

PART 5

SECRET.

Confidential filing.

UK / Polish Relations.


Internal Situation.

Economic Assistance.

POLAND.

Part 1: August 1979

Part 5: December 1981.

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
27-12-81							
22-12-81							
24-12-81							
2-11-81							
6-1-82							
5-1-82							
ENDS							
							

PREM 19/871

PART 5 ends:-

Feo Co WR tax of 5/1/82

PART 6 begins:-

washington tel : 41 of 6/1/82.



Poland

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 January 1982

Dear Willie,

/ I enclose a short acknowledgement which the Prime Minister may wish to send in reply to President Reagan's letter of 24 December. As you asked, it takes account of yesterday's meeting in Brussels of the Foreign Ministers of the Ten.

WR to
Rec 29/12
ref/01

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

W Rickett Esq
10 Downing St

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

The Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

The President of the United ^{States} Nations

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I was grateful for your letter of 24 December informing me of the ^{about} contents of your messages to General Jaruzelski and to President Brezhnev.

You will ~~already~~ have discussed with Helmut Schmidt the meeting the Ten Foreign Ministers held in Brussels on 4 January. ^{the task of} As you know, reconciling views and interests among ten different countries is not an easy ^{one} task. But I am encouraged that both you and we see the objectives in exactly the same light, and hope that, it will be possible to build on what emerged from the meeting on 4 January, ~~in the consultations that lie ahead.~~ We will certainly be pushing in the same direction as you, even though the detailed steps may be somewhat different. This is the view I expressed in ^a ~~my~~ New Year's Eve interview [↑] and the one which Peter Carrington has pressed hard in meetings of the Ten. I am sure that our efforts should be devoted to ensuring that the focus of attention lies where it belongs [↓] on a further example of the failure of the Soviet system and ideas and not on playing up differences between alliance partners whose aims are identical.

in the consultations which will lie ahead,

with the British media

1981 was

~~At the close of what has been~~ an eventful year for us all, I send you my warm regards and best wishes for 1982.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

[Type for tonight's box pl.]

A.J.C. 6/7

GR 250
UNCLASSIFIED
FM WARSAW 051100Z JAN 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 23 OF 5 JANUARY

OUR TELNO 1043: MISKIW.

1. THE DATE FOR MISKIW'S TRIAL HAS BEEN BROUGHT FORWARD TO TOMORROW 6 JANUARY. THE FIRST DECISION OF THE COURT WILL BE WHETHER MISKIW'S OFFENCE IS TO BE DEALT WITH UNDER THE CIVIL PENAL CODE OR MARTIAL LAW REGULATIONS (WITH MUCH STIFFER PENALTIES).

2. WE SAW MISKIW AGAIN THIS MORNING. PHYSICALLY HE IS WELL BUT SIGNS OF STRAIN ARE BEGINNING TO SHOW, PARTICULARLY WHETHER HE IS TO BE TRIED UNDER CIVIL OR MARTIAL LAW REGULATIONS. HE SAYS THAT HE IS HOPING FOR THE BEST PREPARING FOR THE WORST.

3. LEGAL REPRESENTATION HAS NOT YET BEEN ARRANGED. A LETTER SENT ON 28.12 FROM MISKIW TO THE LEGAL COUNCIL EMPOWERED TO REPRESENT FOREIGN CLIENTS WAS RETURNED TO THE PRISON BY THE POSTAL AUTHORITIES ON 31.12 FOR AN APPARENT INFRINGEMENT OF A PETTY POSTAL REGULATION. A LETTER FROM HIM TO THE EMBASSY HAS NOT SO FAR ARRIVED. WE ARE ALL WE CAN TO ARRANGE FOR AN ENGLISH SPEAKING ADVOCATE TO SEE MISKIW THIS AFTERNOON.

4. APART FROM IRRITATING LITTLE THINGS (HE HAS NOT BEEN ALLOWED ACCESS TO HIS TOOTHBRUSH SINCE HIS ARREST, FOR EXAMPLE) MISKIW SAYS THAT HE HAS BEEN WELL TREATED. HE HAS RECEIVED THE BOOKS AND OTHER GOODIES WE SENT HIM. HIS MAIN CONCERN IS THAT HIS PAPER AND RELATIVES BE KEPT INFORMED AS HIS CASE PROGRESSES.

5. WE WILL ATTEMPT TO ATTEND THE TRIAL TOMORROW.

MELHUI SH

LIMITED	PS/PUS
EESD	MR BULLARD
NEWS.D	MR FERGUSSON
CONS.D	MR ADAMS
PS	
PS/LPS	



FCS/82/3

MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOODPoland: Possible Action on Fisheries

As you know, we are currently looking at areas in the economic field in which we could take action against the Soviet Union (and in certain circumstances her allies) in the context of Poland. One area which I think it would be useful to look at carefully is the licensing of ships which buy fish caught by British fishermen in our waters.

Your Department have already raised with us at official level the possibility of introducing, from 1 February, a licensing system for such ships with the aim of reinforcing the mackerel quotas (Henshaw's letter of 22^{attached} December to Spreckley). My officials have replied agreeing to this proposal (de Fonblanque's letter of 4^{attached} January), and have drawn attention to the ways in which such a system could be helpful in the Polish context. In particular, it may be useful to be able to say, in publicly introducing the licensing system, that we are putting ourselves in a position to take measures against the Soviet Union, as Soviet and Eastern European ships are among the main receivers of transshipments of fish in British waters.

I am not suggesting that we should at this stage take any immediate decision to discriminate against Soviet or Polish vessels. But officials will be considering in MISC 64 possible retaliatory measures against the Soviet Union. In this context

/action


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- 2 -



action under the new licensing system against Soviet vessels might well be worth including in a provisional list of measures which would cause at least some damage to Soviet interests without being unduly injurious to the UK.

I am copying this letter to members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.


(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
5 January 1981



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01- 233-5629

J S W Henshaw Esq
MAFF
Great Westminster House
LONDON SW1

Your reference

Our reference

Date 4 January 1981

Dear Henshaw,

TRANSHIPMENT OF FISH-LICENSING OF RECEIVING ~~VEHICLES~~ ^{VESSLS}

1. Thank you for your letter of 22 December to Nick Spreckley, who is away. We agree that the introduction of a licensing scheme, on the lines envisaged in the Fisheries Act for vessels receiving transshipments of fish is now desirable.
2. The introduction at this time of a licensing system, which would mainly affect Soviet and Eastern European ships, naturally has to be seen against the background of current events in Poland and the possibility of economic measures against the Soviet Union and/or Poland. This is not to say that the present situation would inhibit the introduction of a licensing system which you would have wanted to introduce in any case; on the contrary, the introduction of such a system could be positively helpful in present circumstances.
3. As you know, Foreign Ministers of the Ten are meeting on 4 January to consider what action to take in relation to President Reagan's economic measures against Poland and the USSR. The outcome is uncertain. But we may well find it helpful in the near future to be able to say that we are taking measures which, while independently justified, would also put us in a better position to introduce controls or restrictions if we were to judge these appropriate in relation to the Soviet Union (and possibly other Eastern European countries, including in particular Poland, of course). This means that we would be likely to want to ensure that any licences now granted to the Russians (and Eastern Europeans) were not in terms, for example with respect to duration, which might make it more difficult to introduce restrictions later.
4. Against this background I would suggest that:
 - a) the terms and timing of any announcement of a decision to introduce licensing will need to be carefully considered with the FCO.
 - b) the terms and period of validity of licences issued to the Russians and Eastern Europeans will also need to be the subject of further consultation between our Departments.

/5.

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5. In addition to these political arguments, the introduction of a licensing system for vessels receiving transshipments of fish, does as you know from earlier correspondence, raise certain legal questions and we would want to be reassured that these have been borne in mind and can be satisfactorily dealt with. We would prefer to reserve final judgement on this until our legal advisers have had a chance to look at your draft statutory instrument.

6. One aspect which you do not say much about in your letter is Community proofing; if you had been intending to present the measure as a conservation measure, aimed at reinforcing the TAC, it would of course have been necessary to submit the draft instrument to the Commission for their approval. But as I understand it, you are treating this as a management measure ancillary to quotas, which would only be notified.

7. However, it covers EEC transporting ships and, therefore arguably, favours direct landing here rather than transshipment abroad. Also, insofar as shipment is outside the EC, it interferes with the external trade in fish of the Community, as an external aspect of agricultural policy. Therefore the Community position could be a matter for argument. Furthermore, controls on transshipment outside the territorial sea of fish caught outside the British fishing zone is arguably illegal. And the special position of the UK/Polish Bilateral agreement must be taken into account.

Yours sincerely,
J R de Fonblanque

J R de Fonblanque
European Community Department
(Internal)

cc: Mr Rhodes, Cabinet Office
ECD(E)
EESD
Planning Staff
Lord Bridges
Mr Hannay
Mr Darwin, Legal Advisers

RESTRICTED



MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
GREAT WESTMINSTER HOUSE
HORSEFERRY ROAD, LONDON SW1P 2AE

Direct Line 01-216-6572

Switchboard 01-216 6311

N Spreckley Esq
FCO

MWC *012/12* *24/13413*

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 37
5 JAN 1982

DESK CHIEF		ROOM NO.
INDEX	PA	FILE

EES Dept:
Mr. Darwin (Legal Adviser)
Mr. Elliott (Cabinet Office)

22 December 1981

Dear Spreckley,

A batch to me to reorganisation

MJ
24/1/82

TRANSSHIPMENT OF FISH - LICENSING OF RECEIVING VESSELS

216-7380

- Following David Boreham's telephone conversation with Jim Poston yesterday evening I am now writing to seek your urgent views on the action we are seeking to take which is described in the following paragraphs.
- As you may be aware, the western mackerel fishery is the largest fishery now available to the UK fleet. Because of the amount of pressure placed on it, and following scientific advice, we have for the last four years sought to manage the UK fleet's effort, inter alia, by means of weekly vessel quotas. These weekly quotas would be relatively easy to monitor if most of the fish were landed into UK ports. The UK market for fresh mackerel is, however, very small, and there is, furthermore, insufficient shore-based processing capacity to handle the large quantities that in the nature of the fishery are caught over short periods of time. Thus the situation has arisen that a significant proportion of the catch in UK vessels (usually in excess of 60%) is transshipped to receiving vessels. We have always controlled where the transshipment of mackerel may take place and, under S.25 of the Fisheries Act 1981, our officers have powers to go on board receiving vessels to inspect documents, fish and equipment and observe the transshipment operation. Nevertheless, we are constantly being accused by certain sections of the fishing industry of failure to exercise proper control over these operations and it is alleged that, as a result the TAC for mackerel is being grossly over-fished. A figure of 1m tonnes has been mentioned for 1981 against a TAC of 350,000 tonnes. The basis of the allegation is that without wider enforcement powers (including, it is contended, power to restrict numbers of klondykers) the transshipment operation, given connivance between buyer and seller, can defeat the object of the weekly quotas because of the ease with which records can be fabricated or falsified.
- It was pressures of this kind, channelled through back-bench MPs, that led the Government to add to its potential controlling powers over transshipments by including S.21 in the Fisheries Act 1981. This Section enables Ministers, by Order, to require that all vessels that receive fish must be licensed to do so. In taking this power, the Government made it clear that they did not intend to use it immediately but first wished to see in operation the stricter controls flowing from S.25 of the Act. If, however, it was shown that the S.25 powers alone were insufficient to bring proper control to the transshipping operations, the Government undertook to consider introducing a licensing scheme under S.21, after full consultation with all sections of the industry.

4. The extended S.25 powers were used for the first time this autumn in the Minch fishery and my colleagues in DAFS are confident that these, together with certain other changes in the licensing conditions applying to fishing vessels, led to a closer adherence to the quotas than in previous seasons. Nevertheless, they, and we, are still concerned that the transshipping operations continue to provide a means by which the less scrupulous fishermen can evade our quota controls with a good chance of avoiding detection. This view is also held by our Minister of State (Commons) who has asked us to investigate urgently the possibility of introducing a licensing scheme for receiving vessels from 1 February 1982. The significance of this date is that it would be roughly in the middle of the early year SW mackerel fishery (which we hope will last for 8 weeks from 3 January 1982) and would therefore ensure that at least part of this important fishery was subject to this control. Quite apart from the presentational advantages, it would also give us a useful trial run before the more important Minch mackerel fishery in the summer.

5. In the past all receiving vessels have been foreign-owned, coming mainly but not entirely from Eastern bloc countries and being operated by UK charterers. We would expect this Eastern bloc emphasis to continue to prevail. It was in the light of this that, when we consulted you on the inclusion of the powers to licence receiving vessels in the 1981 Act, you expressed reservations but were prepared to accept our proposal on the understanding that you would be given an opportunity to consider specifically any proposals we might make to use these powers. The purpose of this letter is to give you that opportunity.

6. I am in the process of instructing our lawyers to draw up both the necessary SI under S.21 of the 1981 Act, and the licensing scheme that would operate thereunder. In broad principle we are proposing that all receiving vessels, whether from the UK, the EC, or third countries, should be licensed to receive mackerel, sprat, pilchard, horse mackerel or herring caught by UK fishing vessels. (It is necessary to cover the transshipment of all the pelagic species in order to simplify enforcement when mackerel fishing has been stopped but fishing for eg sprat is continuing and could be used as a cover for mackerel fishing. The licence would be issued to a named owner or charterer (who might be either British or foreign) in respect of a named vessel and would be freely available on application. No limitation would be placed on the number or nationality of vessels that could be licensed, or on the amount of fish they could receive. The licence would contain conditions that specified where transshipment could take place (usually within specified harbours in the UK) although transshipment could take place elsewhere with prior permission from one of our officers. Most importantly the

licence would require the receiving vessel to maintain in a specified form a record which would show the amount and species of fish on board at the time of arrival at the fishery; the amount and species of fish received from each named UK fishing vessel during its stay in the port (and the amount and species paid for which is not always, the same) and the amount and species of fish in the hold when it departs. Any failure to comply with these requirements would make the master, the owner and the charterer guilty of an offence which could render the liable to a fine up to £50,000 and suspension of licence (depending on the nature of the offence). We are also considering the possibility of adopting a policy of withdrawing licences administratively if receiving vessels persistently fail to follow the rules if the court did not impose such a sanction.

7. Although we are aware that the system outlined in paragraph 6 above could still be circumvented by those determined to cheat the system, we are satisfied that it would make it significantly more difficult for them so to do. Given the mounting pressure from many quarters to bring the transshipping operations under tighter control, our Minister of State (C) is convinced that it is politically necessary for him to introduce measures on these lines at the earliest possible moment. Clearly a target date for introduction of 1 February 1982 sets us a very tight timetable so I should be grateful if you would urgently consider the proposals I have outlined in paragraph 6 above and let me know by 4 January whether they are acceptable in principle to your Department. I will, of course, send you the draft SI and licence as soon as possible for your comments.

8. I am also copying this letter to Fries (Home Office) and Connelly (Trade) from whom I should be grateful for reactions also by 4 January.

Yours sincerely

Jack Henshaw

JSW HENSHAW

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GRS 225

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DESKBY 060001Z

FM FCO 051831Z JAN 82

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 6 OF 5 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY EC POSTS. UKDEL NATO UKREP BRUSSELS

MOSCOW WARSAW EAST BERLIN SOFIA PRAGUE

BUDAPEST BUCHAREST UKDEL STRASBOURG UKMIS NEW YORK ANKARA

LISBON MADRID OSLO STOCKHOLM HELSINKI TOKYO OTTAWA

BELGRADE

FOR PS/LPS

FCO TELNO 005: INFORMAL MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE TEN, BRUSSELS, 4 JANUARY 1982 .

1. FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH WAS OMITTED IN ERROR:

'MEASURES AGAINST THE USSR

8. IN LINE WITH THE WIDESPREAD FEELING THAT THE COMMUNIQUE SHOULD STRESS SOVIET RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN POLAND, GENSCHER (FRG) AND OTHERS PRESSED HARD FOR THE USSR TO FEATURE IN THE SECTION OF THE COMMUNIQUE DEALING WITH ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE TEN SHOULD NOT JUST PUNISH POLAND. THORN (COMMISSION) SUGGESTED THAT RATHER THAN STOP SUPPLYING THE USSR WITH GOODS, EC MEMBER STATES SHOULD STOP BUYING FROM THE USSR AND IMPOSE QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS AND TARIFF BARRIERS. THIS WOULD PUT THE SOVIET UNION IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION. THE POSSIBILITIES WILL BE PURSUED IN COREPER.'

2. THE FORMAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRIEFING THE AMERICANS NOW RESTS WITH THE BELGIANS. BUT YOU SHOULD NONETHELESS URGENTLY BRIEF THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE MEETING AS WE SEE IT ON THE BASIS OF THIS TELEGRAM AND TUR.

CARRINGTON

POLAND SPECIAL
STANDARD

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CSCE UNIT
NAD
SED
WED
ECD (E)
ESID
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PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

~~MR BULLARD~~

MR FERGUSSON

~~SIR A AGLAND~~ mr. PRH Wright

~~MR GILLMORE~~

~~NO 10 DOWNING ST
ASSESSMENT STAFF
CABINET OFFICE
DIO CABINET OFFICE~~

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 14 OF 5 JANUARY 1982,

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW,
WARSAW, ROUTINE BRUSSELS, UKMIS NEW YORK, PEKING, ROME,
INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS, DUBLIN, TOKYO.

BRUSSELS TELNO 2 : EC STATEMENT OF 4 JANUARY.

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT LAST NIGHT ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

QUOTE WE WELCOME VERY MUCH THE SPECIAL MEETING OF THE EC FOREIGN
MINISTERS WHICH WE BELIEVE WAS FULLY WARRANTED BY THE SITUATION
IN POLAND. WE ALSO WELCOME THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE FOREIGN
MINISTERS. THE TONE OF THE COMMUNIQUE STRIKES A COMMON NOTE WITH
US STATEMENTS ON SEVERAL ISSUES: THE UNACCEPTABLE SITUATION IN
POLAND, THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS THERE, THE NEED TO
RECONVENE THE MADRID CSCE MEETING SOON, THE SOVIET ROLE, AND
THE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES THAT WOULD RESULT FROM OPEN WARSAW PACT
INTERVENTION.

INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS ARE CONTINUING AT NATO AND BETWEEN THE
US AND THE EC. THE ISSUE IS A KEY ONE FOR THE WEST. NEXT MONDAY
AT THE MEETING OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS IN BRUSSELS WE WILL
FURTHER REVIEW EVENTS IN POLAND.

INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS ARE CONTINUING AT NATO AND BETWEEN THE US AND THE EC. THE ISSUE IS A KEY ONE FOR THE WEST. NEXT MONDAY AT THE MEETING OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS IN BRUSSELS WE WILL FURTHER REVIEW EVENTS IN POLAND.

ON THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE USSR WE UNDERSTAND EUROPEAN VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE AND THEY ARE FULLY AWARE OF OURS. WE NOTE THE EC INTEREST IN CONTINUING CLOSE AND POSITIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE US AND OTHERS ON ECONOMIC MEASURES, AND WE WELCOME THEIR STATEMENT THAT THEY WILL AVOID ACTIONS WHICH COULD COMPROMISE OUR EFFORTS. WE HOPE THEY WILL EVENTUALLY TAKE MEASURES PARALLELING OURS. AS INDICATED EARLIER, WE LOOK FORWARD TO FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH THE EUROPEANS ON THIS SUBJECT. UNQUOTE.

2. THE PRESS QUOTE CHEYSSON IN BRUSSELS AS DESCRIBING THE LATEST STATEMENT BY THE COMMUNITY AS PROGRESS THOUGH "IT CAME A LITTLE LATE, FOR THE ANALYSIS OF OUR PARTNERS HAD BEEN A LITTLE SUPERFICIAL".

FCC PASS SAVING: ANKARA, ATHENS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, OTTAWA, OSLO, REYKJAVIK, THE HAGUE, DUBLIN, TOKYO.

HENDERSON

NNNN



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 January 1982

Prime Minister

To note.

A.S.C. $\frac{5}{1}$

Dear John,

h-a.
A.S.C. $\frac{6}{1}$ Jamming of BBC Polish Broadcasts

All except one of the BBC's broadcasts to Poland are now being jammed. The jamming began with the transmission from 1730 to 1830 hours on 30 December. Only the evening broadcasts appeared to be affected until 4 January; but on that day the transmission from 1500 to 1530 was jammed, and from 5 January, the three early morning transmissions also.

This is plainly part of an attempt to cut Poland off from external sources of information. There may also be an element of retaliation for the recent increase in the BBC's Polish service. As you know, the Lord Privy Seal announced in the House on 22 December that from the next day the BBC would increase its broadcasts in Polish by three 15-minute periods a day on weekdays, and by one period of $\frac{1}{2}$ hour on Sundays, making a total weekly increase from $21\frac{1}{4}$ to $26\frac{1}{4}$ hours.

All Voice of America broadcasts have been jammed since 28 December. VOA transmissions in Polish were increased by $2\frac{3}{4}$ hours a day from 31 December. Deutsche Welle broadcasts in Polish, on the other hand, are not being jammed. The pattern of jamming is therefore not uniform. It may possibly reflect the relative firmness of official national attitudes to recent events in Poland. The Americans have said that they may wish to discuss anti-jamming measures with us in due course.

After technical investigation, the BBC are now certain that the jamming is being done from points in the Soviet Union, and intend to issue a public statement to this effect at 1400 hours today.

Lord Trefgarne took the opportunity of a meeting with the Soviet Ambassador on 31 December to express the Government's extreme displeasure at the jamming of the BBC's Polish service and the continuing jamming of the BBC's Russian service. The Ambassador declined to comment on the jamming of the Polish service on the grounds that it was an "internal Polish matter". He claimed not to know of the jamming of the Russian service.

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

/Lord Trefgarne

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Lord Trefgarne will protest to the Polish Ambassador about the jamming of the BBC's Polish service, and other restrictive measures taken by the Polish Government when he sees him at 1530 today. He has also summoned the Soviet Ambassador for tomorrow morning and will deliver a protest to him, now we are sure of Soviet involvement.

Our delegation at the CSCE Review Meeting in Madrid will also raise the jamming question when the Conference reconvenes on 9 February.

Yours ever,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Francis Richards', written in a cursive style.

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

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CONFIDENTIAL

43286 - 2

GRS 1008

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 060001Z

FM FCO 051528Z JAN 82

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 5 OF 5 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE ALL EC POSTS UKDEL NATO AND UKREP BRUSSELS
PEKING (DESKBY 060001Z FOR PS/LPS)

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW WARSAW

EAST BERLIN SOFIA PRAGUE BUDAPEST BUCHAREST UKDEL STRASBOURG
UKMIS NEW YORK ANKARA LISBON MADRID OSLO STOCKHOLM
HELSINKI TOKYO OTTAWA BELGRADE.

INFORMAL MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE TEN, BRUSSELS,
4 JANUARY 1982

1. TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE WAS SENT TO YOU IN BRUSSELS TELNO 002.
2. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON THE TEN'S OBJECTIVES:
 - I. THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW
 - II. THE RELEASE OF DETAINEES
 - III. THE RESUMPTION OF THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN STATE, CHURCH
AND SOLIDARITY.

GENERAL AGREEMENT ALSO ON THE SOVIET UNION'S COMPLICITY IN AND
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND. BUT
REACTIONS TO EVENTS IN POLAND RANGED QUITE WIDELY: FROM COLOMBO
(ITALY) AND CHEYSSON (FRANCE) ON THE ONE HAND, WHO WERE IN FAVOUR
OF STRONG CONDEMNATION OF THE USE OF FORCE BY THE POLISH
AUTHORITIES, TO OTHERS, NOTABLY DENMARK, NETHERLANDS, IRELAND
AND GREECE, WHO SAW RECENT EVENTS MORE AS A LAST-DITCH ATTEMPT TO
FIND A 'POLISH SOLUTION', ALBEIT UNDER SOVIET PRESSURE.
GENSCHER'S EXPLICIT CONDEMNATION OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT WAS NEW
AND WELCOME. THE OPENING PARAGRAPHS OF THE COMMUNIQUE
SHOWED A NEW AND MORE FORCEFUL EXPRESSION OF THE TEN'S VIEWS.
AID TO POLAND

3. FOOD AID. SEVERAL MINISTERS EXPRESSED THE WISH NOT TO
PENALISE THE POLISH PEOPLE FOR THE ACTIONS OF THE POLISH
AUTHORITIES. THE MAJORITY VIEW WAS THAT THE CONTINUATION OF FOOD
AID SHOULD BE LINKED TO IMPROVEMENTS IN CONDITIONS IN POLAND AND

/TO GUARANTEES

1

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43286 - 2

TO GUARANTEES ABOUT THE ULTIMATE DESTINATION OF THE FOOD. CHEYSSON (FRANCE) MADE IT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT HE FAVOURED FOOD AID CONTINUING WITH THE COMMUNITY CONTINUING ITS 15 PER CENT DISCOUNT. GENSCHER (FRG) SAID THAT THE BUNDESTAG RESOLUTION WAS IMPORTANT IN DETERMINING THE GERMAN POSITION. THE PASSAGE IN PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE COMMUNIQUE IS EXPRESSED NEUTRALLY, AND WE EXPECT THAT FUTURE EC POLICY WILL REQUIRE THOROUGH DISCUSSION IN THE COMMUNITY.

4. CREDITS AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THIS SHOULD NOT CONTINUE IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES AS OTHERWISE IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE TEN WERE LENDING THEIR SUPPORT TO REPRESSION.

CSCE

5. I PRESSED FOR SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA OF THE EARLY RECONVENING OF THE CSCE MEETING. THERE WERE SOME HESITATIONS ON THE PART OF THE DUTCH AND IRISH: AND CHEYSSON (FRANCE) ARGUED AGAINST RECONVENING, STRESSING THE NEED TO AVOID ANTAGONISING THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. HE SUGGESTED, HOWEVER, THAT MINISTERS SHOULD ATTEND THE SCHEDULED OPENING ON 9 FEBRUARY, IN ORDER TO GIVE IT MAXIMUM IMPACT. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION IT WAS AGREED THAT THE TEN WOULD APPROACH THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, SEEKING THEIR VIEWS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE EARLY RECONVENING OF THE MEETING.

DISPATCH OF EMISSARY TO POLAND

6. THE IDEA RECEIVED WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FROM MOST MINISTERS, ESPECIALLY GENSCHER AND COLOMBO, WITH THE FORMER SUGGESTING ALSO THAT THE EMISSARY - TINDEMANS - SHOULD ALSO GO TO MOSCOW. BUT THE SUGGESTION WAS BLOCKED BY CHEYSSON WHO ADAMANTLY REFUSED TO PERMIT THE COMMUNIQUE TO MAKE ANY MENTION OF AN IDEA WHICH, HE MAINTAINED, WOULD AMOUNT TO AUTHORISING ONE REPRESENTATIVE TO SPEAK AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL ON THE WHOLE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND WOULD THUS BE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD IN POLITICAL COOPERATION. HE WAS SUPPORTED BY FOTILAS (GREECE). IT WAS THEREFORE OMITTED FROM THE COMMUNIQUE. IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED THAT CHEYSSON HAS BEEN INVITED TO VISIT POLAND.

US-EUROPE RELATIONS

/7. MOST

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7. MOST MINISTERS SPOKE FIRMLY ON THE NEED TO AVOID A CRISIS OF WESTERN UNITY. I EMPHASIZED THAT WE SHOULD FOCUS ON THE CRISIS IN THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM WHICH THE EVENTS IN POLAND SHOWED. DENMARK AND THE NETHERLANDS DOUBTED WHETHER THE TEN SHOULD ENDORSE US MEASURES, BUT AGREED THAT THE TEN SHOULD NOT STAND IN THE AMERICANS' WAY. DOOGE (IRELAND) SAID THAT HIS COUNTRY WOULD EXAMINE THE IMPACT OF US MEASURES IN ORDER TO ENSURE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE UNDERMINED OR CIRCUMVENTED. THORN (COMMISSION) WARNED AGAINST ANTAGONISING THE US IN VIEW OF OTHER EC-US PROBLEMS SUCH AS STEEL. THE ONLY REALLY DISCORDANT NOTE WAS STRUCK BY FOTILAS (GREECE) WHO SAID THAT HE COULD NOT CONCEAL HIS BITTERNESS AT THE UNILATERAL NATURE OF THE US MEASURES. THE TEXT IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE COMMUNIQUE EMERGED IN SATISFACTORY FORM - THE LAST SENTENCE REFERS TO THE NEED TO AVOID ANY STEP 'WHICH COULD UNDERMINE' THE US ACTIONS. (PRESIDENCY TEXT OF ENGLISH VERSION WHICH SAYS 'COMPROMISE' IS WRONG.)
MEASURES AGAINST POLAND

9. OTHER MEASURES AGAINST POLAND WHICH I HAD SOUGHT TO HAVE INCORPORATED IN THE COMMUNIQUE WERE EDITED OUT AFTER OBJECTIONS FROM PARTNERS. AS REGARDS THE POSSIBLE IMPOSITION OF RESTRICTIONS ON POLISH EMBASSIES BY THE TEN, THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTION CAME FROM FOTILAS (GREECE) WHO ARGUED THAT TO IMPOSE SUCH RESTRICTIONS MIGHT LEAD TO THOSE IN WARSAW BECOMING PERMANENT. HE RECEIVED SOME SUPPORT FROM OLESEN (DENMARK) ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WAS NOT DANISH NATIONAL PRACTICE TO RESTRICT ANY EMBASSY, EVEN THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION, IN THE WAY PROPOSED. THE INCLUSION IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF REFERENCE TO THE INCREASE IN BROADCASTING TO POLAND BY THOSE MEMBERS OF THE TEN WITH INTERNATIONAL RADIO SERVICES WAS ALSO OPPOSED BY OLESEN, ALTHOUGH IT WAS AGREED THAT THE PRESIDENCY COULD MENTION THE SUBJECT AT THE PRESIDENCY PRESS CONFERENCE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE MEETING.
COMMENT

10. THE OUTCOME OF THE MEETING WAS SATISFACTORY, IF NOT ALL THAT WE MIGHT HAVE HOPED FOR. THE MEETING'S MOST STRIKING FEATURE, HOWEVER, WAS THE CONTRAST BETWEEN FRENCH WORDS, WHICH WERE STRONGLY CRITICAL OF EVENTS IN POLAND, AND FRENCH ACTIONS, WHICH CONSISTED IN PRESSING FOR FOOD AID TO CONTINUE, OPPOSING THE EARLY RECONVENING OF THE CSCE AND SCUTTLING THE IDEA OF SENDING AN EMISSARY. ON THIS LATTER POINT IN PARTICULAR, THERE WAS A STRONG CLASH BETWEEN CHEYSSON AND GENSCHER. IF THE AMERICANS ARE CRITICAL OF THE RESULTS OF THE TEN'S MEETING, YOU MAY WISH TO MAKE SURE THAT THEY KNOW WHERE THE BLAME LIES.
CARRINGTON

POLAND SPECIAL
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MR FERGUSSON
SIR A ACLAND
MR GILLMORE

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FM ATHENS 051310Z JAN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 2 OF 5 JAN 1982

RPTD INFO ROUTINE TO BRUSSELS UKREP BRUSSELS, PARIS, BONN, ROME AND WARSAW.
SAVING TO OTHER EC POSTS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, ANKARA, NICOSIA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON.

POLAND : MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE TEN ON 4 JANUARY

1. FOTILAS, DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHO ATTENDED THE INFORMAL MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE TEN IN BRUSSELS WAS DISMISSED LATE IN THE EVENING OF 4 JANUARY BY PAPANDEOU FOR "FAILING TO OBEY THE GOVERNMENT'S INSTRUCTIONS ON THE POLISH QUESTION" AT THE MEETING. THE GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN HAS REFUSED TO GIVE ANY FURTHER CLARIFICATION AND MFA OFFICIALS HAD NO ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT. THE ATHENS NEWS AGENCY REFERS TO REPORTS THAT FOTILAS HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS TO ACCEPT THE WORDING OF THE COMMUNIQUE.

FOTILAS HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS TO ACCEPT THE WORDING OF THE COMMUNIQUE.

2. I DO NOT YET HAVE A FULL EXPLANATION OF THE REASONS FOR THE DISMISSAL SEMI COLON BUT IT IS A SHARP ASSERTION OF THE DOMINANT AUTHORITY OF PAPANDEU IN FOREIGN POLICY AND A REMINDER TO OTHER MINISTERS WHO MAY BE TEMPTED TO ACT WITHOUT CONSTANTLY CHECKING BACK TO HIM FOR INSTRUCTIONS. IT IS ALSO A REMINDER OF THE CONTINUED UNCERTAINTIES INVOLVED IN DEALING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF HIS GOVERNMENT. FOTILAS HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED WITH MODERATE, PRO-EC VIEWS WITHIN PASOK, AND, ALTHOUGH NOT A MAJOR FIGURE IN THE PARTY, HIS DEPARTURE FROM THE GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF ANTI-WESTERN ELEMENTS.

FCO PSE PASS ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

SUTHERLAND

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POLAND:

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24.

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PS/PUS

MR BULLARD

MR FERGUSSON

SIR A AGLAND MR. P. R. H. Wright

MR GILLMORE

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FM WARSAW 051605Z JAN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 029 OF 5TH JANUARY 1982

INFO ROUTINE: WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN AND
BODUK.

INFO SAVING: EAST BERLIN, SOFIA, PRAGUE, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST,
BUDAPEST, HELSINKI, STOCKHOLM, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKREP BRUSSELS.

POLISH SITUATION.

1. THERE ARE SOME SIGNS THAT THE PROVISIONS OF MARTIAL LAW ARE
BEING RELAXED SLIGHTLY. TELEPHONE AND TELEX COMMUNICATIONS ARE TODAY
RESTORED WITHIN TEN VOIVODSHIPS. THESE ARE ALL PREDOMINATELY RURAL
AREAS, SUCH AS MLOCLAWA. MOST OF THEM HAVE LITTLE HISTORY OF
SOLIDARITY ACTIVITY BEFORE MARTIAL LAW WAS IMPOSED.

2. THE FIRST MEETING WAS HELD YESTERDAY OF A NEW "SOCIO-ECONOMIC
COMMITTEE" OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. ITS CHAIRMAN IS RA-OWSKI

2. ~~THE FIRST MEETING WAS HELD YESTERDAY OF A NEW "SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMMITTEE" OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. ITS CHAIRMAN IS RAKOWSKI AND AMONG ITS MEMBERS ARE THE LEADERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND PEASANT PARTIES AND OZDOWSKI, CATHOLIC VICE PREMIER. THE COMMITTEE, WHICH IS DESCRIBED AS A NEW ORGAN OF THE GOVERNMENT, MAY WELL BE AN ATTEMPT TO RE-VAMP THE OLD COALITION ALLIANCE.~~

3. TRYBUNA LUDU ANNOUNCES TODAY THE OFFICIAL FIGURE FOR COAL PRODUCTION LAST YEAR, WHICH IS JUST OVER 163MT. WE ARE INCLINED TO TREAT THIS FIGURE WITH SOME SCEPTICISM.

4. THE TRIAL STARTS TODAY OF MACIEJ SZCZEPANSKI, FORMER HEAD OF POLISH TV AND RADIO. THERE IS ALSO NEWS IN TODAY'S PRESS OF TRIALS OF SOME ORGANISERS OF STRIKES AFTER THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW. THEY HAVE BEEN GIVEN JAIL SENTENCES RANGING FROM 3-7 YEARS. ALTHOUGH THESE ARE HARSH, THEY SHOULD BE SEEN AGAINST THE MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH WHICH THE MILITARY COURTS HAVE THE POWER TO ENFORCE.

5. ANOTHER SIGN OF NORMALISATION, OR AT LEAST PRETENDED NORMALISATION, SEEMED TO HAVE APPEARED WHEN FOREIGN JOURNALISTS WERE TODAY INVITED TO VISIT POZNAW ON A TRIP ORGANISED BY THE FORMER INTERPRESS. HOWEVER, THE PLANE IN WHICH THEY WERE TO FLY TO POZNAW WAS NOT GIVEN PERMISSION TO TAKE OFF BY THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES. EVENTUALLY ALL THE JOURNALISTS, INCLUDING THE TASS CORRESPONDENT, WALKED OUT EXCLAIM

6. TWO MEMBERS OF CHANCERY CALLED TODAY ON THE EDITORIAL OFFICE OF ZYCIE WARSZAWY WHICH IS TO RESUME PUBLICATION NEXT MONDAY (11 JANUARY). THEY WERE TOLD THAT THERE HAD BEEN MANY PROBLEMS WITH THE "WERYFIKACJA" THERE. JOURNALISTS WHO FAILED WHEN VETTED ARE DISMISSED. THEY WERE TOLD THAT FOR TECHNICAL REASONS WARSAW'S TELEPHONES MAY NOT BE FULLY OPERATIVE FOR SOME TIME. ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING (SEE YESTERDAY'S SITREP) THE DEPUTY EDITOR SAID THAT HE DID NOT FORESEE ONE FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

7. WHEN BRIEFING THIRD WORLD AMBASSADORS TODAY, CZYREK REPORTED NO STRIKES IN THE COUNTRY, WITH NORMAL WORK RESUMING IN KATOWICE (STEELWORKS) AND GDANSK (SHIPYARDS) ON 4 JANUARY. SITUATION IN FACTORIES WAS MIXED BUT OVERALL TREND WAS GOOD. PRODUCTIVITY WAS HIGHER BUT SOME AREAS OF "PASSIVE RESISTANCE" REMAINED. AT SAME MEETING OLECHOWSKI SAID PFA HOPED TO RESTORE TELEX LINKS TO EMBASSIES NEXT WEEK. MISSIONS' CULTURAL INSTITUTES COULD RESUME ACTIVITIES FROM 18 JANUARY (THE BRITISH COUNCIL HAS NEVER STOPPED ITS ACTIVITIES EXCLAIM) BUT THE BAN ON LARGE GATHERINGS WOULD REMAIN.

ACTIVITIES FROM 18 JANUARY (THE BRITISH COUNCIL HAS NEVER STOPPED
ITS ACTIVITIES EXCEPT) BUT THE BAN ON LARGE GATHERINGS WOULD REMAIN.
FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE ONLY LOT CHARTER FLIGHTS WOULD BE
ALLOWED IN AND OUT OF WARSAW AIRPORT.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

MELHUI SH.

BT

~~NO~~ PASSED BY G.O.D.1

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
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
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 002 OF 04 JAN

INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING(DESKBY 042400Z) AND WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, ATHENS, ROME, THE HAGUE,
COPENHAGEN, LUXEMBOURG, DUBLIN, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, WARSAW,
EAST BERLIN, SOFIA, PRAGUE, BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST, BELGRADE,
UKDEL STRASBOURG, ANKARA, LISBON, MADRID, UKMIS N YORK, OSLO,
STOCKHOLM, HELSINKI, TOKYO, OTTAWA. 

INFORMAL MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE TEN, BRUSSELS
4 JANUARY 1982.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE AS FOLLOWS:

1. THE TEN UTTERLY DISAPPROVE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION IN POLAND.
2. THEY HAVE NOTED THE DECLARATIONS OF THE POLISH LEADERSHIP OF ITS INTENTION TO MAINTAIN NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND TO REESTABLISH IN THE NEAR FUTURE LIBERTY AND THE PROCESS OF REFORM AS WELL AS RESUMING THE DIALOGUE WITH THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE POLISH NATION. UNHAPPILY THE TEN MUST NOTE TODAY THAT, CONTRARY TO THESE DECLARATIONS, WHAT HAS TAKEN PLACE HAS NOT BEEN DIALOGUE BUT REPRESSION BRINGING IN ITS TRAIN VIOLATIONS OF THE MOST ELEMENTARY HUMAN AND CITIZEN'S RIGHTS, CONTRARY TO THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.
3. THE TEN THEREFORE APPEAL URGENTLY TO THE POLISH AUTHORITIES TO END AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE STATE OF MARTIAL LAW, TO RELEASE THOSE ARRESTED, AND TO RESTORE A GENUINE DIALOGUE WITH THE CHURCH AND SOLIDARITY.
4. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE GRAVE EVENTS EXTENDS BEYOND POLAND ITSELF. THE INABILITY OF THE SYSTEM IN EASTERN EUROPE TO ACCEPT THE MODIFICATIONS NECESSARY TO MEET THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLE IS SUCH AS TO ENDANGER PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATIVE LINKS WITH THE EAST, AND THUS SERIOUSLY TO AFFECT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. IN THIS CONTEXT THE TEN NOTE WITH CONCERN AND DISAPPROVAL THE SERIOUS EXTERNAL PRESSURE AND THE CAMPAIGN DIRECTED BY THE U.S.S.R. AND OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AGAINST THE EFFORTS FOR RENEWAL IN POLAND.
5. THIS ALREADY GRAVE SITUATION WOULD BE FURTHER AGGRAVATED IF IT LED TO AN OPEN INTERVENTION BY THE WARSAW PACT. FOR THIS REASON THE TEN WISH TO ISSUE A SOLEMN WARNING AGAINST ANY SUCH INTERVENTION.
6. THE TEN ARE TOTALLY IN SYMPATHY WITH THE POLISH PEOPLE AND ARE WILLING TO CONTINUE THE DIRECT HUMANITARIAN AID TO THEM. 

7. THE TEN HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF THE ECONOMIC MEASURES TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WITH REGARD TO THE U.S.S.R. THE TEN WILL UNDERTAKE IN THIS CONTEXT CLOSE AND POSITIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF OTHER WESTERN STATES IN ORDER TO DEFINE WHAT DECISIONS WILL BEST SERVE THEIR COMMON OBJECTIVES AND TO AVOID ANY STEP WHICH COULD UNDERMINE THEIR RESPECTIVE ACTIONS.

8. DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND CONSTITUTE A GRAVE VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THE TEN THEREFORE CONSIDER THAT THE MADRID CONFERENCE SHOULD DISCUSS THEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL. THE TEN WILL MAKE APPROACHES TO THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES TO PROPOSE AN EARLY RESUMPTION OF THE MADRID MEETING.

9. THE TEN WILL WORK IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS SPECIALISED AGENCIES FOR A DENUNCIATION OF VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACTS OF VIOLENCE.

10. OTHER MEASURES WILL BE CONSIDERED AS THE SITUATION IN POLAND DEVELOPS, IN PARTICULAR MEASURES CONCERNING CREDIT AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO POLAND, AND MEASURES CONCERNING THE COMMUNITY'S COMMERCIAL POLICY WITH REGARD TO THE U.S.S.R. IN ADDITION THE TEN WILL EXAMINE THE QUESTION OF FURTHER FOOD AID TO POLAND.

11. THE TEN HAVE CALLED ON THE POLISH AUTHORITIES BOTH NATIONALLY AND THROUGH THE PRESIDENCY TO LIFT ABNORMAL AND UNACCEPTABLE RESTRICTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN PLACED ON THE WORK OF EMBASSIES, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MEDIA, AIR SERVICES AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS IN POLAND.

12. THE TEN WILL STUDY WHAT CAN BE DONE TO ALLEVIATE THE SITUATION OF POLES OUTSIDE POLAND WHO DO NOT WISH TO RETURN TO THEIR COUNTRY UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

13. REPORT FOLLOWS FROM FCO.

HARTLAND-SWANN

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See below,
From the Private Secretary

5 January 1982

Poland

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 31 December and noted its contents.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to all members of OD Committee and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

John [unclear]
John [unclear]

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JL

IMMEDIATE

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SIR A ACLAND
MR GILLMORE

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DESKBY 041430Z

FM WARSAW 041430Z JAN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 015 OF 4TH JANUARY 1982

AND TO UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

INFO IMMEDIATE: WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, ROME AND UKDEL
NATO.

POLAND : INTERNAL SITUATION.

1. MY TELS NOS 12 AND 13 TRANSMITTED A RECORD OF GENERAL JARUZELSKI'S DISCUSSION WITH EC HEADS OF MISSION TODAY. BEFORE THAT MEETING THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR GAVE US AN INTERESTING ACCOUNT OF DISCUSSIONS HE HAD THE PREVIOUS DAY WITH CZYREK AND RAKOWSKI ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM BONN. I EXPECT MR GENSCHER WILL HAVE INFORMED THE MEETING OF EC MINISTERS ABOUT THIS MEETING WHICH IN MANY RESPECTS WAS MORE INTERESTING THAN THE EXCHANGE WITH JARUZELSKI.

2. THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR SAW CZYREK AND RAKOWSKI TOGETHER ON SUNDAY MORNING, 3 JANUARY. HE SAID THAT GENSCHER HAD ASKED HIM TO REMIND

MORNING, 3 JANUARY. HE SAID THAT GENSCHER HAD ASKED HIM TO REMIND THE POLISH AUTHORITIES OF GERMAN AND WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEREST IN ANY NEW MOVES ON THE RE-OPENING OF THE DIALOGUE WITH CHURCH AND SOLIDARITY, THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE RELEASE OF ALL DETAINEES. GENSCHER HAD TOLD RAKOWSKI THAT HE WAS HOPING FOR SOME ACTION ON ALL OF THESE BY 4 JANUARY WHEN EC FOREIGN MINISTERS WERE MEETING IN BRUSSELS. AFTER THAT MEETING GENSCHER WAS HIMSELF GOING DIRECTLY TO THE US TO JOIN CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT ON 5 JANUARY.

3. RAKOWSKI REPLIED THAT THERE WAS AN ACTIVE DIALOGUE GOING ON WITH THE CHURCH AT THE LEVEL OF BARCIKOWSKI WITH CARDINAL MACHARSKI, AND BISHOP DABROWSKI. THERE WAS ALSO A DIALOGUE WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF SOLIDARITY WHICH WAS BECOMING BROADER AND DEEPER EVERY DAY. MORE SOLIDARITY ACTIVISTS WERE NOW READY TO TALK WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND RAKOWSKI MENTIONED GOTOWSKI, A MEMBER OF SOLIDARITY'S NATIONAL COMMISSION. BRUNNE, SOLIDARITY'S SPOKESMAN, WHO HAD BEEN ABROAD ON DECEMBER 12/13 WAS NOW COMING BACK TO POLAND AFTER CONTACTS IN THE US WITH THE POLISH EMBASSY. NEGWER INTERVENED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD HIS FOREIGN MINISTER TO MEAN THE RE-OPENING OF A DIALOGUE WITH IMPORTANT SOLIDARITY LEADERS AND PARTICULARLY WITH WALESA. RAKOWSKI REPLIED THAT IT WAS MUCH TOO EARLY TO START THIS SORT OF DIALOGUE. WALESA WAS A SPACIAL CASE. HE CONSIDERED HIMSELF A VIP AND HIS PROPOSALS WERE FRANKLY UNREALISTIC. HE WAS NOW BEGINNING TO REALISE THAT LIFE IN POLAND WOULD GO ON WITHOUT HIM. THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT AT FACTORY FLOOR LEVEL THE WORKERS HAD FORGOTTEN HIM.

4. AS FOR MARTIAL LAW, RAKOWSKI SAID THAT NO-ONE COULD YET GIVE A FIRM ESTIMATE ABOUT WHEN IT WOULD BE LIFTED OR RELAXED. THE DECISION HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN THAT "ZYCIE WARSZAWY" WOULD RE-APPEAR THIS WEEK. RAKOWSKI DID NOT REPLY WHEN NEGWER ASKED HIM ABOUT HIS OWN WEEKLY "POLITYKA". ON DETAINEES, RAKOWSKI AND CZYREK SAID THAT ONE-SIXTH OF THOSE INTERNED HAD ALREADY BEEN RELEASED AND MORE WERE BEING RELEASED EACH DAY.

5. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION, CZYREK SAID THAT JARUZELSKI WOULD NOT BREAK MUCH NEW GROUND IN HIS DISCUSSION THE FOLLOWING DAY WITH THE EC HEADS OF MISSION. HE WOULD UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN WESTERN EUROPE AND POLAND WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE "PEACE INFRASTRUCTURES" ESTABLISHED IN THE 70S. WHEN NEGWER MENTIONED THE EC DEMARCHE ON 22 DECEMBER, CZYREK SAID HE HAD FORGOTTEN IT SINCE HE HAD NOT ACCEPTED IT.

6. CZYREK HANDED OVER JARUZELSKI'S REPLY TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S EARLIER LETTER. NEGWER SAID IT CONTAINED NOTHING NEW BUT

6. CZYREK HANDED OVER JARUZELSKI'S REPLY TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S EARLIER LETTER. NEGWER SAID IT CONTAINED NOTHING NEW BUT CONCENTRATED ON POLISH SOVEREIGNTY.

MELHUI SH

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MR FERGUSSON
SIR A ACLAND
MR GILLMORE

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FM WARSAW 041330Z JAN

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 012 OF 4TH JANUARY 1982

AND TO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

INFO IMMEDIATE: WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, ROME, DUBLIN,
ATHENS, THE HAGUE, COPENHAGEN, BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG AND UKDEL
NATO.

INFO SAVING: PRAGUE, SOFIA, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, EAST
BERLIN.

GENERAL JARUZELSKI'S MEETING WITH EC HEADS OF MISSION.

1. JARUZELSKI SPENT NEARLY TWO HOURS WITH THE S EC HEADS OF MISSION
REPRESENTED IN WARSAW. BY AGREEMENT, THE BELGIAN AMBASSADOR WILL BE
SENDING A COLLECTIVE REPORT BUT YOU WILL WISH TO HAVE MY OWN ACCOUNT
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. AFTER CONVEYING NEW YEARS GREETINGS TO US AND TO OUR HEADS OF
STATE GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLE...

STATE, GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLE, JARUZELSKI SPOKE FOR OVER ONE HOUR, WITH TRANSLATION INTO ENGLISH AND FRENCH, ABOUT THE LEAD-IN TO THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW AND ITS JUSTIFICATION. THIS ACCOUNT CONTAINED FEW SURPRISES AND WAS VERY CLOSE TO CZYREK'S DEFENCE OF MARTIAL LAW IN THE FIRST WEEK OF THE CRISIS. SOME FLAVOUR OF JARUZELSKI'S COMMENTS CAN BE GAINED BY THE FOLLOWING SELECTIVE EXTRACTS.

3. POLAND WAS NORMALLY A BRIDGE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BUT NOW, REGRETFULLY, THE COUNTRY WAS A FOCUS OF TENSIONS. THE STATE OF WAR DECLARED ON 13 DECEMBER WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY CORRECT EVEN IF THE TERM GAVE TOO SHARP AND CONFRONTATIONAL A MEANING TO WHAT WAS HAPPENING ON THE GROUND. IT WAS NOT A MILITARY COUP. THE LEGAL GOVERNMENT WAS STILL WORKING. "JARUZELSKI COULD NOT BRING DOWN JARUZELSKI". THE ARMY, VERY MUCH PART OF THE POLISH NATION, REGRETTED ITS CURRENT ROLE BUT HAD TO ACT BECAUSE OF THREATENING ANARCHY. POLAND IN THE 1970S HAD MADE MANY MISTAKES, NOT A FEW BECAUSE OF WESTERN INFLUENCE. THE PROTEST OF THE GDANSK, SZCZECIN ETC WORKERS IN AUGUST 1980 INDUCED THE GOVERNMENT TO SEEK ITS OWN PATH OF RENEWAL. SOME MISTAKES MIGHT HAVE BEEN MADE BUT THE PATH WAS NEW AND DIFFICULT. THE ECONOMY DETERIORATED LARGELY BECAUSE OF SOLIDARITY HOSTILITY. GNP IN 1981 WAS DOWN BY 15% ON THE PREVIOUS YEAR. DESPITE WARNINGS BY THE SEJM AND DESPITE INITIATIVES BY THE GOVERNMENT IN ATTEMPTING TO SET UP A FRONT OF NATIONAL UNDERSTANDING SOLIDARITY REMAINED IMPLACABLY HOSTILE. THE UNION WANTED TO TAKE, AND NOT TO SHARE, POWER. THE DECISION TO IMPOSE MARTIAL LAW ON 13 DECEMBER WAS THE LEAST DESTRUCTIVE COURSE OPEN TO THE AUTHORITIES AND WAS DESIGNED NOT ONLY TO SAVE POLAND BUT PERHAPS EUROPE TOO.

4. JARUZELSKI WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE STATE OF MARTIAL LAW WAS UNNATURAL AND COULD NOT BE MAINTAINED IN THE LONG RUN. SOME FOREIGN COUNTRIES "AND HERE I REFER TO THE UNITED STATES" HAD DELIVERED ULTIMATA WHICH WERE MANIFESTATIONS OF CLEAR INTERFERENCE. POLAND APPRECIATED THE POSITION TAKEN BY COUNTRIES IN WEST EUROPE WHICH WERE CALMLY AND OBJECTIVELY APPRAISING THE SITUATION. POLAND ALSO WELCOMED SUPPLIES OF FOOD STUFFS AND MEDICINES FROM WESTERN EUROPE. AFTER STABILISATION AND THE RESTORATION OF THE ECONOMY POLAND WISHED TO FULFIL ALL OBLIGATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD, TO THOSE WHO EXTENDED CREDITS. MISCHIEF-MAKING BODIES SUCH AS ^{Radio Free Europe} RFE, WHILE DEPLORING MARTIAL LAW, WERE ACTUALLY ENSURING ITS LONGER DURATION BY CREATING ILLUSIONS AND NURTURING FALSE HOPES.

5. JARUZELSKI SAID THAT POLAND WANTED THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE 10 FULLY TO UNDERSTAND POLISH INTENTIONS AND AIMS. THE MARTIAL LAW...

5. JARUZELSKI SAID THAT POLAND WANTED THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE 10 FULLY TO UNDERSTAND POLISH INTENTIONS AND AIMS, THE MARTIAL COUNCIL HAD NO INTEREST IN PROLONGING MARTIAL LAW, WHICH, AMONG OTHER THINGS, MADE THE WORK OF EMBASSIES MORE DIFFICULT. SOME RESTRICTIONS WERE ALREADY BEING EASED BUT THE SCALE AND SCOPE OF FURTHER CONCESSIONS WOULD DEPEND ON THE PACE OF STABILISATION. IF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS WORKED WELL, MARTIAL LAW WOULD PROGRESSIVELY BE LIFTED. THERE WAS, HOWEVER, EVIDENCE OF CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES IN THE COUNTRY ENCOURAGED BY SUCH OUTSIDE BODIES AS RFE AND THIS HAD TO BE STAMPED OUT.

6. THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAD ALREADY RELEASED "A CERTAIN PART" OF THE DETAINEES AND WOULD CONTINUE THIS PROCESS. THOSE RELEASED WOULD HAVE TO SIGN GUARANTEES THAT THEY WOULD NOT INDULGE IN FUTURE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. IN THE INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY AND OF SOLIDARITY, AS A MASS MOVEMENT, SOME LEADERS WOULD HAVE TO REMAIN ISOLATED. THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION IF WESTERN COUNTRIES WERE TO RECEIVE SOLIDARITY LEADERS WHO MIGHT BE EXPELLED. THE CHURCH HAD BEEN GIVEN ACCESS TO THE DETAINEES, WHO WERE NOT HARASSED. AFTER TWO WEEKS OF MARTIAL LAW, THE FIRST MILITARY COURTS HAD NOW STARTED WORK, GIVING SOME SHORT SENTENCES.

7. THE AUTHORITIES INTENDED TO CONTINUE WITH REFORMS BUT ONLY IN A STRONG AND CONSOLIDATED POLISH STATE. "WE SHALL BE CAPABLE OF BRAVE REFORMS AND EXPERIMENTS TO EXPAND THE CHARACTER OF GOVERNMENT". BUT THE AUTHORITIES WERE NOT PREPARED TO DEAL WITH LEADERS OF SOLIDARITY WHO HAD DECLARED WAR ON THE POLISH NATION IN RADOM AND THEN IN GDANSK. SOME SOLIDARITY LEADERS IN DETENTION WERE SHOWING A REALISTIC APPROACH AND THE AUTHORITIES WERE TALKING TO THEM. THERE WAS A GOOD DIALOGUE WITH THE CHURCH, WITH WHOM THE AUTHORITIES FOUND UNDERSTANDING ON MAJOR ISSUES. THE DATE OF IMPLEMENTATION FOR FUTURE DIALOGUE DEPENDED NOT ONLY ON THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES AND OTHER ELEMENTS IN POLAND BUT ALSO ON THE POSITION WHICH WESTERN EUROPE WOULD ADOPT.

8. THE BELGIAN AMBASSADOR, REPRESENTING THE PRESIDENCY, THEN SPOKE AS AGREED BETWEEN US AT AN EARLIER MEETING. HIS COMMENTS FOLLOWED CLOSELY THE AGREED TEXT IN COREU 14 (SEE MIFT) HE DID NOT LEAVE A COPY OF HIS COMMENTS.

9. JARUZELSKI CHOSE TO PICK OUT THE GOOD POINTS IN THE BELGIAN AMBASSADORS' COMMENTS AND TO IGNORE THE NASTY ONES. HE SAID THAT HE NEVER DOUBTED THE FRIENDSHIP OF THE COUNTRIES

~~BELGIAN AMBASSADORS' COMMENTS AND TO IGNORE THE NASTY ONES.~~
~~HE SAID THAT HE NEVER DOUBTED THE FRIENDSHIP OF THE COUNTRIES~~
REPRESENTED ROUND THE TABLE AND WAS CONFIDENT THAT POLAND COULD
RELY ON THEIR COOPERATION. HE SHARED OUR OPINION THAT FOREIGN
INTERFERENCE WAS INADMISSABLE AND WISHED TO EMPHASIS THAT THE
DECISION TO IMPOSE MARTIAL LAW WAS GENUINELY A POLISH ONE.
THE ONLY OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE POLAND APPRECIATED WAS THE ACTION
OF SOCIALIST STATES IN SENDING SPEEDY FOOD AND OTHER AID.
HE HOPED THAT SOME PARTS OF HIS DECLARATION ANSWERED THE POINTS
RAISED IN THE COMMENTS OF THE 10. THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND THE
UN CHARTER SHOULD BE READ IN FULL, SINCE THEY DID NOT EXCLUDE
THE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF COUNTRIES TO PURSUE INTERNAL SECURITY
OBJECTIVES AND TO PREVENT CIVIL WAR AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE
ECONOMY. HUMAN RIGHTS SHOULD INCLUDE THE RIGHT TO WORK AND THE
RIGHT TO PEACE. POLAND HAS TO PUT OUT THE FIRE IN ITS OWN
HOUSE. A TERRORIST WAS NOT ONLY ONE WHO PLANTED BOMBS BUT ONE
WHO THREATENED HIS COLLEAGUES AT THEIR WORK PLACE WITH CLUBS
TO PREVENT THEM FROM WORKING. JARUZELSKI CONCLUDED BY REPEATING
HIS REQUEST FOR WESTERN UNDERSTANDING.

10. IT IS ON THE FACE OF IT SURPRISING THAT JARUZELSKI CALLED
IN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 10, ITSELF AN ACT OF SOME
SIGNIFICANCE, MOSTLY TO REPEAT PAST JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE
IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW. HIS SKETCHY ATTEMPTS TO LOOK INTO THE
FUTURE FOLLOW THE THE THREE MAIN POINTS OUTLINED BY GENSCHER WHEN
HE SAW RAKOWSKI IN BONN (BONN TELNO 1046) AND WHICH THE POLES
KNOW CAUSE COUNTRIES OF THE 10 MOST CONCERN. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER,
OFFER ANY NEW CONCESSIONS NOR PRESENT ANY NEW FACTS EXCEPT, PERHAPS
THE CURIOUS REFERENCE TO WESTERN COUNTRIES ACCEPTING EXPELLED
SOLIDARITY LEADERS. IT WAS SIMPLY AN ELEVATION OF THE DIALOGUE
BETWEEN POLAND AND THE WEST TO HEAD OF GOVERNMENT LEVEL.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

MELHUI SH

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FM WARSAW 041120Z JAN 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 079 OF 2 JANUARY

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO AND

UKREP BRUSSELS

POLAND: NEW ECONOMIC MEASURES

1. AS EXPECTED, THE GOVERNMENT BROUGHT INTO EFFECT SEVERAL IMPORTANT ECONOMIC CHANGES ON 1 JANUARY.
2. SUPPLY PRICES, IE THE PRICES PAID BY FACTORIES FOR THEIR ESSENTIAL RAW MATERIALS, FUELS ETC, WERE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED. ALTHOUGH DETAILS HAVE NOT YET APPEARED, COAL AND OIL ARE RUMOURED TO HAVE GONE UP 4 - 6 TIMES IN PRICE. ANNOUNCING THE CHANGES THE GOVERNMENT STATED THAT THESE INCREASES WOULD NOT IN THEMSELVES CAUSE COMMENSURATE RISES IN RETAIL PRICES; BUT INCREASES IN THE LATTER WERE INESCAPABLE ANYWAY.
3. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO CHANGED THE RATE QUOTED FOR THE ZLOTY AGAINST OTHER CURRENCIES, INCLUDING THOSE OF CMEA COUNTRIES. THE POUND STERLING NOW STANDS AT 153.49 ZLOTYS (AS AGAINST ABOUT 65 ZLOTYS PREVIOUSLY), AN EFFECTIVE DEVALUATION OF 136%. THE NEW RATE AGAINST THE US DOLLAR IS 80 ZLOTYS (ABOUT 35 ZLOTYS PREVIOUSLY). WE BELIEVE THAT THE NEW EXCHANGE RATES WILL OPERATE IN ALL FOREIGN CURRENCY EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS (EXCEPT, POSSIBLY, IN THE CALCULATION OF THE WORLD MARKET VALUES OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS OF DOMESTIC ORIGIN).
4. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO PUBLISHED A DOCUMENT FOR "PUBLIC DISCUSSION" ON PROPOSED CHANGES IN RETAIL PRICES, AND METHODS OF PROVIDING COMPENSATION FOR THE LESS-WELL-OFF. IF THE PROPOSED INCREASES ARE IMPLEMENTED THE PRICE OF 1 KILO OF SUGAR WILL INCREASE FROM 10.5 TO 46 ZLOTYS; MILK FROM 2.9 TO 10 ZLOTYS A LITRE; HAM FROM 59 TO 280 ZLOTYS A KILO; COAL FROM 550 TO 2000 ZLOTYS PER TONNE; DOMESTIC SERVICES EXCEPT THOSE WHOSE PRICES HAVE ALREADY INCREASED RECENTLY, EG BREAD. THE LEVELS OF COMPENSATION FOR THE PRICE INCREASES ARE PRESENTED IN THREE VARIANTS, WHICH ARE THEN RELATED TO CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS (EG ORDINARY WORKERS, RETIRED PERSONS, AND CHILDREN) AND LEVELS OF INCOME. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, A WORKER WHOSE INCOME IS LESS THAN Z 3500 PER MONTH WOULD RECEIVE AN ADDITIONAL Z 1300 A MONTH, WHEREAS SOMEONE EARNING OVER Z 14,000 A MONTH WOULD RECEIVE BETWEEN Z 1100 A MONTH EXTRA OR NOTHING AT ALL, DEPENDING ON THE VARIANT OF THE SCHEME WHICH IS CHOSEN. IT IS NOT CLEAR FROM THE DISCUSSION PAPER

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WHEN, IF AT ALL, THE PRICE INCREASES WILL TAKE PLACE, OR IF THEY WILL BE IMPLEMENTED IN STAGES. NOR IS IT POSSIBLE TO SAY AT THIS STAGE HOW GREAT A ROLE "PUBLIC OPINION" WILL PLAY IN INFLUENCING THE EVENTUAL DECISIONS.

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TELNO 005 OF 021210Z JAN 82

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BUCHAREST, SOFIA, BELGRADE, HELSINKI, STOCKHOLM, UKREP BRUSSELS.
UKMIS NEW YORK AND UKMIS GENEVA.

POLISH SITUATION:

SOLIDARITY ACCOUNT OF EVENTS:

1. SOLIDARITY (MAZOWSZE) ISSUED THEIR 6TH BULLETIN SINCE THE START OF MARTIAL LAW ON 29 DECEMBER. IT REACHED US ON 1 JANUARY. IT MAKES, INTER ALIA, THE FOLLOWING CLAIMS (WHICH, CLEARLY, WE CANNOT SUBSTANTIATE).

A) THE BALTIC COAST. ALL THE SHIPYARDS HAVE BEEN CLEARED. SMALL ZOMO DETACHMENTS REMAIN AT THE LENIN AND PARIS COMMUNE SHIPYARDS. WORK IS DUE TO RESUME IN THE YARDS TODAY. THE WORKERS HAVE DECIDED TO SIGN LOYALTY PLEDGES BECAUSE " A FORCED SIGNATURE BINDS ONE TO NOTHING ". SOLIDARITY HAVE CALLED A STRIKE IN THE YARDS FROM TODAY.

B) SILESIA. SOLIDARITY SAY THAT AT LEAST 14 MINERS DIED IN AN ATTACK ON MANIFEST LIPCOWY MINE. ROUNDUPS OF ACTIVISTS CONTINUE. ONLY MILITIAMEN AND SOLDIERS ARE TO BE SEEN ON THE STREETS OF MANY MINING TOWNS.

C) SWIDNIK. A LONG ACCOUNT IS GIVEN OF EVENTS AT THE HELICOPTER FACTORY THERE ON 16 DECEMBER. IT COINCIDES WITH STORIES WE HAVE ALREADY REPORTED.

D) ARMY MUTINIES. SOLIDARITY UNDERSTANDABLY DEVOTE CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO THIS TOPIC. THEY CLAIM THAT THESE ARE BECOMING MORE WIDESPREAD. SPECIFIC INCIDENTS CITED ARE : A MUTINY BY A WHOLE UNIT AT NIEPOLOMICE NEAR KRAKOW, AFTER WHICH ALL ITS OFFICERS WERE ARRESTED: A FIGHT IN BYDGOSZCZ BETWEEN THE ARMY AND ZOMO (WE HAD HEARD THIS TOO BUT HAVE SINCE ALSO HEARD FROM A BRITISH RESIDENT OF BYDGOSZCZ THAT HE KNEW NOTHING OF SUCH A INCIDENT): THE ENFORCED REPLACEMENT OF THE ARMY BY ZOMO OUTSIDE THE LENIN SHIPYARD BECAUSE THE ARMY WAS VISIBLY SPORTING SOLIDARITY SLOGANS: THE SHOOTING OF AN OFFICER IN AN UNNAMED NORTHERN POLISH TOWN BY A SOLDIER WHO SUFFERED A NERVOUS SHOCK ON HEARING ON TV, OF THE DEATHS AT WUJEK . SOLIDARITY ADD THAT THE MARTIAL COUNCIL ARE DEPENDENT UPON THE CREATION OF A GULF BETWEEN SOCIETY AND THE ARMY. TO THIS END, POLITICAL OFFICERS ARE TELLING SOLDIERS OF ATTACKS ON PATROLS AND THE THREAT PRESENTED TO SOLDIERS FAMILIES BY MEMBERS OF SOLIDARITY (WE HAVE ALSO HEARD THIS STORY FROM A POLE).

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2. IN ADDITION TO NEWS, THE BULLETIN , WHICH IS NEARLY 2 SIDES OF TYPED A4 PAPER, APPEALS TO THE PEOPLE OF WARSAW TO CARRY LARGE BAGS WITH THEM. "THIS WILL MAKE OUR WORK EASIER AND INCREASE SECURITY FOR OUR DISTRIBUTORS".

3. THERE IS ALSO AN EDITORIAL PARAGRAPH. IN BRIEF, IT SAYS THAT SOLIDARITY HAD HOPED TO USE PEACEFUL MEANS TO DEMOCRATISE THE TOTALITARIAN SYSTEM OF THE PRL. BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED THAT "THE AUTHORITIES HAD A CONSCIENCE" THEY HAD ENGAGED IN DIALOGUE WITH THEM. THEY HAD BEEN MISTAKEN. THE PZPR HAD ALL ALONG INTENDED TO DESTROY SOLIDARITY. MARTIAL LAW WAS JUST SUCH AN EFFORT" AN ATTEMPT AT CHANGING POLAND INTO A GREAT LABOUR CAMP IN WHICH FEAR AND UNCERTAINTY OF THE MORROW PREVAIL". BUT THE EDITORIAL CONCLUDES THAT THIS CAN ONLY WORK IF FEAR KILLS THE VOICE OF CONSCIENCE IN PEOPLE.

MELHUI SH

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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Prime Minister

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1 OF 1 JANUARY
INFO PRIORITY EC POSTS, UKDEL NATO, WARSAW AND MOSCOW

YOUR TELNO 2004 AND MY TELNO 3964: US MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION.

1 THE STATE DEPARTMENT GAVE US A FULLER BRIEFING TODAY ON THE US MEASURES. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMISSION AND OF THE BELGIAN EMBASSY WERE PRESENT. THE FOLLOWING WERE THE MAIN POINTS:

(A) AEROFLOT

THE TWO AEROFLOT FLIGHTS PER WEEK TO DULLES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT WILL BE SUSPENDED WITH EFFECT FROM 5 JANUARY. NO US AIRLINES FLY TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE US/SOVIET AGREEMENT DOES NOT SPECIFY A MINIMUM NUMBER OF FLIGHTS. THE AMERICANS THEREFORE HAVE THE NECESSARY LEGAL POWERS TO SUSPEND THEM.

(B) SOVIET PURCHASING COMMISSION.

THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN ASKED TO CLOSE THE COMMISSION AND SEND THE TEN SOVIET EMPLOYEES BACK TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE COMMISSION HAS BEEN PURCHASING INDUSTRIAL AND MANUFACTURED GOODS FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN THE KAMA RIVER PROJECT. THE PURCHASES MADE THROUGH THE COMMISSION ARE ESTIMATED TO HAVE BEEN OF THE ORDER OF DOLLARS 150-200 MILLION PER ANNUM. TOTAL US EXPORTS TO THE SOVIET UNION IN 1980 WERE APPROXIMATELY DLRS 1.5 BILLION. THE COMMISSION IS THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN APPROXIMATELY ONE THIRD OF TOTAL SOVIET PURCHASES OF US MANUFACTURED ITEMS.

(C) SUSPENSION OF LICENCES FOR HIGH TECHNOLOGY EQUIPMENT.

SOVIET PURCHASES OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY ITEMS FROM THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN JANUARY 1980 AND OCTOBER 1981 WERE APPROXIMATELY DLRS 250 MILLION. THE UNITED STATES IS NOT EXTENDING THE LICENSING REQUIREMENTS BUT IS SUSPENDING THE ISSUE OF LICENCES. THEY WILL NOT AUTHORISE THE RE-EXPORT FROM EUROPEAN COMPANIES TO THE SOVIET UNION OF COMPONENTS ON THEIR EMBARGO LIST.

(D) GRAIN AGREEMENT.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT CONFIRM THAT THE PRESENT AGREEMENT RUNS UNTIL SEPTEMBER 1982, AND THAT 11 MILLION TONNES OF GRAIN HAVE ALREADY BEEN SOLD AND 4 MILLION TONNES ALREADY SHIPPED TO THE SOVIET UNION, WITH THE RUSSIANS BEING ABLE TO PURCHASE AN ADDITIONAL 12 MILLION TONNES. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS THE LEGAL POWER TO INTERRUPT FURTHER SALES UNDER THE EXISTING AGREEMENT IF A DECISION WERE TAKEN TO DO SO THE QUOTE FLOOR UNQUOTE FIGURE OF 8 MILLION TONNES HAVING ALREADY BEEN EXCEEDED (THE LONG SHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION ARE NOT AT PRESENT BOYCOTTING THE LOADING OF GRAIN FOR THE SOVIET UNION BUT THERE ARE WORRIES AMONG EXPORTERS THAT THEY MIGHT DO SO).

(E) MARITIME AGREEMENT.

THE EXISTING AGREEMENT EXPIRES TODAY. WHEREAS UNDER THAT AGREEMENT SOVIET VESSELS HAD TO GIVE FOUR DAYS NOTICE OF PORT ENTRY THEY WILL IN FUTURE HAVE TO REQUEST ENTRY 14 DAYS IN ADVANCE. STATE DEPARTMENT

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CONFIRM THAT THESE PROVISIONS WILL BE APPLIED RESTRICTIVELY (THEY HAVE ALREADY TURNED DOWN FOUR SOVIET REQUESTS). THIS WILL AFFECT SOME SOVIET CROSS-TRADING. MOST GRAIN EXPORTS TO THE SOVIET UNION ARE HOWEVER, SHIPPED BY THIRD COUNTRIES.

(F) LICENCES FOR OIL AND GAS EQUIPMENT.

IN ADDITION TO THE SUSPENSION OF LICENCES HITHERTO REQUIRED FOR EQUIPMENT RELATED TO OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION THE UNITED STATES IS EXTENDING THE LICENSING REQUIREMENTS DOWNSTREAM TO RELATED TRANSPORT AND REFINING EQUIPMENT. ALL LICENCES FOR PRODUCTS DESIGNED FOR, OR WHICH WILL BE UTILISED ON ENERGY PROJECTS IN, THE SOVIET UNION ARE BEING SUSPENDED (AFFECTING TURBINES, COMPRESSORS ETC). SO FAR AS THE CATERPILLAR CONTRACT IS CONCERNED THE LICENCE WAS ISSUED IN JULY FOR THE EXPORT OF 100 PIPE-LAYERS AND THESE HAVE ALREADY BEEN SHIPPED. THE ACTION NOW TAKEN INVOLVES THE SUSPENSION OF THE APPLICATION FOR AN ADDITIONAL 200 PIPE-LAYERS (WORTH DLRS 80-90 MILLION). THE US WILL NOT ISSUE LICENCES FOR THE RE-EXPORT OF COMPONENTS FOR ITEMS ON THEIR EMBARGO LIST (SO FAR AS ITEMS NOT HITHERTO SUBJECTED TO RE-LICENSING PROCEDURES AND ALREADY EXPORTED TO EUROPE ARE CONCERNED, THE AMERICAN INTERPRETATION IS NOT CLEAR BUT SEEMS TO BE THAT IN PRINCIPLE THESE TOO SHOULD NOT BE RE-EXPORTED TO THE SOVIET UNION, THOUGH THEY RECOGNISE THAT THIS IS LIKELY TO BE UNENFORCEABLE).

(G) U.S./SOVIET BILATERAL AGREEMENTS.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT CONFIRM THERE HAS BEEN GREATLY REDUCED ACTIVITY UNDER THESE AGREEMENTS SINCE AFGHANISTAN. NONE OF THE EXISTING AGREEMENTS IS BEING ABROGATED. BUT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT RENEW THE ENERGY AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENTS AND WILL BE RESTRICTIVE ABOUT RENEWING OTHER AGREEMENTS, DEALING WITH THEM ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS.

2. IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION WE POINTED OUT THAT, EG IN RELATION TO THE AIR SERVICE AND MARITIME AGREEMENTS, THE EUROPEAN POSITION WAS IN SOME IMPORTANT RESPECTS DIFFERENT. THE STATE DEPARTMENT EMPHASIZED THAT THE U.S. MEASURES ARE LIKELY TO HAVE VERY LIMITED EFFECTS WITHOUT SIMILAR ACTION BY THE ALLIES. THEY RECOGNISED THAT IN SOME CASES IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE EUROPEANS TO TAKE PRECISELY THE SAME ACTION. THEY HOPED THAT THE ALLIES WOULD TAKE MEASURES APPROPRIATE TO THEIR CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD HAVE AN EQUIVALENT EFFECT. THE U.S. MEASURES WOULD REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION IN POLAND (RELEASE OF DETAINEES, LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW). IT WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT THE ALLIES WOULD NOT TAKE ACTION THAT WOULD UNDER-CUT OR CIRCUMVENT U.S. MEASURES. THEY HAD ASKED THE JAPANESE NOT TO SUPPLY PIPE-LAYERS IN LIEU OF CATERPILLAR AND WOULD TAKE SIMILAR ACTION IN OTHER CASES.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 December 1981

*Now overtaken
f.a. m. 6.*

Dear Willie,

President Reagan's letter to the Prime Minister of 24 December has to some extent been overtaken by events but I enclose a short acknowledgement which the Prime Minister may care to send.

We noted your suggestion that this might offer a peg to report on the deliberations of the Ten, but since the meeting on 30 December was only a consultative meeting of officials I do not think that there is anything useful that the Prime Minister could say at this point.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards
(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

W Rickett Esq
10 Downing St

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DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
The Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:
The President of the United States

Your Reference

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SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your letter of 24 December informing me of the contents of your messages to General Jaruzelski and to President Brezhnev.

CAVEAT.....

We have a common objective: to end the current repression of the Polish people and to bring about a resumption of the dialogue between all the national forces in Poland, including the Church and Solidarity, so as to permit both reconciliation and the preservation of the 'Renewal'. I agree that it is right to consider carefully all possible steps which might bring this about. If we are to succeed we must indeed work in unison. I know that this thought will be very much in the minds of the Foreign Ministers who will be meeting shortly in Brussels.

At the close of what has been an eventful year for yourself and your Administration, I send you my warm regards and best wishes for 1982.

Enclosures—flag(s).....



Prime Minister

I think most of this is

known to you.

A.S.C. 4.1

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 December 1981

Dear Chris,

[Handwritten signature]

Poland

Since I wrote to you on 24 December the military regime has established firm control throughout Poland. Major centres of resistance appear to have been eliminated through a combination of pressure, shows of force and on occasion some brutality, although the authorities seem to have tried to avoid violence in the knowledge that this could make the matters worse for themselves. They are now seeking to convince the world that the situation is rapidly returning to normal, that the Polish people are now working more efficiently than before and that the harsh martial law restrictions will soon be relaxed. Though we still have only fragmentary information, it is clear that the reality is far from this rosy picture. Initial resistance may have been broken, including that at Gdansk and in the mines in the South-West, but at least 5,000 people including many leading intellectuals are being detained without trial; the Polish people are back in the factories, but they are not working with a will; and the continuing restrictions on travel and communication are preventing any early return to normal civil or business activity. It is not clear how the authorities can begin to implement their promises to continue the renewal and pursue economic reforms in the face of a sullen and embittered populace. The only logical course must be a resumption of the dialogue between government, the Church and Solidarity but so far the Church's efforts to bring this about have come to nothing.

In these circumstances it is important that the Western response should be clear and carefully judged so as to promote the objective of ending the repression and persuading the Polish authorities to revert to the path of constructive negotiation with all the national elements including the Church and Solidarity.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had hoped to hold a meeting of EC Foreign Ministers in London on 30 or 31 December to discuss this problem, but the Greeks and the French made difficulties. However, Political and Economic Directors of the Ten did meet yesterday and identified the main issues which will now be considered by Foreign Ministers in Brussels on Monday, 4 January. At that meeting - and in the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers likely to be fixed on or about 11 January - we shall be trying to achieve a broad consensus and to identify what actions, if any, should be taken by Europeans to complement the American actions. The signs are that this will be easier as regards Poland than the Soviet Union. Even the French who are the loudest of the Ten in criticism of Moscow (partly for domestic reasons) have strong doubts about the wisdom of economic measures against the Soviet Union at this stage.



At our meeting on Monday we shall therefore try to maximise the possibilities in the political field where the Ten are less constrained than in the economic. We shall also review the question of whether or not we should continue to provide economic assistance of the kind we have been giving to Poland over the past year. Coreper agreed on 28 December that the Christmas gift of 8,000 tonnes of free beef should go ahead in the light of assurances received from the Polish authorities that this food would indeed go to the Polish people for whom it is intended. Of course such assurances cannot be watertight and we shall want to watch closely how the Poles implement them. This will be a factor affecting decisions about any further supplies of food from the Community at special prices. Such decisions have not yet been taken and will also have to take account both of the situation as it evolves in Poland and of the willingness on the part of the Community member states to provide further credit for such supplies. We shall also examine our attitudes towards debt rescheduling and new credits in 1982 and Lord Carrington intends to write to his colleagues next week in the light of these discussions to let you have his views of what UK policy should be.

I am sending copies of this letter to Private Secretaries to all members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,
[Signature]
for (B J P F) Private Secretary

C A Whitmore Esq
10 Downing St

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1163 OF 31 DEC 81

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IMMEDIATE

PARIS TELNO 1150 : FRENCH REACTIONS TO THE POLISH CRISIS.

1. THE FRENCH CONTINUE TO BE PREOCCUPIED WITH THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE POLISH CRISIS ON FRENCH DOMESTIC POLITICS. BUT YESTERDAY AND TODAY THE FRENCH PRESS HAS CONCENTRATED MORE ATTENTION ON GENERAL EUROPEAN REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION AND IN PARTICULAR ON HOW FRANCE SHOULD RESPOND

2. THE PICTURE OF FRENCH REACTIONS AS THE STRONGEST IN EUROPE AND THE FRG AS THE FEBLEST WAS COMPLICATED BY REPORTS THAT THE GERMANS BLAMED M. CHEYSSON FOR THE FAILURE OF THE EC FOREIGN MINISTERS TO MEET ON 30 DECEMBER WHICH DREW AN ON-THE-RECORD DENIAL BY THE QUAI D'ORSAY AND A TENDENCY BY THE MEDIA TO PLAY UP FRANCO-GERMAN DIFFERENCES. REPORTING ON OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES' REACTIONS TO US SANCTIONS AGAINST THE USSR HAS BEEN FULL, BUT LITTLE HAS EMERGED IN ATTRIBUTABLE BRIEFING ABOUT FRANCE'S OWN ATTITUDE (FOR WHICH SEE MY TELNO 1162, NOT TO ALL). MOST PAPERS FOLLOW AN AFP STORY THAT, ACCORDING TO UNOFFICIAL SOURCES IN THE MATIGNON, FRANCE WILL NOT FOLLOW THE AMERICAN LEAD ALTHOUGH FRENCH FILMS

AFP STORY THAT, ACCORDING TO UNOFFICIAL SOURCES IN THE MATIGNON, FRANCE WILL NOT FOLLOW THE AMERICAN LEAD ALTHOUGH FRENCH FIRMS WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES CREATED BY THE US SANCTIONS. M. HUNTZINGER, THE SOCIALIST PARTY (PS) SPOKESMAN FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, IS REPORTED AS SAYING THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE PS ALIGNING ITSELF WITH AMERICAN POLICY. HE DESCRIBED US ACTIONS AS INCOHERENT.

3. THE NON-COMMUNIST FRENCH PRESS POINTS UP THE DILEMMA CREATED FOR THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT BY THE US DECISION. PRESIDENT MITTERRAND WAS NOW FACED WITH THE NEED TO MATCH HIS STRONG WORDS ON POLAND WITH FIRM DEEDS; BUT HOW FAR COULD HE CARRY THESE WITHOUT PROVOKING THE DEPARTURE OF COMMUNIST MINISTERS FROM HIS GOVERNMENT?

STATEMENTS BY FRENCH COMMUNIST LEADERS INDICATE THEIR ANXIETY THAT THIS SITUATION SHOULD NOT ARISE. ON TELEVISION LAST NIGHT M. MARCHAIS CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT WAS GOING ON IN POLAND AND THAT THE US SANCTIONS WERE THEREFORE UNJUSTIFIED. HE ALSO SAID THAT IT WOULD BE AGAINST FRANCE'S INTERESTS TO FOLLOW THE USAJSKS USA'S EXAMPLE WHILE RECOGNISING THAT THE POSITIONS OF THE PS AND THE PCF WERE DIFFERNT, HE CLAIMED

THAT NEITHER THE PCF NOR PRESIDENT MITTERRAND CALLED INTO QUESTION THE CONTINUED PARTICIPATION OF COMMUNIST MINISTERS IN THE GOVERNMENT. M KRASUCKI, THE SECRETARY GENERAL ELECT OF THE COMMUNIST TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION, THE CGT, IN AN ARTICLE IN L'HUMANITE OF 29 DECEMBER WARNED PRESIDENT MITTERRAND THAT HE COULD NOT IMPLEMENT HIS REFORM PROGRAMME WITHOUT CGT SUPPORT AND CALLED ON THE SOCIALIST PARTY TO STOP TRYING TO FORCE THE CGT LEADERSHIP TO CHANGE ITS LINE ON POLAND. THE PRESS CARRIES, HOWEVER, REPORTS OF DISSATISFACTION IN THE RANK AND FILE OF BOTH THE PCF AND THE CGT WITH THEIR LEADERS' POLICIES TOWARDS POLAND.

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FM PARIS 311700Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1162 OF 31 DEC 81

INFO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS UKDEL NATO WASHINGTON ROUTINE MOSCOW
BONN WARSAW BRUSSELS ROME

INFO SAVING COPENHAGEN DUBLIN THE HAGUE LUXENBOURG ATHENS

US MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION

1. WHEN I SPOKE TO VEDRINE, DIPLOMATIC ADVISER IN THE ELYSEE, YESTERDAY AFTERNOON ABOUT THE US MEASURES HE SAID THAT FRENCH VIEWS HAD NOT YET BEEN FINALISED. HIS LINE WAS THAT THE FRENCH WELCOMED THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD DECIDED TO TAKE ACTION RATHER THAN DO NOTHING. BUT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF EUROPE SIMPLY JUMPING THROUGH THE SAME HOOPS BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES HAD WHISTLED. VEDRINE WAS NOT SURE HOW EFFECTIVE THE US ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WOULD BE. THE MAIN QUESTION THAT CONCERNED HIM WAS THE FIELD OF APPLICATION OF THE BAN ON EXPORT OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY. HE NOTED THAT GRAIN EXPORTS WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED UNTIL MID-1982.

2. VEDRINE WENT ON TO SAY THAT WHATEVER MEASURES THE EUROPEANS DECIDED TO TAKE, IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO RETAIN FLEXIBILITY; IE THAT THERE SHOULD BE SCOPE FOR EITHER INTENSIFYING OR DIMINISHING THEM IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. NO OPTIONS SHOULD BE TOTALLY CLOSED AT THIS POINT. VEDRINE WAS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THE GERMANS. HE THOUGHT THEIR INVITATION TO RAKOWSKI WAS ILL-JUDGED AND ILL-TIMED.

HE THOUGHT THEIR INVITATION TO RAKOWSKI WAS ILL-JUDGED AND ILL-TIMED.

3. FREYCHE, PERMANENT SECRETARY IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE (DREE), TOLD FINANCIAL COUNSELLOR TODAY DURING A DISCUSSION ON OTHER MATTERS THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WAS STILL ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE US MEASURES. APART FROM LOOKING AT TIGHTENING COCOM CONTROLS ON THE EXPORT OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY TO THE USSR IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COCOM HIGH LEVEL MEETING ON 19/20 JANUARY, THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT DID NOT HAVE ANY PLANS TO FOLLOW SUIT. THE MEASURES WERE VERY LARGELY COSMETIC FROM THE STANDPOINT OF US-SOVIET TRADE.

4. TURNING TO THE EFFECTS ON FRENCH TRADE, FREYCHE SAID THAT THE ONLY CONTRACT WHICH SEEMED LIKELY TO BE AFFECTED BY THE MEASURES WAS A THOMSON CONTRACT, SIGNED TWO OF THREE YEARS AGO, FOR THE SUPPLY OF TELEPHONE EQUIPMENT. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT WAS THAT THE SOVIET GAS PIPELINE PROJECT WOULD NOT BE HALTED THOUGH IT MIGHT BE DELAYED. HE UNDERSTOOD FROM THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON YESTERDAY THAT ALL LICENCES ALREADY APPROVED WOULD BE UNAFFECTED, INCLUDING THE LICENCES FOR THE CATERPILLAR PIPELAYING EQUIPMENT. APPEYARD SAID THAT OUR INFORMATION (WASHINGTON TEL NO 3964) WAS THAT THE CATERPILLAR LICENCES HAD BEEN APPROVED BUT NOT DELIVERED, AND HAD NOW BEEN SUSPENDED. FREYCHE SAID THAT NEITHER THE CREUSOT-LOIRE/ALSTHOM NOR THOMSON CONTRACTS FOR THE GAS PIPELINE APPEARED TO BE DEPENDENT ON VITAL OR IRREPLACEABLE US EQUIPMENT. THERE WAS NO INTENTION AT PRESENT OF CANCELLING OR POSTPONING THE DISCUSSIONS SCHEDULED FOR MID-JANUARY BETWEEN GAZ DE FRANCE AND SOYUZ GAZ EXPORT ON THE PURCHASE OF SOVIET GAS. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WAS CONTINUING TO SEEK FURTHER DETAILS ON THE MEASURES FROM THE US AUTHORITIES.

5. MELLINGER (DREE DESK OFFICER) TOOK THE SAME LINE WITH FINANCIAL COUNSELLOR EARLIER TODAY. HE SAID THAT WHEN THE THOMSON CONTRACT FOR THE SUPPLY OF TELEMETRY EQUIPMENT WAS BEING NEGOTIATED EARLIER THIS YEAR THE NEGATIVE ATTITUDE OF THE US GOVERNMENT TOWARDS THE PIPELINE PROJECT HAD BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. HENCE THOMSON HAD BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO INCLUDE VITAL COMPONENTS UNIQUELY SOURCED IN THE UNITED STATES. THE MAIN PROBLEM WAS LIKELY TO BE ENCOUNTERED BY NON-FRENCH COMPANIES, INCLUDING JOHN BROWN, WHO WERE SUPPLYING TURBINES UNDER GE LICENCES BUT WITH THE INCLUSION OF ELEMENTS MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE FOR CREUSOT-LOIRE/ALSTHOM

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FM WARSAW 311630Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1111 OF 31 DECEMBER

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO AND MOSCOW

POLAND: THE PARTY

1. BARCIKOWSKI TODAY GAVE AN INTERVIEW FOR TRYBUNA LUDU. HE WAS ASKED ABOUT THE PARTY'S ROLE FOLLOWING THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW. HIS REPLIES GIVE US THE BEST CLUE WE HAVE SO FAR HAD AS TO HOW THE PARTY SEES ITS ROLE AT PRESENT. HE SAID THAT THE PARTY'S ROLE WAS WHAT IT HAD ALWAYS BEEN, TO BE AMONG THE PEOPLE. THE PARTY SHOULD SET AN EXAMPLE FOR EVERYTHING THAT WAS GOING ON IN THE COUNTRY. PARTY ACTIVISTS SHOULD RELAY THE PARTY'S MESSAGE TO THE PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY TO YOUNG PEOPLE. IN SHORT, IT SHOULD CARRY OUT THE TASKS LAID DOWN FOR IT BY THE IX CONGRESS. BARCIKOWSKI, IMPLYING THAT MANY MEMBERS OF THE PARTY HAD NOT BEEN ACTIVE SINCE THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW, SAID THAT THE PARTY HAD BEEN ABLE IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS TO SEE WHICH OF ITS ACTIVISTS WERE REALLY EFFECTIVE.

2. DESPITE BARCIKOWSKI'S ASSURANCES THAT THE PARTY CAN CONTINUE MORE OR LESS AS BEFORE, I SEE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES FOR IT DURING THE PERIOD OF MARTIAL LAW AND EVEN MORE WHEN MARTIAL LAW COMES TO AN END. THE PARTY HAS PROBLEMS AT THREE LEVELS - THE MEMBERSHIP, THE APPARATUS AND THE LEADERSHIP.

THE MEMBERSHIP (UNDERLINED)

THE MEMBERSHIP (UNDERLINED)

3. BETWEEN THE START OF THE ODNOWA AND THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW, THE PARTY HAS LOST A VERY CONSIDERABLE PROPORTION OF ITS MEMBERSHIP (HARRISON'S LETTER TO MISS BROWN OF 10 DECEMBER). SINCE 13 DECEMBER, THERE HAVE BEEN WIDESPREAD RUMOURS OF MEMBERS "QUEUING UP" TO HAND IN THEIR PARTY CARDS. THERE ARE OBVIOUSLY NO RELIABLE FIGURES TO INDICATE EXACTLY HOW MANY MEMBERS HAVE DONE THIS. BUT BARCIKOWSKI'S WORDS ABOUT THE RELIABILITY OF ONLY SOME PARTY ACTIVISTS INDICATE THAT THE PARTY LEADERSHIP CANNOT RELY ON MORE THAN A PART OF ITS MEMBERSHIP TO SUPPORT THEM LOYALLY IN MARTIAL LAW AND BEYOND. BEFORE MARTIAL LAW IS ENDED, IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR THE PARTY TO PURGE ITS RANKS SO THAT ONLY THOSE WHO WILL SUPPORT WHAT WILL PROBABLY BE A HARD-LINE POST-MARTIAL LAW REGIME ARE LEFT. A PARTY REDUCED TO A HARD CORE OF ACTIVISTS WOULD BE NUMERICALLY WEAKER, BUT MUCH MORE RELIABLE.

THE APPARATUS (UNDERLINED)

4. THE POSITION HERE IS PATCHY, BUT SOMEWHAT BETTER FROM THE AUTHORITIES POINT OF VIEW. MOST OF THE PARTY BUREAUCRATS IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE APPARATUS HAVE PROBABLY BEEN LONGING FOR MARTIAL LAW TO BE DECLARED, OR SOMETHING SIMILAR, SINCE AUGUST 1980. THE WARSAW PARTY FOR EXAMPLE HAS ALWAYS PURSUED A HARDER LINE BECAUSE IT IS DOMINATED BY PARTY BUREAUCRATS WHO HAVE HAD A GREAT DEAL TO LOSE FROM THE ODNOWA. THE SITUATION IN THE REGIONS IS RATHER DIFFERENT. WHILST SOME HARD-LINE LOCAL COMMITTEES, LIKE THAT IN KATOWICE, WOULD BE READY TO FUNCTION UNDER A NEW AND HARDER REGIME, MANY MORE WERE INFECTED BY DEMOCRATISATION IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE ODNOWA. LOCAL FIRST SECRETARIES LIKE FISZBACH (GDANSK) AND DABROWA (KRAKOW) WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE TO BE REMOVED. THERE IS INDEED ALREADY A RUMOUR THAT FISZBACH HAS GONE. BUT THE PURGING OF LOCAL FIRST SECRETARIES, AND LOCAL VOIVODSHIP COMMITTEES, WOULD BE A LONG AND DIFFICULT PROCESS. FOR A START, IT PRESUPPOSES A LEADERSHIP THAT IS PREPARED AND ABLE TO DO IT.

THE LEADERSHIP (UNDERLINED)

5. BEFORE THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES CAN HAND POWER BACK TO A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT, THEY WILL NEED TO BE CERTAIN THAT THE PARTY LEADERSHIP IS IN A POSITION TO TAKE OVER THAT POWER. THE PARTY'S LEADING ROLE HAS BEEN PROGRESSIVELY ERODED SINCE AUGUST 1980, AND EVEN BEFORE. THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW HAS TAKEN IT AWAY ENTIRELY. IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE PRESENT

5. BEFORE THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES CAN HAND POWER BACK TO A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT, THEY WILL NEED TO BE CERTAIN THAT THE PARTY LEADERSHIP IS IN A POSITION TO TAKE OVER THAT POWER. THE PARTY'S LEADING ROLE HAS BEEN PROGRESSIVELY ERODED SINCE AUGUST 1980, AND EVEN BEFORE. THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW HAS TAKEN IT AWAY ENTIRELY. IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE PRESENT POLITBURO, WHO HAVE NOT CUT A PARTICULARLY GOOD FIGURE IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS AND WHO WERE NOT FOR THE MOST PART EITHER CONSULTED OR INFORMED IN ADVANCE OF JARUZELSKI'S TAKE-OVER, COULD REASSERT THAT LEADING ROLE. THEY ARE A COLOURLESS BUNCH IN THE MAIN, MOSTLY SURPRISE APPOINTMENTS BY THE IX CONGRESS. ONLY THE HARD CORE OF JARUZELSKI, OLSZOWSKI AND BARCIKOWSKI CARRY MUCH WEIGHT. MILEWSKI AND CZYREK ARE ALSO FAIRLY ROBUST SPECIALISTS IN THEIR FIELDS.

THEY WOULD PROBABLY FORM THE NUCLEUS OF A NEW POLITBURO OF HARD-LINERS, ALTHOUGH BARCIKOWSKI'S FUTURE MUST BE AT BEST UNCERTAIN.

6. THE THREE-FOLD TASKS OF REFURBISHING THE LEADERSHIP, PURGING THE APPARATUS AND PRUNING THE MEMBERSHIP COULD BE MADE MUCH EASIER BY DISBANDING THE PARTY AND CREATING A NEW ONE IN ITS PLACE. BUT THIS ALSO PRESENTS ITS PROBLEMS. AS WE REPORTED YESTERDAY, THE WORKING GROUP UNDER KUBIAK HAS SUGGESTED THAT THE PARTY BE DISBANDED AND BE REPLACED BY SOMETHING LIKE A SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY. OLSZOWSKI'S WORKING GROUP MAY WELL COME UP WITH THE PROPOSAL THAT IT SHOULD BE REPLACED BY AN IDEOLOGICALLY MUCH PURER POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY. BUT EITHER OF THESE IDEAS WOULD ENTAIL ALTERING THE CONSTITUTION AND WOULD PROVOKE REACTION WITHIN THE COUNTRY AND POSSIBLY OUTSIDE IT. I AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES WOULD CONSIDER THESE PROBLEMS INSUPERABLE, BUT THEY MIGHT PREFER TO AVOID THEM.

7. EITHER WAY, THE BUSINESS OF PREPARING A RENOVATED PARTY, READY TO TAKE BACK THE LEADING ROLE IN THIS COUNTRY, WILL TAKE A GOOD DEAL OF TIME. THIS IS YET ANOTHER REASON WHY I BELIEVE MARTIAL LAW WILL NOT END QUICKLY. BARCIKOWSKI'S INTERVIEW TODAY CAN BE SEEN, HOWEVER, AS AT LEAST THE FIRST STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION FROM THE PARTY'S POINT OF VIEW. IT REASSURES THE FAITHFUL THAT THE PARTY IS STILL THERE, EVEN IF IN PRACTICE IT IS NOT DOING VERY MUCH.

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FM WARSAW 311605Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1108 OF 31 DECEMBER

YOUR TELNO 804: DEMARCHE ON RESTRICTIONS OF FOREIGN JOURNALISTS

1. TUR HAS JUST BEEN RECEIVED HERE AT 1630 HOURS LOCAL TIME. WITHOUT TELEPHONES AND ON NEW YEAR'S EVE THERE IS NO CHANCE OF DELIVERING THIS DEMARCHE TODAY, EVEN IF I COULD INFORM MY COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES.

2. DO YOU WISH ME TO PASS IT AND PREVIOUS TELEGRAMS ON TO MY BELGIAN COLLEAGUE? OR OUGHT HE TO BE INSTRUCTED FROM HIS OWN MINISTRY IN BRUSSELS TO TAKE THIS OVER?

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1104 OF 31ST DECEMBER 1981

INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN AND MODUK

INFO SAVING: EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE, BUDAPEST, SOFIA, BUCHAREST,
BELGRADE, HELSINKI, STOCKHOLM, UKMIS NEW YORK AND UKREP BRUSSELS

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POLISH SITUATION.

1. THE COUNCIL OF STATE, MEETING YESTERDAY FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE 13 DECEMBER DECREED THAT THE LOCAL ELECTIONS WHICH ARE DUE ON 5 FEBRUARY 1982 SHOULD BE POSTPONED UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THEY CAN BE CONDUCTED "IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF SOCIAL PEACE AND IN THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THE PRL". AT THE SAME TIME THE COUNCIL OF STATE TOOK NOTE OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL'S DECLARATION THAT THEY WOULD TRY TO NORMALISE THE ACTIVITY OF THE ORGANS OF STATE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. BUT THIS DECREE INDICATES THAT THE AUTHORITIES ENVISAGE A LONGISH PERIOD OF MARTIAL LAW AND MUST THROW SOME DOUBT ON THEIR REPEATED STATEMENTS THAT THEY HOPE TO RETURN POLAND TO NORMAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

POLAND TO NORMAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. THE MILITARY COUNCIL ALSO APPLIED YESTERDAY TO THE SEJM TO SET UP A "STATE TRIBUNAL". THE TRIBUNAL WOULD BE EMPOWERED TO TRY THOSE WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRESENT CRISIS. IN A COMMUNIQUE ABOUT CORRUPTION IN THE 70S, GIEREK, WRZASZCZYK, SZYDLAK AND KAIM ARE MENTIONED BY NAME. THEY WILL PROBABLY BE AMONG THOSE WHO APPEAR BEFORE THIS TRIBUNAL.
3. THE AUTHORITIES HAVE ALSO SUSPENDED THE CURFEW FOR TONIGHT TO ALLOW PEOPLE TO CELEBRATE NEW YEAR'S EVE IN APPROPRIATE FASHION. BUT THERE IS NO OTHER RELAXATION OF MARTIAL LAW. SOME OF OUR LOCAL STAFF WERE TODAY TURNED BACK FROM THE EMBASSY BECAUSE THEY DID NOT POSSESS THE CORRECT DOCUMENTATION.
4. AT CZYREK'S REQUEST, JARUZELSKI HAS DISMISSED DOBROSIELSKI FROM HIS POST AS VICE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS "BECAUSE OF HIS MOVE TO ACADEMIC WORK". IT IS CLEAR THAT HE WILL NOT TAKE UP HIS POST AS AMBASSADOR IN BONN FOR WHICH HE RECEIVED AGREEMENT SOME TIME AGO.
5. THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY LOCAL "COMMITTEES OF NATIONAL SALVATION" ARE BEGINNING TO BE ESTABLISHED. SOME PROMINENCE IS GIVEN TO THIS IN TODAY'S TRYBUNA LUDU, WHICH SAYS THAT THIS INDICATES SOCIETY'S APPROVAL FOR THE DECISIONS OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL.
6. BARCIKOWSKI IS TODAY INTERVIEWED IN TRYBUNA LUDU ABOUT THE STATE OF THE PARTY. HIS BASIC MESSAGE IS "BUSINESS AS USUAL". WE ARE REPORTING SEPARATELY IN MORE DETAIL.
7. CZYREK IS ALSO INTERVIEWED BY TRYBUNA LUDU AND DEVOTES MOST OF HIS REMARKS TO THE IMPORTANCE OF POLISH/SOVIET FRIENDSHIP. HE ALSO COMMENTS ON REACTIONS TO EVENTS IN POLAND FROM THE WEST. HE SAYS THAT THE MAJORITY OF THIRD WORLD AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAVE SHOWN UNDERSTANDING FOR WHAT HAS HAPPENED. BUT THE UNITED STATES HAS TAKEN A MUCH HARsher POSITION. REAGAN HAS TRIED TO MAKE POLAND'S ECONOMIC SITUATION MORE DIFFICULT. THERE HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTS TO DICTATE HOW THE POLISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD RUN ITS OWN COUNTRY. POLAND CANNOT ACCEPT INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS (SEE SEPARATE TELEGRAM FOR FURTHER DETAILS).
8. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAS ISSUED A DECREE ON THE FASHIONING OF THE ECONOMY DURING MARTIAL LAW. WE SHALL REPORT THE DETAILS SEPARATELY, BUT THE DECREE ONCE AGAIN INDICATES THAT THE AUTHORITIES BELIEVE MARTIAL LAW WILL BE WITH US FOR SOME TIME.

AUTHORITIES BELIEVE MARTIAL LAW WILL BE WITH US FOR SOME TIME.

9. EVEN WITHOUT THE INDICATIONS MENTIONED ABOVE, I SEE NO REASON ON NEW YEAR'S EVE TO ALTER MY ASSESSMENT OF A WEEK AGO GIVEN THAT WE ARE IN FOR A LONG HAUL. WE HAVE SEEN A SLIGHT RELAXATION OF RESTRICTIONS OVER THE LAST WEEK, IN THAT TRAVEL IS NOW POSSIBLE WITHIN ONE'S HOME VOIVODSHIP. NOW THAT THE FIRST PHASE OF RESISTANCE IN THE COUNTRY SEEMS TO HAVE DIED DOWN, THE AUTHORITIES MAY BE ABLE TO LIFT OTHER RESTRICTIONS AS WELL, AT LEAST ON AN EXPERIMENTAL BASIS. IT IS, I UNDERSTAND, TECHNICALLY POSSIBLE FOR EXAMPLE TO RE-CONNECT TELEPHONES FOR LOCAL CALLS ONLY, BUT THE LATEST RUMOURS SUGGEST THAT POLISH AIR SPACE WILL BE CLOSED TO INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC POSSIBLY FOR THE NEXT THREE MONTHS. I SUSPECT THAT THAT TIME SCALE MIGHT ALSO APPLY FOR MANY OF THE OTHER IMPOSITIONS OF MARTIAL LAW.

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FM BONN 311700Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1047 OF 31 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING DUBLIN PARIS ROME LUXEBURG COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE

UKREP BRUSSELS BRUSSELS ATHENS ANKARA LISBON OSLO OTTAWA REYKJAVIK

HOLY SEE MOSCOW WARSAW BMG BERLIN

MY TELNOS 1041 TO 1043: FRG PUBLIC REACTIONS TO POLAND.

1. I ASKED STATE SECRETARY VON STADEN THIS MORNING ABOUT THE OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN'S REMARKS YESTERDAY. HE REFERRED ME TO GENSCHER'S INTERVIEW ON GERMAN RADIO TODAY, IN WHICH HE SAID THAT IT WAS SUPERFLUOUS TO ARGUE ABOUT THE CAUSES OF THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND. THE POLISH TRAGEDY MUST NOT BECOME A PROBLEM FOR THE WESTERN ALLIANCE, WHICH SHOULD WORK TOGETHER FOR THE RESTORATION OF THE REFORM COURSE IN POLAND. REFERRING TO HIS TALKS WITH RAKOWSKI HE CONSIDERED IT DECISIVE THAT THE WARSAW LEADERSHIP RECOGNISED THAT NO SOLUTION COULD COME THROUGH MARTIAL LAW. HE RE-STATE THE SIGNALS THE WEST NEEDED TO SEE.

2. IN CONTRAST TO THE SCEPTICISM ABOUT THE USEFULNESS OF SANCTIONS EXPRESSED BY BARZEL, CDU (MY TELNO 1041) MERTES, THE CDU FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPOKESMAN IS REPORTED TODAY TO HAVE ARGUED THAT THE FRG SHOULD JOIN A COMMON WESTERN APPROACH EVEN IF IT INVOLVES SANCTIONS. MEANWHILE ECONOMICS MINISTER LAMBS-DORFF (FDP) HAS COME OUT FIRMLY AGAINST SANCTIONS (MY TELNO 1044 NOT TO ALL) AND SPD DEPUTY CHAIRMAN WISCHNEWSKI SAID THAT THE US DECISION WAS QUOTE NOT A HAPPY ONE UNQUOTE AND WOULD NOT FIND

1041) MERTES, THE CDU FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPOKESMAN IS REPORTED TODAY TO HAVE ARGUED THAT THE FRG SHOULD JOIN A COMMON WESTERN APPROACH EVEN IF IT INVOLVES SANCTIONS. MEANWHILE ECONOMICS MINISTER LAMBERT DORFF (FDP) HAS COME OUT FIRMLY AGAINST SANCTIONS (MY TELNO 1044 NOT TO ALL) AND SPD DEPUTY CHAIRMAN WISCHNEWSKI SAID THAT THE US DECISION WAS QUOTE NOT A HAPPY ONE UNQUOTE AND WOULD NOT FIND ACCEPTANCE IN THE FRG.

3. TODAY'S FRG PRESS TAKE THEIR LEAD FROM THE GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN (MY TELNO 1042) AND HIGHLIGHT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BONN AND WASHINGTON. WIDESPREAD SCEPTICISM IS REPORTED ON THE PART OF EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS ABOUT THE US MEASURES. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS SAID TO BE IRRITATED AT THE LACK OF US CONSULTATION. EDITORIALS FIND THIS REMINISCENT OF THE UNPREDICTABILITY OF THE CARTER ERA: SCHMIDT WAS IN THE US AT THE TIME; SOME OF THE MEASURES AFFECT EUROPE DIRECTLY; THE LACK OF CONSULTATION IS IN MARKED CONTRAST TO THE FRG'S PAINSTAKING EFFORTS TO CONSULT AND BRIEF THE US AND OTHER NATO PARTNERS OVER E.G. THE BREZHNEV VISIT. BELL WRITING IN GENERAL ANZEIGER GOES SO FAR AS TO ARGUE THAT WASHINGTON HAS DEPARTED FROM THE AGREED BASIS FOR POSSIBLE WESTERN MEASURES TO COUNTER DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND. THE INDEPENDENT SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG BELIEVES THAT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BONN AND WASHINGTON ARE INEVITABLE AND LEGITIMATE BUT DESCRIBES BECKER'S PORTRAYAL OF THEM AS UNNECESSARY AND HARMFUL TO THE FRG'S INTERESTS.

4. ON THE SANCTIONS THEMSELVES COMMENT IS VARIED. THE FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG ATTACKES LEFT-WING CRITICS OF THEM (AND EPPLER IN PARTICULAR) BUT DOES NOT EXPLICITLY ARGUE THAT THE FRG SHOULD BACK THE SANCTIONS. NEITHER DOES DIE WELT ALTHOUGH IT AGAIN ACCUSES THE GOVERNMENT OF ADAPTING ITS ANALYSIS OF THE POLISH SITUATION TO FIT ITS OWN PERCEIVED INABILITY TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. THE SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG SUGGESTS THAT IT WOULD BE SIMPLISTIC TO EXPECT THE SOVIET UNION TO CHANGE ITS POLICIES AS A RESULT OF THE US SANCTIONS, BUT THEY SERVE TO REMIND THE SOVIET UNION OF THE BENIFITS IT HAS DERIVED FROM DETENTE. THE FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU (LEFT/LIBERAL) COMMENTS THAT SANCTIONS BOTH AGAINST POLAND AND/OR THE SOVIET UNION ARE THE WRONG POLICY. THEY WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE SOVIET UNION AND WILL ONLY LEAD TO HUNGER AND CATASTROPHE IN POLAND.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL EXCEPT BMG BERLIN

TAYLOR

[Handwritten signature]

Prime Minister

WM
31/12

GRS 260
UNCLASSIFIED
FM BONN 311050Z DEC 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1042 OF 31 DECEMBER
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO PARIS ROME MOSCOW WARSAW
INFO SAVING ANKARA ATHENS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE LISBON
LUXEMBOURG OSLO OTTAWA REYKJAVIK DUBLIN HOLY SEE

MT

MY TELNO 1041: POLAND

1. BECKER, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN, GAVE A COMPREHENSIVE PRESS BRIEFING ON 30 DECEMBER ABOUT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S POLICY TOWARDS POLAND. OUR RECORD OF THE POINTS HE MADE FROM HIS PREPARED TEXT IS IN MIFT. (attached)

2. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS, BECKER SAID THAT THE MEASURES ANNOUNCED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN WERE NOT A DECISION OF THE ALLIANCE BUT OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO FORM A DEFINITIVE VIEW OF THEM: FURTHER CLARIFICATION MUST BE SOUGHT. IT WOULD BE FORMALLY AND POLITICALLY DIFFICULT TO TURN THEM INTO AN ALLIANCE DECISION. THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAD YET TO MAKE CLEAR WHETHER THEY EXPECTED EQUIVALENT MEASURES FROM THEIR ALLIES: BUT REPORTS THAT SECRETARY HAIG WAS CALLING FOR CLEAR SUPPORT FROM THE ALLIES WERE QUITE INCORRECT.

3. BECKER SAID THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THAT THE STATE OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND HAD BEEN IMPOSED BY THE POLISH GOVERNMENT ACTING ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE (QUOTE AUTONOM UNQUOTE). THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THAT POLAND HAD NOT ACTED OF ITS OWN ACCORD. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DID NOT SHARE THIS U.S. VIEW.

4. BECKER SAW NO CONSEQUENCES AS YET FOR THE SIBERIAN GAS PIPELINE DEAL. THERE HAD BEEN LONG-STANDING DIFFERENCES OF VIEW BETWEEN THE US AND THE EUROPEAN STATES AS TO HOW FAR THIS DEAL WAS OPPORTUNE. THESE DIFFERENCES HAD NOT YET BEEN RESOLVED AND THE QUESTION HAD NOW TAKEN ON A NEW QUALITY. IT WAS LIKELY TO BE ONE OF THE SUBJECTS DISCUSSED BETWEEN CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AND PRESIDENT REAGAN ON 5 JANUARY. ON THE WESTERN SIDE HOWEVER IT WAS A EUROPEAN RATHER THAN AN EXCLUSIVELY GERMAN DEAL.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES [THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]
TAYLOR [REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1043 OF 31 DECEMBER
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INFO SAVING ANKARA ATHENS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE LISBON
LUXEMBOURG OSLO OTTAWA REYKJAVIK DUBLIN HOLY SEE

MIPT: POLAND

FOLLOWING IS OUR RECORD OF BECKER'S PREPARED STATEMENT

1. POLAND MUST SOLVE ITS PROBLEMS BY ITSELF WITHOUT EXTERNAL INTERVENTION. THE REFORM PROCESS IN POLAND SHOULD BE CONTINUED, JUST AS THE POLISH LEADERSHIP HAD ANNOUNCED AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND AS FORESEEN IN THE CSCE FINAL ACT. THE SUFFERING OF THE POLISH PEOPLE SHOULD NOT BE INCREASED.
2. THERE ARE MANY GAPS IN ANY ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN POLAND, AND A DEFINITIVE JUDGEMENT IS NOT POSSIBLE. IT IS ALSO SCARCELY POSSIBLE TO SAY ANYTHING ABOUT FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.
3. THE FEDERAL PARLIAMENT'S DECISION GIVES THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT A CLEAR FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS. SINCE FUTURE HELP FOR POLAND IS SUBJECT TO PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL, THE POLISH LEADERSHIP IS QUITE CLEAR ABOUT THE GERMAN POSITION.
4. IN THE MEANTIME THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS UNDERTAKEN EXTENSIVE ACTIVITY:
 - A) FEDERAL CHANCELLOR'S LETTER TO JARUZELSKI:
 - B) FEDERAL CHANCELLOR'S LETTER TO BREZHNEV:
 - C) GENSCHER'S THREE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE POLISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN BONN:
 - D) TALKS BETWEEN THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN WARSAW AND THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER:
 - E) GENSCHER'S DISCUSSIONS TODAY WITH RAKOVSKI WHICH SHOWS WARSAW'S CLEAR REACTION TO BONN'S POLITICAL INFLUENCE.
5. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE VATICAN. THE HOLY SEE'S JUDGEMENT IS PARTICULARLY IMPGRTANT. THE CURIA'S ANALYSIS CORRESPONDS TO THAT OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
6. THE ACCUSATIONS THAT THE GERMAN PEOPLE HAVE STOOD BACK AND LEFT POLAND TO ITS FATE ARE WITHOUT FOUNDATION. IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A SIGNIFICANT PRIVATE INITIATIVE 2 MILLION PACKAGES, WORTH OVER DM 100 MILLION, HAVE BEEN SENT TO POLAND. IN ADDITION THERE HAVE BEEN CHARITABLE EFFORTS ON THE PART OF THE GERMAN RED CROSS, SCHOOLS, CHURCHES, OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE ORGANISATIONS ETC.

/7.

7. THE FAILURE OF THE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS CALLED BY THE BRITISH PRESIDENCY OF THE COMMUNITY FOR 30 DECEMBER TO TAKE PLACE WAS NOT BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. GENSCHER HAS AGREED WITH CARRINGTON AND TINDEMANS THAT THIS MEETING SHOULD TAKE PLACE ON 31 DECEMBER IN LONDON. IT WILL EMERGE IN THE COURSE OF THE DAY WHETHER THIS IS INDEED TO HAPPEN. FURTHERMORE A NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN BRUSSELS IS FORESEEN FOR THE SECOND WEEK IN JANUARY.

8. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS POLAND SHOWS THE IMPORTANCE IT ATTACHES TO EARLY SIGNALS FROM POLAND ABOUT A RELAXATION OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY.

9. THERE IS NO MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN BONN AND WASHINGTON. BONN IS IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH COMMUNITY GOVERNMENTS. NATURALLY THERE ARE DIFFERING ASSESSMENTS OF WHAT IS HAPPENING IN POLAND, AND IT IS NOT YET POSSIBLE TO GIVE A FINAL JUDGEMENT THEREON.

10. THE MEANING OF THE FEDERAL PARLIAMENT'S DECISION ABOUT POLAND HAS BEEN GIVEN INSUFFICIENT WEIGHT IN THE AMERICAN PRESS. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS MAKING A PARTICULAR EFFORT TO PUBLISH THE TEXT ABROAD.

11. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS ONLY INFORMED ABOUT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MEASURES VERY SHORTLY (A FEW HOURS) BEFORE THEY WERE ANNOUNCED. THESE MEASURES WILL NOW BE A MATTER FOR CONSULTATION IN NATO. IN THIS CONNECTION THE CHANCELLOR'S EARLY CALL ON REAGAN WILL BE OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE.

12. POLAND MUST SORT OUT ITS OWN AFFAIRS. STRICT NON-INTERVENTION IS IMPORTANT.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES

TAYLOR

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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POLAND: ADVANCE COPIES

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PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
SIR A ACLAND
MR GILLMORE

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKDEL NATO 311600Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 523 OF 31 DECEMBER 1981

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

MIPT: POLAND: DEMARCHES.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF FINAL VERSION OF GERMAN PAPER.

BEGINS

1. DEMARCHE IN WARSAW (WITH FM CZYREK)

- 1) MOST GRAVELY CONCERNED ABOUT SITUATION IN POLAND, MARTIAL LAW, ESPECIALLY INTERNMENTS, USE OF FORCE AGAINST STRIKERS, DEATHS.
- 2) REPRESSIVE MEASURES REPRESENT GRAVE VIOLATION OF CSCE-FINAL ACT. OPEN SQUARE BRACKETS WESTERN CALL FOR SPECIAL MEETING IN MADRID EARLY IN JANUARY TO DISCUSS THESE VIOLATIONS UNDERSCORES CONCERN. URGENT REQUEST TO POLISH LEADERS TO AGREE TO SUCH A SPECIAL CSCE MEETING. CLOSE SQUARE BRACKETS REQUEST TO END ENCROACHMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND BASIC LIBERTIES.
- 3) REFER TO STATEMENTS BY JARUZELSKI, CZYREK AND MILITARY COUNCIL PROMISING RESUMPTION OF POLICY OF REFORM. WELCOME THESE STATEMENTS WHICH IF TRANSLATED INTO ACTION

WELCOME THESE STATEMENTS WHICH IF TRANSLATED INTO ACTION
COULD BE IMPORTANT SIGNALS OF DEDICATION OF POLISH GOVERN-
MENT TO RETURN TO DIALOGUE WITH REAL FORCES OF THE COUNTRY.
THE SOONER THESE SIGNALS, THE BETTER. MENTION CONSTRUCTIVE
ATTITUDE OF CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE EXTRAORDINARILY HIGH
DEGREE OF US
DEGREE OF SUPPORT IT ENJOYS IN POPULATION OF POLAND
SEMICOLON RESPECT FOR POLISH CHURCH OUTSIDE POLAND. ALL
ASSISTANCE TO POLAND, EXCEPT HUMANITARIAN AID, WILL BE
CONSIDERED IN THIS LIGHT.

II. DEMARCHE IN MOSCOW (WITH FM GROMYKO OR VICE FOREIGN MINISTER)

- 1) WE CANNOT BE INDIFFERENT TO POLAND'S FATE. (GERMAN SIDE
COULD POINT TO EFFORTS FOR GERMAN-POLISH UNDERSTANDING AND
CO-OPERATION ON THIS BASIS OF TREATY OF WARSAW).
- 2) GRAVEST CONCERN ABOUT REPRESSIVE MEASURES IN CONTRAVENTION
TO CSCE FINAL ACT AND DEGREE OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN
PLANNING OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND AND INFLUENCE ON POLISH
LEADERSHIP. QUESTION ABOUT SOVIET INFLUENCE; WAS THERE
MILITARY CO-OPERATION WITHIN THE WARSAW PACT IN PREPARATION
OF MARTIAL LAW?
- 3) WARN OF SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR EAST-WEST CO-OPERATION
IF REPRESSION CONTINUES IN POLAND. SOVIET UNION CANNOT
ESCAPE CONSEQUENCES IN THAT CASE. REFERENCE TO US
MEASURES ANNOUNCED ON 29 DECEMBER.
- 4) POLAND MUST BE ABLE TO DETERMINE ITS POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENTS WITHOUT THREAT OF USE OF FORCE AND OUTSIDE
PRESSURE OF INTERVENTION.

SIMILAR DEMARCHES SHOULD BE TAKEN WITH THE OTHER WARSAW PACT
STATES, EMPHASIZING THAT THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT FOR REPRESSION
WILL HAVE NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE WEST.

III. DEMARCHE WITH THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

- 1) GRAVEST CONCERN ABOUT POLISH DEVELOPMENT AND ABOUT SOVIET
INTERFERENCE IN POLISH AFFAIRS, ESPECIALLY ABOUT SERIOUS
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES.
- 2) REFER TO SOVIET SUPPORT OF USE OF FORCE IN POLAND.

2) DANGER TO INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AS A WHOLE

- 2) REFER TO SOVIET SUPPORT OF USE OF FORCE IN POLAND.
- 3) DANGER TO INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AS A WHOLE.
- 4) POLAND MUST HAVE THE RIGHT, WITHOUT FORCE BEING USED, TO TAKE ROAD TO RENEWAL DESIRED BY ALL SOCIAL FORCES.
- 5) ALL STATES SHOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO WORK FOR ENDING THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND RESUMPTION OF REFORM COURSE. NOTE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCE FOR WESTERN ASSISTANCE TO POLAND (CF I 3, LAST SENTENCE, ABOVE).
- 6) POINT OUT THAT WE HAVE SUPPORTED THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES ON ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO THEM AND WE HOPE THEREFORE THEY WILL SUPPORT US IN THIS CASE.

IV. DEMARCHE WITH THOSE NNA COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN MADRID

DEMARCHE SHOULD STRESS CSCE ASPECT (GRAVE VIOLATION OF FINAL ACT) AND PROPOSE SPECIAL MEETING IN MADRID (CF I ABOVE).

ENDS

ROSE

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IMMEDIATE

FM UKDEL NATO 31700Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 522 OF 31 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, WASHINGTON, WARSAW, MOSCOW
INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS, UKMIS GENEVA

MY TELNO 518; POLAND; DEMARCHES

1. SHORTLY BEFORE THIS MORNING'S M COUNCIL, WIECK (FRG) CIRCULATED A REVISED VERSION OF HIS PAPER REFLECTING COMMENTS MADE YESTERDAY. BENNETT (US) SUGGESTED FOUR FURTHER AMENDMENTS; THESE ARE INCORPORATED IN THE TEXT WHICH FOLLOWS IN MIFT, TO FCO ONLY.
2. THE COUNCIL AGREED THAT:
 - (A) DEMARCHES SHOULD NOW GO AHEAD;
 - (B) THE REVISED PAPER SHOULD FORM A BASIS FOR USE BY INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS AT THEIR DISCRETION AND ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY WERE FREE TO VARY THE CONTENTS. FOR INSTANCE I AND SEVERAL OTHERS EXPRESSED DOUBTS INCLUDING BENNETT'S SUGGESTION OF A REFERENCE TO THE US MEASURES (PARA 11 3).
 - (C) THE DEMARCHES SHOULD BE MADE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE

2. THE COUNCIL AGREED THAT:

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(C) THE DEMARCHES SHOULD BE MADE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE SELECTION OF COUNTRIES WAS LEFT TO NATIONAL DISCRETION, NO DIVISION OF LABOUR WAS DISCUSSED,

(D) REFERENCES TO THE CALLING OF AN EARLY MEETING ON CSCE (PARAGRAPH 1 11) WOULD NOT BE MADE UNTIL THE COUNCIL HAD TAKEN A DECISION ON THIS (SEE MIPT).

3. IT WAS THE COUNCIL'S UNDERSTANDING THAT ACTION ON THE ABOVE BASIS WOULD NOW GO AHEAD IRRESPECTIVE OF DECISIONS WHICH MAY BE TAKEN SUBSEQUENTLY ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE POLISH SITUATION. I ASSUME THAT THE BELGIANS WILL REPORT THIS TO THE TEN FOREIGN MINISTERS ON 4 JANUARY.

4. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO BE INFORMED IN TIME FOR THE COUNCIL MEETING ON 6 JANUARY WHAT ACTION WE ARE TAKING IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DECISION.

FCO PLEASE PASS ALL SAVING

CCN PARA 2(B) LINE 4 SHOULD READ:

EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT INCLUDING BENNETT'S ETC

ROSE

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SENT AT 311849Z PR

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PS/LORD TREFGARNE
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
~~MR FERGUSSON~~
SIR A ACLAND
MR GILLMORE

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FM UKDELNATO 311600Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 521 PF 31 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY PARIS BONN WASHINGTON, MADRID, MOSCOW, WARSAW
INFO SAVING BRUSSELS (ACTIONED)

MY TEL NO 516 POLAND AND CSCE

1. AT THE COUNCIL THIS MORNING, SVART (DENMARK) SAID THAT HAVING CONSULTED HIS MINISTER HE WAS ABLE TO AGREE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF CALLING FOR A SPECIAL MEETING AT MADRID, PROVIDED THAT THERE WAS FIRM BACKING FROM THE NNA COUNTRIES, SOUNDINGS SHOULD BE TAKEN SOON TO ESTABLISH THEIR ATTITUDE. ONLY IF IT WAS CLEAR THAT THERE WAS A GOOD MEASURE OF NNA SUPPORT SHOULD THE IDEA BE DISCUSSED WITH THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. THE COUNCIL AGREED TO PROCEED ON THIS BASIS, THE DUTCH MAKING CLEAR THEY DID SO WITH GREAT RELUCTANCE.
2. BENNET (US) SAID THE AMERICANS HAD ALREADY BEEN IN TOUCH WITH SOME NNA COUNTRIES. AS REGARDS FURTHER CONTACTS WITH THE NNA, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE ITALIANS WOULD APPROACH MALTA, YUGOSLAVIA, AND THE HOLY SEE; THE SCANDINAVIANS WOULD SPEAK TO THE FINNS; THE GERMANS WOULD HANDLE THE AUSTRIANS AND SWISS, AND THE US WOULD COVER SPAIN. THE RESULTS OF THESE CONTACTS WOULD BE REPORTED FOR A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL ON 6 JANUARY. THE COUNCIL WOULD TAKE A FINAL DECISION VAT THAT MEETING IN THE LIGHT OF REACTIONS FROM THE NNA'S AND SUBJECT TO THIS WOULD SET IN MOTION URGENTLY APPROACHES TO THE EAST EUROPEANS.
3. I NOTE FROM PARAGRAPH 5 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO 159 TO BRUSSELS THAT, AT YESTERDAY'S MEETING IN LONDON, OF THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS OF THE TEN THERE WAS SOME OPPOSITION TO THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL

YUGOSLAVIA, AND THE HOLY SEE; THE SCANDINAVIANS WOULD SPEAK TO THE FINNS; THE GERMANS WOULD HANDLE THE AUSTRIANS AND SWISS, AND THE US WOULD COVER SPAIN. THE RESULTS OF THESE CONTACTS WOULD BE REPORTED FOR A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL ON 6 JANUARY. THE COUNCIL WOULD TAKE A FINAL DECISION AT THAT MEETING IN THE LIGHT OF REACTIONS FROM THE NNA'S AND SUBJECT TO THIS WOULD SET IN MOTION URGENTLY APPROACHES TO THE EAST EUROPEANS.

3. I NOTE FROM PARAGRAPH 5 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO 159 TO BRUSSELS THAT, AT YESTERDAY'S MEETING IN LONDON, OF THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS OF THE TEN THERE WAS SOME OPPOSITION TO THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL. APART FROM SOME DUTCH HESITATIONS, THEY DID NOT EMERGE AT TODAY'S COUNCIL MEETING AND THE AMERICANS WILL HAVE TAKEN AWAY THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT THEIR ALLIES ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE CALLING OF A SPECIAL MEETING, PROVIDED THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT NNA BACKING. THEY WOULD FIND IT HARD TO UNDERSTAND IF THE TEN FOREIGN MINISTERS WERE TO DECIDE ON 4 JANUARY NOT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THIS IDEA, EVEN WITH RESPECTABLE NNA BACKING.

ROSE

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SENT AT 311842Z PR

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PS/FUS
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
SIR A ACLAND
MR GILLMORE

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FM THE HAGUE 311500Z DEC 81
TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 347 OF 31 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKREP BRUSSELS AND BRUSSELS

INFO SAVING MWARSAW, MOSCOW

INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO

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POLAND

1. THE MFA SPOKESMAN STATED ON 30 DECEMBER THAT THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT REACT OFFICIALLY "FOR SOME TIME" TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. HE ADDED THAT ECONOMIC MEASURES BY THE NETHERLANDS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION " WOULD BECOME TOPICAL" IF THE USSR "REALLY APPEARED" TO BE INVOLVED IN EVENTS IN POLAND. THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT WAS ANALYSING AND EVALUATING THE POLISH SITUATION IN CONCERT WITH OTHER EC COUNTRIES. IT HAD NOT YET REACHED CONCLUSIONS BUT SUSPENSION OF THE INF ARMS CONTROL TALKS IN GENEVA WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT.
2. VAN DER STOEL TOLD THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING THAT HE SAW PARTICULAR ADVANTAGE IN THE IDEA THAT MINISTERS OF THE TEN MIGHT ON 4 JANUARY PUBLICLY UNDERTAKE NOT TO UNDERMINE THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE U.S. (PARA 11 OF YOUR TEL NO 162 TO BRUSSELS REFERS).

LUSIONS BUT SUSPENSION OF THE INF ARMS CONTROL TALKS IN GENEVA
WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT.

2. VAN DER STOEL TOLD THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING THAT
HE SAW PARTICULAR ADVANTAGE IN THE IDEA THAT MINISTERS OF THE
TEN MIGHT ON 4 JANUARY PUBLICLY UNDERTAKE NOT TO
UNDERMINE THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE U.S. (PARA 11 OF YOUR TEL NO
162 TO BRUSSELS REFERS).

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES

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Prime Minister

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FM FCO DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 162 OF 31 DECEMBER
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, WARSAW, OTHER EC POSTS, UKDEL NATO

MF

MY TEL NO 159: INFORMAL MEETING OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIRECTORS ON POLAND - ECONOMIC SUBJECTS

1. ECONOMIC DIRECTORS OF THE TEN (OR IN MOST CASES THEIR DEPUTIES) PLUS THE COMMISSION CONSIDERED ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH POLAND AND (MORE BRIEFLY) WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN THE LIGHT OF THE LATEST US MEASURES. THE AIM WAS TO PREPARE FOR THE INFORMAL MINISTERIAL MEETING ON 4 JANUARY. IT WAS NOTED THAT CERTAIN SUBJECTS WOULD HAVE TO BE PURSUED IN THE APPROPRIATE COMMUNITY BODIES.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH POLAND.

2. THERE WAS WIDE AGREEMENT THAT THE TEN SHOULD ADOPT A 'WAIT AND SEE' ATTITUDE TO IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF ITS ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH POLAND AS A RESULT OF THE INTERNAL CLAMP-DOWN SINCE 13 DECEMBER. FISCHER (GERMANY) IN PARTICULAR STRESSED THAT, FOR HIS GOVERNMENT, DECISIONS ON ANY FURTHER ECONOMIC SUPPORT WOULD DEPEND ON INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND, AND BE SUBJECT TO CONSULTATION WITH THE GERMAN PARLIAMENT.

3. FOOD. IT WAS GENERALLY THOUGHT THAT ADEQUATE ASSURANCES HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE POLES THAT THE GIFT OF 8,000 TONNES OF BEEF WOULD BE DISTRIBUTED TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. THE COMMISSION REPORTED, HOWEVER, THAT NEITHER CARITAS NOR THE RED CROSS COULD THEMSELVES DISTRIBUTE THIS FOOD OR PROVIDE PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE OF ITS DISTRIBUTION. OTHER NGOS COULD ONLY HANDLE VERY SMALL AMOUNTS. IT WAS ACCEPTED THAT FOOLPROOF SURVEILLANCE OF DISTRIBUTION WOULD, IN PRACTICE, BE IMPOSSIBLE. BUT THE

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COMMUNITY SHOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK ASSURANCES ON DISTRIBUTION FROM THE POLES, INCLUDING DOCUMENTARY CHECKS ON ANY FUTURE SUPPLIES OF FOOD AT SPECIAL PRICES (INCLUDING UNDELIVERED PARTS OF TRANCHE 3(A)).

4. NO MEMBER STATE REPORTED DIFFICULTIES WITH CREDIT FOR OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF TRANCHE 3(A) OF COMMUNITY FOOD SUPPLIES. FRANCE AND ITALY SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THEIR BILATERAL CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS FOR FOOD PURCHASES WERE AT PRESENT FROZEN.

5. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE COMMUNITY WOULD SHORTLY HAVE TO DECIDE HOW TO HANDLE TRANCHE 3(B) OF FOOD AND RELATED CREDIT FOR IT: THIS SHOULD BE DONE IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND.

6. DEBT RESCHEDULING. PAYE (FRANCE) REPORTED A CONVERSATION BETWEEN CAMDESSUS AND HIS POLISH COUNTERPART ABOUT THE MEETING OF THE JOINT COMMISSION SCHEDULED FOR 14-15 JANUARY. CAMDESSUS HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE POSITION ABOUT HOLDING THIS MEETING AND INVITING THE POLES TO IT REMAINED COMPLETELY OPEN, AS DID THE ENTIRE QUESTION OF A 1982 AGREEMENT FOR RESCHEDULING POLISH DEBT. EVEN THE 1981 AGREEMENT WAS PRECARIOUS SINCE THE TANK CLAUSE MIGHT BE INVOKED. IT WAS AGREED THAT IT WAS RIGHT TO MAINTAIN THIS NON-COMMITTAL ATTITUDE FOR THE PRESENT, WHICH HAD THE EFFECT OF EXERTING SOME PRESSURE ON THE POLES, ALTHOUGH NOBODY SUGGESTED INVOKING THE TANK CLAUSE IN THE 1981 AGREEMENT. THE OUTCOME OF THE POLISH MEETING WITH PRIVATE BANKS SCHEDULED FOR 8 JANUARY WOULD ALSO BE IMPORTANT.

7. COMMERCIAL CREDIT. ALTHOUGH THE POSITIONS AND PRACTICES OF MEMBER STATES DIFFERED WIDELY, IT WAS GENERALLY AGREED THAT ALL MEMBERS SHOULD MAINTAIN A NON-COMMITTAL ATTITUDE TO NEW EXPORT CREDITS OR CREDIT INSURANCE.

8. STRATEGIC EXPORT CONTROLS. THE POSSIBILITY OF APPLYING A 'NO EXCEPTIONS' PROCEDURE UNDER COCOM FOR EXPORTS TO POLAND WAS CONSIDERED. THOUGH NOT ENTIRELY EXCLUDED, IT WAS RECOGNISED THAT THE IMPACT OF THIS ON POLISH TRADE WOULD BE SLIGHT.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

9. DISCUSSION OF THE AMERICAN SANCTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION

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WAS VERY GUARDED. MOST OF THOSE PRESENT, ESPECIALLY FISCHER (GERMANY) AND PAYE (FRANCE) WERE RELUCTANT TO TAKE ANY POSITION ON THE AMERICAN MEASURES OR ON THE IDEA OF COMPARABLE MEASURES BY THE TEN. ONLY THE ITALIANS SEEMED PREPARED TO GO FURTHER. DISCUSSION CONCENTRATED ON THE EXACT SCOPE OF THE AMERICAN MEASURES AND THEIR IMPACT IN EC COUNTRIES (ON WHICH SEE MY TEL NO 2004 TO WASHINGTON).

10. KAWAN (COMMISSION) WONDERED WHETHER THOUGHT COULD BE GIVEN TO RAISING TARIFFS AND QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS AGAINST SELECTED PRODUCTS EXPORTED BY THE SOVIET UNION TO THE COMMUNITY. THIS COULD BE DONE LEGALLY AS THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT A MEMBER OF GATT.

11. THE MAIN POINTS WHICH EMERGED WERE:-

(A) THE AMERICAN MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION OPENED UP AN AREA OF GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR THE TEN. MORE INFORMATION WAS NEEDED TO DETERMINE THE IMPACT OF THESE MEASURES.

(B) THE MEASURES HIGHLIGHTED THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, BASED LARGELY ON INDUSTRIAL TRADE, AND THE AMERICAN POSITION AS CHIEFLY AN AGRICULTURAL SUPPLIER.

(C) THERE WAS PARTICULAR UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE US MEASURES ON THE GAS PIPELINE PROJECT AND ON SUPPLIES OF GRAIN AVAILABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION NEXT YEAR.

(D) THE IDEA WAS PUT FORWARD, FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION, THAT THE MINISTERS OF THE TEN, AT THEIR MEETING ON 4 JANUARY, MIGHT UNDERTAKE PUBLICLY NOT TO UNDERMINE OR CIRCUMVENT THE AMERICAN MEASURES.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO *A*

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3964 OF 31 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY EC POSTS, UKDEL NATO, WARSAW, MOSCOW

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YOUR TELNO 2004: US MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION.

1. WE ARE ARRANGING MEETINGS TOMORROW TO PROVIDE AS MANY AS POSSIBLE OF THE DETAILS YOU REQUIRE. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE:

(A) AEROFLOT.

THERE ARE TWO AEROFLOT FLIGHTS TO THE UNITED STATES PER WEEK. IT IS CORRECT THAT NO US AIRLINES FLY TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE AMERICANS, IN THE JUDGMENT OF THEIR COUNSEL, HAVE THE NECESSARY LEGAL POWERS TO SUSPEND THE AGREEMENT.

(B) SOVIET PURCHASING COMMISSION.

ALTHOUGH ESTABLISHED ORIGINALLY TO DEAL WITH PURCHASES FOR THE KAMA RIVER PROJECT, THIS IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN UNDER-TAKING A GOOD DEAL OF ADDITIONAL BUSINESS (PRECISELY HOW MUCH WE ARE TRYING TO ASCERTAIN).

(C) GRAIN AGREEMENT.

IT IS CORRECT (AS ALREADY REPORTED) THAT ALTHOUGH NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NEW AGREEMENT ARE BEING POSTPONED, THE EXISTING ONE YEAR AGREEMENT WILL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL THE END OF SEPTEMBER 1982. UNDER THIS AGREEMENT 11 MILLION TONNES OF GRAIN HAVE ALREADY BEEN SOLD TO THE SOVIET UNION AND 4 MILLION TONNES HAVE ALREADY BEEN SHIPPED AND IT IS OPEN TO THE SOVIET UNION TO PURCHASE UP TO AN ADDITIONAL 12 MILLION TONNES. THESE SALES WILL GO AHEAD UNLESS THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD DECIDE TO TAKE FURTHER ACTION VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION IN WHICH CASE IT WOULD HAVE THE POWER TO INTERRUPT THEM. MOST OF THE SHIPPING IS UNDERTAKEN BY THIRD COUNTRIES. THE RESTRICTIONS ON PORT ACCESS AND THE ATTITUDE OF THE LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION COULD HAVE SOME EFFECT ON SOVIET LOADINGS.

(D) MARITIME AGREEMENT.

THE ADVANCE WARNING REQUIRED FROM SOVIET SHIPS ENTERING US PORTS OPEN TO THEM IS BEING EXTENDED FROM FOUR TO AT LEAST FOURTEEN DAYS. WE ARE TOLD THAT THE AMERICANS ARE LIKELY TO APPLY THIS FAIRLY RESTRICTIVELY.

(E) LICENCES FOR OIL AND GAS EQUIPMENT.

EXISTING CONTRACTS WILL BE HONOURED. THE LICENCE TO CATERPILLAR FOR PIPE LAYERS WAS APPROVED BUT HAS NOT YET BEEN DELIVERED TO THE COMPANY AND IS NOW SUSPENDED.

(F) US/SOVIET BILATERAL AGREEMENTS.

ALTHOUGH THESE AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN OPERATING AT A MUCH LOWER LEVEL OF ACTIVITY SINCE AFGHANISTAN, THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS HAS HITHERTO BEEN PRESERVED. THE AMERICANS ARE NOW LIKELY TO CANCEL THE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ON ENERGY AND ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY WHICH ARE DUE FOR RENEWAL WITHIN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS. THEY NOTE THAT THE SOVIET UNION SEEMS TO ATTACH POLITICAL IMPORTANCE TO THESE AGREEMENTS AS A MANIFESTATION OF DETENTE.

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2. WE SHALL BE EXPLORING FURTHER WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE US MEASURES FOR US SUPPLIED COMPONENTS IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY AND OIL AND GAS EQUIPMENT. THE STATE DEPARTMENT VOLUNTEERED THAT IT IS NOT AT PRESENT THE INTENTION TO IMPEDE THE TRANSFER BY INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER (WHICH IS IN SERIOUS FINANCIAL STRAITS) OF TECHNOLOGY RELEVANT TO THE MANUFACTURE OF COMBINE HARVESTERS.

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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2004 OF 30 DECEMBER

INFO TO PRIORITY BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS, WARSAW,
UKREP BRUSSELS.

INFO TO ROUTINE MOSCOW, OTHER EC POSTS.

YOUR TEL NO 3950: US MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION

1. THERE WAS PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF THE AMERICAN MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION, ANNOUNCED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN ON 29 DECEMBER, AT AN INFORMAL MEETING OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIRECTORS FROM THE COMMUNITY (INCLUDING COMMISSION) IN LONDON TODAY.

2. THE DISCUSSION WAS VERY TENTATIVE, SINCE NONE OF THOSE PRESENT HAD BEEN ABLE TO CONSULT OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND SOME HAD ONLY LEARNT THE DETAILS FROM THE PRESS. WE WERE ABLE TO DRAW ON YOUR USEFUL ACCOUNT OF THE EC LUNCH FOR HAIG (YOUR TEL NO 3941) WHILE THE FRENCH REPORTED SOME DETAILS ABOUT THE MEASURES GIVEN TO THEIR AMBASSADOR BY EAGLEBURGER.

3. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE TEN (PLUS COMMISSION) WILL MEET IN BRUSSELS ON 4 JANUARY TO CONSIDER POLAND, INCLUDING WHAT RESPONSE TO MAKE TO THE AMERICAN ACTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY USEFUL TO HAVE BEFORE THEN SOME GREATER CLARIFICATION OF THE SCOPE OF THESE MEASURES. THIS WILL HELP IN ANY EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT COMMUNITY ACTIONS DO NOT UNDERMINE OR HELP TO CIRCUMVENT THE AMERICAN MEASURES AND MAY ALSO ASSIST DISCUSSION OF WHAT THE TEN MIGHT DO ON THEIR OWN ACCOUNT.

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4. THE POINTS OF GREATEST INTEREST ARE AS FOLLOWS:-

(A) AEROFLOT. WE GATHER THAT THERE ARE ONLY TWO AEROFLOT FLIGHTS TO THE UNITED STATES PER WEEK: THAT NO US AIRLINES FLY TO THE SOVIET UNION: AND THAT THE AMERICANS CAN PREVENT THE AEROFLOT FLIGHTS WITHOUT BEING IN BREACH OF THEIR AID SERVICES AGREEMENT. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD CONFIRM THIS. OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT MOST EC COUNTRIES COULD NOT REDUCE FLIGHTS WITHOUT GIVING ADVANCE NOTICE OF UP TO 12 MONTHS, THOUGH - FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION - THIS DOES NOT APPLY TO THE UK. AIR TRAFFIC BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND EUROPEAN CAPITALS IS OF COURSE MUCH DENSER THAN WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND IN BOTH DIRECTIONS.

(B) SOVIET PURCHASING COMMISSION. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS COMMISSION, SET UP ORIGINALLY TO DEAL WITH PURCHASES FOR THE KAMA RIVER PROJECT, HANDLES ONLY A FRACTION OF US SOVIET TRADE. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD CONFIRM THIS AND OFFER SOME JUDGEMENT ON THE ACTUAL IMPACT OF CLOSING THE COMMISSION? AS FAR AS WE CAN JUDGE THERE IS NO BODY IN BRITAIN OR OTHER EC COUNTRIES WHICH CORRESPONDS TO THIS COMMISSION.

(C) LICENCES FOR HIGH TECHNOLOGY EQUIPMENT. WE BELIEVE THAT DIRECT SALES OF ELECTRONIC AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY EQUIPMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES TO THE SOVIET UNION ARE SMALL. SALES FROM WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY UK, FRANCE AND GERMANY, ARE MUCH HIGHER. MANY OF THE PRODUCTS EXPORTED FROM EUROPEAN COUNTRIES RELY ON US COMPONENTS WHICH REQUIRE RE-EXPORT LICENCES FROM THE UNITED STATES. CAN YOU CLARIFY WHAT EFFECT, IF ANY, THE AMERICAN MEASURES WOULD HAVE IN THESE CONTEXTS? WE BELIEVE THERE WOULD BE A SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT ON ICL SALES OF COMPUTERS TO THE USSR.

(D) GRAINS AGREEMENT. WE ASSUME THAT, ALTHOUGH NEGOTIATIONS ON A NEW AGREEMENT ARE BEING POSTPONED, THE EXISTING AGREEMENT REMAINS IN FORCE TILL ITS EXPIRY AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER 1982. UNDER THIS AGREEMENT THE SOVIET UNION IS EXPECTED TO ORDER UP TO A FURTHER 23,000 TONNES

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OF GRAIN FROM THE UNITED STATES (ACCORDING TO FRENCH AND GERMAN ESTIMATES: OUR OWN ARE A BIT LOWER). DO THE AMERICANS ENVISAGE THAT SALES TO THIS AMOUNT WILL GO AHEAD OR DO THEY HAVE POWERS TO LIMIT THIS?

(E) MARITIME AGREEMENT. EAGLEBURGER TOLD THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR THAT THE ADVANCE WARNING REQUIRED FROM SOVIET SHIPS ENTERING THE FORTY US PORTS OPEN TO THEM WAS BEING EXTENDED FROM 4 TO 14 DAYS, WITH THE OPTION THAT ADMISSION WOULD BE REFUSED. IS THIS CORRECT? IS IT RIGHT TO ASSUME THAT THIS MEASURE WOULD NOT IPSO FACTO LIMIT SOVIET ACCESS TO AMERICAN PORTS UNLESS THE AMERICANS WISHED TO INTERPRET IT RESTRICTIVELY? WE AND MOST OTHER EC COUNTRIES WOULD NEED TO GIVE 12 MONTHS NOTICE OF TERMINATING OUR BILATERAL MARITIME AGREEMENTS. EVEN SO, WE COULD NOT CONTROL ACCESS TO PORTS WITHOUT LEGISLATION.

(F) LICENCES FOR OIL AND GAS EQUIPMENT. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, THIS IS THE MOST SENSITIVE ITEM FOR EC COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY FRANCE, GERMANY AND ITALY, BECAUSE OF ITS EFFECT ON THE GAS PIPELINE PROJECT. EAGLEBURGER TOLD THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR THAT EXISTING CONTRACTS WOULD BE HONOURED AND THAT LICENCES WOULD ONLY BE REQUIRED FOR NEW CONTRACTS. THE FRENCH ALSO HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE LICENCE TO CATERPILLAR FOR PIPELAYERS HAD BEEN GRANTED. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD CLARIFY THE EXACT POSITION ON WHETHER THIS ACTION HAS RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT AND, IF NOT, WHICH LICENCES HAVE ALREADY BEEN GIVEN. A PARTICULAR PROBLEM MAY ARISE OVER ROTORS SUPPLIED FROM THE US FOR GENERATORS BEING MADE BY JOHN BROWN FOR USE IN THIS PROJECT. WOULD THE LICENSING REQUIREMENT EFFECT THESE ITEMS AND, IF SO, HOW WOULD THEY REACT IF A BRITISH FIRM SUPPLIED AN ALTERNATIVE PRODUCT?

(G) US/SOVIET BILATERAL AGREEMENTS.

WE BELIEVE THE AMERICANS HAVE 11-12 OF THESE AGREEMENTS. DO THEY CONSIDER THAT THEY HAVE MUCH IMPACT ON THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS? MOST OF OUR BILATERAL AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN FAIRLY INACTIVE SINCE THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN.

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THE GERMANS HAVE NO SUCH AGREEMENTS.

5. WE APPRECIATE THAT THE ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS MAY MEAN ENQUIRIES ACROSS A WIDE RANGE OF US DEPARTMENTS. GRATEFUL, HOWEVER, FOR SUCH ANSWERS AS YOU CAN GIVE BY THE END OF THIS WEEK, WITH A REQUEST FROM RESIDENT CLERK TO PASS DETAILS TO BULLARD AND BRIDGES, WHO WILL BE ATTENDING A MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF STATE AT 1830Z ON SUNDAY EVENING.

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TO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 159 OF 30 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW WARSAW UKDEL NATO UKMIS GENEVA OTHER EC POSTS
TOKYO LISBON MADRID UKDEL STRASBOURG OSLO STOCKHOLM HELSINKI.

POLAND: INFORMAL MEETING OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIRECTORS
OF THE TEN, 30 DECEMBER.

1. THE FOLLOWING SUMMARISES THE OUTCOME OF THIS MEETING ON THE POLITICAL SIDE: FOR ECONOMIC ASPECTS, SEE SEPARATE TELEGRAM.
2. IT WAS AGREED THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE TEN SHOULD MEET UNDER BELGIAN PRESIDENCY ARRANGEMENTS IN BRUSSELS ON 4 JANUARY TO CONSIDER THE POLISH EVENTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TEN. THIS HAS SINCE BEEN ANNOUNCED.
3. ON THE PRESENT SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN POLAND, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE NEXT PHASE OF MARTIAL LAW IS LIKELY TO BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE REGIME TO IMPLEMENT THAN THE FIRST THREE WEEKS HAVE BEEN. SOME DIFFERENCE OF EMPHASIS BETWEEN FRG AND ESPECIALLY GREECE, WHO WERE DISPOSED TO SUSPEND JUDGEMENT AND GIVE JARUZELSKI THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT FOR A BIT LONGER, AND OTHERS, ESPECIALLY FRANCE, WHO WERE INCLINED TO QUESTION HIS FREEDOM OF ACTION IF NOT HIS SINCERITY. AGREEMENT THAT WESTERN GOVERNMENTS COULD NOT NECESSARILY AFFORD TO TAKE SUCH A LONG-TERM VIEW AS THE CHURCH AND THE VATICAN APPEARED TO BE DOING.
4. NO DISAGREEMENT ON THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES:
 - A) SHORT-TERM: GET MARTIAL LAW LIFTED, DETAINEES RELEASED AND INTERNAL DIALOGUE RESUMED.
 - B) LONG-TERM: - NOT ACCEPT SITUATION AS IRREVERSIBLE.
 - KEEP INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF POLISH CRISIS UNDER CONTROL.
 - PREVENT FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION.
 - ENSURE THAT PROCESS OF REFORM AND RENEWAL, ALTHOUGH SET BACK, IS RESUMED.
 - MAINTAIN UNITY AMONG THE TEN AND (FOR THOSE WHO BELONG TO IT) IN THE ALLIANCE.
5. MADRID. AGREED TO RECOMMEND THAT ON 4 JANUARY MINISTERS CONSIDER THE FULL RANGE OF OPTIONS IDENTIFIED IN NATO, INCLUDING THE ONE (EARLY RECONVENING) ALREADY PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES: OBJECTIONS SEEN TO THE LATTER, ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT COULD PREJUDICE AGREED DATE OF 9 FEBRUARY FOR THE SAKE OF AN UNATTAINABLE TARGET (EARLIER RESUMPTION).
6. RELATIONS WITH POLAND. MINISTERS TO BE INVITED TO CONSIDER HOW BEST TO CONTINUE THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH THE REGIME IN WARSAW, EG BY FURTHER DIPLOMATIC CONTACT, HIGH-LEVEL MESSAGES AND/OR THROUGH A SPECIAL EMISSARY: THE LATTER WOULD NEED TO BE ASSURED OF ACCESS TO CHURCH AND SOLIDARITY LEADERS AS WELL AS TO

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THE REGIME. MINISTERS TO CONSIDER DESIRABILITY OF IMPOSING RETALIATORY RESTRICTIONS ON POLISH EMBASSIES IN CAPITALS OF THE TEN (EXCLUDING DENMARK WHICH HAS DIFFERENT TRADITIONS IN THIS MATTER). IF MINISTERS AGREE, INSTRUCTIONS TO BE SENT TO MISSIONS IN NEW YORK AND GENEVA TO FOLLOW UP POSSIBILITIES OF ACTION THROUGH ILO AND POSSIBLY OTHER UN SPECIALISED AGENCIES. NO SUPPORT FOR IDEA OF WITHDRAWING AMBASSADORS FROM WARSAW, WHETHER BRIEFLY FOR CONSULTATIONS OR INDEFINITELY AS A MARK OF DISAPPROVAL.

7. RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. AGREEMENT, NOT LEAST FROM THE FRENCH POLITICAL DIRECTOR, THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS INTERPRETED CONSULTATION IN A CURIOUS MANNER AND GIVEN A LEAD IN A DIRECTION WHICH EUROPEAN ALLIES WILL FIND IT HARD TO FOLLOW. GENERAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF DIFFICULTY OF MAINTAINING WESTERN UNITY, GIVEN THE AMERICAN STARTING POINT. AGREEMENT ON THREE LINES, SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION BY MINISTERS ON 4 JANUARY:-

A) AVOID ACTION OR COMMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE WESTERN DISUNITY WORSE OR SEEM WORSE THAN IT IS: SOME DEGREE OF COMPLEMENTARITY INEVITABLE AND EVEN DESIRABLE IN WESTERN REACTIONS.

B) MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF THE POSSIBILITIES IN THE POLITICAL FIELD, WHERE THE TEN ARE LESS CONSTRAINED THAN IN ECONOMIC. USE MADRID LEVER IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER, ARGUING THAT POLISH EVENTS UNDERMINE ASSUMPTIONS ON WHICH EAST/WEST RELATIONS HAVE DEVELOPED SINCE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT ISSUED AFTER FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING ON 4 JANUARY SHOULD BE SUITABLY FIRMER THAN THOSE MADE BEFORE CHRISTMAS. NOT UNDERRATE SOVIET SENSITIVITY TO WELL-JUDGED DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE.

C) EACH OF THE TEN SHOULD LOOK FOR NATIONAL WAYS TO REFLECT DISAPPROVAL OF THE SOVIET ROLE IN POLAND, EG BY

- POSTPONING/CANCELLING POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION
- ADVISING PARLIAMENTARIANS TO POSTPONE/CANCEL THEIR CONTRACTS WITH MOSCOW
- REDUCING OR ENDING WORK OF SOVIET OCEANOGRAPHIC VESSELS IN WATERS OF THE TEN (SUGGESTED BY ITALY, WHICH IS TO CIRCULATE A NOTE).

8. I JOINED THE MEETING FOR HALF AN HOUR AT THE END, AND MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-

A) I HAD PROPOSED A MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS THIS WEEK PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE CRITICISM OF THE INACTIVITY OF THE TEN DURING THE AFGHAN CRISIS TWO YEARS AGO. IT WOULD BE HARDER ON 4 JANUARY THAN IT WOULD HAVE BEEN TODAY OR TOMORROW TO RESERVE COMMENT ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION ANNOUNCED ON 29 DECEMBER. GIVEN THAT WE HAD BEEN SAYING FOR MONTHS THAT WE HAD PLANS FOR AN EMERGENCY IN POLAND, WE FACED A PROBLEM OVER WHAT TO SAY NOW.

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B) I UNDERSTOOD FROM SIR N HENDERSON THAT THE AMERICAN REACTION TO REAGAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT HAD BEEN VERY POSITIVE AND THAT AMERICAN EYES WERE NOW TURNING TOWARDS EUROPE TO SEE WHAT WE WERE DOING. IN TAKING OUR DECISIONS WE MUST THINK CAREFULLY ABOUT THE LIKELY EFFECT ON RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE ALLIANCE.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3959 OF 30 DECEMBER 1981

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN

POLAND: U S PRESS BRIEFING

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT, GIVEN TO US IN CONFIDENCE BY A BRITISH CORRESPONDENT, OF THE BACKGROUND BRIEFING GIVEN BY EAGLEBURGER TO EUROPEAN CORRESPONDENTS HERE ON 28 DECEMBER:

BEGINS: THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT MARTIAL LAW AND REPRESSION HAS BROUGHT ABOUT THE ORDER AND STABILITY THE AUTHORITIES SOUGHT. THE SITUATION IS STILL IN A STATE OF FLUX AND THE U.S. EXPECTS TO SEE PASSIVE RESISTANCE CONTINUE OVER AN EXTENSIVE PERIOD OF TIME IN POLAND. THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC PLIGHT, EVEN BEFORE MARTIAL LAW, WILL ONLY MAKE THE SITUATION WORSE. THE U.S. DOES NOT AGREE WITH THE ARGUMENT THAT THE POLISH JUNTA HAS WON THE FIRST ROUND.

2. THE U.S. HOWEVER STILL BELIEVES THAT A SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND IN RECONCILIATORY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE STATE, THE SOLIDARITY UNION AND THE CHURCH BUT QUOTE AS EACH DAY GOES BY THE PROBLEM BECOMES MORE DIFFICULT UNQUOTE.

3. THE U.S. DOES NOT BELIEVE THE SITUATION IN POLAND CAN BE COMPARED WITH HUNGARY IN 1956 OR CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968. THE FACT THAT MOSCOW ALLOWED LIBERALISATION TO PROCEED IN POLAND FOR 18 MONTHS WAS A NEW ELEMENT AND TODAY THE SOVIET UNION IS IN A PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT SITUATION IN TERMS OF ITS RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE AND ITS INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. THE U.S. THEREFORE BELIEVES THAT PRESSURES ON MOSCOW FROM THE WEST CAN HAVE SOME INFLUENCE ON THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN POLAND.

4. NOR DOES THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION SEE HOW IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE WEST TO REMAIN SILENT IN THE LIGHT OF THE MASSIVE REPRESSION IN POLAND OF THE WORKERS MOVEMENT, AND IN VIOLATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS AGREED TO BY BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND POLAND. BECAUSE OF HELSINKI THE SITUATION IN POLAND TODAY IS NOT SIMPLY A QUOTE YALTA TYPE CASE UNQUOTE. THE OBLIGATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED.

5. APPARENTLY A GROWING NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE SHARE THAT VIEW. THE QUESTION IS NOW WHAT MEASURES THE U.S. SHOULD TAKE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION WHICH THE U.S. BELIEVES WAS DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CRACKDOWN IN POLAND. THE U.S. HAS HAD CONSULTATIONS WITH ITS ALLIES IN ADVANCE AND WILL DO EVERYTHING TO KEEP THE ALLIANCE INFORMED OF THE MEASURES, AND TO ASK THEIR VIEWS OF THEM IN ADVANCE, DEPENDING ON TIME BEING AVAILABLE. THE ALLIES HAVE ALREADY HAD THE BENEFIT OF AMERICAN THINKING AND ANY AMERICAN DECISIONS TO BE TAKEN WILL BE TAKEN WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THOSE CONVERSATIONS.

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6. THE U.S. HOPES THAT THE ALLIES WILL THEMSELVES TAKE WHATEVER STEPS THEY FEEL TO BE APPROPRIATE. ALMOST ALL OF THEM HAVE INDICATED THAT THERE WILL BE NO NEW GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT AID FOR POLAND FOR THE PRESENT. THE DILEMMA IS TO TRY TO SEE THAT THE POLISH PEOPLE DO NOT STARVE WHILE AT THE SAME TIME AVOIDING PROVIDING AID TO THE REGIME THAT IS OPPRESSING THE POLISH PEOPLE.

7. QUOTE THE U.S. IS AWARE THAT THERE IS A POTENTIAL FOR SERIOUS DISAGREEMENT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE OVER THE WESTERN RESPONSE TO THE POLISH CRISIS. WE WOULD FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND HOW THE WEST COULD STAND BY AND DO NOTHING IN THE FACE OF WHAT IS GOING ON IN POLAND. THIS IS ABOUT EUROPE, NOT CENTRAL ASIA, AND AFFECTS THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL OF US. BUT WE BELIEVE THE ALLIANCE CAN HANDLE THE SITUATION. WE DON'T EXPECT 100 PERCENT SUPPORT, BUT WE DO HOPE FOR A SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE OF AGREEMENT. UNQUOTE

8. QUOTE IT WOULD BE HARD TO EXPLAIN TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC HOW THE WEST COULD STAND BY AND WATCH WHAT IS GOING ON IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. WE DON'T EXPECT EVERYTHING WE DO TO BE MATCHED SPECIFICALLY, BUT WE DO EXPECT THE WEST TO ACT IN CONCERT. UNQUOTE

9. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT IN NATO ABOUT WHAT WOULD BE DONE IN THE EVENT OF DIRECT SOVIET INTERVENTION IN POLAND. QUOTE BUT WE ARE FACED WITH A NEITHER FISH NOR FOWL SITUATION, WITH POLES AGAINST POLES WITH SOVIET INVOLVEMENT. WE WERE FACED BEFORE THE CRACKDOWN IN A CLASSIC FOREIGN POLICY DILEMMA WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO BRING MUCH INFLUENCE TO BEAR EITHER ON SOLIDARITY OR THE POLISH GOVERNMENT AND CERTAINLY NOT THE SOVIET UNION. BUT WE MUST NOW MAKE IT CLEAR TO MOSCOW AND THE JUNTA THAT A PRICE HAS TO BE PAID.

10. THE U.S. FINDS IT REASSURING THAT THE AVERAGE WEST EUROPEAN WORKER SEES THE SITUATION IN POLAND AS A REGIME SUPPOSEDLY BUILT BY AND FOR WORKERS SPENDING ITS TIME CRUSHING THE WORKERS MOVEMENT. THE U.S. EXPECTS THAT PRESSURES FROM EUROPEAN LABOUR UNIONS WILL FORCE A NUMBER OF WEST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS SHORTLY TO TAKE A TOUGHER LINE. THE U.S. IS NOT THINKING ABOUT WITHDRAWING FROM ARMS REDUCTION TALKS WITH THE RUSSIANS, BUT IT IS GOING TO HOLD THE POLES AND THE RUSSIANS TO THE FACT THAT THEY SIGNED THE HELSINKI ACCORDS.

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FM MOSCOW 301338Z DEC 81

TO ROUTINE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 771 OF 30 DECEMBER

INFO WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, WARSAW

POLAND - U.S. MEASURES

1. I AM NOT SURE WHAT ASSUMPTIONS THE AMERICANS ARE MAKING ABOUT THE SOVIET RESPONSE. THERE IS A FAIR CHANCE THAT THE PRIMARY SOVIET INTEREST LIES IN MAINTAINING A STABLE RELATIONSHIP, BUT THE TAKING OF DIRECT COUNTERMEASURES WILL HAVE SURPRISED THEM AND THEY MAY LOOK FOR SOME MORE THAN VERBAL MEANS OF RETALIATION. THERE ARE SOME MINOR COUNTER-MEASURES OPEN, EG STOPPING THE MILITARY AIRCRAFT FOR THE U.S. EMBASSY, AND I HOPE THEY WILL NOT GO BEYOND THIS KIND OF THING. THERE MUST BE A CERTAIN TEMPTATION TO THROW THE ALLIANCE INTO DISARRAY BY WARNINGS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE EFFECT ON COMMERCIAL DEALS IN WHICH INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST AND HINTS THAT FAILURE TO REVOKE THE U.S. MEASURES COULD PREJUDICE THE CLIMATE FOR AND PERHAPS EVEN THE RESUMPTION OF THE GENEVA TALKS, BUT WITH LUCK THEY WILL DECIDE THAT ANY LINKAGE OF THE LATTER KIND WOULD DO THEIR OWN INTERESTS MORE HARM THAN GOOD.

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[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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FM WARSAW 301440Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1091 OF 30 DECEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO.

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UKMIS TELNO 1614

1. I WAS CALLED TODAY TO SEE NOWORYTA, DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT FOUR AT THE MFA. HE SAID THAT THE POLES HAD RECEIVED DISTURBING INDICATIONS FROM NEW YORK THAT THE US INTENDED TO RAISE THE SUBJECT OF POLAND IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE WISHED TO EMPHASISE THAT THIS WOULD BE CONTRARY BOTH TO THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, SINCE EVENTS IN POLAND WERE AN ENTIRELY POLISH AFFAIR, AND ALSO TO THE INTERESTS OF POLAND HERSELF. ANY INTERNATIONALISATION OF POLAND'S PROBLEMS COULD ONLY FURTHER HARM THE COUNTRY. HE THEREFORE ASKED FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM IN REJECTING ANY SUCH ATTEMPTS AT BRINGING THE MATTER UP IN THE UN.

2. I REPLIED THAT I HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS MATTER, BUT THAT I WOULD PASS THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S MESSAGE BACK TO LONDON.

I SAID THAT I ASSUMED THE POLISH DELEGATION IN NEW YORK, WHICH WOULD REPRESENT THEIR COUNTRY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL FROM

AT BRINGING THE MATTER UP IN THE UN.

2. I REPLIED THAT I HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS MATTER, BUT THAT I WOULD PASS THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S MESSAGE BACK TO LONDON.

I SAID THAT I ASSUMED THE POLISH DELEGATION IN NEW YORK, WHICH WOULD REPRESENT THEIR COUNTRY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL FROM 1 JANUARY, WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH THE BRITISH DELEGATION.

I ADDED THAT POLAND'S PROBLEM HAD BEEN RENDERED MORE ACUTE BY THE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF WAR AND THAT, IF THE STATE OF WAR COULD ONLY BE ENDED, IT WOULD BE UNLIKELY THAT SUCH THREATS OF INTERNATIONALISATION AS HE HAD JUST DESCRIBED WOULD OCCUR.

NOWORYTA REPLIED WITH THE BY NOW STANDARD JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DECLARATION OF THE STATE OF WAR. THERE WAS NOTHING NEW IN IT, EXCEPT THE DISCLOSURE THAT MANY FACTORIES IN GDANSK HAVE ONLY JUST ENDED STRIKES AND THAT THE SHIPYARDS ARE NOT NOW DUE TO RESUME WORK UNTIL 4 JANUARY. (THEY HAD EARLIER BEEN INTENDED TO RESUME OPERATIONS ON 28 DECEMBER).

3. I PROMISED TO GO BACK TO NOWORYTA IF I WAS SO INSTRUCTED FROM LONDON. DO YOU WISH ME TO SAY ANYTHING MORE.?

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FM WARSAW 301335Z DEC
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1089 OF 30TH DECEMBER 1981

FOR NEWS DEPARTMENT.

1. TODAY'S JOINT BRITISH EFFORT, WHICH FOLLOWS, WAS DRAFTED BY MOONEY OGGF REUTERS IN CONJUNCTION WITH VEBASTIAN, BBC.

BEGINS:

SOURCES CLOSE TO THE CHURCH SAID THE MILITARY APPEARED DIVIDED OVER THE FUTURE OF SOLIDARITY AND WHAT TO DO WITH MR WALES. UP TO CHRISTMAS THE AUTHORITIES HZDBBSMN GALKILG IN TERMS OF PERMITTING MR WALES TO MEET WITH THE FULL PRESIDUM OF SOLIDARITY. MR WALES HAD REPEATEDLY STATED THAT HE COULD NOT GO ON TELEVISION AND MAKE ANY PRONOUNCEMENTS ABOUT MARTIAL LAW WITHOUT FIRST DISCUSSING THE SITUATION WITH THE PRESIDUM, THE SOURCES SAID. BUT THEY ADDED THAT SINCE CHRISTMAS THE AUTHORITIES HAD STOPPED TALKING IN TERMS OF SUCH A MEETING. THIS CLEARLY REFLECTED THE DILEMNA FACING THE AUTHORITIES —WHETHER TO RISK ALLOWING THE UNION TO REGROUP IN ITS ORIGINAL FORM OR WHETHER TO SMASH THE MOVEMENT

AND MAKE ANY PRONOUNCEMENTS ABOUT MARTIAL LAW WITHOUT FIRST DISCUSSING THE SITUATION WITH THE PRESIDUM, THE SOURCES SAID. BUT THEY ADDED THAT SINCE CHRISTMAS THE AUTHORITIES HAD STOPPED TALKING IN TERMS OF SUCH A MEETING. THIS CLEARLY REFLECTED THE DILEMMA FACING THE AUTHORITIES --WHETHER TO RISK ALLOWING THE UNION TO REGROUP IN ITS ORIGINAL FORM OR WHETHER TO SMASH THE MOVEMENT ONCE AND FOR ALL. THE CHURCH HAS MADE NO SECRET OF ITS DEMANDS THAT SOLIDARITY BE BROUGHT BACK. THE DEMAND WAS ALSO PUT FORCIBLY BY POPE JOHN PAUL IN HIS PERSONAL LETTER TO GENERAL JARUZELSKI. A NETWORK FOR AID AND INFORMATION FOR THE INTERNEES HAS BEEN ORGANIZED AT THE ST MARTIN'S CHURCH IN WARSAW'S OLD CITY. FOOD PARCELS AND OTHER SUPPLIES ARE BEING SENT THERE. THE CHURCH HAS NOW BEEN PROVIDED WITH A LIST OF 49 PLACES OF INTERNMENT AROUND THE COUNTRY. PRIESTS HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO GO INTO MOST OF THEM TO SAY MASS, HEAR CONFESSION. THE CHURCH HAS BEEN SUPPLIED WITH A LIST OF 5,000 INTERNEES, BUT THERE ARE STILL SOME SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT THE EXACT FIGURE. THE AUTHORITIES HAVE SAID THERE ARE AROUND 400 INTERNEES IN THE WARSAW AREA BUT PEOPLE MAKING LISTS SAY THE FIGURE IS CLOSER TO ONE THOUSAND. HOWEVER TALKS WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS PRODUCE DIFFERING OFFICIAL ESTIMATES OF THOSE INTERNED AND ARRESTED. THIS COULD REFLECT OFFICIAL CONFUSION AS TO THE REAL SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY OR A DELIBERATE DESIRE TO HAMPER AID TO THE VICTIMS.

ALL UNIVERSITIES REMAIN CLOSED BUT THERE ARE SIGNS THAT UNDERGROUND ACADEMIC LIFE IS STIRRING. A NUMBER OF ADVANCED HISTORY STUDENTS IN WARSAW HAVE BEGUN RECEIVING LECTURES IN SECRET, ALONG THE LINES OF THE FORMER "FLYING UNIVERSITY."

TEACHERS SAY THEY BELIEVE UNIVERSITIES WILL OPEN TOWARDS THE END OF JANUARY, BUT WITHOUT FIRST YEAR STUDENTS. REPORTS SAY SOME HAVE ALREADY BEEN DRAFTED FOR MILITARY SERVICE.

A SKELETON SOLIDARITY STAFF CONTINUES TO PRINT SPECIAL BULLETINS, BUT THEY ADMIT THAT THE INFORMATION IS OFTEN SKETCHY AND DELAYED. THE BULLETINS HAVE WARNED PEOPLE TO BEWARE OF INFILTRATION BY THE SECURITY SERVICES. THEY SAID MANY BUS AND TAXI DRIVERS HAD NOW BEEN REPLACED BY POLICE AGENTS.

POLISH OBSERVERS DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF MASSIVE ARMED RESISTANCE IN THE FUTURE AND SAY ITS UNLIKELY THAT ANY NATIONAL UNION STRUCTURE HAS SURVIVED.

HOWEVER SOLIDARITY COURIERS HAVE MANAGED TO TRAVEL LONG DISTANCES AND REPORT LITTLE WORK IN THE MAIN INDUSTRIAL CENTRES.

POLISH OBSERVERS DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF MASSIVE ARMED RESISTANCE IN THE FUTURE AND SAY ITS UNLIKELY THAT ANY NATIONAL UNION STRUCTURE HAS SURVIVED.

HOWEVER SOLIDARITY COURIERS HAVE MANAGED TO TRAVEL LONG DISTANCES AND REPORT LITTLE WORK IN THE MAIN INDUSTRIAL CENTRES. MANY WORKERS ARE SAID TO BE ON A "GO-SLOW"....OTHERS ARE SAID TO BE IDLE DUE TO A SHORTAGE OF RAW MATERIALS.

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FM UKDEL NATO 301105Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
TELEGRAM NUMBER 514 OF 30 DECEMBER 1981,
INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, WASHINGTON, WARSAW, MOSCOW,
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ROME.

WARSAW TELNO 1077 : POLAND.

1. WIECK (GERMANY) CALLED A BRIEF MEETING OF THE COUNCIL THIS MORNING (HAVING APPARENTLY TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO ARRANGE ONE FOR YESTERDAY AFTERNOON) TO REPORT THAT CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT HAD WRITTEN TO BREZHNEV AND JARUZELSKI ON 26 DECEMBER, AND THAT POLISH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER RAKOWSKI WAS VISITING BONN TODAY.
2. WIECK SAID THESE MOVES WERE TO BE SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT'S APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT SITUATION, ON WHICH HE CIRCULATED A PAPER (COPY BY BAG). THIS CONCLUDED THAT POLAND WAS STILL DEPENDENT ON WESTERN AID FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY, THAT THE WEST SHOULD NOT GIVE UP ITS ATTEMPTS TO TEST THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE POLISH MILITARY COMMITTEE'S ASSURANCES OF THEIR INTENTION TO RESTORE THE PROCESS OF RENEWAL BUT SHOULD MAKE FURTHER AID DEPENDENT ON PROGRESS IN THIS DIRECTION, THAT HOPE OF A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN THE SITUATION SHOULD NOT BE ABANDONED SO LONG AS THE CHURCH HAS NOT GIVEN UP, AND THAT TALKS BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND THE MILITARY COUNCIL SHOULD BE SUPPORTED.
3. SCHMIDT'S LETTER TO BREZHNEV EXPRESSED GERMAN CONCERN ABOUT THE FATE OF POLAND, REFERRING TO THE 1970 WARSAW TREATY WHICH HAD HELPED TO LIFT THE BURDENS OF THE PAST HISTORY OF GERMAN/POLISH RELATIONS. IT DESCRIBED THE ACTIONS OF THE POLISH MILITARY COUNCIL AS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND REFERRED TO INDICATIONS THAT THESE ACTIONS HAD NOT BEEN UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM OUTSIDE. RECALLING WHAT HE HAD SAID TO BREZHNEV IN BONN ABOUT THE NEED FOR POLAND TO SOLVE ITS PROBLEMS WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE, SCHMIDT APPEALED TO BREZHNEV TO DO ALL HE COULD TO ENSURE THAT PEACEFUL EAST/WEST COOPERATION WOULD NOT BE ENDANGERED BY EVENTS IN POLAND.
4. WIECK ADDED THAT BREZHNEV HAD NOW REPLIED TO SCHMIDT'S LETTER AND DESCRIBED THE REPLY AS NON-COMMITTAL BUT NOT (NOT) HOSTILE IN TONE.
5. WIECK SUMMARISED SCHMIDT'S LETTER TO JARUZELSKI IN TERMS SIMILAR TO THOSE IN WARSAW TUR. THE LETTER SAID THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS FACING VERY DIFFICULT DECISIONS ABOUT FUTURE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO POLAND AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE BUNDESTAG RESOLUTION OF 18 DECEMBER. FUTURE AID WOULD DEPEND LARGELY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL'S ASSURANCES ABOUT RECONCILIATION AND RENEWAL.

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6. NO REPLY HAS YET BEEN RECEIVED TO THIS LETTER, BUT ONE MAY BE BROUGHT BY RAKOWSKI WHEN HE VISITS BONN TODAY. WIECK SAID THAT THIS VISIT WAS THE RESULT OF A POLISH INITIATIVE. THE POLISH CHARGE HAD CALLED ON STATE SECRETARY LAHNSTEIN IN THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE ON 22 DECEMBER SAYING THAT THE MILITARY COUNCIL WISHED TO SEND RAKOWSKI TO CALL ON THE CHANCELLOR. SCHMIDT BEING UNAVAILABLE, THE GERMANS HAD AGREED TO THE VISIT AND ARRANGED FOR RAKOWSKI TO CALL ON GENSCHER AS VICE CHANCELLOR. WIECK UNDERTOOK TO REPORT ON THESE TALKS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, IF NECESSARY BY CALLING A FURTHER COUNCIL TOMORROW OR ON 1 JANUARY (BOTH OF WHICH ARE HOLIDAYS HERE).

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FM MADRID 301050Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 503 OF 30 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND POLAND.

1. M. THORN, WHO IS HERE ON A VISIT ABOUT WHICH HE BRIEFED COMMUNITY AMBASSADORS TODAY, OFFERED A PERSONAL OPINION ABOUT A POSSIBLE MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS COUNCIL IN LONDON ON 31 DECEMBER. HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE AMERICAN PRESSURE FOR EUROPEAN SUPPORT OVER SANCTIONS, BUT THOUGHT THAT TWO OR THREE DAYS' PREPARATION WAS NEEDED IF A CONVINCING PACKAGE WAS TO BE PUT TOGETHER. HE TOLD ME PRIVATELY THAT IN PRACTICE, GIVEN THE DIFFERENT POSITIONS OF THE GREEK, FRENCH AND GERMAN GOVERNMENTS IN PARTICULAR, HE SAW LITTLE PROSPECT OF FOREIGN MINISTERS BEING ABLE TO ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT ON THIS MATTER BEFORE THE NEW YEAR. WOULD IT NOT THEREFORE BE WISER TO ANNOUNCE SOON IF NECESSARY A HIGH LEVEL MEETING IN EARLY JANUARY? MEANWHILE DAVIGNON WAS OF COURSE AT YOUR DISPOSAL.

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FM FCO 301229Z DEC 81

TO FLASH UKDEL NATO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 275 OF 30 DECEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN

MY TELNO 273, PARAGRAPH 4: US SANCTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION

on the measures
1. FOLLOWING IS BRIEF ANNOUNCED BY REAGAN LAST NIGHT PREPARED FOR TODAY'S MEETING OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIRECTORS OF THE TEN. BEGINS

MEASURE 1: SUSPENSION OF AEROFLOT TO USA

OTHERS' VIEWS?

POINTS TO MAKE.

ESSENTIAL FACTS.

SCHEDULED AIR SERVICES BETWEEN UK AND USSR ARE GOVERNED BY A BILATERAL AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT WHICH HAS TREATY STATUS. SIX MONTHS' NOTICE OF SUSPENSION WOULD BE REQUIRED.

HOWEVER, IN PRACTICE, THE PRESENT LEVEL OF AIR SERVICES COULD BE STOPPED BY TERMINATION OF THE RELATED CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING. AEROFLOT'S OPERATING PERMIT ISSUED UNDER THE 1980 AIR NAVIGATION ORDER COULD ALSO BE TERMINATED AT SHORT NOTICE.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE ALSO HAS THE POWER TO TERMINATE BRITISH AIRWAYS FROM CONTINUING ITS OPERATIONS TO THE SOVIET UNION IN RESPECT OF BOTH SCHEDULED AND CHARTER FLIGHTS.

OVER-FLIGHTS MAY PRESENT DIFFICULTIES. THE USSR IS A SIGNATORY TO THE CHICAGO CONVENTION (1944) WHICH PERMITS NON-SCHEDULED OVER-FLIGHTS TO UK TERRITORY. DOT DO NOT CONSIDER THAT WE CAN RESTRICT OR PREVENT OVER-FLIGHTS UNLESS WE ARE PREPARED TO BE IN BREACH OF THIS CONVENTION. WE CAN, HOWEVER, PREVENT THE OVER-FLIGHT OF SCHEDULED AIR SERVICES WHERE THE RUSSIANS NEED TO OBTAIN ADVANCE PERMISSION FOR EACH FLIGHT. IN ORDER FOR DENIAL OF OVER-FLYING RIGHTS TO BE EFFECTIVE ACTION AGAINST THE USSR WOULD NEED TO BE TAKEN ON AN ALL-EUROPEAN BASIS.

MEASURE 2: CLOSURE OF SOVIET PURCHASING COMMISSION
POINTS TO MAKE.

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THERE IS NO COMPARABLE UK ORGANISATION. DOES ANY EXIST IN OTHER EC COUNTRIES? WOULD ANY PURPOSE BE SERVED BY CLOSURE? ESSENTIAL FACTS.

THE PURCHASING COMMISSION WAS ORIGINALLY ESTABLISHED TO ORGANISE THE PROCUREMENT OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE KAMA RIVER TRUCK PLANT PROJECT IN THE SEVENTIES. SUBSEQUENTLY ITS FUNCTION WAS EXTENDED TO COVER OTHER PURCHASES. IT IS IN NO WAY COMPREHENSIVE (I.E. MANY PURCHASES FALL OUTSIDE ITS REMIT) AND IS NOT REGARDED AS HAVING A MAJOR ECONOMIC ROLE.

THERE IS NO UK EQUIVALENT.

MEASURE 3: 'THE ISSUANCE OR RENEWAL OF LICENCES FOR THE EXPORT TO THE USSR OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT, COMPUTERS AND OTHER HIGH TECHNOLOGY MATERIALS IS BEING SUSPENDED'

POINT TO MAKE.

OTHERS' VIEWS?

ESSENTIAL FACTS.

THIS WOULD TIGHTEN THE AGREEMENT IN COCOM POST-AFGHANISTAN, ON A 'NO GENERAL EXCEPTIONS POLICY' ON EXPORTS TO THE SOVIET UNION. (ONLY MINOR EXCEPTIONS FOR MEDICAL EQUIPMENT AND SPARES HAVE BEEN PERMITTED.)

OF ESTIMATED US EXPORTS IN 1980 TO THE SOVIET UNION OF US DOLLARS 1,500 MILLION ONLY AN ESTIMATED US DOLLARS 100 MILLION COMES INTO THIS CATEGORY. →

HOWEVER, WEST EUROPEAN MANUFACTURERS OF COMPUTERS AND OTHER ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT MAY BE AFFECTED BY THIS SUSPENSION, AS MANY RELY ON US COMPONENTS, WHICH REQUIRE US RE-EXPORT LICENCES.

(ALL UK EXPORTS TO THE SOVIET UNION, SUBMITTED TO COCOM FOR APPROVAL IN 1980 TALLING POUNDS STERLING 34.1 MILLION, CAME UNDER THE COMPUTER CATEGORY.)

THE ANNOUNCEMENT PRE-EMPTS DISCUSSION AT THE COCOM HIGH LEVEL MEETING (HLM) IN PARIS ON 19-20 JANUARY, WHICH WILL DISCUSS WIDE-RANGING US PROPOSALS TO TIGHTEN AND WIDEN SCOPE AT COCOM.

MEASURE 4: SUSPENSION OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR A LONG-TERM GRAIN AGREEMENT

POINT TO MAKE.

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AN EFFECTIVE GRAIN EMBARGO WOULD BE A POWERFUL WEAPON AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION, AS THE NATO PAPER RECOGNISED. BEST USED FOLLOWING NATO 'WORST-CASE' SCENARIO OF OVERT SOVIET INTERVENTION IN POLAND. PRESENT MEASURE A USEFUL REMINDER TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT GRAIN EMBARGO IS A WEAPON THE US ARE PREPARED TO USE. MAY ALSO STIFFEN THE RESOLVE OF OTHER GRAIN EXPORTERS. NO CORRESPONDING ACTION REQUIRED BY THE TEN. ESSENTIAL FACTS.

THE EXISTING US/USSR GRAIN AGREEMENT HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1982. SOVIET UNION HAS ALREADY PURCHASED MORE THAN THE 8 MILLION TONNES THEY ARE ENTITLED TO UNDER THE AGREEMENT, FOR THE PERIOD 1 OCTOBER 1981 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1982, AND MOST OF THIS HAS BEEN DELIVERED. NO REFERENCE IN REAGAN'S STATEMENT LAST NIGHT TO THE UNDELIVERED BALANCE NOR TO FURTHER SUPPLIES UP TO A TOTAL OF 18 MILLION TONNES WHICH SOVIET UNION IS EXPEED TO ORDER FOR DELIVERY BY 30 SEPTEMBER 1982.

MEASURE APPLIES TO NEW LONG-TERM AGREEMENT, PERHAPS UP TO FIVE YEARS, WHICH US WERE EXPECTING FORMALLY TO NEGOTIATE AFTER HAIG/GROMYKO MEETING IN JANUARY. IF ANY NEW AGREEMENT FOLLOWS THE PATTERN OF THE OLD, IT WILL PROVIDE FOR A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF GRAIN TO BE SUPPLIED BY THE US, PLUS FURTHER AMOUNTS SHOULD THE SOVIET UNION REQUIRE THEN.

MEASURE 5: SUSPENSION OF NEW US/SOVIET MARITIME AGREEMENT AND NEW REGIME OF PORT ACCESS CONTROL

POINTS TO MAKE.

OTHERS' VIEWS?

ESSENTIAL FACTS.

UK HAS A MARITIME TREATY WITH THE SOVIET UNION SIGNED IN 1968.

TERMINATION OF THE TREATY WOULD REQUIRE 12 MONTHS NOTICE.

IT MIGHT PROVE POSSIBLE TO USE SECTION 14 OF THE 1974 MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT TO IMPOSE IMMEDIATE CONTROLS. THIS ACT GIVES

WIDE POWERS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE TO REGULATE SHIPPING WHERE FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS ADOPT PRACTICES WHICH DAMAGE THE SHIPPING INTERESTS OF THE UK.

OUR SHIPPING TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS OVERWHELMINGLY IN THEIR FAVOUR. THE TREATY HAS NOT BEEN HELPFUL TO US.

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SUSPENSION OF IT WOULD ENABLE THE DOT EVENTUALLY TO RENEGOTIATE A MORE FAVOURABLE AGREEMENT.

MOST OF OUR COMMUNITY PARTNERS (EXCLUDING THE FRG) HAVE SIMILAR MARITIME TREATIES. THE US/SOVIET AGREEMENT IS FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT BEING BASED UPON RECIPROCITY OF TREATMENT. WE WOULD NEED TO CLEAR OUR LINES WITH DOT BEFORE AGREEING TO ANY ABROGATION OF THE MARITIME TREATY.

← NEW PRIMARY LEGISLATION WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR THE CLOSURE OF PORTS. ANY CONTROLS OF THIS NATURE WOULD ONLY BE EFFECTIVE IF TAKEN ON A EUROPEAN BASIS SINCE THIS WOULD REDUCE THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRANS-SHIPMENT.

MEASURE 6: 'LICENCES WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THE EXPORT TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR AN EXPANDED LIST OF OIL AND GAS EQUIPMENT. ISSUANCE OF SUCH LICENCES WILL BE SUSPENDED. THIS INCLUDES PIPELAYERS.'

POINTS TO MAKE.

THIS SEEMS TO BE AIMED AT THE WEST SIBERIAN GAS PIPELINE. OTHERS (GERMANY, FRANCE, ITALY) MORE INVOLVED THAN US. WILL IT HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON THE PROJECT?

ESSENTIAL FACTS.

THE MOST IMPORTANT CONTRACTS WITH WESTERN SUPPLIERS, INTER ALIA FOR COMPRESSOR STATIONS, GAS REFRIGERATION STATIONS, AND COMPUTER AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, HAVE BEEN SIGNED, BUT EQUIPMENT NOT YET SUPPLIED. MOST EQUIPMENT COMES FROM WESTERN EUROPE, BUT CERTAIN KEY ELEMENTS, INCLUDING ROTORS FOR JOHN BROWN GENERATORS, ARE TO COME FROM THE US. NOT CLEAR HOW FAR US SUPPLIES NOW EMBARGOED COULD BE SUPPLIED BY OTHERS OR DOMESTICALLY PRODUCED: IT MAY BE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT TO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE ROTORS. (US HAVE SUPPLIED THE SOVIET UNION WITH PIPELAYERS FOR OTHER PROJECTS THIS YEAR, BUT HAVE ALREADY SAID THEY WILL NOT SUPPLY THEM FOR THE WEST SIBERIAN PIPELINE.)

UK'S MAIN STAKE IS POUNDS STERLING 100 MILLION CONTRACT FOR GENERATORS, BUT OUR INTEREST IS SMALL COMPARED TO THAT OF FRANCE, GERMANY AND ITALY.

MEASURE 7: UK-SOVIET EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS

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/POINTS

POINTS TO MAKE.

UK AGREEMENTS FEW IN NUMBER AND LIMITED IN SCOPE. ACTIVITIES MUCH REDUCED SINCE AFGHANISTAN. SUSPENSION WOULD BE LARGELY SYMBOLIC GESTURE WHERE UK IS CONCERNED. COROLLARY TO STRONGER MEASURES?

ESSENTIAL FACTS.

UK-SOVIET EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS COMING UP FOR RENEWAL IN THE NEAR FUTURE, INCLUDING THE AGREEMENTS ON ENERGY AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, WILL NOT BE RENEWED. THERE WILL BE A COMPLETE REVIEW OF ALL OTHER UK-SOVIET EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS.

(A) TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION AGREEMENT

➔ (I) NUCLEAR ENERGY (PARTICULARLY FUSION) —

(II) HEALTH

(III) ENVIRONMENT

✓ (IV) AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH —

ACTIVITY UNDER THESE AGREEMENTS HAS BEEN SCALED DOWN SINCE THE AFGHANISTAN INVASION AND THERE HAVE BEEN NO ANNUAL REVIEW MEETINGS. ROUTINE EXCHANGES CONTINUE IN DESCENDING ORDER OF IMPORTANCE.

MINISTERS HAD AGREED THAT IN THE EVENT OF A SOVIET INVASION THESE AGREEMENTS MIGHT BE FROZEN.

(B) SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES

EXCHANGES BETWEEN WORKING GROUPS AND INDIVIDUAL SCIENTISTS CONTINUE UNDER THE TRADE AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMMES.

(C) CULTURAL AGREEMENT

THE CURRENT AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED IN MARCH 1981 FOR A TWO-YEAR PERIOD.

(D) NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE ROYAL SOCIETY AND THE SOVIET ACADEMY AND SOME OTHER RELATED NGOS CONTINUE AT A MODEST LEVEL.

(FOLLOWING TWO MEASURES WERE MENTIONED IN HAIG'S MESSAGE YESTERDAY AS HAVING BEEN DECIDED, BUT NOT TO BE ANNOUNCED LAST NIGHT BY REAGAN.)

MEASURE 8: (NOT ANNOUNCED LAST NIGHT) RADIO BROADCASTING TO THE SOVIET UNION

POINTS TO MAKE.

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HAVE INCREASED BROADCASTING IN POLISH. WOULD INCREASED BROADCASTS IN RUSSIAN BE COST EFFECTIVE? LIKELY TO BE COUNTERED BY JAMMING. PROBABLY BETTER TO KEEP IN RESERVE FOR USE IN EVENT OF INVASION.

ESSENTIAL FACTS.

CURRENTLY THE BBC BROADCASTS 45 HOURS A WEEK (6 AND A HALF TO 7 AND A HALF HOURS A DAY IN RUSSIAN). EXPANSION OF BROADCASTING IN RUSSIAN WAS PARTIALLY IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET JAMMING OF THE BBC WHICH WAS RESTARTED IN MID-1980 IN APPARENT REACTION TO DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND.

PREVIOUS DECISIONS TO EXPAND BROADCASTING HAVE BEEN TAKEN ON AN AD HOC BASIS IN RESPONSE TO EVENTS. MINISTERS HAVE ALREADY SUGGESTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN ANALAGOUS EXPANSION FOLLOWING SOVIET INVASION OF POLAND.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL ANNOUNCED TO THE HOUSE DURING THE DEBATE ON 22 DECEMBER THE EXPANSION OF BROADCASTING TO POLAND BY AN ADDITIONAL FIVE HOURS PER WEEK. WE HAVE HITHERTO CONSIDERED THAT EXPANSION OF BROADCASTS TO THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS A RESPONSE TO AN INVASION. SUCH AN EXPANSION WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE TO BE MADE AT THE COST OF CUTTING SOME SERVICES TO OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD.

MEASURE 9: (NOT ANNOUNCED LAST NIGHT) CONDEMNATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS OF SOVIET UNION'S ROLE IN POLAND.

POINTS TO MAKE

IMPORTANT TO BE SELECTIVE AND TO INITIATE ACTION ONLY WHERE WEST CAN EXPECT TO SUCCEED. AT THIS STAGE TOO MUCH CONFUSION ABOUT POLISH REGIME'S INTENTIONS TO BE CERTAIN OF WINNING THIRD WORLD SUPPORT. WORKING ACTIVELY BEHIND SCENES IN ILO.

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TO FLASH UKDEL NATO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 274 OF 30 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN

MIPT: POLAND AND CSCE

1. YOU SHOULD SUPPORT THE US CALL FOR AN EARLIER RESUMPTION OF THE CSCE MEETING.
2. IF YOU JUDGE IT APPROPRIATE YOU MAY SAY THAT WE FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT THERE IS NO PROCEDURAL DEVICE WITHIN THE CSCE PROCESS WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE MEETING TO RECONVENE EARLIER THAN 9 FEBRUARY AND THAT IN ANY CASE WE ALSO REALISE THAT THE POLES HOLD THE CHAIR UNTIL THE MEETING RECONVENES. BUT WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT:-

(A) TO FOCUS PUBLIC ATTENTION ON THE POLISH AND SOVIET FAILURE TO ABIDE BY THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE FINAL ACT:

(B) TO SHOW THE PUBLIC AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS THAT THE ALLIES TAKE THE CSCE PROCESS SERIOUSLY AND EXPECT OTHER PARTICIPANTS TO DO THE SAME:

(C) TO INDICATE TO THE POLES AND RUSSIANS NOW THAT THEIR FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF THE FINAL ACT WILL AFFECT THE MADRID MEETING.

3. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION WE WISH TO HEAD OFF PRESSURE IN WASHINGTON FOR AN EARLY DECISION THAT CSCE IS A DEAD LETTER.

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TO FLASH UKDEL NATO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 273 OF 30 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN

POLAND: NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING 30 DECEMBER.

1. AS WE SEE IT, THERE ARE TWO SPECIFIC THINGS WHICH THE NAC SHOULD DO AT ITS MEETING TODAY:-

A) REACH A CONSENSUS ON THE AMERICAN SUGGESTION FOR AN EARLY MEETING OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS. ON THIS YOU SHOULD SAY THAT I WARMLY WELCOME THE IDEA AND HOPE THE MEETING CAN BE ARRANGED SOON. THE WEEK BEGINNING 11 JANUARY APPEARS SUITABLE, BUT I COULD MANAGE NEXT WEEK IF THAT IS MORE CONVENIENT TO OTHERS. (IF PRECISE DATES ARE DISCUSSED, YOU SHOULD CONSULT THE PRIVATE SECRETARY BY TELEPHONE).

B) TO MAKE PROGRESS AND IF POSSIBLE FINALISE THE GERMAN THEMES FOR USE IN DIPLOMATIC APPROACHES TO WARSAW, MOSCOW AND THIRD WORLD CAPITALS. THE VERSION CIRCULATED BY THE GERMAN DELEGATION ON 29 DECEMBER (YOUR TEL. NO. 512) WILL PRESUMABLY HAVE TAKEN ACCOUNT OF OUR EARLIER COMMENTS. WE DO NOT WISH TO COMMENT FURTHER AT THIS STAGE. AS YOU WILL HAVE GATHERED, WE SAW NOTHING WRONG WITH THE GERMAN DRAFT, BUT IT SEEMED TO US TO FALL SOME WAY SHORT OF THE ACTIVITY ALREADY IN PROGRESS OR IMPENDING, EG WHAT GENSCHER IS LIKELY TO BE SAYING TODAY TO RAKOWSKI.

2. APART FROM THIS WE HOPE THE AMERICANS WILL MAKE A CLEAR STATEMENT OF THE US OBJECTIVE AND HOW THEY HOPE TO ACHIEVE IT. HAIG'S REMARKS TO THE AMBASSADORS OF THE TEN (WASHINGTON TEL. NO. 3941) SUGGEST THAT HE IS PURSUING MULTIPLE GOALS WHICH MAY TO SOME EXTENT CONFLICT. THE WAY IN WHICH THE AMERICANS ARE CURRENTLY INTERPRETING THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATION WITH THE EUROPEAN ALLIES ALSO RISKS CAUSING DIFFICULTIES FOR THE LATTER. A PAUSE IN THE FLOW OF UNILATERAL AMERICAN DECISIONS WOULD NOW BE APPROPRIATE IF THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IS TO HAVE MUCH POINT. THIS WOULD ALSO ALLOW TIME FOR FURTHER

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CLARIFICATION OF JARUZELSKI'S SITUATION, OBJECTIVES AND FREEDOM OF MANOEUVRE, ALL OF WHICH ARE STILL NOT COMPLETELY CLEAR TO US.

3. IN GENERAL HOWEVER YOU SHOULD BE AS SYMPATHETIC AS POSSIBLE TOWARDS THE LEAD BEING GIVEN BY THE UNITED STATES, WHILE AVOIDING COMMITMENT ON ALL POINTS OF DETAIL. YOU COULD USE THE ARGUMENT THAT A CERTAIN COMPLEMENTARITY IN WESTERN REACTIONS IS NOT ONLY INEVITABLE BUT DESIRABLE, GIVEN THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE POLISH SITUATION WHICH HAIG HIMSELF HAS MENTIONED. WE HOPE NOBODY WILL SEEK TO REPRESENT EG RAKOWSKI'S TALKS IN BONN AS UNDERMINING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF YESTERDAY, OR VICE VERSA. IT WOULD INDEED BE TRAGIC IF THE MAJOR DEFEAT FOR THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM AND THE SOVIET UNION REPRESENTED BY THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND WERE CONVERTED INTO AN OWN GOAL BY NATO THROUGH MISHANDLING ON OUR SIDE. THIS REQUIRES US TO INTERPRET ALLIANCE UNITY NEITHER TOO LIGHTLY NOR IN TOO MECHANICAL A MANNER.

4. WE ARE SENDING YOU SHORT TELEGRAPHIC BRIEFING ON THE MEASURES ANNOUNCED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION ON 29 DECEMBER. THESE WILL ENABLE YOU TO MAKE PRELIMINARY COMMENTS, BUT NO MORE.

5. INSTRUCTIONS ON THE MADRID PROPOSAL, WHERE AGAIN THE AMERICANS HAVE JUMPED THE GUN, ARE ALSO BEING SENT SEPARATELY.

6. WE WILL TRY TO TELEPHONE YOU NOT LATER THAN 1330 GMT WITH THE LUNCH-TIME SCORE FROM THE MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS OF THE TEN IN LANCASTER HOUSE.

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NOTE FOR THE RECORD

cc: Mr. Ingham
Mr. Coles o.r.

POLAND

Before going to the meeting of Political Directors at Lancaster House this afternoon, Lord Carrington telephoned the Prime Minister. He said that all the news on Poland was bad. The Political Directors were almost certain to be unable to reach agreement on measures to be taken against Poland and the Soviet Union. Cheysson, Colombo and the Greek Foreign Minister did not want to hold a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Ten. Cheysson in particular still felt that a meeting would be counter-productive if nothing could be agreed. But, despite this, the Foreign Ministers had now in fact agreed to meet in Brussels on Monday 4 January. Lord Carrington said that he felt this would be even worse than a meeting tomorrow: it would achieve nothing, but it would look as though it had been more carefully prepared. Meanwhile, Sir Nicholas Henderson had reported that public opinion in the United States was behind the measures that President Reagan had announced.

A further complication was that Herr Genscher had seen Rakowski, the Polish Deputy Prime Minister. Rakowski had said that the imposition of martial law in Poland was a temporary measure, that Solidarity remained in being, and that he hoped that things would return to normal when the economy had been placed on a sound footing. In short, Rakowski said exactly what Genscher wanted to hear. Genscher had reported this to Lord Carrington, who had expressed some scepticism, but Genscher still felt that Rakowski was sincere. Genscher had gone on to say that President Reagan's measures would have been an appropriate response to Soviet intervention, but were not an appropriate response to the present situation.

The question was what line to take at the meeting of Foreign Ministers. To do nothing would strain the Alliance, especially as Sir Nicholas Henderson had reported that the Americans considered that they had consulted their allies properly over the measures announced by President Reagan. On the other hand, there

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was most unlikely to be any agreement to match the U.S. initiative. The Ten could plump for a half-way house, but this might achieve the worst of both worlds. The least the Ten could do would be to agree not to frustrate the American measures.

In conclusion, the Prime Minister and Lord Carrington agreed that no substantive decisions could be made at the meeting of Foreign Ministers. Apart from anything else, to take measures like those announced by President Reagan would affect the interests of British industry and of many Government Departments, and it would not be possible to arrange a properly prepared collective discussion in time. The meeting of Foreign Ministers should therefore be seen as "ad referendum" to Governments, and as a preparation for subsequent NATO meetings. It might be possible to use the message from Rakowski to Genscher as an excuse for some delay.

The Prime Minister said that her initial preference was to work towards a statement by the Ten that certain measures would be taken unless certain assurances were forthcoming from the Poles about the temporary nature of the martial law regime, etc. Meanwhile, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office should produce a considered assessment of the effects on Government Departments and UK industry of taking measures similar to those announced by the Americans.

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30 December 1981

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 768 OF 29 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WARSAW

POLAND : THE SOVIET ROLE

1. THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE HERE IN MOSCOW IS LIMITED, BUT IT MAY BE HELPFUL IF I BRING TOGETHER SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT THE PAST AND POSSIBLE FUTURE SOVIET ROLE IN THE POLISH CRISIS.

HOW FAR WERE THEY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW ?

2. TO START WITH THE OBVIOUS, THE POLISH INTERNAL CRISIS IS ESSENTIALLY A REFLECTION OF POLAND'S POSITION WITHIN THE SOVIET EMPIRE, ENCAPSULATED IN THE STATEMENT AT THE WARSAW PACT SUMMIT OF 5 DECEMBER 1980 AND ELSEWHERE, THAT POLAND WAS, IS AND WILL REMAIN A SOCIALIST STATE. THE SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT HAD REACHED A POINT WHICH WAS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF A SOCIALIST STATE. THE SOVIET UNION'S DETERMINATION TO SEE THE COURSE OF EVENTS REVERSED WAS EXPLICITLY SET OUT IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE POLISH/SOVIET SUMMIT OF 5 MARCH. IT MAY BE ASSUMED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WANTED TO AVOID COMMITMENT OF ITS OWN FORCES IF AT ALL POSSIBLE BUT BY THE EARLY AUTUMN IT SEEMED THAT THEY WERE DETERMINED UPON A CONFRONTATION WITH SOLIDARITY. FROM THEN ON, IT WAS FOR THE POLES TO TAKE ACTION. IF KANIA WOULD NOT, JARUZELSKI HAD TO. THERE REMAINED THE DETERMINATION OF TIMING AND METHOD. ON THE LATTER IT MAY BE ASSUMED THAT THERE WAS CLOSE COLLABORATION BETWEEN A SMALL GROUP IN THE SOVIET AND POLISH MILITARY AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE SPEAKS OF INCREASING EVIDENCE OF DIRECT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT OF THIS CHARACTER, IN PARTICULAR USE OF SOVIET WARSAW PACT COMMUNICATIONS IN ORDER TO ENSURE SURPRISE. I DO NOT HAVE DETAILS HERE, BUT PERHPAS THEY ARE AVAILABLE TO YOU FROM OTHER SOURCES. IN ANY CASE, THE REPORT SOUNDS INHERENTLY CREDIBLE. HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIANS WERE PRESSING FOR THE ACTION TO BE TAKEN AND HELPING WHEN IT WAS, THE TIMING SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN DICTATED BY THE EVENTS IN GDANSK AND RADOM AND TO HAVE BEEN OF JARUZELSKI'S CHOOSING. THERE MAY HAVE BEEN CONSULTATIONS IN GENERAL TERMS WITH THE RUSSIANS AND OTHER WARSAW PACT MEMBERS AT THE MEETINGS OF WARSAW PACT FOREIGN MINISTERS IN BUCHAREST (1-2 DECEMBER), AND WARSAW PACT DEFENCE MINISTERS IN MOSCOW, (1-4 DECEMBER) BUT I DOUBT WHETHER THEY WERE CRUCIAL. THE ACTUAL DECISION PROBABLY CAME LATER. THE KEY SOVIET-POLISH CONSULTATION PROBABLY TOOK PLACE DURING KULIKOV'S VISIT TO WARSAW AND NO DOUBT THERE WERE OTHER LESS VISIBLE VISITORS. THE TASS ACCUSATIONS.

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(11, 12 AND 13 DECEMBER - MY TEL NO 737), WERE, IN RETROSPECT, PROBABLY THE FIRST REFLECTION OF THE DECISION TO ACT, WITH THE REPORTS OF THE PREVIOUS FEW DAYS FALLING INTO PLACE IN THE PREPARATORY STAGE. BUT WHEREAS THE EVIDENCE OF SOVIET POLICY AND SOVIET PRESSURE IS CLEAR AND PUBLIC, THE FINAL STAGES ARE A MATTER OF INFERENCE.

HOW WILL SOVIET POLICY DEVELOP ?

3. BREZHNEV'S REPLY TO REAGAN MAY GIVE US SOME CLUES, BUT FOR THE PRESENT THE TASS STATEMENT OF 14 DECEMBER (MY TEL NO 741) IS THE ONE FORMAL SOVIET POLICY STATEMENT. IT MUST BE READ AS PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARY ACTION, AS COMMITTING THE SOVIET UNION TO ITS SUCCESS AND AS A THREAT OF DIRECT INTERVENTION IF THE POLES FAIL TO CONTAIN THE SITUATION WITH THEIR OWN FORCES. THERE IS A DEGREE OF COMMITMENT TO JARUZELSKI, IF ONLY BECAUSE OF THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION, BUT LITTLE SIGN OF FAITH IN THE POLISH PARTY AS AT PRESENT CONSTITUTED. CURRENT PUBLIC TREATMENT IS DESIGNED TO PRESENT THE SITUATION AS RETURNING GRADUALLY TO NORMAL ; TO DEVELOP AND EMBELLISH ACCUSATIONS OF WESTERN AND SPECIFICALLY AMERICAN INSTIGATION OF THE WHOLE COURSE OF EVENTS AS AN ATTEMPT TO DESTROY THE "SOCIALIST" POSITION OF POLAND; AND TO SHOW THE SOVIET UNION AS A FRIEND OF POLAND NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED, BUT READY TO "ASSIST" IF NECESSARY. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE HERE OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION MAY BE CURRENTLY DIRECTING THE ACTION OF THE POLISH ARMY AND MILITIA, BUT WE MAY ASSUME THAT THEY WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENSURE SUCCESS, SINCE OTHERWISE THEY WILL BE FACED WITH THE ULTIMATE CRISIS REQUIRING DIRECT INTERVENTION. JARUZELSKI WILL FIND THAT, HAVING TAKEN ACTION, HE WILL BE UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE TO IMPLEMENT IT IN WAYS ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PROVISION OF SOVIET ECONOMIC AID IS LIKELY TO BE MADE DEPENDENT UPON THIS. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE TOO HOLDS IMPORTANT CARDS SO LONG AS THE SOVIET UNION HAS TO ACT THROUGH HIM. HAVING NOW SEEN THE "REVERSAL OF THE COURSE OF EVENTS" WHICH IT WAS SEEKING, THE SOVIET UNION WILL HAVE THREE OBJECTIVES :

- (A) TO ENSURE THAT THE ACTION AGAINST SOLIDARITY IS PURSUED TO THE POINT AT WHICH IT CAN NEVER AGAIN PRESENT A POLITICAL THREAT;
- (B) TO SEE THE POLISH PARTY RECREATED UNDER A POLITBURO WHICH CAN BE RELIED ON TO PURSUE ORTHODOX SOVIET-ALIGNED POLICIES;
- (C) TO MAKE THE POLISH ECONOMY FUNCTION.

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4. THE FACT THAT ACTION WAS TAKEN BY JARUZELSKI AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT COMMIT ITS OWN FORCES DOES NOT LESSEN THE SOVIET UNION'S ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INSISTING UPON SEEING ITS VERSION OF "SOCIALISM" STAMPED ON POLAND AND I HOPE WE SHALL HOLD THEM PUBLICLY ACCOUNTABLE. WE CAN, HOWEVER, RECKON IT AS SOMETHING OF A GAIN, REFLECTING PERHAPS IN PART THE RESPONSE TO AFGHANISTAN, THAT THEY HESITATED SO LONG AND THEN CHOSE THIS COURSE. IT MUST BE HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THEIR THREE OBJECTIVES (OF WHICH THE FIRST TWO ARE PROBABLY IRRECONCILABLE WITH THE THIRD) CAN BE ATTAINED. IF JARUZELSKI WERE TO LOSE CONTROL THEY MIGHT WELL INTERVENE, BUT IF THEY ARE FACED WITH A LONG, MESSY STRUGGLE, THEY MAY ONCE AGAIN HESITATE. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IF, AS EAGLEBURGER HAS SUGGESTED, THE RECENT EVENTS ARE TO BE SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EAST-WEST STRUGGLE (AND THAT IS CERTAINLY THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WILL SEE THEM) THERE IS STILL QUITE A LOT TO PLAY FOR.

5. I HAVE REPEATED THIS TELEGRAM ONLY TO WARSAW. WOULD FCO PLEASE REPEAT FURTHER IF DESIRED.

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FM FCO 292000Z DECEMBER 81
TO FLASH BRUSSELS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 158 OF 29 DECEMBER
AND TO FLASH OTHER EC POSTS
MIPT

MT

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE COREU BEING SENT DIRECT TO
PARTNER FOREIGN MINISTRIES.

BEGINS

THE PRESIDENCY WISHES TO CONFIRM TO PARTNERS THE MESSAGE WHICH
HAS ALREADY BEEN PASSED THROUGH BRITISH EMBASSIES IN CAPITALS
THAT ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING MADE FOR A SPECIAL INFORMAL MEETING
OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE TEN ABOUT POLAND TO TAKE PLACE AT
LANCASTER HOUSE ON 31 DECEMBER, STARTING AT 10.30 GMT AND ENDING
IF POSSIBLE BY 1700 GMT. ALL THE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE AS
SUGGESTED FOR THE MEETING ORIGINALLY PROPOSED FOR 30 DECEMBER
(AS SET OUT IN COREU CPE/MUL/ETR 4219). ENDS.

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FM FCO 291849Z DEC 81
TO FLASH BRUSSELS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 157 OF 29 DECEMBER
AND TO FLASH OTHER EC POSTS
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO MOSCOW AND WARSAW

MS

POLAND: MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE VERY URGENTLY FROM ME TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER (ATHENS PLEASE PASS TO CHEYSSON AS WELL AS TO THE GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER) AND (UK REP) TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION.

BEGINS:

SINCE OUR EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES JUST BEFORE CHRISTMAS I HAVE SEEN AN ACCOUNT OF THE CONVERSATION AT LUNCH IN WASHINGTON YESTERDAY BETWEEN OUR AMBASSADORS AND SECRETARY HAIG, AND I HAVE ALSO HEARD TODAY OF UNILATERAL AMERICAN MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION WHICH PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL ANNOUNCE THIS EVENING. THIS EVOLUTION IN THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE, TOGETHER WITH EVENTS IN POLAND ITSELF, LEAD ME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IT WOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD BY OUR PUBLICS IF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE TEN DID NOT MEET WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE BELGIAN PRESIDENCY I AM THEREFORE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR US TO MEET AT LANCASTER HOUSE IN LONDON ON THURSDAY 31 DECEMBER, STARTING AT 10.30 GMT AND ENDING IF POSSIBLE BY 1700 GMT. ALL THE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE AS SUGGESTED FOR THE MEETING WHICH I HAD ORIGINALLY PROPOSED FOR WEDNESDAY 30 DECEMBER. THE AGENDA WOULD BE PREPARED BY OUR POLITICAL DIRECTORS AND THEIR ECONOMIC COLLEAGUES WHEN THEY MEET HERE TOMORROW.

I HOPE THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT THIS MEETING OF MINISTERS IS NECESSARY AND THAT YOU CAN MANAGE TO BE PRESENT, EVEN AT THIS VERY SHORT NOTICE. IF YOU CANNOT COME YOURSELF, I SHOULD BE VERY CONTENT IF YOU WERE TO NOMINATE A SUBSTITUTE, WHETHER A DEPUTY MINISTER OR A SENIOR OFFICIAL. IF ANY OF MY COLLEAGUES HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT MY SUGGESTION OF A MEETING I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THESE COULD BE VOICED AT THE OUTSET OF TOMORROW'S MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS, IF NOT BEFORE.

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2. FOR ATHENS. PLEASE ADD THE FOLLOWING TO THE MESSAGE TO CHEYSSON. QUOTE I REALISE THAT THIS IS DIFFERENT FROM YOUR OWN SUGGESTION THAT THE TEN SHOULD MEET ON THE EVE OF ANY GATHERING OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS. BUT I DO NOT WANT TO DELAY OUR OWN MEETING WHILE NATO MAKES UP ITS MIND, AND FROM THE AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW IT SEEMS TO ME BETTER TO HOLD OUR MEETING INDEPENDENTLY UNQUOTE.

3. MIFT CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A COREU BEING SENT DIRECT TO FOREIGN MINISTRIES.

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INFO IMMEDIATE WARSAW
INFO SAVING ROME (ACTIONED)

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 24

POLAND

1. WHEN I SAW MONSIGNOR SILVESTRINI YESTERDAY MORNING TO SEEK THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR TOMORROW'S MEETING HE TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD BE SEEING COLOMBO THAT AFTERNOON. WHEN I SAW HIM AGAIN THIS MORNING HE CAST SOME DOUBT ON WHETHER COLOMBO HIMSELF WOULD ATTEND. BOTTAI WAS MORE LIKELY TO DO SO. THE POINTS WHICH FOLLOW HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED BETWEEN SILVESTRINI AND COLOMBO AND CONSTITUTE THE VATICAN'S REPLY TO THE REQUEST IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE.

2. THE POLISH NATIONAL IDENTITY IS DEEPLY ROOTED IN EUROPEAN CULTURE AND HISTORY. SILVESTRINI REMINDED ME THAT THE NAZI INVASION OF POLAND WAS THE PRECIPITATING FACTOR THAT LED TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THAT A PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE WESTERN ALLIES IN THAT WAR HAD BEEN THE RESTORATION OF THE SOVREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF POLAND AND THE PEOPLES RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. THE VATICAN CONSIDER THAT THE FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE OF POLAND CONSTITUTE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE EUROPEAN PATRIMONY IN WHICH ALL OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAVE A DIRECT INTEREST.

3. INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND SINCE AUGUST 1980 HAVE GIVEN RISE TO THE DEMAND FOR LIBERTY AND FOR RESPONSIBLE PARTICIPATION IN THE DIRECTION OF THE ECONOMY AND OF SOCIETY. THIS MOVEMENT CANNOT BE IGNORED. SO THE CHURCH'S DEMAND FOR THE ENDING OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY, THE RELEASE OF DETAINEES, THE RESTORATION OF FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES AND THE RENEWAL OF THE SOCIAL DIALOGUE REFLECTS A MORAL AND POLITICAL DUTY FOR OUTSIDERS TO SHOW THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH THE POLISH PEOPLE.

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4. CURRENT EVALUATION. WHILST THERE HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIAL CONSOLIDATION OF THE POSITION IN POLAND THE VATICAN OBSERVE THAT MANY QUESTIONS REMAIN UNANSWERED. THEY THINK THAT IT WOULD BE BEST FOR POLAND IF FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS AIMED TO ACHIEVE LIMITED BUT SPECIFIC AND EFFECTIVE RESULTS. THEY UNDERWRITE THE HIERARCHY'S OBJECTIVES AS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE. SILVESTRINI CONFIRMED WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME EARLIER THAT THE CHURCH ITSELF HAD NOT SUFFERED GREATLY SINCE 13 DECEMBER. THE CIRCULATION OF L'OSSERVATORE ROMANO HAD BEEN SUSPENDED AND THEY WOULD CERTAINLY LIKE TO SEE THIS RESTORED. BUT THEY WERE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE RESTORATION OF LIBERTIES GENERALLY THAN WITH THEIR OWN LIMITED PROBLEMS. THE INTERESTS OF THE POLISH PEOPLE THEMSELVES SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND AND THE PROVISION FOR THEM OF THE NECESSITIES OF LIFE. IT WAS NECESSARY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES AND THE REGIME. THE NATION SHOULD NOT BE PUNISHED FOR A SITUATION OF WHICH IT WAS ITSELF THE VICTIM.

5. SILVESTRINI CONCLUDED THAT THE MOST HELPFUL STEP THE WEST COULD TAKE WAS TO BE AS SYMPATHETIC AS POSSIBLE OVER THE PROVISION OF ECONOMIC AID. BY THIS HE DID INDEED MEAN DEBT RESCHEDULING WHICH HE HAD DISCUSSED IN SOME DETAIL WITH COLOMBO.

6. THE VATICAN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MANY QUESTIONS WERE UNANSWERABLE AT PRESENT. THEY DID NOT KNOW WHAT WERE GENERAL JARUZELSKI'S INTENTIONS. THERE WAS NO INDICATION WHETHER THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT WOULD RESUME THE PROCESS OF RENEWAL AND DIALOGUE OR WHETHER THEY WERE IN A POSITION TO DO SO. IT WAS FAR FROM CERTAIN HOW AUTONOMOUS THEIR DECISIONS WERE. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS IT WAS DIFFICULT TO DECIDE HOW BEST TO PROCEED. THE VATICAN SAW TWO POSSIBILITIES. THE FIRST WAS TO ATTEMPT TO COERCE THE POLISH AUTHORITIES IN THE HOPE OF FORCING THEM TO MOVE IN A LIBERAL DIRECTION UNDER THREAT OF SOME FORM OF ULTIMATUM. THE SECOND AND TO THEM A MORE HELPFUL COURSE WAS TO COMBINE FIRMNESS IN SETTING OUT DESIDERATA WITH FLEXIBILITY AND GRADUALNESS. IN SILVESTRINI'S VIEW A GRADUAL APPROACH WAS MORE LIKELY TO ACHIEVE WHAT THE VATICAN SAW AS THE ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVES.

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7. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION ABOUT ARCHBISHOP POGGI'S TALK WITH GENERAL JARUZELSKI ON 24 DECEMBER SILVESTRINI TOLD ME THAT THE LATTER WAS STICKING TO THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S LINE THAT THEY WERE VIRTUALLY FORCED TO ACT AS THEY DID AND THAT HAVING DECIDED TO ACT THEY HAD TRIED TO MINIMISE THE CASUALTIES. THEY STILL MAINTAINED THAT ONLY 7 HAD DIED, ALL AT KATOWICE. THEY INTENDED PROGRESSIVELY TO RELEASE THE DETAINEES. MEMBERS OF SOLIDARITY WHO PROVED IRRECONCILABLE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. POGGI COULD GIVE NO FIGURE FOR THE NUMBER OF DETAINEES. HE REPORTED THAT JARUZELSKI SPOKE WITH A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF IRRITATION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE AND, WITHOUT BEING SPECIFIC, ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE ATTITUDE OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.

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Prime Minister ✓ Mr Ingham

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EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON


December 29, 1981

Dear Foreign Secretary:

I have been asked to deliver the enclosed message to you from Secretary Haig, which was received at the Embassy this morning. Also enclosed is a summary of President Brezhnev's December 26 reply to President Reagan's letter of December 23.

I am enclosing as well a message regarding an emergency CSCE meeting in Madrid during the first week of January. The message on CSCE is being delivered in all NATO capitals, Stockholm, Bern, Belgrade, Vienna, Helsinki, Dublin, and Nicosia. I have been asked to make clear that we will not propose such a meeting publicly until we have made an effort to gather as much support as possible.

Sincerely,



John J. Louis, Jr.
Ambassador

Enclosure:
SECRET

The Rt.Hon. The Lord Carrington, KCMG, MC,
Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London, SW 1.

DEAR LORD CARRINGTON:

IN SPITE OF COSMETIC MEASURES TAKEN BY THE POLISH REGIME OVER THE CHRISTMAS HOLIDAYS, THE WIDESPREAD REPRESSION OF THE POLISH POPULACE CONTINUES WITH NO SIGN OF ABATING. NOR IS THERE ANY INDICATION THAT MOSCOW'S COMPLICITY IN THE SUPPRESSION OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S BASIC RIGHTS HAS IN ANY WAY LESSENER. PRESIDENT BREZHNEV HAS RESPONDED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER ON POLAND BY UNDERSCORING THE SOVIET UNION'S SUPPORT FOR THE POLISH REGIME'S ACTIONS; BY REAFFIRMING

THE SOVIET UNION'S "RIGHT" TO INTERVENE IN POLISH AFFAIRS; AND BY ACCUSING THOSE WHO DEFEND THE BASIC FREEDOMS EMBODIED IN THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AS THE GUILTY PARTIES. THE SOVIET LEADERS HAVE BEEN GIVEN AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW THEIR READINESS TO PERMIT AND ENCOURAGE THE BEGINNING OF A PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION IN POLAND; YET TO DATE WE HAVE SEEN NOTHING TO SUGGEST THAT THEIR GOAL IS ANYTHING LESS THAN THE END OF THE POLISH REFORM MOVEMENT.

PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS THEREFORE DETERMINED THAT HE HAS NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO BEGIN TO TAKE CONCRETE MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. SPECIFICALLY, HE HAS DECIDED THAT THE FOLLOWING STEPS WILL BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY BY THE UNITED STATES AND WILL ANNOUNCE ALL BUT THE LAST TWO ON DECEMBER 29:

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

1. ALL-AERCFLOT SERVICE TO THE UNITED STATES WILL BE SUSPENDED.

2. THE SOVIET PURCHASING COMMISSION IS BEING CLOSED.

3. THE ISSUANCE OR RENEWAL OF LICENSES FOR THE EXPORT TO THE USSR OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT, COMPUTERS AND OTHER HIGH-TECHNOLOGY MATERIALS IS BEING SUSPENDED.

4. NEGOTIATIONS ON A NEW LONG-TERM GRAINS AGREEMENT ARE BEING POSTPONED.

5. NEGOTIATIONS ON A NEW U.S.-SOVIET MARITIME AGREEMENT ARE BEING SUSPENDED, AND A NEW REGIME OF PORT-ACCESS CONTROLS WILL BE PUT INTO EFFECT FOR ALL SOVIET SHIPS WHEN THE CURRENT AGREEMENT EXPIRES ON DECEMBER 31.

6. LICENSES WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THE EXPORT TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR AN EXPANDED LIST OF OIL AND GAS EQUIPMENT. ISSUANCE OF SUCH LICENSES WILL BE SUSPENDED. THIS INCLUDES PIPELAYERS.

7. U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS COMING UP FOR RENEWAL IN THE NEAR FUTURE, INCLUDING THE AGREEMENTS ON ENERGY AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, WILL NOT BE RENEWED. THERE WILL BE A COMPLETE REVIEW OF ALL OTHER U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS.

8. RADIO BROADCASTING TO THE SOVIET UNION AND ANTI-JAMMING ACTIVITIES WILL BE INTENSIFIED.

9. CONDEMNATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION'S ROLE IN POLAND WILL BE STEPPED UP. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE PRESIDENT WILL URGE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE BY THE ILO.

I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT THESE MEASURES, LIKE THOSE WE HAVE IMPLEMENTED TOWARD THE POLISH MILITARY AUTHORITIES, ARE AIMED AT REESTABLISHING THE CONDITIONS FOR RECONCILIATION AND A RESUMPTION OF THE PROCESS OF RENEWAL IN POLAND. THEY REPRESENT THE IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES ON THE SOVIET UNION, AND AN EARNEST OF OUR COMMITMENT TO MEET REPRESSION AND INTERVENTION WITH CONCRETE AND SERIOUS RESPONSES. BUT THEY ALSO ARE REVERSIBLE IF REPRESSION AND SOVIET COMPLICITY IN POLAND ARE REVERSED.

THESE MEASURES ARE IN LINE WITH AND IN SOME CASES

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

IDENTICAL TO THOSE CONTAINED IN THE NATO CONTINGENCY PLAN -- ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT GO AS FAR, SINCE THAT PLAN WAS ESTABLISHED AS A RESPONSE TO OVERT SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION. THERE ARE APPROPRIATE RESPONSES REMAINING IF THE REPRESSION IN POLAND CONTINUES AND THE SOVIET ROLE THERE ESCALATES.

IT IS ONLY THROUGH CONCERTED ACTION THAT THERE WILL BE ANY CHANCE FOR A RETURN TO NEGOTIATION AND COMPROMISE IN POLAND. WE HOPE, THEREFORE, AND URGE THAT YOU TAKE PARALLEL STEPS OF YOUR OWN TO DEMONSTRATE OUR COMMON RESOLVE AND THE COST TO THE SOVIET UNION OF ITS ROLE IN THE POLISH TRAGEDY.

WE SHOULD STAY IN ESPECIALLY CLOSE TOUCH IN THE QUADRIPARTITE CONTEXT. IN THAT REGARD, I HAVE EXPRESSED TO HANS-DIETRICH THE HOPE THAT THE FRG WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY THE LEADING ROLE IN PREPARING, FOR PRESENTATION IN THE NAC, SUGGESTED THEMES FOR ALLIED DEMARCHES IN MOSCOW, WARSAW, OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AND IN THE THIRD WORLD. I HOPE THAT THE ALLIED DEMARCHES CAN REFLECT WESTERN UNITY AND SUPPORT FOR THE ACTIONS WHICH PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS TAKEN.

WE RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO MAINTAIN EFFORTS TO RELIEVE THE SUFFERING OF THE PEOPLE OF POLAND. WE WILL THEREFORE CONTINUE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, PROVIDED WE CAN BE CERTAIN THAT IT WILL GO TO THE NEEDY.

AS YOU CAN SEE, WE HAVE TAKEN NO DECISIONS THAT WOULD AFFECT THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. THE PRESIDENT RECOGNIZES THE SPECIAL CHARACTER OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AND WE DO NOT INTEND TO ALTER OUR STANCE UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS.

WE CONTINUE TO FEEL STRONGLY THAT A MEETING OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD BE HELD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO REVIEW THE SITUATION IN POLAND -- POSSIBLY THE FIRST OR SECOND WEEK IN JANUARY. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTS REGARDING THE ADVISABILITY OF SUCH A MEETING AND THE TIMING.

SINCERELY, ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

S E C R E T

2. ON DECEMBER 26 BREZHNEV SENT REPLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER OF DECEMBER 23 CONCERNING SITUATION IN POLAND. BREZHNEV LETTER MAKES FOLLOWING GENERAL POINTS:

SUBJECT: BREZHNEV'S
REPLY TO PRESIDENT
REAGAN'S LETTER ON
POLAND

-- US OVERT AND COVERT INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF POLAND HAS BEEN UNDERWAY FOR A LONG TIME AND GROSS INTERFERENCE IN POLAND'S AFFAIRS IS THE OFFICIAL POLICY OF THE US. THE SOVIET UNION CONDEMNS THIS POLICY AND CONSIDERS IT UNACCEPTABLE.

-- BY CITING THE SOVIET CP CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF 5 JUNE 1981 AS EVIDENCE OF SOVIET INTERFERENCE IN POLAND, THE US IS ITSELF INTERFERING IN NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CPSU AND PZPR. THIS IS THE BUSINESS OF THE PARTIES THEMSELVES AND NO ONE ELSE. IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO EMPHASIZE THIS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE.

-- YOU, YOURSELF, ARE CALLING FOR OVERTHROW OF THE EXISTING STATE SYSTEM IN POLAND. THIS IS GENUINE INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER SOVEREIGN STATE. SIMILAR ATTEMPTS ARE BEING UNDERTAKEN ALSO IN RELATION TO THE SOVIET UNION BY AMERICAN OFFICIALS WHO UNINTERRUPTEDLY REVILE OUR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SYSTEM. WE RESOLUTELY REJECT THIS.

-- IN LIGHT OF THESE AND OTHER GENERALLY KNOWN FACTS, NOTHING REMAINS OF YOUR ARGUMENTS CONCERNING OUR ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF POLAND.

-- US ALLEGATIONS THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS, IN ITS CONDUCT TOWARD POLAND, VIOLATED THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT ARE GROUNDLESS.

-- NO ONE SHOULD INTERFERE WITH WHAT THE POLISH AUTHORITIES ARE DOING IN THEIR OWN HOME. THE SOCIAL ORDER IN POLAND WAS CHOSEN BY THE POLES THEMSELVES AND NO ONE CAN DIRECT THE POLISH LEADERSHIP ON HOW TO CONDUCT ITS AFFAIRS OR ON WHICH METHODS SHOULD BE USED TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY. THE SOVIET UNION REJECTS CLAIMS OF ANYONE TO INTERFERE IN THE EVENTS OCCURRING IN POLAND. SUCH ATTEMPTS GROSSLY VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARE THOROUGHLY AMORAL.

-- YOUR COMMUNICATION INTERPRETS MILITARY MANEUVERS NEAR POLAND AS CONNECTED WITH THE SITUATION IN THAT COUNTRY. THIS IS COMPLETELY UNFOUNDED CONJECTURE. INSTEAD, WE COULD ASSESS US MANEUVERS AS A THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

-- YOUR LETTER HINTS THAT STEPS MAY BE TAKEN IN THE US-SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP UNLESS EVENTS DEVELOP IN POLAND AS THE US DESIRES. BUT THE US ADMINISTRATION HAS ALREADY UNDERMINED MUCH OF WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. TODAY NOT THAT MUCH REMAINS OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL POLITICAL CAPITAL. BEFORE TAKING FURTHER STEPS, ONE SHOULD MORE CALMLY TAKE EVERYTHING INTO ACCOUNT.

-- THE US WILL BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY FURTHER DETERIORATION IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS. IT WOULD BE MUCH MORE USEFUL IF WE WERE TO TAKE NEW STEPS TO SLOW DOWN AND STOP THE ARMS RACE. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE NEED THIS NO LESS THAN THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND OTHER NATIONS.

SECRET

SUBJECT: CSCE: EMERGENCY MEETING ON POLAND

--DESPITE COSMETIC MEASURES TAKEN BY THE POLISH GOVERNMENT OVER THE CHRISTMAS HOLIDAYS, THE WIDESPREAD REPRESSION OF THE POLISH POPULACE THAT BEGAN WITH IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW ON DECEMBER 13 CONTINUES UNABATED.

--NOR IS THERE ANY SIGN THAT MOSCOW'S COMPLICITY IN THE REPRESSION OF THE BASIC RIGHTS OF THE POLISH PEOPLE HAS IN ANY WAY LESSENED.

- IN HIS RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER ON POLAND, PRESIDENT BREZHNEV TOOK AN UNPROMISING AND UNCOMPROMISING STANCE.

- AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS DECIDED TO BEGIN TO TAKE CONCRETE MEASURES AGAINST

THE SOVIET UNION.

- THESE MEASURES COVER A BROAD RANGE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, PREDOMINANTLY IN THE ECONOMIC AREA.

--IN ADDITION, THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED TO CALL FOR AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF CSCE IN MADRID FOR THE FIRST WEEK IN JANUARY TO DISCUSS THE POLISH SITUATION.

- THE SITUATION IN POLAND AND SOVIET RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT CLEARLY RUN COUNTER TO THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE POLISH GOVERNMENT UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND FOR THAT REASON CANNOT BE IGNORED BY THE OTHER CSCE SIGNATORIES.

- BEFORE WE PROPOSE SUCH A MEETING, HOWEVER, WE WOULD LIKE TO ASK FOR YOUR SUPPORT.

--WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PRESENT POLISH REGIME ARE UNLIKELY TO AGREE TO SUCH A MEETING.

--NONETHELESS, WE BELIEVE THAT A PROPOSAL SUPPORTED BY A LARGE NUMBER OF CSCE SIGNATORIES WOULD DRAMATICALLY FOCUS ATTENTION ON EVENTS IN POLAND AND UNDERLINE SOVIET COMPLICITY IN THEM. IN SO DOING, IT WOULD EMPHASIZE THE VIABILITY OF THE CSCE PROCESS.

--FAILURE TO POINT UP THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL SPIRIT OF THE CSCE PROCESS WILL ON THE CONTRARY SEVERELY WEAKEN ITS CREDIBILITY IN THE EYES OF OUR PUBLICS.

Poland
File SAW

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29 December, 1981

Handwritten signature

On Christmas Eve, I sent across a copy of the attached message from President Reagan to the Prime Minister about Poland. I assume that you have set in hand the drafting of a reply for the Prime Minister to send to President Reagan. This might form a useful peg on which to hang a report on the Ten's deliberations this week. I should be grateful if your draft could reach us by 8 January, if at all possible.

W. F. S. RICHARDS

Francis N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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NOTE FOR THE RECORD

cc. Mr. Ingham

Poland

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary spoke to the Prime Minister on the telephone at 1740 today. He said that he had talked to M. Tindemans and Herr Genscher since he had last spoken to the Prime Minister and he had told them both that he thought there should be a meeting of Community Foreign Ministers on Thursday. They had agreed with him. M. Cheysson was in Athens, but he had been unable to contact him. He was now inclined to send a message to all Community Foreign Ministers saying that he was calling a meeting of them for Thursday this week and that if any of them was unable to attend, he would be grateful if they could be represented. The main difficulty would be in explaining publicly why the meeting had been arranged.

The Prime Minister said that the announcement of measures against the Soviet Union which President Reagan was due to make later in the day was reason enough to hold a meeting of the Community Foreign Ministers. Mr. Haig's message to Lord Carrington emphasised the need for concerted action by the allies, and this would require a response.

The Foreign Secretary agreed with the Prime Minister that President Reagan's statement could be offered as the reason for holding a meeting, but he remained concerned about the outcome of such a meeting. There was the risk of splitting the alliance. But whatever conclusion the meeting came to would be ad referendum to the Governments of the Ten and would not therefore be final. One possible outcome was that the Foreign Ministers might agree that the Political Directors should produce a programme of work, while looking forward to a meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers. The Political Directors were meeting on Wednesday afternoon, and he would telephone the Prime Minister again as soon as that meeting was over.

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The Prime Minister said that she agreed that Lord Carrington should go ahead with the meeting of Community Foreign Ministers on Thursday, though she was inclined to believe that the meeting should produce something more specific in response to President Reagan's statement than the Foreign Secretary seemed to have in mind.

JAW.

29 December, 1981

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Poland

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

c.c. Mr. Whitmore
Mr. Ingham
Mr. Gow

Poland

Lord Carrington telephoned the Prime Minister this afternoon at 1230. He said that he had just received a message from Secretary of State Haig. The Americans would be announcing some fairly severe sanctions against the USSR later today. The sanctions would not include cancellation of the disarmament talks in Geneva. But they would include measures such as the cancellation of Aeroflot landing rights, a halt to negotiations on the sale of grain, a halt to the export of material for constructing natural gas pipelines, etc. The message from Haig asked the Ten to take comparable measures.

Lord Carrington said that a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Ten was now urgent. He had sent a message to Cheysson asking him to change his mind, and agree to such a meeting on Thursday. Cheysson was in Athens today, and would be in Ethiopia tomorrow, and communicating with him was very difficult. A meeting of Foreign Ministers tomorrow would be impossible to arrange. But Haig's message could be considered by the Political Directors on Wednesday, and by Foreign Ministers on Thursday. In case this proved impossible, Lord Carrington said that he had told Tindemans, who would be taking over the Presidency on Friday, that he considered a meeting should be held before next week.

Lord Carrington said that he had now made it public that the UK wanted a meeting to be held, and that it was the French who had been dragging their feet. He had been prompted to do this partly by the fact that the French had now blamed us for dragging our feet over the setting up of the meeting.

On substance, Lord Carrington said that it would be very difficult to reach a consensus in the Ten. He felt that the Americans were focussing more on East-West relations than on the situation in Poland. President Reagan had received a rude response to his message to Brezhnev. The measures they intended to announce today

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were a gesture against Russian interference in Polish affairs. In Lord Carrington's view, the Americans were playing the sanctions card far too soon.

Lord Carrington ended by saying that he would report to the Prime Minister again after the meeting of the Political Directors of the Ten.

CPSA

Lord Carrington said that a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Ten was held on 25th. He had seen a copy of the report on the meeting and was pleased to see that it was agreed to hold a meeting of the Ten on 29th. He said that the meeting would be held in London and would be held on 29th. He said that the meeting would be held in London and would be held on 29th. He said that the meeting would be held in London and would be held on 29th.

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29 December, 1981.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3941 OF 28 DECEMBER

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO BONN PARIS MOSCOW MODUK UKREP BRUSSELS

WARSAW ROME UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS DUBLIN

MIPT (SAVING TO SOME): EC LUNCH FOR HAIG: POLAND

1. AFTER REFERRING TO THE LATEST DISCUSSIONS ON FOOD FOR POLAND IN COREPER (UKREP BRUSSELS TELNO 5048) AND THE DETERMINATION OF THE TEN TO ENSURE THAT THIS REACHED ITS PROPER RECIPIENTS, I ASKED HAIG TO EXPLAIN THE AIMS OF THE ADMINISTRATION. TO WHAT EXTENT HAD THEY COMPLETELY WRITTEN OFF JARUZELSKI, OR DID THEY CONSIDER THAT SOME CONTACT WITH THE POLISH ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE MAINTAINED? WHAT WAS THE LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE?

2. HAIG BEGAN BY REFERRING TO HIS INTERVIEW PUBLISHED YESTERDAY IN THE WASHINGTON POST (TEXT BY BAG - NOT TO ALL) IN WHICH HE HAD ADDRESSED THESE QUESTIONS. THE US HAD NOT BEEN SURPRISED BY THE RESORT BY THE POLES TO INTERNAL REPRESSION. IF THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES HAD DONE IT BY DIRECT INTERVENTION THE COST TO THEM WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE BEEN VERY HIGH. THE LONG CATALOGUE OF HARD INTELLIGENCE ABOUT RUSSIAN MOVEMENTS INCLUDING THE PRINTING IN RUSSIA OF THE MARTIAL LAW LEAFLET, GAVE THE LIE TO THE APPALLING CLAIMS, EVEN BY SOME IN THE WEST, THAT SOLIDARITY WAS TO BLAME FOR THE CRACK-DOWN. SOLIDARITY MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE TIMING OF EVENTS, BUT THE REPRESSION COULD NOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO ITS EXCESSES. IT WAS EQUALLY WRONG, THOUGH CLOSER TO THE TRUTH, TO SEE MOSCOW'S HAND BEHIND EVERYTHING JARUZELSKI HAD DONE.

3. IT WAS VITAL THAT NO-ONE ON EITHER SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC ENGAGED IN ACTIVITIES WHICH SERVED THE RUSSIAN AIMS. NEITHER HE NOR THE PRESIDENT BELIEVED, AS HE SAID IN HIS INTERVIEW, THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE TOTALLY IN CONTROL OF EVENTS IN POLAND. FORCES STILL EXISTED THERE WHO WERE TRYING TO PURSUE THE ORIGINAL OBJECTIVES OF THE REFORM MOVEMENT AND KEEP THE RUSSIANS OUT.

4. ON FOOD AID THOSE WHO WAVED THEIR FINGER AT THE US (AS GENSCHER APPEARED TO HAVE DONE TODAY) HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD WASHINGTON'S POLICY. LONG BEFORE THE PRESENT CRISIS HAIG HAD URGED ON GENSCHER, CHEYSSON

ON FOOD AND THOSE WHO WAVED THEIR FINGER AT THE US (AS GENSCHER APPEARED TO HAVE DONE TODAY) HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD WASHINGTON'S POLICY. LONG BEFORE THE PRESENT CRISIS HAIG HAD URGED ON GENSCHER, CHEYSS AND YOURSELF THE NEED TO ESTABLISH CONDITIONALITY BOTH IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE AS A RESTRAINT TO REPRESSION, AND AS AN ELEMENT IN THE POLISH ECONOMIC REFORMS. WESTERN GOVERNMENTS COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE POURING MONEY DOWN THE POLISH RAT-HOLE. PRESENT US POLICY ON FOOD WAS NOT TO DEPRIVE THE STARVING POLES, BUT TO REFUSE TO REFURBISH THE LARDERS OF THE REPRESSORS. THE ASSURANCES OF THE REGIME WERE NOT SUFFICIENT AND THE WEST SHOULD THINK IMAGINATIVELY ABOUT EXPANDING OUR IDEAS ON ASSISTANCE TO INCLUDE ON-THE-SPOT MONITORING, BY DONOR COUNTRIES, WITH HELP PERHAPS FROM THE POLISH CHURCH. (HE SHOWED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THIS RESPECT IN WHAT I HAD SAID ABOUT E.C. COUNTRIES MONITORING)

5. IN DEALING WITH THE RUSSIANS, THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT RESPONDED IN THE OLD-FASHIONED WAY, POSING CHALLENGES TO SOVIET VITAL INTERESTS OR TRYING TO ROLL BACK THE SOVIET EMPIRE. HOWEVER TWO RECENT EVENTS - POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN - REPRESENTED A DIRECT CONTRAVENTION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THE WEST HAD THE RIGHT AND THE OBLIGATION TO RAISE THIS WITH THE RUSSIANS AND IN OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORA, IF EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND DETENTE WERE TO BE PURSUED WITH SUCCESS. A US OR WESTERN FAILURE TO ACT WOULD DIMINISH OUR CREDIBILITY IN MOSCOW AND DO LASTING DAMAGE TO THE ALLIANCE.

6. HAIG BELIEVED THAT, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF FRANCE, THE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS LAGGED BEHIND THE US IN THEIR ATTITUDES TO MOSCOW'S INVOLVEMENT. HE HAD THE FEELING THAT PUBLIC OPINION THROUGHOUT THE WEST WAS UPSET AND FRUSTRATED AT THE LACK OF WESTERN ACTIVITY. WE COULD NOT IGNORE THAT PRESSURE. THE US WOULD NOT TACKLE THE RUSSIANS IN A SPIRIT OF CONFRONTATION OR ISOLATIONISM BUT WE MUST RECOGNISE THAT THE POLISH PROBLEM WOULD BE EASIER TO SOLVE WITH THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ASSISTANCE OF MOSCOW.

7. WHILE HE RECOGNISED THE GREAT HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF EVENTS IN POLAND, HAIG REPEATEDLY EMPHASISED THAT THE GREATEST DANGER WAS THE IMPACT SOVIET MOVES MIGHT HAVE ON WESTERN UNITY. IT WAS CLEAR FROM INTELLIGENCE REPORTS THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD FOCUSED THEIR ATTACK ON THE FRG WHERE THEY WERE USING EVERY AVAILABLE CHANNEL TO CLAIM THEIR SUPPORT FOR MODERATION. NEITHER PUBLICLY NOR IN PRIVATE TO THE US WERE THEY MAKING SUCH CLAIMS. IN OTHER WORDS, THE RUSSIANS WERE CONTINUING THEIR PEACE OFFENSIVE AND THEIR APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL WHICH WERE SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED

WORDS, THE RUSSIANS WERE CONTINUING THEIR PEACE OFFENSIVE AND THEIR APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL WHICH WERE SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO SPLIT WESTERN EUROPE, ESPECIALLY WESTERN GERMANY, FROM THE US. IF THEY SUCCEEDED, EVENTS IN POLAND WOULD PALE IN CONTRAST. WHATEVER HAPPENED THERE, THE OUTCOME WOULD BE THE WORST POSSIBLE FOR THE WEST.

8. HE HIMSELF HAD BEEN FREQUENTLY IN TOUCH BY TELEPHONE AND NUMEROUS MESSAGES WITH HIS WESTERN COLLEAGUES, AND WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO EC MEETING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL THIS WEEK. I INTERJECTED THAT NONETHELESS THE MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS WOULD BE IMPORTANT. HE REPEATED HIS EARLIER SUGGESTION IN NATO THAT A MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY (REPEAT EARLY) JANUARY. THE ALLIANCE HAD NEVER SUFFERED FROM AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL ON A SUBJECT OF SUCH HISTORIC IMPORTANCE. IF WE DID NOTHING, WE WOULD DESERVE THE CRITICISM WE WERE ALREADY GETTING. (COMMENT: I THINK THAT THIS PROPOSAL HAS MORE SIGNIFICANCE NOW THAN WHEN IT WAS MADE BEFORE THE POLISH CRACK-DOWN).

9 HAIG CONTINUED THAT AS A RESULT OF TODAY'S MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE, HE EXPECTED AN ANNOUNCEMENT, ON WHICH THE ALLIES WOULD BE CONSULTED, TO BE MADE SHORTLY ABOUT FURTHER STEPS. THESE WOULD NOT BE CATAclysmic IN CHARACTER BUT IF THE RUSSIANS REMAINED UNCOOPERATIVE FURTHER STEPS BEYOND THESE WOULD BE TAKEN. DISCUSSING AVAILABLE WESTERN LEVERAGE, HAIG DISTINGUISHED TWO TYPES: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL. THE RESTRAINT THE RUSSIANS HAD EXERCISED OVER THE PAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS, DESPITE THE RISE OF AN INDEPENDENT TRADES UNION MOVEMENT AND THE CHALLENGE TO THE POLITICAL AUTHORITY OF THE PARTY, DEMONSTRATED THAT THE EASTERN EUROPE OF 1981 HAD CHANGED FROM 1968 OR 1956. THE SERIOUS INHIBITIONS AGAINST SOVIET INTERVENTION HAD NOT DISAPPEARED WITH MARTIAL LAW. IN WAS UP TO THE WEST TO DISCOVER THE TRUE NATURE OF THESE AND TO APPLY OUR LIMITED ASSETS IN ORDER TO REINFORCE THEM. IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT, AS THE RUSSIANS AND SOME IN THE WEST CLAIMED, THAT THE POLISH REVOLUTION WAS OVER AND THE REPRESSION SHOULD SOON PASS. THE RESULTS OF THE ECONOMIC SHAMBLES IN POLAND HAD STILL TO BE FELT AND THE POTENTIAL FOR DESTABILISATION REMAINED GREAT. POLAND DEPENDED ON THE WEST FOR HER ECONOMIC VITALITY, WHICH IMPROVED OUR INTERNAL LEVERAGE. IT WAS THEREFORE ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT TO ENSURE CLOSE COORDINATION ON FOOD SUPPLIES, AND NOT TO LIFT PREMATURELY OUR PRESSURE IN THIS AREA.

10. HOWEVER, THE REAL LEVERAGE ON THE RUSSIANS WAS EXTERNAL. THEY HAD SHOWN MASSIVE MISJUDGEMENT OVER AFGHANISTAN, EARNING INTERNATIONAL OPPOBRIUM ESPECIALLY FROM THE THIRD WORLD. MOSCOW NEEDED A DEAL ON ARMS CONTROL AND ECONOMIC AID FROM THE WEST. THEY FACED DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEMS THEMSELVES AND FURTHER TROUBLE IN EASTERN EUROPE AS A RESULT OF POLAND. IF HOWEVER THEY SAW A CHANCE OF SPLITTING THE ALLIANCE ESPECIALLY THE FRG FROM THE US, THEY WOULD CONTINUE THEIR PRESENT COURSE. WE HAD UNPRECEDENTED LEVERAGE, AND SHOULD DO ALL WE COULD TO ENHANCE IT.

11. QUESTIONED ABOUT SPECIFIC STEPS, HAIG SAID THE WORST THING THE ADMINISTRATION COULD DO WOULD BE TO THREATEN CANCELLATION OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS OR TO ADD THEM TO A PACKAGE OF OTHER MOVES. THE US HAD PASSED THE POINT OF TREATING ARMS CONTROL AS NORMAL BUSINESS. WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION WAS HOSTILE TO THE REPRESSION IN POLAND, WE MUST NOT LET IT BE TURNED AGAIN AGAINST OURSELVES. THE PRESIDENT FELT VERY STRONGLY ON THIS POINT. ARMS CONTROL WAS A DIFFERENT AND SEPARATE PART OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY. FOR THE MOMENT, WHILE THE US COULD NOT AFFORD TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD CONTINUE IRRESPECTIVE AND IN IGNORANCE OF WHAT THE SOVIETS DID ELSEWHERE, IT WAS BEST TO KEEP FUTURE POLICY FUZZY, WITH AN EMPHASIS ON THE POSITIVE, AND TO AVOID RAISING PUBLIC CONCERNS ABOUT POSSIBLE CANCELLATION.

12. ON CSCE HAIG SAID THAT IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY IF THE NEXT MEETING WERE CANCELLED. INDEED HE HOPED WITHIN THE NEXT DAY TO GET REAGAN'S AGREEMENT THAT AN EMERGENCY SESSION BE CONVENED. ALTHOUGH SOME PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON THOUGHT THAT THE CONTINUATION OF CSCE WAS AN AFFRONT WHILE REPRESSION CONTINUED IN POLAND, TO CANCEL IT WOULD REMOVE THE FUNDAMENTAL LEGITIMACY OF OUR OWN POSITION IN CRITICISING THE REPRESSION. WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION COULD EASILY UNDERSTAND THE POINT THAT HELSINKI REPRESENTED A SOLEMN AGREEMENT TO WHICH ALL SIGNATORIES WERE BOUND. TO THAT EXTENT, AS HE POINTED OUT IN HIS PRESS INTERVIEW OF 27 DECEMBER, HELSINKI HAD CHANGED THE POLITICAL MAP OF EUROPE ESTABLISHED AFTER YALTA. TO ARGUE ABOUT ROLLING BACK THE SOVIET EMPIRE WOULD IMMEDIATELY INVOLVE US IN DEBATES ABOUT SPHERES OF INFLUENCE AND EVEN CONDOMINIA. THIS THE WEST AND US MUST AVOID (EVEN THOUGH THE RUSSIANS DID NOT OBSERVE THE PRACTICAL SPHERES OF INFLUENCE ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD). WE SHOULD PLAY ON THE SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT LEGITIMACY.

13. ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, ABOUT WHICH I EXPRESSED EUROPEAN SCEPTICISM IN THE LIGHT OF PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE (RHODESIA AND

13. ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, ABOUT WHICH I EXPRESSED EUROPEAN SCEPTICISM IN THE LIGHT OF PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE (RHODESIA AND AFGHANISTAN) AND THE US LIFTING OF THE GRAIN EMBARGO, HAIG AGREED THERE COULD BE NO DOUBLE STANDARDS OR HALF-SANCTIONS. HE HAD PERSONALLY OPPOSED THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO (THOUGH HE NOTED ACKNOWLEDGING THAT HE WAS BEING JESUITICAL IN DOING SO, THAT IF THIS HAD NOT HAPPENED WE WOULD NOT HAVE OUR PRESENT LEVERAGE). HE SHARED THE SCEPTICISM ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PARTIAL SANCTIONS, BUT EMPHASISED THAT AN EMBARGO IMPOSED BY ALL GRAIN-PRODUCERS WOULD HAVE A TREMENDOUS IMPACT ON THE RUSSIANS, EVEN IF THEY WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE COMPELLED TO ACT AGAINST THEIR VITAL INTERESTS. ANY SANCTIONS HAD TO BE IMPOSED ON A BROAD FRONT AND IN UNISON. OTHERWISE THEY WOULD NOT WORK, AND THOSE WHO IMPOSED THEM WOULD BE SINGLED OUT FOR SOVIET REACTION. HAIG ALSO NOTED THAT THEIR GROWING INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION WAS A FURTHER IMPORTANT RESTRAINT ON THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP.

14. IN SUMMARY HAIG MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

← (I) WE MUST MAINTAIN WESTERN COHESION:

(II) THE RUSSIANS HAD A RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN POLAND. IF WE IGNORED THE UNEQUIVOCABLE EVIDENCE IT COULD PRODUCE UNPLEASANT RESULTS:

(III) WE HAD CONSIDERABLE LEVERAGE TO WORK FOR A COMPROMISE IN POLAND. JARUZELSKI WAS NOT A TOTAL STOOGUE OF THE RUSSIANS. WE SHOULD AIM TO STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THE CHURCH, SOLIDARITY AND OTHERS RESPONSIBLE FOR DISBURSING HUMANITARIAN AID.

FCO PASS SAVING:- ANKARA ATHENS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN LISBON
LUXEMBOURG DUBLIN OTTAWA OSLO REYKJAVIK THE HAGUE

HENDERSON

NHNN

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DESKBY 290830Z

FM WASHINGTON 282330Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3940 OF 28 DECEMBER

INFO UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW, MODUK, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK, 29/12
WARSAW, UKREP BRUSSELS

INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS, DUBLIN

MY TELNO 3886 (NOT TO ALL): EC LUNCH FOR HAIG

1. I GAVE A LUNCH TODAY FOR SECRETARY HAIG AND MY EC COLLEAGUES. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY STOESSEL, EAGLEBURGER, VELIOTES, HORMATS AND HOLMES.
2. HAIG CAME STRAIGHT FROM A MEETING TO DISCUSS CONTINGENCY MEASURES ON POLAND AT THE WHITE HOUSE. HE INDICATED PRIVATELY THAT THIS HAD GONE WELL AND HE HAD SECURED WHAT HE WANTED. THE IMPLICATION OF SUBSEQUENT PERSONAL REMARKS TO ME WAS THAT HE WAS FIGHTING A CONSIDERABLE BATTLE AGAINST CHEST-BEATERS IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT.
3. HAIG WAS AT HIS BEST, BETTER INDEED THAN I HAVE SEEN HIM; AND I THINK THAT ALL THE COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES WERE IMPRESSED. TRUE, THEY HAD DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING HIM, PARTICULARLY THOSE NEW TO HAIG SPEAK. BUT THEY AGREED AFTERWARDS THAT HE HAD BEEN CALM, CONVINCING AND INFORMATIVE. PERSONALLY I FOUND THE CONVOLUTIONS FAR LESS COMPLICATED THAN USUAL. THERE WAS NO INJURED INNOCENCE, EXCEPT IN THE OUT BURST AGAINST GENSCHER (SEE BELOW) WHICH ALL BUT THE GERMAN WERE ABLE TO ENDURE WITH EQUANIMITY. HE SPOKE OF THE TROUBLE HE INSISTED ON TAKING TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH EC FOREIGN MINISTERS. FOR ONCE I DID NOT FEEL THAT HE WAS ENGAGED IN SOME MAJOR TASK OF SELF-CONTROL. HE IS JUST OFF TO CALIFORNIA, MECCA AT THE MOMENT. HE TOLD ME THAT HE THOUGHT HIS NEXT FOREIGN TRIP WOULD BE TO ATTEND A NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING IN JANUARY WHICH HE FAVOURED.
4. TWO PARTICULARLY STRIKING POINTS WERE THE WARMTH WITH WHICH HE CRITICISED ALLEGED REMARKS TODAY BY GENSCHER ABOUT POLAND, AND THE EMPHASIS HE PLACED ON THE NEED TO MAINTAIN WESTERN UNITY THROUGHOUT THE POLISH CRISIS. (SUBSEQUENTLY THE FRG CHARGE HAS TOLD ME THAT THE REPORTS OF GENSCHER'S COMMENTS WERE IN-ACCURATE, AND THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE NOW AWARE OF THE TRUE POSITION)
5. IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION EARLIER, EAGLEBURGER INDICATED THAT DURING

Mustard
29/12
@ 2.00
Prime Minister

These 3 telegrams give interesting background, but are somewhat overtaken by the message from No 10 D St. Haig today. Wm

mt

5. IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION EARLIER, EAGLEBURGER INDICATED THAT DURING HIS EUROPEAN TOUR HE HAD RECEIVED A MORE SYMPATHETIC RECEPTION IN PARIS AND ROME THAN IN LONDON OR BONN. (WE UNDERSTAND FROM OTHER CONTACTS THAT HE FEELS EUROPEAN OPINION IS QUOTE SOME WAY AHEAD UNQUOTE OF SOME EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS ON POLAND. HE REPORTEDLY HAD A DIFFICULT MEETING WITH GENSCHER, WHICH INCLUDED AN ARGUMENT OVER EL SALVADOR, DURING WHICH EAGLEBURGER CONTRASTED THE LACK OF CONCERN SHOWN FOR THE US POSITION THERE WITH HAIG'S EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE US POLICIES ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL IN A MANNER DESIGNED TO REDUCE PROBLEMS FOR THE FRG.)

6. THE MAIN POINTS OF THE LUNCH-TIME DISCUSSION ARE REPORTED IN MIFTS, WHICH COVER: POLAND, US/SOVIET RELATIONS, US/EC RELATIONS (POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL) THE DEFENCE APPROPRIATIONS BILL AND THE TWO-WAY STREET, THE SINAI MFO AND LIBYA (THE LAST TWO RAISED BY HAIG)

7. AT THE END OF THE MEETING, I EXPRESSED THE GRATITUDE OF THE TEN FOR THE READY AND FREQUENT CONSULATION WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT. WE WERE CONSCIOUS OF THE TROUBLE HAIG PERSONALLY TOOK TO CONSULT THE ALLIES. SAYING THAT THEY WERE STILL UNDER EMBARGO. I REFERRED TO THE WORDS YOU WOULD BE USING IN YOUR INTERVIEW TO VOICE OF AMERICA ON 2 JANUARY ON THE COMMUNITY PRESIDENCY. YOU WOULD BE MENTIONING THE EXCEPTIONAL TROUBLE THE PRESENT US ADMINISTRATION HAD TAKEN TO CONSULT ITS ALLIES AND YOU WOULD BE PAYING TRIBUTE TO THE EXAMPLE MR HAIG SET IN THIS RESPECT.

FCO PASS SAVING: ANKARA, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, DUBLIN, OTTAWA, OSLO, REYKJAVIK, THE HAGUE.

HENDERSON

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Prime Minister

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FM WARSAW 281635Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1065 OF 28TH DECEMBER 1981

INFO PRIORITY: UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS,
MODUK

INFO SAVING: EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE, SOFIA, BELGRADE, HELSINKI,
STOCKHOLM, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, UKREP BRUSSELS AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

POLISH SITUATION.

1. JARUZELSKI BROADCAST A SHORT MESSAGE TO THE POLISH PEOPLE ON CHRISTMAS EVE, THE TEXT OF WHICH WILL BE AVAILABLE TO YOU FROM THE BBC. THE TONE IS FIRM RATHER THAN HARD-LINE AND REITERATES THE JUSTIFICATION OF MARTIAL LAW AS THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS. BUT IT MAKES NO PROMISES OF A RETURN TO DIALOGUE OR REFORM. IT ASSURES THE POLISH PEOPLE THAT THERE WILL BE NO SQUARING OF ACCOUNTS OR MILITARY DICTATORSHIP AND NO RETURN TO THE MISTAKES OF BEFORE AUGUST 1980.
2. ON THE EVENING OF 24 DECEMBER, WHEN THE CURFEW WAS TEMPORARILY RELAXED, SOLIDARITY TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISTRIBUTE A BULLETIN. IT CLAIMED THAT WORKERS IN SILESIA HAD BEEN FORCED OUT OF MINES BY TEAR GAS AND DETAILED THE CASUALTY RATE IN VARIOUS PARTS OF POLAND. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS BULLETIN WAS THAT IT WAS ISSUED AT ALL. IT CONFIRMED OUR PREDICTION THAT SOLIDARITY WOULD USE ANY LOOPHOLE THE AUTHORITIES MIGHT ALLOW IT TO COORDINATE RESISTANCE. WE ALSO HEARD THAT THE MAZOWSZE BRANCH OF SOLIDARITY HAS GONE UNDERGROUND AND THAT SOME FORMER MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDUM ARE ORGANISING PARTISAN RESISTANCE AND CONTEMPLATING GUERILLA ACTIVITIES.
3. NEW MEAT AND BUTTER RATIONS WERE ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY TO BE INTRODUCED ON 1 JANUARY 1982. ALL SECTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY, APART FROM MINERS, HAVE TAKEN A CUT IN THEIR RATIONS, WHICH NEVERTHELESS REMAIN REASONABLY GENEROUS, AT LEAST IN THEORY.

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4. THE CHURCH HAS TOLD US THAT IT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE WILL BE A RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE EITHER BETWEEN SOLIDARITY AND THE AUTHORITIES OR THE CHURCH AND THE AUTHORITIES. WHEN A MEMBER OF CHANCERY ASKED THE EPISCOPATE ABOUT POGGI'S VISIT TODAY, HE WAS TOLD THAT NO CONCRETE RESULTS HAD COME OUT OF IT. IT HAD BEEN INTENDED AS A COURTESY VISIT ONLY. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN AN ATTEMPT TO COVER THE CHURCH'S DISAPPOINTMENT THAT NOTHING OF MORE SUBSTANCE WAS ACHIEVED BY POGGI. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR WAS EQUALLY NON-COMMITTAL THIS MORNING. WE HAVE THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT THE CHURCH IS UNCERTAIN WHAT TO DO NEXT.

5. WE NOW HAVE THE TEXT OF WALESA'S APPEAL OF 22 DECEMBER, WHICH CALLS FOR SOLID RESISTANCE IN THE FACE OF VIOLENCE - PASSIVE OR ACTIVE STRIKES, PROTEST ACTIONS, BOYCOTTS AND THE CIRCULATION OF INFORMATION. EVERY STRIKE COSTS THE SOVIET UNION SOMETHING AND DAMAGES ITS INTERESTS. WALESA DOES HOWEVER SAY THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO SHEDDING OF BLOOD.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES
JAMES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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FM WARSAW 281415Z DEC

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1059 OF 28TH DECEMBER 1981

FROM MELHUI SH.

MYTEL NO 1043 : MISKIW.

ADVANCE COPY

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NEWS

CONS

M B Ward

RC

Dir. Tu.

P 29, 12

1. H M CONSUL SAW MISKIW THIS MORNING. HE IS FIT AND WELL BUT NATURALLY CONCERNED ABOUT HIS POSITION. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE CHARGES AND THAT HE INTENDED TO PLEAD GUILTY AS HE HAD BEEN CAUGHT "BANG TO RIGHTS". HE CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD SMUGGLED HIMSELF INTO POLAND WITHOUT A VISA IN THE POSTAL SERVICES COACH OF THE VIENNA-WARSAW TRAIN AND HAD BEEN PICKED UP BY THE MILICJA WHEN HE TRIED TO BOOK A ROOM AT THE VICTORIA HOTEL IN WARSAW.
2. H M CONSUL EXPLAINED TO HIM HIS LEGAL POSITION AND ARRANGED FOR THE PRISON AUTHORITIES TO HELP HIM ENGAGE A LAWYER, LICENSED TO ACT ON BEHALF OF FOREIGNERS. HE WAS ALSO TOLD THAT IT WAS EXPECTED THAT HE WOULD APPEAR BEFORE THE COURT ABOUT MID-JANUARY, AND THAT IT WOULD BE THE COURT WHICH WOULD DECIDE WHETHER TO PROCEED UNDER MARTIAL LAW OR THE NORMAL CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CODES (PARA 2 OF MY TUR).
3. THERE IS NO LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF LETTERS HE IS PERMITTED TO SEND (ALTHOUGH HIS LETTERS ARE SUBJECT TO CENSOR). HE HAS WRITTEN TO HIS FAMILY, NEWSPAPER, AND GIRL-FRIEND BUT WOULD LIKE INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION THAT THEY ARE ALL BEING KEPT FULLY INFORMED. CAN YOU PLEASE CONFIRM? HIS PARENTS ADDRESS IS 44, ST MARTINS AVENUE, LEEDS 7 (TEL 0532 - 623197) AND HIS GIRL-FRIEND IS AMANDA DALE FLAT 3, 22 NORTH VILLAS, LONDON NW1 (TEL 01 - 485 - 0555).
4. HE HAS ENOUGH HARD CURRENCY FOR IMMEDIATE NEEDS BUT MAY NEED ADDITIONAL CASH LATER FOR LAWYERS' FEES ETC. H M CONSUL SAID WE COULD ARRANGE THIS THROUGH YOU IF HE WISHED TO CONTACT ANYONE FOR FUNDS. HE SAID THAT PETER WILSON, NEWS EDITOR, SUNDAY MIRROR, WOULD ASSIST IF NECESSARY. WE WILL LET YOU KNOW IF HE WISHES WILSON.

...OULD ASSIST IF NECESSARY. WE WILL LET YOU KNOW IF HE WISHES WYSON
TO BE APPROACHED.

5. WE WILL KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE AND LET
YOU KNOW OF ANY DEVELOPMENTS. WE SHALL IN ANY CASE APPLY TO VISIT
MISKIW AGAIN IN ABOUT 10 DAYS TIME.

JAMES

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1056 OF 28 DECEMBER

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Prime Minister

These reports are drafted by journalists.
Each day the journalists in Warsaw
nominate a lead draftsman. The
lead draftsman for this piece came
from ITN. WR 29/12

FOR NEWS DEPARTMENT

1. REPORTS REACHING WARSAW SUGGEST THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE ARE BEING SACKED FOR REFUSING TO AGREE TO WHAT IS CALLED VERIFICATION... AGREEING NOT TO ENGAGE IN ANTI SOCIALIST ACTIVITY, AND RESIGNING FROM SOLIDARITY.

PRODUCTION IN ENTERPRISES VARIES. THERE IS MILITARY SUPERVISION AND IN MANY FACTORIES INDEPENDANT SOURCES TALK OF NORMAL PRODUCTION ONCE STRIKES HAVE BEEN ENDED. IN OTHER FACTORIES, HOWEVER, PRODUCTION IS MINIMAL. WORKERS ARE APPEARING TO WORK, BUT STRETCHING TOLERANCES ON MACHINES WHICH MAKES FINAL ASSEMBLY OF FINISHED GOODS IMPOSSIBLE.

OBSERVERS EXPECT PRODUCTION TO NORMALISE IN THE NEW YEAR WHEN WHAT MIGHT BE CALLED POTENTIALLY OBSTRUCTIVE WORKERS HAVE BEEN REMOVED OR SACKED. FOR ENTERPRISE MANagements THE THREAT OF THE SACK, AND OTHER SACKINGS HAVE BEEN ENOUGH TO ENSURE THEY RUTHLESSLY INCREASE EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTION IN FACTORIES.

DESPITE OFFICIAL STATEMENTS THAT STETTIN PORT IS WORKING NORMALLY, THE HARBOUR IS JAMMED WITH A BACKLOG OF SHIPS, DOCKERS ARE WORKING BUT CARGOES ARE BEING RECYCLED AROUND THE DOCKS, WHICH MEANS LITTLE IS BEING UNBLOCKED.

IT IS BELIEVED THERE WERE NO DEATHS IN STETTIN, AND FEW INJURIES. RELATIONS WITH SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN GOOD: WITH THE POLICE BAD. A FEAR CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN MOUNTED AGAINST MILITARY FAMILIES. THEIR DOORS HAVE BEEN PAINTED WITH WHITE CROSSES TO IDENTIFY THEM.

POLISH SHIPS RETURNING FROM ABROAD ARE ARRIVING WITH SKELETON CREWS BECAUSE OF DESERTIONS IN OTHER COUNTRIES. EVEN CREWS SENT FROM POLAND TO RETRIEVE SHIPS STRANDED BY DESERTIONS HAVE THEMSELVES SOUGHT POLITICAL ASYLUM. THIS WILL SERIOUSLY HAMPER POLAND'S ATTEMPTS TO RESTORE TRADE WITH THE WEST.

IN KRAKOW THE REGIONAL COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANISTAION HAS BEEN OFFICIALLY SUSPENDED. SIMILAR PARTY SUSPENSIONS HAVE OCCURRED IN SEVERAL FACTORIES ELSEWHERE. THIS IS IN ADDITION TO THE PARTY MEMBERS BELIEVED TO BE HANDING IN THEIR CARDS IN LARGE NUMBERS.

|| 2. SEE MIFT FOR SOURCING DETAILS (YOUR TELNO 792).

JAMES [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

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Prime Minister

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3936 OF 28 DECEMBER

YOUR TELNOS 1994 AND 1995: MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE:
POLAND

1. WE WENT THROUGH THE AGENDA WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT THIS MORNING, INFORMING THEM THAT THIS WOULD NOW BE A MEETING OF THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS.

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:

(I) AND (II)

THE AMERICAN ASSESSMENT IS THAT, DESPITE JARUZELSKI'S REMARKS IN HIS BROADCAST ON 24 DECEMBER, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE AT PRESENT OF A RESUMPTION OF ANY REAL DIALOGUE. THE REPRESSION HAS BEEN REMARKABLY SUCCESSFUL. THE REGIME MAY BE ABLE TO MAKE SOME COSMETIC MOVES IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. IT MUST REMAIN THE WESTERN OBJECTIVE, HOWEVER, TO USE WHAT LEVERAGE IS AVAILABLE TO PUSH THE AUTHORITIES BACK TOWARDS RENEWAL.

(III) (A) THE AMERICANS HAVE PROTESTED ABOUT RESTRICTIONS ON DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN WARSAW AND HAVE IMPOSED SIMILAR RESTRICTIONS ON THE POLISH EMBASSY HERE.

(B) NO EVIDENCE OF ANY IMPROVEMENT.

(C) US CITIZENS ARE IN CONTACT WITH THE EMBASSY AND CONSULATES (THOUGH IT IS OF COURSE IMPOSSIBLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH THEM BY TELEPHONE).

(D) THE AFL/CIO ARE SEEKING TO WORK THROUGH THE ILO AND THE ICFTU AND ARE IN CONTACT WITH SOLIDARITY REPRESENTATIVES WHO WERE OUTSIDE POLAND WHEN THE ARRESTS BEGAN.

(E) THE US EMBASSY HAVE SEEN GLEMP ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. THEY HAVE ALSO BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE CHURCH AUTHORITIES THROUGH THEIR CONSULATES IN KRACOW AND POZNAN. THEY ARE SEEKING AN URGENT REPORT FROM THE VATICAN ON CARDINAL POGGI'S MISSION.

(F) AS INDICATED BY THE PRESIDENT ON 23 DECEMBER, THE US IS PROVIDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO HELP THE AUSTRIANS DEAL WITH THE POLISH REFUGEES IN AUSTRIA. THE NUMBERS ARE ESTIMATED BY THE AUSTRIANS TO BE BETWEEN 40,000 AND 60,000, MANY OF WHOM ARE UNDECIDED AS YET WHETHER OR NOT TO RETURN TO POLAND. THE US HAS ALREADY PROCESSED FOR REFUGEE STATUS IN THE US ABOUT 1,000 PERSONS, WITH ANOTHER 1,000 APPLICATIONS PENDING. (FOR OUR STRICTLY PRIVATE INFORMATION THE STATE DEPARTMENT INDICATED THAT THE US WOULD BE MAKING UP TO DLRS 20 MILLION AVAILABLE FOR THE REFUGEES). / (IV)

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(IV) (A) THE MEASURES ALREADY TAKEN BY THE US, PARTICULARLY THE CANCELLATION OF CREDIT INSURANCE, WILL AFFECT MOST TRADE EXCEPT FOOD AND HUMANITARIAN GOODS.

(B) A SERIES OF POSSIBLE STEPS IS UNDER CONSIDERATION, RANGING FROM RELATIVELY MINOR MEASURES TO WIDER EMBARGOES. (FOR OUR OWN INFORMATION, THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAY THAT ANY EVENTUAL RESUMPTION OF THE GRAIN EMBARGO WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY A COMPLETE INTERRUPTION OF TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO BE POLITICALLY SALEABLE HERE: AND THIS IS A WORST CASE OPTION. IT WILL BE OPEN TO THE U.S. NOT TO CONCLUDE, AS THEY HAD BEEN INTENDING TO DO, A NEW LONG TERM GRAIN SUPPLY AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION).

(C) THE ADMINISTRATION IS CONSIDERING VARIOUS OPTIONS (MY TELNO 3915). (THE STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD WELCOME OUR OWN FURTHER IDEAS, ON A BILATERAL BASIS, IF POSSIBLE BY THE END OF THIS WEEK, ON THE MANNER IN WHICH POLAND SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN THE CSCE, GIVEN THE DIRECT RELEVANCE OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND THE VERY STRONG PRESSURES THE ADMINISTRATION WILL BE UNDER NOT TO PROCEED AS IF NOTHING HAD HAPPENED. THERE ARE STRONG PRESSURES FOR A MORE RADICAL RE-CONSIDERATION OF THE C.S.C.E. PROCESS, BUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE CONSCIOUS THAT THE COURSE MOST LIKELY TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE EUROPEAN ALLIES WOULD BE TO RESUME ON 9 FEBRUARY BUT THEN TO MAKE A MAJOR AND COORDINATED CAMPAIGN ABOUT POLAND. WHAT HAS HAPPENED WILL INCREASE THE US DETERMINATION TO PUT A PREMIUM ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSION IN THE REVIEW CONFERENCE).

(D) ON PRESENT PLANS THE INF AND MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WILL PROCEED. (NO DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN ON THE FIXING OF A DATE FOR THE OPENING OF THE START NEGOTIATIONS AND THIS COULD BE DELAYED, BUT THERE DOES NOT AT PRESENT SEEM A GENERAL TENDENCY HERE TO BELIEVE THAT THESE SHOULD BE CANCELLED, UNLESS THE SITUATION TAKES A FURTHER TURN FOR THE WORSE).

(E) THERE IS NO PRESENT INTENTION TO TAKE ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

(V) (A) THE ADMINISTRATION CONSIDERS THAT THE COMMUNITY HAS CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL LEVERAGE OVER FOOD SUPPLIES. THE AUTHORITIES NEED FOOD AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND SHOULD BE PREPARED TO AGREE REASONABLE DISTRIBUTION ARRANGEMENTS IN ORDER TO GET IT. AT A MEETING LAST WEEK WITH THE POLISH VICE MINISTER OF HEALTH, THE US EMBASSY WERE TOLD THAT THE POLES MIGHT BE PREPARED TO RENEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS TO ENABLE ASSISTANCE WHICH HAD BEEN INTENDED TO BE CHANNELLED THROUGH SOLIDARITY TO BE DISTRIBUTED BY THE CHURCH. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ASKED US TO CONVEY THE STRONG MESSAGE THAT THE AMERICANS HOPED THAT WE WOULD KEEP UP AND INTENSIFY THE PRESSURE ON DISTRIBUTION: OTHERWISE SUCH ASSISTANCE WILL BE USED BY THE AUTHORITIES TO HELP CONSOLIDATE THEIR CONTROL.

/(B)

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(B) ON RE-SCHEDULING, THE AMERICANS NOTE THAT THE PRIVATE BANKS DID NOT AGREE ON ANY NEW STEPS AT THEIR MEETING IN ZURICH ON 21 DECEMBER AND DO NOT YET KNOW WHETHER THE POLES WILL HAVE FOUND DLRS 350 MILLION REQUIRED TO MEET THE 28 DECEMBER DEADLINE. THE AMERICANS ARE CONSCIOUS THAT THE BANKS WILL BE EXTREMELY CONCERNED TO AVOID A DEFAULT AND THAT THIS WILL APPLY TO NEXT YEAR'S RE-SCHEDULING TOC. (US BANKS ARE AT SIGNIFICANTLY LESS RISK, WITH ABOUT DLRS 4 BILLION OUTSTANDING). STATE DEPARTMENT FELT THAT THE TIME HAD NOT YET COME TO TAKE DECISIONS ON THE POLISH APPLICATION TO JOIN THE IMF, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THIS COULD BE USED AS AN INCENTIVE.

(C) FURTHER US CREDIT INSURANCE THROUGH THE EXIM BANK HAS BEEN CANCELLED.

(D) THE PRESIDENT REFERRED IN HIS STATEMENT TO THE PROPOSALS BEING MADE TO THE ALLIES TO INTENSIFY COCOM CONTROLS ON THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO POLAND. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ASKED US TO EMPHASIZE THAT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THE HIGH LEVEL COCOM MEETING IN JANUARY WILL TAKE ON PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE.

3. THE PRESIDENT HAS RECEIVED AN ENTIRELY NEGATIVE REPLY FROM BREZHNEV TO HIS MESSAGE ABOUT POLAND (SEE MIFT).

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Prime Minister

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FM WASHINGTON 282125Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3937 OF 28 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO WARSAW PRIORITY BONN PARIS

INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS

MIPT (NOT TO ALL): POLAND

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT TELL US THAT IN HIS REPLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE, BREZHNEV STATES THAT OVERT AND COVERT US INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF POLAND HAS BEEN UNDER WAY FOR SOME TIME. GROSS INTERFERENCE IN POLISH AFFAIRS HAS BEEN THE OFFICIAL POLICY OF THE US.

2. ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REFERENCE TO THE COMMUNICATION FROM THE SOVIET PARTY TO THE POLISH PARTY ON 5 JUNE AS A DEMONSTRATION OF BLATANT SOVIET INTERFERENCE, BREZHNEV STATES THAT SUCH EXCHANGES ARE A NORMAL FEATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND POLISH PARTIES AND ARE ENTIRELY A MATTER FOR THE PARTIES CONCERNED. THE US IS ACCUSED OF CALLING FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE EXISTING STATE SYSTEM IN POLAND. BREZHNEV ADDS THAT SOME US OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN ADOPTING A SIMILAR ATTITUDE TO THE SOVIET UNION.

3. BREZHNEV REJECTS THE ALLEGATION THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS CONDUCT TOWARDS POLAND HAS VIOLATED IN ANY WAY THE PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THE SOCIAL ORDER IN POLAND WAS CHOSEN BY THE POLES THEMSELVES. THERE MUST BE NO INTERFERENCE IN THE ACTIONS OF THE POLISH AUTHORITIES TO QUOTE STABILISE UNQUOTE THE SITUATION. THE SUGGESTION THAT SOVIET MILITARY MANOEUVRES HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH POLAND WERE UNFOUNDED CONJECTURE.

4. ON HINTS THAT STEPS MAY BE TAKEN IN US-SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS UNLESS THE SITUATION DEVELOPS IN THE WAY DESIRED BY THE US, BREZHNEV STATES THAT SUCH RELATIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN MUCH REDUCED BY THE ACTIONS OF THE US ADMINISTRATION. THERE WAS NOT TODAY ALL THAT MUCH MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL POLITICAL CAPITAL LEFT. THE NEED WAS TO TAKE NEW STEPS TO SLOW DOWN THE ARMS RACE. THE US NEEDED THIS AS MUCH AS THE SOVIET UNION.

FCO PASS SAVING:- ANKARA OTTAWA ATHENS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN
LISBON LUXEMBOURG OSLO ROME REYKJAVIK THE HAGUE

HENDERSON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH LORD CARRINGTON,
SUNDAY, 27 DECEMBER 1981, 12 NOON

LC I ring you up really to let you know the latest on Poland.

PM Yes, the news is very, very conflicting today, according to the Press - some saying they're talking to the Church and others saying that they really are having a massive repression.

LC I personally am inclined to think that, half-way between that is probably true. Cheysson has refused to meet on Wednesday.

PM Well I saw that, but I thought you'd got it all sorted out.

LC So did I. He agreed with me on the telephone, he then came back and said, I don't know whether Mitterrand has told him not to and so reserve their right to do their own thing, but the reason he gave was that he didn't want there to be a meeting out of which come less or only the same as we'd already said and that this would do more harm than good. I think reading between the lines he doesn't want to have a row with the Germans. There's no doubt about it, the Germans are being extremely unwilling to consider taking any measures even against the Poles, let alone the Russians, and I think that it may be that he doesn't want a row with the Germans. So what is now happening is that there is going to be a Political Directors meeting on Wednesday - I think I'll be up on Tuesday and Wednesday and see that all goes well there or at any rate be around - and then I think we shall have to see after the Political Directors meeting whether we ought to have a Foreign Ministers meeting ^{early} next week. This will depend a little bit on the Frenchman and where he stands. I think it's rather a pity really, but ...

/PM

PM Well I think it's a great pity, but I also think it's a pity you can't go ahead without the Frenchmen.

LC Yes, but it's a bit difficult to do that in terms of

PM Yes, but so long as its known, so long as its leaked - I'm now going to do counter leaking Peter, I've had enough of being leaked against me I'll have to do counter - so long as it is leaked that we've tried to call a meeting and everyone agreed except the French.

LC Well, to be fair, the Italians were not overly keen either.

PM Well they don't ... we can do without them.

LC But they were prepared to do it.

PM But its awful when you go to all the trouble ...

LC Yes, mounting it and so on ...

PM But it must be known that we tried to set one up.

LC Well, everybody does know - certainly the Americans know because I talked personally to Al Haig about it on the telephone. The only other thing that's happening is Gibraltar - I don't know if you know anything about that?

PM No.

/LC

LC They really are getting on now with the whole thing and Richard Parsons and Duran - who is the sort of Julian Bullard of the thing - had a talk just before Christmas in which Duran said that he was sending a letter about the opening of the border (proposing to send a letter about the opening of the border) and we would have to acknowledge it. Well, we had agreed that they could say some things unilaterally which we didn't necessarily agree with provided they didn't send it to us and asking for an acknowledgment.

PM Yes.

LC Well we couldn't have accepted this letter so we've sent it back to them and said don't send that, you must really amend it in a way that's acceptable. And that's all going quite well. The people in the Foreign Office today are doing that and they think we can get an acceptable letter which will mean that on the 8th with your talk with Sotelo he will announce the opening of the border on such and such a date. So I don't think that's too bad.

PM No.

LC Otherwise, there is literally nothing happening very much except the poor wretched Poles.

PM I think the Polish thing is going to get worse Peter. As winter gets worse I just think it's going to get worse and worse.

LC Unless they're so sort of beaten that they'll just sort of accept it.

/PM

PM If life is terrible, you might just as well resist. And if life is terrible and you don't resist you might just as well resist. Passive resistance, because there's nothing any Government can do against it.

LC It was quite well timed, wasn't it, what they did because it's too soon to know - I mean over Christmas and so on - it's too soon to know whether they are going to resist passively or not.

PM Well, it seemed to mean that what they were doing was the way to do it. Yes, they turn up to the factories but don't do any work.

LC Well, there are so many conflicting stories, that may be so, one doesn't know.

PM No.

LC This is going to be our problem is to get the truth out of the place.

PM Yes, you get some from the people who are coming over the border. But the most awful one was that they're kept in open detention camps.

LC And having water thrown over them, and that sort of thing.

PM Every hour, but Peter it can't be cold water because it would freeze.

/LC

LC Well, you know, I think you've got to take some of these stories with a certain amount of scepticism.

PM Well so do I, but I'm always - one took the stories out of Nazi Germany...

LC Yes, and they were true.

PM And they were true with scepticism. And that's why I'm - it's just the tyrants are the same these days, well the Communists and the Fascists were the same, and therefore there is no depths to which they cannot sink.

LC Yes, but I don't know if this chap is as bad as that. I really don't know. Certainly Gierek wasn't you know.

PM No. but didn't you say the news was it was virtually all the secret police that were doing this and not the ordinary army?

LC Well, these are some of the rumours coming out, yes.

PM And every Communist state has a secret police and in a way we have to avoid giving the impression that under Communism it was all right but under military rule it's not. And the fact was Solidarity was getting away from Communism.

LC That's right, and the military. Anyway I think we've got to keep a very close eye on things and see which way we go.

PM Yes, so do I.

/LC

LC But as things are I'll give you a ring. You're going to be at Chequers all the week are you?

PM I've got to go up on Wednesday night, because I've got to do something on the New Year for Thursday. There's no-one else doing anything. So I've got to keep it going and I've got to get presentation together. It's not my job to do Government presentation but you know when I was doing it we used to arrange for three or four people to do something. Now this week has fallen through.

LC Which is rather a bore. I can easily arrange to go on television but I don't know quite what one would say.

PM Well I'll have to go on ... either this week or next week.

LC I'm perfectly prepared to do it of course, its just ...

PM Well I shall be on on Thursday now Peter ...

LC On New Year's Day ...

PM On New Year's Eve ...

LC Well, if there's something to say I can easily get a slot, I'm not anxious to get up there and be asked 'what are you doing about it' when we've got the French ...

PM Right, well I shall say 'well we wanted to call a meeting now we're holding the Presidency but two of the big nations disagreed.

/They

PM They couldn't agree to come
Contd.

LC There was disagreement about that

PM And that's Europe, I'm afraid.

LC Don't put the finger on France.

PM No.

LC Not in public. I think, you know, it's easier to let that
be known around the backdoor to say that really.

PM O.K. Peter.

LC Sorry to bother you.

PM No bother, bye.

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PM Seen

Prime Minister to see

Possibly a significant development?

FOR NEWS DEPARTMENT:

Neill Mitchell

Duty Clerk

27/12/81

(Mufasal to Chequers)

NOT TO BE ATTRIBUTED

THE POLISH ARMY SEEMS TO BE ENCOUNTERING SIGNIFICANT DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS AND AT LEAST ONE SOLDIER HAS BEEN RELIABLY REPORTED EXECUTED FOR DISOBEYING ORDERS. AS MARTIAL LAW ENTERS ITS THIRD WEEK, IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR THE ARMY TO JUGGLE ITS PRIORITIES: MAINTAINING THE MORALE OF TROOPS ON TEDIOUS ROADBLOCK DUTIES IN SUB ZERO TEMPERATURES, CONVINCING CONSCRIPTS OF THE NEED TO SUPPORT ATTEMPTS TO BREAK FACTORY AND MINE STRIKES; PERSUADING THE GENERAL STAFF THAT THE NEW MILITARY COUNCIL IS ACTING IN BOTH THE ARMY'S AND THE NATION'S BEST INTERESTS; ABOVE ALL, SUSTAINING THE IMPETUS OF MILITARY RULE IN THE FACE OF ACTIVE AND PASSIVE RESISTANCE.

THE SHOOTING INCIDENT IS IMPORTANT FOR IT LENDS SUPPORT TO THE WIDELY VOICED CONVICTION THAT THE POLISH OFFICER CORPS WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN PERSUADING THEIR TROOPS TO ACT AGAINST THE CIVIL POPULATION. ACCORDING TO A VERY RELIABLE SOURCE A MOTHER HAS BEEN TOLD TO COLLECT THE REMAINS OF HER SON WHO HAD BEEN SHOT FOR DERSEPTION (OR WAS IT SOMETHING ELSE). SOLDIERS ADMITTED TO MILITARY HOSPITAL WITH BULLET WOUNDS OTHER REPORTS OF FRATERNISATION BETWEEN SOME SOLDIERS AND STRIKERS AROUND THE LENIN SHIPYARD IN GDANSK AGAIN GIVE BACKING TO THE IDEA THAT OVER THE LONG TERM DISCIPLINE WILL PROVE A PROBLEM. RELIABLY BELIEVED SOME SOLDIERS POISONED BY SWEETS GIVEN BY PUBLIC. THE LONGER THE TROOPS STAY OUT OF BARRACKS, THE LESS CONVINCED THEY WILL BE THAT ORDINARY POLISH CIVILIANS ARE POTENTIAL ENEMIES. MEANWHILE, A RELIABLE REPORT THAT AT LEAST 10 GENERAL STAFF OFFICERS HAVE BEEN PUT UNDER HOUSE ARREST IN SOUTHERN POLAND SUGGESTS THAT THERE IS NOT UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FOR THE ACTIONS OF THE RULING MILITARY COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL SALVATION. SOLDIERS AT ROADBLOCKS AND ON PATROL SAY THEY ARE CONTINUALLY WATCHED BY OFFICERS AT A DISTANCE WHO ENSURE THEY ENFORCE EVERY ASPECT OF MARTIAL LAW.

THE CENTRAL DILEMMA IS THAT IF THE ARMY IS TO BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR GOVERNMENT AND PARTY THEN IT MUST SIMULTANEOUSLY SHOW ITSELF TO BE BOTH A FORCEFUL GUARANTOR OF SECURITY - AGAINST NOTIONAL "EXTREMISTS" - AND A BENEVOLENT PROVIDER. THIS DUAL ROLE IS PROVING TOO MUCH: THE ARMY HAS BEEN ABLE TO PAVE THE WAY FOR

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POLICE TO CLEAN UP LABOUR UNREST IN FOR EXAMPLE THE URSUS TRACTOR FACTORY, BUT IT CANNOT FORCE THE WORKERS TO WORK. THE NET IMPRESSION AFTER TWO WEEKS OF MARTIAL LAW IS THAT CIVILIANS, IN WARSAW AT LEAST, ARE DEEPLY DISILLUSSIONED WITH THE MILITARY, WHICH WAS ONCE THE UNBLEMISHED GUARDIAN OF THE NATIONAL SPIRIT

THAT IMPRESSION IS CONTINUOUSLY BUTTRESSED BY A COMBINATION OF RUMOUR AND RELIABLE UNOFFICIAL REPORTING. A SOLIDARITY BULLETIN, WHICH SEEMS TO BE WELL INFORMED, SAYS THAT 2,000 PEOPLE ARE INTERNED OUTSIDE RADOM NEAR THE AIRPORT, SOME OF THEM — DESPITE GOVERNMENT DENIALS — HOUSED IN TENTS. THIS IS THE FIRST NEWS TO COME FROM RADOM WHICH HAS BEEN SEALED OFF THROUGHOUT THE EMERGENCY. ACCORDING TO THE BULLETIN ANONYMOUSLY DELIVERED ON CHRISTMAS EVE, WHEN CURFEW WAS LIFTED IN THE CAPITAL — AT LEAST 300 PEOPLE ARE ALSO BEING INTERNED IN WROCLAW. THE BULLETIN, PRINTED ON A FAIRLY PRIMITIVE MACHINE, SAID THAT SOME OF THE INTERNEES WERE REGULARLY BEING WOKEN UP AND HAVING FREEZING WATER POURED OVER THEM.

AS LONG AS REPORTS LIKE THAT GAIN CURRENCY, THE ARMY STAND NO CHANCE OF WINNING THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF THE POLES. SOLIDARITY, AS THE BULLETIN SHOWS, IS STILL ACTIVE IN A SKELETAL FORM, IF AND WHEN TELEPHONES ARE RESTORED AND MOVEMENT FACILITATED, THE CURRENT LEVEL OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE IN FACTORIES MAY WELL BE TRANSFORMED INTO A MORE ORGANISED STRUGGLE. BUT SOME INTERNEES ALREADY RELEASED SAY CONDITIONS WERE NOT APPALLING AND BY AND LARGE WERE OF THE STANDARD CLAIMED BY THE GOVERNMENT.

CHURCH SOURCES QUOTED IN ONE SOLIDARITY BULLETIN SAY THERE ARE 49 DETENTION CAMPS THEY KNOW OF, AT BIALEKA THEY SAY 60 INTERNEES ARE ON HUNGER STRIKE, DEMANDING THE RIGHT FOR MASS IN DETENTION AND FOR THEIR STATUS TO BE CLARIFIED.

ACCORDING TO ANOTHER CLANDESTINE BULLETIN FOUR PEOPLE WERE SHOT IN RIOTING IN GDANSK LAST WEEK. ONE SINCE DIED. IN WROCLAW ONE PERSON DIED AFTER POLICE RAIDED THE POLYTECHNIC AND THEN FORCED STAFF IN THE DUPLICATING DEPARTMENT TO RUN A POLICE GAUNTLET OF TRUNCHEDNS.

IN ONE SILESIA MINE, SECURITY FORCES PUMPED GAS UNDERGROUND, BROUGHT THE UNCONSCIOUS MINERS TO THE SURFACE, THEN AS MINERS RECOVERED THEY WERE FORCED BACK TO WORK AT GUNPOINT OR WERE ARRESTED.

MEANWHILE THE SYSTEMATIC DISMANTLING OF THE SOLIDARITY MACHINE CONTINUES THE PROCESS OF VERIFICATION OF EMPLOYEES AT ALL LEVELS CONTINUES. PEOPLE ARE FORCED TO SIGN DECLARATIONS THAT THEY WILL NOT ENGAGE IN ANTI SOCIALIST ACTIVITY AND THAT THEY WILL RESIGN FROM SOLIDARITY. MANY HAVE REFUSED. AT KURIER POLSKI ONLY TWENTY PER CENT OF JOURNALISTS HAVE BEEN RE-EMPLOYED, THE REST SACKED. AMONG THE NEXT TO BE VERIFIED WILL BE TEACHERS.

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ALSO CLEAR THAT PARTY MEMBERS ARE HANDING IN THEIR COMMUNIST PARTY CARDS IN DROVES IN DISGUST AT THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW. MEMBERSHIP OF THE PARTY GETS SMALLER AND SMALLER AND ITS FUTURE ROLE IN POLAND IN ITS CURRENT FORM REMAINS DOUBTFUL NOW. HOW LONG WILL MOSCOW ENDURE THIS? OBSERVERS HERE BELIEVE SOME FORM OF SURROGATE PARTY, UNDER A NEW NAME WILL SOON HAVE TO BE FORMED TO RE-ESTABLISH THE IMAGE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY HAVING A SUPREME ROLE IN POLAND. BUT HOW MANY PEOPLE WILL AGREE TO JOIN? NO ONE HERE BELIEVES SOLIDARITY CAN RE-EMERGE AS THE GOVERNMENT PROMISES IT WILL. IF IT DOES IT WILL NOT BE THE OLD SOLIDARITY BUT A TOKEN STOOGES ORGANISATION.

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TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 765 OF 26 DECEMBER
INFO PRIORITY WARSAW, AND UKDEL NATO

SOVIET COMMENT ON POLAND

1. PRAVDA ON 25 DECEMBER CARRIED A LONG ARTICLE BY BOLSHAKOV ENTITLED "ON THE INTERFERENCE OF US SPECIAL SERVICES IN THE AFFAIRS OF POLAND". THE ARTICLE BEGINS BY REFERRING TO THE "LONG STANDING PLANS OF IMPERIALISM CONCERNING THE RESTORATION OF CAPITALISM IN POLAND AND THEIR AIM OF TEARING POLAND AWAY FROM THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY AND ABOVE ALL ELSE FROM THE WARSAW PACT". "EVENTS IN POLAND ARE FOR THE USA A MATTER OF NOT ONLY POLITICAL BY ALSO STRATEGIC INTEREST". THE ARTICLE CONCLUDES IN THE SAME VEIN, REMINDING THOSE INVOLVED THAT "THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY HAS MORE THAN ONCE BEFORE GIVEN A REBUFF TO THE ENTHUSIASTS FOR SUCH ADVENTURES".
2. MOST OF THE ARTICLE IS DEVOTED TO AN EXAMINATION OF THE HISTORY OF CIA INTEREST IN POLAND SINCE THE 1950'S IN FAMILIAR TERMS OF RECENT WESTERN INVOLVEMENT WITH KOS/KOR AND SOLIDARITY. THE MAIN CO-ORDINATING ROLE OF RADIO FREE EUROPE IS HIGHLIGHTED AND SOME ATTENTION IS ALSO PAID TO THE INVOLVEMENT OF POLISH EXILE ORGANISATIONS IN VARIOUS WESTERN COUNTRIES.

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TO PRIORITY CANBERRA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 506 OF 24 DECEMBER,
AND TO PRIORITY WELLINGTON
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN, WARSAW
POLAND : CONTACTS WITH OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES
1. ROBERTSON, AUSTRALIAN ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER, AND SHROFF,
COUNSELLOR AT NEW ZEALAND HIGH COMMISSION, CALLED BRIEFLY AT
THEIR REQUEST ON BULLARD THIS AFTERNOON TO DISCUSS POLAND.
ROBERTSON SAID THE AUSTRALIANS WERE UP-TO-DATE ON EVENTS IN
POLAND, BUT WOULD WELCOME GUIDANCE ON QUOTE ATMOSPHERICS UNQUOTE
AND ON US ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE EAGLEBURGER'S EUROPEAN
TOUR.
2. BULLARD GAVE A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF HOW WE SAW THINGS NOW IN
POLAND. HE SAID EAGLEBURGER HAD CALLED ON HIM IN LONDON
YESTERDAY AFTER EARLIER VISITS TO ROME, PARIS, BONN AND BRUSSELS.
THEY HAD GONE OVER THE GROUND TOGETHER. CONSULTATIONS WOULD
CONTINUE. NATO PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES WOULD MEET AGAIN ON
30 DECEMBER. THE TEN WERE GEARED UP TO MEET SHOULD IT BE
NECESSARY, PERHAPS NEXT WEEK OR THE WEEK AFTER, BUT NO FINAL
DECISIONS HAD YET BEEN TAKEN.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 December 1981

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Dear Willie,

Poland: Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Ten,
30 December

I attach a copy of the draft press line which we propose to use to announce the meeting of next week's Foreign Ministers Meeting. Subject to the Prime Minister's views, and to any unexpected developments in replies from our Partners (the deadline for which is noon today), we propose to make the announcement at the 12.30 Press Conference today.

I am copying this letter to John Kerr in the Treasury, John Rhodes in the Department of Trade and to David Wright in the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever.

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

Willie Rickett Esq
10 Downing Street

NOTE TO PRESS OFFICERS

POLAND: PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEECH

ON THE RECORD IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS

We welcome President Reagan's television address which, in large measure, accords with our own views.

General

Reagan: "They have answered the storms of liberty with brute force, killings, mass arrests and the setting up of concentration camps."

LPS, HoC, 22 December: "The long night threatens to fall once again in Poland. Martial law has been declared. A state of emergency has been imposed. There is a curfew: Civil liberties are suspended: trades union activity is banned. There have been thousands of arrests ..."

Concern that food aid should reach the people

Reagan: "We will continue the shipment of food through private humanitarian channels only so long as we know that the Polish people themselves receive the food ... The Administration has suspended all Government sponsored shipments of agricultural and dairy products to the Polish Government ... until we receive absolute assurances that distribution of these products is monitored and guaranteed by independent agencies.

Carrington, Radio 4, 21 December: "We must make quite sure that any more food aid which we give gets to the Polish people."

PM, HoC, 22 December: "We will make strenuous efforts to see that any future deliveries of food get to the people of Poland."

LPS, HoC, 22 December: 'We are considering how we can ensure that supplies of food are distributed to those Poles who most need them.'

Following the meeting of Community Ambassadors in Brussels, to which the LPS referred in his speech, the Presidency in Warsaw is seeking firm assurances from the Polish Authorities about the distribution of supplies before any new decisions on Community food aid can be taken.

Credit

Reagan: 'We have halted the renewal of the Export-Import Bank's line of export credit insurance to the Polish Government.'

Decisions on export credit for 1982 are not imminent, As the Prime Minister said in the House on 22 December; ~~we~~ We shall decide in concert with our partners and allies whether to renew such credit ~~is~~.

(If pressed): Current export credit has not been suspended but there is a relatively small sum remaining for 1981 - in fact £23 million. *In view of restrictions on transport placed by the Polish authorities, it is very unlikely that exports will be able to proceed in current circumstances.*

Civil aviation

Reagan: 'We will suspend Polish civil aviation privileges in the US.'

There are no scheduled flights at present between Poland and Britain.
We shall of course consider this but LOT flights to London have performed a particularly valuable service in recent days. They have been the only flights out of Poland by which stranded foreigners could leave the country.

Fishing rights

Reagan: 'We are suspending the right of Poland's fishing fleet to operate in American waters.'

This is of course a Community matter. But in point of fact the Poles do not have any fishing rights in Community waters so the question of parallel action in this field does not arise.

High technology

Reagan: 'We are proposing to our allies the further restriction of high technology exports to Poland.'

We are already examining this proposal in consultation with our allies. In current circumstances, Polish ^{capacity} activity to purchase high technology is in any case limited.

No business as usual

Reagan: 'If the outrages in Poland do not cease we cannot and will not conduct business as usual with the perpetrators and those who aid and abet them.'

Carrington, Radio 4, 21 December: 'I don't believe you can have ordinary relations when the Polish Government is' engaged in such repression.'

We have made it very clear to the Polish Authorities both in London and in Warsaw that the whole range of our relationships will depend upon the honouring of General Jaruleski's promises.

Role of the Soviet Union

Reagan: 'Public and secret pressure from the Soviet Union'... urging President Brezhnev to permit the restoration of human rights in Poland'

Carrington, Radio 4, 21 December: 'These events could not have taken place without the knowledge and agreement of the Soviet Union.'

The President imposed no new measures in the field of US/Soviet

1. in military for the all. rights?

- 4 -

relations. This question is already the subject of consultation in the alliances.

Consultations on all these matters will continue throughout the holiday period (reference to informal meeting of the Ten on 30 December).

NF

24 December 1981



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
London

T 182/81

December 24, 1981

Subject
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Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver the enclosed message to you from President Reagan, which was received at the Embassy this morning.

Sincerely,

Robert J. Morris
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

Enclosure:

SECRET

The Right Honorable Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, SW1.

SECRET

December 24, 1981

Dear Prime Minister:

As we are both aware, events in Poland are at a critical point where Poland's future ability to attain the diversity, liberalization and renewal which we so strongly wish are in the balance. I believe that it is necessary to make unmistakably clear to both the Polish authorities and the USSR -- which is deeply complicit in recent tragic developments in Poland -- that the repressions must cease and that legitimate Polish elements, including the church and Solidarity, must be part of a genuine process of reconciliation. I also believe that it is necessary to put both Warsaw and Moscow on notice that otherwise, there will be severe costs.

I am therefore sending letters to both General Jaruzelski and to President Brezhnev which will leave no doubt about the broader stakes at issue in Poland today. I want you to be aware of the content of these letters, which are summarized below.

As you can see from these messages, I believe we are at the point where a firm stance and strong action are necessary. You should be aware that, at present, I do not envisage putting arms control processes at hazard among the steps with which the USSR must reckon. Otherwise, however, we are -- as I am informing President Brezhnev -- considering the full range of issues affecting our relationship.

I believe it is crucial for us and other friends and partners to act in harmony to maximize the chances for peaceful evolution in Poland, and I hope that you will agree on the importance of concerting our actions and the signals we send to both Warsaw and Moscow. I hope, thus, that we will be in a position to act together if the suppression of civil liberties in Poland does not soon cease.

I am sending parallel letters to all of our colleagues in NATO, Spain, Australia, Japan and New Zealand.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

SECRET

SECRET

December 24, 1981

Letter to General Jaruzelski

-- Expression of deep concern over recent developments in Poland, including imposition of martial law, arrests of thousands of workers and intellectuals, and reports of beatings and even killings. The impossibility of reconciling these violations with obligations under the Helsinki Final Act and the U.N. Charter.

-- Recognition that Poland has been under considerable external pressure to roll back reforms of the past 16 months, and statement that the U.S. cannot idly ignore the violations of human rights in Poland, since to do so would make us a party to the repression.

-- A statement of U.S. decisions with regard to Poland, including suspending consideration of agricultural assistance; withholding of undelivered sales of commodities; suspension of renewal of export insurance by the Export-Import Bank; not extending existing bilateral air transport services beyond expiration of March 31, 1982; no allocation to Poland in 1982 of U.S. fisheries stocks; and consideration of further steps which could have a severe impact on mutual relations, particularly in the economic sphere.

-- Hope that the U.S. will not be forced to take such further steps, but the need for a full review of U.S. policy toward Poland if repression continues.

-- U.S. readiness to reconsider these actions once the Polish Government has taken concrete steps to end repression, freed those detained, and begun a search for reconciliation and negotiated accommodation with the true representatives of all the social, spiritual, and political elements of Polish society.

-- Urging Jaruzelski to take steps to move Poland to genuine compromise and negotiation.

SECRET

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December 24, 1981

Letter to President Brezhnev

-- Recent events in Poland have filled the people of the United States with dismay. Since the imposition of martial law, the elementary rights of Polish people have been violated daily, with massive arrests, incarcerations in overcrowded jails, suspension of rights of assembly and brutal assaults by security forces on Polish citizens.

-- Recent events in Poland are clearly not an "internal" matter. The Soviet Union has repeatedly intervened in Polish affairs in recent months. The June 5 CPSU letter to the Polish leadership warned that internal Polish developments were intolerable to the USSR. This and numerous other such communications placed pressure on the Polish Government. They were accompanied by a steady barrage of media assaults, military exercises on Poland's borders and warnings of intervention unless Polish civil liberties were restricted.

-- These actions are a clear violation of many international agreements, including the Helsinki Final Act.

-- Since Afghanistan, nothing has so outraged U.S. public opinion as the pressure and threats exerted by the Soviet Government on Poland to stifle its freedom.

-- Attempts to suppress the Polish people, either by Polish forces under Soviet pressure, or through more direct use of Soviet force, will not bring about stability and could unleash a process which cannot be controlled.

-- The only solution is to allow the Polish Government and people now to begin a process of reconciliation. This cannot be done in the present atmosphere of terror, arrests, and bloodshed. Spiritual, political and social forces in Poland must be part of a new national dialogue. This is as essential to solve Poland's major economic problems as it is to heal the political wounds.

-- The Soviet Union can either acknowledge the need for this process or continue to prevent it. The consequences of each of these courses for our relationship are clear.

SECRET

SECRET

page 2

-- Over the course of 1981, we had begun to develop a framework to guide our relations in the years to come. We had set forth a concrete agenda for negotiations on critical regional and arms control issues. We have been expecting to build a better relationship and increased cooperation.

-- The Soviet Union must decide whether we can move ahead with this agenda or not. The responsibility of the USSR for repression in Poland undermines the basis for an improvement in our relationship. We have no intention of dictating a change in the relationship of political forces in Europe. We recognize the interest of the Soviet Union in a stable Poland. But reconciliation and moderate reform in Poland are no threat to the USSR.

-- The United States cannot acquiesce in suppression of the Polish people's legitimate desire for a process of renewal. Should the Soviet Union pursue this course the United States will have no choice but to take concrete measures affecting the full range of our relationship.

-- We bear a mutual obligation to demonstrate wisdom, moderation and restraint. The U.S. is prepared to join in helping heal Poland's wounds and to meet its real needs if the USSR reciprocates.

-- A call on the USSR in the next few days to make clear its understanding of the need for reconciliation in Poland.

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FM UKDEL NATO 241230Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 510 OF 24 DECEMBER 1981

INFO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, ROME,
THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG, COPENHAGEN, ATHENS, DUBLIN,
INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW, WARSAW.

YOUR TELNO 328 TO ATHENS; POLAND.

1. IT MAY HELP YOU TO KNOW THAT THE NATO COUNCIL MEETING ON
30 DECEMBER (MY TELNO 507) IS TO BE HELD IN THE AFTERNOON.
THIS PROBABLY MEANS 1400Z, BUT WE COULD HAVE IT PUT OFF UNTIL
1500Z IF NECESSARY. ALTHOUGH THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE MEETING
IS TO COLLECT REACTIONS TO, AND IF POSSIBLE TO REACH CONCLUSIONS
ON, THE CSCE PROPOSAL REFERRED TO IN MY TELNO 508, IT WOULD ALSO
PROVIDE A CONVENIENT OPPORTUNITY TO REPORT TO OUR ALLIES ANY
CONCLUSIONS REACHED AT THE MORNING SESSION OF THE SPECIAL
INFORMAL MEETING PROPOSED IN YOUR TUR.

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FM PARIS 241712Z DEC 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1150 OF 24 DECEMBER 1981
INFO SAVING TO HM CONSULS GENERAL FRANCE (PASSED BY PARIS)
WARSAW BONN UKDEL NATO AND WASHINGTON

MIPT: FRENCH POLICY IN THE POLISH CRISIS

1. IN HIS SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON 23 DECEMBER M. MAUROY
DEFINED THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S AIMS IN RELATION TO POLAND AS
FOLLOWS:

- I) THAT POLAND SHOULD SOLVE ITS PROBLEMS WITHOUT EXTERNAL
INTERFERENCE;
- II) THAT SOCIAL PROGRESS AND PROGRESS IN THE FIELD OF INDIVIDUAL
LIBERTY RECENTLY ACHIEVED SHOULD NOT BE CANCELLED;
- III) THAT THE POLISH AUTHORITIES SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO UNDERSTAND
THAT ONLY A RADICAL CHANGE IN THEIR ATTITUDE COULD PREVENT
POLAND'S ECONOMIC DISORDER FROM BECOMING WORSE AND THE
INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN GENERAL FROM BEING AFFECTED.

2. M. MAUROY ALSO SPOKE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING IRRESPONSIBLE
DECLARATIONS AND INITIATIVES WHICH MIGHT ENCOURAGE ILLUSORY AND
PERHAPS DRAMATIC HOPES AND WHICH WOULD BE COMPARABLE TO BRANDISHING
A WOODEN SWORD. THE FIRST REQUIREMENT WAS THAT BLOOD SHOULD NO
LONGER FLOW IN POLAND.

FOC PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES EXCEPT CONSULS GENERALS.

HIBBERT

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FM MOSCOW 241230Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 764 OF 24TH DECEMBER

FOR INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND WARSAW

FOR INFO SAVING PARIS BONN AND UKDEL NATO.

WASHINGTON TELNO 3916: POLAND.

1. FIRST SOVIET REACTIONS TO REGANS TELEVISION SPEECH OF 23 DECEMBER WERE IN THE FORM OF A TASS DISPATCH FROM WASHINGTON WHICH DESCRIBED IT AS "UNPRECEDENTLY CRUDE PRESSURE AND ABONINABLE INTERVENTION INTO THE STRICTLY INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A SOVEREIGN STATE", AND AS "MALICIOUS ATTACKS" ON THE STEPS TAKEN BY THE POLSIH STATE COUNCIL. TASS ALLEGED THAT COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY FORCES IN POLAND WERE "CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH THE CIA AND OTHER SPECIAL SERVICES OF IMPERIALIST STATES AND AT THEIR BIDDING PREPARED AN ANTI-STATE COUP, AND PUSHED THE COUNTRY INTO THE ABYSS OF FRATRICIDAL WAR".

2. IN ANTICIPATION OF THE AMERICAN MEASURES THIS MORNING'S PRAVDA CONTAINED AN ARTICLE BY KORIONOV IN "IN IMPOTENT SPITE" (TEXT BY BAG TO F C O).

KORIONOV CLAIMED THAT THE "CAMPAIGN, DISGUSTING IN ITS CYNICISM AND UNSCRUPULOUSNESS, UNLEASHED AGAINST POLAND BY IMPERIALIST PROPAGANDA IN THE US AND SOME OTHER NATO COUNTRIES" WAS INSPIRED AND DIRECTED FROM ONE CENTRE. WASHINGTON MADE NO SECRET OF THE FACT. WASHINGTON WAS INTERFERING IN POLAND'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS; DELIVERIES OF FOOD SUPPLIES HAD BEEN HALTED AND THE QUESTION OF CREDITS WAS BEING REVIEWED. EAGLEBURGER HAD GONE TO NATO HEADQUARTERS IN BRUSSELS TO TRY TO INVOLVE OTHER NATO COUNTRIES IN THE US' "BLOCKADE" AGAINST POLAND. THE US WAS DEMANDING THE REVERSAL OF POLISH GOVERNMENTAL MEASURES.

3. KORIONOV WENT ON TO CITE OTHER SIMILAR EXAMPLES OF ALLEGED INTERFERENCE. HE CLAIMED THAT THE AIM WAS TO INCITE THE POLES TO SLAUGHTER, AND THUS TURN THE POLISH QUESTION INTO A SOURCE OF FURTHER INTERNATIONAL TENSION. BUT THE SITUATION IN POLAND WAS GRADUALLY RETURNING TO NORMAL. ALTHOUGH ISOLATED SEATS OF TENSION REMAINED, COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN POLAND WAS NOT PASSING AND WOULD NOT PASS. POLAND'S FAITHFUL FRIENDS - THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES - WERE AS EVER ON HER SIDE.

4. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL PRESS ARTICLES OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS CRITICISING US POLICIES ON POLAND; E.G. A REPORT IN PRAVDA OF 22 DECEMBER OF A STATEMENT BY THE AMERICAN COMMUNIST GUS HALL. ARTICLES ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN POLAND HAVE MEANWHILE GIVEN SOME DETAILS OF UNREST BUT HAVE CONTINUED TO CLAIM THAT LIFE IS GENERALLY RETURNING TO NORMAL. PRAVDA OF 23 DECEMBER REPRINTED THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S ASSURNACE THAT SOLIDARITY AND OTHER TRADE

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UNIONS HAD NOT BEEN DISBANDED, BUT THAT THEIR ACTIVITY HAD BEEN TEMPORARILY HALTED. PRAVDA OF 24 DECEMBER CLAIMED THAT MANY POLES HAD BEEN REASSURED BY THE MARTIAL COUNCIL'S ASSURANCE OF ITS READINESS TO CONTINUE REFORMS. ACCORDING TO POLISH OPINION POLLS, 91 PER CENT OF THE POPULATION SUPPORTED THE MILITARY OPERATION GROUPS. BUT THERE WAS STILL QUITE ENOUGH "DISORIENTATION, TEMPORIZING AND INDECISION". A REPORT FROM PRAVDA'S SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT ON 23 DECEMBER TALKED TO THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN PARTY RANKS AND RAISE THE IDEOLOGICAL LEVEL OF PARTY WORK.

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELNO 233 OF 24 DEC 81

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RPTD SAVING WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, OSCOW, WARSAW, BUCHAREST,
BUDAPEST, EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE, SOFIA, UKREP BRUSSELS.

MY TELNO 228: POLAND

1. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE FO THE LYG CONSIDERED YESTERDAY DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND. TODAY'S PRESS SUMMARISES THEIR CONCLUSIONS WHICH SHOWS THE PARTY IS TAKING AN INCREASINGLY CRITICAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS MARTIAL LAW. IN PARTICULAR THE, SUMMARY STATES

(A) " THE LYG MEMBERSHIP FOLLOWS WITH GREAT CONCERN DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT SINCE THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LW TO THE PRESENT DAY THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNS INDICATING THE CREATION OF CONDITIONS FOR A WAY OUT OF THE CRISIS. THERE IS GROWING EVIDENCE THAT THE CRISIS IN POLAND IS DEEPENING AND BECOMING MORE ACUTE, LEADING EVEN TO TRAGIC EVENTS".

(B) "THEY I.E. THE WORKING CLASS AND PEOPLE, THE PUWP AND ALL SOCIALIST AND OTHER DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN THE COUNTRY ARE CALLED ON TO FIND INDEPENDENTLY AND WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM AND SIDE WAYS FOR STRENGTHENING THE SOCIAL ROLE OF THE WORKING CLASS AND FOR IMPLEMENTING SOCIAL REFORMS DIRECTED TO THE SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY AND, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COUNTRY'S CONDITIONS, TO ENSURE THE SUPPRESSION OF THOSE FORCES WHICH WANT TO OBSTRUCT AND PREVENT THE INDEPENDENT, FREE AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT OF POLISH SOCIETY".

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FM HOLY SEE 241130Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO. 038 OF 24 DEC 81

INFO ROUTINE WARSAW

SAVING PARIS, BONN, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 020: POLAND

1. FOLLOWING WERE MAIN POINTS MADE TO ME BY MGR. SILVESTRINI YESTERDAY EVENING ABOUT MGR. DABROWSKI'S ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND. (DABROWSKI HAD LEFT FOR WARSAW EARLIER IN THE AFTERNOON).
2. THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING DECLARATION OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY WERE THE MOST DIFFICULT. THE BISHOP'S CONTACTS WITH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN VIRTUALLY SEVERED. THESE HAD BEEN PARTIALLY RESTORED A FEW DAYS AGO. FROM THE START THE BISHOPS HAD DEMANDED THE RELEASE OF DETAINEES, AN END TO THE EMERGENCY AND RESTORATION OF THE ROLE OF SOLIDARITY. THE GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN THE LINE THAT THEIR MEASURES WERE PROVISIONAL, THAT THEY INTENDED TO RESUME THE DIALOGUE, THAT CONCESSIONS MADE EARLIER HAD ONLY BEEN SUSPENDED, NOT WITHDRAWN, AND THAT THIS STEP HAD BEEN FORCED ON THEM AS A RESULT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF EXTREMISTS IN SOLIDARITY.
3. DABROWSKI BELIEVED THAT THE POLISH GOVERNMENT HAD TRIED TO TEMPER THE WIND AND THAT THERE WAS A CHANCE THAT MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF SOLIDARITY MIGHT BE RELEASED. WALESA HAD REFUSED TO JOIN ANY TALKS UNTIL THEY WERE. THE BISHOPS' OFFER OF A NEUTRAL SITE FOR THE TALKS HAD NOT YET BEEN TAKEN UP. UP TO THE TIME OF HIS DEPARTURE FOR ROME THERE HAD BEEN PLENTY OF IDEAS BUT NO DECISIONS ON HOW AND WHETHER TO BEGIN TALKS.
4. ON THE QUESTION OF CASUALTIES DABROWSKI THOUGHT THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME EXAGGERATION. IN KATOWICE, FOR INSTANCE, HE HAD LEARNED AT FIRST HAND FROM THE BISHOP WHO ATTENDED THE FUNERAL THAT SIX HAD DIED. ONE SEVERELY INJURED MAN WAS IN HOSPITAL. THE FIGURE FOR ARRESTS WAS IN THOUSANDS BUT NOT TENS OF THOUSANDS. HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED AT THE TONE OF THE NEWS FROM POLAND IN THE WESTERN PRESS. SILVESTRINI SAID THAT HE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO DRAW A CONCLUSION FROM THESE OBSERVATIONS.
5. WHY DID THE GOVERNMENT MOVE WHEN IT DID? SILVESTRINI HAD HEARD A NUMBER OF THEORIES. ONE WAS IN ORDER TO FORESTALL A MOVE BY OLZOWSKI OF WHICH THERE HAD BEEN TALK. ANOTHER THAT THE DEMONSTRATION PLANNED BY SOLIDARITY FOR THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE EVENTS IN DANZIG OF 17 DECEMBER WAS THE PRECIPITATING FACTOR. THERE WAS NOT MUCH EVIDENCE OF DIRECT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT ALTHOUGH IT WAS KNOWN

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/THAT

THAT THERE WERE SOVIET ADVISERS AND TECHNICIANS WITH THE POLISH ARMY. SILVESTRINI THOUGHT THAT THE POLISH GENERALS THEMSELVES HAD TAKEN THE DECISION TO MOVE, ON THE BASIS OF CAREFULLY PREPARED PLANS. HE ALSO BELIEVED THAT JARUZELSKI HAD SOME GOOD INTENTIONS. HIS OBJECT WAS TO ESTABLISH ORDER UNDER THE ARMY SO THAT SOLIDARITY MIGHT BE MORE INCLINED TOWARDS MODERATION.

6. THE CHURCH ITSELF HAD NOT BEEN GREATLY AFFECTED BY THE MOVE.

THEY WERE PERMITTED TO CARRY ON THEIR HUMANITARIAN WORK. BISHOPS WERE FREE TO TRAVEL. FOOD DISTRIBUTION EG. BY CARITAS WAS NOT BEING HINDERED. SOME PRIESTS AND RELIGIOUS HAD BEEN ARRESTED. BUT THIS WAS USUALLY WHEN THERE HAD BEEN CLOSE CONTACTS WITH STUDENTS OR WITH MEMBERS OF SOLICARITY. MOST DETAINED PRIESTS AND RELIGIOUS HAD BEEN RELEASED FAIRLY SOON. THE CHURCH WAS THEREFORE NOT REALLY INVOLVED ON ITS OWN ACCOUNT; ONLY FOR OTHERS. A NUMBER OF PROFESSORS AT WARSAW UNIVERSITY HAD BEEN ARRESTED, TOGETHER WITH OTHER INTELLECTUALS. WALESA WAS BEING REASONABLY TREATED IN A PROTECTED RESIDENCE OUTSIDE WARSAW. HIS FAMILY AND A PRIEST WERE ALLOWED ACCESS (PARA 3 ABOVE).

7. THE MAIN POINTS FOR THE CHURCH WERE THOSE IN PARA 2 ABOVE, ON WHICH THEY HAD INSISTED. SO FAR THERE HAD BEEN NO HINT OF A CONCESSION FROM THE GOVERNMENT. IN DABROWSKI'S VIEW SUSPENSION OF FOOD AND HUMANITARIAN AID BY THE WEST WOULD BE A MAJOR SETBACK FOR THE POLISH PEOPLE. APART FROM THE HARDSHIP, THE POLES WOULD FEEL EVEN MORE CUT OFF FROM CIVILIZATION UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE USSR THAN THEY DO NOW. SILVESTRINI SAID THAT DABROWSKI HAD OBSERVED THAT THIS ARGUMENT APPLIED NO LESS TO THE RESCHEDULING OF THE POLISH DEBTS ALTHOUGH HE, SILVESTRINI, COULD WELL UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WAS A MORE AWKWARD AND COMPLEX QUESTION FOR US.

8. SILVESTRINI MADE THESE POINTS IN RESPONSE TO MY REQUEST FOR A BRIEFING ON BEHALF OF THE EC AMBASSADORS HERE TO WHOM I SPOKE ACCORDINGLY THIS MORNING. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS TELEGRAM MAY BE DISTRIBUTED IN THE COREU SERIES TO ENSURE FULL CIRCULATION.

9. FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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(Mufaxed to Chequers)

N.P.G. Mitchell PM Sec

Poland: Foreign Ministers Meeting


Duty Clerk 24/12/81

The Secretary of State spoke to M. Cheysson at 1250 hrs today.

M. Cheysson repeated that he would prefer a meeting on the afternoon of 29 December, but could accept the morning of 30 December. But his main worry was whether an emergency meeting could be justified unless something substantial could be produced. He doubted that it would be possible to reach agreement on a statement which went far enough beyond existing texts to be worthwhile. (Lord Carrington indicated at this point that he was not thinking in terms of a statement). He thought that an emergency meeting which produced nothing would be dangerous. He would be speaking to Sr Colombo, Herr Genscher and M. Tindemans, and suggesting that Ministers should keep a time free for a meeting next week, but should leave it to Political Directors to decide in the meantime whether anything useful would come out of such a meeting. If they concluded that it would not, they should meet themselves without Ministers. The only adequate outcome of a Ministerial Meeting that occurred to him was the idea of an emissary to Warsaw on behalf of the Ten (or, more likely, the Nine). Sending an emissary would only be acceptable if he was given access to the opposition as well as to the Government.

The Secretary of State repeated the arguments over holding a Ministerial Meeting, stressing the likelihood of criticism if the Ten appeared to be doing nothing while the Americans acted. The purpose of such a meeting would be to take things further than the Americans had done in preparation either for a Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council or for later action by the Ten. He asked whether M. Cheysson could envisage any other moves which might represent an acceptable outcome from the Ministerial Meeting next week; M. Cheysson did not respond.

It was left that political Directors would pursue this further.



(F M Richards)

24 December 1981
copies to:

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|-------------------|---------------------------|
| PS | Mr Evans |
| PS/LPS | EESD |
| PS/Mr Hurd | ECD(E) |
| PS/Lord Trefgarne | ERD |
| PS/PUS | Mr Mallaby o/r |
| Sir A Acland | News Dept |
| Lord Bridges | J O Kerr Esq, HM Treasury |
| Mr Fergusson | Resident Clerk |
| Mr Hannay | |

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Prime Minister,

I think that you should be aware of this, even though much of it is already known to you.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 December 1981

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(Mufaxed to Cleaners)
24/12/81

DM

Dear Clive,

Poland

Since the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary circulated a minute to his Cabinet colleagues last week there have been further developments, some of which were touched on when he saw the Prime Minister yesterday.

The picture in Poland itself is clouded by the news black-out and the cutting of communications, so that it is impossible (for example) to be sure even of basic facts such as the number of deaths. But it seems that martial law has been successfully imposed in all but one or two places. Passive resistance however is widespread, mostly taking the form of attending work places but not working. The military council has made no move either towards economic reform or towards resumption of the dialogue with other elements, although there are some contacts with the Church. The economic situation must be deteriorating rapidly from the low level to which it had already sunk before martial law was imposed, but this is masked by special deliveries of food and consumer goods from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We may see relaxations in some aspects of martial law, eg shorter curfews, but the prospects for the Polish people must be one of hardship and repression lasting certainly for months and possibly for years.

Western reactions are beginning to take shape. The tone in Washington naturally continues to be sharper than elsewhere, but there have been strong statements from most other NATO capitals (not including Ottawa) and from the Ten as a whole.

As regards actions, the problem is to devise measures constituting pressure on or inducement for the Polish leadership without imposing hardship on the Polish people; and measures which might impel the Soviet Union to help and not hinder such steps back towards normality as Jaruzelski may be able and willing to take. To these objectives the Americans would add the need to strike a firm pose in the context of US-Soviet and East/West relations as a whole. The latter, together with domestic considerations, are probably the main motives behind President Reagan's speech last night.

There has been a great deal of consultation, bilaterally, among the Ten and in NATO. As agreed with the Prime Minister yesterday, Lord Carrington has invited his colleagues in the

/Ten

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Ten to a special informal meeting in London on 30 December: its task would be to try to identify steps which we could usefully take, either as individual governments or as the Ten, or which we could promote in other groups such as NATO and the major creditors' club; and Lord Carrington has it very much in mind that such a meeting would provide an effective response to the kind of criticism levelled at the Ten for its inactivity during the Afghanistan crisis two years ago. We are in close touch with the Americans and will take account of their views, although it seems likely that the United States government intends to advance down the path of 'punishment' of both the military regime in Poland and the Soviet Union, using economic as well as political levers, whether or not its allies are in the mood to follow suit.

There are two particular problems which the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary wishes to draw to the attention of his colleagues:

a. Refugees

The Home Office have announced that any Pole already in Britain who does not wish to return to Poland may apply for his stay in Britain to be extended; that this will normally be granted, initially for two months. Lord Carrington hopes that there will be few if any refusals. A bigger question is how to respond to Chancellor Kreisky's appeal to Western countries to help absorb the 30,000 Poles now in Austria. Lord Carrington hopes that we will consider with sympathy what part we may be able to play.

b. Economic Aid

Leaving aside aid from private sources and humanitarian aid (eg baby food and medical supplies) there are two main aspects here: first, the supply of food; and second all other forms of economic assistance (re-scheduling, fresh credits etc). On food, Lord Carrington considers that supplies already agreed by the Community should go ahead, subject to reasonable satisfaction that the food is being distributed fairly in Poland. (We are already seeking assurances to this effect about the 8,000 tonnes of free beef from France and Ireland, but not so far about the uncompleted part of subsidised food supplies from various Community countries including Britain which were agreed before 13 December.) Meanwhile, the Community has agreed not to take decisions about supplies additional to those agreed before 13 December. As regards the other forms of economic assistance, the question is whether we should make some or all of them depend on our getting evidence that the regime in Warsaw is living up to its own assurances about an early return to the path of reform and renewal.


/Lord

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Lord Carrington's expectation is that it will be necessary to consult his colleagues again on various aspects of the Polish problem very early in the New Year. The French are at present making difficulties about having the proposed meeting of the Ten at Foreign Minister level (as are the Greeks, although we would be prepared to go ahead without them), and it may be that a first meeting will have to take place at Political/Economic Director level. Either way, FCO officials have been in touch with their colleagues over the subjects likely to arise at the meeting and briefs will be cleared as necessary. If the meeting takes place, as we would wish, at Ministerial level, it is the rule at informal meetings of this kind that conclusions which may be reached will need to be processed formally in the appropriate political cooperation and community institutions. Further consultations in the alliance will no doubt also be necessary.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to all Members of OD and to Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,


(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

C A Whitmore Esq
10 Downing Street

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MR FERGUSSON
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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3916 OF 24 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WARSAW MOSCOW UKDEL NATO

ROUTINE PARIS BONN

POLAND

1. THE PRESIDENT APPEARED ON NATION-WIDE TELEVISION TONIGHT (23 DECEMBER). AFTER A BRIEF CHRISTMAS MESSAGE, HE SPOKE ABOUT POLAND. FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS, REPORTED VERBATIM.

QUOTE

AS I SPEAK TO YOU TONIGHT, THE FATE OF A PROUD AND ANCIENT NATION HANGS IN THE BALANCE. FOR A THOUSAND YEARS, CHRISTMAS HAS BEEN CELEBRATED IN POLAND, A LAND OF DEEP RELIGIOUS FAITH. BUT THIS CHRISTMAS BRINGS LITTLE JOY TO THE COURAGEOUS POLISH PEOPLE: THEY HAVE BEEN BETRAYED BY THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT. THE MEN WHO RULE THEM AND THEIR TOTALITARIAN ALLIES FEAR THE VERY FREEDOM THAT THE POLISH PEOPLE CHERISH. THEY HAVE ANSWERED THE STORMS OF LIBERTY WITH BRUTE FORCE. MILLIONS HAVE BEEN KILLED AND THE

POLISH PEOPLE CHERISH. THEY HAVE ANSWERED THE STORMS OF LIBERTY WITH BRUTE FORCE, KILLINGS, MASS ARRESTS AND THE SETTING UP OF CONCENTRATION CAMPS. LECH WALESA AND OTHER SOLIDARITY LEADERS ARE IMPRISONED, THEIR FATE UNKNOWN. FACTORIES, MINES, UNIVERSITIES AND HOMES HAVE BEEN ASSAULTED. THE POLISH GOVERNMENT HAS TRAMPLED UNDER FOOT SOLEMN COMMITMENTS TO THE U N CHARTER AND HELSINKI ACCORDS. IT HAS EVEN BROKEN THE GDANSK AGREEMENT OF AUGUST 1980 BY WHICH THE POLISH GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZED THE BASIC RIGHT OF ITS PEOPLE TO FORM FREE TRADE UNIONS AND TO STRIKE.

THE TRAGIC EVENTS NOW OCCURRING IN POLAND ALMOST TWO YEARS TO THE DAY AFTER THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN HAVE BEEN PRECIPITATED BY PUBLIC AND SECRET PRESSURE FROM THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS NO COINCIDENCE THAT SOVIET MARSHAL KULAKOV, CHIEF OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES, AND OTHER SENIOR RED ARMY OFFICERS, WERE IN POLAND WHILE THESE OUTRAGES WERE BEING INITIATED, AND IT IS NO COINCIDENCE THAT THE MARTIAL LAW PROCLAMATIONS IMPOSED IN DECEMBER BY THE POLISH GOVERNMENT WERE BEING PRINTED IN THE SOVIET UNION IN SEPTEMBER.

THE TARGET OF THE REPRESSION IS THE SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT, THAT IN ATTACKING SOLIDARITY ITS ENEMIES ATTACK AN ENTIRE PEOPLE. TEN MILLION OF POLAND'S THIRTY SIX MILLION CITIZENS ARE MEMBERS OF SOLIDARITY. TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THEIR FAMILIES THEY ACCOUNT FOR THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE POLISH NATION. BY PERSECUTING SOLIDARITY, THE POLISH GOVERNMENT WAGES WAR AGAINST ITS OWN PEOPLE.

I URGE THE POLISH GOVERNMENT AND ITS ALLIES TO CONSIDER THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ACTIONS. HOW CAN THEY POSSIBLY JUSTIFY USING NAKED FORCE TO CRUSH A PEOPLE WHO ASK FOR NOTHING MORE THAT THE RIGHT TO LEAD THEIR OWN LIVES IN FREEDOM AND DIGNITY ? BRUTE FORCE MAY INTIMIDATE, BUT IT CANNOT FORM THE BASIS OF AN ENDURING SOCIETY.

THE AILING POLISH ECONOMY CANNOT BE REBUILT WITH TERROR TACTICS. POLAND NEEDS COOPERATION BETWEEN ITS GOVERNMENT AND ITS PEOPLE, NOT MILITARY OPPRESSION. IF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT WILL HONOUR THE COMMITMENTS IT HAS MADE TO BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOCUMENTS LIKE THE GDANSK AGREEMENT, WE IN AMERICA WILL GLADLY DO OUR SHARE TO HELP THE SHATTERED POLISH ECONOMY JUST AS WE HELPED THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE AFTER BOTH WORLD WARS. IT IS IRONIC THAT WE OFFERED, AND POLAND EXPRESSED INTEREST IN ACCEPTING, OUR HELP AFTER WORLD WAR TWO. THE SOVIET UNION INTERVENED THEN AND REFUSED TO ALLOW SUCH HELP TO POLAND. BUT IF THE FORCES OF TYRANNY IN POLAND AND THOSE WHO INCITE THEM FROM WITHOUT DO NOT RELENT, THEY SHOULD PREPARE THEMSELVES FOR SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES.

ALREADY THROUGHOUT THE FREE WORLD CITIZENS HAVE PUBLICLY DEMONSTRATED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE POLISH PEOPLE AND

ALREADY THROUGHOUT THE FREE WORLD CITIZENS HAVE PUBLICLY DEMONSTRATED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE POLISH PEOPLE. OUR GOVERNMENT, AND THOSE OF OUR ALLIES, HAVE EXPRESSED MORAL REVULSION AT THE POLICE STATE TACTICS OF POLAND'S OPPRESSORS. THE CHURCH HAS ALSO SPOKEN OUT IN SPITE OF THREATS AND INTIMIDATION. BUT OUR REACTION CANNOT STOP THERE. I WANT EMPHATICALLY TO STATE TONIGHT THAT IF THE OUTRAGES IN POLAND DO NOT CEASE, WE CANNOT AND WILL NOT CONDUCT BUSINESS AS USUAL WITH THE PERPETRATORS AND THOSE WHO AID AND ABET THEM. MAKE NO MISTAKE. THEIR CRIME WILL COST THEM DEARLY IN THEIR FUTURE DEALINGS WITH AMERICA AND FREE PEOPLES EVERYWHERE. I DO NOT MAKE THIS STATEMENT LIGHTLY OR WITHOUT SERIOUS REFLECTION. WE HAVE BEEN MEASURED AND DELIBERATE IN OUR REACTION TO THE TRAGIC EVENTS IN POLAND. WE HAVE NOT ACTED IN HASTE. THE STEPS I WILL OUTLINE TONIGHT, AND OTHERS WE MAY TAKE IN THE DAYS AHEAD, ARE FIRM, JUST AND REASONABLE.

IN ORDER TO AID THE SUFFERING POLISH PEOPLE DURING THIS CRITICAL PERIOD, WE WILL CONTINUE THE SHIPMENT OF FOOD THROUGH PRIVATE HUMANITARIAN CHANNELS, BUT ONLY SO LONG AS WE KNOW THAT THE POLISH PEOPLE THEMSELVES RECEIVE THE FOOD. THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRY OF AUSTRIA HAS OPENED HER DOORS TO REFUGEES FROM POLAND. I HAVE THEREFORE DIRECTED THAT AMERICAN ASSISTANCE, INCLUDING SUPPLIES OF BASIC FOODSTUFFS, BE OFFERED TO AID THE AUSTRIANS IN PROVIDING FOR THESE REFUGEES. BUT TO UNDERSCORE OUR FUNDAMENTAL OPPOSITION TO THE REPRESSIVE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE POLISH GOVERNMENT AGAINST ITS OWN PEOPLE, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS SUSPENDED ALL GOVERNMENT SPONSORED SHIPMENTS OF AGRICULTURAL AND DAIRY PRODUCTS TO THE POLISH GOVERNMENT. THIS SUSPENSION WILL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL WE RECEIVE ABSOLUTE ASSURANCES THAT DISTRIBUTION OF THESE PRODUCTS IS MONITORED AND GUARANTEED BY INDEPENDENT AGENCIES. WE MUST BE SURE THAT EVERY BIT OF FOOD PROVIDED BY AMERICA GOES TO THE POLISH PEOPLE, NOT TO THEIR OPPRESSORS.

THE U.S. HAS TAKEN IMMEDIATE ACTION TO SUSPEND MAJOR ELEMENTS OF OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE POLISH GOVERNMENT. WE HAVE HALTED THE RENEWAL OF THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK'S LINE OF EXPORT CREDIT INSURANCE TO THE POLISH GOVERNMENT. WE WILL SUSPEND POLISH CIVIL AVIATION PRIVILEGES IN THE U.S. WE ARE SUSPENDING THE RIGHT OF POLAND'S FISHING FLEET TO OPERATE IN AMERICAN WATERS, AND WE ARE PROPOSING TO OUR ALLIES THE FURTHER RESTRICTION OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS TO POLAND.

THESE ACTIONS ARE NOT DIRECTED AGAINST THE POLISH PEOPLE; THEY ARE A WARNING TO THE GOVERNMENT OF POLAND THAT FREE MEN WILL NOT AND CANNOT STAND IDLY BY IN THE FACE OF BRUTAL REPRESSION. TO UNDERSCORE THIS POINT I HAVE WRITTEN A LETTER TO GENERAL JARUZELSKI, HEAD OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT. IN IT, I OUTLINED THE STEPS WE ARE

UNDERScore THIS POINT I HAVE WRITTEN A LETTER TO GENERAL JARUZELSKI, HEAD OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT. IN IT, I OUTLINED THE STEPS WE ARE TAKING AND WARNED OF THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES IF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO USE VIOLENCE AGAINST ITS POPULACE. I HAVE URGED HIM TO FREE THOSE IN ARBITRARY DETENTION, TO LIFT MARTIAL LAW AND TO RESTORE THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED RIGHTS OF THE POLISH PEOPLE TO FREE SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION.

THE SOVIET UNION, THROUGH ITS THREATS AND PRESSURES, DESERVES A MAJOR SHARE OF BLAME FOR THE DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND. SO I HAVE ALSO SENT A LETTER TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV, URGING HIM TO PERMIT THE RESTORATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLAND PROVIDED FOR IN THE HELSINKI ACT. IN IT, I INFORMED HIM THAT IF THIS REPRESSION CONTINUES, THE U.S. WILL HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO TAKE FURTHER CONCRETE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEASURES AFFECTING OUR RELATIONSHIP.

UNQUOTE.

2. THE PRESIDENT CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE FREE WORLD STOOD AS ONE WITH OUR POLISH BROTHERS AND SISTERS; THEIR CAUSE WAS OURS. HE URGED AMERICANS TO JOIN HIM IN PLACING LIGHTED CANDLES IN THEIR WINDOWS ON CHRISTMAS EVE TO SHOW SOLIDARITY WITH THE POLISH PEOPLE. HE ADDED:

QUOTE ONCE, EARLIER IN THIS CENTURY, AN EVIL INFLUENCE THREATENED THAT THE LIGHTS WERE GOING OUT ALL OVER THE WORLD. LET THE LIGHT OF MILLIONS OF CANDLES IN AMERICAN HOMES GIVE NOTICE THAT THE LIGHT OF FREEDOM IS NOT GOING TO BE EXTINGUISHED. UNQUOTE.

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FROM UKREP BRUSSELS 241135Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 5044 OF 24 DECEMBER 1981

INFO ROUTINE COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE ROME DUBLIN PARIS BONN

LUXEMBOURG ATHENS MADRID WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO MOSCOW WARSAW

POLAND

YOUR TELNOS 328 AND 329 [TO ATHENS]

1. WE CONTACTED THORN'S CABINET (RAVASIO) LAST NIGHT, AND HANDED OVER YOUR PERSONAL MESSAGE AND A COPY OF THE DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS IN YOUR TELNO 329 EARLY THIS MORNING. PRESIDENT THORN IS IN SPAIN AND, WHEN CONTACTED BY HIS CABINET, ASKED IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, TO BE EXCUSED FROM ATTENDING THE 30 DECEMBER MEETING IN LONDON, ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE WOULD BE ON AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO SPAIN WHICH DID NOT END UNTIL 30 DECEMBER. HE ASKED IF WE WOULD AGREE TO THE COMMISSION BEING REPRESENTED BY DAVIGNON WHO WAS "DUTY OFFICER" FOR THE COMMISSION OVER THE HOLIDAY. FOLLOWING TELECON THOMAS/FITZHERBERT WE TOLD THE CABINET THAT THIS WAS ACCEPTABLE. SUBSEQUENTLY HOWEVER, THORN'S CABINET TOLD US THAT HE HAD HAD SECOND THOUGHTS; HAD REARRANGED HIS SCHEDULE, AND NOW PLANNED TO COME TO THE MEETING, ARRIVING BY AIR IN LONDON AT 1105 HRS GMT ON 30 DECEMBER. IT WAS NOT DECIDED WHETHER DAVIGNON WOULD STILL COME, EITHER TO COVER FOR THORN'S LATE ARRIVAL OR TO ATTEND THROUGHOUT. WE WERE ASKED IF DAVIGNON'S POSSIBLE ATTENDANCE IN ADDITION TO THORN WOULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES. WE SAID WE THOUGHT NOT.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 235 OF 24 DEC

YOUR TELNO 328 TO ATHENS: POLAND.

1. MESSAGE PASSED THIS MORNING SINCE MR TINDEMANS DID NOT RETURN FROM THE HAGUE UNTIL MIDNIGHT YESTERDAY. HIS CABINET HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THE DATE IS ACCEPTABLE. DETAILS REQUESTED IN YOUR TELNO 329 WILL BE SENT BY COREU BEFORE MIDDAY 29 DECEMBER.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1048 OF 24TH DECEMBER 1981

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO AND MOSCOW
INFO SAVING MODUK, EAST BERLIN, BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST, BELGRADE,
SOFIA, UKMIW NY, UKREP BRUSSELS, HELSINKI AND STOCKHOLM.

FROM MELHUIH.

POLISH SITUATION.

1. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER WIEJACZ SUMMONED HEADS OF MISSION OF WESTERN COUNTRIES THIS MORNING TO PASS ON INFORMATION ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY AND THE ACTION OF THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN ANNOUNCING A STATE OF EMERGENCY. HE HAD PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED AMBASSADORS FROM NON-CMEA COUNTRIES IN SIMILAR TERMS.
2. WIEJACZ BEGAN BY SAYING THAT THIS WAS ONE OF A SERIES OF MEETINGS DESIGNED TO PASS ON INFORMATION ABOUT THE COUNTRY TO FOREIGN AMBASSADORS. IT WAS PARTICULARLY NECESSARY BECAUSE OF CERTAIN CAMPAIGNS AND ECONOMIC THREATS FROM ONE OR TWO WESTERN COUNTRIES. POLAND WAS "NORMALISING". THERE WERE ONLY TWO MAJOR STRIKES STILL GOING ON IN TWO COAL MINES NEAR KATOWICE AND THE NUMBER OF STRIKES WAS DECREASING. THE TROUBLES IN HUTA KATOWICE, WHERE 1000 WORKERS HAD BEEN STAGING A SIT IN, HAD BEEN RESOLVED WITHOUT INJURIES THE PREVIOUS DAY. THERE WAS NO MAJOR ATTEMPT TO ORGANISE OTHER STRIKES AND BY THE END OF THE CHRISTMAS PERIOD ALL STRIKES WERE LIKELY TO BE OVER. SOCIAL DISCIPLINE HAD INCREASED. MARKET SUPPLIES WERE DIFFICULT WITH PARTICULAR PROBLEMS OF DISTRIBUTION. THERE WOULD BE NO CURFEW TONIGHT AND POLAND WOULD SPEND THE THREE DAY HOLIDAY IN "DIGNITY AND IN PEACE". IN REPLY TO A SUBSEQUENT QUESTION WIEJACZ SAID THAT THE NUMBER OF INTERNEES WAS CURRENTLY RUNNING AT 5000. HE COULD NOT PROVIDE HARD FACTS ABOUT THE BREAKDOWN BETWEEN NUMBERS ARRESTED AND NUMBERS INTERNED. HE ALSO COULD NOT ANSWER A QUESTION ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE UNIVERSITIES RE-OPENING IN EARLY JANUARY.
3. WIEJACZ SAID THAT, NOW THAT MANY CORRUPT AND INCOMPETENT PEOPLE HAD BEEN DEALT WITH, THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE AUTHORITIES AND SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FORCES IN THE COUNTRY WAS BEING ESTABLISHED. JARUZELSKI HAD MET YESTERDAY WITH A GROUP OF ACADEMICS. 68 HAD BEEN ASKED AND ONLY THREE, WHO HAD TO CALL OFF BECAUSE OF BAD HEALTH, DID NOT APPEAR. ARCHBISHOP POGGI WAS TALKING WITH CZYREK AT THAT MOMENT AND WOULD BE SEEING JARUZELSKI LATER IN THE DAY. BISHOP DABROWSKI HAD RETURNED FROM ROME THE PREVIOUS EVENING.

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4. BUT MARTIAL LAW HAD TO GO ON. MANY UNFRIENDLY FOREIGN CRITICS HAD QUESTIONED THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY. IT WAS IN FACT TOTALLY JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 33(2) OF THE POLISH CONSTITUTION. THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAD ACTED AS THEY DID MAINLY BECAUSE OF FOUR FACTORS : SOLIDARITY'S ACTIONS AT RADOM AND GDANSK WHICH HAD BROUGHT THE COUNTRY CLOSE TO CIVIL WAR, THE TRANSFER OF THE POLICIAL STRUGGLE INTO ECONOMIC ACTION WITH STRIKES ETC, SOLIDARITY DEFIANCE OF POLISH LAW, AND THE NUMEROUS ATTACKS BY SOLIDARITY AND OTHERS ON POLAND'S INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCES. THE MARTIAL COUNCIL WAS A PROVISIONAL BODY SET UP TO PREVENT A COUP DETAT AGAINST THE POLISH STATE. IT DID NOT INTEND TO GO BACK TO THE PRE-AUGUST 1980 STATE OF AFFAIRS. IT WOULD CONTINUE THE PROCESS OF RENEWAL AND ENCOURAGE THE GROWTH OF SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY.

5. HE THEN LAUNCHED INTO A LENGTY DEFENCE OF MARTIAL LAW WHICH HE SAID WAS IN CONFORMITY WITH POLISH INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS, WITH THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS . IT WAS NOT DISCRIMINATORY. NO-ONE HAD BEEN DEPRIVED OF THEIR LIFE AND THERE WAS NO TORTURE OR INHUMAN TREATMENT. THE ENFORCED RESTRICTIONS ON CIVIL RIGHTS HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL. INTERNEES WERE ALLOWED TO RECEIVE PARCELS AND TO TAKE PART IN RELIGIOUS SERFICES. THEIR CONDITIONS WERE HUMANITARIAN AND MANY HAD ALREADY BEEN RELEASED. MORE, ESPECIALLY, ACADEMICS , WOULD SOON BE RELEASED.

6. WIEJACZ THEN REFERRED TO THE RESTRICTIONS ON ACTIVITIES OF EMBASSIES AND FOREIGNERS. HE SAID THAT MORE PEOPLE IN EMBASSIES WOULD BE GIVEN SPECIAL PASSES THAT TELEX LINKS WOULD BE INCREASED FOR EMBASSIES AND JOURNALISTS. PERMANENTLY ACCREDITED CORRESPONDENTS WHO HAD LEFT THE COUNTRY FOR CHRISTMAS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO COME BACK. CONSULAR ACCESS TO FOREIGN COMMUNITIES WOULD BE EASIER. FOREIGNERS RESIDENT IN POLAND COULD NOW SEND TELEGRAMS TO EMBASSIES THROUGH A CENTRAL POST OFFICE IN EACH VOIVODSHIP AND EMBASSIES COULD REPLY. MORE HELP WOULD BE GIVEN TO POLISH NATIONALS MARRIED TO FOREIGNERS.

7. FURTHER RELAXATIONS WOULD SOON TAKE PLACE BUT MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON OTHER COUNTRIES' REACTIONS, IN PARTICULAR POLITICAL PROPAGANDA ABROAD AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. REGRETTABLY, SOME GOVERNMENTS HAD TAKEN RECIPROCAL ACTION. THIS SHOWED LACK OF UNDERSTANDING, BASED ON FALSE INFORMATION, WHICH WOULD MAKE THE SITUATION WORSE. THERE WAS LITTLE POINT IN TAKING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST POLAND SINCE THEY WOULD AFFECT THE POLISH PEOPLE. HE THEN WISHED US A HAPPY CHRISTMAS.

8. I THINK WIEJACZ WAS TRYING TO DO THREE THINGS: TO SEEK TO JUSTIFY THE ASSUMPTION OF MARTIAL LAW, TO OPEN UP AN OFFICIAL CHANNEL OF INFORMATION AND TO CONVINCCE US ALL THAT THE COUNTRY WAS

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AT PEACE AND THAT THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES WERE TRYING TO NEGOTIATE A SENSIBLE SOLUTION. ON THE FIRST POINT, HE FAILED TO MAKE A CONVINCING SOLUTION. ON THE SECOND, HE DID PASS SOME INFORMATION BUT, SINCE NONE OF US HAS ANY INDEPENDENT MEANS OF CONFIRMING IT, ITS VALUE MUST BE LIMITED. ON THE THIRD, HE LEFT HIS AUDIENCE SCEPTICAL. IF THE COUNTRY WERE AS PEACABLE AS HE SUGGESTED, THE NEED TO CONTINUE MARTIAL LAW AND ALL THE HEAVY RESTRICTIONS WHICH IT BRINGS WOULD BE REMOVED. AS FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF FINDING SOME SORT OF COMPROMISE SOLUTION WITH SOLIDARITY AND/OR THE CHURCH, THERE WAS NOTHING IN WHAT WIEJACZ SAID, NOR IN ALL THE INFORMATION WE SUBSEQUENTLY POOLED IN A COMMUNITY HEADS OF MISSION MEETING, TO SUGGEST THAT THERE HAS BEEN ANY PROGRESS IN TALKS WITH THE PRIMATE OR ARCHBISHOP POGGI.

9. WIEJACZ IS MORE ARTICULATE, MORE INTELLIGENT AND FASTER ON HIS FEET THAN CZYREK BUT FOR ALL THESE QUALITIES IT WAS A DEPRESSING SESSION.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

JAMES

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From the Principal Private Secretary

24 December, 1981.

Poland: Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Ten,
30 December

You wrote to Willie Rickett earlier today to let us have the press line on Poland which you proposed to follow at News Department's press conference this morning.

As I told you on the telephone earlier today, the Prime Minister has approved the draft attached to your letter, with only one comment which I have already passed on to Nick Fenn. She was a little concerned that the last sentence of the section headed "No business as usual" on page 3 might be taken to imply that we thought that, in certain circumstances, military government was acceptable. I agreed with Nick Fenn that he should instead say something on the lines of:-

"We have made it clear to the Polish authorities both in London and in Warsaw that the whole range of our relationships will depend upon the restoration of the freedoms which the Polish people enjoyed before the imposition of the present military regime".

The Prime Minister's only other observation was that you had done a very good job to produce such an excellent note in so short a time.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Kerr (HM Treasury), John Rhodes (Department of Trade) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

IC. A. WHITMORE

F.N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 1046 OF 24TH DECEMBER 1981

INFO ROUTINE: MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN AND
MODUK

INFO SAVING: EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE, BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST, BELGRADE,
SOFIA, STOCKHOLM, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKREP BRUSSELS AND HELSINKI.

FROM MELHUIS.

POLISH SITUATION.

1. A BRITISH BUSINESSMAN FROM GDANSK TOLD US TODAY THAT THE CITY IS QUIET. HE HAD INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION THAT AT LEAST 3 PEOPLE HAD DIED IN THE RIOTS LAST WEEK AND HE BELIEVED THERE HAD BEEN MANY MORE DEATHS. SINCE THEN, ABOUT A DOZEN FACTORIES HAVE BEEN OCCUPIED INCLUDING THE SHIPYARDS AND THE REFINERY. OTHER WORKERS HAVE BEEN GIVEN EXTENDED LEAVE UNTIL 4 JANUARY. HE DID NOT EXPECT RESISTANCE TO END, HOWEVER, BECAUSE HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT SOLIDARITY WAS WELL ORGANISED. A NEW LEADERSHIP HAD ASSUMED CHARGE AND GONE UNDERGROUND.
2. THE MAIN COUNCIL OF THE EPISCOPATE MET YESTERDAY. THERE IS NO INFORMATION ABOUT THE MEETING. NO COMMUNIQUE HAS BEEN ISSUED, AND NO MESSAGE WILL BE PUBLISHED AS A RESULT.
3. THE ITALIAN EMBASSY, WHO ARE NORMALLY WELL INFORMED ON THE CHURCH, SAY THAT WALESA HAS NOW BEEN LOCATED BY THE CHURCH AT A VILLA NEAR KARCZEW ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE VISTULA.
4. NEWS IS NOW DRYING UP ALMOST COMPLETELY AND TRYBUNA LUDU HAS REVERTED TO ITS EARLIER FORM AS A NON-INFORMATION SHEET. ITS ONLY NEWS WAS THAT JARUZELSKI LAST NIGHT RETURNED TO THE PUBLIC GAZE WHEN HE MET 69 PROMINENT INTELLECTUALS. THE MEETING, WHICH WAS COVERED PROMINENTLY ON TELEVISION, MAY HAVE BEEN STAGED IN AN ATTEMPT TO DISPEL RUMOURS THAT HE IS NO LONGER IN CONTROL.
5. ONE OF THE LESS UNRELIABLE FORMER MEMBERS OF INTERPRESS YESTERDAY TOLD THE REUTER'S CORRESPONDENT THAT THE AUTHORITIES ORIGINAL INTENTION IN DECLARING MARTIAL LAW WAS TO ADMINISTER A SHORT SHARP SHOCK. THE AUTHORITIES HAD BEEN SURPRISED BOTH BY THE COMPARATIVE LACK OF INITIAL RESISTANCE TO MARTIAL LAW AND BY THE STUBBORNNESS OF THE LIMITED RESISTANCE THAT IS CONTINUING. THEY ARE UNCERTAIN WHAT TO DO NEXT. BUT THEY HAD TO RECONCILE THEMSELVES TO A LONGISH PERIOD OF MARTIAL LAW.

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16.

6. THIS ASSESSMENT TENDS TO CONFIRM MY OWN IMPRESSION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION. I BELIEVE MOST OF THE COUNTRY IS COMPARATIVELY QUIET. BUT THE CENTRES OF RESISTANCE THAT CONTINUE TO HOLD OUT DO SO STUBBORNLY. ALMOST ALL THE FACTORIES THAT HAVE BEEN CLEARED OUT BY THE MILITARY HAVE BEEN RE-OCCUPIED A FEW DAYS LATER. THE MILITARY HAVE NO WAY OF PREVENTING THIS SINCE IT TAKES A CONSIDERABLY GREATER NUMBER OF SOLDIERS TO MOUNT AN EFFECTIVE 24-HOUR GUARD ON A FACTORY THAN IT DOES TO CLEAR IT OUT IN THE FIRST PLACE. AS TIME GOES ON, RESISTANCE IN THE MINES AND SOME OF THE MAIN INDUSTRIAL CENTRES IS LIKELY TO GET MORE STUBBORN RATHER THAN LESS. THE WORKERS WILL HAVE MORE TO LOSE BY GIVING UP.

7. A RATHER PESSIMISTIC CONCLUSION ON CHRISTMAS EVE IS THAT MARTIAL LAW WILL BE WITH US WELL INTO 1982. THE AUTHORITIES WILL MAKE SOME CONCESSIONS BUT THERE ARE NOT MANY THAT THEY CAN MAKE WITHOUT DANGER. THEY CAN PLAY AROUND WITH CURFEW HOURS, SHORTENING THEM OR LENGTHENING THEM AT WILL. THEY CAN MAKE OCCASIONAL GESTURES SUCH AS RAISING THE CURFEW THIS EVENING SO THAT THE POLES CAN ATTEND MIDNIGHT MASS. BUT THEY CANNOT RE-CONNECT THE TELEPHONES, EVEN FOR A FEW HOURS ON CHRISTMAS DAY BECAUSE THAT WOULD ALLOW RESISTANCE TO BE INSTANTLY COORDINATED. FOR THE SAME REASON THEY CANNOT ALLOW FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT ABOUT THE COUNTRY. (IN WARSAW, THE CHECK POINTS ARE GETTING MARGINALLY EASIER FOR CARS WITH WARSAW REGISTRATIONS BUT CARS FROM OUTSIDE WARSAW CONTINUE TO BE STOPPED AND SOMETIMES SEARCHED.) IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THEY CAN OPEN POLISH AIR SPACE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE OR LIFT THE RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN JOURNALISTS. WHILST THEY MAY WELL GIVE DIPLOMATS MORE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AROUND THE QUIET PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, I DOUBT IF THEY WILL ALLOW US TO GO TO SILESIA OR GDNANSK FOR SOME TIME TO COME.

8. PROVIDED THAT THIS ASSESSMENT CONTINUES TO HOLD GOOD I DO NOT EXPECT TO SEND FURTHER SITUATION REPORTS OVER THE HOLIDAY WEEKEND.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

JAMES

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FM WARSAW 241150Z DEC

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1040 OF 24TH DECEMBER 1981

FOR NEWS DEPT.

1. FOLLOWING IS TODAY'S POOL COPY:

QUOTE

HEREWITH A CHRISTMAS MEDLEY

THE OFFICIAL MEDIA HAVE LAUNCHED A PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE TO BOOST THE IMAGE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND CONVEY THE IMPRESSION THAT IT IS BUSILY REACTIVATING ITSELF. BUT THE INDEPENDENT REPORTS SPEAK OF DISARRAY. SHOCK AND ANGER IN THE PARTY RANKS; UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONAL AND WORKER SOURCES SAID MANY PARTY MEMBERS HAD HANDED BACK THEIR CARDS AFTER THE MILITARY TAKEOVER. THERE ARE ONLY CAREERISTS AND STALINISTS LEFT. ONE PARTY SOURCE SAID. THE HARD-LINERS APPEAR TO BE REASSERTING THEIR CONTROL OVER THE PARTY AT ALL LEVELS. THERE IS SERIOUS TALK OF MOVES TO FOUND A NEW COMMUNIST PARTY. AT FACTORY LEVEL PARTY ACTIVISTS ARE REOPENING OFFICES THAT HAD BEEN TURNED INTO VIRTUAL NO-GO AREAS BY SOLIDARITY AND ARE AGAIN EXERTING INFLUENCE ON PERSONNEL DECISIONS AND OTHER KEY AREAS. THERE ARE PURGES AT ALL LEVELS. THE OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY PAP SPOKE OF PERSONAL CHANGES IN 29 OUT OF POLAND'S 49 VOIVODSHIPS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND OF DISMISSALS IN STATE ENTERPRISES. BUT THIS APPEARS ONLY TO BE THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG. THE PRICES ARE BEING COMPARED WITH THE WHOLESALERE DISMISSALS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AFTER THE 1968 SOVIET INTERVENTION. IT'S THE SECOND TIME THAT POLAND'S GOVERNMENT AND MANAGERIAL CLASS HAS BEEN TURNED UPSIDE DOWN IN LESS THAN TWO YEARS.

THE ONLY SECTOR THAT SURVIVED THE SOLIDARITY REVOLUTION INTACT WAS THE PROFESSIONAL PARTY AND SECURITY APPARATUS. THE SURVIVAL OF THE GROUP DURING THE SOLIDARITY REVOLUTION ENABLED IT TO COME OUT FIGHTING WHEN THE MILITARY TOOK OVER. THE SECRET POLICE ARE NOW EQUIPPED WITH ENOUGH EVIDENCE AGAINST LIBERALS AND SOLIDARITY SYMPATHISERS TO KEEP THE NATION COERCED FOR ANOTHER GENERATION. THOSE WHO FAIL TO RECONT ARE BEING THROWN OUT OF THEIR JOBS AND THOSE WHO FAIL TO COOPERATE IN FUTURE WILL BE THREATENED WITH THE SAME FATE; NO ONE, EXCEPT THE INNER PARTY CORP FEELS SECURE IN POLAND ANY LONGER.

LONG AFTER THE SO-CALLED STATE OF WAR IS OVER AND THE CURFEW IS RELAXED. THE POLICE AND SECURITY SERVICES WILL BE STILL AT WORK ON A NORMALISATION PROCESS THAT WILL BE LESS VISIBLE BUT FAR UGLIER THAN THE SIGHT OF ARMOURED VEHICLES AND SOLDIERS WITH MACHINE GUNS PATROLLING THE STREETS.

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THE POSITION OF GENERAL JARUZELSKI CONTINUES TO PROVOKE INTENSE SPECULATION ABOUT HIS ROLE IN THE CRACKDOWN AND HIS POLITICAL FUTURE. THERE IS ALSO A GROWING IMPRESSION THAT THE GENERALS DO NOT KNOW WHAT TO DO NEXT. THEIR ONLY WEAPONS ARE FORCE AND FEAR AND IT IS BY NO MEANS CLEAR THAT THE FORMULA CAN SUCCEED IN THE LONG TERM IN GETTING POLES TO WORK.

PRESS SOURCES SAID THE GENERALS WERE FACED WITH A DILEMA OVER WHAT TO DO WITH MR WALESA. INITIALLY THEY HAD HOPED TO WIN HIM OVER AND PERSUADE HIM TO RECANT ON STATE TELEVISION AND CALL ON THE WORKERS TO HALT STRIKES. BUT THE PLAN FAILED AND ONE WESTERN DIPLOMAT COMMENTED THAT THE SOLIDARITY LEADER'S SILENCE WAS NOW BECOMING RATHER ELOQUENT.

OBSERVERS BELIEVE THERE WILL HAVE TO BE SOME FORM OF BREAK THROUGH IN THE NEXT WEEK OR TWO AND IT MAY BE THE MILITARY WHO ARE FORCED INTO MAKING THEIR FIRST CONCESSIONS.

ALREADY THERE ARE SIGNS THAT THE IRON FIST IS WAVERING. AT THE OUTSET THE SOLDIERS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE ONLY DIALOGUE THEY UNDERSTOOD IN THE FACE OF STRIKES WAS FORCE. FACTORY GATES WERE SMASHED DOWN WITH TANKS AND POLICE MOVED IN TO BREAK UP THE STRIKES. THE STEEL MILL AT WCATOWICE WAS CLEARED THAT WAY ON WEDNESDAY. BUT THE AUTHORITIES HAVE HAD TO ADOPT A DIFFERENT TACTIC WITH THE MINERS BELOW GROUND IN SILESIA. THIS IS PARTLY FOR LOGISTICAL REASONS. IT'S HARD, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO STORM A MINE WITHOUT ENDANGERING THE LIVES OF BOTH ATTACKERS AND OFFENDERS. BUT RELUCTANCE TO USE FORCE MAY ALSO ERIVE FROM THE FEAR THAT IT WOULD RESULT IN AN INDEFINITE STRIKE IN ALL SILESIA SINCE THE MILITARY TAKEOVER.

BUT THE OFFICIAL MEDIA HAS SOUGHT TO SPIKE THE MINERS' GUNS BY STATING THAT SOLIDARITY TERRORISTS ARE HOLDING THE MAJORITY OF STRIKERS BELOW GROUND AGAINST THEIR WILL.

MEANWHILE THE AUTHORITIES ARE TRYING LITERALLY TO BUY POPULARITY BY EASING CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS AND BOOSTING SUPPLIES IN THE SHOPS THE RUSH OF MEAT AND OTHER FOOD FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND ELSEWHERE IN THE EAST BLOC HAS ENSURED THAT POLES WILL HAVE MORE TO EAT THIS CHRISTMAS THAN THEY PERHAPS COULD HAVE EXPECTED BEFORE DECEMBER 13. THE LIFTING OF THE CURFEW FOR CHRISTMAS EVE AND THE DECISION TO BROADCAST MASS ON STATE RADIO AGAIN ALSO APPEAR DESIGNED TO WIN POPULARITY. BUT STRICTURES REMAINING WILL STILL MEAN THAT MANY MANY POLES WILL FACE THEIR MOST MISERABLE CHRISTMAS SINCE WORLD WAR TWO. TELEPHONE LINES ARE STILL DEAD, PRIVATE MOTORISTS CAN GET NO PETROL. MANY FAMILIES WILL SPEND A

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DIVIDED CHRISTMAS. SOME BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT ABLE TO TRAVEL ACROSS PROVINCIAL BORDERS TO BE TOGETHER. OTHERS BECAUSE THEIR WIVES, HUSBANDS, SONS, OR DAUGHTERS ARE INTERNED OR IMPRISONED. AND SOME BECUSE THEIR LOVED-ONES ARE DEAD.

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FRAME EXTERNAL/AGRICULTURE

FM WARSAW 241115Z DEC

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1052 OF 24 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS, ROUTINE BRUSSELS, PARIS, BONN,
WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO AND MOSCOW

FROM MELHUI SH

YOUR TELS NOS 785 AND 786: FOOD FOR POLAND

THERE SHOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY IN MEETING THE TIMINGS IN PARA 3
OF YOUR TELNO 785. ALL POLISH MINISTRIES ARE SHUT UNTIL 28
DECEMBER AND, AS YOU KNOW, THERE ARE NO TELEPHONES OPERATING IN
POLAND.

2. WHETHER MITORAJ WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE SUITABLE REPLIES TO
OUR CONDITIONS REMAINS TO BE SEEN. HE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE
TO REFER E.G. ACCESS TO OUTLETS AND STORAGE DEPOTS TO MILITARY
AUTHORITIES. ON CURRENT FORM THIS WILL TAKE TIME.

JAMES

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FM WARSAW 242110Z DEC

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1049 OF 24 DECEMBER ..

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO AND MOSCOW.

FROM MELHUI SH

POLISH SITUATION: THE ECONOMY

1. HARD INFORMATION ON THE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IS DIFFICULT TO COME BY, BUT A RELIABLE SOURCE FROM GDANSK SPOKE OF AT LEAST 12 PLANTS IN THE TRI-CITY STILL BEING OCCUPIED (INCLUDING THE OIL REFINERY); AND OF MOST OTHER FACTORIES EITHER ON "HOLIDAY" OR ELSE MORE OR LESS IDLE BECAUSE OF SHORTAGES OF MATERIALS OR LACK OF COMMUNICATIONS. THE LATTER IS A MAJOR FACTOR HAMPERING THE OPERATIONS OF MINISTRIES, THE BANK HANDLOWY AND FTOS IN WARSAW AND PRESUMABLY ELSEWHERE. GENERALLY, WHETHER AS A RESULT OF STRIKES OR OCCUPATIONS, OR THROUGH THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY MILITARY RULE, LARGE SECTORS OF POLISH INDUSTRY MUST BE OPERATING FAR BELOW CAPACITY, AND TRADE WITH THE WEST WILL SOON GRIND TO A HALT UNLESS POLAND'S LINKS WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD ARE RESTORED.

2. WITHOUT THE RESTORATION OF COMMUNICATIONS, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE ECONOMY TO FUNCTION IN ANY SENSE NORMALLY, EVEN IF ALL OTHER FACTORS ARE FAVOURABLE. THE DECISION TO RESTORE TELEPHONE AND OTHER LINKS WILL CLEARLY BE A DIFFICULT ONE TO TAKE IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, HOWEVER. EITHER THE RISK MUST BE TAKEN OR THE ECONOMY WILL DEGENERATE FURTHER. NOR DO THE GOVERNMENT SEEM TO HAVE A CLEAR POLICY ON THE DIRECETION THE ECONOMY IS TO TAKE. REFORM IS STILL PROMISED, AND A CLUTCH OF BILLS RECEIVED A FIRST READING IN A SEJM COMMITTEE THE OTHER DAY; BUT IN PRESENTING THEM MINISTER BAKA SPOKE OF INTRODUCING "ELEMENTS" OF THE NEW ECONOMIC SYSTEM, AND HE STRESSED THAT ONE OF THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF REFORM WAS TO INCREASE THE STATUS OF CENTRAL PLANNING. (A FULLER ACCOUNT OF THIS SPEECH FOLLOWS BY BAG). GIVEN CURRENT POLICY TOWARDS SOLDARTIY, WHICH WAS THE MAJOR INTERLOCUTOR FOR THE WORKERS IN MOST FACTORIES, AND CENTRAL CONTROL OF SO MANY ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC LIFE UNDER MARTIAL LAW, ANY MEASURE OF GENUINE ECONOMIC REFORM SEEMS A LONG WAY OFF.

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FROM UKMIS GENEVA 241620Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 477 OF 24 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS, WARSAW, UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, VIENNA, DEPT OF EMPLOYMENT

MY TELNO 475 PARAS 7 TO 9: ILO ASPECTS OF POLISH CRISIS

1. FRANCIS BLANCHARD, DIRECTOR OF THE ILO, RETURNED FROM THE MIDDLE EAST ON THE AFTERNOON OF THE 23 DECEMBER AND I HAD A TALK WITH HIM ON THE AFTERNOON OF 24 DECEMBER. HE WAS GOING ON TO SEE MY US COLLEAGUE AND WILL SEE THE POLISH AMBASSADOR ON 28 DECEMBER OR EARLIER.

2. BLANCHARD HAS BEEN CLOSELY INVOLVED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN POLAND OVER THE LAST 18 MONTHS. HE HAS A STRONG PERSONAL STAKE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE UNION FREEDOMS IN POLAND AND FEELS STRONGLY ABOUT THE RECENT EVENTS. HE HAS BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH HIS HEADQUARTERS DURING HIS VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST (WHICH HE COULD NOT CURTAIL), AND HAS ALREADY SENT SEVERAL MESSAGES TO THE POLISH AUTHORITIES. HIS FIRST HOPE IS TO VISIT WARSAW HIMSELF IN AN EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT RECENT MOVES AGAINST FREEDOM OF TRADE UNION ACTIVITY ARE NOT (NOT) IRREVERSIBLE. IF HE SUCCEEDED IN GOING TO POLAND, HE WOULD EXPECT TO SEE SOLIDARITY LEADERS, MANY OF THEM WELL KNOWN TO HIM.

3. HE SAID THE POLISH AUTHORITIES HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN CONTACTING THE ILO BY INSTRUCTING THEIR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE HERE TO APPROCH THE ILO ON 14 DECEMBER. HE FOUND THIS ENCOURAGING. HE SUSPECTED THAT A PRICE OF A VISIT TO WARSAW WOULD BE AN UNDERTAKING FROM HIM TO URGE THE POLISH TRADE UNIONISTS TO COOPERATE WITH THE MILITARY REGIME. HE HAD NOT YET DECIDED HOW TO REACT TO SUCH A DEMAND. THE IMPORTANT THING WOULD BE TO PRESERVE AT LEAST SOME OF THE GAINS OF THE LAST 18 MONTHS.

4. I SPOKE AS IN PARA 8 OF MY TUR. BLANCHARD SAID HE WAS MUCH ENCOURAGED TO KNOW HE HAD THE SUPPORT OF THE TEN. AS I EXPECTED, HOWEVER, HE PREFERRED TO CONTINUE TO ACT ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY FOR A LITTLE LONGER TO SEE WHAT PROGRESS HE COULD MAKE. IF THE POLES TURNED HIM DOWN FLAT, THERE MIGHT THEN BE SCOPE FOR PUBLIC SUPPORT FROM THE TEN.

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5. I REMINDED BLANCHARD THAT DURING HIS VISIT TO WARSAW LAST MAY HE HAD WARNED FOREIGN MINISTER CZYREK TO GOOD EFFECT THAT THE POLISH DELEGATION TO THE ILO CONFERENCE IN JUNE MUST BE GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE, IE MUST INCLUDE SOLIDARITY REPRESENTATIVES. I ASKED HOW FAR HE EXPECTED TO BE ABLE TO EXPLOIT WITH THE POLISH AUTHORITIES THEIR RELUCTANCE TO SACRIFICE THE RESPECTABILITY WITH INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION WHICH THEY HAD EARNED BY THEIR RECENT COOPERATION WITH THE ILO. BLANCHARD WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC, BUT SAID HE THOUGHT THE POLES WERE AWARE OF THIS PART OF THEIR PUBLIC IMAGE. HE SAID THAT SEVERAL FORMAL COMPLAINTS HAD ALREADY BEEN LODGED WITH THE ILO AND REPORTED IMMEDIATELY TO THE POLISH AUTHORITIES. HE HOPED THAT SUBSTANTIAL RESPONSES TO THEM MIGHT BE RECEIVED BEFORE THE ILO GOVERNING BODY MEET NEXT FEBRUARY.

6. BLANCHARD UNDERTOOK TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US.

FCO PSE PASS TO DEPT OF EMPLOYMENT (ROBINSON, MISS DIMOND)

AND PSE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES

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(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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FROM UKMIS GENEVA 241158Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 476 OF 24 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS, WARSAW, UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS AND VIENNA

MY TELNO 475, PARAS 3-4: THE RED CROSS AND THE POLISH CRISIS

1. HOCKE, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, ICRC, TOLD US ON 24 DECEMBER THAT THE MEETING REFERRED TO IN PARA 3 OF MY TUR HAD DULY PRODUCED A WORKING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE LEAGUE OF RED CROSS SOCIETIES AND THE ICRC TO COVER THEIR JOINT OPERATION IN POLAND. THE ICRC ARE AS EXPECTED TO TAKE THE LEAD. THE NEW PRESIDENT OF THE LEAGUE, DE LA MATA, ELECTED AT MANILA IN NOVEMBER, HAD BEEN CONSULTED EXTENSIVELY ON THE TELEPHONE TO MADRID. THE NEXT STEP WOULD NOW BE A JOINT LEAGUE/ICRC VISIT TO WARSAW STARTING ON 28 DECEMBER. THE LEAGUE WOULD BE REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL-ELECT, HOEGH OF THE NORWEGIAN RED CROSS AND STROH, AND THE ICRC BY RUDOLPH JACKLI, A COMMITTEE MEMBER OF THE ICRC ITSELF, AND ALSO MEMBER OF ITS EXECUTIVE COUNCIL.

2. HOCKE SAID THAT SCHMIDT AND RUSSBACH (WARSAW TELNO 002) HAD RETURNED TO GENEVA ON 23 DECEMBER. THEIR NEWS WAS ENCOURAGING. ALL THEIR POLISH INTERLOCUTORS AT ALL LEVELS HAD READILY AGREED TO DISCUSS PROTECTION PROBLEMS. ONE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTY, HOWEVER, IN LOOKING TO THE FUTURE WAS THAT RED CROSS VISITORS TO POLAND SO FAR HAD CONCENTRATED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON WARSAW. THIS WAS BEING CORRECTED: ONE OF RUSSBACH'S FELLOW DOCTORS HAD LEFT GENEVA ON 23 DECEMBER TO VISIT HOSPITALS ACROSS THE COUNTRY AND ASSESS THEIR NEEDS.

3. ASKED ABOUT FINANCE, HOCKE SAID THAT THE LEAGUE APPEAL FOR SF 20 MILLION OVER A FOUR-MONTH PERIOD SHOULD HOLD THE POSITION IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THE ICRC WOULD CONSIDER THEIR OWN NEEDS IN TEN DAYS OR TWO WEEKS FROM NOW. HE ADDED THAT THE RED CROSS COULD NOT YET ABSORB UNLIMITED MONEY OR SUPPLIES. THE 8,000 TONNES OF MEAT OFFERED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COULD NOT POSSIBLY BE DISTRIBUTED PROPERLY IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES: THAT IS TO SAY, IT COULD BE DISTRIBUTED BUT WITHOUT ANY CONTROL. THE POLISH RED CROSS WAS DOING WELL BUT WAS UNDER VERY HEAVY PRESSURE.

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4. I ALSO SPOKE SEPARATELY TO HENRIK BEER, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE. HE CONFIRMED THE SUBSTANCE OF ABOVE. HIS OVER-RIDING CONCERN IS TO SEE SUPPLIES OF MUCH NEEDED FOOD AID DELIVERED SAFELY. HE EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN THAT THERE SHOULD NOT BE UNDUE EMPHASIS ON THE PROTECTION ASPECT LEAST OF ALL IN PUBLIC. THERE IS WEIGHT IN THIS VIEW.

5. FCO PLEASE REPEAT MY TEL UNDER REFERENCE TO UKDEL NATO.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

CORRECTION IN PARA 2 LINE 2 SHOULD READ ...THEIR NEWS WAS ENCOURAGING

MARSHALL

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1043 OF 24TH DECEMBER 1981

FROM MELHUIH.

MYTEL NO 998 : MISKIW.

1. WE RECEIVED NOTIFICATION FROM THE MFA YESTERDAY EVENING THAT APPROVAL HAS BEEN GIVEN FOR CONSULAR ACCESS TO MISKIW. WE WERE ASKED TO ARRANGE THE VISIT THROUGH THE PROCURATOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE. DESPITE INTENSIVE EFFORTS THIS MORNING TO SET UP A VISIT FOR TODAY, WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DO SO. THE REASON GIVEN BY THE PROCURATOR GENERAL'S OFFICE IS THAT IT IS TOO NEAR THE CHRISTMAS BREAK TO MAKE IT ADMINISTRATIVELY POSSIBLE. WE HAVE BEEN PROMISED THAT A VISIT WILL BE ARRANGED FOR HM CONSUL TO SEE MISKIW ON MONDAY MORNING, 28 DECEMBER.

2. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONING FROM HM CONSUL, THE PROCURATOR GAVE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION :-

A) THE PROSECUTION'S CASE IS NOW ALMOST COMPLETE AND THEY HOPE TO BRING MISKIW TO TRIAL ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF JANUARY (THIS IS VERY QUICK IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND IS A MEASURE OF THE POLISH AUTHORITIES DESIRE TO GET SUCH CASES INVOLVING FOREIGNERS OUT OF THE WAY AS SPEEDILY AS POSSIBLE).

B) A DECISION ON WHETHER TO PROCEED UNDER MARTIAL OR CIVIL LAW WILL BE TAKEN BY THE COURT (NOT THE PROCURATOR - GENERAL).

C) IF MISKIW IS DEALT WITH UNDER MARTIAL LAW HE FACES A MINIMUM SENTENCE OF 3 YEARS WITH NO APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE (HE COULD HOWEVER ENTER AN APPEAL FOR CLEMENCY).

D) IF HE IS DEALT WITH UNDER CIVIL LAW, ANY PENALTIES IMPOSED WOULD BE LESS SEVERE, PERHAPS INVOLVING A SUSPENDED SENTENCE ONLY.

E) HE IS ENTITLED TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND HAS BEEN ADVISED OF HIS RIGHTS IN THIS RESPECT (HM CONSUL WILL DISCUSS THIS WITH HIM ON MONDAY).

3. I SPOKE ALSO TO NOWONYTA, HEAD OF DEPARTMENT IV IN THE MFA THIS MORNING SEEKING HIS HELP AND STRESSING THE URGENCY OF CONSULAR ACCESS. HE WAS COOPERATING BUT OFFERED NO HOPE OF A MEETING EARLIER THAN MONDAY.

JAMES
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PS/LPS
PS/PLS
MR BULLARD
MR FERLUSON
MR ADAMS



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 December 1981

Dear Willie,

Poland: Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Ten,
30 December

I attach a copy of the draft press line which we propose to use to announce the meeting of next week's Foreign Ministers Meeting. Subject to the Prime Minister's views, and to any unexpected developments in replies from our Partners (the deadline for which is noon today), we propose to make the announcement at the 12.30 Press Conference today.

I am copying this letter to John Kerr in the Treasury, John Rhodes in the Department of Trade and to David Wright in the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever.

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

Willie Rickett Esq
10 Downing Street

NOTE TO PRESS OFFICERS

POLAND: PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEECH

ON THE RECORD IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS

We welcome President Reagan's television address which, in large measure, accords with our own views.

General

Reagan: "They have answered the storms of liberty with brute force, killings, mass arrests and the setting up of concentration camps."

LPS, HoC, 22 December: "The long night threatens to fall once again in Poland. Martial law has been declared. A state of emergency has been imposed. There is a curfew: Civil liberties are suspended: trades union activity is banned. There have been thousands of arrests ..."

Concern that food aid should reach the people

Reagan: "We will continue the shipment of food through private humanitarian channels only so long as we know that the Polish people themselves receive the food ... The Administration has suspended all Government sponsored shipments of agricultural and dairy products to the Polish Government ... until we receive absolute assurances that distribution of these products is monitored and guaranteed by independent agencies.

Carrington, Radio 4, 21 December: "We must make quite sure that any more food aid which we give gets to the Polish people."

PM, HoC, 22 December: "We will make strenuous efforts to see that any future deliveries of food get to the people of Poland."

LPS, HoC, 22 December: 'We are considering how we can ensure that supplies of food are distributed to those Poles who most need them.'

Following the meeting of Community Ambassadors in Brussels, to which the LPS referred in his speech, the Presidency in Warsaw is seeking firm assurances from the Polish Authorities about the distribution of supplies, before any new decisions on Community food aid can be taken.

Credit

Reagan: 'We have halted the renewal of the Export-Import Bank's line of export credit insurance to the Polish Government.'

Decisions on export credit for 1982 are not imminent, ^{As} the Prime Minister said in the House on 22 December; ~~we~~ We shall decide in concert with our partners and allies whether to renew such credit ~~we~~.

(If pressed): Current export credit has not been suspended but there is a relatively small sum remaining for 1981 - in fact £23 million. *In view of restrictions on transport placed by the Polish authorities, it is very unlikely that exports will be able to proceed in current circumstances.*

Civil aviation

Reagan: 'We will suspend Polish civil aviation privileges in the US.'

There are no scheduled flights at present between Poland and Britain.
We shall of course consider this but ~~LOT~~ ^{Chin} flights to London have performed a particularly valuable service in recent days. They have been the only flights out of Poland by which stranded foreigners could leave the country.

Fishing rights

Reagan: 'We are suspending the right of Poland's fishing fleet to operate in American waters.'

This is of course a Community matter. But in point of fact the Poles do not have any fishing rights in Community waters so the question of parallel action in this field does not arise.

High technology

Reagan: 'We are proposing to our allies the further restriction of high technology exports to Poland.'

We are already examining this proposal, ~~in consultation with our allies.~~ In current circumstances, Polish ^{capacity} activity to purchase high technology is in any case limited.

No business as usual

Reagan: 'If the outrages in Poland do not cease we cannot and will not conduct business as usual with the perpetrators and those who aid and abet them.'

Carrington, Radio 4, 21 December: 'I don't believe you can have ordinary relations when the Polish Government is engaged in such repression.'

We have made it very clear to the Polish Authorities both in London and in Warsaw that the whole range of our relationships will depend upon the honouring of General Jaruleski's promises.

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Role of the Soviet Union

Reagan: 'Public and secret pressure from the Soviet Union'... urging President Brezhnev to permit the restoration of human rights in Poland'

Carrington, Radio 4, 21 December: 'These events could not have taken place without the knowledge and agreement of the Soviet Union.'

The President imposed no new measures in the field of US/Soviet

- 4 -

relations. This question is already the subject of consultation in the alliances.

Consultations on all these matters will continue throughout the holiday period (reference to informal meeting of the Ten on 30 December).

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24 December 1981

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FM PARIS 241635Z DEC 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1151 OF 23 DECEMBER

INFO SAVING WARSAW, BONN, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, HM CONSULS
GENERAL FRANCE (PASSED BY PARIS).

MY TEL NO 1146: FRENCH REACTIONS TO THE POLISH CRISIS

1. IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON 23 DECEMBER THE FRENCH PRIME MINISTER MADE A STATEMENT TO MARK THE END OF THE CURRENT PARLIAMENTARY SESSION. HE DEVOTED MOST OF IT TO THE POLISH CRISIS. THERE HAD BEEN A BROAD EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN POLAND AT THE USUAL WEEKLY COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING IN THE MORNING. AFTER THE MEETING THE SECRETARY GENERAL AT THE ELYSEE, M. BEREGOVY, SAID THAT " NUMEROUS MINISTERS OF DIFFERENT TENDENCIES AND AFFILIATIONS HAD SPOKEN". PRESIDENT MITTERRAND HAD DECLARED THAT WHEREVER LIBERTY WAS IN DANGER FRANCE'S VOICE MUST BE HEARD AND THAT THE SITUATION NEEDED TO BE ASSESSED WITH DETERMINATION AND SANG FROID.
2. M. MAUROY'S SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MARKED AN EVOLUTION IN THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE. IN IT, RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE POLISH CRISIS WAS PINNED ON THE SOVIET UNION (WITH A PEDIGREE GOING BACK TO YALTA) ALTHOUGH M. MAUROY DREW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN OPPRESSION IN POLAND BY THE POLISH ARMY AND OPPRESSION BY DIRECT SOVIET INTERVENTION. THIS DISTINCTION HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY FRENCH POLICY, BUT IT DID NOT MEAN THAT FRANCE SHOULD DO NOTHING. INDEED FRANCE HAD ALREADY DONE MORE THAN OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES: THE UK AND THE FRG HAD BEEN VERY RESERVED. THE UK IN PARTICULAR WAS SINGLED OUT FOR NOT HAVING SUPPORTED THE FRENCH PROPOSAL TO HAVE AN ILO DELEGATION SENT TO POLAND. IN FUTURE, FRENCH POLICY WOULD USE THE HELSINKI AGREEMENTS, PARTICULARLY THE THIRD BASKET, AND WOULD NOT GO BACK TO AMDRID JUST TO PLAY A WALK-ON PART.
3. M. MAURY' WORDS WERE WELL RECEIVED BY MOST OF THE ASSEMBLY BUT THE COMMUNIST DEPUTIES REMAINED SILENT. FOR ITS PART THE COMMUNIST PARTY (PCF) HAS PUBLISHED A LETTER FROM M. MARCHAIS TO GENERAL JARUZELSKI DATED 23 DECEMBER. THIS CLAIMS THAT THE PARTY LINE HAS FROM THE BEGINNING BEEN TO HELP POLAND TO AVOID CIVIL WAR AND EXTERNAL INTERVENTION, BUT IT ADDS A NEW ELEMENT BY REGRETTING THE SUSPENSION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES, THE ARRESTS AND THE INTERNMENTS IN POLAND. M. MARCHAIS ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE PCF HAS FOUND ITSELF IN A DIFFICULT POSITION IN FRANCE BY NOT JOINING IN THE CHORUS OF ABUSE AGAINST THE POLISH GOVERNMENT AND EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT GENERAL JARUZELSKI WILL STICK TO HIS PROMISE TO WITHDRAW THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND THAT HE WILL INCLUDE THE ' HEALTHY WORKER ELEMENT OF SOLIDARITY' WHEN RECONSTRUCTING THE NATION.

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4. PRESS COMMENT IS PROBABLY RIGHT IN SAYING THAT THE MARCHAIS LETTER, BY REDUCING THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE PCF AND THE GOVERNMENT, WAS THE LEAST THE PCF COULD DO TO EASE THE POSITION OF THE COMMUNIST MINISTERS IN THE GOVERNMENT. IN TURNING ITS FIRE ON THE USSR, THE GOVERNMENT HAS ON THE ONE HAND MET CRITICISMS THAT IT WAS AFRAID TO IDENTIFY THE REAL CULPRIT WHILE ON THE OTHER HAND LEAVING ITS APPRECIATION OF ACTUAL EVENTS IN POLAND A BIT VAGUE SO THAT THE COMMUNIST SHIFT OF POSITION WAS MADE A LITTLE EASIER.

5. THE REACTION TO EVENTS OF OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS IS STILL FOUND BY FRENCH COMMENTATORS TO BE INADEQUATE. THE TEN ARE SAID TO BE TRAILING BEHIND FRANCE AND THEIR DEMARCHE IN WARSAW IS DESCRIBED IN THE PRESS AS NOT NEARLY FIRM ENOUGH

THE FRG REMAINS A TARGET AND THERE ARE OCCASIONAL REFERENCES TO WHAT IS DESCRIBED AS BRITAIN'S SILENCE. WESTERN BANKS ARE SCORNFULLY ATTACKED IN THE LEFT-WING PRESS FOR WANTING STABILISATION IN POLAND RATHER THAN LIBERTY. WHILE LE MATIN (SOCIALIST DAILY) IS NOW HAPPIER WITH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S POSITION, AN EDITORIAL SAYS THAT HARD WORDS WILL HAVE TO BE PAID FOR ONE DAY BY HARD DEEDS. THE LEADERS OF THE SOCIALIST TRADE UNION FEDERATION (CFDT) AND THE FORCE OUVRIERE HAVE, LIKE M. JOBET, MINISTER OF STATE AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN TRADE, TALKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ABROGATING THE FINAL ACT OF HELSINKI. ALL THE MAIN TRADE UNION FEDERATIONS EXCEPT THE COMMUNIST CGT HAVE TOLD PRESIDENT MITTERRAND THEY WANT TO SEND A DELEGATION TO WARSAW.

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FM WARSAW 231730Z DEC

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1031 OF 23RD DECEMBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW

INFO SAVING: EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE, BELGRADE, BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST,
SOFIA, BONN AND PARIS.

FROM MELHUI SH.

MEMBERSHIP OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL.

1. THE POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL IS A QUESTION THAT HAS BEEN VEXING WESTERN OBSERVERS HERE SINCE ITS CREATION. SOME BELIEVE THAT JARUZELSKI ACTED TO FORESTALL SOVIET INTERVENTION AND SEE THE POLISH ARMY AS A GUARANTOR OF NATIONAL TRADITIONS. OTHERS SEE JARUZELSKI AND THE ARMY ACTING AS SOVIET SURROGATES AND HIGHLIGHT THE MOSCOW ORIENTATION OF SENIOR OFFICERS.

2. SENIOR POLISH GENERALS HAVE SELDOM MADE THEMSELVES AVAILABLE TO WESTERN DEFENCE ATTACHES, AND MUCH OF WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT THEM IS BASED ON HEARSAY. NEVERTHELESS, RESEARCH BY OUR DEFENCE ATTACHE AMONG HIS COLLEAGUES HAS REVEALED SOME INTERESTING INFORMATION ON SOME OF THE 21 MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.

3. ALL THOSE WHOSE DATES OF BIRTH WE KNOW (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE COSMONAUT COLONEL HERMASZEWUSKI) ARE AGED BETWEEN 55 AND 60. AT LEAST THE TOP FOUR SERVED IN THE POLISH ARMED FORCES RAISED IN THE SOVIET UNION DURING THE WAR, AND SUBSEQUENTLY TOOK PART IN OPERATIONS AGAINST ANTI-COMMUNIST PARTISANS BETWEEN 1945-47. AT LEAST EIGHT ARE GRADUATES OF SOVIET STAFF COLLEGES. AS LEAST TEN HAVE HELD POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS DURING THEIR CAREERS. THREE (SIWICKI, MOLCZYK AND RAPACEWICZ) WERE COMMANDERS OF THE SILESIAN DISTRICT IN GIEREK'S TIME. AND JAROSZ WAS COMMANDER OF THE KRAKOW-BASED AIRBORNE DIVISION. THESE PROBABLY OWE THEIR SWIFT RISE TO GIEREK. NOW THEY UNDOUBTEDLY OWE LOYALTY TO JARUZELSKI AND SIWICKI. THE CAREERS OF ALL THE SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL HAVE PROSPERED SINCE JARUZELSKI BECAME MINISTER OF DEFENCE IN 1968 AND SIWICKI CHIEF OF STAFF IN 1973. THEY ARE IN FACT JARUZELSKI'S MEN.

4. WE KNOW ENOUGH OF JARUZELSKI TO BE ABLE TO DESCRIBE HIM AS A COMMITTED COMMUNIST, A MAN WHO HAS BROKEN WITH HIS FAMILY FOR HIS POLITICAL BELIEFS (THEY OSTRACIZE HIM BECAUSE HIS FATHER WAS KILLED BY THE RUSSIANS AND THEY FEEL THAT HE SHOULD NOT BE SO COMMITTED TO HIS FATHERS KILLERS). HIS REPUTATION FOR PRAGMATISM, BASED ON HIS REFUSAL TO ALLOW TROOPS TO FIRE ON WORKERS IN 1970 AND 1980, DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN HE IS A MODERATE. CERTAINLY, WHEN HE MET HM AMBASSADOR THIS SUMMER, HE DID NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF A MAN WHO HAD ANY TIME OR SYMPATHY FOR THE LIBERAL CURRENTS LOOSE IN SOLIDARITY. HIS DEPUTY, SIWICKI, WHOM MANY PEOPLE SEE AS THE STRONG MAN OF THE COUNCIL, HAS FAMILY CONNECTIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION. HE JOINED THE SOVIET ARMY AT THE AGE OF SEVENTEEN, HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN THE PARTY SINCE 1944 AND IS THOUGHT TO BE AN UNRESTRAINED ADMIRER OF THE SOVIET UNION. MOLCZYK TOO HAS FAMILY CONNECTIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION.

5. WE HAVE ALSO HEARD FROM THE BBC CORRESPONDENT THAT OLIWA, WHO OCCUPIES A POSITION OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN THE OPERATIONAL COMMAND CHAIN, AND WHO HAS HELD MANY POLITICAL POSTS, IS REGARDED AS VERY CLOSE TO MOSCOW. SEBASTIAN'S INFORMANT WENT SO FAR AS TO DESCRIBE HIM AS "MOSCOW'S MAN ON THE MILITARY COUNCIL" AND TO SAY THAT OLIWA WOULD SOMETIMES GIVE JARUZELSKI ORDERS THAT CAME

DESCRIBE HIM AS "MOSCOW'S MAN ON THE MILITARY COUNCIL" AND TO SAY THAT OLIWA WOULD SOMETIMES GIVE JARUZELSKI ORDERS THAT CAME DIRECT FROM THE RUSSIANS. WE HAVE NO WAY OF CONFIRMING THIS STORY AT PRESENT.

6. THE OMISSION FROM THE MARTIAL COUNCIL OF THE SECOND SENIOR GENERAL URBANOWICZ, IS SIGNIFICANT. HE TOO HAS SOVIET MILITARY CONNECTIONS, BUT HE IS SAID, POLITICALLY, TO BE CLOSE TO OLSZOWSKI. IF THE RUMOURS OF A SPLIT BETWEEN OLSZOWSKI AND JARUZELSKI OVER THE EVENTS OF THE PAST FORTNIGHT HAVE ANY FOUNDATION IN FACT, IT MAY BE THAT URBANOWICZ'S OMISSION FROM THE COUNCIL IS RELATED TO THIS.

7. OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE PERSONALITIES ON THE COUNCIL IS, INEVITABLY THIN. NEVERTHELESS, TAKING THE EVIDENCE OF STAFF TRAINING, WAR TIME SERVICE WITH THE SOVIET FORCES PREDOMINANCE OF POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS IN THEIR CAREERS AND LONG TERM PARTY MEMBERSHIP TOGETHER, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE MARTIAL COUNCIL REPRESENTS AN ORTHODOX AND UNQUESTIONING LINE OF ADHERENCE TO THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW. AS PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS AND, AFTER A FASHION, PATRIOTS, THE MEMBERS OF THE MARTIAL COUNCIL NO DOUBT PREFER TO SEE THEIR ARMY TAKE ACTION AGAINST SOLIDARITY RATHER THAN THAT OF THE GREAT ALLY. BUT, IF INCREASED LOCAL OPPOSITION NECESSITATED SOVIET "FRATERNAL ASSISTANCE", I DOUBT IF THERE WOULD BE MANY RESIGNATIONS FROM THE NATIONAL COUNCIL.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 231715Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1618 OF 23 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO WASHINGTON AND PARIS
PRIORITY WARSAW MOSCOW AND BONN.

MY TEL NO 1614: POLAND.

1. I SPOKE TO MRS KIRKPATRICK ON THE TELEPHONE THIS MORNING (23 DECEMBER) JUST BEFORE SHE WENT INTO THE NSC MEETING. I MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS.
2. FIRST, I SAID THAT, IN OUR COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND WITHOUT HAVING HAD TIME TO DO DETAILED RESEARCH, THE QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY HAD NEVER BEEN BROUGHT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. TO DO SO WOULD CREATE A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT WHICH THE OTHER SIDE COULD USE AGAINST THE WEST IN A SERIES OF CONTEXTS SUCH AS CHILE, GUATEMALA, EL SALVADOR AND EVEN NORTHERN IRELAND. WE HAD ALWAYS CONSIDERED THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WAS THE RIGHT FORUM FOR CONSIDERATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS. BY THIS TOKEN, WE HAD NOT EVEN BROUGHT AMIN OR POL POT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ALTHOUGH THEIR BEHAVIOUR HAD DEMONSTRABLY CONSTITUTED A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, VIZ THE ULTIMATE TANZANIAN AND VIETNAMESE INVASIONS.
3. SECONDLY, ARISING OUT OF THE FIRST POINT, WE THOUGH THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD DO BETTER, IF THEY FELT THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE

ACTION, TO ADDRESS THEMSELVES TO THE ASSEMBLY. THE 36TH REGULAR SESSION WAS STILL OPEN. HENCE, UNDER RULE 15 OF THE GA RULES OF PROCEDURE, THERE WAS NOTHING TO STOP THEM ADDRESSING A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY ASKING FOR THE INSCRIPTION ON THE AGENDA OF AN URGENT ADDITIONAL ITEM - HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLAND. THEY COULD ENCLOSE AN EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM AND EVEN A DRAFT RESOLUTION IF THEY SO WISHED, BOTH OF WHICH THEY COULD PUBLICISE WIDELY. KITTANI WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO CALL THE GENERAL COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER THE PROPOSAL. I WAS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE THE VOTES IN THE GENERAL COMMITTEE, BUT THE COMMITTEE WOULD STILL HAVE TO REPORT TO THE PLENARY. THIS WOULD MEAN THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A PLENARY SESSION DURING WHICH THE WHOLE QUESTION COULD BE AIRED, EVEN IF THE ULTIMATE PLENARY VOTE ON INSCRIPTION WENT AGAINST THE AMERICANS. THERE WERE PLENTY OF PRECEDENTS EG THE ANNUAL DEBATE ON CAMBODIAN CREDENTIALS, FOR INTRODUCING QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE INTO PROCEDURAL DEBATES.

4. TO SUM UP, I SAID THAT THIS COURSE WOULD AVOID CREATING A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT AND WOULD IN PRACTICE GIVE THE AMERICANS A WIDER FORUM THAN THAT PROVIDED BY A UNSUCCESSFUL PROCEDURAL ROUND IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. EVEN THOUGH WE LOST IN THE ASSEMBLY, WE WOULD STILL BE FREE TO BRING THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE POLISH CRISIS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS SOON AS THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF OVERT SOVIET INTERVENTION.

5. MRS KIRKPATRICK SAID THAT SHE WAS MOST GRATEFUL FOR THESE VIEWS WHICH MADE A GREAT DEAL OF SENSE TO HER. THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT COME TO A FINAL DECISION (CONTRARY TO WHAT SHE HAD TOLD ME YESTERDAY EVENING) AND WAS STILL EXAMINING ALL OPTIONS. SHE WOULD KEEP IN TOUCH WITH ME.

6. WE HAD PREVIOUSLY GONE OVER ALL THIS GROUND WITH ADELMAN WHO HAD RELAYED IT TO MRS KIRKPATRICK.

7. SINCE THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED, I HAVE SPOKEN TO LEPRETTE (FRANCE). I TOLD HIM WHAT I HAD SAID TO MRS KIRKPATRICK. HE SAID THAT HE ENTIRELY AGREED, AND WOULD SPEAK TO HER ACCORDINGLY IF HE COULD GET IN TOUCH WITH HER LATER IN THE DAY. WHEN SHE HAD SPOKEN TO HIM LAST NIGHT, HE HAD NOT GIVEN ADVICE. HE HAD CONFINED HIMSELF TO REPORTING TO PARIS IN THE LIGHT OF THE EXPECTED MESSAGE FROM HAIG TO CHEYSSON. HE HAD NOT RECEIVED A REPLY BUT HAD HEARD TODAY THAT CHEYSSON HAD BEEN QUESTIONED BY A REPORTER THIS MORNING ON HIS WAY TO A CABINET MEETING: HE HAD SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS THE APPROPRIATE ORGAN TO CONSIDER POLAND IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

8. LEPRETTE ALSO SAID THAT WALDHEIM (ON WHOM HE HAD PAID HIS FAREWELL CALL THIS MORNING) SHARED OUR VIEWS AND WAS VERY DOUBTFUL WHETHER THERE WERE NINE VOTES FOR ADOPTION OF AN AGENDA ON POLAND IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

PARSONS

POLAND: ADVANCE COPIES

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MR FERGUSSON
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FM WASHINGTON 240115Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3915 OF 23 DECEMBER 1981,

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS, WARSAW, MOSCOW,
INFO PRIORITY ROME, OSLO, COPENHAGEN, BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE.

MY TELNO 3909 (NOT TO ALL): POLAND

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THE N S C DECIDED YESTERDAY NOT TO TAKE ANY DECISIONS IN RELATION TO THE MULTI-LATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AT PRESENT UNDER WAY WITH THE SOVIET UNION I E, I N F, M B F R AND THE C S C E. IN I N F THE DISPOSITION WOULD BE TO RESUME AS PLANNED IN JANUARY SUBJECT TO THE CONTINGENCIES IN MY T U R. M B F R HAD BEEN MORE OR LESS STATIC FOR SOME TIME. THE MAIN DEBATE WOULD BE CONCENTRATED ON THE C S C E. THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT WAS DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO EVENTS IN POLAND. THERE WERE MANY IN THE ADMINISTRATION (AND NOT ONLY IN THE PENTAGON) AS WELL AS OUTSIDE IT WHO FELT THAT IT WOULD BE ABERRANT TO PROCEED AS IF NOTHING HAD HAPPENED IN POLAND.

2. WE EMPHASISED THAT WHATEVER DECISIONS WERE TAKEN IN RELATION TO THE CSCE SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO CAREFUL DELIBERATION WITH THE ALLIES

NOTHING HAD HAPPENED IN POLAND.

2. WE EMPHASISED THAT WHATEVER DECISIONS WERE TAKEN IN RELATION TO THE CSCE SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO CAREFUL DELIBERATION WITH THE ALLIES OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID THAT ON THIS AS ON ALL OTHER POINTS HAIG HAS BEEN EMPHASISING STRONGLY IN THE NSC THE NEED FOR ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT AND THE AVOIDANCE OF UNILATERAL DECISIONS WHICH COULD BE SELF-DEFEATING. THERE WERE THOSE WHO FELT THAT IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO RESUME THE C S C E AS PLANNED ON 9 FEBRUARY UNLESS THERE HAD BEEN AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION IN POLAND; THOSE WHO CONSIDERED THAT THE BEST COURSE WOULD BE TO RESUME THE MEETING AS PLANNED, MAKE CLEAR WESTERN VIEWS ON THE POLISH SITUATION, AND THEN SUSPEND THE CONFERENCE BY WITHDRAWING FROM IT FOR SOME TIME; AND THOSE WHO CONSIDERED THAT IT MIGHT BE INDISPENSABLE IN TERMS OF THE ALLIANCE TO CONTINUE WITH THE MEETINGS AS PLANNED FROM 9 FEBRUARY.

3. IT IS CLEAR THAT AN ACTIVE DEBATE IS ALSO TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION AS TO WHETHER THE HAIG/GROMYKO MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 26/27 JANUARY SHOULD GO AHEAD AS PLANNED. THE DISPOSITION IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS TO CONSIDER THAT IT SHOULD, THOUGH HAIG WILL BE BOUND TO TAKE A VERY FIRM LINE ABOUT POLAND. IT IS THOUGHT DOUBTFUL IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES IF IT WILL BE POSSIBLE, AS HAIG HAD INTENDED, TO USE THAT MEETING TO SET A DATE FOR THE OPENING OF THE S T A R T TALKS, THOUGH OUR STATE DEPARTMENT CONTACTS HAVE COMMENTED THAT THIS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT THE EVENTUAL OPENING OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE DELAYED BEYOND THE SPRING. WORK ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION IN S T A R T IS PROCEEDING ACTIVELY. BUT THIS QUESTION, AMONG OTHERS, WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIO IN REAGAN'S MESSAGE TO BREZHNEV THAT U S/SOVIET RELATIONS ACROSS THE BOARD WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE MOVEMENT OR LACK OF IT TOWARDS SOME MEASURE^E OF CONCILIATION IN POLAND.

4. THE STATE DEPARTMENT TELLS US THAT, IN RELATION TO THE ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS, THERE HAS BEEN SATISFACTION HERE AT THE CONSULTATIONS WITH US AND THE FIRM ATTITUDE TAKEN BY THE ITALIANS (WHO INDICATED TO EAGLEBURGER THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO JOIN IN SANCTIONS IF OTHERS DID SO), AND BY THE FRENCH. GENSCHER MADE IT CLEAR TO EAGLEBURGER THAT THE GERMANS HAD NO STOMACH FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. COMPERT'S CONSULTATIONS WITH THE NORWEGIANS, DANES AND DUTCH ARE SAID TO HAVE SHOWN A DESIRE TO CONTINUE WITH BUSINESS MUCH AS USUAL.

HENDERSON.

POLAND: ADVANCE COPIES

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FM WASHINGTON 232000Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3909 OF 23 DECEMBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, BONN, PRIORITY PARIS, WARSAW, MOSCOW.

POLAND AND ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

1. SINCE THERE WAS STILL SOME UNCERTAINTY HERE YESTERDAY ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTENTIONS OVER THE GENEVA TNF NEGOTIATIONS, WE SPOKE TO ROSTOW'S OFFICE POINTING OUT THAT A DECISION TO SUSPEND THOSE NEGOTIATIONS IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE LIABLE TO SERVE SOVIET INTERESTS. ROSTOW HAS SENT US A MESSAGE THAT HE RECOMMENDED STRONGLY TO THE PRESIDENT YESTERDAY THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD CONTINUE. THIS WAS AGREED IN THE NSC AND ANNOUNCED BY MEESE (MY TELNO 3908). THIS WILL BE SUBJECT TO RECONSIDERATION IF THERE IS EXTENSIVE BLOOD-SHED IN POLAND; OR DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION.

HENDERSON

Prime Minister
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TO PRIORITY BONN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 584 OF 23 DEC
INFO PRIORITY WARSAW, PARIS, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO

POLAND

1. THE FRG AMBASSADOR CALLED ON THE LPS TODAY FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE POLISH CRISIS PRIOR TO THE HOLIDAY PERIOD. LORD TREFGARNE WAS ALSO PRESENT. THE DISCUSSION COVERED THE FOLLOWING POINTS.

PUBLIC OPINION

2. THE LPS SAID THAT THE BEST GUIDE TO UK PUBLIC OPINION WAS LAST NIGHT'S COMMONS DEBATE WHEN MR HEALEY HAD MADE A VERY SENSIBLE SPEECH. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE SOME WHO THOUGHT WE SHOULD GIVE NOTHING TO A REPRESSIVE REGIME, THE GENERAL MOOD OF THE HOUSE WAS THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO CONTINUE TO TRY TO GET FOOD THROUGH WHILE MAINTAINING PRESSURE ON THE REGIME TO LIFT ITS RESTRICTIVE MEASURES.

3. RUFUS SAID THAT THIS MIRRORED THE POSITION IN THE FRG WHERE THE BUNDESTAG HAD CONDEMNED POLISH REPRESSION, AND INSISTED UPON BEING CONSULTED REGARDING ANY NEW CREDIT BUT HAD ENDORSED THE CONTINUANCE OF CURRENT ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. THE GERMAN INFORMATION WAS THAT HUMANITARIAN HELP VIA THE RED CROSS WAS GENERALLY GETTING THROUGH TO THE RIGHT PEOPLE.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

4. RUFUS SAID THESE WOULD BE PREMATURE. THE FRG SAW THE CRACK-DOWN ESSENTIALLY AS A POLISH (AS OPPOSED TO A RUSSIAN) OPERATION AND WE SHOULD KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON JARUZELSKI TO LIVE UP TO HIS PROMISES TO PRESERVE THE REFORMS. WE MUST KEEP ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN RESERVE FOR USE IN THE EVENT OF A SOVIET INTERVENTION. THERE MIGHT BE A CASE FOR WARNING MOSCOW OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD PROVOKE SANCTIONS. THE

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LPS AGREED THAT WE DID NOT WISH TO PREJUDICE THE LAST CHANCE OF PRESERVING THE POLISH REFOS. WE COULD AFFORD TO WAIT UNTIL JANUARY TO SEE WHETHER THE POLES LIVED UP TO THEIR ASSURANCES, BUT IF THERE WERE NO SIGNS OF A LET-UP, WE SHOULD HAVE TO THINK AGAIN.

MINISTERIAL EXCHANGES

5. THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT THE CHANNELS FOR MINISTERIAL CONSULTATION MUST BE KEPT OPEN DURING THE HOLIDAY PERIOD. RUHFUS SUGGESTED THAT THE US SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN ANY MINISTERIAL MEETINGS.

PRESIDENCY DEMARCHE

6. LORD TREFGARNE DESCRIBED MR CZYRE'S RECEPTION OF THE PRESIDENCY DEMARCHE IN WARSAW. RUHFUS SAID THIS CORRESPONDED CLOSELY TO THE REACTION OF THE POLISH CHARGE IN BONN WHEN HERR GENSCHER HAD HANDED HIM A RESOLUTION BY THE BUNDESTAG. HE WAS INCLINED TO ACCEPT THAT CZYREK'S ASSURANCES WERE MADE IN GOOD FAITH.

CATHOLIC CHURCH

7. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE POPE IN PARTICULAR HAD A KEY ROLE TO PLAY. THE LPS COMMENTED THAT GLEMP'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION HAD BEEN LESS FORCEFUL THAN EXPECTED.

CSCE

8. RUHFUS STRESSED THAT CSCE SHOULD RESUME IN MID-FEBRUARY, AS PLANNED. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE MADRID CONFERENCE COULD BE USEFUL IN MAINTAINING BRIDGES AND IN HELPING TO FOCUS ATTENTION UPON POLAND AFTER THE INITIAL SHOCK HAD WORN OFF.

SUMMING UP

9. IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO MAJOR DIFFERENCE IN OUR POSITIONS. THE LPS THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE SITUATION DURING THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO KEEP IN LINE WITH THE AMERICANS AND TO ENSURE THAT NOTHING WAS DONE TO ENCOURAGE THE POLISH PEOPLE TO MAKE A QUIXOTIC STAND IN THE EXPECTATION OF RECEIVING WESTERN SUPPORT.

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FM FOO 232050Z DEC 81

TO FLASH ATHENS

TEL NO 329 OF 23 DECEMBER 1981

AND TO FLASH ALL OTHER EC POSTS UKREP BRX

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW WARSAW

MIPT PARA 6 REFERS.

SPECIAL INFORMAL MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS: 30 DECEMBER.

1. LORD CARRINGTON INVITES HIS COLLEAGUES AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION TO A SPECIAL INFORMAL MEETING ON 30 DECEMBER TO DISCUSS POLAND. A SUGGESTED AGENDA WILL FOLLOW.

TIME AND PLACE

2. THE MEETING WILL BE HELD IN THE MUSIC ROOM AT LANCASTER HOUSE, BEGINNING AT 1030 GMT THE PRESIDENCY ENVISAGES THE MEETING ENDING BETWEEN 1700 AND 1800 HOURS GMT.

PARTICIPATION

3. ATTENDANCE AT THE MEETING WILL BE RESTRICTED TO FOREIGN MINISTERS AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION PLUS TWO PER DELEGATION. IN ADDITION, SINCE THERE WILL BE NO SIMULTANEOUS INTERPRETATION PROVIDED, MINISTERS ARE FREE ALSO TO BRING PERSONAL INTERPRETER.

MEALS

4. ALL PARTICIPANTS ARE INVITED TO LUNCHEON AT LANCASTER HOUSE.

TRANSPORT

5. THE PRESIDENCY WILL PROVIDE ONE CAR PER DELEGATION AND PRESIDENCY PROTOCOL OFFICERS WILL GREET MINISTERS AT AIRPORTS.

6. THE PRESIDENCY WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF PARTNERS AND THE COMMISSION WOULD PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE:

A. THE NAMES OF THE 3 MEMBERS OF THEIR DELEGATIONS. IN ORDER FOR PASSES TO BE PREPARED, IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF THESE NAMES COULD BE SUPPLIED BEFORE THE CHRISTMAS HOLIDAY PERIOD BEGINS, I.E. IN THE AFTERNOON OF 24 DECEMBER, BUT ANYWAY NOT LATER THAN MIDDAY ON 29 DECEMBER:

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- B. THE NAMES, WHERE APPROPRIATE, OF ANY ACCOMPANYING PERSONAL INTERPRETERS:
- C. THE NAMES OF ANY ACCOMPANYING SECURITY OFFICERS:
- D. THE TIME AND PLACE OF ARRIVAL OF DELEGATIONS, INCLUDING DETAILS OF ANY SPECIAL AIRCRAFT. RECENT EXPERIENCE WITH THE WEATHER AND ROAD CONDITIONS SUGGEST THAT FOR THIS MEETING TO BEGIN ON TIME AT 1030, DELEGATIONS SHOULD AIM TO ARRIVE AT EITHER NORTHOLT OR LONDON AIRPORT (HEATHROW) NOT LATER THAN 9.45 GMT.

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FM F C O 232000Z DEC 81.

TO FLASH ATHENS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 328 OF 23 DECEMBER,
AND TO FLASH OTHER E C POSTS, U'REP BRUSSELS.

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, PRIORITY MOSCOW AND WARSAW.

POLAND.

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE URGENTLY FROM ME TO
FOREIGN MINISTER/PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION.

BEGINS.

2. WITH THE SITUATION IN POLAND LOOKING SO BLACK AND THE
UNITED STATES EVIDENTLY IN RESOLUTE MOOD, I AM NOT HAPPY AT THE
THOUGHT THAT THE TEN WILL HAVE NO CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER ON
THIS SUBJECT UNTIL SOME TIME IN JANUARY. I RECALL THE CRITICISM
WHICH WE INCURRED TWO YEARS AGO OVER AFGHANISTAN. I FIND THAT THIS
APPREHENSION IS SHARED BY MY SUCCESSOR AS THE HOLDER OF THE
PRESIDENCY, WITH WHOM I HAVE SPOKEN ON THE TELEPHONE TODAY.

I AM THEREFORE CONVENING A SPECIAL INFORMAL MEETING OF FOREIGN
MINISTERS IN LONDON ON WEDNESDAY 30 DECEMBER TO CONSIDER POLAND.
I WOULD ENVISAGE A GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE PRESENT
SITUATION, LIKELY FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AND STEPS WHICH MEMBER
STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COULD CONSIDER TAKING EITHER
NATIONALLY, AS THE TEN OR IN OTHER ORGANISATIONS TO WHICH SOME
OF US BELONG. I HOPE TO BE ABLE TO SEND YOU AN ANNOTATED AGENDA
TOMORROW 24 DECEMBER. ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS ARE BEING COMMUNICATED
BY COREU.

I REALISE THAT IT WILL BE HIGHLY INCONVENIENT AND UNWELCOME
TO ALL OF US TO MEET IN THE HOLIDAY WEEK BETWEEN CHRISTMAS AND THE
NEW YEAR. BUT I DO NOT FEEL ABLE TO TAKE THE RISK, AS PRESIDENT,
OF ALLOWING THIS WEEK TO PASS WITHOUT FOREIGN MINISTERS GIVING
PERSONAL ATTENTION TO A PROBLEM WHICH SEEMS LIKELY TO CONTINUE
AND PROBABLY TO INTENSIFY.

UNLESS I HEAR TO THE CONTRARY BY 1200 GMT TOMORROW 24 DECEMBER I SHALL ASSUME THAT YOU ARE IN AGREEMENT WITH MY SUGGESTION.
THE FACT OF THE MEETING WOULD THEN BE PUBLISHED HERE AT THE DAILY
PRESS CONFERENCE IN THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE AT 12.30
GMT.

ENDS.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. FOR PARIS, BONN, BRUSSELS. I SPOKE ON THESE LINES THIS AFTERNOON TO CHEYSSON, GENSCHE AND TINDEMANS, WHO ALL WELCOMED THE IDEA. MESSAGES TO THEM SHOULD BEGIN QUOTE AS I TOLD YOU THIS AFTERNOON UNQUOTE.

4. FOR ROME. PLEASE AMEND INTRODUCTION AS NECESSARY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF FOLLOW UP TO CONVERSATION FALL/SIMPSON ORLEBAR.

5. FOR WASHINGTON. I HAVE ALSO INFORMED MR HAIG, AND HE TOO IS CONTENT.

6. M.I.F.T. CONTAINS TEXT OF COREU SETTING OUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MEETING.

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*Poland
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*Prime Minister
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FM OTTAWA 232210Z DEC 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 735 OF 23 DECEMBER
AND TO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO WASHINGTON
SAVING TO WARSAW

me

CANADA AND POLAND: MY TELNO 729

1. MR TRUDEAU'S STATEMENT ABOUT MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND NOT BEING INHERENTLY BAD HAS AROUSED SOME CONTROVERSY. THE POLISH AMBASSADOR HAS QUOTED IT APPROVINGLY IN AN INTERVIEW ON THE NATIONAL TV NEWS. DR MACGUIGAN, INTERVIEWED ON TELEVISION THIS MORNING, SAID THAT MR TRUDEAU'S WORDS HAD BEEN MISUNDERSTOOD. WHEN TOLD THAT THERE WAS AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT FROM SWEDEN THAT THE WORDS HAD BEEN RELAYED OVER POLISH RADIO AND MR TRUDEAU HAILED AS THE ONLY REASONABLE VOICE IN THE WEST, DR MACGUIGAN COULD ONLY SAY THAT THIS WAS UNFORTUNATE. WE UNDERSTAND FROM OFFICIALS THAT MR TRUDEAU HAS TRIED TO SET MATTERS STRAIGHT BY RECORDING A MORE CRITICAL VIEW OF THE POLISH AUTHORITIES IN AN INTERVIEW TO BE BROADCAST ON 27 DECEMBER

2. A NUMBER OF POINTS HELP EXPLAIN MR TRUDEAU'S REMARK. HE WOULD HAVE BEEN MINDFUL THAT IN 1970 HE INTRODUCED THE WAR MEASURES ACT TO DEAL WITH THE CRISIS IN QUEBEC. THIS IS STILL A MATTER OF CONTROVERSY IN CANADA. HAD HE ROUNDLY CONDEMNED POLISH GOVERNMENT ACTION, THERE ARE MANY HERE WHO WOULD HAVE DRAWN UNCOMFORTABLE PARALLELS. HE MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN CONCERNED TO REGISTER A CAUTIONARY NOTE OUT OF CONCERN THAT THE WESTERN ALLIES WERE BEING PUSHED BY THE US INTO A MORE ALARMIST AND CONFRONTATIONAL POSTURE THAN HE WOULD CONSIDER JUSTIFIED. THIS WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH HIS VIEWS ON THE FAILURE OF NATO'S CAPACITY FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT AFTER AFGHANISTAN.

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MISKEW

VLB

25/1

29/1

John - copy for our records?

Kay 26/1

23 December 1981

Kay

Asked FWO 27/1

yes. pl. and to me.

A.F.C. 27/1

I enclose a telegram which the Prime Minister has received from Mr. (or Mrs.) Miskew requesting assistance with regard to the release of a son in Poland. The son is said to be a British citizen. I should be grateful if you would arrange for an appropriate reply to be sent.

A J COLES

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

2/10

FILE

VLB

23 December 1981

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your telegram of today's date.

This is receiving attention, and a reply will be sent to you as soon as possible.

A J COLES

M. Miskew, Esq.

TELEGRAM

shown in your dialling instructions

TELEGRAM

shown in your dialling instructions

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MRS THATCHER
10 DOWNINGST
LONDONSW1

PLEASE HELP ME OBTAIN RELEASE OF MY SON GREG FROM POLISH
AUTHORITIES.
HE IS BRITISH CITIZEN.

M MISKEW
44 ST.MARTINS AVENUE
LEEDS7 TELEPHONE 623197

COL 10 LONDONSW1 GREG 44 LFEDS7 623197

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TELEGRAM for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

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DESKBY 222000Z

FM UKDEL NATO 221850Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
TELEGRAM NUMBER 505 OF 22 DECEMBER 1981.

FROM BULLARD.

POLANDMIPT: QUADRIPARTITE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIRECTORS MEETING
BRUSSELS 22 DECEMBER.

FOLLOWING ARE SOME OF THE POINTS MADE IN DISCUSSION.

1. EAGLEBURGER SAW 3 POSSIBLE COURSES OF EVENTS IN POLAND.
 - A) JARUZELSKI SUCCEEDS IN BRINGING ORDER TO POLAND BY CONTINUING MARTIAL LAW FOR SOME TIME. ECONOMIC PRESSURES COULD LATER CAUSE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE POLISH PEOPLE.
 - B) JARUZELSKI FAILS TO MAINTAIN CONTROL: THEIR IS A GRADUAL DECLINE WITH INCREASING VIOLENCE ENDING IN SOVIET INTERVENTION.
 - C) SUDDEN DETERIORATION WITH RAPIDLY INCREASING VIOLENCE AND EARLY SOVIET INTERVENTION.
2. ANDREANI SAW THE FIRST OF THESE AS THE MOST LIKELY SCENARIO. HE THOUGHT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD AVOID INTERVENTION IF IT POSSIBLY COULD, ALLOWING THE SITUATION IN POLAND TO DETERIORATE VERY FAR IF NECESSARY. IF FORCED TO INTERVENE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD DO SO ON THE SMALLEST POSSIBLE SCALE.
3. EAGLEBURGER SUGGESTED THAT THE WEST WAS FACED WITH A VERY HARD PROBLEM. THE SITUATION WAS UNCLEAR. THE POLISH PEOPLE MIGHT BE REPRESSED AND THE REFORMS DESTROYED WHILE THE WEST STOOD BY WITHOUT A WHIMPER. THE WEST MUST FIND SPECIFIC MEASURES TO TAKE, NOT LEAST TO SHOW THE SOVIET UNION THAT WE ARE READY TO CONFRONT EAST/WEST ISSUES SERIOUSLY.
4. ANDREANI FORESAW THAT UNDER THE FIRST SCENARIO WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION COULD BEGIN TO LOSE INTEREST IN POLAND FAIRLY SOON. HE URGED THAT THOUGHT BE GIVEN TO PUBLIC INITIATIVES IN MID-JANUARY TO KEEP POLAND IN THE PUBLIC EYE. IF THERE WERE LARGE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES, A CONFERENCE ON THIS SUBJECT MIGHT BE A POSSIBILITY.
5. FRANCE HAS DECIDED TO RESUME BROADCASTING IN POLISH. FRANCE AND GERMANY ARE BEING AS PRUDENT AS WE ARE ABOUT JOURNALISTS' MATERIAL COMING BACK BY DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. FRANCE AND GERMANY ARE NOT RESTRICTING THE MOVEMENTS OF POLISH DIPLOMATS.
6. A TOUGH LETTER FROM REAGAN TO BREZHNEV IS BEING CONSIDERED IN DRAFT.

SECRET

7. IN THE ECONOMIC DISCUSSION THE U S SUGGESTED TIGHTENING COCOM CONTROLS ON EXPORTS TO POLAND. THE OTHERS THOUGHT THIS A WEAK GESTURE BECAUSE OF THE SMALL AMOUNTS OF EXPORTS INVOLVED. IT WAS LEFT THAT, IF THE U S WISHED TO PURSUE THIS IDEA, IT WOULD DO SO IN THE COCOM HIGH LEVEL MEETING IN JANUARY.
8. THE U S HAS SUSPENDED THE GRANTING OF EXPORTS LICENCES FOR POLAND. HORMATS ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS A SMALL GESTURE. THE OTHERS DID NOT UNDERTAKE TO CONSIDER THIS.
9. THE U S SUGGESTION THAT WE SHOULD DELAY THE PROCESSING OF THE POLISH APPLICATION TO THE IMS WAS ALSO GREETED SCEPTICALLY. IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THE POLAND/IMS TALKS WERE ANYWAY NOT DUE TO RESUME UNTIL LATE MARCH.
10. THE ECONOMIC DIRECTORS HAD NO DIFFICULTY IN AGREEING THAT WE SHOULD MAKE PUBLICLY CLEAR THAT SOVIET INTERVENTION IN POLAND WOULD CREATE A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN OUR ECONOMIC AS WELL AS POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH THE USSR.
11. THE U S DID NOT RAISE THE PIPELINE PROJECT. NOR WERE U S GRAIN SALES TO THE USSR MENTIONED. NOONE SUGGESTED A MAJOR ECONOMIC RELIEF OPERATION WITH POLITICAL CONDITIONS FOR POLAND.

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FM UKDEL NATO. 221840Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,

TELEGRAM NUMBER 504 OF 22 DECEMBER 1981,

INFO IMMEDIATE (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS/MINISTERS) WASHINGTON,
PARIS, BONN.

FROM BULLARD.

POLANDQUADRIPARTITE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIRECTORS MEETING BRUSSELS
22 DECEMBER.

1. THE MEETING COMMISSIONED THE UK TO SUGGEST IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON 23 DECEMBER AN APPROACH ABOUT POLAND AND MADRID TO THE NNA PARTICIPANTS IN THE MADRID CONFERENCE (SEPARATE TELEGRAM ALREADY SENT); AND THE FRG TO PREPARE A NOTE OF THEMES FOR USE IN DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS BY NATO MEMBERS, AND/OR HIGH LEVEL MESSAGES, TO THE SOVIET UNION, POLAND, EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND OTHER STATES.

2. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE FOUR WOULD REFLECT ON A RANGE OF OTHER POLITICAL MEASURES, MOST OF WHICH WERE SUGGESTED BY THE U S. THE U S WOULD BE FREE TO PUT ANY OF THESE FORWARD IN NATO, POSSIBLY AS SOON AS TOMORROW'S MEETING, AND THE OTHER THREE WOULD RESPOND ACCORDING TO NATIONAL POSITIONS. BUT I DIVIDED THE VARIOUS SUGGESTIONS INTO ONES WHICH I THOUGHT MIGHT BE SUPPORTED BY THE UK AND PROBABLY FRANCE AND THE FRG, AND OTHERS WHICH SEEMED INADVISABLE, AS FOLLOWS:

(A) MEASURES FOR FAVOURABLE CONSIDERATION.

DESPATCH OF A WESTERN EMISSARY TO WARSAW (TINDEMANS WAS MENTIONED AS A POSSIBLE CANDIDATE IF THE TEN SO DECIDED);

COORDINATED HEAD OF GOVERNMENT MESSAGES TO SOVIET UNION;

MORE BROADCASTING TO POLAND;

CURTAINMENT OF BILATERAL EVENTS WITH SOVIET UNION;

INVESTIGATE POSSIBILITY OF RAISING POLAND IN US SPECIALISED AGENCIES, NOTABLY ILO;

PROPOSAL FOR A QUOTE DAY OF POLAND UNQUOTE ON THE LINES OF THE QUOTE DAY OF AFGHANISTAN UNQUOTE ALREADY BEING DISCUSSED;

MORE EFFORTS TO WELCOME POLISH REFUGEES;

ADVANCE (OR CANCEL) HAIG'S NEXT MEETING WITH GROMYKO.

(B) MEASURES UNLIKELY TO BE SUPPORTED.

CANCELLATION OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS;

ACTION IN UNGA AND SECURITY COUNCIL;

REDUCING SIZE OF SOVIET EMBASSIES;

WITHDRAWAL OF AMBASSADORS FROM MOSCOW AND WARSAW, FOR CONSULTATION OR FOR LONGER PERIODS;

URGING THE POPE TO VISIT POLAND.

SECRET

3. ON ARMS CONTROL, EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THE OPTIONS THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN WASHINGTON INCLUDED SUSPENSION/TERMINATION OF INF AND MBFR, DELAY OF RESUMPTION AFTER THE RECESS OR MAKING RESUMPTION DEPENDENT ON EVENTS IN POLAND. HE MADE CLEAR THAT NO DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN AND UNDERTOOK THAT THE U S WOULD CONSULT THE OTHER THREE IF LATER INCLINED TO TAKE ACTION IN THIS FIELD.
4. ON BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, FRANCE IS THINKING OF CANCELLING A VISIT TO MOSCOW BY THE SPEAKER OF THE ASSEMBLY AND ALSO A MEETING OF FRENCH AND SOVIET MPS TO DISCUSS ARMS CONTROL.
5. IN THE ECONOMIC DISCUSSION, THE CONCLUSIONS WERE:
- (A) 1981 RESCHEDULING. THE GROUNDS FOR INVOKING THE QUOTE TANK CLAUSE UNQUOTE PROBABLY EXIST BUT NONE OF THE FOUR CONTEMPLATES DOING SO.
 - (B) 1982 RESCHEDULING. THERE IS NO COMMITMENT TO RESCHEDULE. ON THE PLANNED MEETING ON 14/15 JANUARY, THERE MAY BE VALUE IN A DISCUSSION OF WESTERN CREDITOR COUNTRIES; THE DECISION ON WHETHER TO HAVE THE POLES AT SUCH A MEETING COULD WAIT UNTIL EARLY JANUARY.
 - (C) OFFICIAL CREDITS. ALL FOUR ARE TAKING A CAUTIOUS ATTITUDE ON DISBURSEMENT OF EXISTING CREDIT LINES. NEW CREDITS SHOULD BE IN ABEYANCE.
 - (D) HUMANITARIAN AID. REASONABLE CERTAINTY ABOUT DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES IS NEEDED. AT THE SAME TIME HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.
6. IN PRACTICE, ALL FOUR SEEM TO BE GOING SLOW IN THE DISBURSEMENT OF EXISTING CREDIT LINES BUT FRANCE AND GERMANY ARE CONSTRAINED BY LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FROM HALTING ALL DISBURSEMENT.
7. THE NEXT QUADRIPARTITE MEETING WAS PROVISIONALLY FIXED FOR FRIDAY 8 JANUARY IN PARIS. THERE WAS A DISPOSITION TO INCLUDE ECONOMIC DIRECTORS AGAIN, BUT THIS WAS LEFT TO BE DECIDED NEARER THE TIME.
8. I SUGGEST THAT UKDEL NATO SHOULD BE GUIDED TOMORROW BY PARA 2 ABOVE AND SHOULD SHEAK TO PARA 5, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE OTHER 3 DELEGATIONS.

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 SIR A ACLAND
 MR GILLMORE
 LORD BRIDGES
 MR EVANS.

IMMEDIATE

POLAND: ADVANCE COPIES.

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DESKBY WASHINGTON 231400Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 230036Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1614 DATED 22 DECEMBER 81

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, PARIS,
INFO PRIORITY WARSAW, MOSCOW, BONN

MY TELNO 1601: POLAND

1. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE U S MISSION AND OURSELVES THROUGH THE DAY, MRS KIRKPATRICK TELEPHONED ME FROM WASHINGTON THIS EVENING (22 DEC). SHE SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD DECIDED THAT THEY MUST INITIATE URGENT ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ABOUT THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN POLAND. THEIR LINE WOULD BE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS THERE CONSTITUTED A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. THEIR INTENTION WAS TO PUT IN A FORMAL REQUEST TOMORROW (23 DEC) FOR A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL TO TAKE PLACE ON 28 DEC. SHE ASKED FOR MY ADVICE.
2. I SAID THAT THE U S WOULD ENCOUNTER SERIOUS PROBLEMS. IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO GET TO INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE

~~TAKE PLACE ON 28 DEC. SHE ASKED FOR MY ADVICE.~~

2. ~~I SAID THAT THE U S WOULD ENCOUNTER SERIOUS PROBLEMS. IT WOULD~~ BE POSSIBLE TO GET TO INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE COUNCIL. BUT THE RUSSIANS AND GDR WOULD THEN STRONGLY OPPOSE A FORMAL MEETING ON THE GROUND THAT POLAND WAS ENTIRELY AN INTERNAL MATTER, FALLING UNDER ARTICLE 2 (7) OF THE CHARTER. THERE WOULD BE MUCH RELUCTANCE ON THE PART OF THE NON-ALIGNED AND EVEN THE WESTERN NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS (IRELAND AND SPAIN). EVEN IF IT PROVED POSSIBLE TO FORCE A FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL, THE RUSSIANS WOULD FIERCELY OPPOSE THE ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA. I WAS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE AMERICANS WOULD BE ABLE TO MOBILIZE NINE VOTES TO GET THE AGENDA ADOPTED, IN WHICH CASE THE WEST WOULD HAVE BEEN DEFEATED AT THE OUTSET.

3. I WENT ON TO MAKE A NUMBER OF POINTS WHICH SHE HAD EITHER NOT THOUGHT OF OR ON WHICH SHE HAD GOT THE WRONG END OF THE STICK. FIRST I CONTRADICTED HER VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO GET INTO THE COUNCIL BEFORE THE RUSSIANS ASSUMED THE PRESIDENCY ON 1 JANUARY. SHE HAD NOT REALISED THAT, AS PRESIDENT, THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE TO SOME EXTENT MUZZLED. THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO LEAD THE PROCEDURAL BATTLE EITHER IN THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OR IN THE COUNCIL ITSELF. EVEN THEIR ABILITY TO STALL WOULD BE LESS THAN IT WOULD BE IF THEY COULD LEAD THE ATTACK FROM OUTSIDE THE PRESIDENCY. SECONDLY, POLAND WOULD BECOME A MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL ON 1 JANUARY, WHICH OPENED UP INTERESTING POSSIBILITIES. THIRDLY, THE NON-ALIGNED COMPOSITION OF THE COUNCIL WOULD BE MARGINALLY MORE MANAGEABLE BY THE WEST IN JANUARY WITH TOGO AND ZAIRE REPLACING TUNISIA AND NIGER. THE OTHER CHANGES MADE LITTLE DIFFERENCE.

4. MRS KIRKPATRICK SEEMED IMPRESSED BY THESE ARGUMENTS. SHE SAID THAT SHE WAS GOING TO CONSULT LEPRETTE (FRANCE) AND THAT YOU AND CHEYSSON WOULD PROBABLY BE RECEIVING MESSAGES FROM HAIG. FINALLY SHE SAID THAT THE NSC WOULD BE MEETING AGAIN AT 11AM WASHINGTON TIME ON 23 DEC: SHE WOULD PUT TO THEM THE POINTS I HAD MADE AND WOULD TELEPHONE ME IN THE AFTERNOON.

5. I HAD ALREADY BEEN OVER THE GROUND WITH ADELMAN (MRS KIRKPATRICK'S DEPUTY). IT WAS AS A RESULT OF HIS PASSING MY VIEWS TO HER THAT SHE TELEPHONED ME INSTEAD OF GOING STRAIGHT AHEAD WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

6. IN MY VIEW, IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD BE PERSUADED NOT TO MAKE A MESS OF THIS QUESTION OUT OF THEIR DESIRE TO DEMONSTRATE INSTANT ACTIVITY. IF THEY GO AHEAD AS PLANNED, THE ODDS ARE THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL WIN THE PROCEDURAL BATTLE AND THE WEST WILL LOOK AS THOUGH THEY HAD MADE A CLUMSY AND UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO TAKE AN EAST/WEST PROPAGANDA TRICK. THIS WILL MAKE IT EVEN MORE DIFFICULT THAN IT WILL BE

~~PROCEDURAL BATTLE. AND THE WEST WILL LOOK AS THOUGH THEY HAD MADE
CLUMSY AND UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO TAKE AN EAST/WEST PROPAGANDA
TRICK. THIS WILL MAKE IT EVEN MORE DIFFICULT THAN IT WILL BE
IN ANY CASE TO MOBILISE NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT WHEN THE RIGHT TIME
COMES I.E. WHEN EVIDENCE OF DIRECT OUTSIDE INTERVENTION IN POLAND
IS OVERWHELMING, OR WHEN THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION HAS DEGENERATED
TO A POINT WHERE THERE CAN NO LONGER BE SERIOUS DOUBT - EVEN
OUTSIDE WESTERN CIRCLES - THAT INTERNATIONAL ACTION IS IMPERATIVE.
7. I AM NOT SURE HOW FAR EAGLEBURGER IS IN THE PICTURE OR WHETHER
ACTION AT THE UN WILL BE ON THE AGENDA FOR TOMORROW'S MEETING
IN BRUSSELS. BUT I BELIEVE THAT IF THE AMERICANS ARE TO BE
DISSUADED FROM FALLING AT THE FIRST FENCE IN THE UN IT MAY
BE NECESSARY TO INTERVENE AT A HIGH LEVEL TO CONVINCe THEM
THAT OUR DOUBTS ARE NOT DUE TO FAINT-HEARTEDNESS BUT TO THE
WAY WE SEE THE PRACTICAL POSSIBILITIES HERE.~~

PARSONS

NNNN

[Faint, mostly illegible text, possibly bleed-through or a second page of a document.]

FO ND: ADVANCE COPIES

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PS/LORD TREFGARNE
PS/PUS
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MR FERGUSSON
SIR A ACLAND
MR GILLMORE

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DESKBY 221700Z

FM HOLY SEE 221510Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO. 035 OF 22 DEC 81
AND TO PRIORITY WARSAW AND ROME

MY I.P.T.

1. FOLLOWING IS UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF TEXT OF ITALIAN VERSION OF LETTER IN POLISH FROM THE POPE TO GENERAL JARUZELSKI, PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF POLAND. BEGINS:

THE EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS, THE NEWS OF POLISH PEOPLE KILLED AND WOUNDED SINCE THE INTRODUCTION OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY ON 13 DECEMBER LAST, COMPEL ME TO TURN TO YOU, GENERAL, WITH THE URGENT REQUEST AND HEARTFELT APPEAL FOR THE SUSPENSION OF THIS ACTION WHICH HAS LED TO THE SHEDDING OF POLISH BLOOD.

MUCH HARDSHIP HAS BEEN BORNE BY THE POLISH NATION IN THE LAST TWO CENTURIES AND MUCH POLISH BLOOD SPILT IN ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH DOMINATION OVER OUR NATIVE LAND.

HAS LED TO THE SHEDDING OF POLISH BLOOD.

MUCH HARDSHIP HAS BEEN BORNE BY THE POLISH NATION IN THE LAST 10 CENTURIES AND MUCH POLISH BLOOD SPILT IN ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH DOMINATION OVER OUR NATIVE LAND.

THE LAST WAR AND OCCUPATION CAUSED THE LOSS OF ABOUT SIX MILLION POLES FIGHTING FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF THEIR COUNTRY.

IN THIS HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ONE MAY NOT SHED YET MORE POLISH BLOOD AND THIS BLOOD MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO BURDEN THE CONSCIENCE NOR STAIN THE HANDS OF POLES.

I THEREFORE TURN TO YOU, GENERAL, WITH THIS URGENT REQUEST AND HEARTFELT APPEAL IN ORDER THAT THE QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE RENEWAL OF SOCIETY, WHICH FROM AUGUST 1980 HAVE BEEN BY PEACEFUL DIALOGUE, MIGHT RETURN TO THE SAME WAY. EVEN IF IT IS DIFFICULT IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE.

THIS IS NECESSARY FOR THE GOOD OF THE WHOLE NATION. IT IS NECESSARY ALSO FOR WORLD OPINION, AND FOR ALL SOCIETIES, THAT RIGHTLY LINK THE CAUSE OF PEACE WITH RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND FOR THE RIGHTS OF NATIONS.

THE UNIVERSAL HUMAN DESIRE FOR PEACE SPEAKS UP FOR THE DISCONTINUATION OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY IN POLAND.

THE CHURCH IS THE SPOKESMAN OF THIS DESIRE.

THE CHRISTMAS FESTIVITIES ARE NOW DRAWING NEAR. FOR MANY GENERATIONS THESE HAVE UNITED ALL THE SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF OUR NATION BEFORE THE CONFESSORIAL SHARING OF BREAD ON CHRISTMAS EVE.

EVERYTHING MUST BE DONE TO ENSURE THAT OUR FELLOW COUNTRYMEN DO NOT SPEND THIS CHRISTMAS UNDER THE THREAT OF DEATH AND REPRESSION.

I APPEAL TO YOUR CONSCIENCE, GENERAL, AND TO THE CONSCIENCE OF ALL ON WHOM THIS DECISION NOW DEPENDS.

FROM THE VATICAN, 18 DECEMBER 1981. JOHN PAUL PP II

PS - THIS APPEAL WILL BE DELIVERED AT THE SAME TIME INTO THE HANDS OF MR LECH WALESZA, PRESIDENT OF "SOLIDARITY", AND ALSO INTO THE HANDS OF THE PRIMATE OF POLAND, H.E. MONS. ARCHBISHOP JOZEF GLEMP, FOR THE WHOLE POLISH EPISCOPATE, AS WELL AS THOSE OF CARDINAL FRANCISZEK MARCHARSKI, METROPOLITAN OF KRAKOW.

I WILL MAKE THIS INTERVENTION KNOWN TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS. ENDS.

2. PLEASE CIRCULATE THIS AND MY I.P.T. PRIORITY TO ALL EC PARTNERS ON THE COREU NETWORK.

HEATH

POLAND: . ADVANCE COPIES 21

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PS/LORD TREFGARNE
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MR FERGUSSON
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DESKBY 221700Z

FM HOLY SEE 221500Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NO. 034 OF 22 DEC 81
AND TO PRIORITY WARSAW, ROME.

POLAND

1. M.I.F. TELEGRAM CONTAINS AN ENGLISH VERSION OF A LETTER FROM THE POPE TO GENERAL JARUZELSKI, WHICH ARCHBISHOP POGGI DELIVERED IN WARSAW ON 21 DECEMBER.
2. WHEN HE HANDED ME THE ITALIAN TEXT THIS MORNING MGR SILVESTRINI SAID THAT HE WISHED ME TO RECEIVE IT IN MY CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENCY OF THE COMMUNITY, FOR ONWARD TRANSMISSION. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT MGR DABROWSKI ARRIVED IN ROME LAST NIGHT AND THEY HAD RECEIVED HIS PRELIMINARY REPORT. HIS NEWS WAS SOMEWHAT LESS HORRIFIC THAN THEIR OWN INFORMATION HAD LED THEM TO EXPECT. IT SEEMED FOR EXAMPLE THAT THE NUMBER OF DEATHS HAD BEEN EXAGGERATED AND WERE LESS THAN THE HUNDREDS NOW BEING REPORTED. IT WAS ALSO THE CASE THAT SOME PEOPLE HAD ALREADY BEEN RELEASED FROM DETENTION. THE POSITION NEVERTHELESS REMAINED GRAVE AND THE VATICAN WERE MAINTAINING A RESERVED ATTITUDE.

3. THE PURPOSE OF THE POPE'S MESSAGE WAS (A) TO ADDRESS GENERAL JARUZELSKI PERSONALLY: TO APPEAL TO HIS CONSCIENCE AS A POLE TO END THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE DETAINEES BY CHRISTMAS: AND (B) TO SECURE RESUMPTION OF THE DIALOGUE ON RENEWAL AND RECONCILIATION BETWEEN SOLIDARITY AND THE GOVERNMENT. THE INTENTION WAS THAT THE CHURCH SHOULD BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE TALKS BUT NOT A PARTY TO THEM.

4. SILVESTRINI DID NOT SAY WHETHER OR WHEN THE POPE'S LETTER WOULD BE PUBLISHED. BUT HE TOLD ME THAT THE TEXT WAS BEING TRANSMITTED TO ALL SIGNATORIES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

HEATH.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1019 OF 22ND DECEMBER 1981

INFO PRIORITY ALL EC POST, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW,
AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

FROM MELHUI SH.

YOUR TELNO 743 : PRESIDENCY DEMARCHE.

1. I DELIVERED THE DEMARCHE TO CZYREK AT 1915 LOCAL TIME.
I READ THE TEXT OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE TO HIM AND THEN ADDED THE POINT MADE IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TUR.
2. CZYREK REPLIED THAT, WHILE HE HAD GREAT RESPECT FOR YOU AND WOULD TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SEND YOU HIS BEST WISHES, HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE DEMARCHE. POLAND HAD NO RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. A DEMARCHE BY THE EC THEREFORE HAD NO VALIDITY, BUT THIS WAS A FORMAL OBJECTION . HE COULD NOT ACCEPT IT BECAUSE OF ITS CONTENT. AS MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HE FIRMLY REJECTED ALL ITS ALLEGATIONS, WHICH CONSTITUTED INTERFERENCE IN POLAND'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THEY WERE NOT MOREOVER BASED ON FACT. THE POLES WERE FIRMLY INFORMING THEIR PARTNERS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE

CONTENT. AS HYPOTHESIS
ITS ALLEGATIONS, WHICH CONSTITUTED INTERFERENCE IN POLAND'S
INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THEY WERE NOT MOREOVER BASED ON FACT. THE POLES
WERE HONESTLY INFORMING THEIR PARTNERS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE
EC ABOUT THEIR PLANS AND GOALS. HE WAS SURPRISED THAT THE ASSESS-
MENTS MADE IN THE DEMARCHE WERE NOT BASED ON HONEST FACTS BUT ON
INFORMATION THAT WAS FALSE AND DIVERSIONARY. NOTHING WAS BEING DONE
AGAINST THE LAW IN POLAND. FOR THIS REASON, ALL INSINUATIONS ABOUT
LAW BREAKING WERE FALSE. THE POLES HAD APPROACHED THEIR PARTNERS
MANY TIMES WITH INFORMATION AND WITH REQUESTS FOR HELP IN IMPROVING
POLAND'S SITUATION. SUCH APPROACHES HAD BEEN MADE TO HMG, THROUGH
HM AMBASSADOR TO YOU. HE HAD HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT BOTH SIDES
UNDERSTOOD EACH OTHER. HE HAD CLEARLY STATED BEFORE THE IMPOSITION
OF MARTIAL LAW THAT THE SITUATION WAS DISTURBING AND THAT THE POLES
WOULD DO ALL THEY COULD TO PREVENT IT DETERIORATING FURTHER. BUT
HE HAD ALSO SAID THAT IF NECESSARY, THE POLISH AUTHORITIES WOULD
USE EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES. THESE WERE NOW DEMANDED BY POLISH
RAISON D'ETAT. PEOPLE APPEARED NOT TO APPRECIATE THE EFFORTS OF THE
POLES TO SOLVE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS BY THEIR OWN HANDS. ONE SHOULD
NOT VIEW EVERYTHING THROUGH THE SPECTACLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

3. I REPLIED THAT I HAD NO FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS BEYOND MAKING THE
DEMARCHE. I THOUGHT HOWEVER THAT I SHOULD SAY THAT THE ATTITUDE
OF THE TEN HAD CHANGED CONSIDERABLY IN THE PAST FEW DAYS. THE
MINISTER COMPLAINED THAT A FALSE PICTURE WAS BEING PRESENTED. PART
OF THE PROBLEM LAY IN FACT THAT IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO GET A
CLEAR PICTURE WITH THE PRESENT LIMITATIONS ON EMBASSIES' FREEDOM OF
MOVEMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND NORMAL BUSINESS. CZYREK REPLIED THAT
POLAND WAS UNDER MARTIAL LAW. STATES MUST TAKE ALL MEASURES THAT
THEY DEEMED APPROPRIATE AT SUCH A TIME. NEVERTHELESS, HIS MINISTRY
WAS DOING WHAT IT COULD TO HELP EMBASSIES WITH THEIR DIFFICULTIES.

4. I ADDED THAT IT WOULD HELP THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE TEN IF CZYREK
COULD TELL US ANYTHING ABOUT THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN END TO MARTIAL
LAW. HE REPLIED THAT THIS WOULD DEPEND UPON THE PROCESS OF
NORMALISATION AND STABILISATION. THE POLES COULD NOT CONTEMPLATE
ANY STEPS THAT WOULD COMPLICATE THAT PROCESS. MUCH ALSO DEPENDED
UPON THE ATTITUDE OF POLAND'S PARTNERS, HE COULD SEE EVIDENCE OF A
LACK OF TRUST IN THE TERMS USED IN THE EC DEMARCHE. HE THEREFORE
WISHED TO REPEAT AGAIN THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF POLAND HAD UNDERTAKEN
NECESSARY MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD THE PROCESS OF RENEWAL AND TO

5. THOUGH CZYREK HAD SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE DEMARCHE,
I LEFT IT ON THE TABLE AND IT WAS NOT RETURNED TO ME BY HIM OR
JEDYNAK.

JEDYNAK.

6. CZYREK WAS VERY ANGRY. THE POINTS MADE IN THE DEMARCHE VISIBLY
WENT HOME. HIS EMOTIONAL EXPLANATION WAS INCONSISTENT AND
UNCONVINCING.

7. I HAVE BRIEFED EC AMBASSADORS HERE. WE WILL TLL PRESS IN THE
MORNING.

JAMES

NNNN

COL : READ PARA 4.

WISHED TO REPEAT AGAIN THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF POLAND HAD UNDERTAKEN
ITS RECENT ACTIONS IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD THE PROCESS OF RENEWAL
AND REFORM. I WAS THEN DISMISSED.

ETC

221824Z DEC 81
FROM COMMCEN HSP
TO MODUK

CONFIDENTIAL UK COMMS ONLY

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GR 400

FM WARSAW 221824Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1918 OF 22ND DECEMBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE : WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO AND
MODUK

FROM MELHUI SH.

OUR TELNO 977 : POLISH INTERNAL SITUATION.

1. MY RECOMMENDATION IN TUR THAT WE SHOULD RECONSIDER WITH OUR
EC ALLIES THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPOSING A BAN ON EC SUPPLIES OF FREE
OR SUBSIDISED FOOD SO LONG AS THE CURRENT MARTIAL LAW PROVISIONS
CONTINUED WAS PERHAPS TOO ABBREVIATED. I SHOULD HAVE EXPLAINED THAT
I HAD CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY OF DISTINGUISHING AT THIS END
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AS THE RECIPIENT OF FOOD AND THE POLISH
PEOPLE AT LARGE AND HAD DECIDED IT WOULD NOT WORK.

2. WHILE A DEGREE OF CONTROL CAN BE MAINTAINED OVER THE DISTRIBUTION
OF RELATIVELY SMALL AMOUNTS OF FOOD AND OTHER GOODS DONATED BY
PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS, AND EVEN FOR LARGER QUANTITIES WHERE THIS IS
CARRIED OUT UNDER ARRANGEMENT ALREADY IN PLACE (EG THE US GIFTS VIA
CARE), THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES WOULD BE MOST UNLIKELY TO ALLOW
ANY EXTERNAL AGENCY TO MONITOR DISTRIBUTION OF LARGE AMOUNTS OF
FOOD DELIVERED UNDER A GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT AGREEMENT, ESPECIALLY
WHEN FOR INTERNAL SECURITY REASONS LARGE AREAS OF POLAND REMAIN
OUT-OF -BOUNDS TO FOREIGNERS AND NON-INDIGENOUS POLES ALIKE. THERE
CAN BE NO GUARANTEE THEREFORE THAT THE FOOD WILL REACH ITS INTENDED
RECIPIENTS. IT MIGHT INDEED BE USED TO FEED THE ARMY.

3. EVEN IF THE GOVERNMENT ALLOW EC FOOD TO REACH THE POPULATION AT LARGE, THERE WOULD BE ALMOST NOTHING THE WEST COULD DO TO PREVENT THE MILITARY RULERS CLAIMING THAT THIS WAS AN INDICATION OF THE REGIME'S ABILITY TO PROVIDE FOR THE NEEDS OF THE POPULATION, OR AS A GIFT FROM ELSEWHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE. THE MASS MEDIA ARE ENTIRELY UNDER MILITARY CONTROL.

4. IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS IT SEEMED TO ME THEREFORE THAT THE ONLY PRACTICAL WAY TO PROCEED WAS TO IMPOSE A COMPLETE BAN ON EC FOOD AID TO POLAND. IF, HOWEVER, FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS, IT IS DECIDED THAT FOOD DELIVERIES FROM THE EC SHOULD CONTINUE, IT MIGHT BE SENSIBLE TO INSIST THAT WESTERN EMBASSIES HERE BE ALLOWED COMPLETE FREEDOM, INCLUDING THE ABILITY TO MOVE AT WILL OUTSIDE WARSAW, TO MONITOR THEIR DISTRIBUTION. WE SHOULD ALSO SEEK TO IMPOSE A CONDITION THAT THE MEDIA HERE GIVE DUE PROMINENCE TO THE FOODSTUFFS WHICH THE EC IS PROVIDING FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE POLISH PEOPLE.

JAMES

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FM WARSAW 221745Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1016 OF 22ND DECEMBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE: WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN,

MODUK

INFO SAVING: EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE, SOFIA, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST,
UKMIS NEW YORK, UKREP BRUSSELS, HELSINKI AND STOCKHOLM.

FROM MELHUI SH.

POLISH SITUATION.

1. SOURCES OF INFORMATION SEEM TO BE DRYING UP. THIS IS PROBABLY PARTLY BECAUSE LESS IS GOING ON AND PARTLY BECAUSE THE AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN SUPRESSING INFORMATION, AT LEAST ABOUT EVENTS OUTSIDE WARSAW.
2. THE CANADIAN EMBASSY INFORM US THAT A VISA APPLICANT FROM SZCZECIN TOLD THEM THAT THE DOCKERS THERE WERE ON AN "ITALIAN STRIKE" (THEY TURN UP FOR WORK BUT DO NOTHING). WE HEAR CONTINUING REPORTS OF DISTURBANCES IN GDANSK AND OF DEATHS THERE AND IN WROCLAW. NO-ONE HOWEVER SEEMS ABLE TO PUT A FIGURE ON THE NUMBER OF DEATHS. WE ALSO HEAR OF RUMOURS OF DESERTIONS IN THE ARMY, MOST PERSISTENTLY IN THE GDANSK REGION.
3. STORIES OF THE CONDITION OF THOSE INTERNED VARY. ONE RUMOUR SAYS THAT 32 IN TOTAL HAVE DIED OF FROST-BITE. (TEMPERATURES AT NIGHT ARE ABOUT -20 DEGREES C AT THE MOMENT.) OTHER RUMOURS SUGGEST THAT THOSE WHO WERE INTERNED INITIALLY ARE IN REASONABLY GOOD CONDITION, BUT THOSE WHO WERE ROUNDED-UP LATER WERE PUT INTO TENTS BECAUSE THE PLACES ORIGINALLY PREPARED FOR INTERNEES WERE FULL UP. THESE LATTER ACCOUNTS RESEMBLE VERY CLOSELY WHAT ARCHBISHOP GLEMP TOLD ME YESTERDAY (OUR TELNO 1002).
4. IT IS PERSISTENTLY, AND PROBABLY AUTHENTICALLY, REPORTED THAT THE CITY OF RADOM HAS BEEN SEALED OFF MORE OR LESS FROM THE BEGINNING OF MARTIAL LAW. MANY EXPLANATIONS FOR THIS ARE POSSIBLE. BUT, AS RADOM WAS THE CENTRE OF THE STUDENTS CONFLICT THAT PRECEDED THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW, IT MAY BE THAT PARTICULARLY HARSH MEASURES HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED TO PACIFY THE CITY. RADOM WAS THE SCENE OF VIOLENT RIOTING IN THE 1976 TROUBLES.
5. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE TODAY THAT ARCHBISHOP POGGI'S ATTEMPTS TO SET UP SOME FORM OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN SOLIDARITY (WALESA) AND THE MARTIAL COUNCIL (JARUZELSKI) HAD GOT STUCK. HE WAS STILL HOPING TO MAKE PROGRESS AND WOULD STAY ON LONGER.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

JAMES

BT

GRS 200
UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 221500Z - FM. WARSAW
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1004 OF 22ND DECEMBER 1981

MYTEL NO 964: BRITISH COMMUNITY.

1. WE HAVE JUST HEARD THAT THE POLISH AIRLINE LOT ARE PROVIDING ANOTHER LONDON CHARTER FLIGHT TOMORROW. IN VIEW OF CONTINUED BLANKET COMMUNICATIONS BAN IN POLAND GRATEFUL IF BBC COULD BE ASKED TO TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE :-

"THE BRITISH EMBASSY AT WARSAW HAS ASKED THAT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE SHOULD BE BROADCAST TO BRITISH SUBJECTS IN POLAND.

MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY MAY WISH TO KNOW THAT A LOT CHARTER FLIGHT TO LONDON IS SCHEDULED TO LEAVE WARSAW AT 13.30 ON 23 DECEMBER. ANYONE WISHING TO TRAVEL ON THIS FLIGHT SHOULD CHECK IN AT THE LOT TERMINAL IN ULICA WARYNSKIEGO, WARSAW AT LEAST 2 HOURS BEFORE THE ESTIMATED TIME OF DEPARTURE."

JAMES

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SUBJECT
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 181/81



MR COLLET

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

22 December, 1981.

Thank you for your message of 19 December. It was very useful to have your own assessment of the complex and difficult situation we face in Poland.

I agree that the way things are moving in Poland presents us with serious problems and difficult decisions. It is essential that the Western response should be both firm and coordinated. The detailed discussions in progress in Brussels today should give us a clearer idea of the options open to us, and we must continue to keep in close touch.

Like you we have been adjusting our public stance progressively to the developments in Poland. I took the opportunity in the House of Commons today to make clear our condemnation of the detentions and shootings in Poland.

The President of the United States of America

SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 December 1981

Dear John.

/ As requested in your letter of 21 December I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Reagan.

Yours ever.

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Francis Richards', written over the typed name.

John Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

DSR 11 (Revised)

SECRET

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

PRESIDENT REAGAN

Copies to:

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SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

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Like you we have been adjusting our public stance progressively to the developments in Poland. I took the opportunity in the House of Commons today to make clear our condemnation of the detentions and shootings in Poland.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

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 Poland

BACKGROUND NOTE

General

1. The Secretary of State's statement in the Lords, repeated by the Lord Privy Seal in the Commons, is at Annex A.
2. The statement by the Ten Foreign Ministers is at Annex B.

Martial Law

3. Jaruzelski imposed martial law on Poland on night of 12/13 December. Much of Solidarity's leadership, including Walesa, under arrest. Jaruzelski has emphasised measures will be short-lived. Undertook to preserve the essentials of the Renewal of the past 17 months.

Popular Reaction

4. With leaders detained, Solidarity's response was slow to develop. But in past 48 hours resistance has grown with strikes, sit-ins in large industrial enterprises, and reports of a violent confrontation in a big steel mill near Krakow.

Soviet Attitude

5. Marshal Kulikov, Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact, is in Warsaw, but there is no evidence of Soviet preparations to intervene.

Economic Assistance

6. Poles have used up almost all of £65 million credit available in 1981; 1981 Debt Rescheduling Agreement with Western Governments valid until 31 December 1981. We have told Poles we are prepared to reschedule official debt repayments in 1982 on same basis as 1981 and that we will provide further assistance for URSUS tractor project. Neither decision required to be put into effect until new year: next meeting of official creditors with Poles scheduled for 14/15 January.

/Banks

Banks

7. Before emergency, banks expected to sign 1981 rescheduling agreement with Poles by end December/early January. Banks have indicated no immediate change in policy envisaged. Discussions continuing between major banks and Polish Central Bank despite communication difficulties.

EC Food Aid

8. All UK deliveries of food under 1st and 2nd tranches now delivered with exception of 15,000 tonnes of barley under latter. 25,000 tonnes of barley under 1st part of 3rd tranche (3A) also waiting to be shipped. EC Foreign Ministers at their meeting on 15 December agreed no decision should be taken at present on deliveries for 1982 but that the question should be kept under review. Meanwhile, supplies already agreed should not be rescinded. Decision on second part of 3rd tranche (3B) postponed.

POLAND

STATEMENT BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE TEN

15 DECEMBER

The Foreign Ministers of the member states of the European Community are concerned at the development of the situation in Poland and the imposition of martial law and the detention of trade unionists. They have profound sympathy for the Polish people in this tense and difficult time. They look to all signatory states of the Helsinki Final Act to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of the Polish People's Republic. They look to Poland to solve these problems herself and without the use of force, so that the process of reform and renewal can continue.

Foreign Ministers of the Ten are continuing to follow events in Poland with particular attention, and agreed to remain in close consultation on this question.

The holder on 14 December 1981

POLAND

Martial law was declared in Poland from midnight on 12/13 December. A Military Council for National Salvation, consisting of military leaders, has been set up under the Prime Minister and Party Secretary General Jaruzelski. Military Commissars have been appointed to oversee central and local government. Other steps taken include sealing of the borders, severing of telex and telephone links, imposition of a curfew, suspension of civil liberties, a ban on strikes and gatherings other than religious ceremonies, a takeover of the broadcasting system and suspension of regional broadcasts.

General Jaruzelski announced these measures in a speech broadcast to the Polish people early on 13 December. He stressed that they were intended to be of short duration and would be rescinded when calm and order were restored. He said the measures were intended to preserve the fundamentals of the Polish "Renewal" and that reforms would be

/continued.

continued. We regard these commitments
as very important.

There are no reports of danger to the safety of members of the British community in Poland. The British Embassy is in touch with British nationals and as a precautionary measure has advised them to stay at home. This advice has also been broadcast, at the Government's request, on the BBC World Service.

Her Majesty's Government is following developments with the closest attention and with great concern. We are, and shall remain, in close consultation with our partners in the Ten and in the North Atlantic Alliance. The next few days would appear to be of critical importance to the future of Poland. We sincerely hope that the Polish Government and people will be able to resolve their problems without bloodshed by compromise and consensus. We shall observe a policy of

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strict non-intervention and we expect the same
of all signatories of the Helsinki Final Act.

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FM BONN 211710Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1027 OF 21 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO BRUSSELS WASHINGTON WARSAW

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW PARIS

INFO SAVING ANKARA ATHENS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE LISBON LUXEMBOURG

OSLO OTTAWA REYKJAVIK ROME BMG BERLIN EAST BERLIN CICC(G)

POLAND: FRG REACTIONS

1. KEIL (HEAD OF EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT, MFA) GAVE A FURTHER COMMUNITY BRIEFING TODAY. HE SAID IT WAS STILL DIFFICULT TO ASSESS THE SITUATION IN POLAND RELIABLY BECAUSE SO MUCH OF THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE WAS HEARSAY. BUT THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT SAW THE SITUATION AS ONE OF INCREASING REPRESSION, WITH SOLIDARITY UNABLE TO ORGANISE STRIKES TO AN EXTENT SUFFICIENT TO ENDANGER MILITARY CONTROL. EVEN IF GENERAL JARUSELSKI HAD BEEN SINCERE IN HIS INITIALLY DECLARED INTENTION TO CONTINUE REFORM, IT WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO FOLLOW IT THROUGH.

2. KEIL THEN GAVE A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE FRG RESPONSE SO FAR, CLEARLY DESIGNED TO ANSWER AMERICAN CRITICISMS LAST WEEK OF GERMAN FEEBLNESS. HE REFERRED TO THE LINE TAKEN BY HERR GENSCHER WITH THE CZECHOSLOVAK FOREIGN MINISTER CHNOUPEK IN BONN ON 17 DECEMBER (CHNOUPEK HAD BEEN QUOTE USED TO SIGNAL A MESSAGE TO MOSCOW UNQUOTE) AND TO HIS CONFIDENTIAL BRIEFING OF THE TWO BUNDESHAUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEES, THE FIRST SUCH JOINT BRIEFING SINCE 1963 (MY TEL NO 1020 TO FCO). HE ALSO MENTIONED CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S SPEECH AND THE ALL-PARTY MOTION PASSED BY THE BUNDESTAG (MY TELNO 1022).

3. GENSCHER HAD RECEIVED THE POLISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES THIS MORNING 21 DECEMBER, AND HAD READ HIM BOTH THE BUNDESTAG'S MOTION AND THE SHORT STATEMENT WITH WHICH BARZEL, CHAIRMAN OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, HAD INTRODUCED IT (COPY TO FCO BY TOMORROW'S BAG). HE HAD DRAWN PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE PASSAGE IN THE MOTION CALLING UPON THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO LEAVE OPEN THE QUESTION OF ECONOMIC AID FOR POLAND, AND HAD SAID THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS IN CONSEQUENCE OF THIS BOUND TO CONSULT ITS PARLIAMENT ABOUT ANY FUTURE AID TO POLAND BEYOND THAT ALREADY CONTRACTED. IT WAS IMPORTANT THEREFORE FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO KNOW TO WHAT EXTENT THE POLISH MILITARY AUTHORITIES WERE ACTUALLY CARRYING OUT THEIR PROMISE TO CONTINUE REFORM.

4. KEIL SAID IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHARED THE VIEW OF THE BUNDESTAG THAT THE QUESTION OF FURTHER AID SHOULD BE LEFT OPEN. TO SAY EITHER A CLEAR YES OR NO WOULD DEPRIVE THE WEST OF ITS ONE SOURCE OF LEVERAGE ON EVENTS IN POLAND.
FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL EXCEPT BMG BERLIN, EAST BERLIN AND CICC(G)

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FM WASHINGTON 220106Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3891 OF 21 DECEMBER 1981,

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, BRUSSELS, PARIS, BONN, ROME,

PRIORITY WARSAW, MOSCOW,

ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS, PEKING, UKMIS NEW YORK.

M I P T: INTERNAL SITUATION IN POLAND

1. IN BRIEFING N A T O HEADS OF MISSION TODAY, STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS.

2. AT TODAY'S MEETING WITH THE U S AMBASSADOR, ARCHBISHOP GLEMP HAD DENIED REPORTS OF PRIESTS BEING ARRESTED AND BEATEN UP. HE HAD HOWEVER CONFIRMED THAT SOME PRIESTS HAD READ FROM THEIR PULPITS EXTRACTS FROM THE 15 DECEMBER COMMUNIQUE BY THE EPISCOPATE WHICH

HAD DENIED REPORTS OF PRIESTS BEING ARRESTED AND BEATEN BY. HE HOWEVER CONFIRMED THAT SOME PRIESTS HAD READ FROM THEIR PULPITS EXTRACTS FROM THE 15 DECEMBER COMMUNIQUE BY THE EPISCOPATE WHICH WERE TOUGHER THAN THE PASTORAL LETTER DISTRIBUTED ON 20 DECEMBER. THE AUTHORITIES HAD TRIED TO PERSUADE THESE PRIESTS NOT TO PROCEED BUT HAD FAILED. GLEMP WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE DETAILS ABOUT WELESA'S WHEREABOUTS BUT INDICATED, ON THE BASIS OF APPARENTLY ACCURATE INFORMATION, THAT HE WAS IN GOOD HEALTH AND HOLDING UP REASONABLY WELL. HE GAVE NO INDICATION THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AUTHORITIES WERE ANY CLOSER TO BEING HELD. SOME EFFORTS IN THIS DIRECTION WERE BEING MADE, BUT GLEMP DID NOT WISH TO SPECULATE ON THE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS.

3. ON THE ROLE OF THE CHURCH, IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS, U S OFFICIALS SAID THAT, LIKE THE VATICAN, THEY WERE WAITING TO SEE WHAT CAME OUT OF POGGI'S TALKS WITH GLEMP. THE CHURCH WAS THE ONLY INSTITUTION CAPABLE OF PLAYING A MEDIATING ROLE. THIS PERHAPS EXPLAINED GLEMP'S CAUTION AND THE MODERATION IN THE TONE OF THE PASTORAL LETTER COMPARED WITH THE EARLY COMMUNIQUE.

4. THE U S WERE STILL RECEIVING REPORTS OF SCATTERED STRIKES INCLUDING THE 1300 MINERS UNDERGROUND IN KATOWICE, WHO HAD BLOWN UP ONE OF THE MINE-SHAFTS. THEIR CONSUL IN KRAKOW HAD REPORTED ON RELIABLE EVIDENCE THAT THE NOWA HUTA INCIDENT HAD BEEN CAUSED BY THE BRUTAL TREATMENT OF THE FAMILIES OF STRIKING MINERS BY MILITIA, LEADING TO THE MINERS' RESPONSE. GLEMP HAD CONFIRMED THAT ONLY SEVEN HAD BEEN KILLED, BUT MANY HAD BEEN WOUNDED. SIT-IN STRIKES STILL APPARENTLY CONTINUED AT NOWA HUTA AND KATOWICE STEEL MILLS AND IN THE GDANSK SHIPYARDS. ALTHOUGH REPORTS CONTINUE TO BE RECEIVED OF MORE ARRESTS, THESE PROBABLY RELATED TO EARLIER ACTIONS BY THE AUTHORITIES. THE STATE DEPARTMENT COULD NOT DOCUMENT MORE ARRESTS THAN THE 6,000 MINIMUM ALREADY ADMITTED BY THE POLISH AUTHORITIES.

5. SOVIET FORCES IN POLAND WERE ON ALERT BUT NO OTHER MOVEMENT HAD TAKEN PLACE. THERE WAS NO UNUSUAL MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE SOVIET UNION. HOWEVER, PREPARATIONS HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE FOR INTERVENTION AND WITH THE CHANGE IN THE SITUATION - THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOW BE SUPPORTING NOT FIGHTING THE POLISH ARMY, MOSCOW COULD MOVE SOME TEN TO TWENTY DIVISIONS RAPIDLY INTO POLAND.

6. THE U S HAD NOT EXPECTED THE POLISH ARMY TO TAKE SUCH DRACONIAN MEASURES AND HAD ASSUMED THAT THERE WOULD ONLY BE A DEMONSTRATION OF FORCE TO MAKE SOLIDARITY MORE REASONABLE. THE U S BELIEVED THAT THE ARMY WAS RELIABLE IN THE SENSE THAT IT COULD BE USED AS THE UMBRELLA UNDER WHICH REPRESSION WAS CARRIED OUT BY THE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES (W S W) AND MILITIA. THIS MADE IT EASIER TO

THE ARMY WAS RELIABLE IN THE SENSE THAT IT COULD BE USED AS THE UMBRELLA UNDER WHICH REPRESSION WAS CARRIED OUT BY THE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES (W S W) AND MILITIA. THIS MADE IT EASIER TO MAINTAIN DISCIPLINE AMONG THE ARMY CONSCRIPTS. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT ATTITUDE THE ARMY WOULD ADOPT TOWARDS SOVIET TROOPS INTERVENING DIRECTLY IN POLAND BUT, NO LONGER FACED WITH COUNTERVAILING PRESSURE FROM SOLIDARITY, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE LESS RESISTANT TO SUCH SOVIET ACTION.

7. STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF POLAND RETURNING TO THE STATUS QUO OF 12 DECEMBER, WITHOUT OUTSIDE PRESSURE. IF NOTHING WERE DONE, POLAND COULD RETURN NOT MERELY TO THE SITUATION BEFORE AUGUST 1980, BUT TO THE POSITION BEFORE 1952.

HENDERSON.

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FM WASHINGTON 220104Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3890 OF 21 DECEMBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, BRUSSELS, PARIS, BONN, ROME,
PRIORITY WARSAW, MOSCOW, ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS, PEKING,
UKMIS NEW YORK.

POLAND: U.S. VIEWS.

1. I ATTENDED A BRIEFING TODAY OF NATO AMBASSADORS BY SCANLAN AND HOLMES (STATE DEPARTMENT), ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN POLAND AND ON THE DEFECTION OF THE POLISH AMBASSADOR HERE (SEE MY TWO IFTS). THEY ALSO OUTLINED U.S. POLICY ON THE WESTERN RESPONSE. THIS FOLLOWED THE LINE IN HAIG'S LATEST MESSAGE (YOUR TELNO 1971 - NOT TO ALL).

2. HOLMES EMPHASISED THAT THE MILITARY TAKEOVER IN POLAND AND SUBSEQUENT REPRESSION COULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED WITHOUT SOVIET KNOWLEDGE AND APPROVAL. THE QUESTION OF THE PRECISE EXTENT OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT WAS THEREFORE IRRELEVANT. GIVEN THE MILITARY

KNOWLEDGE AND APPROVAL. ~~THE QUESTION OF THE PRECISE EXTENT OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT WAS THEREFORE IRRELEVANT.~~ GIVEN THE MILITARY CRACKDOWN, THE SOVIET POTENTIAL TO INTERVENE ACTIVELY HAD CLEARLY IMPROVED. EVEN IF THEY DID NOT DO SO, THE DEMOLITION OF THE REFORM MOVEMENT COULD CONTINUE, ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES OF THE RUSSIANS AND INFLECTING A DEFEAT ON THE WEST. IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO ALLOW THE RUSSIANS TO THINK THAT THIS COULD HAPPEN WITHOUT ANY WESTERN RESPONSE, AS A RESULT OF A RATIONALISATION THAT MOSCOW HAD NOT ACTUALLY INTERVENED PHYSICALLY.

3. THE U.S. THEREFORE BELIEVED THAT WE SHOULD ACT IN TWO WAYS:
I. BY EXERTING PRESSURE ON JARUZELSKI TO MOVE TOWARDS RECONCILIATION WITH THE CHURCH AND SOLIDARITY. THE POGGI VISIT TO WARSAW WOULD BE IMPORTANT.
II. BY MAKING IT CLEAR TO THE RUSSIANS THAT WE RECOGNISED THE ROLE THEY HAD ALREADY PLAYED, AND REMAINED CONCERNED TO DETER THEM FROM ACTIVE INTERVENTION.

4. PREVIOUS NATO DISCUSSIONS HAD FOCUSED ON SOVIET INTERVENTION BUT THE PRESENT SITUATION INTRODUCED NEW ELEMENTS. WE SHOULD BE READY TO EXERT OUR LEVERAGE ON BOTH THE POLES AND THE RUSSIANS AND DEMONSTRATE OUR READINESS TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE IF THIS WERE REQUIRED. AT THE SAME TIME WE SHOULD GIVE A SIGNAL THAT WE WOULD RELAX THE PRESSURE IF THE SITUATION WITHIN POLAND IMPROVED.

5. SO FAR THE U.S. HAD TAKEN CERTAIN STEPS: THE SUSPENSION OF THE RENEWAL OF EXPORT INSURANCE BY THE EXIM BANK TO POLAND; THE ENCOURAGEMENT TO U.S. BANKS NOT TO LEND NEW CREDITS TO THE SOVIET UNION OR POLAND; AND THE SUSPENSION OF REMAINING SHIPMENTS (6,000 TONNES) OF SURPLUS DAIRY PRODUCTS UNDER THE AGREEMENT CONCLUDED THIS APRIL - SOME 30,000 TONNES HAD ALREADY BEEN SHIPPED. HUMANITARIAN AID ADMINISTERED THROUGH THE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES WAS CONTINUING SINCE THE U.S. WERE STILL ABLE TO CHECK THAT IT WAS REACHING THE DESIGNATED RECIPIENTS. THE POLISH AUTHORITIES HAD BEEN TOLD ON 19 DECEMBER THAT THE U.S. EXPECTED TO BE ABLE TO CONTINUE THIS MONITORING PROCESS. IN ADDITION THE ADMINISTRATION WERE CONSIDERING FURTHER STEPS, INCLUDING WAYS TO BRING HOME TO THE RUSSIANS WHAT THEIR COMPLICITY IN THE MILITARY TAKEOVER WOULD COST THEM.

6. THE U.S. ENCOURAGED THEIR ALLIES TO TAKE PARALLEL ACTION. THERE WAS A NEED TO DEMONSTRATE TO MOSCOW AND WARSAW THAT WE WOULD NOT CONDUCT BUSINESS AS USUAL. THE U.S. HOPED THAT THE NAC MEETING ON 23 DECEMBER COULD BE USED TO COORDINATE WESTERN ACTION AND TO SHOW NATO'S CONCERN AT THE FLIGHT OF THE POLISH PEOPLE AND SOLIDARITY. HOLMES NOTED THAT ONE WAY OF DOING THIS MIGHT BE THROUGH TRADES

23 DECEMBER COULD BE USED TO COORDINATE WESTERN ACTION AND TO SHOW NATO'S CONCERN AT THE FLIGHT OF THE POLISH PEOPLE AND SOLIDARITY. HOLMES NOTED THAT ONE WAY OF DOING THIS MIGHT BE THROUGH TRADES UNIONS IN THE WEST - THE LONGSHOREMEN UNION HERE HAD ALREADY DECIDED TO EMBARGO ALL SHIPMENTS TO POLAND EXCEPT THOSE OF HUMANITARIAN FOOD AID AND MEDICINE.

7. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS, HOLMES AND SCANLAN MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

I. AT PRESENT THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN TO AN INCREASE IN HUMANITARIAN AID, DESPITE THE POSSIBLE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE TO WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION THAT ACTION AGAINST THE POLISH AUTHORITIES WAS BEING BALANCED IN THIS WAY.

II. AMONG THE STEPS UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE ADMINISTRATION WERE A RESUMPTION OF THE GRAIN EMBARGO AND CHANGES IN THE BILATERAL U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. THE U.S. HAD TWO MAJOR POINTS OF LEVERAGE OVER MOSCOW: THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND U.S. RELATIONS WITH CHINA. ANY MOVE TO REIMPOSE THE EMBARGO WOULD MEET WITH STRONG DEMANDS FROM U.S. AGRICULTURE THAT THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR MAKE EQUIVALENT SACRIFICES.

III. EVEN IF THE SITUATION IN POLAND CONTINUED AS IT WAS AND DID NOT GET WORSE, THE U.S. WOULD PROBABLY WISH TO STEP UP THE PRESSURE ON THE POLES AND RUSSIANS.

IV. WEINBERGER'S REFERENCE ON TELEVISION YESTERDAY TO FURTHER SECURITY MEASURES UNDER CONSIDERATION WAS PRESUMABLY (AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT CANNOT BE CATEGORICAL ON THIS POINT) MEANT TO COVER THE ENHANCED READINESS PROCEDURES ALREADY DISCUSSED IN NATO.

HENDERSON

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BF 22/12/81

21 December 1981

Poland

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister received from President Reagan on 19 December. As you are aware, the Prime Minister had some discussion of its contents with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on the telephone yesterday.

I should be grateful if you could let me have a suitable draft reply for signature by the Prime Minister by close of play on 22 December.

A J COLES

Frances Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1002 OF 21ST DECEMBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE : WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS,
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INFO SAVING: UKMIS NEW YORK, PRAGUE, SOFIA, BELGRADE, BUDAPEST,
BUCHAREST, EAST BERLIN, HELSINKI, STOCKHOLM, UKREP BRUSSELS.

FROM MELHUI SH.

POLISH SITUATION.

1. I CALLED BRIEFLY ON THE PRIMATE THIS AFTERNOON AT MY REQUEST.
2. ARCHBISHOP GLEMP SAID THAT THE SITUATION IN POLAND WAS VERY BAD. HE WAS PREPARED TO BELIEVE THAT JARUZELSKI HAD THE GOOD OF THE PARTY AND THE COUNTRY AT HEART WHEN HE DECLARED A STATE OF WAR BUT THE POLISH PEOPLE WERE SUFFERING. THE CHURCH HAS PROTESTED ABOUT THE INTERNEES AND HAD EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONCERN OVER WALESA AND OTHER SOLIDARITY LEADERS. THE METHODS OF THE MILICJA WERE "BRUTAL". THE ARCHBISHOP CONFIRMED THAT SILESIA AND GDANSK WERE STILL THE MAIN TROUBLE SPOTS AND THAT THERE WERE SOME SERIOUS FIGHTS STILL HAPPENING. HE KNEW THAT FOUR MINES AROUND KATOWICE WERE STILL ON STRIKE. THE CHURCH DEPLORED THE SEVEN DEATHS AT THE WUJEK COLLIERY AND OTHER CASUALTIES. WHEN I ASKED HIM ABOUT THE HOST OF CURRENT RUMOURS THAT THERE WERE CONSIDERABLY MORE DEATHS, HE SAID THAT SO FAR AS HE KNEW, ONLY SEVEN PEOPLE HAD DIED. ONE MEMBER OF THE MILICJA WAS SERIOUSLY ILL AND MIGHT DIE SOON.
3. I ASKED WHETHER THE CHURCH WAS ACTIVELY SEEKING SOME NEGOTIATION OR RECONCILIATION BETWEEN WALESA AND JARUZELSKI. THE PRIMATE REPLIED THAT THEY WERE INDEED PRESSING FOR SOME SORT OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN WALESA AND THE SOLIDARITY PRESIDUM ON THE ONE HAND AND JARUZELSKI AND THE MARTIAL COUNCIL ON THE OTHER. HE DID NOT SEEM OPTIMISTIC. THE KEY QUESTION WAS THE FUTURE OF SOLIDARITY WHICH HAD NOT BEEN DISSOLVED. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT JARUZELSKI COULD NOT LET SOLIDARITY GO BACK TO ITS PREVIOUS EXISTENCE BUT, IF SOLIDARITY BECAME MERELY A TRADE UNION, IT WOULD NO LONGER FULFIL THE NEEDS OF THE PEOPLE.
4. I ASKED HIM ABOUT WALESA. HE REPLIED THAT WALESA WAS IN GOOD PHYSICAL HEALTH ALTHOUGH "HIS HEAD ACHES". HE WAS ISOLATED AND HE HAD JUST BEEN MOVED FOR THE THIRD TIME. ARCHBISHOP GLEMP CONFESSES THAT THE CHURCH DID NOT NOW KNOW WHERE WALESA WAS. WHEN I ASKED ABOUT THE DETENTION OF THE INTERNEES, GLEMP SAID THAT SOME HAD BEEN HARSHLY TREATED FOR THE FIRST TWO DAYS BUT, LARGELY BECAUSE OF ACTIVE CHURCH MEDIATION, THEIR CONDITIONS WERE NOW MUCH BETTER.

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THEY WERE STAYING IN HOLIDAY HOMES. THE CHURCH WAS HOPING TO GET AS MANY AS POSSIBLE FREED BEFORE CHRISTMAS AND TO SEND PRIESTS TO SEE ALL THE OTHERS.

5. I ASKED THE PRIMATE HOW LONG THE STATE OF EMERGENCY WOULD LAST. HE SAID THAT HE GENUINELY HAD NO IDEA BUT THOUGHT THAT TELEPHONES AND TELEGRAMS MIGHT BE RESTORED EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR. THE REST OF THE TOUGH MARTIAL LAW CONDITIONS WOULD PROBABLY GO ON LONGER.

6. THE ARCHBISHOP CONFIRMED THAT CARDINAL POGGI, THE POPE'S EMISSARY, WAS IN TOWN AND THAT HE HAD SEEN HIM. HE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN ON WHAT THE CARDINAL MIGHT DO NEXT.

7. FINALLY, I ASKED THE ARCHBISHOP WHAT THE POLISH CHURCH EXPECTED OF THE WEST AT THE MOMENT. HE REPLIED THAT POLAND NEEDED TO PRESERVE ITS LINKS WITH THE WEST. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED BY THE FIRST COMMENTS OF WESTERN LEADERS WHO ARGUED THAT POLAND MUST BE LEFT TO SORT OUT ITS OWN DESTINY. EQUALLY, HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION WAS RIGHT TO CUT OFF FOOD AID SINCE THE POLISH PEOPLE NEEDED THAT AID. IF POLAND COULD NOT GET CRUCIAL FOOD IMPORTS FROM THE WEST, THEY WOULD HAVE TO TURN TO THE SOVIET UNION.

8. THE PRIMATE, WHOM I HAD NOT MET BEFORE, SEEMED DEPRESSED. HE GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS NOT SURE WHAT MORE THE CHURCH SHOULD DO IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. IT IS, HOWEVER, HIS CUSTOMARY STYLE TO BE LACONIC AND A BIT GLOOMY. I FOUND IT PARTICULARLY INTERESTING THAT HE INSISTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN ONLY SEVEN DEATHS SO FAR, SINCE THE CHURCH IS IN NEARLY AS GOOD A POSITION AS THE GOVERNMENT TO KNOW HOW MANY HAVE DIED.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

JAMES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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FROM UKMIS GENEVA 211630Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 470 OF 21 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WARSAW, UKREP BRUSSELS, PARIS, DEPT OF EMPLOYMENT.

POLISH CRISIS: HUMANITARIAN AND SOCIAL ASPECTS

1. I HAVE CONVENED A MEETING OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TEN IN GENEVA AT 11 AM ON 23 DECEMBER TO DISCUSS THOSE ASPECTS OF THE POLISH CRISIS WHICH ARE OF CONCERN TO THE INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES BASED HERE. THERE ARE THREE OF THESE: FOOD AID, IN WHICH THE RED CROSS IS ALREADY INVOLVED; REFUGEES; AND LABOUR AFFAIRS.

2. ON FOOD AID AND THE RED CROSS PLEASE SEE MY TELNOS 463 AND 468. THE TELEX ISSUED BY THE LEAGUE (AND COPIED TO UN DEPARTMENT) MENTIONED THAT AN ICRC DELEGATION WOULD ALSO VISIT WARSAW SHORTLY. IT WOULD BE OF GREAT VALUE TO HAVE ANY VIEWS FROM WARSAW ON THIS ASPECT, YOU ARE NO DOUBT ALREADY CONSIDERING HOW TO RESPOND TO POSSIBLE CALLS FOR FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND OTHER ASSISTANCE FROM THE LEAGUE OR THE ICRC.

3. ON REFUGEES PLEASE SEE MY TELNO 462. WE ARE IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES.

4. ON LABOUR AFFAIRS THE ILO HAVE A SPECIAL INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENTS

4. ~~ON LABOUR AFFAIRS THE ILO HAVE A SPECIAL INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENTS~~ IN POLAND. IT WAS ON THE BASIS OF ILO CONVENTIONS THAT THE MOVEMENT WAS LAUNCHED WHICH LED TO SOLIDARNOSC; WALESA ATTENDED THE LAST ILO CONFERENCE HERE IN JUNE. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE ILO, BLANCHARD, REACTED TO THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS BY SENDING ON 14 DECEMBER A MESSAGE TO THE MILITARY REGIME IN POLAND EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT THE AFFECTS ON THE POLISH TRADE UNION MOVEMENT AND OFFERING TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO REESTABLISH TRADE UNION FREEDOMS.

5. WE HAVE TODAY HEARD FROM THE ILO THAT THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER SENT TO BLANCHARD ON 18 DECEMBER A MESSAGE EXPRESSING FRENCH SOLIDARITY FOR HIS ACTION AND URGING BLANCHARD TO SEND A FACT-FINDING MISSION. WE UNDERSTAND FROM OUR BELGIAN COLLEAGUES THAT THE FRENCH SOUGHT TO GAIN SUPPORT FROM THE TEN FOR THIS LINE AND THAT THEY HAVE CIRCULATED A COREU REFERENCE MUL/ETR/31/34 ON 18 DECEMBER. BLANCHARD WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE FRENCH GESTURE OF SUPPORT. I HAVE BEEN ASKED BY THE BELGIANS WHETHER WE INTEND TO ACT IN PARALLEL EITHER NATIONALLY OR AS PRESIDENCY. ALTHOUGH THERE MIGHT BE VALUE IN GIVING STRONG PUBLIC SUPPORT TO BLANCHARD'S INITIATIVE, AS A MEANS OF BRINGING SOME PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE POLISH MILITARY REGIME, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IT COULD WELL INCREASE POLISH SUSPICIONS OF THE ILO INITIATIVE, AND SO BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE ON THIS SUBJECT BEFORE 0900Z ON 23 DECEMBER.

FCO PLEASE PASS COPIES TO DEPT OF EMPLOYMENT
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GARCIA
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FM FCO 211030Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1974 OF 21 DECEMBER

AND TO MOSCOW PARIS BONN BELGRADE BUCHAREST BUDAPEST PRAGUE SOFIA
EAST BERLIN ROME THE HAGUE LUXEMBOURG BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN ATHENS
DUBLIN AKNARA LISBON OSLO OTTAWA REYKJAVIK UKDEL NATO STOCKHOLM
HELSINKI VIENNA BERNE MADRID CANBERRA WELLINGTON PEKING TOKYO
NEW DELHI ISLAMABAD TEL AVIV CAIRO PRETORIA/CAPETOWN BRASILIA
BUENOS AIRES MEXICO CITY STRASBOURG UKDEL MADRID UKMIS NEW YORK
UKMIS GENEVA KATHMANDU

POLAND

DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW

1. ON THE NIGHT OF 12/13 DECEMBER THE POLISH PRIME MINISTER,
GENERAL JARUZELSKI, DECLARED MARTIAL LAW AND ANNOUNCED THAT A
'MILITARY COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL SALVATION' HAD ASSUMED RESPONSIB-
ILITY FOR GOVERNING POLAND. MILITARY OFFICERS HAVE BEEN
APPOINTED TO OVERSEE CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: THE BORDERS
HAVE BEEN SEALED: TELEX AND TELEPHONE LINKS HAVE BEEN CUT:
CIVIL LIBERTIES SUSPENDED: AND A BAN IMPOSED ON STRIKES.

2. IN ANNOUNCING THE MEASURES JARUZELSKI STRESSED THAT THEY
WOULD BE OF SHORT DURATION AND WOULD BE RESCINDED WHEN CALM AND
ORDER WERE RESTORED. HE SAID THAT THE ESSENTIALS OF THE POLISH
RENEWAL OF THE PAST 17 MONTHS WOULD BE SAFEGUARDED AND CLAIMED
THAT, IN DUE COURSE, REFORM WOULD CONTINUE.

EXPLANATION TO WESTERN GOVERNMENTS

3. IN EXPLAINING THESE MEASURES TO WESTERN GOVERNMENTS, THE
POLISH AUTHORITIES HAVE CLAIMED THAT THE SITUATION HAD BECOME
SO SERIOUS THAT THEY HAD HAD NO ALTERNATIVE, AND THAT A
DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW WAS THE LEAST VIOLENT OF A NUMBER OF
ALTERNATIVES. THEY HAVE REITERATED JARUZELSKI'S CLAIM THAT THE

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MEASURES WILL BE SHORT-LIVED, THAT THERE WILL BE NO RETURN TO THE POLICIES PREVAILING BEFORE AUGUST 1980, AND THAT, AS SOON AS THE INTERNAL SITUATION HAS STABILISED, MARTIAL LAW WILL BE RESCINDED AND CIVIL LIBERTIES RESTORED. THEY HAVE APPEALED TO WESTERN GOVERNMENTS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND HAVE ASKED THEM TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

SOVIET ATTITUDE

4. THE SOVIET UNION HAS EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR JARUZELSKI, BUT COMMENT HAS BEEN KEPT COMPARATIVELY LOW KEY AND FACTUAL, WITH CONSIDERABLE STRESS ON THE FACT THAT THESE DEVELOPMENTS MUST BE SEEN AS POLAND'S INTERNAL AFFAIR. AT PRESENT THE RUSSIANS ARE CLEARLY TRYING TO SUGGEST THAT THEY ARE NOT INVOLVED AND CANNOT BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE: BUT IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT THEY KNOW WHAT JARUZELSKI INTENDED TO DO, AND AGREED WITH IT. SOVIET FORCES ARE AT A HIGH STATE OF READINESS BUT THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS TO SUGGEST THAT SOVIET INTERVENTION IS IMMINENT. HOWEVER, IF THE POLISH MILITARY AUTHORITIES ARE UNABLE TO CONTROL THE SITUATION, SOVIET INTERVENTION IS LIKELY.

POLISH POPULAR REACTION

5. THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW WAS CARRIED OUT WITH CONSIDERABLE EFFICIENCY AND ACHIEVED A LARGE MEASURE OF SURPRISE. THE AUTHORITIES WERE ABLE TO DETAIN MANY OF SOLIDARITY'S LEADERS, INCLUDING LECH WALESZA, WHO WE BELIEVE IS UNDER HOUSE ARREST IN A SUBURB OF WARSAW. SHOCKED BY DEVELOPMENTS AND DEPRIVED OF LEADERSHIP, SOLIDARITY'S REACTION HAS TAKEN TIME TO DEVELOP. HOWEVER, IN THE LAST FEW DAYS THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF WIDESPREAD STRIKES AND SIT-INS (PERHAPS AFFECTING AS MANY AS 200 PLANTS), AND THE POLISH AUTHORITIES HAVE ADMITTED THAT 7 PEOPLE WERE KILLED IN A CLASH BETWEEN MINERS AND SECURITY FORCES AT A MINE IN KATOWICE IN SOUTHERN POLAND.

6. THERE HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY BEEN OTHER VIOLENT INCIDENTS (THE AUTHORITIES HAVE ADMITTED THAT SEVERAL HUNDRED PEOPLE HAVE BEEN INJURED, MANY OF WHOM THEY CLAIM ARE POLICE), AND STRIKES AND SIT-INS ARE CONTINUING. THE POSITION IN THE MINING REGION OF SILESIA IS GIVING THE POLISH AUTHORITIES PARTICULAR TROUBLE: REPORTS SUGGEST THAT UP TO 20 MINES ARE OCCUPIED BY MINERS WHO

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HAVE TAKEN THEIR FAMILIES INTO THE MINES WITH THEM. WE ALSO KNOW OF A LARGE DEMONSTRATION IN WARSAW ON 17 DECEMBER WHICH POLICE BROKE UP WITH TRUNCHEONS AND TEAR GAS. THE AUTHORITIES HAVE SET UP HASTILY CONSTRUCTED DETENTION CAMPS BUT WE DO NOT KNOW HOW MANY, NOR THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE INTERNED IN THEM.

CURRENT POSITION

7. IT IS DIFFICULT TO GIVE AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE POSITION AT THE END OF THE FIRST WEEK OF MARTIAL LAW BECAUSE RELIABLE INFORMATION IS SCARCE. WESTERN EMBASSIES ARE RESTRICTED TO WARSAW AND INTERNAL COMMUNICATION IN POLAND REMAINS CUT. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT, WHILE WARSAW IS FOR THE MOST PART CALM AND TIGHTLY CONTROLLED BY THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES, ACTIVE RESISTANCE ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY, PARTICULARLY IN SILESIA AND ON THE COAST, IS CONTINUING. IT ALSO SEEMS LIKELY THAT THERE IS CONSIDERABLE PASSIVE RESISTANCE, AND THAT FEW INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES ARE WORKING NORMALLY.

THE WESTERN POSITION

8. IMMEDIATE WESTERN REACTIONS TO THE CRISIS, WHICH WERE CLOSELY CO-ORDINATED IN THE TEN AND NATO, WERE TO MARK OUR CONCERN AT THE SUSPENSION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE IMPRISONMENT OF TRADE UNIONISTS, BUT TO AVOID ACTING IN A WAY WHICH MIGHT COMPLICATE THE SITUATION. OUR MAJOR INTERESTS ARE THAT: THE CRISIS SHOULD BE KEPT UNDER CONTROL: THAT POLAND SHOULD SOLVE ITS OWN PROBLEM WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE: AND THAT THE DEMOCRATIC GAINS OF THE LAST 17 MONTHS SHOULD NOT BE PERMANENTLY LOST EVEN IF THEY ARE TEMPORARILY HALTED OR REVERSED.

9. WE REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH OUR PARTNERS AND OUR ATTITUDE WILL BE DETERMINED BY DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND, INCLUDING THE FATE OF SOLIDARITY, THE DEGREE OF POPULAR RESISTANCE, THE USE OF FORCE BY THE AUTHORITIES, AND BY OUR ASSESSMENT OF JARUZELSKI'S INTENTIONS. THE LATTER ARE NOT EASY TO JUDGE. WE MAY BE WITNESSING THE START OF THE EXTINCTION OF THE PROCESS OF RENEWAL BEGUN IN AUGUST 1980, BUT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT JARUZELSKI MAY BE AT LEAST PARTLY SINCERE IN HIS REFERENCES TO RETURNING TO THE PATH OF REFORM AND RENEWAL. HOWEVER, IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER EVENTS WILL PERMIT THIS AT LEAST IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS AND

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MONTHS, WHATEVER JARUZELSKI MAY INTEND. THE DEATHS AND CASUALTIES OF THE LAST FEW DAYS ARE LIKELY TO LEAVE A BITTER LEGACY AND TO PREJUDICE STILL FURTHER THE PROSPECTS FOR ANY RESUMPTION OF A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE AUTHORITIES AND SOLIDARITY. THE GULF BETWEEN RULERS AND RULED, ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF THE PRESENT CRISIS, IS LIKELY TO GROW EVEN WIDER.

LINE TO TAKE

10. ALTHOUGH YOU MAY DRAW ON THE FOREGOING IN TALKING TO RELIABLE CONTACTS, YOU SHOULD BE PARTICULARLY CAREFUL IN EXPLAINING HMG'S POLICY TO STICK CLOSELY TO THE PUBLIC LINE TAKEN BY MINISTERS. THIS WILL BE ADJUSTED AS NECESSARY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENTS. IN THIS CONNECTION YOU SHOULD DRAW ON THE STATEMENT BY ME IN THE LORDS AND BY THE LPS IN THE COMMONS ON 14 DECEMBER (VS 295/81): ON THE STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE TEN OF 15 DECEMBER (RETRACT NO 62515): THE FCO PRESS SPOKESMAN OF 14, 15, 16, 17 DECEMBER (NOT TO ALL): AND MY SPEECH IN STRASBOURG ON 17 DECEMBER.

11. ON THE QUESTION OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO POLAND, YOU SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE OF 15 DECEMBER (RETRACT NO 62515).

12. IF YOU ARE ASKED ABOUT COMMUNITY FOOD AID, YOU MAY SAY THAT MINISTERS OF THE TEN HAVE DECIDED THAT DECISIONS ALREADY TAKEN AND ANNOUNCED SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED. NO NEW DECISIONS FALL TO BE TAKEN FOR THE TIME BEING.

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c. ~~Mr. Whitmore~~
Mr. Coles



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PRIME MINISTER

The Foreign Secretary
would like 15 minutes tomorrow
morning to discuss Poland.
I have put him in after E or
at 1145 approx.

21 December 1981

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GRS 50
UNCLASSIFIED
FM WARSAW 211830Z DEC
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 998 OF 21ST DECEMBER 1981

YOUR TELNO 726: MISKIW.

1. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY THE MFA THAT MISKIW HAS BEEN DETAINED ON SUSPICION OF VIOLATING ARTICLE 288 OF THE POLISH CRIMINAL CODE BY ILLEGALLY CROSSING THE CZECHOSLOVAK/POLISH BORDER AT ZEBAZYDOWICE ON 18 DECEMBER. FORMAL CHARGES HAVE NOT YET BEEN PREFERRED. MISKIW IS BEING HELD IN WARSAW FOR INVESTIGATION. WE ARE REQUESTING CONSULAR ACCESS AND WILL REPORT FURTHER.

JAMES

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FM MOSCOW 211130Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 759 OF 21 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, WARSAW AND

PRIORITY BONN, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO

POLAND

1. FRENCH EMBASSY TODAY GAVE COMMUNITY BRIEFING ON THE REPRESENTATIONS MADE TO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KOVALEV BY FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON 19 DECEMBER.

2. FROMENT-MEURICE BEGAN BY READING EXTRACTS FROM THE STATEMENTS OF PRESIDENT MITTERRAND AND PRIME MINISTER MAUROY ON 16 DECEMBER CONDEMNING THE REPRESSION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN POLAND. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT FRANCE COULD NOT REMAIN INDIFFERENT TO LIBERTY IN A EUROPEAN COUNTRY, ESPECIALLY A LONG-STANDING FRIEND OF FRANCE WHOSE FRIENDSHIP HAD BEEN MADE CLOSER BY HER STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY WHICH FORMED A PART OF THE UNIVERSAL RIGHTS OF MAN. ALTHOUGH FRANCE HAD SCRUPULOUSLY AVOIDED INTERFERENCE IN POLISH INTERNAL AFFAIRS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS, THIS HAD NEVER MEANT INDIFFERENCE. FRANCE REGRETTED THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MILITARY REGIME AND A SEVERE STATE OF SIEGE HAD BRUTALLY

INTERRUPTED THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, CAUSING IMPRISONMENT AND BLOODSHED. SHE WISHED THE IMPRISONED TRADE UNIONISTS TO BE FREED AND CIVIC AND TRADE UNION FREEDOMS RESTORED IN POLAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AT PRESENT IT APPEARED TO FRANCE, THAT EVENTS WERE, AND HAD HITHERTO BEEN, CONFINED TO THE NATIONAL FRAMEWORK OF POLAND; BUT IF THE SITUATION WERE TO DEVELOP OTHERWISE, FRANCE WOULD DRAW THE NECESSARY CONCLUSIONS. OUTSIDE PRESSURES AND INTERFERENCE HAD DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY FACILITATED THE LAUNCHING OF A POLICY WHICH WAS CONTRARY TO POLISH NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS. IN THE FRENCH VIEW SUCH PRESSURE AMOUNTED TO SUPPORT OF REPRESSION. FINALLY FROMENT-MEURICE ASKED WHETHER IT WAS TRUE THAT MARSHAL KULIKOV AND OTHER SOVIET OFFICERS WERE IN WARSAW AT THE TIME WHEN MARTIAL LAW WAS DECLARED.

3. KOVALEV REPLIED BY QUOTING THE GROMYKO/JOBERT CONVERSATION IN MOSCOW ON 15 DECEMBER (AT WHICH GROMYKO HAD REFUSED TO DISCUSS POLISH AFFAIRS AS THEY WERE A MATTER FOR THE POLES) AND INVOKING THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE LAID DOWN IN THE UN CHARTER AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL UNDERTAKINGS. WORDS LIKE "CONDEMNATION" AND "AN IMPOSED SITUATION" WERE AN ATTEMPT TO INTERFERE IN POLISH INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND THE SAME WAS TRUE OF ALL FORMS OF INSINUATION BEING MADE IN WESTERN COUNTRIES. THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT RECOGNISE THE RIGHT OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO ASK QUESTIONS ABOUT POLAND AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION SINCE POLAND WAS AN ALLIED AND SOCIALIST STATE.
4. FROMENT-MEURICE REJECTED THE WORD "INTERFERENCE". FRANCE SYMPATHISED WITH AND WOULD HELP THE POLISH PEOPLE AS VICTIMS OF REPRESSION BY GIVING THEM FOOD AND TAKING DIPLOMATIC ACTION. HE ENDED BY SAYING THAT ALTHOUGH KOVALEV DENIED FRANCE'S RIGHT TO ASK QUESTIONS ABOUT POLAND, THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SITUATION IN POLAND AND OF THE SOVIET POSITION IN REGARD TO POLAND WOULD HAVE AN EFFECT ON FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS.
5. SIMILAR APPROACHES HAVE BEEN MADE IN ALL WARSAW PACT CAPITALS EXCEPT WARSAW.

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GRS 500

FM WARSAW 201810Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 983 OF 29TH DECEMBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE: WASHINGTON, BONN, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, PARIS
AND MODUK.

FROM MELHUI SH

POLAND: THE CHURCH.

1. THE FIRST REACTION OF THE CHURCH TO THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW, CONTAINED IN GLEMP'S SERMON AT CZESTOCHOWA OF LAST SUNDAY, WAS CLEARLY FELT BY MANY BISHOPS TO BE TOO FAVOURABLE TO THE REGIME. THE MAIN COUNCIL OF THE BISHOPS WHICH MET ON TUESDAY ACCORDINGLY DREW UP A COMMUNIQUE WHICH WAS EXTREMELY UNFAVOURABLE TO THE REGIME. IT SPECIFICALLY CALLED FOR THE RELEASE OF ALL INTERNEES AND THE RETURN TO SOLIDARITY OF ITS FULL RIGHTS AS A TRADE UNION. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY THE SUFFRAGON BISHOP OF WARSAW THAT THE MILITARY COUNCIL FELT THIS COMMUNIQUE WAS TOO STRONG AND ACCORDINGLY BROUGHT PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE CHURCH TO TONE IT DOWN. AS A RESULT OF THIS PRESSURE, ONLY A SHORT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIMATE WAS READ OUT IN CHURCHES TODAY. (WE HAVE HEARD A STORY THAT THE FULL TEXT OF THE EARLIER COMMUNIQUE WAS RELEASED BY THE VATICAN TODAY). MEMBERS OF THE EMBASSY WHO ATTENDED THE CHURCH SERVICES SAID THAT THE MOOD WAS ONE OF DESPAIR AMONG BOTH PRIESTS AND CONGREGATIONS.

2. THE MESSAGE SIMPLY SAYS THAT THE STATE OF MARTIAL LAW IS A BAD DEVELOPMENT, PARTICULARLY AT CHRISTMAS SEMI COLON BUT THAT THE POLISH PEOPLE, WHO HAVE NEVER EXPERIENCED A CIVIL WAR, SHOULD NOT START ONE NOW. PRIESTS IN THOSE CHURCHES THAT MEMBERS OF THE EMBASSY VISITED FOLLOWED THE READING OF THIS MESSAGE WITH A STRAIGHTFORWARD RELIGIOUS SERMON, ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT OTHER PRIESTS MAY HAVE BEEN MORE STRONGLY CRITICAL OF THE REGIME.

3. THERE IS SOME SPECULATION THAT THE CHURCH MAY HAVE DEMANDED A QUID PRO QUO FROM THE REGIME IN EXCHANGE FOR THE WATERING DOWN OF THEIR ORIGINAL STATEMENT. THE ONLY CONCESSION THAT HAS SO FAR BEEN MADE PUBLIC IS THAT THE CURFEW WILL BE SUSPENDED ON CHRISTMAS EVE SO THAT POLES MAY ATTEND MIDNIGHT MASS. BUT IT IS ALSO

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RUMOURED THAT WALESZA MAY HAVE BEEN RELEASED INTO THE CUSTODY OF THE CHURCH, AND THAT THE CHURCH HAS BEEN ALLOWED TO TAKE FOOD AND WARM CLOTHING TO AN INTERNMENT CAMP NEAR WARSAW.

4. RUMOURS ARE ALSO PERSISTING IN WARSAW THAT GLEMP HAS REFUSED TO TALK TO JARUZELSKI EXCEPT IN THE PRESENCE OF WALESZA AND WALESZA HAS REFUSED TO TALK TO JARUZELSKI EXCEPT IN THE PRESENCE OF GLEMP. WE ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THIS, THE CHURCH'S ROLE IN THE CRISIS IS OBVIOUSLY CRUCIAL. GLEMP'S AIM AS AN EXPERIENCED POLITICIAN WILL BE TO ENCOURAGE THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN SOLIDARITY AND THE REGIME WHICH HE HAS ALREADY PUBLICLY ENDORSED. IN PERMITTING ONLY A FAIRLY BLAND MESSAGE TO BE READ IN THE CHURCHES TODAY, HE HAS KEPT HIS CARDS UP HIS SLEEVE. HE MAY ALSO WISH TO SPEAK WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES DESPATCHED BY THE POPE. THE REGIME MUST BE AWARE THAT HE COULD STILL ISSUE A HARD HITTING COMMUNIQUE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE EFFECTS OF THIS WOULD BE VERY BAD FOR THE REGIME. BUT THE CHURCH'S MAIN CONCERN WILL BE TO AVOID THE SHEDDING OF POLISH BLOOD, OR AT LEAST THE SHEDDING OF MORE BLOOD THAN IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 3879 OF 20 DECEMBER

AND TO PRIORITY WARSAW (PERSONAL FOR MELHUI SH)

YOUR TELNO 1972: POLISH AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON

YES, I THINK HE HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT SOURCE. STOESEL TOLD ME TO-DAY THAT HE HAD WANTED TO DEFECT LAST SUNDAY BUT THEY HAD IMPLORRED HIM TO STAY ON A BIT SO AS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION. AS OVER WHAT HE TOLD ME I BELIEVE THAT WHAT HE TOLD THE STATE DEPT ABOUT THE DEGREE OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE CRACKDOWN MADE AN IMPACT. IT PUT AN END TO ANY SPECULATION BY HAIG SUCH AS HE HAD ENGAGED IN IN BRUSSELS THAT THE CRACK DOWN MIGHT BE SEEN AS A MEANS OF HEADING OFF THE RUSSIANS.

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO BE SURE ABOUT THE RELIABILITY OF SOMEONE IN THAT POSITION FROM A COMMUNIST COUNTRY. BUT AS YOU WILL KNOW FROM REPORTS OF OUR CONVERSATIONS THAT I HAVE SENT YOU FROM TIME TO TIME WHAT HE HAS TOLD ME HAS BEEN PROPHETIC AND USEFUL, PARTICULARLY ON THE LAST TWO OCCASIONS. JUDGED BY EVENTS HE HAS NEVER MISLED ME. BUT NOR HAS HE TRIED TO INGRATIATE HIMSELF OR GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF SEEKING TO ESTABLISH HIS BONA FIDES FOR A DEFECTION. HE HAS BEEN RESTRAINED AND CAUTIOUS GIVEN THE ENORMITY OF THE EVENTS HE WAS WITNESSING AND HIS PERSONAL

OR GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF SEEKING TO ESTABLISH HIS CREDIBILITY FOR A DEFECTION. HE HAS BEEN RESTRAINED AND CAUTIOUS GIVEN THE ENORMITY OF THE EVENTS HE WAS WITNESSING AND HIS PERSONAL REVULSION FROM THEM. HE BECAME NOTICEABLY MORE OUTSPOKEN ONCE HIS DAUGHTER AND SON-IN-LAW WERE SAFELY OUT OF POLAND AND IN WASHINGTON. HIS WIFE HAS ALWAYS BEEN MORE EMOTIONAL AND DOWNRIGHT THAN HE. I HAVE HEARD FROM A SEPARATE SOURCE NOT THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THEY MAY WANT TO GO TO LONDON BUT HE HAS NOT MENTIONED IT. BOTH THE AMBASSADOR AND HIS WIFE HAVE ELDERLY MOTHERS STILL IN POLAND WHICH IS OBVIOUSLY A WORRY TO HIM.

AS YOUR FILES WILL SHOW HE STARTED LIFE IN THE MILITARY. THERE IS SOMETHING DISCIPLINED ABOUT HIM AND I HAVE NEVER HEARD HIM DISCUSS IDEOLOGY. WHAT HAS ALWAYS STRUCK ME HAS BEEN HIS GREAT CONCERN TO BE PRECISE; NEITHER TO EXAGGERATE NOR TO GLOSS OVER. HE IS METICULOUS OVER DETAIL. YOU MIGHT TAKE HIM FOR A SCHOOL-MASTER IF YOU MET HIM, A TEACHER OF SOME EXACT SUBJECT LIKE MATHEMATICS BUT A MR CHIPS RATHER THAN A MR COMPREHENSIVE. THERE IS NOTHING TRENDY ABOUT HIM, NOT EVEN HIS VERY SMALL BRISTLING, REDDISH, BEARD.

NOT HAVING HAD MUCH EXPERIENCE OF DOUBLE AGENTS SO FAR AT ANY RATE AS I KNOW I CANNOT BE CERTAIN THAT THIS IS NOT HIS ROLE. BUT NONE OF THE FACTS NOR HIS PERSONALITY AS I CAN JUDGE IT WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE PRESENT DEFECTION IS A PUT-UP JOB AND I WOULD BE ASTONISHED IF HE WERE TO PROVE UNRELIABLE. BUT OF COURSE HE HAS LOST MOST OF HIS VALUE TO US NOW. YOU MIGHT WELL ASK WHAT HE TOLD ME THOUGH IN THE PAST THAT INVOLVED SUCH INDISCRETION. IT TOOK SOME TIME TO ESTABLISH CONFIDENCE AND I THINK HE WANTED TO SHARE THE TRUTH WITH SOMEONE WHO UNDERSTOOD POLAND. AT THE BEGINNING HE WAS VERY CAUTIOUS INDEED. DELIBERATELY I HAVE NEVER EXCHANGED VIEWS ABOUT HIM OR WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME WITH STOESSEL OR ANYONE IN THIS OR THE PAST US ADMINISTRATION. HE WAS ALWAYS VERY INSISTENT ABOUT SECURITY.

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FM WASHINGTON 201825Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3877 OF 20 DECEMBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WARSAW, MOSCOW, UKREP BRUSSELS,
PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN, ROME.

MY TELEGRAM NO 3868: POLAND.

IN THE COURSE OF AN INTERVIEW ON "FACE THE NATION" TODAY,
HAIG ANNOUNCED THAT THE POLISH AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, SPASOWSKY,
HAD ASKED FOR AND BEEN GRANTED POLITICAL ASYLUM, WITH HIS FAMILY.

2. HAIG WAS ASKED WHETHER, IN VIEW OF THE ULTIMATE SOVIET
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE REPRESSION IN POLAND, IT MADE SENSE TO
CONTINUE GRAIN SALES TO THE SOVIET UNION. HE REPLIED THAT THIS
WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS. FOR
THE TIME BEING, IT MADE SENSE TO MAINTAIN AN ELEMENT OF LEVERAGE
ON THE SOVIET UNION.

3. HAIG SAID THAT WALESA WAS IN CONFINEMENT ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF

3. HAIG SAID THAT WALESIA WAS IN CONFINEMENT ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF WARSAW AND WAS NOT COOPERATING WITH THE AUTHORITIES. EFFORTS MUST BE MADE TO BRING THE LATTER BACK TO THE PATH OF REFORM. ASSURANCES OF THEIR COMMITMENT TO RENEWAL SO FAR HAD BEEN COMPLETELY BELIED BY THEIR ACTIONS.

4. MEESE APPEARED ON TELEVISION IMMEDIATELY AFTER HAIG'S INTERVIEW, AS IF TO DEMONSTRATE THE WHITE HOUSE'S PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY AND ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY. HE TOO WAS ASKED WHY SANCTIONS HAD NOT ALREADY BEEN APPLIED AND SAID THAT IN THIS SITUATION THE ADMINISTRATIONS CONCERN MUST BE TO HELP THE POLISH PEOPLE.

5. BOTH HAIG AND MEESE WERE EXTREMELY CIRCUMSPECT AND AT PAINS TO SAY NOTHING WHICH MIGHT ENVENOM THE SITUATION OR FORECLOSE ANY OF THE ADMINISTRATIONS OPTIONS. HAIG'S TECHNIQUE OF SHOWING CONCERN ABOUT DELICATE FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES WITHOUT UNDERTAKING COMMITMENTS IS TO RESORT TO VERBIAGE. HE WAS AT HIS MOST CHARACTERISTIC ON TODAY'S PROGRAMME.

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SUBJECT

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY ON SUNDAY 20 DECEMBER 1981
AT 1045 HOURS

PM: Hello Peter.

FCS: Hello. You got Reagan's message?

PM: Yes, it was so vague I didn't think it was worth reading last night when it came in about half eleven.

FCS: I haven't seen it I'm afraid. I've had it read to me.

PM: There's nothing in it.

FCS: Yes, it's sort of cataclysmic isn't it.

PM: He says he's sending someone over to talk about what we can do between us to tackle this situation. But it's simply an internal situation.

FCS: He was coming anyway you realise.

PM: Oh, was he?

FCS: Yes. There's a quadripartite meeting in London on Tuesday. This has been set up for at least a week.

PM: Well, what ... the time has come to avert this tragedy, measures we can take now ... of Soviet intervention.

FCS: Haig's message, which came in this morning, is not really so much more specific either.

PM: Well, it just says Secretary Haig is in touch with your Foreign Minister about developing a specific set of measures. Now this came in about quarter past eleven last night and I got on to our Duty Clerk to see your Resident Duty Clerk to see if you had anything. But quite honestly it didn't look to me that urgent to telephone you last night. But I doubt very much whether they have

/ any proposals

any proposals.

FCS: Well, what Haig says is that Eagleburger is coming over with proposals and would we please have our proposals ready. What I suspect, I may be quite wrong, but what I suspect is that the Americans are moving, he's talking about implementing some of the measures which we had all agreed in NATO in the case of Soviet intervention. And I think they may be moving to a situation in which they're going to take it out on the Russians. That's just a guess because my message consists of a lot of stuff about nobody can suppose that the Russians aren't in it too.

PM: Well, it seems a bit absurd if the Russians aren't actually in the front line of it to take it out on them when they're not.

FCS: Well, it might be a bit unwise too.

PM: Yes.

FCS: However we've got to see about it ..

PM: It looks as if all the private information we've had has been more and more concerned. But it really is, in a sense, it's the new way of Czechoslovakian/Hungary, crushing the first signs of freedom, isn't it.

FCS: Yes, but when one sits down and thinks about it, I mean what is there we can do. There's nothing we can do to help the wretched people. We can, I suppose, say nasty things, well I suppose we've got to do that.

PM: I think the only thing you can say, Peter, is look if you go back to the pre-military circumstances in Poland we will send in more food and we'll reschedule debts and we'll put an aid programme. If you don't we won't.

FCS: I think that's the way we're all moving. I'm sure that's right.

PM: And that, I think, is the only thing we can do.

/ FCS:

FCS: One doesn't want to encourage them to think they are going to get help from us and then let them down and really incite them to have a fight. Because I don't think one is helping them in that way. I mean there are cries of how feeble you're being but it's quite easy to use hard words which encourage other people to go to their death.

PM: Yes, but you see everyone else has been using hard words, harder than we have.

FCS: I used some fairly hard words in Strasbourg.

PM: Yes, but the press and commentators are now on to it and what are you going to do. But the German banks are pretty well exposed aren't they already.

FCS: Very well exposed. The other thing that's happened is that the Americans have once again gone and made a mess of it. And let it be known that there's a quadripartite meeting in London.

PM: Well this of course is appalling.

FCS: And the Italians are now up in arms which accounts for this thing you heard in the news this morning about people going over all over Europe. Wretched Eagleburger is now going to go to Rome.

PM: Well, he would have reason to go to Rome because of this terrible kidnapping of the general.

FCS: Yes, but on the Polish thing. And the difficulty is going to be that I think there's got to be a meeting in London and Eagleburger has more or less said that there wasn't. So I mean really if he says that and then there is - I said they can have Chevening so I suppose you can say it's not exactly London but it's a pretty weak excuse.

PM: Well, Peter, what's the point of going all the way down to Chevening if it's public?

FCS: Well it won't be as public as London.

/ PM:

PM: You might as well have Chequers.

FCS: Well the only thing you can say is that it wasn't in London. I mean that's the only thing. I mean Chevening is perfectly all right from that point of view. But I think the Italians are going to get very cross again.

PM: Well, so do it but it was very silly to let this ... particularly as we don't know whether anything can come out of it.

FCS: And we'd have to consult others as well.

PM: I mean you know what the tendency of these meeting is, you look at all roads and they are all closed.

FCS: That's right. I'm having a meeting in the Foreign Office first thing tomorrow morning about nine o'clock

PM: I think we've got to decide what we're going to do about .. you see the beef is going through for Christmas isn't it.

FCS: Yes, I think we want to leave that.

PM: I think everything goes through for Christmas, then we have to say look nothing else. Because it's getting through to a repressive regime.

FCS: Yes, but I think we also have to make up our minds .. there is a debate in the Commons on Tuesday, but I think we really ought to have a statement before we go away, don't you?

PM: Yes, so do I. But there will be a statement at the beginning of that debate surely?

FCS: Well there will be a speech. I just wondered whether we oughtn't to have one tomorrow perhaps.

PM: Look Peter, what have we got to say tomorrow.

FCS: Well we haven't got anything to say but if we don't say it we shall be blamed.

/ PM: It might

PM: It might be as well to have one tomorrow in preparation for the debate on Tuesday.

FCS: I mean we can say a sort of tougher statement tomorrow.

PM: Well we can say a tougher statement, we can say everything, I had quite a lot to give on Tuesday and get the right questions about what has gone through, what we're letting go through and then there's a great big gap and nothing further is going. ... if knowing there's a meeting of four of us we dash into a statement to say anything on Monday.

FCS: Well it would have to be provisional. The problem is you see the four won't actually meet until Parliament's up. Nothing will come out of it.

PM: Parliament will not be up until Wednesday night.

FCS: Oh, I thought it was up on Tuesday night. Well we might be able to do a statement on Wednesday.

PM: Yes, Wednesday is the adjournment day.

FCS: I thought Tuesday was.

PM: No, Tuesday we have a debate on Poland and the Golan and then on Wednesday we have adjournment day.

FCS: Can you have statements on adjournment day?

PM: Yes.

FCS: Well that might be the day to do it.

PM: Well I would think Tuesday Peter.

FCS: Well, they're not meeting, they won't have cooked anything up by the time..

PM: No, they won't.

/ FCS: On the

FCS: On the other hand it's too stupid to have a statement immediately after the debate on Tuesday. I don't think we can do that really. Anyway I'll think about it ..

PM: No, we'll think about it, what we've got to say. Certainly there is quite a lot of information to give about the stuff that's been going out over BBC External Services, and the planes etc to get our people out.

FCS: I just have a feeling we may have to do something on Monday.

PM: But there is quite a lot to say, Peter, on the logistic side that they don't know. I would have thought we ought advise our people to get out. You know our chaps have been in asking if our planes can land to get them out.

FCS: So far we've said anybody who wants to go, we would advise them to get out.

PM: Well I personally think we ought to advise them to get out. They're not going to be able to get proper food or anything. There are only about 500.

FCS: Yes, I don't know as a matter of fact what the Germans or the French are doing, do you?

PM: No. But they can go overland.

FCS: Well so could ours.

PM: Yes so could ours, I suppose.

FCS: But I think it's more difficult to go overland than by air.

PM: Yes. They are pouring into East Germany aren't they? And Czechoslovakia.

FCS: Anyway, what I will do is, I'll have a run down on all this at nine o'clock tomorrow morning then let you know. Shall I do that.

PM: Yes, OK. Bye.

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FM WASHINGTON 201645Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3875 OF 20 DECEMBER 1981
AND TO WARSAW.

POLISH AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON.

I HAVE BEEN TOLD BY STATE DEPT THAT HAIG WILL ANNOUNCE ON TV TODAY THAT THE AMBASSADOR HAS SOUGHT POLITICAL ASYLUM WHICH HAS BEEN GRANTED.

HENDERSON

NNNN



PRIME MINISTER

President Regan's message
last night refers.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be the name "Jean" written in a cursive, flowing style.

JEAN

20.12.81

SECRET

December 19, 1981

Dear Lord Carrington:

We are now facing a critical, possibly tragic juncture in Poland. Yielding to months of Soviet pressure, the Polish military has now begun to use violence against its own people. Polish workers, students and others are beginning to react and the situation could disintegrate with grave consequences at any time.

The prospect for Soviet military intervention is clear. But even should the Polish Army's suppression tactics succeed, we would face the possible destruction of the reform movement. The Soviets would achieve their objective and the Polish people would pay the price. The West would suffer a profound moral and political defeat.

To forestall further repression, disintegration, and possible Soviet intervention, we must act urgently and simultaneously on two fronts.

-- We must bring pressure to bear on Jaruzelski to make some move toward reconciliation with the Church and Solidarity.

-- And we must take steps to make clear to the Soviets that we understand the role they are already playing and to make more credible our deterrent to their intervening even more directly through the use of their own military forces.

The Right Honorable
The Lord Carrington, KCMG, MC
Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs
London

We are not proposing that we now implement the kind of massive measures which we have agreed in NATO to take in the case of Soviet military intervention. But we do need political and economic measures which we can take now, and others we could take if the situation grows even more ominous but still short of a full-scale Soviet military move. Specifically, I am instructing Larry Eagleburger to concert with the other political directors to develop such measures in the context of the following considerations.

Whatever our assumptions about Jaruzelski, we need to maximize his incentives for reaching out to Solidarity and the Church and to strengthen his hand with the Soviets. To the extent he is an independent agent, he must be brought to understand that the course of repression will not be cost-free in terms of his need for a relationship with the West to preserve his independence. To the degree he is largely a tool of the Soviets, he must be able to convey to the Soviets the increased costs they will bear.

As far as the Soviets are concerned, no reasonable man can believe that this tragedy would be happening without Soviet pressure. The degree of their direct involvement in precipitating and managing the process is largely irrelevant (although the evidence is mounting on that score). The Soviets know they are responsible, and the rest of the world knows this too. Therefore to fail to do anything now with regard to the Soviet Union would send precisely the wrong signal to Moscow about its behavior in Europe and elsewhere for years to come. We cannot be in a position of having the Soviets in their own counsels believe that the United States and the rest of the West stood by and let this happen -- rationalizing our inaction with the transparent absurdity that the Soviet Union should not "intervene" when it so obviously had been doing precisely that for many months, and finally was succeeding in bringing about repression and bloodshed by using their proxy -- the Polish Army, Party and Police.

The situation we face is unpredictable and could disintegrate seriously at any time. We need to come out of the meeting of our political directors on Tuesday with more than just ideas. We need a concrete set of political and economic measures which we can use to

SECRET

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bring about greater restraint both in Warsaw and Moscow. Eagleburger will come to London with our proposed measures and we strongly urge you to do so as well.

I am appealing to you to deal with this matter in terms of its genuine historical importance. Western inaction at this time will not be forgotten by those who assess the character of our nations and our individual qualities as statesmen in the years to come. More important, the Polish people are looking to us today, as are the people of our own countries, for concrete evidence that we understand the magnitude of what is happening before our very eyes -- and who is responsible for it.

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

SECRET

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#2

December 19, 1981

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SECRET

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Sincerely,

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

SECRET

SUBJECT

cc Harter
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PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 179/87

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FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE, LONDON

ZEM

S E C R E T VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WH07185

DEAR MAGGIE:

I KNOW THAT YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER AND SECRETARY HAIG HAVE BEEN IN CLOSE CONTACT, BUT I WANTED YOU TO HAVE MY PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION WE FACE IN POLAND.

THERE IS THE DISTINCT DANGER THAT FURTHER REPRESSION BY THE POLISH ARMY AND POLICE WILL LEAD TO MASSIVE RESISTANCE, WIDESPREAD DISTURBANCES, AND MAY ULTIMATELY RESULT IN INTERVENTION BY SOVIET MILITARY FORCES. THIS WOULD BE A PROFOUND TRAGEDY MOST IMMEDIATELY FOR THE POLISH PEOPLE. BUT IT WOULD HAVE WIDER IMPLICATIONS. A SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION WOULD RETARD REFORM EFFORTS IN EASTERN EUROPE FOR A DECADE OR MORE, EMBOLDEN THE SOVIETS FOR ADVENTURES ELSEWHERE, AND IN GENERAL PUT THE SUPERPOWERS ON A CONFRONTATIONAL FOOTING WE COULD NOT EASILY CONTROL.

SUCCESSFUL SUPPRESSION OF THE POLISH PEOPLE BY THE POLISH ARMY AND POLICE ACTING AFTER MONTHS OF SOVIET PRESSURE ALSO WOULD BE A DEVASTATING BLOW TO THE MOST PROFOUNDLY HOPEFUL DEVELOPMENT OF THIS DECADE.

THE TIME HAS COME TO AVERT THIS TRAGEDY. THERE ARE MEASURES WE CAN TAKE NOW TO HELP PREVENT BOTH FURTHER REPRESSION AND SOVIET INTERVENTION. THESE MEASURES MUST BE ADDRESSED TO THE SOVIET UNION AS WELL AS TO THE POLISH REGIME. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT ABOUT THE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PLIGHT IN WHICH THE POLISH PEOPLE FIND THEMSELVES.

ALLIANCE UNITY MUST CONVINCING MOSCOW AND WARSAW OF THE NECESSITY, ON THE ONE HAND, TO PERMIT AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, TO INITIATE A PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION IN POLAND. SECRETARY HAIG IS IN TOUCH WITH YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUT DEVELOPING A SPECIFIC SET OF MEASURES.

THIS MAY WELL BE A WATERSHED IN THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF MANKIND -- A CHALLENGE TO TYRANNY FROM WITHIN. WE MUST NOT LET THIS MOMENT PASS US BY WITHOUT CLEARLY DEMONSTRATING THAT WE UNDERSTOOD AND THAT WE ACTED.

SINCERELY,

RON

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Prime Minister
For information
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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 754 OF 19TH DECEMBER 1981

FOR INFO ROUTINE WARSAW WASHINGTON PARIS BONN AND UKDEL NATO.

MY TELNO 745: POLAND.

1. IN A PRESS WHICH IS LARGELY DEVOTED TO BREZHNEV'S 75TH BIRTHDAY CELEBRATIONS THERE IS TODAY REMARKABLE COVERAGE OF POLAND, TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALMOST ALL OTHER FOREIGN NEWS. THE ITEMS IN TODAY'S PRAVDA ARE:

A) A SITUATION REPORT BY TASS, WHICH REFERRED TO A DROP IN THE NUMBER OF STRIKES BUT ALSO TO "EMBITTERED RESISTENCE FROM COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY ELEMENTS. IT MENTIONED THE DEATHS IN SILESIA WITHOUT SPECIFYING THE NUMBER. IT CLAIMED THAT SOLIDARITY INSTIGATORS WERE ACTING" ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF SUBVERSIVE WESTERN CENTRES".

B) A TASS REPORT, CLAIMING THAT DOCUMENTS FOUND IN POLAND PROVED THAT SOLIDARITY, KOG-KOR AND THE KPN HAD BEEN PLANNING A COUP FOR

B) A TASS REPORT, CLAIMING THAT DOCUMENTS FOUND IN POLAND PROVED THAT SOLIDARITY, KOG-KOR AND THE KPN HAD BEEN PLANNING A COUP FOR 17 DECEMBER.

C) A TASS CONDEMNATION OF REAGAN'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON POLAND, WHICH TASS CLAIMED DID NOT ACCORD WITH THE SITUATION IN EITHER CONTENT OR FORM. REAGAN HAD NOT HIDDEN HIS INTENTION TO HAMPER POLAND'S OVERCOMING ITS ECONOMIC CRISIS IF POLAND'S LEADERS DID NOT BOW TO AMERICAN DIKTAT. AS FOR REAGAN'S ALLEGATION THAT POLISH EVENTS HAD BEEN INSPIRED AND SANCTIONED BY THE SOVIET UNION, REAGAN WAS SEEKING A PRETEXT TO WHIP UP THE SITUATION SO THAT AN INTERNAL POLISH CRISIS SHOULD BECOME AN INTERNATIONAL ONE, AND TO FIND IN POLISH EVENTS A JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUING WASHINGTON'S MILITARISTIC PROGRAMMES.

D) A TASS ROUND-UP OF FOREIGN REACTIONS, WHICH INCLUDED MORE CRITICISM OF US RESPONSES THAN ON PREVIOUS DAYS.

TODAYS "TRUD" ALSO PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE CRITICIZING THE ATTITUDE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS AND THE EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS.

2. THERE WAS NO POLISH REPRESENTATIVE AT BREZHNEV'S BIRTHDAY CELEBRATION'S, BUT A MESSAGE FROM JARUZELSKI AND JABLONSKY WAS PUBLISHED ALONG WITH OTHER TRIBUTES IN TODAY'S PRAVDA. IT WAS UNUSUAL IN THAT NEITHER WAS GIVEN AN OFFICIAL DESIGNATION. THE MESSAGE WAS SENT FIRSTLY IN THE NAME OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL WITH PARTY AND GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES IN SECOND PLACE. AFTER THE STANDARD TRIBUTES TO BREZHNEV, THE MESSAGE CONTINUED: "WE STAND UNSHAKEABLY ON THE BASIS OF STRENGTHENING THE IDEAS OF SOCIALISM, THE INDEPENDANCE AND SOVERIGNTY OF THE POLISH STATE. WE ARE STRIVING DECISIVELY FOR ITS DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPEMENT IN THE SPIRIT OF SOCIALIST RENEWAL, FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES OF MARXISM-LININISM IN NATIONAL POLISH CONDITIONS".

THE MESSAGE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOVIET/POLISH UNION. THE SOVIET ARMY HAD SAVED THE POLISH PEOPLE FROM PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION. BREXHNEV HIMSELF HAD PERSONALLY PARTICIPATED IN THE LIBERATION OF POLAND.

KEEBLE

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FM WARSAW 191950Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 977 OF 19TH DECEMBER 1981

AND TO IMMEDIATE: WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW
AND MODUK

FROM MELHUI SH.

MIPT: POLAND INTERNAL SITUATION.

1. MY 3 IPTS HAVE SOUGHT TO PORTRAY THIS REGIME AS RUTHLESS, REPRESSIVE AND IN CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY SEMI COLON WITH A DEPRESSINGLY ORTHODOX VIEW OF POLAND'S FUTURE, IN WHICH THE DEMOCRATIC AND PLURALISTIC AIMS OF SOLIDARITY WILL HAVE NO PLACE SEMI COLON AND WITH LIMITED FREEDOM OF MANOEUVRE.

2. OUGHT WE TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT? AND, IF SO, IS THERE REALLY ANYTHING WE CAN DO? I BELIEVE THAT THIS WEEK HAS WITNESSED ENOUGH NASTINESS IN POLAND, WITH THE DEATHS, INJURIES AND MASS ROUND-UPS AND INTERNMENTS, TO WARRANT A VIGOROUS DENUNCIATION. THIS WOULD OF COURSE BE INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL POLISH POLITICS BUT, IF THE CONCEPTS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, THE RULE OF LAW AND BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS REALLY MEAN ANYTHING IN THE WEST, I THINK WE HAVE NO OPTION BUT TO DENOUNCE THEIR DELIBERATE AND CALLOUS SUPPRESSION HERE. IF THIS PERIOD OF MARTIAL LAW WAS SLIKELY TO BE ONLY TEMPORARY, THERE MIGHT BE A CASE FOR HOLDING BACK CRITICISM BUT I DO NOT THINK THAT WILL BE THE CASE. AND HOW LONG DOES A "TEMPORARY" STATE OF EMERGENCY HAVE TO LAST BEFORE WE SHOULD EXERCISE AN OPINION?

3. I WOULD ALSO RECOMMEND THAT WE NOW CONSIDER REOPENING WITH OUR EC ALLIES THE WHOLE QUESTION OF IMPOSING A BAN ON THE SUPPLY OF FREE OR SUBSIDISED FOOD EXPORTS TO POLAND UNTIL SUCH TIME AS MARTIAL LAW IS LIFTED AND ALL THE HARSH RULES ACCOMPANYING MARTIAL LAW ARE WAIVED. I WOULD LIKE TO GO FURTHER AND SEE A BAN ON ALL BRITISH EXPORT CREDITS UNDERWRITING BRITISH EXPORTS TO POLAND UNTIL THE SAME CONDITIONS ARE MET. THIS WOULD NOT BE A GREAT SACRIFICE IN PRACTICAL TERMS, SINCE WE HAVE NOT PROMISED ANY NEW MONEY FOR 1982. IT WOULD HOWEVER BE AN IMPORTANT WAY OF REGISTERING OUR GOVERNMENTAL CONCERN AT THE VERY UNPLEASANT THINGS THAT ARE HAPPENING HERE AT THE MOMENT.

JAMES

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FM WARSAW 191810Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 976 OF 19TH DECEMBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE: WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO,
UKDEL MADRID, MODUK

FROM MELHISH.

MIPT: POLAND INTERNAL SITUATION.

1. JARUZELSKI'S FREEDOM OF MANOEUVRE OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS IS SEVERELY LIMITED. HE WILL BE ASSAILED ON EVERY SIDE.

THE OPPOSITION

2. EVEN IF THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE COUNTRY SETTLES DOWN TO A COLD, HARD WINTER UNDER THE NEW MILITARY REGIME, THERE IS BOUND TO BE SOME ORGANISED RESISTANCE. SOLIDARITY IS ALREADY GOING UNDERGROUND, APPOINTING SECOND-ECHELON LEADERS, DISTRIBUTING PAMPHLETS, ORGANISING DEMONSTRATIONS, SIT-INS AND OTHER FORMS OF STRIKE ACTION AND GENERALLY OPPOSING THE AUTHORITIES IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE. THIS WILL CONTINUE AT FACTORY LEVEL FOR SOME TIME. EVEN WHERE THERE IS NO ACTIVE SOLIDARITY BRANCH, FEW WORKERS WILL WORK FLAT OUT FOR REGIME THAT PROMISES THEM NOTHING AND THREATENS THEM A LOT. SOLIDARITY ALREADY HAS ITS FIRST MARTYRS AND MORE MAY FOLLOW. I DO NOT THINK THAT A LEADERLESS, DISPIRITED SOLIDARITY CAN TOPPLE THE MILITARY REGIME, BUT IT CAN CAUSE SERIOUS ECONOMIC DAMAGE.

3. THE CHURCH IS THE ONLY INSTITUTION, APART FROM THE REGIME, THAT WILL BE ALLOWED TO FUNCTION AT ALL FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. IT IS THEREFORE BOUND TO BE A FOCUS FOR OPPOSITION SEMI COLON SOME CHURCHES HAV ALREADY BECOME INFORMATION CENTRES FOR SOLIDARITY. THE BISHOPS HAVE CLEARLY TAKEN A HARDLINE AGAINST THE MILITARY TAKEOVER, AND INDIVIDUAL PRIESTS ARE LIKELY TO BE EVEN MORE MILITANT. IT IS CLEAR (SEE TODAY'S SITREP) THAT THE CHURCH MAY BE PREPARED TO MODERATE ITS OPPOSITION. BUT IT WILL NOT SUPPORT JARUZELSKI.

4. THE ECONOMY

ONE OF THE REGIME'S MOST PRESSING - AND MOST FORMIDABLE - TASKS IS TO KEEP THE POPULATION FED AND WARM. THIS REQUIRES A SPEEDY RETURN TO NORMAL WORKING, AND PROBABLY EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE IN THE FORM OF FOOD AND KEY RAWPMATERIALS. DESPITE THE OPTIMISTIC TONE OF

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STATE PRONOUNCEMENTS, THERE IS LITTLE SIGN SO FAR THAT SUPPLIES OF FOOD, ALREADY POOR, ARE IMPROVING. EGGS, POTATOES, BREAD AND MILK ARE VERY SCARCE AT THE MOMENT. OFFICIAL STOCKS OF FOOD WERE SAID, BEFORE MARTIAL LAW, TO BE ONLY A FRACTION OF THOSE A YEAR BEFORE. ALTHOUGH THIS WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY AN EXAGGERATION, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT FOOD IN STORE CAN KEEP THE COUNTRY GOING FOR MORE THAN A FEW WEEKS, EVEN ASSUMING SUBSTANTIAL RESERVES BUILT UP BY INDIVIDUALS OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS. OTHER CMEA COUNTRIES HAVE PLEDGED FURTHER FOOD DELIVERIES TO POLAND FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY, BUT THE MILITARY REGIME HERE WILL HAVE TO RESORT TO FORCED COLLECTION OF FOOD FROM FARMERS OR ELSE COME FORWARD WITH OTHER ENCOURAGEMENTS TO THEM TO COOPERATE, VOLUNTARILY, TO AVOID ACUTE SHORTAGES OF FOOD IN THE COMING WEEKS. AS A SOP TO A COLD AND HUNGRY POPULATION I EXPECT TO SEE A SUDDEN RUSH OF CHRISTMAS GOODIES IN THE SHOPS NEX WEEK (CITRUS FRUITS, EXTRA BUTTER, MORE SUGAR, JAM AND PERHAPS SWEETS) BUT THIS WILL NOT GO ON INTO THE NEW YEAR.

5. THE POWER SITUATION ALSO LOOKS CRITICAL. VERY COLD WEATHER OVER THE PAST WEEK (WITH TEMPERATURES IN WARSAW DOEN TO -18 DEGREES C) HAS LED TO FRQUENT POWER CUTS. POWER STATIONS MUST BE RUNNING DOWN LIMITED COAL STOCKS, AND WE DO NOT KNOW HOW MANY MINES ARE OPERATING NORMALLY. THE RESTORATION OF NORMAL WORKING IN THE MINES IS A KEY FACTOR, AND THE EVENTS OF THE LAST WEEK GIVE LITTLE ENCOURAGEMENT THAT THICAN BE ACCOMPLI HED QUICKLY.

6. THE EXTERNAL FINANCIAL SITUATION MUST ALSO BE OF MAJOR CONCERN TO THE GOVERNMENT. EVEN IF WE ASSUME THAT THE AUTHORITIES MANAGE TO PUT TOGETHER THE HARD CURRENCY TO MEET THEIR OBLIGATIONS TO WESTERN COMMERCIAL BANK (BY USING PRIVATE HOLDINGS OF HARD CURRENCY IN BANK ACCOUNTS HERE, BY GETTING HELP FROM THE SOVIET UNION N OR BY OBTAINING A NEW LOAN FROM THE WESTERN BANKS) THE INABILITY TO RAISE NEW CREDITS FOR WESTERN IMPORTS FOR SOME TIME TO COME WILL POSE VERY LARGE PROBLEMS IN THE EFFORT TO RESTORE NORMAL WORKING TO POLISH INDUSTRY. THERE IS ALSO THE QUESTION OF THE 1982 RESCHEDULING OF GOVERNMENT-BACKED DEBTS. BEFORE MARTIAL LAW THE POLES WERE SEEKING TO LINK RESCHEDULING TO THE PROVISION OF NEW CREDITS. THERE HAS BEEN NO INDICATION SO FAR AS TO HOW THE AUTHORITIES HERE INTEND TO APPROACH THIS PROBLEM.

7. IN THE FEW PRONOUNCEMENTS WHICH HAVE APPEARED ON THE ECONOMY, THIS FAR, THE AUTHORITIES HAVE IMPLIED THAT THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW WILL BE LINKED INTER ALIA TO THE RESTORATION OF THE NORMAL FUNCTIONING OF THE ECONOMY. FOR THE REASONS ABOVE THIS COULD CLEARLY TAKE SOME CONSIDERABLE TIME. JARUZELSKI HAS ALSO SAID THAT THE AUTHRORITIES DO NOT INTEND TO RETURN TO THE OLD SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEM, AND THAT ECONOMIC REFORM BASED ON SELF-MANAGEMENT (BUT SUBJECT TO OVERRIDING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES) WILL BE INTRODUCED ALONG THE LINES LAID DOWN BY THE SEJM. WHILST THERE IS NO REASON TO QUESTION THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES' DESIRE TO BRING

ABOUT MAJOR CHANGES IN THE OLD ECONOMIC SYSTEM, THEIR ABILITY TO DO SO, AND AT THE SAME TIME TO RESTORE NORMAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE CURRENT HIGHLY ABNORMAL CONDITIONS, MUST BE QUESTIONABLE.

THE SOVIET UNION

8. IF THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES HERE CONTINUE ALONG THE PATH THEY HAVE ALREADY MAPPED OUT, THEY SHOULD ENCOUNTER LITTLE OPPOSITION FROM THE SOVIET UNION. INDEED, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER COMEAS COUNTRIES, DELIGHTED TO SEE JARUZELSKI UNDERTAKE AND CARRY OFF SUCCESSFULLY THE TASK THEY MIGHT HAVE HAD TO DO THEMSELVES, WILL ENTHUSIASTICALLY HELP POLAND WITH EXTRA FOOD SUPPLIES, CONTINUED IMBALANCES IN THEIR BILATERAL TRADE AND EVEN PERHAPS SOME HARD CURRENCY GIFTS. BUT JARUZELSKI WILL HAVE TO MAKE HIS FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS CONSTANTLY AWARE THAT MOSCOW WILL BE WATCHING HIS EVERY MOVE.

THE WEST

9. THE POLISH PEOPLE CARE DEEPLY ABOUT WESTERN REACTIONS JUDGING

FROM THIS WEEK'S POLISH PRESS (WHAT IS LEFT OF IT), SO DO THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES, INDEED THEY SHOULD, WITH AN ECONOMY THAT HAS BECOME DEPENDENT ON WESTERN IMPORTS PAID FOR BY WESTERN CREDITS, WITH AN AGRICULTURE THAT DEPENDS ON US GRAIN AND OTHER WESTERN IMPORTS, WITH A FINANCIAL SECTOR MISERABLY IN DEBT TO THE WEST AND WITH A POPULATION THAT HAS INNUMERABLE LINKS WITH THE WEST. IF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE WEST FORCED WESTERN GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST THE POLISH GOVERNMENT, THE STRAIN ON POLAND'S ALREADY-CREAKING ECONOMY WOULD BE ENORMOUS.

10. MIPT EXAMINES POSSIBLE WAYS IN WHICH WE MIGHT REACT.

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TO IMMEDIATE MODUK

TELNO UAJ DATED 192120Z DEC 81

AND TO IMMEDIATE HQBAOR, HQRAFG, FCO AND UKDEL NATO

FROM BRIDFAT. MODUK FOR DIS, DI3(ARMY), BAOR FOR G INT AND SY, RAFG FOR CIO.

WARSAW REMAINED QUIET TODAY WITH FEWER TROOPS AND APCS BUT MORE MO IN EVIDENCE. DISCIPLINE REMAINS HIGH HOWEVER FRMA BELIEVES THAT THERE IS EVIDENCE OF FATIGUE AND ILL HEALTH DUE TO THE SEVERE WEATHER TODAY IS WARMER, ABOUT -7C, WITH STEADY SNOW. MORALE REMAINS HIGH BUT RUMOURS PERSIST THAT THIS IS NOT SO TRUE IN AREAS SUCH AS SILESIA WHERE TROOPS HAVE BEEN DRAWN INTO MORE DIRECT CONFLICT WITH STRIKERS.

TOURS OF INDUSTRIAL AREAS THIS MORNING DISCOVERED FEW SIGNS OF ACTIVITY. SOME LIGHT INDUSTRY BUILDINGS WERE VIRTUALLY UNLIT NOTABLY UNITRA ELECTRONICS AND PEZETEL AIRCRAFT. VERY TENTATIVELY, ACTIVITY WAS NOT MORE THAN HALF NORMAL.

NEW BMP SIGHTINGS TODAY INCLUDED TURRET 1041 IN ASSOC WITH STAR 660 BEARING 5 DIV TAC SIGN. WE NOW HAVE 10 SERIES (PROBABLY 5 DIV) 16, 18 AND 19 SERIES (PROBABLY 16 DIV) AND 30 SERIES (DIV UNKNOWN). CAN YOU CONFIRM / ENLIGHTEN?

WE BELIEVE WARSAW CITADEL SERIAL 006 (EC 0007 9066) IS DISTRICT OPS CENTRE. IN IT ARE 4 PRS R400 (NORMALLY ONE) 2 X HAWKEYE AND USUAL HIGH STEP AND COIN GRASS. NEW PR R400 ALSO SEEN IN WARSAW 55 (DC 993853) ORIENTATIONS. 160 AND 320.

SWISS MA GAVE ME INFO FROM THEIR ELINT AND OTHER SOURCES AS FOLLOWS. 4 X SOVIET LANDING CRAFT WITH TROOPS HAVE BEEN IN SWINOUSCIE (VV 5178) SINCE 15 DEC. POLISH NAVY PATROLLING COAST IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH SOVIET AND GDR NAVIES. COMAND NET ACTIVITY IS HIGH IN SOVIET FORCES AROUND POLAND MENTIONING SPECIFICALLY HQ NGF, 48 MRD, 8 GUARDS AND U/I SPECIAL STAFF ASSOC

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WITH 16 AIRBORNE. SCECH AND GDR TROOP LEAVE IS CANCELLED.
SOME TROOP MOVES NOTED IN CZECH BUT NONE IN GDR.

WE CONTINUE TO RECEIVE REPORTS OF MULTI-ENGINE TURBOPROP
MOVEMENTS AT WARSAW OKECIE AIRPORT AT NIGHT. USAA REPORTS THAT
KRAKOW AIRPORT IS ALSO ACTIVE MOST NIGHTS. CANNOT BE CERTAIN AS NO
SIGHTINGS YET BUT ALL LISTENERS CLAIM THAT THEY HEARD CUBS.

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FM WARSAW 192035Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 975 OF 19TH DECEMBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE: WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW AND
MODUK.

FROM MELHUI SH.

MIPT :

POLAND : INTERNAL SITUATION.

1. LIKE MOST MILITARY TAKE-OVERS, JARUZELSKI'S ASSUMPTION OF POWER THIS WEEK WAS DESIGNED MORE TO GET RID OF WHAT HE DID NOT LIKE THAN TO ESTABLISH WHAT HE DOES LIKE. HE AND HIS MILITARY COLLEAGUES IN THE MARTIAL COUNCIL OF NATIONAL REDEMPTION MUST HOWEVER NOW BE GIVING SOME THOUGHT TO WHAT OUGHT EVENTUALLY TO SUCCEED THE PRE-13 DECEMBER SET-UP. IN A HIGHLY SPECULATIVE WAY I WOULD LIKE TO HAZARD A GUESS ABOUT THEIR INTENTIONS.

2. JARUZELSKI IS A POLISH PATRIOT AND A MILITARY MAN. THIS COMBINATION, AND THE FAILURE OF HIS PATIENT AND BRAVE ATTEMPTS TO FIND SOME COMMON GROUND WITH WALESA AND SOLIDARITY SEEM BOUND TO PUSH HIM TOWARDS A CLEAR AND SIMPLE PLAN FOR THE FUTURE. I BELIEVE HE INTENDS TO CONTINUE THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND MILITARY RULE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS HE THINKS A RETURN TO CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT WILL STICK. WHEN THAT MOMENT COMES (SEE PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW), HE WILL ESTABLISH A NEW CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND POLITBURO (APPOINTED AND EVEN "ELECTED" BY A RIGGED PARTY CONGRESS) AND A NEW COUNCIL OF STATE AND MINISTERS, LIBERALLY SPRINKLED WITH MILITARY FIGURES. REAL POWER WILL REMAIN WITH THE MILITARY FOR A LONG TIME. HE WILL DUB THIS NEW REGIME A CONTINUATION OF THE ODNOWA BUT IT WILL BE A VERY DIFFERENT ODNOWA BASED ON DISCIPLINE, CONFORMITY AND HARD WORK (AS OPPOSED TO WHAT HIS PROPAGANDA MACHINE IS DESCRIBING AS THE OLD ANARCHY). THERE WILL INDEED BE A PLACE FOR SOLIDARITY IN THIS NEW REGIME BUT IT WILL BE "SOLIDARITY" ONLY IN NAME, SINCE ITS ACTIVITIES WILL BE CONFINED TO PURELY TRADE UNION MATTERS. THE GDANSK, SZCZECIN AND JASTRIBIE AGREEMENTS WILL BE REWRITTEN OR EVEN ANNULLED WITH THE BLAME FOR THEIR FAILURE PINNED EXCLUSIVELY ON SOLIDARITY SEMI COLON AND A NEW AND MORE DRACONIAN TRADE UNION LAW WILL BE PUSHED THROUGH A PUPPET SEJM. IDEALLY JARUZELSKI MIGHT HOPE THAT A CHASTENED WALESA WILL LEAD THIS NEW TRADE UNION. THIS IS MOST UNLIKELY, IN WHICH CASE SOMEONE ELSE WILL DO. ACTIVE RESISTANCE WILL BE SEVERELY PUNISHED. PASSIVE RESISTANCE WILL BE OVERCOME BY THE CARROT OF FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC SWEETENERS AND

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THE STICK OF SANCTIONS AND MORE SUBTLE PRESSURES. THE RESULT WILL BE DEPRESSINGLY FAMILIAR TO EAST EUROPEAN VETERANS, AS POLAND BECOMES AN ORTHODOX "SOCIALIST" STATE, REJOINING THE SOCIALIST CAMP.

3. THE ABOVE PARAGRAPH BEGS THE QUESTION OF THE LIKELY DURATION OF MARTIAL LAW. NOTHING LASTS LONGER THAN THE TEMPORARY AND THIS TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENT HAS MANY OBVIOUS ADVANTAGES TO THE RULING CLIQUE. IT IS CLEARCUT AND DECISIVE. IT CONFINES THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND OF IDEAS. FOR THE LONGER TERM IT STIFLES PLURALISM AND PREVENTS DEMOCRACY, BOTH DANGEROUS CONCEPTS. AS A NEGATIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE AGENT, IT HAS FEW EQUALS. AND IT MAKES RUNNING THIS QUARRELSOME AND BLOODY-MINDED COUNTRY VERY MUCH EASIER. IT WILL THEREFORE BE DIFFICULT TO ABANDON AND I EXPECT IT WILL BE WELL INTO 1982 BEFORE IT DISAPPEARS. AND THEN ONLY BY STAGES.

4. MARTIAL LAW WILL LAST LONGER IF THINGS DO NOT GO RIGHT FOR THE REGIME. IN MIFT I WOULD LIKE TO EXAMINE THE VARIOUS CONSTRAINTS LIKELY TO COME INTO PLAY.

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FM WARSAW 191650Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 974 OF 19TH DECEMBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE: WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW AND
MODUK.

FROM MELHUISH.

POLAND: INTERNAL SITUATION.

1. THIS IS, I THINK, A REASONABLE MOMENT TO TAKE STOCK OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN POLAND AS WELL AS TO OFFER SOME THOUGHTS ON THE INTENTIONS OF THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES AND THEIR FUTURE OPTIONS.
2. MR CZYREK (OUR TEL NO 955) CLAIMED YESTERDAY THAT THE COUNTRY WAS NOW AT FULL PEACE AGAIN. THIS CARRIES AN ELEMENT OF WISHFUL THINKING. BUT WARSAW IS QUIET. MUCH OF THE COUNTRYSIDE HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED AT ALL BY THIS WEEK'S EVENTS. ONLY IN THE TOWNS AND IN THE FACTORIES HAS THERE BEEN ACTIVE OPPOSITION AND MOST OF THIS HAS NOW BEEN ELIMINATED. SOME SIX OR SEVEN LARGE INDUSTRIAL TOWNS (GDANSK, KRAKOW, KATOWICE, WROCLAW AND SOME OTHERS) ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO SIMMER WITH OCCASIONAL BURSTS OF VIOLENCE AS FACTORY SHIFTS CHANGE OR INCIDENTS OR PROVOCATION OCCUR. THESE WILL BE PUT DOWN RUTHLESSLY BUT WE HOPE WITH A GREAT DEAL MORE SKULL THAN WAS SHOWN AT THE WUJEK COLLIERY.
3. WE HAVE IN FACT JUST WITNESSED A MILITARY TAKE-OVER OF POLAND PLANNED WELL IN ADVANCE AND EXECUTED EFFICIENTLY AND RUTHLESSLY. IT WAS NOT A MILITARY COUP D-ETAT, SINCE NOMINALLY AT LEAST THE GOVERNMENT IS STILL IN PLACE, BUT IT COMES TO MUCH THE SAME THING. JARUZELSKI HAS COMBINED HIS THREE FORMER JOBS INTO ONE, MILITARY OVERLORD. AND EVERY DAY THERE IS CLEAR EVIDENCE, REPORTED IN OUR TWICE-DAILY SITREPS, OF THE INCREASED MILITARISATION OF THE COUNTRY. I SUSPECT IT WILL NOT BE LONG, FOR EXAMPLE, BEFORE HEADS OF MISSION HERE HAVE TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH THE MILITARY COMMISSARS ABOUT ACCESS TO EMBASSIES, PERMISSION TO LEAVE WARSAW ETC.
4. SOME WESTERN JOURNALISTS HERE ARE DESCRIBING THIS WEEK'S EVENTS AS INVASION BY PROXY. THEY MAINTAIN THAT JARUZELSKI ACTED ON SUNDAY ON THE FIRECT ORDERS OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP (MARSHAL KULIKOV WAS IN WARSAW TWO OR THREE DAYS EARLIER) AND THAT HIS SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS HAVE BEEN MASTER MINDED BY MOSCOW. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT JARUZELSKI, DESPAIRING OF REACHING ANY KIND OF SENSIBLE COMPROMISE WITH SOLIDARITY, AND STUNG INTO ACTION BY SOLIDARITY'S NATIONAL COMMISSION'S RASHLY INTRANSIGENT MEETING IN GDANSK, DECIDED HE HAD TO TRY TO RESTORE ORDER IN POLAND BY POLISH MEANS. HE WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE CLEARED HIS LINES WITH MOSCOW, WHO WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN UNHAPPY TO SEE JARUZELSKI DO THEIR JOB FOR THEM.

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5. THE EFFICIENCY OF THIS MILITARY TAKE-OVER HAS BEEN MATCHED BY ITS DISREGARD FOR HUMAN LIFE AND FOR THE BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS. WE NOW HAVE :- POLAND A CLASSIC REPRESSIVE REGIME. WITHOUT DOUBT 7 POLES HAVE DIED SEMI COLON AND MAYBE OTHERS. ADMITTED CASUALTIES RUN INTO THREE FIGURES SEMI COLON AND COULD REACH FOUR. THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER, IN AN ATTEMPT TO CORRECT EXAGGERATED WESTERN PRESS REPORTS, SPOKE LIGHTLY OF "ONLY" 4000 POLES IN INTERNMENT. MANY TIMES THAT FIGURE HAVE BEEN ROUNDED UP, TAKEN AWAY, QUESTIONED AND RELEASED SEMI COLON AND QUITE A FEW OF THEM WERE DETAINED FOR MUCH LONGER PERIOD. SOME ARE SOLIDARITY OFFICIALS, LIKE GEREMEK, LORD TREFGARNE'S BREAKFAST COMPANION ON 2 DECEMBER AND ONYSZKIEWICZ, A MEMBER OF THE POLISH TEAM TO THE RECENT ANGLO-POLISH ROUND TABLE SEMI COLON BUT OTHERS ARE SYMPATHISERS AND INTELLECTUALS. THE RULE OF LAW AND SUCH RIGHTS AS THE POLISH CONSTITUTION CONFERRED ON POLISH CITIZENS HAVE BEEN SET ON ONE SIDE. THE SEJM HAS BEEN SUSPENDED AND ALL TRADE UNION ACTIVITY HAS BEEN FORBIDDEN. NO-ONE FEELS SAFE. AND NO-ONE HAS ANY REDRESS. THE AVERAGE POLE ON THE MOKOTOW OMNIBUS SUDDENLY FINDS HIMSELF IN A NEW AND NASTY WORLD.

6. SO FAR THE REACTION OF THE WEST HAS BEEN UNDERSTANDABLY CAUTIOUS. WE HAVE REPEATED OVER MANY MONTHS OUR BELIEF THAT THE POLES MUST BE LEFT TO THEMSELVES TO WORK OUT THEIR OWN SOLUTIONS FREE OF OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. NOW THAT THE POLES ARE DOING JUST THAT, WE FIND OURSELVES EMASCULATED BY THE LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF OUR PAST UTTERANCES. I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT, IN CONSIDERING WHAT WE SHOULD DO NEXT, WE SHOULD BOTH RECOGNISE DISPASSIONATELY WHAT KIND OF REGIME HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED HERE AND TRY TO ESTIMATE HOW LONG THE "TEMPORARY" STATE OF EMERGENCY WILL LAST.
(PLEASE SEE MIFT)

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PART 4 ends:-

Fes to All members of Cabinet + OD (received) 18.12.87

PART 5 begins:-

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