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PREM 19/923

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PART 2

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Relations with South Africa. Policy on  
Arms sales to South Africa. Internal Situations.  
ECGD Credits.

SOUTH AFRICA

Pr 1: June 1979

Pr 2: Sept 1980

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>10-9-80</del>		<del>25-6-81</del>		<del>16-4-82</del>			
<del>22-9-80</del>		<del>6-7-81</del>		<del>3-6-82</del>			
<del>30-9-80</del>		<del>11-8-81</del>		<del>29-6-82</del>			
<del>29-9-80</del>		<del>17-8-81</del>		<del>4-7-82</del>			
<del>1-10-80</del>		<del>8-9-81</del>		<del>27-9-82</del>			
<del>3-10-80</del>		<del>14-10-81</del>		<del>4-10-82</del>			
<del>29-1-81</del>		<del>19-10-81</del>		<del>21-10-82</del>			
<del>1-2-81</del>		<del>23-11-81</del>		<del>9-12-82</del>			
<del>23-4-81</del>		<del>8-12-81</del>		<del>13-12-82</del>			
<del>30-4-81</del>		<del>11-1-82</del>		<del>16-12-82</del>			
<del>16-5-81</del>		<del>13-1-82</del>		<del>21-10-82</del>			
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<del>4-6-81</del>		<del>22-1-82</del>					
		<del>25-1-82</del>					
		<del>19-3-82</del>					
		<del>7-4-82</del>					

PREM 19/9/83

923

PART 2 ends:-

CC (82) 44<sup>th</sup> - Item 2 2/10/82

PART 3 begins:-

R. Hughes MP to PM 9/12/82



## Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee,  
Session 1980-81: South Africa; Minutes  
of Evidence, 13 May 1981  
HMSO: 13 May 1981

Signed Wayland Date 18 October 2012

**PREM Records Team**

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27067 - 1

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PP PRETORIA

GRS 259

SOUTH AFRICA

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 041637Z OCT 82

TO PRIORITY PRETORIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1153 OF 4 OCTOBER

SOUTH AFRICAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UK

1. AT THE REQUEST OF THE POLICE, HEAD OF PCD WROTE TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR ON 1 OCTOBER TO ASK WHETHER KLUE'S IMMUNITY COULD BE WAIVED SO THAT THE POLICE COULD INTERVIEW HIM BECAUSE HE MIGHT BE A MATERIAL WITNESS IN THE ASPINALL/CASELTON/WEDIN CASE. STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION (LAST FIVE WORDS UNDERLINED). IF A WAIVER IS REFUSED WE WILL CONSIDER ASKING FOR KLUE'S IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL.

2. PRESS INTEREST HERE IN THE CASE IS GROWING. THE OBSERVER CARRIED A PIECE ON 3 OCTOBER ALLEGING THAT THE DEPARTURE OF VAN DER KLASHORST, FIRST SECRETARY AT THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY, OF 30 SEPTEMBER WAS CONNECTED WITH THE CASE (IN FACT WE HAD NOT ASKED FOR HIS REMOVAL). THE TIMES OF 4 OCTOBER QUOTES MR STANLEY CLINTON DAVIS AS CALLING ON THE GOVERNMENT TO EXPELL ANY SOUTH AFRICAN OFFICIAL ENGAGED IN SUBVERSIVE AND CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES.

3. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS ABOUT VAN DER KLASHORST, NEWS DEPARTMENT ARE TAKING THE FOLLOWING LINE:

' IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL PRACTICE WE HAVE BEEN OFFICIALLY NOTIFIED OF MR VAN DER KLASHORST'S TERMINATION OF APPOINTMENT AS A MEMBER OF THE STAFF OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY.'

IF RAISED:

IT IS STANDARD PROCEDURE THAT IF SOMEONE HOLDING DIPLOMATIC STATUS IS THOUGHT TO HAVE ACTED IN A MANNER INCOMPATIBLE WITH THAT STATUS THE FCO WOULD CONSIDER WHAT ACTION TO TAKE. WHETHER THAT ACTION AMOUNTED TO EXPULSION WOULD CLEARLY DEPEND ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES.'

PYM

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NEWS D.

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MAED

PS

PS/MR HURD

PS/LD BELSTEAD

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/PUS

SIR J LEAHY

MR SQUIRE

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

MR J PILLING, HOME OFFICE

MR H STEEL, LAW OFFICER'S DEPT

JSS 553/

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 30  
- 5 OCT 1982

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- 5 OCT 1982		
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GRS 60  
 CONFIDENTIAL  
 FM PRETORIA 020710Z OCT 82  
 TO PRIORITY FCO  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 917 OF 2 OCTOBER

PERSONAL FOR VARCOE

YOUR TELNO 1146: SOUTH AFRICAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN UK

1. YOU WILL WISH TO BE AWARE THAT THE DIRECTOR OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (SADF) TELEPHONED THE DEFENCE ATTACHE THIS MORNING (1 OCT) ASKING FOR DETAILS OF THE DEFENCE SECTION SUPPORT STAFF. HE SEEMED SURPRISED BY THE SMALL SIZE OF OUR STAFF.
2. YOU MAY WISH TO INFORM THE MOD.

FERGUSSON

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PS/MR HURD  
 PS/MR RIFKIND  
 PS/MR BELSTEAD  
 PS/MR MR ONSLOW  
 PS/PUS  
 SIR J LEAHY  
 MR SQUIRE  
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 MR STEEL  
 LAW OFFICER'S DEPT  
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GRS 235  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM LUANDA 301510Z SEP 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 475 OF 30 SEPTEMBER  
INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA

*MR G*  
*10*  
*p.a.*

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 337: SWAPO BREAK-IN

1. I WILL STICK TO THE LINE ADVISED IN PARAGRAPHS 5 AND 6 OF YOUR TELEGRAM 337 BUT THIS WILL NOT SATISFY SWAPO. AS EXPLAINED IN MY TELEGRAM 464 NUJOMA CLAIMED TO HAVE GOOD CONTACTS IN LONDON INCLUDING A NUMBER OF MPS. IF IT IS THE CASE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE BEEN MOUNTING ON BRITISH SOIL MINI WATERGATE OPERATIONS AGAINST SWAPO AND ANC OFFICES THEN I THINK THAT WE NEED TO PROTECT OURSELVES AGAINST ACCUSATIONS OF A COVER UP OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONNECTION. IF THERE IS INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE OF INVOLVEMENT OF A MEMBER OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY STAFF IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST THESE TWO LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN BRITAIN THEN I WOULD URGE THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO DECLARING THAT SOUTH AFRICAN PERSONA NON GRATA.

FCO PASS PRETORIA  
KENNEDY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

LIMITED

S AF D  
OADS  
NEWS D  
MAED  
PUSD  
LEGAL ADVISERS  
PS

PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR WRIGHT  
MR SQUIRE  
MR ADAMS

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MR STEEL LAW OFFICER'S DEPT  
HOME OFFICE

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<i>JES 0531</i>	
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- 6 OCT 1982	
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P.A. 1/10  
RST (12)

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25173 - 1

PP DAR ES SALAAM  
PP LUSAKA  
PP GABORONE  
PP LAGOS  
PP ADDIS ABABA  
PP HAVANA  
PP PRETORIA  
PP ROME  
GRS 482

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 300830Z

FM FCO 291000Z SEPTEMBER 82

TO IMMEDIATE LUANDA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 337 OF 29 SEPTEMBER

AND TO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, LUSAKA, GABORONE,

LAGOS, ADDIS ABABA, ALGIERS, HAVANA.

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, OTTAWA, WASHINGTON, PRETORIA, UKMTS

NEW YORK, ROME.

SWAPO BREAK-IN

1. IN YOUR TELNO 464 (NOT TO ALL) YOU ASKED WHAT WE COULD TELL SWAPO ABOUT THE BREAK-IN AT THEIR OFFICES IN LONDON ON THE NIGHT OF 31 AUGUST. THE FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR YOU AND OTHER ADDRESSEE POSTS TO USE IN ANSWERING ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE INCIDENT.

BACKGROUND (MAY BE USED FREELY)

2. THE LONDON OFFICES OF SWAPO WERE BROKEN INTO ON 31 AUGUST, AND A NUMBER OF FINANCIAL AND TRAVEL DOCUMENTS WERE TAKEN. A SMALL AMOUNT OF MONEY WAS ALSO STOLEN, BUT OTHER ITEMS SUCH AS AN EXPENSIVE RADIO WERE LEFT BEHIND. SWAPO CONCLUDED THAT THE MOTIVE FOR THE BREAK-IN WAS POLITICAL. THIS WAS FULLY REPORTED IN THE BRITISH PRESS (EG THE OBSERVER OF 5 SEPTEMBER). EARLIER ON 14 MARCH THE ANC OFFICE IN LONDON WAS BOMBED.

3. ON 23 SEPTEMBER TWO MEN, MR PETER CASTLETON AND MR BERTIL WEDIN, WERE CHARGED WITH OFFENCES ARISING FROM BURGLARY AT THE

1  
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JSS 058/1	
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- 1 OCT 1982	
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25173 - 1

LONDON OFFICES OF THE ANC AND SWAPO IN RECENT MONTHS. THEY WERE BOTH REMANDED PENDING TRIAL. A WARRANT HAS BEEN ISSUED FOR THE ARREST OF A THIRD, MR EDWARD ASPINALL. THEY WILL PROBABLY NOT GO TO TRIAL FOR SOME MONTHS.

LINE TO TAKE

4. YOU SHOULD DRAW AS NECESSARY ON PARAS 2-3 ABOVE. YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT THE MATTER REMAINS SUB JUDICE AND THAT YOU CANNOT COMMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CASE. IF IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE CASE IS NOT BEING PURSUED SERIOUSLY, YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM SUCH MATTERS ARE ENTIRELY WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES AND THE POLICE. THERE HAS BEEN NO POLITICAL INTERVENTION.

5. IF ASKED WHETHER WE HAVE TAKEN THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO TASK OVER THEIR INVOLVEMENT WITH THESE INCIDENTS, YOU SHOULD REPEAT THAT THE MATTER IS SUB JUDICE AND THAT YOU CAN MAKE NO COMMENT WHICH MIGHT PREJUDGE THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL. (STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION ONLY-: SIR JOHN LEAHY CALLED IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR ON 27 SEPTEMBER TO PROTEST AT INADMISSIBLE BEHAVIOUR BY A MEMBER OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY STAFF, JOSEF KLUE. SINCE THE POLICE HAVE INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE LINKING KLUE TO THESE MEN AND THE BURGLARIES. NEWS DEPT WILL CONFIRM, IF ASKED, THAT WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS BUT WE SHOULD PREFER NOT TO RELEASE THIS INFORMATION VIA SWAPO.)

6. IF ASKED ABOUT THE PROTECTION GIVEN TO THE SWAPO OFFICE IN LONDON, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT SWAPO DO NOT (NOT) ENJOY DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY HERE, BUT THAT THE POLICE PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THEIR PREMISES AND TO ANY INDICATIONS THAT MAY BE RECEIVED OF SPECIFIC THREATS TO THEM. THE FACT THAT MEN HAVE BEEN CHARGED IN CONNECTION WITH THE BURGLARY AT SWAPO OFFICE IS EVIDENCE OF POLICE VIGILANCE. IN ADDITION, VISITING SWAPO LEADERS LIKE MR NUJOMA RECEIVE INDIVIDUAL POLICE PROTECTION.

PYM

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H. STEEL. LAW OFFICERS  
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OO PRETORIA DESKBY 291000Z

GRS 161

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DESKBY 291000Z

FM FCO 281635Z SEP 82

TO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1146 OF 28 SEPTEMBER

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR FROM VARCOE, SAFD

71

JSS 053/1		
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- 1 OCT 1982		
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INDEX	IPA	Antion Tolson
		JAB

YOUR TELNO 907: SOUTH AFRICAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UK

1. WE WOULD PREFER YOU NOT TO MENTION THIS SUBJECT IF VAN DALSEN DOES NOT. BUT IF HE DOES RAISE IT WITH YOU, YOU MIGHT LIKE TO PUT ACROSS THE FOLLOWING THREE POINTS:
  - I. THIS ISSUE HAS INEVITABLY CAUSED A GOOD DEAL OF ANNOYANCE HERE, BUT WE WANT TO HANDLE IT IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO DO ANY GREATER DAMAGE TO OUR RELATIONS THAN HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE.
  - II. EVEN SO, THERE MUST BE A RISK OF A MAJOR PUBLIC OUTCRY IF AND WHEN MORE BECOMES GENERALLY KNOWN.
  - III. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR ACTION IS FULLY JUSTIFIED AND WE HOPE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WILL NOT FEEL OBLIGED TO RETALIATE: THIS COULD ONLY ESCALATE THE MATTER SO THAT IT WOULD BE LIKELY TO DEVELOP INTO THE MAJOR ROW THAT WE WOULD PREFER TO AVOID.

PYM

LIMITED ✓  
 HD/S AF D ✓  
 D/HD/PUSD  
 SIR J LEAHY  
 MR SQUIRE

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GRS 360

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DESKBY PRETORIA 271900Z

FM FCO 271600Z SEPTEMBER 82

TO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1144 OF 27 SEPTEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG FOR PS/PM, UKMIS NEW YORK FOR PS/S OF S<sup>28.9.</sup>

Prime Minister

This arises from the case I mentioned to you just before we left London. I have not seen any publicity about it so far. FERB

MT

YOUR TELNO 895 AND 898 (NOT REPEATED).

SOUTH AFRICAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY IN THE UK: PROTEST TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR.

1. ON THE BASIS OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE POLICE, SIR JOHN LEAHY CALLED IN MR STEYN ACCOMPANIED BY MINISTER (EVANS) ON 27 SEPTEMBER TO PROTEST AT INADMISSIBLE BEHAVIOUR BY A MEMBER OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY STAFF, WARRANT OFFICER JOSEF KLUE.

2. LEAHY SAID THAT HMG ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT, BUT WAS NOT PREPARED TO TOLERATE ILLEGAL OR IMPROPER BEHAVIOUR BY SOUTH AFRICAN OFFICIALS ABOUT WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICAN AUTHORITIES HAD BEEN WARNED ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, THE LATEST IN DECEMBER 1981. TWO MEN, PETER CASTLETON AND BERTIL WEDIN WERE CHARGED ON 23 SEPTEMBER WITH OFFENCES ARISING FROM BURGLARIES AT THE LONDON OFFICES OF THE ANC AND SWAPO IN RECENT MONTHS. A THIRD MAN, EDWARD ASPINALL, WAS WANTED IN CONNECTION WITH THESE CASES. WE HAD INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE LINKING KLUE TO THESE MEN AND THE BURGLARIES

EVIDENCE LINKING KLUE TO THESE MEN AND THE BURGLARIES. BUT FOR HIS IMMUNITY, KLUE WOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN FOR QUESTIONING AND MIGHT HAVE BEEN PROSECUTED. IT WAS STILL POSSIBLE THAT WE MIGHT ASK FOR A WAIVER OF HIS IMMUNITY. WE MUST ASK FOR KLUE TO REMAIN IN THIS COUNTRY UNTIL THE CASE WAS COMPLETED. AFTER THAT HE MUST LEAVE AT ONCE AND WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO RETURN.

3. LEAHY SAID THAT ANY POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE AFFAIR LAY ENTIRELY WITH SOUTH AFRICA. WE COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT TOLERATE SUCH ACTIVITIES. THE MATTER WAS FOR THE MOMENT SUB JUDICE AND THE TRIAL MIGHT NOT TAKE PLACE FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. WE SHALL NOT INITIATE PUBLICITY BUT IF ASKED WOULD CONFIRM THAT WE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN AUTHORITIES.

4. STEYN SAID THAT HE WAS DUMBFOUNDED BY THE MATTER. HE VOLUNTEERED NO SERIOUS STATEMENT IN EXPLANATION. HE SAID THAT HE NOTED THE PROTEST AND WOULD COMPLY WITH ITS TERMS.

5. IF ASKED, NEWS DEPT WILL TAKE THE LINE THAT THE CASE IS SUB-JUDICE, BUT CONFIRM CONTACT WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN AUTHORITIES AS IN LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 3.

PYM

GRS 311

SECRET

FROM FCO 231344Z SEP 82.

TO PRIORITY PEKING


TELEGRAM NUMBER 438 OF 23 SEPTEMBER.

FOLLOWING FOR COLES FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SOUTH AFRICAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UK: THE ASPINALL

CASE

1. THE HOME OFFICE BRIEFED NO 10 ORALLY ABOUT THIS CASE BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER LEFT FOR TOKYO. TWO UK CITIZENS AND ONE SWEDE FACE PROSECUTION FOR OFFENCES ARISING OUT OF THE BURGLARIES AT THE LONDON OFFICES OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (ANC) ON THE NIGHT OF 20/21 JULY AND OF SWAPO ON 31 AUGUST/1 SEPTEMBER. THE POLICE HAVE INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE THAT A MEMBER OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY WAS BEHIND THESE AND A NUMBER OF OTHER BURGLARIES.
2. ALL THREE ACCUSED (ASPINALL, CASTLETON AND WEDIN) ARE APPEARING IN COURT TODAY FOR A COMMITTAL HEARING. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHEN THE TRIAL WILL BE BUT A DELAY OF SOME MONTHS IS LIKELY. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL IS BEING KEPT IN TOUCH.



3. ON MR PYM'S INSTRUCTIONS, THE SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR WILL BE SUMMONED ON SHORTLY TO RECEIVE A STRONG PROTEST ABOUT HIS EMBASSY'S INVOLVEMENT. HE WILL BE ASKED TO KEEP KLUE HERE AS A POSSIBLE WITNESS UNTIL LEGAL ACTION IS OVER AND THEN TO HAVE HIM REMOVED. AS A MEMBER OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL STAFF OF THE EMBASSY, KLUE HAS COMPLETE IMMUNITY FROM UK CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AND COULD NOT BE COMPELLED TO ATTEND COURT, THOUGH HIS OWN AUTHORITIES COULD AGREE TO WAIVE HIS IMMUNITY. WE CANNOT ASK THAT KLUE BE REMOVED WHILE PROCEEDINGS CONTINUE WITHOUT FACING THE DANGER OF ACCUSATIONS OF IMPEDING THE COURSE OF JUSTICE.

4. THE PRESS HAVE NOW GOT HOLD OF THE STORY (WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS INCLUDES KLUE'S ROLE) AND THERE MAY WELL BE A POLITICAL ROW. NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL DECLINE TO COMMENT ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE CASE IS SUB JUDICE. AFTER THE AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN SEEN THEY WILL ADD IF PRESSED THAT WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY. BUT THEY WILL STICK AT THAT.

PYM

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

S. Africa  
A.S.C. (2)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

You ought to be aware of this dispute -  
but I am sure we should stay out of it.

A.S.C. 9/7

Dear John,

MB

A.S.C. 12/7  
f.c.

South Africa/Swaziland Border Negotiations

Following our discussion on the telephone, you may find the attached note on this subject useful. At our request, the JIC are also preparing an assessment.

As the note shows, the issue is a complex one and the balance of advantage for our interests in recognising or disapproving of the transfer is by no means clear. In addition to uncertainties about the position of our Allies and the OAU, the extent to which the inhabitants of the areas concerned freely consent to their transfer will be an important factor in our view. Therefore, we wish to avoid taking a public position until the facts and African attitudes become clearer. We have initiated consultations with the Americans and the Ten with a view to coordinating a joint position. I understand that the Americans are considering a discreet warning to the South Africans about the dangers of precipitate action.

Meanwhile, if comment is unavoidable we are taking the line that the issue is not one in which we have any standing; and that it appears to raise many complex legal, political and historical factors which are still by no means clear and which will take time to evaluate.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



NOTE BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE: SOUTH AFRICA/  
SWAZILAND BORDER NEGOTIATIONS

BACKGROUND

1. There have been increasing signs that longstanding negotiations between South Africa and Swaziland initiated by the latter about the cession of territory to Swaziland are likely to reach a conclusion soon. The territory involved is the KaNgwane (Swazi) homeland lying north and west of Swaziland and a strip of land lying between Swaziland and the Indian Ocean known as Ingwavuma, which is presently part of the KwaZulu homeland (see attached map). Historically and ethnically, KaNgwane is Swazi. Ingwavuma, however, is a sort of Alsace-Lorraine, neither completely Swazi nor Zulu.

SWAZI POSITION

2. Swazi motivation is a mixture of long-standing irredentism against the Boers and Zulus, and a desire to have an outlet to the sea. The elderly and ailing Swazi King Sobhuza clearly sees the recovery of lost territory and people as the culminating achievement of his long reign. More sophisticated Swazis, including in the Government, are concerned about the probable internal political and economic repercussions of incorporating an additional 30% of territory and 50% or more of population; and also of the possible international consequences. However, Swaziland is likely to push ahead with the cession so long as the King survives.

SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION

3. The South African Government's inducement to agree to Swazi demands include the opportunity to get rid of a sizeable number of blacks (there are about 350,000 blacks in the areas to be ceded, and 450,000 elsewhere in South Africa who would lose their South African citizenship as a result); and the enlisting of

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



active Swazi cooperation in the fight against the African National Congress and in possible South African plans to form a 'constellation of states' in the region. However, there is opposition to the transfer both among blacks and whites in South Africa. Some black political leaders in both KaNgwane and Ingwavuma are opposed for economic and political reasons. The ANC and the black internal Zulu-based political organisation, INKATHA (led by Chief Buthelezi) are also bitterly hostile. There has been white opposition both in the South African Parliament and from the Natal provincial government. Nonetheless, current signs are that the Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha intends to override opposition within South Africa.

#### LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

4. From the legal point of view, consideration of the issues involved in territorial transfer between sovereign states cannot nowadays overlook the wishes of the inhabitants. In this case, the wishes of those directly involved are unclear, nor have South Africa or Swaziland yet indicated that any objective test of opinion is likely to take place. In addition, because the areas to be transferred form part of the South African homeland system, the deal is open to the charge that it is a betrayal of the interests of the black people of South Africa. Particularly important politically will be the attitude of the Organisation of African Unity. If as seems possible they condemn the cession out of opposition to apartheid and concern about the principle of the inviolability of inherited colonial boundaries in Africa, it is likely that the matter will be raised in the United Nations Security Council.

6 July 1982



N.B.  
 NSIKAZI will be an  
 enclave without a direct  
 border with the enlarged  
 Swaziland.

KaNgwane, the Swazi homeland which has become the centre of controversy over attempts to cede it to Swaziland.

FILE

da

S. Agnew

29 June 1982

South Africa: Astronomical Observatory

I enclose a large colour signed photograph of the Prime Minister as you requested and I hope it is what Dr. Feast requires.

CAROLINE STEPHENS

Miss Marsha Fenwick  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

100



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 June 1982

Dear Caroline,

SOUTH AFRICA: ASTRONOMICAL OBSERVATORY

Mr Reid, the Minister at the British Embassy in Pretoria, recently visited the South African Astronomical Observatory at Sutherland in South Africa. The Observatory was founded in 1820 and is run by a British Director, Dr Michael Feast, and is funded jointly by the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research and the Science Research Council of the United Kingdom. An intensive programme of astronomical work is being carried on at Sutherland by some twenty or so people, several of whom are from Britain. The Sutherland Observatory is one of the three main observatories in the Southern hemisphere, the other two being in Chile and Australia.

Mr Reid has reported that the Observatory at Sutherland was opened in 1972 by Mr Vorster, the then Prime Minister of South Africa, in the presence of Mrs Thatcher, who was then Secretary of State for Education and Science. The main entrance hall for the Observatory has an imposing stone inscription recording the opening, but there is no mention of Mrs Thatcher. Dr Feast has asked Mr Reid if it might be possible to acquire a photograph of Mrs Thatcher (preferably signed) which he could mount on the wall of the entrance hall facing the inscription. In passing this request to us Mr Reid has commented that the provision of a signed photograph would not only be appropriate in view of the large and continuing British connection with the Observatory, but it would also be very well received because of the high regard in which Mrs Thatcher is held in South Africa, a regard markedly increased as a result of the successful conclusion of the Falklands operation.

I should be most grateful if you could let me know whether it might be possible to help with this request.

Yours sincerely,

Marsha

Miss C Stephens  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

(Marsha Fenwick)  
Assistant Private Secretary

S. Agnew  
BSC

e. flo

CP



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

3 June 1982

Dear Archbishop,

Thank you for your letter of 18 May asking the Government to intervene in the case of Mr. Lubisi, Mr. Mashigo and Mr. Manana who have been condemned to death in South Africa.

The Government associated themselves with the statement made in February 1981 by the President of the United Nations Security Council which expressed concern over the sentences imposed on these three men. As you say, we also supported Security Council Resolution 503, adopted unanimously on 9 April this year, which calls upon the South African authorities to commute the death sentences and urges all states to use their influence and to take urgent measures to save these men's lives.

In the light of this Resolution we, like other Governments, have let the South African Government know of the deep public concern that has been expressed on this matter.

Yours sincerely

Raymond Huddleston

The Most Reverend Trevor Huddleston, C.I.E., C.B.E.

Tout

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 June 1982

*Dear Willie,* *at home for pm* *WNR* *2/6*

Reply to Archbishop Trevor Huddleston: ANC 3 Condemned to Death

Thank you for your letter of 24 May. I enclose a suggested draft reply to the Archbishop who is President of the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

The three ANC men to whom the Archbishop refers were sentenced to death in November 1980 at Pretoria Supreme Court. The three were convicted of high treason, attempted murder and robbery with aggravating circumstances, in respect of their participation in an attack on a police station in January 1980 in which no-one was injured.

In addition to the steps outlined in the draft reply, the Belgian Ambassador delivered an appeal for clemency on behalf of the Ten on 8 April in Cape Town. Sir J Leahy and Mr Onslow also made humanitarian appeals for clemency when the South African Ambassador called on 19 April and 21 May. These appeals were made on the understanding that their substance would be kept confidential.

The Prime Minister replied in identical terms to those in the enclosed draft to Mr Habib Chatty (Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference Organisation) on 26 April.

*Yours avr.*

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

W Rickett Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: PS/NO 10

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

TO: The Most Rev Trevor Huddleston  
 Archbishop of the Province of  
 the Indian Ocean  
 Bishop's House  
 Phoenix  
 MAURITIUS

CR Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter ~~to the Prime Minister~~ of 18  
 May asking the Government to intervene in the case of  
 Mr Lubisi, Mr Mashigo and Mr Manana who have been  
 condemned to death in South Africa. ~~The Prime Minister~~  
~~has asked me to reply.~~

The Government associated themselves with the statement  
 made in February 1981 by the President of the United  
 Nations Security Council which expressed concern over  
 the sentences imposed on these three men. As you say,  
 we also supported Security Council Resolution 503,  
 adopted unanimously on 9 April this year, which calls  
 upon the South African authorities to commute the death  
 sentences and urges all states to use their influence  
 and to take urgent measures to save these men's lives.

In the light of this resolution we, like other Governments,  
 have let the South African Government know of the deep  
 public concern that has been expressed on this matter.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

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file 175

24 May 1982

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of 24 May.

Your letter is receiving attention and a reply will be sent to you as soon as possible.

WR

The Most Reverend Trevor Huddleston,  
C.I.E., C.B.E.

2/6

Trevor HUDDLESTON


24 May 1982

I attach a copy of a letter the Prime Minister has received from Trevor Huddleston, the Archbishop of the Indian Ocean.

I should be grateful if you could let us have a draft Private Secretary reply to send to Mr. Huddleston. It would be helpful to have this by Friday 4 June.

WR

Francis Richards Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office





Anglican Diocese of Mauritius

R22

Bishop's House,  
Phoenix,  
Mauritius.  
Tel. 865158

*From the Bishop*

The Rt. Hon Mrs. M. Thatcher, MP, PC  
10 Downing St,  
London.

18th May 1982

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

I am sure you are aware of the case of three young members of the African National Congress of South Africa, Johnson Lubisi, Petrus Mashigo and Naphtali Manana, whose execution is imminent. Their death sentences were confirmed by the Appellate Division of the South African Supreme Court on 7th April.

I was very encouraged to learn that the United Kingdom delegation joined with the other members of the United Nations Security Council in unanimously adopting Resolution 503, which called upon the South African authorities to commute the death sentences. I understand that the South African Prime Minister has already given an assurance that the State President and the Ministers constituting the Executive Council in South Africa will take cognisance of all appropriate representations. I am sure that any personal representations you are able to make will influence the South African authorities in their consideration of this matter and I hope very much that you will be able to take such an initiative.

Yours sincerely,

+ Trevor Huddleston GC.

Trevor Huddleston, CR  
Archbishop of the Province of the  
Indian Ocean.



South Africa

CONFIDENTIAL

*From the Secretary of State*

Terry Mathews Esq  
PS/Chief Secretary  
to the Treasury  
Treasury Chambers  
Parliament Street  
London SW1

N.S.P.N.

MR 19/4

16 April 1982


Dear Terry,

My Secretary of State was very grateful indeed for the Chief Secretary's helpful and prompt response to Mr Biffen's letter of 1 April about the credit support for GEC's response to ESCOM's request to carry over the tender terms that they put in for Station C.

He fully recognises the Chief Secretary's concerns, but feels there is just one point where you are being a little less than fair: the request for GEC to carry over their bid comes from ESCOM. It results directly from the extremely close decision on the C Station in favour of the German bid, and from the strength of GEC's goodwill with the customer from previous contracts successfully fulfilled. The timing was thus not in GEC's control; indeed they have put the request as soon as it was received.

I am copying this to the recipients of the Chief Secretary's.

Yours sincerely,



JOHN RHODES  
Private Secretary





South Africa

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

Rt Hon the Lord Cockfield  
Secretary of State  
Department of Trade  
1 Victoria Street  
London SW1H 0ET

7 April 1982

N.B.P.R.

7/4

*D. Arter,*

John Biffen wrote to me on 1 April about the interest rate to be charged on the credits supporting the sale by GEC of turbines to the South African Electricity Supply Commission for Section D.

GEC have won this business on the basis of an offer, made without prior approval, of the old Consensus rate of  $8\frac{1}{2}\%$  for this power station and now seek retrospective ratification for these terms. This clearly puts you in an awkward position since to concede these terms you will need to seek a derogation under the Consensus rules. I am sure you would accept that the UK should always seek to avoid making derogations because it is strongly in our national interest to maintain effective Consensus discipline. However, I note that you do not expect any difficulties about this derogation since it arises from ESCOM's decision to place two orders from the same round of tenders, which were submitted before the increase in Consensus rates. I draw some comfort from the fact that the changes in the credit terms compared with those offered for Station C go some way towards offsetting the extra subsidy cost of holding the old Consensus rate of  $8\frac{1}{2}\%$ .

Accordingly, I am reluctantly prepared to agree that you may support an interest rate of  $8\frac{1}{2}\%$  for the turbines GEC are to supply for Station D. I must however record my concern about the way in which GEC have apparently proceeded without securing official approval for the financing terms and thus have effectively presented us with a fait accompli. I trust this will not be allowed to happen again. If it does I would not be able to take the same view of it.

I strongly endorse your conclusion that current Consensus interest rates should be applied for other contracts for Station D which are expected to be subject to open competition.

I am sending copies of this letter to No. 10, Francis Pym, Patrick Jenkin and Norman Tebbit

*Leon Brittan*

LEON BRITTAN

7 APR 1952





FROM THE  
MINISTER OF STATE  
FOR INDUSTRY AND  
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

KENNETH BAKER MP

Rt Hon Leon Brittan QC MP  
Chief Secretary  
HM Treasury  
LONDON SW1

DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY  
ASHDOWN HOUSE  
123 VICTORIA STREET  
LONDON SW1E 6RB

TELEPHONE DIRECT LINE 01-212  
SWITCHBOARD 01-212 7676

6401

cc PS/PRIME MINISTER ✓  
PS/SOS  
PS Mr MacGregor  
Mr Manzie  
Mr Gill  
Mr Benjamin  
Mr Dell  
Mrs Bell 5 April 1982  
Mr Collins

N. S. P. R.

MR 6/4.

*John Biffen*

Peter Carrington Esq  
Geoffrey Howe Esq  
Norman Tebbit Esq  
John Biffen Esq

I am writing to support John Biffen's letter of 1 April. I do not think I can add to the full account of the project and related matters given in his letter, but there are a few key issues that I want to stress.

If we proceed as John proposes, the cost to official funds of the credit on Station 'D' would actually be less than that for Station 'C' because of the changes in financing conditions agreed between GEC and the client. Since the value of the business won would be virtually identical, there is no doubt that Station 'D' would represent better value for money for the UK taxpayer.

Since GEC are the only firm effectively in the bidding, it is unlikely that there would be objections to a derogation from current consensus terms, from the European Community or elsewhere. I note that John Biffen believes that the international repercussions of a derogation could be easily contained.

I also strongly support John's view that a rejection of GEC's case now - the company having secured an outline letter of intent - would effectively be to throw away business for which the company have worked very hard.

Finally, I would like to comment on the position of the other British companies interested in Station 'D'. I agree with John that if Babcock or any others were to be offered business on the same terms as GEC, we could not in equity offer them less than GEC.

I hope you will find it possible to agree with John's arguments without the need for a discussion in EX.

I am copying this to those who received John Biffen's letter.

*Kenneth Baker*

M37/M37AAD

KENNETH BAKER





*From the Secretary of State*

Rt Hon Leon Brittan QC MP  
Chief Secretary  
H M Treasury  
Parliament Street  
London SW1

April 1982

*Dear Leon,*

The South African Electricity Supply Commission, ESCOM, has been ordering a series of new power stations. Tenders for the third of these, known as Station C, were called for last Autumn. At that time the site had not been decided. Bids were submitted before the 16 November deadline under the Consensus, and therefore the old rates of interest applied. Our own credit offer, which was in line with our main competitors, was for repayment over 8½ years at 8½% interest.

GEC put in a bid for the turbines (6 x 660MW), at a value of £220m of UK work. Following a lengthy evaluation, the South Africans have now decided to award the contract for turbo-generators for Station C to the German firm, Kraftwerk Union. However, they found the competitive GEC bid so close that they have indicated their readiness to award a second order, labelled Station D, at the same time, provided the same credit terms are available. It was always known that the South Africans intended to place an order for a fourth power station in the near future, but it was assumed that they would require a fresh round of tenders. They now propose, if this can be achieved, to make a formal announcement of the award of both contracts, Station C and Station D, together early this month.

Station D will be commissioned one year later than Station C, but the technical specification is identical, and apart from some minor adjustments in price, which GEC do not expect to have any difficulty negotiating with the South Africans, the details of the order will be the same as they would have been for Station C. GEC are naturally concerned not to lose the opportunity opened up by the ESCOM's expressed intention to run the two orders together - indeed, GEC have an outline letter of intent already. From our standpoint, the contract would involve 2,675 man-years of employment in their own plants, with orders worth £60m, and some

*Amint Feb.*

*N. S. P. R.*

*MR 5/4.*



*From the Secretary of State*

10,000 man-years of work for sub-contractors, peaking over the next two years. In addition, this order would be a valuable reference for "dry cooled" power-generation, for which UK industry is not noted since our power stations are water-cooled. It is therefore an extremely important order more generally, particularly since GEC have already committed a lot of resources in pursuing this job.

There will be no problem in making ECGD cover available for Station D on the same terms as would have been available for Station C, except as regards the rate of interest. As our notification of the case at the time the original tenders were made was tied to Station C, technically we cannot claim a prior commitment for Station D. It will therefore be necessary to report the case internationally as a derogation under the Consensus. However, in view of the fact that our tender was submitted before 16 November 1981, was accepted by the South Africans before 15 May 1982, and is not in competition with any other country but results from a South African decision to place 2 orders from the same round of tenders, I am advised that it should not prove too contentious internationally.

The subsidy cost for Station D will, of course, depend upon the course of market interest rates over the period of the credit. However, there is no reason to suppose that it will be any greater than the cost we were prepared to accept for Station C; indeed, it will probably be less, because GEC are not now asking for capitalisation of interest. If we refuse to maintain the interest rate quoted for Station C, the South Africans will probably decide to call for a further round of tenders for Station D, with no certainty that GEC will win.

Taking account of the importance of the order from an industry and employment point of view, I hope you will agree that, in the circumstances explained, it would be foolish for us to risk losing the order by taking the purist position that our pre-November 1981 tender applied only to Station C and is not available for a second virtually identical order which the South Africans are willing to place. If the position had been reversed, and we have been awarded Station C, it is difficult to believe that our competitors would have refused an offer of the kind the South Africans are now making to us.



*From the Secretary of State*

I understand that Station D is the last order likely to be placed by the South Africans in this field for some years at least.

There are other British suppliers interested in the supply of other items for Station D, notably Babcock & Wilcox for boilers. If any of them were to be made the same offer as GEC, it would clearly be difficult to deny them equal treatment; however, at the present time this is not the case and I do not consider that we should allow the pre-November 1981 rate of interest to be applied to bids for Station D that are subject to open competition, since then other Consensus participants could justly accuse us of leading a credit race.

I understand that your officials have reservations about agreeing to support GEC in the way proposed, on the grounds that GEC had earlier been told that the 8½% rate could not be maintained for Station D. Although this is true, I think that, given the way things have developed, it would be cutting off our nose to spite our face to refuse the attractive offer that has now been placed before us. I hope you can agree: if not, perhaps we could discuss at EX Committee.


In 1980, South Africa was our 13th largest overseas market and our visible exports to that country last year, valued at between £1,200-1,300m, have probably maintained perhaps even improved on that position. However, the South African economy has rapidly turned around from boom to recession and the depressed gold price is principally responsible for a massive balance of payments deficit. Coupled with recently introduced fiscal measures to damp down imports, our bread and butter exports to South Africa over the next two or three years may be expected to decline. Against that background, this prospective ESCOM business assumes a much greater relative importance than would have been the case a year ago.

I am copying this to No 10, Peter Carrington, Geoffrey Howe, Patrick Jenkin and Norman Tebbit.

*John Biffen*

JOHN BIFFEN

2 APR 1982



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TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 199 OF 19 MARCH  
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INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK LUANDA SALISBURY MAPUTO GABORONE  
DAR ES SALAAM AND LAGOS

PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S CALL FOR A MEETING WITH P W BOTHA

1. THE EVENING PAPERS OF THE ARGUS GROUP REPORTED PROMINENTLY YESTERDAY (18 MARCH) THAT PRESIDENT KAUNDA, IN AN INTERVIEW WITH AN ARGUS REPORTER, HAD SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO MEET P W BOTHA TO DISCUSS SOUTH AFRICA'S ATTITUDE TO NAMIBIA AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF ESCALATING VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA. IT SOUNDS FROM THE REPORT AS IF KAUNDA'S REMARKS WERE UNPREMEDITATED, AND MADE IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE LOSS OF MOMENTUM IN THE NAMIBIA NEGOTIATIONS. HE ADDED THAT THE MEETING COULD TAKE PLACE ANYWHERE, INCLUDING LUSAKA. ALTERNATIVELY HE WOULD CONSIDER GOING TO SOUTH AFRICA.

2. KAUNDA IS ALSO REPORTED AS SAYING THAT, WHILE THE BLACK NATIONS CONDEMNED APARTHEID, SOUTH AFRICA WAS AN INDEPENDENT STATE RULED BY PEOPLE WHO WERE AFRICANS IN EVERY SENSE OF THE WORD. NEITHER HE NOR THE FRONT LINE STATES NOR NATIONALIST LEADERS WANTED WHITES SWEEPED INTO THE SEA. THE LUSAKA DECLARATION OF 1969 STILL APPLIED. KAUNDA WARNED THAT, UNLESS THERE WAS MEANINGFUL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA, THERE WOULD BE AN EXPLOSION WHICH WOULD QUOTE MAKE THE FRENCH REVOLUTION LOOK LIKE A CHILDREN'S SUNDAY PICNIC UNQUOTE. KAUNDA WENT ON TO COMMENT ON THE PROSPECTS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE SPLIT IN THE NATIONAL PARTY.

3. P W BOTHA HAS REACTED IMMEDIATELY WITH THE PREDICTABLE COMMENT THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAD NOTED KAUNDA'S REMARKS AND WAS ALWAYS WILLING TO DISCUSS MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN WITH LEADERS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. P W BOTHA ADDED THAT JUDGING FROM KAUNDA'S REMARKS QUOTE HE IS NOT CORRECTLY INFORMED ON SOUTH AFRICAN CONDITIONS UNQUOTE.

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4. THE CAPE TIMES TODAY (19 MARCH) REPORTS THAT LAST NIGHT KAUNDA COMMENTED ON P W BOTHA'S REMARKS BY REITERATING HIS DESIRE FOR TALKS. HE SAID IT WAS UP TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO ARRANGE A MEETING. HE WAS, HOWEVER, ONLY WILLING TO DISCUSS THE DEVELOPING CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND NAMIBIA AND APARTHEID, AND NOT SUCH MATTERS AS TRADE.

5. AS SEEN FROM HERE, IT IS HARD TO IMAGINE ANYTHING COMING OF THIS. EVEN IF A MEETING DID TAKE PLACE P W BOTHA WOULD NEVER CHANGE HIS POLICIES IN RESPONSE TO PUBLIC PRESSURE FROM KAUNDA.

PCO PLEASE PASS ALL

REID

[REPETITION TO MAPUTO REFERRED FOR  
DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS  
REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 101 OF 23 FEBRUARY

INFO ROUTINE CAPETOWN, PRETORIA, LUSAKA AND MAPUTO.

*mb*

INTERNAL POLITICS: WHITES

1. MUGABE ADDRESSED A MEETING OF WHITE PROFESSIONAL PEOPLE AND BUSINESSMEN IN THE CHAMBER OF THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY ON 19 FEBRUARY. HIS MESSAGE WAS THAT THE GOVERNMENT WANTED THE WHITE COMMUNITY TO STAY, AND VALUED THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SINCE INDEPENDENCE. HE CALLED FOR MORE CONTACT BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES, AND MORE UNITY, A PROCESS IN WHICH INDIVIDUALS, BUSINESSMEN AND INDUSTRIALISTS SHOULD ALSO BE INVOLVED. PEOPLE WERE FREE TO CHOOSE THEIR FRIENDS: BUT INDUSTRY AND PUBLIC SERVICES MUST BE NON-RACIAL. WHITE FEARS ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS ON NATIONALISATIONS WERE UNFOUNDED. THE SOCIALISM PLANNED BY THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT ENTAIL THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE. "WE CANNOT DESTROY THE INFRASTRUCTURE WE INHERITED AT INDEPENDENCE. THAT WOULD BE TO DESTROY THE BASIS FOR FUTURE PROGRESS..... WE ARE NOT TALKING OF NATIONALISATION .... UNLESS THE FORCE OF CIRCUMSTANCES OBLIGES US TO DO SO". PRIVATE ENTERPRISE WOULD BE A FACT OF LIFE IN ZIMBABWE FOR "AT LEAST THE NEXT TWO DECADES" AND "AFTER THAT YOU MUST CONSULT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TIME". ON LAND, MUGABE SAID THE GOVERNMENT WOULD SEEK TO ACQUIRE UNDER USED OR UNDER-UTILISED LAND, BUT STRESSED THE GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF JUST COMPENSATION.

2. HINTING AT FURTHER CABINET CHANGES, MUGABE SAID HE WAS NOT KEEN TO HAVE AN ALL-BLACK CABINET. BUT WHITE PARTICIPATION WOULD NOT COME THROUGH THE CHANNELS OF THE REPUBLICAN FRONT WHOSE PRESENCE IN PARLIAMENT AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WHITE COMMUNITY WAS AN IMPEDIMENT, AND HAD BEEN AN EMBARRASSMENT TO DAVID SMITH (FORMER MINISTER OF TRADE AND COMMERCE).

3. THE MEETING (EVIDENTLY THE FIRST IN A SERIES) WAS ORGANISED BY ANDERSEN, A RELATIVELY MODERATE RF MP (AND A LANCASTER HOUSE DELEGATE), WHO HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY CRITICAL IN PRIVATE OF THE RF LEADERSHIP'S INTRACTABILITY. HE AND A NUMBER OF LIKE-MINDED "LIBERALS" ARE SAID TO BE CONTEMPLATING LEAVING THE PARTY AND SITTING IN PARLIAMENT AS INDEPENDENTS. MUGABE'S SPEECH SEEMS DESIGNED IN PART TO ENCOURAGE THEM AND THUS POSSIBLY HASTEN THE DISSOLUTION OF THE RF (IAN SMITH HIMSELF IS SAID TO WANT TO RETIRE).

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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# CONFIDENTIAL

4. THIS INITIATIVE BY ANDERSEN IS APPARENTLY DISTINCT FROM MUGABE'S APPROACH TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE (MY TELNO 069). THEY UNDERSTAND THAT HE STILL WANTS A MEETING UNDER THEIR AUSPICES ALSO, THOUGH NO DATE HAS YET BEEN FIXED.

5. THE MEETING SEEMS TO HAVE RAISED WHITE SPIRITS SOMEWHAT AND OFFERS WELCOME EVIDENCE THAT MUGABE NOW FEELS ABLE TO DO SOMETHING TO BOLSTER THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PREDOMINATELY WHITE PRIVATE BUSINESS COMMUNITY.

BYATT

Repetition to MAPUTO  
referred for departmental decision,  
repeated as requested to other posts.

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TO ROUTINE F C O

TELEGRAM 028 OF 22 JANUARY

INFO CAPETOWN, WASHINGTON AND D O T.

MI

PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENTS ON NATIONALISATION AND ONE-PARTY STATE

1. I SEE THAT THE BRITISH PRESS HAVE (UNDERSTANDABLY) GIVEN SOME PROMINENCE TO THE STATEMENTS THAT MUGABE MADE AT RALLIES IN SALISBURY LAST WEEKEND ABOUT THE NEED FOR ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE BEFORE POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE COULD BE FULLY ACHIEVED AND ABOUT THE NEED TO PRESS AHEAD WITH A ONE-PARTY STATE.

2. ACCORDING TO SOME OF THE JOURNALISTS WHO ATTENDED THE FIRST RALLY, MUGABE'S SPEECH (IN SHONA) WAS GENERALLY UNREMARKABLE AND ON NATIONALISATIONS WENT NO FURTHER THAN EXISTING POLICY. UNFORTUNATELY, THE SUNDAY MAIL (HEADLINE, "STATE TO HAND KEY INDUSTRIES TO WORKERS") SENSATIONALISED MUGABE'S REMARKS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO SUGGEST, QUITE WRONGLY, THAT WHOLESALE NATIONALISATIONS WERE IMMINENT. SOME OF THE BRITISH PRESS EVIDENTLY TOOK THEIR CUE FROM THE SUNDAY MAIL. AS ALWAYS WHEN MUGABE SPEAKS TO A RALLY, THERE IS NO PROBLEM PICKING OUT QUOTES TO BACK UP AN ALARMING ANALYSIS BUT WHAT HE SAID NEEDS TO BE READ IN THE LIGHT OF MORE FORMAL DECLARATIONS OF POLICY.

3. MUGABE HAS ALWAYS MADE IT PLAIN THAT HE WANTS (I) GREATER LOCAL PARTICIPATION IN ZIMBABWEAN INDUSTRY AND A GREATER LOCAL SHARE OF DISTRIBUTED PROFITS AND DIVIDENDS (II) STATE PARTICIPATION IN CERTAIN KEY AREAS AS AND WHEN OPPORTUNITIES ARISE - EG BY JOINT VENTURES WITH NEW FOREIGN INVESTORS AND (III) WORKERS' COOPERATIVES AND WORKER SHARE-HOLDINGS WHERE FEASIBLE. DESPITE THE TEMPTATIONS OF RHETORIC, TO WHICH HE IS SUSCEPTIBLE ON SUCH OCCASIONS, HIS SPEECH, CONSIDERED CAREFULLY AS A WHOLE, DID NOT GO BEYOND THESE OFT-STATED PRINCIPLES. HE STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT HE WAS NOT TALKING ABOUT "WHOLESALE NATIONALISATION" AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT TAKE OVER BUSINESSES "BY FORCE". BUT THE LOCAL PRESS, IN THEIR MISGUIDED IDEOLOGICAL ENTHUSIASM, AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR WITH THEIR TENDENCY TO BELIEVE THE WORST, HAVE BOTH REACTED AS THOUGH HE HAD.

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4. THE 'ONE PARTY STATE' SPEECH THE FOLLOWING DAY SHOULD ALSO BE READ WITH SOME CAUTION. IT WAS ACTUALLY ONLY A SHORT PASSAGE IN A RATHER LONG SPEECH. WE ARE TOLD HE WAS PUT UP TO IT BY THE LOCAL PARTY OFFICIALS WHEN HE ARRIVED - SO IT WAS PRESUMABLY UNPREPARED (AS ITS PROMPT REJECTION BY NKOMO THE FOLLOWING DAY WOULD SUGGEST). THE PASSAGE IN QUESTION WAS TELEVISED. THE AUDIENCE WERE SHOWING NO ENTHUSIASM, INDEED THEY LOOKED DISTINCTLY UNHAPPY (THOUGH THIS MAY HAVE BEEN SHEER BOREDOM - MUGABE'S DELIVERY DOES NOT FIRE THE IMAGINATION AND ONE SUSPECTS INDEED THAT HE IS SOMETIMES DRIVEN TO SPEAK MORE WILDLY THAN HE INTENDS BY THE VERY LACK OF AUDIENCE RESPONSE). HE AND HIS SENIOR MINISTERS HAVE ALWAYS SAID PRIVATELY THAT A ONE-PARTY STATE, HOWEVER DESIRABLE, COULD ONLY BE ACHIEVED WITH THE WHOLEHEARTED AGREEMENT OF NKOMO AND HIS PARTY. AS RALPH HAS REPORTED BY BAG, ZVOBGO WENT OUT OF HIS WAY ON TELEVISION LATER IN THE WEEK TO SAY THAT A ONE PARTY STATE WOULD ONLY BE INTRODUCED BY CONSENT AND INDEED THAT THE INTENTION WOULD NOT BE TO BAN MINOR PARTIES - MERELY TO AMALGAMATE THE TWO MAIN ONES.

5. SOME OF THE UK PAPERS HAVE AT THE SAME TIME REPORTED AN INCREASING OUTFLOW OF WHITES FROM ZIMBABWE. IN FACT, THE NOVEMBER FIGURES (PUBLISHED THIS WEEK) SHOW THE LOWEST MONTHLY TOTAL OF EMIGRANTS SINCE INDEPENDENCE, AND THE THREE-MONTH TOTALS FOR JULY/SEPTEMBER, AUGUST/OCTOBER AND SEPTEMBER/NOVEMBER WERE EACH LOWER THAN LAST YEAR. SO THE CURRENT TREND IS ACTUALLY (RATHER SURPRISINGLY) DOWNWARD - THOUGH IT MAY NOT STAY THAT WAY.

ELAM

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 MR GILLMORE  
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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 182343Z JAN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 68 DATED 18 JANUARY 82

INFO PRIORITY CAPETOWN, PRETORIA, ROUTINE: WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, PARIS, BONN, LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM

INFO SAVING GABORONE, LUANDA, SALISBURY, MAPUTO, LAGOS

MIPT: SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPLY OF 13 JANUARY TO PIK BOTHA ON APARTHEID

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT:

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF 12 JANUARY 1982 CONCERNING MY STATEMENT TO THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AGAINST APARTHEID.

I MUST CONFESS THAT THE TONE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF YOUR MESSAGE SURPRISED ME. MY STATEMENT REFLECTED WITH CLARITY AND ACCURACY THE VIEWS OF THE UNITED NATIONS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF YOUR GOVERNMENT. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT CAN HARDLY BE DESCRIBED

AS A STATEMENT OF MY GROUP OR ALLIANCE. YOU MUST SUPPLY RE

GOVERNMENT. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT CAN HARDLY BE DESCRIBED AS "SUBSERVIENT" TO ANY GROUP OR ALLIANCE. YOU MUST SURELY BE AWARE THAT THE SYSTEM OF APARTHEID IS VIEWED WITH GRAVE AND UNIVERSAL CONCERN, AND NOT ONLY WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS.

NOR DO I BELIEVE THAT IT WAS FELICITOUS TO HAVE SPOKEN OF THE "IMPOTENCE" OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE "RIDICULE" IN WHICH IT IS HELD. I CAN ONLY ASSUME THAT SUCH TERMS REFLECT THE FACT THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT DOES NOT AGREE WITH UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS ON THIS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE. AS TO THE "ALIENATION OF THOSE WHO RESPECT FAIR PLAY", I WOULD SUGGEST THAT THIS ADMIRABLE CONCERN CAN SCARCELY BE RECONCILED WITH THE POLICY AND PRACTICE OF APARTHEID. MAY I ADD THAT THE QUESTION OF APARTHEID IS ONE OF SCORES OF MAJOR ISSUES WITH WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS DEALS WITH EACH DAY. YOU REFERRED TO THE PRIORITY THAT SHOULD BE ACCORDED TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS AROUND THE WORLD, I SHOULD LIKE TO REMIND YOU THAT IT IS PRECISELY TOWARDS THE PROBLEMS OF POVERTY AND SURVIVAL THAT THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM DIRECTS THE LARGEST SHARE OF ITS RESOURCES AND ENERGY.

I HAVE TAKEN THE LIBERTY OF ANSWERING YOU FRANKLY SINCE, IN YOUR LAST TWO MESSAGES TO ME YOU HAVE BEEN, IF I MAY SAY SO, MORE THAN FRANK YOURSELF. I WOULD HOPE THAT OUR DIALOGUE WILL BE CONSTRUCTIVE AND PRIMARILY DIRECTED TO THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS TO THE GREAT PROBLEMS OF OUR TIME. FOR MY PART, I SHALL BE GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER ALONE.

FCO PASS SAVING GABORONE, LUANDA, SALISBURY, MAPUTO, LAGOS

PARSONS

*[Parsons being, as requested.]*

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DESKBY 140900Z  
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 132346Z JAN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 45 OF 13 JANUARY  
INFO PRIORITY CAPE TOWN PRETORIA, ROUTINE WASHINGTON  
INFO SAVING TO PARIS BONN OTTAWA LAGOS.

MIPT: MESSAGE FROM PIK BOTHA TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR ON APARTHEID.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT:

BEGINS

YOUR PUBLIC OUTRAGE YESTERDAY AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA REFLECTS THE INSTITUTIONALISED INTOLERANCE, BIAS AND PREJUDICE THAT HAVE BECOME THE TRADEMARK OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS OFFICIALDOM IN VIOLATION OF CLEAR CHARTER PROVISION. WITH YOUR ASSUMPTION OF THE POST OF SECRETARY-GENERAL A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY WAS PRESENTED TO INITIATE A PROCESS TO RESTORE SOME MEASURE OF CREDIBILITY IN THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION. THE FACT THAT MY GOVERNMENT IS AGAIN PROMPTED TO OBJECT TO PUBLIC REMARKS MADE BY YOU WITHIN A MATTER OF DAYS SINCE YOUR DAMAGING COMMENTS ON SWA/NAMIBIA IS A STRONG INDICATION OF THE DIRECTION THAT YOU HAVE SET UPON IN THE CONDUCT OF WORLD AFFAIRS. BY PUBLICLY DEMONSTRATING YOUR PERSONAL ATTACHMENT TO THE POLITICAL CAUSE OF IDEOLOGICAL ADVERSARIES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT YOU HAVE CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED YOUR INABILITY TO ACT IN A JUST AND UNBIASED MANNER TOWARDS MEMBER STATES WHO ARE EXCLUDED FROM POWER BLOCS AND WHO ARE MADE SCAPEGOATS FOR THE INEQUITIES WHICH ARE CHARACTERISTIC OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

THE LATEST OUTBURST AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA IS PARTICULARLY REPREHENSIBLE CONSIDERING THE AUDIENCE WHOSE APPROVAL WAS CATERED FOR. I URGE YOU TO REFLECT SERIOUSLY ON THIS MANIFESTATION OF SUBSERVIENCE TO GROUPS AND ALLIANCES THAT COMMAND MAJORITIES IN VOTING BUT SHOW LITTLE REGARD FOR THE MOST ELEMENTARY NORMS OF HUMAN DIGNITY.

THE IMPOTENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS TODAY AND THE RIDICULE WITH WHICH IT IS VIEWED IS A DIRECT CONSEQUENCE OF THIS PATTERN OF BEHAVIOUR. FOR, IT CAN NEVER SATISFY THE EXTREMISTS WHILE IT CAUSES ALIENATION AMONG THOSE WHO RESPECT FAIR PLAY. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT CLAIM OR PRETEND THAT IT HAS NO SHORTCOMINGS OR INADEQUACIES. THESE ARE RECOGNISED AND SOUGHT TO BE RESOLVED. HOWEVER, IT STRAINS THE CONSCIENCE THAT YOU SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON SOUTH AFRICA. WHILE POVERTY PLAYS HAVOC WITH THE LIVES OF MILLIONS IN THE MOST OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD THREATENING THEIR VERY SURVIVAL, THE GOVERNMENTS OF THESE COUNTRIES REMAIN OBSESSED WITH THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF SOUTH AFRICA.

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/THE TOTAL

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THE TOTAL DISREGARD FOR BASIC FREEDOMS IN THE MAJORITY OF UNITED NATIONS MEMBER STATES IS SEEMINGLY OF NO INTEREST TO YOU OR YOUR ORGANISATION. SINCE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PLEAD IGNORANCE OF THE FACTS MUST WE THEN ASSUME THAT THE LACK OF FREEDOM AND PROGRESS IN THOSE COUNTRIES ARE TOLERATED, EXCUSED OR CONDONED SO AS NOT TO ANGER THE PERPETRATORS WHOSE PIETY IS REFLECTED IN THEIR PROFESSED CONCERN OVER THE AFFAIRS OF SOUTH AFRICA?

IF YOUR EXCELLENCY WILL PERMIT ME A WORD OF FRIENDLY CAUTION AT THE OUTSET OF YOUR TERM OF OFFICE: HEED THE WARNINGS IN THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REPORTS OF UNITED NATIONS COMMISSIONS, SHOW CONCERN FOR THE MISERY OF THE MILLIONS OF PEOPLE IN THE MAJORITY OF UNITED NATIONS MEMBER STATES, NEGOTIATE THE REAL ENEMIES OF MANKIND, NAMELY HUNGER, DISEASE, ILLITERACY AND POVERTY, DEDICATE YOUR TALENTS AND ENERGY WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOUR TO THE UPLIFTMENT OF THE AFFECTED. IN SO DOING YOU MAY SALVAGE SOMETHING OF THE UNITED NATION'S DIGNITY, IDEALISM AND CREDIBILITY AND YOU WILL EARN CREDIT FOR YOUR OWN EFFORTS.

ENDS

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO PARIS BONN LAGOS.

PARSONS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]  
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DESKBY 140900Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 132345Z JAN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 44 OF 13 JANUARY.

INFO PRIORITY CAPE TOWN PRETORIA, ROUTINE WASHINGTON PARIS BONN  
OTTAWA DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA GABORONE SALISBURY MAPUTO AND LAGOS.

MY TEL NO'S 27, 28, 37 AND 42: SOUTH AFRICAN REACTIONS TO THE NEW  
SECRETARY GENERAL.

1. PIK BOTHA HAS EXPLODED AGAIN. THE TEXT OF HIS LATEST MESSAGE TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR IS CONTAINED IN MIFT (NOT TO ALL). IT IS IN RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S STATEMENT TO THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AGAINST APARTHEID (MY TEL NO 37 - NOT TO ALL). APART FROM THE EXTRAVAGANCE OF THE LANGUAGE IT IS FULL OF HEAVY IRONY, EG QUOTE THOSE WHO RESPECT FAIR PLAY UNQUOTE AND QUOTE IF YOUR EXCELLENCY WILL PERMIT ME A WORD OF FRIENDLY CAUTION UNQUOTE.

2. URQUHART ASKED ME TO CALL THIS AFTERNOON (13 JANUARY) TO SHOW ME THIS LATEST MISSIVE AND TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSED DRAFT REPLIES FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THIS AND TO THE EARLIER BLAST ON NAMIBIA (PRETORIA TEL NO'S 6 AND 7 AND MY TEL NO'S 27, 28 AND 42). URQUHART SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT PIK BOTHA, IN HIS USUAL FASHION, WAS SEEKING TO TERRORISE THE NEW SECRETARY GENERAL BUT THAT HE WOULD FIND THAT HE WAS MADE OF STERNER STUFF THAN WALDHEIM. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD HAVE TO REPLY TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN MESSAGES. BUT URQUHART WANTED THE FIVE TO KNOW THAT THE SECRETARIAT WERE STILL COMMITTED TO THE NAMIBIA INITIATIVE AND WOULD DO NOTHING TO UNDERMINE THE FIVE'S NEGOTIATIONS WHICH THEY SUPPORTED. THE REPLY ON NAMIBIA THEREFORE WOULD BE SHORT AND SWEET (DRAFT TEXT WHICH URQUHART HAS SUBMITTED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN MY SECOND IFT) BUT THAT ON APARTHEID WOULD BE LONGER AND STERNER: THERE WAS NO DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE UN ON THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF APARTHEID AS A SYSTEM.

3. URQUHART SAID THAT ORDINARILY HE WOULD HAVE CONSULTED THE FIVE CLOSELY ON THE REPLY ON NAMIBIA AND ASKED FOR THEIR SUGGESTIONS. AS HE HAD REMARKED TO ME EARLIER, HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE PREPARING A LET-OUT FOR THEMSELVES OVER IMPARTIALITY AND TRYING TO MAKE LIFE AS DIFFICULT AS POSSIBLE FOR THE FIVE IN PHASE 2 (THE RECENTLY RETURNED CHIEF NEWSWEEK CORRESPONDENT IN SOUTH AFRICA HAD TOLD HIM THAT AT HIS LAST INTERVIEW WITH PIK BOTHA RECENTLY, BOTHA HAD EMPHASISED THAT SOUTH AFRICA WOULD NEVER (NEVER) ACCEPT SWAPO WINNING THE ELECTIONS). BUT THE SLOW AND UNCERTAIN AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINE MEANT THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SECRETARIAT TO BE ABLE TO RELY ON QUICK AND CONSIDERED ADVICE FROM THE FIVE. I SAID THAT THE NAMIBIA REPLY LOOKED ALL RIGHT AND UNDER-TOOK TO ONFORM THE REST OF THE FIVE.

PARSONS [REPETITION TO MAPUTO REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION,  
REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]  
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South Africa

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FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 121310Z JAN 82  
TO FLASH F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 18 OF 12 JANUARY

REFERENCE TELECON SPRAKE-REID: KITSON

1. KITSON IS BEING RELEASED BY THE POLICE THIS AFTERNOON. A SEAT HAS BEEN BOOKED FOR HIM ON THIS EVENING'S BA FLIGHT TO LONDON LEAVING JOHANNESBURG 1845 HOURS LOCAL (1645Z) ARRIVING HEATHROW TOMORROW AT 0605 HOURS. MILLER WILL MEET COLONEL MALAN AND KITSON WITH PASSPORT AND TICKET AT 1700 HOURS LOCAL AT THE AIRPORT.

2. COLONEL MALAN HAS SPECIFICALLY ASKED THAT NO-ONE OUTSIDE BRITISH OFFICIAL CIRCLES SHOULD BE INFORMED UNTIL KITSON HAS LEFT THE COUNTRY. WE ARE NOT THEREFORE INFORMING HIS RELATIVES OR LAWYER HERE. KITSON ALSO TOLD MILLER IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION THAT HE EMPHATICALLY DID NOT WISH TO HAVE TO SPEAK TO THE PRESS ON HIS DEPARTURE FROM JAN SMUTS, AND THAT HE WOULD PREFER NOT TO HAVE TO SPEAK TO THEM AT ALL THOUGH HE RECOGNISED THIS WAS PROBABLY A VAIN HOPE.

3. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES I THINK THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER IF YOU DID NOT INFORM THE FAMILY UNTIL AFTER KITSON HAS LEFT THE COUNTRY. JOHANNESBURG WILL TELEPHONE SAFD AS SOON AS THEY HAVE CONFIRMATION OF DEPARTURE. (KITSON COLLECTED HIS BELONGINGS THIS MORNING FROM THE JOHANNESBURG FLAT WHERE HE WAS STAYING SO THERE IS JUST A POSSIBILITY THAT THE FAMILY MAY DEDUCE THAT HE IS LEAVING.)

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- PS/LORD TREFGARNE
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- MR DAY
- SIR L ALLINSON

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THE WORLD OF JOHANN STRAUSS  
WILLI BOSKOVSKY\*



MS.

f-a. M 12/1

## MR STEVEN KITSON - BACKGROUND NOTE

1. Mr Steven Kitson (a 25 year old Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies who lives in Bristol) was detained by the South African Security Police on 7 January under Section 22 of the General Law Amendment Act 1966. This followed an incident on 6 January when he was spotted drawing a sketch outside Pretoria Central Prison. Mr Steven Kitson was in South Africa visiting his father, Mr David Kitson (a 62 year old dual UK-South African citizen) who is presently serving a 20 year prison sentence imposed in 1964 for offences under the Terrorism Act.
2. Mr Steven Kitson was allowed one telephone call to his aunt (Mrs Norma Kitson's sister), who informed the Consulate-General of his detention.
3. Mr Kitson can be detained for up to 14 days under Section 22 of the General Law Amendment Act after which he has to be either released or charged. It would however be possible, in theory, for him to be detained indefinitely under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act.
4. Following representations by HM Ambassador Cape Town, HM Consul in Johannesburg obtained consular access to Mr S Kitson at Security Branch Interrogation Centre, Pretoria on 9 January. Mr Kitson was in good physical condition. He stated that he had been obliged to stand upright for 24 hours of interrogation (except for two brief rest periods) and had been awakened with water when he fell asleep. He requested that this be kept from his family who have therefore not been told. He admitted taking photographs and making sketches of the prison. The Consulate-General hopes that another visit can be arranged shortly.
5. The Kitson family have appointed a lawyer to represent Mr S Kitson but under Section 22 of the General Law Amendment Act a lawyer has no right of access until the detainee appears in court.



6. There has been considerable public and press interest in the case. Mr Luce met a deputation led by Mr Ken Gill, General Secretary of the AUEW-TASS on 11 January. They were primarily concerned that the Consulate maintain regular access to keep a check on Mr S Kitson's condition.

7. A senior official of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has been in touch with the South African Ambassador in London and Sir John Leahy, HM Ambassador Cape Town has contacted the Acting Deputy Director General of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information in Pretoria, to emphasise the potential sensitivity of the case.

Southern African Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
11 January 1982



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*copy to Mr Colles*

*No 10.*

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FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 316 OF 8 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS ( FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

*S. Africa*  
*mf*

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 147 : CALL ON PRIME MINISTER

1. I HAD 50 MINUTES ALONE WITH MR P W BOTHA THIS MORNING ( DECEMBER). HE WAS IN A RELAXED AND FRIENDLY MOOD AND THOUGH AT TIMES HE SPOKE CRITICALLY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO SOUTH AFRICA HE GAVE THE APPEARANCE OF SPEAKING MORE IN SORROW THAN IN ANGER. I WILL SEND A FULL RECORD BY BAG TO THE DEPARTMENT: THIS TELEGRAM PICKS OUT THE HIGHLIGHTS (THE ORDER IS MINE).

GENERAL

2. MR BOTHA WARMLY RECIPROCATED THE PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL GOOD WISHES WHICH I HAD PASSED ON TO HIM AT THE START OF OUR CONVERSATION. HE SAID HE MUCH ADMIRER HER COURAGE AND DETERMINATION. ALTHOUGH HIS FATHER HAD FOUGHT THE BRITISH IN THE BOER WAR AND QUOTE HAD NEVER BEEN CAUGHT UNQUOTE , HE HAD BROUGHT UP HIS SON (IE P W BOTHA HIMSELF) TO HAVE HIGH REGARD FOR THE BRITISH. WHEN WE HAD FOUGHT ONE ANOTHER WE HAD BOTH BEEN HARMED, WHEN WE HAD WORKED TOGETHER WE HAD BOTH BENEFITED.

3. I TOLD MR BOTHA THAT WE HAD RECENTLY MADE A REAL EFFORT TO STRIKE A POSITIVE NOTE IN OUR RELATIONS IN VARIOUS DIFFERENT WAYS. WE WANTED BETTER RELATIONS AND THOUGHT THIS WAS IN OUR OWN INTERESTS AS WELL AS IN SOUTH AFRICA'S. BUT WITH ALL OUR JOINT HISTORY BEHIND US WE COULD NOT TAKE GOOD RELATIONS FOR GRANTED, WE HAD TO WORK AT THEM. THERE WERE PEOPLE IN BOTH COUNTRIES WHO DID NOT WANT GOOD RELATIONS. I THOUGHT IT RIGHT THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO ENCOURAGE THOSE PEOPLE IN SOUTH AFRICA WHO WERE WANTING TO MOVE FORWARD AND TO INDICATE TO THEM SOME OF THE BENEFITS THAT MIGHT ACCRUE TO SOUTH AFRICA FROM DOING SO. ON THE OTHER HAND WE SHOULD NOT GIVE ANY COMFORT TO THOSE WHO DID NOT WANT CHANGE AND WHO ARGUED THAT SOUTH AFRICA STOOD TO GAIN NOTHING FROM IT IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT BECAUSE SHE NEVER RECEIVED A FAIR HEARING ANYWAY.

4. MR BOTHA SAID THAT DEEP IN HIS HEART HE RESENTED THE UNFAIRNESS OF THE WORLD TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNWILLINGNESS OF OTHER COUNTRIES TO RECOGNIZE ALL THE EFFORTS BEING MADE TO IMPROVE THE LOT OF THE ENTIRE POPULATION. WESTERN GOVERNMENTS THAT KNEW WHAT WAS HAPPENING HERE AND IN SOUTHERN AFRICA GENERALLY (HE DID NOT MENTION US BY NAME BUT CLEARLY MEANT TO INCLUDE US) SHOULD NOT ALWAYS JOIN IN THE CHORUS OF CONDEMNATION BUT SHOULD GIVE THE WORLD THE TRUE PICTURE. I SAID THAT WE HAD BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN LOWERING THE LEVEL OF THE RHETORIC IN THE UNITED NATIONS RECENTLY. MOREOVER

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/ HE MIGHT

HE MIGHT HAVE NOTICED THAT WE HAD BEEN RETICENT IN PUBLIC OVER THE HANDLING OF THE SEYCHELLES HIJACKERS AND HAD NOT SAID ANYTHING DISOBLIGING ABOUT C/SKEI QUOTE INDEPENDENCE UNQUOTE EITHER. HE SHOULD ALSO KNOW THAT THE POSITIVE REMARKS IN THE SPEECH I MADE IN JOHANNESBURG RECENTLY HAD NOT BEEN MADE OFF THE TOP OF MY HEAD: ON THE CONTRARY THEY HAD BEEN CLEARED AT A HIGH LEVEL IN THE FCO.

#### NAMIBIA

5. I SAID THAT THIS WAS NOW OUR FIRST PRIORITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. WE FULLY SUPPORTED THE AMERICANS IN THEIR EFFORTS TO BRING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. WE HAD ALSO NOTED WITH APPRECIATION THE PERSONAL COMMITMENT WHICH HE AND PIK BOTHA HAD RECENTLY DEMONSTRATED, PARTICULARLY IN WINDHOEK, TO GETTING AN AGREEMENT. I REALISED THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR HIM AND IN THIS CONTEXT THE DESIRABILITY OF CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA, THOUGH THIS WAS NOT SOMETHING WHICH THE FIVE AS SUCH FELT ABLE TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT. MR BOTHA SAID THAT HE WAS GLAD THAT THE AMERICANS WERE RECEIVING SAVIMBI AND THOUGHT THE REST OF US WERE MAKING A BIG MISTAKE OVER HIM. HE WAS AN IMPRESSIVE AFRICAN LEADER AND WAS WILLING TO COME TO A REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION WITH THE MPLA. I SAID THAT I COULD NOT HELP WONDERING WHETHER HE WAS SOMEONE WHO COULD EVER PLAY SECOND FIDDLE, EVEN IF UNITA AS SUCH MIGHT BE RECONCILED TO IT. MR BOTHA REPLIED THAT HE FELT QUITE SURE THAT SAVIMBI QUOTE DID NOT WANT THE WHOLE OF ANGOLA OR TO GET MIXED UP WITH THOSE PEOPLE UP IN THE NORTH UNQUOTE.

6. MR BOTHA EXPRESSED SOME OPTIMISM THAT SWAPO WOULD NOT DO ANYTHING LIKE AS WELL AMONG THE OWAMBOS IN AN ELECTION AS WAS COMMONLY THOUGHT. HE SAID THAT THE OWAMBOS WERE PRACTISING CHURCH-GOING CHRISTIANS AND WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SWALLOW THE UNGODLINESS OF COMMUNISM. I LET THAT PASS.

7. I ALSO TRAILED MY COAT BY SAYING THAT I HAD NOTICED THAT IN HIS RECENT SPEECH TO THE BUSINESS CONFERENCE IN CAPE TOWN HE HAD ONCE AGAIN REFERRED TO THE IDEA OF A REGIONAL NON-AGGRESSION PACT. MR BOTHA FOR HIS PART LET THAT ONE PASS AND WE DID NOT MENTION IT AGAIN.

#### ZIMBABWE

8. MR BOTHA SAID THAT WE HAD MADE A TERRIBLE MISTAKE OVER RHODESIA. BY RUSHING THINGS THE WASY WE HAD WE HAD DONE A DISSERVICE TO SOUTHERN AFRICA. HE HAD WARNED US QUOTE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL UNQUOTE NOT TO DO THIS. NOW ZIMBABWE WAS GOING RAPIDLY DOWN THE DRAIN: BUSINESSMEN WHO HAD INTERESTS THERE WERE UNANIMOUS IN TELLING HIM THIS. IN TWO YEARS TIME THE COUNTRY WOULD BE REDUCED TO CHAOS. THE TRANSPORT SYSTEM WAS GRINDING TO A HALT, VERY MUCH TO THE DETRIMENT OF ZAIRE, MALAWI, AND ZAMBIA. HE HAD ONCE THOUGHT THAT MUGABE WOULD BE REASONABLY FLEXIBLE, BUT HE WAS PROVING

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TO BE A VERY STUBBORN MAN. HE (PWB) HAD SECRETLY PROPOSED A MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO OF THEM SOME TIME AGO, BUT MUGABE HAD NOT RESPONDED. I SAID THAT WE HAD A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE ON ZIMBABWE. WE HAD HELPED TO BRING IT TO BIRTH AND FELT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT IT SHOULD SUCCEED. MUGABE SEEMED TO US TO BE THE BEST PRIME MINISTER ANY OF US COULD EXPECT TO HAVE IN SALISBURY : IF HE WERE SUPPLANTED IT COULD ONLY BE BY SOMEBODY WORSE FROM SOUTH AFRICA'S POINT OF VIEW. WE HAD BEEN PLEASED, THEREFORE, TO NOTE SOME IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES RECENTLY FOLLOWING CERTAIN SOUTH AFRICAN GESTURES AND HOPED THIS IMPROVEMENT WOULD LAST.

SEYCHELLES

9. THE PRIME MINISTER SPOKE AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT THIS QUOTE COWBOY OPERATION UNQUOTE WHICH HAD EMBARRASSED BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS. HE THOUGHT MIKE HOARE MUST INDEED BE MAD. MR BOTHA WAS AT PAINS TO EXPLAIN THAT AT THE TIME THE 39 WERE RELEASED THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO CHARGE THEM AND THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT HAVE DIRECTED THE TRANSVAAL ATTORNEY-GENERAL OTHERWISE. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS WAS STILL THE CASE. HE IMPLIED THAT NOW THE MATTER HAD BEEN HANDED OVER TO THE NATAL ATTORNEY-GENERAL THE POSITION MIGHT HAVE CHANGED. BUT HE STOPPED SHORT OF SAYING THIS, FALLING BACK INSTEAD ON THE OLD FORMULA THAT THE LAW MUST BE ALLOWED TO TAKE ITS COURSE (QUOTE YOU BRITISH OF ALL PEOPLE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THIS UNQUOTE) I SAID THAT WE HAD NOT RUSHED TO MAKE ANY JUDGEMENTS OURSELVES AND YOU WERE FIRST TRYING TO ESTABLISH, THROUGH ME, WHAT THE FACTS WERE. OUR CONCERN, LIKE HIS, WAS THAT THE GUILTY PEOPLE SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE AND THAT AS WELL AS BEING DONE JUSTICE SHOULD BE SEEN TO BE DONE. IN THE MEANTIME HE SHOULD NOT JUMP TO ANY CONCLUSIONS ON THE BASIS OF PRESS REPORTS ABOUT WHAT THE SEVEN MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT DO. MR BOTHA NODDED HIS HEAD.

LEAHY

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PS/MR LUCE  
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SIR E YOUDE  
MR DAY  
SIR L ALLINSON  
MR GOODISON  
SIR A ACLAND  
CABINET OFFICE

[NOT ADVANCED]

Alan - really not for CP!  
see record up top  
with President  
Mubarak.  
Key  
26/11



South Africa

jd

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

23 November 1981

Dear Julian

Thank you for your letters of 12 and 19 November about South Africa and the Middle East. I am, as always, most grateful to you for letting me have the benefit of your views.

signed

MT

The Rt. Hon. Julian Amery, M.P.

jfh



FROM: THE RT. HON. JULIAN AMERY, M.P.

112, EATON SQUARE,  
SW1W 9AA  
TEL: 01-235 1543  
01-235 7409

*Confidential*

19th November, 1981.

*Dear Margaret,*

I was in Cairo at the weekend with Bill Mclean and Robert Cranborne. We went at the invitation of the Foreign Minister, General Kamal Hassan Ali. His invitation apparently followed a speech I made on 5th November in the foreign affairs section of the debate on the Address.

We had very cordial and full talks first with President Husni Mubarak whom I knew only slightly and later with the Foreign Minister whom I have known for some time. As the whole problem of the Middle East is very much on the agenda, I have thought it right to let you have fairly detailed records of these talks based on notes taken by Bill McLean and Robert Cranborne at the time. We had a short but helpful meeting with our Ambassador Michael Weir and paid a courtesy call on the Empress Farah of Iran who is an old friend of mine.

Our visit received extensive coverage on Cairo television and in their press. This went well beyond the intrinsic interest of anything I had to say. It probably indicates the importance the Egyptian Government attach to demonstrating to their public that they have friends in Europe who share their broad approach to the Middle East problem. It may also be their way of signalling to other countries where they stand.

The broad if necessarily tentative conclusions which I reached at the end of our visit are as follows; and here I would stress that they are <sup>purely</sup> my interpretation of what was said to us the record of which is attached.

1. The Egyptians attach paramount importance to securing the final withdrawal of the Israelis from the Sinai by April 25th 1982. They believe the Israelis to be firmly committed to this withdrawal but recognise that there are sections of Israeli public opinion which would like to go back on the agreement or postpone its fulfilment ~~and perhaps over-estimate their importance.~~ They would welcome our participation in the Sinai multinational force and see some positive merits in Prince Fahad's plan. They are, however, very anxious to avoid any initiatives or declarations which could be seen as superceding Camp David and might thus interfere with the withdrawal process e.g. by incurring an Israeli veto on the composition of the multi national force.
2. The Egyptians do not expect to get a detailed agreement on autonomy for the West Bank or Gaza before April 1982. They hope, however, to have constructed a framework which would enable Palestinian representatives to emerge in the occupied territories. It would then be for these representatives and the Jordanians, hopefully with Saudi encouragement, to take over the business of negotiations with Israel. The Egyptians would



continue to give their support but would no longer play a primary role. Other Arab countries must resort to negotiation as they had done rather than confrontation.

3. The Egyptians believe the Saudis will mend their fences with Egypt progressively. At the moment there is a truce in the war of words. Once the Sinai phase of Camp David is completed they believe the Saudi position will come much closer to their own. They and other Arabs will have to accept that negotiation pays and confrontation does not.

4. They accept the principle of Palestinian self-determination. But they do not believe that the moderates in the PLO can decide PLO policy so long as the Syrians remain in the Lebanon and thus have the main body of the PLO under their physical control and so indirectly that of Moscow. Accordingly they see two possibilities of achieving a settlement. One would be by bringing the Soviets into the peacemaking process. To this, they, and I imagine the USA would be strongly opposed. The other would be to secure the withdrawal of the Syrians from the Lebanon and some disarmament of the PLO with a consequent change of regime in Damascus.

5. Resistance to Soviet Imperialism remains their prime objective and they see close cooperation with the United States as the best way of organising it. They are indeed impatient to see the United States build up extensive military stockpiles and servicing facilities in Egypt itself as well as within the general area of the Gulf.

6. I am always sceptical of assessments of personalities. Sadat, after all, was Nasser's man until Nasser died and Sadat overthrew his policies. I do not know President Husni Mubarak at all well. He struck me, however, as more down to earth and more concerned with the practical problems of reorganising the Egyptian economy and administration than either of his predecessors. There was certainly little of the wideranging and perhaps unrealistic geopolitical vision which characterised my conversation with Sadat or for that matter Nasser. Internal pressures may lead the new President - as they so often have in the past - to seek an external role. If so, my guess would be that he would seek it in the Nile Valley, the Red Sea and North Africa more than in the Asian Middle East. But this can only be a guess. "Dissimulation" as Disraeli wrote (apologies for coded language!) is the secret of oriental policy."

In conclusion I would venture to suggest that we should consider paying more attention to Egypt than we have done in the recent past and put the Palestinian problem on the backburner at least until April 1982. It may prove easier to solve once the success of Sadat's policies where Egypt is concerned have been established beyond doubt.

*Lyons cover,*  
*Julian Amery*  
Julian Amery

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.

P.S. ....

P.S.

As the records of the talks are rather long I have sidelined what seem to be the more significant sections.

I am copying this letter to Peter Carrington and to John Nott.

Confidential

Note of a talk with Major General Kamal Hassan Ali at the  
Foreign Ministry, Cairo on Sunday, 15th November, 1981 at 1.30 p.m.

Present:

The Deputy Prime Minister and  
Foreign Minister, Major General  
Kamal Hassan Ali

The Rt. Hon. Julian Amery, M.P.  
Colonel Neil McLean  
Viscount Cranborne, M.P.

The Minister's Private Secretary

After recalling earlier conversations and expressing regret over the murder of President Sadat, Mr. Amery wondered whether it was not the Arab world that was isolated from Egypt rather than the other way round? The Minister agreed warmly and quoted with approval a leading article which had just appeared in Al Madina, a Saudi owned paper, published in Kuwait, which had ~~agreed~~ argued: "peace with Israel is inevitable". The Minister thought many of the Arab states were now drawing closer to the Egyptian position. The war of words in the press and on the radio had practically stopped. The peace process would continue to grow.

The Minister welcomed the proposal for a European contribution to the multi-national force in Sinai and thought the Fahad plan was encouraging in its implicit recognition of Israel. But the Europeans must be careful not to create difficulties which might upset Israel and slow down or even stop the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.

He was frankly worried about Israel which he described as suffering from "unlimited suspicion". He had noted press reports of the possible formation of a coalition Government in Israel and recalled that the Israelis only went in for coalitions when they faced some grave national difficulty. He thought ~~the~~ coalition government might mean one or 3 things.

1. A decision to evict Israeli settlements in Sinai by force. This might involve bloodshed.
2. A decision not to withdraw from Sinai by April 1982. He

thought this unlikely but as a soldier had to take account of the worst case.

3. A political preparation for an attack on South Lebanon with the object of ejecting the Syrians and breaking up the PLO military organisation.

The Minister repeated his view that he thought it unlikely that Israel would postpone their withdrawal. Israel had made a pact to withdraw from Sinai not only with Egypt but with the rest of the world. An attack on the PLO and Syrians in South Lebanon would be more understandable. It would be a preemptive bid, rather in the style of 1967, to knock out the increasing strength of the PLO and the Syrian presence in the Bekke~~a~~ Valley. It would be a limited war. The Israelis would not go as far as Damascus. But if they were successful, which he seemed to assume, this would probably lead to the fall of the Assad Government and the end of the Alawite supremacy in Syria.

If Israel adopted the third course, Egypt would not interfere. Indeed its non intervention would be Egypt's first test of its commitment to the Camp David agreement. Egypt would keep faith with Israel.

The Minister then turned to the autonomy talks. These had been very disappointing. The initiative in raising the talks to ministerial level had come from the Israeli side. In the event the Israelis had had nothing new to propose. Presumably they had failed to reach agreement in their own cabinet before the meeting.

There were important differences between Israel and Egypt about the concept of autonomy.

1. The first concerned the structure of the representative body.

This was important because the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza were an educated people and such a people had to have representative government. Egypt wanted to see about 100 representatives who would elect a council of 13 to 17 members ~~into the administration.~~ *as an administrative body.*

2. The Egyptians wanted autonomy to be based on the whole area of the West Bank and Gaza. The Israelis wanted it based on the population as distinct from the land. Of the (?)100,000 hectares in question, about one third was state land, mostly mountainous and rocky and partly settled by Israelis already. The second third belonged to Palestinians who had emigrated or to the WAKF. The final third belonged to existing inhabitants. In the Israeli view autonomy only applied to them.
3. There was the problem of Jerusalem. Of its 400,000 inhabitants, 115,000 were Arabs. In the Egyptian view these should also be represented in the autonomous institutions. Israel disagreed.

Egypt could not compromise with Israel on these three points (i.e. the size of the representative body, its constituency, and Jerusalem).

Egypt's objective however, was to establish a framework within which further negotiations could take place after the final Israeli withdrawal <sup>from Sinai</sup> in April 1982. Thereafter Egypt's responsibility must diminish. It would be up to the Palestinians and Jordanians to discuss <sup>with Israel the issues</sup> ~~the details~~ of internal security, foreign affairs and defence which were separate subjects to any rights secured under autonomy. This would involve simultaneous recognition between Israel and the Palestinians and so, presumably, the PLO.

The PLO, however, was severely fragmented. The larger part, as much as 80%, was moderate. The others owed allegiance to more extreme Arab states. The question was would the activist tail wag the dog? The moderate bulk of the PLO depended on Syria and thus on the Soviets, because their main body and armed forces were situated in the Lebanon which was under Syrian control. They could do nothing without Syrian and so Soviet approval.

The Foreign Minister regarded the PLO as an essential ingredient in any settlement. He believed that the problem

4.

*The Israelis could not help withdrawing in the end. If they*

should be solved within 2-3 years. ~~If Israel~~ tried to absorb Gaza and the West Bank there would be more ARabs than Jews in Israel. This prospect would oblige Israel to be as flexible as Egypt had been.

But there was one cause for concern. Prince Saud bin Faisal had made an offer to the Russians to approve Prince Fahad's plan and join in discussing it. The Soviets unexpectedly had said "yes". This could be interpreted in one of two ways. Perhaps the SAudis were nodding in Moscow's direction to obtain Libyan and Syrian support at the Arab Summit. Alternatively the Soviets were trying to get in on the act by the back door. The question was, who was pulling whose leg? If it were a purely tactical manoeuvre on the part of the Saudis there would be no harm. But the Minister did not want to see the Soviets brought back into the Middle East.

The conversation then turned to Chad. The Minister was not convinced that the Libyans had in fact withdrawn. He thought they would probably try and stay in the uranium rich northern province. They might, however, have withdrawn from the capital in order to secure the arms deal they were negotiating with the French. Ghadaffi had unbounded ambitions but his support for the Polisario was not an expression of Libyan expansionism but came purely from a desire to destroy King Hassan of Morocco.

Turning to the Horn of Africa the Minister said that although the Ethiopian regime was a Soviet puppet they were now fairly quiet in their relations with the Sudan. They had not tried to stir up the South Sudanese. Eritrea was also quiet. There was still a problem between Ethiopia and Somalia but President Ziad Barre had proved himself a great survivor.

Looking across the Red Sea the situation in North Yemen was deteriorating steadily and could be a danger to the Saudis unless they developed a more positive policy. The Americans understood this but had so many points of relative friction with

5.

the Saudis that they hesitated to press them where the Yemen was concerned.

In conclusion the Minister expressed the view that the American military capability in the area would develop quite rapidly once they had established effective stockpiles and servicing arrangements in Egypt.

Confidential

Note of a meeting with President Husni Mubarak at the Presidential Palace, Cairo on Sunday, 15th November, 1981 at 11.30 p.m.

Present:

President Husni Mubarak

The Rt.Hon. Julian Amery, M.P.  
Colonel Neil McLean  
Viscount Cranborne, M.P.

After an initial exchange of courtesies, the President explained that he had just received Khalid Mohieddin, the left wing leader. Mohieddin had come to protest against martial law and the restrictions on the press and to explain his opposition to certain aspects of Camp David. The President had told him that martial law was necessary particularly for his sake. Without it the Fundamentalists would "break your neck first of all because they look on you as a Communist". The President went on to say that he did not regard Mohieddin as a Communist but that he had contacts with the Soviets and was indeed pro-Soviet. He had made it clear to him that he would not allow anyone to act as a channel for foreign propoganda. He was not going to sit on his hands and allow the Soviets to come back and dominate Egypt. The President added that on Camp David he had told Mohieddin that there was no other way in which the Sinai could have been recovered. It could not have been done by war. So why was Mohieddin complaining? What would he have done? Mohieddin apparently agreed but said that he could not say so publicly since he had opposed Camp David in public from the beginning.

The President went on to say that the autumn had been a time of great trouble for Egypt but now things were much quieter and the universities were open again. A number of people had been arrested and were awaiting interrogation. When this was completed the Government could decide what further steps to take. But as at present advised, he did not think that foreign powers had been directly involved in President Sadat's assassination.

Mr. Amery asked whether relations with Saudi Arabia were improving. The President replied that he had good unofficial



contacts with the Saudis and had received private messages of condolence after the murder of President Sadat. Mr. Amery recalled that President Sadat had told him that Egypt could make friends with the Saudis whenever it wanted to. Had the time come? The President said that he preferred to move slowly. The essential thing was to complete the Camp David agreements and not give the Israelis any reason to go back on or postpone their withdrawal from the Sinai. Both Mr. Begin and Mr. Peres had assured him that they would stick to the Agreement and he believed them. "War has been erased from the Israeli/Egyptian vocabulary" Nevertheless, there were voices raised in Israel urging at least postponement of withdrawal. €

The President went on to speak of the autonomy talks. He did not expect to reach a detailed agreement by April 25th 1982 but he hoped there might, by then, be a framework within which more detailed negotiations with Israel could be carried on by Palestinians and Jordanians, hopefully with Saudi encouragement. Egypt would naturally do what it could to help. But the Egyptians could not be expected to assume the main responsibility. This must be left to the parties directly concerned. The Egyptians could not be expected to fight other Arab states battles for them. When the Israelis had bombed the Bagdad reactor some Arab Governments had called on Egypt to take action against Israel. But what had they done themselves? All Iraq had done had been to refer the question to the UN! So why should Egypt fight Iraq's battles for her?

The President went on to talk about the PLO. This was a mixture of different groups divided into a pro-Syrian, pro-Iraqi and pro-Libyan faction - and all paid for by the moderate Arab states! The PLO could only follow a united line of policy if its three backers were in agreement. Of the three Syria was the most important because it had physical control of the main PLO bases in South Lebanon.

The President doubted whether the PLO leaders were really very keen on peace with Israel. If a Palestinian state were

established, financial contributions from Saudi Arabia would go to the new State and not to individual leaders, to the detriment of their Swiss Bank accounts. The President did not regard the Fahad proposals as a serious or effective plan but rather as a possible starting point for talks. The Venice initiative too had some merit. But the PLO could only negotiate seriously if the Syrians, and so the Russians, gave them the green light.

Mr. Amery mentioned that Lord Carrington was trying hard to involve the PLO in the peace process. The President commented "God help him", this in a tone that conveyed exasperation rather than benison. For his part he was inclined to doubt whether the Palestinian question would be settled for "50 years". But that, he added, was a purely private view. He went on to say that he had been told, also privately, by "a senior member of the Saudi Arabian Royal family" that the Saudis were not really all that interested in a settlement for the Palestinians. They would agree to terms with Israel if a solution could be found for Jerusalem. He believed this view was shared by other Saudis and perhaps some of the Gulf rulers.

Turning to Syria, the President doubted whether the Syrians really wanted a settlement of the Palestinian problem as this would end their chances of extracting money from the rich Arab states. The Golan Heights were worthless land but provided a reason for keeping the Syrian army on the alert and so for extracting money from the Saudis. Golan was really "a furnished flat for which the rich Arabs pay the rent".

The President expanded at some length on the mercenary character of the Syrians. He claimed that earlier this year Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia had paid the Syrians \$500 million just to withdraw from the Jordan border which they had never really intended to attack. They had apparently even mentioned the sum of \$16 billion as their price for pulling out of Lebanon!

Nevertheless, after the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, Hafiz Assad could be in a tight corner. Assad's Government had pursued a policy of confrontation with Israel. Egypt had opted instead for negotiation. All Sinai would shortly be in Egyptian hands. The Syrian people would begin to realise the mistakes of what was anyway a very unpopular and minority government. This might well prove fatal to Assad's regime.

Colonel McLean asked what sort of regime would follow? The President thought that on balance it would be another pro-Soviet regime. If it were an anti Russian regime this would be a great defeat for the Russians, too great perhaps for them to accept, though obviously desirable.

Turning to Jordan the President said that King Hussein could expect a great deal of trouble from the Palestinians. Nevertheless, after the return of Sinai, King Hussein must be associated with the next phase of talks about the West Bank. But it would be very difficult to pin King Hussein down. "He is very clever but you can never catch him. Even when you have him in your grasp he slips out". He accompanied this remark with a graphic gesture as of one trying to grip an eel.

The President then turned to Libya. He thought that President Ghadaffi was experiencing some difficulty at home because of a shortage of liquid cash. He had, however, received private assurances from Ghadaffi that Libya would not attack Egypt. Ghadaffi had also sent him a private message, just after President Sadat's murder, but the timing of it had been in such contrast with Ghadaffi's public statements as to be "impolite". Anyway he did not want to negotiate with Libya "while this madman is at the helm". When Mr. Amery remarked that it would be constructive if Egypt had access to Libya's oil resources, the President smiled appreciatively but said "Yes, but that is something we cannot discuss".

The President discounted reports of concentrations of Libyan troops on the Chad/Sudan border. The country was too inhospitable

to sustain the presence of an army for long. He also thought the reports of fighting between the troops of the Chad Defence Minister and the Chad Foreign Minister were false. They might have been invented to give the Libyans an excuse to return to Chad should Ghadaffi later wish to do so.

On the subject of the Soviet stockpile of arms in Libya, the President said that this stockpile was indeed substantial. Ghadaffi had bought the arms at a time when he believed the Americans were stockpiling arms in Israel. He had planned himself to establish a parallel stockpile for a pan Arab war against Israel. The President, however, predicted that Libya would find that there was a desperate shortage of spare parts. He had had some experience of Soviet methods when commanding the Egyptian air force. He had found, then, that there were not even spare tyres or engines for Russian supplied Migs. It was the classic Russian technique for keeping control of weapons they supplied.

He personally had a poor opinion of the Libyan armed forces "We gave them a good drubbing when we bombed Tobruk in 1977 and destroyed the airport facilities and some aeroplanes on the ground". He believed some Russian advisers had also been among the casualties.

Mr. Amery asked how the President saw the outlook in Iran. He thought the opposition to Khomeini strong but very divided. There was not much hope of doing anything until a strong man arose inside the country, probably from the armed forces. His own guess was that the Soviets would strike next in Poland which would be "very bad for Europe" but he himself was more seriously concerned about Iran. It was the Middle Eastern country most vulnerable to Soviet expansion.

Colonel McLean asked about the situation in Yemen. Here the President was very critical of the Saudis for having no positive policy. He spoke with disapproval of a Saudi prince

who had told him that the Saudis had no quarrel with Aden and this at a time when the Russians were building a major new airfield and expanding their naval facilities. He thought the situation in North Yemen was deteriorating seriously and that this could be disastrous for the Saudis.

Mr. Amery said how much he had been encouraged by President Reagan's general approach to the international situation. The President agreed warmly. He found the Americans <sup>how</sup> reacted much faster than they had under President Carter who had been rather slow. He liked General Haig very much. In particular he was grateful to the Americans for their swift reaction to the murder of President Sadat. He was very pleased with the "Bright Star" manoeuvres which had just started, though he had not yet had any detailed report about them.

Strategically he thought it essential that there should be an American presence in the area of the Gulf and judged that Mascira could serve very well for this purpose. He was, however, doubtful about the present American military capability in the area. But this could be greatly improved once they began to establish stockpiles of war materials in Egypt and facilities for servicing weapons. He did not want American bases on Egyptian soil but would give them all facilities.

He welcomed the AWACS deal with Saudi Arabia as evidence of American determination to defend Western oil supplies. He could not understand why the Israelis had made such a fuss about the AWACS planes. As an air force officer he knew that they would remain under effective American control with American technicians on board and on <sup>the</sup> ground installations. If the Saudis had not bought them the Americans would have stationed them there anyway. The only difference was that the Saudis had paid \$10 billion for what they could have had for free!



FROM: THE RT HON. JULIAN AMERY, M.P.

112, EATON SQUARE,  
SW1W 9AA  
TEL: 01-235 1543  
01-235 7409

12th November, 1981.

*Don Haynes*

*R16*

I was in South Africa in the second part of October and had talks with Ministers in Pretoria as well as businessmen and others in Johannesburg.

I put down below a few thoughts on some of the main issues in Southern Africa.

#### Namibia


South African Ministers appreciate that the Reagan administration is the most friendly American Government they are likely to find. They will accordingly cooperate sincerely with Washington, though that doesn't mean that they won't fight their own corner hard.

The Namibia issue is not simple as you will know. Agreeing constitutional principles is almost as difficult as agreeing a detailed constitution. In what they ~~ask~~ call "Phase II" the administrative problems - status of Civil Servants, relations with UN, provision for law and order etc. - bristle with difficulties. I should be surprised if the timetable for "independence" could be completed even in theory, before the early summer of 1983. And, of course, the local SWA parties may prove difficult and can count on a good deal of support within the Nationalist Party itself.

Basically this is a tougher problem than Rhodesia. The FCO wanted to get rid of the Rhodesia problem. The South Africans don't really want to get rid of Namibia and will try to avoid doing so until it seems a reasonably safe proposition.

Then there is the question of how to enforce constitutional safeguards even if they are agreed. A lot here will depend on the wider context under which Independence comes about. To risk a SWAPO victory in SWA while neighbouring Angola remains a one-party state, virtually occupied by the Soviets and Cubans, could be very dangerous for South African and indeed Western interests. Short of a South African reconquest of the territory, there would be little to stop a SWAPO Government calling in Cubans or other Soviet allies from Angola.

If, on the other hand, the Soviets and Cubans were withdrawn from Angola, if, moreover, the Angolan Opposition parties - UNITA and FNLA - were recognised in some form or other a SWAPO victory in Namibia would not present much of a danger to South African or to other interests generally and any subsequent SWAPO regime could be controlled or contained.



This issue, of course goes beyond the remit of the 5 power Contact Group and will be mainly for discussion between Washington and Pretoria. I suspect however, that in practice, progress over Namibia may well depend, as far as Pretoria is concerned, on how far we can move towards the decolonisation of Angola. It is, to say the least, a little odd to insist on free elections in Namibia and the withdrawal of "foreign" troops when Angola has never had elections of any kind and is occupied by Warsaw Pact and Cuban forces.

For my own part, I think it would be to our advantage to link the two questions of Namibia and Angola. If we could get the Soviets out of Angola militarily and politically, this would be a great gain. If we cannot, it might well be better to let Namibia go on as it is.

#### Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

I did not go to Zimbabwe but discussed the situation with both South Africans and Rhodesians like Harold Hawkins and Peter Walls. Their general impression was pretty pessimistic. The whites have been leaving to and through South Africa in even larger numbers than the published figures suggest. The farmers of course have to stay because they cannot liquidate their assets and many older people choose to stay. The main drain is among the under 50s, particularly technicians, skilled workers and civil servants. The effect on the economic and administrative infrastructure is already visible.

This process seems likely to continue as the Mugabe regime adopts policies and strikes attitudes increasingly unfriendly to the whites. Nkomo and his friends are equally unhappy at the prospect of a one party state. Muzorewa and Sithole may already be in personal danger. The advent of North Korean arms and instructors has inevitably increased the sense of uncertainty.

I don't believe the South Africans are deliberately seeking to destabilise Zimbabwe. But they could do so and have made it plain that they will not tolerate any practical support for the African National Congress. They are prepared for everyday cooperation but on the basis of reciprocity and mutual respect. They are not prepared to accept alleged internal political pressures on Mugabe as justifying unfriendly rhetoric or gestures.

How Zimbabwe will develop may well turn on how the Namibia problem is solved. If it is accompanied by the Soviet/Cuban withdrawal from Angola the prognosis could be hopeful. Otherwise a steady deterioration seems more likely.

General

The South African economy remains very strong and its growth rate impressive. Notable growth areas, I was told, are Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and the Phillipines. Trade with Black Africa continues to grow, and increasingly openly.

Inspite of many previous disappointments the South Africans seem convinced that their rapprochement with the United States is for real, because dictated by genuine strategic and economic considerations.

Discussions about internal reforms continue but are bogged down at the moment by the boycott of Coloured and Asian councils by their community leaders. The Prime Minister is also under growing pressure from his breakaway right. But he, Pik Botha, and General Malan make up a strong team.

Looking ahead I have a hunch that South Africa may move away from the Westminster type to a more presidential system. This would enable the President to nominate ministers and officials from other races without undermining the basic structure of white supremacy.

Ted Heath's speech in South Africa was coldly received, so I was told by half a dozen people who heard it. The more sophisticated assessed it as directed to Social Democrat and Liberal opinion in Britain. Ministers resented that he had been their guest the day before but gave no indication of what he was going to say. Even opponents of the Government regretted his demand for "one man one vote". Coming from a former Tory PM it was bound to give the impression that the much lesser but still substantial reforms now under discussion would earn South Africa no good will abroad.

*Julian*  
Julian Amery

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.

PS. Sorry for the delay in sending this letter but I had to go to Poland between drafting and signing it.



SECRET

HL

13

S. Africa

29 October 1981

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 27 October and has agreed that Sir John Leahy should speak along the lines proposed if he is summoned by Mr. P.W. Botha.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

R



①  
 Prime Minister  
 content that Sir J. Leahy  
 should speak along these lines?

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 October 1981

Dear Michael,      Paul      Mrs [unclear]

In her reply of 19 October to Mr P W Botha's letter about the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's speech at the UN General Assembly on behalf of the Ten, the Prime Minister suggested that Sir John Leahy should on his return to South Africa call on Mr P W Botha to give him any background to the position of the Ten and discuss ways in which Anglo-South Africa relations might be improved.

Given that both the text and manner of delivery of Mr P W Botha's letter of 4 October constituted a fairly transparent attempt at wedge-driving, it would strengthen John Leahy's hand considerably if he could make clear in suitable terms to P W Botha that he is speaking on behalf of both the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. He might convey the Prime Minister's personal good wishes to Mr Botha. He would then be prepared, if required, to explain in standard terms the importance which the Government attach to relations with South Africa: the difficulties which both South Africa's internal policies and the absence of a Namibian settlement present for the development of a closer relationship: our desire for a Namibian settlement on the basis of the Five's proposals: and our interest in being able to give public acknowledgement to genuine changes made within South Africa. In all of this, the Ambassador would as necessary emphasise that he was representing the views of the Prime Minister and of the British Government as a whole.

Would the Prime Minister be content for Sir John Leahy to speak in these terms, if he is summoned by Mr P W Botha?

Yours ever

Rodric Lyne

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
 10 Downing St

28 OCT 1961

11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister 3

I'm afraid the earlier  
version of this letter that you  
signed was addressed to  
"Mr PW Borne". The FCO  
felt this would be interpreted  
as a deliberate slight.

Could you please sign  
this amended version?

"Dear Prime Minister"

"Yours sincerely" ! I should

much prefer to  
be addressed by my  
name! Mr.

WPM 18/10

SUBJEZT



South Africa file HL

10 DOWNING STREET

cc fro  
British Embassy in  
Cape Town

THE PRIME MINISTER

19 October 1981

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T145B/81

Dear Prime Minister

I had delivered to me in Melbourne your letter about the speech made by Lord Carrington on behalf of the ten members of the European Community at the United Nations General Assembly. I cannot accept your description of the passage in question, which represents the considered views of the ten governments concerned. But I am concerned that there should be no misunderstandings between us on questions of great importance to both our countries. John Leahy, who is presently on leave in London, will be returning to South Africa at the end of October. He would be glad to call on you then to give you any background to the position of the Ten which you thought useful and to discuss ways in which we might improve our bilateral relations. This might also be an opportunity to carry forward the discussions on Namibia to which we both attach such importance.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

LPO

The Honourable P.W. Botha, D.M.S., M.P.

S. Africa



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 October 1981

Dear Mike,

GR/ m type another  
letter to P W Botha  
for the pm addressed  
as at Xm  
15/10Letter from the South African Prime Minister

We have received the Prime Minister's reply to be delivered to the South African Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha, through the South African Ambassador in London.


Unfortunately our draft letter (submitted under cover of my letter of 9 October to you) and consequently the reply signed by the Prime Minister, was addressed to Mr P W Botha rather than giving him his correct full title, the Honourable P W Botha, DMS, MP.

In view of the current difficulties in Anglo-South African relations, which gave rise to Mr P W Botha's letter, HM Ambassador to South Africa considers that there is some risk that failing to give Mr P W Botha his correct title in the Prime Minister's reply might be taken by the South Africans as a deliberate slight. In the light of this I should be most grateful if you were able to let us have another signed letter from the Prime Minister addressed to The Honourable P W Botha, DMS MP. It would be helpful if the envelope could be addressed as follows:

The Honourable P W Botha DMS MP  
The Prime Minister  
The Republic of South Africa

I enclose a copy of the previous letter signed by the Prime Minister. We have retained the original of this which we will destroy on receipt of a second signed letter, giving Mr P W Botha's correct title.

I am sorry to put you to this trouble.

Yours ever  


(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M Pattison Esq  
10 Downing Street



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

12 October, 1981

*Dear Mr. Botha,*

I had delivered to me in Melbourne your letter about the speech made by Lord Carrington on behalf of the ten members of the European Community at the United Nations General Assembly. I cannot accept your description of the passage in question, which represents the considered views of the ten governments concerned. But I am concerned that there should be no misunderstandings between us on questions of great importance to both our countries. John Leahy, who is presently on leave in London, will be returning to South Africa at the end of October. He would be glad to call on you then to give you any background to the position of the Ten which you thought useful and to discuss ways in which we might improve our bilateral relations. This might also be an opportunity to carry forward the discussions on Namibia to which we both attach such importance.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Margaret Thatcher*

Mr. P.W. Botha



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

12 October

cc: Brilio  
CAPE  
FEO

Not  
sent  
see  
Fro letter  
14/10

Dear Mr. Botha,

I had delivered to me in Melbourne your letter about the speech made by Lord Carrington on behalf of the ten members of the European Community at the United Nations General Assembly. I cannot accept your description of the passage in question, which represents the considered views of the ten governments concerned. But I am concerned that there should be no misunderstandings between us on questions of great importance to both our countries. John Leahy, who is presently on leave in London, will be returning to South Africa at the end of October. He would be glad to call on you then to give you any background to the position of the Ten which you thought useful and to discuss ways in which we might improve our bilateral relations. This might also be an opportunity to carry forward the discussions on Namibia to which we both attach such importance.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

Mr. P.W. Botha

Kbb





10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

12 Octob

cc: Br/13  
CAPE  
FEO

Net  
12  
see  
No letter  
14/10

Dear Mr. Botha.

I had delivered to me in Melbourne your letter about the speech made by Lord Carrington on behalf of the ten members of the European Community at the United Nations General Assembly. I cannot accept your description of the passage in question, which represents the considered views of the ten governments concerned. But I am concerned that there should be no misunderstandings between us on questions of great importance to both our countries. John Leahy, who is presently on leave in London, will be returning to South Africa at the end of October. He would be glad to call on you then to give you any background to the position of the Ten which you thought useful and to discuss ways in which we might improve our bilateral relations. This might also be an opportunity to carry forward the discussions on Namibia to which we both attach such importance.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

Mr. P.W. Botha

kb

CONFIDENTIAL

*to type, and note x*

*mm  
12/m*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 October 1981

*Dear Michael,*

Letter from the South African Prime Minister

/ During the CHGM, the South African Ambassador to Australia delivered a letter from Mr P W Botha criticising Lord Carrington's speech on behalf of the Ten to the UN General Assembly. A copy of Mr Botha's letter is enclosed for ease of reference. You asked for our advice on a reply.

/ I enclose a draft of a reply which the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recommends that the Prime Minister should send to Mr Botha. We would propose that it should be delivered through the South African  
x/ Ambassador at London with a copy being sent to our Embassy at Capetown for their information.

*yours ever*

*R M J Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O' D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

Mr P W Botha

Secret

Prime Minister of South Africa

Confidential

Copies to:

Restricted

Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I had delivered to me in Melbourne your letter about the speech <sup>made</sup> ~~delivered~~ by Lord Carrington on behalf of the ten members of the European Community at the United Nations General Assembly. I cannot accept your description of the passage in question, which represents the considered views of the ten governments concerned. But I am concerned that there should ~~not~~ <sup>no</sup> be misunderstandings between us on questions of great importance to both our countries. John Leahy, who is presently on leave in London, will be returning to South Africa at the end of October. <sup>He</sup> ~~and~~ would be glad to call on you then to give you any background to the position of the Ten which you thought useful and to discuss ways in which we might improve our bilateral relations. <sup>This</sup> ~~There~~ might <sup>also an opportunity</sup> ~~be occasion also~~ to carry forward the discussions on Namibia to which we both attach such importance.

Enclosures—flag(s).....



Saltzman

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 October 1981

MESSAGE FROM MR. PIK BOTHA

I attach a copy of a personal message from Mr. P.W. Botha to the Prime Minister which was delivered in Canberra yesterday. I have written to the South African Ambassador acknowledging the letter.

B/F 16/10 /

The Prime Minister would be grateful for Lord Carrington's advice on a reply to Mr. Botha.

I am sending a copy of this letter, and of the message, to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

CW

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CB

FILE

R H

4 October, 1981

I am writing to acknowledge your letter of 4 October with which you send a message from your Prime Minister to Mrs Thatcher.

I will bring your letter to the Prime Minister's attention at the earliest opportunity.

C WHITMORE

H.E. Mr John Oxley

South African Ambassador, Canberra

SERIAL NO. 134A/81  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
PRIME MINISTER'S



T 134A/81  
Top copy to see  
also to see  
4 October 1981  
end  
23/9.

Dear Prime Minister,

I have been instructed personally to pass to you here the text of a letter from the Honourable P.W. Botha, Prime Minister of South Africa, addressed to you in London at the time of your departure for Australia.

The letter, telegraphed to me, reads:

"The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, MP,  
Prime Minister,  
LONDON.

Dear Prime Minister,


The South African Government learned with severe displeasure of the uncalled-for remarks by Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington at the United Nations in connection with the internal policies of the Republic of South Africa. The South African Government is shocked that the Government of the United Kingdom should associate itself with a derogatory and counter-productive statement of this nature by the Ten.

The Foreign Secretary's remarks do not contribute to better relations between our countries. If the British representative chooses to harangue South Africa in a public forum for its internal policies, in a fashion perhaps more appropriate to a colony, he should be aware that he exposes the United Kingdom to public attack on controversial aspects of its own internal policies.

Yours sincerely,

P.W. BOTHA"

I remain, Prime Minister, respectfully and sincerely yours,

  
JOHN OXLEY  
AMBASSADOR

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
CANBERRA.



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

The South Africans have  
said nothing so far. They  
may well be unaware that you are

24 September 1981

Dear Michael, leaving in the morning. Aunt

Anglo-South African Relations

Passage deleted and retained under  
Section 3(4).

Wayland.

18 October 2012

We do not know what the South African Prime Minister's letter will contain. It could be about Namibia and/or the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. But there seems a strong likelihood that it will contain representations about the current state of Anglo-South African relations, on which we have received several indications recently of South African disquiet and irritation. This includes an outburst by the South African Foreign Minister, Mr 'Pik' Botha, to our Consul-General in Johannesburg on 7 September (copy of reporting telegram attached); and probably inspired articles in the Afrikaans press eg Rapport of 6 September (copy attached) which have inter alia suggested that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was exercising a malign influence. The latter could explain why Mr Steyn has been instructed to approach No 10 direct.

The South Africans may regard as among 'evidence' of a cooler attitude on our side the statement which was issued on 26 August deploring the South African incursion into Angola; our abstention in the Security Council on 31 August on a resolution condemning the South African incursion (the United States vetoed the resolution); our approach in South Africa on behalf of the Ten about bannings and treatment of squatters; and Lord Carrington's statement on behalf of the Ten to the Plenary of the General Assembly on 22 September, to the South African sections of which considerable prominence was given by the British press, (though not as a result of official briefing).

Should Mr Botha's message contain representations on these lines, the following points could be drawn on:

- (a) It remains our policy to have normal relations with South Africa. We have shown understanding for the problems that the South African Government faces both internally and in relation to Namibia. Our record, including in positions we have adopted in United Nations bodies, makes this clear. For example, we have consistently supported the right of all the Namibian internal parties to be heard in the Security Council.

/(b)



- (b) We have, for example, been encouraging within the Five and elsewhere efforts to take account of South Africa's concerns in relation to a Namibia settlement.
- (c) However, it is also our policy to look for and encourage peaceful change within South Africa towards a form of government based on the consent of all of the South African people and to achieve stability in Southern Africa.
- (d) Therefore our attitude towards South African Government's policies cannot be completely uncritical, especially when faced with large-scale incursions into a neighbouring African country with whom we have diplomatic relations, and against which we had earlier cautioned the South African authorities (Mr Steyn's call on the Lord Privy Seal on 7 August); and lack of movement towards internal reform about which much had been broadcast by Mr Botha when he came to office.
- (e) (If raised) As our Chargé d'Affaires explained to Mr Fourie on 1 September, our abstention in the Security Council on 31 August was consistent with our previous position on similar resolutions, and our explanation of vote clearly set out our attitude towards the unacceptable aspects of the resolution.
- (f) (If raised) Lord Carrington's recent speech at the United Nations was of course delivered in our capacity as current President of the European Community. It thus reflected the views of all of the Ten, including our own. There will be other occasions on which we shall have to make such statements in the coming months and we hope that there will be no misunderstanding that they reflect Community rather than purely national views.
- (g) (Only if appropriate - and to be used with caution without any implication of a quid pro quo) We attach importance to our economic relations with South Africa. These include interest in a number of major projects which are in the offing. (The note attached sets out the position). We hope that our chances will be at least as good as those of companies from countries which have demonstrated less understanding for South Africa's position than we have.

*Yours ever,*

*Francis Pollard*  
 (F N Richards)  
 Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
 10 Downing St



27

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 483

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CG JOHANNESBURG 081520Z SEPT 81

TO IMMEDIATE EMBASSY CAPE TOWN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 12 OF 08 SEPTEMBER 1981

AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO, DEPT OF TRADE FOR REG COLLINS CRE 5

ANGLO-SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS.

1. THE FOREIGN MINISTER REPRESENTED THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT DURING PRINCESS MARGARET'S TRANSIT STOP AT JAN SMUTS LAST EVENING. AFTER HER DEPARTURE, PIK BOTHA VOLUNTEERED SOME THOUGHTS ON BRITAIN'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA WHICH HE CLEARLY EXPECTED ME TO REPORT.

2. HE PROFESSED TO BE VERY DISAPPOINTED AT BRITAIN'S ABSTENTION IN THE RECENT SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN INCURSION INTO ANGOLA. OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CABINET HAD BEEN EVEN MORE INCENSED AND HE HAD HAD DIFFICULTY IN DISSUADING THEM FROM ISSUING A PUBLIC STATEMENT CONDEMNING BRITAIN. BRITAIN SHOULD HAVE VETOED WITH THE US, SOUTH AFRICA'S FRIENDS (SIC), AND NOT HAVE TRIED TO SIT ON THE FENCE BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE EUROPEANS. HIS INFORMATION WAS THAT BRITAIN HAD LOBBIED THE AMERICANS AGAINST USING THE VETO. BRITAIN SHOULD RECOGNISE WHERE HER BEST INTERESTS LAY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (MEANING THAT SHE SHOULD SUPPORT THOSE WHO WERE RESISTING AN EXTENSION OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT) AND AVOID A REPETITION OF OUR MISTAKES IN ZIMBABWE.

3. WHEN I PROTESTED AT THIS HARSH JUDGEMENT ON OUR EFFORTS TO FIND COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT, MR BOTHA REITERATED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO PERCEIVE WHAT THE BRITISH REALLY WANTED IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. AT LEAST THEY KNEW WHERE THEY STOOD WITH THE FRENCH AND, ALMOST IN THE NEXT BREATH, HE WAS ILLUSTRATING THE NATURE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FRENCH BY REFERENCE TO QUOTE SEVERAL CONTRACTS WE HAVE GIVEN THEM LATELY UNQUOTE. WHEN I ASKED, WITH MATIMBA IN MIND, WHETHER THIS MEANT THAT THE AWARD OF MAJOR PUBLIC SECTOR CONTRACTS MIGHT BE INFLUENCED BY GROUNDS OTHER THAN COMMERCIAL MERIT, MR BOTHA

CONFIDENTIAL

/ INSISTED

CONFIDENTIAL

INSISTED THAT COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS ALONE COUNTED, BUT QUICKLY ADDED QUOTE BUT I CANNOT SAY WHAT THE POSITION WILL BE NEXT WEEK UNQUOTE.

4. COMMENT. EVEN THOUGH THE BOMBAST WAS UNDOUBTEDLY FOR MY BENEFIT, THE IRRITATION ABOUT OUR ABSTENTION APPEARED GENUINE ENOUGH. MR BOTHA WAS HOWEVER IN NO MOOD TO LISTEN TO ANY EXPLANATION OF OUR POSITION. THE MENTION OF CONTRACTS FOR THE FRENCH WAS, I SUSPECT, A GENUINE SLIP AND COULD REFER NOT ONLY TO FRANCE'S SUCCESS OVER THE BOILERS FOR MATIMBA BUT ALSO TO SOME AS YET UNDISCLOSED UNDERSTANDING WITH THE FRENCH ABOUT FUEL FOR KOEBERG. IN ANY EVENT, MR BOTHA'S REMARKS WOULD SUGGEST THAT COMMERCIAL COMPETITIVENESS MAY NOT BE ENOUGH TO ENSURE THAT WE SECURE THE TURBINES FOR MATIMBA OR STATION C. IT MAY NOW BE LATE IN THE DAY TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT THIS BUT I HOPE THAT THE IMPORTANCE TO BRITISH INDUSTRY OF FUTURE POWER STATION BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA WILL BE BORNE IN MIND WHEN TACTICS FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE ARE BEING DECIDED.

TITCHENER

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOUTHERN AFRICA STANDARD

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OADs  
M AND C D  
UND  
NAD  
WED  
ECD  
ES & SD  
CABINET OFFICE

SWA

1. Weld reports that considerable progress has been made in the last few days with the attempt to iron out differences between SA and the Western contact group on the future of SWA, which is encouraging at a time when the SA incursions into Angola have made things difficult. EEC sources say that the Americans told them last week that progress had been made after five months' worth of intensive discussions between SA and the US government. The progress was announced after there were fears last week that tension among the Western group could wreck their joint action on SWA. A British government spokesman said that he could not comment on the conditions and guarantees which SA had asked for, and suggested that this would be discussed when the five foreign ministers meet later this month. It is generally accepted that the progress is in fact a return to the position held by SA before contact with the five worsened seriously in 1978. One of SA's reasons for resuming talks about accepting 435 may be the greater confidence it has in the Reagan administration. SA's major difficulty in the past was the partiality of the UN, and the more realistic approach of the Reagan administration has made it possible for the US to play a decisive part in the search for an internationally acceptable solution.

SA/UK relations

2. Rapport (6.9) reports from London that relations between the SA government and the FCO are souring fast, and informed observers say that they have hit a low comparable to the days of the Labour government and Dr David Owen. If relations deteriorate further, Mr PW Botha and Mrs Thatcher will have to meet in order to avoid a crisis. The blame is laid on Lord Carrington; he and his department are making SA their scapegoat in Africa and accusing SA of furthering destabilisation by its across-border raids. It would appear that the FCO is keeping Mrs Thatcher at arms' length as far as Africa policy is concerned. Lord Carrington is so strong in the Conservative Party that he is not only allowed to go his own way, but there is practically nobody who will oppose him. Diplomatic circles frowned at the response from Sir Ian Gilmour to Mr Marais Steyn when he complained at the Granada programme; before Lord Carrington had been properly briefed about the Angolan incursion, he was one of the first foreign ministers to summarily condemn SA's

action. Lord Carrington is apparently quite clearly not very pleased with the Reagan administration's view of Southern African affairs, and he seems to think that SA's actions are so provocative that they play into the hands of the Communists. By having Britain abstain in the Security Council, he is trying to butter his bread on both sides, with black Africa being told that Britain wants to act as a bridge-builder and exert a moderating influence on America and its view of SA and its place in the world. Part of this "realism" would be to make the US understand that by openly inclining towards SA it would drive black Africa into a joint anti-Western huddle which would be to Russia's advantage. There are people close to Lord Carrington who would like to persuade the US that the Cubans and Communists are in Angola because the SADF is illegally in SWA, and not the other way around. Some of the harshest criticism of the direction being taken by the FCO comes from Mr John Carlisle, who sees the hand of the FCO behind Mr Heath's speech in Johannesburg. Mr Carlisle described the speech as unhelpful and an embarrassment for the Conservative government and Mrs Thatcher.

#### SAIIA congress

3. Rapport (6.9) says in a background article by a Coloured columnist that there was nothing really new in what Mr Heath said apart from the fact that he himself has said it. The French professor, De Montbrial, came closest to the truth and hit the hardest, and it took a philosopher to do it. He said that the trouble with SA is that our system of values is wrong. It is out of step with the West, and the values espoused, though not necessarily followed, by the Soviet Union are closer to the West's than are SA's, which seek to subordinate basic human dignity to the criteria of race and colour and to entrench this in law. Is this not enough of itself to make us look again at the basic values we apply to our coloured fellow-citizens and decide their lifestyles with by means of legislation? Or are the French, and indeed the Germans, English, Dutch and Americans, all out of step and we alone are 'right'?

## MAJOR CONTRACTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Matimba Power Station

! None of the prime contracts will now come to the UK. French, German and US companies have either been awarded contracts or letters of intent have been issued. Northern Engineering International (NEI) will however probably pick up sub-contract work worth between £50-£100 million.

Station C

GEC's efforts are now concentrated on the generators for station C for which they have a very good chance of being awarded the contract and which would be worth perhaps between £300-£400 million. GEC has been asked to revalidate its bid by 2 October. The Contract is likely to be awarded between the end of October and the middle of November.

Station D

Station D is likely to be a copy of Station C but is too far in the future for any estimate to be made of UK prospects.

RESTRICTED

**SUBJECT**

cc Master  
tops.

The pm replied on 12 October via 18/10

T 134A/81



Term. Ref. I.13/2

Republiek van Suid-Afrika • Republic of South Africa

Kantoor van die Eerste Minister  
Prime Minister's Office

Privaatsak X193  
Private Bag

Kaapstad  
Cape Town

8000

23 September 1981

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 134A/81


The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, M P  
Prime Minister  
LONDON

Dear Prime Minister

The South African Government learned with severe displeasure of the uncalled for remarks by Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington at the United Nations in connection with the internal policies of the Republic of South Africa. The South African Government is shocked that the Government of the United Kingdom should associate itself with a derogatory and counter-productive statement of this nature by the Ten.

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Yours sincerely

  
P W BOTHA

South Africa

IMMEDIATE

Pa

[~~SOUTH AFRICA~~] [ADVANCE COPIES]

16-17

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
MR DAY  
~~SIR A AGLAND~~  
SIR L ALLINSON  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MR P H MOBERLY  
HD/S AF D  
HD/C AF D  
HD/UND  
HD/DEFENCE D  
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A  
HD/NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

MR COLLINS DOT.  
MR R L WADE-GERY  
CABINET OFFICE  
NO 10. DOWNING STREET

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CG JOHANNESBURG 081520Z SEPT 81

TO IMMEDIATE EMBASSY CAPE TOWN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 12 OF 08 SEPTEMBER 1981

AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO, DEPT OF TRADE FOR REG COLLINS CRE 5

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TITCHENER



S. Africa  
Mo

RESTRICTED

GRS 265  
RESTRICTED  
FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 171520Z AUG 81  
TO PRIORITY F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 130 OF 17 AUGUST  
INFO SAVING CAPE TOWN(CG), JO'BURG, DURBAN.

MY TELNO 124: SQUATTERS

1. IN A CONCILIATORY MOVE ON 14 AUGUST THE MINISTER OF COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT ANNOUNCED THAT THE POSITION OF THOSE OF THE NYANGA SQUATTERS WHO WERE ILLEGALLY RESIDING IN THE CAPE, BUT WHO HAD EMPLOYMENT, WOULD BE LEGALISED. THOSE WITHOUT EMPLOYMENT WOULD BE OFFERED JOBS IN THE TRANSVAAL AND ORANGE FREE STATE. HOWEVER THOSE LEGALISED OR GIVEN JOBS ELSEWHERE WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE ALLOWED TO KEEP THEIR FAMILIES WITH THEM.
2. THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS FOLLOWED BY SOME RELAXATION IN OFFICIAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE SQUATTERS. OVER THE WEEKEND A NEW SQUATTER CAMP AT NYANGA SPRANG UP AS HOMELESS AND JOBLESS BLACKS FLOCKED TO THE AREA TO CASH IN ON THE JOB BONANZA AND TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE FREE FOOD AND CLOTHING BEING SUPPLIED BY RELIEF ORGANISATIONS. THERE ARE NOW ABOUT 2000 PEOPLE AT NYANGA, COMPARED TO ABOUT 400 BEFORE THE WEEKEND. MANY OF THE NEW ARRIVALS WERE UNDOUBTEDLY INVOLVED IN THE ORIGINAL EVICTIONS. OTHERS WERE ILLEGALLY SQUATTING ELSEWHERE IN THE CAPE PENINSULAR.
3. THE GOVERNMENT IS APPARENTLY CAUGHT IN A NO-WIN SITUATION. ON THE ONE HAND ENFORCEMENT OF INFLUX CONTROL AND HARASSMENT OF ILLEGAL SQUATTERS HAS PRODUCED AN OUTCRY AT HOME AND ABROAD. ON THE OTHER HAND CONCESSIONS HAVE LED TO AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBERS INVOLVED, WHICH WILL CREATE NEW PROBLEMS OF SANITATION AND HYGIENE. MOREOVER THE GOVERNMENT'S CONCESSIONS DO NOT TACKLE ONE OF THE PRIME CAUSES OF ILLEGAL RESIDENCE, NAMELY THE WISH OF FAMILIES TO LIVE WITH THE BREADWINNER.

PRETORIA REGY PSE PASS SAVING JO'BURG, DURBAN.

REID

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]  
[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

STANDARD	
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UND	ES & SD
NAD	CABINET OFFICE

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S Africa

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 85  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 141200Z  
FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 141000Z AUG 81  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 123 OF 14 AUGUST

MIPT

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT:-

WE, THE HEADS OF MISSION OF OPEN SQUARE BRACKETS HERE INSERT THE NAMES OF ALL THOSE COUNTRIES WHOSE GOVERNMENTS AGREE TO TAKE PART CLOSE SQUARE BRACKETS WISH TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERN ABOUT RECENT EVENTS IN THE NYANGA/CROSSROADS AREA WHICH ARE INCREASINGLY ENGAGING THE ATTENTION OF OUR GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLE.

WE APPEAL TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO GIVE HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS HIGH PRIORITY IN THEIR HANDLING OF THIS SITUATION.

REID

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOUTHERN AFRICA STANDARD

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ECD  
ES & SD  
CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 510

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 141200Z

FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 140955Z AUG 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 122 OF 14 AUGUST

MY TELNO 119 : SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ACTION AGAINST SQUATTERS.

1. IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING DEAN OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS, THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR (DORIN) YESTERDAY (13 AUGUST) CALLED A MEETING OF ALL HEADS OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS PRESENT IN CAPE TOWN AT WHICH HE PROPOSED THAT THEY SHOULD TAKE JOINT ACTION OVER THE RECENT CALLOUS TREATMENT OF SQUATTERS IN THE NYANGA AREA NEAR CAPE TOWN. IN ADDITION TO DORIN, THE MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY HEADS OF MISSION OF AUSTRALIA, BELGIUM, CANADA, GERMANY, GREECE, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES.
2. DORIN, WHO WAS ACTING ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS, SAID THAT COLLECTIVE ACTION MIGHT TAKE THE FORM EITHER OF A PROTEST OR APPEAL TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT, OR OF SOME PRACTICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE HOMELESS; OR BOTH. HE SAID THAT PUBLIC OPINION ABROAD WAS DEEPLY STIRRED. THERE WOULD BE AN OUTCRY IF, FOR EXAMPLE, A CHILD DIED FROM EXPOSURE. DORIN IS A COMPASSIONATE MAN WHO IS GENUINELY MOVED BY THE SUFFERINGS OF THE PEOPLE CONCERNED. BUT HE ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WOULD BE VALUABLE TO GOVERNMENTS, IN RESPONDING TO COMPLAINTS AND CRITICISMS, TO BE ABLE TO SAY THAT THEY HAD TAKEN SOME ACTION WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT.
3. IN DISCUSSION, THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT SOMETHING SHOULD BE DONE AND A MAJORITY WERE PREPARED TO AGREE THERE AND THEN TO A JOINT APPEAL TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. SEVERAL TOUGH DRAFTS WERE PROPOSED. THE US CHARGE D'AFFAIRES SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO AGREE TO AN QUOTE ACCUSATORY UNQUOTE FORM OF WORDS, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE CURRENT NAMIBIA NEGOTIATIONS. I SUPPORTED HIM. IN THE END, IT WAS AGREED THAT AN APPROACH TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE BRIEF, FOCUS ON HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS AND AVOID EXPOSING SURFACE TO ANY CHARGE OF FACTUAL INACCURACY OR ACCUSATION OF INTERFERENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. A MAJORITY THOUGHT THAT THE FACT OF HAVING MADE A COLLECTIVE APPROACH WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN WHAT IT SAID.
4. DORIN SAID THAT THERE WAS LITTLE POINT IN TAKING ACTION IF IT WAS NOT KNOWN. ON THE OTHER HAND ANY BENEFICIAL EFFECT THAT THE APPROACH MIGHT HAVE IN MOVING THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD BE LOST IF THEY THOUGHT WE WERE MERELY MANIPULATING PUBLICITY AGAINST THEM.

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5. EVENTUALLY THE BRIEF TEXT IN MIFT WAS AGREED AD REFERENDUM REPEAT AD REFERENDUM. THE PROPOSAL IS THAT DORIN SHOULD CALL ON FOURIE, READ THE AGREED TEXT AND LEAVE A COPY. DORIN WOULD VOLUNTEER NOTHING ABOUT RELEASING THE TEXT TO THE PUBLIC, AND, IF ASKED, WOULD SAY THAT THIS WOULD REST WITH GOVERNMENTS: HE WAS NOT RELEASING THE TEXT HERE NOW. THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE GOVERNMENTS WHICH AGREED TO JOIN IN WOULD BE THAT ANY OF THEM MIGHT SAY IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS THAT THEY HAD TAKEN ACTION WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT BUT WITHOUT SPECIFYING EXACTLY WHAT WAS SAID, OR IN WHOSE COMPANY.

6. DORIN IS ARRANGING FOR OTHER HEADS OF MISSION NOT NOW IN CAPE TOWN NOTABLY THOSE OF ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS, FINLAND AND BRAZIL TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO JOIN IN THE APPROACH. THERE IS TO BE A FINAL MEETING AT 1800Z ON 17 AUGUST TO FINALISE DETAILS. I RECOMMEND THAT YOU AGREE TO THE TEXT AND ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED FOR HANDLING IT. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS DESKBY 171400Z .

7. MY SECOND IFT REPORTS ON THE LATEST SITUATION AT NYANGA.

REID

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*Home Minister*

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TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 119 OF 12 AUGUST  
INFO WASHINGTON  
INFO SAVING BCG CAPE TOWN, BCG JOHANNESBURG, BC DURBAN

*M.P.*  
*13/*

**CAPE TOWN: POLICE ACTION AGAINST ILLEGAL BLACK RESIDENTS**

1. HARASSMENT OF THE HUNDREDS OF BLACKS MADE HOMELESS BY EVICTIONS NEAR CAPE TOWN (FALL'S LETTER 014/20 OF 24 JULY TO SPRAKE SAFD) CONTINUED YESTERDAY (11 AUGUST) WHEN ARMED POLICE AND OFFICIALS BURNED CRUDE SHELTERS ERECTED TO PROVIDE SOME PROTECTION FROM ONE OF THE COLDEST AND WETTEST WINTERS FOR YEARS.

*ms*

2. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SHELTERS TOOK PLACE ONLY HOURS BEFORE THE SITE WAS VISITED BY A US CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION. MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION WERE PREVENTED BY POLICE FROM TALKING TO THE HOMELESS BLACKS. IN A SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONFERENCE THEY DESCRIBED THE AUTHORITIES' ACTION AS INHUMAN AND BRUTAL (SEPARATE REPORT FOLLOWS ON THE VISIT AS A WHOLE).

3. ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE NOW CAMPING OUT ON THE OPEN GROUND BETWEEN CROSSROADS AND NYANGA VARY. KOORNHOF, THE MINISTER RESPONSIBLE, HAS REFERRED TO OVER 1000 PEOPLE (SEE PARA 7 BELOW) BUT OTHERS PUT THE FIGURE NEARER SEVERAL HUNDRED. THESE ARE MOSTLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN, FORMER ILLEGAL RESIDENTS OF THE LANGA BARRACKS EVICTED BY POLICE LAST MONTH. MOST SEEM TO HAVE BEEN IN THE CAPE FOR SOME YEARS.

4. THE AUTHORITIES CONTINUE TO ARREST, FINE AND IMPRISON THOSE ILLEGALLY IN THE CAPE. THOSE RELEASED AFTER BEING FINED OR IMPRISONED APPEAR TO PREFER TO REMAIN AND BRAVE THE ELEMENTS AND OFFICIAL HARASSMENT RATHER THAN FACE WORSE PRIVATION IN THEIR QUOTE HOMELANDS UNQUOTE ( IN MOST CASES THE TRANSKEI OR CISKEI). NONE SO FAR APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN FORCIBLY REMOVED TO THE HOMELANDS.

5. FOOD, CLOTHING, BATHS, MEDICAL ATTENTION AND LEGAL AID HAVE BEEN PROVIDED BY A VARIETY OF ORGANISATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS. HOWEVER, ALL WHITES, INCLUDING MPS, ARE NOW APPARENTLY BEING BARRED FROM ENTERING THE AREA.

6. THE OPPOSITION PROGRESSIVE FEDERAL PARTY HAVE BITTERLY CRITICISED THE GOVERNMENT OVER THE AFFAIR. HELEN SUZMAN DESCRIBED THE BURNING OF THE SHELTERS AS QUOTE ONE OF THE MOST SHAMEFUL EPISODES OF THE NATIONAL PARTY REGIME UNQUOTE.

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/ 7. KOORNHOF

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7. KOORNHOF SAID YESTERDAY THAT THE AFFAIR WAS BEING ORCHESTRATED IN ORDER TO WRECK INFLUX CONTROL. HE SAID THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE BLACKMAILED INTO ALLOWING THE CREATION OF NEW SQUATTER CAMPS. IT HAD A DUTY TO PROTECT LEGAL BLACK RESIDENTS OF THE CAPE, FOR WHOM, DESPITE GOVERNMENT EFFORTS, THERE WAS STILL NOT ENOUGH HOUSING OR JOBS. THE ILLEGAL RESIDENTS EVICTED FROM THE LANGA BARRACKS HAD BEEN WARNED TWO YEARS AGO THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO MOVE TO MAKE WAY FOR NEW HOUSING DEVELOPMENT.

8. OFFICIAL REMOVALS OF ILLEGAL RESIDENTS AND SQUATTERS' CAMPS OCCUR PERIODICALLY. KOORNHOF TOOK AN ENLIGHTENED COURSE IN 1979 WHEN HE LEGALISED THE CROSSROADS SQUATTERS. HIS DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN GRADUALLY MOVING THEM INTO NEW HOUSING. BUT IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT HE WILL FOLLOW THE SAME COURSE OVER THE NYANGA SQUATTERS.

9. THE CONTINUING SAGA OF THE SQUATTERS AND THE ATTENDANT PUBLICITY IS CAUSING UNEASE IN NATIONAL PARTY CIRCLES. TODAY'S PRO-GOVERNMENT PAPER DIE BURGER EXPRESSES MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE AUTHORITIES' ACTION WHICH IT SAYS HAS CREATED THE SORT OF PUBLICITY SOUTH AFRICA COULD DO WITHOUT.

PRETORIA REGISTRY PLEASE PASS SAVING TO JOHANNESBURG AND DURBAN.

REID

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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Duty Clerk - No. 10

*With the compliments of*

*Private Office*

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

LONDON, SW1A 2AH



Mr M Hayward  
Private Office.

*With the compliments of*

SAFD

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

LONDON, SW1A 2AH

23/7/81





Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01-233-5336

*SAfrica*  
*JS*  
*Shut*

Miss J McKnight  
Secretary of Customs and Excise Group  
Society of Civil and Public Servants  
124-130 Southwark Road  
LONDON SE10 2TU

Your reference

Our reference

JSU 087/10

Date

22 July 1981

*Dear Miss McKnight,*

EXPORT OF RADAR EQUIPMENT TO SOUTH AFRICA

I am sorry not to have replied earlier to your telegram of 29 April to the Prime Minister.

The equipment being loaded at Hurn Airport was in fact a consignment of radar air surveillance equipment destined for South Africa under an export licence issued by the Department of Trade.

The export of this equipment was approved by the present and previous Governments on the understanding that it is to be used in a combined civil and military air control system and involves no infringement of the United Nations arms embargo. We have no doubt that the system in question had a genuine civil application.

*Yours sincerely,*  
*Carol Lane*

Miss C A Lane  
Southern African Department

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*Sub Fred*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*MF*

11 June 1981

(4)

Dear Michael,

*vs. Ant*

*Prime Minister*

*Ant*

South Africa: Elections

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary thought that the Prime Minister might wish to read Mr Leahy's despatch on the recent General Election in South Africa, a copy of which is enclosed.

*yours ever*  
*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O D'B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1

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BRITISH EMBASSY  
PRETORIA

15 May 1981

SOUTH AFRICA'S GENERAL ELECTION: WHY THE EASY WINNER  
CANNOT TAKE ALL

## SUMMARY

1. South Africa's recent General Election (whites only) was no more than a qualified success for P W Botha. The governing National Party (NP) fought a confused campaign and although it predictably won an overwhelming majority of seats it shed support to left and right, particularly to the extreme right Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP). Mr Botha can claim to have won a personal mandate for himself, but he did not do as well as he must have hoped. (Paragraphs 1-7)

2. Mr Botha apparently intends to proceed with reform designed to strengthen the system of separate development (in particular new constitutional structures for coloureds and Asians, benefits for urban blacks, and economic development linking South Africa and the internal black "national states"). But he needs to proceed with caution in order to take his party with him. (Paragraphs 8-10)

3. The opposition Progressive Federal Party (PFP) picked up a few seats, but won no substantial support from Afrikaners. The NP alone will decide the pace and extent of reform. (Paragraph 11)

4. Blacks will have taken little comfort from the election. (Paragraph 12)

/5. The



5. The basic elements of the Namibia problem have not been changed and the Prime Minister will not want to expend his political capital on it. (Paragraph 13)

6. The future is difficult to predict. It is hard to believe that P W Botha can meet the rising expectations of the blacks on the one hand and overcome reactionary white resistance on the other. (Paragraph 14)

BRITISH EMBASSY  
PRETORIA

15 May 1981

The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington KCMG MC  
LONDON

My Lord

SOUTH AFRICA'S GENERAL ELECTION: WHY THE EASY WINNER  
CANNOT TAKE ALL

1. In the South African General Election on 29 April the National Party (NP) led by Mr P W Botha won 131 out of 165 seats. (details at annex). In British politics that would be a crushing victory of unheard of proportions. But in the strange world of South African politics it was a somewhat qualified success. Why? What will it mean for P W Botha's policies?
2. P W Botha called an early election partly because a large number of by-elections were pending in which the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) and other right extremists, were likely to do particularly well in low polls, and partly because he wanted to cash in on the economic boom before the downturn later in the year. Having succeeded Mr John Vorster a year after the 1977 election, P W Botha also wanted to secure a personal mandate to implement his policies of pragmatic reform. These policies are designed not to abolish but to strengthen the system of separate development by extending the political independence of the black homelands and uniting them eventually with the rest of South Africa in a confederation; by promoting the economic development of the whole country as a single economic unit and improving the conditions of the urban blacks; by reaching a constitutional accommodation with the coloureds and Asians; and by removing



"unnecessary" discrimination (ie petty apartheid).

3. The fact that so far there has been little to show for P W Botha's reforms has been mainly due to opposition from within his own party. The establishment in January 1981 of the President's Council, including coloureds and Asians but excluding blacks, was meant to help him overcome this opposition. But it looks as if he also calculated that he could best outflank the opponents within his own party by calling a snap election before the President's Council had made any recommendations and before he had decided on the detail of his own policies towards the blacks. Thus he would be able to win a mandate on the shadowy principle of reform without exposing surface with specific proposals.

4. Mr Botha won his mandate in terms of seats, but the election revealed ominous trends for him and his party. The NP shed support to left and to right. The opposition Progressive Federal Party (PFP), under their blossoming young Afrikaner leader Dr F van Zyl Slabbert, took most of the dozen seats that changed hands. But more disturbing for P W Botha was a haemorrhage of Afrikaner support to the HNP, which preaches a creed of uncompromising white supremacy, Afrikaner nationalism and emotive racism. The HNP failed - narrowly - to win a seat but took 14% of the votes cast, more than quadrupling the support it gained in the 1977 general election.

5. P W Botha and the NP lost ground because the snap election apparently caught his own much vaunted party machine unprepared, and because the NP campaign was confused. An attempt to re-create the atmosphere of the 1977 landslide by harping on a Soviet-

/inspired



inspired "total onslaught" against South Africa flopped. As opinion polls more and more revealed the strength of the HNP challenge, Ministers avoided mention of reform and fell back on traditional apartheid themes in order to refute HNP claims that they were "selling out to the blacks".

6. The NP's concern with the HNP threat left the PFP free to develop a well-researched campaign on economic issues, particularly inflation. A last minute government attempt to counter this threat was largely torpedoed by a much exploited gaffe by the Minister of Health who claimed in a press conference that white pensioners could live on a diet costing £11.30 a month.

7. By trying to be all things to all men the NP presented no clear message to the electorate. In contrast, the HNP's reassuring and simple policy of continued white "baaskap" (domination) appealed to confused and apprehensive Afrikaners. Tens of thousands defected to the HNP. Many others spoiled their ballot papers, or abstained. At the same time, many English-speakers, alienated by the reactionary tone of the government campaign and worried over economic issues, turned to the PFP when they might otherwise have voted for the NP.

8. What are the implications? First of all for the prospects of reform in this country. In February P W Botha said in Parliament:

"..... I have undertaken to do nothing that I do not intend to carry out.....What I said in public I would do I shall carry out as leader of this party, as long as I receive the grace and strength to lead."

/Following



Following the election, Mr Botha is apparently letting it be known that he does not intend to be deflected from this course. On 30 April he claimed that the election result was an endorsement of the Government's intention to "proceed with the President's Council" and to bring into being a constellation of southern African states. Within the next few months we may see proposals for new constitutional structures for coloureds and Asians, legislation improving the lot of urban blacks, and the establishment of a Southern Africa Development Bank linking South Africa and the internal black "national states".

9. It remains, however, uncertain whether P W Botha will be able to carry the NP with him along the road of reform. While there has been no split in the party, Afrikanerdom itself has been split. The HNP has become respectable and is no longer a refuge for the lunatic fringe. The election has not strengthened P W Botha's position as he hoped it would. His autocratic style and uncontrolled temper have left him with few friends - indeed if he were to slip up no one would reach out a hand to help. Many Afrikaners suspect his ultimate policy objectives. Other Afrikaner centres of power - the Broederbond, the civil service, the church - all have reservations about him. As a Cape Nationalist he is still mistrusted in conservative Transvaal, the NP's heartland. The composition of the NP caucus is largely unchanged by the election. Many of its members will now be looking over their shoulders at the threat from the HNP to their seats and thus their livelihood. There is already much talk of what will happen at the next General Election. Afrikaner politicians have vivid memories of earlier South African

/Governments





Governments overturned from their flanks. Only 10 years before D F Malan came to power in 1948 he and his small band of followers had been far out in a political wilderness on the right.

10. Meanwhile P W Botha is still in command. He leads a strong and apparently united Cabinet with all the resources of the state at his disposal and with powerful media support. For all that he will need to take care. If he moves too fast or rides roughshod over established NP procedures, his own position could be at risk. And he has not yet demonstrated that he can get his way in a trial of strength with his caucus. There is some speculation in the press and among politicians that P W Botha might create, and assume, the role of Executive President in an attempt to get round this problem. But it is too early to judge how much credence to give this.

#### The Opposition

11. Despite the increase in its Parliamentary representation the PFP still has only a fifth of the number of seats held by the NP, and remains primarily an urban, middle class, English-speaking party. It has no prospect of forming an alternative government unless it picks up substantial support from Afrikaners, which it has shown no sign of doing. The PFP will be a more effective opposition than before and will continue to press for what it regards as real reform. But the pace and extent of change will be decided by the NP alone and the Government will be less worried by the aggression of their opponents than by the threat of defection of their supporters.

#### The Blacks

12. Articulate politically-conscious black opinion viewed the



election with a mixture of resentment and indifference. To them it was not about the real issue, namely consultation with valid representative blacks leading to a genuine sharing of power. They know that this is the one thing that cannot be expected from P W Botha. Among less politically-minded blacks there may still be some residual goodwill towards him, in that they may expect some benefits from him even if only economic. But they will have taken little comfort from the reversion to old apartheid themes in the election. P W Botha will have to move quickly if he is to maintain or increase this goodwill.

#### Namibia

13. The election changes none of the basic elements of the Namibia problem. I believe that P W Botha would like to get the matter settled but, unless the Americans can persuade him otherwise, he is unlikely to give it a high priority for the expenditure of his scarce political capital.

#### The Future

14. Prediction is exceptionally hazardous. My guess is that P W Botha is heartily glad to have got the General Election out of the way and will now press ahead with his characteristic energy and enthusiasm. He might - just - succeed in constructing a confederation and in getting coloured and Asian Parliamentary representation. He is likely to carry through reforms designed to benefit the urban blacks. But it is hard to believe that he will succeed in meeting the rising expectations of the black community on the one hand, and overcoming the resistance of deeply entrenched reactionary white opinion on the other. The General Election has not significantly affected the march of



events. The realities are growing black power and increasing disunity and apprehension among the whites.

15. I am copying this despatch to the British High Commissioners at Maseru, Mbabane, Gaborone, Salisbury and Lusaka; to HM Ambassadors at Maputo, Luanda, Washington, Paris, Bonn and Ottawa; and to the United Kingdom Permanent Representative at New York.

I am, My Lord,  
yours faithfully

*John Leakey*



## ANNEX

## SOUTH AFRICAN GENERAL ELECTION - 29 APRIL 1981

## RESULTS

Party	Total number of seats <sup>(1)</sup>	Total number of votes	% of total votes <sup>(2)</sup>
National Party (NP)	131 (122)	771,925	57
Progressive Federal Party (PFP)	26 (17)	256,578	19
New Republic Party (NRP)	8 (8)	105,933	8
Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP)	- (-)	191,456	14
National Conservative Party (NCP)	- (-)	16,691	1
Independent	- (-)	3,895	1
TOTAL	165 (148)	1,346,478	100

NOTES: (1) Figures in brackets indicate number of seats held by each party at dissolution of Parliament (26 February 1981). There were also 17 vacant seats. Figures do not include nominated MPs.

(2) Percentage figures rounded.



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*from Munich Africa*  
*for...*  
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FM WASHINGTON 161655Z MAY 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1522 OF 16 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRIORITY PARIS, BONN,  
OTTAWA, LUANDA, LAGOS, LUSAKA, SALISBURY, GABORONE, DAR ES SALAAM,  
INFO SAVING ADDIS ABABA.

FOR RESIDENT CLERK: PLEASE INFORM BARDER (SAFD)

PIK BOTHA'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

1. CROCKER BRIEFED THE WASHINGTON CONTACT GROUP ON 15 MAY ABOUT  
PIK BOTHA'S TALKS HERE. THE AMERICANS THOUGHT THESE HAD GONE REAS-  
ONABLY WELL.

2. NAMIBIA. IN 3 HOURS OF MEETINGS WITH BOTHA, HAIG MADE IT CLEAR  
THAT THE US WANTED TO TREAT ITS RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA IN A  
MORE POSITIVE SPIRIT. BUT THIS HAD TO BE RECIPROCATED: PARTICULARLY  
OVER NAMIBIA. THE SOUTH AFRICANS MUST GENUINELY COMMIT THEMSELVES  
TO A SEARCH FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT:  
THE US WOULD NOT INVOLVE ITSELF IN FURTHER FRUITLESS NEGOTIATIONS.  
HAIG INSISTED THAT PIK BOTHA MUST OBTAIN HIS CABINET'S CLEAR COMMIT-  
MENT TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES. PIK BOTHA  
WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT SUCH A COMMITMENT WOULD BE FORTHCOMING: HE  
ACCEPTED THAT THE BALL WAS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN COURT.

3. BOTHA SAID THAT SOUTH AFRICA WOULD NOT ACCEPT A MARXIST GOVERN-  
MENT IN WINDHOEK: (CROCKER ADDED THAT THE US SHARED THIS VIEW).  
HOWEVER HE HAD NOT RULED OUT SOUTH AFRICAN ACQUIESCENCE IN A SWAPO  
VICTORY, SUBJECT TO SATISFACTORY CONSTITUTIONAL ASSURANCES, GUARANT-  
EES OF NEUTRALITY AND A FAIR TRANSITION.

4. ON THE TRANSITION, THE SOUTH AFRICANS MAINTAINED THAT IN ITS  
PRESENT FORM UNTAG WAS UNACCEPTABLE. THEY ARGUED THAT THE FORCE  
SHOULD NOT WEAR A UN UNIFORM: (COMMENT: IN REPLY TO OUR QUESTIONS  
ON THIS, IT APPEARS THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NOT DISCOVERED WHETHER  
THE SOUTH AFRICANS WANTED A WHOLLY CIVILIAN UNTAG OR COULD ACCEPT  
A MILITARY TRANSITION FORCE DISTANCED FROM THE UN).

5. ON GUARANTEES, BOTHA ACCEPTED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR  
SOUTH AFRICA TO BECOME A FORMAL GUARANTOR IN THE SENSE THAT IT WOULD  
HAVE A LEGAL RIGHT OF INTERVENTION AND ENFORCEMENT IN NAMIBIA. HE  
THOUGHT THAT SOUTH AFRICA'S CONTROL OF WALVIS BAY, OF COMMUNICATIONS,  
ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY ETC. WOULD ENABLE SOUTH AFRICA IN PRACTICE  
TO ENSURE NAMIBIAN GOOD BEHAVIOUR SIMPLY BY ITS WITH-HOLDING POWER,  
BUT HE WANTED SOME FORM OF INTERNATIONAL APPROVAL FOR THE EXERCISE  
OF THIS WITH-HOLDING POWER.

6. BOTHA HAD BEEN RELAXED ON THE QUESTION OF HOW FAR THE CONSTITUT-  
ION SHOULD BE WORKED OUT IN FINE DETAIL. HE ACCEPTED THE US ARGUM-  
ENT THAT THE CONSTITUTION MUST NOT RESEMBLE TOO CLOSELY THE MULTI-  
LAYERED TURNHALLE ARRANGEMENTS. HE SAID THAT SOUTH AFRICA WAS  
MORE CONCERNED ABOUT ENSURING COMPLIANCE (IE GUARANTEES) THAN  
ABOUT THE FINE PRINT.

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7. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CABINET IS DUE TO MEET EARLY NEXT WEEK (BEGINNING 19 MAY) TO CONSIDER BOTHA'S REPORT. THE AMERICANS TOLD HIM THAT THEY WOULD EXPECT A COMMITMENT TO ACHIEVING A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT AND A FIRM UNDERTAKING THAT SOUTH AFRICA WOULD ALLOW THE INDEPENDENCE PROCESS TO GO AHEAD ONCE ITS SPECIFIED CONCERNS HAD BEEN MET. THE AMERICANS WOULD WANT THESE CONCERNS SPELLED OUT AND THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF ADDING TO THEM.

8. ZIMBABWE, AT OUR SUGGESTION, HAIG HAD RAISED THE DETERIORATING RELATIONS BETWEEN ZIMBABWE AND SOUTH AFRICA. THE US VALUED ITS RELATIONS WITH ZIMBABWE AND WAS UNHAPPY AT THE HOSTILITY BETWEEN PRETORIA AND SALISBURY. BOTHA SHRUGGED THIS OFF - HIS GOVERNMENT WAS NO LONGER ESCALATING ITS HOSTILE RHETORIC, WHICH HE SAID HAD TO SOME EXTENT REFLECTED DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONCERNS, FUELLED BY WHITE EMIGRANTS FROM ZIMBABWE.

9. ANGOLA. THE AMERICANS AND SOUTH AFRICANS AGREED THAT THERE WAS AN EMPIRICIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROBLEMS OF NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA SAVIMBI MUST NOT BE SACRIFICED IN ANY NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT. BUT BOTH SIDES ACCEPTED THAT THE NAMIBIAN EFFORT MUST BE PRESSED AHEAD FIRST ON ITS OWN MERITS. THEY ALSO AGREED THAT PUBLIC COMMENTS SUGGESTING A FORMAL LINKAGE BETWEEN CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA AND A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT WOULD BE UNHELPFUL. (COMMENT: AN UNNAMED ADMINISTRATION SOURCE WAS REPORTED IN THE WASHINGTON STAR OF 15 MAY AS HAVING REFERRED TO THAT PRECISE LINKAGE.)

10. BOTHA HAD A 30 MINUTE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, MOST OF WHICH WAS GIVEN UP TO A REPEAT OF BOTHA'S WELL-REHEARSED QUOTE AFRICA IS DYING UNQUOTE ACT. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE US WANTED A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT AND WOULD ALSO SUPPORT FURTHER POLITICAL CHANGES INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF.

11. COMMENT. IT IS NOT IMMEDIATELY CLEAR TO WHAT EXTENT BOTHA WAS CONVINCED THAT SOUTH AFRICAN CO-OPERATION OVER NAMIBIA MAY BE A PREREQUISITE FOR IMPROVED BILATERAL RELATIONS. BUT IT IS OBVIOUSLY HELPFUL THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS SHOULD HAVE BEEN TOLD AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL THAT US/SOUTH AFRICAN FRIENDSHIP IS A TWO-WAY STREET, AND WHEN THE CABINET MEETS NEXT WEEK, IT SHOULD AT LEAST HAVE A CLEARER VIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S REFUSAL AUTOMATICALLY TO SUPPORT WHATEVER COURSE SOUTH AFRICA DECIDES UPON. WHETHER THIS WILL BE ENOUGH TO EXTRACT A MORE CO-OPERATIVE APPROACH FROM PRETORIA REMAINS UNCERTAIN, AND BOTHA'S REMARKS ABOUT THE COMPOSITION OF UNTAG SUGGEST THAT THE PRESSURES AGAINST A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT REMAIN STRONG.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDIS ABABA

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HENDERSON

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SOUTHERN AFRICA STANDARD

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**Foreign and Commonwealth Office document**

Reference DIPLOMATIC REPORT No. 165/81  
Description SOUTH AFRICA'S GENERAL  
ELECTION: WHY THE EASY WINNER  
CANNOT TAKE ALL  
Date 15 May 1981

The above FCO document, which was enclosed on this file has been removed and destroyed.

Such documents are the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. When released they are available in the appropriate FCO CLASSES.

Signed AWayland Date 18 October 2012

**PREM Records Team**



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IMMEDIATE

Del/cby 301030Z

(Received 10131:  
301140Z)

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DESKBY 301030Z

FM PRETORIA 301005Z APR 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 135 OF 30 APRIL 1981

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO ROUTINE GABORONE, MASERU, MBABANE, SALISBURY, JOHANNESBURG,  
INFO SAVING CONSULATE-GENERAL CAPE TOWN AND CONSULATE DURBAN.

## SOUTH AFRICAN GENERAL ELECTION.

1. WITH RESULTS IN 34 OF THE 165 SEATS STILL TO COME IN (1100 HRS LOCAL) THE NATIONAL PARTY (NP) HAVE WON 102, THE PROGRESSIVE FEDERAL PARTY (PFP) 24 AND THE NEW REPUBLIC PARTY (NRP) 5. COMPUTER PREDICTIONS OF THE FINAL RESULT GIVE THE NP 135 SEATS, THE SAME NUMBER THEY WON IN THE LAST ELECTION IN NOVEMBER 1977.
2. THE PFP HAVE DONE BETTER THAN MOST PEOPLE EXPECTED WINNING SEATS FROM THE NP (DEFEATING DR DAWIE DE VILLIERS, THE MINISTER OF INDUSTRIES, COMMERCE AND TOURISM IN A CAPE TOWN CONSTITUENCY) AND THE NRP. THEY HAVE SO FAR POLLED 23% OF THE VOTES CAST. THE NRP HAVE LOST SEATS BOTH TO THE PFP AND THE NP BUT WILL REMAIN IN BEING AS A PARLIAMENTARY PARTY : THEY ARE ALSO LIKELY TO RETAIN CONTROL OF THE NATAL PROVINCIAL COUNCIL.
3. NEITHER OF THE PARTIES OF THE EXTREME RIGHT THE HERSTIGTE

3. NEITHER OF THE PARTIES OF THE EXTREME RIGHT, THE HERSTIGTE NASIONALE PARTY (HNP) AND THE NATIONAL CONSERVATIVE PARTY (NCP), HAVE SO FAR WON ANY SEATS AND ARE UNLIKELY TO DO SO. BOTH PARTY LEADERS HAVE BEEN DEFEATED. BUT THE PERCENTAGE OF VOTES FOR THE HNP HAS RISEN TO NEARLY 13% AND NATIONAL PARTY MAJORITIES IN MANY SEATS HAVE BEEN SEVERELY REDUCED BY THEIR INTERVENTION.

4. THIS IS A MIXED RESULT FOR P W BOTHA. IF HE WINS 135 SEATS OUT OF 165 IT CANNOT BE DESCRIBED AS ANYTHING BUT AN OVERWHELMING VICTORY. HE CAN CLAIM TO HAVE EMERGED WITH HIS OWN MANDATE AND TO HAVE FOUGHT OFF THE IMMEDIATE THREAT FROM THE HNP. HE HAS, HOWEVER, CLEARLY LOST SUPPORT WITHIN THE AFRIKANER COMMUNITY TO THE EXTREME RIGHT : AND THE PFP HAVE STRENGTHENED THEIR POSITION IN ENGLISH-SPEAKING URBAN AREAS.

5. I SHALL SEND A SEPARATE ASSESSMENT LATER OF THE PROBABLE EFFECT OF THIS RESULT ON P W BOTHA'S POLICIES. HIS IMMEDIATE REACTION THIS MORNING WAS THAT THE NP HAD ENOUGH PUBLIC SUPPORT TO CONTINUE UNDAUNTED. HE WOULD NOT BE DIVERTED FROM HIS CHOSEN PATH.

LEAHY

NNNN

TO C480806

TO DAVID NEW YORK

TO LEO DEBRA 387231

TO 689/38

TO 6 818/18

TRANS TO FCO on 1/5/81 file

dl

Deal with as regards embargo: but PR?



Mr. McKnight

2/6/81

S. Africa 17/6

we should see a copy 10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 April 1981

of the reply.

Phil

Yes, please,

Phil

Arms Embargo on South Africa

I enclose a copy of a telegram received here early yesterday evening and about which I have spoken to you on the telephone. I should be grateful for early advice as to the facts. I should also be grateful if you would send a reply to Mr. McKnight on the Prime Minister's behalf, and let us have a copy for our records here at No.10.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Roderic Lyne (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Brian Norbury, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

② 22/6

③ 29/6

④ 6/7

AS letter 14/7  
NB. Transferred to  
FCO on 1/5/81

FCO: ② 20/7

P.R. 29/5

1/6

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889113 PO SW G  
299992 PO TS G  
J131 LONDON T 56/54 29 1512

THE PRIME MINISTER 10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1

IS PRIME MINISTER AWARE OF HERCULES PLANE CURRENTLY AT HURN  
AIRPORT CONTAINING MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR EXPORT TO  
SOUTH AFRICA STOP IS THIS NOT IN CONTRAVENTION OF UN INTERNATIONAL  
ARMES EMBARGO OF SOUTH AFRICA?

J MCKNIGHT GR0PXXXXX GROUP SECRETARY CUSTOMS AND EXCISE  
GROUP SOCIETY OF CIVIL AND PUBLIC SERVANTS

COL 10 SW1

299992 PO TS G  
889113 PO SW G



S. Africa

GRS 430

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FM PRETORIA 281000Z APR 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 128 OF 28 APRIL 1981.

GENERAL ELECTION

1. ON THE EVE OF THE GENERAL ELECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA TOMORROW (29 APRIL) I SEE NO REASON TO CHANGE MY GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN AND OF ITS LIKELY OUTCOME AS SET OUT IN MY LETTER OF 3 APRIL TO DEREK DAY, NAMELY THAT THE GOVERNMENT MAY LOSE SOME OF THE POPULAR VOTE BUT WILL RETAIN THEIR OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS.

2. IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS OF THE CAMPAIGN ECONOMIC ISSUES (NOTABLY INFLATION) HAVE COME TO THE FORE. THE NATIONAL PARTY (NP) ORGANISATION HAS BEEN FORCED TO DEVOTE MUCH EFFORT TO REFUTING OPPOSITION CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC POLICIES. THE NP HAVE NOT BEEN HELPED BY A FEW ILL-CHOSEN WORDS BY THE MINISTER OF HEALTH AT A PRESS CONFERENCE TO THE EFFECT THAT A PENSIONER COULD SURVIVE ON A DIET COSTING TWENTY RAND (£11.30) PER MONTH. THE OPPOSITION PRESS HAVE SEIZED ON THIS TO DEMONSTRATE HOW AFTER 33 YEARS OF NATIONAL PARTY RULE THE GOVERNMENT HAVE LOST TOUCH WITH THE REALITIES OF EVERYDAY LIFE. IT MAY COST THE NP SOME VOTES AND COULD HELP TO TIP THE BALANCE AGAINST THEM IN A FEW CONSTITUENCIES WHERE THEY ARE RUNNING NECK AND NECK WITH THE PROGRESSIVE FEDERAL PARTY (PFP), WHO FROM THE OUTSET HAS BASED THEIR CAMPAIGN ON ATTACKING GOVERNMENT MISMANAGEMENT.

3. THE NP'S MAIN CONCERN, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN TO AVOID BEING OUTFLANKED BY THE EXTREME RIGHT IN THE SHAPE OF THE HERSTIGTE NASIONALE PARTY (HNP). FOR THIS PURPOSE THEY HAVE GONE OUT OF THEIR WAY TO UNDERLINE THAT THEY ARE SECOND TO NONE IN CHAMPIONING THE WHITE MAN'S CAUSE. THEIR SPOKESMEN HAVE PUT GREATER EMPHASIS ON MAKING FAST THAN MAKING CHANGE. IT HAS BEEN DEPRESSING TO HEAR RELATIVELY ENLIGHTENED MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT, SUCH AS DR KOORNHOF, EXPLAINING DEFENSIVELY AT PUBLIC MEETINGS HOW MUCH BETTER OFF UNDER THE NP THE WHITES ARE THAN THE BLACKS. THE QUESTION ARISES WHETHER AND IF SO HOW SOON AFTER SUCH A CAMPAIGN THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE ABLE TO CLAIM HE HAS A

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/MANDATE

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MANDATE FOR CHANGE AND GET BACK ON TO THE REFORMING TRAIL. I HOPE AND BELIEVE SO. ABOVE ALL, WILL THE RESULT OF THE ELECTION MAKE HIM ANY MORE INCLINED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS OVER NAMIBIA ? I DOUBT IT. BUT I WILL BE BETTER PLACED TO ANSWER BOTH QUESTIONS AS SOON AS THE DUST HAS SETTLED AFTER TOMORROW.

LEAHY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOUTHERN AFRICA STANDARD

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TO MODUK

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*South Africa*

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FM PRETORIA 161440Z MAR 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 62 OF 16 MARCH 81

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MODUK

*mw*

VISIT BY SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE OFFICERS TO WASHINGTON.

1. THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE PRESS TODAY (16 MARCH) REPORTS PROMINENTLY THAT FIVE SENIOR SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY OFFICERS ARE ON THEIR WAY BACK TO SOUTH AFRICA HAVING HAD TO CUT SHORT, AFTER FOUR DAYS, A VISIT TO WASHINGTON. OUR EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON WILL NO DOUBT BE TELEGRAPHING A FULL ACCOUNT BUT, ACCORDING TO THE PRESS HERE, THE SOUTH AFRICAN OFFICERS, WHO WENT TO WASHINGTON AS GUESTS OF THE "VERY CONSERVATIVE" (AND NON-OFFICIAL) AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL, DID NOT DISCLOSE THEIR MILITARY STATUS WHEN APPLYING FOR VISAS, AND ACCORDING TO THE REPORT REPRESENTED THEMSELVES AS CIVILIAN OFFICIALS TRAVELLING TO WASHINGTON FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY. AFTER ARRIVAL HOWEVER THEY HAD MEETINGS WITH PENTAGON AND NSC OFFICIALS, CONGRESSIONAL AIDES AND POSSIBLY WITH A CABINET MINISTER, TO WHOM THEY GAVE BRIEFINGS ON THE SOVIET THREAT TO SOUTHERN AFRICA. STATE DEPARTMENT SOURCES ARE QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE TRUE NATURE OF THE GROUP WAS ONLY DISCOVERED WHEN THEY ARRIVED ON 13 MARCH FOR A MEETING AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT, WHERE REAR ADMIRAL DU PLESSIS WAS RECOGNISED. RAPID CONSULTATIONS THEN APPARENTLY TOOK PLACE AS A RESULT OF WHICH THE GROUP WERE ASKED TO LEAVE. THE PRESS SPECULATE THAT THE INCIDENT "IS CERTAIN TO TRIGGER A SHOW-DOWN BETWEEN RIVAL FACTIONS FIGHTING OVER PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN'S NEW AFRICA POLICY". THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD BANNED OFFICIAL LEVEL MILITARY MEETINGS WITH SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1963; THEY DESCRIBED THE SOUTH AFRICANS' FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THEMSELVES AS MILITARY OFFICERS WHEN APPLYING FOR VISAS AS "JUST SHORT OF FRAUDULENT".

2 THE AMERICAN DEFENCE ATTACHE (PLEASE PROTECT) HAS

SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1963 ; THEY DESCRIBED THE SOUTH AFRICANS,  
FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THEMSELVES AS MILITARY OFFICERS WHEN APPLYING  
FOR VISAS AS "JUST SHORT OF FRAUDULENT".

2. THE AMERICAN DEFENCE ATTACHE (PLEASE PROTECT) HAS  
CONFIRMED TO MINE THAT THREE OF THE SADF OFFICERS CONCERNED ARE  
LIEUTENANT GENERAL P W VAN DER WESTHUIZEN, CHIEF OF STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE SADF, REAR ADMIRAL N A DU PLESSIS FORMERLY SOUTH  
AFRICAN DEFENCE ATTACHE IN WASHINGTON AND NOW WITH THE NATIONAL  
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (HE WAS PNG'D IN APRIL 1979 FOLLOWING THE  
US SPY PLANE INCIDENT HERE) AND BRIGADIER C J VAN TONDER OF THE  
SADF INTELLIGENCE STAFF. THE AMERICAN DEFENCE ATTACHE SAID THAT  
DURING THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION HE HAD BEEN APPROACHED FOR A VISA  
FOR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN BUT HAD REPLIED THAT AN APPLICATION AT THAT  
TIME WOULD BE TURNED DOWN. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS  
SHOULD WAIT UNTIL THE ELECTION RESULTS WERE KNOWN AND IF THERE WERE  
A CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATION TO APPLY AGAIN, BUT NOT TOO SOON.  
IN THE EVENT, HOWEVER, NO FURTHER APPROACH WAS MADE TO THE  
AMERICAN DEFENCE ATTACHE AND VISA APPLICATIONS WERE SENT IN AS  
DESCRIBED. EVEN SO, THE AMERICAN EMBASSY UNDOUBTEDLY MISSED A  
TRICK IN FAILING TO SPOT WHO THEY WERE.

LEAHY

BT

IMMEDIATE

NNNN



PRIME MINISTER

Humphry Berkeley rang from Johannesburg. He reported that he had been to the Transkei, and had returned safely. He had had a private meeting with Chief George Matanzima, who had agreed in principle to an out-of-court settlement. The relevant legal advisers will meet early next week with a view to concluding such a settlement by the end of the week.

Mr. Berkeley said that he had no doubt in his own mind that your intervention had been the decisive factor, and that he was most grateful for your personal interest.

4 March 1981

~~MOABA~~  
 Do you want to write  
 again to Mr B?  
 (if not, re M/A 13/13)

IMMEDIATE

D/B 300900Z

PS

PS/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

MR DAY

SIR A ACLAND

SIR L ALLINSON

LORD N G LENNOX

MR P H MOBERLY

HD/S AF D

HD/C AF D

HD/UND

HD/DEFENCE D

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

HD/NEWS D

MR R L WADE-GERY  
CABINET OFFICE

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

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South Africa

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DESKBY 300900Z

FM PRETORIA 291520Z JAN 81

ADVANCE COPY

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 041 OF 29 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK AND CAPE TOWN

Read in full.

CAPE TOWN TELNO 25: GENERAL ELECTION

FROM AMBASSADOR TEMPORARILY IN PRETORIA.

1. THE ONLY REASON WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER GAVE FOR HIS DECISION TO CALL AN EARLY GENERAL ELECTION WAS THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF BY-ELECTIONS ARE PENDING (MANY AS A RESULT OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL) AND THAT IT WOULD BE WASTEFUL TO HOLD THESE ELECTIONS SOON WHEN A LARGE NUMBER OF SEATS WOULD HAVE DIFFERENT BOUNDARIES AT THE NEXT GENERAL ELECTION BECAUSE OF THE REDRAWING OF CONSTITUENCY BOUNDARIES.

2. THE REAL REASONS ARE PROBABLY AS FOLLOWS:

A. P W BOTHA SUCCEEDED VORSTER LESS THAN A YEAR AFTER THE LATTER'S OVERWHELMING VICTORY IN NOVEMBER 1977. BOTHA HAS FOR SOME TIME BEEN SAID TO BE WANTING HIS OWN MANDATE TO STRENGTHEN HIS HAND IN PUTTING THROUGH A PROGRAMME OF REFORMS. HOW MUCH INFLUENCE HE WILL BE ABLE TO EXERT ON THE NOMINATIONS OF NATIONAL PARTY CANDIDATES, WHICH ARE JEALOUSLY GUARDED BY

HOW MUCH INFLUENCE HE WILL BE ABLE TO EXERT ON THE NOMINATIONS OF NATIONAL PARTY CANDIDATES, WHICH ARE JEALOUSLY GUARDED BY THE CONSTITUENCY ORGANISATIONS, REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

- B. P W BOTHA MAY HAVE SEEN NO PROSPECT OF CARRYING HIS CAUCUS WITH HIM IN ANY PROPOSALS FOR REFORM IF THE CURRENT PARLIAMENTARY SESSION HAD RUN ITS NORMAL COURSE. THE CALLING OF AN EARLY GENERAL ELECTION CREATES A DIVERSION OBSCURING THIS EMBARRASSMENT. HE CAN STOP THE GAME BY KICKING THE BALL INTO TOUCH. THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL, WHICH WILL CONTINUE ITS WORK UNAFFECTED BY THE GENERAL ELECTION, IS LIKELY TO HAVE RECOMMENDATIONS TO PUT FORWARD TO PARLIAMENT WHEN IT REASSEMBLES, PROBABLY FROM AUGUST TO OCTOBER.
- C. P W BOTHA MAY HAVE JUDGED THAT THE OPPOSITION'S MORALE, ELECTORAL APPEAL AND FINANCES PUT THEM AT A DISADVANTAGE IN FIGHTING AN EARLY GENERAL ELECTION. IT IS WIDELY EXPECTED THAT THE PFP WILL NOT DO WELL. PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANTLY HE MAY THINK THAT THE EXTREME RIGHT HNP WOULD HAVE DONE WELL IN SOME OF THE BY-ELECTIONS BUT WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO MAKE MUCH OF A SHOWING IN THE GENERAL ELECTION.
- E. SOME OF THE SHINE WILL HAVE RUBBED OFF THE ECONOMY LATER IN THE YEAR.

3. P W BOTHA'S ANNOUNCEMENT EXPLAINS THE LACK OF CONTENT OF THE STATE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH (CAPE TOWN TELNO 20) AND THE GENERALLY HARDLINE ATTITUDE WHICH HE HAS TAKEN RECENTLY OVER THE CLOSURE OF NEWSPAPERS AND THE BANNING OF INDIVIDUALS, ALL OF WHICH HELP TO PROJECT HIM AS A TRADITIONAL NATIONAL PARTY LEADER READY TO ACT VIGOROUSLY IN DEFENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY. WE WILL HEAR MUCH MORE FROM HIM IN THE CAMPAIGN ABOUT CLOSING WHITE RANKS AGAINST THE GROWING MARXIST THREAT AND MUCH LESS ABOUT MAKING CONCESSIONS TO THE BLACKS. HE WILL BE SEEKING TO OUTFLANK THE CONSERVATIVE RIGHT, NOT (NOT) THE LIBERAL OPPOSITION.

4. THE QUESTION ARISES WHETHER THE SOUTH AFRICANS' PERFORMANCE AT THE GENEVA PIM WAS PART OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S STRATEGY. I CAN ONLY SAY THAT IF IT WAS NOT, IT FITS IN WITH IT REMARKABLY WELL. THE FEELING THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN/INTERNAL PARTY DELEGATION DID WELL AT GENEVA AND IN SO DOING SERVED SOUTH AFRICA'S BEST INTERESTS IS WIDESPREAD HERE AND NOT CONFINED TO GOVERNMENT SUPPORTERS. COCKING SNOOKS AT THE U.N. IS A VOTE-CATCHER, IF ONLY A MINOR ONE. THE TIMING IS ALSO FAVOURABLE IN THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE CREDIT FOR CONTINUED FIRM RESISTANCE TO THE U.N. AND TO OUTSIDE PRESSURE GENERALLY AT THE

ONLY A MINOR ONE. THE TIMING IS ALSO FAVOURABLE IN THAT THE  
RPRIME MINISTER WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE CREDIT FOR CONTINUED FIRM  
RESISTANCE TO THE U.N. AND TO OUTSIDE PRESSURE GENERALLY AT THE  
SAME TIME AS IMMEDIATE PRESSURE FROM THE AMERICANS IS RELAXED AND  
THE THREAT OF SANCTIONS FURTHER REMOVED. IF THE ELECTION HAD BEEN  
HELD LATER IN THE YEAR THE SAME FAVOURABLE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD  
HAVE BEEN UNLIKELY TO PREVAIL; AND THOUGH IN THAT EVENT HE WOULD  
NOT HAVE HESITATED TO FIGHT A JINGOISTIC ELECTION CAMPAIGN AGAINST  
THE THREE CORNERS OF THE WORLD I DO NOT THINK THAT IS WHAT HE  
REALLY WANTS. IF POSSIBLE HE MEANS TO LEAVE HIMSELF ROOM FOR  
MANOEUVRING BACK ON TO A MORE REFORMING PATH AFTER THE ELECTION.  
ALL THIS HE WILL HOPE TO DO WITHOUT ALLOWING THE ELECTION TO  
FORECLOSE ANY OPTIONS ON NAMIBIA ITSELF.

EVANS

NNNN



(4)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

---

You may, following your conversation with Lunsdale van der Poort, like to glance through these reports from our Embassy.

Ant

NT.

19 Ant - 17/3

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 80

28 JAN 1981

DEPT. OFFICER	DATE
INDEX	FILE

BRITISH EMBASSY  
PARLIAMENT STREET, CAPE TOWN

15 January 1981

SOUTH AFRICA: ANNUAL REVIEW 1980

SUMMARY

1. A year of much activity, but less action. The Prime Minister consolidated his hold over the Government but made little headway in the ruling National Party. The present state of the party inhibits change and there were indications that the Prime Minister was trying to find ways of bypassing it.

(Paragraphs 1-4)

2. How far the Prime Minister wants to push reform is still uncertain. A confederation of self-governing states linked by some kind of common nationality, coupled with the "uplifting" of the urban blacks, seems to be his ultimate objective.

(Paragraphs 5-6)

3. To some observers 1980 was a year of preparation for reforms to come. To others it was a year of marking time and lost opportunities. Most whites seemed willing to give the Prime Minister a chance. (Paragraphs 6-7)

4. On the other hand the blacks by and large were not impressed. (Paragraph 8)

5. But they began to flex their muscles in the field of industrial relations and there is likely to be trouble ahead here. (Paragraphs 9-10)

/6. A bumper,



6. A bumper, booming year for the economy. However, there are problems here too - notably the level of inflation and the shortage of skilled manpower. (Paragraphs 11-13)

7. Despite occasional outbursts of violence the internal security situation remained tolerably stable. (Paragraph 15)

8. Relations with Zimbabwe were strained, but the South African Government seemed to want to make the best of them. (Paragraph 16)

9. South Africa continued a skilful delaying action in the Namibia negotiations, whilst handing over more power to the local administration led by the DTA. (Paragraph 17)

10. The outlook for the immediate future is for continuing calm and occasional squalls on the surface combined with increasing evidence of turbulence to come in the future. (Paragraph 18)

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BRITISH EMBASSY  
PARLIAMENT STREET, CAPE TOWN

15 January 1981

The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington KCMG MC  
LONDON

My Lord

SOUTH AFRICA: ANNUAL REVIEW 1980

"I have one great fear in my heart, that one day when they are turned to loving, they will find we are turned to hating" -

Reverend Theophilus Msimangu in Cry The Beloved Country  
by Alan Paton (1948)

1. In some ways 1980 was a year of hope for South Africa. In others it was a year in which the ship of state churned up much foam with her propellers but made little, if any, headway through the water. At the end of the year it remains as uncertain as ever whether it will be able to pick up enough speed to overcome the counter-currents.

Internal

2. The Prime Minister strengthened his hold over the Government by an administrative reorganization which put more power into his own hands and by a Cabinet reshuffle which introduced his own supporters to key positions. His satisfaction should have been qualified, however, by the continued solid resistance to his policies by the country's vast bureaucracy.

3. Within the National Party Mr P W Botha made little headway against the strong verkrampt element led by Dr Andries Treurnicht. This prevented him from implementing any of his reforms during the 1980 Parliamentary Session. Mr P W Botha would dearly like

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/to be





to be rid of Dr Treurnicht. In Westminster terms the loss of Dr Treurnicht and his more ardent followers as a result of a split would not be fatal. The Party's parliamentary strength would be reduced but with its present majority of over 110 in a House of Assembly of 165 it could afford to lose quite a few seats before its position was threatened. This reasoning falls on deaf ears here. It is not a matter of numerical calculations, the argument runs: as history shows, the unity of the Afrikaner volk must be preserved at all costs. No Nationalist Prime Minister who could be held responsible for disrupting it would long survive: the Party could, but he could not. Perhaps a split will still occur, for example over the looming issue of somehow enfranchising the coloured and Asian members of the population. If a split should come about, Mr P W Botha will make very sure that the responsibility for it cannot easily be laid at his door.

4. What must have become all too clear to the Prime Minister last year is that the National Party in its present state cannot be the vehicle of change in this country. In order, therefore, to institute change without splitting the Party in the process, he seems to be looking for ways of reducing the power of the Parliamentary Caucus. During the year there were strong indications, of which the decision to set up the President's Council is the prime example, that this is how his mind is working.

5. What was still not clear, on the other hand, at the end of the year was how much of a reformer the Prime Minister really is and how far he wants to go. Nothing in his record suggests that he is imbued with moral fervour for change. His conversion to



the need for change seems to have come through his head rather than his heart. He wants change not for its own sake, but to ward off revolution. For this purpose the minimum necessary becomes the optimum desirable and the speed of change must not be allowed to get out of control. In any event change stops far short of sharing power with the blacks in a unitary state. Dividing power in a confederation of separate entities linked together by some kind of common nationality emerged more clearly during the year as the ultimate objective. (In this context the decision of the Ciskei to opt for "independence" was a success for the Government.) Coupled with this goes the "uplifting" of the material well-being of the urban blacks, so as to give them, it is hoped, a stake in the continuation of the capitalist system.

6. Benevolent observers see 1980 as the year in which the Prime Minister was laying the foundations for decisive measures to come. Much was bruited about draft legislation "in the pipeline" and Mr P W Botha was even said to have remarked privately that the process of putting it through Parliament would age him. The Minister of Cooperation and Development, Dr Piet Koornhof, was as active as ever during the year producing draft Bills, sketching plans for the future and generally preaching a message of reconciliation and hope. His weakness, as he admitted to Mr Richard Luce, is that he tends to treat his plans for the future as if they were happening today.

7. For harsher critics all that 1980 showed was that the Prime Minister was still marking time and stumbling from one expedient to another in order to avoid taking unpalatable decisions. Such people, who are mainly to be found in the ranks of the official



Opposition (who incidentally had a bad year electorally) and the English-language press, form a very small minority of the white population. Most white people, both Afrikaners and English-speakers, seemed willing to give Mr P W Botha at least tacit and often enthusiastic support.

8. Unfortunately very few whites in this country know (or care) what the blacks really think. It hardly occurred to them that the urban blacks (who form about 45% of the whole black population) were in general little impressed with all they saw and heard last year. It left the blacks cold because so little of it touched them directly. Their children still received a hopelessly inadequate education. They were still subject to discriminatory and humiliating control of every aspect of their daily lives. Although in places like Soweto real attempts were at last being made to upgrade their housing and provide such essential services as electricity, throughout 1980 they still heard more about jam tomorrow than jam today. On a political level they found themselves excluded from membership of the President's Council and from any genuine consultation about their future. As they saw them, Dr Koornhof's draft Bills to which I referred earlier seemed to defeat their own purposes with their small print. In general it was a case of plus ça change ..... But their expectations had been aroused earlier in the year by events in Zimbabwe. At the end of 1980 they were still not in a revolutionary mood, but they seemed more ready to believe that the march of history was going their way.

9. One area in which the blacks began to flex their muscles in 1980 was in the labour field. After decades of quiescence the



climate of expectation raised by the Wiehahn Commission in 1979 and the recognition of black unions created a situation to which government, employers and the existing trade union system were unaccustomed. The economic boom and an annual shortfall of 100,000 skilled workers gave impetus to the drive towards black labour power. There were clear signs that in future labour relations will become increasingly politicised. Three million black workers are beginning to realise that while other avenues are closed they may be able to express their views and exert real influence in the field of industrial relations. This is also one area where a cadre of future leaders can gain essential training and experience.

10. The Government's reaction has been ambivalent and hesitant. Some progress has been made and they have shown a new realism and a refreshing willingness to exchange views with employers and labour leaders. But government and employers seem reluctant to contemplate fundamental changes in the existing highly structured framework for industrial relations. If organised black labour should decide that the system is too remote and irrelevant serious confrontation and consequent damage to the economy may be inevitable.

#### The Economy

11. Once again the gold price dominated the South African economy. In 1979 the average daily fixing in London was \$307 per oz; in 1980 the average price was \$612 per oz. The euphoria stimulated by this unexpected bonanza in foreign exchange earnings turned a gentle upswing into a major economic boom founded on strong consumer demand and a powerful resurgence of fixed

/investment.



investment. In contrast to other countries in the Western world the South African economy grew by 8% in 1980. However, by the end of the year serious concern was being expressed among leading businessmen over the increasingly critical shortage of skilled manpower (although there remains a very large pool of unskilled black labour) and over inflation, which is now known to have reached an annual rate of 15.8% for 1980, the highest on record, with the prospect of worse to come in the New Year.

12. Oil supplies continue to be a worry for this country which, for all its other natural resources, lacks any indigenous source of oil (although at the very end of the year there was speculation about the potential importance of certain gas finds off the southern coast). Helped by their very strong balance of payments, the South Africans are reported to have taken full advantage of the softness of the spot market during the second quarter of 1980 to increase their already substantial reserves. As the SASOL oil-from-coal plants near completion, South Africa can look forward to a position in which she will have to import oil to meet only 15% of her total energy requirements.

13. The new era of consultation between government and industry to which I referred in my last Annual Review languished until late October, when the Prime Minister announced the abandonment of the Verwoerdian ideal of economic as well as political autonomy for the homelands (now "national states") and instead sought industry's support for a regional approach to economic development transcending political boundaries. In quick succession the Government announced the creation of three regional development areas, a Development Bank for Africa and a Small Business



Development Bank, the latter to be jointly financed by government and the private sector.

#### Defence and Security

14. In the October Cabinet reshuffle General Malan, the Chief of the South African Defence Force (SADF), moved to the post of Minister of Defence. His successor, General Viljoen, is a straight soldier without political ambitions. There was an expansion of non-white recruiting into the armed forces and at least four new non-white regional units were formed as part of the Army. The anti-submarine warfare capacity of the Navy was allowed to run down further. In the armaments field South Africa reached a high level of self-sufficiency.

15. The internal security situation within South Africa remained tolerably stable. Soweto was quiet throughout the year and urban terrorism was limited, except for one sensational ANC attack on the SASOL oil-from-coal installation. 1980, however, was for the coloured community what 1976 had been for the black community. In the wake of a well-organised schools boycott and spurred on by an inept attempt by the Government to impose a new nominated Coloured Persons Council, the coloured community in Cape Town erupted in June in a violent outburst during which as many as 50 people are reported to have died.

#### External

16. The election result in Zimbabwe came as a shock to South Africans and they still find it difficult to adjust to the new and uncomfortable relationship with their northern neighbour. But by and large they acted sensibly and if some hotheads believed that upheaval and disorder in Zimbabwe would suit South Africa's



interests best, the Government apparently thought otherwise. For them the dreaded Mugabe had turned out to be best Prime Minister they could hope for and while a year earlier they had cursed his name, now they were anxious for his survival.

17. It became more apparent than ever during the year that for the South African Government the problem of Namibia was essentially linked to the Prime Minister's domestic problems inside the National Party. He could not afford to play into the hands of his opponents by appearing to throw Namibia away. In the continuing negotiations, therefore, South Africa conducted a skilful delaying action. So that at the end of yet another year in this long drawn out saga matters were left once again in a state of suspense and there was uncertainty about South Africa's real intentions. Despite increasing pressures from the UN, the Front Line States, and above all the Five Contact countries, the South African Government manoeuvred successfully to avoid committing themselves to a date for implementing the UN plan, while holding out enough hope that they eventually would do so to avoid a breakdown. As most of the hurdles over the Demilitarized Zone were cleared away, they erected new obstacles for the UN to overcome in an attempt to gain more time. Above all they devoted much effort to associating the internal parties with any decisions taken so as to absolve themselves from blame if, as seemed likely, SWAPO won the UN-supervised elections. They also handed over responsibility for much of the local administration to a "Council of Ministers" led by Dirk Mudge of the DTA, whilst retaining formal control in the hands of an Administrator-General specially chosen to be a nonentity.

The Future

18. This is a country where current appearances differ sharply from the underlying reality. The white population, living in secluded comfort, buoyed up by fast increasing wealth, and conditioned by relentless government propaganda put out by the SABC, is cocooned in a world of its own. Deep down many realise that it is a fragile world, but they seem incapable at present of drawing the logical conclusions. It is perhaps a cliché to say that things will have to get worse before they get better in any real sense, but without that I do not see that the whites will ever show the imagination and will required to make the necessary concessions for serious negotiation of this country's future to be possible. When they do, it may be too late, for the reason that Alan Paton foresaw in his book. The irony is that if only they could find some way of allowing national leaders to emerge in the black population and would then agree to negotiate with them they might find that the basis of discussion was less horrifying than they imagined. But that is not at present within the realm of the conceivable. The more immediate prospect is for continuing calm and occasional squalls on the surface combined with increasing, but still largely invisible, evidence of turbulence to come in the future.

19. I am sending a calendar of events in 1980 separately to the Department.

20 I am copying this Review to the British High Commissioners at Salisbury, Gaborone, Maseru and Lusaka, to HM Ambassador at Washington and to the United Kingdom Permanent Representative

/at





at New York.

I am, My Lord,  
yours faithfully

[Signed] JOHN LEAHY

J H G Leahy



*cc Mr. Sample  
Mr. Ballon  
I think key numbers  
do the Reagan expectations and fears  
needs membership of perhaps  
of sanctions. Only to state*

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	Action Taken
	15

BRITISH EMBASSY  
PRETORIA

15 December 1980

*Sounds a slow & very  
difficult process*

*Sir H. Allender  
W. Botha*

D M Day Esq CMG  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1

*please prepare a draft reply  
consultative with Mr. Ballon  
reply at 3*

Dear Derek,

JSS014/2(210) 17/2 1980

*for any obs.*

P W BOTHA'S REFERENDUM: A PROGRESS REPORT AND THE COMING CRUNCH

B

1. In my letter to you of 6 October, I explained that P W Botha had given a clear, though indirect, indication of the objective to which he is working - that South Africa and the homelands, independent and self-governing, should join in a confederation, which would be developed as a single economic entity; that a determined effort would be made to end hurtful discrimination; and (very tentatively) that the existing white Parliament might be enlarged to include representatives of the coloured, Indian and Chinese communities. Since then all the signs indicate that the last of these elements will be the issue on which P W Botha's long-running quarrel with the right-wing opposition in the National Party will come to a head.

A Parliament for non-blacks

2. It is widely expected that the President's Council will recommend a single Parliament for non-black South Africans. Indeed Dr Dennis Worrall, the Chairman of the Council's Constitutional Sub-Committee, has been reported as saying that it would. The President's Council will no doubt need time to go into the details: eg. will the different races vote on separate rolls? Will all MPs represent constituencies? How many members will there be for each race-group?

3. The President's Council will address its recommendations to the Government, who, if they agree them, will then have to introduce a Bill in Parliament to give effect to them. But on a contentious issue of this kind the National Party Congresses would want their say. In a recent major speech at Ladysmith P W Botha appeared to be saying that since the National Party Congresses had approved constitutional proposals containing comparable (but not identical) provisions in 1977 it followed that they accepted the principle of a single Parliament for the non-black racial groups. Few Nationalists would accept this argument. P W Botha went on to say that if the President's Council made recommendations which would have a fundamental effect on the constitution the National Party Congresses would have to give their approval. He also said that the Government might call for a referendum on such an issue.

/4. There



CONFIDENTIAL

4. There is some uncertainty in people's minds whether in speaking as he did the Prime Minister was actually thinking in terms of a referendum or a plebiscite. Nor, I confess, am I completely sure what the difference is, except that one is decisive and the other advisory. If the choice were for a decisive popular consultation the Prime Minister would presumably have to seek Parliamentary approval for it to be set in motion, since there is no provision in the Constitution for it. He might well prefer not to do this. As against this, by going for a decisive popular consultation he would be taking the matter more demonstrably out of the hands of the National Party Congresses (see below).
5. The timing of any move in this direction is uncertain, and a number of questions remain unanswered. The President's Council does not start work until it formally comes into being in the New Year. It may take a few months to formulate its recommendations. The Parliamentary Session ends in June. The National Party Congresses take place in August/September. If there is to be a referendum/plebiscite at what stage would it take place? Will whites only have a vote?
6. Forecasting is always hazardous but I would expect that the President's Council will formally recommend a single Parliament for non-blacks by, say April, and that the Government will in, say, May, take note of the recommendations and decide that the Congresses will first have to be consulted and that there will thereafter be a referendum/plebiscite. Since everyone knows - and this has recently been confirmed in a poll published in the Johannesburg Sunday Times - that a referendum/plebiscite of all whites will come out in favour of a single Parliament for non-blacks, this will operate as a very powerful level of pressure on the NP Congresses. They will not want to be put in the position of rejecting the proposal and then find that the referendum/plebiscite endorses it overwhelmingly, because that would show that the Congresses were out of touch with white opinion. Even some moderate Nationalists, however, are complaining that what P W Botha seems to have in mind is to ally himself with the anti-Nationalist whites to prevail over his opponents within the party. This is of course what would happen if the Nationalists were divided and the other whites were solidly in favour: but the Sunday Times poll actually gives a 62.4% favourable vote for Afrikaans speakers.
7. If this timing is roughly correct, the crunch may not come soon, and may be less painful for being taken in stages over a period in which people will have time to adjust to the idea. But a crunch it will be. Treurnicht has committed himself irrevocably to oppose any but an all white Parliament. Tension within the National Party has grown to unprecedented levels. There is talk on all sides of the dreaded "Broedertwis" - serious quarrelling within the volk. We have reported separately on the eruption within the Pretoria National Party which has revealed a bitterness which few would have believed possible, and on the saga surrounding the leak

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of drafts of the Erasmus Commission report and the thinly disguised accusation by P W Botha that Vorster has been plotting against him. Treurnicht would have to go if the Transvaal National Party Congress accepted, or acquiesced in, a proposal for a single Parliament for non-blacks. And P W Botha would have to go if it did not. But the crunch could also come at an earlier stage eg. on the Cabinet's initial stand on the Presidential Council's recommendations. Treurnicht's position is of course weakened by his membership of a Cabinet which is stacked with P W Botha's supporters. He does not want to deny himself the position and prestige of membership of the Cabinet but his supporters are increasingly reproaching him for not standing up for his point of view. A good example is the Cabinet's decision, to which Treurnicht was a party, to give prior endorsement to P W Botha's statement about a referendum: it was a decision aimed primarily against Treurnicht.

8. Some journalists and opposition MPs to whom I have spoken are inclined to think that the Prime Minister's talk of a referendum is really nothing more than a threat and that he hopes this will have the desired effect on his opponents in the Party without the necessity of going through with it. The same people are also beginning to speculate again on the possibility or, as they would see it, likelihood that P W Botha will call a general election next Spring. We have of course, heard that before and I am still not persuaded that the Prime Minister will want to go for an early election. But he might do and if he did there would presumably be no need for a referendum/plebiscite.

9. The Nationalists have been concentrating so much on their internal differences that little attention has been given to the reactions of the coloured and Indian communities to the proposal that they should send representatives to a single Parliament. By no means all reactions however are favourable. Alienation in the Coloured community in particular has gone so far that - at a guess - half of them would be opposed; so would a substantive percentage (I hesitate to give a figure) of the Indian community. But Hendrickse, leader of the Coloured Labour Party, recently said in private that the offer of even a small number of seats for coloureds in Parliament would put him in a dilemma.

#### The Confederation

10. The Government have had their hands full in negotiations with Chief Sebe on independence for Ciskei. Sebe was committed to holding a referendum and has now done so. The result will almost certainly be favourable but it looks as if the issue has been fiddled by making voting easy for yes voters and difficult for no voters. Until the terms of Ciskei's independence are known it is difficult to see whether they provide a pattern which other homeland leaders will follow. Sebe has not consulted them (though there is an established machinery for doing so) and they suspect he has settled

/for

He has -  
29 April.  
mb



for too little. But once Ciskeian independence is sewn up the South African Government are likely to turn their attention to Lebowa and Gazankulu and they have powerful means of bringing pressure to bear, especially finance.

Legislation affecting blacks

11. Complicated new legislation affecting urban blacks is coming forward and we have reported separately and in detail. Suffice it to say here that the South African Government claim to accept that the South African economy is going to need many more millions of skilled and semi-skilled black workers in the years ahead and that these people will want better conditions and wider trade union rights. But Dr Koornhof's new legislation, though well intentioned, does not in practice change the essentials of influx control, which is the heart of the matter; and "Fanie" Botha's new legislation on trade unions, while making several concessions, is designed to direct trade union development into acceptable channels rather than to allow it to develop on natural lines to a position of real economic, still less of political, power.

12. The new political season beginning next month looks like being a busy one. But the crucial question remains the same - is P W Botha any nearer to solving the problem that matters more than all the rest - how to find a lasting and mutually acceptable accommodation between blacks and whites? If I had to answer that question myself I would say that while the propellor is rotating quite fast and churning up the water the ship of state does not seem to be making much headway.

Yours wr,

John

J H G Leahy

cc: A R Titchener Esq, Johannesburg  
A G Elgar Esq, OBE, Cape Town  
D A Wright Esq, Durban

Chancery: Gaborone  
Maseru  
Mbabane  
Salisbury

P. a.  
MAH 24/10BRITISH EMBASSY  
PRETORIA

reply at 214

6 October 1980

D M Day Esq CMG  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office  
London SW1

JSS 014/2		
24 OCT 1980		
✓	✓	✓

Dear Derek,

SOUTH AFRICA: WHERE ARE WE NOW?

1. The National Party Congress season has now ended; the names of the members of the President's Council have just been announced; Parliament, in Special Session, is this very day electing the first Vice-State President (ex-officio Chairman of the President's Council); and the recent Cabinet changes come into effect at midnight tonight. This seems a suitable moment therefore to take stock of P W Botha's plans and prospects.

Confederation of Southern African States

2. Although P W Botha has, since he became Prime Minister almost exactly two years ago, been committed to a policy of constitutional reform, he has seemed not to know exactly where he was heading. He has, however, now given, indirectly but authoritatively, a clearer picture of his objective. I cannot of course guarantee that his ideas will not evolve and new ideas and formulations have a habit of being taken up by the Government for a time and almost as quickly discarded. At any rate the key concept now is "Confederation". We have already emphasised the importance of a recent newspaper article, clearly inspired by P W Botha, which sketches out the concept of a Confederation of Southern African States (for a summary, see our telegram No 375, copy attached). The notion of a common nationality is designed to overcome the hesitations of leaders of the non-independent homelands about agreeing to previous South African plans which would have meant the loss of their South African nationality. The principle that economic development should proceed on natural lines - which sounds innocent enough, even obvious - means that P W Botha has in effect abandoned "the meaningful consolidation" of the homelands. There will no doubt still be some territorial

/adjustments,



adjustments, especially those required to discharge existing commitments, but they will not be of the radical kind that aroused such excitement a year ago. No attempt is now going to be made to give the homelands large additional tracts of land to make them into viable economic units. The Confederation is to be managed as a single economic unit. This marks a radical departure from the Verwoedean concept that the homelands should be not only independent politically but should be independent economic entities as well. To overcome the disappointment of homeland leaders who wanted more territory as a condition for seeking independence, new growth areas are to be developed in such a way as to bring economic benefits to the homelands. It is in essence this deal (common nationality and regional development) which has apparently persuaded Chief Sebe to accept the principle of independence for Ciskei without major territorial changes and on the basis of a commitment to develop the whole East London hinterland on a regional basis. Sebe is reported over the weekend to have qualified his acceptance and may be trying to extract some final concessions. But I do not believe he will draw back from his commitment in principle. When it was first reported, the South African Government were jubilant about Sebe's decision. They clearly hope that it will not be long before Lebowa and Gazankulu follow suit. But even if some homelands continue to hold out against "independence" - KwaZulu is the obvious case - the Confederation in any case reduces the differences between independent and non-independent homelands. Both can be accommodated in the Confederation.

3. Little is heard any more of the Constellation of States, meaning an association between South Africa and the BLS countries and larger neighbours to the north. The South Africans recognise the political obstacles and they are furious with the nine black African states of the region for ganging up against South Africa in their "counter-constellation". They regard this as deeply inimical to their interests and also a sham because South Africa's neighbours know full well that they need her more in the economic field than she needs them. The Constellation is now seen as

/something



something which may evolve in time if economic and other links develop to the point at which it would be mutually acceptable to give them some institutional structure. P W Botha has recently confirmed his commitment to set up a Southern African Development Bank. This will be chiefly directed at the homelands but the neighbouring states, especially the BLS, will probably be eligible to join and may find the prospect too tempting to decline, in spite of the political association with South Africa.

President's Council

4. Since it is the purpose of the President's Council to bypass the National Party Congresses and to provide advice acceptable to the Government on a new constitution, we can expect that P W Botha will steer the President's Council to make proposals on the Confederation on the lines that he now envisages. Above all he may have calculated that the new and most controversial feature of his thinking, a single Parliament for the whites, coloureds, Indians and Chinese, will appeal to the President's Council, which has the same racial composition.

#### The Official Opposition

5. The official PFP Opposition are no threat to P W Botha's plans. They have in any case been going through a bad patch. Their failure to win the Simonstown by-election was a setback. They could perhaps lose the East London North by-election, where the National Party have shrewdly not fielded a candidate in order to help the NRP candidate in a bilateral contest. The party has not been solid in refusing to serve on the President's Council. There has been a quarrel over the PFP leadership in the Transvaal. And van Zyl Slabbert has been abroad for rather a long time. But, whatever their current, probably temporary problems, the PFP have succeeded in hammering home the key point that P W Botha's plans, however radical in National Party terms, are still based on separate development. The blacks are to be treated as fundamentally different from the other racial groups: they are to exercise their political rights only in the homelands; a single multiracial South Africa is ruled out; and the blacks are not to be consulted about the future constitution except





through the homeland governments. That is why the blacks have been excluded from the President's Council.

### The Blacks

6. Can any solution along these lines succeed in providing a unique (and lasting) answer to South Africa's admittedly unique problems, despite the fact that it will still be based on separate development and the homeland concept? The odds must be heavily against. But the prospects for P W Botha have, I believe, improved somewhat. With the support of Dr Koornhof, P W Botha has gained a good deal of ground with the homeland leaders. The independence of Ciskei, if it comes off, will be a major step towards the consummation of the whole homelands policy. And I have been assured by people who should know that good progress has been made in negotiating a "declaration of intent" which could bring on board the other homeland leaders, except Buthelezi. The mood is better. There can of course be no doubt that black South Africans, if freely consulted, would opt overwhelmingly for a unitary state with one man one vote. But this is not negotiable and I have the impression - in the nature of things it is no more than this - that many blacks would acquiesce in a second best arrangement of the kind which P W Botha envisages provided that it brings some tangible benefits. And the standard of living of urban black South Africans is certainly improving.

7. There are of course large numbers of blacks who will have nothing to do with P W Botha's plans, which they regard as fundamentally unacceptable. There is undoubtedly a strongly militant element especially among young blacks. The Cape Town riots have shown that the coloured community are deeply alienated. The schools boycott has now led to the large scale closure of schools especially in the Cape Province, thus sowing the seeds of bitterness for the future.

8. The most important of all black South Africans, Chief Buthelezi, is becoming increasingly difficult for P W Botha to deal with. He will not conform to any Government plan; his own initiative,



the Buthelezi Commission, points to a form of integration which is also not negotiable. He cannot be ignored, but P W Botha may calculate that Buthelezi cannot obstruct his (P W Botha's) plans. Another troublesome customer, President Kaiser Matanzima of the Transkei, has made some sort of public statement that appears to oppose the Confederation by saying he could not allow a common Southern African nationality to dilute Transkei's complete independence.

#### The National Party

9. If P W Botha faces difficulties in getting his ideas accepted by the other racial groups, these are matched by his problems within his own party. Although the new thinking has been formulated only tentatively, Treurnicht has already publicly repudiated as contrary to National Party policy the concept of a Parliament in which whites would sit on equal terms with coloureds, Indians and Chinese. Nationalists as a whole are probably sympathetic to the idea of a closer association with (non-black) racial groupings because they sense the need for allies if any future conflict should develop with blacks. But there must be a great many Nationalists who could not swallow a multiracial Parliament of the kind proposed (even with separate voting rolls). Dr Carel Boshoff, the new head of the Broederbond, has made it clear that he still holds to the Verwoedian tradition and cannot accept that the Confederation should be managed as a single economic entity. He has even reverted to the outdated idea of a "whitestan". P W Botha must feel that his gain in having Dr Gerrit Viljoen in the Cabinet is diminished by his loss as head of the Broederbond!

10. All in all, the divisions within the National Party are becoming wider, deeper and more public. I will not rehearse the reasons which inhibit P W Botha from precipitating a break with his right wing which could split the party. But I detect a greater determination of P W Botha's part not to be held in check by opposition within his own party. He must have been heartened by the evidence of the Simonstown by-election that

/more



more English-speaking South Africans are prepared to support him. The series of by-elections which will be required in the New Year as a result of nominations to the President's Council may serve as a more accurate weather-vane of prevailing opinion in the white community at large and more particularly in the Afrikaner part of it. P W Botha's instinct will be to find ingenious ways round obstacles which he cannot flatten by frontal assault. Magnus Malan and Gerrit Viljoen will be powerful reinforcements in the Cabinet. Meanwhile Treurnicht is not quite so much in evidence and he could be losing some support to the HNP. P W Botha would be delighted if opposition to his policies were concentrated in the HNP, provided that did not mean large losses of NP voters, because he could then attack the HNP as hard as he liked without damaging National Party unity.

11. I realise that much of this is atmospheric. Moreover attitudes and trends can change quickly. We will try to keep you in the picture as developments unfold in the months ahead.

Yours ever,

John

J H G Leahy

Copy to:

A R Titchener Esq, JOHANNESBURG  
 A G Elgar Esq OBE, CAPE TOWN  
 D A Wright, Esq, DURBAN  
 W Turner Esq CMG CVO, GABORONE  
 O G Griffith Esq OBE MVO, MASERU  
 D M Kerr Esq OBE, MBABANE  
 R A C Byatt Esq CMG, SALISBURY

Enc

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S. Africa 10



From the Minister

PRIME MINISTER

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*Prime Minister*

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*Am*

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The memorandum OD(80)/54 circulated by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs draws attention to the issues we must face if sanctions are imposed against South Africa by the United Nations. It is supported by a Cabinet Office paper which draws attention in paragraph 14 to the effect of an embargo on imports of fresh and canned fruits from South Africa. It notes that in the United Kingdom in the short term at least there would be acute shortages and substantial price rises for these items. Moreover, the United Kingdom would be the most hard hit among traditional importers of South African supplies of such commodities.

I would like to emphasise very strongly that this is the only sanction of all those considered which might be applied by the United Kingdom which would be immediately perceptible by the general public given that there would be price rises for canned fruit in the shops and acute shortages of such items as oranges and grapes in the middle and late summer.

I do not believe that we can afford to neglect the presentational problem that this will cause for the Government at almost any time let alone the present. I am not convinced that we can find alternative supplies in anything under the medium term, even if then.

I believe that we shall need to give the most careful consideration to this problem of price, supply, and presentation before deciding on any course of action involving sanctions against South Africa.

I am copying this to other members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

*Peter Walker*

PETER WALKER  
3 October 1980

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD  
VETERINARY SERVICES

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South Africa

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FCO  
Chanc. Exch  
Defence  
L.Pres  
L.P Seal

9  
Trade

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

1 October, 1980

South Africa: Proposed Extension of

UN Arms Embargo

The Prime Minister has seen and taken note of your Secretary of State's minute of 30 September about the possible extension of the UN arms embargo against South Africa.

As I recorded in my letter of 29 September to Stuart Hampson, the Prime Minister does not intend to take this issue any further at present but would prefer to wait and see how matters develop in New York.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OD and to Julian West (Department of Energy) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

IC. VETA. WHITMORE

Ian K C Ellison, Esq  
Department of Industry

SECRET

K/S



PRIME MINISTER

SOUTH AFRICA : PROPOSED EXTENSION OF UN ARMS EMBARGO

I had intended to comment on the Secretary of State for Trade's minute to you of 19 September at the OD meeting which was scheduled for 29 September. I have now seen his further minute to you of 25 September and would like to record my general support for the points he has made.

2. I will not rehearse details about the industrial interests which are at stake, since these are covered in the papers by officials. I would, however, add that, in addition to the particular proposals for extension to the arms embargo to which he refers, I have some concern about proposal 3, calling for the termination of industrial licences to manufacture arms and related material, and proposal 5 prohibiting investment in the manufacture of arms and related material. I recognise that we have already taken action following the arms embargo to prevent industrial licences being granted in this area. But the language used in our Order is very carefully circumscribed and my concern is that, in the light of the extension of the definition of "related material" which is proposed in proposition 7, we may well find that we are faced with calls for control over licences for a much wider range of products.

3. I know that our request FCO officials have pressed

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Prime Minister.

2, 8  
 Sir Keith Joseph is working in support of Mr Nott whose minute to you you saw over the week-end.

You have already agreed to take no further action to resolve the difference of view between Ministers until we see how matters develop in New York; and Sir Keith is not pressing for a decision now (see x/ below). You need therefore only take note of his minute at this stage.

full  
 30.12.



the Americans on this point and I look forward to seeing the response. The same question arises in relation to proposal 5 where, if we are not careful, we could find ourselves undertaking control over investment - which is objectionable in principle - in a wider area than arms manufacture, where in my view it would be just tolerable in the last resort.

4. I very much agree with the emphasis which John Nott has placed on proposal 6, since this could have far reaching consequences in relation to trade in such things as civilian aircraft and equipment, computers and vehicles. I recognise all the difficulties about contemplating the use of the veto in isolation and I would not wish to reach any conclusion on this at this stage. I naturally very much hope that we will get changes to proposal 6 and the others which will be satisfactory to us. But I agree with him that we should keep open the option of possibly using the veto on our own if we cannot achieve this.

5. I will not go into detail about particular language which is being considered between officials but I would just mention a particular problem about four wheel drive vehicles. As it stands proposal 6 would place a ban on supplies of such vehicles destined for the military or police forces. It is true that we do not supply these vehicles in made up form but we do export about 2,000 Land Rover kits to South Africa,





some of which undoubtedly finish up with the military and police. I am very hesitant about the suggestion by FCO officials that we can accept the language in 6, drawing on the distinction between "vehicles" and "kits". We export over 11,000 Land Rovers to the rest of Africa, many in kit form, and are very vulnerable to retaliation. I hope therefore that our representatives will be able to secure the removal of this sentence or, if that is not possible, make sure that the reference to four wheel drive vehicles is so qualified that it allows the trade in kits to continue.


6. I am copying this minute to Members of OD Committee, David Howell and Sir Robert Armstrong.

g

K J

30 September 1980

Department of Industry  
Ashdown House  
123 Victoria Street  
LONDON  
SW1E 6RB



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COMMUNICATIONS

SECRET



7  
South Africa

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

29 September 1980

Dear Stuart,

SOUTH AFRICA:  
PROPOSED EXTENSION OF UN ARMS EMBARGO

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 25 September about the possible extension of the United Nations arms embargo against South Africa.

She proposes not to take this issue any further for the time being but to wait and see how matters develop in New York.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to other members of OD, to Ian Ellison (D/Industry), Julian West (D/Energy) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

John Williams

Stuart Hampson, Esq.,  
Department of Trade.

SECRET

6

Ref: B06024

MR WHITMORE

c Sir Robert Armstrong o/r

Sanctions on South Africa

attached  
files -

Mr Nott's minute to the Prime Minister of 25th September challenges Lord Carrington's advice (with which the Prime Minister agreed at her meeting with him, in Mr Nott's absence, on 21st September) that we should not veto alone any part of the impending proposals for widening the United Nations arms embargo against South Africa. In Mr Nott's view we should not exclude a solitary British veto if we cannot otherwise achieve his two minimum requirements (not to accept a widely drawn ban on dual-purpose civil/military items and not to accept anything which interefered with existing contracts).

2. I have agreed with the Department of Trade and the Foreign Office that, subject to the Prime Minister's views, no immediate action should be taken to resolve this difference of opinion but that we should wait for one of the following developments.

a. The problem may well dissolve; either because we are able in the current negotiations in New York to eliminate from the proposed Security Council resolution any features which would be incompatible with Mr Nott's two minimum requirements, or because we are able to persuade the French and/or Americans to join us in vetoing such features.

b. If by 13th October a. has not happened, but negotiations in New York are still continuing, collective discussion of the problem will be possible at the OD meeting arranged for that afternoon (which will primarily be concerned with European Community affairs); Mr Nott will unfortunately be abroad but would be content to be represented by Mr Parkinson.

c. If a. does not happen and the crunch point in New York looks like coming earlier than 13th October, emergency Ministerial consultations will need to be arranged ad hoc, eg during the Party Conference in Brighton.

3. If b. does not happen OD will need at some later date to consider more generally the whole problem of the rising demand for sanctions against South Africa, on the basis of Lord Carrington's outline policy paper OD(80) 54.

26th September 1980

R L WADE-GERY

1/

Prime Minister.

Agree to wait upon developments, as proposed in paragraph 2 below? The FLO and Department of Trade are content to do so.

Yes

16ix

R L Wade-Gery

26 SEP 1980



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DESKBY 260700Z  
FM FCO 260127Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE (FOR PS/PRIME MINISTER)  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 228 OF 26 SEPTEMBER

GYPHER

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE SECRETARY WAS RECEIVED FROM U KMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1360 OF 25 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PRIORITY PARIS OTTAWA BONN PRETORIA LUSAKA LUANDA DAR ES SALAAM SALISBURY.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY: SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH MR MUSKIE, NEW YORK, 25 SEPTEMBER.

MIPT'S (NOT TO ALL): SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS EMBARGO.

1. IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS WAS AN UNFORTUNATE MOMENT TO PUT FURTHER PRESSURE ON THE SOUTH AFRICANS. MCHENRY TOO ACCEPTED THIS, ARGUING THAT IT WOULD PROVIDE THE SOUTH AFRICANS WITH THE PERFECT EXCUSE FOR RATIONALISING FURTHER DELAY. UNLIKE THE SECRETARY OF STATE HE THOUGHT THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE IN ANY EVENT NOT YET READY TO GO FORWARD WITH THE UN PLAN. THERE WAS SOME PROSPECT OF POSTPONING, BUT NOT AVOIDING, DISCUSSION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IT WAS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE PRESIDENT COULD DRAG HIS FEET UNTIL THE UN VISIT TO PRETORIA ON 20 OCTOBER. BUT HE HAD COME UP WITH A USEFUL PROCEDURE REQUIREMENT THAT SIX SPEAKERS SHOULD BE INSCRIBED BEFORE DISCUSSION BEGAN. GIVEN THE PRESENT PRE-OCCUPATION WITH THE IRAN/IRAQ SITUATION, IT MIGHT TAKE TIME TO MUSTER THIS NUMBER. THE SECRETARY OF STATE NOTED THAT PAULO JORGE THE ANGOLAN FOREIGN MINISTER, DID NOT SEEM AT ALL ANXIOUS TO PUSH FOR A TIGHTENING OF THE ARMS EMBARGO, BUT WAS CONCENTRATING, UNDERSTANDABLY, ON THE SEARCH FOR A NAMIBIAN SOLUTION. IT WAS AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT IT MIGHT AROUSE AFRICAN SUSPICIONS IF WE WERE TO TRY TOO HARD OR TOO OVERTLY TO PUSH THEM OVER THE ISSUES.

2. ON THE SUBSTANCE, LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE HOPED THE AMERICANS AND OURSELVES COULD STICK AS CLOSE TOGETHER AS POSSIBLE. MUSKIE MADE NO COMMITMENT, CONFINING HIMSELF TO POINTING OUT THAT AMERICAN CONTROLS ON ARMS EXPORTS TO SOUTH AFRICA WERE ALREADY STRICTER THAN THOSE UNDER THE EMBARGO.

3. HE ALSO MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS MIGHT INTERPRETE ANY DIMINUTION OF THE EFFORTS TO TIGHTEN THE PRESSURE OVER THE ARMS EMBARGO AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS.

4. IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE PROSPECTS AND VIABILITY OF THE CONFERENCE ON NAMIBIA, LORD CARRINGTON AND MCHENRY AGREED THAT SUCH A CONFERENCE COULD BE A RECIPE FOR INDEFINITE DELAY. LORD CARRINGTON SAID HE WAS THEREFORE PUZZLED BY THE FACT THAT THE FRONT LINE STATES WERE INTERESTED IN A CONFERENCE. MCHENRY CLAIMED THAT THEY WERE NOT. MCHENRY ALSO SUGGESTED A DANGER THAT SWAPO TOO WOULD USE THE CONFERENCE TO DELAY MATTERS: NUJOMA HAD ALWAYS SHOWN RELUCTANCE TO GET TO GRIPS WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN PLAN.

:-448,059,  
CARRINGTON

27 SEP 1980



PRIME MINISTER

SOUTH AFRICA: PROPOSED EXTENSION OF UN ARMS EMBARGO

I have seen your Private Secretary's letter of 22 September recording your meeting with the Foreign Secretary over the weekend concerning the possibility of an extension of the United Nations arms embargo. In my minute to you of 19 September I set out two minimum conditions which seemed to me essential before coming to a decision not to veto on any account. I am greatly disturbed to see that a decision has at this stage been taken that in no circumstances will we be prepared to isolate ourselves on this particular matter. It seems unwise to me to go into any negotiation, particularly one as important as this, having already decided, even in private, not to use the ultimate sanction. I do not see how we can take a final decision on the use of a veto before we know how the final resolution emerges.

I enclose a note from my officials setting out the possible loss of trade to us if the recommendations of the UN Committee are translated into a mandatory resolution. I am worried that the dangers to our trade far exceed those stated in the note. South Africa has become one of the fastest growing markets in the world since the rise of the gold price. We can say with considerable assurance (and the South African Finance Minister was here on Wednesday indicating just this) that the South Africans are keen to steer more major projects our way. (GEC recently gained their largest overseas contract - for the Tutuka power station in South Africa - worth some £200m.) It is not as if there are many markets which are expanding at this rate and which are genuinely anxious to buy British. I am not

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sure that if we failed to veto a "dual purpose" embargo which went beyond recognisably military equipment we would not seriously damage our opportunities in South Africa.

I am by no means convinced that if we make clear the importance to us of our substantial trade in, for example, computers of an essentially civilian character and the fundamental opposition in our Parliament and outside to reneging on contracts, our position would not be fully - albeit reluctantly - understood. On my recent visit to Nigeria I found a high degree of grudging respect for our trade policy towards South Africa, and we must not allow wild statements in the Nigerian press to mislead us into a policy of weakness. Surely if we do not stick to this principle there is no end to the compromises which we shall be pressed to make down the road of sanctions affecting normal civil trade, not just in South Africa?

My conclusion is therefore that we would be wrong to decide against a veto (either in company with the Americans and/or the French or alone) at this stage. Although I am wholly against using it if we can possibly avoid doing so, we must not let the impression be created either in the minds of our delegation at the UN or in those of our allies that this is our stance until the minimum changes set out in my note have been achieved. If they are not, we should reconsider the matter without having closed any options.

I am copying this minute to other Members of OD Committee, Keith Joseph, David Howell and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Department of Trade  
1 Victoria Street  
London, SW1H 0ET

25 September 1980

J N





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SOUTH AFRICA: THE EFFECTS OF AN EXTENSION OF THE UN ARMS EMBARGO

1 Our main concern relates to recommendations 2, 6 and 7 of the UN Arms Embargo Committee (although there are many other unsatisfactory features). The terms of these recommendations are as follows:

" 2 States should prohibit the export of spare parts for embargoed aircraft and other military equipment belonging to South Africa and the maintenance and servicing of such equipment.

6 All States should prohibit the export to South Africa of 'dual purpose' items, ie items provided for civilian use but with the potential for diversion or conversion to military use. In particular, they should cease the supply of aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, electronic and telecommunications equipment and computers to South Africa. Supplies of 4-wheel drive vehicles destined for the military or police forces should also be prohibited.

7 The term 'arms and related material of all types' should be clearly defined to include all equipment intended for the military and police forces of South Africa."

2 These recommendations extend the embargo beyond items of military significance to items essentially civilian in character that are destined for use - or even that are capable of use - by the South African military or police forces. Since there can be no certainty as to the precise terms of any Resolution until a vote is taken in the Security Council, and since the definition of "dual purpose" items is equally uncertain until that same time, it is doubly difficult to quantify the effects that any extension of the embargo might have on our normal civil trade with South Africa. Those effects would, however, be four-fold and would concern: dual purpose goods (as may come to be defined) which are currently outside the embargo, and the loss of the visible exports which they represent; the loss of invisible exports



represented by the revocation of maintenance or manufacture-under-licence contracts; associated claims for compensation or claims against ECGD because of the revocation of existing contracts; and the administrative burden caused by increased controls (principally export licensing).

Visible exports

3 The loss of exports if the items specified in recommendation 6 were to remain unchanged would be as follows:

	<u>1979 exports to South Africa</u>
aircraft	£3m (not public knowledge)
aircraft spare parts	£1m
aircraft engines	£2m
electronic and telecommunications equip- ment	£12m
computers (see para 5)	£28m
4-wheel drive vehicles (part kits for assembly in South Africa)	£12m
	<hr/> £58m <hr/>

In addition, other exports - other dual-purpose equipment, and purely civilian items sold to the South African military and police - would also be at risk, but we have no means of estimating the value of this. (Moreover, our export figures for 1980 are running substantially higher than in 1979).

4 If the extension of the embargo were to apply to existing contracts, major current business affected would include the Plessey radar contract (from £60-100m). This contract was the subject of certain written assurances from the previous Government who told Plessey that HMG had no intention of preventing the export of the equipment if the contract was awarded to Plessey or another UK supplier. Although this did not amount to a guarantee no doubt the South African Government and Plessey would regard it as having moral force.



5 The impact would be particularly severe on ICL. Their South African business is growing. It represents 10% of their total turnover and they have 30% of the South African computer market. Computers (other than those integral to defence systems) are particularly susceptible to a wide interpretation of "dual purpose"; they are already supplied by ICL to the South African police for administrative purposes.

#### Invisible exports

6 Recommendation 3 would also require us to abrogate licensing agreements and would lose us some invisible earnings without any impact on the South Africans. It is impossible to estimate the loss of invisible earnings that would be entailed by implementing recommendations 2 and 3.

#### Claims for compensation

7 Insofar as any of the new sanctions applied retrospectively (ie to current contracts) UK businesses would incur losses and there would be pressure on HMG to pay compensation to the companies affected. To the extent that exporters are insured these claims would fall on ECGD. Their best estimate is that, on the basis of the present recommendations, insured claims could amount to £40m (of which Plessey would at present account for £26m). Uninsured exporters would also suffer loss and would no doubt pressure for compensation. Those uninsured losses might amount to at least as much again, bringing the total to perhaps £80-100m. If the proposed ban on nuclear collaboration in recommendation 8 were to compromise RTZ's interest in the Rössing mine in Namibia, or prevent the import of uranium by BNFL, there could be additional claims.

#### Administration

8 Recommendations 6 and 7 would involve a substantial increase in administrative work. Whatever definition of "dual purpose" items is finally negotiated there would have to be an extension of the items subject to specific export licensing, and there would



inevitably be an increase in the number of doubtful cases. Recommendation 7 would effectively prohibit the export of all goods "intended" for the South African armed or police forces. This could probably only be implemented by requiring a declaration from exporters to Customs that goods were not to their knowledge destined for the South African forces. Enforcement of this would be particularly difficult since some exports are distributed through agents or other intermediaries and in any case there would be no way of ensuring that goods were not diverted once they had passed beyond our physical control. Some machinery, however rudimentary and ineffective, would be required to monitor such an arrangement.

Department of Trade  
25 September 1980

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file

S. Africa

RH

KRB

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cc Martin Set

cc Home Office

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

22 September, 1980

Dear George,

South Africa and Sanctions

When the Prime Minister met the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence yesterday evening about another matter, Lord Carrington took the opportunity to raise the question of the line we should take in the UN on the proposal of the UN Arms Embargo Committee for tightening up the existing arms embargo against South Africa.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that it was clear that, for electoral reasons, the Americans were going to go as far as they possibly could towards agreeing with the proposal. The position of the French was uncertain. M. Francois-Poncet was being robust in private, and the Embargo Committee's proposal contained clauses on which the French might continue to place reservations. But there were others on which they might give way, and the fact was that hitherto they had tended to follow the Americans' line. We would go on trying to get the Americans and French to resist the proposal, but we had to recognise that we might not succeed and then we should have to take the very difficult decision whether to veto alone or not. He knew, for example, that the Secretaries of State for Industry and Trade were very concerned about any extension of the arms embargo to embrace the supply of computers and four-wheel drive vehicles to the South African police, as was recommended in paragraph 6 of the Embargo Committee's proposal. But if the UK vetoed alone on these relatively limited issues which the present proposal raised, we might well wreck our whole strategy for dealing with the much bigger and much more important question of general economic sanctions against South Africa. If we vetoed alone any resolution based on the Embargo Committee's proposal, this might well be taken by the Americans and French as a signal that they could shelter behind us and let us veto alone a resolution introducing general economic sanctions. It was very doubtful whether we should let ourselves be singled out in responding to the present proposal for tightening the arms embargo. We should certainly not veto all the recommendations in the proposal, and even to veto a single clause could wreck our broader strategy. Above all we must prevent the introduction of general economic sanctions against South Africa.

/After

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- 2 -

After a brief discussion the Prime Minister said that she agreed that we should not veto alone on the relatively limited matter of the proposal to tighten the arms embargo and we should do all we could to prevent a situation coming about where we were isolated. The most recent telegrams which she had seen over the weekend gave slight cause for greater optimism.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Wiggins (HM Treasury), Ian Ellison (Department of Industry), Richard Dykes (Department of Employment), Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), Julian West (Department of Energy) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours  
love,

Alfred Whittam

G G H Walden, Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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DESKBY FCO 220900 Z  
FROM UKMIS NEWYORK 192241Z SEPT 80  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1312 OF 19 SEPTEMBER  
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON PARIS  
INFO ROUTINE MOD DS11

Prime Minister<sup>(2)</sup>  
20.9.80

MJ

YOUR TELNO 680: SOUTH AFRICA: ARMS EMBARGO COMMITTEE.

1. THE COMMITTEE COMPLETED ITS WORK ON THE REPORT TODAY (19 SEPTEMBER) AT A FURTHER SESSION TO MEET THE PORTUGUESE REQUEST FOR 24 HOURS TO CONSIDER THE NEW AMERICAN WORDING FOR PARA 7.
2. THE WORDING FINALLY AGREED FOR PARA 7 WAS QUOTE THE TERM QUOTE ARMS AND RELATED MATERIEL OF ALL TYPES UNQUOTE, REFERRED TO IN RESOLUTION 418 (1977), SHOULD BE CLEARLY DEFINED TO INCLUDE ALL EQUIPMENT INTENDED FOR THE MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES OF SOUTH AFRICA. UNQUOTE.
3. FRANCE MAINTAINED ITS RESERVATION ON PARA 7.
4. PARAS 1 AND 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE: THE FRENCH HERE SAY THAT THEY DO NOT SHARE OUR OBJECTIONS TO PARA 2 SINCE THEY CONSIDER IT SIMPLY AS EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 418. THEY HAVE ALREADY STOPPED EXPORTS OF SPARE PARTS THOUGH ORIGINALLY THIS WAS DIFFICULT FOR THEM. THEY ALSO SAY THAT THEY HAVE NO PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING EXPORTS BY REFERENCE TO END-USERS RATHER THAN CATEGORY. THEIR LICENSING SYSTEM PROHIBITS ONWARD SALE TO THIRD COUNTRIES EVEN IN PRIVATE CONTRACTS. BUT THIS APPLIES ONLY TO ARMS AND THEIR PRECISE LIST OF WHAT CONSTITUTES ARMS.
5. PARA 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. PLEASE SEE THE PARENTHESIS IN PARA 2 OF MY TELNO 1283. OBJECTIONS ALSO RELATE TO THE FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AS WELL AS TO PERSONNEL DIFFICULTIES.
6. FURTHER TO MY TELNO 1305, LUSAKA (ZAMBIA) TOLD US THAT CLARK (NIGERIA) AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AGAINST APARTHEID WOULD BE STEERING THE DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE TIMING OF THE DEBATE MAY SLIP A LITTLE WHICH IS THE REASON THE LETTER REQUESTING A MEETING HAS NOT YET GONE IN. THIS IS BECAUSE THE AFRICANS ARE VAGUE ABOUT THE TIMING OF THEIR FOREIGN MINISTERS VISITS TO NEW YORK AND THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE GENERAL DEBATE. THUS, IT MAY NOT START UNTIL THE WEEK BEGINNING SEPTEMBER 29.

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7. THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT ANY NEGOTIATIONS ON A DRAFT RESOLUTION MAY LAST TWO OR THREE WEEKS (AS HAPPENED IN 1977 IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER 418). THEY THINK THAT THEY CAN NEGOTIATE WORDING TO MEET THEIR RESERVATIONS ON RECOMMENDATIONS 5, 6, 10 AND 15. THEY SAY THEIR REAL STICKING POINTS, EVEN TO THE POINT OF A VETO, WOULD BE A NUCLEAR OR OIL EMBARGO.

8. ALTHOUGH THE OIL EMBARGO HAS BEEN DROPPED FROM THE ARMS EMBARGO COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS, MUTUKWA (ZAMBIA) TOLD US THAT HE EXPECTED THE AFRICAN GROUP, FOLLOWING THE DECISIONS OF THE OAU FREETOWN SUMMIT, WILL INSIST THAT AN OIL EMBARGO FORMS PART OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. CLARK (NIGERIA) IS PARTICULARLY KEEN ON ONE. THE FRENCH HAVE HEARD FROM THEIR AFRICAN CONTACTS THAT THE AFRICANS AT PRESENT INTEND TO EMPLOY SALAMI TACTICS: THE AFRICANS WILL PUT FORWARD A FIRST DRAFT RESOLUTION IN VERY STRONG TERMS (NOW BEING DRAFTED BY THE ANC). WHEN THEY MEET RESISTANCE FROM THE WEST A QUOTE MODERATE UNQUOTE AFRICAN WILL THEN APPROACH US AND AGREE TO NEGOTIATE A SO-CALLED Milder DRAFT.

9. THE FRENCH THINK, AS DO WE, THAT THE AFRICANS WILL NEGOTIATE FIRST WITH THE AMERICANS WHO WILL BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT MUCH MORE THAN WE OR THE FRENCH AND THEREAFTER PICK US OFF. FRENCH INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO STICK CLOSELY WITH US AND NOT TO MAKE PROBLEMS FOR US.

PARSONS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOUTHERN AFRICA STANDARD

S AF D  
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UND  
NAD  
WED  
ECD  
ES & SD  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

COPIES TO:

MR P GENT DOI  
MR D T WEST D/ENERGY

2

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT MINUTE

*Seen by PM*

*20/9*

*cc S Africa: PC 2  
Sik in Namibia*

PRIME MINISTER

South Africa

I have just seen the final recommendations of the UN Arms Embargo Committee which are likely to be considered by the Security Council on 25 September. I understand that the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs may be speaking to you during the weekend about the line we should take in the Security Council.

2 Several of the recommendations affect our trading interests and I think I should let you know my views immediately. Naturally I deplore any widening of the present arms embargo; but I also acknowledge that it would be foolish to put at risk our substantial commercial interests in black Africa over proposals that did us no serious harm, and (as modifications to an existing embargo that we have accepted) give away no new principles.

3 There are many points in the recommendations that I should like to see omitted or softened, and I hope our delegation in New York will continue to do their best to achieve these amendments before any resolution is presented to the Security Council. I therefore attach great importance to the closest consultation between my officials and those of the FCO. However there are two points which in my view we must regard as non-negotiable, and which, if they are not met, should justify our using our veto in the Security Council, either with the US and France, or if necessary alone. These two sticking points are:

- (i) that recommendation 6 (which attempts to ban the export to South Africa of dual-purpose equipment, widely-defined) should be drastically narrowed in its scope to apply only to exports to South Africa of a type used primarily for military purposes, and
- (ii) that no recommendation should interfere with existing contracts for the supply of goods to South Africa. (You will of course recall the strong opposition we encountered when we

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/ attempted ..



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attempted to introduce retrospective sanctions against Iran.)

4 I hope you will be able to agree that our delegation in New York be instructed accordingly.

5 I am copying this to other members of OD, the Secretary of State for Industry and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

6. Between my return from Paris and my departure for my constituency I found the enclosed papers. In view of the extreme importance & urgency of this matter, I am taking the liberty of handing in to No 10 tonight my departmental briefing and this draft minute.

attached  
Page A

7. Earlier correspondence indicates my concern at the tactics, so far pursued by our negotiators in this matter.

8. I think that I should telephone you about this matter CONFIDENTIAL and the Greek Power Station contract over the weekend.

JN.

D of Trade internal  
briefing SW

cc MfT  
PS Secretary  
Mr Caines Dep Sec  
Mr Kemp ECGD  
Mr Clarke CRE5  
Mr Coleman Sols  
Mr Priston CRE4

Secretary of State

SOUTH AFRICA

- 1 See below Cabinet Office are circulating today for Ministers' weekend boxes a detailed assessment by officials of the impact on UK interests of a UN sanctions Resolution against South Africa and of any black African retaliation against a UK veto of such a Resolution. The important points are the size of our interests in both South Africa and black Africa, our vulnerability to retaliation and the serious risks involved in accepting wide-ranging sanctions on the one hand, and vetoing alone such sanctions on the other.
- 2 The Report was commissioned against the risk that the Namibia crisis might result in pressure for an economic boycott of South Africa. In fact, as you know, pressure for tighter control on the supply of arms and related material to South Africa has suddenly developed in the UN, even though there has been no breakdown in negotiations over Namibia.
- 3 See Flag A  
.. ..  
FlagsB/c I attended a meeting yesterday afternoon at the Cabinet Office which examined the latest draft of the Report of the UN Arms Embargo Committee. A final version of the Committee's conclusions is attached. This will probably be considered by the Security Council on Thursday 25 September. I also attach two telegrams which report on the last meeting of the Committee. The main point is that there are now some hopeful signs that the Americans and the French may switch - although it would be unwise to rely on them in view of their behaviour so far.
- 4 S Between now and Thursday HMG will need to decide what its line should be. The report is a mixed bag. Some proposals do no

more than we are already obliged to do under the existing UN Resolution. Paragraphs 2 to 7 and 9 and 12 are of most interest to DOT. Our initial reactions to these are as follows:

- Para 1: with some softening of the word "guarantees", no great difficulty but this is primarily for MOD.
- Para 2: the provision of spares is already embargoed. We believe however that there are some current maintenance and service agreements which would have to be terminated. Retrospective application is objectionable. Primarily for MOD.
- Para 3: this would create little or no damage to South Africa but it would lead to some loss of income to UK companies.
- Para 4: no difficulty since covered by present embargo.
- Para 5: most investment is financed by reinvestment of funds by UK owned South African companies which would be unaffected. In any case, difficult to distinguish between investment for arms manufacture and investment for other purposes. Little practical effect.
- Para 6: bans all "dual purpose" equipment including specifically all aircraft, aircraft spares, electronics and telecommunications equipment and landrovers. Significant impact on exports, and by bringing civil goods within scope of boycott creates precedent for further action. Highly objectionable.
- Para 7: bans all sales (including non-military items) to the South African forces. Widens existing boycott, but impact on our exports uncertain. Any retrospective application would be objectionable. Would also add to administrative burdens of export control.
- Para 9: we already have enforcement machinery with appropriate penalties. No difficulty.
- Para 12: we do not think the proposed ban on imports of arms and related material would cause difficulty, but Departments are still checking.

- 5 To sum up, we have two fundamental difficulties. Firstly in paragraph 6 we require a much narrower definition of "dual purpose" with all the types of equipment specified left out. If the ban applied only to equipment of a type used primarily for military purposes, even though used for civilian purposes, the effect would be little different from the situation we have now. Secondly, paragraph 6, 7 and others should not apply retrospectively. Action against existing contracts would be heavily criticised in the House and by industry. It would also result in heavy claims against ECGD. (The best rough estimate we can make is that these could amount to £40m or more).
- 6 Without doubt, the best course would be for the UK, the Americans and the French to agree together to impose a triple veto, but for the reasons given in earlier minutes, it is possible that we will find ourselves isolated in the Security Council. In this event we can either:
- (i) negotiate essential changes in the draft using the threat of a unilateral veto to secure concessions. If we can secure these changes we should then acquiesce in the resolution. The main objection is that this might be regarded as the slippery slope towards full economic sanctions against South Africa.
  - (ii) refuse on grounds of principle to accept any widening of the existing embargo, and if need be veto alone. But this would demonstrate to the Allies that we would veto any sanctions Resolution, no matter how mild. They could then sit back in the knowledge that the UK would protect their interests, and we would incur the wrath of the black African states, with possible damage to our trade.
- 7 This is a difficult decision with arguments on both sides. As they stand at present, the recommendations are in our view unacceptable and should be vetoed. But we expect that the Americans and the French will not accept it as it stands, and that further significant watering down will take place. We think that from the DOT's viewpoint, if we can secure a much narrower paragraph 6 on the lines suggested earlier and the elimination of retrospection



we could just about get by without serious damage. These changes are the essential minimum. A number of other changes are desirable and should if possible be secured, but need not be absolute sticking points.

8 The Prime Minister and Lord Carrington are both away next week and will not be able to be present at any Ministerial meeting to discuss the issue. I understand that the Foreign Secretary will seek a steer from the Prime Minister over the weekend. An ad hoc group of Ministers, with the Lord Privy Seal representing the FCO, may meet next week, but it will be operating within the discretion allowed by the Prime Minister. It is important therefore that the Secretary of State also communicates his views to the Prime Minister.

9 A draft minute to the PM, which if not sent would serve as a speaking note, is attached.

Ray D..

R Williams  
US/CRE5  
215 5400  
304 V/St  
19 September 1980



SECRET

Prime Minister

I imagine Lord Carrington  
will have a word about this  
to-morrow evening. A VOT  
may mig be.

Phd - 28/9

PRIME MINISTERSouth Africa and Sanctions

(OD(80) 53 and 54)

## BACKGROUND

One of what will no doubt be a series of crunch-points on South Africa and sanctions is expected at the Security Council meeting which begins on 25th September. As background for awkward decisions of this kind when they came, a group of officials under Cabinet Office auspices has been analysing what British interests would be at risk if we accept sanctions or alternatively if we alienate Nigeria and others by an isolated British veto.

Flag A

The results are now circulated as OD(80) 53. They show that in material terms we have if anything rather more at stake in Black Africa than in South Africa (Nigeria, for example, is nowadays a larger British export market than the Republic); but that how much we would actually lose in either case would depend on unpredictable circumstances at the time.

Flag B

2. As a companion piece to this report Lord Carrington has circulated an outline policy paper OD(80) 54. His formal recommendations (paragraph 6) are not controversial: since we have so much at stake either way, we should try to avoid a general sanctions resolution, and if we fail in that we should try to organise a joint veto with the Americans and French. What matters is his views on the really difficult policy issues, which emerge from his earlier paragraphs as follows:

- a. His paragraph 2 is categorical that, if we were faced with a call for total sanctions, we should veto, if necessary alone.
- b. His paragraph 3 argues against making clear in advance what Britain would veto, lest the Americans and French are thereby encouraged to let us do so alone and to rely, for the protection of their interests, on our willingness to incur international odium.
- c. His paragraph 4 hints that, in at least some circumstances, he would not favour vetoing a call for partial sanctions on our own.





SECRET

Other members of OD will no doubt agree with a. There is room for controversy about the tactics at b, about which Mr Nott for one is somewhat sceptical. But the real difficulty will of course lie in c. Next week's crunch point in New York will force this into the open.

#### THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS

3. This crunch point is briefly referred to in Lord Carrington's paragraph 5. The United Nations Committee responsible for the existing arms embargo against South Africa has at Black African instigation proposed drastically tightening that embargo. The final text of their proposal, which is due to come before the Security Council on 25th September, is now available in UKMIS New York telegram no. 1306 of 18th September, with Sir Anthony Parsons' comment in telegrams nos. 1304-5. The crucial vote in the Council may take place any day from 25th September onwards. Before the vote, the proposal as it stands will have to be translated into a draft Council resolution. During that process we and our allies will of course be trying to modify some of its worst features. Sir Anthony Parsons seems guardedly optimistic about our chances.

below this  
minute

4. Our original aim was to line up the Americans and French in solid opposition to the whole proposal. But for electoral reasons the Americans preferred to try negotiating a compromise. They have not yet succeeded very far, but have left the impression that subject to certain reservations they will not veto. At one time the French too seemed likely to strike a deal by which they would not veto provided the Africans watered down the proposed ban on nuclear collaboration (paragraph 8 of the proposal), which is the main thing they care about; but this has not happened and there may now be more chance of the French joining us in vetoing if it comes to that. Your talks in Paris today may have shed light on this.

5. The main problem from our point of view is the proposed ban on all items of a dual-purpose military/civilian character (paragraph 6 of the proposal). But other aspects, eg the ban on spares and servicing (paragraph 2) and on licence arrangements (paragraph 3), would also cause us problems. You will



SECRET

*below flag C*

recall the correspondence beginning with Mr Pym's minute to the Foreign Secretary of 15th July and ending with Mr Sanders' letter to the Foreign Office of 27th August in which it was provisionally agreed, at Lord Carrington's insistence and in the face of doubts expressed by Mr Pym, Mr Nott and yourself, that we should tighten our confidential guidelines on what dual-purpose <sup>items</sup> should be regarded as falling within the existing embargo. The present proposal would of course go far wider than that.

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#### PROCEDURE

6. Lord Carrington's paragraph 5 promises that colleagues will be consulted as soon as the Security Council prospect is clearer, so that decisions on our stance there can be taken. Mr Nott's letter to Lord Carrington of 8th September had already asked for collective discussion of the problem. But your own absence in Greece and Yugoslavia (and Lord Carrington's, health permitting, in America) mean that no meeting of OD will be possible next week. Lord Carrington will therefore be getting in touch with you over the coming week-end, to seek such guidance on how to play the hand as may be possible in the present state of our knowledge.

7. Consultation will of course be possible, at the situation develops next week, between Sir Ian Gilmour and the other two Ministers directly concerned, ie Mr Nott and Mr Pym. But before you and Lord Carrington leave, and before you conclude your discussions with him, you may wish to have a word on the telephone with Mr Nott. Temperamentally, as well as by departmental interest, Mr Nott represents the anti-sanctions end of a spectrum of possible views, of which Lord Carrington necessarily represents the other end. You will find Lord Carrington pretty determined that we should not veto in isolation this time round (save in the unlikely case that the proposal cannot be modified at all); quite apart from the Black African hostility which this would involve, he understandably fears that a lone British veto now would convey the worst possible signal to the Americans and French, who would conclude that they could safely rely on us to carry the can when other even more serious crunch points are reached in the future. The critical question is therefore how damaging a resolution we could if necessary accept this time round; ie what

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SECRET

is the irreducible minimum which we need to excise from the current United Nations proposal in order to be able, however unhappily, to live with it. Mr Nott's views on that will be very relevant to the guidance you give Lord Carrington.

8 I have warned Mr Nott's office that you may wish to consult him over the week-end; and it may be that he will in any case wish to get in touch with you and/or with Lord Carrington.

9. A meeting of OD will be arranged after your return. This will be able to take stock of what has by then happened at the United Nations, as well as considering the two papers. Lord Carrington will have to be represented by the Lord Privy Seal; he himself will be away almost continuously from 22nd September until November (he will be back only for the Party Conference, for two week-ends and on 13th and 24th October).

*R L Wade-Gery*

19th September 1980

R L WADE-GERY

c Sir Robert Armstrong o/r



20 SEP 1980



CONFIDENTIAL

*PM has discussed*



PRIME MINISTER

*MAD*

SOUTH AFRICA

I have just seen the final recommendations of the UN Arms Embargo Committee which are likely to be considered by the Security Council on 25 September. I understand that the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs may be speaking to you during the weekend about the line we should take in the Security Council.

Several of the recommendations affect our trading interests and I think I should let you know my views immediately. Naturally I deplore any widening of the present arms embargo; but I also acknowledge that it would be foolish to put at risk our substantial commercial interests in black Africa over proposals that did us no serious harm, and (as modifications to an existing embargo that we have accepted) give away no new principles.

There are many points in the recommendations that I should like to see omitted or softened, and I hope our delegation in New York will continue to do their best to achieve these amendments before any resolution is presented to the Security Council. I therefore attach great importance to the closest consultation between my officials and those of the FCO. However there are two points which in my view we must regard as non-negotiable, and which, if they are not met, should justify our using our veto in the Security Council, either with the United States and France, or if necessary alone. These two sticking points are:-

- (i) that recommendation 6 (which attempts to ban the export to South Africa of dual-purpose equipment, widely-defined) should be drastically narrowed in its scope to apply only to exports to South Africa of a type used primarily for military purposes, and



- (ii) that no recommendation should interfere with existing contracts for the supply of goods to South Africa. (You will of course recall the strong opposition we encountered when we attempted to introduce retrospective sanctions against Iran.)

I hope you will be able to agree that our delegation in New York be instructed accordingly.

I am copying this to other members of OD, the Secretary of State for Industry and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Department of Trade  
1 Victoria Street  
London, SW1H 0ET

19 September 1980

*ll.*  
ff JN

(Approved by the Secretary of State and signed in his absence.)



CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT MINUTE

PRIME MINISTER

South Africa

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/ attempted ..



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attempted to introduce retrospective sanctions against Iran.)

4 I hope you will be able to agree that our delegation in New York be instructed accordingly.

5 I am copying this to other members of OD, the Secretary of State for Industry and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

6. Between my return from Paris and my departure for my constituency I found the enclosed papers. In view of the extreme importance & urgency of this matter, I am taking the liberty of handing in to No 10 tonight my departmental briefing and this draft minute.

7. Earlier correspondence indicates my concern at the tactics, so far pursued by our negotiators in this matter.

8. I think that I should telephone you about this matter CONFIDENTIAL and the Greek Power Station contract over the weekend.

JN.





cc MfT  
PS Secretary  
Mr Caines Dep Sec  
Mr Kemp ECGD  
Mr Clarke CRE5  
Mr Coleman Sols  
Mr Priston CRE4

D of Trade internal  
briefing SW

Secretary of State

SOUTH AFRICA

1  
See below

Cabinet Office are circulating today for Ministers' weekend boxes a detailed assessment by officials of the impact on UK interests of a UN sanctions Resolution against South Africa and of any black African retaliation against a UK veto of such a Resolution. The important points are the size of our interests in both South Africa and black Africa, our vulnerability to retaliation and the serious risks involved in accepting wide-ranging sanctions on the one hand, and vetoing alone such sanctions on the other.

2 The Report was commissioned against the risk that the Namibia crisis might result in pressure for an economic boycott of South Africa. In fact, as you know, pressure for tighter control on the supply of arms and related material to South Africa has suddenly developed in the UN, even though there has been no break-down in negotiations over Namibia.

3  
See Flag A


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I attended a meeting yesterday afternoon at the Cabinet Office which examined the latest draft of the Report of the UN Arms Embargo Committee. A final version of the Committee's conclusion is attached. This will probably be considered by the Security Co on Thursday 25 September. I also attach two telegrams which report on the last meeting of the Committee. The main point is that there are now some hopeful signs that the Americans and the French may switch - although it would be unwise to rely on them in view of their behaviour so far.

S

4 Between now and Thursday HMG will need to decide what its line should be. The report is a mixed bag. Some proposals do no



more than we are already obliged to do under the existing UN Resolution. Paragraphs 2 to 7 and 9 and 12 are of most interest to DOT. Our initial reactions to these are as follows:

- Para 1: with some softening of the word "guarantees", no great difficulty but this is primarily for MOD.
- Para 2: the provision of spares is already embargoed. We believe however that there are some current maintenance and service agreements which would have to be terminated. Retrospective application is objectionable. Primarily for MOI
- Para 3: this would create little or no damage to South Africa but it would lead to some loss of income to UK companies.
- Para 4: no difficulty since covered by present embargo.
- Para 5: most investment is financed by reinvestment of funds by U owned South African companies which would be unaffected. In any case, difficult to distinguish between investment for arms manufacture and investment for other purposes. Little practical effect.
- Para 6: bans all "dual purpose" equipment including specifically all aircraft, aircraft spares, electronics and telecommunications equipment and landrovers. Significant impact on exports, and by bringing civil goods within scope of boycott creates precedent for further action. Highly objectionable.
- Para 7: bans all sales (including non-military items) to the South African forces. Widens existing boycott, but impact on our exports uncertain. Any retrospective application would be objectionable. Would also add to administrative burden of export control.
- Para 9: we already have enforcement machinery with appropriate penalties. No difficulty.
- Para 12: we do not think the proposed ban on imports of arms and related material would cause difficulty, but Departments are still checking.



- 5 To sum up, we have two fundamental difficulties. Firstly in paragraph 6 we require a much narrower definition of "dual purpose" with all the types of equipment specified left out. If the ban applied only to equipment of a type used primarily for military purposes, even though used for civilian purposes, the effect would be little different from the situation we have now. Second paragraph 6, 7 and others should not apply retrospectively. Action against existing contracts would be heavily criticised in the House and by industry. It would also result in heavy claims against ECGD. (The best rough estimate we can make is that these could amount to £40m or more).
- 6 Without doubt, the best course would be for the UK, the Americans and the French to agree together to impose a triple veto, but for the reasons given in earlier minutes, it is possible that we will find ourselves isolated in the Security Council. In this event we can either:
- (i) negotiate essential changes in the draft using the threat of unilateral veto to secure concessions. If we can secure these changes we should then acquiesce in the resolution. The main objection is that this might be regarded as the slippery slope towards full economic sanctions against South Africa.
  - (ii) refuse on grounds of principle to accept any widening of the existing embargo, and if need be veto alone. But this would demonstrate to the Allies that we would veto any sanctions Resolution, no matter how mild. They could then sit back in the knowledge that the UK would protect their interests, and we would incur the wrath of the black African states, with possible damage to our trade.
- 7 This is a difficult decision with arguments on both sides. As they stand at present, the recommendations are in our view unacceptable and should be vetoed. But we expect that the Americans and the French will not accept it as it stands, and that further significant watering down will take place. We think that from the DOT's viewpoint, if we can secure a much narrower paragraph 6 on the lines suggested earlier and the elimination of retrospection



we could just about get by without serious damage. These changes are the essential minimum. A number of other changes are desirable and should if possible be secured, but need not be absolute sticking points.

8 The Prime Minister and Lord Carrington are both away next week and will not be able to be present at any Ministerial meeting to discuss the issue. I understand that the Foreign Secretary will seek a steer from the Prime Minister over the weekend. An ad hoc group of Ministers, with the Lord Privy Seal representing the FCO, may meet next week, but it will be operating within the discretion allowed by the Prime Minister. It is important therefore that the Secretary of State also communicates his views to the Prime Minister.

9 A draft minute to the PM, which if not sent would serve as a special note, is attached.

Frags D.

R Williams  
US/CRE5  
215 5400  
304 V/St  
19 September 1980

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DESKBY 190800Z  
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 190042Z SEPT 80  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1306 OF 18 SEPTEMBER.  
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS WASHINGTON, ROUTINE MOD (DS 11).

MIPT: SOUTH AFRICA: UN ARMS EMBARGO COMMITTEE.

FOLLOWING IS LATEST VERSION OF TEXT OF THE COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS:

BEGINS

A. THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS ARE SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION AND DECISION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 11 OF SCR 473(1980). RESERVATIONS ARE LISTED AT B.

1. ALL STATES SHOULD UNDERTAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO CLOSE EXISTING LOOPHOLES IN THE EMBARGO. TO THIS END, ALL STATES SHOULD ENSURE THAT ARMS EXPORT AGREEMENTS INCLUDE GUARANTEES WHICH WOULD PREVENT EMBARGOED ITEMS FROM REACHING THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AND POLICE THROUGH THIRD COUNTRIES. THE GUARANTEES SHOULD COVER COMPONENTS OF EMBARGOED ITEMS SUB-CONTRACTED BY FIRMS FROM ONE COUNTRY TO ANOTHER.

2. STATES SHOULD PROHIBIT THE EXPORT OF SPARE PARTS FOR EMBARGOED AIRCRAFT AND OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT BELONGING TO SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE MAINTENANCE AND SERVICING OF SUCH EQUIPMENT.

12 3. STATES SHOULD REVOKE OR TERMINATE ALL INDUSTRIAL LICENCES PREVIOUSLY CONCLUDED WITH SOUTH AFRICA TO MANUFACTURE ARMS AND RELATED MATERIEL OF ALL TYPES.

4. STATES SHOULD PROHIBIT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND CORPORATIONS UNDER THEIR JURISDICTION FROM TRANSFERRING TECHNOLOGY OR USING TECHNOLOGY SUBJECT TO THEIR CONTROL IN THE MANUFACTURE OF ARMS AND RELATED MATERIEL OF ALL TYPES IN SOUTH AFRICA.

u.s. F 5 5. STATES SHOULD PROHIBIT CORPORATIONS UNDER THEIR JURISDICTION FROM INVESTING IN THE MANUFACTURE OF ARMS AND RELATED MATERIEL IN SOUTH AFRICA.

u.s. F 6. STATES SHOULD PROHIBIT THE EXPORT TO SOUTH AFRICA OF QUOTE DUAL PURPOSE UNQUOTE ITEMS, I.E., ITEMS PROVIDED FOR CIVILIAN USE BUT WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR DIVERSION OR CONVERSION TO MILITARY USE. IN PARTICULAR, THEY SHOULD CEASE THE SUPPLY OF AIRCRAFT, AIRCRAFT ENGINES, AIRCRAFT PARTS, ELECTRONIC AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND COMPUTERS TO SOUTH AFRICA. SUPPLIES OF 4-WHEEL DRIVE VEHICLES DESTINED FOR THE MILITARY OR POLICE FORCES SHOULD ALSO BE PROHIBITED.

/Y. ALL

F  
7. ALL EXPORTS TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY AND POLICE, EXCEPT MEDICAL EQUIPMENT SOLD TO CIVILIAN USERS, SHOULD BE PROHIBITED.

F  
U.S.  
8. ALL FORMS OF NUCLEAR COLLABORATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD CEASE. THERE SHOULD ALSO BE A TERMINATION OF THE EXCHANGE OF NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, AS WELL AS THE TERMINATION OF THE TRAINING OF SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS IN ANY COUNTRY.

9. ALL STATES SHOULD ENSURE THAT THEIR NATIONAL LEGISLATION OR COMPARABLE POLICY DIRECTIVES GUARANTEE THAT SPECIFIC PROVISIONS TO IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION 418 (1977) INCLUDE STIFF PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS.

U.S.  
10. ALL STATES SHOULD INCLUDE IN THEIR NATIONAL LEGISLATION OR COMPARABLE POLICY DIRECTIVES PROVISIONS TO PROHIBIT WITHIN THEIR NATIONAL JURISDICTION THE ENLISTMENT AND/OR THE RECRUITMENT OF MERCENARIES OR ANY OTHER PERSONNEL FOR SERVICE WITH SOUTH AFRICA'S MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES.

F  
11. STATES WHICH HAVE NOT DONE SO SHOULD PUT AN END TO EXCHANGES OF MILITARY ATTACHES, AS WELL AS EXCHANGES OF VISITS BY GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL, EXPERTS IN WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY AND EMPLOYEES OF ARMS FACTORIES UNDER THEIR JURISDICTION, WHEN SUCH VISITS AND EXCHANGES MAINTAIN OR INCREASE SOUTH AFRICA'S MILITARY OR POLICE CAPABILITIES.

12. NO STATE SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO SOUTH AFRICA'S ARMS AND PRODUCTION CAPABILITY; THUS THE EMBARGO SHOULD INCLUDE IMPORTS OF ARMS AND RELATED MATERIEL OF ALL TYPES FROM SOUTH AFRICA.

F  
13. NATO COUNTRIES, IN IMPLEMENTING THE TERMS OF RESOLUTION 418 (1977), SHOULD REJECT ANY ARMS PURCHASE ORDERS BY SOUTH AFRICA, SUBMITTED THROUGH THE CODIFICATION SYSTEM USED BY NATO MEMBER STATES.

14. RECALLING THE PROVISION OF PARAGRAPH 1 (C) OF RESOLUTION 421 (1977) WHICH REQUESTS THE COMMITTEE QUOTE TO SEEK FROM ALL STATES FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING ACTION TAKEN BY THEM CONCERNING THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS LAID DOWN IN RESOLUTION 418 (1977) UNQUOTE, THE COMMITTEE CONSIDERS THAT FURTHER ACTION IS NEEDED TO STUDY SYSTEMATICALLY THE INTERNATIONAL FLOW OF ARMS TO SOUTH AFRICA, WITH A VIEW TO MONITOR AND VERIFY EFFECTIVELY THE TRANSFERS OF ARMS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE EMBARGO. MEASURES SHOULD ALSO BE TAKEN TO INVESTIGATE VIOLATIONS AND PREVENT FUTURE CIRCUMVENTION OF THE EMBARGO. INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SHOULD BE MORE INFORMED AS TO THE TERMS OF THE EMBARGO AND ALERTED TO ITS VIOLATIONS. IT IS, THEREFORE, NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN DIRECT CONTACT WITH RESPONSIBLE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS WHOSE ACTIVITIES AND/OR EXPERTISE ARE LIKELY TO PROMOTE THE STRICT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMBARGO. CONSEQUENTLY, THE COMMITTEE CONSIDERS THAT THE MACHINERY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMBARGO SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED.

15. A SANCTIONS

F  
u.s.

15. A SANCTIONS BRANCH SHOULD BE CREATED WITHIN THE SECRETARIAT TO ASSIST THE COMMITTEE IN CARRYING OUT ITS FUNCTIONS AS OUTLINED ABOVE.

16. ONE MEMBER PROPOSED THAT THE COMMITTEE RECOMMEND THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD CALL ON ALL STATES WHICH CONTINUE TO COLLABORATE WITH SOUTH AFRICA IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD TO STOP SUCH COLLABORATION UNLESS SOUTH AFRICA ACCEPTS FULL-SCOPE INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS.

B. THE UNITED KINGDOM PLACED A GENERAL RESERVE ON THE ABOVE. FRANCE EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ON PARAS 3, 5, 7, 11, 13 AND 15 AND ITS OPPOSITION TO PARAS 6 AND 8. THE UNITED STATES EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS WITH REGARD TO PARAGRAPHS 5, 6, 8, 10 AND 15.

ENDS

PARSONS

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SOUTHERN AFRICA STANDARD

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1305 OF 18 SEPTEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS WASHINGTON ROUTINE MOD DS11

MIPT: SOUTH AFRICA: UN ARMS EMBARGO

1. YOU WILL SEE FROM MIPT THAT FRENCH SUPPORT MAY (REPEAT MAY) BE FIRMING UP PARTLY BECAUSE OF US RAILROADING TACTICS. THE PORTUGUESE WHO EARLIER HAD EXPRESSED GENERAL SUPPORT FOR THE RECOMMENDATIONS APPEAR TO BE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS BECAUSE OF THE POTENTIALLY FAR REACHING IMPLICATIONS OF US ADVOCACY OF A BAN ON SALES OF ALL GOODS WHICH MIGHT GET IN TO THE HANDS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY OR POLICE. EVEN THE AMERICANS HAVE PROBLEMS WITH SOME OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS.
2. IT IS TOO EARLY TO GUESS WITH ANY CERTAINTY AT AFRICAN INTENTIONS. WE KNOW THAT THEY ARE THINKING OF CALLING A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING TO START ON 25 SEPTEMBER TO GIVE THEIR FOREIGN MINISTERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO SOUND OFF AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA ON APARTHEID. BUT THEY HAVE NOT YET SENT IN A LETTER ASKING FORMALLY FOR SUCH A MEETING. THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY HAVE BEEN TOO BUSY WITH OTHER MATTERS TO FOCUS THEIR MINDS.
3. IF THIS MEETING TAKES PLACE, THE COMMITTEE REPORT WILL BE ON THE TABLE. MY PRESENT FEELING IS THAT THE AFRICAN STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO EXTEND THE ARMS EMBARGO AS MUCH AS THEY CAN RATHER THAN TO PROVOKE WESTERN VETOES. THEIR AIM WOULD BE A RESOLUTION IN MANDATORY LANGUAGE. THEY ARE LIKELY TO PLAY THE DETAILS BY EAR AS THE DEBATE DEVELOPS. ON PAST FORM THEIR TACTICS MIGHT WELL BE TO ESTABLISH THE MAXIMUM THEY CAN GET OUT OF THE AMERICANS AND THEN BRING PRESSURE ON THE FRENCH AND OURSELVES TO FALL INTO LINE. AT THAT STAGE WE MIGHT STILL HAVE A LITTLE NEGOTIATING MARGIN EG ON MANDATORY/NON-MANDATORY LANGUAGE ON INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPHS, BUT THE AFRICANS WOULD PROBABLY TRY TO PICK OFF THE FRENCH FIRST, LEAVING US IN THE LAST DITCH. ALL THIS MIGHT GO ON FOR SOME DAYS.

PARSONS

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 190040Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1304 OF 18 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS WASHINGTON ROUTINE MOD DS11

MY TELNOS 1299 AND 1300; SOUTH AFRICA; UN ARMS EMBARGO COMMITTEE.

1. THE COMMITTEE MET ALL DAY TODAY ( 18 SEPTEMBER ) AND AGREED ITS RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL SUBJECT TO DETAILED RESERVATIONS FROM FRANCE AND THE US AND A GENERAL RESERVATION FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM.
2. THERE WAS AN UNEDIFYING OPEN DISPUTE AMONG NATO ALLIES (FRANCE, PORTUGAL AND THE US) OVER A COMPLETE REWORDING OF PARA 7 PROPOSED BY THE AMERICANS.
3. WE MADE A SHORT STATEMENT POINTING OUT THAT THE RECOMMENDATIONS HAD ONLY JUST REACHED THEIR FINAL FORM AND WOULD NEED CAREFUL EXAMINATION BY MANY GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS. WE THEN PLACED A GENERAL RESERVE ON ALL OF THEM
4. FRANCE EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ON PARAS 3,5,11, 13 AND 15, ITS STRONG OPPOSITION TO PARAS 6 AND 8, AND LATER A RESERVATION ON THE NEW AMERICAN WORDING FOR PARA 7 (SEE TEXT IN MIFT).
5. THE US EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ON PARAS 5,6,8, 10 AND 15.
6. PORTUGAL ASKED FOR 24 HOURS TO CONSIDER THE NEW AMERICAN WORDING FOR PARA 7.
7. COMMENT ON SECURITY COUNCIL PROSPECTS IS IN MY FIRST IFT AND LATEST VERSION OF THE TEXT OF THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS IS IN MY SECOND IFT.

PARSONS

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S. A. F.  
File 106



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

12 September 1980

MR. LUCE'S VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 11 September about Mr. Luce's visit to South Africa.

She agrees that the Ambassador should speak as proposed in your letter.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

M. A. Arthur, Esq.,  
Lord Privy Seal's Office.

MAA

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 September 1980

Dear Michael

Prime Minister the Ambassador  
Agree that ~~A. Luce~~ should speak as an 'A'?

Yes not.

Phind 4/5

The Prime Minister will wish to know that as part of a Southern African tour Mr Luce will be visiting South Africa from 16 to 19 September and hopes to have talks with the Prime Minister and other Ministers, and some of the influential black and coloured leaders.

With the South African Prime Minister Mr Luce will want to discuss Namibia and to learn what he can of the prospects for new internal initiatives in South Africa, in the light of the recent Cabinet changes, and of Mr Botha's renewed public attack on entrenched opposition to change in the country's racial policies. HM Ambassador in Pretoria has suggested that it would create a favourable climate for Mr Luce's talks if he was able to say in advance that Mr Luce would be bringing a message from the Prime Minister.

A The Lord Privy Seal would not wish to recommend that the Prime Minister should at this stage send a substantive or written message. He agrees with the Ambassador however that it would be helpful to the talks if the South African Government knew in advance of the Prime Minister's personal interest in the discussions. He suggests therefore that the Ambassador should be authorised to tell the

/South

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

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A. South African Government that the Prime Minister attaches importance to Mr Luce's visit: that she sees the discussions he will have as a continuation of the useful dialogue launched earlier this year at the time of Lord Hunt's visit to South Africa; that she hopes the visit will provide the opportunity for a wide-ranging discussion with Mr P W Botha of Southern African questions; and that she will be particularly interested to learn of Mr Botha's assessment of recent developments.

If the Prime Minister agrees we shall so instruct the Ambassador.

*Yours ever*

*Michael Arthur*

M A Arthur

File No.....

Department SAfD.....

Drafted by S N P HEMANS  
(Block Capitals).....

Tel. Extn.....

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

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AND SAVING TO .....

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SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution: -

[TEXT]

Personal for Ambassador from Allinson.

Your telno 324: DIALOGUE WITH SOUTH AFRICA.

1. You may tell the South Africans that the Prime Minister attaches importance to Mr Luce's visit: that she sees the discussions which he will have as a continuation of the useful dialogue launched earlier this year at the time of Lord Hunt's visit to South Africa, and that she hopes the visit will provide the opportunity for a wide-ranging discussion with Mr P W Botha of Southern African questions in which she will be particularly interested to learn of Mr Botha's assessment of recent developments.

Copies to: -

2. We do not believe that for Mr Luce to say this to Mr Botha at the start of talks is sufficiently substantive to justify telling the South Africans in advance that he will be bringing a message from the Prime Minister, and that to do so would risk raising expectations. We believe however that <sup>(the action in para 1)</sup> ~~it~~ should be sufficient to kindle Mr Botha's interest and ensure a meeting. We shall not therefore be approaching the South African Embassy here lest we create the impression that we are not sure of our own justification in seeking a meeting with P W Botha.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



subject file - S. Africa  
Namibia - Pt 2

(2)

Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1

These problems will be for  
discussion at an early meeting

Lg  
Purd

of. of.

10 September 1980

Purd - 4/9

mb

Peter John

SOUTH AFRICA

As Peter Carrington is on holiday I am replying to your letter of 8 September about Namibia and sanctions against South Africa.

I agree that the South African reply to the United Nations Secretary General was not as positive as we would have wished. But behind the rhetoric a continuing readiness to proceed towards implementation of the UN plan was clearly evident. So far the reply has been treated by the UN and by the Front Line States as offering possibilities for bringing agreement nearer on implementation of the UN Settlement Plan. Certainly there appears to be no disposition - so far - to regard it as a cause for further recourse to the Security Council or for renewed demands for sanctions.

That being said I agree that our aim must be to persuade our allies that their interests, like ours, require that we do everything possible to avoid sanctions demands being made, and that we should together resist them if they are. The Anglo-French summit will have a very wide agenda, but we are naturally including the point in our briefing for the Prime Minister.

At the officials meeting in New York on 11/12 September about Namibia I have no doubt that there will be discussion of sanctions particularly, but not only, in the Namibia context. In any such  
/discussion

The Rt Hon John Nott MP  
Secretary of State for Trade  
1 Victoria Street  
London SW1



discussion our object will be to convince our partners that the interests of all of us would be best served, in the event of sanctions demands, by a triple US/French/British veto in the Security Council. But I think it would be mistaken at this stage to indicate that we would veto regardless. This would simply allow our partners to conclude that they could hide behind a British veto. A solitary British veto could be very damaging to our overall interests in Black Africa, including our extensive commercial interests. It will therefore be tactically wise to cast doubt on our readiness to incur the odium of a solitary veto, and thus reinforce the need for our partners to take their own stands against sanctions. In this way we hope that the result will be united Western opposition.

I agree that we will certainly need to study the results of the official examination of the impact of sanctions or a veto.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, other Members of OD, to Keith Joseph and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

your ✓  
/an

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RH

*South  
Africa*

MR WRIGHT  
CABINET OFFICE

South Africa

I agree with your minute of 9 September proposing that Ministerial discussion of arms exports to South Africa should be linked with OD's discussion of South African sanctions in general.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

10 September, 1980

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*R.*

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. ALEXANDER


South Africa

In his letter of 27th August to Mr. Neilands in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, about the change in our guidelines relating to the United Nations embargo on the provision of arms to South Africa, Mr. Sanders mentioned that the Prime Minister might wish to have the problem considered further in the Ministerial Committee on Exports (EX).

2. Meanwhile it looks as if we shall fairly soon need a meeting of OD to consider the whole subject of sanctions against South Africa (Mr. Nott's letter of 8th September to Lord Carrington refers), on the basis of an interdepartmental study which is nearing completion at official level (MISC 43).

3. In his letter, Mr. Sanders did not specify when collective Ministerial discussion of the arms export point might be needed. It would seem natural to link it with OD's discussion of South African sanctions in general. The two subjects are related, though separate; and it would seem better to concentrate them both in OD, rather than dividing them between OD and EX. Do you agree?


*Sitm in Namibia,  
South Africa Pt 2*



(D. J. Wright)

9th September 1980

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Subject file - S Africa  
Namibia - Pt 2.

NRPA yet

Phms

From the Secretary of State

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The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington KCMG MC  
Secretary of State for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Downing Street  
London, SW1A 2AL

8 September 1980

Dear Peter.

SOUTH AFRICA

I understand that the latest South African response to the UN Secretary General about Namibia is by no means as helpful as we would wish, and that accordingly there are likely to be renewed calls in the UN for economic sanctions against South Africa. I am sure we are agreed that in coming weeks we must make every effort to persuade our Western allies that their economic interests in South Africa are not dissimilar to our own, and that together we should resist any call in the UN for sanctions.

The first major opportunity in this context will of course come at the Anglo-French Summit meeting later this month, and no doubt it will be possible then to test the attitude of the French on South African issues.

I understand also that in New York next week your officials will be participating with officials of our principal allies in talks about Namibia. I am sure that if the possibility of sanctions is raised in that context, we should say nothing which would lead the allies to think that we are prepared to contemplate sanctions. In this connection, I understand that officials have been examining the

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*From the Secretary of State*

likely impact that sanctions would have on our trade with South Africa, and what the reaction of the black African states would be to a Western veto of a UN resolution. The results should be available soon. I hope there will then be an early opportunity for us to discuss in OD Committee how we should react should there be any sign that our allies are prepared to concede any sanctions.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, other members of OD, Sir Keith Joseph and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Cons - ev  
John

JOHN NOTT

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PART 2 begins:-

Cab Office to MODBA 9.9.80

PART 3 ends:-

MODBA to Cab Off 10.10.80

