MT

Confidential Filing

PM's Visit to Pakistan on 8 October 1981

Policy

PAKISTAN

September 1981

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~13.10.81~~							
~~2.11.81~~							
~~18.1.82~~							
27.1.82							

PREM 19/860

CLOSED

Dd 533270 5M 2/78 8362633 JET

MFJ Pakistan

27 January 1982

Assistance for Handicapped Children
in Pakistan

Thank you for your letter of 26 January. The Prime Minister has seen it and taken note of its content.

AJC

R M J Lyne Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Prime Minister

A.J.C 26/1

(2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 January 1982

Dear John,

Assistance for Handicapped Children in Pakistan

In his letter of 18 January, Clive Whitmore said that the Prime Minister had enquired about progress on this matter, which was raised briefly during her meeting with General Zia on 8 October.

I am afraid that there is little to add to the note by Bill Fullerton, of our Embassy in Islamabad, which you enclosed with your letter. Following the Prime Minister's visit, we promptly reaffirmed our willingness to provide assistance by way of a follow-up to the short advisory visit which we had mounted in March 1980. This was done both orally during a visit in October by the ODA Desk Officer for Pakistan, and subsequently in writing by our Embassy. So far the offer has not been taken up, although we understand that we can expect to receive a formal request in due course.

ODA's Education Adviser is due to visit Pakistan next month and, if no response has been received by then, he will be asked to take the matter up again with the Pakistani authorities.

Yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

File AH

Pakistan

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

18 January 1982

Dear Brian,

ASSISTANCE FOR HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN PAKISTAN

I attach a copy of a note (8.10.81) which was prepared by our High Commission in Pakistan as part of the Prime Minister's briefing for her meeting with General Zia on 8 October 1981.

In the event the President referred to the question of assistance for handicapped children only briefly. He said that Pakistan was grateful for the help given to establish an Institute for Handicapped Children, and he would welcome more. He said that it was proposed that British experts should come to Pakistan for six months or so at Pakistan's expense to provide technical help to set up an institute.

The Prime Minister recently inquired whether any progress had been made on this matter. I should be grateful if you could let me have a short report.

B/F

A

Yours ever,

Clive Whitmore.

Brian Fall Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

AH

JS

Pakistan

CF

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 November 1981

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter to her of 15 October. She was most grateful to you for having written.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Mr. K.G. Sarwar

ds

PS

Peshawar Cantt

NWFP

Pakistan

15 October 1981.

R31/10

May it please Your Excellency,

Most respectfully I beg to say that it was on 8 October 1981 when I had the great honour to interpret Your Excellency's speech into Pashto delivered at the representative assembly of Afghan refugees held at their tented camp near Peshawar.

After the meeting, Your Excellency were extremely kind and considerate in complimenting me for my contribution, little though,I think it was.

Your kind words were highly encouraging. I thank Your Excellency with all the respect due to your high office. I am deeply obliged and feel grateful.

I met quite a few Afghan refugees after the 'Jirga' was over who most warmly and sincerely felt grateful for all that was said by Your Excellency crystalising the pace of historical events- both in the past and present and assuring them of the shape of good things to come in Afghanistan. Your Excellency's speech was indeed a message of hope to Afghan refugees under their present state of stresses and strains, hard peril and pain. Yet they are the people who have chosen the right with invincible resolution, resisting the sorest pressure,bearing the heaviest burden cheerfully and remaining cool.calm and fearless in storms giving strength and stability to what they hold most dearly namely to pursue their own good in their own way without any dictation or intervention from outside.

I thank Your Excellency again for

Your kindness and consideration by quoting Sir H. Davy that 'life is made up not of great sacrifices or duties but of little things in which smiles and kindnesses and small obligations given habitually are what win and preserve the heart and secure comfort'.

I request Your Excellency to very kindly convey to Mr. Denis Thatcher my respectful 'Salaam' and good wishes.

Her Excellency,
Mrs Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister,
United Kingdom,
L O N D O N.

I beg to remain,
Your Excellency's
most obediently,
K. G. SARWAR.

HOME ADDRESS:-
K. G. SARWAR M.A.
No 1 KHATTAK LODGE,
NEAR CIVIL QUARTERS,
KOHAT ROAD,
PESHAWAR CANTT: NWFP
PAKISTAN.

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Pakistan

From the Secretary of State

M O'D B Alexander Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London, SW1

13 October 1981

WM 14/10

Dear Michael

Thank you for your letter of 24 September regarding the inclusion in the Prime Minister's main brief of a reference to the Metap Trading and Contracting (ME) Limited interest in the Pakistan Ministry of Communication's plans to modernise their telecommunications network.

Unfortunately your letter and enclosure arrived too late for inclusion of the project and we considered the alternative course of a reference in the "round-up" telegram sent out by the FCO on 5 October. In the end we decided that we should not make specific reference to Metap's particular interest as the question of British interests in major projects in general was covered in the main brief, but more importantly, we were advised that there was neither provision for cover in the World Bank programme, nor finance available from British aid sources at the present time.

In the event we decided that it would be misleading to encourage the Prime Minister to single out this particular project in the light of such unfavourable financial circumstances and left it that should the occasion arise she could make reference merely to United Kingdom interest in telecommunications developments generally.

In the meantime we are pursuing Metap's particular interests separately both in respect of telecommunications and also the fishing industry which they mentioned in their letter.

Yours sincerely

Catherine Capon

CATHERINE CAPON
Private Secretary

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

13 October, 1981

My dear Ambassador,

I am writing to thank you and your staff for all you did to make my visit to Pakistan last Thursday so successful.

It was asking a great deal to try to pack so much in so short a space of time, but thanks to the arrangements which you had made with the Pakistani authorities, we managed it. The result was that though my stay was so brief, I gained an invaluable understanding of the problems facing President Zia, and especially of the impact on Pakistan of the situation in Afghanistan.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Mr. O.G. Forster, C.M.G., M.V.O.

FWE

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

13 October, 1981

My dear Governor,

I should like to thank you very warmly indeed for receiving me in the North-West Frontier Province last Thursday. The programme which had been arranged for me could not have been better. It was an eventful day, and I feel that I saw a good deal of your Province in a very short time.

I am particularly grateful to you for the lunch you gave for me: the setting under the awnings in the grounds of your lovely residence was one I shall long remember.

I shall have too your very generous gifts to remind me of the few hours I spent with you. I am only sorry that I was unable to stay longer.

Thank you again for all your hospitality.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Lieutenant General Fazle Haq

RHb

FILE

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

13 October, 1981

My dear Colonel,

I should like to thank you for the hospitality which you and your fellow officers showed me when I visited Landikotal and Torkham last Thursday.

I am particularly grateful for the two daggers and the shield which you gave me. They will be a memento of a fascinating visit.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Colonel Mohammed Akram Khan

RH

SUBJECT CF

FILE

T 143/81

10 DOWNING STREET

cc Master
Ops

THE PRIME MINISTER

12 October, 1981

My dear President Zia,

Now that I am back in London I can write to let you know how very much I enjoyed my visit to your country last Thursday.

The programme which you arranged for me was perfect - from the first moment of the very warm welcome which I received at the airport to the banquet you gave for me in your Palace before I left. You made the best possible use of every available second and so, though I was with you for all too short a time, I feel that I was able to learn a very great deal from my visit.

Above all, I have gained, both from my talks with you and my visit to the North-West Frontier Province, an invaluable personal insight into the effect of the Afghanistan problem on Pakistan. I am, as I said at my press conference, full of admiration for the way in which you are grappling with the burdens which have been thrust upon you. We in Britain will continue to do all we can to help.

/I am most

Yours

I am most grateful to you for all your hospitality, and your very generous gifts will serve to remind me of what was a truly fascinating day. I hope you will accept the enclosed photograph as an indication of my gratitude.

I am only sorry that I was not able to spend longer in Pakistan, and I look forward to our next meeting.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq

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[TEXT]

Following is a transcript of Prime Minister's Press Conference held at 081400Z.

Ladies and Gentlemen

The Prime Minister will say a few words and then she will take questions. Prime Minister:

Mr President Ladies and Gentlemen

I would like to start by thanking President Zia and the Government of Pakistan for their very warm hospitality in organising a facinating programme for my all too brief stay in Pakistan today and I am very glad to be back here for my second visit to Pakistan, I am glad to renew my acquaintance with the President and to continue to demonstrate the British Government's support to Pakistan in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

W and Pakistan have had close and friendly relations for many years and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has added a new dimension to the relationship. Lord Carrington has visited Pakistan twice for consultations with Mr Agha Shahi and my visit is part of that continuing relationship in addition I have the pleasure of welcoming President Zia to Britain a year ago and the Foreign Minister Mr Agha Shahi has visited us on several occasions. Now today I have seen for myself the plight of great people of Afghanistan who have been driven from their homes to seek refuge in Pakistan. Their manfolk and their women and children made a great impression on me. We British new their courage and determination from long ago and the Russians are now discovering it to their cost . I have assured the refugees that we in Britain would work to help them return to their own villages to live in peace and freedom and also I am very impressed with the efforts and generosity of the Pakistan Government in looking after over 2 million refugees in this now the largest refugee problem in the world. The work they have done together with the representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees is much admired by all the free countries in the world. Again I promised such help as we could give and I announced the provision of an additional 2 million grant on top of the £5.8 ~~£~~ million pounds we have already given from the British Government. At my meeting with the President this morning we discussed = these problems and a wide range of subjects which we and Pakistan have an interest. I told the President a little bit of one or two things that have happened in ~~London?~~ Melbourne this past week. We discussed the situation in this area and our shared interest in its stability and prosperity. I stressed the importance we attach to the security and stability to the Gulf region and of course the progress towards the solution of

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

the main conflict in the middle eastern area, particularly in the light of the tragic event in Cairo. I was very struck by the main issue
views . Pakistan is an Islamic Republic a developing country and a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. We respect that independence and we value it. It contributed a great deal to our discussions today. Once again I am very happy to be here, delighted with the warm welcome, and thank you for your generous hospitality Now Ladies and Gentlemen, may I answer your questions. It would help if you said who you were and the paper which you represent and may we ask first the questions from our host country

Q Pakistan Times?
Prime Minister indistinct

A. We have not discussed any further initiative. You ~~we~~ are as your question indicates, well aware of the initiative by the European community and you will remember that the Lord Carrington went to Moscow to discuss with the Moscow Government. You are quite right we have so far got nowhere it would be the right way to proceed. I know of no further developments at the moment that I can report to you . Next question:

This question was an oblique reference to Mrs Gandhi's "le Figaro" interview in which she said Pakistan was exploiting the Afghan situation for its own ends

Q. Indistinct

A. I confess I find it very hard to understand your question. Very difficult to understand your question. I see no sign whatsoever of exploitation of the refugees We were all extremely grateful to Pakistan , very grateful indeed that everything that's been done for them tremendous courage, naturally they want their country back but, the words expressed to me were of gratitude to the Government of Pakistan and that everything that has been done to them and for the kindness of the peoples in the area were the refugee camps are situated.

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Q. Indistinct

A. We have already been part of 2 communiques one from the ~~through~~ the Ottawa Conference, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ which said that we should go ahead with preparations with global negotiations and we hope that those negotiations would be constructive and be likely to be successful There was a similar communique from the European Heads of Government. I think there is a certain amount of difference between what people understand by the term global negotiations we certainly have indicated that we believe that they will go ahead. There is no doubt about that. When we go to CANCUN in Mexico some 24 nations go representing themselves not representing anyone else and I think we are all very conscious that we are only 24 out of a very much larger number so please don't expect suddenly pronouncements from CANCUN I think our job will be to see how to take the process of growing help from the developed to the developing world. How best to take that process forward

~~Mmdx~~

Q. London Times? Trevor Fish~~er~~lock. The Afghan refugees you met today Prime Minister asked you for arms and to put it colloquially they seem to be suggesting that in this respect the British Government should put its money where its mouth is. How do you think the British Government will respond to this?

A. Well I believe that the Afghan refugees those who are fighting (as freedom fighters) within Afghanistan* already have a supply of arms and we do not usually discuss these matters to put it colloquially.

*Prime Minister said "Pakistan"

Q. PAK TV. What sort of role is Britain going to play over Afghanistan at the current session of the UNGA?

A. I am sure we will play a constructive role if your question is related to Afghanistan. Then ~~xxxx~~ of course we shall continue to use our influence to see that the Soviet Union continues to be condemned so long as she

occupies Afghanistan. Afghanistan was a Non-alighned country. We believe that every country has the right to decide her own destiny and it is the people of that country who decide it and they should decide it and they should decide it without the troops of occupation.

Q. PAK TV Excellency, in your opinion what is the best solution to the problem of Afghanistan.

A. If we ~~xxx~~ could pour a whole series of solutions out of our heads it would be marvelous. There is only one solution ~~xxx~~ and thats the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The question is how best to achieve that. So far there have been initiatives on the part of both Islamic peoples and the Eropean Economic Community I am afraid we have not yet discovered a way to bring it about. We must continue to search for a way because the occupation of Afghanistan continues to be unacceptable to the world as a whole as well as to the people of Afghanistan.

Q. Morning News. There's a great deal of terrorism in the world today. Is there any appreciation in Britain and the rest of the world of the way that Pakistan handled the recent Hijacking of an aircraft to Pakistan.

A. Very great appreciation it was handled superbly and I congratulate the Government of Pakistan on the way it was handled. And I believe that it is fully appreciated.

Q. Could you tell us what happened in Melbourne about Pakistan's possible re-entry to the ~~xxxxxxxx~~ Commonwealth

A. That was not discussed in open session at Melbourne. There was an informal discussion between a certain number of members at the Conference - those discussions have not yet been ~~xx~~ concluded.

Q. Amit Roy - D. Telegraph. We heard in your opening remarks about the tragic events in Cairo. How do you think that effects the security situation in the Gulf and here.

A. I will give you the reply that I gave yesterday to similar question. I think there will be strenuous efforts on the part of both Egipt and Isreal and all other nations to try to see that there is a stable situation and to try to continue with the return of Sinia to Egypt. When you get something like this happening naturally a number of people feel uncertain but I think we have become very conscious, because of events in the last 2 or 3 years, of the importance of trying to create stability out of a situation of potential uncertainty. Can I just give you one example of what I mean. When the Iran Iraq conflict broke out there was a danger that it would spread very widely, that would have been very damaging to almost the whole world. There was tremendous activity immediately after the start of the conflict. That activity was successful. I believe that there will be strenuous efforts made to see that the process that President Sadat began which would have concluded with the return of Sinai in April 1982 will continue and that both the caretaker and whatever government is ultimately put in office in Egypt as well as Israel will do everything to see that things are as stable as possible.

Q. Dawn
I presume that bilateral matters came up Prime Minister. What would be the position of Pakistanis settled in Britain in relations to the Nationality Bill.

A. If they are full citizens of Britain and have been accepted for permanent citizenship they will be treated just exactly the same as any other person who is a full citizen of Britain. Exactly the same as I would be. If they are full citizens of Britain already.

Q. Arab Times.
Madam you have acknowledged that the Palestine problem is the core of the Middle East conflict. Does Britain support the creation of a Palestinian state so that this problem can be resolved.

A. Britain's views are governed by the ~~Xxxxxx~~ Venice declaration of last year to which we were a party which set out 2 fundamental pronciples which must be satisfied one that Israel has the right to live within secure boundaries. The other that the Palestinians have their legitimate rights to self-determination and that each must recognise ~~xxxx~~ the rights of the other. After all you cant demand for yourself something which you are going to deny to another people. We will try to get those things accepted by each side. Get the Israelis to accept the Palestinians right to self-determination. To get the Palestinians to accept the Israelis right to exist behind secure borders. I'm afraid we've not yet been successful in securing both of those things the difficulty is to get them happening simultaneously. I think that if I might say so that Crown Prince Fahd's 8 principles were very welcome indeed and of course one of them, I believe it was the 7th, did ~~xxx~~ recognise the right of all states in the area to exist within secure borders. And that I think was very good indeed.

Q. At the Melbourne Conference you must have discussed the situation in this area. Did you see any appreciation of Pakistan's efforts to normalise relations with~~xx~~ India

A. I am sure that Pakistan wishes to have friendly relations with India. I'm not in any doubt about that at all nor am I in any doubt that that would be in everyones interests.

Q. How do you view the security problem of Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

A. I say what I have said very many times. Every country of the world has a right to defend herself and to defend her people and must have the tools and weapons with which to do that. Pakistan is no exception and now she is right in the front line since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. I believe that Pakistan has a number of sources for the supply of weapons the United States is one. We in the past have supplied Pakistan with weapons and of course if asked to do so would obviously look at any request Pakistan

wishes to make.

Q. Hassan Akhtar, Dawn. In relation to the last question there has been some concern expressed about the xxx delay in the supply of weapons. The deliver schedule looks as if weapons might arrive too late to help Pakistan.

A. I am not aware that there has been any specific request that has not .....

Q. Interrupting..... I am not referring in relation to your country but I am speaking of the Western offer of assistance to Pakistan. I refer to the US 3.5 billion offer and perhaps to other assistance which is required. The time lag is such that it seems that by the time the aid arrived it will be too late.

A. There is always the question xfx with sophisticated arms and weapons - they cannot be produced quickly you are quite right, but I understand that the United States has given a very sympathetic hearing to Pakistan's needs and I don't think I can go further than that.

Q. PAK Times. In relation to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has this altered your Government's defence policy in relation to the south asian region.

A. My own Government is not unaware of the potential threat from the Soviet Union and the Head of my own Government was particularly aware of it so I don't think we needed to make a fresh assessment insofar as we suddenly had an extra conflict added which I might say was af an unexpected kind Iran and Iraq. In all the forecasts I think I have ever seen I do not recall having seen one in which there would be a conflict between Iran and Iraq without being part of a wider conflict. Now it happened and as I indicated in the reply to an earlier question streuous efforts were made by the whole world community to contain that that particularly group of hostilities. Those were successful and shortly afterwards the United States moves some fleet into the straits of Hormuz.

We also have some ships there and France. Now you could call that, in your appreciation of the situation, and you could also say that we perhaps have a more lively appreciation now, that one may have to act to contain hostilities in a number of parts of the world. And you will know that the question of a rapid deployment force had in fact come up long before that. But of course it would be a force, if the United States decided to go ahead with it, that could be move around the world, at the request of the host governments. So yes, in a way, I think there has been a great deal of appreciation that there can be hostilities breaking out well away from the NATO line and don't forget the NATO line has held peace in Europe for what 36 years is it now. There are a number of danger points round the world which could spread and of course all our efforts are bent on containing those. Not only for the immediate area, because its vital to them, but the rest of the world as well. That's a very extended answer, but I think you've got the general gist of it.

Q: Prime Minister you have mentioned in your opening statement . . . . .

A. Well it is part of a continuing series of visits by Ministers, one to another. We do try to do what we can to help with the refugee problem, for instance Zia has raised a number of bilateral problems with me. I will of course look into those. But you know the relationship is good. The relationship has been good, is good and will continue to be good, and that's the way we want it to be.

Q: inaudible

A: But one is always, always, always searching for a political solution. The solution to the Afghanistan problem is in fact for the Russian troops to withdraw from Afghanistan. You will say that's a military solution, in a way it is because they ought not to be there. One tries to bend all diplomatic efforts to secure that withdrawal. It is not easy. As you can have seen from the number of initiatives that have been taken that have not so far been fruitful. But that is the solution. In the meantime every country has to defend itself from potential aggressors. We do that. Almost every country in the world does it. And of course

/ one

expects Pakistan to do exactly the same thing. Indeed she already does it to a very considerable extent. But the fact that you depend to deter an aggressor does not preclude you from constantly searching for political solutions. And don't forget a large part of your defence efforts is what I call "peace-mongering". It is to deter a war. It's not war-mongering, its peace-mongering. You are much more likely to keep the peace when you can clearly be seen to be defending your own people.

Q: Madam, Prime Minister. Can you give me some examples, some solid details about bilateral matters . . .

A: Well they are comparatively small detailed matters. We had a discussion about greater world matters too.

Q: inaudible

A: Well we don't usually give detailed examples.

Q: inaudible

A: I'm afraid that's not mine. I was just having a look at it. It belongs to the person who gave it to me to have a look at. No I'm not going home with it. I think it might cause some problems.

PS to Prime Minister

ASSISTANCE FOR HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN PAKISTAN

1. General Zia, who has a handicapped child, raised this during Mr Callaghan's visit to Pakistan in January 1978. The Pakistan Ambassador in London wrote to Mr A G Hurrell of ODA in November 1979 seeking assistance in the provision of specialists. The ODA arranged for Mr David Thomas, Head of Department and Coordinator of Medical Education for Handicapped Children at Leicester Polytechnic, to visit Pakistan for three weeks in March 1980 and submit a report assessing existing facilities and requirements and making recommendations. Mr Thomas met General Zia, who later expressed his appreciation of the report.

2. The Pakistan Government wrote to the British Ambassador in Islamabad on 9 September 1980 with an uncoordinated list of specialists (also for blind, deaf, dumb and orthopaedically disabled) they hoped we could provide. ODA expressed willingness to consider this but asked first for a reaction to Mr Thomas' proposals. ODA also offered a technical consultant to tackle the first part of the work suggested by Mr Thomas (development of suitable infra-structure and detailed assessment of expatriate needs, both federal and provincial). The Pakistanis accepted that this would be sensible but, in spite of reminders from the Embassy, have not pursued the matter.

3. The Prime Minister might say to General Zia that the British Government are prepared to do what they can to help but still await from the Pakistan Government a reaction to the suggestions in Mr Thomas' report and to the ODA's suggestion that an expert might come out to assist with the implementation of the first part of that report.

W H Fullerton

W H Fullerton

8 October 1981

cc:- HE Mr O G Forster
Mr J T Masefield

CF.

This note was given to the Prime Minister by our High Commissioner in Islamabad as part of the briefing for her meeting with President Zia when she was in Pakistan in October. In the event the matter did not come up.

The Prime Minister has found the note among her private papers and has asked whether we know of any developments subsequent to her visit. Is the matter on the fire? MCS 14.i.82.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

8 October 1981

Meeting with President Zia of Pakistan

I attach a copy of the record of the meeting between the Prime Minister and President Zia of Pakistan which was held in Rawalpindi this morning.

I am sending a copy of this letter and of the record to David Omand (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

C. A. WHITMORE

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN, GENERAL ZIA UL HAQ, AND THE PRIME MINISTER, THURSDAY, 8 OCTOBER, 1981 AT 0915 HOURS

Present:-

The Prime Minister

Mr O G Forster

Mr J T Masefield

Mr C.A. Whitmore

The President, General Zia ul Haq
Lt General K M Arif, Chief of Staff to the President

Dr Attiya Inayatullah, Minister in Waiting

Mr Riaz Piracha, Foreign Secretary

Mr Ali Arshad, Pakistan Ambassador in London

Mr Asif Ezdi, Director (W. Europe) Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The President, after welcoming the Prime Minister, introduced Brigadier Niazi who gave a briefing on the military security of Pakistan.

Brigadier Niazi said that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had brought the Russian threat directly to Pakistan's borders and had created a situation in which pressure could easily be brought to bear on Pakistan. It enabled the Soviet Union to outflank both Iran and China and could give the Russians a stranglehold on the Gulf. However, Soviet difficulties were compounded by the disintegration and ineffectiveness of the Afghan army. With only 9 Soviet divisions (80-90,000 men) the Russians had no option but to increase the size of their forces. Pakistan, which was weak in military terms, had led the world reaction to the invasion and was regarded by the Soviet Union as the only obstacle in its move towards the Gulf. Pakistan therefore had to face the full blast of Soviet anger.

In this situation India saw western assistance for Pakistan as the only obstacle to the primacy it had enjoyed in the region since dismembering Pakistan in 1971. India was therefore a willing partner to the Russians and had launched a diplomatic offensive before Pakistan was able to absorb Western military help. India took an ambivalent position, offering good relations but keeping the military options open. There was growing evidence that the Indians were mounting diplomatic pressures and a subversive threat to Pakistan.

/The Russians

The Russians in Afghanistan were unlikely to be a threat to Pakistan unless they could consolidate their hold and reorganise the Afghan army on the Soviet model. Then there was a risk that Pakistan would be threatened with confrontation from both sides.

The Russians had few troops on the border between Afghanistan and Iran. In Afghanistan as a whole, in addition to the Russian troops, there were 500 Cuban troops engaged in special operations, 2 Bulgarian construction units and some East Germans and Czech personnel including doctors. (President Zia later described these numbers, which he said were confirmed by American intelligence, as a token contribution, possibly with a training element). In 1980 the Russians had occupied the Wakhan Salient, which had strategic implications for both Pakistan and China.

Pakistan's military infrastructure on its western border was seriously underdeveloped. For the first time in the country's history they had had to shift troops from the eastern frontier and deploy them permanently on the western border.

Since the Soviet invasion Afghan army casualties included more than 1,000 officers killed and over 10,000 other ranks killed. Soviet casualties included 132 officers killed and 695 other ranks killed. 24 officers had been captured. Equipment losses were also on a large scale. After 21 months the Russians had failed to achieve their objectives. On the other hand, the Freedom Fighters also had problems arising from lack of leadership, difficulty of communications between groups, and the lack of weapons for use against M124 helicopters. There were 2.4 million refugees, more than one-seventh of the Afghan population. The Russians saw these refugees as the principal source of Freedom Fighters and the main threat to their plans to dominate Afghanistan.

The Indian arms deal with the Russians in 1980 was a significant landmark. It had increased the quantum and quality of Indian force beyond its legitimate needs. It was now the fourth ranking military machine in the world. New bases, new road and rail links and new formations were "earmarked for Pakistan". Nearly 25 standard infantry divisions faced Pakistan. The bulk of the Navy was to

/ the west

the west of India. Twenty-three out of 35 fighter squadrons were in the west and these included India's high-performance aircraft such as MIG 21s and 27s and Jaguars. Low performance aircraft were being shifted to India's eastern borders.

Soviet designs fitted well into India's territorial ambitions. The Russians had now inherited Afghanistan's border claims. Pakistan could not rule out the possibility of co-ordinated action against her, and had never faced so great a defence problem.

In a short discussion after the briefing the President described the Indian briefing given to the US Representative at the UN, Mrs. Kirkpatrick, in which Pakistan's military forces had been played up and the situation in Afghanistan had been dismissed as no more than "a hue and cry raised by Pakistan". The President said he had gone out of his way to inform Mrs. Gandhi and to draw her out, but without success: the state of confrontation continued. The Prime Minister congratulated the President on the successful end to the hijacking of the Indian aircraft to Lahore. She had hoped that the successful action by the Pakistanis to end this hijack, which had worried Mrs. Gandhi at the start of the Commonwealth Meeting in Melbourne, would have helped Indo-Pakistan relations. But Mrs. Gandhi had not changed: she had an obsession that weapons supplied to Pakistan by the West would not be used against the Russians - they would in any case not be sufficient to stand up to the Russians - and would be used against India. This was a pity, as both India and Pakistan had pressing economic problems at home. The President said that Mrs. Gandhi had more problems than he did: he could only keep on trying. He had already promised to return the hijackers.

After adjourning to less formal surroundings, President Zia indicated some rays of hope in the Afghan situation. First of all, although the Russians had gone into Afghanistan for political reasons the military had not been able to carry out their objectives. Even if Soviet casualties were less than estimated, very many families, especially in the southern parts of the Soviet Union, were affected by the return of sick, wounded and dead soldiers. Already, according

/ to reports,

to reports, soldiers were asking whose war they were fighting. Finally, 15 million Afghans had not been subdued.

The Prime Minister commented that the British knew of the courage and determination of the Afghan people, but she had feared that the Soviet helicopter gunships might have given the Russians a qualitative advantage which the British had never had. However, the Freedom Fighters had even found ways of dealing with the helicopters.

The President said the situation in Afghanistan directly affected Pakistan, but since the 80,000 Soviet troops had not been able to subdue Afghanistan there was still no direct threat to Pakistan. If, however, the Russians pushed in the extra 10 divisions which were north of Afghanistan and the 10 divisions north of Iran the situation might be different. The present violations of Pakistan's border were sometimes deliberate and sometimes accidental. In answer to questions, the President thought that, although the Russians could increase their troop numbers, the lack of room for manoeuvre and the difficulty of communications would be a constraint. To some extent they were using Afghanistan as a testing ground for their latest weapons. However, Pakistan had no concrete evidence that gas was being used. General Zia had tried to get the six resistance groups to unite but they would not, and he had now given up. They were in any case doing the same job, even if some were more effective than others. The number of Freedom Fighters was increasing and was helped by the large numbers of defecting Afghan troops. The border post recently attacked in Pakistan was opposite an area where a whole battalion had defected across the border. The political situation in Afghanistan was that Babrak Karmal was a Soviet puppet who would be out 24 hours after the Russians had left. But the resistance leaders could not create a political leadership and would not allow others to do so while they were doing the fighting. However, leaders might emerge, as had happened with the Palestinians, but this would take time.

The President said that 80,000 refugees per month had crossed into Pakistan over the last 4 months. There would be fewer in the winter months, but the problem was enormous. Yet the response of the people of Pakistan had been splendid. Even the Baluch had been

/ prepared to

prepared to tolerate 600,000 more Pathan refugees from Afghanistan in Baluchistan. The effect on Pakistan's economy was considerable. They were bearing half the financial burden. They had spent the equivalent of 120 million dollars on food, clothing and shelter for the refugees. They were grateful for the help provided by Britain and other western countries but feared that the international community did not like long term problems, and this refugee problem would be long term.

Pakistan could not afford to absorb so many people. Some were engaged in work, but every Afghan was determined to go back even though their conditions were often better in Pakistan. UNHCR had rehabilitation plans to help them improve their agriculture and economy when they returned. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had also provided useful assistance. But the Government of Pakistan were still giving a small sum equivalent to £2.50 per family per month, which added up to a lot. The supply of kerosene for cooking and heating was also expensive but essential as the refugees had burnt up everything that grew within 10 miles within months of their arrival. The Soviet Ambassador had complained in 1979 that Pakistan was making life too attractive for refugees here and should put its house in order, although in 1971 the Russians had complained of the opposite when refugees left Pakistan to go into India.

The Prime Minister saw no hope in the talks between Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Haig. The Russians seemed to be in Afghanistan without knowing what to do. It was important to keep the problem before the world and not allow it to be institutionalised. The President agreed that the question of Afghanistan must not die. He agreed with the Prime Minister that the film "Afghanistan 1980" had been most effective.

Asked about Iran, the President said that Pakistan kept in touch but the country was in a confused state. There was no contact at the top. Something, however, should be done now. When President Carter had told him about plans for the Rapid Deployment Force he had said that it would be no use to prevent a take-over by the Left in Iran. The Prime Minister asked what could be done. So many people equated the two super powers. Even in Melbourne many of the

/Non-Aligned

Non-Aligned wanted to refer in equal terms to the activities of the two super powers in the Indian Ocean and she had had great difficulty in getting reference to them omitted from the communique.

President Zia said that Pakistan had spent much time and effort trying to get the Iranians to agree to a ceasefire in the war with Iraq but without success. As a former Ambassador in Tehran, Mr. Ali Arshad commented that the new Prime Minister Khomeini had been behind the students when the American Embassy was occupied. He was not necessarily a leftist although under their influence.

Bilateral

The President raised a number of bilateral points.

(a) He told the Prime Minister that Pakistan had a candidate for the International Court of Justice competing against the present Indian incumbent and 3 other Asian candidates.

(b) The Pakistanis were grateful for the help given to establish an Institute for Handicapped Children. They would like more - in particular, help with speech therapy, some equipment and teachers, and diagnostic specialists. The idea was for British experts to come to Pakistan for 6 months or so at Pakistan's expense to provide technical help to set up an Institute.

(c) Oil Exploration. Pakistan had recently found some oil and BP were involved in a joint venture in the southern part of the country. Pakistan would like similar joint ventures offshore, where they knew there was oil.

(d) Defence Collaboration. Pakistan appreciated the British military training assistance programme, but would like even more, primarily for the Navy, although the Army needed some training against chemical and biological warfare. The Prime Minister commented that military training assistance was something we could do and did well.

/(e) If Pakistan

(e) If Pakistan had the money they would approach HMG for some decommissioned ships for the Navy and some artillery guns. The Prime Minister said that in principle the Government would view such a request favourably.

(f) The President touched on the Pakistan community in the UK and agreed with the Prime Minister that they made good citizens.

(g) The President hoped that with the political situation stabilising in Pakistan there would be more inward capital flows from Britain.

(h) The President regretted the increased fees for overseas students in Britain. There were currently 700-800 Pakistanis in the UK and the number was declining, while those going to the USA were increasing (now 10,000).

(i) Pakistan had an adverse trade balance with the UK, which did not matter, but this year Pakistan would have some good quality rice to export, textiles and light engineering products. He would be grateful if these could be viewed favourably.

The Prime Minister said that she would be telling the refugees that the British Government would be contributing an extra £2 million. She was sorry it was not more, The President said that its effect would be equal to £20 million.

Finally, there was a brief discussion on the Commonwealth, on which the Prime Minister undertook to brief the President separately. In sum, there was considerable support for Pakistan's return but the discussions continued.

The meeting ended at 10.40 am.

8 October 1981

PRIME MINISTER

YOUR PRESS CONFERENCE - ARRANGEMENTS

The Press Conference is scheduled to take place at the CMLA Secretariat Auditorium beginning at 7 p.m. and lasting for forty minutes.

We understand you will be escorted either by the President or the Minister of State (Dr. Attiya Inayatulla). If the President accompanies you we expect he will remain for the Press Conference seated in the front row of the Auditorium.

The Auditorium, which is quite modern, will seat about 100. We expect it to be full. All the major international news agencies are represented here and will be present. Pravda and Tass also have bureaux here and could be present. Pakistan TV and radio will be covering it as will BBC radio. (BBC TV and ITN are unable to attend because they will be in the process of preparing to satellite to London.)

You will be seated at a table on the stage along with the Ambassador and Bernard. Bernard will introduce you and if you wish will select the questions. All the questions will be put to you in English. Questions from Pakistani journalists are likely to be diffuse and much less sharp than you might expect from Western journalists.

Apart from your talks with the President and your visit to the Border, you may well be questioned about some of the following:-

- Pakistan's readmission to the Commonwealth
- Indo/Pakistan Relations
- Pakistan's right to self defence and acquisition of arms
- British aid
- Your remarks in Kuwait about the PLO
- Possible British involvement in a Regional Defence Force
- The possibility that the troops who recently successfully dealt with an aircraft hi-jack were trained by the SAS

I attach draft opening remarks prepared by the Embassy.

8 October 1981 Ian Ingold.

Embargo: to be checked
against delivery

OPENING REMARKS FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE
AT 1900 HOURS ON THURSDAY 8 OCTOBER

I should like to start by thanking President Zia and the Government of Pakistan for their warm hospitality. I have had a full and fascinating programme for my all too brief visit to Pakistan today.

I am glad to be back here for my second visit to Pakistan. I am glad to renew my own acquaintance with the President and to continue to demonstrate the British Government's continuing support for Pakistan in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We have had close and friendly relations for many years. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has added a new dimension to that relationship. Lord Carrington has visited Pakistan twice for consultations with Mr Agha Shahi, and my visit is part of that continuing relationship. In addition, I had the pleasure of welcoming President Zia to Britain a year ago and the Foreign Minister Mr Agha Shahi has visited us on several occasions.

Now I have seen for myself the proud and brave people of Afghanistan who have been driven from their homes to seek refuge in Pakistan. Their menfolk, and their women and children, made a great impression on me. We British know their courage and determination from long ago. The Russians are now discovering it to their cost. I assured the refugees that we in Britain would work to help them return to their own villages to live in peace and freedom.

/I was also

I was also very impressed with the efforts of the Pakistan Government to look after over two million refugees in this, the largest refugee problem in the world. The work they have done together with the representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is much admired by all the free countries of the world. Again, I promised such help as we could give. And I announced the provision of an additional £2 million grant from the British Government.

At my meeting with the President this morning we discussed these problems and a wide range of subjects in which both we and the Pakistan Government have an interest. I told the President about our deliberations in Melbourne this past week. We discussed the situation in this region, and our shared interest in its stability and prosperity. I presented our views on the global threat from the Soviet Union; I stressed the importance we attach to the security and stability of the Gulf region; and I underlined the need for progress towards a solution of the Arab/Israel conflict, particularly in the light of the tragic events in Cairo.

I was very struck by the many issues on which our views are very close, although we sometimes have different perspectives. Pakistan is an Islamic Republic, a developing country and a member of the Non Aligned Movement. We respect that independence and value it. It contributed much to our discussions today.

I should now be happy to answer your questions.

pr.

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ITEM: MRS THATCHER MEETS AFGHAN REFUGEES

KHYBER PASS, PAKISTAN, 8 OCTOBER (LPS): BRITAIN'S PRIME MINISTER MRS MARGARET THATCHER STOOD TODAY ON THE THRESHHOLD OF AFGHANISTAN TERRITORY AND DECLARED: QUOTE WE SHALL NEVER ACCEPT THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN - WE SHALL NEVER GIVE UP OUR EFFORTS UNTIL SOVIET TROOPS ARE WITHDRAWN UNQUOTE.
BBR WAY BACK FROM THE COMMONWEALTH SUMMIT MEETING IN AUSTRALIA, MRS THATCHER WAS PAYINBNA ONE-DAY VISIT TO PAKISTAN IN ORDER, SHE SAID, TO SEE FOR HERSELF THE SITUATION CREATED BY THE SOVIET INVASION.

AFTER TALKS IN ISLAMABAD WITH PAKISTAN'S PRESIDENT, GENERAL ZIA UL-HAQ, THE PRIME MINISTER FLEW BY HELICOPTER TO THE FLAT DUSTY PLAIN BEYOND PESHAWAR TO A REFUGEE CAMP WHERE SOME 15,000 OF THE TWO MILLION AFGHANI REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN ARE SCATTERED IN TENTS OVER A WIDE AREA. THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY THE JOINT EFFORTS OF THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT AND THE UN HIGH COMMISSION FOR REFUGEES AND NOW REPRESENT THE WORLD'S BIGGEST SINGLE REFUGEE PROBLEM.

A CAMP OFFICIAL SAID MORE REFUGEES ARRIVE EVERY DAY - ON 000

PROBLEM.

A CAMP OFFICIAL SAID MORE REFUGEES ARRIVE EVERY DAY - ON OCCASION A WHOLE TRIBE, SOMETIMES THE POPULATION OF A VILLAGE, MORE OFTEN TRICKLES OF A DOZEN OR TWENTY.

RAPTUROUS RECEPTION

AT THE CAMP MRS THATCHER HAD A RAPTUROUS RECEPTION FROM AFGHANI TRIBAL LEADERS. THEY TOLD HER THEY HAD DECLARED A QUOTE JIHAD UNQUOTE (HOLY WAR) AGAINST THE SOVIET INVADERS AND MADE CLEAR THAT THEY NOT ONLY KNEW OF BUT THOROUGHLY APPRECIATED THE STAND BRITAIN HAD TAKEN INTERNATIONALLY IN THEIR SUPPORT.

IN HER TURN, MRS THATCHER VOICED HER ANGER THAT HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT PEOPLE WERE SUFFERING, NOT THROUGH ANY FAULT OF THEIR OWN BUT BECAUSE A SUPER-POWER HAD QUOTE INVADED YOUR COUNTRY, ASSAULTED YOUR INDEPENDENCE AND DRIVEN YOU FROM YOUR HOMES WITH AIRCRAFT AND TANKS UNQUOTE.

THE PRIME MINISTER EXPRESSED HER ADMIRATION FOR THE WAY IN WHICH AFGHANIS HAD REFUSED TO LIVE UNDER QUOTE A GODLESS COMMUNIST SYSTEM UNQUOTE WHICH WAS TRYING TO DESTROY THEIR RELIGION, THEIR WAY OF LIFE AND INDEPENDENCE.

QUOTE THE BRAVERY AND PROUD INDEPENDENCE OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE ARE LEGENDARY, UNQUOTE SHE DECLARED. QUOTE THE BRITISH PEOPLE KNOW THESE QUALITIES THROUGHOUT THEIR HISTORY AND THE SOVIET UNION IS LEARNING OF THEM TO ITS COST. THE AFGHAN PEOPLE WILL NEVER SUBMIT TO FOREIGN TYRANNY UNQUOTE.

MORE BRITISH AID

THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD THE TRIBAL CHIEFS THAT IN ORDER TO HELP THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT MAKE LIFE A LITTLE EASIER FOR THEM, BRITAIN WOULD CONTRIBUTE ANOTHER POUNDS 2 MILLION IN GRANT AID AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROGRAMME FOR RELIEF OF THE AFGHAN REFUGYEZRDE

SINCE JANUARY 1980 BRITAIN HAS GIVEN POUNDS 5.8 MILLION IN CASH, EMERGENCY SUPPLIES AND FOOD AID FOR THE REFUGEES.

AFTER VISITING THE CAMP, THE PRIME MINISTER TRAVELLED BY HELICOPTER AND CAR UP THE KHYBER PASS TO WITHIN A FEW YARDS OF THE AFGHANISTAN BORDER. AS SHE LOOKED ACROSS THE MOUNTAINOUS AEC DESOLATE LANDSCAPE, A MAN PROUDLY HANDER HER A RUSSIAN KALASHNIKOV AUTOMATIC RIFLRE WHICH HE SAID AFGHAN GUERILLAS HAD XCAPTURED FROM THE RUSSIANS.

TUMULTUOUS GREETING

WHEN THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER ARRIVED EARLY THIS MORNING SHE WAS GIVEN AN OFFICIAL RECEPTION ON A SCALE NORMALLY RESERVED

WHEN THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER ARRIVED EARLY THIS MORNING SHE WAS GIVEN AN OFFICIAL RECEPTION ON A SCALE NORMALLY RESERVED FOR HEADS OF STATE, ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATS HERE, AND A TUMULTUOUS GREETING BY THE POPULATION WHO STOOD SHOULDER TO SHOULDER TO CLAP AND CHEER HER ON EACH STAGE OF HER TOUR.

THIS MORNING MRS THANCHER HAD AN HOUR-LONG BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ZIA, DISCUSSING MAINLY AFGHANISTAN BUT ALSO A NUMBER OF BILATER ISSUES.

SHE TOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE AFTERWARDS THAT THE ANGLO-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP - CLOSE AND FRIENDLY AS IT HAD BEEN FOR MANY YEARS HAD BEEN GIVEN AND ADDED DIMENSION BY THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN.

THE EFFORTS AND GENEROSITY OF THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT IN CATERING FOR MORE THAN TWO MILLION REFUGEES WAS MUCH ADMIRED BY ALL THE FREE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, SHE DECLARED. (LPS)
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UNCLASSIFIED
FROM UKDEL MELBOURNE 080010Z OCT 81
TO F L A S H ISLAMABAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER 15 OF 8 OCT
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, NEW DELHI, ROUTINE WELLINGTON, OTTAWA, DACCA.
AND SAVING TO COLOMBO, CANBERRA.

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER.

PAKISTAN AND THE COMMONWEALTH

FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN YESTERDAY AFTERNOON BY MR FRASER AND MR RAMPHAL FOLLOWING END OF CHGM:

(MR FRASER): THERE WAS VERY INFORMAL DISCUSSION AMONG SOME LEADERS ON THE GENERAL QUESTION OF RE-ADMISSION TO THE COMMONWEALTH. THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS WILL BE KEEPING IN TOUCH ON THAT PARTICULAR MATTER.

QUESTION: MR FRASER, YOU MENTIONED THAT THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSION BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENT ON RE-ADMISSION INTO THE COMMONWEALTH, AND THAT THIS MATTER WOULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. WAS THIS SIMPLY DISCUSSION ABOUT PROCEDURES TO BE ADOPTED OR WAS THE POSSIBLE RE-ADMISSION OF PAKISTAN RAISED WITH MRS GANDHI? COULD YOU ELABORATE, PLEASE?
MR FRASER: I CAN ELABORATE A LITTLE BIT BUT NOT VERY MUCH. IT WAS NOT JUST A QUESTION OF PROCEDURES, THERE WAS ALSO A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE, BUT NO DECISIONS WERE MADE. THE DECISION IS AS STATED: TO KEEP IN TOUCH ON THE MATTER.
QUESTION: YES, BUT WAS THE QUESTION OF PAKISTAN'S POSSIBLE RE-ADMISSION RAISED WITH MRS GANDHI?
MR FRASER: YES, THE QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WAS RAISED, BUT IT WAS NOT A QUESTION OF YESES OR NOES BEING ASKED OR GIVEN. THERE WAS NOT A QUESTION OF THAT: IT WAS A QUESTION OF DISCUSSION: IT WAS A QUESTION OF MAKING UP OUR MINDS TO KEEP IN TOUCH ON THE PARTICULAR MATTER.
QUESTION: COULD YOU TELL US WHICH COUNTRIES RAISED THIS QUESTION WITH MRS GANDHI?
MR FRASER: WELL, IT WAS ALL DONE IN PRIVATE SESSION, NOT IN OPEN SESSION, I THINK MOSTLY BILATERALLY, AND I THINK IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO MENTION WHICH COUNTRIES WERE IN FACT - - - I WOULD NOT KNOW THE LIST ANYWAY. I KNOW SOME BUT I HAVE GOT NO DOUBT THERE WERE OTHERS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING COLOMBO, CANBERRA.

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FM ISLAMABAD 081530Z OCT 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 512 OF 8TH OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY NEW DELHI, ROUTINE WASHINGTON AND UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING MOSCOW, KABUL, EC POSTS, CANBERRA, OTTAWA AND PEKING.

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN

1. AFTER A FULL CEREMONIAL WELCOME AT THE AIRPORT MRS THATCHER BEGAN HER ONE-DAY VISIT TO PAKISTAN WITH ONE AND A HALF HOURS DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT ZIA. THIS OPENED WITH A MILITARY BRIEFING ON THE THREAT TO PAKISTAN'S SECURITY.

2. THE PAKISTANIS ESTIMATED THAT, IN ADDITION TO THE 80-90,000 SOVIET TROOPS, THERE WERE 500 CUBAN TROOPS, 2 BULGARIAN CONSTRUCTION UNITS AND SOME EAST GERMANS AND CZECHS IN AFGHANISTAN. THEY HAD NO EVIDENCE THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS. PRESIDENT ZIA WAS AFRAID THAT WITH THE RUSSIANS BOGGED DOWN IN AFGHANISTAN THE MASSIVE REFUGEE PROBLEM IN PAKISTAN WOULD CONTINUE AND WESTERN ASSISTANCE, WHICH HAD BEEN PROMPT AND VALUED, WOULD TAIL OFF. HE AGREED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER THAT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO KEEP AFGHANISTAN IN THE FOREFRONT OF THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA.

3. THE POSSIBLE THREAT FROM INDIA WAS BRACKETED WITH SOVIET DESIGNS AND PAKISTAN'S FEAR OF CO-ORDINATED ACTION AGAINST HER. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID SHE HAD HOPED THAT THE PROMPT AND SUCCESSFUL PAKISTAN REACTION TO THE HIJACK OF AN INDIAN PLANE, WHICH HAD WORRIED MRS GANDHI AT THE START OF THE MELBOURNE CONFERENCE, WOULD HAVE HAD A GOOD EFFECT ON INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS. UNFORTUNATELY MRS GANDHI'S ATTITUDE HAD NOT CHANGED. THE PRESIDENT WAS ALSO GLOOMY, BUT SAID HE WOULD CONTINUE TO TRY. HE HAD MADE AN IMMEDIATE PROMISE TO RETURN THE HIJACKERS.

4. THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT BRITAIN WOULD BE CONTRIBUTING ANOTHER POUNDS 2 MILLION FOR REFUGEE RELIEF. GENERAL ZIA WELCOMED THIS, SAYING IT WOULD BE WORTH POUNDS TWENTY MILLION.

5. IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION ABOUT IRAN THE PAKISTANIS SAID THEY TRIED TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH TEHRAN BUT THEY HAD NO CONTACT AT THE TOP. THEY THOUGHT PRIME MINISTER KHAMEINI, WHO HAD BEEN BEHIND THE STUDENTS WHEN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY WAS OCCUPIED, WAS NOT NECESSARILY A LEFTIST, ALTHOUGHT UNDER THEIR INFLUENCE.

6. PRESIDENT ZIA ASKED ABOUT THE COMMONWEALTH. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN'S RETURN BUT DISCUSSIONS CONTINUED.

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7. THE PRESIDENT DID NOT HAND OVER ANY LIST OF DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS, BUT SAID THAT IF PAKISTAN HAD THE MONEY THEY WOULD APPROACH HMG FOR SOME DECOMMISSIONED RN SHIPS AND SOME ARTILLERY GUNS. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT IN PRINCIPLE THE GOVERNMENT WOULD VIEW SUCH A REQUEST FAVOURABLY.

8. AMONG OTHER BILATERAL POINTS RAISED AT THE END OF THE MEETING THE PRESIDENT ASKED FOR MORE MILITARY TRAINING ASSISTANCE, JOINT VENTURES TO SEARCH FOR OFFSHORE OIL, INCREASED CAPITAL INFLOWS FROM THE UK, AND TECHNICAL HELP TO SET UP AN INSTITUTE FOR HANDICAPPED CHILDREN. HE REGRETTED THE INCREASED FEES FOR OVERSEAS STUDENTS IN BRITAIN, AND HOPED THAT BRITAIN WOULD REACT FAVOURABLY TO PAKISTAN'S EFFORTS TO EXPORT MORE GOOD-QUALITY RICE, TEXTILES AND LIGHT ENGINEERING PRODUCTS.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING MOSCOW, KABUL, EC POSTS, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, AND PEKING.

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FM ISLAMABAD 060615Z OCT 81
TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL MELBOURNE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 9 OF 6TH OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO

FOR ALEXANDER
PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ZIA

1. PAKISTANIS HAVE NOW DECIDED TO HAVE OTHERS PRESENT AT THE PRELIMINARY TETE-A-TETE. ON THEIR SIDE THERE WILL BE RIAZ PIRACHA, FOREIGN SECRETARY (I.E. PUS), ALI ARSHAD, PAKISTAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON, AND GENERAL AREF, PRINCIPAL STAFF OFFICER TO PRESIDENT. WE ARE SIMILARLY OFFERED THREE ADDITIONAL PLACES - PRESUMABLY MYSELF AND WHO ELSE WOULD YOU LIKE? THE OTHERS WOULD WAIT OUTSIDE IN THE CABINET ROOM AND WE WOULD GET INTO A BIGGER MEETING IN DUE COURSE, THOUGH IT NOW LOOKS AS IF THE MAIN PART OF THE BUSINESS MAY BE DONE AT THE SMALL MEETING.

2. PAKISTANIS HAVE NO SET AGENDA IN MIND AND THINK THAT PRESIDENT WILL WANT TO RANGE OVER THE WHOLE EXTERNAL FIELD, FOCUSSING PARTICULARLY ON THE MELBOURNE MEETING, THE AFGHANISTAN SITUATION, INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS AND US/PAKISTAN RELATIONS. AFTER SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS, HE WILL ASK PRIME MINISTER TO LEAD OFF AND WILL PROBABLY SUGGEST THAT SHE TELLS THEM WHAT HAPPENED AT MELBOURNE. EVEN IF HE DOES NOT SUGGEST IT, THIS WOULD PROBABLY BE THE MOST APPROPRIATE FIRST SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION SINCE IT IS UPPERMOST IN THE PAKISTANIS' MINDS. THEY WOULD HOPE FOR A FRANK ACCOUNT OF WHAT HAPPENED ON THE

QUESTION OF RE-ADMISSION OF PAKISTAN AND A MORE GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE OTHER DECISIONS TAKEN AT MELBOURNE. FORMER WILL INEVITABLY INVOLVE A DISCUSSION OF MRS GANDHI'S ATTITUDES AND WILL PROBABLY LEAD INTO A DISCUSSION OF INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH THEY WILL PROBABLY WANT OUR ASSESSMENT OF WHAT THE INDIANS ARE UP TO. AFGHANISTAN COULD APPROPRIATELY FOLLOW NEXT, LEADING TO A DISCUSSION ABOUT US/PAKISTAN RELATIONS AND ABOUT US POLICY GENERALLY IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD. THIS WOULD TAKE US INTO THE MIDDLE EAST GENERALLY, ARAB/ISRAEL, THE GULF, IRAN AND THE IRAN/-IRAQ WAR.

3. THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO HAVE MUCH TO RAISE ON BILATERAL ISSUES, WHICH WILL PROBABLY COME UP AT THE WIDER MEETING (OR LATER IN THE DAY). IF THEY ARE GOING TO HAND OVER A LIST OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT NEEDED FROM US IT WOULD PROBABLY BE AT THAT POINT, THOUGH IT MIGHT COME UP AT THE SMALLER MEETING, AND MIGHT BE FOLLOWED BY A BRIEF DISCUSSION ON AID AND TRADE. THEY MAY AT SOME STAGE REFER TO THE FAILURE OF THE OTTAWA 7 TO ACT OVER ARIANA FLIGHTS FROM AFGHANISTAN. THE RIOTS IN THE UK MAY BE MENTIONED, ALSO THE ACTIVITIES OF PAKISTAN EXILES IN THE UK. THEY ARE LESS SENSITIVE THAN THE INDIANS ON IMMIGRATION QUESTIONS, BUT MAY TOUCH ON THEM.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
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INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL MELBOURNE (FOR PS), ROUTINE KABUL AMND
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DELHI.

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AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN.

1. PAKISTAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ANNOUNCED ON 4 OCTOBER THAT TWO AFGHAN MIG-17 AIRCRAFT INTRUDED INTO PAKISTAN AIRSPACE AT 1150 AM LOCAL ON 4 OCTOBER AND REMAINED IN THE REGION OF THE DOMANDI BORDER POST FOR 20 MINUTES. THE AIRCRAFT CIRCULED THE POST 5 TIMES AND ON THE FIFTH RUN STRAFED THE POST BEFORE RETURNING TO AFGHANISTAN PAKISTANI GROUND TROOPS ARE SACD TO HAVE TAKEN NECESSARY PREVENTIVE MEASURES (UNSPECIFIED) AND NO DAMAGE WAS CAUSED TO THE POST.

2. THIS IS THE SAME BORDER POST AT WHICH CIVILIANS WERE INJURED AND STRUCTURAL DAMAGE WAS CAUSED DURING A SCMILAR INCURSION ON 5 SEPTEMBER. (MY TELNO 430 NOT TO ALL).

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
UKDEL NATO, DELHI.

FORSTER
BT

NNNN

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CONFIDENTIAL

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~~Refer to Miss Noble~~
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MYTEL 504 AND TELECON MISS NOBLE/FABIAN: AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN

1. THE INCURSION OF 4 OCTOBER WAS IN BALUCHISTAN IN THE AREA USED BY HAZARAS (CENTRAL AFGHANISTAN TRIBESMEN) TO GO BACK AND FORTH ACROSS THE BORDER. LAST YEAR THERE WERE SEVERAL INCURSIONS INTO THE NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE INCLUDING ONE SHOOTING-UP OF A PAKISTAN BORDER POST. HOWEVER, SUCH INCURSION HAVE ALWAYS BEEN CAREFULLY CONTROLLED BY THE AFGHANS/RUSSIANS. I SEE NO REASON TO RECOMMEND CHANGE IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S PROGRAMME.

FORSTER

NNNN

File

D59

24 September 1981

I enclose a copy of a letter which we have received from the Director of Metap Trading and Contracting Limited. I have told Mr. Brown that his letter will be taken into account in the Prime Minister's briefing. If there are any points which you would like us to pursue, perhaps you could let me know in Melbourne. You may also like to send a more detailed reply to Mr. Brown.

MODBA

John Rhodes, Esq.,
Department of Trade.

File

24 September 1981

Thank you for your letter of 16 September. I shall ensure that it is taken into account in the Prime Minister's briefing for her visit to Pakistan.

MOBA

Wing Commander B. Brown, O.B.E. (RAF Retd.)

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~930 7022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 6/13

24th September 1981

Dear Michael,

You wrote to me yesterday asking for advice on the brief on possible Tornado sales to Pakistan, which John Wilkinson MP forwarded to the Prime Minister. To judge from the typeface Mr Wilkinson is right in saying that it originated from PANAVIA.

Our advice is that this is certainly not an issue which should be specifically raised. We are not aware of any Pakistani interest, nor is this surprising in view of the impending purchase of F16s through the US military aid package. PANAVIA may talk of Tornado complementing the F16, but if Pakistan is in the market for further aircraft, additional purchases of F16 are much more likely, particularly in view of the considerable price difference. Given these remote prospects it would be unwise to jeopardise our efforts to keep alive Indian interest in Tornado and RB199, which is a difficult enough task given the sensibilities of our FRG partners, and would be more difficult if the Indians thought we were seeking to interest Pakistan as well. If the Pakistanis raise the question of Tornado the Prime Minister is advised to note their potential interest and to say that she will look into the matter.

Other briefing on defence sales for Pakistan has separately been submitted. I am copying this letter to Francis Richards.

Yours sincerely

Nick Evans.

(N H R EVANS)

M O'D B Alexander Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

CCFCO

HU

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 September 1981

Further to our conversation a few moments ago, I enclose a brief on possible sales of Tornado to Pakistan which has been forwarded to the Prime Minister by John Wilkinson, M.P. According to Mr. Wilkinson the brief has been supplied by Panavia.

You said that you would let me have comments together with any other briefing on defence sales for Pakistan that you intend to submit, in good time tomorrow.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Francis Richards (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

N.H.R. Evans, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

THIS IS IMPORTANT.

?. L.
22/9/81

Private & Confidential

21st September, 1981

Tornado - Pakistan

Thank you very much for your letter of 18th September, together with its enclosure.

I am most grateful to you for having taken the trouble to write about this.

Thank you, too, for your good wishes for my forthcoming visit to Pakistan.

I look forward to seeing you in Blackpool.

John Wilkinson, Esq. M.P.
House of Commons,
Westminster, London SW1

CONFIDENTIAL.

From John Wilkinson M.P.

Rt. Hon. M. Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London S.W.1.

18th September, 1981

Dear Prime Minister,

In view of your forthcoming visit to Pakistan I thought you might welcome the enclosed brief from Panavia about the possibility of selling the Tornado aircraft to the Pakistan Air Force.

There have been indications that the Pakistan Air Force could be interested in the aeroplane, and in view of the political and strategic ramifications the brief could be helpful if the subject is raised. I hope your trip goes well. I'm so glad you're to visit a refugee camp on the Frontier.

Yours ever
John

TORNADO FOR PAKISTAN

The events in Afghanistan and Iran have focussed attention on the military preparedness of a number of countries in the Middle East, particularly Pakistan. The Pakistan Armed Forces urgently need re-equipping with new weaponry, particularly new aircraft. This was recognised by America and Saudi Arabia and they have offered Pakistan considerable aid. In the case of America this military aid amounts to 3 billion dollars; Saudi Arabia has offered 1.5 billion dollars. Pakistan has therefore been shopping for a number of items. In the case of the Air Force they have been looking at the F16. The aircraft has been evaluated by Pakistani pilots in the United States and they have given it a clean bill of health. Negotiations appear to have reached an advanced stage but they may have run into difficulties connected with President Zia's intention to extract as much as he can from the Americans in exchange, perhaps, for the establishment of American bases or facilities in the country. However, it is still likely that these negotiations will be brought to a successful conclusion before the end of the year. But as the Pakistanis are only looking for some 30 F16s it would appear that even if they make other arms purchases there will still be enough aid left over for the purchase of other aircraft.

There have been no official contacts with the Pakistan Government concerning a possible TORNADO sale. However, a number of reports indicate that the Air Force is interested in the aircraft and would like a formal briefing in the near future. This interest is by no means inconsistent with the negotiations connected with the F16 since TORNADO would complement the F16 due to its much higher capability.

The interest of the Pakistan Air Force however poses a number of delicate problems from the political point of view. British Aerospace, PANAVIA's UK partner company, has long standing business interests in India and the Indian Air Force has also shown interest in the TORNADO. The main competitor here would be the French Dassault Mirage 2000. Whilst discussion on TORNADO with the Pakistan government may increase Indian interest in the aircraft there is obviously a danger that they could also damage British Aerospace's interests in India.

An attractive solution would be for the UK to continue to push TORNADO in India and for one of the other partner nations to follow up the Pakistan interest. However, despite the current German review of their export policy it is unliikely that they would be prepared to undertake any lead function in Pakistan, particularly in view of Pakistan's uneasy relations with India and the undoubted increase in capability that would result from the supply of the TORNADO. In addition the German aerospace industry also has established links with India and have provided India with technical assistance in the design of their own aircraft.

From the technical and operational point of view, TORNADO is well suited to Pakistans's national requirements. The other possible contenders in addition to the F16 would probably be the F18 and the Mirage 2000. In comparison with the other 3 aircraft TORNADO has overwhelming advantages for the Pakistan Air Force. For example, it is the only aircraft which has a two man crew, it has the highest payload, it has the best radius of action at low level, it has the best loiter time, it is the only aircraft with terrain following radar but more importantly it is the only aircraft capable of 24 hours a day, all-weather operation in the air to surface attack roles.

TORNADO is currently highly competitive, in terms of price, its unit flyaway price in 1980 dollars is at present about $14.5 Mio, 20% cheaper than the F18, about 10% more expensive then the Mirage 2000 and about 25% more expensive than the F16. With its greater capability than the F16 and Mirage 2000 it is highly cost effective.

From the industrial point of view a gentle encouragement of any interest shown by the Pakistan government would be, on balance desirable, but the political situation is undoubtedly of overriding importance.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 September 1981

p/w my briefs.

Dear Michael,

Prime Minister's Visit to Pakistan

In my letter of 18 September I undertook to let you have drafts for the two speeches which the Prime Minister is expected to make during her visit to Pakistan. These are enclosed.

In considering the drafts, there are a few points which you may wish to bear in mind:

a) The procedure at the refugee camp (the Pakistani Government have not yet told us which of the camps they envisage the Prime Minister visiting) will probably follow what has become a standard pattern for distinguished visitors. A gathering of perhaps several hundred refugees will be assembled by their leaders, seated in the open air. The Prime Minister is likely to be seated on a dais together with some of her party and a representative of the Pakistani Government who will organise and introduce the proceedings. One of the refugee leaders will make a shortish (5 - 10 minutes) speech which may be preceded by a prayer. The speech is likely to be in emotional terms and may well include a general appeal for the supply of advanced weapons to the Afghan resistance. The enclosed draft says nothing specifically on the latter point. The audience will probably not expect it. The Pakistani Government would not want a specific reference to this question in public, since it is one of considerable delicacy for them. The draft otherwise attempts to take into account the emotional, though in no way difficult, atmosphere which has surrounded similar visits to refugee camps in the past.

/b) The other

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b) The other speech requires less comment, being a more standard event. It may be desirable to include in it a reference to the question of Pakistan's membership of the Commonwealth but that must depend on any discussion of that issue at Melbourne.

Yours ever,

Frances Richards.

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

DRAFT SPEECH FOR REFUGEE CAMP

I listened to you with mounting feelings of sadness and anger.

Sadness because I meet you all here, in a refugee camp in Pakistan, instead of your own homes in Afghanistan.

Sadness because of what you have lost - your homes, your fields, your possessions, your way of life.

Anger because so many hundreds of thousands of innocent people - parents and children, old and young - are suffering. Not through any fault of your own but because a super-power has invaded your country, assaulted your independence and driven you from your homes with aircrafts and tanks.

But I listened too with admiration. You left your country because you refused to live under a godless communist system which is trying to destroy your religion and your independence. The hearts of the free world are with you - and with those of your countrymen who have stayed behind in Afghanistan.

The bravery and proud independence of the Afghan people are legendary. The British people know these qualities through their history. The Soviet Union has come to know them too in these last two years. Surely they now realise what we already knew. The Afghan people will never submit to foreign tyranny. They will fight to the end until the invader is expelled from Afghanistan.

We are doing our best, as are other friendly countries, to help the Pakistan Government to make life easier for you during this difficult period. Today I am making available another two million pounds of aid as a contribution to the refugee relief programme. We in Britain will continue to help you in every way we can.

/But

But helping you live here is no substitute for trying to help~~ing~~ you to return to your own homes to live in peace and freedom - in your own villages - among your own people. That we shall also try to do. We shall continue, together with Pakistan, the Islamic Conference, the non-aligned movement, with the vast majority of the world's countries, to work for a solution to the problems brought about by the invasion of your country.

~~We shall not give up. We shall go on until the last Soviet soldier leaves your country, until you can return safely to your homes and until you are again free to choose your government and your way of life.~~

I hope that we shall not have to meet here again. I want the next time we meet to be in free and independent Afghanistan. I shall work, hope and pray for that day.

DRAFT SPEECH FOR PRESIDENT'S DINNER

Mr President

I thank you most warmly for your hospitality. The crowded and ~~and for the~~ ~~excellent~~ fascinating programme which you ~~was~~ arranged for me was some compensation ~~for my regrettably too~~ ~~short visit~~. for my all too brief visit to your marvellous country.

I wanted to ~~visit~~ revisit Pakistan, partly because you ~~so~~ kindly invited me to do so, partly because I wished to return the visit, ~~alas~~ itself too short, which you paid to London about a year ago.

~~But~~ I also wanted to come because Britain and Pakistan have important things to do together. Trade, certainly. I hope it will expand faster. Cultural ties are important too - there is so much in our shared history which links us. But over and above these we have a shared interest in the stability and prosperity of this strategically crucial area. And a shared interest in confronting the situation which has ~~been brought about by the invasion of one of your neighbours by a super-power.~~ arisen in Afghanistan.

Mr President, this last point was, rightly, the central issue in the very valuable talks which I have had with you today, and the central focus of my programme. I have now seen for myself the situation on your North-West frontier. I have seen some of the two-and-a-half million refugees. And I ~~am~~ have been moved

- by the sheer size of this humanitarian problem;
- by the suffering of the innocent people involved;
- by the efforts of your country and its helpers to care for them.

As I told refugee leaders earlier today I am not only moved but angry. They and their people are suffering needlessly, through the mistakes actions of a ~~country which has pressed~~ neighbour pursuing pursued its interests ~~and ambitions ruthlessly and~~ careless of the consequences. ~~thereby creating the greatest refugee problem in the world~~.

/This

This situation can be changed. And it must be, in the interests of the Afghan people, of Pakistan, of this sub-continent and of the peoples of the world. For what has happened on your borders is not a local affair - it is a global event with global implications. East/West relations cannot be normalised, with all that would mean for the stability of Europe, Asia and beyond, without a settlement of the problem of Afghanistan.

Mr President, the government and people of Pakistan saw this from the beginning. You accepted that a historic responsibility had been thrust upon you, a responsibility to cope with and manage this situation not just in the interests of Pakistan, but in the interests of the international community. It is for that reason, among others, that Pakistan deserves the support of Britain and of all the nations of the world who are genuinely interested in bringing about the withdrawal of Soviet troops ~~the Russian invasion to an end~~.

On behalf of Britain, let me confirm to you - Pakistan has our support. As Prime Minister of the country which at present holds the Presidency of the European Community, I can say too that the ten member states of that Community support you. We admire deeply the courage and skill you have shown in handling the crisis. We admire and support the attachment you have steadfastly shown to the four principles laid down by the Islamic Conference:

- withdrawal of the Soviet troops;
- the restoration of Afghanistan's non-aligned status;
- the honourable return of the refugees to their country;
- the right of the Afghan people to choose their own form of government in peace.

If we all stand firm on these principles the day ~~must~~ will come when ~~your~~ our efforts ~~will~~ succeed. That will be an important day in world history.

/ Mr President

Mr President, our relations are necessarily dominated by this problem at present. But the ties between Britain and Pakistan long pre-date the problem and will certainly survive it, probably stronger and richer because of it. We fully respect the non-aligned status of Pakistan and seek no ties which contradict that status. But it is the wish of both our countries, confirmed again in our talks today, that we should maintain a close and friendly relationship. The United Kingdom will therefore continue to be receptive to the wishes, the aspirations and problems of Pakistan. We shall continue to seek ways of giving Pakistan practical support in its present difficult circumstances. And we shall look forward to, and work for, the day when, released from the pressures of the present international situation, your country can concentrate fully on the task of promoting the ~~economic and social~~ progress of its people.

I thank you again for this full and memorable day and wish you, the government and people of Pakistan all success and prosperity for the future.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 September 1981

p/w my briefs.

Dear Michael,

Prime Minister's Visit to Pakistan

I attach a note on the senior staff at the Embassy at Islamabad for the information of the Prime Minister.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN : 8 OCTOBER 1981

BRITISH EMBASSY, ISLAMABAD

NOTES ON SENIOR STAFF

Mr O G Forster CMG MVO (Oliver)	Senior Grade H M Ambassador. Aged 56. Arrived 12/7/79 Married (Beryl). Two daughters Formerly Minister in New Delhi. A calm, competent officer who is popular with his staff and runs a happy post.
Mr J T Masefield (Thorold)	Grade 4 Counsellor, Head of Chancery and Consul-General Aged 42. Arrived 11/10/79 on promotion to Grade 4. Married (Jenny). Two sons, one daughter. A first-class officer and excellent staff manager, doing a very good job in Islamabad
Mr W H Fullerton (Bill)	Grade 4 Counsellor (Economic and Commercial) Aged 42. Arrived 31/5/80. Married to an American wife (Arlene) Cheerful, relaxed and enterprising officer. An Arabist who is interested in the Islamic world and enjoys Pakistan.
Brigadier W C Deller OBE (Bill)	Defence and Military Attaché. Aged 53. Arrived May 1980. Married (Deidre). One daughter Ebullient extravert. Previously served in Cairo

September 1981

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 September 1981

P/W briefs
cc. Mr Whitmore
+ Self

Dear Michael,

Visit by the Prime Minister to Pakistan

One important issue which could arise during the Prime Minister's visit to Pakistan on 8 October is that of arms sales. It has been necessary to delay the brief on this subject because of recent developments which are described below. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes that the Prime Minister will wish to have separate advice on this subject. If Mrs Thatcher is content with Lord Carrington's advice in this letter, a brief will be prepared accordingly.

The Pakistan government were pleased by the Prime Minister's statements, during her visit to India, about Pakistan's right to acquire them for its defence. It is therefore prudent to assume that President Zia will raise the issue and may seek to give it some prominence in public presentation of the visit. With this in mind officials earlier prepared a list of equipment which the United Kingdom would be willing to sell to Pakistan, with the thought that the Prime Minister might give this to Zia on a confidential basis as a demonstration of our support for Pakistan.

Given that, one way or another, the existence of any list, or the fact that the Prime Minister had discussed arms supplies with Zia, are likely to become publicly known, we have had much in mind the possible impact on our relations with India. Indo/Pakistani relations have deteriorated in recent months. The Indians have expressed serious concern about the implications for stability in the area of the lengthy negotiations, which have just been concluded, between Pakistan and the United States, on a major aid and arms package, including the sale of F-16 aircraft. They are also concerned that Pakistan's nuclear programme is likely to develop to the point (not before late 1982 by our assessment, though the Indians may be more pessimistic) where Pakistan has the capability to test a nuclear device. Given the current Indian mood about Pakistan, we believe that the risk of our interests in India being adversely affected by arms sales discussions with Pakistan has to be taken seriously.

In particular, as you know, the latest indications are that the Indian Government may take a decision soon on the very valuable coastal steel plant contract and that they may well award it to the Davy-led consortium. Although we have had such predictions before, and may still have to live with the uncertainty

/for

for some time, it would clearly be foolish to prejudice our prospects by allowing the Indians to think that we are engaged in negotiating with the Pakistanis a major arms package containing controversial equipment, particularly since there has long been considerable doubt whether Pakistan has the funds to purchase significant equipment from us.

A recent development has made the problem somewhat easier. On 14 September the Pakistani Vice-Chief of the General Staff gave us the list of equipment in the annex to this letter which he said they would like to purchase from the UK. He said that Zia might raise the list with the Prime Minister during her visit. But he sought our initial reactions since he did not wish to include items which HMG might subsequently refuse to supply.

The items in the list are nearly all uncontroversial. With one exception we have been discussing them with the Pakistanis for some time. They do not involve new technology nor do we think the Indian Government could regard them as provocative. The exception is the final item - electronic warfare equipment. More specific information will be needed from the Pakistanis before we and the MOD can evaluate whether there are political or security objections to supply.

It is not certain that Zia will hand the Prime Minister this list. He has had a good deal of difficulty with the Indians over the American negotiations referred to above and may not want to start fresh controversy so soon. (The items on the list are of course very small beer compared with the US package, but in the present climate in the sub-continent that is not necessarily how they would be regarded by eg the Indian press.) Furthermore, there can in any case be no certainty that any list he hands over will correspond exactly to the one we already have, which seems to represent entirely a Pakistan army bid and does not include any of the naval or airforce equipment which we have been discussing with Pakistan.

In the light of all these factors Lord Carrington advises that if Zia gives the Prime Minister a list, Mrs Thatcher should say that we remain prepared to sell Pakistan arms, that we shall examine the list rapidly and that a reply will be given quickly. We believe that it would be unwise to go further, both because we shall need to analyse carefully the type and quantity of equipment requested (the present list is defective on both counts) and because it will be best to take stock of our relations with India again before giving a firm commitment to sell to Pakistan. If this is agreed, the Embassy in Islamabad will be instructed to tell the Pakistan VCGS that we would expect the Prime Minister to react favourably in principle to a list on the lines of that in the annex and that, subject to further discussion of details, none of the items appear to present difficulty.

/There

There remains the question of whether we should say anything to the Indians in advance, to contain any unfavourable reaction on their part. Lord Carrington advises that the Prime Minister should take the opportunity of her meeting with Mrs Gandhi in Melbourne to explain that she will be visiting Pakistan briefly on 8 October, principally to discuss the Afghanistan situation, that we think it possible that the question of arms supplies will arise, that it is not true (as the India press have suggested) that she will be taking a list of arms that we are prepared to sell and that from what we know of Pakistan's intentions it is most unlikely that they will seek from us any equipment of a controversial nature. We are in any case fully prepared to sell to India equipment of the same kind - and a good deal more, as is clear from current discussions with them in this field (a supplementary brief for Melbourne will spell out the latter point).

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

ANNEX

(a) Cymbeline Mortar Locating Radar

(b) 105mm Light Gun

(c) Blowpipe

(d) (Vickers T-59 Tank Improvement Package

(e) Class-60 Tank Access Trackway

(f) Class-30 Assault Trackway

(g) Combat Engineer Tractor

(h) Medium Girder Bridge

(j) Electronic warfare counter measures package to include HF and VHF search and surveillance receivers, HF and VHF DF stations, HF and VHF jammers and an EW collection, analysis and control system.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 September 1981

Dear Michael,

I enclose copies of two despatches from HM Ambassador in Islamabad which the Prime Minister may wish to see before she arrives in Pakistan on 8 October. They deal respectively with the viability of Pakistan as a state and the stability of the Zia regime.

We suggest that the despatches be regarded as background reading at this stage. We propose to use them as the basis for a careful study of the prospects of the current regime in Pakistan and of the implications for British policy. This will take a little time but the despatches are clearly of considerable topical interest in the context of the Prime Minister's visit and we thought you would wish to have them without waiting for the conclusions of our study.

A brief has of course already been prepared for the Prime Minister's use on the internal situation in Pakistan. We see no need to change it.

I am copying this letter and its enclosures to David Wright in the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

014/2

SUMMARY

HOW VIABLE IS PAKISTAN?

1. Pakistan's importance to Britain and the West arises from its position next door to Afghanistan and the consequences of the Russian invasion of that country (paras 1 and 2). What are Pakistan's chances of survival?

2. Pakistan began life as a geographical anomaly. The separation of Bangladesh may have been no bad thing. Pakistan has defensible borders, and its ethnic and regional differences, though deep, do not seem stronger than the sense of nationhood, incomplete though it may be (paras 3 to 6). The Baluchistan problem is manageable (para 7). Even the influx of Afghan refugees has a local rather than national impact (para 8).

3. External threats to Pakistan have played a major role in the unifying process (para 9). Islam was its raison d'être and remains the most powerful single internal force for stability. But Islam in Pakistan is moderated by various historical and cultural factors, and the mullahs are not the force they are, e.g. in Iran. The Shias occasionally display their differences, but neither they nor the far smaller other religious minorities constitute any real threat to national integrity (para 10).

4. The economy is basically agricultural. Pakistan can, short of major disaster, feed itself. Poverty of the Indian type is absent. Lack of minerals and oil mean much development aid and long-term indebtedness. Remittances continue for the time being from Pakistanis overseas, but inflation is rising, and there are the problems common to all Third World countries (paras 11 to 13).

5. On balance, Pakistan is here to stay (para 14).

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY
ISLAMABAD

13 September 1981

014/2

The Rt Hon
The Lord Carrington KCMG MC

My Lord

HOW VIABLE IS PAKISTAN?

1. Until December 1979 Pakistan was probably not of major importance to British interests or to Western strategy. It occupied a strategic position near the entrance to the Persian Gulf and was part of the containing front against a southward spread of Russian and Communist power that the West sought to build up through CENTO and SEATO. But countries like Iran and Turkey were more important components of this front and were in more important strategic positions. It was an artificial creation, inherently unstable with its two widely separated wings, and subject to what looked like chronic internal unrest. Much of its energy and resources were consumed in implacable opposition to India which had resulted in three wars between the two countries.

2. The Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the near simultaneous collapse of Iran altered the picture considerably. The southern frontier of the free world against Russian expansion towards the Gulf began to look very vulnerable indeed and Pakistan was suddenly projected into the front line of the free world. The frontiers of the Russian empire had advanced from the Oxus to the Khyber, something which successive British Governments had worked hard to prevent throughout the second half of the 19th century. The immediate Western objective of securing a

/Russian

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Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan became largely dependent on Pakistan cooperation and willingness to stand firm. If this objective was not achieved then Pakistan would have to take the place of Afghanistan as a buffer state against a further Russian expansion southeast-wards. Whether the Russians intended to expand further in that direction might be open to question, but on past form it would clearly become a Russian objective to convert Pakistan into an amenable ally if not a client state; at any rate, as in Afghanistan, the Russians could be relied upon not to miss any opportunity which a weakened Pakistan might present of furthering their aims. So to an extent, the global balance in this part of the world has come to depend on the future stability of Pakistan and, since it may take a long time to restore the status quo and to consolidate that balance, this stability may have to stand up to a prolonged period of pressure. This and the following despatch attempt to examine Pakistan's ability to face a long haul.

3. In this despatch I will consider the integrity of Pakistan - whether it is likely to survive as a nation. In the following despatch I will look at its internal political stability. In considering the stability of Pakistan, we need constantly to bear in mind the wise words of Sir Anthony Parsons on the debacle in Iran: "No third world regime is stable in our sense of the word. It only maintains a greater or lesser degree of tranquillity. Almost all third world regimes rest on the loyalty of their Armed Forces, not on their popularity." Pakistan is a

/Third

Third World country which has been in existence for 34 years only and, like most of the former British Empire, is to an extent an artificial creation. It is misleading to judge its stability against the standards of the older nation-states with their ethnic homogeneity, their historically developed political institutions and their secure frontiers built up over centuries. As with other Third World countries, it is impossible to say with any certainty that Pakistan will survive; one can only assess the chances of whether in 50 years time Pakistan will or will not still feature on the maps of the world.

4. Dealing first with the geographical integrity of Pakistan, she is now not too badly placed. The original creation in 1947 of a state divided into two halves 1,000 miles apart, and of roughly equal populations and economic potential, each half inhabited by people of totally different culture and race united only by the bond of religion, was an obvious nonsense and it took no great prescience in 1947 to see that it was unlikely still to be there in 50 years time. Most of Pakistan's early troubles stemmed from the difficulties of administering a country split into two halves and of harmonising the divergent interests of each half. I am myself sure, though most Pakistanis would not agree with me, that the best thing that happened to Pakistan was the 1971 war and that Pakistan is much better off as a result of the secession of Bangladesh. Certainly,

/geographically

geographically it has left Pakistan much stronger. Pakistan is now one geographical entity and for the most part its frontiers rest on defensible natural features. The Western frontier with Afghanistan runs roughly along the watershed of extremely rugged mountains, interspersed with deserts on the southern side of Afghanistan. The Pakistan/Iran border is an artificial line drawn up by the British in the last century but runs for the most part through similarly inhospitable territory. The eastern frontier with India up to the latitude of Delhi is covered by extensive deserts (an Indian force penetrated some distance in the 1971 war but a major invasion through the deserts would be very difficult to sustain). The northern frontier with India in Kashmir runs along the points to which Pakistan troops had penetrated when the cease-fire was agreed; it is artificial to that extent but again the country is extremely mountainous and is defensible from the Pakistan side. Only the Punjab frontier is a line drawn across the Punjab plain resting on no real geographical features except the river Sutlej for a part of its length. This is by no means an unfavourable geographical picture and many Third World countries would undoubtedly be glad to live within such secure frontiers. Of course, as with many other Third World countries, there are claims from Pakistan's neighbours to stretches of Pakistan territory - India to the rest of Kashmir and Afghanistan to the North West Frontier Province - but the

/point

point I am making is that Pakistan has a geographical unity with defensible frontiers resting for the most part on natural features.

5. Turning to the ethnic composition of the country, the picture is not so simple and must raise greater doubts about the future integrity of Pakistan. Of the four major races which inhabit Pakistan, the Punjabis constitute roughly 66 per cent of the total population, the Sindhis 13 per cent, the Pathans 8 per cent and the Baluch 3 per cent. Ethnic loyalties, or regional loyalties since the provincial boundaries conform more or less to the ethnic ones, are as deep-rooted in the Sub-continent as they are in the rest of the Third World. Each of the four races in Pakistan speak their own language, have distinctive cultures and spring from different historical backgrounds; their attitude to each other ranges from disinterest through dislike to active hostility. However, while it would be wrong to minimise these regional differences and loyalties, it is equally wrong in my view to make too much of them. India is a case in point. Many very knowledgeable people, including former Indian Civil Servants, forecast that when the British left, India would split up into its component parts. When that did not happen, it was argued that once Nehru died the powers of the Centre would decline and those of the States increase, leading eventually to fragmentation. This did not happen either - if anything the powers of the Centre over the States has steadily increased - and the reason seems to be that the 200 years of British rule had succeeded in imposing a

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consciousness of being Indian and of being part of one nation which has transcended the ethnic loyalties. The question is whether the same thing has happened in Pakistan. This, I think, is more doubtful. Having served in both countries, I can say that one does not find in Pakistan quite the national self-confidence that one finds in India. They are still unsure of themselves. They are too anxious to prove that they are one nation, whether by emphasising their common religion or by repeating ad nauseam the words of the founding fathers. But at the same time I have a feeling that, after 34 years, the concept of nationhood is now there and that the average Pakistani does think of himself as a Pakistani as well as, e.g. a Pathan. It is a small thing, but the Pakistan Government's decision to make much of Independence Day this year (presumably because they share some of the doubts expressed above) aroused a quite unexpected and spontaneous outburst of popular feeling. There are of course other reasons for this, but I am now surer than I was some years ago that Pakistan has acquired a sense of nationhood.

6. Of course, looking at the four races in more detail, it is easy to get a picture of diversity and to see only the factors making for disunity, but there are many which make for unity as well. The Punjabis are not only numerically far larger than all the others put together but also they occupy the economic heart of the country and command the major resources. In India, the various regional

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groupings tend to balance each other. In Pakistan there is an imbalance. Whether this makes for stability or instability is arguable. On the one hand it perpetuates the dislike of the Punjabis as the dominant race; on the other hand, in the last resort the Punjabis can impose their will on the rest of the country and hold the others in check. At the moment, the relative backwardness of at any rate the Pathans and the Baluch, means that this country is dominated and largely run by Punjabis. The Sindhis feel this most as the nearest neighbour, with their own distinctive and equally historic culture and background. They are a poorer province but they control Karachi, the main centre of population and of industrial growth in the country. There seems to me a provincial self-confidence about Sind which makes for unity since they feel themselves an equally important component of Pakistan as the Punjab. The Pathans are a quite different people, of Persian rather than Sub-Continental extraction, with strong tribal loyalties and a tribal system of government. The Pathans normally cause no trouble provided no attempt is made to interfere with their traditional self-government and way of life; the Central Government is sensible enough to realise this and to ride the Pathans on a loose rein. They are a surprisingly mobile people and because of the poverty of their resources at home, Pathans have always sought employment elsewhere in the Sub-Continent and now elsewhere in Pakistan; there are

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large colonies of Pathans in Sind and other provinces. There is a sense of Pathan nationality and hence a fellow-feeling with the Pathans of Afghanistan but generally tribal or clan loyalties transcend ethnic ones. (Pathan refugees from Afghanistan who do not belong to any of the Pakistan tribes are pushed on down into the plain for the Central Government to look after). Pakhtunistan, a union with the Pathans of Afghanistan, would only I think become an attractive proposition if Pakistan were to break up.

7. Baluchistan is a separate case. The Baluch are also organised on a tribal basis, but in much smaller units than the Pathans inhabiting the odd fertile valley in the surrounding desert and mountain wastes. The British left them, like the Pathans, to govern themselves and it was the attempt of the Pakistan Government after partition to integrate them that led to increasing disaffection and open hostilities in the Bhutto era. The disaffection of the Baluch is often made much of by visiting journalists and others, but it is basically a small and manageable problem. The number of true Baluch (half their province is inhabited by Pathans) is only about 2 million out of a total Pakistan population of some 84 million. The problem is largely a psychological one. The Baluch feel they are economically and politically neglected and always have been and that their province is run by Punjabis and Pathans. This is true, but the fact is that there are still too few educated Baluch to take on the administration. It will take a long period of education, economic development and sensitive

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government before the Baluch can stand on their own feet and rid themselves of their feelings of inferiority. Of course Baluchistan is a worry because it borders on Afghanistan and contains useful material for subversion but in the last analysis it is unlikely that anything which happens in Baluchistan can seriously shake the fabric of Pakistan.

8. There is one other group which needs to be touched on - the Afghan refugees. The refugee problem could be a factor for local unrest in both Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province though more seriously in the latter. So far relations between the local population and their usually ethnically related kin from Afghanistan have been remarkably good. But there are now over 2 million Afghan refugees and the number is still rising. The impact on the land, the already sparse grazing (many of the refugees have brought their cattle with them), and none too plentiful tree and bush cover will inevitably become more severe. The Afghans may in many cases be said to have a better standard of living in terms of food provision, health care and the subsidy each family receives from the Pakistan Government, than the local population. Trouble between the refugees and the indigenous population seems inevitable sooner or later, but it is a local problem and not I think a large enough one to affect the stability of the country.

9. So my conclusion is that although the ethnic stability of Pakistan is open to some question, the question marks are no larger than those which apply to many other Third

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World countries. My guess is that the overall concept of Pakistan is now firm enough to hold the four races together and, of course, in theory, the longer Pakistan lasts, the stronger the national bonds and the weaker the regional ones should become. There is a further factor. The external threat to Pakistan throughout its short history both from India and Afghanistan has undoubtedly been largely responsible for imposing a unity on Pakistan; the fissiparous tendencies might have been more in evidence had it not been for this threat. The fact is that Pakistan has been throughout its existence a beleaguered country and its inhabitants of whatever race have been kept constantly aware of that. If the country were to split up there is nowhere else for them to go except to India, Afghanistan in the case of the Pathans and Iran in the case of the Baluch. They either hang together or hang separately and this continues to be perhaps the most potent factor in ensuring the unity and integrity of the country.

10. When we turn to religion, the cause of so much instability and disunity in the Sub-Continent, the picture is clearer. Pakistan was formed because a large section of the Muslims of the Sub-Continent did not wish to live under Hindu rule; the religious motivation and the killings which it gave rise to was strong enough to cause millions of people to give up everything and flee either to India or Pakistan. In the Sub-Continent, it has been said that there are only two basic issues which will get a man out

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on to the streets, his religion and his pocket. Certainly the hold of religion over the peasantry is often not fully understood in the Western world. Islam was the raison d'etre for Pakistan and it remains the most powerful internal force for unity and stability. There is a consciousness also of being part of a worldwide faith and way of life often under threat from other religions. The educated Pakistani may lapse from the true faith, but the peasant and the uneducated man is as bound to his religion as he always was and prepared, if sufficiently roused, to do battle for it. The founder of Pakistan, Jinnah, was in no way a devout Muslim (this fact is now well-concealed), but he saw very quickly that Islam had to be placed in the forefront in order to keep the country he had founded together. Zia is similarly on the right lines in stressing Islam, but I think he neglects one factor. The Muslims of Pakistan are probably 80 per cent Sunni. Most of them have lived for generations surrounded by Hindus and people of other religions. They have incorporated much Hindu culture into their way of life and some Hindu practices into their practice of Islam (to an extent this accounts for the strong strain of Sufism, Islamic mysticism, in Pakistan). They have never been fanatical except when driven to extremes by other religions. The Mullahs are not the force in the land that they appear to be in Iran or perhaps in Shia countries generally. The average Pakistani talks about the Mullah in somewhat similar terms that we might use for the

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Parish Priest in England - a well-meaning chap, who knows all about religion, but is a bit unworldly and is certainly not to be trusted with practical secular problems (this is not entirely a true analogy, since there is very often an additional element of distrust of the Mullah - he is potentially a dangerous figure who needs to be watched in case he tries to step outside his religious role). It is difficult to see Islamic fundamentalism taking root in Pakistan or a repetition of events in Iran. I would judge that the religious backgrounds of the two countries are very different. But it is self-evident that having a common religion is one of the major factors making for the integrity and unity of Pakistan. If religion were to decline in importance, then the ethnic diversity might become more significant. Of course, there is a Shia population, believed to number about 20 per cent of the total population, which has caused difficulties in the past. But these difficulties have never presented anything like a national threat. They manifest themselves sometimes in riots generally at times like Muharram when Shia practices differ from those of Sunnis and are ostentatiously displayed. Normally the two branches of Islam co-exist in Pakistan without too much difficulty, going to their own mosques and not interfering with each other; Shias are spread throughout all branches of the administration and there is no discrimination on grounds of sect. The other religious minorities in Pakistan are so small (about 3 per cent of the population) as to constitute no threat to

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national integrity.

11. Finally, in this survey of the factors affecting the integrity of Pakistan, I need to look at the economic scene and to consider briefly how economically viable Pakistan is. The picture here is a mixed one but again it is probably no worse than most Third World countries present. Basically, Pakistan is still an agricultural country with a mixture of blessings and misfortunes. Compared to India, Pakistan has the advantage of a much smaller (though still too rapidly growing) population and much less pressure on land, though much of the land is barren. A higher proportion of agriculture than in India rests on irrigated rather than on rain-fed lands and hence Pakistan is not so susceptible to the vagaries of the weather as India. Rice for the Pakistani is a secondary item in his diet, so the bulk of the rice crop can be exported. Wheat is the staple item and Pakistan has just achieved self-sufficiency. She ought to have done so a long time ago and there is no reason at all why she should not remain self-sufficient and become a considerable exporter; the yields in Pakistan Punjab are still well below those achieved on the other side of the border. So because of her agricultural blessings the Pakistan economy does have one major and significant advantage at least in that in the last resort, and short of a serious disaster with the weather, the country should be able to feed itself. This, and the relative lack of population pressure, can readily be seen throughout

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Pakistan. Nowhere in Pakistan is there anything approaching either the urban or the rural poverty of parts of India; there is an air of prosperity which is to an extent spurious but strikes visiting Indians quite forcibly.

12. The gloomy part of the picture is Pakistan's lack, up to now, of mineral and other resources. Locally produced oil at the moment only meets 10 to 12 per cent of Pakistan's requirements and further exploration, stepped up considerably over the last few years, has so far proved disappointing. It is true that Pakistan has large fields of natural gas and that these are already meeting some 40 per cent of the country's energy requirements, but the fields are finite and probably have a shorter life than was at first expected; nothing else is emerging at the moment to take their place. Pakistan also seems to lack other mineral resources, though there is some poor quality coal in Baluchistan and copper has also been discovered there. There may well be much concealed in the mountains of Baluchistan but they have not yet been fully explored. So the external account presents a dismal picture as it does in most other parts of the Third World, with Pakistan heavily dependent on overseas aid for its development and with a correspondingly large amount of long term indebtedness. Pakistan exports mainly textiles and the industrial base is still too narrow to sustain much diversification into non-traditional exports, though a considerable amount of import substitution is being achieved. At the moment she is exporting population and the remittances

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from the Pakistan Workers Overseas are helping in large measure to meet the rising cost of imported oil. But this flow is also not likely to last for ever.

13. So, while there is a certain inherent strength in the agricultural basis of the economy, there are major economic weaknesses and of course a collapse in the economy could quickly lead to widespread unrest in which the other factors making for disunity could come to the fore, thus imperilling the integrity of Pakistan. And of course there are other factors, more sociological than economic, which are bound to exert increasing pressures as time goes on. The high population growth-rate, which the Government is doing little to check; the exodus from the countryside to the towns, particularly in Sind to Karachi which the Government has controlled with a fair measure of success; the increase in consumer goods and the rising expectations in the villages as a result of the remittances from Pakistanis overseas; rising inflation, due to deficit financing as a result of the heavy burden of defence and other subsidies; the general wind of change affecting traditional and conservative societies everywhere. There are no easy answers to these economic and sociological problems and it is not much consolation to know that the same problems undoubtedly face most Third World countries.

14. To sum up this diverse picture, in which I have tried to bring out the various factors making for disunity and for unity, my answer to the question whether Pakistan will

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still feature on the map in 50 years time is that I think that there is a good chance that it will. I think that, after 34 years and the removal of the millstone of Bangladesh, the country rests on reasonably sure geographical, religious and psychological foundations. I would expect this fragile unity to persist long enough to erode some of the existing ethnic differences, particularly if the external threat persists. The major doubt is over the long-term economic viability of the country, which could have serious consequences for its integrity, but it is a doubt which hangs over the whole non-oil-producing Third World. Of course, I have excluded throughout the possibility of major external aggression from India or from Afghanistan which would no doubt very quickly bring Pakistan's independent existence to an end. Short of that and of an economic collapse, I think that this country is here to stay, whatever its system of government which I will examine in my following despatch.

15. I am copying this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in New Delhi, Washington, Kabul, Dacca and Karachi.

I am, Sir,
Yours faithfully

O G Forster

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SUMMARY

THE INTERNAL STABILITY OF PAKISTAN

1. The preceding despatch looks at the general problem of Pakistan's viability; the present despatch looks at the current regime which, as for half Pakistan's history, is a military government. Democracy of the Western variety has never flourished in what is now Pakistan, perhaps because of Islam, and because for historical and social reasons experiments in democratic practice in the 1930's degenerated into feudal habits. Traditional tribal democracy on the frontier was an isolated phenomenon (paras 1 to 3).

2. The Muslim League never achieved the same grass-roots appeal as that of the Congress Party, nor did it represent a political ideology. The factions of the League and the behaviour of individual leaders debased the popular image of politicians. Nor was the Pakistan Civil Service left sufficiently strong at 1947 to govern the country regardless of the politicians. The Army, by contrast, formed itself into the only solid and stable force (paras 4 and 5).

3. The Bengal factor bedevilled Pakistan's political development, and eventually was only resolved by the breakaway of Bangladesh. Bhutto's success of combining Bengal political thinking with the feudal element enabled him to become the first leader of Pakistan's Muslims to obtain real grass-roots support, but his achievement was flawed, and instead of imposing a proper form of democracy, Bhutto may have wrecked its chances here for good (paras 6 and 7).

4. The breakdown of Bhutto's government led to General Zia's takeover, first to avoid further bloodshed, and then as a caretaker. Four years later, Zia's tenure, still nominally that of a caretaker, continues. He is no stereotype military dictator. Although no intellectual, he possesses a certain shrewdness and tactical skill. His simple religious faith is not fanatical but can result in flesh-creeping statements, and he has an old-fashioned view of discipline. He seems determined to keep control of the situation. His intention is to rebuild democracy in an Islamic framework, but his pronouncements are often contradictory. He certainly does not intend a return to PPP rule, nor to the former style of political manoeuvrings (paras 8 and 9).

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5. What are Zia's chances? So far he has given Pakistan four years of peace and stability, helped internally by the lack of obvious alternatives and externally by the Afghan crisis and threats from India. His regime is marked by apathy among the public rather than hatred, and is reasonably efficient and not overly onerous. He has never looked stronger (para 10). But Zia's is a balancing act, preserving the status quo and the goodwill of important blocks of opinion, the Army itself, the Muslim right-wing, business people and the ordinary man. Politicians and students who cannot be placated are kept quiet by a mixture of force and favour (para 11). But Zia is making no real progress towards his declared aim of evolving a new political system. Sooner or later the pressures will increase, and it is doubtful whether Zia, who lacks popular support, will contain them. His regime is likely therefore to collapse at some stage, but from what precise cause or combination of forces cannot be foreseen. The likely outcome in any case would be another general taking over (paras 12 and 13).

6. For Britain and the West, there nevertheless seems no alternative but to give Pakistan as much support as is consistent with our interests elsewhere: she must solve her internal problems in her own way.

BRITISH EMBASSY
ISLAMABAD

13 September 1981

014/2

The Rt Hon
The Lord Carrington KCMG MC

My Lord

THE INTERNAL STABILITY OF PAKISTAN

1. In my preceding despatch, I discussed the chances of Pakistan surviving in its present form. In this despatch I will examine the internal political stability of Pakistan and the chances of the present regime surviving. It is an historical fact that in the 34 years of Pakistan's existence exactly half - 17 years to date - has been spent under military rule. In considering the internal stability of Pakistan and what type of government is likely to emerge it is first necessary to discuss why this has happened and why democracy has proved so fragile a plant in Pakistan soil while taking root and flourishing, after a fashion, in Indian soil.

2. I am not sure that I really know the answers to this question. To start with I suspect that there is something in Islam which is basically inimical to Western democracy. Certainly a creed which claims to embrace all aspects of life and which, at least in its more fundamentalist doctrines, denies the Western distinction between Church and State, seems to point towards theocracy rather than democracy. President Zia has expounded to me what Islamic

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democracy means to him and its sounds perilously close to what is happening in Iran. According to him, by popular consent, certain men of proven religious knowledge, zeal and integrity are somehow chosen to rule the country and, by implication, they can only be removed when they begin to depart from the true faith. Anyhow, whether or not Islam is basically in conflict with the concept of Western democracy, it remains a fact that there are very few Muslim Western-type democracies in the world. (Of course this may be a Third World and not simply a Muslim phenomenon, though that does not account for cases like India).

3. Beyond this, there are particular factors which apply in the case of Pakistan. Before 1947, democracy and the political process never really flourished in this part of the British Raj. Apart from the fundamentally autocratic tradition of Moghul rule which Muslims in the Sub-Continent looked back to as a golden age, the social structure in what is now Pakistan did not lend itself to democracy. The West Punjab (unlike the East Punjab where there were more small land-owners) and Sind had always been dominated by princely rulers and big land-owners; when democracy was tried in these parts in the 1930s it simply led to the creation of a string of pocket boroughs. The tribal areas in the North West Frontier and Baluchistan had their own traditional system of democracy - the tribal Jirga sitting under the chairmanship of the hereditary village or tribal

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chief, the Sardar. Such political agitation against the British as there was in this area before 1947 was largely stimulated by Hindus.

4. A further factor militating against the emergence of a viable democracy in Pakistan lay in the nature of the Muslim struggle for independence. For a long time the Muslims of the Sub-Continent believed that their future lay in backing the British Raj against rising Hindu nationalism; they hoped to regain some of their former power by becoming loyal satraps of the British. Politically and nationalistically-minded Muslims like Mr Jinnah who wanted to get rid of British rule joined the basically Hindu Congress Party. It was only when, in the 1920s and 1930s, it became evident that independence for India was likely to be achieved and that the Congress Party might emerge as the new rulers that fears of Hindu domination grew among the Muslims and the Muslim League, founded primarily to protect Muslim religion and culture, took on a political form. The manifestly Hindu slant of the Congress Party, despite Gandhi's efforts, and the experience of Muslim minorities under the Congress provincial governments formed after the 1935 Government of India Act led to the demand for Pakistan. But it was never a unanimous demand among Muslims. Many Muslims remained in the Congress Party and many preferred to continue living in India and disagreed with the whole concept of a Muslim State.

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5. A more significant development, however, was that whereas Gandhi's great achievement was to give the Congress Party a mass and grass-roots appeal, the Muslim League was never more than a coalition of wealthy, educated Muslims aiming basically to protect their own economic interests. It had no political ideology beyond the creation of a separate Muslim State. So at Partition, Pakistan was left with the rump of a Constituent Assembly, and Provincial Assemblies elected under the 1935 Act, dominated by a group of corrupt and self-seeking land-owners and politicians with no political programme and quickly dividing into factions based on personalities and wheeling and dealing. This unsavoury image of the average politician remains very strong in the minds of ordinary Pakistanis today and the behaviour of such of the old politicians as remain still tends to conform to these earlier patterns. Behind this basic political weakness was a Civil Service framework considerably weaker than that which steered India through the formative years. The Muslims of the Sub-Continent had always been educationally backward compared to the Hindus and anyhow by temperament preferred the Army to the Civil Service (administration was for Hindu babus; real men went into the Army). As a result, Pakistan was left in 1947 with very few good administrators and when I first came here, seven years after independence, Englishmen were still occupying key positions in the central and provincial administrations. The Civil Service machine was not strong

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enough to govern the country regardless of the politicians. By contrast, the Army, drawn from the large Muslim section of the old Indian Army, contained a large section of the educated elite and quickly formed itself into an efficient machine and the only solid and stable force in the country.

6. As well as these basic weaknesses, a further factor which bedevilled the first 25 years of Pakistan's existence was East Bengal. The pace of Bengal's political development had been entirely different. The Bengalis were highly educated and politically articulate, had led, both in thought and practice, the struggle against the British and had a well-developed party political system. From the very start, the East Bengal politicians and their left-wing doctrines exercised a baleful influence on the politically-naive and conservative West Pakistanis; and of course added to the differences in political background was the major problem of administering and balancing the two wings. Most of the political manoeuvrings and constitutional experiments of the first 25 years of Pakistan were designed to reconcile the divergent interests and backgrounds of the two wings and, from the point of view of West Pakistan, were designed basically to perpetuate Punjabi domination of East Bengal and of Pakistan as a whole.

7. For the purpose of this despatch, I do not need to go into the details of what happened between 1958 and 1971. It is sufficient to say that the Army stepped in to resolve the political deadlock, tried under Ayub to produce a

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solution, which in turn failed and led eventually to the secession of East Pakistan and a democratic system of a sort under Bhutto. Bhutto was a curious phenomenon who has been much analysed. He combined in himself the political thinking of Bengal with a background of Sindhi landlordism. The former enabled him to become the first leader in the history of the Muslims of this part of the Sub-Continent to achieve real grass-roots support. His political programmes and his demagoguery appealed to the ordinary man and he constructed a party machine much on the lines of the old Congress machine in India which reached down to the grass-roots. But the other side of his make-up - that of the Sindhi feudal landlord - began to emerge increasingly as his power grew. He became increasingly authoritarian, contemptuous of democratic forms, ruthless and flamboyant; the stories of his vindictiveness and of the evils perpetrated, often with his knowledge, can be heard all over Pakistan and not only from supporters of General Zia (these stories are never told in the liberal Western Press since they do not fit the image of the martyred hero). He was a flawed genius and the great tragedy for Pakistan is that he had the mass support and the ability to impose a proper democratic system on Pakistan and to ensure that it took root; instead he destroyed democracy in Pakistan for what may be a very long time.

8. It was in these circumstances that General Zia took over, as Field Marshal Ayub and General Yahya Khan had done before him. Law and order had broken down, the mobs

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were on the streets and the Army was having to open fire on them. He has given me a graphic description of the evening when Bhutto ordered him, as Chief of Army Staff, to shoot down 4,000 people if necessary to impose order and of his realisation as he left the room that he would have to intervene at once to stop Bhutto. He saw himself, like many dictators before him, purely as a caretaker whose task was to restore law and order and to hold the ring until fresh elections could be held and a stable government could be returned. He talked constantly of his caretaker role for the first two years of his rule. Since his efforts to hold fresh elections failed in October 1979, we have heard less of this, but he still preserves the forms of the office of caretaker refusing, for instance, to move to the new Presidential Palace and continuing to live in the Chief of Army Staff's house in Rawalpindi - a somewhat cramped old British bungalow, not at all appropriate for Head of State entertainments.

9. Four years later, Zia remains in power and, by a combination of luck and judgement, has emerged as the dominant figure on the Pakistan scene. At the moment, he is so much the dominant figure and so much the key to the internal stability of Pakistan over the next few years at any rate, that I must attempt an analysis of his character and his thinking. He is not by any means the stereotype

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military dictator, if there is such a thing, or the conventional Indian or Pakistan Sandhurst-charicature General. He comes from comparatively humble origins and a non-army background; he has not had the British connections and does not look back with nostalgia on the British connection like some other Pakistan officers of his generation. There is a total and unusual (for the Sub-Continent) lack of arrogance and pomposity about him. He is courteous, soft-spoken, ready to listen and almost embarrassingly frank and humble in his approach to problems. He gives a distinct impression of mediocrity and of a man promoted out of his depth, but this is not an entirely accurate picture; he is not quite the simple soldier he likes to make out and he has much shrewdness and tactical skill. Above all, he is deeply and genuinely religious and always has been. He is not an intellectual and has, I think, no real understanding of the political process or of constitutional forms. I doubt whether he is a real believer in democracy, certainly of the Western type. He has a simple philosophy that the politicians have made a total mess of Pakistan and that there was something inherently wrong with the political structure which caused this. He believes that the ordinary man, if not seduced by demagogic politicians, is inherently sound and sensible and that if only good honest yeomen can be elected they will somehow remain unsullied by the political process. In keeping with his strong religious beliefs, he also believes that Bhutto was fundamentally irreligious and that many of Pakistan's

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problems are the result of departing from the true faith; a return to the true faith will in some way solve these problems. He is not a religious fanatic (he believes that what is going on in Iran is wrong) but his direct and simple faith that God has ordained certain things which Man tampers with at his peril makes my flesh creep at times, as does his belief, stemming from his army training, that this part of the world needs the smack of firm government and that if doses of discipline are not administered at intervals, the country lapses into corruption and inefficiency. I suspect that his sense of mission is growing and that he is beginning to believe that only he can solve Pakistan's problems. He still talks occasionally of being a caretaker but he is obviously determined to retain control over the situation and to keep the Army in control until something better emerges. What that something is is not at all clear and I am not sure that he himself really knows; his pronouncements on the subject are often contradictory. It certainly does not involve a return to the rule of Bhutto's party and to the former political manoeuvrings, though he has made considerable efforts to win over the more sensible of the older politicians. I think that he hopes to build democracy from the grass-roots. He already has his elected local government bodies and on these he is trying to construct provincial assemblies and a national assembly with, to start with, only advisory powers. From this process, he

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hopes a new breed of honest politicians will emerge to whom he can hand over the country. Somewhere along the line he has to incorporate Islamic democracy, whatever that is, and to bring the country back more to what he believes to be a proper Islamic state.

10. How far is he likely to achieve these rather nebulous and idealistic objectives? The future internal stability of Pakistan turns on this question. We should not underestimate his achievements to date. After the turmoil of the end of Bhutto's rule, he has given the country four years of peace and stability, despite the external pressures of the last two years; years which were badly needed to cool the passions of the Bhutto era, to heal some of the divisions created by Bhutto and to restore the economy. He has been helped by the lack of any obvious alternative, by the Afghan crisis and the continued threats from India, by good harvests and the improvement in a generally well-managed economy, by apathy and by the lack of issues likely to excite public opinion. The regime is not an onerous one and it is by and large an efficient one with corruption kept within bounds. It is not a hated regime or he a hated figure, except among the dedicated Bhutto supporters; the jokes which circulate about Zia show him as a fool and simpleton rather than an ogre. At the moment, after four years of rule, he has never looked stronger or more unchallengeable.

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11. But up to now it has been a (not unskilful) balancing act. He has not touched the essentials or grasped the nettles which will have to be grasped if his objectives are to be achieved and new institutions and a reformed political system are to emerge. He has concentrated on preserving the status quo and not alienating important blocks of opinion. The Army is kept happy by clamping down on the old politicians, by restricting the independence of the judiciary and by firm and efficient government. Right-wing Muslim opinion is kept happy by the Islamisation policy and the greater influence of the religious parties, but the Islamic punishments are never carried out so moderate opinion is not upset. Businessmen are kept happy by reversing Bhutto's socialist policies and by favouring the private sector, but there has been no move yet to reverse Bhutto's labour policies which would upset organised labour. The ordinary man is kept happy by keeping prices under control and eliminating corruption and black-marketing; it is hoped that his desire for some sort of say in the government of his country will be met by the elected local government bodies. The old politicians and the students who cannot be placated are kept quiet by a mixture of force and favour. There are powerful forces in a country like this which wish to maintain the status quo and are not unhappy to see the present regime continue:- the landowners and businessmen; the small shopkeepers, now protected to an extent from the exactions of the police even if their profits are cut a bit; the new type

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of Army Officer, with no independent means or wealthy family behind him and looking only to the Army for his future.

12. But life does not stand still and good government is rarely a satisfactory substitute for progress in a young country. Zia is producing no new policies, except Islamisation and this shows no signs of attracting widespread support outside the right-wing religious parties. His progress towards evolving a new political system is snail-like. This is not entirely his fault; his difficulties are real ones and it is a nice matter of judgement to decide how fast political progress should proceed to keep ahead of popular demand without losing control. The snail-like progress has been sufficient up to now and may suffice for another year or two. But sooner or later the pressures will increase, whether from intellectuals for more of a say in government or, for example, from businessmen for tougher labour legislation. When that time comes, I very much doubt whether Zia, lacking popular support or full popular backing for his policies, will prove able or subtle enough to keep ahead of growing popular discontent without losing control of the situation.

13. Therefore, I expect Zia's regime to collapse at some stage, but when or in what way, whether a swift collapse or a slow decline, whether with bloodshed or with a smooth transition to a successor government, cannot yet be foreseen. Explosions happen quickly in the Sub-Continent, but

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the explosive material has to be around and there has to be a catalyst. There is plenty of explosive material to hand in Pakistan:- the students, always dissatisfied about something and traditionally in the forefront of any agitation, the growing industrial proletariat in Karachi, the regional dissidents, the increasing mobility of society and growing expectations (remittances from overseas Pakistanis in the Middle East are having dramatic effects in the villages); finally, the independence of mind and spirit which the ordinary Pakistani shares with his Indian counter-part. I also have a feeling that Bhutto has wrought some sort of sea-change in the Pakistan scene, with his appeal to the poor and down-trodden and his mass support, and that the seeds of a rejection of the hierarchical traditions of the East may have been planted. It is difficult to see what combination of these forces might bring Zia down. It was the students and industrial labour, touched off by trouble in Bengal, which brought down Ayub; it was the shopkeepers and religious right-wing elements which brought down Bhutto. Further, the catalyst is not yet apparent. It could be one particular issue - a defeat on the North West Frontier, a humiliation by India or particularly ham-handed behaviour by the Army. Or it could be a general decline in the economy, poor harvests, a growth in inflation and a steady rise in prices. Or some particular economic factor like the return of the overseas Pakistan workers with increased expectations and no jobs. At the moment, the most likely scenario would seem to be growing dissatisfaction with the

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performance of the regime for any of the above reasons and a growing demand for a return to some sort of democracy, with Zia not moving fast enough to meet the dissatisfaction and the demands. If he began to lose control of the situation he might then hand back power to the Army, represented by the senior Generals, the Corps Commanders and Provincial Governors, who would then no doubt appoint one of themselves to rule, possibly with a promise of elections and a return to democracy to follow. This, of course, is exactly what happened in the case of Ayub - leading to Yayha Khan and Bhutto. But history does not often repeat itself and there can be no certainty about any such forecasts. If I had to make a guess at the political future, I would say that the Westminster type of democracy will never take root in Pakistan, though we may yet have to go through some further alternations between it and military rule, and that Pakistan will eventually settle down under some sort of mildly authoritarian rule, susceptible in some degree to the popular will and with some mechanism for an orderly transition of power. This is probably the best we can hope for in any Third World country.

14. In these two despatches, I have argued that Pakistan is sufficiently soundly-based to survive and that it is unlikely to break up except under severe economic or external pressure, but that the internal political situation is unstable in the medium-term and is likely to remain unstable for some considerable time to come. In short,

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a not unfamiliar Third World picture. It remains to look at the implications of this reading, if it is a true one, for our and the West's policies towards Pakistan particularly in the context of the Afghanistan crisis. I can state my views quite shortly. If we want to call a halt to Russian expansion in this part of the World, I do not think that we have any alternative but to continue to back Pakistan and to give her as much support as is consistent with our important interests in India and elsewhere. Of course once again in the struggle against Communism we find ourselves backing an unpopular military regime which may not last long. But are we to tell Zia, as the Guardian would probably have us do, that we are not going to help him unless he holds elections? Obviously if Pakistan's internal policies became so oppressive as to be offensive to British public opinion, we should have to reconsider our policy. But we have not come to that yet and for the moment we should, in my view, continue to back Zia. At the same time, we should do what we can to improve the stability of Pakistan by encouraging Western economic aid, if we cannot provide it ourselves. We should also use the position of trust and confidence that our firm support for Pakistan has given us to offer discreet advice on how best to achieve greater internal stability, but without, to use your own word Sir, "nannying"; for in the last resort Pakistan must solve her own internal problems in her own way. Finally, we in this Embassy must continue to keep a close watch on

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the internal situation so that we are not taken by surprise by a change of regime and are in a position to change horses without falling off.

15. I am copying this despatch to H M Representatives in New Delhi, Washington, Kabul, Dacca and Karachi.

I am, Sir
Yours faithfully

O.G. Forster

O G Forster

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R17/9

Your Reference.....

Our Reference.....BB.SF.....

Date.....16th. September 1981

The Office of the Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
Whitehall,
London.

Prime Minister's Brief for Visit to Pakistan.

Dear Sirs,

We understand that after the Commonwealth Conference, the Prime Minister will be visiting Pakistan, for which we have assumed, she will be in possesssion of a Brief prepared for her before her departure. It is thought that the following information not available from the Board of Trade, could be included in the Brief.

The Company seen above is a joint venture, between Metap Trading Ltd., and Messrs. Rizsons Ltd., operating from 32 Writers Chambers, Dunolly Road, Karachi. The object of the joint venture is to develop trade between the U.K. and Pakistan. The U.K. side of the joint venture is managed by Mr.Hamid N.Rizvi, who is on a business residence visa in the United Kingdom and in Pakistan by the two sons of Mr.Rizvi. Both sons are well connected in Pakistan and become aware of projects being considered by their Government Ministries.

We are reliably informed that the Pakistan Ministry of Communications, wish to modernise their Telecommunication networks and have done a preliminary budget study of a costing of USD 700 millions of which USD. 200 million would be available for foreign currency purchasing. In the first instance they are seeking a Consultancy Agency to study and specify the requirement. We have had a meeting with British Telconsult the Consultancy Service of British Telecon, who are very interested in the project. Our Mr.Jawad Rizvi now on a business visit to the UK. will formally introduce British Telecom to the Ministry of Communications in Islamabad. Please see the attached letter. Please treat the above information as confidential. British Telecom may also be in a position to offer reconditioned telecom. equipment made redundant from their modernisation programmes.

Our joint venture is also the exclusive distributor for Thorneycroft Marine Diesels. Messrs. Thorneycroft are part of British Leyland. The fishing industry in Pakistan operates as a Fishing Co-operative, a semi- Government Body which provides finance for the fishermen for the purchase of engines and fishing boats. We are currently at a disadvantage in Pakistan against our main competitor the Yanmar Diesel Marine Engine from Japan. The Japanese Government recently gave development aid for these engines.

The fish harbour in Karachi has 6,000 registered fishing boats of which 4,000 are unserviceable or requiring engines. There is also a large requirement of marine engines for the State of Baluchistan, where the Government of Pakistan wish to encourage the fisheman there.

There is no Glass Re-inforced Plastic industry in Pakistan and we are told that the Government wishes to encourage the setting up of a manufacturing capability for G.R.P. fishing boats in Pakistan, in lieu of the present use of timber. We are offering the technical expertise services of Island Plastics Ltd., of Ryde Isle of Wight who are Lloyds approved moulders and approved builders for the British White Fish Authority. Any project we might be able to set up would of course lead to the fitment of Thorneycroft engines, their installation fittings and the provision of moulds and designs of British designed marine craft.

We understand that a £5 million aid credit facility has been organised by the British Development Aid Administration for Pakistan and we would like to feel that part of this aid could be used for the Fishing Co-operatives.

Yours faithfully,

B. Brown.

B.Brown. Director.
Wg.Cdr.B.Brown O.B.E. R.A.F. Rtd.

c.c. Mr.Tony Durant M.P.
Reading North,
House of Commons.

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

DWFM/221

11 September 1981

Secretary
Ministry of Communications
Government of Pakistan
Islamabad
Pakistan

Dear Sir,

We are given to understand from our contacts (Rizsons, Karachi) that the Pakistan Communication Ministry is planning to carry out a major development and enhancement of the Pakistan telecommunications network, and we wish to indicate our interest in acting as consultant to this project.

British Telconsult is the consultancy service of British Telecom (the new name for the Post Office Telecommunications administration in the UK) and the attached brochure explains the range and depth of services that we offer, drawing as we do from the expertise within the UK Telecoms administration.

Yours faithfully,

D W F MEDCRAFT

Enc

cc Mr Jawed Hamid Rizvi
Director, RIZSONS

JS

16 September 1981

I am replying on the Prime Minister's behalf to your letter to her of 9 September. I will, of course, draw your letter to the Prime Minister's attention.

MA

David Soskin, Esq.

TEL. 01-493 1164. CARLTON CLUB,
"PROCARLTON LONDON-SW1" 69, ST. JAMES'S ST., SW1A 1PJ

9. IX. 1981

Dear Mrs Thatcher,

We understand that you are soon to visit Pakistan again.

As you may recall, we were your fellow houseguests in August 1976 at the invitation of the late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

We are seriously concerned about the safety of the late Prime Minister's wife and his daughter Benazir – our contemporary and friend at Oxford.

We would be grateful if you would raise the matter with Pakistan's President Zia Al Haq.

Yours sincerely,

David Soskin

Kath Gregory


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