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Part 4

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(38)

Confidential filing

Falkland Island Review  
(FRANKS REPORT)

ARGENTINA

Part 1 April 1982

Part 4 January 1983

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>20.1.83</del>							
<del>23.1.83</del>							
<del>26.1.83</del>							
<del>Undated</del>							
<del>3.2.83</del>							
6.5.83							
PREM 19/956							



## Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

1. House of Commons Hansard, 25 January 1983, columns 795-878
2. House of Lords Hansard, 25 January 1983, columns 136-224
3. House of Commons Hansard, 26 January 1983, columns 920-1000

Signed *D Wayland* Date *15 January 2013*

**PREM Records Team**

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

MR. HATFIELD  
CABINET OFFICE

Franks Report

Thank you for your minute of 5 May (A083/1262). I confirm that No. 10 hold two copies of the "final draft" of the Franks Report and that they have been regraded to TOP SECRET - CODEWORD.

E. E. R. BUTLER

6 May 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

Jo VC

NR

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Butler  
2 re-classified  
copies held in CF.  
ADJ 6/5.

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Ref. A083/1262

Mr. Davitt Jones

MR BUTLER

Can you please confirm that  
we have these two copies and that  
they have been re-classified  
Franks Report accordingly. PEEB

I understand that No 10 retained two S.S.  
copies of the "final draft" of the Franks  
Report (ie the typescript version originally  
submitted to the Prime Minister). This was  
graded CONFIDENTIAL but, as you will recall,  
a number of amendments were made to this  
version of the Report before it was published  
in order to make it suitable for publication.  
I would be grateful if you could arrange for  
the two copies of the unamended version which  
you have retained to be regraded TOP SECRET -  
CODEWORD and given the appropriate protection.

R P HATFIELD

5 May 1983

CONFIDENTIAL


Argentina  
WM  
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LORD PRESIDENT

CONSOLIDATED FUND BILL - Mr Tam Dalyell

I attach briefing against the possibility of Mr Dalyell's being called to raise the following issue on Monday, February 7:

The Prime Minister's relations with the news media in relation to the release of the Franks Report and her visit to the Falklands.



BERNARD INGHAM  
3 February 1983

FRANKS REPORT

The Prime Minister took the decision that there should be no advance issue of the Franks Report, in the form of a Confidential Final Revise (CFR), entirely independently of the restricted embargo system currently operating. This was introduced after the wholesale breach of the Falklands Honours and Gallantry Awards embargo in October.

The Prime Minister decided that no-one should be put in possession of the Report before Parliament. Copies of the Report were made available to the press at the same time as they appeared in the Vote Office - 3.30pm on January 18 when the Prime Minister stood up to make her statement on the Report.

I repeatedly told the media that the decision not to provide CFRs was not connected with the embargo issue.

The Parliamentary Lobby journalists were seriously exercised about the lack of CFRs and pressed me to identify the numbers of the important paragraphs in the Franks Report so that they could find their way quickly through the Report.

My willingness to do this - in line with previous practice - reached the ears of Mr Dalyell who raised it on the floor of the House while the Lord President was there. The extract is at Annex I.

The issue was subsequently raised by Mr Dalyell and the Leader of the Opposition immediately on publication of the Report. The extracts are at Annex II.

The Prime Minister in these exchanges disclosed that she had specifically instructed me, in view of this publicity, not to help the Lobby with paragraph numbers in advance of publication - even though my objectivity, or lack of it, could subsequently be checked by a reading of the Report.



I did not of course do so. But immediately after the Prime Minister's statement journalists in the Press Gallery clamoured for help in identifying key paragraphs and I read out from the attached note.

Later that evening Roy Hattersley telephoned "as a journalist" and asked me which paragraphs I would have read out. I avoided answering precisely but outlined my approach to helping the media 'gut' a report rapidly; told him that after the Prime Minister's statement I did respond to journalists' requests for help; and spoke in severe terms that I did not propose to be judged in this matter by the debased standards which some people appeared to have about the work of a Press Secretary.

Mr Hattersley's two latest articles in 'Punch' on the issue are at Annex III.

Adam Raphael, Observer, accurately predicted the outcome of the Franks investigation on January 16. The Prime Minister has denied No 10 was the source of the leak.

#### EMBARGOES

The Prime Minister took the view when the Falklands Honours and Gallantry awards embargo was broken that the embargo system should end.

She was persuaded that the system can benefit Government as well as press and that a much restricted embargo system should operate. Since then Departments have ended the practice of issuing documents on an overnight - 24-hour - embargo. The general practice is now to make documents available only a few hours before publication.

Lobby correspondents would like to return to a more flexible system and the provincial press would particularly value 24-hour embargoes, especially with major documents, to enable them to get them to editors and leader writers in their publishing centres.

I have made it clear that I cannot recommend a return to a less restrictive regime without assurances from the various media bodies that the Government could have confidence in the operation of an embargo system.

The Newspaper Publishers' Association - representing Fleet Street - is the only body I have written to which has yet to give a definite reply. Three months after I wrote to them they replied suggesting that the matter could best be progressed through an informal lunch or meeting.

I wrote back saying:

"Willing though I normally am to meet people, I must say that I do not see such an occasion serving any useful purpose, except as a preliminary to a written assurance of the kind I sought on October 11."

At Annex IV and V are cuttings from the Times (February 2) and Financial Times (February 3) which are relevant.

#### VISIT TO THE FALKLANDS

The Prime Minister's approach to her visit to the Falklands is summarised in the following written answer of January 26:

"Mr Dubs asked the Prime Minister what representations she or her staff made to the British Broadcasting Corporation to have the corporation make available to Independent Television News all the film of the Prime Minister's recent Falklands visit."

"The Prime Minister: Because of the need for security over my travel arrangements, my chief press secretary arranged for a BBC TV team who were to have left Port Stanley in the week before my arrival to remain in the Falklands to cover the visit. He accordingly asked the BBC, in the interests of fair play, to make the film and sound available to ITN and IRN. The BBC eventually gave an undertaking to do so. Later an ITN reporter, also representing IRN, and a film crew arrived in the Falklands and also covered my visit."

In addition to an ITN reporter (David Walter) and a film crew of two, the Government invited Press Association (Chris Moncrieff) and the chairman of the Parliamentary Lobby journalists (John Warden, Daily Express) to make the trip. They travelled to and from the Falklands after the Prime Minister because of the security surrounding her departures.

The Channel 4 programme "The Friday Alternative" broadcast extracts from telephone calls from Port Stanley by the Chief Press Secretary to Alan Protheroe, BBC, and No 10.

A transcript of the Channel 4 broadcast is at Annex VI.

The legality of the broadcast is being investigated.

The magazine "Broadcast" has alleged the Chief Press Secretary raised no objection to the Channel 4 broadcast. Annex VII sets out the facts.

B. INGHAM

3 February 1983

Kerr, Russell  
 Kilroy-Silk, Robert  
 Lambie, David  
 Lamond, James  
 Leadbitter, Ted  
 Leighton, Ronald  
 Lewis, Arthur (N'ham NW)  
 Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)  
 Litherland, Robert  
 Lofthouse, Geoffrey  
 Lyon, Alexander (York)  
 McCartney, Hugh  
 McDonald, Dr Oonagh  
 McElhone, Mrs Helen  
 McGuire, Michael (Ince)  
 McKay, Allen (Penistone)  
 McKelvey, William  
 MacKenzie, Rt Hon Gregor  
 McMahan, Andrew  
 McNamara, Kevin  
 McWilliam, John  
 Marks, Kenneth  
 Marshall, D(G'gow S'ton)  
 Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)  
 Martin, M(G'gow S'burn)  
 Mason, Rt Hon Roy  
 Maxton, John  
 Maynard, Miss Joan  
 Meacher, Michael  
 Mikardo, Ian  
 Millan, Rt Hon Bruce  
 Miller, Dr M. S. (E Kilbride)  
 Mitchell, Austin (Grimsby)  
 Morris, Rt Hon C. (O'shaw)  
 Morris, Rt Hon J. (Aberavon)  
 Morton, George  
 Moyle, Rt Hon Roland  
 Mulley, Rt Hon Frederick  
 Newens, Stanley  
 Oakes, Rt Hon Gordon  
 O'Neill, Martin  
 Palmer, Arthur  
 Park, George  
 Parker, John  
 Parry, Robert  
 Pendry, Tom  
 Penhaligon, David  
 Powell, Raymond (Ogmore)  
 Prescott, John  
 Price, C. (Lewisham W)  
 Race, Reg  
 Radice, Giles  
 Rees, Rt Hon M (Leeds S)  
 Richardson, Jo  
 Roberts, Allan (Bootle)  
 Roberts, Ernest (Hackney N)  
 Roberts, Gwilym (Cannock)

Robertson, George  
 Robinson, G. (Coventry NW)  
 Ross, Ernest (Dundee West)  
 Rowlands, Ted  
 Ryman, John  
 Sever, John  
 Sheerman, Barry  
 Shore, Rt Hon Peter  
 Short, Mrs Renée  
 Silkin, Rt Hon J. (Deptford)  
 Silkin, Rt Hon S. C. (Dulwich)  
 Silverman, Julius  
 Skinner, Dennis  
 Smith, Rt Hon J. (N Lanark)  
 Snape, Peter  
 Soley, Clive  
 Spearing, Nigel  
 Spellar, John Francis (B'ham)  
 Spriggs, Leslie  
 Stallard, A. W.  
 Steel, Rt Hon David  
 Stewart, Rt Hon D. (W Isles)  
 Stoddart, David  
 Stott, Roger  
 Strang, Gavin  
 Straw, Jack  
 Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley  
 Taylor, Mrs Ann (Bolton W)  
 Thomas, Dr R. (Carmarthen)  
 Thorne, Stan (Preston South)  
 Tilley, John  
 Tinn, James  
 Torney, Tom  
 Varley, Rt Hon Eric G.  
 Wainwright, E. (Dearne V)  
 Walker, Rt Hon H. (D'caster)  
 Wardell, Gareth  
 Watkins, David  
 Welsh, Michael  
 White, Frank R.  
 White, J. (G'gow Pollok)  
 Whitehead, Phillip  
 Whitlock, William  
 Williams, Rt Hon A. (S'sea W)  
 Wilson, Gordon (Dundee E)  
 Wilson, Rt Hon Sir H. (H'ton)  
 Wilson, William (C'try SE)  
 Winnick, David  
 Woodall, Alec  
 Woolmer, Kenneth  
 Wright, Sheila  
 Young, David (Bolton E)

Tellers for the Noes:  
 Mr. Walter Harrison and  
 Mr. Norman Hogg.

*Question accordingly agreed to.*

## Falkland Islands (Franks Report)

12.14 am

**Mr. Tam Dalyell (West Lothian):** On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. May I, in the presence of the Leader of the House, ask for the protection of the House on a House of Commons issue? In the last few minutes it has become fairly common knowledge that tomorrow at 11 am and again at 2.45 pm, on the Prime Minister's instructions, Mr. Bernard Ingham will brief the press on what Downing Street believes to be important in the Franks report.

I put it to you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, as one of many who gave evidence to the Franks committee, that hon. Members and many others who are concerned will not see the report until 3.30 pm, and that if anyone is to brief the press or the lobby on the Franks report it should be Lord Franks, not a representative of Downing Street. As I understand it, the report is not the property of Downing Street until it is delivered to the House.

I ask for your protection, Mr. Deputy Speaker, in the sense that early tomorrow morning you raise the matter with Mr. Speaker. The motion that I have been able to table at the very last moment is

"That this House instructs the Prime Minister to ensure that no official will provide briefings for journalists on the Franks report before she has made her statement to the House."

I do this in no party political spirit, and least of all with any point of view on the Falklands campaign. It is a House of Commons matter and it deserves the attention of Mr. Speaker.

**Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Ernest Armstrong):** I shall put the observations of the hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) to Mr. Speaker. I am sure that the arrangements for tomorrow are not a matter for the Chair.

**Mr. Michael Cocks (Bristol, South):** Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I understand your reticence about moving into these waters, but, as the Leader of the House is present, and as my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) has made some relevant points, perhaps the Leader of the House would care to respond to what he said.

**The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. John Biffen):** I shall respond by accepting at once the concluding comments of the hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell)—that the matter be put to Mr. Speaker. I think that that is the appropriate course.

## Falkland Islands (Franks Report)

3.31 pm

**Mr. Speaker:** Statement, The Prime Minister.

**Mr. Tam Dalyell (West Lothian):** On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Just after midnight last night, I raised a point of order about Mr. Bernard Ingham and his proposed 11 am and 2.45 pm guidance to journalists. From the Opposition Front Bench last night, my right hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, South (Mr. Cocks), the Opposition Chief Whip, said that he thought that the issues were substantial and invited the Leader of the House to comment. Very fairly and properly, and acting in his capacity as Leader of the whole House, the right hon. Member for Oswestry (Mr. Biffen) said from the Dispatch Box that he agreed that the matter should be considered by you, Mr. Speaker, this morning. Indeed, Mr. Deputy Speaker announced then that he would report the matter to you, Mr. Speaker.

If the Franks committee had been set up by the House, there would have been a succession of breach of privilege cases, besides which the cases of the late Sir Gerald Nabarro on car tax, of the leak of the Civil List and of myself in relation to Porton Down would have paled into insignificance—[HON. MEMBERS: "He is reading."] Indeed, in 1967, for talking prematurely about the report of the Select Committee on Science and Technology to Laurence Marks of *The Observer*, I was arraigned before the whole House.

**Mr. Speaker:** Order. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will submit a point of order to me on which I can rule.

**Mr. Dalyell:** What I said was trivial and obscure compared with the reports in *The Observer* on Sunday by Mr. Adam Raphael and the long report in *The Scotsman* which I sent to you, Sir, by the responsible diplomatic correspondent Alexander MacLeod who reported in detail and authoritatively much of what Lord Franks said and his conclusions.

The point of order is this. Is there to be one law for Downing Street and another for Back Benchers? If Downing Street did not make the leak, who did? Lord Franks? A member of his committee? Was it Lord Carrington? Was it the Foreign Office? The House of Commons is entitled to a statement on prima facie breaches of the Official Secrets Act.

When the committee was set up, so great was the store that was set by the need for secrecy that it had to be Privy Councillors who were appointed to it. Rightly, Sir Patrick Nairn was appointed to the Privy Council precisely for that purpose.

In the absence of what some of us consider the civilised and sensible habit of an embargo for the Lobby so that they can study things in a relaxed and proper manner, what we have had is selective briefing and selected leaking by interested parties. Moreover—

**Mr. Speaker:** Order. The hon. Gentleman must now submit a point of order to me. [HON. MEMBERS: "He has done it."] If he has done it, I am quite willing to give my ruling. He must now come to the point. The House is waiting to hear a statement.

**Mr. Dalyell:** Is it right for the House of Commons to face a situation where a Prime Minister can put her own

gloss on something? If Downing Street was not responsible, let us have an inquiry to discover who made the leak. The first thing in the public mind is—

**Mr. Speaker:** Order. I can help the hon. Gentleman and the House in this matter. This is not a matter over which I have any authority to rule. It is not a report that has been commissioned by the House. It is a Government report. It is not for me to tell the Government how they may conduct their own affairs. Statement, the Prime Minister.

**Mr. George Foulkes (South Ayrshire):** On a point of order on another matter, Mr. Speaker, which is your responsibility. Some hon. Members are privileged enough to have had a copy of the report for a long time. Others are scurrying out of the Chamber to get one now. Would it not be better for the statement to be made when all hon. Members, especially Back Benchers, for whom I know you have a special concern, Mr. Speaker, are on an equal footing when the statement is made? Would it not be sensible for this sitting to be suspended—

**Hon. Members:** No.

**Hon. Members:** Hear, Hear!

**Mr. Foulkes:** —to allow hon. Members to read the report or for the Prime Minister's statement to be postponed until hon. Members have read it?

**Mr. Speaker:** Order.

3.37 pm

**The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher):** With permission, Mr. Speaker, I will make a statement about the report of the Falkland Islands review committee.

The House will remember that I announced the setting up of the review committee in July 1982, after consultation with the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition and with leading Privy Councillors in other parties. At that time I expressed the hope that the committee would be able to complete its work within six months.

The committee has justified that hope. I received its report on 31 December 1982, and I am presenting it to Parliament as a Command Paper this afternoon. Copies are now available in the Vote Office. [HON. MEMBERS: "Too late."]

I should like to express the Government's gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Franks, and to his colleagues for the amount of time and effort which they have devoted to producing such a thorough and comprehensive report in so short a time.

The report makes it clear that the committee was provided with all the papers relevant to its terms of reference, including a comprehensive collection of reports from the intelligence agencies. The committee's report contains a number of references to intelligence matters which would not in other circumstances be divulged. These references are essential for a full understanding of the matters into which the committee was asked to enquire, and the Government have agreed that the public interest requires that on this occasion the normal rule against public reference to the intelligence organisation or to material derived from intelligence reports should be waived.

The Government have, however, agreed with Lord Franks amendments to certain of the references to

intelligence reports with a view to minimising potential damage to British intelligence interests. Lord Franks has authorised me to tell the House that he agrees that, first, all the references to intelligence reports included in the committee's report as submitted have been retained in the report as presented to Parliament, most of them without amendment; secondly, none of the amendments that have been made alters the sense, substance or emphasis of the reference to the intelligence report concerned, or removes anything of significance to the committee's account of the matters referred to it or to its findings and conclusions; thirdly, apart from those agreed amendments, no other deletions or amendments have been made to the committee's report as submitted.

The report is unanimous and is signed by all the members of the committee without qualification. It falls into four chapters. The first gives an account of the dispute from 1965—when the issue was first brought formally to international attention by a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations—to May 1979.

The second chapter covers the period from May 1979 to 19 March 1982. The third deals with the fortnight from 19 March to 2 April 1982, which included the South Georgia incident and which led up to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. The fourth and final chapter deals with the way in which the Government discharged their responsibilities in the period leading up to the invasion. There are six annexes, the first of which deals with 10 specific assertions that have been made by some who have commented on the matters in question.

In the fourth chapter of the report—that is, the one that deals with the way Government discharged their responsibilities—the committee notes a number of points where, in its judgment, different decisions might have been taken, fuller consideration of alternative courses of action might have been advantageous, and the machinery of government could have been better used. That chapter defines and addresses itself to two crucial questions: first, could the Government have foreseen the invasion of 2 April 1982; secondly, could the Government have prevented the invasion?

The committee emphasises that its report should be read as a whole. At this stage, therefore, I shall do no more than quote the committee's conclusions on those two crucial questions. On the first question, whether the Government could have foreseen the invasion of 2 April, the committee's conclusion is:

"In the light of this evidence, we are satisfied that the Government did not have warning of the decision to invade. The evidence of the timing of the decision taken by the Junta shows that the Government not only did not, but could not, have had earlier warning. The invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2 April could not have been foreseen."

I have quoted the whole of paragraph 266.

On the second question, whether the Government could have prevented the invasion, the committee's conclusion, contained in the final paragraph of the report, is:

"Against this background we have pointed out in this Chapter where different decisions might have been taken, where fuller consideration of alternative courses of action might, in our opinion, have been advantageous, and where the machinery of Government could have been better used. But, if the British Government had acted differently in the ways we have indicated, it is impossible to judge what the impact on the Argentine Government or the implications for the course of events might have been. There is no reasonable basis for any suggestion—which would be purely hypothetical—that the invasion would have been prevented if the Government had acted in the ways indicated in our report. Taking account of these

considerations, and of all the evidence we have received, we conclude that we would not be justified in attaching any criticism or blame to the present Government"

[Laughter.]

Hon. Members: Hear, hear!

The Prime Minister: May I finish the conclusion of the Franks Committee? It was its conclusion and has nothing to do with the Government. It said:

"we conclude that we would not be justified in attaching any criticism or blame to the present Government for the Argentine Junta's decision to commit its act of unprovoked aggression in the invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982."

I have quoted in full the final paragraph of the Franks report.

Time will, of course, be found for an early debate, and that will be discussed through the usual channels. The Government will welcome an early opportunity of discussing the matters contained in the report more thoroughly than is possible this afternoon.

Mr. Michael Foot (Ebbw Vale): My hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalrymple) raised a question about leakages. Anyone who read some of the reports in the newspapers could have reached a *prima facie* opinion that there was some leakage. It is a serious question. Will the right hon. Lady investigate the matter and report to the House? That is the most satisfactory way to deal with the matter, and such a course has been taken on previous occasions.

I am sure that the right hon. Lady's proposal for a debate will be accepted. The Opposition naturally concur with her suggestion. I hope that the Government will agree that the debate—I trust it will take place next week—will be a two-day debate. We had lengthy debates on the subject last year and it would be unsatisfactory to have a debate that was principally occupied by Privy Councillors. Many of them have every right to speak, but there should be a full two-day debate. Will the right hon. Lady agree to that now?

Most of the right hon. Lady's statement concerned procedural questions, and I shall put one procedural question to her before moving on. When the committee was established in July, she properly gave an undertaking that if any Minister or civil servant felt that they had suffered unfair criticism in the report, they would have the chance to reappear before the committee to state their views and to have them taken further into account. Have any civil servants or Ministers availed themselves of that opportunity?

The right hon. Lady referred to the clear statement in paragraph 336 of the report about the Committee's conclusions. It is essential that the report is read as a whole. I am one of the few hon. Members who have had an opportunity to read it, and I am happy to confirm its judgment. There are references to the machinery of government and the failures that may have occurred.

Indeed, the right hon. Lady referred to that. I wish to quote a paragraph from the report that why it is necessary to examine the whole report before passing judgment on its conclusions. It is necessary to draw the right conclusions to ensure that the same tragic errors are not committed in future. In the words of the Foreign Secretary who resigned, those errors led to a national humiliation. [Interruption.] It was pretty tragic for the people who were killed. We need to know whether measures will be taken

[Mr. Michael Foot]

to ensure that such a tragic development does not occur again, perhaps in Belize, which is not such a different example.

For those reasons, I wish to put to the House another paragraph that illustrates the case most clearly. Paragraph 115 states:

"When they were informed of the decision"—  
that is, the decision to withdraw HMS "Endurance"—  
"the Falkland Islands Councils held a joint meeting on 26 June 1981, following which they sent a message to Lord Carrington in the following terms:

"The people of the Falkland Islands deplore in the strongest terms the decision to withdraw HMS *Endurance* from service. They express extreme concern that Britain appears to be abandoning its defence of British interests in the South Atlantic and Antarctic at a time when other powers are strengthening their position in these areas. They feel that such a withdrawal will further weaken British sovereignty in this area in the eyes not only of Islanders but of the world. They urge that all possible endeavours be made to secure a reversal of this decision."

On the following page the report describes fully for the first time what happened to those "all possible endeavours". One would have thought that in the face of such an appeal "all possible endeavours" should have included a reference of this matter to the Cabinet or to the Overseas and Defence Committee of the Cabinet. There was a difference of opinion between the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."] I am talking now about what happened to the Falkland Islands. [HON. MEMBERS: "Question."] I am coming to my question to the right hon. Lady. There was a difference of opinion between the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence about the withdrawal of HMS "Endurance". The Foreign Secretary, who resigned, persisted in his attempt to raise the matter.

Does the right hon. Lady agree that the proper place for the question to have been decided—the difference of opinion between the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence—was either in the Overseas and Defence Committee over which she presides or the Cabinet over which she is supposed to preside? Does she agree, having read the entire report, that it illustrates a collapse of effective Cabinet government in this country—[*Interruption.*] We had Cabinet government in this country that could not even discuss this appeal from the Falkland Islands. Will the right hon. Lady tell us now what changes she is making in the effective control of the Government to ensure that such a tragic event does not arise again?

**The Prime Minister:** On the first question raised by the right hon. Gentleman, which was raised before I made my statement, about the alleged briefing of the press, the remarks that were made rightly cause deep offence to a very distinguished civil servant who has served both Governments. [HON. MEMBERS: "Leaking."] The leaking was not from No. 10. As a civil servant has been named, and it is my duty and pleasure to defend him, may I say that there was never an arrangement for my press secretary to brief the press on the contents of the Franks report before its publication. To help the press to digest the report in the short time available to them after publication, my press secretary was prepared to give them a list of numbers of key paragraphs—[HON. MEMBERS: "Ah!"]—knowing full well that those paragraphs could have been tested against the report when published and that it could have

been seen whether he had been fair or not—[*Interruption.*] Is the hon. Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner) suggesting that he would have been unfair? [HON. MEMBERS: "Yes."]

**Mr. Dennis Skinner (Bolsover):** What I am suggesting to the right hon. Lady is that she talks about guidance for certain paragraphs, but she just said in response to my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition that the report should be read in its entirety, not just selected paragraphs. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]

**The Prime Minister:** So the hon. Gentleman is not accusing my press secretary. Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker for enabling me to make that point.

However, in view of what occurred in the House last night, about which I heard, I specifically instructed him not to brief the press either on the paragraphs or in any way. Therefore, he did not brief them on the paragraphs and had no intention at any time of briefing them on the contents, nor did he brief them on the contents. The only people outside the Government who have had the report in advance of publication are the Leader of the Opposition—[HON. MEMBERS: "Ah!"]—former Prime Ministers—[HON. MEMBERS: "When?"] I shall come to the moment when. The report was also made available to the Ministers who resigned when the invasion took place. They were given the report at midday yesterday. The leaders of the other opposition parties, who were consulted on the establishment of the committee, and you, Mr. Speaker, received it this afternoon.

I agree with the Leader of the Opposition that the report should be read as a whole—

**Mr. Skinner:** The right hon. Lady quoted those two paragraphs.

**The Prime Minister:**—which is why I quoted only the conclusions, which one is entitled to quote because the Franks committee was set up to pronounce on precisely those matters. It would have been absurd to do otherwise.

The right hon. Gentleman pointed out the paragraphs about HMS *Endurance* and about the decision to withdraw it. If the report is to be read as a whole, he should also refer to paragraph 44, which states:

"One consequence of the 1974 Defence Review, which resulted in a phased rundown of overseas commitments outside NATO was a decision to take HMS *Endurance* out of service."

**Hon. Members:** Read on.

**The Prime Minister:** I will indeed read on. I shall read the next sentence and the one after that if need be. There was a decision to take HMS *Endurance* out of service. It was not implemented, nor was our decision to take HMS *Endurance* out of service implemented. [*Interruption.*] The fact is that the invasion occurred while HMS *Endurance* was on station.

The Leader of the Opposition should also direct attention to signals and developments in British policy that are discussed in paragraphs 278 to 281, which refer also to other signals given by governments of both parties—[*Interruption.*]

**Mr. Ron Leighton (Newham, North-East):** On a point of order, Mr. Speaker.

**Mr. Speaker:** Order. I will take the hon. Gentleman's point of order if he cannot wait until the end of the answer. But may I say to the House that it is very wrong on an issue of such magnitude that anyone must fight to be heard. It is very wrong indeed.

PRESS GANG

Roy Hattersley



## Less Than Franks

All credit to the *Observer*. 48 hours before official publication, its banner headline was confident and categorical about the Falkland Isles report. "Franks finds Thatcher is not to blame," was splashed across its front page over an "exclusive" story. The author—Adam Raphael—insists that there was no leak. He neither saw the document on which he commented nor had its contents been tittle-tattled. He simply used his initiative and judgment, pursuing not the six wise men on the committee but the innumerable witnesses who provided their evidence. In short, Mr Raphael claims that he constructed a parallel report and drew the intelligent conclusion. Who are we to argue with him?

It is Mr Raphael's success in holding a Franks inquiry of his own and gaining from it an accurate assessment of the real report's conclusions that makes the behaviour of Bernard Ingham so difficult to understand. Mr Ingham is the Prime Minister's Press Secretary. So he saw the results of the Falklands investigation as soon as they were submitted to Mrs Thatcher. He knew that the final paragraph concluded that no one would "be justified in attaching any criticism to the present Government," and he must have therefore expected the press to do their patriotic duty—i.e. idolatrise the Prime Minister. Yet he behaved in a way which opened him to the charge of attempted manipulation.

I describe his behaviour in that neutral way for three reasons. One: In the circumstances, manipulation was unnecessary. With the recently knighted David English in command and the material which the report provided, no power on earth could have prevented the *Daily Mail* splashing, "Not Guilty. First to raise the alert was Maggie." Two: Mr Ingham assured me that all he tried to do was help journalists "find their way around" Franks. Three: He gave me that assurance in such bellicose language that failure to report his disclaimer would put my person at risk when next I meet the burly Mr Ingham.

Nevertheless his conduct on the day of the report's publication was at best naive and the explanations which followed were (to be charitable) disingenuous. The facts can be easily stated. The Franks Report (all 109 pages) was made available to press, public and Parliament only at 3.30 p.m. on the

afternoon of Tuesday, 18th January at the exact moment when Mrs Thatcher began to make her statement on its contents. Mr Ingham, conscious of the problems which this would cause for journalists, offered help.

He suggested that at 2.45 he addressed a meeting of "the Lobby"—that elite band of Parliamentary Correspondents which never betrays a confidence. He was prepared, three-quarters-of-an-hour before they actually saw the report, "to point out the important paragraphs" in a document which (at least according to its authors) ought to be considered as a whole. Unfortunately, some of the political journalists who might have benefited from his guidance made his offer public. The Prime Minister was so incensed by the implied slur on the integrity of her faithful servant that she forbade him to go on with the proposed spoon-feeding. The ingrates had to fend for themselves. And they managed their lonely obligation very well.

None better than John Warden, the Political Editor of the *Daily Express*. Mr Warden is this year's chairman of "the Lobby". Because he holds that office, he went with Mrs Thatcher on her tour of the liberated islands. And in that capacity he upbraided his indiscreet colleagues for biting the hand with which Bernard Ingham proposed to feed them a pre-digested version of the Franks Report. But surely, he did himself, and his colleagues, less than justice. With or without Mr Ingham's help, "The Voice of Britain" would have celebrated: "Mrs Thatcher scored another Falklands victory last night by yomping all over her fiercest critics."

The *Daily Telegraph* was only slightly less predictable. "Thatcher is Exonerated" probably wins the year's award for the longest word to appear in a banner headline. But there was nothing else of novelty in the paper. Godfrey Barker—now firmly entrenched in the pretentious tradition of *Telegraph* sketch writers—made a singularly inapposite comparison between the Danish Court receiving news of Ophelia's death and the Opposition in the House of Commons listening to the Prime Minister's statement. And its leader writers acknowledged the importance of the subject not by the profundity of their judgments but by the length down the page of their ponderous editorial.

But as compared with the comment column in the *Daily Mail*, the *Telegraph* editorial was a model of moderation. The *Mail* produced a passage of prose which was clearly intended to be purple, but came out in the wash as a slightly streaky mauve. "The slate has been wiped clean. Britain under Mrs Thatcher did win a glorious victory for freedom. Now let there be an end to the carping." What carping did they have in mind? Perhaps they were perturbed by a paragraph six inches higher on the same page. "Lord Carrington wishes he had sent a submarine on March 5th . . . but he didn't." Or are we allowed to go on carping at the Foreign Office and the Tory wets as long as we acknowledge Mrs Thatcher's "glorious victory"?

Compared with all this, *The Times* ("Thatcher cleared of Falklands blame by Franks") and *The Guardian* ("Thatcher is cleared of Falklands blame") seem like paragons of calm objectivity and balance—even though they could not manage an apostrophe between them. *The Times* even found room to report the one policy point that came out of the report's publication—"Fortress Falklands seen as only option". And the *Financial Times* managed to produce "Franks says Government not to blame for Junta's invasion." Did these three papers, I wonder, enjoy the services of journalists who read the report for themselves, rather than rely on Bernard Ingham's assistance?

For despite the Prime Minister's stern injunction, Mr Ingham did come to the aid of the bewildered press. Of course, he did not brief them before they saw the report. But after Mrs Thatcher's House of Commons statement, some lost souls did ask him "to give them a quick run-through". That is how Mr Ingham describes their requests. And "if people do not believe" in the innocence of his agreement to help, "that is their problem."





Last week *Press Gang* began with a paean of praise for Adam Raphael of *The Observer* who anticipated the contents of the Franks Falklands Report by 48 hours. Mr Raphael's coup would have no place in a column which, today, deals with leaks, were it not for one extraordinary aspect of his exclusive story. For the triumphant author argued that he had no prior knowledge of the report's contents, but simply pieced together the opinions of sundry witnesses and came to the conclusion that their evidence would exonerate the Prime Minister.

Now that we have all had the opportunity to digest the Franks Report, Mr Raphael's achievement seems even more spectacular. For after weeks of careful sifting, he actually came to the same conclusion as the document's two final paragraphs. The rest of Franks—as all the serious newspapers have now explained—is highly critical of the Government's performance. It takes a journalist of real talent to conduct an independent enquiry and come up, not with the opinions expressed in the body of the report which his investigations mirrored, but with the conflicting judgement with which it ended.

But as Mr Raphael's story was not based on the sight of a secret document it is not part of this week's subject. Today we examine the publication of private papers: the sort of thing that I vividly remember from my days in the Cabinet. All Cabinets leak. And I suspect that all low-grade Cabinet Ministers react as I always reacted to the Prime Minister's Thursday morning denunciation of the known but unnamed culprit. I always feared that although I was wholly innocent, I was the principal suspect. The intonation, the choice of pronouns and the careful textual analysis of the offending extract all pointed to me.

No doubt someone at New Scotland Yard felt very much the same on the Monday morning after the *Mail on Sunday* published its "EXCLUSIVE: On a plan to devolve the police". Certainly the story made Fleet Street buzz. For it was written by Chester Stern, Crime Correspondent. And not only is Chester Stern a real person, he is an ex-information officer of the Metropolitan Police. It was assumed that Mr Stern was in the know. So his story was dutifully copied

## Springing a Leak

into the rival editions of other papers. Unfortunately, he grossly overdramatised the proposals. Innocent politicians who were booked for television and radio broadcasts on the strength of his mountain were told that they were not wanted when the Commissioner of Police unveiled his mouse.

All hope that a second David Henke had been discovered was extinguished. When David Henke was local government correspondent of *The Guardian* he seemed to reveal the contents of a secret document almost every day. They usually belonged to the Department of the Environment, and concerned matters of immense controversy and even greater complication. "Rate Support Grant Formula to be Changed" he would prophesy. And then would follow a passage of explanation which appeared to be written in code. When translated into English the prophecies always turned out to be correct.

Mr Henke clearly benefited from the activities of a mole—a man or woman, deep inside the DoE, who surfaced from time to time bearing a piece of paper. Most leaks are by word of mouth—which is why so many of them turn out to be inaccurate. A perfect example of the fallibility of leaks and the frailty of leakers is to be found in the recent spate of stories concerning the Government's new immigration proposals. Knowing Conservative backbenchers have stopped lobby correspondents in House of Commons corridors and assured them (in absolute confidence) that they know the Home Secretary's secret intentions. The lobby correspondents have confused confidentiality with authority

and a lot of them will be proved wrong. They have all been sprinkled by conflicting leaks.

The other problem about leaks is that they are usually spurted out for a purpose. There are in Parliament and the Civil Service genuine enuretics who leak because they cannot help it, contemptible and compulsive blabbers who cannot see a journalist without wanting to reveal a secret. But most leakers relieve themselves for a purpose. The people in the Department of Health who spread around papers which outlined plans for re-organising the Health Service did it because they believed re-organisation to be synonymous with destruction. Stories from the Cabinet are usually spread with the specific purpose of discrediting one faction and promoting another.

In my experience leaks rarely do any harm and are the cause of much innocent fun. Occasionally they do positive good—as in the case of President Nixon's destruction. More often they do no more than prick the bubble of a politician's self esteem. For nothing makes a Minister feel more important than knowing something that the rest of us do not know. Hence all the fuss when a story which was intended for release on a Monday morning appears in the newspapers on the previous Friday. The leak is also the enemy of news manipulation. If the careful plan requires a story simultaneously to explode on every front page and it pops up prematurely in a single paper, the people who planned the megaton presentation are naturally furious. They take refuge in pompous pronouncements about the proprieties of public life.

This is how the Government responded to that very special category of leak, the broken embargo, when the list of Falklands War gallantry awards was broadcast 24 hours before official publication date. Newspapers and television companies had been given an early sight of the names, so that they could prepare their articles in advance. Falkland enthusiasm prompted some of them to jump the gun. The official complaint was not that another reminder of the Government's victory had been dissipated but that the families of medallists had been pestered at the wrong time.

Of course, the more the Government tries to manage the news, the more good journalists determine to tap the leaks. Which brings us back to Adam Raphael's story in *The Observer*—or rather would bring us back to it, if we suspected that the ingenious Mr Raphael had actually caught early sight of the Franks Report.

THE TIMES - 2 February 1983

## Fleet Street's 'cavalier' stance criticized

By Rupert Morris

Fleet Street newspapers were accused yesterday of being "cavalier" in their relations with the Government over the breaking of an embargo on publication of the Falklands awards.

Whitehall's anger is still such that nearly four months after the event copies of government reports and White Papers are being issued to the media only a few hours in advance of publication, instead of the usual day or longer.

This "restricted embargo system" is of considerable inconvenience to newspapers wishing to prepare in-depth coverage.

Mr Bernard Ingham, the Prime Minister's press secretary, said yesterday that he had only just received a reply from the Newspaper Publishers Association, representing Fleet Street newspapers, to a letter he wrote three months ago.

He had asked the NPA for an assurance that the Government could have confidence in the embargo system not being abused. The NPA's response was to invite him to discuss the matter over lunch.

He has replied, in turn, by saying that he will accept such an invitation only if the NPA is prepared to give the assurances he originally requested. The

NPA executive meets tomorrow to reconsider its position.

Mr Ingham said yesterday that he found the NPA's attitude "cavalier", in view of the fact that radio, television and provincial newspaperers had all indicated that they would like the system restored, and would be prepared to work within it.

"I share the deep concern among working journalists to see the embargo system restored", he said. "If the NPA will provide those assurances, I will strongly recommend the Prime Minister to go back to the old system."

## Lombard

How not to tame  
the press

By Max Wilkinson

FOR NEARLY four months, the Prime Minister's office has been "punishing" the press by severely curtailing the normal embargo system for advanced copies of important documents. This followed the premature disclosure in some papers of names in the Falkland Islands honours list.

As a result Tuesday's 150-page public spending White Paper, for example, was released to the press at mid-day, just 200 minutes before the official publication time, instead of being sent out a day in advance as would have been "normal" practice.

The Downing Street press office may have had a case for cracking the whip back in October when the embargo system was breached, but the continued restrictions are now operating against the public interest.

It is clearly wrong that journalists should be obliged to summarise or comment on complicated state publications without having had adequate time to read them properly.

For this reason a system of advanced copies under embargo has been operated successfully for many years in the UK and in most industrialised countries. Over the years there have been few breaches of confidentiality and these have almost always been honest errors.

However, the continued restrictions, which limit the issue of advanced copies to, at most, a few hours before publication time has a more serious aspect.

It is becoming clear that the restrictions stack too many aces in the hands of the authorities. For journalists who are denied the possibility of careful study of a document before their deadlines for writing are forced to rely more heavily on official conclusions and special "press summaries."

They also become more open to the blandishments of "leaked" hints which can be used skillfully to steer them towards a particular interpretation.

This may well have happened with the reporting of the Franks report on the Falkland Islands conflict which was issued only a matter of hours before the deadlines for most daily papers. Many comments must necessarily have been based on a

superficial or partial reading. This may not have mattered to the Government since the report's conclusions were broadly favourable to it. But in general the public interest requires that time should be given for contrary evidence to be sifted as well.

The present restrictions were imposed when Mr Bernard Ingham, the Prime Minister's blunt-talking Press secretary, wrote to all Press organisations asking for an assurance that the breach over the Falkland honours would not recur.

Most organisations gave the assurance, but the Newspaper Publishers Association, which represents the Fleet Street nationals, has not yet done so. The letter to the NPA on October 11 may have been considered provocative by some editors. It said: "It would be very useful to have the observations of your organisation and the editors of your member companies on whether the Government could have any grounds for confidence in the embargo system in future."

At all events, the NPA appears to have been somewhat dilatory. It is due to consider its position in relation to the letter at a meeting today, but the general question of embargoes has not been discussed by any of its specialist committees.

Downing Street maintains that a matter of principle over the observance of embargoes is at stake. Downing Street also appears to believe that the system represents a special privilege for the press.

There is, however, a more important principle at stake. The system has helped safeguard the thoughtful and independent reporting of State papers. The government interest and the public interest do not always co-incide, as even prime ministers may sometimes need to be reminded. The public interest requires a press which will keep up the pressure of informed criticism. Petty restrictions which inhibit criticism may occasionally appear to serve the Government's immediate interest, but in the long run they injure it because some journalists may tend to become more critical and less well informed.

CHANNEL 4

THE FRIDAY ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMME: 21 JANUARY 1983TRANSCRIPT TAKEN FROM VCR

How you nearly didn't see Mrs. Thatcher in the Falklands.

A row between the Government and the BBC.

Narrator: There is always tension between the Government and the broadcasters but most of it goes on in secret. Mrs. Thatcher's visit was a scoop for the BBC. They had the only crew out there. It would have come back sooner but Downing Street hinted that it might be worth their while staying on. What Downing Street didn't tell the BBC was that it wanted what's called "a pool", an arrangement where the BBC had to make its own exclusive film available to anyone who wanted it. That way, the Government could secure maximum coverage for the visit. There was a terrible row when the BBC, who had n't been expecting this, refused. No. 10 threatened them with incalculable consequences if they didn't agree. We wouldn't now know about the details of this confrontation had a radio ham not happened to tune in and record phone calls made from the Falkland Islands by Mrs. Thatcher's press secretary, Bernard Ingham, during the Prime Minister's visit. The Friday Alternative has obtained a copy of that tape. What follow are excerpts from his conversation with Alan Protheroe, Assistant Director General of the BBC.

Mr. Ingham: It is this childish behaviour that when indeed we have done you a signal service, a signal service, by keeping your people in the Islands ..... I say and to repeat at considerable risks to ourselves ..... I frankly don't believe that the British public, when it is explained to them, will understand this childishness .... I do expect more actually from the BBC and I am deeply hurt.

A. Protheroe: It would have been a lot easier if your office had asked us, told us 24 hours beforehand .....

Mr. Ingham: I am sorry, there was absolutely no question of our doing that and you've got to get it into your mind, and the media has got to get it into its mind that we don't operate for your convenience, we operate for the security of the Prime Minister.

A. Protheroe: I really find it very, very difficult to accept that No. 10 can actually just declare a Pool when necessary, Bernard .....

Narrator: Mr. Ingham had one trump card. His threat that he would stop the BBC's film leaving the Falklands.

Mr. Ingham: No film is coming out tonight unless I have your absolute assurance that it will be freely available to ITN and IRN.

/ Narrator:

Narrator: Alan Protheroe protested. He felt that the BBC was being used by the Government for its own purposes. But as revealed in Bernard Ingham's subsequent triumphant phone call to No. 10, Alan Protheroe had capitulated.

Mr. Ingham to No. 10 Press Office

Mr. Ingham: I've won.

No. 10: You've won?

Mr. Ingham: Yes.

No. 10: What happened?

Mr. Ingham: I rang Protheroe and told him in no uncertain terms that he wouldn't get it back tonight unless it was freely available. He gave me his assurance that it would be made freely available and .....

Narrator: So the Government managed to secure maximum coverage for itself by pressuring the BBC into cooperating. As we say, the BBC fought against this very hard, but lost.

Sir ROBERT ARMSTRONG

cc Mr R Butler

CHANNEL 4


Please see the attached correspondence from Channel 4.

Technically, the report that I raised no objection to the broadcast of my intercepted telephone calls is correct. Liz Forgan of Channel 4 confirms her impression (on informing me of their intention to broadcast about 30 minutes before doing so) was that I took the news rather well. She says she formed the impression that I was taking it on the chin but that by no stretch of the imagination could it be said that I approved.

I did not react other than rather ruefully because I had no idea precisely what was to be broadcast or what I could do about it if extracts from interceptions of my personal telephone calls were broadcast.

As you know, I took an early opportunity after the broadcast to get in touch with you to register my concern both about the broadcast and to raise the question as to whether an offence had been committed. I have since taken many opportunities to deplore the interception of my calls and their subsequent broadcast.

Mrs Forgan does not intend to write to 'Broadcast'. Unless you advise otherwise, I do not intend to do so.



B. INGHAM

2 February 1983

DIVERSE



*Protheroe: Conversation "tapped"*

# Ham and exploit

THE SO-CALLED "bitter row" between Downing Street and the BBC took a new turn last week when it was revealed that Bernard Ingham, the Prime Minister's press secretary, indeed knew that excerpts from telephone calls made between him and the BBC were to be transmitted on Channel 4 and had raised no objection.

It was on this understanding that the IBA cleared the broadcast which was part of *The Friday Alternative*, the programme that replaces the second half of Channel 4's 7-8pm news on Friday night.

The calls between Ingham in Port Stanley and Alan Protheroe, assistant director general of the BBC in London, were recorded by a radio amateur who, apparently fortuitously, tuned to the same frequency.

Since the conversations showed how the BBC was persuaded to share its "scoop" film of Mrs Thatcher's arrival in the Falklands with ITN, under threat of the film being held up for 48 hours in Stanley, fuel has been added to the fire of those MPs and others who are already accusing Downing Street of manipulating the media. But a larger issue is involved: was Channel 4 legally in the clear when it used the recordings?

Downing Street is seeking legal advice on the matter which is further complicated by the fact that not only was a private telephone call "tapped" and broadcast, but also that a recording of material from the air waves was made and published.

Channel 4 is showing no concern at any suggestion that it might have behaved illegally. "We thought it was in the public interest that the incident should be shown to our viewers and so we showed it," was the comment of a spokesman. Whether or not a complaint is made to the IBA seems to rest with the BBC, since Ingham had previously cleared his own interest. — PC

• A question is due to be asked of the Attorney-General in the Commons as to the legality of the broadcasts.



Personal

Bernard Ingham  
Press Office  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

2 February 1983

*CA Sending  
copy of  
article -  
attached  
14*

Dear Bernard

I am distressed to see that the media trade magazine Broadcast is implying in its account of the Falklands radio tapes story, that you in some sense "cleared" our transmission of the tapes.

I would like to assure you that I never at any time gave that impression to anyone, indeed I did not discuss our conversation with anyone except the Channel Controller who informed the IBA that I had alerted you, as a matter of courtesy only, shortly before transmission.

I have not written to Broadcast to this effect as on balance I think that only makes even heavier weather of it all, but I will happily do so if you would like me to.

Best wishes

Yours sincerley

Liz Forgan  
Senior Commissioning Editor



014  
From the Master · St. Catherine's College · Oxford · OX1 3UJ

Telephone Oxford (0865) 49541

21. 1. '83

26

④  
Prime Minister

A.S.C.  $\frac{26}{1}$

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you so much for your letter about my part in the Falkland Islands Review. I greatly appreciate your generous words of thanks.

Every good wish,

yours sincerely,

Patrick Nairne

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mt

KEY PARAGRAPHS

in Franks Report

Argentina

Paragraph

1	Terms of reference.
3	Number of meetings.
5	Documents made available.
6	Files.
12	Structure of Report.
15-70	Chapter I - Account of Dispute from 1965-79.
70	Significant themes of period.
71-160	Chapter 2 - Period of Present Government May 1979- 19 March 1982.
161-259	Chapter 3 - March 19-April 2, 1982.
260-339	Chapter 4 - The Government's Discharge of their Responsibility.
260	2 Questions addressed by Franks.
266 and 339	Answers to those 2 Questions.
263	When order given to invade.
283	British Government's dilemma.
284	Conduct of FCO officials.
288	Conclusions on Endurance.
296	Views on FCO judgement in early 1982.
312-314	Views on intelligence.
317-320	Views on intelligence assessment machinery.
325	Earlier Task Force?
326-330	Earlier smaller force?
331-332	Deployment in response to South Georgia.
334	Warnings to Argentina.
Annex A	Comments on Some Specific Assertions

Argentina

Mr Wilson's Government (until May 1970)

OPD	1970	11 Meetings
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Mr Heath's Government (from June 1970)

DOP	1970	12 Meetings
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DOP	1971	26 Meetings
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DOP	1972	20 Meetings
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DOP	1973	24 Meetings
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DOP	1974	4 Meetings
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Mr Wilson's Government (from March 1974)

OPD	1974	18 Meetings
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OPD	1975	15 Meetings
-----	------	-------------

OPD	1976	6 Meetings
-----	------	------------

Mr Callaghan's Government (from April 1976)

DOP	1976	6 Meetings
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DOP	1977	7 Meetings
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DOP	1978	10 Meetings
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DOP	1979	4 Meetings
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Mrs Thatcher's Government (from May 1979)

OD	1979	13 meetings
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OD	1980	27 meetings
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OD	1981	18 meetings
----	------	-------------

OD	1982 (to 8 September)	17 meetings
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SECRET

3

THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND THE DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE  
OF THE CABINET: SEPTEMBER 1979 TO APRIL 1982

- (i) 20 September 1979  
Lord Carrington minutes the Prime Minister on the options for handling the Falkland Islands dispute with Argentina.
- (ii) 21 September 1979  
Sir John Hunt minutes the Prime Minister on (i).
- (iii) 26 September 1979  
The Prime Minister indicates her wish to discuss (i) at an early meeting of OD (Alexander to Walden).
- (iv) 27 September 1979  
Sir K Berrill writes to the Secretary of State for Energy about (i).
- (v) 12 October 1979  
Comprehensive memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary (OD (79)31) on the Falkland Islands with nine annexes. Sets out three broad options.
- (vi) 15 October 1979  
The Prime Minister asks for postponement of discussion of (v) by OD until after the Rhodesian issue has been concluded (Alexander to Walden).
- (vii) 12 November 1979  
Lord Carrington seeks Prime Minister's approval to OD decisions on (v) by the end of November to enable negotiations with Argentina to open "at a time of our own choosing" (Lyne to Alexander).
- (viii) 15 November 1979  
The Prime Minister agrees to resume discussion in OD but not until after the European Council meeting in Dublin.

1  
SECRET

- (ix) 14 January 1980  
Hastie-Smith asks Lyne for a supplementary paper on the wider political and economic factors relating to the Falkland Islands before OD meets on 29 January 1980.
- (x) 22 January 1980  
Lyne refuses.
- (xi) 24 January 1980  
Lord Carrington minutes the Prime Minister to say that exploratory talks with the Argentines should start soon. "To continue to stall would be risky".
- (xii) 29 January 1980  
OD discussion (OD(80) 3rd Meeting) of (v). Authorises talks with Argentina, subject to written confirmation from the Islanders that it is their wish.
- (xiii) 22 February 1980  
Lord Carrington minutes Prime Minister to propose that Mr Ridley make contact with his Argentine opposite number.
- (xiv) 25 February 1980  
Prime Minister agrees (Alexander to Walden).
- (xv) 24 April 1980  
Brief discussion in Cabinet (CC(80) 17th Conclusions) on Ridley talks. "It would be his aim not to allow any such discussion to reach a point at which a decision would need to be taken".
- (xvi) 27 June 1980  
Memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary (OD(80)46) on Ridley talks and new options.
- (xvii) 2 July 1980  
Further discussion in OD (OD(80) 17th Meeting) on exploratory talks with Argentina.

- (xviii) 4 November 1980  
Further memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary (OD(80)66) on need for Mr Ridley to visit the Falkland Islands.
- (xix) 7 November 1980  
Further discussion in OD (OD(80) 23rd Meeting) recorded in MCR. Lease-back to be put to the Islanders. OD to consider further in light of their reaction.
- (xx) 27 November 1980  
Brief discussion in Cabinet (CC(80) 42nd Meeting) which is reassured by Lord Carrington that the wishes of the Islanders remain paramount.
- (xxi) 3 December 1980  
Further discussion in OD (OD(80) 25th Meeting). Inconclusive. Further consideration needed, in light of Islander reaction and feelings in House of Commons.
- (xxii) 4 December 1980  
Brief discussion in Cabinet (CC(80) 43rd Meeting). Considered reaction of Islanders still awaited.
- (xxiii) 14 January 1981  
Wright (Cabinet Office) minutes Alexander on the Falkland Islanders and the Nationality Bill, suggesting to the Prime Minister that since the Government's handling of this aspect of the problem will be influenced by the Islanders reaction to the proposals which Mr Ridley has put to them, it may be best not to form a view until the meeting of OD on 29 January has taken place.
- (xxiv) 26 January 1981  
Memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary (OD(81)2) on latest position. Proposes talks with Argentines in late February/early March with Islanders present.
- (xxv) 29 January 1981  
Discussion in OD (OD(81) 1st Meeting) which noted and endorsed (xxiv). Nationality and savings to be urgently pursued.

- (xxvi) 13 March 1981  
 Lord Carrington minutes Prime Minister on Anglo-Argentine talks in New York on 23/24 February.
- (xxvii) 8 April 1981  
 Wenban-Smith minutes Hastie-Smith on how matters stand on OD since 29 January.
- (xxviii) 14 May 1981  
 Sir Robert Armstrong minutes Whitmore, enclosing the three month forward look. The Falkland Islands is entered for an OD in July, on the basis of a memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. The minute is 'seen and noted' by the Prime Minister on 18 May.
- (xxix) 8 June 1981  
 Wenban-Smith minutes Hastie-Smith on the bleak outlook for the Anglo-Argentine dispute. He says that Lord Carrington may put round a background paper to OD in July. "But the prospects are not cheerful. The Argentines are jumpy and may soon become provocative .... OD may need to discuss future policy in September". Hastie-Smith commented: "An announcement of British defence cuts, especially in the maritime field, may make the Argentines more daring".
- (xxx) 8 September 1981  
 Facer minutes Wright on forthcoming business. The following is an extract:
- "Given the absence abroad of the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary for much of the rest of September and early October, I am not bidding for any further meetings of OD before the Conservative Party Conference. But it is possible that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary may wish to circulate a paper on policy towards South Africa and he is also likely to have papers on UK/Vatican relations, the Falkland Islands and the Canadian Constitution. All these are potential candidates for an October meeting".

- (xxxix) 14 September 1981  
 Lord Carrington minutes the Prime Minister before meeting the Argentine Foreign Minister at the UNGA. He is pessimistic and gloomy.
- (xxxix) 25 September 1981  
 The Chief Secretary comments advising precautions against stumbling inadvertently into new financial commitments.
- (xxxix) 6 October 1981  
 Facer minutes Wright, attaching a business forecast. The relevant extract reads:  
 "I also foresee the need for an OD discussion on Gibraltar at about end-October, early November. Another possibility for OD around this time is the Falkland Islands".  
 This possibility is not mentioned in Sir Robert Armstrong's subsequent business note of 9 October to Whitmore.
- (xxxix) 16 November 1982  
 Wenban-Smith minutes Wade-Gery to record his urging of the FCO to deal with (xxxix) in Lord Carrington's forthcoming minute to OD colleagues.
- (xxxix) 24 November 1981  
 Lord Carrington minutes the Prime Minister on steps to improve certain aspects of the Falkland Islands economic situation (notably savings).
- (xxxix) 2 December 1981  
 Lord Carrington minutes the Prime Minister on his talks with the Argentine Foreign Minister, the evolution of Islander opinion and the prospects for Mr Luce's forthcoming talks with the Argentines. Note of cautious optimism.
- (xxxix) 3 December 1981  
 Prime Minister 'takes note' of Lord Carrington's minute of 2 December (Alexander to Lyne).



- (xxxviii) 7 December 1981  
Chief Secretary, Treasury, still worried about expenditure if Argentines interfere with communications (Mathews to Fall).
- (xxxix) 7 January 1982  
Facer minutes Hilton, attaching the three month forward look. This includes an entry for a discussion of the Falkland Islands at an OD in March "contingent on Anglo-Argentine talks".
- (xxxx) 22 January 1982  
Sir Robert Armstrong minutes Whitmore, enclosing the three month forward look in precisely the same terms as (xxxix). The minute is "seen and noted" by the Prime Minister on 25 January.
- (xxxxi) 9 February 1982  
Mr Callaghan warns of dangers of scrapping HMS Endurance (Arthur to Pattison, No 10). Sir Robert Armstrong (?) comments "I agree".
- (xxxxii) 15 February 1982  
Lord Carrington minutes the Prime Minister on forthcoming talks in New York on 26/27 February. Ends by saying "I expect we shall need a further discussion of the Falklands in OD in March".
- (xxxxiii) 17 February 1982  
Prime Minister says that we must also make it clear to the Argentinians that the wishes of the Islanders are paramount (Coles to Holmes).
- (xxxxiv) 23 February 1982  
Facer's business forecast sent to Mrs McGraffin includes "Falkland Islands (possible)" for OD on 17 March.
- (xxxxv) 25 February 1982  
Sir Robert Armstrong minutes Whitmore. [Falkland Islands] is entered for OD on 16 March which appears to have been brought forward one day.

(xxxxvi) 2 March 1982

Facer's business forecast sent to Mrs McGraffin includes the Falkland Islands for OD either on 16 March or on 25 March. It is marked "possible but unlikely".

(xxxxvii) 5 March 1982

Sir Robert Armstrong's business minute to Whitmore includes the Falkland Islands for OD on 25 March. He adds: "Negotiations between Britain and the Argentine on the Falkland Islands have been taking place in New York. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary may wish to have a discussion of thir outcome".

(xxxxviii) 8 March 1982

Prime Minister minutes on Buenos Aires telegram No 60 of 3 March: "We must make contingency plans". Mr Coles continues: "I understand that it may be the intention of Lord Carrington to bring a further paper on the Falkland Islands to OD in the fairly near future. You may think that this could helpfully contain an account of our contingency planning". (Coles to Holmes).

(xxxxix) 16 March 1982

Facer's business forecast to Mrs McGraffin enters the Falkland Islands as a possible item for OD on 6 April. The minute comments as follows:  
 "The Falkland Islands will probably not come to the Committee until after Easter since it is likely that there will be nothing for Ministers to decide before then. But there is a chance that it may need to come at fairly short notice and it might therefore be worth keeping open the possibility of an OD on 6 April".

(L) 19 March 1982

Sir Robert Armstrong's business minute to Whitmore refers to the Falkland Islands as a possible item for OD on 6 April. It then adds:  
 "This meeting of OD has only been included on a contingency basis since it is more likely that the Falkland Islands will not have come to the Committee until after Easter. If there is to be a discussion, the Chief Whip should be invited to attend".

(Li)

19 March 1982

Wade-Gery minutes Facer on forthcoming business following the meeting of Deputy Secretaries on that day. The following is an extract:

"6 April

... I see that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is stated to be out of London that day. Can you check whether the FCO are really content for the Falkland Islands to be taken at OD in his absence or, if not, what do they suggest?"

(Lii)

23 March 1982

Facer's business forecast to Mrs McGraffin includes the Falkland Islands for a (possible) OD in the week beginning 19 April. The following is an extract from the minute:

"The position on the Falkland Islands is that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is expected to minute the Prime Minister in the next day or two to report on the present state of play and to seek authority for contingency planning in case of action by the Argentines. This contingency planning will involve preparatory work with commercial firms for alternative sources of supply, and this will have financial implications. Lord Carrington is also likely to minute the Defence Secretary about HMS Endurance and military contingency plans. The FCO's intention is not to seek a discussion in OD before Easter. Lord Carrington wishes to be present if there is an OD discussion. It would therefore be prudent to find a time in the week beginning 19 April when an OD could be arranged with the Foreign Secretary present .... You asked if there was any other likely business for the week of 19 April: at present I cannot see any which would require a Ministerial meeting, other than possibly the Falkland Islands".

(Liii)

23 March 1982

Sir Robert Armstrong's business minute to Whitmore includes an OD on 22 April to discuss the "Falkland Islands".

- (Liv) 24 March 1982  
 Lord Carrington minutes the Prime Minister on the New York talks and the prospect of an early confrontation with Argentina. Seeks authority for officials to carry forward urgent contingency planning.
- (Lv) 24 March 1982  
 Lord Carrington minutes Mr Nott suggesting circulation by him to OD of contingency paper on defence aspects. Also agreement to maintain Endurance on station, to be looked at by OD "fairly soon".  
25 March 1982 Cabinet decision: FCS raises Gyttala under "Foreign Affairs".
- (Lvi) 25 March 1982  
 Subject to views of other members of OD, Prime Minister agrees (Coles to Holmes).
- (Lvii) 26 March 1982  
 Mr Wiggin replies to Lord Carrington agreeing on contingency paper, agreeing to maintain Endurance on station for up to two months but raising financial and other implications. Hopes for "very early discussion by OD, hopefully before Easter".
- (Lviii) 26 March 1982  
 Note on defence implications of Argentine action against the Falkland Islands circulated to OD members (Evans to Coles). Ends as follows:  
 "The note makes clear that our scope for effective military action in response to whatever the Argentinians do is extremely limited and that almost anything we could do would be too late and/or extremely expensive".
- (Lix) 26 March 1982  
 Sir Robert Armstrong minutes Whitmore on business at length. He includes provision for an OD at 11.30 am on 22 April in the following terms:  
 "11.30 am OD  
 [Falkland Islands]  
 [Economic Measures against the Soviet Union]  
 Both these items are included in the agenda on a provisional basis. We do not know how matters will develop over the Falkland

Islands in the next few weeks but it is prudent to include this in forthcoming business for OD, since the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary may wish to seek his colleagues' approval for measures which could involve a call on the contingency reserve. The second item should have been taken at OD yesterday. It is possible that a discussion may not after all be necessary".

- (Lx) 28 March 1982  
Prime Minister, acknowledging Lord Carrington's and Mr Wiggin's minutes, says she would like the matter to be discussed at a very early meeting of OD (Coles to Holmes).
- (Lxi) 29 March 1982  
Financial Secretary writes to Lord Carrington to say he has no objection to contingency planning but ruling out recourse to the Contingency Reserve in the event of implementation.
- (Lxii) 30 March 1982  
Falkland Islands appears on Revised Agenda for OD at 11.30 on 1 April (as item 3 after Statement on Defence Estimates and Belize - withdrawal of the garrison).
- (Lxiii) 31 March 1982  
Falkland Islands moves up to Item 2 on second Revised Agenda for OD on 1 April.
- (Lxiv) 31 March 1982  
Sir Robert Armstrong minutes Prime Minister on OD on 1 April (ie Chairman's brief). Outcome sought is clear guidance to FCO and MOD on contingency planning.
- (Lxv) 31 March 1982  
Prime Minister exchanges messages with President Reagan - latter's reply only on file (Coles to Richards of 1 April).

(Lxvi)

1 April 1982

Meeting of OD (OD(82) 6th Meeting). Full record contained in MCR dated 5 April.

(Lxvii)

2 April 1982

Sir Robert Armstrong's business minute to Whitmore includes the following for:

"Monday 5 April

There are at the moment no plans for Cabinet or Cabinet Committees chaired by the Prime Minister. In the light of developments over the Falkland Islands we may of course need further meetings of the Cabinet. The same consideration applies to the rest of the period covered by this minute".



10 DOWNING STREET

1981 -

29 Jan : Falklands

Parallels 17 x 03 meetings.

1982

5 x 03 meetings between

Jan - Dec, not a Falkland.

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OD M/sgs  
1982

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OD(82)1st Meeting

COPY NO

60

CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

MEETING to be held in 10 Downing Street  
on WEDNESDAY 27 JANUARY at 9.00 a.m.

AGENDUM

THE DEFENCE PROGRAMME

Memoranda by the Secretary of State for Defence  
OD(82)2 - already circulated  
OD(82)3 - already circulated

Memorandum by the Chief Secretary Treasury  
OD(82)4 - to be circulated.

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG  
R L WADE-GERY  
R L L FACER

Cabinet Office

25 January 1982

The Secretary of State for Industry and the Chief Secretary, Treasury, are invited to be present.

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OD(82)2nd Meeting

COPY NO

CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

---

MEETING to be held in  
the Prime Minister's Room, House of Commons,  
on THURSDAY 28 JANUARY 1982 at 5.30 p.m.

---

REVISED AGENDUM

POLAND - SANCTIONS

To be raised orally

[Letter dated 27 January from the Private Secretary to the Lord Privy Seal to the Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, and Note by the Secretaries (OD(82)5), covering a letter dated 27 January from the Governor of the Bank of England to the Chancellor of the Exchequer are relevant].

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG  
R L WADE-GERY  
R L L FACER

Cabinet Office  
28 January 1982

The Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the Secretary of State for Industry are invited to attend.

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OD(82) 3rd Meeting

COPY NO 57

CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

---

MEETING to be held at  
10 Downing Street on  
TUESDAY 16 FEBRUARY 1982 at 10.30 am

---

REVISED AGENDUM

NORTHERN IRELAND: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland  
OD(82)6 - already circulated

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG  
R L WADE-GERY  
R L L FACER

Cabinet Office  
11 February 1982

The following are invited to attend -

Secretary of State for Northern Ireland  
Secretary of State for Scotland  
Attorney General

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OD(82) 4th Meeting

COPY NO 54

CABINET  
DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

MEETING to be held at  
10 Downing Street on  
THURSDAY 11 MARCH 1982 at 10.30 am

REVISED AGENDUM

SIXTH INTERNATIONAL TIN AGREEMENT

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Industry  
OD(82) 9 - already circulated

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign  
and Commonwealth Affairs  
OD(82) 11 - already circulated

Note by the Secretaries  
OD(82) 10 - already circulated

[The letter of 5 March 1982 from the Governor of the Bank of England  
to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs is  
also relevant]

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG  
D J S HANCOCK  
D M ELLIOTT

Cabinet Office  
9 March 1982

The Secretary of State for Industry is invited to attend.

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OD(82)5th Meeting

COPY NO

58

CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

---

MEETING to be held at  
10 Downing Street on  
THURSDAY 25 MARCH 1982 at 10.30 am

---

AGENDA

1. NORTHERN IRELAND: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Previous Reference: OD(82)3rd Meeting

Memoranda by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland  
OD(82)13 - already circulated  
OD(82)14 - to be circulated

2. ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  
OD(82)15 - to be circulated

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG  
R L WADE-GERY  
R L L FACER

Cabinet Office  
22 March 1982

The following are invited to attend -

For Item 1 - Secretary of State for Northern Ireland  
Secretary of State for Scotland  
Chief Whip

For Item 2 - Secretary of State for Industry  
(at 11 am)

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OD(81) 1st Meeting

COPY NO 56

CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

—  
MEETING to be held at  
10 Downing Street on  
THURSDAY 29 JANUARY 1981 at 9.30 am  
—

AGENDA

1. FALKLAND ISLANDS

Previous Reference: OD(80) 25th Meeting

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  
OD(81) 2 - to be circulated

2. ARMS SUPPLIES TO IRAN AND IRAQ

Previous Reference: OD(80) 25th Meeting

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  
OD(81) 3 - to be circulated

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG  
R L WADE-GERY  
R M HASTIE-SMITH

Cabinet Office  
26 January 1981

The following are invited to attend -

Attorney General

For Item 1 Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury  
Minister of State Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr Ridley)

For Item 2 Secretary of State for Industry

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OD mfgs  
1981  
69411 00

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OD(81) 2nd Meeting

COPY NO 63

CABINET  
DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

MEETING to be held at  
10 Downing Street on  
THURSDAY 12 FEBRUARY 1981 at 12 noon

AGENDA

1. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO POLAND: LONGER-TERM APPROACH

Previous Reference: OD(80) 27th Meeting Item 2

Note by the Chairman of the Official Group on  
Economic Assistance to Poland  
OD(81) 7 - already circulated

2. BELIZE

Previous Reference: OD(80) 21st Meeting Item 1

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  
OD(81) 5 - to be circulated

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  
and Secretary of State for Defence  
OD(81) 6 - to be circulated

3. TORNADO EXPORT SALES

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  
and Secretary of State for Defence  
OD(81) 8 - to be circulated

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG  
R L WADE-GERY  
R M HASTIE-SMITH

Cabinet Office  
10 February 1981

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OD(81) 3rd Meeting

COPY NO

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CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

MEETING to be held at  
10 Downing Street on  
MONDAY 23 FEBRUARY 1981 at 4.30 pm

AGENDUM

PATRIATION OF THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  
OD(81) 12 - to be circulated

Memorandum by the Attorney General  
OD(81) 11 - already circulated

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG  
R L WADE-GERY  
R M HASTIE-SMITH

Cabinet Office  
19 February 1981

The following are invited to attend -

Attorney General  
Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury

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OD(81) 4th Meeting

COPY NO 54

CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

—  
MEETING to be held at  
10 Downing Street on  
THURSDAY 5 MARCH 1981 at 11.30 am

—  
AGENDUM

STATEMENT ON THE DEFENCE ESTIMATES 1981

Note by the Secretary of State for Defence  
OD(81) 13 - already circulated

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG  
R L WADE-GERY  
R M HASTIE-SMITH

Cabinet Office  
27 February 1981

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OD(81) 5th Meeting

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CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

MEETING to be held at  
10 Downing Street on  
THURSDAY 12 MARCH 1981 at 9.30 am

AGENDA

1. CAP PRICES 1981

Memorandum by the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food  
OD(81) 16 - already circulated

Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer  
OD(81) 18 - to be circulated

2. PASSPORTS

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Home Department and the  
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  
OD(81) 17 - to be circulated

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG  
M D M FRANKLIN  
D M ELLIOTT

Cabinet Office

9 March 1981

The following are invited to attend -

For Item 1 - Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food  
Secretary of State for Scotland  
Secretary of State for Wales  
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland

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OD(81) 6th Meeting

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CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

—  
MEETING to be held at  
10 Downing Street on  
THURSDAY 19 MARCH 1981 at 9.30 am \*

—  
AGENDUM

FISHERIES SETTLEMENT AND 1981 CAP PRICES

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  
OD(81) 20 - to be circulated

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG  
M D M FRANKLIN  
D M ELLIOTT

Cabinet Office

17 March 1981

The following are invited to attend -  
Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food  
Secretary of State for Scotland

\* Please note change in time of Meeting.

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OD(81) 7th Meeting

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CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

—  
MEETING to be held at  
10 Downing Street on  
THURSDAY 9 APRIL 1981 at 12 noon

—  
AGENDUM

UNITED KINGDOM/IRAN RELATIONS: SUPPLY OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT

Previous Reference: OD(81) 1st Meeting

Memorandum by the Lord Privy Seal  
OD(81) 22 - to be circulated

Note by the Secretaries  
OD(81) 21 - already circulated

The following papers are also relevant:-

Minute by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to the Prime Minister dated 26 March 1981 entitled 'Arms Supplies to Iran'.

Minute by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Prime Minister dated 3 April entitled 'Arms Sales to Iran'.

Cabinet Office  
7 April 1981

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG  
R M HASTIE-SMITH

The following are invited to attend:-

Secretary of State for Industry  
Attorney General

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OD(81) 8th Meeting

COPY NO

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CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

MEETING to be held in  
Conference Room A, Cabinet Office,  
Whitehall on WEDNESDAY 15 APRIL 1981  
at 11.30 am\*

AGENDUM

POLISH DEBT

Previous Reference: OD(81) 2nd Meeting, Item 1

To be raised orally

The following paper is relevant:-

Letter dated 13 April from the Private Secretary to the  
Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Private Secretary to the  
Prime Minister

Cabinet Office  
13 April 1981

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG  
R L WADE-GERY  
R M HASTIE-SMITH

The following are invited to attend under the Chairmanship of the Home Secretary

Secretary of State for Industry  
Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food

\*Please note change in time and place of Meeting

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OD(81) 9th Meeting

COPY NO 52

CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

MEETING to be held at  
10 Downing Street on  
WEDNESDAY 20 MAY 1981 at 5.30 pm

AGENDUM

POLISH DEBT

Previous Reference: OD(81) 8th Meeting

To be raised orally

The following papers are relevant:-

Minute from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Prime Minister  
dated 30 April

Minute from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  
to the Prime Minister reference PM/81/257

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG  
R L WADE-GERY  
R M HASTIE-SMITH

Cabinet Office  
18 May 1981

The following are invited to attend:-

Secretary of State for Industry  
Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food

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OD(81) 10th Meeting

COPY NO

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CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

—  
MEETING to be held at  
10 Downing Street on  
MONDAY 1 JUNE 1981 at 4.00 pm  
—

AGENDA

1. BBC EXTERNAL SERVICES

Previous Reference: OD(80) 3rd Meeting, Item 1

Note by the Secretaries  
OD(81) 28 - to be circulated

2. POLAND: POSSIBLE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN THE EVENT OF FORCIBLE INTERVENTION

Note by the Secretaries  
OD(81) 26 - to be circulated

Note by the Secretaries  
OD(81) 27 - to be circulated

Cabinet Office  
28 May 1981

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG  
R L WADE-GERY  
R M HASTIE-SMITH

The following are invited to attend

Chief Secretary, Treasury

For Item 1 Minister of State Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr Ridley)

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OD(81) 11th Meeting

COPY NO

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CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

—  
MEETING to be held at  
10 Downing Street on  
MONDAY 8 JUNE 1981 at 4.00 pm  
—

REVISED AGENDUM

THE DEFENCE PROGRAMME

Previous Reference: OD(81) 4th Meeting

Note by the Secretary of State for Defence  
OD(81) 29 - already circulated

Note by the Chancellor of the Exchequer  
OD(81) 31 - already circulated

Cabinet Office  
5 June 1981

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG  
R L WADE-GERY  
R M HASTIE-SMITH

The following are invited to attend

Secretary of State for Industry  
Secretary of State for Employment  
Chief Secretary, Treasury  
Chief of the Defence Staff

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OD(81) 12th Meeting

COPY NO

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CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

—  
MEETING to be held at  
10 Downing Street on  
THURSDAY 18 JUNE 1981 at 4.45 pm  
—

AGENDA

1. INDEPENDENCE FOR ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs  
OD(81) 30 - already circulated.

2. NORTHERN IRELAND: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRISONS SITUATION

Previous Reference: OD(80) 24th Meeting

Memoranda by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland  
OD(81) 32 and 33 - already circulated

The following paper is also relevant:-

Minute dated 12 June 1981 to the Prime Minister from the  
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland entitled  
'Northern Ireland: The Need for Movement'

Cabinet Office  
15 June 1981

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG  
R L WADE-GERY  
R M HASTIE-SMITH

The following are invited to attend

For Item 1 - Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury  
  
For Item 2 - Secretary of State for Scotland  
at 4.55 pm - Secretary of State for Northern Ireland  
Attorney General

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OD(81) 13th Meeting

COPY NO 53

CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

MEETING to be held at  
10 Downing Street on  
FRIDAY 24 JULY 1981 at 11.00 am\*

AGENDUM

ARMS SALES

Previous Reference: OD(81) 2nd Meeting

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  
OD(81) 36 - already circulated

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence  
OD(81) 39 - already circulated

The following paper is also relevant:-

Letter dated 20 July 1981 from the Secretary of State for  
Defence to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth  
Affairs

Cabinet Office  
22 July 1981

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG  
R L WADE-GERY  
R M HASTIE-SMITH

The Secretary of State for Industry is invited to attend

\*Please note change in time of Meeting

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OD(81) 14th Meeting

COPY NO

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CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

---

MEETING to be held at  
10 Downing Street on  
TUESDAY 8 SEPTEMBER 1981 at 10.00 am

---

REVISED AGENDUM

THE HEAVYWEIGHT TORPEDO

Note by the Secretary of State for Defence  
OD(81) 41 - already circulated

Signed R L WADE-GERY  
R L L FACER

Cabinet Office

7 September 1981

The following are invited to attend -

Secretary of State for Employment  
Secretary of State for Industry  
Chief Secretary, Treasury  
Chief of Naval Staff

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OD(81) 15th Meeting

COPY NO

31

CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

---

MEETING to be held at  
10 Downing Street on  
WEDNESDAY 9 SEPTEMBER 1981 at 3.30 pm

---

AGENDUM

EC BUDGET RESTRUCTURING: THE NEXT PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

Note by the Secretaries  
OD(81) 40 - already circulated

[The Chancellor of the Exchequer's Minute to the Prime Minister dated 4 August 1981 and the Secretary of State for Trade's Minute to the Prime Minister dated 21 August 1981 are also relevant.]

Signed M D M FRANKLIN  
D M ELLIOTT

Cabinet Office

3 September 1981

The following have been invited to attend -

Secretary of State for Industry  
Secretary of State for Employment  
Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food  
Secretary of State for Energy

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OD(81) 16th Meeting

COPY NO

31

CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

MEETING to be held at  
10 Downing Street on  
FRIDAY 18 SEPTEMBER 1981 at 10.00 am

REVISED AGENDA

1. BBC EXTERNAL SERVICES

Previous Reference: OD(81) 10th Meeting

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs  
OD(81) 42 - already circulated

Memorandum by the Chief Secretary, Treasury  
OD(81) 45 - to be circulated

2. RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs  
OD(81) 43 - already circulated

Note by the Secretaries  
OD(81) 44 - to be circulated

**CONFIDENTIAL**

3. FOOD AID TO POLAND

Previous reference: OD(81) 9th Meeting

To be raised orally

[The Minute (PM/81/43) from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to the Prime Minister, dated 16 September, and a letter of the same date from the Minister for Agriculture to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, are relevant]

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG  
R L WADE-GERY  
R L L FACER

Cabinet Office

17 September 1981

The following Ministers have been invited to attend -

	Chief Secretary, Treasury
For Item 1	Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury
For Item 2	Secretary of State for Energy
(at 10.15 am)	Minister of State, Department of Trade
For Item 3	Minister for Overseas Development
(10.30 am)	
	Minister of State, Department of Trade
	Minister of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr Alick Buchanan-Smith MP)

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OD(81)17th Meeting

COPY NO 1

CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

MEETING to be held in 10 Downing Street  
on THURSDAY 12 NOVEMBER 1981 at 4.30 pm

AGENDA

1 EUROPEAN COMMUNITY BUDGET RESTRUCTURING: THE NOVEMBER EUROPEAN COUNCIL

Previous Reference: OD(81)15th Meeting

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign  
and Commonwealth Affairs

OD(81)54 - already circulated

Memorandum by the Minister of Agriculture,  
Fisheries and Food

OD(81)53 - already circulated

2 ECONOMIC AID FOR POLAND

Previous Reference: OD(81)16th Meeting Item 3

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign  
and Commonwealth Affairs

OD(81)52 - already circulated

Note by the Chairman of the Official Group on Economic  
Assistance to Poland

OD(81)51 - already circulated

3 GIBRALTAR DOCKYARD

Note by the Secretaries

OD(81)50 - already circulated

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG  
M D M FRANKLIN  
R L WADE-GERY

Cabinet Office  
9 November 1981

The following have been invited to attend:-

Items 1 - 3

Secretary of State for Industry  
Chief Secretary, Treasury

Items 1 and 2

Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food

Item 1 only

Secretary of State for Energy  
Financial Secretary, Treasury  
Sir Kenneth Couzens, Treasury

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OD(81) 18th Meeting

COPY NO

56

CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

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MEETING to be held at  
10 Downing Street on  
WEDNESDAY 2 DECEMBER 1981 at 10.00 am

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AGENDA

1. OVERHAUL OF CAPTURED CHIEFTAIN TANKS IN IRAQ

Previous References: OD(81) 1st and 13th Meetings

To be raised orally  
(Minute from the Secretary of State for Defence to the Foreign and  
Commonwealth Secretary dated 19 November 1981 is relevant)

2. SALE OF HMS INVINCIBLE TO AUSTRALIA

To be raised orally  
(Minute from the Secretary of State for Defence to the Prime Minister  
dated 30 November 1981 is relevant)

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG  
R L WADE-GERY  
R L L FACER

Cabinet Office

30 November 1981

The following are invited to attend -

Secretary of State for Industry  
Attorney General

**CONFIDENTIAL**



Ships visits to Latin America & Falklands.

RN deployment (4/5 DD/FFR + 1 SSN) to Latin America Spring of 1979. During deployment Tribal class frigate (ASHANTI) was refueled off & visited Falklands 1-5 May 1979.

1980. RN Task Group to Far East. Believed no ship visits to South Atlantic (other than ENSORANCE)

1981 RN deployment to South Atlantic cancelled because of fuel cuts (moratorium)

(Other deployments to Latin America '75 & '77)

Keep on file.

A.S.C. 27/11.

*Positive*

ORDER OF BATTLE MARCH/APRIL 1982 FOR  
AIRFORCE AND NAVY

---

- 10 Canberra
- 20 Mirage 3 aircraft
- 26 Mirage 5 aircraft
- 5 Super Entendard
- 75 Sky Hawks
- 60 Pucara
- 18 Aermacchi
- 7 Hercules
- 2 Hercules Tankers
- 8 Tracker Aircraft
- 6 Neptune



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone ~~019907022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 5/21/5

26th January 1983

Dear Tim,

FRANKS DEBATE

You asked this morning for a critique of the defence points made by Dr Owen in his speech yesterday. This is attached, in the form of speaking notes. I also enclose, as you requested, a chronology of decisions on HMS ENDURANCE and of the subsequent exchanges between the Defence and Foreign Secretaries. You may also like to see a note which the DGI has produced on the capability of Argentine forces in April 1982. This is also attached.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Hatfield in the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever  
Nick Evans

(N H R EVANS)  
APS/S of S

T Flesher Esq

In his speech the Right Hon Member for Plymouth Devonport made extensive comparison of the events of 1977 with those leading up to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. As the House will know the convention in these matters is that I do not have access to the papers of past administrations. I am not, therefore in a position to comment in detail on what happened in 1977.

But I would like to make some general comments on what he said. First he implied that if we had deployed a nuclear powered submarine to the South Atlantic at the beginning of March 1982 it might have deterred the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. He has stated that the submarine deployed in 1977 was given rules of engagement which provided that if Argentine ships came within 50 miles of the Falkland Islands and were believed to have displayed hostile intent, the submarine was to open fire. If that was the case, I must say that I am amazed that the previous Government were prepared to allow one of our submarines to open fire on the high seas on the ships of a country with which we were not at war. It seems to me that action such as this, far from deterring an Argentine invasion, might have triggered it off. And in a climate of extremely unfavourable world opinion arising from our action.

As I said in the House yesterday, the sinking of an Argentine ship before an attack on the Islands had taken place would have condemned us in the eyes of the world. We know from our experience last year the importance of the support of our Allies and of the international community in an operation such as this.

Mr Speaker, as I understand it the other component of the 1977 Force was 2 frigates. But the Argentines had an overwhelming capability to attack two frigates. They had sufficient maritime air reconnaissance aircraft to find them and 116 tactical jet fighter bombers all capable of sinking them.

Or they could have used surface ships. They had one carrier, one cruiser, 8 destroyers and 3 frigates. This force would have overwhelmed two frigates.

Finally they could have attacked with their submarines.

But in any event the option of an airborne landing would have remained open to them. Argentina has one Parachute Brigade of 3,000 men - an elite force better trained than the average army unit. A total of some 700 troops could have been dropped in a single wave.

We are left with the reality that a limited display of force risks triggering a confrontation with which you are not equipped to deal. It is easy to gloss over those realities with the benefit of hindsight. The judgement on this incident of the Franks Committee - who had access to all the papers - is quite clear.

The Right Hon Gentleman also stated that "I believed in 1977, and I believe now, that withdrawal of HMS ENDURANCE would be substantially misread by the Argentines".

*Franks - Lewis  
Loyal  
Fiddler  
re 1977  
can be*

Mr Speaker, I am fully aware of the arguments on Endurance but they have to be stretched a long way to say that the announcement had a decisive influence on the junta. There were signs the other way. The Royal Marine garrison was to remain and we made this entirely clear. Paragraph 146 of the Report quotes the unequivocal statement of my honourable Friend the Member for Shoreham, in this House on 3rd March: "We have no doubts about our duties to the Islands." And as for our capability for operations outside the NATO area and our will to exercise that capability if necessary I would remind the House of the announcement on 8th March that INTREPID and FEARLESS would after all remain in service. We all recognise that the junta was capable of irrational and emotional decisions but it is just not credible that the announcement of ENDURANCE's withdrawal from service determined their actions.

HMS ENDURANCE: CHRONOLOGY

1981

- June 3 Secretary of State for Defence's OD paper on the Defence Programme Review. Among the measures recommended is the phasing out of ENDURANCE in 1982.
- June 5 Lord Carrington minutes Defence Secretary prior to OD meeting. He points to the importance of ENDURANCE in both political and defence terms. "Unless and until the dispute is settled it will be important to maintain our normal presence in the area at the current level. Any reduction will be interpreted by both the Islanders and the Argentines as a reduction in our commitment to the Islands".
- June 8 OD meeting discusses Mr Nott's minute. The proposals are generally agreed but, in the Prime Minister's summary, states that "particular problems for other ministers which arose from these proposals should be pursued with the Secretary of State for Defence bilaterally".
- June 10 Meeting between officials following which Foreign Office officials judge there is no prospect of decision being reversed and report accordingly to Mr Ridley.
- June 30 Decision to withdraw ENDURANCE is confirmed in Parliament by Lord Trefgarne, as follows: "I can confirm that HMS ENDURANCE will be paid off in 1982 on her return to the United Kingdom, following her deployment in the South Atlantic and the Antarctic region later this year. There are no plans to replace her. However, the Royal Marines garrison in the Falkland Islands will be maintained at its present strength, and from time to time Her Majesty's Ship will be deployed in the region". Strong public reaction followed. The Governor reported the strong reaction of the Islanders but expressed his personal and private view that it would be unrealistic to expect ENDURANCE to be treated as a special case.

*Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4).  
At Wayland, 15 January 2013*

- December 15 Mr Nott sees Lord Buxton and confirms that he does not intend to run the ship on.

1982

- January 22 Foreign Secretary minutes Defence Secretary. Emphasises the political problems which the decision to withdraw ENDURANCE is causing. "The issue is having a disproportionate effect on the credibility of our policy in the area". Asks whether Mr Nott would be prepared to reinstate her.
- February 3 Mr Nott replies. He is considering her future following her paying off. The options are to sell her, place her in reserve or scrap her. Sale to the only country expressing interest - Brazil - is not acceptable. Keeping her in reserve might keep the controversy alive although "it might allow the controversy to cool down with time". In

the circumstances he cannot agree to run on ENDURANCE at the expense of other commitments. As FCO cannot fund the ship he sees little alternative to sticking to the decision unless Lord Carrington sees scope for an approach to OD for new money.

February 17 Lord Carrington replies. He does not rule out an approach to OD for new money but wishes to wait until after the next round of Anglo/Argentine talks at the end of February "when we shall have a clearer picture of Argentine intentions and of the defence implications". He will consult Mr Nott again in due course.

March 24 Lord Carrington writes to Mr Nott urging that, in view of the South Georgia incident ENDURANCE should "remain on station in the area of the Islands after the rotation of the Marine Garrison is completed at the end of the month".



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DGI 6/2

PS/S of S

ARGENTINE CAPABILITIES APRIL 1982

1. You asked for a note on Argentine air and naval capabilities, particularly against two frigates and also para-dropping troops, in April 1982. And also whether the Argentines had access to satellite intelligence.

The Frigates

2. The Argentines had an overwhelming capability to take out two frigates. They had three principal methods. In probable order of priority these were:

a. Air Attack. The Argentines had about 116 tactical jet fighter bombers all capable of sinking a frigate. They had sufficient maritime air reconnaissance aircraft to find the frigates. However, the Super Etendard fitted with Exocet was probably not available until late April 1982. But it could have used bombs. Argentine air power of course demonstrated its effectiveness against the co-ordinated air defence capability of the Task Force. Two frigates would have been exceedingly vulnerable.

b. Surface Attack. The Argentines had a surface fleet of one carrier, one cruiser, 8 destroyers and 3 frigates. The carrier could have deployed 8 Skyhawk attack aircraft. The frigates would also have been very vulnerable to the long range guns on the cruiser. And 8 of the surface combatants were also fitted with Exocet (MM 38). This force would have overwhelmed two frigates.

c. Submarine Attack. The two Argentine S209 submarines fitted with wire guided torpedoes would have posed a considerable threat. They are quiet and difficult to detect. But in the event we knew later they had problems with their fire control systems.

Para-drop Capability

3. The Argentine have one Parachute Brigade of 3,000 men. They are an elite force better trained than the average army unit. A total of some 700 troops could have been dropped in a single wave.

Satellite Intelligence

4. As far as we are aware the Argentines had no access to satellite intelligence. But they would have had access to the Landsat data available to all nations. It has little if any military significance.

26th January 1983

  
DCI

RESTRICTED

FRANKS DEBATE: MAIN POINTS IN SPEECHES1. INTERVENTIONS IN PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH(a) Mr. Callaghan:

Should there not have been a collective discussion in 1981 in view of Ambassador's comment that there was only "a policy of Micawberism" and of Chiefs of Staff report of August 1981?

(b) Dr. Owen:

Asked for Prime Minister's comment on JIC assessment of 9 July 1981.

(c) Mr. Rowlands:

1977 Task Force was sent with Chiefs of Staff agreement..

(d) Mr. Healey:

Was Prime Minister's request for contingency planning in early March an idle and capricious request or did she share Franks view that timely action could have deterred invasion?

(e) Mr. Jay:

Why did Lord Carrington resign?

(f) Mr. Dalyell:

Since March Defence Committee paper was to contain annexes on contingency planning, how can Prime Minister say threat was not imminent?

2. MR. FOOT

Why did Prime Minister not repudiate campaign against Lord Carrington and FCO?

MR. FOOT (continued)

Accepts that main guilt attaches to Argentines.

Lord Carrington's memorandum of 12 October 1979 (Franks paragraph 75) pointed up "serious threat of invasion": at what meetings was that paper discussed?

Why was intelligence assessment of March 1982 not discussed? And why was Defence Committee of 16 March cancelled?

British Ambassador's message about absence of strategy (Franks paragraph 104) should have been discussed by ODP or Cabinet.

There were signs in the Report (Franks paragraph 291) that preparation of contingency plans was waiting on collective discussion.

Quoted representations from Islanders (Franks paragraph 115) and Hill-Norton in Lords debate of 16 December 1981 on dire consequences of withdrawing Endurance.

Franks Report extremely thorough, but does not agree with final sentences.

Fortress Falklands not the only policy - quoted Nicho Henderson in Sunday Times of last week: problem will need international solution.

3. DR. OWEN

1. Surprised the Prime Minister did not concede any mis-judgement. Equally surprised Foot thinks Report does not exist, and says that Government solely responsible, even though Report was signed by his colleagues. Do not accept all aspects of the Report, but 1982 was clearly not an easy time for the Government: always felt "there but for the grace of God, go I".

2. Would have been better if Prime Minister had admitted she was wrong on HMS ENDURANCE. She should have insisted on collective discussion of Lord Carrington's concerns. Prime Minister wrong on this point. Gives credit to Callaghan for reprieving ENDURANCE. Withdrawal substantially misread. Even so, it clearly did not precipitate the invasion.

3. Period after the New York talks was the critical time. Agree that the force should not have been sent before. Critical moment when the negotiations were disowned, and the Ambassador sent his warning. This in fact triggered a response from the Prime Minister which absolves her of some blame. Amazed that the contingency plans she called for were not drawn up. What were the terms of her Private Secretary's letter? Why was it not answered? Why was it not chased? Why was there no meeting of OD? Some blame attaches to the Foreign Secretary who should have followed up the 1977 precedent much more strongly, instead of relying on a short oral briefing, especially when the Prime Minister raised the same question with the Defence Secretary.

4. Should have thought of deploying the submarine. In 1977 the surface ships were only a communication link with the submarine, and were kept standing off out of range of the mainland. No-one would have expected them to go within range. Credit to the Navy that this was kept secret. Use of a submarine should have been brought forcibly to Lord Carrington's attention, but Foreign Office officials probably opposed as they were in 1977. Submarine would have been ready to intervene.

/ 5. In answer

5. In answer to Michael Latham's intervention: did not reveal existence of 1977 force because it would have provoked Argentines. There only to intervene as necessary. Do not believe Sir Maurice Oldfield revealed its existence to the Argentines as Hastings and Jenkins make out. In answer to John Nott's intervention: a meeting chaired by Callaghan on 21 November wrote rules of engagement. If Argentine ships came within 50 miles and displayed hostile intent, then submarine would have torpedoed them. Armed Forces are there to be used if necessary. Never criticised sinking of Belgrano. Did not think threat was of airborne invasion: all advice said we faced naval invasion.

6. If submarine had been sent, Reagan could have told Galtieri, or Prime Minister could have announced an exclusion zone on the approach of the Argentine navy. Believe Callaghan would have deployed a submarine on 3 March. But not all leaders of Labour Party would have done this: no way Foot would have, although Healey might. Some Conservatives might have done better than Foot. But why does Prime Minister show no humility? Why did she not have a collective discussion? Does she think she governs alone?

7. Now we must win the peace. And the Prime Minister has shown no magnanimity or sensitivity. This is losing support from staunch allies such as French and Americans.

8. Fortress Falklands was rejected in 1979 and 1980 and by previous Governments. Now Prime Minister embraces it and refuses to negotiate. Massive cost and risk of further humiliation at hands of Latin American, not just Argentine forces. House must insist on negotiations. Final British position in Haig shuttle negotiations was reasonable.

9. The Prime Minister says that sacrifices make negotiation unacceptable. But international and domestic support for the campaign was based on the UN resolutions. Prime Minister forgot these the day Port Stanley was liberated. Her adamant refusal to countenance any negotiations caused recent US vote in UN. We must be prepared to discuss sovereignty. Here you intervened

/ to ask whether

to ask whether he was denying that the wishes of the Islanders were paramount. Dr. Owen said that he had never committed himself to paramountcy. Government should act in the best or long-term interests of the Islanders. A commitment to paramountcy was dangerous and should be avoided in the Falklands and equally in Hong Kong. The wishes of 1800 people, no more than a parish council, could not be paramount. Parliament was sovereign. Parliament and no-one else should judge the long-term interests of the Islanders. In any case Conservative Ministers had in the past ceded negotiations on sovereignty. We fought aggression not a flag. The Government must not box themselves in. Judgement on future policy must be made by the House.

/ 4. MR. PEYTON

4. MR. PEYTON

Carping about Franks due to disappointment at verdict. Must now avoid inquest upon inquest, and escape preoccupation with past.

Tribute to Franks Members for resisting pressure for scapegoats.

Tribute to those in constituency who served the Task Force.

5. MR. POWELL

Crucial mistake was conditional offer to surrender sovereignty in 1967: turned all the pressure on the Islanders.

Episode has moral for other policies, e.g. Northern Ireland.

6. SIR F. BENNETT

Franks (paragraph 278) lists progressive UK withdrawal from South Atlantic.

British public not interested in post mortem.

Government and Prime Minister did service by showing at crucial moment that they were not willing to be pushed around.

Exhortations from Opposition on magnanimity to Argentines incomprehensible.

7.

MR. BENN

Two main questions: Could bloodshed have been avoided?  
And what lessons will avoid future bloodshed?

Political failure masked by costly military success.

News management has been used to make political  
capital out of conflict.

Franks unsatisfactory because:

- (a) should not have ended on 2 April;
- (b) did not ask the right question,  
namely, did Government's policy  
lead to war?
- (c) conclusions do not follow from  
Report.

Information in the Report is good argument for Freedom  
of Information Act.

Report confirms that Prime Minister chose option of  
"letting things slide", which was most likely to lead  
to war.

Prime Minister chose date of visit to Falklands  
before Report published.

Now only two options for the future - negotiation or  
military option: Government should choose

"peace option" involving:

- (a) UN mandate for Falklands;
- (b) Acceptance of Argentinian observer;
- (c) Withdrawal of UK forces;
- (d) £400 million grant to development  
of Falkland Islands;
- (e) UN to make award on sovereignty.



8. MR. ATKINS

1. All Opposition Members have condemned Report except Powell. What of Mr. Rees? Benn complained about terms of reference but did not vote against them in July. Do they say the conclusions do not follow from the evidence? Committee's work impeccable and very thorough. Seen all papers. Taken oral and written evidence and held 42 meetings. Clearly no more than anyone else. Report also unanimous.

2. Points main conclusions of Report and draws attention to Annex A which deals authoritatively with speculation.

3. Pays tribute to FCO. Points out that Ministers take decisions. FCO does not pursue its own policies (here Michael English asks why FCO did not put forward option of referring issue to the International Court of Justice). Adds caveat that some FCO officials may lose touch with domestic feeling because they spend so much time out of the country: should be borne in mind in personnel management.

4. Points out that hostility in the House towards leaseback narrowed the options (here refutes David Ennals' suggestion that sufficient messages were sent to alert Argentine junta that they would face resistance).

5. Foreign Secretary right to say that time is now needed: time to put our case in the UN, time for Argentine Government to be changed if necessary, time for Islanders to recover. Would be a mistake to force them into negotiations. Must for the moment maintain status quo.

6. House should welcome the Report and apply its lessons.

/ 9. MR. ROWLANDS

9. MR. ROWLANDS

1. Saddened at war, but right to fight. Pays tribute to Armed Forces.

2. It would have been possible to avoid Fortress Falklands if events leading up to the invasion had not been mismanaged. Rowlands avoided Fortress Falklands by pulling punches, by compromise, and by negotiations with nasty people. Perfectly honourable policy pursued even further by this government, who did nothing to restore integrity of Southern Thule.

3. Prime Minister only discovered passion for Fortress Falklands in April 1982.

4. Franks' account and narrative shows failure of crisis management. Shows that invasion stemmed from Government's actions. First months of 1982 very tense. General comes to power in Argentina, Foreign Ministry calls for rigid timetable of negotiations, only one year before 150th anniversary, force threatened publicly. Paragraph 302 of Report says officials gave insufficient weight to changing Argentine attitudes but Ministers equally to blame. We held collective talks before every round of negotiations: 5 meetings in 1977, one in February 1978, Government negligent not to do likewise.

5. February 1982 talks the crunch. Valid comparison with 1977. In 1977 sent force to buttress negotiations, not to deter invasion. Feared a breakdown of negotiations or that they would be disowned by Argentine government. Force was sent so that Islands would not be left naked in such circumstances. Chiefs of Staff advised on make-up of force for that purpose. When negotiations did not break down called force off.

6. Here Michael Mates asked Mr. Rowlands whether he accepted the conclusion of the Franks Report in paragraph 328. Mr. Rowlands said that he did not, the House was passing its own judgement on the Government.

/ 7. Exactly what

7. Exactly what the Labour Government feared in 1977 happened in 1982: the junta disowned the negotiations in New York. Shows crucial need for force in 1982, yet Carrington only had brief word with officials. Prime Minister did not even have a meeting when she called for contingency plans to be made, and response only came five days later. Franks right to say that it would have been better if Ministers had discussed this.

8. Report portrays a rudderless ship of state drifting from the Davidoff farce to the tragedy of the invasion. Cabinet and OD did not even meet. Shows the personalised form of Government favoured by Prime Minister. She should take personal blame.

25.1.83

PRIME MINISTER

The following are short notes on some of the speakers in the debate for whose speeches you were not present.

SIR A. KERSHAW

His main point was that given the background there was nothing the Government could have done in the period immediately preceding the invasion to prevent it. We had neither a strategic nor an economic nor a political interest in protecting the Falklands; only a moral one in the protection of our "kith and kin" against the evil government of the Argentine. Moreover, we did not really understand what we were up against in the Argentine military. They were a "mafia in fine uniforms". There was an impossible dilemma. You cannot negotiate with such people but if we had not negotiated there would have been an international uproar. Nor could we have despatched a task force earlier than we did: it would have been seen as provocation.

Now he said we have two choices. Fortress Falklands or evacuation. Half measures, e.g. "internationalisation" amounted to surrender in the long term. For the moment Fortress Falklands was the only possible policy.

MR. T. DALYELL

He opened by praising the drafting of the Report and saying that he did not wish to accuse the Committee of "a cover up". There was a brief passage in which he complained about the Franks appendix which attacked some of the contentions. In particular he said that the behaviour of the Argentine crew of the Hercules which landed at Stanley on 11 March was incompatible with their having made an emergency landing.

The main burden of his comments was to amplify his "cynical and unpleasant" view of events leading up to the campaign. He alleged:

- (i) that your contention that the Falklands crisis "came out of the blue" was untrue. In support of this he claimed that your 3 March request for contingency plans and the 5 March (paragraph 147) paper by Mr. Ure recording that you wished the next Defence Committee paper on the Falklands to have civil and military contingency plans attached were incompatible with the crisis having come out of the blue. You had asked the Defence Secretary how long it would take to get frigates to the Falklands; you could have had them there by 28 March. He also repeated the line he used in Questions on 23 December that "the barmaids of Gibraltar" knew more than the Prime Minister about the deployment of the Fort Austin to the South Atlantic.
  
- (ii) He asked why you did not follow up your request for contingency plans as forcefully as he would expect, for example by arranging a meeting of OD during the following week. He attributed this either to the turning of a blind eye to the warnings about the Argentine intentions on the grounds that responding to them was too expensive, or to a decision to lay low and permit an Argentine encroachment in order to "savour the discomfort of the Foreign Office". He attributed these alleged attitudes to the malign influence of Ian!

/ (iii)

- (iii) He accused you of leading the Argentines on to the punch by taking a hard line after leading them to believe that you were going to take a soft line.

Mr. Dalyell also spoke at some length on his familiar territory about the sinking of the Belgrano. He cited this as conclusive evidence that you were not interested in peace. He claimed "that an honourable peace could have been had for the asking". Now it was the Argentine which had the moral upper hand and we who faced continual harrassment.

/ MR. AMERY

MR. AMERY

Julian Amery said that the Report was "a devastating indictment" of this Government and past ones. We had had two options:

- (i) to surrender sovereignty on the best terms we could get;
- (ii) to defend the Islands.

Successive Governments had willed the end that the wishes of the Islanders should be paramount but none of them had been willing to will the means. We could have done so. By lengthening the runway at Stanley, and stationing a squadron there, we could have defended the Islands at a fraction of the present cost. Instead we had negotiated but negotiations without a possible conclusion cannot succeed. Lord Carrington had mistaken "diplomacy for foreign policy". Because we had ceded the principle of negotiations of sovereignty the Treasury had been reluctant to spend money on the Falklands, MOD was reluctant to defend them and the Falkland Islands Company repatriated their profits.

Mr. Amery criticised what he saw as the excessive reliance on intelligence reports about the imminence of the invasion. Invasions, he said, are not like grouse shooting; they do not wait until summer. Surprise is the weapon of dictators. We should have been prepared for anything when Galtieri came to power.

He concluded by praising your leadership during the campaign.

MR. HOOLEY

He said that there was a conflict between the interests of the 1800 Islanders and the 55 million living in the UK. Although we had continually proclaimed the principle that the Islanders'

/ wishes

wishes were paramount we had undermined our own negotiating position by our actions. These included the run-down of the Navy, the sale of INVINCIBLE, our willingness to sell arms to the Argentines, the rejection of Shackleton and most important, the British Nationality Act. He then attacked the Falklanders for their "white colonial settler mentality" that the UK owed them a living. We should give them an absolute right to British nationality, generous financial compensation and a free option of destination when we reached an accommodation with Argentina. We owed them no more than that. He concluded with the argument that we were isolated in the UN and had no international support for our non-negotiation lines; we should use the machinery of the UN to extricate ourselves.

T.F.

25.1.83



FILE

do



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

25 January 1983

Franks Report

I enclose the latest version of the Prime Minister's speech for today's debate. Any comments would be needed by 11.00 a.m. at latest today - and preferably earlier.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Brian Fall (FCO) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

Richard Hatfield, Esq.,  
Cabinet Office.

URGENTÍSIMO

MEMO

24/1/83

RE THE "FRANKS DEBATE".

from: ALFRED SHERMAN

"We don't start wars; we finish them. But we'd rather they didn't start in the first place." Margaret Thatcher. House of Commons Debate. . . .

- 1) Further to the division of labour between Foot and Healey in the debate (as distinct from the division of Labour exemplified by Benn, Dayell and Foulkes).

One can expect Healey to be the bluff major, one-time Defence Minister, saying how much more firmly Labour would have handled it. He thereby hopes to goad you into what could then be described as "jingoistic . . . militaristic" statements for Foot to denounce in his closing speech, indulging his internationalist peace-loving veteran pacifist instincts. It would be no use your explaining that you were answering his pal Healey, because Foot would be appealing to a different audience, the pacifists, the Bennites, the Argentines, the UN, all our enemies abroad. Remember, that he is reserving a place for himself at Labour conferences after he steps down as leader, pushed, as the white-haired peace orator, like Noel-Baker and Brockway who get all applause and no criticism.

You can't spike all his guns. But you can avoid coming into range of some. You can also bait him. Ask why none of his Socialist comrades in the Argentine and the Leftwing Peronists etc, spoke up for internationalism instead of outdoing Galtieri in jingoism, helping to drive Argentina into war, when the country's energies and resources are needed to reverse their disastrous economic decline.

It's alright Foot orating about socialist internationalism, "left speaks to left" - as in Healey's short-lived euphoria in 1945, before Ernest Bevin barked at him and he subsided meekly into place. True internationalism means give and take, not we give and others take.

More.

- 2) The debate was demanded, in order to discuss the past. The question which you can help decide is how far it should address the future.

There are good reasons for allowing Labour to wallow in the past as much as possible. The Argentines are taking the initiative in military-political preparations. We have yet to move from defence to deterrence, from status quo to initiative. We have months in which to elaborate an overall strategy, military and diplomatic, including not only responses to their forthcoming military attacks, but also initiatives of our own, not least to the USA and Latin America. In the meantime, it would be hard to go beyond generalities.

- 3) As far as the questions addressed by Franks, any government in our position, facing territorial demands and the possibility of an attack, has to balance two conflicting considerations. The negotiations risk prejudice by defence-preparations. But neglected defences bring the risk of defeat, should negotiations fall. Worse still, it is not only defence preparations which can be provocative. Weakness can also provoke attack; especially when you are dealing with the likes of the Junta.

What are our critics alleging: that we sacrificed preparedness to negotiation? Or that we prejudiced the outcome of negotiation in order to play safe? Criticise if you will; but don't try to have it both ways. And remember that anything you say is liable to be picked up and quoted abroad.

I inherited a situation from my predecessor who inherited from a chain of Premiers. The limitations on defence manpower and equipment had long since ruled out maintaining a force on the Falklands at the level needed for defence against a serious invasion attempt.

So we have been left with negotiations, and deterrence should they fail. Negotiations took us nowhere, in the end, because the other side demanded nothing less than the handing over of Islands and their inhabitants to a regime which all political factions in this country regarded as intolerable.

More.

The only deterrent was the likelihood, or certainty, that an invasion would provoke reconquest by us, with all this entailed for the occupier. But how far could we bring this home without being accused of provocation, sabre-rattling, jingoism? Any government in our position walks a tightrope. We may have slipped, . . . but we did not fall.

- 4) As far as "colonialism" is concerned, Europeans - the British and Spaniards - colonised the New World (together with Portugese, Dutch and Danes and the Russians.) No one is more "colonial", "colonist", "coloniser" in the New World than anyone else. It was not the British who wiped out the inhabitants of what is now the Argentine.
- 5) I need not tell you that in the debate you will be expected to defend your position not only from frontal attacks by Labour. The Foreign Affairs committee under Kershaw (read Edward Heath and the FCO) is developing an infinitely more dangerous attack.

Since the end of the fighting, the Bank of England has been twisting the arms of British Banks, to lend to the Argentines. The latter use the cash to buy arms and know how, with the proportion changing in favour of the latter. (Do you need more information on this?)

End.

The Opposition's Amendment to the Government Motion on the Franks  
Debate

Leave out to 'after House' and insert:

Notes that the report confirmed the failure of HMG to give adequate priority to the Falkland Islands in its defence on foreign policy, its failure to consider the problem in Cabinet or the Defence Committee of Cabinet in the fifteen months before the invasion took place, and its failure to respond adequately to a risk of invasion which it knew to exist.

24 January 1983

FROM THE RT. HON. LORD BARBER  
01 - 584 5262



15 MONTPELIER SQUARE,  
LONDON SW7

(2)

24. 1. 83

*ms*

Prime Minister

A.B.C.  $\frac{26}{1}$

Dear Prime Minister,

I have just returned from a visit to the  
United States to find awaiting me your kind  
letter of the 19th January about the Falkland  
Islands Review. I appreciate very much what  
you say. It was quite a task! Good luck on  
Tuesday.


Sincerely,

Baron

ARGENTINA : FALKLAND ISLANDS REVIEW Pg 4.



24 JAN 1983



John

- ① Sir Anthony Parsons telephoned to give his contribution.

The following is a very summarised version of what he considers to be the main points which the Opposition will focus upon.

Attackers will be on the Pp, being Chairman & OD.  
FCO will get away with it

Main focus will be on the fact that there was no collective Meeting of Ministers between Jan 81 - April 82.

### Keypoints

SIC report July 1981

David Owen's Article in the Observer today takes up this line.

Peter Carington's Talks with Argentines in Sept



Pre Luce Talks  
Post Luce Talks

Deponwe Line

great difference between situation  
in 1966-67 when there was a near stale  
of war and the period between  
January 81 - 19 March 82 when  
Darcloff landed.

He also considers that the Future of the  
Islands should be included in the  
"wind ups" session either by PM or  
another Minister.

His minute to PM on Thursday  
on this subject highlights what he  
terms Internationalisation

The article by Sir Nico Henderson  
in today's Sunday Times touches on  
this.

PTO

He is at home this evening if you  
wish to speak to him.

- ② Do you think you will require  
typing to be done this evening?  
Enough to occupy 2 GR girls?

Logie

23/11

Interviewer: Can we take it your preference when you were in Government was for some kind of deal with Argentina involving handing over sovereignty to Argentina but getting the Islands back on some sort of lease-back?

Mr. Luce: Well the choice was quite clear as it had been for previous Governments, either you pursued the policy of Fortress Falklands which would have involved considerable expenditures of money as we now know to defend the Islands and which it is questionable how much support there would have been for that particular policy or you decided to hand over the Islands to the Argentine or took the middle course which was to see whether it was possible to find a modus vivendi between the wishes and the interests of the Islanders and the aspirations of the Argentine and that it seemed to me is the policy which successive Governments have been following for the past fifteen years or so and that is the policy that we were trying to pursue ourselves.

Interviewer: Surely that was indeed the view of the Labour Government. The Labour view was that the Falklands were really indefensible at any price we were prepared to pay, so you had to do some kind of deal with Argentina and as early as the summer of 1977 the Labour Defence Committee came to the conclusion that it would probably be leased back in the end. Now why did the Labour Government not pursue that policy more vigorously?

Mr. Healey: We did pursue it but we never got to the point where the matter became the central element in negotiation and it took the Conservatives two years actually to get the lease-back proposal formally on the agenda and as you know the tragedy was that when Mr. Ridley put it to the Islanders it was turned down flat, there was an explosion in the House of Commons against it and from that moment on, as the Franks Committee reports, there was really no <sup>British</sup> policy except to string the Argentines along in the hope that they would not do anything.

/Interviewer:

Interviewer: But stringing along was really the policy of both Governments and the question arises why did first the Labour Government not set about trying to explain to the country, trying to explain to the House of Commons, that there was really in the end no option but either to build up Fortress Falklands massively or else to do a deal with Argentina.

Mr. Healey: I think the central problem always was that the Falklands problem, important as it was and as it turned out to be in the end, was never given a high enough priority to justify a major expenditure of political effort and there is no doubt that in the end it proved to be a very grave error. But I was Chancellor at the time and when we took the decision I think in '77 to try to negotiate on lease-back we did have one or two other problems to deal with you know at home as well as abroad and I think the problem was that Mr. Rowlands started negotiating with the Argentines, indeed we were deeply concerned at the end of '77 that if we didn't have forces in the area the Argentines might take military action against us then and it turned out that proved not to be the case.

Interviewer: You read the Falklands Report - it is very striking that Ted Rowlands goes to New York in December 1977 and he comes back and almost sounds proud about the fact that he didn't propose lease-back. If both Governments - I will begin with yours - believed that that was the policy in the end why should a Junior Minister negotiating with the Argentine actually be proud of not making this rather sensible proposal?

Mr. Healey: I don't know that he was particularly proud of not making it and I don't think that anybody would say that the lease-back proposal was the only way forward. What we were trying to do the whole time, as Mr. Luce has said, was to find some agreement with the Argentines which would be acceptable to the Falkland Islanders and, I think, it was very difficult to reach such an agreement without a real effort to show the Falkland Islanders the real nature of their problem. I think they understand that now as they have seen a British Government under a very nationalistic Prime Minister fall to defend them against enemy occupation and all

the evidence we now get from the Falkland Islanders is that they will find it difficult to feel confident in the future that they may not suffer the same fate again and I think from that point of view oddly enough the tragedies of the last 12 months may have produced a new element in the situation.

Interviewer: But let us go back briefly to that extraordinary episode in the House of Commons in December 1980 when Mr. Ridley gets up in the House of Commons, Junior Foreign Policy Minister, and produces a proposal, which is approved of by the Government, which is very much on the lines Labour had been pursuing and he meets a very hostile reception. Now Mr Luce why wasn't he at that time backed up by the Government because from the Prime Minister you had silence, from the Foreign Secretary you had silence, he was left completely out on a limb.

Mr. Luce: Well, as I recall it at the time, because I wasn't dealing with it then, he was reporting back to the House on his findings as a result of going to the Falkland Islands and consulting them about various alternatives which included lease-back and he was, I think, indicating that so far not much progress had been made. Now at that stage the House of Commons reacted very violently indeed, led I might say by Mr. Peter Shore, who produced a very strong reaction against any form of discussions at all, despite the fact that the previous Government had been involved in discussions, and in my view quite rightly and I think successive Governments have pursued that course correctly in my view. So I think the problem we face and there are lessons to be learnt from this, was whether or not successive Governments had tried to explain fully enough and forcefully enough to Parliament what the real issues are at stake and I think perhaps looking back over the years this is one of the failures.

/ Interviewer:

Interviewer: Mr Healey, could I ask you about why Mr. Shore was allowed to savage Mr. Nicholas Ridley in the way he did in the House of Commons in December 1980, that had been the policy of the Labour Government yet no member of the Labour Defence Committee in '77/<sup>which</sup> had come to that conclusion spoke for Mr. Ridley and nothing Mr. Shore said was subsequently repudiated by anybody on the Labour Front Bench.

Mr. Healey: I think the reason is easy to explain but not easy to justify and that is that Mr. Ridley came along without notice to make a statement on the Falklands, Mr. Shore had not been a member of the Cabinet Committee which considered these matters, he didn't know what the Labour Government's policy had been, he is himself a man deeply patriotic and his reaction was a gut reaction. Why did nobody disavow him. Well people don't disavow their own appointed statesman/spokesmen in the House and in a sense this was an almost inevitable consequence of the way in which Governments and opposition organise their affairs. What I would say however is that since the Government at that time as now had a majority of over 60 it didn't have to worry very much about what one Opposition spokesman said, what really worried the Government was that there was a very powerful Conservative lobby which was totally opposed to any discussion of sovereignty, it had never been explained to them, Mr. Braine for example was one of their leaders, this was the Government's policy. It came to them as a great shock and with great respect it is quite unfair to blame Mr. Shore's remarks at that time for Government policy, Governments often find themselves criticised by Opposition fairly or unfairly. What terrified the Government was the realisation that they hadn't support in their own party for the policy they were following and the great tragedy as revealed by Franks is that although the Foreign Office then at the official level recognised the need for a campaign to try to teach the country and the Tory Party the facts of life the Foreign Secretary felt insecure about trying it because he said that although Mrs. Thatcher had supported him in trying to get lease-back the moment she had seen the strength of Tory backbench feeling she wouldn't support him if he went on trying to sell lease-back to the Tories, this comes out doesn't it in the Franks Report.

/Interviewer:

Interviewer: But even if all that is true wasn't it still the duty of the official Labour Opposition, having adopted a line of policy in Government, prepared to get up in Opposition, and say the Government made these proposals, we think they are broadly right.

Mr. Healey: I believe so, yes. I think it was. I deeply regret that we didn't but unfortunately it wasn't my personal responsibility to play the central role at that time.

Mr. Luce: May I just add one other point to this - and I don't disagree with Denis Healey that there was very strong opposition in our Party, in fact there wasn't I don't think a single person who stood up on that day and supported Nick Ridley and the Government. But I think there was also very very strong opposition in the Labour Party and in other parties and I got the impression very much so far as the Labour Party was concerned and this is not a reason I criticise at all, that here was a regime in the Argentine, it was a Fascist regime, and they would not countenance the possibility of handing over the Islanders to the Argentine. That was a very strong feeling in the Labour Party and I think it was therefore almost the whole Parliament that felt very strongly.

Interviewer: If the Government was reduced to playing for time, it was warned repeatedly by the Joint Intelligence Committee, by people in Buenos Aires, that if you played for time sooner or later time was going to run out. Wasn't that a very dangerous policy to pursue?

Mr. Luce: I think we ought just to remind ourselves there was one agreement between the Argentine and the British and the Islanders which took place under Mr. Heath's Government in 1971 when the Communications Agreement was signed, designed to bring the Islanders and the Argentine and the British closer together in communications terms. Now the purpose of that I think was a very sensible one. A form of bridge building. The Islands are only 400 miles from the Argentine and that was a constructive approach. Now the hope at that stage was that it would then persuade all the parties of the dispute that it was worth their while getting even closer together. That in fact didn't happen.

/Mr Healey:

Mr. Healey: I think what emerges from the Franks Report in this area, with horrifying clarity, is that the Parliamentary response to Mr. Ridley's mission, which was approved by the Prime Minister, left the Government without any policy at all except to try to string the Argentines along. Now the Joint Intelligence Committee in its last and only full scale examination of this issue in the 18 months before the Argentines actually invaded had warned that if the Argentines once felt that negotiations would not succeed their response might be violent and very rapid and involve direct attack on the Islands. Now for some reason the Foreign Office, the Foreign Secretary as he said many times in the last week, ignored that part of the recommendation and chose to believe that any build up of Argentine pressure would be slow and over a long period and most extraordinarily he rejected advice from his own officials to take some military contingency steps in case the Argentines did do something and I think the thing that emerges most clearly from the report is that the likelihood of an Argentine attack on the Islands was there from the moment that the Argentines themselves effectively put off negotiations in February.

Interviewer: Now you have raised issues that we want to come back to and I would like to bring in Sir Michael Palliser. Now you were the Permanent Head of the Foreign Office during the great bulk of this period in 1975 to 1982. Now the Government's policy was to string the Argentines along. Both Governments pursued the same policy. In hindsight it was almost certainly the same policy. The wrong policy. Now officials can only advise, Ministers have to take these decisions, but were you ...

Mr. Healey: it was not the wrong policy it was an unsuccessful policy, which isn't quite the same thing ..

Interviewer: Well, we can come back to that issue too. But how unhappy were you at the time with the line of policy which the Government was pursuing? Did you dissent from it? Did you register your dissent?

/Sir Michael Palliser:



Sir Michael Palliser: No, I personally did not and that is why I would like to comment on what Denis Healey said just now because I think that in a way he is shortening the situation at that time. I don't disagree fundamentally with what he has been saying but if you carry your mind back to the middle of '81 which is the period we are talking about, the Falklands Review Body described very accurately and very clearly in the report the discussion that took place in the Foreign Office, under Mr Ridley's chairmanship, with the Ambassador from Buenos Aires and a number of us, and the conclusions that we reached then, and then as Mr. Healey said there was subsequently at the end of July a report by the JIC - Joint Intelligence Committee. Now what that actually said was that - and that is why I think Denis Healey is shortening things a bit - it in fact said that if at a given point which it didn't identify and didn't try to identify - quite rightly - if at a given point it became clear to the Argentines that there was no mileage whatever out of negotiation - I mean I <sup>am</sup> paraphrasing but I think this is a fair paraphrase - then we must expect military action. But they also thought that military action would be preceded by other action and ..

Interviewer: What incidentally was the logic of this i.

Mr. Healey: That is not what the report says with respect.

Sir Michael Palliser : Well why don't you read it to us.

Mr. Healey: Well let me read it. The final paragraph of the assessment stated that if Argentine had concluded there was no hope of a peaceful transfer of sovereignty there would be a high risk of their resorting to more forceable measures against British interests and it might act swiftly and without warning. In such circumstances military action against British shipping or a full scale invasion of the Falkland Islands couldn't be discounted. Now with great respect that is not compatible with the picture you have drawn of their warning or indeed that was the Foreign Secretary .....

Interviewer: They got it right didn't they?

Mr. Healey: Yes they got it absolutely right.

Interviewer? And you ignored it?

Sir Michael Palliser: No, that's the final paragraph, we didn't ignore it. The final paragraph in those reports is as you very well know, those of you who are Privy Counsellors and have been in Government, is a summary of the conclusions and the bulk of the report sets out the process by which they come to that and I don't think I am in the least distorting that report in saying that they thought that there would probably be a progression of measures, including forceful action, and culminating maybe in military action against the Islands.

Interviewer: Can I press you on this question of the build up. Throughout the Franks Report one gets the impression that everybody supposed that except the times the Joint Intelligence Committee that their might be some kind of slow build up of pressure, attacks on British ships, cutting of the airlink.

Sir Michael Palliser: This is the point I wanted to answer. This of course was actually the situation that confronted the Labour Government in the - whenever it was '76/'77 - and at that time the military action that was taken by the Labour Government, the secret despatch of warships to the area, was because they were expecting action, not actually against the Falklands, but against British shipping because that was what Argentina had been doing. Coming back to 1981, and I would like to be allowed to conclude this, what the Government thought was, as I say, that if negotiations resulted in a situation where - I am sorry you shake your head, but this is correct - resulted in a situation where the Argentines concluded that they were getting nowhere, then we must expect forceful action. Now I think that - it is not for me to speak for him - but I think I can say in the light of the previous discussion, that what Lord Carrington felt in September when he considered these matters at the meeting in the Foreign Office as described in the report and in the subsequent weeks was that we had to see whether it was possible to carry the process further forward - this was simply a repetition of what previous Governments had done and had done actually with success in the sense that there had not been forceful action. And he did this because having seen earlier reactions in Parliament and those have been very well described by Mr Luce and Mr Healey, he felt that it was necessary

to be able to demonstrate, and we felt and I agreed with him, to demonstrate convincingly, what the alternatives were. Now don't forget that we were due to have another round of negotiations with Argentina at the end of '81, those had been preceded by a discussion between Lord Carrington and the Argentine Foreign Minister which again is described in the report and I won't repeat what it says. It was Argentina which asked for those negotiations to be postponed and it was quite clear that at that point they were not asking for that in order to take military action. So I don't actually think - we can discuss maybe if you like what happened in March - I don't think that the decision taken by Lord Carrington was an unreasonable one in either political or diplomatic terms at that time.

Mr. Healey: I must take this point up because to me it was one of the seminal issues in the whole report and that is that after the Argentines had effectively broken off negotiations after Mr. Luce had had his talks in New York and they had been disavowed in Argentina which was in February, Lord Carrington did in fact meet his officials and one of them told him, which he hadn't known owing to the odd rules we have in Britain that the previous Government had entered negotiations where they thought there was a risk of Argentine military action, taking the precaution to put forces in the area in case they were needed and I took part in that decision which was never announced and Winston Churchill we now know from the papers released 30 years later made a similar decision in '52 and when in fact the negotiations proceeded without any Argentine action we withdrew them. Now what to me is astounding is that having been told the Government did this, the Labour Government, Lord Carrington said did the Argentines know about it and was told no, and he said in that case I am not interested but the funny thing is justifying not sending the forces down in the last week if we had sent forces down they would have found out it would have torpedoed the negotiations. Now that with great respect, those two positions are quite inconsistent. Secondly, Lord Carrington made it clear that he and Government did expect that if the Argentines took action it would take place later in the year when incidentally Endurance would have left the area and we would already have handed over our aircraft carrier Illustrious to the Australians. So that we were /prepared

prepared for military action later in the year but took no steps to discuss the problem with his colleagues.

Interviewer: Now we could argue that particular point for hours.

Mr. Healey: It is a very important point. It is crucial to the whole affair.

Interviewer: It is indeed and I hope we can come back to it but I would like to bring in Enoch Powell who has very much ...

Mr. Powell: I do enjoy this ... I am quite used to it in the House of Commons.

Mr. Healey: /<sup>I never</sup> noticed you enjoying it Enoch.

Mr. Powell: Oh yes, I enjoyed your speech the other day.

Mr. Healey: I am so glad.

Interviewer: Mr. Powell, what do you conclude from all this? You once described the Foreign Office as a nest of vipers, does listening to this conversation lead you to reinforce that conclusion?

Mr. Healey: That nursery of traitors and nest of vipers - a phrase that has become classic if not actually authorised description of that Department since then. What we have been shown in the report and what has emerged from this discussion is that for some 15 years we engaged in a game of blind-man's bluff, we engaged in the game of looking for something which did not exist - looking for something between sovereignty and not sovereignty. Something which the Argentines were in no circumstances going to settle for and anybody could have told them that and anybody knew that. There was nothing between sovereignty and not sovereignty. But we hoped that something could be found. You know you go on looking for a solution to this difficult problem. That is the formula by which you get yourself nearer to disaster. And in addition to that as Governments knew that the House of Commons would not be agreeable, the polite phrase is had not been educated up to, the acceptance

of a transfer of the sovereignty of the Islands, an additional ingredient was thrown in, that this wouldn't happen except it had the consent sometimes, and I fear Nick Ridley fell into this, he wobbled over .... after consultation.

Mr. Healey: Even Mr. Pym made the same wobble.

Mr. Powell: Yes, it is a very dangerous wobble and it helped to make the House of Commons very anxious and very angry. I am saying in addition that that either meant that the thing was going to be vetoed anyhow by the Falkland Islanders and that therefore even if Britain wanted to get rid of sovereignty she wasn't going to get rid of it in terms of her own statement or that the Falkland Islanders were going to be put under so much pressure, we needn't go into the details of what is meant in those connections, but the pressure, I am sure the Foreign Office will supply the details if requested, would be put under so much pressure that eventually they would collapse and give way. Now that was what we were doing. We were playing a silly game which had not a tragic outcome, it had thanks to the mercy of providence, a fortunate outcome, but it had an outcome which was not one which statecraft should either aim at or be proud of having achieved.

Interviewer: Simon Jenkins - now you are the author of the Battle for the Falklands - the co-author, you probably know more about this than just about anybody outside Government, do you think that the Foreign Office, successive British Government, were playing a silly game.

Simon Jenkins: No I disagree with Enoch Powell on that. I think the Foreign Office was trying to pursue the only sensible policy as it perceived it at the time right through the entire period since 1965 and the policy existed - the aim did exist, the aim was lease-back ultimately, and lease-back was a respectable policy and I think was they were desperately trying to do ....

Mr. Healey: ..... Hong Kong ....

/Mr Jenkins:

Mr. Jenkins: ... and no-one wanted to end up as Mr Healey said with Fortress Falklands. No-one was prepared to pay that price. That is where we have now got. That is why I don't regard it as a success - I regard it as a tragedy. But the nub of the Franks issue, as far as this is concerned, seems to me only in part that - I mean why was it that the Foreign Office failed to sell its policy to the House of Commons?

Interviewer: Was it the Prime Minister?

Mr. Jenkins: Well it sold it to successive Prime Ministers.

Mr. Healey: The Prime Minister agreed to lease-back and Lord Carrington repeated that again in his press interview on Wednesday.

Mr. Jenkins: I don't think the Prime Minister did fully agree to lease-back, I think she tolerated the attempt to sell lease-back which is a different thing. But the Foreign Office failed - the policy was not sold to the House of Commons and it therefore collapsed. The charge against the Government and I think it is a substantive charge is that it did not realise the consequences of the collapse of that policy and the consequence was a serious risk of Argentinian military action. Now the second point to which Franks is trying to address himself and this is where I think Franks itself collapses, was what were the sequence of events which led up to the April 2nd invasion and what was the Government's role in them. By not talking to any Argentinians, by not attempting in any sense to get some view of why they invaded on April 2nd not as we now know their original intention of invading much later in the year. Franks was unable to come I think to any coherent statement as to what part the British Government's decisions played in that. Now there were two key decisions. One was the decision to shift Endurance and ..... which we dealt with before but which are very important in allocating ..

Mr. Healey: .. and which the Opposition strongly attacked at the time.

/Mr Jenkins:

Mr Jenkins: The Opposition strongly attacked the decision to move Endurance but the Opposition had its part in the other decision or the other consequence of that which was the leaking of the news about the sending of a submarine and indeed Denis Healey played party politics on this issue.

Mr. Healey: Absolutely nonsense.

Mr. Jenkins: Richard Luce on the Tuesday of the invasion week. Now those two things I believe precipitated .....

Mr. Healey: That is absolutely disgraceful and untrue and try to justify what you are saying.

Mr. Jenkins: You said in the House of Commons on the Tuesday of the invasion week that it was absolutely disgraceful that the Government had left the Falkland Islands undefended.

Mr. Healey: That's right.

Mr. Jenkins: You must have know at the time that Richard Luce had ordered submarines to go.

Mr. Healey: Of course I didn't know. How would I have known?

Mr. Jenkins: If you did not know that, if you did not know that you were goading him into saying it.

Mr. Healey: Nonsense. How on earth should I know something which is a Government secret? You are really talking the most unutterable dribble.

Mr. Jenkins: It was the talk of the Lobby at the time.

Mr. Healey: It may have been the talk of the Lobby but the Lobby says many things, it is absolutely nonsense. Absolutely untrue - you must withdraw that.

/Mr Luce:

Mr. Luce: Now I am going to answer a general point which I think needs exploring a bit further. This seems to be turning into a Franks Mark II enquiry and I think there are dangers that we go all over precisely the same ground again. But one thing I think should be made absolutely clear and it is important to be absolutely frank about this, there has always been a danger of an Argentine attack upon at least an island belonging to the Falkland Islands, or part of the Falkland Islands and it had happened over the past 15 years and the fact is that no successive Government, no Government has ever decided that they were prepared to spend a sizeable/large amounts of money in order to set/<sup>up</sup>a permanent and effective deterrent force and there is in fact a very substantial difference between what happened in early March and what happened in November 1977 with the Task Force which Lord Franks sets out very very clearly, that the tensions were far greater in November 1977 at that particular time with no Ambassadors between both countries, with harrassing of shipping by the Argentines, with intelligence reports saying that there were dangers of invasion and so it is very false to say that there are parallels between November '77 and early March.

Mr. Healey: That wasn't true of March 5th. By March 5th ..

Interviewer: I am a little worried that we really will conduct a Mark II Frank enquiry.

Mr Jenkins? But March 5th is terribly important because it was on March 5th that any sensible person reading back through all that material must say to themselves why on earth didn't they send covert submarines. 5

Interviewer: But surely the problems had been created long before March 5th. I want to pull back and look at again at what seems to a lot of people to be the central issue and this was Sir Michael that successive British Governments were pursuing a line of policy which had attached to it enormous risks, the risk was in the end an invasion of the Falklands and that the only reason it wasn't pursuing, successive Governments weren't pursuing the policy they really believe in, which was lease-back, was that they wanted to quiet life on the domestic front in the short-term.



Sir Michael Palliser: I think that is over-simplifying it. I mean I suppose in this discussion I am what you might call - I am in a sense the chief viper and head traitor, I must say the competition this evening is powerful, but I think that it was not in that acuteness the situation at that time the - there is a very powerful element of hindsight in this March 5th business because all of us know that on March 18th or 19th the events began in South Georgia and I think it was that which actually helped to trigger an Argentine invasion which would otherwise more probably have taken place later, not least because it would have been a much better time to do it later from their point of view for obvious reasons. .... would have happened unless and that is why I want to finish, unless it had become clear after the next round of negotiation, which I think probably would have done, that talks about talks had come to an end and at that point it is quite clear to me that Lord Carrington would have had to say to <sup>his</sup> colleagues we now have the option either of in effect of giving way to Argentina which is politically, morally and in every other way unacceptable, or of sending a proper force down there to defend it and I think that that was probably what was in his mind in waiting for the psychological moment to do it. I would just like to make one more point not directly related to this but related to what Mr. Powell said earlier because I think his formidable talent lies in formidable over-simplification of problems and he said that lease-back never had any hope of being accepted by Argentina. If you read the Falkland Islands Review you will see that the idea of lease-back was first proposed by the Argentine Foreign Minister some years ago.

Mr. Powell: They played with it but in the end they were going to settle for nothing but sovereignty.

Sir M. Palliser: I don't think that is true because lease-back gave them that opportunity. That is precisely the point. Lease-back gave them sovereignty but gave it to them with British administration continuing. ....

/Mr Powell:

Mr Powell: ... but why should they have had any qualification whatever upon their sovereignty. The only reason for having lease-back was if they didn't intend to honour the lease. Because they knew, they knew what we knew, they believed at any rate that they had us by the scruff of the neck, they knew that Britain was anxious to get out, they knew that we were putting all the pressure we could to bear upon the sole obstacle of getting out.

Sir M. Palliser: You say they knew, what you mean is they believed, because what actually happened was they were shown - I mean we are talking about misjudgment, misunderstanding ..... who made the plain misjudgment in all this, Argentina.

Mr. Powell: The misjudgment was that of successive Governments...

Sir M. Palliser: ... successive Argentine Governments ..

Mr. Powell: ... successive British Governments who did not know what would be the mind of the House of Commons and of a British nation in the event towards which it was steering events knowing they were steering events towards that.

Interviewer: But what about the mind of the House of Commons because surely the House of Commons can be held partly responsible for the fact that collectively it prevented the Government from pursuing the policy it wanted to be pursue but didn't insist the alternative policy was actually to build up some kind of military presence in the South Atlantic.

Mr. Powell? The House of Commons says we wont wear that. It is then for the Government to go away and find what it will wear.

Mr. Healey: Could I try to drag the discussion back to where it started and that is the element of Greek tragedy in this. I mean I agree very much with Michael Palliser that Enoch has a formidable talent for over-simplification - comic strip stuff - I remember him arguing in '54 that we should leave NATO and concentrate all our military effort on helping the French to stay in Indo-China.

/Mr Powell:

Mr. Powell: It is remarkable how we are coming back to that view ..

Mr. Healey: Well we can follow that argument. I don't think we should try to concentrate our military effort in keeping the French in Indo-China as you then argued but the point I really want to put is this, because I have been Secretary for Defence and as Chancellor I have been involved in many similar problems. In foreign policy a country which has inherited an imperial position, a possession for example, even now of hundreds of islands scattered over the oceans of the world, which it has no power to defend, faces enormous problems in bringing the reality into its policy, particularly since public opinion not carefully or indeed sincerely educated by the press was liable to close option after option. There is a very similar problem facing the Government today in Belize. We have accepted responsibility for the defence of Belize. It is neighboured by military dictatorship with an appalling human rights record which has reasserted last week not a claim to the whole of Belize but a claim to a fifth of it. Now we want to try to negotiate a situation in which Belize can live with its neighbours as we did in the case of the Falklands. We cannot guarantee a success but we have thank God, partly because of the Falklands, taken steps in the case of Belize, to ensure that we have something on the ground which is a powerful deterrent to attack. These problems I fear exist in many parts of the world and we may face them later over Gibraltar and Hong Kong, where incidentally a lease-back situation has worked for 85 years in spite of the fact that the Chinese Government for many years has not accepted the validity of the treaty under which it took place. Foreign affairs and national affairs are full of problems where it is extremely difficult to devise policies which are viable in the real world and acceptable at the same time to politicians. Many people all over the world throughout history have wondered whether democracy is consistent with the conduct of an intelligent foreign policy, I believe it is. But please with respect it is very easy for a professor to point to the situation and the problem but with great respect your suggestions that by talking to the Falklanders or talking to the House of Commons or talking to the Argentines we could have guaranteed to produce a solution flies in the face of historical experience and we must all be a little more humble and modest when we face these very difficult problems.

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

23 January, 1983

Paragraph 42 of the Franks Report refers to the incident in February, 1976 when an Argentine destroyer fired shots at the RRS Shackleton. Could you please let me know by lunchtime on Monday the precise date of this incident?

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Ah

9105 SW

done

MR. RICKETT

Could you please let me have extracts from Hansard showing:

- a) a remark by Mr. Nott in the various debates on the Falklands to the effect that he wished that a different decision had been taken about HMS Endurance;
- b) Mr. Healey's comments on the sinking of the Belgrano.

By lunchtime on Monday, please.

A. J. COLES

23 January, 1983

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held as at 1020.

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

23 January, 1983

Franks Debate

Paragraph 110 of the Franks Report refers to a paper which was formally approved by the Chiefs of Staff on 14 September, 1981.

I should be grateful if a copy of that paper could be obtained for the Prime Minister urgently.

The Prime Minister would be grateful to know the procedure by which that paper was approved, which Ministers saw it and why it was not brought to the Prime Minister's attention. (The answer may be that such papers by the Chiefs of Staff are not normally brought to the attention of the Prime Minister).

Paragraph 112 of the Franks Report describes part of the Chiefs of Staff paper and states that, to deter a full-scale invasion, a large balanced force would be required, comprising an Invincible class carrier with four destroyers or frigates, etc. Although this paper is said by Franks to be similar to a paper prepared in 1977, the Prime Minister has observed that assessments made available to her in, for example, September, 1979, did not mention an aircraft carrier as a necessary component of the force which would be required. Is there any explanation for this?

I should be grateful for a reply by lunchtime on Monday.

A. J. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence

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now revised.  
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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

21 January, 1983.

Franks Debate

I enclose a copy of a draft opening speech which is being put to the Prime Minister over the weekend, but which Mrs. Thatcher has not yet seen. The concluding passage has yet to be written.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Sir Robert Armstrong, Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence). Should they have any comments on the facts in the draft, it would be helpful to have these, but I do not suggest that extensive comments should be made at this stage. We shall try to circulate a further draft in the course of Monday.

A. J. COLES

Mrs. Mary Brown,  
Office of the Lord Privy Seal.

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## FRANKS DEBATE: OPENING SPEECH BY PRIME MINISTER

### Introduction

Mr Speaker, I beg to move that the House takes note of the Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors entitled, "The Falkland Islands Review", prepared by a Committee of Privy Counsellors under the Chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Franks.

### Origins of the Committee

The House will recall that on 8 April, just six days after the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands, I announced in reply to the Rt. Hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland that a review would be held of the way in which the responsibilities of Government were discharged in the period leading up to the Argentine invasion.

As soon as the liberation of the Islands had been accomplished, consultations were set in hand with the Leader of the Opposition, and with leading Privy Counsellors in other Opposition parties, about the establishment of a Committee to undertake the Review. These consultations led to broad agreement both about the terms of reference of the review and about its membership. On 6 July I announced the Government's decision to establish a Committee of Privy Counsellors under Lord Franks and two days later the House of Commons debated a motion to approve the establishment of the Committee. That motion was approved by the House without a Division.

On that occasion the Leader of the Opposition, who proposed the names of two of the six members of the Committee said:-



"The inquiry will deal with a serious and important matter, and it will be of great benefit to the country if the matter is probed in the way in which the House is determined that it should be. I believe that the names of those appointed to the Committee are the guarantee that that will be so."

#### Procedure of the Committee

The Committee had access to all relevant Cabinet and Cabinet Committee papers and to a comprehensive collection of reports from the intelligence agencies. They saw not only the papers of the present Administration but those of previous Administrations also. The members of the Committee read all these papers personally: they did not rely on summaries or extracts.

The Committee interviewed those principally involved, both Ministers and officials, in the development of the present Government's policy; Ministers of previous Administrations, including all Prime Ministers since 1965; people with a special knowledge of and interest in the area; representatives of the media; and some journalists. They issued an open invitation to anyone who had relevant information to submit it; and it received many responses to that invitation.

I mention these arrangements because they demonstrate that the Committee were in a unique position of authority to comment on the matters covered by the terms of reference.

The Contents of the Report

I turn now to the Report itself.

I welcome it as a serious contribution to our understanding of a major episode in our country's history.

After the unprovoked Argentine aggression of April 1982

- the suffering and bravery of the Falkland Islanders
- the magnificent achievements of the Task Force
- the tragic losses
- the strong emotions and the torrent of public comment and speculation

after all this, it was necessary and right that a group as distinguished as Lord Franks and his Committee should review, objectively and impartially, the events, the judgements and the decisions which led to those experiences. It is equally necessary that this House should debate fully the Report's analysis and conclusion.

/I shall

I shall deal in turn

- first, with the fundamental nature of the dispute with which successive governments tried to deal
- second, the events immediately preceding the invasion and some points which have been made about the Government's handling of those events
- then, the main conclusions of the Report and the Government's reactions to them
- finally, I shall make some observations about the future.

Throughout, I shall try to follow both Lord Franks' advice that his Report should be read as a whole and his wise warning against the dangers of hindsight.

#### Fundamental Nature of the Dispute

His analysis brings out clearly "the dilemma to which successive Governments were exposed by their policy of seeking to resolve, or at least contain, the dispute by dipolomatic negotiations on the one hand and their commitment to the defence of the Falkland Islands on the other" (para 283).

/Argentina

Argentina was interested in only one thing - sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and, if they could get it, over the dependencies as well. Successive British governments recognised that any solution had to be acceptable to the Islanders and sought to achieve that solution by negotiation. The inherent contradiction was evident. No solution which satisfied the Argentinian demand for sovereignty pure and simple could possibly be reconciled with the wishes of the Islanders or of this Parliament. It was on this rock that all attempts to find a solution - whether by condominium, leaseback or a policy of improving links between the Islands and Argentina - foundered.

From 1967, when the then Labour Government first stated formally that they would be prepared to cede sovereignty under certain conditions, until the New York talks of February 1982 the dilemma persisted.

No government wished to pursue the only other option, that of breaking off negotiations and pursuing a policy of "Fortress Falklands". The difficulty of that course is clear from the Report.

In 1976 the Chiefs of Staff advised that "it would not be practicable to provide, transport and support the force necessary in the Islands to ensure that a determined Argentine attempt to eject the British garrison was unsuccessful" (para 47).

/Five years

Five years later, in 1981, the Chiefs of Staff again advised on the nature of the force which would be necessary to deter a full-scale invasion and said: "Such a deployment would be very expensive and would engage a significant portion of the country's naval resources. There was a danger that its despatch could precipitate the very action it was intended to deter. If then faced with Argentine occupation of the Falkland Islands on arrival, there could be no certainty that such a force could retake them" (para 112).

Mr. Speaker, given the military difficulty, it is not surprising that Britain over the years sought to negotiate a peaceful and just solution. But we had to negotiate with successive regimes in Argentina who were not prepared to take into account the wishes of the inhabitants of the Islands and who in the end abandoned the diplomatic process and chose to use force instead.

It is obvious, but seems to need repeating, that the true cause of the final conflict was not the misdemeanours of British governments or civil servants, not a failure of machinery, nor of intelligence but the decision of a military Junta to try to take by force British territory inhabited by people who had always wanted to remain British.

Mr. Speaker, I shall spend no longer on Chapter 1 of the Report which covers the period from 1965 to 1979. The Report speaks for itself. Anyone who wanted to indulge in recrimination would be able to select sentences to suit his purpose. But I believe we should rise above that approach, try to see the Report as a whole and use it as a guide to the future.

/Events under the

Events under the present Government

Chapters 2 and 3 cover the period of the present Government. As with previous governments, the full range of policy options was put to us at the outset. Although we were preoccupied in foreign affairs at that time by the issue of Rhodesia, the second half of 1979 saw a visit by a Minister to the Islands, two exploratory meetings with Argentine representatives and the circulation of proposals to the Overseas Policy and Defence Committee on our policy for handling the dispute. In exchanges in the House on 18 January the rt. hon. Gentleman, the Leader of the Opposition, referred to what he called a "collapse of effective Cabinet Government". The fact is that in 1980 there were no less than seven collective discussions of our policy towards the Falkland Islands, three in Cabinet and four in the Overseas Policy and Defence Committee. In January 1981 a further meeting of that Committee reviewed the situation in the light of the Islanders' reactions to the leaseback proposal and the comments in this House on the statement of December 1980 by my rt. hon. Friend the Financial Secretary. The Committee decided that the policy should be to continue negotiations with the aim of finding an acceptable basis for a negotiated settlement.

That remained our policy - and because it remained our policy, there was no need for further collective discussion in 1981. But the members of the Overseas and Defence Policy Committee were kept informed as necessary in writing.

/ Lord Franks

Lord Franks refers to four such minutes from the then Foreign Secretary to his colleagues on the Committee between September 1981 and March 1982.

/ And just

And just to reassure the Rt. Hon. Gentleman let me tell him that Cabinet government flourished so well in 1981 that I held 17 meetings of the Overseas Committee, to say nothing of all the other Cabinet and Cabinet Committee meetings.

If he is referring to the period of 1982 before the invasion, then that Committee met on 5 occasions. It did not discuss the Falklands because the policy, until the South Georgia affair, did not change and did not need to be changed. I shall come in a moment to the question of H.M.S. Endurance.

Mr. Speaker, I will not take the House through the whole of Chapters 2 and 3. Again the Report speaks for itself. But before passing on to the main conclusions and to the future can I just mention two matters about which there has been some comment..

#### HMS ENDURANCE

First, HMS Endurance. I understand the interest in the Government's decision - a collective Cabinet decision resulting from the 1981 Defence Review - to withdraw Endurance at the end of her 1981-82 deployment. Given the fine work which that ship had done in the South Atlantic for many years, and the attachment of the Islands to its role, that interest is not surprising. But the matter needs to be seen in perspective.

/ - Endurance,



- Endurance, as the Argentines well knew, has a limited defence capability.
- Its presence in the South Atlantic at the time did not stop Argentina launching its invasion any more than her presence in the area deterred the Argentines from attacking RRS Shackleton in 1976.
- Endurance was not the only symbol of our commitment to the defence of the Islands. We made it plain that the marine garrison would remain, that HM Ships would continue to visit the Islands and, in many statements in Parliament, that we were firmly committed to the defence of the Islands and its people.

It has been said that the decision to withdraw Endurance was a signal to the Argentines of our reduced determination to defend the Islands. If so, they had seen the signal before, at the time of the 1974 Defence Review by the party opposite. They had seen other signals which Lord Franks lists in his Report (para 278). The most striking of those signals may well have been the failure of the then government to respond effectively to the Argentine military occupation of Southern Thule in 1976. As the report says "Argentina no doubt always had in mind that what it saw as the weakness of Britain's response . . . was an indication that it might be able to mount similar operations, at least in the uninhabited islands, without provoking serious retaliatory action." And were they not encouraged by the then government's behaviour in keeping the House and the British public in ignorance of this affair for 17 months

*no public statement made by the government as far as MOD are concerned - delete*

Earlier Despatch of Ships

It has also been said that military measures should have been taken earlier, that for example a submarine should have been sent to the South Atlantic before 29 March.

Here again it is easy enough to say with hindsight that if there had been a powerful force in the area the invasion might have been deterred. But that is not the issue. The question is whether in the situation as it actually developed it would have been right to despatch a force.

The Report states (paragraph 325) that it would not have been appropriate to prepare a large task force with the capacity to retake the Falkland Islands before there was clear evidence of an invasion. I agree - and of course as soon as the evidence became available, on 31 March, that action was taken.

Then, some argue that a small force should have been deployed earlier. Franks states clearly that the situation at the time of the New York talks in February 1982 was quite different to the situation in November 1977, the time of the deployment of a submarine and two frigates by the then government. In the weeks before that deployment the Argentines had arrested seven Soviet and two Bulgarian vessels in Falklands waters. Shots had been fired at one of those ships.

The Argentine admiral had orders to sink that vessel if necessary and made it plain that he would deal similarly with any other vessel, whatever its flag. And there was information that another Argentine naval party was due to land on Southern Thule. Honourable Members opposite often portray the November 1977 deployment as just a prudent precaution to back up the diplomatic talks in December 1977. But the fact is that there had already been bellicose military action by Argentina in Falklands waters and an explicit threat to any of our ships which might enter those waters.

That is quite different to the situation in February 1982, which, as Franks says, did not justify a similar naval deployment.

Then it is said a force might have been sent on about 5 March. The rt. hon. Member for Leeds East (Mr. Healey) has been heard to say that it was quite clear that the Argentines had by then given up hope of a negotiated settlement. No so. The talks in New York had laid down a programme for monthly meetings and that programme was specifically endorsed in the unilateral communique issued in Buenos Aires on 1 March. The prospect was of continuing negotiations, not of an imminent military threat. Any suggestion that that was the time to despatch ships is, quite simply, hindsight. If we had done so, and this had leaked, then certainly the remaining prospect of negotiation would have been destroyed.

The Franks Committee consider that there was a case for taking this action on about 25/26 March, i.e. some three days before the Government took that action. This is a fairly fine judgement and depends on the interpretation of the developing situation in South Georgia which the Government had been trying to solve by negotiation. It is arguable that there was a case for taking on 25 March the action we took on 29 March.

I certainly do not accept the assertion made by some of those opposite that such action would have deterred the eventual Argentine invasion. The submarine would not have reached the area in time. If it is said that we should have made known our intention to the Junta and that that would have stopped the invasion, I again do not accept the argument. We were not dealing with a rational government engaged in careful discussion of the pros and cons of invasion but with a military regime under pressure, well used to violent methods, and looking for ways to divert attention from their domestic problems. Their response to the knowledge that we had despatched a submarine could well have been to decide to invade by methods proof against submarine attack, for example by landing paratroops. I note that one commentator on these events has asserted that knowledge of the despatch of the submarine on 29 March finally triggered the invasion. I do not know of any evidence for that assertion but it illustrates that the effect of sending a deterrent force could be argued either way.

Those of us who had to take the many difficult decisions during the actual conflict know very well that it is not sufficient to talk glibly of despatching a submarine and using it to stop an invasion. Some Members opposite criticised the sinking of the Belgrano in the middle of actual hostilities. What would their attitude have been if we had sunk a ship on the high seas before hostilities, if we had fired the first shot? They would have been the first to condemn and to demand an inquiry.

#### Intelligence Machinery

The principal suggestion made by Lord Franks for the future is that the machinery within Government for intelligence assessment should be reviewed.

The Committee expressed the view that during the period leading up to the invasion the Joint Intelligence Organisation might not have given sufficient weight to the diplomatic and other indications that the Argentine Government's position was hardening in the early months of 1982, as compared with intelligence reports which tended to be more reassuring about the prospects of an early move to any kind of military confrontation. The Committee thought that the arrangements for bringing to the attention of the Joint Intelligence Organisation information other than intelligence reports should be examined.

/ They also

They also suggested that the independence in operation of the Joint Intelligence Committee from the Government departments principally constituting it should be emphasised by having the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee appointed by the Prime Minister and being a full-time member of the Cabinet Office, with a more critical and independent role.

The Committee emphasised that these recommendations were aimed at correcting what it saw as possible weaknesses in the arrangements for assessing intelligence; it did not seek to attach any blame to individuals.

Mr. Speaker, these are matters which it is our custom not to discuss in public, or on the floor of the House, for obvious and very good reasons. But I believe that the House would expect me on this occasion to show that we have taken those observations seriously.

The Government has itself been reviewing the intelligence assessments machinery. We had come to certain provisional conclusions before the Franks Committee reported, but we thought it right not to take final decisions until we knew what the Committee had to say on the subject.

It is clearly a matter for judgment by those responsible for assessment as to what relative weight should be attached to information from intelligence sources and to information

/ from other sources.

from other sources. That is not a question of organisation. Organisationally what matters is that all the available and relevant information from all sources reaches those who have to make the assessments. I can assure the House that those responsible for making assessments have access to all the relevant reporting from our diplomatic posts overseas, both on the attitudes that members of our missions overseas encounter in the countries where they are serving and on media reporting in those countries on current issues of significance for British foreign policy making. They also of course take full advantage of the product of agencies such as the BBC Monitoring Service. Our missions overseas are already aware of the importance of maintaining a full coverage of the policies and attitudes of the governments to which they are accredited. My rt. hon. Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is taking steps to ensure that his Department is reminded of the continuing need to make all such reports fully available to those responsible for intelligence assessment.

On the composition of the Joint Intelligence Committee itself the report may give rise to some misunderstanding. Under successive Governments in recent times the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee has been a senior official of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who has combined this work with other duties in the Foreign Office; but as Chairman of the JIC he has not been responsible to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. He has been appointed

/with the

with the approval of the Prime Minister, and has been responsible to the Prime Minister through the Secretary of the Cabinet. This arrangement has worked satisfactorily with a succession of chairmen.

Nonetheless we had ourselves come to a very similar conclusion to that reached by the Franks Committee. I think it right that the chairmanship of the JIC should in future be held by a member of the Cabinet Office who is able to give more time to supervising the work of the assessments machinery. I therefore intend to appoint as Chairman of the JIC someone who will be an official of the Cabinet Office and will be engaged full time on intelligence matters. He will have direct access to me, as do the heads of the security and intelligence agencies.

I also propose formally to lay on the JIC organisation a more definite responsibility to keep watch for developing situations that might threaten British interests. Hitherto it has been regarded as primarily the business of the Departments of State (particularly the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence) to identify threats and decide upon action to meet them. The changes I have in mind will not absolve the Departments from those responsibilities but they will, I hope, enable the Joint Intelligence Organisation to be an additional source of advice to Ministers on the identification of threats and an additional spur to timely and effective decision-making on the responses to them. It will of course continue to be the responsibility of Departments - and ultimately of Ministers - to decide what action should be taken.



The Report's Main Conclusions

Mr. Speaker, I have dealt at some length with these points because they have been raised in the public comment on the Franks Report. But they must be kept in perspective. And the correct perspective is set by the final sentences of the Franks Report.

I quote:

"There is no reasonable basis for any suggestion - which would be purely hypothetical - that the invasion would have been prevented if the Government had acted in the ways indicated in our Report. Taking account of these considerations, and of all the evidence we have received, we conclude that we would not be justified in attaching any criticism or blame to the present Government for the Argentine Junta's decision to commit its act of unprovoked aggression in the invasion of the Falklands on 2 April 1982."

That is the unanimous conclusion, taking into account all the considerations and all the evidence. That is the bottom line.

/ And the question

And the question which the Opposition must answer is: Do they accept that bottom line? After all their efforts to paint in stronger colours this or that aspect of the account, do they accept this independent Committee's final and unanimous verdict? The House and the country will expect from the rt. hon. Gentleman a clear answer to that question.

Performance of Government Ministers and Officials

Mr Speaker, as a result of the events of last year and of the Franks Report the performance of government machinery, of Ministers and of officials has been subjected to the closest scrutiny. That is our way in this democracy, and rightly so. After great events, which ended in triumph but which also brought tragic losses, such an examination is indispensable. But it is also in our nature to be fair in our judgements.

Three Ministers thought it right and honourable to resign on 5 April. That they did so is to their credit, much as I may personally have regretted their departure from government. But I pay tribute again to the outstanding service which the then Foreign Secretary, the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, has given to this country and pay tribute also to the work of my Rt. Hon. Friend, the member for Spelthorne and my honourable Friend, the member for Shoreham whose skill in handling the New York talks in February, 1982 is specifically acknowledged in the Report.

Officials, too, in the intelligence organisation, in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and in the Ministry of Defence have been subjected to much criticism. The Franks Report attaches no blame to the individuals involved in the intelligence machinery and I endorse that. It makes equally clear that the mass of allegations made against the Foreign and Commonwealth Office were quite unjustified. I endorse that, too, and would add that the department which incurred that criticism was the same department

/which

which so brilliantly mobilised opinion and so skilfully promoted our cause at the United Nations, in the United States, with our other partners and allies and across the world. That needs saying and I am glad to say it.

And I pay tribute as well to the work of the Ministry of Defence who played such a notable part in the mobilisation and servicing of the task force and the other government departments for their contributions.

Mr. Speaker, it is not surprising that a thorough enquiry over six months by a Committee with the distinction and calibre which has produced this Report should have observations to make on the handling of this or that event. That would have been so whatever the subject of the enquiry. Given that, I submit to the House that the Government can legitimately take pride in the final verdict of this Review. Where it points the need for change, change will, as I have indicated, be made. For it is now the future that matters - and in particular the future of the Falkland Islanders. This government is determined, as are the British people, that everything necessary shall be done to secure for the Islanders what they themselves want and deserve - a life of freedom and peace under a government of their choice. That prospect was momentarily shattered last spring. It is now restored and we shall do everything within our power to ensure that it is never again imperilled.

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MR. COLES

THE FUTURE OF THE FALKLANDS

1. I am not writing this minute specifically in the context of the House of Commons debate next week on the Franks Report. However, the Prime Minister might like to have some of the following thoughts to turn over in her mind.
2. I am an unashamed hard-liner on the question of negotiations. I think that my view is shared by most intelligent people of good will. To put it bluntly, there was a time when it was possible to negotiate with the Argentines on peripheral subjects such as joint economic development, communications, education, etc, thus blurring the central issue of sovereignty. With the Argentine military humiliation, this kind of thing has become impossible. Any negotiations, to be acceptable to Argentina, would have to be about sovereignty and nothing but sovereignty. This is totally unacceptable to us. Hence, we must continue to adopt an inflexible line on this question. If we try to shade the meaning of what we are saying in order not to give offence, eg to our partners and allies, the passion for negotiation which grips the greater part of the world will take over and we will find ourselves on a slippery slope.
3. Having said this, we must at the same time recognise that our position internationally is going to become increasingly isolated and our nerves are going to have to be correspondingly strong. To put it in UN terms, the number of abstentions on a "negotiations resolution" at each General Assembly will dwindle: I doubt whether we will be able to hold EC in the 1983 GA to an abstention position: and we will fairly soon find ourselves accompanied only by micro states such as Caribbean Islands and states with special interests such as Guyana. Our position is not eased by the fact that we are ourselves constantly urging negotiations on others, eg the Arabs to negotiate with Israel, the black Africans to negotiate with the South Africans, and so on and so forth. Never mind. We must be prepared if necessary to see ourselves in a minority of one. Once we put a toe on the slippery slope, we will find ourselves sliding down it with increasing speed.
4. There is, however, another aspect which I think will shortly begin to develop in the internal debate in this country, perhaps amongst our

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/allies and partners


allies and partners as well. Those people who accept that we cannot and will not negotiate over sovereignty with Argentina are already casting about for some kind of internationalisation of the problem. For example, Lord Carrington is reported in The Times of 20 January as saying that a new Antarctic Treaty allowing British Administration of the Falklands under international sovereignty was an eventual answer to Anglo-Argentine confrontation. This idea of an extension of the Antarctic Treaty to encompass the Falklands and the Dependencies has been aired by others and has been put to me in private by a number of people. By the same token, I have just read an article in the Contemporary Review by Lord Stamp in which he proposes an analogous solution. This is that the Falklands should be constituted as a "Falklands Trust" which should be administered in the interests of development of natural resources in the Falklands, the Dependencies and in Antarctica on behalf of the Third World. His idea is that this organisation should come under the aegis of the World Development Fund proposed in the Brandt Report. It should have a Board of Trustees on which developed and developing countries should be equally represented, and so on. As the Prime Minister no doubt knows, Julian Amery and others have a grandiose concept of establishing a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation to include South Africa, Argentina, Chile, the United States and ourselves in which the Falkland Islands would be incorporated as a strategic base. There are other such ideas abroad, for example the formation of a mini Antarctic-type Treaty to include the United States, ourselves, Uruguay, Chile and Argentina in which sovereignty claims over the Falklands and Dependencies would be frozen with the Islands being developed and used only for peaceful purposes.

5. All these notions are being floated as long term possibilities designed to escape from the sterile confrontation over sovereignty and the indefinite continuation of "Fortress Falklands". It is easy to demolish all of them: for example an extended Antarctic Treaty would introduce six Communist States, including the Soviet Union, to the Falklands and the Dependencies. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to devise a permutation of "internationalisation" which would hold water and meet all our desiderata. It is in any case too early to do so. Nevertheless, I believe that this particular aspect of the debate will intensify in the weeks and months ahead. We will be expected to take a view on the general proposition, certainly in private, if not in public as well. I do not want to bore the Prime

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- 3 -

Minister with a written critique of these various propositions.  
Perhaps she might like to have a word about this minute when she  
has any time to spare.



A.D. PARSONS  
20 January 1983

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Item

Falkland Islands

Previous Reference: CC(82) 49th Conclusions, Minute 2

THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY said that the publication of Lord Franks's Report had been warmly welcomed by the Diplomatic Service, which had suffered a great deal of unjustified criticism in recent months both at home and abroad. Meanwhile there was evidence that the Argentine authorities might be planning acts of harassment against British forces and installations on the Falkland Islands. This evidence had to be read in the light of a number of bellicose statements by Argentine military leaders which had been reported in the Argentine Press. There were also separate indications of possible Argentine military action against British scientific bases in the Antarctic which, if it materialised, was likely to produce a severely critical reaction from world opinion. The Government were taking all these indications seriously. Representations had been made in a wide range of foreign capitals to enlist the help of friendly governments in discouraging Argentina from embarking on any further military adventure. A message had been sent to the Argentine Government through the Swiss warning them against any action against the Falkland Islands Dependencies; and instructions were being sent to the United Kingdom representative to the meeting, currently taking place in Wellington, of the signatory states of the Antarctic Treaty to give warning of the risk of Argentine military action in the Antarctic area. Parallel representations would be made in capitals. Military contingency plans had also been carefully reviewed.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE said that the present Falkland Islands garrison had been established with a view to meeting the sort of contingencies which it now faced and the Chiefs of Staff were satisfied that it had the necessary equipment to deal with the limited threat which Argentina was likely to be able to present over the next three or four years. Thereafter, however, account would have to be taken of the build up of Argentine forces and the increasingly sophisticated equipment which they were acquiring.

THE PRIME MINISTER, summing up a short discussion, said that consideration had been given to the possibility of retaliatory action in the event of acts of military harassment by Argentina. But, in the light of legal advice it was difficult to see how retaliation which went beyond self-defence would be consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The most effective way of deterring Argentina was to ensure that any Argentine act of harassment was decisively repulsed.

- The Cabinet -
- 3. Took note.





Argentina.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
Telephone 01-218 2839 (Direct Dialling)  
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE

DJB/83/50  
9/31/F

Robin Butler Esq  
Principal Private Secretary  
No 10  
Downing St

20 January 1983

Mr. Coles  
Dear Robin

20  
1

FRANKS REPORT

<sup>with FERB?</sup>  
Clive Whitmore has seen David Goodall's minute to you of 18 January and has the following comments on the material for the PM's opening speech:

- a. Para 15, Lines 5-6: It would be more correct to say "shortly before the invasion";
- b. Para 20, Line 5: To make it absolutely clear that "recovery" is in quotation marks it might be worth inserting after "committed to" some phrase such as "what they claimed would be";
- c. Para 22, Line 5: "1976" should be amended to "1967";
- d. Para 22, Last Line: This might be better expressed "would immediately take the form of full scale invasion";
- e. Para 29, Lines 9-10: To make the point quite clear expansion might be helpful, as follows: "..... reinforcement could provoke, long before it reached the Islands, the very act of Argentine aggression it was designed to deter. And short of that extreme, reinforcement was always liable severely to damage the prospects for .....".

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Hatfield, Michael Jay and David Goodall.

*[Handwritten signature]*

D J BOWEN  
Private Secretary

Argentina  
Pension #43

20 JAN 1983



102-4



FILE

DA

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 January 1983

PERSONAL*Dear Harold*

I well realise how great were the demands which the work of Lord Franks' Committee made on its members. Now that the Report has been published, I am writing to each member of the Committee to thank you for agreeing to serve on the Committee and for the time and care which you devoted to it.

The matters reviewed by the Committee are matters of current political controversy. But they are also matters of concern to the public generally, and particularly to those who served in the South Atlantic campaign and their families. It was of great importance that, whatever the conclusions of the Review, the Committee should have reached them unanimously. Without revealing to me anything of the Committee's proceedings, Lord Franks has told me of the care and integrity with which all members of the Committee worked both to get to the heart of the material before them and to reach conclusions which the whole Committee could accept as fair and impartial. The introduction to the Report indicates how much time that work involved, and I am deeply grateful to you for your part in it.

*Yours ever**Margaret*

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Lever of Manchester

*HL*



FILE

DA

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 January 1983

PERSONAL*Dear Sir Patrick,*

Now that the Falkland Islands Review has been published, I am writing to each member of the Committee to thank you for the time and care which you devoted to its work.

The introduction to the Report indicates the demands which the work of the Committee made upon its members, and that would anyway have been apparent from the meticulous care which every line of the Report reveals. Lord Franks has not told me anything about the proceedings of the Committee. But he has told me of the time which each member of the Committee devoted to reading personally the mass of written material, to framing questions which would enable the Committee to get to the heart of the matter and, of course, to reaching conclusions which the whole Committee could accept as fair and impartial. In a matter which is of concern to a very wide public, and particularly to those who served in the South Atlantic campaign and their families, it is of the greatest importance that the conclusions of the Committee, whatever they were, should have been unanimous.

I am afraid that St. Catherine's will have seen little of its Master in the second half of 1982. But I am deeply grateful to you for serving as you did.

*Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher*

The Rt. Hon. Sir Patrick Nairne, G.C.B., M.C.

*HL*



FILE

DA

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 January 1983

PERSONAL

*Dear Merlyn.*

Now that the Report of the Franks Committee has been published, I think that it is right for me to write to each member of the Committee to thank you most warmly for agreeing to serve as a member of the Committee and for the time and care which you devoted to its work.

Lord Franks has not told me anything about the proceedings of the Committee. But he has told me of the many hours which members of the Committee devoted to reading personally the very large quantity of papers made available to you, of the trouble taken to frame questions to witnesses which would enable you to get to the heart of the issues, and of the care and integrity with which the Committee worked to reach conclusions which each of you could accept as fair and impartial.

I well realise how much was asked of the Privy Counsellors on the Committee in inviting you to comment on matters which are the subject of current political controversy. But they are also matters of concern to the public generally, and particularly to those who served in the campaign and their families. It is of great importance that the Committee were able to reach a unanimous conclusion.

*I am profoundly grateful to you all.*

*Yours sincerely*

*Margaret Thatcher*

The Rt. Hon. Merlyn Rees, M.P.

*tel*



FILE

DA

## 10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 January 1983

PERSONAL*Dear Harold*

I am writing to thank you for serving on the Falkland Islands Review and for the time and care which you devoted to it. I am also writing personally to each member of the Committee.

Now that the Report has been published, I thought it right to see Lord Franks. He did not, of course, tell me anything about the Committee's proceedings, but he did tell me of the time which each member of the Committee devoted to reading personally the mass of written material relevant to the Committee's work, of the trouble taken to frame questions to witnesses and of the care and integrity with which the Committee worked to reach conclusions which all its members could accept as fair and impartial. It is of the greatest importance that, whatever its conclusions, the Report should have been unanimous.

It is a tribute to the quality of British public life that people of such distinction should have been willing to devote their time to this work. I am deeply grateful to you for doing so.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Rogaret*

The Rt. Hon. The Viscount Watkinson, C.H.

*HE*

covering **SECRET**

✓ A.J.C. <sup>23</sup>/<sub>T</sub>  
1. Mr Coles to see

2. CF to BF on 27.1.83 for  
consideration about  
PM talking to Sir Robert  
Armstrong - see FERB m.s.

AH  
20.1.83

Robin

1. Do you want  
Tom Wiles and  
Tony Parsons  
to see him?      Yes please

2. Will you speak to  
Caroline about meeting  
with RTA?

(The minute went out  
this morning).

Angela

Pl. B.F. again  
on Thurs. 27 to  
consider.

20.1.83



RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 January 1983

*Dear John,*

Franks Report: Debate

In order to help counteract the expected concentration by the opposition on the 'signals' to the Argentine Government of HMS Endurance's withdrawal, the Nationality Act etc, you asked for an account of signals in the opposite direction given to the Argentine Government since May 1979.

We have not been able to identify any specific measures to which we could point. But I enclose a list of statements made either in Parliament or to the Argentine Government covering the Government's attitude to the defence and support of the Islands, to the paramountcy of Islander wishes, and to British sovereignty. I am not sure how much use this will be, but you may find it a useful quarry in any case. The essential point is that at every opportunity, ministers and officials stressed our commitment to the Islands, our respect for the Islanders' wishes and our confidence in our sovereignty case.

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

1. Commitment to defend and support the Islands

(a) House of Commons

'I confirm that our long-standing commitment to their [Islanders'] security and economic well-being continues.'  
(Mr Ridley - 2 December 1980)

'The decision [to withdraw HMS Endurance] does not affect our policy towards the Falkland Islands.'  
(Mr Ridley - 2 December 1980)

'The Government are committed to support and defend the Islands and their Dependencies to the best of our ability.'  
(Mr Luce - 23 March 1982)

(b) 'There is no doubt of the Government's commitment to the Falkland Islanders. We will support them in every practicable way... That commitment will continue, whatever their views may be about the best way of making progress in the dispute'.  
(Lord Carrington - 16 December 1980)

'We remain firmly committed to the defence of the Falkland Islands.'  
(Lord Skelmersdale - 16 December 1981)

2. Wishes of the Islanders

(a) House of Commons

'We have made it clear that any proposals for a settlement would have to be acceptable to the Islanders and would be laid before the House.'  
(Sir Ian Gilmour - 27 November 1980)

'It is for the Islanders to advise on which, if any, option should be explored in negotiations with the Argentines.'

(Mr Ridley - 2 December 1980)

'We have many times made it clear that the interests of the Falkland Islanders are paramount.'

(Sir Ian Gilmour - 21 January 1981)

'...the wishes of the Islanders are paramount.'

(Mr Ridley - 26 June 1981)

(b) Anglo-Argentine Talks in New York, 1980, 1981 and 1982

At each round the Minister leading the British delegation stressed HMG's commitment to the paramountcy of the Islanders' wishes.

(c) Other meetings

In Lord Carrington's meeting with the Argentine Foreign Minister in September 1981, he stressed that HMG could not coerce the Islanders or act over their heads. HMG were committed to respect the Islanders' wishes.

3. British Sovereignty

(a) House of Commons

'Successive British Governments have left the Argentines in no doubt as to British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies.'

(Sir Ian Gilmour - 25 May 1979)

'We have no doubt about our sovereignty over the Islands.'

(Mr Ridley - 2 December 1980)

'The constitutional links between the UK and the Falkland Islands remain unchanged.'

(Prime Minister - 11 December 1980)

(b) New York Talks

In all three rounds of talks (April 1980, February 1981 and February 1982) the Minister who led the British delegation stressed that HMG had no doubt about our legal title to the Islands and the Dependencies.

(c) Messages to the Argentine Government

In a note delivered on 8 February 1982 (cf para 127) HM Ambassador Buenos Aires reaffirmed that the British Government were in no doubt about sovereignty. They could not accept the Argentine assumption that the purpose of the negotiations was the eventual recognition by HMG of Argentine sovereignty in the area.

20 JAN 1988

BRZ 2  
BK 3  
9  
B 4  
L 5  
G 6





MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

TELEPHONE 01-930 7022

Monday Jan 20  
1993

Dear Nigel

You will want to  
put it in your own words  
but I suggest the enclosed  
as a first draft of the  
end of your speech on fronts  
- I think for the wind up!  
Yours ever  
M.H.H.

Once the Argentinians had decided to invade the Falklands I believe this House and the whole country were united in our determination to restore the freedom of the Islanders. I have never doubted that this was right. I sought to consult and draw in the Opposition parties in the conduct of the war. But I always knew that after the war was won it was inevitable that questions would rightly be asked about the responsibility. It was inevitable and right that the issues of public concern be investigated and resolved.

I myself knew <sup>and</sup> ~~I~~ welcomed that every act and decision of mine and my government would be open to scrutiny. Indeed it is this very openness and accountability that distinguishes us from those against whom we fought.

I had therefore to agree Mr Speaker a form of enquiry. I did not - could not - seek to choose a form of enquiry other than one of absolute integrity and independence. I sought therefore one of our most distinguished public figures, Lord Franks.

The Leader of the Opposition approved his name. I suggested a distinguished ex-Permanent Secretary Sir Patrick Nairn. The Leader of the Opposition agreed his name. I suggested two Privy Councillors from each of the main political parties. The Leader of the Opposition named two distinguished Privy Councillors, one of whom sits as a member of the Shadow Cabinet and the other was a distinguished member of the last Labour government. I myself proposed two former Conservative Cabinet Ministers.

I then put forward terms of reference. These were agreed by the rt hon Gentleman the Leader of the Labour Party.

No Prime Minister has ever in any significant way gone further to open the record of their government to public scrutiny and investigation. I believed in what I had done. But I was prepared to put my record to the ultimate test. It cannot be overstated. The personalities involved and the terms of the enquiry were agreed with all parties in this House. I believe Mr Speaker that there is only one conclusion from the Franks Report.



It exonerates my government from any blame on the two issues. We could not have known of the plans for Argentina to invade. We could not have prevented the invasion. These are the conclusions - the only major conclusions of the Report. We welcome this situation. But the Opposition tonight is to reject the findings of the Report. Reject a report which their own representatives signed without reservation. Reject a report their own Privy Councillors unanimously agreed.

The party opposite, Mr Speaker, by this vote tonight is condemned beyond words. They helped to establish the enquiry. They nominated their own people. They waited for the results. They didn't like the results and so they turn now and vote against their own people.

Just think, Mr Speaker, what the Opposition tonight would be saying if the position was reversed. Just imagine, Mr Speaker, if Franks had found against me and I was standing at the dispatch box, disputing the findings, quarrelling with the conclusions, crying foul when the referee had blown the whistle.

Mr Speaker, I agreed the rules for the enquiry, I agreed the names of those that were called to sit in judgement of all that I had done. I placed my own and my government's reputation in their hands. They have exonerated us in full. I am grateful for their support.

We could not have done more.

✓ cc Sir A Parsons

Ref: A083.0194



CONFIDENTIAL

MR. BUTLER

Debate on the Franks Report

I attach draft paragraphs on the intelligence issues raised by the Franks Report, for inclusion in the Prime Minister's speech in the debate next week.

2. These paragraphs have been prepared after consultation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence.

Approved by  
Robert Armstrong  
and signed in his absence.

19th January 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

## DRAFT PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH

### Intelligence Assessments Machinery

6.1 The Franks Committee considered that the machinery within Government for intelligence assessment should be reviewed, with particular reference to two points. First, the Committee suggested that during the period leading up to the invasion of the Falkland Islands the Joint Intelligence Organisation might not have given sufficient weight to the diplomatic and other indications that the Argentine Government's position was hardening in the early months of 1982, as compared with intelligence reports which tended to be more reassuring about the prospects of an early move to any kind of military confrontation. The Franks Committee thought that there should be a look at the arrangements for bringing to the attention of the Joint Intelligence Organisation information other than intelligence reports.

6.2 Second, the Committee suggested that the independence in operation of the Joint Intelligence Committee from the Government Departments principally constituting it should be emphasised by having the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee appointed by the Prime Minister and being a full-time member of the Cabinet Office, with a more critical and independent role..

6.3 The Committee emphasised that these recommendations were aimed at correcting what, as a result of its review, it saw as possible weaknesses in the arrangements for assessing intelligence; it did not seek to attach any blame to individuals.

6.4 Mr. Speaker, these are matters which it is our custom not to discuss in public, or on the floor of the House, for obvious and very good reasons. But the Franks Committee has made these observations and suggestions, and I believe that the House would expect me on this occasion to say enough on the subject to demonstrate that we have taken those observations very seriously, and we are taking the appropriate action.

6.5 The Government has itself been reviewing the intelligence assessments machinery. We had come to certain provisional conclusions before the Franks Committee reported, but we thought it right not to take final decisions until we knew what the Committee had to say on the subject.

6.6. On the first point, it is clearly a matter for judgment by those responsible for assessment as to what relative weight should be attached to information from intelligence sources and to information from other sources. That is not a question of organisation. Organisationally what matters is that all the available and relevant information from all sources reaches those who have to make the assessments. I can assure the House that those responsible for making assessments have access to all the relevant reporting from our diplomatic posts overseas, both on the attitudes that members of our missions overseas encounter in the countries where they are serving and on media reporting in those countries on current issues of significance for British Foreign policy making. They also of course take full advantage of the product of agencies such as the BBC Monitoring Service. Our missions overseas are already aware of the importance of maintaining a full coverage on the

policies and attitudes of the governments to which they are accredited. My right hon Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is taking steps to ensure that his Department is reminded of the continuing need to make all such reports fully available to those responsible for intelligence assessment.

6.7 On the composition of the Joint Intelligence Committee itself the Franks Committee's report may give rise to some misunderstanding. Under successive Governments in recent times the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee has been a senior official of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who has combined this work with other duties in the Foreign Office; but as Chairman of the JIC he has not been responsible to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. He has been appointed with the approval of the Prime Minister, and has been responsible to the Prime Minister through the Secretary of the Cabinet. This arrangement has worked satisfactorily with a succession of chairmen.

6.8 Nonetheless we had ourselves come to a very similar conclusion to that reached by the Franks Committee. We think it right that the chairmanship of the JIC should in future be held by a member of the Cabinet Office who is able to give more time to supervising the work of the assessments machinery. I therefore intend to appoint as Chairman of the JIC someone who will be an official of the Cabinet Office and will be engaged full time on intelligence matters. He will have direct access to me, as do the heads of the security and intelligence agencies.

6.9 I also propose formally to lay on the JIC organisation a more definite responsibility to keep watch for developing situations that might threaten British interests. Hitherto it has been regarded as primarily the business of the Departments of State (particularly the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence) to identify threats and decide upon action to meet them. The changes I have in mind will not absolve the Departments from those responsibilities; but they will, I hope, enable the Joint Intelligence Organisation to be an additional source of advice to Ministers on the identification of threats and an additional spur to timely and effective decision-making on the responses to them.

6.10 Mr. Speaker, I hope that the arrangements I have described will ensure that the intelligence assessments machinery is fully provided with all relevant information, and works as effectively as possible for the purpose of identifying threats to British interests and making sure that prompt and effective consideration is given to the responses that those threats call for from Her Majesty's Government. It will continue to be the responsibility of Departments - and of course ultimately of Ministers - to decide what action should be taken, and to put it into effect.

~~SECRET~~



FILE copy

2 AH

John Coles to see  
cc Sir A Parsons

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

I attach a copy of a note of the Prime Minister's discussion with Lord Franks today. I should draw your attention particularly to the last paragraph of it. Lord Franks will, I think, be expecting you to contact him, and I am sure that the Prime Minister will welcome the opportunity to discuss with you the staffing of the Assessment Staff. We will arrange a time in the near future.

R.R.B.

19 January 1983

~~SECRET~~



SECRET

cc Sir A Parsons

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

FRANKS COMMITTEE

Lord Franks called on the Prime Minister at 11.00 am today.

The Prime Minister thanked Lord Franks warmly for the work which he and his committee had done. She said that she would write individually to members of the committee and Lord Franks encouraged this suggestion.

Lord Franks drew the Prime Minister's attention to the fact that the last sentence of the report was carefully drafted to refer to the Argentine junta's decision to invade the Falkland Islands on 2 April. He emphasised that the conclusion was directly related to that decision, and the committee had reached no conclusion about what their judgment would have been in relation to an invasion at some other time.

Lord Franks said that the members of the committee had agreed that no one would speak about the proceedings of the committee at least until after the debate and probably not ever. He himself would not speak in the Parliamentary debate, and he believed no other members of the committee would do so, except possibly Lord Lever. His own feeling was that those who produced reports should say all that they had to say in the report and then leave others to judge their conclusions.

Lord Franks said that he had been surprised at what the Prime Minister's own papers had not contained. The papers indicated to him a need for matters to be reported to the Prime Minister more acutely and with more vigour. The Prime Minister said that she shared this view and had had it very much in mind in appointing Sir Anthony Parsons and Mr Jackling to her office.

Lord Franks said that he would like to make one other point, emphasising that it did not reflect on any individual.

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- 2 -

/to deal

The member of the intelligence machinery dealing with South America, Captain Todd, had previously been in charge of a frigate off Belize. He had struck Lord Franks as a very conscientious and hard-working man, but as somebody who was not well equipped with the nuances of the material available to him. He had no experience through which he could judge the inwardness of diplomatic exchanges or of the press reports which he received. Lord Franks had felt that this part of the machinery was somewhat amateur. The Prime Minister suggested that it would be useful if Lord Franks could speak to Sir Robert Armstrong about this matter. Lord Franks said that he doubted whether he could add very much to what he had said, but would gladly talk to Sir Robert Armstrong.

F.R.B.

19 January 1983

SECRET

PERSONAL



FILE

JD

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

19 January, 1983.

Personal

Dear Tony,

Now that the Falkland Island Review has been published, I can properly write to thank each member of the Committee for the time and care which they devoted to its work.

I write with particular gratitude to you because I know what inroads the Review must have made upon the time you could devote to your other responsibilities. You will know how important I felt it was that your experience and insight should be available to the Committee, and Lord Franks, whom I saw this morning, told me how much he valued your contribution. I have now read the Report many times, and each time I am impressed by some new evidence of the meticulous care with which the Committee did its work. As you know, I regard it as particularly valuable that the Committee should have been able to reach conclusions which each of its members could accept as fair and impartial. I send you my warmest thanks.

Yours ever  
Margaret

The Rt. Hon. Lord Barber, TD.

HU

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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AJC

NO COPIES TO BE MADE WITHOUT PRIVATE SECRETARY'S APPROVAL

ILLEGAL LANDING ON SOUTH GEORGIA: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

FRIDAY 19 MARCH:

A BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY FIELD PARTY REPORT THAT AN ARGENTINE NAVY CARGO VESSEL IS ANCHORED IN LEITH HARBOUR. A PART OF ABOUT 60 ARGENTINES HAVE SET UP CAMP AND AN ARGENTINE FLAG HAS BEEN HOISTED.

SATURDAY 20 MARCH:

THE BAS FIELD PARTY INFORMS THE ARGENTINES THAT THEY HAVE LANDED ILLEGALLY AND THAT THEY MUST LEAVE.

THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE INSTRUCT HMS ENDURANCE TO PREPARE TO SAIL TO SOUTH GEORGIA WITH A DETACHMENT OF MARINES FROM PORT STANLEY.

HM AMBASSADOR BUENOS AIRES INFORMS THE ARGENTINE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THAT WE ARE TREATING THE INFRINGEMENT OF OUR SOVEREIGNTY VERY SERIOUSLY. THE ARGENTINE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IS CALLED IN TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND TOLD THE SAME. THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT PROFESS IGNORANCE BUT AGREE TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER URGENTLY.

SUNDAY 21 MARCH:

HMS ENDURANCE DEPARTS FOR SOUTH GEORGIA.

ARGENTINE MFA INFORM US THAT THE SHIP WILL LEAVE SOUTH GEORGIA SHORTLY AND THAT NO SERVICE PERSONNEL ARE INVOLVED.

MONDAY 22 MARCH:

WE RECEIVE CONFIRMATION THAT THE SHIP HAS LEFT BUT THERE ARE DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER ALL THE MEN HAVE GONE.

IN THE EVENING, BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY CONFIRM THAT ABOUT SIX MEN AND SOME EQUIPMENT REMAIN.

/ TUESDAY 23 MARCH

**SECRET** AND PERSONAL

TUESDAY 23 MARCH:

HMS ENDURANCE IS INSTRUCTED TO SAIL ON FOR SOUTH GEORGIA AND REMOVE THE MEN, IF POSSIBLE WITHOUT USING FORCE.

MR. LUCE MAKES A STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT LATER WARNS THAT USE OF HMS ENDURANCE WOULD BE GRAVELY PROVOCATIVE. THEY ARE TOLD WE WISH TO AVOID THIS IF POSSIBLE: IF THEY CAN PROPOSE AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF REMOVING THE MEN, WE ARE PREPARED TO LET THEM DO SO.

WEDNESDAY 24 MARCH:

HMS ENDURANCE ORDERED TO ANCHOR IN GRYTVIKEN HARBOUR, BUT NOT TO PROCEED TO LEITH.

ARGENTINE MFA SAY THEY WISH TO PREVENT THE SITUATION ESCALATING IF POSSIBLE, BUT NEED TIME TO CONSIDER.

THURSDAY 25 MARCH:

ARGENTINE NAVAL VESSEL IS SIGHTED AT LEITH DELIVERING FURTHER SUPPLIES.

WE ASK THE ARGENTINES FOR AN EARLY RESPONSE TO OUR REQUEST THAT THEY REMOVE THE MEN.

ARGENTINE MFA THEN SAY THAT BY DEPLOYING HMG ENDURANCE WE HAVE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO CONTAIN THEIR POSITION.

WE REPLY THAT WE WISH TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVOID CONFRONTATION AND PROPOSE THAT IF THE PARTY REQUEST THE PROPER AUTHORISATION FROM GRYTVIKEN, IT WILL BE GIVEN.

FRIDAY 26 /  
SATURDAY 27 MARCH:

NO FORMAL REPLY FROM THE ARGENTINE MFA. BUT THEY ISSUE A PRESS STATEMENT ANNOUNCING THAT THE MEN WILL BE GIVEN ALL NECESSARY PROTECTION AND THE PRESS REPORTS THAT SEVERAL ARGENTINE NAVY VESSELS HAVE BEEN ORDERED INTO THE AREA.

/ SUNDAY 28 MARCH:

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SUNDAY 28 MARCH:

ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER SENDS A MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE NO INTENTION OF AGREEING TO OUR PROPOSAL.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY SENDS A MESSAGE TO MR. HAIG, ASKING HIM TO INTERVENE AND URGE RESTRAINT ON THE ARGENTINES.

MONDAY 29 MARCH:

CONVERSATION AT NORTHOLT.

TUESDAY 30 MARCH:

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY MAKES STATEMENT IN HOUSE OF LORDS.

ARGENTINES REJECT US PROPOSAL FOR A SOLUTION BASED ON REGULARISING THE MEN'S PRESENCE.

WEDNESDAY 31 MARCH:

FOREIGN SECRETARY SENDS MESSAGE TO COSTA MENDEZ PROPOSING THE DESPATCH OF AN EMISSARY.

WE RECEIVE INFORMATION ~~~~~~~~~ THAT ARGENTINE NAVAL FORCE WILL BE GROUPING FOR PORT STANLEY ON 2 APRIL. MEETING IN PRIME MINISTER'S ROOM IN HOUSE OF COMMONS. PRIME MINISTER SENDS MESSAGE TO MR. REAGAN ASKING HIM TO INTERVENE.

THURSDAY 1 APRIL:

COSTA MENDEZ REJECTS PROPOSAL TO SEND EMISSARY AND SAYS DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL IS NOW CLOSED. ONLY REMAINING POINT OF DISCUSSION WOULD BE THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY TO ARGENTINA.

PRESIDENT REAGAN REBUFFED BY GALTIERI: SENDS MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER STATING THAT GALTIERI LEFT "THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT HE HAS EMBARKED ON A COURSE OF ARMED CONFLICT".

UN SECRETARY GENERAL SUMMONS BRITISH AND ARGENTINE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO APPEAL TO BOTH TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

OD DECIDES THAT ENDURANCE SHOULD REMAIN ON STATION IN SOUTH ATLANTIC FOR TIME BEING.

*~ Passage deleted  
and retained under  
Section 3(4).*

*Wayland  
15 January 2013*

/ BRIEF DISCUSSION

THURSDAY 1 APRIL (CONTD) BRIEF DISCUSSION IN CABINET.

AFTER RECEIVING FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT AN ARGENTINE ATTACK WAS IMMINENT, WE SEEK AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH RESULTS IN A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT CALLING ON BOTH SIDES TO REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF FORCE IN THE AREA. THE UK PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AGREES; THE ARGENTINE SAYS NOTHING.

WE UNDERTAKE INTENSIVE LOBBYING OF US AND EC COUNTRIES ASKING THEM TO INTERVENE ON OUR BEHALF.

LAST MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM FALKLANDS (2155 HRS. OUT TIME).

FOREIGN SECRETARY RETURNS FROM ISRAEL. MEETING // AT 10 DOWNING STREET.

FRIDAY 2 APRIL:

0833 - TELEGRAM SENT TO FALKLANDS

0845 - COMMUNICATIONS CEASE.

0945 - CABINET INFORMED THAT ARGENTINE INVASION IMMINENT AND THAT TASK FORCE HAD BEEN PLACED ON IMMEDIATE ALERT. DECIDE THAT NAVAL AND MILITARY PREPARATIONS SHOULD CONTINUE AS PLANNED.

1100 - THE LORD PRIVY SEAL MAKES STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE EXPRESSING HMG'S GRAVE CONCERN AT THE SITUATION.

1230 - BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY SHIP REPORTED THAT A LOCAL RADIO REPORT STATION HAD SAID THAT LANDING OPERATION HAS BEGUN.

CONFIRMATION BY MINISTRY OF DEFENCE NOT THEN AVAILABLE.

FOLLOWING FURTHER REPORTS FROM MEDIA AND OTHERS, SECOND MEETING OF CABINET DECIDES THAT NAVAL TASK FORCE SHOULD SAIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UK AND ARGENTINE BROKEN OFF.

/ BRITISH OFFICIALS

**SECRET** AND PERSONAL

FRIDAY 2 APRIL (CONTD)

BRITISH OFFICIALS AND MARINES FLOWN FROM FALKLANDS TO MONTEVIDEO.

MESSAGE FROM COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL TO ALL COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT URGING CONDEMNATION OF ARGENTINE ACTION.

MESSAGES ALSO FROM PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN SECRETARY TO WIDE RANGE OF GOVERNMENTS.

UK CALLS IMMEDIATE MEETING OF SECURITY COUNCIL.

SATURDAY 3 APRIL:

FIRST DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT. PRIME MINISTER ANNOUNCES THAT TASK FORCE WILL SAIL ON 5 APRIL, ARGENTINE BALANCES IN THE UK HAVE BEEN FROZEN, AND NEW ECGD COVER SUSPENDED.

PRESIDENT MITTERRAND TELEPHONES PRIME MINISTER. PRIME MINISTER TELEPHONES KING HUSSEIN.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL CALLS BY 10 VOTES TO 1 WITH 4 ABSTENTIONS FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL.

SUNDAY 4 APRIL:

BRITISH OFFICIALS AND MARINES EXPELLED FROM FALKLAND ISLANDS LEAVE MONTEVIDEO FOR UK.

MR. NOTT INTERVIEWED ON "WEEKEND WORLD".

WE RECEIVE CONFIRMATION THAT SOUTH GEORGIA HAS ALSO BEEN ATTACKED AND IS NOW IN ARGENTINE HANDS.

REPORTS THAT THE MARINES DEFENDING GRYTVIKEN HAVE INFLICTED CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE ON THE ARGENTINES.

WIDE RANGING DIPLOMATIC ACTION TO SECURE CONDEMNATION BY OTHER COUNTRIES OF ARGENTINE ACTION AND ALSO TO <sup>PERSUADE</sup> ~~DISSUADE~~ OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE ECONOMIC ACTION SIMILAR TO OUR OWN.

PERSUADE 7

ORDER IN COUNCIL PROVIDING FOR REQUISITIONING OF SHIPPING.

/ MONDAY 5 APRIL



**SECRET** AND PERSONAL

MONDAY 5 APRIL:

LORD CARRINGTON, MR. ATKINS AND MR. LUCE RESIGN.  
GOVERNOR, STAFF AND MARINES ARRIVE BACK IN THE  
UK. GOVERNOR AND TWO ROYAL MARINE MAJORS CALL  
ON PRIME MINISTER.

TASK FORCE DEPARTS FROM THE UK.

WIDE RANGING TRADE SANCTIONS ANNOUNCED.

BRITISH CITIZENS ADVISED TO CONSIDER LEAVING  
ARGENTINA (BBC WORLD SERVICE BROADCAST).

PRIME MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON ITN.

IN AN IMPROMPTU PRESS CONFERENCE, PRESIDENT REAGAN  
SAID THAT THE CONFRONTATION PUT THE UNITED STATES  
IN A DIFFICULT POSITION AS IT WAS FRIENDLY WITH  
BOTH COUNTRIES.

REMAINING MARINES IN FALKLANDS CAPTURED.

REQUISITIONING OF CANBERRA ANNOUNCED.

TUESDAY 6 APRIL:

PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

MR. HAIG MEETS BRITISH AND ARGENTINE AMBASSADORS  
IN WASHINGTON.

CABINET INFORMED THAT OD(SA) WOULD BE ESTABLISHED.

PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO EC COUNTRIES, US,  
CANADA, NEW ZEALAND, AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN ABOUT  
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS.

BAN ON ARGENTINE IMPORTS ANNOUNCED (CAME INTO  
EFFECT AT MIDNIGHT).

INFORMAL MEETING IN PRIME MINISTER'S ROOM IN  
HOUSE OF COMMONS ON MILITARY OPTIONS.

WEDNESDAY 7 APRIL:

SECOND DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT. CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT  
RINGS PRIME MINISTER. OD(SA) MEETS TWICE.  
MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE ANNOUNCED.

THURSDAY 8 APRIL:

MR HAIG'S FIRST VISIT TO LONDON FOR TALKS ON  
FALKLANDS SITUATION WITH PRIME MINISTER.

/ MOST OF BRITISH

**SECRET**

AND PERSONAL

THURSDAY 8 APRIL (CONTD) MOST OF BRITISH EMBASSY STAFF FROM BUENOS AIRES RETURN TO UK; ARGENTINE EMBASSY STAFF LEAVE LONDON.

OD(SA) APPROVES RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR SUBMARINES.

FRIDAY 9 APRIL:

MESSAGE FROM FALKLAND ISLANDS PUBLIC SERVANTS REQUESTING EVACUATION REACHES MONTEVIDEO.

OPERATING RIGHTS OF ARGENTINE AIRLINES SUSPENDED.

SATURDAY 10 APRIL:

EC COUNTRIES ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT TO IMPOSE BAN ON ARGENTINE IMPORTS.

MR. HAIG IN BUENOS AIRES.

MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER FROM PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO OF BRAZIL.

SUNDAY 11 APRIL:

PERUVIAN PROPOSAL FOR 72-HOUR TRUCE.

MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO MR. HAIG ("ARGENTINA IS THE AGGRESSOR").

FOREIGN SECRETARY INTERVIEWED ON WEEKEND WORLD.

MONDAY 12 APRIL:

MR. HAIG'S SECOND VISIT TO LONDON.

MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE COMES INTO EFFECT.

TUESDAY 13 APRIL:

AFTER STAYING IN LONDON OVERNIGHT, MR HAIG HAS FURTHER TALKS AT NO. 10.

ARRIVAL IN MONTEVIDEO OF CHIEF SECRETARY AND OTHERS FROM FALKLAND ISLANDS.

OAS RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS FOLLOWING ACRIMONIOUS ARGUMENT BETWEEN CARIBBEANS AND LATIN AMERICANS.

ARGENTINA BANS IMPORTS FROM EC.

WEDNESDAY 14 APRIL:

THIRD DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT.

PRIME MINISTER SPEAKS TO HAIG ABOUT LATTER'S PROPOSED STATEMENT ON "COOPERATION".

/ THURSDAY 15 APRIL:

THURSDAY 15 APRIL:

CHIEF SECRETARY AND PARTY ARRIVE IN LONDON.  
PRIME MINISTER GOES TO MOD FOR BRIEFING.  
TWO MESSAGES SENT TO HAIG, ABOUT (A) CONTENTS  
OF POSSIBLE AGREEMENT (B) ARGENTINE SUBMARINE  
MOVEMENTS.

FRIDAY 16 APRIL:

PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO MESSAGE FROM REAGAN  
STRESSES THAT ARGENTINA BROKE THE PEACE AND MUST  
WITHDRAW.

HAIG IN BUENOS AIRES.

OD(SA) APPROVES RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR TASK  
FORCE.

# CONFIDENTIAL

(FCO EDITION)

SATURDAY 17 APRIL:

IT IS LEARNT THAT THREE BRITISH JOURNALISTS HAVE BEEN MISSING IN ARGENTINA SINCE 11 APRIL.

ARGENTINES NOTIFY ICAO THAT PERMISSION WILL HAVE TO BE SOUGHT FOR OVERFLIGHTS OF ARGENTINE TERRITORY SOUTH OF PARALLEL 36S (WHICH INCLUDES THE FALKLANDS).

SUNDAY 18 APRIL:

ANDEAN PACT COUNTRIES (PERU, VENEZUELA, BOLIVIA, ECUADOR AND COLOMBIA) ANNOUNCE THAT THEY WILL INCREASE THEIR TRADE WITH ARGENTINA TO COMPENSATE FOR EFFECT OF ECONOMIC MEASURES BY EUROPEAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES.

ARGENTINE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONFIRM THAT THE THREE MISSING BRITISH JOURNALISTS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED.

ARRIVAL IN MONTEVIDEO OF 29 ROYAL MARINES AND 13 BAS PERSONNEL.

MONDAY 19 APRIL:

NORWAY BANS ARGENTINE IMPORTS.

MR. HAIG SENDS TEXT OF DRAFT AGREEMENT REACHED WITH ARGENTINES AND RETURNS TO WASHINGTON. STATEMENT ISSUED FROM NO. 10 DOWNING STREET DESCRIBES THE PROPOSALS AS 'COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT'.

SOVIETS LAUNCH SALYUT 7 SATELLITE WHICH COULD MONITOR NAVAL MOVEMENTS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

/ TUESDAY 20 APRIL

# CONFIDENTIAL

(FCO EDITION)

TUESDAY 20 APRIL:

THE 29 ROYAL MARINES AND 13 BAS PERSONNEL ARRIVE IN UK.

FURTHER PARTY OF 30, MOSTLY ODA PERSONNEL, ARRIVE IN MONTEVIDEO FROM FALKLANDS.

OAS AGREE TO HOLD FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING ON 26 APRIL.

MEETING IN BRUSSELS, THE EC MINISTERS EXPRESSED FULL SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN AND BACKED THE UN CALL FOR THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE TROOPS FROM THE FALKLANDS.

WEDNESDAY 21 APRIL:

MR. HAIG REPORTS ON UTTER IRRATIONALITY AND CHAOTIC NATURE OF PRESENT ARGENTINE LEADERSHIP.

US ASSESS THAT ON PRESENT INDICATIONS ARGENTINA WILL OBTAIN TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY FOR ACTION UNDER RIO TREATY. US TO LOBBY BEFORE MEETING DUE ON 26 APRIL.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT PASSES RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF UK POSITION.

ARGENTINE PLANE INTERCEPTED IN AIRSPACE OVER TASK FORCE.

THURSDAY 22 APRIL

SECRETARY OF STATE HAS TALKS IN WASHINGTON WITH MR. HAIG AND WITH SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE.

/ PRESIDENT GALTIERI

# CONFIDENTIAL

(FCO EDITION)

THURSDAY 22 APRIL (CONTD) PRESIDENT GALTIERI VISITS FALKLANDS.

IN A NOTE TO THE EC COUNCIL LATIN AMERICAN AMBASSADORS ACCREDITED TO THE EC PROTEST AGAINST THE COMMUNITY'S BAN ON ARGENTINE IMPORTS AND ASK THAT THE MEASURE BE REVOKED.

FRIDAY 23 APRIL:

MR. DENIS HEALEY CALLS ON UN SECRETARY-GENERAL.

MESSAGE COMMUNICATED THROUGH THE SWISS EMBASSY TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WARNING THAT ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT APPROACHING TASK FORCE VESSELS WILL BE TREATED AS HOSTILE.

SATURDAY 24 APRIL:

S OF S RETURNS TO UK FROM WASHINGTON.

SUNDAY 25 APRIL:

ARGENTINE SUBMARINE ATTACKED OFF GRYTVIKEN, SOUTH GEORGIA, BY 2 BRITISH HELICOPTERS.

BRITISH FORCES LAND IN SOUTH GEORGIA AND SUCCESSFULLY TAKE CONTROL OF GRYTVIKEN.

ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER COSTA MENDEZ SAYS IN NEW YORK THAT ARGENTINA AND THE UK ARE NOW "TECHNICALLY" AT WAR.

MONDAY 26 APRIL:

ARGENTINE CONTINGENT AT LEITH HARBOUR, SOUTH GEORGIA SURRENDER.

ARGENTINE PRISONER SHOT DEAD ON SOUTH GEORGIA BY ROYAL MARINE.

/ OAS MEETING

# CONFIDENTIAL

(FCO EDITION)

MONDAY 26 APRIL (CONTD) OAS MEETING CONVENED. ARGENTINE REPRESENTATIVE CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF UK FORCES AND SUSPENSION OF ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST HER, BUT NO CALL FOR OAS SANCTIONS. HAIG MAKES FULL SPEECH.

TUESDAY 27 APRIL: MR. HAIG PASSES TEXT OF PROPOSALS TO ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, TELLING THEM THAT HE MUST HAVE AN ANSWER, ACCEPTING OR REJECTING THEM, BY MIDNIGHT BUENOS AIRES TIME ON 27/28 APRIL.

WEDNESDAY 28 APRIL: OAS ADOPT RESOLUTION BY 17-0-4 WHICH RECOGNIZES ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY BUT INSISTS THAT SCR 502 MUST BE OBSERVED. NO CALL FOR SANCTIONS.

INFORMATION RELEASED ABOUT DEATH OF ARGENTINE OFFICER ON SOUTH GEORGIA.

TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE ANNOUNCED (COMES INTO OPERATION ON 30 APRIL).

THURSDAY 29 APRIL: FURTHER DEBATE ON FALKLANDS IN PARLIAMENT. DETAILS OF 151 ARGENTINE MILITARY PERSONNEL AND 39 FOREIGN CIVILIANS CAPTURED ON S. GEORGIA RECEIVED AND PASSED TO APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES.

LETTER FROM COSTA MENDEZ TO HAIG STATING THAT US PROPOSALS FALL SHORT OF ARGENTINE DEMANDS AND DO NOT SATISFY ARGENTINE ASPIRATIONS IN RELATION TO SOVEREIGNTY AND AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION.

ARGENTINA DECLARES TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE.

/ FRIDAY 30 APRIL

# CONFIDENTIAL

(FCO EDITION)

FRIDAY 30 APRIL:

THE BRITISH TOTAL EXCLUSION-ZONE COMES INTO FORCE AT 1100 GMT. US SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG PUBLICLY ANNOUNCES US GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR THE UK IN THE FORM OF A BAN ON ARMS SALES TO ARGENTINA AND FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS ON THAT COUNTRY. IN ADDITION THE US WILL RESPOND POSITIVELY TO UK REQUESTS FOR MATERIAL SUPPORT.

SATURDAY 1 MAY:

AIRFIELDS ON THE ISLANDS BOMBED.  
TASK FORCE LATER COMES UNDER AERIAL ATTACK:  
ARGENTINES LOSE 3 AIRCRAFT.

SECRETARY OF STATE FLIES TO WASHINGTON.

SUNDAY 2 MAY:

SECRETARY OF STATE CALLS ON UN SECRETARY-GENERAL.

MONDAY 3 MAY:

BRITISH SUBMARINE TORPEDOES ARGENTINE CRUISER,  
WHICH LATER SINKS.

ARGENTINE PATROL VESSEL FIRES ON BRITISH  
HELICOPTER AND IS SUNK BY OTHERS.

SECRETARY OF STATE RETURNS FROM NEW YORK.

TUESDAY 4 MAY:

SECRETARY OF STATE AND MR. NOTT MAKE STATEMENTS  
IN THE HOUSE.

/ MOD STATEMENT



# CONFIDENTIAL

(FCO EDITION)

TUESDAY 4 MAY (CONTD)

MOD STATEMENT ON THE LOSS OF HMS SHEFFIELD AND ONE SEA HARRIER FOLLOWED BY FURTHER STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE BY MR. NOTT.

WEDNESDAY 5 MAY

REVISED VERSION OF US/PERUVIAN PROPOSALS FOR CEASEFIRE AND SETTLEMENT SENT TO SECRETARY OF STATE BY MR. HAIG. UK RESPONDS WITH SOME SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS. PROPOSALS SENT TO PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT FOR TRANSMISSION TO ARGENTINA.

- INFORMAL SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS.
- UN SECRETARY-GENERAL ANNOUNCES THAT ARGENTINA HAS ACCEPTED HIS 'PROPOSALS', I.E., THE IDEAS DISCUSSED WITH MR. PYM ON 2 MAY.
- SECRETARY OF STATE AND MR. NOTT MAKE STATEMENTS IN THE HOUSE.

THURSDAY 6 MAY

MR. HAIG AND, LATER, THE PERUVIAN PRESIDENT, THROUGH HMA LIMA, INFORM HMG THAT THE US/PERUVIAN PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN OVERTAKEN BY ARGENTINA'S APPROACH TO UN SECRETARY-GENERAL.

- SIR ANTHONY PARSONS DELIVERS HMG'S RESPONSE TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE.
- MOD RELEASE STATEMENT CONCERNING THE LOSS OF TWO BRITISH SEA-HARRIERS.
- INFORMAL SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS.
- MR. HAIG SENDS MESSAGE TO NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS ABOUT US/PERUVIAN PROPOSALS REJECTED BY ARGENTINA.

FRIDAY 7 MAY

STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE BY MR. PYM.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

FRIDAY 7 MAY (CONTD)

BRITISH GOVERNMENT INTRODUCES 12-MILE BLOCKADE OF ARGENTINE COAST. SR ROS OFFERS AMPLIFICATION TO SECRETARY-GENERAL OF ARGENTINA'S REPLY TO HIS PROPOSALS.

- ARGENTINE NOTE TO ICRC ACCUSING BRITAIN OF NEGLECTING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.

SATURDAY 8 MAY

SECRETARY-GENERAL SEEKS CLARIFICATION FROM BOTH SIDES TO HIS PROPOSALS.

SATURDAY/SUNDAY  
8/9 MAY

INFORMAL MEETING OF EC FOREIGN MINISTERS AT VILLERS-LE-TEMPLE, BELGIUM. NO DECISION ON RENEWAL OF EC SANCTIONS.

SUNDAY 9 MAY

MOD STATEMENT ON ATTACK ON MILITARY TARGETS AT PORT STANLEY AND SURRENDER OF ARGENTINE FISHING VESSEL.

- SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN UN SECRETARY-GENERAL AND BOTH PARTIES TO FIND BASIS OF AGREEMENT CONTINUE.

MONDAY 10 MAY

HMG ISSUES NOTICE TO AIRMEN ESTABLISHING A TERMINAL CONTROL AREA FOR AIR TRAFFIC WITHIN A 100-MILE RADIUS OF ASCENSION ISLAND.

- MR. PYM APPEARS BEFORE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SELECT COMMITTEE.
- FURTHER ROUND OF SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN UN SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE PARTIES.

TUESDAY 11 MAY

MOD STATEMENT ON NAVAL ENGAGEMENT WITH A 'SURFACE VESSEL' WITHIN THE TEZ; 'LARGE EXPLOSION' REPORTED IN THE VICINITY OF THE TARGET.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

TUESDAY 11 MAY (CONTD)

ARGENTINE JUNTA ISSUES COMMUNIQUE No.40 WARNING THAT BRITISH SHIPS SAILING THROUGH SOUTH ATLANTIC TOWARDS 'AREA OF OPERATIONS' WILL BE CONSIDERED HOSTILE AND TREATED ACCORDINGLY. FOLLOWED BY COMMUNIQUE No.41 APPLYING SIMILAR PROVISIONS TO AIRCRAFT.

- FURTHER ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN UN SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE PARTIES. SR PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAYS HE IS 'RATHER ENCOURAGED' BY LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. ARGENTINIANS TALK OF NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PREJUDGEMENT OF THE OUTCOME.

WEDNESDAY 12 MAY

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ISSUE TWO STATEMENTS ABOUT ARGENTINE AIR ATTACKS ON TASK FORCE: 2 ARGENTINE A4 AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN - NO BRITISH CASUALTIES.

- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ADOPTING RESOLUTION REAFFIRMING CONDEMNATION OF ARGENTINE FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT SC RESOLUTION 502 AND INVITING EC FOREIGN MINISTERS TO RENEW SANCTIONS.
- MORE DISCUSSIONS IN NEW YORK BETWEEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE PARTIES.

THURSDAY 13 MAY

188 ARGENTINE PRISONERS CAPTURED ON SOUTH GEORGIA HANDED OVER TO ICRC AT ASCENSION ISLAND; FLOWN TO MONTEVIDEO FOR RETURN BY SEA TO ARGENTINA. LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER ASTIZ DETAINED AT ASCENSION ISLAND.

- MOD STATEMENT ABOUT CRASH OF THIRD ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT IN SEA DURING ATTACK ON TASK FORCE ON 12 MAY.
- DEBATE ON FALKLANDS CRISIS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

FRIDAY 14 MAY

INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS AT UN. TALKS BETWEEN UN SECRETARY-GENERAL AND PARTIES CONTINUE.

- M. CHEYSSON SEES SECRETARY OF STATE IN LONDON.
- PORT STANLEY AIRFIELD AND ASSOCIATED MILITARY INSTALLATIONS ATTACKED BY SEA HARRIERS, AND PEBBLE ISLAND RAIDED.

SATURDAY 15 MAY

SIR A. PARSONS AND SIR N. HENDERSON RECALLED FOR DISCUSSIONS.

- POLITICAL COMMITTEE OF THE TEN, MEETING IN BRUSSELS, AGREE TO REFER DECISION ON RENEWING EC SANCTIONS TO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN LUXEMBOURG ON 16 MAY.

SUNDAY 16 MAY

SIR A. PARSONS AND SIR N. HENDERSON AT CHEQUERS. SECRETARY OF STATE MEETS MR. HAIG IN LUXEMBOURG BEFORE START OF NATO MEETING.

- EMERGENCY MEETING OF EC FOREIGN MINISTERS IN LUXEMBOURG. NO DECISION ON RENEWAL OF SANCTIONS. FURTHER MEETING PROPOSED FOR 17 MAY.
- MOD STATEMENT ON SEA HARRIER ATTACKS ON 2 ARGENTINE VESSELS IN FALKLAND SOUND. NO FIRM INDICATIONS OF DAMAGE CAUSED.

MONDAY 17 MAY

SIR A. PARSONS HANDS OVER TEXT TO UN SECRETARY-GENERAL SETTING OUT HMG'S FINAL NEGOTIATING POSITION.

- AT EC FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN LUXEMBOURG, EIGHT MEMBER STATES AGREE TO EXTEND SANCTIONS REGULATION FOR SEVEN DAYS. ITALY AND IRELAND WILL NOT APPLY REGULATION, BUT UNDERTAKE NOT TO ALLOW IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA DURING THAT PERIOD. DENMARK WILL CONTINUE TO APPLY

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

MONDAY 17 MAY (CONTD) REGULATION PENDING INTRODUCTION OF EQUIVALENT NATIONAL MEASURES.

TUESDAY 18 MAY LOSS OF UK SEA KING HELICOPTER REPORTED; DITCHED IN SEA: ACCIDENT RATHER THAN MILITARY ACTION: ALL FOUR CREW MEMBERS RESCUED,

- NATO SECRETARY-GENERAL REPORTS ROBUST SUPPORT OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS, MEETING IN LUXEMBOURG, FOR UK POSITION.
- UN SECRETARY-GENERAL RECEIVES INITIAL ARGENTINE RESPONSE TO HMG'S FINAL POSITION PAPER.

WEDNESDAY 19 MAY TEXT OF ARGENTINE REPLY TO OUR PROPOSALS HANDED OVER BY UN SECRETARIAT. SECURITY COUNCIL MEETS INFORMALLY TO HEAR A REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. SECRETARY-GENERAL IN A LAST MINUTE BID TO AVERT A BREAKDOWN OF NEGOTIATIONS PRESENTS AN AIDE-MEMOIRE TO THE UK AND ARGENTINE GOVERNMENTS SETTING OUT HIS PROPOSALS TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS IN NEGOTIATIONS.

- DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION ADOPTS RESOLUTION URGING MEMBER STATES TO SUPPORT IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502 AND SEEK PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTE.

THURSDAY 20 MAY SECRETARY-GENERAL DECLARES THAT HIS PEACE EFFORTS HAD COME TO AN END. ARGENTINA FAILS TO RESPOND TO HIS AIDE-MEMOIRE.

- HMG RELEASES DETAILS OF THEIR FINAL POSITION ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE.
- PRESIDENT OF PERU HANDS TO THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR A NEW PEACE FORMULA.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# CONFIDENTIAL

FRIDAY 21 MAY

PERUVIAN PRESIDENT IS THANKED FOR HIS EFFORTS BUT TOLD THAT CONSIDERABLE MOVEMENT ON BEHALF OF ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WILL BE NECESSARY BEFORE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT CAN BE REACHED.

- MINISTRY OF DEFENCE RELEASES NEWS OF BRITISH LANDING ON EAST FALKLAND AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BRIDGEHEAD.
- UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETS BUT NO RESOLUTION IS CONSIDERED.

SATURDAY 22 MAY

UN SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE CONTINUES BUT NO DRAFT RESOLUTION IS YET TABLED.

- THE TASK FORCE CONTINUES TO CONSOLIDATE THE BRIDGEHEAD AROUND SAN CARLOS WATER. NO ENEMY ACTION REPORTED.
- THE POPE SENDS A MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE.
- THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL REAFFIRMS ITS SUPPORT FOR THE BRITISH POSITION.
- THE PRESIDENTS OF COLOMBIA AND DOMINICA BOTH SEND MESSAGES TO THE PRIME MINISTER. THE PERUVIAN PRESIDENT ANNOUNCES THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE ACCEPTED HIS PEACE PROPOSALS. THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO PUBLICLY APPEALS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE.

SUNDAY 23 MAY

UN SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE CONTINUES.

- ARGENTINE AIR ATTACKS ON SHIPS IN THE FALKLAND SOUND AND SAN CARLOS WATER SUCCEED IN SEVERELY DAMAGING HMS ANTELOPE. SIX ARGENTINE PLANES ARE SHOT DOWN.
- THE PRIME MINISTER REPLIES TO THE POPE'S MESSAGE.

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

MONDAY 24 MAY

UN SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE CONTINUES. A RASH OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS EMERGE. THOSE OF IRELAND AND PANAMA ARE UNACCEPTABLE. A NAM AMENDED VERSION OF THE IRISH DRAFT AND A JAPANESE DRAFT OFFER POSSIBILITIES OF AVOIDING A VETO. THE BRAZILIANS CIRCULATE A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, BUILDING ON THEIR PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE.

- EC MINISTERS AGREE TO EXTEND THE BAN ON ARGENTINE IMPORTS INDEFINITELY.
- HMS ANTELOPE SINKS AND FURTHER ARGENTINE AIR ATTACKS CAUSE SOME DAMAGE TO OUR SHIPS. EIGHT ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT ARE SHOT DOWN.

TUESDAY 25 MAY

UN SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE CONTINUES. IRISH DRAFT RESOLUTION (AS AMENDED BY NAM AND UK) IS LIKELY TO BE PUT TO THE VOTE ON 26 MAY AFTER FURTHER ARGENTINE CONSIDERATION OF THE TEXT.

- THE NORWEGIAN BAN ON ARGENTINE IMPORTS IS TO REMAIN IN FORCE INDEFINITELY.
- MOD PRESS STATEMENTS THAT THREE ARGENTINE PLANES WERE DOWNED AND THAT ONE OF OUR SHIPS IS IN DIFFICULTY.

WEDNESDAY 26 MAY

UNSCR 505 (AN AMENDED VERSION OF THE IRISH DRAFT) IS ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY.

- MOD PRESS STATEMENT ON THE LOSS OF HMS COVENTRY AND THE ATLANTIC CONVEYOR IN ATTACKS ON 25 MAY.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

WEDNESDAY 26 MAY (CONTD) MR. NOTT MAKES STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

- COLOMBIAN AMBASSADOR DELIVERS ORAL MESSAGE TO FCO ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENTS OF COLOMBIA, BRAZIL AND PERU PROPOSING A 5-DAY TRUCE.

THURSDAY 27 MAY

MOD PRESS STATEMENT THAT THE ONLY MILITARY DEVELOPMENT ON 26 MAY WAS A HARRIER RAID AGAINST PORT STANLEY AIRFIELD.

- RIO TREATY MEETING DUE TO BEGIN IN WASHINGTON LATER TODAY.

**CONFIDENTIAL**



para 19

March 61

would be launch attack

- but multilateral party - obtaining further -  
their attitude of Arg Gov. could change  
radically.

para 32

End 1973

though Arg. attitude

Leadership - Person might be

proposing contingency plans for occup?

Advancements of staff main thrust

of kind which not ruled out.

para 40

Nov 75

Arg. would be launch invasion

in near future

political pressures would intensify

"deliberately  
planned invasion  
of the Falkland  
Islands in near  
future still seemed  
unlikely but could  
not be wholly  
excluded."

not excluded

Physical aggression

U.S. 8 Jan 1976

"physical aggression a remote possibility but  
could not be excluded."

Jan 22 1976

Army of Arg

consideration of current

military action that might help

South Pacific

regions to stay in power

South Pacific - then

para 42

R.R.S. Shackleton

likelihood of advertisement  
"military operations received a new  
impetus from the Falkland Islands  
incident"

operation in recent  
months - possibly but as  
proceeds must be regarded  
as that - must remain  
shaky to help

pressure on Arg to negotiate.. Arg. commander

opposed to invasion - policy of control pin-pricks

para 50

July 76 - rearmament in view of military cooperation

March - Concluded Argentine military high

expedition of resolutions - if there started

initially to U.N. (Dec 1976. U.N. res 4012

102 + 1 (all) 32 abstentions

para 54

27 Jan 1977

- Arg. Intelligence on British reaction to

Southern Shetlands. Further intelligence joint and joint  
on any invasion contingency plan of U.N. withdrawal

*Assessment of Argentine threat*

19. In March 1965, the Joint Intelligence Committee<sup>(1)</sup> had re-assessed the external threat to the Falkland Islands and Dependencies. It considered that it was unlikely that the Argentine Government would launch an assault against the Islands, but that, if an unofficial party of raiders were able to obtain a footing on the Falklands, the attitude of the Argentine Government might change radically and rapidly under pressure of public opinion.

*First diplomatic exchanges*

20. The Argentine claim to the Islands was raised with the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Michael Stewart (as he then was), when he visited Buenos Aires in January 1966, and in July a preliminary meeting was held in London, at which the Argentine Ambassador submitted a note formally claiming the "restitution" of the Falkland Islands to Argentina. The British delegation rejected the implication that Britain's occupation of the Islands was illegal, but there was agreement that there should be detailed examination at a later date of ways of decreasing friction and of limiting the scale of the dispute.

*'Operation Condor'*

21. In September 1966 a further unofficial incident, known as 'Operation Condor', took place. An armed group of 20 young Argentines hijacked an Argentine Airlines DC4 and forced it to go to the Falklands, where it landed on the race-course at Port Stanley. As in 1964, the Argentine Government publicly dissociated themselves from the incident, but there were demonstrations throughout Argentina in support of the Argentine claim to the Islands, and shots were fired at the British Embassy in Buenos Aires while the Duke of Edinburgh was on an official visit there. In the light of the 'Condor' incident, the Royal Marine detachment on the Islands, which had been established in 1965 but reduced to one officer and five men in 1966, was restored to platoon strength. Although consideration was subsequently given from time to time to its withdrawal, it was retained at that level thereafter.

*The 'Memorandum of Understanding'*

22. Further talks were held in November 1966, and in 1967. In a paper to the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee<sup>(2)</sup> in preparation for the talks in November 1966, the Foreign and Colonial Secretaries (Mr. George Brown and Mr. Fred Lee (as they then were)) pointed out that Argentina could easily occupy the Islands by force. At the talks the British side initially proposed a 'sovereignty freeze' for a minimum of 30 years, to allow for normalisation of relations between the Islands and Argentina while each side's position on sovereignty was protected. At the end of this period the Islanders would be free to choose between British and Argentine rule. The Argentine Government rejected this proposal, and in March 1967 the British Government for the first time stated formally to Argentina that they would be prepared to cede sovereignty over the Islands under certain conditions.

<sup>(1)</sup> For a description of the role and composition of the Joint Intelligence Committee see Annex B.

<sup>(2)</sup> For a description of the composition and functions of the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee see Annex B. For the sake of brevity we refer to it as the Defence Committee.

### Condominium

29. Further exchanges followed, in which the Argentine Government pressed strongly for renewed negotiations on sovereignty while the British Government sought to establish that the talks did not constitute negotiations on that issue. In the course of 1973, however, it became clear that an impasse had been reached. Argentina again took the issue to the United Nations, where the Special Committee adopted a resolution, which formed the basis of a further Resolution (3160(XXVIII)) passed by the General Assembly calling on both parties to accelerate negotiations towards a solution of the sovereignty issue. In January 1974 the Defence Committee agreed that, in view of the pressure in the United Nations to reach a settlement and the risks of economic and military action against the Islands, the likely attitude of the Islanders to the possibility of condominium as an alternative to a transfer of sovereignty should be discussed with the Governor of the Falkland Islands. The Governor and the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires advised that in their opinion the idea was worth pursuing. Before this could be done, the General Election of March 1974 led to a change of Government. A Labour Government took office, with Mr. Wilson (as he then was) as Prime Minister and Mr. Callaghan as Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

30. The new Government, having been presented with a range of options, decided in the Defence Committee to consult the Falkland Islands Executive Council on the possibility of initiating talks with Argentina on condominium. The Council indicated that it would raise no objection to talks on condominium going ahead, provided that there was no Islander participation initially. The subject of condominium was broached with the Argentine Government; but, in the face of the Islanders' continuing refusal to participate, it was decided that there would be no purpose in proceeding without them, and the Argentine Government were so informed in August 1974. Despite this setback, further commercial agreements were concluded in September 1974, the most important being one providing for *Yacimientos Petroliferos*, the Argentine State Oil Company, to supply certain petroleum products on the Islands at mainland prices.

### Increased Argentine pressure

31. In December 1974 an Argentine newspaper, *Cronica*, mounted a press campaign advocating invasion of the Islands. The Argentine Government publicly dissociated themselves from it, their Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sr. Vignes, informing Congress that he preferred negotiation to invasion. Nevertheless, following remarks made by Sr. Vignes to the press in March 1975, a few days before the arrival of the new British Ambassador in Buenos Aires, the Ambassador was instructed to warn him that an attack on the Islands would meet with a military response. The British Ambassador delivered this warning to Sr. Vignes in April 1975, at his first meeting with him.

### Intelligence assessments

32. Over the period from 1965 to 1975 assessments were made by the Joint Intelligence Committee, usually about once a year but more frequently at times of increased tension. In the earlier years the conclusions were, broadly speaking, that official military action against the Falkland Islands

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and the Dependencies was unlikely, at least until diplomatic means of settling the dispute had been exhausted, but that there was a continuing risk of unofficial action. In the early 1970s, when the Communications Agreements had led to improved relations with Argentina, the assessments were that direct military action could be discounted and that even the risk of an 'adventurist' operation was very slight. Towards the end of 1973 it was thought that Argentine attitudes were hardening, and for the first time there were indications that the Argentine Government (of President Peron) might be preparing contingency plans for an occupation of the Islands. In 1974 the Joint Intelligence Committee assessed that 'adventurist' operations were still the main threat, but with less likelihood of the Argentine Government's discouraging them; official military action was thought unlikely, as long as Argentina believed that the British Government were prepared to negotiate on sovereignty, but it was not ruled out.

### **Increased tension 1975-1977**

#### *Economic development*

33. The next British initiative was a proposal, approved by the Defence Committee in July 1975, for discussions of joint Anglo-Argentine development of the resources of the South-West Atlantic. In response to this proposal Sr. Vignes suggested linking such an initiative to the possibility of a transfer of sovereignty followed by simultaneous leaseback for a period of years, as a means of settling the dispute. He also proposed that Argentina should occupy the uninhabited islands of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and that the occupation should be accepted without condemnation by the British Government. Sr. Vignes was warned that any such unilateral action would be quite unacceptable. The Argentine Government rejected the Government's proposal for talks on economic co-operation, which they saw as excluding discussion of the sovereignty issue.

#### *The Shackleton survey*

34. As a result of growing concern about the decline of the Falkland Islands' economy and the Islands' loss of population, the Government commissioned a comprehensive, long-term economic survey, under the leadership of Lord Shackleton, of the possibilities for the development of the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies. The terms of reference for the survey were drawn up in consultation with the Falkland Islands Executive Council and were announced in October 1975. This provoked a very hostile reaction in Argentina. The Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a *communiqué* stating that the survey was an unwelcome initiative, to which Argentina had not agreed. The survey went ahead and the Shackleton Report was published in May 1976 (see paragraph 58 for the Government's response to it).

#### *Argentine action at the United Nations*

35. On 8 December 1975 the Argentine Representative at the United Nations made a long speech on the dispute at a plenary session of the General Assembly, in which he said:

"We are prepared to continue our efforts, but the limits of our patience and tolerance should not be underestimated if we should have to face an obstinate and unjustified refusal to negotiate by the other party".

*Cronica* the previous year. A further report a week later stated that the storm that had blown up at the beginning of the month had at last begun to abate; there were indications that the Argentine Government had not wished to allow the "anti-British bandwagon" to get out of control; there had been no threats or demonstrations against the Embassy.

39. Mr. Callaghan made a statement in the Commons on 14 January 1976<sup>(1)</sup> in conciliatory terms concluding that "given goodwill on both sides, Britain and Argentina should be able to transform the area of dispute concerning sovereignty over the Islands into a factor making for co-operation between the two countries which would be consonant with the wishes and interests of the Falkland Islanders".

1.A *Intelligence reports and assessments*

40. In November 1975 the Joint Intelligence Committee had prepared a new assessment on the Falkland Islands. It concluded that a deliberately planned invasion of the Falkland Islands in the near future still seemed unlikely but could not be wholly excluded. It followed earlier assessments in judging that there was a greater possibility of some kind of 'adventurist' operation, particularly if the Shackleton survey went ahead in the face of continued public Argentine opposition: this opposition might be expressed by a propaganda campaign and possibly some practical harassment of the Falkland Islanders; the suspension of the air service would be an easy measure for Argentina to take.

1A 41. In a further assessment on 8 January 1976 the Joint Intelligence Committee concluded that Argentina was unlikely to launch a sudden invasion in the near future, but that the likelihood had increased of the Argentine Government's intensifying political pressures and taking specific measures, such as the recall of Ambassadors and the suspension of the air service. It concluded that physical aggression remained a remoter prospect, but certainly could not be excluded. On 22 January 1976 a further assessment was prepared of the events leading up to the withdrawal of Ambassadors. It judged that the army and navy commanders were against any military action which might help Sra. Peron's régime to stay in power; and noted that an Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs announcement on 8 January that the Argentine Government were going ahead immediately with the extension of the airstrip suggested that they did not wish, at least for the time being, to interfere with communications. It assessed, however, that, although there might be a short lull, further counter-measures against British interests, in the form of more hostile political and economic pressure, were possible in due course. The likelihood of an 'adventurist' operation had increased. The assessment concluded that military operations remained a more remote possibility but, as the sequence of counter-measures proceeded, must be regarded as that much nearer. An intelligence report of 23 January 1976 referring to a meeting in December 1975 indicated that the armed forces commanders had at that stage ruled out invasion.

RRS Shackleton

42. In December 1975 the British Naval *Attaché* in Buenos Aires had been warned by the Chief of the Argentine Naval Staff that the

<sup>(1)</sup> *Official Report*, House of Commons, 14 January 1976, Cols. 391-397.



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45. In February 1976, in view of the increasing risk of hostile action by Argentina, Mr. Mason agreed to a proposal from Mr. Callaghan for the deployment to the area of a frigate with Royal Fleet Auxiliary<sup>(1)</sup> support.

46. In the same month, with a view to discussion in the Defence Committee, Mr. Callaghan asked Mr. Mason for "a full and up-to-date military assessment on possible military options and limitations" considering the range of possible deployments in a number of eventualities, including a determined Argentine assault intended to eject the British garrison. A paper on military options to counter possible Argentine actions was approved by the Chiefs of Staff on 19 February 1976 and circulated as an annex to a paper for the Defence Committee.

COF 47. The Chief of Staffs paper drew attention to the fact that air reinforcement was ruled out by the limitations of the airstrip at Port Stanley; the adverse weather conditions there; its distance from Ascension Island; and the likely unavailability of South American airfields in the event of a conflict. To dislodge Argentine occupation of part of the Falkland Islands or the Dependencies would require an amphibious force with embarked troops. It would not be practicable to provide, transport and support the force necessary in the Islands to ensure that a determined Argentine attempt to eject the British garrison was unsuccessful. To recover the Islands by military means, though far from impossible, would be a major operation at very long range. The least force for this purpose would be of Brigade Group strength, the transport of which would entail the use of all the Navy's amphibious resources, a sizeable Task Force, including HMS Ark Royal, and substantial logistic support.

#### Resumption of negotiations

48. In the light of the deterioration of relations with Argentina, and the agreement in principle reached between Mr. Rowlands and the Argentine Foreign Minister in New York, Mr. Callaghan decided to undertake a major review of policy. In March 1976 the Defence Committee and the Cabinet approved his proposals for a fresh dialogue on all aspects of the dispute, both the possibilities of Anglo-Argentine economic co-operation in the South West Atlantic and "the nature of a hypothetical future constitutional relationship".

49. Once Argentina had been informed that the Government were prepared to resume negotiations, including discussion of sovereignty, the threat of military action receded. Exploratory talks with Argentina were held in confidence at official level in July and August 1976. By then, following a coup on 23 March 1976, Argentina was under the rule of a military Junta, which, with changes in membership, remained in power.

1.A 50. In July 1976 the Joint Intelligence Committee assessed the Argentine political situation in the light of events since the military coup in March. On the Falklands it concluded that Argentina might have unduly high expectations of the current negotiations. If these were dashed, it could be expected to return to a more aggressive approach, initially in the United Nations. It assessed, however, that it was most unlikely that the Argentine Government would react by taking military action against

(1) A Royal Fleet Auxiliary is a civilian manned Royal Navy support vessel.

the Islands. This assessment derived from intelligence that it was the view of President Videla and others that, if it proved impossible to reach a solution through bilateral negotiations, Argentina would be obliged to seek a solution via the United Nations.

#### *Further Argentine activity at the United Nations*

51. In December 1976 the United Nations General Assembly passed another Resolution (31/49 (XXXI)) approving a further report of the Special Committee; expressing "its gratitude for the continuous efforts made by the Government of Argentina . . . to facilitate the process of decolonization and to promote the well-being of the population of the Islands"; and requesting the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to expedite the negotiations and to report to the Secretary-General and to the General Assembly as soon as possible on the results. The Resolution was passed by 102 votes to one (the United Kingdom) with 32 abstentions.

#### *Southern Thule*

52. On 20 December 1976 a helicopter from HMS Endurance discovered the existence of an Argentine military presence on Southern Thule in the South Sandwich Islands. An intelligence report indicated that the presence was probably established the previous month with the approval of the Naval Commander-in-Chief. On 5 January 1977 the Argentine *Chargé d'Affaires* in London was summoned to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and asked by the head of the Latin America Department to explain the Argentine presence. At the same time the British *Chargé d'Affaires* in Buenos Aires was instructed to seek an explanation from the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

53. On 14 January 1977 the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered a communication to the British *Chargé d'Affaires* in the form of a *bout de papier* claiming that the purpose of the operation was to establish a station with a view to scientific investigation within the jurisdiction of Argentine sovereignty and expressing the hope that nothing would cloud the "auspicious perspectives" for negotiations. The *bout de papier* also stated that the station's permanency would depend on the practicability of the tasks undertaken, although the official delivering it hinted that it would not be permanent. A formal protest was delivered on 19 January 1977 stating that the British Government considered the establishment of the scientific station, without prior reference to the British authorities, a violation of British sovereignty; pointing out that the British Government were entitled to expect that the Argentine Government would have approached them before taking action; and expressing the hope that they would learn that the scientific programme was being terminated. The British Government took no steps to make public the Argentine presence on Southern Thule, which did not become known in the United Kingdom until May 1978.

54. It became clear later in the month that the Argentine presence was larger than the *bout de papier* had indicated. On 27 January 1977 intelligence indicated that the original intention had been to announce the existence of the base in mid or late March, when it was too late for

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British ships to enter South Atlantic waters. The Argentine expectation had been that the British reaction would have been stronger. If the Argentine personnel had been captured, the British Antarctic Survey party on South Georgia would have been taken off as a reprisal. According to further intelligence, there was an Argentine Navy contingency plan for a joint air force and navy invasion of the Falkland Islands combined with a diplomatic initiative at the United Nations.

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55. The Joint Intelligence Committee assessed the situation on 31 January 1977. It thought it unlikely that the establishment of an Argentine presence on Southern Thule could have been mounted without the approval of the Junta and judged that the Argentine Government's intentions were:

- (i) to make a physical demonstration of Argentine sovereignty over the Dependencies;
- (ii) to probe the British Government's reaction to such a demonstration; and
- (iii) to obtain a bargaining counter in the forthcoming discussions.

→ The assessment concluded that the Argentine Government were unlikely to order withdrawal until it suited them to do so and, depending on the British Government's actions in the situation, could be encouraged to attempt further military action against British interests in the area. ←

56. On 7 February 1977 intelligence indicated that the Argentine Navy's contingency plans had been shelved for the time being, on the ground that, although an occupation would have had much to commend it for internal political reasons, Argentina could not count on the support of the Third World or the Communist Bloc.

57. On 14 February 1977 *Ultima Clave*, a Buenos Aires weekly political news-sheet, published an article about the occupation of an "island" (Southern Thule) in the South Sandwich Islands. Argentina maintained a presence there and it was still in occupation at the time of the invasion of the Falkland Islands.

Announcement of resumption of negotiations

58. On 2 February 1977 in a statement to Parliament<sup>(1)</sup> the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Crosland, announced the Government's decision that "the time has come to consider both with the Islanders and the Argentine Government whether a climate exists for discussing the broad issues which bear on the future of the Falkland Islands, and the possibilities of co-operation between Britain and Argentina in the region of the South West Atlantic". He made it clear that in any discussions the Government would reserve their position on sovereignty; that any changes which might be proposed must be acceptable to the Islanders; and that there must be full consultation with the Islanders at every stage. In the same statement, Mr. Crosland announced the Government's conclusions on the recommendations in the Shackleton Report. He said that a number of further studies would be set up, but the Government were not prepared to accept the more costly recommendations, notably the enlargement of the airport and lengthening of the runway. Mr. Crosland reported

<sup>(1)</sup> Official Report, House of Commons, 2 February 1977, Cols. 550-561.

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Avj. gov't interests 31 Jan 1977

• prob British gov't's reaction to  
demonstration of physical sovereignty -  
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Assessment concluded - Brj. Gov. unlikely to order  
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PUNITIVE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST BRITISH INTERESTS"

56. 7 Feb 1977 - Invasion Plans Sketched

- would be counter-attack of 3rd world  
on Communist bloc.

63. 11 Nov 77 - information that another

Anglo-Soviet naval party due to land on  
Southern Dink in middle of month

- British presence might act as conduit  
of arms on Riff jump to Southern Dink

1 Nov 77

• fuller assessment British reports  
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" Invasion could not be discounted."

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<sup>(1)</sup> Official Report, House of Commons, 2 February 1977, Cols. 550-561.

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63. On 11 October 1977 a Joint Intelligence Committee assessment referred to information that another Argentine naval party was due to land on Southern Thule in the middle of the month. It judged that military action was still unlikely pending the negotiations, although Admiral Massera might act unilaterally against a Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessel going to Southern Thule. A fuller assessment on 1 November 1977 referred to the increasing resentment in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of what were seen as the British Government's delaying tactics; and to the militancy of the Navy. The assessment concluded that the military Junta as a whole would prefer to achieve its sovereignty objectives by peaceful means and that, as long as it calculated that the British Government were prepared to negotiate seriously on the issue of sovereignty, it was unlikely to resort to force. If negotiations broke down, or if Argentina concluded from them that there was no prospect of real progress towards a negotiated transfer of sovereignty, there would be a high risk of its then resorting to more forceful measures, including direct military action. The assessment judged that in those circumstances action against British shipping would be the most serious risk; another possibility was the establishment of an Argentine presence on one or more of the Dependencies, which might involve a risk to the British Antarctic Survey base on South Georgia. A private 'adventurist' operation against the Falklands, which the Junta might feel obliged to support, was always possible. In the Committee's view invasion of the Falkland Islands was unlikely, but could not be discounted.

*Consideration of counter-measures*

Chiefs Staff

64. In the light of the deteriorating situation, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office asked the Ministry of Defence at the end of October 1977 for a paper on the defence implications of the Argentine threat. The Ministry of Defence circulated a paper on 4 November, which had been approved by the Chiefs of Staff, on the military options to counter possible Argentine actions as identified in the Joint Intelligence Committee's assessment. It followed closely the lines of the paper prepared the previous year (see paragraphs 46-47) and, in relation to the main threats, reached broadly similar conclusions.

cf para 112 for higher force needed

65. In the light of the intelligence assessment Ministers decided at a meeting on 21 November 1977 that a military presence in the area of the Falkland Islands should be established by the time the negotiations began in December. The objective would be to buttress the Government's negotiating position by deploying a force of sufficient strength, available if necessary, to convince the Argentines that military action by them would meet resistance. Such a force would not be able to deal with a determined Argentine attack, but it would be able to respond flexibly to limited acts of aggression. The Committee agreed that secrecy should be maintained about the purpose of the force. One nuclear-powered submarine and two frigates were deployed to the area, the submarine to the immediate vicinity of the Islands with the frigates standing off about a thousand miles away. Rules of engagement were drawn up.

66. Cabinet Committee papers show clearly that it was agreed that the force should remain covert. We have found no evidence that the Argentine Government ever came to know of its existence. In the event the negotiations went reasonably well. The Argentine threat receded, and it was agreed after the talks that the naval force could be withdrawn. Consideration

was subsequent next round of not to do so.

Continuation

67. At the meeting agreed, in accordance with the working group's proposal for co-operation. Following the delegation of

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68. At the meeting an arrangement was agreed for the presence on the meeting of the Falkland Islands that the scope of the

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69. The agreement reached at a meeting of Mr. Rowland reached on the Dependencies consulted a to Southern Dependencies sovereignty Argentine since 1979 at off the motives agreement.

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*Assessment of Argentine threat*

77. In November 1979 the Joint Intelligence Committee reassessed the Argentine threat to the Falklands. It reviewed developments since the last assessment (in November 1977), since when, as it judged, the Argentine military threat had been diminished by the British Government's decision to negotiate and by Argentina's preoccupation with higher priorities in foreign affairs, notably its dispute with Chile over the Beagle Channel, and with changes in the Argentine Government. It considered, however, that there was no diminution in Argentina's determination to extend its sovereignty to the area of the Falklands, and that the overriding consideration for the Argentine Government remained their perception of the British Government's willingness to negotiate about, and eventually to transfer, sovereignty. It concluded that, while the Argentine Government would prefer to achieve their sovereignty objectives by peaceful means, if negotiations broke down or if for some other reason the Argentine Government calculated that the British Government were not prepared to negotiate seriously on sovereignty, there would be a high risk of their resorting quickly to more forceful measures against British interests; and that in such circumstances direct military action against British shipping or against the Falkland Islands could not be discounted, although "the risk of such action would not be as high as hitherto".

*Exploratory talks*

78. On 24 January 1980 Lord Carrington sent a minute to the Prime Minister and other members of the Defence Committee in preparation for a meeting the following week. He advised that exploratory talks with the Argentine Government should be started soon since to continue to stall could be risky. The Defence Committee considered Lord Carrington's memorandum of 12 October 1979 on 29 January 1980. The Committee agreed that it was undesirable that talks should be resumed on the basis of the terms of reference announced by the previous Government in April 1977 (see paragraph 60). It invited Lord Carrington to seek written confirmation from the Falkland Islands Council that it was its wish that talks with the Argentine Government should be resumed; and to propose new terms of reference for them. The agreement of the Falkland Island Councillors was obtained, and it was announced in the House of Commons on 15 April 1980<sup>(1)</sup> that talks would take place later that month in New York.

79. The first round of talks was held in New York in April 1980. The British delegation, which was led by Mr. Ridley, included an Island Councillor. The talks were exploratory and, although the Argentine delegation restated the Argentine position on sovereignty, it was agreed that the fundamental difference of opinion on this matter should not inhibit further discussion of the possibility of co-operation in the development and conservation of the resources of the South-West Atlantic.

**Leaseback**

80. In July 1980 the Defence Committee reviewed the position in the light of these discussions, on the basis of a further memorandum by Lord Carrington. It agreed to attempt to reach a solution of the dispute on the basis of a leaseback arrangement. At a further meeting on

<sup>(1)</sup> Official Report, House of Commons, 15 April 1980, Written Answers, Col. 589.

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although risk of such action would not be as high as hitherto.

para 94

9 July 81

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"As in 1979, ... limit to forcible action only as a last resort.

"Earlier in year Argentina had reduced scheduled flights and delayed a supply ship. These actions were seen as evidence that in any escalation of the dispute such measures would be likely to come first.

"If no hope of peaceful transfer military action against British shipping or a full scale invasion of the Falklands could not be discounted.

149

Intelligence reports March (early) 1982

"found letter - that while it was important for the Argentine gov. to make progress with negotiations military action not being contemplated in near future.

Information that if the letter did not produce results - a campaign would be mounted against Britain in other organized. If that failed and the letter on Diego Channel made no progress - likely to be little alternative to the use of force.

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Rec'd also para 150

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Int. Intelligence Staff. Referred to press comment in para by Proj. Navy. 10<sup>th</sup> March 1982

come of itself in the Islands, in Parliament or even in the whole of Government. The Ambassador recommended that the forthcoming meeting should concentrate on the possibility of a "sales campaign", perhaps mainly by bringing home to British opinion the potential cost of any alternative. He warned that the risk of Argentina's using Britain as a scapegoat for its domestic troubles could well be much more threatening by the end of the year. If the Government sponsored more visibly the idea that a negotiated settlement must be envisaged and achieved, it would help to reduce the risk of Argentina's concluding that the Government were simply bamboozling them without any basic intention of reaching a mutually acceptable settlement.

92. At the meeting on 30 June the situation in Argentina and in the Islands was also discussed in detail. The Governor gave the view from the Islands. He said that the Islanders wished to have nothing whatsoever to do with the Argentines; they did not believe that any terms which could be agreed for a leaseback settlement could ever provide them with the guarantees that they wanted.

93. The conclusions reached by the meeting were that the immediate aim should be to play for time with Argentina; that the new Falkland Islands Legislative Council, when elected, should be persuaded to allow talks to continue; that a paper for the Defence Committee should be prepared recommending a major public education campaign; and that up-to-date contingency papers, both civil and military, should be prepared as annexes to it.

L.A. - Intelligence assessment

July 81.

94. On 9 July 1981 the Joint Intelligence Committee circulated a new assessment of the likelihood of Argentina's resorting over the next few months to forcible action in the Falkland Islands dispute. It reviewed developments since the last assessment in 1979, including the progress of talks held with Argentina in that period, political and economic developments in Argentina, the progress of its sovereignty dispute with Chile about islands in the Beagle Channel and its improving relations with the United States and Brazil. The assessment reviewed the options open to the Argentine Government if they decided to resort to direct measures in the dispute. It took the view that it was likely that in the first instance Argentina would adopt diplomatic and economic measures. The latter could include the disruption of air and sea communications, of food and oil supplies and of the provision of medical treatment. There was also a distinct possibility that Argentina might occupy one of the uninhabited Dependencies, following up its action in 1976 in establishing a presence on Southern Thule; and a risk that it might establish a military presence in the Falkland Islands themselves, remote from Port Stanley. In the Committee's view harassment or arrest of British shipping would not be a likely option unless the Argentine Government felt themselves severely provoked.

95. As in 1979, the assessment noted that there was no sign of diminution in Argentina's determination eventually to extend its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands area, but that it would prefer to achieve this objective by peaceful means and would turn to forcible action only as a last resort. As before, it judged that the overriding consideration would be Argentina's perception of the Government's willingness to negotiate genuinely about,

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and eventually to transfer, sovereignty. It recorded evidence of impatience in Argentina at the absence of progress in negotiations and at the attitude of the Islanders. Earlier in the year Argentina had reduced the scheduled flights to the Islands and delayed a supply ship. These actions were seen as evidence that in any escalation of the dispute such measures would be likely to come first. It was thought, however, that relatively small-scale military action could not be ruled out. The final paragraph of the assessment stated that, if Argentina concluded that there was no hope of a peaceful transfer of sovereignty, there would be a high risk of its resorting to more forcible measures against British interests, and that it might act swiftly and without warning. In such circumstances military action against British shipping or a full-scale invasion of the Falkland Islands could not be discounted.

*Mr. Ridley's report to Lord Carrington*

96. On 20 July Mr. Ridley sent a minute to Lord Carrington. He recorded the agreement of his meeting on 30 June that there was no alternative to the leaseback idea which stood any chance of solving the dispute, while noting that the prospects for negotiating a sovereignty solution with Islander agreement had receded in recent months. The forthcoming general elections in the Islands seemed certain to lead to a new Legislative Council opposed to substantive sovereignty talks with Argentina. While it might be possible to manage one more round of talks without specific sovereignty proposals on the table, it must be expected that Argentine patience would then run out. Mr. Ridley warned that, if Argentina concluded, possibly by early 1982, that the Government were unable or unwilling to negotiate seriously, retaliatory action must be expected: in the first instance through the withdrawal of communications, fuel and other facilities which it provided; in the longer run through some form of military action. Mr. Ridley then examined the options available. He dismissed that of simply playing for time, except in the very short term, and suggested that there were three possible courses of action: to open negotiations on leaseback with or without Islander concurrence or participation, but with the outcome remaining conditional on the agreement of the Islanders and of Parliament; to embark on a public education campaign to educate Islander and British public opinion about the facts of the situation, the consequences of a failure to negotiate and the corresponding advantages of a sovereignty solution; or to let Argentina conclude that the Government would not discuss sovereignty, and to set in hand contingency action to deal with the consequences. Mr. Ridley advised against the first of these on the ground that it would breach the long held policy of acting only in accordance with the Islanders' wishes; and the third on the ground that it would be difficult and very costly to sustain the Islands and could lead to a military confrontation with Argentina. He recommended adopting the second option, despite the public criticism that it was likely to attract, and suggested that the matter should be discussed in the Defence Committee in September.

*Formal expression of Argentine views*

97. On 27 July 1981 a note was delivered to the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires from the Argentine Foreign Minister, Dr. Camilion, expressing the Argentine Government's serious concern at the lack of progress at the last round of talks in February 1981. It referred to the fact that ten years had passed since the Communications Agreements and stated



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been struck by the much tougher way in which everyone in Buenos Aires was talking about the Falkland Islands. He thought that, if Argentina did not get what it wanted, it might well take some military action.

*The Foreign and Commonwealth Office's assessment of the situation*

146. On his return to London Mr. Luce answered a Parliamentary Question on 3 March<sup>(1)</sup> on the discussions he had held in New York. In answer to supplementary questions he stated that there would be no contemplation of any transfer of sovereignty without consulting the wishes of the Islanders, or without the consent of the House. He referred to the *communiqué* issued by the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs as "not helpful to the process that we all wish to see, that will resolve this dispute"; and, when asked for an assurance that all necessary steps were in hand to ensure the protection of the Islands against unexpected attack, said, "we have no doubts about our sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and no doubt about our duties to the Islanders".

147. At a short meeting on 5 March 1982 Lord Carrington reviewed the situation with Mr. Luce, Mr. Ure and Mr. Fearn. In accordance with normal Foreign and Commonwealth Office practice, no minutes of the meeting were taken, but Mr. Ure recorded the points for action that had emerged. These were that:

- (i) draft messages should be prepared urgently for Mr. Luce to send to Sr. Ros, and for Lord Carrington to send to Dr. Costa Mendez urging him to put the talks back on the rails on the lines agreed in New York;
- (ii) a draft personal message should be prepared for Lord Carrington to send to Mr. Haig;
- (iii) a note should be prepared on United Nations Resolutions on the Falklands; and the Department should consider what initiative might be taken there if the present negotiations broke down; and
- (iv) a draft paper should be prepared for a Defence Committee meeting to be held "fairly soon", probably as soon as the Argentine response to the ministerial messages was received.

Mr. Ure recorded that the Cabinet Office had said that the Prime Minister would like the next Defence Committee paper on the Falklands to include annexes on both civil and military contingency plans.

148. Although the fact is not recorded in Mr. Ure's note, he also took the opportunity, after consulting the Permanent Under-Secretary of State (who was not present at the meeting) to tell Lord Carrington that, in November 1977, at an earlier period of heightened tension in the dispute, the previous Government had covertly sent a small naval task force to the area. Lord Carrington asked whether the Argentines had known about it and, when told that they had not, he did not pursue the matter. Officials did not recommend to Ministers at the meeting that they should consider a similar naval deployment.

*Intelligence reports*

149. In early March 1982 a number of intelligence reports were available indicating the views of Argentine Ministers and officials in the preceding

<sup>(1)</sup> *Official Report*, House of Commons, 3 March 1982, Cols. 263-264.

weeks. The general tenor of these reports was that, while it was important for the Argentine Government to make progress in the negotiations, military action was not being contemplated in the immediate future. Reports available immediately prior to the New York talks reflected the views of Argentine officials that there would be no invasion unless the talks broke down; that it would be unrealistic to think of invasion before the next southern summer; and that invasion was not considered a realistic option. A further report at the beginning of March, reflecting an Argentine diplomatic view, was to the effect that Argentina was determined to achieve progress on sovereignty by the end of the year; and, if this was not forthcoming, would take the issue to the General Assembly with a view to obtaining a declaration recognising Argentine sovereignty over the Falklands. There was information that Dr. Costa Mendez had decided that, if the talks did not produce results, a campaign would be mounted against Britain in international organisations; if this failed and the talks on the Beagle Channel made no progress, there was likely to be little alternative to the use of force.

150. On 2 March 1982 the British Defence *Attaché* in Buenos Aires wrote to the Governor of the Falkland Islands, copying his letter to the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (where it was received on about 9 March) on the Argentine military threat to the Falklands. This followed a private visit that he had made to the Islands on his own initiative in January 1982 to enable him to judge at first hand the military situation there in the event of Argentine action. On his return to Buenos Aires he had briefed the British Ambassador there about his visit, but had not made a formal report in view of its unofficial nature. In the light of later developments, in particular Argentine press comment about the possibility of military measures, the Defence *Attaché* decided to circulate his views more widely. In his letter he commented that, on the worst possible interpretation of developments, an Army President, who had already demonstrated his lack of patience when frustrated over such issues, could give orders to the military to solve the Malvinas problem once and for all in the latter half of the year. He judged that, unless and until the talks broke down, the most likely threat was posed by the Argentine Navy, which could take a number of measures to demonstrate how the Argentine claim to sovereignty could be backed by strength, such as establishing a naval presence on an outlying island or landing marines on one of the islands for a twenty-four hour exercise. If the Argentines came to believe that a negotiated settlement was no longer possible, a straight seizure of the Islands was an obvious alternative. The Defence *Attaché* pointed out that in Argentina a military *coup* was a fairly well practised art; the Argentine Army studied and admired *coup de main* operations of all sorts. He examined several ways in which Argentina might mount an operation of this kind, and pointed out that the chance of providing early warning from Argentina could be increased if some special arrangements could be made, but that as things were they could not realistically expect to be able to detect any Argentine military moves.

151. On 10 March an officer in the Defence Intelligence Staff of the Ministry of Defence circulated a minute widely within the Ministry of Defence; it was also copied to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. It drew attention to recent intelligence indicating that the belligerent press comment had been inspired by the Argentine Navy in an attempt to achieve

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an early settlement of the dispute. The intelligence also indicated that, if there was no tangible progress towards a settlement by the end of June, the Argentine Navy would push for a diplomatic offensive in international organisations, a break in relations with Britain and military action against the Islands, but that neither President Galtieri nor the Army was thinking along those lines. Summarising the position, the minute said that all other diplomatic and intelligence reporting in recent weeks confirmed that all elements of the Argentine Government apart from the Navy favoured diplomatic action to solve the dispute and that the military option was not under active consideration at that time. It saw no reason to believe that the Argentine Navy had any prospect of persuading the President or other Government members to adopt its proposed course of action or of going it alone; and did not therefore consider that the Navy's attitude posed any immediate or increased threat to the Falkland Islands beyond that outlined in the most recent Joint Intelligence Committee assessment, prepared in July 1981.

P.M. *The Prime Minister's reaction to the deteriorating diplomatic situation*

152. On 3 March the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires had reported further comment in the Argentine press on the unilateral *communiqué* (see paragraph 139). When the Prime Minister saw this telegram, she wrote on it, "we must make contingency plans". Her Private Secretary wrote to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 8 March, copying his letter to the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Office, recording the Prime Minister's comment and saying that he understood that it might be the intention of Lord Carrington to bring a further paper on the Falkland Islands to the Defence Committee in the fairly near future; and that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office might think that this could helpfully contain an account of contingency planning. No immediate response was made to the letter because, we believe, of the general expectation in Whitehall that it would be included on the agenda of an early meeting of the Defence Committee.

153. On 8 March the Prime Minister also spoke to Mr. Nott and asked him how quickly Royal Naval ships could be deployed to the Falkland Islands, if required. The Ministry of Defence replied on 12 March indicating which ships were then deployed in the West Indies, and on exercise in the Gulf of Mexico and off the eastern seaboard of the United States. The reply pointed out that passage time for a frigate deployed to the Falklands, which would require Royal Fleet Auxiliary support, would be in the order of 20 days.

*Diplomatic initiatives*

154. On further consideration of the action agreed at Lord Carrington's meeting on 5 March 1982 (see paragraph 147), it was decided to send only one message to the Argentine Government, from Lord Carrington to Dr. Costa Mendez. A draft was sent to the Governor on 8 March for consideration by the Island Councillors. It expressed Lord Carrington's pleasure at the progress that had been made in New York towards setting up new procedures for carrying forward and giving fresh impetus to negotiations about the future of the Islands, which reflected the Government's determination to achieve a peaceful solution to a difficult issue which would be acceptable to both Governments and to the people of the Falkland Islands,

JIC(4)

Page 158 - Intelligence Mid March 1962  
Several reports

① "naval officers doubted that Argentina would invade the Falklands although relatively simple to do so and they thought Britain would not resist it."

② London told of Argentine intention to mount military offensive

Also page 189. Inverini said not to have been seriously considered but in last <sup>resort</sup> stages could not be discounted in view of unpredictability.

Page 206 - of President.  
Page 232. - 1. reports - 23rd March still no known intention of invasion  
- S. George incident Wed 31st March 1962

Inverini's main aim to persuade

Briggs job to negotiate transfer of sovereignty

- likely to use S. George incident to obtain early opening of talks on basis discussed in N.Y.

Debevered... at that time the Argentine Govt. did not wish to let the JIC to adopt further measures

~~Page 274 - The JIC~~

Page 274 - The famous meeting - new intelligence

Haig's help in ensuring that the issue was settled peacefully and in accordance with the democratically expressed wishes of the inhabitants of the Islands. Mr. Haig's reply was delivered on 15 March. In it he referred to Mr. Enders's visit to Buenos Aires, where he had urged the Argentines to continue negotiations. He said that they had been non-committal but not negative. Mr. Haig added that, as opportunities presented themselves, the Americans would continue to urge a constructive approach with due regard for all interests at stake.

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*Intelligence: mid-March 1982*

158. In mid-March Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ministers received a number of intelligence reports. One reported that Mr. Enders had been told during his visit that Argentina planned to mount an international diplomatic offensive if there were no immediate signs of British willingness to bring negotiations to a successful conclusion within the next year; the report claimed that Mr. Enders had indicated that the United States Government would see no problem in this course of action. Another, reflecting Argentine military views, referred to a plan to achieve gradual British withdrawal from the Falklands over a period of 30 years, at the end of which full sovereignty would pass to Argentina; the talk of invasion since the New York negotiations was said to have been part of a design to put psychological pressure on Britain. A further report indicated that senior Argentine naval officers doubted that Argentina would invade the Falklands, although it would be relatively simple to do so and they thought that Britain would not prevent it.

159. Other intelligence reports indicated that the Junta had been displeased with the agreement reached in New York and that the unilateral Ministry of Foreign Affairs *communiqué* had been issued on the orders of the President. The view of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was said to be that the negotiating team in New York had properly carried out its instructions except in failing to obtain British agreement to a date in March 1982 for a meeting to begin the monthly series of talks. This had caused the trouble with the Government. It had been decided that, if no reply were forthcoming from the British side on a date in March 1982, Argentina would retaliate by withdrawing the air or sea services to the Islands. There had been no final decision on the action to be taken if the British agreed to a date after March but there was a disposition in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take action to show all concerned that they were serious. Dr. Costa Mendez was also concerned to make up for the Argentine failure in the Beagle Channel dispute. An invasion was said not to have been seriously considered but in the last resort it could not be discounted in view of the unpredictability of the President and some senior members of the armed forces.

160. At this stage in the diplomatic exchanges with Argentina, the initiatives directed towards the resumption of negotiations on the basis agreed at the New York talks at the end of February were, in effect, overtaken by the South Georgia incident, with which we deal in Chapter 3.

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that for these reasons there was everything to be said for a very early discussion by the Defence Committee, hopefully before Easter. Mr. Wiggin separately notified Mr. Luce of his agreement to the double-banking of the Port Stanley garrison.

*W. in D. C of Staff*

205. The Ministry of Defence also sent to the Prime Minister's office a revised version of the note approved by the Chiefs of Staff in September 1981 on the defence implications of Argentine action against the Falkland Islands (see paragraphs 110-112). The only significant changes from the earlier version were the removal of the cost estimates and of a concluding summary paragraph, and the addition of a passage discussing the possibility, at the outset of a period of rising tension with the prospect of Argentine military action against the Falklands, of deploying a nuclear-powered submarine to the region, either covertly or overtly as a deterrent pending the arrival of further naval reinforcements. On the response to an Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands, the conclusion was unchanged: if faced with Argentine occupation of the Islands on arrival, there could be no certainty that the large balanced force required to deter a full-scale invasion could retake them.

*P.M*

*Para 112 for full cont*

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206. Intelligence reports were circulated—and seen by Mr. Luce—indicating that on 23 March there was still no serious intention of invasion by the Argentine Government as a whole, although there was a more hawkish attitude in Navy quarters, and that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs believed that a negotiated solution would be preferable. The reports also indicated that the Argentine Government would try to raise the temperature but would stop short of bloodshed. The British Embassy in Buenos Aires reported, on the basis of information from another Embassy, that all the submarines at the naval base of Mar del Plata had recently put to sea but that this might not be sinister since a joint naval exercise was taking place, probably in the River Plate area, with the Uruguayan navy.

Saturday 27 March

207. On Saturday 27 March the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires reported his fears that Dr. Costa Mendez had been less than honest with him and that the Argentines had been "playing us along". He took this view because after the Commanders-in-Chief's meeting the previous evening Dr. Costa Mendez did not summon him, as they had agreed, but instead made a public statement that a firm decision had been taken to give the men on South Georgia all necessary protection, which, in view of the presence of the Bahia Paraiso, would not be only diplomatic. The British Ambassador reported that he was seeking an urgent interview with Dr. Costa Mendez to discuss this statement and to clarify the status of the Bahia Paraiso. He later saw Sr. Ros and pressed for information about the position of the Bahia Paraiso and about suggestions in the press that there were armed marines on board. Sr. Ros was unable to answer these questions and said that, following the Commanders-in-Chief's meeting the previous evening, revised instructions had been given to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which would be put into a message to the British Government and delivered that day. The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires commented later in the day that he suspected that Argentine intentions were still a subject for debate within the Junta, the navy being the most, and the army and the President

intelligence reports received since his departure reflecting Argentine service views. One indicated that a peaceful settlement of the South Georgia incident was possible but that, if any Argentines were killed, Argentina would initiate military action against the Falkland Islands themselves. The Argentine Government had not provoked the South Georgia incident but, now that it had happened, would take advantage of it to press forward Argentina's claim to sovereignty over all the islands. The Argentine assessment was that, while Britain might send naval reinforcements to the area, this was unlikely. The other report indicated that the Argentine Government could take military action against the Falklands in April, not through a complete invasion, but by occupying one of the outlying islands. A further report indicated that the Argentine Navy was keeping under review British naval dispositions worldwide.

*Wednesday 31 March*

229. On the morning of Wednesday 31 March Lord Carrington sent a telegram from Tel Aviv accepting the advice of the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires to delay the message to Dr. Costa Mendez. Later in the day, however, Lord Carrington decided that the message should be delivered, in view both of the intelligence reports and of a British press report that day about the sailing of a nuclear-powered submarine, which might give the Argentines the impression that the British were seeking a naval rather than a diplomatic solution. The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires was instructed accordingly, and he delivered the message that evening.

1. A 230. An immediate assessment headed "Falkland Islands—the incident on South Georgia" was prepared and circulated by the Latin America Current Intelligence Group. It assessed that the landing on South Georgia had not been contrived by the Argentine Government, but that the Junta was taking full advantage of the incident to speed up negotiations on the transfer of sovereignty. Despite Sr. Davidoff's close contacts with some senior Argentine naval officers, the unauthorised landing was not considered to be part of the Navy's plans. There was no central co-ordination of Argentine policy and the Junta's intentions were not known, but it had a wide range of options open to it. Argentina had overwhelming superiority in the area. There was a possibility that, both because of the strength of Argentine public feeling on the issue and because of imperfect co-ordination and the confused counsel given by various Argentine officials and service advisers, the Junta might take some unexpected action. The assessment concluded that the Argentine Junta's main aim in its handling of the Falkland Islands dispute was to persuade the British Government to negotiate the transfer of sovereignty, and it was likely to try to use the incident on South Georgia to obtain the early opening of talks on the basis discussed in New York in February. This would tend to constrain it from adopting extreme options, but the possibility could not be ruled out that it might in future choose to escalate the situation by landing a military force on another Dependency or on one of the Falkland Islands. But it was believed that at that time the Argentine Government did not wish to be the first to adopt forcible measures. There was, however, a high risk of the Argentine Government's resorting to the use of force to rescue their nationals if the Argentine civilians on South Georgia were arrested or removed from the island. The Argentine Government would

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see such action by the British authorities as highly provocative and might use it as a pretext for an invasion of the Falkland Islands.

231. The British Naval *Attaché* in Buenos Aires reported to the Ministry of Defence that, according to the United States Naval *Attaché*, virtually all the Argentine fleet was at sea, but without the fleet commanders, and that this was well in advance of the next exercises planned for after Easter.

232. The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires reported Argentine press comment on the dispute, which had been overshadowed by violent demonstrations in Buenos Aires against the Government's economic policies. Lord Carrington's statement had been reported, but the popular press had given greater prominence to the despatch of a nuclear-powered submarine. There were also reports of the despatch of a British destroyer and a Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessel. Dr. Costa Mendez was widely quoted as telling reporters that Argentina would not give way to threats of force and that the group on South Georgia was on Argentine soil.

233. In the early evening of 31 March Mr. Nott was briefed by Ministry of Defence officials on intelligence which had been received that day that a time in the early morning of 2 April had been set by the Argentines as the time and day for action. It was considered that, taken with earlier intelligence reports, this provided a positive indication of an Argentine intention to invade the Falkland Islands. These reports were also seen by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Joint Intelligence Organisation.

234. Mr. Nott sought, and obtained, an urgent meeting with the Prime Minister, which took place in her room at the House of Commons. It was also attended by Mr. Atkins, Mr. Luce, and Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence officials. The Chief of Naval Staff was also present, having gone to the House of Commons to brief Mr. Nott.

235. At the meeting a message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan was drafted and sent just before 9.00 p.m. In it the Prime Minister referred to intelligence indicating that an Argentine invasion of the Falklands might be imminent and said that the British Government could not acquiesce in any Argentine occupation. She asked President Reagan to talk urgently to President Galtieri and ask for an immediate assurance that he would not authorise any landing, let alone hostilities; she said that he could tell President Galtieri that the British Government would not escalate the dispute or start fighting. The British Ambassador in Washington was asked to speak to Mr. Haig to ensure a rapid reaction from the White House. The Chief of Naval Staff advised on the size and composition of a task force likely to be capable of re-taking the Islands and was instructed to prepare such a force without commitment to a final decision as to whether or not it should sail.

236. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office immediately informed the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires and the Governor of the Falklands of the reports indicating a possible invasion. The Governor was instructed to pass on this information only to the garrison commander, *HMS Endurance* was ordered back to Port Stanley.

237. At 10.30 p.m. the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires delivered the message (see paragraph 229) to Dr. Costa Mendez, who said that he would communicate the message to his President and report back. Dr. Costa Mendez added, however, that the message was not what he had hoped for.



Military Assessment.

47. Feb 1976 (Collyer)

Levin's list - air-ships at Port Stanley

- air reinforcement ruled out
- adverse weather conditions
- no diversion air-ships
- distance from Auckland

To dislodge occupation - amphibious force with embarked troops

Not be possible to provide transport support the force necessary in the Islands to ensure that a determined attempt to eject British garrison was unsuccessful.

To recover Islands by military means - though tactics impossible - Brigade Group strength which would require use of Navy's amphibious resources - direct Task Force - HMS Ark Royal substituted logistic support

64-5. Where implications of Argentine threat asked for end of.

Remind to Nor. Same premises previously - hardly same conclusion

65. Minister decided at a meeting (not 01) military presence should be established by deploying one nuclear sub. 2 frigates to area in immediate vicinity standing off 1,000 miles away.

"Such a force would not be able to deal with a determined Argentine attack but it would be able to respond flexibly to limited acts of aggression. Security should be maintained - force over."

45. In February 1976, in view of the increasing risk of hostile action by Argentina, Mr. Mason agreed to a proposal from Mr. Callaghan for the deployment to the area of a frigate with Royal Fleet Auxiliary<sup>(1)</sup> support.

46. In the same month, with a view to discussion in the Defence Committee, Mr. Callaghan asked Mr. Mason for "a full and up-to-date military assessment on possible military options and limitations" considering the range of possible deployments in a number of eventualities, including a determined Argentine assault intended to eject the British garrison. A paper on military options to counter possible Argentine actions was approved by the Chiefs of Staff on 19 February 1976 and circulated as an annex to a paper for the Defence Committee.

CoF 5. Military Option 15 Feb 76  
47. The Chief of Staffs paper drew attention to the fact that air reinforcement was ruled out by the limitations of the airstrip at Port Stanley; the adverse weather conditions there; its distance from Ascension Island; and the likely unavailability of South American airfields in the event of a conflict. To dislodge Argentine occupation of part of the Falkland Islands or the Dependencies would require an amphibious force with embarked troops. It would not be practicable to provide, transport and support the force necessary in the Islands to ensure that a determined Argentine attempt to eject the British garrison was unsuccessful. To recover the Islands by military means, though far from impossible, would be a major operation at very long range. The least force for this purpose would be of Brigade Group strength, the transport of which would entail the use of all the Navy's amphibious resources, a sizeable Task Force, including *HMS Ark Royal*, and substantial logistic support.

#### *Resumption of negotiations*

48. In the light of the deterioration of relations with Argentina, and the agreement in principle reached between Mr. Rowlands and the Argentine Foreign Minister in New York, Mr. Callaghan decided to undertake a major review of policy. In March 1976 the Defence Committee and the Cabinet approved his proposals for a fresh dialogue on all aspects of the dispute, both the possibilities of Anglo-Argentine economic co-operation in the South West Atlantic and "the nature of a hypothetical future constitutional relationship".

49. Once Argentina had been informed that the Government were prepared to resume negotiations, including discussion of sovereignty, the threat of military action receded. Exploratory talks with Argentina were held in confidence at official level in July and August 1976. By then, following a coup on 23 March 1976, Argentina was under the rule of a military Junta, which, with changes in membership, remained in power.

1.A 50. In July 1976 the Joint Intelligence Committee assessed the Argentine political situation in the light of events since the military coup in March. On the Falklands it concluded that Argentina might have unduly high expectations of the current negotiations. If these were dashed, it could be expected to return to a more aggressive approach, initially in the United Nations. It assessed, however, that it was most unlikely that the Argentine Government would react by taking military action against

(1) A Royal Fleet Auxiliary is a civilian manned Royal Navy support vessel.

1A-

63. On 11 October 1977 a Joint Intelligence Committee assessment referred to information that another Argentine naval party was due to land on Southern Thule in the middle of the month. It judged that military action was still unlikely pending the negotiations, although Admiral Massera might act unilaterally against a Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessel going to Southern Thule. A fuller assessment on 1 November 1977 referred to the increasing resentment in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of what were seen as the British Government's delaying tactics; and to the militancy of the Navy. The assessment concluded that the military Junta as a whole would prefer to achieve its sovereignty objectives by peaceful means and that, as long as it calculated that the British Government were prepared to negotiate seriously on the issue of sovereignty, it was unlikely to resort to force. If negotiations broke down, or if Argentina concluded from them that there was no prospect of real progress towards a negotiated transfer of sovereignty, there would be a high risk of its then resorting to more forceful measures, including direct military action. The assessment judged that in those circumstances action against British shipping would be the most serious risk; another possibility was the establishment of an Argentine presence on one or more of the Dependencies, which might involve a risk to the British Antarctic Survey base on South Georgia. A private 'adventurist' operation against the Falklands, which the Junta might feel obliged to support, was always possible. In the Committee's view invasion of the Falkland Islands was unlikely, but could not be discounted.

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*Consideration of counter-measures*

64. In the light of the deteriorating situation, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office asked the Ministry of Defence at the end of October 1977 for a paper on the defence implications of the Argentine threat. The Ministry of Defence circulated a paper on 4 November, which had been approved by the Chiefs of Staff, on the military options to counter possible Argentine actions as identified in the Joint Intelligence Committee's assessment. It followed closely the lines of the paper prepared the previous year (see paragraphs 46-47) and, in relation to the main threats, reached broadly similar conclusions.

Chiefs of Staff

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65. In the light of the intelligence assessment Ministers decided at a meeting on 21 November 1977 that a military presence in the area of the Falkland Islands should be established by the time the negotiations began in December. The objective would be to buttress the Government's negotiating position by deploying a force of sufficient strength, available if necessary, to convince the Argentines that military action by them would meet resistance. Such a force would not be able to deal with a determined Argentine attack, but it would be able to respond flexibly to limited acts of aggression. The Committee agreed that secrecy should be maintained about the purpose of the force. One nuclear-powered submarine and two frigates were deployed to the area, the submarine to the immediate vicinity of the Islands with the frigates standing off about a thousand miles away. Rules of engagement were drawn up.

cf para 112 for higher force needed

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66. Cabinet Committee papers show clearly that it was agreed that the force should remain covert. We have found no evidence that the Argentine Government ever came to know of its existence. In the event the negotiations went reasonably well. The Argentine threat receded, and it was agreed after the talks that the naval force could be withdrawn. Consideration

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Military Assessments (2)

Page 110-111-112

Meetings between Dulles + F.O. on 11 July 1957  
- political military assessments of response  
to a very 2 possible Argentine actions.

Chief of Staff approved 14 Sept. 1957

" Summary in scope to that - prepared in 1957)  
- examined military options and possible  
responses to them" Noted that Argentine  
some of most efficient ground forces in  
S. America and gave a brief account of its  
naval and air capability

Noted on limited capability - (inclusion plus  
44 planes no run-way for large aircraft etc

"To deter full-scale invasion a large island  
force would be required - ~~to~~ invasion class carrier  
4 destroyers or frigates plus possibly a nuclear  
powered submarine - additional manpower up to  
brigade strength to reinforce the garrison

Such a force would engage in whatever portion of  
continental naval resources. There was a danger that  
its dispatch could precipitate the very action it was  
intended to deter. If their faced with Argentine  
occupation of the islands on arrival there could be no  
certainty that such a force could retake them.

To DEAL with FULL-SCALE INVASION would  
require NAVAL LAND FORCES with ORGANIC AIR  
SUPPORT on a very substantial scale and that  
the logistic problems of such an operation would  
be formidable

Foreign and Commonwealth Office were not contingency plans in this sense, but a much broader appreciation of the action that would be necessary to counter various forms of military action by Argentina. They did, however, incorporate a 'concept of operations', on which military action could be based.

110. At a meeting between Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials on 1 May 1981 it was agreed that what was required was a "short politico-military assessment of the United Kingdom's ability to respond militarily to a range of possible Argentine actions, the implications of responding in a particular way and the chances of success, with some indication of the possible cost". (It was also agreed that plans for the evacuation of the Island population in the event of an emergency should not be prepared.) It was envisaged that the paper would form an annex to a paper for the Defence Committee. On completion the paper was formally approved by the Chiefs of Staff on 14 September 1981.

*Chief of Staff*

111. This paper, which was similar in scope to that prepared in 1977, examined the military options identified by the July 1981 Joint Intelligence Committee assessment as open to Argentina and possible responses to them. It noted that Argentina had some of the most efficient armed forces in South America, and gave a brief account of its naval and air capability. It also drew attention to Britain's very limited military capability in the area, consisting of only the garrison of 42 lightly armed Royal Marines on the Islands, the part-time Falkland Islands' defence force, and HMS Endurance, which was due to be withdrawn in March 1982. The paper explained that the length of the runway at Port Stanley, the lack of diversion airfields, the limited airfield facilities and the adverse and unpredictable weather conditions precluded air reinforcement on any significant scale. A British military response would therefore have to be primarily a naval one. Passage time was of the order of 20 days for surface ships, and additional time would be required to assemble and prepare sea reinforcements, which could involve significant penalties to other military commitments.

*P22  
47  
264*

112. The paper then examined possible responses to various forms of Argentine action: harassment or arrest of British shipping; military occupation of one or more of the uninhabited islands; arrest of the British Antarctic Survey team on South Georgia; a small-scale military operation against the Islands; and full-scale military invasion of the Islands. On the last option the paper judged that, to deter a full-scale invasion, a large balanced force would be required, comprising an Invincible class carrier with four destroyers or frigates, plus possibly a nuclear-powered submarine, supply ships in attendance and additional manpower up to brigade strength, to reinforce the garrison. Such a deployment would be very expensive and would engage a significant portion of the country's naval resources. There was a danger that its despatch could precipitate the very action it was intended to deter. If then faced with Argentine occupation of the Falkland Islands on arrival, there could be no certainty that such a force could retake them. The paper concluded that to deal with a full-scale invasion would require naval and land forces with organic air support on a very substantial scale, and that the logistic problems of such an operation would be formidable.

*See  
P22  
264*

113. In the period that the Chiefs of Staff paper was being prepared there was some anxiety in the Ministry of Defence (Navy Department)

*Similar assessment 26<sup>th</sup> March  
para 205.*

about the Falkland Islands. The United Kingdom's position to the Defence Committee. The Chiefs of Staff in the Ministry of Defence discussed the situation by the Chiefs of Staff to us by paragraph

HMS Endurance

114. to withdraw Carrington 1981 on the HMS Endurance the dispute British Government reduction of the defence survey task over a wide aspect of HMS Endurance essential Antarctic on 10 July officials judge and so result was confirmed

115. Councils a message

the decision extremely British other feel this a urge decision

116. a letter several A

(\*) Official

# Military Document,

2015.

26<sup>th</sup> March - Mon. to P.M. after -

a revised version of note in Oct, 1987

- only significant changes - were removal  
of last sentence - & concluding para

- plus prospect of displaying nuclear powered  
submarine to region. On response to Argentine  
mission - conclusion unchanged

"if faced with Argentine dispatch of islanders  
on arrival. There would be no certainty that  
the large balanced force requires to deter  
a full-scale invasion could relocate them.

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Wiggin added

that for these reasons there was everything to be said for a very early discussion by the Defence Committee, hopefully before Easter. Mr. Wiggin separately notified Mr. Luce of his agreement to the double-banking of the Port Stanley garrison.

*W. in Rank*  
*CO Staff*

205. The Ministry of Defence also sent to the Prime Minister's office a revised version of the note approved by the Chiefs of Staff in September 1981 on the defence implications of Argentine action against the Falkland Islands (see paragraphs 110-112). The only significant changes from the earlier version were the removal of the cost estimates and of a concluding summary paragraph, and the addition of a passage discussing the possibility, at the outset of a period of rising tension with the prospect of Argentine military action against the Falklands, of deploying a nuclear-powered submarine to the region, either covertly or overtly as a deterrent pending the arrival of further naval reinforcements. On the response to an Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands, the conclusion was unchanged: if faced with Argentine occupation of the Islands on arrival, there could be no certainty that the large balanced force required to deter a full-scale invasion could retake them.

*P.M.*

*Para 112 for full context*

*1.A*

206. Intelligence reports were circulated—and seen by Mr. Luce—indicating that on 23 March there was still no serious intention of invasion by the Argentine Government as a whole, although there was a more hawkish attitude in Navy quarters, and that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs believed that a negotiated solution would be preferable. The reports also indicated that the Argentine Government would try to raise the temperature but would stop short of bloodshed. The British Embassy in Buenos Aires reported, on the basis of information from another Embassy, that all the submarines at the naval base of Mar del Plata had recently put to sea but that this might not be sinister since a joint naval exercise was taking place, probably in the River Plate area, with the Uruguayan navy.

*Saturday 27 March*

207. On Saturday 27 March the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires reported his fears that Dr. Costa Mendez had been less than honest with him and that the Argentines had been "playing us along". He took this view because after the Commanders-in-Chief's meeting the previous evening Dr. Costa Mendez did not summon him, as they had agreed, but instead made a public statement that a firm decision had been taken to give the men on South Georgia all necessary protection, which, in view of the presence of the *Bahia Paraiso*, would not be only diplomatic. The British Ambassador reported that he was seeking an urgent interview with Dr. Costa Mendez to discuss this statement and to clarify the status of the *Bahia Paraiso*. He later saw Sr. Ros and pressed for information about the position of the *Bahia Paraiso* and about suggestions in the press that there were armed marines on board. Sr. Ros was unable to answer these questions and said that, following the Commanders-in-Chief's meeting the previous evening, revised instructions had been given to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which would be put into a message to the British Government and delivered that day. The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires commented later in the day that he suspected that Argentine intentions were still a subject for debate within the Junta, the navy being the most, and the army and the President

Live

cc Mr Coles  
Sir Anthony Parsons

PRIME MINISTER

I attach a first shot at a skeleton for your speech on the opening of the Debate on the Franks Report, as a basis for our discussion this afternoon.

E. E. R. BUTLER

19 January 1983



PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH IN DEBATE ON  
FRANKS REPORT : FRAMEWORK

I beg to move that the House takes Note of the Report.

Remind House of the origins of the Committee:-

First promised on 8 April 1982

Consultations with Leader of Opposition  
and Privy Counsellors in Opposition parties

Terms of reference and Membership agreed

Establishment of Committee announced on 6 July

Procedure of the Committee

Access to all papers of the British Government, more than anyone else has seen because no Member of present Administration has seen earlier papers.

42 meetings, including 40 whole day meetings.

Invited submissions from anyone with evidence to provide - also invited any member of the press with specific information to come forward with it.

Oral evidence not only from Ministers and officials of the present Administration but former Prime Ministers; people with special knowledge and interest; broadcasting media; and journalists.

Content of the Report

- i) First chapter - development of dispute under previous Governments. Won't take the House through this in detail but worth quoting the three significant themes of the period mentioned in paragraph 70.

Do not think that the Leader of the Opposition would deny that it was position of both parties

that solution had to be acceptable to the islanders and that the heart of the difficulty was that Argentina principally interested in sovereignty and islanders not prepared to accept transfer of sovereignty.

ii) Period of administration of present Government - FCO very properly put options to Government. Collective consideration. Policy set. Meetings of OD on 29 January 1980, July 1980 and in December 1980 and in January 1981 which set subsequent policy. Thereafter no changes in policy. But Lord Carrington reported at frequent intervals.

iii) Deal with three specific matters which have been subject of comment in Franks Report and since.

i) Decision on HMS Endurance

Successive Governments had recognised that it was not significant to defence of islands. Decision to withdraw was collective Cabinet decision as part of defence review. It has been argued that decision to withdraw was signal to Argentine Government. If so, it was a signal which had been given before and had not proved decisive. And previous Governments had given more decisive signals.

ii) Intelligence machinery

Not true that intelligence machinery ignored Argentine press reports. Essential point is that no one has identified what hard intelligence was available to pick up. Neither Americans nor anyone else had it.

But Government has considered the observations of Lord Franks on intelligence machine - announce decisions.

iii) Should some deterrent force have been sent down on 5 March ?

The Franks Committee considered Lord Carrington's decision not to send a submarine not unreasonable and I am certain that that view is right.

Three points to make:-

first, in considering all such action, it was debatable whether it would deter an attack or provoke;

second, it would not have deterred an airborne attack which would easily have taken the island;

third, as the rest of the Franks Report indicates, there was every reason to believe that military action by Argentina, if it happened at all, would happen later in the year.

#### Conclusion

Right to remind the House that the Franks Committee considered all these matters and other assertions made by those who commented.

Its unanimous conclusion that it would not be justified in attaching any criticism or blame to the present Government for the Argentine Junta's decision was taken in the light of its consideration of all these matters and all the evidence it had taken.

On that basis the Government justified in asking for the support of the House.

PART 3 ends:-

BI to Chief Information Officers  
18.1.83

PART 4 begins:-

FERR to PM 9.1.83

