN FAIL TO GO UP HERE.

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DESKBY 100600Z

FM FCO 091630Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM NUMBER 187 OF 9 JUNE,

INFO IMMEDIATE BONN (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY) BEIRUT,
DAMASCUS, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, PRIORITY OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.
ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. BIRAN (MINISTER AT ISRAELI EMBASSY) TELEPHONED SIR J LEAHY EARLY ON 9 JUNE ON INSTRUCTIONS. HE SAID THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HOPED THAT ANY EUROPEAN STATEMENT ON THE CRISIS WOULD BE ABLE TO INCLUDE SOME ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ISRAEL'S POSITION THAT SHE WAS ACTING IN SELF-DEFENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER. FAILING THAT THEY HOPED WE WOULD AT LEAST CONDEMN THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO ISRAELI ACTION EG. SHOOTING OF ARGOV AND ACCUMULATION OF PLO ATTACKS ON ISRAEL. IN VIEW OF OUR ACTION IN THE FALKLANDS THEY EXPECTED SPECIAL UNDERSTANDING FROM US.
2. LEAHY LATER SUMMONED BIRAN TO TELL HIM ALSO ON INSTRUCTIONS, THAT BRITISH GOVERNMENT SAW GREAT DANGER IN THE PRESENT SITUATION AND PARTICULARLY IN ISRAEL'S UNWILLINGNESS TO COMPLY WITH SCR'S 508 AND 509. WE UNDERSTOOD ISRAEL'S INTENTION WAS TO AVOID CLASHES WITH SYRIAN FORCES: WE ALSO UNDERSTOOD THIS TO BE SYRIA'S WISH. BUT ISRAELI FORCES WERE NOW FAR BEYOND THE 40KM LINE THEY HAD ORIGINALLY SPOKEN OF AND SEEMED POISED TO CUT THE BEIRUT/DAMASCUS ROAD. WE ALSO UNDERSTOOD ISRAELI FORCES TO BE VERY CLOSE TO BEIRUT. WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE 1200 OR SO BRITISH CITIZENS THERE. WE THEREFORE WISHED TO KNOW WHAT ISRAELI OBJECTIVES WERE AND TO ASK THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO RECONSIDER THEIR ACTION AND DRAW BACK.
3. BIRAN UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY THIS MESSAGE TO HIS GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT THE ISRAELI POSITION WAS QUITE CLEAR. THE OPERATION IN LEBANON WAS DESIGNED TO ERADICATE THE PLO THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF ISRAELI CITIZENS, ESPECIALLY THOSE IN GALLILEE, BUT ALSO TO DEAL WITH THE PLO BASES FROM WHICH ATTACKS BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE ISRAEL WERE LAUNCHED. BIRAN REPEATED THAT ISRAEL HAD A RIGHT AND A DUTY TO ACT IN SELF-DEFENCE, CLAIMING THAT ISRAEL HAD EXERCISED RESTRAINT OBSERVING THE CEASEFIRE DESPITE NUMEROUS PLO BREACHES OF IT. AS BEGIN HAD MADE CLEAR TO PRESIDENT ASSAD ISRAEL HAD NO INTEREST IN A CONFRONTATION WITH THE SYRIANS. NOR WAS SHE INTERESTED IN ACQUIRING LEBANESE TERRITORY. ISRAEL SUPPORTED LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. SHE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A NEW REUNIFICATION OF LEBANON AND A RETURN TO HER FORMER RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL WHICH HAD BEEN A PEACEFUL ONE BEFORE PLO'S INTERVENTION. WHILE REFUSING TO COMMENT ON ISRAEL'S MILITARY OBJECTIVES, BIRAN SAID THAT IN HIS PERSONAL VIEW ISRAEL WOULD ONLY BE INTERESTED IN A PERMANENT ARRANGEMENT WHICH ENSURED THAT ISRAELI CITIZENS WERE NO LONGER SUBJECT TO PLO ATTACKS.
4. LEAHY SAID THAT THE SCALE OF ISRAEL'S ACTION COULD NOT BE JUSTIFIED. OUR UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT BETWEEN JULY 81 AND MAY 82 THE PLO HAD NOT (NOT) LAUNCHED ANY ROCKET OR ARTILLERY ATTACKS ACROSS THE ISRAEL/LEBANON BORDER (BIRAN DID NOT CONTEST THIS). ISRAEL WOULD KNOW THAT WE REGRETTED AS MUCH AS ANYBODY THE ATTACK ON ARGOV BUT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS AS JUSTIFICATION FOR ISRAELI ACTION EITHER. IN ANY CASE ISRAEL HAD SURELY ACHIEVED HER MILITARY OBJECTIVES BY THIS TIME - UNLESS THERE WAS IN FACT A MORE FAR-REACHING PLAN, AS SOME PEOPLE WERE NOW SPECULATING. FURTHER ISRAELI ACTION COULD HAVE UNTOLD

HAD SURELY ACHIEVED HER MILITARY OBJECTIVES BY THIS TIME. THERE WAS IN FACT A MORE FAR-REACHING PLAN, AS SOME PEOPLE WERE NOW SPECULATING. FURTHER ISRAELI ACTION COULD HAVE UNTOLD CONSEQUENCES. LEAHY ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT WE REJECTED ISRAEL'S INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 51 AND THE PARALLEL DRAWN WITH BRITISH ACTION IN THE FALKLANDS. THE ARGENTINIANS HAD INVADDED BRITISH TERRITORY. THEY HAD THEN REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH A MANDATORY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL. THE SITUATION IN LEBANON WAS QUITE DIFFERENT.

4. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL SAY THAT WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT OUR DEEP CONCERN AT THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AND OUR HOPE THAT ISRAEL WILL COMPLY WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS CALLING FOR HER WITHDRAWAL.

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8. GENERAL SECRETARY...
...IN THE CASE OF THE...
...SITUATION IN LEBANON...
...THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT...
...THE SECURITY COUNCIL...
...THE PARALLEL DRAWN...
...THE ARGENTINIANS...
...THE MANDATORY SECURITY...
...THE WITHDRAWAL...
...THE DIFFERENT...
...THE NEWS DEPARTMENT...
...THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT...
...THE DEEP CONCERN...
...THE HOPE THAT ISRAEL...
...THE SECURITY COUNCIL...
...THE WITHDRAWAL...

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FM FCO 091630Z JUN 1982

TO FLASH BEIRUT

TELEGRAM NUMBER 193 OF 9 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, MODUK

PRIORITY AMMAN, ANKARA, UKMIS NEW YORK

SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

YOUR TELNOS 259 AND 260: LEBANON/ISRAEL.

1. WE ENDORSE THE ACTION YOU HAVE ALREADY TAKEN TO ADVISE BRITISH SUBJECTS RESIDENT IN WEST BEIRUT TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY MOVING TEMPORARILY TO EAST BEIRUT.
2. SO FAR AS THE EMBASSY IS CONCERNED YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO MAKE DISPOSITIONS ON THE LINES INDICATED IN YOUR TELNO 259 IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR JUDGMENT OF THE EVOLVING SITUATION. THOUGH WE ARE AWARE OF THE RISK THAT THE EMBASSY MIGHT BE OCCUPIED BY REFUGEES OR MILITIA GROUPS IF YOU LOCK UP AND LEAVE FOR EAST BEIRUT, YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO TAKE THIS STEP AT ANY TIME YOU BELIEVE THAT THE SAFETY OF THE STAFF OR THE MAINTENANCE OF CONTACT WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT REQUIRES THIS PROVIDED THAT YOU ENSURE THAT COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND REMAINING CLASSIFIED PAPERS ARE DESTROYED FIRST.
3. OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL, WE SHOULD PREFER ON SECURITY GROUNDS THAT IF YOU FIND IT NECESSARY TO MOVE TO EAST BEIRUT, YOU SHOULD NOT LEAVE A PART OF THE EMBASSY STAFF BEHIND IN WEST BEIRUT, THOUGH HERE AGAIN THE FINAL DISCRETION IS LEFT WITH YOU.
4. IF IT SHOULD COME TO A WIDER EVACUATION OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY FROM THE COUNTRY, IT LOOKS AS THOUGH EVACUATION FROM JOUNIEH IS LIKELY TO BE THE MOST PRACTICABLE ALTERNATIVE, THOUGH WE SHOULD WELCOME YOUR COMMENTS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF USING THE AIRFIELD AT KHLAYAT IN THE NORTH. THE NEAREST NAVAL SHIP IS AT PRESENT FOUR DAYS STEAMING FROM BEIRUT BUT MOD ARE LOOKING INTO THE POSSIBILITY OF BRINGING THIS VESSEL, A LEANDER CLASS FRIGATE, INTO THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. A FRIGATE COULD LIFT ABOUT 200 PEOPLE, AND THE ROUND TRIP TO CYPRUS WOULD BE ROUGHLY 24 HOURS. IF KHLAYAT COULD BE USED AN RAF HGERCULES COULD

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BE MADE AVAILABLE MORE QUICKLY AND MIGHT LIFT 600 OR SO PEOPLE WITHIN 24 HOURS FLYING TIME. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ESTIMATE OF THE SIZE OF THE REMAINING BRITISH COMMUNITY, THOUGH WE ASSUME THAT MANY OF THESE WOULD HAVE COMMITMENTS WHICH WOULD MAKE THEM LOATH TO LEAVE.

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FROM TEL AVIV 091255Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 230 OF 9 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, PRIORITY DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
MODUK, ANNAN AND CAIRO.

BEIRUT TELNO 259: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT THE ISRAELIS INTEND TO OCCUPY BEIRUT. NOR HAVE THE AMERICANS. THEY AND OTHERS TO WHOME WE HAVE SPOKEN SUGGEST THAT THE IDF IS MOST UNLIKELY TO MOVE AGAINST BEIRUT ITSELF. THE RESOURCES REQUIRED TO DO THE JOB WOULD LEAVE THEM SERIOUSLY OVER-STRETCHED AND THEY WOULD BE BOUND TO TAKE HEAVY CASUALTIES IN STREET FIGHTING ON SUCH A LARGE SCALE. NOR IS THERE ANY COMPELLING MILITARY REASON TO INVEST BEIRUT. THIS WOULD NOT HOWEVER EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF ACTION AGAINST INDIVIDUAL TARGETS BY SPECIAL FORCES. SEE ALSO PARAGRAPH 6 OF MY TELNO 228.

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FM JEDDA 091050Z JUN 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 249 OF 09 JUN

INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV,
DAMASCUS, AMMAN, BRUSSELS, CAIRO, BAGHDAD, PARIS

FCO TELNO 511 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. THE IMPLICATIONS OF HAIG'S REMARKS ARE VERY GRAVE. THOUGH
WE OURSELVES MAY BE WILLING TO ACCEPT THAT THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE
ARTSES FROM AN UNWILLINGNESS, FOR DOMESTIC REASONS, TO APPLY

REAL PRESSURE TO ISRAEL, IT WILL BE TAKEN BY THE ARABS, NOT
WITHOUT REASON, AS A JUSTIFICATION OF THEIR WILDEST CHARGES OF
CONNIVANCE. WHO CAN SAY WHAT WAY EVEN THE MOST MODERATE ARABS,
INCLUDING THE SAUDIS, WILL THEN JUMP.

2. I REALISE THAT WE ARE UNDER A HEAVY OBLIGATION TO THE AMERI-
CANS BECAUSE OF THE FALKLANDS. BUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF A BRITISH
ASSOCIATION WITH HAIG'S PRESENT LINE ARE LIKELY TO BE SEVERELY
DAMAGING TO OUR INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

CRAIG

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OO UKMIS NEW YORK DESKBY 081515Z
OO WASHINGTON

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DESKBY 081515Z

FM FCO 081325Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 511 OF 8 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, BRUSSELS
PRIORITY CAIRO, BAGHDAD, PARIS, JEDDA.

ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. I HAD HALF AN HOUR'S DISCUSSION OF THIS WITH HAIG THIS MORNING. HE EXPLAINED WHAT HE UNDERSTOOD WERE BEGIN'S INTENTIONS: TO ACHIEVE RAPID MILITARY CONTROL OF SOUTHERN LEBANON UP TO A ROUGH LINE 40 KM NORTH OF THE ISRAELI BORDER, AND TO DESTROY PALESTINIAN UNITS AND EQUIPMENT WITHIN THAT AREA. ON 7 JUNE THE ISRAELIS THOUGHT THEY WOULD ACHIEVE THEIR MILITARY OBJECTIVES WITHIN 48 HOURS, GIVEN NO SYRIAN INTERVENTION. AS FOR THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE ISRAELIS MIGHT WITHDRAW, THE AMERICANS WERE AWAITING THE RESULT OF A FURTHER CONVERSATION BETWEEN HABIB AND BEGIN THIS EVENING (8 JUNE). IT APPEARED THAT THE ISRAELIS ENVISAGED AN ENLARGED BUFFER ZONE, MAINLY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE LEBANESE THEMSELVES, WITH HADDAD PLAYING A LEADING ROLE (CF PARA 5 (IV) OF TEL AVIV TELNO 225 - NOT TO ALL). UNTIL THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS STRONG ENOUGH TO TAKE ON SUCH A RESPONSIBILITY ON ITS OWN, SOME KIND OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING FORCE WOULD CLEARLY BE NECESSARY.
2. HAIG SAID THAT THE US REALISED THE DIFFICULTIES IN SUCH A PROPOSAL, BUT HE DID NOT BELIEVE ANY OTHER SOLUTION WOULD WORK. A FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN LEBANON WAS NECESSARY, PREFERABLY ONE WHICH ALSO SAW THE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD SO FAR REACTED STRONGLY AGAINST THE INVASION, BUT THEY MIGHT COME TO SEE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A LONG TERM SOLUTION ALONG THESE LINES. THE US WOULD NOT WISH TO BE DRAWN INTO PARTICIPATING IN OR ARRANGING A NON-UN SPONSORED

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MULTILATERAL PEACE-KEEPING FORCE, UNLESS A PERMANENT SOLUTION WAS CLEARLY IN SIGHT. A US GUARANTEE OF ISRAELI SECURITY WAS THE AMERICANS' LAST TRUMP CARD WITH THE ISRAELIS AND HE DID NOT WISH TO EXPEND IT ON WHAT MIGHT BE AN UNSATISFACTORY INTERIM SOLUTION OF THE LEBANON PROBLEM. THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE WAS THEREFORE TO CREATE A SEPARATE ROLE IN THE SOUTH FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND TO HELP THEM GRADUALLY STRENGTHEN THEIR FORCES TO TAKE IT ON.

3. HAIG MADE IT CLEAR THAT IN THE SHORT TERM THE AMERICANS WERE NOT PREPARED TO PUT FIRM PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW. HE WISHED TO PRESERVE THE POSSIBILITY OF FLEXIBILITY FROM MR BEGIN AND TO AVOID GETTING THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS WRONG.

4. ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGHT AN ARRANGEMENT POSSIBLE WHEREBY UNIFIL EXPANDED ITS OPERATIONS NORTHWARDS ON CONDITION THAT IT ALSO COVERED HADDAD'S ZONE TO THE SOUTH, HAIG SAID HE BELIEVED BEGIN, WHO WAS EMOTIONALLY COMMITTED TO HADDAD, WOULD NOT ALLOW IT. NONETHELESS HE THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL THAT CONTRIBUTORS TO UNIFIL SHOULD NOT WITHDRAW THEIR UNITS: A CONTINUED INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE WAS ESSENTIAL.

5. IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE WIDER ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM, HAIG EXPLAINED WHY THE AMERICANS WERE COMMITTED TO PRESSING ON WITH THE AUTONOMY TALKS. IT WAS THE ONLY WAY TO RESTRAIN THE ISRAELIS FROM FURTHER AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS AND TO OBTAIN A HALT TO ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS. HE HAD HIMSELF TOLD THE ISRAELIS IN DEFINITE TERMS LAST WINTER THAT SETTLEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO STOP. HE ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WERE REAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE TALKS, PRIMARILY OVER THE QUESTION OF A PALESTINIAN FRANCHISE AS WELL AS SETTLEMENTS. MR HURD ASKED WHETHER THE AMERICANS WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT ABOUT SETTLEMENTS: THIS WOULD HAVE A REASSURING EFFECT THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. HAIG SAID THAT FOR THE PRESENT THE US WOULD AVOID HARSH VALUE JUDGEMENTS THAT WOULD MAKE THE ISRAELIS EVEN MORE INTRACTABLE. THE ISRAELIS COULD SURVIVE MILITARILY FOR SIX MONTHS WITHOUT US SUPPORT: THIS, TOGETHER WITH DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS, LIMITED AMERICAN LEVERAGE.

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6. PRELIMINARY COMMENT. THE AMERICANS CLEARLY WISH TO EXPLORE ISRAELI THINKING FURTHER. NONETHELESS THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO PRESS ISRAEL TO ACCEPT A COMPROMISE OVER THE HADDAD ENCLAVE, TO ENABLE AN EXPANSION OF UNIFIL'S AREA BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH (CF PARA 6 OF YOUR TELNO 955), IS DISCOURAGING. TO HOPE FOR A TRANSFORMATION IN THE CAPACITY OF THE CENTRAL LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO CONTROL THE SOUTH IS A LONG SHOT INDEED, AND DOES NOT SEEM TO TAKE SUFFICIENTLY INTO ACCOUNT EITHER THE SYRIAN (AND SOVIET) POSITION OR THE INCREASED DIFFICULTIES NOW FACING THE LEBANESE ELECTIONS. BUT NO ALTERNATIVE PROSPECT LOOKS ANY BRIGHTER. DISCUSSIONS WITH THE AMERICANS WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TOMORROW. MEANWHILE IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO AVOID ANY PRECIPITATE ACTION AT THE UN, EG THAT LEADS TO WITHDRAWAL OF PRESENT UNIFIL CONTINGENTS.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 081625Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 959 OF 8 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, WASHINGTON,
MODUK,

INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, BAGHDAD, PARIS, JEDDA.

mt

MY TELNO 955: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. ON THE MORNING OF 8 JUNE THE SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTED A REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL RELATING TO SCR 509 (DOCUMENT S/15178 OF 7 JUNE) WHICH CONTAINED THE REPLIES OF LEBANON, THE PLO AND ISRAEL TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

LEBANON

2. THE LEBANESE REPLY, RECEIVED AT 072330Z, STATES THAT:
"WE CONSIDER THAT ISRAEL HAS VIOLATED THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT OF 1949, WHILE WE CONTINUE TO REITERATE OUR ADHERENCE TO THIS AGREEMENT, ISRAEL HAS CONTINUED ITS AGGRESSIVE ACTS AGAINST LEBANON, AGAINST LEBANESE TERRITORY, LEBANESE CITIES AND VILLAGES, AND LEBANESE CIVILIANS.
DESPITE THE PRESENT ISRAELI AGGRESSION, LEBANON HAS NOT BECOME A PARTY TO THE HOSTILITIES THAT HAVE ENSUED.
WHILE MY GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE PREFERRED A RESOLUTION CLEARLY

WHILE MY GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE PREFERRED A RESOLUTION CLEARLY BASED ON THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, CALLING ON ISRAEL TO ABIDE BY IT, WE CANNOT BUT WELCOME RESOLUTION 509 (1982) IN ITS PRESENT FORM AND THE CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE WHICH IT REITERATES, THOUGH WE HAVE NOT BECOME A PARTY TO THE HOSTILITIES, BUT MERELY VICTIMS OF AGGRESSION''.

3. THE REPLY CONCLUDES BY PLEDGING THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S FULL SUPPORT FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S EFFORTS TO RESTORE PEACE AND SECURITY; REGRETTING THAT SCR 509 DID NOT PROVIDE FOR STRONGER MEANS OF IMPLEMENTATION (''WE TRUST THAT SUCH MEANS WILL BE EXAMINED BY THE COUNCIL AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME''); AND HOPING THAT IN THE LIGHT OF PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE RESOLUTION, THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL BE ABLE TO ENSURE THE FULL, IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON.

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4. YASSER ARAFAT'S MESSAGE, RECEIVED AT 080010Z, STATES: ''IN ITS MEETING AT 22 HOURS BEIRUT TIME TODAY, THE LEBANESE PALESTINIAN JOINT COMMAND HAS DECIDED TO AGREE TO THE CONTENTS OF YOUR MESSAGE RELEVANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 509 (1982).''

ISRAEL

5. THE ISRAELI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE'S LETTER, RECEIVED AT 080130Z, STATES:

''1. THE ''PEACE OF GALILEE'' OPERATION WAS ORDERED BECAUSE OF THE INTOLERABLE SITUATION CREATED BY THE PRESENCE IN LEBANON OF A LARGE NUMBER OF TERRORISTS OPERATING FROM THE COUNTRY, EQUIPPED WITH MODERN, LONG-RANGE WEAPONRY, THREATENING THE LIVES OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF GALILEE.

2. ANY WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL MILITARY FORCES PRIOR TO THE CONCLUSION OF CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD PERMANENTLY AND RELIABLY PRECLUDE HOSTILE ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL'S CITIZENS IS INCONCEIVABLE.

3. THE INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF DEFENCE IS ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGN STATES. ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER REAFFIRMS THE RIGHT OF SELF DEFENCE OF ALL MEMBER STATES.

4. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL REITERATES ITS STATEMENT PUBLISHED ON 6 JUNE 1982 THAT ''ISRAEL CONTINUES TO ASPIRE TO THE SIGNING OF A PEACE TREATY WITH INDEPENDENT LEBANON, ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY PRESERVED.'''

MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND US SECRETARY OF
STATE HAIG: 1045 AM 8 JUNE 1982: ISRAEL/LEBANON

Present:

Secretary of State
Rt Hon Douglas Hurd MP
Sir Anthony Acland
Sir Nicholas Henderson
Mr J L Bullard
Sir John Leahy
Mr J C Moberly
Mr B J P Fall
Mr J Q Greenstock

Secretary Haig
Ambassador John J Louis Jnr
Mr J Rentschler
Mr R Burt
Mr E Streater (US Embassy)
Ambassador W Cluverius

1. The Secretary of State asked for Mr Haig's view of recent developments. Mr Haig said the situation was serious. Mr Habib had been despatched at once with a message to Mr Begin and had had a far-ranging, free-wheeling discussion with him. Mr Begin had already explained Israeli reasons for taking action in a message to the President: they intended to clear out a 40km belt and eliminate the threat to Galilee posed by the PLO. It was clear that the Israelis had invaded in greater strength than in 1978. The operation had been undertaken in the face of massive American pressure against such action. The Americans knew the ceasefire had been tenuous and that any provocation might trigger an invasion: so they had not been surprised. The Israelis had indicated that they wished to withdraw rapidly; they calculated on 7 June that they would achieve their military objectives within 48 hours, provided the Syrians did not intervene. The difficulty lay in the conditions under which they would be willing to withdraw. Mr Habib would be discussing this further with Mr Begin that evening. The Egyptian reaction had been strong, but the Americans noted that Mubarak had renewed his commitment to peace with Israel at the same time. Syrian involvement was clearly a potential danger: there had been some Syrian/Israeli clashes, but on a limited scale. The Americans had told Damascus that the Israelis wished to avoid contact with the Syrians.

2. Mr Haig believed that the Israelis would have discussed with Haddad possible arrangements for the next phase, along the lines of an all-Lebanese force holding back what remained of the PLO to the north of the buffer zone. They would probably wish a peace-

keeping force to provide reinforcement in the zone, as no purely Lebanese force was yet capable of doing it alone. The Americans themselves would be very wary of joining in such an arrangement: if they did the Russians would insist on participating also. What was needed was a fundamental structural change in Lebanon, for which international involvement would be necessary. It would also help if at least a start could be made to Syrian withdrawal. It was possible that the Lebanese, who had so far tended to over-react, might come to sense an opportunity here for a long term solution.

3. Mr Haig said the US Administration was going to be faced with difficult choices at home. Some kind of retaliation against the Israelis for their action would be expected, but they would have to be careful not to get the strategic implications wrong. He did not wish to jump in and kill a fly with a hammer: the first priority was to extract as much flexibility out of Begin as possible. The Secretary of State said there was not much sign of that. Mr Haig said Begin had showed more flexibility yesterday than expected. It was Sharon who was the hawk. He asked whether the UK had any ideas on the next steps.

4. The Secretary of State asked whether it was conceivable that Israel would withdraw soon. Had they yet reached their 40km line? Ambassador Cluverius said they had done so on two out of their three axes. They would wish to guarantee that Palestinian artillery could not move south again. Sir John Leahy said that the Israeli MFA had indicated to our Ambassador that there were four possible alternatives after withdrawal:

- an extension of the UNIFIL area northwards;
- a MFO-type force to take over from the Arab Deterrent Force;
- a peacekeeping force composed of only one or two Western countries;
- or a thoroughgoing change in the central Lebanese Government enabling the Lebanese to exclude the PLO force from their present area.

A permanent Israeli presence was apparently not a serious option, although Israeli forces might have to stay in the short term. The Israelis had made it clear that they were not prepared to remove

Haddad. Mr Hurd said that this was not a package which the Security Council would like. He asked whether the Americans saw a prospect of a non-UN force. Mr Haig saw difficulties with a non-UN multilateral force, as the Israelis would clearly insist on US participation. The US could not go along with this unless a long-term solution was in sight. A US guarantee was the last trump card they had to get Begin to do the reasonable thing. They had to keep it in reserve for the peace process as a whole. They would otherwise land up with an unsatisfactory interim arrangement, having played their card. He thought we would all agree that the strengthening of the Lebanese government and the removal of the Syrians was a common interest. Sir Anthony Acland asked whether the Israelis saw Haddad as their preferred choice to control the buffer zone. Mr Haig said that Haddad alone was not strong enough. Ambassador Cluverius said that Haddad was Begin's first choice - he was emotionally committed to him. But he had neither the political nor the military muscle. A multilateral force was essential. Mr Haig said that the most important thing to construct out of this was a separate Lebanese role. We should aim quietly to build up Lebanese armed forces until they were capable in their own right of taking over. Meanwhile outside forces must stay. Certainly contributors to UNIFIL should not withdraw their units.

5. Mr Hurd said the Security Council might agree to expand UNIFIL's present area, but only if they took over Haddad's enclave as well as the area to the north. Was this conceivable? Mr Haig said he doubted whether Begin would agree, having publicly handed over control of Beaufort to Haddad. Sir John Leahy said Begin's strong commitment to Haddad had been clear during Lord Carrington's visit to Israel. Mr Haig said we would have to build on that in some way, although Haddad was anathema to the other Lebanese. Sir Nicholas Henderson asked about Russian reactions. Mr Haig said they had so far been very cautious. They recognised that this area was a US-Israeli condominium. Mr Moberly said that we might have to work at reintegrating Haddad with the Lebanese Government. Ambassador Cluverius said that the Lebanese might accept him back, if there was a benefit for the Lebanese Government in extending their authority in the south. Mr Haig said that he knew no other way to proceed. For the US to cut off support for Israel would be traumatic domestically.

6. The Secretary of State asked how the US now intended to approach the wider Palestinian problem. Mr Haig explained why the Americans had not been able to concentrate on the autonomy talks throughout last winter: events and the lead-up to the final withdrawal from Sinai had precluded it. They now intended to drive hard for results in the talks, as this was the only way to obtain a veto on Israeli settlements and to stop Israeli attacks in Arab territory. He himself had made it absolutely clear to the Israelis last winter - he had confronted Sharon directly on this - that the settlements would have to stop. The other main problem in the talks was the question of a Palestinian franchise. The Egyptians were adamant that the Palestinians must have a say in their own future. He believed the Israelis knew the US would now be pushing hard on autonomy and they may have decided to take preemptive action. Ambassador Cluverius agreed that the Israelis had been anticipating difficulties over the next few months and probably wished to avoid facing the choices which real autonomy would require. They knew the Egyptians would never agree to the Israeli interpretation of autonomy.

7. The Secretary of State asked whether Israel's attitude might change after Begin. Mr Haig said he thought the present mood was a reflection of the change in the whole body politic in Israel. Jews of eastern origin were now more militant, while many of those of East European origin had left. The leadership of the Labour party was not what it was. In a sense the Israelis might be more flexible, because they were probably no more willing to compromise. Mr Hurd asked whether the Americans would be willing to express publicly their opposition to Israeli settlements. It would be reassuring elsewhere in the Middle East. Mr Haig said that, for the present, he wished to avoid harsh value judgements which would make the Israelis more intractable. Begin was now strong enough militarily to last for six months without US support. If the US cut off aid entirely, Begin would take off. No likely combination of Arab states could stop him. The Administration could attempt to stand up to him, but the result would be a Democratic Administration in Washington in 1984.

Distribution:

PS
PS/Mr Hurd
PS/Lord Belstead
PS/PUS
Mr Bullard
Sir J Leahy
Mr Wright
Mr Moberly
Mr Goodison
Mr Gillmore
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MED
Defence Dept
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PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR MOBERLY

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DESKBY 081330Z FCO AND BRUSSELS)

FROM TEL AVIV 081115Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 227 OF 08 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR MILES), MODUK, PRIORITY
WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN AND CAIRO.

MY TELNO 224: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. HABIB SAW BEGIN, SHAMIR AND SHARON LAST NIGHT ON THEIR RETURN FROM THE NORTH. ACCORDING TO THE PRESS HE WAS NOT BEST PLEASED AT HAVING HAD TO TWIDDLE HIS THIMBS IN JERUSALEM ALL DAY. HE IS DUE TO HAVE A FURTHER MEETING WITH ISRAELI MINISTERS THIS EVENING. US EMBASSY EXPECT HIM TO STAY ON FOR A WHILE, SUBJECT TO FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

2. POLITICAL COUNSELLOR AT US EMBASSY HAS TOLD US THAT THERE HAS SO FAR BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF WHAT POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT FOLLOW PRESENT OPERATION IN LEBANON WHICH THE ISRAELIS WERE

HAS SO FAR BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF WHAT POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT FOLLOW PRESENT OPERATION IN LEBANON, WHICH THE ISRAELIS WERE CLEARLY DETERMINED TO COMPLETE. BEGIN HAD DECLINED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH HABIB UNTIL HE HAD CONSULTED THE CABINET. ACCORDING TO HARE, ISRAELIS WERE NOW TALKING OF PUSHING THE PLO BACK 43 KMS AND HAD TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT THEY BELIEVED PLO HAD 180 MM ARTILLERY IN SIDON WITH A RANGE OF 42.8 KMS. HARE SUGGESTED THAT WHAT IDF DID AFTER TAKING DAMUR WOULD BE A KEY INDICATOR OF ISRAELI INTENTIONS. IF THEY FELL BACK TO AWWALI RIVER, THIS WOULD TEND TO CONFIRM THAT OPERATION WAS LIMITED IN NATURE.

3. SO FAR ISRAELI CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN SURPRISINGLY LIGHT, 25 DEAD, 7 MISSING AND UNDER 100 WOUNDED. ISRAELIS CLAIM TO HAVE LANDED AT SIDON AND TAKEN BEAUFORT CASTLE WITHOUT CASUALTIES, WHICH SEEM TO HAVE BEEN INCURRED MAINLY IN ASSAULTS ON TYRE AND NABATIYAH.

4. IDF HAVE BEEN CAREFUL TO AVOID SYRIAN POSITIONS. THE CHIEF OF STAFF TOLD REPORTERS THAT THEY HAD NOT GONE ANYWHERE WHERE THERE WERE SYRIANS EVEN WHEN PLO WERE KNOWN TO BE IN THE VICINITY. THIS HAS INHIBITED THE SCOPE OF IDF OPERATION NORTH EAST OF HASBAYA, AND COULD EXPLAIN THE FACT THAT SCATTERED SHELLING OF SETTLEMENTS IN NORTHERN GALILEE WAS REPORTED YESTERDAY AND LAST NIGHT. THIS MAY MEAN THAT ISRAELI AIM OF PUTTING ALL OF ISRAEL OUT OF REACH OF PLO KATYUSHA AND ARTILLERY ATTACKS CANNOT BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT ATTACKING PLO POSITIONS IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE SYRIANS, THEREBY RISKING CONFRONTATION WITH THEM.

5. ALL THE INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE ISRAELIS REMAIN DETERMINED TO COMPLETE THE CURRENT OPERATION REGARDLESS OF INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE. AS REGARDS WHAT HAPPENS THEREAFTER, OPTIONS OUTLINED TO ME BY KIMCHE YESTERDAY (MY TELNO 225) HAVE NOW SURFACED IN THE PRESS.

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PS/PUS
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MR MOBERLY

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FM MOSCOW 081110Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 328 OF 8 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, DAMASCUS.

SAVING FOR INFO TO BEIRUT, AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, BAGHDAD.

SOVIET STATEMENT ON LEBANON

1. A TASS STATEMENT ON 7 JUNE CONDEMNED ISRAEL'S INVASION:

(A) ISRAEL WAS TRYING TO DROWN THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN BLOOD AND TO INTIMIDATE THE PALESTINIAN ARABS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

(B) THE AGGRESSION WAS UNDERTAKEN WITH WASHINGTON'S CONSENT AND SUPPORT. IT WAS A DIRECT CONSEQUENCE OF CAMP DAVID AND US/ISRAELI STRATEGIC CO-OPERATION.

(C) TASS WAS AUTHORISED TO DECLARE THAT THE SOVIET UNION EMPHATICALLY CONDEMNED ISRAEL'S AGGRESSION. TO TRY TO COMPEL THE ARABS TO RENOUNCE THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHTS AND

COMPEL THE ARABS TO RENOUNCE THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHTS AND SUBORDINATE THEMSELVES TO THE MILITARY-STRATEGIC PLANS OF IMPERIALISM WAS AN ADVENTURE WHICH COULD COST ISRAEL DEAR.

(D) THE SOVIET UNION DEMANDED AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF ISRAEL'S ARMED INVASION AND A PULL-OUT OF THE ISRAELI TROOPS TO THEIR TERRITORY. THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL "SHOULD IMMEDIATELY TAKE MEASURES TO CURB THE AGGRESSION, TO COMPEL ISRAEL TO RESPECT THE CHARTER AND DECISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND TO GUARD THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON AND THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF THE ARAB PEOPLES."

(E) ISRAEL'S AGGRESSION WAS ONCE AGAIN LEADING THE MIDDLE EAST TO A DANGEROUS POINT. THE PRIME DUTY OF ALL COUNTRIES VALUING PEACE AND JUSTICE WAS TO PREVENT A NEW MILITARY EXPLOSION THREATENING UNIVERSAL PEACE AND TO TURN DEVELOPMENTS TOWARDS A SEARCH FOR A COMPREHENSIVE AND JUST SOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT.

2. THE STATEMENT IS THE MINIMUM NECESSARY. ITS LANGUAGE IS NOT AS COLOURFUL AS SOVIET PRESS COMMENT WHICH HAS DESCRIBED THE INVASION AS THE FIFTH ARAB/ISRAELI WAR AND AS A "COLD-BLOODEDLY PLANNED ACT OF GENOCIDE". NOR DOES THE STATEMENT GO AS FAR IN CALLING FOR ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL AS EARLIER TASS CONDEMNATIONS OF ISRAELI ATTACKS ON LEBANON. (THE TASS STATEMENT OF 22 JULY 1981 (MY TEL NO 471) CALLED FOR "THE STRICTEST SANCTIONS PROVIDED FOR BY THE UN CHARTER". THE STATEMENT OF 22 APRIL THIS YEAR (MY TEL NO 227) URGED THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ADOPT "EFFECTIVE MEASURES".) THIS PROBABLY REFLECTS REALIZATION THAT THERE IS NOTHING TO BE DONE TO STOP THE ISRAELIS AND CONCERN TO SAY AND DO NOTHING WHICH COULD THREATEN THE RESUMPTION OF US/SOVIET TALKS ON STRATEGIC ARMS. THE RUSSIANS WILL ANYWAY REGARD THE INVASION AS A NOT UNWELCOME BLOW TO US INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD AND TO THE CREDIBILITY OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS WHICH, SINCE THE RETURN OF SINAI TO EGYPT, HAS BEEN UNDER REPEATED ATTACK IN THE PRESS HERE (THOUGH USUALLY, AS IN TODAY'S STATEMENT, WITHOUT MENTION OF EGYPT). AGAINST THIS, THEY WILL BE AWARE OF THE DANGERS OF THE SITUATION GETTING OUT OF CONTROL. THE SYRIAN POSITION DESCRIBED IN DAMASCUS TEL NO 146 IS THEREFORE MUCH WHAT WE WOULD EXPECT THE RUSSIANS TO BE URGING.

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Prime Minister

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PS/PUS
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FROM TEL AVIV 071205Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 225 OF 7 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS,
PRIORITY AMMAN AND CAIRO.

MY TELNO 224: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. AMBASSADORS ARE GETTING INDIVIDUAL MFA BRIEFINGS TODAY.
MINE EXCEPTIONALLY WAS FROM THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, WHO MADE A SPECIAL
APPEAL FOR BRITISH UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISRAELI MOVE INTO LEBANON.

2. KIMCHE SAID THAT THE ARGOV SHOOTING WAS THE STRAW WHICH
BROKE THE CAMELS BACK. IT WAS NOT THE CAUSE BUT ONLY THE OCCASION
FOR ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE PLO. HE QUOTED APPROVINGLY
A REMARK BY MRS THATCHER TO THAT EFFECT. ISRAEL HAD BEEN FORCED
TO WATCH A GRADUAL ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE SINCE THE JULY 1981
CEASEFIRE. APART FROM THE PLO RAIDS AND BOMB EXPLOSIONS REPORTED
AT THE TIME A NUMBER OF OTHER BOMBS IN ISRAEL HAD ONLY BY A MIRACLE
NOT CAUSED EXTENSIVE LOSS OF LIFE. ISRAEL WOULD NEVER HAVE ACCEPTED
THE CEASEFIRE IN THE FIRST PLACE ON THE BASIS THAT THE PLO WERE
FREE TO ATTACK ISRAELIS ANYWHERE EXCEPT ON ISRAELI TERRITORY,

WHILE THE ISRAELIS WERE COMMITTED TO GRANTING THE PLO SANCTUARY AGAINST ANY ATTACK. IT HAD ONLY BECOME CLEAR LONG AFTER JULY 1981 THAT THERE WERE DIFFERENCES OF INTERPRETATION AS SUBSEQUENTLY EXPLAINED BY THE AMERICANS.

3. ISRAEL, LIKE BRITAIN OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, WAS NOW ACTING TO PROTECT ITS CITIZENS IN NORTHERN ISRAEL IN EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. HE HOPED THE BRITISH OF ALL PEOPLE WOULD UNDERSTAND WHY ISRAEL HAD FELT OBLIGED TO ACT. HE REPEATED THAT ISRAEL'S SOLE PURPOSE WAS TO PUSH PLO FORCES BACK BEYOND RANGE OF TARGETS IN ISRAEL. ONCE THIS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED THE ISRAELIS WOULD WISH TO SEE THE POSITION CONFIRMED THROUGH POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

4. I REPLIED BY DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE STATEMENT BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AT VERSAILLES AND PARTICULARLY THE CALL FOR A CESSATION OF VIOLENCE. BRITAIN SUBSCRIBED WHOLEHEARTEDLY TO THAT APPEAL. I SUGGESTED THAT THE PARALLEL WITH THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WAS NOT EXACT, SINCE WE WERE ACTING TO REGAIN BRITISH TERRITORY WHILE ISRAEL WAS CERTAINLY NOT CLAIMING LEBANESE TERRITORY AS ISRAELI. THIS LED ON TO A DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE LONG-TERM ARRANGEMENTS ONCE THE FIGHTING STOPS.

5. KIMCHE MENTIONED FOUR OPTIONS, NOT MEANT TO BE EXHAUSTIVE:
(I) EXTENSION OF THE UNIFIL AREA NORTHWARDS SEMICOLON
(II) A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE LIKE THE SINAI MFO TO TAKE OVER FROM THE ARAB DETERRENT FORCE IN THE LEBANON SEMICOLON
(III) A SIMILAR FORCE COMPOSED OF ONLY ONE OR TWO WESTERN COUNTRIES SEMICOLON
(IV) A THOROUGHGOING CHANGE IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON FOLLOWED BY EFFECTIVE EXCLUSION OF PLO FORCES FROM THEIR PRESENT AREAS BY THE LEBANESE. A PERMANENT ISRAELI GARRISON WAS NOT A SERIOUS OPTION, ALTHOUGH ISRAELI FORCES MIGHT HAVE TO STAY IN THE SHORT-TERM (UNDEFINED) WHILE OTHER ARRANGEMENTS WERE BEING WORKED OUT.

6. I ASKED ABOUT A POSSIBLE EXTENSION OF THE UNIFIL AREA SOUTHWARDS. KIMCHE SAID HE COULD NOT SPEAK FOR THE GOVERNMENT BUT HE PERSONALLY DOUBTED IF ISRAEL WOULD BE WILLING TO JEOPARDISE HADDAD'S POSITION OR SEE HIS FORCES DISARMED. HE DISCOUNTED ANY SUGGESTION OF TREATING HADDAD AND THE PLO ON THE SAME BASIS. HIS OWN PREFERRED OUTCOME WOULD BE OPTION (IV) IF FEASIBLE.

7. WHILE WE TALKED A SITREP WAS BROUGHT IN. KIMCHE SAID THE ISRAELI ASSESSMENT WAS THAT SYRIA WAS MOVING A TANK DIVISION TO

SIRAEI ASSESSMENT WAS THAT SYRIA WAS MOVING A TANK DIVISION TO REINFORCE THEIR TANK BRIGADE ALREADY IN THE SOUTHERN BEKAA VALLEY. IN HIS VIEW THIS DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THE SYRIANS WERE ABOUT TO INTERVENE. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF SYRIAN MOVES TOWARDS GOLAN. HE GUESSED THE SYRIANS WISHED TO SIGNAL THAT ISRAELI FORCES SHOULD KEEP CLEAR OF THE BEKAA. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD PASSED AASEBSABEFDRCEBMRROU6DEBRUGH1822EBITWATRETBEXVE9UMBRBOH0ATATKCKED.

3. HE CONCLUDED BY ~~CALLING~~ CALLING AGAIN FOR BRITISH UNDERSTANDING. NO COUNTRY COULD TOLERATE ITS PEOPLE LIVING INDEFINITELY UNDER THREATENED OR ACTUAL BOMBARDMENT. MILITARY ACTION HAD BECOME ISRAEL'S ONLY POSSIBLE COURSE ALTHOUGH NEW POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE NEEDED TOO.

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Prime minister

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FROM TEL AVIVH071055Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 224 OF 7 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS,
PRIORITY AMMAN AND CAIRO.

MY TELNO 223: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. BEGIN'S MESSAGE IN REPLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN PUBLISHED YESTERDAY SAYS THAT THE ARMY HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO "PUSH BACK THE TERRORISTS TO A DISTANCE OF 43 KMS TO THE NORTH SO THAT ALL OUR CIVILIANS IN THE REGION OF GALILEE WILL BE SET FREE OF THE PERMANENT THREAT TO THEIR LIVES". BEGIN REFERS TO ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER, MAKING A SPECIFIC COMPARISON WITH BRITISH ACTION IN THE FALKLANDS.

2. A COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER YESTERDAY'S CABINET SESSION DEFINES THE AIM OF THE ISRAELI OPERATION AS BEING "TO PLACE ALL THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF THE GALILEE BEYOND THE RANGE OF THE TERRORIST FIRE FROM THE LEBANON". THE SYRIAN ARMY WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED

FIRE FROM THE LEBANON''. THE SYRIAN ARMY WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED UNLESS IT ATTACKED ISRAELI FORCES. ISRAEL CONTINUED TO ASPIRE TO THE SIGNING OF A PEACE TREATY WITH INDEPENDENT LEBANON, ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY PRESERVED.

3. THE POLITICAL DECISION TO INVADE LEBANON IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN AT AN UNPUBLICIZED MEETING OF THE CABINET ON SATURDAY EVENING, BY WHICH TIME ALL THE MILITARY INDICATORS WERE POINTING UNMISTAKEABLY IN THAT DIRECTION. INFORMED SOURCES SPEAK OF A 72 HOUR CAMPAIGN, WHICH MY DA THINKS IS DISTINCTLY OPTIMISTIC. THERE IS OFFICIAL VAGUENESS ABOUT THE PRECISE PARAMETERS OF THE OPERATION. FOR EXAMPLE, BEGIN'S LETTER DOES NOT DEFINE WHETHER THE 49 KMS MENTIONED ARE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER, THE HADDAD ENCLAVE, OR THE LITANI. AT THE COAST, 43 KMS WOULD TAKE THE ISRAELIS TO THE ZAHRANI RIVER.

4. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE CRITICISM WITHIN ISRAEL OF THE OPERATION. ON THE CONTRARY, THERE IS A NEAR NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON THE NEED FOR SWIFT AND EFFECTIVE MILITARY ACTION WITH THE LIMITED AIM DEFINED IN THE CABINET COMMUNIQUE. LABOUR PARTY LEADERS WHO, ALONG WITH LEADERS OF ALL PARTIES OTHER THAN THE COMMUNISTS, WERE BRIEFED BY BEGIN YESTERDAY HAVE SUPPORTED THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT. RABIN SAID AFTERWARDS: ''NOW IS THE TIME FOR UNITY''. BUT BOTH PERES AND RABIN STRESSED THAT WHILE THE PRESENT NEED WAS FOR ISRAEL TO PUT AN END TO THE SHELLING IN THE NORTH, SHE MUST ALSO TRY FOR AN ALL ENCOMPASSING CEASEFIRE WHICH WOULD STOP TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND EVERYWHERE ELSE. MAPAM LEADERS TOO HAVE CALLED FOR A CEASEFIRE AND WARNED AGAINST THE DANGERS OF WAR, THOUGH INDIVIDUAL MK'S AGREE THAT MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE KATYUSHAS WAS INEVITABLE. ONLY THE COMMUNISTS AND THE SMALL SHELI PARTY (UNREPRESENTED IN THE KNESSET) CONDEMNED THE INVASION AS ADVENTURIST AND DANGEROUS. BROADLY SPEAKING, MOST MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION SUPPORT A LIMITED OPERATION AND WOULD AGREE WITH CHAIM HERZOG THAT IT MUST BE TIGHTLY CONTROLLED BY THE CIVIL AUTHORITY SINCE A MILITARY SOLUTION CAN ONLY BE OF VALUE IF IT IS PART OF AN OVERALL POLITICAL DESIGN.

5. THE PUBLIC SIGNAL TO SYRIA, REINFORCED BY DIPLOMATIC ACTION (PRESUMABLY BY THE AMERICANS), THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE NOT REPEAT NOT SPOILING FOR A FIGHT WITH THEM IS SIGNIFICANT. THE US EMBASSY HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE SYRIANS FOR THEIR PART MIGHT NOT WANT TO INTERVENE: THE ARGUMENT RUNS THAT THE SYRIANS KNOW THAT THE ABU NIDHAL GROUP IS FUNDED BY IRAQ AND MIGHT SUSPECT THAT THE ARGOV SHOOTING AND ITS AFTERMATH HAD BEEN SET UP BY THE IRAQIS IN THE HOPE THAT SYRIA WOULD BE SUCKED IN AND TAKE A GLORIOUS

IN THE HOPE THAT SYRIA WOULD BE SUCKED IN AND TAKE A CLOBBERING FROM THE ISRAELIS.

6. MY GUESS IS THAT, HAVING GRASPED THE NETTLE, THE ISRAELIS WILL IGNORE CALLS FOR A CEASEFIRE UNTIL THEY HAVE ACHIEVED THEIR MILITARY OBJECTIVES, UNLESS THE OPERATION GOES BADLY WRONG. THEREAFTER, THE KEY QUESTION IS HOW THE ISRAELIS WILL ENSURE THAT THE PLO DO NOT SIMPLY FILTER BACK. THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS IMPLY PERMANENT ARRANGEMENTS TO KEEP PLO ARTILLERY AND ROCKETS OUT OF RANGE OF ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER (ACCORDING TO TODAY'S PRESS, ANOTHER 50 ROCKETS AND ARTILLERY SHELLS LANDED IN THE NORTH DURING YESTERDAY UNTIL 7PM). THE ISRAELIS WANT A WIDER CORDON SANITAIRE THAN TILL NOW, BUT THEY CANNOT EXPECT TO OCCUPY IT PERMANENTLY THEMSELVES. HENCE THE IDEA OF AN EXTENSION OF THE UNIFIL AREA NORTHWARDS (PARAGRAPH 6 OF MY TUR) OF WHICH THERE IS RENEWED MENTION IN THE PRESS TODAY, INCLUDING THE SUGGESTION THAT SHARON FLOATED THE IDEA DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES. THE IDEA WILL NO DOUBT BE EXPLORED DURING HABIB'S TALKS IN JERUSALEM TODAY, WHERE HE IS SEEING BEGIN AND SHAMIR. BUT THIS IS ONLY ONE POSSIBILITY, AS THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TOLD ME THIS MORNING: SEE MIFT. (below)

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FM DAMASCUS 071500Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 146 OF 7 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK
AND WASHINGTON

INFO SAVING OTHER ME POST, OTHER EC POSTS.

MY TELNO 144 (NOT TO ALL) SYRIAN REACTIONS. ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. NOW THAT THE INEVITABLE HAS HAPPENED, THE SYRIANS WILL BE TORN BETWEEN THE NEED TO BE SEEN TO BE UPHOLDING THE ARAB CAUSE IN THE FACE OF THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION AND THEIR DISINCLINATION TO GET INVOLVED IN A MAJOR CLASH WITH THE ISRAELIS (REINFORCED BY THEIR AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PLO). THE INDICATIPPS SO FAR FROM THE STATEMENTS REPORTED IN TUR AND EARLIER REPORTS BY MY DEFENCE ATTACHE, ARE THAT THE SYRIANS ARE MAKING THE REQUISITE AMOUNT OF NOISE AND TAKING THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF ACTION. MY GUESS IS THAT THEY WILL TRY TO KEEP IT THAT WAY. INDEED IT IS NOT INCONCEIVABLE THAT THEY MAY HAVE SOME KIND OF "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT" WITH THE ISRAELIS IN THIS SENSE. HOWEVER THAT MAY BE, THE PRESENT BALANCING ACT COULD EASILY BE UPSET, WHETHER BY ACCIDENT OF DESIGN.

2. I HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN AN APPOINTMENT AT SENIOR LEVEL IN THE MFA TO TAKE ACTION ON THE VERSAILLES SUMMIT APPEAL, WHICH HAS ALREADY TO SEPE EXTENT BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS, AND TO CLAIM CREDIT FOR OUR ROLE IN THE ADOPTION OF SCR'S 508 AND 509. THE SYRIANS ARE DOUBTLESS IN NO HURRY TO HEAR YET FURTHER URGING OF RESTRAINT BY US, ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE VERY DIFFERENT RESPONSE WHICH WE OURSELVES HAVE BEEN MAKING TO ARGENTINE AGGRESSION.

FCO PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSES.

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FM WASHINGTON 072310Z JUN 82

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 2054 OF 7 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, UKMIS NEW YORK AND DAMASCUS

INFO ROUTINE AMMAN AND CAIRO

ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT TODAY. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD IN CONFIDENCE THAT THE REFERENCE TO THE QUOTE SPIRAL OF VIOLENCE UNQUOTE IS THE PRICE WHICH HAD TO BE PAID FOR THE MORE POSITIVE LANGUAGE IN THE LAST PARAGRAPH.

QUOTE

WE DEEPLY REGRET THAT THE SPIRAL OF VIOLENCE THAT BEGAN WITH THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AGAINST THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO BRITAIN AND THAT MOVED ON TO ISRAELI AIR STRIKES ON LEBANON AND PALESTINIAN SHELLING OF ISRAEL HAS NOW REACHED NEW HEIGHTS, THREATENING THE LIVES AND PROPERTY OF A GREAT MANY INNOCENT PEOPLE IN LEBANON.

THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN DOING ITS VERY BEST - NOT ONLY IN RECENT DAYS - BUT ALSO AS FAR BACK AS LAST YEAR - TO FORESTALL THE TERRIBLE TRAGEDY THAT IS NOW UNFOLDING. TWO NIGHTS AGO, THE UNITED STATES JOINED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE YESTERDAY AT DAWN, WHICH - IF OBSERVED BY ALL SIDES - MIGHT HAVE PREVENTED THESE PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS. THE US HAS BEEN IN TOUCH NOT ONLY WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT BUT WITH ALL GOVERNMENTS AND QUARTERS WHICH HAVE INFLUENCE ON THE SITUATION. OUR COUNSELS OF RESTRAINT AND CAUTION HAVE BEEN INTENSE AND CONSTANT.

WE HAD HOPED THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO DEAL WITH THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE PRESENT VIOLENCE THROUGH OTHER MEANS, WHICH IS WHY THE PRESIDENT HAD ONCE AGAIN CALLED ON AMBASSADOR PHILIP HABIB TO GO TO THE REGION WITH SOME NEW IDEAS. THE UNITED STATES STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON WITHIN ITS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED BORDERS, AS THE SECRETARY MADE CLEAR IN HIS RECENT SPEECH IN CHICAGO.

A DIVIDED LEBANON MUST NOT BE THE OUTCOME OF THIS PRESENT VIOLENCE. ISRAEL WILL HAVE TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM LEBANON, AND THE PALESTINIANS WILL HAVE TO STOP USING LEBANON AS A LAUNCHING PAD FOR ATTACKS ON ISRAEL.

UNQUOTE.

2. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT ISRAELI USE OF WEAPONS SUBJECT TO US CONTROLS, THE DEPARTMENT SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE LOOKING INTO THE ISSUE OF THE POSSIBLE USE OF SUCH AMERICAN EQUIPMENT. THE QUESTION WAS NOT UNRELATED TO HABIB'S DISCUSSIONS IN ISRAEL. THE SPOKEMAN WAS NOT TO BE DRAWN ON THE POSSIBILITY OF CUTTING OFF US MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL. HE DREW ATTENTION TO THE NEED FOR A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BY ALL OF THE PARTIES AND FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF

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ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON; THESE TWO OBJECTIVES WERE INEXTRICABLY LINKED AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION MUST BE SIMULTANEOUS.

3. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT IN RESPONSE TO DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST SOME US NAVY SHIPS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO LEAVE ROTA FOR THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN TO ASSIST, IF REQUIRED, IN THE EVACUATION OF CIVILIANS.

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
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FM CAIRO 071401Z JUN 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 255 OF 7 JUNE

MIPT: LEBANON/ISRAEL

1. PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE APPRECIATE YOUR GENUINE CONCERN OVER THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN LEBANON. THE CURRENT ISRAELI OPERATION THERE IS CERTAIN TO HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT THROUGHOUT THE REGION. IT DEALS A DEVASTATING BLOW TO THE EFFORTS WE ARE EXERTING TIRELESSLY IN ORDER TO WIDEN THE SCOPE OF PEACE AND GAIN MORE SUPPORT FOR THE PROPOSITION OF PEACE AND HARMONY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. OUR TASK HAS BEEN MADE MORE DIFFICULT BY THE NEW ISRAELI ACTION.
2. THE PRESENT ISRAELI ATTITUDE IS LIKELY TO WEAKEN THE VOICES OF MODERATION AND REASON WITHIN THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT AND GIVE NEW AMMUNITION TO THE FORCES OF EXTREMISM AND NEGATIVISM. IN OTHER WORDS, THOSE AMONG THE PALESTINIANS WHO WERE WILLING TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL AND SIMULTANEOUS RECOGNITION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WILL FEEL ISOLATED AND BETRAYED.
3. ON THE OTHER HAND, THIS UNWISE POLICY WILL NO DOUBT ENCOURAGE OUTSIDE INTERVENTION AND STIMULATE FURTHER POLARIZATIONS WHICH ARE DETRIMENTAL TO THE INTERESTS OF ALL NATIONS.
4. THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WHICH WAS PROMPTLY ISSUED TODAY WAS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. HOWEVER, FURTHER ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES AND THE REINSTITUTION OF THE VIOLATED CEASE-FIRE.
5. WE EXPECT YOUR FRIENDLY COUNTRY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE TO PLAY A VITAL AND INDISPENSABLE ROLE DURING THE COMING FEW WEEKS. FIRST, PRESSURE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED WITHIN THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNTIL ITS RESOLUTION IS FULLY OBSERVED AND IMPLEMENTED. ANY WEAKENING OF THE COUNCIL'S STAND WOULD BE A SERIOUS SETBACK TO OUR EFFORTS. SECOND, THE UN FORCES OPERATING IN LEBANON SHOULD BE

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REINFORCED AND ENLARGED SO AS TO ENABLE THEM TO CARRY OUT THEIR CRUCIAL MISSION EFFECTIVELY AND EFFICIENTLY. THE GAPS THAT HAVE EXISTED IN THE AREA COVERED BY THE UN FORCES SHOULD BE CLOSED WITHOUT DELAY. IN THE ABSENCE OF THIS ARRANGEMENT, THE UN ROLE WILL BE JEOPARDIZED AND SEVERELY COMPROMIZED. THIRD, PRESIDENT MUBARAK HOPES THAT YOUR EXCELLENCY USE YOU GOOD OFFICES AND INFLUENCE WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF EFFECTING A PROMPT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. THE LONGER ISRAEL REMAINS ON LEBANESE SOIL, THE GREATER BECOMES THE RISK TO THE CAUSE OF A DURABLE AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE REGION. THE PRESIDENT TRUSTS YOUR GOOD JUDGEMENT AND IS CERTAIN THAT YOU WILL TAKE WHATEVER MEASURES ARE NEEDED TO CONTAIN THIS DANGEROUS ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE AND TENSION. A FIRM EUROPEAN STAND WILL STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF ARAB MODERATES AT THESE TENSE MOMENTS.

6. PRESIDENT MUBARAK WOULD LIKE TO INFORM YOU THAT HE SENT TWO URGENT MESSAGES TO PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN FOR THE SAME PURPOSE.

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FM CAIRO 071400Z JUN 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 254 OF 7 JUNE

INFO TEL AVIV, AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
UKDEL NATO, EC POSTS.

UKDEL VERSAILLES TELS NOS 1 AND 2: LEBANON/ISRAEL

(attached)

1. AMBASSADORS OF THE TEN WERE SUMMONED TODAY BY THE MINISTER OF STATE BOUTROS GHALI (KAMAL HASSAN ALI HAVING ALREADY LEFT FOR GENEVA AND WASHINGTON) TO RECEIVE A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT MUBARAK TO OUR HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. TEXT IN MIFT (NOT REPEATED). PARALLEL MESSAGES HAVE GONE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN AND MR BEGIN.

2. BOUTROS GHALI SAID THAT EGYPT CONSIDERED IT ESSENTIAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE EARLY ACTION TO IMPLEMENT SC RESOLUTION 509, AND BELIEVED THE TEN COULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN SECURING IT. A QUICK SOLUTION INVOLVING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES WAS IMPERATIVE, OTHERWISE EGYPT FEARED AN UNCONTROLLABLE SERIES OF EVENTS THAT COULD CAUSE THE UNRAVELLING OF THE ENTIRE PEACE PROCESS. AS FAR AS EGYPT WAS CONCERNED THIS COULD BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE PRESSURE OF PUBLIC OPINION, WHICH WAS ALREADY BUILDING UP AGAINST ISRAEL.

3. EARLIER THE EGYPTIANS ISSUED SEVERAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS CONDEMNING THE ISRAELI ACTION. A STATEMENT FROM THE PRESIDENCY ON 6 JUNE DENOUNCED IT AS NAKED AGGRESSION, A CLEAR VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND A NEW OBSTACLE TO PEACE EFFORTS. A SIMILAR STATEMENT WAS ISSUED BY THE EGYPTIAN CABINET. THERE HAVE BEEN PROTESTS THROUGH THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV AND TO THE ISRAELI CHARGE HERE.

4. THE LANGUAGE OF THESE STATEMENTS IS STRONGER THAN ON PREVIOUS OCCASION, E.G. OVER THE ANNEXATION OF GOLAN. BUT THE EGYPTIAN PROTEST REMAINS VERBAL. THERE IS NOT TALK YET OF CONCRETE MEASURES, SUCH AS RECALLING THE AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV OR SUSPENDING NORMALISATION, THOUGH THE GOVERNMENT EVIDENTLY ANTICIPATE PUBLIC PRESSURES IN THIS DIRECTION. THE MOST LIKELY CASUALTY WOULD BE THE AUTONOMY TALKS, WHICH WOULD LEAVE THE EGYPTIANS WITHOUT EVEN THE FIG-LEAF OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE EFFORT AT A TIME WHEN ISRAEL'S MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THE OTHER ARAB STATES IS BEING SO BRUTALLY DEMONSTRATED. AN UNENVIABLE PREDICAMENT FOR MUBARAK. HE MUST AT LEAST BE GLAD THAT HE TURNED DOWN REAGAN'S INVITATION TO WASHINGTON.

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FM FCO 061554Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL VERSAILLES
TELEGRAM NUMBER 67 OF 6 JUNE 1982
(FOR IMMEDIATE SECRETARY OF STATES PARTY)
FOLLOWING TELGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF RC WAS RECEIVED
FROM TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NUMBER 223 OF 6 JUNE 82

CONFIDENTIAL
FROM TEL AVIV 061115Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 223 OF 6 JUNE 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS
PRIORITY AMMAN, CAIRO
MY TELNO 220 OF 5 JUNE 1982 : ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. MY ATTACHES HAVE REPORTED TO MOD THAT ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN OBSERVED MOVING IN STRENGTH INTO THE HADDAD ENCLAVE ON FOUR AXES.

2. THE MINISTER/COUNSELLOR AT THE US EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT A GROUND ATTACK IS IMMINENT. HE DESCRIBED THE ISRAELI POSITION AS QUOTE 100 METRES FROM THE BORDER AND LEANING FORWARD UNQUOTE. BROWN SAID THAT BEGIN HAD BEEN AT HIS FROTIEST WHEN MY US COLLEAGUE SPOKE TO HIM JUST BEFORE MIDNIGHT LAST NIGHT TO RELAY A MESSAGE FROM ARAFAT, VIA URQUHART AND AT LEAST ONE OTHER GOVERNMENT, THAT IF THE ISRAELIS WOULD STOP SO WOULD THE PLO. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD SENT A MESSAGE URGING RESTRAINT WHICH BEGIN HAD RECEIVED ABOUT 0700 LOCAL TIME THIS MORNING. BUT BROWN THOUGHT THE ISRAELIS LIKELY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CURRENT CONJUNCTION OF FAVOURABLE FACTORS (EG THE FALKLANDS, IRAN/IRAQ, WIDESPREAD FEELING IN ISRAEL THAT LATEST KATYUSHA ATTACKS WERE THE LAST STRAW) AND PRESS AHEAD REGARDLESS. IMMINENCE OF HABIB'S PROPOSED VISIT WOULD NOT INFLUENCE THEM SEMICOLON NOR WOULD YESTERDAY'S SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, ESPECIALLY SINCE KATYUSHA ATTACKS CONTINUED.

3. ONE CABINET MINISTER (NOT A CENTRAL FIGURE) TOLD ME THAT ISRAELIS HALTED THEIR AIR ATTACKS AT MIDDAY YESTERDAY IN HOPE THAT CEASEFIRE MIGHT REASSERT ITSELF AND ONLY RESUMED ATTACKS AFTER FURTHER PLO ROCKETS FELL ON NORTHERN SETTLEMENTS DURING THE AFTERNOON.

4. DILEMMA FACING ISRAELIS HAS ALL ALONG BEEN WHETHER ACTION ON THE GROUND WOULD:

A. FREE THE NORTH OF ISRAEL FROM ROCKET ATTACK IN THE LONG RUN

B. BE WORTHWHILE IN TERMS OF IMMEDIATE ISRAELI CASUALTIES, THE RISK OF SYRIAN INTERVENTION AND LIKELY INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS ESPECIALLY IN WASHINGTON.

IT IS WIDELY THOUGHT HERE THAT LACK OF A NATIONAL CONSENSUS WAS RESPONSIBLE, TOGETHER WITH AMERICAN PRESSURE FOR DISSUADING BEGIN AND HIS GOVERNMENT FROM INVADING LEBANON BEFORE NOW. PRIOR TO THIS LATEST CRISIS, OPPOSITION AND OTHER FIGURES HAVE ALSO QUESTIONED WHETHER THE PLO COULD EVER BE TOTALLY SILENCED BY MILITARY MEANS.

5. MY GUESS IS THAT RESUMPTION OF HEAVY CROSS-BORDER SHELLING BY PLO (LEAVING ASIDE WHAT PROMPTED IT) WILL HAVE PRODUCED NEAR UNANIMITY AMONG ISRAELIS THAT ACTION BY THE ISRAELI ARMY IS NOW THE ONLY WAY TO TAKE OUT THE KATYUSHAS. MORALE OF THE SETTLERS AND TOWNSPEOPLE IN NORTHERN GALILEE WILL CERTAINLY NOT ALLOW A PROLONGED WAR OF ATTRITION LIKE LAST YEARS. DESPITE A MILD STATEMENT BY THE OPPOSITION LABOUR PARTY LAST NIGHT URGING THE GOVERNMENT TO ENSURE THAT ITS ACTIONS IN LEBANON WERE POWERFUL BUT CONTROLLED AND TO RESTORE THE CEASEFIRE, LABOUR OFFICIALS PRIVATELY HAVE TAKEN A MORE HAWKISH LINE WITH US.

6. ISRAELI AIM MUST BE TO ELIMINATE PLO MILITARY POTENTIAL IN SOUTHERN LEBANON FOLLOWED BY LONG TERM ARRANGEMENTS TO DENY PLO RE-ENTRY. ONE COMMONLY SUGGESTED SOLUTION IS EXTENSION OF UNIFIL AREA NORTHWARDS COUPLED WITH MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE UNIFIL POLICING AGAINST PLO INFILTRATION. WOULD ISRAEL IN RETURN ALLOW UNIFIL INTO THE HADDAD ENCLAVE? THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM IS NO. ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN ADAMANT TILL NOW THAT THEY COULD NOT ENTRUST THE SECURITY OF THE AREA ADJOINING ISRAELI TERRITORY TO ANYONE BUT THEMSELVES AND HADDAD. BUT AT THIS STAGE I WOULD NOT EXCLUDE THE ISRAELIS BEING PREPARED TO SETTLE EVENTUALLY FOR UNIFIL BEING EXTENDED SOUTHWARDS AS WELL AS NORTHWARDS PROVIDED THEY WERE SATISFIED THAT THE CORDON SANITAIRE WOULD BE REALLY EFFECTIVE. BUT THEY WILL TAKE A LOT OF CONVINCING.,9

7. THE IMMEDIATE QUESTION TODAY HOWEVER RELATES TO ISRAEL'S MILITARY INTENTIONS. THE US EMBASSY HAVE CAUTIONED US AGAINST ASSUMING THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD ATTACK ACROSS A BROAD FRONT. THEY MIGHT MOUNT A TWO PRONGED ATTACK WITH THE AIM OF SQUEEZING THE PLO IN A PINCER MOVEMENT. BUT EVENTS MIGHT ACHIEVE THEIR OWN MOMENTUM AND THE IDF COULD END UP FURTHER NORTH THAN THEY INTENDED. ~~A JUNIOR RESERVE OFFICER TOLD US LAST NIGHT THAT THE IDF COULD END UP FURTHER NORTH THAN THEY INTENDED.~~ A JUNIOR RESERVE OFFICER TOLD US LAST NIGHT THAT THE IDF HAD LEARNED THE LESSONS OF OPERATION LITANI OF 1978. HE TOO SUGGESTED A PINCER MOVEMENT, TO TAKE THE PLO FROM BEHIND.

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FOVER 007/6 JUNE

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UNCLASSIFIED
FROM F C O 060824Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL VERSAILLES
TELEGRAM NUMBER 59 OF 6 JUNE.

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF RESIDENT CLERK
WAS RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 943 OF 5 JUNE.

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DESKBY 060800Z (FCO)
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 052346Z JUNE 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 943 OF 5 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT TEL AVIV AMMAN DAMASCUS
PRIORITY JEDDA CAIRO PARIS AND WASHINGTON.

MY 2 IPT'S: ISRAEL/LEBANON: SECURITY COUNCIL.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY EXPLANATION OF VOTE.

BEGINS

MR PRESIDENT, I CANNOT EMPHASISE TO STRONGLY THE SHOCK AND HORROR
FELT BY MY GOVERNMENT AND BY THE PEOPLE OF BRITAIN AT THE DASTARDLY
TERRORIST ATTACK ON THE AMBASSADOR OF ISRAEL TO LONDON, MR SHLOMO
ARGOV A MOST DISTINGUISHED AND RESPECTED MEMBER OF THE DIPLOMATIC
COMMUNITY. WILL ALL HOPE AND PRAY FOR HIS LIFE AND HIS RECOVERY
FROM HIS WOUNDS.

AS THE COUNCIL WILL KNOW THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES HAVE MADE ARRESTS
IN CONNECTION WITH THIS APPALLING CRIME. FOUR MEN ARE IN CUSTODY
AS A RESULT OF THESE PRELIMINARY ENQUIRIES THE POLICE HAVE
DISCOVERED A LIST OF NAMES WHICH INCLUDES NOT ONLY AMBASSADOR ARGOV
BUT ALSO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PLO IN LONDON.

MR. PRESIDENT, THIS ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT, HOWEVER DESPICABLE,
DOES NOT IN ANYWAY JUSTIFY THE MASSIVE ATTACKS ON LEBANESE TOWNS
AND VILLAGES BY THE ISRAELI AIRFORCE : ATTACKS WHICH HAVE ALREADY
INFLECTED MAJOR LOSS OF LIFE, CASUALTIES AND DAMAGED TO PROPERTY.
THESE ACTIONS HAVE ALSO LED TO THE COLLAPSE OF THE PRECARIOUS
CEASE FIRE WHICH HAS NOW BEEN IN EFFECT IN SOUTH LEBANON SINCE JULY
1981. IT IS IMPERATIVE, IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE IN THE REGION
AND FOR THE SAKE OF THE SUFFERING PEOPLE IN LEBANON, THAT THERE IS
NO ESCALATION OF FIGHTING AND THAT THE CEASEFIRE IS IMMEDIATELY
RESTORED.

MY DELEGATION THEREFORE WARMLY SUPPORTS THE RESOLUTION WHICH THE
COUNCIL HAS JUST ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY AND STRONGLY URGES ALL
CONCERNED TO COMPLY WITH ITS TERMS.

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FOVER 008/6 JUNE

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UNCLASSIFIED

FM F C O 060837Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL VERSAILLES

TELEGRAM NUMBER 60 OF 6 JUNE

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF RESIDENT CLERK
WAS RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 942 OF 5 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT TEL AVIV AMMAN DAMASCUS

PRIORITY JEDDA CAIRO PARIS AND WASHINGTON.

MIPT: ISRAEL/LEBANON: SECURITY COUNCIL.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SCR 508.

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

RECALLING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 425 (1978), 426 (1978) AND
THE ENSUING RESOLUTIONS, AND MORE PARTICULARLY, SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 501 (1982).

TAKING NOTE OF THE LETTERS OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
LEBANON DATED 4 JUNE 1982 (S/15161 AND S/15162),

DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE DETERIORATION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN
LEBANON AND IN THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER AREA, AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION,

GRAVELY CONCERNED AT VIOLATION OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY,
INDEPENDENCE, AND SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON,

REAFFIRMING AND SUPPORTING THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT AND
THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 4 JUNE 1982 (S/15163), AS

WELL AS THE URGENT APPEAL ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 4 JUNE
1982,

TAKING NOTE OF THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,

1. CALLS UPON ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CEASE IMMEDIATELY
AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITHIN LEBANON AND ACROSS
THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER AND NO LATER THAN 0600 HOURS LOCAL TIME
ON SUNDAY, 6 JUNE 1982:

2. REQUESTS ALL MEMBER STATES WHICH ARE IN A POSITION TO DO SO TO
BRING THEIR INFLUENCE TO BEAR UPON THOSE CONCERNED SO THAT THE CESS-
ATION OF HOSTILITIES DECLARED BY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 490
(1981) CAN BE RESPECTED:

3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO UNDER TAKE ALL POSSIBLE EFFORTS
TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AND COMPLIANCE WITH THIS
RESOLUTION AND TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS EARLY AS
POSSIBLE AND NOT LATER THAN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF
THIS RESOLUTION.

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FM FCO 060830Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL VERSAILLES
TELEGRAM NUMBER 61 OF 6 JUNE

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FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT THE REQUEST OF
RESIDENT CLERK WAS RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER
941 OF 5 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT TEL AVIV AMMAN DAMASCUS
PRIORITY JEDDA CAIRO PARIS AND WASHINGTON.

=MY TEL NO 939: ISRAEL/LEBANON: SECURITY COUNCIL.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL MET THIS AFTERNOON (5 JUNE), AT TUENI'S
REQUEST FIRST IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS AND THEN IN FORMAL SESSION.
A DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS AGREED WITHOUT DIFFICULTY IN THE INFORMAL
CONSULTATIONS. IT WAS THEN INTRODUCED BY JAPAN IN THE FORMAL
MEETING AND ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY AS SCR 508 (TEXT IN MIFT).

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF HOSTILITIES TO DATE.
ACCORDING TO UNIFIL AND UNTSO OBSERVERS, THERE HAD BEEN SOME
2,000 ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY, ROCKET AND MORTAR FIRE BETWEEN THE PLO
AND LEBANESE NATIONAL MOVEMENT ON THE ONE SIDE AND THE ISRAELIS
AND HADDAD'S FORCES ON THE OTHER. ABOUT 600 ROUNDS HAD BEEN
IDENTIFIED AS COMING FROM THE FORMER AND ABOUT 800 FROM THE LATTER.
HE HAD REMAINED IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE PARTIES AND HAD MADE AN
URGENT APPEAL TO THEM FOR A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND A RETURN TO
THE CEASEFIRE NOT LATER THAN 0600 LOCAL TIME ON 6 JUNE.

3. I MADE A SHORT EXPLANATION OF VOTE (TEXT IN MY SECOND IFT).

DORR (IRELAND) SIMILARLY EMPHASISED THAT THE ASSASSINATION
ATTEMPT ON ARGOV WAS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ISRAELI RAIDS.

4. TUENI SAID THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED A REPORT OF AN ISRAELI
COMMANDO ATTACK NEAR SIDON IN WHICH CIVILIAN VEHICLES HAD BEEN
MACHINEGUNNED. CASUALTIES IN LEBANON WERE NOW IN THE HUNDREDS. RED
CROSS VEHICLES, ORPHANAGES AND FOOD WAREHOUSES HAD ALL BEEN HIT.
THOUSANDS OF LEBANESE REFUGEES WERE FLOODING INTO BEIRUT FROM THE
SOUTH. LEBANON WAS SLIDING INTO AN ABYSS OF VIOLENCE AND CHAOS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD RISE TO THE CHALLENGE AND PREVENT IT
HAPPENING.

5. ABDEL RAHMAN (PLO) SAID THAT THE ISRAELI RAIDS WERE AN ACT OF
GENOCIDE NOT OF RETALIATION. THE PLO HAD DENIED ANY CONNECTION WITH
THE SHOOTING OF ARGOV. THIS WAS SUPPORTED BY THE FACT THAT THE PLO

REPRESENTATIVE IN LONDON HAD ALSO BEEN A TARGET AS THE UK HAD
CONFIRMED. THE PLO WERE OPPOSED TO ANY ACT OF VIOLENCE WHICH TOOK
PLACE OUTSIDE THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OR INVOLVED A THIRD PARTY.
THEY HAD ABIDED BY THE CEASEFIRE AND IT WAS INCUMBENT ON ISRAEL TO
IMPLEMENT IT ALSO.

6. THE USSR SAID THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION HAD FAILED TO CONDEMN
ISRAEL. THE COUNCIL SHOULD USE ALL MEANS AVAILABLE TO IT TO
HALT FURTHER ISRAELI AGGRESSION.

7. BLUM (ISRAEL) SAID THAT THE RESOLUTION IGNORED THE 150 PLO ACTS
OF TERRORISM WHICH HAD OCCURRED SINCE THE CEASEFIRE. THE PLO
FREQUENTLY DENIED ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THESE ACTS SHELTERING
BEHIND ASSUMED NAMES. ISRAEL REGRETTED ALL CIVILIAN CASUALTIES,
BUT THE PLO HAD SITED THEIR MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN CIVILIAN
NEIGHBOURHOODS. IF LEBANON WAS UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO CONTROL THE
PLO IT HAD TO FACE THE RISKS OF ISRAELI COUNTERMEASURES.

8. DE NANTEUIL (FRANCE) SAID THAT FRANCE ENERGETICALLY CONDEMNED
THE ISRAELI BOMBING. MAKSOUH (ARAB LEAGUE) WAS THE ONLY OTHER SPEAKER

9. URQUHART AND HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE SECRETARIAT ARE VERY WORRIED
BY THE INFORMATION THEY HAVE RECEIVED OF ISRAELI MOVEMENTS. THEY
REMAIN EXTREMELY APPREHENSIVE THAT A MAJOR ISRAELI INVASION IS
IMMINENT.

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FM FCO 061118Z JUN 82
TO FLASH UKDEL VERSAILLES
TELEGRAM NUMBER 063 OF 6 JUNE

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF RESIDENT
CLERK WAS RECEIVED FROM TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NUMBER 221 OF 6 JUNE.

ISRAELI ATTACK INTO SOUTH LEBANON

1. THE DA REPORTS FROM THE GOLAN THAT AT 130800Z ISRAELI FORCES ENTERED SOUTH LEBANON, IN STRENGTH, AT FOUR CROSSING POINTS.
2. THE GERMAN DA REPORTS FROM METULLA THAT QUOTE THE INVASION HAS STARTED UNQUOTE. US EMBASSY HAVE A REPORT FROM ONE OF THEIR ATTACHES ALSO IN METULLA, THAT ELEMENTS OF AN ISRAELI TASK FORCE HAD BEEN SEEN ENTERING THE ENCLAVE VIA WEISSGATE. THEY HAVE ALSO HEARD, PROBABLY FROM UN SOURCES, THAT 29 MERKAVAS HAVE BEEN SEEN BETWEEN MARJAYOUN AND THE LITANI.
3. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO CONFIRMATION HERE THAT THESE FORCES HAVE CONTINUED NORTH, THROUGH THE CHRISTIAN ENCLAVE, TO ATTACK TARGETS NORTH OF THE UNIFIL LINE - NOR CAN WE BE SURE OF OBTAINING CONFIRMATION QUICKLY FROM OUR OWN SOURCES.
4. FULLER REPORTS FOLLOW BY IMMEDIATE SIGNAL.

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SECRET
FM FCO 061200Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL VERSEILLES
TELEGRAM NUMBER 64 OF 6 JUNE

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF RESIDENT
CLERK WAS RECEIVED FROM TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NUMBER 222 OF 6 JUNE.

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 222 OF 6 JUNE 1982
OUR TELEGRAM 221 OF 6 JUNE : ISRAELI ATTACK INTO SOUTH LEBANON
MODUK FOR DIA THROUGH DIC

1. FURTHER TO MY FLASH 131000Z JUNE INDICATIONS OF A PROBABLE
ISRAELI ATTACK INTO SOUTH LEBANON HAVE BEEN GROWING DURING
THE LAST 24 HOURS. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT OF THESE ARE:

A. A REPORT FROM US SOURCES THAT A LEVEL 3 CALL UP OF
RESERVISTS MAY HAVE BEEN ORDERED. THIS REQUIRES ALL RESERVISTS
ATTACHED TO STANDING ARMY ACTIVE DUTY UNITS TO REPORT
IMMEDIATELY. OBSERVATION OF LARGE NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL
ON THE ROADS IN SPECIAL BUSES, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC TRANSPORT
GIVES CREDENCE TO THIS REPORT.

B. A RELIABLE REPORT FROM AN EXPERIENCED FRENCH COLLEAGUE
THAT FORCES ON THE GOLAN EQUAL OR EXCEED THE NUMBER IN
PLACE DURING THE APRIL 82 CRISIS.

C. A STATEMENT BY THE IDF SPOKESMAN AT 130730Z WHICH STATED,
INTER ALIA, THAT DESPITE HEAVY IAF ATTACKS THE PLO GUNNERS
WERE CONTINUING TO ATTACK NORTHERN ISRAEL. AT LEAST ONE
MORE FATALITY OCCURRED OVERNIGHT.

D. A SHIFT IN THE MAIN AXIS OF THE AIR ATTACK THIS
MORNING AWAY FROM THE COASTAL AREAS TO THE MARJAYUN, NABATIYA,
BEAUFORT CASTLE AREA WHICH COULD INDICATE PREPARATION FOR
A GROUND ATTACK.

E. THE MOVEMENT NORTH OF HELI GUNSHIPS AND HELI TRANSPORTS
IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS.

2. OTHER MINOR INDICATORS ARE THE PRESENCE OF MILITARY POLICE
AND RECOVERY VEHICLES AT ALL MAJOR ROAD JUNCTIONS, THE EQUIPMENT
OF MANY TANKS WITH MINE ROLLERS AND THE STABLISHMENT OF A
COMPREHENSIVE PR ORGANISATION USING MOBILIZED RESERVE OFFICERS.

3. BETWEEN 2130Z AND 2150Z LAST NIGHT AT LEAST 5 COMMS HELIS
CONVERGED ON SDE DOV (TEL AVIV AIRFIELD) FROM THE NORTH
AND NORTH EAST. THEY DEPARTED AGAIN AT 0400Z. IT IS
TEMPTING TO SPECULATE THAT THIS WAS A GATHERING OF MAJOR
COMMANDERS FOR AN OPERATIONAL BRIEFING.

4. THE DA WILL REMAIN IN THE NORTH TODAY AND POSSIBLY TONIGHT.
AIR ACTIVITY CONTINUES AT AN INTENSIVE RATE WITH ALL IAF
AIRFIELDS, INCLUDING UVDA AND RAMON, INVOLVED IN THE ACTIVITY.

5. THE IAF LOST ONE AIRCRAFT IN THE NABATIY AREA THIS MORNING.
THE PILOT EJECTED BUT ACCORDING TO ISRAELIS IS NOW A PRISONER
OF THE PLO

MOBERLY

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 061506Z JUNE 82
TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL VERSAILLES
TELEGRAM NUMBER 65 OF 6 JUNE
(FOR IMMEDIATE SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF RC WAS
RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 946 OF 6 JUNE

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 061410Z JUNE 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 946 OF 6 JUNE
INFO FLASH BEIRUT DAMASCUS AND WASHINGTON
INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV CAIRO BAGHDAD PARIS AMMAN AND JEDDA.

MY TEL NO 941: ISRAEL/LEBANON.

1. URQUHART TOLD ME THIS MORNING (6 JUNE) THAT AT 02.30Z TODAY THE PALESTINIANS GAVE AN ASSURANCE THAT THEY WOULD RESPECT THE CEASEFIRE CALLED FOR IN SCR 508. THEY DID SO. BUT AT 06.00 LOCAL TIME THE ISRAELIS LAUNCHED MASSIVE AIR STRIKES ALL ALONG THE FRONT IN SOUTH LEBANON. AT 10.00 LOCAL TWO ARMoured COLUMNS CROSSED THE FRONTIER. THE FIRST PROCEEDED UP THE ROAD TO TYRE. UNIFIL COUNTED 100 APC'S AND 140 TANKS. A SECOND COLUMN (SIXE UNSPECIFIED) MOVED UP THE EASTERN BOUNDARY OF THE UNIFIL AREA IN THE DIRECTION OF HASBAYA. UNIFIL BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A THIRD TANK REGIMENT ON THE CENTRAL PART OF THE FRONT MOVING TOWARDS THE Khardala BRIDGE, I.E. THROUGH THE MARJAYOUN GAP. THE EASTERN THRUST IS OF COURSE DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TO SYRIAN POSITIONS IN THE BEKAA. URUQHART SAID THAT THERE HAD ALSO BEEN ISRAELI LANDINGS NORTH OF SIDON AND THAT A SUBSTANTIAL NAVAL FORCE WAS OFF TYRE.

PARSONS

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MR MOBERLY

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FM BEIRUT 061915Z JUN 82
TO FLASH F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 249 OF 6 JUNE 1982

INFO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

IMMEDIATE UKDEL VERSAILLES, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, AMMAN,
CAIRO, WASHINGTON
SAVING UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW AND OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

.UKDEL VERSAILLES TELNO 1 OF 6 JUNE: LEBANON-ISRAEL.

1. I WAS SENT FOR AT 1930 HRS LOCAL TIME TODAY BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER. I HANDED OVER THE TEXT OF THE APPEAL, WHICH THEY HAD NOT YET SEEN.
2. SARKIS BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE HAD SUMMONED ME AND THE FRENCH AND SOVIET AMBASSADORS (THERE IS NO CHINESE) TO ASK FOR OUR URGENT HELP. HE PARTICULARLY ASKED ME TO TELEGRAPH TODAY RATHER THAN WAIT FOR TOMORROW MORNING.
3. BOUTROS THEN TOOK UP THE TALE. THE ISRAELIS HAD HELD THE UNITED NATIONS UP TO INTERNATIONAL CONCEPT BY THEIR TREATMENT OF...

WATT 1-27-73 10:30 AM MORNING

3. BOUTROS THEN TOOK UP THE TALE. THE ISRAELIS HAD HELD THE UNITED NATIONS UP TO INTERNATIONAL CONTEMPT BY THEIR TREATMENT OF UNIFIL. THEY HAD EXCEEDED ALL REASONABLE LIMITS. THEY LOOKED TO US TO PLAY A PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT ROLE AS A "GO BETWEEN".

4. I SAID THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT WE COULD BE OF MOST PRACTICAL USE IN SEEKING TO INFLUENCE THE UNITED STATES. I SHOULD CERTAINLY REPORT URGENTLY WHAT THEY HAD ASKED OF US. (I ADDED THAT, WHILE IT WAS NOT MY PROVINCE, I DID NOT THINK WE COULD DO MUCH WITH THE ISRAELIS THEMSELVES).

5. THEY DID NOT SEEM TO KNOW THE ANSWER WHEN I ASKED WHETHER THE LEBANESE DELEGATE WAS TABLING A RESOLUTION OR CONTEMPLATED SOME PARTICULAR ACTION. I SAID I WAS CERTAIN THAT OUR DELEGATE WOULD BE CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH GHASSAN TUENI.

6. THEY ARE TIRED AND FRIGHTENED MEN (WITH GOOD REASON). I ONLY HOPE THAT WE CAN PERSUADE THE AMERICANS THAT THIS TIME THE ISRAELIS HAVE GONE TOO FAR. AT THE VERY LEAST THEY MUST STOP KILLING PEOPLE. I STRONGLY SUSPECT THAT MOST OF THE CASUALTIES WILL BE INNOCENT LEBANESE, PROBABLY NOT LESS THAN 500 DEAD, WHEN TODAY'S RAIDS ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

7. I CANNOT JUDGE THE SITUATION IN NEW YORK, BUT FROM HERE THE CASE FOR PUSHING THE AMERICANS TO INSIST ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 425, ALWAYS STRONG, NOW SEEMS OVERWHELMING.

8. FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

ROBERTS

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MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 19

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PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR MOBERLY

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DESKBY 061730Z (FCO, CAB).

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 061649Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 947 OF 6 JUNE

AND TO CABINET OFFICE

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT TEL AVIV DAMASCUS AMMAN MODUK WASHINGTON

PRIORITY CAIRO BAGHDAD PARIS AND JEDDA.

MY TEL NO 946: ISRAEL/LEBANON.

1. THE SECURITY COUNCIL MET AGAIN IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS AT 1500Z TODAY (6 JUNE). AFTER HEARING A REPORT FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THE CONSULTATIONS WERE ADJOURNED TO ALLOW THE PRESIDENT TO HOLD BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT A POSSIBLE DRAFT RESOLUTION. THE LEBANESE HAVE PRIVATELY FLOATED A TEXT WHICH CONDEMNS THE ISRAELI INVASION AND CALLS FOR THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER.
2. THE TEXT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S CONFIDENTIAL REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE COUNCIL IN PURSUANCE OF SCR 508 WAS AS FOLLOWS.

BEGINS:

IN RESOLUTION 508 THE SECURITY COUNCIL CALLED UPON ALL THE

"IN RESOLUTION 508 THE SECURITY COUNCIL CALLED UPON "ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CEASE IMMEDIATELY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITHIN LEBANON AND ACROSS THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER AND NO LATER THAN 06.00 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON SUNDAY 1982". THE SECURITY COUNCIL ALSO REQUESTED ME TO UNDERTAKE ALL POSSIBLE EFFORTS TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESOLUTION AND TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE AND NOT LATER THAN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION.

AS THE COUNCIL IS AWARE, PRIOR TO THE ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION I HAD ALREADY MADE AN URGENT APPEAL TO THE PARTIES FOR SUCH A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. THEREAFTER, FOLLOWING THE ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) REAFFIRMED ITS COMMITMENT TO STOP ALL MILITARY OPERATIONS ACROSS THE LEBANESE BORDER WHILE RESERVING ITS RIGHT TO RESPOND IN CASE OF ANY ISRAELI AGGRESSION. THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL INFORMED ME AT 23.00 NEW YORK TIME THAT, WHILE ISRAELI REACTIONS WERE IN EXERCISE OF ITS RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE, THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE BROUGHT BEFORE THE ISRAELI CABINET.

IN A MESSAGE TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL CALLAGHAN, THE COMMANDER OF UNIFIL, I INSTRUCTED HIM TO USE EVERY POSSIBILITY OF FOLLOWING UP ON MY APPEAL TO THE PARTIES AND THE SUBSEQUENT RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

I REGRET TO STATE, HOWEVER, THAT DESPITE ALL EFFORTS THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO EFFECT A CEASE-FIRE. INDEED, HOSTILITIES HAVE ESCALATED DANGEROUSLY. IN THIS CONNEXION, IT IS RELEVANT TO RECORD THAT MR. ARAFAT, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, IN RESPONSE TO A MESSAGE FROM ME, INFORMED ME THAT IN SPITE OF HEAVY ISRAELI AIR-STRIKES AFTER THE SCHEDULED TIME OF THE CEASE-FIRE, HE HAVE GIVEN ORDERS TO ALL PLO UNITS TO WITHHOLD FIRE FOR A FURTHER UNSPECIFIED PERIOD. THIS WAS OF COURSE BEFORE THE ISRAELI GROUND ACTION STARTED.

THE FOLLOWING IS THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE COMMANDER OF UNIFIL:

(A) BETWEEN 21.00 HOURS GMT ON 5 JUNE 1982 AND 04.00 HOURS GMT ON 6 JUNE 1982, THERE WERE INTERMITTENT AND RELATIVELY LIGHT EXCHANGES OF FIRE BETWEEN POSITIONS OF THE ARMED ELEMENTS (MAINLY THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) AND THE LEBANESE NATIONAL MOVEMENT) ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE ISRAEL DEFENCE FORCES (IDF) AND THE DE FACTO FORCES, ON THE OTHER. THE EXCHANGES OF FIRE INVOLVED, OR AFFECTED, THE FOLLOWING AREAS: ON THE ONE SIDE, IN LEBANON, TYRE AND VICINITY, CHATEAU DE BEAUFORT, NABATIYAH AND THE KAUKABA-HASBAVAH AREA; ON THE OTHER SIDE, MARJAYOUN IN LEBANON, AND THE AREA OF METULLA IN ISRAEL.

(B) FROM 04.24 HOURS GMT (06.04 HOURS LOCAL LEBANESE TIME

OF METULLA IN ISRAEL.

(B) FROM 04.24 HOURS GMT (06.24 HOURS LOCAL LEBANESE TIME AND AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE TIME SET BY THE COUNCIL) TO 06.25 HOURS GMT INTENSIVE AIR-ATTACKS WERE LAUNCHED BY ISRAEL, WITH APPROXIMATELY 40 STRIKES BEING RECORDED BY UNIFIL. THESE STRIKES OCCURRED PRINCIPALLY IN THE AREA OF THE CHATEAU DE BEAUFORT AND TYRE AND ITS VICINITY, FROM WHERE THERE WAS ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE. ONE AIRCRAFT WAS OBSERVED TO HAVE BEEN DOWNED, NORTH OF THE LITANI RIVER, NEAR THE CHATEAU DE BEAUFORT.

(C) AT AROUND 09.30 HOURS GMT, UNIFIL REPORTED THAT ISRAELI GROUND FORCES - INCLUDING A VERY LARGE NUMBER OF TANKS AND ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIERS - HAD BEGUN A MOVE INTO LEBANESE TERRITORY IN STRENGTH. THEY MOVED ALONG THREE MAIN AXES: IN THE WEST, ALONG THE COASTAL ROAD; IN THE CENTRAL SECTOR TOWARDS ETT-TAIBE AND THE AKIYA BRIDGE; AND IN THE EASTERN SECTOR THROUGH THE KAIFER CHOUBA-CHEBAA AREA. AS AT 13.30 HOURS GMT, THE ISRAELI FORCES ARE REPORTED TO HAVE REACHED THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS: TYRE ON THE COASTAL ROAD, WHERE HEAVY FIGHTING IS REPORTED; IN THE CENTRAL SECTOR, TWO KILOMETRES NORTH OF THE AKIYA BRIDGE OVER THE LITANI; IN THE EASTERN SECTOR, SOUTH OF CHEBAA. THERE IS ALSO A HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF TANKS IN THE KHARDALA AND BLATE AREAS.

I HAVE JUST BEEN INFORMED THAT AS OF 11.00 HOURS NEW YORK TIME 12 ISRAELI TANKS CROSSED THE LITANI RIVER NORTH OF THE KHARDALA BRIDGE.

I HAVE ALSO BEEN INFORMED THAT A HEAVY AERIAL BOMBARDMENT OF TYRE IS NOW IN PROGRESS.

AS THE ISRAELI FORCES MOVED INTO SOUTHERN LEBANON, THE COMMANDER OF UNIFIL GAVE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE STANDING OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES TO BE PUT INTO EFFECT BY ALL UNITS. THESE INCLUDE MEASURES TO BLOCK ADVANCING FORCES AND ALSO DEFENSE MEASURES. THE OVERWHELMING STRENGTH AND WEIGHT OF THE ISRAELI FORCES PRECLUDED THE POSSIBILITY OF STOPPING THEM AND UNIFIL POSITIONS IN THE LINE OF THE INVASION HAVE THUS BEEN OVER-RUN OR BY-PASSED.

I SHALL KEEP THE COUNCIL INFORMED OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS."

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PS/MR HURD
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SIR J LEAHY
MR MOBERLY

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 061410Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 946 OF 6 JUNE

INFO FLASH BEIRUT DAMASCUS AND WASHINGTON

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV CAIRO BAGHDAD PARIS AMMAN AND JEDDA.

MY TEL NO 941: ISRAEL/LEBANON.

1. URQUHART TOLD ME THIS MORNING (6 JUNE) THAT AT 02.30Z TODAY THE PALESTINIANS GAVE AN ASSURANCE THAT THEY WOULD RESPECT THE CEASEFIRE CALLED FOR IN SCR 508. THEY DID SO. BUT AT 06.00 LOCAL TIME THE ISRAELIS LAUNCHED MASSIVE AIR STRIKES ALL ALONG THE FRONT IN SOUTH LEBANON. AT 10.00 LOCAL TWO ARMoured COLUMNS CROSSED THE FRONTIER. THE FIRST PROCEEDED UP THE ROAD TO TYRE. UNIFIL COUNTED 100 APC'S AND 140 TANKS. A SECOND COLUMN (SIXE UNSPECIFIED) MOVED UP THE EASTERN BOUNDARY OF THE UNIFIL AREA IN THE DIRECTION OF HASBAYA. UNIFIL BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A THIRD TANK REGIMENT ON THE CENTRAL PART OF THE FRONT MOVING TOWARDS THE Khardala BRIDGE, I.E. THROUGH THE MARJAYOUN GAP. THE EASTERN THRUST IS OF COURSE DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TO SYRIAN POSITIONS IN THE BEKAA. URUQHART SAID THAT THERE HAD ALSO BEEN ISRAELI LANDINGS NORTH OF SIDON AND THAT A SUBSTANTIAL NAVAL FORCE WAS OFF TYRE.

PARSONS



Security Council

DISTR.
GENERAL

S/RES/508 (1982)
5 June 1982

RESOLUTION 508 (1982)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2374th meeting,
on 5 June 1982

The Security Council,

Recalling Security Council resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and the ensuing resolutions, and more particularly, Security Council resolution 501 (1982),

Taking note of the letters of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon dated 4 June 1982 (S/15161 and S/15162),

Deeply concerned at the deterioration of the present situation in Lebanon and in the Lebanese-Israeli border area, and its consequences for peace and security in the region,

Gravely concerned at the violation of the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Lebanon,

Reaffirming and supporting the statement made by the President and the members of the Security Council on 4 June 1982 (S/15163), as well as the urgent appeal issued by the Secretary-General on 4 June 1982,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General,

1. Calls upon all the parties to the conflict to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border and no later than 0600 hours local time on Sunday, 6 June 1982;
2. Requests all Member States which are in a position to do so to bring their influence to bear upon those concerned so that the cessation of hostilities declared by Security Council resolution 490 (1981) can be respected;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to undertake all possible efforts to ensure the implementation of and compliance with this resolution and to report to the Security Council as early as possible and not later than forty-eight hours after the adoption of this resolution.

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PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
~~MR MOBERLY~~

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM TEL AVIV 221300Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 169 OF 22 APRIL 1982

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, CAIRO, JERUSALEM, WASHINGTON
AND UK MIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 136: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. I SAW THE UNDER-SECRETARY FOR EUROPOE AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THIS MORNING AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED, ENDING WITH AN APPEAL FOR UTMOST RESTRAINT IN VIEW OF THE DANGERS OF FURTHER ESCALATION. I SAID WE WERE APPEALING FOR RESTRAINT ALSO TO OTHERS CONCERNED IN THE AREA. I HOPED HE COULD ASSURE ME THAT THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT WAS STILL COMMITTED TO THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT.

2. MEROZ THANKED ME FOR MY REMARKS ABOUT UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH ISRAEL FACED AND ABOUT OUR WELCOME FOR THE CABINET'S DECISION ON WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI. HE SAID THE ISRAELIS HAD SHOWN GREAT RESTRAIN. OVER MANY MONTHS AT REPEATED PLO VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE. THEY FELT THAT THE SCALE OF RETALIATION YESTERDAY WAS APPROPRIATE IN ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES. THE TARGETS HAD BEEN

WAS APPROPRIATE IN ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES. THE TARGETS HAD BEEN CHOSEN FOR THEIR MILITARY NATURE AND BECAUSE THEY HAD HELPED SUPPORT RECENT TERRORIST OPERATIONS AGAINST ISRAEL. CARE HAD BEEN TAKEN TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE TO AVOID HITTING TARGETS WHICH MIGHT CAUSE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.

3. HE DREW MY ATTENTION TO LAST NIGHT'S DESCRIPTION BY THE ISRAELI CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR STRIKES AS A WARNING TO THE PLO. YESTERDAY'S ACTION SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS MEANING THAT ISRAEL WAS NO LONGER PREPARED TO OBSERVE THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT. MEROZ CONFIRMED, IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION, THAT WE WOULD BE RIGHT TO TAKE IT THAT ISRAEL'S POSITION REMAINED AS BEFORE AND THAT ISRAEL WOULD ABIDE BY THE CEASEFIRE SO LONG AS THE OTHER SIDE DID SO TOO.

4. I SAID THAT GENERAL EITAN WAS ALSO REPORTED AS HAVING IMPLIED THAT YESTERDAY'S RETALIATION WAS COMPLETE AND THAT THERE WAS NO MORE TO COME. MEROZ AGREED THAT TO THE BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE NO FURTHER OPERATION WAS PLANNED.

5. I ASKED IF TARGETS HAD BEEN CHOSEN BECAUSE THEY BELONGES TO SOME OF THE MORE EXTREME SPLINTER GROUPS OF THE PLO. HE PLAYED DOWN THIS SUGGESTION, SAYING THAT ISRAEL HAS ALWAYS TAKEN THE LINE THAT THE PLO ITSELF MUST TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL ITS COMPONENT PARTS.

6. I ASKED WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAPPEN NEXT. MEROZ SAID IT WAS UP TO THE PLO. HE HOPED THEY WOULD HAVE THE SENSE NOT TO RESORT TO FURTHER VIOLENCE.

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D/B 211700Z

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PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR MOBERLY

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CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 211700Z

FROM TEL AVIV 211505Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 168 OF 21 APRIL 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRIORITY AMMAN, DAMASCUS AND CAIRO.

ISRAEL/SOUTH LEBANON

1. THE IDF ANNOUNCED THIS AFTERNOON THAT AFTER MONTHS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY, CULMINATING IN THE MURDER OF AN IDF OFFICER TODAY AND THE WOUNDING OF ANOTHER WHEN THEIR VEHICLE RAN OVER A MINE NEAR THE VILLAGE OF TAIBE IN SOUTH LEBANON, ISRAEL HAD DECIDED TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST SPECIFIED TERRORIST LOCATIONS IN LEBANON FROM SIDON TO SOUTH BEIRUT WHERE TERRORIST HQ'S WERE LOCATED. THIS ACTION WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL THE MISSION HAD BEEN COMPLETED.

2. AN IMMEDIATE ISRAELI RESPONSE TO ANOTHER BREACH OF THE CEASE-FIRE, ESPECIALLY ONE INVOLVING CASUALTIES, WAS ALWAYS ON THE CARDS.

FIRE, ESPECIALLY ONE INVOLVING CASUALTIES, WAS ALWAYS ON THE CARDS. IT FOLLOWS REPEATED ISRAELI WARNINGS IN RECENT DAYS. A MEMBER OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TOLD MY DA AFTER THIS AFTERNOON'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN PROVOKED BEYOND ENDURANCE AND THAT THE RAIDS TODAY WERE AGAINST PURELY MILITARY TARGETS. PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE (FCO TEL TO WASHINGTON NO 1766 OF 1981) INDICATES THAT THE TERMS OF THE CEASEFIRE COVER THE ENCLAVE.

3. THE ISRAELIS MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN TEMPTED TO BALANCE THE CABINET'S UNQUALIFIED DECISION THIS MORNING TO WITHDRAW FROM SINAI ON TIME BY VIGOROUS ACTION AGAINST THE PLO.

4. BY ISRAELI STANDARDS, TODAY'S ACTION AMOUNTS TO A MEASURED RESPONSE. AS INDICATED IN PARA 3 OF MY TELNO 158, IT STOPS SHORT OF AN ALL-OUT ATTACK, PLACES THE ONUS FOR ESCALATION ON THE PLO, AND MINIMIZES THE RISK OF SUCKING IN THE SYRIANS. I SUSPECT THAT WHAT HAPPENS NEXT DEPENDS LARGELY ON THE PLO THEMSELVES. THE ISRAELIS WILL NOT TOLERATE A RESUMPTION OF THE WAR OF ATTRITION ACROSS THE LEBANESE BORDER. IF THE PLO RETALIATE FOR THE AIR-RAIDS BY SHELLING THE NORTHERN TOWNS AND SETTLEMENTS, THE ISRAELIS ARE VIRTUALLY CERTAIN TO RESPOND BY MOVING INTO SOUTH LEBANON IN GREAT FORCE WITH THE INTENTION OF TAKING OUT THE PLO ARTILLERY AND KATYUSHAS AND PERHAPS EVEN OF FORCING THE PLO TO WITHDRAW NORTH OF THE ZAHRANI.

5. MEANWHILE, WE HEAR THAT SETTLERS IN THE NORTH ARE TAKING SHELTER.

6. ANY APPEAL WE MAY MAKE PRIVATELY OR PUBLICLY TO THE ISRAELIS ABOUT REFRAINING FROM FURTHER ESCALATION WOULD HAVE A SHADE MORE CHANCE OF BEING HEARD IF IT COMMENDED THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO STICK TO THE DEADLINE FOR SINAI WITHDRAWAL, ALTHOUGH THIS TOO COULD STILL BECOME A CASUALTY OF THE FLARE-UP IN THE LEBANON.

MOBERLY

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Middle
East

19 April 1982

Israel/Lebanon

Thank you for your letter of 16 April. The Prime Minister agrees that you may send a draft message to Mr. Klibi in the terms proposed but would like the second sentence which reads: "Francis Pym is replying in greater detail to your message to him" to be deleted.

JOHN COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

HC

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 April 1982

Prime Minister

Dear John,

Yes - or amended message agree to send the message at Ray F?
(The F.S.'s message has not been sent)

A.J.C. 16/4

Israel/Lebanon: Message from Secretary-General of the Arab League

/ You will have seen from Tunis telno 63 of 13 April (copy enclosed) that Mr Klibi, Secretary-General of the Arab League, has sent messages to the Prime Minister and to the Secretary of State about the recent rise in tension between Israel and Lebanon. / I enclose a translation of the message to the Prime Minister.

/ As the Prime Minister will know, there is plenty of evidence to justify Mr Klibi's fears of an Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon. The danger of such an invasion may have receded slightly in the past few days but the American view, which we share, is that any PLO attack resulting in Israeli casualties would lead to retaliation by Israel against PLO bases in Lebanon. You will recall that the Secretary of State discussed this subject briefly with / Mr Haig early in the week, after which a statement (copy also enclosed) was issued calling for maximum restraint by all parties.

/ There is little more we can do. But a short reply from the Prime Minister to Mr Klibi would be an appropriate demonstration of our concern. I enclose a telegram to Tunis containing a message to Mr Klibi approved by Mr Pym and a draft message from the Prime Minister to Mr Klibi. I would be grateful if you could let me know whether the Prime Minister is content to send a message in these terms.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

GRS 475
UNCLASSIFIED
FM TUNIS 130943 Z APRIL 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 63 OF 13 APRIL

ARAB/ISRAEL: LEBANON

1. KLIBI HAS ASKED ME TO TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGES TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND TO YOURSELF:

(A) BEGINS

SON EXCELLENCE MADAME MARGARET THATCHER PREMIER MINISTRE DE GRANDE BRETAGNE

LES NOUVELLES FAISANT ETAT DE CONCENTRATIONS DE TROUPES, ISRAELIENNES AUX FRONTIERES DU LIBAN, CONCENTRATIONS CONFIRMES PAR L'OBSERVATION SPATIALE AMERICAINE, SONT PARTICULIEREMENT ALARMANTES.

UNE NOUVELLE AGRESSION ISRAELIENNE, PRECEDEE TOUS CES DERNIERS JOURS D'UNE PREPARATION PSYCHOLOGIQUE DE L'OPINION MONDIALE SE FONDANT SUR DE FAUX-PRETEXTES, SEMBLE SUR LE POINT D'ETRE LANCEE.

SI LA MENACE EN DEVAIT SE PRECISER, ELLE NE MANQUERAIT PAS DE PROVOQUER DES MORTS ET DES RUINES ET DE FAIRE PESER SUR LA PAIX LES PLUS GRAVES DANGERS.

AVANT QUE LA COMMUNAUTE INTERNATIONALE NE SOIT UNE FOIS DE PLUS MISE DEVANT LE FAIT ACCOMPLI, JE VOUS ADJURE D'USER DE VOTRE INFLUENCE ET D'INTERVENIR PAR LES MOYENS QUI VOUS JUGEREZ ADEQUATS POUR QUE LE PERIL QUI PARIT IMMINENT, SOIT EVITE.

HAUTE CONSIDERATION CHEDLI KLIBI SECRETAIRE GENERAL DE LA LIGUE DES ETATS ARABES. ENDS

(B) BEGINS

HIS EXCELLENCY THE HONOURABLE FRANCIS PYM

THE MASSIVE DEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES ALONG THE BORDERS OF LEBANON CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS ESCALATION OF TENSION, TREATENING TO IGNITE A MAJOR CONFLICT IN THE REGION.

THE CHAIN OF EVENTS FLOWING FROM THE DANGEROUS ISRAELI MILITARY BUILD-UP ON THE LEBANESE BORDER CAN NOT ONLY UNDERMINE THE SECURITY OF THE REGION, BUT CAUSE IRREPARABLE DAMAGE TO THE CHANCES OF PEACE IN THE WORLD.

I AM SURE, EXCELLENCY, THAT YOU ARE AWARE OF THE PROFOUND CONCERN OF THE ARAB STATES ABOUT THE INHERENT PERILS OF THE SITUATION.

IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE TAKE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES TO PREVENT THE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES OF ISRAEL'S POLICY, PARTICULARLY IF ISRAELI ACTIONS REMAIN UNCHECKED.

/YOUR EXCELLENCY,

YOUR EXCELLENCY, IT IS CLEAR THAT ISRAEL IS ATTEMPTING TO MAKE LEBANON HOSTAGE TO THE CAMPAIGN OF INTIMIDATION AND ANNEXATION BEING CONDUCTED IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, AND TO PROVIDE PRIOR JUSTIFICATION FOR THE IMMINENT AGGRESSION AGAINST LEBANON. THIS SINISTER POLICY OF BLACKMAIL, WHICH ISRAEL HAS USED IN THE PAST, IS MEANT TO FURTHER ISRAEL'S ANNEXIONIST DESIGN IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME GIVING ISRAEL A FREE HAND IN PRECIPITATING THE BLOOD-BATH WHOSE VICTIMS WILL BE THE PALESTINIAN AND LEBANESE.

ISRAEL ALSO IS USING THE PREOCCUPATION OF THE WORLD WITH OTHER CRISIS TO ESCALATE ITS AGGRESSION AGAINST THE PALESTINIAN AND THE LEBANESE PEOPLES IN THEIR OWN HOMELANDS.

WE ARE SURE, YOUR EXCELLENCY, THAT YOUR COUNTRY WHICH HAS SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES AS A MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL WILL EXERCISE THOSE RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE CAUSE OF MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

WITH HIGHEST PERSONAL REGARDS CHEDLI KLIBI SECRETARY GENERAL OF LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES.

ENDS.

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE,
MR KLIBI, TO THE PRIME MINISTER

The news of Israeli troop concentrations on the borders of Lebanon, which have been confirmed by American satellite observation, are particularly alarming.

A new Israeli attack preceded in recent days by the psychological preparations of world opinion based on false pretexts seems about to be launched.

If the threat becomes a reality, it will certainly bring chaos, deaths and destruction and will pose the gravest risk to peace.

Before the International Community is once again confronted with fait accompli I urge you to use your opinion and to intervene by any means you consider adequate so that the danger which appears imminent can be avoided.

With my highest consideration

Chedli Klibi

Secretary General of the Arab League

No. 61

12.30 p.m.

13 April 1982

THE MIDDLE EAST

In the course of their meeting on 12 April, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Mr Francis Pym, and Secretary of State Haig received reports of mounting tension in the Middle East and reviewed the situation there.

They attach the greatest importance to the maintenance of the ceasefire in Lebanon and to this end call on all parties to exercise the maximum restraint.

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

UNCLASSIFIED

Precedence/Deskby

IMMEDIATE

1 ZCZC
 2 GRS
 3 UNCLASSIFIED
 4
 5
 6 FM FCO Z APRIL 82
 7 TO IMMEDIATE TUNIS
 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
 9 INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, CAIRO
 10 INFO ROUTINE OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK
 11 Your telno. 63 (now being repeated to other addressees):
 12 ISRAEL/LEBANON : MESSAGES FROM KLIBI
 13 1. Please pass the following reply from me to Mr Klibi.
 14 Begins: Thank you for your message. I share your concern at
 15 the recent escalation of tension on the border between Israel and
 16 Lebanon. We are very conscious of the dangerous consequences of
 17 any outbreak of hostilities for the Middle East and West alike.
 18 You may have seen the statement put out here after my meeting
 19 earlier this week with Mr Haig. It is of the greatest importance
 20 that the ceasefire should be maintained. You can count on the
 21 support of the British Government to that end. We shall con-
 22 tinue to urge restraint on all the parties. I know we can rely
 23 on the Arab League to do the same. I look forward to meeting you
 24 in the near future. With best wishes. Francis Pym. Ends.
 25 2. The Prime Minister has also agreed that the following

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword <i>message reply</i>
File number	Dept NENAD	Distribution Middle East Standard
Drafted by (Block capitals) R O Miles		<u>Additional distribution:</u> Arab-Israel dispute
Telephone number 233 6048		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

UNCLASSIFIED

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reply should be sent from her to Mr Klibi. Begins: Thank you
for your message. ~~Francis Pym is replying in greater detail to~~
~~your message to him.~~ We very much share your concern about the
recent rise in tension between Israel and Lebanon. We attach
the greatest importance to the maintenance of the ceasefire in
Lebanon and shall continue to urge all parties to exercise
maximum restraint. Yours sincerely, Margaret Thatcher. Ends.

PYM
NNNN

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/

NNNN ends
telegram

BLANK

Catchword



12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1982

16 APR 1982



N° 059/SG/CI/CO-82

Jeddah, le 15 avril 1982

Son Excellence Mme Margaret THATCHER
Premier Ministre de Grande Bretagne
10, Downing Street,
L O N D R E S

Madame le Premier Ministre,

Au nom de 43 Etats Membres dont 22 Africains, nous vous serions reconnaissants d'user de votre autorité pour que le régime au pouvoir en Afrique du Sud ne mette pas en application son projet d'exécuter les 3 leaders Sud-Africains :

MM. Johnson LUBISI,
Naphtali MANANA, et
Petrus MASHIGO.

Comme vous le savez sans doute, ces trois personnalités ont agi dans le cadre politique de la défense des principes que nous nous sommes tous engagés à faire prévaloir dans le monde. Le délit pour lequel ils se voient si cruellement condamnés est non seulement un délit d'opinion, mais surtout une activité qui n'a pour objectif que le respect des principes et des valeurs contre toute forme de racisme et d'apartheid, condamnée d'ailleurs par la Communauté internationale.

Nous sommes convaincus que vous ne manquerez pas de prendre les mesures nécessaires afin de sauver ces trois victimes du combat combien noble, exaltant et légitime pour l'égalité des hommes et leur liberté.

. / 2

ORGANISATION
DE LA CONFÉRENCE ISLAMIQUE
SECRETARIAT GÉNÉRAL

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



ORGANISATION
OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE
GENERAL SECRETARIAT

مَنْظِمَةُ الْمَوْقِعِ الْإِسْلَامِيِّ
الْإِمْنَانَةُ الْعَامَّةُ

.2.

Je vous prie, Madame le Premier Ministre, de vouloir bien agréer les assurances de ma très haute considération.

Habib CHATTY

Secrétaire Général de l'Organisation
de la Conférence Islamique.





10 DOWNING STREET

~~C/W~~, Israel/Lebanon

Please see the attached.

I spoke to the Resident Clerk
about conflicting reports.

He said that intelligence
coming through suggested
covert operation by Israel
and that tanks had gone
over border and covered
up tracks afterwards. They
were possibly preparing the
ground for an attack.

Steve

12/4/82

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 15

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PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
MR J C MOBERLY

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CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 111800Z

FM WASHINGTON 111535Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1229 OF 11 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, CAIRO, UKMIS NEW YORK

ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. WEINBERGER TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT AN ISRAELI ATTACK IN SOUTHERN
LEBANON NOW LOOKED WELL NIGH INEVITABLE. BEGIN HAD SENT A MESSAGE
SAYING THAT HE WOULD BE UNABLE TO DEFER ACTION UNLESS HAIG WENT
FORTHWITH TO TEL AVIV.

HENDERSON

'ISRAEL WON'T ATTACK' - AMBASSADOR

TEL AVIV, SUNDAY -- THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR WAS QUOTED TODAY AS SAYING PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN HAS ASSURED HIM THAT ISRAEL HAD NOT DECIDED TO ATTACK THE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON. MR BEGIN AND U.S. AMBASSADOR SAMUEL LEWIS MET IN JERUSALEM FOR THREE HOURS AFTER MR BEGIN'S CABINET HELD A SIX-HOUR SESSION AMID HIGH TENSION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS.

THOUGH NO ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE AFTER THE CABINET MET, U.S. EMBASSY SPOKESMAN JEFF DIETRICH QUOTED MR LEWIS AS SAYING MR BEGIN TOLD HIM THE CABINET HAD NOT MADE A DECISION TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK.

MR BEGIN'S SPOKESMAN, URI PORAT, WOULD NOT COMMENT ON THE EMBASSY REPORT.

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2150

PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
MR J C MOBERLY

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DESKBY BEIRUT 130600Z

DESKBY DAMASCUS 130600Z

DESKBY WASHINGTON 121400Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 102305Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 438 OF 10 APRIL 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON,

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, CAIRO, JERUSALEM.

WASHINGTON TELNO 1205: ISRAEL/LEBANON.

1. THE LEBANESE PR HAS TODAY (10 APRIL) WRITTEN TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DRAWING HIS ATTENTION TO THE ISRAELI MILITARY BUILD UP IN NORTHERN ISRAEL AND TO REPORTS OF AN IMMINENT INVASION. TUENI DOES NOT ASK FOR AN IMMEDIATE MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT RESERVES HIS RIGHT TO DO SO IF THE "ESCALATION" CONTINUES.

WYTE

NNNN

File
(hang telegram sent to
FCO - no ack. needed)

Surp

MR. CHEDLI KLIBI

M/East

CF

31 March 1982

MIDDLE EAST

I enclose a telegram which the Prime Minister has received from the Secretary General of the Arab League, referring to the current situation in the Middle East and expressing the view that it is time for Europe to propose a just and durable solution for the Palestinian problem.

The Prime Minister would be grateful if a Minister from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office could reply in suitable terms.

A. J. COLES

F.N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

Lebanon



He Ks

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 February 1982

VISIT TO UK OF LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER

Thank you for your letter of 16 February containing the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's recommendation that the Lebanese Foreign Minister should if possible be invited to pay a courtesy call on the Prime Minister on either 30 June or 1 July.

The Prime Minister regrets that, owing to other commitments at that time, she is not able to receive Mr. Boutros.

A. J. COLES,

J. E. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

A

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John.

Please see FCO letter to
you dated 16/2/82. The PM appears
to have refused the Foreign Minister of
Lebanon a meeting. Could you confirm
that the FCO have been informed.

One

17/2/82.



Prime Minister

You could give him 30
minutes on 30 June at 5.00pm
(but you will have made a
statement that afternoon on the previous
day's European Council).

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Agree?

No

16 February 1982

Dear John,

A.J.C. 16.2

Visit to UK of Lebanese Foreign Minister

The Lebanese Foreign Minister, Mr Fuad Boutros, will be paying an official visit to Britain as Lord Carrington's guest from 29 June to 2 July.

This will be the first official visit to Britain by a Lebanese Foreign Minister. The Lebanese Ambassador has put in a strong plea that Mr Boutros should be received by the Prime Minister. Lord Carrington supports this request. Lebanon is facing particularly severe difficulties at present. Arab efforts to restore peace between the various heavily armed factions have so far failed, and there have been frequent outbreaks of fighting in recent months. In the South, the Israeli-supported forces of Major Haddad continue to defy both the central government and UN resolutions calling for the deployment of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) down to the Israel/Lebanon border. We have frequently stated our support for Lebanon while being unable to offer her any practical help. But gestures of moral support are also important. An invitation to Mr Boutros to call on the Prime Minister during his visit would demonstrate that we take Lebanon's problems seriously and are genuinely sympathetic to the government's plight. Lord Carrington therefore recommends that if possible Mr Boutros should be invited to pay a courtesy call on either 30 June or 1 July.

Mr Boutros, like other Lebanese Ministers, is a technocrat not a political leader. He has a keen lawyer's brain and is crisp to deal with. His English is competent.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary


A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street



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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 072310Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1472 OF 7 DECEMBER 1981
 INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON,
 INFO DAMASCUS, CAIRO, PARIS, JEDDA.

M.

MY TELNO 1369: SOUTH LEBANON/UNIFIL

1. THE SECRETARIAT HAVE TOLD US THAT THERE WAS A FURTHER SERIOUS INCIDENT ON HILL 880 LAST NIGHT (6/7 DECEMBER). IN THE COURSE OF THE EVENING, SOME OF HADDAD'S MEN CHARGED THE HILL AND WERE TURNED BACK AS THEY APPROACHED THE WIRE ENCLOSING THE TOP. REPEATED ATTEMPTS WERE MADE OVER A PERIOD OF TWO HOURS IN THE COURSE OF WHICH THE IRISH THREW HADDAD'S MEN BODILY OFF THE HILL. THE HADDAD APC ON THE HILL WAS USED TO TRY TO BREACH THE WIRE. TANK FIRE FROM BEIT YAHOUN WAS DIRECTED AT IRISH POSITIONS AND SEVERAL HADDAD APCS WERE MOVED INTO THE VICINITY. SHORTLY AFTER 0100Z THIS MORNING, FOUR OF HADDAD'S MEN MANAGED TO REACH THE TOP OF THE HILL WHILE A GREAT DEAL OF SMALL ARMS FIRE WAS DIRECTED AT THE IRISH (IT WAS NOT RETURNED). SEVEN OF HADDAD'S MEN ALREADY THERE WERE WITHDRAWN.

2. DAYAL SAID THAT THE USUAL MESSAGES HAD BEEN SENT TO EYTAN (WHOM CALLAGHAN SAW AGAIN LAST WEEK) AND TO THE AMERICANS. THE ISRAELI MISSION WERE UNHAPPY AT THIS LATEST DEVELOPMENT, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE IMMINENT ISSUE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S SIX-MONTHLY REPORT ON UNIFIL. DAYAL SAID THAT THE INCIDENT WAS PARTICULARLY ALARMING AND THAT IT WAS LUCKLY NO-ONE HAD BEEN KILLED.

3. MEANWHILE, THE PRESENT UNIFIL MANDATE EXPIRES ON 19 DECEMBER. THE LEBANESE AMBASSADOR ASKED LAST WEEK THAT THE RENEWAL DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE PLACE ON 10 DECEMBER: APPARENTLY, TUENI DOES NOT WANT IT TO BE OVERSHADOWED BY ACTIVITY IN THE COUNCIL LATER IN THE MONTH TO ELECT A NEW SECRETARY GENERAL. DAYAL DOUBTED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HOLD THE MEETING AS EARLY AS 10 DECEMBER SINCE WALDHEIM HAD STILL NOT APPROVED THE UNIFIL REPORT. NOR HAD TUENI YET CONVEYED HIS GOVERNMENT'S AGREEMENT TO THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THE FORCE. URQUHART WAS TRYING TO DISCOURAGE TUENI FROM COMING FORWARD WITH FURTHER GRANDIOSE PLANS, OR FROM MAKING LEBANESE APPROVAL OF AN EXTENSION CONDITIONAL ON AN INCREASE IN THE SIZE OF THE FORCE. BUT HABIB WOULD BE IN BEIRUT ON 8 DECEMBER, WHICH MIGHT ENCOURAGE THE LEBANESE TO OVERBID.

4. WE SHALL SPEAK TO THE LEBANESE TO TRY TO FIND OUT WHAT THEY HAVE IN MIND.

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MR J C MOBERLY

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FM BEIRUT 170945Z NOV
TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.
TELEGRAM NUMBER 418 OF 17 NOVEMBER 1981
INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, JEDDA, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKREP BRUSSELS, PARIS, ROME.

UKMIS TEL NO 1248 OF 16 NOVEMBER: LEBANON.

1. I DO NOT WISH TO BE ALARMIST BUT THE MORE I LOOK AT THE CONJUNCTURE OF THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH, THE FAHD PLAN, THE

ARAB SUMMIT, AND OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI FORCE THE LESS I LIKE IT.
2. WHAT I FEAR IN PARTICULAR IS PROVOCATIVE ACTION BY THE EXTREMIST PALESTINIANS OR INDEED THE ISRAELIS. THERE IS NOW A CAPITAL OPPORTUNITY FOR THE HARD MEN ANYWHERE IN THE REGION TO UPSET THE ENTIRE PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE. I IMAGINE SUCH ACTION WOULD SUIT THE ISRAELI HAWKS.

UPSET THE ENTIRE PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE. I IMAGINE SUCH ACTION WOULD SUIT THE ISRAELI HAWKS.

3. ALL THAT IS NEEDED IS FOR SOMEONE TO GIVE THE ISRAELIS THE EXCUSE, PERHAPS BY USING KATYUSHAS ON A KIBBUTZ, TO LAUNCH A HEAVY MILITARY ACTION IN SOUTH LEBANON. THIS WOULD ENABLE THE EXTREMISTS HERE AND IN THE REST OF THE ARAB WORLD TO SAY THEY MUST HAVE ACTED WITH AMERICAN CONSENT AS A RESULT OF THE "STRATEGIC CONSENSUS" SEMI COLON AND WOULD ALSO DISCREDIT ANY FUTURE AMERICAN INITIATIVE. IT WOULD ALSO PREJUDICE THE PROSPECTS FOR THE FAHD PLAN OR INDEED ANY OTHER MODERATE INITIATIVE. INDEED IT WOULD JUSTIFY WHAT SEEMS TO BE THE FUNDAMENTAL SYRIAN THESIS, NAMELY THAT THE TIME IS NOT RIPE FOR ANY MOVE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB/ISRAELI PROBLEM BECAUSE THE STRATEGIC BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS WRONG ON ACCOUNT OF THE DEFECTION OF EGYPT.

4. I IMAGINE A FURTHER RESULT OF SUCH AN ACTION MIGHT BE TO GIVE THE ISRAELIS A PRETEXT FOR NOT WITHDRAWING FROM SINAI ON THE DATE PROVIDED FOR UNDER CAMP DAVID. THIS IN TURN WOULD UNDERMINE THE POSITION OF HUSNI MUBARAK. FROM HERE THIS CAN ONLY BE SPECULATION BUT IT SEEMS ALL TOO PLAUSIBLE.

5. THE LOCAL EFFECT WOULD CERTAINLY BE BAD. THE AFUC IS ALREADY NEARLY AT A STANDSTILL AND ISRAELI ACTION IN THE SOUTH OF LEBANON EVEN IF EVERYONE KNEW IN THEIR HEARTS THAT IT HAD BEEN PROVOKED BY THE ARABS, WOULD GIVE THE SYRIANS A HEAVEN-SENT EXCUSE TO DO NOTHING UNTIL THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS HERE HAD BEEN ARRANGED TO THEIR SATISFACTION.

6. I CAN THINK OF NO ACTION ON OUR PART WHICH WOULD IN ITSELF STOP SUCH A TRAIN OF EVENTS. I STAND READY TO URGE RESTRAINT ON THE MAIN-LINE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP, IF YOU WISH TO INSTRUCT ME IN THAT SENSE SEMI COLON BUT, AS THEY WILL NOT FAIL TO POINT OUT, THE MATTER IS NOT REALLY IN THEIR GIFT. WE COULD, HOWEVER, POSTPONE THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT WE WERE GOING TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SINAI FORCE TILL AFTER THE ARAB SUMMIT. SEEN FROM HERE THAT WOULD DO NO HARM AND MIGHT INDEED BE HELPFUL. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT IT BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED.

7. F.C.O. PLEASE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

ROBERTS

GRS 660
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PS TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 162323Z NOV 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1248 OF 16 NOVEMBER 1981

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, ROUTINE WASHINGTON, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV

INFO SAVING JEDDA, AMMAN, CAIRO, PARIS

MY TELNO 1242: LEBANON

1. THE SECRETARIAT ARE BAFFLED BY REPORTS IN THE NEW YORK TIMES OF A SPEECH BY ARAFAT TO PALESTINIAN STUDENTS ON 14 NOVEMBER IN WHICH HE SAID THAT HE HAD TURNED DOWN A UN REQUEST FOR HEAVY WEAPONRY OT BE REMOVED FROM THE TYRE POCKET AND HAD INFORMED THE UN THAT HE ALSO REJECTED A PROPOSAL TO INCREASE THE SIZE OF UNIFIL FROM 6,000 TO 7,200: SUCH PROPOSALS WERE PART OF AMERICAN DESIGNS TO WEAKEN THE PLO. (IN THE COURSE OF A WIDE RANGING SPEECH, ARAFAT IS ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT:

- (A) HE HAD TOLD THE ARAB LEAGUE THAT THE PLO WOULD ACCEPT NO CURBS ON THE FLOW OF WEAPONS TO ALL FACTIONS IN LEBANON;
- (B) WHILE THE FAHAD PLAN CONTAINED POSITIVE ELEMENTS, HE HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT SOME OF ITS ASPECTS. HE DID NOT AGREE THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE LIMITED TO TERRITORY SEIZED IN 1967. RECOGNITION AT THIS STAGE OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST WOULD WEAKEN THE PLO'S NEGOTIATING POSITION AT ANY FUTURE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST.
- (C) HE HAD INSISTED WITH THE SAUDIS THAT THE RUSSIANS SHOULD TAKE PART IN MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS AND HAD ADVISED THEM TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW.

2. DAYAL WAS INCLINED TO ATTRIBUTE ARAFAT'S REMARKS TO THE PRESSURES OF THE FORTHCOMING ARAB SUMMIT AND THE PLO TENDENCY TO SEE THE HAND OF THE AMERICANS IN EVERYTHING. DAYAL SAID THAT THE PLO HAD NOT SPOKEN TO THE UN IN SIMILAR TERMS HERE OR IN BEIRUT. HE DID NOT WANT TO MAKE TOO MUCH OF ARAFAT'S SPEECH, WHICH THE SECRETARIAT WOULD TRY TO PLAY DOWN IF QUESTIONED ABOUT IT.

3. DAYAL SAID THAT, MEANWHILE, LAST WEEKEND HAD BEEN THE WORST FOR SOME TIME IN THE UNIFIL AREA. ON 13 NOVEMBER, THERE HAD BEEN AN EXPLOSION NEAR RSHAF IN THE IRISH SECTOR, WHERE HADDAD FORCES HAVE ENCROACHED, IN WHICH HADDAD SAID THAT THREE OF HIS MEN HAD BEEN KILLED. IN RETALIATION, HADDAD HAD THE SAME DAY MOVED A TANK, AN ARMOURD PERSONNEL CARRIER AND 14 MEN TO HILL 888, ALSO IN THE IRISH SECTOR (NEAR AT-TIRI, WHERE SEVERAL IRISH SOLDIERS WERE KILLED IN A PREVIOUS INCIDENT). THEY HAD BEEN SURROUNDED BY UNIFIL AND HADDAD HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT NO RESUPPLY OR REINFORCEMENT WOULD BE PERMITTED.

4. ON 14 NOVEMBER, HADDAD HAD ESCALATED THE SITUATION. HIS MEN HAD:
A) ENTERED OP HIN:

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/B)

CONFIDENTIAL

- B) TAKEN NORWEGIAN POST 5.1, NIGERIAN POST 3.26 AND GHANAIAN POST 8.2. THE LATTER TWO ARE IN THE HADDAD ENCLAVE;
- C) PUT A TANK OPPOSITE THE SWEDISH MEDICAL COMPANY AT NAQOURA, WITH ITS GUN POINTING AT THE MEDICAL POST;
- D) CLOSED ROADS IN THE AREA AND INSTRUCTED SHOPKEEPERS TO SHUT THEIR SHOPS;
- E) THREATENED TO SEND HIS MILITIA TO RELIEVE HILL 880.

5. DAYAL SAID THAT BY THE END OF 15 NOVEMBER HADDAD FORCES HAD WITHDRAWN FROM A) AND B) ABOVE (EXCEPT FOR THE GHANAIAN POST), AND A UN PRESENCE HAD BEEN RE-ESTABLISHED. NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONTINUING ABOUT THE NEW HADDAD POSITION ON HILL 880. UNIFIL HAD NOT ALLOWED FOOD IN BUT HAD THEMSELVES FED THOSE ON HILL 880.

6. DAYAL SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN TWO MEETINGS WITH HADDAD TODAY (16 NOVEMBER). HIS POSITION WAS THAT HE WANTED A PERMANENT POSITION ON HILL 880. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE UN ALLOWING THIS.

7. DAYAL SAID THAT THE UN HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE ISRAELIS AND AMERICANS TO ASK THEM TO HELP DEFUSE THE PROBLEM. THE SITUATION WAS NOW QUIET BUT EXTREMELY TENSE. LAST NIGHT THERE HAD BEEN AN EXCHANGE OF ARTILLERY FIRE BETWEEN MARJAYOUN AND THE PLO POSITION AT MAHMOUDIYE.

8. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO NENAD.

9. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING JEDDA, AMMAN, CAIRO AND PARIS.

PARSONS

(ADVANCED AS REQUESTED)

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

STANDARD

NENAD
MED
NAD
UND
EESD
ECD
WED
RID

MAED
ES & SD
ERD
ESID

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

PART 1 ends:-

17. 9. 87

PART 2 begins:-

16. 11. 87

