S
807

PREM 19/959

The dispute with Guatamala over Belize

BELIZE

March 1980

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
1-4-80		11.2.81		2.1.81		1.4.82	
15.7.80		12.3.81		14.7.81		13.4.82	
19-7-80		13-2-81		16.7.81		19.4.82	
8.8.80		16.2.81		19.7.81		26.4.82	
14.8.80		19.2.81		23.7.81		29.4.82	
23.8.80		24.2.81		27.7.81		4.5.82	
23.9.80		5.3.81		4.8.81		- ends -	
2.10.80		11.3.81		5.8.81			
22.10.80		12.3.81		18.8.81			
23.10.80		13.3.81		26.8.81			
		2.4.81		27.8.81			
27.11.80		9.4.81		8.9.81			
24.12.80		14.4.81					
15.1.81		8.5.81		21.9.81			
26.1.81		3.6.81		21.10.81			
11.2.81		4.6.81		23.12.81			
		5.6.81		24.2.82			
		12.6.81		25.2.82			
		25.6.81		11.3.82			

PREM 19/959

PART 1 ends:-

4.5.82

PART 2 begins:-

5.5.82

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
OD (80) 31	26.3.80
OD (80) 10th Meeting, Minute 2	2.4.80
OD (80) 55	23.9.80
OD (80) 59	20.10.80
OD (80) 21st Meeting, Minute 1	23.10.80
CC (80) 43rd Conclusions, Minute 2	4.12.80
OD (81) 6	6.2.81
OD (81) 5	9.2.81
OD (81) 2nd Meeting Minute 2	12.2.81
CC (81) 8th Conclusions, Minute 3	24.2.81
CC (81) 9th Conclusions	5.3.81
CC (81) 11th Conclusions, Minute 2	12.3.81
CC (81) 14th Conclusions, Minute 2	2.4.81
CC (81) 15th Conclusions, Minute 2 (extract)	9.4.81
OD (81) 23	24.4.81
OD (81) 24	21.5.81
L (81) 75	3.6.81
CC (81) 21st Conclusions, Minute 2	4.6.81
L (81) 16th Meeting, Minute 1	9.6.81
CC (81) 26th Conclusions, Minute 2	2.7.81
CC (81) 28th Conclusions, Minute 2	16.7.81
OD (81) 38	17.7.81
CC (81) 31st Conclusions, Minute 1 (extract)	15.9.81
CC (81) 32nd Conclusions, Minute 2	24.9.81
CC (82)10th Conclusions, Minute 3	11.3.82
CC (82) 12th Conclusions, Minute 2	25.3.82
OD (82) 6th Meeting, Minute 3	1.4.82

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed R Wayland Date 28 January 2013

PREM Records Team

SECRET

Belize 26

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 May, 1982.

Belize: British Garrison

Thank you for your letter of 29 April. The Prime Minister has now signed a reply to the letter of 9 February from Mr. Price. I enclose the signed version, and would be grateful if you would arrange for its delivery.

I enclose copies of the Prime Minister's letter for the Private Secretaries of other Members of OD, to whom I am copying this letter.

A. J. COLES

B.J.P. Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

SUBJECT

cc OD

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 94/82

10 DOWNING STREET

Ops Master

THE PRIME MINISTER

4 May, 1982.

Dear Prime Minister,

I have not replied before to your letter of 9 February in which you asked us to review the time-table for the withdrawal of the British garrison from Belize because we were waiting to see whether progress could be made towards a settlement with Guatemala in the period following the elections there. In fact the situation has become even more uncertain. We have now decided that we should not proceed with plans to withdraw the garrison by the agreed date of 21 June. At this stage we are prepared to extend it by a period of three months beyond that date. No announcement will be made about this but we will make clear if asked that the garrison will be staying for the time being.

We fully understand your concern and it is our intention to watch developments with Guatemala closely, to remain in touch with the US Government and to consult you as the situation and our ideas develop.

Every good wish.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

The Honourable George Price.

CO

SECRET

Belize 25

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 April 1982

Please type letter at Flag A.

MR 30/4

Dear John,

Belize: British Garrison

With your letter of 26 April you enclosed a revised draft letter from the Prime Minister to the Prime Minister of Belize. Mr Pym would prefer it if the draft were to incorporate the suggestion made by Mr Nott in his minute of 26 April so that the penultimate sentence of the fourth paragraph would read: 'At this stage we are prepared...'.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD.

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing St

SECRET



CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 6169 (Direct Dialling)
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MO 5

28th April 1982

Dear John,

Amit F.C.O. reply. AR 29/4

BELIZE - BRITISH GARRISON

Thank you for sending us a copy of your letter of 26th April to John Holmes.

I confirm that the draft reply to Mr Price attached to your letter is acceptable to my Secretary of State.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD, and to David Wright.

Yours ever

Dick Piper

(D T PIPER)

A J Coles Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

24

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 April 1982

BF

BELIZE - BRITISH GARRISON

The minute of 19 April to the Prime Minister by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary proposed that the Prime Minister should write to Mr. Price about the date of withdrawal of the Garrison in Belize. Your letter of 22 April suggested some amendments to the draft. The minute of 26 April by the Secretary of State for Defence suggested some further amendments.

Before I put the papers to the Prime Minister, it would be helpful to know whether the Departments most closely concerned are now agreed on the text of the letter. I should therefore be grateful if you and David Omand, to whom I am copying this letter, could let me know whether the enclosed revised draft is acceptable.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD but do not suggest that it is necessary for them to submit it to their Ministers.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE HON GEORGE PRICE, 14 MAR

I have not replied before to your letter of 9 February in which you asked us to review the time-table for the withdrawal of the British garrison from Belize because we were waiting to see whether progress could be made towards a settlement with Guatemala in the period following the elections there. In fact the situation has become even more uncertain. We have now decided that we should not proceed with plans to withdraw the garrison by the agreed date of 21 June. At this stage we are prepared to extend it by a period of three months beyond that date. No announcement will be made about this but we will make clear if asked that the garrison will be staying for the time being.

We fully understand your concern and it is our intention to watch developments with Guatemala closely, to remain in touch with the US Government and to consult you as the situation and our ideas develop.

23

MO 5

PRIME MINISTER

BELIZE - BRITISH GARRISON

I have seen Francis Pym's minute of 19th April proposing the terms in which you might reply to Premier Price's letter of 9th February.

2. I have already indicated my agreement to postponing the date for the withdrawal of the British Garrison from Belize until 21st September. I recognise that there are many uncertainties at present, but I do not regard these as sufficient reason to postpone withdrawal beyond that date. Belize is an independent country, to which we have no binding defence commitment. We have no strategic interests in Central America. It is anomalous, therefore, that we should retain a permanent garrison in Belize for any longer than is necessary. Moreover, the longer we postpone the withdrawal of the garrison the greater will be the risk that we shall get drawn into the conflicts which are spreading in that highly volatile region.

3. Against this background, I propose that we should concede only three months to Mr Price at this stage, and I suggest that the draft letter should be amended as follows:

Para 1, final sentence: Delete "and that no .... announced" and add a new sentence, "At this stage we are prepared to agree to the extension of the garrison by a period of three months".

Such an amendment would recognise that we will take further decisions in the light of developments but would avoid Mr Price going away with the idea that our commitment was in any way open-ended. I also wonder whether we should add a sentence to say that we do not intend to make any public statement about our intentions one way or the other.

4. I am copying this minute to OD colleagues.

NHR Evans (Private Secretary)

[Draft approved by Mr Mott and signed in his absence]

Ministry of Defence

26th April 1982

26 APR 1982

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note SECRET

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

Hon George Price
Belize

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

I have not replied before to your letter of 9 February in which you asked us to review the time-table for the withdrawal of the British garrison from Belize because we were waiting to see whether progress could be made towards a settlement with Guatemala in the period following the elections there. In fact the situation has become even more uncertain. We have now decided that we should not proceed with plans to withdraw the garrison by the agreed date of 21 June and that no date for withdrawal should be announced for the time being. We are prepared to extend it by a period of three months beyond that date.

We fully understand your concern and it is our intention to watch developments with Guatemala closely, to remain in touch with the US Government and to consult you as the situation and our ideas develop.

No announcement will be made about this but we will make clear if asked that the garrison will be staying for the time being.

closures—flag(s).....

Not enclosed w

CONFIDENTIAL

Belize

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 April 1982

NOD still will to comment. Draft letter comment. MR 22/4

Dear John,

Belize: British Garrison 14/4 L.a.

We spoke about Mr Pym's minute to the Prime Minister of 19 April. I now enclose Caracas telno 103, which is the Venezuelan report referred to in paragraph 2 of Mr Pym's minute. We also discussed the wording of the draft letter to Mr Price. I suggest that the penultimate sentence of the first paragraph should end at "21 June", deleting from "and that" to "the time being". The following sentence could then be added at the end of the paragraph: "No announcement will be made about this or about a new date for withdrawal but we will make clear if asked that the garrison will be staying for the time being".

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Donwing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Belize 22

SECRET

Await ROD comment

A.J.C. 20/4

hc.

PM/82/28
PRIME MINISTER

Belize: British Garrison

1. Following your and John Nott's agreement to defer the withdrawal of the garrison, I have been giving thought to the best way of putting this both to Mr Price and to the US Government, bearing in mind your own desire that we should use this decision as positively as possible with the Americans. I also have in mind the likely reactions here and, in particular, the need to ensure that this issue does not become a point of unnecessary parliamentary controversy.

2. It is impossible to predict now how the Falklands problem will affect our relations with either the US Government or Latin American governments. Moreover we need to have a clearer understanding of the nature of the new Guatemalan regime and their prospects for survival as well as their attitudes towards Belize. The current assessment here suggests that the Guatemalan armed forces are not for the moment planning military action against Belize, but you will have seen a report from Caracas which suggests that at least some Venezuelans do not agree with this assessment.

3. The US are of course crucial in all this. While we have received a number of indications of their concern over our plans for withdrawal, we have not yet embarked on a dialogue with them about those plans in the light of the new circumstances. I believe that our first need is to reassure the Americans that we would not wish to take a precipitate or unilteral decision on the garrison while so many uncertainties beset us. Similarly, we should seek to give a similar reassurance to Mr Price while making clear that our long term aim remains unchanged.

/4.

SECRET

SECRET

4. I therefore propose that in your letter to Mr Price, and in the parallel message which we shall have to send to the US Government, we should not give any indication / of a new date. I attach a draft letter from you to Mr Price on these lines.

5. I appreciate that John Nott, in particular, will want to have a firm commitment to a withdrawal date so that his planners may begin to consider what steps need to be taken. But I believe it would be most unwise to make a hard and fast commitment, even internally at this stage, to withdrawal by 21 September. In any event, I take the view that we must use this time to reappraise the relationship between foreign policy and defence effort in this part of the world.

6. I am copying this minute to other members of OD.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
19 April 1982

SECRET

SECRET

DSR [redacted] Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

The Hon George Price
BELIZE

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

I had not replied before to your letter of 9 February in which you asked us to review the timetable for the withdrawal of the British garrison from Belize because we were waiting to see whether progress could be made towards a settlement with Guatemala in the period following the elections there.

In fact, as you know, the situation has become even more uncertain. We have therefore decided that we should not proceed with plans to withdraw the garrison by the previously agreed date of 21 June. We shall not be making any announcement about this or about a new date for the withdrawal.

Your concerns about the future are fully understood here. We intend to continue to watch developments with Guatemala closely, to remain in touch with the US Government and to consult you as the situation and our ideas develop.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

APR 1982

GRS 400
CONFIDENTIAL
FM CARACAS 141900Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 103 OF 14 APRIL

OUR TEL NO 101 : THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. A MEMBER OF CHANCERY HAS MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISORY COMMISSION (CARE) , DR RAFAEL EMILIO MARQUEZ, SINCE THE ARGENTINIAN INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. ON 14 APRIL, FOLLOWING THE MAJOR GOVERNMENT AND PARTY MEETING WHICH ENDORSED COMMUNIQUE REPORTED IN TUR. DR MARQUEZ MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(I) IN CASE OF ARMED CONFLICT
THE VENEZUELANS WOULD TAKE NO DEFINITE ACTION WHILST MEDIATION ATTEMPTS CONTINUED. BUT, IF ARMED CONFLICT TOOK PLACE, THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT WOULD ADHERE TO THE RIO TREATY OF 1947. MILITARY ASSISTANCE (UNSPECIFIED) WOULD BE SENT TO ARGENTINA, DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE UK WOULD BE BROKEN AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WOULD BE REVISED.

(II) ATTITUDE TO BRITAIN
THIS WAS HARDENING AND THREE ANTI-BRITISH POPULAR DEMONSTRATIONS WERE BEING PLANNED. THE TWO MOST SIGNIFICANT WERE THOSE BEING ORGANISED BY THE YOUTH WING OF THE GOVERNING PARTY COPEI AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY (PCV)

(III) GUATEMALA
THE VENEZUELANS HAD RECEIVED REPORTS THAT THE NEW GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT , WHICH WAS WELL VIEWED BY VENEZUELA, WERE CONSIDERING MOVING AGAINST BELIZE. IF THIS OCCCURRED IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES VENEZUELA WOULD BE COMPELLED TO SUPPORT THEM.

(IV) THE GUYANA DISPUTE
DR MARQUEZ CONSIDERED THAT CURRENT POPULAR AND MEDIA CALLS TO OCCUPY THE ESSEQUIBO IMMEDIATELY DID NOT REFLECT THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEW. THE GOVERNMENT WAS COMMITTED TO AWAITING THE EXPIRY OF THE PORT OF SPAIN PROTOCOL, AT WHICH TIME IT WAS LIKELY THAT THEY WOULD CALL UPON THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO SET UP NEW NEGOTIATING MACHINERY. NEVERTHELESS PUBLIC OPINION WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY WORKED UP AND HE COULD NOT GIVE FIRM ASSURANCES THAT THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT NOT WAVER IN ITS RESOLVE.

/ (V) CUBA.

(V) CUBA.

A DELEGATION FROM THE SOVIET EMBASSY HAD CALLED ON CARE ON 13 APRIL. THEY SAW THE INVOCATION OF THE RIO TREATY AS A MEANS OF BRINGING CUBA BACK INTO THE LATIN AMERICAN FOLD. CUBA NEEDED AN ACCOMMODATION WITH LATIN AMERICA. THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR, AND SEVENTEEN OFFICIALS, HAD RETURNED POSTE HASTE TO BUENOS AIRES. THE RUSSIANS WERE NONETHELESS CONCERNED THAT THE RIO TREATY, IF IT WAS REVIVED BY THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE, COULD BE USED AGAINST THEM AT A LATER DATE.

(VI) HAWK

THE HAWK CONTRACT HAD BEEN JEOPARDISED. THOUGH THE ARMED FORCES STILL WANTED IT, POLITICIANS WERE THINKING NOW IN TERMS OF GOING TO THE US. LACK OF MONEY, THE ESSEQUIBO AND THE FALKLANDS CRISIS WERE WORKING AGAINST THE HAWK.

2. I AM INCLINED TO TAKE MARQUEZ' VIEWS SERIOUSLY. HE IS A CENTRAL FIGURE IN THE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE , AND HE HAS BEEN CLOSELY INVOLVED WITH THE CRISIS. WE HAVE FOUND HIM LEVEL-HEADED IN THE PAST.

SECONDE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
FALKLAND ISLANDS

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

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PS/CHANCELLOR
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MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILETT
} TREASURY

MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (EEP DIVN) D/ENERGY

Belize 21

SECRET

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3 (Direct Dialling)
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MO 5

13th April 1982

NR 13/4
Ltr.

Dear Brian,

BELIZE: BRITISH GARRISON

My Secretary of State has seen the Foreign Secretary's minute to the Prime Minister of the 9th April and Clive Whitmore's letter to you of the 11th April. He agrees that we should defer the date for withdrawal of the Belize Garrison to the 21st September.

I am copying this letter to Private Secretaries to other members of OD and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

N H R Evans

(N H R EVANS)

SECRET

B J P Fall Esq

SECRET

SHOW TO MR GILES ON TUESDAY. MRR 14/4

20a

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

11 April 1982

BELIZE: BRITISH GARRISON

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute PM/82/28 of 9 April 1982 about the British Garrison in Belize.

Subject to the views of other members of OD, she agrees with Mr. Pym that we should defer the withdrawal date to 21 September and that she should write accordingly to Mr. Price as soon as possible. She has, however, added that she hopes that we shall use this decision with the Americans. She has commented that we are expected to take decisions to support them and that she hopes this expectation will be fully reciprocated.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to other members of OD, and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

C. A. WHITMORE

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

PM/82/28

PRIME MINISTER

Belize: British Garrison

1. While the meeting of OD on 1 April was unable to deal fully with this item, you suggested that now was not the right moment to start withdrawing the garrison. The salient arguments in favour of retaining the garrison for the time being were set out in my predecessor's minute of 26 March to the Secretary of State for Defence, copied to all members of OD.

2. Since then the situation over the Falkland Islands has greatly strengthened our view that it would be politically impossible to announce the withdrawal of the garrison in the near future.

3. Moreover, in this difficult situation we must keep our lines as clear as possible with the US Government. We have had a further indication from the Ambassador in Washington that the US Government are most anxious that the garrison should not be withdrawn as scheduled. The Ambassador expects us to come under still more pressure from the US Government in the coming weeks.

4. The situation in Guatemala is still unclear, although the Junta do appear to be in full control of the country. The new Foreign Minister has said, in answer to a question at a press conference, that the Belize issue is being studied and that an announcement will be made in due course. With many other pressing pre-occupations facing the new Junta, I would not expect that announcement to be made soon.

/5. Meanwhile,

SECRET

5. Meanwhile, you have not yet sent a substantive reply to the message which the Prime Minister of Belize sent you on 9 February. HMG is committed to consult the Government of Belize over withdrawal of the garrison. While that commitment is not precise, Mr Price will undoubtedly have grounds for complaint if we keep him in suspense much longer. He must be under strong temptation to breach his undertaking of secrecy and bring the whole issue into the open. Apart from anything else, he has to consider the economic consequences for Belize. Although we are being generous to Belize with economic aid and help in developing the Belize Defence Force, the High Commission estimate that the total expenditure by the garrison is about £50 a head of the Belizean population (when the total GNP of Belize is around £420 per head). While there is probably not much more we can do to mitigate this, we should at least give Mr Price as much notice as possible of our intentions so that he may take whatever remedial steps are open to him.

6. I therefore propose that we should agree now to defer the withdrawal date to 21 September and that you should write accordingly to Mr Price as soon as possible. This would give us a breathing space in which to consider the future of the garrison after that date.

7. I am copying this to other OD colleagues and will assume that they agree unless I hear to the contrary.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

9 April 1982

Belize

Ref. A07969

PRIME MINISTER

OD: Belize: Withdrawal of the Garrison

BACKGROUND

OD decided in February 1981 that, if no settlement could be reached with Guatemala, the British garrison might be retained in Belize for up to a year after independence, provided that satisfactory control could be maintained over the foreign policy of the Belize Government during that period.

2. Belize became independent in September 1981. No settlement of Belize's dispute with Guatemala has been achieved. The Prime Minister of Belize, Mr Price, has written to you asking that the garrison should remain for at least three more years. Last week there was a military coup in Guatemala.

3. Mr Price has been told that the withdrawal date will be 21 June. If this date is to be met, a decision must be taken now, so that preparatory action can go ahead, and the withdrawal would become public knowledge by the middle of April. In his minute of 26 March the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has proposed that we should not announce withdrawal at present, should retain the garrison for the time being and look at the situation again in about two months' time when the position in Guatemala might be clearer. He rests his case on

(a) the domestic political difficulties which withdrawing the garrison would bring, in the light of criticism of the Government's policy towards Central America and indeed the Falklands; and

(b) the strong American desire for us to keep the garrison in Belize which was shown by their attempting to link its retention with the terms of our purchase of Trident.

4. In his reply dated 26 March, the Secretary of State for Defence draws attention to

(a) the risks of maintaining combat forces in an independent Central American country;

(b) the point that, if we give in now to Mr Price, he will believe we can be pressurised into staying much longer;

(c) the intelligence assessment that the military threat to Belize is low and

(d) the fact that the Americans were reassured of our willingness to help by leaving behind loan service personnel to help the Belize Defence Force and to keep a naval presence in the Caribbean.

5. The Acting Chief of the Defence Staff, the Chief of the Air Staff, will with your agreement be in attendance.

HANDLING

6. You will wish to invite the Lord Privy Seal, in the absence of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, to introduce the subject and then ask the Secretary of State for Defence for his views. Points to establish in subsequent discussion are:

(a) Will it be possible to limit the postponement of withdrawal of the garrison, or are we likely, if we postpone, to undertake a commitment which will in practice prove open-ended? If the Committee's original decision not to leave the garrison there for longer than 12 months after independence is to stand, that will involve an announcement not later than July that the garrison is to be withdrawn in September.

(b) What would be the purpose of retaining the garrison? The original object was to bridge the uneasy period during which an independent Commonwealth country could establish itself in the face of a claim to its territory

from one of its neighbours. Since the threat from Guatemala is now thought to be low, and there are no immediate prospects of a settlement with Guatemala, the purpose of retaining the garrison would presumably be primarily to give evidence, to the Americans and others, of British concern for the stability of Central America. Do the Committee feel that the United Kingdom should become involved in that region in support of American policies?

(c) How would Premier Price be likely to respond to a postponement of withdrawal and how would it be presented to him? Belmopan Telegram No 121 of 25 March reports that the reaction of the Belize Government and public to the news of the coup in Guatemala has been calm. Would Mr Price think that, if the British Government's reaction is to postpone withdrawal, they might easily be persuaded to keep the garrison there for considerably longer? Does the Lord Privy Seal propose that Mr Price should be given any indication of when the new withdrawal date should be?

(d) If the Committee feel that to announce a date for withdrawal now in the immediate aftermath of the elections in El Salvador would be difficult, could the Secretary of State for Defence accept a slight delay in the decision and the consequent preparatory moves, while still keeping open the option of withdrawal in June? Would it be possible to hold over an announcement until the end of April and still keep a June withdrawal date?

(e) If the garrison is to stay in Belize for a further period, how is the cost to be financed? On whose vote? and from the Contingency Reserve?

CONCLUSION

7. If the Committee decides that withdrawal of the garrison should proceed as planned, by 21 June, it will be necessary to invite the Lord Privy Seal to consider how best to present this decision to the Americans and to the Government of Belize. You will also wish to register a decision on whether the announcement should be postponed until the end of April.

8. If the Committee concludes that the withdrawal of the garrison should be postponed, you will wish to consider whether a new target date for withdrawal should be set. You will also need to invite the Secretary of State for Defence to consider the consequences of this, in consultation with the Lord Privy Seal and the Chief Secretary, Treasury, and the Lord Privy Seal to consider when and how the news of the decision should be conveyed to the United States Government, the Government of Belize, and Parliament.

RGA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

31st March 1982

SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 March 1982

BELIZE: BRITISH GARRISON

The Prime Minister has seen Lord Carrington's minute of 26 March and Mr. Nott's minute of the same date. She has commented that the problem should be discussed at OD.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the members of OD and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

MO 5

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

BELIZE

Thank you for your minute of today's date.

2. I cannot bring myself to accept the arguments you adduce for postponing our withdrawal from Belize. Our common objective is to withdraw the Garrison as soon as possible. We run considerable risks in maintaining combat forces in an independent Central American country, and these risks increase the longer those forces remain. We must avoid getting drawn into a conflict which is spreading rapidly through the region. We have no strategic interest in Central America, and we do not have the resouces to help the Americans defend theirs.

3. Of course, Premier Price, the Americans, and even the Guatemalans have reasons for wanting us to stay. Price has already asked us to stay for a further three years. If we now do as you propose, he will infer that we can be pressured into staying, he will not be satisfied by the extension you have in mind, and he will not hesitate to mobilise his friends in this country and elsewhere in support of further extensions.

4. As to the Guatemalan coup, this would seem to rule out any chance of a settlement of the Belize question in the coming months. It was to avoid prejudicing the chance of a settlement that Richard Luce originally proposed to Peter Blaker a postponement of the withdrawal. It is, of course, difficult to be sure what the coup portends, but the intelligence assessment suggests that the military threat to Belize is lower now than it has been for some considerable time.

5. As you say, the Americans have asked us to stay on in Belize, and this possibility was discussed in the context of Trident. We made it clear then that we could not leave combat troops in Belize, but that our Loan Service Personnel (LSP) would remain to help the Belize Defence Force (BDF), that we were equipping the BDF to a good standard, and that there would continue to be a RN presence in the Caribbean for several months every year. The Americans were reassured by all this, and we have since decided to keep the Caribbean guardship, and to look at the possibility of periodic Army exercises in Belize after the Garrison is withdrawn.

6. As you can see my position has not changed and, in the light of the presentational problems which you foresee, we must clearly discuss this at OD at the earliest possible opportunity.

7. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister and other members of OD.

N H R Evans

[Draft approved by Mr Holt and signed in his absence]

Ministry of Defence
26th March 1982

SECRET

Prime Minister

You may wish simply to note, pending Mr. Nott's reply. – NOW BELOW

A.J.C. 26/3

FCS/82/56

We shall have to discuss d. ovd.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

Belize: British Garrison

1. Gerry Wiggin wrote to Richard Luce on 10 March about the withdrawal of the garrison. I understand that if the garrison is to be withdrawn by 21 June as scheduled you would need a decision no later than 1 April and that moves would then have to be made which would lead to the withdrawal becoming public knowledge by the middle of April. You also know that Mr Price, the Prime Minister of Belize, has written to the Prime Minister asking that the garrison should remain in Belize for at least three more years.

2. I have given careful consideration to all the arguments for sticking to the June date and have come to the conclusion that this is simply not the time to begin the withdrawal of the garrison and for this to become public. As you will know, the situation in Central America is giving rise to increasing Parliamentary and public concern in this country. There is considerable uncertainty over events in the area which will ensure that it remains in the forefront of public attention for some time to come. This week's coup d'etat in Guatemala focusses that uncertainty uncomfortably close to Belize. We have already had indications of back-bench concern within our own party over rumours of the imminent withdrawal of the garrison. Mr Price has many friends on both sides of the House, as well as within the Commonwealth, whom he will not hestitate to lobby in support of his case. I am quite sure that if we were to announce withdrawal in the next few weeks, as we would have to, we would face a very considerable political storm which would add to the sustained attack we are already suffering over our policy towards Central America and indeed the Falklands.

/3.

SECRET

SECRET

3. But I am not only looking at this from the domestic point of view. We have, at considerable political cost, sent observers to the Salvadorean elections partly because we felt it necessary to support the US Government for broader Alliance reasons and partly because we hope that by doing so we might have greater influence over US policy towards Central America which is giving us all some worries. If at this critical time we were to announce our withdrawal, knowing that the Americans have only recently urged us to stay, I believe that the US Government would find it very difficult to understand. They would be likely to put heavy pressure on us to reverse our decision. If we refused this could spill over into our wider relations. They have already attempted to make a link between our troops in Belize and Trident.

4. You will recall that OD originally agreed on 17 July last year that if no settlement could be reached with Guatemala the garrison might be retained for up to a year after Independence - that is until 21 September this year. Nicholas Ridley was subsequently able to persuade Mr Price that the withdrawal date should be nine months after Independence. I propose that we should retain the garrison for the time being, within the disretion of a year originally given by OD. This would give us an opportunity to look at the situation in OD in a couple of month's time when the position in Guatemala might be clearer. It would also be useful to have the El Salvador elections and their immediate consequences, not least for US policy, behind us.

5. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister and other members of OD.

26 March 1982
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

(CARRINGTON)

CONFIDENTIAL

P 252300Z MAR 82
FM BELMOPAN
TO FCO LONDON
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L UK COMMS ONLY
SIC TELNO 121
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 121 OF 25 MARCH 1982
FOR INFO WASHINGTON, TEGUCIGALPA, SAN JOSE AND BERNE (FOR BIS GUATEMALA)

WASHINGTON TELNO 979 : GUATEMALA

REACTION OF BELIZE GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC TO NEWS OF COUP HAS BEEN CALM. SENIOR OFFICIAL OF MFA COMMENTED THAT IT IS THE KIND OF THING BELIZEANS EXPECT TO HAPPEN IN GUATEMALA AND THAT THEY WOULD NOT EXPECT THE NEW MILITARY GOVERNMENT TO BE VERY DIFFERENT FROM THE LAST ONE. HOWEVER, THE BELIZE GOVERNMENT WILL CERTAINLY BE WATCHING CLOSELY FOR ANY INDICATION OF NEW REGIME,S ATTITUDE TOWARDS BELIZE AND THE IMPLPCATIONS OF THIS FOR THEIR SECURITY AND THE PROSPECTS OF FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS.

FCO PLEASE PASS ALL

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

TREW

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

LIMITED PS/LPS
MCAD PS/MRLUCE
DEF.D PS/PUS
SAMD MR GIFFARD
RES.D MR WRIGHT
NAD MR GILLMORE
NEWS.D MR ULE
INFO.D CABINET OFFICE
PS

COPIES TO:
CABINET OFFICE
CAPT TOD

CONFIDENTIAL

Belize

PS/No 10 Downing Street

SECRET DEDIP

25254 - 1

h.a. AR 26/2

GRS 767
D E D I P
SECRET
FM FCO 2512457 FEBRUARY 82
TO FLASH WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 357 of 25 Feb
INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY), PRIORITY
MODUK (FOR PS S OF S)
YOUR TELNO 611 : TRIDENT
FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR WADE-GERY

1. ON FEARLESS AND INTREPID YOU CAN CONFIRM THAT IT WOULD BE OUR INTENTION TO ANNOUNCE THEIR REPRIEVE ON 8 MARCH BEFORE ANNOUNCING THE DECISION ON D5. THE AIM WOULD BE TO MAINTAIN THEM IN THEIR CURRENT ROLE, AT LEAST FOR THE REST OF THE DECADE. WE WOULD THUS PRESERVE NOT ONLY OUR CAPABILITY FOR EARLY AMPHIBIOUS REINFORCEMENT OF NORTH NORWAY AND OTHER KEY NATO AREAS, BUT ALSO OUR ABILITY TO OPERATE WITH THESE SHIPS AND ROYAL MARINES OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA. IT WOULD IN ANY CASE BE OUR INTENTION TO DEPLOY ONE OF THEM ANNUALLY IN THE TRAINING ROLE TO THE CARIBBEAN FOR A PERIOD OF SOME SIX WEEKS. THE DEFENCE SECRETARY WOULD BE GLAD TO SEND A MESSAGE TO SECRETARY WEINBERGER TO THIS EFFECT TO MEET THE TIMESCALE ENVISAGED IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE.

2. ON BELIZE, YOU WERE QUITE RIGHT TO DISCOUNT THE PROSPECTS OF OUR BEING PREPARED TO MAINTAIN COMBAT UNITS THERE BEYOND THE DATE NOW PLANNED. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, MINISTERS HAVE NOT YET TAKEN A VIEW ON PRICE'S SUGGESTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF THAT PRESENCE, AND THIS WILL BE CONSIDERED IN SLOWER TIME AND ON ITS MERITS. YOU SHOULD ON NO ACCOUNT, THEREFORE, LET THIS BECOME AN ISSUE IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS. WE NOTE IN ANY CASE THAT MACFARLANE SAW LITTLE PROMISE IN THAT DIRECTION.

3. SO FAR AS THE TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME IS CONCERNED, OUR PRESENT PLAN IS FOR SOME 15 LOAN SERVICE

/PERSONNEL

PERSONNEL TO REMAIN AFTER THE GARRISON IS WITHDRAWN WHO WILL BE INTEGRATED INTO THE BELIZE DEFENCE FORCE (BDF). THESE WILL INCLUDE THE FORCE COMMANDER. THIS PRESENCE WILL REMAIN FOR AN INITIAL TERM OF 2 YEARS, BUT IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE BEYOND THAT PERIOD. WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF LSP, BUT WE WILL BE CONSTRAINED BY THE EXTREME RELUCTANCE ON POLITICAL GROUNDS OF THE BELIZEAN GOVERNMENT TO ACCEPT A LARGER NUMBER. THIS IS NOT MAINLY A QUESTION OF MONEY, YOU CAN STRESS THAT WE PAY THE MAJOR PROPORTION OF THE COSTS. THERE ARE LIMITS TO THE CAPACITY OF THE BDF TO ABSORB TRAINING EFFORT OR TO ACHIEVE A SIGNIFICANTLY FASTER RATE OF BUILD-UP. WE ARE ALSO PREPARED TO CONSIDER MAKING MORE MONEY AVAILABLE TO PAY FOR MILITARY TRAINING OF BELIZEANS IN THE UK.

4. ON EQUIPMENT, YOU CAN POINT OUT THAT WE HAVE ALREADY STARTED PROVIDING A WIDE RANGE OF EQUIPMENT TO THE BDF FOR THEIR REGULAR AND PART-TIME RIFLE COMPANIES. ADDITIONALLY, WE WILL PROVIDE AND PAY FOR THE EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING FOR AN AIR WING OF 2 LIGHT AIRCRAFT, A MARITIME WING OF 2 ARMED PATROL VESSELS, AND A LIMITED AIR DEFENCE CAPABILITY. THE GARRISON WILL BE LEAVING A GOOD DEAL OF OTHER EQUIPMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE BEHIND FOR THE BDF. THIS IS STILL UNDER DISCUSSION IN BELIZE.

5. AS REGARDS THE QUESTION OF A NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN, YOU ARE AWARE THAT WE DO NOT INTEND TO MAINTAIN THE BELIZE GUARDSHIP PRECISELY IN ITS PRESENT FORM. BUT YOU CAN TELL THE AMERICANS THAT WE DO PLAN REGULAR FRIGATE DEPLOYMENTS TO THE CARIBBEAN, CERTAINLY FOR SOME MONTHS IN EACH YEAR. THIS WOULD BE COMPLEMENTED BY ANNUAL TRAINING DEPLOYMENTS BY EITHER FEARLESS OR INTREPID.

6. THE DEFENCE SECRETARY WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE OPENING YOU HAVE CREATED FOR SIDE LETTER ON TWO-WAY STREET. WE SUGGEST YOU TACKLE DRAFTING ON YOUR RETURN IN LIGHT OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS. IT WILL BE VERY IMPORTANT FOR US TO BE ABLE TO SAY THAT YOU HAVE FULLY DEPLOYED WITH THE AMERICANS THE OFFSET ARGUMENTS SET OUT IN ANNEX E OF YOUR ORIGINAL

/NEGOTIATING

NEGOTIATING BRIEF INCLUDING HAWK AND RAPIER, AND THAT THE AMERICANS ARE CONSIDERING OUR ARGUMENTS.

7. ON TIMING OF ANNOUNCEMENT, YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT DEFENCE SECRETARY IS CONCERNED AT PROPOSED GAP BETWEEN FINAL CABINET AND PUBLIC STATEMENT AND THIS IS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION IN LONDON. YOU SHOULD WARN AMERICANS THAT THURSDAY 11 MARCH IS STILL A POSSIBLE ANNOUNCEMENT DATE.

8. YOU WILL NO DOUBT WISH TO ENSURE THAT MR LUCE IS AWARE OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS AS THEY AFFECT BELIZE, IN VIEW OF HIS FORTHCOMING DISCUSSIONS WITH ENDERS ON ON 1 MARCH.

CARRINGTON

LIMITED

HD/DEFENCE D
PS
PS/LPS
PS/PUS
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE

COPIES TO:

PS/No10 DOWNING STREET ✓
PS/SIR R. ARMSTRONG
Cabinet Office

Belize

Lle No

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 February 1982

BELIZE

Thank you for your letter of 23 February about a message to the Prime Minister from the Prime Minister of Belize.

I did not see Belmopan telegram No. 63 of 9 February at the time. I do not think that the enclosure to your letter can be the original of the message from Mr. Price. The original version reached me on 23 February and is retained here.

I note that work is in hand on a draft reply and that you will be letting me have advice in due course.

B/F/

A.J. COLES

J. E. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

19

covering SECRET

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 February 1982

Dear John,

I attach the original of a message to the Prime Minister from Prime Minister Price about Belize defence arrangements, which reached us in this form on Friday.

The text of Mr Price's message was telegraphed by the High Commission on 9 February (a copy of their telegram no 63 is attached). I am not sure whether this telegram was copied to you at the time. If not, I apologise for the oversight. Work is in hand on a draft reply, which will be sent to you as soon as possible. Mr Luce has already talked about this to Mr Blaker and FCO and MOD officials are discussing further.

We have asked the High Commissioner in Belmopan to acknowledge to Mr Price that we have received his message, which is being studied.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

covering SECRET

9 February 1982

Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London

Dear Prime Minister,

Time is going by (it is now five months since independence) and we have not been able to reach a settlement with Guatemala, although we are trying hard to do so with the help of the United States.

According to the Guatemalan Foreign Minister, they are awaiting the results of their elections on March 7, 1982, before doing anything. Then afterwards (depending on the outcome) they will resume negotiations.

Because of this uncertain situation would you please review the time table of the "appropriate period" and arrange for the British Garrison to be in Belize for at least three years or until a definite settlement is reached and Guatemala takes out of its constitution its unfounded claim to Belize. The British presence here is an essential factor of stability in Central America.

I am sorry to bother you with this request at a time when you are applying difficult policies, which I trust time and history will vindicate.

Kindest regards and best wishes.

Sincerely,

(GEORGE PRICE)
Prime Minister

SECRET

GRS 563
SECRET
FM BELMOPAN 092300Z FEB 82.
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 63 OF 9 FEBRUARY.

FOR MCAD ONLY

1. FOLLOWING LETTER ADDRESSED TO PRIME MINISTER RECEIVED FROM MR PRICE TODAY.
BEGINS:-
TIME IS GOING BY (IT IS NOW FIVE MONTHS SINCE INDEPENDENCE) AND WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO REACH A SETTLEMENT WITH GUATEMALA, ALTHOUGH WE ARE TRYING HARD TO DO SO WITH THE HELP OF THE UNITED STATES. ACCORDING TO THE GUATEMALAN FOREIGN MINISTER, THEY ARE AWAITING THE RESULTS OF THEIR ELECTIONS ON MARCH 7 1982, BEFORE DOING ANYTHING. THEN AFTERWARDS (DEPENDING ON THE OUTCOME) THEY WILL RESUME NEGOTIATIONS. BECAUSE OF THIS UNCERTAIN SITUATION WOULD YOU PLEASE REVIEW THE TIMETABLE OF THE QUOTE APPROPRIATE PERIOD UNQUOTE AND ARRANGE FOR THE BRITISH GARRISON TO BE IN BELIZE FOR AT LEAST THREE YEARS OR UNTIL A DEFINITE SETTLEMENT IS REACHED AND GUATEMALA TAKES OUT OF ITS CONSTITUTION ITS UNFOUNDED CLAIM TO BELIZE. THE BRITISH PRESENCE HERE IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR OF STABILITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA.
I AM SORRY TO BOTHER YOU WITH THIS REQUEST AT A TIME WHEN YOU ARE APPLYING DIFFICULT POLICIES, WHICH I TRUST TIME, HISTORY WILL VINDICATE.
ENDS.

2. PRICE TOLD ME BY TELEPHONE THAT THIS WAS ON THE WAY BUT I CANNOT CALL ON HIM TODAY TO DISCUSS IT FURTHER SINCE HE IS INCOMMUNICADO IN CABINET MEETINGS ALL DAY. (IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO PIN DOWN FOR THE REST OF THE WEEK SINCE THE BUDGET IS IN PREPARATION.) THE LETTER IS NOT UNEXPECTED SINCE PRICE HAS BEEN PUTTING OUT SIGNALS FOR SOME TIME. I DO NOT THINK THAT HE HAS ANY REAL EXPECTATION OF OBTAINING OUR AGREEMENT TO AN EXTENSION TO 3 YEARS. THIS IS IN THE NATURE OF AN OPENING BID. BUT HE WOULD LIKE TO BE RID OF THE PROSPECT OF AN EARLY REVELATION THAT THE TROOPS WILL BE GONE IN 4 MONTHS TIME. IF THE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER IS NEGATIVE HIS NEXT MOVE WILL NO DOUT BE TO TRY TO MOBILISE PRESSURE ON HMG FROM OTHER SOURCES E.G. THE AMERICANS, THE COMMONWEALTH CARRIBEAN AND BRITISH MP'S.

3. MCAD TO ARRANGE ANY FURTHER DISTRIBUTION PLEASE.
TREW

LIMITED

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CCD	MR URE
NEWS D	LORD N G LENNOX
INFORMATION D	

SECRET

SUBJECT
cc MASTER
OPS

T 26A/82

Please Quote

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 26A/82

Office Of The Prime Minister

Belmopan,
Cayo District, Belize
Central America

9 February 1982

Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London

Dear Prime Minister,

Time is going by (it is now five months since independence) and we have not been able to reach a settlement with Guatemala, although we are trying hard to do so with the help of the United States.

According to the Guatemalan Foreign Minister, they are awaiting the results of their elections on March 7, 1982, before doing anything. Then afterwards (depending on the outcome) they will resume negotiations.

Because of this uncertain situation would you please review the time table of the "appropriate period" and arrange for the British Garrison to be in Belize for at least three years or until a definite settlement is reached and Guatemala takes out of its constitution its unfounded claim to Belize. The British presence here is an essential factor of stability in Central America.

I am sorry to bother you with this request at a time when you are applying difficult policies, which I trust time and history will vindicate.

Kindest regards and best wishes.

Sincerely,

George Price

(GEORGE PRICE)
Prime Minister

Belize

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime minister

See also the attached, which tends to confirm this report.

LVR 29/12

P 281600Z DEC 81
FM BELMOPAN
TO FCO LONDON
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L UK COMMS ONLY
SIC TELNO 161
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 161 OF 28 DECEMBER 1981
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. SHORTLY AFTER PAYNE'S VISIT I MET WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ROGERS. HE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS LESS SANGUINE THAN PRICE ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR A TREATY BASED ON THE AMERICAN TEXTS. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN INTO NEGOTIATIONS TOO OFTEN BEFORE, AND KNEW HOW EASY IT WAS FOR INITIAL OPTIMISM TO BE DISAPPOINTED. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE COULD NOT SEE HOW PRESIDENT LUCAS COULD AFFORD TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY OVER BELIZE, WHEN HIS CANDIDATE (GENERAL GUEVARA) WAS SHOWING SO POORLY IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

2. FITCH, THE ACTING CHARGE AT THE US EMBASSY , SAID TO ME ON 21 DECEMBER THAT, IN HIS VIEW, ONLY A HEAVY COMMITMENT BY THE US TO SUPPLY ARMS TO THE GUATEMALANS WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO PERSUADE PRESIDENT LUCAS TO SIGN A TREATY.

FCO PASS WASHINGTON

[PASSED AS REQUESTED]

NASH

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PUSD	MR DAY	[NOT ADVANCED]
PLANNING STAFF	SIR A ACLAND	
LEGAL ADVISERS	MR GILLMORE	
CCD	MR URE	
NEWS D	LORD N G LENNOX	
INFORMATION D	CABINET OFFICE	

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 600

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 242330Z DEC 81
TO ROUTINE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3933 OF 24 DECEMBER 1981,
AND TO BELMOPAN,
AND SAVING TO MEXICO CITY.

BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. MORLAND (ACCOMPANIED BY FRENCH) CALLED ON CRAIG JOHNSTONE TODAY TO HEAR HOW SENATOR STONE HAD GOT ON IN DISCUSSING THE TREATY WITH THE GUATEMALANS.

2. JOHNSTONE SAID THAT THE TEXT STONE PRESENTED HAD INCORPORATED HAND WRITTEN AMENDMENTS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF BELIZE'S COMMENTS RECORDED IN BELMOPAN TELNOS 148 AND 149 TO THE F C O, THOUGH IT WAS PRESENTED TO THE GUATEMALANS AS BASED ON DISCUSSIONS WITH THE THREE OTHER PARTIES (U S, U K, BELIZE). STONE SAW LUCAS, SKINNER-KLEE AND ALONSO LIMA. THE GUATEMALANS WERE GENERALLY HELPFUL. IN PARTICULAR THEY DID NOT REACT ADVERSELY TO THE REARRANGEMENT OF THE DRAFTS PROPOSED BY PRICE. THEY WERE NOT, HOWEVER, PREPARED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES FULLY TO THEIR COMMENTS, WHICH THEY WERE RELUCTANT TO DESCRIBE EVEN AS PRELIMINARY REACTIONS. THAT SAID, STONE (AND JOHNSTONE) ARE REASONABLY OPTIMISTIC.

3. THE GUATEMALAN COMMENTS (SEE M I F T) HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED INTO A FRESH TEXT WITH ARTICLES RENUMBERED AS NECESSARY WHICH FOLLOWS BY BAG LEAVING 29TH DECEMBER. THE AMERICANS HAVE ADDED TO THIS TEXT COCKSHY DRAFT EXCHANGES OF NOTES ABOUT PIPELINES, POLLUTION ETC. JOHNSTONE ASKED, AND WE AGREED, THAT THE FRESH TEXT SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN TO PRICE AT THIS STAGE SINCE GUATEMALAN REACTIONS ARE STILL SO TENTATIVE, AND THE TEXT COULD GIVE PRICE A FALSE IMPRESSION.

4. BEFORE LEAVING FOR HIS CHRISTMAS TRIP, CASTILLO HAD APPARENTLY CONVINCED LUCAS THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO SIGN A TREATY BEFORE THE GUATEMALAN ELECTIONS ON 7 MARCH AS THE MORE RADICAL PARTIES, IN PARTICULAR, MIGHT TRY TO MAKE IT AN ELECTION ISSUE. LUCAS IS NOW THINKING IN TERMS OF CONCLUDING THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TREATY BY MID-FEBRUARY, THEN DELAYING SIGNATURE UNTIL THE IMMEDIATE POST-ELECTION PERIOD WHEN HE STILL HAS SOME INFLUENCE OVER HIS SUCCESSOR. JOHNSTONE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD ASK STONE TO TRY TO GET THE DATE FOR SIGNATURE BROUGHT FORWARD, BUT WOULD ACCEPT THE PROPOSED DELAY IF THEY HAD TO. IT WOULD, HOWEVER, BE DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN THE DEGREE OF CONFIDENTIALITY OVER SUCH A LONG TIME EVEN IF, AS THE AMERICANS ASSUME, THE REFERENDUM IN BELIZE WOULD BE AFTER SIGNATURES. THE ADMINISTRATION IS ALSO ANXIOUS TO SECURE AT AN EARLY STAGE CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR FURTHER ASSISTANCE TO GUATEMALA, FOR EXAMPLE IN THE WAY OF MILITARY SPARE PARTS, AND THEY WOULD HAVE

/LIKED

LIKED TO PURSUE THIS WHEN CONGRESS RETURNS AT THE END OF JANUARY. GUATEMALAN SIGNATURE OF AN AGREEMENT WITH BELIZE COULD MOLLIFY GUATEMALA'S OPPONENTS ON THE HILL. IF LUCAS INSISTED ON DELAYING SIGNATURE UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD STILL LIKE, EARLY ON, TO PRESENT AGREED TEXTS OF A TREATY TO A FEW KEY PEOPLE ON THE HILL ASSURING THEM THAT SIGNATURE WAS IN SIGHT.

5. ON TIMING, THE AMERICANS HAVE IN MIND MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON ON 6/8 JANUARY AT THE EARLIEST. THE AMERICANS WOULD TALK FIRST WITH THE GUATEMALANS (SKINNER-KLEE MIGHT COME OVER): WE AND THE U S WOULD THEN GET TOGETHER, FOLLOWED BY A MEETING BETWEEN THE U K AND PRICE, PERHAPS IN WASHINGTON.

6. JOHNSTONE SUGGESTED THAT WE TELL PRICE THAT THE GUATEMALANS HAVE GIVEN A FIRST REACTION TO THE TREATY, WHICH WE ARE CONSIDERING WITH THE AMERICANS.

F C O PASS SAVING MEXICO CITY.

HENDERSON.

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INFORMATION D	CABINET OFFICE	

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

[PASSED AS REQUESTED]

Belize

Col 6 21.10.81 **Belize**

Mr. Healey asked the Prime Minister whether it is proposed that a gift should be presented to the Government of Belize to mark the attainment of independence on 21 September.

The Prime Minister: The House will, I feel sure, wish to send congratulations to Belize on its independence, along with best wishes for the happiness and prosperity of the people of that country. Her Majesty's Government propose to offer a suitable gift to mark the occasion.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 October, 1981

Michael Alexander wrote to you on 3 September about the independence gift for Belize.

I am writing to say that we expect Mr Denis Healey to table the question suggested in your letter of 1 September, and the Prime Minister will answer it on 19 October.

I am sending copies of this letter to Jim Buckley (Chancellor of the Duchy's Office), David Heyhoe (Lord President's Office), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and Sir Noel Short (Speaker's Office).

M. A. PATTISON

A K C Wood, Esq
Lord Privy Seal's Office

10 DOWNING STREET

NOTE FOR THE FILE

Spoke to Roger Sands Overseas Office House of Commons. Informed him that we intend to arrange PQ for Party next week.

See FCO to MODBA 1.9.1981

TCR
15 October 1981

12 October 1981

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your telegram of 11 October. I will place this before her at once.

W. F. S. RICKETT

The Honourable George Price

British TELECOM Telegram for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

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11 OCT 1981/1844

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BELIZECITYBELIZE 28/27 11 1102

RIGHT HONOURABLE PRIME MINISTER

MARGARET THATCHER

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDONSW1

PLEASURE MEETING YOU. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR UNDERSTANDING

OF BELIZE'S PROBLEM. BEST WISHES FOR HAPPY BIRTHDAY.

GEORGE PRICE

COL 10

NOT TRC DLY

TOWNNAME LONDONSW1 LR

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British TELECOM Telegram for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

SUBJECT

Belize

BOX

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 130/81

c.c. Mar 6
Ops.

Belizean Independence Secretariat
Independence Hill
Belmopan
Belize, Central America

T 130/81

MG

22 September 1981

R9/10

Dear Prime Minister,

On behalf of the people and government of Belize, very many thanks for your message of congratulations on the independence of Belize, Monday, 21 September 1981.

We do appreciate the kind words of congratulations and encouragement and we shall endeavour to live up to our obligations as an independent country in preserving and promoting in our region peace, stability and prosperity.

In our statement on Independence Day, I declared Belize's place in the international community:

> "As we become a member of world communities, we hear the question asked - What is Belize and its people, and how will they fit among you?
>
> "In reply, Belize is a Caribbean and Central American nation, which works and lives a revolution that is peaceful, constructive, new, progressive and Belizean. It is our own with all our national attributes.
>
> "Belize is a people with all the attributes of nationhood, having one flag, one government, one constitution. Our mind imbues the democratic process. Our hand works the mixed economy. Our heart beats with social justice, and our soul cherishes treasures of the spirit."

May we be accepted by you and together work to help bring peace, stability and prosperity to our region and to wider circles of our planet earth.

With kindest regards and best wishes

Sincerely

George Price

(GEORGE PRICE)
Prime Minister

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland
10 Downing Street
London SW 1

SUBJECT

Belize

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 128/81

cc Mr Lever + Ops CF

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 September 1981

I am very pleased to send through The Hon. Nicholas Ridley, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this message of goodwill to the Government and people of Belize from myself and the British Government. On this historic day, which marks the beginning of a new era in the long association between Belize and the United Kingdom, we extend to you our warm congratulations on the attainment by Belize of sovereign independent status.

I look forward with confidence to long and fruitful co-operation between our two countries as fellow members of the Commonwealth. I shall particularly welcome the opportunity to join colleagues in welcoming you to the meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government in Australia later this month.

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

The Honourable George Price

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 September 1981

Dear Michael,

Commonwealth Membership

I enclose a message from the Commonwealth Secretary-General informing Heads of Government that Commonwealth Governments have agreed to Belize becoming a member of the Commonwealth on independence on 21 September. The Secretariat issued an announcement on 15 September.

Belize will become the 45th member of the Commonwealth, and Mr Price is expected to be present at Melbourne.

yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

OFFICE OF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL
MARLBOROUGH HOUSE · PALL MALL · LONDON SW1Y 5HX

Circular Letter No. 42/81 11 September 1981

I should be grateful if you would kindly transmit the following message about Belize's membership of the Commonwealth to your Head of Government:

BEGINS

"I am pleased to inform you that following consultations with Commonwealth Heads of Government on the question of Belize's application for membership of the Commonwealth which began with my message of 13 August 1981, I will be announcing on 15 September that Belize will become the forty-fifth member of the Commonwealth on achieving independence on 21 September 1981.

With deep respect,

Shridath S Ramphal
Commonwealth Secretary-General"

ENDS

A copy of the text of the announcement is attached for your information.

Yours sincerely,

Shridath S. Ramphal

Shridath S Ramphal

Text of announcement:

BELIZE JOINS THE COMMONWEALTH

Belize will join the Commonwealth as its forty-fifth member state when it becomes independent on 21 September. This was announced today by the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Mr Shridath Ramphal, after consultations with member Governments.

Belize, situated on the Caribbean coast of Central America has a population of 150,000. Approximately forty-two per cent of the workforce is engaged in agriculture, with maize, rice and beans being the main produce.

After independence Belize will be a consitutional monarchy with Queen Elizabeth II as Head of State. The Prime Minister, Mr George Price, has been Premier since 1964. Born in 1919 he entered public life in 1944 serving as Mayor of Belize City on several occasions. He was a founder member of the People's United Party in 1950 and became its leader in 1956 shortly after he was elected to the National Assembly. He spearheaded the internationalisation of Belize's problems, and mobilised Commonwealth and international support for its independence. He is expected to attend for the first time the Meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government in Melbourne at the end of this month.

17 SEP 1934

BELIZE/GUATEMALA ADVANCE COPIES 21

P 6
PS/LPS 3
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/PUS
MR DAY
~~MR URE~~

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

HD/M & C D (2)
HD/S AM D
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HD/NEWS D
HD/UND

RESIDENT CLERK

DIO CABINET OFFICE

IMMEDIATE

GRS 80
CONFIDENTIAL
FM GUATEMALA CITY 11/1534Z SEP 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER U/N OF 11 SEPTEMBER
R F I : IMMEDIATE BELMOPAN (PERSONAL)

MY TELNO 443 : BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. WE HEARD TODAY OF FURTHER INSTANCES OF BRITISH SUBJECTS CARRYING TOURIST CARDS, BEING DENIED ENTRY TO TH GUATEMALA ON 10 SEPTEMBER.

2. ALTHOUGH GUATEMALANS TOLD US YESTERDAY THAT PREVIOUS INSTANCES WERE A ''MISTAKE'' THESE FURTHER EXAMPLES APPEAR TO INDICATE A DELIBERATE POLICY OF HARASSMENT BY THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT.

WILKES

NNNN

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Type for PM's signature

8 September 1981

Dear Michael,

Independence of Belize

When a British territory becomes independent it is customary for the Prime Minister to send a message of congratulations to the Prime Minister of the newly independent State. I enclose for consideration a draft of such a message to the Prime Minister of Belize which will become independent on 21 September.

The message would be delivered by the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Nicholas Ridley, who will attend the Independence Celebrations.

It is also customary for a message from The Queen to be read when the Constitutional instruments are presented by Her Majesty's Special Representative, in this case Prince Michael of Kent. Arrangements for this are being made.

yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11

Registry No.

DRAFT MESSAGE

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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~~Confidential.~~ XXXXXX
~~Restricted.~~ XXXXXX
Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

To:-
Prime Minister of Belize

From
Prime Minister

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

I am very pleased to send through The Hon Nicholas Ridley, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this message of goodwill to the Government and people of Belize from myself and the British Government. On this historic day, which marks the beginning of a new era in the long association between Belize and the United Kingdom, we extend to you our warm congratulations on the attainment by Belize of sovereign independence status.

I look forward with confidence to long and fruitful co-operation between our two countries as fellow members of the Commonwealth. I shall particularly welcome the opportunity to join colleagues in welcoming you to the meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government in Australia later this month.

D 107991 500,000 7/76 904 953

18

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 September 1981

From The Minister of State

NBPM (She saw in July)
- 9/9

Dear Premier

I refer to the conversations between us on the subject of defence arrangements post independence. I now record that the following represents the understanding of the United Kingdom Government of the arrangements under which British Forces will remain in Belize after 21 September, 1981.

At the request of the Government of Belize, the United Kingdom Government will maintain a garrison in Belize for the defence of Belize against external threat for up to nine months. Before any withdrawal or reduction of forces, there would be consultations between the two Governments. During this period and thereafter, Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to provide British military personnel in the form of training teams and Loan Service Personnel to assist in the expansion of the Belize Defence Force.

The Government of Belize will enter into arrangements satisfactory to both Governments in relation to the status of the British Forces which will come into force on independence.

Requests for the use of the British garrison in support of the Belize Defence Force will be made to the United Kingdom Government through the British High Commissioner. It is no part of the function of the British garrison to assist in or otherwise take part in operations concerned with internal security or with the enforcement of law and order.

The Government of Belize will not without the consent of the United Kingdom Government permit the presence in Belize of any forces of any other State during the period for which British Forces are present in Belize under these arrangements. The Government of Belize while exercising sole sovereign responsibility for Belize's foreign policy recognise the need to avoid any course of action likely to precipitate an external threat to the country and embroil the British Forces stationed there. The United Kingdom Government reserve the right to withdraw their troops if, in their judgement and after due warning, the actions of the Government of Belize seem likely to precipitate such a threat.

/Any

Any announcement on the subject of retention of British Forces should refer to the terms of the public statement agreed between the two Governments.

I should be grateful to know that this also represents the understanding of the Belize Government.

Yours sincerely

Nicholas Ridley

Nicholas Ridley MP

The Hon G Price
Premier
BELIZE

-9 SEP 1981

GRS 350

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM GUATEMALA CITY 042008Z SEPT 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 416 OF 4 SEPTEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE BELMOPAN (PERSONAL) PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK
AND MEXICO CITY

RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE INFORM PAYNE MCD OF THE FOLLOWING

BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. THE FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED ME TO CALL ON HIM ON 04 SEPTEMBER.
2. HE SAID THAT IN VIEW OF OUR LONG AND FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP HE WISHED TO INFORM ME PERSONALLY, AND IN ADVANCE, THAT ON 07 SEPTEMBER THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT WOULD ANNOUNCE THAT IT WAS CLOSING ITS CONSULATES IN BELIZE CITY AND BENQUE VIEJO AND THAT IT WAS ASKING THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO CLOSE THIS POST AND THE HONORARY CONSULATE IN PUERTO BARRIOS. THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT WOULD ASK ALL BRITISH OFFICIALS TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY BY 14 SEPTEMBER.
3. HE SAID THAT THE SAME ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD GIVE AN ASSURANCE OF PROTECTION TO ALL OTHER BRITISH SUBJECTS RESIDENT IN GUATEMALA, AND TO THEIR PROPOERTY. HOWEVER, ALL BELIZEAN STUDENTS IN GUATEMALA ON GUATEMALAN GOVERNEMTN SCHOLARSHIPS WOULD BE EXPECTED TO HAVE LEFT THE COUNTRY BY 14 SEPTEMBER.
4. HE AGREED THAT I COULD GIVE ADVANCE WARNING TO THE SWISS CHARGE D'AFFAIRES SO THAT THE SWSS EMBASSY COULD PREPARE TO REPRESENT OUR CONSULAR AS WELL AS OUR DIPLOMATIC INTERESTS. HE ALSO AGREED THAT, IF NECESSARY, A MEMBER OF MY STAFF COULD STAY ON FOR A FURTHER FEW EXTRA WEEKS ATTACHED TO THE SWISS EMBASSY TO WIND UP ANY OUTSTANDING ADMINISTRATION PROBLEMS. IN FACT, HE THOUGHT IT PROBABLE THAT THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNEMNT WOULD AGREE TO A BRITISH OFFICIAL BEING PERMANENTLY ATTACHED TO THE SWISS EMBASSY, BUT IF SO HE THOUGHT IT BETTER THAT A NEW OFFICER SHOULD ARRIVE WITHIN A FEW WEEKS TO RELIEVE THE OFFICER WHO HAD STAYED ON.
5. AS WELL AS SPEAKING IN VERY FRIENDLY TERMS TO ME HE SENT HIS WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS TO MR RIDLEY AND SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT THEY COULD MEET AGAIN IN THE FUTURE. HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT THAT THE TIME WOULD NOT BE RIPE FOR A MEETING FOR SOME WEEKS OR POSSIBLY MONTHS TO COME. WE DISCUSSED HOW BEST HE COULD COMMUNICATE WITH MR RIDLEY INFUTURE AND I SUGGESTED ON A PERSONAL BASIS, THAT ANY MESSAGE MIGHT BEST BE PASSED THROUGH THE CANADIAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HERE RATHER THAN THROUGH THE SWISS EMBASSY. I SHALL PURSUE THIS SUBJECT WITH MY CANADIAN COLLEAGUE.

/6.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. I SHALL TELEGRAPH FURTHER ABOUT ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS BUT I WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO LEARN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHETHER , AS SUGGESTED IN THE AUTUMN ON 1980 YOUWOULD STILL SEE ADVANTAGE IN NASH STAYING ON FOR A FEW WEEKS ATTACHED TO THE SWISS EMBASSY PENDING A DECISION ON WHETHER TO REPLACE HIM BY A PERMANENT OFFICER.

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BELIZE/GUATEMALA

Belize

File

cc HMTT
DOE
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CSLO
CO
Mr. Gordon
Sir Noel Short

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 September 1981

Independence Gift to Belize

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 1 September on this subject and has agreed that the proposed presentation to the Belize Government should be made. We shall arrange a Parliamentary Question in due course.

I am sending copies of this letter to the recipients of yours.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

A.K.C. Wood, Esq.,
Lord Privy Seal's Office,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Letter sent Mr Ratliffe O.K. for further action. 2/9

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 September 1981 (1)

Prime Minister

Agree to the expenditure of £6,000 on an independence gift to Belize?

2/9

Dear Michael,

INDEPENDENCE GIFT TO BELIZE

As you know, Belize is due to attain independence on 21 September; and their government have applied for full membership of the Commonwealth. It is customary for these occasions to be marked by the presentation of a gift from the British Government.

The Financial Secretary to the Treasury has approved expenditure of up to £6,000 for the gift. The choice of gift will be made in consultation with the Belize Government.

We should be grateful if you would seek the Prime Minister's approval for the proposed presentation. Once this has been given, it is customary for an announcement to be made by means of an arranged Parliamentary Question for written reply by the Prime Minister. It is sometimes tabled by the Leader of the Opposition personally. I enclose a suggested draft question and answer, together with a background note. Assuming the proposal is approved, we should be grateful if you could arrange for the PQ to be tabled soon after Parliament reassembles.

As is customary, the House of Commons will, separately, present a gift of a parliamentary nature to the House of Representatives of Belize. The House will itself make the necessary arrangements, but would like to announce the gift by means of an arranged Parliamentary Question at a similar time. I should be grateful if you would coordinate the tabling of the PQs with Martin Ryle of the Overseas Office, House of Commons.

/I am

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

Roger Sands
219 5467

I am sending copies of this letter without enclosures to John Wiggins (Treasury), David Edmonds (DOE), Jim Buckley (Lord President's Office), David Heyhoe (Chancellor of the Duchy's Office), David Wright (Cabinet Office), and to Cass Gordon and Sir Noel Short (House of Commons).

Yours,
Adam

A K C Wood
Assistant Private Secretary
to the Lord Privy Seal

BACKGROUND NOTE

INDEPENDENCE GIFT TO BELIZE

It is the practice of the British Government and of the House of Commons to present gifts to Governments and Legislatures respectively on independence, provided the countries concerned are becoming members of the Commonwealth.

2. The Treasury have sanctioned expenditure of up to £6,000 on the Government gift for Belize. The House of Commons will make the arrangements for their gift.

3. The Belize authorities will be consulted about the form that the Government gift might take. The announcement about the Government gift, in the form of a written Answer to a Parliamentary Question, should be made as soon as possible after Parliament reassembles.

1 September 1981

DSR 11 (Revised)

WRITTEN PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION & ANSWER

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note~~ **TYPE:** Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
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Unclassified

TO:

Your Reference

Copies to:

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.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

To ask the Prime Minister whether it is proposed that a gift should be presented to the Government of Belize to mark the attainment of independence on 21 September.

The Prime Minister

The House will, I feel sure, wish to send congratulations to Belize on its independence, along with best wishes for the happiness of prosperity of the people of that country. Her Majesty's Government propose to offer a suitable gift to mark the occasion.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

CONFIDENTIAL

Belize

0 280015Z AUG 81
FM BELMOPAN
TO FCO LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L UK COMMS ONLY

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 493 OF 27 AUGUST 1981
INFO IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY, WASHINGTON,
INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, MEXICO CITY

BELIZE/GUATEMALA
MIPT. TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS:-
BEGINS
GUATEMALAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAFAEL CASTILLO VALDEZ WAS IN WASHINGTON 24 AUGUST TO HANDLE PERSONAL AFFAIRS. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF HIS VISIT FOR A QUOTE TOUR D'HORIZON UNQUOTE IN WHICH THE QUESTION OF BELIZE CAME UP. I OFFERED FOREIGN MINISTER CASTILLO MY VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS WITH BELIZE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. I SUGGESTED THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT TAKE PLACE PRIVATELY AND AT A LOWER LEVEL WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF OUTLINING AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN BELIZE AND GUATEMALA WHICH WOULD BE PUT TO A REFERENDUM IN BELIZE SOON AFTER YOUR INDEPENDENCE. FOREIGN MINISTER CASTILLO APPEARED TO BE RECEPTIVE AND I BELIEVE HE WILL PURSUE THE QUESTION WITHIN HIS GOVERNMENT UPON HIS RETURN TO GUATEMALA.

I ALSO DISCUSSED WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CASTILLO OUR VIEW THAT OELIZE MIGHT ADHERE TO THE RIO TREATY SOON AFTER INDEPENDENCE AND THAT PERHAPS THE UNITED STATES AND BELIZE, AND POSSIBLY GUATEMALA, MIGHT HOLD TALKS ON SECURITY ISSUES PRIOR TO THIS.

IN KEEPING WITH OUR POLICY OF NON-INVOLVEMENT IN BELIZE-GUATEMALA DISPUTES WE DID NOT DISCUSS ANY OF THE SUBSTANTIVE AREAS OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN YOUR TWO COUNTRIES.

I HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING WHETHER MY DISCUSSION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CASTILLO WILL PRECIPITATE ANY ACTION ON THE PART OF GUATEMALA. IF IT DOES, HOWEVER, I WOULD HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE WILLING TO RESPOND FAVORABLY TO ANY OFFER TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS.

I FOUND OUR DISCUSSIONS IN PANAMA TO BE MOST USEFUL. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AGAIN SOON.
ENDS
FCO PASS ALL
HENNESSY

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FM BELMOPAN
TO FCO LONDON

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C O N F I D E N T I A L UK COMMS ONLY

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 492 OF 27 AUGUST 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY, WASHINGTON,
INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, MEXICO CITY

GUATEMALA CITY TELNO 390: BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. THE PREMIER BROUGHT ME TODAY A LETTER FROM ENDERS DATED 26 AUGUST WHICH HAD BEEN DELIVERED TO HIM YESTERDAY BY THE US CONSUL GENERAL. THE TEXT IS IN MIFT.

2. THIS MOVE BY THE AMERICANS MAY BE THE PRESSURE REFERRED TO IN TUR. IF SO, CASTILLO'S MESSAGE (GUATEMALA CITY TELNO 392) SUGGESTS THAT IT HAS NOT SO FAR BEEN VERY FRUITFUL. IN ANY CASE I WOULD HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT A RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS NOW (SEE MIPT). FOR HIS PART PRICE REITERATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER TALKS, EVEN BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, PROVIDED ANY RESULTING TREATY WAS NOT SIGNED UNTIL AFTER INDEPENDENCE.

3. PRICE SAW THE SUGGESTION IN PARA 2 OF THE MESSAGE AS AN INDICATION OF AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO ENTER INTO COMMITMENTS ON BELIZE'S SECURITY. HE HOPES TO PURSUE THIS WITH ENDERS AT A MEETING HE HAS ASKED BARNEBY TO ARRANGE IN WASHINGTON ON 14/15 SEPTEMBER.

FCO PASS ALL

HENNESSY

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Belize
Prime Ministers
See last paragraph in particular.
WM 4/8

GRS
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FM GUATEMALA CITY 26/2237Z AUG 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
DESKBY 27/0900Z
TELEGRAM NUMBER 391 OF 26 AUGUST
R F I : PIMMEDIATE BELMOPAN (PERSONAL) PRIORITY WASHINGTON
UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING MEXICO CITY

BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. RODRIGUEZ (DIRECTOR OF BELIZE AFFAIRS) CAME TO SEE ME ON 26 AUGUST TO DELIVER THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S REPLY TO MR RIDLEY'S MESSAGE OF 24 JULY (TRANSLATION IN MIFT). (attached)

2. I SAID TO RODRIGUEZ THAT THIS WAS NOT EXACTLY THE MESSAGE THAT I HAD BEEN TOLD TO EXPECT FOUR WEEKS AGO. I ASKED WHY THERE HAD BEEN A DELAY OF FOUR WEEKS AND WHAT HAD CAUSED THE CHANGE.

3. RODRIGUEZ EXPLAINED THE DELAY BY QUOTING VISITS OF OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS, THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S FAMILY'S CAR ACCIDENT, AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S PREOCCUPATION WITH POLITICS AND ELECTION TACTICS. HE SAID THAT THERE WAS NO CHANGE OF SUBSTANCE FROM WHAT I HAD EXPECTED BUT THIS MESSAGE WAS LESS EXPLICIT IN SUGGESTING AN EARLY MEETING THAN HAD BEEN THE MESSAGE DRAFTED ON 30 JULY. I SAID THAT I COULD SEE THAT, AND I ASKED WHETHER THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT REALLY WANTED FURTHER DISCUSSIONS BEFORE BELIZE BECAME INDEPENDENT. RODRIGUEZ SAID THAT THEY DID.

4. I SAID THAT I WOULD SO INFORM YOU, BUT I EXPECTED THAT YOU AND PREMIER PRICE WOULD WONDER WHAT HAD CHANGED SINCE THE LAST ROUND OF TALKS IN NEW YORK IN JULY. RODRIGUEZ BEGAN TO EXPLAIN AT LENGTH THAT ALL THAT WAS NEEDED WAS TO TURN THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT INTO A TREATY, WHICH THE BELIZEANS HAD REFUSED TO DO IN JULY. I SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT SO. THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT HAD CONTAINED NOTHING ABOUT MILITARY USE OF THE CAYS NOR ABOUT THE DURATION OF THE USE AND ENJOYMENT OF THE CAYS. THESE WERE THE TWO POINTS ON WHICH THE BELIZEANS HAD BEEN UNABLE TO ACCEPT THE GUATEMALAN REQUIREMENTS. HAD THE GUATEMALAN POSITION CHANGES? RODRIGUEZ TRIED TO DISMISS MILITARY USE AS A QUESTION THAT HAD NEVER BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE GUATEMALANS BUT HAD BEEN INVENTED AS A PROBLEM BY THE BELIZEANS. I REMINDED HIM THAT THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN LONDON LAST MARCH. HE THEN CAME NEAR TO ADMITTING THAT GUATEMALA COULD NOT REALLY MAKE ANY MILITARY USE OF THE CAYS.

5. ON DURATION HE TRIED TO CLAIM THAT GUATEMALA HAD BEEN PROMISED THE USE AND ENJOYMENT OF THE CAYS IN PERPETUITY IN LONDON LAST MARCH. I SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT SO. I COULD REMEMBER PREMIER PRICE OBJECTING TO THE TERM PERPETUITY. HE THEN SAID THAT 15 YEARS WAS TOO SHORT A PERIOD, GUATEMALA SHOULD BE OFFERED AT LEAST 99 YEARS. I SAID THAT GUATEMALA WAS BEING OFFERED WHAT COULD AMOUNT TO AN INDEFINITE PERIOD BUT EXPRESSED IN UNITS OF 15 YEARS WITH PROVISION FOR A REVIEW AT THE END OF EACH SUCH UNIT. HE THEN ADMITTED THAT THIS COULD WELL PROVE ACCEPTABLE.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. HE RAISED THE QUESTION OF ACCESS TO THE HIGH SEAS. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM NOW IN KEEPING TO THE ''SNAKE'' SOLUTION. HE SAID THAT GUATEMALA MIGHT WANT MORE THAN THE SNAKE BUT I REMINDED HIM THAT GUATEMALA HAD ACCUSED THE BELIZEANS OF ACTING IN BAD FAITH BY OFFERING LESS THAN THE SNAKE.

7. I SAID THAT I DID NOT KNOW WHETHER YOU OR PREMIER PRICE WOULD FEEL ABLE TO RENEW THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SHORT TIME LEFT BEFORE INDEPENDENCE. IN PRACTICE THIS WOULD MEAN HOLDING TALKS IN THE COURSE OF THE NEXT TWO WEEKS. I ASKED WHETHER THE GUATEMALANS WOULD BE READY TO RENEW TALKS SO QUICKLY IF YOU AND PREMIER PRICE WISHED TO DO SO. HE SAID THAT THEY WOULD, BUT HE SAID IT WITHOUT ANY GREAT CONVICTION.

8. MY GUESS IS THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER IS NOW LESS INTERESTED IN THE RENEWAL OF NEGOTIATIONS THAN HE WAS, AND THAT THE MESSAGE HAS ONLY BEEN DELIVERED NOW BECAUSE OF AMERICAN PRESSURE. (MY TELNO 390) HOWEVER THE GUATEMALANS ARE NOW ABLE TO SAY TO THE AMERICANS THAT THEY HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR READINESS TO TRY AGAIN. IF ONLY FOR THE SAKE OF OUR GOOD STANDING WITH THE MAERICANS I RECOMMED THAT WE MAKE SOME POSITIVE PROPOSAL IN REPLY.

FCO PSE PASS ALL

WILMSHURST

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FM GUATEMALA CITY 26/2214Z AUG 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

DESKBY 27:0900Z AUG 81

TELEGRAM NUMBER 392 OF 26 AUGUST

R F I : IMMEDIATE BELMOPAN (PERSONAL) PRIORITY WASHINGTON ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING MEXICO CITY

MIPT : BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF FOREIGN MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO MR RIDLEY, DATED 26 AUGUST :

BEGINS :

DEAR NICHOLAS

THANK YOU FOR YOUR NOTE OF 24 JULY LAST, IN WHICH YOU INFORMED ME OF THE AGREEMENTS REACHED IN LONDON WITH PREMIER GEORGE PRICE, WHICH REFERRED TO THE DATE OF 21 SEPTEMBER FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF BELIZE, THE STATIONING OF BRITISH FORCES IN THE TERRITORY AFTER THAT INDEPENDENCE, AND THE CONTINUING WORK BY GREAT BRITAIN IN TRAINING THE BELIZE DEFENCE FORCE.

AT THE SAME TIME YOU INFORMED ME THAT YOU WERE CONTINUING WITH THE UNWISE (LIT. IMPRUDENTE) INTENTION OF INVOLVING THIRD COUNTRIES IN ACTIONS RELATED TO THE SECURITY OF BELIZE, IN VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION AND THEREBY CAUSING JUSTIFIED CONCERNS, IF NOT THE INSTABILITY OF THE AREA.

I AM VERY PLEASED BY YOUR WISH THAT WE KEEP IN TOUCH, TO THE BENEFIT OF OUR TASK OF REACHING A SOLUTION OF THE TERRITORIAL CONTROVERSY OVER BELIZE, AND BY YOUR INDICATION OF THE FRANK SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP WHICH HAS BEEN DISPLAYED DURING OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

IN THIS SENSE I AM HAPPY TO LET YOU KNOW THAT HERE IN GUATEMALA WE ARE READY TO COOPERATE WITH WHATEVER EFFORT WE CAN MAKE TO REACH AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT SATISFACTORY TO ALL, AND WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE FULFILLMENT OF THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT.

MY CORDIAL GREETINGS. RAFAEL CASTILLO VALDES.

ENDS

FCO PASS ALL

WILMSHURST

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FM FCO 251130Z AUG 81
TO PRIORITY KINGSTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 174 OF 25 AUGUST,
AND TO BRIDGETOWN, PORT OF SPAIN, NASSAU, GEORGETOWN, OTTAWA
INFO PRIORITY BELMOPAN (PERSONAL), WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
GUATEMALA CITY, UKDEL NATO, MODUK
MY TELNO 157 : BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. ALTHOUGH WE STILL AWAIT THE BARBADIAN RESPONSE WE DO NOT WISH TO LOSE MOMENTUM ON THIS INITIATIVE. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE NOW APPROACH YOUR HOST GOVERNMENTS AGAIN AS FOLLOWS.

2. WE HAVE HAD A GENERALLY ENCOURAGING RESPONSE FROM THE GOVERNMENTS APPROACHED (AND HOPE THAT THE ATTITUDE OF BARBADOS WILL BE SIMILARLY SYMPATHETIC). ON THIS BASIS WE WOULD LIKE TO INVITE THEM TO JOIN WITH US IN SIGNING A DECLARATION, TO PRECEDE OR COINCIDE WITH BELIZEAN INDEPENDNECE, IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS. QUOTE IN THE EVENT OF AN ARMED ATTACK AGAINST BELIZE, EXTERNALLY ORGANISED OR SUPPORTED, OR THE THREAT OF SUCH AN ATTACK, THE GOVERNMENTS OF .... WOULD CONSULT TOGETHER TO CONSIDER WHAT MEASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN IN RELATION TO SUCH AN ATTACK UNQUOTE.

3. IF IT PROVES DIFFICULT TO SET UP A JOINT DECLARATION IN THE TIME AVAILABLE WE WOULD, FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, PROPOSE THAT EACH OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED SHOULD ISSUE A SEPARATE DECLARATION IN SIMILAR LANGUAGE, BUT YOU SHOULD NOT REFER TO THIS SECONDARY OBJECTIVE AT THIS STAGE.

CARRINGTON

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 205 OF 20 AUGUST
AND TO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN, PORT OF SPAIN, NASSAU, AND GEORGETOWN.
PRIORITY INFOR BELMOPAN (PERSONAL), WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, UKMIS
NEW YORK, GUATEMALA CITY, AND UKDEL NATO.

YOUR TEL NUMBER 157
BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. FRANCIS, PERMANENT SECRETARY MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TOLD HEAD OF CHANCERY ON 19 AUGUST THAT JAMAICA WOULD WISH TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH SOME FORM OF CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENT AND WOULD BE INTERESTED TO HAVE FURTHER DETAILS OF OUR PROPOSAL. HE SAID THAT IN PRINCIPLE JAMAICA WOULD ALSO BE WILLING TO CONSIDER ASSISTING A BELIZE DEFENCE FORCE. HE HAD NOT CONSULTED THE JAMAICA DEFENCE FORCE (JDF) BUT HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD BE IN FAVOUR OF HELPING WITH THE TRAINING OF SUCH A FORCE. FROM OUR OWN KNOWLEDGE OF THE JDF I AM SURE THAT THEY WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY.

DRINKALL

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FM GUATEMALA CITY 20/1533Z AUG 81

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 377 OF 20 AUGUST

R F I : PRIORITY BELMOPAN (PERSONAL)

FOLLOWING FOR PAYNE MCD

MY TELNO 375 : BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. THREE WEEKS HAVE NOW PASSED SINCE I WAS TOLD THAT THE GUATEMALANS WISHED TO RENEW NEGOTIATIONS. DURING THAT TIME I HAVE BEEN GIVEN REPEATED ASSURANCES THAT THAT POLICY REMAINS UNCHANGED, AND I HAVE BEEN GIVEN A SUCCESSION OF EXCUSES FOR THE CONTINUING DELAY IN SENDING A MESSAGE TO MR RIDLEY FROM THE FIREIGN MINISTER PROPOSING NEW TALKS.

2. SOME OF THE EXCUSES GIVEN HAVE BEEN LESS THAN WHOLLY CONVINCING (VISITS BY THE EGYPTIAN AND CHILEAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS), OTHERS HAVE BEEN MORE CONVINCING (INTERNAL POLITICAL MANOEVRING AND CASTILLO'S FAMILY'S ACCIDENT).

3. INDEPENDENCE IS JUST OVER FOUR WEEKS AWAY, AND PRESUMABLY THE BELIZEAN GOVERNMENT WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY PREOCCUPIED WITH INDEPENDENCE AS THOSE WEEKS PASS.

4. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF YOUSEE ANY ADVANTAGE IN RESUMING NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE INDEPENDENCE (AND I REALISE FROM YOUR TELNO 196 THAT YOU HAVE DOUBTS) IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO FORCE THE PACE RATHER THAN TO ALLOW MORE TIME TO BE LOST. I SUGGEST THAT THE BEST METHOD OF SMOKING OUT THE GUATEMALANS WOULD BE FOR MR RIDLEY TO SEND YET ANOTHER MESSAGE TO CASTILLO VALDEZ. AT THE LEAST THIS COULD SERVE THE PURPOSE OF MAKING OUR POSITION CLEAR FOR THE RECORD. MIFT CONTAINS A SUGGESTED DRAFT.

(attached)

WILMSHURST

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FM GUATEMALA CITY 20/1549Z AUG 81

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 378 OF 20 AUGUST

R F I : PRIOTIY BELMOPAN (PERSONAL)

FOLLOWING FOR PAYNE MCD

MIPT : BELIZE GUATEMALA

1. FOLLOWING IS SUGGESTED DRAFT MESSAGE:

SINCE SENDING YOU MY MESSAGE OF 24 JULY I HAVE HAD FURTHER EXCHANGES OF VIEW WITH PREMIER PRICE, AND FROM THSES I KNOW THAT HE WOULD WELCOME FURTHER TALKS WITH YOU AIMED AT SETTLING THE DISPUTE BEFORE BELIZE BECOMES INDEPENDENT. SO WOULD I AND SO, I HAVE NO DOUBT, WOULD YOU IF SUCH TALKS MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE THREE OF US TO TRANSFORM THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT WHICH WE SIGNED IN LONDON IN MARCH INTO A REAL AGREEMENT.

HOWEVER, I CANNOT SEE THAT ANY SUCH AGREEMENT COULD NOW BE RATIFIED, OR SUBMITTED TO A REFERENDUM IN BELIZE, BEFORE 21 SEPTEMBER. BUT I FEEL THAT IF WE COULD AT LEAST SIGN AN AGREEMENT BEFORE THAT DATE, WITH THE INTENTION OF RATIFYING IT, AND OF SUBMITTING IT TO BELIZEAN REFERENDUM, BEFORE THE END OF THIS YEAR WE WOULD LAY A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR THE FUTURE RELATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN GUATEMALA AND BELIZE THAT WE ALL THREE DESIRE.

IN SAYING THIS I REALISE THAT FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF BELIZE THERE REMAINS THE PROBLEM THAT THEY CAN ONLY SIGN AN AGREEMENT WHICH, IN THEIR JUDGEMENT, STANDS A GOOD CHANCE OF BEING ACCEPTED BY A REFERENDUM. AS YOU WILL RECALL FROM OUR LAST MEETING IN NEW YORK IT WAS THIS FACTOR WHICH MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO MEET YOUR POSITION ON MILITARY USE OF THE CAYS AND ON THE DURATION OF YOUR USE AND ENJOYMENT OF THE CAYS. IS THERE ANY POSSIBILITY OF YOUR POSITION ON THESE TWO PROBLEMS HAVING CHANGED? IF SO I AM SURE THAT THE OTHER OUTSTANDING MATTERS COULD BE RESOLVED QUICKLY AND TO EVERYBODY'S SATISFACTION, AND IF THAT IS THE CASE I THINK THAT WE SHOULD, WHILE WE STILL HAVE TIME, TRY AGAIN TO PRODUCE A DRAFT AGREEMENT. INDEED, IF YOUR POSITION ON THESE TWO MATTERS HAS CHANGED THEN I THINK THAT THE WORK OF PRODUCING A DRAFT AGREEMENT, AD REFERENDUM, COULD BE COMPLETED BY OUR EXPERTS WITHIN A WEEK.

/ WE

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WE HAVE FOUR WEEKS LEFT IN WHICH TO MAKE THIS LAST EFFORT. PLEASE LET ME KNOW AS SOON AS YOU CAN WHETHER YOU THINK THAT IT IS STILL WORTH TRYING. I THINK SO, AND HOPE THAT YOU SHARE MY FEELINGS. IF YOU DO AGREE, THEN I SUGGEST THAT WE CONVENE ANOTHER MEETING OF THE JOINT COMMISION IN..... IN THE WEEK BEGINNING 01 SEPTEMBER.

WILMSHURST

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FM BELMOPAN
TO FCO LONDON
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C O N F I D E N T I A L UK COMMS ONLY
SIC TEL NO 459
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 459 OF 18 AUGUST 1981
INFO PRIORITY GUATEMALA CITY
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MEXICO CITY

MY TELNO 451: ARANDA

1. ARANDA TELEPHONED ME THIS MORNING TO ASK WHETHER A DATE HAD NOW BEEN SET FOR A FURTHER ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GUATEMALANS. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS ANXIOUS TO DISCUSS WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE UDP EXECUTIVE THE PARTY'S ATTITUDE TO PARTICIPATION IN FUTUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH GUATEMALA. (HE IMPLIED THAT HE WAS IN FAVOUR OF THIS BUT THAT HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD NEED PERSUADING.) I REPLIED THAT DESPITE SOME ENCOURAGING SIGNS RECENTLY (OF WHICH MR RIDLEY HAD INFORMED HIM IN LONDON - YOUR TELNO PERSONAL 110), THERE HAD SO FAR BEEN NO MOVE TO SET UP FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. WE WERE IN FACT STILL WAITING FOR A REPLY TO MR RIDLEY'S MESSAGE OF 24 JULY TO CASTILLO. THE UDP WOULD THEREFORE HAVE TO MAKE UP THEIR MINDS ON THE HYPOTHESIS, BUT NOT THE CERTAINTY, OF FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. ARANDA RELUCTANTLY ACCEPTED THIS BUT ASKED ME TO LET HIM KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IF ANY FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WERE ARRANGED.

(See attached for reasons)

2. ARANDA SAID THAT YESTERDAY'S DISCUSSIONS WITH PRICE HAD GONE REASONABLY WELL AND THAT FURTHER MEETINGS WERE PLANNED.

FCO PASS ALL
HENNESSY (REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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FM GUATEMALA CITY 191805Z AUG
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 375 OF 19 AUGUST
INFO BELMOPAN(PERSONAL) WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TEL NO 366: BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. I SPOKE TO HERRERA AGAIN ON 19 AUGUST. HE APOLOGISED FOR THE CONTINUING LACK OF INFORMATION, BUT SAID THAT CASTILLO VALDEZ HAD BEEN OUT OF THE COUNTRY FOR SOME DAYS BECAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT INVOLVING HIS FAMILY, AND IN HIS ABSENCE NOTHING COULD BE DONE.

2. HERRERA THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF HE AND SKINNER KLEE SPENT AN EVENING WITH ME AS SOON AS THEY HAD BEEN ABLE TO DISCUSS MATTERS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER. WE LEFT IT THAT HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH AGAIN AS SOON AS HE KNEW ANYTHING, BUT HE THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT THIS WOULD BE BEFORE NEXT WEEK.

WILMSHURST

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FM FCO 041030Z AUGUST 1981
TO IMMEDIATE BELMOPAN
TELEGRAM NUMBER PERSONAL 111 OF 7 AUGUST
INFO MODUK GUATEMALA CITY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK
MEXICO CITY OTTAWA.
YOUR TELNO 425: BELIZE: SECURITY SITUATION
1. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM MR RIDLEY TO PREMIER PRICE: BEGINS
THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE WHICH THE GOVERNOR TRANSMITTED TO ME ON 3 AUGUST. I AM GLAD TO HEAR OF YOUR CONTINUING ATTEMPTS TO REACH A SETTLEMENT BASED ON THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT WITH GUATEMALA WHILE AT THE SAME TIME MOINTAINING BELIZE'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. I AGREE WITH YOU THAT WE MUST MAINTAIN THE UTMOST FLEXIBILITY ABOUT THE METHODS OF ACHIEVING THIS AND I HOPE THAT YOU AND THE GOVERNOR CAN CONTINUE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH ABOUT THIS.
2. THE GOVERNOR HAS ALSO REPORTED TO ME YOUR CONCERN THAT THE LANGUAGE OF THE SECRET MINUTE ABOUT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AFTER INDEPENDENCE MIGHT LEAD TO A PRECIPITATE WITHDRAWAL OF THE GARRISON. AS YOU KNOW THE WORDING OF THE MINUTE WAS AGREED BY THE BRITISH CABINET AND IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR ME TO SEEK ANY CHANGE AT THIS JUNCTION. BUT LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT WHEN THE TIME COMES FOR THE CONSULTATIONS MENTIONED IN THAT MINUTE HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WILL OF COURSE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT

BOTH THE SECURITY SITUATION AT THE TIME AND THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED IN ANY FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WITH GUATEMALA. I HOPE THAT THIS WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO ALLAY ANY CONCERNS WHICH YOU AND YOUR CABINET COLLEAGUES MIGHT HAVE. ENDS

2. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, WE WOULD NOT WISH AT THIS STAGE TO COMMIT OURSELVES TO 12 MONTHS IN THE MINUTE BECAUSE THIS WOULD GIVE US NO FLEXIBILITY WHATSOEVER TO EXTEND THE PERIOD IN THE LIGHT OF LATER CIRCUMSTANCES GIVEN THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE CABINET.

GILMOUR

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FM FCO 071000Z AUG 81
TO IMMEDIATE BELMOPAN PERSONAL
TELEGRAM NUMBER PERSONAL 110 OF 7 AUGUST
AND INFO GUATEMALA CITY, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MEXICO CITY
YOUR TELNO 423 : ARANDA

1. AFTER A PRELIMINARY MEETING WITH OFFICIALS, ARANDA AND ESQUIVEL SAW MR RIDLEY YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. THEY STARTED BY DEMANDING THAT THERE SHOULD BE A REFERENDUM OR OTHER TEST OF PUBLIC OPINION IN BELIZE BEFORE INDEPENDENCE. THEY CLAIMED THAT MR RIDLEY HAD GIVEN THEM AN ABSOLUTE UNDERTAKING THAT REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH GUATEMALA THERE WOULD BE SUCH A TEST. MR RIDLEY FIRMLY REFUTED THIS ALLEGATION AND MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT A REFERENDUM BEFORE INDEPENDENCE OR ANY POSTPONEMENT OF THE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE WAS NOW OUT OF THE QUESTION. THE GOVERNMENT OF BELIZE WAS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE, ELECTED ON A PLATFORM WHICH INCLUDED INDEPENDENCE. THE PROGRESS TO INDEPENDENCE, INCLUDING THE SETTING OF THE DATE HAD BEEN MADE IN AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF BELIZE.

2. IT WAS ONLY WITH CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY THAT ARANDA COULD BE PERSUADED TO BROADEN THE BASIS OF THE DISCUSSION, AND HE REPEATEDLY BROUGHT EVERY NEW AVENUE BACK TO HIS BASIC PROPOSITION. HE COMPLAINED BITTERLY, DESPITE BEING REMINDED THAT MR RIDLEY HAD INVITED THE UDP TO PARTICIPATE ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, THAT THE BRITISH AND BELIZEAN GOVERNMENTS HAD CONSPIRED TO EXCLUDE THEM FROM BOTH NEGOTIATIONS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES. HE SAID THAT PRICE HAD CONSISTENTLY REFUSED TO MEET WITH HIM TO DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS. HE CITED HIS NON-DELIVERY OF MR RIDLEY'S INVITATION AS THE MOST RECENT EXAMPLE.

3. MR RIDLEY SOUGHT WITHOUT MUCH SUCCESS TO EXTRACT FROM ARANDA WHETHER THE UDP WANTED NEGOTIATIONS WITH GUATEMALA TO CONTINUE AND WHAT THEY WOULD HOPE TO ACHIEVE THAT HAD NOT BEEN

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COVERED BY THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT THEMSELVES HAD BEEN THE END PRODUCT OF A PROCESS IN WHICH GUATEMALAN DEMANDS HAD BEEN PROGRESSIVELY REDUCED AS THE UK HAD TAKEN SUCCESSIVE CONSTITUTIONAL STEPS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE. HE TOLD ARANDA IN CONFIDENCE (AND ARANDA PROMISED TO RESPECT THIS) THAT SINCE A DATE FOR INDEPENDENCE HAD BEEN SET WE HAD RECEIVED INDICATIONS THAT THE GUATEMALANS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO MODIFY THEIR POSITION YET AGAIN. IF THIS PROVED TO BE THE CASE IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO REOPEN NEGOTIATIONS WITH A FAIR CHANCE OF CONCLUDING A TREATY THAT ALL BELIZEANS COULD ACCEPT. WOULD ARANDA BE WILLING TO TAKE PART IN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS?

4. ARANDA TRIED TO LINK ANY UDP PARTICIPATION WITH A COMMITMENT TO A REFERENDUM ON THE RESULT BEFORE INDEPENDENCE. HE DID HOWEVER, IN THE END, AGREE TO PUT THIS PROPOSITION TO HIS PARTY COLLEAGUES AND TO ENTER INTO A SERIOUS DIALOGUE WITH THE PREMIER WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS ON EITHER SIDE, IF THE PREMIER FOR HIS PART COULD BE PREVAILED UPON TO DISCUSS THIS AND OTHER MATTERS WHICH PREOCCUPIED THE UDP. HE MADE CLEAR THAT HE WOULD PREFER SUCH A DIALOGUE TO TAKE PLACE EITHER UNDER YOUR CHAIRMANSHIP OR AT LEAST WITH YOU PRESENT. WE OURSELVES WOULD REGARD YOUR PRESENCE AS VITAL TO ENSURE THAT HMG'S INTERESTS DO NOT GO BY DEFAULT AND THAT WE GET AN ACCURATE ACCOUNT OF THE DISCUSSION.

5. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD GIVE THE PREMIER AN ACCOUNT OF MR RIDLEY'S MEETING WITH ARANDA AND URGE HIM TO ACCEPT MR RIDLEY'S SUGGESTION OF DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN PRICE AND ARANDA ON THE BASIS THAT THESE SHOULD BE (IN THE FORMULATION WE AGREED WITH ARANDA) 'TO DISCUSS VARIOUS ISSUES CONNECTED WITH PROGRESS TO INDEPENDENCE, INCLUDING ANY ACTION TO BE TAKEN BEFORE INDEPENDENCE IN RELATION TO THE DISPUTE WITH GUATEMALA'. PLEASE STRESS THAT MR RIDLEY ATTACHES THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO MAKING THIS EFFORT TO ARREST THE INCREASING POLARISATION IN BELIZE AND TO REMOVE AS MANY OF THE CAUSES OF RESENTMENT AS POSSIBLE AND THAT THEREFORE NO TOPIC SHOULD BE EXCLUDED. BUT THE PRIME PURPOSE WHOULD BE TO TRY TO ESTABLISH A MUTUALLY COMPATIBLE POSITION WITH REGARD TO POSSIBLE RESUMPTION OF

/ NEGOTIATIONS.

NEGOTIATIONS.

6. ARANDA AND ESQUIVEL LEAVE LONDON TOMORROW EVENING. THEY WILL SPEND A DAY IN NEW YORK AND ARRIVE BACK IN BELIZE ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON. WE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT ARANDA SHOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH YOU ON HIS RETURN.

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Belize

FM PANAMA CITY 052046Z AUG 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 62 OF 5 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY BELMOPAN (PERSONAL), WASHINGTON, GUATEMALA CITY, UKMIS NEW YORK AND TEGUCIGALPA.

MR

BELMOPAN TELEGRAM NO. 424 TO FCO: VISIT OF PREMIER OF BELIZE.

1. PRICE HAD A BRIEF BUT, HE CLAIMS, USEFUL DISCUSSION WITH ENDERS, US ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS, YESTERDAY. ACCORDING TO PRICE ENDERS PROMISED TO DO WHAT HE COULD TO BRING ABOUT CONTINUATION OF JOINT COMMISSION NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE INDEPENDENCE. PRICE ALSO CLAIMS THAT ENDERS SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE BRITISH WERE TRYING TO RID THEMSELVES OF THE BELIZE PROBLEM TOO QUICKLY.

2. PRICE ALSO SAW PRESIDENT ROYO THIS MORNING AND CLAIMS TO HAVE OBTAINED AN ASSURANCE OF PANAMANIAN SUPPORT FOR BELIZE'S MEMBERSHIP OF THE OAS. PRICE TOLD ME THAT ROYO HAD SAID THAT TORRIJOS' DEATH WOULD NOT CHANGE PANAMA'S POLICY ON BELIZE.

3. CASTILLO VALDEZ DID NOT ATTEND TORRIJOS' FUNERAL AND MEXICANS SENT ONLY ONE, LOW LEVEL, REPRESENTATIVE. PRICE WAS NOT THEREFORE ABLE TO HAVE ANY USEFUL DISCUSSION WITH EITHER MEXICANS OR GUATEMALANS.

4. PRICE LEAVES FOR HONDURAS TOMORROW 6 AUGUST. TEGUCIGALPA HAVE BEEN ADVISED BY TELEPHONE.

FCO PASS ALL

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

STEPHENSON

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FM WASHINGTON 041635Z AUG 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2324 OF 4 AUGUST
INFO PRIORITY GUATEMALA CITY, BELMOPAN (PERSONAL), UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 186 TO GUATEMALA CITY
BELIZE/GUATEMALA: POSSIBLE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS

1. THE AMERICANS WOULD NATURALLY PREFER THE CONCLUSION OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, AND THEY MAY WELL HAVE ENCOURAGED THESE LATEST GUATEMALAN OVERTURES. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THEY WOULD FAVOUR AGREEMENT BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY NOT HAVE CONSIDERED IN DETAIL THE CONSEQUENCES THAT MIGHT FLOW FROM THE POSSIBLE REJECTION OF A PROPOSED SETTLEMENT BY THE BELIZIANS IN A PRE-INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM. WHAT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE AMERICANS IS THAT THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS SHOULD CONTINUE IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER.

2. THUS SEEN FROM HERE THERE IS EVERYTHING TO BE SAID FOR GOING ON WITH THE DIALOGUE. THE MEASURED APPROACH SUGGESTED IN PARA 3 OF TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE SEEMS RIGHT, THE MORE SO AS THE AMERICANS ARE COMMITTED NOT TO INTERFERE IN THE DETAILED WAY WE PLAY OUR HAND AND ARE UNLIKELY TO PRESS US TOO HARD IF WE TREAT THE GUATEMALAN PROPOSALS WITH PROPER CAUTION.

HENDERSON

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O 040100Z AUG 81
FM BELMOPAN
TO FCO LONDON
INFO MODUK (FOR DS11)
BT
S E C R E T UK COMMS ONLY
SIC TEL NO 425
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 425 OF 3 AUGUST 1981
INFO MODUK(DS11), GUATEMALA CITY, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
MEXICO CITY, OTTAWA

MY TELNO 405: DEFENCE GUARANTEE

1. PRICE CALLED THIS MORNING AND ASKED ME TO TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO MR RIDLEY:-

BEGINS

1. RESOLUTION PASSED BY PUP NATIONAL CONVENTION JULY 26, 1981, RELATES SECURITY TO SETTLEMENT OF PROBLEM.

2. WE SHALL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO REACH A SETTLEMENT ON HEADS OF AGREEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

3. THE TIME TABLE MAY NOT ALLOW FOR COMPLETING ALL PROCEDURES: REFERENDUM IN BELIZE AND AMENDMENT TO GUATEMALA'S CONSTITUTION.

4. WOULD REQUEST SOME ASSURANCE THAT THERE WILL BE SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THE TIME TABLE TO ALLOW FOR COMPLETION OF WHOLE PROCEDURE.

5. IN VIEW OF OUR COMMITMENT TO DO EVERYTHING IN OUR POWER TO SPEED SETTLEMENT, THE TIME TABLE SHOULD ALLOW FOR THIS.

ENDS.

2. PRICE IS EVIDENTLY STILL HAVING TROUBLE WITH HIS INNER CABINET. HE SAID THAT HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE ASSURANCES CONTAINED IN YOUR TELNO PERSONAL 101 MIGHT NOT GIVE ENOUGH FLEXIBILITY. FOR EXAMPLE, IF FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WITH GUATEMALA (IN WHICH HE WAS WILLING TO PLAY HIS PART) LOOKED LIKE PRODUCING AN AGREEMENT ABOUT NINE MONTHS AFTER INDEPENDENCE, THE BRITISH GARRISON MIGHT, AS THINGS NOW STOOD, BE WITHDRAWN JUST BEFORE A REFERENDUM TOOK PLACE ON SUCH A TREATY. THIS WOULD MAKE HIS POSITION VERY DIFFICULT. HE WONDERED IF THERE COULD NOT BE A CODICIL CONTAINING SOME KIND OF REVIEW CLAUSE OF THE KIND BELIZE HAD SUGGESTED TO THE GUATEMALANS OVER THE USE OF THE CAYES? HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE MORE IN LINE WITH WHAT HE HAD ASKED FOR AND, HE THOUGHT, HAD ACTUALLY OBTAINED IN LONDON.

3. I EXPLAINED THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO AMEND THE SECRET CABINET MINUTE, AND THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF OUR EXTENDING AN INDEFINITE GUARANTEE OVER THE RETENTION OF THE BRITISH GARRISON. I UNDERTOOK TO REPORT HIS REQUEST.

4. QUITE APART FROM ANY DIFFICULTIES WITH HIS CABINET, PRICE IS OF COURSE FACING CONSIDERABLE OPPOSITION CRITICISM OVER THE INADEQUACY OF THE DEFENCE GUARANTEE. HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE SEEN AS HAVING TAKEN HIS COUNTRY, AS HE PUT IT, QUOTE RECKLESSLY INTO INDEPENDENCE UNQUOTE. HE EVEN HINTED THIS MORNING THAT HE MIGHT CONCEIVABLY HAVE TO DELAY INDEPENDENCE IF THE DEFENCE GUARANTEE COULD NOT BE IMPROVED TO HIS COLLEAGUES' SATISFACTION. I DO NOT TAKE THIS THREAT TOO SERIOUSLY BUT IT WOULD CERTAINLY HELP IF MR RIDLEY COULD SEND PRICE A MESSAGE ASSURING HIM THAT, WHEN THE TIME CAME FOR THE CONSULTATIONS MENTIONED IN THE CABINET MINUTE, HMG WOULD OF COURSE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT BOTH THE SECURITY SITUATION AT THE TIME AND THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED TOWARDS A FINAL SOLUTION OF THE BELIZE/ GUATEMALA DISPUTE. IT MIGHT ALSO HELP HIM IF WE COULD NOW INCREASE THE PERIOD MENTIONED IN THE SECRET CABINET MINUTE TO TWELVE MONTHS.

FCO PASS ALL

HENNESSY

BT

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
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TELEGRAM NUMBER 338 OF Ø3 AUG
AND TO IMMEDIATE BELMOPAN (PERSONAL) PRIORITY WASINGTON ROUTINE
UKMIS NEW YORK

DESKBY

MY TELNO 337 : BELIZE/GUATEMALA : RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS

1. AT A RECEPTION AT THE NATIONAL PALACE ON 31 JULY HERRERA TOLD ME THAT THE MESSAGE TO MR RIDLEY HAD BEEN APPROVED BUT HAD BEEN DELAYED BY THE VISIT OF THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER. SAENZ DE TEJADA (HEAD OF TREATY SECTION MFA) TOLD WILKES AT THE SAME PARTY - THAT THE MESSAGE DOES NOT SUGGEST A DATE IN AUGUST BUT ONLY SUGGESTS THAT FURTHER TALKS BE HELD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SAENZ ALSO SAID THAT THE GUATEMALANS WOULD AGREE TO QUOTE NON-MILITARY UNQUOTE USE OF THE CAYS, TO THE SNAKE FORMULA FOR ACCESS TO THE HIGH SEAS, AND THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO COMPROMISE ON WORDING BECAUSE THEY NEEDED A SETTLEMENT.

2. MY FEELING THAT THE GUATEMALANS ARE ACTING , LARGELY, IN GOOD FAITH WAS CONFIRMED BY THE WAY THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER, HIS WIFE, AND HERRERA WENT OUT OF THEIR WAY TO TALK TO MYSELF AND MY WIFE AT BOTH RECEPTIONS OVER THE WEEKEND. THIS WAS REMARKABLE AS THE CONTROVERSY OVER THEIR PRESENCE AT MY HOUSE ON 29 JULY WAS

FAITH WAS CONFIRMED BY THE WAY THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER, HIS WIFE, AND HERRERA WENT OUT OF THEIR WAY TO TALK TO MYSELF AND MY WIFE AT BOTH RECEPTIONS OVER THE WEEKEND. THIS WAS REMARKABLE AS THE CONTROVERSY OVER THEIR PRESENCE AT MY HOUSE ON 29 JULY WAS MAINTAINED BY THE PRESS UNTIL Ø1 AUGUST. THE CONTROVERSY ONLY STOPPED THEN BECAUSE PRESIDENT LUCAS MADE A STATEMENT ON THE EVENING OF 31 JULY, SAYING THAT IT WAS PART OF THE DUTY OF A FOREIGN MINISTER TO ATTEND SUCH RECEPTIONS. SKINNER-KLEE, PREDICTABLY WAS LESS WILLING TO BE SEEN TALKINVTO US BUT HIS WIFE DID NOT SHARE HIS HESITATION.

3. GIVEN THE THEN CONTINUING CONTROVERSY I THINK THAT CASTILLO VALDEZ AND HERRERA WOULD ONLY HAVE BEEN SO PUBLICLY FRIENDLY, AND THAT PRESIDENT LUCAS WOULD ONLY HAVE GIVEN PUBLIC SUPPORT TO THEM, IF THE EXPECTED GUATEMALAN APPROACH IS BEING MADE LARGELY IN GOOD FAITH WITH THE HOPE OF REACHING A NEGOATIATED SETTLEMENT.

WILMSHURST

NNNN

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
DESKBY 03/0900Z
TELEGRAM NUMBER 337 OF 31 JULY
R F I : IMMEDIATE BELMOPAN (PERSONAL) PRIORITY WASHINGTON ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 186 : BELIZE/GUATEMALA : POSSIBLE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS

1. MY COMMENTS ON YOUR TUR ARE :

A) I REALISE THAT THERE ARE CONSIDERABLE PROBLEMS, AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 333. HOWEVER, AS IT APPEARS THAT PREMIER PRICE SEES NO OBJECTION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A REFERNDUM AFTER INDEPENDENCE (BELIZE TELNO 411) I WONDER WHETHER WE REALLY NEED TO FEEL SO COMMITTED TO HOLDING THE REFERENDUM BEFOREHAND SEMI COLON

B) YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM MY LATER TELEGRAM S (NUMBERS 334 AND 335 NOT TO ALL) THAT THIS MOVE BY THE GUATEMALANS COULD GIVE RISE TO POLITICAL OPPOSITION HERE. IF, DESPITE THIS, THEY GO AHEAD WITH A PROPOSAL FOR NEW NEGOTIATIONS ITHINK THAT WE CAN TAKE THIS AS AN INDICATION THAT THEY ARE ACTING IN GOOD FAITH, EVEN IF THEY HAVE OTHER MOTIVES IN THE BACK OF THEIR MINDS.

C) I AGREE THAT WE NEED TO SMOKE OUT THE GUATEMALAN POSITION (PARA 3 OF YOUR TUR AND PARA 3 OF MY TELNO 333) . HOWEVER, I SEE SOME DANGER IN OUR THINKING IT POSSIBLE TO STRING THE GUATEMALANS ALONG WITH THE AIM OF HOLDING OFF FULL SCALE NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL AFTER 21 SEPTEMBER. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM PARA 6 OF MY TELNO 328 THAT THE GUATBELANS WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO CONTINUE TALKING TO US AFTER 21 SEPTEMBER. I FEAR THAT IF WE DID STRING THEM ALONG WITH THIS IN MIND WE WOULD NOT ONLY OPEN OURSELVES TO RENEWED GUATEMALA

RENEWED GUATEMALALN ACCUSATIONS IN WASHINGTON AND AT THE UN OF OUR ACTING IN BAD FAITH (ACCUSATIONS WHICH ARE STILL BEING REPEATED IN THE GUATEMALAN PRESS) BUT WE WOULD ALSO PREJUDICE THE PRESENT POSSIBILITY THAT INDEPENDEN CE CCAN TAKE PLACE IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF AT LEAST RESTRAINT ON THE GUATEMALAN SIDE. TO TURN THE GUATEMALANS DOWN WOULD, OF COURSE, MAKE THE PERIOD OF INDEPENDENCE VERY UNCERTAIN AS GUATEMALAN PRIDE, WHICH HAS ALREADY TAKEN SOME KNOCKS, WOULD REQUIRE A DRAMATIC REACTION.

2. MY FEELING THEREFORE IS THAT THE GUATEMALANS MAY WELL BE ACTING IN GOOD FAITH IN WANTING TO ACHIEVE AN EARLY SETTLEMENT, EVEN IF THEY FEEL THAT THE MERE FACT OF MAKING THE ATTEMPT WILL IMPROVE THEIR POSITION WITH THE AMERICANS AND AT THE UN. WHILST WE NEED SOME CLEAR INDICATION OF HOW FAR THE GUATEMALANS ARE PREPARED TO GO, I FEEL THAT WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE FAST

IF THEY CONFIRM THEIR READINESS TO COMPROMISE ON THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES.

E3. THIS LEAVES THE QUESTION OF HOW BEST TO SMOKE THEM OUT WITHOUT LOSING TOO

WITHOUT LOSING TOO MUCH OF THE LITTLE TIME LEFT AVAILABLE. A PRELIMINARY MEETING OF OFFICIALS, AS YOU SUGGEST IN YOUR PARA 3, COULD WELL, ON PAST EXPERIENCE, TAKE TIME TO ORGANISE. ALTER-NATIVES WOULD BE THAT MR RIDLEY

NATIVES WOULD BE THAT MR RIDLEY'S REPLY TO THE EXPECTED GUATEMALAN MESSAGE SHOULD OFFER A VISIT TO GUATEMALA IN THE NEAR FUTURE BY AN APPROPRIATE OFFICIA

APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL FOR EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS WITH GUATEMALAN OFFICIALS, OR THAT IT SHOULD SUGGEST THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S ADVISERS HAVE PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS WITH ME WHICH COULD THEN BE REPORTED BACK TO MR RIDLEY.

4. I AM LIKELY TO MEET THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND SOME OF HIS ADVISERS AT TWO RECEPTIONS FOR THE VISITING EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER OVER THE WEEKEND. I SHALL REPORT ANY FURTHER INDICATIONS OF GUATEMALAN THINKING THAT I PICK UP.

WILMSHURST

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TO ROUTINE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 335 OF 31 JULY

R F I : ROUTINE BELMOPAN (PERSONAL)

MY TELNOS 328,329 -AND 334 : BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. I SPOKE TO SKINNER-KLEE ON 31 JULY AT THE SWISS NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION. HE SAID THAT THE GUATEMALAN REPLY TO MR RIDLEY'S MESSAGE HAD BEEN DRAFTED (HE IMPLIED THAT HE HAD DRAFTED IT HIMSELF) BUT HAD NOT YET BEEN FINALLY APPROVED. FROM HIS ACCOUNT IT APPEARS THAT THE MESSAGE WILL CONTAIN NO INDICATION OF ANY MOVE IN THE GUATEMALAN POSITION.

2. COMMENTING ON THE CRITICISM AROUSED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER ATTENDING MY PARTY ON 29 JULY (MY TELNO 334) SKINNER-KLEE SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT THIS WOULD NOT CAUSE ANY CHANGE IN THE GUATEMALA N POSITION, BUT THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS A DANGER THAT COULD. HE WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THAT PRESIDENT LUCAS IS THINKING, AT PRESENT, OF PERSUADING THE LARGEST POSSIBLE COALITION OF POLITICAL PARTEIS TO BACK GENERAL GUEVARA FOR THE PRESIDENCY WITH CASTILLO VALDEZ AS THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. HE SAID THAT THE MAN WHO IS INSISTING ON BEING THE NEXT FOREIGN MINISTER IS UCLES. AS UCLES HAD MADE PUBLIC HIS DECISION NOT TO ATTEND THE PARTY (PARA 1 OF MY TELNO 329), THIS COULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN UCLES, CASTILLO VALDEZ AND PRESIDENT LUCAS. HOWEVER, HE HOPED THAT THE SUGGESTION FOR NEW TALKS ON BELIZE WOULD GO AHEAD AS PLANEED.

3. HE ASKED ME WHETHER I HAD YET HAD ANY REACTION FROM LONDON TO WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME ON 29 JULY. I SAID THAT I HAD NOT AS I ASSUMED THAT YOU WERE AWAINTING THE GUATEMALAN REPLY TO MR RIDLEY'S MESSAGE. HOWEVER I ADDED THAT IT SEEMED POSSIBLE THAT PREMIER PRICE WOULD WELCOME A FURTHER ROUND OF TALKS PROVISING THAT NO REFERENDUM WAS NECESSARY UNTIL AFTER 21 SEPTEMBER. SKINNER - KLEE ASSURED ME THAT THAT WOULD CAUSE NO PROBLEM TO THE GUATEMALANS, AND TYPICALLY, HE SAID THAT HE HAD SUGGESTED PRECISELY THAT TIMETABLE DURING THE LAST NEW YORK MEETING.

WILMSHURST

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 186 OF 31 JUL
IMMEDIATE BELMOPAN(PERSONAL)
PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK
YOUR TELNOS 328 AND 333 AND BELMOPAN TELNO 411
BELIZE/GUATEMALA: POSSIBLE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS
1. THE CONVERSATIONS REPORTED IN YOUR TURS ARE CERTAINLY ENCOURAGING, BUT WE ARE FAR FROM SURE THAT THEY CAN BE TAKEN ALTOGETHER AT THEIR FACE VALUE. WE SUSPECT THAT THE GUATEMALANS MAY, AT LEAST IN PART, BE RESPONDING TO US PRESSURE AND THAT THEIR MAIN CONCERN MAY BE TO PUT THEMSELVES IN THE MOST FAVOURABLE LIGHT FOR THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
2. THERE ARE SOME OBVIOUS PROBLEMS ABOUT AN EARLY RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS. MR RIDLEY GAVE AN UNDERTAKING DURING HIS VISIT TO BELIZE IN APRIL THAT IF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT RESULTED IN A TREATY THIS WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO A REFERENDUM BEFORE INDEPENDENCE. WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIT IN NEGOTIATIONS AND A REFERENDUM BEFORE THE 21 SEPTEMBER DATE FOR INDEPENDENCE. EVEN IF THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE RESUMED AND A TREATY WERE NOT IN SIGHT BEFORE 21 SEPTEMBER WE COULD EXPECT CONSIDERABLE OPPOSITION PRESSURE IN BELIZE TO POSTPONE INDEPENDENCE UNTIL THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE CLEAR. WE SHOULD BE MOST RELUCTANT TO POSTPONE THE DATE, AND WOULD ONLY CONSIDER DOING SO IF, IN THE LIGHT OF A SERIOUSLY DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION IN BELIZE, PRICE HIMSELF ASKED US TO POSTPONE IT SO THAT NEGOTIATIONS COULD CONTINUE.
3. WE CLEARLY CANNOT HOWEVER TURN THE GUATEMALANS DOWN FLAT. OUR STRATEGY MUST BE TO EXPLORE THE GUATEMALAN POSITION FURTHER ON A BILATERAL BASIS AND TO TRY TO PLAY THEM LONG. OUR PRECISE

REACTION WILL DEPEND ON THE TERMS OF CASTILLO VALDEZ' MESSAGE TO MR RIDLEY, BUT WE SHOULD ENVISAGE A REPLY ASKING THE GUATEMALANS TO CLARIFY WHAT THEIR POSITION NOW IS, AND POSSIBLY PROPOSING PRELIMINARY LOW-KEY BILATERAL TALKS AT OFFICIAL LEVEL WITH THE AIM OF HOLDING OFF FULL SCALE NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL AFTER 21 SEPTEMBER (BUT WITHOUT NECESSARILY SAYING THIS AT THE OUTSET). WE SHOULD NEED TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE GUATEMALANS THAT 21 SEPTEMBER IS A FIRM DATE FOR INDEPENDENCE WHICH WE CANNOT AT THIS STAGE CHANGE. WE SHOULD WANT TO ADD THAT THERE WOULD BE NO POINT IN HOLDING TALKS AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL UNLESS WE WERE ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT THEY WOULD RESULT IN THE SIGNING OF A TREATY. ANOTHER ABORTIVE MEETING WOULD BE OF NO USE TO ANY OF US. FINALLY, IT MIGHT BE WORTH POINTING OUT TO THE GUATEMALANS THAT PRICE WOULD HAVE A BETTER CHANCE OF WINNING A REFERENDUM ON THE TREATY AFTER INDEPENDENCE, WHEN THERE WOULD BE NO DANGER OF PEOPLE VOTING ON THE INDEPENDENCE ISSUE RATHER THAN THE TREATY.

4. WE SHALL BE SENDING INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF CASTILLO VALDEZ' MESSAGE, BUT SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY COMMENTS YOU OR OTHER RECIPIENTS MAY HAVE AT THIS STAGE.

CARRINGTON

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TO IMMEIDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 328
OF 29 JULY
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R F I : PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. I GAVE A RECEPTION ON 29 JULY TO MARK THE WEDDING OF THE PRINCE OF WALES. MY INVITATIONS TO THE OFFICIAL GUATEMALANS WERE REGRETTED, BUT ON THE MORNING OF THE 29 JULY THE FOREIGN MINISTER TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT HE WOULD BE COMING AFTER ALL, AND SKINNER KLEE AND HERRERA ALSO CAME. THE TWO LATTER EXPLAINED THAT AT FIRST THEIR INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN NOT TO ATTEND, BUT AT A MEETING ON 28 JULY SUMMONED BY PRESIDENT LUCAS THEY HAD BEEN TOLD TO COME AND TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT HE WANTED TO CONTINUE THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION.

2. CASTILLO VALDEZ WHO STAYED AT THE PARTY FROM BEGINNING TO END

2. CASTILLO VALDEZ, WHO STAYED AT THE PARTY FROM BEGINNING TO END, CONFIMED HIMSELF TO SAYING THAT HE HOPED THAT WE COULD KEEP TALKING. SKINNER KLEE AND HERRERA WERE MORE EXPLICIT. THEY SAID THAT LUCAS WAS AFRAID THAT IF NO AGREEMENT WAS REACHED DURING HIS REMAINING MONTHS OF OFFICE THERE WAS A RISK OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE NEXT PRESIDENT. LUCAS HAD DESCRIBED THOSE WHO HAD INSISTED ON MILITARY USE OF THE CAYS AS FOOLS, SAYING THAT ANY BASE BUILT ON THE CAYS COULD BE SWEPT AWAY BY A HURRICANE AT ANY TIME, NO REQUIREMENT FOR MILITARY USE WAS NEEDED, ALL THAT WAS NECESSARY WAS THAT THERE SHOULD FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION, BE NO PROHIBITION OF MILITARY USE. HE HAD SAID THAT THE QUESTION OF DURATION OF GUATEMALAN USE OF THE CAYS WAS AN ARTIFICIAL PROBLEM: IN 15 YEARS EITHER BELIZE AND GUATEMALA WOULD BE FRIENDS OR THEY WOULD BE ENEMIES. ON ACCESS TO THE HIGH SEAS ALL THAT MATTERED WAS THE SNAKE, NOT THE SUGGESTION THAT THE MARITIME BOUNDARY RUN BETWEEN THE CAYS AND THE MAINLAND.

3. HERRERA WAS DELIGHTED BY THE PRESIDENT'S INSISTENCE ON STARTING AGAIN ON MORE SENSIBLE TERMS, SKINNER KLEE WAS LESS ENTHUSIASTIC BUT THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS NOW A REAL CHANCE OF GETTING AN AGREEMENT. THEY ASKED HOW THIS NEW APPROACH WOULD SQUARE WITH PREMIER PRICE'S CONCERN ABOUT A REFERENDUM. I SAID THAT THE PREMIER MIGHT CONSIDER TALKING AGAIN IF THE TIMING WERE SUCH THAT HE COULD SIGN AN AGREEMENT BEFORE INDEPENDENCE BUT SUBMIT IT TO A REFERENDUM AFTER INDEPENDENCE. THEY SAW NO PROBLEM WITH THIS.

4. SKINNER KLEE SAID THAT A REPLY TO MR RIDLEY'S LATEST MESSAGE WAS BEING DRAFTED. PRESIDENT LUCAS SAW THAT MESSAGE AS OFFERING A GOOD CHANCE OF FINDING A SETTLEMENT.

5. THE FOREIGN MINISTER, HERRERA AND SKINNER KLEE ALL MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT THEIR PRESENCE IN MY HOUSE ON SUCH A PUBLIC OCCASION SHOUD BE SEEN AS A CLEAR GESTURE OF GOODWILL AND READINESS TO TRY AGAIN TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE BEFORE BELIZE BECAME INDEPENDENT. THIS MESSAGE WAS ALSO CONVEYED TO OTHER DIPLOMATS PRESENT.

6. I EXPECT TO RECEIVE THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S REPLY TO MR RIDLEY'S MESSAGE WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR SO. GRATEFUL TO LEARN WHETHER, IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT APPEARS TO BE A CONSIDERABLE MOVE IN THE GUATEMALAN POSITION, I SHOULD MAKE ENCOURAGING NOISES ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE 21 SEPTEMBER. THEY ALL SAID THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO TALK AFTER THAT DATE.

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TO IMMEIDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 328

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BELIZE/GUATEMALA

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23 July 1981

Belize: Defence Arrangements

As I have already mentioned to you on the telephone, the Prime Minister had a brief discussion with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary this morning about your letter to me of 22 July on this subject. The Prime Minister said that she was content that the formula about the maintenance of a garrison in Belize set out in the second paragraph of your letter should be used.

I established separately this morning that the Defence Secretary was also content.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Jonathan Dawson (Ministry of Defence).

MA

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

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From the Private Secretary

22 July 1981

Dear Brian,

Belize

We spoke on the return flight from Ottawa about my letter to Roderic Lyne of 19 July on this subject. I told you that I had discussed the situation with the Prime Minister and that she remained concerned about the formulation which it is proposed should be used with Belizean Ministers about the provision of assistance to Belize in the event of external attack. The Prime Minister still feels that we may be giving a hostage to fortune (or, alternatively, that the wording is misleading) but has agreed that the full formulation set out in paragraph 8 of OD(81)38 may be used if Ministers judge it necessary.

Yours ever

Richard Alexander

B.J.P. Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SECRET

15

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 July 1981

Prime Minister
Has seen.

Dear Michael.

Belize: Defence Arrangements

Mr Ridley discussed future defence arrangements for Belize with Premier Price today. It was agreed that / Mr Price should speak on the lines of the attached 'statement on Defence' at a public meeting in Belize after his return on Sunday 26 July. It will be seen that this does not include any reference to the possibility of providing direct assistance as part of a consultative arrangement. At the same time it would be announced that we were planning to grant independence on 21 September this year (as foreshadowed - the Lord Privy Seal's and the Defence Secretary's joint memorandum dated 17 July (OD(81)38). A parallel announcement would be made here; Parliament would be informed on Monday.

There was also discussion of the terms of a secret memorandum (a draft of which was annexed to OD(81)38). Mr Price asked for a Belizean veto on the withdrawal of the British garrison during the first six months after independence, / but he was told that this could not be agreed. I enclose a copy of the draft of the secret memorandum after discussion with Premier Price. As you see, the best that Mr Ridley felt able to offer him, subject to Cabinet approval here, was an undertaking in the secret memorandum to the effect that 'HMG would maintain a garrison in Belize for up to nine months; before any reduction or withdrawal of forces, there would be consultation between the two governments'. This is less than the previous OD agreement that the garrison might remain for 'up to a year after independence'. The additional offer of consultations commits us to nothing. The condition about Belize's foreign policy being acceptable in the OD minutes is contained in paragraph 5 of this memorandum.

Mr Price flies tomorrow to Washington where he hopes to persuade the Americans to associate themselves with the training of the Belize Defence Force and possibly to persuade them to agree to consult with the UK and others in the event of an armed attack against Belize. We hope for a favourable response on the former points, but do not rate highly his chances of success on the latter point.

/Mr Price

SECRET

Mr Price remains confident that the sum of the arrangements we are making for the defence of Belize will prove sufficient for him to satisfy public opinion in his own country that he is leading Belize into a secure independence.

I am sending a copy of this letter (which has not yet been seen by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary) to Jonathan Dawson (MOD)

yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

BELIZE : STATEMENT ON DEFENCE

Premier Price of Belize and the Hon Nicholas Ridley MP, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, discussed on 22 July the arrangements to be made after independence for the defence of Belize.

Recognising its responsibility to bring Belize to secure independence, Her Majesty's Government has agreed with the Government of Belize appropriate measures to ensure a sound basis for the future security of Belize from any external threat. It was agreed that British forces would remain in Belize after independence for an appropriate period, under arrangements to be made in an Exchange of Notes between the two Governments on the attainment of independence by Belize. At the same time the British Government would provide military training, aid and assistance including the provision of training teams and Loan Service Personnel to assist in the development and growth of the Belize Defence Force. The Belize Government for its part would make available training areas for use by British forces as required.

It was further agreed that certain countries in the region would be invited to participate in arrangements with the United Kingdom under which, in the event of armed attack against Belize, externally organised or supported, or the threat of such an attack, they would consult together to consider what measures should be taken in relation to such an attack.

These arrangements should be viewed in the context of Belize's membership of the United Nations and of the Commonwealth, and against the background of the international support already expressed for Belize's independence within its traditional and existing borders.

Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Belize consider that these measures provide a sound basis for the future security and territorial integrity of Belize.

SUPPLEMENTARY

In answer to questions if necessary:

The size of the garrison and the length of its stay will be decided by the British Government in the light of the circumstances at the time.

SECRET MINUTE PROVIDING FOR BRITISH FORCES IN BELIZE AFTER INDEPENDENCE

1. At the request of the Government of Belize, the United Kingdom Government will maintain a garrison in Belize for the defence of Belize against external threat for up to nine months. Before any withdrawal or reduction of forces, there would be consultations between the two Governments. During this period and thereafter, Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to provide British military personnel in the form of training teams and Loan Service Personnel to assist in the expansion of the Belize Defence Force.

2. The Government of Belize will enter into arrangements satisfactory to both Governments in relation to the status of the British forces which will come into force on independence.

3. Requests for the use of the British garrison in support of the Belize Defence Force will be made to the United Kingdom Government through the British High Commissioner. It is no part of the function of the British garrison to assist in or other wise take part in operations concerned with internal security or with the enforcement of law and order.

4. The Government of Belize will not without the consent of the United Kingdom Government permit the presence in Belize of any forces of any other State during the period for which British Forces are present in Belize under these arrangements.

5. The Government of Belize while exercising sole sovereign responsibility for Belize's foreign policy recognise the need to avoid any course of action likely to precipitate an external threat to the country and embroil the British Forces stationed there. The United Kingdom Government reserve the right to withdraw thier troops if, in their judgement and after due warning, the actions of the Government of Belize seem likely to precipitate such a threat.

6. Any announcement on the subject of retention of British forces should refer to the terms of the public statement agreed between the two governments.

CONFIDENTIAL

HL

FILE Belize

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 July 1981

Dear Rodric,

Belize

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 17 July and the OD paper enclosed with it. The Prime Minister is generally content with the policy outlined in OD(81)38 but is concerned about the formulation for use with Belizean Ministers set out in paragraph 8. She believes that we might in time regret the implied offer in it. I should be grateful if you could reflect on this: it may be that you will have to consult us by telegram in Ottawa.

Yours ever

Michael Alexander

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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HL

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 July 1981

Belize

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 17 July and the OD paper enclosed with it. The Prime Minister is generally content with the policy outlined in OD(81)38 but is concerned about the formulation for use with Belize and Ministers set out in paragraph 8. She believes that we might in time regret the implied offer in it. I should be grateful if you could reflect on this: it may be that you will have to consult us by telegram in Ottawa.

MA

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister to see

N.P.G. Mitchell
Duty Clerk 17/7/81

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 July 1981

Dear Michael,

Belize

I attach for ease of reference a copy of the joint OD Memorandum circulated this morning by the Secretary of State for Defence and the Lord Privy Seal containing proposals for the defence arrangements to be made for Belize after independence and for the date of independence to be 21 September. The Memorandum assumes the concurrence of OD colleagues in the absence of comments before 21 July.

Premier Price of Belize is arriving on a visit to London for discussions beginning on 20 July. The main purpose of his visit is to discuss defence arrangements. We are arranging for him to discuss other matters on 20 and 21 July but Mr Ridley hopes to be in a position to put the agreed proposals to Premier Price on 22 July. I am sorry that, for this reason, we have had to seek agreement to the paper at such short notice.

yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

CONFIDENTIAL

17 JUL 1981

Prime Minister to see.

NRG Mitchell
Duty Clerk 17/7/81

Ref. A05289

MR ALEXANDER

Belize/Guatemala

(OD(81) 38)

In this memorandum the Secretary of State for Defence and the Lord Privy Seal seek the agreement of OD colleagues to the line to be taken with the Premier of Belize, Mr Price when he comes to London on 22 July, following the failure to achieve a treaty in relation to Belize with Guatemala. OD discussed this problem on 12 February 1981. The present proposals by the Secretary of State for Defence and the Lord Privy Seal are in line with what OD agreed on that occasion although it has not yet been possible to establish a multilateral defence undertaking for Belize after independence.

2. The main elements in this problem are that it is desirable from the United Kingdom's point of view that Belize should be broght to independence as soon as possible, that as soon as possible thereafter the United Kingdom should be able to shed Belize as a defence commitment, and that in the interim period satisfactory control should be maintained over the foreign policy of the Belize Government. In the absence of satisfactory agreement with Guatemala, which is regrettable but seems inevitable in present circumstances, the proposals in OD(81) 38 seem to represent the best deal that can be achieved. As telegram number 313 of 16 July from Guatemala City (attached) makes clear, there must be some doubt about the Guatemalan reaction to them. Subject to points which may be raised by OD colleagues, I would advise the Prime Minister to agree:

a. to the terms of the draft SECRET minute at Annex A to OD(81) 38;

b. to the proposed public statement in paragraph 8 of OD(81) 38 and the text in Annex B in relation to multilateral consultative defence arrangements;

c. a target date of 21 September for Belize independence.

Am very unhappy about this. We could refuse it.

RCA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

17 July 1981

GRS 200

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FM GUATEMALA CITY 16/2025Z JUL 81
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 313 OF 16 JULY
R F I : PRIORITY BELMOPAN (PERSONAL) ROUTINE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 308 : BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. THERE HAS STILL BEEN NO FORMAL PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER BUT THE MORNING PAPERS OF 16 JULY REPORT REMARKS THAT BOTH HE AND THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE HAVE MADE TO JOURNALISTS.

2. THE FOREIGN MINISTER IS REPORTED AS HAVING SAID THAT GUATEMALA WILL NOT STEP BACK IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE INDEPENDENCE OF BELIZE AND WILL STAND BY THE MARCH HEADS OF AGREEMENT. HOWEVER IF GREAT BRITAIN WERE TO GRANT UNILATERAL INDEPENDENCE TO BELIZE, THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT, GUATEMALA WOULD DECLARE SUCH AN ACT ILLEGAL. BELIZE CONTINUED TO BE PART OF THE NATIONAL TERRITORY AS PRESIDENT LUCAS HAD SAID IN HIS SPEECH OF 01 JULY (MY TELNO 289).

3. THE MINISTER FOR DEFENCE, GENERAL GUEVARA, ALSO SAID THAT GUATEMALA STOOD BY THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT AND CONSIDERED THAT ANY TREATIES OR NEGOTIATION SHOULD BE BASED ON THEM. GUATEMALA WAS NOT THINKING OF ATTACKING ANYBODY AND WAS NOT A BELLICOSE COUNTRY. HOWEVER IF BELIZE BECAME INDEPENDENT WITHOUT AN AGREEMENT GUATEMALA WOULD RESERVE HER RIGHT TO TAKE WHATEVER ACTION PRESIDENT LUCAS DECIDED AND THE ARMY WOULD SUPPORT WHATEVER POLICY THE PRESIDENT ADOPTED. UNILATERAL INDEPENDENCE OF THAT TERRITORY, IF NOT REACHED BY AGREEMENT WITH GUATEMALA, WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE CONSIDERED AS AN AGRESSION WHICH WOULD AFFRONT THE GUATEMALAN PEOPLE.

WILMSHURST

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ADVANCE COPY
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 361 OF 14 JULY 1981
INFO GUATEMALA CITY
INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA
MY TELNO 359: BELIZE/GUATEMALA NEGOTIATIONS
1. PREMIER'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION WAS IN THE EVENT NOT BROADCAST UNTIL 18.15 LOCAL TIME TODAY. TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS:-

MY FELLOW BELIZEANS,

I LEFT BELIZE FOR NEW YORK CITY ON THE WEEK-END OF THE 3RD OF JULY TO DISCUSS WITH MINISTER RIDLEY, MINISTER OF STATE IN THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, HOW WE COULD BEST

PROCEED IN THE TASK OF CONVERTING THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT INTO TREATIES.

THIS PROCESS, SINCE LAST MARCH, HAS INCLUDED ONE ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS AT OFFICIAL LEVEL IN NEW YORK CITY IN MAY.

OF DISCUSSIONS AT OFFICIAL LEVEL IN NEW YORK CITY IN MAY. AT THAT MEETING, A NUMBER OF IDEAS WAS PUT TOGETHER WITH A VIEW TO SUBMIT THEM TO THE THREE GOVERNMENTS.

THIS PROCESS LOST MOMENTUM WHEN THE GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA DECLARED THAT IT WAS NOT READY TO CONTINUE THE PROCESS IN JUNE, PLEADING THE NEED FOR MORE TIME TO STUDY THE REPORT PUT FORWARD BY THEIR OFFICIALS.

IT WAS THE HOPE OF THE GOVERNMENTS MF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BELIZE THAT GUATEMALA WOULD BE READY TO JOIN MR RIDLEY AND MYSELF IN NEW YORK CITY. UP TO THE TIME I LEFT BELIZE, NO POSITIVE RESPONSE HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM GUATEMALA TO THIS INVITATION; AND IT REMAINED UNCERTAIN WHAT EXACTLY WOULD HAVE

TRANSPIRED. AS IT TURNED OUT, WE WERE JOINED BY FOREIGN MINISTER ING. RAFAEL CASTILLO VALDEZ OF GUATEMALA; AND WE SPENT MANY HOURS ATTEMPTING TO CARRY FORWARD THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS.

BY NOW YOU WILL HAVE HEARD, IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE

ISSUED BY OUR THREE GOVERNMENTS, THAT WHILE WE HELD TALKS AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE JOINT COMMISSION TO MEET, AND SO WE WERE NOT ABLE TO AGREE ON ANY FINAL TREATY OR TREATIES.

IT IS NOW LIKELY THAT THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT CAN BE MADE INTO TREATIES BEFORE THE END OF THE UNITED NATIONS PLENARY SESSION THIS YEAR; NEVERTHELESS, OUR POLICY OF A SECURE INDEPENDENCE WITH ALL OUR TERRITORY WILL PROCEED ALONG THE OTHER ROAD, THAT IS, AN INDEPENDENCE WITH A SUITABLE SECURITY GUARANTEE.

THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT ARE NO LONGER IN EXISTENCE. THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT WILL STILL REMAI THE FRAMEWORK OF A FUTURE SETTLEMENT OF THE ANGLO-GUATEMALAN DISPUTE. WE SHALL CONTINUE OUR ENDEAVOURS TO GET THE JOINT COMMISSION TO RESUME ITS WORK IN FRIENDSHIP AT ANYTIME, EITHER BEFOGE OR AFTER INDEPENDENCE.

SHOULD A TREATY OR TREATIES EMERGE FROM THE WORK OF THE JOINT COMMISSION, THE COMMITMENT REMAINS THAT THEY WILL BE PUT TO THE PEOPLE OF BELIZE IN A REFERENDUM.

THIS NEW DEVELOPMENT WILL NOT COME TO BELIZEANS AS A

SURPRISE. OUR GOVERNMENT MADE IT CLEAR FROM THE OUTSET

SURPRISE. OUR GOVERNMENT MADE IT CLEAR FROM THE OUTSET IN MARCH THAT WHILE THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT REPRESENTED A LANDMARK IN THE LONG PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH GUATEMALA, IT WOULD YET BE DIFFICULT TO CONVERT THESE HEADS INTO TREATIES WHICH WOULD REPRESENT A FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE ANGLO-GUATEMALAN DISPUTE.

WE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT CERTAIN PRINCIPLES WERE VITAL TO THE WELFARE OF BELIZE AND THAT THE BELIZE GOVERNMENT HA NO INTENTION OF COMPROMISING THOSE PRINCIPLES. THE SOVEREIGNTY OF BELIZE, ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND ITS RIGHT TO INDEPENDENCE, ARE PRINCIPLES WHICH WE SHALL NEVER COMPROMISE.

WE ARE EQUALLY DETERMINED THAT WHENEVER THE SETTLEMENT OF THIS DISPUTE IS FINALLY NEGOTIATED, THE BEST INTEREST OF THE PEOPLE OF BELIZE SHALL BE PROTECTED AND PRESERVED.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE FUTURE WELFARE OF BELIZE REQUIRES HER GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH UNTIL THE GUATEMALAN CLAIM TO BELIZEAN TERRITORY IS REMOVED. WE CANNOT CONTINUE FOREVER TO LIVE WITH A TERRITORIAL DISPUTE THAT IS NOT RESOLVED. PEACE, TRANQUILITY, AND ULTIMATELY, FRIENDSHIP, MUST REPRESENT THE OBJECTIVES OF OUR FUTURE

RELATIONS WITH ALL OUR NEIGHBOURS. THIS IS THE MESSAGE IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ANGLO-GUATEMALAN TALKS IN WHICH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, GUATEMALA AND BELIZE REAFFIRMED THEIR DESIRE TO PROMOTE AND TO PRESERVE PEACE IN THE REGION.

HERE EMERGES A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA IN WHICH SHE HAS REAFFIRMED HER DESIRE TO PROMOTE AND PRESERVE PEACE IN THE REGION. SHE HAS EXPRESSED HER DETERMINATION TO BUILD UPON THE UNDERSTANDING AND RESPECT BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. TOWARD THIS OBJECTIVE OF PEACE IN THE REGION, WE HAVE AGREED TO PRESERVE THE EXISTING CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS AND TO CREATE NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR DISCUSSION, WITH THE HOPE THAT ALL THIS WILL LEAD TO MUTUAL TRUST AND RESPECT.

THIS OUTLOOK PROMISES NEW HOPE THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WILL BE CHARACTERIZED BY AN AWARENESS THAT WE ARE ON THE CENTRAL AMERICAN CONTINENT; THAT THE ADVANTAGE OF LIVING AND WORKING TOGETHER OUTWEIGHS THE PROSPECT OX FIGHTING WITH ONE ANOTHER. WE HOPE THIS NE SPIRIT OF UNDERSTANDING WILL LEAD THE GOVERNMENT AND THE

PEOPLE OF GUATEMALA TO ACCEPT AND RESPECT THE DETERMINATION OF THE BELIZEAN PEOPLE TO BE A SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENT NATION WITH ALL ITS TERRITORY.

LET US LOOK TO A BETTER FUTURE FOR ALL OF US. WE MUST CONTINUE OUR SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION TO THE ANGLO-GUATEMALAN DISPUTE. WE HAVE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT A DEFENSE COMMITMENT TO AN INDEPENDENT BELIZE. WE HAVE TO CONTINUE TO MAKE PLANS FOR OUR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS AN INDEPENDENT NATION.

YOU WILL NO DOUBT RECALL THAT THE UNITED NATIONS DIRECTED THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY TO TAKE NECESSARY STEPS IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF BELIZE. THIS DIRECTIVE WAS ENDORSED RECENTLY BY BOTH POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, WHEN THEY REPEATED THEI COMMITMENT TO A DEFENSE GUARANTEE FOR BELIZE.

IT IS THE INTENTION OF OUR GOVERNMENT TO HAVE THESE COMMITMENTS DOCUMENTED INTO FIRM AND ACCEPTABLE TERMS BEFORE BELIZE EMBARKS UPON THE DECLARATION OF THE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE. TO ENDEAVOUR AND TO ACCOMPLISH THESE THREE

OBJECTIVES - SECURITY, ECONOMIC PROGRAMME AND THE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE - THERE WILL BE DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO DETERMINE THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE INDEPENDENT NATION OF BELIZE WILL BE BORN.

MY FELLOW BELIZEANS, YOU HAVE WORKED AND STRUGGLED MANY YEARS FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF BELIZE. I ASK YOUR CONTINUED DEDICATION TO THIS OBJECTIVE AND A GREATER SENSE OF UNITY AND NATIONAL ENDEAVOUR SO THAT TOGETHER, WE CAN ENSURE THE BEST FUTURE OF BELIZE AS A SECURELY INDEPENDENT COUNTRY WITH ALL ITS TERRITORY INTACT.

THE STATUS QUO, THAT IS, THINGS AS THEY NOW ARE CANNOT REMAIN MUCH LONGER. AN INDEPENDENT BELIZE WITH SEQURITY HAS A BETTER PROSPECT TO EXIST, TO DEVELOP AND TO PROSPER, THAN A NON-INDEPENDENT BELIZE WITH SECURITY.

THIS IS THE POLITICAL REALITY OF TODAY.

GOD-FEARING WE FEAR NO EVIL. LET US ADVANCE TO THE GREATER OPPORTUNITIES OFFERED BY A SECURE INDEPENDENCE.

FCO PASS ALL

HENNESSY

BT

O 132345Z JUL 81
FM BELMOPAN
TO FCO LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L UK COMMS ONLY

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM MUMBER 359 OF 13 JULY 1981
INFO PRIORITY GUATEMALA CITY, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND OTTAWA.

YOUR TELNO PERSONAL 80 AND UKMIS NEW YORK TELNOS 613, 614 615 : BELIZE/ GUATEMALA NEGOTIATIONS.

1. PREMIER RETURNED YESTERDAY AN CALLED ON ME THIS MORNING. HIS DECRIPTION OF THE TALKS IN NEW YORK LAST WEEK SQUARED GENERALLY WITH THE ACCOUNT FGIVEN IN TURS AND THE BRIEFING GIVEN BY WILMSHURST ON 11 JULY (FOR WHICH WE WERE MOST GRATEFUL). PRICE THOUGHT THAT THE GUATEMALANS' DEMANDS FOR INDEFINITE AND UNRESTRICTED (UNCLUDING MILITARY) USE OF THE CAYES AND THE WATERS SURROUNDING THEM, TOGETHER WITH THEIR LONG LIST OF AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFTS AGREED IN NEW YORK IN MAY (MANY OF WHICH REPRESENTED A MORE EXTREME GUATEMALAN POSITION) INDICATED THAT THE GUATEMALANS NO LONGER WISHED OR EXPECTED A TREATY TO RESULT FROM THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT. HE ADDED THAT HERRERA HAD, TOWARDS THE END OF THE RTALKS, PRIVATELY RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF GUATEMALA PURCHASING SOME OR ALL OF THE RANGUANAS AND SAPODILLAS (HE OFFERED US DOLLARS 10 MILLION). PRICE SAID THAT HE HAD TURNED HIM DOWN BUT HAD THE FIRM IMPRESSION THAT THE OFFER WAS MADE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS.

2. ALTHOUGH PRICE THOUGHT THAT FURTHER NEGOTIATION BASED ON THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT WAS NO LONGER POSSIBLE, HE EMPHASISED THAT THE DOOR REMAINED OPEN. HE HOPED THAT THE FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE EVIDENT AT THE END OF THE TALKS WOULD CONTINUE. HE SAID THAT HE AND CASTILLO VALDEZ HAD EXCHANGEB TELEPHONE NUMBERS AND THERE WOULD BE EXCHANGES OF VISITS BY MINISTERS. I WAS LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT, ONCE INDEPENDENCE HAD BEEN ACHIEVED, PRICE WOULD NOT BE ADVERSE TO RE-OPENING TALKS WITH THE GUATEMALANS ON THE BASIS OF THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT.

3. PRICE HAD OBVIOUSLY TAKEN TO HEART MR RIDLEY'S WARNING THAT THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT WOULD NEED TO BE ASSURED THAT THE MAJORITY OF BELIZEANS REALLY WANTED INDEPENDENCE. HE HAD ALREADY ARRANGED TO MEET ARANDA AND ESQUIVEL LATER IN THE DAY AND PLANNED TO TALK TO THE PUBLIC SERVICE UNION AND PERHAPS OTHER GROUPS, SUCH AS LAWYERS AND BUSINESSMEN. NOR HAD HE RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF MEETING WITH INDIVIDUAL BAM LEADERS (AS OPPOSED TO CONFRONTING NOISY BAM DEMONSTRATIONS). THIS NEW WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE A DIALOGUE WITH THE OPPOSITION IS A GOOD SIGN AS FAR AS IT GOES AND I ENCOURAGED PRICE TO MAINTAIN AND, IF POSSIBLE, BUILD ON THESE LINKS.

4. THIS AFTERNOON, PRICE TOLD ME THAT, AT HIS MEETING WITH THE OPPOSITION, ARANDA HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE UDP WOULD WANT TO SEE A PROPOER SETTLEMENT WITH GUATEMALA BEFORE THE COUNTRY WENT INTO INDEPENDENCE. IRONICALLY, ARANDA HAD ARGUED IN FAVOUR OF GOING BACK TO THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT.

5. PRICE CONCLUDED FROM ALL THIS THAT WE WERE LIKELY TO BE IN FOR MORE TROUBLE, INCLUDING VIOLENCE, FROM THE UDP AND BAM. BUT WITH A GOOD DEFENCE GUARANTEE, HE THOUGHT HE WOULD HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE MAJORITY.

6. THE TWO COMMUNIQUES WERE BROADCAST AT 1230 LOCAL TIME TODAY AND PRICE INTENDS TO ADDRESS THE NATION HIMSELF TONIGHT, FOLLOWED BY A PUBLIC MEETING TOMORROW.

FCO PASS ALL

HENNESSY

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 102356Z JULY 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 614 OF 11 JULY.
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, MEXICO CITY, BELMOPAN (PERSONAL)
GUATEMALA CITY.

MIPT: BELIZE/GUATEMALA NEGOTIATIONS.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AGREED PRESS COMMUNIQUE.

QUOTE

JOINT COMMUNIQUE TO BE ISSUED ON MONDAY 13 JULY AT 7PM (BST).

TALKS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND GUATEMALA, WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF BELIZE, WERE RESUMED AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL FROM 6-10 JULY IN NEW YORK TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION ON A TREATY OR TREATIES TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT SIGNED IN LONDON ON 11 MARCH THIS YEAR. THE DELEGATIONS WERE LED BY MR NICHOLAS RIDLEY, MINISTER OF STATE AT THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, ING RAFAEL E CASTILLO VALDEZ, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF GUATEMALA AND THE HON. GEORGE PRICE, PREMIER OF BELIZE.

ALTHOUGH THE TALKS DID NOT LEAD TO FINAL AGREEMENT ON ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES, THE ATMOSPHERE WAS CORDIAL.

THE MINISTERS AGREED THAT EXISTING CHANNELS OF COMMINICATION BETWEEN THE PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS SHOULD CONTINUE AND THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO OPEN NEW ONES. FURTHER STUDY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE MANY IDEAS DISCUSSED AT RECENT MEETINGS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT.

IN PARTICULAR THE THREE MINISTERS IDENTIFIED AREAS OF COOPERATION, FOR EXAMPLE IN AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, THE USES OF ENERGY, TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT AND IN OTHER FIELDS, WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED IN A SPIRIT OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND TRUST.

THE MINISTERS REAFFIRM THEIR DESIRE TO PROMOTE AND PRESERVE PEACE IN THE REGION AND ARE DETERMINED TO BUILD UPON THE UNDERSTANDING AND RESPECT WHICH HAVE BEEN CREATED AT THIS AND EARLIER MEETINGS.

UNQUOTE
PARSONS

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TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 613 OF 10 JULY
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON OTTAWA MEXICO CITY BELMOPAN (PERSONAL)
GUATEMALA CITY.

BELIZE/GUATEMALA NEGOTIATIONS.

1. THE ROUND OF TALKS WHICH OPENED ON 6 JULY CLOSED ON THE EVENING OF 10 JULY WITH AGREEMENT ON THE TEXT OF A PRESS COMMUNIQUE (ENGLISH TEXT IN MIFT) TO BE ISSUED IN LONDON, GUATEMALA CITY AND BELMOPAN ON MONDAY 13 JULY AT 7PM BST (NOON CENTRAL AMERICAN TIME).

2. THE COMMUNIQUE REFLECTS THE REALISATION OF THE BELIZEANS AND GUATEMALANS, IN THE COURSE OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS ON 10 JULY, THAT NEITHER SIDE WAS ABLE TO MOVE SUFFICIENTLY FAR TOWARDS THE OTHER TO MAKE AGREEMENT POSSIBLE ON EITHER A FULL ANGLO/GUATEMALA/BELIZE TREATY OR ON THE ALTERNATIVE OF AN ANGLO/GUATEMALA TREATY LEAVING OPEN FOR LATER NEGOTIATION MATTERS THAT COULD NOT NOW BE CONCLUDED.

3. THE GUATEMALANS AND BELIZEANS AGREED THAT THEIR FUTURE RELATIONSHIP, THOUGH IT WOULD FALL SHORT OF GUATEMALAN RECOGNITION OF AN INDEPENDENT BELIZE, WOULD BE MARKED BY FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION IN THE HOPE THAT WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME AND WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW LINKS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AN EVENTUAL FORMAL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE WOULD PROVE POSSIBLE. THIS RESULT, ALTHOUGH NOT AN AGREED SETTLEMENT, AVOIDS THE NEED FOR A REFERENDUM IN BELIZE AND LEAVES OPEN A FUTURE OF LIMITED BUT FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN GUATEMALA AND BELIZE. THIS IS A BETTER OUTCOME THAN WE MIGHT HAVE FEARED, EVEN IF LESS THAN WE MIGHT HAVE HOPED FOR.

4. THE TEXT OF A UK/BELIZEAN STATEMENT (SEE MY SECOND IFT) FOR PUBLICATION AT THE SAME TIME AS THE ANGLO /GUATEMALAN/BELIZEAN COMMUNIQUE WAS ALSO AGREED. THE CONSULTATIONS IN LONDON ARE ENVISAGED FOR 20 JULY.

5. FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LINE TO TAKE FOR POSTS WHEN THE COMMUNIQUE IS PUBLISHED WILL FOLLOW.

PARSONS

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 100358Z JUL 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 606 DATED 9 JULY 81
INFO WASHINGTON, GUATEMALA CITY, BELMOPAN (PERSONAL), OTTAWA

BELIZE NEGOTIATIONS

1. HAVING TAKEN THE MORNING TO STUDY THE BRITISH PAPERS (MY TELNO 595) CASTILLO AND MR RIDLEY MET AFTER LUNCH TO DISCUSS GUATEMALAN REACTIONS. IT SOON BECAME CLEAR THAT CASTILLO SAW NO POSSIBILITY OF PROCEEDING WITH A BILATERAL TREATY BETWEEN THE UK AND GUATEMALA, WHICH DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH ADVANTAGES TO JUSTIFY THE RENUNCIATION OF THEIR CLAIM. PRICE THEN JOINED THE MEETING IN AN ATTEMPT TO FIND A WAY FORWARD WITH THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT OF A TRILATERAL TREATY OF SETTLEMENT. DISCUSSION CENTERED UPON THE FIVE REMAINING POINTS OF DIFFICULTY. NEITHER PRICE NOR CASTILLO WAS PREPARED TO GIVE GROUND, AND FIVE HOURS OF TALK ENDED WITH THE BELIZEANS AND GUATEMALANS AGREEING TO BREAKFAST TOGETHER IN THE SLENDER HOPE THAT MORE CONTENT CAN BE GIVEN TO A POSSIBLE BILATERAL TREATY BETWEEN UK AND GUATEMALA, WITH DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN BELIZE AND GUATEMALA TO FOLLOW AFTER INDEPENDENCE. THIS IS, OF COURSE, THE CONCEPT REJECTED BY CASTILLO AT THE BEGINNING OF TODAY'S MEETINGS.

2. UNLESS THE GUATEMALANS ARE PREPARED TO CHANGE SIGNIFICANTLY THEIR ATTITUDE EITHER ON THE FIVE POINTS OF DIFFICULTY IN A TRILATERAL TREATY OR OVER THE MORE RECENT IDEA OF A BILATERAL ANGLO/GUATEMALAN TREATY, WE ARE LIKELY TOMORROW TO REACH END OF THE ROAD. PRICE AND SHOMAN ARE ALREADY CONCLUDING THAT THERE IS LITTLE POINT IN FURTHER MEETINGS. THEY ARE IN SELF-RIGHTEOUS MOOD AND SEEM UNDISMAYED AT THE PROSPECT OF IMMINENT BREAKDOWN. CASTILLO SEEMED TENSE AND UNHAPPY AT THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE IMPASSE WHICH WE HAVE NOW REACHED. THERE IS AN OUTSIDE CHANCE THAT HE MAY BE ABLE TO OFFER SOME MOVEMENT IF NEW INSTRUCTIONS ARE FORTHCOMING FROM GUATEMALA CITY. BUT WE SEEM TO HAVE GOT TO THE GUATEMALAN BOTTOM LINE, WELL SHORT OF WHAT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO CLINCH A DEAL ON CAYS AND WATERS (THOUGH ACCESS TO THE HIGHSEAS COULD PROBABLY NOW BE AGREED).

3. IT IS TOO SOON TO CONCLUDE THAT A TREATY IS BEYOND REACH. BUT EVERYING MAY DEPEND ON HOW BADLY PRESIDENT LUCAS NEEDS A SETTLEMENT. AFTER A FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH THE BELIZEANS TONIGHT WHICH PRODUCED NO NEW FLEXIBILITY ON THEIR PART, WE CANNOT BE OPTIMISTIC. IT IS PROBABLY STILL WORTHWHILE TO ALLOW THE GUATEMALANS THE WEEKEND TO REFLECT ON THEIR POSITION BUT THIS WILL ONLY BE POSSIBLE IF THEY MAKE CLEAR TOMORROW THAT THEY ARE NOT YET READY TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE TALKS HAVE REACHED BREAKDOWN POINT.

PARSONS

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RR WASHINGTON

GRS 250
RESTRICTED
FM GUATEMALA CITY 02/1548Z JUL 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
DESKBY 02/1700Z
TELEGRAM NUMBER 288 OF 02 JULY
R F I : PRIORITY BELMOPAN (PERSONAL) ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. ON 01 JULY, THE THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF HIS TAKING OFFICE, PRESIDENT LUCAS MADE HIS ANNUAL SPEECH TO CONGRESS. HE DEVOTED A LARGE PART OF THE SPEECH TO BELIZE, AND THIS PORTION OF HIS SPEECH HAS BEEN WIDELY REPORTED AND COMMENTED ON. TRANSLATION OF PASSAGES FROM HIS

OF THE SPEECH TO BELIZE, AND THIS PORTION OF HIS SPEECH HAS BEEN WIDELY REPORTED AND COMMENTED ON. TRANSLATION OF PASSAGES FROM HIS SPEECH IS IN MIFT.

2. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT LUCAS HAS PUBLICLY SUGGESTED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT NOT SUCCEED, AND IT IS THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE SIGNATURE OF THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT IN MARCH THAT HE HAS RESTATED GUATEMALA'S CLAIM TO THE WHOLE OF BELIZE.

3. I FEAR THAT THIS SPEECH MUST STRENGTHEN OUR GROWING CONCERN THAT THE GUATEMALAN COMMITMENT TO AN EARLY SETTLEMENT HAS WEAKENED. UNTIL NOW, ALTHOUGH IT HAS BEEN EVIDENT THAT MANY OF THE ADVISERS HAD TURNED AGAINST THE IDEA OF A SETTLEMENT, IT HAS BEEN POSSIBLE TO THINK THAT THE PRESIDENT AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER WERE STILL COMMITTED TO THEIR POLICY. NEWSPAPER COMMENT HAS PICKED UPON THE TIMING OF THE SPEECH AND INTERPRETS IT AS A WARNING TO US THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN NEW YORK OFFER THE LAST CHANCE TO ACHEIVE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE DISPUTE.

4. I DO NOT THINK THAT THE GUATEMALAN GOBERNMENT HAS TAKEN A FIRM DECISION AGAINST A SETTLEMENT, BUT THE PRESIDENT HAS NOW MADE IT CLEAR THAT UNLESS THE TERMS OFFERED ARE ACCEPTABLE, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH GUATEMALAN INTERPRETATION OF THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT, THERE CAN BE NO SETTLEMENT. I INTERPRET THE SPEECH BOTH AS A SIGNAL TO US, AND AS A MEANS OF PREPARING GUATEMALAN PUBLIC OPINION FOR A BREAKDOWN IN THE TALKS.

WILMSHURST

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FM BELMOPAN 302000Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 345 OF 30 JUNE 1981
INFO GUATEMALA CITY, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON

BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. PREMIER ASKED YESTERDAY WHETHER THE MEETING WITH THE GUATEMALANS IN NEW YORK WAS DEFINITELY ON AND, IF SO, WHETHER HE SHOULD PLAN TO GO. I SAID IT HAD NOT YET BEEN CONFIRMED BUT THAT AS MR RIDLEY WOD LIKE TO MEET HIM IN NEW YORK ON 5 JULY ANYWAY, HE SHOULD AT LEAST MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO GO HIMSELF. WHO ELSE SHOULD BE PRESENT COULD BE DECIDED LATER.

2. PRICE IS NOW PLANNING TO LEAVE HERE ON 3 JULY. I HAVE MADE NO ARRANGEMENTS TO GO MYSELF AND UNLESS YOU CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL WILL NOT DO SO. IF NEGOTIATIONS ARE RESUMED HOWEVER, I WOULD BE GRATEFU IF PAYNE COULD COME ON TO BELIZE AFTER THE MEETING IS OVER IN ORDER TO BRIEF ME.

FCO PASS ALL
HENNESSY

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CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

Belize Defence Force

1. Thank you for your letter of 12 June.

2. I too hope that we will be able to fulfil our obligations with less than the £6 million envisaged. We will certainly keep the cost down to the minimum. The Ministry of Defence are working with this objective in view. But, if we are able to extract ourselves from Belize this year, the long term saving will be appreciably greater than the short term costs.

3. I very much hope that the sum set will not be exceeded and we hope to persuade the Americans to put something in. But, since you have raised the question of what would happen if we had to spend more, I must say that, although I would look again at my own programmes, the pressures on ODA and FCO Votes are such that I cannot accept a commitment to find more than the sum now allocated. I believe that we can contain the requirements within this, but if there should be an overrun, we would have to look at the issue again collectively.

4. I am copying this minute to the recipients of yours.

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
25 June 1981

25 JUN 1981

Belize

O 122000Z JUN 81
FM BELMOPAN
TO FCO LONDON

UNCLAS

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 315 OF 12 JUNE 1981
INFO PRIORITY GUATEMALA CITY, WASHINGTON

1. FOLLOWING PRESS RELEASE WAS ISSUED BY GOVERNMENT AT 1830Z TODAY:
BEGINS
THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED TODAY THAT THEY WOULD BE UNABLE TO ATTEND THE ANGLO-GUATEMALAN TALKS WHICH WERE DUE TO BEGIN IN LONDON NEXT WEEK. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT THEY NEEDED MORE TIME TO STUDY THE DOCUMENTS PRODUCED AT THE LAST MEETING. THE TALKS HAVE ACCORDINGLY BEEN POSTPONED. (until early July)
ENDS
FCO PASS GUATEMALA CITY, WASHINGTON
HENNESSY

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Belize.

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

12 June 1981

The Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington PC KCMG MC
Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs

NBPA

BELIZE DEFENCE FORCE

I have a copy of your minute of 4 June to John Nott proposing that up to £6 million should be found over the financial years 1981-82 and 1982-83 by transfer from the PES allocation for overseas aid to the FCO Military Assistance Vote.

I have no objection to the course you propose. Indeed, I am grateful to you for recognising the pressing need for economy referred to by Leon Britton in his letter to you of 25 March.

I realise that the continuing uncertainty surrounding the present negotiations with both Guatemala and Belize make it impossible to put a firm figure on the cost of our contribution to building up the Belize Defence Force. £6 million is the more expensive of the two alternatvies identified by John Nott in his minute of 18 March. Nevertheless, it is not inconceivable that we might, for one reason or another, come under pressure to spend more than this. I assume that in such circumstances, you would similarly be prepared to find the necessary money from within existing programmes.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, to other OD colleagues and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

GEOFFREY HOWE

11 JUN 1981

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister.

I have not been managing many of the telegrams to you but there is a good deal of diplomatic activity going on with the aim of bring Belize & Guatemala to the point of agreement.

GRS 950
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DESKBY 10/0900Z
FM GUATEMALA CITY 09/2232Z JUN 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 247 OF 09 JUNE
R F I : IMMEDIATE BELMOPAN (PERSONAL)
R F I : PRIORITY WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 126 : BELIZE/GUATEMALA NEGOTIATIONS

1. I SAW THE GUATEMALA N FOREIGN MINISTER ON 09 JUNE, ACCOMPANIED BY WEBB, AND DELIVERED THE MINISTER OF STATE'S MESSAGE.

2. CASTILLO VALDEZ ASKED ME TO THANK MR RIDLEY FOR THE MESSAGE. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER THE CONTENTS CAREFULLY. HE WAS NOT SURE THAT HE AND HIS ADVISERS WOULD BE READY FOR A MEETING IN THE WEEK BEGINNING 15 JUNE, THEY HAD BEEN DELAYED IN PREPARING THE NEW YORK PAPERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY PRESIDENT LUCAS AND HAD NOT YET COMPLETED THE TRANSLATION OF THOSE PAPERS INTO SPANISH. (THIS DOES NOT SQUARE WITH WHAT HERRERA TOLD ME ON 04 JUNE - MY TELNO 239 PARA 2).

3. AT THAT POINT I SPOKE ON THE LINES OF PARA 2 OF YOUR TUR INCLUDING THE ASSURANCE ABOUT THE OAS AND THE RIO TREATY. I ALSO INFORMED CASTILLO VALDEZ, AS AUTHORISED BY KYDD ON THE TELEPHONE, THAT HE AND HIS ADVISERS, IF THEY WERE IN LONDON NEXT WEEK, WOULD BE INVITED TO THE ROYAL ENCLOSURE AT ASCOT ON WEDNESDAY 17 JUNE. THE ASSURANCE ABOUT THE OAS AND THE NEWS OF ASCOT BOTH BRIGHTENED THE FACE OF CASTILLO VALDEZ.

4. HE THEN SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT UNFORTUNATE THAT THE WORK IN NEW YORK HAD ALL BEEN DONE ON ENGLISH TEXTS, CAUSING A DELAY IN GUATEMALA CITY. HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT AT FUTURE MEETINGS BOTH LANGUAGES BE USED, BOTH IN SPEECH AND ON PAPER. HE SAID THAT THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT HAD INTERPRETED THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT AS BEING BASED ON SUBJECTS DISCUSSED ON MANY OCCASSIONS, AND NOT AS BEING OPEN TO NEW INTERPRETATIONS. FOR THIS REASON HE THOUGHT THAT THE USE OF THE EXPRESSION QUOTE EXTREME DISSAPPOINTMENT UNQUOTE IN THE SECOND PARA OF MR RIDLEY'S MESSAGE WAS CORRECT, BUT THE EXTREME DISAPPOINTMENT WAS FELT NOT JUST BY BOBBY HERRERA BUT BY ALL OF THE GUATEMALANS WHO HAD BEEN IN NEW YORK, BY HIMSELF AND BY PRESIDENT LUCAS. HE SAID THAT IN LONDON IN MARCH HE HAD BEEN PREPARED TO ACCEPT NO MRE THAN THE QUOTE USE AND ENJOYMENT UNQUOTE OF THE CAYES BECAUSE HE FELT THAT THE QUOTE SNAKE UNQUOTE OFFERRED GUATEMALA WHAT SHE NEEDED IN TERMS OF ACCESS TO THE HIGH SEAS. THE SNAKE HAD NOW BEEN WITHDRAWN, AND THERE WAS TALK OF BELIZE EXTENDING HER TERRITORIAL WATERS TO 12 MILES EVEN IN THE SOUTH. IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO CONVINCE THE GUATEMALAN PEOPLE TO ACCEPT A SETTLEMENT WHICH INVOLVED A REDUCTION IN GUATEMALA'S HISTORICAL PRESENCE, ACCESS, AND USE IN THE AREAS IN THE CAYES.

5. I THEN SAID, AND STRESSED THAT I WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND NOT ON INSTRUCTIONS, THAT I FELT THAT THE EXTREME DISAPPOINTMENT WHICH T THE MINISTER HAD DESCRIBED TO ME WAS BASED ON SOME MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION. I VSAID THAT THE DRAFT AGREEMENT TABLED BY

GUATEMALA HAD SET OUT WHAT COULD BE DESCRIBED AS A MAXIMUM POSITION, WHEREAS THE DRAFT TABLED BY THE BRITISH/BELIZEAN DELEGATION MIGHT BE SEEN AS A MINIMUM POSITION. IN OTHER WORDS BOTH SIDES HAD EXPLORED THE OTHER'S POSITION, BUT ON A SUBJECT OF THIS DELICACY OFFICIALS BOUND BY THEIR INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN UNABLE TO BRING THE TWO POSITIONS CLOSER TOGETHER. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT IT SEEMED TO US ESSENTIAL THAT THE MINISTER, PREMIER PRICE AND THE MINISTER OF STATE SHOULD APPROACH TOGETHER THE OUTSTANDING PROBLEM OF CAYES AND WATERS AND SHOULD SEE HOW BEST TO ACHIEVE A MIDDLE POSITION WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE NOT JUST TO THE PEOPLE OF GUATEMALA BUT ALSO TO THE PEOPLE OF BELIZE.

6. CASTILLO VALDEZ AGREED THAT IT WAS THE FUNCTION OF MINISTERS TO TRY TO USE THEIR JUDGEMENT ON WHAT WAS POLITICALLY POSSIBLE ON SUCH DIFFICULT MATTERS, AND HE APPEARED TO AGREE THAT IT MIGHT BE BEST TO LEAD INTO NEGOTIATIONS AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL BY FURTHER PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS AT OFFICIAL LEVEL.

7. HE SAID THAT HE WAS ABOUT TO MEET THE PRESIDENT. HE WOULD INFORM HIM OF MR RIDLEY'S MESSAGE, AND HE WOULD LET ME KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHETHER HE WAS ABLE TO ACCEPT MR RIDLEY'S INVITATION. HE SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE A FEW DAYS BEFORE HE COULD GIVE ME A REPLY. I SAID THAT BOTH I AND EVERYBODY CONCERNED IN LONDON WOULD BE WAITING WITH GREAT IMPATIENCE, AND I HOPED THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO REPLY VERY SOON.

8 HIS ATTITUDE BORE OUT HERRERA'S WARNING, AND IN HIS REMARKS HE ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO THE QUESTION OF ACCESS TO THE HIGH SEAS WHILST SCARCELY MENTIONING THE CAYES. I THINK THAT THE MINISTER OF STATE'S MESSAGE PLUS THE ADDITIONAL REMARKS THAT I WAS AUTHORISED TO MAKE WILL HAVE HELPED TO SMOOTH ANY RESENTMENT THAT THE GUATEMALANS ARE STILL FEELING AND MY GUESS, AT THIS MOMENT, IS THAT CASTILLO VALDEZ WILL ACCEPT MR RIDLEY'S INVITATION AND WILL BE IN LONDON NEXT WEEK.=

WILMSHURST

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SIC TELNO 301
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 301 OF 5 JUNE 1981
INFO IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY
ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MEXICO CITY

YOUR TELNO PERSONAL 61: BELIZE NEGOTIATIONS

1. I ASKED THE PREMIER THIS MORNING - BEFORE RECEIPT OF YOUR TUR - IF HE WAS YET IN A POSITION TO LET YOU HAVE THE BELIZEAN NEGOTIATING POSITION ON THE VARIOUS POINTS IN THE TREATY THAT STILL REMAIN TO BE SETTLED. PRICE SAID THAT, FOLLOWING VERY LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS ON THE JOINT COMMISSION DRAFT, THE CABINET HAD REACHED CERTAIN CONCLUSIONS WHICH HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO EXPLAIN, ALTHOUGH HE HAD ONLY ROUGH NOTES OF WHAT HAD BEEN SAID.

2. FOLLOWING ARE THE CABINET'S VIEWS AS OUTLINED BY PRICE:-

(A) ON USE AND ENJOYMENT OF THE CAYES:

(I) FULL MILITARY USE COULD NOT BE CONTEMPLATED, THOUGH A JOINTLY OPERATED RADAR STATION, VISITS BY SOLDIERS IN MUFTI ETC COULD BE

(II) THE LAWS OF BELIZE SHOULD APPLY:

(III) THE ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE REVIEWED AFTER 15 YEARS. BUT CABINET WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER EXTENDING THIS PERIOD TO THE END OF THE CENTURY IF PRESSED.

(IV) GUATEMALA SHOULD HAVE SPECIAL RIGHTS OF USE IN A HALF-MILE STRIP OF SEA AROUND THE CAYES. IF PRESSED, CABINET WOULD AGREE TO NEGOTIATE UP TO ONE MILE OF SEA IF NECESSARY. FISHING RIGHTS WOULD NOT INCLUDE COMMERCIAL FISHING.

(V) GUATEMALA SHOULD HAVE SPECIAL RIGHTS OF ACCESS TO THE CAYES THROUGH AN AREA OF SEA TO BE NEGOTIATED. THE AREA SHOULD BE AS NARROW AS IT WAS POSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE.

(B) ON ACCESS TO THE HIGH SEAS CABINET WERE PREPARED TO GRANT

GUATEMALA AN ADEQUATE PASSAGE. A CHANNEL ONE MILE WIDE WAS CONSIDERED ADEQUATE. BUT THIS COULD BE EXTENDED, IF PRESSED, UP TO A MAXIMUM OF AY, 3 MILES. THEY WERE NOT WILLING TO RE-OPEN THE QUESTION OF RENOUNCING ANY FUTURE CLAIM TO A 12-MILE TERRITORIAL SEA. I.E. THEY DO NOT WISH TO RECONSIDER THEIR PRESENT POSITION ON THE 'SNAKE'.

3. WHEN I ASKED PRICE IF HE THOUGHT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY IN THE BELIZE POSITION NOW TO NEGOTIATE A FINAL TREATY ON THE BASIS OF THE POSITION OUTLINED ABOVE, HE REPLIED THAT IT DEPENDED WHETHER THE GUATEMALANS ACCEPTED THAT MILITARY USE OF THE CAYES WAS NOT NEGOTIABLE. ROGERS, COURTENAY AND SHOMAN HAD NOT AGREED WITH PAYNE'S ASSESSMENT OF THE GUATEMALAN POSITION I.E. THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER A TRADE-OFF. THEY FELT THAT THE GUATEMALANS WOULD INSIST ON MILITARY USE- AND NOT MERELY AS A PRESENTATIONAL POINT. HE HOPED HE WAS WRONG. BUT IN CASE HE WAS NOT, HE THOUGHT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE PREPARED (SEE MIFT).

4. PRICE HAS NOW LEFT BELMOPAN WITH THE HONDURAN FOREIGN MINISTER SO I MAY NOT BE ABLE TO PUT TO HIM HERRERA'S ACCOUNT OF CASTILLO VALDEZ'S REACTION AS OUTLINED IN GUATEMALA CITY TELNO 239 BEFORE MONDAY. BUT AS COURTENAY AND SHOMAN ARE ALSO

TELNO 839 BEFORE MONDAY. BUT AS COURTENAY AND SHOMAN ARE ALSO

PAGE FOUR RBLABCR 501 C O N F I D E N T I A L UK COMMS ONLY
OUT OF THE COUNTRY, PRICE WOULD NOT IN ANY CASE BE ABLE TO GO BEYOND THE POSITION AGREED BY CABINET. THIS SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, PREVENT MR RIDLEY SENDING CASTILLO VALDEZ A SUITABLY REASSURING MESSAGE. AS YOU WILL SEE FROM THE ABOVE, THE BELIZEANS ARE PREPARED TO GIVE THE GUATEMALANS ADEQUATE ACCESS TO THE HIGH SEAS AND, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE AT PRESENT UNWILLING TO RECONSIDER THE 'SNAKE', THEY HAVE IN THE PAST MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD RECONSIDER THE QUESTION IF IT BECAME A BREAKING POINT. GIVEN GOODWILL ON BOTH SIDES, THERE IS NO REASON WHY THE REMAINING QUESTIONS SHOULD NOT BE SETTLED TO EVERYONES SATISFACTION.

5. PRICE CERTAINLY IS WELL AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES AND WILL DO HIS BEST, I THINK, TO OVERCOME THEM. HE IS CLEARLY ANXIOUS TO REACH A SETTLEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BUT IF IT APPEARED THAT THE GUATEMALANS WERE TAKING AN UNREASONABLE POSITION AND WERE PREPARED TO BREAK OFF THE NEGOTIATIONS, HE MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO LET THEM DO SO SINCE HE WOULD THEN AVOID THE NECESSITY OF HAVING A REFERENDUM.

6. ON BALANCE, THEREFORE, I SEE NO ADVANTAGE IN PRESSING THE BELIZEANS TO MAKE FURTHER CONCESSIONS NOW OUTSIDE THE CONFERENCE ROOM AND AHEAD OF THE LONDON NEGOTIATIONS. THEIR POSITION IS

PAGE FIVE RBLABCR 501 C O N F I D E N T I A L UKCOMMS ONLY
NOT AN UNREASONABLE OPENING STANCE. AND IT IS FLEXIBLE. TO PRESSURE THEM FURTHER ON THE BASIS ONLY OF HERRERA'S TALK COULD LEAD TO A RENEWAL OF SUSPICION OF HMG'S POSITION AND WOULD, AS INDICATED ABOVE, PROBABLY BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

7. HERRERA'S ACCOUNT OF CASTILLO VALDEZ'S PRESENT THINKING IS AS GLOOMY AND PERHAPS AS MISTAKEN AS SOME OF HIS EARLIER ACCOUNTS (SEE, FOR INSTANCE, GUATEMALA CITY TELEGRAM NUMBER 87 OF 19 FEBRUARY). I DO NOT THINK WE NEED ASSUME, THEREFORE, THAT THE POSITION HE DESCRIBES REPRESENTS THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION - SUCH EVIDENCE AS WE HAVE IS THAT LUCAS AND HIS GOVERNMENT DO NOW WANT A SETTLEMENT. HERRERA'S AIM COULD SIMPLY BE TO GAIN FURTHER CONCESSIONS BEFORE HAVING TO FACE US AGAIN IN LONDON.

ECO PASS ALL

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TO IMMEDITE F C O
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TELEGRAM NUMBER 239 OF 05 JUNE
R F I : IMMEDIATE BELMOPAN (PERSONAL)
R F I : ROUTINE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING MEXICO CITY

BELIZE/GUATEMALA NEGOTIATIONS

1. HERRERA CAME TO MY HOUSE ON 04 JUNE AND STAYED FOR NEARLY THREE HOURS DISCUSSING THE SITUATION.

2. HE SAID THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD RECEIVED HIS REPORT ON THE NEW YORK NEGOTIATIONS WITH DISMAY, AND FELT THAT OUR OFFER OF ACCESS TO THE HIGH SEAS WAS NOT ONLY DERISORY BUT A WITHDRAWAL FROM OUR LONG STANDING POSITION. HE ALSO FELT THAT THE PROPOSALS ON THE CAYS WERE A WITHDRAWAL FROM WHAT HE UNDERSTOOD TO BE THE TACIT AGREEMENT BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE MINISTER OF STATE THAT GUATEMALA WOULD ENJOY RIGHTS AMOUNTING TO, EVEN IF NOT CALLED, SOVEREIGN RIGHTS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD DELAYED SUBMITTING THE REPORT ON AND THE DOCUMENTS AGREED IN NEW YORK TO PRESIDENT LUCAS UNTIL THEY HAD BEEN TRANSLATED INTO SPANISH, BUT , SINCE THE TRANSLATIONS HAD BEEN MADE TWO DAYS AGO, THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD REFUSED TO SEE THE NEGOTIATING TEAM OR TO ARRANGE A MEETING BETWEEN THEM AND THE PRESIDENT.

3. HERRERA ALSO SAID , IN STRICT CONFIDENCE, THAT SKINNER KLEE HAD BECOME SCARED, HAD TURNED AGAINST A SETTLEMENT, AND WAS ADVISING THAT EVEN IF A SETTLEMENT WERE REACHED THERE WAS NO NEED TO SUMMON A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY UNTIL THE NEW YEAR. OF THE NEW YORK TEAM, DELPREE AND COLONEL CASTELLANOS HAD TURNED AGAINST A SETTLEMENT BECAUSE THEY FELT THAT WE HAD NEGOTIATED IN BAD FAITH, THAT ONLY LEFT SAENZ DE TEJADA, WHOM HERRERA DISMISSED AS AN AMIABLE TECHNICIAN. DURING THE NEW YORK TALKS GENERAL MENDOZA, WHO WAS PRESENT ON THE SIDELINES, HAD TOLD HERRERA TO BREAK OFF THE NEGOTIATIONS BUT HAD BEEN OVERRULED BY HERRERA.

4. HERRERA SAID THAT THE QUESTION OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND ACCESS TO THE HIGH SEAS WAS THE SUBJECT WHERE WE HAD CAUSED THE MAXIMUM OFFENCE BY APPEARING TO RENEGE ON PREVIOUS OFFERS. I PRESSED HIM ON THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF ACCESS TO THE HIGH SEAS AND MILITARY USE OF THE CAYS SEMI COLON IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THE FORMER WAS THE ISSUE THAT REALLY COUNTED. HE SPOKE OF THE NEED TO BE ABLE TO DEFEND THE CAYS AGAINST A POSSIBLE HONDURAN ATTACK, BUT ADMITTED THAT THE PACKAGE OF ACCESS, MARITIME BOUNDARY, NAVIGATION AREA, AND SEABED EXPLOITATION REALLY CARRIED WEIGHT, AND WAS THE ISSUE WHERE WE HAD CREATED THE WORST IMPRESSION. HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT FOR THE ARMY A COMMITMENT BY BELIZE TO JOIN THE OAS AND THE RIO TREATY WAS ESSENTIAL.

5. HE SAID THAT AT PRESENT THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF CASTILLO VALDEZ GOING TO LONDON AT ALL, BECAUSE HE FELT PERSONALLY CHEATED. HE

/THOUGHT

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THOUGHT THAT IF A MESSAGE COULD BE SENT TO CASTILLO FROM THE MINISTER OF STATE OFFERING A MORE FORTHCOMING APPROACH TO THE MARITIME QUESTIONS, AND STATING CLEARLY THAT HMG RECOGNISED THAT GUATEMALA HAD A JUST AND EQUITABLE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE ACCESS TO THE HIGH SEAS (NOT, REPEAT NOT, A CHANNEL ONE MILE WIDE) THEN CASTILLO MIGHT AGREE TO GO TO LONDON. UNLESS SUCH A MESSAGE WERE SENT QUICKLY IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO MEET IN THE WEEK BEGINNING 15 JUNE. IN THE FOLLOWING WEEK THERE WAS TO BE A MEETING OF CENTRAL AMERICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS, WHICH WOULD MENA THAT NO MEETING WOULD BE POSSIBLE BEFORE 29 JUNE. HE, UNLIKE SKINNER KLEE, STILL HOPED TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT RATIFIED BY ALL PARTIES BEFORE BELIZE BECAME ANDEPENDENT, BUT IF THINGS WERE DELAYED THE CHANCES BECAME SMALLER.

6. IN REPLY TO FURTHER QUESTIONS HE ADMITTED THAT THE CAYS WERE LESS IMPORTANT THAT THE QUESTION OF WATERS, AND HE SUGGSETED THAT THE CAYS COULD BEST BE DEALT WITH BY KEEPING AS CLOSE TO POSSIBLE TOT THE HEADS OF AGREMENT, WITHOUT DEFINING WHAT USE AND ENJOYMENT REALLY MEANT. WHEN I SAID THAT THIS WOULD PUT THE BELIZE GOVERNMENT IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION IN THEIR REFERNDUM HE AGREED, BUT THOUGHT THE QUESTION OF MILITARY USE WOULD BE BEST AVOIDED RATHER THAN SPELT OUT.

7. HE SAID THAT CASTILLO VALDEZ AND PRESIDENT LUCAS WERE STILL COMMITTED TO THE IDEA OF AN AGREEMENT, BUT OF THE ADVISERS WHO AGREED WITH THIS POLICY THERE NOW REMAINED HERRERA ALONE, THE OTHERS HAD LEFT THE SINKING SHIP AFTER NEW YORK. HE ADDED THAT ON HIS WAY HOME FROM NEW YORK HE HAD MET IN MIAMI, BY CHANCE, GENERAL VERNON WALTERS WHO HAD BEEN SURPRISED AND DISMAYED BY HERRERA'S ACCOUNT OF THE MINIMAL OFFERS ON CAYS AND WATERS. HE ALSO SAID THAT WHILST IN NEW YORK HE HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY , BUT HAD NOT SEEN, ARANDA WHO HAD BEEN IN WASHINGTON, HE ASSUMED THAT THE LATTER WAS AFTER MONEY WHICH, HE SAID, BY TRADITION WAS THE ONLY THING THAT CAUSED BELIZEAN POLITICIANS TO MAKE CONTACT WITH GUATEMALANS.

8. HERRERA WAS SPEAKING VERY FRANKLY, AND WHAT HE SAID ABOUT THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S REACTION SQUARES WITH THE FRIENDLY BUT UNCOMMUNICATIVE LINE THAT CASTILLO VALDEZ HAS TAKEN ON THE TWO OCCASIONS THAT I HAVE MET HIM SOCIALLY THIS WEEK.

9. I RECOMMENT, THEREFORE, THAT A MESSAGE BE SENT ON THE LINES SUGGESTED IN PARA 5 ABOVE, AND CONTAINING THE INVITATION SUGGESTED IN MY TELNO 236, AND THAT IT BE SENT, IF POSSIBLE, IN TIME FOR ME TO DELIVER IT ON 08 JUNE. MY IMPRESSION IS THAT WITHOUT SUCH A MESSAGE NOT ONLY WILL WE NOT HAVE THE GUATEMALANS IN LONDON, BUT THE GROWING WEIGHT OF ADVICE THAT IT WOULD BE BEST TO LET BELIZE COME TO UNRECOGNISED INDEPENDENCE AND WAIT FOR THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT TO ENFORCE GUATEMALA'S CLAIM MIGHT PREVAIL.

WILMSHURST

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Belize

FCS/81/65

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

Belize Defence Force

1. Thank you for your minute of 18 March. I am sorry to have taken so long to reply.

2. The proposals you made are most helpful. But we are still not in a position to say finally what the cost to HMG of enhancing the Belize Defence Force will be. It will depend to a large extent on our discussions with the Belizeans about the sort of force needed. This in turn is likely to be affected by the outcome of the Treaty negotiations with Guatemala. These have not yet been concluded. Moreover, Nicholas Ridley has suggested to the Americans that they may wish to help. At official level they were sympathetic to this idea. If they are able to make a contribution that will ease the burden for us.

3. It is, thus, too early to say with precision how much of the outside figure of £6m over two years will need to be found by us. But given that we must have certainty about the funds before we can really come to agreement with the Belizeans, I am prepared to agree in the light of the discussion in OD (OD(81) 2nd Meeting) subject to the Chancellor's agreement that up to £6m should be found over the financial years 1981/83 by transfer from the PES allocation for overseas aid to the FCO Military Assistance Vote to meet the cost of BDF enhancement. The exact sum will depend on the progress of negotiations and what the Americans may be willing to offer; but I have noted that some part of this expenditure could be incurred in the

/present

present financial year.

4. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, other OD colleagues and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

4 June 1981

- 4 JUN 1981

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C O N F I D E N T I A L 'UK COMMS ONLY
SIC TELNO 279
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 279 OF 15 MAY 1981
AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY, PRIORITY WASHINGTON

Belize

MY TELNO 276: BELIZE/GUATEMALA NEGOTIATIONS

1. I SAW THE PREMIER ON HIS RETURN TO BELMOPAN THIS MORNING. HE SAID HE WAS IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION TRYING TO BARGAIN WITH THE OPPOSITION IN AN ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE THEM TO ATTEND THE TREATY TALKS. IT WAS STILL NOT CLEAR WHAT FURTHER CONDITIONS THEY WOULD MAKE - THEY HAD ALREADY ASKED FOR TIME ON RADIO BELIZE AND FOR REFORM OF THE ELECTIONS AND BOUNDARIES COMMISSION. HE HAD HAD TO AGREE TO THEIR TAKING THREE DELEGATES PLUS ELRINGTON AS LEGAL ADVISER. THE BELIZE GOVERNMENT WOULD PAY THE EXPENSES OF ALL BUT NOT OF PROFESSOR LAING, AN ADDITIONAL LEGAL ADVISER WHOM HE HAD AGREED COULD ATTEND AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OPPOSITION. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HE COULD NOT, REPEAT NOT, REDUCE HIS OWN TEAM FROM THE FOUR HE HAD ALREADY NOMITATED (ROGERS, COURTENAY, SHOMAN AND SYLVESTRE) PLUS THE TWO LEGAL ADVISERS, MESSRS BUNDU AND PATTERSON. WHEN I SAID THIS WAS FAR TOO LARGE A TEAM, HE AGREED. HE SAID HE PERSONALLY WOULD HAVE PREFERRED ONLY ONE DELEGATE, BUT THE QUESTION WAS NOW IRRETRIEVABLY MIXED UP WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE OPPOSITION AND HE WOULD FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO REDUCE NUMBERS ON HIS OWN SIDE.

2. I ASKED HIM THEN IF HE WOULD AGREE TO REDUCE THE SIZE OF HIS TEAM IF THE OPPOSITION CHOSE NOT TO GO. HE REPLIED THAT THIS WOULD BE A NEW SITUATION AND HE WOULD DO HIS BEST.

3. I DO NOT THINK I CAN CARRY THIS ANY FURTHER AT THIS STAGE. THE PREMIER IS MEETING THE OPPOSITION FOR A FINAL DECISION TOMORROW MORNING (SATURDAY) AND WILL LET US KNOW THE RESULTS THEREAFTER. THE BELIZEAN DELEGATION IS LIKELY TO LEAVE ON SUNDAY AND PRICE HOPES TO LET US HAVE THEIR TRAVL DETAILS AND TOTAL NUMBERS BEFORE THEN. IN THE MEANTIME, UKMIS NEW YORK MAY WISH TO MAKE PROVISIONAL BOOKINGS FOR TWO ADDITIONAL ROOMS FOR THE BELIZE DELEGATION AT THE BEVERLY HOTEL.

FCO PASS ALL

HENNESSY

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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file BK
cc. Press Office

Belize

CF

8 May 1981

Thank you for your letter of 7 May, about your intention to publish on Wednesday 20 May as a Command Paper the Report on the Belize Constitutional Conference.

I confirm that we are content with what you have in mind.

I am sending copies of this letter to David Heyhoe (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office) and Peter Moore (Chief Whip's Office).

M A PATTISON

E.R. Worsnop, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

BK

Yes Rich

MODBA
Content? MAP 7/5

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

7 May 1981

N Sanders Esq
10 Downing Street
London
SW1

cc Press

Dear Nick,

BELIZE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

We propose publishing as a Command Paper on Wednesday 20 May the Report on the Belize Constitutional Conference which was successfully concluded at Marlborough House on 14 April. The report represents a factual record of the proceedings of the Conference and we wish to publish it as a matter of priority in order that progress on the preparation of independence legislation can be maintained.

I should be grateful if you, and those to whom I am copying this letter, would kindly confirm that there is no objection to publication.

Yours sincerely
Edric.

E R Worsnop
Parliamentary Clerk

cc: D C R Heyhoe Esq
Office of the Chancellor of the
Duchy of Lancaster
68 Whitehall
London
SW1

P J Moore Esq
Government Chief Whips Office
12 Downing Street
London
SW1

Belize

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SIC TEL NO 261
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 261 OF 4 MAY 1981
INFO GUATEMALA CITY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND MEXICO CITY

TALKS IN BELIZE.

1. WE HAVE HAD A GRUELLING DAY. AFTER THOROUGH TALKS WITH THE GOVERNOR, HIS STAFF AND THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, MR RIDLEY WAS JOINED FOR A WORKING LUNCH BY PRICE, ROGERS AND COURTENAY..

2. ON A REFERENDUM, PRICE HAS ALREADY PUBLISHED ONE WEEK AGO (NO DOUBT TO PREEMPT MR RIDLEY'S ORIGINAL PROGRAMME) A COMMENTARY ON THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT WHICH CONTAINS A SPECIFIC OFFER OF A REFERENDUM BEFORE SIGNATURE OF ANY TREATY NEGOTIATED WITH GUATEMALA. IT IS AN OBJECTIONABLE DOCUMENT BUT COULD NOT NOW BE RECALLED (SEE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM). PRICE IS THUS NOW FULLY COMMITTED TO A REFERENDUM AND MR RIDLEY HAS HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO ACKNOWLEDGE THIS, PRESENTING THE DECISION AS PRICE'S ALONE, AND REFUSING DETAILED COMMENT. PRICE CLEARLY BELIEVES THAT IF HE WINS A REFERENDUM ON A TREATY, WELL AND GOOD. IF HE LOST, HE WOULD REJECT THE TREATY, NEVERTHELESS EXPECTING TO PROCEED TO INDEPENDENCE WITHOUT AN AGREEMENT AND WITH A BRITISH GUARANTEE NOT TO WITHDRAW THE GARRISON. HE REFUSED TO COUNTENANCE A REFERENDUM ON THE ISSUE OF INDEPENDENCE CLAIMING UNCONVINCINGLY THAT A VOTE ON A TREATY AND INDEPENDENCE PACKAGE WOULD ENHANCE OPPOSITION CHANCES OF SICCESSFULLY OBTAINING A 'NO' VOTE IN THE REFERENDUM..

3. PRICE PRESSED HARD FOR IMMEDIATE ANNOUNCEMENT OF 21 SEPTEMBER AS THE FIRM DATE FOR INDEPENDENCE, REJECTING THE VIEW THAT SUCH TIMING WOULD BE PREMATURE, GIVEN THE RISK OF RENEWED DISTURBANCES IN BELIZE AND ALMOST CERTAINLY ADVERSE GUATEMALAN REACTION WITH RESULTANT PREJUDICE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE TRIED TO MAKE HIS ATTENDANCE AT MEETING WITH CASTILLO VALDEZ ON 8 MAY CONDTIONAL UPON PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT OF INDEPENDENCE DATE. HE RECEIVED NO COMFORT ON THIS AND IS NOW CONSIDERING HIS POSITION, BUT HAS NOT YET UNDERTAKEN TO COME TO WASHINGTON.

4. MR RIDLEY POINTED OUT

(1) THAT NEGOTIATION OF A TREATY STILL REPRESENTED MUCH THE BEST OPTION FOR INDEPENDENT BELIZE'S FUTURE AS A NEIGHBOUR OF GUATEMALA.

(11) IT WOULD BE FOLLY TO JEOPARDISE THE CHANCES OF AN AGREEMENT BEFORE THE MATTER HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE GUATEMALANS AND WITH OPPOSITION GROUPS IN BELIZE. FLEXIBILITY NEED NOT MEAN DELAY.

(111) NO BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD ALLOW PRICE TO REJECT A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT IN THE LIGHT OF AN ADVERSE REFERENDUM RESULT AND THEN PROPOSE TO PARLIAMENT EARLY INDEPENDENCE WITH A BRITISH GARRISON TO STAY ON TO DEFEND BELIZE. PRICE COUNTERED THIS BY POINTING TO THE STRENGTH OF INTERNATIONAL OPINION IN FAVOUR OF INDEPENDENCE THIS YEAR. THROUGHOUT THIS CONVERSATION, WHICH IS TO BE CONTINUED TOMORROW, PRICE AND HIS COLLEAGUES PORTRAYED THE OPPOSITION AS WRECKERS, OUT FOR IMMEDIATE POLITICAL ADVANTAGE, AND IN FAVOUR OF

FURTHER

FURTHER VIOLENCE. HE WANTED THE STATE OF EMERGENCY TO REMAIN IN FORCE TO ASSIST HIM IN HIS DETERMINATION TO MUZZLE THE OPPOSITION. HE IS ALSO MISTRUSTFUL AND BITTER ABOUT PSU SUPPORT FOR OPPOSITION VIEWPOINTS.

5. MR RIDLEY THEN PROCEEDED TO TWO CONFUSED AND OFTEN EMOTIONAL LARGE MEETINGS OF OPPOSITION GROUPS, WHICH INCLUDED MAYORAL DELEGATIONS FROM ALL PARTS OF BELIZE AND MEMBERS OF THE YPF AND BAM YOUTH WINGS. THE MAIN PREOCCUPATIONS WHICH AROSE WERE -

(1) THERE IS WIDESPREAD MISTRUST OF PRICE, HIS MOTIVES AND STYLE OF GOVERNMENT.

(11) OPPOSITION TO THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT IS MOTIVATED BOTH BY POLITICAL DESIRE TO EMBARRASS PRICE AND BY GENUINE BUT MAINLY INSTINCTIVE FEAR OF GUATEMALA.

(111) A MAJOR IRRITANT IS THE DOMINATION BY THE PUP OF RADIO BELIZE.

(1V) THERE IS STRONG SUSPICION THAT PRICE IS USING THE STATE OF EMERGENCY TO SUPPRESS DISSENT ON THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT.

(V) THERE IS WIDESPREAD AND BASIC MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT.

(V1) NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS BI-PARTISAN DESIRE FOR EARLY INDEPENDENCE.

(V11) MANY OF THE SAFEGUARDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE REPORT ARE EITHER UNKNOWN OR IGNORED IN BELIZE.

6. THERE WAS UTTERANCE OF SOME UGLY THREATS OF MORE VIOLENCE FROM THE YOUNGER BAM REPRESENTATIVES, BUT THE DISCUSSION HAS GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO MANY OPPOSITION MEMBERS TO BLOW OFF STEAM.

7. IN A LATE EVENING MEETING WITH ARANDA, HE SHOWED WILLINGNESS TO REFLECT AND HINTED AT FLEXIBILITY OVER UDP ATTENDANCE AT 20 MAY NEGOTIATIONS. DETAILS IN TOMORROW'S TELEGRAM.

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Belize

MR. ALEXANDER

Belize

The Lord Privy Seal has circulated a memorandum to OD (OD(81) 23 dated 24th April) to seek agreement that, on a contingency basis, preparations should immediately begin for a Bill granting independence to Belize.

2. This proposal is in accordance with the conclusions reached by OD at their discussion on 12th February about the continuance of preparations for Belizean independence. The Lord Privy Seal is already in touch with the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster about the preparation of the proposed Bill and its place in the Legislative programme. He has asked for agreement or comments on his memorandum by 1st May. Subject to any points which may be raised, the Prime Minister is recommended to agree to the proposal in OD(81) 23.

3. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary also sent a minute to the Prime Minister and OD colleagues about Belize on 23rd April. This minute describes the present position on the proposals for Belizean independence in relation to Guatemala, and explains the purposes for which Mr. Ridley will be visiting Belize and then Washington in order to carry matters forward.

4. The proposals in this minute are also in line with the conclusions reached by OD on 12th February. Since that meeting the Secretary of State for Defence has already circulated detailed proposals for the expansion of the Belize Defence Force (BDS). Progress has also been made towards finding the £6 million required for the initial investment for the expansion of the BDS, although the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has not yet circulated any formal proposals on this point.

5. Mr. Ridley's planned visit to Washington will provide an opportunity to explore the possibility of creating a multilateral defence undertaking for Belize after independence, and to enlist American support for British policy over Belize. In her reply to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute, the Prime Minister may like to stress the importance she attaches to

both these points as being the means by which this country will be able to remove our garrison from Belize at the earliest possible date, and avoid a long term defence commitment to a regime which may move progressively towards the left after independence.

6. The Secretary of State for Defence has been fully consulted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary about all these proposals, and is in agreement with what is suggested.

RwA

Robert Armstrong

27th April 1981

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2

PRIME MINISTER

To see. Mr Ridley is visiting Belize and Washington

MS
23/4

PM/81/18

PRIME MINISTER

Belize

1. The State of Emergency declared by the Governor on 2 April, following disturbances protesting against the Heads of Agreement with Guatemala and Premier Price's constitutional proposals, has been effective in restoring calm. The Governor has relaxed some of the measures imposed but considers that undercurrents of violence and tension could re-emerge. Although the Opposition refused to attend the Constitutional Conference, it went ahead as planned and reached a satisfactory conclusion. No date for independence was set at the Conference, although the Belize Government is urging immediate public announcement that it should be 21 September.

2. The Heads of Agreement have been satisfactorily received in Guatemala where the Government seem to have wide-spread backing for the policy of negotiating with us. They would undoubtedly prefer the date of Belizean independence to be put off until after any Treaty is ratified. We cannot give Guatemala a veto on further progress and must therefore proceed to prepare the way for independence, whatever the outcome of the forthcoming Treaty negotiations.

3. While pressing ahead with independence procedures, we must seek to allay the Belizean Opposition's doubts and fears about both the Constitutional proposals and the Heads of Agreement. We must also ensure that the US are kept fully informed of our progress and are invited to underwrite in some appropriate way any eventual Treaty of Settlement. We need to review the security situation with the Governor.

4. To achieve these objectives, I propose that the Minister of State should visit Belize from 27 April and travel thereafter to Washington. In Belize he would speak to Premier Price and confirm to him that our policy on independence is not conditional on our reaching agreement on the

/Treaty.

Treaty. But we need to try to retain flexibility on the announcement of a date for independence and of the date itself in order, on the one hand, not to put the Guatemalans under unacceptable pressure and, on the other, to keep open for as long as possible the prospect of achieving a settlement before independence. With the Belizean Opposition, Nicholas Ridley would explain that the Constitutional proposals which have emerged take account of many of the points which they have made, and are in line with recent constitutions for newly independent territories. Human rights and fundamental freedoms are safeguarded. He would assure them that the Heads of Agreement envisage no cession of territory, nor any diminution of Belizean sovereignty within its existing frontiers, and specifically provide for Guatemalan acceptance of Belizean independence with its frontiers intact. Similarly, Nicholas Ridley would meet representatives of the Public Services Union, the Chamber of Commerce and other bodies to discuss their concerns about the Heads of Agreement and the terms of the Constitution.

5. Nicholas Ridley will also need to assess the strength of feelings inside Belize with regard to independence. He will discuss with Premier Price his commitment to a referendum before independence. If however he is unable to dissuade Price, or if he considers that opposition to independence is likely to persist and possibly take a violent form, he will need to consider with the Governor what precise form any test of opinion might take and what the likely outcome would be. We would wish any test of opinion to address the question of independence "under arrangements made by the existing government" and not be a vote specifically on our eventual Treaty of Settlement - which is essentially an arrangement between the UK and Guatemala.

6. I further propose that Nicholas Ridley should go on to Washington where we hope to arrange a meeting with the

Guatemalan Foreign Minister, ideally with Premier Price present. This would enable us to obtain some idea of how Guatemalan public opinion is reacting to the Heads of Agreement and create a good atmosphere for the negotiations due to open on 20 May to convert the Heads of Agreement into a Treaty. It would also be an opportunity to indicate to the Guatemalans that we may need to proceed to independence for Belize before any Treaty has been ratified, if there are unreasonable delays on the Guatemalan side.

7. In Washington Nicholas Ridley will also be able to bring the US Administration up-to-date on recent developments; to discuss the possibility of US assistance in financing the enhancement of the Belize Defence Force; to seek assurances that they would be prepared to help in underwriting Belizean security after independence, and to ask them to continue to exercise restraint in supplying arms to Guatemala.

8. I shall report further after Nicholas Ridley's visit, and before significant decisions are taken or further announcements made.

9. I am copying this minute to OD colleagues, and also to Sir Robert Armstrong.

C

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
23 April 1981

(CARRINGTON)

23 APR 1981

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 168 OF 2 APRIL 1981
INFO IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY

SECURITY SITUATION AND THE OPPOSITION

1. I HAD A TWO-HOUR METTING WITH AN OPPOSITION DELEGATION LED BY ARANDA THIS MORNING AT WHICH I MADE IT CLEAR ONCE MORE THAT HMG WOULD NOT BE INTIMIDATED BY VIOLENCE FROM WHATEVER SOURCE INTO POSTPONING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE OR HOLDING UP THE PROCESSES OF INDEPENDENCE. I SAID THAT, IF THE OPPOSITION DID NOT START THE VIOLENCE AS THEY CLAIMED, THEY HAD A DUTY TO SAY SO AND TO RESTRAIN THE HOTHEADS.

2. ARANDA DENIED THAT HE OR HIS PARTY OR THE YOUTH WING HAD ANY PART IN THE VIOLENCE. HE BLAMED POLICE STRONG ARM TACTICS. HE SAID THAT THE PEOPLE HAD FOR TOO LONG BEEN DENIED A VOICE BY THE GOVERNMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THEIR FUTURE: THE GOVERNMENT WAS DEAF TO THEIR PLEAS, IT DID NOT CONSULT THE PEOPLE ON VITAL CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND IT WAS TIME TO CALL A HALT. NOT ONLY THE UDP, BUT CIVIL SERVANTS, TEACHERS, THE BAR ASSOCIATION, THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE GUILD OF GRADUATES AND OTHERS HAD ALL OBJECTED TO THE WAY IN WHICH HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HAD RUSHED INTO A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AND NOT GIVEN PEOPLE TIME TO THINK ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS OR TO MAKE THEIR OBJECTIONS KNOWN. THE PEOPLE NOW WANTED A REFERENDUM ON THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT BEING GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THEM.

3. I TOLD ARANDA THAT, IN MY VIEW, THEY WERE UTTERLY MISTAKEN IN CALLING FOR A REFERENDUM ON THE AGREEMENT. IT WAS A DOCUMENT WHICH THE WORLD HAD ACCLAIMED AND IT COULD LEAD TO THE SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE WITH GUATEMALA WHICH THEY TOO WANTED. THE TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT WOULD BE EMBODIED IN A TREATY. THAT

WAS THE SUBSTANTIVE DOCUMENT. AND ON THAT THE PREMIER HAD OFFERED A REFERENDUM. I ADDED THT THE GOVERNMENT HAD PUBLISHED ITS CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS LONG AGO. THERE HAD BEEN DEBATES IN THE DISTRICTS AND EVIDENCE HAD BEEN TAKEN BY THE JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE. THERE HAD BEEN A DEBATE IN THE HOUSE RECENTLY AND MEMORANDA HAD BEEN CALLED FOR FROM INTERESTED BODIES. IF THEY WERE NOT SATISFIED WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS, THEY NOW HAD AN OPPORTUNITY OF SAYING SO TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. HMG WAS NOT RAILROADING ANYONE. NO COLONY HAD EVER BEEN PUSHED INTO INDEPENDENCE AGAINST ITS WILL. THEY WOULD HAVE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE PART IN THE CONFERENCE. THE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE STILL HAD TO BE SETTLED. HOWEVER, IF THEY CHOSE NOT TO GO, THEY WOULD LOSE THAT OPPORTUNITY AND IT MIGHT NOT RECUR. THEY WOULD ALSO LOSE THE SYMPATHY OF ALL RIGHT-THINKING PEOPLE.

4. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS SOME WAVERING TOWARDS THE END, ARANDA WOULD NOT COMMIT HIS DELEGATION TO ANYTHING. HOWEVER, BEFORE THEY LEFT, WAGNER ASKED WHERE THEY COULD GET THEIR TICKETS FROM AND WHETHER THEY COULD TAKE A LEGAL ADVISER TO LONDON.

FCO PASS GUATEMALA CITY

HENNESSY

BT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L UK COMMS ONLY
SIC TEL NO 165
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 165 OF 2 APRIL 1981
INFO IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY

MY TELNO 162 : SECURITY SITUATION

1. LUMUMBA AND A LARGE CROWD OF SUPPORTERS SUCCEEDED EARLY TODAY IN GETTING WORKERS TO STOP WORK AT THE POWER STATION AND WATER WORKS FOOD STORES AND PETROL SUPPLY STATIONS ARE ALSO CLOSED. THE AIRPORT IS IN DANGER OF CLOSING THROUGH LACK OF POWER. TAN AND SAHSA AIRWAYS HAVE CANCELLED FLIGHTS. TH HOSPITALS ARE AT RISK. MAIL HAS STOPPED ENTERING THE CITY. OFFICES AND SHOPS ARE AGAIN CLOSED.

2. THE PREMIER HAS TRIED, BUT FAILED, TO GET THE PSU TO CALL OFF THE STRIKE. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES HE, WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE CABINET AND THE SECURITY COMMITTEE, AND WITH THE ADVICE OF THE SECURITY FORCE COMMANDERS, ASKED ME AT MIDDAY TO DECLARE A STATE OF EMERGENCY URGENTLY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ESSENTIAL SERVICES.

3. I SPOKE PERSONALLY TO TILLETT, THE LEADER OF THE PSU, AND HE PROMISED TO TRY AND GET ESSENTIAL SERVICE WORKERS BACK ON THE JOB. BY 2.30 PM THIS AFTERNOON I HAD NOT HEARD FROM HIM AGAIN AND MINISTERS WERE NOT WILLING TO RISK LETTING THE SITUATION DETERIORATE FURTHER. AFTER MUCH DISCUSSION WITH THE PREMIER AND MY ADVISERS I HAVE THEREFORE NOW SIGNED THE PROCLAMATION DECLARING A STATE OF EMERGENCY. PRICE ACCEPTS THAT THIS MEANS THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES WILL NOT BE ABLE TO ATTEND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. HE HOPES THAT IT WILL ONLY BE A QUESTION OF POSTPONEMENT UNTIL AFTER EASTER.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 149 OF 28 MARCH 1981
INFO GUATEMALA CITY

OUR TELNO 127: SECURITY SITUATION

1. THE DISASTROUS FIRES AND DISTURBANCES IN BELIZE CITY LAST WEEK WHICH RESULTED IN CALLING OUT THE DEFENCE FORCE AND POLICE TACTICAL SERVICES UNIT, HAVE GIVEN RISE TO RUMOURS OF AN IMPENDING CIVIL SERVICE STRIKE, DEMONSTRATIONS, ARSON, AND THREATS TO LIFE AND PROPERTY. MUCH OF MY TIME SINCE MY RETURN, THEREFORE HAS BEEN TAKEN UP WITH QUESTIONS OF SECURITY. THERE IS STILL SOME TENSION AND MANY SHOPS IN BELIZE CITY ARE BOARDED AND SHUTTERED, THE US CONSULATE HAS ASKED FOR PROTECTION, AND THE POLICE REMAIN AT FULL STRETCH, PATROLLING, GUARDING KEY POINTS, AND COVERING POLITICAL MEETINGS. THE DEFENCE FORCE IS ON PERMANENT STANDBY. A NEW UNDERGROUND MOVEMENT CALLING ITSELF THE BELIZE LIBERATION ORGANISATION HAS THREATENED TO BURN DOWN THE WHOLE OF BELIZE CITY WHILE MINISTERS AND THEIR FAMILIES HAVE BEEN THREATENED WITH ASSASSINATION. THE CIVIL SERVICE IS DISAFFECTED, AND A NATIONAL STRIKE HAS BEEN CALLED WHICH THREATENS TO BRING THE GOVERNMENT TO A HALT NEXT WEEK. A PERMANENT SECRETARY HAS OFFERED HIS RESIGNATION.

2. THE POLICE BELIEVE THAT MUCH OF THE TROUBLE CAN BE LAID AT THE DOOR OF THE OPPOSITION RADICAL YOUTH MOVEMENT, ENCOURAGED BY THE UDP ITSELF. A PROFESSIONAL TROUBLE-MAKER CALLED BULLER, ALIAS LUMUMBA, RECENTLY DEPORTED FROM GHANA FOR ALLEGEDLY HELPING TO ORGANISE A COUP THERE, IS ALSO THOUGHT TO BEAR MUCH OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONTINUING TENSION.

THE POLICE ARE HAMPERED IN THEIR TASK BY A LACK OF MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT, AN ACTIVE GROUP OF OPPOSITION LAWYERS, AND MAGISTRATES WHOSE SYMPATHIES LIE WITH THE OPPOSITION. SOME MINISTERS ARE UNDERSTANDABLY JITTERY BUT DO NOT HELP MATTERS BY CALLING FOR MORE FORCE AND MAKING IMPOSSIBLE DEMANDS ON THE POLICE. FEARING ASSASSINATION, A NUMBER OF THEM HAVE SURROUNDED THEMSELVES WITH PRIVATE ARMIES OF THUGS.

3. THE CAUSE OF ALL THIS TENSION STEMS FROM THE OPPOSITION ATTITUDE TO THE AGREEMENT RECENTLY CONCLUDED WITH GUATEMALA. IT IS BEING DESCRIBED AS A SELL OUT. THE PARTY REJECT MINISTERIAL EXPLANATIONS AS MERE PROPAGANDA AND ARE DOING THEIR BEST TO OVERTURN IT AND STOP THE MOVE TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE. THEY HOPE TO CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE TO BE POSTPONED.

4. THE STRENGTH OF FEELING IS UNDOUBTEDLY GREAT AND SOME OBSERVERS BELIEVE THERE IS WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR THEIR VIEWS. PRICE IS SAYING THAT HE WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY IN PUSHING THROUGH HIS OWN CABINET MORE THAN THREE OR FOUR CLAUSES OF THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT. I HAVE HAD LONG DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PREMIER, LEADERS OF THE OPPOSITION AND THE SECURITY FORCES. YESTERDAY I ASKED PRICE TO TRY AND DO MORE HIMSELF TO ALLAY THE FEARS OF THE PEOPLE - TO EXPLAIN THE AGREEMENT IN FULL AND THE SAFEGUARDS THERE ARE IN IT FOR BELIZEANS. TO BE FAIR I THINK HE IS DOING HIS BEST, AND EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS BY COURTENAY AND SHOMAN ARE BEING BROADCAST DAILY OVER THE RADIO. CHURCH LEADERS HAVE ADDED THEIR VOICE TO TE CALLS FOR AN END TO THE VIOLENCE. I MADE ARANDA AWARE THAT I WILL HOLD THE OPPOSITION RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY VIOLENCE THAT CAN BE LAID AT THE DOOR OF THE YOUTH WING.

5. THE POLICE ARE IN A DIFFICULT POSITION. ON THE ONE HAND, THEY ARE BEING URGED BY MINISTERS TO GET EVEN TOUGHER AND HAVE SUFFERED CRITICISMS BY THE DEPUTY PREMIER FOR NOT BEING SUFFICIENTLY ACTIVE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY HAVE COME IN FOR PUBLIC CRITICISM FOR USING UNNECESSARY FORCE AND ROUGH TACTICS. THE COMMISSIONER REACHED THE DEPTHS OF DESPAIR LAST WEEK WHEN HE PUT IN HIS RESIGNATION. HE HAS BEEN WORKING ROUND THE CLOCK AND IS SUFFERING BADLY FROM ULCERS. FOR ALL HIS FAULTS, WILLOUGHBY IS AN EFFECTIVE COMMISSIONER AND, IN THIS SITUATION, PROBABLY IRREPLACEABLE. THERE IS NO-ONE BELOW HIM CAPABLE OF TAKING OVER IMMEDIATELY AND AN EXPATRIATE WOULD FIND THE TASK ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE. I HAVE THEREFORE SPENT SOME TIME ASSURING WILLOUGHBY OF MY SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING WHILE REMOVING AS MANY AS POSSIBLE OF THE MISUNDERSTANDINGS THAT HAVE ARISEN BETWEEN HIMSELF AND MINISTERS AND THE DEFENCE FORCE. HE HAS I THINK BEEN ENCOURAGED TO CARRY ON FOR THE TIME BEING.

6. PROVIDED THINGS DO NOT GET WORSE, I AM CONFIDENT THAT, WITH THE BACKING OF THE DEFENCE FORCE AND THE PRESENCE OF THE GARRISON, THE POLICE SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONTAIN THE SITUATION UNTIL THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED.

FCO PASS ALL

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CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE TREASURY

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

The Rt Hon Lord Carrington KCMG MC
Secretary of State
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London SW1A 2AL

25 March 1981

Dear Peter,

BELIZE DEFENCE FORCE

I have seen John Nott's minute to you dated 18 March concerning the two alternative options for expanding this Force.

I cannot pretend to offer any judgement upon whether the Force should have an external defence role or simply an internal security capability. But I would take this opportunity of pointing out that, in view of the pressing needs for economies recognised at the OD meeting, the costs in 1981-82 and in 1982-83 will have to be found from within existing agreed programmes.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister, OD Colleagues and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,

LEON BRITTAN

US MAR 1951

Belize

MO 5

B/F with FCO reply.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

BELIZE DEFENCE FORCE

OD invited me to develop detailed proposals for the expansion of the Belize Defence Force, taking account of the pressing need for economy (OD(81) 2nd Meeting, Item 2). We had suggested in our joint memorandum (OD(81) 6) that a reasonable contribution by HMG to the capital cost of expanding the force (£7-£10M) would be £6-7M, plus the cost for loan service personnel, a number of whom are already serving in Belize.

2. The attached note by officials shows that, by trimming the proposed equipment provision, we could reduce our cost estimate for providing the BDF with a very limited external defence capability, to an initial investment of about £6M, plus annual expenditure of about £0.7M on loan service personnel (LSP).

3. That sum could be substantially reduced, if we decided to help the BDF only to acquire an adequate internal security capability. The cost would be about £3.3M plus about £0.6M annually for LSP. The immediate requirement would then be to find, say, £2M on FCO Votes in the next financial year, and a further £1.3M in 1982/3.

4. The option that we select - and there may be room for manoeuvre between the two - depends both on your judgement of the post-independence security arrangements that may be

negotiable with the Belizeans, and on what can be afforded in current circumstances. If, as we hope, the military threat from Guatemala can be seen to be eliminated, we could justify the lesser expansion programme.

5. I am sure that the expansion programme should begin as soon as possible. But we need to decide first on the scale of HMG funding and to agree our proposals with the Belizeans in principle. Once that has been done, a detailed expansion plan can be drawn up and the Ministry of Defence could move rapidly to implement it. So long as the garrison remains in Belize, it would give as much help as possible in training the BDF.

6. How should we present to the Belizeans before the Constitutional Conference our proposals for a British military training and advisory presence after independence? The concept of a multilateral defence undertaking could still be valuable here even although it was originally put forward in the context of independence without settlement. It could provide additional reassurance both to the Belizeans and to others that Belize's independence would be secure and internationally accepted. It could also provide the context in which other countries could help expand the BDF.

7. I am sending copies of this minute to the Prime Minister, OD colleagues and Sir Robert Armstrong.

SW

Ministry of Defence

18th March 1981

EXPANSION OF THE BELIZE DEFENCE FORCE

(Note by MOD Officials)

Belize's Requirements

1. In the light of discussion at OD(81) 2nd Meeting (Item 2) we have reviewed earlier work on proposals for the expansion of the Belize Defence Force (BDF). The BDF at present consists essentially of one regular rifle company and 3 volunteer companies. Our assessment remains that the minimum size of BDF that could offer a very limited defensive and deterrent capability is about (and perhaps more than) the maximum that Belize's limited resources, with initial HMG funding, could sustain for the future. Such a force would consist of a small headquarters, an infantry battalion of 4 regular rifle companies, with air defence, anti-tank and light artillery elements, plus small maritime and air wings (Option 1). In theory, a final settlement of the dispute with Guatemala could, by removing the external threat, reduce Belize's defence requirements to an internal security capability, which could perhaps be met by 3 regular companies plus air defence, maritime and air wings (Option 2). However, the Belizeans may well still perceive a need for the BDF to have some external defence capability and/or a need for multinational security arrangements, as reassurance against the emergence of a military threat from Guatemala in future.

2. Under either Option, the maritime and air wings would have to be established from scratch. The role of the maritime force would be surveillance and patrolling; fishery protection; anti-smuggling and policing; and search and rescue. A minimum capability could be provided by two armed trawlers equipped with Gemini craft (although the Belizeans may hope for fast patrol boats, which we have ruled out for the present on grounds of cost). A small air force, with a minimum of two aircraft, would provide air mobility and a reconnaissance capability for the BDF. It could also be used to support the police or other government agencies. Thus both the maritime and air wings could operate in a quasi-civil role.

Costs

3. We have re-examined the means by which either level of capability could be achieved over a short period, with a view to keeping the cost to a minimum. Detailed costings are at Annex. Option 1 could hopefully be achieved by a crash recruitment programme, virtually tripling the BDF's size over two years; an initial investment (on equipment and training) of about £6M over the next two financial years; the provision of about 24 loan service personnel at an annual cost of some £0.7M; and the acceptance by the Belizean government of annual recurrent costs

for the expanded force building up to about £5M (as compared with Belize's current annual defence expenditure of about £1M).

4. Option 2 would of course be cheaper. Major savings could be made by deleting the light artillery battery and the anti-tank platoon envisaged for Option 1. There would be substantial savings in the annual recurrent costs to the Belize government, by reducing the size of the battalion from 4 regular companies to 3. On this basis, the initial investment required for Option 2 would be about £3.3M; 20 LSP would be provided at an annual cost of some £0.6M; and the Belizean government could expect to bear annual recurrent expenditure of about £3.6M.

Expansion Programme

5. It would be important to start expansion on the lines of either Option as soon as possible, if Belize is to come to independence with a reasonable prospect of being able to meet its own security requirements in the near future. It may be possible to agree on Option 2 in principle with the Belizean authorities, and to leave open the possibility of grafting on the additional elements that would achieve Option 1. Either Option will require an intensive recruiting campaign (and Belize's capacity to produce quickly sufficient recruits of suitable quality, particularly officers, must be in doubt). The equipment programme will also need to be carefully planned, taking account of HMG funding and any other assistance that might usefully be provided from elsewhere, eg the USA or Canada. It is likely to be nearly two years, even with a crash training programme, before expansion is completed, although the Option 2 capability might be achieved earlier.

Conclusions

6. We must stress that our proposals for both Options are based on limited information. A firm and detailed plan for expansion can only be prepared in consultation with the Belizeans, after agreement in principle on the broad framework of funding and desired operational capability. Assuming that a settlement removes the military threat from Guatemala, and taking account of the financial pressures and Belize's limited resources, we recommend that the aim should be to implement Option 2 but to retain the flexibility to expand the BDF in line with Option 1, if circumstances require. Careful consideration will have to be given to the presentation of HMG's proposals for a British military training and advisory presence after independence. Wholehearted Belizean commitment will be needed to implement the expansion plan.

ANNEX

EXPANSION OF BELIZE DEFENCE FORCE: COSTS SUMMARY (1)

£M

Elements of force required for both Option 2 and Option 1	Initial Investment (2)	LSP Costs (3)	Annual Costs to Belize Defence Budget (4)
Force Headquarters	0.01	0.07	0.01
regular Infantry battalion with 3/rifle companies	0.25	0.31	2.34
Air Defence Platoon (5) with Oerlikon guns	0.64	0.09	0.36
Maritime Wing (base facilities and two armed trawlers equipped with Gemini craft)	1.27	0.07	0.11
Air Wing (2 Defenders, flown by contract pilots, plus RAF LSP to command)	0.60	0.06	0.11
Miscellaneous (6)	0.50	-	0.70
Total Cost for Option 2	3.27	0.60	3.63
Additional elements requires to achieve Option 1			
Anti-tank platoon (8 Wombats)	0.47	0.02	0.30
Artillery Battery (6 105mm light guns	2.19	0.06	0.41
regular Additional/company for infantry battalion	-	0.03	0.66
Total Cost for Option 1	5.93	0.71	4.90

Notes

1. All figures quoted are broad cost estimates at current prices.
2. Covers equipment and related training in UK or Belize.

3. Only "out-of country" costs are included, since the normal convention is that where, as in this case, the FCO meets the costs of LSP, the "in-country" costs (eg housing, transport and food) are borne by the host government. This may be an optimistic assumption in the case of Belize. "In-country" costs are expected to total about £0.23M for Option 1 and slightly less for Option 2; and this would represent an additional bill either for the Belize government or HMG.

4. These estimates are based on rather sketchy information. "In-country" LSP costs are not included (see Note 3).

5. While an air defence capability may not be essential to meet the Option 1 internal security capability, the defence of the airport is considered so crucial to Belize that it has been included in both Options.

6. Covers capital costs which cannot be estimated at this stage, including requirements for stores, equipment resources, ranges and ammunition; and also military advisory visits and other additional training. The additional cost to the Belize defence budget covers such items plus the annual cost of maintaining barracks, works services etc.

19 MAR 1981

Belize

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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 425 OF 13 MARCH
INFO IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY, BELMOPAN (PERSONAL), ROUTINE MEXICO CITY AND UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNOS 51 TO GUATEMALA CITY AND GUIDANCE 31 AND YOUR TELNO 855:
BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. I HAVE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY HAIG. BEGINS. BEFORE LEAVING THE OFFICE LAST NIGHT FOR HOME, I RECEIVED THE NEWS OF YOUR ACHIEVING A BASIS FOR SETTLEMENT OF THE BELIZE PROBLEM. IT WAS A PERFECT WAY TO END A DAY WHICH BEGAN IN OTTAWA AND CONCLUDED WITH A VERY GOOD MEETING WITH YOUR COLLEAGUE, JOHN NOTT. YOUR PATIENCE, PERSEVERANCE AND STATESMANSHIP RESULTED IN FINALLY RESOLVING THIS EXTREMELY COMPLICATION ISSUE. PLEASE ACCEPT MY HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU AND ALL OF YOUR COLLEAGUES WHO WORKED SO HARD AND SO WELL. ENDS.

2. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IN REPLY AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY. BEGINS. THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS FOLLOWING THE SIGNING OF THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT WHICH PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT OF OUR DISPUTE WITH GUATEMALA OVER BELIZE. THAT WE WERE ABLE TO REACH THIS POINT IS DUE TO THE IMAGINATION AND FLEXIBILITY SHOWN BY BOTH THE BELIZEANS AND THE GUATEMALANS DURING THE LATEST TALKS. WE ARE WELL AWARE THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION PLAYED NO SMALL PART IN CREATING THE ATMOSPHERE WHICH MADE THIS POSSIBLE. I SHOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY OF EXPRESSING MY GRATITUDE FOR YOUR HELP AND UNDERSTANDING.

3. THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT ARE A SIGNIFICANT BREAKTHROUGH. WE NOW FACE THE TASK OF NEGOTIATING THE DETAILED AGREEMENTS TO PUT THEM INTO EFFECT. I KNOW THAT WE CAN COUNT ON YOUR CONTINUING HELP THROUGH THE RELATIONSHIP WHICH YOU ARE DEVELOPING WITH GUATEMALA. I SHALL ENSURE THAT YOU ARE KEPT CLOSELY INFORMED OF

PROGRESS AND HOPE THAT I MAY LET YOU KNOW IF THERE IS ANY OTHER ACTION WHICH WE THINK YOU COULD USEFULLY TAKE TO HELP THE PROCESS ALONG. ENDS.

4. AT THE SAME TIME AS DELIVERING THE MESSAGE YOU SHOULD LET THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE AT A HIGH LEVEL THE TEXT OF THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT CONTAINED IN MY TELNO 51. YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT THESE ARE STRICTLY EMBARGOED UNTIL 1800Z ON 16 MARCH. WE ARE MOST CONCERNED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO LEAK OF THE TEXT WHICH CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO US. IN HANDING OVER THE TEXT YOU SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THE BELIZEANS HAVE GIVEN A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT BY AGREEING TO GUATEMALA HAVING THE USE OF BOTH THE RANGUANA AND SAPODILLA CAYS. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT THE RIGHTS WILL HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY DEFINED IN THE AGREEMENT TO BE NEGOTIATED, BUT IT HAS BEEN ACCEPTED ON ALL SIDES THAT THERE IS NO QUESTION OF CESSION OF TERRITORY NOR OF ANY LEASING ARRANGEMENT.

CARRINGTON

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Press Notice

The Anglo/Guatemalan Ministerial Talks ended with a formal final session at 8.30am on 11 March.

In the presence of ~~The Rt Hon Lord Carrington~~, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Foreign Minister of Guatemala and the Premier of Belize signed a document which sets out Heads of Agreement. These provisions will be given effect by a Treaty, the details of which will be negotiated by the three Governments.

Mr Nicholas Ridley

The Heads of Agreement provide for an honourable and final settlement of the controversy between the United Kingdom and Guatemala.

The text will be issued in London, Guatemala City and Belmopan at 1800 hrs GMT on Monday 16 March.

Document signed on 11 March by Mr Ridley, Sr Castillo Valdez, & Mr Price.

Heads of Agreement

The United Kingdom and Guatemala, in order to settle the controversy between them over the territory of Belize, have reached agreement on the following points.

1. The United Kingdom and Guatemala shall recognise the independent State of Belize as an integral part of Central America, and respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity in accordance with its existing and traditional frontiers subject, in the case of Guatemala, to the completion of the treaty or treaties necessary to give effect to these Heads of Agreement.

2. Guatemala shall be accorded such territorial seas as shall ensure permanent and unimpeded access to the high seas, together with rights over the seabed thereunder.

3. Guatemala shall have the use and enjoyment of the Ranguana and Sapodilla cays, and rights in those areas of the sea adjacent to the cays, as may be agreed.

4. Guatemala shall be entitled to free port facilities in Belize City and Punta Gorda.

5. The road from Belize City to the Guatemalan frontier shall be improved; a road from Punta Gorda to the Guatemalan frontier shall be completed. Guatemala shall have freedom of transit on these roads.

/6.

6. Belize shall facilitate the construction of oil pipelines between Guatemala and Belize City, Dangriga and Punta Gorda.

7. In areas to be agreed an agreement shall be concluded between Belize and Guatemala for purposes concerned with the control of pollution, navigation and fishing.

8. There shall be areas of the seabed and the continental shelf to be agreed for the joint exploration and exploitati of minerals and hydrocarbons.

9. Belize and Guatemala shall agree upon certain developmental projects of mutual benefit.

10. Belize shall be entitled to any free port facilities in Guatemala to match similar facilities provided to Guatemala in Belize.

11. Belize and Guatemala shall sign a treaty of cooperation in matters of security of mutual concern, and neither shall permit its territory to be used to support subversion again the other.

12. Except as foreseen in these Heads of Agreement, nothing in these provisions shall prejudice any rights or interests of Belize or of the Belizean people.

13. The United Kingdom and Guatemala shall enter into agreements designed to re-establish full and normal relations between them.

14. The United Kingdom and Guatemala shall take the necessary action to sponsor the membership of Belize in the United Nations, the Organisation of American States, Central American organisations and other international organisations.

15. A Joint Commission shall be established between Belize, Guatemala and the United Kingdom to work out details to give effect to the above provisions. It will prepare a treaty or treaties for signature by the Signatories to these Heads of Agreement.

16. The controversy between the United Kingdom and Guatemala over the territory of Belize shall therefore be honourably and finally terminated.

Signed at London, the 11th day of March 1981, in the English and the Spanish language, both texts being equally authentic.


11 MAR 1981

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister
Rather than send an acknowledgement, you may want to say something in Cabinet tomorrow.

PM/81/11

PRIME MINISTER

1. I would like you to know how well Nick Ridley has done over the Belize-Guatemalan negotiations. Neither he nor I have any illusions about the outstanding problems. But the mixture of patience and firmness which Nick has deployed over a long period to persuade the stubborn and suspicious Belizeans to accept this agreement has really been admirable. He has also helped to erode the Guatemalans' claims, and gain their confidence, by some personal diplomacy with Castillo Valdez, their Foreign Minister, to the point where we can no longer be accused of forcing Belize to cede chunks of her territory.

2. Nick and I will now do what we can to follow up quickly on this first important step to independence, and, eventually to a lower British financial and military commitment in Belize.

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

11 March 1981

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

(2)

Mr Ridley

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister. MR6

The Belize + Guatemalan delegations have agreed to sign a document along the lines of the attached tomorrow morning. There will be some loose ends to be tied up which could give rise to troublesome discussion in future: that is why only a 'Heads of Agreement' is being signed. Nonetheless this is a considerable success for Mr Ridley + his team who have done virtually all the work. (The text of the Heads of Agreement will not be released for a few days.)

10.3.81

DRAFT B

DRAFT HEADS OF AGREEMENT [I do not know how the various square bracketted points have been resolved. Ref]

The United Kingdom and Guatemala, in order to settle the controversy between them over the territory of Belize, have reached agreement on the following points.

1. The United Kingdom and Guatemala shall recognise the independent State of Belize [as an integral part of Central America] and respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity in accordance with its existing and traditional frontiers [, upon the completion of the treaty or treaties necessary to comply with these Heads of Agreement].

2. Guatemala shall have permanent and unimpeded access through Guatemalan territorial sea to the high seas together with rights over the seabed thereunder.

3. Guatemala shall have the use and enjoyment of the Ranguana and Sapodilla cays.

4. Guatemala shall have rights in those areas of the sea adjacent to the cays [as well as to the corresponding continental shelf] as may be agreed.

5. Guatemala shall be entitled to free port facilities in Belize City and Punta Gorda.

6. The road from Belize City to the Guatemalan frontier shall be improved; a road from Punta Gorda to the Guatemalan frontier shall be completed.

[Guatemal

/ Guatemala shall have free transit rights on these roads. /

7. Belize / and Guatemala / shall facilitate the construction of oil pipelines between Guatemala and / Belize City, / Dangriga and Punta Gorda.

8. In areas to be agreed an agreement shall be concluded between Belize and Guatemala for purposes concerned with the control of pollution, navigation and fishing.

9. There shall be areas of the seabed to be agreed for the joint exploration and exploitation of minerals and hydrocarbons.

10. Belize and Guatemala shall agree upon certain developmental projects of mutual benefit.

11. Nothing in these provisions shall prejudice any / established or traditional / rights or interests of Belize or of the Belizean people.

12. Belize shallbe entitled to any free port facilities in Guatemala to match similar facilities provided to Guatemalans in Belize.

13. Belize and Guatemala shall sign a treaty of cooperation in matters of security of mutual concern and neither shall permit its territory to be used to support subversion against the other.

14. The United Kingdom and Guatemala shall enter into agreements designed to reestablish full and normal relations between them.

15. The United Kingdom and Guatemala shall take the necessary action to sponsor the membership of Belize in the United Nations, the Organisation of American States Central American organisations and other international organisations.

16. A Joint Commission shall be established between Belize, Guatemala and the United Kingdom to work out details to give effect to the above provisions. It will prepare a treaty /~or treaties~/ for signature by the parties to this agreement.

17. The controversy between the United Kingdom and Guatemala over the territory of Belize shall /~therefore~/ be honourably and finally terminated.

10 MAR 1981

GRS 270 CONFIDENTIAL

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FM GUATEMALA CITY 062145Z MAR 81

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 115 OF 06 MARCH

R F I: BELMOPAN (PERSONAL) WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

The talks are still on course. Both sides have made concessions - not much.

BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. I LUNCHED ON 6 MARCH WITH DELPREE OF THE MFA BELIZE AFFAIRS OFFICE.

2. HE SAID THERE WOULD NEVER BE ANOTHER CHANCE LIKE THE PRESENT ONE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT. THE ONE PROBLEM WAS PRICE'S STUBBORNNESS, COUPLED WITH THE FACT THAT SHOMAN DID NOT WANT A SETTLEMENT. FOR SHOMAN INDEPENDENCE WITHOUT A SETTLEMENT WAS PREFERABLE AS THE RESULTING INSTABILITY WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR HIM TO INTRODUCE COMMUNISM TO BELIZE. DELPREE THOUGHT THAT PRESIDENT LUCAS WAS COMPLETELY SINCERE IN HIS DESIRE FOR A SETTLEMENT AS HE WISHED TO CONCENTRATE ON GUATEMALA'S OTHER PRESSING NEEDS. NEVER BEFORE HAD A GUATEMALAN PRESIDENT GIVEN NEGOTIATORS SUCH UNEQUIVOCAL INSTRUCTIONS THAT THEY SHOULD TRY AND REACH A SETTLEMENT.

3. DELPREE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD STILL BE DIFFICULT FOR THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT TO SELL THE PACKAGE, ESPECIALLY WHEN IT WAS REVEALED THAT IT DID NOT CONTAIN A 20-KILOMETRE STRIP. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO BUILD UP THE OTHER ELEMENTS IN THE PACKAGE SO AS TO CONCEAL THE LACK OF TERRITORY. DELPREE SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THE MAJORITY OF BELIZEANS WOULD SETTLE FOR AN AGREEMENT ON THE TERMS BEING PROPOSED NOW BY GUATEMALA. IF THERE WERE NO AGREEMENT AND GUATEMALA LET IT BE KNOWN THAT THE TALKS HAD FAILED BECAUSE PRICE HAD REFUSED TO AGREE TO SUCH MINIMAL GUATEMALAN DEMANDS, MOST BELIZEANS WOULD BE APPALLED.

4. IF THE TALKS FAILED THE OUTLOOK WAS GLOOMY ESPECIALLY FOR BELIZE. WHO WOULD WANT TO INVEST IN A COUNTRY UNDER THREAT OF WAR? ONCE THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS TOWARDS UNILATERAL INDEPENDENCE HAD BEGUN, THERE WOULD BE NO QUESTION OF FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. THE ONLY POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE COURSE, PROVIDED THE INDEPENDENCE PROCESS HAD NOT BEEN STARTED, WAS US MEDIATION.

NASH

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Belize

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The first two days of talks have gone quite well. The Guatemalans definitely want to settle.

MP

O 052010Z MAR 81
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 111 OF 5 MARCH 1981
INFO GUATEMALA CITY, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MEXICO CITY

ANGLO-GUATEMALAN TALKS.

1. U.S. CONSUL-GENERAL TOLD WOODFIELD LATE THIS MORNING THAT U.S. EMBASSY IN LONDON HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO ADVISE THE GUATEMALAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON 5 MARCH TO ACCEPT A MODIFIED FORMULA ON THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE. THE UNITED STATES, HE SAID, SAW THE ISSUE IN GEO-POLITICAL TERMS AND WERE ANXIOUS TO IMPRESS ON THE GUATEMALANS THE URGENT NEED TO COME TO A SETTLEMENT. BARNEBEY SAID THAT THE U.S. EMBASSY HAD NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCTED TO INFORM YOU OF THIS DEMARCHE.

FCO PASS ALL
MARSHALLECK

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SIC TEL NO 103
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 103 OF 23 FEBRUARY 1981
INFO GUATEMALA CITY, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND MEXICO CITY.

The American (Barnebey) may well have misunderstood the situation. And the terms of this tel are probably unnecessarily dramatic. Nonetheless this is most helpful,

WASHINGTON TELNO 631 : BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. BARNEBEY CAME TO SEE ME THIS AFTERNOON TO TELL ME THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD NOW FORMULATED HER POLICY TOWARDS BELIZE. IT HAD BEEN DECIDED LAST WEDNESDAY OR THURSDAY, FOLLOWING THE DETAILED REPORT THE AMERICANS HAD HAD FROM BOTH GUATEMALAN SOURCES AND BRITISH SOURCES IN GUATEMALA OF THE LAST ROUND OF TALKS. THEIR POLICY WAS TILTED TOWARDS GUATEMALA. THEY HAD LEARNED THAT THE GUATEMALANS WERE ASKING FOR A CESSION OF ALL THE CAYES FROM THE RANGUANA ENTRANCE SOUTHWARDS. THEY WERE ALSO

ASKING FOR A ROAD, A PIPELINE, PORT FACILITIES, ETC ETC. THEY FELT THAT THESE DEMANDS WERE REASONABLE THAT THE GUATEMALANS HAD COME DOWN A LONG WAY FROM THEIR ORIGINAL DEMANDS. THEY HAD SO INFORMED THE GUATEMALAN FOREIGN MINISTER LAST SATURDAY WHEN HE SAW SECRETARY HAIG. THEY HAD TOLD CASTILLO VALDEZ THAT THEY SUPPORTED THE GUATEMALANS' POSITION.

2. BARNEBEY WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT HAD BEEN AGREED BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS LAST WEEK THAT BOTH THE UK AND USA WOULD NOW LEAN HEAVILY ON THE BELIZEANS IN AN ENDEAVOUR TO GET THEM TO AGREE TO THE GUATEMALAN DEMANDS. THAT IS WHY HE HAD SEEN PRICE ON INSTRUCTIONS LAST FRIDAY. HE HAD ACTED WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND AGREEMENT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT BOTH BRITISH AND US REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BE LEANING ON PRICE OVER LUNCH IN LONDON TODAY. HE HOPED HE AND I COULD AGREE JOINTLY HOW TO DEAL WITH PRICE WHEN HE RETURNED TOMORROW. ALTHOUGH HE HAD HAD A COOL RECEPTION FROM THE PREMIER WHEN HE HAD MADE HIS DEMARCHE, HE EXPECTED OUR UNITED PRESSURE WOULD CAUSE PRICE TO CAVE IN.

/3. I

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3. I SAID I DOUBTED IT. PRICE WOULD FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO GO BACK ON HIS PLEDGES NOT TO CEDE TERRITORY. AND IF HE DID, HE WOULD PROBABLY BE OVERTHROWN. I ADDED THAT I FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT HMG HAD AGREED TO PUT PRESSURE ON PRICE TO CEDE TERRITORY. MINISTERS HAD REPEATEDLY SAID THAT CESSION WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION. I SAID I WAS SURPRISED, TOO, TO LEARN THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION HAD REACHED A POLICY DECISION ON BELIZE BEFORE DISCUSSING THE MATTER WITH US. (BARNEBEY INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THE MATTER HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AND AGREED BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS IN WASHINGTON OR IN LONDON.) I WENT ON TO SAY THAT I WAS EVEN MORE SURPRISED THAT SUCH AN IMPORTANT MATTER FOR BRITAIN SHOULD BE DECIDED JUST BEFORE YOU YOURSELF WERE DUE TO GO TO WASHINGTON. (TO THIS BARNEBEY REPLIED THAT THE AMERICANS REGARDED THE MATTER AS FAR TOO URGENT TO AWAIT THIS WEEK'S MEETING.)

4. SPEAKING AS GOVERNOR OF BELIZE, I SAID I COULD ONLY REGRET THE AMERICAN ACTION. IT WOULD MAKE IT IMMEASURABLY HARDER FOR US NOW TO SOLVE THE DISPUTE. THE GUATEMALANS WERE NOT LIKELY TO BACK DOWN SO LONG AS THEY HAD US SUPPORT FOR WHAT THEY WERE DOING. INSTABILITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA COULD NOT BE HALTED BY GIVING IN TO BLACKMAIL.

5. I HOPED THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE SECOND THOUGHTS. I ADDED THAT THE PREMIER WOULD NO DOUBT RAISE WITH ME THE PROPRIETY OF BARNEBEY'S INTERVENTION ON HIS RETURN TO BELIZE TOMORROW. HE HAD ACTED IMPROPERLY IN GOING DIRECT TO PRICE. HE HAD FLOUTED THE CONSTITUTION. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT DID NOT SURPRISE ME TO LEARN THAT PRICE HAD ASKED WHETHER THE US ACTION MEANT THAT AMERICA WAS NOW BACKING AWAY FROM THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION. NOR WAS IT SURPRISING THAT PRICE SHOULD HAVE REFERRED TO HIS FRIENDS IN THE CARIBBEAN. WE HAD LONG FORESEEN THIS POSSIBILITY. HE HAD OTHER FRIENDS AT THE UN TOO AND THE AMERICANS MIGHT FIND THAT THE REST OF THE WORLD WOULD NOT REGARD GUATEMALA'S DEMANDS AS REASONABLE. /6.

6. BARNEBEY WAS OBVIOUSLY UNCOMFORTABLE AND AT TIMES SEEMED STRAINED. HE MAY HAVE EXAGGERATED THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AMERICANS HAD MADE UP THEIR MINDS ABOUT BELIZE. BUT HE LINKED THEIR NEW BELIZE POLICY TO THE LINE THE ADMINISTRATION IS NOW ADOPTING TOWARDS EL SALVADOR. SO IT MAY TAKE A LOT TO SHIFT THEM. IF THEY ARE NOT MOVED, FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS MAY BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT.PERHAPS THE BEST WE CAN HOPE IS THAT, IF THE AMERICANS HAVE A LINE, IT IS BASED ON INACCURATE AND BIASED REPORTS OF WHAT ACTUALLY OCCURRED IN NEW YORK AND MAY BE SUSCEPTIBLE OF MODIFICATION AT YOUR MEETING WITH GENERAL HAIG ON 26TH.

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HENNESSY

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 100 OF 19 FEBRUARY 1981
AND TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS (FOR PS/SECRETARY OF STATE)
INFO GUATEMALA CITY, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, MEXICO CITY

GUATEMALA CITY TELNO 076 OF 17 FEBRUARY TO YOU : BELIZE/ GUATEMALA

1. H M CONSUL, GUATEMALA CITY IS PROBABLY RIGHT IN THINKING THAT A BETTER OFFER FROM THE BELIZEANS WOULD HAVE KEPT THE GUATEMALANS AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE A LITTLE LONGER. BUT BELIZEANS DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD HAVE BROUGHT A SETTLEMENT. BEFORE PUTTING PRICE IN THE DOCK, THEREFORE, AND SCREWING FURTHER CONCESSIONS OUT OF HIM NEXT WEEK - WHICH COULD BE A SCARRING EXPERIENCE - YOU MAY CARE TO HAVE THE BELIZEAN PERCEPTION OF WHAT TOOK PLACE IN NEW YORK.

2. BELIZEANS SEE THE GUATEMALAN MOVE TO BREAK OFF THE TALKS LAST WEEK AS DELIBERATE AND CALCULATED. PIQUE MAY HAVE BEEN A FACTOR BUT BELIZEANS FIND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE THE GUATEMALANS TO THROW AWAY THE CHANCE OF A SETTLEMENT IF THEY HAD REALLY WANTED ONE. PRICE TAKES THE VIEW THAT THEY WANTED TERRITORY. HAVING FAILED TO GET IT THEY GRASPED THE OPPORTUNITY OFFERED BY THE EMBARRASSING PRESS LEAKS AND THE INADEQUATE BELIZEAN OFFER TO BREAK OFF THE TALKS WHILE THEY WERE IN A POSITION TO SHOW THE AMERICANS THAT THEY HAD TRIED - BUT COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO GO ON.

3. BELIZEANS SEE THE WHOLE LONG HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE STUDDED WITH EXAMPLES OF HOPES RAISED ONLY TO BE DASHED AT THE LAST MINUTE BY THE GUATEMALANS. THE ONE CONSTANT ELEMENT IN ALL THE NEGOTIATIONS HAS BEEN THE GUATEMALAN DEMAND FOR TERRITORY. WHILE SKINNER-KLEE HAS, IN RECENT TALKS, SAID THAT GUATEMALA DOES NOT NEED TERRITORY - THEREBY SUCCEEDING IN GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY WOULD SETTLE WITHOUT IT - HE HAS NEVER BEEN PINNED DOWN. BELIZEANS BELIEVE THEREFORE THAT HE IS, AS IN THE PAST, STRINGING THEM ALONG. WITH THE ESCALATING GUERRILLA WAR NOW SPILLING OVER BELIZE' S BORDERS AND WITH ARMS TO FIGHT THAT WAR AT A PREMIUM, THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT IS THEY BELIEVE NOW USING THE EMOTIVE ISSUE OF BELIZE TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM TROUBLES AT HOME IN ORDER TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE EXTERNAL THREAT (IMAGINED RATHER THAN REAL) PRESENTED BY AN INDEPENDENT BELIZE ON THEIR EASTERN BORDER.

4. BY INFLATING THAT THREAT AND PLAYING ON THE PATRIOTIC FEELINGS OF THEIR PEOPLE, THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT IS, IN BELIZEAN EYES, AIMING TO WIN SUPPORT AT HOME FOR A TOUGH ANTI-BELIZE POLICY WHILE LOOKING TO THE USA FOR SUPPORT IN THE FIGHT AGAINST WHAT THEY CALL COMMUNIST SUBVERSION. THUS BELIZEANS HAVE NO FAITH IN GUATEMALAN PROTESTATIONS OF GOOD FAITH. THEY BELIEVE A SETTLEMENT WITHOUT TERRITORY, WOULD BE AN EMBARRASSMENT TO THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT AND NO IN THEIR INTERESTS. AND SINCE NEITHER SANCTIONS NOR BRIBES ARE IN THEIR GIFT, THEY BELIEVE THEIR ONLY COURSE IS TO PRESENT THE GUATEMALANS WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI, IE TO PROCEED UNILATERALLY TO INDEPENDENCE. THEY BELIEVE THIS COURSE WOULD IN FACT SUIT THE GUATEMALAN BOOKS.

5. IF THIS ANALYSIS IS ACCEPTED, VARIOUS CONCLUSIONS CAN BE DRAWN:-

(1) FURTHER CONCESSIONS BY THE BELIZEANS (SHORT OF CONCEDING A LARGE SLICE OF TERRITORY) ARE UNLIKELY TO BRING A SETTLEMENT ANY NEARER.

(2) THE ATTITUDE OF THE US IS THE KEY TO A SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. ONLY THEY ARE IN A POSITION TO APPLY STICKS AND CARROTS WITH ANY DEGREE OF SUCCESS.

(3) IF THE AMERICANS BACK US THEN THE PRESENT BELIZEAN OFFER IS LIKELY TO SUFFICE. IF THEY DO NOT, ADDITIONAL CONCESSIONS ARE UNLIKELY TO HELP.

(4) PRESENT GUATEMALAN THREATS AGAINST BELIZE ARE MORE IMAGINARY THAN REAL.

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BT [REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 083 OF 19 FEBRUARY

R F I : PRIORITY BELMOPAN (PERSONAL) ROUTINE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT : BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. RODRIGUEZ CONFIRMED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEFT ON 19 FEBRUARY FOR A VISIT TO WASHINGTON (MY TELNO 079 (NOT TO ALL)).

2. HE SAID THAT HE ASSUMED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD NOW BE DISCUSSING THE SITUATION WITH PREMIER PRICE. I CONFIRMED THAT SUCH DISCUSSIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE SHORTLY. THEN, HAVING DISCUSSED REPORTS OF PUBLIC OPINION IN BELIZE AND IN GUATEMALA ON THE ISSUE, WE TALKED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE ELEMENTS OF A SOLUTION. HE BEGAN TALKING ABOUT THE MOHO RIVER. I TOLD HIM TO FORGET ANY IDEAS ABOUT TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENT ON THE MAINLAND AND REMINDED HIM THAT WE HAD BEEN DISCUSSING A LEASE ON THE CAYS. HE AGREED THAT THE MAINLAND WAS OUT BUT SAID THAT THE GUATEMALAN PROPOSLA ON THE CAYS WAS TO INCLUDE THE RANGUANAS AS WELL AS THE SAPODILLAS. I SAID THAT I WAS SURE THAT SOMETHING COULD BE WORKED OUT ON THE CAYS BUT I HOPED THAT GUATEMALA WOULD NOT BE TOO GREEDY.

3. I ASKED HIM WHETHER A PACKAGE ON THE LINES DISCUSSED IN NEW YORK, NAMELY SOMETHING ON THE CAYS, A ROAD TO PUNTA GORDA, A PRESENCE IN PUNTA GORDA, AND THE REMAINDER OF THE 16 POINTS COULD BE SOLD TO PUBLIC, POLITICAL AND MILITARY OPINION IN GUATEMALA. HE SAID THAT HE WAS CONVINCED THAT SUCH A PACKAGE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE.

WILMSHURST

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 076 OF 17 FEBRUARY

R F I : ROUTINE BELMOPAN (PERSONAL) UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. I SAW US CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ON 17 FEBRUARY AND GAVE HIM, AND HEAD OF POLITICAL SECTION US EMBASSY, AN OUTLINE BRIEFING ON THE TWO ROUNDS OF TALKS IN NEW YORK.

2. CHARGE COMMENTED THAT HE HAD SEEN THE FOREIGN MINSTER THE PREVIOUS EVENING AT A RECEPTION FOR THE COLOMBIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, AND HAD FOUND CASTILLO VALDEZ UNPRECEDENTEDLY GLUM AND SILENT. HE COULD NOW UNDERSTAND WHY. HE SAID THAT HE WAS SURE THAT THE GUATEMALANS WANTED A SETTLEMENT SOON, BUT HAD NOT EXPECTED THEM EVER TO DISCUSS LEASING CAYS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR CESSION OF TERRITORY. HE THOUGHT THAT WE SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR PRESENT MOOD, BUT FEARED THAT THEIR DEMANDS MIGHT NOW BE INCREASED IF THEIR PRIDE HAD BEEN HURT IN NEW YORK.

3. WHEN NASH DELIVERED THE TEXT OF MR RIDLEY'S MESSAGE TO DELPREE (MY TELNO 075) THE LATTER REMARKED THAT THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT NOT FIND IT EASY TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY TWO THIRDS MAJORITY IN CONGRESS IF BELIZEAN CONCESSIONS WERE THOUGHT TO BE INADEQUATE. HE ALSO WARNED THAT ARMY OPINION, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE YOUNGER OFFICERS AND NEWER GENERALS, MIGHT BE OPPOSED TO A SETTLEMENT EVEN IF IT HAD PRESIDENT LUCAS'S BLESSING. HE SAID THAT THE CONTENT OF THE RECENT NEGOTIATIONS WAS KNOWN TO ONLY A HANDFUL OF OFFICERS. THE NEWSPAPER STORIES OF A 20 KILOMETRE STRIP WERE SEEN BY MANY OFFICERS AS OFFERING AN INADEQUATE CONCESSION. WHEN THE TRUTH CAME TO LIGHT THERE COULD BE A DANGER OF PRESIDENT LUCAS BEING OVERTHROWN BY THE MORE CHAUVINISTIC OFFICERS.

4. THESE CONVERSATIONS CONFIRM MY FEELING THAT WE HAD A CHANCE OF GETTING GUATEMALAN AGREEMENT TO A PACKAGE OF THE SIXTEEN POINTS, THE PUNTA GORDA ROAD,/FREE PORT/PRESENCE, AND A LONG LEASE ON THE SAPODILLAS. NOW, I FEAR, AFTER DAMAGING THEIR PRIDE BY BELIZE OFFERING TOO LITTLE, WE MAY FIND THAT THE SAPODILLAS ARE NOT ENOUGH AND THAT THE GUATEMALANS WILL AT LEAST HOLD OUT FOR THE RANGUANAS AS WELL. IT IS IRONIC THAT THE NEW BELIZEAN FLEXIBILITY REPORTED IN PARAS 2 AND 3 OF BELMOPAN TELNO 086 MAY BE A WEEK TO LATE TO CLINCH THE DEAL. I THINK THAT WE DID BRING THE GUATEMALANS TO THE WATER (PARA 1 OF BELMOPAN TELNO 087), BUT HAVING SCARED THEM AWAY I AM NOT SURE THAT WE CAN BRING THEM BACK AGAIN.

WILMSHURST

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 86 OF 16 FEBRUARY 1981
INFO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, GUATEMALA CITY

Read in full.

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 128 TO YOU: BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. I SPOKE TO PRICE THIS MORNING BEFORE HIS MEETING WITH HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES AND IMPRESSED ON HIM THE CRITICAL STAGE WE HAD REACHED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. I STRESSED THE POINT THAT IF WE WERE TO GET A SETTLEMENT WITH THE GUATEMALANS IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO PLAY THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE HAND. WHILE NO-ONE KNEW FOR CERTAIN WHAT THE GUATEMALANS WANTED IT HAD APPEARED TO OUR DELEGATION IN NEW YORK THAT A BOLD MOVE NOW MIGHT STILL BRING AGREEMENT. THE GUATEMALANS HAD ASKED FOR A 999 YEAR LEASE OF THE RANGUANA AND SAPODILLA CAYES BUT THEY MIGHT TAKE LESS. HOW MUCH LESS WAS THE

TO PLAY THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE HAND. WHILE NO-ONE KNEW FOR CERTAIN WHAT THE GUATEMALANS WANTED IT HAD APPEARED TO OUR DELEGATION IN NEW YORK THAT A BOLD MOVE NOW MIGHT STILL BRING AGREEMENT. THE GUATEMALANS HAD ASKED FOR A 999 YEAR LEASE OF THE RANGUANA AND SAPODILLA CAYES BUT THEY MIGHT TAKE LESS. HOW MUCH LESS WAS THE QUESTION. IN BRITAIN, WE WOULD CONSIDER 99 YEARS A LONG LEASE. WHAT DID HE THINK HE COULD GO UP TO?

2. PRICE SAID THAT HE STILL BELIEVED THAT THE GUATEMALANS REALLY ONLY WANTED TERRITORY. THEY HAD NOT LOST HOPE IN THE AMERICANS. BUT ONCE THEY SAW THAT TERRITORY WAS OUT THEY WOULD BREAK OFF THE TALKS. WE HAD NO MORE CARROTS TO OFFER OR STICKS TO USE. A SETTLEMENT WITHOUT TERRITORY MIGHT HAVE MORE DISADVANTAGES THAN ADVANTAGES FOR PRESIDENT LUCAS. HOWEVER, WE HAD ALREADY SAID THAT TERRITORY WAS NOT NEGOTIABLE AND WE COULD NOT GO BACK ON THAT. SOVEREIGNTY WAS ALSO INVIOLATE, SO ANY LEASE WHICH APPEARED TO DEROGATE FROM BELIZEAN SOVEREIGNTY WAS ALSO OUT OF THE QUESTION. WITHIN THESE PARAMETERS HE WAS READY TO BE FLEXIBLE. A 99 YEAR LEASE, SUBJECT TO REVIEW AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS AND RENEWABLE FOR A FURTHER 49 YEARS, MIGHT BE POSSIBLE.

3. ON THE QUESTION OF THE EXTENT OF TERRITORY TO BE LEASED, PRICE SAID THAT IT HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE CLEAR TO THE GUATEMALANS THAT THE RANGUANAS COULD NOT FORM PART OF THE PACKAGE, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE SAPODILLAS COULD. (I URGED HIM TO CONSIDER OFFERING TO LEASE ALL (LAST WORD UNDERLINED) THE SAPODILLAS).

4. ON THE QUESTION OF CONDITIONS I TOLD PRICE THAT, HOWEVER DESIRABLE IT MIGHT BE TO RESTRICT THE USE OF THE CAYES TO TOURIST PURPOSES, THERE REALLY WAS NOT MUCH POINT SINCE THERE WAS LITTLE ANYONE COULD DO ABOUT ENFORCING THE CLAUSE ONCE THE LEASE HAD BEEN GRANTED. PRICE APPEARED TO RECOGNISE THE FORCE OF THIS ARGUMENT.

5. I GAVE PRICE AN OUTLINE OF THE TIMETABLE AS IT NOW APPEARED TO US AND HE SAID HE WOULD MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL FROM 2 MARCH ONWARDS. (HE HAS A BUDGET SESSION HERE STARTING ON THE 27TH.)

FCO PASS WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, GUATEMALA CITY

HENNESSY
BT

Belize)

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GRS 450

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 140009Z FEB 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 128 DATED 13 FEBRUARY 81
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BELMOPAN (PERSONAL), GUATEMALA CITY.

MYTELNO 123: BELIZE/GUATEMALA.
FOLLOWING FROM DAY.
1. GUATEMALAN REJECTION OF THE BELIZEAN TERRITORIAL OFFER WAS NOT UNEXPECTED. THE VIOLENCE OF THEIR REACTION WAS. WHY WAS THIS?
2. THE GUATEMALANS PROBABLY REALISED THAT CESSION OF ANY CAYS WAS UNOBTAINABLE AND WERE EXPECTING THAT WE WOULD OFFER A STRAIGHTFORWARD LONG LEASE ON A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF CAYS (I.E. ALL OF THE SAPODILLAS IF NOT THE RANGUANAS AS WELL). THEY TOOK THE RESTRICTED NATURE OF THE OFFER - PRESENTED INITIALLY AS OF LIME CAY ONLY - AND THE CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO THE LEASE AS WHOLLY OUT OF KEEPING WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS HITHERTO. IT APPEARED TO THEM AS AN INSULT, AND THUS AN INDICATION THAT WE AND THE BELIZEANS WERE NOT SERIOUS. PRIDE WAS BADLY HURT.
3. THE GUATEMALANS WILL ALSO HAVE SEEN THE HAND OF MR SHOMAN BEHIND WHAT THEY SEE AS A DERISORY OFFER. THIS WILL HAVE MADE IT EVEN MORE UNACCEPTABLE TO THEM.
4. IT MAY ALSO HAVE APPEARED TO THEM THAT H.M.G. WERE UNABLE, OR UNWILLING, TO CONTROL THE BELIZEANS AND, IF THIS WERE SO, THERE WOULD BE NO PROFIT IN CONTINUING THE TALKS, SINCE GUATEMALA COULD NEVER COME TO AN AGREEMENT WITH SHOMAN AND CO.
5. WERE DO WE GO NOW? THE GUATEMALAN REACTION IS NOT, IN MY JUDGEMENT, A MERE NEGOTIATING PLOY. IT WILL TAKE A LOT TO GET THEM BACK TO THE TABLE. THEY HAVE NOW AGREED, TO A FURTHER MINISTERIAL ROUND BEFORE CONCLUDING THAT THE TALKS HAVE FAILED. BUT THEY WILL BE LOOKING FOR SOME FAIRLY CLEAR ASSURANCE FROM US THAT MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS WILL HOLD OUT A REASONABLE PROSPECT OF AGREEMENT, I.E. THAT THERE WILL BE SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT FROM OUR PRESENT POSITION ON THE CAYS AND RELATED TERRITORIAL WATERS.

6. THE KEY TO PROGRESS THEREFORE RESTS WITH PRICE. IF HE IS PREPARED TO GIVE US A REASONABLE NEGOTIATING HAND (WHICH IN PRACTICE MEANS AT LEAST A GENUINE LONG LEASE, WITHOUT STRINGS ON THE SAPODILLA GROUP, AND ASSOCIATED TERRITORIAL SEA.) THERE IS STILL A CHANCE, THOUGH FAINT, OF KEEPING THE NEGOTIATIONS ALIVE. FAILING THIS, WE HAVE PROBABLY COME TO THE END OF THE ROAD. WE NEED THEREFORE TO FIX AN EARLY MEETING WITH PRICE, WHO WILL FIRST NEED TO HAVE A REPORT FROM HIS NEGOTIATING TEAM AND CONSULT HIS COLLEAGUES. I HAVE ASKED THE GOVERNOR TO IMPRESS UPON PRICE THE CRITICAL STAGE NOW REACHED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE NEED FOR HIM AND HIS GOVERNMENT TO TAKE BOLD DECISIONS. I HAVE MADE THE SAME POINT TO THE BELIZEAN TEAM HERE.

7. IT COULD HELP TO KEEP THE GUATEMALANS STEADY IF MR RIDLEY WERE TO SEND A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE GUATEMALAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE LINES OF THE TEXT IN M.I.F.T.

PARSONS

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IMMEDIATE

SECRET
FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 130034Z FEB 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 119 DATED 12 FEBRUARY 81
INFO BELMOPAN (PERSONAL), GUATEMALA CITY, WASHINGTON.

BELIZE/GUATEMALA: NEW YORK TALKS

1. BECAUSE OF LAST MINUTE BELIZEAN DECISION TO INCLUDE COURTENAY, WHO DID NOT ARRIVE UNTIL LUNCHTIME, TALKS DID NOT RESUME UNTIL AFTERNOON.

2. BELIZEANS BROUGHT WITH THEM A MEMORANDUM ON THE 16 POINTS (COPY FOLLOWS BY BAG) WHICH OFFERED REASONABLY FORTHCOMING STANCE ON VARIOUS DEVELOPMENTAL IDEAS INCLUDING ROAD FROM PUNTA GORDA TO THE BORDER VIA SAN ANTONIO, FREE PORT AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES AT PUNTA GORDA AND BELIZE CITY, PIPELINES, BUT RULING OUT ALTOGETHER ANY QUESTION OF MAINLAND LEASING.

3. AFTER AN OPENING STATEMENT IN WHICH SKINNER KLEE REHEARSED ONE BY ONE THE POINTS OF HIS OPENING STATEMENT OF LAST WEEK, HE MADE A STRONG COMPLAINT ABOUT REPORTS IN GUATEMALAN PRESS BASED ON EFE (SPANISH) NEWS AGENCY ITEM DATELINED LONDON. THERE FOLLOWED AN EXCHANGE IN WHICH WE AND THE BELIZEANS REFUTED CHARGES OF DELIBERATE LEAKS TO THE PRESS IN LONDON OR BELMOPAN, SKINNER

DELIBERATE LEAKS TO THE PRESS IN LONDON OR BELMOPAN, SKINNER KLEE THEN GOT DOWN TO SOME CONSTRUCTIVE EXCHANGES ON THE ROAD AND MAINLAND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS.

4. ON SECURITY, (POINT 16 OF 16 POINTS), SKINNER KLEE MADE AN ATTEMPT TO RESURRECT DISCUSSIONS AT BERMUDA AS A BASIS FOR FURTHER DEBATE. DAY AND SHOMAN TOGETHER VERY FIRMLY PLAYED THIS BALL INTO THE LONG GRASS AND SKINNER KLEE APPEARED TO ACCEPT THAT ASSURANCES FROM THE BELIZEAN GOVERNMENT ALONG THE LINES ENVISAGED IN POINT 16 MIGHT, IN THE EVENT OF A SETTLEMENT, BE ADEQUATE PROVIDED THEY WERE SET OUT IN MORE PRECISE DETAIL.

5. LEASING OF ONE OR MORE OF THE SOUTHERN CAYS WAS NOT REACHED UNTIL TOWARDS THE CLOSE. COURTENAY SAID THAT BELIZE COULD AGREE TO LEASING OF LIME CAY AT INDEPENDENCE AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF A SETTLEMENT. THEY PROPOSED THAT THE LEASE SHOULD BE TO THE UK ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE CAY WOULD THEN BE SUB-LET TO GUATEMALA. AN ECONOMIC RENT WOULD BE REQUIRED. NONE OF THE RANGUANA RANGE COULD BE CONSIDERED. A DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME FOR THE CAY WOULD BE AGREED BUT USE FOR MILITARY PURPOSES WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED. LENGTH AND TERMS OF LEASE WERE NOT DISCUSSED. AFTER A BRIEF EXCHANGE IT WAS AGREED THAT THE GUATEMALANS WOULD REFLECT ON THE BELIZEAN STATEMENT AND MEET AGAIN ON 13 FEBRUARY.

6. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS AS CORDIAL AS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, THE GUATEMALANS REASSERTING THEIR DESIRE FOR A SETTLEMENT AND THE NEED TO AVOID DELAY. NO DOUBT THE BELIZEAN STATEMENT ON THE CAYS WAS A DISAPPOINTMENT TO THE GUATEMALANS, THOUGH THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE OR NEGATIVE REACTION. HOWEVER, HERRERA AND RODRIGUEZ PRIVATELY SEEMED NOT TO REGARD THE LEASING OF ONE CAY AS A BASIS FOR SETTLEMENT OF THEIR TERRITORIAL CLAIM (THOUGH THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF THE POINT).

7. THE BELIZEANS PERFORMED WELL. WE HAD NO DIFFICULTY IN PRESENTING A UNITED FRONT AND THE GUATEMALANS WERE FRIENDLY IN THEIR WELCOME TO BOTH ROGERS AND SHOMAN WHO MADE FIRM BUT CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS. SKINNER KLEE SEEMED ALSO TO ACCEPT OUR CONCEPT OF BUILDING ON AREAS OF AGREEMENT WITH THE AIM OF NARROWING THE DIFFERENCES WHICH STILL EXIST. NEVERTHELESS, HE SEVERAL TIMES REPEATED THAT DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS WERE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR SATISFACTION ON THE CRUCIAL QUESTION OF TERRITORY.

8. PLEASE SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

PARSONS

NNNN

Ref: A04247

SECRET

12

Belize

PRIME MINISTER

Belize
(OD (81) 5 and 6)

BACKGROUND

OD agreed on 23rd October that a Constitutional Conference should be held in 1981 with a view to early independence for Belize; that negotiations for a settlement with Guatemala should continue; but that if these failed British forces might have to remain in Belize for a strictly limited period after independence. OD(81) 5 deals with the present position in the negotiations, with Guatemala which are being resumed in New York on 12th February. OD(81) 6 deals with the post-independence security arrangements which will need to be worked out with the Belizeans (and others) if agreement cannot be reached with Guatemala. Conclusions on both papers are therefore dependent on the outcome of negotiations which have not yet been completed. Furthermore, the attitude of the new American Administration towards Guatemala and Belize is not yet clear, but will be very important in relation to both sets of negotiations.

2. Preliminary decisions are nevertheless needed now, if we are to stick to a timetable under which Belize is brought to independence by the end of the year. For tactical reasons, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Mr. Ridley need to maintain momentum in their dealings both with the Guatemalans and with the Belizeans, at least for the time being.

3. OD need have no hesitation in once more endorsing Lord Carrington's broad strategy. International pressure for Belizean independence is very strong and disengagement (which will be possible once we have either settled with Guatemala or helped Belize through the immediate dangers of independence without a settlement) is what we want for political, military and financial reasons. In money terms, garrisoning for one year after independence will cost us less than garrisoning indefinitely in the absence of independence.

4. But there are some alarmingly fuzzy edges to parts of the security paper in particular, which the Committee will no doubt wish to probe as carefully as the present state of our knowledge permits.

5. The Chief Secretary, Treasury, the Attorney General and Mr. Ridley will be present for this item. The Secretary of State for Defence has also asked if he may bring the Chief of the Defence Staff.

HANDLING

6. You may care to deal with the two papers separately and begin by inviting the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to introduce OD(81) 5 dealing with the current position of Anglo-Guatemalan negotiations. He will probably ask Mr. Ridley to amplify the present position. Points to cover in the subsequent discussion are as follows -

(a) What does the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believe will be the final outcome of the current negotiations with the Guatemalans? When is this position likely to be reached?

(b) In the view of the Attorney General, is the proposed leasing of the Southern Cays compatible with the preservation of the territorial integrity of Belize? Do we run the risk of forfeiting United Nations support by forcing such an arrangement upon Mr. Price? How obdurate is Mr. Price likely to be to such an arrangement?

(c) Have Mr. Price's Government of Belize been given any grounds for their public assertion, quoted in paragraph 4 of OD(81) 5, that "Britain will do all that is necessary to ensure the country's security after independence"? OD agreed to no such blank cheque, but only that Britain would underwrite independence in military terms for a strictly limited period, and on the strict condition that in his foreign policy Mr. Price did what he was told. Can Mr. Ridley say if this position has changed?

(d) Is there a risk, in the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's view, that the Reagan Administration may be more sympathetic to the staunchly anti-communist government of Guatemala than to an independent Belize under Mr. Price which may have leanings towards Cuba?

(e) If agreement is reached with Guatemala, would the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary still want to offer Belize a "defence undertaking" after independence?

7. You should then invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence to introduce the paper on security arrangements post independence (OD(81) 6). Three separate elements are now foreseen: garrison, "defence undertaking" and build-up of local forces. There are questions to raise on each:-

(i) Is the Secretary of State for Defence content to cover the cost of a Belize garrison for 12 months after independence from his existing budget?

(ii) At the OD discussion in October Mr. Ridley said it had been made clear to Mr. Price that British troops could remain after independence only on condition that "every step of his foreign policy was agreed with the British Government in advance". Does the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary agree that this condition (which is not mentioned in the present paper) should still be maintained?

(iii) Are the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence confident that 12 months will be the longest the garrison have to stay on? It was 6 months when OD discussed the subject last October.

(iv) If we succeed in getting the Americans and/or others to join us in a "defence undertaking" to Belize, would the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary see any danger that our partners' wishes would limit our freedom to remove our garrison at the end of 12 months? He quoted this danger to OD in October as a reason for not involving the Americans.

(v) Is the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's idea that we should give the "defence undertaking" alone if necessary, i.e. if no one else will join in? Would the Secretary of State for Defence object to that?

(vi) Would the Secretary of State for Defence want to earmark any forces in case we were asked to act militarily in the light of our "undertaking"? If so, would this impair our military contribution elsewhere, e.g. to NATO?

(vii) Does the Chancellor of the Exchequer agree that the Contingency Reserve should be raided for the capital cost of building up Belizean forces, as proposed in paragraph 4 of OD(81) 6? Has any action been taken on conclusion 5 of the OD discussion on Belize on 23rd October that "separate consideration should be given to any financial problem arising from Britain's disengagement from Belize"? (There are indications that none has.) If the Chancellor demurs, what do the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence suggest? And how firm are their costings?

(viii) How soon does the Secretary of State for Defence believe that the proposed Belizean forces would be capable of defending Belize against Guatemala without the support of a British garrison? Would they include a navy and combat aircraft? If not, who will provide these elements?

CONCLUSIONS

8. Subject to points made in discussion you might lead the Committee to:-

(i) Take note of the present position which has been reached in the negotiations.

(ii) Agree that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should report again to the Committee when the negotiations with Guatemala have been concluded.

(iii) Agree that preparation for a Constitutional Conference should continue.

(iv) Agree that the British garrison should remain in Belize after independence, if necessary, for not more than 12 months and subject to firm British control of Belize's foreign policy during that period.

(v) Agree that further consideration should be given to the desirability and possibility of a consultative defence undertaking for Belize after your and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's discussions with the Reagan Administrati on later this month.

(vi) Invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for Defence to discuss further the method of financing the expansion of the Belize defence force.

(vii) Invite the Secretary of State for Defence thereafter to develop detailed proposals for such an expansion, taking account of the resources likely to be available.

RtA

Robert Armstrong

11th February 1981

11 FEB 1981

file

DS

DAVID WRIGHT
CABINET OFFICE

OD

As I have already told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister is content that those referred to in paragraph 2 of your minute to me of 10 February should be invited to attend the OD discussion on Belize. You undertook to inform the Chancellor of the Duchy's office that the Prime Minister will be prepared for him to leave OD at about 1225.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

11 February 1981

9C.

FM BELMOPAN
TO FCO LONDON
BT

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DESKBY 110800Z
SIC TEL NO 75
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 75 OF 10 FEBRUARY 1981
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO PRIORITY GUATEMALA CITY, WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 73 : BELIZE/GUATEMALA NEGOTIATIONS

1. PREMIER CAME OVER TO SEE ME LATE THIS AFTERNOON IN A VERY AGITATED STATE. HE SAID THAT COURTENAY WOULD NOT NOW BE RETURNING TO THE NEGOTIATIONS IN NEW YORK. HIS PLACE WOULD BE TAKEN BY DEPUTY PREMIER ROGERS AND MINISTER SHOMAN. THEY WOULD MAKE THEIR OWN WAY TO THEIR HOTEL AND ARE NOT ASKING TO BE MET.

2. THE PREMIER EXPLAINED THAT AT A FURTHER MEETING OF THE CABINET THIS AFTERNOON, COURTENAY HAD SAID THAT BOTH HE AND I REGARDED THE CABINET'S RESPONSE TO THE GUATEMALAN PROPOSALS AS INADEQUATE. SPEAKING UNDER CONSIDERABLE STRAIN, COURTENAY HAD ACCUSED THE PREMIER OF GOING BACK ON HIS EARLIER AGREEMENT ON THE 16 POINTS. COURTENAY THOUGHT THIS WOULD PUT THE PREMIER (AND HIMSELF) IN AN EMBARRASSING POSITION. HE HAD LOST HIS TEMPER. THE PREMIER HAD THEREFORE THOUGHT IT BEST THAT COURTENAY SHOULD NOT RETURN TO NEW YORK IN HIS PRESENT CONDITION. HE WAS OVER-TIRED.

3. I TOLD THE PREMIER THAT I WAS NOT SURPRISED THAT COURTENAY WAS TIRED. HE HAD WORKED HARD IN PRESENTING BELIZE'S CASE IN NEW YORK. AND HE HAD BEEN UNDER CONSIDERABLE STRESS SINCE HIS RETURN. THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT HAVE HAD A BETTER NEGOTIATOR. HE HAD BEEN EXTREMELY FAIR IN HIS PRESENTATION OF THE CABINET'S DECISION TO ME LAST NIGH. HE HAD MADE A MOST DISAPPOINTING RESPONSE ALMOST CREDIBLE, AND I WAS EXTREMELY SORRY THAT HE WOULD NOT BE AT THE NEXT ROUND.

4. I THEN SHOWED THE PREMIER THE WORDING OF POINT NUMBER 14 OF THE 16 POINTS AND SAID THAT THE CABINET'S RESPONSE DID SUGGEST THAT BELIZE HAD TO SOME EXTENT GONE BACK ON ITS UNDERTAKING. WHILE THIS MIGHT BE A GOOD OPENING STANCE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, SOME FLEXIBILITY WAS REQUIRED. IF THE GUATEMALANS APPEARED TO BE READY TO SETTLE FOR A LONG LEASE, I HOPED WE WOULD BE ABLE TO MEET THEM. OTHER-WISE, THIS COULD WELL BE THE BREAKING POINT.

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5. PRICE WOULD GO NO FURTHER THAN TO AGREE THAT CABINET MIGHT RAISE THE NUMBER OF CAYES TO THREE AND EXTEND THE LENGTH OF THE LEASE TO A NUMBER OF YEARS - WHICH HE WAS NOT WILLING TO DEFINE.

COMMENT

6. IF THE REASON FOR COURTENAY'S DISMISSAL BECOMES PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, THERE COULD PRESUMABLY BE SOME HARDENING IN THE GUATEMALAN POSITION. ON THE OTHER HAND - LOOKING ON THE BRIGHTER SIDE - THE PRESENT SPLIT IN THE CABINET SHOULD RESULT IN MORE FLEXIBILITY ON THE BELIZEAN SIDE. THE EXPOSURE OF TWO MORE MEMBERS OF CABINET TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN NEW YORK MAY ALSO HELP TO PRODUCE A MORE REALISTIC BELIZEAN POSTURE IN THE END.

FCO PASS UKMIS NEW YORK, GUATEMALA CITY, WASHINGTON
HENNESSY

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 063 OF 10 FEBRUARY
R F I : PRIORITY UKMIS NEWYORK

(FOR PAYNE ON ARRIVAL)

R F I : ROUTINE BELMOPAN (PERSONAL) WASHINGTON

BELIZE/GUATEMALA : NEGOTIATIONS

1. ON THE MORNING OF 10 FEBRUARY I SAW RODRIGUEZ AND, BRIEFLY, SKINNER-KLEE. THEY RETURNED TO GUATEMALA ON 08 FEBRUARY AND REPORTED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND PRESIDENT LUCAS ON THE MORNING OF 09 FEBRUARY. THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD FEARED THAT A SETTLEMENT WITHOUT CESSION OF TERRITORY MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO SELL POLITICALLY, BUT THE PRESIDENT HAD SEEMED CONFIDENT THAT A SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE OUTLINE DISCUSSED ON 5/6 FEBRUARY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. HE WISHED THE GUATEMALAN TEAM GOOD LUCK AND TOLD THEM TO CARRY ON AND PRODUCE A SETTLEMENT QUICKLY.

2. RODRIGUEZ AND SKINNER-KLEE ASKED IF I HAD ANY NEWS FROM LONDON OR BELMOPAN. I SAID THAT I HAD NONE. I ADDED THAT ALTHOUGH I RECOGNISED THAT THE GUATEMALANS HAD MADE CONSIDERABLE CONCESSIONS FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW I STILL FEARED THAT THEY WERE POSSIBLY ASKING MORE THAN THE BELIZE GOVERNMENT WOULD FEEL ABLE TO DELIVER. THEY BOTH ASSURED ME THAT THE GUATEMALAN TEAM WAS NEGOTIATING VERY SERIOUSLY AND REALLY WANTED A SETTLEMENT, BUT THAT THEY HAD MOVED AS FAR AS THEY POSSIBLY COULD. SKINNER-KLEE SAID THAT IF BELIZE WAS UNABLE TO ACCEPT THE IDEAS DISCUSSED ON 5/6 FEBRUARY THEN THE GUATEMALAN TEAM WOULD HAVE NO OPTION BUT ''TO PICK UP THEIR MARBLES AND GO HOME''. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD THEN BE UP TO THE AMERICANS TO KNOCK EVERYBODY'S HEADS TOGETHER AND HE HOPED THAT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THEY WOULD KNOCK PREMIER PRICE'S HEAD HARDEST.

3. SKINNER-KLEE EXPRESSED SOME SURPRISE THAT INSTEAD OF WELCOMING WITH OPEN ARMS THE IDEA OF THE PUNTA GORDA ROAD INSTEAD OF MAINLAND TERRITORY WE HAD QUIBBLED OVER THE EXTENT OF THE ROAD FOR WHICH WE WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE. I SAID THAT HE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT THE AMOUNT OF MONEY THAT HMG HAD AVAILABLE FOR SUCH PROJECTS WAS NOT UNLIMITED.

4. I THINK THAT PREMIER PRICE IS WRONG IN HIS SUSPICION THAT THE GUATEMALANS ARE NOT NEGOTIATING SERIOUSLY. I ALSO THINK THAT IT WOULD BE WRONG TO OVER-ESTIMATE THEIR LEEWAY FOR FURTHER CONCESSION SEMI-COLON I HAVE THE STRONG IMPRESSION THAT THEY HAVE GONE JUST ABOUT AS FAR AS THEY CAN GO. I SUSPECT THAT SKINNER-KLEE WAS SERIOUS

/1N.

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IN SUGGESTING THAT IF WE QUIBBLE OR BARGAIN TOO HARD AT THIS STAGE THEY WILL SIMPLY PACK UP AND HOPE THAT THE AMERICANS WIL INTERVENE BEFORE THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNEMENT FEEL THAT THEY THEY HAVE TO ADOPT THE HARSHER POLICY OUTLINED BY SKINNER-KLEE IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT ON 05 FEBRUARY.

WILMSHURST

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(1)

Prime Minister
Agree the additional invitees mentioned in para 2 below?
Yes DJW

Ref. A04235

MR ALEXANDER

Belize

When Sir Robert Armstrong discussed business with the Prime Minister yesterday, he reported that it might not be necessary after all to discuss Belize at the meeting of OD arranged for Thursday 12 February. Since then (as I reported to you yesterday) the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has decided that he does after all want the meeting of OD, now arranged for 12 noon on Thursday 12 February to consider further policy on Belize. There are to be two papers which consider both the current state of negotiations with the Guatemalans and defence arrangements in the territory. Negotiations with the Guatemalans are continuing and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is anxious that the subject should be considered by the Committee this week, since he will be away in Africa next week and with the Prime Minister in the United States for much of the following week.

2. Since one of the issues which the Committee will be asked to consider will be defence arrangements in Belize, the Secretary of State for Defence has asked if he might be accompanied for this item by the Chief of the Defence Staff. Sir Robert Armstrong recommends that the Prime Minister should agree to this: there are implications for the disposition of units of the armed services. The other additional invitees for a discussion on Belize will be the Chief Secretary, the Attorney General and the Minister of State, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr Ridley).

D J Wright

DAVID J WRIGHT

10 February 1981

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
WHITEHALL. LONDON SW1A 2AT

Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster

9th February 1981

Dear Prime Minister,

I understand that the next meeting of OD Committee has had to be re-arranged to take place at 12 noon on Thursday, 12th February. Unfortunately, I have a long standing commitment to see Her Majesty at the Palace at 12.40 about Duchy matters and I very much fear, therefore, that I have to seek your permission to leave the Committee at about 12.25. This will at least enable me to attend part of the meeting. I am very sorry about this, but hope that the Committee will not be greatly inconvenienced.

FRANCIS PYM

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP
10 Downing Street
London
SW1

10 FEB 1981

CONFIDENTIAL

Belize

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
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MO 5

9th February 1981

Overtaken by events. Belize is not now on the agenda. RJ 9/2

Dear David,

OD: BELIZE

OD are due to consider Belize this week, on Thursday 12th February, and my Secretary of State would be grateful if the Chief of the Defence Staff could attend the meeting for this discussion. Could you let me know whether this is acceptable?

I am sending a copy of this letter to Clive Whitmore at No 10.

Yours ever
Barry

(B M NORBURY)

D J Wright Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

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GRS 450 SECRET

SECRET

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 060202Z FEB 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 105 DATED 5 FEBRUARY 81
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, GUATEMALA CITY, BELMOPAN (PERSONAL)

BELIZE/GUATEMALA: NEW YORK TALKS

1. SKINNER-KLEE, WHO MADE THE RUNNING THROUGHOUT, OPENED WITH A TOUGH AND AGGRESSIVE REASSERTION OF THE GUATEMALAN POSITION. HE REJECTED THE PARALLEL PATH CONCEPT, DEPLORED CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE PREPARATIONS BEFORE A SETTLEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED, DISMISSED THE POSSIBILITY THAT A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN GUATEMALA WOULD BRING ABOUT SOLUTION AND DESCRIBED WHAT WOULD BE THE GUATEMALAN RESPONSE TO AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF A DATE FOR A CONFERENCE. IN THE ABSENCE OF A SETTLEMENT (NON-RECOGNITION OF AN INDEPENDENT BELIZE, REFUSAL TO ACKNOWLEDGE OR RESPECT ITS BORDERS, SUSPENSION OF NEGOTIATIONS AND OF ALL ASSISTANCE TO BELIZE, DISRUPTION OF CROSS-BORDER COMMERCE, SUSPENSION OF COMMUNICATIONS INCLUDING SEA LINKS, AND INTERDICTION OF ALL TRADE WITH BRITAIN.)

2. DESPITE THESE THREATS, HE STRESSED THAT GUATEMALA WAS READY TO OFFER THE HAND OF FRIENDSHIP AND TO RECOGNISE BELIZE AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE WITHIN ITS EXISTING FRONTIERS, PROVIDED THAT AN HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT HAD FIRST BEEN REACHED.

3. THIS UNCOMPROMISING BEGINNING SOFTENED NOTABLY DURING A DAY OF CONSTRUCTIVE AND FRIENDLY EXCHANGES. BY THE CLOSE, WE HAD ESTABLISHED THAT THE GUATEMALAN TEAM HAD BEEN SPECIFICALLY EMPOWERED BY PRESIDENT LUCAS TO SEEK A SPEEDY AND PERMANENT SETTLEMENT PROVIDED THAT IT CONTAINED SOME CONCRETE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE TERRITORIAL CLAIM. SKINNER-KLEE STATED SPECIFICALLY THAT HE COULD SETTLE FOR CESSION OF THE SAPODILLA AND RANGUANA CAYS PLUS LEASE OF LAND SOUTH OF A LINE DUE WEST FROM MOTHER POINT TO THE WESTERN BORDER. HE WAS TOLD THAT ANY LEASE OF LAND ON THE MAINLAND CREATED EXCEPTIONAL DIFFICULTY FOR BELIZE. HERRERA, IN ONE OF ONLY TWO INTERVENTIONS, THEN INDICATED THAT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROPOSALS OF THE KIND LISTED IN OUR 16 POINTS MIGHT BE REGARDED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR MAINLAND CESSION OR LEASE OF TERRITORY PROVIDED THAT AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON THE CAYS AND ASSOCIATED SEABED RIGHTS WITH MARITIME BOUNDARY DELIMITATION. THIS WAS CONFIRMED BY SKINNER-KLEE, AND COURTENAY THOUGHT THAT SOME CONCESSION OVER THE CAYS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE THOUGH HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO OFFER ANY PROSPECT OF AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF HERRERA'S PROPOSAL WITHOUT CONSULTING PREMIER PRICE. HE AGREED TO DO SO IMMEDIATELY BY TELEGRAM.

4. SKINNER-KLEE, AND OTHERS IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION, LEFT NO DOUBT OF THEIR DESPERATION FOR ANY SOLUTION WHICH MIGHT BE SALEABLE TO GUATEMALAN PUBLIC OPINION. SKINNER-KLEE ALSO REVEALED THAT BEFORE DEPARTURE, THE GUATEMALAN TEAM HAD BEEN GIVEN DISCRETION (AFTER LENGTHY CONSULTATION IN GUATEMALA BETWEEN POLITICAL GROUPS, PRIVATE SECTOR INTERESTS AND THE MILITARY) TO SETTLE DEFINITIVELY ON WHATEVER HONOURABLE TERMS THEY COULD ACHIEVE.

5. IT IS CONCEIVEABLE, THOUGH AS YET BY NO MEANS CERTAIN, THAT AN OFFER OF A LEASE ON THE SAPODILLA AND PROBABLY SOME ADDITIONAL CAYS TO THE NORTH, WITH ASSOCIATED MARITIME BOUNDARY DELINEATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROPOSALS MIGHT CLINCH A SETTLEMENT. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT GUATEMALANS WOULD AGREE TO A FURTHER MINISTERIAL MEETING OR INDEED ANY FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS UNLESS THE PRESENT MEETING PRODUCES REALISTIC PROSPECT OF EARLY AGREEMENT. I.E. BEFORE THE DATE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IS ANNOUNCED

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PA

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK Ø6ØØ41Z FEB 81
TO IMMEDIATE BELMOPAN
TELEGRAM NUMBER PERSONAL 1 DATED 5 FEBRUARY 81
INFO IMMEDIATE F C O PRIORITY GUATEMALA CITY.
FOR WOODFIELD FROM HENNESSY
GRATEFUL YOU PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM MINISTER COURTENAY TO DEPUTY PREMIER FOR ONWARD TRANSMISSION TO PREMIER IMMEDIATELY ON RECEIPT
BEGINS
ATTITUDE OF GUATEMALAN DELEGATION APPEARS TO CONFIRM THEIR AUTHORITY TO REACH FINAL SETTLEMENT AT THIS ROUND AND ALSO CONFIRMS A MOOD TO MAKE CONCESSIONS, AND AN URGENCY ON THEIR PART NOT TO POSTPONE FINAL AGREEMENT. OUR DELEGATION SENSES A POSSIBLE BREAK THROUGH. LAND CESSION REMAINS THEIR OBJECTIVE BUT IT MAY BE POSSIBLE GET AWAY WITH MARITIME CONCESSIONS INVOLVING LONG LEASE OF SOME SOUTHERN CAYES (AS AGREED IN ITEM 14 OF 16 POINTS IE SOME CAYES IN THE SAPODILLA AND RANGUANA RANGES) AND ASSOCIATED TERRITORIAL WATERS: AUGMENTED BY AS YET UNDEFINED ACCESS FROM PETEN TO THE SEA. IF THIS IS NEGOTIABLE EVENTS MAY CHANGE SUDDENLY AND AGREEMENT MAY BE ROUND THE CORNER. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHETHER YOU COULD AGREE TO MY CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS ON ABOVE BASIS. IF SO FURTHER CONSULTATIONS MAY BE NECESSARY - COURTENAY
ENDS

PARSONS

PA Belize 87

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GPS 320
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DESKBY 270900Z
FM WASHINGTON 270056Z JAN 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 261 OF 26 JANUARY
INFO GUATEMALA CITY, BELMOPAN (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR), MEXICO CITY, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEGUCIGALPA, SAN JOSE, HAVANA.

MY CALL ON HAIG: CENTRAL AMERICA

1. WHEN I CALLED ON HAIG TODAY, I MENTIONED OUR INTENTION TO BRING BELIZE TO EARLY INDEPENDENCE AND EXPLAINED WHY WE FELT THAT, DESPITE POSSIBLE GUATEMALAN OBJECTIONS, WE WOULD STICK TO OUR PLAN. I SAID THAT WE WOULD HOPE FOR AMERICAN SUPPORT IN THIS. HAIG REPLIED BY REFERRING TO THE PRESSURES TO WHICH WE HAD BEEN SUBJECTED FROM WASHINGTON IN THE DAYS WHEN WE WERE BUILDING UP OUR BELIZE GARRISON. HE HIMSELF AS SACEUR HAD SUPPORTED US (THOUGH IT MEANT WITHDRAWING TROOPS FROM NATO). HE AFFIRMED THAT WE WOULD NOT QUOTE GET ANY STICK UNQUOTE FROM HIM PERSONALLY OR FROM THE ADMINISTRATION, NOR WOULD WE FEEL ANY HOT BREATH ON OUR NECKS FROM WASHINGTON AS REGARDS THE TIMING OF THE DECISIONS WE TOOK OVER BELIZE. HAIG EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT WE COULD PROCEED ON THIS IN TANDEM AND IN STEP.

2. HAIG CONTINUED THAT HE WAS ACUTELY AWARE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF LEAVING UNTENDED CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA. HE DESCRIBED THEIR INCURSIONS AS RAMPANT, AND THE SITUATION AS ONE OF HAEMORRHAGE. HUNDREDS OF TONS OF ARMS HAD BEEN AIR-LIFTED FROM NICARAGUA TO THE INSURGENTS IN EL SALVADOR. THERE WOULD BE NO AGONISING ON THE AMERICANS' PART ABOUT HEARTS AND MINDS: THEY WERE FACED WITH A CLEAR-CUT CASE OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSION.

3. I SUGGESTED THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO PURSUE THE TALKS ON THE CARIBBEAN THAT WE HAD PERIODICALLY HELD WITH THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION. HAIG WELCOMED THIS, BUT SAID THAT HE HAD NOT YET DECIDED BETWEEN THE TWO CANDIDATES HE WAS CONSIDERING FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS. I SUGGESTED THAT, ONCE HE WAS CHOSEN, IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF WE COULD TALK TO HIM PRIOR TO YOUR VISIT.

HENDERSON

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FM GUATEMALA CITY 15/1445Z JAN 81

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 018 OF 15 JANUARY

INFO: PRIORITY BELMOPAN (PERSONAL)

ROUTINE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK MEXICO CITY

No need to read in full but see underlined passages overleaf.

MY TELNO 014 : BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. HERRERA, SKINNER KLEE, MENDOZA AND RODRIGUEZ CAME TO MY HOUSE ON 14 JANUARY FOR TALKS WITH MYSELF AND NASH.

2. HERRERA BEGAN BY STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MLN AND THE ARMY IN PUTTING ANY SETTLEMENT OVER TO PUBLIC OPINION. HE SAID THAT DESPITE THE PATRIOTIC NOISES MADE BY THE MLN, IF A SETTLEMENT WERE AGREED WITH THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT THE MLN COULD BE BROUGHT INTO LINE TO ACCEPT, OR AT LEAST NOT TO IMPEDE IT, : IF NECCESSARY BY MEANS OF THE GOVERNMENT BUYING ENOUGH CONGRESSMEN WHEN IT CAME TO A VOTE IN CONGRESS.

3. THEY THEN SHOWED SURPRISE THAT WE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED A REPLY TO MR RIDLEY'S MESSAGES. IT SEEMED THAT THE DELAY IS DUE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S PROCRASTINATION, AND THAT THE REPLY WILL ASK FOR TALKS IN THE FIRST WEEK OF FEBRUARY.

4. ON THE CONTENT OF THE TALKS THEY AGREED THAT IT WAS TO BE EXPECTED THAT THE BRITISH SIDE WOULD WISH TO BEGIN WITH THE SIXTEEN POINTS PUT FORWARD BY MR RIDLEY IN NEW YORK IN OCTOBER : HOWEVER THEY FELT THAT MOST OF THE SIXTEEN POINTS WERE PERIPHERAL TO THE REAL PROBLEMS.

5. I SUGGESTED THAT THE REAL PROBLEMS WERE THEIR OWN LEGAL CASE AND THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE. I SAID THAT IF BOTH SIDES AGREED, AS PART OF A GENERAL SETTLEMENT, TO ACCEPT THAT ARTICLE SEVEN OF THE 1859 TREATY HAD NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH, AND IF BELIZE RECOGNISED HER CENTRAL AMERICAN STATUS IN HER CONSTITUTION, THIS SHOULD HELP THE LEGAL PROBLEM. THEY AGREED. ON TERRITORY I SUGGESTED THAT THE OFFER , MADE IN NEW YORK IN JULY, OF A LONG LEASE OF THE SOUTHERN CAYS SHOULD SURELY MEET GUATEMALAN REQUIREMENTS. THEY DID NOT AGREE.

6. HERRERA SUGGESTED THAT IF THE SOUTHERN CAYS COULD BE DEMOLISHED, AND THE BOUNDARY OF GUATEMALAN/BELIZEAN TERRITORIAL WATERS REDRAWN ACCORDINGLY, THIS WOULD SUFFICE. I SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE LESS DRASTIC TO IGNORE THE CAYS FOR THE PURPOSE OF DRAWING BOUNDARIES. MENDOZA SAID THAT MARITIME CONCESSIONS MADE IN THIS WAY WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH FOR THE ARMY.

7. RODRIGUEZ RESURRECTED THE IDEA OF JOINT ADMINISTRATION, I SAID THAT THIS WAS A NON-STARTER. HERRERA THEN SUGGESTED THAT GUAT-EMALA BE GIVEN A LONG LEASE NOT ONLY OF THE SOUTHERN CAYS BUT ALSO OF THE AREA BETWEEN THE MOHO AND SARSTOON RIVERS. WE PURSUED THIS IDEA, AGREEING THAT THE AREA SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION. MENDOZA SAID THAT THE LEASE OF MAINLAND TERRITORY, WHICH WHICH WOULD ENABLE HIM TO MOVE IN A DETACHMENT OF TROOPS AND RAISE THE GUATEMALAN FLAG, WOULD ENABLE HIM TO SELL A SETTLEMENT TO THE ARMY : IN DISCUSSION HE AGREED THAT BOTH GUATEMALAN AND BELIZEAN FLAGS COULD BE RAISED. THEY ALL SAID THAT SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD NOT DEROGATE BELIZEAN SOVEREIGNTY, BUT WOULD GIVE THE GOVERNMENT

AND THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND THE OPPORTUNITY TO SAY TO POLITICAL AND MILITARY OPINION THAT THEY HAD OBTAINED THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT THEY HAD BEEN TRYING TO GET FOR SO MANY YEARS. THEY QUOTED HONG KONG AS A PRECEDENT, AND SAID THAT GUATEMALA WOULD HAPPILY PAY THE ANNUAL BUDGETARY FIGURE OF 10 MILLION DOLLARS, OR MORE, AS ANNUAL RENT.

8. I PROMISED TO PASS THIS IDEA TO YOU, BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT ANY SUCH IDEA WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE BELIZEAN GOVERNMENT. THEY SUGGETED THAT PRESSURE SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON PREMIER PRICE BY HMG, THE US GOVERNMENT, AND EVEN BY GENERAL TORRIJOS TO MAKE HIM SEE THAT HE WOULD NOT BE SACRIFICING BELIZEAN TERRITORY OR SOVEREIGNTY, BUT THAT HE WOULD BE GAINING PEACE AND PROSPERITY BY AGREEING TO SUCH A PROPOSAL.

9. THEY STATED VERY CLEARLY THAT IF NO SUCH SETTLEMENT COULD BE AGREED OUR OTHER PROPOSLAS WERE IRRELEVANT, AND THAT GUATEMELA WOULD REACT ''VIOLENTLY'' TO BELIZEAN INDEPENDENCE. THEY QUOTED THE MORROCCAN GREEN MARCH AS AN EXPAMPLE, AND THEY SADI THAT BELIZE'S ECONOMY COULD BE CRIPPLED BY A FEW BOMBS IN SUGAR MILLS. THEY ALL AGREED THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF A SETTLEMENT THE CONSULATE WOULD BE EXPELLED AT THE TIME OF BELIZE'S INDEPENDENCE.

10. HERRERA WAS THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE : SKINNER KLEE THE GLOOMIEST, SAYING THAT GUATEMALA WOULD DO BEST TO LEAVE AS MANY PROBLEMS AS POSSIBLE UNRESOLVED SO THAT THE PROBLEM COULD BE REVIVIED AT A SUITABLE TIME IN THE FUTURE. MENDOZA WAS FAIRLY INSCRUTABLE, HE TALKED ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF HISTORY, AND ONLY CAME TO LIFE WHEN THE IDEA OF A LEASE OF MAINLAND TERRITORY WAS DISCUSSED. THEY ALL STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION OF ACCESS TO THE SEA, AND QUOTED BOLIVIA'S RECENT REVIVAL OF HER TERRITORIAL CLAIM AGAINST CHILE AS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW SUCH CLAIMS CAN FESTER FOR A CENTURY. THEY ALL, ALSO, MADE IT CLEAR THAT WHAT MATTERED WAS TO CONVINCE PRESIDENT LUCAS OF THE CONTENT OF A SETTLEMENT , SAYING IN PRETTY DIRECT TERMS THAT IF THE PRESIDENT AGREED A SETTLEMENT ANY BODY STANDING OUT AGAINST IT WOULD BE PUTTING HIMSELF IN CONSIDERABLE PERSONALA DANGER. THEY SPOKE WISTFULLY OF A POSSIBLE CHANGE IN THE US ATTITUDE, BUT ACCEPTED THAT TIME WAS AGAINST THEM AND THAT THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION WAS UNLIKELY TO GIVE A HIGH PRIORITY TO THE BELIZE PROBLEM.

11. I SAID THAT I HOPED THAT THE IDEA OF LEASING MAINLAND TERRITORY WOULD BE PUT FORWARD BY THE GUATEMALAN SIDE AT THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS. SKINNER KLEE SHOWED SIGNS OF WANTING TO REVIVE DOCUMENTS TABLED AT MEETINGS OVER THE LAST TWENTY YEARS OR SO, BUT THE OTHERS AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO CONCENTRATE ON IDEAS DISCUSSED AT AND SINCE THE MEETING IN BERMUDA IN MAY 1980.

12. IT BECAME VERY CLEAR THAT THE OCTOBER SIXTEEN POINTS, OR ANY VARIATION ON THEM, WILL BE INSUFFICIENT AND THAT WITHOUT A SETTLEMENT THE GUATEMALAN REACTION WILL HAVE TO BE VIOLENT. THEIR IDEA OF EXPANDING POINT NUMBER 14 OF THE OCTOBER 16 POINTS TO COVER AN AREA OF MAINLAND AS WELL AS THE CAYS SEEMS TO OFFER A COMPROMISE :

NO CESSION OF TERRITORY OR SOVEREGNTY WOULD BE REQUIRED, BUT GUATEMALA MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT AND OFFER A FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP TO AN INDEPENDENT BELIZE IF THE IDEA WERE ACCEPTED BY BELIZE. WHETHER PREMIER PRICE COULD ACCEPT THE IDEA OF A LEASE, AT A RENT OF TEN MILLION DOLLARS PER ANNUM, AND FOR WHAT AREA AND FOR HOW LONG, IS OF COURSE OPEN TO NEGOTIATION, AND WOULD SEEM LESS OF A DIMINUTION OF BELIZEAN SOVEREIGNITY THAN JOINT ADMINISTRATION. TH GUATEMALANS SEEM TO BE LOOKING TO US TO PERSUADE HIM THAT SUCH A DEAL MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF FACE ON BOTH SIDES. OTHERWISE THEY SEEM HAPPY TO ENTER INTO A PERIOD OF CONTINUAL AND VIOLENT CONFRONTATION.

WILMSHURST

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER ØØ3 OF 9 JANUARY 1981
INFO GUATEMALA CITY

YOUR TELNO PERSONAL ØØ1 : PRESS VISITS

1. CBF INFORMED MY OFFICE TODAY THAT GEOFFREY ARCHER WOULD BE FLYING TO BELIZE UNDER RAF AUSPICES AND THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY MOD TO SPONSOR ARCHER'S VISIT TO BELIZE AND TO PROVIDE LATTER WITH EVERY ASSISTANCE WHILE HERE.

2. AS YOU ARE AWARE, THE PREMIER IS VERY SENSITIVE ABOUT THE MEDIA. THIS VISIT HAS NOT BEEN CLEARED WITH OR AUTHORISED BY LOCAL MINISTERS. IT WOULD BE MOST UNFORTUNATE IF ITN, IN THE COURSE OF FILING PIECES ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION, WERE TO AROUSE LOCAL FEELINGS, PARTICULARLY AT THIS DELICATE STAGE IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE GUATEMALANS AND BELIZEANS. COMING JUST BEFORE MR RIDLEY'S MEETING WITH PRICE AND THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS ON THE ANGLO-GUATEMALAN DISPUTE, THE TIMING COULD NOT BE WORSE. BUT IT WOULD BE DOUBLY UNFORTUNATE IF HMG WERE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR ITN'S REPORTING - AND I FEAR THAT, UNDER THE PRESENT PROPOSALS, THAT

GUATEMALAN DISPUTE, THE TIMING COULD NOT BE WORSE. BUT IT WOULD BE DOUBLY UNFORTUNATE IF HMG WERE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR ITN'S REPORTING - AND I FEAR THAT, UNDER THE PRESENT PROPOSALS, THAT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE THE CASE. MOREOVER, IN VIEW OF THE BAD PUBLICITY THAT THE GARRISON HERE ALWAYS SEEMS TO SUFFER AT THE HANDS OF THE PRESS (THE RECENT ''SUN'' AND ''NOW'' ARTICLES ARE CASES IN POINT), I AM RELUCTANT TO AGREE TO ANY FURTHER INVOLVEMENT OF THE MEDIA WITH THE ARMY HERE. HOWEVER, SINCE ARCHER APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN TOLD ALREADY THAT HE WOULD BE WELCOME, I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF MOD COULD ENSURE THAT HE IS NOT LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT HIS VISIT IS BEING SPONSORED IN ANY WAY BY HMG OR THAT HE CAN EXPECT ANY SPECIAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE GARRISON, APART FROM PERMISSION TO TAKE PHOTOGRAPHS OF TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT (AT CBF'S DISCRETION) IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS.

3. MEANWHILE, I AM ISSUING INSTRUCTIONS TO CBF IN THESE TERMS AND WILL ENSURE THAT HE IS AWARE OF THE MOD DIRECTIVE REGARDING INTERVIEWS.

4. IN FUTURE I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF ALL SUCH VISITS COULD BE CLEARED WITH ME BEFORE THEY ARE AUTHORISED.

FCO PASS GUATEMALA CITY
HENNESSY
BT

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Belize

Prime Minister

MAP 21/XII

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FM WASHINGTON 241930Z DEC 80
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 5007 OF 24 DECEMBER 1980,
INFO GUATEMALA CITY, BELMOPAN (PERSONAL), MEXICO CITY, UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 1962: BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. T U R CROSSED MY TELNO 4986.

2. THE APPARENT HARDENING OF THE GUATEMALAN POSITION MAY INDEED OWE SOMETHING TO THEIR EXPECTATION THAT U S/GUATEMALAN RELATIONS WILL IMPROVE UNDER A REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. IN THIS THE GUATEMALANS, LIKE A NUMBER OF OTHER CENTRAL AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS, MAY BE OVER-ESTIMATING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PERSONAL SPECULATIONS OF THEIR REPUBLICAN CONTACTS (MY TELNO 4986). WE KNOW THAT THESE CONTACTS HAVE FOR THE MOST PART BEEN THOSE ON THE FRINGES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY WHO HAVE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF IMPRECISE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS TO CONVEY UNDERSTANDINGS TO WHICH THEY HOPE THE INCOMING ADMINISTRATION WILL HAVE TO BIND ITSELF. THE MOST ACTIVE OF THESE HAVE BEEN JOHN CARBAUGH AND PEDRO SAN JUAN (BOTH MEMBERS OF THE STATE DEPT TRANSITION TEAM WHICH HAIG HAS SUMMARILY DISBANDED), TOGETHER WITH SILBERMAN (RECENTLY RESIGNED HEAD OF THE C I A TRANSITION TEAM), AND CLETO DI GIOVANNI (A PRIVATE CONSULTANT). IT IS NOT CERTAIN THAT ANY OF THEM WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE NEW ADMINISTRATION.

3. THUS WE NEED NOT ASSUME THAT THE SENTIMENTS WHICH THE GUATEMALANS WANT TO AND DO HEAR FROM THEIR REPUBLICAN INTERLOCUTORS INDICATE THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WILL NECESSARILY LEAN ON BELIZE RATHER THAN GUATEMALA. MUCH WILL DEPEND ON HOW FAR WE CAN INFLUENCE THE NEW ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR LATIN AMERICA, AND I SEE ADVANTAGE IN AN EARLY VISIT TO WASHINGTON. WE WILL HAVE TO CONSULT HIM PERSONALLY ONCE HE HAS BEEN NOMINATED, TO FIND WHEN HE WOULD BE ABLE TO MANAGE A DISCUSSION. IN THE MEANTIME HARDING'S TALK WITH NEUMANN ON 4 DECEMBER WILL HAVE ENSURED THAT THE PROBLEM IS COVERED IN THE BRIEFING MATERIAL PREPARED FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION: AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO BRIEF THOSE WHO MAY HOLD POSITIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY.

4. ALTHOUGH THEY ARE PERHAPS NOT BEST PLACED TO JUDGE, THE GUATEMALANS' LATEST SABRE-RATTLING COMES AS NO SURPRISE TO THE AMERICANS, WHO HAVE NEVER CONSIDERED THAT OUR STRATEGY WILL BE SMOOTHLY ACCOMPLISHED. OFFICIALS HERE NATURALLY TEND TO PLAY DOWN SUGGESTIONS THAT THE GUATEMALANS ARE RESPONDING TO WINKS AND NUDGES FROM SOME REPUBLICANS AND EMPHASIZE INSTEAD THAT THE CONCEPT OF PARALLELISM WHICH H M G HAS ADOPTED WILL INEVITABLY CREATE MOMENTS OF TENSION.

HENDERSON.

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TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1962 OF 23 DECEMBER
INFO GUATEMALA CITY, BELMOPAN (PERSONAL), MEXICO CITY,
UKMIS NEW YORK.

GUATEMALA CITY TELNOS 408 AND 409 AND MY TELNO 237 TO GUATEMALA CITY
:BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. APPARENT HARDENING OF THE GUATEMALAN POSITION AND THEIR RELUCTANCE TO BE PINNED DOWN TO AN EARLY MEETING MAY NOT BE UNCONNECTED WITH THEIR HOPES FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FROM THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. THEY MAY WELL HAVE SOME BASIS FOR SUCH HOPES (WILMSHURST'S LETTER OF 16 DECEMBER) AND WE OURSELVES (BELMOPAN TELNO 389) HAVE INDICATIONS THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION MAY BE MORE DISPOSED TO LEAN ON BELIZE RATHER THAN GUATEMALA. IT IS CLEARLY MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD TAKE THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF HAIG AND HIS ADVISERS ON CENTRAL AMERICA (WHEN THESE ARE APPOINTED). WE DEPEND ON YOUR GUIDANCE AS TO WHEN AND HOW TO ACHIEVE THIS, BUT MR RIDLEY OR MR DAY WOULD BE PREPARED TO COME TO WASHINGTON AT SHORT NOTICE. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ADVICE WHETHER IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO ARRANGE A MEETING EVEN BEFORE THE INAUGURATION.

CARRINGTON

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MR P H MOBERLY
MR HARDING
LORD N G LENNOX
CABINET OFFICE

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 November 1980

Dear Michael,

Belize

You will remember that at the meeting of OD held on 23 October, it was agreed that a Constitutional Conference on Belize should be held in London in 1981. The UN General Assembly resolution on the question was adopted on 11 November by an overwhelming 139-0-7, and it was particularly gratifying that this year the US voted in favour of the resolution. In order to respond to the General Assembly's call for independence to be achieved before the end of next year's General Assembly, we must set the constitutional procedures in train. We are therefore planning to convene a Conference at the beginning of February.

We will be announcing the calling of a Conference through an inspired Parliamentary Question on 2 December. The question will be as follows:

> "To ask the Lord Privy Seal whether in the light of the recent UN resolution on Belize the Government intends now to take steps to bring the Colony to independence."

The reply will say:

> "A Constitutional Conference will be convened in the near future with the intention of bringing Belize to early independence. It remains the Government's objective to secure a negotiated settlement of the dispute with Guatemala. To that end, a proposal for a further meeting with Guatemalan representatives has been put to the Guatemalan Government".

Fortuitously, Lord Brockway has tabled a written Parliamentary Question in the House of Lords in the following terms:

> "To ask Her Majesty's Government what progress has been made in the negotiations with Guatemala regarding the future of Belize".

/This

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This will be answered, also on 2 December, as follows:

> "There have been no further negotiations on the dispute with Guatemala since the Ministerial meeting held in New York on 13 and 14 October, though a proposal for a further meeting has been put to the Guatemalan Government. A Constitutional Conference will be convened in the near future with the intention of bringing Belize to early independence. It remains the Government's firm intention to seek a negotiated settlement of the dispute."

The Guatemalan Foreign Minister will be warned in confidence a day or two before this announcement and, at the same time, Mr Ridley will propose a further negotiating meeting in the near future. We shall similarly forewarn Mr Price.

You may like to know that the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs have indicated that they will put questions on Belize and the Government's policy for this colony's future to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary when he appears before them on 3 December.

yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St
London SW1

27 NOV 1980

7

SECRET

Belize

Ref. A03316

PRIME MINISTER

Anglo-Guatemalan Negotiations over Belize

(OD(80) 59)

BACKGROUND

OD discussed this subject on 2nd April 1980 and agreed that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should arrange for negotiations to be resumed with Guatemala on the basis of a package of proposals which included provision for seaward access, help with the provision of road access from Guatemala to the Caribbean, and reassurances in the field of security designed to convince the Guatemalans that Belize would not be used as a launching ground for Cuban or other left-wing subversion of Guatemala. Mr. Ridley has been conducting the negotiations with the Guatemalans and has just returned from New York. He will be present at the OD meeting on 23rd October. He is likely to say that, while the negotiations have gone quite well, they have not satisfied the Guatemalans who insist that the dispute can only be settled in terms which recognise that the matter at issue is territory. A slice of Belize would give them satisfaction but this is not being offered. Guatemala is conscious that there is overwhelming international support for Belize to proceed soon to independence. This factor must also affect the British view of the situation. It would be preferable to proceed to independence for Belize with full Guatemalan agreement. But such agreement seems unlikely to be forthcoming. There is a risk that the Guatemalans' dissatisfaction may reach such a pitch that they decide to take some kind of military action against Belize. Hence the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's wish to seek the collective endorsement by OD colleagues of the policy which is being proposed at this stage.

2. From a defence point of view Belize continues to be one of our more sizeable deployments outside the NATO area. The Belize Garrison includes infantry units, Harrier, Puma and Gazelle aircraft and an RAF Regiment Rapier

detachment to defend the airfield. There are also armoured reconnaissance, artillery, air defence, engineer and communications units there. A Royal Navy warship, supported by a Royal Fleet Auxiliary, is deployed to the Caribbean and Western Atlantic as the Belize guardship. Because of present pressure on the Defence Budget and the threat of worse to come in 1981-82, the Chiefs of Staff are more than usually uneasy about the danger of our defence commitments outrunning the resources available to meet them. The possibility of trouble with Guatemala in the run-up to independence and the consequential need to reinforce the British garrison in Belize could have serious implications for our continuing ability to meet all our defence commitments elsewhere. For the same reason it will be necessary to think very carefully about any continuing security arrangements which will be required for Belize in the post-independence period.

3. The Chief Secretary, the Attorney General and Mr. Ridley are being invited to the meeting.

HANDLING

4. It seems unlikely that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will be back in time for this OD meeting. Subject to anything which the Lord Privy Seal may wish to say by way of introduction, you may like to ask Mr. Ridley to introduce the paper by describing the negotiations in which he has been taking the lead. Points to cover in the subsequent discussion are as follows.

(a) What exactly is the nature of the uncertainty which is attributed to the United States Administration in paragraph 5? Are they bothered about the danger (referred to at OD last time) of the Belizeans turning to Cuba for help? How real is that danger? Do the Americans have any constructive suggestions for dealing with the situation other than by the course of action which we are proposing to pursue? How would a Reagan Administration's outlook differ?

(b) What is Mr. Ridley's latest assessment of the possible Guatemalan reaction to the course of action we have proposed to them in the course of negotiations? How highly does he rate the possibilities of diplomatic, commercial and/or military retaliation, (a) before independence and (b) thereafter?

(c) How strong is the international pressure for Belizean independence? What British interests would suffer if we were to resist it? Are those responsible for the pressure prepared to put their money and men where their mouth is, i.e. to undertake to protect an independent Belize from Guatemalan wrath? If not, can they at least be forced to make that clear?

(d) The British security commitment

(i) What are the Secretary of State for Defence's views on the possibility of having to reinforce the garrison before independence? How large a reinforcement? And at what cost to British defence policy elsewhere?

(ii) What are his views on the possibility of leaving British forces there after independence, for what the paper calls "a strictly limited period"? How large forces? How long a period? How would it be kept limited - i.e. what would we do if at the end of the period the Guatemalan military threat was unabated?

(e) Public expenditure will be of concern to the Chief Secretary. Will the cost of any reinforcement of the garrison before independence be met from the Defence Budget? Who will pay for any garrison we leave for a period after independence? About how much money would be involved? Paragraph 11d also refers to the need to find money "for an Independence settlement". Will this not be from within the Aid Budget (OD were told on 2nd April that the ODA had made appropriate provision)? Paragraph 16 of the Possible Points for an Agreement, attached to Lord Carrington's paper, suggests possible British help over advice, training and equipment for the Belize Defence Force. How is this to be paid for?

5. The paper is alarmingly vague about post-independence security arrangements. There seems a real danger that we will embark on the policy proposed without thinking through what commitments it might involve, and will discover these only when they have become unavoidable. You may therefore wish

to invite the Lord Privy Seal and Mr. Ridley to let members of OD have a further assessment of the maximum which might be involved, after independence, in terms of how many British troops and for how long and at what overall financial cost.

CONCLUSION

6. Subject to points made in discussion you might lead the Committee to

(i) endorse conclusions a., b. and c. in paragraph 11 of OD(80) 59

(ii) note that some continuing security arrangements will be required for Belize in the post-independence period but to seek to establish what they might involve in terms of money and manpower and how the commitment might be limited.

RA

(Robert Armstrong)

22nd October, 1980

SECRET

Belize 5

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

TELEPHONE 01-218 9000
DIRECT DIALLING 01-218 2111/3

MO 5

2nd October 1980

NBPM Yek Rmk -3/x

Dear Secretary of State,

THE DISPUTE WITH GUATEMALA OVER BELIZE

I should like to offer some comments on your memorandum OD(80)55 in advance of the Ministerial meetings with the Guatemalans in New York later this month.

We should be in no doubt about the potential implications of the negotiating strategy you propose. The latest intelligence assessment is that "Moves by HMG towards granting independence to Belize regardless of Guatemala's wishes would initially give rise to sabre-rattling by the Guatemalans and a period of mounting military and political tension. If HMG persisted and the Guatemalans were faced with an imminent fait accompli, there would be a high risk of their taking some kind of military action against Belize".

You suggest that there is small prospect of a negotiated settlement as a result of the next round of talks. From a defence point of view, a negotiated settlement with Guatemala before Belizean independence would obviously be much the most desirable outcome. If this cannot be achieved, you propose that we either continue to negotiate with the Guatemalans in parallel with the independence

The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington KCMG MC

process or seek a situation in which the Belizeans negotiate direct with the Guatemalans after independence. If the latter course were followed, I take it that there could be no question of a bilateral negotiation between Guatemala and an independent Belize dealing with British defence commitments.

I assume that we would need, in any case, to agree with the Belizeans before independence the form that any future British defence commitment might take. I would see grave disadvantages in the retention of the garrison for an open-ended commitment in an independent state. The role of the force would have to be responsive to the wishes of the Belizean Government; command and control would therefore be difficult; and the cost would be high. As your memorandum acknowledges, Belize must in the longer term rely for her security on the building-up of the Belize Defence Force, whose current capability and potential for expansion are extremely limited.

I appreciate that it has already been explained to the Belizeans that any British forces could only remain in Belize after independence for a strictly limited period and on clearly defined terms. But even a limited commitment could become, in practice, open ended. We would need to look very carefully at the implications and details of any such commitment, before deciding whether to offer it, particularly in the absence of a settlement of the territorial dispute.

No security proposals have, of course, been put formally to the Guatemalans. If it is our intention to take Belize to independence even without a settlement with Guatemala, we cannot, I believe, at this stage give the Guatemalans any indications of the precise security arrangements that might be made for an independent Belize. If the intelligence assessment of Guatemalan perceptions is correct, this could be essential to forestall aggressive military action.

If the negotiations fail, we shall as you accept then have to assess the risk of a violent Guatemalan

reaction before we start the independence process, and you suggest that reinforcement of the garrison would probably become necessary. I would much prefer to avoid a precautionary reinforcement unless there are compelling military grounds in favour. Nevertheless against this background the Chiefs of Staff have updated our contingency plan for reinforcing the garrison. I must however say that our resources are heavily stretched, and experience suggests that reinforcements of this type nearly always assume a permanence not originally intended.

My officials have agreed with yours to provide a detailed brief on security issues for the New York talks. I think it would be right for me to discuss this with Nicholas Ridley and if you are happy I propose to see him next Tuesday.

I agree that the options for security arrangements for an independent Belize, should be left open in advance of the New York talks since no commitments can, in any event, be entered into with the Guatemalans and HMG's objective is to withdraw the permanent garrison as soon as practicable. I agree with you that, in the light of the New York discussions, we may need to consider all this further in OD.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, other OD colleagues and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours sincerely

Francis Pym

(Private Secretary)

(Above name typed and signed in his absence)

3 OCT 1980

Belize

Prime Minister

To glance at this record of Belize/Guatemala talks. The atmosphere was good, but there seems to have been no movement on substance.

MAP

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 19 OF 23 AUGUST 1980 (SUBJECT TO CORRECTION)

BELIZE/GUATEMALA MEETING

1 PD THE GUATEMALAN FOREIGN MINISTER ACCOMPANIED BY SKINNER-KLEE AND EDUARDO RODRIGUEZ MET THE PREMIER AND COURTNAY IN MIAMI YESTERDAY EVENING AS PLANNED PD PEART WAS PRESENT AS THE OBSERVER PD
2 PD CASTILLO MADE IT CLEAR AT THE OUTSET THAT HE DID NOT WANT NOTES TAKEN BY EITHER SIDE AS HE CLAIMED MR RIDLEY HAD SAID THE MEETING WOULD BE STRICTLY INFORMAL PD HAVING AGREED ON THIS THE TALKS PROCEEDED OVER WHISKY IN A FRIENDLY AND INFORMAL FASHION FOR FOUR HOURS PD
3 PD CASTILLO BEGAN BY SAYING HE WANTED A QUOTE WHOLESOME UNQUOTE SETTLEMANT - I.E. AN ENDURING SETTLEMENT PD
PRICE AGREED THIS SHOULD BE THE AIM CMM BUT EMPHASISED THAT IT SHOULD BE WITHIN THE TERMS OF THE U.N. RESOLUTION PD BY THIS HE MEANT THAT LAND WAS NON-NEGOTIABLE WHEREAS QUOTE TERITORY OUTSIDE THE THREE-MILE LIMIT UNQUOTE WAS PD
4 PD PRICE PROPOSED THAT THE GUATEMALANS SHOULD BE GIVEN A PERM-ANENT SEA CHANNEL PROVIDING MARITIME ACCESS THROUGH BELIZEAN WATERS AND RIGHTS TO THE SEA BED IN THE CHANNEL PD
HE ALSO SUGGESTED THE GUATEMALANS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO BUILD AN OIL PIPE LINE FROM THE PETEN TO BELIZE CITY OR DANGRIGA PD
5 PD CASTILLO DID NOT TAKE UP EITHER OF THESE PROPOSALS DIRECTLY PD HE CONCENTRATED ON THE ADVANTAGES THAT WOULD ACCRUE TO BELIZE FROM SOME KIND OF MUTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESOURCES OF BOTH COUNTRIES PD HE EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING FRIENDLY RELATIONS FOR THE FUTURE CMM WHICH WOULD ENSURE AN ENDURING SETTLEMENT PD
HE MADE NO SPECIFIC PROPOCGCXVYNRPAMQ

D SKINNER-KLEE'S INTER-
JECTION THAT THE U.N. RESOLUTION SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS LEGALLY BINDING PD
6 PD TURNING TO THE QUESTION OF THE COMMUNIST THREAT TO BELIZE HE ASKED HOW BELIZE WOULD PRESERVE HER INTEGRITY ONCE BRITISH TROOPS HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN PD PRICE REPLIED THAT BELIZEAN TERRITORY WOULD NEVER BE USED AS A BASE FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AGAINST GUATEMALA AND SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO GIVE THE NECESSARY ASSURANCES IN A BINDING TREATY PD HE WENT ON TO ASK WHETHER COMMONWEALTH TROOPS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO GUATEMALA AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE BRITISH

GARRISON ONCE THE LATTER HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN PD
7 PD CASTILLO SAID GUATEMALA WOULD OBJECT TO ANY FOREIGN TROOPS IN BELIZE PD THE QUESTION OF GUATEMALAN SECURITY WAS A QUESTION FOR GUATEMALA PD ONCE FOREIGN TROOPS HAD BEEN INVITED INTO THE AREA IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO REMOVE THEM PD
8 PD IN THE COURSE OF THE EVENING CASTILLO SUGGESTED THAT THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS SHOULD BE HELD IN THE WEEK BEGINNING 13TH OCTOBER PD PRICE RAISED NO OBJECTION AND AGREED THAT HE WOULD GO HIMSELF PD

9 PD IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT THE NEXT TALKS SHOULD LOOK AGAIN AT THE POSSIBILITY OF UPDATING THE 1859 TREATY PD
10 PD THE MEETING CONCLUDED ON A FRIENDLY NOTE WITH CASTILLO EMPHASISING THE BENEFITS ARISING FROM CLOSER PERSONAL CONTACTS AND REPEATING THE INVITATION TO PRICE (WHICH PRICE REJECTED) TO MEET PRESIDENT LUCAS IN GUATEMALA PD
11 PD IT WAS AGREED THAT EACH SIDE WOULD ISSUE A SHORT STATEMENT ON 25TH AUGUST INDICATING THAT [AV BUNRUMEB L--?24-.3?) HAD BEEN TAKEN OF THEIR JOINT PRESENCE IN THE U.S.A. TO TALK INFORMALLY ABOUT THE BELIZE DISPUTE PD THE BELIZEAN STATEMENT WILL INCLUDE A REFERENCE TO THE U.N. RESOLUTION CMM BUT THE GUATEMALANS' STATEMENT WILL NOTPD
12 PD COMMENT PD

THE MEETING DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BROUGHT EITHER SIDE ANY CLOSER TO AN AGREEMENT PD BUT THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WHICH WERE ESTABLISHED COULD BE OF BENEFIT IN THE LONG TERM PD
13 PD PRICE PROBABLY FEELS THAT HE HAS ESTABLISHED HIS BONA FIDES AS A WILLING PARTICIPANT IN THE SEARCH FOR AN AGREED SOLUTION - SOMETHING WHICH HE REGARDS AS IMPORTANT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEXT U.N. RESOLUTION PD AT THE SAME TIME HE HAS MADE CLEAR HIS POSITION ON LAND AND SOVREIGNTY PD HE DID NOT CMM HOWEVER CMM SUCCEED IN ESTABLISHING THE GUATEMALANS' NEGOTIATING POSITION PD WHILE MAINTAINING A FRIENDLY POSTURE THROUGHOUT THEY GAVE NOTHING AWAY PD
14 PD PRICE HAS NOT YET RETURNED FROM MIAMI PD I WILL SEND FURTHER COMMENTS WHEN I HAVE SEEN HIM PD
15 PD FULL RECORD OF TALKS FOLLOWS BY BAG PD
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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 252 OF 14 AUGUST

R F I : IMMEDIATE BELMOPAN (PERSONAL)

R F I : PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, MEXICO CITY, WASHINGTON.

This seems to have been a useful visit

MR RIDLEY'S VISIT

1. ALTHOUGH THE MAINLY SOCIAL CHARACTER OF THE VISIT HAS BEEN SCRUPULOUSLY PRESERVED BY THE GUATEMALANS, FORMAL TALKS WITH CASTILLO VALDEZ AND THE PRESIDENT, AND FREQUENT SOCIAL ENCOUNTERS WITH MEMBERS OF THE BELIZE COUNCIL PRODUCED A NUMBER OF INTERESTING EXCHANGES.

2. THE GUATEMALANS SEEM NOW TO HAVE ACCEPTED THAT PROGRESS TOWARD INDEPENDENCE CANNOT BE HELD UP, DESPITE OUR CONTINUING WILLINGNESS TO TALK. OBJECTIVES OF CASTILLO VALDEZ SEEMED TO BE

(1) TO CEMENT A GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP. THE WARMTH OF THE WELCOME AND THE ATTENTIONS OF ALL MEMBERS OF THE GUATEMALAN SIDE WERE NOTEWORTHY

(2) TO SECURE A FURTHER NEGOTIATING MEETING SOON AND IN ANY EVENT BEFORE THE U N G A IN THE AUTUMN.

(3) TO REPEAT THEIR GENUINE DESIRE FOR NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME UNDERLINING THE CONSTRAINTS ON THEM.

(4) TO PRESENT AN ACCEPTABLE IMAGE OF GUATEMALA.

3. IN FORMAL TALKS, MR RIDLEY DID NOT DISGUISE THE HOSTILITY OF PRICE AND THE BELIZEANS TO LAND CESSION OR ANY DEROGATION OF SOVEREIGNTY. THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF NEW YORK IDEAS, THOUGH MR RIDLEY SAID THAT INITIAL REACTIONS IN BELIZE HAD BEEN NEGATIVE. CASTILLO VALDEZ SAID THAT MORE IDEAS WERE NEEDED. WITH THE PRESIDENT MR RIDLEY FLOATED THE IDEA OF DIRECT NEGOTIATION ON A BASIS OF EQUALITY BETWEEN BELIZE AND GUATEMALA ON CE THE FORMER HAD GAINED ITS INDEPENDENCE. SKINNER KLEE AND HERRERA SAW SOME ATTRACTION IN THIS IDEA WHICH WAS BY NO MEANS TURNED DOWN OUT OF HAND, THOUGH THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF GAVE IT NO ENCOURAGEMENT DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE PROBABLE LEFT WING COMPLEXION OF INDEPENDENT BELIZE. THE PRESIDENT SEEMED PREOCCUPIED WITH GUATEMALA 'S INTERNAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT AND MISREPRESENTATION ABROAD : ON BELIZE HE CLEARLY EXPECTS SUBSTANTIAL FACE SAVING PROVISION IN ANY EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT.

4. AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE LAST DAY THAT MR RIDLEY AND CASTILLO VALDEZ SHOULD MEET IN THE PERIOD MID SEPTEMBER/MID OCTOBER FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WAS ANNOUNCED TO THE PRESS. OUTCOME OF PRICES' INVITATION TO CASTILLO VALDEZ (BELMOPAN TELNO 036) WILL NOT AFFECT THIS ENGAGEMENT.

15. GUATEMALANS

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5. GUATEMALANS WENT OUT OF THEIR WAY TO BE FRIENDLY. CASTILLO SAID THAT TENSION BETWEEN UK AND GUATEMALA HAD NEVER BEEN LOWER.
6. SEAL WAS SET WHEN MR AND MRS RIDLEY WERE MADE HONOURED GUESTS OF THE CITY OF GUATEMALA ON THEIR LAST EVENING.

WILMSHURST

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ANGLO/GUATEMALAN DISPUTE

1. MR RIDLEYS MEETING WITH PRICE, AT WHICH COURTENAY WAS PRESENT LASTED TWO AND A HALF HOURS AND ENDED WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON PRICES PART TO ANY CONCESSION OF SUBSTANCE TO THE GUATEMALANS

2. PRICE STUCK OBDURATELY TO HIS REFUSAL, ALREADY CEPORTED, TO COUNTENANCE ANY ARRANGEMENT INVOLVING SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE CAYES OR FOR A PLEBISCITE ON THE FUTURE OF THE TOLEDO DISTRICT. IN THIS HE WAS SUPPORTED BY COURTENAY WHO SEEMED TO BE MAKING AMENDS FOR HIS ACCOMMODATING REACTION TO THE GUATEMALANS PROPOSALS IN NEW YORK

3. THE MOST MR RIDLEY WAS ABLE TO WIN FROM PRICE WAS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT SOME KIND OF JOINT ARRANGEMENT IN RESPECT OF THE SEAWARD APPROACHES IN THE BAY OF AMATIQUE MIGHT BE NEGOTIABLE (BY IMPLICATION AFTER INDEPENDENCE) WITH VUATEMALA AND HONDURAS. PRICE ALSO REFRAINED FROM RULING OUT ALTOGETHER A BELIZE-WIDE REFERENDUM, BUT WOULD NOT COUNTENANCE A POST-INDEPENDENCE PLEBISCITE, AS PROPOSED BY THE GUATEMALANS, TO DETERMINE THE FUTURE OF THE TOLEDO DISTRICT. OTHER POINTS STRESSED BY PRICE IN DISCUSSION WERE:

A A STRONG UN RESOLUTION EMBODYING A DATE FOR INDEPENDENCE, A REFERENCE TO A UN SECURITY GUARANTEE AND PERHAPS ALSO A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE

B HE HAD BEEN ASSURED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT MR RIDLEYS VISIT TO GUATEMALA WAS OF A PURELY SOCIAL NATURE AND WOULD NOT BE USED TO PURSUE THE NEGOTIATIONS

C HE WOULD FAVOUR ONE MORE MINISTERIAL MEETING WITH GUATEMALA BEFORE THE UNGA, IF ONLY TO ENSURE THAT PUBLIC BLAME FOR THE INEVITABLE BREAKDOWN LAY WITH GUATEMALA

D HE WOULD BE WILLING TO ATTEND SUCH A MEETING IN PERSON

E HE RE-EMPHASISED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE READY TO ENTER INTO A NON-AGGRESSION TREATY DESIGNED TO ALLAY GUATEMALAN FEARS OF SUBVERSION FROM BELIZE

/HE

CONFIDENTIAL

HE ALSO UNDERLINED THE CONCESSIONS WHICH THE BELIZE GOVERNMENT HAVE ALREADY EXPRESSED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO MAKE IN ORDER TO SECURE AN AGREEMENT, INCLUDING FREE PORT FACILITIES, A ROAD, AND GUARANTEED MARITIME ACCESS EXTENDING TO THE SEABED

4 AS A RESULT OF THE IMPASSE REACHED AT THIS MEETING, MR RIDLEY NOW FEELS THAT THE MOST HE CAN SAY TO THE GUATEMALAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND PRESIDENT LUCAS IS THAT HE HAS ENCOUNTERED IN BELIZE IMPLACABLE OPPOSITION TO TERRITOREAL CESSION OF ANY KIND INCLUDING TERRITORIAL WATERS. HE WILL, HOWEVER, IMPLY THAT WE NOW NEED TIME TO STUDY THE OUTCOME OF OUR RECENT TALKS WITH PRICE, BOTH IN MEXICO CITY AND HERE.

THERAFTER, WE SHALL SUGGEST A FURTHER MEETING AT WHICH BOTH SIDES CAN CONVEY THEIR CONSIDERED REACTION TO THE NEW YORK IDEAS. WE HAVE IN MIND SUCH A MEETING AS SOON AS IS REASONABLY PRACTICAL AND WILL SUGGEST AS MUCH TO THE GUATEMALANS. MR RIDLEYS OBJECTIVE WILL THUS BE TO STICK TO HIS INTENTION OF MAKING HIS VISIT TO GUATEMALA CITY A PURELY SOCIAL ONE. HE FEELS THE NEED TO REASSESS THE WHOLE SITUATION BEFORE MAKING ANY FURTHER SUBSTANTIVE MOVE

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TELEGRAM NO 249 OF 8 AUGUST
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INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON GUATEMALA CITY.

Prime Minister

Quite a long report, but you may like to read through it. Lord Carrington spoke to you of these matters.

MAP 11/8

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STAT'S MEETING WITH PREMIER OF BELIZE

1. LORD CARRINGTON MET PRICE (WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SHOMAN) FOR HALF AN HOUR ON 8 AUGUST. HARDING WAS PRESENT AND WILL REPORT ORALLY TO MR RIDLEY IN MIAMI ON 10 AUGUST.

2. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE HAD THOUGHT IT SENSIBLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF PRICE'S PRESENCE IN MEXICO CITY TO MAKE CONTACT, BUT DID NOT WISH TO GO INTO DETAILS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE DID NOT WISH TO CROSS WIRES WITH MR RIDLEY, WHO WOULD BE HOLDING SUBSTANTIVE TALKS WITH PRICE ON 11 AUGUSTV. HE ASSURED PRICE THAT THE FOUR PRINCIPLES AGREED IN LONDON IN JANUARY HAD BEEN ADHERED TO. IF WE COULD GET THE GUATEMALANS TO AGREE THROUGH NEGOTIATION TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF BELIZE, IT WOULD BE A CONSIDERABLE BONUS. WITHOUT GUATEMALAN AGREEMENT, LIFE WOULD BE LESS SECURE FOR THE BELIZEANS. HE DID NOT KNOW IF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WOULD BE POSSIBBLE: BUT MR RIDLEY HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO THE GUATEMALANS THAT, WHETHER THEY LIKED IT OR NOT, WE INTENDED TO PROCEED TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF BELIZE. THERE WERE SOME SIGNS THAT THEY WERE INCLINED TO COME TO TERMS WITH THIS REALITY.

3. PRICE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT WE HAD GONE OFF THE RAILS OF THE STRATEGY AGREED IN JANUARY. A TIMETABLE FOR INDEPENDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN LAID DOWN. TERRITORIAL CESSION AND THE EROSION OF SOVEREIGNTY SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN RAISED WITH THE GUATEMALANS. THE GUATEMALAN PROPOSAL FOR A TEN YEAR CONDOMINIUM FOLLOWED BY A PLEBISCITE WAS UNACCEPTABLE. THE BELIZEANS HAD BEEN TOLD THAT WE WOULD GET THE US GOVERNMENT TO PUT PRESSURE ON GUATEMALA: THIS HAD NOT COME ABOUT. LITTLE WORK APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN DONE ON THE PROPOSAL FOR A MULTILATERAL GUARANTEE OF THE SECURITY OF BELIZE.

4. IN REPLY, LORD CARRINGTON AND HARDING REPEATED THAT MR RIDLEY HAD MADE ENTIRELY CLEAR TO THE GUATEMALANS OUR INTENTION TO PROCEED TO EARLY INDEPENDENCE, THOUGH SPECIFIC

/ DATE

DATES HAD NOT YET BEEN MENTIONED. THE NEW YORK MEETING HAD BEEN PURELY AN EXPLORATORY DISCUSSION AT OFFICIAL LEVEL TO LOOK INTO THE 1859 TREATY: COURTENAY HAD ATTENDED: THERE HAD BEEN NO COMMITMENT ON EITHER SIDE. THE AMERICANS UNFORTUNATELY NO LONGER APPEARED TO EXERCISE A STRONG INFLUENCE OVER GUATEMALAN ACTIONS.

5. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION ON BELIZEAN SECURITY, PRICE SUGGESTED THAT A COMMONWEALTH FORCE SHOULD BE ASSEMBLED, AS IN RHODESIA BEFORE INDEPENDENCE. HE SAW THE BARBADOS GOVERNMENT WAS WILLING TO PARTICIPATE. LORD CARRINGTON POINTED OUT THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN RHODESIA HAD BEEN VERY DIFFERENT: AND THERE HAD NOT BEEN A COMMONWEALTH PEACEKEEPING FORCE, BUT MERELY TROOPS IN A LIMITED MONITORING ROLE. THE CHANCES OF ASSEMBLING A GENUINE COMMONWEALTH FORCE FOR BELIZE SEEMED NEGLIGIBLE. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHICH - IF ANY - COUNTRIES WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS. A BARBADIAN ELEMENT WOULD NOT BE VERY SIGNIFICANT, IN THE FACE OF THE GUATEMALAN ARMY: AND IN LORD CARRINGTON'S TALKS IN BARBADOS ON 2 AUGUST, THE BARBADIAN GOVERNMENT HAD NOT SEEMED KEEN TO COMMIT THEMSELVES. LORD CARRINGTON SUGGESTED THAT, WHILE A FEW COMMONWEALTH TROOPS WOULD NOT MAKE MUCH OF A DIFFERENCE, A UN GUARANTEE MIGHT HAVE A CONSIDERABLE DETERRENT EFFECT. HE SUGGESTED THAT PRICE SHOULD DISCUSS THIS WITH THE MEXICANS LATER IN THE DAY. SHOMAN ARGUED THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD BLOCK IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL A UN GUARANTEE OF BELIZE'S SECURITY. LORD CARRINGTON DID NOT AGREE.

6. PRICE EXPRESSED SUSPICION ABOUT MR RIDLEY'S FORTHCOMING SOCIAL VISIT TO GUATEMALA AT THE INVITATION OF CASTILLO VALDES (AND SHOMAN LATER COMPLAINED THAT THE BELIZEANS HAD NOT SEEN THE RECORDS OF MR RIDLEY'S TALKS WITH CASTILLO VALDES DURING THE LATTER'S RECENT VISIT TO THE UK). PRICE SUGGESTED THAT SPECIFIC AREAS, SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE SCOPE OF TALKS BETWEEN MR RIDLEY AND THE GUATEMALANS. LORD CARRINGTON POINTED OUT THAT MR RIDLEY WOULD BE VISITING BELIZE BEFORE GUATEMALA, AND THAT PRICE SHOULD THEREFORE EXPRESS HIS CONCERNS DIRECTLY TO THE MINISTER OF STATE. IN ANY CASE, MR RIDLEY WAS NOT GOING TO HOLD TALKS WITH THE GUATEMALANS.

7. PICKING UP PRICE'S COMPLAINT, HARDING SAID THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN BEST PLEASED BY PRICE'S REQUEST FOR A MEETING WITH LORD CARRINGTON THROUGH UNORTHODOX CHANNELS, FOLLOWING HIS FAILURE TO RESPOND TO MR RIDLEY'S INVITATION. THIS WAS NOT THE WAY TO BUILD CONFIDENCE.

8. SHOMAN REVERTED TO THE CESSION OF TERRITORY. THE BELIZEANS HAD MADE IT CLEAR FROM THE OUTSET THAT THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE. THEY HAD ALSO TOLD MR RIDLEY IN BERMUDA THAT THEY WERE OPPOSED TO HIS QUOTE COSMETIC UNQUOTE IDEAS, FOR EXAMPLE FOR THE JOINT ADMINISTRATION OF THE DISPUTED TERRITORY. THE GUATEMALANS HAD TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE FLOATING OF COSMETIC PROPOSALS, AND HAD DEVELOPED THE IDEA OF A CONDOMINIUM AND A PLEBISCITE. ALTHOUGH PRICE HAD IMMEDIATELY SAID THAT THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE, THE FCO HAD MADE A PUBLIC STATEMENT WHICH REFERRED TO SIGNS OF PROGRESS IN THE TALKS WITH GUATEMALA. LORD CARRINGTON TOLD SHOMAN VERY FIRMLY THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT NEGOTIATE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF BELIZE WITHOUT THROWING OUT IDEAS AND EXPLORING DIFFERENT AVENUES. IT WAS NOT HELPFUL IF THE BELIZEANS REJECTED EVERY IDEA OUT OF HAND, OR INFLEXIBLY OPPOSED EVERY ATTEMPT TO FIND A WAY THROUGH. :WE WERE AGREED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND ON THE NEED FOR EARLY INDEPENDENCE. WER WERE NOT GOING TO SELL BELIZE DOWN THE RIVER. IT WOULD DO BELIZE NO GOOD IF WE SIMPLY GRANTED INDEPENDENCE AND LEFT. WE WERE TRYING TO SECURE THE FUTURE OF BELIZE. THE BEST WAY OF DOING THIS WOULD BE THROUGH A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT: AS IN THE RHODESIA NEGOTIATIONS, WE COULD NOT HOPE TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT WITHOUG EXPLORING DIFFERENT IDEAS AND SHOWING A DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY. WE WERE TRYING TO HELP BELIZE AND NEEDED THE CO-OPERATION OF MINISTERS THERE. IF THE BELIZEANS DID NOT LIKE PARTICULAR IDEAS, WE WOULD TRY OTHERS.

9. PRICE SAID THAT WE SHOULD AVOID THE MISTAKE OF THE PREVIOUS BRITISH GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAD BEEN TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF LAND CESSION. LORD CARRINGTON REPEATED THAT WE WERE OPPOSED TO THE CESSION OF TERRITORY. HE SAID THAT THE BELIZEANS SHOULD NOW GO OVER THE GROUND IN DETAIL WITH MR RIDLEY. WE COULD THEN DECIDE WHAT TO DO NEXT. THE MAIN POINT AT ISSUE WAS THE SECURITY OF BELIZE. THE MEXICANS HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD NOT GIVE A MILITARY GUARANTEE. WE THEREFORE NEEDED TO DEVISE OTHER WAYS, HENCE HIS SUGGESTION OF A UN GUARANTEE. HE ASKED PRICE TO GIVE THIS SOME THOUGHT. THE BRITISH COULD NOT STAY FOR EVER: AND A BRITISH PRESENCE AFTER INDEPENDENCE WOULD INEVITABLY LEAD TO CHARGES OF NEO-COLONIALISM.

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10. PRICE ASSERTED THAT HIS ADMINISTRATION WAS UNITED IN ITS APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. AS A FINAL COMPLAINT, HE PROTESTED THAT MR RIDLEY HAD PREVENTED THE ATTENDANCE OF A LEGAL ADVISER FROM THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT THE THE NEW YORK TALKS. HARDING SAID THAT WE HAD AN OPEN MIND ON THE ATTACHMENT OF A LEGAL ADVISER: BUT THIS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATE IN THE TALKS ON THE 1859 TREATY, WHERE THE INSERTION OF A FOURTH ELEMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN AN ADDITIONAL COMPLICATION.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 249 OF 5 AUGUST 1980
INFO GUATEMALA CITY, MEXICO CITY, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MP 5/8

ANGLO-GUATEMALAN DISPUTE

1. I USED THE OPPORTUNITY OF A TALK WITH THE PREMIER OVER TEA AT GOVERNMENT HOUSE YESTERDAY TO PRESS HIM ONCE AGAIN ON THE NEW YORK PROPOSALS.

2. THE FOLLOWING SUMMARISES HIS VIEWS:
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY WERE, IN BELIZEAN EYES, NON-NEGOTIABLE. ANYTHING ELSE WAS. ALL THE NEW YORK PROPOSALS HAD NON-NEGOTIABLE ELEMENTS. THAT WAS WHY HE HAD HAD TO REJECT THEM. IF HE HAD ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE, FOR EXAMPLE, SOMETHING LESS THAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SOUTHERN CAYES - AND THIS HAD RESULTED IN AGREEMENT WITH GUATEMALA - WE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO FURTHER FORWARD, BECAUSE THAT AGREEMENT WOULD THEN HAVE BEEN REJECTED BY A MAJORITY OF BELIZEANS.

3. GUATEMALA KNEW VERY WELL WHAT WAS NOT NEGOTIABLE. HE HAD TOLD THE MINISTER OF STATE AND THE LATTER HAD TOLD THE GUATEMALANS. YET THEY STILL PERSISTED IN PUTTING FORWARD PROPOSALS WHICH THEY KNEW COULD NEVER BE ACCEPTED IN BELIZE. ALL WERE VARIATIONS ON THEMES WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WAS WHY HE SAID THEY WERE NOT NEGOTIATING SERIOUSLY. THEY MIGHT WANT A SETTLEMENT BUT ONLY ON THEIR TERMS - AND THOSE TERMS ALWAYS INCLUDED A LOSS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORY FOR BELIZE. SIXTEEN YEARS AGO BELIZE HAD BEEN GIVEN FULL SELF GOVERNMENT AND THE THEN MINISTER OF STATE HAD PROMISED INDEPENDENCE SHORTLY. BELIZE WAS STILL WAITING. THE GUATEMALANS HAD BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL IN THEIR DELAYING TACTICS. IT WAS TIME THEY WERE TOLD THAT THEY COULD NO LONGER HOLD UP THE PROCESS OF INDEPENDENCE.

4. GUATEMALA HAD CLAIMED BELIZE FOR THE LAST 150 YEARS. BRITAIN HAD ALWAYS RESISTED THOSE CLAIMS AND SAID THEY HAD NO VALIDITY. WHY WAS HE NOW BEING PRESSED TO RECOGNISE THESE CLAIMS AND CEDE TERRITORY AND SOVEREIGNTY IF THEY WERE FALSE. IT WAS BRITAIN THAT WAS UNDER A MORAL OBLIGATION TO GIVE GUATEMALA SOMETHING IN LIEU OF THE HELP SHE HAD PROMISED THEM WITH THE CART TRACK IN 1859. HOWEVER HE WAS WILLING TO PLAY HIS PART TOO. THAT WAS WHY HE HAD OFFERED MARITIME AND OTHER CONCESSIONS TO THE GUATEMALANS. HE SAW THE DESIRABILITY OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT VERY CLEARLY. BELIZE HAD NO TROOPS TO DEFEND HERSELF. BUT THERE WAS A LIMIT TO WHAT BELIZEANS WOULD ACCEPT IN ORDER TO SATISFY GUATEMALA'S PRIDE. AND AS A POLITICIAN HE HAD TO RECOGNISE THOSE LIMITS.

5. HE RECOGNISED EQUALLY WELL THE DIFFICULTIES THE PRESENT GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT WERE IN. IF THEY AGREED TO GIVE UP THEIR CLAIM TO BELIZE THEY MIGHT BE OVERTHROWN. IT WAS ALREADY A WEAK AND WOUNDED GOVERNMENT. TO GIVE UP THE CLAIM TO BELIZE MIGHT FINISH IT OFF. THAT WAS WHY IT MIGHT BE IN THEIR OWN BEST INTERESTS TO BE PRESENTED WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI. THEY COULD THEN SAY TO THEIR PEOPLE THAT THEY HAD DONE THEIR BEST. THEY HAD NOT ACTED DISHONOURABLY. THEY HAD MAINTAINED THEIR CLAIM TO THE END.

6. HE DOUBTED WHETHER GUATEMALA WOULD ATTACK AN INDEPENDENT BELIZE. THEY HAD TOO MANY OTHER PREOCCUPATIONS. BUT OF COURSE THE OPPOSITION WOULD NEVER ACCEPT THAT THIS WAS SO. THEY WOULD DEMAND A GUARANTEE. EVEN HIS OWN PARTY WOULD WANT SOME SORT OF SECURITY AGREEMENT. SO HE WOULD NEED A DEFENCE TREATY OR ITS EQUIVALENT BEFORE HE COULD ACCEPT INDEPENDENCE. HE HOPED BRITAIN WOULD PROVIDE IT. IF SHE DID NOT HE HOPED THENCOMMONWEALTH OR USA OR CANADA WOULD. IF THEY TOO REFUSED HE WAS NOT SURE WHAT HE COULD DO ON HIS OWN. THAT WAS WHY HE WOULD PREFER A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. BUT THAT SETTLEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL HIS PEOPLE. OTHERWISE IT WOULD NOT BE A SETTLEMENT. HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MAKE IT STICK.

7. PRICE WAS RELAXED AND FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT. BUT HE WAS ALSO EXTREMELY SI

M. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HIM MOVING AWAY FROM THIS POSITION.

FCO PASS GUATEMALA CITY, MEXICO CITY, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

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Belize

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Text of reply attached.

GRS 321
CONFIDENTIAL
PERSONAL
DESKBY 171415Z0
FM FCO 171400Z JULY 1980
TO IMMEDIATE BELMOPAN
TELEGRAM NUMBER PERSONAL 43 OF 17 JULY
INFO GUATEMALA CITY, MEXICO CITY, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEWYORK
YOUR TELNOS 213, 217 AND 218: ANGLO/GUATEMALAN TALKS

1. WE ARE, AS YOU MAY IMAGINE, GREATLY DISAPPOINTED BY PRICE'S NEGATIVE REACTION AND THERE IS CLEARLY A NEED FOR AN EARLY MEETING WITH THE MINISTER OF STATE. WE NEED, IN PARTICULAR, TO CLEAR OUR OWN MINDS BEFORE REPORTING THE PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO MINISTERS AT THE END OF THIS MONTH. UNFORTUNATELY, BECAUSE OF DIARY PROBLEMS, THE MINISTER OF STATE IS NOW UNABLE TO CONTEMPLATE A VISIT TO BELIZE AND WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL THEREFORE IF YOU WOULD PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM HIM TO MR PRICE.

BEGINS. AFTER THE NEW YORK TALKS I THINK THAT WE HAVE MUCH TO DISCUSS. WITH APOLOGIES FOR THE SHORT NOTICE, I HOPE YOU CAN COME TO LONDON FOR TALKS WITH ME ON 21 OR 24 JULY. I WILL MYSELF BE AWAY FROM LONDON FROM THEN UNTIL EARLY AUGUST, BY WHICH TIME THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILL HAVE LEFT FOR HIS LATIN AMERICAN TOUR. IF YOU CAN COME ON 21 JULY, YOU COULD ALSO SEE LORD CARRINGTON ON THAT DAY: HE COULD PROBABLY ALSO SEE YOU ON 24 JULY, ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR HIM. ENDS.

2. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT PRICE WROTE ON 3 JULY TO LORD JELLICOE OF TATE AND LYLE ASKING IF HE COULD ARRANGE A MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN AUGUST. WE ARE NOT IMPRESSED BY THIS BACK DOOR APPROACH AND WOULD NOT NORMALLY RESPOND TO IT. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE DISABUSE MR PRICE IF HE SHOWS ANY SIGN OF BELIEVING THAT HIS LETTER TO LORD JELLICOE HAS ACHIEVED THIS OFFER OF A CALL ON LORD CARRINGTON.

3. THESE DATES WOULD FIT WELL WITH ARANDA'S PROPOSED VISIT (YOUR TELNO 214) AND MR RIDLEY'S VISIT TO GUATEMALA. YOU WERE RIGHT TO TELL ARANDA THAT MEETINGS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND

SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE (THE LATTER WILL BE IN LATIN AMERICA FROM 28 JULY UNTIL 8 AUGUST). WHY ARE THE UDP COMING FOR SO LONG?

CARRINGTON

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TELEGRAM NO 223 OF 17 JULY 1980
INFO PRIORITY GUATEMALA CITY
INFO MEXICO CITY, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK
YOUR TEL NO 43: ANGLO GUATEMALA TALKS

1. PREMIER ASKEDME TO THANK THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR HIS MESSAGE AND TO REGRET THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT MR RIDLEYS KIND INVITATION ON EITHER OF THE DATES SUGGESTED. HE HOPED THAT IF THE MINISTER OF STATE WAS UNABLE TO VISIT BELIZE BEFORE THE GUATEMALA TALKS HE WOULD BE ABLE TO COME ON HERE AFTERWARDS.
2. PRICE LEAVES FOR MANAGUA TOMORROW AFTERNOONAND WILL ONLY GET BACK HERE ON THE EVENING OF 21ST. THEREAFTER HE SAYS THAT HE HAS TO PREPARE FOR AND BE PRESENT AT THE DEBATE IN THE HOUSE ON 25TH ON OPPOSITION MOTION CALLING FOR REJECTION OF LAND CESSION.
3. BOTH DATES SUGGESTED WOULD THEREFORE UNDOUBTEDLY BE INCONVENIENT FOR HIM. BUT AS THREE OTHER MINISTERS ARE ALREADY SCHEDULED TO GO TO MANAGUA HIS ABSENCE FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY CELEBRATIONS WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO CAUSE OFFENCE. AS FOR THE OPPOSITION MOTION, GOVERNMENT HAS SUCH AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW HIS PRESENCE COULD BE REGARDED AS ESSENTIAL.
4. MY IMPRESSION IS THAT PRICE FEELS THAT HAVING GIVEN HIS REACTION TO THE NEW YORK TALKS THERE IS NOTHING MORE TO BE SAID. HE IS TAKING THE LINE THAT IS IT NOW UP TO US THE BRITISH. HE HAS GIVEN HIS ADVICE AND NOTHING ANYONE ELSE SAYS IS LIKELY TO CHANGE IT.
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TELEGRAM NUMBER 217 OF 15 JULY 1980
INFO PRIORITY GUATEMALA CITY
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This leads to put recent diplomacy in a rather different light.

MY TELNO 213: ANGLO/GUATEMALAN TALKS

1. PREMIER AND HIS DEPUTY CALLED YESTERDAY WITH A PIECE OF PAPER (SEE MIFT) SETTING OUT THE GOVERNMENT'S REACTIONS TO NEW YORK TALKS.

2. COURTENAY HAD SEEN ME EARLIER IN THE DAY TO WARN ME THAT PRICE WAS STILL NOT CONVINCED THAT GUATEMALANS WERE NEGOTIATING SERIOUSLY. HE BELIEVED THAT THEY WERE BEING CONCILIATORY SOLELY IN ORDER TO AVOID A ROUGH PASSAGE AT THE UN. THEIR AIMS HAD NOT CHANGED.

3. COURTENAY, SPEAKING VERY FRANKLY, ALSO TO

D ME THAT PRICE
THOUGHT THE BRITISH SIDE MUST HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN BY THE GUATEMALANS FROM THE START AS THEY WERE BEING ALTOGETHER TOO FRIENDLY. PRICE NOW BELIEVED THE TIME HAD COME TO START PREPARATIONS FOR INDEPENDENCE. HE APPEARED NOT TO BE INTERESTED IN FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS.

4. COURTENAY'S OWN COMMENT WAS THAT WATTS HAD HANDLED THE NEGOTIATIONS IN NEW YORK EXTREMELY WELL AND HE HAD NOTHING BUT PRAISE FOR THE WAY THE DELEGATION HAD BEEN LED. HE HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE GUATEMALANS WERE SERIOUS ABOUT WANTING A SOLUTION.

5. HE SAID HE THOUGHT PRICE WAS PROBABLY RIGHT, HOWEVER, NOT TO ACCEPT THE INVITATION TO VISIT GUATEMALA AS THE OPPOSITION WOULD MAKE HIS POSITION INTOLERABLE. BUT HE WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT THE PREMIER AND HIS OTHER COLLEAGUES HAD REJECTED SO QUICKLY THE IDEA OF A JOINT AUTHORITY IN THE GULF OF HONDURAS. HE HIMSELF THOUGHT IT HAD DISTINCT POSSIBILITIES. HE WAS NOT SURPRISED, HOWEVER, THAT THE PLEBISCITE IDEA HAD NOT GAINED ACCEPTANCE. HAD THE PROPOSAL BEEN TO HOLD IT SHORTLY AFTER COMI
G
TO AN AGREEMENT, IT MIGHT HAVE WON SUPPORT.

6. WHEN DISCUSSING THE MATTER WITH ME, PRICE REJECTED EVEN THIS POSSIBILITY. HE WAS QUITE ADAMANT THAT THERE WAS NOTHING IN ANY OF THE NEW YORK PROPOSALS THAT WOULD CAUSE HIM OR HIS COLLEAGUES TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS. HE WAS EXTREMELY SUSPICIOUS OF GUATEMALAN MOTIVES AND HIS SUSPICIONS APPEARED TO EXTEND EVEN

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TO US. HE WAS NOT IMPRESSED WITH THE QUOTE CHARM OFFENSIVE UNQUOTE.

7. PRICE IS A BITTER AND FRUSTRATED MAN. ALL HIS OLD SUSPICIONS HAVE BEEN AROUSED. HE TALKS OF HIMSELF AS A REVOLUTIONARY AND ANTI-MONARCHIST. HE SUSPECTS HMG OF COLLUSION. HE COMPLAINS ABOUT THE LIMITATIONS OF HIS POWERS (THE POLICE, CIVIL SERVANTS, ETC) AND HE HAS EVEN RESURRECTED (TO THE CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER) THE CHARGE THAT THE BRITISH PRESENCE IN BELIZE IS BEING FUNDED CLANDESTINELY FROM WASHINGTON - A PIECE OF INFORMATION APPARENTLY KNOWN ONLY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE PERSONALLY AND MR MUSKIE. COURTENAY WARNED ME TO EXPECT A ROUGH RIDE.

8. THE RECENT ARMS THEFT AND BOMB SCARES MAY HAVE SOMETHING TO DO WITH PRICE'S ATTITUDE. BUT THE GROWING FEELING IN THE COUNTRY, PARTICULARLY IN THE CIVIL SERVICE AND COMMERCIAL CIRCLES, THAT INDEPENDENCE WITH PRICE CAN ONLY BRING INCREASING CORRUPTION AND CONTINUING DETERIORATION IN THE ALREADY BADLY RUN-DOWN GOVERNMENT SERVICES IS OBVIOUSLY WORRYING HIM TOO. HE SEES THE PRIZE FOR WHICH HE HAS WAITED SO LONG SLOWLY SLIPPING FROM HIS GRASP.

9. HOWEVER, HE AGREED THAT A MEETING WITH THE MINISTER OF STATE BEFORE THE LATTER VISITED GUATEMALA WOULD BE USEFUL, AND HE SAW NO OBJECTION - THOUGH HE HELD OUT NO HOPE - FOR A RESUMED SESSION IN OCTOBER. HE TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD BE LEADING A 4-MAN MINISTERIAL DELEGATION TO THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTIONARY CELEBRATIONS LATER THIS WEEK. SHOMAN, HE SAID, WAS ALREADY IN GRENADA AND W
ULD BE JOINING THE DELEGATION THERE. THEY HOPED TO BE BACK BY 22/23 JULY AND WOULD BE FREE TO SEE THE MINISTER ANY TIME FROM THEN ON.

10. I HOPE MR RIDLEY CAN MANAGE A VISIT.

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2 Belize

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PRIME MINISTER

The Dispute with Guatemala over Belize
(OD(80) 31)

BACKGROUND

This intractable dispute prevents the grant of independence to a colony in which we have little positive interest, either political or economic. The maintenance of the status quo entails the costs of a permanent garrison and occasional reinforcement for the colony, and complicates our relations with Latin America. But the grant of independence without a settlement of the dispute could well result in a Guatemalan invasion. Annex A to the paper recounts the history of the dispute and of attempts to resolve it, ending with the proposal made by Mr. Callaghan's Government in 1978 and rejected by the Guatemalans.

2. The Prime Minister of Belize has just been re-elected with a clear mandate for early independence. The growth of instability in Central America makes a solution of the problem more urgent. And the Americans, who have hitherto been carefully neutral in the dispute, now seem ready to back us in looking for a settlement. For all these reasons Lord Carrington now wishes to resume negotiations. He hopes to win Guatemalan agreement to independence for Belize on the basis of the sort of package deal setout in his Annex B. But if this attempt looks like foundering, e.g. over Guatemalan insistence on territorial concessions which the Belizeans cannot accept, he is prepared to consider proceeding to independence unilaterally.

3. With or without agreement with Guatemala, an independent Belize will probably need military allies. Regional allies seem to be one possibility. But Lord Carrington clearly does not rule out a continuing British military presence and/or guarantee; and he even mentions the possibility of a Sovereign Base Area, on the Cyprus model.

SECRET

HANDLING

4. You will wish Lord Carrington to introduce his paper, and Mr. Pym to comment on defence aspects. Points to clarify in the discussion are as follows:-

(a) Would the cost to Britain of the economic parts of Lord Carrington's package deal be met from within the Aid Programme (which is already badly stretched, as the Committee's recent discussion of Turkey underlined)?

(b) Would the threat to proceed unilaterally to independence, if necessary, be a bluff to scare the Guatemalans? Or could we really do it, and if so at what cost in terms of de-stabilising the area?

(c) How firm is United States support, particularly if we were forced to act without Guatemalan agreement?

(d) Is the negotiating gap, between minimum Guatemalan demands and maximum Belizean concessions, any narrower or more bridgeable than in the past?

(e) Would not independence with a British military guarantee give us the worst of all worlds - no political control but an unlimited defence commitment?

(f) Is the idea of British troops remaining after independence primarily seen as a device for solving the Belize problem, or is there really independent justification for our having facilities "to enable us to provide rapid military assistance to our friends in the area"?

(g) If the latter, is there not a case for Lord Carrington and Mr. Pym producing a further paper on Britain's military role in the Caribbean area? What do we hope to achieve, with what resources and which allies?

(h) Is there likely to be radical political change in Guatemala, following the revolution which has occurred in Nicaragua and seems imminent in El Salvador? If so, what bearing should that have on our tactics over Belize?

(i) How real are the prospects for local military guarantees for Belize, e.g. from Panama or Barbados? Would we welcome such a development?

(j) Could the United Nations be persuaded to play an active role on the ground, militarily or otherwise?

CONCLUSION

5. Subject to points made in discussion you might lead the Committee to:-

(i) endorse (i) and (ii) of paragraph 9 of the paper;

(ii) invite Lord Carrington to report further on what outline agreement with Guatemala looks like emerging: or alternatively on how far the United States or others would support a unilateral move to independence, and what the military implications of that are likely to be;

(iii) invite Lord Carrington and Mr. Pym to prepare a further paper on the security situation in the wider Caribbean area and the extent to which Britain might become militarily involved;

(iv) suspend judgment, meanwhile, on (iii) and (iv) in Lord Carrington's paragraph 9.

RWA

(Robert Armstrong)

1st April 1980

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

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