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PREM 19/906

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
SECRET.

Confidential filing.

Visit of Professor Hambleton, a Canadian economist and self-confessed Soviet spy, to the UK in June/July 1980.

SECURITY.

June 1980.

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>27.6.80.</del>							
<del>29.6.82</del>							
<del>30.6.82</del>							
<del>25.11.82</del>							
<del>26.11.82</del>							
<del>24.11.82</del>							
<del>7.12.82</del>							
PREM 19/				/			
						906	

Ref. A082/0418

MR BUTLER

Professor Hambleton

I have just learned that Professor Hambleton, who had originally pleaded not guilty, this morning changed his plea to guilty, and has been sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment.

2. This may mean that there will be questions put to the Prime Minister at question time this afternoon.

3. We had better go through the process of consultation of the reference to the Security Commission (first, seeking the view of Lord Bridge; second, consulting the Leader of the Opposition). I think it likely, however, that we shall be recommending that there should be no such reference in this case. Professor Hambleton was a Canadian rather than a British spy; he was in NATO as a representative of Canada, not of Britain. If any security procedures are in question as a result of this case it is Canadian (and NATO) rather than British procedures.

--- 4. I attach a Speaking Note for the Prime Minister.

*R. H. H.*

Approved by  
ROBERT ARMSTRONG  
and signed in his absence.

7 December 1982



SPEAKING NOTE

I confirm that Professor Hambleton, who had pleaded not guilty to offences under the Official Secrets Act, changed his plea this morning and pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment.

2. The nature of the charges has been very fully set out in the statements by my rt hon and Learned Friend the Attorney General in his conduct for the prosecution and I do not propose to make any further statement on those matters.

3. In accordance with the normal procedure, I shall now seek the view of the Chairman of the Security Commission as to whether an investigation by the Commission would be likely to serve a useful purpose. I shall consult the rt hon Leader of the Opposition, taking into account the views of the Chairman of the Security Commission, before deciding whether or not to refer the case to the Commission. I shall, of course, keep the House informed of developments on this aspect of the matter.



CONFIDENTIAL

Security  
Prime Minister

MR. BUTLER

Professor Hugh Hambleton

Proceedings in this case were due to start this afternoon.

2. If the Prime Minister is asked about it in the course of Question time tomorrow, I think that she must stick rigidly to the statement that the case is sub judice and that she cannot comment. It would be nice to be able to say in some way that he was not our spy: but any kind of disclaimer could too easily be used by Professor Hambleton's Counsel in the course of the proceedings. Professor Hambleton has pleaded not guilty and I understand that part of his defence is likely to be that he was a double agent, acting for the French and Canadian authorities as well as for the Russians. It is difficult to reconcile this with his confession, but there it is. I think that we have to be very careful not to say anything which could suggest that we were not really interested in him, as part of the case against him is that the disclosure of classified material belonging to NATO damaged the interests of the Alliance and of each of its members, including the United Kingdom.

Robert Armstrong

29th November 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

*Security*

Ref. A082/0296

MR BUTLER

*original filed on:-*

*Security: Ritchie of the Foo:  
March 82*

Official Secrets: Ritchie and Hambleton

Thank you for your minute of 25 November.

2. The Ritchie case is likely to be over within the morning on 29 November, since she is expected to plead guilty. The Hambleton case is expected to run for at least a week, and perhaps for longer.

3. The two cases are quite different from each other, and from Prime. Miss Ritchie is charged under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act, not under section 1; and though the charge of passing information to an Egyptian intelligence officer is serious, the damage done is trivial, particularly by comparison with Prime; and, such as it is, it is damage to international relations rather than to national security. There may be a question whether positive vetting could or should have disclosed that Miss Ritchie was liable to put herself into compromising situations which could make her vulnerable to pressure or blackmail to disclose information she should not disclose, and might not therefore be a fit person to have regular access to highly classified information.

4. Professor Hambleton, though he has dual citizenship, is basically a Canadian traitor. He betrayed Canadian and NATO secrets, but not specifically British secrets. It will be argued in court that British interests suffered from the betrayal of NATO secrets; but the case does not call in question British security procedures.

5. I have just received, and attach as briefing for the Prime Minister, copies of drafts of the opening statements by Counsel for the Crown in both cases.

6. I incline to the view that, for the purposes of answering questions or making statements, the Prime Minister should seek to keep the two cases separate. An additional argument for this is that the Ritchie case will cease to be sub judice on 29 November, so that questions can be asked on 30 November. The Hambleton case will be sub judice all next week at least.

CONFIDENTIAL

7. The procedure laid down by the then Prime Minister on 25 March 1969 requires us, in a case where a breach of security has led to a prosecution:

- (1) to send the Chairman of the Security Commission a statement outlining the facts of the case and to ask him whether he thinks that an investigation would be likely to serve a useful purpose;
- (2) to consult the Leader of the Opposition before deciding whether or not to refer the case to the Commission.

8. Lord Bridge is being sent a statement of the facts of the Ritchie case and asked for an opinion. I am suggesting to him that, though the facts of the case might not themselves appear to call for further investigation, the question whether positive vetting could or should have brought Miss Ritchie's vulnerability to light may be a matter to which, particularly in current circumstances, the Security Commission should give attention; and that it might therefore be sensible to refer the case to the Security Commission, to be investigated by the same panel as is conducting the inquiry into the Prime case and dealt with in the same report.

9. I do not think that the Ritchie case calls for the kind of full statement that the Prime Minister has made in some previous cases - eg Blunt, Hollis and Prime. But she will need to say something about a reference to the Security Commission. She could wait to be asked; but there would be something to be said for a short written answer to an arranged PQ, which could be put down as soon as the Ritchie case is concluded. I attach a draft. She could then refer back to that answer in dealing with any other questions on the subject.

10. For next week at least, any questions on the Hambleton case can and should be sidestepped on the ground that the case is sub judice. At some stage we shall have to go through the process of consulting the Chairman of the Security Commission about a reference, but my present view is that this case will not call for a reference to the Security Commission. On this again, the Prime

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Minister will have to be ready to say something, but I hope that we can confine it to a written answer. I will advise further when we see how the case is going.

11. I am sending copies of this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Home Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to the Legal Secretary to the Law Officers.

**ROBERT ARMSTRONG**

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

26 November 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE QUEENAGAINSTREGINA JANE McINTYRE RITCHIEOPENING NOTEALLEGATION

On various days between mid-November 1981 and some time late in January or early February 1982 the Defendant who at the time held an appointment under the Crown as Second Secretary at the British Embassy in Tel Aviv wrongfully communicated the contents of a number of confidential telegrams to an employee in the Egyptian Embassy with whom she was having an affair.

INDICTMENT

One Count, contrary to Section 2(1)(a) of the Official Secrets Act 1911 in relation to one such telegram. The Court will hear of four other telegrams. However, there are no further counts dealing with these because the substance of the case is that the defendant's conduct as a whole put the public interest at risk rather than that the disclosure of a particular telegram was itself damaging to the public interest.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

This is a very different kind of case from that which your Lordship had to deal with in this Court recently. Miss Ritchie's behaviour was more foolish than wicked. Nevertheless it involved a sad breach of the trust confided in her by virtue of her appointment and of her duty as a servant of the Crown.

What happened, put quite briefly, was this. Having formed an attachment to her opposite number at the Egyptian Embassy, she allowed herself to be so carried away by her involvement as to reveal to him the text of confidential telegrams which had come to her knowledge in the course of her duties.

The damage to our country's interests was not in the event great. Egypt is a friendly power and most of the information she has admitted conveying would have become public knowledge in due course anyway. The mischief lay in the very fact of a breach of confidentiality and the inevitable doubts about our trustworthiness and security which the discovery of her conduct must have given rise to in the minds of other interested parties.

Those Governments, with whom we enjoy harmonious relationships, have a right to expect that confidential exchanges will remain confidential.

#### DEFENDANT'S HISTORY

RHONA JANE McINTYRE RITCHIE

AGED 30

3rd September 1979

Appointed to the staff of The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (F.C.O.)

By which time on

1st August 1979

She had signed a declaration relating to the Official Secrets Act EX.1 p.1 including "I am aware that I should not divulge any information gained by me as a result of my appointment to any unauthorised person".

5th July 1981

She was appointed as Second Secretary at the Embassy in Tel Aviv.

Report Para.3

In due course she was promoted to First Secretary in Chancery, doing political work, although this promotion came after her unlawful activities.

Miles D.p.1

She would have seen all the telegrams from the F.C.O. to the Embassy and telegrams sent from the Embassy; unless they were subject to special restrictions.

The relevant paragraphs for the purposes of this case are:-

- 11 (Dealing with safeguarding and proper security of classified documents)
- 21 (This forbids discussion of classified matter in the presence of domestic staff and in public generally)
- 23 (which simply reminds officers that they are subject to the Official Secrets Act).

While at the Embassy she met and became friendly with an official at the Egyptian Embassy called Refaat el Ansary.

She started to go out socially with him in August 1981.

Vol.57 of the Diplomatic Service Procedure is relevant here and is also a publication with which she should have been familiar.

Para.7.4

It alerts Diplomatic Service officers to the obvious danger of intelligent services of hostile powers making contacts with nationals of neutral or friendly countries with a view to using them suborn members of our Diplomatic Service. "They should report immediately any indication that there is anything unusual arising from a contact with a national of a non-communist country".

Para.12.1

The Official Secrets Act protects all information and material obtained from official sources, whether classified or not.

DSR/12 (Diplomatic Service Regulations)

This stresses in the strongest terms the personal responsibility of Diplomatic officers for safeguarding all official information in their possession or knowledge. It makes reference to the Official Secrets Act in the following terms:- "Under the Official Secrets Acts, 1911 to 1939, it is an offence for you to disclose to an unauthorised person, either orally or in writing, any information you have acquired through your official duties unless you have received official permission. There is, however, no objection to your repeating information which

has already officially been made public".

THE TELEGRAMS

17th November 1981

No 919

EX.5 p.16

This is a telegram to UK Representative in Brussels, giving the text of a message from Lord Carrington to Mr Haig informing him of the Government's willingness to participate in the Multi National Force (MFO) and Observers

(Cont'd overleaf)

in Sinai - which was repeated to, inter alia, the British Embassy,  
Tel Aviv.

As we shall see, when interviewed Miss Ritchie identified this as  
one where the substance of the text was passed to Ansary.

21st November 1981

No 1773

Ex.6 p.17-20

This is a telegram to Washington repeated to Tel Aviv stating that the  
text of the statement agreeing to participation in the MFO was to be  
delivered to the Israeli and Egyptian Foreign Ministers the following  
day.

Miss Ritchie identified a copy of this telegram and admitted she  
supplied Ansary with a copy of the text.

23rd November 1981

No 186

Ex.8 p.30-32

This is a telegram to Tel Aviv giving details of an announcement to be  
made in the UK Parliament agreeing to contribute to the MFO in Sinai.  
The telegram would have been received in Tel Aviv about noon UK time,  
the announcement being made in Parliament at 3.30 pm.

This was not shown to Miss Ritchie at the interview, but she refers to  
it in such terms as to make it clear it was one of those of which she  
gave what she called an 'advanced copy' to Ansary.

26th November 1981

No 1802

Ex.4 p.13-14

This is a telegram containing a message from Lord Carrington to Mr Haig  
in Washington, which was repeated to a number of British Embassies  
including Tel Aviv.

Miss Ritchie was shown a copy of this telegram and describes it as the  
most sensitive of the telegrams she discussed with Ansary as it was not  
going to be made public.

It is in respect of this telegram that Miss Ritchie is indicted.

12th January 1982

Nos 5 and 6

Ex.9 p.33-36

These telegrams refer to a message from Lord Carrington to the Israeli Foreign Minister about European participation in the Sinai Force. These telegrams were not available to show to Miss Ritchie at the interview, but again she mentioned a number of telegrams received between November and January relating to European Foreign Ministers understanding of their countries' participation in the MFO; she stated that when the final text had been decided in January (these are the two relevant telegrams) she told Ansary that the Government's answer was going to be given to the Israelis the following day and she admitted noting down the text and giving it to Ansary.

17th March 1982

Westcott D. p. 4

5.32 pm

Waghorn D. p. 7

Defendant was interviewed in London

Ex.2 p. 3

Q. I have been told today that you have passed the text of certain official telegrams from The Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Defence Attache Tel Aviv to an acquaintance of yours called Ansary.

A. If you put it bluntly - yes that's true. It never entered my head in any way to betray secrets.

She was then cautioned.

Q. I have been told that you passed the text of certain telegrams to Ansary. Is that true?

A. Yes, that's true.

She was shown the telegram 1802 of 26th November 1981  
and identified it

Ex. 4 p. 13

She was then asked to look at other documents and point out the ones of which she had taken notes to pass to Ansary.

She dealt with:-

Ex. 5 p. 15

A telegram of 17th November 1981 which sets out the text of a message to Secretary of State Haig, about the agreement of various countries to contribute to the multi-national force in Sinai.

About it, she said:

"The substance of this text was passed to Ansary by me. You must appreciate that this is one of many telexes on the statement to be issued by the four European countries on their participation in the multi-national force in Sinai.

What I gave him was the final text of the statement which may have been fully set out in a later telegram. .... I only did this because I knew the statement would in any case be officially delivered/<sup>the</sup>next day to the Egyptian foreign minister ....."

She also admitted giving Ansary the text of a statement that was to be made in Parliament on 23rd November 1981. Ex. 8 p. 30

She said:

"I only did this because I knew the statement would in any case be officially delivered the next day to the Egyptian Foreign Minister."

"There was another telegram or telegrams which are not here giving the text of the statement which would be made in Parliament on 23-11-81 .... I knew that this also would shortly be public knowledge and so also gave Ansary these texts."

She then made a statement under caution in writing.

Ex. 3 p. 7-12

At p. 9

She describes Ex. 4 p. 13 telegram No. 1802 as  
"the most sensitive of the telegrams I discussed with Ansary as  
it was not going to be made public ..... but it seemed to me obvious  
that the content would also be made known to the Egyptians.

About this and other documents she said :

Ex. 3 p. 10

"As before, I again felt uncomfortable in that I should not have released  
it to him, but by the same token I was persuaded that this was something  
that he was going to get anyway and was therefore tantamount to an  
advanced copy given on a personal basis."

I was only prepared to let him see copies of final texts which I  
thought he could get from other sources but I realised that this  
was a breach of the rules but I never felt that I had given him  
anything which he would not in any case find out from other sources.

Ex. 3 p. 11

She then deals with her personal relationship with Ansary and  
completes the statement by saying:

"I am obviously aware of the Official Secrets Act but never felt  
that I was breaching its spirit."

SECRET

13

REGINA v. HAMBLETON

NOTE FOR OPENING

Background

Hugh Hambleton, 60 years, was born in Canada.

He went to school in the U.K., and completed his education in Canada.

1944-46. He served in the Free French Army in N. Africa, later transferring to the Canadian Armed Forces where he was engaged in military intelligence.

Up to 1956. He worked at University in Mexico, The National Film Board of Canada and then completed 2 years at the L.S.E. in London.

1956-61. He worked for N.A.T.O. in Paris in the Economic and Finance Division.

After 1961. He returned to the L.S.E. for a short while and travelled a good deal especially to France and Spain.

From 1964 he held the post of Professor of Economics at Laval University in Quebec.

Nov. 1979, he was arrested in Canada and a certain amount of sophisticated spying equipment was seized by the R.C.M.P. (He was not prosecuted by the Canadians).

SECRET

June 1982. He came to London on a British passport where he was interviewed by Special Branch officers and admitted in considerable detail his activities with Russian agents over a period of some 30 years.

He is a British subject, enjoying dual British and Canadian nationality.

Although he was born in Canada, his father and grandfather were born in the U.K. By the British Nationality Act 1948 all Canadian citizens are British subjects. He holds a British passport.

#### Allegation

He was recruited in Canada in the late 1940's by a K.G.B. officer attached at the time to the Russian Embassy.

For 30 years he has been in almost continuous contact with Russian agents all over the world but mainly in Paris and Quebec.

In 1956, at the instigation of the Russians, he took a part in the Economics Section of N.A.T.O. which was based in Paris (at that time). Whilst there he passed over a great deal of CLASSIFIED material belonging to N.A.T.O. to Soviet agents in Paris. The U.K. was a founder member of N.A.T.O. and the disclosure of that CLASSIFIED information inevitably damaged the interests of the Alliance and each of its members, including the U.K.

After N.A.T.O. he maintained his association with the K.G.B. visiting Moscow in 1975. When arrested in Quebec in 1979 he was found in possession of very sophisticated communications equipment supplied by the Russians.

The evidence against him emerges mainly from his interviews with Special Branch officers in June 1982. He was interviewed on 6 occasions over 3 days (25th, 26th and 27th June). They can be summarised as follows:-

/Pre - N.A.T.O. period/

In c. 1947 he was "cultivated" by Borodin, the cultural attache to the Russian Embassy, in Canada.

Ex.1.  
p.24

This occurred over a period of time - with more and more meetings, invitation] to dinner etc. His association with Borodin lasted c 4 or 5 years.

p.32

He realized subsequently that Borodin was a K.G.B. officer. He was given early training by Borodin in the techniques of espionage.

Ex.4  
p.179

His family always had a tradition of "sympathy towards the Russian experience". His mother studied Russian and taught English to Tass people.

Ex.1  
p.29  
p.24

His first wife knew he was being cultivated and provided him with the opportunity to pass over information because her father worked in the Defence office, But he refrained at that early stage.

p.26

He passed over no information in the early days. It was merely training.

p.27,29,32

At the time he was working for the Film Board in Canada.

p.33

His guess was that the Russians thought of him as "playing a role useful to them in the Canadian political scene in the long term future".

p.34

1951/52 He went to Paris to take a doctorate of economics at the Sorbonne.

p.35

Within a year, Borodin appeared in France (in a small village south of Paris) and introduced him to another Soviet agent.

p.36

Thereafter he had a number of covert meetings with a succession of agents. Meetings would be arranged in Paris at particular places at a fixed time of the month.

p.37-39

He was in Paris for 2 or 3 years and in contact with 3 different agents meeting every 3 or 4 months.

p.40

He didn't think he received any money at that stage.

p.41

"They never had to put pressure on me but they easily could. You get in deeply so slowly you don't see it at first".

p.42

c 1954 He moved to L.S.E. in London - for c 2 years p.42/46  
- on a grant from the Belgian Government.

There was no contact in London (he claimed) but he went over to Paris for pre-arranged meetings from time to time.

Whilst at the L.S.E. he received about £60 a month in American bills. p.43

"The Russians take care of your fear about jobs. You can always fall back on them for money". p.44

/ N.A.T.O. period/ 1956 - 1961.

17/9/56 he took an appointment as officer, Grade 2 in the Economics Section of N.A.T.O. on the International Staff. Ex.25

He had applied for a post the year before, even offering his services as an economist "without pay". see Ex.21

He had been asked by the Russians to work for N.A.T.O. This was after about a year at the L.S.E. and when his contact at the time was a short blond agent "who seemed to correspond with somebody at the Russian Embassy in Paris". p.45-47

He was pushed very persistently into making an application.

p.48

For about a year after his appointment he heard nothing from the Russians and then contact was resumed.

p.50/52

Meetings with agents became more and more frequent rising to about once a fortnight.

p.53

Venues varied but usually it was some working-class area in Paris.

There were 5 different agents during this period. The best rapport was established with a man known as "Paul".

p.54,74

The Russians were interested in "original authentic documents of the highest classified<sup>cation</sup>".

p.61

They also wanted him to evaluate N.A.T.O. policy, to forecast what N.A.T.O. was likely to do and to advise what attitude the U.S.S.R. should adopt towards N.A.T.O.

p.67,68

Half way through his time at N.A.T.O., a system was introduced enabling radio contact on a fixed frequency at a fixed time of night. This method was used when the Russians asked for specific documents, Sometimes providing the N.A.T.O. reference number. It was also available in case of emergency.

p.252-5

[ Hambleton had access to <sup>a large number of</sup> most secret N.A.T.O. documents in the ordinary course of his duties. Their classification was as follows:-

- (1) Top Secret (Cosmic) - applying to information/ Considered so important that its disclosure would result in exceptionally grave damage to N.A.T.O.
- (2) Secret - where disclosure was thought to incur serious damage to N.A.T.O.
- (3) Confidential - disclosure would be prejudicial to N.A.T.O.
- (4) Restricted - disclosure undesirable to the interests of N.A.T.O.

Western  
p.19

On his appointment Hambleton had signed a Security Declaration promising to preserve the security of classified information and recognising that he was liable to prosecution if he allowed it to pass into unauthorised hands at any time.

Ex.27

Central Sheets are still available of the classified documents issued to him during his employment and demonstrate the large volume of top secret, secret and confidential material passing through his hands. He also had access to secret documents available to others in the Economics Section.

Ex.31

Dobson  
p.15

The North Atlantic Treaty came into force in 1949. It is a continuing agreement between the members of the Alliance for their collective self-defence on the basis that an armed attack against one of them should be considered an attack against all. All members have agreed to protect and safeguard each other's classified information as well as that of N.A.T.O. itself. "N.A.T.O. classified information" is a term that embraces all military, political and economic matters.

Western<sup>c</sup>  
p.17

He took documents home overnight, photographed them and handed the films over to Soviet agents, returning the documents the next day.

p.63

He was provided with camera<sup>f</sup> by the Russians and also used his own.

The films were handed to agents at brief meetings in different parts of Paris, often in the Metro, usually in dark streets.

p.62

p.101

He was still receiving \$60 a month.

p.259

Over 4 years he photographed hundreds of documents — "maybe 300 at the top".

p.66

"A document would be either thick or a single page. If you had 36 frames in a film and you used that say every three weeks on average and passed on two films you are talking possibly about thousands of pages."

p.97

There can be no doubt he passed across a great deal of highly damaging material.

About the nature of that material he had this to say:-

(1) "a certain amount on economics and oil . . . . Some would be secret but that doesn't mean anything".

p.64

(2) "economics, politics, oil. I am not saying there wouldn't be others".

"the work of the oil Committee, you know plans to Stockpile oil for thirty days".

p.97

(3) "Although the majority were classified secret that was because they may have come from a file classified secret and in themselves not classified. For example I would see security reports from SHAPE but the whole report was classified. Most would be collected by military attaches and I would avoid that but some stuff which may be classified secret such as reports on political parties from open sources which were classified because they came from an Embassy, I would use these".

p.97

(It was not right to say, in effect, that files marked secret contained unclassified documents. N.A.T.O. practice was to classify each document separately within a file).

(4) "a lot would have N.A.T.O. confidential". p.100

(5) ". . . . . there may be parts of a Cosmic document contained in another document which you photograph . . . ."

Q. So it is possible that something classified Cosmic could have got to them through you?

A. "Yes. I guess so". p.193

(Although, in the main, he denied passing Cosmic documents, he allowed for the possibility towards the end of the 4th interview. His constant refrain was that Cosmic documents would indicate him as the source. However, as can be seen from the Control Sheets, he was issued with a large number of Cosmic files and it is highly unlikely that he would not have photographed them especially as he had already conceded that the Russians were interested in documents "of the highest classification").

When arrested in Quebec in 1979 he was still in possession of a few N.A.T.O. documents - most marked 'Confidential' and dated 1958, 1959, 1960.

NFE JJFD/4

Whilst at N.A.T.O. the Russians had no other tasks for him in case he was compromised in some way. He was supposed to have a life job there.

p.71

However, he resigned in 1961 for reasons that are not entirely clear.

The Russians wanted him to defect immediately, but he declined.

p.73

/Post N.A.T.O. period/

After N.A.T.O. he was told to lie low for a while.

p.74

He returned to L.S.E. in London and spent a lot of time in Spain - doing a thesis.

p.74

1964. He went to <sup>L</sup>aval University in Quebec as Professor in Economics, where he remained employed until 1979.

Before leaving Europe, he met an RIS officer in Vienna where he was told that they would attempt to find him a position in Western Europe. They wanted to push him towards a job in the Canadian Government.

p.106

On his return to Canada, contact was made with an agent in Ottawa after 3 or 4 months. Meetings lasted a while and then petered out. p.112

2 years later an agent called Rudi Herman approached him at the University saying Moscow was worried that contact had been lost. p.117

He maintained contact with Herman until 1974 meeting every 3 or 4 months. p.118

As is clear from his passport he travelled extensively over those years, including:-

1970 - 2 months in Israel paid for by the Russians after which he prepared a report for them. p.130

There were subsequent visits to Israel in 1975 and 1978. p.137

1971 - 6 months in Peru working at the Canadian Embassy and in the President's office working <sup>on</sup> ~~as~~ aid for disaster relief. There was contact with an agent in Lima. p.122

1973-5 Haiti - where he trained Government personnel on how to present reports on projects financed by international banks. He gave his Soviet agent a report on the economic situation there. p.135/136

1975 - He went to Moscow through Vienna and Prague.

There he was trained in different methods of secret communication.

In particular, he was shown:-

(a) how to use a "Tonal Converter"

(he called it a "light" machine).

This is a device designed for use at the audio output of a domestic radio receiver to convert a signal conveying a series of tones into a display in which figures corresponding to those tones are illuminated by lights. It is a very sophisticated piece of decoding equipment not available in the West (on the open market at any rate). It involves careful training and practice before it can be used successfully. It enabled Moscow to communicate direct with him in Canada.

NFE Mr "A"

He described in very accurate detail how the machine worked and how he was trained to use it. He was then supplied with a machine in Montreal in 1977 and found with it in his apartment in Quebec in November 1979 by the R.C.M.P.

p.152 et seq.

p.212

JGMBB1

(b) how to use chemicals and specially prepared writing paper to transmit secret messages. He set out in detail the method he was given to reveal messages chemically written on paper. The message would be on a letter or the inside of an envelope.

p.159  
et seq.

Experts have confirmed the accuracy of his observations.

NFE Mr."B"

In his office at <sup>L</sup> Naval University, R.C.M.P. officers found a yellow notebook and 2 containers with "potassium iodide" inside.

NFE  
JJFD/1,2,3

An expert has discovered that some pages in the notebook have been specially treated for writing secret messages. The same expert has also discovered that the two containers of chemicals can be used for developing incoming secret messages. The instructions for developing secret messages with these chemicals as set out by Hambleton in his interview are very accurate.

NFE Mr."B"

He tended to receive messages in French and on the reverse of the envelope where the address was written. p.162

Whilst in Moscow he saw the head of the K.G.B., Andropov, who said he hoped Hambleton would play a role in world trouble-spots in the future, assessing them politically and economically. An attempt was also made to persuade him to stand for the Canadian Parliament with a campaign financed by the Russians

p.164/5

or to join the Hudson Institute near New York (an institute that carries out research for the Defence Dept.).

p.168

After his return to Canada from Russia, agents were no longer necessary because control was exercised directly from Moscow. He was able to communicate direct - first by secret letters, later through the Tonal Converter.

p.209

He was sent a series of requests through the Tonal Converter to go to the Middle East and other areas. He declined most of them.

p.219

But in 1978 he agreed to go to Cairo where he prepared a report on the Egyptian economy based on a report by the Central Bank of Egypt. He collected his expenses from a contact in Vienna and left the report in Vienna after spending a month in Cairo.

p.226

At the end of 1978 he went back to Vienna where he was told by "Paul" that Western Intelligence Agencies were investigating him and that he should defect to the East. He was given \$5,000 to help his decision. He declined, ~~not to~~.

p.231

He maintains that there has been no contact with the Russians since that meeting.

p.240

He was arrested by the R.C.M.P. in Quebec in November 1979 and the following items were found at his home and office:-

Tonal Converter (Decoder)	<u>JGMBB1</u>
Yellow Beaver Notebook (+ treated pages)	<u>JJFD1</u>
2 containers of Potassium Iodide	<u>JJFD1/2</u>
9 N.A.T.O. documents.	<u>JJFD4</u>
2 sheets of paper with instructions for Dead Letter Boxes	<u>DBS1</u>

Finally, He was asked for his motive and, without finding an easy answer, said there was:-

- (a) a sense of belonging to the K.G.B.
- (b) a certain liking for the Security Service network
- (c) an element of glamour and excitement.

p.181  
et seq.

To ask the Prime Minister, whether she will make a statement on the security implications raised by the case of Regina versus Ritchie.

Miss Rhona Ritchie, a Second Secretary in the British Embassy in Tel Aviv, was tried at the Central Criminal Court yesterday on charges under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911. She pleaded guilty, and was given a suspended sentence of        years' imprisonment.

2. Miss Ritchie passed information and documents without authority to an Egyptian intelligence officer in Tel Aviv with whom she was having an affair. The facts of the case were fully set out in the statement by Counsel for the Crown in yesterday's proceedings, and I need not recapitulate them here.

3. These were serious offences, and Miss Ritchie's conduct represented a grave breach of her obligations as a member of the Diplomatic Service and of the trust placed in her. The damage was, however, limited. So far as is known, none of the information which she gave was classified higher than confidential. Her activities were prejudicial to the conduct of inter-

national relations, in a sensitive area of those relations, but cannot be described as damaging to national security.

4. In accordance with the procedure described to the House by my predecessor on 25 March 1969, the Chairman of the Security Commission has received a statement outlining the facts of the case and has been asked to say whether in his opinion an investigation by the Commission would be likely to serve a useful purpose. I shall consult the Rt Hon Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, taking into account the views expressed by the Chairman of the Commission, before deciding whether or not to refer the case to the Commission. I will tell the House in due course what my decision is.



2-4 AH

6

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

You will have seen Jim Nursaw's letter of 24 November to me about the cases against Miss Ritchie and Professor Hambleton.

May I look to you for advice on the action which the Prime Minister will need to take when these cases are out of the way. I imagine that there will be pressure for her to make a statement on them. It would obviously be preferable for her to make one statement rather than two. But I suppose that there may be pressure for a statement on the case of Miss Ritchie immediately it is disposed of, which would be as early as Tuesday. Nevertheless, if you think it a sustainable line for the Prime Minister to say that she will make a statement on both cases together when Professor Hambleton's case has been disposed of, this would obviously be more convenient.

F.R.B.

25 November 1982

AW

SECRET



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CO  
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MOD

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

25 November 1982

Dear Jim,

Thank you for your letter of 24 November about the cases against Miss Ritchie and Professor Hambleton. I am following up with Sir Robert Armstrong's office the preparation of briefing for the Prime Minister on statements when the cases are out of the way.

I have shown your letter to the Prime Minister, who has noted the contents of the part of Professor Hambleton's confession which was attached to your letter.

I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

Yours sincerely,

Robin Butler

J Nursaw Esq.,  
Law Officers' Department.

p.s. Thank you also for your postscript of today.

ATA

SECRET

*Top Copy on Security,  
March 1982, Miss R.J.M.  
Ritchie.*



J. Nursaw

LEGAL SECRETARY.

LAW OFFICERS' DEPARTMENT  
ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE  
LONDON, WC2A 2LL

5

25 November 1982

F E R Butler Esq  
Principal Private Secretary  
Prime Minister's Office  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON S W 1

*Dear Robin,*

R v HAMBLETON  
R v RITCHIE

A postscript to my letter of yesterday.

At a conference yesterday with the DPP's staff, Treasury Counsel and Bernard Sheldon, the Attorney General discussed the handling at the trial of Hambleton of the Andropov story. It was agreed that for the Attorney to comment that the Crown is unable to say whether the story is true would be inconsistent with the Crown relying upon the confession as a whole as a truthful account of Hambleton's offences. We have no reason to doubt any other part of the confession. In the circumstances, the most that the Attorney General can do is to introduce the story with some such words as "The Defendant says that.....".

I am giving this letter the same circulation as yesterday's.

*Yours sincerely,  
Jin Nursaw*

SECRET

SECRET

Top Copy on Security, ~~Bernard Ingham~~  
March 1982, Miss R.J.M. Ritchie



J. Nursaw

LEGAL SECRETARY

LAW OFFICERS' DEPARTMENT  
ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE  
LONDON, WC2A 2LL

4

24 November 1982

F E R Butler Esq  
Principal Private Secretary  
Prime Minister's Office  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON S W 1

You may be pressed for a  
statement immediately on  
Miss Ritchie, before the  
Trial of Hambleton is  
concluded.

Dear Robin,

R v HAMBLETON  
R v RITCHIE

FERB

24.11.

On Monday 29 November it is anticipated that Miss Ritchie will plead guilty at the Central Criminal Court before the Lord Chief Justice to an offence under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act. Thereafter the Court will try Professor Hambleton who is accused of offences under section 1. Estimates of the length of that trial vary from five working days to three weeks.

I am writing to you because it is inevitable that there will be pressure for a Government statement immediately the trials are ended and in the case of Hambleton (whose spying related to his work in NATO) there is no Department able to answer questions about security aspects of the case. Since the Prime Minister will be under pressure to give details of the cases and to say whether they raise issues which will be referred to the Security Commission, you will wish to begin coordinating the preparation of briefing material. All that I could do would be to provide information about the prosecution evidence and the trials.

I will ask Sir Robert Armstrong's office to do so.

There is one aspect of the case against Hambleton which I must bring to your attention immediately. In a very long confession to the Police he describes his years as a spy in some detail. One of the stories he tells is how the then Head of the KGB came to dinner at his apartment in Moscow and how he asked Hambleton to try to become a member of the Canadian Parliament, offering to finance his campaign. In view of the subsequent elevation of that official, the Attorney thinks that the Prime Minister should be informed that this evidence will undoubtedly come out at the trial. The Attorney thinks it would be quite wrong to take any steps to attempt to conceal it but

/as

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SECRET



J. Nursaw

LEGAL SECRETARY.

LAW OFFICERS' DEPARTMENT  
ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE  
LONDON, WC2A 2LL

as we have no idea whether it is a true story, he proposes to mention it in his opening speech with the comment that the Crown are unable to say whether it is true.

I enclose a copy of the relevant extract from the record of the Police interview with Hambleton.

I am copying this letter, together with the enclosure, to Brian Fall (FCO) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office) and without the enclosure to John Halliday (HO), David Omand (MOD) and Bernard Sheldon.

*Yours sincerely,  
Jim Nursaw*

SECRET

SECRET

EXHIBIT No. 3 (CTD.)

FORM 9900

Record of interview of

Hugh George HAMBLETON

continued

Page no. 60

written. HGH

Q: How competent were their instructors.

A: The language is a great problem if they are not working with Russian speakers. The case of the woman instructor who did not know the chemical name for the white powder, except in Russian, delayed the use of that method in my case by one year.

It was

my impression by the way this instruction was organised that there could not have been a great number of agents coming through that way I thought that such examples as going through Russia on aircraft etc with other people I must have stood out like a sore thumb. HGH

Q: Were other people undergoing

Hugh G Hambleton

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reunited with file after redacted version

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SECRET

EXHIBIT No. 3 (CTD.)

FORM 9900

Record of interview of

Hugh George HAMBLETON

continued

Page no. 60

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Hugh G Hambleton

J P Westcott

D J Adams D/S

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SECRET

EXHIBIT No. 3 (CTD.)

FORM 9900

Record of interview of

Hugh George HAMBLETON

continued

Page no. 61

instruction.

A: No. HGH

Q: What other things were discussed  
other than training.

A: I saw the head of the KGB,  
ANDROPOV, he came for an  
evening meal at my apartment,  
there were seven or eight people  
present as well. Paul and the  
"American" were there, although  
the instructors were not there. HGH

Q: This must have been an honour,  
they must have valued you  
highly.

A: I don't know, they were interested  
to see me. I was asked what  
I thought about the future of the  
Common Market. I suggested that  
I didn't think it would last  
long because national feelings

Hugh G Hambleton

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SECRET

EXHIBIT No. 3 (CTD.)

FORM 990C

Record of interview of

Hugh George HAMBLETON

continued

Page no. 61

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A: No. HGH

Q: What other things were discussed  
other than training.

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Hugh G Hambleton

J P Westcott

D J Adams D/S

SECRET

SECRET

EXHIBIT No. 3 (CTD.)

FORM 990

Record of interview of

Hugh George HAMBLETON

continued

Page no. 62

would rise. HGH

Q: Are you sure it was ANDROPOV.

A: Yes. He asked me general questions, for instance didn't I think the American defence budget was too high. He was worried about the situation in Russia because of high defence spending. HGH

Q: Did he thank you for your work.

A: He didn't have a medal, he thanked me but hoped I could play a role in world trouble-spots in the future. HGH

Q: What did you think he was after in that connection.

A: Political and economic assessments of these trouble spots. HGH

Q: Are the RCMP satisfied that you did meet ANDROPOV.

Hugh G Hambleton

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SECRET

EXHIBIT No. 3 (CTD.)

FORM 990

Record of interview of

Hugh George HAMBLETON

continued

Page no. 62

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Hugh G Hambleton

J P Westcott

D J Adams D/S

SECRET

SECRET  
EXHIBIT No. 3 (CTD.)

FORM 990

Record of interview of

Hugh George HAMBLETON

continued

Page no. 63

A: Yea, I think so.

Then he suggested that I enter the Canadian Parliamentary system to become a Member of Parliament. He said he would finance the campaign. I got the feeling that what he wanted me to do was exert influence on behalf of Russia rather than spying. HGH

Q: What else did ANDROPOV want.

A: The communication people had left a short wave radio with me and I had been listening to Israel and he came out with a statement that there was a lot of prejudice against Israel in the United States and I can only assume that because I listened to Israel on the radio given to me on the visit and in view of the fact that Paul told

Hugh G Hambleton

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ACT 2000

SECRET

SECRET  
EXHIBIT No. 3 (CTD.)

FORM 990

Record of interview of

Hugh George HAMBLETON

continued

Page no. 63

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J P Westcott

D J Adams D/S

SECRET

SECRET

EXHIBIT No. 3 (CTD.)

FORM 990C

Record of interview of

Hugh George HAMBLETON continued

Page no. 64

me the flat was bugged, this seemed a crude attempt to show a common stance on alleged anti-semitism in the United States. I was not certain whether he was sincere or not. HGH

Q: What else happened at this dinner.

A: He asked about the attitude of youth towards the USSR.

I answered that the progressive left were perhaps more pro-Mao because it was a new experience. HGH

Q: What did Paul say about ANDROPOV's visit.

A: Nothing at all. They are all afraid of him. HGH

Q: When did they tell you that he was coming to dinner.

A: About three days before he came. He came about the

Hugh G Hambleton

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ACT 2000

SECRET

SECRET

EXHIBIT No. 3 (CTD.)

FORM 990C

Record of interview of

Hugh George HAMBLETON

continued

Page no. 64

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Hugh G Hambleton

J P Westcott

D J Adams D/S

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EXHIBIT No. 3 (CTD.)

FORM 990

Record of interview of

Hugh George HAMBLETON

continued

Page no. 65

fifth or sixth day. HGH

Q: Did Paul suggest it had been  
a great honour.

A: Oh yes. Then there was  
another thing, a trip organised  
to go to Leningrad during the  
last few days, so I went with the  
"American" on an overnight train  
and we went to a "safe" apartment.  
The apartment was part of a block  
but the remainder of the block  
was not "safe".

Q: What other  
tasks did they ask you to perform.

A: Paul seemed to have wider  
ranging interests or responsibilities  
and although the "American" was  
specifically interested in the USA.  
He wanted me to gather information  
on the Hudson Institute near New

Hugh G Hambleton

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EXHIBIT No. 3 (CTD.)

FORM 99

Record of interview of

Hugh George HAMBLETON

continued

Page no. 65

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a great honour.

A: Oh yes. Then there was  
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Hugh G Hambleton

J P Westcott

D J Adams D/S

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CONFIDENTIAL



See AH  
Security.

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

The Prime Minister has seen and noted your minute A08839 of 29 June 1982 to me about the self-confessed Soviet spy, Professor Hugh Hambleton.

AH.

30 June 1982

AH

CONFIDENTIAL

Top Copy on Security, March '82, Miss Ritchie.

This is for the



A-L's

decision. We  
can't interfere  
in any  
way

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

not

I think that you will  
want to see this immediately.

The Russians, not  
understanding British justice, will  
no doubt believe that we have  
organised that the story about  
Andropov should come out now,  
as an unfriendly act.

I will explain tomorrow  
whether it really is inevitable  
that this story should come out  
in the evidence. If it is inevitable,  
there is no point in seeking FCO  
advice. But if it could be avoided  
the FCO may want to comment.

Prime Minister

3

fw

29m

Ref. A08839

MR WHITMORE

On 26 June 1980 I sent you a minute (A02452) about the possibility that a self-confessed Soviet spy, Professor Hugh Hambleton, who lives and works in Canada, was to visit Britain. Professor Hambleton has dual Canadian and British nationality; he was employed by NATO in Paris from 1956 to 1961 and was resident in the United Kingdom from 1961 to 1964. His confession that he had spied for the Russian Intelligence Service for about 30 years was made to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in late 1979. Since he had not passed any Canadian classified information to the Russians, the Canadian Justice Department did not charge him, since they did not have sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction. He has, therefore, remained at liberty.

2. His visit to the United Kingdom in 1980 did not attract any Press or Parliamentary interest. It was, however, learned some days ago that Professor Hambleton had decided to visit Britain again this summer between 24 June and 1 July and again between 20 August and 31 August. The Canadian Security Service mentioned to Professor Hambleton, without any authority from our own Security Service, that we might wish to interview him during this visit. Professor Hambleton responded to this by suggesting that he should be contacted in London on 24 June.

3. The Attorney General and the Director of Public Prosecutions were consulted about this. The Attorney General decided that Professor Hambleton should be interviewed by the police on his arrival in this country or as soon as reasonably possible thereafter. The interview, conducted by the Metropolitan Police Special Branch, started on 25 June and continued until the evening of 27 June. Under caution, Professor Hambleton gave an account of his work for the KGB from 1947 until 1979 in great detail. He admitted, inter alia, passing a great deal of classified NATO information to the KGB in the period 1956 to 1961. He maintained that he had not been tasked by the KGB against British interests whilst resident in the United Kingdom from 1961 to 1964, but he admitted that he had remained in contact with the KGB throughout that period, including receiving payments from them, by means of meetings on the Continent.



4. Following these disclosures and consultation with the Director of Public Prosecutions, Professor Hambleton was charged under Section I of the Official Secrets Act. This charge did not refer to NATO and was in the nature of a holding charge. Professor Hambleton appeared before Horseferry Road Magistrates yesterday morning and was remanded in custody until 6 July. The Canadian authorities have been informed of Professor Hambleton's arrest.

---

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

29 June 1982

SECRET



2

Security

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

PROFESSOR HAMBLETON

The Prime Minister has seen and noted your minute AO2452 of 26 June 1980 about Professor Hambleton.

I am sending copies of this minute to Sir Brian Cubbon and Sir Howard Smith.

87

C. A. WHITMORE

EW

27 June 1980

SECRET



Prime Minister.

A02452

MR WHITMOREmb  
2bn

The Prime Minister should be aware of the possibility that a self-confessed Soviet spy, Professor Hambleton, who lives and works in Canada, intends to begin a visit to this country tomorrow.

2. Professor Hambleton is a economist currently working at Laval University in Quebec. He was born in Ottawa, but since his father was British he is a dual national and holds both British and Canadian passports. He was originally interrogated by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in late 1979, when he admitted he had spied for the Russian Intelligence Service for about 30 years. He said that he had not passed any Canadian classified information, and the Canadian Justice Department ruled that there was insufficient evidence to charge him. He has therefore remained at liberty. Furthermore since his original discovery the Canadian authorities have obtained from him, under promise of immunity, further admissions of providing classified information to the Russians while he was employed in the Economic Section of NATO in Paris from 1956 to 1961.

3. He was a PhD student at the London School of Economics from 1961 to 1964 and although the Security Service do not yet know enough about his activities here then to interview him, they are looking into any British connections he may have had in the past or may make during his visit to discover whether his spying involved any British interests. The Canadian authorities have also undertaken to let the Security Service know if they discover anything directly affecting British interests.

4. Hambleton's visit to Britain is expected to last 2 weeks during which he will attend a 3 day academic conference at Exeter. The Security Service have been told by the Home Office that there are no powers under which he can be excluded from this country. Equally, we have no evidence on which he could be charged under the British Official Secrets Act. But it is possible that the Press may notice his presence here (though his case has so far attracted relatively little attention on this side of the Atlantic) and that this may excite interest or possibly Parliamentary Questions.



5. The drafting of replies to Questions which may be asked about Professor Hambleton's visit will of course be dependent on what form they take. But it is likely that Questions would ask to know why Professor Hambleton had been admitted into this country and whether he was a threat to our own security. In either case the Questions would be for the Home Secretary to answer. The replies would be to the effect that the Professor Hambleton is not wanted in this country for any offence, that his presence here is not thought likely to put British security interests at risk, and that Questions relating to his activities in Canada or any confession he may have made there are not matters for the British Government.

6. I am sending copies of this minute to Sir Brian Cubbon and Sir Howard Smith.


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conqueror

26 June 1980

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