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Confidential Filing

Meeting with Hugh Fraser MP and a delegation of the Conservative Friends of Israel.

PRIME MINISTER

MAY 1980

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
9.5.80							
13.5.80							
14.5.80							
15.5.80							
29.5.80							
12.7.82							

PREM 19/879

This question has now been deferred.

①

*MR 4 p.a. PM
We will discuss this. I started the first Friday Israel*

PRIME MINISTER

Conservative Friends of Israel

Ian Gow has shown me the attached minute.

I have not mentioned this to the FCO but I think you would want the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's advice before taking this further.

Meanwhile my own view is that you should decline this invitation, for the following reasons:

(a) Where there is a major dispute, with countries friendly to Britain involved on both sides (and with, in my view, a good deal of right on both sides), I do not think that the Prime Minister should be conspicuously attached to either. My view would be precisely the same if you were invited, as you probably would be if you accepted this invitation, to be patron of the Council for the Advancement of Anglo/Arab Understanding.

(b) The present Government of Israel has undertaken actions of which you disapprove - the annexation of the Golan and the massive onslaught on the Lebanon - and to accept patronage of the Conservative Friends of Israel in these circumstances would be bound to be regarded as inconsistent with the stand you have taken (though I know that in logic a distinction can be made).

(c) Saud, Qaboos, Mubarak, Hussein etc would take it amiss.

No.

With Arab feeling as it is at present - and with many friends of Israel also deeply disturbed - I must recommend that you do not accept this invitation.

A.S.C.

Prime Minister

CONSERVATIVE FRIENDS OF ISRAEL


*My intention is
to accept. Would you
have a word with
John Cole re*

1. Anthony Eden was the first Patron of the Conservative Friends of Israel.
2. Since his death, the post of Patron has remained vacant.
3. Following Andrew Devonshire's defection to the S.D.P. Hugh Fraser succeeded him as President. Michael Latham is now the Chairman.
4. Michael Latham telephoned today to say two things:-
 - (a) That he was deeply disturbed that Douglas Hurd had met a delegation from the Arab League which included a member of the P.L.O.
 - (b) That he wondered whether, if an invitation was extended to you, you would agree to become Patron of the Conservative Friends of Israel (an office now vacant, and having no duties attached to it).
5. We share a real concern about the effect on the Jewish vote of the policies of H.M.G. I fear that the Foreign Office will advise you not to become Patron of Conservative Friends of Israel.

.../...

6. However, any such objection by the Foreign Office is illogical, in that you are a Founder Member of the Conservative Friends of Israel and have referred to this in messages you send to them.
7. How, please, should I reply to Michael Latham?

9th July 1982



IAN GOW

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OO ALGIERS

GRS 492

UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO 021030Z NOVEMBER 1981

TO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM NUMBER 170 OF 2 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH CONSERVATIVE FRIENDS OF ISRAEL

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ADDRESSED A MEETING OF THE CONSERVATIVE FRIENDS OF ISRAEL ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPARTURE FOR RIYADH. THE TEXT OF HIS OPENING SPEECH WILL FOLLOW IN THE VERBATIM SERVICE. THE FOLLOWING SUMMARISES HIS ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS:

- Q. IF THE PLO GAVE UP THE COVENANT AND A PALESTINIAN STATE WAS ESTABLISHED ON THE WEST BANK, WHAT GUARANTEE COULD THERE BE THAT SUCH A STATE WOULD BE DENIED OFFENSIVE ARMAMENT?
- A. IF THESE THINGS HAPPENED, THAT WOULD BE THE BEGINNING OF A LONG AND DIFFICULT NEGOTIATION. AT LEAST IT WOULD HAVE REMOVED THE LOG JAM. IF I WERE AN ISRAELI I WOULD NEED TO BE SATISFIED ABOUT THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL. THAT IS A MATTER FOR ISRAELI NEGOTIATION.
- Q. WHY SEEK INVOLVEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BY THE PLO SINCE IT IS A MURDEROUS, ANTI-DEMOCRATIC, TERRORIST ORGANISATION?
- A. I CONDEMN TERRORISM WHEREVER IT IS FOUND AND HAVE NOTHING TO SAY IN ITS DEFENCE. BUT THE PLO, LIKE IT OR NOT, REPRESENTS THE MAJORITY OF PALESTINIANS. IN THE PROCESS OF DE-COLONISING THE BRITISH EMPIRE WE HAVE OFTEN HAD TO DEAL WITH THOSE WHO WERE DENOUNCED AS TERRORISTS. WE DID SO BECAUSE THEY WERE A REALITY. IT NEVER DID ANYBODY ANY GOOD TO IGNORE REALITY.

/Q. ISRAEL

UNCLASSIFIED

- Q. ISRAEL FEELS BRITAIN TO BE UNSYMPATHETIC AND PREJUDICED AGAINST HER. COULD YOU NOT SHOW SOME SIGN OF GOOD WILL LIKE VISITING ISRAEL?
- A. WHEN I SAW MR SHAMIR IN NEW YORK IN SEPTEMBER I SUGGESTED SUCH A VISIT AND I PLAN TO GO TO ISRAEL EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR. IT IS TRUE THAT MANY ISRAELIS FEEL THAT BRITAIN IS UNSYMPATHETIC. I REGRET THIS AND REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THE VENICE DECLARATION IS FAIR.
- Q. LORD CARRINGTON HAS WARNED PROTESTERS AGAINST NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BEWARE LEAST THEY SERVE THE NEEDS OF THE SOVIET UNION. SHOULD HE NOT TAKE HIS OWN ADVICE OVER THE PLO?
- A. IT IS THE STATUS QUO WHICH PROMOTES THAT CAUSE - THE HOPELESSNESS OF THE PALESTINIANS. THE LONGER IT GOES ON THE MORE LIKELY IT IS THAT SOVIET INFLUENCE WILL INCREASE.
- Q. DOES LORD CARRINGTON STAND BY HIS STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE OF LORDS IN 1976 THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE MILITARILY INDEFENSIBLE IF THE WEST BANK WERE RETURNED TO THE PALESTINIANS?
- A. YES. IT IS FOR ISRAEL TO BE SATISFIED ABOUT HER SECURITY IN ANY NEGOTIATION (CF. ANSWER TO QUESTION 1 ABOVE).
- Q. IS A PALESTINIAN HOME-LAND CONFINED TO THE WEST BANK NOT UNFAIR TO THE PALESTINIANS SINCE 76PER CENT OF THE FORMER PALESTINE IS NOW PART OF JORDAN?
- A. THAT IS A MATTER FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES IN THE PROCESS OF SELF-DETERMINATION. A SOLUTION CANNOT BE IMPOSED ON JORDAN.

CARRINGTON

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LIMITED

NEWS D	PS	SIR J GRAHAM
NENAD	PS/LPS	LORD N GORDON LENNOX
MAED	PS/MR HURD	MR MOBERLY
INFO D	PS/PUS	

ppd
29 May 1980

Thank you for your letter of 28 May to Michael Alexander following up two points which arose when the Prime Minister saw the Conservative Friends of Israel on 14 May.

I have shown this to the Prime Minister and she has taken note of Lord Carrington's views on the two points.

P. Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

GB



2.

Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Useful in a
preliminary to Friday's
meeting at Hayes.

ms

28 May 1980

Dear Michael,

AM
28v.

Thank you for your letter of 14 May about the call on the Prime Minister by the Conservative Friends of Israel on 14 May. You asked for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's views on two points raised during the call.

Members of the delegation claimed that the FCO were committed to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. This is not so. HMG are committed to support the Palestinian right of self-determination within the framework of a comprehensive settlement but it is up to the Palestinians themselves to decide what sort of entity they want. One option would clearly be an independent state; another would be some form of confederation with Jordan; another could be the Benelux type of federation between "Palestine", Israel and Jordan as advocated by Mr Eban. It is for the parties themselves to decide on the future of the area. We would not rule out the possibility of an independent Palestinian state but we are not advocating such a solution.

The best result would probably be an autonomous Palestinian entity possessing many of the theoretical attributes of independence but politically and economically linked with Jordan in such a way that Jordan would exercise considerable influence over its international relations (particularly vis-a-vis Israel) and external defence (thus easing the way for complete demilitarisation of the West Bank). Neither Jordan, which is committed to the Palestinians' right to speak for themselves through the PLO, nor the PLO itself can publicly espouse this possibility at this stage, but there is some reason to believe that both King Hussein and Yasser Arafat see eventual advantage in such an arrangement.

However, whatever solution short of full independence for the Palestinians may be ultimately devised, it is clear that while most Palestinians of the diaspora would not wish to return to the West Bank, all Palestinians attach considerable importance to the symbolism of a national home, much as the Zionists did earlier this century. In other words, they want a separate nationality, which involves a Palestinian passport, and a place of ultimate refuge. A settlement which does not provide at least this is unlikely to last. Nor is there much point in

/providing



providing some 'autonomous' body on which Palestinians will not serve, or holding elections in which they will not vote.

The attitude of other Arab leaders to the creation of an independent state is ambiguous. The Saudis and others are privately concerned that a Palestinian state might become a new centre for radical and possibly Soviet influence. The Syrians and Jordanians are wary of being obliged to maintain a state of permanent confrontation with Israel at the behest of a Palestinian state. But it would be misleading to say that they are therefore opposed to such a state. While in an ideal world they might prefer other arrangements, they are not prepared to stand out against the Palestinians' own wishes and would be ready to accept a state if that were the price of an end to the Palestinian problem, which they regard as more threatening to them than a future Palestinian state is likely to be.

It is worth adding that while King Hussein is undoubtedly ready to play a role in reaching a peace settlement and may at some stage be the key interlocutor for the Israelis, he has no intention of getting out in front of the PLO. Nor does he want the troublesome West Bank to revert again to Jordan. Publicly he has accepted the PLO's exclusive right to speak for the Palestinians. There has thus been a major change in his stance since he ruled the West Bank before 1967. He is not prepared to risk his position in the Arab world and the economic help which results, and perhaps his throne, by trying to reach a settlement which cuts out the PLO. This is the major flaw in the so-called "Jordanian option" favoured by the Israeli Labour Party. The King might at some stage be able to speak to the Israelis with the authority of the PLO when neither Israel nor the PLO is prepared to speak to the other directly, but his role will inevitably be to a large extent that of an intermediary.



On the PLO and the language used by the FCO, Lord Carrington does not believe that we can be seriously accused of ambiguity. The Prime Minister is aware of our avoidance of the term "recognition" in the PLO context. Letters to MPs and the public have consistently made clear that there is no question of "recognising" the PLO in any formal or diplomatic sense; that we do not accept the PLO's claim to speak exclusively for the Palestinians; but that we do accept that the PLO, which is seen by large numbers of Palestinians as the voice of their aspirations, cannot be ignored and will have to be associated with peace efforts at some stage.

Yours own
Paul

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

28 MAY 1960



FROM: THE RT. HON. HUGH FRASER, M.B.E., M.P.

fm



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

nb

15th May, 1980

John P. ...

Thank you so very much for having received our group from the Conservative Friends of Israel and for giving us so much of your time for a very full and frank discussion. It was very good of you. There will of course be no public reference to our meeting or to what was said.

With every good wish.

Margaret Thatcher

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
10 Downing Street
London S.W.1.

SUBJECT.

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File sur



PM

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

BF 21.5.80

14 May 1980

Dear Paul,

Call on the Prime Minister by the
Conservative Friends of Israel

A delegation of the Conservative Friends of Israel called on the Prime Minister this afternoon. The delegation was headed by Hugh Fraser and included Julian Amery, Peter Thomas, Maurice Macmillan, Timothy Sainsbury and Michael Fidler.

The issues raised by the delegation were basically those foreseen in the brief which you sent me yesterday. Their pre-occupations were under three headings:

- (a) Foreign Office Ministers had been making statements which implied that recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, or something akin to recognition, was coming closer. The FCO appeared to envisage a radical change in Resolution 242 and the involvement of the PLO in negotiations for a Middle East peace settlement. This was causing keen resentment and a consequent loss of support for the Government among members of the Jewish community in this country;
- (b) the Government was becoming increasingly aligned with the European stance on the Arab/Israel dispute. There was talk of a European initiative and an evident attempt to force the pace on the Camp David process which, in the opinion of the delegation, was not yet exhausted (Mr. Amery argued that far from there being a deadline on 26 May, the process still had three years to run);
- (c) the FCO were increasingly inclined to favour the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank. Such a state would not, in fact, be welcome to the majority of Arab states (Mr. Amery specifically mentioned President Sadat, King Hussein and President Asad as being privately opposed). If such a state was established, the Middle East would explode and the involvement of the Soviet Union would be inevitable.

Taking these points in turn the Prime Minister said that:-

/(a) the Government

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- 2 -

(a) the Government did not 'recognise' organisations and had no intention of 'recognising' the PLO. Her opposition to terrorism was well known, as was her refusal to meet members of the PLO during the visit she paid to Damascus when Leader of the Opposition. However, the very fact that she did not wish to see the Palestinians achieve their objectives by violence meant that it was essential to listen to their case. Just as the Israelis had a right to exist, so the Palestinians had a right to determine their own future. The PLO could not, of course, be brought into any negotiating process until they had abandoned their commitment to the destruction of the state of Israel. HMG's policy was to secure parallel recognition by each party of Israel's right to exist and of the Palestinians' right to determine their own future;

(b) it was now clear that the Camp David process was effectively exhausted and that nothing would be achieved before 26 May. She and other European Heads of Government had been scrupulously careful not to pre-empt the 26 May deadline, eg, during their talks in Luxembourg. However, things could not be allowed to drift on indefinitely. In particular it was inconceivable that nothing further should be done for three years as Mr. Amery appeared to suggest;

(c) the Foreign and Commonwealth Office were not promoting the idea of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank.

Talking more generally about her attitude to the Arab/Israel dispute, the Prime Minister said that she was deeply concerned about Israel's continued occupation of the West Bank. The land there was legally part of Jordan. So long as Israel occupied it, there was the risk that other countries would be tempted to try to occupy Israel's territory and to hold it for the same reason that Israel was holding the West Bank. She found it difficult to argue with those of her Arab visitors who drew a parallel between the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Israel occupation of Jordanian territory. She thought that inadequate attention had been given to King Hussein's position. He seemed to her to be a key figure both in dealing with the Arab/Israel dispute and in dealing with other Middle East problems as well. It might be true that Jordan had been invited to associate itself with the Camp David process, but the matter had not been handled in a way likely to appeal to the Jordanians.

As regards the Israeli Government's present policy, the Prime Minister had told Mr. Begin that he was making things very difficult for his Western friends. His settlements policy was a terrible mistake. The Israeli Government was in danger of bringing about precisely the outcome they wished to avoid. Nor did their policy on autonomy make much sense. It had always been difficult to imagine how one could give a people autonomy without giving them autonomy over their land. King Hussein had made it clear that he was willing to contemplate a federal solution. This was an approach which should be pursued.

/At the end

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- 3 -

At the end of the discussion, members of the delegation returned to the question of what they saw as the FCO commitment to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. They said that it would be very helpful if the Prime Minister would make a public statement that any initiative with which Britain was associated would be aimed at bringing in Jordan. They also asked the Prime Minister to look at the language presently being used in FCO letters about the PLO. They claimed that phrases such as "we do not recognise the PLO as the sole legitimate spokesman of the Palestinian people" implied that the PLO was "recognised" in some manner. The Prime Minister undertook to consider both points.

The Prime Minister is aware that we are no longer thinking in terms of a UN Resolution or of a fully-fledged Middle East initiative and more in terms of opening up a dialogue with the various parties to the dispute. It would, none-the-less, be helpful if you could let me have a letter setting out the views of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on the two points raised in the previous paragraph.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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RM

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 May 1980

Policy Towards the Middle East

I am sending Paul Lever under separate cover an account of a meeting the Prime Minister had this afternoon with a delegation of the Conservative Friends of Israel. This discussion confirmed me in the view that it would be useful to have in the near future a small meeting, along the lines of that held earlier in the year to discuss East/West relations, on the Middle East situation. I have put this idea to the Prime Minister. She would welcome it.

It is for discussion whether such a meeting would deal simply with the Arab/Israel dispute or whether it could deal more profitably with the situation in South West Asia and the Middle East as a whole. As both the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary have made clear in recent speeches, all the problems in the region are becoming increasingly intertwined.

Perhaps we could have a word about this soon.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

SP.

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 May 1980

fs

Paul

14/5

Dear Michael,

Your letter of 9 May asked for briefing for a meeting between the Prime Minister and a delegation from the Conservative Friends of Israel on 14 May.

I attach a brief.

Yours ever

Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE CONSERVATIVE FRIENDS OF ISRAEL

Points to Make

Need for a settlement

Lack of progress important cause of tension in region. Affects ability of West to make common cause, eg over Afghanistan. Present situation in West Bank not tenable in long term.

Requirements for a comprehensive settlement

No playing with Israel's security but Israel must show readiness to withdraw from West Bank and Gaza and stop settlements. Palestinians must accept unequivocally co-existence with Israel.

Autonomy talks

Prospects look poor. Autonomy agreement has to be acceptable to Palestinians themselves.

European initiative

European Council will consider in June. Will not cut across Camp David efforts but something more needed if Egypt-Israel peace not to be jeopardised.

PLO

Unrealistic to suppose comprehensive settlement possible without their eventual association with negotiations. But remain very concerned about PLO groups' involvement with terrorism and failure to confirm openly readiness to accept Israel. No question of recognition in diplomatic sense.

Self-determination/Palestinian State

Not committed to support for a state. Fears about Soviet domination understandable but Palestinian entity would depend on outside aid from West and Gulf and be demilitarised.

Essential Facts

1. A CFI delegation called on Lord Carrington on 23 January. A copy of the record is attached. The delegation are likely to express concern about what they see as moves towards 'recognition' of the PLO; lack of European support for Camp David and talk of a European initiative; and endorsement of self-determination for the Palestinians, regarded as tantamount to support for a Soviet-dominated Palestinian state. They may also raise the UK vote in favour of last week's Security Council resolution calling for Israel's decision, to expel two West Bank mayors and a religious leader in retaliation for a terrorist attack, to be rescinded.

PLO

2. The delegation may raise Lord Carrington's description of the PLO in the Lords on 17 March as not a terrorist organisation as such (we have consistently said that the PLO is a political umbrella movement which includes groups who continue to be involved with terrorism rather than itself a terrorist body). They may point to recent incidents at the Misgav Am kibbutz (carried out by an extremist group under the PLO umbrella but not endorsed by the PLO) and in Hebron (for which Fatah claimed responsibility) as evidence that the main business of the PLO continues to be terrorism. They may also query assertions that the PLO has in recent years become more 'political' by quoting an interview allegedly given by Yasser Arafat to a Venezuelan paper in which he called for Israel's destruction. Arafat has categorically denied giving such an interview, and our own researches cast considerable doubt on the interview's authenticity (eg it is supposed to have taken place in Libya during a period

in which Arafat could not have been there.) However, we have made clear that any policy not involving unequivocal acceptance of Israel's right to live in peace is quite unacceptable to us. The evidence about the PLO's real policies is conflicting.

Autonomy talks

3. Our position has been that we will not undermine Camp David but that there may be an opportunity in the second half of 1980 for Europe to keep up the momentum of peace efforts. This was most recently set out by Lord Carrington in Washington. There is now no prospect of an autonomy agreement by the 26 May deadline and President Sadat has suspended the plenary talks as a sign of displeasure at Israel's inflexibility. The chances of an agreement capable of attracting Palestinian participation and therefore of being workable are increasingly poor. The European Council have asked for a report on the issue for their next meeting in Venice on 12-13 June. Meanwhile discussion of options within the Nine remains at a preliminary stage.

Self-determination/Palestinian state

4. Self-determination does not necessarily mean an independent state. Palestinian options will be constrained by the need to seek agreement in negotiation (hence the important qualification 'within the framework of a negotiated ^{settlement'} / which we attach to our endorsement of self-determination). The Russians have supported the PLO for several years but there is no ideological affinity between the PLO leadership and Soviet party leaders, and no evidence that the PLO act under Soviet instructions. A Palestinian entity on the West Bank and Gaza would be very weak, almost certainly demilitarised, and dependent on financial aid from the West and the conservative oil-producing states. As such it would pose little immediate threat to Israel and would be an unlikely base for Soviet expansionism. More

/Widely

widely the continuation of the Arab-Israel conflict, with the US cast as Israel's supporter, offers the Soviet Union constant opportunities to identify with the Arabs and acquire influence through arms supplies.

West Bank/Hebron

5. Tension in the West Bank has risen steadily in recent months. The Israeli decision to establish two religious schools in the centre of Hebron has led to violent clashes involving deaths on both sides. The worst incident took place on 2 May when six Israelis were killed as they returned from a religious service. Fatah claimed responsibility. The Israelis immediately expelled in retaliation the mayors of Hebron and Halhul and the religious leader (Khadi) of Hebron (none of whom was noted for extreme views). They did not claim that the three were involved in the incident but accused them of incitement. Normal appeal procedures and the Geneva Convention on the responsibility of occupying powers, which forbids expulsions under any circumstances, were ignored. On 8 May the Security Council passed a resolution calling on Israel to cancel the expulsions. The US abstained. We argued in informal consultations that the Security Council should not concentrate on only one aspect of the situation, ignoring the incident which led to the expulsions, but nevertheless voted in favour of the resolution, which contained no condemnation of Israel. No speeches were made in the debate other than by the US to explain their abstention.

Arab Boycott

6. A separate brief is attached in case this is raised.

Mr Tomkys ✓

cc: Private Secretary
Mr Moberly
Chancery Tel Aviv

(11)
NFR 026
Moberly
Moberly
Moberly

CALL ON THE SECRETARY OF STATE BY THE CONVERSATIVE FRIENDS OF ISRAEL (CFI)

1. A CFI delegation, led by the Rt Hon Hugh Fraser MP and including Messrs Latham, Biggs-Davison, Dykes and Sainsbury. MPs and Baroness Hornsby-Smith, called on the Secretary of State on 23 January. It was agreed that the meeting would be regarded as private and confidential by both sides.
2. Mr Fraser said they had intended to raise the Arab Boycott but following discussions with the Israeli Minister of Foreign Trade, Mr Patt, and the exchanges at the recent Anglo-Israeli Joint Commission meeting were content to leave this aside for the moment. Their main concern was European policy. Mr O'Kennedy's references at the General Assembly to the need to broaden 242 and to the PLO suggested that Europe was thinking of undermining Camp David. Recent events had, however, demonstrated that the Egypt-Israel peace treaty represented a cornerstone of stability in an area otherwise in total disarray. Europe had never fully appreciated the extent of the achievement of the peace treaty or the sacrifices Israel had made. Whatever happened in the Arab/Israel dispute the disarray in the Arab world would continue. Meanwhile, the Arabs were unwilling to face the realities of Soviet action in Afghanistan and preferred to take refuge behind emotional talk of Israeli occupation of Jerusalem. The CFI plea to the Government was to avoid any action which might threaten what had been achieved by Camp David.
3. The Secretary of State explained his concern that the autonomy process was leading nowhere. We would continue to support US efforts but Afghanistan had brought home the degree to which Arab reactions were conditioned by Arab/Israel considerations. Meanwhile, Israel was continuing to lose friends in the West, particularly over the settlements issue, and the

/PLO

PLO were continuing to gain ground internationally. The PLO seemed to have become more political in character in recent years. He personally did not favour a ban on talking to the PLO, although this was not to say he wished in any way to whitewash them. In sum, unless something could be done for the Palestinians, Israel's international isolation was bound to increase. A European initiative might be able to help and might not be unwelcome to the Americans. A new resolution supplementing 242 was a possibility we had in mind.

4. In further discussion, the delegation expressed the view that the PLO had not changed their spots. The covenant remained unrepudiated. To give them a greater degree of recognition encouraged the PLO radicals, not the moderates. No Israeli politician was prepared to tolerate a PLO-dominated West Bank. Europe should be encouraging Palestinian representatives other than the PLO to come forward, rather than acquiescing in PLO intimidation.

5. The Secretary of State repeated in conclusion that while we feared the autonomy talks were a dialogue of the deaf, we would certainly not torpedo them. However Camp David was not enough in itself to solve the dispute.

J. E. Holmes

J E Holmes
Near East & North Africa Dept

28 January 1980

ARAB BOYCOTT

POINTS TO MAKE (DEFENSIVE)

HMG'S POLICY

1. We deplore the boycott. Wrong to interfere with commercial judgement of firms. Government's role to encourage trade with both Israel and Arabs and remove misconceptions about boycott. First priority to resolve Arab/Israel conflict which gives rise to boycott.

AUTHENTICATION OF NEGATIVE CERTIFICATES

2. Ceasing authentication would cause unacceptable damage to exports. Service will be maintained. But explanatory statement now attached makes clear that procedure does not imply approval of documents in question.

EC INITIATIVE

3. Prepared to discuss the boycott at any time in the Community if there were a general wish to do so. But no evidence of this at present and no case for UK raising subject. Community policies (including Dutch) broadly similar to ours.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

ARAB BOYCOTT

1. Successive British Governments have deplored and opposed all trade boycotts, such as the Arab boycott of Israel, which lack international sanction and authority. They have consistently been criticised by Israel's supporters for doing too little to challenge the Arab boycott.
2. Late in 1977 Lord Byers introduced a Bill, on the lines of earlier US legislation, which would have made it illegal for British firms to comply with the boycott. The Bill failed when a Select Committee of the Lords reported in July 1978 that legislation would damage British commercial and political interests.
3. The Committee concluded that firms should remain free to decide whether or not to comply with the boycott in the light of their own commercial judgement; that the Government should promote British exports to Israel and the Arab states, maintain friendly relations with both sides and do nothing to impede a peace settlement in the Middle East. This amounted to a broad endorsement of existing Government policy but the Committee thought the Government should be more active in combatting the boycott and its effects. In particular they recommended that the FCO cease authentication of negative certificates of origin and take the initiative in the Nine to achieve concerted (and thereby more effective) EEC resistance to the boycott.

NEGATIVE CERTIFICATES OF ORIGIN (NCO'S)

4. Iraq, and in some circumstances Bahrain, PDRY and YAR, require

NCO's (a statement by an exporter that goods were not made in Israel to be authenticated by the FCO. Such certificates are first attested by a Notary or Chamber of Commerce official whose signature the FCO in turn authenticates. We have made it clear that our authentication of the attesting signature does not imply approval for the contents of the document. But the Select Committee's view was that the FCO nevertheless thereby gave the impression of condoning the boycott. In response to the Committee's recommendation DOT consulted a number of trade and other bodies with an interest in authentication. As a result we announced in Parliament on 5 November that the FCO would not cease authentication because to do so would involve an unacceptable risk to our exports, but that we would issue an explanation with each authentication to the effect it was the signature on the document not the document itself which was being authenticated.

EEC INITIATIVE

5. The previous Administration did not accept the Select Committee's recommendation but expressed willingness to discuss the boycott in the Community if there was a general wish for this. There is still no evidence of such a wish and the signs are that an initiative would be unwelcome to our partners, would fail and could carry risks to our exports and standing in the Middle East. Ministers have endorsed this line. The policies of the Nine are broadly comparable to our own (although Italy, Ireland and Luxembourg for varying reasons do not authenticate NCO's). A number of anti boycott resolutions have been passed in the Dutch Parliament but there has not yet been any change in that Government's policy.

ADVICE TO FIRMS

6. Apart from the normal commercial support work DOT and overseas posts advise firms on the operation of the boycott and assist in overcoming problems. On the Select Committee's recommendation DOT have issued a revised statement for the guidance of firms which sets out the Government's opposition to the boycott and invites firms to take this into account.

PM
BF 13.5.80

9 May 1980

The Prime Minister will be receiving a delegation of the Conservative Friends of Israel here on Wednesday 14 May. I should be grateful if you could let me have a brief by close of play the previous evening.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

ABD



MR. ALEXANDER

Did you ask for
briefing for this meeting?

es.

8 May, 1980.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 May, 1980.

I am writing to confirm that the Prime Minister is looking forward to seeing you and the delegation of the Conservative Friends of Israel at 1615 on Wednesday, 14 May, at 10 Downing Street.

CAROLINE STEPHENS

The Rt. Hon. Hugh Fraser, M.B.E., M.P.

FROM: THE RT. HON. HUGH FRASER, M.B.E., M.P.



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

1st May, 1980

Prime Minister

Ian says you will agree to this. It will have to be after the 2200 vote on Wednesday. Agree?

Yes Mr. El. 2/5.

Ian Gow

Meeting of the Prime Minister with the
Conservative Friends of Israel

I gratefully take up your offer of a meeting with the Prime Minister next week at her convenience after a Division in The House.

Our delegation would consist of the following: Julian Amery, Peter Thomas, Maurice Macmillan, Tim Sainsbury, Michael Latham and the organiser of the C.F.I. and ex-MP, Michael Fidler. and Malcolm THORNTON MP

We will be coming against a background where in the gloom of increasing international tension, the May "deadline" for Camp David could become another crisis point. Locally, you will be aware, there is a mounting and vociferous distrust by the Jewish community of the British Foreign Office.

The two problems I suggest for discussion are:

- (1) some statements by Ministers outside No.10 regarding the P.L.O. and Israel, which I trust are misleading and misconceived, and which certainly have lead to confusion, and
- (2) our fear that the so-called European stance on Israel seems to be French dictated and not in our national interest.

I know how difficult the Israelis are being and, as a Group, we have criticised major parts of their settlement policy. Nevertheless, we will be coming with a feeling of great urgency on the points I have outlined.

The meeting will of course be private and it will be for the Prime Minister to decide whether anything should be said. Perhaps we could have a word about this at The "22" this evening.


P.S. I have warned all the above to be on stand-by. If you could perhaps let me know on Tuesday the approximate time of the meeting, they will be ready.

Ian Gow, Esq. TD, MP

Ian Gow

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