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PREM 19/843

PART 9

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FILING

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

MIDDLE EAST

PART 1: MAY 1979

PART 9: Dec 1983

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
14-12-81		10-2-82					
17-12-81		11-2-82					
21-12-81		16-2-82					
30-12-81		18-2-82					
31-12-81		24-2-82					
2-1-82		5-3-82					
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28-1-82		19-4-82					
29-1-82		21-4-82					
1-2-82		22-4-82					
3-2-82							
4-2-82							

PREM 19/84/3

PART 9 ends:-

FCO to AJC 21/4

PART 10 begins:-

FCO to AJC 22/4

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MEAT

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 April 1982

[Handwritten squiggle]

Prime Minister

A.F.C. 2/4

t-a. 22/4

Dear John,

Shooting Incident at the Dome of the Rock Mosque: Statement
by the Israeli Prime Minister

The Israeli Embassy delivered, on 19 April, a statement by Mr Begin about the shooting incident at the Dome of the Rock Mosque (or Temple Mount) in East Jerusalem in which two Palestinians were killed and several others wounded. I enclose a copy of the statement, which the Embassy were instructed to deliver to the Prime Minister.

The statement is cast in emotional terms. The accusations against other Arab countries are exaggerated and not relevant to this particular incident. The Arabs would no doubt respond by pointing to eg Israeli attacks on Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.

You will have seen UKMis New York telegrams nos 508-9 reporting the outcome of the Security Council debate and our explanation of vote which, despite our positive vote on the text, questioned the need for a resolution on this kind of incident.

Yours ever

[Handwritten signature: John Holmes]

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing St



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN
LONDON W8 4QB
Telephone: 01-937 8050

שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

Statement by the Prime Minister's Office

15th April 1982

History will record that during the days of Passover, 5742 - April 1982 - the forces of black reaction perpetrated a blood libel against the Jewish People in its homeland, while the civilised, democratic world once again stood by and remained silent.

A sick man ascended the Temple Mount, sacred to the three monotheistic religions, opened fire, and killed and wounded innocent people. He was arrested and will be brought to trial, in accordance with the law of the land.

This human tragedy has been exploited in order to convene a special session of the Security Council, where despicable charges against the People of Israel are being voiced. Who are those attempting to place an entire nation in the dock on account of the crime of one, mentally-ill man? They are:

Syria: Its government has slaughtered thousands of Christians, women and children, in Lebanon. Several weeks ago it destroyed dozens of mosques and massacred thousands of civilians - men, women and infants - in the city of Hama.

Jordan: In order to be rid of the organisation called the PLO, heavy artillery of this nation shelled refugee camps and killed thousands of their residents - men, women and little children.



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שגרירות ישראל
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Iraq: This nation started a war of aggression against its neighbour and, despite its failure in (conducting) this war, has already caused thousands of soldiers and civilians - on both sides of the front - to lose their lives.

Iran: This nation has reintroduced the darkness of the Middle Ages into our time - tortured mercilessly in its dungeons, and executed thousands of civilians, man and women.

Saudi Arabia: Hands are still cut off, in accordance with "court sentences", in this nation, and it is ruled by one family of predatory princes.

A Moslem citizen of Turkey attempted to assassinate the Head of the Catholic Church, attacked His Holiness Pope John Paul II, and seriously wounded him. Was this man's nationality or religion accused of this crime?

Only when the Jewish People is concerned is the guilt of one person turned into the source of incitement against many, against his nation.


There are accomplices to the inciters in the Security Council, and besides the voice of truth of Israel's representative, the voice of human civilisation and freedom has not yet been heard.

But let the enemies of Israel, wherever they may be, take note: The days when the Jewish People was defenceless and paid with rivers of blood of its sons on account of false libels brought against it by evil men - these days are gone, never to return.

* * *

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12 APR 1982



MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 15

ADVANCE COPY

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PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR MOBERLY

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 202337Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 509 OF 20 APRIL 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, AMMAN,

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, CG JERUSALEM, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, JEDDA, RABAT,

INFO SAVING PARIS, ALL OTHER ARAB POSTS, UKDEL UNESCO PARIS.

MIPT: SECURITY COUNCIL: DOME OF THE ROCK.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY EXPLANATION OF VOTE:

MR PRESIDENT

MY GOVERNMENT, LIKE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, WAS DEEPLY SHOCKED BY THE DREADFUL CRIME COMMITTED AT THE DOME OF THE ROCK ON 11 APRIL. WE ARE GREATLY SADDENED BY THE INJURIES AND LOSS OF LIFE WHICH OCCURRED AND WISH TO EXTEND OUR SINCERE CONDOLENCES TO ALL THOSE WHO WERE INJURED OR BEREAVED.

ALL OF US IN THE COUNCIL RECOGNISE AND ARE DEEPLY CONSCIOUS OF THE GREAT DEPTH OF FEELING WHICH ATTACHES TO ALL MATTERS CONCERNING THE HOLY PLACES IN JERUSALEM. THIS FEELING HAS FOUND EXPRESSION IN MANY OF THE STATEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE DEBATE. WE GREATLY REGRET THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE COUNCIL TO HAVE REACHED

THE HOLY PLACES IN JERUSALEM. THIS FEELING HAS FOUND EXPRESSION IN MANY OF THE STATEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE DEBATE. WE GREATLY REGRET THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE COUNCIL TO HAVE REACHED^{IN} CONSENSUS ON A DRAFT RESOLUTION AND IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES I THINK THAT WE NEED TO ASK OURSELVES WHETHER IN THIS CASE THE INTERESTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WERE BEST SERVED BY HAVING A RESOLUTION AT ALL.

MY GOVERNMENT VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION BECAUSE WE WISHED TO ASSOCIATE OURSELVES WITH THE CONDEMNATION OF THE ACT OF SACRILEGE WHICH OCCURRED. WE DID SO HOWEVER ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE RESOLUTION CANNOT PREJUDGE THE FACTS OF THE INCIDENT WHICH WE UNDERSTAND IS UNDER INVESTIGATION. WE TAKE FULL NOTE IN THIS CONTEXT OF THE CLEAR STATEMENT BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAVE PROMPTLY AND VIGOROUSLY CONDEMNED THE CRIME AND THAT THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL AND JEWISH PEOPLE AROUND THE WORLD SHARE THE SENSE OF REVULSION AT THE DESPICABLE ACT.

I SHOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE MY GOVERNMENT'S FIRM VIEW THAT THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION OF 12 AUGUST 1949 IS APPLICABLE TO ALL THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967, INCLUDING EAST JERUSALEM. WE HAVE FREQUENTLY MADE CLEAR OUR CONDEMNATION OF ISRAELI PRACTICES BOTH IN EAST JERUSALEM AND OTHER OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE RECOGNISE THAT THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES HAVE IN GENERAL FULFILLED THEIR OBLIGATIONS ON ACCESS TO THE HOLY PLACES.

MORE WIDELY, I SHOULD LIKE TO REITERATE MY GOVERNMENT'S RECOGNITION, EXPRESSED IN THE VENICE DECLARATION OF 13 JUNE 1980, OF THE SPECIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM FOR ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED. MY GOVERNMENT ADHERES TO THE POSITION SET OUT IN THAT DECLARATION THAT IT WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY UNILATERAL INITIATIVE DESIGNED TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM AND THAT ANY AGREEMENT ON THE CITY'S STATUS SHOULD GUARANTEE FREEDOM OF ACCESS FOR EVERYONE TO THE HOLY PLACES.

FCO PASS SAVING TO PARIS, UKDEL UNESCO PARIS, ABU DHABI, ADEN, ALGIERS, BAGHDAD, BAHRAIN, DOHA, DUBAI, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, MUSCAT, SANAA, TRIPOLI AND TUNIS.

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PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR MOBERLY

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 202335Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 508 OF 20 APRIL 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, AMMAN,

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, CG JERUSALEM, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, JEDDA,
RABAT,

INFO SAVING PARIS, ALL OTHER ARAB POSTS, UKDEL UNESCO PARIS.

YOUR TELNO 275 (NOT TO ALL) AND TELECON HUMFREY/CHAPLIN: SECURITY COUNCIL; DOME OF THE ROCK

1. AFTER INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS THIS MORNING THE COUNCIL MOVED QUICKLY TO A VOTE. THERE WERE NO FURTHER CHANGES IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. THE VOTE WAS 14-1(US)-0, THE RESOLUTION FAILING BECAUSE OF THE US VETO (THEIR THIRD ON THE MIDDLE EAST THIS YEAR).
2. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF STATEMENTS BEFORE AND AFTER THE VOTE. THE TEXT OF MY EXPLANATION OF VOTE IS IN MIFT.

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THE TEXT OF MY EXPLANATION OF VOTE IS IN MIFT.

3. SPEAKING BEFORE THE VOTE, DE NANTEUIL (FRANCE) CONDEMNED THE ATTACK ON THE DOME OF THE ROCK AND CALLED FOR THOSE RESPONSIBLE TO BE PUNISHED. HE SAID THAT ISRAEL SHOULD ENSURE THAT SUCH ACTS WERE NOT REPEATED AND SHOULD ABIDE BY THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION. NISHIBORI (JAPAN) HOPED THAT ISRAEL WOULD FULFIL ITS RESPONSIBILITIES OF PROTECTING AND SAFEGUARDING THE HOLY PLACES. KARRAN (GUYANA) SAID THAT THE DEED SHOULD BE VIEWED IN THE CONTEXT OF ISRAELI REPRESSION. KAMANDA (ZAIRE) SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD ALSO SUPPORT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION THOUGH WITHOUT NECESSARILY LINKING THE ACT OF SACRILEGE TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT.

4. BLUM (ISRAEL) SAID THAT THE DEBATE HAD BEEN A GLARING EXAMPLE OF THE DOUBLE STANDARDS OF THE ARABS AND THEIR FELLOW TRAVELLERS (OF WHOM HE ATTACKED POLAND AND UGANDA BY NAME). THE DRAFT RESOLUTION SOUGHT TO ASSOCIATE ISRAEL WITH THE LONE ACT OF AN INDIVIDUAL. THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD IGNORED SEVERAL ARAB ACTS OF RELIGIOUS DESECRATION BUT WITH TYPICAL HYPOCRISY WAS SINGLING OUT ISRAEL.

5. MRS KIRKPATRICK (US) SAID THAT THE US PROFOUNDLY REGRETTED AND CONDEMNED THE ACT OF SACRILEGE AND SHE QUOTED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PRESS STATEMENT ABOUT IT. HOWEVER THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WOULD ONLY EMBITTER PEOPLE IN THE REGION AND MAKE NEW ACTS OF VIOLENCE MORE LIKELY. IT CONTAINED LANGUAGE WHICH IMPLIED THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACT OF VIOLENCE AND ALSO THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT CO-OPERATING WITH THE SUPREME MOSLEM COUNCIL. THE US HAD THEREFORE DECIDED TO VOTE NO. THEIR VOTE DID NOT AFFECT THE LONGSTANDING US POSITION ON JERUSALEM WHICH WAS THAT THE FINAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM COULD ONLY BE DETERMINED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS AMONG ALL CONCERNED PARTIES.

6. DORR (IRELAND) NOTED ISRAELI CONDEMNATION OF THE DEED WHILE AGREEING WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION OVINNOKOV (USSR) SAID THAT THIS THIRD US VETO ON THE MIDDLE EAST SHOWED THAT THE US WOULD NOT RESTRAIN ISRAEL IN ANY WAY. THE US HAD ALSO VOTED AGAINST THE RESOLUTION BECAUSE IT DID NOT RECOGNISE THAT EAST JERUSALEM WAS OCCUPIED TERRITORY AND BECAUSE IT HAD ABANDONED THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NON-RECOGNITION OF ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE. THE VOTE WAS THE OUTCOME OF THE US AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC CO-OPERATION WITH ISRAEL. HE WARNED ARAB COUNTRIES THAT THE US WAS LOOKING FOR BASES IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN PURSUANCE OF THIS POLICY.

7. DORR (IRELAND) THANKED THE US FOR ITS VOTE WHICH HE SAID UNPACKED

OF THIS POLICY.

7. TERZI (PLO) THANKED THE US FOR ITS VOTE WHICH HE SAID UNM. THE TRUE DESIGNS OF THE US ADMINISTRATION. HE ATTACKED US FAIL TO STATE THAT THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION APPLIED TO EAST JERUSALEM. THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO PAY A PRICE FOR ITS HOSTILE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PALESTINIANS AND THE ARAB PEOPLE. FOR THEIR PART, THE PALESTINIANS WOULD CONSIDER IT THEIR RIGHT AND DUTY TO CONTINUE TO RESIST ISRAELI OCCUPATION BY ALL MEANS INCLUDING STRIKES, STONE THROWING AND EVEN EXPLOSIVES. ZENTAR (MOROCCO) CLOSED THE DEBATE ON A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTE BY REITERATING KING HASSAN'S STATEMENT THAT IT WAS ONLY THROUGH TOLERANCE AND THE MUTUAL RESPECT OF ALL MEN OF GOOD FAITH THAT THE PROBLEM OF JERUSALEM WOULD BE SOLVED.

8. THE DEBATE HAS LEFT A RAW ATMOSPHERE. THE US MISSION, WHO HAD BEEN HOPING UP UNTIL THIS MORNING TO BE INSTRUCTED TO ABSTAIN, ARE DEPRESSED BY THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS THIRD SUCCESSIVE VETO. THEY RECOGNISE THAT A VETO CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED BY THE RELATIVELY MILD LANGUAGE OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AND THEY ASSUME THAT WASHINGTON DECIDED, UNDER INTENSE ISRAELI PRESSURE, THAT NOT TO VETO COULD JEOPARDISE ISRAEL'S COMMITMENT TO THE SINAI WITHDRAWAL. THE JORDANIANS HAVE TOLD US THAT WHILE THEY UNDERSTAND THE POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS UNDER WHICH THE AMERICANS WERE OPERATING, THE MODERATE ARABS WERE NEVERTHELESS VERY DISAPPOINTED THAT THEIR CONSIDERABLE EFFORTS TO PRODUCE A MODERATE TEXT FOR THE AMERICANS SHOULD HAVE ENDED IN ITS TOTAL REJECTION: THE MORE SO SINCE THIS HAS DAMAGED THEIR CREDIBILITY IN THE ARAB GROUP. IRONICALLY, MRS KIRKPATRICK FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE DEBATE ON THE IRAQI REACTOR LAST SUMMER, DID ALL SHE POSSIBLY COULD TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE ARABS. SHE WAS OBVIOUSLY VERY DISAPPOINTED WITH THE OUTCOME. THE US MISSION IS RESIGNED TO BECOMING THE GENERAL WHIPPING BOY IN THE LARGE NUMBER OF SPEECHES LIKELY TO BE MADE HERE IN THE RESUMED 7TH EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION ON PALESTINE WHICH OPENED TODAY (28 APRIL).

F C O PLEASE PASS SAVING TO PARIS, UKDEL UNESCO PARIS, ABU DHABI, ADEN, ALGIERS, BAGHDAD, BAHRAIN, DOHA, DUBAI, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, MUSCAT, SANAA, TRIPOLI, TUNIS.

PARSONS

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PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR MOBERLY

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FROM TEL AVIV 201455Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 166 OF 20 APRIL 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PRIORITY CAIRO, AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS,
JERUSALEM AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

CAIRO TELEGRAM NUMBER 171: EGYPT/ISRAEL

1. WHEN STOESSEL RETURNS HERE TONIGHT HE WILL HAVE ANOTHER MEETING WITH BEGIN. THEREAFTER THE ISRAELI CABINET ARE DUE TO TAKE A FINAL DECISION ON WITHDRAWAL TOMORROW (21 APRIL).
2. THE ACCOUNT THE US EMBASSY (HARE) HAVE GIVEN US OF STOESSEL'S TALKS HERE WAS A BIT LESS EUPHORIC THAN THE PRESS REPORTS. HARE SAID THAT, WHILE STOESSEL HAD MANAGED TO PARE DOWN THE PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE ISRAELIS, SUBSTANTIAL DIFFICULTIES REMAINED, PRINCIPALLY IN THE POLITICAL FIELD AND OVER TABA. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT REMAINING DIFFICULTIES COULD BE PAPERED OVER, HE BELIEVED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD GO AHEAD WITH WITHDRAWAL ON TIME, THOUGH THERE WAS A 10/20 PERCENT CHANCE THAT THE CABINET MIGHT DECIDE TO DELAY IT. BEGIN WAS ON THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS BUT NEEDED SOMETHING POSITIVE TO SHOW. IT WAS ALSO CONCEIVABLE THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT DELAY TAKING A FINAL DECISION UNTIL LATER IN THE WEEK.
3. ON POLITICAL RELATIONS, HARE SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD WANTED THE EGYPTIANS IN EFFECT TO DISAVOW MEGUID'S ELEVEN POINT

3. ON POLITICAL RELATIONS, HARE SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD WANTED THE EGYPTIANS IN EFFECT TO DISAVOW MEGUID'S ELEVEN POINT STATEMENT IN KUWAIT SEMICOLON BUT THEY REALISED THAT THIS WAS NOT FEASIBLE AND HAD RETREATED TO THE POINT WHERE THEY WOULD ACCEPT A REAFFIRMATION OF THE COMMITMENT OF ALL THREE PARTIES TO THE AUTONOMY PROCESS. THE MAIN PROBLEM HERE WAS NOT WORDING, BUT RATHER MUBARAK'S UNWILLINGNESS TO SIGN ANYTHING UNDER ISRAELI PRESSURE. HOWEVER, HARE THOUGHT IT WAS HELPFUL THAT KAMAL HASSAN ALI AND BOUTROS GHALI HAD BEEN HERE TO SEE THE STRENGTH OF ISRAELI FEELING ON THIS POINT. VERBAL REASSURANCES (PARAGRAPH 2D OF CAIRO TELEGRAM 171 UNDER REFERENCE) WOULD NOT DO. HARE SEEMED TO BE THINKING OF A THREE SIDED EXCHANGE OF LETTERS, BUT THE ISRAELI PRESS MENTION A POSSIBLE LETTER FROM REAGAN TO BEGIN AND MUBARAK.

4. HARE SAID THAT TABA CONTINUED TO PROVE DIFFICULT. HIS ACCOUNT SQUARED WITH PARAGRAPH 2A OF CAIRO TUR ALTHOUGH HE ADDED THAT THE EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELIS ALSO DISAGREED ON WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE ANY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE NEUTRAL ZONE (IE THE HALF-BUILT HOTEL) DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. HE APPEARED TO BE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE MFO WOULD POLICE IT IN ANY CASE, THOUGH THE MFO THEMSELVES HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED OR INFORMED. HARE SAID THAT A COMMITTEE WOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO DECIDE ON CONCILIATION/ARBITRATION PROCEDURES, AND TO AGREE ON WHICH COUNTRIES WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE.

5. AS REGARDS ISRAEL'S COMPLAINTS ABOUT GUN RUNNING TO GAZA HARE SAID THAT THE CHIEF OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN EGYPT HAD BEEN HERE AT THE END OF LAST WEEK TO REASSURE THE ISRAELIS. A MEMBER OF MY STAFF WHO RETURNED FROM CAIRO BY ROAD RECENTLY CONFIRMS THAT STRINGENT CHECKS ARE NOW IN OPERATION ON THE EGYPTIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER.

6. ON ALLEGED BREACHES OF FORCE LEVELS IN SINAI, HARE SAID THAT THE SINAI FIELD MISSION HAD GIVEN THE EGYPTIANS A FAIRLY CLEAN BILL OF HEALTH. THE AMERICANS FELT THAT, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE MERITS OF ISRAELI COMPLAINTS, EGYPT WOULD NOT ALLOW THIS KIND OF PROBLEM TO BE A STUMBLING BLOCK.

7. MEANWHILE THE ISRAELI ARMY HAS BEGUN TO EVICT REMAINING SETTLERS AND SQUATTERS FROM THE YAMIT AREA. UP TO 20,000 TROOPS ARE SAID TO BE INVOLVED. THE GOING MAY WELL GET VERY ROUGH SEMICOLON THE SQUATTERS ARE THREATENING TO USE CHILDREN IN THE FRONT LINE AND ONE GROUP OF EXTREMISTS IS THREATENING TO COMMIT SUICIDE. BUT THE EXCLUSION OF THE ISRAELI AND FOREIGN PRESS FROM THE AREA MAY HELP TO AVOID THE WORST EXCESSES SINCE PAST EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT THE STOP

OF THE ISRAELI AND FOREIGN PRESS FROM THE AREA MAY HELP TO AVOID THE WORST EXCESSES SINCE PAST EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT THE STOP THE WITHDRAWAL MOVEMENT PLAY TO THE CAMERAS.

8. FOR ISRAELIS THESE LAST DAYS BEFORE THE 25 APRIL DEADLINE ARE LIKE STANDING ON THE EDGE OF AN ICY POOL BEFORE JUMPING IN. THEY KNOW THEY HAVE TO DO IT BUT ARE ALL NERVES BEFOREHAND. I STILL THINK THEY WILL TAKE THE PLUNGE.

MOBERLY

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OO UKREP BRUSSELS

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CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 291400Z

FROM TEL AVIV 291255Z MAR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 122 OF 29 MARCH 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE JERUSALEM, UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)
PRIORITY BEIRUT, AMMAN, ROUTINE DAMASCUS, JEDDA, CAIRO AND
UKMIS NEW YORK.

INFOR SAVING WASHINGTON, PARIS AND UKREP BRUSSELS.

FROM PRENDERGAST IN AMBASSADOR'S ABSENCE

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 91: WEST BANK

1. I SPOKE ACCORDINGLY TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE EUROPE II DEPARTMENT
AT THE MFA THIS MORNING (29 MARCH).

2. GANOR SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD NO OBJECTION TO THE PROPOSED
CONTACTS BETWEEN SIR J LEAHY AND FREIJ AND SHAWA, BUT CALLS ON SHAKAA
AND KHALAF WERE UNACCEPTABLE. THE DISMISSED MAYORS REPRESENTED NO
ONE. THEY HAD BEEN DISMISSED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF JORDANIAN LAW
BECAUSE THEY WERE DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR INCITEMENT TO VIOLENCE
AND FOR THE RECENT TROUBLES. HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE
DECISION TO MEET THEM COULD BE RECONSIDERED.

3. I SAID THAT I HAD ALREADY REPORTED TO YOU THE ISRAELI REACTION
TO THE PROPOSED MEETINGS. THAT WAS WHY THE ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN
ALTERED SO THAT CONTACT WITH SHAKAA AND KHALAF WOULD BE ON THE
MORNING OF 2 APRIL, AFTER YOUR VISIT HAD ENDED. I DID NOT BELIEVE
THAT YOUR DECISION COULD BE FURTHER REFINED. IN ANY CASE THE CAT
WAS OUT OF THE BAG. THE ARRANGEMENTS HAD ALREADY LEAKED IN THE
JERUSALEM POST (THIS IS AN UNFORTUNATE DISCOURTESY). I ASKED
WHAT "UNACCEPTABLE" MEANT IN PRACTICAL TERMS.

4. GANOR REFUSED TO BE DRAWN. WE WOULD SEE WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES WERE IF THE DECISION WAS NOT RECONSIDERED. I REPEATED THAT IN MY VIEW WE WERE NOW PAST THAT STAGE. I DID NOT SEE HOW YOUR DECISION COULD BE RECONSIDERED.

5. GANOR SAID THAT HE WOULD CONSULT AND GET BACK TO ME. HE HAS SINCE TOLD ME THAT THE ISRAELIS DID NOT WANT TO ELABORATE THEIR POSITION FURTHER UNTIL THE LATEST EXCHANGE BETWEEN US HAD BEEN REPORTED AND I HAD YOUR REACTION. HE AGAIN URGED THAT WE SHOULD RECONSIDER OUR DECISION, AND NOT TRY TO ARRANGE A MEETING WITH TWO OF THE DISMISSED MAYORS.

6. THE POSITION IS THEREFORE THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE WAITING FOR FURTHER WORD FROM US, EVEN IF IT IS ONLY THAT THE PROPOSED CALLS BY SIR J LEAHY ON SHAKAA AND KHALAF ARE STILL TO GO AHEAD. GRATEFUL THEREFORE FOR EARLY INSTRUCTIONS. MEANWHILE:

- A) WE AND JERUSALEM ARE REFUSING TO COMMENT TO THE PRESS SEMICOLON
- B) MY GUESS IS THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL BE TEMPTED TO REFUSE TO ALLOW SHAKAA OR KHALAF TO RECEIVE SIR J LEAHY.

7. SINCE THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED, I HAVE SEEN JERUSALEM TELNO 21. THE POSSIBILITY OF A CALL ON THE MAYOR OF EL BIREH WAS NOT MENTIONED BY ME TO GANOR. I THINK THEY WOULD TAKE IT AS AN ESCALATION ON OUR PART. I ACCORDINGLY HOPE THAT IT WILL NOT BE PURSUED.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

MOBERLY

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 291600Z MAR 82
TO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 261 OF 29 MARCH
INFO PRIORITY ALL MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WEST BANK: ARAB REPRESENTATIONS

1. THE JORDANIAN AND LEBANESE AMBASSADORS CALLED ON MR HURD THIS MORNING ON BEHALF OF ALL THE ARAB AMBASSADORS IN LONDON. THEIR MAIN PURPOSE WAS TO URGE THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO RECONSIDER HIS VISIT TO ISRAEL. MR HURD EXPLAINED WHY THE SECRETARY OF STATE CONSIDERED THAT THE VISIT SHOULD GO AHEAD, BUT UNDERTOOK TO INFORM THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THEIR REPRESENTATIONS.
2. THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR STRESSED THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION AND URGED THE TEN TO TRANSLATE THEIR WORDS INTO ACTION. THE ARAB AMBASSADORS HAD GREAT RESPECT FOR LORD CARRINGTON, BUT HIS VISIT TO ISRAEL AT THIS TIME WOULD HAVE A VERY ADVERSE EFFECT. HE ASKED THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO RECONSIDER IT. THE LEBANESE AMBASSADOR SUPPORTED THIS, NOTING THAT ISRAEL SEEMED ON THE PATH TO ANNEXATION OF THE WEST BANK. PRESIDENT MITTERRAND HAD POSTPONED HIS VISIT FOLLOWING THE ANNEXATION OF GOLAN. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD BE ARRIVING IN ISRAEL ON THE DAY OF AN ARAB GENERAL STRIKE.
3. THE AMBASSADORS ALSO ASKED FOR BRITISH AND EUROPEAN SUPPORT AT THE UN, AND FOR CLEAR PUBLIC STATEMENTS CONDEMNING THE ISRAELI ACTION.
4. MR HURD SAID THAT RECENT ISRAELI ACTIONS IN THE WEST BANK HAD CREATED A GRAVE SITUATION WHICH WE DID NOT UNDERESTIMATE. OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS SHOWED THIS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD GIVEN CAREFUL THOUGHT TO HIS VISIT. ONE OF THE DIFFICULTIES IN TAKING FORWARD THE EUROPEAN ROLE WAS THAT THE ISRAELIS REJECTED THE VENICE DECLARATION AND WERE SUSPICIOUS OF LORD CARRINGTON. WE WISHED TO PUT THIS RIGHT. LORD CARRINGTON WOULD MAKE CLEAR OUR

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VIEWS TO THE ISRAELIS. IF HE CANCELLED HIS VISIT, HIS CREDIBILITY PARTICULARLY WITH THE US WOULD BE MARKEDLY DIMINISHED. HE HAD THEREFORE DECIDED THAT THE VISIT SHOULD GO AHEAD, EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT. MR HURD ADDED IN CONFIDENCE THAT WE WERE TRYING TO ARRANGE FOR A SENIOR OFFICIAL TO MAKE CONTACTS ON THE WEST BANK TO DEMONSTRATE OUR GROWING INTEREST IN THE PLIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS: IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WEST BANK LEADERS SHOULD FORM A PART OF THE VISIT.

5. ON ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, MR HURD POINTED OUT THAT SIR A PARSONS HAD BEEN ASKED TO RETURN TO NEW YORK AND WAS CLOSELY INVOLVED IN THE CONSULTATIONS PRESENTLY UNDER WAY. OUR LATEST INFORMATION WAS THAT A CONSENSUS RESOLUTION REMAINED A POSSIBILITY, AND WE WOULD CERTAINLY BE WORKING FOR THIS.

6. THE AMBASSADORS DID NOT PRESS THEIR CASE ON CANCELLATION OF THE VISIT. MR HURD UNDERTOOK TO INFORM THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THEIR VIEWS, AND TO ENSURE THAT THEY WERE BRIEFED PROMPTLY AFTER THE VISIT TO ISRAEL.

7. THERE WAS ALSO A SHORT DISCUSSION OF THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE. THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR MENTIONED M. TINDEMANS' COMMENT THAT THE TEN WOULD ELABORATE VENICE. MR HURD SAID THAT THE TEN WERE BEGINNING TO CONSIDER THEIR ROLE AFTER APRIL. THE AMBASSADORS POINTED OUT THAT THE RECENT EVENTS ON THE WEST BANK MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE PLO TO MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF CONDITIONAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL.

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FROM TEL AVIV 291445Z

PS TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 125 OF 29 MARCH 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

INFO SAVING JERUSALEM

ROUND-UP ON THE EVE OF YOUR VISIT

1. THESE ARE TROUBLED TIMES FOR ISRAEL. YOUR VISIT LOOKS LIKE BEING EVEN TRICKIER THAN TWO WEEKS AGO. BY PREVIOUS ISRAELI STANDARDS HOWEVER THE PRESS PREVIEWS OF YOUR VISIT HAVE BEEN COUCHED IN REASONABLY MODERATE TERMS, AND THE WORD SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN PUT AROUND THAT YOU SHOULD BE GIVEN A FAIR HEARING.

INTERNAL (UNDERLINED)

2. LAST WEEK'S TIED VOTE IN THE KNESSET WAS FOLLOWED BY TALK OF EARLY ELECTIONS. ASSUMING THE GOVERNMENT WIN A CRUCIAL VOTE ON THE BUDGET TODAY HOWEVER THERE SEEMS NO REASON WHY BEGIN SHOULD NOT CONTINUE FOR QUITE A WHILE YET. NONE OF THE MAIN PARTIES ARE THOUGHT TO WANT ELECTIONS AT THIS STAGE. THERE MAY BE 4 OR 5 KNESSET MEMBERS NOW VOTING AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OVER SINAI WITHDRAWAL WHO WILL SWING ACROSS TO BEGIN'S SIDE AFTER 25 APRIL. ALTHOUGH BEGIN HAS SPOKEN OF EARLY ELECTIONS AND HAS THE BACKING OF OPINION POLLS FOR CLAIMING THAT LIKUD WOULD INCREASE ITS MAJORITY AT THE EXPENSE OF LABOUR, HE HAS LEFT HIMSELF PLENTY OF ROOM FOR MANEUVER ABOUT TIMING. ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE NOVEMBER WHEN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS ARE DUE. BUT IF HE MANAGES TO SOLDIER ON SUCCESSFULLY THROUGH THE SUMMER MONTHS I WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF HE PREFERENCES TO DUCK THE ISSUE OF NEW ELECTIONS TILL NEXT YEAR. IN ANY CASE, THE DECISION IS NOT HIS ALONE BUT REQUIRES THE AFFIRMATIVE VOTE OF THE KNESSET. THE LEAST LIKELY DEVELOPMENT SEEMS A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. PERES STILL HANKERS AFTER GETTING A CHANCE TO FORM A GOVERNMENT FROM WITHIN THE EXISTING PARTY STRENGTHS IN THE KNESSET, BUT THIS BEGIN IS DETERMINED TO DENY HIM.

EXTERNAL (UNDERLINED)

3. THE ISSUES WITH WHICH YOU WILL FIND THE GOVERNMENT MOST PRE-OCCUPIED ARE THE WEST BANK, SINAI, RELATIONS WITH CAIRO AND THE LEBANON. IN THE LONGER TERM YOU WILL FIND THEM CONCERNED ABOUT THE EROSION OF CAMP DAVID, THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW GROUPINGS IN THE ARAB WORLD, INCLUDING POSSIBLE RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA, AND A NAGGING WORRY ABOUT THE TREND OF FUTURE POLICY IN WASHINGTON. NOTHING WE CAN SAY WILL CONVINCEN THEM THAT THE PLO WILL EVER BE GENUINELY BROUGHT TO CHANGE ITS SPOTS.

4. THE GOVERNMENT ARGUE THAT RECENT EVENTS ON THE WEST BANK SHOULD BE SEEN AS A CONTEST WITH THE PLO OVER THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF THE ARAB POPULATION. THEY DISMISS TALK OF OUTRIGHT ANNEXATION.

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THE OPPOSITION SAYS THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY PUSHES THE WEST BANK ARABS INTO THE ARMS OF THE PLO. THEY CANNOT BOTH BE RIGHT. ONE IS TEMPTED TO WONDER IF, AS WITH THE GOLAN LAW, THERE WAS A MEASURE OF DELIBERATE CALCULATION BY THE GOVERNMENT IN ACTING TOUGH ON THE WEST BANK JUST AS SINAI WITHDRAWAL IS REACHING ITS CLIMAX. IT SEEMS MORE LIKELY TO HAVE BEEN PARTLY A REACTION TO RECENT JORDANIAN STATEMENTS AGAINST THE VILLAGE LEAGUES AND PARTLY THAT BEGIN AND HIS COLLEAGUES FELT THAT THEY COULD NOT AFFORD TO LET PLO POLITICAL ASCENDENCY ANY LONGER PASS UNCHALLENGED. CERTAINLY THE DISMISSAL OF THE MAYORS AND THE CRACKDOWN ON DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH FOLLOWED ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE NEW STYLE APPROACH OF SHARON AND PROFESSOR MILSON. THE WEAKNESS OF THAT APPROACH OF COURSE REMAINS THE FAILURE TO DEVELOP ANY REAL ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP ON THE WEST BANK. MEANWHILE YESTERDAY'S CABINET MEETING DEVOTED MUCH OF ITS TIME TO CRITICISING THE ISRAELI TELEVISION SERVICE FOR ITS COVERAGE OF THE PAST FEW DAYS' EVENTS, INCLUDING SCREENING OF INTERVIEWS WITH TWO OF THE DEPOSED MAYORS. BUT THE DEBATE ABOUT THE MORALITY OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION HAS BEEN WIDELY RE-OPENED, AND HAS ALSO INFECTED ARABS WITHIN ISRAEL PROPER.

5. BEGIN REMAINS ADAMANT ABOUT WITHDRAWING FROM SINAI AS SCHEDULED. THE GOVERNMENT HAVE HAD TO BE QUITE TOUGH WITH PROTESTERS AGAINST WITHDRAWAL. BUT THINGS HAVE NOT BEEN TOO BAD SO FAR, ALTHOUGH THERE IS STILL NEARLY A MONTH TO GO. THE PRICE THE ISRAELIS ARE PAYING IS OF COURSE NOT JUST A MATTER OF LAND BUT OF SETTLEMENTS. SOME PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT THE YAMIT DIHARDS AND THEIR EXTREMIST SUPPORTERS FROM ELSEWHERE IN ISRAEL ARE TRYING TO MAKE SURE NO FUTURE GOVERNMENT WOULD EVER DARE GIVE UP SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK.

6. BEGIN HAS JUST SENT A MESSAGE TO MUBARAK. MY GUESS IS THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE PROBABLY RESIGNED THEMSELVES TO THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT NOT COMING HERE TILL AFTER THE END OF APRIL AND THEN WITH NO MORE THAN THE NOMINAL INCLUSION OF JERUSALEM IN HIS PROGRAMME. I AM ALSO PRETTY SURE THAT THEY WILL NOT ALLOW THE TABA FRONTIER PROBLEM TO HOLD UP ARRANGEMENTS FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI AS A WHOLE.

7. LEBANON HAS BEEN PUSHED INTO THE BACKGROUND TEMPORARILY BY OTHER EVENTS. BUT THE ISRAELIS REMAIN MUCH CONCERNED ABOUT EVIDENCE OF PLO BUILD-UP. THE ISRAELI MILITARY, PERHAPS SHARON TOO, WOULD WELCOME A CHANCE OF HAVING A CRACK AT THEM. ON THE POLITICAL FRONT, THE ISRAELIS ALSO REMAIN CONCERNED AT THE SITUATION IN LEBANON GENERALLY, FEARING THAT THE LID COULD ALL TOO EASILY BE BLOWN OFF AND BEING PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF ANYONE WITH OUTSIDE INFLUENCE BEING ABLE TO PREVENT IT.

8. THE AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO IS HERE TILL TOMORROW, IS REPORTED TO HAVE HAD VERY FRIENDLY TALKS WITH SHAMIR AND TO

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HAVE SAID THAT AUSTRALIA WOULD NOT RECOGNISE THE PLO UNTIL THE LATTER RECOGNISE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST IN PEACE. THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IS DUE HERE IN MAY , AND VISITS BY THE BELGIAN AND GERMAN ARE SAID TO HAVE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE WITHOUT DATES YET BEING FIXED.

9. FINALLY ONE OR TWO LAST MINUTE THOUGHTS ABOUT YOUR TALKS:

(A) I HAVE BEEN STRUCK IN MY OWN CONTACTS WITH THE PRESS AND OFFICIALS BY THEIR APPARENT IGNORANCE OF YOUR EFFORTS DURING THE UK PRESIDENCY AND SINCE TO PERSUADE ARAB LEADERS THAT ISRAEL HAS TO BE RECOGNISED. IT SEEMS TO HAVE REGISTERED AT LEAST ONE MARK WITH THEM ON BEING TOLD THAT THIS WAS SO. YOU MAY FIND IT A HELPFUL POINT TO REITERATE, OBVIOUS AS IT MAY BE FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW:

(B) I NOTICE IN THE DEPARTMENT'S TALKING POINTS ONE OR TWO REFERENCES TO SOMETHING BEING IN OR AGAINST ISRAEL'S OWN INTERESTS. THIS PARTICULAR FORMULATION IS LIABLE TO SEEM INSENSITIVE TO ISRAELIS WHO CONSIDER THEY ARE THE BEST JUDGES OF THEIR OWN INTERESTS JUST AS WE ARE OF BRITISH INTERESTS. I AM SURE THE POINT CAN BE PUT JUST AS EFFECTIVELY IN A DIFFERENT WAY:

(C) I RECALL SHAMIR TELLING ME THAT ISRAEL WOULD NEVER ALLOW ITSELF AGAIN TO BE DOMINATED BY GUNS IN THE HANDS OF ARAB ENEMIES IN THE HILLS OVERLOOKING ISRAELI CITIES. THERE IS AN ABSOLUTE REFUSAL HERE ON THE GOVERNMENT'S PART TO CONTEMPLATE THAT THE WEST BANK COULD EVER BE EFFECTIVELY DEMILITARISED. IF WE ARGUE TO THE CONTRARY, WE MAY FIND OURSELVES BEING ASKED TO DESCRIBE HOW IN PRACTICE WE

ENVISAGE DEMILITARISATION COULD POSSIBLY BE RELIED ON WITHOUT ISRAEL RUNNING UNACCEPTABLE RISKS WITH HER SECURITY:

(D) I WOULD BE SURPRISED IF OUR CRITICISM OF THEIR WEST BANK POLICIES IS NOT MET AT SOME STAGE BY ISRAELI REJOINDERS ABOUT BRITAIN'S ROLE IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

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DESKBY 260700 Z

FROM FCO 251645 MARCH 82

TO IMMEDIATE CG JERUSALEM

TELEGRAM NUMBER 13 OF 25 MARCH.

INFO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 260700 BEIRUT, TEL AVIV,
ROUTINE DAMASCUS, AMMAN, JEDDA, CAIRO, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKREP BRUSSELS

MY VISIT TO ISRAEL: WEST BANK

1. IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS ON THE WEST BANK I HAVE DECIDED THAT IT WOULD BE WRONG TO AVOID ANY CONTACT WITH WEST BANK PALESTINIANS. I HAVE THEREFORE ASKED SIR JOHN LEAHY TO BE AVAILABLE FOR A MEETING WITH WEST BANK MAYORS AND OTHER LEADERS DURING MY PROGRAMME IN ISRAEL, THIS WOULD PERHAPS BE MOST EASILY ARRANGED ON THE MORNING OF 1 APRIL FOLLOWING MY OWN VISIT TO THE CONSULATE-GENERAL. SIR JOHN WOULD LIKE YOU TO BE PRESENT. THE PRECISE ARRANGEMENTS ARE LEFT TO YOUR DISCRETION, IN CONSULTATION WITH HMA TEL AVIV. BUT THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IN USING A VENUE ON THE WEST BANK ITSELF, BOTH AS A SYMBOL AND TO AVOID A CLASH WITH MY VISIT TO THE CONSULATE-GENERAL. SIR JOHN WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO CATCH UP WITH MY PROGRAMME LATER.

2. WE READILY UNDERSTAND THAT SOME OF THE MAYORS WILL BE SUBJECT TO TRAVELLING RERTRICIONS AND THAT A FULLY REPRESENTATIVE GATHERING MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE. YOU SHOULD TRY TO ENSURE THAT INVITATIONS AT LEAST REACH THE THREE DISMISSED MAYORS. OTHERWISE THE MAYORS OF BETHLEHEM AND GAZA AND THE ACTING MAYOR OF HEBRON ARE OBVIOUS CANDIDATES. YOU SHOULD AIM FOR A MAXIMUM ATTENDANCE OF ABOUT SIX.

3. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT BASSAM SHAKAA SENT A MESSAGE TO

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MILES VIA THE ARAB LEAGUE REPRESENTATIVE HERE, AL HASSAN, ASKING WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR ME TO VISIT THE WEST BANK DURING MY PROGRAMME IN ISRAEL. MILES EXPLAINED THAT THERE WAS NO AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY. MILES WILL BE INFORMING AL HASSAN OF THE PROPOSAL FOR THE MEETING WITH SIR J LEAHY AND INDICATING THAT THIS IS A SIGN OF OUR CONCERN ABOUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 260115Z MAR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 300 OF 25 MARCH 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV,

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, CG JERUSALEM, CAIRO, PARIS, WASHINGTON,
JEDDA.

MY TELS 289-291: SECURITY COUNCIL; OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

1. THERE WAS LITTLE PROGRESS TODAY (25 MARCH) AS THE COUNCIL'S TIME WAS TAKEN UP WITH NICARAGUA.

2. THE US MISSION HAVE TOLD US THAT AFTER SOME TOING AND FROING WITH WASHINGTON DURING THE AFTERNOON, MRS KIRKPATRICK HAS THIS EVENING BEEN GIVEN "CARTE BLANCHE" TO PRODUCE HER OWN DRAFT AND TO TRY TO AGREE A TEXT WITH THE ARABS, EITHER DIRECTLY OR WITH THE HELP OF FRIENDLY MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. THE AIM WOULD BE TO URGE ALL CONCERNED TO EXERCISE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT, (IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE SITUATION GETTING DANGEROUSLY OUT OF HAND WITH POSSIBLE SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS BOTH FOR SINAI AND LEBANON).

3. THE IRISH HAVE MEANWHILE, WITH US ENCCOURAGEMENT, BEEN QUIETLY TAKING SOUNDINGS ON SOME IDEAS FOR A SHORT RESOLUTION OF THEIR OWN. THEIR IDEAS SEEM HELPFUL AND THEY HAVE APPARENTLY HAD A MODERATELY ENCOURAGING RESPONSE FROM THE PLO.

MODERATELY ENCOURAGING RESPONSE FROM THE PLO.

4. THE COUNCIL WILL MEET AT 1600Z TOMORROW 26 MARCH FOR INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON ITS PROGRAMME OF WORK. MOROCCO AND TURKEY HAVE INSCRIBED THEMSELVES TO SPEAK ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THE ARABS ARE LIKELY TO PRESS FOR A FORMAL MEETING TOMORROW AFTERNOON, GIVEN THE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION ON THE WEST BANK AND IN GAZA. BUT THE REAL WORK TOMORROW WILL BE BEHIND THE SCENES.

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DESKBY AMMAN 240630Z

DESKBY DAMASCUS 240600Z

DESKBY TEL AVIV 240615Z

FROM U K MISSION NEW YORK 232316Z MARCH 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 275 OF 23 MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN DAMASCUS TEL AVIV PRIORITY BEIRUT CG JERUSALEM
CAIRO PARIS WASHINGTON.

MY TELNO 272: SECURITY COUNCIL: OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

1. AT THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE COUNCIL THIS AFTERNOON IT WAS AGREED TO HOLD A FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL TOMORROW (24 MARCH) AT 2030Z IN RESPONSE TO THE JORDANIAN REQUEST.
2. NUSEIBEH (JORDAN) HAS TOLD US THAT THE ARAB GROUP ARE STILL WORKING ON A DRAFT RESOLUTION. HE SAID THAT HE WANTED A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD NOT BE VETOED, BUT THAT THE SYRIANS WERE PRESSING FOR CHAPTER VII. THE US MISSION HAVE BEEN SHOWN A RELATIVELY MODERATE DRAFT WHICH CONDEMNS ISRAEL FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF THE AL BIREH COUNCIL AND FOR ITS SECURITY MEASURES AND CALLS UPON IT TO RESCIND THE DISSOLUTION. NUSEIBEH HAS ALSO MENTIONED TO US THE POSSIBILITY OF REACTIVATING THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMISSION ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES THAT WAS ESTABLISHED BY SC RESOLUTION 446 (1979).
3. IT IS TOO SOON TO SAY HOW EXTENSIVE THE DEBATE WILL BE. IF MUSEIBEH SUCCEEDS IN GETTING A SHORT AND COMPARATIVELY UNCONTENTIOUS RESOLUTION, WE MAY NEED TO DO NO MORE THAN SPEAK BRIEFLY IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE. IF A MORE GENERAL DEBATE LOOKS LIKE DEVELOPING I WILL SEND RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE OTHER WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 230005Z MAR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 272 OF 23 MARCH.

INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN DAMASCUS AND TEL AVIV

PRIORITY BEIRUT CG JERUSALEM CAIRO PARIS AND WASHINGTON.

TEL AVIV TEL NO 98: SECURITY COUNCIL; WEST BANK.

1. JORDAN THIS EVENING (22 MARCH) SUBMITTED ON BEHALF OF THE ARAB GROUP A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, MRS KIRKPATRICK (USA), REQUESTING QUOTE A MOST URGENT UNQUOTE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL QUOTE TO CONSIDER THE GRAVE AND RAPIDLY DETERIORATING SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN AND ARAB TERRITORIES. UNQUOTE THE LETTER REFERS BRIEFLY TO VARIOUS ALLEGED ACTS OF ISRAELI REPRESSION AND SUGGESTS THAT THESE ARE QUOTE PART OF AN OVERALL REIGN OF TERROR, REMINISCENT OF THE 1947-1948 POLICY OF ORGANISED VIOLENCE UNQUOTE WHICH BROUGHT ABOUT THE EARLIER PALESTINIAN EXODUS. IT ACCUSES THE ISRAELIS OF SEEKING SUBSTANTIAL ANNEXATION AND THE DISLODGE MENT OF THE PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS.
2. THE LETTER WILL BE DISCUSSED ALONG WITH THE SEPARATE NICARAGUAN REQUEST FOR A MEETING, AT INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE COUNCIL AT 1830Z TOMORROW (23 MARCH). A FORMAL MEETING SEEMS INEVITABLE.

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FM JERUSALEM 221315Z MARCH 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 13 OF 22 MARCH

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, CAIRO, TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON.

INFO SAVING DAMASCUS, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKMIS NEW YORK AND BEIRUT.

DISMISSAL OF MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF AL BIREH

1. THE CALL FOR A THREE DAY STRIKE THROUGHOUT THE WEST BANK, REPORTED IN MY TELEGRAM NO 12, HAS BEEN WIDELY OBSERVED. MUNICIPAL OFFICES, TOGETHER WITH BUSINESSES AND SCHOOLS, CLOSED DOWN FROM LAST FRIDAY ONWARDS. THE STRIKE HAS NOW BEEN EXTENDED FOR A FURTHER TWO DAYS, IN PROTEST AGAINST THE ISRAELI HANDLING OF PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS (SEE PARA 4 BELOW).
2. MOVEMENT IN AND OUT OF RAMALLAH AND NABLUS HAS BEEN SEVERELY CURTAILED, BUT ONLY BETWEEN 0800 AND 1600 HRS DAILY, EVIDENTLY FOR THE BENEFIT OF WORKERS COMMUTING TO ISRAEL. AL BIREH HAS BEEN PLACED UNDER CURFEW.
3. THE ISRAELIS BEGAN TO COMPEL SOME SHOPKEEPERS TO OPEN THEIR STORES IN SOME WEST BANK TOWNS TO-DAY. EAST JERUSALEM HOWEVER REMAINS ALMOST COMPLETELY SHUT DOWN, WITH POLICE AND SOLDIERS MUCH IN EVIDENCE.
4. WIDESPREAD DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE CONTINUED DAILY. MOST WERE AS USUAL PRIMARILY BY STUDENTS, BUT IN AL BIREH ITSELF ONE WAS STAGED BY WOMEN. SOME FORTY INJURIES HAVE BEEN REPORTED. IN ONE INCIDENT AT AL BIREH ON 20 MARCH, A SEVENTEEN YEAR OLD BOY WAS SHOT DEAD. HIS FUNERAL LATER THAT DAY BEGAN TO TURN INTO A POLITICAL DEMONSTRATION AND WAS DISTRUPTED BY SOLDIERS.
5. THE REMAINING MAYORS HAVE SO FAR REFRAINED FROM RESIGNING IN PROTEST, ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE MORE RADICAL ONES ARE REPORTEDLY UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM THEIR SUPPORTERS TO DO SO.
6. THE PRESENT WAVE OF UNREST (WHICH, ODDLY ENOUGH, HAS NOT GREATLY AFFECTED GAZA) IS AT FIRST SIGHT NOT GREATLY DIFFERENT FROM SIMILAR ONES IN THE PAST (IN PARTIUCULAR, FOLLOWING THE ATTACKS ON THE MAYORS OF RAMALLAH AND NABLUS IN MAY 1980),

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ALL OF WHICH HAVE SUBSIDED WITHIN DAYS. THE BASIC CAUSE IS HOWEVER RATHER MORE DEEP-SEATED THIS TIME. THE THREAT REPORTEDLY MADE YESTERDAY BY THE ISRAELI MINISTER OF DEFENCE TO APPLY ISRAELI LAW TO QUOTE JUDEA AND SAMARIA UNQUOTE SHOULD EGYPT ABANDON CAMP DAVID HAS PROVOKED WIDESPREAD COMMENT HERE.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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FM JERUSALEM 190930Z MARCH 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 12 OF 19 MARCH

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, CAIRO, TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON

SAVING INFO DAMASCUS, UKREP BRUSSELS AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

THE WEST BANK: CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

1. THE ISRAELIS YESTERDAY DISMISSED THE MAYOR OF AL BIREH AND DISSOLVED THE TOWN'S MUNICIPAL COUNCIL. A TEAM OF ISRAELIS, HEADED BY A SENIOR ARMY OFFICER, HAS TAKEN OVER.
2. THUS THE GROWING CONFRONTATION RESULTING FROM THE ISRAELI ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION HAS ENTERED A NEW PHASE. MOST OF THE LARGER WEST BANK MUNICIPALITIES HAVE BEEN REFUSING ALL CONTACT WITH THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATOR, PROFESSOR MILSON, EVER SINCE HIS APPOINTMENT LAST NOVEMBER, BECAUSE THEY SAW THE LATTER AS A STEP TOWARDS AN EVENTUAL IMPOSED AUTONOMY. TAWIL AND HIS COUNCIL HOWEVER WENT FURTHER THAN THE REST, IN NOTIFYING THEIR BOYCOTT OF MILSON TO THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN WRITING. WHEN SUBSEQUENTLY SUMMONED BY MILSON TO EXPLAIN HIMSELF, TAWIL AGAIN REFUSED IN WRITING. THERE IS OTHERWISE NO EXPLANATION WHY AL BIREH (ADJOINING RAMALLAH, A FEW MILES NORTH OF JERUSALEM SEMICLN MEDIUM IN SIZE BY LOCAL STANDARDS, WITH SOME 25,000 INHABITANTS) HAS BEEN SINGLED OUT FOR THIS LATEST MANIFESTATION OF THE ISRAELI CARROT AND STICK POLICY (MY TEL NO 05, PARA 4). THE ISRAELIS MUST HOWEVER HAVE WELCOMED THE PRETEXT FOR MAKING AN EXAMPLE OF ONE OF THE LESS IMPORTANT MAYORS.
3. IN ANNOUNCING THE DISMISSAL, THE ISRAELI MINISTRY OF DEFENCE HAVE CLAIMED TO BE ACTING IN THE INTERESTS OF THE CITY AND ITS INHABITANTS. THE LATTER, ON THE CONTRARY, HAVE SHOWN OVERWHELMING SUPPORT FOR TAWIL, THE FIRST ELECTED MAYOR TO BE DISMISSED FOR CLEARLY POLITICAL REASONS.
4. TAWIL'S STAND HAD ALREADY ATTRACTED WIDESPREAD SYMPATHY AMONG OTHER MUNICIPALITIES (MY TELELETTER 014/1 OF 18 MARCH TO CHAPLIN). A MEETING YESTERDAY IN RAMALLAH, AT WHICH MOST MUCICIPALITIES SEEM TO HAVE BEEN REPRESENTED, CALLED FOR AN IMMEDIATE THREE-DAY GENERAL PROTEST STRIKE AGAINST WHAT IS BEING GENERALLY REGARDED HERE AS A FURTHER STEP TOWARDS ANNEXATION. FIRST REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE STRIKE IS BEING GENERALLY OBSERVED.

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5. THERE HAS BEEN NO CO-ORDINATED REACTION AS YET FROM THE REMAINING MAYORS, WHO ARE FORBIDDEN TO MEET. THERE IS MUCH SPECULATION OVER THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MAY RESIGN IN PROTEST. THE ONLY PUBLIC COMMENT ON THIS SO FAR HAS COME FROM THE MODERATE MAYOR OF BETHLEHEM, WHO IS AGAINST THE IDEA, SEEING IT AS ONLY HELPING TO SERVE ISRAELI PURPOSES.
FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

HAMLEY

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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TO F L A S H F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 93 OF 18 MARCH 1982

DISAPPEARANCE OF MUHAMMAD MOKDAD, SECOND SECRETARY.

1. MOKDAD DISAPPEARED ON THE MORNING OF 15 MARCH PROBABLY WHILE WALKING TO THE EMBASSY BETWEEN 0730 AND 0800 LOCAL TIME. HIS FAMILY CHECKED THE HOSPITALS AND CONTACTED VARIOUS SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS DURING THE AFTERNOON AND EVENING.
2. AT 2132 LOCAL TIME A TELEPHONE CALLER TO MOKDAD'S FLAT SAID THAT HE WAS IN GOOD HEALTH AND WOULD BE RELEASED IN RETURN FOR US DOLLARS 150,000. MORE INFORMATION WAS PROMISED ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 MARCH. THE CALLER SPOKE COOLLY IN A LEBANESE ACCENT AND SAID HE HAD BEEN ASKED TO PASS THE MESSAGE.
3. WE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH THE MFA, THE ADF, THE DEUXIEME BUREAU AND THE ISF THIS MORNING.
4. LOCAL MEDIA HAVE GIVEN WIDE COVERAGE TO THE EVENT AND HAVE MENTIONED THE RANSOM DEMAND. RANSOM DEMAND HAS SO FAR BEEN MADE TO THE FAMILY AND NOT TO THE EMBASSY. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.
5. HEADS OF MISSION SECTION SHOULD INFORM MR ROBERTS.

PALMER

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 MR STREETON
 MR BARRETT
 DUTY R C

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* Mr. A. Gold, Home Office, OAG.

✓ Ps/Home SECRETARY
 ✓ Ps/Secretary of the Cabinet

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 no. 10, Downing St.] ✓

✓ Aukley MEMPH
 * Aukley: MADD

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ZZ BEIRUT
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FM FCO 161030Z MAR 82
TO FLASH BEIRUT

TELEGRAM NUMBER 68 OF 16 MARCH
YOUR TELNO 93 : MUHAMMAD MOKDAD

1. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO AMBASSADOR WHO SUGGESTS THAT APART FROM THOSE IN PARA 3 OF TUR AND SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS IT MIGHT BE WORTH CONTACTING MARWAN HAMADI, RENE MOAWWAD, THE SHIA MUFTI SHAMS AL-DIN AND THE JA'AFARI MUFTI KABALAN. AMIN GEMAYEL AS A CLOSE FRIEND OF MOKDAD MIGHT ALSO BE WORTH CONTACTING.
2. SECURITY DEPARTMENT WILL BE IN TOUCH BY TELEPHONE ON REINFORCING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.
3. HMG'S POLICY ON KIDNAPPING IS CLEAR. WE CONDEMN ALL ACTS OF TERRORISM. WHERE HOSTAGES ARE INVOLVED GOVERNMENT POLICY IS TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO RESOLVE SITUATION WITHOUT LOSS OF INNOCENT LIVES BUT WITHOUT ACCEDING TO TERRORIST DEMANDS SINCE TO DO SO WOULD INCREASE THE TERRORIST MENACE. THERE CAN THEREFORE BE NO QUESTION OF PAYMENT OF RANSOM SHOULD DEMAND BE MADE TO US. NEWS DEPARTMENT ARE CONFIRMING DETAILS IN TUR IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS AND DRAWING ON LINE ABOVE.
4. WE AWAIT NEWS OF OUTCOME OF YOUR CONTACTS LOCALLY. IT WILL BE EASIER TO FORMULATE RESPONSE ONCE WE HAVE A CLEARER IDEA OF WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR KIDNAPPING. WOULD IT BE WORTH BRINGING DAMASCUS INTO PLAY IF SYRIANS HAVE INFLUENCE?
5. AMBASSADOR ASKS THAT HIS PERSONAL SYMPATHY BE PASSED ON TO MOKDAD'S FAMILY. PLEASE ADD SYMPATHY AND CONCERN OF MOKDAD'S FRIENDS HERE. CONSUL IN HANOVER HAS BEEN IN TOUCH ON BEHALF OF MOKDAD'S SON. WE HAVE PASSED ON DETAILS IN TUR,
6. GRATEFUL FOR COMMENT IN DUE COURSE ON MOKDAD'S FAMILY AND HOW THEY ARE LIKELY TO REACT.

CARRINGTON

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Middle East

15 March 1982

Thank you for your letter of 9 March enclosing a copy of Mr. Hurd's report of 3 March to Lord Carrington, describing his recent visit to Bahrain, North Yemen, Oman and Qatar. The Prime Minister read Mr. Hurd's report with interest.

A J COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Jed

12 March 1982

LORD CARRINGTON'S VISIT TO ISRAEL:
MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your letter of 10 March.

The Prime Minister has considered Lord Carrington's recommendation and the text of the proposed message to Mr. Begin but is on the whole inclined to think that a message on these lines would do more harm than good.

Clearly, the drafting of any message will, in present circumstances, be difficult. Unless Lord Carrington attaches particular importance to the matter, you may therefore think it better to drop the idea.

A. J. COLES

S

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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15 13

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MR J C MOBERLY

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FM CAIRO 111400Z MAR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 121 OF 11 MARCH

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, BEIRUT, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON AND PARIS.

YOUR TELNO 86 : PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK.

1. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TODAY TO THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISER AND CHEF DU CABINET OSAMA AL BAZ, IN THE HOPE OF HAVING A MORE THOROUGH TALK THAN IS ALWAYS POSSIBLE WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER, AND WAS NOT DISAPPOINTED.

2. ON THE JERUSALEM VISIT QUESTION, AL BAZ STRESSED THAT AS FAR AS THE EGYPTIANS WERE CONCERNED MUBARAK WAS STILL READY TO VISIT ISRAEL AND ONLY THE TIMING REMAINED TO BE DECIDED. BUT HE WOULD NEVER GO TO JERUSALEM. THE EGYPTIANS WERE STILL PUZZLED AS TO BEGIN'S MOTIVES IN PUBLICISING THE ISSUE, AND AL BAZ COULD ONLY SUPPOSE THAT HE HOPED TO FORCE MUBARAK TO CLIMB DOWN FOR FEAR OF JEOPARDISING THE FINAL WITHDRAWAL (AS SADAT MIGHT HAVE DONE). FOR THEIR PART THE EGYPTIANS INTEND TO PLAY THE MATTER DOWN, AND THEY HAD DELIBERATELY KEPT IT OUT OF THE MEDIA. BEGIN'S SUBSEQUENT STATEMENT THAT HE WOULD NOT VISIT EGYPT AGAIN UNTIL MUBARAK WENT TO JERUSALEM HAD COME AS AN UNCOVENANTED BUT WELCOME BONUS.

3. WE THEN DISCUSSED THE TWO OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS IN THE WITHDRAWAL NEGOTIATIONS, RAFA AND TABA IN THE SOUTH. AL BAZ SAID THAT RAFA WAS NOW SETTLED. BUT THERE WAS COMPLETE DEADLOCK OVER TABA. HE

IMMEDIATE

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Mf

AL NEGOTIATIONS, RAFA AND TABA IN THE SOUTH. AL BAZ SAID THAT RAFA WAS NOW SETTLED, BUT THERE WAS COMPLETE DEADLOCK OVER TABA. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD FIRST SCENTED TROUBLE SOME TWO MONTHS AGO WHEN SURVEYORS CHECKING THE FRONTIER ALIGNMENT WITH THE ISRAELIS OBSERVED THAT OF THE TOTAL OF 91 MARKER POSTS THE TEN SOUTHERNMOST MARKERS WERE EITHER MISSING OR APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN MOVED ABOUT ONE KILOMETRE TO THE WEST, SO AS TO LEAVE THE NEW ISRAELI HOTEL UNDER CONSTRUCTION ON THE ISRAELI SIDE OF THE LINE. AFTER VAIN ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE ISSUE ON THE GROUND KAMEL HASSAN ALI ON HIS RECENT VISIT TO TEL AVIVI HAD OFFERED INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION OR ARBITRATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 7 OF THE TREATY. THE EGYPTIANS HAD IN MIND A PURELY TECHNICAL ARBITRATION BY A NEUTRAL THIRD PARTY LIKE NEW ZEALAND OR SWEDEN WITH A VIEW TO ESTABLISHING THE FACTS ON THE GROUND, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RELEVANT MAPS AND DOCUMENTS: ALTERNATIVELY THEY HAD PROPOSED THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. PENDING THE OUTCOME THE DISPUTED AREA WOULD BE TREATED AS A NEUTRAL ZONE AND ONLY THE MFO ALLOWED ACCESS. KEMAL ALI HAD YESTERDAY RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM SHARON (THIS FOR OUR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION) REJECTING ALL THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSALS AND STATING THAT UNLESS AGREEMENT WERE REACHED ON THE ALIGNMENT OF THE ENTIRE FRONTIER BY 25 APRIL ISRAEL WOULD BE UNABLE TO CARRY OUT THE FINAL WITHDRAWAL AS PROVIDED IN THE TREATY. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THEY ISRAELIS MEANT ALL THE REMAINING OCCUPIED TERRITORY AND NOT MERELY THE SMALL DISPUTED AREA.

4. I SAID THIS SOUNDED A SERIOUS DEVELOPMENT AND ASKED HOW THE EGYPTIANS PROPOSED TO REACT. AL BAZ SAID THEY WERE QUITE RELAXED, AND INCLINED ^{TO} ~~TH~~ THINK THE ISRAELIS WERE BLUFFING, IN THE HOPE (AS WITH THE JERUSALEM VISIT) OF DEMONSTRATING THEIR ABILITY TO EXTRACT CONCESSIONS FROM EGYPT OVER AND ABOVE THE LETTER OF THE TREATY. BUT IF THEY WERE NOT BLUFFING THE EGYPTIANS WERE PREPARED TO FACE THE CONSEQUENCES, WHICH THEY RECKONED WOULD BE FAR MORE DAMAGING FOR ISRAEL. AS A FIRST STEP THEY HAD DRAWN THE ATTENTION OF THE AMERICANS TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER TO BEGIN DATED MARCH 26 1979 DESCRIBING THE ACTION THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD TAKE IN THE EVENT OF AN ACTUAL OR THREATENED VIOLATION OF THE PEACE TREATY. THE LETTER OF COURSE HAD ORIGINATED IN BEGIN'S DESIRE FOR AN ASSURANCE AGAINST A POSSIBLE EGYPTIAN VIOLATION AND EGYPT HAD OPPOSED IT. BUT HAVING BEEN ISSUED TO BOTH PARTIES THEY NOW INTENDED TO HOLD THE AMERICANS TO ITS TERMS. AL BAZ STRESSED THAT HE WAS TELLING ME ALL THIS IN CONFIDENCE, AND THAT THE EGYPTIANS FOR THEIR PART WOULD NOT PUBLICISE THE LATEST ISRAELI MOVE.

5. ~~WE ALSO HAD A WORD ABOUT PRESIDENT MITTERAND'S VISIT TO ISRAEL.~~
4. BAZ, EMPLOYING MORE COLOURFUL LANGUAGE THAN ONE WOULD HEAR FROM

5. WE ALSO HAD A WORD ABOUT PRESIDENT MITTERAND'S VISIT TO ISRAEL. AL BAZ, EMPLOYING MORE COLOURFUL LANGUAGE THAN ONE WOULD HEAR FROM THE PRESIDENT OR FOREIGN MINISTER, SAID THE EGYPTIANS RESPECTED MITTERAND'S PERSONAL MOTIVES FOR GOING, BUT OTHERWISE SAW THE VISIT AS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE FRENCH TRYING TO BE ALL THING TO ALL MEN. THEY WOULD NO DOUBT TRY TO EXPLOIT IT, E.G. IN THEIR EFFORTS TO SUCK UP TO THE SAUDIS, BUT HE DID NOT SEE WHAT THEY EXPECTED TO ACHIEVE. HE CERTAINLY DID NOT ACCEPT THAT FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE PARTIES AND THAT THERE WAS NO ROLE FOR OUTSIDERS. HE HOPED THAT THE EUROPEANS WOULD CONTINUE IN THE PATH THEY HAD FOLLOWED SINCE THE VENICE DECLARATION, AND IN PARTICULAR THAT YOU WOULD PURSUE THE CONCEPT OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION DURING YOUR FORTHCOMING VISIT TO ISRAEL.

6. I HAVE SINCE COMPARED NOTES ON THE TABA DISPUTE WITH THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR, WHO WAS SUMMONED BY KAMAL HASSAN ALI AT THE SAME TIME AS I SAW AL BAZ. ACCORDING TO HIM KAMAL ALI IS INDEED SERIOUSLY CONCERNED, BUT IS RESERVING JUDGEMENT UNTIL HIS MEETING WITH SHARON ON 15 MARCH WHEN HE WILL MAKE A FINAL EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM. THE ACCOUNT ATHERTON WAS GIVEN OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISRAELI MESSAGE IS EXACTLY AS DESCRIBED ABOVE. ON THE OTHER HAND HE SAYS THAT THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV HAS COMMENTED THAT THE STARK LANGUAGE IT USES HAS NOT BEEN REFLECTED IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAELI MINISTERS AND THAT THE APPEARANCE OF AN ULTIMATUM MAY NOT HAVE BEEN INTENDED. AT ALL EVENTS THE AMERICANS ARE HOLDING THEIR BREATH UNTIL 15 MARCH, BUT RECOGNISE THAT THEREAFTER THE BALL WILL BE IN THEIR COURT IF THE DISAGREEMENT PERSISTS.

WEIR

NNNN

010
Prime Minister



We shall need to make sure
near the time that the
text is still appropriate
but subject to that do you
agree?

A.S.C. 11/3.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 March 1982

I think the proposed
message would do
more harm
than good
not

Dear John,

Lord Carrington's visit to Israel:

Message from the Prime Minister

As you know, Lord Carrington is due to visit Israel from
30 March to 1 April 1982.

Lord Carrington hopes that the Israelis will take his
visit as evidence of our desire to improve relations. But the
Israelis continue to be extremely sensitive about the Ten's
Middle East policy and were particularly suspicious of what
they saw as Britain's leading role in its formulation during
our Presidency. Mr Begin is unpredictable and there is a risk
that the Israelis will try to turn Lord Carrington's visit into
an occasion for a public and damaging row.

We have been considering how best to insure against this
risk. One idea is that Lord Carrington should take with him to
Israel a message from the Prime Minister to Mr Begin. The
purpose of the message would be to reassure Mr Begin of our
genuine desire to see an improvement in Anglo/Israeli relations.
There is no escaping the fact that some Israeli policies are
harmful to our interests and to peace, and the message will
need to avoid implying that we are about to abandon any part of
the Ten's Middle East policy. But we need to improve our
dialogue with the Israelis and avoid the misunderstandings which
have soured our relations in recent months.

Lord Carrington therefore recommends that he should take
with him a message from the Prime Minister to Mr Begin along
the lines of the enclosed draft. I should be grateful to know
whether the Prime Minister is content.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary


A J Coles Esq
10 Downing St

MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO MR BEGIN


I am taking the opportunity of Lord Carrington's visit to send you my warmest good wishes. I well remember my own visit to Israel in 1971 and our meeting here in London in 1979.

He and I are both ^{Carrington} ~~conscious~~, ~~as I am sure you are~~, that recently relations between our two countries have not been as warm and close as they should be. If it is inevitable that we should have a different perspective on some important issues, then our natural friendship should be strong enough to understand those differences and take account of them. I personally feel sure that we can restore our relationship to reflect more closely the fundamental values and interests which we both share. I look forward to hearing from ^{Lord Carrington} ~~him~~ ways in which you think this might be done.

10 MAR 1982



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3 (4)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 March 1982

Prime Minister



Dear John,

mf

A.S.C. 3

I enclose a copy of Douglas Hurd's report of 3 March to Lord Carrington, describing his recent visit to Bahrain, North Yemen, Oman and Qatar. You may wish to show this personal account to the Prime Minister.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing St

mf

COVERING SECRET

Secretary of State

Mr. Hurd

file

Secretary of State

cc: Lord Privy Seal
 Mr Luce
 Lord Trefgarne
 PUS
 Mr Wright
 Mr Moberly
 Mr. Myers

Splendid

BAHRAIN: 22 AND 26 FEBRUARY

The Ruler, Shaikh Issa, was, as always, benign and full of generalities. He received me with his brother Khalifa, the Prime Minister, and his son Hamad, the Crown Prince and Minister of Defence. After the attempted coup last December internal security is at the top of their minds. Ian Henderson (intelligence chief for 15 years) does not believe the Iranian-trained revolutionaries will try again in Bahrain. He admires in general the political skills of the ruling family but is less sure that either the Prime Minister or the Crown Prince are up to the top job. In this I think he is right. The two men are not on good terms. The Saudis are pressing for harsh measures against those being charged for the December plot, and against the Shias in Bahrain in general (more than half the population). This would probably be a mistake. Henderson is also worried about left-wing subversion inspired from Damascus. But in general I would guess that the ruling family still have a fair run ahead of them. The Foreign Minister, Mohammed bin Mubarak, is an exceptionally articulate and moderate Arab, and we should I think pay him marked attention - he could one day prove a useful interlocutor.

NORTH YEMEN: 23-26 FEBRUARY

2. On a second visit this country is even more amazing - scenery, architecture, squalor. We drove into the streets of Sana'a at 4 am through packs of baying dogs and half a dozen checkpoints manned by sleepy teenagers with loaded Kalashnikovs. The old quarter, street after street of tall highly-decorated stone fortresses, is unique in the Middle East. This time we flew to the southern city of Taiz, sprawling over the foothills of a splendid mountain, and drove back through sensational wild country.

3. More amazing, but not really more important. Despite the endless and complicated to-ing and fro-ing of internal restlessness the political and military situation is much the same as two years ago. And the seemingly absurd contradictions remain. Large tracts of mountain are still controlled by the National Democratic Front, backed by Libya and the PDRY. The President still wavers between a policy of bashing and conciliating. The Russians still supply arms to enable the Government to check these friends of Russia. The PLO (this is new) have a team of

/officers

officers trying to patch up local ceasefires. The YAR is still in theory negotiating on unity with the PDRY, while in fact bitterly opposed to it. With probably a million Yemenis sending home the inflated incomes they can still earn in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, the shops are even fuller of consumer goods (video cassettes on sale in the villages) while the Government has no funds to pay the teachers' salaries. Three-quarters of the people still chew qat all afternoon, with profound and fairly disastrous effects on the whole economy.

4. The President was touring the Gulf for funds to pay for the second Five-Year Plan. Everyone else was most friendly and welcoming. The Prime Minister was particularly good news - perky and articulate. I think we should ask him here.

5. But I do not think we need spend too many sleepless nights over the Yemen. I would be inclined to drop the idea of a naval base or other ambitious triangular schemes. I doubt if they will work. Nor is there cause for panic. The Yemenis have shown themselves capable of balancing the Saudis, the Russians, the Chinese, etc etc, with much skill, getting something from each. I suspect this will continue indefinitely. It is a substantial country with a lot of people by Middle East standards, and we should keep our end up with practical aid schemes on the present lines, emphasising agriculture. The experimental farm I visited, run by half a dozen British experts, was very impressive and represents just the kind of help which can benefit the people directly. The Yemenis are grateful for the modest amount we do for them.

6.

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

OMAN: 27 FEBRUARY - 1 MARCH

7. Within hours a visiting British Minister becomes immersed in the inner political life of Oman, which makes this a different country from any other in the Middle East - more like Iraq or Egypt in the 1930s. This is fun but hazardous. My separate talks with the Sultan, Zawawi, Creasey, and Yusuf Alawi (effectively the new Foreign Minister) covered the same problems, but each had his own angle. It was characteristic that while Creasey was describing in his saltiest style his plans for the future of the armed forces, a telegram was brought into the room to me describing Landon's exactly opposite views expressed to John Moberly in London.

/8.

S E C R E T

8. We seem to have reached roughly the following stage on defence. The Sultan and his advisers are looking for the right balance between the Americans, the Gulf countries and ourselves. They believe that after a bad start Weinberger's visit went well, and that Weinberger himself understands the need for discretion in building up the agreed American facilities and planning the occasional exercise. There is no need now for trilateral talks, though the Sultan said there might be very quiet and restricted discussions later on, perhaps in London. Meanwhile he has accepted Creasey's ideas for a request (to be put to us during the State Visit) that we define more exactly than I did in December what we would do for Oman in peace and war. The suggestions as outlined by Creasey are skilfully tailored to what we would obviously do anyway, and I hope we need not make heavy weather of them. The Americans are likely to say an eager 'yes' to the corresponding request to them.

9. The Gulf countries may produce quite large sums for Oman's defence budget after the Gulf summit in November if the recent GCC mission's recommendations are accepted. These helpful recommendations are not linked to any weakening in the Sultan's pro-Western stance. Privately they advised him to replace his British commanders, but he told them this would not do.

10. Intrigue is endemic to Oman, and to the Sultan's way of doing business. He has shown courage in getting rid of the corrupt Chief of Police. It is too early to assess Zawawi's move out of foreign affairs. It is true that he told me some time ago that he wanted to give up this part of his work. The test of his present standing is whether he will still be consulted on defence and security matters. My guess is that he will. The new man at Foreign Affairs, Yusuf Alawi, is young, rather silent, dignified; I like him. Creasey loves a scrap, and keeps several going at any one time. He has won more than he has lost, and is enormously enjoying both his present Indian Army lifestyle, and the discomfiture of what he regards as the corrupt old gang (Landon, Zawawi) who but for him would (he thinks) have sold the Sultan out to the Americans.

11. Qaboos too was in excellent form, much better than in December. His eyes sparkled at the thought of the State Visit.

12. We scrambled over the rocks and mud of the university site, did what we could with Zawawi on the big power station, and on Sunday had a picnic lunch by a mud village near Nizwa destroyed by the RAF in the late fifties.

QATAR: 1-2 MARCH

13. All very friendly, and no real problems. All the Gulf states are bearing a heavy financial burden supporting Iraq against Iran. The Ruler cross-examined me rigorously about the war (why don't we stop it?) and the low price of gas (why don't we stop the



/Soviet

Soviet pipeline?) I asked him to London in November, and discussed defence sales and cooperation with his two sons. The Qataris are evidently worried by the declining price of oil. We share this market with the French and are not doing too badly. The most likeable of the Gulf States west of Hormuz.

Douglas Hurd.

Douglas Hurd

3 March 1982



9 MAR 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM TEL AVIV 081200Z MAR 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 69 OF 8 MARCH 1982

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, WASHINGTON, AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS
AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S VISIT TO ISRAEL: 3-5 MARCH

1. THIS VISIT, THE FIRST BY A EUROPEAN HEAD OF STATE, HAS BEEN EXTENSIVELY REPORTED IN THE PRESS. MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE GAVE COMMUNITY AMBASSADORS YESTERDAY THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS.

2. THE MOST POSITIVE FEATURE OF THE VISIT WAS TO SET A NEW STYLE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND ISRAEL. THERE WAS NOW GENUINE CORDIALITY AFTER YEARS OF FORMALITY. MITTERRAND HAD COME AS AN OPENLY DECLARED FRIEND OF ISRAEL. AT THE KNESSET HE HAD SPOKEN NOT JUST OF ISRAEL BUT OF WORLD PROBLEMS THEREBY SHOWING THAT HE REGARDED ISRAEL "AS ADULT".

3. FRENCH CRITICISMS OF ISRAELI POLICY HAD BEEN MADE DELICATELY AND IN LOW KEY. THE BAGHDAD NUCLEAR RAID AND THE GOLAN LAW FOR INSTANCE HAD BEEN BARELY TOUCHED ON. MITTERRAND HAD PLEASSED THE ISRAELIS BY ASSURING BEGIN OF FRENCH REFUSAL TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE ARAB BOYCOTT AND BY PROMISING TO INTERVENE OVER THE PLIGHT OF JEWS IN SYRIA AS WELL AS SOVIET JEWS. (THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR COMMENTED THAT REPRESENTATIONS IN DAMASCUS WERE NOT LIKELY TO GET FAR BECAUSE THE FRENCH WERE NOT ON GOOD TERMS WITH THE SYRIANS OVER LEBANON SEMICOLON MITTERRAND HAD TOLD BEGIN THAT THE FRENCH BELIEVE THE SYRIANS WERE BEHIND THE ASSASSINATION OF THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN DAMASCUS LAST YEAR).

4. THE ISRAELIS HAD OF COURSE WELCOMED MITTERRAND'S ASSURANCE THAT HE WAS IN FAVOUR OF CAMP DAVID OR MORE PRECISELY PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT. EQUALLY HE HAD DECLARED HIMSELF AGAINST THE VENICE DECLARATION ON GROUNDS THAT THIS ASSUMED A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE WHEN IN THE FRENCH VIEW STEP BY STEP WAS THE RIGHT WAY FORWARD. MOREOVER IT WOULD BE FOR THE PARTIES THEMSELVES TO WORK OUT A SOLUTION, ALTHOUGH THE EUROPEANS SHOULD BE READY TO SUPPORT AND ASSIST THE PARTIES IN THAT PROCESS. (IT WOULD FOLLOW, ALTHOUGH ACCORDING TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR WHO WAS PRESENT AT ALL HIS TALKS, MITTERRAND HIMSELF DID NOT ACTUALLY SAY SO, THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT SUPPORT ANY NEW EUROPEAN INITIATIVE.)

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 5. THE FRENCH

5. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR THEN LISTED THE POINTS MADE BY MITTERRAND WHICH THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT HAVE LIKED:

(A) PALESTINIAN STATE (UNDERLINED). IN HIS SPEECH TO THE KNESSET ON 4 MARCH, MITTERRAND HAD REFERRED TO THE RIGHTS OF EACH PARTY. QUOTE FOR THE PALESTINIANS AS FOR THE OTHERS THIS MEANS IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS A STATE QUOTE. I GATHER THAT MITTERRAND WROTE THIS CENTRAL SECTION OF THE SPEECH HIMSELF OVERNIGHT. NOTHING WAS SAID ABOUT WHERE SUCH A STATE MIGHT BE LOCATED. ALTHOUGH CHEYSSON HAS REFERRED IN THE PAST TO A PALESTINIAN STATE, THIS IS SAID TO BE NEW FOR MITTERRAND WHO UNTIL NOW HAS REFERRED ONLY TO STATE STRUCTURES.

(B) PLO (UNDERLINED). BY INCLUDING THE PLO SQUARELY IN HIS KNESSET SPEECH, MITTERRAND CAN CLAIM TO HAVE ESTABLISHED THE PLO QUESTION AS A SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION WITH ISRAEL. BUT HE BALANCED THIS BY CALLING FOR MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS AND FOR RENUNCIATION OF WAR DIRECT OR INDIRECT:

(C) AUTONOMY TALKS (UNDERLINED). BEGIN GAVE MITTERRAND A STATEMENT OF ISRAELI PROPOSALS FOR AUTONOMY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES PREVIOUSLY HANDED TO THE AMERICANS AND EGYPTIANS. FRENCH AMBASSADOR TOLD US THAT MITTERRAND HAD DISMISSED THESE BRUSQUELY WITH THE COMMENT THAT JURIDICALLY THE ISRAELI PROPOSALS MIGHT BE FINE BUT POLITICALLY THEY WERE NO GOOD - THE ARABS WOULD NOT ACCEPT AUTONOMY ON THOSE TERMS. THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK. WHEN MITTERRAND TOUCHED ON THE PROSPECT OF EVENTUAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WHICH HE SAID WOULD OF COURSE NEED TO BE DEMILITARISED, BEGIN WAS NOT TO BE DRAWN ON WHETHER ANY FORM OF DEMILITARISATION SATISFACTORY TO ISRAEL COULD BE DEvised: BEGIN'S FOCUS HAD BEEN ENTIRELY ON AUTONOMY.

6. ON OTHER INTERNATIONAL SUBJECTS, THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT NOT MUCH HAD BEEN SETTLED. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE LEBANON, AFRICA AND POSSIBLE SUPPLY OF A FRENCH NUCLEAR REACTOR TO ISRAEL HAD BEEN DISCUSSED, BUT INCONCLUSIVELY. THE FRENCH HAD CONCLUDED THAT AN ISRAELI MILITARY MOVE INTO SOUTHERN LEBANON WAS NOT LIKELY FOR THE MOMENT. ON ARMS SUPPLIES, THE FRENCH HAD TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER REQUESTS BUT HAD MADE NO COMMITMENT, (AMBASSADOR SAID FRENCH EXPERIENCE WAS THAT ISRAELIS USUALLY WISHED TO BUY FOUR OR FIVE EXAMPLES OF SOME NEW PIECE OF EQUIPMENT WHICH THEY THEN COPIED FOR THEMSELVES.)

7. MITTERRAND HAD NOT RESPONDED DURING THE VISIT TO A PROPOSAL BY BEGIN IN THE KNESSET FOR A MEDITERRANEAN CHARTER. IN HIS SPEECH BEGIN ASKED MITTERRAND TO PURSUE THE IDEA OF THE MEDITERRANEAN STATES AGREEING NOT TO INITIATE WAR, TO RESOLVE DISPUTES THROUGH NEGOTIATION, AND TO RENOUNCE WARFARE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY. AMBASSADOR'S OWN VIEW WAS THAT THIS WOULD NOT APPEAL MUCH TO MITTERRAND: A MEDITERRANEAN CHARTER HAD BEEN ONE OF POMPIDOU'S IDEAA.

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8. ON BILATERAL COOPERATION ISRAELIS HAVE MADE MUCH OF VARIOUS FOLLOW-UP ARRANGEMENTS. AMBASSADOR WAS AT PAINS TO SAY THAT THESE WERE MORE SPECTACULAR THAN PROFOUND. OFFICIALS WILL MEET NEXT MONTH AT DIRECTOR-GENERAL LEVEL, BUT PLAN FOR A MIXED COMMISSION HAD BEEN AGREED BEFORE THE VISIT AND ISRAELIS HAD PRESSED UNSUCCESSFULLY FOR IT TO BE AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL. ALTHOUGH SHAMIR WOULD BE GOING TO PARIS IN MAY, THIS AGAIN HAD BEEN DECIDED AT THE TIME OF CHEYSSON'S VISIT TO ISRAEL LAST DECEMBER. FURTHER MINISTERIAL VISITS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS WERE POSSIBLE, INCLUDING THE FRENCH DEFENCE MINISTER, BUT NOTHING WAS FIXED. NOR HAD ANY INVITATION BEEN GIVEN TO BEGIN OR PRESIDENT NAVON TO VISIT PARIS.

9. COMMENT. THE ISRAELIS HAVE HAILED THE VISIT AS A GREAT SUCCESS AND A BREAK-THROUGH IN RELATIONS WITH FRANCE. OF COURSE MITTERRAND HAS BEEN HERE OFTEN BEFORE AND KNOWS MANY ISRAELI POLITICIANS PERSONALLY. I CAN WELL BELIEVE FRENCH AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT THAT MITTERRAND PROBABLY DID NOT LEARN MUCH NEW, HAVING NO ILLUSIONS BEFORE HE CAME. BUT THE NEW WARMTH IN RELATIONS IS PLAIN FOR ALL TO SEE. THIS IS DOUBLY WELCOME TO THE ISRAELIS IN THEIR PRESENT MOOD OF ISOLATION. DESPITE THE HOME TRUTHS AND PLAIN SPEAKING WHICH HE BROUGHT TO THEM, NOTABLY OVER A PALESTINIAN STATE, MITTERRAND WAS RECEIVED AS A FRIEND AND LEFT WITH HIS REPUTATION HERE NOT JUST INTACT BUT ENLARGED. TIME WILL SHOW HOW THE ARAB WORLD REACTS TO WHAT LOOKS FROM HERE LIKE A PRETTY SUCCESSFUL BALANCING ACT.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES EXCEPT JERUSALEM.

MOBERLY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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[NOT ADVANCED]

Middle East ^{HL}

8 March 1982

President Mubarak's message to the Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 5 March. The Prime Minister agrees that the draft message enclosed with your letter may be sent to President Mubarak.

JOHN COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JS

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

5 March 1982

Content to send message

at Flag A?

Dear John,

Yes mk

A-F.C. 5/3

President Mubarak's Message to the Prime Minister

HM Ambassador Cairo reported in his telegrams numbers 104 and 105 (copies enclosed) that he had received an 'oral message' from President Mubarak to the Prime Minister explaining the difficulties caused by the Israeli Government's insistence that President Mubarak should go to Jerusalem if he visits Israel.

President Mubarak's message makes a warm reference to his recent talks with the Prime Minister at Chequers, and goes on to give a frank account of the problems posed by the Israeli Government's decision. Lord Carrington recommends that the Prime Minister send a short reply to President Mubarak. I enclose a draft message, cast in the form of a telegram of instructions to HM Ambassador, Cairo.

The draft message does not touch on the substance of the Jerusalem issue. President Mubarak's reluctance to visit Jerusalem is understandable. We would not however want to become involved in what is a disagreement between the Israelis and Egyptians. In particular we should bear in mind that the Israelis might learn of the terms of a reply from the Prime Minister to President Mubarak, and would be quick to seize on any suggestion that we were encouraging President Mubarak not to visit Jerusalem.

Yours ever

J E Holmes
Private Secretary

John Holmes

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.

Department **NENAD**

Drafted by

(Block Capitals) **P F RICKETTS**

Tel. Extn. **233 3736**

OUTWARD

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[TEXT]

YOUR TELNOS 104 AND 105: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT
MUBARAK TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

1. Please deliver the following reply from the
Prime Minister to President Mubarak. BEGINS

Thank you for your message, which I received
through the British Ambassador in Cairo on 1 March,
about the problems over your planned visit to Israel.

I am most grateful to you for taking the
trouble to inform me so promptly and fully. I can
quite understand your difficulties, particularly
at this crucial moment in the process of building
peace between your country and Israel.

I, too, found our talks at Chequers last month
most useful and satisfactory. I look forward to
keeping closely in touch with you. ENDS.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 105 OF 1 MARCH

INFO TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON

MY IPT: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT MUBARAK TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT:

BEGINS

1. THE PRESIDENT WAS VERY PLEASED AND SATISFIED WITH THE TALKS HE HAD WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER DURING HIS RECENT VISIT. THE WARM AND FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH THE TALKS WERE HELD TESTIFIES TO THE EXCELLENT RELATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION THAT EXIST AMONG OUR COUNTRIES. THE OUTCOME OF THE TALKS WAS ANOTHER INDICATION OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY CAN PLAY TO PROMOTE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
2. AS PRESIDENT MUBARAK INDICATED, WE ARE UNEQUIVOCALLY DETERMINED TO CONTINUE OUR PEACE POLICY FOR THE GOOD OF ALL NATIONS. WE SPARED NO EFFORT TO REASSURE THE ISRAELIS THAT PEACE, TO US, IS A STRATEGIC LINE OF POLICY AND A FIRM COMMITMENT WHICH WE WILL NOT VIOLATE. THE PRESIDENT MADE IT A POINT TO STATE THAT EGYPT ACCEPTS NO CONDITION REGARDING ITS PEACE POLICY FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH ANY COUNTRY. WE ALSO STATED THAT THE COMPLETION OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI WILL SIGNAL A SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT OF EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS AMONG THE TWO PEOPLES AS IT IS CERTAIN TO REMOVE ANOTHER PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIER ALONG THE ROAD TO FULL PEACE.
3. THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS IS PROCEEDING VERY SMOOTHLY AND WITHOUT ANY PROBLEM. IN THE NORMALIZATION TALKS, EGYPT HAS CONSISTENTLY TAKEN A VERY POSITIVE AND RESPONSIVE ATTITUDE. THE LAST ROUND OF TALKS, HELD WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR A FEW DAYS AGO PRODUCED POSITIVE RESULTS.
4. WITHIN THIS CONTEXT ALSO, PRESIDENT MUBARAK EXPRESSED TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HIS WILLINGNESS TO VISIT ISRAEL AT ANY TIME. NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE ON OUR PART TO POSTPONE THAT VISIT UNTIL THE COMPLETION OF WITHDRAWAL. NO CONDITION WAS SET FOR UNDERTAKING THE VISIT BUT AN EXPRESSION OF HOPE THAT ISRAEL WILL APPLY SELF RESTRAINT AND REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION THAT IS APT TO EXACERBATE THE SITUATION OR INCREASE TENSION IN THE REGION. PRESIDENT MUBARAK RECALLS THAT THIS CONCERN WAS SHARED BY PRIME MINISTER THATCHER DURING THE RECENT TALKS.

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5. THE PRESIDENT WAS PLANNING TO PAY THAT VISIT AROUND THE MIDDLE OF MARCH. WHEN CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES WERE STARTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF AGREEING ON THE PROGRAM, THE ISRAELIS PROPOSED THAT THE PRESIDENT VISIT JERUSALEM. WE TOLD THEM THAT A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO THE HOLY CITY WOULD CREATE SEVERAL PROBLEMS IN THE LIGHT OF THE ISRAELI LAW OF 1980 WHICH ANNEXED EAST JERUSALEM TO ISRAEL AND CONSIDERED THE "UNIFIED CITY" THE ETERNAL CAPITAL OF ISRAEL. PRIME MINISTER THATCHER IS CERTAINLY AWARE OF THE UNIVERSAL REJECTION OF THIS ACT WHICH WAS REFLECTED IN A UNANIMOUS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. SHE IS ALSO AWARE OF THE COMMOTION IT STIRRED IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD.

6. FOLLOWING THE PROMULGATION OF THIS LAW, PRESIDENT SADAT ORDERED THE SUSPENSION OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS AND ADDRESSED THREE URGENT MESSAGES TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, DRAWING HIS ATTENTION TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE MATTER. THE LATE PRESIDENT WAS INCLINED TO BAN ANY VISITS TO THE CITY BY EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS. IN AN ATTEMPT TO FACILITATE MATTER, PRESIDENT MUBARAK THEN VICE PRESIDENT, REQUESTED HIM TO MAKE OUR RESPONSE FLEXIBLE AND IT WAS AGREED FINALLY THAT:

- A) ANY OFFICIAL VISITING THE CITY WOULD ISSUE A STATEMENT THAT HIS VISIT MEANT NO RECOGNITION OF THE ISRAELI ACT.
- B) THAT NO SUCH VISIT SHOULD EXTEND BEYOND OFFICE HOURS. AFTER CONDUCTING THEIR BUSINESS, OFFICIALS WOULD STAY IN ANOTHER CITY.

7. THIS FORMULA WAS RELAYED TO THE ISRAELI SIDE AND WAS STRICTLY ADHERED TO. WHEN PRESIDENT SADAT VISITED ISRAEL AFTERWARDS, HIS VISITS WERE CONFINED TO HAIFA AND BERSHIBA.

8. THUS, THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD NO REASON TO BE SURPRISED WHEN THEY WERE INFORMED OF PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S DESIRE TO AVOID THIS HIGHLY SENSITIVE ISSUE ON HIS COMING VISIT.

9. PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR LAST WEEK, THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO CAIRO CONVEYED TO US AN ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER STATING THAT MR BEGIN WOULD BE COMPELLED TO REQUEST THE CANCELLATION OF THE VISIT IF IT DID NOT INCLUDE JERUSALEM WE PREFERRED TO WITHHOLD ANY REPLY UNTIL MINISTER SHAMIR ARRIVED AS WE WERE DESIREOUS THAT SHOULD BE WORKED OUT IN A FRIENDLY MANNER.

10. WHEN MINISTER SHAMIR ARRIVED, THE PRESIDENT TOLD HIM THAT IT WOULD BE MOST DIFFICULT TO REVERSE THE STAND PRESIDENT SADAT TOOK ON THIS ISSUE, ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF ITS RELIGIOUS DIMENSION. IT WOULD BE DISSERVICE TO PEACE TO GIVE AMMUNITION TO FANATIC FUNDAMENTALISTS AND OTHER EXTREMIST GROUPS WHICH OPERATE OUTSIDE THE MAINSTREAM OF THE EGYPTIAN SOCIETY. A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO THE CITY AFTER THE ISRAELI ACT WOULD CREATE A MOST UNFAVOURABLE ATMOSPHERE AT A CRUCIAL TIME WHEN THE TRIAL OF PRESIDENT SADAT'S ASSASSIN'S IS APPROACHING ITS END. OTHER TRIALS ARE UNDER WAY, TOO. THE FORCES THAT FOMENT

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TENSION AND OPPOSE PEACE WOULD NO DOUBT SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONTEND THAT EGYPT HAS SURRENDERED ARAB AND MUSLIM RIGHTS IN ORDER TO SECURE THE COMPLETION OF WITHDRAWAL.

11. THE PRESIDENT ADVISED THE ISRAELI CABINET TO DEMONSTRATE THE SAME FLEXIBILITY WHICH CHARACTERIZES OUR BEHAVIOUR. HE SAID THAT THE TWO SIDES SHOULD BE ABLE TO FIND OTHER ALTERNATIVES THAT WOULD NOT INFLICT ANY HARM ON EITHER PARTY. HE STRESSED THAT THE INSISTENCE ON A PROVOCATIVE MOVE WOULD HURT THE CAUSE OF BUILDING PEACE BETWEEN THE TWO PEOPLES, UNNECESSARILY.

12. MINISTER SHAMIR LEFT CAIRO WITH THE PROMISE OF SEEKING A COMPROMISE. HOWEVER, WE WERE SURPRISED TO RECEIVE PRESS REPORTS FROM ISRAEL STATING THAT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN WOULD RATHER HAVE THE VISIT CANCELLED THAN TAKE PLACE WHILE OMITTING JERUSALEM.

13. WE WILL NOT BE DRAWN TO A USELESS PUBLIC EXCHANGE OF ARGUMENTS AND/OR ACCUSATIONS. BUT PRESIDENT MUBARAK WANTS PRIME MINISTER THATCHER TO KNOW THAT THIS ISRAELI ATTITUDE IS NOT SERVING THE CAUSE OF PEACE. THERE IS NO RATIONAL REASON FOR THIS ADAMANT INSISTENCE ON A MATTER THAT CAUSES MORE HARM THAN GOOD. ALTERNATIVES ARE MANY AND WE SHALL NOT BE FORCED TO CHANGE OUR POLICY UNDER PRESSURE. BOTH PARTIES ARE UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO FULFILL THEIR COMMITMENTS UNDER THE PEACE TREATY IN GOOD FAITH. NO PARTY SHOULD SEEK TO IMPOSE UNREASONABLE DEMANDS. EACH SIDE SHOULD CONSIDER THE SENSITIVITIES AND THE DIFFICULTIES CONFRONTING THE OTHER.

14. NONE OF ^{US} STANDS TO BENEFIT OF SUCH SITUATIONS. WE HAVE BEEN MOST CONCILIATORY AND ACCOMMODATING WITH ISRAEL AND WE EXPECT THEM TO ACT IN RECIPROCITY. IT IS FUTILE TO RESORT TO THE MEDIA, FOR THIS WILL NOT GENERATE ANY PRESSURE ON US. IT WOULD ONLY PRODUCE THE ILLFEELING WE HAVE BEEN WORKING TIRELESSLY TO ELIMINATE.

15. PRESIDENT MUBARAK WOULD LIKE TO INFORM YOU THAT IF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT INSISTS ON THE JERUSALEM ISSUE, WE WILL HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO POSTPONE THE VISIT FOR A FEW MONTHS PENDING A CLARIFICATION OF THE MATTER OR A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 104 OF 28 FEBRUARY
INFO TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS,
JEDDA, KUWAIT, PARIS, ROME, BONN AND VIENNA

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(CORRECTED VERSION)

MY TELNO 103: PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S VISIT TO ISRAEL

1. I WAS SUMMONED THIS AFTERNOON BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO BE TOLD ABOUT THE NEW DIFFICULTY THAT HAS ARISEN WITH THE ISRAELIS, OVER JERUSALEM. HE HANDED ME AN "ORAL MESSAGE" FROM PRESIDENT MUBARAK TO THE PRIME MINISTER, WHICH SETS OUT THE EGYPTIAN POSITION AT LENGTH. TEXT IN MIFT (NOT REPEATED TO ALL). SIMILAR MESSAGES ARE GOING TO THE OTHER EUROPEAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WHOM MUBARAK MET ON HIS RECENT TOUR, AND AMBASSADOR GHORBAL HAS RETURNED TO WASHINGTON WITH A MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN.

2. KAMAL HASSAN ALI'S MAIN POINT WAS THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE WELL AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTY THAT VISITING JERUSALEM HAS POSED FOR THE EGYPTIANS EVER SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE KNESSET BILL, AND HAD ON THE WHOLE BEEN CO-OPERATIVE IN FINDING WAYS ROUND IT (TO THE EXAMPLES QUOTED IN MUBARAK'S MESSAGE HE ADDED THE EXCHANGE OF RATIFICATIONS OF THE PEACE TREATY AT THE US FIELD MISSION IN SINAI, THOUGH THE ISRAELIS HAD WANTED JERUSALEM). IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE FOR MUBARAK TO GO TO JERUSALEM IN THE SAME MONTH IN WHICH JUDGEMENT IS TO BE GIVEN IN THE TRIAL OF SADAT'S ASSASSINS AND WITH THE TRIAL OF OTHER FUNDAMENTALISTS DUE TO BEGIN ON 30 MARCH. THE EGYPTIANS HAD SAID AS MUCH LAST WEEK TO SHAMIR, WHO HAD UNDERTAKEN TO SEEK A COMPROMISE. THE EGYPTIANS WERE THEREFORE SURPRISED TO LEARN FROM THE PRESS LEAKS, AND THE SUBSEQUENT ANNOUNCEMENT AFTER TODAY'S ISRAELI CABINET MEETING, THAT IF JERUSALEM COULD NOT BE INCLUDED THE ISRAELIS WOULD PREFER THE VISIT TO BE CANCELLED.

3. I ASKED WHETHER THE EGYPTIANS REGARDED THIS AS A SERIOUS DEVELOPMENT WHICH MIGHT HAVE DAMAGING CONSEQUENCES. KAMAL ALI REPLIED WITH A SMILE THAT IN EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI RELATIONS THE UNEXPECTED HAD USUALLY COME FROM ONLY TWO SOURCES, PRESIDENT SADAT AND MR BEGIN, AND SADAT WAS NOW GONE. HE HOPED BEGIN WOULD RESIST THE TEMPTATION TO MAKE A MAJOR ISSUE OUT OF THE AFFAIR. HE DID NOT RISE TO MY SUGGESTION THAT THE EGYPTIANS MIGHT BE SECRETLY RELIEVED TO BE SPARED THE EMBARRASSMENT OF MUBARAK'S VISITING ISRAEL AT ALL AT THE PRESENT TIME. I SUSPECT THAT THEY ARE, THOUGH THEIR NERVOUSNESS IS APPARENT FROM THE FACT THAT THE LATEST UPSET HAS BEEN REPORTED ONLY INDIRECTLY (QUOTING ISRAEL RADIO) IN THE LOCAL MEDIA.
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 70 OF 5 MARCH

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, JEDDA, AND BEIRUT
INFO SAVING OTHER ME POSTS, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK.

1. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PERSONAL ENVOY, PHILIP HABIB, VISITED SYRIA FROM ISRAEL FROM 2 TO 3 MARCH. THE US EMBASSY HERE HAD REQUESTED PERMISSION ON 24 FEBRUARY FOR HABIB TO COME. THE SYRIANS DELAYED A REPLY UNTIL 28 FEBRUARY, BUT EVENTUALLY SAID THAT THEY WOULD RECEIVE HIM TO HEAR REAGAN'S ORAL MESSAGE TO ASAD, ON CONDITION THAT HABIB SAW ASAD ALONE. ON 3 MARCH ASAD RECEIVED HABIB (WHO WAS EXPECTING A COOL HALF-HOUR FORMAL SESSION) FOR TWO HOURS AND FORTY MINUTES. ON THE PREVIOUS EVENING, THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM, SAW HABIB FOR TWO HOURS WITH MORRIS DRAPER AND EMBASSY STAFF.

2. BECAUUE OF THE UNEXPECTED LENGTH OF THE TALKS WITH ASAD AND THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIS ONWARD JOURNEY, HABIB WAS UNABLE TO BRIEF EMBASSY STAFF ON WHAT HAD TAKEN PLACE. BUT THEY HAVE TOLD US THAT HIS MANDATE ON THIS OCCASION WAS RESTRICTED TO STRENGTHENING AND BROADENING THE CEASEFIRE IN SOUTH LEBANQN. THE MISSILE QUESTION WAS NOT INCLUDED. HE AIMED TO ENSURE THAT THE SYRIANS UNDERSTOOD CLEARLY THE POLITICAL MOOD IN ISRAEL, THE FRAGILITY OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND THE LOW THRESHOLD WHICH WOULD PROVOKE AN ISRAELI ATTACK. IN THIS WAY HE HOPED THAT A FLAREUP THROUGH MISCALCULATION COULD

FIRE AND THE LOW THRESHOLD WHICH WOULD PROVOKE AN ISRAELI ATTACK. IN THIS WAY HE HOPED THAT A FLAREUP THROUGH MISCALCULATION COULD BE AVOIDED. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SYRIANS AT THIS STAGE LAY IN THE INFLUENCE THEY COULD EXERT ON THE WILDER PALESTINIAN GROUPS. KHADDAM HAD SAID THAT SYRIA WAS OF COURSE NOT A PARTY TO THE CEASEFIRE. BUT THE AMERICANS HAVE THE FIRM IMPRESSION THAT THE SYRIANS ARE ANXIOUS TO SEE THAT THE CEASEFIRE CONTINUES, ARE APPREHENSIVE OF AN ISRAELI ATTACK ON SOUTH LEBANON, AND FEAR THAT THE ARAB DETERRENT FORCE MIGHT BE EMBROILED IN THE FIGHTING. FOR ONCE US AND SYRIAN POLICY SEEMS TO BE WORKING IN PARALLEL, THOUGH FOR DIFFERENT REASONS.

3. HABIB TOLD KHADDAM THAT THE US REGARDED THE PALESTINIAN ATTACK ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES FROM JORDAN AS A VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE, SINCE IT ORIGINATED IN LEBANON. CONVERSELY, HE ASSURED HIM THAT THE US WOULD NOT REGARD A PALESTINIAN ATTACK ON A JEWISH TARGET OUTSIDE THE REGION, EG IN EUROPE, AS A CEASEFIRE VIOLATION.

4. HABIB WAS SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME OF HIS TALKS IN DAMASCUS. AFTER HIS VISIT TO JORDAN HE WILL VISIT SAUDI ARABIA AND WILL RETURN TO ISRAEL BEFORE GOING HOME.

5. THE US EMBASSY HERE SAY THAT HABIB'S DISCUSSIONS IN ISRAEL WERE HEATED. OUR CONTACT CONSIDERED THAT ISRAEL HAD 40,000 MEN READY FOR AN ATTACK ON SOUTH LEBANON TO FINISH OFF THE PLO MILITARILY, AND THAT BEGIN WAS STILL KEENLY AWAITING A JUSTIFICATION TO SEND THEM IN.

6. THE US EMBASSY ARE UNDER STRICT INSTRUCTIONS TO REVEAL NOTHING ABOUT HABIB'S VISIT TO THEIR COLLEAGUES. I WOULD THEREFORE BE GRATEFULL IF THEIR CONFIDENCE COULD BE RESPECTED.

7. COMMENT. THE SYRIANS MAINTAINED THEIR PATTERN OF RECEIVING HIGH-LEVEL AMERICAN ENVOYS, AND THUS KEEPING OPEN THEIR LINES OF COMMUNICATION. IT IS AT LEAST ARGUABLE THAT THE SYRIANS GRANT GREATER ACCESS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL TO THE US THAN TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE DELAY IN RESPONDING TO THE AMERICAN REQUEST FOR ^{HABIB} ~~FOR HIM TO VISIT~~ WAS PROBABLY THE LEAST THEY COULD DO, GIVEN THE ^{CURRENT} PRESS CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE UNITED STATES (REPEATED BY ASAD HIMSELF IN AN INTERVIEW WITH LEMONDE) ACCUSING THE US OF BACKING THE MUSLIM BROTHERS IN HAMA. HABIB PRESUMABLY HAD SOME EXPLAINING TO DO ABOUT STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING ON HAMA. THE US EMBASSY BELIEVE THAT ASAD WAS SHAKEN BY THAT EPISODE, AND THAT HE IS NOW CONVINCED THAT THE US IS TRYING TO DESTABILISE HIS REGIME. IN THAT CONTEXT, HIS CONTINUED WILLINGNESS TO SEE HABIB IS ALL THE MORE STRIKING.

NOW CONVINCED THAT THE US IS TRYING TO DESTABILISE HIS REGIME. IN THAT CONTEXT, HIS CONTINUED WILLINGNESS TO SEE HABIB IS ALL THE MORE STRIKING.

FCO PASS SAVING TO OTHER ME POSTS, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK.

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TO PRIORITY F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 79 OF 4 MARCH 1982

INFO DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM

INFO SAVING AMMAN, CAIRO, PARIS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,

UKREP BRUSSELS

FOR MILES NENAD. msMY TELNO 78 (NOT TO ALL): CONTACTS WITH THE PLO.

1. WHEN I CALLED ON ABU YAHYA OF THE PLO POLITICAL OFFICE ON 4 MARCH, HE RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO ISRAEL. HE SAID THAT THE PLO UNDERSTOOD THE REASONS FOR LORD CARRINGTON'S GOING THERE. THEY WERE NOT AGAINST IT IN THE WAY IN WHICH THEY WERE AGAINST PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S CURRENT STATE VISIT.

2. ABU YAHYA SAID THAT THE PLO ATTACH GREAT WEIGHT TO WHAT LORD CARRINGTON SAYS ABOUT THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM BECAUSE, UNLIKE M. CHEYSSON, HE DOES NOT TRIM HIS WORDS TO SUIT HIS AUDIENCE. THE PLO VERY MUCH HOPED THAT LORD CARRINGTON WOULD NOT TRIM DURING HIS VISIT TO ISRAEL. HE THEN SAID (ADDING THAT THIS WAS A PURELY PERSONAL SUGGESTION AND DID NOT REPRESENT OFFICIAL PLO POLICY) THAT IT WOULD "FOR THE FUTURE" BE HELPFUL IF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WERE TO STATE PUBLICLY IN ISRAEL THAT HE (AND HIS EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES IF HE WISHED TO INCLUDE THEM) WOULD LIKE TO HELP TO FIND SOME WAY WHEREBY THE ISRAELIS AND THE PLO (REPEAT PLO) COULD MOVE TOWARDS SOME FORM OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION. SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD, HE ACCEPTED, UPSET THE ISRAELIS AND WOULD UPSET SOME IN THE PLO TOO. THEY, LIKE THE ISRAELIS, INITIALLY WOULD HAVE PUBLICLY TO OBJECT TO IT. BUT PRIVATELY THE PLO WOULD RECOGNISE SUCH A STATEMENT AS BEING HELPFUL, NOT LEAST BECAUSE IT WOULD INDICATE CLEARLY THAT EUROPEAN INTEREST IN THE PROBLEM HAD NOT DIMINISHED DESPITE FRENCH ATTEMPTS, AS THE PLO SEE IT, TO PERSUADE THEIR EUROPEAN PARTNERS TO WASH THEIR HANDS OF IT. ALL THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL TO ARAFAT IN THE COMING MONTHS UN HIS EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN HIS MODERATE POSITION AND COUNTER THE OPPOSITION TO IT FROM HARDLINE ELEMENTS.

3. IF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WERE TO SAY ANYTHING PUBLICLY ABOUT OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO THE PLO HOPED THAT HE WOULD MATCH IT WITH SOME REFERENCE TO THE PASSAGE IN THE VENICE DECLARATION WHERE THE EUROPEANS EXPRESS WILLINGNESS TO TAKE PART IN ANY PEACE-KEEPING EFFORTS WHICH MAY BE SET UP AS PART OF A SETTLEMENT OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

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/ 4. I SAID

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4. I SAID THAT I HAD NO IDEA WHAT LORD CARRINGTON WAS PROPOSING TO SAY DURING HIS VISIT TO ISRAEL. I WAS CONFIDENT THAT HE WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT OUR POLICY, I.E. SUPPORT FOR THE FRAMEWORK OFFERED BY THE VENICE DECLARATION, HAD NOT CHANGED. BUT I WAS NOT SURE WHETHER HE WOULD WANT TO SAY ANYTHING TOO CONTROVERSIAL OR TOO OFFENSIVE TO HIS ISRAELI HOSTS. NONETHELESS I UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY HIS THOUGHTS TO YOU.

5. I AM NOT SURE WHAT TO MAKE OF ALL THIS. ABU YAHYA IS A MODERATE. IT IS HIS JOB TO ESTABLISH GOOD CONTACTS WITH THE WESTERN EUROPEANS. AND I THINK HE GENUINELY BELIEVES THAT VENICE STILL OFFERS A WAY, AND PERHAPS THE BEST WAY, FORWARD. I CANNOT JUDGE WHETHER HIS PERSONAL SUGGESTION HAS THE BLESSING OF ARAFAT OR NOT. HE PRESENTED IT AS A PERSONAL INITIATIVE, BUT I DO NOT THINK THAT HE WOULD HAVE DONE SO UNLESS HE JUDGED THAT THE IMPACT ON ARAFAT WOULD BE AS DESCRIBED IN PARA.2 ABOVE. I THEREFORE HOPE THAT IT CAN BE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION.

6. I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY BY TELELETTER THE OTHER POINTS OF INTEREST WHICH ABU YAHYA AND SHAFIQ AL HUT MADE. ABU YAHYA WAS PARTICULARLY BITTER ABOUT THE FRENCH.

7. FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

PALMER

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 093 OF 03 MARCH

INFO MODUK (DI4), BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON.

SAVING TO (FOR INFO) OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

JORDAN/IRAQ

1. IT WAS ANNOUNCED ON 2 MARCH ON JORDANIAN TELEVISION THAT THE FIRST CONTINGENT OF THE YARMOUK FORCE LEFT FOR IRAQ ON 1 MARCH. IN A FAREWELL SPEECH IN THE PRESENCE OF WHAT APPEARED TO BE THE ENTIRE FORCE, KING HUSSEIN SAID HE HOPED TO JOIN THE VOLUNTEERS ON THE BATTLEFIELD VERY SHORTLY. NO INFORMATION WAS GIVEN ABOUT THE NUMBER OF VOLUNTEERS IN THE FIRST CONTINGENT. BUT WE HAVE A REPORT FROM A RELIABLE SOURCE THAT AROUND 200 MEN, ORGANISED AS TWO FORMED INFANTRY COMPANIES AND CARRYING PERSONAL WEAPONS AND PACKS, WERE INVOLVED IN WHAT SEEMED TO BE A DRESS REHEARSAL THE PREVIOUS EVENING.

2. SINCE KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO ONE OF THE FORCE'S TRAINING CAMPS ON 9 FEBRUARY (CHARLTON'S TELELETTER OF 11 FEBRUARY REFERS), ALL REQUESTS FROM FOREIGN JOURNALISTS AND TV STATIONS TO VISIT THE TRAINING CAMPS HAVE BEEN TURNED DOWN AND LITTLE HAS APPEARED ABOUT THE FORCE IN THE JORDANIAN PRESS. FEELINGS ABOUT THE DESPATCH OF VOLUNTEERS REMAIN MIXED. HOWEVER MESSAGES OF SUPPORT AND FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FORCE, MANY OF THEM OFFICIALLY PROMPTED, CONTINUE TO FLOW IN.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

URWICK

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No: T 344/82**

LWY 644/01

OO FCO

RR TEL AVIV

RR WASHINGTON

GRS 1100

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CAIRO 010900Z MAR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 105 OF 1 MARCH

INFO TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON

MY IPT: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT MUBARAK TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT:

BEGINS

1. THE PRESIDENT WAS VERY PLEASED AND SATISFIED WITH THE TALKS HE HAD WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER DURING HIS RECENT VISIT. THE WARM AND FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH THE TALKS WERE HELD TESTIFIES TO THE EXCELLENT RELATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION THAT EXIST AMONG OUR COUNTRIES. THE OUTCOME OF THE TALKS WAS ANOTHER INDICATION OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY CAN PLAY TO PROMOTE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
2. AS PRESIDENT MUBARAK INDICATED, WE ARE UNEQUIVOCALLY DETERMINED TO CONTINUE OUR PEACE POLICY FOR THE GOOD OF ALL NATIONS. WE SPARED NO EFFORT TO REASSURE THE ISRAELIS THAT PEACE, TO US, IS A STRATEGIC LINE OF POLICY AND A FIRM COMMITMENT WHICH WE WILL NOT VIOLATE. THE PRESIDENT MADE IT A POINT TO STATE THAT EGYPT ACCEPTS NO CONDITION REGARDING ITS PEACE POLICY FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH ANY COUNTRY. WE ALSO STATED THAT THE COMPLETION OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI WILL SIGNAL A SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT OF EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS AMONG THE TWO PEOPLES AS IT IS CERTAIN TO REMOVE ANOTHER PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIER ALONG THE ROAD TO FULL PEACE.
3. THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS IS PROCEEDING VERY SMOOTHLY AND WITHOUT ANY PROBLEM. IN THE NORMALIZATION TALKS,

SMOOTHLY AND WITHOUT ANY PROBLEM. IN THE NORMALIZATION TALKS, EGYPT HAS CONSISTENTLY TAKEN A VERY POSITIVE AND RESPONSIVE ATTITUDE. THE LAST ROUND OF TALKS, HELD WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR A FEW DAYS AGO PRODUCED POSITIVE RESULTS.

4. WITHIN THIS CONTEXT ALSO, PRESIDENT MUBARAK EXPRESSED TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HIS WILLINGNESS TO VISIT ISRAEL AT ANY TIME. NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE ON OUR PART TO POSTPONE THAT VISIT UNTIL THE COMPLETION OF WITHDRAWAL. NO CONDITION WAS SET FOR UNDERTAKING THE VISIT BUT AN EXPRESSION OF HOPE THAT ISRAEL WILL APPLY SELF RESTRAINT AND REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION THAT IS APT TO EXACERBATE THE SITUATION OR INCREASE TENSION IN THE REGION. PRESIDENT MUBARAK RECALLS THAT THIS CONCERN WAS SHARED BY PRIME MINISTER THATCHER DURING THE RECENT TALKS.

5. THE PRESIDENT WAS PLANNING TO PAY THAT VISIT AROUND THE MIDDLE OF MARCH. WHEN CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES WERE STARTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF AGREEING ON THE PROGRAM, THE ISRAELIS PROPOSED THAT THE PRESIDENT VISIT JERUSALEM. WE TOLD THEM THAT A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO THE HOLY CITY WOULD CREATE SEVERAL PROBLEMS IN THE LIGHT OF THE ISRAELI LAW OF 1980 WHICH ANNEXED EAST JERUSALEM TO ISRAEL AND CONSIDERED THE "UNIFIED CITY" THE ETERNAL CAPITAL OF ISRAEL. PRIME MINISTER THATCHER IS CERTAINLY AWARE OF THE UNIVERSAL REJECTION OF THIS ACT WHICH WAS REFLECTED IN A UNANIMOUS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. SHE IS ALSO AWARE OF THE COMMOTION IT STIRRED IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD.

6. FOLLOWING THE PROMULGATION OF THIS LAW, PRESIDENT SADAT ORDERED THE SUSPENSION OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS AND ADDRESSED THREE URGENT MESSAGES TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, DRAWING HIS ATTENTION TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE MATTER. THE LATE PRESIDENT WAS INCLINED TO BAN ANY VISITS TO THE CITY BY EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS. IN AN ATTEMPT TO FACILITATE MATTER, PRESIDENT MUBARAK THEN VICE PRESIDENT, REQUESTED HIM TO MAKE OUR RESPONSE FLEXIBLE AND IT WAS AGREED FINALLY THAT:

- A) ANY OFFICIAL VISITING THE CITY WOULD ISSUE A STATEMENT THAT HIS VISIT MEANT NO RECOGNITION OF THE ISRAELI ACT.
- B) THAT NO SUCH VISIT SHOULD EXTEND BEYOND OFFICE HOURSE. AFTER CONDUCTING THEIR BUSINESS, OFFICIALS WOULD STAY IN ANOTHER CITY.

7. THIS FORMULA WAS RELAYED TO THE ISRAELI SIDE AND WAS STRICTLY ADHERED TO. WHEN PRESIDENT SADAT VISITED ISRAEL AFTERWARDS, HIS VISITS WERE CONFINED TO HAIFA AND BERSHIBA.

8. THIS THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD NO REASON TO BE SURPRISED

VISITS WERE CONFINED TO HAIFA AND BERSHIBA.

8. THUS, THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD NO REASON TO BE SURPRISED WHEN THEY WERE INFORMED OF PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S DESIRE TO AVOID THIS HIGHLY SENSITIVE ISSUE ON HIS COMING VISIT.

9. PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR LAST WEEK, THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO CAIRO CONVEYED TO US AN ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER STATING THAT MR BEGIN WOULD BE COMPELLED TO REQUEST THE CANCELLATION OF THE VISIT IF IT DID NOT INCLUDE JERUSALEM. WE PREFERRED TO WITHHOLD ANY REPLY UNTIL MINISTER SHAMIR ARRIVED AS WE WERE DESIREOUS THAT SHOULD BE WORKED OUT IN A FRIENDLY MANNER.

10. WHEN MINISTER SHAMIR ARRIVED, THE PRESIDENT TOLD HIM THAT IT WOULD BE MOST DIFFICULT TO REVERSE THE STAND PRESIDENT SADAT TOOK ON THIS ISSUE, ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF ITS RELIGIOUS DIMENSION. IT WOULD BE DISSERVICE TO PEACE TO GIVE AMMUNITION TO FANATIC FUNDAMENTALISTS AND OTHER EXTREMIST GROUPS WHICH OPERATE OUTSIDE THE MAINSTREAM OF THE EGYPTIAN SOCIETY. A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO THE CITY AFTER THE ISRAELI ACT WOULD CREATE A MOST UNFAVOURABLE ATMOSPHERE AT A CRUCIAL TIME WHEN THE TRIAL OF PRESIDENT SADAT'S ASSASSIN'S IS APPROACHING ITS END. OTHER TRIALS ARE UNDER WAY, TOO. THE FORCES THAT FOMENT TENSION AND OPPOSE PEACE WOULD NO DOUBT SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONTEND THAT EGYPT HAS SURRENDERED ARAB AND MUSLIM RIGHTS IN ORDER TO SECURE THE COMPLETION OF WITHDRAWAL.

11. THE PRESIDENT ADVISED THE ISRAELI CABINET TO DEMONSTRATE THE SAME FLEXIBILITY WHICH CHARACTERIZES OUR BEHAVIOUR. HE SAID THAT THE TWO SIDES SHOULD BE ABLE TO FIND OTHER ALTERNATIVES THAT WOULD NOT INFLICT ANY HARM ON EITHER PARTY. HE STRESSED THAT THE INSISTENCE ON A PROVOCATIVE MOVE WOULD HURT THE CAUSE OF BUILDING PEACE BETWEEN THE TWO PEOPLES, UNNECESSARILY.

12. MINISTER SHAMIR LEFT CAIRO WITH THE PROMISE OF SEEKING A COMPROMISE. HOWEVER, WE WERE SURPRISED TO RECEIVE PRESS REPORTS FROM ISRAEL STATING THAT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN WOULD RATHER HAVE THE VISIT CANCELLED THAN TAKE PLACE WHILE OMITTING JERUSALEM.

13. WE WILL NOT BE DRAWN TO A USELESS PUBLIC EXCHANGE OF ARGUMENTS AND/OR ACCUSATIONS. BUT PRESIDENT MUBARAK WANTS PRIME MINISTER THATCHER TO KNOW THAT THIS ISRAELI ATTITUDE IS NOT SERVING THE CAUSE OF PEACE. THERE IS NO RATIONAL REASON FOR THIS ADAMANT INSISTENCE ON A MATTER THAT CAUSES MORE HARM THAN GOOD. ALTERNATIVES ARE MANY AND WE SHALL NOT BE FORCED TO CHANGE OUR POLICY UNDER

INSISTENCE ON A MATTER THAT CAUSES MORE HARM THAN GOOD. ALTERNATIVES ARE MANY AND WE SHALL NOT BE FORCED TO CHANGE OUR POLICY UNDER PRESSURE. BOTH PARTIES ARE UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO FULFILL THEIR COMMITMENTS UNDER THE PEACE TREATY IN GOOD FAITH. NO PARTY SHOULD SEEK TO IMPOSE UNREASONABLE DEMANDS. EACH SIDE SHOULD CONSIDER THE SENSITIVITIES AND THE DIFFICULTIES CONFRONTING THE OTHER.

14. NONE OF STANDS TO BENEFIT OF SUCH SITUATIONS. WE HAVE BEEN MOST CONCILIATORY AND ACCOMMODATING WITH ISRAEL AND WE EXPECT THEM TO ACT IN RECIPROCITY. IT IS FUTILE TO RESORT TO THE MEDIA, FOR THIS WILL NOT GENERATE ANY PRESSURE ON US. IT WOULD ONLY PRODUCE THE ILLFEELING WE HAVE BEEN WORKING TIRELESSLY TO ELIMINATE.

15. PRESIDENT MUBARAK WOULD LIKE TO INFORM YOU THAT IF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT INSISTS ON THE JERUSALEM ISSUE, WE WILL HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO POSTPONE THE VISIT FOR A FEW MONTHS PENDING A CLARIFICATION OF THE MATTER OR A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

ENDS.

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Prime Minister

The Israelis are reported to have said that President Mubarak's visit should not go ahead if he will not visit Jerusalem. Mubarak's message to you (attached) simply says that the visit will have to be postponed if the Israelis insist on this.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 104 OF 28 FEBRUARY
INFO TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS,
JEDDA, KUWAIT

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MY TELNO 103: PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S VISIT TO ISRAEL

1. I WAS SUMMONED THIS AFTERNOON BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO BE TOLD ABOUT THE NEW DIFFICULTY THAT HAS ARISEN WITH THE ISRAELIS, OVER JERUSALEM. HE HANDED ME AN "ORAL MESSAGE" FROM PRESIDENT MUBARAK TO THE PRIME MINISTER, WHICH SETS OUT THE EGYPTIAN POSITION AT LENGTH. TEXT IN MIFT (NOT REPEATED TO ALL). SIMILAR MESSAGES ARE GOING TO THE OTHER EUROPEAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WHOM MUBARAK MET ON HIS RECENT TOUR, AND AMBASSADOR GHORBAL HAS RETURNED TO WASHINGTON WITH A MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN.

2. KAMAL HASSAN ALI'S MAIN POINT WAS THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE WELL AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTY THAT VISITING JERUSALEM HAS POSED FOR THE EGYPTIANS EVER SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE KNESSET BILL, AND HAD ON THE WHOLE BEEN CO-OPERATIVE IN FINDING WAYS ROUND IT (TO THE EXAMPLES QUOTED IN MUBARAK'S MESSAGE HE ADDED THE EXCHANGE OF RATIFICATIONS OF THE PEACE TREATY AT THE US FIELD MISSION IN SINAI, THOUGH THE ISRAELIS HAD WANTED JERUSALEM). IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE FOR MUBARAK TO GO TO JERUSALEM IN THE SAME MONTH IN WHICH JUDGEMENT IS TO BE GIVEN IN THE TRIAL OF SADAT'S ASSASSINS AND WITH THE TRIAL OF OTHER FUNDAMENTALISTS DUE TO BEGIN ON 30 MARCH. THE EGYPTIANS HAD SAID AS MUCH LAST WEEK TO SHAMIR, WHO HAD UNDERTAKEN TO SEEK A COMPROMISE. THE EGYPTIANS WERE THEREFORE SURPRISED TO LEARN FROM THE PRESS LEAKS, AND THE SUBSEQUENT ANNOUNCEMENT AFTER TODAY'S ISRAELI CABINET MEETING, THAT IF JERUSALEM COULD NOT BE INCLUDED THE ISRAELIS WOULD PREFER THE VISIT TO BE CANCELLED.

3. I ASKED WHETHER THE EGYPTIANS REGARDED THIS AS A SERIOUS DEVELOPMENT WHICH MIGHT HAVE DAMAGING CONSEQUENCES. KAMAL ALI REPLIED WITH A SMILE THAT IN EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI RELATIONS THE

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UNEXPECTED HAD USUALLY COME FROM ONLY TWO SOURCES, PRESIDENT SADAT AND MR BEGIN, AND SADAT WAS NOW GONE. HE HOPED BEGIN WOULD RESIST THE TEMPTATION TO MAKE A MAJOR ISSUE OUT OF THE AFFAIR. HE DID NOT RISE TO MY SUGGESTION THAT THE EGYPTIANS MIGHT BE SECRETLY RELIEVED TO BE SPARED THE EMBARRASSMENT OF MUBARAK'S VISITING ISRAEL AT ALL AT THE PRESENT TIME. I SUSPECT THAT THEY ARE, THOUGH THEIR NERVOUSNESS IS APPARENT FROM THE FACT THAT THE LATEST UPSET HAS BEEN REPORTED ONLY INDIRECTLY (QUOTING ISRAEL RADIO) IN THE LOCAL MEDIA.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 103 OF 26 FEB

AND TO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, KHARTOUM, TRIPOLI.

VISIT OF ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER.

1. SHAMIR VISITED EGYPT ON 22-25 FEBRUARY. HE HELD TWO ROUNDS OF TALKS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KAMAL HASSAN ALI, AND WAS RECEIVED BY PRESIDENT MUBARAK, PRIME MINISTER FUAD MOHIEDDIN AND THE SPEAKERS OF THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY AND SHURA COUNCIL. HE VISITED UPPER EGYPT ON 24 FEBRUARY, AND LEFT FOR ISRAEL ON 25 FEBRUARY AFTER A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH KAMAL HASSAN ALI.

2. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF AN AGREED MINUTE ON NORMALISATION (VISAS, MARITIME TRANSPORT, ECONOMIC LINKS ETC) THE TWO SIDES REMAIN FAR APART ON THE MAIN ISSUES DIVIDING THEM. SHAMIR FAILED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN ARRANGING A DATE FOR MUBARAK'S VISIT TO ISRAEL OR IN PERSUADING THE EGYPTIANS TO SIGN A LIMITED "DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES" ON AUTONOMY.

3. ON MUBARAK'S VISIT, THE EGYPTIANS WERE ORIGINALLY BELIEVED TO HAVE AGREED TO EARLY MARCH, AND AN ANNOUNCEMENT WAS EXPECTED TO FOLLOW SHAMIR'S CALL ON MUBARAK. INSTEAD THERE ARE TO BE FURTHER CONTACTS. APART FROM TIMING (BEFORE OR AFTER 25 APRIL), THE EGYPTIANS HAVE OBVIOUS DIFFICULTIES OVER DURATION (THE ISRAELIS WANT AT LEAST 24 HOURS), VISITING JERUSALEM, AND ON THE POSSIBILITY OF BEGIN SPRINGING AN EMBARRASSING SURPRISE DURING OR AFTER THE VISIT. (WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE EGYPTIANS SOUGHT, BUT FAILED TO OBTAIN, AN ISRAELI ASSURANCE ON THE LATTER POINT). MY GUESS IS THAT IF ONLY TO GET IT OVER, MUBARAK WILL STILL RISK A SHORT VISIT TO ISRAEL, PREFERABLY AVOIDING JERUSALEM, BEFORE 25 APRIL.

4. ON AUTONOMY, THE EGYPTIANS AGAIN REJECTED ISRAELI SUGGESTIONS THAT THEY SIGN A LIMITED "DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES", SETTING ASIDE THE MAIN DIFFICULTIES FOR DISCUSSION AT THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. EGYPT, ALI SAID, COULD NOT SIGN AN AGREEMENT THAT WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE PALESTINIANS. HE WAS QUICK TO DISAGREE WITH SHAMIR'S ASSERTION TO CORRESPONDENTS THAT THE PALESTINIANS HAD ALREADY EXERCISED THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN STATE OF JORDAN. SHAMIR ADDED THAT AUTONOMY SHOULD BE MODELLED ON THAT ENJOYED BY THE CORSICANS, KURDS, BASQUES ETC. THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS DID NOT SPECIFY THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. ISRAEL WOULD HOWEVER BE PREPARED TO TALK TO ELIAS FREIJ, THE MAYOR OF BETHLEHEM, WITHOUT CONDITIONS.

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5. THE EGYPTIANS ALSO MADE THEIR USUAL PITCH FOR ISRAELI CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND ASKED ONCE AGAIN FOR THE RETURN OF THE DEIR AL SULTAN MONASTERY IN JERUSALEM TO THE EGYPTIAN COPTS, WITHOUT APPARENT EFFECT.

6. THE EGYPTIAN PRESS REFLECTED THE UNCOMPROMISING LINE TAKEN BY THE EGYPTIANS IN THE TALKS, THIS WAS MATCHED BY SHAMIR'S PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS (REFERENCES TO JUDAEA AND SAMARIA) THE VISIT SUGGESTS THAT EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS MAY BE ENTERING A DIFFICULT PHASE. ON THE OTHER HAND, SHAMIR DECLARED HIMSELF SATISFIED THAT THE EGYPTIANS INTENDED TO STICK BY THE PEACE TREATY. AND THE EGYPTIANS WILL TAKE NO RISKS OVER THE WITHDRAWAL.

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FROM FCO 241800Z FEBRUARY 82

TO IMMEDIATE VIENNA

INFO SAVING BEIRUT

TELEGRAM NUMBER 17 OF 24 FEB

MIPT: YOUR CALL ON CHANCELLOR KREISKY: MIDDLE EAST

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF CHANCELLOR KREISKY'S LETTER OF 30 JANUARY TO ME: BEGINS

I STILL REMEMBER WELL OUR LAST CONVERSATION IN LONDON AND YOUR VERY VIVID INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT I AM WRITING TO YOU TODAY.

YOU HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY BEEN KEPT INFORMED ABOUT THE RECENT DISCUSSION IN ISRAEL AND INSIDE THE PLO ABOUT A DECLARATION DR ISAM SARTAWI MADE LAST WEEK TO THE JOURNAL QUOTE LE MONDE UNQUOTE. DR SARTAWI, WHOM I HAVE KNOWN FOR MANY YEARS AND FOR WHOM I HAVE A GREAT PERSONAL ESTEEM, HAS BEEN IN VIENNA LAST WEEK TO DISCUSS WITH ME HIS INITIATIVE. I COULD NOT BUT ENCOURAGE HIM IN THIS AS I HAVE GAINED THE IMPRESSION DURING A VISIT TO THE GULF STATES IN DECEMBER THAT THERE IS A STRONG CURRENT OF MODERATION AND A GENUINE DESIRE FOR PEACE WITH ISRAEL IN THIS REGION.

DR SARTAWI HAS ALSO ASKED ME WHETHER I WOULD BE READY TO ASSIST HIM IN PRESENTING HIS VIEWS TO LEADERS IN EUROPE AND IN SOME OF THE ARAB STATES. AS HE HAD SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED HOW MUCH HE WOULD VALUE A CONTACT WITH YOU, EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH ONE OF YOUR PERSONAL ASSISTANTS, I THOUGHT IT USEFUL TO INFORM YOU ABOUT HIS WISH.

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FROM FCO 241800 FEBRUARY 82
TO IMMEDIATE VIENNA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 16 OF 245 FEBRUARY
SAVING TO INFO BEIRUT
YOUR LETTER OF 18 FEBRUARY TO MILES, NENAD: CALL ON CHANCELLOR
KREISKY: MIDDLE EAST

1. MIFT CONTAINS TEXT OF LETTER TO ME FROM CHANCELLOR KREISKY, DATED 30 JANUARY AND DELIVERED BY THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR ON 9 FEBRUARY, ABOUT A TALK WITH DR SARTAWI OF THE PLO. AT YOUR MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR KREISKY TOMORROW PLEASE DELIVER MY REPLY SET OUT IN PARA 7 BELOW. THIS INCLUDES A WORD OF THANKS FOR THE CHANCELLOR'S SUPPORTING ACTION FOLLOWING YOUR APPROACH ABOUT SOUTHERN LEBANON (YOUR TELNOS 22 AND 23). SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW VIA THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR.

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY REPLY: BEGINS

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 30 JANUARY ABOUT YOUR TALK WITH DR ISAM SARTAWI OF THE PLO. WE HAD READ WITH INTEREST DR SARTAWI'S INTERVIEW IN LE MONDE.

YOU KINDLY PASSED ON DR SARTAWI'S INTEREST IN PRESENTING HIS VIEWS TO US. I AGREE WITH YOU THAT WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THOSE SUCH AS DR SARTAWI WHO PUBLICLY ENDORSE THE NEED FOR DIALOGUE AMONG THE PARTIES CONCERNED IN THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM. IT IS ONLY THROUGH DIALOGUE AND THE MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE BY ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS OF EACH OTHER'S RIGHTS THAT THIS TRAGIC CONFLICT CAN BE SETTLED. I AM THEREFORE ARRANGING FOR DR SARTAWI TO BE INFORMED THAT ONE OF MY SENIOR ADVISERS IN THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE WOULD BE GLAD TO MEET HIM AS SOON AS A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT DATE CAN BE ARRANGED.

I WAS INCIDENTALLY MOST GRATEFUL TO LEARN THAT, FOLLOWING MR ALEXANDER'S CALL ON YOUR FOREIGN MINISTRY ON 16 FEBRUARY TO DISCUSS OUR CONCERN AT THE TENSION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, YOU HAVE ALSO SENT A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO MR ARAFAT, URGING RESTRAINT.

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WHILE THE CURRENT TENSE SITUATION IN THE LEBANON PERSISTS, SELF-RESTRAINT WILL BE MORE THAN EVER IMPORTANT. ENDS

3. IN ADDITION YOU MIGHT MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST MORE GENERALLY:

(I) ON SOUTHERN LEBANON, THE TEMPERATURE NOW SEEMS TO HAVE COOLED SOMEWHAT, ALTHOUGH THE ISRAELIS CONTINUE TO TALK TOUGH.

HABIB LEAVES ON A TOUR TODAY. YOU WILL ALSO HAVE SEEN ARAFAT'S COMMENT REPORTED IN THE TIMES OF 22 FEBRUARY TO THE EFFECT THAT THE CEASEFIRE APPLIED ONLY ACROSS THE LEBANON/ISRAEL BORDER. ALL IN ALL THE RISKS REMAIN OF SOME FURTHER ISRAELI ACTION EITHER IN LEBANON OR ELSEWHERE BETWEEN NOW AND 25 APRIL, AND RESTRAINT WILL CONTINUE TO BE NEEDED ON ALL SIDES. BUT WE STILL FEEL NEITHER SIDE WILL GAIN FROM MAKING THE FIRST MOVE.

(II) WE SEE LITTLE SCOPE FOR ACTIVITY BY THE TEN BETWEEN NOW AND 25 APRIL. ONCE THAT HURDLE IS PAST, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO ENCOURAGE THE AMERICANS TO TAKE A FRESH LOOK AT THEIR POLICY, AND TO MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF ACCEPTANCE OF PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION. THE PROSPECTS ARE POOR UNLESS THE MODERATE ARABS CAN OBTAIN ENDORSEMENT AT A RESUMED FEZ CONFERENCE OF A POSITIVE STRATEGY INCLUDING CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL EG THE FAHD PRINCIPLES. ANYTHING WHICH CHANCELLOR KREISKY CAN DO TO GET THIS MESSAGE ACROSS TO THE PLO AND OTHERS WOULD BE HELPFUL.
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FM BAHRAIN 230715Z FEB 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 52 OF 23 FEBRUARY

INFO ROUTINE TEL AVIV, AMMAN, JEDDAH, WASHINGTON, PARIS, MUSCAT
DOHA

MR HURD'S VISIT TO BAHRAIN - PRESS CONFERENCE

1. AT AN ON-RECORD BRIEFING OF LOCAL PRESS AND CORRESPONDENTS ON 22 FEBRUARY, MR HURD MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS ABOUT ARAB/ISRAEL.

(1) THE PLO WERE IMPORTANT AND ENJOYED WIDE SUPPORT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THEY MUST THEREFORE BE ASSOCIATED WITH ANY NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THEIR CHANCES OF SELF-DETERMINATION WOULD BE BETTER IF THE PLO WERE TO RECOGNISE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXISTENCE IN RETURN FOR ISRAEL'S RECOGNITION OF THE PALESTINIAN'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. ISRAEL COULD NOT EXPECT TO LIVE IN SECURITY - A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT IN HMG'S EYES - IF IT DENIED TO THE PALESTINIAN'S THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IT DEMANDED FOR ITSELF. WE HAD PUT THESE VIEWS TO BOTH SIDES AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS.

(11) MR HURD HAD STUDIED M CHEYSSON'S RECENT STATEMENT DURING HIS GULF VISIT. THERE WERE NO DIFFERENCES OF SUBSTANCE OVER MIDDLE EAST POLICY BETWEEN FRANCE AND OURSELVES, BUT OUR SIMILAR VIEWS WERE SOMETIMES CLOTHED DIFFERENTLY. COHESION OF VIEW AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE EC (WITH THE OCCASIONAL EXCEPTION OF GREECE) WAS MUCH MORE PRONOUNCED THAN MINOR DIFFERENCES OF EMPHASIS.

(111) AFTER THE EVACUATION OF SINAI ALL CONCERNED, INCLUDING THE ARAB STATES, MUST CONSIDER CAREFULLY A PEACE PROCESS THAT WENT BEYOND CAMP DAVID AND INVOLVED THOSE WHO HAD REJECTED CAMP DAVID INCLUDING THE PALESTINIANS. WE HOPED THAT THE ARAB STATES IN 1982 WOULD REACH AGREEMENT ON A COMMON STRATEGY FOR PEACE. THE MIDDLE EAST COULD NOT BE HAPPY AND STABLE UNTIL THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM WAS SOLVED; EUROPE HAD A ROLE TO PLAY ITSELF IN TRYING TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH ALL THE PARTIES. WE COULD NOT IMPOSE A SETTLEMENT, BUT WE COULD PERHAPS MAKE A HELPFUL CONTRIBUTION TO BRINGING THE PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

2. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION MR HURD SAID THAT THERE WERE UNDOUBTEDLY PEOPLE IN IRAN WHO WERE TRYING TO MAKE TROUBLE IN THE GULF, AS WITNESSED BY THE DECEMBER PLOT HERE AND BY SUBVERSIVE BROADCASTS.

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FROM TEL AVIV 181420Z FEB 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 45 OF 18 FEBRUARY 1982

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.
INFO SAVING JERUSALEM.YOUR TELNO 32 TO BEIRUT AND TELECON PRENDERGAST/CHAPLIN: SOUTHERN LEBANON

1. WHEN I SAW THE HEAD OF THE EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TODAY (JUST RETURNED FROM HIS VISIT TO LONDON) I SAID WE WERE CONCERNED AT RECENT REPORTS POINTING TO A POSSIBLE BREAKDOWN OF THE CEASEFIRE. THIS IN OUR VIEW WOULD BE IN NOBODY'S INTEREST. WE WERE URGING RESTRAINT ON THE ARAB SIDE. COULD I RE-ASSURE LONDON THAT ISRAEL HAD NO PLANS TO MOVE INTO SOUTHERN LEBANON AND CERTAINLY WAS NOT LOOKING FOR A PRETEXT TO DO SO?

2. GANOR SAID THAT ISRAEL WISHED TO SEE THE CEASEFIRE MAINTAINED. HE COULD ASSURE ME THAT THERE WAS NO INTENTION OF SEEKING ANY PRETEXT FOR MILITARY ACTION. THE ISRAELIS WOULD OBSERVE THEIR SIDE OF THE CEASEFIRE SO LONG AS IT WAS NOT BROKEN FROM THE OTHER SIDE. THE GOVERNMENT HAD MADE IT PLAIN THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST TO BREAK THE CEASEFIRE, BUT WOULD FEEL FREE TO RESPOND TO FURTHER PLO VIOLATIONS. HE HOPED THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS WOULD HAVE SERVED AS A WARNING AND DETERRENT TO THE PLO, BEARING IN MIND THAT THE CEASEFIRE DID NOT APPLY ONLY TO ATTACKS ACROSS THE FRONTIER ITSELF.

3. HE WENT ON TO EXPRESS SURPRISE AND REGRET THAT HM AMBASSADOR IN BEIRUT HAD SEEN ARAFAT A FEW DAYS AGO, AND THAT THIS HAD BEEN CONFIRMED BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE. SUCH A MEETING HELPED TO CONFER RESPECTABILITY ON THE PLO AND ON THEIR PRESENCE IN LEBANON. IT APPEARED TO GO BEYOND THE LEVEL OF PREVIOUS CONTACTS. MY CALL TODAY AND THE ONE BY MR ROBERTS IN BEIRUT COULD BE INTERPRETED AS AN EFFORT TO LOBBY BOTH SIDES EQUALLY, THEREBY ATTRIBUTING A STATUS TO THE PLO WHICH ISRAEL WOULD DEEPLY RESENT.

4. I REPLIED THAT WE HAD MADE NO SECRET OF HAVING INFORMAL CONTACTS WITH THE PLO. SO FAR AS I KNEW THE LATEST MEETING DID NOT REPRESENT ANY CHANGE OF POLICY. ITS PURPOSE WAS TO URGE OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE FROM WHICH ISRAEL STOOD DIRECTLY TO GAIN. THE ISRAELIS COULD SCARCELY DENY THAT PLO CONFORMITY WAS ESSENTIAL IF THE CEASEFIRE WAS TO CONTINUE. MOREOVER OUR REPRESENTATIONS WERE NOT LIMITED TO THE PLO: WE HAD MADE APPROACHES IN OTHER ARAB CAPITALS AS WELL.

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5. THIS WAS A TYPICAL ISRAELI COUNTER-ATTACK AFTER MY OWN APPROACH. I HAD THE FEELING NEVERTHELESS THAT THE POINT ABOUT ARAFAT WAS RAISED MORE FOR FORMS SAKE THAN FROM ANY WISH TO PICK A SUSTAINED QUARREL WITH US.

6. AS TO LEBANON, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY LINE WAS NO MORE THAN WE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED. I DOUBT IF WE SHALL LEARN HOW CLOSE THE ISRAELIS IN FACT CAME TO LAUNCHING AN ATTACK AFTER THE PLO RAID FROM JORDAN. RUMOUR HAS IT THAT THEY WERE ON THE VERGE OF MOVING WHEN SECOND THOUGHTS PREVAILED. I CAN WELL BELIEVE THAT THE MILITARY AND PERHAPS SHARON HIMSELF WERE IN FAVOUR, WITH SOME MILITARY PREPARATIONS BEING PUT IN HAND. HOWEVER MY GUESS IS THAT BEGIN AND POSSIBLY OTHER KEY MINISTERS WERE UNCONVINCED BUT WERE NONETHELESS NOT AVERSE TO LETTING THE OUTSIDE WORLD THINK THAT ISRAEL WAS PREPARED TO ACT - EVEN IF THIS LOOKED EMBARRASSINGLY LIKE ISRAELI BRINKMANSHIP.

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FM VIENNA 180925Z FEB 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 23 OF 18 FEBRUARY
INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 022 : SOUTHERN LEBANON

I HAVE NOW LEARNT THAT THE AUSTRIAN MESSAGE WAS IN THE FORM OF
A PERSONAL LETTER FROM KREISKY TO ARAFAT. THE DECISION TO SEND
SUCH A LETTER APPARENTLY FLOWED FROM OUR APPROACH. (THE LETTER
ITSELF DID NOT, OF COURSE, CONTAIN ANY REFERENCE TO THAT APPROACH.)
THE AMERICANS ONLY SURFACED AFTER ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN.

ALEXANDER

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FM FCO 181700Z FE 82

TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 304 OF 18 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, JEDDA, DAMASCUS.

INFO ROUTINE OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, PARIS, ROME, THE HAGUE,

UKMIS NEW YORK

SINAI MFO

1. THE TIMES OF 17 FEBRUARY CARRIED A REPORT, DATELINED JERUSALEM, WHICH IMPLIED THAT THE AMERICANS MIGHT BE PLANNING A LINK BETWEEN THE US MFO CONTINGENT AND THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE. IT MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY THAT THE FIRST AMERICAN CONTINGENT WOULD BE DRAWN FROM THE 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION, WHICH WAS A PART OF THE RDF.

2. WE ASKED THE US EMBASSY TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THIS REPORT

REFLECTED ADMINISTRATION THINKING, AS IF IT DID IT WAS BOUND TO CAUSE DIFFICULTIES FOR US, AND COULD NO DOUBT DO LIKEWISE FOR OTHER CONTRIBUTORS. THE US EMBASSY TOLD US TODAY THAT A PRESS LINE HAD BEEN DRAWN UP FOR STATE DEPARTMENT USE WHICH TOOK THE LINE THAT THE REPORT WAS MISCHIEVOUS AND A COMPLETE DISTORTION OF THE FACTS. THERE WAS NO TRUTH IN THE SUGGESTION THAT THE AMERICAN ELEMENT OF THE MFO WOULD BE A DE FACTO PART OF THE RDF, NOR WOULD THERE BE ANY OVERLAP IN RESPONSIBILITIES NOR A CONNECTION BETWEEN THE MFO AND THE RDF. THE STATUTE AUTHORIZING US PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS PARTICIPATION WAS SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSES SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL AND IN THE ACCOMPANYING PROTOCOL. THIS WOULD INVOLVE PEACEKEEPING DUTIES ONLY.

3. WE UNDERSTAND THAT, IF PRESSED, THE STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD SAY THAT IT WAS A COINCIDENCE THAT, FOR REASONS OF ROTATIONAL CONVENIENCE, PERSONNEL FROM THE US INFANTRY CONTINGENT IN THE MFO WERE BEING DRAWN FROM THE 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION AND PERHAPS ALSO FROM THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION, WHICH WERE DIVISIONS EARMARKED FOR THE RDF.

4. IT IS REASSURING TO NOTE THE FIRM STATE DEPARTMENT LINE THAT THERE WILL BE NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THE MFO AND THE RDF. BUT IT SHOWS SOME INSENSITIVITY ON THE PART OF THE ADMINISTRATION TO EARMARK TROOPS FOR THE MFO FROM DIVISIONS THAT ARE KNOWN TO HAVE A RDF ROLE. IT WILL ALREADY HAVE BEEN NOTED IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT WE HAVE RAISED OUR EYEBROWS AT THIS. NEVERTHELESS IF YOU HAVE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO IN THE NEAR FUTURE, YOU SHOULD REFER TO OUR CONCERN THAT THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TWO FORCES IMPLIED BY THE CHOICE OF TROOPS FROM THE AIRBORNE DIVISIONS WILL READILY BE MADE IN THE

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ARAB WORLD AND WILL NOT BE HELPFUL. YOU MIGHT ASK WHETHER THERE IS STILL A CHANCE AT THIS STAGE THAT CONSIDERATION COULD BE GIVEN TO SENDING TROOPS FROM OTHER, LESS SENSITIVE SOURCES.

5. IF THE QUESTION IS RAISED ELSEWHERE, POSTS SHOULD SAY THAT THE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION IS A MATTER FOR THE US GOVERNMENT, BUT THAT YOU UNDERSTAND THAT THERE IS NO QUESTION OF A CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TWO FORCES (ETC AS IN PARA 2 ABOVE).

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 497 OF 16 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, BEIRUT, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV

YOUR TELNO 271: PUS'S TALK WITH STOESSEL: MIDDLE EAST

1. WHEN THE PUS SAW STOESSEL TODAY HE ASKED HIM ABOUT THE ANXIETY OF THE AMERICANS AT THE END OF LAST WEEK THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE GOING TO PROVOKE TROUBLE IN SOUTH LEBANON. WHAT WAS THE EVIDENCE FOR THIS? WAS THERE SOME CONNECTION BETWEEN THIS AND WEINBERGER'S VISIT TO JORDAN AND THE FEAR IN ISRAEL THAT THIS HAD CREATED?

2. STOESSEL SPOKE ABOUT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THAT HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM THEIR PEOPLE IN ISRAEL WITH DETAILS ABOUT EQUIPMENT, SUGGESTING THAT ACTION WAS GOING TO BE TAKEN. HE DID NOT THINK THAT THIS WAS ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE WEINBERGER VISIT TO JORDAN. THE ISRAELIS WERE CERTAINLY IN A VERY TENSE MOOD AND ANY SUGGESTION OF A BUILD-UP IN JORDAN ADDED TO THEIR CONCERN.

3. HAIG HAD SENT A MESSAGE TO BEGIN, WHO HAD GIVEN AN ASSURANCE THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE NOT GOING TO TAKE ANY ACTION. STOESSEL WAS NOT SURE WHETHER THIS HAD HEADED OFF AN ISRAELI MOVE OR NOT.

4. THE PUS REFERRED TO THE ACTION WE HAD TAKEN WITH VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS - THE LEBANESE, THE JORDANIANS AND THE SYRIANS, AS WELL AS THE PLO. THEY HAD REJECTED THE IDEA THAT THEY WERE GOING TO MAKE ANY MOVE AND HAD URGED US TO GET THE AMERICANS TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS.

5. STOESSEL SAID THAT HABIB, WHO WAS DUE IN WASHINGTON TODAY, WOULD BE LIKELY TO RETURN TO THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE NEAR FUTURE. MEANWHILE, FAIRBANKS WAS LEAVING TODAY. IN ANSWER TO THE PUS'S QUESTION ABOUT WHAT THE AMERICANS WERE SEEKING TO ACHIEVE IN THE NEAR FUTURE ON THE PALESTINE ISSUE, AND HOW THEY SAW MUBARAK'S VIEWS, STOESSEL SAID THAT THE LATTER, WHILE SUPPORTING THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS, OBVIOUSLY COULD NOT DO ANYTHING THAT WOULD BE CRITICISED BY THE MODERATE ARABS, INCLUDING THE PALESTINIANS.

6 THE PUS ASKED WHETHER THE REPORT OF WEINBERGER'S VIEWS INDICATED SOME SHIFT IN AMERICAN POLICY OR WHETHER IT WAS SIMPLY HIS OWN PERSONAL OPINION. TO WHICH STOESSEL REPLIED THAT THE AMERICANS WANTED TO HAVE MORE THAN ONE FRIEND IN THE AREA. THEY SOUGHT TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE MODERATE STATES THERE. HE REFERRED AGAIN TO THE ISRAELIS MOOD OF SUPER-SENSITIVITY AND INSECURITY. HE ADMITTED THAT THERE WAS A QUOTE MORE QUESTIONING MOOD ABOUT ISRAEL IN THE USA UNQUOTE. THIS INCLUDED THEIR TRADITIONAL FRIENDS.

7. ON THE SUBJECT OF THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK, THE PUS SAID THAT AT SOME STAGE THE EGYPTIANS WOULD BE TOLD BY THE PLO THAT THERE COULD BE NO SOLUTION FOR THE WEST BANK PROBLEM WITHOUT THE PALESTINIANS. HE ASKED WHAT PROSPECTS STOESSEL SAW OF THE US COMING TO TERMS WITH THE PALESTINIANS. STOESSEL SAID THAT HE SAW NO PROSPECT OF CHANGE IN THE US ATTITUDE TO THE PLO. BUT THEY WOULD BE ON THE LOOK-OUT FOR OTHER PALESTINIANS, EG. WEST BANK MAYORS, WHO COULD BE INVOLVED IN THE AUTONOMY TALKS. THE PUS SAID THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW ANY SETTLEMENT COULD EMERGE UNLESS THE PLO WERE INVOLVED.

8. STOESSEL DID NOT REVEAL ANYTHING NEW ABOUT HOW THE AMERICANS ARE GOING TO PROCEED IN KEEPING THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS TALKS GOING. BUT HE SAID THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO KEEP UP THE MOMENTUM.

9. AS REGARDS MUBARAK, THE PUS REFERRED TO HIS PRESENCE IN LONDON AND TO THE GOOD IMPRESSION THAT HE HAD MADE THERE. STOESSEL SAID

9. AS REGARDS MUBARAK, THE PUS REFERRED TO HIS PRESENCE IN LONDON AND TO THE GOOD IMPRESSION THAT HE HAD MADE THERE. STOESEL SAID THAT HE HAD ALSO MADE A GOOD IMPRESSION IN WASHINGTON. HE HAD DEVELOPED A GREAT DEAL SINCE TAKING OVER FROM SADAT. HE HAD BEEN MATTER-OF-FACT IN EXPLAINING THE INVITATION TO THE SOVIET SPECIALISTS TO RETURN TO COMPLETE OUTSTANDING PROJECTS. HIS ATTITUDE TO RESUMING BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE OTHER ARAB STATES HAD APPEARED TO THE AMERICANS TO BE VERY REASONABLE. HE WAS QUOTE NOT GOING OVERBOARD UNQUOTE

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 78 OF 16 FEB

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO MODUK (DI4B AND AUSS MOD SALES), BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV
SAVING INFO BAHRAIN BEIRUT CAIRO DOHA JEDDA MUSCAT MOSCOW
UKMIS NEWYORK

VISIT OF US DEFENCE SECRETARY TO JORDAN

1. MR WEINBERGER VISITED JORDAN FROM 10-13 FEBRUARY. HE HAD DINNER WITH KING HUSSEIN ON THE EVENING OF HIS ARRIVAL AND, FOLLOWING FORMAL TALKS AT THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS ATTENDED BY THE KING, THE PRIME MINISTER, THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF AND OTHERS, SPENT MUCH OF THE NEXT DAY TOURING WITH THE KING BY HELICOPTER. HE ALSO HAD A SEPARATE MEETING WITH CROWN PRINCE HASSAN. THE US AMBASSADOR, WHO WAS PRESENT AT ALL THE DISCUSSIONS EXCEPT FOR A HALF-HOUR TETE-A-TETE BETWEEN THE KING AND WEINBERGER BEFORE DINNER ON THE NIGHT OF HIS ARRIVAL, HAS GIVEN ME THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF THE MAIN THEMES OF WEINBERGER'S TALKS HERE.

2. ON DEFENCE SALES TO JORDAN, WEINBERGER TOLD THE JORDANIANS THAT IF THEY DECIDED TO GO FOR AN ADVANCED US AIRCRAFT SUCH AS F16S OR 18S, OR FOR F5GS, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD, SUBJECT TO THE PRESIDENT'S AGREEMENT, BE WILLING TO PUT THE CASE TO CONGRESS.

ACCORDING TO AMBASSADOR VIETS, THE JORDANIANS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY HAD REACHED NO FIRM DECISIONS YET ON FUTURE AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS AND WOULD REQUIRE MUCH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE US AIRCRAFT TYPES. VIETS THOUGHT THE JORDANIANS WOULD TRY TO REACH SOME CONCLUSION BEFORE APRIL, WHEN THE NEXT MEETING OF THE JOINT US/JORDANIAN JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION IS DUE TO TAKE PLACE. VIETS ADDED THAT WHEREAS F4GS MIGHT BE AVAILABLE QUITE QUICKLY, THE DELAY IN SUPPLYING F16S OR 18S WOULD BE LENGTHY (AND, ALTHOUGH VIETS DID NOT SAY SO, MUCH WOULD PRESUMABLY DEPEND ON WHAT CREDIT TERMS THE AMERICANS COULD OFFER). VIETS ALSO SAID (AND ASKED ME TO ENSURE THAT HIS CONFIDENCE WAS FULLY RESPECTED) THAT THE KING HAD TOLD HIM SEPARATELY THAT, IF THE AMERICANS CAME UP WITH A SUITABLE AIRCRAFT TO MEET JORDAN'S NEEDS, HE WOULD TRY TO GET RID OF HIS FRENCH F1S PROBABLY TO IRAQ AS THEY WERE CAUSING THE JORDANIANS A GREAT DEAL OF TROUBLE.

3. NO SPECIFIC PACKAGE OF AIR DEFENCE EQUIPMENT WAS APPARENTLY DISCUSSED, BUT IT WAS LEFT THAT THE JORDANIANS WOULD PUT TOGETHER A LIST OF THEIR REQUIREMENTS WHICH WERE LIKELY TO BE MAINLY FOR MOBILE HAWK. MY DEFENCE ATTACHE HAS HEARD SEPARATELY FROM US ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHE THAT THE AMERICANS ALSO RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF SUPPLYING JORDAN WITH IMPROVED CHAPPARAL, EQUIPPED WITH NIGHT-VISION BLIND-FIRE CAPABILITY, TO MEET THE LOW-LEVEL REQUIREMENT. IT WAS RECOGNISED BY BOTH SIDES THAT, EVEN IF A SUITABLE PACKAGE COULD BE AGREED TOMORROW, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE 3 YEARS BEFORE DELIVERY COULD BE MADE WHEREAS THE SOVIET-SUPPLIED ZSU 23/4 GUNS WOULD BE DELIVERED BY MAY AND SAM 8S TOWARDS THE END OF 1982. US AMA SAID THAT THE KING MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE

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WANTED IMPROVED HAWK AND CHAPPARAL IN ADDITION TO SAM 8S (WE UNDERSTAND THE SOVIET OFFER IS FOR 20 SAM 8S AND 16ZSU 23/4S; THE PRICE BEING CHARGED FOR THE SAM 8S IS ONLY US DOLLARS 10 MILLION EACH). VIETS (PLEASE PROTECT) PUT AN INTERESTING GLOSS ON THIS SEMICLN HE CLAIMED TO HAVE REMINDED THE KING IN WEINBERGER'S PRESENCE OF AN EARLIER UNDERTAKING THAT IF THE US COULD SUPPLY JORDAN WITH AIR DEFENCE EQUIPMENT TO MEET HER REQUIREMENTS, HE MIGHT IN DUE COURSE PASS THE SOVIET EQUIPMENT TO ONE OF HIS ARAB NEIGHBOURS. HOWEVER, WHEN I QUESTIONED VIETS ON THE TIMESCALE HE ENVISAGED, HE READILY ADMITTED THAT IF THIS HAPPENED AT ALL IT WOULD NOT BE FOR SOME YEARS. FROM ALL THAT VIETS AND WA SAID, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE AMERICANS NOW REALISE THAT THEY CANNOT HOPE TO DISPLACE THE SOVIET EQUIPMENT FOR SOME TIME TO COME, IF EVER SEMICLN WEINBERGER'S MILITARY ADVISERS SEEM TO HAVE RECOGNISED THAT TECHNICALLY THE SAM 8 IS PROBABLY THE BEST MOBILE LOW-LEVEL AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM CURRENTLY AVAILABLE.

4. THERE WAS MUCH DISCUSSION OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE GULF AREA, ALTHOUGH THE JORDANIANS SAID VERY LITTLE ABOUT THE IRAQ/IRAN WAR OTHER THAN TO REITERATE THAT THE DESPATCH OF VOLUNTEERS WAS INTENDED AS A SYMBOLIC GESTURE. LHEY HAD BEEN KEENLY INTERESTED IN WEINBERGER'S TALKS WITH THE SAUDIS AND HAD TOLD WEINBERGER OF THEIR MANY DIFFICULTIES IN DEALING WITH THE SAUDIS. KING HUSSEIN HAD SPOKEN AT LENGTH ABOUT THE VULNERABILITY OF WHAT HE HAD TERMED THE "CARDBOARD REGIMES" IN THE GULF, PARTICULARLY IN FACE OF IRANIAN SUBVERSION. HE HAD SPOKEN OF THE FORTHCOMING MILITARY EXERCISES WITH BAHRAIN, AND HAD SAID HE HOPED TO DO SOMETHING SIMILAR WITH OTHER GULF STATES IN DUE COURSE. HE INDICATED THAT HE WAS STILL PLANNING TO VISIT ONE OR TWO GULF STATES QUITE SOON, INCLUDING QATAR AND KUWAIT.

5. THE SYRIAN INTERNAL SITUATION HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT LENGTH, PARTICULARLY WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN IF THE PRESENT SYRIAN REGIME WERE TO LOSE INTERNAL CONTROL. VIETS GAINED A CLEAR IMPRESSION FROM THESE EXCHANGES THAT THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER IN PARTICULAR FAVOURED SOME FORM OF JORDANIAN INTERVENTION IN SUPPORT OF THE

OPPONENTS OF THE REGIME (BADRAN TAKES A VERY HARD LINE ON SYRIA, PARTICULARLY FOLLOWING THE SYRIAN REGIME'S ATTEMPT TO HAVE HIM ASSASSINATED), BUT THAT HIS VIEWS WERE NOT SHARED BY OTHERS.

6. ACCORDING TO VIETS, THERE WERE ONLY BRIEF REFERENCES BY THE JORDANIANS TO THEIR CONCERN ABOUT A POSSIBLE ISRAELI OPERATION AGAINST SOUTHERN LEBANON. THE JORDANIANS HAD, HOWEVER, REITERATED THEIR DETERMINATION TO PREVENT INFILTRATION BY PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS THROUGH JORDAN INTO ISRAEL (SEE ALSO MY TELNO 77). VIETS REMARKED THAT THE JORDANIANS HAD ALSO SAID SURPRISINGLY LITTLE ABOUT EGYPT, PERHAPS BECAUSE THE KING DID NOT HAVE ANY RECENT DEVELOPMENTS TO REPORT (SEE MY TELNO 72).

7. SUMMING UP, VIETS FELT THAT WEINBERGER HAD MADE A CONSIDERABLE IMPRESSION ON THE JORDANIANS. THERE HAD NOT BEEN A BAD MOMENT THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSIONS AND WEINBERGER HAD MADE VERY CLEAR TO

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THE JORDANIANS HIS DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN A BALANCE IN US POLICY BETWEEN ISRAEL ON THE ONE HAND AND HER LINKS WITH MODERATE ARAB STATES ON THE OTHER. VIETS THOUGHT THE VISIT HAD HAD A MUCH-NEEDED TONIC EFFECT ON THE JORDANIANS, WHO WERE STILL SMARTING FROM MRS KIRKPATRICK'S PERFORMANCE AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER RECENT EVENTS.

8. SHORTLY BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FROM AMMAN AIRPORT, WEINBERGER GAVA A PRESS CONFERENCE (FULL TEXT BY BAG TO FCO AND WASHINGTON ONLY). ASKED WHETHER HE AGREED WITH THE ISRAELIS THAT THE SALE OF MOBILE AIR DEFENCE MISSILES OR F16S TO JORDAN WOULD CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO ISRAEL, WEINBERGER SAID HE BELIEVED "MATTERS LIKE THESE" WOULD SERVE TO STRENGTHEN A GOOD FRIEND (IE JORDAN) BUT ADDED THAT THE JORDANIANS HAD NOT REQUESTED FURTHER US WEAPONS AND HENCE THAT ANY DISCUSSION OF SUCH SALES WOULD BE MERE CONJECTURE. THE JORDANIAN PRESS COMMENT ON HIS VISIT HAS FOCUSED ON ISRAELI PROTESTS ABOUT POSSIBLE US ARMS SALES TO JORDAN, AND IN PARTICULAR ON SPECULATION ABOUT WHETHER THE AMERICANS WILL GIVE IN TO THIS ISRAELI PRESSURE.

9. COMMENTS BY KING HUSSEIN ON WEINBERGER'S VISIT ARE BEING SENT ON OTHER CHANNELS.

10. WASHINGTON ONLY. I AM SENDING THIS TELEGRAM TO YOU IMMEDIATE IN CASE IT PROVIDES USEFUL BACKGROUND FOR THE PUS'S TALKS WITH THE AMERICANS TODAY.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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FM BEIRUT 161145Z FEB
TO ROUTINE F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 53 OF 16 FEBRUARY 1982

INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, JEDDA,
DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, CAIRO AND PARIS.

FAHD PLAN AND VENICE DECLARATION.

1. WHEN I SAW ARAFAT ON 15 FEBRUARY, I ASKED HIM HOW HE SAW THE WAY FORWARD AFTER FEZ. WAS THERE ANY FUTURE IN THE FAHD PLAN ? DID HE SEE ANY ROLE FOR EUROPE AT THIS STAGE IN THE LIGHT OF THE VENICE DECLARATION ?

2. ON THE FAHD PLAN HE SAID FIRMLY THAT HE STILL SUPPORTED IT AND WOULD GO ON DOING SO. THE ARABS HOWEVER COULD NOT REALLY GET TOGETHER BEHIND IT UNTIL THE NEXT ARAB SUMMIT WHICH WOULD NOT BE BEFORE JULY. THEY MIGHT SUPPORT IT THEN BUT HE WAS SURE THAT THEY WOULD WANT SOME SORT OF "GUARANTEE". EMPHASIZING THAT AT THIS POINT HE WAS JUST THINKING ALOUD HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION IN FAYOUR OF IT WOULD DO THE TRICK. HE BRUSHED DOUBTS ASIDE WHEN I SAID THAT I WONDERED WHETHER THE AMERICANS WOULD AGREE. AN ALTERNATIVE WAY FORWARD WAS A GENEVA CONFERENCE SEMI COLON BUT HE WAS VAGUE ON THIS TOPIC.

3. ON THE VENICE DECLARATION AND THE ROLE OF EUROPE HE WAS INSISTENT THAT EUROPE HAD A MOST IMPORTANT, PERHAPS DECISIVE ROLE TO PLAY. UNFORTUNATELY FRENCH STATEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES HAD LEFT HIM AND HIS COLLEAGUES IN GRAVE DOUBT WHETHER THEY COULD EXPECT ANYTHING FROM EUROPE FOR THE TIME BEING. AVOIDING ANY EXCUSE FOR THE FRENCH I EXPLAINED THAT EUROPEAN POLITICAL CO-OPERATION WAS A NEW AND FRAGILE PLANT. HE SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND THIS WELL (AS INDEED ANY ARAB SHOULD).

4. WE ALSO DISCUSSED THE "LAME DUCK" EFFECT (PARAGRAPH EIGHT OF MY DESPATCH NUMBER 014/1 OF 12 JANUARY). HE WAS WELL AWARE OF THIS AND ADDED THE INTERESTING POINT THAT OFF-YEAR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS IN 1982 IN THE UNITED STATES WOULD IMPOSE FURTHER DELAYS ON THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN POLICY.

15. HE WAS

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5. HE WAS ALTOGETHER MORE CONSTRUCTIVE THAN I EXPECTED. HE SPOKE MORE IN SORROW THAN IN ANGER.

6. FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL SAYING ADDRESSEES.

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FROM TEL AVIV 161315Z FEB 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 42 OF 16 FEBRUARY 1982

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN: BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, WASHINGTON AND
UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING JEDDA AND JERUSALEM.

US POLICY: KNESSET DEBATE

1. AT THE END OF A SHORT DEBATE ON 15 FEBRUARY, THE KNESSET
RESOLVED TO

A) EXPRESS ITS PROFOUND CONCERN AT THE US DEFENCE SECRETARY'S
OFFER TO SUPPLY F-16 AIRCRAFT AND IMPROVED GROUND-TO-AIR HAWK
MISSILES, FROM WHICH THE BAN ON THEIR MOBILITY WILL BE LIFTED SEMI-
COLON

B) DECLARE THAT THE SUPPLY OF SUCH SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY TO THE
FORWARD STATE ON THE EASTERN FRONT AMONG THE STATES REFUSING EVEN
TO NEGOTIATE PEACE WITH ISRAEL AND MAINTAINING A STATE OF WAR WITH
HER, CONSTITUTES A GRAVE THREAT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY SEMICOLON

C) CALL ON THE US GOVERNMENT TO REFRAIN - IN KEEPING WITH THE
PRESIDENT'S DECLARATIONS AND A RESOLUTION OF THE CONGRESS - FROM
THUS GRAVELY IMPERILLING ISRAEL'S SECURITY

THE VOTE WAS 88 : 3 IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION, WHICH WAS SPONS-
ORED BY THE GOVERNMENT PARTIES, THE OPPOSITION ALIGNEMENT AND
TELEM, WITH SIX ALIGNMENT ABSTENTIONS.

2. INTRODUCING THE DEBATE, MR BEGIN APPEALED TO PRESIDENT
REAGAN TO REMEMBER HIS SEPTEMBER 1981 PROMISE THAT THE UNITED
STATES WOULD GUARANTEE ISRAEL'S DEFENSIVE EDGE OVER ITS ENEMIES
QUANTITATIVELY AS WELL AS QUALITATIVELY. AFTER NOTING WEINBERGER'S
FAILURE TO VISIT ISRAEL AND EXPRESSING ASTONISHMENT AT HIS
ATTRIBUTABLE AND UNATTRIBUTABLE STATEMENTS, BEGIN SAID THAT, IN
VIEW OF HAIG'S SUBSEQUENT STATEMENT IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER
WEINBERGER WAS SPEAKING ON HIS OWN BEHALF OR FOR THE ADMIMW WKIIMTN.
THE POSITION SHOULD BE CLARIFIED SHORTLY WHEN AMBASSADOR ARENS
PRESENTED HIS CREDENTIALS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

/3. THIS

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3. THIS STRIDENT RESPONSE TO WEINBERGER'S REMARKS AND THE UNUSUAL DISPLAY OF UNITY BY GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION CAN BE ATTRIBUTED PARTLY TO CURRENT ISRAELI JITTERINESS OVER SINAI AND LEBANON BUT ALSO TO THE FOLLOWING FACTORS:

- A) THE ISRAELIS ARE GENUINELY CONCERNED AT THE JORDANIAN WISH TO OBTAIN AND APPARENT US WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER THE SALE OF SUCH ADVANCED EQUIPMENT. THEY CANNOT SEE WHY JORDAN SHOULD NEED F-16S OR MOBILE HAWK OTHER THAN FOR SINISTER PURPOSES. TO THIS EXTENT, THEIR OBJECTION TO THE PROVISION OF SUCH EQUIPMENT TO JORDAN STEMS FROM CONSIDERATIONS EVEN CLOSER TO HOME THAN THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE SAUDI AWACS DEAL.
- B) THE ISRAELIS PROBABLY JUDGE THAT THE AWACS PACKAGE WENT THROUGH BECAUSE THEY DID NOT PITCH THEIR OPPOSITION TO IT STRONGLY ENOUGH AT THE OUTSET. THEY MAY HOPE TO STIFLE ANY DEAL WITH JORDAN AT BIRTH BY MAKING THEIR OPPOSITION UNMISTAKEABLY CLEAR BEFORE IT GOES ANY FURTHER.
- C) AS INDICATED IN MY TELEGRAM NO 48, THE ISRAELIS ARE ONCE MORE CONCERNED AT EVIDENCE THAT UNITED STATES POLICY IS SHIFTING AWAY FROM GUARANTEED SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL TOWARDS A CLOSER ALIGNMENT WITH MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES. THE SIGNALS FROM WASHINGTON RECENTLY HAVE BEEN CONFUSING AND CONTRADICTORY. BUT THERE HAS BEEN ENOUGH OF SUBSTANCE TO GIVE THEM CAUSE TO WORRY. SINCE THE AMERICAN SAFETY NET IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL, ANY INDICATION THAT THE AMERICANS MAY BE RE-WRITING THE BOTTOM LINE IN THIS RESPECT IS BOUND TO PROVOKE AN IMMEDIATE REACTION HERE. THEY WANT TO BE REASSURED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL THAT THE UNITED STATES IS STILL A RELIABLY ALLY IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.

KCG PASS SAVING TO JEDDA.

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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FM VIENNA 161205Z FEB 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 022 OF 16 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL-AVIV, CAIRO AND WASHINGTON

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 32 TO BEIRUT: SOUTHERN LEBANON

1. ON RECEIPT OF YOUR TUR, I SPOKE ON FRIDAY TO THE MFA HERE, I SAID THAT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I WAS SURE YOU WOULD WELCOME ANYTHING THAT THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT COULD DO TO URGE RESTRAINT ON THE PLO.

2. I WAS TELEPHONED BACK THIS MORNING. CHANCELLOR KREISKY HAD GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS YESTERDAY THAT THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR IN BEIRUT SHOULD SEEK A MEETING WITH ARAFAT AND SHOULD ADVISE HIM THAT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE PLO TO EXERCISE "THE UTMOST RESTRAINT" IN ORDER NOT TO GIVE ISRAEL AN EXCUSE TO "STRIKE BACK". CHANCELLOR KREISKY HAD ASKED THAT YOU SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THIS DEMARCHE.

BE INFORMED OF THIS DEMARCHE.

3. ONE ELEMENT IN THE AUSTRIAN DECISION TO TAKE ACTION SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN A REPORT FROM THEIR AMBASSADOR IN DAMASCUS REPORTING THE VIEWS OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PLO, KHALID FAHUM. ACCORDING TO THIS REPORT, FAHUM IS ASSERTING THAT MILITARY ACTION BY ISRAEL IS IMMINENT. THE PURPOSE OF SUCH ACTION, IN HIS VIEW, WOULD BE TO PRE-EMPT A RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS. THE THEORY IS, OBVIOUSLY, THAT IF AN OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON PRECEDES THE RETURN OF THE SINAI, PRESIDENT MUBARAK WILL BE UNABLE TO RESPOND TO THE INEVITABLE REQUESTS FROM ARAB GOVERNMENTS THAT HE SHOULD TAKE THEIR PART.

ALEXANDER

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DESKBY 161100Z FCO

FM BEIRUT 160825Z FEB

TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 52 OF 16 FEBRUARY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW.

MY TELS NO 50 OF 15 FEBRUARY AND 51 OF 16 FEBRUARY: SOUTH LEBANON.

1. THE REACTIONS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE LEBANESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WERE MUCH AS EXPECTED. LABAKI KNOWS THAT I KNOW THAT THEY CAN DO PRACTICALLY NOTHING ABOUT THE SOUTH. WE HAVE GONE OVER THE GROUND BEFORE. MEANWHILE THE LEBANESE ARMY HAS BEEN PUT ON ALERT AS A ROUTINE PRECAUTION.

2. ARAFAT'S REACTIONS WERE MORE COMPLEX. ON THE SPECIFIC QUESTION OF SOUTH LEBANON HE WAS RATHER BELLIGERENT BUT THAT MAY HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO SHEW THAT HE WAS NOT "ON THE RUN" AS SOME REPORTS HAVE SUGGESTED. ON THE OTHER HAND, AS I HAVE REPORTED SEPARATELY, HE WAS MORE REASONABLE ON THE WIDER ARAB/ISRAEL QUESTION.

3. AS FAR AS I CAN SEE IT CANNOT BE IN ISRAEL'S INTEREST, LEAVING ASIDE ALL LEGAL AND MORAL ASPECTS, TO ATTACK THE SOUTH OF LEBANON. THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY GAINS WOULD BE SMALL AND THE POTENTIAL DANGERS GREAT. MOREOVER IT WOULD ONCE MORE ALLOW THE SYRIANS TO STRIKE HEROIC PAN-ARAB ATTITUDES WHILE THE LEBANON SUFFERED, WITHOUT FACING A WHIFF OF GRAPESHOT THEMSELVES.

4. ON THE OTHER HAND EXACTLY THE SAME ARGUMENTS APPLIED TO THE ISRAELI AIR ATTACKS ON BEIRUT. MOREOVER, AS I POINTED OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 2 TO 4 OF MY TEL NO 418 OF 17 NOVEMBER 1981 AND IN PARAGRAPH 11 OF MY ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1981, THE EXTREMISTS HAVE EVERY INTEREST IN PROVOKING SUCH ACTION.

5. I HAVE JUST SEEN THE SERIES OF TELEGRAMS CULMINATING IN YOUR TEL NO 37 OF 15 FEBRUARY REPEATING UKMIS NEW YORK'S TEL NO 155 OF 12 FEBRUARY. I CAN ONLY COMMENT AS FOLLOWS:-

(A) I DO NOT HAVE THE "FEEL" THAT AN ATTACK IS IMMINENT.

(B) ARAFAT, WHO WOULD KNOW FAR MORE THAN ME ABOUT IT, AND MIGHT HAVE A POSITIVE INTEREST IN SCARING ME, DID NOT SEEM TO FEEL THAT AN ATTACK WAS IMMINENT, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT EXCLUDE IT.

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(C) THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT AND VARIOUS OTHER FACTIONS HERE HAVE A DIRECT INTEREST IN PRETENDING THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE ABOUT TO ATTACK AS AN EXCUSE FOR NOT AGREEING TO ANY MEASURES TO SOLVE THE LEBANESE PROBLEM.

ALL IN ALL AN ATTACK DOES NOT LOOK IMMINENT BUT COULD EASILY BE PROVOKED SEMI COLON AND THERE ARE PLENTY OF PEOPLE ON BOTH SIDES WHO HAVE EVERY INTEREST IN PROVOKING IT.

6. FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 27 OF 15 FEBRUARY
INFO TO PRIORITY DAMASCUS
INFO TO ROUTINE OTHER ME POSTS UKREP BRUSSELS UKMIS NEW YORK
WASHINGTON
SAVING DUBLIN PARIS THE HAGUE BRUSSELS LUXEMBOURG BONN COPENHAGEN
ROME ATHENS TOKYO

GOLAN

1. THE ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL MET IN TUNIS ON 12/13 FEBRUARY TO CONSIDER ACTION OVER ISRAELI ANNEXATION OF THE GOLAN, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DEBATES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
2. THE COUNCIL CONDEMNED US POLICY IN THE ME AND PARTICULARLY US SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL AS BEING HOSTILE TO VITAL ARAB INTERESTS. IT CALLED ON THE US TO HALT ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL WHICH ENABLED IT TO MAINTAIN ITS OCCUPATION OF ARAB TERRITORY, TO IGNORE PALESTINIAN RIGHTS AND TO PURSUE AGGRESSION IN DEFIANCE OF UN RESOLUTIONS.
3. THE COUNCIL DECIDED TO CO-ORDINATE ACTION TOWARDS IMPLEMENTING THE UNGA RESOLUTION OF 5 FEBRUARY AND THE EXCLUSION OF ISRAEL FROM THE UN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS.
4. THE ATTITUDE OF JAPAN AND QUOTE CERTAIN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES UNQUOTE WAS DENOUNCED AND THEY WERE WARNED OF THE DAMAGE THIS ATTITUDE COULD DO TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH ARAB STATES. A COMMITTEE WAS APPOINTED TO REPORT ON ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN ARAB STATES AND COUNTRIES SUPPORTING ISRAEL WITH A VIEW TO MODIFYING THESE RELATIONS. THE COMMITTEE COMPRISES JORDAN, ALGERIA, SAUDI ARABIA, IRAQ, SYRIA, KUWAIT AND THE PLO. IT IS TO REPORT TO THE NEXT ARAB SUMMIT. THE ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS ALSO REQUESTED TO PREPARE AN ANNUAL REPORT DETAILING ASSISTANCE GIVEN TO ISRAEL BY EVERY COUNTRY.
5. THE COUNCIL DECIDED TO REINFORCE RELATIONS WITH FRIENDLY COUNTRIES, EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR THE ATTITUDE OF AFRICAN STATES AND RESOLVED TO SEEK ARAB/AFRICAN CO-OPERATION AGAINST ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA.

/ 6. ADDRESSING THE

6. ADDRESSING THE COUNCIL, THE ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY-GENERAL NOTED THAT AT THE UN THERE HAD BEEN UNANIMOUS CONDEMNATION OF ISRAELI ACTION OVER GOLAN AND ALMOST UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT ON SANCTIONS. HE ATTRIBUTED THIS RESULT TO ARAB SOLIDARITY. HE DEPLORED THE FAILURE OF THE US, THE CHAMPION OF LIBERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, TO LIVE UP TO ITS PRINCIPLES WHERE ISRAELI ACTIONS WERE CONCERNED. HE PRAISED THE QUOTE COURAGEOUS UNQUOTE GREEK POSITION AND DEEPLY REGRETTED THE ATTITUDE OF OTHER EC MEMBERS AND JAPAN. HE APPEALED AT LENGTH FOR AN END TO INTER-ARAB DIVISIONS.

7. A LOCAL PRESS EDITORIAL SUMMED UP REACTIONS TO THE COUNCIL MEETING: NOTHING DEFINITE WAS DECIDED AND ARAB DISCORD PERSISTS, THE CALL TO THE US HAS NO CHANCE OF BEING HEEDED SINCE IT IS NOT BACKED BY THE THREAT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS; ARAB UNWILLINGNESS TO ACT EFFECTIVELY AGAINST AMERICAN POLICY IS A BITTER REALITY ON WHICH ALL ARABS SHOULD REFLECT.

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FM FCO 121117Z FEB 82

TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT

TELEGRAM NUMBER 32 OF 12 FEBRUARY

AND TO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, JEDDA, KUWAIT,
MOSCOW, MADRID (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY).

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,

INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, BAGHDAD, TUNIS, VIENNA, HOLY SEE, PARIS,
OTHER EC POSTS.

SOUTHERN LEBANON

1. HOOPER (US EMBASSY) CALLED ON MILES (NENAD) TODAY ON INSTRUCTIONS. HE SAID THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WAS NOW EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT A POSSIBLE BREAKDOWN OF THE CEASEFIRE IN SOUTH LEBANON, PARTICULARLY SINCE ATTEMPTED INFILTRATION BY A PALESTINIAN GROUP (WHICH MIGHT BE FATAH ACCORDING TO ISRAELIS) ON 28 JANUARY (TEL AVIV TELNO 31, NOT TO ALL). HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS AT THIS STAGE TO ASK US TO TAKE SPECIFIC ACTION IN ARAB CAPITALS, NOR DID US GOVERNMENT WANT US TO SPEAK ON THEIR BEHALF E.G. TO THE SYRIANS OR PLO. BUT THEY WISHED TO SHARE THEIR CONCERN WITH US AND WOULD WELCOME ANY FEEDBACK FROM ARAB INTERLOCUTORS AS WELL AS ANY IDEAS FOR HELPING TO PREVENT FURTHER DETERIORATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. SIMILAR REPRESENTATIONS WERE BEING MADE IN PARIS, VIENNA AND TO THE VATICAN: THE COMMON THREAD APPEARS TO BE THAT ALL ARE ON SPEAKING TERMS WITH THE PLO AND/OR LEBANESE FACTIONS. HOOPER SAID THAT HABIB WOULD BE RETURNING TO THE AREA SOON, BUT THAT NO DATES HAD YET BEEN DECIDED HE COULD SAY NOTHING ABOUT REPORTS THAT ISRAELI DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, SAGUY, HAD VISITED WASHINGTON RECENTLY TO WARN THAT ISRAEL WOULD ATTACK SOUTHERN LEBANON IF FURTHER PROVOKED, THOUGH HE RANG TO CONFIRM REPORTS LATER AFTER CHECKING WITH WASHINGTON.

2. MILES SAID THAT WE TOO WERE CONCERNED AT THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND WOULD BE HAPPY TO SHARE ANY INFORMATION OR IDEAS. FOR THE MOMENT WE DID NOT HAVE MUCH TO ADD TO THE US

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ASSESSMENT. WE HAD SEEN NO EVIDENCE THAT PLO INFILTRATION OF 28 JANUARY HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT BY FATAH, AND THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE PRODUCED EVIDENCE IF THEY HAD HAD ANY. IT WAS ALSO NOT CERTAIN THAT THIS INFILTRATION FROM JORDANIAN TERRITORY CONSTITUTED A BREACH OF THE CEASEFIRE. SUCH CONTACTS AS WE HAD HAD RECENTLY HAD UNDERLINED THAT THE PLO WERE WELL AWARE OF THE NEED NOT TO GIVE ISRAELIS ANY PRETEXT TO ATTACK SOUTHERN LEBANON. THERE WAS, NEVERTHELESS, GENUINE ANXIETY IN THE ARAB WORLD THAT SUCH AN ATTACK WAS IMMINENT, AND THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD MANUFACTURE AN EXCUSE IF NECESSARY. MANY ARABS ALSO FELT THAT US/EGYPTIAN OBSESSION WITH THE RETURN OF SINAI GAVE BEGIN A MORE OR LESS FREE HAND IN THESE MATTERS WITH LITTLE TO FEAR FROM US RETALIATION FOR ANY ATTACK ON SOUTHERN LEBANON. IT WOULD HELP US IN SPEAKING TO ARAB GOVERNMENTS AND THE PLO IF WE WERE ABLE TO GIVE THEM AN ASSURANCE THAT THE US HAD TAKEN A TOUGH LINE IN WARNING ISRAEL AGAINST SUCH AN ATTACK, AND THAT FIRM US ACTION WOULD FOLLOW IF SUCH AN INVASION TOOK PLACE.

3. OUR CONCERN ABOUT SOUTHERN LEBANON HAS BEEN HEIGHTENED RECENTLY BY CONTINUING ISRAELI SABRE-RATTLING AND BY A REPORT FROM TEL AVIV (UNNUMBERED TELEGRAM OF 9 FEBRUARY TO MODUK - NOT TO ALL) OF A LIMITED CALL-UP OF RESERVISTS. SUBJECT TO ANY COMMENTS FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN MADRID, PLEASE SPEAK AT YOUR DISCRETION AT WHATEVER LEVEL YOU THINK APPROPRIATE TO HOST GOVERNMENT. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR OUR CONCERN AT POSSIBLE BREAKDOWN OF CEASEFIRE FOLLOWING PLO INFILTRATION INTO ISRAEL IN LATE JANUARY OR ANY SIMILAR ACTION, EVEN BY FRINGE GROUPS, AGAINST THE LETTER OR SPIRIT OF THE CEASEFIRE, AND OUR SUSPICION THAT ISRAEL MAY BE LOOKING FOR A PRETEXT TO MOUNT AN ATTACK ON SOUTHERN LEBANON. THIS WOULD BE IN NO ONE'S INTEREST: IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT THAT NO SUCH PRETEXT SHOULD BE GIVEN. HM AMBASSADOR BEIRUT SHOULD SPEAK IN SIMILAR TERMS DURING PRO- JECTED MEETING WITH ARAFAT (OUR TELNO. 16). ||

4. (FOR MOSCOW) ALTHOUGH YOU WILL NO DOUBT NOT WISH TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE MFA IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, GRATEFUL FOR ANY COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE ON THE LIKELY SOVIET VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON.

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INFO ROUTINE AMMAN, BEIRUT, JEDDA, KHARTOUM, TEL AVIV,
TRIPOLI, AND OTHER GULF PGSTS.

ant

EGYPT/OMAN.

1. ON 10 FEBRUARY THE PRIME MINISTER, FUAD MOHIEDDIN, ANNOUNCED THAT PRESIDENT MUBARAK WILL VISIT OMAN AT THE END OF NEXT WEEK TO HOLD TALKS WITH SULTAN QABOOS AT THE INVITATION OF THE LATTER. THE PRECISE TIMING OF THE TRIP WAS DECIDED DURING MEETINGS BETWEEN MUBARAK AND OMANI ENVOYS IN WASHINGTON AND LONDON, AND WOULD BE ANNOUNCED IN OMAN ON 13 FEBRUARY IN A STATEMENT ON THE STRENGTH OF EGYPTIAN/OMANI RELATIONS. MOHIEDDIN ADDED THAT EGYPT WOULD NOT ENGAGE IN INTER-ARAB DISPUTES. OMAN WAS ONE OF EGYPT'S ARAB FRIENDS LIKE SUDAN.

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FROM TEL AVIV 111410Z FEB 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 36 OF 11 FEBRUARY 1982

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, CAIRO AND WASHINGTON
INFO SAVING BEIRUT AND JERUSALEM.

UN VOTE ON GOLAN

1. AT THE END OF A TWO DAY DEBATE, THE KNESSET ON 10 FEBRUARY DECIDED IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS TO
 - (A) REJECT AND CONDEMN THE MALICIOUS RESOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY MAJORITY OF FEBRUARY 5, 1982,
 - (B) DECLARE THAT THIS RESOLUTION IS DEVOID OF ANY MORAL FOUNDATION AND HAS NO VALIDITY WHATEVER,
 - (C) EXTEND ITS APPRECIATION TO THE 20 FREE AND DEMOCRATIC STATES THAT, ALONG WITH ISRAEL, OPPOSED THE AFOREMENTIONED RESOLUTION.

2. VOTING WAS 61 IN FAVOUR AND 3 AGAINST. 41 OPPOSITION ALIGNMENT MEMBERS ABSTAINED.

3. ALL PARTIES WERE FIERCELY CRITICAL OF THE UN RESOLUTION. IN RESTATING THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION IN STANDARD TERMS MR SHAMIR SPOKE OF "THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS THAT WE SHALL NEVER COME DOWN FROM THE GOLAN HEIGHTS". BUT THE DEBATE WAS CHIEFLY NOTABLE FOR OPPOSITION CRITICISM OF THE GOLAN LAW. THE ALIGNMENT REFUSED TO JOIN WITH THE GOVERNMENT IN A JOINT RESOLUTION AND SUBMITTED ONE OF THEIR OWN, STATING THAT THE GOLAN LAW HAD PLAYED INTO THE HANDS OF THOSE WHO WISH ISRAEL ILL AND URGING THE GOVERNMENT TO "REFRAIN FROM SUPERFLUOUS INITIATIVES THAT DO NOT SERVE ANY NATIONAL INTEREST AND DO NOT CREATE ANY NEW POSITIVE SITUATIONS". THIS WAS VOTED DOWN 42-61.

4. THE UNDER-SECRETARY FOR EUROPE TOLD ME ON 8 FEBRUARY THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WERE CONSIDERING MESSAGES TO GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAD VOTED AGAINST THE UN RESOLUTION THANKING THEM FOR THEIR VOTE AND SUGGESTING THAT THEY MIGHT COMPARE NOTES WITH THE ISRAELIS ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESOLUTION, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS THE POSSIBLE EXPULSION OR SUSPENSION OF MEMBER STATES RESULTING FROM THE MANIFEST BIAS OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. MEROZ SUGGESTED THAT, IN YOUR CASE, THE MATTER MIGHT BE DISCUSSED DURING YOUR VISIT. I CONCLUDE THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TAKE SERIOUSLY THE SENSE OF INCREASING INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION FOR ISRAEL, EVEN IF THIS IS NOT AN OVERRIDING CONSIDERATION FOR THE GOVERNMENT AS A WHOLE.

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5. MEROZ ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN AT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE VOTE FOR THE PRACTICAL RELATIONS WHICH ISRAEL HAS WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN COUNTRIES. HE INSTANCED TRADE AND IN SOME CASES TOURIST CONNECTIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA, HUNGARY AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT, BULGARIA AS WELL AS POLAND (BEFORE THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW). THERE WERE ALSO TRADING AND DEFENCE SALES CONNECTIONS WITH AFRICAN COUNTRIES. ISRAEL HAD BEEN ON THE POINT OF ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SOME OF THEM. MEROZ CONCEDED THAT, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTE, THE POSITION OF INDIVIDUAL WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL SEEMED TO VARY FROM WEEK TO WEEK.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING BEIRUT.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

10. DOWNING STREET. (2COPIES).

TELEGVAZ NUMBER 074 OF 11 FEB
FNFO PRIORITY MODUK (DI4B) ROUTINE BAGHDAD BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS
TEHRAN TEL AVIV UKMIS NEWYORK WASHINGTON ABU DHABI BAHRAIN DOHA
JEDDA DUBAI KUWAIT AND MUSCAT

YOUR TELNO 17: JORDAN/IRAQ

1. I HAD A LONG TALK WITH KING HUSSEIN YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AT HIS HOME, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH I MADE THE POINTS IN YOUR TUR. THE KING SAID HE WAS VERY WELL AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL EMBARRASSMENT TO OUR DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP OF TOO DEEP A JORDANIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN AND WAS DETERMINED TO LIMIT JORDANIAN INTERVENTION TO THE DESPATCH OF VOLUNTEERS. HE WENT ON TO TELL ME (EMPHASISING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING IN STRICT CONFIDENCE) THAT HE HAD JUST AGREED WITH THE IRAQIS THAT THE JORDANIAN VOLUNTEER FORCE WOULD BE INTEGRATED INTO IRAQI UNITS AND WOULD WEAR IRAQI UNIFORMS. HE HOPED THAT THIS MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN EMPHASISING THE LIMITED AND SYMBOLIC ROLE JORDAN WOULD BE PLAYING AND ALSO IN ENSURING THAT JORDAN COULD NOT BE REPRESENTED AS A BELLIGERENT. HE CLAIMED THAT THE IRAQIS FULLY SHARED HIS CONCERN THAT THIS SHOULD NOT HAPPEN.

2. THE KING SAID HE ENTIRELY AGREED THAT THE WAR SHOULD BE TERMINATED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SEMICLN HE HOPED THAT THE LATEST DECLARATION OF JORDANIAN SUPPORT FOR IRAQ WOULD ENCOURAGE THE IRANIANS TO ACCEPT PEACE ON REASONABLE TERMS. BUT THE KING WAS NOT HOPEFUL THAT ANY OF THE CURRENT NEGOTIATING EFFORTS WOULD PRODUCE THIS RESULT. HE REMARKED THAT MR PALME SEEMED TO BE LIMITING HIS EFFORTS TO FREEING SHIPS TRAPPED IN THE SHATT, AND THOUGHT IT A PITY THAT PALME WAS NOT APPARENTLY ADDRESSING HIMSELF TO THE WIDER ISSUES.

3. WE THEN DISCUSSED THE COURSE OF THE WAR ITSELF. THE KING BELIEVED THAT THE JORDANIAN DECISION TO SEND VOLUNTEERS HAD HAD AN IMMEDIATE BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON THE MORALE OF THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES. THE KING WAS AWARE OF REPORTS THAT THE IRANIANS MIGHT BE PLANNING A MAJOR COUNTER-OFFENSIVE IN THE SOUTH SEMICLN HE ASSUMED THAT THE IRAQIS WERE TRYING TO BLUNT THIS BY PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACKS. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE IRAQIS RETAINED CONTROL OF THE AIR AND THAT THEIR AIR FORCE WAS PLAYING AN EFFECTIVE ROLE.

4. THE KING ALSO SPOKE AT LENGTH ON FAMILIAR LINES OF THE DANGER WHICH THE PARTICULAR BRAND OF SHI'ITE FANATICISM NOW PREVALENT IN IRAN POSED FOR ALL THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF AREA. IF IRAQ WERE TO COLLAPSE, THE REST OF THEM WOULD NOT LAST LONG. OF COURSE HE WOULD GO TO THE HELP OF OTHER GULF STATES IF THEY NEEDED IT: HE REFERRED TO THE JOINT MILITARY EXERCISES AT PRESENT BEING PLANNED WITH BAHRAIN (MY TELNO 56), BUT CLAIMED THAT HE COULD HARDLY SUPPORT BAHRAIN AND NOT GIVE HELP TO IRAQ WHICH WAS THE KEY TO THE WHOLE GULF AREA.

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5. THE KING MADE A RATHER OBSCURE REFERENCE TO A RECENT VISIT WHICH THE SYRIAN MINISTER OF INFORMATION HAD PAID TO IRAN AND TO A MOVE TO HAVE THE ALAWITE SECT BROUGHT WITHIN SHI'ITE ORTHODOXY SEMICLN HE THOUGHT THIS A SINISTER DEVELOPMENT. HE ALSO SAID HE HAD HAD A REPORT THAT IT WAS THE AMERICANS WHO HAD TIPPED OFF PRESIDENT ASAD ABOUT THE LATEST PLOT AGAINST HIM. HE INTENDED TAKING THIS UP WITH MR WEINBERGER, WHO IS AT PRESENT VISITING JORDAN (I HAVE WARNED THE US AMBASSADOR OF THIS POSSIBILITY: THE JORDANIAN SUSPICION THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE SOME SORT OF SPECIAL UNDER-COVER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ASAD REGIME IS A LONG-STANDING ONE).

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TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 072 OF 11 FEB
INFO CAIRO AND WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 32: JORDAN/EGYPT

1. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN YESTERDAY, I BRIEFED HIM ON PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S VISIT TO BRITAIN (YOUR TELNO 46 TO CAIRO REFERS). HE WAS MOST GRATEFUL AND SEEMED WELL SATISFIED WITH THE LINE MUBARAK HAD TAKEN.
2. THE KING CLAIMED THAT HIS OWN RELATIONS WITH MUBARAK WERE GETTING STEADILY CLOSER. HE HAD, FOR EXAMPLE, WRITTEN TO HIM JUST PRIOR TO HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES ENCLOSING A COPY OF THE PAPER HE HAD GIVEN TO PRESIDENT REAGAN (MY TELELETTER TO SIR JOHN GRAHAM OF 30 NOVEMBER 1981 REFERS). THE KING ALSO CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD OFFERED A TOP-LEVEL CONFIDENTIAL MEETING IN EITHER EGYPT OR JORDAN. MY IMPRESSION FROM THE WAY THE KING SPOKE WAS THAT MUBARAK HAD NOT YET RESPONDED TO THIS SUGGESTION.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 73 OF 11 FEB

JORDAN/UK

1. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN YESTERDAY, HE SPOKE WARMLY OF YOUR PROPOSED VISIT TO JORDAN IN APRIL. HE ALSO ASKED ME TO REITERATE HIS STANDING INVITATION TO THE PRIME MINISTER TO VISIT JORDAN. HE SO MUCH HOPED THAT SHE MIGHT FIND IT POSSIBLE TO DO SO SOME TIME THIS YEAR.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 February 1982

Dear Michael,

ARAB/ISRAEL: UK PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS

The Prime Minister has seen and taken note of the Lord Privy Seal's minute of 8 February.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OD, and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever
John Cole.*

Michael Arthur, Esq.,
Lord Privy Seal's Office.

Prime Minister

To note.

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PRIME MINISTER

ARAB/ISRAEL: UK PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS


- on point 4*
1. On 28 October the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary minuted to OD on our response to the Americans' request for the participation of a British unit in the Sinai Multi-National Force and Observers (MFO). In Lord Carrington's absence abroad, I wish to let you know the latest position on our contribution. I have cleared the broad lines of this minute with Lord Carrington.
 2. We have agreed with the Ministry of Defence that our contribution should consist of a Headquarters Unit which the Americans were particularly anxious for us to supply. (The MFO said they had no requirement for the Royal Engineers which we originally offered). We are currently negotiating with the MFO on the detailed legal and practical arrangements for our participation.
 3. In October, when it seemed possible that HMG's contribution to the MFO could cost as much as £2 million a year, there was a problem about financing. This has disappeared. The sum now involved is around £600,000 and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have agreed at official level with the Treasury that this expenditure can be met from the savings resulting from economies on UNFICYP. This will be a continuing provision for as long as the UK participates in the MFO.
 4. I should, however, stress that this was a fortuitous saving, and that if it had not occurred we would have continued to press for additional resources. It is most unlikely that we shall be able to deal with future contingencies in this way. As a general rule, therefore, we would not be able to meet sudden contingencies - however desirable a positive response may be on foreign policy grounds - unless we have the additional resources which may be needed.
 5. I am copying this minute to members of OD Committee.

J.A.

8 February 1982



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DESKBY 050900Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 050038Z FEB 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 138 DATED 4 FEBRUARY 82

INFO IMMEDIATE BANGKOK (FOR S OF S), DAMASCUS, AMMAN, JEDDA,
TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 132: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION : GOLAN HEIGHTS

1. THE DEBATE CONTINUED TODAY WITH 21 SPEAKERS. SANCTIONS OR
"APPROPRIATE MEASURES" WERE CALLED FOR BY TURKEY, JORDAN,
SAUDI ARABIA, NIGER, SOMALIA, BHUTAN, TUNISIA, SURINAME, KENYA,
GUINEA, UGANDA, INDONESIA, GUYANA, YEMEN, BENIN, BULGARIA AND
ALBANIA. SENEGAL SAID THAT IT REMAINED DISPOSED TO ASSOCIATE
ITSELF WITH ANY EFFORT WHICH COULD LEAD TO PEACE. POLAND CALLED
FOR THE CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL IN SUFFICIENTLY STRONG AND ENERGETIC
TERMS TO PREVENT FUTURE AGGRESSION AND TO SECURE IMMEDIATE ISRAELI
WITHDRAWAL. OTHER SPEAKERS WERE PANAMA AND THAILAND. NO SPEAKER
TODAY CALLED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI MEMBERSHIP OF THE UN

TODAY CALLED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI MEMBERSHIP OF THE UN.

2. THE ARAB RESOLUTION WAS TABLED THIS AFTERNOON WITH 39 SPONSORS, INCLUDING ALL THE ARABS, A FEW COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND A SELECTION OF NON-ALIGNED INCLUDING SUCH MODERATES AS INDONESIA, NIGERIA, PAKISTAN AND YUGOSLAVIA. THE TEXT (COPY BY FACSIMILE TO NENAD) IS LARGELY THE SAME AS THAT IN MY TELNO 133 BUT CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT MODIFICATIONS:

- (A) THE SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO THE UNITED STATES IN PREAMBULAR 2 AND OPERATIVES 7 AND 8 HAVE BEEN DELETED;
- (B) "UN BODIES" HAS BEEN DELETED FROM OPERATIVE 15. THIS FOLLOWS REPRESENTATIONS TO THE ARABS BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL WHO POINTED OUT THAT IF INTERPRETED LITERALLY THIS PARAGRAPH WOULD REQUIRE HIM TO REFRAIN FROM ANY CONTACT WITH ISRAEL WHICH WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE PEACE-KEEPING FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO CONTINUE TO OPERATE. BUT THE PARAGRAPH RETAINS THE REFERENCE TO THE SPECIALISED AGENCIES, FROM WHICH THE ARABS CAN NOW BE EXPECTED TO TRY TO EXCLUDE ISRAEL.

3. THE US MISSION ARE DISPLAYING AS MUCH HOSTILITY TO THE FINAL TEXT AS TO THE ORIGINAL VERSION. THEY HAVE BEEN VERY ACTIVE IN THE ASSEMBLY TRYING TO PERSUADE DELEGATIONS NOT TO CO-SPONSOR (THEY ARE PARTICULARLY FURIOUS WITH NIGERIA AND PAKISTAN) AND SEEM TO BE ALMOST AS OPPOSED TO THE IDEA OF PARAGRAPH VOTING (WHICH WOULD PUT THEM ON THE SPOT OVER LANGUAGE WHICH THEY WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO VOTE AGAINST) AS TO THE RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE. MRS KIRKPATRICK HAS GIVEN A TOUGH INTERVIEW TO REUTERS WHICH CONTAINS PHRASES SUCH AS "THE DRAFT WAS ATTRACTING A GROWING NUMBER OF ENQUIRIES FROM CONCERNED MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS" AND "ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE UN AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS SPONSORS WOULD CERTAINLY BE AFFECTED"

4. THE TEN HAVE CONTINUED COORDINATING THEIR POSITION. ALL THE NINE HAVE NOW RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO VOTE AGAINST THE RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE. THERE IS AS YET NO WORD FROM ATHENS. A NUMBER OF CHANGES HAVE BEEN AGREED TO THE COMMON EXPLANATION OF VOTE, BUT THEY ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH FOR ME TO REPORT IN DETAIL. THE GREEKS AND FRENCH WERE WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS ON THE TEXT AND HAVE RESERVED THEIR POSITION. BECAUSE OF FRENCH, AND TO SOME EXTENT GERMAN AND IRISH, RESERVATIONS, AND BECAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTITUDE, THE TEN HAVE AGREED THAT THEY WILL NOT TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN CALLING FOR PARAGRAPH VOTING. BUT IT IS ON THE CARDS THAT SOME OTHER DELEGATION MAY DO SO. THE TEN THEREFORE HAVE BEEN THROUGH THE DRAFT PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH AND ESTABLISHED

AGREEMENT ON A COMMON VOTE (AT LEAST OF THE NINE) ON EACH OF

HAVE BEEN THROUGH THE DRAFT PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH AND ESTABLISHED AGREEMENT ON A COMMON VOTE (AT LEAST OF THE NINE) ON EACH OF THE PARAGRAPHS EXCEPT OPERATIVE 10 (TOTAL AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL), ON WHICH THERE ARE DIVERGENT VIEWS ON WHETHER WE SHOULD ABSTAIN OR VOTE AGAINST.

5. THERE ARE NINE FURTHER SPEAKERS TOMORROW AND THE VOTE IS LIKELY TO TAKE PLACE IN THE AFTERNOON (ABOUT 2100Z).

PARSONS

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TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
FROM THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
SUBJECT: THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
1. THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WISHES TO STATE THAT IT HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT
THE ARAB DELEGATION HAS AGREED TO A COMMON VOTE
ON EACH OF THE PARAGRAPHS EXCEPT OPERATIVE 10
ON WHICH THERE ARE DIVERGENT VIEWS ON WHETHER
WE SHOULD ABSTAIN OR VOTE AGAINST.


2. THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WISHES TO STATE THAT IT HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT
THE ARAB DELEGATION HAS AGREED TO A COMMON VOTE
ON EACH OF THE PARAGRAPHS EXCEPT OPERATIVE 10
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ON WHICH THERE ARE DIVERGENT VIEWS ON WHETHER
WE SHOULD ABSTAIN OR VOTE AGAINST.

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DESKBY 041600Z NEW YORK, BANGKOK.

FM FCO 041500Z FEB 82

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 062 OF 04 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 041600Z BANGKOK (FOR PS/S OF S), DAMASCUS,
AMMAN, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO. 132: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION: GOLAN HEIGHTS

1. WE AGREE THAT YOU SHOULD JOIN THE OTHER EIGHT IN A VOTE AGAINST THE RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE, AND IN VOTING FOR PARAGRAPHS 1, 3, 4, 5 AND 9 IN A SEPARATE PARAGRAPH VOTE. WE ALSO AGREE THAT YOU SHOULD NOT (NOT) SEEK TO NEGOTIATE CHANGES IN THE PRESENT TEXT.

2. THE PROPOSED COMMON EXPLANATION OF VOTE (YOUR TELNO. 134) IS ACCEPTABLE. WE SHOULD PREFER THE SEVENTH PARAGRAPH (LE PARAGRAPHE 11), HOWEVER, TO BE STRENGTHENED WITH A STATEMENT OF OUR FIRM OPPOSITION TO ANY ATTEMPT TO PROMOTE THE EXPULSION OR SUSPENSION OF ISRAEL ON THESE GROUNDS.

3. YOUR EARLIER ACTION (YOUR TELNO. 120) TO BLOCK AN OUTRIGHT ATTEMPT TO SUSPEND ISRAEL'S MEMBERSHIP CLEARLY HAD AN EFFECT AND THE AMERICANS HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR APPRECIATION TO US. THEY HAVE AGAIN LOBBIED US TO VOTE AGAINST. YOU WILL NO DOUBT URGE THEM TO VOTE WITH US IF THERE IS A PARAGRAPH VOTE.

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DESKBY FCO 040900Z

DESKBY BANGKOK (FOR S OF S) 040200Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 040121Z FEB 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 133 DATED 3 FEBRUARY 82

INFO IMMEDIATE BANGKOK (FOR S OF S), DAMASCUS, AMMAN, JEDDA,
TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON

MIPT: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION : GOLAN HEIGHTS

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE LATEST ARAB DRAFT

1. HAVING CONSIDERED THE QUESTION OF "THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES," AT THE NINTH EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 500 OF 28 JANUARY 1982,

2. NOTING WITH REGRET AND CONCERN THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AT ITS 2329TH MEETING ON 20TH JANUARY 1982, FAILED TO TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES AGAINST ISRAEL AS REQUESTED BY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 497 (1981), AS THE RESULT OF THE NEGATIVE VOTE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

3. RECALLING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 497 OF 17 DECEMBER 1981,

4. RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 35/122 E OF 11 DECEMBER 1980,

5. REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTION 36/226 B OF 17 DECEMBER 1981,

6. HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT A/36/846--S/14805 DATED 21 DECEMBER 1981, A/36/846/CORR.1--S/14805/CORR.1 DATED 23 DECEMBER 1981 AND S/14821 DATED 31 DECEMBER 1981,

7. RECALLING GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3314 (XXIX) OF 14 DECEMBER 1974, WHICH DEFINES AN ACT OF AGGRESSION AS INTER ALIA "THE INVASION OR ATTACK BY THE ARMED FORCES OF A STATE OF THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER STATE, OR ANY MILITARY OCCUPATION, HOWEVER TEMPORARY, RESULTING FROM SUCH INVASION OR ATTACK, OR ANY ANNEXATION BY THE USE OF FORCE OF THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER STATE OR PART THEREOF"; AND WHICH PROVIDES THAT "NO CONSIDERATION OF WHATEVER NATURE, WHETHER POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY OR OTHERWISE, MAY SERVE AS A JUSTIFICATION OF AGGRESSION."

8. STRESSING ONCE AGAIN THAT ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE IS INADMISSABLE UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS,

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/ 9. REAFFIRMING

9. REAFFIRMING ONCE MORE THE APPLICABILITY OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR, OF 12 AUGUST 1949, TO THE OCCUPIED SYRIAN TERRITORY,

10. NOTING THAT ISRAEL'S RECORD AND ACTION SEESTABLISH CONCLUSIVELY THAT IT IS NOT A PEACE-LOVING MEMBER AND THAT IT HAS NOT CARRIED OUT ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

11. NOTING FURTHER THAT ISRAEL HAS REFUSED, IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 25 OF THE CHARTER, TO ACCEPT AND CARRY OUT THE NUMEROUS RELEVANT DECISIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE LATEST BEING RESOLUTION 497 (1981),

1. STRONGLY CONDEMS ISRAEL FOR ITS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 497 OF 17 DECEMBER 1981 AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 35/226 B OF 17 DECEMBER 1981:

2. DECLARES THAT ISRAEL'S DECISION OF 14 DECEMBER 1981 TO IMPOSE ITS LAWS, JURISDICTION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE OCCUPIED SYRIAN GOLAN HEIGHTS, CONSTITUTES AN ACT OF AGGRESSION UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 39 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3314 OF 14 DECEMBER 1974:

3. DECLARES ONCE MORE THAT ISRAEL'S DECISION TO IMPOSE ISRAELI LAWS, JURISDICTION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE OCCUPIED SYRIAN GOLAN HEIGHTS IS NULL AND VOID AND HAS NO LEGAL VALIDITY AND/OR EFFECTS WHATSOEVER:

4. DETERMINES THAT ALL ACTIONS TAKEN BY ISRAEL TO GIVE EFFECT TO ITS DECISION RELATING TO THE OCCUPIED SYRIAN GOLAN HEIGHTS ARE ILLEGAL AND INVALID, AND SHALL NOT BE RECOGNIZED:

5. REAFFIRMS ITS DETERMINATION THAT ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THE HAGUE REGULATIONS OF 1907 AND THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF 12 AUGUST 1949 RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIMES OF WAR CONTINUE TO APPLY TO THE SYRIAN TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967, AND CALLS ON ALL PARTIES THERETO TO RESPECT AND ENSURE RESPECT OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THESE INSTRUMENTS IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES:

6. DETERMINES THAT THE CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF THE SYRIAN GOLAN HEIGHTS SINCE 1967 AND ITS EFFECTIVE ANNEXATION BY ISRAEL ON 14 DECEMBER 1981 FOLLOWING THE ISRAELI DECISION TO IMPOSE ITS LAWS, JURISDICTION AND ADMINISTRATION ON THAT TERRITORY CONSTITUTE A CONTINUING THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY:

7. STRONGLY DEPLORES THE ACTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH PREVENTED THE COUNCIL FROM ADOPTING

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AGAINST ISRAEL UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER THE "APPROPRIATE MEASURES" REFERRED TO IN RESOLUTION 497 (1981) UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL:

8. FURTHER DEPLORES THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S CONTINUED AND INCREASED POLITICAL ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL, MILITARY AND TECHNOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO ISRAEL, WHICH ENCOURAGES ISRAEL TO COMMIT ACTS OF AGGRESSION AND TO CONSOLIDATE AND PERPETUATE ITS OCCUPATION AND ANNEXATION OF OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES:

9. FIRMLY EMPHASIZES ITS DEMANDS THAT ISRAEL, THE OCCUPYING POWER, RESCIND FORTHWITH ITS DECISION OF 14 DECEMBER 1981 TO IMPOSE ITS LAWS, JURISDICTION AND ADMINISTRATION ON THE SYRIAN GOLAN HEIGHTS WHICH HAS RESULTED IN THE EFFECTIVE ANNEXATION OF THAT TERRITORY:

10. REAFFIRMS THE OVER-RIDING NECESSITY OF THE TOTAL AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL FROM ALL THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED SINCE 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, WHICH IS A PRIMARY REQUIREMENT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE AND JUST PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST:

11. DECLARES THAT ISRAEL'S RECORD AND ACTIONS CONFIRM THAT IT IS NOT A PEACE-LOVING MEMBER AND THAT IT HAS CARRIED OUT NEITHER ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS NOR ITS COMMITMENT UNDER GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 273 (III):

12. CALLS UPON ALL MEMBER STATES TO APPLY THE FOLLOWING MEASURES:

- A) TO REFRAIN FROM SUPPLYING ISRAEL WITH ANY WEAPONS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT AND TO SUSPEND ANY MILITARY ASSISTANCE WHICH ISRAEL RECEIVES FROM THEM,
- B) TO REFRAIN FROM ACQUIRING ANY WEAPONS OR MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM ISRAEL,
- C) TO SUSPEND ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE TO AND COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL,

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D) TO SEVER DIPLOMATIC, TRADE AND CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL:

13. ALSO CALLS UPON ALL MEMBER STATES TO CEASE FORTHWITH INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY ALL DEALINGS WITH ISRAEL IN ORDER TO TOTALLY ISOLATE IT IN ALL FIELDS:

14. URGES STATES NON-MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS RESOLUTION:

15. CALLS UPON ALL UNITED NATIONS BODIES, SPECIALIZED AGENCIES, AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS TO CONFORM THEIR RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL TO THE TERMS OF THIS RESOLUTION:

16. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO FOLLOW UP THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION AND TO REPORT THEREON AT INTERVALS OF TWO MONTHS TO THE MEMBER STATES AS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND TO SUBMIT A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT TO THE 37TH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 040112Z FEB 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 132 DATED 3 FEBRUARY 82
INFO IMMEDIATE BANGKOK (FOR S OF S), DAMASCUS, AMMAN, JEDDA,
TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON

of GENERAL ASSEMBLY

MY TELNO 120: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION: GOLAN HEIGHTS

1. THE DEBATE CONTINUED TODAY (3 FEBRUARY) WITH OVER TWENTY MORE SPEAKERS. THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MADE OFFENSIVE REFERENCES TO THE STRUGGLE AGAINST BRITISH COLONIALISM IN PALESTINE IN THE 1930S. THE FOLLOWING CALLED FOR SANCTIONS - UAE, ETHIOPIA, MONGOLIA, QATAR, GRENADA, UKRAINE, IRAN, BAHRAIN, IRAQ. QATAR AND BAHRAIN ALSO CALLED FOR THE SUSPENSION OF ISRAELI MEMBERSHIP OF THE UN.
2. THE ARAB DRAFT HAS TAKEN SHAPE. THE LATEST VERSION IS IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. YOU WILL SEE THAT THE ARABS HAVE RESPONDED TO MODERATE NON-ALIGNED WISHES BY REMOVING THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH DECIDING TO REJECT ISRAEL'S CREDENTIALS:

~~OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH DECIDING TO REJECT ISRAEL'S CREDENTIALS;~~
BUT THAT THE DRAFT RETAINS BOTH A PREAMBULAR AND AN OPERATIVE
PARAGRAPH NOTING THAT ISRAEL IS NOT A PEACE-LOVING STATE AND HAS
FAILED TO CARRY OUT ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER (A REFERENCE
TO THE CONDITIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP IN ARTICLE 4 AND THUS A
PRECURSOR OF SOME LATER ATTEMPT TO GET ISRAEL SUSPENDED OR
EXPULSED). THE DRAFT IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM WAS
CIRCULATED TO THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
TODAY WITH A REQUEST FOR CO-SPONSORS. BUT THE ARABS ARE NOT OUT
OF THE WOOD YET. NUSEIBEH (JORDAN) TOLD ME THIS AFTERNOON THAT
THERE COULD STILL BE COSMETIC CHANGES TO OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS
7 AND 8 (DENUNCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES BY NAME) BUT THAT
THE CALL FOR SANCTIONS WAS NOT NEGOTIABLE.

3. THE US MISSION ARE TAKING THE DRAFT VERY SERIOUSLY. THEY
ARE ARGUING THAT THE CALL FOR SANCTIONS IS WHOLLY INAPPROPRIATE
AND UNHELPFUL, AND THAT THE REFERENCES TO THE UNITED STATES ARE
UNACCEPTABLE, AS ARE THE PARAGRAPHS ABOUT ISRAEL NOT BEING A
PEACE-LOVING STATE ETC. THEY ARE MAKING IT BRUTALLY CLEAR,
BOTH HERE AND IN CAPITALS, THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD REGARD
ANYTHING OTHER THAN A NEGATIVE VOTE AS AN UNFRIENDLY ACT.
THEY ARE ADDING THAT, IF THE RESOLUTION WERE ADOPTED, IT WOULD HAVE
A PROFOUND EFFECT UPON THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE
UNITED NATIONS.

4. I HAVE SINCE SPOKEN TO MRS KIRKPATRICK (IN WASHINGTON) AT
HER REQUEST. SHE TOOK BROADLY THE LINE IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE BUT
WAS MUCH LESS APOCALYPTIC. I TOLD HER THAT, IF THE ARABS
WENT AHEAD WITH THE TEXT AS DRAFTED, THEY COULD COUNT ON A POOR
VOTE. NEGATIVE VOTES WOULD NOT BE CONFINED TO THE WEST ONLY,
IN THE LIGHT OF THE OFFENSIVE REFERENCES TO THE UNITED STATES:
THESE WERE UNACCEPTABLE TO MODERATE NON-ALIGNED DELEGATIONS ALSO.
I THEREFORE THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE
TACTICALLY WRONG FOR ANY OF US TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE ARABS IN
THEIR PRESENT MOOD, THE ARABS MIGHT WELL WATER THE TEXT DOWN
(ALTHOUGH NOT ON SANCTIONS) RATHER THAN COME OUT WITH A DISMAL
RESULT.

5. THE TEN AGREED IN CONSULTATIONS THIS AFTERNOON TO RECOMMEND
TO CAPITALS A NEGATIVE VOTE ON THE DRAFT AS IT STANDS: EXCEPT
FOR GREECE WHICH WILL RECOMMEND AN ABSTENTION. IN ORDER TO MODERATE
THE IMPACT OF THIS VOTE ON THE ARABS, THE TEN ARE ALSO
RECOMMENDING THAT THEY SHOULD CALL FOR SEPARATE PARAGRAPH VOTES
ON OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 1, 3, 4, 5 AND 9, ON ALL OF WHICH THE
TEN WOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR. THE TEN WOULD THUS PRESS FIVE
GREEN BUTTONS BEFORE PRESSING A RED ONE.

6. MY SECOND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM (NOT TO ALL) CONTAINS

6. MY SECOND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM (NOT TO ALL) CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A PROPOSED COMMON EXPLANATION OF VOTE WHICH IT WAS AGREED THE TEN WOULD RECOMMEND TO CAPITALS AND SEEK COMMENTS ON BY 1700Z TOMORROW (4 FEBRUARY). GRATEFUL FOR COMMENTS ON THIS AND THE PROPOSED VOTING PATTERN BY THEN.

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FROM U K MISSION NEW YORK 030033Z FEB 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 120 OF 2 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE MANILA (FOR S OF S), DAMASCUS, AMMAN, JEDDA,
TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON.

MY TELNO 117: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION; GOLAN HEIGHTS.

1. THE DEBATE CONTINUED TODAY (2 FEBRUARY) WITH A FURTHER
19 SPEAKERS. BELGIUM DELIVERED THE TEN'S SPEECH (TEXT IN MIFT).

2. LIBYA CALLED FOR A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD SUSPEND ISRAEL'S
MEMBERSHIP OF THE UN AND ALSO FOR ALL STATES TO BREAK OFF
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND IMPOSE SANCTIONS. THE
MAJORITY OF THE OTHER SPEAKERS ALSO CALLED EXPLICITLY FOR A
RESOLUTION CONTAINING SANCTIONS. THESE SPEAKERS INCLUDED CHINA,
ZAMBIA, BANGLADESH, VIETNAM, MEXICO, PAKISTAN, SUDAN, TANZANIA,
MAURITANIA, MALAYSIA. THE REMAINDER - MALTA, SRI LANKA,
PHILIPPINES, NIGERIA, ROMANIA AND TOGO - CONTENTED THEMSELVES
WITH A GENERAL DENUNCIATION OF THE ISRAELI ACTION. ALI BABA
(MINISTER OF STATE, NIGERIA) CRITICISED THE US BUT SPOKE
POSITIVELY OF THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

POSITIVELY OF THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE ON THE MIDDLE EAST (WHICH HE MISTAKENLY DESCRIBED AS CALLING FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE).

3. THE ARABS ARE STILL DISCUSSING A DRAFT RESOLUTION WITH THE NON-ALIGNED. THIS NOW INCLUDES AN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH WHICH READS QUOTE DECIDES TO REJECT THE CREDENTIALS OF THE DELEGATION OF ISRAEL TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ISRAEL ACCEPTS AND CARRIES OUT THE DECISION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNQUOTE. THE AMERICANS ARE GREATLY CONCERNED BY THIS CLEARLY UNLAWFUL PROPOSITION AND HAVE INSTRUCTED POSTS IN SELECTED NON-ALIGNED CAPITALS TO MAKE CLEAR THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE US POSITION AT THE UN IF SUCH A RESOLUTION WERE ADOPTED.

4. AT THE END OF TODAY'S PROCEEDINGS, I MET THE SAUDI DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, ABDULAZIZ AL-THUNAYAN, AT HIS REQUEST, I TOLD HIM POINT BLANK THAT THE ARABS SHOULD THINK VERY CAREFULLY BEFORE INCLUDING A PARAGRAPH ON THE ABOVE LINES IN THEIR RESOLUTION. IN RESPONSE TO HIS REMARKS, I SAID THAT I WELL UNDERSTOOD ARAB FRUSTRATION AT THE ENDLESS PASSAGE OF UN RESOLUTIONS WHICH WERE NEVER IMPLEMENTED. BUT HE HAD TO AGREE WITH ME WHEN I SAID THAT, PARTICULARLY DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, THE UN, FOR ALL ITS FAILINGS, HAD BEEN DIPLOMATICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE ARABS. THEY SHOULD NOT THROW THIS AWAY LIGHTLY. I WAS CONVINCED THAT, IF THE ISRAELIS WERE UNSEATED THROUGH A CREDENTIALS DEVICE, THE UNITED STATES WOULD WALK OUT AND WOULD NOT RETURN UNTIL THE SITUATION HAD BEEN REVERSED. THE SAUDI CHARGE, WHO WAS PRESENT, CONFIRMED MY VIEW, ADDING THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD ALSO WITHOLD THEIR 25 PER CENT CONTRIBUTION TO THE REGULAR BUDGET. THE MINISTER WAS VISIBLY SHAKEN AND HAD OBVIOUSLY NOT THOUGHT OF THESE CONSEQUENCES. HE ASKED ME WHAT THE EUROPEANS WOULD DO. I SAID THAT I COULD TELL HIM WITHOUT HESITATION THAT VIRTUALLY THE WHOLE WESTERN EUROPEAN GROUP WOULD VOTE AGAINST A RESOLUTION CONTAINING SUCH A PARAGRAPH. I EMPHASISED THAT I WAS NOT SIMPLY TALKING ABOUT THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE REST OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. I ADDED THAT THERE WOULD BE FURTHER CONSEQUENCES ALTHOUGH I COULD NOT SAY WHAT THEY WOULD BE. HE WOULD KNOW (HE OBVIOUSLY DID NOT) THAT WE HAD OPPOSED AN ANALOGOUS MOVE ON SOUTH AFRICA AND CONTINUED TO DO SO AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE WHENEVER THE ISSUE CAME TO A VOTE. WE WOULD REGARD THE PRESENT CASE AS EVEN MORE SERIOUS. THE MINISTER'S COMPOSURE DISINTEGRATED FURTHER, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE SAUDI CHARGE ENDORSED EVERY WORD I SAID.

5. MY KUWAITI COLLEAGUE ~~THINKS THAT~~, WHEN THE FULL IMPLICATIONS SINK IN, THE SYRIANS WILL COME OFF IT. HE HAS ALREADY TALKED TO KHADDAM WHOM HE FOUND LESS INFLEXIBLE THAN FATTAL.

6. THE KUWAITI ALSO TOLD ME THAT DISCUSSIONS IN THE NON-ALIGNED/

6. THE KUWAITI ALSO TOLD ME THAT DISCUSSIONS IN THE NON-ALIGNED/
ARAB DRAFTING GROUP WOULD CONTINUE TONIGHT AND TOMORROW MORNING;
THEIR PRESENT INTENTION WAS TO CIRCULATE THE FINAL DRAFT TOMORROW
AFTERNOON.

7. FOR THE MOMENT, I NEED NO INSTRUCTIONS - MODERATION MAY PREVAIL.

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Middle East.

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TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 60 OF 1 FEBRUARY
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
INFO ROUTINE TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM
SAVING AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK

US SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISITS TO EGYPT

1. DURING HIS VISIT OF 28/29 JANUARY, HAIG CALLED ON MUBARAK AND HAD TWO ROUNDS OF TALKS WITH KEMAL HASSAN ALI. THE MEETING WITH MUBARAK COVERED HAIG'S GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, GLOBAL MATTERS, POLAND AND GENERAL MIDDLE EAST ISSUES AS WELL AS THE AUTONOMY TALKS. THE TALKS WITH KEMAL HASSAN ALI FOCUSSED ON THE LATER.

2. BADAWI (HEAD OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS DEPARTMENT IN THE MFA), WHO WAS PRESENT, SAID THAT, ON HIS FIRST VISIT, HAIG HAD DESCRIBED HIS PURPOSE AS TWO-FOLD: TO INDICATE TO ALL CONCERNED THAT HE HAD ASSUMED PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS AND TO ESTABLISH THE "BOTTOM LINE" OF THE ISRAELIS AND EGYPTIANS.

3. THE EGYPTIANS HAD AT THE OUTSET EXPLAINED THAT THEY WERE UNWILLING TO ATTEMPT TO REACH ANY AGREEMENT BEFORE 25 APRIL SINCE, LEAVING ASIDE THE CONTENT OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT, IT WOULD INEVITABLY BE SEEN AS A QUID PRO QUO FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. AFTER APRIL THEIR POSITION WOULD BE SOMEWHAT MORE FLEXIBLE, BUT NOT OVER THEIR STICKING POINTS, WHICH THEY HAD LISTED AS:
(A) EAST JERUSALEM, WHICH HAD BECME A PAN-ARAB ISSUE. THE ARAB INHABITANTS MUST HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED ON THE SELF GOVERNING AUTHORITY (SGA).
(B) THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC LAND IE THAT THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS COULD NOT BE EXCLUDED FROM THE TERRITORY TO BE COVERED BY THE AUTONOMY AGREEMENT.
(C) THE RIGHT OF THE SGA TO LEGISLATE.
(D) THAT THOSE FUNCTIONS EXCLUDED FROM THE SGA'S POWERS (EG FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE), SHOULD NOT BE ALLOCATED TO THE ISRAELIS.

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4. ON HIS SECOND VISIT (WHICH HAIG EXPLAINED ON THE BASIS THAT HE FELT OBLIGED TO RETURN TO ISRAEL AND THEREFORE TO CAIRO ALSO) HAGI HAD MENTIONED VAGUE US FORMULATIONS ON SOME OF THE CRUCIAL ISSUES, THOUGH ACCORDING TO BADAWI, THESE WERE NOT PRECISE ENOUGH TO SET DOWN ON PAPER. HE HAD EXPLAINED HIS INTENTION TO APPOINT FAIRBANKS AS HIS SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR. THE LATTER WOULD SHORTLY BEGIN A SHUTTLING PROCESS WITH THE AIM OF NARROWING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

5. BADAWI'S PERSONAL THEORY IS THAT HAIG'S PERSONAL INTEREST INDICATES HIS INTENTION TO BROADEN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AFTER APRIL EG BY ATTEMPTING TO BRING IN THE JORDANIANS. THE EGYPTIANS HAD URGED HAIG TO ESTABLISH BETTER CONTACT WITH THE PALESTINIANS ON THE WEST BANK WITH WHOM THEY THEMSELVES WERE IN CONSTANT TOUCH. THEY HAD ALSO PRESSED HIM TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS TO IMPLEMENT CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES BUT HE HAD TOLD THEM ON HIS SECOND VISIT THAT HE HAD DRAWN A BLANK WITH BEGIN ON THIS.

FCO PSE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 291 OF 29 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, PRIORITY JAKARTA (FOR PS/SECRETARY OF STATE),
BAGHDAD, ROUTINE MODUK, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, GULF POSTS,
TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 151: JORDAN/IRAQ

1. WE SPOKE TO DRAPER (STATE DEPARTMENT). HE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD SEEN THIS MOVE COMING AND HAD DONE THEIR BEST, TO DISSUADE KING HUSSEIN. THE KING'S STATEMENT HAD CREATED A VERY DIFFICULT SITUATION. DRAPER IDENTIFIED THREE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS - THE FACT THAT U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED TO JORDAN COULD NOT BE USED ELSEWHERE WITHOUT U.S. PERMISSION; FUTURE U.S. ARMS SUPPLIES TO JORDAN IF THE LATTER WERE TO BE REGARDED AS A BELLIGERENT IN THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR; AND OPPOSITION WITHIN JORDAN TO SADDAM'S EMBRACE WHICH COULD CREATE MORE TROUBLE FOR KING HUSSEIN.
2. DRAPER SAID THAT THE AMERICANS NEEDED TO KNOW MORE ABOUT KING HUSSEIN'S MOTIVES, AND IN PARTICULAR HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF HIS ACTION FOR MEMBERS OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL. AMBASSADOR VIETS WAS BEING INSTRUCTED TO SPEAK TO THE KING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO STRESS THAT THE JORDANIAN VOLUNTEERS COULD NOT USE U.S. SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT IN IRAQ WITHOUT U.S. AGREEMENT (THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN MADE THIS POINT AT TODAY'S PRESS BRIEFING BUT WITHOUT IMPLYING ANY CRITICISM OF KING HUSSEIN'S ANNOUNCEMENT).
3. DRAPER TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE THAT A VERY GOOD AMERICAN FRIEND AND ASSOCIATE OF KING HUSSEIN'S HAD REPORTED TODAY THAT THE KING WAS EXTREMELY DEPRESSED, MORE SO THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE THE DEATH OF QUEEN ALIA. DRAPER SPECULATED THAT THIS MIGHT BE RELATED TO UNFAVOURABLE JORDANIAN REACTION TO HIS ANNOUNCEMENT.
4. DRAPER SAID THAT HE WOULD BE REVIEWING THE WHOLE SITUATION WITH HAIG AND VELIOTES ON THEIR RETURN TOMORROW MORNING. HE THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL THAT VIETS SHOULD HAVE A THOROUGH EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH KING HUSSEIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A FACE-SAVING FORMULA WHICH WOULD GET THE KING OFF THIS HOOK. DRAPER'S OWN IDEA IS THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT BE PERSUADED TO THANK HUSSEIN FOR HIS OFFER AND SAY THAT JORDANIAN VOLUNTEERS WILL NOT BE REQUIRED. HE BELIEVES THAT THE ARRIVAL OF SUCH VOLUNTEERS IN IRAQ WOULD BE DAMAGING TO SADDAM'S STANDING AND THAT THE IRAQIS MAY IN ANY CASE BE CONTEMPLATING AN EARLY WITHDRAWAL OF ALL THEIR FORCES FROM IRANIAN TERRITORY. DRAPER WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ANY IDEAS WE MAY HAVE; HE COMMENTED THAT THE JORDANIANS COULD OF COURSE SIMPLY GO SLOW IN RECRUITING THE VOLUNTEERS.

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5. DRAPER IS ATTRACTED BY THE SUGGESTION THAT WE MIGHT HAVE PARALLEL DISCUSSIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN THOUGH HE WOULD PREFER THESE TO BE BILATERAL. HE EXPLAINED THAT IT WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, BE EASIER FOR VIETS TO MAKE THE POINT TO THE KING ABOUT USE OF U.S.-SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT IF MR URWICK WERE NOT PRESENT AND THAT NO DOUBT SIMILAR CONSIDERATIONS APPLIED TO US.

HENDERSON

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FM FCO 29 1800Z JAN 82
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 151 OF 29 JANUARY 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN DESKBY 300800Z
INFO PRIORITY MODUK (D14B), JAKARTA (FOR PS/SEC. OF STATE),
INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEHRAN,
TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI,
MUSCAT.

AMMAN TELNO. 48 (COPIED BY BOX TO JAKARTA): JORDAN/IRAQ

1. KING HUSSEIN'S DECISION TO RAISE A FORCE OF VOLUNTEERS IS UNWELCOME NEWS. HOWEVER INSIGNIFICANT ITS AFFECT MAY BE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR, JORDAN'S PARTICIPATION IS THE FIRST OUTSIDE IRAN AND IRAQ THEMSELVES AND COULD CONCEIVABLY SET A PRECEDENT FOR OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES. IT ALSO RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT JORDAN'S POSSIBLE STATUS AS A BELLIGERENT. WE HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED A REQUEST FROM THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM AMMAN, TO STRENGTHEN PROTECTION FOR THE EMBASSY AND OTHER JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICES HERE. IN SPITE OF THE KING'S IMPRESSION (PARA. 3 OF TUR) THAT THE STEP DID NOT AMOUNT TO A DECLARATION OF WAR, THERE COULD BEN AN EFFECT ON OUR DEFENCE AND DEFENCE SALES RELATIONSHIP. THOUGH IT IS A LITTLE EARLY TO BE CERTAIN ABOUT THE EXTENT OF THIS.

2. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WOULD NOT BE EASY TO TRY TO RESTRAIN THE KING. WE DO NOT HAVE A CLEAR LOCUS STANDI AND WOULD NOT WISH TO SOUND THREATENING ABOUT THE POSSIBLE EFFECT ON OUR DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP. HIS HEART IS CLEARLY SET ON MAKING A POSITIVE GESTURE, HIS MOTIVE BEING AS MUCH APPREHENSION ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES FOR JORDAN AND THE GULF OF AN IRANIAN VICTORY AS JORDANIAN-IRAQI FRIENDSHIP. BUT HIS ACTION COULD HAVE AN UN-

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SETTLING EFFECT ON THE POSITION OF THE GULF STATES, WHOSE PERCEPTIONS OF THE NEED FOR BALANCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH IRAQ AND IRAN ARE DIFFERENT FROM JORDAN'S. (CF MUSCAT TELNOS 23 AND 24.)

3. IT WOULD BE SENSIBLE FIRST TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH THE AMERICANS AND SEE WHAT ACTION THEY ARE PREPARING TO TAKE. WE MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN ASSOCIATING OURSELVES WITH FURTHER US-JORDANIAN EXCHANGES ON THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE KING'S DECISION. THE SUBJECT CAME UP BRIEFLY IN TALKS WITH VELIOTES TODAY, WHO SAID HE WAS PUZZLED BY THE KING'S DECISION AND DOUBTFUL OF ITS WISDOM: HE THOUGHT HOSTILITY TO SYRIA WAS AT THE HEART OF THE MATTER. IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO KNOW WHAT FOLLOW-UP ACTION THE AMERICANS ARE CONTEMPLATING.

CARRINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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TELNO 30 OF 29 JANUARY 1982

INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, WASHINGTON, ROUTINE AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS,
JEDDA, CG JERUSALEM, AND UKMIS NEW YORK.US SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO ISRAEL

1. AT YESTERDAY'S AIRPORT PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE END OF HAIG'S VISIT, BOTH HE AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR STATED THAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON THE AUTONOMY ISSUE. THE IMPRESSION GIVEN PRIVATELY HOWEVER IS THAT ISRAEL AND EGYPT ARE STILL FAR APART.

2. ACCORDING TO THIS MORNING'S PRESS THE FOLLOWING POINTS ON AUTONOMY WERE DISCUSSED DURING THE VISIT:-

I HAIG IS REPORTED TO HAVE RAISED THE ISSUE OF SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND TO HAVE SAID THAT CONTINUED SETTLEMENT CONSTITUTES A MAJOR PROBLEM. PREDICTABLY, THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT BE MOVED.

II HAIG SUGGESTED A FIGURE OF BETWEEN 32 AND 45 FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY, IN CONTRAST TO THE ISRAELI FIGURE OF 20 OR LESS AND THE EGYPTIAN ONE OF 80 OR MORE. HAIG IS SAID ALSO TO HAVE SUGGESTED THE AUTHORITY HAVING POWERS TO ISSUE BYE-LAWS ALTHOUGH NOT TO ACT AS A FULL LEGISLATURE.

III HAIG FLOATED THE IDEA WITH BEGIN OF ALLOWING EAST JERUSALEM ARABS TO VOTE FOR THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY, BUT THE IDEA WAS TURNED DOWN.

IV BEGIN ALSO TURNED DOWN A SUGGESTION BY HAIG THAT ISRAEL AND EGYPT SHOULD PUBLISH A LIST OF POINTS ON WHICH AGREEMENT HAS ALREADY BEEN REACHED..

3. IT DOES NOT LOOK AS IF HAIG'S SECOND EXPLORATORY VISIT TO ISRAEL HAS ELICITED ANY SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF THE ISRAELIS. THIS MAY BE PARTLY A REACTION TO THE SUPPOSED HARDENING OF THE EGYPTIAN LINE (PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TELNO 15) WHICH WAS AGAIN RAISED BY SHAMIR DURING TALKS ON 27 JANUARY. SHAMIR IS SAID TO HAVE PRODUCED A LIST OF EGYPTIAN STATEMENTS WHICH HAD CAUSED CONCERN IN JERUSALEM; THAT AUTONOMY IS THE FIRST STEP ON THE ROAD TO SELF-DETERMINATION (SHAMIR HIMSELF STATED IN A LECTURE IN JERUSALEM ON 26 JANUARY THAT ISRAEL HAD PUT FORWARD THE IDEA OF AUTONOMY AS PART OF CAMP DAVID IN ORDER TO REMAIN IN JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA) SEMI COLON THAT ANY AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PLO SEMICOLON THAT THE PALESTINIAN ARABS AND THE PLO MUST HAVE A PART IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SEMICOLON AND THAT EAST JERUSALEM MUST BE INCLUDED IN THE AUTONOMY DISCUSSIONS.

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4. US EMBASSY HAVE CONFIRMED TO US PRESS REPORTS THAT HAIG IS TO APPOINT RICHARD FAIRBANKS AS HIS FULL-TIME SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AUTONOMY TALKS. FAIRBANKS ACCOMPANIED HAIG DURING THE VISIT AND ATTENDED ALL SESSIONS OTHER THAN THE TETE-A-TETE WITH BEGIN.

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~~MR BRATTMANN~~ Mr Adams
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~~Sr. A. Adams~~

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FM AMMAN 281525Z JAN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 48 OF 28 JAN

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DI4B), ROUTINE BAGHDAD BEIRUT CAIRO
DAMASCUS JEDDA TEHRAN TEL AVIV UKMIS NEWYORK AND WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 34: JORDAN/IRAQ

1. KING HUSSEIN SUMMONED THE US AMBASSADOR AND MYSELF AT THE END OF THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT HE HAD DECIDED TO APPEAL FOR JORDANIAN VOLUNTEERS TO ASSIST IRAQ IN HER WAR WITH IRAN; HE THOUGHT HE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY MAKE THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN A TELEVISED SPEECH THIS EVENING AND WISHED OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS TO BE INFORMED IN ADVANCE. HE SAW THIS AS PRIMARILY A PSYCHOLOGICAL GESTURE AND AN EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR IRAQ, IN A WAR WHICH WAS OF DIRECT CONCERN TO ALL THE ARABS BUT IN WHICH REGRETTABLY SOME ARAB STATES WERE SUPPORTING IRAN.
2. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FROM VIETS AND MYSELF, THE KING SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD TAKE SOME TIME TO RAISE A FORCE OF VOLUNTEERS, WHICH HE ENVISAGED MIGHT IN THE END PERHAPS TOTAL ONE BRIGADE. THEY WOULD BE LIGHTLY ARMED AND WOULD BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF JORDANIAN OFFICERS, IT WOULD BE FOR THE IRAQIS TO DECIDE WHETHER THEY TOOK PART IN THE FIGHTING OR WERE USED FOR SUPPORT DUTIES.

JORDANIAN OFFICERS. IT WOULD BE FOR THE IRAQIS TO DECIDE WHETHER THEY TOOK PART IN THE FIGHTING OR WERE USED FOR SUPPORT DUTIES.

3. THE KING EMPHASISED THAT THIS WAS A SPONTANEOUS GESTURE ON THE PART OF JORDAN, RATHER THAN A RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FROM PRESIDENT SADDAM DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO IRAQ. HE SPOKE OF "SPRINGING IT ON PRESIDENT SADDAM" IN HIS BROADCAST THIS EVENING. VIETS REFERRED TO THE NEW UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS TO BRING THE WAR TO AN END, BUT SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SURE WHETHER PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S EFFORTS HAD YET RESULTED IN THE SORT OF PROPOSALS IRAQ COULD ACCEPT. I SAID I KNEW THAT YOUR OVERRIDING WISH WAS TO SEE THE WAR ENDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BEFORE FURTHER DAMAGE WAS DONE TO THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED (IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY COMMENT ON MY TUR I DID NOT FEEL I COULD GO FURTHER THAN THIS IN IMPLICITLY QUESTIONING THE KING'S ACTION). I ASKED THE KING IF HE THOUGHT THIS STEP WOULD INVOLVE A FORMAL JORDANIAN DECLARATION OF WAR ON IRAN. HE SAID HE DID NOT THINK SO, AS THE IRANIANS WERE STILL MAINTAINING THEIR EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD. HOWEVER, JORDANIAN PARTICIPATION WOULD BE DIFFERENT IN NATURE FROM THAT OF THE EGYPTIANS SEMICLN EGYPTIANS SERVING WITH THE IRAQI FORCES HAD BEEN RECRUITED FROM THE EGYPTIAN WORKFORCE ALREADY IN IRAQ.

4. MY DEFENCE ATTACH SAW THE JORDANIAN CHIEF OF STAFF EARLIER THIS MORNING. GENERAL ABU TALEB (PLEASE PROTECT) CLAIMED THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD ORIGINALLY INTENDED TO SEND ENTIRE UNITS OF THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES TO IRAQ BUT THAT HE HAD BEEN TALKED OUT OF IT BY THE JORDANIAN COMMANDER IN CHIEF. THE CHIEF OF STAFF MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE HAD BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION IN THE HEADQUARTERS OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS SEMICLN HE SAID THE PRESENT PLAN WAS TO CALL FOR INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTEERS (HE THOUGHT FROM WITHIN THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES, BUT THE KING SPECIFICALLY SPOKE TO ME OF APPEALING FOR VOLUNTEERS FROM RESERVISTS AND OTHER FORMER JAF PERSONNEL). THE CHIEF OF STAFF SAID THERE WAS DISAGREEMENT OVER WHAT INDUCEMENTS SHOULD BE OFFERED TO SUCH VOLUNTEERS SEMICLN THE IRAQIS WERE FEELING THE PINCH FINANCIALLY AND WERE NO LONGER ABLE TO BE SO OPEN-HANDED AS THEY HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY.

5. IN MY TELELETTER TO MILES OF 21 JANUARY (NOT TO ALL) I REPORTED ON THE HURRIED PURCHASE OF EMERGENCY MEDICAL AND OTHER SUPPLIES BY JORDAN. I HAVE SINCE BEEN TOLD THAT THE MEDICAL SUPPLIES REFERRED TO IN PARA 1.B. OF MY TELELETTER ARE DEFINITELY FOR IRAQ AND IT WOULD NOT BE SURPRISING IF THESE WERE BEING BOUGHT IN CONNECTION WITH THE DESPATCH OF VOLUNTEERS THERE SEMICLN THE SAME MAY ALSO BE TRUE OF THE EMERGENCY RATIONS.

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FROM FCO 271630 JANUARY 82

TO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM NUMBER 15 OF 27 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON,

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, CAIRO, PARIS, ROME, THE HAGUE,

SINAI MFO

1. AS FORESHADOWED IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF MY MESSAGE TO HAIG (OUR TELNO 98 TO WASHINGTON), MR HURD SUMMONED THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR ON 27 JANUARY. MR HURD SAID THAT, IN MY ABSENCE HE WANTED TO CONVEY TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT OUR DESIRE TO SETTLE THE PROBLEM OF OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. AS WE HAD EXPLAINED TO THE ISRAELIS PREVIOUSLY, WE WERE READY AND WILLING TO JOIN THE MFO WITHOUT ANY PRECONDITIONS AND IN FULL ACCORDANCE WITH THE VARIOUS DOCUMENTS RELEVANT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FORCE. WE HAD NO INTENTION OF USING OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO TO BRING ABOUT CHANGES IN ISRAELI OR EGYPTIAN POLICY IN AN UNACCEPTABLE WAY. ALTHOUGH OUR DECISION TO PARTICIPATE HAD CAUSED US, AND WAS STILL CAUSING US, DIFFICULTIES WITH THE ARABS, WE CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT IT WAS RIGHT FOR US TO PARTICIPATE AND TO HELP TO ENSURE PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE AREA. WE HOPED THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WOULD ACCEPT THAT WE WERE ACTING IN GOOD FAITH IN OFFERING TO JOIN THE MFO. OUR PARTICIPATION WOULD NOT OF COURSE REMOVE THE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION BETWEEN US ON SOME OF THE WIDER ISSUES BUT THIS WAS NOT THE POINT OF OUR PARTICIPATION. THOSE DIFFERENCES WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED AND IF POSSIBLE RESOLVED OVER TIME BUT IT WAS NOW URGENT TO FINALISE THE PRINCIPLE OF OUR PARTICIPATION IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE NECESSARY PRACTICAL DETAILS TO BE RESOLVED. ALTHOUGH COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN US AND THE ISRAELIS HAD HITHERTO LARGELY BEEN THROUGH THE AMERICANS, FOR REASONS CONNECTED WITH THE ORIGINS OF THE FORCE, WE HAD THOUGHT IT RIGHT TO SPEAK DIRECTLY ON THIS

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OCCASION TO REINFORCE OUR MESSAGE.

2. MR ARGOV SAID THAT HE WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO PASS ON THIS MESSAGE TO HIS GOVERNMENT AND HOPED THAT THIS PROBLEM WOULD SOON BE PUT BEHIND US. HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO SAY MORE THAN THAT BUT HOPED THAT THE POSITION WOULD BE CLEARER AFTER HAIG'S CURRENT VISIT TO ISRAEL.

3. IN DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBLE NEW DATES FOR MY VISIT, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE HOPED TO HAVE AN ANSWER SOON. HIS DAUGHTER WAS GETTING MARRIED IN JERUSALEM ON THE DAY THAT I PROPOSED TO ARRIVE, BUT HE NEVERTHELESS HOPED THAT THE DATES WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. HE COULD ASSURE US THAT I WOULD BE VERY WELCOME INDEED IN ISRAEL.

4. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION, ARGOV REFERRED TO THE SENSITIVITY OF THE FINAL WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI IN ISRAELI DOMESTIC POLITICS BUT ASSURED US THAT ISRAEL WOULD LEAVE SINAI ON TIME. THE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS WITH EGYPT HAD BEEN RESOLVED, ALTHOUGH ISRAEL HAD SOME CONCERN OVER THE HARDER EGYPTIAN POSITION ON AUTONOMY. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM MR HURD, ARGOV CONFIRMED THAT ISRAEL HAD NO INTEREST IN EGYPT REMAINING A PARIAH IN THE ARAB WORLD AND WOULD NOT COMPLICATE HER EFFORTS TO RESTORE RELATIONS AFTER APRIL. MR HURD ALSO MENTIONED TO ARGOV OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE INSTABILITY OF SUDAN, WHICH WAS ALSO OF COURSE A MATTER OF CONCERN TO EGYPT. ARGOV COMMENTED THAT ONE EFFECT OF PEACE AND STABILITY ON HER ISRAELI FRONT FOR EGYPT WAS THAT SHE WAS FREER TO TURN HER ATTENTION TO AFRICAN PROBLEMS INCLUDING SUDAN.

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Prime Minister

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A.F.C. 29/11.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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27 January 1982

Jean Michael

request if required

Thank you for your letter of 20 January following your recent visit to Israel. It was kind of you to send me your considered views.

I certainly intend to visit Israel. I am very anxious to dispel some of the misunderstandings which have arisen between us and to improve relations. I have no doubt that a constructive and useful dialogue is possible. We have put a set of dates to the government of Israel which it now transpires are not convenient to them; we are looking for alternatives.

In this context I am glad that you were able to defend this government against the wholly unjustified charge of being anti-Israeli. I am sorry that this impression seems to persist in Israel and hope that we shall soon be able to lay it to rest for once and for all. The Israeli impression that we have in mind imposing a settlement on Israel is of course quite false, as we have made clear many times. A freely negotiated and accepted settlement is fundamental to our policy and that of our European partners.

You say that the only way Israel is prepared to make progress is on the basis of Camp David and/or peace treaties with sovereign states. Of course Camp David may yet prove able to produce further progress towards the necessary settlement and any settlement must involve peace treaties between Israel and her Arab neighbours. But the fact is that there will not be lasting peace in the area unless the

/future

Michael Latham Esq MP



future of the Palestinians is also adequately provided for. Permanent Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank is not compatible with this. Moreover, pace your paragraph 5, the West Bank cannot simply be handed back to an existing sovereign state: there is no Arab state prepared to have it on those terms, whatever Jordan's interest in the future of the area. Israel may have her minimum requirements for a settlement, but the Arabs have theirs too. Neither can be regarded as the last word if progress towards a negotiated settlement is to be possible.

I am afraid I do not find very convincing the reasoning you give for the Israeli law on Golan. Internal problems in Israel cannot serve as a defence for such an illegal act. There is no doubt that it does constitute an obstacle to peace and that it has made the prospect of Syrian-Israeli negotiations more remote. Only a negotiated peace can make Israel's long-term future secure.

I was interested in your view of the potential usefulness of Soviet involvement. It has always been noticeable that the Russians have stuck firmly to their support for Israel's right to live in peace and have urged the Arabs to follow suit. However, an international conference looks a very long way off (not least because of Israel's attitude) and I am not confident of US readiness to tackle the problem in this way.

If you wish to discuss your ideas further, I am of course always ready to discuss them with you, as I am sure are Humphrey Atkins or Douglas Hurd, our programmes allowing. I am sending copies of my letter to them and to the Prime Minister. Perhaps we could have a talk after I get back from Israel.

J. a
P. Carrington

(CARRINGTON)



21 JAN 1962

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FROM TEL AVIV 261315Z JAN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 25 OF 26 JANUARY 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO, WASHINGTON, PRIORITY AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS,
JEDDA AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

ISRAEL INTERNAL: NO CONFIDENCE MOTION

1. THE OPPOSITION ALIGNMENT YESTERDAY TABLED A NO-CONFIDENCE MOTION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT COALITION. THE DEBATE IS SCHEDULED TO START AT 1400Z TODAY. THE KNESSET HOUSE COMMITTEE IS EXPECTED TO RULE THIS AFTERNOON THAT THE VGTE BE HELD TONIGHT.
2. THE MOTION FOLLOWS THE GOVERNMENT DEFEAT YESTERDAY IN A KNESSET VOTE ON THE YAMIT SETTLERS' COMPENSATION AGREEMENT. AN ALIGNMENT RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A LAW TO REPLACE THE AGREEMENT APPROVED BY THE CABINET (OUR TELNO 004), AND CONDEMNING THE GOVERNMENT'S

RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A LAW TO REPLACE THE AGREEMENT APPROVED BY THE CABINET (OUR TELNO 004), AND CONDEMNING THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF THE EVACUATION ISSUE, WAS ADOPTED BY 45 VOTES TO 40. IT WAS SUPPORTED BY THE ALIGNMENT, SHINUI, TELEM AND THE DEMOCRATIC FRONT. A COALITION DRAFT RESOLUTION, SUPPORTING THE GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO ADVANCE THE PEACE WITH EGYPT AND TO REACH AGREEMENT ON COMPENSATION WITH THE YAMIT SETTLERS, WAS DEFEATED BY 46 VOTES TO 42, WITH THE TEHIYA FACTION VOTING AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. SEVERAL COALITION MEMBERS, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT MINISTERS PATT AND LEVY, DID NOT TAKE PART IN THE VOTE.

3. TODAY'S HEBREW PRESS SUGGESTS THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE NO-CONFIDENCE VOTE IS IN THE BALANCE. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT 13 KNESSET MEMBERS ARE OVERSEAS AND CANNOT RETURN IN TIME. ALL NON-COALITION FACTIONS HAVE STATED THEIR INTENTION TO VOTE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, ALTHOUGH ACCORDING TO ISRAEL RADIO (1100Z) TEHIYA MAY RECONSIDER IF THEY FIND THEY HOLD THE BALANCE. THE ALIGNMENT IS CLAIMING THAT TAMI WILL VOTE WITH THE OPPOSITION. ISRAEL RADIO PREDICTS THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD SURVIVE BY 54 VOTES TO 53.

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TO PRIORITY FCO
TEL NO 36 OF 24 JAN 82.

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M I P T : PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRINCE FAHD.

1. TEXT OF REPLY IS AS FOLLOWS:

MT

"HER EXCELLENCY

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MRS MARGARET THATCHER
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND.

GREETINGS, I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR EXCELLENCY'S LETTER
IN WHICH YOU EXPRESSED YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT THE SITUATION
PREVAILING AT PRESENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, PARTICULARLY
AFTER THE ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE WHICH WAS HELD IN FEZ IN
THE KINGDOM OF MOROCCO.

I THANK YOUR EXCELLENCY FOR THE GOOD SENTIMENTS YOU
EXPRESSED IN YOUR LETTER. I THEY ARE GOOD, NOBLE SENTIMENTS
AND I APPRECIATE THE PERCEPTION YOU HAVE SHOWN IN YOUR
FEELINGS FOR THE PROBLEMS WHICH WE ARE ALL TRYING TO SOLVE
TOGETHER.

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT AWARENESS OF THE DEPTH AND
EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM MAKES EVERYONE WHO IS CONSCIOUS
OF IT, REALISE JUST HOW DIFFICULT IT IS, AND STRIVE TO
COMPREHEND HOW PAINFUL IT IS. BUT DIFFERENCES IN
POINTS OF VIEW HAVE SOMETIMES COMPELLED US TO START TO
RECONCILE WIDELY SEPARATE POINTS OF VIEW IN ORDER TO
ARRIVE AT A MEETING POINT FROM WHICH WE CAN START TO
SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS AIMED AT FIRST REDUCING DIFFICULTIES
AND THEN AT TRYING TO OVERCOME THEM.

I AM SURE THAT YOU, LIKE ME, ARE AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTY
OF ARRIVING AT THIS MEETING POINT. IF WE ALL WORK CLOSELY
AND SINCERELY TOGETHER WE WILL SURELY GET THERE.

I HAVE SENSED YOUR EXCELLENCY'S FRIENDLY WISH TO EXCHANGE
VIEWS IN ORDER TO OVERCOME THOSE PROBLEMS AND HELP TO
SOLVE THEM. I WAS PLEASED BY THE POSITION OF THE TEN,
WHICH NO DOUBT RESULTED FROM YOUR EFFORTS. PERHAPS YOU
YOURSELF WILL HAVE NOTED HOW ARROGANT AND OBSTINATE ISRAEL
HAS BEEN IN EMBARKING ON THE ANNEXATION OF THE GOLAN
WITHOUT ANY REGARD OR RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL RESOLUTIONS
OR COVENANTS. THIS SORT OF IRRESPONSIBLE ACTION MAKES THE
WORK OF SINCERE PEOPLE DIFFICULT AND NECESSITATES MUCH
EFFORT FROM FRIENDS LIKE YOU.

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I HOPE THAT THESE GOOD EFFORTS WILL CONTINUE WITH THE
START OF THE NEW YEAR IN ORDER THAT THE WORLD MAY FEEL
CONFIDENCE AND TRANQUILITY AND THAT THOSE WHO ARE LOOKING
FOR THE RESTORATION OF THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHTS AND THEIR
RIGHT TO ESTABLISH THEIR INDEPENDENT STATE ON THEIR
TERRITORY MAY HAVE A HAPPY AND DECENT LIFE.

WISHING YOUR EXCELLENCY ABUNDANT HEALTH AND HAPPINESS.
MY SINCERE GREETINGS AND ESTEEM TO YOU.

FAHD BIN ABDUL AZIZ AL SAUD

RIYADH, 18 RABI' I 1402 AH

CORRESPONDING TO 13 JANUARY 1982 AD.''

WINCHESTER

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FM JEDDAH 240742Z JAN 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 35 OF 24 JANUARY 1982

REPEATED ROUTINE BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, ATHENS, DUBLIN,
THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, PARIS, ROME, UKREP BRUSSELS, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN
REPEATED SAVING TO MOSCOW AND OTHER ME POSTS.

YOUR TELNO 649: PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRINCE FAHD

1. ON 23 JANUARY WE RECEIVED PRINCE FAHD'S REPLY TO
THE PRIME MINISTER (TRANSLATION IN MIFT - NOT TO ALL).
DATED 13 JANUARY, IT EXPRESSES PLEASURE WITH THE POSITION
OF THE TEN, AND STATES THAT ACTION LIKE THE ANNEXATION OF
GOLAN MAKES THINGS MORE DIFFICULT, AND NECESSITATES MUCH
EFFORT FROM "FRIENDS LIKE YOU".

(attached).

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO MOSCOW AND OTHER ME POSTS.

WINCHESTER

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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FM WASHINGTON 230135Z JAN 82

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 208 OF 22 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, MUSCAT, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, BONN, ROME.

INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY

1. I HAVE SENT A SEPARATE TELEGRAM ABOUT U.S. POLICY TOWARDS POLAND AND THE BEARING OF THIS ON THE ALLIANCE. IT MAY ALSO BE USEFUL TO SEND YOU SOMETHING ABOUT THE OTHER MAIN PREOCCUPATION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE ARE, OF COURSE, MANY ISSUES AND IRRITANTS, FROM THE FUTURE OF IRAN TO THE PROBLEM OF QADHAFI, BUT I WILL CONCENTRATE HERE ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE PALESTINE PROBLEM AND THEIR STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE AREA.
2. ON THE FACE OF IT, IT IS SURPRISING THAT HAIG SHOULD BE EMBARKING UPON A FURTHER ROUND OF MIDDLE EAST VISITS AND ENGAGING HIMSELF INCREASINGLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM: BECAUSE IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE THAT ANY SUCCESS IS LIKELY TO BE REACHED THERE, AND IT IS A SUCCESS THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION NEEDS IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.
3. WHAT HAS HAPPENED IS THAT HAIG FOR THE FIRST TIME HAS STARTED TO FOCUS ON THE PALESTINE PROBLEM WHILE HIS FEAR GETS NO LESS THAT ARISING OUT OF IT SOME SPARK MAY IGNITE A CONFLICT IN THE AREA FROM WHICH NEITHER THE UNITED STATES NOR THE SOVIET UNION CAN REMAIN UNINVOLVED.
4. I DOUBT WHETHER HE REALLY BELIEVES THAT ANYTHING IN THE NATURE OF AN AGREEMENT ABOUT THE WEST BANK CAN BE REACHED BEFORE THE END OF APRIL, BUT HE IS CLEARLY HOPING TO ENMESH THE PARTIES IN A NEGOTIATION OF A FEW GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN SUCH A WAY AS TO KEEP THEM ENGAGED AFTER THE COMPLETION OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI.
5. WHAT HE MAY BE BANKING ON IS NOT THE HOPE THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE GOING TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS, BUT THAT THE ARABS OF THE WEST BANK MAY COME TO BELIEVE THAT ALMOST ANYTHING WILL BE BETTER THAN A CONTINUATION OF THE STATUS QUO WHICH MEANS NOT MERELY CONTINUED ISRAELI CONTROL BUT ALSO AN INTENSIFICATION OF SETTLEMENTS. /WHAT

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WHAT THIS COULD MEAN IN PRACTICE FOR THE WEST BANK IS PROBABLY SOME INTERIM REGIME. NOTHING WOULD BE ATTEMPTED WHICH WOULD TRY TO DEFINE THE LONGER TERM. WE HAVE TO BEAR IN MIND THAT THE AMERICANS ALWAYS ENVISAGE THIS ISSUE AS GETTING ROUND THE NEXT CORNER AND THE NEXT CORNERS FOR THEM ARE THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS AT THE END OF THE YEAR AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF THREE YEARS TIME. THEIR AIM ABOVE ALL WILL BE TO AVOID CONFLAGRATION SPARKED BY THE ISRAELIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ELECTORAL DAMAGE IN THE U.S. CAUSED BY THE DISAFFECTION OF THE JEWISH SYMPATHISERS IN THE UNITED STATES RESULTING FROM EXCESSIVE PRESSURE ON ISRAEL OVER A WEST BANK SETTLEMENT.

6. SLOWLY THE AMERICANS ARE COMING TO REALISE THE BEARING OF THEIR PALESTINE POLICY ON THEIR OTHER INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, HOWEVER MUCH THEY REMAIN RELUCTANT TO ADMIT IT TO OTHERS. IT IS IRONICAL TO HEAR TALK NOW IN WASHINGTON OF THE NEED FOR A BALANCED POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS OF COURSE ARISES FROM THE REACTION THAT THEY RUN INTO IN THEIR TALKS, IN PARTICULAR WITH THE SAUDIS, WHEN THEY SEEK TO ESTABLISH A BETTER RELATIONSHIP TO MEET THEIR STRATEGIC NEEDS. THE SAUDIS ARE NOT ONLY RELUCTANT TO DO ANYTHING THAT MIGHT JEOPARDISE NON-ALIGNMENT BUT THEY ALSO TELL THE AMERICANS HOW IMPOSSIBLE IT IS TO APPEAR TO BE TOO CLOSE TO THEM OR TO BE GIVING THEM FACILITIES THEY REQUIRE IF AMERICA PERSISTS IN A ONE-SIDED PRO-ISRAEL POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

7. NEVERTHELESS THE NEED TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST SUCH AS IS NECESSARY IF AMERICA'S STRATEGIC NEEDS ARE TO BE MET AND IN PARTICULAR IF THE FACILITIES NECESSARY FOR THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE ARE TO BE PROVIDED, IS A FIRST PRIORITY OF THE AMERICANS AT THE PRESENT TIME. THEY ARE, OF COURSE, ON CLOSE TERMS WITH THE EGYPTIANS WHO TO BE SURE, DEPEND UPON THEM FOR MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID ON A VAST SCALE. THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT MUBARAK WILL THROW OVER THE PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL IN ORDER TO MEND HIS FENCES WITH THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. HE WILL, IN THEIR VIEW, TRY TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE LATTER BUT THEY ARE HOPEFUL THAT THERE WILL BE NO SUDDEN SWITCH. AS REGARDS THE RAS BANAS BASE, MY IMPRESSION IS THAT THE AMERICANS ARE AWARE OF THE LIMITED VALUE OF THIS FOR THE RDF OPERATIONS IN THE GULF. I MIGHT ADD IN PARENTHESIS THAT THE SAME PROBLEM OF DISTANCE ATTENUATES THE VALUE OF DIEGO GARCIA TO THE AMERICANS, APART FROM OTHER PROBLEMS.

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8. THE FOCUS OF AMERICAN STRATEGIC INTEREST THEREFORE IS ON SAUDI ARABIA AND OMAN. THEY WOULD BE HAPPY TO CONCLUDE THE SORT OF STRATEGIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH SAUDI ARABIA THAT THEY HAD WITH ISRAEL (UNTIL BEGIN TO RE IT UP) BUT THEY DO NOT THINK THAT THE SAUDIS ARE IN ANY MOOD FOR THIS FOR THE REASONS I HAVE JUST EXPLAINED. THEIR EFFORTS THEREFORE WILL BE DIRECTED TO PIECEMEAL AGREEMENTS ON PARTICULAR FACILITIES THAT THEY THINK WILL HELP WITH PREPOSITIONING ETC BUT I AM CONSCIOUS OF AMERICAN CONCERN THAT THIS WILL NOT REALLY ADD UP TO AN ADEQUATE FOUNDATION SUCH AS THEY REQUIRE FOR STRATEGIC PURPOSES IN THE GULF.

9. THIS SENSE OF INADEQUACY ABOUT SAUDI ARABIA EXPLAINS THE CONSIDERABLE FOCUS OF INTEREST ON OMAN, WHICH WEINBERGER WILL BE VISITING NEXT MONTH. THE AMERICANS SEE OMAN AS A DECLARED SUPPORTER AND DO NOT, I SUGGEST, REALISE THE DANGER OF COMMITTING OR INVOLVING OMAN TOO OVERTLY ON THEIR SIDE. WEINBERGER OBVIOUSLY THINKS THAT CREASEY IS MORE OMANI THAN THE OMANIS AND LIKE MOST AMERICANS HAS DIFFICULTY IN BELIEVING THAT HE IS NOT UNDER BRITISH ORDERS. OMAN, BEING THE ONE AREA WITHIN STRIKING DISTANCE OF THE GULF, IS IMPORTANT TO THE AMERICANS WHO ARE NOT GOING TO BE DEFLECTED FROM TRYING TO MAKE USE OF THE FACILITIES THEY HAVE BEEN GRANTED THERE. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE ARE THE MAKINGS BOTH OF TROUBLE AND OF FRUITFUL COOPERATION BETWEEN US ON THIS MATTER WHICH SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED.

FCO PASS SAVING ABU DHABI, ADEN, ALGIERS, BAGHDAD, BAHRAIN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, DOHA, DUBAI, JERUSALEM, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, RABAT, SANA'A, TRIPOLI AND TUNIS.

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

HENDERSON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 212330Z JAN 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 86 OF 21 JANUARY,

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON AMMAN DAMASCUS JEDDA TEL AVIV CAIRO BEIRUT
TUNIS.

MY TEL NO 82: SECURITY COUNCIL: GOLAN HEIGHTS.

1. NUSEIBEH (JORDAN) HAS SAID PUBLICLY THAT HE EXPECTS THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO MEET AGAIN ON 26 OR 27 JANUARY IN ORDER TO PASS A RESOLUTION FOR AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION (WHICH WOULD HAVE TO CONVENE WITHIN TWENTY FOUR HOURS). HE SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED THIS PRIVATELY AND TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS PARTICULAR APPRECIATION OF OUR EXPLANATION OF VOTE.

PARSONS

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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FM FCO 212010Z JAN 82
TO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV
TELEGRAM NUMBER 10 OF 21 JANUARY
AND TO IMMEDIATE CG JERUSALEM
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, EC POSTS, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT,
AMMAN, JEDDA.

GOLAN

1. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN SIR A PARSONS' REFERENCE, IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL (UKMIS TELNO 83), TO THE GOVERNMENT'S CONSIDERATION OF MEASURES WHICH MIGHT NEED TO BE TAKEN UNILATERALLY. WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND IS NOT ACTIVE MEASURES AS SUCH, BUT DECISIONS ON HOW WE WILL DEAL WITH SITUATIONS WHERE CERTAIN KINDS OF ACTION OR REACTIONS BY US COULD PREJUDICE OUR LEGAL VIEW. BEFORE CONSIDERING OUR POSITION IN DETAIL AND EXAMINING THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF OUR VIEW OF THE ISRAELI LEGISLATION AS INVALID, WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS ON CIRCUMSTANCES, IF ANY, WHERE WE ARE LIKELY TO BE FACED WITH DIFFICULTIES.

THE OBVIOUS ANALOGY IS EAST JERUSALEM, BUT THE MAIN PROBLEMS ARISE THERE BECAUSE OF ITS STATUS AS PART OF ISRAEL'S CLAIMED CAPITAL, E.G. OVER MINISTRIES SITUATED THERE, SIGNATURE OF TREATIES ETC. SUCH PROBLEMS ARE PRESUMABLY UNLIKELY TO ARISE IN GOLAN.

2. NEVERTHELESS THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT MAY SET UP REGIONAL OFFICES IN THE AREA AND THE VARIOUS SETTLEMENTS, NOTABLY KATZRIN, WILL PRESUMABLY CONVERT THEMSELVES IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, INTO ISRAELI STATE INSTITUTIONS. THIS HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR VISITS BY MEMBERS OF THE EMBASSY AND OTHER OFFICIALS TO THE AREA, ON WHICH WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS. MOREOVER PRESUMABLY ISRAELI COURTS WILL NOW BEGIN TO DISPENSE ISRAELI LAW IN THE AREA. ALTHOUGH IT MAY BE A REMOTE CONTINGENCY, WE NEED TO CON-

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SIDER OUR POSITION IF AN INDIVIDUAL UK CITIZEN OR A UK COMPANY BECOMES INVOLVED LOCALLY IN LITIGATION WHERE ISRAELI LAW IS USED. A FURTHER, VERY DIFFICULT, AREA, MIGHT BE THE APPLICABILITY OF EC-ISRAEL TARIFFS TO PRODUCE FROM THE GOLAN. THERE MAY BE OTHER AREAS WHERE WE MIGHT HAVE DIFFICULT DECISIONS TO TAKE OR WHERE APPROPRIATE ACTION WOULD DEMONSTRATE CLEARLY THAT WE DO NOT ACCEPT ISRAELI JURISDICTION.

3. WE ASSUME THAT OUR MAIN CRITERION IN CONSIDERING THIS SHOULD BE OUR DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE TO TREAT THE AREA AS OCCUPIED TERRITORY, WITH ALL THAT ENTAILS IN LEGAL TERMS. ANY GENERAL THOUGHTS YOU MIGHT HAVE ON THIS WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

4. CG JERUSALEM MAY ALSO BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE FROM EXPERIENCE OF DIFFICULTIES OVER JERUSALEM. ANY COMMENTS WOULD BE WELCOME, AS THEY WOULD ALSO FROM DAMASCUS.

5. NEWS DEPARTMENT ARE BRIEFING THE PRESS ON THE RECORD THAT SIR A PARSONS' REFERENCE (PARA 5 OF TELNO 83) TO QUOTE MEASURES ON A UNILATERAL BASIS UNQUOTE IS TO BE READ STRICTLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THAT PARAGRAPH, I.E. WE SHALL BE TAKING WHATEVER STEPS ARE NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT WE ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR VIEW THAT THE ISRAELIS MOVE IS ILLEGAL AND INVALID.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 January 1982

Prime Minister

MS.

A.S.C. 27/11.

A.S.C. 24/11

h.a.

Dear John,

Golan

You will have seen that Sir A Parsons, in his explanation of vote in the Security Council on 20 January, referred to government consideration of unilateral measures in the light of the Israeli decision. This may be misinterpreted in some quarters as a reference to UK readiness to impose some form of unilateral sanctions on Israel.

In fact, as the preceding content of the paragraph makes clear, the reference was to the need for us to consider the consequences, practical and legal, which flow from our view that the Israeli action in extending Israeli jurisdiction and administration to the occupied Golan was contrary to international law and therefore invalid in our eyes. The situation is analogous in some ways to that in East Jerusalem, where our refusal to accept Israel's incorporation of East Jerusalem into Israel leads us to avoid actions which would prejudice this view, such as dealings in East Jerusalem with Israeli ministries and offices which are located there. This sort of problem is likely to be less intrusive in Golan than in East Jerusalem, for obvious reasons of geography, but, for example, we should not deal with the Israeli authorities there in any way which would imply that they have any rights going beyond those of an occupying power.

We are currently considering with our Embassy in Tel Aviv and our own Legal Advisers the exact implications of our attitude to the new Golan law, on the basis of the attached telegram (the distribution copy of which will reach you in due course).

Handwritten signature

(B J, P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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DESKBY 210900Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 210056Z JAN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 83 DATED 20 JANUARY 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, JEDDA, TEL AVIV
INFO PRIORITY DUBLIN, CAIRO, BEIRUT, MADRID, TOKYO, KINSHASA,
PANAMA CITY, TUNIS.MIPT: SECURITY COUNCIL : GOLAN HEIGHTS1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY EXPLANATION OF VOTE:

MY GOVERNMENT HAVE ALREADY MADE CLEAR ITS POSITION REGARDING THE ISRAELI DECISION TO EXTEND THE LAW, JURISDICTION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. AS I STATED TO THIS COUNCIL ON 16 DECEMBER, THE TERRITORY OF ONE STATE IS NOT TO BE ACQUIRED BY ANOTHER BY THE USE OF FORCE. WE TOTALLY REJECT AND CONDEMN THE UNILATERAL INITIATIVE BY ISRAEL TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS.

TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WE JOINED IN UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FOR THE ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION 497. AS STATED IN THAT RESOLUTION, WE CONSIDER THE ISRAELI DECISION TO BE NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL EFFECT. SIMILARLY WE HOLD THAT ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION OF 12 AUGUST 1949 CONTINUE TO APPLY TO THE SYRIAN TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE JUNE 1967. WE STRONGLY CONDEMN ISRAEL'S FAILURE TO ABIDE BY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 497 AND TO RESCIND ITS DECISION.

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, MR PRESIDENT, IT WILL BE EVIDENT THAT MY GOVERNMENT AGREES WITH MUCH OF THE THINKING BEHIND THE DRAFT ON WHICH THE COUNCIL HAS JUST VOTED. INDEED THERE IS MUCH IN IT THAT WE CAN SUPPORT. WE ARE ONLY TOO WILLING TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL THE COMPLETE UNACCEPTABILITY OF THEIR ACTION IN EXTENDING ISRAELI JURISDICTION TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. WE CAN IN NO WAY CONDONE SUCH ACTION WHICH WE REGARD AS BOTH PROVOCATIVE AND SERIOUSLY DAMAGING TO THE OBJECTIVE OF PROMOTING LASTING PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. OUR PATIENCE AND THAT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS BEEN SORELY TRIED. IF ISRAEL BY SUCH ACTIONS CONTINUES TO DISTANCE HERSELF FURTHER FROM ACCOMMODATION WITH HER NEIGHBOURS SHE CANNOT EXPECT TO ESCAPE THE CONSEQUENCES INDEFINITELY.

AT THE SAME TIME, MY GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE WISHED THE COUNCIL TO HAVE BUILT ON THE BASIS OF ITS EARLIER UNANIMITY. FROM THE OUTSET WE HAVE URGED ON DELEGATIONS THE NEED FOR THE COUNCIL TO PROCEED BY CONSENSUS IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE THE

OBJECTIVE, WHICH MY GOVERNMENT SHARES, OF BRINGING ISRAEL TO RESCIND ITS DECISION AND TO REFRAIN FROM ANY SIMILAR ACTION IN FUTURE. WE REGRET THAT OUR ADVICE WAS NOT TAKEN. THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON WHICH WE HAVE JUST VOTED CLEARLY DID NOT PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR SUCH A CONSENSUS. THIS WAS ONE REASON WHY WE DECIDED TO ABSTAIN. WE ALSO HAD CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ON THE TEXT. WE ARE DUBIOUS, FOR EXAMPLE, ABOUT THE COUNCIL MAKING A DETERMINATION UNDER ARTICLE 39 OF THE CHARTER THAT THE ISRAELI ACTION CONSTITUTES AN "ACT OF AGGRESSION". WE WOULD REGARD SUCH A DETERMINATION AS THE MOST SERIOUS AND FAR-REACHING OF ALL THOSE DETERMINATIONS WHICH THE COUNCIL IS EMPOWERED TO MAKE. WE NOTE THAT EVEN AT THE TIME OF THE KOREAN WAR, IN WHICH HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF LIVES WERE LOST, THE COUNCIL DID NOT GO BEYOND A DETERMINATION IN RESOLUTION 82 THAT THE EVENTS IN QUESTION CONSTITUTED A BREACH OF THE PEACE.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD INSTEAD, IN THE PRESENT CASE, HAVE SOUGHT A CONSENSUS THAT WOULD HAVE, WITHOUT MAKING A CHAPTER VII DETERMINATION, CALLED UPON ALL STATES TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTS OR DEALINGS WHICH WOULD IMPLY RECOGNITION OF OR LEND SUPPORT OR ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL'S DECISION. THE COUNCIL COULD ALSO HAVE REQUIRED THAT ALL MEMBER STATES SHOULD REFRAIN FROM PROVIDING ISRAEL WITH ANY ASSISTANCE THAT WOULD BE USED SPECIFICALLY IN THE OCCUPIED SYRIAN GOLAN HEIGHTS; THAT MEMBER STATES SHOULD REFUSE TO HAVE ANY CONTACT WITH ISRAELI INSTITUTIONS THERE AND THAT THEY SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY EVENTS OR ACTIVITIES ORGANISED THERE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL. THIS IS NOT AN EXHAUSTIVE LIST. FOR ITS PART MY GOVERNMENT IS CONSIDERING WHICH OF SUCH MEASURES IT SHOULD TAKE ON A UNILATERAL BASIS.

FINALLY, MR PRESIDENT, MY GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT WE SHOULD NOT REGARD THE COUNCIL'S INABILITY ON THIS OCCASION TO REACH CONSENSUS AS A FAILURE, BUT RATHER AS TEMPORARY SETBACK. MY GOVERNMENT REMAINS WILLING ON THIS ISSUE TO WORK FOR A TRUE CONSENSUS WITHIN THE COUNCIL WHICH WE BELIEVE PROVIDES THE BEST MEANS TO ACHIEVE OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE OF GETTING THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO RESCIND ITS ILLEGAL ACT.

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FM WASHINGTON 210132Z JAN 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 178 OF 20 JANUARY

INFO CAIRO TEL AVIV AMMAN JERUSALEM

HAIG'S VISIT TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL: AUTONOMY TALKS

1. DRAPER BRIEFED REPRESENTATIVES OF WESTERN EMBASSIES TODAY. HE SAID THAT HAIG HAD WANTED TO HEAR AT FIRST HAND EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI VIEWS ON ALL THE ISSUES IN THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS AND TO GIVE THE TALKS NEW MOMENTUM. HE HAD STRESSED THE NEED FOR PROGRESS BEFORE 26 APRIL. THE EGYPTIANS HAD INSISTED (AND THE ISRAELIS HAD AGREED) THAT THIS DATE SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS A DEADLINE. DRAPER ADMITTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE OF SUBSTANCE IN EITHER SIDE'S POSITION.
2. DRAPER SAID THAT HAIG HAD NOT PUT FORWARD ANY IDEAS FOR RESOLVING THESE DIFFERENCES. HE HAD APPEALED TO THE ISRAELIS TO SHOW CREATIVITY IN DEVELOPING BRIDGING POSITIONS AND THE ISRAELIS HAD AGREED TO GIVE THIS SOME THOUGHT. DRAPER COMMENTED THAT THE CLIMATE IN ISRAEL WAS NOT ALTOGETHER REASSURING. THERE WAS A MOOD OF TENSENESS, ANXIETY ABOUT ISRAEL'S FUTURE AND SUSPICION OF EGYPT'S INTENTIONS. THE WITHDRAWAL OF SETTLERS FROM YAMIT WOULD BE A MAJOR NATIONAL TRAUMA FOR THE ISRAELIS.
3. DRAPER CLAIMED NEVERTHELESS THAT HAIG STILL HOPED TO BE ABLE TO SECURE A BREAKTHROUGH ON SOME ISSUES (WHICH HE DID NOT SPECIFY) WHICH WOULD ACT AS A CATALYST FOR FURTHER AGREEMENT. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE AMERICANS SEE THE KEY ISSUES ON WHICH AGREEMENT MUST BE REACHED AS THE SIZE OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY, VOTING RIGHTS FOR ARABS IN EAST JERUSALEM, THE RESIDUAL POWERS OF THE ISRAELIS IN THE INTERIM PERIOD AND ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS. DRAPER STRESSED THAT HAIG'S PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT WAS A MAJOR ASSET: HAIG NOW FULLY UNDERSTOOD ALL THE ISSUES AND COULD NOT BE QUOTE BLINDSIDED UNQUOTE.
4. DRAPER DOUBTED WHETHER THE AMERICANS WOULD BE READY TO PUT FORWARD SPECIFIC PROPOSALS DURING HAIG'S NEXT VISIT TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL. HE HOPED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD BY THEN HAVE SOME IDEAS OF THEIR OWN TO DISCUSS. HAIG WAS ALSO KEEPING AN OPEN MIND ON THE POSSIBLE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR: DRAPER SAID THAT HE WAS NOT YET CONVINCED THAT THIS WAS EITHER NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE.

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5. KEMP (NSC) HAS GIVEN US A SIMILAR ACCOUNT AND HAS CONFIRMED THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE YET TO DECIDE THEIR TACTICS FOR HAIG'S NEXT VISIT AND FOR MUBARAK'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. HE ADDED (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT SECURITY WAS ALSO A VERY DIFFICULT ISSUE. THE ISRAELIS HAD YET TO GIVE THE EGYPTIANS A PROMISED BRIEFING ON THE AREAS THEY WISHED TO RETAIN UNDER THEIR DIRECT CONTROL AND ON THE SCOPE OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THEIR SECURITY FORCES IN THOSE AREAS. ANOTHER PROBLEM WAS THAT IT WAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD DEAL WITH TERRORIST OFFENCES BUT NOT HOW THESE SHOULD BE DEFINED (WAS, FOR EXAMPLE, CHANTING OF PLO SLOGANS A TERRORIST OFFENCE?).

6. KEMP SEES THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM AS ONE OF POLITICAL WILL. HE BELIEVES THAT MOST OF THE ISSUES CAN BE RESOLVED IF MUBARAK AND BEGIN GIVE A SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR LEAD. BUT IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL FOR MUBARAK TO DISREGARD THE ADVICE HE IS RECEIVING TO CONSULT PALESTINIANS AND OTHER ARABS IN ADVANCE OF AGREEING ANY CONCESSIONS AND TO GAMBLE ON THE ACCEPTABILITY TO THEM OF ANY AGREEMENT HE REACHES. EQUALLY BEGIN WILL HAVE TO TAKE GREAT POLITICAL RISKS OVER JERUSALEM, TO WHICH THE EGYPTIANS ARE GIVING HIGH PRIORITY.

7. KEMP CONCLUDED THAT THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS WERE SLIM. HE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE NEED TO GET SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS UNDER WAY BEFORE THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI. ONE FAINT GLEAM OF HOPE WAS INDICATIONS (IN VELIOTES' TALKS IN JORDAN) THAT THE JORDANIANS AND MODERATE PALESTINIANS WERE COMING TO SEE THAT IT WAS A CASE OF AN AUTONOMY AGREEMENT OR NOTHING: IF THERE WERE NO MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS BY THE END OF APRIL THE ISRAELIS WOULD ANNEX THE WEST BANK AND THAT WOULD BE THAT.

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OO BEIRUT (DESKBY 210700Z)
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 TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 16 OF 20 JANUARY
 YOUR TELNO. 22: MEETING WITH ARAFAT.

NFP 020/4		
RECEIVED IN SECURITY NO. 10		
21 JAN 1982		
DESK OFFICER		ASSTY
INTEK	PA	Action Taken

1. OUR ORIGINAL INSTRUCTIONS (OUR TELNO 304) REMAIN GENERALLY VALID. SINCE THEN THERE HAS BEEN THE PLO CENTRAL COUNCIL MEETING AT THE END OF DECEMBER AT WHICH IT IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN AGREED THAT THE FAHD PLAN COULD NOT BE RECONCILED WITH EXISTING PLO POLICY, BASED ON PREVIOUS PNC DECISIONS. IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO HAVE ARAFAT'S VIEW OF WHAT FLEXIBILITY THIS LEAVES HIM.
2. IF THE MFO COMES UP, YOU SHOULD ASSURE ARAFAT OF OUR CONTINUING ADHERENCE TO A POLICY BASED ON VENICE AND EXPLAIN OUR READINESS TO PLAY A ROLE IN ENSURING THAT THE SINAI IS SAFELY RETURNED TO EGYPT. WE ARE WATCHING THE AUTONOMY TALKS BUT STILL BELIEVE THAT THE AMERICANS WILL HAVE TO TURN IN ANOTHER DIRECTION EVENTUALLY. THAT IS WHY IT IS SO IMPORTANT THAT THE PLO SHOULD OFFER THE US ADIRECTION IN WHICH THEY CAN GO BY SHOWING READINESS TO ACCEPT A SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATED WITH ISRAEL. IF YOU ARE CHALLENGED ON OUR (PRESUMED) ABSTENTION ON THE ARAB DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON GOLAN, YOU SHOULD POINT OUT THAT WE VOTED FOR RESOLUTION 497 AND HAVE OTHERWISE MADE OUR ATTITUDE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR. WE REGRET THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO VOTE FOR THE RESOLUTION, BUT TO DO SO WOULD HAVE BEEN HYPOCRITICAL, GIVEN OUR DOUBTS ABOUT THE APPROPRIATENESS OF A FORMAL CHAPTER VII DETERMINATION AND OUR LACK OF FAITH IN THE EFFICACY OF SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL, VOLUNTARY OR OTHERWISE.
3. ON SOUTH LEBANON AN ACCOUNT OF ARAFAT'S PRESENT VIEWS WOULD BE OF INTEREST. DOES THE CLAIMED PALESTINIAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY ON 19 JANUARY PORTEND A NEW AND MORE ACTIVE POLICY AGAINST ISRAELI OVERFLIGHTS? WE HAVE BEEN CONSISTENTLY IMPRESSED BY THE SELF-DISCIPLINE OF THE PALESTINIANS SINCE THE

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CEASE-FIRE, WHICH HAS DONE MUCH FOR THE PLO'S STANDING. WE KNOW SOME OF THE PRESSURES ON ARAFAT: CAN HE HOLD THE LINE?

4. WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING MORE FROM DAJANI SINCE THE CONVERSATION REPORTED IN PARA 5 OF OUR TELNO 304. A GENTLE REMINDER THAT WE AWAIT THE RESUMPTION OF THE DIALOGUE MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE, PARTICULARLY IF DAJANI IS WITH ARAFAT.

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MR J C MOBERLY

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FM PARIS 191825Z JAN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 74 OF 19 JANUARY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, COLOMBO (FOR PS/MR HURD)

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON TEL AVIV AMMAN JEDDAH DAMASCUS DUBLIN

CAIRO BEIRUT MADRID TOKYO KINSHASA PANAMA CITY

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 32: SECURITY COUNCIL: GOLAN HEIGHTS

1. ACTION TAKEN WITH RAPIN (DEPUTY HEAD MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT) WHO AFTER CONSULTING BOIDEVAIX (DIRECTOR FOR NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST) TOLD THE EMBASSY THAT THE FRENCH WERE NOT REPEAT NOT KEEN ON THE ACTION PROPOSED. AS INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WERE NOW TAKING PLACE IN NEW YORK ON THE BASIS OF AN AMENDED VERSION OF THE JORDANIAN TEXT IT SEEMED INAPPROPRIATE TO THE FRENCH FOR FRANCE AND THE UK TO SET OFF TOGETHER ON A SEPARATE TRACK. THE FRENCH WOULD PREFER TO TAKE NO ACTION FOR THE MOMENT. IF EFFORTS AT STRIKING A COMPROMISE WERE TO BE MADE AT ALL THE FRENCH BELIEVED THAT THE IRISH/SPANISH/JAPANESE TEXT OFFERED THE BEST POSSIBILITIES. BUT IN ANY CASE THE FRENCH DID NOT WANT TO BE IN THE FOREFRONT OF

~~BUT IN ANY CASE THE FRENCH DID NOT WANT TO BE IN THE FOREFRONT OF ANY ACTIVITY, PARTICULARLY IF IT WAS LIABLE TO INTERPRETATION BY THE ARABS AS A MANOEUVRE TO DEFLECT THEM FROM THEIR PREFERRED COURSE.~~

2. WHAT MAY LIE BEHIND FRENCH RELUCTANCE TO ACT IS THE CONSIDERATION THAT THEY HAVE JUST MADE A MOVE WHICH WILL HAVE UPSET THE ARABS: THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S VISIT TO ISRAEL IN EARLY MARCH DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT HAD EARLIER BEEN ANNOUNCED THAT NO DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN ON A DATE FOR THE VISIT UNTIL AFTER THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE (FORD'S LETTER TO GREENSTOCK OF 18 JANUARY). AFTER THIS THE FRENCH SEEM TO THINK THAT THEY SHOULD KEEP THEIR HEADS DOWN.

HIBBERT

NNNN

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
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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 200356Z JAN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 80 DATED 19 JANUARY 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, JEDDA, TEL AVIV
COLOMBO (FOR PS/MR HURD).INFO PRIORITY DUBLIN, CAIRO, BEIRUT, MADRID, TOKYO, KINSHASA,
PANAMA CITYMIPT: SECURITY COUNCIL - GOLAN HEIGHTS 

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF REVISED JORDANIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 497 (1981) DATED 19 DECEMBER 1981,

HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONTAINED
IN DOCUMENT S/14805 DATED 21 DECEMBER 1981, S/14805/CORR.1 DATED
23 DECEMBER 1981 AND S/14821 DATED 31 DECEMBER 1981,CONSIDERING THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN ITS RESOLUTION 497 (1981)
DECIDED THAT IN THE EVENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE BY ISRAEL IT WOULD
URGENTLY MEET "TO CONSIDER TAKING APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS",BEARING IN MIND GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 36/226 B OF 17
DECEMBER 1981,RECALLING GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3314 (XXIX) OF 14 DECEMBER
1974, WHICH DEFINES AN ACT OF AGGRESSION AS "THE INVASION OR ATTACK
BY THE ARMED FORCES OF A STATE OF THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER
STATE, OR ANY MILITARY OCCUPATION, HOWEVER TEMPORARY, RESULTING
FROM SUCH INVASION OR ATTACK, OR ANY ANNEXATION BY THE USE OF
FORCE OF THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER STATE OR PART THEREOF.",DETERMINING THAT THE CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF THE SYRIAN GOLAN
HEIGHTS SINCE JUNE 1967 AND ITS ANNEXATION BY ISRAEL ON 14
DECEMBER 1981 CONSTITUTE A CONTINUING THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY,ACTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER VII
OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

1. STRONGLY CONDEMNS ISRAEL FOR ITS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 497 (1981) AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTION 36/226 B (1981):

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/ 2. DETERMINES

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2. DETERMINES THAT ISRAELI MEASURES IN THE OCCUPIED SYRIAN GOLAN HEIGHTS, CULMINATING IN ISRAEL'S DECISION OF 14 DECEMBER 1981 TO IMPOSE ITS LAWS, JURISDICTION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE OCCUPIED SYRIAN GOLAN HEIGHTS, CONSTITUTE AN ACT OF AGGRESSION UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 39 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

3. DECIDES THAT ALL MEMBER STATES SHOULD CONSIDER APPLYING CONCRETE AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES IN ORDER TO NULLIFY THE ISRAELI ANNEXATION OF THE SYRIAN GOLAN HEIGHTS AND TO REFRAIN FROM PROVIDING ANY ASSISTANCE OR AID TO AND CO-OPERATION WITH ISRAEL, IN ALL FIELDS, IN ORDER TO DETER ISRAEL IN ITS POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF ANNEXATION:

4. DECIDES ALSO TO CALL UPON ALL MEMBER STATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO CARRY OUT THIS DECISION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 25 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

5. URGES, HAVING REGARD TO THE PRINCIPLES STATED IN ARTICLE 2, PARAGRAPH 6, OF ITS CHARTER, STATES NOT MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF THIS RESOLUTION:

6. CALLS UPON ALL OTHER UNITED NATIONS BODIES AND OTHER SPECIALIZED AGENCIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR MEMBERS TO CONFORM THEIR RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL TO THE TERMS OF THIS RESOLUTION:

7. DECIDES TO ESTABLISH IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 29 OF THE CHARTER A COMMITTEE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO EXAMINE AND REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON THE PROGRESS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION:

8. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT A REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 200352Z JAN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 79 DATED 19 JANUARY 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, JEDDA, TEL AVIV
COLOMBO (FOR PS/MR HURD).INFO PRIORITY DUBLIN, CAIRO, BEIRUT, MADRID, TOKYO, KINSHASA,
PANAMA CITYMY TELNO 69: SECURITY COUNCIL- GOLAN HEIGHTS

1. TODAY'S MEETING OF THE NON ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL PRODUCED THE REVISED DRAFT IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. THIS IS THE ORIGINAL JORDANIAN DRAFT, WITH AN AMENDMENT TO THE LAST PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH AND WITH OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 4 REPLACED BY A NEW OPERATIVE 3 WHICH IS A VARIANT OF THE ZAIREAN FORMULA INVITING MEMBER STATES TO CONSIDER APPLYING SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL. THE NEW PARAGRAPH IS SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUS AND UNGRAMMATICAL BUT IT CAN BE CONSTRUED AS BEING ENTIRELY VOLUNTARY, IE AS REQUIRING MEMBER STATES TO DO NO MORE THAN CONSIDER APPLYING MEASURES AND REFRAINING FROM PROVIDING AID ETC. (attached)

2. THE ARABS CLAIM THAT SPAIN, ZAIRE AND PANAMA WILL ALL VOTE IN FAVOUR, THUS GIVING THE DRAFT TEN VOTES. DE PINIES (SPAIN) HAS TOLD ME THAT HE WILL DO SO AND KAMANDA (ZAIRE) THAT HE IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO. THE AMERICANS HOWEVER ARE MAKING FURTHER REPRESENTATIONS IN KINSHASA AND PANAMA CITY, AND PROBABLY IN MADRID AND LOME TOO.

3. THE REVISED DRAFT WAS CIRCULATED THIS EVENING (19 JANUARY) AND THE PRESIDENT IMMEDIATELY CALLED INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE COUNCIL. NISIBORI (JAPAN) RAISED THE AMBIGUITY IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3. HE AND DORR (IRELAND), WITH MY SUPPORT AND THAT OF KAMANDA (ZAIRE), PROPOSED THAT "TO REFRAIN" BE REPLACED BY "REFRAINING" WHICH WOULD BRING THE ENGLISH TEXT INTO LINE WITH THE FRENCH. NUSEIBEH SAID SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE VERB "CONSIDER" WAS INTENDED TO APPLY TO BOTH "APPLYING" AND TO "TO REFRAIN". BUT HE REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE AMENDMENT BECAUSE THIS WOULD REQUIRE FURTHER REFERENCE TO DAMASCUS. AFTER A HALF-HEARTED ATTEMPT BY THE AMERICANS TO POSTPONE THE VOTE TILL 21 JANUARY, IT WAS AGREED TO MEET AT 2100Z TOMORROW (20 JANUARY) TO VOTE ON THE REVISED DRAFT.

4. THE AMERICANS HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY WILL DEFINITELY VOTE AGAINST THE DRAFT. I HAVE SPOKEN TO DORR (IRELAND) FROM WHOM I GOT THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT HE AND JAPAN WOULD BE INCLINED TO FOLLOW US AND FRANCE.

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/ 5. IT IS

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5. IT IS OBVIOUSLY IMPORTANT, AS IT HAS BEEN ALL ALONG, THAT WE AND THE FRENCH SHOULD STICK TOGETHER. GIVEN THAT WE WERE BOTH PREPARED TO ACQUIESCE IN THE IMPOSITION OF CERTAIN MANDATORY SANCTIONS BY ABSTAINING ON THE ORIGINAL TEXT, IT WOULD BE LOGICAL FOR US TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THIS WEAKER TEXT, EVEN THOUGH IT IS IN CHAPTER VII, SINCE IT CONTAINS NO MANDATORY MEASURES.

6. HOWEVER, FROM MY CONVERSATIONS WITH THE FRENCH, IRISH AND JAPANESE THIS EVENING, I GOT THE STRONG IMPRESSION THAT ALL THREE WERE DISPOSED TO RECOMMEND ABSTENTIONS TO THEIR CAPITALS. IF WE TAKE THE LEAD IN PERSUADING THE FRENCH TO VOTE IN FAVOUR, WE COULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR DELIVERING, APART FROM OUR OWN, THREE MORE POSITIVE VOTES FOR THE RESOLUTION. DO WE REALLY WANT TO DO THIS IN VIEW OF THE DANGEROUS PRECEDENT WHICH A MOVE INTO CHAPTER VII ON GOLAN WILL SET WHEN THE COUNCIL CONSIDERS FUTURE BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY ISRAEL ON THE WEST BANK, GAZA, JERUSALEM, ETC?. THE AMERICANS WHO ARE AT PRESENT ASSUMING THAT WE WILL ABSTAIN WOULD QUICKLY GET TO KNOW IF WE HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING THEM THE ONLY MEMBER NOT TO VOTE IN FAVOUR.

7. MY INCLINATION THEREFORE IS TO RECOMMEND AN ABSTENTION UNLESS THE FRENCH ARE DETERMINED TO VOTE IN FAVOUR IN WHICH CASE WE SHOULD DO THE SAME. I WOULD NOT FIND IT DIFFICULT TO DRAFT AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE TO COVER AN ABSTENTION.

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Prime Minister M/Case (2)

The latest development in the
never-ending saga.

A.F.C. 12/1

MF

A.F.C. 20/1

f.u.

Mr Moberly

Sinai MFO

Mr Haig rang the Secretary of State at 1500 today. Mr Haig's words have been preserved wherever possible in what follows.

His purpose in telephoning was to give the Secretary of State a resume of his visit to Tel Aviv, which he found worrisome. There were any number of opportunities for mischief which we must be alert to. He had in mind the deadline for a certain event. He had had a discussion with Shamir of European responses on the MFO, which had been at cross purposes because the two of them had been speaking from different texts. The sentence in our letter, missing from his own text, which referred to the November 23 statement had resulted in a major brouha (sic) and Shamir had said that the Israelis would not accept it. Lord Carrington pointed out that the sentence, which had appeared in all the other copies of the text which we had provided to the Americans, was also in the replies of our partners. It was merely factual. Mr Haig said that this was true, but that the Israelis saw the most insidious motives in it. We must get around it.

Lord Carrington replied that now that the letter had gone with the sentence in, if we were to remove it the fact would become known and we would appear to be abandoning our position. This would lead to appalling confusion. It would be quite different if the sentence had never been there in the first place. If the Israelis wanted to pick a quarrel we could not stop them; we had hoped that the Israelis would see no need to reply to our letter. So did Mr Haig. He did not disagree, but there was a tempest in a teapot which we somehow had to defuse. There had been a leak in the Israeli press to the effect that the letter had not been submitted to the Israeli Cabinet because the Cabinet would not approve it.


Lord Carrington said that he would consult his colleagues and look for a way round. But he thought it would be very difficult. Mr Haig hoped that it would not be too difficult. What we were after here was an outcome. He hoped that we might clarify that the November 23 statement had no effect on this issue, or re-emphasise only those elements in it to which we attached particular importance.

/Lord Carrington

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Lord Carrington repeated that his fear was that the Israelis would leak the fact of any amendment to our letter, and claim that our position had changed. He would be in touch with Mr Haig when he had spoken to his colleagues. Mr Haig said that he would not be in contact with the other potential participants in the meantime.

19 January 1982


(F N Richards)

cc: PS ✓
PS/Mr Hurd
PS/PUS
NENAD *Mr Bullard*
ECD(E)
News Dept

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OO PARIS - DESKBY 182030Z

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DESKBY 182030Z TO PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, JEDDA AND COLOMBO.

FM FCO 181800Z JAN 82

TO IMMEDIATE PARIS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 32 OF 18 JANUARY

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, JEDDA, DAMASCUS AND COLOMBO (FOR PS/MR HURD).

INFO PRIORITY DUBLIN, CAIRO, BEIRUT, MADRID, TOKYO, KINSHASA, PANAMA CITY.

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO. 63: SECURITY COUNCIL: GOLAN HEIGHTS

1. WHILE THERE REMAINS LITTLE ATTRACTION IN ANY OF THE COURSES OPEN TO US AND SOMETHING TO BE SAID FOR KEEPING OUR HEADS DOWN AND LETTING EVENTS TAKE THEIR COURSE, I SHOULD PREFER TO MAKE A FURTHER ATTEMPT TO FIND AN AREA OF COMPROMISE AROUND A MODERATE RESOLUTION (PARA 5 OF TUR). OUR AIM SHOULD BE A RESOLUTION ON WHICH THE AMERICANS CAN ABSTAIN AND WHICH WOULD ATTRACT THE VOTES OF MOST OF THE REST.

2. I AGREE THAT WE SHOULD WORK CLOSELY WITH THE FRENCH IN SUCH AN ATTEMPT. PARIS SHOULD SEEK EARLY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE QUAI TO SEE IF THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO RESURRECT THE IDEAS DESCRIBED IN FCO TELNO 2 TO UKMIS (PARA 3) AND UKMIS TELNOS 8 AND 10. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE VOTE ON FRIDAY SAVED US FROM WHAT WOULD IN MANY WAYS HAVE BEEN AN UNSATISFACTORY OUTCOME. WHILE WE ARE NOT CONFIDENT THAT A COMPROMISE CAN BE FOUND ON A BASIS ON WHICH WE COULD PERSUADE THE AMERICANS TO ABSTAIN, IT IS IMPORTANT TO DEMONSTRATE OUR INTEREST IN A RESULT WHICH HAS A POSITIVE EFFECT ON ISRAEL. IF THE FRENCH AGREE THAT IT IS WORTH A TRY, WE WOULD WILLINGLY HELP BY TAKING ACTION IN ARAB CAPITALS. WE WOULD ALSO WANT TO CONSULT THE AMERICANS.

3. I AGREE THAT IT IS ALSO WORTH CONSIDERING WORKING FURTHER ON THE ZAIREAN DRAFT ON THE LINES OF PARA 7 OF TUR. YOU MAY MENTION THAT TO THE QUAI AS A POSSIBLE, THOUGH LESS DESIRABLE,

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ALTERNATIVE. IT LEAVES US WITH THE PROBLEM OF SUPPORTING A RESOLUTION (EVEN IF SATISFACTORILY AMENDED) WHICH THE AMERICANS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO VETO. EVEN SO, THIS COURSE SEEMS BETTER THAN INACTION (CF FCO TELNO 24 TO UKMIS).

4. SIR A PARSONS SHOULD SHAPE HIS DISCUSSION TODAY WITH NUSEIBEH ACCORDINGLY. THE ATMOSPHERE IN NEW YORK IS CLEARLY AN UNHELPFUL ONE FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND WE SHOULD AIM TO CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS ON CAPITALS FOR THE MOMENT.

CARRINGTON

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SELECT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

THE GOLAN HEIGHTS

Background

1. The Golan Heights are a southern extension of the Anti-Lebanon and Mount Hermon range, running for some 30 miles from Banias in the north to the southern shore of Lake Tiberias. The Western edge of the Heights is marked by a steep escarpment rising from the Jordan valley to a height of some 1,000 ft above the lake. But the Golan area is not all mountainous terrain; it includes an extensive plateau with much excellent agricultural land.
2. When following the First World War it was agreed to establish a British Mandate for Palestine and a French one for Syria, the border between them in this area was eventually demarcated along a line following closely the previous boundary between the Turkish sanjaks (administrative areas) of Acre and Hauran, which meant that the Golan was included in the Syrian mandate. The "Franco-British Convention" of December 1920 gave a triangle of territory on Golan, including Quneitra, to Palestine, but the Anglo-French Boundary Commission report, in 1922, recommended including this in Syria in return for a change in Palestine's favour to the South of Lake Tiberias. This frontier was confirmed in the Franco-British treaty of 1923 and constituted an internationally recognised border.
3. After the lapse of the British mandate and subsequent fighting between the emergent Israel and Syria, the 1949 Syria-Israel Armistice Agreement established an Armistice line which followed closely the previous internationally recognised frontier, leaving Syria in control of the Golan Heights including the vital escarpment. Although the

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Armistice Agreement made it clear that this line was without prejudice to a final negotiated settlement between Syria and Israel, it has gained general acceptance, including that of the then British Government, as a de facto boundary. The Armistice line remained in force until June 1967, despite intermittent fighting across it. The Syrians were able to use their positions on the escarpment in these exchanges to shell Israeli settlements in the valley below.

4. In the closing stages of the 1967 Six-Day war the Israelis attacked Syrian positions on the heights above the east bank of the Jordan and occupied a strip of Syrian territory, some 430 square miles in all, running from the Lebanese frontier in the north through Quneitra to the river Yarmuk in the south. In the immediate aftermath of the fighting virtually all the approximately 90,000 Arab inhabitants fled to Syria. The only major community to stay there were some 6,000 Druze (members of a small Arabic-speaking sect concentrated in the mountain ranges between Syria, Israel and Lebanon).

5. There was further fierce fighting on the Golan Heights in 1973 when Syria attacked Israel at the same time as Egypt attacked across the Suez Canal in the south. Initial Syrian gains were gradually reversed and the eventual ceasefire left the area under Israeli occupation somewhat larger than before. The subsequent US-sponsored Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement of 1974 created a demilitarised buffer zone between the two countries, patrolled by the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).

6. The map at Annex A shows the various boundaries, ceasefire lines and demilitarized zones.

7. The prevailing view in Israel since 1967 has been that the area is of such strategic importance that military control should be denied to the Syrians indefinitely. From late 1967 onwards, Israeli civilian settlements began to be established on the Golan. Israel's

/justification

justification was that only through such settlement could Israel's security be properly ensured. There are now some 31 settlements on the Golan housing some 6,000 settlers, and plans were announced in November to increase their numbers to 10,000 within two years. They are for the most part agricultural settlements making use of the good land and water facilities available. An urban settlement, Katzrin, has also been established to serve as a local centre for development. The only population apart from the Israeli settlers are the Druse (now 12,000 strong) who are divided between those ready to accept Israeli control and those resisting it and preferring to return to Syria. The latter seem to be in a majority.

Knesset Law

8. There has long been a strong current of opinion in Israel favouring annexation, or at least permanent control, of the Golan Heights, both for security reasons and because some Israelis regard the area as part of biblical (Eretz) Israel. This view stretches across both the major political groupings, Likud and Labour (the Golan settlements were established largely under Labour Party sponsorship). After the Israeli elections in summer 1981, the re-elected Begin government reiterated that Golan was included in the territories which Israel would not give up.¹ Mrs Geula Cohen, a member of the Knesset, had previously (March 1981) put forward a Private Member's bill to annex the Golan which the Government did not at the time support.

9. Although the pressure from Mrs Cohen and others for action over Golan remained strong, the Israeli government's eventual decision to extend Israeli law to the Golan came without warning. On 14 December, after a special Cabinet meeting, Mr Begin introduced a short bill (text at Annex B) extending Israel's law, jurisdiction and administration to the Golan Heights. The three necessary readings of the bill were gone through on the same day and it was passed that evening by a Knesset vote of 63-21. The vote was officially boycotted by the Labour Alignment opposition.

10. Although not formally annexation, the effect of the Knesset

/bill

bill is to end Golan's status in Israeli eyes as a territory under occupation, administered by a military government, and to treat the area in exactly the same way as existing areas of Israel. The military government of Golan was therefore immediately replaced by a civilian administration. This action over Golan is analogous to Israeli action over East Jerusalem. After the 1967 war, Israeli law was immediately extended to East Jerusalem (a step which was confirmed in 1980 by the passage through the Knesset of a bill enshrining the whole of Jerusalem's status as Israel's capital in a Basic Law, ie. part of Israel's developing constitution). This has amounted to annexation in practice. However, the Israelis have said that they remain ready to negotiate peace with Syria unconditionally, on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (the Israeli official explanation of their action, given to the UN Secretary General on 29 December, is at Annex C).

Reactions to the Law

11. International reaction to the passage of the Knesset law was swift. Israel's partners in the Camp David process, Egypt and the US, both expressed their dismay and opposition. Egypt described it as contrary to the Camp David agreements (Golan is not mentioned specifically but the framework agreement for a wider peace cites Resolutions 242 and 338 as basic starting points and refers to the need for a peace treaty between Israel and Syria). The Foreign Ministers of the Ten, meeting in London on 15 December, issued a statement strongly deploring the decision of the government and Knesset of Israel to extend Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration to occupied Syrian territory in the Golan Heights. They made clear their view that this was tantamount to annexation and contrary to international law. They therefore regarded it as invalid. The Foreign Ministers pointed out that this step prejudiced the possibility of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and was bound to complicate further the search for a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East to which they remained committed.

12. The Syrians, for their part, described the Knesset law as a dangerous and serious development in the region. It was a breach of the UN Charter and UN Resolutions, including Security Council Resolution 338.

It in effect abolished the status of the Israeli/Syrian ceasefire, constituted aggression against Syria and was a challenge to Middle East peace and security. The Syrians called for an emergency meeting of the Security Council to take measures against the Israeli decision.

13. The Security Council met on 16 and 17 December and adopted unanimously Resolution 497 (text at Annex D) calling on Israel to rescind the Knesset law and looking forward to further Security Council consideration if Israel did not do so by 5 January. The Security Council met again on 6 January to discuss what measures should be taken against Israel in view of their failure to obey Resolutions 497. The Syrians were trying to get majority support for sanctions against Israel.

British views

14. The framework of the government's views is set out in the statement of the Ten on 15 December. We regard the Knesset bill as:

(a) contrary to international law: it is a universally accepted principle of international law, reinforced by the provisions of Article 2(4) of the UN charter, that territory cannot be validly acquired by force. The Golan law, which is tantamount to annexation, is in clear contradiction of this principle. While there is no internationally recognised border between Israel and Syria and it is for the parties themselves, as part of a peace settlement, to decide where the border between them shall run, it is the clear British view, in the absence of such a settlement, that the Golan Heights are Syrian territory. This view stems from our acceptance of the previous internationally recognised border between the two mandates and the very similar 1949 Armistice Line.

(b) invalid in our eyes: we cannot recognise an action taken in defiance of international law and international opinion and will not accept any legal or other consequences flowing from it. For example, we shall not recognise judgements rendered by the courts established by the Israeli law.

(c) prejudicial to the possibility of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242: Resolution 242, in a preambular paragraph, emphasises the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, and in its operative paragraphs says inter alia that a just

/and

and lasting peace in the Middle East should include application of both the following principles:

- (i) withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; and
- (ii) termination of all claims of states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area, and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force.

Israel accepted Resolution 242 at the timeⁱⁱ and continues to do so. Resolution 242 was used as a cornerstone of the Camp David agreementsⁱⁱⁱ Syria did not accept Resolution 242 at the time but after the 1973 war accepted Resolution 338 which calls for the implementation of 242 in all its parts and calls for a negotiated peace. This remains Syria's position. The Knesset law is contrary to the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and is also in conflict with the principle of Israeli withdrawal, which we and the international community as a whole regard as applicable to the Golan, as to the other fronts, despite the ambiguity of the English text of 242.

(d) prejudicial to the search for negotiated peace: the essential bargain implicit in Resolution 242 is Israeli withdrawal from Arab territory in exchange for Arab recognition of and peace with Israel. The Knesset law does not entirely rule this out between Israel and Syria, since Israel maintains that she is ready to negotiate unconditionally with Syria. But it is bound to complicate the search for peace since it will be considerably more difficult for a future Israeli government to negotiate over the future of Golan when the Knesset have in effect decided to regard it as part of Israel. Moreover such unilateral actions, combined with the continuing settlement of the occupied territories, including Golan, discourage the Arabs from making peace with Israel, since they suggest that she is aiming at a change of status of and permanent control over the territories occupied in 1967, which they regard as

/incompatible

incompatible with peace and with legitimate Arab claims.

15. We hope that Israel will agree to rescind the Knesset law, in the interests of a comprehensive peace settlement, thus leaving the way open for eventual peace negotiations, free of preconditions or created "facts". We hope that Syria for her part will make clear again her readiness to negotiate full peace with Israel, as part of a comprehensive settlement, and will confirm in specific terms her acceptance of Resolution 242.

i) Amongst the policy guidelines issued by the Begin government on 6 August was:

'Israel will not descend from the Golan Heights, nor will it remove any settlement established there. It is the government that will decide on the appropriate timing for the imposition of Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administration on the Golan Heights.'

ii) On 1 May 1968 Israel's Permanent Representative at the United Nations confirmed his government's 'acceptance of the resolution for the promotion of agreement on a just and lasting peace.'

iii) The preamble in paragraph 2 of the Framework for Peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David in 1978 states:

'The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.'

15 January 1982

THE GOLAN AREA

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 Miles

- Ottoman Administrative Boundaries.
- Franco-British Convention Line, Dec. 1920.
- Treaty Line, Feb. 1923; and Mandate Boundary.
- Armistice Line, 1949.

Demilitarized Zones, 1949.

Area of separation, 31 May 1974.



GOLAN HEIGHTS LAW - 5742/1981

Application
of the Law

1. "The law, jurisdiction and administration of the State shall apply to the Golan Heights, as described in the Appendix.

Validity

2. This Law shall become valid on the day of its passage in the Knesset.

Implementation
and Regulations

3. The Minister of the Interior shall be charged with the implementation of this Law, and he is entitled to enact regulations for its implementation."

Content of letter presented to The Secretary-General
of the United Nations on 29th December 1981 in New York

Ever since Israel's establishment in 1948, Syria has regarded itself as being in a state of war with Israel. It sought to prevent by force Israel's establishment before 1948, and having failed in that, attempted with other Arab states to destroy Israel. Between 1948 and 1967, Syrian tanks and artillery on the Golan Heights repeatedly bombarded the northern part of the country and harassed its population.

The Golan Heights Law - 5742/1981 was enacted almost fifteen years after the Six-day War of June 1967 which Syria and other Arab states forced upon Israel. Both before June 1967 and ever since, Syria has repeatedly rejected Israeli offers to negotiate peace. It has also refused to accept Security Council Resolution 242, which affirms the right of every state in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

Instead, Syria opened yet another all-out war against Israel in October 1973. In the wake of that aggression, Israel again sought to attain full and durable peace with Syria. In its quest for peace, Israel withdrew considerably from territory captured in its defensive operations in the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 as well as in those of 1967. Despite all this and in disregard of Security Council Resolution 338, which calls for negotiations for the establishment of peace, Syria has refused to go beyond agreements on a cease-fire and a disengagement of military forces. This Syrian position has placed the Golan Heights and its inhabitants in a limbo: if left to the policies of the present Syrian government, there would be no peace with Israel for generations to come.

It is preposterous that a state should be permitted to unleash repeated acts of aggression with the aim of conquering and even destroying a neighbouring country, and then, having been repulsed, should be permitted to invoke international law in a selective and distorted manner, and to find fault with legislation which seeks, in the absence of peace or even of negotiations aimed at reaching peace, to normalize the situation in the area in question. This Syrian attitude would appear to violate Article 2 (2) of the Charter which states that:

"All members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter."

In the view of the Government of Israel, recent Syrian acts and declarations have made it urgently necessary to bring to an end the anomalous situation regarding the Golan Heights. The Government of Israel could not wait endlessly for Syria to begin to show political will to make peace and agree on secure boundaries. Israel cannot be expected to maintain indefinitely a military administration merely to accommodate Syria's interest in persistent conflict. It is therefore greatly regretted that the Security Council should have passed a resolution which ignores this background.

The Israel legislation in question does not in the slightest manner diminish the rights of the local population, including, of course, their property rights, and their right to education and religious worship according to their traditions. All these are fully safeguarded.

The Government of Israel wishes to reiterate that it is willing, now as always, to negotiate unconditionally with Syria, as with its other neighbours, for a lasting peace, in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The Golan Heights Law does not preclude or impair such negotiations.

The Government of Israel expresses the hope that any further consideration by the Security Council of this matter will focus constructively on the attainment of peace through negotiations between the states directly concerned, and on the prevention of the threat or use of force.



UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/497 (1981)
17 December 1981

RESOLUTION 497 (1981)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2319th meeting,
on 17 December 1981

The Security Council,

Having considered the letter of 14 December 1981 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic contained in document S/14791,

Reaffirming that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, the principles of international law, and relevant Security Council resolutions,

1. Decides that the Israeli decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights is null and void and without international legal effect;
2. Demands that Israel, the occupying Power, should rescind forthwith its decision;
3. Determines that all the provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 continue to apply to the Syrian territory occupied by Israel since June 1967;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution within two weeks and decides that in the event of non-compliance by Israel, the Security Council would meet urgently, and not later than 5 January 1982, to consider taking appropriate measures in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 17 OF 13 JAN 82

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JORDAN/MIDDLE EAST

JORDAN/ISRAEL

1. I SAW KING HUSSEIN ON THE EVENING OF 12 JANUARY. AFTER WARMLY WELCOMING YOUR PROPOSED VISIT TO JORDAN IN APRIL WHICH HE INTENDED DISCUSSING WITH HIS FOREIGN MINISTER LATER IN THE EVENING, THE KING REFERRED TO WHAT HE TERMED THE VERY DISTURBING INCIDENT REPORTED IN MY TELNO 12 (IN WHICH 6 ISRAELI HELICOPTERS HAD FLOWN OVER JORDANIAN AND SAUDI TERRITORY ON THE NIGHT OF 10 JANUARY AND HAD SPENT SEVERAL HOURS IN IRAQ BEFORE RETURNING BY A SIMILAR ROUTE). HE WAS STILL COMPLETELY IN THE DARK AS TO WHAT THE PURPOSE OF THEIR MISSION WAS AND HAD APPARENTLY RECEIVED NO INFORMATION FROM THE IRAQIS. BUT IT FOLLOWED ON TWO OTHER RECENT ISRAELI AERIAL INCURSIONS (SEE JEDDA TELNO U2G/026 OF 12 JANUARY), AND THE KING SPECULATED THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT EITHER BE PREPARING FOR ANOTHER MAJOR OPERATION AGAINST IRAQ OR THAT THE MISSION HAD SOME INCKOWN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSE, OR POSSIBLY BOTH. A THIRD POSSIBILITY WAS THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE SIMPLY TRYING TO PROVOKE THE ARABS INTO PROVIDING THEM WITH AN EXCUSE TO STAGE A MAJOR RETALIATORY INCIDENT. HE AGREED WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD MADE LITTLE OR NO ATTEMPT TO CONCEAL THE FLIGHT, BUT SAID THAT THE HELICOPTERS WOULD HAVE BEEN FLYING VERY LOW AND WOULD THEREFORE PROBABLY HAVE ESCAPED RADAR DETECTION. THE KING REVEALED THAT THE JORDANIANS HAD FIRED ON THE HELICOPTERS ON THEIR RETURN JOURNEY, BUT CLAIMED THAT THEY HAD BEEN OUT OF RANGE. HE TOLD ME THAT THE JORDANIANS HAD OBSERVED A HEAVY BUILD-UP TO THE OPERATION, AND ASKED IF WE COULD OFFER ANY EXPLANATION OF WHAT THE ISRAELIS WERE DOING. HE SAID THAT ALL THIS, TAKEN TOGETHER WITH OTHER ISRAELI MILITARY MOVES OPPOSITE SYRIA AND JORDAN IN RECENT WEEKS AND THE ANNEXATION OF GOLAN, MADE HIM VERY UNEASY.

SAUDI ARABIA

2. COMMENTING ON HIS RECENT VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA ON 7/8 JANUARY, THE KING SAID IT HAD ON THE WHOLE BEEN A SATISFACTORY VISIT AND HE HAD SEEN KING KHALED AND PRINCES SULTAN, TURKI BIN FEISAL AND ABDULLAH, BUT NOT PRINCE FAHD (IT MUST HAVE BEEN A DISAPPOINTMENT TO HIM NOT TO SEE FAHD, AS IT IS OF COURSE WITH

CONFIDENTIAL

/ HIM IN

HIM IN PARTICULAR THAT THE KING WOULD HAVE WANTED TO DISCUSS WHAT SHOULD BE DONE BETWEEN NOW AND ~~THE~~ RECONVENING OF THE FEZ SUMMIT CONFERENCE). HE HOPED THAT PRINCE FAHD WOULD SHORTLY PAY A VISIT TO JORDAN. THE KING CLAIMED THAT THE SAUDIS SEEMED QUITE DETERMINED TO PURSUE THE COURSE AGREED BETWEEN PRINCE FAHD, KING HASSAN AND HIMSELF AT RABAT, THAT THEY HAD AGREED THAT THE FEZ SUMMIT SHOULD NOT BE RECONVENED UNTIL AFTER THE COMPLETION OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI AND THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE SHOULD BE DONE TO RALLY THE MODERATE ARABS IN THE MEANWHILE. THE KING TOLD ME THAT HE HAD SENSED PRINCE ABDULLAH WAS RATHER OUT OF STEP WITH THE OTHERS SEMICOLON HE HAD LEARNED THAT IT WAS APPARENTLY PRINCE ABDULLAH WHO HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN RESUMING RELATIONS WITH LIBYA, AND THAT THIS HAD CAUSED SOME EMBARRASSMENT TO THE OTHER SAUDI LEADERS AS IT WAS DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN PUBLICLY THE SUDDEN SWITCHES IN SAUDI POLICY INVOLVED. THE SAUDIS HAD CLAIMED TO THE KING THAT THEY WERE NOT INTENDING TO PAY FURTHER SUMS OF MONEY TO SYRIA, BUT HE GAVE ME THE IMPRESSION THAT HE DID NOT ALTOGETHER BELIEVE THEIR ASSURANCES ON THIS SUBJECT.

IRAQ

3. THE KING TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD BE VISITING IRAQ ON 16 JANUARY (PRESUMABLY THE VISIT HE HAD BEEN HOPING TO PAY BEFORE CHRISTMAS--SEE MY TELNO 486 OF 13 DECEMBER 1981). HE SAID THE IRAQIS WERE ACHIEVING AIR SUPERIORITY UP TO A DISTANCE OF ABOUT 150 MILES BEHIND THE IRANIAN LINES, BUT THAT RECENTLY THEIR AIRCRAFT HAD BEGUN TO BE SHOT DOWN BY MISSILES FIRED WITH UNUSUAL ACCURACY. THE IRAQIS THEMSELVES SUSPECTED THAT THIS MIGHT BE DUE TO ISRAELI TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SEMICOLON HE WAS AFRAID THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT RETALIATE IN SOME WAY, AND FEARED THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES.

4. THE KING SAID THAT JORDANIAN AIR FORCE TECHNICIANS WERE AT PRESENT IN IRAQ, HELPING TO REPAIR 20 OLD IRAQI HUNTER AIRCRAFT WHICH THE IRAQIS WERE INTENDING TO BRING BACK INTO USE.

SYRIA

5. HE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO IMPROVEMENT WHATEVER IN JORDANIAN RELATIONS WITH SYRIA. THINGS REMAINED AS BAD AS EVER, AND HE DID NOT AT PRESENT SEE ANYTHING HE COULD DO TO IMPROVE MATTERS.

6. I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY COMMENTS MADE BY THE KING ON THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S RECENT VISIT TO JORDAN AND ON JORDANIAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

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7. AT THE END, THE KING REVERTED TO RECENT ISRAELI ACTIONS: OVERFLIGHTS OF JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAQ, ANNEXATION OF THE GOLAN, REINFORCEMENT OF THEIR FORCES ON VARIOUS FRONTS. HE KEPT REPEATING THAT THERE MUST BE SOMETHING BEHIND ALL THIS AND THAT HE HAD AN UNEASY FEELING THAT WE MIGHT ALL BE IN FOR A NASTY SURPRISE. THE CONTINUING WAR WITH IRAN WAS A SERIOUS SOURCE OF WEAKNESS FOR THE ARABS AND HE WISHED SOMETHING COULD BE DONE TO STOP IT. AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED, 1982 HAD GOT OFF TO A DIFFICULT START.

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IRAQ/IRAN

[NOT ADVANCED]

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JP

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 January 1982

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT NIMEIRI

Thank you for your letter of 8 January about the above.

I enclose a reply to President Nimeiri which the Prime Minister has signed. I agree with the procedure for handling this which you suggest in your last paragraph.

A. J. COLES

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

✓ cc Master
Ofs



JR

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 4A/82.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

12 January 1982

Dear Mr. President

Thank you for your message of 23 December, which was delivered through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 5 January, about the Israeli action in the Golan Heights. As you will know, the United Kingdom relinquished the Presidency of the European Community on 31 December. Our position and that of our partners was, however, made known in a statement by the Foreign Ministers of the Community on 15 December.

We made clear then how strongly we deplored the decision of the government and Knesset of Israel to extend Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration to occupied Syrian territory in the Golan Heights. We regard the extension, which is tantamount to annexation, as being contrary to international law and therefore invalid in the eyes of the European Community member states. We believe that the Israeli action prejudices the possibility of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and is bound to complicate further the search for the comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East to which we all remain committed.

May I take this opportunity to offer you my best wishes in what I know are difficult times for your country.

Yours sincerely
Rajiv Gandhi

His Excellency Sayed Gaafar Mohammed Nimeiri

JR

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

President Nimeiri of Sudan

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your message of 23 December about the Israeli action in the Golan Heights, which was delivered through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 5 January. As you will know, the United Kingdom relinquished the Presidency of the European Community on 31 December. Our position and that of our partners was, however, made known in a statement by the Foreign Ministers of the Community on 15 December.

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Enclosures—flag(s).....

May I take this opportunity to offer you my best wishes in what I know are difficult times for your country.

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FM DAMASCUS 111445Z JAN 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 8 OF 11 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK AND TEL AVIV.

INFO SAVING OTHER ME POSTS, MOSCOW, PARIS AND WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO 9 :-

GOLAN HEIGHTS

1. SYRIAN PRESS AND TELEVISION COMMENTARY HAS STATED UNANIMOUSLY OVER THE LAST THREE DAYS THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE AND VOTE WILL ALLOW ALL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THOSE WHO SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY, AND HENCE THE IMPOSITION OF MANDATORY SANCTIONS ON ISRAEL TO FORCE HER TO RESPECT THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION, AND THOSE WHO DO NOT AND ARE THUS ACCOMPLICES IN ISRAEL'S ANNEXATION OF THE GOLAN. THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT'S POSITION APPEARS TO HAVE HARDENED IN THIS RESPECT, AND THE CHANCES OF THEIR AUTHORIZING FATTAL TO DROP ANY REFERENCE TO MANDATORY SANCTIONS ARE RECEDING, IF THEY EVER EXISTED. THEY

AND THE CHANCES OF THEIR AUTHORIZING FATTAL TO DROP ANY REFERENCE TO MANDATORY SANCTIONS ARE RECEDING, IF THEY EVER EXISTED. THEY NOW REGARD AN US VETO AS CERTAIN BUT APPEAR TO BELIEVE THAT THIS WILL HELP THEM CHANGE THE ATTITUDE OF THE MODERATE ARAB STATES.

2. THERE IS NO CLEAR INDICATION YET OF THE REASON FOR KHADDAM'S TRIP TO SAUDI ARABIA AND BAHRAIN. IT IS A FAIR ASSUMPTION THAT IN THE LATTER HE WILL BE REPORTING ON DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER. BUT, INPRECEDENTEDLY, IT HAS BEEN SIGNALLED IN ADVANCE THAT HIS FORTHCOMING OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE USSR IS FOR CONSULTATIONS UNDER THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAS TOLD SOME COLLEAGUES THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE BEEN PRESSING FOR THESE, RELATED TO THE GOLAN AND INCLUDING THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS FOR TWO WEEKS BUT HE STILL HAS NO CLEAR IDEA WHAT THEY WANT. THE LOCAL PRESS HAS NOT REPRODUCED A PRESS AGENCY REPORT QUOTING KHADDAM AS SAYING TO A SAUDI NEWSPAPER THAT SYRIA WISHED TO SIGN A STRATEGIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AFTER CONSULTING THE ARAB BRETHREN.

3. THE INDIAN AMBASSADOR TELLS ME THAT ON 8 JANUARY PRESIDENT ASAD TOLD THE SPEAKER OF THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT THAT HE REGARDED THE GOLAN ANNEXATION AS A TEST CASE FOR AMERICAN INTENTIONS. IF THE USA COULD NOT TAKE A STAND ON SUCH A CLEAR-CUT BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THEN ASAD THOUGHT THAT ONLY ARMED CONFLICT COULD PRODUCE PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE DID NOT INDICATE THAT THIS WAS IN IMMEDIATE PROSPECT.

4. ONE REASON FOR CURRENT SYRIAN TOUGHNESS MAY WELL BE THAT THEY SEE THIS AS A LAST CHANCE TO SHIFT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY AND HAD HOPES THAT A ONE TERM PRESIDENT COULD AFFORD TO BE LESS CONCILIATORY TO ISRAEL THAN A MAN WHO WOULD HAVE TO SEEK REELECTION. ASAD MAY ALSO BE USING THE SOVIET BOGEY IN AN ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE REAGAN NOT TO RETURN TO BUSINESS AS USUAL WITH ISRAEL AFTER THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE. BUT THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THIS IS A WIDELY AND DEEPLY FELT ISSUE AMONG THE POPULATION AT LARGE AND THAT THE FACTS BEING CREATED BY THE ISRAELI CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION IN THE GOLAN ARE RESENTED. ISRAELI SPECULATION THAT GOLANI DRUZE MAY NOW BE CALLED UP INTO THE ISRAELI ARMY, FOR INSTANCE, AND CIVIL DEFENCE EXERCISES IN MAJD ASH SHAMS ARE HIGHLY PROVOCATIVE.

5. MEANWHILE IT HAS BEEN REPORTED HERE THAT A GROUP OF BRITISH CONSERVATIVE MPS HAS VISITED THE GOLAN UNDER ISRAELI AUSPICES, EXPRESSED ITS SUPPORT FOR THE ISRAELI DECISION AND URGED THE

DEFENCE EXERCISES IN MAJD ASH SHAMS ARE HIGHLY PROVOCATIVE.

5. MEANWHILE IT HAS BEEN REPORTED HERE THAT A GROUP OF BRITISH CONSERVATIVE MPS HAS VISITED THE GOLAN UNDER ISRAELI AUSPICES, EXPRESSED ITS SUPPORT FOR THE ISRAELI DECISION AND URGED THE ISRAELIS TO STAND BY IT AS TO ABANDON IT WOULD BE SUICIDE. THIS IS PRESUMABLY THE GROUP MENTIONED IN YOUR TELNO 207 TO TEL AVIV. IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO KNOW JUST WHAT THE GROUP SAID, IN CASE THE SYRIANS RAISE IT WITH ME.

FCO PASS SAVING TO OTHER ME POSTS, MOSCOW, PARIS AND WASHINGTON.

MARSHALL

NNNN

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 January 1982

Dear John,

The Minister in the Sudanese Embassy called on the Head of Near East and North Africa Department on 5 January to deliver the attached message to the Prime Minister from President Nimeiri, expressing Sudanese concern at the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights. The Embassy's covering note is dated 5 January, but the President's letter was written on 23 December and is addressed to the Prime Minister as the 'current Chairman of the European Economic Community'. The wording of the message suggests that similar messages have been sent to other EC members. Subject to the Prime Minister's views we believe that the contents of the message should be made known to our European partners on a confidential basis.

I attach a draft of a reply which the Prime Minister could send to President Nimeiri which, we suggest, should be forwarded to the Sudanese under cover of a note to their Embassy in London, the text being copied to our Ambassador in Khartoum.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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Middle East

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 74 OF 8 JANUARY
INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, TEL AVIV AND AMMAN

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

AUTONOMY TALKS

1. KEMP (HSC), WHO IS TO ACCOMPANY HAIG ON HIS VISITS TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL NEXT WEEK, TOLD US TODAY THAT HAIG HAD DECIDED THAT THE AMERICANS MUST MAKE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO PROMOTE AN AUTONOMY AGREEMENT BEFORE APRIL. HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP WOULD BE DIFFICULT, NOT LEAST BECAUSE IT WOULD BE HIS FIRST EXPERIENCE OF GRAPPLING WITH THE DETAIL OF THIS INTRACTABLE PROBLEM.

2. KEMP SAID THAT THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WAS THE MUTUAL SUSPICION OF THE TWO SIDES. IF THIS COULD BE ALLAYED, HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE COULD BE REACHED VERY QUICKLY. HAIG'S AIMS WERE TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE SERIOUS ABOUT REACHING AN AUTONOMY AGREEMENT AND NOT JUST WAITING FOR THE

~~AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE COULD BE REACHED VERY QUICKLY. HAIG'S ATMS WERE TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE SERIOUS ABOUT REACHING AN AUTONOMY AGREEMENT AND NOT JUST WAITING UNTIL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI WHEN THE PRESSURE ON THIS WOULD BE OFF, AND TO PERSUADE THE EGYPTIANS THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE PREPARED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO REACH AGREEMENT BEFORE APRIL.~~

3. KEMP IS UNDER NO ILLUSION ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES. HE ADMITTED THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE NO CLEAR INDICATION OF BEGIN'S INTENTIONS. THEY HAD NOTED THAT WHENEVER HE WAS PHYSICALLY ILL HE TOOK A POLITICALLY TOUGHER STANCE - AS OVER THE GOLAN. ON THE OTHER HAND HIS GOLAN POLICY AND SUBSEQUENT ROW WITH THE AMERICANS HAD INCURRED CONSIDERABLE CRITICISM WITHIN ISRAEL AND HE HAD SHOWN SIGNS OF A MORE REASONABLE APPROACH IN A RECENT THREE-HOUR DISCUSSION WITH SENATOR PERCY. US AMBASSADOR LEWIS WAS RETURNING TO TEL AVIV THIS WEEKEND WITH A FIRM MESSAGE TO BEGIN, KEMP HOPED THAT BEGIN MIGHT BE PREPARED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS OVER BOTH THE POWERS OF THE PROPOSED SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY AND VOTING RIGHTS FOR ARAB RESIDENTS OF EAST JERUSALEM (NOTWITHSTANDING HIS RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE LATTER POINT). KEMP ADDED THAT THE IMPORTANT ISSUE FOR THE EGYPTIANS WAS THE RESIDUAL POWERS OF THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES RATHER THAN THE POWERS OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY. HE CONCLUDED HOWEVER THAT A MOVE OF BEGIN'S OFFICE TO EAST JERUSALEM, WHICH LEWIS HAS EVIDENTLY PREDICTED, COULD UPSET THE APPLECART.

4. KEMP CONFIRMED THAT HAIG HAS TAKEN NO DECISION ON THE POSSIBLE APPOINTMENT OF A US SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR FOR THE AUTONOMY TALKS. HE SAID THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE FIRMLY OPPOSED TO THIS, LEST IT APPEAR THAT THEY WERE BEING PRESSURED INTO MAKING CONCESSIONS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PALESTINIANS BEFORE AND IN RETURN FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SINAI.

THOMAS

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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 016 OF 7 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, THE HAGUE, ROME

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE TO MR HAIG WHICH I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD DELIVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE:

BEGINS. I KNOW FROM NICKO HENDERSON'S REPORT OF THE AMBASSADORS' LUNCH WITH YOU ON 28 DECEMBER HOW CONCERNED YOU ARE THAT THE REPLY FROM THE FOUR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO THE ISRAELIS ON THE SINAI MFO HAS BEEN DELAYED. I SHARE YOUR ANXIETY, AND THE EGYPTIANS', THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD BE GIVEN NO EXCUSE TO RENEGE ON THEIR COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW AND I SHOULD LIKE TO SEE THE QUESTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION SETTLED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WE HAVE A NUMBER OF LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES WHICH WE NEED TO RESOLVE WITH THE MFO DIRECTOR-GENERAL AND TIME IS GETTING SHORT.

I AM SURE YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT THE GOLAN BUSINESS HAS BEEN GENUINELY AWKWARD FOR US IN THIS RESPECT (AS IN SEVERAL OTHERS). BUT THE ARGUMENTS YOU HAVE PUT TO US, TOGETHER WITH OUR OWN ASSESSMENT, HAVE CONVINCED US THAT IT WOULD BE WRONG TO DELAY THE REPLY ANY LONGER. I HAVE BEEN PRESSING OUR PARTNERS TO AGREE THAT IT SHOULD BE SENT, IF POSSIBLE IN TIME FOR THE ISRAELI CABINET TO CONSIDER IT ON 17 JANUARY. BUT CLAUDE CHEYSSON STILL HAS DIFFICULTIES WITH THIS. I AM TODAY INSTRUCTING OUR AMBASSADOR IN PARIS TO MAKE A FURTHER EFFORT TO OVERCOME THESE, AND WILL LET YOU KNOW IF WE SUCCEED. BUT IF WE HAVE STILL MADE NO HEADWAY BY THEN, I THINK IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF YOU COULD FIND TIME TO HAVE A WORD WITH CLAUDE IN BRUSSELS ON MONDAY. ENDS.

CARRINGTON

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FM FCO 071015Z JAN 82

TO PRIORITY PARIS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 005 OF 7 JANUARY

INFO WASHINGTON, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, THE HAGUE, ROME.

YOUR TELNOS. 003 AND 006: SINAI MFO

1. THESE ACCOUNTS OF FRENCH UNWILLINGNESS TO PROCEED, PARTICULARLY YOUR TELNO 006, ARE DISTURBING. THE FRENCH HAVE TAKEN A LONG TIME TO REALISE PRECISELY WHAT THEY ARE COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO IN CONTRIBUTING TO THE SINAI FORCE UNDER THE RELEVANT AGREEMENTS.

2. WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE AMERICANS THAT HAIG IS LIKELY TO BE IN ISRAEL NEXT WEEK AND IS VERY KEEN THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET MEETING ON 17 JANUARY, AT THE LATEST, SHOULD HAVE A EUROPEAN REPLY TO CONSIDER. THERE IS MUCH LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE WORK TO BE DONE BEFORE CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES CAN GET THEIR UNITS IN PLACE AND WE ARE ANXIOUS NOT TO DELAY MUCH LONGER. PROVIDED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON THE GOLAN DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS DOES NOT SOUR THE ATMOSPHERE SO BADLY THAT IT CONSTRAINS US FROM MAKING A FURTHER MOVE ON THE MFO, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO GIVE THE ISRAELIS A REPLY BY FRIDAY, 15 JANUARY.

3. PLEASE PUT THESE POINTS TO THE FRENCH AND ARGUE FIRMLY AGAINST FURTHER DELAY. IF THE FRENCH APPEAR ADAMANT THAT IT IS TOO EARLY FOR THEM TO MAKE A DECISION, AND IF THEY CONTINUE TO SHOW DOUBTS ABOUT THE WORDING OF THE DRAFT REPLY ON WHICH THE FOUR HAVE AGREED, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE WOULD BE MOST RELUCTANT TO REOPEN THE QUESTION OF THE TERMS OF OUR REPLY AND THAT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WAITING LONGER WILL MAKE THINGS ANY EASIER. IF APPROPRIATE YOU SHOULD SAY THAT IN OUR VIEW DELAYING THE ARRIVAL OF PARTICIPANTS BEYOND 20 MARCH WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE COMMIT-

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MENT THE 4 HAVE UNDERTAKEN, AND WOULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE THE CONTRIBUTION WE ARE MAKING TO THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF THE FORCE. WE HAVE ACQUIESCED IN THE FRENCH WISH TO DELAY OUR NEXT MOVE UNTIL THE GOLAN DEBATE IS OVER, BUT WE DO NOT ACCEPT THE NEED FOR LONGER DELAY: IF THE FRENCH ARE UNWILLING TO ACT AS AGREED WE BELIEVE THE POSITION MUST BE EXPLAINED TO THE AMERICANS WHO HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SETTING UP THE FORCE.

CARRINGTON

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SUBJECT.

10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 1 8/82

THE PRIME MINISTER

7 January 1982

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Egypt: visit to UK by Mubarak: Nov 81

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for the kind message which your Ambassador delivered to me on 17 December. I am glad that we have been able to help by offering a contribution to the Multi-national Force and Observers. We are aware of the importance your Government attaches to the final withdrawal from Sinai and it is our firm hope that it will take place on schedule and according to plan. We and our European partners will continue in other ways to help progress towards a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, on the basis of the principles set out in the Venice Declaration. Egypt's role remains crucial and I know your efforts will be directed at the same end.

I very much hope that you will be able to come here next month and look forward to seeing you then.

Yours sincerely,

MT

His Excellency Mr. Mohammed Hosni Mubarak

JK

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Middle East

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 070107Z JAN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 20 DATED 6 JANUARY 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, PARIS, TEL AVIV, ROUTINE: DUBLIN, JEDDA, AMMAN, CAIRO, BEIRUT, MADRID, TOKYO, KINSHASA, PANAMA CITY.

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MY TELNO 15 (NOT TO ALL): SECURITY COUNCIL; GOLAN HEIGHTS

1. THE FORMAL DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OPENED THIS AFTERNOON (6 JANUARY) WITH A LONG AND EMOTIONAL STATEMENT BY FATTAL (SYRIA). HE STRONGLY ATTACKED ISRAELI JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THEIR ACTION. IT WAS ISRAEL, NOT SYRIA, THAT HAD VIOLATED THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT ON THEIR COMMON BORDER AFTER 1948. ISRAEL HAD DELIBERATELY ACTED TO ERODE THE AGREEMENT AS PAST SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS (AND UNTSO REPORTS) SHOWED. ISRAEL'S CLAIM TO BE "NORMALISING" THE SITUATION IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS WAS A SUBTEXT FOR ANNEXATION.

THE SITUATION IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS WAS A EUPHEMISM FOR ANNEXATION. THE SYRIAN POPULATION THERE WERE BEING DEPRIVED OF THEIR RIGHTS. PEACE FOR THE ISRAELIS MEANT ARAB SURRENDER, BUT SYRIA (SAID FATTAL, BANGING THE TABLE) WOULD NEVER CAPITULATE. THE U S REFUSED TO UNDERSTAND THE ARAB POSITION AND PROVIDED ISRAEL WITH UNLIMITED SUPPORT, THEREBY ENCOURAGING ISRAELI ESCALATION. ITS STAND ON THIS ISSUE WOULD BE A TEST OF U S WILLINGNESS TO RESIST ISRAELI PRESSURES. ISRAEL HAD FLOUTED SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 497 AND THE COUNCIL MUST THEREFORE TAKE CONCRETE MEASURES. ANNEXATION HAD BEEN CLEARLY DEFINED IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3314 (1974) AS AN ACT OF AGGRESSION AND, IF THE COUNCIL ALLOWED ISRAEL TO GO UNPUNISHED THE UN WOULD LOSE ALL RESPECT, AND FORCE WOULD PREVAIL OVER INTERNATIONAL LAW. SYRIA DEMANDED ITS RIGHT THAT THE COUNCIL FULFIL ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 41 TO COMPEL ISRAEL TO RESCIND ITS DECISION, WITHDRAW FROM THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AND DISMANTLE ITS SETTLEMENTS THERE. IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL FAILED TO DO THIS, SYRIA RESERVED ITS RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 51 TO DEAL WITH THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION. SYRIA DEMANDED THAT ISRAEL BE DEPRIVED OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, ARMS AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. ISRAEL'S ALLIES AND PROTECTORS SHOULD NOT ENCOURAGE IT TO BELIEVE IT WAS ABOVE THE LAW.

2. BLUM (ISRAEL) REPLIED THAT THE ROOT PROBLEM WAS SYRIA'S RELENTLESS ENMITY TOWARDS ISRAEL. AND ITS REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE. SYRIA ITSELF WAS AN AGGRESSOR AND HAD QUOTED SELECTIVELY FROM RESOLUTION 3314 TO DISGUISE THIS. THE ARAB STATES HAD SET OUT TO DESTROY ISRAEL BY FORCE OF ARMS IN VIOLATION OF THE UN CHARTER. THE GOLAN HEIGHTS WERE A FORTIFIED BRIDGEHEAD FOR AGGRESSION AGAINST ISRAEL. SYRIA HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT S C RESOLUTION 242 AND ISRAEL COULD NOT WAIT FOR SYRIA TO SHOW THE POLITICAL WILL TO NEGOTIATE NOR COULD ISRAEL BE EXPECTED TO MAINTAIN MILITARY ADMINISTRATION INDEFINITELY ON THE HEIGHTS TO SUIT SYRIA. THE ISRAELI ACTION IN NO WAY DIMINISHED THE RIGHTS OF THE INHABITANTS THERE. THE COUNCIL'S DEBATE SHOULD FOCUS ON NEGOTIATIONS. ISRAEL REITERATED THAT IT WAS READY TO NEGOTIATE UNCONDITIONALLY WITH SYRIA FOR A LASTING PEACE IN ACCORDANCE WITH S C RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. BUT SYRIA HAD FAILED TO RESPOND.

3. OF THE OTHER SPEAKERS, JORDAN CALLED FOR EARLY SANCTIONS AND SAID THAT ANNEXATION CONSTITUTED AN ACT OF AGGRESSION AND THREAT TO THE PEACE. ISRAEL HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE COUNCIL'S FAILURE TO TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION. "ONE OF THE MAJOR POWERS" HAD INDICATED RELUCTANCE TO GO ALONG WITH THE PROPOSED DRAFT RESOLUTION. KUWAIT TOO CALLED FOR FULL SANCTIONS AND REFERRED TO THE DOUBLE STANDARDS OF "SOME POWERS", WHO HASTENED TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON CERTAIN COUNTRIES BUT REFUSED TO DO SO ON ISRAEL. LAOS SUPPORTED

STANDARDS OF "SOME POWERS", WHO HASTENED TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON CERTAIN COUNTRIES BUT REFUSED TO DO SO ON ISRAEL. LAOS SUPPORTED THE CALL FOR APPROPRIATE MEASURES UNDER CHAPTER VII. SENEGAL HOWEVER, IN A MODERATE SPEECH, MADE NO DIRECT REFERENCE TO SANCTIONS.

4. TROYANOVSKY (USSR) HAS SET THE NEXT MEETING FOR 2030Z TOMORROW AFTERNOON (7 JANUARY). THE SYRIANS HAVE BEEN BEATING THE BUSHES FOR SPEAKERS. WE EXPECT THE LIST WILL THEREFORE EXTEND WELL BEYOND TOMORROW. IT IS INTERESTING THAT THE RUSSIANS APPEAR TO BE DELIBERATELY SPINNING OUT THE PROCEEDINGS WHEN ONE MIGHT HAVE THOUGHT THEY WOULD WISH TO SEE THE SYRIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION PUSHED TO AN EARLY VOTE.

5. DRAPER HAS TACKLED THE FRENCH FROM WASHINGTON. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE KNEW ABOUT THEIR APPROACH TO FATTAL AND THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH US. THE FRENCH MISSION HERE ARE UPSET BY THE SPEED OF THIS LEAK WHICH THEY BELIEVE MAY HAVE ORIGINATED IN PARIS. MEANWHILE, THE FRENCH HAVE GOT NO FURTHER WITH FATTAL WHO HAS BEEN IN A BAD MOOD TODAY.

6. IN A COMMUNIQUE ISSUED LAST NIGHT THE NAM EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR SYRIA, INCLUDING THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL. AT THE NAM MEETING ZAIRE APPARENTLY URGED MODERATION AND THE MAINTENANCE OF UNANIMITY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. I AM TOLD THAT THE ARABS ARE NOW GANGING UP WITH OTHER AFRICANS TO PRESSURISE ZAIRE.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 003 OF 5 JANUARY 1982

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON TEL AVIV CAIRO

CAIRO TELNO 1 TO FCO: SINAI MFO

1. AS THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IS STILL BEING OBSTRUCTIVE OVER THE QUESTION OF AN EARLY REPLY TO MR SHAMIR, YOU MAY LIKE TO HAVE A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF FRENCH MOTIVATION.

2. I NOTE (FROM MOBERLY'S LETTER TO PETRIE OF 24 DECEMBER) THAT THE OVERWHELMING IMPRESSION IN LONDON OF FRENCH MIDDLE EAST POLICY IS ONE OF INCOHERENCE. I THINK IN FACT ITS OVERRIDING CHARACTERISTIC AT PRESENT IS OPPORTUNISM. THE MITTERRAND/MAUROY GOVERNMENT GIVES HIGH PRIORITY TO MAINTAINING AN APPEARANCE OF A VIGOROUS BUT INDEPENDENT FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME CLAIMING TO GET ON WELL WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS AND TRYING HARD NOT TO BE ON BAD TERMS WITH ANYONE IN THE THIRD WORLD. THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH THESE CONFLICTING AIMS CAN BE RECONCILED IS BY NOT FOLLOWING THROUGH REALLY EFFECTIVELY ANY PARTICULAR POLICY LINE AND FINDING WAYS OF PLEASING EACH DIPLOMATIC INTERLOCUTOR SEPARATELY.

3. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND IT IS NOT ONE OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S CONCERNS THAT THE SINAI MFO SHOULD BE REALLY EFFECTIVE. THIS IS A PROBLEM FOR THE US GOVERNMENT RATHER THAN FOR FRANCE. THE FRENCH WOULD NOT MIND ALL THAT MUCH IF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT VETOED EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO. FRANCE WOULD HAVE SHOWN WILLING AND ISRAEL WOULD HAVE SAVED FRANCE FROM DOING SOMETHING WHICH IS NOT POPULAR WITH THE ARABS. IN ANY CASE FRENCH INTEREST IS CLOSELY FOCUSED ON FRANCE'S OWN INDEPENDENT INITIATIVES, FOR EXAMPLE IN RELATION TO THE LEBANON.

4. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO CALCULATE THAT FRANCE'S REALTIONS WITH ISRAEL HAVE MOMENTUM OF THEIR OWN WHICH WOULD NOT BE MUCH AFFECTED BY AN ISRAELI VETO OF EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO. IT IS NOTICEABLE THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE TAKEN UMBRAGE AT REPORTS OF THE LIKELY POSTPONEMENT OF PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S VISIT TO ISRAEL BECAUSE OF ISRAEL'S ANNEXATION OF THE GOLAN (MY TELNO 1135 OF 1981).

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5. FRANCE SEEMS TO HAVE OBTAINED ALL SHE WANTED FROM EGYPT DURING THE RECENT VISITS THERE OF M. CHEYSSON AND M. HERNU (SALE OF 20 MIRAGE 2000) AND PROBABLY SEES NO POINT IN PLEASEING EGYPT GRATUITOUSLY AT THE EXPENSE OF DISPLEASEING OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES WHICH ARE ALREADY A LITTLE SORE ABOUT FRANCE'S RECENT PERFORMANCE.

6. ALL OF THIS MEANS THAT WHILE THERE MIGHT BE SOMETHING FOR THE MIDDLE EAST IN AN EARLY REPLY TO MR SHAMIR, THERE IS NOTHING IN IT FOR FRANCE IN THE SHORT TERM AND, UNLESS CIRCUMSTANCES CHANGE, THERE IS UNLIKELY TO BE HELPFUL FRENCH MOVE.

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TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2 OF 5 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, DUBLIN, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV.

INFO ROUTINE AMMAN, JEDDA, CAIRO, BEIRUT, MADRID, TOKYO, KINSHASA,
PANAMA CITY.

YOUR TELNOS 2 AND 3: SECURITY COUNCIL: GOLAN HEIGHTS

1. THERE IS NO QUESTION OF OUR SUPPORTING A RESOLUTION ON THE LINES OF THE SYRIAN DRAFT IN YOUR TELNO. 3. THE AMERICANS SEEM TO STAND A CHANCE OF DENYING SUCH A RESOLUTION THE NECESSARY NINE VOTES. WE SOUNDED PARIS AND DUBLIN BY TELEPHONE TODAY ABOUT THEIR INTENTIONS. BOTH SAID THAT, THOUGH FORMAL DECISIONS HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN, THEY WERE CONFIDENT THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS WOULD NOT VOTE FOR SANCTIONS. MORAN (DUBLIN) SAID HE EXPECTED HIS MINISTERS TO TAKE THE VIEW THAT THE ISRAELI ACTION WAS ILLEGAL AND THEREFORE CALLED FOR A FORMAL RESPONSE, BUT THAT IT HAD NOT ALTERED THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND AND SANCTIONS WOULD THEREFORE BE INAPPROPRIATE.
2. WE REMAIN INTERESTED IN THE IDEA OF AN ALTERNATIVE RESOLUTION. THE SAUDI SUGGESTIONS (MY TELNO. 1, PARA 2 - SEE ALSO MIFT, NOT TO ALL) ARE ATTRACTIVE, BUT WE WOULD EXPECT THE AMERICANS TO BE UNABLE TO GO AS FAR AS THE ARAB BOTTOM LINE. A RESOLUTION LEAVING THE CHOICE OF MEASURES AGAINST ISRAEL TO THE DISCRETION OF EACH COUNTRY WOULD IN ANY CASE PRESENT US WITH DIFFICULTIES WHILE WE REMAIN UNABLE TO IDENTIFY EFFECTIVE BUT ACCEPTABLE ACTION TO TAKE AGAINST ISRAEL OURSELVES.
3. RAPIN (PARIS) TOLD US THAT CHEYSSON ALSO WAS ATTRACTED BY THE SUGGESTION OF IMPROVING THE AMERICAN IDEAS FOR A DRAFT RESOLUTION BY INSERTING A REFERENCE TO PALESTINE. THE FRENCH WERE WORKING ON LANGUAGE. THEY HAD IN MIND DRAWING ON THE US/ SOVIET STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST OF 1 OCTOBER 1977, SINCE IT

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OFFERED REFERENCES TO THE PALESTINIANS WHICH BOTH GOVERNMENTS MIGHT STILL FIND ACCEPTABLE. RAPIN ALSO MENTIONED SC RESOLUTION 478 ON JERUSALEM AS A SOURCE. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF YOU COULD EXPLORE THESE IDEAS FURTHER WITH THE FRENCH (AND THE IRISH, IF INTERESTED). WE AGREE (YOUR TELNO 1620 OF 29 DECEMBER) THAT THIS KIND OF MOVE WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO SUCCEED IF A SYRIAN RESOLUTION WERE VETOED. NEVERTHELESS WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE SOMETHING UP OUR SLEEVES AND AN OPPORTUNITY MIGHT ARISE IF A SYRIAN RESOLUTION FAILED PROCEDURALLY. WE LEAVE IT TO YOUR DISCRETION AT WHAT POINT TO CONSULT THE AMERICANS. IF A 242 PLUS PALESTINIAN RIGHTS PROPOSAL WERE TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF MAKING AN IMPACT, IT WOULD PRESUMABLY BE BETTER NOT TO SPRING IT ON THEM AT THE LAST MOMENT.

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TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1 OF 4 JANUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV
ROUTINE JEDDA, AMMAN, CAIRO, BEIRUT, DUBLIN, MADRID, TOKYO,
KINSHASA, PANAMA CITY.

FROM NENAD

WASHINGTON TELNO. 4: SECURITY COUNCIL: GOLAN HEIGHTS

1. HOOPER OF THE US EMBASSY BRIEFED NENAD ON INSTRUCTIONS ON 4 JANUARY. THE MAIN MESSAGE FOR HMG WAS CONTINUED US DETERMINATION TO VETO ANY SANCTIONS RESOLUTION, AND THE HOPE THAT WE WOULD SUPPORT THE IDEA THAT IT WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO URGE STATES TO 'GIVE CONCRETE LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPRESSION, AS APPROPRIATE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, TO THE CONCEPT THAT THE KNESSET ACTION IS VOID FROM THE START.'

2. HOOPER SAID THAT THE US AMBASSADOR IN JEDDA SPOKE AGAIN TO MANSOURI ON 3 JANUARY. MANSOURI SAID THAT SAUDI ARABIA WAS ONE HUNDRED PER CENT AGAINST A US VETO. HE ARGUED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD GAINED FROM SUPPORTING SC RESOLUTION 497 AND BY THEIR UNILATERAL ACTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL, AND SHOULD ON NO ACCOUNT RISK LOSING WHAT THEY HAD GAINED. HE HINTED THAT THE SYRIAN POSITION ON SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS WAS AN OPENING BID AND THAT SYRIA COULD BE PERSUADED TO ACCEPT LESS. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HE URGED THE AMERICANS TO PUT FORWARD A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD 'COMMIT' ALL STATES TO WHATEVER 'PROCEDURES OR SANCTIONS' THEY THOUGHT EFFECTIVE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 497, LEAVING THIS TO THE DISCRETION OF EACH COUNTRY. MURPHY ARGUED THAT IT WAS US ACTIONS THAT HAD BROUGHT ISRAEL TO RESTATE, IN ITS MESSAGE TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL (MY TELNO. 2009 TO WASHINGTON) ITS READINESS TO NEGOTIATE UNCONDITIONALLY WITH

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SYRIA. MANSOURI SUGGESTED THAT THE US AND OTHERS SHOULD SAY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT THIS TERMINOLOGY REPRESENTED A 'RETREAT FROM ISRAELI ANNEXATION OF THE GOLAN'.

3. MURPHY ASKED THE SAUDIS TO URGE SYRIA TO REMAIN FLEXIBLE. MANSOURI UNDERTOOK TO SPEAK TO PRINCE SAUD BUT COMMENTED THAT THE US PROPOSALS WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIC AND OFFERED NO REAL ALTERNATIVE TO SANCTIONS.

4. ON 2 JANUARY THE US AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO SPOKE TO KAMAL HASSAN ALI AND BUTROS GHALI. GHALI REJECTED THE US IDEA THAT THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE WHAT THE ISRAELIS HAD DONE AS A FACT, AND ARGUED THAT WHAT THEY HAD DONE WAS NULL AND VOID BECAUSE IT WAS ILLEGAL AND SHOULD BE PUNISHED FOR THE SAME REASON. ALI SAID THAT, WITHOUT SANCTIONS, ISRAEL WOULD SIMPLY DO WHAT SHE WANTED.

5. IT SEEMS THAT THE AMERICANS LIKE US HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO FIND A REALISTIC COURSE OF ACTION, GIVEN ON THE ONE HAND THEIR REJECTION OF SANCTIONS AND ON THE OTHER THE DANGER THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL SIMPLY GET AWAY WITH THIS AND GO ON FOR MORE E.G. ON THE WEST BANK OR GAZA (DAMASCUS TELNO. 1). WE SEE SOME VALUE IN SAUDI IDEAS E.G.

THAT OF IMPLICITLY CHALLENGING THE ISRAELIS TO DENY THAT THEY HAVE IN FACT RETREATED FROM THEIR INITIAL POSITION ON GOLAN. BUT WE EXPECT THAT MINISTERS, WHO WILL BE REVIEWING THE QUESTION ON 5 JANUARY, WILL PREFER TO LET THE AMERICANS MAKE THE RUNNING FOR THE PRESENT.

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TELNO 01 OF 02 JANUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.
INFO ROUTINE TEL AVIV
INFO SAVING OTHER ME POSTS.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 2009 TO WASHINGTON

SECURITY COUNCIL GOLAN HEIGHTS.

1. DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUMMONED FRENCH CHARGE AND MYSELF TODAY 2 JANUARY. HE REMINDED US THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE MEETING ON 5 JANUARY TO CONSIDER WHAT MEASURES SHOULD BE APPLIED TO ISRAEL IN VIEW OF HER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RESOLUTION 497. SYRIA WOULD BE PUTTING FORWARD A DRAFT RESOLUTION ASKING FOR APPLICATION OF CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER. HER AMBASSADOR IN NEW YORK WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH OUR DELEGATION. SHE HOPED THAT FRANCE AND THE UK WOULD SUPPORT IT. WE UNDERTOOK TO REPORT URGENTLY

AMBASSADOR IN NEW YORK WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH OUR DELEGATION. SHE HOPED THAT FRANCE AND THE UK WOULD SUPPORT IT. WE UNDERTOOK TO REPORT URGENTLY

2. QADDOR GAVE A FEW MORE DETAILS IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS. SYRIA, HE SAID, HAD CONSULTED OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAS DISCUSSING A TEXT WITH THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. AS YET NO FINAL DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN WHETHER ALL, OR IF NOT WHICH, OF THE MEASURES COVERED BY CHAPTER VII SHOULD BE APPLIED. THE AIM WAS THAT ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE WHICH COULD HELP ISRAEL TO ANNEX THE GOLAN SHOULD BE SUSPENDED UNTIL THE RECENT LAW WAS REVOKED. IT WAS THIS REPEAL AND NOT SANCTIONS AS SUCH WHICH INTERESTED SYRIA. SHE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ISRAELI LAW ON JERUSALEM, WHERE THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION HAD HAD NO PRACTICAL EFFECT, SHOULD NOT BE REPEATED. THE REMEDIES IN THE CHARTER MUST BE APPLIED, OTHERWISE TOMORROW MIGHT BE THE WEST BANKS TURN FOR ANNEXATION AND THE NEXT DAY GAZAS.

FCO PASS SAVING TO OTHER ME POSTS

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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2009 OF 31 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK.

SECURITY COUNCIL: GOLAN HEIGHTS

1. THE US EMBASSY HERE GAVE US THIS MORNING THE RESULTS OF AMERICAN CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS AND SAUDIS ON THE BASIS OF THE IDEAS SET OUT IN WASHINGTON TELNO 3938. THE US AMBASSADOR IN DAMASCUS HAD HAD A LONG MEETING WITH KHADDAM ON 30 DECEMBER IN WHICH HE HAD OUTLINED THE PROPOSED US STRATEGY AND CONFIRMED THAT THE US WOULD VETO SANCTIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. KHADDAM HAD APPARENTLY BEEN UNIMPRESSED. HE HAD SAID THAT PRACTICAL MEASURES AGAINST ISRAEL WERE NEEDED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE UN CHARTER (ALTHOUGH HE CONCEDED THAT THESE WOULD NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE UNDER CHAPTER SEVEN.) HE HAD ASKED FOR CONCRETE EXAMPLES OF THE ACTION THE US WAS PREPARED TO TAKE TO FOLLOW UP THEIR REJECTION OF THE ISRAELI LAW ON GOLAN AS INVALID. HE HAD DESCRIBED THE US ARGUMENT THAT TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON ISRAEL WOULD BE TO ACCEPT THE ISRAELI ACTION AS A FAIT ACCOMPLI AS UNCONVINCING. HE HAD ALSO SAID THAT EVEN IF THE US WERE TO SUCCEED IN OBTAINING FROM THE ISRAELIS A STATEMENT THAT THEY WERE READY TO NEGOTIATE PEACE WITH SYRIA WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS, THIS WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH. HE DID NOT SEE HOW SYRIA COULD NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL WHILE THE KNESSET LAW REMAINED IN FORCE. IN SUM, KHADDAM HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO THE US AMBASSADOR THAT AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED, PRESENT US THINKING HELD NO ATTRACTIONS FOR SYRIA, ALTHOUGH THE SYRIANS REMAINED INTERESTED IN CONTINUING THE DIALOGUE WITH THE US. THE US AMBASSADOR'S OWN COMMENTS TO WASHINGTON HAD BEEN THAT OBVIOUSLY MORE WOULD BE NEEDED IF THE SYRIANS WERE TO BE GOT ON BOARD.

2. THE US AMBASSADOR IN JEDDA HAD ALSO HAD A TWO HOUR MEETING WITH PRINCE SAUD ON 30 DECEMBER. SAUD HAD BEEN SYMPATHETIC TO

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THE GENERAL US APPROACH AND HAD CONFIRMED THAT SYRIA WAS WILLING TO WORK WITH THE AMERICANS ON LANGUAGE WHICH COULD AVOID A US VETO. HE HAD HAD NO SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS OF HIS OWN TO MAKE BUT HAD SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD NEED TO OFFER MORE THAN MERE CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL AND REPETITION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 497. HE HAD URGED THE AMERICANS TO FOCUS ON WHAT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE, SHORT OF MANDATORY SANCTIONS, TO SHOW THAT THE US WERE READY TO TAKE ON ISRAEL OVER AN ISSUE OF THIS KIND. HE HAD DOUBTED THAT SYRIA COULD ACKNOWLEDGE PUBLICLY RESOLUTION 242. SAUD'S GENERAL VIEW WAS THAT THE RENEWED SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION GAVE THE AMERICANS AN OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE A STRONG STAND AGAINST ISRAEL AND REASSURE THE ARABS OF AMERICAN EVENHANDEDNESS.

3. MEANWHILE THE ISRAELI EMBASSY HERE HANDED OVER ON 31 DECEMBER THE TEXT OF A LETTER GIVEN TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL BY THE ISRAELI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ON 29 DECEMBER. THIS REHEARSES THE ISRAELI ARGUMENTS FOR THE GOLAN LAW, CONCENTRATING ON SYRIAN REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE PEACE WITH ISRAEL. THE LETTER CONCLUDES BY SAYING QUOTE THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WISHES TO REITERATE THAT IT IS WILLING, NOW AS ALWAYS, TO NEGOTIATE UNCONDITIONALLY WITH SYRIA, AS WITH ITS OTHER NEIGHBOURS, FOR A LASTING PEACE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. THE GOLAN HEIGHTS LAW DOES NOT PRECLUDE OR IMPAIR SUCH NEGOTIATIONS UNQUOTE. THIS IS WHAT THE AMERICANS WERE HOPING TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS TO SAY. BUT KHADDAM'S COMMENTS TO THE US AMBASSADOR SUGGEST THAT SUCH A STATEMENT WILL CUT LITTLE ICE WITH THE SYRIANS AND WILL NOT TAKE THE HEAT OUT OF THE SITUATION.

4. GRATEFUL FOR ANYTHING FURTHER YOU CAN DISCOVER ABOUT US THINKING IN THE LIGHT OF THE SYRIAN AND SAUDI REACTIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 701 OF 31 DEC

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ROME, WASHINGTON, THE HAGUE, TEL AVIV,
UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 2001 : SINAI MFO

DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A FORMAL APPROACH, THE EGYPTIANS WOULD DOUBTLESS LIKE THE FOUR'S PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO CONFIRMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ABDUL WAHAB (FOREIGN MINISTER'S CABINET) TOLD ME RECENTLY THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE WORRIED THAT FURTHER DELAY IN SETTLING THIS ISSUE WOULD LEAVE INSUFFICIENT TIME FOR RESOLVING THE COMPLICATED PRACTICAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE SETTING UP OF THE FORCE. THE EGYPTIANS HAVE A LIAISON TEAM IN WASHINGTON AT PRESENT DISCUSSING WITH THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE FORCE AND AN ISRAELI TEAM THE PRECISE LOCATIONS WHICH THE FORCE IS TO OCCUPY AND THE RESULTS OF HUNT'S RECENT INSPECTION TOUR OF THE SINAI. THE ABSENCE OF A REPLY FROM THE FOUR WILL

DELAY IN SETTLING THIS ISSUE WOULD LEAVE INSUFFICIENT TIME FOR RESOLVING THE COMPLICATED PRACTICAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE SETTING UP OF THE FORCE. THE EGYPTIANS HAVE A LIAISON TEAM IN WASHINGTON AT PRESENT DISCUSSING WITH THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE FORCE AND AN ISRAELI TEAM THE PRECISE LOCATIONS WHICH THE FORCE IS TO OCCUPY AND THE RESULTS OF HUNT'S RECENT INSPECTION TOUR OF THE SINAI. THE ABSENCE OF A REPLY FROM THE FOUR WILL ADD AN AIR OF UNCERTAINTY TO THESE DISCUSSIONS.

2. WHAT MAY BE GIVING THE EGYPTIANS PAUSE IS THE THOUGHT THAT REPRESENTATIONS BY THEM TO THE FOUR MIGHT LEAD TO A REPLY WHICH WILL HAVE THE WRONG EFFECT ON THE ISRAELIS AND THUS PRECIPITATE AN ISRAELI VETO ON THE FOUR'S PARTICIPATION. HOWEVER, THE EGYPTIANS MUST ALSO BE EYEING THE FORTHCOMING SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE APPREHENSIVELY AND MAY WELL CONCLUDE THAT IF NO REPLY IS TRANSMITTED TO THE ISRAELIS BEFORE THEN THE LIKELIHOOD OF GETTING THE MATTER SETTLED FINALLY WILL RECEDE FOR SOME CONSIDERABLE TIME. FOR THAT REASON, IT WILL BE SURPRISING IF THEY PASS UP THE OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE THE FOUR'S REPLY WITH CHEYSSON WHILE HE IS IN CAIRO.

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NO 3965 OF 30 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY: CAIRO, PARIS, ROME, THE HAGUE, TEL AVIV, UKMIS
NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 2001: SINAI MFO

1. WE HAVE EXPLAINED THE POSITION TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT, MAKING CLEAR THAT WE OURSELVES FAVOURED A REPLY TO THE ISRAELIS NOW, BUT COULD NOT GO AHEAD WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE FOUR.
2. STATE DEPARTMENT SAID THEY HAD HOPED THAT A REPLY MIGHT GO THIS WEEK, SO THAT IT COULD BE CONSIDERED AT SUNDAY'S ISRAELI CABINET MEETING, BUT THEY REALISE THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCH AN EARLY REPLY ARE NOW SLIM.
3. STATE DEPARTMENT ARE PARTICULARLY UNHAPPY AT THE FRENCH VIEW THAT, SINCE WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI WILL NOT HAPPEN UNTIL THE END OF APRIL, THERE IS NO URGENCY OVER REPLYING TO THE ISRAELIS. THE US EMBASSY IN PARIS WAS TO MAKE A FURTHER DEMARCHE THIS MORNING TO POINT OUT THAT THE FORCE HAS TO BE IN PLACE BY 20 MARCH AND THAT FORMAL DISCUSSIONS ON LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS CANNOT TAKE PLACE IN THE ABSENCE OF A REPLY TO THE ISRAELIS.

HENDERSON

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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Prime Minister

Agreement on an early response
to the Israelis appears to have
cluded us so far.

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FROM FCO 301200 DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND TO CAIRO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2001 OF 30 DECEMBER

REPEATED IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME, THE HAGUE PRIORITY TEL AVIV

UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 3945: SINAI MFO

1. BULLARD DISCUSSED THIS WITH HIS COLLEAGUES FROM THE THREE IN THE MARGINS OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETING ON POLAND ON 30 DECEMBER. HE EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE INCREASINGLY PERSUADED THAT THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS WAS TO REPLY TO SHAMIR'S LETTER NOW. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE FOR THE DUST TO SETTLE AFTER THE SECOND ROUND IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IF COUNCIL CONSIDERATION DRAGGED ON, AS IT MIGHT, WE COULD DRIFT INTO FEBRUARY WITHOUT AN OPPORTUNE MOMENT HAVING ARRIVED. MEANWHILE IT WAS DIFFICULT TO TAKE DISCUSSIONS ON THE PRACTICAL AND LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS VERY FAR, AND THE AMERICANS WERE PRESSING FOR AN EARLY REPLY.

2. BOTTAI (ITALY) SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT TOOK THE SAME VIEW. HE THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE MORE INCLINED TO ACCEPT OUR OFFER NOW THAN LATER. THE EGYPTIANS HAD ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT THEY FAVOURED A FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE FROM THE FOUR.

REININK (NETHERLANDS)

SAID THAT VAN DER STOEL WAS CONCERNED BY THE LIKELY ARAB REACTION. THE IRAQIS HAD ALREADY MADE CLEAR BILATERALLY THAT THEY HELD STRONG VIEWS. THE DUTCH HAD NO DOUBT THAT A REPLY SHOULD BE SENT TO SHAMIR BUT DID NOT THINK THAT NOW WAS THE RIGHT MOMENT. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO WAIT UNTIL IT WAS CLEAR WHAT THE SECOND ROUND IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL COULD BRING.

ANDREANI (FRANCE) SAID THAT CHEYSSON CONTINUED TO FAVOUR DELAY. HE SAW NO ADVANTAGE IN RUSHING AND NO DISADVANTAGE IN WAITING A LITTLE LONGER. THE ABSENCE OF A REPLY FROM THE FOUR CONTRIBUTED TO THE PRESSURE ON ISRAEL OVER GOLAN, ALTHOUGH HE RECOGNISED

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THAT THIS CONTRIBUTION WAS VERY SMALL. CHEYSSON WOULD BE IN CAIRO AT THE WEEKEND. IF THE EGYPTIAN POSITION WERE STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF A QUICK REPLY, THIS MIGHT HAVE SOME EFFECT ON CHEYSSON'S VIEWS. BUT AS THINGS STOOD HE, ANDREANI, COULD NOT AGREE TO A REPLY NOW.

IN FURTHER DISCUSSION BOTTAI ARGUED THAT A REPLY WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT AFTER THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD MET, NOT EASIER. THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD BE MORE POLARISED THAN BEFORE. REININK SAID THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL COULD NOT BE RULED OUT. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO WAIT AND SEE. TO REPLY NOW WOULD BE TO ADD INSULT TO INJURY AS FAR AS THE ARABS WERE CONCERNED.

3. IT WAS AGREED, THAT IN THE LIGHT OF THE VIEWS EXPRESSED, A DECISION ON THE TIMING OF THE REPLY TO SHAMIR COULD NOT BE TAKEN YET. THE FOUR POLITICAL DIRECTORS SHOULD REPORT TO THEIR FOREIGN MINISTERS. THE RESULT OF CHEYSSON'S VISIT TO EGYPT WOULD BE OF PARTICULAR INTEREST. BULLARD SAID THAT WE WOULD TELL THE AMERICANS WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED.

4. WE HAVE ALREADY TOLD THE US EMBASSY HERE THE POSITION. WASHINGTON SHOULD REPEAT THIS TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT, EXPLAINING THAT WHILE WE FAVOUR A REPLY NOW OUSELVES WE ARE NOT WILLING TO GO AHEAD WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE FOUR AS A WHOLE AND THAT WE HAVE NO PRESIDENCY ROLE IN THE FOUR WHICH WOULD ENABLE US TO PRESS THE FRENCH AND DUTCH HARD TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS. (see attached)

5. (FOR CAIRO) GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EGYPTIAN VIEWS. THE EGYPTIANS APPEAR TO HAVE MADE MORE OR LESS FORMAL APPROACHES TO BOTH THE ITALIANS AND DUTCH IN FAVOUR OF A FORTHCOMING EUROPEAN RESPONSE ALTHOUGH, UNDER QUESTIONING FROM ANDREANI, BOTH BOTTAI AND REININK SAID THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD NOT SPECIFICALLY ASKED THE FOUR TO REPLY QUICKLY TO SHAMIR. WE OURSELVES HAVE NOT HAD AN EGYPTIAN APPROACH ON THIS SUBJECT. (also attached)

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Middle East
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~~PERSONAL MESSAGE~~

~~SERIAL No.~~
~~PS TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET.....~~

CONFIDENTIAL

42785 - 2

GRS 358

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM FCO 241515Z DECEMBER 81

TO PRIORITY JEDDA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 649 OF 30 DECEMBER

INFO ROUTINE BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN ATHENS DUBLIN THE HAGUE
LUXEMBOURG PARIS ROME UKREP BRUSSELS WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
TEL AVIV CAIRO, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN
INFO SAVING MOSCOW AND OTHER ME POSTS.

MIPT: FEZ SUMMIT AND THE 8 POINT PLAN

1. TEXT OF MESSAGE IS AS FOLLOWS: BEGINS MUCH HAS HAPPENED SINCE WE SAW EACH OTHER IN LONDON AND DISCUSSED THE PRINCIPLES YOU HAVE PUT FORWARD FOR A MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT. WE SHARE WITH YOU THE DISAPPOINTMENT YOU MUST FEEL THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO MOVE FURTHER FORWARD AT THE ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT: BUT I WAS GLAD TO HEAR FROM KING HUSSEIN THAT THOSE WHO SUPPORTED YOUR IDEAS AT FEZ ARE DETERMINED TO CONTINUE TO WORK FOR A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST. YOU MAY BE SURE THAT YOU WILL HAVE OUR SUPPORT IN FUTURE EFFORTS IN THIS DIRECTION. FOR OUR PART, WE - THE UNITED KINGDOM AND OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS - REMAIN FULLY COMMITTED TO PURSUING THE POLICY OF THE TEN MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WHICH WAS SET OUT IN THE VENICE DECLARATION.

THE EXTREME DIFFICULTY OF THE TASK HAS BEEN UNDERLINED BY ISRAEL'S TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE ACTION IN EXTENDING ISRAELI LAW TO THE SYRIAN TERRITORY WHICH THEY OCCUPY ON THE GOLAN. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THAT THE EUROPEAN TEN HAVE STRONGLY DEPLORED THIS MOVE, WHICH WE REGARD AS INVALID, AND WE HAVE OF COURSE JOINED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S CALL FOR ISRAEL TO RESCIND ITS LAW. I CAN WELL UNDERSTAND THE ANGER WHICH HAS BEEN AROUSED IN THE ARAB WORLD. THIS LATEST COMPLICATION, HOWEVER, DOES NOT CHANGE OUR VIEW THAT THE WAY TOWARDS PEACE LIES IN THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES CONCERNED. WE SHALL GO ON

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DOING WHAT WE CAN TO MAKE THAT POSSIBLE AND I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER. I MUCH VALUE THE EXCHANGES BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS ON THESE VITAL ISSUES AND I HOPE THAT WE SHALL REMAIN CLOSELY IN TOUCH AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPS. I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL LET JAMES CRAIG KNOW IF YOU FEEL THAT ANOTHER ROUND OF TALKS AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL WOULD BE USEFUL. ENDS

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FROM FCO 241515Z DECEMBER 81

TO PRIORITY JEDDA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 648 OF 30 DECEMBER

INFO ROUTINE BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN ATHENS DUBLIN THE HAGUE
LUXEMBOURG PARIS ROME UKREP BRUSSELS WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
TEL AVIV CAIRO, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN
INFO SAVING MOSCOW OTHER ME POSTS.

YOUR TELNOS 790 AND 795: FEZ SUMMIT AND THE 3 POINT PLAN

1. SORRY THAT THE RESPONSE TO YOUR IDEA OF A MESSAGE HAS BEEN DELAYED. A MINISTERIAL VISIT (PARA 6 OF YOUR TELNO 790) HAS NOT BEEN THOUGHT PRACTICABLE, BUT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS NOW AGREED A MESSAGE FROM HER TO CROWN PRINCE FAHD, WHICH YOU MAY USE TO SEEK A MEETING WITH EITHER FAHD OR SAUD FOR A GENERAL DISCUSSION. TEXT IN MIFT. YOU SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE NOT ACTING IN A PRESIDENCY CAPACITY.

2. EVENTS HAVE MOVED ON AND IT IS EVEN LESS LIKELY NOW THAT THE TEN COULD RESPOND POSITIVELY TO MANSOURI'S 2 REQUESTS (PARA 6 OF YOUR TELNO 793). BUT IT REMAINS IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD DO WHAT WE CAN TO ENCOURAGE THE SAUDIS TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO SEEK GENERAL ARAB SUPPORT FOR THE FAHD POINTS. THE BALL IS VERY MUCH IN THE ARABS' OWN COURT AND THERE IS LITTLE WHICH WE CAN DO FOR THE MOMENT TO HELP THEM. WE NEED TO BEWARE OF ENCOURAGING THEM TO THINK THAT THEY CAN PASS THE BUCK FOR FURTHER ACTION ON TO US. NEVERTHELESS WE WISH TO KEEP THE DIALOGUE GOING.

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FM DAMASCUS 300615Z DEC 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 437 OF 30 DECEMBER
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING AMMAN CAIRO BEIRUT JEDDA TUNIS TEL AVIV

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1619 TO YOU: GOLAN HEIGHTS

1. IF WE DECIDE TO PICK UP DRAPER'S IDEA ON THE ICJ WE SHOULD DO SO WITHOUT DELUSIONS AS TO ITS ATTRACTIVENESS TO THE SYRIANS. IN THEIR VIEW THE POSITION WOULD BE :-

- A) THE GOLAN HEIGHTS ARE SYRIAN TERRITORY. THERE IS NO LEGAL QUESTION THERE REQUIRING RESOLUTION. THE WORLD ACCEPTS IT.
- B) THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY IN THE WORLD, THE SECURITY COUNCIL, HAS RULED THE ISRAELI MOVE NULL AND VOID AND DEMANDED THAT IT BE REVOKED. THIS REQUIRES NO SUPPORT FROM ANY OTHER COURT.
- C) THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST MAKE OSURE THAT ITS DECISION IS OBEYED AND THAT ANY PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE ISRAELI MOVE (SUCH AS ISSUING OF IDENTITY CARDS AND CHANGE OF CIVIL AINISTRATION) ARE REVERSED. IT HAS THE TEETH TO DO SO WHICH THE ICJ DOES NOT. IT SHOULD USE THEM.
- D) DELAY SIMPLY ENABLES THE ISRAELIS TO CREATE MORE FACTS IN THE GOLAN.

2. DURING HIS RECENT TOUR OF THE ARABIAN PENINSULA PRESIDENT ASAD IS REPORTED TO HAVE WORKED FOR A UNIFIED ARAB POSITION. HIS AIM, NO DOUBT, WAS TO LINE UP PRESSURE ON THOSE WHO MIGHT OPPOSE COERCIVE ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL. AN OFFICIAL OF THE MFA HAS TOLD ME THAT THE REASON FOR THE SYRIAN REQUEST FOR POSTPONEMENT OF THE MEETING OF ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS SCHEDULED FOR 27 DECEMBER UNTIL AFTER 5 JANUARY WAS TO ENABLE THE ARABS TO TAKE DECISIONS BASED ON COUNTRIES' VOTING AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

FCO PASS SAVING TO AMMAN, CAIRO, BEIRUT, JEDDA, TUNIS AND TEL AVIV.

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FM WASHINGTON 300145Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3956 OF 29 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK PRIORITY DAMASCUS JEDDA

ROUTINE TEL AVIV AMMAN CAIRO BEIRUT DUBLIN MADRID TOKYO KINSHASA

PANAMA CITY TUNIS ACCRA

SECURITY COUNCIL: GOLAN HEIGHTS

MIPT. FOLLOWINGS STATE DEPARTMENT PAPER ENTITLED ILLUSTRATIVE ELEMENTS FOR A DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS

PREAMBULAR SECTION

— REFERENCE TO THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 497 OF 17 DECEMBER 1981.

— REAFFIRMATION THAT THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE IS INADMISSIBLE UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

— DECLARATION THAT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 OF 22 NOVEMBER 1967 AND 338 OF 22 OCTOBER 1973 SET OUT PRINCIPLES FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

OPERATIVE SECTION

— REITERATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION THAT THE MEASURE ADOPTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IMPOSING ISRAELI LAWS, JURISDICTION, AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE OCCUPIED SYRIAN GOLAN HEIGHTS IS NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL EFFECT.

— REAFFIRMATION THAT ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR OF 12 AUGUST 1949 CONTINUE TO APPLY TO THE SYRIAN TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE JUNE 1967.

— CALL UPON ALL STATES TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTIONS IMPLYING RECOGNITION OF THE LEGALITY OF OR LENDING SUPPORT TO THE ABOVE MEASURE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL.

— STATEMENT THAT THE ABOVE ISRAELI MEASURE MAY NOT BE PERMITTED TO PREJUDICE OR IMPEDE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, OR DIMINISH THE OBLIGATION OF ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO ACHIEVE SUCH A PEACE THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS, WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338.

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FM WASHINGTON 300130Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3955 OF 29 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRIORITY DAMASCUS, JEDDA,
ROUTINE TEL AVIV, AMMAN, CAIRO, BEIRUT, DUBLIN, MADRID, TOKYO,
KINSHASA, PANAMA CITY, TUNIS, ACCRA

MY TELNO 3938: SECURITY COUNCIL: GOLAN HEIGHTS

1. MIFT CONTAINS ILLUSTRATIVE ELEMENTS FOR A DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS GIVEN TO US BY DRAPER (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY) TODAY. DRAPER SAID THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD THOUGHT IT BETTER SIMPLY TO LIST WHAT THEY SAW AS THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION RATHER THAN TO TRANSLATE THEM INTO UN LANGUAGE AT THIS STAGE.

2. WE TOLD DRAPER THAT WE HAD NOT YET HAD YOUR COMMENTS ON THE IDEAS SET OUT IN OUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. BUT WE DREW ON UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1620 TO SAY THAT, AS PRESENTLY CONCEIVED, THE PROPOSED DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS ASKING A LOT OF THE SYRIANS WHILE OFFERING THEM VERY LITTLE IN RETURN. DRAPER AGREED AND REITERATED THAT HE STILL HOPED THAT THE IDEA OF A REFERENCE TO THE ICJ MIGHT BE RESURRECTED.

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DESKBY 291800Z DEC 81

FM PARIS 291715Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1157 OF 29 DEC 81

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON ROME THE HAGUE ROUTINE TEL AVIV

DESKBY

PARIS TELNO 1154 TO FCO: SINAI FORCE

1. RAPIN (DEPUTY HEAD, MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT, QUAI) TOLD US TODAY THAT MR HAIG SENT A MESSAGE TO M. CHEYSSON ON 27 DECEMBER URGING HIM TO SEND A REPLY TO MR SHAMIR BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON THE GOLAN. M. CHEYSSON SENT A MESSAGE BACK ON 28 DECEMBER SAYING THAT HE SAW NO (NO) NEED FOR URGENCY.

2. RAPIN COMMENTED THAT EVEN IF AN EARLY REPLY WERE SENT TO MR SHAMIR THAT WOULD NOT PREVENT THE ISRAELIS FROM VETOING EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI FORCE IF THEY WERE SO MINDED AFTER THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE.

PETRIE

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FROM TEL AVIV 291420Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 502 OF 29 DECEMBER 1981

INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, ROME AND THE HAGUE.

YOUR TELNO 587 TO PARIS: SINAI FORCE

1. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF HANDLING THE ISRAELIS I AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO GET A REPLY ABOUT SINAI OUT OF THE WAY BEFORE NEXT WEEK'S SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON GOLAN. I AM ALSO GETTING THIS ADVICE INFORMALLY FROM WELL-DISPOSED ISRAELIS WHO ARE CLOSE TO OFFICIAL THINKING ALTHOUGH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THEMSELVES HAVE MADE NO MOVE IN MY DIRECTION TO TRY AND HASTE^N OUR REPLY.

2. GENERALLY SPEAKING THE SEVERER WE EXPECT TO BE ON ISRAEL IN A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, THE STRONGER THE CASE FOR GETTING IN A REPLY ON SINAI OF THE KIND IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO 643 TO JEDDA BEFORE BATTLE IS JOINED IN NEW YORK.

3. THERE IS ONE FURTHER REASON FOR AN EARLY REPLY IN PURELY

3. THERE IS ONE FURTHER REASON FOR AN EARLY REPLY IN PURELY ANGLLO/ISRAELI TERMS. THE ISRAELIS HAVE PERSUADED THEMSELVES THROUGHOUT THAT BRITAIN IS THE LEAST KEEN OF THE FOUR TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SINAI FORCE AND THAT AT TIMES WE WERE DELIBERATELY PUTTING OBSTACLES IN THE WAY. THERE WILL BE PEOPLE HERE WHO WOULD CHARACTERISE A REPLY WELL ON IN JANUARY AS EVIDENCE THAT ONLY WHEN THE UK HAD GIVEN UP THE PRESIDENCY WAS THE OBSTACLE TO PARTICIPATION BY THE FOUR FINALLY CLEARED AWAY. A REPLY DELIVERED IN THE VERY FIRST DAYS OF JANUARY SHOULD NOT BE OPEN TO THAT MISREPRESENTATION AT OUR EXPENSE.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3945 OF 28 DECEMBER

INFO BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, WARSAW, MODUK, UKREP BRUSSELS,
CAIRO, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, UKMIS NEW YORK,
ROME

INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POST, DUBLIN.

MIPT (SAVING TO SOME): EC LUNCH FOR HAIG: SINAI MFO

1. HAIG RAISED THIS HIMSELF. HE REFERRED TO RECENT STATIC IN US-ISRAEL RELATIONS, AND TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE BEGIN REGIME MIGHT NOW TAKE SOME EARTH-SHAKING ACTION, ESPECIALLY IN RESPECT OF LEBANON, THE WEST BANK OR GAZA, IF WE WERE NOT CAREFUL. WHILE THE ISRAELIS MUST REALIZE THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE A BLANK CHEQUE, WE COULD NOT GIVE THEM THE EXCUSE TO CUT THEMSELVES TOTALLY LOOSE FROM WESTERN RESTRAINTS.

2. HAIG URGED STRONGLY THAT IT WAS IN THE COLLECTIVE WESTERN INTEREST TO SETTLE THE MFO QUESTION WITHOUT WAITING FOR FURTHER ACTIVITY IN THE UN. HE HOPED THAT THOSE INVOLVED WOULD AGREE TO MOVE AHEAD WITH THE FORCE PRIOR TO ANY DECISIONS BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WE SHOULD PURSUE THE PROCESS OF PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND GIVE NO ENCOURAGEMENT TO THOSE WHO WANTED TO TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION.

FCO PASS SAVING ANKARA ATHENS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN LISBON LUXEMBOURG
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HENDERSON

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PS/MR LUCE

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MR BULLARD

SIR A. ACLAND

MR MOBERLY

MR HANNAY

MR DAY

MR URE

MR FERUSON

MR HILLMORE

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DESKBY 290930Z DEC

FM WASHINGTON 282150Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3938 OF 28 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK PRIORITY DAMASCUS JEDDA
ROUTINE TEL AVIV AMMAN CAIRO BEIRUT DUBLIN MADRID TOKYO KINSHASA
PANAMA CITY TUNIS ACCRA

MY TELNO 3932: SECURITY COUNCIL - GOLAN HEIGHTS

VELIOTES (ASSISTANT SECRETARY), WHO, ATTENDED MY EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LUNCH FOR HAIG TODAY, STAYED ON AFTERWARDS TO DISCUSS THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON GOLAN WITH ME AND THE FRENCH CHARGE, HAREL DRAPER (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY) WAS ALSO PRESENT.

2. VELIOTES SAID THAT HAIG HAD NOW CONSIDERED THE IDEAS WHICH DRAPER HAD EARLIER DISCUSSED WITH US. THE US WISHED TO HAVE BRITISH AND FRENCH VIEWS BEFORE GOING ANY FURTHER. THE US WANTED TO SEE A RESOLUTION PUT FORWARD WHICH THEY COULD SUPPORT (AND WHICH WOULD FORESTALL A MUCH MORE FAR REACHING SYRIAN RESOLUTION). THIS MEANT THAT IT COULD NOT INCLUDE SANCTIONS (OR MEASURES OF ANY KIND HOWEVER LIMITED, UNDER CHAPTER 7 OF THE UN CHARTER). THE AIM WAS TO CONTAIN THE DAMAGE DONE BY ISRAELS' ANNEXATION AND TO TRY TO MAKE A POSITIVE OUT OF A NEGATIVE BY SECURING AGREEMENT TO A RESOLUTION WHICH, IN ADDITION TO RESTATING THE UNACCEPTABLE NATURE OF ISRAELI ACTION, WOULD GO ON TO STRENGTHEN THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE PEACE PROCESS I.E. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. EVEN IF THE AMERICANS FAILED IN THEIR EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS TO STATE PUBLICLY THEIR WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE PEACE WITH SYRIA ON THE BASIS OF RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, I.E. WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO RECORD ITS COMMITMENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND TO ASSOCIATE SYRIA WITH IT. THE SYRIAN POSITION, AS EXPLAINED TO THE US AMBASSADOR IN DAMASCUS, WAS THAT THE SYRIANS DID ACCEPT 242 AND 338 BUT IT WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP IF THEY WOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES UNEQUIVOCALLY THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF A NEW SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

3. I SAID THAT WE SHARED THE US AIM OF AVOIDING CHAPTER VII BUT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THE SYRIANS COULD BE PERSUADED TO GO ALONG WITH A RESOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT HAVING FIRST PUT FORWARD A MORE EXTREME DRAFT WHICH THE US WOULD PRESUMABLY VETO. VELIOTES SAID THAT HE HOPED TO HAVE HIS RESOLUTION ADOPTED WITHOUT FIRST HAVING TO VETO SOMETHING MORE EXTREME. THE AIM WOULD BE TO PERSUADE ENOUGH MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE MERITS OF THE US APPROACH TO DENY THE SYRIANS NINE VOTES FOR THE KIND OF LANGUAGE THEY WOULD FAVOUR. WE AGREED THAT, FOR THIS TACTIC TO SUCCEED, THE RESOLUTION WOULD NEED TO CONTAIN A FIRM STATEMENT MAKING CLEAR THAT, NOT ONLY WAS THE ISRAELI ANNEXATION NULL AND VOID BUT THAT IT WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO HAVE ANY EFFECT

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ON THE FUTURE OF THE PEACE PROCESS, IN OTHER WORDS IT WOULD BE DISREGARDED. THE RESOLUTION MIGHT ALSO APPEAL TO ALL MEMBER STATES TO AVOID ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD BE SEEN AS RECOGNITION OF ANNEXATION.

4. THE AMERICANS WOULD LIKE OUR PRELIMINARY REACTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE (PREFERABLY BY THE END OF TOMORROW, LONDON TIME). IN THE MEANTIME, THEY WILL START TO DRAFT SOME LANGUAGE WHICH THEY WILL SHOW TO US AND THE FRENCH. IF WE ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE AMERICAN APPROACH, THIS WILL STRENGTHEN THE US HAND IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SYRIANS IN DAMASCUS. DRAPER SAID THAT THE SYRIANS HAD ALREADY BEEN TOLD THAT THE US WOULD NOT SUPPORT SANCTIONS. THE US ALSO HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT FAHD HAD ADVISED ASSAD TO WORK COOPERATIVELY WITH THE AMERICANS. THE US AMBASSADOR IN JEDDA WILL BE SEEING FAHD ON WEDNESDAY. ONLY THEREAFTER, WILL THE AMERICANS LOBBY IN OTHER SECURITY COUNCIL CAPITALS.

5. COMMENT: THE AMERICAN IDEAS MAY SEEM A BIT THIN BUT, TO JUDGE FROM YOUR TELNO 910 TO UKMIS NEW YORK, THEY ARE NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH OUR OWN THINKING AND REFLECT SIMILAR CONSTRAINTS, NOTABLY DIFFICULTIES WITH CHAPTER VII LANGUAGE. DRAPER TOLD US PRIVATELY AFTER THE MEETING THAT BECAUSE OF THE ATTITUDE OF STATE DEPARTMENT LAWYERS (WHO FEAR THAT THE WHOLE FUTURE OF THE PEACE PROCESS MIGHT END UP BEING DISCUSSED) HE HAS HAD TO DROP THE IDEA OF A REFERENCE TO THE ICJ FOR THE TIME BEING. BUT DRAPER THINKS IT MIGHT RE-EMERGE LATER (QUOTE MAYBE THE SYRIANS WILL THINK OF IT UNQUOTE). A REFERENCE TO THE COURT WOULD CERTAINLY ADD SUBSTANCE TO A DRAFT THAT CAN HAVE FEW ATTRACTIONS FOR THE SYRIANS IN ITS PRESENT OUTLINE FORM. THE AMERICANS, NONETHELESS, REMAIN AGREEABLY SURPRISED BY THE BUSINESSLIKE WAY IN WHICH THE SYRIANS ARE DEALING WITH THEM IN DAMASCUS.

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FROM FCO 221800 DEC 81

TO PRIORITY TUNIS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 152 OF 24 DECEMBER,

INFO ROUTINE DAMASCUS, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON

INFO SAVING OTHER ME POSTS

YOUR TELNO 204: GOLAN

1. MIFT CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE TO ME FROM KLIBI SENT ON 16 DECEMBER BY DIRECT TELEX. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING REPLY FROM ME TO KLIBI.

BEGINS.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 16 DECEMBER ABOUT ISRAEL'S DECISION TO EXTEND HER JURISDICTION TO OCCUPIED SYRIAN TERRITORY IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE TEN ISSUED A STATEMENT ON 15 DECEMBER DESCRIBING ISRAEL'S ACTION AS CONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND A BLOW TO THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE VIEW THIS ISRAELI STEP WAS FURTHER ILLUSTRATED BY OUR VOTE IN FAVOUR OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 497 CALLING ON ISRAEL TO RESCIND THE KNESSET LEGISLATION. YOU MAY BE SURE THAT WE ARE AWARE OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF ISRAEL'S DECISION TO EXTEND HER JURISDICTION TO GOLAN AND THAT WE SHALL EXERT ALL OUR EFFORTS, IN COOPERATION WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE TEN, TO ENSURE THAT NEGOTIATED PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF RESOLUTION 242 AND LEGITIMATE PALESTINIAN RIGHTS REMAINS POSSIBLE.

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PP TUNIS
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FROM FCO 231100 DECEMBER 81
TO PRIORITY TUNIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 151 OF 24 DECEMBER
INFO ROUTINE DAMASCUS, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON
INFO SAVING OTHER ME POSTS
MIPT: GOLAN

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM KLIBI SENT ON 16 DECEMBER.
BEGINS YOU CERTAINLY AGREE WITH ME, YOUR EXCELLENCY THAT THE
ISRAELI AUTHORITIES' DECISION OF 14 DECEMBER 1981 TO ANNEX THE
SYRIAN ARAB TERRITORY OF THE GOLAN, IS A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS
AND IN PARTICULAR, THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, AS WELL AS
A DERISIVE ABUSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY.

YOU UNDOUBTEDLY REALISE, YOUR EXCELLENCY, THE GRAVE IMPACT OF
THIS DECISION ON PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND BY
WAY OF CONSEQUENCE, IN THE WORLD AT LARGE, YOU NO LESS KEENLY
REALISE ITS DANGEROUS EFFECTS ON WHATEVER POSSIBILITIES ARE
LEFT FOR THE SUCCESS OF EFFORTS TOWARDS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE
IN THE REGION.

THIS NEW ISRAELI ACTION CLEARLY ILLUSTRATES, EVEN TO THE
FRIENDS OF ISRAEL, THAT ISRAEL HAS NO DESIRE NO MATTER HOW SLIGHT
TO ACCEPT ANY EFFORTS FOR PEACE, AND IS UNABLE ON ACCOUNT OF ITS
AGGRESSIVE AND EXPANSIONISTIC NATURE TO ASSUME A NORMAL CODE OF
BEHAVIOUR IN THE REGION IN CONFORMITY WITH ITS RESPONSIBILITIES
AS A MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION. YOU CERTAINLY
HAVE FELT, YOUR EXCELLENCY THE DANGEROUS IMPLICATIONS OF THIS
DECISION AND IN PARTICULAR THE REAFFIRMATION OF ISRAEL'S POLICIES
AS BEING BASED ON THE BELIEF IN THE ABSOLUTE POWER OF MILITARY
FORCE, A FORCE WHICH IT USES AS ITS KEY INSTRUMENT TO EXPAND OVER
THE LAND AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHERS IN FULL DISREGARD OF ANY
INTERNATIONAL ORDER, THE WILL OF THE WORLD'S NATIONS AND THE
RESOLUTIONS OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OCCUPIES IN THE WORLD COMMUNITIES A

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DISTINGUISHED POSITION, POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY, AND MILITARILY, AND MORE SO IN THE CULTURAL FIELD. IT INCLUDES AMONG ITS MEMBERS TWO STATES ENJOYING PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS MEANS FOR THIS THE ASSUMPTION OF SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN SAFEGUARDING WORLD SECURITY, AND SUBSEQUENTLY IN PLAYING A LEADING ROLE TO HALT THE PROVOCATIVE AND DANGEROUS ISRAELI POLICIES. THE ARAB STATES MAINTAIN THE HOPE THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WILL BOTH COLLECTIVELY AND INDIVIDUALLY TAKE PROMPT AND ADEQUATE MEASURES TO SAVE THE INCREASINGLY DETERIORATING SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH ISRAEL IS SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR, AS WELL AS ALL RELATED IMPLICATIONS WHICH WILL UNDOUBTEDLY THREATEN PEACE AND SECURITY THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCEREST GREETINGS AND BEST FRIENDLY REGARDS. CHEDLI KLIBI. ENDS

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EMBASSY
OF
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN
ST. JAMES'S
LONDON, S. W. I.



سفارة
جمهورية السودان الديمقراطية
لندن

The Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan presents its compliments to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and has the honour to forward herewith an urgent message from His Excellency President Gafaar Nimeiri addressed to the Rt. Hon Margaret Thatcher, the Prime Minister.

The Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan will be very grateful if the message is brought to the attention of the esteemed addressee.

The Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan avails itself of this opportunity to renew to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs the assurance of its highest consideration.

London: 5th January, 1982.



Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

✓ca Master
ops

THE PRESIDENT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T161 E/81



TRANSLATION

Date, 23.Dec.1981.

Excellency Mrs. Thatcher,


The Sudan has followed with great concern and deep alarm the latest developments in the occupied Arab Territories, and in particular the Israeli decision to annex the Syrian Golan Heights.

The Sudan, as a true peace-loving country, would like to state clearly that the Israeli decision is illegal and represents a flagrant violation of International Law, and constitutes a blatant challenge to the will of the World Community as reflected in all pertinent United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

Such act of aggression by Israel is a clear evidence of Israel's designs to usurp the occupied Arab Territories one after another, thereby undermining all efforts of the International Community to achieve a Just and Peaceful settlement to the conflict of the Middle East. Accordingly, this latest move by Israel to annex the Syrian Golan Heights must be strongly condemned, and the Israeli arrogance and expansionist policy be deterred and brought to an end.

Excellency,

The Sudan knowing the role of the United Kingdom and that of the European Economic Community vis-a-vis the acquisition of foreign territories by force, as reflected in Venice Communique, and in many resolutions of United Nations General Assembly, requests the United Kingdom and the other members of the EEC to continue their unflinching endeavours to preserve world peace which is currently being threatened by the Israeli act of aggression.



Excellency,

The Sudan is confident that United Kingdom and EEC members would take all necessary measures that will compel Israel to respect International Law and rescind forthwith the annexation decision.

Excellency,

I would be most grateful if you could bring this matter to the attention of all members of the EEC with a view to considering it seriously and taking prompt action.

Accept , Excellency, the renewed assurances of highest consideration.

(SIGNED)

GAAFAR MOHAMED NIMEIRI
PRESIDENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF SUDAN.

H.E. MRS. MARGARET THATCHER
PRIME MINISTER OF UNITED KINGDOM
AND CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY.

" بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم "

الرئيسي



التاريخ : ٢٧ صفر ١٤٠٢ هـ
الموافق ٢٣ / ديسمبر / ١٩٨١ م

صاحبة الفخامة السيدة كاترين

لقد تابع السودان بأهتمام بالغ التطورات الاخيرة فى الاراضى العربية المحتلة ، وبالتحديد قرار الكنسيات الاسرائيلى الأخير بضم مرتفعات الجولان السورية * * و كبلد محسوب للسلام ، فان السودان يود ان يعلن فى وضوح تام بطلان وعدم شرعية القرار الاسرائيلى ، والذي يمثل انتهاكا صارخا للقانون الدولى وتحديا سافرا لارادة المجتمع الدولى ، التى تجسدت فى قرارات الجمعية العامة للامم المتحدة ومجلس الأمن الدولى .

ان القرار الاسرائيلى بضم الجولان يشكل تطورا خطيرا ، كما يكشف بصورة قاطعة نوايا اسرائيل التوسعية وعزمها اغتصاب الاراضى العربية المحتلة الواحدة تلو الاخرى ، وهى بذلك تضع العقبات أمام أية مساع بذلها ويبدلها المجتمع الدولى من أجل تحقيق تسوية سلمية وعادلة لمشكلة الشرق الاوسط ، وعليه فان ذلك القرار الاسرائيلى يجب أن يكون محل اذانة واضحة وقوية ، لوضع حد للغطرسة والسياسة التوسعية الاسرائيلية .

صاحبة الفخامة ،


تعلمون ان موقف المملكة المتحدة وموقف المجموعة الاقتصادية الاوربية من مسألة ضم اراضى الغير بالقوة ، كما بينه بيان البندقية وعدد من قرارات الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة لا يحتاجان منا لتذكير ولكن يرى السودان ان من واجبه ان يدعو المملكة المتحدة والدول الاخرى الاعضاء فى المجموعة الاقتصادية الاوربية ، الى مواصلة الجهود من أجل الحفاظ على السلم العالمى الذى يتهدده العدوان الاسرائيلى .

صاحبة الفخامة ،

ان السودان لعلى ثقة بان المملكة المتحدة والسودان
الاعضاء فى المجموعة الاقتصادية الاوربية سيتخذون كافة
الاجراءات التى ستؤدى الى احترام اسرائيل للقانون
الدولى وتراجعها ، فى الحال عن قرار الضم •

ونكون شاكرين ومقدرين لو تكرمتم بعرض هذا الامر
على كافة اعضاء المجموعة الاقتصادية الاوربية للنظر فيه بما
يستحق من اهتمام واتخاذ الاجراء المناسب والسريع •

وتقبلوا فخامتكم فائق تقديرنا ،،،



جعفر محمد نميرى
رئيس جمهورية السودان الديمقراطية

صاحبة الفخامة

السيدة مارغريت تاتشر

رئيسة وزراء المملكة المتحدة

والرئيس الحالى للمجموعة الاقتصادية الاوربية

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FM PARIS 231150Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1141 OF 23 DECEMBER 1981

INFO PRIORITY TO ROME THE HAGUE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK
CAIRO TEL AVIV BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN
DUBLIN LUXEMBOURG UKREP BRUSSELS AND ATHENS

YOUR TELNO 581: SINAI FORCE

1. ACTION TAKEN WITH DELAYE IN M. CHEYSSON'S CABINET. ACCORDING TO DELAYE, M. CHEYSSON AGREES THAT IN SPITE OF EVENTS RELATING TO THE GOLAN THE FOUR SHOULD GO AHEAD WITH PARTICIPATION IN THE M.F.O. HE ALSO AGREES THAT THE FOUR'S REPLY TO MR SHAMIR SHOULD BE DELAYED UNTIL AFTER THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON THE GOLAN.

2. DELAYE ADDED THAT M. CHEYSSON WANTED TO CONSULT THE EGYPTIANS BEFORE MAKING A MOVE. M. CHEYSSON BELIEVED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO INVOLVE EGYPT IN THE DISCUSSIONS BECAUSE IT WAS ONE OF THE PARTIES MOST CONCERNED AND FRANCE DISLIKED BEING PUT IN THE POSITION OF HAVING TO DEAL WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED ONLY THROUGH THE INTER-MEDIARY OF THE US. M. CHEYSSON WILL BE VISITING CAIRO ON 2 AND 3 JANUARY.

3. DELAYE RAISED THE SUBJECT OF THE LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE EUROPEAN CONTINGENTS AND THE PROBLEM OF THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE MFO. FOR THE FRENCH MR HUNT HAD NO LEGAL STATUS. THEY WERE THEREFORE CONSIDERING A COMPROMISE SOLUTION WHEREBY THE FOUR WOULD CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE MFO PROVIDED THE LATTER WAS GIVEN AN APPROPRIATE STATUS THROUGH BEING MANDATED TO NEGOTIATE BY THE EGYPTIANS AND THE ISRAELIS. DELAYE COMMENTED THAT IF THE ISRAELIS MADE PROBLEMS OVER THIS OR ANY OF THE OTHER LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS, THE FRENCH WOULD NOT BE TOO CONCERNED. THE FRENCH WOULD NOT MIND IF THE EUROPEAN CONTINGENTS DID NOT REACH SINAI UNTIL AFTER THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS THE POLITICAL GESTURE.

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PP UKMIS NEW YORK
GRS 339
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FROM FCO 221100Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 581 OF 22 DECEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE ROME, THE HAGUE, WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, OTHER EC POSTS.
OUR TELNOS 569 AND 570: SINAI FORCE

1. I HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING WHETHER THE ISRAELI DECISION ON GOLAN SHOULD CAUSE US TO RECONSIDER OUR OFFER TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SINAI FORCE. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO DIRECT CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TWO, THE POLITICAL LINK IS CLEAR AND ARAB REACTION TO OUR PARTICIPATION WILL BE CORRESPONDINGLY STRONGER. IT IS NOT ENCOURAGING TO WOULD-BE PARTICIPANTS IN A PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN THE AREA THAT ISRAEL SHOULD BE SO READY TO ACT IN DEFIANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE NORMS OF DIPLOMACY (AND IN APPARANT VIOLATION OF CAMP DAVID) HOWEVER MY PRELIMINARY THINKING IS THAT IT WOULD NOT BE RIGHT TO CHANGE OUR DECISION.
2. WE ALSO NEED TO CONSIDER THE TIMING OF OUR REPLY TO SHAMIR. A REPLY NOW, WHICH SHOULD CLEAR THE WAY PUBLICLY FOR FINAL AGREEMENT ON OUR PARTICIPATION, WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DEFEND AGAINST THE CHARGE THAT IT ^{WAS} ~~IS~~ SENDING THE WRONG SIGNAL NOT ONLY TO THE ARABS BUT TO ISRAEL HERSELF. THERE IS THUS A CASE FOR A DELAY, THE LENGTH OF WHICH MIGHT BE LEFT UNDECIDED AT THIS STAGE, ALTHOUGH IS NOT LIKELY THAT CIRCUMSTANCES WILL IMPROVE UNTIL AT LEAST EARLY JANUARY.
3. PARIS, ROME AND THE HAGUE SHOULD SAY TO HOST GOVERNMENTS THAT I WOULD APPRECIATE AN ACCOUNT OF MY COLLEAGUES' THINKING. IN RESPONDING, THEY MAY DRAW ON PARA 1 ABOVE TO EXPLAIN MY OWN. WASHINGTON SHOULD EXPLAIN TO THE AMERICANS THAT I AM NOT DISPOSED TO WITHDRAW OUR OFFER TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FORCE, DESPITE ISRAELI PROVOCATION, BUT THAT I AM CONSULTING MY COLLEAGUES. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE APPRECIATE THE DIFFICULTIES THIS

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WILL CAUSE FOR THE MFO DIRECTOR GENERAL AND HIS STAFF. IDEALLY WE WOULD PREFER TO DELAY DISCUSSION ON THE PRACTICAL AND LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS UNTIL FINAL AGREEMENT TO OUR PARTICIPATION HAS BEEN REACHED, BUT IN VIEW OF THE LACK OF TIME BETWEEN NOW AND 20 MARCH WE WOULD BE READY TO HAVE INFORMAL TALKS THROUGH THE AMERICANS IF REALLY FELT THAT THIS WOULD HELP TO CLEAR THE GROUND.

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FROM TEL AVIV 221010Z DEC 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 497 OF 22 DECEMBER 1981

INFO WASHINGTON, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, BEIRUT AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MEETING WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER

1. AT LUNCH YESTERDAY WITH COMMUNITY AMBASSADORS, MR SHAMIR REAFFIRMED THAT ISRAEL IS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITH SYRIA WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS AND WENT ON TO INDICATE THAT THIS COULD INCLUDE NEGOTIATION OVER THE GOLAN FRONTIER. IN ANSWER TO FURTHER QUESTIONS FROM MYSELF AND MY COLLEAGUES HOWEVER HE DECLINED TO SAY WHETHER THE ISRAELIS WOULD STATE THE LATTER POINT PUBLICLY. WHEN THE SYRIANS SAT DOWN TO NEGOTIATE THEY WOULD FIND THE ISRAELIS READY TO DISCUSS EVERYTHING, INCLUDING THE FRONTIER. BUT WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS WAS THE FURTHEST HE WOULD GO WHEN PRESSED TO DEFINE ISRAEL'S FORMAL POSITION.

2. SHAMIR ALSO ASSERTED THAT THERE IS NO CHANGE IN ISRAEL'S POSITION ON RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, WHICH THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO ACCEPT AS THEY HAD DONE AT CAMP DAVID AND IN THE PEACE TREATY WITH EGYPT. WHEN ASKED HOW THIS COMMITMENT COULD BE RECONCILED WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF INADMISSIBILITY OF GAINING TERRITORY BY WAR, SHAMIR WENT OFF INTO A FAMILIAR EXPLANATION OF THE ISRAELI VIEW ABOUT THE MEANING OF THE WORD "TERRITORIES" IN 242. BY APRIL ISRAEL WOULD HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM 80 PERCENT OR MORE OF THE AREA SHE HAD OCCUPIED IN 1967. ONE OF HIS OFFICIALS ADDED THAT THE INADMISSIBILITY MENTIONED IN 242 WAS SEEN BY THE ISRAELIS AS REFERRING TO A DELIBERATE WAR OF CONQUEST, WHEREAS ISRAEL HAD OCCUPIED THE GOLAN ETC IN SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST AN ATTACK LAUNCHED BY THEIR NEIGHBOURS. SHAMIR CLAIMED THAT THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE OF 242 HAD BEEN THE CALL FOR A SETTLEMENT BY NEGOTIATION SEMI-COLON AND WHEREAS ISRAEL HAD REPEATEDLY STATED HER READINESS TO NEGOTIATE THE SYRIANS HAD EQUALLY EMPHATICALLY RULED THIS OUT.

3. SHAMIR SET THE SCENE FOR THIS ROUND-THE-TABLE MEETING WITH COMMUNITY AMBASSADORS, WHICH TRADITIONALLY TAKES PLACE HERE ONCE DURING EACH PRESIDENCY, BY DESCRIBING THE APPROACHING WITHDRAWAL FROM ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN NORTHERN SINAI AS A NATIONAL TRAGEDY. IT WOULD BE FIVE, SIX OR PERHAPS TEN YEARS BEFORE ISRAELIS WOULD SEE WHETHER THEIR SACRIFICE WAS WORTHWHILE. INEVITABLY THERE WAS NOW A CERTAIN TENSION WITHIN ISRAEL AS THE APRIL DEADLINE DREW NEAR, AND THE OUTSIDE WORLD SHOULD TRY TO UNDERSTAND THE EFFECT WHICH THIS HAD ON ISRAELIS. HE PERSONALLY HOPED THAT GIVING UP THE SINAI SETTLEMENTS WOULD NOT BE REPEATED ELSEWHERE.

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4. SHAMIR HAD LITTLE NEW TO SAY ABOUT EGYPT OR THE LEBANON. NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS WITH EGYPT WAS PROCEEDING IN A GOOD ATMOSPHERE. HE ADMITTED THAT THERE ARE STILL WIDE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT IN THE AUTONOMY TALKS, BUT NONETHELESS PROFESSED TO BE HOPEFUL THAT A FIRST AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND THAT THEREAFTER IT WOULD ATTRACT A CERTAIN DEGREE OF SUPPORT AMONG WEST BANK ARABS. ON LEBANON, HE SAID THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK ACROSS THE BORDER. BUT IF THEY THEMSELVES WERE ATTACKED THEY WOULD HIT BACK. HE HAD AN APPROVING WORD OR TWO TO SAY ABOUT UNIFIL.

5. WHEN THE DISCUSSION REVERTED TO THE GOLAN ISSUE I ASKED IF SHAMIR COULD CLARIFY THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO THE RECENT STRATEGIC CO-OPERATION AGREEMENT WITH THE US. THIS HAD BEEN PRESENTED HERE AT THE TIME AS A MAJOR DEVELOPMENT, BUT MR BEGIN WAS NOW SAYING IN EFFECT THAT ISRAEL COULD LIVE WITHOUT IT. SHAMIR'S RESPONSE WAS THAT THE AGREEMENT ITSELF AND STRATEGIC COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES WERE IMPORTANT FROM ISRAEL'S POINT OF VIEW. HE WAS SURE THAT CONTACTS WOULD BE RESUMED AGAIN BEFORE LONG ON THE BASIS OF SHARED INTERESTS.

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Secretary of State for Industry

21 December 1981

The Rt Hon John Nott MP
Secretary of State for Defence
Ministry of Defence
Whitehall
London SW1A 2HB

N.B.P.R.

WR 12/12
f.c.

Dear John,

Thank you for your letter of 11 December to John Biffen, copied to me, among others.

2 I strongly support the industrial case. It would be very valuable to secure a contract which would help Vosper Thornycroft. The Portsmouth yard of Vospers is clearly at risk from the cutback in the Defence Programme.

3 More generally British Shipbuilders need substantial warship exports as the workload for the Ministry of Defence diminishes and a large export order now would be an important fillip to their policy of renewing naval export efforts. Equally it would be a grave setback if the French were to win this order in an area where Vosper Thornycroft have had a very good record.

4 I am copying this to recipients of your letter.

Your ever
Patrice

2 21 DEC 1981

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FROM TEL AVIV 210940Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 496 OF 21 DECEMBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PRIORITY CAIRO, DAMASCUS, AMMAN,
BEIRUT, UKMIS NEW YORK AND MODUK(FOR DIA).

MY TELNO 494: GOLAN

1. BEGIN SUMMONED THE US AMBASSADOR HERE IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE REGULAR ISRAELI SUNDAY CABINET MEETING YESTERDAY TO GIVE HIM THE ISRAELI RESPONSE TO WASHINGTON'S DECISION TO SUSPEND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE US/ISRAELI STRATEGIC CO-OPERATION AGREEMENT. THE PRIME MINISTER DESCRIBED THE AMERICAN ACTION AS CONSTITUTING ABROGATION OF THE AGREEMENT.

2. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, THE CABINET RAISED NO OBJECTIONS TO WHAT BEGIN HAD ALREADY TOLD LEWIS. HIS REMARKS (TEXT BY BAG) WERE SUBSEQUENTLY READ OUT IN FULL TO REPORTERS BY THE CABINET SECRETARY, WHO SAID THAT THEY CARRIED THE VALIDITY OF A CABINET DECISION.

3. EVEN BY HIS USUAL STANDARDS BEGIN'S RESPONSE WAS EXTREMELY OUTSPOKEN. IT MARKS A SEVERE DETERIORATION IN US/ISRAELI RELATIONS WHICH ARE NOW GOING THROUGH ONE OF THEIR WORST PATCHES FOR YEARS.

4. ONE CANNOT, NEVERTHELESS, AVOID THE SUSPICION THAT MUCH OF WHAT BEGIN HAD TO SAY WAS FOR EFFECT: HE OBVIOUSLY NEEDED TO DEMONSTRATE TO HIS POLITICAL CLIENTELE, AND TO ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION AT LARGE, THAT THE US DECISION TO SUSPEND THE AGREEMENT IS MATCHED BY AN EQUALLY TOUGH ISRAELI REPLY. HIS CHARACTERISTIC ANXIETY TO HAVE THE LAST WORD WAS ALSO OBVIOUSLY AT PLAY. INDEED THE FACT THAT HIS REMARKS TO LEWIS WERE PASSED ON SO QUICKLY AND COMPREHENSIVELY TO THE WORLD'S PRESS INDICATES THAT THE PUBLIC RELATIONS ASPECT OF THE ISSUE WAS PROBABLY DOMINANT.

5. ALTHOUGH WE CAN EXPECT THE ISRAELIS TO SUSTAIN A HARD ANTI-AMERICAN LINE FOR THE MOMENT, I DOUBT IF BEGIN AND HIS IMMEDIATE SUPPORTERS EXPECT THE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES IN US/ISRAELI RELATIONS TO LAST FOR LONG. THE JUDGEMENT HERE STILL SEEMS TO BE THAT, WHEN THE DUST HAS CLEARED, THINGS WILL GO ON VERY MUCH AS BEFORE AND MINISTERS ARE CLEARLY TAKING COMFORT FROM HAIG'S TEMPERATE PUBLIC RESPONSE YESTERDAY TO BEGIN'S STATEMENT. US/ISRAELI STRATEGIC CO-OPERATION WILL ALSO REMAIN A MAJOR OBJECTIVE. BEGIN AND SHARON WOULD NOT HAVE WORKED SO HARD TO ACHIEVE AND TO JUSTIFY THE RECENT CO-OPERATION AGREEMENT IF THEY HAD NOT REALLY WANTED IT TO CONTINUE WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES ALLOW.

MOBERLY
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FM WASHINGTON 190110Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3864 OF 18 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, PRIORITY CAIRO, BEIRUT,
JEDDA, AMMAN AND UKMIS NEW YORKMY TELNO 3855: GOLAN

1. WHEN I SAW MCFARLANE (COUNSELLOR TO HAIG) TODAY I SAID THAT I HAD NOTED THE ACTION TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO THE ISRAELI ANNEXATION OF GOLAN AND THE BREAKING OFF OF DISCUSSIONS ON STRATEGIC COOPERATION. DID HE THINK IT WAS POSSIBLE TO GO AHEAD WITH THE AUTONOMY TALKS AS IF NOTHING HAD HAPPENED?

2. MCFARLANE SAID THAT IN TERMS OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON STRATEGIC COOPERATION, NOTHING HAD YET HAPPENED THAT WAS VERY TANGIBLE. BUT THERE HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL INVESTMENT IN THIS IDEA ON THE ISRAELI SIDE. THE US NOW CALLING IT A DEAD LETTER SHOULD HAVE A SOBERING EFFECT IN JERUSALEM. HE UNDERSTOOD THE POINT ABOUT THE AUTONOMY TALKS: BUT (UNLIKE THE ISRAELIS) THE US HOPED TO ACHIEVE REAL IMPROVEMENTS IN RELATION TO THE SETTLEMENTS, AUTONOMY ARRANGEMENTS AND THE STATUS OF THE CITIZENS OF EAST JERUSALEM; AND TO BRING ABOUT AN EVOLUTION IN ISRAELI THINKING WHICH WOULD HELP TO DEMONSTRATE MUBARAK'S BONA FIDES IN TRYING TO ACHIEVE SOMETHING FOR THE PALESTINIANS. THERE WAS A SENSE OF OUTRAGE HERE OVER THE ISRAELI ACTION - AND THE RAID ON THE REACTOR - GREATER THAN THERE HAD EVER BEEN BEFORE IN WASHINGTON. (M^{CFARLANE} REFERRED TO BEGIN'S QUOTE PERFIDY UNQUOTE.) IT WAS FORTUNATE THAT THE ACTION HAD NOT FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY ON HAIG'S PLANNED VISIT TO ISRAEL.

3 MCFARLANE DID NOT EXCLUDE FURTHER MEASURES AGAINST ISRAEL IF THERE WAS A MAJOR INTERVENTION IN LEBANON; OR IF THEY STALLED THE AUTONOMY TALKS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT BEGIN'S DECISION TO MOVE HIS OFFICE TO EAST JERUSALEM WOULD CAUSE FURTHER HEADACHES. HE SUSPECTED THAT THE ISRAELIS MAY HAVE HOPED THAT THE SYRIANS, IN RESPONSE TO THE ISRAELI ACTION, WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER TRANSFERRING SOME FORCES FROM THE LEBANON TO THE SYRIAN SIDE OF THE GOLAN. THE SYRIANS, HOWEVER, HAD BEEN REACTING PRUDENTLY. MCFARLANE AGREED THAT IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES SAUDI FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE SYRIANS WAS LIKELY TO CONTINUE. THE SAUDI CROWN PRINCE, HOWEVER, WAS CONTINUING TO PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE OVER THE CEASE-FIRE AND ATTEMPTS TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE SYRIANS ABOUT WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON.

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FM TUNIS 180950Z DECEMBER 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 206 OF 18 DECEMBER

INFO TO PRIORITY DAMASCUS CAIRO TEL AVIV WASHINGTON PARIS THE HAGUE

ROME UKREP BRUSSELS UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING TO OTHER ME POSTS

MY TEL NO 204: GOLAN

1. AT SYRIAN REQUEST, ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS ARE TO MEET IN TUNIS ON 21 DECEMBER TO DISCUSS ISRAEL'S ACTION ON THE GOLAN.

2. KLIBI HAS ALSO ASKED THE OTHER FOUR PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ENSURE THAT CONCRETE ACTION IS TAKEN AGAINST ISRAEL. HE SPOKE IN MODERATE TERMS TO THE AMERICAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES BUT MORE SHARPLY TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR. THE FRENCH WERE ASKED TO RECONSIDER PARTICIPATING IN THE SINAI FORCE AND ALSO TO POSTPONE MITTERRAND'S VISIT TO ISRAEL. KLIBI IS GOING TO PARIS HIMSELF ON 18 DECEMBER.

FCO PLSE PASS SAVING TO OTHER ME POSTS

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FROM FCO 181800Z DEC 81

TO PRIORITY JEDDA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 643 OF 18 DECEMBER

INFO OTHER ME POSTS

SINAI: SITREP

1. WE HAVE NOT YET FINALLY AGREED WITH OUR THREE EUROPEAN PARTNERS THE TEXT OF OUR REPLY TO SHAMIR'S LETTER ASKING FOR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THE US/ISRAEL STATEMENT OF 3 DECEMBER. WE PROPOSE THAT THE REPLY SHOULD REMAIN LOW-KEY, AVOIDING ENDORSEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE US/ISRAEL STATEMENT, MAKING CLEAR THAT OUR POSITION HAS NOT CHANGED BUT NOT GIVING THE ISRAELIS REASON FOR OBSTRUCTING OUR PARTICIPATION FURTHER. THERE IS NO DISPUTE BETWEEN US AND OUR THREE PARTNERS ON THE GENERAL LINES OF THIS REPLY BUT WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED FINAL CONFIRMATION FROM THEM OF THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF ITS EXACT TERMS.
2. THERE IS CLEARLY AT LEAST A POLITICAL LINK BETWEEN OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI FORCE AND ISRAEL'S VIRTUAL ANNEXATION OF GOLAN. OUR PRELIMINARY THINKING IS THAT WE SHOULD NOT WITHDRAW OUR OFFER TO PARTICIPATE DESPITE THIS ISRAELI PROVOCATION BUT THAT WE MAY HAVE TO DELAY OUR REPLY TO SHAMIR AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. IT WOULD BE EMBARRASSING IF FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE PARTICIPATION WERE TO BE REACHED WHILE ARAB SENSITIVITIES OVER GOLAN ARE AT THEIR HEIGHT. WE ARE CONSULTING OUR THREE EUROPEAN PARTNERS FOR THEIR VIEWS ON THIS. A FACTOR IN OUR THINKING IS THAT TO WITHDRAW OUR OFFER OF PARTICIPATION IN THE FORCE WOULD PUNISH NOT ISRAEL BUT PRIMARILY EGYPT.
3. IF ASKED YOU SHOULD SAY ONLY THAT WE ARE CONSIDERING WITH OUR THREE PARTNERS HOW WE SHOULD RESPOND TO THE US-ISRAEL STATEMENT. OUR POSITION, AS SET OUT BY THE LORD PRIVY SEAL ON 23 DECEMBER, REMAINS UNCHANGED.

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FM WASHINGTON 172335Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3841 OF 17 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
PRIORITY TEL AVIV
ROUTINE CAIRO DAMASCUS BEIRUT AMMAN JEDDA PARIS BONN

YOUR TELNO 1939 (NOT TO ALL): GOLAN

1. I SPOKE TO VELIOTES THIS MORNING TO UNDERLINE YOUR CONCERN THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD TAKE SOME PRACTICAL ACTION TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY CANNOT ACT AS THEY HAVE OVER THE GOLAN WITH IMPUNITY. I ASKED HIM WHAT STEPS THE AMERICANS HAD IN MIND.

2. VELIOTES SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR YESTERDAY ON HAIG'S INSTRUCTIONS TO EXPRESS GRAVE CONCERN ABOUT THE MILITARY BUILD-UP IN NORTHERN ISRAEL. A REPLY FROM SHAMIR HAD JUST BEEN DELIVERED: IT CONTAINED ASSURANCES THAT ISRAEL HAD NO OFFENSIVE INTENTIONS AND WOULD ONLY REACT IF ATTACKED, AND THAT IT WOULD CARRY OUT ALL ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER THE EGYPT/ISRAEL PEACE TREATY.

3. VELIOTES SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE CONSIDERING FURTHER ACTION. FINAL DECISIONS HAD NOT YET BEEN TAKEN BUT HE THOUGHT [unclear] WITHIN THE NEXT FORTY-EIGHT

3. VELIOTES SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE CONSIDERING FURTHER ACTION. FINAL DECISIONS HAD NOT YET BEEN TAKEN BUT HE THOUGHT THAT A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT MIGHT BE MADE WITHIN THE NEXT FORTY-EIGHT HOURS. THE MEASURES UNDER CONSIDERATION WERE SIGNIFICANT AND WOULD BE IN THE CONTEXT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS. HE DECLINED TO GIVE DETAILS BUT IMPLIED IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION THAT SUSPENSION OF MILITARY SUPPLIES OR ECONOMIC AID WAS UNLIKELY, NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF THE PROBLEM OF WHEN SUCH A BAN COULD BE LIFTED. IT IS, HOWEVER, DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT OTHER BILATERAL MEASURES WOULD HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THE ISRAELIS. A MEMBER OF HIS STAFF CONFIDED TO ME LATER THAT HE THOUGHT WE WOULD BE PLEASED WITH THE FURTHER MEASURES AGAINST ISRAEL THAT HAD BEEN DECIDED UPON. (COMMENT: WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR DETAILS EMPHASISING THE ADVANTAGES OF PRIOR NOTICE.)

4. VELIOTES REITERATED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD HAD NO PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE ISRAELI ACTION AND HAD CERTAINLY NOT BEEN ALERTED TO IT BY PERES AS THE FRENCH HAVE APPARENTLY SUGGESTED. THEY WERE NOW TRYING TO TURN THE EPISODE TO SOME ADVANTAGE BY SECURING THE INCLUSION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF REFERENCES TO RESOLUTIONS 242, 338 AND 358. THIS WOULD SECURE INTERNATIONAL REAFFIRMATION OF THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND REASSURE THE SYRIANS THAT THEY APPLIED TO THE GOLAN. ELIOTES ALSO HOPED TO SECURE SOME RECONFIRMATION FROM THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY REMAIN PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE PEACE WITH ALL THEIR NEIGHBOURS ON THE BASIS OF THE UN RESOLUTIONS.

5. VELIOTES COMMENTED THAT THE SYRIANS WERE SO FAR BEING VERY CAREFUL AND RESTRAINED. THE SAUDIS HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THEM AND HAD ASSURED THE AMERICANS THAT THEY COULD OBTAIN MORE TIME IF THIS WAS REQUIRED. THE AMERICANS HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO THE SYRIANS THAT THEY WOULD VETO MANDATORY SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL AND THE SYRIANS SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS.

6. VELIOTES OBSERVED THAT ISRAELI ACTIONS APPEARED TO SERVE ASAD'S PURPOSES. IT WOULD NOW BE FAR MORE DIFFICULT TO SECURE ANY SYRIAN MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON OR CONCESSIONS OVER THE SAMS: SYRIA HAD BEEN BROUGHT OUT OF ITS ISOLATION AND THE SAUDIS BROUGHT TO RESUME FINANCIAL AID TO SYRIA WHICH THEY HAD BEEN READY TO SUSPEND AFTER THE FEZ SUMMIT. HE NOTED GLOOMILY THAT BEGIN'S NEXT STEP WOULD PROBABLY BE TO MOVE HIS OFFICE TO EAST JERUSALEM BEFORE APRIL AS A FURTHER TEST OF THE EGYPTIAN ATTITUDE.

(COMMENT: IT LOOKS AS THOUGH BEGIN MAY BE READY TO USE QUOTE TESTING THE EGYPTIANS UNQUOTE AS COVER FOR GETTING

TO SYRIA WHICH THEY HAD BEEN READY TO SUSPEND AFTER THE FEZ
SUMMIT. HE NOTED GLOOMILY THAT BEGIN'S NEXT STEP WOULD
PROBABLY BE TO MOVE HIS OFFICE TO EAST JERUSALEM BEFORE
APRIL AS A FURTHER TEST OF THE EGYPTIAN ATTITUDE.
(COMMENT: IT LOOKS AS THOUGH BEGIN MAY BE READY TO USE QUOTE
TESTING THE EGYPTIANS UNQUOTE AS COVER FOR GETTING
AWAY WITH WHATEVER HE CAN WHILST HE STILL HOLDS THE SINAI
TRUMP).

7. I ASKED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF THE ANNEXATION OF THE GOLAN ON
THE AUTONOMY TALKS. VELIOTES ADMITTED THAT IT MADE THINGS
MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE EGYPTIANS. A MAJOR US EFFORT
TO COME TO GRIPS WITH ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE WOULD BE NEEDED.
THE TALKS AT WORKING LEVEL HAD SUCCEEDED IN DEFINING THE
POSITIONS OF THE TWO PARTIES ON THE KEY ISSUES, AN ESSENTIAL
PRELIMINARY. THE AMERICANS WERE ABOUT TO REASSESS IN DETAIL HOW THEY
COULD ENGAGE MORE INTENSIVELY IN THE PROCESS. HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL
DECISIONS WOULD BE REQUIRED BEFORE THE AMERICANS EMBARKED ON ANY
EFFORT TO BRIDGE THE GAPS. MUBARAK'S VISIT TO THE US,
NOW ARRANGED FOR 3-4 FEBRUARY, WOULD OFFER AN OPPORTUNITY FOR
DISCUSSION. THE AMERICANS HAD NO INTENTION OF DRAGGING OUT THE
AUTONOMY TALKS BUT VELIOTES THOUGHT THAT THEY WERE LIKELY
TO CONTINUE WELL BEYOND APRIL, IF ONLY BECAUSE THE EGYPTIANS
WOULD NOT WISH TO BE ACCUSED OF MAKING CONCESSIONS AT THE
EXPENSE OF THE PALESTINIANS IN ORDER TO SECURE ISRAELI
WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI.

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FM CAIRO 171135Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 685 OF 17 DECEMBER

see overleaf

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MIPT: GOLAN HEIGHTS.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF KEMAL HASSAN ALI'S MESSAGE:

BEGINS:

EXCELLENCY,

IN KEEPING WITH AN ESTABLISHED PRACTICE OF MUTUAL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, AND BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WHICH THE UNITED KINGDOM CURRENTLY PRESIDES OVER, I FIND IT NECESSARY TO SEND YOU EXCELLENCY THIS MESSAGE TO CLARIFY EGYPT'S POINT OF VIEW CONCERNING THE REGRETTABLE DEVELOPMENT WHICH TOOK PLACE LATELY DUE TO THE ISRAELI LAW PROCLAIMED ON 14TH OF THIS MONTH TO APPLY THE ISRAELI LEGISLATION, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION TO THE OCCUPIED SYRIAN GOLAN HEIGHTS.

IT IS INDEED REGRETABLE THAT ISRAEL TAKES SUCH ACTION WHILE EFFORTS ARE BEING PURSUED BY ALL FORCES CONCERNED WITH PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO FOSTER THE PROSPECTS OF ATTAINING A PEACEFUL, JUST, LASTING AND COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, HENCE, DEALING A BLOW TO THESE EFFORTS AND PUTTING OBSTACLES ON THE WAY TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE REGION.

I NEED NOT TO EXPLAIN WHY EGYPT CONSIDERS THE ISRAELI DECISION A VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE

A VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND A COMPLETE CONTRAVENTION OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST SIGNED ON 17TH OF SEPTEMBER 1979 AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS SPECIALLY THE RESOLUTUION 242 UPON WHICH THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS WERE BASED.

THEREFORE, EGYPT ANNOUNED ITS ABSOLUTE REJECTION OF THE ISRAELI MEASURE AS INVALID AND ILLEGITIMATE.

EXCELLENCY,

EGYPT DOES NOT CONSIDER THE ISRAELI DECISION A MERE BLOW AGAINST MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS, BUT ALSO, AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, A DEFIANCE TO THE SOCIETY OF NATIONS WHICH NECESSITATES COUNTERING SUCH MEASURES THAT CONSTITUTE A DESTABILISING FACTOR ON THE WORLD SCENE AND POSE A THREAT TO THE PROSPECTS OF PEACE AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE BETWEEN PEOPLES AND STATES OF THE MIDDLE EAST REGION.

THE STATEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ANNOUNCED IN LONDON ON 15TH OF DECEMBER 1981, AND WHICH CONSIDERED THE ISRAELI DECISION A VIOLATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW, AS WELL AS THE DECLARATIONS OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM ON 16TH DECEMBER 1981, WERE RECEIVED BY SATISFACTION AND APPRECIATION ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT, WILL CONTINUE TO ADOPT CLEAR ATTITUDES TOWARDS ANY THREAT TO PEACE IN OUR REGION. WE ALSO HOPE THAT THE COMMUNITY WILL PARTICIPATE IN EFFORTS TO NULLIFY THE EFFECTS OF THE ISRAELI MEASURE AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE WORLD AT LARGE.

EXCELLENCY,

LET ME EXPRESS THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN US CONCERNING THE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE SITUATION AND TO COORDINATING OUR EFFORTS TO SAFEGUARD PEACE PROPSECTS IN THE REGION.

I AVAIL MYSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW TO YOUR EXCELLENCY THE ASSURANCE OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

KAMAL HASSAN ALI
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFARIS.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 684 OF 17 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

SAVING ALL OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS AND EC POSTS

YOUR TELNO 199 TO TEL AVIV: GOLAN HEIGHTS.

1. I CALLED THIS MORNING ON THE EGYPTIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTRY AND FOREIGN MINISTER AND HANDED HIM THE TEXT OF THE EC STATEMENT. KEMAL HASSAN ALI GAVE ME IN TURN A MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO YOU, SETTING OUT EGYPT'S POINT OF VIEW, EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR THE STATEMENTS BY THE EC AND BY THE PRIME MINISTER, AND ALSO THE HOPE THAT THE COMMUNITY WILL TAKE PART IN EFFORTS TO NULLIFY THE EFFECTS OF THE ISRAELI MEASURE AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE PEACE PROCESS. TEXT IN MIFT (NOT RPTD)

2. KEMAL ALI SAID THAT EGYPT HAD BEEN EXPECTING SUCH A MOVE, WHETHER ON GOLAN, SOUTHERN LEBANON OR (IN HIS PERSONAL VIEW AS A MILITARY MAN) THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. THOUGH THE LAST WOULD HAVE BEEN A MORE BLATANT VIOLATION OF CAMP DAVID WE SHOULD NOT OVERLOOK THE FACT THAT THE ANNEXATION OF GOLAN WAS ALSO A DIRECT VIOLATION OF THE CLAUSE IN THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH EGYPT AND ISRAEL STATED THAT THE PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS IT CONTAINED SHOULD APPLY TO PEACE TREATIES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EACH OF ITS NEIGHBOURS - EGYPT, JORDAN, SYRIA AND LEBANON. HE HOPED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD NOT CONFINE ITS REACTION TO VERBAL STATEMENTS AND RESOLUTIONS AT THE UN. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION HE SAID THAT HE HAD PASTORAL

STATEMENTS AND RESOLUTIONS AT THE UN. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION HE SAID THAT HE HAD PARTICULARLY IN MIND ACTION BY THE UNITED STATES.

3. DISCUSSING THE MOTIVES FOR THE ISRAELI DECISION KEMAL ALI SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS CHIEFLY A QUESTION OF TIMING TO DO WITH OTHER COUNTRIES' PREOCCUPATIONS, POLAND, THE IRAQ/IRAN WAR ETC. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT PROVOCATIVE STATEMENTS BY ASSAD, OR DISAPPOINTMENT WITH HABIB, WOULD HAVE WEIGHED MUCH WITH BEGIN. AS TO THE THEORY THAT BEGIN MIGHT HAVE WISHED TO "TEST" EGYPTIAN INTENTIONS IN ADVANCE OF NEXT APRIL (TEL AVIV TELNO 490) KEMAL ALI OBSERVED THAT THE ASSASSINATION OF SADAT HAD BEEN THE GREATEST TEST THAT COULD POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN DEvised. WHAT MORE PROOF DID THE ISRAELIS NEED?

4. KEMAL ALI MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE EGYPTIAN THEMSELVES ARE CONTEMPLATING NO FURTHER ACTION, APART FROM MESSAGES TO FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS AND A STATEMENT IN PARLIEMENT. BUT THE ISRAELI ACTION HAS UNDOUBTEDLY COME AS A SEVERE BLOW, AND HE WAS OFF TO A FURTHER CABINET MEETING TO DISCUSS IT, FOLLOWING A LENGTHY CABINET SESSION YESTERDAY CHAIRED BY PRESIDENT MUBARAK. NEXT APRIL IS SUDDENLY BEGINNING TO LOOK A LONG WAY OFF.

FCO PSE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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TO DIRECTOR GENERAL

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1593 OF 17 DECEMBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV.

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, CAIRO, BEIRUT, JEDDA, WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO 894, PARA 3: SECURITY COUNCIL: GOLAN HEIGHTS.

1. AFTER A DELAY OF CONFUSED NEGOTIATIONS, THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED RESOLUTION NO 497 (1981).

2. THERE WERE 12 FURTHER SPEAKERS IN THE DEBATE. MEANWHILE THE AMERICANS TRIED TO PERSUADE THE SYRIANS TO ACCEPT THEIR DESIRED CHANGES, WITH HELP FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL. THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE COMPLICATED BY SIMULTANEOUS DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION ON THE SAME SUBJECT, ON WHICH I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY. IN THE END, THE MOST THE AMERICANS COULD GET THE SYRIANS TO ACCEPT WAS THE FOLLOWING (REFERENCES ARE TO THE TEXT IN MY TELNO 1588):

(A) ADD TO THE SECOND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH "IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UN CHARTER, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS";

- THE TEXT IN THE PREAMBLE 1967
- (A) ADD TO THE SECOND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH "IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UN CHARTER, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS";
 - (B) ADD TO OPERATIVE PARA 1: "AND WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL EFFECT";
 - (C) DELETE "NECESSARY" IN OPERATIVE PARA 4 AND SUBSTITUTE "APPROPRIATE".

THE MAIN PROBLEM WAS AMERICAN INSISTENCE ON THE ADDITION OF "INCLUDING RESOLUTION 338" AT THE END OF THE NEW PASSAGE IN THE SECOND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH. THIS THE SYRIANS ADAMANTLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT. THE AMERICANS FINALLY GAVE WAY, PERMITTING UNANIMOUS ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION LATE IN THE EVENING.

3. AFTER IT HAD BEEN ADOPTED, LICHESTEN (USA) SAID THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT RESOLUTIONS ALLUDED TO IN THE PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH WERE 242, 338 AND 350, WHICH COMPRISED THE BASIS FOR A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE. HE EXPRESSED THE UNITED STATES' "DEEPEST REGRET AND OPPOSITION" TO THE KNESSET'S ACTION. THE US DID NOT ACCEPT AS VALID UNILATERAL ACTS WHICH PURPORTED TO ALTER THE STATUS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THEY HAD STRONGLY URGED ISRAEL TO AVOID THE ACTION WHICH IT HAD JUST TAKEN. THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS HAD TO BE ADDRESSED IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT UNDER RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL ACTION WOULD COMPLICATE SUCH NEGOTIATIONS. LICHESTEN ENDED RATHER LAMELY WITH AN APPEAL TO ISRAEL TO REAFFIRM ITS COMMITMENT TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THE CONFLICT, INCLUDING THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS.

4. BLUM (ISRAEL) SAID THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT ACCEPT THE RESOLUTION JUST ADOPTED. IT IGNORED WHAT HE HAD SAID YESTERDAY ABOUT THE SYRIAN THREAT TO ISRAEL AND ITS REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE. SYRIA WAS THE AGGRESSOR AND THE VIOLATOR OF THE CHARTER. IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS LIVING UP TO ITS RESPONSIBILITIES, IT SHOULD BE CALLING SYRIA, NOT ISRAEL, TO ORDER. THERE FOLLOWED AN EXCHANGE OF RIGHTS OF REPLY BETWEEN FATTAL AND BLUM, WHICH THE LATTER WON EASILY.

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FILE



BF
on MCG
with Egypt
Ambassador
Aug 80

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 December 1981

Call on the Prime Minister by the Egyptian Ambassador

Would you please refer to Francis Richards' letter of 16 December and your own of 17 December.

ref on
Egypt Aug 80
Meeting with
Egyptian Ambassador
Aug 1980

Mr. Abou Seeda paid a 10-minute call on the Prime Minister today. His primary purpose was to convey a letter to the Prime Minister from President Mubarak. A copy is enclosed with this letter.

The Prime Minister read the letter and commented that it was our firm hope that withdrawal from Sinai would take place on schedule and according to plan. The Ambassador said that Egypt was hoping for the best. All calculations suggested that the Israelis ought to complete the withdrawal process and Egypt was sure that they would indeed withdraw. The Israeli Government could, however, be expected to make difficulties, for which Egypt would be ready.

The Ambassador congratulated the Prime Minister on the speech she had made to the Board of Deputies of British Jews on the recent Israeli move on the Golan. HMG's attitude was very solid and encouraging. The Israelis could be counted upon to raise new issues to complicate the peace process, for example in Southern Lebanon their objective would be to distract attention from the Palestinian issue. The autonomy negotiations presented great difficulty but Egypt had to go on with them. There was no other way to promote peace. Egypt hoped that after the completion of Sinai withdrawal in April 1982, friendly Governments, including the United Kingdom, would co-ordinate action with the Americans to stimulate new movement towards peace. Egypt wanted a comprehensive peace, not just a settlement in Sinai.

The Prime Minister said she concluded from this that Egypt's approach was not limited to the ideas contained in the Camp David Agreement (the Ambassador confirmed that that was so). She added that it was important that Egypt's relations with other Arabs should improve.

/ The Prime

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The Prime Minister then said that she hoped President Mubarak would be able to visit London soon. Mr. Abou Seeda said that the President was hoping to visit the United States in February. The Prime Minister said he would be very welcome to visit London either on his way to or back from the United States, or at any other time. The Ambassador said that he would convey this invitation with pleasure to President Mubarak.

I should be grateful if you could let me have in due course a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to President Mubarak's letter.

A. J. COLES

R. M. J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

4

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The Golan Heights

6. N/W Basin Papers.
2. Copy to Mr. Cohen ✓
No 10:
(para 3 is relevant to the letter in the Times of 17/12/81) JH

P.A. M 12/12

I Introduction

In the closing stages of the Six Day War in June 1967 the Israelis, having disposed of the Egyptian forces in Sinai, and having driven the Jordanian army from the West Bank, attacked the Syrian positions on the heights above the east bank of the Jordan north and south of Lake Tiberias and occupied a strip of Syrian territory running from the Lebanese frontier in the north through Quneitra to the River Yarmuk in the south. This area, known as the Golan Heights, rising steeply for some 1,000 ft. from the valley below, is likely to prove a major stumbling block in the way of an Arab/Israel peace settlement.

II General Description of the Area

2. The Heights are a southern extension of the Anti-Lebanon and the Mt. Hermon range, and extend for some 30 miles along the Israeli/Syrian armistice line as fixed by the armistice agreement of 20 July 1949, from roughly Banias in the north to the northern shore of Lake Tiberias. It contains two demilitarised zones, that of the Dan triangle in the north, and the central more extended Bridge of the Daughters of Jacob, (Jisr Banat Yagoub) zone stretching northwards from Lake Tiberias. Both lie on the Israeli side of the armistice line and both, ever since their establishment, have been in constant dispute and the cause of frequent breaches of the ceasefire by both sides.⁽¹⁾ In these exchanges the Syrians had a definite advantage in that their artillery sited on the reverse side of the escarpment could shell Israeli settlements and working parties in the Upper Jordan Valley and the plain below with little fear of retaliation except on a massive and wholly disproportionate scale which the Israelis, except in their assault on Tawafiq in 1960, never found it feasible to attempt.

3. It appears that the name Golan was extant in biblical times to describe the area between Mt. Hermon and the Sea of Gallilee, part of the larger area of Bashan conquered by Joshua, and forming part of the territory of the tribe of Manasseh. It was divided into Upper

(1) See ~~LR~~ LR 6/24. The Demilitarised Zones of Israel's Frontier with Syria and the UAR (10 May, 1966).

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Jolan, a sparsely populated grazing area, and Lower Golan (biblical Geshur) which was a rich and fertile agricultural area. The frontier prior to June 1967 was that fixed at San Remo in 1920 between the French mandated territories of Lebanon and Syria and British mandated Palestine, the actual demarcation owing something to Lloyd George's insistence that Palestine should be reconstituted on what he believed to be its biblical limits of "Dan to Beersheba". This frontier was confirmed in the Franco/British Treaty of 3 February, 1923, and continued unaltered after the lapse of the mandates as the armistice line between Israel and Syria.

4. The area, including that south and east of Lake Tiberias, is of no great extent (about 430 square miles) but includes Quneitra, the old Headquarters of the Syrian Southern Command, and the new boundary is only 40 miles over easy terrain from Damascus. Prior to June 1967 it had a population of just over 100,000 including 6,000 Druzes, but a great part of the area was occupied by an elaborate defence system some ten miles deep which covered the entire frontier north and south of Lake Tiberias, consisting of underground bunkers, wire, minefields, gun emplacements, anti-tank and anti-aircraft defences constructed with Russian advice and supervision.

5. The Druze population, which dates from the migration from Mt. Lebanon in the Nineteenth Century, had for long been on bad terms with successive Syrian Governments, intensified in recent years by the advent to power of an Alawi dominated régime which did not hesitate to use force to deal with any recalcitrance. Apart from the Druzes there was also a sizable Circassian population, the bulk of which appears to have fled before the Israeli advance, and at least one settlement of Turcmen which, like the Druzes, had stayed put, and did not take part in the general saue qui peut which preceded the occupation of Quneitra. The Druzes have strong kinship ties with the 30,000 strong Druze community in Israel, and they alone of the original population remain and are apparently reconciled to living under Israeli occupation.

III Israeli Settlement

6. The exact number of Israeli settlements established in the area since June 1967 is uncertain, probably not more than a dozen strong

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out along the line of the Banias-Quneitra-Hama road, and divided roughly into a northern group lying in the area between the Lebanese frontier and Rafid, and a southern group situated in the triangle between Lake Tiberias and the River Yarmuk, east and north of the demilitarised zone of Al Hammamiya. (See Annex and Map.)

7. According to reports which have appeared in the Israeli press the total area under occupation is 1,160,000 dunums (= about 280,000 acres) of which the Druze and Mt. Hermon villages account for 35,000 acres, ^{and} ~~plus~~ forest and grazing land for 225,000, leaving 35,000-40,000 acres agricultural land available for settlement and development. Approximately 5,000 dunums (1,250 acres) have been allotted to each settlement, those in the northern and more hilly area concentrating on cattle and goats, with some field crops and vineyards, while those in the much more fertile south are to grow fruit, vegetables and flowers for export and consumption in Israel itself.

8. The majority of these new settlements were manned initially by Nahal, young conscripts of the Israeli Defence Force who combine military service with agricultural pioneering usually in border areas. Discipline is intensive and the settlements are well armed and fortified for defence. One at least, however, Kibbutz Golan (now Ramat Shalom), on the outskirts of Quneitra, was established as a purely civilian settlement within a week of the occupation. This was contrary to the declared policy of the Government which is that there should be no ~~permanent~~ permanent civilian settlements in the occupied territories, but it seems that despite this other settlements have either been civilian-type from their inception or have become so since. The pattern of Nahal settlement is for a unit of about 100 strong to farm an area of 1,200-1,500 acres with the professed aim of utilising empty land and providing additional food supplies, the finance required coming mainly from the Diaspora in the USA, channelled through the Jewish National Fund.

9. This is only one aspect of the Nahal settlements, however, and in response to a Syrian protest to the United Nations the Israeli representative replied that:-

"The Nahal corps..... are military units of the Israel Defence Force

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and their activities are designed to assist in ensuring the security of the area and in maintaining the cease fire" which of course was begging the question of their agricultural activities and the settlement ^{aspects} of their presence.

10. All settlements are heavily armed and it seems clear that in part they have been sited with an eye to their defence value, and to act as a buffer against Syrian and Palestine guerrilla raiding and infiltration into Israel proper, though it could be argued that in situating them thus the Israelis are positively inviting Arab action against them. The official line therefore is that these are temporary military settlements in occupied territory which could be removed without difficulty in the event of evacuation, and that they are no indication of an intention to remain. This may be so but the Gahal Party, which, extremist though it is, is not on this particular issue without a great deal of popular support, has come out strongly for retention of all occupied territory, and as regards the Golan Heights the Deputy Premier, Mr. Allon, is on record as having said:- "We will return Golan to Syria when we give them the entire State of Israel". (2)

11. Well in the forefront of popular demand for permanent occupation is the Movement for the Entire Land of Israel which favours immediate extension of settlement in the occupied territories, particularly on the Golan Heights, in terms of a further 10 or 12 settlements, and which regards the present situation as a "golden opportunity for Israel" as providing "a future granary as well as providing large quantities of meat which Israel now has to import. The great need is for more settlers". (3) It is alleged that in all about 250,000 acres are available for settlement, most of it pasture land suitable for cattle raising, but including also some 25,000 acres of fertile arable, the whole area capable of supporting some 4,000 families.

IV Conclusion

12. Annexation of the Heights, perhaps more than any other occupied area, is deemed essential for Israel's security, and here one of the

(2). Speech at the first anniversary celebration of Kibbutz Golan in 1968.

(3). The Jewish Chronicle, 13 June, 1969. "No Retreat from Golan".

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main deterrents to adding further territory to Israel, the presence of a potentially hostile Arab community, does not exist. The Arabs, by removing themselves en masse have presented Israel with about 430 square miles of virtually unoccupied territory which to them is of the greatest strategic and also of some economic value. They are unlikely to let it go under almost any circumstances.

13. That there is no real intention of handing the area back to Syria in the face of strong public pressure not to do so can be inferred from the fact that about £50 mill. (£6. mill) is in the process of being expended on development with the prospect of more to come, and that various Israeli Ministries are interesting themselves in a number of projects such as cattle raising, road building, tourist centres on the eastern shores of Lake Tiberias and winter sports facilities on the slopes of Mt. Hermon.

14. It is true that Israel is committed to withdrawal to "secure, recognised and agreed boundaries to be determined in peace agreements", but it seems unlikely in the light of past history and present pressure that the old armistice line boundary could be accepted by any Israeli Government as secure, even if demilitarised, and as a recent article in the Jewish Observer made clear:- "The Golan Heights, too, will probably not be among the territories from which Israel will be ready to withdraw".⁽⁴⁾

15. There seems little doubt, therefore, that the Israelis would surrender the Heights only with the utmost reluctance and under very severe pressure, and that there is a strong body of opinion in favour of hanging on to the area at all costs in view of (a) its association with biblical Israel and (b) its relevance to national security.⁽⁵⁾ In fact so strong is this attitude that Syrian refusal to make peace at any price is welcomed by Israelis as affording them excuse for permanent occupation of the Heights.

Middle East Section,
FCO Research Department.

August, 1970

(4) An article "How Much Would Israel Give Back", dated 7 August, 1970

(5) It is perhaps relevant to note that occupation would also increase Israel's offensive potential against both Syria and Jordan. Damascus now lies only a short 40 miles beyond the present cease fire line, and Jordan is vulnerable to a thrust southwards from the Heights through Dera'a and Irbid.

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ANNEX

Israeli Settlements on the Golan Heights
as identified to date.

Snir (formerly Nahli Snir).
Ramat Shalom (on the outskirts of Quneitra: formerly Kibbutz Golan).
Merom Hagolan.
Ein Ziwan.
Nahl Geshur.
El Al.
Nahl Golan.
Ramat Magshimim.
Givat Yo'av.
Neot Hagolan.
Mevo Hama.
and possibly also Matan Oz.

Six of these have been described as kibbutzim, four as moshavim
and a possible two as nahals.

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
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SKETCH MAP OF
THE GOLAN HEIGHTS

Settlements



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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1588 OF 16 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV DAMASCUS BEIRUT AMMAN AND WASHINGTON.

MIPT:

SECURITY COUNCIL - GOLAN HEIGHTS.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION:

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
HAVING CONSIDERED THE LETTER OF 14 DECEMBER 1981 FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT
S/14791,

REAFFIRMING THAT THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE IS
INADMISSIBLE,

1. DECIDES THAT THE ISRAELI DECISION TO IMPOSE ITS LAWS, JURISDICTION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE OCCUPIED SYRIAN GOLAN HEIGHTS IS NULL AND VOID;
2. DEMANDS THAT ISRAEL, THE OCCUPYING POWER, SHOULD RESCIND FORTHWITH ITS DECISION.
3. DETERMINES THAT ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION

AND VOID

2. DEMANDS THAT ISRAEL, THE OCCUPYING POWER, SHOULD RESCIND FORTHWITH ITS DECISION.

3. DETERMINES THAT ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR OF 12 AUGUST 1949 CONTINUE TO APPLY TO THE SYRIAN TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE JUNE 1967.

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION WITHIN TWO WEEKS AND DECIDES THAT, IN THE EVENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE BY ISRAEL, THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD MEET URGENTLY AND NOT LATER THAN 5 JANUARY 1982 TO CONSIDER TAKING NECESSARY MEASURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1590 OF 16 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS TEL AVIV

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON AMMAN BEIRUT

MIPT: SECURITY COUNCIL - GOLAN HEIGHTS.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY STATEMENT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
ON 16 DECEMBER:

BEGINS:

MY GOVERNMENT IS DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THE ISRAELI
GOVERNMENT'S ACTION IN INTRODUCING AND IMMEDIATELY HAVING
ADOPTED BY THE KNESSET, A BILL TO EXTEND THE LAW, JURISDICTION
AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS.
OUR CONCERN HAS BEEN INCREASED BY THE SUDDENNESS AND THE HASTE
WITH WHICH THIS ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN.

MY GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THIS ISSUE IS CLEAR. THE GOLAN
HEIGHTS BELONG TO THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC AND FORM PART OF
THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL IN THE WAR OF 1967. THE
AREA IS SUBJECT TO THE PRINCIPLES EMPHASISED IN SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, INCLUDING THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE
ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY WAR, THE TERRITORY OF A STATE IS
NOT TO BE ACQUIRED BY ANOTHER BY THE USE OF FORCE. WE CANNOT

COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, INCLUDING THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY WAR, THE TERRITORY OF A STATE IS NOT TO BE ACQUIRED BY ANOTHER BY THE USE OF FORCE. WE CANNOT THEREFORE ACCEPT ANY UNILATERAL INITIATIVE BY ISRAEL TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORY INTO AN AREA SUBJECT TO ISRAELI LAW, JURISDICTION AND ADMINISTRATION.

WE REGARD SUCH AN INITIATIVE AS CONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND AS TANTAMOUNT TO ANNEXATION. WE CONSIDER THAT ALL LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES AND ACTIONS IMPLEMENTING THIS INITIATIVE HAVE NO LEGAL VALIDITY.

TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS REPEATEDLY REAFFIRMED THE ILLEGALITY OF ANY UNILATERAL CHANGE IN THE PHYSICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTER OF THE TERRITORIES WHICH ISRAEL HAS OCCUPIED SINCE 1967. WE HAVE ALSO REPEATEDLY TAKEN THE VIEW THAT THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION OF 12 AUGUST 1949 APPLIES TO ALL THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES INCLUDING THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. ARTICLE 47 OF THIS CONVENTION EMPHASISES THAT PROTECTED PERSONS CANNOT BE DEPRIVED OF THE BENEFITS OF THE CONVENTION BY A PURPORTED ANNEXATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO REGARD THE CONVENTION AS APPLYING TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. WE SUPPORTED THE ADOPTION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 476 AND 478 OF 1980 IN RELATION TO ISRAEL'S ENACTMENT OF A QUOTE BASIC LAW UNQUOTE ON JERUSALEM AND WE HAVE CONTINUED TO MAKE CLEAR OUR OPPOSITION TO ANY UNILATERAL CHANGE IN THE STATUS OF THAT CITY.

THIS LATEST DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT AND KNESSET OF ISRAEL TO EXTEND ISRAELI LAW, JURISDICTION AND ADMINISTRATION TO OCCUPIED SYRIAN TERRITORY IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS COMES AT THE END OF A YEAR IN WHICH TENSIONS IN THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE HAVE BEEN INFLAMED BY SEVERAL INCIDENTS. IN A STATEMENT ISSUED ON 15 DECEMBER BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MY GOVERNMENT JOINED IN STRONGLY DEPLORING THIS DECISION. IN THEIR STATEMENT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS FURTHER TOOK THE VIEW THAT THIS STEP BY ISRAEL PREJUDICED THE POSSIBILITY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND WAS BOUND TO COMPLICATE FURTHER THE SEARCH FOR A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO WHICH THE TEN REMAIN COMMITTED.

IN CONCLUSION, I SHOULD LIKE TO APPEAL ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT TO THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES TO RECONSIDER THEIR DECISION.

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MY TELNO 495: ZIAD ABU EIN

1. MY US COLLEAGUE, SPEAKING IN STRICT CONFIDENCE, TOLD ME THAT HE HAD DELIVERED A MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN FROM JUDGE CLARK (ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE IN MR HAIG'S ABSENCE) CONCERNING ABU EIN. WHEN SEEING THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON 14 DECEMBER TO RECEIVE THE JORDANIAN REPLY, AMBASSADOR VIETS HAD TOLD QASEM THAT ABU EIN HAD SPOKEN FREELY WHILE IN GAOL OF HIS COMPLICITY IN THE ACT OF TERRORISM OF WHICH HE HAD BEEN ACCUSED. THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IN REPLYING HAD SAID ON A PERSONAL BASIS THAT THE JORDANIANS DID NOT NECESSARILY CONDONE ABU EIN'S ACTIONS.
2. HOWEVER AMBASSADOR VIETS DREW LITTLE OR NO COMFORT FROM THIS EXCHANGE. THE JORDANIAN REACTION HAD BEEN VERY SHARP, EVEN THOUGH A PLANNED DEMONSTRATION AGAINST THE US EMBASSY YESTERDAY DID NOT TAKE PLACE, AND HE THOUGHT THE CONSEQUENCES FOR US/JORDANIAN RELATIONS WERE LIKELY TO BE EXTREMELY SERIOUS. VIETS SAID IT WAS FORTUNATE IN THE EXTREME THAT MR HAIG HAD NOT PAID HIS SCHEDULED VISIT TO ISRAEL THE DAY AFTER ABU EIN WAS HANDED OVER, AS THIS WOULD HAVE MADE A BAD SITUATION EVEN WORSE.

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TELNO 426 OF 16 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 199 TO TEL AVIV

GOLAN HEIGHTS

1. US AMBASSADOR WAS ABLE TO PASS HIS GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS TO KHADDAM ON INSTRUCTIONS ON MORNING OF 15 DECEMBER. HE STRESSED THAT US STRONGLY DEPLORED THE ISRAELI MOVE, URGED THE SYRIANS NOT TO TAKE ACTION IN BREACH OF THE CEASEFIRE AND (ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE AND AT A LOWER LEVEL) WARNED THAT THE US WOULD HAVE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES WITH ANY SECURITY COUNCIL

US WOULD HAVE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES WITH ANY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WHICH ENVISAGED SANCTIONS. BUT KHADDAM, WHO WELCOMED THE APPROACH, TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THREE TIMES THAT SYRIA WAS KEEPING ALL OPTIONS OPEN, AND WOULD DECIDE ON FUTURE ACTION AND HER ATTITUDE TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE LIGHT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE. THERE WAS AN IMPLICIT THREAT IN HIS WORDS, NOT LEAST TO THE FUTURE OF US/SYRIAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

2. IT WOULD DO SOMETHING TO EXTRACT EUROPE FROM THE DOGHOUSE TO WHICH SYRIA HAS CONSIGNED THEM AS A RESULT OF PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI MFO AND OF CHEYSSON'S RECENT REMARKS IF I COULD CONVEY A STRONG AND POSITIVE REPLY TO KHADDAM'S DEMARCHE (MY TELNO 420) ON INSTRUCTIONS IN BOTH A BRITISH AND A PRESIDENCY CAPACITY. BUT TO HAVE IMPACT IT MUST GO FURTHER THAN SIMPLY HANDING OVER A TEXT WHICH HAD BEEN BROADCAST AND FULLY REPORTED IN THE SYRIAN PRESS BEFORE IT REACHED ME. ASSUMING THAT THE VOTING RECOMMENDATIONS IN UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1564 TO YOU ARE ACCEPTED, COULD I BE AUTHORISED IN ADDITION TO TRANSMITTING THE DECLARATION OF THE TEN, TO INFORM THE SYRIANS OF OUR INTENTIONS BEFORE THE VOTES TAKE PLACE AND ALSO, OF HOW FAR WE ARE PREPARED TO GO IN THEIR SUPPORT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ?

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OO UKMIS NEW YORK DESKBY 161430Z
RR WASHINGTON
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DESKBY 161430Z
FM FCO 161130Z DECEMBER 81
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 886 OF 16 DECEMBER 1981
INFO AMMAN, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, CAIRO, BEIRUT, JEDDA.

YOUR TELNOS 1564-1567: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND GOLAN HEIGHTS.

1. I ACCEPT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION IN YOUR TELNO 1567 IS STORING UP TROUBLE FOR A SECOND ROUND. YOU SHOULD SEEK THE SUBSTITUTION OF QUOTE CONSIDER TAKING UNQUOTE FOR QUOTE TAKE UNQUOTE IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4 AND SUGGEST A LONGER PERIOD THAN ONE WEEK. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE ISRAELI STEP AND MY WISH TO SEND THE RIGHT POLITICAL SIGNAL TO THE ISRAELIS AND TO THE ARABS MY VIEW AT THIS STAGE IS THAT YOU SHOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION EVEN IF THESE CHANGES ARE NOT ACCEPTED, ASSUMING THAT YOU WILL NOT BE ALONE IN THE WESTERN GROUP IN DOING SO. YOU SHOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR EVEN IF THE AMERICANS VOTE AGAINST. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE TEXT ARE ACCEPTED, YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE THAT WE DO NOT REGARD OURSELVES AS COMMITTED BY THE TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION TO PARTICULAR FORMS OF ACTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT A LATER STAGE.

2. I AGREE THAT YOU SHOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR OF BOTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS ON GOLAN (IE THAT IN YOUR TELNO 1565 AND THE PREVIOUS RESOLUTION UNDER THE ISRAELI PRACTICES ITEM). YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN YOUR VOTE ON THE LATTER AS YOU SUGGEST, MAKING CLEAR THAT OUR CONCERN OVER ISRAEL'S DECISION HAS OVERRIDDEN DOUBTS WE HAVE ON SOME ELEMENTS IN THE DRAFT, NOTABLY OPERATIVE

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PARAGRAPH 4.

3. YOU SHOULD VOTE AGAINST THE OMNIBUS RESOLUTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH CONTAINS A NUMBER OF UNACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS.

4. IN ALL THE ABOVE CASES, YOU SHOULD SEEK MAXIMUM COMPANY FROM THE NINE AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES.

5. PLEASE SEEK AN EARLY VIEW FROM THE ADMINISTRATION ABOUT HOW THEY INTEND TO PLAY THIS HAND NOW THAT SYRIAN TACTICS HAVE GIVEN US MORE TIME THAN WE EXPECTED BEFORE BEING FACED WITH A SANCTIONS RESOLUTION. DO THEY SEE ANY POSSIBILITY OF PERSUADING THE ISRAELIS TO MODIFY THEIR POSITION?

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GRS 307
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FM FCO 151730Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1939 OF 16 DECEMBER
INFO CAIRO, TEL AVIV.

GOLAN HEIGHTS

1. THE US EMBASSY HERE HAVE PASSED US MATERIAL ILLUSTRATING THE STRENGTH OF US FEELINGS ABOUT THIS SURPRISE ISRAELI DECISION. THEY AND WE ARE LIKELY TO BE FACED WITH A DIFFICULT DECISION OVER ARAB CALLS FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IT WILL NOT BE EASY TO VOTE AGAINST OR EVEN ABSTAIN ON MEASURES AGAINST ISRAEL IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ISRAELI ACTION WHICH HAS CAST GRAVE DOUBT ON THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.
2. YOU SHOULD SPEAK TO THE ADMINISTRATION AT A SUITABLY HIGH LEVEL AND SAY THAT WE SUPPORT THE STRONG US REACTION TO ISRAEL'S DECISION TO ANNEX GOLAN. THE AMERICANS WILL HAVE SEEN THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE TEN ON 15 DECEMBER. WE ARE MAKING OUR CONCERN KNOWN TO THE ISRAELIS BUT WE HAVE TO ACCEPT THAT OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THEM IS VERY LIMITED. ALTHOUGH IT IS UNLIKELY THAT EVEN THE AMERICANS CAN NOW REVERSE WHAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE DONE WE HOPE THAT THEY WILL DO THEIR UTMOST TO PREVENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ISRAELI DECISION AND IF POSSIBLE SECURE ANNULMENT OF THE KNESSET LAW. IF IT APPEARS IMPOSSIBLE WE HOPE THAT THE AMERICANS WILL AT LEAST BE PREPARED TO DEMONSTRATE IN A PRACTICAL WAY THAT THE ISRAELIS CANNOT ACT AS THEY HAVE WITH IMPUNITY.
3. WE APPRECIATE THE SPECIAL NATURE OF THE US/ISRAEL RELATIONSHIP AND THE DIFFICULTY FOR THE AMERICANS OF TAKING ANY ACTION WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED AS JEOPARDISING ISRAEL'S SECURITY. BUT YOU MAY WISH TO MAKE THE POINT THAT WHEN THE ARAB (JORDANIAN, QATARI, ALGERIAN AND SYRIAN) AMBASSADORS CALLED ON ME THIS MORNING THE MODERATES AMONG THEM STRESSED THE VERY DIFFICULT POSITION IN WHICH THEIR GOVERNMENTS

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WOULD BE PLACED IF THE US MADE NO CONCRETE RESPONSE TO THIS
LATEST ISRAELI MOVE.

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FM FCO 161330Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 268 OF 16 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

INFO PRIORITY OTHER ME

POSTS, ATHENS, BONN, BRUSSELS, UKREP BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN,
DUBLIN, THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, PARIS AND ROME.

GOLAN

1. THE JORDANIAN, SYRIAN, ALGERIAN AND QATARI AMPASSADORS, REPRESENTING ARAB LEAGUE AMPASSADORS IN LONDON, CALLED ON ME THIS MORNING TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS ABOUT THE ISRAELI ACTION ON THE GOLAN. THEY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND MYSELF AND HOPED THAT OUR OPPOSITION TO THE MOVE WOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE UN. THE JORDANIAN SAID THAT THE TIME HAD NEVERTHELESS COME FOR EUROPE AND THE US TO REEVALUATE THE WHOLE RANGE OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. UP TO NOW ISRAEL HAD IGNORED ALL UN DECLARATIONS AND PEACE INITIATIVES PROPOSED BY EUROPE HAD BEEN NO MORE THAN AN ACADEMIC EXERCISE PRACTICAL MEASURES WERE NOW ESSENTIAL. THE REGION WOULD OTHERWISE BE HEADING FOR A GREAT CONFLICT.
2. THE SYRIAN AMPASSADOR SAID HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY HIS GOVERNMENT TO INFORM US THAT SYRIA CONSIDERED THE ISRAELI MOVE ILLEGAL AND A PROVOCATION TO WAR, AND THEY REGARDED IT AS CANCELLING THE ISRAEL/SYRIAN CEASEFIRE. IT WAS A VERY SERIOUS STEP WHICH THREATENED THE SECURITY OF THE WHOLE REGION. THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT HOPED THAT THE UK WOULD SUPPORT SYRIA AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND WOULD DO THEIR BEST TO SECURE ALL POSSIBLE MEASURES TO PREVENT THE ISRAELIS FROM CARRYING THROUGH THEIR INTENTIONS. HE NOTED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE TEN HAD 'DEPLORED' THE ISRAELI ACTION: THIS WORDING WAS NOT STRONG ENOUGH - THE SYRIANS WANTED CONDEMNATION, FOLLOWED BY PRACTICAL MEASURES.
3. I TOOK NOTE OF THESE REPRESENTATIONS AND DISCUSSED WITH THE AMPASSADORS WHAT ISRAELI MOTIVES MIGHT BE. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD THE ANGER AND FRUSTRATION FELT IN THE ARAB WORLD AND AGREED WITH

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MUCH OF THEIR ANALYSIS. I POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR SANCTIONS WOULD MOST PROBABLY MEET AN AMERICAN VETO AND THEIR HOPE FOR PRACTICAL MEASURES WOULD THUS BE DISAPPOINTED. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THEY SHOULD JUDGE CAREFULLY THE ACTION CALLED FOR AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL. AS FOR ARAB CRITICISM OF EUROPEAN EFFORTS SO FAR, I SAID THAT WE HAD NEVER BELIEVED WE COULD SOLVE THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM OURSELVES. THE COLLAPSE OF THE FEZ SUMMIT WAS AN INDICATION THAT THE ARAB COUNTRIES HAD THEMSELVES LOST AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS.

4. THE MEETING WAS FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT, BUT THE AMBASSADOR MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE ARABS COULD NO LONGER COUNTENANCE MERE VERBAL CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL. THIS TIME THEY WERE EXPECTING SERIOUS PRACTICAL MEASURES TO BE TAKEN.

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DESKBY 160900Z
FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 160036Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1567 DATED 15 DECEMBER 81
INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, AMMAN, CAIRO
BEIRUT, JEDDA

MIPT: GOLAN

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SYRIAN DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL
HAVING CONSIDERED THE LETTER OF 14 DECEMBER 1981 FROM
THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT S/14791,
REAFFIRMING THAT THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE
IS INADMISSIBLE,

1. DECIDES THAT THE ISRAELI DECISION TO IMPOSE ITS LAWS,
JURISDICTION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE OCCUPIED GOLAN HEIGHTS
IS NULL AND VOID:

2. DEMANDS THAT ISRAEL, THE OCCUPYING POWER, SHOULD
RESCIND FORTHWITH ITS DECISION REFERRED TO ABOVE NOT LATER
THAN ONE WEEK FROM THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION:

3. DETERMINES THAT ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN
TIME OF WAR OF 12 AUGUST 1949 CONTINUE TO APPLY TO THE SYRIAN
TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE JUNE 1967:

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE
SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION NOT
LATER THAN (ONE WEEK) AND IN THE EVENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE BY
ISRAEL, THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD MEET URGENTLY TO TAKE
NECESSARY MEASURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS.

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 160035Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1566 DATED 15 DECEMBER 81

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, CAIRO
BEIRUT, JEDDA

MY TELNO 1557: GOLAN

1. THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL MEET FORMALLY AT 1530Z ON 16 DEC.
THERE IS LIKELY TO BE A LARGE NUMBER OF SPEAKERS.
2. MEANWHILE THE SYRIANS HAVE INFORMALLY CIRCULATED A DRAFT RESOLUTION (TEXT IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM) ON WHICH THEY WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY INSIST ON AN EARLY VOTE, PERHAPS ON 17 OR 18 DEC.
3. AS YOU WILL SEE, THE WORDING IS DECEPTIVELY MILD AND THE SERIOUS TROUBLE IS STORED UP FOR THE SECOND ROUND ANTICIPATED IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4.
4. MRS KIRKPATRICK'S INITIAL REACTION WAS TO REFUSE TO DISCUSS THE DRAFT WITH ANYONE UNTIL HAIG HAD PRONOUNCED ON IT. I TOLD HER THAT THIS WAS RIDICULOUS. IT WAS UP TO US, AT THE SHARP END, TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO OUR CAPITALS. I EXPLAINED TO HER THE INWARDNESS OF THE SYRIAN DRAFT, IE THAT THEY WERE LOOKING FOR QUICK UNANIMITY BOTH IN THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY (MY TELNO 1564) WITH A VIEW TO AN EARLY RETURN TO THE COUNCIL WITH A STRONG RESOLUTION, INCLUDING CHAPTER VII MEASURES, FORTIFIED BY ACCEPTANCE OF THIS PRELIMINARY DRAFT. SHE PASSED THESE (BLINDLY OBVIOUS) VIEWS IMMEDIATELY TO HAIG AFTER A CONFUSED DISCUSSION IN WHICH SHE ARGUED THAT EL SALVADOR WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS.
5. AS REGARDS THE SYRIAN DRAFT, I CANNOT SEE THAT WE CAN DO MUCH MORE THAN ASK FOR THE SUBSTITUTION OF "CONSIDER TAKING" FOR "TAKE" IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4. WE MIGHT ALSO TRY TO INSIST ON A LONGER PERIOD THAN ONE WEEK (OPERATIVE PARA 4) WHICH IS OBVIOUSLY ABSURDLY SHORT.
6. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS BY 161530Z. I WILL SPEAK, AS PLANNED, EARLY IN THE DEBATE ON THE LINES AGREED ON THE TELEPHONE BETWEEN HUMFREY AND HOLMES, NENAD.

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FROM UKMIS NEWYORK 160034Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1565 OF 15 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS TEL AVIV WASHINGTON

MIPT: UNGA 36: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND GOLAN HEIGHTS.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE INFORMAL SYRIAN DRAFT
GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION.

BEGINS:

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

GRAVELY ALARMED BY ISRAEL'S DECISION ON 14TH DECEMBER 1981 TO
APPLY ISRAELI LAW TO THE OCCUPIED SYRIAN ARAB GOLAN HEIGHTS,
REAFFIRMING ONCE MORE THE APPLICABILITY OF THE GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN
TIME OF WAR, OF 12 AUGUST 1949, TO THE OCCUPIED SYRIAN TERRITORY,
REAFFIRMING THAT ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE IS
INADMISSIBLE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 35/122 OF 15 DECEMBER 1980,

1. STRONGLY DEPLORES THE PERSISTENCE OF ISRAELI POLICY
OF ANNEXATION WHICH ESCALATES TENSION IN THE REGION;

2. DETERMINES THAT THE ISRAELI DECISION IS QUOTE NULL AND
VOID UNQUOTE AND HAS NO LEGAL VALIDITY, WHATSOEVER;

3. DEMANDS THAT ISRAEL, THE OCCUPYING POWER, RESCINDS
FORTHWITH ITS DECISION AND ALL ADMINISTRATIVE AND OTHER MEASURES
RELATING TO IT WHICH CONSTITUTE FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF ALL RELEVANT
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND IN PARTICULAR THE
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS
IN TIME OF WAR, OF 12 AUGUST 1949;

4. CALLS UPON ALL STATES, SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, NOT TO RECOGNIZE THIS DECISION;

5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS
RESOLUTION NOT LATER THAN DECEMBER 21ST 1981.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1564 OF 15 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS TEL AVIV WASHINGTON

UNGA 36: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND GOLAN HEIGHTS

1. THE DEBATE ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION FINISHED THIS EVENING (15 DECEMBER). FOR THE MOST PART IT WAS A REPETITION OF THE DEBATE ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE. REPORT FOLLOWS BY TELELETTER. I GAVE THE TEN'S STATEMENT ON 14 DECEMBER (COPIES BY BAG TO FCO, WASHINGTON AND MIDDLE EAST POSTS).
2. THERE ARE EXPECTED TO BE TWO RESOLUTIONS, THE USUAL OMNIBUS RESOLUTION AND A SEPARATE RESOLUTION ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. VOTING WILL BE ON THURSDAY 17 DECEMBER. NEITHER DRAFT RESOLUTION HAS YET BEEN TABLED. THE OMNIBUS DRAFT RESOLUTION IS EXPECTED TO BE ON THE LINES OF THE TEXT ALREADY SENT BY FACSIMILE TO HOLMES, NENAD. THE TEXT OF THE INFORMAL (AND MILD) SYRIAN DRAFT ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS IS IN MIFT. THE TEN'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON THESE DRAFTS AS THEY STAND ARE AS FOLLOWS. THE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE INTENDED TO GO TOGETHER AS A BALANCED PACKAGE:
 - (A) OMNIBUS RESOLUTION. GREECE HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO VOTE IN FAVOUR, BUT COULD ABSTAIN ON SEPARATE VOTES ON OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 14 AND 15. OF THE REST ONLY THE NETHERLANDS HAS INSTRUCTIONS: THESE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO A COMMON POSITION WHILE PREFERRING A NEGATIVE VOTE. THE NINE AGREED TO MAKE A COMMON RECOMMENDATION TO CAPITALS TO VOTE AGAINST THE RESOLUTION AND AVOID SEPARATE PARAGRAPH VOTES.
 - (B) GOLAN HEIGHTS RESOLUTION. THE TEN AGREED TO RECOMMEND A COMMON POSITIVE VOTE.
3. THERE IS ONE FURTHER VOTING QUESTION. THE DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON ISRAELI PRACTICES WHICH WERE ADOPTED IN THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE WILL BE VOTED ON IN PLENARY TOMORROW MORNING (16 DECEMBER). THESE INCLUDE DRAFT RESOLUTION A/SPC/36/L22 ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS ON WHICH THE NINE ABSTAINED IN THE COMMITTEE (MY TELNO 1397 - DRAFT RESOLUTION E). THE GERMANS PROPOSED, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM BONN, THAT THE NINE SHOULD NOW VOTE IN FAVOUR IN PLENARY BOTH AS A POLITICAL SIGNAL AND BECAUSE THE TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION NOW APPEAR MORE ACCEPTABLE IN THE WAKE OF THE ISRAELI DECISION. WHILE ACCEPTING /THAT

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THAT THERE WERE STILL DIFFICULTIES WITH OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4, IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE WAS A STRONG POLITICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE CASE FOR SUCH A CHANGE AND THAT IT SHOULD BE RECOMMENDED TO CAPITALS. THE CHANGE OF VOTE WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY AN EXPLANATION BEFORE THE VOTE THAT WOULD REFER TO THE COMMON STATEMENT BY FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE TEN ON 15 DECEMBER AND EXPLAIN THAT THE CHANGE WAS MADE IN THE LIGHT OF THE RECENT ISRAELI DECISION. THE RESOLUTION IS VERY STRONGLY WORDED AND I AM PRETTY SURE THAT THE AMERICANS WILL MAINTAIN THEIR VOTE AGAINST. BUT GIVEN THE HIGH HANDEDNESS OF THE ISRAELI ACTION, THE UNLIKLIHOOD OF A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE STRONG WISH OF OUR PARTNERS, I THINK THAT THE ABOVE RECOMMEN- DATION IS RIGHT.

4. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS BY 1400Z TOMORROW, 16 DECEMBER.

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TELNO 804 OF 15 DEC

INFO PRIORITY RIYAD# (FOR HMA), DAMASCUS AND ROUTINE WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV

INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

ISRAEL AND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS.

1. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ISSUED A STATEMENT ON 14 DECEMBER CONDEMNING ISRAEL'S DECISION TO APPLY ISRAELI LAW TO THE GOLAN. THE ACTION REFLECTED ISRAEL'S DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE ITS EXPANSIONIST POLICIES IN OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS CALLED FOR ARAB UNITY IN THE FACE OF THIS DANNFROUS ISRAELI CHALLENGE AND URGED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO DENOUNCE THE ISRAELI MEASURE AND TO WORK TO EXPOSE ISRAELI EXPANSIONIST PLOTS. THE KINGDOM WOULD STAND BY THE SIDE OF SYRIA.
2. THIS WAS A PRETTY MILD STATEMENT - PROBABLY THE LEAST THE SAUDIS FELT THEY COULD GET AWAY WITH. IT IS AN INDICATION OE THE LEVEL OF SAUDI SYMPATHY FOR SYRIA AFTER FEZ.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 678 OF 15 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK;

ROUTINE JEDDA, KHARTOUM

SAVING ALL OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

ANNEXATION OF GOLAN : EGYPTIAN REACTION.

1. EGYPT REACTED IN THREE WAYS:

(A) KAMAL HASSAN ALI IMMEDIATELY INSTRUCTED THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV TO INFORM THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT'S REJECTION OF THE ISRAELI MEASURE;

(B) A PRESIDENCY SPOKESMAN ISSUED A STRONG STATEMENT DENOUNCING THE MOVE.

(C) ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM PRESIDENT MUBARAK, KAMAL HASSAD ALI SUMMONED THE US AND ISRAELI AMBASSADORS, AND SPOKE TO THE PRESS AFTER SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH THEM.

TEXTS OF (B) AND (C) BY BAG.

2. THE PRESIDENCY STATEMENT CONDEMNED THE ISRAELI DECISION AS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE CONTENTS OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST SIGNED ON 17 SEPTEMBER 1979 (SIC), AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S DECISION ON WHICH THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT WERE BASED. THERE IS MUCH ADDITIONAL CRITICISM OF THE ISRAELI ACTION AS A THREAT TO PEACE. EGYPT, THE STATEMENT SAYS, IS CONSULTING FRIENDLY COUNTRIES INTERESTED IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE ISSUE ABOUT HOW TO COUNTER THE ISRAELI MOVE.

3. SPEAKING TO THE PRESS AFTER HIS MEETINGS WITH THE TWO AMBASSADORS, KAMAL HASSAN ALI SAID THAT BOTH HAD BEEN ASKED TO INFORM THEIR GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT'S POSITION. THE MOVE WAS AN OBSTACLE TO PEACE. THE GOLAN WAS SYRIAN ARAB LAND OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL. HE CLAIMED THAT THE US AMBASSADOR HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE AMERICAN POSITION COINCIDED EXACTLY WITH EGYPT'S VIEW THAT THE MOVE WAS ILLEGAL, AND CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF CAMP DAVID. EGYPT WOULD NEVER RECOGNISE THE ISRAELI DECISION.

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4. ALI IS ALSO SENDING THE PRESIDENCY STATEMENT TO THE EGYPTIAN UN MISSION, AND TO ALL EGYPTIAN EMBASSIES. INSTRUCTING THEM TO INFORM THEIR HOST GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT'S POSITION. HE IS TO MAKE A DETAILED STATEMENT ON 19 DECEMBER BEFORE THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY DEFENCE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. THE HAS NOT YET BEEN TIME FOR PRESS COMMENT.

3. THE ISRAELI MOVE PLACES THE EGYPTIANS IN A SEVERELY EMBARRASSING POSITION, REMINISCENT OF THEIR PREDICAMENT AFTER THE ISRAELI RAID ON IRAQ. THEY ARE PROTESTING AS VIGOROUSLY AS THE Y DARE. BUT THEY HAVE LITTLE ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE. THE TEAM OF OFFICIALS CURRENTLY IN TEL AVIV FOR AUTONOMY TALKS HAVE BEEN LEFT LOOKING PARTICULARLY FOOLISH. IT IS REPORTED IN THE PRESS THAT THE AFTERNOON SESSION ON 14 DECEMBER WAS CANCELLED AT EGYPTIAN REQUEST. THE TALKS WILL NO DOUBT BE RESUMED (IF NOT AT ONCE), BUT THE PROSPECTS OF AN AGREEMENT ARE NOW MORE REMOTE THAN EVER.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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DESKBY 151100Z (FCO, WASHINGTON, DAMASCUS AND UKMIS NEW YORK)

FROM TEL AVIV 150930Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 498 OF 15 DECEMBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DAMASCUS AND UKMIS NEW YORK, PRIORITY
 AMMAN, CAIRO, BEIRUT AND JEDDA.
 INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

MY TELS NO 487 AND 488: GOLAN

1. THE COALITION'S GOLAN BILL WAS FINALLY APPROVED BY A KNESSET VOTE OF 63-21, AFTER A SIX HOUR DEBATE WHICH WAS OFFICIALLY BOYCOTTED BY THE ALIGNMENT OPPOSITION. THE FINAL VERSION OF THE BILL INCLUDED AMENDMENTS TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE THIRD PARAGRAPH (PARAGRAPH 1(C OF MY FIRST TUR) PROPOSED DURING THE BILL'S FIRST READING BY THE KNESSET FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE COMMITTEE. THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE ARE NOW PREPARING AN OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE BILL AS PASSED INTO LAW WHICH WE WILL TELEGRAPH AS SOON AS AVAILABLE.
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3. ISRAELIS ARE THIS MORNING STILL RECOVERING FROM THEIR SURPRISE. MISGIVINGS ABOUT POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES WILL BE OVERSHADOWED BY STRONG POPULAR SUPPORT FOR BEGIN'S DECISION. BUT NO ONE HAS YET PRODUCED AN ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY EXPLANATION OF WHY HE CHOSE THIS PARTICULAR MOMENT TO MOVE. IN ADDITION TO THE JUSTIFICATIONS IN PARAS 4 AND 5 OF MY SECOND TUR, WE ARE HEARING IT SUGGESTED THAT BEGIN AND HIS IMMEDIATE ADVISERS (PRIMARILY SHARON AND SHAMIR) MAY HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY SOME OR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS, WHATEVER ONE MAY THINK OF THEM:-
 - A) IN THE WAKE OF HABIB'S SUBSTANTIVELY UNSUCCESSFUL VISIT TO THE AREA, AND THE HARSH SYRIAN PUBLIC CRITICISM OF US MIDDLE EAST POLICIES WHICH ACCOMPANIED IT, THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT MAY HAVE CALCULATED THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE LESS LIKELY TO REACT SYMPATHETICALLY TO SYRIAN PROTESTS AT THE EXTENSION OF ISRAELI LAW TO THE GOLAN. AT LEAST THIS SEEMED PERHAPS THE BEST AVAILABLE MOMENT FOR SUCH A MOVE FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF US/SYRIAN RELATIONS, TAKING ACCOUNT ALSO OF AMERICAN RESENTMENT AGAINST SYRIA'S ALLY LIBYA.

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B) A RELATED JUDGEMENT THAT THERE WAS NOW NO HOPE POST-HABIB OF SEEING SYRIAN MISSILES REMOVED FROM THE BEKAA AND THE PLO BROUGHT TO HEEL IN THE LEBANON. THERE WAS THEREFORE NOTHING TO LOSE BY FURTHER INFURIATING THE SYRIANS.

C) THE ISRAELIS PROBABLY DISCOUNTED ANY DAMAGING REACTION FROM MUBARAK ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE APRIL TIMETABLE FOR SINAI MATTERS EVEN MORE FOR EGYPT. ALTERNATIVELY, IF THE EGYPTIANS REACT BY REFUSING TO TAKE THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS FURTHER (E.G. BREAKING OFF THE AUTONOMY TALKS), ISRAEL COULD ARGUE THAT IT WAS NO LONGER POSSIBLE TO CARRY OUT ITS SIDE OF THE CAMP DAVID BARGAIN, THE FINAL WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI. THE ONUS FOR SUCH AN ISRAELI DECISION WOULD THEN BE PLACED ON EGYPTIAN SHOULDERS. A VARIATION OF THIS THEME IS THAT BEGIN WISHED TO "TEST" EGYPTIAN INTENTIONS IN ADVANCE OF LATE APRIL, 1982, THE ARGUMENT BEING THAT ISRAEL COULD ONLY BE PERSUADED OF THE SINCERITY OF MUBARAK'S INTENTION TO CARRY THROUGH CAMP DAVID BY EVIDENCE OF HIS ABILITY TO SWALLOW THE GOLAN MOVE WITHOUT FLINCHING.

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E) BEGIN WISHED AGAIN TO DEMONSTRATE HIS CREDENTIALS HERE AS THE PRIMARY UPHOLDER OF THE CONCEPT OF "ERETZ ISRAEL" AND THE INITIATOR OF FORWARD SETTLEMENT POLICIES BEYOND THE 1967 BOUNDARIES. THIS WOULD HELP HIM TO DEFUSE PUBLIC ANXIETY ABOUT THE ABANDONMENT OF SETTLEMENTS IN NORTHERN SINAI AS PART OF THE PRICE OF THE ISRAELI/EGYPTIAN PEACE TREATY.

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DESKBY 151130Z
FM DAMASCUS 151030Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 422 OF 15 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV
INFO SAVING OTHER ME POSTS, EC POSTS AND WASHINGTON.

TEL AVIV TELNO 488:

GOLAN

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2. WE HAVE CONSULTED THE HEAD OF THE PRESS OFFICE AT THE PRESIDENCY, WHO CONFIRMS THAT THE TEXT AS PUBLISHED IN THE SYRIAN PRESS IS DEFINITIVE. IT CONTAINS NO (REPEAT NO) REFERENCE TO SYRIAN REFUSAL TO RECOGNISE ISRAEL EVEN IF THE PALESTINIANS DO. IT CONTAINS NOTHING NEW ON SYRIAN POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL.
3. SYRIA HAS ALWAYS ACCEPTED (WITH SOME RESERVATION) UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO. 338.

FCO PASS SAVING OTHER ME POSTS, EC POSTS AND WASHINGTON.

MARSHALL

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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PRIME MINISTER'S QUESTION TIME: 15 DECEMBER

GOLAN HEIGHTS

Line to take

1. We deplore the decision of the Government and Knesset of Israel to extend Israeli law and jurisdiction to occupied Syrian territory in the Golan Heights. This extension is contrary to international law. We do not accept that the status of occupied areas in Golan can be changed unilaterally. This step prejudices the possibility of implementing Security Council Resolution 242, which speaks of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need for Israeli withdrawal, and is bound to complicate further the search for a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East to which we remain committed.

WILL THE GOVERNMENT SUPPORT SYRIAN PROPOSALS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL?

2. As a permanent member of the Security Council we have a responsibility to consider carefully proposals put before the Council. The Council has not yet met. When it does so, our main concern will of course be to preserve peace and stability in the area and facilitate the achievement of a comprehensive peace settlement.

WHAT ACTION WILL THE TEN TAKE?

3. My right hon. and noble friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has discussed this with his colleagues in the Ten, who are in London and a statement has been issued recording the Ten's reaction to this Israeli decision. We are not in a position to prevent Israel making such unilateral moves but we regard such moves as invalid and of no binding effect.

IS NOT THE ISRAELI ATTEMPT TO STAY ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS JUSTIFIED?

4. The geographical sensitivity of the area is fully appreciated. Any peace settlement which would have to be arrived at through negotiations between the parties, would need to take this into account. But I do

/not



not believe that either Israeli security or the cause of peace in the area are served by acting against the principles of international law and the requirements of the search for peace.

HOW WILL THE US REACT?

5. The Americans have expressed their concern publicly and have let us know that they are deeply disturbed by the Israeli action. It is for the US Government to explain their response further.

DOES THE ISRAELI MOVE INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR?

6. Our concern is to make progress towards a just and lasting settlement of the Arab/Israel dispute. The Israeli action is bound to complicate the search for peace.



Background Note

1. The Israeli Knesset passed late on 14 December a bill extending the law, jurisdiction and administration of Israel to the Golan Heights with immediate effect. This step was taken without prior warning but the Americans have told us that they had no advance knowledge of it. Mr Begin claimed that the Golan Heights were part of 'Eretz Israel' and that Israeli security required permanent Israeli withdrawal over the area. There has been talk in Israel for some time of annexation of the Golan but the Government refused to sponsor last year a private annexation bill. It is difficult to say what has inspired the Israelis to act now, but the focus of international attention on Poland, US and Egyptian impotence while awaiting the final withdrawal from Sinai, Arab disarray and the current anti-Libyan hysteria in the US may all have convinced Begin that now was the time to act. Mr Begin also referred to remarks by President Asad on 13 December opposing recognition of Israel, but we have not so far seen the text of such remarks.

2. We have always regarded the Golan Heights as occupied Syrian territory since the 1967 war. Israel and Syria are currently separated by a UN peacekeeping force, UNDOF, which operates in a narrow de-militarised zone. There is of course no internationally recognised border between Syria and Israel, but there was a clear international border before 1948 between Syria and mandated Palestine. The Syria/Israel armistice demarcation line of 1949 followed this closely, and we and other Western countries have regarded this as the legitimate division between the two countries. We have always regarded the Golan as covered by the provision of Resolution 242 on Israeli withdrawal, although of course the English text of 242 is ambiguous and is interpreted by the Israelis to suit themselves.

3. The FCO News Department may issue a statement today on the lines of the line to take above, if the Foreign Ministers of the Ten who are in London to discuss the Community mandate do not issue the statement

/collectively



collectively.* The Americans have made known their opposition to any attempt to change the status of the Golan unilaterally, which they regard as contrary to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and to the Camp David agreements.

/ * Statement has been issued - text attached.

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE TEN ON ISRAELI ANNEXATION OF THE
GOLAN HEIGHTS

The Foreign Ministers of the member states of the European Community strongly deplore the decision of the Government and Knesset of Israel to extend Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration to occupied Syrian territory in the Golan Heights. Such an extension, which is tantamount to annexation, is contrary to international law, and therefore invalid in our eyes. This step prejudices the possibility of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and is bound to complicate further the search for a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East to which we remain committed.

D/B 15100Z.

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SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY

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FROM TEL AVIV 150930Z DEC 81

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DESKBY 151130Z

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FCO PASS SAVING OTHER ME POSTS, EC POSTS AND WASHINGTON.

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EXTRA SUPPLEMENTARIES

GOLAN HEIGHTS

WAS NOT THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT STATEMENT OF 13 DECEMBER
SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION?

1. Reports I have seen indicate that the Syrian President may have been misreported as saying that his Government would never recognise Israel: I have not yet seen an official text of his statement. It remains our view that the Israeli action is contrary to international law.

IF THE SYRIANS HAVE DECLARED THAT THEIR CEASE-FIRE WITH
ISRAEL IS NO LONGER EFFECTIVE, DOES A STATE OF WAR EXIST?

2. I would ask all parties to adhere to the ceasefire and avoid all provocative acts in this tense situation.

HOW DID ISRAEL INDICATE ITS ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION 242?

3. On 1 May 1968 the Israeli Government confirmed its acceptance of 'the Resolution for the promotion of agreement on a just and lasting peace'. On 17 September 1978, Prime Minister Begin signed the Camp David Accords, which note in the Preamble to the 'Framework for Peace in the Middle East':

'the agreed basis of a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbours is UN Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts ...'.



HOW DID SYRIA INDICATE ITS ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION 242?

4. The Syrian Government agreed to a ceasefire with Israel in October 1973 on the basis of Security Council Resolution 338, which includes a call for the implementation of SCR 242 in all of its parts.



Background Note

GOLAN HEIGHTS: LEGAL ASPECTS

Invalidity of Israel's actions in international law

1. A belligerent occupier is not sovereign in occupied territory and he has no right to make changes in its law or the administration other than those temporarily necessitated by his interest in the maintenance and safety of his army and the needs of the population. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations on the Laws and Customs of War on Land 1899 require the occupant to respect, "unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country". Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (Civilian Persons) 1949 sets out the limited exceptions in relation to penal laws. No exception permits the wholesale replacement of law and administration, which is contrary to international law.

2. The acquisition of territory by force is today contrary to international law. Article 2.4 of the Charter of the United Nations requires that "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations".

3. Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) (copy attached) emphasised "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.....".

Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and Camp David

4. Resolution 242 emphasised, in a preambular paragraph, "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war". The first operative paragraph affirmed the requirement that Israel's armed forces should withdraw "from territories occupied in the recent conflict".



5. Resolution 338 calls upon the parties concerned "to start immediately after the ceasefire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts".

6. The Camp David text, signed 17 September 1978, by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, and witnessed by President Carter, noted in the Preamble:-

"The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:-

-the agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbours is United Nations Security Council resolution 242 in all its parts.....".

The resolutions were annexed to the "Framework" agreement.

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GRS 250
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FM WASHINGTON 150115Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3792 OF 14 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN,
CAIRO, BEIRUT, JEDDA.
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TEL AVIV TELS NOS 487 AND 488: EXTENSION OF ISRAELI LAW TO THE GOLAN.

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY HAD NO PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF BEGIN'S INTENTIONS. THEY ARE TAKING THE LINE WITH THE PRESS THAT THEY HAVE MADE KNOWN TO THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES THEIR DEEP CONCERN OVER AND OPPOSITION TO ANY EFFORT TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF THE GOLAN UNILATERALLY. THEY CONSIDER ANY SUCH UNILATERAL CHANGE TO BE CONTRARY TO U N SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND TO THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, AND THAT THE ISRAELI ACTION CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION OF TERRITORY.

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO EXPLAIN THE TIMING OF BEGIN'S MOVE, THOUGH THEY TOO SPECULATE THAT HE MAY BE USING EVENTS IN POLAND AS A SMOKE SCREEN.

F C O PASS SAVING ABU DHABI, ADEN, ALGIERS, BAGHDAD, BAHRAIN, DOHA, DUBAI, JERUSALEM, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, MUSCAT, RABAT, SANA'A, TRIPOLI, TUNIS.

HENDERSON

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The framework of peace in the Middle East

Preamble:

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbours is United Nations Security Council resolution 242 in all its parts.

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



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GENERAL

S/RES/242 (1967)
22 November 1967

RESOLUTION 242 (1967)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1382nd meeting,
on 22 November 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.



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FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LONDON, SW1A 2AH

14. 12. 89

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Middle East

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/338 (1973)
21 October 1973

RESOLUTION 338 (1973)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1747th meeting,
on 21/22 October 1973

The Security Council

1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
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the area;
- (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
- (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence
of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of
demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

SUBJECT: TEXT OF FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF ONE OF THE TWO DOCUMENTS SIGNED AT THE WHITE HOUSE THE EVENING OF SEPTEMBER 17

BY PRESIDENT SADAT, PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND PRESIDENT CARTER. THIS WAS THE FIRST DOCUMENT SIGNED. YOU WILL RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS SEPARATELY INSTRUCTIONS TO DELIVER IT TO THE RECIPIENT OF A SEPARATE MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AGREED AT CAMP DAVID

MUHAMMAD ANWAR AL-SADAT, PRESIDENT OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, AND MENACHEM BEGIN, PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL, MET WITH JIMMY CARTER, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AT CAMP DAVID FROM SEPTEMBER 5 TO SEPTEMBER 17, 1978, AND HAVE AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY INVITE OTHER PARTIES TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT TO ADHERE TO IT.

PREAMBLE

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST MUST BE GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING:

-- THE AGREED BASIS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS IS UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, IN ALL ITS PARTS.
(FOOTNOTE: THE TEXTS OF RESOLUTION 242 AND 338 ARE ANNEXED TO THIS DOCUMENT.)

[Clean acceptance by Israel of 242]

-- AFTER FOUR WARS DURING THIRTY YEARS, DESPITE INTENSIVE HUMAN EFFORTS, THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH IS THE CRADLE OF CIVILIZATION AND THE BIRTHPLACE OF THREE GREAT RELIGIONS, DOES NOT YET ENJOY THE BLESSINGS OF PEACE. THE PEOPLE OF THE MIDDLE EAST YEARN FOR PEACE SO THAT THE VAST HUMAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE REGION CAN BE TURNED TO THE PURSUITS OF PEACE AND SO THAT THIS AREA CAN BECOME A MODEL FOR COEXISTENCE AND COOPERATION AMONG NATIONS.

-- THE HISTORIC INITIATIVE OF PRESIDENT SADAT IN VISITING JERUSALEM AND THE RECEPTION ACCORDED TO HIM BY THE PARLIAMENT, GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF ISRAEL, AND THE RECIPROCAL VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER BEGIN TO ISMAILIA, THE PEACE PROPOSALS MADE BY BOTH LEADERS, AS WELL AS THE WARM RECEPTION OF THESE MISSIONS BY THE PEOPLES OF BOTH COUNTRIES, HAVE CREATED AN UNPRECEDENTED OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE WHICH MUST NOT BE LOST IF THIS GENERATION AND FUTURE GENERATIONS ARE TO BE SPARED THE TRAGEDIES OF WAR.

-- THE PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE OTHER ACCEPTED NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LEGITIMACY NOW PROVIDE ACCEPTED STANDARDS FOR THE CONDUCT OF RELATIONS AMONG ALL STATES.

-- TO ACHIEVE A RELATIONSHIP OF PEACE, IN THE SPIRIT OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ANY NEIGHBOR PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE PEACE AND SECURITY WITH IT, ARE NECESSARY FOR THE PURPOSE OF CARRYING OUT ALL THE PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338.

-- PEACE REQUIRES RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY STATE IN THE AREA AND THEIR RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES FREE FROM THREATS OR ACTS OF FORCE. PROGRESS TOWARD THAT GOAL CAN ACCELERATE MOVEMENT TOWARD A NEW ERA OF RECONCILIATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST MARKED BY COOPERATION IN PROMOTING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, IN MAINTAINING STABILITY, AND IN ASSURING SECURITY.



Duty Clerk.
NO. 10. Downing St.

With the compliments of

Colin Sutas

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LONDON, SW1A 2AH



UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/338 (1973)
21 October 1973

RESOLUTION 338 (1973)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1747th meeting,
on 21/22 October 1973

The Security Council

1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.



RESOLUTION 242 (1967)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1382nd meeting,
on 22 November 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

- (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

- (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
- (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
- (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

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Return to Sir J
Graham. done
1978

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BY COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONS WHICH ENJOY NORMAL RELATIONS. IN ADDITION, UNDER THE TERMS OF PEACE TREATIES, THE PARTIES CAN, ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROcity, AGREE TO SPECIAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS SUCH AS DEMILITARIZED ZONES, LIMITED ARMAMENTS AREAS, EARLY WARNING STATIONS, THE PRESENCE OF INTERNATIONAL POLICE, LIAISON, AGREED MEASURES FOR MONITORING, AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS THAT THEY AGREE ARE USEFUL.

FRAMEWORK

TAKING THESE FACTORS INTO ACCOUNT, THE PARTIES ARE DETERMINED TO REACH A JUST, COMPREHENSIVE, AND DURABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT THROUGH THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE TREATIES BASED ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 IN ALL THEIR PARTS. THEIR PURPOSE IS TO ACHIEVE PEACE AND GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS. THEY RECOGNIZE THAT, FOR PEACE TO ENDURE, IT MUST INVOLVE ALL THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN MOST DEEPLY AFFECTED BY THE CONFLICT. THEY THEREFORE AGREE THAT THIS FRAMEWORK AS APPROPRIATE IS INTENDED BY THEM TO CONSTITUTE A BASIS FOR PEACE NOT ONLY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL, BUT ALSO BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EACH OF ITS OTHER NEIGHBORS WHICH IS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE PEACE WITH ISRAEL ON THIS BASIS. WITH THAT OBJECTIVE IN MIND, THEY HAVE AGREED TO PROCEED AS FOLLOWS:

A. WEST BANK AND GAZA

1. EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. TO ACHIEVE THAT OBJECTIVE, NEGOTIATIONS RELATING TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA SHOULD PROCEED IN THREE STAGES:

transitional period

(A) EGYPT AND ISRAEL AGREE THAT, IN ORDER TO ENSURE A PEACEFUL AND ORDERLY TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY, AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SECURITY CONCERNS OF ALL THE PARTIES, THERE SHOULD BE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA FOR A PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING FIVE YEARS. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FULL AUTONOMY TO THE INHABITANTS, UNDER THESE ARRANGEMENTS THE ISRAELI MILITARY GOVERNMENTS AND ITS CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION WILL BE WITHDRAWN AS SOON AS A SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY HAS BEEN FREELY ELECTED BY THE INHABITANTS OF THESE AREAS TO REPLACE THE EXISTING INHABITANTS OF THESE AREAS TO REPLACE THE EXISTING MILITARY GOVERNMENT. TO NEGOTIATE THE DETAILS OF A TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT, THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN WILL BE INVITED TO JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THIS FRAMEWORK. THESE NEW ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD GIVE DUE CONSIDERATION BOTH TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT BY THE INHABITANTS OF THESE TERRITORIES AND TO THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED.

(B) EGYPT, ISRAEL, AND JORDAN WILL AGREE ON THE MODALITIES FOR ESTABLISHING THE ELECTED SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. THE DELEGATIONS OF EGYPT AND JORDAN MAY INCLUDE PALESTINIANS FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA OR OTHER PALESTINIANS AS MUTUALLY AGREED. THE PARTIES WILL NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT WHICH WILL DEFINE THE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY TO BE EXERCISED IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. A WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI ARMED FORCES WILL TAKE PLACE AND THERE WILL BE A REDEPLOYMENT OF THE REMAINING ISRAELI FORCES INTO SPECIFIED SECURITY LOCATIONS. THE AGREEMENT WILL ALSO INCLUDE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ASSURING INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC ORDER. A STRONG LOCAL POLICE FORCE WILL BE ESTABLISHED, WHICH MAY INCLUDE JORDANIAN CITIZENS. IN ADDITION, ISRAELI AND JORDANIAN FORCES WILL PARTICIPATE IN JOINT PATROLS AND IN THE MANNING OF CONTROL POSTS TO ASSURE THE SECURITY OF THE

(C) WHEN THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY (ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL) IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IS ESTABLISHED AND INAUGURATED, THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS WILL BEGIN. AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT NOT LATER THAN THE THIRD YEAR AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, NEGOTIATIONS WILL TAKE PLACE TO DETERMINE THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS NEIGHBORS, AND TO CONCLUDE A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN BY THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED AMONG EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. TWO SEPARATE BUT RELATED COMMITTEES WILL BE CONVENED, ONE COMMITTEE, CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FOUR PARTIES WHICH WILL NEGOTIATE AND AGREE ON THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS NEIGHBORS, AND THE SECOND COMMITTEE, CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF ISRAEL AND REPRESENTATIVES OF JORDAN TO BE JOINED BY THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, TO NEGOTIATE THE PEACE TREATY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE AGREEMENT REACHED ON THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. ~~THE NEGOTIATIONS SHALL BE BASED ON WEST BANK AND GAZA. THE NEGOTIATIONS SHALL BE BASED ON~~ ALL THE PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242. THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL RESOLVE, AMONG OTHER MATTERS, THE LOCATION OF THE BOUNDARIES AND THE

NATURE OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THE SOLUTION FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR JUST REQUIREMENTS. IN THIS WAY, THE PALESTINIANS WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR OWN FUTURE THROUGH:

- 1) THE NEGOTIATIONS AMONG EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA TO AGREE ON THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES BY THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.
 - 2) SUBMITTING THEIR AGREEMENT TO A VOTE BY THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
 - 3) PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA TO DECIDE HOW THEY SHALL GOVERN THEMSELVES CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THEIR AGREEMENT.
 - 4) PARTICIPATING AS STATED ABOVE IN THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE NEGOTIATING THE PEACE TREATY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN.
2. ALL NECESSARY MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN AND PROVISIONS MADE TO ASSURE THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND BEYOND. TO ASSIST IN PROVIDING SUCH SECURITY, A STRONG LOCAL POLICE FORCE WILL BE CONSTITUTED BY THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY. IT WILL BE COMPOSED OF INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. THE POLICE WILL MAINTAIN CONTINUING LIAISON ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS WITH THE DESIGNATED ISRAELI, JORDANIAN, AND EGYPTIAN OFFICERS.
 3. DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, REPRESENTATIVES OF EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY WILL CONSTITUTE A CONTINUING COMMITTEE TO DECIDE BY AGREEMENT ON THE MODALITIES OF ADMISSION TO PERSONS DISPLACED FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IN 1967, TOGETHER

THE NECESSARY MEASURES TO PREVENT DISRUPTION AND DISORDER.
OTHER MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN MAY ALSO BE DEALT WITH BY
THIS COMMITTEE.

4. EGYPT AND ISRAEL WILL WORK WITH EACH OTHER AND WITH
OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES TO ESTABLISH AGREED PROCEDURES
FOR A PROMPT, JUST AND PERMANENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
RESOLUTION OF THE REFUSEE PROBLEM.

B. EGYPT-ISRAEL

1. EGYPT AND ISRAEL UNDERTAKE NOT TO RESORT TO THE THREAT
OR THE USE OF FORCE TO SETTLE DISPUTES. ANY DISPUTES
SHALL BE SETTLED BY PEACEFUL MEANS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 33 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS.

2. IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE PEACE BETWEEN THEM, THE PARTIES
AGREE TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH WITH A GOAL OF CONCLUDING
WITHIN THREE MONTHS FROM THE SIGNING OF THIS FRAMEWORK A
PEACE TREATY BETWEEN THEM, WHILE INVITING THE OTHER PARTIES
TO THE CONFLICT TO PROCEED SIMULTANEOUSLY TO NEGOTIATE
AND CONCLUDE SIMILAR PEACE TREATIES WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEV-
ING A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE AREA. THE FRAMEWORK FOR
THE CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL
WILL GOVERN THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THEM. THE
PARTIES WILL AGREE ON THE MODALITIES AND THE TIMETABLE FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE TREATY.

C. ASSOCIATED PRINCIPLES

1. EGYPT AND ISRAEL STATE THAT THE PRINCIPLES AND PRO-
VISIONS DESCRIBED BELOW SHOULD APPLY TO PEACE TREATIES
BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EACH OF ITS NEIGHBORS--EGYPT, JORDAN,
SYRIA AND LEBANON.

2. SIGNATORIES SHALL ESTABLISH AMONG THEMSELVES RELATION-
SHIPS NORMAL TO STATES AT PEACE WITH ONE ANOTHER. TO THIS
END, THEY SHOULD UNDERTAKE TO ABIDE BY ALL THE PROVISIONS
OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. STEPS TO BE TAKEN
IN THIS RESPECT INCLUDE:

(A) FULL RECOGNITION;

(B) ABOLISHING ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS;

(C) GUARANTEEING THAT UNDER THEIR JURISDICTION THE
CITIZENS OF THE OTHER PARTIES SHALL ENJOY THE PROTECTION
OF THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

3. SIGNATORIES SHOULD EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF FINAL PEACE TREA-
TIES, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF CONTRIBUTING TO THE ATMOSPHERE
OF PEACE, COOPERATION AND FRIENDSHIP WHICH IS THEIR
COMMON GOAL.

4. CLAIMS COMMISSIONS MAY BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE MUTUAL
SETTLEMENT OF ALL FINANCIAL CLAIMS.

5. THE UNITED STATES SHALL BE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN
THE TALKS ON MATTERS RELATED TO THE MODALITIES OF THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENTS AND WORKING OUT THE
TIMETABLE FOR THE CARRYING OUT OF THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE
PARTIES.

6. THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL SHALL BE REQUESTED
TO ENDORSE THE PEACE TREATIES AND ENSURE THAT THEIR PRO-
VISIONS SHALL NOT BE VIOLATED. THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHALL BE REQUESTED TO UNDERWRITE
THE PEACE TREATIES AND ENSURE RESPECT FOR THEIR PRO-

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pm 22
AID: UN ✓

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Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution

UNITED NATIONS
1 January, 1968
Section 1

**THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION ON THE MIDDLE EAST,
NOVEMBER 1967**

Lord Caradon to Mr. Brown. (Received 1 January)

x Jarring
Mission

SUMMARY

The Security Council resolution on the Middle East authorising the appointment of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring of Sweden as United Nations Special Representative was adopted unanimously, and this gives some hope for the future. Jarring is admirably qualified for his task. (Paragraph 3.)

The record of the last five months has shown that even on the Arab/Israel issue the international search for common ground can give results. (Paragraph 4.)

The Foreign Secretary's speech at the Emergency Special Session set out the principles and aims which should guide this search. But urgency was lacking. The moderation shown by the Arabs at Khartoum was offset by Soviet and American withdrawal from the apparent agreement reached in the Gromyko-Goldberg talks of July. (Paragraphs 7-11.)

When the XXIInd Session began Israeli opinion was hardening, the Arabs seemed to be at loggerheads once more, and their respective patrons seemed disinclined to move towards any settlement. (Paragraph 12.)

The sinking of the *Eilat* and the bombardment of Suez signalled the danger of further delay. King Hussein arrived in New York at the beginning of November and made conciliatory statements. The Egyptians, alarmed, called for an urgent meeting of the Council at which two conflicting draft resolutions were tabled. The impasse was complete and so, apparently, was the United Nations' failure to deal with the situation. (Paragraphs 13-17.)

At this nadir, we launched the British initiative. A draft resolution was prepared which gave the Arabs what they needed, a positive statement of the commitment on Israel to withdraw. The Israelis were offered a clear declaration in favour of a permanent peace and security within recognised boundaries. The Israelis turned our text down flat and Ambassador Goldberg, who was still hoping through King Hussein to get the Arabs to accept an amended American text, urged us not to proceed with ours. (Paragraphs 18-23.)

The Latin American members of the Council then nearly wrecked our initiative by circulating a text which despite their excellent intentions would have been quite unacceptable to the Israelis. (Paragraph 24.)

Kuznetsov, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, then entered the ring and demanded far-reaching changes to our text which would have completely destroyed its balance. When the Russians tabled their own draft resolution all hope of agreement seemed lost. (Paragraphs 25-28.)

Fortunately the Latins were persuaded to delay tabling their draft and the moderate Arabs, fearing further delay, came round to ours. Just before the vote came the final obstruction—from the Indian

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Ambassador (Parthasarathi) who insisted on stating what the Afro-Asians understood by the withdrawal clause in our text, as the price of withdrawing his own. (Paragraphs 29–30.)

A fundamental point of principle in our draft was thus directly challenged. With difficulty and just in time the Indian, United Arab Republic and Soviet Representatives were prevailed upon to accept the terms of our statement in reply to Parthasarathi. A close-run thing. (Paragraphs 31–32.)

Conclusion

The British initiative in fact canalised the deep desire of the general membership of the United Nations and of Israelis and Arabs alike, for differing reasons, to secure a positive result. This desire came eventually to be shared by the Americans and the Russians also. We were lucky in our timing and in maintaining good relations with all concerned. The operation at the 11th hour did credit to the Security Council. (Paragraphs 33–38.)

(No. 26. Confidential) *UKMIS to UN,*
—Guard) *New York,*
Sir, *29 December, 1967.*

On the 26th of November the Secretary-General of the United Nations announced the appointment of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring of Sweden as his Special Representative in the Middle East, and on the 9th of December Ambassador Jarring left New York to undertake his formidable task.

2. So ended six months of wrestling in New York in an endeavour to cope with the problems created by the six-day war of last June.

3. Ambassador Jarring was appointed under the authority of the Security Council resolution sponsored by the United Kingdom. The resolution (of which I enclose a copy)⁽¹⁾ set out terms of reference for his mission and provided the framework of a possible settlement. The fact that the resolution was unanimous gave authority and some hope to the Jarring mission, and the fact that all concerned welcomed his selection and expressed admiration for his personal qualities was another good augury. It would indeed be difficult to imagine a man better qualified for such a demanding undertaking. Ambassador Jarring is a diplomat of long and wide experience, including experience of working in and for the United Nations, of undoubted skill and discretion and impartiality. He is respected by both Russians (he comes from his post as Swedish Ambassador in Moscow) and Americans (he was previously Swedish Ambassador in Washington), accepted by

everyone, welcomed by Israelis and Arabs and trusted by the Secretary-General. Nevertheless, the difficulties of his task, as he is the first to recognise, are enormous.

4. To tell the story of the tortuous and fluctuating six months of manoeuvre and negotiation at the United Nations leading up to Ambassador Jarring's appointment will emphasise some of the difficulties he faces. The story will also illustrate the frustrations and limitations and delays which accompany and impede United Nations action. It will also show that, even in a crisis of such complexity and danger around a generation-old confrontation which arouses such intense hate and fear, it is possible to find common ground of international agreement.

5. In his despatches Nos. 21 and 22 of the 9th of August Sir Leslie Glass reported on the debates in June in the Security Council leading up to the calls for a cease-fire, and on the subsequent Russian-called Fifth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly. At that Session the Soviet Union had put forward its resolution calling for condemnation of Israel and immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops to the positions held before the 5th of June. Mr. Gromyko had then seen his resolution defeated in the vote clause by clause until there was no resolution left to vote on. The United States resolution would have fared no better, and had to be withdrawn. Both the Latin American resolution and the so-called non-aligned resolution had failed on the 4th of July for lack of the necessary two-thirds majority.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

6. The month's debate in the abortive Emergency Special Session had thrown away the chance of early and effective United Nations action. It had enabled Israel to consolidate its hold on captured territory and had encouraged Israeli belief that it might be possible to retain some at least of its territorial gains. It had also illustrated that the Assembly would not come down on one side or the other and was consequently not prepared to back either the Soviet Union or the United States. But both the Latin Americans and the score of self-declared non-aligned States had searched for some middle ground and some agreed method on which a settlement could be worked out. Moreover the depression which followed the Emergency Special Session was relieved by the fact that Chairman Kosygin and President Johnson met at Glassboro during the Session, and Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Goldberg had met at the end of it and apparently agreed on a formula for settlement. The extreme Arabs had been unwilling to support it, but the fact that the USSR and the United States had reached agreement on a basis for a solution gave some prospect of progress.

7. More than that, the Emergency Special Session had given the opportunity for everyone to state their views, and when you spoke on the 21st of June you set out the principles and aims which should guide the search for a settlement, and you proposed the methods to be employed, including the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General. There was gathering support for the proposals you made. In spite of the failure of the Emergency Special Session the outline of the decisions which the United Nations should take began to emerge through the fog of accusations and recriminations. The Gromyko-Goldberg formula held out some hope that action backed by East and West would not be long delayed.

8. In spite of these promising indications the Security Council did not meet on the Middle East for three months after the end of the Emergency Special Session. In that period the chances of any agreement receded, and when the Council met on the 24th of October the prospect of effective United Nations action was as bleak as it had been at any time since the cease-fire of July.

9. Early in August Sir Richard Beaumont and a British delegation had carried out

discussions in Washington with the State Department, and we thought that good progress had been made in full agreement with the Americans. A draft resolution was worked out and agreed based on the Gromyko-Goldberg formula with the added provision for the appointment of a Representative of the Secretary-General "to assist him in seeking the implementation of the resolution".

10. Then the Khartoum Arab Summit Meeting called by the Arab League had shown a surprising new spirit of Arab co-operation and moderation, and a recognition of the need for a political settlement.

11. But these encouraging developments assisted by President Tito's initiative with the Arabs before and after the Khartoum Summit Meeting, were offset by what appeared to be withdrawal of the Russians on one side and the Americans on the other from the apparent agreement reached in the Gromyko-Goldberg talks of July. The Russians questioned the text prepared at those talks, and appeared to be reluctant to make any move not approved in advance by all the Arabs. Gromyko was away on holiday and no response could be obtained from Moscow to repeated enquiries. Meanwhile the Americans too seemed to be in no hurry. Worse still, they appeared to be increasingly moving to an outright Israeli position, and were not even prepared to press for the kind of resolution agreed with us in Washington in early August. They were now speaking not of laying down general principles for a settlement but of the necessity for specific guarantees including an advance Arab acceptance that Israeli ships must be permitted to use the Suez Canal.

12. When the XXIIInd Session of the General Assembly began on the 19th of September the outlook was consequently again gloomy. When you spoke in the Assembly on the 26th of September you again set out the principles which should guide the search for a settlement and both your speech and the discussions you had with the Foreign Ministers of Israel and the UAR again made clear the consistent policy which you advocated throughout. But Israeli opinion was hardening. The Arabs seemed to be again at loggerheads amongst themselves. The Russians and the Americans appeared to be unable to move except with the approval of the Arabs on one side and the Israelis on the other.

13. It was against these obstacles that preparations for a meeting of the Security Council went forward. Urgency was lacking until on the 23rd of October there came the news of the sinking by the Egyptians of the Israeli destroyer *Eilat* and bombardment by the Israelis of the town of Suez. This resulted in a brief Security Council meeting and a reaffirmation of its call for observance of the cease-fire. It also proved a spur to the work of the non-permanent drafters. First the Indians put forward a draft resolution which was so clearly partisan on the Arab side that it made no progress. (Foreign Minister Riad admitted afterwards that the Egyptians had drafted most of it.)

14. Then at the instigation of the Americans Foreign Minister Tabor of Denmark tried his hand at a compromise draft. After an initially encouraging response from both sides this too came to nothing.

15. The non-permanent members of the Security Council did however agree on three purposes—that the provisions of Chapter VI (peaceful settlement) rather than those of Chapter VII (enforcement) should apply, that the Secretary-General should be authorised to send a Representative to the Middle East and that the Representative should be given precise terms of reference. But they could get no further.

16. King Hussein arrived in New York on the 2nd of November and his public and private statements seemed to show some hope of Arab readiness to compromise. He was mainly concerned to get the Americans committed to work for Israeli withdrawal, but he left New York with no positive conclusion in sight.

17. Then while these tentative and exploratory attempts were still going on suddenly on the 7th of November the United Arab Republic called for an urgent meeting of the Council. This appeared to be done without consultation with King Hussein. If this meant a major split in the Arab camp there appeared to be no hope at all. And as the Council met two conflicting draft resolutions were tabled. The first sponsored by India, Nigeria and Mali was an improvement on the earlier Indian effort but was still quite unacceptable to the Americans and Israelis. The second sponsored by the United States was equally unacceptable to the Russians and the Arabs. We had reached a deadlock, and since the Council was already called it seemed certain that

the impasse and thus the complete frustration and failure of the United Nations must soon be publicly apparent.

18. It was at this rock bottom point that you authorised me to take an initiative of our own.

19. During your two visits to New York and in subsequent continuous discussions with the Israelis and the Arabs and with members of the Council, we had the fullest opportunity for understanding the attitudes and the aims of all concerned. We had been careful to make no commitment and to keep ourselves free to make the best contribution at the right time. We were the only permanent members of the Council in a position to take a new initiative. The Russians were clearly committed to support the Arabs and the Americans were equally clearly committed to support the Israelis. The French, while maintaining their usual attitude of superior and negative detachment, had not disguised their support for the Arabs. We on the other hand had throughout endeavoured to understand the essential needs of both sides and to keep in close touch with them both.

20. We knew from our long discussions with the Arabs that what they chiefly needed was a positive requirement of Israeli withdrawal. We knew that the Israelis must secure some clear declaration in favour of a permanent peace and future security of Israel within permanent frontiers. Our conclusion and contention was that these purposes were not in conflict but were complementary. We thought that if we could combine on a fair and balanced basis a call both for withdrawal and for a permanent peace we might be able to carry the Council with us and achieve the acquiescence of both the Israelis and the Arabs. It was with these purposes in mind that we drew up our own draft resolution.

21. In doing so we scarcely dared to hope that our initiative would be successful, but the presentation of our text would at least make our own position clear and point the way to an eventual just solution. During the next 11 days the lifeboat we launched on the 11th of November was to face and survive the buffeting of fierce storms.

22. First I went to Mr. Eban and Ambassador Rafael and showed them the text we had prepared. Their reaction was immediate and strongly adverse. In particular they said that a mandatory call for the withdrawal of Israel's Armed Forces

from territories occupied "in the recent conflict" and the statement in the preamble emphasising "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" were wholly unacceptable to Israel. They could not possibly acquiesce in any resolution containing such provisions. I argued with them that the statements about withdrawal and the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war were coupled with the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area could live in security, and also with a statement in the clearest terms of what I understood the Israeli case to be regarding the termination of all claims or states of belligerency coupled with guaranteeing of freedom of navigation through international waterways and the guaranteeing of the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area. But they maintained their uncompromising opposition and immediately confirmed it in writing.

23. I then showed our draft to Ambassador Goldberg who urged me not to proceed with it since he was still hopeful that something might come of his discussions with King Hussein and with Foreign Minister Riad.

24. Our next serious obstacle was the danger that the two Latin American members of the Council (Argentine and Brazil) would wreck our initiative by putting forward a text of their own based on the resolution which they had put to the Emergency Special Session. We had voted for the Latin American resolution in the Assembly (as indeed the Americans had too) and it would have been difficult for us to oppose the Latin American text. But that draft was quite unacceptable to the Americans and Israelis, and could consequently have no prospect of achieving any effective result on the ground. If the Latin American text had been presented to the Council before our own it would nevertheless have attracted a majority of votes and this would have given our resolution no chance of acceptance. We prevailed upon the Latin Americans to delay tabling their text, and then we went to work with them to see whether we could marry their text with ours and so put forward a joint British/Latin American resolution. So important it was to prevent a competition between our text and a Latin American text that we worked out a compromise and were ready to put it forward with them. But even

the limited changes we had worked out with the Latin Americans made the married draft most unwelcome if not unacceptable to the Americans and the Israelis.

25. The next development was that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov who had so far remained very much in the background, no doubt watching Arab reactions, demanded that our text should be amended in several essential provisions to make it acceptable to the Arabs. I had to tell him that these amendments were out of the question.

26. As the debate in the Council neared its end we still had hopes that when put to the final test the Arabs would not oppose our unchanged draft resolution, and by the 17th of November we were prepared to put it to the test of the vote.

27. On the evening of the 19th of November, however, we learnt to our dismay that the Russians had been instructed from Moscow to table their own resolution. When we heard this all hope of agreement seemed completely lost.

28. The Russians put down their text on the 20th of November and then asked for a further recess of two days.

29. By this time, owing to the intervention of our Ambassadors in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires, the Latin Americans had been at last persuaded not to present their own resolution but to vote for ours, and the Arabs too, particularly the Representatives of Jordan, Iraq and Morocco, fearing complete failure, were most anxious that our resolution should survive. We also heard, though we could not be certain till the end, that Foreign Minister Riad too was prepared to withdraw objections to our resolution.

30. We now had rising hopes of success though we scarcely dared to expect for more than an abstention from the Russians. Then in the last day or two before the vote yet another danger emerged. Ambassador Parthasarathi of India said that he was determined to speak before the vote to state in specific terms his understanding that the withdrawal clause in our resolution meant withdrawal of Israeli forces from all territories occupied since the 5th of June. I was told at the last moment by the Indians and also by the Russians and the Arabs that if I challenged this interpretation the Afro-Asians would not withdraw their draft resolution and our initiative would thus come to nothing.

31. This was no question of mere wording or interpretation. It was a fundamental point of principle. Our contention was that by adding the words "in the recent conflict" to define the territories from which Israel should withdraw and by insisting on the retention in the preamble to our resolution of the clause about "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" we had made the principle perfectly clear. But by omitting the requirement pressed throughout by the Arabs and the Indians and the Russians that the withdrawal should be to positions before the 5th of June we had equally clearly shown that we were not intending merely a return to the old armistice lines and the uneasy truce of the past. By stating the need for "secure and recognised boundaries" we had also made it clear that we contemplated new permanent frontiers to be duly negotiated and agreed. So the question at issue at this last moment was one of central importance. Consequently we had to walk a very narrow path as we approached the end.

32. Just before we went into the Council for the final vote on the 22nd of November I had to see Ambassador Parthasarathi, Foreign Minister Riad and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov in that order to get their grudging agreement to what I proposed to say in reply to Ambassador Parthasarathi. I told them that I would restate our position, maintain that the wording of our resolution was clear and also state that I could accept no partisan interpretation. It was just enough. With difficulty and just in time each was persuaded. When the vote was called, following an extreme statement from the Representative of Syria, India withdrew the Afro-Asian resolution, 15 hands went up in support of our resolution, and the Russians withdrew their own. We were home.

33. We had survived first the opposition of the Israelis, then that of the Russians, then the diversion proposed by the Latin Americans, and lastly the intervention of the Indians.

34. This account may give the impression that it was our initiative and our determination not to be deflected from it that achieved the result. But this would be misleading. In fact the various and conflicting interests of the Israelis and the Arabs and the members of the Council all converged in the end to secure the positive result.

35. The non-permanent members made a genuine effort to start with; the possibility

of a rival Latin American text in the result helped rather than hindered by showing, by comparison, the impartiality of ours; and even the interpretation of the Indians on the final day may well have helped the Arabs to withdraw their objections. We had good reason to be grateful to the Canadians and the Danes for their help and support throughout. And once the Americans realised that their direct negotiations with the UAR Foreign Minister were making no headway they gave us their full support, making it plain first in Cairo and then in open debate in the Council that if the British resolution were passed the backing of the United States would be forthcoming to give it practical effect.

36. The chief credit for the Soviet decision to join in the unanimous vote must probably go to Kuznetsov. He had been helpful and understanding throughout and had shown great patience in listening to my advocacy of our resolution. I think that it was his own personal intervention which led to the remarkable Russian decision to abandon their own resolution and vote for ours.

37. Credit must also go to the Israelis and the Arabs. The Israelis, having done their best to shake us on the wording of our resolution on withdrawal, were later prepared to recognise that we were making a genuine effort with a full recognition of their needs. The Arabs, after their divisions and vacillations, were also prepared in the end to accept our good faith and to withdraw their objections.

38. We were fortunate in timing and in our friendly relations with all those involved. But the result was basically due to the genuine desire, indeed the desperate need, of everyone concerned to find some sensible common ground on which to advance. It was an operation which in the end reflected credit on the Council as a whole.

39. I am sending copies of this despatch (with enclosure) to Her Majesty's Representatives at all 1967 Security Council posts, and at those countries which will serve on the Council in 1968 (Algeria, Hungary, Pakistan, Paraguay, Senegal); to all Middle East posts; and to the United Kingdom delegations to NATO and at Geneva.

I have, &c.

CARADON.

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PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY

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FM AMMAN 141123Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
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INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS

ROUTINE BAGHDAD BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS JEDDA TEL AVIV
WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK UKREP BRUSSELS AND OTHER
EC POSTS

INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

FRENCH POLICY ON THE MIDDLE EAST

1. JORDANIAN CONCERN OVER FRENCH STATEMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST IS SHOWING NO SIGN OF ABATING. THE ANXIETIES EXPRESSED BY THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TO ME (MY TELNO 485) AND SUBSEQUENTLY (AT MY SUGGESTION) TO THE FRENCH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, AND THE ANGRY REMARKS MADE TO ME BY KING HUSSEIN (MY TELNO 486, PARA 2) HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED BY A FULL CABINET MEETING ON 13 DECEMBER CHAIRED, EXCEPTIONALLY, BY KING HUSSEIN HIMSELF TO DISCUSS FRANCE'S MIDDLE EAST POLICIES.

2. A COMMUNIQUE (FULL TEXT BY BAG TO FCO AND PARIS ONLY) ISSUED AFTER THIS MEETING, WHICH HAS BEEN GIVEN WIDESPREAD COVERAGE ON THE JORDANIAN MEDIA, STATES THAT KING HUSSEIN DREW ATTENTION TO THE POSITIVE MIDDLE EAST POLICIES PURSUED BY

COVERAGE ON THE JORDANIAN MEDIA, STATES THAT KING HUSSEIN DREW ATTENTION TO THE POSITIVE MIDDLE EAST POLICIES PURSUED BY PRESIDENTS DE GAULLE, POMPIDOU AND GISCARD AND CONTRASTED THESE WITH THE NEGATIVE IMPRESSION CREATED BY STATEMENTS MADE BY "SENIOR FRENCH OFFICIALS" DURING AND AFTER MONSIEUR CHEYSSON'S RECENT VISIT TO ISRAEL. THESE WERE TO BE REGARDED AS A SERIOUS INDICATION OF THE GENERAL POLITICAL LINE BEING FOLLOWED BY THE FRENCH SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST. IT WAS NOW CLEAR FROM VARIOUS POLITICAL REPORTS SUBMITTED TO THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT THAT THIS NEW FRENCH LINE CONSTITUTED A DANGEROUS REVERSAL IN FRENCH ATTITUDES BECAUSE IT UNDERMINED THE MAIN FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE FRENCH POSITION WAS A DEVIATION BOTH FROM THE VENICE DECLARATION AND FROM THE PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD DICTATE A DURABLE MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT, INCLUDING THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE AND THE RIGHT OF ALL PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION

3. THE COMMUNIQUE GOES ON TO STATE THAT THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT VIEWS RECENT FRENCH OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO EUROPEAN EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A BALANCED MIDDLE EAST POSITION AND AS AN ATTEMPT TO DESTROY ALL HOPES PINNED BY THE ARABS ON THE EUROPEANS IN GENERAL AND THE FRENCH IN PARTICULAR. FRENCH STATEMENTS "SUPPORT ISRAEL AND WORLD ZIONISM"; AS SUCH, THESE STATEMENTS CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND TO THE WORLD AT LARGE.

4. THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT THE STAND TAKEN BY FRANCE IS INTENDED TO DESTROY THE CREDIBILITY WHICH THE EUROPEANS HAVE WORKED TOGETHER TO CREATE OVER THE LAST TEN YEARS. THE FRENCH WOULD LIKE TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT EUROPEAN POLICIES ARE DRAWN UP AND DETERMINED "BY ONE OF ITS STATES". JORDAN EXPECTS THE EUROPEANS TO RECTIFY THIS IMPRESSION BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE.

5. IN CONCLUSION THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT'S COMMUNIQUE CALLS UPON THE ARAB STATES, WHICH HAVE WORKED OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS TO REINFORCE THEIR RELATIONS WITH FRANCE, TO RECONSIDER SUCH POLICIES "SERIOUSLY, QUICKLY AND DECISIVELY" SINCE ARAB INTERESTS AND ARAB CAUSES ARE THREATENED BY FRANCE'S REGRETTABLY PROVOCATIVE AND UNEXPECTED STAND.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

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MR J C MOBERLY

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FM WASHINGTON 150115Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3792 OF 14 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN,
CAIRO, BEIRUT, JEDDA.

INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

TEL AVIV TELS NOS 487 AND 488: EXTENSION OF ISRAELI LAW TO THE GOLAN.

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY HAD NO PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF BEGIN'S INTENTIONS. THEY ARE TAKING THE LINE WITH THE PRESS THAT THEY HAVE MADE KNOWN TO THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES THEIR DEEP CONCERN OVER AND OPPOSITION TO ANY EFFORT TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF THE GOLAN UNILATERALLY. THEY CONSIDER ANY SUCH UNILATERAL CHANGE TO BE CONTRARY TO U N SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND TO THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, AND THAT THE ISRAELI ACTION CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION OF TERRITORY.

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO EXPLAIN THE TIMING OF BEGIN'S MOVE, THOUGH THEY TOO SPECULATE THAT HE MAY BE USING EVENTS IN POLAND AS A SMOKE SCREEN.

F C O PASS SAVING ABU DHABI, ADEN, ALGIERS, BAGHDAD, BAHRAIN, DOHA, DUBAI, JERUSALEM, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, MUSCAT, RABAT, SANA'A, TRIFOLI, TUNIS

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DESKBY 142200Z

FM DAMASCUS 142100Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 420 OF 14 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK AND TEL AVIV

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, EEC POSTS, OTHER ME POSTS.

TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO. 488 TO YOU (NOT TO ALL)

GOLAN.

1. SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED HEADS OF MISSION OF PERMANENT MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL AT 1915Z ON 14 DECEMBER.

2. KHADDAM SAID THAT A DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENT HAD TAKEN PLACE IN THE REGION IN THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED TO APPLY ISRAELI LAW TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY OF THE GOLAN AND A LAW TO THIS EFFECT HAD JUST BEEN PASSED IN THE KNESSET. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC WISHED TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF GOVERNMENTS TO THE SERIOUS NATURE OF THIS DEVELOPMENT WHICH CHANGED THE SITUATION IN THE REGION AND HAD THE FOLLOWING CONSEQUENCES

A) IT WAS A BREACH OF THE CHARTER OF THE UN AND OF UN RESOLUTIONS, IN PARTICULAR RESOLUTION 338. IT ABOLISHED THE STATUS OF THE ISRAELI/SYRIAN CEASE FIRE AND CONSTITUTED AGGRESSION AGAINST SYRIA.

B) IT WAS A CHALLENGE TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION WHOSE RESULTS COULD BE DANGEROUS.

RESULTS COULD BE DANGEROUS.

C) IT REVEALED THE AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS OF PAST ISRAELI MOVES

D) SYRIA HAD CALLED FOR AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE MEASURES AGAINST THE ISRAELI DECISION, TO CANCEL IT AND TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON ISRAEL. THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT HOPED THAT OUR GOVERNMENTS WOULD SUPPORT THE SYRIAN POSITION, THEY RESERVED THE RIGHT TO TAKE ANY MEASURE NECESSARY TO DEFEND THEIR NATIONAL RIGHT. THEY HOPED THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IN VIEW OF THEIR SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY, WOULD RECOGNISE THE DANGERS OF THE SITUATION IN THE REGION AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ISRAELI MEASURE. THE SYRIANS LOOKED FOR OUR COOPERATION.

3. WE ALL UNDERTOOK TO REPORT URGENTLY TO OUR GOVERNMENTS. THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR SAID THAT THE SYRIANS COULD BE SURE OF HIS COUNTRY'S SUPPORT. AS WE LEFT THE PRESS WAS WAITING, PRESUMABLY TO BE TOLD OF THE MESSAGE GIVEN TO US.

FCO PASS TO SAVING ✓ ADDRESSEES

MARSHALL

[Placed Davis, as requested.]

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FM DAMASCUS 142100Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 420 OF 14 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK AND TEL AVIV

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, EEC POSTS, OTHER ME POSTS.

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[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 150016Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1557 OF 14 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV WASHINGTON DAMASCUS AMMAN CAIRO
BEIRUT JEDDA.

TEL AVIV TEL NO 487: GOLAN.

1. FATTAL (SYRIA) WROTE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TODAY (14 DECEMBER) ASKING FOR AN URGENT MEETING OF THE COUNCIL. HIS REQUEST WAS CONSIDERED AT AN INFORMAL MEETING THIS EVENING. THE PRESIDENT (OTUNNU, UGANDA) REPORTED THAT HE HAD ALREADY SPOKEN TO THE ISRAELI AND SYRIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES. THE FORMER HAD SAID THAT HE WAS IN THE DARK AND WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS. THE LATTER HAD SAID THAT HE WANTED AN URGENT MEETING TO QUOTE CONDITION INTERNATIONAL OPINION UNQUOTE AND A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD CALL ON ISRAEL TO DESIST OR, IF THE LEGISLATION HAD ALREADY BEEN PASSED, TO RESCIND IT.
2. THERE WAS A GENERAL DISPOSITION NOT TO RUSH INTO A MEETING UNTIL MORE FACTS WERE AVAILABLE. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE COUNCIL COULD MEET AGAIN INFORMALLY TOMORROW EVENING (15 DECEMBER), FOLLOWING TWO FORMAL MEETINGS ON THE SEYCHELLES AND CISKEI RESPECTIVELY.
3. WHEN THE COUNCIL MEETS FORMALLY, I WOULD PROPOSE TO SPEAK EARLY AND BRIEFLY, IN ORDER TO GET OUR STATEMENT OUT OF THE WAY BEFORE THE INEVITABLE FLOOD OF ARAB INVECTIVE.

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 141830Z (FCO, WASHINGTON, DAMASCUS AND UKMIS NEW YORK)

FROM TEL AVIV 141730Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 487 OF 14 DECEMBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DAMASCUS, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN,
PRIORITY CAIRO, BEIRUT AND JEDDA.
INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

EXTENSION OF ISRAELI LAW TO THE GOLAN

1. BEGIN LEFT HOSPITAL THIS MORNING. HE SUMMONED A SPECIAL CABINET MEETING IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER AT WHICH IT WAS DECIDED TO SUBMIT A BILL IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS (OUR OWN TRANSLATION FROM THE HEBREW) TO THE KNESSET THIS EVENING:

QUOTE

A) THE LAW, JURISDICTION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE SHALL APPLY TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AS DEFINED IN THE ANNEX. (A MAP ATTACHED TO THE DRAFT BILL.)

B) THE LAW SHALL APPLY FROM THE DAY OF ITS ADOPTION BY THE KNESSET.

C) THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW, AND IS EMPOWERED TO ISSUE REGULATIONS FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

UNQUOTE

2. ACCORDING TO THE SPEAKER (SAVIDOR, LIKUD), SPEAKING AT THE OPENING OF TONIGHT'S SPECIAL SESSION (1520Z), THE GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO PRESS THROUGH THE NECESSARY THREE READINGS OF THE BILL LEADING TO ITS FINAL PASSAGE THIS EVENING. THE OPPOSITION ALIGNMENT, WHOSE ACTING LEADER IN THE KNESSET (IN PERES'S ABSENCE IN THE UNITED STATES) WAS INFORMED THAT THE BILL WOULD BE PRESENTED TO THE SPECIAL SESSION ONLY A FEW HOURS AGO, ARE STILL CONSIDERING THE LINE THEY SHOULD TAKE. THERE ARE REPORTED TO BE SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES OF OPINION WITHIN THE PARTY ON THIS. SOME MEMBERS MAY DECIDE TO BOYCOTT THE SESSION BECAUSE THEY OBJECT TO THE GOVERNMENT'S TACTICS. (AS AT 1630Z THE ALIGNMENT WERE STILL ABSENT FROM THE KNESSET CHAMBER.)

3. THE DEBATE IS NOW PROCEEDING. INTRODUCING THE BILL, AND SPEAKING FROM A WHEELCHAIR, BEGIN ASSERTED THAT NO ONE IN ISRAEL WHO HAD STUDIED THE HISTORY OF "ERETZ ISRAEL" (LAST TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) WOULD TRY TO DENY THAT THE GOLAN HEIGHTS HAD FORMED PART OF IT. AFTER REHEARSING THE THREAT POSED TO ISRAEL DURING THE PERIOD OF SYRIAN CONTROL OF THE GOLAN, HE SAID THAT NO ONE COULD IMAGINE THAT ISRAEL WOULD AGREE TO THE RESTORATION OF SUCH A SITUATION. A WIDE CONSENSUS EXISTED (ON THIS).

4. BEGIN THEN QUOTED THE (JULY) GOVERNMENT POLICY GUIDELINES ON THE GOLAN ISSUE: "ISRAEL WILL NOT DESCEND FROM THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AND WILL NOT REMOVE SETTLEMENTS FROM THEM. THE GOVERNMENT WILL DECIDE ON THE TIMING OF THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS." THESE GUIDELINES HAD BEEN APPROVED BY THE KNESSET AND THE GOVERNMENT HAD TODAY DECIDED, ON BOTH POLITICAL AND MORAL GROUNDS TO APPLY (ISRAELI) LAW TO THE GOLAN.

5. HE HAD TIME AND AGAIN PROPOSED NEGOTIATIONS TO SYRIA BUT HAD BEEN REJECTED, A DENIAL OF ISRAEL'S VERY RIGHT OF EXISTENCE. AT THE FEZ SUMMIT, KHADDAM HAD REJECTED THE FAHD PLAN AND HAD SAID THAT THE ARABS COULD WAIT A HUNDRED YEARS UNTIL ISRAEL'S STRENGTH DECLINED. IT WOULD NOT DECLINE BUT THE ENEMIES' PLOT HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR BEYOND ALL DOUBT. THEN THEY (THE ENEMIES) WOULD ACT.

6. YESTERDAY ASAD HAD, BEGIN SAID, CONFIRMED THIS (KHADDAM'S SPEECH AT FEZ) TO A KUWAITI NEWSPAPER WHEN HE HAD SAID THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT RECOGNISE ISRAEL EVEN IF THE PALESTINIANS DID SO. HE HAD CALLED ON THE ARAB WORLD TO WAIT UNTIL THEY WERE SUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO ENFORCE PEACE ON ISRAEL IN THE SPIRIT OF THE ARAB DEMANDS. THIS WOULD MEAN "THE BEGINNING OF THE DESTRUCTION OF OUR STATE."

7. BEGIN ADDED THAT LIBYA WAS BEHIND TERRORISM EVEN IN THE UNITED STATES. IN THIS CONTEXT, SYRIA SAID THAT SHE WAS SUPPORTING THE LIBYANS. SHE HAD ALSO TAKEN CONTROL OF THE LEBANON. IT WAS FOR THESE HISTORIC, SECURITY AND MORAL REASONS THAT HE WAS ASKING THE KNESSET TO ADOPT THE GOLAN BILL.

8. SEE MIFT.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

MOBERLY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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FROM TEL AVIV 141815Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 488 OF 14 DECEMBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DAMASCUS, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN,
PRIORITY CAIRO, BEIRUT AND JEDDA

INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

MIPT: EXTENSION OF ISRAELI LAW TO THE GOLAN.

1. THE GOLAN ISSUE HAS BEEN RELATIVELY QUIESCENT SINCE MARCH WHEN THE KNESSET REJECTED THE TEHIYA (RIGHT-WING EXTREMIST) PRIVATE MEMBER'S BILL TO EXTEND ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AND TO APPLY ISRAELI LAW THERE. (THE ISRAELI CABINET HAD DECIDED IN DECEMBER, 1980, NOT TO SUPPORT THE BILL BECAUSE THEY CONSIDERED THAT THERE WAS NOT THEN A "NATIONAL CONSENSUS" FOR IT AND BECAUSE THE TIMING WAS INAPPROPRIATE: TEL AVIV TELNO 576 OF 23 DECEMBER REFERS.)

2. IT WAS, HOWEVER, CLEAR THROUGHOUT THE LENGTHY DEBATE IN DECEMBER ON THE TEHIYA BILL, THAT ALTHOUGH BEGIN AND HIS CABINET WERE NOT AT THE TIME WILLING TO TAKE THE FINAL STEP - MAINLY BECAUSE OF THE ADVERSE INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES WHICH WOULD RESULT - THEY FAVOURED SOME KIND OF LEGISLATIVE MOVE TO STRENGTHEN ISRAEL'S LINKS WITH THE GOLAN WHEN THE TIME WAS RIPE. (AS BEGIN REMINDED THE KNESSET THIS EVENING, THE RELEVANT SECTION OF THE POST-ELECTORAL POLICY GUIDELINES ARE CLEAR ON THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS). BEGIN KNEW, AND KNOWS, THAT HE CAN COUNT ON THE ENDORSEMENT OF A SUBSTANTIAL BODY WITHIN THE OPPOSITION FOR SUCH LEGISLATION; AND ON THE SUPPORT OF A MAJORITY OF ISRAELIS, WHO, WHATEVER THEIR RESERVATIONS ABOUT PARTICULAR ASPECTS OF LIKUD POLICY, CAN BE RELIED ON TO BACK THE GOVERNMENT ON THE JERUSALEM AND GOLAN ISSUES.

CONFIDENTIAL

/3. TODAY'S

3. TODAY'S DECISION HAS NEVERTHELESS SURPRISED EVEN THE MOST DEVOTED STUDENTS OF BEGIN'S PROPENSITY FOR DRAMATIC MOVES MADE WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION. IF THE NEWS REPORTS OF THIS MORNING'S EVENTS ARE ACCURATE, HE CONSULTED ONLY SHARON BEFORE PUTTING THE PROPOSED BILL TO THE REST OF THE CABINET, WHO HAD NO ADVANCE WARNING OF HIS INTENTION AND WERE LEFT WITH LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO ACCEPT A FAIT ACCOMPLI (LAST TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) BOTH ON DRAFTING AND PARLIAMENTARY TACTICS. MANY ISRAELIS, PERHAPS INCLUDING SOME CABINET MEMBERS, WHILE FAVOURING THE EXTENSION OF ISRAELI LAW TO THE GOLAN MAY NEVERTHELESS HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE APPARENTLY SNAP NATURE OF BEGIN'S DECISION AND ABOUT HIS DETERMINATION TO BULLDOZE HIS BILL THROUGH THE KNESSET, WHATEVER THE DAMAGE TO ISRAEL'S REPUTATION AS A DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY.

4. WHY DID BEGIN DECIDE TO MOVE TODAY? THE BEST EXPLANATION AT PRESENT IS THAT PUT TO US INFORMALLY BY THE ISRAEL FOREIGN MINISTRY (WHO HAVE YET TO RECEIVE FIRM GUIDANCE ON THE LINE THEY SHOULD TAKE); THAT BEGIN, HAVING BROODED FOR SOME TIME ON KHADDAM'S SPEECH AT FEZ, WAS ENRAGED BY ASAD'S STATEMENT (AS REPORTED HERE) TO A KUWAITI NEWSPAPER THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT RECOGNISE ISRAEL EVEN IF THE PALESTINIANS DID SO. AS HE EMPHASISED IN THE CLOSING PASSAGES OF HIS SPEECH TONIGHT, BEGIN INTERPRETED ASAD'S COMMENTS AS IMPLYING THE EVENTUAL DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL. HE APPARENTLY WENT ON TO DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT SINCE SYRIA WAS EVIDENTLY DETERMINED NEVER TO MAKE PEACE, HE WAS JUSTIFIED IN TAKING TODAY'S ACTION. AND IF THE DEED WERE TO BE DONE, BEST IT WERE DONE QUICKLY BEFORE NASCENT OPPOSITION COULD BE EFFECTIVELY MOBILISED.

5. SOME COMMENTATORS ALSO SUGGEST THAT BEGIN TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY PROVIDED BY THE WEST'S, AND PARTICULARLY THE UNITED STATES'S, PREOCCUPATION WITH EVENTS IN POLAND, TO SPRING HIS SURPRISE. BUT WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THIS THEORY. (ACCORDING TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY HERE, THE US AMBASSADOR HAS IN ANY EVENT ALREADY EXPRESSED THE UNITED STATES'S DEEP CONCERN TO SHAMIR AT THE ADVERSE EFFECT THIS MOVE WILL HAVE ON SC242, AND ON THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS.)

6. I SHALL COMMENT FURTHER AFTER THE OUTCOME OF THE KNESSET DEBATE IS KNOWN.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

MOBERLY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS AND OTHER EC POSTS.

MY TELNO 845 PARA 5: JORDAN/ MIDDLE EAST.

PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE

1. I SAW KING HUSSEIN ON 12 DECEMBER AND DELIVERED TO HIM THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER ANSWERING HIS MESSAGES OF 22 NOVEMBER AND 27 NOVEMBER (MY TELNOS 446, 447 AND 463). HE EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE FOR OUR INTERVENTION WITH THE AMERICANS CONCERNING THE REMARKS PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD MADE ON JERUSALEM PRIOR TO THE FEZ SUMMIT AND ALSO NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THE EXPRESSION IN THE LETTER OF OUR OWN RESOLUTE COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES SET OUT

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LETTER OF OUR OWN RESOLUTE COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN THE VENICE DECLARATION AND TO THE PURSUIT OF AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

FRENCH STATEMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. THE KING THEN EXPRESSED HIS ANGER AT RECENT STATEMENTS BY THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER, WHICH HE SAID HAD NOT BEEN HELPED BY THE SUBSEQUENT "UNCLEAR AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE" COMMENTS MADE BY M. CHEYSSON HIMSELF AND PRESIDENT MITTERRAND. HE HAD NO INTENTION OF LETTING THESE FRENCH STATEMENTS PASS AND WOULD MAKE HIS FEELINGS ON THEM KNOWN PUBLICLY. IT WAS FOLLY FOR THE FRENCH TO SAY SUCH THINGS, WHICH PLAYED INTO THE HANDS OF THE EXTREMIST ARABS AND OTHERS HOSTILE TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. (LATER THE SAME DAY THE KING SAW MME VEIL: HIS EXPRESSION TO HER OF HIS DISSATISFACTION AT M. CHEYSSON'S STATEMENTS IS HEADLINED IN TODAY'S JORDANIAN NEWSPAPERS, WHICH CONTINUE TO ATTACK THE FRENCH IN STRONG TERMS).

3. THE KING WENT ON TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE UK PRESIDENCY WOULD TAKE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO RESTATE PUBLICLY EUROPEAN ADHERENCE TO THE VENICE DECLARATION AND THEIR DEDICATION TO THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE SAW EUROPEAN EFFORTS AS AN ESSENTIAL COMPLEMENT TO THOSE OF THE MODERATE ARABS IN PREPARING FOR WHAT WOULD FOLLOW ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI.

FOLLOW'UP TO FEZ SUMMIT

4. KING HUSSEIN TOLD ME HE WAS KEEPING IN VERY CLOSE TOUCH WITH PRINCE FAHD. HE HAD BEEN AFRAID THAT, IF THE SUMMIT MEETING HAD CONTINUED AT FEZ, IT WOULD HAVE LED TO A PREMATURE APPEAL TO EGYPT TO BREAK AWAY FROM CAMP DAVID AND REJOIN THE ARAB RANKS. THE EGYPTIANS WOULD HAVE BEEN BOUND TO REFUSE, FOR FEAR OF PUTTING THE COMPLETION OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN JEOPARDY, AND THIS MIGHT NEEDLESSLY HAVE SET BACK BY MANY MONTHS THE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE MODERATE ARAB STATES. THE KING SAID THAT, MEANWHILE, HE WAS MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH THE EGYPTIANS AND HOPED THAT, BY POSTPONING THE RECONVENING OF THE SUMMIT UNTIL WELL AFTER ISRAEL WAS DUE TO HAVE COMPLETED HER WITHDRAWAL, THE WAY WAS BEING KEPT OPEN FOR A RECONCILIATION BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE ARABS.

5. I ASKED KING HUSSEIN WHETHER HE THOUGHT IT WOULD PROVE POSSIBLE TO BRING THE IRAQIS ROUND TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE FAHD PRINCIPLES. THE KING SAID HE COULD NOT BE SURE. THE IRAQIS

5. I ASKED KING HUSSEIN WHETHER HE THOUGHT IT WOULD PROVE POSSIBLE TO BRING THE IRAQIS ROUND TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE FAHD PRINCIPLES. THE KING SAID HE COULD NOT BE SURE. THE IRAQIS, WHO CLAIMED TO BE FOLLOWING A LONG-STANDING POLICY ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION, HAD NEITHER OPPOSED FAHD'S 8 POINTS AT FEZ NOR SUPPORTED THEM. HOWEVER THE KING WAS HOPEFUL THAT HE COULD BRING PRESIDENT SADDAM ALONG AND FELT THAT IRAQ'S CURRENT DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAR WITH IRAN (ON WHICH SEE PARA 6 BELOW) MIGHT MAKE SADDAM MORE AMENABLE TO DRAWING TOGETHER WITH THE MODERATE ARABS ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE (THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PUT IT SLIGHTLY DIFFERENTLY TO ME ON 10 DECEMBER, SAYING THAT HE THOUGHT THE IRAQIS WOULD BE CONTENT WITH WHATEVER WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE PALESTINIANS, BUT AT THE SAME TIME WOULD TRY TO PREVENT THE SYRIANS FROM UNDERCUTTING THEIR POSITION). THE KING WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF ALL THE GULF STATES AND BELIEVED THAT KUWAIT, WHICH HAD SUPPORTED THE FAHD PLAN AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S MEETING PRIOR TO THE FEZ SUMMIT, WOULD STAY WITH THE MODERATE MAJORITY.

IRAN/IRAQ

6. KING HUSSEIN SAID HE WAS EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT REPORTS COMING OUT OF IRAN OF THE MURDER BY THE IRANIANS OF IRAQI PRISONERS OF WAR (BAGHDAD TELNO 753 REFERS). - HE HAD BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH PRESIDENT SADDAM AND ALSO PRINCE FAHD ABOUT THESE REPORTS AND THEY WERE PLANNING A JOINT ARAB STATEMENT (I LEARNED SUBSEQUENTLY THAT KING HUSSEIN AND THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER WERE WORKING ON THIS STATEMENT UNTIL LATE LAST NIGHT).

7. KING HUSSEIN SAID HE WOULD BE PAYING A VISIT TO IRAQ VERY SHORTLY AND HOPED ALSO TO GO TO SAUDI ARABIA IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAYING ADDRESSEES.

URWICK

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Mr. (Ses) (No 16)

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FM FCO 111715Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT
TELEGRAM NUMBER 304 OF 11 DECEMBER.

YOUR TELNOS. 429 AND 441: PLO

1. PLEASE NOW SEEK MEETING WITH ARAFAT, WHICH WE HOPE THE PLO WILL TREAT AS ROUTINE WITH NO PUBLICITY AS FAR AS POSSIBLE.
2. IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE HIS PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF WHAT HAPPENED AT FEZ AND HIS VIEW OF LIKELY DEVELOPMENTS ON THE ARAB SIDE IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO HIM THAT OUR POLICY REMAINS AS SET OUT IN THE VENICE DECLARATION AND SUBSEQUENTLY AND THAT WE WISH TO PLAY AN ACTIVE AND HELPFUL ROLE IN MAKING PROGRESS POSSIBLE BUT ARE ALSO AWARE OF THE LIMITS OF WHAT WE CAN ACHIEVE BY OURSELVES. IF ARAFAT ASKS ABOUT A MEETING WITH ME YOU SHOULD SAY THAT I AM READY IN PRINCIPLE FOR A MEETING BUT THAT IT MUST MARK A FURTHER STEP TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IF IT IS TO HELP US TO INFLUENCE US AND ISRAELI VIEWS AND NOT TO COMPLICATE OUR RELATIONS WITH THE PLO BECAUSE OF POLITICAL REACTIONS TO IT. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE PLO HAVE IT IN THEIR OWN HANDS TO BREAK THE PRESENT IMPASSE AND BRING FULFILMENT OF THEIR ASPIRATIONS NEARER BY MOVING TOWARDS CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE. YOU SHOULD ASSURE ARAFAT OF OUR READINESS TO CONTINUE A DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO AND REMIND HIM THAT FOLLOWING OUR LATEST MEETING WITH DAJANI WE ARE AWAITING PROPOSALS FROM HIM FOR A BASIS ON WHICH A MEETING COULD BE ARRANGED.
3. AS BACKGROUND YOU WILL WISH TO BE AWARE THAT MOBERLY AND MILES SAW QADDUMI IN LONDON ON 11 DECEMBER. AS WE HAD ANTICIPATED FROM HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS, QADDUMI WHILE PERSONALLY FRIENDLY TOOK A VERY HARD LINE. HE ARGUED THAT THE ISRAELIS UNDERSTOOD ONLY THE LANGUAGE

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OF FORCE, WHICH HAD INDEED BEEN EFFECTIVE IN PERSUADING THEM TO AGREE TO THE CEASEFIRE IN SOUTH LEBANON. THE PLO'S BITTER EXPERIENCES WITH THE AMERICANS AND THE ISRAELIS HAD CONVINCED THEM THAT MODERATE OR CONDITIONAL STATEMENTS WOULD BE TAKEN AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS. AFTER HARKING BACK TO THE CONCEPT OF THE SECULAR STATE IN THE WHOLE OF PALESTINE, QADDUMI SAID THAT RECOGNITION COULD BE DISCUSSED ONLY AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND BETWEEN A PALESTINIAN STATE AND ISRAEL. HE ADDED THAT ACROSS THE TABLE WITH THE ISRAELIS HE WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT CO-EXISTENCE ON THE BASIS OF THE 1947 UN PARTITION PLAN BUT, IF HE WERE TO SAY SO NOW TO A JOURNALIST, HE WOULD BE A DEAD MAN. WHERE HAD WILLINGNESS TO RECOGNISE ISRAEL GOT SADAT? AS FOR PRINCE FAHD'S PROPOSALS, THEY WERE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE PLO. QADDUMI URGED THAT I SHOULD MEET ARAFAT WITHOUT SETTING CONDITIONS. ALL THESE POINTS COULD THEN FRUITFULLY BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN US.

4. AFTER EXPLAINING MY POSITION ON A MEETING WITH ARAFAT, MOBERLY AND MILES CONTESTED QADDUMI'S POINTS AND MADE THE CASE FOR A PLO POLITICAL INITIATIVE NOW ON STANDARD LINES. QADDUMI DISAGREED AND SAID THAT TIME WAS ON THE SIDE OF THE PALESTINIANS. THEIR MILITARY CAPABILITY WAS GROWING. THE ISRAELIS MIGHT OCCUPY ALL LEBANON BUT THEY WOULD TAKE HEAVY CASUALTIES WHICH WOULD DISCOURAGE FURTHER JEWISH IMMIGRATION INTO ISRAEL. TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS WE SHOULD LEAN ON THE ISRAELIS. TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE THE PLO HAD TO HAVE SOMETHING IN THEIR HAND.

5. QUITE SEPARATELY DAJANI TELEPHONED MOBERLY FROM PARIS ON 10 DECEMBER. HE SAID HE HAD HOPED TO PASS THROUGH LONDON ON 11 DECEMBER. IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT HE WOULD NOW BE ABLE TO DO SO BUT HE HOPED TO COME BACK IN ABOUT THREE WEEKS AND WOULD BE GLAD TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE WITH US THEN.

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PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR BULLARD
MR MOBERLY

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FM PARIS 111800Z DEC 81

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1113 OF 11 DECEMBER

INFO SAVING TEL AVIV, BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, ROME, UKREP BRUSSELS, ATHENS, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, JEDDA.

MY TEL NO 1089: FRANCE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

1. THE FRENCH PRESS HAS GIVEN GOOD COVERAGE TO THE ADVERSE REACTIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD AND IN OTHER EUROPEAN CAPITALS TO M. CHEYSSON'S ORATORY.
2. CRITICISM OF M. CHEYSSON HAS TENDED TO FIRM UP A LITTLE. LE MATIN ON 11 DECEMBER, WHILE WELCOMING THE POLICY OF BEING FRIENDS WITH ALL SIDES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SAYS IT IS A POLICY REQUIRING DISCRETION, WHICH IS NOT THE FORTE OF M. CHEYSSON. THE PAPER SEES MERIT IN BEING FRANK BUT CONSIDERS THAT THIS TIME M. CHEYSSON HAS DROPPED A BRICK.
3. UNDER THE HEADLINE "WHERE IS THE MISTAKE AND THE ABSURDITY?", THIS AFTERNOON'S LE MONDE REPORTS SCEPTICALLY M. CHEYSSON'S CLAIM TO HAVE BEEN MISINTERPRETED. IT QUOTES THE KEY PASSAGE ON THE VENICE DECLARATION IN M. CHEYSSON'S RADIO INTERVIEW, COMMENTING THAT THE CONTEXT MAKES IT CLEAR THAT M. CHEYSSON WAS INDEED CONDEMNING THE ANTI-CAMP DAVID NATURE, AS HE SAW IT, OF VENICE. LE MONDE ALSO POINTS OUT THAT VENICE WAS CAUTIOUSLY WORDED AND THAT SO FAR THE TEN HAVE NOT ACTUALLY EMBARKED ON AN "INITIATIVE", IMPLYING THAT IT IS M. CHEYSSON WHO HAS MISINTERPRETED VENICE.
4. THE OPPOSITION PRESS HAS CRITICISED M. CHEYSSON EVEN MORE ROUNDLY. LE QUOTIDIEN ON 10 DECEMBER SAID THAT FRENCH POLICY WAS CONTRADICTIONARY AND FRENCH DIPLOMACY LOSING ALL CREDIBILITY.
5. FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

HIBBERT

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