

PREM 19/953

# Relations with Argentina

# ARGENTINA

Position of the Falkland Islands,  
their rehabilitation and future.

Pt 1: Sept 1979

Shackleton Report and follow-up

Internal Situation in Argentina

PART 35

Pt 35: Sept 1983

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>19.9.83</del>		<del>18.11.83</del>					
<del>3.10.83</del>		<del>21.11.83</del>					
<del>11.10.83</del>		<del>23/11/83</del>					
<del>18.10.83</del>		<del>25.11.83</del>					
<del>19.10.83</del>		<del>28.11.83</del>					
<del>20.10.83</del>		<del>1/12/83</del>					
<del>27.10.83</del>		<del>5.12.83</del>					
<del>26.10.83</del>		<del>8/12/83</del>					
<del>28.10.83</del>		<del>12.12.83</del>					
<del>3.10.83</del>		<del>15.12.83</del>					
<del>1/11/83</del>		<del>25.12.83</del>					
<del>4/11/83</del>		<del>23.12.83</del>					
<del>8/11/83</del>		<del>30.12.83</del>					
<del>9.11.83</del>							
<del>14.11.83</del>							
<del>15.11.83</del>							
<del>16.11.83</del>							
<del>17.11.83</del>							

PREM 19/953

~~PART ENDS~~

~~X~~

PART 35 ends:-

~~Solicitor General to PM 30.12.83~~

FCO to AJC 30.12.83

PART 36 begins:-

AJC to Law Officers Dept 3.1.84





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>953</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Letter from Bone to Coles dated 30 December 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <i>40</i> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>17 January 2013</i> <i>Wayland</i>
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Classification and Caveats

Precedence/Despatch

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IMMEDIATE

ZCZC 1 ZCZC  
 GRS 2 GRS  
 CLASS 3 CONFIDENTIAL  
 CAVEATS 4  
 DESKBY 5  
 FM FCO 6 FM FCO  
 PRE/ADD 7 TO IMMEDIATE BERNE  
 TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
 9 RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA: NEXT STEPS  
 10 1. We now need to follow up the exchange of messages between  
 11 the Prime Minister and President Alfonsin. (I am most  
 12 grateful for Probst's help in transmitting our message:  
 13 text of letter to him follows.)  
 14 2. I should be grateful if you could make an early appoint-  
 15 ment to see Probst again and tell him that you are now able  
 16 to give him details of the follow-up action envisaged when  
 17 you saw him on 14 December (your telegram No 259). You  
 18 should say that we would now like the Swiss Ambassador in  
 19 Buenos Aires to approach the Argentines. Our preference  
 20 would be for Keusch to see Gobbi, the Minister at the MFA  
 21 with direct responsibility for these matters.  
 /// 22 3. It will be necessary for the Swiss, in this highly  
 // 23 important initial approach, to strike the correct balance.  
 / 24 *We trust that they will accept*  
 25 ~~They will be aware that there is no inconsistency between~~

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword our
File number	Dept FID	Distribution  (Private Secretary may wish to decide)
Drafted by (Block capitals) A E PALMER		
Telephone number 233.8020		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcon reference	Time of despatch	

1 <<<<

2 our declared willingness to improve bilateral relations with  
3 Argentina and our determination to stand by our commitments to  
4 the Falkland Islanders. *and maybe we will not discuss sovereignty* We know that the Argentines, for their  
5 part, are bound to reaffirm their claim to the Islands. There  
6 are thus constraints which both sides must recognise, but we hope  
7 these need not prevent us from establishing a more productive  
8 relationship, and to managing this in a progressive way without  
9 prejudice to the basic positions of either side.

10 4. My IFT contains the text of a speaking note which we hope  
11 the Swiss will agree to transmit to Keusch, giving him  
12 discretion to leave a copy with Gobbi if he judges this to be  
13 advisable. *now to negotiate any pact with them, you have discretion,* While we do not wish to invite comments on the  
14 substance from the Swiss, *the matter* if Probst volunteers advice on the  
15 tactics of handling ~~this~~, ~~you have discretion~~ to refer back before  
16 pressing for immediate action. Otherwise, I should be grateful  
17 if the Swiss Ambassador could make his representations to Gobbi  
18 as soon as he possibly can, holiday season permitting.

19 5. We hope the Swiss Ambassador will also agree with the  
20 Argentine MFA that, while it is already public knowledge that we  
21 intend to follow up the Prime Minister's exchange of messages  
22 with President Alfonsin, we think the public line about any  
23 exchanges at this stage should be to confirm, if asked, that we  
24 are exploring ways of doing this, *but* giving no details. You should  
25 bear in mind that a senior official involved in this problem  
26 would be available to visit Berne at any stage that you or the  
27 Swiss thought ~~that this~~ would be helpful.

28 HOWE

30 NNNN

NNN ends  
telegram

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Catchword

Argentina



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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

20 December 1983

In the light of telegram No. 958 of 16 December from Buenos Aires I have contacted Sir Anthony Jolliffe to see if I could discover what further contact he had had with Senor Spilsinger since he last spoke to me on 11 November. The outcome is recorded in the attached note. There are clearly some dangers in this situation, but I think that my conversation will have helped to alert Sir Anthony Jolliffe to them. If you thought it right to pass any of this in confidence to H.M. Ambassador in Buenos Aires I would have no objection.

E. E. R. BUTLER

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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NOTE FOR THE RECORD

I spoke to Sir Anthony Jolliffe on the telephone on 20 December. Recalling our last conversation on Friday 11 November, I asked him whether he could bring me up-to-date on any further contacts he had had with Senor Spilsinger.

Sir Anthony Jolliffe said that he had met Senor Spilsinger in New York at the end of November. Senor Spilsinger had said that he was about to be appointed by the Argentine Government to make secret approaches to the British Government and would give Sir Anthony Jolliffe a memorandum about this.

I commented that there were some dangers in the present situation. We had some evidence that Senor Spilsinger was not well known to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Buenos Aires but might be suggesting to them that he could make contact with them on behalf of the British Government. There was a danger of creating misunderstandings.

Sir Anthony Jolliffe said that he had made clear that he could do nothing unless he received a memorandum from Senor Spilsinger making quite clear that it came from the Argentine Government. Even then, he could do no more than act as a postman and transmit it to the British Government. He would take note of what I had said and would take no initiative in the matter unless and until Senor Spilsinger approached him.

I said that I thought this was wise. I asked him to let me know of any further contacts between himself and Senor Spilsinger on this matter and Sir Anthony Jolliffe agreed to do so.

FERB

20 December 1983

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FM LISBON 201652Z DEC 83  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 245 OF 20 DECEMBER 1983

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YOUR TELNO 147: ARGENTINA-PORTUGAL

1. I SAW PORTUGUESE PRIME MINISTER ON 19 DECEMBER.
2. SOARES SAID HE HAD ASKED TO SEE ME BECAUSE HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE PRESS ABOUT HIS VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES AND HAD MENTIONED PRESIDENT ALFONSIN'S WISH FOR BETTER RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN. HE WANTED TO GIVE ME HIS IMPRESSIONS.
3. ALFONSIN HAD STRUCK HIM AS LIKE A EUROPEAN LIBERAL - 'RATHER LIKE HELMUT SCHMIDT'. HE HAD ALREADY TAKEN SOME ACTION AGAINST THE MILITARY, DISMISSING 57 GENERALS AND SPEAKING AGAINST MILITARY VENTURES BY WHICH HE HAD MEANT THE FALKLANDS INVASION. HE WOULD HAVE REAL DIFFICULTIES WITH THE PERONISTS AND LABOUR ORGANISATIONS BUT SOARES BELIEVED THERE WAS A PROSPECT THAT DEMOCRACY COULD BE RESTORED IN ARGENTINA AND HAD RETURNED CONVINCED THAT IT WAS IN THE INTERESTS OF EUROPE AND THE WEST THAT ALFONSIN SHOULD SUCCEED.
4. DURING MEETINGS IN BUENOS AIRES SOARES HAD STRESSED PORTUGAL'S ALLIANCE WITH BRITAIN AND IMPORTANCE HE PERSONALLY ATTACHED TO HIS RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN WHOSE PRIME MINISTER HE HAD INVITED TO VISIT PORTUGAL SOON. AT A SUBSEQUENT PRIVATE MEETING ALFONSIN HAD REVERTED TO THIS AND ASKED HIM IF HE WOULD DO WHAT HE COULD TO CONVINCE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF HIS WISH FOR BETTER RELATIONS. SOARES SAID HE FELT IT HIS DUTY TO TRANSMIT THIS MESSAGE. HE BELIEVED THAT AT HEART DEMOCRATIC POLITICIANS IN ARGENTINA KNEW QUITE WELL THAT BUT FOR MRS THATCHER'S RESPONSE TO THE FALKLANDS INVASION THEY WOULD NOT HAVE GOT THEIR PRESENT OPPORTUNITY. BRITAIN (AND THEREFORE EUROPE) WAS STILL UNPOPULAR IN SOUTH AMERICA BUT THERE WAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESUME A HEALTHFUL DEMOCRATIC INFLUENCE.
5. I ASKED IF ALFONSIN HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE. SOARES SAID THAT SEQUENCE HAD BEEN AS DESCRIBED ABOVE. ALFONSIN HAD RAISED QUESTION OF IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH HMG AS SOON AS HE HAD RECEIVED SOARES IN PRIVATE.
6. I THANKED SOARES FOR HIS ACCOUNT AND UNDERTOOK TO REPORT. I THEN SPOKE ON LINES OF GUIDANCE TELNO 166 (PARAGRAPH 4). MEMORIES OF THE CONFLICT FORCED UPON US LAST YEAR WERE STILL FRESH AND CONFIDENCE HAD TO BE REBUILT STEP BY STEP. I FELT SURE THERE WOULD BE GRATITUDE IN LONDON FOR SOARES'S INTEREST AND THAT THIS WOULD BE BORNE IN MIND. WE WERE NOW PURSUING DEVELOPMENTS THROUGH OUR OWN CHANNELS.

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7. IN A SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH SOARES'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISER, WHO HAD BEEN PRESENT, HE TOLD ME HE THOUGHT SOARES HAD BEEN GLAD OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE AN ACCOUNT OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT ALFONSIN. HE WOULD NOT EXPECT ANY IMMEDIATE RESPONSE BUT MIGHT REVERT TO THE MATTER DURING THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO LISBON.

8. SEE ALSO MIFT.

BYATT

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FM UKREP BRUSSELS 191505Z DEC 83  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 4544 OF 19 DECEMBER  
 INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS

*mt*

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

**ARMS SALES TO ARGENTINA**

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD A WORD WITH CHEYSSON IN THE MARGINS OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL THIS MORNING ABOUT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO REMOVE EXISTING RESTRAINTS ON ARMS SALES TO ARGENTINA.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HOPED TO HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF COLLEAGUES OVER LUNCH ABOUT THE STEPS WE HOPED MIGHT BE TAKEN TO HELP NORMALISE RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA. HE HAD, HOWEVER, BEEN DISMAYED BY THE FRENCH DECISION ON ARMS SALES. THERE WAS A REAL RISK THAT IT WOULD ONVEY THE WRONG SIGNAL. THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT ALFONSIN DID NOT WISH TO UNDERTAKE A PROGRAMME OF HEAVY MILITARY EXPENDITURE: THERE WERE NEVERTHELESS PRESSURES ON HIM FROM THE MILITARY, AND THE FRENCH DECISION WOULD NOT HELP. ALFONSIN'S REGIME HAD NOT YET DECLARED A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

3. ON THE PATTERN OF SALES, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE HOPED THAT HE AND CHEYSSON COULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH. A LIST SPECIFYING THE MOST SENSITIVE ITEMS, HAD BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE QUAI A YEAR AGO. EXOCET WAS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE, BUT THE OTHER ITEMS ON THE LIST WERE ALSO VERY IMPORTANT. HE HOPED THE FRENCH WOULD CONSULT US ON THE BASIS OF THAT LIST, BEFORE ANY PARTICULAR SALE WAS AGREED.

4. CHEYSSON SAID THAT HE WAS UNSIGHTED ON THIS SUBJECT. HE <sup>Agreed</sup> WITH THE SUGGESTION FOR CONSULTATION. HE WOULD MAKE ENQUIRIES IN PARIS, AND LET US HAVE A CONSIDERED COMMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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ZCZC 1 ZCZC  
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 CLASS 3 CONFIDENTIAL  
 CAVEATS 4  
 DESKBY 5  
 FM FCO 6 FM FCO 1630Z DECEMBER 83  
 PRE/ADD 7 TO IMMEDIATE BERNE  
 TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
 9 MIPT: RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA  
 10 1. Following is text of speaking note.  
 11 Begins: The British Government have asked the Swiss Protecting  
 12 Power to approach the Government of Argentina, to consider means  
 13 of following up the exchange of messages on 10 December between  
 14 Mrs Thatcher and President Alfonsin. The British Government <sup>repeat</sup>  
 15 <sup>it is welcome for the return of democracy to Argentina and</sup> appreciated the Argentine President's reply to the Prime Minister's  
 16 message, <sup>They</sup> ~~and~~ believe that ~~we should now look ahead to~~ the  
 17 possibility of talks between Britain and Argentina at official  
 18 level about <sup>progressive</sup> the normalisation of relations between the two  
 19 <sup>should now be considered.</sup> countries. <sup>however</sup> It will be necessary <sup>L</sup> for both sides to recognise the  
 20 realities of the situation and the constraints under which the  
 21 other is operating.  
 22 2. With this in mind, the British Government propose that <sup>any</sup> ~~these~~  
 23 discussions should be without prejudice to the positions of the  
 24 United Kingdom and Argentina respectively on the question of  
 25 sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, and indeed, that sovereignty

///  
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NNNN ends telegram		BLANK	Catchword would not
File number		Dept FID	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) A E PALMER			
Telephone number 233 8020			
Authorised for despatch			
Comcon reference		Time of despatch	

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2 would not be discussed. Alternatively, the British Government  
 3 could accept an arrangement whereby each side made a short <sup>and self-contained</sup> L  
 4 statement of their position on this question for the record,  
 5 and then agreed ~~not~~ <sup>proceed to the discussion of a number</sup> to revert to it again during the talks  
 6 ~~on normalisation of practical issues, without prejudice to their~~  
 7 ~~stated positions.~~

8 3. It is proposed that the agenda for discussion could  
 9 include:

- 10 A. The reciprocal lifting of restrictions on trade between  
 11 the United Kingdom and Argentina.  
 12 B. The lifting of all outstanding financial restrictions.  
 13 C. Arrangements for the return of the Argentine dead from  
 14 the Falkland Islands or, failing that, for a next-of-  
 15 kin visit.  
 16 D. The resumption of air services.  
 17 E. The resumption of cultural, scientific and full  
 18 sporting contacts. <sup>(and eventual resumption)</sup>  
 19 F. The ~~eventual~~ upgrading <sup>of</sup> ~~our~~ official relations.

20 4. There have been suggestions for secret talks. The  
 21 British Government would not welcome such a procedure,  
 22 seeing no need to cloak in secrecy meetings about the  
 23 normalisation of bilateral relations. Moreover, there  
 24 would be serious dangers of misunderstanding if there were  
 25 to be clandestine discussions, and word of these were to  
 26 leak. <sup>!! S. REGARDING PRESENTATION,</sup> Sir Geoffrey Howe said in a broadcast on 11 December  
 27 that both sides are developing a will to begin taking steps  
 28 towards restoring a normal relationship. If British spokes-  
 29 men are asked about the present Swiss approach to the  
 30 Government of Argentina, they propose to confirm in general  
 31 terms that means of carrying this process forward are being  
 32 explored. But the Swiss and British Governments have no  
 33 intention of stimulating publicity at this early stage.  
 34 The public presentation of talks between British and

NNNN ends  
telegram

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Catchword

Argentine

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Argentine officials can be discussed once terms of reference have been agreed.

<sup>6</sup>5. The British Government look forward to knowing the views of the Government of Argentina on these suggestions. They consider it most important to follow up the exchange of messages through exchanges in areas on which it is realistic to expect early progress. The British Government hope that this can lead to the establishment of a renewed climate of mutual confidence *in which our relations can be managed in a practical and productive way.*

HOWE  
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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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PT 35



20 DEC 1987



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GRS 250

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(FM BERNE 191100Z)

FM BIS BUENOS AIRES

TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 958 OF 16 DECEMBER

ALFREDO SPILSINGER

*Mr. Butler*

*A. S. C. W  
/ 12*

1. ALBERTO MOLINARI, LAST YEAR'S CHAIRMAN OF THE BRITISH CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, TOLD A MEETING OF THE CHAMBER'S COUNCIL ON 15 DECEMBER HE HAD BEEN ASKED ON THURSDAY, 8 DECEMBER BY A FRIEND HIGHLY-PLACED IN THE NEW MFA TO FIND OUT WETHER ANYONE KNEW THE ABOVE-NAMED AND IN PARTICULAR WHETHER HE HAD ANY CREDENTIALS FOR MAKING CONTACT WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT ON BEHALF OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND WHETHER HE HAD BEEN IN NEW YORK LATE IN NOVEMBER.

2. RICHARD AHRENS, FORMERLY OF HARRODS (BA) SAID SPILSINGER WAS AN ACCOUNTANT, THE ARGENTINE CORRESPONDENT OF A LONDON-BASED AUDIT FIRM TAKEN OVER BY THORNTON BAKER, AND HAS REPRESENTED THEM AROUND THE WORLD. HE IS LINKED WITH CORK, JOLLIFFE, INTERNATIONAL, IS THE LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT AND WAS ONE OF THE FIRST TO BE CONVINCED ALFONSIN WOULD WIN THE ELECTION.

3. I SAID, AS FAR AS I KNEW, SPILSINGER HAD NO AUTHORITY FOR MAKING OFFICIAL CONTACTS.

JOY

POWELL-JONES

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(FM BERNE 291610Z)

*Prime Minister*

FM BIS BUENOS AIRES

*Dms  
30/12*

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 972 OF 29 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY MOD BANK OF ENGLAND ASUNCION CARACAS BRASILIA  
MONTEVIDEO SANTIAGO UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON CIVIL COMMISSIONER  
PORT STANLEY

## ALFONSIN'S FIRST TWO WEEKS : ASSESSMENT

1. AFTER TWO HECTIC WEEKS, THE NEW GOVERNMENT ARE STILL BARELY SETTLING IN BUT ALFONSIN HAS UNLEASHED A DIRECT AND FORCEFUL ASSAULT UPON THE GOVERNMENT'S MAJOR INTERNAL PROBLEMS : THE MISDEEDS OF THE FIRST THREE JUNTAS, THE PRUNING AND REORGANISATION OF THE THREE ARMED FORCES, INVESTIGATION INTO THE MISSING PEOPLE, THE ECONOMY AND DEMOCRATISATION OF THE UNIONS. THE SPEED HAS LEFT MANY PEOPLE BREATHLESS AND DISCONCERTED.

2. ALFONSIN'S PROSPECTS SEEM EVEN BRIGHTER AFTER THESE FIRST FEW WEEKS : ROBERT POTASH, A NORTH AMERICAN EXPERT ON THE ARGENTINE MILITARY, QUOTED TO ME THE RECENT WORDS OF RETIRED GENERAL AND EX-PRESIDENT LANUSSE : "FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MANY YEARS I HAVE HEARD THE VOICE OF A COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF". IT CERTAINLY APPEARS THAT PRESIDENT ALFONSIN CURRENTLY HAS THE ARMED FORCES ON THE DEFENSIVE.

3. BUT THE DANGER SIGNALS IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD ARE ALREADY FLASHING :

A. ECONOMIC POLICY IS STILL ILL-DEFINED, WITH MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS AND POLICY PROPOSALS PROLIFERATING,

B. THE DECEMBER PAY RISE WAS RECEIVED WITH RIDICULE BY THE UNIONS,

C. THE PRICE FREEZE WAS SIMILARY RECEIVED BY INDUSTRY,

D. THE TAX INCREASE PROPOSALS APPEAR TOTALLY INADEQUATE EFFECTIVELY TO REDUCE THE ENORMOUS BUDGET DEFICIT,

E. THERE ARE NO CLEARLY DEFINED PROPOSALS FOR ABSOLUTE EXPENDITURE REDUCTIONS : MAINLY SHIFTS FROM DEFENCE TO EDUCATIONAL, HEALTH AND HOUSING SPENDING,

F. THE STATEMENTS ON QUOTE PRIVATISATION UNQUOTE CONTRADICT EACH OTHER,

G. THE PERONISTS ARE DETERMINED TO OPPOSE THE NEW UNION DEMOCRATISATION LEGISLATION.

THE ECONOMY REMAINS ALFONSIN'S ACHILLES HEEL.

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4. ON BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN, A GRAPHIC DESCRIPTION BY A LOCAL JOURNALIST IS OF QUOTE TWO STONE STATUES STARTING TO SMILE AT EACH OTHER UNQUOTE. THE EXPRESSION OF GOOD WILL CONVEYED BY THE INAUGURATION MESSAGES HAS NOT RESULTED IN ANY MOVEMENT SO FAR, AND ALFONSIN'S REPLY MAY NOT EVEN HAVE CONVEYED A CLEAR SIGNAL: THE INTENTION WAS APPARENTLY THAT BRITAIN SHOULD SHOW THE WILL: IT WAS A CHALLENGE RATHER THAN A PROMISE. ARGENTINA NEEDS TO REFINE AND DEFINE ITS SHORT AND MEDIUM TERM OBJECTIVES OVER THE FALKLANDS SOVEREIGNTY ACQUISITION IS CLEARLY NOT ON BUT THE QUESTION REMAINS WHETHER THE NEW TEAM WILL BE PREPARED TO QUOTE PLAY IT LONG UNQUOTE OR WHETHER INTRANSIGENCE WILL AGAIN SPOIL THE GAME.

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SUBJECT



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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 December 1983

Top Copy on Economic  
Policy, Indebtedness,  
Pt 3  
cc Master

Dear John

Argentina: Arms Sales and Bank Lending

The Prime Minister held a meeting yesterday with the Chancellor, the Foreign Secretary and the Solicitor General. They considered the paper attached to the Chancellor's minute of 5 December.

The Prime Minister was concerned that the Government could be accused of permitting British banks to lend to Argentina who could use the money to finance weapons for use against Britain. She found this a very difficult argument to counter.

The discussion turned to the current loan agreement for \$1.5 billion, of which \$0.5 billion was drawn on 30 November. The Prime Minister said that the Government had reluctantly acquiesced in this when it was signed in August as, at the time, it was told that to oppose it would exacerbate the international debt crisis. The Chancellor said that the Government had not been shown a copy of the loan agreement but had been assured by Lloyds Bank International, who are the British bank represented on the Committee of International Banks dealing with Argentine debt, that the agreement constitutes a legally binding contract enforceable in the New York courts. Participation by British banks in further drawings could be stopped only by primary legislation which would open the Government to claims for damages. This interpretation was confirmed by the Solicitor General.

The Prime Minister asked about the conditions under which further drawings were made. The Treasury's latest report on the international debt scene had referred to the possibility of a drawing as early as mid January. This was puzzling as the new Argentine Government could not by then have established a new agreement with the IMF. Would the next drawing be a further arrears-clearing exercise like the first?

The discussion then turned to future loans to Argentina. The Solicitor General said the power of the Bank of England to issue instructions had to be general; it could not be directed at specific customer transactions. It was therefore unlikely that

/ instructions

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instructions could be used to prevent further loans. The Chancellor said the only other course was primary legislation which was extremely unattractive. Furthermore, it was not possible, in the IMF, to impose political conditions on its lending.

His preferred approach, therefore, was to work within the IMF to ensure that the new Argentine programme had tight limits for public expenditure, and that public expenditure should be directed towards strengthening the base of the economy, and in particular exports. This would limit the scope for arms purchases. In addition, he would ensure that the Government was given advance warning via the Bank of England of any further drawings or any new loans. He recognised the political problems though he thought the reality was that the absence of British banks, who provided only about 10% of current lending to Argentina, would not seriously limit Argentina's ability to buy arms. The Prime Minister said it might also be necessary to make clear to British banks that the UK Government would deplore their participation.

Summing up, the Prime Minister said the political prospect was very unattractive. If it were the case that the present agreement was legally binding, all she could say, if questioned, was that this was a matter for the banks and not the UK Government. The latter had not approved the agreement, nor even seen the detailed terms. On future loans, the Chancellor should establish an advance warning system. The Government should work to make IMF programmes, on which bank lending was based, as tight as possible. Nevertheless it might be necessary for the Government to make it clear that the participation of UK banks would not have its endorsement. She asked the Chancellor to prepare a further note clarifying, as far as possible, the conditions under which further drawings of the existing loan could be made and whether they were in any way dependent upon the establishment of a new IMF programme. She asked the Solicitor General to consider whether a general instruction could be issued by the Bank forbidding lending by UK banks to a country in a state of hostilities with the UK.

I am copying this letter to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Henry Steel (Solicitor General's Office), Alex Galloway (Office of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster), John Bartlett (Governor of the Bank of England's Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*Your sincerely*

*Andrew Turnbull*

Andrew Turnbull

John Kerr, Esq.,  
H.M. Treasury.

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

21 December 1983

Argentina/Falklands: Next Steps with the Alfonsin Government

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 20 December conveying the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's views on the above subject.

Mrs. Thatcher considers that it would be premature to take the steps with the Argentine Government which are proposed in your letter. She would prefer to see how the new Argentine Government develops before going much further.

The Prime Minister would wish these questions to be discussed in OD in the New Year. Moreover, if OD agrees to the proposed steps, she believes that it will be necessary to consult the Falkland Islanders before we go ahead.

Mrs. Thatcher has made several comments on the speaking note which it is proposed that the Swiss might use in talking to the Government of Argentina. She would be reluctant to say that the British Government appreciated Alfonsin's reply to her own message since she herself did not like the last sentence of Alfonsin's reply. She sees considerable difficulty in the wording of the first sentence of paragraph 2 of the speaking note which, she believes, implies a judgement about sovereignty. It would be necessary that any such note makes absolutely clear that we will not negotiate about sovereignty.

As regards the proposed agenda for the talks, the Prime Minister has observed that she would not wish to see air services from Argentina to the Falklands resumed (I am not clear whether you envisage discussion of such services).

I should be grateful if Richard Hatfield, to whom I am copying this letter, could arrange for the question of future relations with the Argentine Government to be discussed at a meeting of OD in the New Year.

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Sy

MR. COLES

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

A.F.C. 2/12

THE FALKLANDS

I have been thinking about the letter from the FCO and the draft telegram which you showed me last night proposing that we should make a fresh move vis a vis the Argentines in order to launch talks about normalisation.

The Prime Minister knows my views in principle from my recent note and the discussion we had at dinner last week. In a nutshell, I believe that we must take an initiative at the right time to launch the process of normalisation, the objective being to defuse the pressure which will mount on us from our friends and partners and from within this country, or to reverse the pressure on to Argentina.

Nevertheless, I think it most important that the Prime Minister should not allow herself to be rushed. I cannot see why, apart from bureaucratic momentum, the FCO should think it desirable to give the impression of running after a government which has only been in office for a few days. If we act as proposed, the Argentines are bound to get the impression that we are in a hurry to woo them. This will make them tend to raise their price and also to invoke our friends to bring more pressure to bear on us.

I believe that we should wait until the Argentine Government has had time to settle down, say a month or two or maybe until the Spring. There is no violent hurry that I can see.

Meanwhile, we should think out exactly how we want to handle the situation. For example, is it right to start with functional steps of normalisation, eg trade, culture etc? Or should we try to start with eg a clear statement of non use of force in exchange for lifting the exclusion zone? Is it right to conduct the negotiations through a third party, even the neutral Swiss? Should we not thoroughly consider direct contact by confidential means as a starter, as we did with Egypt and other countries?

I am not suggesting answers to these questions, only that we should thoroughly consider every aspect of our forward planning before we reach a decision to make a move.

A.D. PARSONS  
21 December 1983

CONFIDENTIAL



PRIME MINISTER

Argentina/Falklands : Next Steps with the Alfonsin Government

The attached letter sets out the Foreign Secretary's views on how we should now move ahead towards more normal relations with Argentina.

You will wish to read all these papers but the important one is that at Flag F - this is the speaking note on which the Swiss would draw in speaking to the Argentine Government.

My own feeling is that the letter envisages moving ahead rather too quickly. I wonder whether it would not be better to wait until the New Year and also whether you would not wish to discuss the matter in OD or at Cabinet before we go ahead.

Paragraph 2 of the speaking note at Flag F contains some language on sovereignty which you will wish to consider carefully. I can quite see that something of the kind may be necessary to get talks going.

The other point which strikes me is that the proposed agenda contains no reference to a formal cessation of hostilities. But it may be that it is better to raise that point in connection with item F on the upgrading and eventual resumption of official relations.

Would you prefer this to be raised in OD or Cabinet in the New Year - and meanwhile that nothing should be done?

A.J.C.

I think this approach shows  
indeed haste and I am  
horrified at the restrictions, I could  
not possibly agree them.  
However we have to consult the  
Falklanders and go to OD.

20 December 1983

COPY OF TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 1630Z DECEMBER 83  
TO IMMEDIATE BERNE

MIPT: RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA

1. Following is text of speaking note.

Begins: The British Government have asked the Swiss Protecting Power to approach the Government of Argentina, to consider means of following up the exchange of messages on 10 December between Mrs. Thatcher and President Alfonsin. The British Government repeat their welcome for the return of democracy to Argentina and appreciated the Argentine President's reply to the Prime Minister's message. They believe that the possibility of talks between Britain and Argentina at official level about the progressive normalisation of relations between the two countries should now be considered. It will be necessary however for both sides to recognise the realities of the situation and the constraints under which the other is operating.

*Will not take his sentence*  
*?*  
*This judges sovereignty. It must be made clear that we will not negotiate sovereignty*  
2. With this in mind, the British Government propose that any discussions should be without prejudice to the positions of the United Kingdom and Argentina respectively on the question of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, and indeed, that sovereignty would not be discussed. Alternatively, the British Government could accept an arrangement whereby each side made a short and self-contained statement of their position on this question for the record, and then agreed to proceed to the discussion of a number of practical issues, without prejudice to their stated positions.

3. It is proposed that the agenda for discussion could include:

- A. The reciprocal lifting of restrictions on trade between the United Kingdom and Argentina.
- B. The lifting of all outstanding financial restrictions.

- C. Arrangements for the return of the Argentine dead from the Falkland Islands or, failing that, for a next-of-kin visit.
- D. The resumption of air services. *Not to Falklands*
- E. The resumption of cultural, scientific and full sporting contacts.
- F. The upgrading and eventual resumption of official relations.

4. There have been suggestions for secret talks. The British Government would not welcome such a procedure, seeing no need to cloak in secrecy meetings about the normalisation of bilateral relations. Moreover, there would be serious dangers of misunderstanding if there were to be clandestine discussions, and word of these were to leak.

5. Regarding presentation, Sir Geoffrey Howe said in a broadcast on 11 December that both sides are developing a will to begin taking steps towards restoring a normal relationship. If British spokesmen are asked about the present Swiss approach to the Government of Argentina, they propose to confirm in general terms that means of carrying this process forward are being explored. But the Swiss and British Governments have no intention of stimulating publicity at this early stage. The public presentation of talks between British and Argentine officials can be discussed once terms of reference have been agreed.

6. The British Government look forward to knowing the views of the Government of Argentina on these suggestions. They consider it most important to follow up the exchange of messages through exchanges in areas on which it is realistic to expect early progress. The British Government hope that this can lead to the establishment of a renewed climate of mutual confidence in which our relations can be managed in a practical and productive way.

HOWE

*My message was only a  
 working . . . not a prelude to  
 concentrated diplomatic exchanges I should  
 like to see how the new joint. develops before going  
 much further out*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 December 1983

Dear John,

Argentina/Falklands: Next steps with the Alfonsin Government

There was discussion in Cabinet on 15 December about exploring through the Swiss the possible resumption of some official contact with Argentina.

The Foreign Secretary believes that we need to follow up the Prime Minister's exchange of messages with President Alfonsin as soon as possible. Hopes of progress are quite widespread. Sir Geoffrey thinks it important to avoid creating any exaggerated expectations. But there will be criticism at home and abroad if we appear to hesitate over this opportunity to move towards more normal relations - at the same time, of course, as standing firmly by our commitments to the Islanders.

// Sir Geoffrey therefore proposes to put in hand an approach by the Swiss to the Argentines to establish acceptable terms of reference for talks at official level about means of making progress in a number of areas. I enclose drafts of the telegrams which Sir Geoffrey proposes to send to HM Ambassador in Berne. We of course have in mind, with reference to paragraph 3f of the second draft telegram, the Prime Minister's comment in her summing-up in Cabinet last week that a formal cessation of hostilities must be the pre-condition for any resumption of full diplomatic relations. There are various stages, stopping well short of the resumption of full diplomatic relations, which could be examined in talks about normalisation.

Sir Geoffrey intends that we should steer the Argentines firmly away from "Secret" talks. We do not propose to publicise our approach to the Swiss, though Sir Geoffrey thinks we should tell our main Allies and partners of our action. He proposes that our line for use in Parliament and in public when asked, should be that following the exchange of messages, we are indeed exploring realistic means of moving towards a more normal relationship with Argentina, but decline to give details. Any talks that

/eventually



eventually take place with the Argentines themselves could be presented in a broadly similar way, although we could then describe, as indeed we have already done, the broad areas in which we think it realistic to contemplate early progress. We could also place additional emphasis on the talks being without prejudice to our own views and position on sovereignty.

We see no need to consult the Falkland Islands' Councils in advance since our approach is consistent with public statements by Ministers and the Islanders' interests are fully protected. We did, as you know, inform Sir Rex Hunt in advance of the Prime Minister's message to Alfonsin and asked him to reassure the Islanders that we stand as firmly as ever by our commitments to them. We propose to keep him closely informed of the developments contained in these telegrams accordingly.

*Yours ever,*

*Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

PS  
 PS/LADY YOUNG  
 PS/WHITNEY  
 PS/VE RIFKIND  
 PS/PUS  
 SIR J BULLARD  
 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
 LORD N G LENNOX  
 MR EVANS  
 MR UEE  
 MR CARTLEDGE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST. (3)

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
 MISS M E CUND ) TREASURY  
 MR LITTLER )

SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
 MR A D S GOODALL ) CABINET OF  
 DIO )

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

ED/PUSD (2)  
 ED/SAMD  
 ED/FID  
~~ED/NEWS DEPT~~  
 ED/NEWS DEPT  
 ED/ECD  
 ED/ECD(E)  
 ED/UND  
 ED/PLANNING STAFF

Mr A FORTNAM IAT/ D. TRANSPORT

RESIDENT CLERK

**IMMEDIATE**

GRS 210  
 CONFIDENTIAL  
 FM MADRID 151635Z DEC 83  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 693 OF 15 DECEMBER  
 INFO UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

ADVANCE COPY

MY TELNO 663: RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA

1. THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME TODAY TO HEAR THE OUTCOME OF HIS ACTIVITIES IN BUENOS AIRES. MORAN SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN THERE TO CAPUTO. THE SPANISH PRIME MINISTER HAD SPOKEN IN SIMILAR TERMS TO ALFONSI. THEY HAD URGED THE ARGENTINES TO ENTER INTO NORMAL RELATIONS WITH HMG WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS (YOUR TELNO 323). THE ARGENTINES HAD SAID THEY FULLY RECIPROCATED THE PRIME MINISTER'S FRIENDLY MESSAGE, WHICH ALFONSI HAD BEEN VERY GLAD TO RECEIVE. FOR OBVIOUS REASONS THEY WERE UNABLE TO ABANDON THEIR OWN CLAIM TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS OR TO TAKE SUCH OVERT ACTION AS WOULD APPEAR TO RENOUNCE THAT CLAIM. THE ARGENTINES, FOR THEIR PART, UNDERSTOOD OUR OWN POSITION AS REGARDS SOVEREIGNTY. ALFONSI AND CAPUTO ACCEPTED THAT AN EFFORT SHOULD NOW BE MADE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS, WITHOUT PRIOR CONDITIONS ON EITHER SIDE.

WITHOUT PRIOR CONDITIONS ON EITHER SIDE.

2. MORAN ADDED THAT THE NEW ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT CLEARLY FACED THREE ENORMOUS PROBLEMS OVER THE FATE OF THE PEOPLE WHO HAD DISAPPEARED, THE TREATMENT OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FALKLANDS WAR, AND THE ECONOMY.

3. I THANKED MORAN AND UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY HIS MESSAGE TO YOU.

PARSONS

NNNN

SENT AT 151653Z KEJ

ADVANCE COPY

1  
1

1  
1

2

SECRET

①

9

PRIME MINISTER

Mr. Heseltine told you yesterday that he is to visit the Falklands in January. You said to me that you hoped Foreign Office Ministers would not be going there as well.

Earlier this month you agreed that Lady Young should go to the Falklands from 9-18 January. Do you now wish this arrangement to be changed?

A.S.C.

I think it  
absurd for  
both to go.

15 December, 1983

Richard must go.

SECRET

not

see now Mr. Butler's

letter.

A.S.C.  $\frac{3}{1}$





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>953</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Defence Secretary to Prime Minister dated 15 December 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <i>40</i> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>17 January 2013</i> <i>AWayland</i>
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LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <u>PREM 19</u> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <u>953</u> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <u>Letter from Ricketts to Coles dated 14 December 1983, with enclosure.</u>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <u>40</u> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<u>17 January 2013</u> <u>Wayland</u>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
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LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>953</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Armstrong to Prime Minister dated 14 December 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <i>40</i> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>17 January 2013</i> <i>AWayland</i>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
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PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>953</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Coles to Armstrong dated 14 December 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <i>40</i> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>17 January 2013</i> <i>Wayland</i>
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From: D O Arnold-Forster\*



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2452 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR THE ARMED FORCES

D/US of S(AF)DGT 13/2/6

13 December 1983

Per Mertes:

To note  
particularly paragraph  
11 of the report

Dear Tim,

Lord Trefgarne has asked me to send you a copy of the  
1983 Annual Report of the South Atlantic Fund, which  
the Prime Minister may find of interest.

13/2

Yours Sincerely

D O Arnold-Forster

mb

Private Secretary

Tim Flesher Esq



**SOUTH ATLANTIC  
FUND**

**ANNUAL REPORT 1983**



**THE SOUTH ATLANTIC FUND**

(Registered under the Charities Act 1960, Registered No 285161  
and governed by a Deed of Trust dated 15 July 1982)

**Office**

Room 3, Archway Block South, Ministry of Defence,  
Whitehall, London SW1A 2BE

**PATRON**

His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales KG, KT, GCB

**TRUSTEES**

Admiral Sir Peter Herbert KCB, OBE  
General Sir George Cooper KCB, MC, ADC Gen  
Vice Admiral Sir Simon Cassels KCB, CBE  
Air Chief Marshal Sir Thomas Kennedy KCB, AFC, ADC  
Mr E Broadbent CB, CMG  
Rear Admiral K D E Wilcockson CBE  
Major General J N S Arthur  
Air Vice Marshal L W F Wheeler

**Secretary**

Captain A H Lambourne Royal Navy (until 3 August 1983)  
Colonel J C M Ansell (from 4 August 1983)

**Custodian Trustee**

The United Services Trustee

**Auditors**

Ernst and Whinney

**Investment Adviser**

Mullens & Co

## THE SOUTH ATLANTIC FUND

### The Reason for Constituting the Fund

1. During the Falklands Campaign, the public quite spontaneously started sending money to the Ministry of Defence for the benefit of those who suffered as a result of the conflict and for the welfare of those who continued to work in the arduous conditions of the South Atlantic.
2. Some of the letters accompanying donations specified to which of the Service Benevolent Funds the gift should be directed but the majority contained no such instruction. It soon became clear that a collecting agency was required to handle the flood of donations and properly to administer this money until such a time as the needs of the bereaved families and the injured were known. The Secretary of State for Defence announced the setting up of the South Atlantic Fund in the House of Commons in mid-May 1982 and the Fund was formally constituted on 15 July 1982 with Charitable status.

### The Trust Deed

3. a. The Trust Deed of the South Atlantic Fund specifies its object as being: "to hold those unallocated (Note 1) funds which have been or may be received by or on behalf of the Secretary of State upon trust to apply the same by payment to the service benevolent funds or to such other charity or charities the purpose whereof are in the opinion of the Trustees appropriate to enable them to relieve the needs of members of the Armed Forces, associated personnel and their dependants or any of them in so far as such needs have arisen or may hereafter arise by virtue of the operations and work (Note 2) referred to in the recitals to this deed in such shares if more than one and subject to such conditions and in such manner generally as the Trustees shall think fit".
- b. The Trust Deed requires the Fund to be wound up within five years at which time the residual money left in the Fund must be transferred to the three Service Benevolent Funds; King George's Fund for Sailors, The Army Benevolent Fund and the Royal Air Force Benevolent Fund, for the long term care of those cases which have arisen or may yet occur as a consequence of the conflict.

Note 1: Unallocated Funds are those upon which no special purpose has been expressly imposed by the donor.

Note 2: Operations and work include operations during the conflict and thereafter work relating to the administration of the Islands.

## Donations

4. Donations large and small have been, and still are being received from individuals, companies, institutions, associations, societies, clubs and fund raising groups. Donations from individuals have varied from children's precious pennies to gifts of many thousands of pounds. Whenever it has been possible each donation has been acknowledged but the Trustees would like to take this opportunity to thank the very many anonymous donors and all those who contributed to group efforts for their generous support. On the 31 October 1983 the total of donations stood at £14,993,688.
5. Whilst the work of the Fund was getting under way, donations were placed on deposit. Subsequently a major proportion of the capital was invested thus increasing the Fund's assets while retaining sufficient liquidity to meet its needs. Investment has complied with the Trustees Investment Act 1961 and has increased to date the value of the Fund by more than £1 million.

### The Assessment of Need

6. The task was considerable: there were more than 130 widows many of whom needed urgent help; there were the next of kin of more than 120 single servicemen who had been killed and there were over 700 wounded casualties many of whom were likely to need some form of assistance early in their rehabilitation. Furthermore it was evident that the donors were anxious that their gifts should be distributed as quickly and as generously as possible. The Trustees and the Ministry of Defence therefore saw the urgent need to create adequate machinery to deal with the Fund. A small full-time staff was set up to administer the receipt of the donations and to act as a Secretariat for the Trustees. In addition to this Secretariat an assessment group was established in Aldershot. The task of this group, which is made up of military officers, is to work in conjunction with medical officers, the welfare organisations, DHSS staff and naval and military welfare officers to assess the needs of those who have suffered and to make initial recommendations. These recommendations are passed to the Working Committee of the South Atlantic Fund.
7. The Working Committee of the Fund is made up of Staff Officers from the three Services and senior representatives of the Service Benevolent Funds as well as representatives from the Merchant Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary. A legal officer from the assessment group always attends and a senior Service doctor is present when considered necessary. The recommendations of the Working Committee are passed to the Trustees for their consideration and approval.
8. The Trustees believe that they have thereby been able to identify needs more quickly than would have been the case had individuals been left to make their own claims on the Fund and that no immediate needs have been overlooked. The involvement of representatives from the Service Benevolent Funds in the assessment process has also provided a measure of continuity for the time when they take over responsibility for any further assistance which may be necessary in the years ahead.



## Purposes for which money has been disbursed

9. Very early in the life of the Fund the Trustees authorised payments totalling almost £2 million to the widows and next of kin servicemen. The purpose of these payments was to ease any hardship suffered by the beneficiaries over the early months of their bereavement. Interim payments totalling £1.5 million were made to certain of the injured and the three major Service Benevolent Funds each received sums of money to meet any urgent needs which were brought to their attention.

10. This gave the assessment group time to give detailed consideration to cases of individual need. As a result of their work and the decisions made by the Trustees sums including the following have been paid in respect of hardship:

£5,467,249	—	to widows and dependant children.
£4,829,826	—	to the seriously injured.
£1,034,635	—	to the less seriously injured.
£320,828	—	to the parents or next of kin of single servicemen killed in the conflict.

Service Benevolent Funds have spent further sums from their allocation to provide things such as; assistance in moving house, the adaption of houses for disabled men, the purchase of specially adapted cars or wheelchairs, educational trusts for children and travel costs for injured servicemen and their families.

## The Future of the Fund

11. The Trust Deed requires that the Fund is wound up by 1987 at the latest (unless there are special reasons to the contrary). As a result of decisions made by the Trustees nearly £13 million has already been distributed from the Fund to meet all needs that have so far become apparent. However the Trustees are very much aware that there could be other needs arising both over the next few years and long after the Term of the Fund has expired. They have, for the time being kept a reserve at their disposal and will review when and at what rate they will pass the residual money to the Service Benevolent Funds.

## Other Charities

12. The Trustees of the Fund have received advice and assistance from many other charitable organisations. A list of charities through whom payments have been made is attached to this Report and the Trustees are most grateful to all of them for their co-operation.

## Accounts

13. The attached statement is the audited balance sheet of receipts and expenditure since money started to come into the Ministry of Defence in May 1982.

## SOUTH ATLANTIC FUND GRANTS MADE TO CHARITIES

Grants have been made to meet the needs of individuals through the following Charities:

Army Central Fund  
Army Air Corps Fund  
Army Catering Corps Association No 2 Benevolent Fund  
Airborne Forces Security Fund  
Army Officers Widows Fund  
Chinese Dependants  
Fleet Air Arm Relief Fund  
Fleet Amenities Fund  
Gurkha Welfare Trust Fund  
Gurkha Dependants Fund  
HMS Tamar Welfare Amenities Fund  
Irish Guards Benevolent Fund  
Missions to Seamen  
Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes  
Naval Air Relief Fund  
The Royal Air Force Central Fund  
The Royal Air Force Dependants Fund  
Royal Army Medical Corps General Relief Fund  
Royal Army Service Corps/Royal Corps of Transport Benevolent Fund  
Royal Army Ordnance Corps Aid Society  
Regimental Association of The Queen's Own Highlanders  
Royal Marines Tercentenary Fund  
Royal Navy and Royal Marines Dependants Fund  
Royal Artillery Charitable Fund  
Royal Engineers Association  
Royal Marines 1939 War Fund  
Royal Signals Association & Benevolent Fund  
22 Special Air Service Trust Fund  
Scots Guards Charitable Fund  
Royal Electrical & Mechanical Engineers Fund  
Single Soldiers Dependants Fund  
Soldiers Widows Fund  
The United Services Trustee (including Royal Fleet Auxiliary and Merchant Navy Dependants)  
Welsh Guards Comforts Fund  
St Saviours Church, Portsmouth

Grants have also been made to the principal Service Charities to enable them to react immediately to any case of need which comes to their notice:

King George's Fund for Sailors  
Army Benevolent Fund  
The Royal Air Force Benevolent Fund

Approximately £1,000,000 was donated to the Fund expressly to provide for the welfare of those continuing to defend the Falkland Islands. Grants have been made to the following:

Army Central Fund  
The Royal Air Force Central Fund  
Fleet Amenities Fund  
Commandant General Royal Marines Fund

## SOUTH ATLANTIC FUND

Receipts and expenditure since opening the fund  
on 27th May 1982 until 31st October 1983

Receipts		
Donations	14,993,688.54	
Interest & Dividends	1,123,146.42	
Profit on sale of investments	<u>119,456.71</u>	
		<u>16,236,291.67</u>
Expenditure		
Grants	12,792,695.35	
Administration expenses	<u>25,119.26</u>	
		<u>12,817,814.61</u>
Balance in hand		<u>3,418,477.06</u>
Represented by:		
Investments at cost	2,594,038.87	
Monies on deposit	650,000.00	
Cash in hand	32,503.44	
Creditors (due from sale of investments)	<u>141,934.75</u>	
	<u>£3,418,477.06</u>	

**SOUTH ATLANTIC FUND**  
**Period 1st November 1982 - 31st October 1983**

**RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURE**

Receipts		
B/F 1st November 1982	10,266,440.17	
Donations net	1,535,584.72	
Interest & Dividends	894,904.07	
Profit on investments	119,456.71	
	<hr/>	<hr/>
		12,816,385.67
Expenditure		
Grants	9,385,916.35	
Administration expenses	11,992.26	
	<hr/>	<hr/>
		9,397,908.61
Balance C/F		3,418,477.06
Represented by:		
Investments at book value	2,594,038.87	
Monies on deposit	650,000.00	
Cash in hand	32,503.44	
Creditors (due from sale of investments)	141,934.75	
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	£3,418,477.06	



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 December, 1983

Dear John,

F-a. A. & C. 13/12.

Argentina: Reply to the Prime Minister's Message

You will have seen our telegram no 139 to Berne, confirming that the text of President Alfonsin's reply to the Prime Minister's message had been received here, and that its terms were those carried in several of Sunday's newspapers.

I now enclose for the record a copy of the Note from the Brazilian Embassy delivered late on Sunday which formally transmits the message, together with an unofficial translation of President Alfonsin's words.

File - date order.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (ADVANCES)

39

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MR EVANS  
MR URE

MR CARTLEDGE

ED/PUSD (2)

ED/SAMD

ED/FID

~~ED/DEFENCE DEPT~~

ED/NEWS DEPT

ED/ERD

ED/ECD(E)

ED/UND

ED/PLANNING STAFF

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST. (3)

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
MISS M E CUND ) TREASURY  
MR LITTLER. )

SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
MR A D S GOODALL ) CABINET OF  
DIO )

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

MR A FORTNAM IAT/ D. TRANSPORT

RESIDENT CLERK

*ms*

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 122315Z DEC 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3732 OF 12 DECEMBER  
INFO PRIORITY BERNE

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

MY TELS NOS 3678 AND 3698:

ARGENTINA

1. THE VICE PRESIDENT SENT A MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER WHILE HE WAS EN ROUTE TO BUENOS AIRES, MAKING CLEAR THAT HE WOULD TRY TO ENCOURAGE ALFONSIN TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORE NORMAL RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN.

2. ON THE VICE PRESIDENT'S RETURN TODAY HIS FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER, GREGG, CONTACTED US TO SAY THAT MR BUSH WAS VERY GRATEFUL TO HAVE ADVANCE WARNING OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO ALFONSIN. WHILE CONSCIOUS OF THE STAGGERING PROBLEMS ARGENTINA AND THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT FACED, MR BUSH HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE EUPHORIA IN BUENOS AIRES AND STILL MORE, BY ALFONSIN PERSONALLY. ALFONSIN HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE REALISED THAT QUOTE ARGENTINA WILL ALWAYS BE A TINPOT COUNTRY UNLESS WE ABIDE BY A FEW GOLDEN RULES UNQUOTE. ALFONSIN AND HIS DEFENCE MINISTER HAD SOUGHT US VIEWS ON WAYS OF OVERCOMING INTER-SERVICE RIVALRIES WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES, AND HELPING TO ENSURE CIVILIAN CONTROL.

3. ALFONSIN HAD TOLD THE VICE PRESIDENT THAT RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN HAD SUFFERED FROM THE FALKLANDS. BUT THEY COULD IMPROVE. HE WANTED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN RESOLUTION. CONVERSATIONS SHOULD BEGIN EVEN WITH DIFFERING AGENDAS ON THE TWO SIDES. THE KEY STEPS

WOULD BE AN END TO THE EXCLUSION ZONE AND AVOIDANCE OF THE CREATION OF A QUOTE FORTRESS UNQUOTE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. THE VICE PRESIDENT HAD SAID THAT HE KNEW THAT WE WANTED TO RE-BUILD THE RELATIONSHIP, THOUGH WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS SOVERIEGNTY. CERTIFICATION OF ARGENTINA HAD NOT BEEN EASY FOR BRITAIN TO ACCEPT. THE US WANTED GOOD RELATIONS WITH BOTH COUNTRIES. IF THE US COULD PLAY A USEFUL PART, THEY WERE PREPARED TO DO SO, BUT NOT IF THERE WAS NO REAL SCOPE TO DO SO.

5. GREGG SAID THAT ALFONSIN SEEMED TO HAVE TAKEN A SIMILAR LINE IN HIS INTERVIEW WITH THE QUOTE OBSERVER UNQUOTE ON SUNDAY.

5. WE THANKED GREGG FOR THIS ACCOUNT. WE POINTED OUT THAT ALFONSIN IN HIS INAUGURAL ADDRESS HAD TALKED ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY BEING QUOTE A FACT PREVIOUS TO NEGOTIATION UNQUOTE ETC. THIS WAS NOT HELPFUL. BUT IT REMAINED OUR DESIRE TO WORK BACK TOWARDS A MORE NORMAL RELATIONSHIP.

6. I SHALL BE HAVING A FURTHER TALK WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT ABOUT THIS AND OTHER MATTERS ON WEDNESDAY. I SHALL BE DRAWING HIS ATTENTION TO YOUR REMARKS IN YOUR BBC INTERVIEW (YOUR TEL. NO. 595 TO PORT STANLEY). PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF THERE ARE OTHER POINTS YOU WISH ME TO PUT TO HIM. I SHALL OF COURSE TELL HIM THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO SEE HIM IN LONDON IN JANUARY 1984.

WRIGHT

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The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>953</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Armstrong to Prime Minister dated 12 December 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <i>40</i> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>17 January 2013</i> <i>Wayland</i>
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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

12 December 1983

ARGENTINA

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from the US Vice President which was received at No. 10 Downing Street over the weekend.

I expect that Sir Oliver Wright told the Department, following his call on the Prime Minister last week, that Mrs. Thatcher much welcomes the idea put to her by Sir Oliver Wright that Vice President Bush should visit London early in 1984. The last paragraph of Mr. Bush's message may provide an opportunity to take up this suggestion - though I was under the impression that Sir Oliver would be conveying orally to the Vice President the Prime Minister's positive response to the suggested visit. Perhaps therefore you could be in touch with the Embassy in Washington before recommending a draft reply to Mr. Bush from the Prime Minister.

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL



CÓPIA.

W. M. de  
O. P. T207AC/83

Nº 128/921.5 (B29) (F27)

The Ambassador of Brazil presents his compliments to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and, at the request and on behalf of the Argentine Government has the honour to transcribe hereunder a message from His Excellency Señor Raul Alfonsín, President of the Argentine Republic to the Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher:

"Agradezco sus expresiones referentes al restablecimiento de instituciones democráticas en Argentina. Coincido con su apreciación sobre la existencia de diferencias entre la Argentina y el Reino Unido. A este respecto seria útil recordar un viejo proverbio inglés: 'Where there's a will there's a way'.

Raul Alfonsín  
Buenos Aires, 9 de diciembre de 1983."

An unofficial translation is attached.

The Ambassador of Brazil avails himself of the opportunity to renew to the Secretary of State the assurances of his highest consideration.

London, December 11th, 1983.



Filed in  
date order  
9/12/85

CÓPIA.

SERVIÇO NO EXTERIOR

Subst

cc Mark  
ops

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 207 AC/83

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

"I thank you for your words regarding the restoration of democratic institutions in Argentina. I agree with your appreciation on the existence of differences between Argentina and the United Kingdom. In this respect it would be worthwhile mentioning the old English proverb: 'Where there's a will there's a way.'

Raul Alfonsin

Buenos Aires, 9 de diciembre de 1983."



Argentine file

10 DOWNING STREET

## Press Notice

EMBARGO: NOT FOR BROADCAST, PUBLICATION OR USE ON CLUB TAPES BEFORE 17.00 HOURS GNT, SATURDAY 10 DECEMBER 1983 (12.00 HOURS BUENOS AIRES TIME)

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO  
PRESIDENT ALFONSIN OF ARGENTINA

The Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, FRS, MP, has sent the following personal message to President Raul Alfonsin, who will be inaugurated in Buenos Aires today, 10 December, 1983.

"On the occasion of your inauguration I wanted to let you know that, although we have many differences, we can all take pleasure in the restoration of democracy to Argentina, believing it will bring freedom and justice to all your people. Today brings new hope to your country."

The following text is also being presented today to the new Argentine Foreign Minister, Senor Dante Caputo.

"Following the general elections in Argentina the British Government issued a formal statement, and the Prime Minister has commented on the outcome of the elections, both in the House of Commons and in an important newspaper interview. Reference has been made to these statements in the Argentine press. It may, nonetheless, be helpful for the new Government of Argentina to have the precise texts of these."

/On

On 31 October 1982 the Foreign and Commonwealth Office issued the following statement about the Argentine elections:

'We welcome this step towards the restoration of democracy in Argentina. We hope that the new Government will be more inclined to respond positively to the ideas we have put forward to secure the restoration of normal relations between our two countries. This is the only realistic way towards the restoration of confidence between us.'

Answering a question about the elections in Parliament on 1 November, Mrs Thatcher said, 'We are always pleased when a country returns to democracy. There can be no question about that. I hope that, now that that country has returned to democratic ways, it will be prepared to consider better economic and commercial relations between itself and Britain.'

Mrs Thatcher also said in her newspaper interview published in the Daily Mail on 7 November 1983, 'I am willing to enter into talks. We want good commercial relations, diplomatic relations. We want normal relations. But I am not entering into talks about sovereignty'."

9 December 1983

NOTES FOR EDITORS

These messages are being handed over by the Swiss State Secretary, Herr Probst, who is attending the inauguration ceremonies in Buenos Aires. Switzerland is acting as the protecting power for British interests in Argentina, in the absence of normal diplomatic relations (Brazil has been performing a similar role for Argentina).



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>953</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Letter from Coles to Ricketts dated 9 December 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <i>40</i> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>17 January 2013</i> <i>Wayland</i>
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PIECE/ITEM ..... <u>953</u> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Home Secretary to Prime Minister dated 9 December 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <u>40</u> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>17 January 2013 Wayland</i>
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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

9 December 1983

ARGENTINA

Thank you for your letter of 8 December about the connection between Sir Anthony Jolliffe and Argentina.

There have been no developments since Robin Butler's letter of 3 November to Brian Fall. Robin told the then Lord Mayor that we were at his disposal if he wished to receive guidance on what he should say to Senor Spilsinger but Sir Anthony Jolliffe did not take up this offer.

I therefore suggest that you say to Mr. Joy that Sir Anthony Jolliffe does not have the Prime Minister's authority for contacts with Argentina. Moreover, as Robin Butler's letter made clear, Jolliffe had explained to Senor Spilsinger that he could not speak for the British Government or act as an intermediary.

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (ADVANCES)

39

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LOED N G LENNOX  
MR EVANS  
MR UEE  
MR CARTLEDGE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST. (3)  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
MISS M E CUND ) TREASURY  
MR LITTLER )

SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
MR A D S GOODALL ) CABINET OFF  
DIO )

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

ED/PUSD (2)  
ED/SAUD  
ED/FID  
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ED/NEWS DEPT  
ED/ERD  
ED/ECD(E)  
ED/UND  
ED/PLANNING STAFF

Mr A FORTNAM IAT/ D. TRANSPORT

IMMEDIATE

RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPY

GRS 200

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BERNE 091530Z

DESKBY FCO 091630Z

IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 258 OF 09 DECEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS ROME MADRID  
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO ALL OTHER EC POSTS

MY TELNO 257: ARGENTINE ELECTIONS

1. BRUNNER (DEPUTY TO STATE SECRETARY) INVITED ME TO CALL THIS AFTERNOON AT THE FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND READ OVER A TELEGRAM FROM SWISS AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES REPORTING STATE SECRETARY PROBST'S MEETINGS WITH ALPHONSIAN AND OTHERS ON 08 DECEMBER.

2. PROBST WAS FIRST RECEIVED BY THE NEW MINISTER OF INTERIOR. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT MISSING SWISS PERSONS AND OBTAINED ASSURANCES THAT PROBLEM WOULD BE PURSUED BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT. HE WAS ALSO RECEIVED BY NEW MINISTER OF THE ECONOMY, GRINSPUN WITH WHOM HE HAD A WIDE DISCUSSION ON THE ECONOMIC SITUATION.

3. AT BOTH THESE MEETINGS PROBST SAID THAT HE HAD A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER WITH THE RESULT THAT HE WAS INVITED TO AN IMMEDIATE AUDIENCE THE SAME EVENING WITH ALPHONSIAN, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY CAPUTO.

4. PROBST HANDED OVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO DR ALPHONSIAN AND AT THE SAME TIME GAVE CAPUTO THE NOTE AS REQUESTED IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO 137.

5. SWISS TELEGRAM REPORTED THAT ALPHONSIAN WAS EVIDENTLY MUCH AFFECTED (MANIFESTEMENT EMU) BY THE GESTURE WHICH MRS THATCHER HAD SEEN FIT TO MAKE ON HIS INAUGURATION. PROBST'S ASSESSMENT WAS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE WOULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT IMPACT ON THE POLICY OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT.

6. ALPHONSIAN'S COMMENT ON THE SECOND DOCUMENT IE FCO NOTE CONCENTRATED PARTICULARLY ON THE SENTENCE IN PRIME MINISTER'S DAILY MAIL INTERVIEW: " I AM NOT ENTERING INTO TALKS ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY". HE SAID IN THIS RESPECT THAT HE HOPED TO BE IN A POSITION TO COUNT ON THE SOLIDARITY OF OTHER DEMOCRATIC STATES TO HELP ARGENTINA INTRODUCE ALSO THIS ELEMENT (SOVEREIGNTY) IN ANY FUTURE TALKS.



7. PROBST WAS ALSO RECEIVED SEPARATELY BY STATE SECRETARIES AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND TRADE DEPARTMENT. NO DETAILS OF THE DISCUSSIONS WERE GIVEN.

POWELL-JONES

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SENT AT RECD AT 091604ZTWPM/FP

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[Ms. Harman]

ruling. However, in the summer of last year the European Court said that the Government were failing in their equality legislation and the Government still have not remedied that position.

**Mr. Smith:** I am grateful to my hon. Friend for a telling analogy of the Government's attitude. The Government have deliberately sought to bring in the minimum provisions that they could get away with on equal pay for work of equal value. We have had a sorry tale of regulations being introduced and then being withdrawn. In the other place, regulations were produced in October, mysteriously withdrawn, and they reappeared in December as the deadline of the end of the year marched relentlessly forward. The way in which the Government have approached this matter shows that they are simply dragging their feet on well-known commitments that they ought to be putting into force.

Clause 8 offers the Government a way out. My hon. Friend the Member for Barking has been helpful in bringing forward that provision because it allows the Government to escape from the problem and to conform to the requirements of the European Court.

There are other important matters in the Bill that are of current concern, including the problem of part-time employment which is becoming an increasing feature of our labour market. There are 800,000 more people in part-time employment than 10 years ago. It is important that legislation is put in place to ensure that those people are properly protected. In a recent paper to the National Economic Development Council the Chancellor of the Exchequer drew attention to the increase in part-time employment. He talked ominously about the need for real wages to be made more responsive to conditions in the labour market. That has alerted many people to the need to ensure that part-time workers are properly protected, and the Bill offers us such an opportunity.

The community faces another major problem with homeworkers because low pay is endemic among them. The Bill takes a major step to eradicate that exploitation. I hope that we shall receive a more considered reply on measures relating to part-time employment and homeworkers than the Government have given so far. It is not good enough for the Government merely to say that some changes will cost more. That argument could have been put to Lord Shafesbury when he was trying to stop people being forced to climb chimneys. Every time we make such an advance, some cost will be involved. The cost must be evaluated in terms of the community's social objectives, the improvement in our standards of life, and the raising of the standards that we as a community want to see observed by employers. I hope that the Minister will give a much more considered reply on these matters.

The Opposition support the Bill. We have shown that the Government response is totally inadequate. Hiding behind technicalities will not stop the progress of this legislation. If it is defeated today, my hon. Friend the Member for Barking and others will ensure that it is brought back time and again for urgent consideration by the House.

*It being Eleven o'clock, MR. SPEAKER interrupted the proceedings, pursuant to Standing Order No. 5 (Friday sittings).*

## Argentina (Arms Purchases)

**Dr. David Owen** (Plymouth, Devonport): On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. You will recall that I raised a point of order at 9.35 am. I was told at 10 am that a private notice question had not been allowed. I am at a loss to understand how a private notice question can be disallowed when a Government statement is now to be made.

**Mr. Speaker:** As the right hon. Gentleman knows, matters about private notice questions are not normally raised with the Speaker. The usual time for announcements of these matters and of statements is after 10 o'clock, not at 9.30.

**The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Ray Whitney):** With your permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement on the United States certification of and possible arms sales to Argentina. I apologise to the Opposition for not being able to let them have an earlier advance copy of the statement, due to circumstances of which I believe they are aware.

President Reagan's decision, announced yesterday, was not sprung upon us. As my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House told the House on 22 November, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made our position very clear to President Reagan when she saw him in September and the Americans have kept us closely informed. Their certification under United States law that Argentina has made significant progress in human rights is not equivalent to arms sales. Like the President, we have noted and welcomed the restoration of democracy in Argentina and other progress there on human rights.

Arms purchases are not one of the priorities of the incoming Government of Argentina. We have been glad to note the public assurance by the United States Defence Secretary that the United States Administration will exercise caution about the resumption of major new supplies to Argentina and will not supply weapons which could be used to attempt a new invasion of the Falklands.

We shall remain in contact with the United States Administration on this subject.

**Mr. Denis Healey** (Leeds, East): I thank the hon. Gentleman for responding so quickly to our urgent appeal for a statement in the House. I also welcome the very moderate and sensible tone of his statement today, which was in striking contrast with the excited rhetoric of the Prime Minister a few weeks ago when she talked of betrayal and outrage. Coming from her, such complaints were difficult to understand, as in the summer she had herself authorised British firms to supply vital equipment for German warships, knowing that they were to be sold to Argentina. She also authorised the sale of heavy water to Germany, knowing that it would be on sale to Argentina for the manufacture of nuclear materials suitable for weapons, although the Argentine Government had not—and still have not—accepted international safeguards in relation to their nuclear processes.

I also welcome the Minister's recognition that Mr. Alfonsín has no intention of wasting his country's money on armaments unless he is compelled to do so. The only threat that he now faces is from Chile, which is ruled by a dictatorship even less agreeable than the Argentine junta but to which, as we were told yesterday, the British

commission a report from an independent expert. But there is a fundamental difference between the two officers. Under the new regulations the expert is to be a person designated by ACAS, and independent body which has no possible partisan interest in the proceedings.

According to the Bill, the equality officer will be an employee of the Equal Opportunities Commission. But the Bill also provides for that same commission to assist a claimant and even handle her case before the tribunal. The commission's sense of integrity would of course, in practice, guarantee that there would be no conflict of interest. But surely it is unreasonable to expect a respondent to feel sanguine at having his case determined on the evidence of an official of the organisation supporting those who are claiming against him. I believe that this provision would be considered neither fair nor reasonable by employers.

The Equal Opportunities Commission has a statutory duty to review the working of the Sex Discrimination and Equal Pay Acts. I know that the commission intends to bring forward proposals for amendment in the latter half of next year, and we shall consider them most carefully.

It would have been interesting to hear the commission's views on the Bill. I know that it wanted to comment but was unable to do so in the short time available since the Bill's publication. I take this opportunity to record our appreciation of the constructive and sensible comments made by the commission during our consultations on the equal pay amendment regulations and the accompanying tribunal procedure regulations, which were largely altered in the light of the commission's recommendations.

The commission has a key role in assisting in the development of equal opportunity policies through legislative change where appropriate and its many initiatives, such as the important Women into Science and Engineering Year which is to be commended for its valuable and practical approach to the serious issue of tackling the under-representation of girls and women in engineering. That point was made by the hon. Lady when she referred to the fact that very few girls do physics and mathematics courses of an advanced nature. As the hon. Lady probably knows, I have signed a number of designations under section 47 designating courses that are exclusively for women and girls.

I am sure that the House will understand that in my opening remarks I have not been able to deal with more than a few of the Bill's main provisions. There is scope for a lengthy critique on important but complex issues, such as indirect discrimination and the concept of the hypothetical man. Other right hon. and hon. Members may wish to develop that point.

I emphasise that, although the Government remain firmly committed to equal opportunities, many of the Bill's specific proposals are fundamentally misconceived and taken together, we have no option but to oppose them. Some proposals, such as those on maternity and paternity leave, would place unacceptable administrative burdens on employers and jeopardise the prospects for both men and women. Other proposals, such as the provisions on single sex recruitment, would surely have unintended ill-effects.

Even more importantly, I remind the House that a number of the Bill's provisions go well beyond what I believe public opinion is prepared to support in this sensitive field of legislation. I said that the Bill was monumental and certainly, whatever its effect, it will be

a monument to the industry and single-mindedness of the author and those who have assisted her. None the less, I believe that the Bill is impracticable, expensive and in many respects alien to public opinion, and I must urge the House to reject it.

10.53 am

**Mr. John Smith** (Monklands, East): The Labour party give the Bill their total support. I wish to say how inadequate we found the reply of the Under-Secretary of State. It is typical of Ministers who are frightened to argue the principles that lie behind the Bill that they take refuge in pettifogging, legalistic criticisms, such as those to which we have just listened.

I can speak briefly because of the eloquent way in which my hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Ms. Richardson) introduced the measure. Our commitment to the Bill's sentiments pre-dates the hon. Lady's Opposition Front Bench responsibility, but her speech today amply demonstrated the wisdom of her appointment to those responsibilities.

The principle that lies behind the Bill—I hope that the House will not forget it—is that discrimination based on sex and sexuality is wrong. That is the first point that we wish to make in support of the Bill. Secondly, the plain fact is that the Equal Pay Act 1970 and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 have been shown to suffer from important defects, such as those outlined by the hon. Lady. Those were useful and necessary pieces of legislation, but in a number of important respects they have been found to be inadequate. It is a measure of how far they fall below current international standards that the European Court ruled that the existing provisions for equal pay for work of equal value were illegal in terms of the European provisions. That was a sorry tale.

Only a few days ago, another place expressed the opinion that the regulations that the Government are offering, after having been found to have acted illegally by the European Court, are still in contravention of the provisions that the European Court wishes to see implemented. Not only have the Government been found to have acted illegally, but there is a strongly held opinion that they are still acting illegally in the methods used to try to put the illegality right. It is not sufficient for Ministers to say that the regulations still stand. By a clear and free vote backed by distinguished judges, such as Lord Denning, the other place showed that it thought that the Government were not only not acting in good faith in bringing forward the regulations but acting illegally. The other place came to that view because the regulations were over-complex, insufficient, bureaucratic in character and allowed market force defences and all sorts of other provisions that strike right at the heart of the objectives that the regulations were designed to achieve. The Government are failing in their obligation to observe the directive from the European Commission and going back on their commitment to be genuine partners in the European Community.

**Ms. Harman:** Is not a striking contrast and telling difference to be found in the way that the Government have responded to the European Court's ruling on the importation of UHT milk, which will annihilate the doorstep delivery? The European Court of Justice made a decision on that matter in February this year, yet already regulations have been passed that will comply with its

Government are still supplying weapons which could be used against Argentina. Does the Minister accept that if the Government wish to dissuade the Argentine Government from taking advantage of the relaxation of American controls there is no better way to do it than to put an immediate embargo on the sale of British arms to Chile?

**Mr. Whitney:** I welcome the right hon. Gentleman's condemnation of excited rhetoric. I hope that he will continue to take that view and to abjure the excited rhetoric that we have heard from him and from many of his right hon. and hon. Friends in the anti-American postures that they have adopted so regularly in past weeks — in opposition to all that the right hon. Gentleman himself previously stood for, although I appreciate his problems in seeking to maintain a facade of unity behind the rhetoric.

The circumstances of the transfers of heavy water have already been explained to the right hon. Gentleman and he knows that they had nothing to do directly with this Government. The attitude towards arms sales to Chile, which is not the subject of the statement, is examined on a case by case basis, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary explained clearly in the House on Wednesday.

I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman accepts the moderate, balanced and sensible tone of my statement.

**Dr. Owen:** I, too, welcome the marked difference in tone between the Minister's statement and those emanating from No. 10. Does he agree that it is a tragedy that the British Government will not be represented at the inauguration of President Alfonsín in Buenos Aires tomorrow?

Will the Minister explain what the Prime Minister meant when she wrote to me yesterday about the Argentine Government not having yet made a definitive declaration on the cessation of hostilities? The new President has talked about using peaceful means. The House should commend a man who, in the midst of the Falklands war, referred to the invasion as an illegitimate act by an illegal Government in a just cause. He is a true democrat and should be sustained by the House.

Will the Prime Minister now drop her hysterical attitude on fortress Falklands and realise that no country should continue to bear that burden unless there is failure to reach a negotiated settlement? She should now show generosity and a capacity to forgive, welcome the new democratic regime and declare the Government's readiness to open negotiations on the basis that they will be conducted by peaceful means only, which should be accepted as a satisfactory definition of the fact that hostilities are now over or will be over as from tomorrow.

**Mr. Whitney:** I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on achieving his private notice question without its being allowed. I am happy to respond to it.

**Mr. Speaker:** Order.

**Mr. Whitney:** I apologise, Mr. Speaker. With your permission, I shall be happy to respond to the substance of the right hon. Gentleman's intervention, although it is somewhat far from the statement.

I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will accept that, as my right hon. and noble Friend the Minister of State said in another place this week, Her Majesty's Government

"welcome the election of a democratic Government in Argentina. We wish President-elect Alfonsín and his colleagues well."—[*Official Report, House of Lords*, 6 December 1983; Vol. 445, c. 1013.]

I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will also acknowledge that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has consistently said that we look for normalisation of relations with the new Argentine Government.

The right hon. Gentleman must also recognise, however, that for the time being no cessation of the use of force has been formally declared and that it is vital that we continue to preserve the interests of the Falkland Islanders. In view of the support that he gave the Government in that difficult period last year, I hope that he will recognise that that vital principle must not be neglected.

**Mr. Ivan Lawrence (Burton):** Is my hon. Friend aware that, although Conservative Members believe that America is very much our best ally and deplore the anti-Americanism now sweeping through parts of this country and being triggered off by the words and actions of Opposition Members, some of us consider that it would have been rather more friendly and helpful if the Americans had required the Argentines to declare an end to hostilities with Britain before rushing to confer this benefit on them?

**Mr. Whitney:** The act of certification depended on progress on human rights and democracy in Argentina. As I said in my statement, the British Government acknowledge that significant progress has indeed been made in Argentina in those two important areas. The next step — the authorisation of specific arms sales — is something else again. On that, we have received assurances from spokesmen for the United States Administration. We have been assured, for example, that no arms transfers are contemplated that would increase the prospects of a renewed conflict in the Falklands.

**Mr. J. Enoch Powell (Down, South):** Is it not the case that the defence of the Falkland Islands depends not on what arms Argentina can or cannot acquire but upon the ability and will of this country to reinforce the islands when a real threat to them exists?

**Mr. Whitney:** That is a major factor. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will accept that Her Majesty's Government are fully conscious of that point and are taking all steps to meet it.

**Mr. Peter Viggers (Gosport):** Does my hon. Friend agree that while a state of hostility formally exists it is necessary for our armed forces in the Falkland Islands area to remain at the highest state of vigilance? Can we rely on the good offices of the United States Government to try to ensure that this state of hostilities is ended by the Argentine Government?

**Mr. Whitney:** I hope that my hon. Friend will accept that her Majesty's Government's commitment to the defence of the Falkland Islands is beyond question, as all the evidence and all the steps we have taken surely prove. I can also assure my hon. Friend that the United States Administration are left in no doubt about Her Majesty's Government's attitude to the future of the Falkland Islands and to our relations with the Argentine Government.

**Mr. Jack Ashley (Stoke-on-Trent, South):** Does not the United States' decision underline the fact that the

[Mr. Jack Ashley]

inexorable pressure of world events is compelling this country to recognise that it is being isolated in the Falklands and that sooner or later it will be forced to negotiate with the new Argentine regime? Is it not better to do so gracefully sooner rather than later?

**Mr. Whitney:** I repeat that Her Majesty's Government have already welcomed the democratic Government in Argentina. We have extended, through the statement by my noble Friend in another place the other day, our good wishes to President-elect Alfonsin and his colleagues. Our attitude to the future of the Falkland Islands government remains clear and our commitment to the future of the Falkland Islanders is beyond question.

**Dr. Brian Mawhinney (Peterborough):** Does my hon. Friend accept that, because of the importance of our alliance with the United States, his intimation that there were prior consultations before this decision was taken is most welcome? In the light of Secretary Weinberger's comments, will Her Majesty's Government indicate to the American Government which classes of weapons we consider it would be unhelpful for them to supply to Argentina?

**Mr. Whitney:** I certainly accept my hon. Friend's point. As I pointed out, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made our position clear to the President in September and we have been kept fully informed by the American since those exchanges. On the issue of arms sales, the assurances we have been given by the United States, which have been made publicly, can give confidence to the House that the aim that my hon. Friend wishes and indeed we all wish, will be achieved.

**Mr. Dennis Skinner (Bolsover):** Does the Minister recall that at the beginning of this year the Prime Minister, along with the banks in this country and in connivance, I assume, with the United States banking set-up and the rest, decided that it would be in the best interests of the world's economy, or, more precisely, the banking economy, to send a lot of money to Argentina in order that this bankers' ramp could be continued? Does not the Minister agree that what he has had to say today about America and the selling of missiles is more than a little hypocritical in view of the fact that, were not the British banks taking part in the exercise to loan money to Argentina, the Argentines would not be so well equipped to buy those arms which, undoubtedly, on one occasion or another, will be landing on the airport which is costing the British taxpayer so much money?

**Mr. Whitney:** Not for the first time the hon. Gentleman is led astray by cries about a bankers' ramp. If the hon. Gentleman were to take time just occasionally to reflect calmly on British interests, he would accept that the Government are pursuing a calm, moderate and sensible policy in this difficult direction.

**Mr. Skinner:** Answer the question.

**Mr. Whitney:** With regard to the aid that our banks have given to Argentina, the hon. Gentleman should understand, as I am sure do workers in this country, that the prosperity of Britain and the jobs of British workers depend on the future of the banking system.

**Mr. Kenneth Carlisle (Lincoln):** Does my hon. Friend agree that our long-term aim must be a prosperous and

secure future for the Falkland Islands without an undue burden on this country? In this respect, I welcome very much his statement that we are pursuing a normalisation of relations with the Argentine and his welcome to the Alfonsin Government. Will he reaffirm that we are determined now to normalise our relations with the Argentines? What steps might bring this into effect?

**Mr. Whitney:** I am happy to reaffirm Her Majesty's Government's strong desire to achieve a normalisation of relations with Argentina and at the same time, of course, to fulfil the commitment we have given and continue to give to secure the future of the Falkland Islanders. I believe that at this stage it would be premature to make any early forecasts about a Government who, after all, have not yet taken office.

**Mr. Alex Carlile (Montgomery):** Does the Minister agree that the long-term defence of the Falkland Islands and particularly of the islanders' way of life depends not so much on a huge military fortress which no longer has public support in the United Kingdom but on early negotiations with Argentina without unnecessary preconditions?

**Mr. Whitney:** I can only repeat that Her Majesty's Government's policy, which I have outlined over the past few minutes, will achieve the ends we seek, which are the protection of the interests of the Falkland islanders and a normalisation of our relations with Argentina. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept that it takes two to tango.

**Mr. Ian Lloyd (Havant):** However welcome may be the improved legitimacy and democratic quality of the new Argentine regime, does not the normalisation of relations depend on the new President saying that he disagrees with his air force general who announced the other day that his air force would continue to probe the defences of the Falkland Islands in order to increase the cost to this country of defending them?

**Mr. Whitney:** I entirely accept my hon. Friend's point. We very much need a clear statement from the Argentine Government, once they assume office, that the use of force is banned for ever from their policy towards the Falkland Islands.

**Dame Judith Hart (Clydesdale):** As the Minister has welcomed the restoration of democracy in Argentina, and as it is clear that the American Government recognise the tremendous improvement in human rights there which is the result of that, does he agree, first, that, having welcomed the election of Mr. Alfonsin, it is necessary to take any steps which will preserve and strengthen democracy in Argentina — that is relevant to the discussions that may take place between the two Governments — and, secondly, that this requires a complete review of our policies in Latin America, particularly in relation to arms sales to Chile? Is it not absurd that we welcome democracy in Argentina but continue to supply arms to its major enemy, which is the grossest offender against human rights in the whole of Latin America?

**Mr. Whitney:** I assure the right hon. Lady that, although we welcome the steps taken towards democracy in Argentina, when she asks whether we would consider any sacrifice, I must tell her that there are vital interests with regard to the Falkland Islanders which we most certainly will not sacrifice in that interest.

I have already told the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) that the case in Chile is considered item by item. I wish that the right hon. Lady and her right hon. and hon. Friends would accept that there have been steps towards the opening of democracy in Chile during the past few months.

**Mr. James Callaghan** (Cardiff, South and Penarth): As the Minister referred to the reaction of the Foreign Office as being "calm" and "moderate" towards this action by the United States, may we be assured that the Prime Minister has seen and approved his statement?

**Mr. Whitney:** It should scarcely be necessary for me to assure the distinguished right hon. Gentleman that any statement made from the Dispatch Box of course carries the agreement and approval of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. I assure him and the House that any attempt to suggest that there is a wedge between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Prime Minister is pure fiction.

**Mr. Patrick Nicholls** (Teignbridge): Will my hon. Friend accept that, although hon. Members on both sides of the House will wish President Alfonsín the best, we still have to conduct our defence of the Falklands on the basis that South American politics can be turbulent and the fact that there is a democratic regime there today does not mean that there will be a democratic regime there tomorrow?

**Mr. Whitney:** Sadly, that will remain a factor in Latin American politics, as it remains a factor in the politics of all too many countries.

**Mr. James Lamond** (Oldham, Central and Royton): Remembering the Minister's excellent speech from the Government Back Benches when the task force was sent to the south Atlantic, may we take it that he at least recognises that this is one more step along the road to complying with the United Nations resolution that, to save ourselves enormous costs, we should get down as soon as possible to negotiating the future of the Malvinas?

**Mr. Whitney:** I did not quite recognise the last word in the hon. Gentleman's question. I should hate to accept his praise undeservedly. I recall that my statement on 2 April 1982 strongly urged the Government that, as the fleet steamed to the south Atlantic, they should negotiate earnestly and seriously to try to achieve a peaceful resolution. That is precisely what the Government did. The tragedy was that the military regime in the Argentine rejected those attempts.

The Government's policy is to normalise our relations with the Argentine, while preserving the vital interests of the Falkland Islanders, which we have committed ourselves to preserving.

**Mr. Nicholas Soames** (Crawley): Will my hon. Friend confirm that if the new Argentine Government made sensible overtures to us the Government would receive them with a positive and magnanimous attitude?

**Mr. Whitney:** My hon. Friend tempts me into the realms of hypothetical questions. Let us see what overtures develop. I assure my hon. Friend that they will be considered positively, in the spirit of our professed desire to restore normal economic and diplomatic relations with the Argentine.

**Mr. Willie W. Hamilton** (Fife, Central): As the United States Government have said that in future arms sales to the Argentine they will distinguish between arms that could be used for a military invasion of the Falklands and those that could not, are the British Government satisfied that such a distinction can be made? If so, will they consider sending the Americans a list of the arms that they think would not be used in a military invasion of the Falklands?

**Mr. Whitney:** The United States Administration have given us an undertaking that they will remain in close consultation on this issue, and their performance has shown that they are firmly honouring that undertaking. I have no doubt that we shall remain in close consultation on the points raised by the hon. Gentleman.

**Mr. Bill Walker** (Tayside, North): Does my hon. Friend agree that when a previous Labour Government decided to remove the deterrent force of an aircraft carrier and a support ship from the south Atlantic and the Indian ocean they left the Falkland islands with no means of deterring aggression? May we be assured that plans being made now, by either the United States or ourselves, will not put the Falkland Islanders at risk again?

**Mr. Whitney:** The real crisis for the Falkland islands came with the total failure of the Argentines to understand the Government's determination to resist aggression. After the events of last year, I am confident that neither the next Argentine Government nor any successor Government will be in any doubt about the fact that while the Conservative party is in power we shall respond positively in defence of the legitimate interests of the Falkland Islanders and any other minority people for whom we have responsibility.

**Mr. Roland Boyes** (Houghton and Washington): Last night, a senior member of the Cabinet said of our relationship with Washington: "the scars are healing, but they are still there and we may get beyond the US election before we are back in the kind of circumstances where we have got better relations." That was said before this latest announcement. Does the Minister agree that the so-called special relationship between President Reagan and our Prime Minister is in tatters?

**Mr. Whitney:** Of course I do not. It is important to understand that the fundamental interests of and the relationship between the United States and this country extend far beyond any individuals, however important they may be.

**Mr. Healey:** Hear, hear.

**Mr. Whitney:** The fundamental interests that we share are absolute. The tragedy is that the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) used to understand that fact, but now, under the pressure of too many of his hon. Friends, he is ready to renege on it.

**Mr. Alfred Dubs** (Battersea): Is the Minister saying that the Government's attitude to and willingness to negotiate with and sell arms to other Governments is not in the least related to whether those Governments are democratic or in fundamental breach of human rights?

**Mr. Whitney:** Did the hon. Gentleman refer to the United States or the British Government?

**Mr. Dubs:** I was talking about the British Government.

**Mr. Whitney:** The hon. Gentleman should understand that, as has been explained many times in the House, the Government's policy is to consider those matters case by case. That has been done over the years by Governments of both complexions. It is the most sensible way to conduct our relations in the interests of Britain.

**Mr. Richard Holt (Langbaugh):** Does my hon. Friend agree that but for the bravery of the British forces and the courage of our Prime Minister the chances are that the junta would still be in power in the Argentine and that the democracy there today owes a great deal more to the troops who died and the actions of the Government than to anything said by the Opposition?

**Mr. Whitney:** I agree with my hon. Friend. The Opposition's position during the months following the invasion was difficult to follow, because it moved so rapidly. There is no doubt that the point made by my hon. Friend is well taken.

**Mr. Healey:** Despite the typical comment made by the Minister a moment ago, I repeat that we welcome the fact that his statement has opened the prospect of a return to common sense by the Government in relation to the problems of the Falklands and the Argentine. As the hon. Gentleman has said that he wants to normalise our relations with the Argentines, will he agree that by far the best demonstration of that desire would be to take advantage of President Alfonsín's taking office tomorrow to announce the full restoration of diplomatic relations between London and Buenos Aires? Sending an ambassador back to Buenos Aires would be by far the best demonstration of the Government's intentions and would not, in itself, imply anything further.

**Mr. Whitney:** I am sorry if the right hon. Gentleman thinks that my response was typical. What I was doing, and I shall readily continue to do it, was pointing out the inconsistencies in his attitude to the United States.

With regard to the right hon. Gentleman's substantive point, the Government continue to wish to see the normalisation of relations with the Argentine. However, I repeat to the right hon. Gentleman, because it is appropriate in this context, that it takes two to tango.

**Mr. Speaker:** May I remind the House that it is not in order for right hon. or hon. Members to make any reference on the Floor of the House to the fact that a private notice question has not been accepted by the Chair. I hope that all right hon. and hon. Members will observe our long-standing practice in that respect.

## Ministerial Statements

**Mr. Michael Cocks (Bristol, South):** On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I wish to raise with you a matter that could be raised only after a full study of the *Official Report* for yesterday, which hon. Members will now have had the chance to look at. I refer to the statement made yesterday by the Minister for Health about National Health Service pharmaceuticals. That statement occupies some nine and a half columns of the *Official Report*—c. 477 to 486. Despite that, some right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House were squeezed out from asking questions.

At the time, the Minister was suspected of filibustering. If we examine the official record we find that after his opening statement and the reply from my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Meacher), the questions occupy some 144 lines whereas the Minister's replies occupy some 237. I ask you to examine that, Mr. Speaker, because it is a possible abuse of the House if a Minister, by giving inordinately long answers, is able to protect himself from full cross-examination on a highly contentious matter.

**Mr. Robert MacLennan (Caithness and Sutherland):** Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. Will you also consider the episode regarding the Prime Minister's statement after her return from the Athens summit? Will you measure the number of lines taken by the Leader of the Opposition and compare them with the number taken by the Prime Minister? If you do so, you will realise that there is some equity in these matters.

**Mr. Dennis Skinner (Bolsover):** As, Mr. Speaker, you are to be asked to examine all of these lines in *Hansard*, many column inches and to rule on God knows what else before Christmas, will you take into account the fact that when the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport, (Dr. Owen) was the Foreign Secretary, he used to make long, fudging and mudding answers?

**Mr. Speaker:** Perhaps I can content myself by saying that I have, of course, studied *Hansard*, as I do every day. I have been somewhat perturbed at the length of questions and answers at Question Time as well as after statements. The House would help the Chair and itself if questions and answers could be shorter, as many more hon. Members could then be called.

EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
LONDON

December 9, 1983

*ms*

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver the enclosed message to you from Vice President Bush, which was received at the Embassy this evening.

Sincerely,

*Charles H Price II*  
Charles H. Price, II  
Ambassador  
*by [Signature]*

Enclosure

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
London, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL



US Declassified



THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

December 8, 1983

The Right Honorable Margaret Thatcher  
Prime Minister  
London, England

*h.a.*  
*AB*  $\frac{22}{12}$

Dear Madame Prime Minister:


Before leaving for Argentina, I want to send a few thoughts to you. Oliver Wright came in to see me on Tuesday, just before his departure for London. We had a very good talk about the overall relationship and I made clear to Oliver my desire to help in any way to deal with matters of mutual concern.

Since that meeting, I have read your most forthcoming response to President Reagan's letter about our certification of Argentina. I am also aware that you have sent a message to President-elect Alfonsin congratulating him and the people of Argentina on the restoration of democracy in that country. I will do all I can to help the Argentines understand your interest in restoring relations between Buenos Aires and London without having such restoration be dependent upon discussion of the Falkland Islands sovereignty issue.

I am concerned about recent events and am determined to do all I can to be helpful. Upon my return from Argentina, we will make certain that Sir Oliver is fully briefed on pertinent developments that took place during that trip.

I wish we could sit down and chat because I have been troubled by recent tensions and I know it hasn't been easy for you either.

Respectfully,

  
George Bush

CONFIDENTIAL

# US Declassified

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

Before leaving for Argentina, I want to send a few thoughts to you. Oliver Wright came in to see me on Tuesday, just before his departure for London. We had a very good talk about the overall relationship and I made clear to Oliver my desire to help in any way to deal with matters of mutual concern.

Since that meeting, I have read your most forthcoming response to President Reagan's letter about our certification of Argentina. I am also aware that you have sent a message to President-elect Alfonsin congratulating him and the people of Argentina on the restoration of democracy in that country. I will do all I can to help the Argentines understand your interest in restoring relations between Buenos Aires and London without having such restoration be dependent upon discussion of the Falkland Islands sovereignty issue.

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I wish we could sit down and chat because I have been troubled by recent tensions and I know it hasn't been easy for you either.


Respectfully,

George Bush

CONFIDENTIAL

US Declassified

18 DEC 1983



Argentina Pt 35

see AT-11MT  
8/12



CF  
Please bf for  
meeting.

10 DOWNING STREET

Dms  
9/12

Caroline

changed for  
15.30 on  
~~Friday~~ Thursday  
22nd

Could you very CR  
9/12

kindly fix this  
for before Christmas  
if poss:

- ✓ Chancellor
- ✓ FCS
- ✓ AG or SG

About 3/4 hour.

David  
9/12

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

8 December 1983

ARGENTINA

The Prime Minister has seen the paper attached to the Chancellor's minute of 5 December. She has noted it but without comment at this stage. She suggests, however, that it would be better to discuss this in a smaller Ministerial group. This Office will arrange such a meeting.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Henry Steel (Law Officers' Department), Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office) and John Bartlett (Governor of the Bank of England's Office).

Andrew Turnbull

John Kerr, Esq.,  
H.M. Treasury.

CONFIDENTIAL

NK



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 December 1983

Dear John,

Argentina

I wrote to you on 10 November in response to Robin Butler's letter of 3 November about the then Lord Mayor of London's offer to act as a channel to the incoming Argentine government.

Sir Anthony Jolliffe's name has now come up again in connection with Argentina. Mr Joy in our Interests Section in Buenos Aires telephoned this morning. He was speaking on an open line and was therefore obliged to pass his message obliquely. But he implied that Sr Caputo had asked him to ascertain whether Sir Anthony Jolliffe had the Prime Minister's authority for contacts with Argentina. Mr Joy added that there was a message on its way, apparently from Sir Anthony Jolliffe to an unnamed recipient in Argentina to this effect. This letter, which was being sent via New York, included a tape and a signed letter.

I would welcome your advice on how we should reply to Mr Joy. We have undertaken to call him back at about 6 p.m. tomorrow evening, 9 December.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

Argentina Relativo P-35

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London, W.1A 1AA





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>953</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Solicitor General to Prime Minister dated 8 December 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <i>40</i> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>17 January 2013 Wayland</i>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
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The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>953</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Lord Chancellor to Prime Minister dated 8 December 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <i>40</i> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>17 January 2013</i> <i>AWayland</i>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
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MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

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5635 - 1

DD 081030Z BERNE

GRS 578

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 081030Z BERNE AND UKDEL NATO (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

FM FCO 081003Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE BERNE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 137 OF 8 DECEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, MADRID, UKDEL NATO  
(FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

PRIORITY OTHER EC POSTS

YOUR TELNO 229: ARGENTINE ELECTIONS

1. THE PRIME MINISTER WISHES TO SEND THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE TO ALFONSIN. BEGINS: [ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR INAUGURATION I WANTED TO LET YOU KNOW THAT, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE MANY DIFFERENCES, WE CAN ALL TAKE PLEASURE IN THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY TO ARGENTINA, BELIEVING IT WILL BRING FREEDOM AND JUSTICE TO ALL YOUR PEOPLE. TODAY BRINGS NEW HOPE TO YOUR COUNTRY.] ENDS.

2. PLEASE ASK THE SWISS TO TELEGRAPH THIS TEXT URGENTLY TO PROBST IN BUENOS AIRES. WE HOPE HE WILL BE ABLE TO DELIVER IT PERSONALLY TO ALFONSIN ON 10 DECEMBER. WE PROPOSE TO RELEASE THE TEXT PUBLICLY ON 10 DECEMBER.

3. WE SHOULD ALSO BE GRATEFUL IF THE SWISS STATE SECRETARY COULD HAND TO AN APPROPRIATELY SENIOR MEMBER OF ALFONSIN'S PERSONAL STAFF, AND TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER-DESIGNATE, A NOTE DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE EXACT TERMS OF OTHER BRITISH COMMENT ON THE ELECTIONS IN ARGENTINA. TEXT OF THIS WOULD BE RELEASED PUBLICLY AT THE SAME TIME AS THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. IT IS AS FOLLOWS. BEGINS FOLLOWING THE GENERAL ELECTIONS IN ARGENTINA THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ISSUED A FORMAL STATEMENT, AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAS COMMENTED ON THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS, BOTH IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND IN AN IMPORTANT NEWSPAPER INTERVIEW. REFERENCE HAS BEEN MADE TO THESE STATEMENTS IN THE ARGENTINE PRESS. IT MAY, NONETHELESS, BE HELPFUL FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA TO HAVE THE PRECISE TEXTS OF THESE.

ON 31 OCTOBER 1982 THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

1

CONFIDENTIAL

A.S.C.  $\frac{8}{12}$   
p.a.

CONFIDENTIAL

5635 - 1

ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ABOUT THE ARGENTINE ELECTIONS: QUOTE WE WELCOME THIS STEP TOWARDS THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA. WE HOPE THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL BE MORE INCLINED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE IDEAS WE HAVE PUT FORWARD TO SECURE THE RESTORATION OF NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THIS IS THE ONLY REALISTIC WAY TOWARDS THE RESTORATION OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN US. UNQUOTE.

ANSWERING A QUESTION ABOUT THE ELECTIONS IN PARLIAMENT ON 1 NOVEMBER, MRS THATCHER SAID, QUOTE WE ARE ALWAYS PLEASED WHEN A COUNTRY RETURNS TO DEMOCRACY. THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION ABOUT THAT. I HOPE THAT, NOW THAT THAT COUNTRY HAS RETURNED TO DEMOCRATIC WAYS, IT WILL BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER BETTER ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN ITSELF AND BRITAIN UNQUOTE. MRS THATCHER ALSO SAID IN HER NEWSPAPER INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN THE DAILY MAIL ON 7 NOVEMBER 1983 QUOTE I AM WILLING TO ENTER INTO TALKS. WE WANT GOOD COMMERCIAL RELATIONS, DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. WE WANT NORMAL RELATIONS. BUT I AM NOT ENTERING INTO TALKS ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY. UNQUOTE.

4. FOR WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME AND MADRID. PLEASE ENSURE THAT BUSH/MAUROY/CRAXI/GONZALEZ IS MADE AWARE, IN CONFIDENCE, OF THESE STEPS WE ARE TAKING. WE HOPE THAT, WHEN THEY ARE IN BUENOS AIRES, THEY WILL COMMEND TO ALFONSIN AND HIS TEAM THIS POLICY OF IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS AS THE ONLY REALISTIC WAY AHEAD. WE WOULD ALSO BE GRATEFUL IF THEY COULD TRY TO ELICIT FROM THE NEW ARGENTINE PRESIDENT SOME INDICATION THAT HE RECIPROCATES OUR FEELINGS.

5. OTHER ADDRESSEES SHOULD SPEAK SIMILARLY TO LEADING PERSONALITIES TRAVELLING TO ALFONSIN'S INAUGURATION AND TO OTHER APPROPRIATE CONTACTS.

6. TO ALL. GRATEFUL FOR EARLIEST POSSIBLE REPORT OF ANY ARGENTINE REACTION.

HOWE

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL  
FCO  
FID  
CABINET OFFICE

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST.]

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

- 2 -  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL  
8 December, 1983

Message to New Government in Argentina

Thank you for your letter of 7 December.

The Prime Minister agrees that the telegram which you enclosed may be despatched.

P. F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

LOBBY NOTE

*Copied to Mr.  
Sent at 6.45 pm.*

*Dec 8, 1983*

*JW.*

US HUMAN RIGHTS CERTIFICATION OF ARGENTINA

The US Administration have announced that they have re-certified\* Argentina as a potential purchaser of US arms. BUT this does not mean that arms' sales are either in the pipeline or planned in any way. Each case will be considered on its merits but there is no longer an automatic bar to consideration of arms' sales.

The Prime Minister made our position very clear to President Reagan in September and the US Administration is very well aware of our concern and we have been kept closely informed of their thinking on this subject. We have been glad to note that Weinberger has remarked that the USA would exercise caution about the resumption of major new supplies and that they would not supply weapons which could be used in a new attempt to invade the Falkland Islands.

Certification is not equivalent to arms' sales. An amendment in 1978 to the US Foreign Assistance Act placed a ban on most arms' sales to Argentina. Only when the Administration certifies that the Argentine authorities have made significant progress on human rights and that the resumption of arms' sales is in the United States' interests can they be resumed. The Administration have now judged that the situation in Argentina meets this test in US Law of human rights' performance. Like the President, we have noted and welcomed the restoration of democracy in Argentina and other progress there on human rights.

Certification opens the way for arms' supplies but the Argentine Foreign Minister-Designate has said that buying arms is not one of the priorities of the new Government and we understand that the Americans for their part do not envisage major transactions.

We shall obviously remain in contact with the US Administration on this subject.

Press Office  
10 Downing Street

8 December 1983

\*effective from 10 December 1983

PS  
 PS/LADY YOUNG  
 PS/MR WHITNEY  
 PS/MR RIFKIND  
 PS/PUS  
 SIR J BULLARD  
 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR FRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
 LORD N G LENNOX  
 MR EVANS  
 MR URE

MR CARTLEDGE  
 ED/PUSD (2)  
 ED/SALT  
 ED/FID

~~ED/NEWS DEPT~~  
 ED/NEWS DEPT  
 ED/ED  
 ED/EOC(E)  
 ED/END  
 ED/PLANNING STAFF

~~Mr. [unclear] and [unclear]~~

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (3)  
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
 MISS M E GUND )  
 MR LITTLE ) TREASURY

SIR P ARMSTRONG )  
 MR A D S GOODALL ) CABINET OF  
 DIO )

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

MR A TITCHENER DIT (Victoria)

MR A FORTNAM IAT/ D. TRANSPORT

~~PRESIDENT OFFICE~~  
 IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 082156Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 3698 OF 8 DEC 83

INFO PRIORITY BERNE PARIS ROME MADRID UKDEL NATO

YOUR TELNO 137 TO BERNE : ARGENTINA

1. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO GREGG (FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER TO THE VICE-PRESIDENT) AND GAVE HIM THE TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO ALFONSI. HE WAS GLAD TO HAVE THIS AND SAID THAT THE VICE-PRESIDENT WOULD TRY TO ENCOURAGE THE ARGENTINES TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MORE NORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH US. MR BUSH WOULD BE SENDING A MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON HIS RETURN.

BRAITHWAITE



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

8 December, 1983

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 8 December enclosing a message from President Reagan.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency The Honourable Charles Price II

CP

8 December, 1983

Argentina and US Certification

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister received this morning from President Reagan in response to Mrs. Thatcher's message of 6 December about the US decision to certify that Argentina has made significant improvements in human rights.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

P. F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office




EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
LONDON

December 8, 1983

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver the attached message to you from President Reagan, which was received at the Embassy early this morning.

Sincerely,



Charles H. Price, II  
Ambassador

Enclosure

SECRET

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
London, S.W. 1

SUBJECT COMASTER  
OPS

US Declassified 7

PRIME MINISTER'S

THE WHITE HOUSE

PERSONAL MESSAGE

WASHINGTON

SERIAL No. T 205/83

December 7, 1983

Dear Margaret:

I sincerely appreciate your positive response to my decision to certify that Argentina has made significant improvements in human rights. We are sensitive to your concerns on this matter. As we indicated, certification does not mean arms sales and, in any case, any request will be evaluated carefully on a case-by-case basis. We will consult closely with you prior to any proposed major sale.

George Shultz will discuss this issue with Geoffrey Howe in Brussels this week. I agree with the approach you outlined in your letter for the public presentation of our certification decision. We will cooperate fully with your government on all public affairs aspects of the certification process.

George Bush will inform President-elect Alfonsin of our mutual desire to see the Falklands issue resolved peacefully. The Vice President's visit represents our hope that the inauguration of the Alfonsin government will be a major step forward in the new political process in Argentina -- one that will adhere to the democratic ideals we both hold so dear.

With warm wishes,

Sincerely,

Ron

The Right Honorable  
Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
Prime Minister  
London

3 JAN 1984



Subject cc Master  
Ops.



This message was sent  
in a slightly different  
form. but keep on file.

10 DOWNING STREET

A.D.C. 5/12

THE PRIME MINISTER

f.a.

To the President of Argentina

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T206/83

Although we have  
many differences, we can  
all take pleasure in the  
restoration of democracy  
to Argentina believing that  
it will bring freedom and



THE PRIME MINISTER

10 DOWNING STREET, LONDON, W. 1

justice to all your  
people. To-day brings new  
hope to your country.

Margaret Thatcher

---

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE SH

8 December, 1983

Message to New Government in Argentina

Thank you for your letter of 7 December.

The Prime Minister agrees that the telegram which you enclosed may be despatched.

A. J. COLES

P. F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

NR



Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Would you be willing  
for your message to the  
President of Argentina to be handled  
in the way?

7 December 1983

Dear John,

A.C.C. 7.12

Yes Mr

Message to New Government in Argentina

You passed to us this morning the text of a short personal message from the Prime Minister to Alfonsin.

I now enclose a telegram which requests the Swiss to transmit the message on their own channels to their State Secretary Dr Probst who will be in Buenos Aires for the inauguration. The telegram also indicates that we would propose to reissue the text publicly here on 10 December.

The Foreign Secretary also thought that it would be useful if Dr Probst could hand to a member of Alfonsin's staff a note recapitulating the public statement we have made about the outcome of the Argentinian elections, to ensure that the incoming Argentinian government is accurately informed of our position. The enclosed telegram contains a proposed text for such a note.

The Foreign Secretary has seen this telegram and agrees with it. I would be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister is content with it.


Yours ever,

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

Peter Ricketts

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	Precedence/Deskby <b>IMMEDIATE</b>
	CONFIDENTIAL	

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE BERNE
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, MADRID, UKDEL NATO
	10	(FOR SEC OF STATE'S PARTY)
	11	PRIORITY OTHER EC POSTS
	12	YOUR TELNO 229: ARGENTINE ELECTIONS
	13	1. The Prime Minister wishes to send the following personal
	14	message to Alfonsin. Begins: On the occasion of your inauguration
	15	I wanted to let you know that, although we have many differences,
	16	we can all take pleasure in the restoration of democracy to
	17	Argentina, believing it will bring freedom and justice to all
	18	your people. Today brings new hope to your country. Ends.
	19	2. Please ask the Swiss to telegraph this text urgently to Probst
	20	in Buenos Aires. We hope he will be able to deliver it personally
	21	to Alfonsin on 10 December. We propose to release the text
///	22	publicly on 10 December.
//	23	3. We should also be grateful if the Swiss State Secretary
/	24	could hand to an appropriately senior member of Alfonsin's
	25	

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword <b>personal</b>
File number	Dept Private Office	Distribution ce
Drafted by (Block capitals) <b>P F Ricketts</b>		Falkland Islands General
Telephone number <b>233 4641</b>		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats  
CONFIDENTIAL

Page  
2

<<<<

1 <<<<  
2 personal staff, and to the Foreign Minister-designate, a  
3 note drawing attention to the exact terms of other British  
4 comment on the elections in Argentina. Text of this ~~will~~ should  
5 be released publicly at the same time as the Prime Minister's  
6 message. It is as follows. Begins Following the general  
7 elections in Argentina the British Government issued a formal  
8 statement, and the Prime Minister has commented on the out-  
9 come of the elections, both in the House of Commons and in  
10 an important newspaper interview. Reference has been made  
11 to these statements in the Argentine press. It may,  
12 nonetheless, be helpful for the new Government of Argentina  
13 to have the precise texts of these.

14 On 31 October 1982 the Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
15 issued the following statement about the Argentine  
16 elections: Quote we welcome this step towards the  
17 restoration of democracy in Argentina.  
18 We hope that the new Government will be more inclined to  
19 respond positively to the ideas we have put forward to  
20 secure the restoration of normal relations between our two  
21 countries. This is the only realistic way towards the  
22 restoration of confidence between us. Unquote.

23 Answering a question about the elections in Parliament  
24 on 1 November, Mrs Thatcher said, quote we are always  
25 pleased when a country returns to democracy. There can be  
26 no question about that. I hope that, now that that  
27 country has returned to democratic ways, it will be prepared  
28 to consider better economic and commercial relations  
29 between itself and Britain unquote. Mrs Thatcher also  
30 said in her newspaper interview published in the Daily Mail  
31 on 7 November 1983 quote I am willing to enter into talks.  
32 We want good commercial relations, diplomatic relations.  
33 We want normal relations. But I am not entering into talks  
34

NNNN ends  
telegram

BLANK

Catchword

about

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	Page <b>3</b>
	↓	

<<<<

1 <<<<  
 2 about sovereignty. Unquote.  
 3 4. For Washington, Paris, Rome and Madrid. Please ensure  
 4 that Bush/Mauroy/Craxi/Gonzalez is made aware, in  
 5 confidence, of these steps we are taking. We hope that,  
 6 when they are in Buenos Aires, they will commend to  
 7 Alfonsin and his team this policy of improving bilateral  
 8 relations as the only realistic way ahead. We would also  
 9 be grateful if they could try to elicit from the new  
 10 Argentine President some indication that he reciprocates  
 11 our feelings.  
 12 5. Other addressees should speak similarly to leading  
 13 personalities travelling to Alfonsin's inauguration and to  
 14 other appropriate contacts.  
 15 6. To all. Grateful for earliest possible report of any  
 16 Argentine reaction.

18 HOWE  
 19 NNNN

/// 31  
 // 32  
 / 33  
 34

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
--------------------	-------	-----------

AJC  
8/12



10 DOWNING STREET

Caroline.

The FCS must discuss  
this with the P.R. urgently -  
not later than Monday.

Can you fix 30 minutes pl.

A.S.C.<sup>2.</sup>/<sub>12</sub>

1700 - 1730  
on Friday. Have  
told K.O.

A.S.C.<sup>7.</sup>/<sub>12</sub> CR 7/12



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <u>PREM 19</u> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <u>953</u> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Howe to Prime Minister (PM/83/97) dated 6 December 1983, with attachments</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <u>40</u> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>17 January 2013 Wayland</i>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
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Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use **Black Pen** to complete form

Use the card for one piece/item number only

Enter the Lettercode, Series and Piece/Item references clearly  
e.g.

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>GRA 168</i> .....
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>49</i> ..... (ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY)

Please Sign and Date in the box adjacent to the description that applies to the document being replaced by the Dummy Card

If the document is Closed under a FOI exemption, enter the number of years closed. See the TNA guidance *Preparation of records for transfer to The National Archives*, section 18.2

The box described as 'Missing' is for TNA use only (it will apply to a document that is not in its proper place after it has been transferred to TNA)

EPS 400  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 062012Z DEC 83  
TO PRIORITY F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3678 OF 6 DECEMBER.

ARGENTINA

1. I CALLED ON VICE PRESIDENT BUSH THIS MORNING TO GO OVER THE GROUND PRIOR TO HIS VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES FOR THE INAUGURATION OF ALFONSIN.
  
2. THE CALL PROVED TIMELY IN THAT BUSH WAS CLEARLY CONCERNED THAT HIS PURPOSE IN ATTENDING THE INAUGURATION COULD GIVE RISE TO MISUNDERSTANDING IN THE U.K. HE SAID HIS AIM WAS TO ENCOURAGE THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA, AND TO SEE WHETHER U.S. RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA COULD BE ESTABLISHED ON A BETTER FOOTING UNDER THE NEW GOVERNMENT. HE REALISED THAT WITH ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS PASSING THROUGH A DELICATE PHASE HIS VISIT COULD BE INTERPRETED AS A SIGN THAT THE U.S. WAS TILTING AWAY FROM THE U.K. AND TOWARDS ARGENTINA. HE WANTED TO ASSURE US THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION WHATSOEVER OF THIS BEING THE CASE. HE SAID HE HAD IT IN MIND TO WRITE DIRECTLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER TO REASSURE HER.
  
3. I ASSURED HIM THAT THERE WAS NO DANGER OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT MISUNDERSTANDING THE PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT, AND I EXPLAINED TO HIM OUR ATTITUDE TO THE ALFONSIN GOVERNMENT. I SAID THAT WE WELCOMED THE RETURN OF DEMOCRACY TO ARGENTINA, AS HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR BY THE PRIME MINISTER. WE WANTED TO RESTORE NORMAL RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA. WE WERE READY TO GO AS FAR AND AS FAST AS THE ALFONSIN GOVERNMENT. WE HAD DEMONSTRATED OUR GOOD WILL BY JOINING IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL RESCUE OPERATIONS. WHAT CONCERNED US HOWEVER WAS THAT SO FAR THE ALFONSIN GOVERNMENT HAD GIVEN NO SIGN OF BEING READY TO DECLARE AN END TO HOSTILITIES. AS A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IT OUGHT TO BE READY TO DECLARE THAT IT WOULD NOT SEEK TO GOVERN THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS AGAINST THEIR WISHES OR PROSECUTE ITS CLAIM TO THE ISLANDS BY FORCE. WE WERE NOT, MOREOVER, PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY: THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF ARGENTINA GETTING THROUGH NEGOTIATION WHAT IT HAD FAILED TO GET BY FORCE: THIS WOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD BY PUBLIC OPINION IN THE U.K. OR BY THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS THEMSELVES.
  
4. BUSH LISTENED CAREFULLY TO ALL THIS, AND SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK WE WERE APART ON ANY OF IT.

CONFIDENTIAL

15.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. I MENTIONED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SENT THE PRESIDENT A MESSAGE ON CERTIFICATION, AND OUTLINED THE ESSENTIAL POINTS IN ATHENS TELNO 3 TO WASHINGTON OF 6 DECEMBER.

6. BUSH INVITED ME TO CALL AGAIN ON HIS RETURN FROM BUENOS AIRES. I INTEND TO DO SO.

BRAITHWAITE

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL  
FCO  
FID  
CABINET OFFICE

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]  
ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

2

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. ....  
Department .....  
Drafted by .....  
(Block Capitals) .....  
Tel. Extn. ....

OUTWARD  
TELEGRAM

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence
IMMEDIATE
DESKBY .....Z

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched (Date) .....  
(Time) .....Z

POSTBY .....Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) .....  
(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/ Privacy marking) .....  
(Codeword) ..... (Deskby) ..... Z

TO IMMEDIATE MOD LONDON Tel. No. .... of  
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE FCO LONDON

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) .....

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR PS TO SECRETARY OF STATE AND  
PS TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY FROM PS TO  
PRIME MINISTER

FCO tel. no. 578; US Certification and arms sales

The Prime Minister saw last night Mr. Heseltine's message in the telegram under reference. After careful consideration, Mrs. Thatcher decided that we should not, repeat not, make a major issue of US certification of Argentina but instead be prepared, ~~if necessary~~, to take up the cudgels if and when a major American arms sale to Argentina is in prospect.

2. The Prime Minister also authorised a reply to President Reagan's message on this matter which you will see in a separate telegram.

6 December 1983

A.S.C. 6/12

Copies to:-



LLG 292/φ5

FDW G 1φ4/φ5

IMMEDIATE

\* DD φ5193φZ ATHENS \*  
GRS 235

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY φ5193φZ

FM FCO φ5183φZ DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE ATHENS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 578 OF 5 DECEMBER

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR PS/PRIME MINISTER AND PS/SECRETARY OF STATE

ARGENTINA: US CERTIFICATION AND ARMS SALES

1. MR HESELTINE'S PRIVATE OFFICE HAVE ASKED US TO PASS THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM MR HESELTINE TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

BEGINS. I DISCUSSED US CERTIFICATION OF ARGENTINA WITH GEOFFREY HOWE AT THE END OF LAST WEEK AND I HAVE NOW SEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE TO YOU OF THE 4TH OF DECEMBER, TOGETHER WITH THE FCO DRAFT REPLY.

I MUST REITERATE MY VIEW THAT WE SHOULD TAKE AN UNEQUIVOCAL STAND AGAINST THE US DECISION, AND SHOULD BE SEEN TO BE DOING SO. I BELIEVE THAT THE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO ARGENTINA IS SO CLEARLY CONTRARY TO OUR INTERESTS THAT WE CANNOT AFFORD TO COMPROMISE ON THIS MATTER.

I HAVE AS YOU KNOW EXPRESSED THIS VIEW CONSISTENTLY, BUT EVEN SINCE YOUR DEPARTURE FOR ATHENS THE MOOD HAS WORSENERED. I HAVE DISCUSSED THE REACTION TO MALCOLM RIFKIND'S STATEMENT TODAY ABOUT LEBANON WITH WILLIE WHO I KNOW WILL ENSURE THAT YOU ARE BRIEFED.

I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT GEOFFREY CAN GO TO THE HOUSE TO DEFEND AN AMERICAN DECISION TO SUPPLY ARMS TO A COUNTRY WHICH IS STILL IN A STATE OF HOSTILITIES WITH US AND EXPECT ANYTHING OTHER THAN A CATASTROPHIC REACTION. I HAVE EXPLAINED THIS VIEW TO GEOFFREY PERSONALLY. I URGE YOU MOST STRONGLY TO STAND RESOLUTE UPON THIS MATTER. ENDS.

HOWE

NNNN



Mr Coles

*AD 6.  
12*

*discussed.*

*deft to President Reagan authorized reports.*

*No action by the time being as message to*

Argentina

*President of Argentina.*

If there is time on the plane, the Secretary of State would welcome a word with the Prime Minister.

A As you know, they have already discussed the possibility of a message from the Prime Minister to the new President of Argentina. I attach a copy of my letter of 29 November, summarising the case for considering such a move and a redraft of the proposed message.

B  
C The Prime Minister has also received a message from President Reagan about certification for arms sales. I  
D attach a draft reply, which takes into account the points  
E,F made by Oliver Wright on the draft sent to us by the Department.

*[Signature]*

(B J P Fall)

5 December 1983

cc: PS

Sir J Bullard

CONFIDENTIAL

VC

5 December 1983

French Arms Sales to Argentina

Thank you for your letter of 2 December to John Coles. The Prime Minister saw this over the weekend and has noted the contents.

D BARCLAY

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

*do*

LLG 25φ  
FDW G 25/4

**FLASH**

Prime Minister

ZZ ATHENS

GRS 6φφ  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM WASHINGTON φ4193φZ DEC 83  
TO FLASH ATHENS  
TELNO φφ2 OF 4 DEC 83  
AND TO FLASH FCO (FOR PS TO SECRETARY OF STATE AND PS TO PRIME MINISTER).

*We shall let you have a  
ref to the President's  
message. A.S.C. 4/12*

FCO TELNO 555 TO YOU : ARGENTINA : US CERTIFICATION.

1. I AM WELL AWARE OF THE POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT TO HMG OF THE US DECISION TO CERTIFY, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS NOT UNEXPECTED, AND EVEN MORE AWARE OF THE POLITICAL HARM TO BRITISH INTERESTS OF POSSIBLE FUTURE US ARMS SALES TO ARGENTINA. BUT I AM CONCERNED FOR THE BRITISH IMAGE IN THE UNITED STATES AND FOR OUR REPUTATION WITH THE US ADMINISTRATION UNLESS WE CHOOSE VERY CAREFULLY THE GROUNDS ON WHICH TO CONDUCT PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ROWS WITH THEM, PARTICULARLY IN THE AFTERMATH OF GRENADA.

2. I HAVE BEEN VERY STRUCK HOW DEEPLY OUR INABILITY TO SUPPORT THE UNITED STATES OVER GRENADA HAS PENETRATED BOTH PUBLIC CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS HERE. IN SPEAKING ENGAGEMENTS SINCE GRENADA FROM PITTSBURG TO SAN FRANCISCO AND BACK AGAIN VIA MILWAUKEE TO WASHINGTON THE QUESTION HAS BEEN PUT TO ME : "WE SUPPORTED YOU OVER THE FALKLANDS: WHY DIDN'T YOU SUPPORT US OVER GRENADA". THE ANSWER IS LISTENED TO WITH COURTESY BUT DOES NOT, IN THE VIEW OF THE MEDIA OR PUBLIC, CARRY CONVICTION. GRENADA, IN THE AMERICAN VIEW, WAS A GREAT SUCCESS : IT CLEARED OUT GRENADA AND IS GIVING SOVIETS, CUBANS AND THEIR SURROGATES ELSEWHERE PAUSE.

3. IT SEEMS TO ME THEREFORE, THAT UNLESS OUR RELATIONSHIP IS TO DETERIORATE MORE THAN IS DESIRABLE IN THE BRITISH INTEREST, WE SHOULD SPACE OUR ROWS AND ENGAGE IN THEM ONLY WHEN REAL AND IMPORTANT MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE ARE INVOLVED. I RECOMMEND THEREFORE THAT WE DO NOT ARGUE ABOUT THE FORM (CERTIFICATION), FOR WHICH WE SHALL FIND SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING NEITHER WITH PUBLIC OPINION NOR WITH THE ADMINISTRATION NOR CONGRESS, BUT HOLD OUR FIRE FOR THE SUBSTANCE (ARMS SUPPLIES) FOR WHICH WE CAN EXPECT SUPPORT BOTH FROM OUR FRIENDS IN THE ADMINISTRATION (EG WEINBERGER) AND MORE WIDELY. TO PLAY THE HAND THIS WAY WILL IN FACT GIVE US MORE LEVERAGE WHEN WE REALLY NEED IT.

4. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, I HAVE ONE GENERAL AND SEVERAL PARTICULAR COMMENTS. THE GENERAL COMMENT CONCERNS THE TONE OF THE MESSAGE. IT IS COMMON GROUND, I TAKE IT, THAT WE WISH TO OBTAIN MAXIMUM RECEPTABILITY OF THE MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER. SINCE, AS IS WELL KNOWN, THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT LIKE ROWS AND TENDS TO SWITCH OFF WHEN THE DECIBEL LEVEL IS TOO HIGH, I SUGGEST THE TONE OF THE MESSAGE SHOULD REFLECT THE FACT, WHICH IS UNDISPUTED, THAT BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAVE A DIFFICULT POLITICAL PROBLEM ON THESE LAWS WHICH IT IS IN THEIR JOINT INTEREST TO MINIMISE SO THAT DOMESTIC POLITICAL PREOCCUPATIONS DO NOT SPILL OVER TO THEIR WIDER INTERESTS. THIS IS LARGELEY A QUESTION OF USING LANGUAGES AS BETWEEN FRIENDS.

5. AS FOR MY SPECIFIC POINTS THEY ARE :

(A) SECOND PARAGRAPH: DELETE QUOTE THE INCOMING GOVERNMENT THERE ARE NOT ONL NOT COMMITTED TO REDUCTIONS IN MILITARY SPENDING UNQUOTE.

(B) DELETE ALSO THE LAST SENTENCE OF THAT PARAGRAPH (IT SEEMS UNNECESSARY TO ARGUE THIS POINT, AND THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT ACCEPT IT).

(C) CONSIDER DELETING THE PASSAGE IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH: QUOTE IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR ME TO EXPRESS PUBLICLY THE REGRET I AM NOW CONVEYING TO YOU UNQUOTE.

WRIGHT

NNNN



Duty Clerk  
No 10 Downing Street.

*With the compliments of*

*Timothy Wray*  
Resident Clerk

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

LONDON, SW1A 2AH

4

xii

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats  
CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/Deskby  
FLASH

ZCZC  
GRS  
CLASS  
CAVEATS  
DESKBY  
FM FCO  
PRE/ADD  
TEL NO

1 ZCZC  
2 GRS  
3 CONFIDENTIAL  
4  
5  
6 FROM FCO 4 DECEMBER 1983  
7 TO FLASH ATHENS *SSS*  
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
9 AND TO FLASH WASHINGTON  
10 FOR PS TO SECRETARY OF STATE AND PS TO PRIME MINISTER  
11 ARGENTINA: UNITED STATES CERTIFICATION AND ARMS SALES  
12 1. Following is suggested draft message from Prime Minister  
13 to President Reagan. It incorporates comments by the PUS. If  
14 HM Ambassador in Washington has substantive <sup>VIEWS</sup> on the form or  
15 content of the draft, grateful if he could tele <sup>graph</sup> ~~phone~~ them  
16 direct to Athens, repeating to us.  
17 2. Draft text begins:  
18 Quote I appreciate your informing me of your decision in  
19 advance of the other Governments involved. But this is as you say  
20 a delicate question in Britain which will generate a lot of  
21 criticism.  
22 Like you, I welcome the restoration of democracy to  
23 Argentina, and the other progress there in the field of human  
24 rights. I have several times publicly welcomed the return of  
25 the democratic process in Argentina. I note that certification

///  
//  
/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword is not
File number	Dept	Distribution <i>FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL.</i>
Drafted by (Block capitals) RESIDENT CLERK		
Telephone number 8272		
Authorised for despatch <i>T.P.H. Murray</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Page 2
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<<<<

1 <<<<  
 2 is not equivalent to arms sales. But I cannot share your view  
 3 that your announcement is a good means of exerting influence in  
 4 Argentina. The incoming Government there are not only committed  
 5 to reductions in military spending; their Foreign Minister-  
 6 designate has said that arms purchases are not a priority  
 7 for them, and that they would prefer other signs of approval.  
 8 I fear that the Argentines who will find your announcement most  
 9 welcome are the military, who will immediately look ahead from  
 10 certification to arms procurement. The Argentine armed forces  
 11 are now in eclipse but it is from them that we must in the  
 12 longer term fear renewed threats to stability in the South  
 13 Atlantic as well as to human rights in their own country. I  
 14 suspect that they will see your decision as cutting across  
 15 Dr Alfonsin's commitment to bring the armed forces under control-  
 16 the process which your Government and mine so keenly wish to  
 17 succeed.  
 18 I welcome your undertakings about major supplies. I am  
 19 glad that close consultations can continue between us. These  
 20 can be considered further at the meetings this week between  
 21 Geoffrey Howe and George Shultz, and between Michael Heseltine  
 22 and Caspar Weinberger. Your officials have said that it is  
 23 important to maintain the confidentiality of these consultations.  
 24 I would certainly not wish to say anything in Parliament or in  
 25 public that might imply either that I was acquiescing in a  
 26 decision to sell any particular item to Argentina, or that  
 27 you had ignored requests from us not to do something which  
 28 ~~we thought~~ could enhance the threat to our forces in the  
 29 Falklands. But the fact that certification, however legitimate  
 30 **IN US TERMS,** opens the way for arms sales will cause great concern here, and  
 31 it will be necessary for me to express publicly the regret  
 32 I am now conveying to you. I propose to add that I shall  
 33 continue to make my views plain to you, and to point out that  
 34 your Administration has given public assurances that you will

*and about the careful  
 evaluation of Argentine de  
 quest on a case by case  
 basis.*

///  
 //  
 /

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword not supply
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Page 3
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<<<<

1 <<<<  
 2 not supply Argentina with sophisticated weaponry that could help  
 3 them mount another attack on the Falklands (this was the very  
 4 welcome line taken publicly by Caspar Weinberger on 10  
 5 November).

6 You speak of normalising your relations with Argentina.  
 7 This is also our declared policy. In welcoming the restoration  
 8 of democracy there, I have made it clear that I cannot discuss  
 9 sovereignty over the Falklands. But I have also said that  
 10 I am willing to talk to the new Government about commercial and  
 11 diplomatic relations, and that I hope that Dr Alfonsin and his  
 12 Government will be able to respond positively to our proposals,  
 13 ignored by the Junta, for the improvement of relations between  
 14 our two countries. I hope that George Bush, when he represents  
 15 the United States at Dr Alfonsin's inauguration on 10  
 16 December, will commend this approach personally to the new  
 17 President as the only realistic way ahead. End quote.  
 18

19 NNNN  
 20 HOWE  
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 22  
 23  
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 26  
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 28  
 29  
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///

//

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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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DESKBY 032100Z

FM WASHINGTON 031841Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3650 OF 3 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE).

YOUR TELNOS. 2037 AND 2038: MESSAGE TO SHULTZ ON ARMS SALES TO ARGENTINA.

1. YOUR MESSAGE WAS DELIVERED VIA SEITZ (HEAD OF MR SHULTZ'S OFFICE) FIRST THING THIS MORNING. IT HAS CROSSED WITH A MESSAGE SENT LAST NIGHT FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER SAYING THAT, SINCE ARGENTINA HAS MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN HUMAN RIGHTS, THERE IS NO LONGER ANY LEGAL BASIS FOR THE US TO WITHHOLD CERTIFICATION. THE ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE MADE HERE ON 7 DECEMBER, JUST BEFORE THE VICE PRESIDENT LEAVES FOR BUENOS AIRES. CERTIFICATION WILL COME INTO EFFECT WITH THE INSTALLATION OF THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT ON 10 DECEMBER.

2. SEITZ SAID, HOWEVER, THAT SHULTZ WOULD BE VERY GLAD TO RECEIVE YOUR MESSAGE, WHICH WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO THE VICE PRESIDENT IN HIS TALKS IN BUENOS AIRES. SHULTZ KNEW THAT WE WERE OPPOSED TO CERTIFICATION IN PRINCIPLE, BUT HOPED WE UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS HAD BEEN WITHHELD UNTIL THE LAST POSSIBLE MOMENT AND THAT THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY LEGAL BASIS TO DO SO. THE IMPORTANT ISSUE WAS THAT RAISED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR MESSAGE. IN REACTING TO CERTIFICATION, THE AMERICANS HOPED THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO EMPHASISE THAT WHAT MATTERED WAS WHAT THE UNITED STATES WAS ACTUALLY PREPARED TO SUPPLY RATHER THAN CERTIFICATION ITSELF.

3. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION BURT (ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS) SAID THAT THE WHOLE US ADMINISTRATION WAS VERY CONCERNED TO AVOID GRENADA-LIKE PUBLIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US. CONSULTATION HAD BEEN METICULOUS. THE US HAD TO CERTIFY AND IT WAS IN OUR INTERESTS THAT THERE SHOULD BE US INFLUENCE ON THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. CERTIFICATION WAS NOT EQUIVALENT TO ARMS SALES, THOUGH IT DID REMOVE A LEGAL IMPEDIMENT TO SUCH SALES. OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAD ALREADY RESUMED SUPPLIES. EVERY REQUEST WOULD BE REVIEWED IN RELATION TO ANY THREAT THAT COULD BE POSED TO PEACE IN THE REGION. EAGLEBURGER WOULD PERSONALLY REVIEW ALL SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR MAJOR ARMS SALES.

4. BURT GAVE AN ASSURANCE THAT THE US WOULD NOT APPROVE SALES SUCH AS ADVANCED FIGHTER AIRCRAFT OR MISSILES THAT WOULD INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY THE THREAT OF ARMED ATTACK AGAINST THE FALKLANDS OR REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN THE ARGENTINE/CHILE MILITARY BALANCE. THEY WOULD NOT AUTHORISE THIRD COUNTRY TRANSFERS EXCEPT ON THE SAME TERMS THEY WOULD AUTHORISE US SALES. NO SIZEABLE IMMEDIATE SALES WERE ANTICIPATED, THOUGH SOME NON-LETHAL REQUESTS MIGHT BE APPROVED DURING THE FIRST 6-12 MONTHS FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION (EG AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AND RADAR SYSTEMS).

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5. WE IMPRESSED ON BURT THE VERY GREAT CONCERN THAT WOULD BE CAUSED BY THE SUPPLY OF ANY EQUIPMENT THAT COULD INCREASE THE THREAT TO OUR SERVICEMEN ON THE ISLANDS. NOR WAS IT IN US INTERESTS TO OBLIGE US TO INCREASE THE RESOURCES WE HAD TO DEVOTE TO DEFENCE OF THE ISLANDS. BURT AGREED WITH THIS. WE RAISED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ARGENTINES MIGHT MAKE EARLY REQUESTS FOR SPARE PARTS FOR SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT OF US ORIGIN. WE LEFT BURT IN NO DOUBT THAT WE WOULD BE GREATLY CONCERNED AT THE RESUMPTION OF SUCH SUPPLIES.

6. BURT SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WELCOMED THE LINE TAKEN BY THE LEADER OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS IN HIS PARLIAMENTARY REPLY TO MR LATHAM ON 22 NOVEMBER (YOUR TELNO 1973). FOR OBVIOUS REASONS, THE AMERICANS COULD NOT ACKNOWLEDGE PUBLICLY THAT WE WOULD BE CONSULTED ABOUT ALL SIGNIFICANT ARMS SUPPLIES TO ARGENTINA. ITS CONFIDENTIALITY WAS CRUCIAL TO THE ABILITY TO MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE CONSULTATION PROCESS. WE SAID THAT, NEVERTHELESS, WE WOULD CERTAINLY WANT TO STRESS THAT WE WOULD BE IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH THE US ADMINISTRATION ABOUT THIS. WE SAID THAT AS YOUR MESSAGE TO SHULTZ HAD MADE CLEAR, WE WOULD WANT ALSO TO REFER TO THE ASSURANCES WEINBERGER HAD GIVEN ABOUT EXERCISING CAUTION IN THE RESUMPTION OF ARMS SALES.

7. BURT SEEMED INCLINED TO CONSIDER TRYING TO DELAY THE U.S. ANNOUNCEMENT TO 8 DECEMBER TO ENABLE SHULTZ TO HAVE A WORD WITH YOU IN BRUSSELS BEFORE IT IS FINALLY MADE. HE DID NOT KNOW, HOWEVER, WHETHER THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE.

8. I EXPECT TO SEE SHULTZ OR DAM ON MONDAY: AND WILL BE SEEING THE VICE PRESIDENT ON TUESDAY MORNING.

WRIGHT

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL  
FCO  
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rec'd  
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3/12/83

Prime Minister

✓ MOD  
FCO

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
LONDON

December 3, 1983

ms

SECRET

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver to you the enclosed message from the President on the issue of certification of Argentina that was received by the Embassy this evening.

In connection with the President's message, I have been asked to make the following points:

As you know, Argentina has been making steady progress in improving its human rights situation, and will complete its transition to democracy when President-elect Alfonsín takes office on December 10. In recognition of Argentina's significant human rights progress, culminating in its successful transition to democracy, the President has decided to certify Argentina. His decision will be announced on December 7; the determination will take effect on December 10.

? It is our view that to deny certification when Argentina clearly meets the criteria set forth in the law would be considered a political act by the new Argentine Government, and would prejudice our efforts to improve relations with the newly-elected civilian government in Argentina at this time.

3 Certification now also will strengthen our influence with the new government of Argentina, thus enabling us to work more effectively to assure regional stability and to prevent a recurrence of conflict in the South Atlantic.

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M. P.,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
London, S. W. 1.

SECRET

-2-

I should note that certification is not equivalent to arms sales, although it removes a legal impediment to such sales. We will evaluate each request on a case-by-case basis, taking into account any threat that might be posed to peace in the region. Under Secretary Eagleburger will personally review all specific proposals for major arms sales to Argentina.

We intend to review very carefully all requests of the Government of Argentina and would not approve sales such as advanced fighter aircraft or missiles that would increase significantly the threat of armed attack against the Falklands or represent a significant destabilization of the Argentina-Chile military balance.

In addition, we will consult with the British on any major arms sales. We will not authorize third country transfers except on the same terms that we would authorize sales from the U. S. In any case, no sizeable, immediate sales are anticipated. The most likely immediate request will be for spare parts for U. S.-origin ships and aircraft. However, there may be some non-lethal requests approved during the first 6-12 months following certification, for example, air traffic control radar systems.

Argentina has replaced most of its losses resulting from the Falklands War from a variety of sources. In addition, President Alfonsin is firmly committed to a significant reduction of the military budget. Argentina is experiencing serious economic problems, and cannot afford to divert major resources to arms purchases.

At the same time, we note a continuation of business and large sales by West Germany, France, Italy, and other NATO allies (including U. K. components ordered previously whose sale was authorized after the Falklands conflict).

We do not intend to enter any form of arms race that would affect the military balance in the area; but we must be aware of important U. S. commercial interests and our competitive position vis a vis other allied suppliers for routine or normal transactions.

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

It is important that confidentiality of consultations on arms sales be maintained in order to insure the effectiveness of the consultative process.

I will welcome receiving reactions to the President's letter and to the foregoing points that I may forward to Washington.

Sincerely,

*Charles H. Price, II*

Charles H. Price, II  
Ambassador

Enclosure:  
As stated (SECRET).

SECRET

*Please  
prepare  
draft  
now*

||

OR MASTER  
SPS  
US Declassified

T 203/83

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
December 2, 1983

Original of  
message rec'd. earlier.

A. J. C. <sup>45</sup>/<sub>12</sub>

Dear Margaret:

As you know, Argentina has made steady progress in strengthening its protection of human rights. The fair, open and honest elections on October 30 are the latest manifestation of this progress. When President-elect Alfonsin takes office on December 10, Argentina will have completed its return to democracy.

In view of this and other relevant factors, I will be certifying to the U.S. Congress that Argentina has made significant progress in human rights and that making Argentina eligible for arms transfers is in the U.S. national interest. Our announcement will be made on December 7, just before the U.S. delegation arrives in Buenos Aires for the inauguration. Certification will be effective upon installation of the new government.

I know this announcement will be a delicate question in Great Britain. However, as I suggested when we last met, and as subsequent consultations between our two governments have indicated, it is now appropriate and accurate to certify that Argentina has made significant progress in human rights.

We will be informing U.S. Congressional leaders and Presidents Bignone and Pinochet of our decision on December 6. Because of our special relationship and the importance you personally place on this question, I am notifying you first of our decision.

The decision was based on the following considerations. During the past year, the Government of Argentina has made significant progress in complying with internationally recognized principles of human rights. Argentina's human rights performance now meets the test for certification required by U.S. law.

Certification is not equivalent to arms sales. We will evaluate each request very carefully on a case-by-case basis, taking into account any threat that may be posed to peace in the region. We would consult closely with your government on any major sales.

Significant sales are not expected. Argentina has replaced most of its losses from a variety of sources and President-elect Alfonsin is committed to a significant reduction of the military budget. Moreover, Argentina's difficult economic situation will not support major arms acquisitions. In any event, should Argentina so desire, arms are readily available from other sources, including the Soviet Union.

In my view, our normalization of relations with Argentina will be in the interests of the United States and Great Britain. Certification will help strengthen U.S. influence with Argentina and enable us to work more effectively to assure regional stability. The climate for dialogue and negotiation will be improved.

I sincerely appreciate your eloquent and timely statement at the Guildhall. I wholeheartedly agree with your assessment of the special relationship between our two nations and the importance of our shared interests and purposes.

Margaret, be assured that I continue to place the highest value on your personal advice, counsel and friendship.


With warm wishes,

Sincerely,

*Ron*

The Right Honorable  
Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
Prime Minister  
London

15 DEC 1983





PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. *mk* T 203/83

SECRET

*Subject* *rec Made*  
*aps*  
US Declassified

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*what progress*  
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SECRET

SECRET

-2-

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I sincerely appreciate your eloquent and timely statement at the Guildhall. I wholeheartedly agree with your assessment of the special relationship between our two nations and the importance of our shared interests and purposes.

Margaret, be assured that I continue to place the highest value on your personal advice, counsel and friendship.

With warm wishes,

Sincerely,

/s/ Ron

SECRET

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GRS 354

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DESKBY 022200Z

FM FCO 022130Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2037 OF 3 DECEMBER

MESSAGE TO SHULTZ ON ARMS SALES TO ARGENTINA

1. PLEASE DELIVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO MR SHULTZ.

BEGINS: MARGARET THATCHER AND I DISCUSSED THE WHOLE QUESTION OF THE PROBABLE RESUMPTION OF US ARMS SALES TO ARGENTINA WITH KEN DAM AT CHEQUERS EARLY IN NOVEMBER, AND JANET YOUNG HAS SINCE BEEN OVER THE GROUND WITH BOTH KEN DAM AND LARRY EAGLEBURGER.

I DO NOT THEREFORE NEED TO LABOUR OUR SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF US ARMS SALES FOR OUR DEFENCES IN THE FALKLANDS PARTICULARLY WHILE THE ARGENTINES CONTINUE TO REFUSE TO DECLARE A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. I WANTED TO LET YOU HAVE THIS MESSAGE NOW TO UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THIS ISSUE IN ADVANCE OF THE INSTALLATION OF THE NEW ARGENTINE PRESIDENT.

WE WERE VERY PLEASED TO NOTE CAP WEINBERGER'S PUBLIC ASSURANCE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD EXERCISE CAUTION OVER MAJOR NEW SUPPLIES, ESPECIALLY OF WEAPONS THAT COULD BE USED IN A RENEWED ATTEMPT TO INVADE THE FALKLANDS. WE ALSO WELCOME LARRY EAGLEBURGER'S UNDERTAKING TO JANET YOUNG PERSONALLY TO VET ALL PROPOSED EXPORT LICENCES. MICHAEL HESELTINE WILL I KNOW WANT TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT WITH CAP WEINBERGER IN WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK, AND I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A WORD WITH YOU IN THE MARGINS OF THE NATO MINISTERIAL IN BRUSSELS.

AS REGARDS OUR POLICY TOWARDS THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN ARGENTINA, I SHOULD LIKE TO EMPHASISE THAT OUR AIM IS TO RE-ESTABLISH MORE NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE PREVIOUS ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO OUR VARIOUS PROPOSALS: I HOPE THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL BE

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MORE CONSTRUCTIVE. MARGARET THATCHER HAS DECLARED PUBLICLY HER WILLINGNESS TO RESUME FULL COMMERCIAL AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA. I UNDERSTAND THAT GEORGE BUSH WILL BE REPRESENTING THE USA AT DR ALFONSIN'S INAUGURATION. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IF HE COULD TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO EMPHASISE THAT THE NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA IS THE MOST REALISTIC POINT FROM WHICH TO START BUILDING. ENDS

HOWE

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 December 1983

*Dear John,*French Arms Sales to Argentina

You will have seen from Paris telegram No 1116 that the French Government have decided in principle to remove the existing restraints on arms sales to Argentina (I enclose a copy). The Foreign Secretary is being briefed to raise this issue bilaterally with Cheysson if he gets the opportunity. He would take the line that we regret the French decision; appreciate the limitation on French arms sales until now; are concerned that the decision will send the wrong signals to the Argentine military, and that we hope that our particular concerns will be borne closely in mind, especially the highly emotive subject of the sale of advanced air-launched weapons, particularly EXOCET.

*Yours ever,**Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (ADVANCES)

39 39 40

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MR EVANS *Sr. C. TICKER*  
MR UPE

ADVANCE COPY

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST. (3) ✓  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
MISS M E CUND ) TREASURY  
MR LITTLE )

SIR B ARMSTRONG )  
MR A D S GOODALL ) CABINET OF  
DIO )

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

~~MR A MITCHELL DEPT (Victoria)~~

MR A FORTNAM IAT/ D. TRANSPORT

RESIDENT OFFICE

MR CARTLEDGE  
~~HI / WEA~~  
ED/PUSD (2)  
ED/SAUD  
ED/FID  
~~ED/NEWS DEPT~~  
ED/EDD  
ED/ECG(E)  
ED/UND  
ED/PLANNING STAFF

~~Mr. [unclear] [unclear]~~

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FM PARIS 011800Z DEC 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1116 OF 1 DECEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK DS11  
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON

FRENCH ARMS SALES TO ARGENTINA

1. IN ANSWER TO A ROUTINE ENQUIRY FOUQUET, SOUS-DIRECTEUR FOR SOUTH AMERICA AT THE QUAI, REVEALED TODAY THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED IN PRINCIPLE TO REMOVE THE EXISTING RESTRAINTS ON ARMS SALES TO ARGENTINA. EACH CASE WOULD BE CONSIDERED BY AN INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE CHAIRED BY THE PRIME MINISTER, BUT THE TACIT AGREEMENT NOT TO SIGN NEW CONTRACTS FOR ITEMS ON THE LIST HANDED OVER ON 17 DECEMBER NO LONGER APPLIED. THE REASON FOR THIS CHANGE OF POLICY WAS THE ADVENT OF THE ALFONSIN GOVERNMENT. THE FRENCH WERE ABSOLUTELY CONFIDENT THAT ALFONSIN WOULD NOT LAUNCH ANY FRESH MILITARY ADVENTURE AGAINST THE FALKLANDS, IN SPITE OF HIS RELUCTANCE FORMALLY TO RENOUNCE HOSTILITIES.

2. FIRST SECRETARY CHANCERY SAID THAT THIS NEWS WAS VERY UNWELCOME. ALFONSIN HAD NEITHER INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO RENOUNCE THE USE OF FORCE NOR EVEN TO NORMALISE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS. THERE REMAINED A REAL POSSIBILITY THAT ANY ARMS SOLE BY THE FRENCH MIGHT BE USED AGAINST BRITISH FORCES. HE WOULD REPORT FOUQUET'S COMMENTS AND EXPECTED THAT WE WOULD WANT TO TAKE THIS UP FORMALLY.

COMMENT

~~I EXPECT YOU WILL INDEED WISH TO FOLLOW THIS UP. THE MARGINS~~

COMMENT

3. I EXPECT YOU WILL INDEED WISH TO FOLLOW THIS UP. THE MARGINS OF THE ATHENS EUROPEAN COUNCIL MAY PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO. YOU MAY ALSO WISH ME TO SPEAK TO THE QUAI AT SENIOR LEVEL.

4. GIVEN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN FRENCH MINISTERS AND THE ALFONSIN GOVERNMENT, WHICH FOUQUET DESCRIBED AS INTIMATE, WE ARE UNLIKELY TO GET THIS DECISION REVERSED. OUR BEST HOPE WOULD SEEM TO LIE IN THE CASE-BY-CASE EVALUATION PROCEDURE, WHERE WE CAN SEEK TO PERSUADE THE FRENCH TO CONTINUE TO BLOCK THE EXPORT OF THE MOST SENSITIVE KINDS OF WEAPONS.

5. WE MIGHT ALSO QUESTION WHETHER THE FRENCH ARE DOING ALFONSIN ANY REAL FAVOUR BY FEEDING THE APPETITE OF THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES FOR EXPENSIVE NEW WEAPONRY.

FRETWELL

NNNN

SENT AT 011904Z JW

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 December, 1983

*I told the F/C.O. that I did not propose to trouble the Prime Minister with this - which would well established*

*policy. A.J.C. 2/12*

*Dear John,*

US Arms Sales to Argentina

The Foreign Secretary considers that we need to move one stage further in our representations to the US Administration on this issue as the date for Alfonsin's inauguration draws nearer. I enclose the text of a message which the Foreign Secretary proposes to send to Mr Shultz, whom we will be seeing in the margins of the NATO Ministerial next week.

You will see that the draft message does not refer to the question of certification. As a matter of substance we believe that the US decision to certify Argentina, when the new government takes office, is beyond our influence. As a matter of tactics we therefore believe that it would be better not to press this point in the message to Shultz. Sir Geoffrey proposes instead to instruct HM Ambassador Washington, in handing over this message, to say that, although we would of course be very glad if the US decided in the event not to certify Argentina, our understanding is that they are resolved to do so. If this is so, we attach importance to the public presentation of such a decision; and we would hope to have the earliest possible consultations with the Americans on this point to enable us to develop a coordinated press line.

Sir Oliver Wright expects to see Shultz on 5 December and Vice-President Bush on 6 December. These meetings would provide a good opportunity to act on the instructions summarised in this letter, provided that the Prime Minister is content.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD).

*Yours ever,  
Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Office

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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Message from Secretary of State to Mr Shultz: Argentina

Margaret Thatcher and I discussed the whole question of the probable resumption of US arms sales to Argentina with Ken Dam at Chequers early in November, and Janet Young has since been over the ground with both Ken Dam and Larry Eagleburger.

I do not therefore need to labour our serious concern about the possible implications of US arms sales for our defences in the Falklands particularly while the Argentines continue to refuse to declare a cessation of hostilities. I wanted to let you have this message now to underline the importance we attach to this issue in advance of the installation of the new Argentine President. I would like to have a word with you in the margins of the NATO Ministerial in Brussels next week.

In preparation for that, I should say that we were very pleased to note Cap Weinberger's public assurance that the Administration would exercise caution over major new supplies, especially of weapons that could be used in a renewed attempt to invade the Falklands. We also welcome Larry Eagleburger's undertaking to Janet Young personally to vet all proposed export licences and Ken Dam's invitation to let you know which weapons systems would cause us particular concern. I very much hope that you will feel able to consult us before decisions are taken about any Argentine request for weaponry which could affect the security of the Falklands. I thought you might find it helpful to know without delay the broad categories of arms which are of particular concern to us. I enclose a list and suggest that our officials might look at this in more detail. *Nickel Henkel will, I know, want to discuss the subject with Cap Weinberger in Washington last week.*

As regards our policy towards the new Government in Argentina, I should like to emphasise that our aim is to re-establish more normal relations between our two countries. The previous Argentine Government failed to respond positively to our various proposals: I hope the new Government will be more constructive. Margaret Thatcher has declared publicly her willingness to resume full

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commercial and diplomatic relations with Argentina. I understand that George Bush will be representing the USA at Dr Alfonsin's Inauguration. I believe it would be very useful if he could take the opportunity to emphasise that the normalisation of relations between Britain and Argentina is the most realistic point from which to start building.

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## ARGENTINA : US CERTIFICATION ARMS SUPPLIES

List of Weaponry for discussion with the US Administration

1. Combat aircraft.
2. Anti-submarine warfare equipment.
3. Anti-ship missiles.
4. Aircraft with an air lift capability.
5. Naval missiles and sea mines.
6. Sophisticated tactical communications equipment.
7. Electronic warfare equipment.
8. Advanced avionics equipment.
9. Modification equipment for air-to-air refuelling.
10. Late generation (ie recent versions of) torpedoes.
11. Late generation air-to-air missiles.
12. Anti-radar missiles.
13. Cluster munitions and runway attack weapons.
14. Equipment for special forces.

Preamble proposed by MOD

This list is illustrative and designed to demonstrate the range of our concerns. It highlights the main areas for consultation and reflects our views of Argentine requirements and hence possible requests for US equipment.

It is not suggested that supply of all items in each category should be vetoed.

File

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UNCLASSIFIED

(FM BERNE 051030Z)

FM BIS BUENOS AIRES

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 929 OF 02 DECEMBER.

INFO PRIORITY MOD BANK OF ENGLAND MONTEVIDEO ASUNCION SANTIAGO  
BRASILIA CARACAS WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK CIVIL COMMISSIONER  
PORT STANLEY

PRESS SUMMARY

1. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL NEWS AGAIN RECEIVES PROMINENT COVERAGE IN TODAY'S PRESS.
2. SEVERAL PAPERS ALLEGE THAT PRESIDENT-ELECT RAUL ALFONSIN HAS ASKED THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT TO SIGN INTO LAW THE 1984 BUDGET BEFORE HIS OWN ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE. THIS WOULD BE AN ATTEMPT TO BY-PASS TIME-CONSUMING CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE AND HAS PROVOKED CONSIDERABLE CONTROVERSY. ACCORDING TO ECONOMY MINISTRY SOURCES THE MILITARY REGIME'S BUDGET HAS A PLANNED FISCAL DEFICIT OF 3.5 BILLION DOLLARS, EQUAL TO 5 PER CENT OF GNP.
3. THE LEFT-WING PERONIST DAILY ''LA VOZ'' CITES ALFREDO CONCEPCION, PRESIDENT DESIGNATE OF THE BANCO DE LA NACION (BNA) AS DECLARING THAT ARGENTINA'S FOREIGN DEBT INCLUDES MORE THAN 3 BILLION DOLLARS WHICH WERE NOT QUOTE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT UNQUOTE BY THE CENTRAL BANK OR THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND WHICH CORRESPOND TO CREDITS OBTAINED BY THE NEW YORK BRANCH OF BNA. THESE ADDITIONAL MONIES HAD BEEN DIVERTED TO AMONGST OTHERS THE ARMED FORCES, THE PRESIDENCY AND STATE COMPANIES.
4. THE FIRST 500 MILLION DOLLAR TRANCHE OF THE 1.5 BILLION MEDIUM-TERM LOAN TO ARGENTINA WAS TRANSFERRED YESTERDAY. IT WAS IMMEDIATELY USED TO AMORTIZE ABOUT 350 MILLION DOLLARS OF THE DECEMBER 1982 BRIDGING LOAN AND TO COVER OUTSTANDING INTEREST PAYMENTS FOR WHICH AN ADDITIONAL 50 MILLION DOLLARS WERE ALSO DRAWN FROM EXISTING CENTRAL BANK RESERVES.
5. CENTRAL BANK SOURCES YESTERDAY STATED THAT THE DECEMBER REGULATED INTEREST RATES WILL REMAIN AT THE NOVEMBER LEVEL OF 14.5 PER CENT FOR DEPOSITS AND WILL BE INCREASED 1 POINT TO 15.5 PER CENT FOR LOANS. INCREASING ILLIQUIDITY IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS HAS PUSHED UP THE LOCAL INTER-BANK AND INTER-COMPANY LENDING RATES, WHILE THE PARALLEL DOLLAR RATE HAS FALLEN BY 3.7 PER CENT.

6. THE METAL WORKERS UNION (UOM) HAS CONFIRMED FOR TODAY A 24-HOUR STRIKE WHICH WILL INVOLVE SOME 300,000 WORKERS AND PARALYSE PRODUCTION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

7 ACCORDING TO "CLARIN" , THE REPORT COMPOSED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EDGARDO CALVI ON THE ARMY'S PERFORMANCE IN THE FALKLANDS CAMPAIGN WILL BE PUBLISHED TODAY. "LA NACION" RELAYS THE CONTENTS OF YESTERDAY'S GUARDIAN ARTICLE WHICH, BASED ON INFORMATION FROM GUILLERMO MAKIN OF CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY, SUGGESTS THAT ALFONSIN'S GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO SHARE WITH THE UK THE COSTS OF COMPENSATION TO FALKLAND ISLANDERS FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY LAST YEAR'S FIGHTING. IN RETURN THE UK WOULD ALLEGEDLY HAVE TO ACCEPT A LEASE-BACK AGREEMENT. "LA PRENSA" CARRIES AN ANALYSIS OF THE VOTING PATTERNS AT LAST MONTH'S UNGA FALKLANDS DEBATE ON WHICH IT ATTEMPTS TO PLACE THE MOST OPTIMISTIC INTERPRETATION FROM THE ARGENTINE VIEWPOINT (COPY BY BAG TO FCO).

8. THE PROMINENT PERONIST POLITICIAN ANGEL ROBLEDO HAS AGREED TO JOIN ALFONSIN'S TEAM OF ADVISORS. THE PERONIST PARTY LEADERSHIP WILL TODAY DISCUSS MARIA ESTELA MARTINEZ DE PERON'S FORTHCOMING RETURN TO ARGENTINA.

9. MAJOR GENERAL JUAN CARLOS TRIMARCÓ, CHIEF OF THE FIRST ARMY CORPS AND A SUPPOSEDLY KEY FIGURE IN THE "MILITARY TRADE UNION PACT" HAS ASKED TO GO INTO RETIREMENT AND HAS TRANSFERRED HIS COMMAND TO HIS DEPUTY, BRIGADIER-GENERAL JULIO ALFREDO TORRES, WHO HAS BEEN TIPPED FOR THE POST OF ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF UNDER ALFONSIN'S GOVERNMENT.

10. LABOUR LAWYER ROBERTO PENA HAS BEEN NAMED AS THE FUTURE HEAD OF THE STATE INFORMATION SECRETARIAT (SIDE) ALTHOUGH THIS TOP POSITION IN THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN RESERVED FOR HIGH-RANKING MILITARY OFFICERS.

JOY

UNQUOTE

POWELL -JONES

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL  
FCO  
FID  
CABINET OFFICE

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

1 December, 1983.

Thank you for your letter of 28 November about the disposal of money remaining in the South Atlantic Fund. The Prime Minister remains concerned that the money donated to the Fund should be seen to be used for the purposes for which its donors gave it. For example, she believes that it would be wrong if in the future the child of someone killed in the Falklands needed to be educated privately, and funds were not available for that purpose. She considers, therefore, that there may well be a good case for retaining the Fund in being for some years yet. She has noted that the Trustees will shortly be considering their strategy for the handling of the residual money, and I should be grateful if you could draw the Prime Minister's comments to their attention. Mrs. Thatcher would be grateful for a further report after the Trustees have met.

Timothy Flesher

B.P. Neale, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'B.P. Neale', located at the bottom right of the page.

SECRET

6 288

File

1 December 1983

ARGENTINA: URANIUM ENRICHMENT PLANT

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 29 November and sees with some surprise that the Americans had no foreknowledge of Argentine plans and were unable to confirm or disprove the claim that a pilot plant is now operational.

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

30/11/83.



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Tim Dalyell  
raised the attached  
scandalous article in  
the Wall Street Journal  
under guise of an SO LO  
application today. I suspect  
Alexander Cockburn is  
the son of Claude  
Cockburn, the former  
Communist who died  
recently.

Can we find out? Mr  
JF



# Double Talk Doesn't Speak Well for U.S. Foreign Policy

By ALEXANDER COCKBURN

NEW YORK—A worthy Scot in Dundee yearned to become a magistrate and maneuvered toward this goal for many years. At long last he attained his dream and proudly took his seat upon the bench. The first miscreant to appear before him was a pervert, caught exposing himself in a public park. The magistrate listened to the squalid circumstances of the offense and the plea of guilty. Then he leaned forward and gazed down bleakly at the prisoner: "Hamish McKenzie, it is the sentence of this court that you shall be taken to another place and from there to a place of execution, and there hanged by the neck until you are

## Another View

dead, and may the Lord have mercy on your soul."

McKenzie fainted dead away and the clerk rose swiftly to whisper in the magistrate's ear that even leaving aside the merits of the punishment such a sentence was beyond the competence of his worship. "I'm well aware of that," the magistrate said with a sigh of pleasure, "but for 25 years I've been waiting to say it."

So McKenzie found to his great relief that words are one thing and deeds another. A few months ago, President Reagan was having a fine time saying that the Russians—or at least their leaders—are a bunch of morally worthless scoundrels. Then the Clerk of the Court of Sober Opinion whispers in his ear and the Caterpillar tractors and the grain shipments roll down to the docks and the president waves goodbye as they head east into the sunrise toward the empire of evil.

It's double talk and it's dangerous. A people asked to believe everything will in the end believe nothing. Double talk leads to double-think and then we're done for.

A couple of examples.

*Double talk and moral self-righteousness: the dangerous belief that your side is*

*infinitely good and the other side infinitely bad. Let's test British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher on this one. After the ruthless downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, she told television audiences that the subsequent lack of apology by the Russians shows that they are an inherently evil and barbaric bunch.*

On May 1, 1982, President Belaunde of Peru phoned President Galtieri of Argentina with U.S. Secretary of State Haig's proposals for settling the Falklands conflict. Shortly thereafter Mr. Galtieri told Mr. Belaunde that with two minor qualifications, the proposals were satisfactory. This response was ratified by the Argentinean junta a few hours later. On the same day then British Foreign Secretary Francis Pym, in Washington with Mr. Haig, declared an end to further hostilities unless the Argentineans entered the exclusion zone around the Falklands. Late that same night Adm. Anaya ordered all Argentinean naval ships to port.

On the morning of May 2 Mrs. Thatcher had before her reports of the state of the peace proposals, of the junta meeting and of Adm. Anaya's order. Without consulting Mr. Pym in Washington, she changed the rules of naval engagement. Outside the exclusion zone and steaming away from it, the Belgrano was torpedoed without warning and 368 Argentineans killed. Butchery continued until Mrs. Thatcher asked her people to rejoice in victory.

*Double talk and double cross: the self-righteousness that marches with ignorance. For years one or another faction of the Christian minority in Lebanon has sought to lure in the U.S. to advance its interests. President Eisenhower and the Dulles brothers, misreading the Kassim coup in Iraq and the blandishments of Chamoun, dispatched thousands of Marines to Beirut in 1958. The situation was fortunately redressed by the speedy substitution of a U.N. peace-keeping force.*

How now to explain, unless by self-righteous, self-deluding ignorance, a strategy

that has left U.S. Marines propping up the ambitions of the Phalange faction of the minority Christians, now termed a "government" but in fact the rabid militia that, with Israeli connivance and over U.S. guarantees of safety, slaughtered hundreds of refugees in the camps of Sabra and Chatilla. It is ignorant double talk to invoke a "quagmire" and to trace all trouble to Soviet meddling via its supposed Syrian and Palestinian "proxies" in a region where the hatreds and schisms have survived a thousand years.

*Double talk and double-think: the consequences of believing your own propaganda. Can a government that has smiled upon tyrants in the Philippines, South Africa, Iraq, Pakistan and now even in Cambodia, afford excessive moral self-regard? The answer of course is yes, as long as the world is carefully rearranged to accommodate the moral and psychological self-mutilation required by the act of embracing two contradictory postures at the same time: i.e., that the U.S. despises tyrants but must sustain them, loves peace but must prepare for war. The need to recast the world into two simple hemispheres of good and evil becomes virtually pathological, with no crime so bizarre or so unfounded that it cannot be laid to the foe: yellow rain, the "plot" to kill the pope, the Soviet "destabilization," etc.*

Almost worst is the fear that lies behind double talk: fear that straight talk will alienate some valued or threatening constituency. Watch courage and leadership melt away as we roll closer to the primaries and to Nov. 8, 1984; watch as the candidates rattle their mendicant cups—John Glenn to the Israeli lobby, Mr. Reagan to the women and so on. The Russians fear reality and say nothing. The Americans fear reality and say everything. Either way the Word, which came in the beginning, does not fare well, and neither does humankind.

Mr. Cockburn is a columnist for the Village Voice.



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

MT

29 November 1983

Dear John,

Argentina

We considered previously whether it would be appropriate to send a message to the new Argentine Government and came down, on balance, against the idea. We have now looked at the matter again in the light of the Radical victory and its extent; and of the reaction to it in the United States and Western Europe.

The Foreign Secretary believes that we are likely to have a number of difficult discussions with our friends over Argentina in the months to come. With the Americans, our main concern will be to ensure that certification (which should probably now be regarded as inevitable), does not lead to arms sales at a level or of a type to increase the threat to the Falklands or to do damage to our bilateral relations. With the Americans and with the Western Europeans, we shall go on having to argue the need for strict conditionality on loans to Argentina; and, a little more in the future, we shall have another round of the Falklands at the General Assembly. In all these cases, the points we make are likely to be discounted if our partners feel that we are unwilling to take some account of their view that Alfonsin offers the best hope for many years of effective and democratic government in Argentina, and should therefore be encouraged by the West.

The Foreign Secretary thinks that it would strengthen our hand if we were to make the political gesture of sending an appropriate message to the new Argentine Government. As the man who counts there is Alfonsin, the message would have to go to him from the Prime Minister. A draft of such a message is enclosed; and the Foreign Secretary would welcome an opportunity to discuss it with the Prime Minister when they meet tomorrow afternoon.

Yours ever,  
J.P.F.

(B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

POSSIBLE MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE INCOMING  
PRESIDENT OF ARGENTINA

Your Excellency

On behalf of Her Majesty's Government, I am asking the Swiss State Secretary for Foreign Affairs to convey to you this message to congratulate you on your election as President of the Republic of Argentina and to express our welcome for the restoration of democracy in your country.

The action of the Argentine military Junta in 1982 tragically destroyed the fundamentals of the good relations which had existed between the United Kingdom and Argentina over more than a century. It is my sincere wish that we may now move towards the normalisation of the relations between our two countries including the re-establishment of diplomatic relations. I believe that the most realistic first step would be the full and reciprocal removal of all the commercial and financial restrictions imposed at the time of the conflict. I have expressed in public my willingness to enter into talks about this and my regret at your predecessors' failure to take up any of the proposals put to them.

I reiterate the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government that the Argentine people can now live under a government of their own choosing, a right which should be enjoyed by all peoples,



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

You asked about the  
U.S. reaction.

29 November 1983

A.S.C.  $\frac{30}{11}$

*ms*

Dear John,

Argentina: Uranium Enrichment Plant

My minute to you of 24 November in New Delhi gave an initial response to the Prime Minister's question whether we had been in touch with the United States on this matter. We have now received the Americans' reaction to Argentina's announcement that she has developed uranium enrichment technology.

The State Department have told our Embassy in Washington that they had no foreknowledge of Argentine plans, and are unable to confirm or disprove the claim that a pilot plant is now operational. Given the limited resources which Argentina appears to have been able to devote to the enterprise, they believe that any facility would have to be a modest one. The US Embassy in Buenos Aires shares our suspicion that the CNEA's announcement was prompted, at least in part, by a desire to project a good image and protect itself against budget cuts. Like us, the Americans await the report by Dr Blix, Director-General of the IAEA, following his current trip to Argentina.

Whether or not the CNEA's achievements have been exaggerated, the State Department remain concerned on non-proliferation grounds about the Argentine declaration. They say that they have already told Argentina that the construction in secret of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities is a cause for anxiety and likely to provoke a sharp negative reaction in the US. They have urged the Argentine Government to place all nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and to impose strict controls on any future exports of enriched uranium. In addition, the American Embassy here have told us that when the new American Ambassador in Buenos Aires presents his credentials to the Alfonsin government, he will again urge that the new plant be placed under safeguards.

/We have



We have also been told that Richard Kennedy, US Ambassador-at-large and special adviser to Mr Shultz on non-proliferation policy and nuclear energy affairs, will be conducting a review of relations between Argentina and the United States in the nuclear field.

We shall continue to keep in close touch with the Americans on this subject, and I will let you know of any developments. Meanwhile, we have set in hand a JIC assessment of Argentina's nuclear programme in the light of the announcement on 18 November.

*Yours ever,*

*Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-330 7022 218 6169

28th November 1983

*1 agree - we can't leave matters here. What of a child needs to be sent to a private school and why?*

*funds have been dispersed?!*

*think we should not*

*make representations*

*that all this money*

*should be earmarked*

*S. M. Charles for*

*seven years yet.*

*Dear Tim,*

Prime Minister:

*Following your exchange with Robert Atkins in the House (transcript attached), I wrote to MOD. This is their response. I do not think that we can leave matters at X and, if you agree, I will ask MOD for a further report after the Trustees have met.*

In your letter of 4th November, which I acknowledged on 15th November, you asked for a note for the Prime Minister on the disposal of money remaining in the South Atlantic Fund. The attention of the trustees has been drawn to the views expressed by the Prime Minister in the House and to those recorded in your letter - in particular the question of some assurances being given regarding the ability, in due course, of the Service Benevolent Funds being able to meet later contingencies.

*JA  
29/11*

The current situation is that all the dependants of the men who died in the conflict have received their assessed grants, and all but a few of the men who sustained injuries have had their claims considered by the Trustees. Those that remain will very soon be receiving the assessed grant for which they may be eligible.

I should stress that the Trustees have not yet formally considered the precise allocation to Service Charities of the remaining money, whatever that sum may be; or the timing of the transfer from the Fund to these Charities. The only firm decision concerning allocation of future funds was made known to some parents of single Servicemen who were informed that Trustees were unable to make any further allocation of monies to them.

Whatever the precise future distribution may be, the decision would be taken on the advice of the Treasury Solicitor, and would be in accordance with the terms of the Trust Deed which provides for the remaining monies to be distributed to the Service Benevolent Funds within five years of the date of the Deed, that is, by July 1987.

The Trustees will shortly be considering their strategy for the handling of the residual money over the remaining years of the Fund, and are conscious of the need to make arrangements which will meet the Prime Minister's desire to provide for contingencies.

*X*

*Yours ever  
Barry Neale*

(B P NEALE)  
Private Secretary

ARGENTINA

16/10

PK 38

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR  
1100 BARRIO SUR  
BUENOS AIRES



29 NOV 1983

1100 BARRIO SUR  
BUENOS AIRES

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Mr. Bidwell: Does the Minister accept that  
her justification for carrying out policy on behalf of the  
Government because it was part of her manifesto should  
apply equally to local authorities? Does she agree that  
Liverpool city council, in creating 1,000 jobs, building  
houses for people in need and reducing rents by £2, is  
carrying out its democratic policies, or does democracy  
extend only to Tory party policies?

**The Prime Minister:** As the hon. Gentleman knows,  
local authorities have precisely those powers that this  
House agrees to give them and from time to time those  
powers are changed. Public expenditure must still be  
found from taxes or rates or by borrowing or printing  
money. Therefore one must have regard to the total burden  
on the private sector because, on the whole, the private  
sector creates the wealth to sustain the public sector.

**Mr. Robert Atkins:** Is my right hon. Friend aware that  
concern has been expressed to hon. Members about the use  
of funds within the south Atlantic fund? While in no sense  
being critical of the humanity and attention that the  
administrators of the fund have given to the dispositions  
that they have made, will she recognise that there is  
concern, and will she give consideration to seeing how the  
extra £2 million should be spent?

**The Prime Minister:** I will, of course, communicate  
my hon. Friend's concern. I have noticed a certain amount  
of concern expressed in the press. The south Atlantic fund  
is governed by the charity laws which it must obviously  
uphold, but I understand that my hon. Friend is asking  
whether the money yet needs to be transferred to the  
service charities when there might still be calls upon it. I  
will, of course, communicate my hon. Friend's concern to  
the trustees of the south Atlantic fund.

**Q3. Mr. Bidwell** asked the Prime Minister if she will  
list her official engagements for Thursday 3 November.

**The Prime Minister:** I refer the hon. Gentleman to the  
reply that I gave some moments ago.

**Mr. Bidwell:** Has the right hon. Lady had a chance to  
study the widespread comment on television and in the  
press on the possibility of peace demonstrators being shot  
at Greenham Common and elsewhere? Did she see the  
interview with a woman demonstrator who said that  
British soldiers would not fire but that American defence  
forces might fire? In those circumstances will she disown  
the clumsy remarks of the Secretary of State for Defence

"Mr. Heschel will go to in  
business of cruise deployment  
Army and the police in their thou  
are there precisely to avert such  
envisage a crowd of demonstra  
warheads whilst the Parachute Re  
And she"—

me—

"is right . . . that one couldn't  
Callaghan Government—or a  
reach any other conclusion."

**Mr. Nicholls:** Does my  
concern about the report in *The*  
CND intends to send 10,000 p  
Armed Forces? Will she conc  
that latest attempt by Pat Ar  
subvert the forces of the Crow

**The Prime Minister:** My h  
the same view—members  
Forces will know precisely wh

**Mr. Norman Atkinson:** I  
Prime Minister wishes to be c  
thoroughly honest person—

**Mr. Adley:** She is.

**Mr. Atkinson:**—may I a  
Lady this morning remonstrated  
for Employment, who said the  
down when he really meant  
people claiming unemployment  
down? Did he not, by issuing fi  
give rise to a myth that the P  
this afternoon, ignoring the  
looking for work? Rather than  
it is steadily climbing.

**The Prime Minister:** The  
basis well known to the hon.  
who faithfully and with total h  
Both the crude figures and the  
calculated on that basis are dow  
from special employment meas  
the same press notice. The tot  
is estimated to be 613,000.

Special employment measu  
training scheme, are for those  
will ensure that, in many cases  
There is still a shortage in some  
labour.



FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (ADVANCES)

39 39

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD W G LENNOX  
MR EVANS  
MR URS

MR CARLEIDGE

ED/PUSD (2)

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ED/FID

ED/NEWS DEPT

ED/ED

ED/EC(D)

ED/UND

ED/PLANNING STAFF

~~Mr. Keble and Mr. ...~~

*Repeated  
to Delhi  
2ms  
28/11*

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (3)

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
MISS M E GUND )  
MR LITTLE )

TREASURY

SIR B ARMSTRONG )  
MR A D S GOODALL )  
DIO )

CABINET OF

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

MR A TITCHENER DIT (Victoria)

MR A FORTNAM IAT/ D. TRANSPORT

~~PRESIDENT COPY~~  
ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 281400Z

FM MADRID 281250Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 654 OF 28 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ROME, ATHENS AND UKHIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 610

RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA

1. AT DINNER ON 25 NOVEMBER I WAS APPROACHED BY YANEZ, THE SPANISH PRIME MINISTER'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER. HE SAID HE WOULD BE ACCOMPANYING FELIPE GONZALEZ SHORTLY TO BUENOS AIRES FOR THE INAUGURATION OF THE NEW PRESIDENT. FELIPE GONZALEZ ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS EVENT AS DID THE SOCIALIST PRIME MINISTERS OF FRANCE, ITALY AND GREECE. IT WAS AN ALMOST UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO SUPPORT A HOPEFULLY DECENT AND MODERATE NEW GOVERNMENT IN ARGENTINA FREE FROM THE EXCESSES BOTH OF PERONISM AND MILITARISM. GONZALEZ WAS CONVINCED THAT ALFONSO'S SUCCESS, IF INTERNATIONALLY BOOSTED, COULD HELP TO USHER IN A GREATLY IMPROVED NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MODERATE GOVERNMENTS IN EUROPE AND IN LATIN AMERICA.

2. YANEZ CONTINUED THAT FELIPE GONZALEZ WAS OF COURSE WELL AWARE OF THE BRITISH POSITION OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND THE RESERVED ATTITUDE WE NATURALLY HAD TO TAKE FOR THE TIME BEING TOWARDS THE NEW ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. GONZALEZ CERTAINLY DID NOT WISH TO INTRUDE UNHELPFULLY. NEVERTHELESS YANEZ THOUGHT THAT ON RETURN TO MADRID HE MIGHT WELL WISH TO CONVEY HIS IMPRESSIONS TO THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER. THESE WOULD BE OF A GENERAL NATURE, MAINLY EMPHASISING THE IMPORTANCE OF SEIZING THE PRESENT UNPARALLELED OPPORTUNITY.

3. I SAID THAT I HOPED GONZALEZ WOULD BEAR IN MIND THE STRENGTH OF OPINION IN BRITAIN. THE OPERATION TO RECOVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS HAD BEEN SUPPORTED BY ALL SECTIONS OF BRITISH OPINION. MR MICHAEL FOOT HAD MADE THIS CLEAR THAT DAY IN MADRID. YOUNG MEN HAD LAIN DOWN THEIR LIVES FOR THIS PURPOSE AND THEIR RELATIVES WERE STILL IN MOURNING. IT WOULD BE CONSIDERED AN AFFRONT TO THE DEAD IF HMG WERE NOW TO APPEAR TO BE THROWING AWAY THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE CAMPAIGN WAS FOUGHT. ARMED AGGRESSION MUST

WERE STILL IN MOURNING. IT WOULD BE CONSIDERED AN AFFRONT TO THE DEAD IF HMG WERE NOW TO APPEAR TO BE THROWING AWAY THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE CAMPAIGN WAS FOUGHT. ARMED AGGRESSION MUST NOT BE SEEN TO PAY OR TO HAVE NO PRICE ATTACHED. THERE WAS MOREOVER THE IMPORTANT PRACTICAL POINT. WHILE THE NEW ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO DECLARE A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, IT WAS OBVIOUSLY ESSENTIAL FOR US TO MAINTAIN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IN A STATE OF OPERATIONAL DEFENCE. I THOUGHT HMG WOULD NOT DISAGREE THAT THE NEW ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE MORE PROMISING THAN THEIR PREDECESSORS FOR MANY YEARS. BUT THEY INHERITED THEIR COUNTRY'S STRONGLY NATIONALIST CLAIMS AND HAD SHOWN LITTLE INCLINATION SO FAR TO DEPART FROM THEM. I SUGGESTED THEREFORE THAT THE CHANCES OF ANY SPANISH MESSAGE GETTING ACROSS SUCCESSFULLY TO HMG WOULD BE GREATLY ENHANCED IF THE TEXT TOOK ACCOUNT OF THESE IMPORTANT POLITICAL AND HUMAN FACTORS AND ALSO IF IT COULD BE DELIVERED WITHOUT PUBLICITY. YANEZ PROMISED TO NOTE THESE POINTS.

4. GONZALEZ IS LIKELY TO BE A PROMINENT FIGURE AT THE INAUGURATION IN BUENOS AIRES. IF THEREFORE YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL POINTS TO MAKE WE SHOULD DO SO SOON. MORAN WILL ALSO PROBABLY BE GOING TO BUENOS AIRES AND MR RIFKIND MIGHT PERHAPS SAY SOMETHING TO HIM HERE TOMORROW NIGHT (7PM YOUR TIME).

PARSONS

NNNN

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (ADVANCES)

39 39

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR WHITNEY/  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MR EVANS  
MR UEN

MR CARTLEDGE

ED/PUSD (2)

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MISS M E GUND ) TREASURY  
MR LITTLE )

SIR B ARMSTRONG )  
MR A D S GOODALL ) CABINET OF  
DIO )

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

MR A TITCHENER DEPT (VICARIO)

MR A FORTNAM IAT/ D. TRANSPORT

~~RESIDENT CHIEF~~

*Pa  
Mrs  
25/11*

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM PORT STANLEY 251350Z NOV 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 641 OF 25 NOVEMBER

IMMEDIATE


ADVANCE COPY

YOUR TELNOS 566 AND 568: DESTEFANIS

1. MY CHIEF POLICE OFFICER REPORTED ON ARRIVAL IN STANLEY THIS MORNING (25 NOVEMBER) THAT DESTEFANIS WAS SAFELY LOCKED IN KEITH SHACKLETON'S CABIN AND WOULD REMAIN THERE DURING LINDBLAD EXPLORER'S STAY IN STANLEY HARBOUR (SHE IS NOT ALONGSIDE JETTY) UNLESS HE CREATED A NUISANCE, IN WHICH CASE HE WOULD BE LOCKED IN A STOREROOM.

2. CPO BOARDED LINDBLAD EXPLORER AT NEW ISLAND ON 23 NOVEMBER. CAPTAIN NILSSON TOLD HIM THAT DESTEFANIS HAD SOMEHOW SECRETED HIMSELF ABOARD THE LINDBLAD EXPLORER AT MONTEVIDEO ALONG WITH OTHER PASSENGERS AND WAS NOT NOTICED UNTIL THE NEXT MORNING. HE SLEPT IN THE LIBRARY AND ANNOUNCED HIMSELF TO CAPTAIN NILSSON AT 7 AM.

3. CPO INTERVIEWED DESTEFANIS, WHO SAID THAT HE AND PIZARRO HAD TAKEN THE FERRY FROM BUENOS AIRES TO MONTEVIDEO AND MADE THEIR WAY TO THE DOCK WHERE HE KNEW LINDBLAD EXPLORER WOULD BE TIED UP. HE ~~HE~~ <sup>HE</sup> ~~SAID~~ <sup>SAID</sup> ~~HE~~ <sup>HE</sup> ~~HAD~~ <sup>HAD</sup> NOT SEEN HIM SINCE. HE SIMPLY WALKED UP THE GANGWAY WITH OTHER PASSENGERS WHEN THEY ARRIVED BY COACH AND MINGLED WITH THEM UNTIL THE SHIP SAILED. CPO SAID THAT DESTEFANIS WAS PLAYING THE "LITTLE BOY LOST", PLEADING WITH HANDS TOGETHER AND TEARS IN HIS EYES THAT HE WANTED ONLY TO SET FOOT ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND SEE WHERE HIS DEAR NEPHEW WAS BURIED. ON BEING LOCKED IN SHACKLETON'S CABIN THIS MORNING AS THE SHIP SAILED INTO STANLEY



SHACKLETON'S CABIN THIS MORNING AS THE SHIP SAILED INTO STANLEY HARBOUR, HOWEVER, HIS MOOD CHANGED COMPLETELY, HE STARTED RANTING AND RAVING ABOUT HIS RIGHTS AND HAMMERING ON THE DOOR. CAPTAIN NILSSON WAS WORRIED THAT HIS NOISY BEHAVIOUR WOULD UPSET THE PASSENGERS. HE DOES NOT RELISH THE PROSPECT OF TAKING HIM ALL THE WAY SOUTH AND BACK TO PUNTA ARENAS.

4. PASSENGERS, MOST OF WHOM ARE AMERICAN AND IN THEIR LATE 60S, ARE UNSYMPATHETIC BUT CONCERNED THAT THEIR ARGENTINE STOWAWAY MIGHT UPSET THEIR HOLIDAY BY SETTING FIRE TO THE CABIN, DOING HIMSELF AN INJURY OR OTHERWISE MAKING A NUISANCE OF HIMSELF. NILSSON WOULD CLEARLY LIKE TO DISEMBARK DESTEFANIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BUT I HAVE SAID THAT IT IS COMPLETELY OUT OF THE QUESTION TO LET HIM COME ASHORE HERE.

5. CPO PRODUCED A POSTER WHICH DESTEFANIS HAD PREPARED FOR HANGING OUTSIDE THE PORT-HOLE SAYING "HELP, I ONLY WANT TO VISIT THE ARGENTINE CEMETERY" (SIC).

6. CPO WILL KEEP GUARD ON DESTEFANIS THROUGHOUT LINDBLAD EXPLORER'S STAY IN STANLEY. SHE IS DUE TO DEPART AT 2100Z, TODAY.

7. CAPTAIN NILSSON HAS CARRIED OUT THOROUGH SEARCH OF SHIP AND IS CONFIDENT THAT PIZARRO IS NOT ABOARD. CHIEF POLICE OFFICER HAS CAREFULLY SCRUTINIZED ALL PASSPORTS AND IS SATISFIED THAT PIZARRO IS NOT MASQUERADING UNDER ANOTHER NAME.

8. CAPTAIN NILSSON ALLOWED DESTEFANIS TO TELEPHONE HIS WIFE IN BUENOS AIRES TO SAY EHRE HE WAS BUT REFUSED HIS REQUEST TO TELEPHONE TAM DALYELL IN LONDON. HE AGREED WITH ME NOT TO ALLOW DESTEFANIS TO HAVE ANY OTHER TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS AND PROMISED NOT TO ALLOW ANY JOURNALISTS TO SEE HIM.

HUNT

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CCN: PLEASE IN SERT AFTER "WOULD BE" THE FOLLOWING:  
"TIED UP. HE BECAME SEPARATED FROM PIZARRO AT THE QUAREEEEE  
QUAYSIDE.....".

APOLOGIES FOR ERROR

SENT/RECD 251445Z TT//DD

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Please let me have the  
again in London.

Mr Coles

A.S.C. 24/11.

10/24/11

h-a-

Argentina: Uranium Enrichment Plant

Thank you for your letter of 21 November on whether we had been in touch with the Americans over Argentina's development of a uranium enrichment plant.

We are in regular contact with the Americans on overt and covert channels about Argentina's nuclear programme in general, but we have not yet heard their reaction to the announced plans for an Argentine enrichment plant. We have raised the question both in London and Washington and expect to hear shortly.

Although the message we received from the Canadians said that a plant "had been built" it is clear from the subsequent Argentine public announcement that the plant is still under construction and will not be in production before the end of 1985. The announcement now is probably related to CNEA's wish to demonstrate the major role it can play in development of Argentina's economy at a time when it is short of funds and may fear that the new Radical government may seek to place it and its finances under tight civilian control.

There is, therefore, some time in which to solve the safeguards problem. We shall continue to do what we can in the circumstances to press for the conclusion of a new safeguards agreement between the IAEA and Argentina which would encompass all her nuclear activities. Negotiations are in train but the main sticking point is the Argentine wish to retain the right to exploit nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

*P F Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)

24 November 1983

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FM FCO 231827Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI FOR PS SECRETARY OF STATE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 878 OF 23 NOVEMBER

INFO UKDEL STRASBOURG (FOR LADY YOUNG)

1. THE S OF S WILL WISH TO KNOW THAT TODAY'S GUARDIAN CARRIES AN ARTICLE HEADED 'GOVERNMENT 'SUPORESSED FALKLAND DOCUMENTS' ' WHICH STATES THAT LORD AVEBURY HAS ACCUSED THE GOVERNMENT OF ATTEMOTING TO SUOPRESS OUBLIC DOCUMENTS BECAUSE THEY CAST DOUBT ON BRITAIN'S TERRITORIAL CLAIM TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THE ARTICLE SAYS THAT DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE AND MINISTERS HAVE REFUSED TO GIVE DETAILS OR ALLOW ACCESS TO THE 'UNCLASSIFIED' DOCUMENTS AT THE FCO. NEWS DEPARTMENT ARE TAKINO THE FOLLOWINO LINE:

AS IS EVIDENT FROM THE FRANKS REPORT OUESTIONS CONCERNINO SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS HAVE BEEN UNDER REVIEW FOR MANY YEARS. OLDER DOCUMENTS RELATINO TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ARE WITHDRAWN FROM TIME TO TIME FROM THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE FOR RESEARCH WITHIN THE FCO. SOME OF THESE HAVE NEVER ENTERED THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: THEV ARE WITHHELD UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACTS BECAUSE THEY CONTAIN OAPERS THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THEY MUST CONTINUE TO BE WITHHELD. WHEN RECORDS ARE NO LONGER REQUIRED BY THE FCO THEV ARE RETURNED TO THE PRO AND THOSE WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN WITHHELD ARE THEN FREELV ACCESSIBLE TO THE PUBLIC. IT WOULD NOT BE PRACTICABLE TO ALLOW ACCESS TO RECORDS WHICH ARE CURRENTLV IN USE BY THE FCO.

2. THE ARTICLE APPEARS TO ARISE FROM LORD AVEBURY'S STARRED QUESTION FOR REOLY ON 13 DECEMBER COVERING MUCH THE SAME GROUND AND ASKINO SPECIFIC OUESTIONS ALL OF WHICH HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN ANSWERED EITHER IN THE LORDS OR COMMONS ABOUT FALKLAND ISLANDS RECORDS WITHDRAWN FROM THE PRO AND HELD OVER A LONG PERIOD BV THE FCO. THE PRESS LINE REFLECTS THESE ANSWERS.

*Howe*

LIMITED

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FID

NEWS D

PARLY UNIT

LEGAL ADVISERS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

LORD N GORDON LENNOX

MR MCINNES

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OO NEW DELHI

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FM FCO 231230Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 861 OF 23 NOVEMBER

FOR S OF S'S PARTY

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF FID WAS RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON TELNO 3511 OF 21 NOVEMBER:

**MIPT: ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE CERTIFICATION OF ARGENTINA.**

1. I MYSELF BELIEVE IT SHOULD NOT BE TOO DIFFICULT TO SECURE OUR MAJOR BRITISH INTERESTS - THE PROTECTION OF OUR FORCES IN THE FALKLANDS, THE MAINTENANCE OF SOME LEVERAGE IN WASHINGTON AND THE MANAGEMENT OF ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE UK. TO DO SO, WE SHALL HAVE TO ACCEPT THE FACTS AS THEY WILL BE - THE CERTIFICATION OF ARGENTINA AND THE PROBABLE RESUMPTION OF LIMITED ARMS SALES - AND WITHIN THAT CONTEXT FIGHT HARD TO OBTAIN OUR OBJECTIVES.
2. FORTUNATELY THE US ADMINISTRATION RECOGNISES OUR LEGITIMATE INTERESTS AND, MOST RECENTLY IN THE TALKS WHICH LADY YOUNG HELD AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON 18 NOVEMBER, BOTH UNDERTOOK TO CONSULT OVER ARMS SALES AND INVITED US TO STATE WHICH ARMS WE SHOULD WISH NOT (REPEAT) NOT TO BE SUPPLIED. EAGLEBURGER GAVE INSTRUCTIONS IN LADY YOUNG'S PRESENCE THAT NO ARMS WERE TO BE SUPPLIED TO ARGENTINA WITHOUT HIS EXPRESS AUTHORITY. DAM ALSO WARNED LADY YOUNG THAT THERE WOULD BE A LOT OF RUMOURS BUZZING AROUND TOWN, SPREAD BY THOSE WITH AN INTEREST IN DISTURBING US, AND HE RECOMMENDED THAT WE SHOULD, BY CONSULTATION, DISTINGUISH BETWEEN FACT AND FICTION. GOOD ADVICE.
3. I RECOMMEND THEREFORE THAT, IN THE NEW SITUATION, WHERE BOTH SIDES HAVE BEEN BRUISED BY RECENT EXPERIENCE, WE SHOULD TAKE THE AMERICANS AT THEIR WORD AND RIGOROUSLY HOLD THEM TO IT. WE SHOULD INSIST ON THE CLOSEST CONSULATION AS THEIR POLITICO-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH ARGENTINA DEVELOPS AND ON BEING KEPT IN THE PICTURE ON PARTICULAR PROSPECTS FOR AMS SALES. IN ADDITION, WE SHOULD RESPOND TO THE INVITATION TO LET THE AMERICANS KNOW WHICH TYPES OF WEAPONS WE SHOULD FIND MOST OBJECTIONABLE IF SUPPLIED TO ARGENTINA. CDS, WHO WAS HERE LAST WEEK, INDICATED THE MAIN TYPES: AND I KNOW THAT THE DEPAROMENT HASLBEEN DOING SOME VERY USEFUL PRELIMINARY WORK ON THIS. IT WILL OF COURSE BE NECESSARY FOR US HERE TO KEEP IN THE CLOSEST CONTACT WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AS WELL AS THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
4. ONE FURTHER SUGGESTION. TO REINFORCE THE ASSURANCES WHICH LADY YOUNG HAS RECEIVED FROM BOTH DAM AND EAGLEBURGER, THERE MIGHT BE VALUE IN YOUR SENDING A MESSAGE TO SHULT, REFERRING TO THE MINISTER OF STATE'S TALKS, AND WELCOMING THOSE ASSURANCES, SO THAT THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN REGISTERED AT HIS LEVEL. I WOULD PROPOSE TO DELIVER THE MESSAGES PERSONALLY AND SO GUAGE HIS REACTIONS. THIS WOULD ALSO GIVE ME THE OPPORTUNITY OF MAKING ANY OTHER POINTS WHICH YOU MIGHT WISH TO GET ACROSS. MY BELIEF IS THAT THIS WOULD GIVE HIM NO PROBLEM. IN THAT CASE, WE SHOULD HAVE THE ASSURANCES WE REQUIRE AS COPPER BOTTOMED AS THESE THINGS EVER CAN BE. I WOULD SUGGEST THAT AT THIS STAGE WE KEEP THE POSSIBILITY OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT IN RESERVE. SINCE AN OUNCE OF HELP IS WORTH A TON OF ADVICE I SUBMIT A POSSIBLE DRAFT OF A MESSAGE FROM YOU TO SHULTZ. SEE MIFT.

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
FM FCO 231230Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 859 OF 23 NOVEMBER

FOR S OF S'S PARTY.

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF FID WAS  
RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON TELNO 3510 OF 21 NOVEMBER:



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ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE UK AND THE CERTIFICATION OF ARGENTINA.

1. I AM SURE YOU ARE AS CONCERNED AS I AM ABOUT THE APPRENT RISE OF ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AS MOST RECENTLY MANIFESTED OVER REACTIONS TO GRENADA AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE. MORE TROUBLE OF THE SAME SORT MAY LIE AHEAD WITH THE CERTIFICATION OF ARGENTINA AND THE PROSPECT OF THE RESUMPTION OF AMERICAN ARMS SALES TO THAT COUNTRY. WE NEED TO BE CLEAR IN OUR OWN MINDS HOW BEST TO DEFEND BRITISH INTERESTS BOTH IN MINIMISING THE THREAT TO OUR FORCES IN THE FALKLANDS AND IN REDUCING THE GROWTH OF ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT IN BRITAIN. THE US ADMINISTRATION HAS A ROLE TO PLAY IN BOTH.

2. IT IS CLEAR FROM ONE TALKS WHICH LADY YOUNG HAD WITH DAM AND EAGLEBURGER THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE DECIDED TO CERTIFY ARGENTINA. THEY MAY DO SO AT ANY TIME AND PROBABLY NOT LATER THAN THE ASSUMPTION OF POWER BY THE DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT ON 10 DECEMBER. THE AMERICANS TELL US, WHICH IS TRUE, THAT CERTIFICATION ITSELF DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN, ALTHOUGH IT IS A NECESSARY PRECONDITION FOR, THE RESUMPTION OF ARMS SALES. IT SIMPLY CERTIFIES THAT THERE HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS OVER HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA. THIS FACT IS SURELY ONE WE CAN ALSO WELCOME PUBLICLY, NO LESS THAN WE HAVE WELCOMED PUBLICLY THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT WE MAKE THE BEST OF A BAD JOB AND DO SO.

3. IT IS ALSO CLEAR FROM LADY YOUNG'S TALKS IN WASHINGTON THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION WILL WISH TO REPAIR ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH ARGENTINA AND SEES THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF A POLITICO-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ALFONSIN GOVERNMENT AS AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF THAT REPAIR WORK. ARMS SALES OF SOME SORT WILL FEATURE IN THAT RELATIONSHIP, ALTHOUGH BOTH ARGENTINE FINANCES AND US CONSTRAINTS, AS WELL AS BRITISH PREOCCUPATIONS, ARE LIKELY TO SET LIMITS TO THE QUANTITY AND SORT OF EQUIPMENT THAT WILL BE DELIVERED. NONETHELESS THE DESIRE TO PRE-EMPT ANY SOVIET ARMS DEALS AND PREVENT THE MOVEMENT OF A LEFT OF CENTRE GOVERNMENT TOWARDS A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION WILL REMAIN HIGH ON THE LIST OF AMERICAN PRIORITIES WHEN ALFONSIN TAKES OVER. THAT FACT TOO WE HAVE TO ADJUST TO AND MAKE THE BEST OF.

4. HOW THEN SHOULD WE REACT TO THIS NEW SITUATION: TO PROTECT OUR FORCES IN THE FALKLANDS, TO RETAIN SOME LEVERAGE OVER THE USE ADMINISTRATION AND TO PREVENT THE RISE OF ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE UK? FOR MY RECOMMENDATIONS PLEASE SEE MIFT.

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COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

24 NOV 1983

DUPLICATES

<< Mr Stead

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FM FCO 231230Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 858 OF 23 NOVEMBER

FOR S OF S'S PARTY

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF FID WAS RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON TELNO 3509 OF 21 NOVEMBER:

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FM WASHINGTON 212226Z NOV 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3509 OF 21 NOVEMBER

MIFT

ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE UK AND THE CERTIFICATION OF ARGENTINA.

FOLLOWING IS DRAFT OF MESSAGE FROM YOU TO SHILTZ:

QUOTE JANET YOUNG HAS TOLD ME OF THE VERY USEFUL TALKS WHICH SHE HAD IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK WITH KEN DAM AND LARRY EAGLEBURGER ABOUT YOUR PROBABLE CERTIFICATION OF ARGENTINA, AND, SUBSEQUENTLY, THE LIKELY RESUMPTION OF ARMS SALES TO THAT COUNTRY.

2. YOU KNOW WHAT DIFFICULTIES THIS POSES FOR US. THZ PRIME MINISTER TOOK THE MATTER UP WITH THE PRESIDENT ON HER RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND I HAVE MENTIONED IT FREQUENTLY TO YOU. I AM CONCERNED CHIEFLY ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS SALES UPON OUR FORCES IN THE FALKLANDS, PARTICULARLY IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ARGENTINIANS, AND ABOUT THE PROBLEMS OF EXPLAINING TO BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION HOW OUR PRINCIPAL ALLY CAN SUPPLY ARMS TO AN OPPONENT OF OURS WHO HAS NOT YET RENOUNCED THE USE OF FORCE TO PROSECUTE HIS CLAIM TO OUR TERRITORY. I WOULD HOPE, THOUGH WITHOUT MUCH EXPECTATION OF RESULTS, THAT A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA WOULD PERCEIVE THAT DEMOCRACY IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH A CONTINUED DETERMINATION TO PURSUE ITS CLAIM BY FORCE AND THAT ARGENTINA, SHORTLY TO BE GOVERNED BY A GOVERNMENT OF ITS OWN CHOICE, SHOULD NOT DENY THAT RIGHT TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS. YOU MAY FEEL ABLE TO PUT THESE POINTS TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN ARGENTINA.

3. HOWEVER, IT IS CLEAR THAT YOU INTEND TO CERTIFY, AND THAT YOU SEE IT TO BE AN AMERICAN INTEREST TO ESTABLISH A MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND THAT ARMS SALES ARE LIKELY TO BE A COMPONENT OF THAT RELATIONSHIP. I AM CONCERNED THEREFORE, AND I HOPE YOU MAY BE TOO, TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE WHICH YOUR DECISION MAY CAUSE NOT ONLY TO THE SECURITY OF OUR FORCES IN THE FALKLANDS BUT TO THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION IN BRITAIN OF THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES. I HAVE BEEN WORRIED, AS NO DOUBT YOU HAVE BEEN ALSO, BY THE STRIDENCY, AMOUNTING IN SOME CASES TO ANTI-AMERICANISM, OF THE PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION TO OUR ACTION IN GRENADA AND TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE IN THE UK. I AM ANXIOUS TO MINIMISE THE INEVITABLE DAMAGE TO OUR RELATIONSHIP THAT YOUR DECISIONS ON CERTIFICATION AND ARMS SALES WILL CAUSE.

4. IT WILL GREATLY HELP ME IN THIS TASK IF I TAKE UP WITH YOU TWO POINTS WHICH BOTH KEN DAM AND LARRY EAGLEBURGER MADE TO JANET YOUNG. THE FIRST IS THE QUESTION OF CONSULTATION ON ARMS SALES. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD CONFIRM THAT WE SHALL BE CONSULTED, BEFORE DECISIONS ARE TAKEN, ABOUT ANY ARGENTINE REQUEST FOR ARMS SALES WHICH COULD AFFECT THE SECURITY OF OUR FORCES ON OUR ISLANDS, AND THE RESOURCES NEED TO DEFEND THEM. THIS WOULD ENABLE US TO LET YOU HAVE OUR CONSIDERED VIEW ON THE LIKELY REPERCUSSIONS OF YOUR ARMS DELIVERIES ON OUR FORCES IN THE FALKLANDS AND ON OUR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP. THE SECOND CONCERNS THOSE WEAPONS SYSTEMS WHICH WE SHOULD FIND IT MOST DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT. I AM IN TOUCH WITH MICHAEL HESELTINE ABOUT THIS. WHILE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO BE TO CATEGORIC ABOUT IT IS OBVIOUS THAT SOME WEAPONS WILL BE WORSE THAN

4. IT WILL GREATLY HELP ME IN THIS TASK... POINTS WHICH BOTH KEN DAM AND LARRY EAGLEBURGER MADE TO JANET YOUNG. THE FIRST IS THE QUESTION OF CONSULATION ON ARMS SALES. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD CONFIRM THAT WE SHALL BE CONSULTED, BEFORE DECISIONS ARE TAKEN, ABOUT ANY ARGENTINE REQUEST FOR ARMS SALES WHICH COULD AFFECT THE SECURITY OF OUR FORCES ON OUR ISLANDS, AND THE RESOURCES NEED TO DEFEND THEM. THIS WOULD ENABLE US TO LET YOU HAVE OUR CONSIDERED VIEW ON THE LIKELY REPERCUSSIONS OF YOUR ARMS DELIVERIES ON OUR FORCES IN THE TALKLANDS AND ON OUR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP. THE SECOND CONCERNS THOSE WEAPONS SYSTEMS WHICH WE SHOULD FIND IT MOST DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT. I AM IN TOUCH WITH MICHAEL HESELTINE ABOUT THIS. WHILE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO BE TO CATEGORIC ABOUT THESE MATTERS, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT SOME WEAPONS WILL BE WORSE THAN OTHERS FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. IF, AS I HOPE, WE CAN IDENTIFY WEAPONS OF PARTICULAR DIFFICULTY TO US, THEN I HOPE WE COULD RELY ON YOUR ASSURANCE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO QUESTION OF YOUR SUPPLYING THEM TO ARGENTINA.

5. ONE FINAL POINT. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE WELCOMED THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA AND HAVE SAID SO PUBLICLY. WE WISH TO RESTORE OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH ARGENTINA TO NORMALITY. WHILE THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY, SINCE WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF LETTING ARGENTINA OBTAIN BY NEGOTIATION WHAT WE HAD TO PREVENT HER ACQUIRING BY FORCE, WE ARE READY TO RESUME A NORMAL RELATIONSHIP, AS FRIENDLY AS CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT. WE HAVE ALREADY DEMONSTRATED OUR GOOD WILL BE JOINING IN THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE OPERATION FOR ARGENTINA, WE ARE READY TO RESUME FULL COMMERCIAL, CONSULAR AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AS SOON AS ARGENTINA IS READY TO RESPOND. IF YOU THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL, PLEASE FEEL AT LIBERTY TO MAKE THIS KNOWN TO THE NEW ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. WITH BEST WISHES. UNQUOTE.

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
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Handwritten initials or a signature, possibly 'J. Young'.

MR. COLES ✓ to see o.v.  
THE FALKLANDS

AR 30.

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir A. Parsons.

Prime Minister

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I anticipate a difficult year ahead of us internationally and, to an increasing extent, domestically. If the military had remained in power or if the Peronists, with their evil reputation, had won the elections in Argentina, we should not come under serious pressure to make the first move towards reconciliation with Argentina, with the concomitant of eventual "negotiations" over the Falklands. But the Radical victory has produced the most acceptable of all possible Argentine governments in Western eyes - democratic, unmilitaristic, committed to human rights, moderately non-aligned.

First, provided that Alfonsin's government survives, I find it inconceivable that the Americans will not resume military supplies although they will, to start with, carefully scrutinise each order. We should keep them up to the mark on this: the dialogue has started. Secondly, the Americans and the Europeans will pressurise us to show "flexibility". They will argue that, as a self-confident major power, we are in a better position than the fledgling civilian government in Argentina to make the first gesture. They will say that it is in the Western interest to give every encouragement to Alfonsin and that continued confrontation over the Falklands will weaken his ability to resist the military and to pursue moderate, un-demagogic policies. They will urge us to spare them further embarrassing rounds of arm-twisting and counter arm-twisting, plus difficult decisions at the UN. In a nutshell they will become increasingly fed-up with us, and the Falklands dispute with Argentina will gradually replace Rhodesia as a thorn in our flesh vis a vis our friends - never mind our adversaries.

I also think that many of these sentiments will steadily permeate responsible British public and parliamentary opinion: this process has in fact already begun. Clamour about "a sterile Fortress Falklands" policy will mount (see for example the attached leader from the Financial Times of 22 November, which I read after drafting this minute).

The first manifestations are likely to be private lectures by the Americans and Europeans (the French take over the Presidency in the New Year) plus back-door attempts by the Latin-American lobby in this country to set up confidential contacts between us and leading

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/Radical politicians

Radical politicians/businessmen from Argentina. This kind of thing could start fairly soon, ie after Alfonsin is inaugurated in December: in fact a first attempt to set up a private contact was made within days of the Argentine election.

None of these pressures may develop. The military in Argentina may mount another coup; the Peronists may make it impossible for Alfonsin to govern by promoting major industrial action (their normal tactic) or the Alfonsin Government may turn out to be less admirable than expected. We need not therefore take any decisions before, say, the early summer of 1984. By that time we should have a clear idea of how the wind is blowing.

If domestic and international opinion of the kind that matters to us is developing as outlined above, we should at that time consider whether it would be in our interest to modify our present policy. What is important is that, by standing pat, we should not lose the initiative and find ourselves forced uncomfortably onto the defensive. If we were to decide that it would be right to take an initiative, we should obviously concentrate on the process of normalisation of relations between Britain and Argentina, and avoid putting a foot in the quicksand of "negotiations" over the Falklands. Visible progress towards normalisation, even if slow, would dissipate domestic and international pressure.

The kind of first small step I am thinking of would be a deal under which we would lift or reduce the exclusion zone in exchange for a public assurance from Argentina that they had renounced the use of force as a means of settling their dispute with us in the South Atlantic. If this worked, we could then consider small reciprocal steps designed to restore full financial and commercial relations; then perhaps cultural - British Council etc; and finally diplomatic relations. All this would take a long time, years not months in all probability (it took us 2½ years with the Egyptians after Suez to go from first contact to exchange of Ambassadors). During this process we would exclude the Falklands themselves from any discussions. If the Argentines would not accept this, all bets would immediately be off.

*The have said they won't do this*

How should we tackle such a process procedurally? Not, I suggest through a third party, eg the US, Perez de Cuellar or a friendly European or Latin. Third parties would want to force the pace,

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- 3 -

would be disposed to push us harder than they would Argentina; and would be thirsting to launch us into the quicksand. We could, however:

a. make a public statement and see if Argentina reacted positively - not satisfactory;


b. pass a message via the Swiss - not as good as a personal contact;

c. arrange a secret, and if necessary disownable, contact with an Argentine politician, official or businessman - this would be my preferred course.

*It would become known or undeniable*

There are many ways in which we could follow course (c). For example, we could brief Lord Montgomery, or someone like him, to make contact with a senior Argentine businessman close to the Radical government. This could be done on the basis that we would disown anything said if it leaked and that our interlocutor would be making soundings on a personal basis without any commitment. This is roughly speaking how we got started with the Egyptians after Suez. Alternately, we could make use of my old chum, Hugo Gobbi. Although he has been publicly dismissive about the possibility of mending fences with Britain without engaging in specific negotiations over the Falklands, the fact remains that he will be in charge of Falklands affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and will also be staying on as Perez de Cuellar's Cyprus negotiator. In his latter capacity, he may very well visit London and will certainly be available in third countries. He is, I know, a very close friend of Perry Rhodes in Athens. It would be simple to set up an entirely non-committal talk to him.

If the Prime Minister does not burn this minute as she reads it, I would be glad to expand on these thoughts.



A.D. PARSONS  
23 November 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

# the Falklands

THE DEBATE in the UN on the Falklands last week was a set piece exchange with Britain and Argentina sticking to well known positions. This was to be expected, since Argentina is still in a transitional phase from a military regime to the installation early next month of President Raul Alfonsin and his Radical Government.

Yet there was a note of complacency about the way Britain emerged from the debate, encouraged by the fact that the voting line-up was virtually unchanged from the previous year when it was held in the heated aftermath of the Falklands conflict.

## Solid majority

It would be a pity if such attitudes persist since an opportunity has been presented to both sides to begin the long and difficult process of re-establishing a dialogue. The incoming Argentine President courageously opposed the invasion and he now has the authority of a solid majority vote in a democratic election behind him. Britain could expect neither now, nor in the future, a better man in office.

Britain, and one might as well say the Prime Minister since it is Number Ten that is making policy, is insisting that no move can be made until Argentina formally declares an end to hostilities. The Argentines have not done so partly through pride and partly in the belief that a fortress Falklands policy will eventually become unpopular in Britain, as well as expensive. They also claim that despite Britain's unilateral end to hostilities, certain activities—especially the construction of a new runway near Port Stanley—constitute continued belligerency.

Both sides could take the view that the problem is so intractable that it is best left for the time being. If this course is followed, Britain rather than Argentina has more to lose. For the Argentines the only concern is the continued denial of sovereignty. Britain meanwhile faces the financial cost, almost £700m next year, of sustaining a credible defence of the islands.

And it is not just defence costs. Mrs Thatcher was already embarrassed in September when she had to permit British banks to take part in debt refinancing agreements with Argentina. This issue will resurface again early in the new year. More emotive is the U.S. administration's intention to resume arms shipments to the new Argentine government. There is little doubt that arms sales will soon take place, starting with spares, whether or not Argentina formally ends its state of hostilities with Britain. These arms sales will be uncomfortable for Mrs Thatcher to digest.

Meanwhile, Britain cannot rely indefinitely on its allies to support its Falklands policy once Argentina possesses a democratically installed government.

Thus, although the first move should be made by Argentina, it has less incentive than Britain to do so. In addition, Sr Alfonsin is going to be handicapped by a highly nationalistic electorate united in Argentina's claim to the Falklands. The war reinforced this sentiment, rather than diminished it. Anything perceived as a Falklands sell-out could cause Sr Alfonsin's downfall, and so endanger the country's democracy. Mrs Thatcher, on the other hand, has an infinitely stronger domestic position, and it is always easier for the victor to take the initiative.

The initiative can be taken by Britain in two ways—behind-the-scenes diplomacy or a public gesture; or a combination of the two. The obvious gesture is to remove the 150-mile protection zone round the islands. This is an irritant to the Argentines since their fishing vessels can theoretically gain permission to enter but refrain from doing so since this constitutes recognition of British sovereignty. Britain has already unilaterally shifted from imposing a 200-mile exclusion zone to the current position.

Diplomatic contacts will have to start through intermediaries since there are no formal links. Both the U.S. and Peru have acted as go-betweens in the past, and Peru is understood to be once again ready to help. Using the Americans would have the additional value of dampening controversy over arms supplies. Perhaps only U.S. involvement would persuade the Argentines of the value of talks which would see Britain almost certainly begin by putting the issue of sovereignty on one side.

## Last resort

Such diplomatic contacts will be fraught with mutual inhibition and cannot realistically begin until Sr Alfonsin has assumed office. However, Sr Alfonsin could signal his good intentions in his inaugural address, or shortly after, by publicly renouncing the use of force in the settlement of disputes. Specific mention of the Falklands is not necessary since this message would be aimed as much at Chile and the Beagle Channel dispute. The latter is going to be his first foreign policy initiative.

It will be difficult for Britain to take the first step if Sr Alfonsin remains silent on the issue. However, there is in the last resort the compelling reality that no satisfactory solution to the future of the islands and their inhabitants can be achieved without the involvement and co-operation of Argentina.



Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

David Heyhoe Esq  
 Lord Privy Seal's Office  
 House of Commons  
 LONDON SW1

21 November 1983

*DA*  
 22/11/83

Dear David,

WITHDRAWAL OF FALKLAND ISLANDS DRAFT ORDER IN COUNCIL

The Lord Privy Seal may conceivably be asked, at Prime Minister's Questions Time tomorrow, why the draft Order on a new double taxation Arrangement with the Falkland Islands was laid last Wednesday and has now been withdrawn.

The background is this. The text of a new double taxation Arrangement with the Falkland Islands was originally agreed at official level in 1981 with the authorities there and the Foreign Office. The new provisions replace, and are more generous (to the Falklands) than, the existing arrangements which date mainly from 1949.

Progress towards bringing the new provisions into force was delayed by the invasion, but further discussions took place this Summer and after some remaining issues had been resolved, the Revenue made arrangements for the draft Order to be prepared and it was laid last Wednesday. We had hoped that it would be debated next Wednesday in the Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments along with three other similar draft Orders (relating to Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and the Netherlands).

However, I am afraid that it was only last Thursday that the Foreign Office realised the implications of the definition of the "Falkland Islands" in the Order and decided it had to be withdrawn. The short point is that the draft Order contains a definition of the Falkland Islands including a reference to the Falkland Islands Dependencies. The latter are of course a separate Colony with their own laws.

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The definition of the countries with which the Revenue concludes double taxation agreements is of course a matter for the Foreign Office; and the invasion had changed things very considerably since the definition of the Falkland Islands in the new Arrangements was agreed in 1981. Moreover, this was not one of the subjects dealt with during the discussions in the Summer. I understand, however, that sometime last year, No 10 asked the Foreign Office to ensure that in future Government pronouncements left no doubt about the existence of two separate colonies. We and the Revenue have never seen that advice, and so saw no reason to enquire further as to whether the new Arrangement correctly reflected the strict constitutional position in the Falklands.

I am copying this and the briefing to Andrew Turnbull at No 10, Murdo Maclean in the Chief Whip's Office, to Lady Young's Office at FCO, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

*Yours ever,*

*Andrew*

A P HUDSON

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BRIEF FOR PRIME MINISTER'S QUESTIONS

WITHDRAWAL OF FALKLAND ISLANDS ORDER IN COUNCIL

FACTS

1. The draft Order providing for a new Arrangement between the UK and Falkland Islands dealing with double taxation relief was laid in the House on 16 November. It was expected to be debated in the Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments on 23 November but had to be withdrawn.
2. It was withdrawn because a drafting defect was unfortunately discovered in the definition of the Falkland Islands. The text wrongly suggested that there is only one Colony rather than two, ie the Falkland Islands themselves and the separate Colony of the Falkland Islands Dependencies.
3. The difficulty arises because -
  - (a) the Arrangement is declared in the Order to be with "the Government of the Falkland Islands"; and
  - (b) the "Falkland Islands" are defined as " .... the islands of the Falkland Islands, including the islands of the Falkland Islands Dependencies .....".
4. A copy of the draft Order is attached. (*Top copy only.*)
5. It is Government policy, in view of the Argentine claim, to make it clear that there are two quite separate Colonies, but the Foreign Office only realised the significance of the text (originally agreed with them in 1981 before the invasion) after it had been laid and they decided it had to be withdrawn.
6. A background note by the FCO is attached.
7. Other matter. Attached is a copy of a recent reply to a Question by Mr McQuarrie about a double taxation arrangement with Gibraltar. He may have heard of the proposed Falkland Islands Arrangement and wondered whether similar provisions were being considered for Gibraltar whose territory is also claimed by a foreign power.

LINE TO TAKE

1. The draft Order was withdrawn because of a drafting defect.

If pressed for further explanation

2. The draft Order referred to Arrangements made with the "Government of the Falkland Islands" about double taxation relief. Unfortunately these Arrangements contain a definition of the Falkland Islands which includes a reference to the Falkland Islands Dependencies. The latter are of course a separate Colony with its own laws; and Arrangements in respect of it cannot be included in Arrangements made only with the Government of the Falkland Islands.

What now?

3. We shall be having fresh discussions with the appropriate authorities and a new Order will be laid.

Are the existing (1949) Arrangements not broadly the same as those withdrawn?

4. Yes, and although this has not given rise to any problems in practice, it is important to get matters right in new Order.

Will delay penalise the Islands' economy?

5. No, the new provisions and the relief they provide will operate with effect from 1982.

Will there be Arrangements with Gibraltar?

6. I have nothing to add to the reply given on 15 November 1983 to my hon Friend the Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr A McQuarrie).

Background Note by FCO

When the Haig proposals were being considered by HMG in April last year the Prime Minister raised the fundamental point whether the proposed text would include the Falkland Islands Dependencies, since if it did this would have caused us great difficulties both immediately and later. Once South Georgia had been repossessed we could not accept that any short term arrangements for administering the Falkland Islands which involved Argentine or other outside participation should include the Dependencies. Furthermore in case there were ever to be a resumption of negotiations with Argentina over the future of the Falkland Islands, it would be essential that the legally distinct status of the Dependencies be maintained and emphasised.

The Government has been at pains to do this ever since. The amendment to the British Nationality Act to confer British citizenship on the Falkland Islanders does not apply to the Dependencies. All agreements, Bills or statutory instruments which are intended to apply to both the Islands and the Dependencies list them separately rather than using the previous formula of "Falkland Islands and its Dependencies".

In a report by officials which was considered and approved by last Wednesday's meeting of OD (chaired by the Prime Minister) it was stated that the new constitution for the Islands will make no provision for the Dependencies for which a quite separate constitution will be promulgated.

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Parliamentary Debates 15 November 1983  
(Daily Reports)

Vol 48 No.49 Col 404

**Gibraltar (Double Taxation Relief)**

**Mr. McQuarrie:** asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether there exists a double taxation relief arrangement relating to taxes on income between the United Kingdom and Gibraltar; and if he will make a statement.

**Mr. Moore:** There is no arrangement of this kind. However, the domestic tax laws of both the United Kingdom and Gibraltar contain provisions for unilateral relief in respect of tax paid in the other country on income arising there and flowing to their residents.

21 NOV 1983



CONFIDENTIAL

*Sub*



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

21 November 1983

ARGENTINA: URANIUM ENRICHMENT PLANT

A submission, dated 18 November, from Mr. Kenyon of your Nuclear Energy Department was copied to me. In view of the importance of this subject, and in view of the Prime Minister's departure today for CHOGM, I showed Mrs. Thatcher the submission over the weekend.

*Bof* The Prime Minister has asked whether we have been in touch with the United States about Argentina's development of a uranium enrichment plant. I should be grateful for your comments.

A. J. COLES

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

*sg*

CONFIDENTIAL

Jul



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

21 November 1983

FALKLAND ISLANDS: CHIEF EXECUTIVE

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 17 November.

A. J. COLES

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Have we been in touch with the U.S. about this?  
MS

Prime Minister.

Private Secretary

MS

AR 15/11

ARGENTINA: URANIUM ENRICHMENT PLANT

1. I have just heard from the Canadian High Commission that the Argentine Foreign Minister today called in the Canadian Ambassador to announce "a major Argentine nuclear achievement". He said that the media would be informed shortly that Argentina has, without outside help, developed and built a medium-sized uranium enrichment plant in Rio Negro. The plant is based on gas diffusion technology (such as was used in the original Capenhurst plant). The Foreign Minister reiterated to the Canadian Ambassador that Argentine policy remains that nuclear energy should be used only for peaceful purposes. He stressed that the Argentine nuclear programme would not be used to the detriment of any of her neighbours, including the Falkland Islands. He stated that Argentina continues to believe in "the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons".

→ 2. We were not previously aware of this development. The Argentina nuclear power programme is based entirely on natural uranium and has no need for enrichment. However, Argentina has several research reactors, including a new one under construction. She is also building a research reactor for Peru and negotiating to build one for Colombia. So far all these research reactors have had to be fuelled with imported enriched uranium and the ability to offer enriched uranium for export will put her in a stronger position to sell research reactors to other developing countries. The ability to produce highly enriched uranium would of course also provide a source of fissile material for a nuclear weapon or for nuclear submarine propulsion.

3. I suggest the following line for use by News Department:

"We note Argentine statements that her nuclear programme is entirely for peaceful purposes. We would however be more confident of her intentions if such sensitive plant were to be placed under IAEA safeguards and if Argentina were to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco."

IR Kenyon

18 November 1983

I R Kenyon  
Nuclear Energy Department

→ cc Private Secretary, No 10  
Mr Cartledge  
Mr Wright  
Sir J Bullard  
Mr Ure  
FID  
News Department  
PUSD





Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

A.A.C. 11/11

17 November 1983

Dear John,

Falkland Islands: Chief Executive

We spoke on the telephone about the announcement of the appointment of Mr David Taylor to the new post of Chief Executive to the Falkland Islands Government.

Mr Taylor will fly out to Port Stanley on 29 November to take up his new duties. He has been seconded from Booker McConnell PLC for three years and is being employed under technical cooperation arrangements through the British overseas aid programme. He was appointed after the post had been advertised nationally and produced over 60 enquiries.

The post of Chief Executive was recommended in Lord Shackleton's Report. It will combine the duties of Chief Secretary to the Falkland Islands Government and Executive Vice-Chairman of the new Falkland Islands Development Corporation. Mr Taylor will therefore be responsible to the Civil Commissioner both for running the Administration and for implementing a range of development projects financed from the £31 million development grant. He will be appointed Acting Civil Commissioner in Sir Rex Hunt's absence.

Mr Taylor, who is aged 50, was educated at Clifton and at Clare College, Cambridge. He served for nearly five years in the Overseas Civil Service in Tanganyika before joining Booker McConnell PLC in 1964. He has held various managerial posts with that company in London related to its distributive, light industrial and agricultural operations overseas and served in Malawi as Chief Executive of Booker's activities there.

Mr Taylor is being briefed by the ODA on development matters and by the FCO on constitutional and governmental ones. He has been received by Lady Young and Mr Raison.

Yours ever,

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

Peter Ricketts

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 November, 1983

Dear David,

Falklands: Sir Nicholas Henderson's Article in the Economist

Thank you for your letter of 16 November about the question which Mr Tam Dalyell intends to raise with the Leader of the House at Business Questions today.

/ I enclose a suggested Line to Take which refers to the Written Answer by the Prime Minister to Mr Dalyell on the same subject yesterday.

// As background I enclose a copy of the relevant Hansard extract and the background note submitted to the Prime Minister with this reply, In addition I enclose a copy of the Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors on Ministerial Memoirs. This includes the conclusion (Part IV, paragraph 92 (page 32)) that "... a former public servant should be under just the same obligation as a former Minister to submit his manuscript to scrutiny ...". If Mr Dalyell presses further, it is open to us to confirm that Sir Nicholas Henderson did indeed submit his manuscript. For the moment, we see no need to go beyond the more general formulation used by the Prime Minister in her Answer yesterday.

I am copying this letter to Tim Flesher (No 10), Richard Mottram (MOD) and to Richard Hatfield in Sir Robert Armstrong's Office.

Yours sincerely,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

D C R Heyhoe Esq  
Privy Council Office  
Whitehall

'USE THAT MAY BE MADE BY FORMER CIVIL SERVANTS OF  
DIPLOMATIC TELEGRAMS AND INTELLIGENCE REPORTS''

Line to Take

1. I take it that the hon Member's interest in this matter stems from the article in the Economist of 12 November by Sir Nicholas Henderson, the former British Ambassador in Washington.
2. As my right hon Friend the Prime Minister told the hon Member in a written reply yesterday, Sir Nicholas acted in accordance with normal procedures in consulting officials about certain points reflecting material to which he had access during his time as Ambassador in Washington.
3. I therefore see no need to discuss the matter further.

BACKGROUND NOTE

- A 1. A copy of Sir N Henderson's article is attached, together  
B with the line to take in answer to press enquiries agreed last  
week between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry  
of Defence.
2. Mr Dalyell's interest is entirely predictable. Sir N  
Henderson's article provides a number of detailed glosses on  
events whose main outline was already well known. The account  
of events in Lima on 1-3 May 1982 accords with material prepared  
for contingency use by Ministers, but not previously deployed  
in full.
3. There is a passage on page 56 (sidelined) in which Sir N  
Henderson's information could be said to derive from intelligence  
sources. This can be countered by referring to Admiral  
Woodward's remarks in the preceding paragraph, making the point  
that a 'pincer movement' against the Task Force was expected.
4. The proposed reply takes into account the requirement for  
retired officials to consult the Permanent Under Secretary before  
publishing material deriving from knowledge or experience gained  
as a result of their official duties. It would not be normal  
practice to confirm or deny that 'authority' had been given for  
such publication: if appropriate, the expression that there  
had been 'no official objection to publication' could be used,  
although it does not (yet) appear to be necessary in the present  
instance.

Falkland Islands Department  
15 November 1983

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Carry

"input about post - line by line"



*With the compliments of*

SIR ANTONY ACLAND

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, SW1

8/11, 1983 .



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Sir Antony Acland KCMG KCVO  
Permanent Under-Secretary of State

17 November 1983

General Sir John Stanier GCB, MBE, ADC GEN  
Chief of the General Staff  
Ministry of Defence

Dear John,

Thank you for sending me a copy *\*~~~~~\**  
*\*~~~~~\** about the possibility of  
The Duke of Kent visiting the 2nd Battalion The Royal  
Regiment of Fusiliers on the Falkland Islands. This  
arrived at about the same time as the revival of an  
earlier proposal originating, I believe, with the Chief  
of the Defence Staff, that Princess Anne visit the Royal  
Signals on the Islands.

When we discussed this last month I said that  
Sir Geoffrey Howe and I thought it impossible to say so  
far ahead whether such a visit would be wise, and that  
much would depend on the outcome of the Argentine  
elections. The results are now known, but we think we  
must wait for the new government's intentions to become  
clearer. This is unlikely to be until well into the New  
Year.

Additionally, with plans already in hand for a  
number of high level visits over the next few months,  
there is a need to guard against overloading the very  
limited resources which exist in the Islands. An excess  
of VIP visitors could cut across our aim of helping the  
Islanders return to their normal pattern of life.

*\*~~~~~\**  
*\*~~~~~\** I suggest that  
we should look at the proposal again towards the end of  
February.

*\*~\* Passages deleted and  
closed, 40 years, under  
FOI Exemptions.*

*Yours etc*  
*Antony Acland*  
Antony Acland

*Wayland, 17 January 2013*

cc: Field Marshal Sir Edwin Bramall GCB, OBE, MC, MOD  
The Rt Hon Sir Philip Moore, GCMG KCB CMG, Buckingham Palace  
Sir Clive Whitmore KCB CVO, MOD  
F E R Butler Esq, 10 Downing Street ✓



IMMEDIATE

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PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

SIR J BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
~~MR SIRC TICKELL~~  
MR UZZ

MR CARTLEDGE

ED/PUSD (2)

ED/SAMD

ED/FID

~~ED/PLANNING STAFF~~

ED/NEWS DEPT

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ED/PLANNING STAFF

Mr Kirk and Kirk

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
MISS M E CUND )  
MR LITTLE )

TREASURY

SIR B ARMSTRONG )  
MR A D S GOODALL )  
DIO )

CABINET OF

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

~~MR A RITCHENER DEPT (VICTORIA)~~

MR A FORTNAM IAT/ D. TRANSPORT

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1363 OF 16 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON (FOR LADY YOUNG'S PARTY)

MIPT : FALKLANDS DEBATE

1. FOLLOWING IS DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VOTING ON THIS YEAR'S RESOLUTION:

IN FAVOUR:

AFGHANISTAN, ALBANIA, ALGERIA, ANGOLA, ARGENTINA, AUSTRIA, BENIN, BOLIVIA, BOTSWANA, BRAZIL, BULGARIA, BURUNDI, BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, CAPE VERDE, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, CHILE, CHINA, COLOMBIA, COMOROS, CONGO, COSTA RICA, CUBA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA, DEMOCRATIC YEMEN, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, EGYPT, EL SALVADOR, EQUATORIAL GUINEA, ETHIOPIA, GABON, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, GHANA, GUATEMALA, GUINEA, GUINEA-BISSAU, GUYANA, HAITI, HONDURAS, HUNGARY, INDIA, INDONESIA, IRAN, IRAQ, IVORY COAST, JAPAN, LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA, MADAGASCAR, MALAYSIA, MALI, MALTA, MAURITANIA, MEXICO, MONGOLIA, MOROCCO, NICARAGUA, NIGERIA, PAKISTAN, PANAMA, PAPUA NEW GUINEA, PARAGUAY, PERU, PHILIPPINES.

MAURITANIA, MEXICO, MONGOLIA, MOROCCO, NICARAGUA, NIGERIA, PAKISTAN, PANAMA, PAPUA NEW GUINEA, PARAGUAY, PERU, PHILIPPINES, POLAND, ROMANIA, RWANDA, SPAIN, SURINAME, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, TOGO, TUNISIA, UGANDA, UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, UNITED REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON, UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UPPER-VOLTA, URUGUAY, VENEZUELA, VIET NAM, YEMEN, YUGOSLAVIA, ZAMBIA, ZIMBABWE.

AGAINST:

BELIZE, DOMINICA, GAMBIA, MALAWI, NEW ZEALAND, OMAN, SOLOMON ISLANDS, SRI LANKA, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND.

ABSTAINING:

AUSTRALIA, BAHAMAS, BAHRAIN, BANGLADESH, BARBADOS, BELGIUM, BHUTAN, BURMA, CANADA, CHAD, DENMARK, FIJI, FINLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF, GREECE, ICELAND, JAMAICA, JORDAN, KENYA, KUWAIT, IRELAND, ISRAEL, ITALY, LEBANON, LESOTHO, LIBERIA, LUXEMBOURG, MALDIVES, MAURITIUS, NEPAL, NETHERLANDS, NIGER, NORWAY, PORTUGAL, QATAR, ST CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS, SAINT LUCIA, SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES, SAMOA, SAUDI ARABIA, SENEGAL, SIERRA LEONE, SINGAPORE, SOMALIA, SUDAN, SWAZILAND, SWEDEN, THAILAND, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, TURKEY, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, VANUATU, ZAIRE.

ABSENT:

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA, CYPRUS, DJIBOUTI, GRENADA, MOZAMBIQUE, SAOTOME AND PRINCIPE, SEYCHELLES.

2. SEE MIFT.

THOMSON

NNNN

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (ADVANCES)

39 39

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

SIR I SINCLAIR

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

LOED N G LENNOX

MR EVANS

MR UEN

MR CARTLEDGE

ED/PUSD (2)

ED/SAUD

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ED/PLANNING STAFF

Mr Kirk and Kill

IMMEDIATE

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PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR

MISS M E GUND

MR LITTLE

TEASURY

SIR R ARMSTRONG

MR A D S GOODALL

DIO

CABINET

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

MR A TITCHENER DPT (VICTORIA)

MR A FORTNAM IAT/ D. TRANSPORT

PRESIDENT CLERK

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1364 OF 16 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON (FOR LADY YOUNG'S PARTY).

MIPT: FALKLANDS VOTING.

1. THE CHANGES IN VOTING FROM LAST YEAR WERE AS FOLLOWS:

FROM NO TO YES: PAPUA NEW GUINEA

FROM NO TO ABSTAIN: FIJI

FROM YES TO ABSTAIN: ISRAEL, GREECE, LIBERIA AND UAE

FROM ABSTAIN TO YES: CAMEROON, EGYPT, GUYANA, MAURITANIA.

2. IN ADDITION ANTIGUA/BARBUDA (WHICH VOTED AGAINST LAST YEAR), CYPRUS, GRENADA, MOZAMBIQUE AND SLO TOME/PRINCE

2. IN ADDITION ANTIGUA/BARBUDA (WHICH VOTED AGAINST LAST YEAR), CYPRUS, GRENADA, MOZAMBIQUE AND SAO TOME/PRINCIPE (WHICH VOTED IN FAVOUR) ABSENTED THEMSELVES AS WELL, FOR THE SECOND YEAR RUNNING, AS DJIBOUTI AND SEYCHELLES. WE KNOW THAT BOTH CYPRUS AND, PERHAPS MOST INTERESTINGLY OF ALL, MOZAMBIQUE ABSENTED THEMSELVES ON PURPOSE IN ORDER NOT TO BE COUNTED AGAINST US.

3. SEE MIFT.

THOMSON

NNNN

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PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE  
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AT

16 November, 1983

*DR*  
*16/11*

*Dear Peter,*

FALKLANDS : SIR NICHOLAS HENDERSON'S ARTICLE  
IN THE ECONOMIST

---

Mr Tam Dalyell telephoned me at lunch-time today to give notice of his intention to raise with the Leader of the House at Business Questions tomorrow afternoon, with reference to Sir Nicholas Henderson's article in The Economist of 12 November (pp 49-60), 'the use that may be made by former civil servants of diplomatic telegrams and intelligence reports'.

Mr Biffen would be very grateful if you could provide him, by midday tomorrow, with a line to take which he might use in reply to Mr Dalyell.

I am copying this letter to Tim Flesher (Number Ten), Richard Mottram (MOD) and to Richard Hatfield in Sir Robert Armstrong's Office.

*Yours ever,*

*David*

D C R HEYHOE  
Private Secretary

Peter Ricketts Esq.,  
Private Secretary  
to the Foreign Secretary



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone 01-2027622 218 6169

D/S of S/PS/10

15th November 1983

Dear Tim,

Mr. Flecker.

15.  
11

15/11

In your letter of 4th November addressed to Richard Mottram you asked for a note for the Prime Minister on the points she has raised about the unallocated funds of the South Atlantic Fund.

This is just to confirm that Ministers here are now discussing this whole subject between themselves and with the Fund's Trustees; and I hope to be able to let you have a note for the Prime Minister in the next few days.

Yours ever,

B P Neale

(B P NEALE)

Timothy Fleisher Esq

Argentina relations

Pt 35



MINISTRY OF OFFICE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY



By letter from

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE 84

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

14 November, 1983

Falklands

Thank you for your letter of 11 November.

As I told you on the telephone this morning, the Prime Minister has approved the enclosed message from Lady Young to the President of Peru.

A. J. COLES

P. F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

M

CONFIDENTIAL



Argentine: P.F. 25  
MR. COLES ✓ A.S.C. 1/11.

Mr. Butler

Pl. file until Lord  
Mayor returns to the  
matter FERB 15.11.

I spoke to the Lord Mayor of London today in the light of Brian Fall's letter of 10 November. He told me that Senor Spilsinger had been in regular contact with him and was to be an adviser to the Argentine Government with special responsibility for the Falklands. Senor Spilsinger will be ringing the Lord Mayor again tonight and had proposed meeting him in Paris next week.

I said that I had communicated to the FCO the message which the Lord Mayor had given me previously. We agreed that the Lord Mayor should not get himself into the position of being an intermediary, but we could give him a speaking note on the British Government's position. The Lord Mayor said that he would be grateful for this. He would telephone me on Monday to let me know what Senor Spilsinger said on the telephone this evening and then perhaps call round to be briefed. If he does so, I propose to give him a speaking note on the attached lines, which are drawn from Brian Fall's letter.

FERB

11 November 1983

SPEAKING NOTE FOR THE LORD MAYOR OF LONDON IN TALKING TO  
SENOR SPILSINGER

---

The Prime Minister said in the House of Commons on 1 November that we are always pleased when a country returns to democracy. She hoped that Argentina would now be prepared to consider better economic and commercial relations with Britain. As to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, the touchstone should be the wishes of the Islanders, who had made clear their view that they should remain British. The Prime Minister reiterated these themes in her interview published in the Daily Mail of 7 November in which she said:-

"If democracy means self-determination in your country, then you ought to recognise it extends to other countries too".

She added:

"I am willing to enter into talks. We want good commercial relations, diplomatic relations. We want normal relations. But I am not entering into talks about sovereignty.

The Foreign Secretary said at a Press Conference in Rome on 31 October that it was the Argentine invasion of 1982 which had caused the serious rupture in our relations: to get back from the consequences of this was bound to require the passage of a considerable amount of time, starting by trying to recreate the basic foundations of good relations between our two countries.

/Having quoted

Having quoted these remarks to Senor Spilsinger, the Lord Mayor may like to add the hope that the new rulers of Argentina will clearly understand both the sincerity of our willingness to restore normal bilateral relations, and the limitations on the range of subjects on which it is realistic to contemplate discussions.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

Apce message:

11 November, 198e

A.J.C. "u"

Dear John

Falklands

Yes Mr

Lima telegram number 295 and 296 (copies enclosed), recorded Lady Young's conversation on 4 November with President Belaunde of Peru, and her recommendation that she (Lady Young) should send a personal message to the Peruvian President, formally replying to the ideas he put to her for a solution of the Falklands question.

We see much merit in Lady Young's suggestion. President Belaunde's idea of dividing the Islands is, of course, wholly unacceptable. We need unequivocally to head him off any further pursuit of this or other proposals for long-term solutions; it remains premature to speculate about these.

At the same time, the Peruvian President is a highly respected personality, well placed to point out to the new Argentine Government the areas in which it is realistic to think of developing bilateral relations with us. We therefore believe that it is worth explaining our policy to him again through the proposed message from Lady Young, with a view to persuading him to speak appropriately to Dr Alfonsin at his inauguration on 10 December.

I enclose a draft telegram containing the text of a message. You will see that it also asks President Belaunde to disabuse Dr Alfonsin of the severely distorted view of our military dispositions in the Falklands which Alfonsin and his spokesmen have been expressing at the United Nations and elsewhere.

A message from Lady Young on the lines proposed would have greatest impact if delivered soon. I am therefore sending this letter before consulting the Foreign Secretary; I will show him a copy in parallel and let you know of any comments he may have. Mr Whitney agrees with the draft message.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

GRS 314  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LIMA 051815Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

DESKBY 070900Z NOV

TELNO 296 OF 5 NOVEMBER

AND TO INFO PRIORITY PORT STANLEY, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

FROM PS/LADY YOUNG

MIPT : LADY YOUNG'S VISIT TO PERU : MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BELAUNDE

1. ALTHOUGH LADY YOUNG DISCOURAGED BELAUNDE FROM PURSUING HIS IDEA OF A DIVISION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, HE SEEMS ALL TOO LIKELY TO REVERT TO IT. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES SHE BELIEVES IT ESSENTIAL THAT WE SHOULD FOLLOW UP WITH A FORMAL REPLY. THE IDEA WOULD BE TO SHOW HIM THAT WE HAD GIVEN SOME CONSIDERATION TO THE PROPOSAL WHILE FIRMLY DISCOURAGING BELAUNDE FROM TAKING IT FURTHER. LADY YOUNG CONSIDERS THAT THIS MIGHT BEST BE DONE BY MEANS OF A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM HER PITCHED IN THE CONTEXT OF HER VISIT. IF YOU AGREE, GRATEFUL IF A DRAFT COULD BE TELEGRAPHED TO US IN BELIZE WITH A VIEW TO THE FINAL VERSION BEING HANDED OVER IN LIMA NEXT WEEK.

2. LADY YOUNG FEELS WE SHOULD TAKE BELAUNDE'S REQUEST FOR A ROYAL VISIT SERIOUSLY AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF IT COULD BE FED INTO THE NEXT MEETING OF THE ROYAL VISITS COMMITTEE. I UNDERSTAND FROM SINDALL THAT THE DEPARTMENT HAVE REINSTATED A POSSIBLE VISIT TO PERU BY PRINCESS ALEXANDRA IN THE ROYAL VISITS SCHEDULE.

SHAKESPEARE

LIMITED

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PLANNING STAFF

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR URE  
CABINET OFFICE

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No. 10 DOWNING STREET

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM LIMA 051800Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 295 OF 5 NOVEMBER

DESKBY FCO 070900Z NOV

INFO PRIORITY PORT STANLEY, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

FROM PS/LADY YOUNG

LADY YOUNG'S VISIT TO PERU : MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BELAUNDE

1. LADY YOUNG CALLED ON PRESIDENT BELAUNDE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON (4 NOVEMBER). THE ATMOSPHERE WAS CORDIAL. THE MEETING RAN CONSIDERABLY OVER TIME AND INCLUDED AN UNSCHEDULED TETE A TETE LASTING TWENTY MINUTES (PARA 4 BELOW)

2. BELAUNDE WELCOMED LADY YOUNG'S VISIT AND MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WANTED TO SEE AN IMPROVEMENT IN ANGLO -PERUVIAN RELATIONS. HE SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT THE UK'S HISTORIC LINKS WITH PERU AND SAID THAT HE WOULD WELCOME A ROYAL VISIT, BY IMPLICATION BEFORE THE END OF HIS TERM OF OFFICE IN 18 MONTHS TIME. LADY YOUNG CONGRATULATED HIM ON PERU'S ELECTION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND HOPED

THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH OVER ISSUES WHICH AROSE AT THE UN.

3. NOT SURPRISINGLY THE FALKLANDS PROVED THE MAIN SUBSTANTIVE POINT OF DISCUSSION. BELAUNDE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE SITUATION IN ARGENTINA WOULD IMPROVE AFTER ALFONSIN ASSUMED POWER. IT MIGHT THEREAFTER BE POSSIBLE TO FIND A WAY FORWARD OVER THE FALKLANDS, ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD TAKE SOME TIME. PERU WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO HELP IF SHE COULD. LADY YOUNG REPLIED THAT WE WOULD WELCOME BETTER BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE COULD NOT CONTEMPLATE NEGOTIATIONS OVER SOVEREIGNTY WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS.

4. AFTER OFFICIALS HAD LEFT THE MEETING, BELAUNDE TOLD LADY YOUNG THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE NEW ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO GIVE UP THE IDEA OF REGAINING SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLANDS. THERE WERE SOME GROUPS IN ARGENTINA WHO, NOT WITHSTANDING

THE EVENTS OF LAST YEAR, WANTED TO SETTLE THE MATTER BY FORCE. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HE WONDERED WHETHER IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO REACH A SOLUTION BY DIVIDING THE ISLANDS WITH ARGENTINA GAINING SOVEREIGNTY OVER WEST FALKLANDS AND EAST FALKLAND REMAINING BRITISH. LADY YOUNG TOOK NOTE BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT ANYTHING ON THESE LINES WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO CONTEMPLATE. SHE REPEATED THAT DISCUSSIONS ON SOVEREIGNTY WERE OUT OF THE QUESTION WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE ISLANDERS; AND THE STRENGTH OF PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY FEELING ON THIS POINT IN THE UK ON THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED. THE BEST WAY FORWARD AT THIS STAGE WAS THROUGH IMPROVED BILATERAL RELATIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

/WITH

# CONFIDENTIAL

WITH ARGENTINA: DISCUSSION OF THE FALKLANDS PROBLEM SHOULD BE PUT TO ONE SIDE FOR THE MOMENT. BELAUNDE SAID THAT HE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE INVITED TO ALFONSIN'S INAUGURATION AND UNDERTOOK TO MAKE LADY YOUNG'S POINT TO HIM. BUT HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE FELT THAT NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS WOULD HAVE TO COME EVENTUALLY AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE EXPECTED SOME MOVEMENT AFTER THE NEW ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT ASSUMED OFFICE.

FCO PLEASE PASS ALL.

SHAKESPEARE.

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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PLANNING STAFF  
PS  
PS | LADY YOUNG  
PS | MR WHITNEY  
PS | PUS  
SIRT BULLARD  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR URE  
CABINET OFFICE

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OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	Precedence/Deskby <b>IMMEDIATE</b>
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1	ZCZC
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6	FM FCO            NOVEMBER 83
7	TO IMMEDIATE
8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
9	INFO IMMEDIATE LIMA, PRIORITY PORT STANLEY, UKMIS NEW YORK,
10	WASHINGTON
11	For PS/Lady Young
12	LADY YOUNG'S VISIT TO PERU: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BELAUNDE:
13	LIMA TELNOS 295 AND 296 (NOT TO BELMOPAN)
14	1. Ministers here agree with Lady Young's suggestion that we
15	should make a formal reply to Belaunde's ideas. It has been
16	encouraging meanwhile to note Schwalb's undertaking to use
17	a suitable opportunity to convey to the Argentines our view that
18	normalisation of bilateral relations is the only realistic way
19	ahead.
20	2. We suggest a message in the following terms, opening and
21	closing with complimentary remarks about Lady Young's visit to
22	Peru.
23	BEGINS:
24	When we met on 4 November, I was very interested <sup>in</sup> what
25	you said about possible developments in Argentina after the

///  
//  
/

NNNN ends telegram		BLANK		Catchword transfer	
File number		Dept Private Office		Distribution	
Drafted by (Block capitals) PETER RICKETTS				Ltd FID SAmD UND	
Telephone number				Mr Wright Mr Ure	
Authorised for despatch				News Dept Info Dept Planning Staff PS PS/Lady Young PS/Mr Whitncy PS/PUS	
Comcen reference		Time of despatch		Sir J Bullard Mr Giffard	



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	<b>IMMEDIATE</b>	Page 2
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1 <<<<  
 2 transfer of power to a government led by Dr Alfonsin, and to  
 3 hear your personal views on possible ways forward to resolve  
 4 the dispute between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland  
 5 Islands. I have put the points you made to my colleagues  
 6 in London, including the Prime Minister, and they have reflected  
 7 carefully on them.  
 8 Since we met, the Prime Minister has made a number of comments  
 9 which are most relevant to our discussion. She reiterated the  
 10 British Government's welcome to the election of a democratic  
 11 government in Argentina. She expressed the hope that if  
 12 democracy means self-determination in Argentina, the Argentines  
 13 ought to recognise that it extends to other countries too.  
 14 In an interview published on 7 November she said, 'I am willing  
 15 to enter into talks. We want good commercial relations,  
 16 diplomatic relations. We want normal relations. But I am not  
 17 entering into talks about sovereignty'. You will remember that  
 18 I emphasised to you on 4 November the view that the best way  
 19 forward at this stage is through improved bilateral relations  
 20 with Argentina, with discussion of the Falklands problem being  
 21 put to one side. I very much hope that you will agree that  
 22 this is indeed the only feasible means of starting the work of  
 23 recreating confidence between Argentina and ourselves.  
 24 I was very pleased when, during my conversation with your  
 25 Foreign Minister on 7 November he undertook, if an opportunity  
 26 presented itself, to convey to the new Argentine Government  
 27 our view that the most profitable way ahead is through a gradual  
 28 normalisation of relations.  
 29 It would be helpful if you, Mr President, when you attend  
 30 Dr Alfonsin's inauguration as President of Argentina, could  
 31 convey to him your belief that we are sincere in what we say  
 32 about the restoration of bilateral relations. The basis of  
 33 these was destroyed by Argentina's invasion of the Falkland  
 34 Islands. The new Argentine Government was not of course

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE	Page 3
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1 <<<<  
 2 responsible for this, but must take account of its consequences  
 3 and join us in seeking to re-build the foundations of our  
 4 relationship. We have taken various initiatives to this end,  
 5 and we would like to see the new Argentine Government show more  
 6 willingness than their predecessors to respond to them. I  
 7 have no doubt that advice in this sense from a statesman of  
 8 your international standing would carry much weight in Buenos  
 9 Aires.

10 I was pleased that you felt able to share with me your personal  
 11 reflections about possible solutions to the Falklands problem.  
 12 But Mrs Thatcher has said in Parliament that it is premature to  
 13 speculate about specific policies for the long-term future.  
 14 Wounds must be given time to heal. I firmly believe that the  
 15 realistic way ahead is to concentrate on re-creating the  
 16 essential elements in our bilateral relations with Argentina,  
 17 in the way I have explained above. If you find that the new  
 18 Argentine Government genuinely regard our military dispositions  
 19 in the Islands as a strategic base with a wider purpose than  
 20 that of defending the Islands - Radical spokesmen have been  
 21 making much of this point - I should be very grateful if you  
 22 could also take the opportunity to tell Dr Alfonsin that these  
 23 allegations misrepresent our policy. We have a commitment to  
 24 deter further aggression: our military deployments in the Islands  
 25 are for that purpose, and that alone. The new airfield has a  
 26 military role which we hope will fall away. It also has a  
 27 very important civilian role - its construction meets Lord  
 28 Shackleton's recommendations for improved air communications,  
 29 which are vital to the development of the Islands' economy.  
 30 ENDS

/// 31 3. Ministers here are content with this text. Subject to Lady  
 // 32 Young's views on it, we envisage HM Ambassador in Lima transmitt-  
 / 33 ing it to President Belaunde in the week beginning 14 November,  
 34 as proposed.

*Amud mt.*

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword HOWE
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats  
CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

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telegram

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Catchword



File No  
a Lord Chancellor  
Miss Dyer

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

11 November 1983

SOUTH ATLANTIC SURRENDER DOCUMENTS

Thank you for your letter of 8 November to John Coles.

The Prime Minister is content with your Secretary of State's proposals for displaying the Falkland Islands Surrender Documents. She also agrees that they should pass to the Public Record Office after a two-year loan period.

I am copying this letter to Richard Stoate (Lord Chancellor's Office).

DAVID BARCLAY

Nick Evans, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 November, 1983

Mr. Butler.

A. J. C. "u".

Dear John,

Robin Butler wrote on 3 November to Brian Fall about the Lord Mayor of London's offer to pass on a message from HMG to his Argentine business partner Sr Alfredo Spilsinger, who had told the Lord Mayor that he expected to be appointed Argentina's Foreign Minister under Sr Alfonsin's Presidency.

We had not seen any other indication that Sr Spilsinger was a candidate for the Argentine Foreign Ministry: today's press confirms that Sr Dante Caputo has now been appointed. But we could use this contact as one further opportunity to dampen any exaggerated expectations that we might now be more prepared to enter into negotiations about sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.

We do not believe that this should be done by means of a formal message. We must avoid giving the impression that we are anxious to enter in to a political dialogue through this channel and we hope the Lord Mayor will be careful to explain that he is not acting as an intermediary in this sense. We would much prefer him to re-state HMG's views following the Argentine elections in terms Ministers have already used, making it clear to Sr Spilsinger that this was all he could expect.

We therefore suggest that the Lord Mayor might reply along the following lines. The Prime Minister said in the House of Commons on 1 November that we are always pleased when a country returns to democracy. She hoped that Argentina would now be prepared to consider better economic and commercial relations with Britain. As to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, the touchstone should be the wishes of the Islanders, who had made clear their view that they should remain British. The Prime Minister reiterated these themes in her interview published in the Daily Mail of 7 November in which she said:-

'If democracy means self-determination in your country, then you ought to recognise it extends to other countries too'.

She added:

'I am willing to enter into talks. We want good commercial relations, diplomatic relations. We want

/normal



normal relations. But I am not entering into talks about sovereignty'.

The Foreign Secretary said at a Press Conference in Rome on 31 October that it was the Argentine invasion of 1982 which had caused the serious rupture in our relations: to get back from the consequences of this was bound to require the passage of a considerable amount of time, starting by trying to recreate the basic foundations of good relations between our two countries.

Having quoted these remarks to Sr Spilsinger, the Lord Mayor may like to add the hope that the new rulers of Argentina will clearly understand both the sincerity of our willingness to restore normal bilateral relations, and the limitations on the range of subjects on which it is realistic to contemplate discussions.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

Argentina  
Pelestrens  
PT 35



NO 10  
NOV 1993

Prime Minister

Ref. A083/3209

PRIME MINISTER

mt

- I have just received a call from Monsieur Attali in Paris.
2. Making it clear that he was speaking on the President's instructions he said that France would abstain in the vote on the Falklands resolution.
  3. He went on to add that the President was trying his best to achieve European unity on this position. He could not be absolutely sure of success, but he was hopeful.
  4. I expressed suitable appreciation and gratitude, and promised to pass the message straight on to you.
  5. You will have seen from the letter which I sent to Clive Whitmore yesterday (of which I sent John Coles a copy) that the Elysee appear to be making some link between this and SKYNET.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

10 November 1983

4.45 pm



CONFIDENTIAL

GR 560

CONFIDENTIAL

FM TOKYO 100900Z NOV

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 594 OF 10 NOV 83

AND TO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 417: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR ON TOUR KATO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE EUROPEAN AFFAIRS BUREAU IN THE MFA, SUMMONED WHITEHEAD THIS AFTERNOON. HIS MAIN MESSAGE WAS THAT THE ARGENTINE RESOLUTION THIS YEAR WAS IN SUBSTANCE IDENTICAL TO THE ONE ADOPTED LAST YEAR AND WAS COMPATIBLE WITH THE BASIC POSITION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT OVER THE FALKLANDS THAT

- A) ANY INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE MUST BE SOLVED PEACEFULLY THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS,
- B) THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE MUST BE STRICTLY ADHERED TO AND
- C) THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT WAS IN NO WAY ABLE TO TAKE A POSITION ON THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE.

AFTER CONSIDERATION AT THE HIGHEST (PRIME MINISTERIAL) LEVEL THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAD THEREFORE DECIDED TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION THIS YEAR.

2. KATO SOUGHT TO SOFTEN THE BLOW BY EMPHASISING THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAD URGED ARGENTINA TO REACH A VERY EARLY AGREEMENT WITH HMG OVER CIVIL AVIATION MATTERS AND "TO MAKE THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CLEARER AND MORE DEFINITE "AS WELL AS" MAKING CLEAR THE INTENTION OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO START NEGOTIATIONS WITH HMG WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS". KATO SAID THAT THE JAPANESE REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UN WOULD GIVE A BRIEF EXPLANATION OF THE JAPANESE VOTE GENERALLY ALONG THE FOREGOING LINES. THE JAPANESE EMBASSY IN LONDON WERE ALSO BEING INSTRUCTED TO SPEAK AS KATO HAD DONE HERE.

3. WHITEHEAD SAID THAT THE JAPANESE DECISION WAS BOUND TO BE RECEIVED WITH CONSIDERABLE REGRET. DESPITE JAPANESE EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO ADOPT A MORE REALISTIC STANCE THE PLAIN FACT WAS THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT FOR THE SECOND YEAR IN A ROW WOULD BE VOTING ON AN ISSUE OF VERY CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO THE UK IN A WAY WHICH WOULD LINE THEM UP WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND AGAINST HMG. THIS WOULD BE THE VIEW TAKEN BY BOTH THOSE GOVERNMENTS. MOREOVER THIS WAS BEING DONE AT A TIME WHEN NO SERIOUS MOVES HAD BEEN MADE BY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT IN RECENT MONTHS TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION, WHICH REMAINED ONE IN WHICH POINT-SCORING SEEMED TO BE MORE IMPORTANT THEN PRACTICAL MEASURES DESIGNED TO DEFUSE THE ISSUE. WHITEHEAD NOTED KATO'S HOPE THAT DIFFERENCES OVER THIS MATTER WOULD NOT LEAD TO A COOLING IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BRITAIN AND JAPAN:

CONFIDENTIAL

/ BUT

# CONFIDENTIAL

BUT SPEAKING PERSONALLY HE REGRETTED A MOVE WHICH WAS BOUND TO BE SEEN AS INIMICABLE TO BRITISH INTERESTS AT A TIME WHEN THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BRITAIN AND JAPAN NEEDED ALL THE REINFORCEMENT THAT IT COULD GET. ALTHOUGH NO DIRECT PARALLEL COULD BE DRAWN WE HAD ALSO NOTED THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAD FOUND IT POSSIBLE TO ABSTAIN ON THE GRENADA PROBLEM. IN RESPONSE KATO DENIED THAT THERE WAS ANY ELEMENT OF POLITICAL CYNICISM IN THE JAPANESE VOTING PATTERN OVER THESE TWO ISSUES. HE UNDERTOOK TO REPORT OUR VIEWS TO HIS SUPERIOURS

CORTAZZI

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FAKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

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UND  
FID  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FAKLAND ISLANDS

2  
CONFIDENTIAL

*Original on Grenada but situation Pt. 2*

GRS 160  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FM WASHINGTON 102305Z NOV 83  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3395 OF 10 NOVEMBER

*Read in file*

**WEINBERGER ON ARGENTINA AND GRENADA**

1. WEINBERGER WAS ASKED THIS MORNING BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BRITISH PRESS ABOUT ARMS SUPPLIES TO ARGENTINA. WEINBERGER INDICATED THAT CERTIFICATION WOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, BUT THAT THE U.S. WOULD EXERCISE CAUTION ABOUT THE RESUMPTION OF MAJOR NEW SUPPLIES. WEINBERGER SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW IN THE FALKLANDS WAR QUOTE THE BRITISH WERE TOTALLY AND COMPLETELY CORRECT AND WE HAD A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF AID WHICH WE WERE ABLE TO GIVE VERY GLADLY TO BRITAIN IN THAT CONFLICT. WE WOULD CERTAINLY NOT WANT TO SEE THAT SITUATION DUPLICATED BY A FURTHER ATTEMPT BY ARGENTINA TO INVAD E AND TRY TO TAKE-OVER THE ISLANDS UNQUOTE.
2. ON GRENADA, WEINBERGER CATEGORICALLY DENIED ALLEGATIONS OF THE BBC OVERSEAS SERVICE THAT US CASUALTY FIGURES WERE SUBSTANTIALLY HIGHER THAN HAVE BEEN ANNOUNCED: AND PLAYED DOWN US/BRITISH DIFFERENCES OVER GRENADA.

WRIGHT

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

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FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

FCO  
FID  
WIAO  
NAD  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

MR. COLES

Falklands at the UN

The following are expected to abstain on the Argentine Resolution as currently worded:

Denmark  
Antigua ? Vote Against  
United Arab Emirates  
Australia  
Bahrain  
Finland  
Ireland  
Fiji  
Singapore  
Bahamas  
Vanuatu ? Vote Against  
Saudi Arabia  
Portugal  
Cameroon  
Lesotho  
Iceland  
Norway  
Jordan  
Trinidad and Tobago  
Mauritius  
Sierra Leone  
Swaziland  
Netherlands  
Belgium  
Thailand  
Somalia  
Canada  
St. Lucia.

*Liberia*

/The following

The following are expected to vote against:

Solomon Islands

Sri Lanka

New Zealand.

The Netherlands have taken no decision. For Egypt see  
UKMIS Telno. 1281 below.

DAVID BARCLAY

9 November, 1983

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (ADVANCES)

39 38

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MR EVANS  
MR URE  
MR CARTLEDGE

ED/PUSD (2)  
ED/SAMD  
ED/FID

~~ED/NEWS DEPT~~  
ED/ED  
ED/ECG(E)  
ED/UND  
ED/PLANNING STAFF

MR KIRK UND

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST. (3)

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF. MOD.

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
MISS M E CUND ) TREASURY  
MR LITTLER. )

SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
MR A D S GOODALL ) CABINET OF  
DIO )

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

~~MR A TITCHENER DEPT (Victoria)~~

MR A FORTNAM IAT/ D. TRANSPORT

RESIDENT CHECK

ADVANCE COPY

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 092125Z NOV 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1231 OF 8 NOVEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO

IMMEDIATE

FALKLANDS LOBBYING: CAIRO

1. THE EGYPTIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE HAS NOW CONFESSED TO ME THAT HE HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO CHANGE HIS VOTE TO SUPPORT THE ARGENTINE RESOLUTION ON THE FALKLANDS. KHALIL IS UNHAPPY ABOUT THIS BUT BELIEVES IT TO BE THE RESPONSE TO STRONG ARGENTINE LOBBYING IN CAIRO. SO FAR HE IS KEEPING HIS INSTRUCTIONS CLOSE TO HIS CHEST AND DOES NOT AIM TO TRY TO INFLUENCE OTHERS TO GO THE SAME WAY.

2. WE IMPRESSED ON KHALIL ONCE AGAIN THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED TO THIS VOTE AND HOW BAD IT WOULD LOOK IF, AS SEEMED LIKELY, EGYPT WOULD BE THE ONLY COUNTRY, OR ONE OF THE VERY FEW COUNTRIES, TO MOVE AWAY FROM US ON THE VOTE. HE SAID THERE MIGHT JUST BE A CHANCE OF APPEALING TO HIS FOREIGN MINISTER THROUGH A PERSONAL MESSAGE, IF WE ACTED QUICKLY, BEFORE HE LEFT ON A TRIP ABROAD. HE GAVE A BROAD HINT THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE EGYPTIAN DELEGATION TO BE INSTRUCTED TO ABSENT THEMSELVES FROM THE VOTE. THEY COULD PERHAPS DEFEND THIS WITH THE ARGENTINES AS A MINOR MOVE IN THEIR DIRECTION WITHOUT DAMAGING RELATIONS WITH THE UK. I RECOMMEND THAT IF THE EGYPTIANS CANNOT BE BROUGHT BACK TO AN ABSTENTION WE SHOULD SUGGEST THAT THEY SHOULD ABSENT THEMSELVES, BUT WITHOUT REFERRING TO KHALIL'S HINT.

THOMSON

NNNN

020  
A J Coles Esq



# CABINET OFFICE

With the compliments of  
Sir Robert Armstrong GCB CVO  
*Secretary of the Cabinet  
and Head of the  
Home Civil Service*

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS

Telephone 01-233 8319

SECRET and PERSONAL



Prime Minister  
A.S.C. 9/11

70 WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AS

01-233 8319

*From the Secretary of the Cabinet and Head of the Home Civil Service*

Sir Robert Armstrong GCB CVO

Ref.A083/3184

9 November 1983

*My dear Aine,*

*ms*

As I told you on the telephone this afternoon, I received a call yesterday evening from Monsieur Attali, the Special Adviser to the President of the French Republic.

During the course of this call Monsieur Attali told me, and asked me to convey to the Prime Minister, that the President attached the highest importance to our forthcoming decision about SKYNET. This was said with a good deal of emphasis, in the course of a conversation in which Monsieur Attali was giving welcome news on two other fronts (that, despite the pressures on France to vote for the Falklands resolution in the United Nations General Assembly, the French Ambassador to the United Nations would be instructed to abstain; and (more trivially) that the President had withdrawn his objections to the dates which we were proposing for the Economic Summit 1984).

The decision on the Falklands resolution is obviously of considerable importance and significance to us; it would be very damaging if France were to vote for the resolution. So I think that, in the context of this telephone conversation, we have to take seriously the considerable stress which Attali laid upon the importance which the President attaches to SKYNET.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence.

*Yours ever*  
*Robert*

Sir Clive Whitmore KCB CVO

SECRET and PERSONAL



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CONFIDENTIAL

30331 - 1

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MLK  
J--

ZZ PARIS  
GRS 564  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM F C O 081500Z NOV 83  
TO FLASH PARIS  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 564 OF 8 NOVEMBER.

UNP 04018		
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY		
- 9 NOV 1983		
DESK OFFICER		REC'D
DEB	PA	Action Taken
		SR 9/11

574 - MY TELNO 323 TO ROME:

FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND.

BEGINS: WHEN YOU WERE HERE ON 20/21 OCTOBER WE HAD A WORD ABOUT THE DEBATE ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. YOU WERE GOOD ENOUGH THEN TO GIVE ME AN ASSURANCE THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT VOTE FOR THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AS CURRENTLY CIRCULATED BY ARGENTINA. SINCE THEN I HAVE OF COURSE RECEIVED THE MESSAGE WHICH YOU CONVEYED TO ME AT THE WEEKEND. I WAS MOST GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR GETTING IN TOUCH WITH ME AGAIN ON THIS MATTER, AND FOR YOUR WISH TO KNOW MY PERSONAL ATTITUDE ON THE POSSIBILITY OF CHANGES IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE VOTING INTENTIONS OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES. WHAT SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG SAID THE MONSIEUR ATTALI, SPEAKING ON MY INSTRUCTIONS AFTER HE HAD TRANSMITTED YOUR MESSAGE TO ME, WILL HAVE BEEN REPORTED TO YOU. NONETHELESS, WITH THE VOTE DUE ON 10 NOVEMBER, I THOUGHT THAT I SHOULD SEND YOU THIS MESSAGE, TO UNDERLINE THE GREAT IMPORTANCE TO US OF THE POSITION TO BE ADOPTED BY FRANCE, WHOSE SUPPORT AT THE OUTSET OF AND THROUGHOUT THE CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC I REMEMBER WITH DEEP GRATITUDE.

OUR ATTITUDE TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IS NOT AFFECTED BY SMALL DETAILS: ITS FUNDAMENTAL UNACCEPTABILITY TO US WOULD NOT BE DIMINISHED BY DRAFTING CHANGES SUCH AS (FOR EXAMPLE) THE EXCISE OF THE REFERENCE TO 'A COLONIAL SITUATION'. WHAT I AM CONCERNED ABOUT IS ARGENTINA'S EVIDENT DETERMINATION THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS CALLED FOR IN THE DRAFT SHOULD HAVE ONLY ONE POSSIBL

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30331 - 1

OUTCOME: THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS TO ARGENTIN  
REGARDLESS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION WHICH I KNOW  
FRANCE ALWAYS UPHOLDS AND WHICH APPLIES TO THE PEOPLE OF THE  
FALKLANDS AS MUCH AS TO ANYONE ELSE. FRANCE WILL SURELY  
UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS WE FACE.

WE ALL WELCOME THE SUCCESSFUL HOLDING OF ELECTIONS IN  
ARGENTINA ON 30 OCTOBER. WE IN THIS COUNTRY HAVE BEEN TRYING TO  
DEVELOP A MORE NORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ARGENTINA AND WILL BE  
HOPING FOR A BETTER RESPONSE FROM THE NEW GORNMENT THAN WE HAD  
FROM THE MILITARY. I CAN UNDERSTAND THE DESIRE OF EUROPEAN  
PARTNERS TO MAKE A GESTURE OF ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT TO THE  
EMERGING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN ARGENTINA. BUT THERE ARE MANY  
WAYS IN WHICH THIS COULD BE DONE. IT SHOULD NOT BE DONE IN THE  
CONTEXT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS OR AT THE EXPENSE OF THE UNITED  
KINGDOM.

A SWITCH TO A POSITIVE VOTE BY A COUNTRY AS IMPORTANT AS  
FRANCE WOULD SEND THE WRONG SIGNAL TO THE INCOMING GOVERNMENT.  
IT WOULD SUGGEST TO THEM THAT THEY SHOULD CONTINUE TO FOLLOW  
THE PRESENT STERILE COURSE AND THAT WE COULD EVENTUALLY BE  
BROUGHT TO NEGOTIATE THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY AGAINST THE  
WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS. THIS CAN ONLY SERVE TO MAINTAIN THE  
PRESENT TENSION. I NEED HARDLY TELL YOU WITH WHAT DISMAY A  
POSITIVE VOTE BY SO CLOSE A PARTNER AND ALLY AS FRANCE WOULD BE  
RECEIVED IN THIS COUNTRY. IT WOULD ALSO SEND THE WRONG SIGNAL  
TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS: WE SHOULD BE CONCERNED THAT, GIVEN SUCH A  
LEAD BY FRANCE, OTHERS NOW MINDED TO ABSTAIN WOULD BE EMBOLDENED  
TO FOLLOW FRANCE'S EXAMPLE. WE ARE NOT ASKING YOU TO VOTE WITH  
US AND DIRECTLY OPPOSITE TO ARGENTINA, BUT I DO ASK YOU MOST  
EARNESTLY NOT TO VOTE WITH ARGENTINA AND DIRECTLY OPPOSITE TO  
THE UNITED KINGDOM. ENDS

HOWE

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30272 - 1	
UNP 04018	
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY	
- 9 NOV 1983	
TEXT OFFICER	REGISTRY
PA	John Faxon
	SA 9/11

DD 081230Z ROME  
 GRS 417  
 CONFIDENTIAL  
 DESKBY 081230Z  
 FM FCO 081140Z NOV 83  
 TO IMMEDIATE ROME  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 324 OF 8 NOVEMBER

574

MIPT: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO CRAXI.  
 BEGINS:

WHEN YOU WERE HERE ON 16 SEPTEMBER WE HAD A WORD ABOUT THE DEBATE ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. SIR GEOFFREY HOWE AND SIGNOR ANDREOTTI HAVE DISCUSSED THE MATTER IN THE MEANWHILE, BUT WITH THE VOTE DUE ON 10 NOVEMBER, I THOUGHT I SHOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH YOU TO REMIND YOU PERSONALLY OF THE GREAT IMPORTANCE TO US OF THE POSITION TO BE ADOPTED BY ITALY.

SIGNOR ANDREOTTI HAS GIVEN US AN ASSURANCE THAT ITALY WOULD NOT VOTE FOR THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AS CURRENTLY CIRCULATED BY ARGENTINA. BUT I AM AWARE THAT CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING SOME SMALL CHANGES TO THE DRAFT.

I AM SURE YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT OUR ATTITUDE TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IS NOT AFFECTED BY SMALL DETAILS. WHAT I AM CONCERNED ABOUT IS ARGENTINA'S EVIDENT DETERMINATION THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS CALLED FOR IN THE DRAFT SHOULD HAVE ONLY ONE POSSIBLE OUTCOME: THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS TO ARGENTINA, REGARDLESS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION WHICH APPLIES TO THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLANDS AS MUCH AS TO ANYONE ELSE. WE ALL WELCOME THE SUCCESSFUL HOLDING OF ELECTIONS IN ARGENTINA ON 30 OCTOBER. WE IN THIS COUNTRY HAVE BEEN TRYING TO DEVELOP A MORE NORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ARGENTINA AND WILL BE HOPING FOR A BETTER RESPONSE FROM THE NEW GOVERNMENT THAN WE HAD FROM THE MILITARY. I CAN UNDERSTAND THE DESIRE OF EUROPEAN PARTNERS TO MAKE A GESTURE OF ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT TO THE EMERGING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN ARGENTINA. BUT THERE ARE MANY WAYS IN WHICH THIS COULD BE DONE. IT SHOULD NOT BE DONE IN THE

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30272 - 1

CONTEXT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS OR AT THE EXPENSE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.

A SWITCH TO A POSITIVE VOTE BY A COUNTRY AS IMPORTANT AS ITALY WOULD SEND THE WRONG SIGNAL TO THE INCOMING GOVERNMENT. IT WOULD SUGGEST TO THEM THAT THEY SHOULD CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THE PRESENT STERILE COURSE AND THAT WE COULD EVENTUALLY BE BROUGHT TO NEGOTIATE THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY AGAINST THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS. THIS CAN ONLY SERVE TO MAINTAIN THE PRESENT TENSION. I NEED HARDLY TELL YOU WITH WHAT DISMAY A POSITIVE VOTE BY SO CLOSE A PARTNER AND ALLY AS ITALY WOULD BE RECEIVED IN THIS COUNTRY. WE ARE NOT ASKING YOU TO VOTE WITH US AND DIRECTLY OPPOSITE TO ARGENTINA, BUT I DO ASK YOU MOST EARNESTLY NOT TO VOTE WITH ARGENTINA AND DIRECTLY OPPOSITE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM.  
ENDS.  
HOWE

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FID

CABINET OFFICE

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30409 - 1

OO BRIDGETOWN

OO KINGSTON

GRS 550

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FM F C O 081500Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 348 OF 8 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ST VINCENT, CASTRIES, ANTIGUA, KINGSTON,  
WASHINGTON

MIPT: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR MUNIZ OF  
ARGENTINA IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON GRENADA ON 26 OCTOBER  
1983:

BEGINS

MR PRESIDENT, I THANK YOU AND THE COUNCIL FOR HAVING  
RESPONDED TO OUR REQUEST TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DEBATE ON A  
SERIOUS QUESTION CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS A  
WHOLE AND MORE SPECIFICALLY OUR OWN REGION.

THE COUNCIL HAS BEEN CONVENED IN AN EMERGENCY MEETING TO  
ANALYSE THE SITUATION CREATED BY THE INVASION OF GRENADA BY A  
MILITARY FORCE MADE UP OF TROOPS OF THE UNITED STATES AND SOME  
CARIBBEAN STATES. IT IS CLEAR THAT THIS ACT CONSTITUTES A  
VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER,  
WHICH FORBID THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND  
INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER STATES.

THE INVASION OF GRENADA REPRESENTS AGGRESSION AGAINST A  
MEMBER STATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THIS ACT, WHICH IS GRAVE IN  
ITSELF, IS EVEN MORE DANGEROUS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EXISTING  
TENSION IN THE REGION. THE POLICY OF CONFRONTATION AND  
INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF SOVEREIGN COUNTRIES OF  
OUR CONTINENT IS REACHING ALARMING PROPORTIONS, AND WE SHOULD  
LIKE TO EXPRESS OUR PROFOUND CONCERN AT THIS FACT.

ARGENTINA DEPLORES THE TRAGIC INTERNAL EVENTS THAT HAVE  
RECENTLY TAKEN PLACE IN GRENADA AND THE INVASION OF THAT COUNTRY,  
AND WE SUPPORT RESTORATION OF THAT COUNTRY'S FULL SOVEREIGNTY AS  
WELL AS WITHDRAWAL OF THE INVADING FORCES.

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I WOULD RECALL THAT THROUGHOUT ITS HISTORY MY COUNTRY HAS ALWAYS SUPPORTED AND DEFENDED MOST STRONGLY THE PRINCIPLES THAT PRESERVE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IN STATING THESE VIEWS I AM MERELY REITERATING THE DOCTRINE SUPPORTED BY SOME OF THE MOST OUTSTANDING ARGENTINE STATESMEN, SUCH AS COMO CALVO, ROQUE SAENZ PENA, HONORIO PUEYRREDON AND CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS, WHO POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES CONSISTS IN ABSOLUTE RIGHT, FULL INTEGRITY AUTONOMY AND COMPLETE EXTERNAL INDEPENDENCE.

INTERNATIONAL COEXISTENCE AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY ARE BASED ON RESPECT FOR THE DIFFERENT POSITIONS OF STATES, WITHOUT WHICH WE SHOULD BE LED INTO CHAOS AND IRREVERSIBLE CONFRONTATION.

THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION IS EXPLICITLY ENSHRINED IN ARTICLE 2 (7) OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. MOREOVER IT IS MOST FIRMLY SUPPORTED BY THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND HAS BEEN REITERATED IN THE DECLARATION ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF INTERVENTION AND INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF STATES, IN THE DRAFTING OF WHICH MY DELEGATION TOOK AN ACTIVE PART. NO ONE MUST ATTEMPT TO CHANGE BY FORCE THE SITUATION OF A SOVEREIGN STATE BY OCCUPYING ITS TERRITORY MILITARILY.

GUYANA AND NICARAGUA, COUNTRIES OF OUR REGION AND MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL HAVE PRESENTED THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN DOCUMENT S/16077. MY GOVERNMENT, WHICH HOPES THAT THE COUNCIL WILL RESPOND APPROPRIATELY TO THE EVENTS IN GRENADA, BELIEVES THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION CONTAINS THE NECESSARY AND BASIC ELEMENTS FOR A SPEEDY AND SATISFACTORY SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN GRENADA AND THEREFORE FIRMLY SUPPORTS IT.

ENDS

HOWE

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(1)



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Sorry to trouble you  
with this again.

Are you content with  
Mr Heseltine's proposal?

Dubs

10/11



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
 Telephone 01-~~9207022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 5/21

8th November 1983

Dear John,

Prime Minister

Agree?  
 Yes no DMS  
 8/11

SOUTH ATLANTIC SURRENDER DOCUMENTS

You will remember press reports of a couple of months ago that the Falkland Islands surrender documents had been lost and then found. We now have in our possession the original documents for the surrender of the Falkland Islands themselves, South Georgia and Southern Thule. The only document still missing is the second of the two original instruments of surrender for the Falkland Islands, and we are continuing the search for it.

Mr Heseltine thinks that all the documents should now be put on public display and he believes that the most appropriate place to do this is the Imperial War Museum. We have been in touch with the Museum and they would very much like to have the documents for this purpose. We, the Museum and the Public Record Office have agreed that the Museum should keep the documents on loan for a period of two years and that after that they should pass into the keeping of the Public Record Office. Mr Heseltine would be glad to know that the Prime Minister is content that we should proceed on this basis.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Stoate. Mr Heseltine would also like to be sure that the Lord Chancellor is content with what he is proposing.

For ear  
 Michigam

(N H R EVANS)

A J Coles Esq



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-838 7073

8861 NOV 8 -



Ref.A083/3169

MR COLES

The Prime Minister has  
now sent a message to  
President Mitterand.

A.S.C. - 9/11

I should record my transactions with Monsieur Attali, the Special Adviser of and the Personal Representative of the President of the French Republic, last weekend about the French attitude to the Falklands resolution in the United Nations General Assembly.

2. On the evening of 5 November, shortly after his arrival, Monsieur Attali said that the President had been thinking of ringing up the Prime Minister but had decided to co-convey his message through Monsieur Attali and me as Monsieur Attali was coming to London. It related to the Falklands resolution. The President was aware of the importance of this for the Prime Minister and her Government, and was anxious to try to avoid doing anything which would increase her difficulties. He was minded to instruct the French Ambassador to the United Nations to abstain from voting on the resolution, though he was under some pressure from some members of the Government to vote for the resolution. It was possible, however, that the Argentine Government might be persuaded to excise from the draft resolution the references at the beginning of it to "a colonial situation" in the Falklands. The President wondered whether, if the Argentine Government could be persuaded to delete that clause, the Prime Minister would be very angry if France voted for the resolution. Mr Attali repeated that the President wanted to consult the Prime Minister about this, and to try to avoid doing anything to make life more difficult for her. He said that the President's understanding was that most if not all of the Europeans would be voting for the resolution.
3. Having consulted the Prime Minister, I responded to Monsieur Attali the next morning on the following lines. The Prime Minister was grateful to the President for consulting her on the matter, and for his desire to be helpful. She



would never forget his early pledge of support when the Argentines first invaded the Falklands. Her position was that the draft resolution was fundamentally unacceptable, and that the sort of drafting change envisaged by the President would not make it less so. Her impression from her conversation with Mr Papandrecu on 4 November had been that most of the Europeans would abstain from the resolution. Her fear would be that, if the resolution was modified, a number of those at present minded to abstain would come under pressure which they would find it difficult to resist to vote for the resolution. We should prefer that as many as possible of our friends and allies abstain on the resolution, if they could not vote against it. If the French Government changed its position and voted for the resolution, that would undoubtedly be taken by many others as giving them a lead which they should follow. Remembering President Mitterrand's early support for the British position on the Falklands, the Prime Minister very much hoped that the French Government would not seek to modify the draft resolution and would abstain from voting upon it when it came to the vote at the General Assembly. She would be very upset if the French Government decided to vote for the resolution.


4. Monsieur Attali promised to report what I had said to the President immediately upon his return to Paris later that day.
5. I am sending a copy of this minute to Peter Ricketts at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

8 November 1983



8 NOV 1984



COMPTON

A J Coles Esq



CABINET OFFICE

With the compliments of  
Sir Robert Armstrong GCB CVO  
*Secretary of the Cabinet  
and Head of the  
Home Civil Service*

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS

Telephone 01-233 8319

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Note

Text of message approved - At JB's request passed this onto HO + asked him to despatch. ETA's PE of the told.

70 WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AS

01-233 8319

*From the Secretary of the Cabinet and Head of the Home Civil Service*

Sir Robert Armstrong GCB CVO

Ref. A083/3177

8 November 1983

Falklands at the General Assembly

I am writing separately to John Coles, with a copy to you, to record my transactions with Monsieur Attali over the weekend about the French position on the Falklands resolution. I am glad to be given a chance of commenting, in the light of those transactions, on the draft message to President Mitterrand enclosed with your letter of 7 November, which was not copied to us at the time.

Clearly the message to President Mitterrand should be modified to take account of my conversations with Monsieur Attali. I enclose a revised draft. The main change is to the introductory paragraph, but there are one or two minor changes down the line to reflect the points which the Prime Minister asked me to make to Monsieur Attali.

I am sending a copy of this letter and the revised draft to John Coles.

**ROBERT ARMSTRONG**

P F Ricketts Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. ....

Department .....

Drafted by  
(Block Capitals) .....

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OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification  
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) .....

(Security Class.) ..... (Caveat/  
Privacy marking) .....

(Codeword) ..... (Deskby) ..... Z

TO IMMEDIATE (precedence) PARIS (post) Tel. No. .... of .....

AND TO (precedence/post) .....

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) .....

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:-

[TEXT] My tel no to Rome: Falklands at the General Assembly

Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to President Mitterrand.

Begins:

When you were here on 20/21 October we had a word about the debate on the Falkland Islands at the United Nations General Assembly. You were good enough then to give me an assurance that France would not vote for the draft resolution as currently circulated by Argentina. Since then I have of course received the message which you conveyed to me at the weekend. I was most grateful to you for getting in touch with me again on this matter, and for your wish to know my personal attitude on the possibility of changes in the draft resolution and their implications for the voting intentions of our friends and allies. What Sir Robert Armstrong said to Monsieur Attali, speaking on my instructions after he

Copies to:-

- 8 NOV 1941

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had transmitted your message to me, will have been reported to you. Nonetheless, with the vote due on 10 November, I thought that I should send you this message, to underline the great importance to us of the position to be adopted by France, whose support at the outset of and throughout the conflict in the South Atlantic I remember with deep gratitude.

Our attitude to the draft resolution is not affected by small details; its fundamental unacceptability to us would not be diminished by drafting changes such as (for example) the excision of the reference to "a colonial situation". What I am concerned about is Argentina's evident determination that the negotiations called for in the draft should have only one possible outcome: the transfer of sovereignty over the Islands to Argentina, regardless of the principle of self-determination which I know France always upholds and which applies to the people of the Falklands as much as to anyone else. France will surely understand the problems we face.

We all welcome the successful holding of elections in Argentina on 30 October. We in this country have been trying to develop a more normal relationship with Argentina and will be hoping for a better response from the new Government than we had from the military. I can understand the desire of European partners to make a gesture of encouragement and support to the emerging democratic Government in Argentina. But there are many ways in which this could be done. It should not be done in the context of the Falkland Islands or at the expense of the United Kingdom.

A switch to a positive vote by a country as important as France would send the wrong signal to the incoming Government. It would suggest to them that they should continue to follow the present sterile course and that we could eventually be brought to negotiate the transfer of sovereignty

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

File No. ....

Department .....

Drafted by  
(Block Capitals) .....

Tel. Extn. ....

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification
Precedence
DESKBY .....Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched	(Date) ..... (Time) .....Z	POSTBY .....Z
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) .....

(Security Class.) ..... (Caveat/  
Privacy marking) .....

(Codeword) ..... (Deskby) ..... Z

TO ..... (precedence) (post) Tel. No. ....of .....

AND TO (precedence/post) .....

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) .....

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution: -

[TEXT]

against the wishes of the Islanders. This can only serve to maintain the present tension. I need hardly tell you with what dismay a positive vote by so close a partner and ally as France would be received in this country. It would also send the wrong signal to other Governments: we should be concerned that, given such a lead by France, others now minded to abstain would be emboldened to follow France's example. We are not asking you to vote with us and directly opposite to Argentina, but I do ask you most earnestly not to vote with Argentina and directly opposite to the United Kingdom.

Ends.

Copies to: -

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FIVE SH



bcc: Sir A. Parsons  
Sir A. Walker.

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

8 November, 1983

Private Visitors from Argentina

Thank you for your letter of 7 November about approaches from Dr. Arnaldo Musich and Dr. Hebling seeking appointments both with No. 10 staff and with FCO Ministers.

The Prime Minister agrees that no-one at No. 10 should see these Argentinians. She also agrees that they should be received in a routine way at the FCO.

A. J. COLES

P. F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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FCR 84



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

8 November, 1983

Arms for Argentina

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 7 November, concerning the reports of a campaign against the Jewish population in Argentina and the use that might be made of this to bring pressure on the US Government over certification of human rights in Argentina and the possible resumption of US arms sales.

A. J. COLES

P. F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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CONFIDENTIAL

FILE SH



Bf

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

8 November, 1983

Falklands at the General Assembly

Thank you for your letter of  
7 November.

Bf

The Prime Minister agrees that the  
proposed messages to Signor Craxi and  
to President Mitterrand should be despatched.

A. J. COLES

P. F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister.

Agree that

- ① no-one at No. 10 should see these Argentines Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH
- ② they should be received in a routine way at the F.C.O.? 7 November, 1983

Dear John,

A.S.C. 2/4

Private Visitors from Argentina

You may have heard from Sir Anthony Parsons of an approach he has received from Dr Arnaldo Musich, an Argentine businessman who is also active politically. Sir A Parsons has indicated to Dr Musich's intermediaries in the City that a meeting with him would be inappropriate. The Foreign Secretary agrees with Sir A Parsons' response.

You should also know that another Argentine visitor of similar background, Dr Helbling, has asked through a separate City intermediary for a wide range of appointments, including Ministers here and, at No 10 Downing Street, Professor Alan Walters as well as Sir Anthony Parsons.

Sir Geoffrey does not think that any Minister should see Dr Helbling. He also considers that Helbling's request to see advisers to the Prime Minister should be turned down, on the lines of Sir A Parsons' reply to Dr Musich. Meetings at this level with the Argentine visitors, however private their status and however innocuous the content, could if word of them leaked generate speculation about a 'political dialogue'. Sir Geoffrey believes that we should take particular care to avoid this at a time when we are doing our best to dampen exaggerated expectations of changes in our policy following the elections in Argentina.

It would however be wrong to refuse to see these two visitors at any level in Whitehall. Both visitors have called at the FCO in the past. We have welcomed the restoration of democracy in Argentina, and continue to press for the normalisation of bilateral relations especially in the financial and commercial fields, in which the two visitors are active. Both have, in previous conversations, had interesting points to make about the situation in Argentina. They might now be able to offer some insights into the intentions of the incoming Radical Government.

The meetings in the FCO would be on the understanding that the conversations were wholly private and unofficial, and that nothing would be said to the press about them. Should the fact of the meetings nevertheless become public, we propose that there should be a coordinated public response. This should emphasise that the conversations had no official /initiative/status whatever: that they had been at the Argentine visitors' and that we were naturally prepared to listen to what they had

/to

CONFIDENTIAL



to tell us about the situation in Argentina.

*Yours ever,*

*P F Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Prime Minister.

London SW1A 2AH

You have made the point

to Mr. Lam saying.

7 November 1983

M2/11

Dear John,

Arms for Argentina

Your letter of 1 November asked whether, in our representations to the US Administration over certification of human rights in Argentina and the possible resumption of US arms sales, we might make use of the suggestions in the 'Today' programme on 25 October of a campaign against the Jewish population in Argentina.

The Foreign Secretary does not believe this tactic would be successful. We find that the suggestions broadcast in the 'Today' programme on 25 October are strikingly similar to an article in 'Newsweek' of 10 October (copy enclosed). Both rely heavily on the views of Marshall Meyer, an American Rabbi who has lived in Buenos Aires for some years. In both interviews, Rabbi Meyer makes the point that extreme right-wing elements in Argentina are instigating the anti-semitic campaign as they lose power. The appearance of these charges in 'Newsweek' will have ensured that Congressmen and others in Washington now considering the possible resumption of arms sales to Argentina have had the opportunity to reflect on the allegations.

There is no doubt that incidents of this kind do take place in Argentina. But we have no evidence that the problem is on the scale alleged by Meyer. It must remain to be seen whether the new Radical government in Argentina will, when they take over power in December or January, be effective in controlling these tendencies. With his convincing majority, Sr Alfonsin will be well placed to do so. The Radicals have already condemned violence against the Jews; and you will see that the 'Newsweek' article describes Alfonsin as 'the candidate of the Jews'.

Our latest reports from the Embassy in Washington are that the State Department is satisfied that there has been a dramatic improvement in Argentina's human rights record. Congressional opinion is already moving to the view that there is no further basis for withholding certification. The Foreign Secretary does not think that the repetition by us of allegations already made in an American magazine would

/alter



CONFIDENTIAL



alter this trend. It is also relevant that the Israeli Government have received pleas from Jews in Argentina not to pursue the matter of anti-semitism there.

Sir Geoffrey Howe thinks that it is better, in the strong representations which we are continuing to make to the Americans at a high level about the undesirability of arms sales to Argentina, to concentrate on the implications this would have in conferring respectability on a nation that has recently committed an act of unprovoked aggression. We are also leaving the Americans in no doubt of the likely public reaction here.

*Yours ever,*

*Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



Photos by Editorial Abril

An educator gives a fascist salute, vandalized gravestone: A 'historical precedent'

ARGENTINA

## Anti-Semitism Erupts Again

For Argentina's 245,000 Jews, anti-Semitism has long been a painful fact of life. They have faced discrimination, outright harassment and the sporadic destruction of their temples for years. But in recent months the attacks have become more numerous and more daring—and many Jewish leaders are worried that the situation may soon become much worse. In the small southern Patagonian city of Comodoro Rivadavia recently, a band of hooligans swept through the streets, terrorizing Jewish families and attacking their homes and businesses. They also vandalized the local synagogue, smashing its windows and smearing its walls with anti-Semitic slogans and crudely painted swastikas. Said Rabbi Marshall Meyer, head of the Latin American Rabbinical Seminary in Buenos Aires: "This is the closest thing we've had to a pogrom in years."

Many Jewish leaders believe that the anti-Semitic campaign has been orchestrated by fascist groups seeking to sabotage Argentina's return to democracy in free elections scheduled for Oct. 30. Others contend that Jews are being used as scapegoats for Argentina's growing economic and social problems. Although there are no Jewish candidates, anti-Semitic smear tactics have infected the campaign. Fascist groups have distributed posters and leaflets denouncing Raúl Alfonsín, who is running for president on the slightly left-of-center Radical Party ticket, as "the candidate of the Jews," who has entered into a secret pact with "international Zionism."

Some Jewish leaders believe that the military government and its security forces are partly to blame for the recent incidents. They note that Argentina's feared security police were able to wipe out the Montoneros, a sophisticated, well-organized urban terrorist group, but that no one has ever been

arrested for violent attacks against Jews. In fact, Nazi and fascist ideologies have long been popular in the country's military and security forces—and Jews were often singled out for abuse during the government's "dirty war" against its political opponents in the 1970s.

**'Gas Chambers':** The latest rash of anti-Semitic violence began roughly six months ago. Since then at least four synagogues have been vandalized. In May, a popular kosher restaurant in Buenos Aires was strafed with machine-gun fire as 30 people sat dining inside. In August a bomb was defused outside a Jewish school. Sales of anti-Semitic propaganda have mushroomed. And last month 25 Jewish schoolchildren undergoing routine checkups at a Buenos Aires Physio-Psychological Examining Board were allegedly abused by mem-

### Swastikas in Buenos Aires: Scapegoats

La Penna—ILA—Gamma—Liaison



bers of the board's staff, who told the children, "You should be sent to the gas chambers."

Argentina's Jewish community remains divided over how to fight back. Some religious leaders have long favored a quiet, diplomatic approach. "We don't want to minimize the acts," says Moises Camji, vice president of DAIA, the political arm of Argentina's Jewish organizations. "But we don't want to exaggerate them, either." Others, however, insist that the country's Jews should be more aggressive in battling anti-Semitism. "There is a negative tendency in the Jewish community to deny what is happening so as not to alarm people," says Herman Schiller, director of the Jewish weekly Nueva Presencia. "But the more this is left to itself, the more it will grow."


There are some encouraging signs. In the past, government officials and other political leaders had persistently denied that anti-Semitism even existed in the country. But almost every major candidate in the upcoming national elections has condemned the recent wave of violence against Jews. Last week the popular news magazine *Siete Días* ran a cover story titled "Dangerous to be Jewish in Argentina?"—a sign of growing public concern over anti-Semitism.

Many government officials are quick to point out that the country has no laws that discriminate against Jews. That is cold comfort to some members of the Jewish community who see frightening parallels between the social and economic chaos now gripping Argentina and the situation in Germany before the rise of the Third Reich. "There is the historical precedent," says Camji. "What happens here doesn't have to occur in exactly the same way." Those fears are probably exaggerated. But to Argentina's Jews, any outbreak of anti-Semitism is reason enough for concern.

MARC FRONS with MARTIN ANDERSEN  
in Buenos Aires

Arizona  
Rehs. B3J

17 NOV 1983





Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

We need a decision

London SW1A 2AH

Tonight?

7 November 1983

Agree message to Mitterrand

Mitterrand and Signe Craxi? ✓

Yes

Dear John,

A.J.C.  $\frac{7}{11}$

no

Falklands at the General Assembly

As you know, the vote is still expected to take place on 10 November. We have been considering what further action we should take with our European partners in the last few days before the vote.

The Italians have confirmed to us that they are still toying with minor amendments to the Argentine draft. Lord Bridges has suggested that the Prime Minister should send a message to Craxi. Sir Geoffrey Howe agrees and thinks that the Prime Minister should also send a message to Mitterrand since the French are known to be in close touch with the Italians about the possibility of revising the Argentine draft resolution.

We do not recommend messages to any other head of government in the Ten. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary will have an opportunity to speak to Kohl and Genscher in Bonn shortly. If we can hold the Germans, we have a good chance of holding the other Community countries even if we lose the French and Italians. Denmark and Luxembourg are probably sound but we will check the position of the Belgians and Dutch. Mr Papandreou confirmed to the Prime Minister that Greece would abstain. As they confirmed at the Anglo-Irish Summit, the Irish are also set on an abstention.

I enclose a draft telegram to EC posts and draft messages to Craxi and Mitterrand for the Prime Minister's consideration.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
		<b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	<b>IMMEDIATE</b>

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE ROME
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM
	9	REPEATED IMMEDIATE OTHER EC POSTS
	10	REPEATED ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK
	11	YOUR TELNO 550: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
	12	1. Please deliver the message from the Prime Minister to
	13	Craxi contained in MIFT.
	14	2. For Paris: please deliver the similar message from the
	15	Prime Minister to Mitterrand which is being telegraphed to
	16	you separately.
	17	3. The Prime Minister and I will have an opportunity to
	18	speak to Kohl and Genscher when we are in Bonn on 8/9 November.
	19	4. Brussels should be aware that the Italian Minister here
	20	suggested to Giffard on 4 November that the Belgians might
	21	be involved in seeking minor changes to the Argentine draft
///	22	resolution. We are inclined to discount this suggestion but
//	23	Brussels should check the Belgian position at a senior level.
/	24	The Hague should do likewise.
	25	

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword 5. For
File number	Dept	Distribution  Falkland Islands distribn.
Drafted by (Block capitals) <b>PRIVATE SECRETARY</b>		
Telephone number <b>233-4641</b>		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	↓	Classification and Caveats	Page
		CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE 2

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1 <<<<  
 2 5. For Athens: Papandreou confirmed to the Prime Minister  
 3 on 4 November that Greece would abstain.  
 4 6. For Dublin: The Irish confirmed during the Anglo-Irish  
 5 Summit on 7 November that they too will abstain.  
 6 7. Other EC Posts should stand by to intervene at a high  
 7 level as necessary in the remaining days before the vote which  
 8 is still expected on 10 November.

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 10 HOWE  
 11 NNNN

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OUT TELEGRAM

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	CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE

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GRS  
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PRE/ADD  
TEL NO

1 ZCZC  
2 GRS  
3 CONFIDENTIAL  
4  
5  
6 FM FCO 071200Z NOV 83  
7 TO IMMEDIATE ROME  
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
9 MIPT: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
10 1. Following is text of Prime Minister's message to Craxi.  
11 Begins:  
12 When you were here on 16 September we had a word about the  
13 debate on the Falkland Islands at the United Nations General  
14 Assembly. Sir Geoffrey Howe and Signor Andreotti have  
15 discussed the matter in the meanwhile, but with the vote due on  
16 10 November, I thought I should get in touch with you to remind  
17 you personally of the great importance to us of the position  
18 to be adopted by Italy.  
19 Signor Andreotti has given us an assurance that Italy would not  
20 vote for the draft resolution as currently circulated by  
21 Argentina. But I am aware that consideration is being given to  
22 the possibility of making some small changes to the draft.  
23 I am sure you will appreciate that our attitude to the draft  
24 resolution is not affected by small details. What I am  
25 concerned about is Argentina's evident determination that the

///  
//  
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File number	Dept UND	Distribution  Falkland Islands distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) N C R WILLIAMS		
Telephone number 233 4330		
Authorized for despatch		
Comcon reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

Page

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

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1 <<<<  
 2 negotiations called for in the draft should have only one  
 3 possible outcome; the transfer of sovereignty over the Islands  
 4 to Argentina, regardless of the principle of self-determination  
 5 which applies to the people of the Falklands as much as to  
 6 anyone else. We all welcome the successful holding of elections  
 7 in Argentina on 30 October. We in this country have been trying  
 8 to develop a more normal relationship with Argentina and will be  
 9 hoping for a better response from the <sup>NEW</sup> Government than we had  
 10 from the military. I can understand the desire of European  
 11 partners to make a gesture of encouragement and support to the  
 12 emerging democratic Government in Argentina. But there are many  
 13 ~~ways~~ <sup>WAYS</sup> in which this could be done. It should not be done in the  
 14 context of the Falkland Islands or at the expense of the United  
 15 Kingdom.

16 A switch to a positive vote by a country as important as  
 17 Italy would send the wrong signal to the incoming Government.  
 18 It would suggest to them that they should continue to follow the  
 19 present sterile course and that we could eventually be brought  
 20 to negotiate the transfer of sovereignty against the wishes of  
 21 the Islanders. This can only serve to maintain the present  
 22 tension. I need hardly tell you with what dismay a positive vote  
 23 by so close a partner and ally as Italy would be received in this  
 24 country. We are not asking you to vote with us and directly  
 25 opposite to Argentina, but I do ask you most earnestly not to  
 26 vote with Argentina and directly opposite to the United Kingdom.  
 27 Ends.

28 HOWE

30 NNNN

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telegram

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Catchword



OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	Precedence/Deskby <b>IMMEDIATE</b>
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ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO 071230Z NOV 83
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE PARIS
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	MY TELNO TO ROME: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
	10	1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to
	11	President Mitterrand. Begins:
	12	When you were here on 20/21 October we had a word about the
	13	debate on the Falkland Islands at the United Nations General
	14	Assembly. With the vote due on 10 November, I thought I should
	15	get in touch with you to remind you of the great importance to us
	16	of the position to be adopted by France.
	17	You were good enough to give me an assurance that France would
	18	not vote for the draft resolution as currently circulated by
	19	Argentina. But I am aware that consideration is being given to
	20	the possibility of making some small changes to the draft.
	21	I am sure you will appreciate that our attitude to the draft
///	22	resolution is not affected by small details. What I am concerned
//	23	about is Argentina's evident determination that the negotiations
/	24	called for in the draft should have only one possible outcome:
	25	the transfer of sovereignty over the Islands to Argentina,

NNNN ends telegram		BLANK		Catchword regardless	
File number		Dept UND		Distribution  Falkland Islands distribution	
Drafted by (Block capitals) N C R WILLIAMS					
Telephone number 233 4330					
Authorised for despatch					
Comcen reference		Time of despatch			

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

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regardless of the principle of self-determination which I know  
France/ always upholds and which applies to the people of the  
Falklands as much as to anyone else. France ~~of all countries~~  
will surely understand the problems we face.

6

We all welcome the successful holding of elections in Argentina  
on 30 October. We in this country have been trying to develop a  
more normal relationship with Argentina and will be hoping for a  
better response from the new Government than we had from the  
military. I can understand the desire of European partners to  
make a gesture of encouragement and support to the emerging  
democratic Government in Argentina. But there are many ways in  
which this could be done. It should not be done in the context  
of the Falkland Islands or at the expense of the United Kingdom.

15

A switch to a positive vote by a country as important as  
France would send the wrong signal to the incoming Government.  
It would suggest to them that they should continue to follow  
the present sterile course and that we could eventually be  
brought to negotiate the transfer of sovereignty against the  
wishes of the Islanders. This can only serve to maintain the  
present tension. I need hardly tell you with what dismay a  
positive vote by so close a partner and ally as France would be  
received in this country. We are not asking you to vote with us  
and directly opposite to Argentina, but I do ask you most  
earnestly not to vote with Argentina and directly opposite to  
the United Kingdom. Ends.

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HOWE

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telegram

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Catchword

CONFIDENTIAL



*file*

*Br*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

7 November 1983

Thank you for your letter of 4 November with which you enclosed a draft article by Sir Nicholas Henderson about the Belgrano.

The Prime Minister considers that if at all possible the reference in the article to the rules of engagement should be deleted and I should be grateful if you could seek to achieve this. Mrs. Thatcher also agrees that Mr. Francis Pym should be given the opportunity to comment on the article and indeed I understand that this has now been arranged.

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

*AP*

COPY OF WASHINGTON TELEGRAM No. 3329 OF 4 NOVEMBER

Your telegram number 1851: American Arms for Argentina

1. I called on Dañ this evening to carry out the instructions in your telegram under reference.

2. I said we had publicly welcomed the restoration of democracy in Argentina. We hoped it would herald a normalisation of our relations with the Argentines. We had shown ourselves ready to take part in operations to rescue Argentina financially, and we were ready to move pari passu with the Argentines in a number of other areas. However it remained of great concern to us that Argentina had not declared an end to hostilities. We hoped this would now happen. Renunciation of force and of any desire to govern the Falkland Islands against the wishes of the Islanders should be a litmus test of Argentine democracy.

/3.

3. I said that against this background the resumption of US arms sales to Argentina would pose us great problems. This was a highly emotive issue in Britain. If the Americans were tending to the conclusion that some sort of security assistance relationship with Argentina was desirable in the light of the elections, we hoped:

a) that we would be consulted on the timing of the announcement of an intention to certify as well as the decision itself. In any case we hoped this would not happen before the Alfonsin Government took over power. Any announcement in the next few weeks would create difficulties for our relations that would be especially serious so soon after our differences over Grenada.

b) That we would also be consulted over the supply of individual items of equipment. I emphasised that strengthening Argentina's military capabilities through the supply of equipment would have implications for the size of our garrison on the Falkland Islands. In turn this would affect our capacity to deploy our forces normally committed to NATO.

4. Dam had no hesitation in assuring me that we would be consulted both over the timing of an announcement to certify and over individual sales. He said the administration did not at present have a time-table on certification, so he could not give me a commitment that this would not take place before the Alfonsin Government assumed power. But he took note of our concern on this point.

5. Dam said that if and when sales were resumed, the Argentines were most unlikely to get more than the minimum necessary to ensure a viable US/Argentine military relationship. US budgetary constraints would militate against a large-scale security assistance programme, and the US would not want to upset the military balance in the region.

6. Dam said he hoped we would not be misled by press reports that a given deal was under consideration. This would not necessarily mean that the administration had decided to supply. I assured him we would know how to make this distinction. I warned him

/that

that you and the Prime Minister would probably raise this subject at Chequers.

FCO please pass to No.10 Downing Street.

WRIGHT.

PRIME MINISTER

Belgrano: Article by Sir N. Henderson

I attach a FCO letter together with a passage from an article which Sir Nicholas Henderson has written for The Economist dealing with the Belgrano.

The article may be published next week and is clearly relevant to Mr. Dalyell's latest moves.

There are passages in the article which I do not like. I doubt whether it is right to reveal Rules of Engagement (see page 4). I also think that he reveals a good deal more than he should about his conversations with the Americans and others during the Falklands campaign.

But I gather from the FCO that it may not be very easy to secure changes. I suspect, though I do not know, that The Economist already have an advance text. Nevertheless I think we should try to get the reference to Rules of Engagement deleted. And if there is anything else to which you particularly take exception, I am sure that we could persuade Sir Nicholas to change it.

A.S.C.

I agree

And, I think Francis must see it

4 November 1983

because it reveals private conversations.

not.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 November 1983

*Dear John,*

Sir N Henderson

Thank you for your letter of 24 October.

We have gone over very carefully with Sir N Henderson the account in his draft article of the events of 1-3 May 1982. I enclose a copy of this. He is aware of Mr Tam Dalyell's remarks to the press here and in Peru suggesting that he is likely at any moment to make a major new move in his campaign about the Belgrano. Sir N Henderson envisages giving his material to the Economist next week. In the light of Mr Dalyell's declared intentions, we see no need to stand in the way of this timing.

As to the rest of the article, John Holmes told you in his letter of 21 October that we had been pointing out to Sir N Henderson the political drawbacks of reviving the question of United States' assistance to us during the Falklands crisis. He has agreed to delete all coverage of American materiel assistance. He is re-writing the passages about American diplomacy in the light of the difficulties in our relations with Washington over Grenada. In this altered context, in which Sir N Henderson's comments will be about present-day events as well as those which occurred when he was still Ambassador in Washington, it is less feasible - and less necessary - to go over the non-Belgrano passages with Sir N Henderson in detail, when he has written them. We believe that, instead we should concentrate on continuing to do all we can to ensure that his treatment of the Belgrano episode is satisfactory. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary thinks that this section, as it stands, should be helpful to us when published. But he points out that he is not himself familiar with the story at first hand. In the circumstances, he thinks the Prime Minister will want to form her own view. He also believes that Mr Pym should

/be

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be given the opportunity to comment on the text, and we shall be in touch with Sir N Henderson about this.

*Answer*


A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'B J P Fall', written in a cursive style.

(B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Argentina: Relaciones Pt 35



SIR NICHOLAS HENDERSON'S ARTICLE: PASSAGE ON BELGRANO MYTHS

The U.S. decision of 30 April to support Britain was a turning-point in our fortunes. But it did not put an end to negotiations or to America's part in them. On the contrary, the U.S. Government's desire to bring off a peaceful settlement grew with the likelihood of bloodshed in the South Atlantic.

On the afternoon of Saturday May 1st Pym arrived in Washington for the second weekend running. There was static in the air and the Press everywhere. Some decisive development, whether diplomatic or military, was widely expected. Pym said publicly that the previous week he had come to Washington to visit a negotiator, this week to visit an ally, a remark that made some members of the U.S. Administration wince. To me in private Pym spoke about the very tough mood at home reflected in the debate that had just taken place in the House of Commons. Pym was certainly conscious of the fact that the moment was now approaching when the lines between military and diplomatic action, hitherto wide apart, were beginning to converge and then cross, compounding the high pitch of drama that each had reached. Port Stanley had been bombed by Vulcans that day; other attacks had been made on the Islands by Harriers of which one had been lost.

On Sunday May 2nd at 1900 hours GMT, 2000 hours London time and 1500 hours Washington time, the cruiser Belgrano was hit by the submarine Conqueror following a decision reached by the war cabinet meeting at Chequers around mid day.

/I should

I should emphasize here that it is not true, despite frequent allegations, that the Argentinians had had no warning of our readiness to take military action outside the Maritime Exclusion Zone. On the 23rd April HMG had announced their preparedness to attack any Argentine ship or aircraft wherever it was if it posed a threat to British Forces in the South Atlantic. This was a highly important warning. It was conveyed immediately to the Argentine Government, circulated to the Security Council and released publicly. From that time any Argentinian warship, submarine or military aircraft (including air transports used for reconnaissance) could expect to be attacked on the high seas. The Argentinians have said subsequently that they were taken unawares by the attack. One can only say that this is not surprising given the endemic unawareness of the junta and their confidence that the British would never react militarily to the invasion of the Islands. During the morning (Washington time) the same day - not over breakfast, as some have alleged - Haig met Pym for a tete-a-tete that lasted two hours. He relayed President Reagan's conviction that U.K. Forces were 'doing the work of the free world', but then balanced this with an ardent plea that we could and should avoid a large-scale battle because it would be unnecessary and risky. He said that he hoped that certain proposals, which had originated in a Peruvian initiative, and which were very similar to those he himself had advanced earlier, would be more acceptable in B.A. if they were put forward by a South American government and briefly outlined the proposals to him. (See Annex 'A' for the 7-point plan as it came

/to be

called.)

In reply, as he has said publicly, Pym made it clear to Haig that while he was very ready to consider any new proposal, what Haig had outlined was in essence not very different from his own scheme which had just been totally rejected by Argentina. Pym therefore wondered whether, if and when the details had been worked out, the Argentines were likely to take a different view this time. Pym added that he would of course need to discuss any new proposal with his colleagues in London on his return. Haig fully agreed that more time and more detailed work were needed.

Pym and Haig saw each other again over lunch at the British Embassy, and spoke again on the telephone before Pym flew to New York in the afternoon. It was only at this point that Pym *was* was in a position to telegraph a report to London: that telegram was despatched at 1815 Washington time, or 2315 London time.

Several critics have asked why, before giving their authority for the Conqueror to attack Belgrano, British Ministers did not get into touch with Pym in Washington to make sure that nothing was going on there that might affect their decision. Tam Dalyell has described London's failure to check with Pym as 'mind-boggling'. The first comment to make is, of course, that at the time when Ministers were considering the subject at Chequers nothing had happened in Washington to suggest that any new peace initiative was afoot or that anything more meaningful was likely than the numerous proposals that had been made in previous weeks to which the Argentinians had always responded negatively.

Even if, assuming it would have been possible, British Ministers had been told that discussions had been going on between Washington, Lima and Buenos Aires about the possibility of some new ideas for peace to be put forward with Peruvian blessing, I did not think that they would on that account have refrained from a decision they thought necessary for the security of British forces. After all they had had three weeks of Argentinian diplomatic prevarication. It was widely thought that if negotiations were ever going to lead to anything this would only be as a result, not of conciliatory noises, but of direct and heavy military pressure.

To come to a verdict on this subject, it is necessary to bear in mind the military scene as it looked to London at the end of April and beginning of May. The Task Force had not succeeded - and there was no prospect of it doing so - in neutralising the Argentinian Air Force. The Argentinian fleet had not been bottled up. Their active submarines posed a continuous threat to British forces, particularly to the SSNS. The Argentinians were finding it possible to supply the Islands regularly by sea. The dangers resulting from the lack of adequate air reconnaissance and air defence for the British fleet were all too apparent. How could Ministers in that atmosphere have desisted from authorising any measure that they thought necessary for the security of their forces? It is worth interpolating here that although under the Rules of Engagement Conqueror had to obtain authority before attacking Belgrano, this would not have been so had it been detected by the Argentinians, in which event it had the right to attack without permission.

Is it  
right to  
reveal  
ROE's?  
A.S.C. 4  
11

/It is not

It is not really my business here to deal with the argument about whether or not the Belgrano posed a military threat, but, given the key part that this incident is said to have played in the diplomatic scene, I cannot refrain from registering my view that the Belgrano and its two escorting destroyers, equipped with exocets, must inherently have been a danger. Apart from their own weapons, they provided useful air guidance for Argentinian air attacks on British forces. Their own position and direction at the time of the attack were irrelevant. Following the Belgrano sinking the Argentinian fleet never came out again which considerably reduced the threat to British forces. Certainly, the Belgrano appeared menacing to Admiral Woodward, This is how he has described it subsequently: 'Early on the morning of the 2nd May all the indications were that the Veinticinco de Mayo, the Argentine carrier, and a group of escorts, had slipped past my forward SSn barrier to the north, while the <sup>Cruiser</sup> carrier General Belgrano and her escorts were attempting to complete the pincer movement from the south while outside the Total Exclusion Zone.' \* Some critics seem to think that there was something not quite fair in attacking a ship outside the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ). But the purpose of the TEZ and of the earlier Maritime Exclusion Zone was to try to enforce a blockade of the Islands. They were not intended, and could not after the 23rd April Declaration have been taken to have <sup>been</sup> /intended to limit the inherent right to self-defence of the British Forces.

It is surely something of a calumny on the Argentine forces to allege, as had been done, that they were entirely pacific until we sank the Belgrano. The reality is that a large force of /Argentinian

\* Woodward and Moore; Ibid

Argentinian Mirages did their best to sink the Glamorgan a day before the attack on the Belgrano, and the Argentine authorities had also ordered their frigates to attack Hermes. We also knew of an Argentinian plan for a co-ordinated attack on the Task Force to be conducted by aircraft from the mainland from carrier based aircraft and from surface ships equipped with Exocets.

From the discussions I have had subsequently I do not believe that any of those who were responsible for the decision to attack Belgrano hesitated about it at the time or have had any regrets about it since, except of course for the loss of life inseparable from war. I certainly do not think that they need have any doubts on the score of the impact of their decision on the negotiations because, as I shall come on to explain, the Argentinians continued to manifest as much, or as little, interest in negotiations after as before the Belgrano attack.

As recorded above, just before he left Washington on that afternoon of Sunday May 2nd for New York, Pym received a telephone call from Haig conveying some empressement about the importance of the Peruvian proposals. Pym then asked me to speak to Haig to emphasise - and these are the words I used - that it was 'too sudden for us to be negotiating new proposals. Pym does not want to be rushed. He has not consulted London about them'. I reported this <sup>by</sup> telegram to London less than an hour after the despatch of the first telegram.

At about 2000 hours Washington time, I was having dinner at home when Haig telephoned. He told me of the attack on Belgrano.

/It was



It was the first I had heard of it. He went on to speculate very calmly about the effect of this incident on the Argentinians. He was not sure about it. He thought I had better come down and have a talk with him as soon as possible the following day.

In New York Pym was seeing Perez de Cuellar that evening. The Secretary-General gave him a set of ideas for a negotiated settlement which he also communicated to the Argentinians. These ideas covered the usual ground : troop withdrawals, lifting of sanctions and Exclusion Zone, transitional arrangements, and diplomatic negotiations for a long-term settlement. It is pertinent to note that the Argentine Ambassador to the U.N. continued to discuss these points with the Secretary-General daily from the 2nd to the 19th May (as did Anthony Parsons) so there can be no question of the Belgrano having ditched diplomacy in New York.

Meanwhile, let us see what had been going on in Lima. Much has been alleged about the progress there, in which the Argentinians were engaged, before the decision to sink Belgrano was made at Chequers. The British representative in Lima is said to have been involved in what were regarded as promising talks for a diplomatic solution. Details have even been published in several British papers and quoted in the House of Commons describing the 'red leather' in which the Treaty had been bound ready for signature. The truth is less colourful. On Saturday 1st May the British Ambassador to Lima, Mr C W Wallace, saw the Peruvian Foreign Minister Dr Arias Stella on instructions from London to give an account of the situation in the South Atlantic. Dr Arias Stella asked if there was any way in which

/Peru

Peru could help to break the diplomatic deadlock. He made no specific suggestion, that is to say no new plan or any fresh initiative, nor did he give any hint at all that a Peruvian initiative might be in an advanced state of preparation.

The following day President Belaunde gave a press conference at 1800 hours Lima time (mid-night London time) - ie four hours after the Belgrano had been sunk, although the Peruvians did not yet know this. He stated, without giving details, that Haig had phoned him the previous night (1st May) to put to him a 7-point plan. There was as yet no agreement on it but the Argentinians were considering it and he hoped to be able to make an announcement about it later that night or the following day. Half-an-hour later the Peruvian Foreign Minister summoned the British Ambassador to say that the previous day he had, on Belaunde's instructions, telephoned the Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez to urge him to accept the new formula. This had been discussed by Belaunde and Haig and modified as a result of these talks into a 7-point formula. Dr Arias Stella claimed that the formula had the approval of Costa Mendez, that Galtieri had told Belaunde that he was well disposed towards it but that he had his 'senate'\* to consult and convince. The junta were meeting then to consider the terms and their reply was expected hourly. Dr Arias Stella added that he had reason to believe that Haig's proposals had been conveyed with the knowledge and consent of the British Foreign Minister.

Arias Stella told Wallace the following day that the previous evening - i.e. the evening of the 2nd May Lima time - the junta

\*presumably his euphemism for the senior officers surrounding him.

had rejected the Peruvian proposal as a result of the torpedoing of the Argentine cruiser. But Arias Stella went on to say that the Argentinians had not entirely closed the door.

In my first meeting with Haig on May 3rd, he told me that Belaunde had complained bitterly about the torpedoing which he said had wrecked the chance of peace. He was as sore with the U.S.A. as he was with the U.K.

Haig told me of his worry that the Argentinians might return to the Rio Treaty Organisation confident that they could get support for sanctions against Britain. The U.S.A. would veto it but it would divide the hemisphere between north and south. It was being put about in B.A. that the Belgrano had been hit as a result of intelligence passed by U.S. satellites and with the help of U.S.A. special weapons. Haig feared that if further military action was taken by the British, American opinion and that of the west generally might become less favourable towards the U.K. People might say that Britain was over-reacting.

I told Haig of the attempts the Argentinians had made to sink our ships before the Belgrano had been attacked. It could not, therefore, be said that the Argentinians had been behaving peacefully. Haig said that it was difficult to know whether hitting the Argentinians was the only thing that would bring them to negotiate or whether it made them more inflexible, on which I made the obvious retort that for three weeks we had made no attack upon them and they had shown no flexibility.

/Haig

Haig asked me to put to Mrs Thatcher that she should come forward with some declaration expressing readiness to stop hostilities at a certain time provided the Argentinians said they would do the same and undertake to withdraw.

I said that the Argentinians had had plenty of time to negotiate and what we could not do at this stage was to let up on the military pressure unless there was a categorical assurance that the Argentinians were going to stop military action and leave the islands.

FIVE

SH

Arms and  
relations Pt 35  
Bf 7/11



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 November, 1983

As you know, the issue of payments from the South Atlantic Fund has received some publicity recently which prompted the attached Question from Mr. Robert Atkins during Prime Minister's Questions yesterday. In response, the Prime Minister undertook to draw Mr. Atkins' concern to the attention of the South Atlantic Fund. Mrs. Thatcher shares the concern implicit in Mr. Atkins' Question that the remaining resources in the Fund should remain available to meet future contingencies affecting previous beneficiaries of the Fund which have not already been met. She wonders therefore whether any assurances might be given to the effect that service benevolent funds which will inherit the balance of the unallocated funds of the South Atlantic Fund will be able to meet such contingencies. Such assurances would, Mrs. Thatcher believes, go a long way to meeting public concern that the money donated by the public to the South Atlantic Fund should be spent for the purposes intended by its donors.

I should be grateful if you could let me have a note on the points raised by Mrs. Thatcher.

TIMOTHY FLESHER

R. Mottram, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence

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hon. Friend. To icts of nuclear superiority on ould not enable ace the stockpile ance.

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ember, will g the latest of London man of the o previous addition to ements of her weight sponsibility est possible

**Mr. Terry Fields:** Does the Prime Minister accept that her justification for carrying out policy on behalf of the Government because it was part of her manifesto should apply equally to local authorities? Does she agree that Liverpool city council, in creating 1,000 jobs, building houses for people in need and reducing rents by £2, is carrying out its democratic policies, or does democracy extend only to Tory party policies?

**The Prime Minister:** As the hon. Gentleman knows, local authorities have precisely those powers that this House agrees to give them and from time to time those powers are changed. Public expenditure must still be found from taxes or rates or by borrowing or printing money. Therefore one must have regard to the total burden on the private sector because, on the whole, the private sector creates the wealth to sustain the public sector.

**Mr. Robert Atkins:** Is my right hon. Friend aware that concern has been expressed to hon. Members about the use of funds within the south Atlantic fund? While in no sense being critical of the humanity and attention that the administrators of the fund have given to the dispositions that they have made, will she recognise that there is concern, and will she give consideration to seeing how the extra £2 million should be spent?

**The Prime Minister:** I will, of course, communicate my hon. Friend's concern. I have noticed a certain amount of concern expressed in the press. The south Atlantic fund is governed by the charity laws which it must obviously uphold, but I understand that my hon. Friend is asking whether the money yet needs to be transferred to the service charities when there might still be calls upon it. I will, of course, communicate my hon. Friend's concern to the trustees of the south Atlantic fund.

**Q3. Mr. Bidwell** asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Thursday 3 November.

**The Prime Minister:** I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

**Mr. Bidwell:** Has the right hon. Lady had a chance to study the widespread comment on television and in the press on the possibility of peace demonstrators being shot at Greenham Common and elsewhere? Did she see the interview with a woman demonstrator who said that British soldiers would not fire but that American defence forces might fire? In those circumstances will she disown the clumsy remarks of the Secretary of State for Defence

*Guardian* said:

"Mr. Heseltine will go to more business of cruise deployment lead Army and the police in their thousands are there precisely to avert such incidents envisage a crowd of demonstrators warheads whilst the Parachute Regt. And she"—

me—  
"is right . . . that one couldn't expect Callaghan Government—or a pro reach any other conclusion."

**Mr. Nicholls:** Does my right hon. Friend have any concern about the report in *The Guardian* that the CND intends to send 10,000 paratroopers to the Armed Forces? Will she condemn that latest attempt by Pat Aronson to subvert the forces of the Crown?

**The Prime Minister:** My hon. Friend has the same view—members of the Armed Forces will know precisely what I mean.

**Mr. Norman Atkinson:** If my right hon. Friend wishes to be completely and thoroughly honest person—

**Mr. Adley:** She is.

**Mr. Atkinson:**—may I ask my right hon. Lady this morning remonstrated with the Secretary for Employment, who said that the economy was down when he really meant that the economy was down? Did he not, by issuing figures, give rise to a myth that the Prime Minister was down this afternoon, ignoring the 4 million people looking for work? Rather than say that the economy is steadily climbing.

**The Prime Minister:** The statistics on that basis well known to the hon. Gentleman who faithfully and with total honesty has reported. Both the crude figures and the seasonally adjusted figures calculated on that basis are down. The figures from special employment measures are also down. The same press notice. The total number of people is estimated to be 613,000.

Special employment measures, training scheme, are for those who are unemployed. There will ensure that, in many cases, people will be employed. There is still a shortage in some areas of labour.

CONFIDENTIAL

4



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Prime Minister. London SW1A 2AH

Worth reading, especially  
the section on the Falklands.

3 November 1983

MF

A+C.  $\frac{3}{11}$

Dear John,

Elections in Argentina

The Prime Minister might be interested  
to see the enclosed preliminary assessment  
of the results of the elections in  
Argentina.

Yours ever,

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

Peter Ricketts

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

ELECTIONS IN ARGENTINA : VICTORY OF SR RAUL ALFONSIN AND THE  
RADICAL PARTY

1. Most commentators predicted a close result to the elections held in Argentina on 30 October. They were wrong: the Radical Party of Sr Raul Alfonsin won a sweeping victory. In the vote for the Presidency, 52 per cent voted for Sr Alfonsin, against 40 per cent for the Peronists. This will give Sr Alfonsin a comfortable majority when the Electoral Colleges meet for the formal nomination of the new President later this month - probably not before 30 November.

2. The composition of the Lower House of the new Congress, already decided, also shows a clear Radical victory. The Party's vote fell to 48 per cent - confirmation of the strong personal appeal of Sr Alfonsin. But this still gives them 131 seats out of the 254 in the Lower House: this is an absolute majority of 8 over the remainder. The Peronists won 111 seats. Even in the Electoral Colleges, it will not be necessary for Sr Alfonsin to strike bargains with any of the smaller parties. The threat of a President from one Party and a Congress dominated by another has also been averted.

3. No formal announcement has yet been made about advancing the date of the transfer of power, which remains for the moment set at 30 January 1984. But the unexpectedly strong current of support for Sr Alfonsin can now be added to the factors that could influence the caretaker military rulers to announce an earlier date. President Bignone is expected to make a statement shortly.

4. Sr Alfonsin takes much personal credit for the victory. A Biographical Note on the President-elect is attached. From being the leader of only a minority wing of the Radical Party earlier this year, he emerged early as the Party's front runner for the Presidency. In internal Party elections he and his allies first overcame the more traditional members of the party hierarchy. He then set about expanding the Radicals' base, giving their campaign a more populist appeal. This enabled him to establish himself in the public mind as a credible alternative to the Peronists. Their disunity, meanwhile, was only temporarily patched up through the adoption of Sr Luder as their Presidential candidate. The Peronists paid a heavy price even for this, as Sr Luder was a colourless campaigner.

5. The original impetus towards the return to democracy in Argentina owed as much to the failure in all policy areas of the discredited military rulers as to any popular enthusiasm for civilian politicians. The electorate have also evidently judged that jaded Peronist personalities would lack the dynamism necessary to lift Argentina out of the unhappy cycle of rule by a succession of equally inadequate civil and military régimes. Sr Alfonsin's success derived from turning both these tendencies to positive use. The title of his movement within the Radical Party, "Renewal and Change", which later became the slogan of his national campaign, bears this out.

/6. Sr Alfonsin



6. Sr Alfonsin faces a range of problems:-

(a) The attitude of the Peronists

Cooperative acquiescence in defeat is not in the Peronist nature. But Sr Alfonsin's popular triumph will at least for a period forestall any attempt to make the country ungovernable. The control of the trade unions required for this must now be in doubt given the substantial numbers of trade unionists who voted for Alfonsin.

(b) Attitudes of the Military

The military have been particularly concerned at the prospect of a Radical victory, as Sr Alfonsin's undertakings to repeal the amnesty law, to cut military spending, and establish civilian control over the armed services, have all been much firmer than the Peronists'. His campaign appealed to the more moderate and more enlightened officers. But he will still face many dangerous enemies if, having carried out his pledge to repeal the amnesty, he gives the civilian courts unrestrained authority to prosecute members of the armed forces who were involved in the 'dirty war'.

(c) Economic Problems

These are very serious indeed, especially inflation. The Radicals' policy is based on a 'social contract'. The overwhelmingly Peronist trade union leadership has been routed by the election results, and Sr Alfonsin will have better prospects, and more time, to tackle the chronic problem of inflation than observers had anticipated. Internationally, Sr Alfonsin aware of the enthusiasm with which his victory has been welcomed by his fellow social democrats and others in the industrialised world, will judge that other major democracies will wish to assist the development of stable democratic rule in Argentina. He may therefore feel in a strong position to press for favourable treatment by the IMF in dealing with the economic problems he has inherited. He may even try to drive hard bargains with the Fund and in discussions of Argentina's external debts.

THE FALKLANDS

7. The Radicals are committed to "promote the recovery and final incorporation into the national territory" of the Falklands. There has been emphasis on the need for a peaceful solution, and Sr Alfonsin and his supporters set much store by the belief that, once Argentina has an elected civilian government, other democratically-governed States will rally to her support over the Falklands. The Party issued a communiqué on 14 October which drew particular attention to United Nations Resolutions as the basis of which the problem should be solved.

/8. Earlier in the

8. Earlier in the year, Sr Alfonsin took a relatively encouraging line about the desirability of an early return to normality in relations with Britain. Since September he has advocated the unacceptable linkage between the declaration of a cessation of hostilities by Argentina with readiness on our part to negotiate sovereignty. The communiqué of 14 October identified other points that, in the Radicals' view, must be considered together with the possibility of a formal cessation of hostilities: "A mutual promise to refrain from using force, the lifting of the exclusion zone, the withdrawal from the Islands of British troops and of weapons that could threaten the safety of the South Atlantic, and the promise to resume the negotiations to find a solution to the conflict in line with the United Nations Resolutions."

9. The allegation that our military presence is a 'threat' has also been accompanied by complaints that we are constructing 'a military fortress and nuclear base'. The Radicals' objections to nuclear aspects have included explicit opposition to the manufacture of nuclear weapons by Argentina.

10. With such a commanding majority, Sr Alfonsin will for some while be well placed to insist on non-violent policies towards the Falklands, and perhaps from time to time to urge the nation to concentrate instead on vital national economic priorities. The Radicals' emphasis on solving the dispute by diplomatic means, especially through the United Nations, and their confidence that Argentina's new respectability will further her cause, should, in the short term, significantly reduce the risk of even limited military action against the Islands. But if they are really thorough in carrying out their policy of bringing the military to book for excesses committed during the counter-terrorist campaign, military tolerance of the Radical Government may be short-lived.

11. In the medium to long term, increased expectation of diplomatic progress over the Falklands could cause serious frustration at the popular level, and among the military if these high hopes are not fulfilled.

12. The Radicals seem likely to follow the familiar Argentine tendency to demand a 'gesture' from us before making what should be reciprocal moves themselves, even towards the normalisation of bilateral commercial relations.

#### FOREIGN POLICY : GENERAL

13. Sr Alfonsin will not adopt the stridently nationalistic stance of a Peronist President. But he will speak out critically on such issues as American activities in Central America - reflecting his known belief that the problems in that region are due to 'imperialism'. We expect relations with the Soviet Union to be correct, but without much likelihood of developing: the Argentine Communists and other extreme-left groups all supported the Peronists in the elections. We must

/hope that Sr Alfonsin



hope that Sr Alfonsin's commitment to reduce military expenditure will make him immune from the temptation to try to force increased arms supplied from western countries by threatening to purchase weapons from the Soviet Union.

14. Under Sr Alfonsin, it seems certain that Argentina's close involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 will continue. This will, to a considerable extent, derive from the belief that such associations are expedient in the campaign to gain maximum international support for Argentina's claim to the Falklands. But it would not be surprising to find that Sr Alfonsin's heart genuinely lies in this direction, regardless of tactical Falklands considerations.

## BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

ALFONSIN RAUL

Argentine President-elect : 31 October 1983

Born in April 1926 in Chascomús, Buenos Aires Province. Studied at General San Martín Military College (emerging as a Second Lieutenant in the Reserves) before going on to National University of La Plata: graduated as a lawyer.

An active member of the Radical movement (UCR) from an early age, he was a town councillor of Chascomús and President of the local district party committee at the age of 24. In 1953 he became Vice-President of the Buenos Aires Provincial bloc of Radical Deputies. In 1963 he was elected Vice-President of the bloc of National Deputies.

He was the prime mover behind the reformist 'Renewal and Change' faction of the Radical Party, which was founded on 24 September 1972. In the 1973 internal party elections for Radical Presidential candidate, Alfonsín unsuccessfully stood against party President Ricardo Balbín, who in turn lost resoundingly to the Peronist nominee and, later the same year, to Perón himself.

Throughout 1983 Alfonsín worked hard to become the UCR presidential candidate, mounting a successful challenge to his rival Fernando de la Rúa, the leader of the predominant faction of the Radicals, the Balbinistas. He was adopted in July. For many years Alfonsín has been editor of the newspaper El Imparcial in Chascomús. In 1976 he also became a director of the magazine Proposal and Change. In 1977, he became a member of the Steering Committee of the Argentine Permanent Assembly for Human Rights. In 1980 he published a book La Cuestión Argentina ('The Argentine Question') in which he described his faction of the UCR as a social-democratic populist movement.

In recent years Alfonsín has travelled widely throughout Latin America and Western Europe and has made numerous contacts abroad, particularly within the Socialist International. Alfonsín is married to María Lorenza, neé Barreneche. They have six children.

The constraints on BISBA's range of contacts make it necessary for the moment to rely on our Allies' impressions of Alfonsín. These vary widely. When senior French officials met him in Paris in February, the French roving Ambassador for South America described him as a man of considerable talent and a genuine moderate; but the Head of the South America Department in the Quai was unimpressed. Some Americans fear that Alfonsín's outlook on international economic and political affairs is marred by a pronounced anti-US bias and a tendency to see conspiracies: they attribute to him the view that 'imperialism' is responsible for many of the hemisphere's economic, social and political problems and that Argentina has been victimised by speculators and bankers who have drained the nation's wealth with the connivance of the military.

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

3 November, 1983.

*Dear Brian,*

The Lord Mayor of London telephoned me this afternoon with the following message. The senior partner, Senor Alfredo Spilsinger, of the Buenos Aires Branch of the Lord Mayor's accountancy firm, told the Lord Mayor that, if the Radical Party won the Argentine Election, he expected to be appointed Foreign Minister. If he was so elected, he hoped to have constructive and friendly discussions with the British Government. The Lord Mayor explained that he could not speak for the British Government or act as an intermediary, but said that he would use his good offices in passing on any messages. The Lord Mayor had received a telex from Senor Spilsinger this afternoon in which he had said that he was "now in a position to talk": the Lord Mayor interpreted this message as meaning that Senor Spilsinger had been appointed Foreign Minister, but was hoping to telephone Senor Spilsinger this evening to discover the position.

The Lord Mayor emphasised to me that he was not seeking in any way to become involved in relations between HMG and Argentina, but was willing to use his good offices with Senor Spilsinger in any way helpful to HMG if that could be useful. He had been a close friend of Senor Spilsinger for many years.

I pass this on for what it is worth. The Lord Mayor had tried to speak to Sir Antony Acland, but had been unable to owing to Sir Antony's absence abroad.

*Yours ever,*

*Robin Butler*

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

*LB*

CONFIDENTIAL

HL



cc MASTER SET.

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

3 November 1983

Argentine next-of-kin

There was some discussion on this subject when the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary called on the Prime Minister this morning.

In relation to previous correspondence, the Prime Minister made it clear that her main concern was that we should not appear to be weakening in our attitude towards our sovereignty over the Falkland Islands just because a new Government was in prospect in Argentina. In that context she did not wish it to appear that we were taking a new position on a possible visit by Argentine next-of-kin to the Islands. She had already told the United Nations Secretary General of our willingness to contemplate such a visit and we should continue to make clear our general willingness to do so. We should not conceal this either from the United Nations or from the House of Commons if we were asked. But it would not be necessary at this stage to go into the details of our offer.

A. J. COLES

RA

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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PRIME MINISTER

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 November 1983

Prime Minister

*MS*

The transcript is

attached.

*AS* <sup>1.</sup>/<sub>11</sub>

Arms for Argentina

I enclose an extract from a transcript of a BBC Radio 4 'Today' programme on 25 October which describes a campaign against the Jewish population in Argentina.

The Prime Minister has asked whether we can make use of this material to bring pressure on the US Government not to resume arms sales to Argentina. I should be grateful for very early advice and any comment you may have on the facts presented on the radio programme concerned.

Peter Ricketts Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Handley - cc [unclear] [unclear]  
Cru

W.C.

TRANSCRIPT FROM BBC RADIO 4 TODAY PROGRAMME, 25 OCTOBER 1983

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE JEWISH POPULATION IN ARGENTINA

COMMENTATOR: .....an utterly discredited military regime, and one of the less savoury aspects of the campaign which has come to the fore, is the growing emphasis on anti-semitism. Martin Leeburn reports.

MARTIN LEEBURN: That was a crowd of thousands of Jews in the centre of Buenos Aires last night, celebrating the forthcoming end of military rule, but also protesting at an upsurge in violence and provocations against Argentina's court of a million-strong Jewish community. In recent months there has been a serious anti-Jewish riot in the Southern city of Comodoro Rivadavia, several attacks on synagogues and even violence against Jewish school children. No-one's been arrested in any of these incidents. Some Jews here say that there's been no period like it since the Israeli secret service kidnapped Nazi war criminal Adolph Eichmann on the street of Buenos Aires in 1962 and a series of far right reprisals ensued. One of the organisers of last night's demonstration is an American Rabbi Marshall Meyer who's lived here for 26 years, and told me how seriously he took the situation.

MR MEYER: Well, there's been any number of acts in the last few months that have really created a great deal of anxiety on the part of the Jews of Argentina. The City has been painted, I would say virtually swathed with swastikas and anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist and anti-Israel inscriptions. The amount of anti-Semitic literature has suffered an extraordinary increment. They've just re-published Henry Ford's, The International Jew, they've re-published The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, there have been any number of people threatened, as well as some very violent scenes.

MARTIN LEEBURN: You say, they have re-published The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Who are "they" who are doing this?

MR MEYER: Well, I personally can't identify them, but living in a police state I can't believe that the Government can't identify them.

MARTIN LEEBURN: Well who do you think is behind it then?



MR MEYER: I think the extreme Right. But the extreme Right in Argentina is divided into any number of fragmentary atomised groups.

MARTIN LEEBURN: Is there anything co-ordinated, then, behind it? Why should it of come now?

MR MEYER: I think that it's quite clear that when you have a democratic opening in a society which is used to military dictatorship, then obviously when the Right is losing its power then they have to create destabilising elements in the society. And, we Jews, who've been around the stage of history for some 4,000 years, have our fair share of experience in these matters.

CONFIDENTIAL

HL

1 November 1983

Reaction to the Elections in Argentina

For the record, I should confirm (as I told you on the telephone some time ago) that the Prime Minister was content with the press line enclosed with your letter of 28 October, subject to the deletion of the words "as a first step" in paragraph 2.

JOHN COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



Title

Sub

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

1 November 1983

AMERICAN ARMS FOR ARGENTINA

BK 11  
I am sure that you have the point very much in mind, but the Prime Minister observed this morning how very damaging it would be if, in present circumstances, the US Government announced their willingness to resume arms sales to Argentina. She would be grateful for the advice of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on what action, following the Grenada situation, we should now take with the US Government to bring home to them the very serious difficulties in which we would be placed if such an announcement was made (at any rate in the next few weeks).

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Ry



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

31 October 1983

Falklands: Possible Visit by Argentine Next-of-Kin

---

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 28 October recording the view of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that we should not reveal in public, in particular at the United Nations General Assembly, the details of our proposal for an Argentine next-of-kin visit to the Falkland Islands.

The Prime Minister has commented that she referred to this visit during her talks with the UN Secretary-General in New York last month. She is inclined to think that it would be a mistake to conceal our offer (a) from the House of Commons if asked and (b) from the United Nations. Moreover, to conceal the details might make it appear that we were adopting a different attitude to the new Government in Argentina and that our resolve on sovereignty was weakening.

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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8



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*This overlong letter concludes that we should wait for a new government in Argentina before taking up again the idea of a next of kin visit - and meanwhile not reveal the details of our proposal publicly.*

28 October, 1983

Dear John,

*Agree?*

*I referred to the proposed visit during my talks with the J-6 at A.J.C. 25/10. The U.N. I think it would be a mistake to*

Falklands: Possible Visit by Argentine Next-of-kin

It was agreed in OD(EM) on 6 July that an initiative should be taken to facilitate a visit to the Argentine Cemetery at Darwin, on the conditions discussed at that meeting. The Foreign Secretary was invited first to arrange for the Falkland Islanders to be consulted: Sir Rex Hunt's telegram number 447 of 2 August 1983 (copy enclosed) reported the unanimous consent of the Islands' Council.

*Cancel this offer a) from the H.C. if*

We duly approached the Swiss Government. Their Ambassador delivered to the Argentine Foreign Ministry on 19 August a Memorandum setting out the conditions. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, the President of the International Red Cross and the Government of Uruguay were told, in confidence, of the action the Swiss had taken on our behalf.

*asked and b) from the U.N. However*

There has been no response from Buenos Aires. If the present Junta had managed a timely response, it might have been possible to organise a visit before Christmas - the timing suggested by the Prime Minister at the meeting of OD(EM) on 6 July. Now that we are so much closer to the transition to civilian rule, however, the Foreign Secretary would prefer to await the assumption of power by the new regime before asking the Swiss to take the matter up again. The proposals would be a convincing means of demonstrating to the new rulers of Argentina that we are serious in what we have been saying about wishing to improve bilateral relations in certain clearly defined fields. The new government will not come to power before December, at the earliest. There would, therefore, still be time for a visit before the end of the forthcoming Falklands summer in mid-May.

*it would seem as if we were a different attitude to the new govt. and that our resolve on sovereignty was weakening*

At the OD(EM) meeting on 6 July, Sir Geoffrey made the point that a British initiative to permit a visit, even if it failed, would be helpful internationally, not least in the United Nations. The Argentines' silence made it necessary to look again at the possibility of referring to our proposals at the time of the General Assembly Debate on the Falklands, expected to take place in the week beginning 7 November. Sir Geoffrey believes that any decision to refer to our proposals in public should be taken in the light of the likely impact of any announcement on the prospects for that visit itself,



rather than in terms of our tactics at the General Assembly or elsewhere. Our conditions ~~do~~<sup>in</sup>clude that we regard it as essential that discussion of the proposed visit should remain confidential until all concerned are agreed that the time is ripe for a public statement. Revelation in the General Assembly of our proposals would earn us some extra goodwill, but it would be unlikely to make a significant difference to the voting pattern; and it would certainly not improve the prospects for Argentine acceptance of our proposals. Sir Geoffrey thinks that it will only really be open to us to make mileage ~~unilaterally~~<sup>internationally</sup> through the public revelation of our very reasonable conditions if the new Argentine government, having been given a decent period for reflection, clearly indicate that they are not prepared to organise a visit on these terms. Until then, our provision for confidentiality must apply as much to them as to the present regime.

Sir Geoffrey accordingly proposes to instruct Sir John Thomson not to reveal any details of our proposals during the Falklands Debate. We envisage giving Sir John discretion to refer, in the context of our efforts to normalise bilateral relations, to readiness in principle to accept a suitably-prepared Next-of-Kin visit, under ICRC supervision: this is the line we have taken in public for some time, ever since the time of Destefanis' attempted trip. But Sir John Thomson should give no hint of the approach that has been made by the Swiss in August.

If the Prime Minister is content with the tactics recommended in this letter, we propose to tell the Swiss Government, in strict confidence, that we wish the matter to be left alone for the time being, on the grounds that this offers the best prospect of eventually coming to a satisfactory arrangement with Argentina. We would simultaneously tell the Falkland Islands' Councils of our thinking - Sir Rex Hunt and the Councillors are already well aware of the Argentines' failure to respond, and share our judgement that the desirability of setting up a once-and-for-all visit on satisfactory terms must be the primary consideration. We would also keep the UN Secretary-General, President of the ICRC and the Government of Uruguay generally aware of how matters stand.

*Yours ever,*

*Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Office

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

E

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GRS 160  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FROM PORT STANLEY 022040Z AUG 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGAM NUMBER 447 OF 2 AUGUST

APF 225/4		
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY		
- 3 AUG 1983		
DESK OFFICER		REGISTRY
INDEX	PA	Action Taken

ARGENTINE NEXT-OF-KIN VISIT

1. THE PROPOSAL THAT HMG SHOULD TAKE INITIATIVE ON ARGENTINE NEXT OF KIN VISIT THROUGH THE SWISS AUTHORITIES WAS AGREED UNANIMOUSLY BY COUNCILLORS TODAY (2 AUGUST). IN PARTICULAR THEY ACCEPTED THAT WE NEED NOT INSIST ON THE COURTESY FLAG BEING FLOWN (BUT THAT RED CROSS FLAG MUST): THAT SMALL, CAREFULLY CHOSEN, POOL OF JOURNALISTS BE EMBARKED: AND THAT IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES COULD BE WAIVED.

2. COUNCILLORS HOPED THAT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES AT THE COMMITTEE OF 24 WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE USE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS VALUE OF THIS PROPOSAL. THERE WAS SOME CONCERN THAT ARGENTINA MIGHT INSIST ON PROPOSAL BEING KEPT CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE MOMENT., BUT COUNCILLORS HOPED THAT, SHOULD ARGENTINA TRY TO MAKE PROPAGANDA GAINS AT THE UN, HMG'S PROPOSAL WOULD THEN BE PUBLICISED UNDERLINING THAT ISLAND COUNCILLORS HAD AGREED IT ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS.

HUNT

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Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Agree the attached  
comment to the press?

A.F.C. 28/10

See amendment  
not

28 October 1983

Dear John, Copy: Mr. Ingham.

Reaction to the Elections in Argentina

We shall be pressed to make some comment on the elections due to be held in Argentina on 30 October, whatever their result. Quite apart from the Falklands dimension, these are the first elections to be held in Argentina since 1973. The country has been under military rule since 1976.

The official British reaction will be very carefully scrutinised in Buenos Aires and elsewhere. The Foreign Secretary has no doubt that the general state of our relations with Argentina does not warrant such a gesture as sending any message through one of the Protecting Powers to the Argentine politicians who are successful in the elections. Sir Geoffrey feels that we should use the occasion, without showing undue warmth or raising the hope of any change in our position on sovereignty over the Falklands, to show that we are not indifferent to the fact that elections are being held in Argentina. It could be helpful to us tactically at the United Nations and among the Ten to make this clear. The occasion also provides an opening to encourage the new Argentine Government to adopt more constructive policies than those of the present Junta. I enclose a suggested draft of our statement. You will see that this is a comment on the electoral process rather than its result: because of the complicated system of Electoral Colleges, the Presidential result may not be clear until quite late in November, although the composition of the new Congress should be apparent before then.

Sir Geoffrey considers that we should be very careful not to create exaggerated expectations of movement in our Falklands policy (or theirs) as a result of the Argentine elections, and considers that this will be more easily achieved if we omit any reference to the Islands in our statement. But we are likely to be pressed and we have therefore suggested a contingency line drawing attention to the Falkland Islanders' right also to live under a Government of their own choosing.

Within the Ten, there has been an initiative by the Greek Presidency, supported by some others, for a statement welcoming the elections and also containing quite strong language about human rights in Argentina. We have accepted the principle of a statement by the Ten and shall ensure that it is not inconsistent with the British position. We have proposed that it should include a reference to the need for observance of human rights and the rule of law in Argentina.

I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

Peter Ricketts



CONFIDENTIAL

ARGENTINE ELECTIONS:

BRITISH STATEMENT

1. We welcome this step towards the restoration of democracy in Argentina.

2. We hope that as a first step <sup>?</sup> the new government will be more inclined to respond positively to the ideas we have put forward to secure the restoration of normal commercial and economic relations between our two countries. This is the only realistic way towards the restoration of confidence between us.

[If pressed on sovereignty]

3. We hope that a democratically elected Argentine Government will recognise the Falkland Islanders' right also to live under a government of their own choosing.

CONFIDENTIAL



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1983  
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CONFIDENTIAL

27516 - 1

OO WASHINGTON  
OO UKMIS NEW YORK  
GRS 708  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM FCO 271440Z OCT 83  
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1803 OF 27 OCTOBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
INFO ROUTINE EC POSTS

*Handwritten:*  
AOL 21/10.  
h.a.

YOUR TEL NO 3031 FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. PLEASE LET THE AMERICANS KNOW AT A SUITABLY HIGH LEVEL THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND I ARE DISAPPOINTED AND DISTRESSED THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ONCE AGAIN BE PROPOSING TO VOTE WITH ARGENTINA AND DIRECTLY OPPOSITE US ON A MATTER OF SUCH IMPORTANCE TO US. WE CONTINUE TO FIND THIS AN EXTRAORDINARY POSTURE FOR ONE CLOSE ALLY TO ADOPT TOWARDS ANOTHER AT THE UNITED NATIONS. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES' ATTITUDE WILL SET BACK RATHER THAN ADVANCE THE PROSPECTS FOR A RELAXATION OF TENSION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC BECAUSE IT CAN ONLY ENCOURAGE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT PRESENT AND FUTURE TO CONTINUE ON THE PRESENT STERILE COURSE AND DAMAGE THE CHANCES OF THE CHANGE OF HEART IN ARGENTINA WITHOUT WHICH THERE CAN BE NO IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION.
2. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION. I DO NOT PROPOSE TO PRESS THE AMERICANS TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION. WE HAVE ALWAYS THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT THEY WOULD FEEL BOUND TO SUPPORT A DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH SO CLOSELY RESEMBLES LAST YEAR'S. AS YOU HAVE POINTED OUT THE DRAFT HAS BEEN SLIGHTLY STRENGTHENED WITH THE INSERTION OF THE SEVENTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH AND THE EXPRESSION OF REGRET AT THE LACK OF PROGRESS SINCE LAST YEAR WHICH IMPLIES A CRITICISM OF US. BUT I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT IT IS NOT (NOT) IN OUR INTEREST TO PRESS THESE POINTS TOO HARD WITH THE AMERICANS. WE DO NOT WANT THEM TO ATTEMPT TO PLACATE US BY PERSUADING THE ARGENTINES TO MAKE SOME MODEST ADJUSTMENT TO THE DRAFT WHICH COULD THEN LOSE US THE VOTES OF SOME IF NOT ALL OF OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS.
3. LAST YEAR THE AMERICANS ANNOUNCED THEIR DECISION TWO DAYS

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27516 - 1

BEFORE THE VOTE. THUS COMPOUNDING OUR DIFFICULTY WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THE FINAL STAGES OF OUR LOBBYING. THIS TIME THEY HAVE GIVEN THE ARGENTINES THE WEEKS NOTICE OF THEIR POSITION. WE MUST EXPECT THE ARGENTINES TO MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF THIS IN THEIR INTENSIVE CONTACTS WITH THE EUROPEANS. PLEASE POINT OUT TO THE AMERICANS THAT THEY HAVE DONE US A DISSERVICE BY TAKING THIS STEP AT SO EARLY A STAGE AND URGE THEM TO DO NOTHING WHICH MIGHT ENCOURAGE THE ITALIANS, THE FRENCH OR OTHER PARTNERS TO CHANGE THEIR VOTE. WE NOTE THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT DO NOT PROPOSE TO BE ACTIVE IN SUPPORT OF THE ARGENTINE DRAFT BUT THEY MAY WELL BE APPROACHED.

4. WE HOPE THE AMERICANS COULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO ANY EUROPEAN ENQUIRERS THAT WHILE THEY, FOR REASONS PECULIAR TO THEMSELVES WERE PROPOSING TO MAINTAIN THE POSITION THEY ADOPTED LAST YEAR THEY SAW NO REASON WHY THE UNITED KINGDOM'S PARTNERS IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION SHOULD CHANGE THE POSITION THEY HAVE ADOPTED. WE PARTICULARLY HOPE THAT THE AMERICANS WILL REFRAIN FROM ENDORSING THE ITALIAN IDEA THAT A VOTE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSITE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM OVER THE FALKLANDS IS A GOOD WAY OF OFFERING ENCOURAGEMENT TO A NEW DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN ARGENTINA. THERE ARE MANY WAYS IN WHICH SUCH A GESTURE COULD BE MADE. IT SHOULD NOT BE AT OUR EXPENSE.

5. BURT OFFERED NO HELP REGARDING ARMS SALES. IT IS ONLY SMALL CONSOLATION THAT THE AMERICANS DO NOT NOW INTEND TO CERTIFY HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA BEFORE THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN POWER. YOU SHOULD KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON THIS SUBJECT, WHICH I REGARD AS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE UNGA DECISION YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT THE RESUMPTION OF UNITED STATES ARMS DELIVERIES TO ARGENTINA COULD SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE THREAT TO THE FALKLANDS. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE TAKEN VERY BADLY BY THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT AND PUBLIC. ARGENTINE ATTITUDES REMAIN MENACING. THE JUNTA HAVE NOT EVEN DECLARED A FORMAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND LEADING CONTENDERS IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN HAVE GIVEN NO INDICATION WHATEVER THAT THEY MIGHT BE PREPARED TO RENOUNCE THE USE OF FORCE IN THE FUTURE. DECISION IN FAVOUR OF CERTIFICATION AND ARMS SUPPLIES WOULD GIVE PRECISELY THE

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27516 - 1

WRONG SIGNALS TO THE INCOMING ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND  
MISTAKENLY, CONFER A MARK OF INTERNATIONAL RESPECTABILITY ON A  
NATION WHICH HAS RECENTLY COMMITTED A BRUTAL VIOLATION OF  
INTERNATIONAL LAW. THE MESSAGE IN THESE SIGNALS WILL BE  
INTENSIFIED IF THERE ARE FURTHER LEAKS SUCH AS THE REPORT  
DATELINED WASHINGTON IN THE DAILY TELEGRAPH OF 22 OCTOBER.

HOWE

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MR A TITCHENER DTI (Victoria St)

Mr A FORTNAM IAT/ D. TRANSPORT

RESIDENT CLERK

00 FCO DESKBY 280900Z

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 280026Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 1172 OF 27 OCTOBER 1983

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

MIPT: SECRETARY GENERALS REPORT: FALKLANDS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ADVANCE COPY OF SECRETARY GENERALS REPORT ON THE FALKLANDS.

QUESTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS)  
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL

1. THE PRESENT REPORT IS SUBMITTED IN PURSUANCE OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 37/9 OF 4 NOVEMBER 1982.

2. BY THAT RESOLUTION, I WAS REQUESTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO UNDERTAKE A RENEWED MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES IN ORDER TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF

~~TO UNDERTAKE A RENEWED MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES IN ORDER TO~~  
ASSIST THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF  
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER  
TO FIND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE SOVEREIGNTY  
DISPUTE RELATING TO THE QUESTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (MAL-  
VINAS), AND TO REPORT TO THE ASSEMBLY AT ITS THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION  
ON THE PROGRESS MADE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT  
RESOLUTION.

3. FOLLOWING ITS ADOPTION, I COMMUNICATED THE CONTENTS OF THE  
RESOLUTION TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED  
KINGDOM AND EXPRESSED MY DESIRE TO BE OF EVERY ASSISTANCE IN  
FACILITATING A SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM WHICH WOULD PROVIDE THE  
BASIS FOR AN ENDURING PEACE IN THE AREA. I REITERATED MY OFFER IN  
A SUBSEQUENT LETTER ADDRESSED TO BOTH PARTIES IN JULY 1983. IN  
ADDITION, I HAD EXTENSIVE EXCHANGES WITH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CON-  
CERNED, INCLUDING MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT OF ARGENTINA AND THE  
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AS WELL AS WITH THEIR  
RESPECTIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS.

4. THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM CONVEYED  
TO ME THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS, WHICH WERE MOST RECENTLY  
OUTLINED IN THE STATEMENT MADE DURING THE GENERAL DEBATE AT  
THE THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY THE MINISTER  
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND WORSHIP OF ARGENTINA AND BY THE SECRETARY  
OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED  
KINGDOM.

5. WHILE IT IS CLEAR THAT NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT BEGIN UNLESS BOTH  
PARTIES AGREE, IT IS MY BELIEF THAT A RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE,  
COUPLED WITH THE ADOPTION OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, CAN  
CONTRIBUTE TO A NORMALISATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC  
AND OPEN THE WAY TOWARDS A LASTING SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. FOR MY  
PART, I STAND READY TO ASSIST BOTH PARTIES IN THIS PROCESS.

THOMSON

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

26 October, 1983.

Falklands at the General Assembly:  
American Position

BR / Thank you for providing a revised paragraph 5 to the draft telegram enclosed with John Holmes' letter of 21 October. The Prime Minister has approved the text as amended.

A. J. COLLETT

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



RESTRICTED



CF Young?

~~HE~~ - of Hon's?  
CF in GR NOT Honours

Foreign and Commonwealth Office AM

London SW1A 2AH

25 October 1983

Dear David

Thank you for your letter of 21 October and its enclosures about the public announcement of the award of South Atlantic Battle Honours.

Lady Young is content with the way in which you propose the announcement should be handled. She asks, however, that MOD officials keep in close touch with the FCO about the timing of the announcement of the Army honours referred to in Answer 4 of the media briefing.

Yours ever

S G Eldon

S G Eldon  
PS/Baroness Young

D O Arnold-Forster Esq  
Private Secretary to Lord Trefgarne  
Ministry of Defence  
Main Building  
Whitehall  
SW1 2HB

cc: John Coles Esq, 10 Downing Street  
David Beamish Esq, House of Lords

RESTRICTED

1985 2 -



TRANSCRIPT FROM BBC RADIO 4 TODAY PROGRAMME, 25 OCTOBER 1983

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE JEWISH POPULATION IN ARGENTINA

COMMENTATOR: .....an utterly discredited military regime, and one of the less savoury aspects of the campaign which has come to the fore, is the growing emphasis on anti-semitism. Martin Leeburn reports.

MARTIN LEEBURN: That was a crowd of thousands of Jews in the centre of Buenos Aires last night, celebrating the forthcoming end of military rule, but also protesting at an upsurge in violence and provocations against Argentina's court of a million-strong Jewish community. In recent months there has been a serious anti-Jewish riot in the Southern city of Comodoro Rivadavia, several attacks on synagogues and even violence against Jewish school children. No-one's been arrested in any of these incidents. Some Jews here say that there's been no period like it since the Israeli secret service kidnapped Nazi war criminal Adolph Eichmann on the street of Buenos Aires in 1962 and a series of far right reprisals ensued. One of the organisers of last night's demonstration is an American Rabbi Marshall Meyer who's lived here for 26 years, and told me how seriously he took the situation.

MR MEYER: Well, there's been any number of acts in the last few months that have really created a great deal of anxiety on the part of the Jews of Argentina. The City has been painted, I would say virtually swathed with swastikas and anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist and anti-Israel inscriptions. The amount of anti-Semitic literature has suffered an extraordinary increment. They've just re-published Henry Ford's, The International Jew, they've re-published The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, there have been any number of people threatened, as well as some very violent scenes.

MARTIN LEEBURN: You say, they have re-published The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Who are "they" who are doing this?

MR MEYER: Well, I personally can't identify them, but living in a police state I can't believe that the Government can't identify them.

MARTIN LEEBURN: Well who do you think is behind it then?

MR MEYER: I think the extreme Right. But the extreme Right in Argentina is divided into any number of fragmentary atomised groups.

MARTIN LEEBURN: Is there anything co-ordinated, then, behind it? Why should it of come now?

MR MEYER: I think that it's quite clear that when you have a democratic opening in a society which is used to military dictatorship, then obviously when the Right is losing its power then they have to create destabilising elements in the society. And, we Jews, who've been around the stage of history for some 4,000 years, have our fair share of experience in these matters.



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

You did not like the first  
draft of this telegram.

There is now a much stronger  
final proposal about US  
arms sale to Argentina.

Agree telegram?

Yes  
no

A.J.C.  $\frac{25}{10}$

See ECOT  
A.J.C. 21/10/83

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 October 1983

Dear John,

Falklands: American Position

Thank you for your letter of 24 October passing on the Prime Minister's comments about the passage on arms sales in the draft telegram enclosed in John Holmes' letter of 21 October.

I enclose a revised draft of paragraph 5. We take it from your letter that the Prime Minister's remarks do not apply to the preceding paragraphs on the UN General Assembly, which are already drafted in quite strong terms.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Argentina - Relations P+35.

London 27/11/47



NEW DRAFT PARAGRAPH 5 TO REPLACE EXISTING PARAGRAPH 5  
IN DRAFT TELEGRAM TO WASHINGTON

5. Burt offered no help regarding arms sales. It is only small consolation that the Americans do not now intend to certify human rights in Argentina before the civilian government has taken power. You should keep up the pressure on this subject, which I regard as more important than the UNGA decision. You should emphasise that the resumption of United States arms deliveries to Argentina could significantly increase the threat to the Falklands. It would therefore be taken very badly by the British Parliament and public. Argentine attitudes remain menacing. The Junta have not even declared a formal cessation of hostilities and leading contenders in the election campaign have given no indication whatever that they might be prepared to renounce the use of force in the future. Decision in favour of certification and arms supplies would give precisely the wrong signals to the incoming Argentine Government and, mistakenly, confer a mark of international respectability on a nation which has recently committed a brutal violation of international law. The message in these signals will be intensified if there are further leaks such as the report datelined Washington in the Daily Telegraph of 22 October.



GPS 374

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FM LIMA 241800Z OCT  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 258 OF 24 OCTOBER

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION  
27/10/83

MY TELNOS 255 AND 256 :VISIT OF TAM DALYELL MP

1. TODAY'S EDITION OF THE WEEKLY (AND EXTREMELY PRO ARGENTINE) MAGAZINE "CARETAS" ALSO CARRIES AN ARTICLE, WHICH SUGGESTS THAT THIS VISIT AROSE FROM A COMMENT BY PRESIDENT BELAUNDE IN MARCH DURING AN INTERVIEW WITH THE ARGENTINE MAGAZINE "TODO ES HISTORIA". REFERRING TO THE PERUVIAN PEACE PLAN, BELAUNDE REPEATEDLY SAID TO THE INTERVIEWER FELIX LUNA THAT HE POSSESSED VERY IMPORTANT UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS AND QUOTE ONE DAY I'M GOING TO REVEAL THE LAST BRITISH DOCUMENT I SENT TO GALTIERI BY TELEX UNQUOTE. THE COMMENT WAS APPARENTLY RELAYED TO DALYELL BY THE ARGENTINE ACADEMIC GUILLERMO MAKIN, WHO ACCOMPANIED DALYELL ON THE LIMA VISIT.

2. "CARETA" STATES THAT DALYELL WAS RECEIVED BY EX PREMIER ULLOA IN ADDITION TO THE PRESIDENT, BUT THAT EX WAR MINISTER CISNEROS CRIED OFF THE APPOINTMENT AT THE LAST MOMENT. THE ARTICLE NOTES THAT DALYELL RETURNED TO LONDON WITHOUT THE PRESIDENTS QUOTE SECRET PAPER UNQUOTE.

3. IN THE "CARETAS" ARTICLE, DALYELL REPEATS HIS CHARGES ABOUT THE SINKING OF THE BELGRANO BEING QUOTE FOR MILITARY PURPOSES UNQUOTE AND MENTIONS THE QUOTE TRIVIALISATION UNQUOTE BY HMG OF THE PERUVIAN INITIATIVE. THE ARTICLE ENDS BY SAYING THAT DALYELL GAVE A LENGTHY INTERVIEW, THE IMPLICATION BEING THAT MORE WILL BE REVEALED IN DUE COURSE (THIS VERSION MUST ONLY JUST HAVE BEATEN THE "CARETAS" DEADLINE FOR RECEIVING MATERIAL.

CREEK

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FCO

FID

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FM LIMA 241730Z OCT 83  
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TELNO 256 OF 24 OCTOBER  
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MIPT : VISIT OF TAM DALYELL TO PERU

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION.  
25/10/83.

1. IN ITS EDITION OF 22 OCTOBER EL COMERCIO CARRIES WHAT IT DESCRIBES AS AN EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH TAM DALYELL QUOTE FOLLOWING A PRIVATE VISIT DURING WHICH DALYELL SAW PRESIDENT BELAUNDE AND OTHER PERUVIAN POLITICIANS UNQUOTE.
2. DALYELL IS REPORTED AS SAYING THAT THE PRIME MINISTER ORDERED THE SINKING OF THE BELGRANO TO PREVENT THE PERUVIAN PEACE PLAN FROM SUCCEEDING AND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S WISH FOR A MILITARY VICTORY HAD FRUSTRATED THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE UN, DESPITE THE MEDIATION OF THE PERUVIAN SECRETARY GENERAL.
3. DALYELL IS ALSO REPORTED AS SAYING QUOTE IT IS TOTALLY FALSE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER DID NOT KNOW OF THE PERUVIAN PEACE PLAN UNTIL 3 HOURS AFTER THE SINKING UNQUOTE. THE PROOF IS THAT THE PLAN QUOTE WAS APPROVED IN PRINCIPLE BY BOTH THE ENGLISH AND ARGENTINE NEGOTIATORS AND THE AMBASSADORS OF BOTH COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SIGN THE DOCUMENT ON THE SAME DAY. THE PERUVIAN AUTHORITIES WHO WERE INVOLVED WOULD BE ABLE TO SHOW THE RESPECTIVE DOCUMENTATION TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PEACE PLAN OF PRESIDENT BELAUNDE WAS PERFECTLY VIABLE UNQUOTE. DALYELL ADDED THAT US SUPPORTED THE UK TO OBTAIN BRITISH SUPPORT FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE.

CREEK

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Argentinian  
relations  
Pt. 35

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

24 October 1983

Sir Nicholas Henderson

John Holmes wrote to me on 21 October about the intention of Sir Nicholas Henderson to write an article for The Economist about the Falklands crisis.

The Prime Minister has no objection to Sir Nicholas proceeding on these lines. We note that you will be clearing the text in detail. We should like an opportunity to see it.

BK |

A. J. COLES

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

S E C R E T

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Argentina  
Relations

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

24 October 1983

Falklands at the General Assembly:  
American Position

John Holmes wrote to me on 21 October enclosing a draft telegram to Washington.

The Prime Minister finds the telegram too mild in tone. She has stated that if the United States sells arms to Argentina she will find it necessary to make clear in public her hostility to such a decision. She is therefore inclined to think it wrong that in carrying out the instructions envisaged the Embassy in Washington should make only passing reference to the certification issue. I should be grateful if you could provide a revised and strengthened draft.

B/E /

A. J. COLES

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 October 1983

Prime Minister

- ① Content for Sir N. Henderson to write the article?
- ② Would you like to see the text?

Dear John,

A-J.C. 24/10

The Prime Minister will wish to be aware of the intention of Sir Nicholas Henderson to write an article about the Falklands crisis, which would be published in the Economist.

The initiative came from Sir N Henderson in July. He told us that his idea was to write about the bearing of the sinking of the Belgrano on the negotiations that were current at the time, as seen through the eyes of the United States authorities. Sir N Henderson said he particularly wished to help us to scotch the myths that were developing about the Belgrano. Our view at that stage, when speculation about the Belgrano was continuing, was that we would have no objection to his writing such a piece, provided we could see it first.

In September, Sir N Henderson showed us a draft article. He had expanded the scope to a point where it was unrecognisable from the basis earlier agreed with us: he addressed at much greater length than the Belgrano episode the whole question of the United States' help to us, both material and diplomatic. We pointed out the political drawbacks of reviving this issue. These reservations have been echoed by senior officials in the State Department whom we have consulted. But Sir N Henderson has been encouraged by Mr Haig and Mr Weinberger to draw attention to the United States' help for us, which, Sir N Henderson insists, has not been properly understood in Britain. Most recently he has quoted Mr Deaver as seeing advantage in the publication of an account of the US contribution. (None of the three has seen any text.)

While we were debating with Sir N Henderson the case for publishing material about the United States' role, controversy over the Belgrano died down and Sir Robin Day's revelation about Mr Foot's private views encouraged us to think that the Labour Party would not be inclined to revive the issue. We therefore suggested to him that, while we would welcome a piece in support of our account when the issue did surface again, we would prefer him not to publish an article whose principal effect would be to restimulate discussion. \*~~~~~\* that Mr Tam Dalyell has travelled to Peru and may be received by

/President

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

\*~\* Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4) of the Official Secrets Act 1989. 17 January 2013



President Belaunde. A further, Dalyell-inspired, round of Belgrano controversy thus appears inevitable. It may, therefore, be that we can put Sir N Henderson's perseverance to good effect.

At our suggestion, Sir N Henderson is currently revising his article, in order to shorten his coverage of the United States' role and to excise altogether his more provocative passages on the subject. We have asked him to concentrate on the Belgrano, as well as to ensure that his account is fully consistent with those already given by Ministers in Parliament and in the Press. He has just given us a revised text, designed to meet these aims, which we shall study very carefully. It would meanwhile be helpful to know whether the Prime Minister sees objection to Sir N Henderson going ahead on these lines. He is evidently under considerable pressure from the Economist. Andrew Wright has suggested that, if in the end no article is forthcoming, the implication must be that we are not sure of our ground on the Belgrano. We do not of course wish to have our arms twisted in this way, but given the Dalyell factor, the Foreign Secretary thinks that the balance of advantage does now lie in allowing Sir N Henderson to go ahead on the terms described, preferably delaying publication until Mr Dalyell has made his next public move. We will of course clear the text in detail here before publication, and would be happy to show it to you also if you so wish.

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

GRS 70

UNCLASSIFIED  
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 211823Z OCT 83  
TO ROUTINE ROME  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1 OF 21 OCTOBER  
INFO FCO

YOUR TELNO 511 TO FCO: FALKLANDS VOTE AT THE UN

1. YOUR PARAGRAPH 2. THE FALKLANDS DEBATE IS  
INSCRIBED FOR 9-10 NOVEMBER (WITH THE VOTE BEING TAKEN  
ON THE SECOND DAY).

THOMSON

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 October 1983

*I think the telegram too mild  
 in tone. If U.S. this  
 will seem to encourage  
 be very hostile in public  
 such a decision - very  
 Dear John, President  
 critical of the  
 state of affairs  
 Prime Minister  
 agree with the contents of  
 the enclosed telegram?*

*A.S.C. 24/10.*

Falklands at the General Assembly: American Position

You will have seen from Washington telno 3031 (copy enclosed) that the Americans have told us formally that they intend to vote for the Argentine draft resolution. They have evidently also told the Argentines.

We have always thought it most unlikely that the Americans would change their position on a draft resolution which so closely resembles last year's. We must recognise that it would be difficult for the Americans, in terms of their relations with Latin America, to draw back from the position they adopted at the last General Assembly. The Foreign Secretary continues to think that we should not use up credit unproductively in trying to press the Americans to change their position. He accordingly does not suggest that the Prime Minister should take the matter up personally with President Reagan.

Sir Geoffrey does think however that we should make clear to the Americans our strong feelings about the position they have adopted at the United Nations and should do our best to minimise the impact of their decision on the thinking of our European partners.

The Washington telegram also confirms that the Americans are moving towards the resumption of arms sales to Argentina. We shall need to keep them fully aware of our misgivings on this front also, on the lines the Prime Minister has already taken with the President. But the time-scales are different and the Foreign Secretary thinks it best if the Ambassador concentrates on the UN problem for the moment.

I enclose a draft telegram to Washington and should be grateful for any comments you may have.

*Yours ever*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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Section and Division of the Office

Section 271-10

21 JUN 1983

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

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FM WASHINGTON 192341Z OCTOBER 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3031 OF 10 OCT

INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, ATHENS, BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN,  
DUBLIN, THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, PARIS, ROME, UKREP BRUSSELS

MY TELNO 2962: UNGA DEBATE: FALKLANDS

1. BURT (ASSISTANT SECRETARY, EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, STATE DEPARTMENT) ASKED THE MINISTER TO CALL YESTERDAY TO FOLLOW UP MY DISCUSSION WITH EAGLEBURGER ON 13 OCTOBER. HE SAID THAT EAGLEBURGER HAD UNDERTAKEN TO COME BACK TO US ONCE THE AMERICANS HAD MADE UP THEIR MINDS ABOUT THEIR VOTING INTENTIONS.

2. READING CAREFULLY FROM A PREPARED PIECE OF PAPER, BURT SAID THAT IT APPEARED TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WHICH THE ARGENTINIANS HAD GIVEN THEM WAS LEGALLY EQUIVALENT TO LAST YEAR'S. HE CONTINUED THAT, PRIMARILY ON GROUNDS OF POLICY CONSISTENCY, THE US WOULD VOTE FOR THE RESOLUTION IF NO OBJECTIONABLE LANGUAGE WAS ADDED TO THE DRAFT. THE US CONTINUED TO SUPPORT A NEGOTIATED OUTCOME ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES AS THE BEST MEANS TO SETTLE THIS DISPUTE AND DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ATTEMPTING TO APPLY PRESSURE WOULD ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS. THEY ALSO HOPED THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD REFRAIN FROM TAKING STEPS WHICH WOULD HEIGHTEN TENSIONS.

sic 2. THOMAS SAID THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THE ARGUMENT ABOUT CONSISTENCY BUT HAD HOPED THAT ARGENTINA'S REFUSAL TO DECLARE A FORMAL END OF HOSTILITIES SINCE THE PREVIOUS UNGA DEBATE WOULD HAVE LED THE AMERICANS TO ABSTAIN THIS TIME. QUOTE LEGALLY EQUIVALENT UNQUOTE WAS A NEAT FORMULATION BUT THE FACT WAS THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME STRENGTHENING OF THE TEXT. THIS DECISION WAS THEREFORE DISAPPOINTING. BUT WHAT WAS NOW IMPORTANT WAS THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD RESIST ANY TEMPTATION TO REPEAT LAST YEAR'S UNHELPFUL PERFORMANCE BY LOBBYING ON BEHALF OF THE ARGENTINE DRAFT. WE LOOKED TO THE AMERICANS TO KEEP A LOW PROFILE. BURT TOOK NOTE.

3. THOMAS SAID THAT AS REGARDS THE REFERENCE TO A NEGOTIATED OUTCOME, BURT WOULD BE AWARE THAT AS LONG AS THE ARGENTINIANS STUCK TO THE VIEW THAT NEGOTIATIONS COULD ONLY BE ABOUT THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY, THERE WOULD BE NOTHING TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT. HE SAID HE NOTED THE AMERICAN RELUCTANT TO APPLY PRESSURE BUT HE HOPED NEVERTHELESS THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD ENCOURAGE THE NEW ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO RENOUNCE HOSTILITIES AND MOVE TOWARDS NORMALISATION. THIS WAS OUR OBJECTIVE AND IT WAS SURELY IN THE US INTEREST TO REMOVE THIS SOURCE OF TENSION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. (4)

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4. BURT UNDERTOOK TO LOOK INTO THESE POINTS. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HE CONSIDERED THAT THE US WOULD WISH TO PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE BUT WOULD EXPECT A DEGREE OF GIVE AND TAKE FROM BOTH SIDES.

5. ON CERTIFICATION, BURT CONFIRMED THAT UK CONCERNS WERE WELL KNOWN. BUT THIS WAS A BILATERAL US-ARGENTINE ISSUE, IT HAD ARISEN IN A HUMAN RIGHTS CONTEXT WHICH PREDATED THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT. IF THERE WAS NOW A LEGAL BASIS (IMPROVED HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE) FOR A US SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP, LOGIC SUGGESTED THAT THIS SHOULD GO AHEAD. ARMS SALES WOULD NEVERTHELESS BE CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF ARGENTINE REQUESTS AND ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS. THE US WOULD WISH TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US ABOUT THIS.

6. THOMAS REPLIED THAT, AS THE PRIME MINISTER HERSELF HAD MADE CLEAR DURING HER RECENT VISIT, CERTIFICATION LEADING TO ARMS SALES WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE UNDERSTOOD IN BRITAIN. IT WAS NOT DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE THE REACTION IF BRITISH FORCES CAME UNDER ATTACK FROM ARMS SUPPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES. BURT HAD MENTIONED HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT HUMAN RIGHTS WERE SURELY INDIVISIBLE. THERE COULD HARDLY HAVE BEEN A CLEARER SUPPRESSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS THAN IN THE FALKLANDS, WHICH REMAINED UNDER THREAT. BURT HAD THE GRACE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THIS WAS AN ARGUMENT WHICH THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES USED IN THE CONTEXT OF EL SALVADOR.

7. AFTER THE MEETING, A STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL WHO WAS PRESENT SAID THAT VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL TALKING POINTS HAD BEEN USED WITH THE ARGENTINES, WHO HAS RESPONDED BY URGING THAT PRESSURE BE PUT ON US OVER THE AIRFIELD IN PARTICULAR. THE AMERICANS HAD DECLINED. THE OFFICIAL ADDED THAT IT WAS AGREED WITHIN THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO US ACTIVITY IN SUPPORT OF THE ARGENTINE DRAFT, BUT IT WAS HARD TO GUARANTEE THE CONDUCT OF THE US MISSION IN NEW YORK. AS FOR CERTIFICATION, CURRENT TALK WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT WAS OF TIMING THIS TO COINCIDE WITH INAUGURATION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT. WE CONTINUED TO MAKE APPROPRIATELY DISCOURAGING NOISES.

WRIGHT

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Drafted by  
(Block Capitals) N C R WILLIAMS

TELEGRAM

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Tel. Extn. 233 4330

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COMMS. DEPT.  
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(Time) .....Z

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Copies to:-

[TEXT]

YOUR TELNO 3031: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. Please let the Americans know at a suitably high level that the Prime Minister and I are disappointed and distressed that the United States should once again be proposing to vote with Argentina and directly opposite to us on a matter of such importance to us. We continue to find this an extraordinary posture for one close ally to adopt towards another at the United Nations. We also believe that the United States' attitude will set back

/rather

rather than advance the prospects for a relaxation of tension in the South Atlantic because it can only encourage the Argentine government, present and future, to continue on the present sterile course and damage the chances of the change of heart in Argentina without which there can be no improvement in the situation.

2. For your own information, I do not propose to press the Americans to change their position. We have always thought it likely that they would feel bound to support a draft resolution which so closely resembles last year's. As you have pointed out, the draft has been slightly strengthened, with the insertion of the seventh preambular paragraph and the expression of regret at the lack of progress since last year, which implies a criticism of us. But I have concluded that it is not (not) in our interest to press these points too hard with the Americans.

We do not want them to attempt to placate us by persuading the Argentines to make some modest adjustment to the draft which could then lose us the votes of some if not all of our European partners.

3. Last year the Americans announced their decision two days before the vote, thus compounding our difficulty with our partners in the final stages of our lobbying. This time they have given the Argentines three weeks notice of their position. We must expect the Argentines to make maximum use of this in their intensive contacts with the

/Europeans.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Europeans. Please point out to the Americans that they have done us a disservice by taking this step at so early a stage and urge them to do nothing which might encourage the Italians, the French or other partners to change their vote. We note that the State Department do not propose to be active in support of the Argentine draft, but they may well be approached.

4. We hope the Americans could make it clear to any European enquirers that while they, for reasons peculiar to themselves, were proposing to maintain the position they adopted last year, they saw no reason why the United Kingdom's partners in European political co-operation should change the position they have adopted. We particularly hope that the Americans will refrain from endorsing the Italian idea that a vote diametrically opposite to the United Kingdom over the Falklands is a good way of offering encouragement to a new democratic government in Argentina. There are many ways in which such a gesture could be made. It should not be at our expense.

*See new page overleaf.*

~~5. Burt was unable to offer much cheer regarding arms sales, although we note that the Americans do not now intend to certify human rights in Argentina before the civilian government takes power. We shall wish you to keep up the pressure on this subject also, but in view of the different time-scale we would be content for you to make only passing reference to it when acting on this telegram.~~

NEW DRAFT PARAGRAPH 5 TO REPLACE EXISTING PARAGRAPH 5  
IN DRAFT TELEGRAM TO WASHINGTON

5. Burt offered no help regarding arms sales. It is only small consolation that the Americans do not now intend to certify human rights in Argentina before the civilian government has taken power. You should keep up the pressure on this subject, which I regard as more important than the UNGA decision. You should emphasise that the resumption of United States arms deliveries to Argentina could significantly increase the threat to the Falklands. It would therefore be taken very badly by the British Parliament and public. Argentine attitudes remain menacing. The Junta have not even declared a formal cessation of hostilities and leading contenders in the election campaign have given no indication whatever that they might be prepared to renounce the use of force in the future. Decision in favour of certification and arms supplies would give precisely the wrong signals to the incoming Argentine Government and, mistakenly, confer a mark of international respectability on a nation which has recently committed a brutal violation of international law. The message in these signals will be intensified if there are further leaks such as the report datelined Washington in the Daily Telegraph of 22 October.

25-0071983

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PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR THE ARMED FORCES

D/US of S(AF)DGT/1/1/5

21 October 1983

Stewart Eldon Esq  
PS/Rt Hon Baroness Young PC  
Minister of State  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Downing Street  
London SW1A 2AL

DA

24/10

Dear Stewart,

Further to Lord Trefgarne's letter of 13 October about the announcement next week of Falkland Battle Honours, it is now planned to announce the honours by means of written answers in both houses on Tuesday 25 October. Lord Trefgarne will also refer to them in his speech ... winding up the defence debate in the House of Commons. I attach a copy of the proposed Parliamentary Question and Answer, and a copy of the Q and A brief for the media. No doubt you will let me know if Lady Young sees any significant difficulties in what is proposed.

I am copying this letter and its enclosures to John Coles and David Beamish.

Yours Ever,

*David*

Private Secretary

QUESTION: To ask [the Secretary of State for Defence]/[HMG] if [he is]/[they are] yet able to make a statement on whether ships and units which took part in the Falklands campaign will be able to include the campaign in their battle honours.

ANSWER: Her Majesty The Queen has graciously approved the Award of battle honours to ships and units of the three Services and the Merchant Navy which took part in the campaign to liberate the Falkland Islands. The award of the battle honour "Falkland Islands 1982" is to be made to all HM ships, submarines and Fleet Air Arm squadrons which had passed or were below 35° South and were north of 60° South in the South Atlantic between 2 April and 14 June 1982. Royal Fleet Auxiliaries and Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service vessels will similarly qualify as will ships taken up from trade in support of the operation. The ships and naval air squadrons which qualify are set out below.

The Theatre Honour "Falkland Islands 1982" together with honours for the engagement at Goose Green, Mount Longdon, Tumbledown Mountain and Wireless Ridge have been approved for the Army. Those Regiments which took part in the Campaign will be entitled to claim these honours in accordance with normal practice in the Army. After these claims have been considered by the Army Board recommendations will be submitted for Her Majesty The Queen's approval. I am therefore not able at this stage to list the Regiments which will be so honoured.

The Squadrons of the Royal Air Force listed below, which saw service between 2 April and 14 June 1982 South of 35° and North of 60° South or took part in an operational sortie south of Ascension Island will be awarded the battle honour "South Atlantic 1982".

HM SHIPS, NAVAL AIR SQUADRONS, RFAs, RMAs  
AND MERCHANT NAVY VESSELS TO RECEIVE  
THE BATTLE HONOUR "FALKLAND ISLANDS 1982"

HM SHIPS

HMS ACTIVE	HMS BRILLIANT
HMS ALACRITY	HMS BRISTOL
HMS AMBUSCADE	HMS BROADSWORD
HMS ANDROMEDA	HMS CARDIFF
HMS ANTELOPE	HMS COVENTRY
HMS ANTRIM	HMS CONQUEROR
HMS ARDENT	HMS CORDELLA
HMS ARGONAUT	HMS COURAGEOUS
HMS ARROW	HMS DUMBARTON CASTLE
HMS AVENGER	HMS ENDURANCE
HMS EXETER	HMS MINERVA
HMS FARNELLA	HMS NORTHELLA
HMS FEARLESS	HMS ONYX
HMS GLAMORGAN	HMS PENELOPE
HMS GLASGOW	HMS PICT
HMS HECLA	HMS PLYMOUTH
HMS HERALD	HMS SHEFFIELD
HMS HERMES	HMS SPARTAN
HMS HYDRA	HMS SPLENDID
HMS INTREPID	HMS VALIANT
HMS INVINCIBLE	HMS YARMOUTH
HMS JUNELLA	
HMS LEEDS CASTLE	

RN AIR SQUADRONS

737	809	824	829	847
800	815	825	845	848
801	820	826	846	899

ROYAL FLEET AUXILIARIES/ROYAL MARITIME AUXILIARY SERVICE VESSEL

RFA APPLELEAF	RFA RESOURCE
RFA BAYLEAF	RFA SIR BEDIVERE
RFA BLUE ROVER	RFA SIR GALAHAD
RFA BRAMBLELEAF	RFA SIR GERAIN
RFA ENGADINE	RFA SIR LANCELOT
RFA FORT AUSTIN	RFA SIR PERCIVALE
RFA FORT GRANGE	RFA SIR TRISTRAM
RFA OLMEDA	RFA STROMNESS
RFA OLNA	RFA TIDEPPOOL
RFA PEARLEAF	RFA TIDESPRING
RFA PLUMLEAF	RMAS TYPHOON
RFA REGENT	

MERCHANT SHIPS TAKEN UP FROM TRADE

MV ANCO CHARGER  
SS ATLANTIC CAUSEWAY  
SS ATLANTIC CONVEYOR  
MV BALTIC FERRY  
MV BRITISH DART  
MV BRITISH ESK  
MV BRITISH TAY  
MV BRITISH TEST  
MV BRITISH TRENT  
MV BRITISH WYE  
SS CANBERRA  
MV CONTENDER BEZANT  
MV ELK  
MV EUROPIC FERRY  
MV FORT TORONTO  
MV GEESTPORT  
CS IRIS  
MT IRISHMAN  
MV LYCAON  
MV NORDIC FERRY  
MV NORLAND  
RMS QUEEN ELIZABETH 2  
MV SAINT EDMUND  
MT SALVAGEMAN  
MV SAXONIA  
MV SCOTTISH EAGLE  
MV SHELL EBURNA

MV STENA SEASPREAD

MV TOR CALEDONIA

SS UGANDA

MV WIMPEY SEAHORSE

MT YORKSHIREMAN

RAF SQUADRONS TO RECEIVE THE BATTLE HONOUR

"SOUTH ATLANTIC 1982"

No 1(F) Squadron	Harrier
No 18 Squadron	Chinook
No 42 Squadron	Nimrod
No 44 Squadron	Vulcan
No 47 Squadron	Hercules
No 50 Squadron	Vulcan
No 51 Squadron	Nimrod
No 55 Squadron	Victor
No 57 Squadron	Victor
No 63 Squadron RAF Regiment	Rapier
No 70 Squadron	Hercules
No 101 Squadron	Vulcan
No 120 Squadron	Nimrod
No 201 Squadron	Nimrod
No 206 Squadron	Nimrod

DRAFT Q & A BRIEF

Q1 What is a battle honour?

A1 A battle honour is an official acknowledgement of the relevant units' participation in a successful campaign or engagement of which past, present and future generations of Servicemen can be proud.

Q2 Is there any significance in the timing of the announcement?

A2 No

Q3 Why is the Army not able to say which of its units will receive battle honours?

A3 It is established practice that Regiments must make a claim for battle honours which is then validated against their known involvement in a particular action or the campaign as a whole before being submitted to Her Majesty The Queen for approval.

Q4 When will Army battle honours be announced?

A4 The process of considering claims for honours is likely to take some months and it is not possible to say when final approval will be given. But a further announcement will be made at that stage.



Q5 When were battle honours last awarded?

A5 After the Korean War

Q6 Have battle honours been awarded previously to merchant ships?

A6 Yes, for certain categories of activity during the Second World War. (If pressed, these were merchant ships which took part directly in amphibious operations)

Q7 Is it not odd that merchant ships should receive battle honours?

A7 In determining to which ships awards should be made, account has been taken of precedent, and of the despatch by Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, in which he stressed the contribution to the successful outcome made by all the elements of the Task Force.

Q8 Why not the Royal Marines?

A8 The Royal Marines will not be applying for battle honours as a result of the Falklands campaign. This is in accordance with the tradition spelt out in the following statement by the then Duke of Clarence (later King William IV) in 1827:

"The greatness of their number and the difficulty of selecting from amidst so many glorious deeds, such a portion as could be inserted in the space, determined His Majesty (King George IV) in lieu of the usual badges and mottoes on the Colours of the troops of the Line to direct that the "Globe Inserted with Laurel" should be the distinguishing badge as the most appropriate emblem of a Corps, whose duties carried them to all parts of the Globe in every quarter of which they had earned Laurels by their valour and good conduct."

Q9 Will the Army Honours when approved, be shown on the Colours?

A9 The Theatre Honour will be emblazoned on Regimental Colours. Engagement Honours will not be so emblazoned but will be published in the Army List as a permanent record.

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (ADVANCES)

39 37

PS  
PS LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
~~PS/MR STEWART~~  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGET  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MR EVANS  
MR URE

MR CARTLEDGE

ED/PUSD (2)

ED/SAID

ED/FID

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ED/NEWS DEPT

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ED/PLANNING STAFF

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (3)

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
MISS M E CUND ) TREASURY  
MR LITTLER )

SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
MR A D S GOODALL ) CABINET OFF  
DIO )

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

MR A TITCHENER DIT (Victoria St)

Mr A FORTNAM IAT/ D. TRANSPORT

RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 192341Z OCTOBER 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO 20

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3031 OF 10 OCT

INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, ATHENS, BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, THE HAGUE, LUXENBOURG, PARIS, ROME, UKREP BRUSSELS

NY TELNO 2962: UNGA DEBATE: FALKLANDS

1. BURT (ASSISTANT SECRETARY, EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, STATE DEPARTMENT) ASKED THE MINISTER TO CALL YESTERDAY TO FOLLOW UP MY DISCUSSION WITH EAGLEBURGER ON 13 OCTOBER. HE SAID THAT EAGLEBURGER HAD UNDERTAKEN TO COME BACK TO US ONCE THE AMERICANS HAD MADE UP THEIR MINDS ABOUT THEIR VOTING INTENTIONS.

2. READING CAREFULLY FROM A PREPARED PIECE OF PAPER, BURT SAID THAT IT APPEARED TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WHICH THE ARGENTINIANS HAD GIVEN THEM WAS LEGALLY EQUIVALENT TO LAST YEAR'S. HE CONTINUED THAT, PRIMARILY ON GROUNDS OF POLICY CONSISTENCY, THE US WOULD VOTE FOR THE RESOLUTION IF NO OBJECTIONABLE LANGUAGE WAS ADDED TO THE DRAFT. THE US CONTINUED TO SUPPORT A NEGOTIATED OUTCOME ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES AS THE BEST MEANS TO SETTLE THIS

~~FOR THE RESOLUTION IF NO OBJECTIONABLE LANGUAGE WAS ADDED TO THE DRAFT. THE US CONTINUED TO SUPPORT A NEGOTIATED OUTCOME ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES AS THE BEST MEANS TO SETTLE THIS DISPUTE AND DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ATTEMPTING TO APPLY PRESSURE WOULD ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS. THEY ALSO HOPED THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD REFRAIN FROM TAKING STEPS WHICH WOULD HEIGHTEN TENSIONS.~~

2. THOMAS SAID THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THE ARGUMENT ABOUT CONSISTENCY BUT HAD HOPED THAT ARGENTINA'S REFUSAL TO DECLARE A FORMAL END OF HOSTILITIES SINCE THE PREVIOUS UNGA DEBATE WOULD HAVE LED THE AMERICANS TO ABSTAIN THIS TIME. QUOTE LEGALLY EQUIVALENT UNQUOTE WAS A NEAT FORMULATION BUT THE FACT WAS THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME STRENGTHENING OF THE TEXT. THIS DECISION WAS THEREFORE DISAPPOINTING. BUT WHAT WAS NOW IMPORTANT WAS THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD RESIST ANY TEMPTATION TO REPEAT LAST YEAR'S UNHELPFUL PERFORMANCE BY LOBBYING ON BEHALF OF THE ARGENTINE DRAFT. WE LOOKED TO THE AMERICANS TO KEEP A LOW PROFILE. BURT TOOK NOTE.

3. THOMAS SAID THAT AS REGARDS THE REFERENCE TO A NEGOTIATED OUTCOME, BURT WOULD BE AWARE THAT AS LONG AS THE ARGENTINIANS STUCK TO THE VIEW THAT NEGOTIATIONS COULD ONLY BE ABOUT THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY, THERE WOULD BE NOTHING TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT. HE SAID HE NOTED THE AMERICAN RELUCTANT TO APPLY PRESSURE BUT HE HOPED NEVERTHELESS THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD ENCOURAGE THE NEW ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO RENOUNCE HOSTILITIES AND MOVE TOWARDS NORMALISATION. THIS WAS OUR OBJECTIVE AND IT WAS SURELY IN THE US INTEREST TO REMOVE THIS SOURCE OF TENSION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

4. BURT UNDERTOOK TO LOOK INTO THESE POINTS. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HE CONSIDERED THAT THE US WOULD WISH TO PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE BUT WOULD EXPECT A DEGREE OF GIVE AND TAKE FROM BOTH SIDES.

5. ON CERTIFICATION, BURT CONFIRMED THAT UK CONCERNS WERE WELL KNOWN. BUT THIS WAS A BILATERAL US-ARGENTINE ISSUE, IT HAD ARISEN IN A HUMAN RIGHTS CONTEXT WHICH PREDATED THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT. IF THERE WAS NOW A LEGAL BASIS (IMPROVED HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE) FOR A US SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP, LOGIC SUGGESTED THAT THIS SHOULD GO AHEAD. ARMS SALES WOULD NEVERTHELESS BE CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF ARGENTINE REQUESTS AND ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS. THE US WOULD WISH TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US ABOUT THIS.

6. THOMAS REPLIED THAT, AS THE PRIME MINISTER HERSELF HAD MADE CLEAR DURING HER RECENT VISIT, CERTIFICATION LEADING TO ARMS SALES WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE UNDERSTOOD IN BRITAIN. IT WAS NOT

6. THOMAS REPLIED THAT, AS THE PRIME MINISTER HERSELF HAD MADE CLEAR DURING HER RECENT VISIT, CERTIFICATION LEADING TO ARMS SALES WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE UNDERSTOOD IN BRITAIN. IT WAS NOT DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE THE REACTION IF BRITISH FORCES CAME UNDER ATTACK FROM ARMS SUPPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES. BURT HAD MENTIONED HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT HUMAN RIGHTS WERE SURELY INDIVISIBLE. THERE COULD HARDLY HAVE BEEN A CLEARER SUPPRESSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS THAN IN THE FALKLANDS, WHICH REMAINED UNDER THREAT. BURT HAD THE GRACE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THIS WAS AN ARGUMENT WHICH THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES USED IN THE CONTEXT OF EL SALVADOR.

7. AFTER THE MEETING, A STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL WHO WAS PRESENT SAID THAT VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL TALKING POINTS HAD BEEN USED WITH THE ARGENTINES, WHO HAS RESPONDED BY URGING THAT PRESSURE BE PUT ON US OVER THE AIRFIELD IN PARTICULAR. THE AMERICANS HAD DECLINED. THE OFFICIAL ADDED THAT IT WAS AGREED WITHIN THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO US ACTIVITY IN SUPPORT OF THE ARGENTINE DRAFT, BUT IT WAS HARD TO GUARANTEE THE CONDUCT OF THE US MISSION IN NEW YORK. AS FOR CERTIFICATION, CURRENT TALK WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT WAS OF TIMING THIS TO COINCIDE WITH INAUGURATION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT. WE CONTINUED TO MAKE APPROPRIATELY DISCOURAGING NOISES.

WRIGHT

NNNN



FIVE PH

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

19 October, 1983

Falklands at the General Assembly

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 18 October.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RW



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 October, 1983

Dear John,

MB

Prime Minister

Read in full.

Falklands at the General AssemblyA.P.C.  $\frac{15}{10}$ 

You may care to have a summary of the position we have reached in our lobbying of our European partners.

You will be aware from the telegrams that the Italians have been speaking to our other partners about the importance of relations with Argentina and Latin America as a whole and making clear that they would like to be able to vote for a resolution on the Falklands. The Italians are anxious to offer encouragement to a new democratic government in Argentina. The vote in the General Assembly will be taking place in the week beginning 7 November, shortly after the elections in Argentina on 30 October.

The Foreign Secretary summoned the Italian Ambassador as soon as we learned of this initiative. Lord Bridges took parallel action with Andreotti in Rome. He obtained an assurance that Italy would not vote for the present text. Sir Geoffrey also spoke personally to Andreotti in Athens. But the Italians have confirmed that they are working on an alternative draft resolution.

The French have been in close touch with the Italians. They say they favour negotiations in principle (despite their own position on negotiations over Mayotte - see my letter of 12 September) and have only one sticking point in the present draft (the preambular reference to colonial situations being incompatible with the ideal of peace). They appear to have let it be known to the Italians and the Argentines that they would be prepared to support a resolution which omitted this passage. It is clear that Cheysson hankers after voting with Argentina. Sir Geoffrey has told him that we would regard a French vote in favour of an amended resolution as a very unhelpful gesture indeed.

/Of



Of our other Community partners, abstentions by Denmark and Luxembourg seem firm and the Dutch, Irish and Belgians are also planning to abstain. German officials have recommended an abstention but a final decision is not expected until much nearer the time of the vote. This is likely to come just after the Anglo-German Summit on 8-9 November and the Prime Minister will be able to speak to Chancellor Kohl then if necessary. There is a glimmer of hope that the Greeks will move to an abstention under cover of their tenure of the Presidency.

The Argentines are reluctant to make any changes in their present text. But the French and Italian votes would be major gains for them and we cannot exclude the possibility that continued French and Italian encouragement may decide them to make a cosmetic change. If the French and/or Italians were to change from an abstention to an affirmative vote, this would be likely to have a serious effect on our support elsewhere in the Community and indeed in the rest of the world.

You will recall that it was the personal intervention of the Prime Minister with Mitterrand on the eve of the vote last year which finally secured the French abstention then. The Foreign Secretary regards it as essential that the Prime Minister should leave Mitterrand in no doubt of the continuing importance we attach to France's position in the General Assembly when he is here later this week.

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



ARGENTINA Relations

# 35

18 OCT 1983



FIVE SH



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 October, 1983

Operation Armilla: Royal New Zealand Navy Participation

You wrote to David Barclay on 10 October suggesting that the Prime Minister should send a message of thanks to Mr. Muldoon for the help which we have received from the New Zealand Navy since the Falklands operation.

I enclose a letter which the Prime Minister has signed and should be grateful if you would arrange for its delivery.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Holmes (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

A. J. COLES

S. H. Lowe, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence

EM

Master  
Ops

FILE  
Ce: MOD  
FIO



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

18 October, 1983

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T155/83

Dear Prime Minister,

During last year's Falklands operation, you made available a Royal New Zealand Navy frigate to the Royal Navy. For most of the time since then either HMNZS CANTERBURY or HMNZS WAIKATO has participated in the patrol in the Indian Ocean.

As you know, this joint operation has now come to an end. Michael Heseltine and Admiral Fieldhouse have already expressed their appreciation to their New Zealand counterparts.

I should like to reiterate my personal gratitude to you for this spontaneous act of generosity, which was characteristic of the staunch support that you gave us over the Falklands issue from the very outset. It has been a great help to the Royal Navy, both during the South Atlantic operation and in its aftermath, to be able to take advantage of the attachment of one of your frigates and I know that both Navies have valued the shared operational experience.

Please accept my deepest thanks.

Warm regards  
Yours sincerely  
Rogaret Dalbey SH

The Right Honourable R.D. Muldoon, CH, MP.

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (ADVANCES) 39 38

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MR EVANS  
MR URE  
MR CARTLEDGE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST. (3)  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF-MOL

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
MISS M E CUND ) TREASURY  
MR LITTLER )

SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
MR A D S GOODALL ) CABINET OFF  
DIO )

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

MR A MITCHELL DEPT (Victoria St

MR A FORTNAM IAT/ D. TRANSPORT

HD/PUSD (2)  
HD/SAMD  
HD/FID

~~HD/PLANNING STAFF~~  
HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/ERD  
HD/ECD(E)  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF

ADVANCE COPY

RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

GRS 380

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 132231Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 2962 OF 13 OCT 83

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK ATHENS BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN  
THE HAGUE LUXEMBOURG PARIS ROME UKREP BRUSSELS

THE FALKLANDS : UNGA DEBATE AND US ARMS CERTIFICATION

1. I CALLED ON EAGLEBURGER THIS MORNING TO ALERT HIM TO THE IMPORTANCE YOU ATTACHED TO US HANDLING OF THIS YEAR'S UNGA FALKLANDS RESOLUTION. I REMINDED HIM THAT WE HAD TAKEN A VERY POOR VIEW LAST YEAR NOT ONLY OF US SUPPORT FOR THE ARGENTINE DRAFT, BUT ALSO OF THE WAY IN WHICH THE US HAD DISCUSSED THE TERMS OF THIS DRAFT WITH THE ARGENTINES WITHOUT KEEPING US INFORMED, AND SUBSEQUENTLY HAD LOBBIED OTHERS TO JOIN THEM IN SUPPORT OF IT. ACCEPTING THAT THE US SAW A NEED TO LOOK AFTER ITS INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA, I THOUGHT A RECONCILIATION OF INTERESTS ~~INTERESTS~~ ~~INTERESTS~~ COULD PERFECTLY WELL BE ACHIEVED THROUGH AN ABSTENTION. IN ANY CASE WE EXPECTED THE US WOULD KEEP US FULLY IN THE PICTURE DURING THE RUN UP TO THE UNGA DEBATE, AND WOULD REFRAIN FROM LOBBYING OTHERS.

2. EAGLEBURGER SAID HE HAD NOT FOCUSSED ON THIS QUESTION YET. HE COULD NOT FORECAST HOW THE US WOULD VOTE THIS YEAR BUT HE COULD PROMISE US THAT WE WOULD BE SPARED LAST YEAR'S FAILURE TO CONSULT FULLY, FOR WHICH ENDERS HAD BEEN TO BLAME. (THE STATE DEPARTMENT, HOWEVER, HAVE TOLD THE ARGENTINIANS THAT THE US IS LIKELY TO VOTE FOR THE LATIN DRAFT RESOLUTION).

3. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO RE-EMPHASISE THE QUESTION OF ARMS CERTIFICATION, AND UNDERLINED THAT CERTIFICATION WOULD BOTH OBLIGE

*head in file*

*ms*

3. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO RE-EMPHASISE THE QUESTION OF ARMS CERTIFICATION, AND UNDERLINED THAT CERTIFICATION WOULD BOTH OBLIGE US TO MAINTAIN OUR MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND HAVE <sup>AN UN</sup> DESIRABLE EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UK, NOT LEAST AS THE ARGENTINES CONTINUED TO REFUSE TO DECLARE AN END TO HOSTILITIES. EAGLEBURGER SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO SAY AUGHT OF COMFORT. IN HIS JUDGEMENT IT WAS NOW A QUESTION NOT OF WHETHER US CERTIFICATION WOULD BE FORTHCOMING BUT OF WHEN. IT WAS ONLY OUR CONCERNS, WHICH WERE WELL UNDERSTOOD, WHICH HAD DELAYED CERTIFICATION UNTIL NOW. HE POINTED OUT THAT CERTIFICATION WOULD NOT NECESSARILY ENTAIL THE ARGENTINES GETTING ALL THE EQUIPMENT THEY WANTED. HE REPEATED THE ASSURANCE SHULTZ GAVE YOU LAST MONTH THAT WE WOULD BE CONSULTED BEFORE A FINAL DECISION WAS TAKEN.

WRIGHT

NNNN

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (ADVANCES)

39 38 37

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MR EVANS  
MR URE

MR CARTLEDGE

ED/PUSD (2)  
ED/SAMD  
ED/FID  
~~ED/DEFENCE DEPT~~  
ED/NEWS DEPT  
ED/ERD  
ED/ECD(E)  
ED/UND  
ED/PLANNING STAFF

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (3)

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
MISS M E CUND ) TREASURY  
MR LITTLER )

SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
MR A D S GOODALL ) CABINET OFF  
DIO )

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

~~MR A DITCHENER~~ DEL (Victoria St)

MR A FORTNAM IAT/ D. TRANSPORT

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

**IMMEDIATE**

GRS 30  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM COPENHAGEN 111215Z OCT 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 226 OF 11 OCTOBER  
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK

**ADVANCE COPY**

*m 4/6*

YOUR TELNO 283 TO ROME: FALKLANDS AT UNGA.

1. ACTION TAKEN WITH DYVIG (POLITICAL DIRECTOR, MFA). DENMARK'S POSITION REMAINS UNCHANGED.

MELLON

NNNN



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
Telephone 01-~~9207622~~ 218 2111/3

MO 14/12

10th October 1983

Dear David,

*GR*

*Type letter as  
enclosed.*

*the way*

OPERATION ARMILLA: RNZN PARTICIPATION

Last year, at the height of the Falklands operation, the New Zealand Prime Minister offered to make available a frigate to the Royal Navy. This offer was accepted and for most of the past 16 months either HMNZS CANTERBURY or HMNZS WAIKATO has joined an RN ship on the Gulf of Oman patrol. The attachment, which has been extended as a result of successive exchanges between the Defence Secretary and his New Zealand counterpart, has now had to come to an end and WAIKATO rejoined the New Zealand Fleet at the end of September.

Both Mr Heseltine and the First Sea Lord have expressed their thanks to the New Zealand Defence Minister and Chief of Naval Staff respectively. As the offer was made by Mr Muldoon personally, the Prime Minister may wish also to send a message of thanks and a suitable draft is attached.

I am copying this letter to Marsha Fenwick at the FCO.

*Yours*

*A H Lowe*

(S H LOWE)  
Private Secretary

D Barclay Esq

DRAFT LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER TO THE RT HON ROBERT MULDOON CH

During last year's Falklands operation, you made available a Royal New Zealand Navy frigate to the Royal Navy. For most of the time since then either HMNZS CANTERBURY or HMNZS WAIKATO has participated in the patrol in the Indian Ocean.

As you know, this joint operation has now come to an end. Michael Heseltine and Admiral Fieldhouse have already expressed their appreciation to their New Zealand counterparts. I should like to reiterate my personal gratitude to you for this spontaneous act of generosity, which was characteristic of the staunch support that you <sup>gave</sup> ~~have given~~ us over the Falklands issue from the very outset. It has been a great help to the Royal Navy, both during the South Atlantic operation and in its aftermath, to be able to take advantage of the attachment of one of your frigates and I know that both Navies have valued the shared operational experience.

Please accept my deepest thanks.

AMC  
/w.



20 OCT 1953

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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (ADVANCES)

39 38

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MR EVANS  
MR URE  
MR CARTLEDGE



HD/PUSD (2)  
HD/SAMD  
HD/FID  
~~HD/DEFENCE DEPT~~  
HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/ERD  
HD/ECD(E)  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST. (3)

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
MISS M E CUND ) TREASURY  
MR LITTLER. )

SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
MR A D S GOODALL ) CABINET OF  
DIO )

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

MR A FITCHENER DTI (Victoria)

MR A FORTNAM IAT/ D. TRANSPORT

RESIDENT CLERK  
ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

FM ATHENS 101645Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO.,

TELNO 504 OF 10 OCTOBER 1983.,

REPEATED AS IMMEDIATE INFO TO ROME.,

REPEATED AS PRIORITY INFO TO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, AND PARIS.,

REPEATED AS ROUTINE INFO TO BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN,

THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG AND UKREP BRUSSELS.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

FALKLANDS AT THE UNGA: ROME TELNO 513

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RAISED THIS WITH ANDREOTTI IN THE MARGINS OF THE SPECIAL COUNCIL THIS MORNING. HE UNDERLINED OUR CONCERN THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO SWITCHING TO A POSITIVE VOTE BY COMMUNITY MEMBERS ON THE ARGENTINE RESOLUTION. HE REFERRED TO HIS CONVERSATION WITH CAGIATI IN LONDON, AND MADE CLEAR TO ANDREOTTI OUR DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE ITALIANS SEEMED TO HAVE TAKEN SUCH WIDESPREAD ACTION, ON WHICH THEY APPEARED TO HAVE KEPT THE ARGENTINES WELL INFORMED. ANDREOTTI DEMURRED. HE UNDERLINED THAT THIS WAS A SUBJECT OF SOME IMPORTANCE TO ITALY, GIVEN THE CLOSENESS OF MANY FAMILY TIES WITH ARGENTINA. HE REFERRED TO THE US VOTE LAST YEAR

SUBJECT OF SOME IMPORTANCE TO ITALY, GIVEN THE CLOSENESS OF MANY FAMILY TIES WITH ARGENTINA. HE REFERRED TO THE US VOTE LAST YEAR AND SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THIS. HE THEN REPEATED THE POINT HE HAD MADE TO HM AMBASSADOR AT ROME ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A SHORTER, AMENDED RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD NOT REFER TO NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MADE CLEAR THAT WE DID NOT REACT KINDLY TO ATTEMPTS TO PRODUCE AN AMNEDED RESOLUTION OF THIS KIND: THIS WOULD NOT, IN OUR JUDGEMENT, HELP TO RESOLVE THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE CONTINUING DIFFICULTIES WITH ARGENTINA. WE EXPECTED OUR COMMUNITY PARTNERS TO ATTACH OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE TO COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY. THERE WAS NO FURTHER DISCUSSION OF DETAIL, BUT ANDREOTTI WAS LEFT IN NO DOUBT OF OUR ANXIETIES ABOUT THE ITALIAN APPROACH TO THE UNGA RESOLUTION.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE LOOKED FORWARD TO SEEING ANDREOTTI IN ROME ON 31 OCTOBER. HE MENTIONED IN PASSING THAT HE HAD BEEN SORRY TO HEAR INDIRECTLY THAT ANDREOTTI HAD NOT BEEN ENTIRELY CONTENT WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIS OWN VISIT TO LONDON LAST MONTH. ANDREOTTI IMPLIED THAT NO OFFENCE HAD BEEN TAKEN. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ALSO SAID IN CONVERSATION WITH ANDREOTTI AND PANJQLFI, THAT HE HOPED THERE MIGHT BE AN OPPORTUNITY IN ROME FOR A SHORT MEETING WITH THE LATTER.

R H O D E S

NNNN



DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY  
1-19 VICTORIA STREET  
LONDON SW1H 0ET

TELEPHONE DIRECT LINE 01-215  
SWITCHBOARD 01-215 7877

5144

From the Minister for Trade

Lord Gowrie  
Minister for the Arts  
Office of Arts and Libraries  
Old Admiralty Buildings  
Whitehall  
London SW1A 2AZ

7 October 1983

Dear Grey,

on 11/10  
f-a-

Thank you for your letter of 9 August about the approaches you received from the British Library and from the Standing Conference of National and University Libraries over imports of books from Argentina.

As you know, the Prime Minister decided that the present import licence waiver operated by Customs and Excise in respect of newspapers and periodicals should be widened to cover books other than those imported for resale or trade advertising material. The implementation of this exemption was announced in a Press Notice last week and I enclose a copy with this letter. I am sure this should end the problems which these organisations have been experiencing over importing information from Argentina without the need to allow trade in books, which I believe would leave us wide open to the numerous claims for special consideration which I mentioned in my minute to the Prime Minister.

We remain firmly committed to seeking a fully reciprocal lifting of all remaining trade sanctions. But while the Argentines continue their policy of non-co-operation the general import ban must stay in place.

I am copying this to Geoffrey Howe, Keith Joseph, Arthur Cockfield, Barney Hayhoe, Robert Armstrong and No. 10.

V  
/ms.

Paul

PAUL CHANNON

1 Victoria Street, SW1H 0ET Press Office: 01-215 5995/3788 Ref: 363  
Out of hours: 01-215 7877

September 27 1983

IMPORT OF BOOKS FROM ARGENTINA

In the absence of action by Argentina to end trade sanctions against Britain and to lift commercial and economic restrictions against British interests there, the general ban on imports into the UK of goods exported from Argentina must be maintained. However, the Government has decided that the exemption which already allows import of newspapers and periodicals will now also cover books other than trade advertising material or imports for resale.

This applies equally to such books currently held by Customs and Excise and arrangements are being made for their release. An individual import licence is not required for the books covered by the exemption.

Announcing this exemption, Mr Cecil Parkinson, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, said today:

"The Government has repeatedly made clear that it favours the reciprocal lifting of all remaining trade sanctions. The Presidency of the European Community and the Commission have on several occasions proposed to the Argentine authorities discussion on the normalisation of economic and commercial relations. Regrettably the Argentines have not so far indicated any willingness to co-operate in removing their restrictions. In these circumstances it is the Government's policy to maintain the ban imposed on April 7 1982 on the importation of Argentine goods.

"However, in view of the unique considerations which apply to books, the Government has decided to extend the exemption to books provided they are neither imported for resale nor are trade advertising material."

Project of

Religion &

PE-35

GRS850/12  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM ROME 031245Z OCT 83  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 480 OF 3 OCTOBER  
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, PARIS, . ROUTINE  
ATHENS, BONN, BURSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG,  
UKREP BRUSSELS.  
INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO.

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

Andreotti is being unhappy  
about the Falkland

resolution.

MR 4  
10.

YOUR TELNO 553. TO UKMIS NEW YORK: FALKLANDS AT UNGA.

1. FOREIGN MINISTER WAS NOT ABLE TO SEE ME UNTIL THIS MORNING, BY WHICH TIME HE HAD RECEIVED A REPORT OF YOUR CONVERSATION WITH CAGIATI ON SEPTEMBER 30 (YOUR TELNO 274).
2. I TOOK ANDREOTTI THROUGH OUR POSITION. THE FALKLANDS WERE A VITAL ISSUE FOR US: WE COULD NOT PRETEND THAT THE INVASION HAD NOT TAKEN PLACE, WE EXPECTED OUR FRIENDS TO UNDERSTAND THIS, AND WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT ITALY SHOULD BE PROMOTING A VOTE ON LINES DIFFERENT FROM OUR OWN. THE ARGENTINE DRAFT RESOLUTION, ALMOST IDENTICAL TO LAST YEAR'S , STILL CALLED FOR NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY, AND THAT WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO US. IT ALSO PREJUDGED THE OUTCOME IN THE SECOND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH ABOUT QUOTE COLONIAL SITUATIONS UNQUOTE. THE BEST POLICY FOR THE TEN WOULD BE TO DECIDE ON ABSTENTION NOW. ANY OTHER COURSE WOULD HAVE A SERIOUS EFFECT ON E C POLITICAL COOPERATION AND BE SEEN IN THE REST OF THE WORLD AS A VICTORY FOR ARGENTINA. WE ALSO HAD TO RECALL ARGENTINIAN CONDUCT IN THE RECENT PAST: THEIR ATTEMPTS TO BUY NEW MILITARY EQUIPMENT, THEIR INCURSIONS INTO THE AREA AROUND THE FALKLANDS, AND THEIR DISCRIMINATION AND RESTRICTIONS AGAINST OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS . I GAVE THE MINISTER A MORE EXTENDED VERSION OF OUR VIEWS, TAKEN FROM YOUR RECENT TELEGRAMS, AND ASKED HIM TO TAKE THESE CAREFULLY INTO ACCOUNT BEFORE DECIDING ON THE ITALIAN POSITION.
3. ANDREOTTI GAVE A LONG AND REASONED REPLY. HE UNDERSTOOD OUR ATTITUDE AND HAD NO WISH TO CAUSE DIFFICULTIES FOR US. BUT HE WAS TRYING TO TAKE THE WIDER CIRCUMSTANCES INTO ACCOUNT. THESE INCLUDED THE DESIRABILITY OF ENCOURAGING A SENSIBLE CIVIL REGIME IN ARGENTINA, AND AVOIDING PRESSURE ON ITS FUTURE LEADERS WHO MIGHT THEN FEEL OBLIGED TO TURN TO THE U S S R (THERE WERE STILL LONG-TERM ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES IN SUCH A POLICY IN THE EYES OF SOME ARGENTINIANS). THERE WERE ALSO MANY FAMILY TIES BETWEEN ITALY AND ARGENTINA WHICH MADE THIS A SUBJECT OF SOME IMPORTANCE FOR ITALIANS.
4. THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION DID NOT ATTRACT ANDREOTTI, NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF THE REFERENCE TO NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY WHICH WE DISLIKED. HE HAD NO INTENTION OF CASTING ITALY'S VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THAT. BUT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED BY CHEYSSON THAT FRANCE DID NOT WISH TO TAKE A DIFFERENT LINE FROM THE US ON THE ARGENTINE DRAFT RESOLUTION THIS YEAR. THIS CREATED A NEW SITUATION AND HE WAS TRYING TO FIND SOME ALTERNATIVE

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/COURSE

COURSE. THE POSSIBILITY WHICH HE HAD IN MIND, AND HAD MENTIONED DURING HIS VISIT TO LONDON, HAD BEEN A MUCH SHORTER RESOLUTION, CALLING ON THE PARTIES TO RESUME EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WOULD NOT STATE WHAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE ABOUT, NOR ASK BRITAIN TO UNDERTAKE ANYTHING NEW. A THIRD ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO ARRANGE A VOTE ON THE ARGENTINE DRAFT PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH, BUT THAT HAD PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES IN NEW YORK, AND MIGHT ALSO PRODUCE DIFFERENT VOTES BY EC MEMBERS ON CRUCIAL PARAGRAPHS, WHICH WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE. I REPLIED THAT THE SHORTER DRAFT HE FAVOURED WOULD NEVERTHELESS BE SEEN BY ARGENTINA AS A CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY, WHICH WAS THEIR PRE-OCCUPATION. SURELY ARGENTINA SHOULD TAKE A NUMBER OF OTHER STEPS FIRST, SUCH AS FORMALLY TERMINATING HOSTILITIES, CEASING INCURSIONS, LIFTING ECONOMIC RESTRICTIONS, AND PERHAPS ALSO RESUMING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

5. FINALLY ANDREOTTI ASSURED ME THAT HE HAD NOT SOUGHT TO LOBBY OTHER EC CAPITALS TO BRING ABOUT A SWITCH IN THEIR VOTES. BUT HE DID THINK THAT THE SITUATION REQUIRED DISCUSSION AND CAREFUL HANDLING, AND HE AGREED WITH THE SUGGESTION (APPARENTLY REPORTED BY CAGIATI) THAT YOU THOUGHT THE ISSUE SHOULD BE HANDLED IN POLITICAL COOPERATION. HE AGREED WITH MY REMARK THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR HIM TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION FURTHER AT YOUR NEXT MEETING WITH HIM.

6. I SHOULD REPORT THAT I HAD PREVIOUSLY RAISED THIS SUBJECT WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE MFA ON SEPTEMBER 29, CARRYING OUT THE INSTRUCTION IN YOUR TELNO 264, REGARDING LINKAGE WITH OUR OFFER ON AKROTIRI. I PREFERRED ON THAT OCCASION TO TAKE THE TWO SUBJECTS SERIATIM, WITH THE DISCUSSION ABOUT AKROTIRI (REPORTED IN MY TELNO 478) PRECEDING THE DISCUSSION ABOUT THE ARGENTINIAN RESOLUTION ON THE FALKLANDS, RATHER THAN MAKING AN EXPLICIT LINK. MALFATTI WAS ENCOURAGINGLY ROBUST, SAYING THAT HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE BEST FOR ITALY TO ABSTAIN AGAIN ON THE ARGENTINIAN RESOLUTION THIS YEAR, AND THAT HE WOULD SO RECOMMEND TO THE MINISTER. IT IS THUS CLEAR THAT THE DIFFERENT LINE TAKEN BY ITALIANS IS AT ANDREOTTI'S PERSONAL WISH.

7. ANDREOTTI MENTIONED AT ONE POINT THAT HE HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUT THE UNGA ITEM.

8. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

BRIDGES

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 791 OF 30 SEPTEMBER

INFO PRIORITY MOD BANK OF ENGLAND ASUNCION CARACAS  
BRASILIA MONTEVIDEO SANTIAGO UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON  
CIVIL COMMISSIONER PORT STANLEY

ASSESSMENT

1. THE ARGENTINE ELECTION TIMETABLE IS ON SCHEDULE FOR 30 OCTOBER BUT GROWING GOVERNMENT PARALYSIS IN THE FACE OF RAMPANT INFLATION AND RISING UNION AND SOCIAL PRESSURES IS CREATING WIDESPREAD UNEASE, MILITARY WARNINGS AND ENDLESS RUMOURS. THE NEXT CRUCIAL DATE WILL BE 17 OCTOBER, SET BY THE INTERNATIONAL BANKS AS A DEADLINE FOR RESOLVING ARGENTINA'S RECENTLY AGGRAVATED DEBT RENEGOTIATION PROBLEMS WHICH ARE ADDING FUEL TO AN INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT SITUATION.
2. ELECTION FORECASTS STILL FAVOUR THE PERONISTS BUT SOME RECENT SUGGESTIONS ARE THAT THEY MAY ONLY DOMINATE CONGRESS AND THE SENATE AND LOSE OUT TO THE RADICAL ALFONSIN IN THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE WHICH CHOOSES THE PRESIDENT. WITH INTRANSIGENT PARTY, FOR WHICH SUPPORT IS REPORTEDLY GROWING FAST, AND OTHER MINOR PARTIES' SUPPORT IN THE COLLEGE, ALFONSIN MAY JUST BEAT LUDER. A PERONIST CONGRESS AND A RADICAL PRESIDENT COULD BE THE WORST POSSIBLE RESULT, PERPETUATING PRESENT PARALYSIS, OR IT COULD BE A NEW BASIS FOR INTERPARTY COOPERATION.
3. THE MILITARY'S PROMISED AMNESTY LEGISLATION PRODUCED PREDICTABLE CRITICISM FROM POLITICIANS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANISATIONS. BUT SOME LEADERS, EG LUDER, WERE LESS THAN FORTHRIGHT ON THE QUESTION OF FUTURE REPEAL. ONCE INTRODUCED, THE LEGISLATION MAY WELL REMAIN. THE MASS OF VOTERS APPEARS LARGELY UNTOUCHED AND UNINFLUENCED BY THE QUOTE DISAPPEARED UNQUOTE AND HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS. THERE MUST BE STRONG SUSPICIONS OF OVERSEAS FUNDING FOR THE MOTHERS AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS PROTEST GROUPS.

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4. THERE IS NO GLEAM ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT, WITH OVER 25 PERCENT MONTHLY INFLATION LIKELY FOR OCTOBER. EVEN SO, THERE ARE SUGGESTIONS THAT EVEN A BRIEF PERIOD OF REASONABLY STABLE AND SENSIBLE GOVERNMENT COULD TURN THE ECONOMY ROUND VERY QUICKLY.

5. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, LUDER HAS SHOWN HIMSELF MORE REALISTIC THAN ALFONSIN WITH A RECOMMENDATION THAT ARGENTINA SHOULD NOT BE TIED PERPETUALLY TO THE NAM AND SHOULD SEEK CLOSER TIES WITH THE WEST. THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE OVER THE FALKLANDS QUESTION EXCEPT FOR A FEW PRIVATE HINTS OF POSSIBLE WAYS FORWARD, THOUGH NOT UNFORTUNATELY FROM LIKELY POLICY MAKERS. WE CAN LOOK FOR A RELATIVELY FRIENDLY DISPOSITION IN THE MID AND THE CENTRE PARTIES, YET BOTH PERONISTS AND RADICALS WILL TAKE AN UNCOMPROMISING LINE. THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF MOVEMENT, AT LEAST UNTIL THE NEXT GOVERNMENT IS INSTALLED. THERE ARE SOME ENCOURAGING INDICATIONS OF A POSSIBLE BEAGLE SETTLEMENT IN 1984 DURING THE EXPECTED QUOTE HONEYMOON UNQUOTE PERIOD AFTER THE MILITARY WITHDRAW, ALTHOUGH MUCH WILL ALSO DEPEND UPON THE ATTITUDE OF THE EMBATTLED PRESIDENT PINOCHET, WHOSE COUNTRY MAY WELL RESIST ARGENTINE INSISTENCE ON THE BI-OCEANIC PRINCIPLE.

6. IN GENERAL, POLITICAL FORECASTING IS MORE DIFFICULT THAN EVER AS THE POWER VACUUM GROWS AND INCIPIENT CHAOS TAKES HOLD. WE MIGHT SAY, WITH GOETHE, QUOTE IM CHAOS GIBT ES ALLE MOEGELICHKEITEN UNQUOTE.

JOY  
UNQUOTE

POWELL-JONES

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FM F C C 291545Z SEP 83

TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 554 OF 29 SEPTEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE ROME

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, OTHER EC POSTS, UKDEL NATO

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

LUXEMBOURG TELNO 218 TO FCO (NOT TO ALL): FALKLANDS AT UNGA

1. SEE MIPT. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PROPOSED SPEAKING NOTE:

(1) UNDERSTAND THAT ITALIANS HAVE BEEN LOBBYING PARTNERS TO CHANGE VOTE ON ARGENTINE RESOLUTION. VERY SURPRISED THAT ITALIANS SHOULD TAKE SUCH ACTION WHICH THEY MUST HAVE KNOWN (EG FROM PRIME MINISTER/CRAXI-ANDREOTTI MEETING ON 16 SEPTEMBER) WOULD BE OFFENSIVE TO US. ARE REPORTS CORRECT?

(2) CANNOT UNDERSTAND ITALIAN FAILURE TO CONSULT US ON A MATTER THAT DIRECTLY AFFECTS OUR INTERESTS AND IS OF CRITICAL POLITICAL IMPORTANCE TO US. FAILURE TO DO SO INCOMPATIBLE WITH SPIRIT OF POLITICAL COOPERATION. LOBBYING OTHERS AGAINST THE VITAL INTERESTS OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE CANNOT FAIL TO BE DAMAGING TO POLITICAL COOPERATION, ESPECIALLY AT A TIME WHEN WE BOTH AGREE IT IS UNDER STRAIN FROM RECENT EVENTS IN ATHENS. ALSO PARTICULARLY SURPRISING JUST AFTER OUR AGREEMENT TO ITALIAN USE OF AKROTIRI - A DIFFICULT DECISION FOR US MADE TO MEET WHAT WE SAW THEN AS A PRESSING ITALIAN NEED.

(3) HAVE ALREADY MADE CLEAR TO ITALIANS AT HIGHEST LEVEL, BUT MUST CLEARLY REITERATE NOW, THAT WE DO NOT WANT ANY PARTNERS OR ALLIES TO SUGGEST AMENDMENTS TO ARGENTINES THAT MIGHT SOFTEN TEXT. DO NOT SEE HOW A RESOLUTION WHOSE CENTRAL THESIS (NEGOTIATIONS TO WHICH THE OUTCOME IS PREDETERMINED) IS WHOLLY

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UNACCEPTABLE TO US CAN SOMEHOW BE MADE ACCEPTABLE BY AMENDMENT. ANY ITALIAN ACTION IN THIS REGARD THEREFORE MOST UNHELPFUL AND UNWELCOME TO US. IT WILL NOT DO ANYTHING TO HELP SOLVE THE PROBLEM.

(4) MAY FEEL OBLIGED IN LIGHT OF ITALIAN RESPONSE TO OUR APPROACH TO INFORM PARTNERS THAT WE ARE AWARE OF ITALIAN ACTION, AND MAKE CLEAR ONCE AGAIN OUR OWN VIEWS.

(5) ITALY IS AN IMPORTANT NATO ALLY AS WELL AS EUROPEAN PARTNER. IN HIS STATEMENT TO THE UNGA ON 26 SEPTEMBER THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER EXHORTED ANY NATO ALLIES TO DISSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM OUR FALKLANDS POLICY. OBSERVERS COULD REASONABLY INTERPRET THE ITALIANS' LOBBYING AS A FAVOURABLE RESPONSE TO THIS ARGENTINE APPEAL.

HOWE

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Mr Coles F1.

PP OTTAWA

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FROM FCO 231700Z SEPTEMBER 83

TO PRIORITY CANBERRA AND CERTAIN OTHER POSTS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 328 OF 23 SEP

AND TO SAVING ANTIGUA BANJUL CASTRIES ST VINCENT HONIARA

PORT MORESBY REYKJAVIK VILA

INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON EC POSTS PORT STANLEY

F014/1

INFO SAVING CERTAIN OTHER POSTS

MY TELNO 244: FALKLAND ISLANDS: UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS NOW STARTED. YOU MAY FIND IT USEFUL TO HAVE AN IDEA OF HOW THE LOBBYING CAMPAIGN HAS GONE SO FAR. WE HAVE NOW HAD REPLIES FROM MOST OF THE POSTS TO WHOM MY TUR WAS ADDRESSED, AND THE INITIAL SIGNS ARE FAIRLY ENCOURAGING. THERE IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO BE SOME SLIPPAGE IN VOTES AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS YEAR, BUT THE RESULTS OF THE ACTION YOU HAVE TAKEN HAVE SHOWN THAT WE NEED NOT AT PRESENT FEAR TOO GREAT A REDUCTION IN THE LEVEL OF SUPPORT. ONE OR TWO WHO VOTED IN FAVOUR LAST YEAR MIGHT MOVE TO AN ABSTENTION.
2. IT IS HOWEVER CLEAR THAT THE VOTING INTENTIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE TEN ARE GOING TO BE CRITICAL (SEPARATE INSTRUCTIONS ARE GOING TO THESE POSTS AND WASHINGTON). IF ASKED, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE EXPECT MEMBERS OF THE TEN (OTHER THAN, PERHAPS, THE GREEKS, WHO VOTED FOR THE ARGENTINE RESOLUTION LAST YEAR) TO ABSTAIN. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, WE ARE REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT WE CAN KEEP THE TEN ONSIDE, BUT THE ATTITUDES OF THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS ARE CAUSING CONCERN.
3. WE DO NOT YET KNOW WHEN THE DEBATE WILL BE. IT WILL BE LARGELY UP TO THE ARGENTINES AND THE (LATIN AMERICAN) PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO FIX THIS. WE DO NOT EXPECT IT BEFORE THE MIDDLE OF OCTOBER, BUT IT COULD TAKE PLACE SHORTLY AFTER THE ARGENTINE ELECTIONS AT THE END OF OCTOBER. WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED SO THAT YOU CAN BUILD UP THE PRESSURE.
4. YOU SHOULD CONTINUE YOUR APPROACHES TO YOUR HOST GOVERNMENT AND REPORT CONTACTS BY TELEGRAM OR OTHER MEANS TO UND. YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO DEPLOY THE ARGUMENTS IN PARA 5 OF MY TUR. YOU MIGHT ALSO FIND IT USEFUL TO DRAW TO YOUR INTERLOCUTORS' ATTENTION HOW THE ARGENTINES HAVE SPENT THE YEAR SINCE THE LAST RESOLUTION: THEY HAVE NOT RENOUNCED HOSTILITIES BUT HAVE RESERVED THE RIGHT TO RENEW THEM. THEY HAVE MADE BELLICOSE STATEMENTS. THEY HAVE BOUGHT OR TRIED TO BUY MODERN WEAPONS,

ESPECIALLY OF KINDS THAT HAD BEEN MOST EFFECTIVE AGAINST  
BRITISH FORCES IN 1982. THEY HAVE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST  
BRITISH BANKS AND FIRMS, DESPITE AGREEMENT IN SEPTEMBER 1982  
TO LIFT FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS, AND WOULD STILL BE DOING SO IF  
THEY HAD BEEN ALLOWED BY THE IMF TO GET AWAY WITH IT. THEY  
HAVE MOUNTED PROVOCATIVE INCURSIONS BY SEA AND AIR. THEIR  
POLICY SEEMS TO BE TO THREATEN THE ISLANDS NOW AND TO MAKE PLANS  
FOR ATTACKING THEM AGAIN IN THE FUTURE. (IF YOUR INTERLOCUTORS  
RAISE THE BUILDING OF THE AIRFIELD ON THE ISLANDS OR THE STAGING  
OF MATERIALS THROUGH SOUTH AFRICA, YOU SHOULD BE GUIDED BY MY  
TELEGRAM GUIDANCE 094 OF 27 JULY.)

5. IN CONTRAST, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR OUR WISH TO ESTABLISH A  
MORE NORMAL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND TO  
REDUCE TENSION. WE HAVE TAKEN OR SUPPORTED  
SEVERAL INITIATIVES INTENDED TO PROMOTE SUCH A DEVELOPMENT:  
YOU SHOULD POINT IN PARTICULAR TO THE REPEATED INVITATIONS TO  
THE ARGENTINES BY THE PRESIDENCY OF THE COMMUNITY AND THE  
COMMISSION TO DISCUSS THE RECIPROCAL LIFTING OF ALL REMAINING  
ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RESTRICTIONS. BUT THE ARGENTINES HAVE  
FAILED TO RESPOND TO THIS AND OTHER INITIATIVES.

6. MY TUR DID NOT ASK POSTS TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION, BUT IT  
WOULD NOW BE USEFUL TO US TO HAVE A MORE COMPLETE PICTURE.  
FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF COUNTRIES IN WHICH WE ARE INTERESTED AND  
FOR WHOM WE HAVE NO INFORMATION: BANGLADESH, BELIZE, BOTSWANA,  
BURMA, FIJI, JAMAICA, KENYA, LEBANON (WE APPRECIATE THE DIFFICULTIES  
HM EMBASSY BEIRUT FACES AT THE MOMENT - PERHAPS UKMIS NEW  
YORK WOULD PURSUE ?), MAURITIUS, NEPAL, OMAN, PAKISTAN, QATAR,  
SRI LANKA, SUDAN, SWAZILAND, TANZANIA, VANUATU, ZAIRE. GRATE-  
FUL IF UKMIS NEW YORK WOULD MAKE A PARTICULAR POINT OF LOBBYING  
COUNTRIES IN WHICH WE DO NOT HAVE RESIDENT REPRESENTATION:  
BHUTAN, CHAD, MALDIVES, MAURITANIA, NIGER, ST KITTS, WESTERN  
SAMOA (AS WELL AS LEBANON). INFORMATION ADDRESSEES HAVE  
DISCRETION TO APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENTS IF THEY SEE ADVANTAGE  
IN DOING SO.

FOR ACTION ADDRESSEES IN NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

7. POSTS IN NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES WHICH ENTERED (OR SAID THEY  
WOULD ENTER) RESERVATIONS ON THE FALKLANDS PASSAGES OF THE  
NEW DELHI NAM FINAL DECLARATION, SHOULD DRAW TO THE ATTENTION OF  
THEIR HOST GOVERNMENTS THE NAM FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN  
NEW YORK IN THE FIRST WEEK OF OCTOBER. THE ARGENTINES WILL  
PROBABLY TRY TO SEEK AGAIN THE ENDORSEMENT OF THIS MEETING.  
LAST YEAR WE WERE SUCCESSFUL IN MOBILISING SUPPORT AT THE  
FOUR MEETINGS AND TO A CERTAIN EXTENT FRUSTRATED

ARGENTINE OBJECTIVES. WE WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO DO SO AGAIN.  
POSTS SHOULD REPORT BY IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM TO US COPIED TO UKMIS  
NEW YORK FOR UKMIS TO TAKE FURTHER ACTION AS NECESSARY. POSTS  
IN NAM COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THESE WHICH ARE NONETHELESS  
SYMPATHETIC TO OUR CASE SHOULD TAKE ACTION UNLESS THEY SEE  
OBJECTION.

HOWE

Drafted by  
(Block Capitals).....

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INFO..... UKMIS NEW YORK

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[TEXT]

FALKLAND ISLANDS: UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

From PS to Prime Minister

Mr. Trudeau told the Prime Minister in a tête-à-tête conversation yesterday that on the assumption that the resolution was much the same as last year's Canada would abstain.

AA 27.  
9

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R M

19 September, 1983

FALKLANDS: SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS IN  
THE VICINITY OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS  
PROTECTION ZONE (FIPZ)

Thank you for your letter to John Coles of 16 September. The Prime Minister is content with the arrangements proposed by the Foreign Secretary.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

W. F. S. RICKETT

R.B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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PART 34 ends:-

FCO to AJC 16. 9. 83

PART 35 begins:-

WR to FCO 19. 9. 83

