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808

PREM 19/971

PART 1

Confidential Filing

Internal Situation  
UK/Cypriot Relations

CYPRUS

FEBRUARY 1980

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>29.2.80</del>		25.3.82		<del>48.10.83</del>			
<del>24.4.80</del>		<del>29.3.82</del>		<del>24.10.83</del>			
<del>6.5.80</del>		26.4.82		<del>31.10.83</del>			
4.8.80		<del>4.8.82</del>		7.11.83			
<del>25.11.80</del>		<del>31.8.82</del>		<del>15.11.83</del>			
<del>28.7.81</del>		<del>7.9.82</del>		<del>18.11.83</del>			
<del>3.8.81</del>		10.9.82		19.11.83			
<del>13.7.81</del>		<del>14.9.82</del>		<del>25.11.83</del>			
<del>17.8.81</del>		17.1.83		1/12/83			
<del>26.8.81</del>		<del>25.1.83</del>		29.11.83			
<del>25.9.81</del>		15.2.83		- PT Ends -			
<del>25.9.81</del>		<del>28.2.83</del>					
<del>14.10.81</del>		<del>21/3/83</del>					
<del>24.11.81</del>		7.4.83					
<del>27.11.81</del>		10.5.83					
<del>3.12.81</del>		<del>29.6.83</del>					
<del>24.2.81</del>		3.10.83					

PREM 19/9/71

PART 1 ends:-

Athens tel: 704 29/a

PART 2 begins:-

Noel-Baker to ~~asc~~ pm 1/12



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OM COMMCEN HSP  
TO CSFC

CONFIDENTIAL UK COMMS ONLY  
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GRS 300

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 290900Z

FM ATHENS 290815Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY FCO.,

TELNO 704 OF 29 NOVEMBER 1983.,

REPEATED AS IMMEDIATE INFO TO NEW DELHI (FOR CHOGM DELEGATION),  
UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY), NICOSIA, ANKARA,  
WASHINGTON,

REPEATED AS PRIORITY INFO TO UKMIS NEW YORK, CSFC, UKDEL, NATO  
UKDEL STRASBOURG AND ISTANBUL.9

MY TELEGRAM NO. 700: CYPRUS:

GUARANTOR POWER CONSULTATIONS

1. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN WAS ASKED YESTERDAY WHETHER THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAD FINALLY ACCEPTED TRIPARTITE DISCUSSIONS UNDER THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE. HE SAID 'WE ARE WAITING SEE WHAT KYPRIANOU SAYS'.

2. THERE ARE ALSO PRESS REPORTS THAT PRESIDENT KARAMANLIS WILL CHAIR A MEETING JHTENDED BY PAPANDEOU AND KYPRIANOU. ASKED WHETHER THAT MEETING WOULD DECIDE WHETHER THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD ACCEPT TRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS, THE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD DECIDE. THEY SIMPLY WANTED TO BE INFORMED OF THE VIEWS OF KYPRIANOU. IN ANSWER TO FURTHER QUESTIONS HE MAINTAINED THAT PAPANDEOU'S STATEMENTS OF 26 NOVEMBER WERE STILL VALID BUT THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WISHED TO KNOW THE VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CYPRUS.

3. THE SPOKESMAN WAS ALSO ASKED ABOUT WHAT ARE DESCRIBED AS MRS THATCHER'S 'PROPOSALS'. HE REPLIED THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT KNEW THAT SOMETHING WAS CIRCULATING BETWEEN AMBASSADORS BUT HAD RECEIVED NO OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION.

4. IT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED THAT THE PROJECTED MEETING BETWEEN CYPRIOT POLITICAL LEADERS AND PAPANDEOU HAS BEEN POSTPONED GO FOLLOING DISCUSSION BETWEEN PAPANDEOU AND KYRPRIANOU.

COMMENT (UNDERLINED)

5. ALL THIS BEARS OUT MY VIEW THAT WE SHALL GET NO CLEAR ANSWER BEFORE KYPRIANOU'S VISIT TO ATHENS. IF KARAMANLIS DOES PRESIDE OVER A MEETING ATTENDED BY KYPRIANOU AND PAPANDEOU, IT WILL BE HIS FIRST DIRECT INTERVENTION IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS SINCE HIS ELECTION. NO DOUBT HE WOULD JUSTIFY THIS BY THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT THE GREEKS SEE AS AN ASPECT OF THEIR 'NATIONAL ISSUE', I.E. AN ASPECT OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND SURVIVAL OF 'HELLENISM'.

R H O D E S

BT

CYPRUS: ADVANCE COPIES 14

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
MR JENKINS

~~PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET~~  
D I O CABINET OFFICE

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*Pa  
Dms  
28/11*

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RESIDENT CLERK

**IMMEDIATE**

UNCLASSIFIED  
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 252117Z NOV 87 **ADVANCE COPY**  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1442 OF 25 NOVEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI (FOR CHOGM DELEGATION), NICOSIA, ATHENS,  
ANKARA  
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL STRASBOURG, CBFC  
ISTANBUL  
INFO SAVING PARIS, BONN, ROME

MIPT : CYPRUS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECRETARY GENERAL'S STATEMENT:

FOLLOWING THE ADOPTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF ITS RESOLUTION 541 (1983) OF 18 NOVEMBER, I HAVE MET WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU OF CYPRUS ON 18 AND 22 NOVEMBER, WITH HIS EXCELLENCY MR. DENKTASH ON 19 NOVEMBER AND WITH FOREIGN MINISTER TURKMEN OF TURKEY ON 19 NOVEMBER TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION RELATING TO CYPRUS. ON 17 NOVEMBER I HAD MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HARALAMBOPOULOS OF GREECE, AND I HAD FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PERMANENT MISSION OF GREECE ON THE 21ST. I HAVE ALSO HELD CONSULTATIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS. IT IS NOW NECESSARY TO WORK BOTH FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION IN ALL ITS ASPECTS AND FOR THE DEFUSING OF TENSIONS IN THIS CRITICAL AREA. TO THIS END, I HAVE DRAWN THE ATTENTION OF THE PARTIES TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE RESOLUTION AND TO THE CALL CONTAINED IN IT TO 'COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES'.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO PARIS, BONN AND ROME.

FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION IN ALL  
ITS ASPECTS AND FOR THE DEFUSING OF TENSIONS IN THIS CRITICAL AREA.  
TO THIS END, I HAVE DRAWN THE ATTENTION OF THE PARTIES TO THE  
PROVISIONS OF THE RESOLUTION AND TO THE CALL CONTAINED IN IT TO  
"COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS MISSION OF  
GOOD OFFICES".

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO PARIS, BONN AND ROME.

THOMSON

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ADVANCE COPY

NYFO 005/25

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00 NEW DELHI (FOR CHOGM DELEGATION)

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 240044Z NOV 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3552 OF 24 NOVEMBER

SECRET

Z

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
PRIORITY NEW DELHI (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY), ATHENS  
ANKARA NICOSSIA BONN PARIS ROME UKDEL STRASBOURG  
UKDEL NATO UKREP BRUSSELS

YOUR TELNO 1976: CYPRUS

1. WE TOOK SHERMAN AND DILLERY (STATE DEPARTMENT) SEPARATELY THROUGH THESE POINTS TODAY AND URGED THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD PUT THEM TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND SECRETARIAT. THEY TOOK NOTE. ALL OUR POINTS WERE WELL TAKEN. NOT LEAST FOR THEIR OWN DOMESTIC REASONS, THE AMERICANS AGREED THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO MAINTAIN A SENSE OF URGENCY IN NEW YORK. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD HINTED TO THEM THAT THE DUST MIGHT BE ALLOWED TO SETTLE UNTIL AFTER CHRISTMAS: THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE. HE SHOULD EITHER APPOINT A SUCCESSOR TO GOBBI SOON OR TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE HIMSELF.
2. SHERMAN SAID THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD CONSIDER URGENTLY A FURTHER APPROACH TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL. HAASS WAS PLANNING A VISIT TO NEW YORK EARLY NEXT WEEK. HE ADDED THAT CYPRUS WOULD BE HIGH ON THE AGENDA FOR SHULTZ'S BILATERAL DISCUSSION WITH YOU IN THE MARGIN OF THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING.
3. SHERMAN SAID THAT TURKMEN HAD TAKEN A STRONG LINE IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND SHULTZ IN WASHINGTON ON 22 NOVEMBER. THE US/TURKISH RELATIONSHIP SHOULD NOT BE DEPENDENT ON CONGRESSIONAL WHIMS: THEY HAD MUTUAL SECURITY INTERESTS WHICH NEEDED TO BE FOSTERED. THE AMERICANS HAD STRESSED THAT THE CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEM WAS ONE FOR TURKEY AS WELL AS THE ADMINISTRATION: THERE WAS A REAL RISK OF AN ARMS EMBARGO. THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID THAT SOME MOVE, FOR EXAMPLE TROOP WITHDRAWALS, WAS NEEDED FROM THE TURKISH SIDE. TURKMEN'S REACTION HAD BEEN LESS NEGATIVE THAN THE AMERICANS HAD EXPECTED AND HAD HINTED AT POSSIBLE FLEXIBILITY. STRAUSS-HUPE WOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW UP IN ANKARA AFTER THE THANKSGIVING HOLIDAY.
4. SHERMAN MENTIONED THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE LOOKING VERY CAREFULLY AT THE IMPLICATIONS OF DENKTASH'S PROPOSAL ON VAROSHA. THE AMERICANS WERE TRYING TO FIND OUT WHAT EXACTLY DENKTASH HAD IN MIND: THERE SEEMED TO BE A POSSIBILITY THAT HE ENVISAGED OPENING FOR GREEK-CYPRIOT SETTLEMENT A LARGER SECTOR OF VAROSHA THAN HAD BEEN ENVISAGED IN THE 1980 MINI-PACKAGE. SHERMAN ASKED WHETHER WE COULD SHED ANY LIGHT ON THIS.

WRIGHT

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THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS  
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT



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24/11*

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~~SECRET~~ UK/US EYES ONLY UNITED KINGDOM  
CLASSIFIED  
JICTEL 291 24 NOVEMBER 1983  
FROM: SECRETARY JIC.  
FOR: MR COLES, PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY.

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY FROM THE CURRENT WEEKLY SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE,  
APPROVED BY THE JIC 24 NOVEMBER.

CYPRUS: TEN DAYS AFTER TURKISH CYPRIOT SECESSION - SECRET  
- UK/US EYES ONLY - UNITED KINGDOM CLASSIFIED.

THERE HAS BEEN WIDESPREAD INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION OF THE  
TURKISH CYPRIOT SECESSION FROM THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS. SO FAR,  
ONLY TURKEY HAS RECOGNISED THE NEW +STATE+. THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL GAVE ITS PRIOR APPROVAL TO THE DECISION  
TO DECLARE STATEHOOD.

THE SITUATION ON THE ISLAND REMAINS CALM. NO ATTEMPT HAS YET  
BEEN MADE TO INTERRUPT THE SUPPLY OF ELECTRICITY TO THE NORTH, BUT  
THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS ARE TAKING CONTINGENCY MEASURES.

BOTH THE GREEK AND CYPRUS GOVERNMENTS APPEAR TO BE PREPARED TO  
AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF THE VARIOUS DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES CURRENTLY  
UNDER WAY BEFORE DECIDING ON FURTHER ACTION. KYPRIANOU SEES THE  
VALUE OF KEEPING THE SITUATION COOL, BUT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT MAY  
WANT TO SEE MORE DIRECT ACTION.

DENKTASH WILL NOT WITHDRAW THE DECLARATION OF STATEHOOD. THE  
UN SECRETARY GENERAL HAS LITTLE IMMEDIATE CHANCE OF SUCCESS IN  
BRINGING THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT AND THE TURK CYPRIOTS TOGETHER. THE  
PROSPECT IS FOR A WORSENING OF RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY,  
IN WHICH THEY WILL ATTEMPT TO INVOLVE THEIR ALLIES: THIS HAS  
IMPLICATIONS FOR BOTH NATO AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, AS WELL AS FOR  
BILATERAL RELATIONS.

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THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS  
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

OUT TELEGRAM

cc. LEBANON: Int. Situ. Part 5  
 CYPRUS: Int. Situ. Feb 80.  
 GRENADA: Int. Situ. Part 2  
 SOV. UNION: Soviet Leadership June 1979

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/Deskby

25 11 30 Z.

DESKBY ~~23 11 30~~

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
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CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	DESKBY 23.30
FM FCO	6	FM FCO 241600Z NOV 83
PRE/ADD	7	IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER; AND FOR PUS
	10	SITUATION REPORT 23/24 NOVEMBER
	11	<u>Lebanon</u>
	12	1. The Israelis have begun to release about 1100 of the
	13	Palestinian and Lebanese detainees in exchange for six
	14	Israeli prisoners held by loyalist PLO in Tripoli. A further
	15	six Israeli soldiers remain in Syrian and rebel PLO hands.
	16	2. There have been indications that President Gemayel
	17	and the Maronites are returning to the view that the
	18	withdrawal of foreign forces should precede national
	19	reconciliation. President Gemayel's planned visit to
	20	London <sup>on</sup> 30 November <del>will provide an opportunity to press</del> <sup>but he will still be going to Rome and</sup>
✓	21	<del>on Gemayel the need to push for reconciliation by the</del> <sup>Washington.</sup>
///	22	<del>early convening of Geneva II.</del>
//	23	3. In Tripoli, the de facto ceasefire is holding. The
/	24	rebel leader has extended the deadline for Arafat's
	25	departure by one day to 26 November. Diplomatic activity

*Pa  
DUB  
24/11*

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword	/continues
File number	Dept	Distribution	
Drafted by (Block capitals) <i>Planning Staff</i>		LIMITED	
Telephone number		Private Secretary	
Authorised for despatch <i>[Signature] 24/11</i>		PS/Mr Rifkind	
Comcen reference		PS/Lady Young	
Time of despatch		PS/Mr Whitney	
		PS/Mr Luce	
		PS/PUS	
		Planning Staff	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats  
CONFIDENTIAL

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2 continues. The UN Security Council Resolution (23 November)  
3 called on the parties to "settle their differences exclusively  
4 by peaceful means". The Russians are pressing Damascus  
5 to halt <sup>the</sup> fighting. The PLO loyalists are said to have  
6 accepted a Saudi/Syrian plan for <sup>a</sup> ceasefire, withdrawal of all  
7 PLO forces (loyalist and dissident) from North Lebanon and  
8 talks to re-establish the unity of PLO. But the rebels  
9 are reported to have dismissed the proposals.

10 Cyprus

11 4. At Coreper on 24 November the Greek representative  
12 called for action by the EC in the economic and social fields  
13 against Turkey following the UDI by the Turkish Cypriots.  
14 This is the first such call for action against Turkey.  
15 The Greeks said that they had in mind that the EC should  
16 freeze the current position in the EC/Turkey Association  
17 Agreement (ie there should be no further liberalisation  
18 as previously planned). No decisions were taken and the  
19 question is likely to arise again at the Foreign Affairs  
20 Council on 29 November.

21 Grenada

22 5. Motley (State Department) has reiterated to Minister,  
23 Washington American concern about <sup>the likely</sup> policing problems in  
24 Grenada following <sup>the</sup> withdrawal of US combat troops. Motley  
25 said the Americans and the Governor-General saw a pressing  
26 need for a contingent of preferably British policemen  
27 to be sent to the island. He also expressed concern about  
28 the situation in the prison and hoped the UK would be able  
29 urgently to send trained prison warders. ~~The department is drafting~~

30 Soviet Union

/// 31 6. Moskovskaya Pravda of 23 November reported a speech  
// 32 by Politburo member, Grishin, in which he referred to a  
/ 33 meeting he had had with Andropov on 21 November. But there  
34 have still been no Western sightings of Andropov.

NNNN ends  
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Catchword

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats  
CONFIDENTIAL

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
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Catchword

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IMMEDIATE

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CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 240300Z

FM FCO 231630Z NOV 1983

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY NEW DELHI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 881 OF 23 NOVEMBER

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING FOR PS TO PRIME MINISTER: FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY: AND  
FOR PUS

SITUATION REPORT 22/23 NOVEMBER

CYPRUS

1. ON 22 NOVEMBER 1983 POCO FOREIGN MINISTERS ASKED THE COMMISSION TO EXAMINE THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR EC TRADE WITH NORTHERN CYPRUS OF TURKISH CYPRIOT UDI. ANY DECISIONS BY EC MINISTERS WOULD BE TAKEN IN THE LIGHT OF THIS. IN PRACTICE IT WILL PROBABLY MEAN WITHDRAWAL OF PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR EXPORTS FROM NORTHERN CYPRUS FOR THE EC.

BRAZIL

2. BRAZIL'S REQUEST FOR A REVISED IMF PROGRAMME (AN EXTENDED FUND FACILITY OF 4.6 BN DOLLARS) AND FOR A BUFFER STOCK DRAWING FOR 58 M DOLLARS WERE APPROVED BY THE IMF EXECUTIVE BOARD ON 22 NOVEMBER. THIS WILL RELEASE IMMEDIATELY 673 M DOLLARS UNDER OF THE BIS BRIDGING LOAN. THE DEPUTY MD SAID THAT THE COMMERCIAL BANKS HAD PLEDGED SUFFICIENT NEW MONEY FOR THE PROGRAMME TO GO AHEAD. COMMITMENTS OF 5.865 BILLION DOLLARS HAD BEEN PLEDGED OUT OF THE 6.5 BILLION DOLLARS TOTAL. THE MD EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THE 2.5 BILLION DOLLARS SOUGHT FROM GOVERNMENTS 'WOULD BE FORTHCOMING' BUT DID NOT GO INTO DETAILS OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY CONTRIBUTIONS. THE PARIS CLUB REACHED AGREEMENT WITH BRAZIL TODAY (23 NOVEMBER) ON BRAZIL'S REQUEST FOR RETRUCTURING OF HER 1983/4 DEBT.

LEBANON

3. IN AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE LEBANESE ARMY AND SHIA IN SOUTHERN BEIRUT ON 22 NOVEMBER ONE ROCKET PROPELLED GRENADE MISSED ITS TARGET AND DETONATED ON THE ROCKET SCREEN SURROUNDING BRITFORLEB HQ. THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES AND NO RESPONSE FROM BRITFORLEB. HMS GLAMORGAN AND HMS BRAZEN ARRIVED OFF BEIRUT YESTERDAY AND HAVE TAKEN UP POSITIONS 15 NAUTICAL MILES OFF COAST (OUTSIDE LEBANESE TERRITORIAL WATERS).


4. THERE HAS BEEN A LULL IN THE FIGHTING IN TRIPOLI, BUT REBEL FORCES ARE REPORTED IN NORTHERN OUTSKIRTS OF THE CITY WITHIN HALF A MILE OF ARAFAT'S HQ. THE REBEL LEADER HAS THREATENED TO ENTER THE CITY IN FORCE UNLESS ARAFAT LEAVES WITHIN THREE DAYS. THE LOYALISTS HAVE BEEN MOVING ARTILLERY TO NEW POSITIONS WITHIN TRIPOLI TO COUNTER AN EXPECTED FINAL ATTACK. THE DOMINANT LOCAL MILITIA (ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST) IS NOW APPARENTLY FULLY INVOLVED ON THE SIDE OF THE LOYALISTS AND IS BUILDING BARRICADES. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO STOP THE FIGHTING CONTINUE. THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER MET HIS SYRIAN OPPOSITE NUMBER IN DAMASCUS ON 22 NOVEMBER. THE NAM DELEGATION HAVE ALSO ARRIVED IN DAMASCUS. THE PLO 'FOREIGN MINISTER' FAROUK QADDOUMI (LOYALIST) HAS GONE TO MOSCOW FOR TALKS.

HOWE

CYPRUS

OUT TELEGRAM

afed to Brazil  
Lebanon


	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE DESKBY 2330Z
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ZCZC 1 ZCZC  
 GRS 2 GRS  
 CLASS 3 CONFIDENTIAL  
 CAVEATS 4  
 DESKBY 5 DESKBY 2330Z 240300Z  
 FM FCO 6 FM FCO 231630Z NOV 1983  
 PRE/ADD 7 TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY NEW DELHI  
 TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

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9  
 10 FOLLOWING FOR PS TO PRIME MINISTER; FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY; AND  
 11 FOR PUS  
 12 Situation Report 22/23 November  
 13 Cyprus  
 14 1. On 22 November 1983 PoCo Foreign Ministers asked <sup>the</sup> Commission  
 15 to examine <sup>the</sup> possible consequences for EC trade with Northern  
 16 Cyprus of Turkish Cypriot UDI. Any decisions by EC Ministers  
 17 would be taken in the light of this. In practice it will  
 18 probably mean withdrawal of preferential treatment for exports  
 19 from northern Cyprus for the EC.  
 20 Brazil  
 21 2. Brazil's request for a revised IMF programme (an Extended  
 22 Fund Facility of 4.6 bn dollars) and for a buffer stock drawing  
 23 for 58 m dollars were approved by the IMF Executive Board on  
 24 22 November. This will release immediately 673 m dollars under  
 25 the Extended Fund Facility. This will in turn permit repayment

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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword of
File number	Dept PLANNING	Distribution LIMITED
Drafted by (Block capitals) A J COLQUHOUN		Private Secretary PS/Mr Luce PS/Mr Rifkind PS/Lady Young PS/Mr Whitney PS/PUS
Telephone number 233 7888		Planning Staff.
Authorised for despatch 		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats  
CONFIDENTIAL

Page  
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1 <<<<  
 2 of the BIS bridging loan. The Deputy MD said that the commercial  
 3 banks had pledged sufficient new money for the programme to go  
 4 ahead. Commitments of 5.865 billion dollars had been pledged out  
 5 of the 6.5 billion dollars total. The MD expressed confidence  
 6 that the 2.5 billion dollars sought from governments 'would be  
 7 forthcoming' but did not go into details of individual country  
 8 contributions. ~~The Paris Club is meeting today to consider~~  
 9 ~~Brazil's request for restructuring of her 1983/84 debt.~~  
 10 Lebanon *(The Paris Club reached agreement with Brazil today (23*  
 11 *November) on Brazil's request for restructuring of her 1983/4 debt*  
 12 3. In an exchange between <sup>the</sup> Lebanese Army and Shia in Southern  
 13 Beirut on 22 November one rocket-propelled grenade missed its  
 14 target and detonated on the rocket screen surrounding BRITFORLEB  
 15 HQ. <sup>There were</sup> ~~NO~~ casualties and no response from BRITFORLEB. HMS Glamorgan  
 16 and HMS Brazen arrived off Beirut yesterday and have taken up  
 17 positions 15 nautical miles off coast (outside Lebanese  
 18 territorial waters).  
 19 4. There has been a lull in the fighting in Tripoli, but rebel  
 20 forces are reported in Northern outskirts of the city within  
 21 half a mile of Arafat's HQ. The rebel leader has threatened to  
 22 enter <sup>the</sup> city in force unless Arafat leaves within three days. The  
 23 loyalists have been moving artillery to new positions within  
 24 Tripoli to counter expected <sup>an</sup> final attack. The dominant local  
 25 militia (Islamic fundamentalist) is now apparently fully involved  
 26 on the side of the loyalists and is building barricades.  
 27 Diplomatic efforts to stop the fighting continue. The Saudi  
 28 Foreign Minister met his Syrian opposite number in Damascus on  
 29 22 November. The NAM Delegation have also arrived in Damascus.  
 30 The PLO "Foreign Minister" Farouk Qaddoumi (loyalist) has gone  
 31 to Moscow for talks.

HOWE

NNNN ends  
telegram

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Catchword

PP NICOSIA

PP ROME

cc Royal Path

GR 1300

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 222315Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3520 OF 22 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY NEW DELHI (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY), ATHENS, ANKARA, NICOSIA, BONN, PARIS, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL STRASBOURG, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS.

YOUR TELNO 1971 : CYPRUS

SUMMARY

1. THE AMERICANS' MAIN CONCERN REMAINS THAT SOME VISIBLE PROGRESS BE MADE IN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS IN ORDER TO HEAD OFF CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE FOR AN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST TURKEY AND FURTHER GREEK CYPRIOT RECOURSE TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THEY ARE URGING THE GREEKS AND GREEK CYPRIOTS TO SHOW RESTRAINT AND FLEXIBILITY AND THE TURKS TO CONSIDER MAKING CONCESSIONS, POSSIBLY INCLUDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOME TURKISH FORCES FROM NORTHER CYPRUS. THEY ARE ENCOURAGING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REMAIN CLOSELY INVOLVED.

DETAIL

2. WE TOLD SHERMAN (STATE DEPARTMENT) THIS MORNING OF THE ACTION WE ARE TAKING IN THE GUARANTOR POWERS CONTEXT AND OF YOUR INSTRUCTIONS TO SIR J THOMSON (FCO TELNO 779 TO UKMIS NEW YORK). SHERMAN WELCOMED THESE MOVES WHICH WERE CLOSELY IN LINE WITH US THINKING. KYPRIANOU HAD TOLD SHULTZ ON 21 NOVEMBER THAT HE HOPED THAT CONSULTATIONS UNDER THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE COULD BE ARRANGED AND THAT THEY WOULD LEAD TO THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS. BUT HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE GREEKS WOULD AGREE UNTIL THE TURKISH CYPRIOT ACTION WAS REVERSED.

3. SHERMAN SAID THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD TELEPHONED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 17 NOVEMBER TO ASSURE HIM OF US SUPPORT. THE STATE DEPARTMENT WERE NOW CONSIDERING INSTRUCTIONS TO MRS KIRKPATRICK TO FOLLOW UP WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO URGE HIM TO TAKE SOME BOLD INITIATIVE AND TO ANNOUNCE GOBBI'S SUCCESSOR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. (THE STATE DEPARTMENT BELIEVE THAT THE UGANDAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UN, OTUNU, IS THE MOST LIKELY CHOICE). THEY ARE ALSO CONSIDERING SUGGESTING TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR THAT HE SHOULD EXPLORE WITH THE TURKS THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER CONCESSIONS TO ENCOURAGE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO RESUME THE INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS. THESE MIGHT INCLUDE A REDUCTION OF TURKISH TROOPS IN NORTHERN CYPRUS, FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR GREEK CYPRIOTS IN THE TURKISH CYPRIOT ZONE AND AN IMPROVED OFFER ON VAROSHA. SHERMAN SAID THAT THE AMERICANS EXPECTED THE UNFICYP MANDATE TO BE RENEWED NEXT MONTH BUT WOULD BE SPEAKING PRIVATELY TO CONTRIBUTORS TO HELP ENSURE THAT THERE WAS NO HITCH.

4. SHERMAN SAID THAT SHERRY (SECRETARIAT) HAD DELIVERED A MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 19 NOVEMBER ASKING THE AMERICANS TO URGE THE GREEKS AND GREEK CYPRIOTS NOT TO TURN DOWN DENKTASH'S PROPOSALS OUT OF HAND. SHERRY CLAIMED THAT DENKTASH'S OFFER HAD BEEN INSPIRED BY ANKARA, (THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE NO CONFIRMATION OF THIS) AND WAS THEREFORE DOUBLY WORTH PURSUING. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD IT IN MIND TO INSIST, AS A FURTHER SWEETENER FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS, THAT THE PACKAGE SHOULD BE IRREVERSIBLE, IE THAT THE UN SHOULD GUARANTEE TO CONTINUE TO ADMINISTER VAROSHA AND THE NICOSIA AIRPORT UNTIL AN AGREED SOLUTION WAS REACHED. SHERRY HAD A PERSONAL INTEREST, IN THAT HE WAS THE AUTHOR OF THE MINI-PACKAGE ON WHICH DENKTASH'S OFFER WAS BASED, BUT HAD BEEN INSISTENT THAT HIS APPROACH HAD THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S FULL SUPPORT. THE US TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH KYPRIANOU HAD BEEN MODIFIED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THESE VIEWS.



5. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD ASSURED KYPRIANOU ON 21 NOVEMBER OF US SUPPORT AND HAD URGED HIM NOT TO ALLOW DENKTASH'S ILL-ADVISED ACTION TO PRECLUDE CONSIDERATION OF OPPORTUNITIES TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. KYPRIANOU HAD SAID THAT THE US AND UK WERE BEST PLACED TO ACHIEVE SOME REVERSAL OF DENKTASH'S ACTIONS WHICH HE STILL HOPED COULD BE ACHIEVED. IF THIS WERE DONE, THE GOVERNMENT OF CYPRUS COULD ENSURE PEACEFUL CONDITIONS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. SHERMAN WAS INCLINE TO INTERPRET THIS AS AN INDICATION THAT KYPRIANOU WOULD NOT RESUME INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS UNTIL THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE WAS WITHDRAWN. BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO EXPLICIT DISCUSSION OF KYPRIANOU'S CONDITIONS FOR RESUMING NEGOTIATIONS. KYPRIANOU HAD SAID THAT HE HAD AN ASSURANCE FROM PAPANDEOU THAT THE GREEKS WOULD RESPOND TO WHATEVER REQUEST THE GREEK CYPRIOTS MIGHT MAKE TO THEM: THE CLEAR IMPLICATION WAS THAT THIS WOULD INCLUDE THE DESPATCH OF MORE TROOPS. KYPRIANOU HAD ALSO MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF CALLING FOR A RESUMED SESSION OF THE UNGA IN JANUARY. SHULTZ HAD, UNFORTUNATELY, NOT BEEN BRIEFED ON THIS POINT AND HAD SAID NOTHING TO DISCOURAGE HIM. BUT SUCH A DEBATE WOULD CLEARLY BE UNHELPFUL.

6. THOUGH KYPRIANOU'S MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND SHULTZ WENT WELL, THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE ANGERED BY THE SUBSEQUENT WHITE HOUSE PRESS STATEMENT WHICH IN THEIR VIEW PLAYED DOWN THE STRENGTH OF THEIR FEELING THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED. THEY HAVE ALSO BEEN UPSET BY TURKMEN'S HIGH LEVEL RECEPTION IN WASHINGTON TODAY: HE IS HAVING SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT, BUSH AND SHULTZ. SHERMAN SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE TAKING THE LINE WITH THE TURKS THAT IF THERE WERE NOT VISIBLE PROGRESS IN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS, THERE WOULD BE REAL TROUBLE WITH CONGRESS OVER AID. THEY CONDEMNED THE TURKISH CYPRIOT ACTION WHICH OUGHT TO BE REVERSED AND REGRETTED TURKISH RECOGNITION. THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN BRIEFED TO SUGGEST TO TURKMEN THAT THE TURKS SHOULD CONSIDER WITHDRAWING SOME OF THEIR TROOPS FROM NORTHERN CYPRUS.

7. AS FOR THE GREEKS, SHULTZ HAD SEEN HARALAMBOPOULOS ON 18 NOVEMBER. HE HAD EXPRESSED SYMPATHY FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS, CONDEMNED DENKTASH'S ACTION AND URGED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DRASTIC REACTION FROM THE GREEK SIDE. HARALAMBOPOULOS HAD SAID THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WERE VERY SATISFIED WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND WITH THE REACTION IN CONGRESS. THEY WERE CONVINCED THAT DENKTASH HAD ACTED WITH TURKISH SUPPORT AND HELD TURKEY RESPONSIBLE: THE EPISODE WOULD INEVITABLY HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE GREEK/TURKISH DIALOGUE.

8. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE NOT YET DECIDED HOW TO HANDLE FUTURE DEALINGS WITH THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS. ON CYPRUS THEY ARE TRYING TO AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION OF CONDUCTING BUSINESS AS USUAL BY LIMITING THEIR CONTACTS, THOUGH THE US AMBASSADOR HAS SEEN ONAN AND ATAKOL SINCE THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. HE HAS MADE CLEAR THE US VIEW OF UDI, BUT HAS NOT ENGAGED IN FURTHER DISCUSSION EG OF HOW DENKTASH'S OFFER MIGHT BE IMPROVED. THE AMERICANS HAVE HAD NO CONTACT WITH DENKTASH HIMSELF SINCE UDI. THE US AMBASSADOR IN NICOSIA IS CONTINUING TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH HIS TURKISH COLLEAGUE. OTHER US MISSIONS HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAINTAIN THEIR EXISTING RELATIONSHIPS WITH TURKISH CYPRIOT REPRESENTATIVES BUT TO LIMIT CONTACTS TO ESSENTIAL BUSINESS.

9. SHERMAN AGREED THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO KEEP CLOSELY IN TOUCH AND UNDERTOOK TO GIVE US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AN ACCOUNT OF TURKMEN'S TALKS HERE.

WRIGHT

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DD NEW DELHI 220130Z

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UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 220130Z

FM F C O 211828Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 811 OF 21 NOVEMBER

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPT WAS RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1388 OF 17 NOVEMBER

FM U K MISSION NEW YORK 180345Z NOV'83

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1388 OF 17 NOVEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, PARIS, WASHINGTON

MOD UK, THE HAGUE

PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, ISTANBUL, MOSCOW, ISLAMABAD, AMMAN, CBF CYPRUS, BONN, ROME

INFORMATION  
22 NOV 1983  
DUPLICATES  
OF LETTER .....  
OF ENCLOSURES .....  
LOCATION .....

MY TWO IPTS: **TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.**

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE UK DRAFT RESOLUTION AS FORMALLY TABLED THIS EVENING (17 NOVEMBER).

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS,

CONCERNED AT THE DECLARATION BY THE TURKISH CYPRIOT AUTHORITIES ISSUED ON 15 NOVEMBER 1983 WHICH PURPORTS TO CREATE AN INDEPENDENT STATE IN NORTHERN CYPRUS,

CONSIDERING THAT THIS DECLARATION IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE 1960 TREATY CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS AND THE 1960 TREATY OF GUARANTEE,

CONSIDERING THEREFORE THAT THE ATTEMPT TO CREATE A "TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS" IS INVALID AND WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A WORSENING OF THE SITUATION IN CYPRUS,

REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTION 365 (1974) AND (1975), AWARE OF THE NEED FOR A SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, BASED ON THE MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES UNDERTAKEN BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

AFFIRMING ITS CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR UNFICYP, TAKING NOTE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S STATEMENT OF 17 NOVEMBER 1983,

1. DEPLORES THE DECLARATION OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT AUTHORITIES OF THE PURPORTED SECESSION OF PART OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS:

2. CONSIDERS THE DECLARATION REFERRED TO ABOVE AS LEGALLY INVALID AND CALLS FOR ITS WITHDRAWAL:

3. CALLS FOR THE URGENT AND EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS RESOLUTIONS 365(1974) AND 367(1975):

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO PURSUE HIS MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE PROGRESS TOWARDS A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT IN CYPRUS:

5. CALLS UPON THE PARTIES TO CO-OPERATE FULLY WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN HIS MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES:

6. CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS:

7. CALLS UPON ALL STATES NOT TO RECOGNIZE ANY CYPRIOT STATE OTHER THAN THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS:

8. CALLS UPON ALL STATES AND THE TWO COMMUNITIES IN CYPRUS TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT EXACERBATE THE SITUATION:

9. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO KEEP THE SECURITY COUNCIL FULLY INFORMED.

ENDS.


UD1 - would

nothing else to do with them

"Grade Millers" to Northern Cyprus.

K.F.C. items.

Headmark - C.F.E.



LUK 259  
FDW G 148/21

CHAIR  
22 NOV 1983  
DUPLICATES  
OR LETTER  
OF ENCLOSURES  
LOCATION

OO NEW DELHI  
PP ATHENS  
PP ANKARA  
PP NICOSIA  
GRS 384

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 220130Z  
FM F C O 211930Z NOV 83  
TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 815 OF 21 NOVEMBER  
INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, ANKARA, NICOSIA  
CYPRUS: TURKISH CYPRIOT UDI  
FOR BYRNE, CHOGM DELEGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

1. FOLLOWING ARE POINTS TO MAKE AND ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND FOR CHOGM BRIEF NO PMVE(83) B10 REVISE, ON CYPRUS.

POINTS TO MAKE

- 2(A) AS WE HAVE MADE CLEAR, DEPLORE TURKISH CYPRIOT ACTION. WORKED HARD TO PREVENT IT, AND HAVE TRIED TO SECURE REVERSAL.
- (B) UK WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORT UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION (TABLED BY UK). PASSED OVERWHELMINGLY. CALLS ON STATES NOT TO RECOGNISE AND ON UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO USE GOOD OFFICES TO ACHIEVE EARLIEST POSSIBLE PROGRESS TOWARDS A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT IN CYPRUS. WE ARE DOING ALL WE CAN TO SUPPORT UN SECRETARY GENERAL. HOPE COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES WILL ALSO SUPPORT AND NOT RECOGNISE.
- (C) (DEFENSIVE) SEPARATE COMMONWEALTH INITIATIVE WOULD CUT ACROSS UN EFFORTS. BELIEVE THAT CONTACTS BETWEEN COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL AND SR PEREZ DE CUELLAR BETTER WAY OF EFRING COMMONWEALTH INTEREST IS TAKEN ACCOUNT OF. FOR SIMILAR REASONS MEETING OF COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE ON CYPRUS IS UNNECESSARY.
- (D) (DEFENSIVE) COULD AGREE TO REFERENCE IN COMMUNIQUE DEPLOING TURKISH CYPRIOT UDI .

ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND

- 3(A) UN SECURITY COUNCIL PASSED RESOLUTION TABLED BY UK AND AGREED BY GREEK CYPRIOTS DEPLOING UDI AND CALLING FOR REVERSAL BY 13-1-1 (PAKISTAN AND JORDAN) ON 18 NOVEMBER. WE ARE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH UN SECRETARY GW ON NEXT MOVES AND PRESSING HIM TO REMAIN PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION. ALSO TO APPOINT SOON A NEW SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN CYPRUS.
- (B) TURKS HAVE AGREED TO TRILATERAL GUARANTOR POWER CONSULTATIONS. GREEKS WILL NOT TALK TO THE TURKS WHILE STILL TURKISH TROOPS IN CYPRUS.
- (C) OUR INTERESTS OVER THE SOVEIGN BASE AREAS REQUIRE US TO SHOW SOME SYMPATHY FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS. BUT THE WIDER INTERESTS OF NOT ALIENATING TURKEY FROM THE WEST, AND THE GREEK CYPRIOT TENDENCY TO SEIZE UPON AND EXAGGERATE THE SUPPORT FOR THEM REQUIRES US NOT (NOT) TO TAKE THEIR SIDE TOTALLY AND TO AVOID EG OUTRIGHT CHOGM CONDEMNATION OF TURKEY.
4. YOU SHOULD WORK FOR A REFERENCE IN THE CHOGM COMMUNIQUE WHICH STICKS AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE TO THE LANGUAGE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1388, NOW COPIED TO YOU).

HOWE

NNNN

? Should he go ahead with  
intercommunal talks?

If not - from partition.

Must be given  
every opportunity  
to pursue his  
mission of good  
offices.

Ugla S-G to be more active  
Gobbi - not yet replaced

Vorosha - back to Greek Cypriots

3-power talks. Have commended  
him

Turks will - Greeks not

Greeks will sit down with  
Turks unless Turks will draw

[N.B. Bangladesh Delayed]

1960. Provided for Propn 70:30 (draft)

Part 60:40

Turks gradually moved out

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*Pa.*  
*DMS*  
*22/11* 1802 - 1

OO ATHENS

OO ROME

PP MOSCOW

GRS 493

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 212200Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 822 OF 21 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE ANKARA ATHENS

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK UKREP BRUSSELS UKDEL NATO

WASHINGTON PARIS BONN ROME MODUK CBFC UKDEL STRASBOURG

PRIORITY MOSCOW

INFO SAVING ISTANBUL

FOLLOWING FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY.

MIPT:CYPRUS CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN GUARNTOR POWERS

MESSAGE TO TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER

1. I WAS GRATEFUL FOR YOUR RESPONSE TO MY PROPOSAL FOR CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE GUARANTOR POWERS AS ENVISAGED BY THE 1960 TREATY OF GUARANTEE.
2. YOU CONFIRMED TO ME IN OUR DISCUSSION ON 18 NOVEMBER THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WERE PREPARED IN PRINCIPLE TO TAKE PART IN SUCH CONSULTATIONS PROVIDED THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT DID SO TOO.
3. I SHOULD NOW LIKE TO INFORM YOU OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE REPLY TO MY PROPOSAL MADE BY THE GREEK GOVERNMENT. I AM SIMILARLY INFORMING THE GREEK GOVERNMENT OF THE REPLY YOU HAVE GIVEN ME.
4. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAVE SAID THAT THEY WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO ENTER INTO BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES OF RESOLVING THE PRESENT CYPRUS CRISIS. BUT THEY HAVE ALSO SAID THAT THEY DO NOT CONSIDER IT POSSIBLE UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES FOR

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1802 - 1

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN DISCUSSION ON CYPRUS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT.

5. IN THE LIGHT OF THESE RESPONSES FROM THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED I AM NOW CONSIDERING HOW BEST TO PURSUE FURTHER THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSULTATIONS AS ENVISAGED IN THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE.

MESSAGE TO THE GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER

6. I WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE RESPONSE OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT, CONVEYED TO ME BY YOUR AMBASSADOR ON 17 NOVEMBER, TO MY PROPOSAL THAT THE GUARANTOR POWERS SHOULD CONSULT TOGETHER AS ENVISAGED IN THE 1960 TREATY OF GUARANTEE.

I NOTE THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT DO NOT CONSIDER IT POSSIBLE TO HOLD CONSULTATIONS TOGETHER WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

7. I SHOULD LIKE TO INFORM YOU THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IN THEIR RESPONSE HAVE SAID THAT THEY, FOR THEIR PART, WOULD BE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO CONSULTATIONS AS ENVISAGED BY THE TREATY PROVIDED THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT ALSO PARTICIPATE.

8. ARTICLE 4 OF THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE LAYS DOWN THAT, IN THE EVENT OF A BREACH OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY, THE THREE GUARANTOR POWERS UNDERTAKE TO CONSULT TOGETHER. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WILL RECONSIDER THEIR POSITION AND THAT, DESPITE YOUR EARLIER RESERVATIONS, YOU WILL NEVERTHELESS AGREE TO CONSULTATIONS UNDER THE TERMS OF THE TREATY, IN WHICH REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL THREE GOVERNMENTS WOULD PARTICIPATE.

9. I AM INFORMING THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IN GENERAL TERMS OF THE REPLY YOU HAVE MADE TO MY PROPOSALS. WHILE AWAITING YOUR FURTHER REPLY, AND IN THE HOPE THAT IT WILL STILL PROVE POSSIBLE FOR THE THREE GOVERNMENTS

CONFIDENTIAL

1802 - 1

TO CONSULT TOGETHER ABOUT THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS  
IN CYPRUS, I AM NOT AT PRESENT MAKING PUBLIC DETAILS OF THE  
REPLIES I HAVE RECEIVED.

HOWE

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PLANNING STAFF

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SOV DEPT  
PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
MR WRIGHT  
SIR C TICKELL  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR ADAMS  
MR CARTLEDGE  
MR EGERTON  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
MR HANNAY  
MR THOMAS

ADDITIONAL DISTN  
CYPRUS

- 3 -  
CONFIDENTIAL



SUBJECT

FILE

cc master JH  
ops



PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. F 1969/83

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 November 1983

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of 15 November, which I received through your High Commissioner in London, about the purported declaration of independence by the Turkish Cypriots in Northern Cyprus.

As I explained in our meeting yesterday, my Government deplore this action by the Turkish Cypriot community which we consider to be incompatible with the 1960 treaties. We took early steps to initiate a debate in the Security Council of the United Nations and we have proposed consultations to both the Turkish and Greek Governments in accordance with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. We have also sent a message to President Evren urging him to help secure a reversal of the Turkish Cypriot declaration. It remains our position that we recognise only one Republic of Cyprus.

Looking to the future, we shall continue our efforts to bring about a reversal of this declaration. But it would be most regrettable if this action, unwelcome as it is, led to the breakdown of the intercommunal talks and consultations carried out by the Secretary General of the United Nations.

/ We also

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We also trust that all concerned will avoid any action which could lead to a further deterioration of the situation in Cyprus.

I can assure you that we shall continue to work to this purpose and I hope that our two Governments will remain in close touch during the coming weeks.

I look forward to seeing you in Athens.

Yours sincerely  
Raymond Beckett

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His Excellency Mr. Spyros Kyprianou



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

21 November 1983

Cyprus

You recommended earlier that when the President of Cyprus called on the Prime Minister last week Mrs. Thatcher might hand over her reply to his letter of 15 November.

In the event we decided that it would be better to wait until after the meeting. I now enclose a slightly revised version of the draft which has been signed by the Prime Minister. I should be grateful if you would arrange for its delivery.

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Sub



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

21 November 1983

CYPRUS: TURKISH-CYPRIOIOT DECLARATION OF INDEPENDNCE

Thank you for your letter of 18 November giving your advice on how we should handle Mr. Denktash's letter of 15 November.

The Prime Minister has noted your view that we should not reply to Mr. Denktash's letter, in view of the implications for recognition. But she has commented that she does not see how we can influence him if we do not seek an occasion to put the facts right and to put over our own view. Would you kindly let me know what facilities we have for bringing our influence to bear directly on the Turkish-Cypriots.

A. J. COLES

Handwritten initials or signature.

R.B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



# PRESS RELEASE

HIGH COMMISSION OF MALAYSIA  
50-M, SATYA MARG, CHANAKYAPURI, NEW DELHI

STATEMENT BY MENTERI LUAR NEGERI  
YB TAN SRI M. GHAZALI SHAFIE ON  
THE LATEST DEVELOPMENT AT CYPRUS

Malaysia does not favour any move that would lead to the dismemberment of a sovereign nation. In respect of Cyprus, Malaysia has and will continue to fully support the equality of rights and legitimate demands of the Turkish Cypriot Community as co-partners with the Greek Cypriot Community within the framework of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. Malaysia's position is that the Turkish Cypriot Community has the right to be heard at all fora where the inter-community question of Cyprus is raised.

H.E. Mr. Rauf Denktash in his declaration has clearly stated that there is a deep desire on the part of the Turkish Cypriots to find a just and durable solution and that the proclamation of independence "will not hinder but facilitate the establishment of a genuine federation". This declaration of H.E. Mr. Rauf Denktash coincides with the views of H.E. Mr. Kyprianou. As such, the proclamation cannot be considered as final or permanent but rather one that would pave the way for urgent, serious and earnest moves on the part of both sides towards the realisation of the much desired unity.

It is our view that now is not the time to attribute blame, to condemn or acclaim either party. The International Community must concentrate its best endeavours in re-building mutual trust and confidence between the two communities and, above all, to contribute towards finding a solution on the basis of what is right for Cyprus

and Cypriots of both communities. Malaysia welcomes all efforts that would conduce to bringing the two parties for reconciliation in the spirit of a united Cyprus. Negative words and actions would only make such efforts difficult and must therefore be avoided.

Malaysia considers negotiations within the framework of reconciliation of the two communities and the good offices mission of the UN Secretary-General as the most appropriate forum for pursuing a concrete and effective negotiating process towards an enduring settlement of the problem.

Malaysia will continue to follow with a deep sense of responsibility and interest the developments in Cyprus and, in the meantime, would consult her friends both in the commonwealth and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference whose meetings will take place in the next few days in New Delhi and Dhaka respectively.

Malaysian High Commission,  
New Delhi.

21st November, 1983



## EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INFORMATION SERVICE

DELEGATION OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES FOR SOUTH ASIA



44/83  
21st November 1983

### THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND CYPRUS

In the context of political cooperation, the European Community made the following declaration :

"The Ten Member States of the European Community are deeply concerned by the declaration purporting to establish a "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" as an independent state. They reject this declaration, which is in disregard of successive resolutions of the United Nations. The Ten reiterate their unconditional support for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus. They continue to regard the Government of President Kyprianou as the sole legitimate government of the Republic of Cyprus. They call upon all interested parties not to recognise this act, which creates a very serious situation in the area."

+ + + + +



**Security Council**

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/RES/541 (1983)  
18 November 1983

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RESOLUTION 541 (1983)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2500th meeting,  
on 18 November 1983

The Security Council,

Having heard the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus,

Concerned at the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot authorities issued on 15 November 1983 which purports to create an independent State in northern Cyprus,

Considering that this declaration is incompatible with the 1960 Treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee,

Considering, therefore, that the attempt to create a "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" is invalid, and will contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus,

Reaffirming its resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975),

Aware of the need for a solution of the Cyprus problem based on the mission of good offices undertaken by the Secretary-General,

Affirming its continuing support for the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus,

Taking note of the Secretary-General's statement of 17 November 1983,

1. Deplores the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus;
2. Considers the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal;



3. Calls for the urgent and effective implementation of its resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975);
4. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices, in order to achieve the earliest possible progress towards a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus;
5. Calls upon the parties to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission of good offices;
6. Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus;
7. Calls upon all States not to recognize any Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus;
8. Calls upon all States and the two communities in Cyprus to refrain from any action which might exacerbate the situation;
9. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed.

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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister: Cyprus

to recommend that  
there should be no  
acknowledgement to  
the lengthy letter from  
Mr Denktash (attached).

Peter Ewing  
Deputy Clerk

ME

18. 11. 83

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*I don't see how we can influence him*

*if we don't acknowledge his letters and*

*put the facts right* 18 November 1983

*from John - give our view. He doesn't have to be addressed as President*

Cyprus: Turkish Cypriot Declaration of Independence

*attached*

Thank you for your letter of 15 November reporting the Prime Minister's telephone conversation of that date with President Kyprianou. You also enclosed a letter from Mr Denktash and asked for advice on how it should be handled.

Mr Denktash's letter is a long justification of the Turkish Cypriot decision, enclosing a text of the declaration made by the Turkish Cypriot 'Assembly'. We have always in the past recommended that the Prime Minister should not acknowledge letters from Mr Denktash since that would have implied recognition of his status as 'President' of the then 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus'. A fortiori we recommend that there should be no acknowledgement this time.

Some of the points that Denktash makes in the letter are reasonably justified. He refers, for example, to the actions of the Greek and Greek Cypriot leaderships which hampered the chances of reconciliation between the two peoples of Cyprus. He refers in particular to their action in taking the Cyprus problem to the UN Assembly last May - a move which sparked off the train of events which gave Denktash the excuse he needed to declare independence and which we had advised them against. Mr Denktash also mentions his proposal for a summit meeting with President Kyprianou, claiming that the proposal received 'totally irresponsible treatment' from the Greek Cypriots and that they attempted to turn it into another futile exercise of political manoeuvring and familiar delaying tactics. In fact President Kyprianou was sensitive to the dangers of rejecting Denktash's proposal and thus giving him an excuse to declare independence, or of rushing into an ill-prepared summit. Kyprianou's agreement in principle to the meeting made it more difficult for Denktash to find a good excuse to go ahead with his declaration of independence. Perez de Cuellar believed that the meeting needed careful preparation and could not have taken place before January at the earliest. It is therefore unfair for Denktash to accuse the Greek Cypriots of 'delaying tactics'. In the end, Denktash decided to go ahead with UDI despite the lack of a reasonable excuse and

/thus

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thus flew directly in the face of the Secretary-General's endeavours.

The Foreign Secretary has not seen this letter: I shall be submitting a copy in parallel to him this evening.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'R B Bone', written in dark ink.

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Price Minder's  
by Ask  
28/11


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CYPRUS: ADVANCE COPIES 14

ADVANCE COPY

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PS/MR WHITNEY  
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FM WASHINGTON 182014Z NOV 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3474 OF 18 NOVEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK ATHENS ANKARA NICOSIA PRIORITY  
UK REP BRUSSELS UKDEL STRASBOURG UKDEL NATO PARIS BONN ROME  
  
YOUR TELNOS 1934 AND 1945: CYPRUS

*mt*

1. WHEN LADY YOUNG SAW EAGLEBURGER THIS MORNING, SHE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UK AND US KEEPING CLOSELY IN TOUCH. EAGLEBURGER READILY AGREED, ADDING THAT WE SEEMED TO SHARE MUCH THE SAME VIEW OF THE SITUATION. EAGLEBURGER THOUGHT THINGS WOULD GET WORSE BEFORE THEY GOT BETTER. THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD ALSO HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THE GREEK LOBBY IN CONGRESS, WHICH GOES INTO RECESS TODAY. IF THERE HAD BEEN NO MOVEMENT ON THE ISSUE BY THE TIME CONGRESS RECONVENED IN JANUARY, THE ADMINISTRATION COULD EXPECT CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE TO CUT OFF ALL MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY, EVEN THOUGH SUCH ACTION IN THE PAST HAD

RECOVERED IN JANUARY, THE ADMINISTRATION  
COULD EXPECT CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE TO CUT OFF ALL MILITARY  
ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY, EVEN THOUGH SUCH ACTION IN THE PAST HAD  
MANIFESTLY FAILED TO INFLUENCE TURKISH POLICIES. HE INTENDED FOR THE  
MOMENT TO TRY TO MAINTAIN THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME, BUT  
HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD TO  
GUARD AGAINST VOICING EXCESSIVE CRITICISM WHICH MIGHT LATER BE  
PLAYED BACK AGAINST THEM BY THE CONGRESS.

2. LADY YOUNG SAID YOU HAD TOLD TURKMEN THIS MORNING THAT  
WE HOPED THERE WOULD BE NO QUESTION OF ANY INCREASE IN TURKISH  
FORCES ON THE ISLAND. IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF THE AMERICANS WERE  
TO MAKE THE SAME POINT TO THE TURKS. EAGLEBURGER TOOK NOTE.

3. EAGLEBURGER AGREED THAT CONTINUING UN INVOLVEMENT REPRESENTED  
THE BEST WAY FORWARD. THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUED TO BELIEVE  
THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD. BUT EAGLEBURGER  
EXPECTED CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO TAKE  
THE INITIATIVE. HE HALF-JOKINGLY PICKED UP A SUGGESTION BY HAASS  
(CYPRUS COORDINATOR) THAT THE UK MIGHT WISH TO ACT AS A MEDIATOR  
BETWEEN THE GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS. LADY YOUNG SAID THAT  
IT WAS MOST UNLIKELY THAT WE WOULD WISH TO DO THIS.

EAGLEBURGER'S REMARKS UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR BOTH OUR COUNTRIES  
TO KEEP CLOSELY IN TOUCH.

4. EAGLEBURGER SAW A NEED TO RESTRAIN THE GREEKS FROM ACTING  
EVEN MORE UNWISELY THAN THEY COULD BE EXPECTED TO DO. HE  
SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT BE BETTER PLACED THAN THE AMERICANS TO  
APPROACH THE GREEKS IN ORDER TO GET THEM TO MODERATE THEIR  
RESPONSE TO THE TURKISH ACTION, WHILE THE AMERICANS MIGHT  
HAVE MORE INFLUENCE IN ANKARA.

5. AS AN ASIDE, EAGLEBURGER SUGGESTED THAT NOW THAT THE TURKISH  
CYPRIOTS HAD ACHIEVED WHAT THEY WOULD REGARD AS EQUALITY WITH  
THE GREEK CYPRIOTS THEY MIGHT FEEL PSYCHOLOGICALLY MORE DISPOSED  
TO BE FLEXIBLE IN FURTHER TALKS. THE PROBLEM WOULD BE IN  
GETTING THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH TALKS. HE THOUGHT  
THAT DEKNTASH'S PROPOSALS ON VAROSHA AND THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT  
WERE HELPFUL SIGNS, BUT LADY YOUNG MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE  
DOUBTED THAT THEY COULD LEAD TO EARLY NEGOTIATIONS.

WRIGHT

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3963 83-11-18 16:48

3 PRIVATE OFFICE  
1 FILE

139287

ATTN: MR JOHN COLES  
-----

FROM: SIR FRANCIS NOEL-BAKER

CYPRUS  
-----

cc. Resident Clerk  
fco.

1) Copy to Mr. Bone (Fco)

2) Return to me.

FR 2/11

1. ON TUESDAY, I RETURNED FROM MY 45TH VISIT SINCE EDEN SENT ME TO CYPRUS TO MEDIATE BETWEEN MACARIOS AND HARDING. I VISITED BOTH SIDES AND MET LEADING GREEK - AND TURKISH - CYPRIOTS, AND THE (HIGHLY INTELLIGENT) TURKISH 'AMBASSADOR' TO THE NORTH.
2. INTER-ALIA, WE DISCUSSED UDI AND I WARNED THEM, VERBALLY AND ON PAPER, AGAINST IT BECAUSE IT WOULD: FREEZE THE PRESENT PARTITION: DELAY TALKS WITH GREEK CYPRIOTS: AND DISTURB MAINLAND TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNITY.
3. PERSONALLY, HOWEVER, I DO NOT BELIEVE GREAT DAMAGE HAS BEEN DONE IN CYPRUS.
4. I HAVE LONG THOUGHT THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S 'MEGAPHONE DIPLOMACY', THROUGH INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS, WAS DOOMED TO FAIL.
5. I AM NOW MORE THAN EVER CONVINCED THAT THE BEST HOPE IS A SUSTAINED AND PERSISTENT, LOW PROFILE SHUTTLE MISSION, WITHOUT PUBLICITY, TO SOUND OUT THE FOUR PARTIES (OF WHOM ANKARA AND GREEK NICOSIA ARE DECISIVE). THIS MIGHT CONSIST OF ONE CANADIAN (THEY HAVE TROOPS THERE), ONE YUGOSLAV AND ONE OTHER. IT COULD EVEN START WORK AS A 'RESEARCH TEAM'. IT COULD SEEK TO ESTABLISH THE REAL POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES AND REPORT IN, SAY, 3 MONTHS. IF A BASIS FOR MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS EMERGED BY THEN, THE PARTIES COULD BE INVITED TO MEET - NOT BEFORE. IF NOT, NO HARM WILL BE DONE.

27582 CABOFF G  
917506 GLOTEL G



10 DOWNING STREET

MM 21  
11

Prime Minister <sup>h-a-</sup>

President Erven of  
Turkey has replied to  
y<sup>r</sup> message of  
15 November (attached).

From do nA feel  
that a reply is  
necessary.

Johny Clerk  
18.11.83





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 November 1983

*John Thomas,*

Cyprus

I enclose a reply from President Evren of Turkey to the Prime Minister's message to him of 15 November. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr Turkmen, handed this reply to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs when they met this morning.

The reply takes the line we would expect, and offers us no grounds for believing that the Turks will withdraw recognition of the self-proclaimed 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus', or use their influence to have the declaration of statehood reversed.

In the last paragraph President Evren refers to contact between Mr Turkmen and Sir Geoffrey Howe. Mr Turkmen told Sir Geoffrey Howe this morning that Turkey was prepared to take part in consultations of the three guarantor powers, provided the Greeks take part. The Greeks have told us that they can not agree to trilateral consultations involving Turkey. We are considering what the next move should be.

We do not consider that the message needs a reply.

*Yours*

*R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

*It is a  
well drafted  
overall reply  
out reply*

*MB*

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



R26

EMBASSY OF GREECE

1a Holland Park, London W11 3TP Tel: 727-8040

no reply  
JMB  
28/11

*With Compliments*

## The Greek Parliament

interpreting in today's session the feelings of anger and indignation of the entire Greek nation caused by the unacceptable insurrectionary, illegal and arbitrary action of the Denktash regime in declaring the occupied areas of suffering Cyprus to be a so-called State describing itself as the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus"

unanimously

1. denounces before world public opinion and the conscience of all men the sacrilege so crudely and deceitfully committed against the Republic of Cyprus by the declaration of a Turkish-Cypriot pseudo-State with the backing of the Turkish occupation forces in 37% of the territory of Cyprus;

2. notes that this coup in occupied Cyprus, taking the unfounded form of a so-called State, runs counter to the rules of international law and to the generally and indisputably accepted principles of the international community, as well as shattering the UN Resolutions for a united, independent and indivisible Cyprus Republic. It constitutes the most insolent and provocative response to the initiative of the honourable Secretary-General of the UN, Sr. Javier Perez De Cuellar, for a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem, and also comes into total conflict with the resolutions of all international bodies, such as the European Parliament, the Non-aligned Conference, the Council of Europe, and the Commonwealth Conference;

3. brands this insolent crime the inspiration of Ankara in its attempt to create new faits accomplis in Cyprus at a time when the efforts of the UN Secretary-General, accepted by the entire international community, were under way to find a solution for a united, independent and peaceful Cyprus. Consequently this illegal action is aimed directly against the UN Secretary-General and against all countries which look forward to a just and correct solution of the Cyprus problem;

4. appeals to all States in the world to refuse any form of recognition to the pseudo-State, internationally to denounce this insurrectionary action, and to exercise every pressure for its immediate reversal.

#### The Greek Parliament

expresses its whole-hearted solidarity with the legal Government of the Republic of Cyprus, and demonstrates the firm will and determination of the Greek people to join unwaveringly in the sacred struggle of the Cypriot people for a united, indivisible and independent Cyprus, in accordance with the UN Resolutions.

5. dispatches this unanimous national resolution to all the Parliaments of the world, to the European Parliament, to the Council of Europe, and to the United Nations Organisation, and

calls upon them

to condemn the Turkish-Cypriot pseudo-State as a deforming excrescence on the body of the Cyprus Republic, which violates the indivisibility of Cyprus, undermines the international order, abolishes human rights, makes a mockery of the UN Resolutions, and encompasses grave dangers for peace in this sensitive region.

Athens:17.11.83    The Speaker of the Greek Parliament  
Yiannis N.Alevras

London: 17th November 1983.

CYPRUS: ADVANCE COPIES

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PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET  
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*Arvey good notes*  
*MT*

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TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO.1388 OF 17 NOVEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, PARIS, WASHINGTON

MOD UK, THE HAGUE

PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, ISTANBUL, MOSCOW, ISLAMABAD.

AMMAN, CBF CYPRUS, BONN, ROME

MY TWO IPTS: TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE UK DRAFT RESOLUTION AS FORMALLY TABLED THIS EVENING (17 NOVEMBER).

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS,

CONCERNED AT THE DECLARATION BY THE TURKISH CYPRIOT AUTHORITIES

ISSUED ON 15 NOVEMBER 1983 WHICH PURPORTS TO CREATE AN INDEPENDENT

STATE IN NORTHERN CYPRUS

ISSUED ON 15 NOVEMBER 1983 WHICH PURPORTS TO CREATE AN INDEPENDENT STATE IN NORTHERN CYPRUS,  
CONSIDERING THAT THIS DECLARATION IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE 1960 TREATY CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS AND THE 1960 TREATY OF GUARANTEE,  
CONSIDERING THEREFORE THAT THE ATTEMPT TO CREATE A "TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS" IS INVALID AND WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A WORSENING OF THE SITUATION IN CYPRUS,  
REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTION 365 (1974) AND (1975),  
AWARE OF THE NEED FOR A SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, BASED ON THE MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES UNDERTAKEN BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

AFFIRMING ITS CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR UNFICYP,  
TAKING NOTE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S STATEMENT OF 17 NOVEMBER 1983,

1. DEPLORES THE DECLARATION OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT AUTHORITIES OF THE PURPORTED SECESSION OF PART OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS:
2. CONSIDERS THE DECLARATION REFERRED TO ABOVE AS LEGALLY INVALID AND CALLS FOR ITS WITHDRAWAL:
3. CALLS FOR THE URGENT AND EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS RESOLUTIONS 365(1974) AND 367(1975):
4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO PURSUE HIS MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE PROGRESS TOWARDS A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT IN CYPRUS:
5. CALLS UPON THE PARTIES TO CO-OPERATE FULLY WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN HIS MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES:
- 6 CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY , INDEPENDENCE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS:
7. CALLS UPON ALL STATES NOT TO RECOGNIZE ANY CYPRIOT STATE OTHER THAN THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS:
8. CALLS UPON ALL STATES AND THE TWO COMMUNITIES IN CYPRUS TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT EXACERBATE THE SITUATION:
9. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO KEEP THE SECURITY COUNCIL FULLY INFORMED.

ENDS.

THOMSON

NNNN

D/B 180800z

IMMEDIATE ADVANCE COPY

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PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET  
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DESKBY 180800Z  
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 180340Z NOV 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM UMBER 1386 OF 17 NOVEMBER 1983  
INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, PARIS, WASHINGTON,  
THE HAGUE, MODUK: PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, ISTANBUL,  
MOSCOW, ISLAMABAD, AMMAN, CBFC, BONN, ROME.

YOUR TELNO 767: TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

SUMMARY

1. FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS IN YOU TUR I REACHED AGREEMENT WITH THE CYPRIOT FOREIGN MINISTER THIS EVENING (17 NOVEMBER) ON THE TEXT IN MY SECOND IFT AND HAVE FORMALLY TABLED IT. IT WAS TOUCH AND GO THROUGHOUT THE DAY WITH THE CYPRIOTS PRESSING FOR MUCH MORE AND AT LEAST TWO MORE EXTREME WORKING PAPERS CIRCULATING IN THE COUNCIL. HOWEVER, ONCE WE HAD THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S AGREEMENT TO THE TEXT, ONLY PAKISTAN PRESSED AMENDMENTS IN THE COUNCIL THIS EVENING. WE RESISTED THESE AND BARRING LAST MINUTE HITCHES THE COUNCIL SHOULD VOTE ON THE TEXT TOMORROW MORNING (18 NOVEMBER) WITH AT LEAST 13 VOTES IN FAVOUR. A REPORT OF THE DEBATE SO FAR IS IN MY TELNO 1374 AND MIFT (NEITHER TO ALL).

DETAIL

2. THINGS BECAME DIFFICULT TODAY WITH THE APPEARANCE OF TWO MORE EXTERME WORKING PAPERS WHICH WERE BEING CIRCULATED IN THE COUNCIL. THE FIRST, FROM GUYANA, WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE HAD THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE NON-ALIGNED CONTACT GROUP, CONDEMNED THE TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION AND CALLED FOR SANCTIONS. THE SECOND, PRODUCED BY THE CYPRIOTS, WAS A MUCH STRENGTHENED VERSION OF OUR DRAFT RESOLUTION.

3. IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE COUNCIL AFTER LUNCH, THERE WAS GROWING PRESSURE FOR A LENGTHY DISCUSSION THAT EVENING OF OUR TEXT AND FOR US TO TAKE GREATER ACCOUNT OF CYPRIOT VIEWS.

4. ON RECEIPT OF YOUR INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOWING THE PRIME MINISTER'S

4. ON RECEIPT OF YOUR INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOWING THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU, I HAD A SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH IACOVOU. I BEGAN BY GIVING HIM THE AMENDMENTS IN YOUR TUR TOGETHER WITH THOSE IN YOUR TELNO 759 REFERRING TO THE GOVERNMENT OF CYPRUS AND ITS NON-ALIGNED STATUS. HE RETURNED AFTER TALKING TO THE GREEKS AND TO HIS ADVISERS WITH A WHOLE RAFT OF ADDITIONAL AMENDMENTS WHICH HE CLAIMED WERE BASED ON HIS UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED AT THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. THE AMENDMENTS INCLUDED AMONG OTHERS THE SUBSTITUTION OF "CONDEMNS" FOR "DEPLORES"; THE DELETION OF OPERATIVE PARAS 5 AND 8; OPERATIVE PARA 4 TO STOP AT "GOOD OFFICES"; I TOLD HIM FIRMLY THAT THIS WOULD BUST THE NEGOTIATIONS. I HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT MY PROPOSED AMENDMENTS REFLECTED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING AND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT HAD AGREED ON THE NEED FOR THE RESOLUTION TO BE PASSED QUICKLY (WHICH IACOVOU ACCEPTED). I SAID THAT WHETHER OR NOT HE COULD AGREE TO OUR REVISED DRAFT I WOULD HAVE TO TABLE IT FORMALLY THAT EVENING IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD THE POSSIBILITY OF A VOTE TOMORROW. I WARNED HIM OF THE RISKS OF THE VOTE BEING POSTPONED AND THE RESOLUTION BEING SUBJECTED TO CONFLICTING AMENDMENTS IF WE DID NOT MOVE AT ONCE.

5. AFTER GOING AWAY ALLEGEDLY TO CONSULT WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU, HE RETURNED TO SAY THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT OUR NEW TEXT WITH ONE ABSOLUTE STICKING POINT WHICH WAS THAT OPERATIVE PARA 2 SHOULD ALSO DECLARE THE TURKISH CYPRIOT RESOLUTION LEGALLY INVALID. HE NOTED THAT THE FOURTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH ALREADY USED THE WORD "INVALID". I AGREED TO ACCEPT THIS BUT NO MORE ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WOULD CLINCH HIS SUPPORT FOR THE DRAFT. AFTER A FURTHER LENGTHY DISCUSSION IN WHICH HE APPARENTLY SOUGHT AND GOT APPROVAL OF THE FOUR CYPRIOT POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS WHO HAD COME TO NEW YORK - CLERIDES, PAPAIOANNOU, GALANOS, LYSSARIDES - HE GAVE ME THE GO-AHEAD AND I FORMALLY TABLED THE TEXT WHICH IS IN MY SECOND IFT.

6. WHEN THE COUNCIL MET AGAIN IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS THIS EVENING, THE PRESIDENT WAS ABLE TO ANNOUNCE THAT OUR TEXT HAD THE SUPPORT OF THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT. THIS CHANGED THE WHOLE ATMOSPHERE. THE PAKISTANI FOREIGN MINISTER PROPOSED A NUMBER OF PRO-TURKISH AMENDMENTS (TEXT BY FACSIMILE TO SED), MOST OF WHICH SOUGHT TO INTRODUCE REFERENCES TO THERE BEING OTHER PAST VIOLATIONS OF THE 1960 TREATIES. BUT GUYANA, NICARAGUA AND ZIMBABWE SAID FIRMLY THAT THEY SUPPORTED OUR NEW TEXT ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WAS A COMPROMISE AND THAT THEY WOULD HAVE SEVERAL (PRO-CYPRIOT) AMENDMENTS OF THEIR OWN IF DISCUSSION OF IT WAS RE-OPENED. WE STRESSED THE NEED NOT TO UNRAVEL WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED. THE RUSSIANS SAID THAT THEY TOO COULD SUPPORT THE TEXT EVEN THOUGH IT WAS NOT PERFECT.

7. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD MEET FOR FURTHER INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS AT 1600Z TOMORROW (18 NOVEMBER) FOLLOWED BY A FORMAL MEETING AT 1630Z. THE PRESIDENT APPEALED TO COUNCIL MEMBERS NOT TO OPEN A PANDORA'S BOX BY PROPOSING AMENDMENTS THOUGH HE LEFT IT OPEN FOR THEM STILL DO SO. THE GENERAL ASSUMPTION APPEARED TO BE THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD VOTE ON THE TEXT AS IT STOOD TOMORROW MORNING AND THAT ONLY JORDAN, WHICH RESERVED ITS POSITION, AND PAKISTAN MIGHT NOT SUPPORT IT.

THOMSON



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PP UKREP BXLS

PP UKDEL STRASBOURG

PP BONN

PP UKDEL NATO

PP PARIS

PP ROME

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FM WASHINGTON 172250Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3464 OF 17 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS ANKARA NICOSIA UKMIS NEW YORK PRIORITY  
UKREP BRUSSELS UKDEL NATO UKDEL STRASBOURG PARIS BONN ROME

CYPRUS: TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

1. BURT ASKED MINISTER TO CALL THIS AFTERNOON TO REVIEW DEVELOPMENTS IN CYPRUS. HE STRESSED THE US DESIRE TO WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH US OVER THIS ISSUE.

2. BURT SAID THAT THE US WOULD CONTINUE TO URGE PUBLICLY THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED AND TO TAKE THE SAME LINE WITH THE TURKS, BUT IN HIS VIEW THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS WERE NEARLY ZERO. IT WOULD HOWEVER BE WORTH EXAMINING WHETHER DENKTASH'S DECISION MIGHT OPEN UP NEW NEGOTIATING POSSIBILITIES. HIS WILLINGNESS TO OPEN VAROSHA TO GREEK CYPRIOT RESETTLEMENT AND TO AGREE TO THE REOPENING OF NICOSIA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT OFFERED OPPORTUNITIES WHICH WE SHOULD DISCUSS FURTHER. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER DENKTASH'S MOTIVE WAS TO DEFUSE THE NEGATIVE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO HIS DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, OF TO SIGNAL A GENUINE INTEREST IN NEW NEGOTIATIONS. BUT IN EITHER CASE HIS INITIATIVE SHOULD NOT BE IGNORED.

3. BURT NOTED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD PRIVATELY BEEN URGING

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PS/MR WHITNEY  
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MR ADAMS  
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M

~~3. BURT NOTED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD PRIVATELY BEEN URGING~~  
BOTH THE TURKS AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS TO TAKE SOME SUCH MOVE TO  
BUILD CONFIDENCE. THEY HAD RECEIVED SOME INTRIGUING SIGNALS  
FROM THE TURKS SUGGESTING THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT DECISION  
COULD BE CONSISTENT WITH AN EFFORT TO ESTABLISH A SINGLE  
FEDERATED STATE ON CYPRUS. THE TURKS MAINTAINED THAT THEY HAD  
NOT ABANDONED THE 1977 AND 1979 UNDERSTANDINGS AND STILL  
SUPPORTED WALDHEIM'S EVALUATION. BURT WENT ON TO SPECULATE ON  
A PERSONAL BASIS THAT, THOUGH DENKTASH MIGHT SIMPLY HAVE CHOSEN  
AN OPPORTUNE MOMENT TO CONSOLIDATE HIS OWN POSITION HE MIGHT ALSO  
BE KEEPING OPEN THE OPTION OF ENTERING REAL NEGOTIATIONS. THERE WOULD  
BE OPPORTUNITIES THIS WEEK IN NEW YORK TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES.

4. THOMAS AGREED THAT WE SHOULD KEEP CLOSELY IN TOUCH. OUR  
DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION KEPT OPEN THE WAY FOR THE  
SECRETARY GENERAL TO BUILD ON HIS PREVIOUS CONTACTS WITH THE  
PARTIES. A PARTICULAR UK CONCERN WAS TO FULFIL OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER  
THE 1960 TREATIES FOR OBVIOUS REASONS CONNECTED WITH THE SOVEREIGN  
BASE AREAS. THE TURKS HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO CONSULTATIONS BUT  
THE GREEKS HAD PROPOSED SEPARATE BILATERAL TALKS. THOMAS SAID  
THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT US TO ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL OR TO SEEK  
A MEDIATION ROLE. THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL WAS BEST PLACED TO  
TAKE UP THE PROBLEM. A GOOD SUCCESSOR TO GOBBI WAS URGENTLY  
NEEDED.

5. BURT STRESSED THAT THE US HAD NO DESIRE TO TAKE THE LEAD  
THEMSELVES IN DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS OR TO PRESS THE UK  
TO DO SO. THEY ENTIRELY AGREED THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD  
TAKE THE LEAD. WE SHOULD ACT TOGETHER TO SUPPORT HIS EFFORTS.

6. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION ABOUT CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES, BURT SAID  
THAT THERE WAS SUPPORT ON THE HILL FOR THE POSITION THE  
ADMINISTRATION HAD TAKEN. THERE WOULD NOT BE TIME BEFORE THE  
RECESS FOR CONGRESS TO TAKE ACTION TO CUT AID TO TURKEY. BUT  
MEMBERS WOULD COME UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE IN THE NEXT FEW  
WEEKS, PARTICULARLY FROM GREEK AMERICANS. IT WAS THEREFORE  
DESIRABLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME VISIBLE PROGRESS BEFORE  
CONGRESS REASSEMBLED IN JANUARY.

WRIGHT

NNNN

Subject: Cyprus  
Int slit Feb 80

SUBJECT

Ankara, 17 November 1983

Your Excellency,

MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T188A183

I have studied carefully your message of 15 November 1983 regarding the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

The decision of the Turkish Cypriots to set-up their own independent state should be judged in the light of the convulsive history of Cyprus. The Government of the United Kingdom knows better than any other government the oppression and humiliation suffered by the Turkish Cypriots whenever the Greeks were holding ascendancy over them. The Government of the United Kingdom cannot also ignore that the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee has never been applied for the safeguarding of the basic and constitutional rights of the Turkish Cypriots. The Treaty remained a dead letter during the onslaught against the Turks in 1963/64, in 1967 and finally in 1974 when Greece attempted to annex the Island.

Since 1975 the Government of Turkey has constantly supported and encouraged a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus issue between the two communities. Despite the frustration justifiably felt by the Turkish Community over the lack of any progress and the refusal of the Greek Cypriots to recognize them as equal partners, the Turkish Government persisted in urging the Turkish Community to persevere in the dialogue. You have been regularly informed of our efforts to dissuade the Turkish Cypriots from embarking on a different course. But we have also indicated that we cannot deny their right to self-determination, since that right is inherent

./..

- The Right Honourable  
Margaret Thatcher  
Prime Minister  
LONDON

in the very creation of the Cyprus State in 1960 and in the recognition by the international community that the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots should work out between themselves a negotiated solution regarding their future. It would have been inconceivable for Turkey not to recognize the new State particularly in view of the reaffirmation of its commitment to continue the intercommunal talks. The Government of Turkey will no doubt pursue its efforts in support of the good offices mission of the Secretary General of the United Nations.

Our Foreign Minister will be in contact with Sir Geoffrey Howe on the suggestion that there should be consultation between the three Guarantor Powers. Like the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus we recognize the legal validity of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.

Kenan EVREN  
President

with BJC

CYPRUS: ADVANCE COPIES 13

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR JENKINS

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*[Handwritten signature]*

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FM ATHENS 171215Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO.,

TELNO 669 OF 17 NOVEMBER 1983.,

REPEATED AS IMMEDIATE INFO TO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, ANKARA,  
AND NICOSIA.,

REPEATED AS PRIORITY INFO TO BONN, PARIS, ROME, UKDEL NATO,  
ISTANBUL, STRASBOURG, UKREP BRUSSELS AND CBFC.

MY TELNO 668 AND TELECON KEEFE/MADDEN: **TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION  
OF STATEHOOD**

1. CAPSIS HAS SENT ME A COPY OF THE MESSAGE TO YOU WHICH HE SENT LAST NIGHT FOR DELIVERY BY KYRIAZIDES. THE TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS:

"IN THE ABSENCE ABROAD OF FOREIGN MINISTER MR IOANNIS HARALAMBOPOULOS, I WOULD LIKE TO BRING THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO YOUR ATTENTION REGARDING YOUR MESSAGE TO HIM, DATED NOVEMBER 15TH.

"THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAS HIGHLY APPRECIATED THE POSITION TAKEN BY HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT DURING THE RECENT CYPRUS CRISIS; WHICH WAS PRECIPITATED BY THE PURPORTED DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS.

"IT ALSO VALUES THE INTENTION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO ADOPT INITIATIVES IN ORDER TO DEFUSE THE CRISIS AND EVENTUALLY ALLOW THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO PURSUE HIS INITIATIVE TO WHICH WE ALL WISH SUCCESS. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE APPRECIATE THE PROPOSAL FOR CONSULTATIONS UNDER THE 1960 TREATY OF GUARANTEE.

"HOWEVER, YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN DISCUSSIONS ON CYPRUS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT, AS LONG AS A MAJOR PART OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS REMAINS UNDER OCCUPATION BY TURKISH ARMED FORCES.

"ON THE OTHER HAND, THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED AND WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO ENTER INTO BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES OF RESOLVING THE PRESENT CYPRUS CRISIS.

"IT IS OBVIOUS THAT WE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION WHATSOEVER SHOULD THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WISH TO ENTER ALSO INTO BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WITH THE SAME PURPOSE".

R H O D E S

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FM FCO 162059Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE ATHENS

TELEGRAM NO 501 OF 16 NOV 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA, NICOSIA, WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, ROME,  
UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, ISTANBUL, STRASBOURG, UKREP BRUSSELS,  
CBFC.

CYPRUS: TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

1. THE GREEK AMBASSADOR CALLED ON ME THIS EVENING AT HIS OWN REQUEST. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY KOUTSOGIORGAS, MINISTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER. KOUTSOGIORGAS, SPEAKING IN GREEK, DID ALL THE TALKING ON THE GREEK SIDE.
2. I EXPLAINED THE ACTIONS WE HAD TAKEN SO FAR AS REFERRED TO IN MY STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE YESTERDAY. IN ADDITION WE VERY MUCH REGRETTED THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAD CHOSEN TO RECOGNISE THE NEW SO CALLED STATE. WE HOPED THAT NO OTHERS WOULD FOLLOW THIS EXAMPLE AND WERE TAKING APPROPRIATE ACTION IN A NUMBER OF CAPITALS.
3. I EMPHASIED THAT WE SHOULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH. ALL CONCERNED SHOULD AVOID ACTION WHICH MIGHT MAKE THE PRESENT SITUATION WORSE. WE WOULD BE GUIDED BY THIS PRINCIPLE AND HOPED THAT THE GREEKS WOULD BE TOO. REFERRING TO OUR CALL FOR CONSULTATIONS, I SAID THAT THE PRELIMINARY REACTION FROM THE TURKS WAS TO SAY

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THAT THEY ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE PROVIDED THE GREEKS ALSO ACCEPTED. WHAT WAS THE GREEK REACTION?

4. KOUTSOGIORGAS SAID THAT, GIVEN THE ACTIONS BY TURKEY IN VIOLATION OF THE TREATY, THE POSITION OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WAS THAT THEY COULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY TRILATERAL OR THREE-SIDED CONSULTATIONS. THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO ENVISAGE A REPETITION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OF 1974 WHICH HAD MERELY SERVED AS A CLOAK FOR THE TURKISH INVASION. THEY WERE HAPPY TO CONSULT WITH THE UK. THE UK WAS ALSO FREE TO CONSULT WITH TURKEY IF SHE WISHED. IN ANSWER TO QUESTION HE SAID THAT GREECE WOULD NOT CONSULT DIRECTLY WITH TURKEY. I SAID THAT THE TREATY CALLED FOR CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE THREE GUARANTOR POWERS TOGETHER. I WOULD REFLECT ON WHAT HAD BEEN SAID BUT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT THE WAY FORWARD WOULD BE. I HOPED THE GREEKS TOO WOULD REFLECT. PRESUMABLY WE COULD EXPECT A CONSIDERED REPLY FROM HARALAMBOPOULOS. KOUTSOGIORGAS SAID THAT WE COULD EXPECT A REPLY FROM HARALAMBOPOULOS VERY SOON. NO ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE MADE OF THE GREEK RESPONSE UNTIL THE REPLY HAD BEEN SENT. BUT THE POSITION HE HAD DESCRIBED WAS A FIRM DECISION BY THE GOVERNMENT.

5. KOUSOGIORGAS SAID THAT THE TURKS BORE A GRAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DESTROYING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR INTERCOMMUNAL DIALOGUE. NEGOTIATIONS COULD NOT RESUME UNLESS THE TURKISH CYPRIOT DECISION WAS REVERSED. GREECE WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR A WITHDRAWAL OF TURKISH TROOPS.

6. I ASKED KOUSOGIORGAS IF HE COULD GIVE ME AN ASSURANCE THAT GREECE WOULD DO NOTHING TO MAKE THE SITUATION MORE SERIOUS OR INCREASE THE RISKS OF CONFLICT ON THE ISLAND. HE REPLIED THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAD NEVER TAKEN ACTION WHICH PROVOKED VIOLENCE. BUT THEY HAD TO TAKE ALL MEASURES THEY CONSIDERED NECESSARY FOR THE SECURITY OF CYPRUS. THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT THERE WAS ANY DEFINITE PLAN FOR ACTION. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD CONSIDER ITS POSITION AFTER THE UN DEBATE. THEY HAD



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NOT ENVISAGED SENDING TROOPS IN THE PAST. BUT THE PRESENT SITUATION REPRESENTED A SERIOUS CHANGE. ALTHOUGH THEY WERE NOT DEFINITELY PLANNING TO SEND TROOPS, HE COULD NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY. HE APPRECIATED THE UK REACTION TO THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE INITIATIVE WE HAD TAKEN IN THE UN. HE HOPED IT WOULD PRODUCE RAPID RESULTS LEADING TO A REVERSAL OF THE DECLARATION. I SAID IT WAS OUR STRONG WISH THAT NOTHING WOULD BE DONE WHICH MIGHT ADD TO TENSION. ANY INCREASE IN TROOP STRENGTHS WOULD GIVE THE WRONG SIGNAL.

7. AS HE WAS LEAVING THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE WISHED TO CONFIRM THAT GREECE WOULD ABSTAIN ON THE FALKLANDS RESOLUTION. THEY HAD COME UNDER STRONG PRESSURE FROM ARGENTINA TO BE ABSENT FROM THE VOTE. BUT THEY WOULD BE THERE AND WOULD ABSTAIN. I THANKED HIM FOR THIS INFORMATION.

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MR WRIGHT  
SIR C TICKELL  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR ADAMS  
MR CARTLEDGE  
MR EGERTON  
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FM FCO 162100Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE ANKARA

TELEGRAM NO 312 OF 16 NOV 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS, NICOSIA, WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, ROME,  
UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, ISTANBUL, STRASBOURG, UKREP BRUSSELS,  
CBFC.

CYPRUS: TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

1. THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR CALLED THIS EVENING AT MY REQUEST. I TOLD HIM I WISHED TO ENSURE THAT HE HAD A CLEAR VIEW OF OUR ATTITUDE TO RECENT EVENTS IN CYPRUS. HE WOULD HAVE SEEN MY STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE. WE DEPLORED THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS' DECLARATION OF STATEHOOD. IT WAS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE 1960 TREATIES AND HAD BEEN MADE DESPITE OUR REPEATED EFFORTS AT DISSUASION IN NICOSIA AND ANKARA. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SENT A MESSAGE TO EVREN URGING HIM TO SECURE A REVERSAL. WE HAD ALSO CALLED FOR A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND CIRCULATED INFORMALLY A DRAFT RESOLUTION. WE VERY MUCH REGRETTED TURKISH RECOGNITION AND THE FACT THAT THE TURKISH AUTHORITIES HAD NOT PREVAILED UPON DENKTASH TO DISSUADE HIM FROM ACTION. WE HAD CALLED FOR CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE GUARANTOR POWERS. MR TURKMEN'S PRELIMINARY REPLY HAD BEEN TO AGREE IN PRINCIPLE. WE AWAITED THE GREEK RESPONSE. MEANWHILE WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH. WE HOPED THAT ALL INVOLVED WOULD AVOID DOING ANYTHING TO MAKE THE PRESENT SITUATION WORSE.

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2. I ADDED THAT WE HAD GIVEN GREAT SUPPORT TO THE TURKS IN THEIR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A RETURN TO DEMOCRACY. WE WOULD CONTINUE TO ADOPT THIS ATTITUDE SO FAR AS WE COULD. BUT HE SHOULD REALISE THAT THE LATEST DEVELOPMENT, COMING AT A CRUCIAL TIME FOR TURKEY, MADE THE TASK FACING TURKEY'S FRIENDS CONSIDERABLY MORE DIFFICULT.

3. THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR SAID THAT WE WOULD KNOW TURKEY'S POSITION FROM REPORTS FROM OUR AMBASSADOR IN ANKARA AND FROM THEIR STATEMENTS. DENKTASH'S DECISION HAD COME AS A SURPRISE TO TURKEY ALTHOUGH IT HAD BEEN IN THE AIR FOR A LONG TIME. THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAD ENCOURAGED A SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM THROUGH INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AND THROUGH THE PROPOSED SUMMIT MEETING. HE THEN SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERCOMMUNAL DISCUSSIONS: THE UNHELPFUL INITIATIVES TAKEN BY GREEKS AND GREEK CYPRIOTS TO INTERNATIONALISE THE ISSUE: AND THE MONOPOLY WHICH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD ESTABLISHED FOR THEMSELVES IN INTERNATIONAL REPRESENTATION OF CYPRUS. TURKEY'S DECISION TO RECOGNISE THE NEW STATE HAD BEEN PROMPTED BY THE FAVOURABLE ASPECTS OF THE DECLARATION (EG PARAS B4 TO 8 OF NICOSIA TEL NO. 282. HE BELIEVED THAT THE NEW STATE WOULD RECEIVE SUPPORT FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THAT THIS WOULD HELP TO RESTORE THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES IN CYPRUS. THE OBJECTIVE OF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM COULD ONLY BE ACHIEVED IF THERE WAS UNDERSTANDING FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. PARTICULARLY THE UK, OF THE POSITION OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS. IF THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WERE CUT OFF FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD THEN THE PRESENT PROMISING OPPORTUNITY FOR THE FUTURE OF CYPRUS WOULD BE LOST. IN DESPERATION THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS MIGHT EVEN TAKE MORE DRASTIC ACTION.

3. REFERRING TO OUR PROPOSAL FOR CONSULTATIONS OF THE GUARANTOR POWERS, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT TURKEY WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE

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PLEASED IF THE INITIATIVE HAD COME BEFORE OTHER ACTION HAD BEEN  
TAKEN, EG UK 'ASSOCIATION' WITH THE GREEK CYPRIOT INITIATIVE  
IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

4. I SAID THAT I WAS PLEASED TO NOTE THE EMPHASIS ON SEEKING  
FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS BUT DISTURBED BY THE REFERENCE TO  
POSSIBLE FURTHER MEASURES BY THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS. I HOPED  
THAT THE TURKS WOULD EXERCISE THE NECESSARY RESTRAINT.  
THE AMBASSADOR CONFIRMED THAT THIS WOULD BE THEIR INTENTION.

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PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
MR WRIGHT  
SIR C TICKELL  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR ADAMS  
MR CARTLEDGE  
MR EGERTON  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
MR HANNAY  
MR THOMAS

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 November 1983

*John S. ...*

Cyprus

/ I enclose a brief for President Kyprianou's call  
/ on the Prime Minister tomorrow. I also enclose, as  
requested in your letter of 15 November, a draft reply  
to a message from the President which was  
delivered by the Cyprus High Commissioner on 15 November.  
You may feel that the reply could be handed over during  
President Kyprianou's call. I am submitting the brief  
and draft message in parallel to the Foreign Secretary  
this evening, and will let you know first thing tomorrow  
if he has any comments.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard  
Motttram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield  
(Cabinet Office).

*Yours ...*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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DSR 11 (Revised)

**DRAFT:** minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

**TYPE:** Draft/Final 1+

**FROM:**  
Prime Minister

Reference

**DEPARTMENT:** **TEL. NO:**

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

**TO:**  
His Excellency Mr Spyros Kyprianou

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

**SUBJECT:**

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your letter of 15 November, which I received through your High Commissioner in London, about the purported declaration of independence by the Turkish Cypriots in northern Cyprus.

CAVEAT.....

As you will know, my Government deplore this action by the Turkish Cypriot community which we consider to be incompatible with the 1960 treaties. We have approached the President of the Security Council of the United Nations with a view to securing an early meeting and we have proposed consultations to both the Turkish and Greek Governments in accordance with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. We have also sent a message to President Evren urging him to help secure a reversal of the Turkish Cypriot declaration. It remains our position that we recognise only one Republic of Cyprus.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Looking to the future, we shall continue our efforts to bring about a reversal of this declaration. But we would deeply regret if this action, unwelcome as it is, led to the breakdown of the intercommunal talks and

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consultations carried out by the Secretary General of the United Nations. We also trust that all concerned will avoid any action which could lead to a further deterioration of the situation in Cyprus.

I can assure you that we shall continue to work to this purpose and I hope that our two governments will remain in close touch during the coming weeks.

CYPRUS: ADVANCE COPIES 13

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PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

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SIR J BULLARD

MR JENKINS

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RIS 161800Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1044 OF 16NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK PRIORITY NICOSIA ATHENS, ANKARA,  
BONN, ROME, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO.

ADVANCE COPY

MY TELNO 1029 : TURKISH CYPRIOT UDI : FRENCH REACTIONS.

1. THE QUAI ISSUED A STATEMENT LAST NIGHT DENOUNCING QUOTE  
DENONCE SANS RESERVES UNQUOTE DENKTASH'S ACTION WHICH IT DESCRIBED  
AS A SERIOUS BLOW TO THE INTEGRITY, SOVEREIGNTY AND UNITY OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT COULD NOT POSSIBLY  
ACCEPT THIS FAIT ACCOMPLI WHICH RAN COMPLETELY COUNTER TO SECURITY  
COUNCIL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS.

2. WHEN WE TOOK ACTION WITH THE SOUS DIRECTEUR FOR SOUTHERN  
EUROPE IN QUAI ON YOUR TELNO 747 TO UKMIS NEW YORK, GODECHOT SAID  
THAT AT FIRST GLANCE THE UK DRAFT SEEMED REASONABLE BUT HE WONDERED  
IF IT WOULD BE STRONG ENOUGH FOR THE GREEKS AND GREEK CYPRIOTS.  
HE ALSO NOTED THE ABSENCE OF ANY REFERENCE TO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS  
ADDING, HOWEVER, THAT THE CYPRIOTS THEMSELVES DID NOT SEEM SO FAR  
TO BE DEMANDING THIS. PERHPAS THEY WERE AFRAID THAT SUCH MEASURES  
WOULD CONSECRATE PARTITION OR EVEN PUSH THE NORTH TOWARDS UNION



TO BE DEMANDING THIS. PERHPAS THEY WERE AFRAID THAT SUCH MEASURES WOULD CONSECRATE PARTITION OR EVEN PUSH THE NORTH TOWARDS UNION WITH TURKEY. A PROPOS OF THE FRENCH STATEMENT , GODECHOT SAID THAT AVOIDANCE OF THE TERM QUOTE CONDEMN UNQUOTE HAD BEEN DELIBERATE.

3. YESTERDAY, WHEN WE WERE TAKING ACTION ON YOUR TELNO 305 TO ANKARA GODECHOT SAID THAT IN VIEW OF THEIR BAD RELATIONS WITH TURKEY THE FRENCH HAD POOR ACCESS IN ANKARA. HE ASKED FOR ANY INFORMATION WE COULD GIVE THEM ABOUT TURKISH REACTIONS. TODAY WE THEREFORE GAVE HIM THE GIST OF ANKARA TELNOS 553 AND 554, TAKING CARE NOT TO MAKE THE TURKS SOUND TOO NEGATIVE. GODECHOT SAID THAT THE QUAM HAD SUMMONED THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING TO SEEK AN EXPLANATION FOR TURKISH RECOGNITION OF THE NEW ENTITY. THE AMBASSADOR HAD TAKEN A SIMILAR LINE TO TURKMEN.

4. THERE HAS NOT BEEN MUCH COMMENT IN THE FRENCH PRESS. LE MONDE, HOWEVER, WRINGS HIS HANDS OVER THE FAILURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, ESPECIALLY THE UN, BRITAIN AND THE US, TO PREVENT CYPRUS' HEADING FOR PARTITION.

FRETWELL

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CYPRUS: ADVANCE COPIES 13

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FM ANKARA 160915Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 555 OF 16 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK  
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, ROME, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS  
MODUK, CBFC AND ISTANBUL

CYPRUS : UDI : TURKISH PRESS REACTION

1. THE TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION HAS PREDICTABLY SWEEPED ALL OTHER NEWS FROM THE FRONT PAGES, MANY OF WHICH SHOW PROMINENTLY MAPS OF DIVIDED CYPRUS. THE GENERAL TONE OF HEADLINES AND NEWS STORIES IS ONE OF SELF-CONGRATULATIONS, TOGETHER WITH THE ASSERTION THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAVE AT LAST GOT WHAT THEY DESERVED.

2. THE TONE OF THE EXTENSIVE PRESS COMMENT, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN INTERESTINGLY DIFFERENT. IT IS UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED THAT DENKTASH ACTED WITHOUT THE AUTHORITY OR KNOWLEDGE OF ANKARA. IT IS ALSO ACCEPTED THAT HIS ACTION WAS ENTIRELY UNDERSTANDABLE AND MUST BE SUPPORTED BY ANKARA. HOWEVER, THERE IS A SURPRISING DEGREE OF REALISM, AND INDEED APPREHENSION, ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES INTO WHICH TURKEY HAS BEEN PLUNGED. IT IS THOUGHT LIKELY THAT:

- (A) THE PROBLEM OF RECOGNITION OF THE NEW "STATE" WILL LINGER FOR MANY YEARS (SEMI COLON)
- (B) THE GREEK LOBBY IN THE UNITED STATES WILL CREATE MAXIMUM TROUBLE OVER VITAL US MILITARY AID (SEMI COLON)
- (C) TURKEY WILL FIND IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO NORMALISE

RELATIONS WITH THE EC AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

(C) TURKEY WILL FIND IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO NORMALISE  
RELATIONS WITH THE EEC AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE.

AS TO THE TIMING, ALTHOUGH IT IS RECOGNISED THAT DENKTASH HAS TAKEN  
ADVANTAGE OF A QUASI-INTERREGUM, THE INCOMING OZAL GOVERNMENT  
HAS NEVERTHELESS BEEN PUT IN A VERY AWKWARD POSITION IN ADDITION  
TO ALL OF ITS OTHER DIFFICULTIES.

3. ON THE MORE POSITIVE SIDE, COMMENTATORS POINT TO DENKTASH'S  
APPEAL TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS, AND HOPE  
(BUT WITHOUT MUCH ARGUMENT TO JUSTIFY THAT HOPE) THAT THE DECLARATION  
WILL AT LAST ENABLE NEGOTIATIONS TO PROCEED ON A BASIS OF EQUALITY.  
MUMTAZ SOYSAL, WHO HAS BEEN CLOSELY INVOLVED WITH CYPRUS FOR MANY  
YEARS AND WHO HAS LONG BEEN A ADVOCATE OF UDI, HAS SAID THAT NOW  
IS THE TIME FOR THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS, HAVING MADE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL  
ADVANCE OF DECLARING THEIR EQUALITY, TO LOOK FOR COMPROMISE AND  
RECONCILIATION. BUT NONE OF THIS RECOGNISES THE NEED TO TAKE  
ACCOUNT OF THE INEVITABLE ANGER AND FRUSTRATION OF THE GREEK  
CYPRIOTS.

4. THE CONDEMNATORY STATEMENTS BY OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE  
UK, HAVE SO FAR BEEN REPORTED FULLY AND FACTUALLY, BUT WITHOUT  
COMMENT.

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THE RT HON MARGARET THATCHER MP  
PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

FOLLOWING URGENT FROM SECRETARY-GENERAL RAMPHAL

BEGINS  
-----

I AM SURE ALL COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS WILL WISH TO IMMEDIATELY DENOUNCE THE PURPORTED DECLARATION OF SECESSION AND INDEPENDENCE BY MR DENKTASH IN RELATION TO THE TURKISH OCCUPIED NORTHERN ZONE OF CYPRUS, TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WILL NOT RECOGNISE THIS ILLEGAL AND UNILATERAL ACT AND IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE TO SHOW THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS AND WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU.

SONNY RAMPHAL  
COMSECGEN LONDON

ENDS  
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83-11-16 11:25

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CYPRUS: ADVANCE COPIES 14

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

~~MR JAMES~~

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ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

THE RT HON MARGARET THATCHER MP  
PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

FOLLOWING URGENT FROM SECRETARY-GENERAL RAMPHAL

BEGINS

I AM SURE ALL COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS WILL WISH TO IMMEDIATELY DENOUNCE THE PURPORTED DECLARATION OF CESSION AND INDEPENDENCE BY MR DENKTASH IN RELATION TO THE TURKISH OCCUPIED NORTHERN ZONE OF CYPRUS, TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WILL NOT RECOGNISE THIS ILLEGAL AND UNILATERAL ACT AND IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE TO SHOW THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS AND WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU.

SONNY RAMPHAL  
COMSECGEN LONDON

ENDS

83-11-15 15:40

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**IMMEDIATE**

CYPRUS: ADVANCE COPIES 13



**ADVANCE COPY**

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR. WHITNEY  
PS/PUS

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SIR J BULLARD  
MR JENKINS

... ..  
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CONFIDENTIAL

FM ANKARA 161130Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 558 OF 16 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON  
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS,  
MODUK, CBFC, ISTANBUL

MY TELNO : 556 CYPRUS : UDI : RECOGNITION

1. MFA HAVE TOLD US THAT BANGLADESH HAVE DULY RECOGNISED THE  
TURKISH CYPRIOT "STATE".

RUSSELL  
BT

WSC014/11

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 16

16 NOV 1983

DESK OFFICER	RF
INDEX	PA
	Action Taken

SUBJECT  
a. Minister  
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61

CONFIDENTIAL

67 - 1

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 187<sup>A</sup> / 83

ZZ ANKARA  
OO NICOSIA  
OO ATHENS  
DD ROME DESKBY 151530Z  
GRS 357

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 151530Z (PARIS BONN ROME UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON)  
FM FCO 151407Z NOV 83  
TO F L A S H ANKARA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 305 OF 15 NOVEMBER  
AND TO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK AND  
WASHINGTON  
INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS,  
UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, MODUK CBFC  
UDI: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT EVREN  
FOR ANKARA

1. YOU SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME  
MINISTER TO PRESIDENT EVREN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE:

QUOTE

I NOTE WITH CONCERN THAT THE 'ASSEMBLY' OF THE TURKISH  
CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION IN NORTHERN CYPRUS PASSED A RESOLUTION  
ON 15 NOVEMBER WHICH PURPORTS TO APPROVE THE ESTABLISHMENT  
OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTH CYPRUS AND THE DECLARATION OF  
INDEPENDENCE.

WHEN MR HESELTINE SAW YOU ON 18 OCTOBER HE TOLD YOU  
OF OUR ANXIETY ABOUT REPORTS THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT  
AUTHORITIES WERE CONTEMPLATING AN ACTION OF THIS SORT AND OUR  
HOPE THAT THEY WOULD BE DISSUADED. LADY YOUNG SPOKE  
SIMILARLY TO MR DENKTASH ON 22 OCTOBER.

AS A GUARANTOR POWER UNDER THE 1960 TREATY OF GUARANTEE  
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DEPLOR THIS ACTION ON THE PART OF  
THE TURKISH CYPRIOT AUTHORITIES. IT IS CLEARLY INCOMPATIBLE  
WITH THE 1960 TREATY OF GUARANTEE. IT CAN ONLY COMPLICATE  
THE ALREADY DIFFICULT TASK OF REACHING A SETTLEMENT IN CYPRUS  
ACCEPTABLE TO THE PEOPLE OF BOTH COMMUNITIES AND THE  
ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL TO ACHIEVE

CONFIDENTIAL

67 - 1

SUCH A RESULT.

I SHOULD LIKE TO APPEAL TO YOU, AS PRESIDENT OF ONE OF THE SIGNATORY STATES OF THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE TO DO YOUR UTMOST TO SECURE A REVERSAL OF THIS ACTION BY THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS AND, MEANWHILE, NOT TO SUPPORT THE DECLARATION WHICH THEY HAVE ALREADY MADE. I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST BOTH KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THIS MATTER. SIR GEOFFREY HOWE WILL BE SENDING A MESSAGE TO MR TURKMEN PROPOSING THAT THERE SHOULD BE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE THREE GUARANTOR POWERS ON HOW TO RESPOND TO THE MOVE BY THE TURKISH CYPRIOT AUTHORITIES.

UNQUOTE

FOR PARIS, BONN, ROME, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

2. YOU SHOULD INFORM THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED AND THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE TERMS OF THIS MESSAGE.

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PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/FUS

SIR J BULLARD

LORD N GORDON LENNOX

MR JAMES

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

CYPRUS

-2-  
CONFIDENTIAL



PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR-WHITNEY  
PS/PUS

PS/No 10 DOWNING STREET  
D I O CABINET OFFICE

SIR J BULLARD

~~MR JAMES~~

... ..  
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DESKBY FCO 151830Z

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

FM NICOSIA 151725Z

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY FCO

TELEGRAM NO 290 OF 15 NOVEMBER 1983.

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.  
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, ROME, BONN, UKDEL NATO, MODUK AND CBFC.

MY TEL 288 : TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION OF STATEHOOD.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF KYPRIANOU'S SECOND MESSAGE TO THE PRIME  
MINISTER DATED 15 NOVEMBER.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS WARMLY WELCOMES  
THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT IN REGARD  
TO THE PURPORTED SECESSION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF  
AN INDEPENDENT STATE IN THE TURKISH OCCUPIED PART OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS. THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC FURTHER  
WISHES TO THANK HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT FOR ITS PROMPT  
RESPONSE.

WILBERFORCE.

BT

PS

PS/LADY WOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

~~MR JAMES~~

...

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CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

FM ANKARA 151755Z NOV 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO (DESKBY 151830Z)  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 553 OF 15 NOVEMBER

ADVANCE COPY

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA AND ATHENS (DESKBY 151830Z)  
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON,  
UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, MODUK, CBFC.  
INFO PRIORITY ISTANBUL.

YOUR TELNO 305: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT EVREN

1. ON RECEIPT OF YOUR TUR I SOUGHT AN IMMEDIATE INTERVIEW WITH THE PRESIDENT BUT WAS ADVISED THAT THIS WAS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH TURKISH PROTOCOL AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD SEE ME. I ACCORDINGLY CALLED ON TURKMER AT 7.30 THIS EVENING (1630Z) AND HANDED HIM THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. AFTER READING IT HE SAID THAT HE WOULD DELIVER IT IMMEDIATELY TO THE PRESIDENT.

2. WHEN I ASKED HIM TO COMMENT ON THE SITUATION, TURKMER RECALLED THE MANY DISCUSSIONS HE HAD HAD ON THIS SUBJECT WITH UK MINISTERS AND WITH MYSELF. THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAD NOT CHANGED ITS POSITION. IT HAD SUPPORTED THE RESUMPTION OF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AND THE IDEA OF A KYPRIANOU/DENKTASH SUMMIT HAD BEEN THEIRS IN ORDER TO KEEP THE PROSPECT OF NEGOTIATION IN BEING. THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAD GONE AS FAR AS IT COULD AND EVEN TO THE POINT WHERE THEY WERE BEING CRITICISED BY TURKISH PUBLIC OPINION FOR LACK OF ROBUSTNESS. HE HAD ALWAYS WARNED THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT DID NOT CONTROL DENKTASH AND SO IT HAD BEEN PROVED.

3. IN THIS SITUATION THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WERE OBLIGED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE RIGHT OF THE TURKISH COMMUNITY IN CYPRUS TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE. THEY WERE RECOGNISED INTERNATIONALLY AS ONE OF THE INTERLOCUTORS IN THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AND IF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE ENTITLED TO INDEPENDENCE SO WERE THE TURKS.

4. TURKMER THEN DREW MY ATTENTION TO THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION THIS MORNING. IN PARTICULAR THE

~~4. TURKMEN THEN DREW MY ATTENTION TO THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN~~  
THE TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION THIS MORNING. IN PARTICULAR THE  
TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAD ESCHEWED PERMANENT PARTITION, UPHELD THE  
1960 TREATIES, FAVOURED A FEDERAL SOLUTION, WISHED TO CONTINUE  
THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AND CONFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE GOOD  
OFFICES OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL. TAKING THESE POSITIVE  
ELEMENTS INTO CONSIDERATION, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED  
TO EXTEND RECOGNITION TO THE NEW STATE. BUT IN DOING SO THEY  
HAD UNDERLINED THAT IN THEIR VIEW THIS DID NOT MEAN AN END  
TO THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, RATHER THE REVERSE.

5. GIVEN THAT POSITIVE APPROACH, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN  
DISAGREEABLY SURPRISED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM'S PUBLIC  
PRONOUNCEMENT TODAY. THEY WOULD HAVE EXPECTED A MORE BALANCED  
APPROACH. TO DENY RECOGNITION TO THE TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE WAS  
NOT GOOD POLICY. IN THE END THAT COULD LEAD TO UNIFICATION WITH  
TURKEY WHICH WOULD 'FINISH' THE CYPRUS PROBLEM ONCE AND FOR  
ALL. HE HOPED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE INTO  
ACCOUNT THE LONGER-TERM IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR ACTIONS AND ADOPT  
A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH. THE UK WAS A FRIEND AND  
CONSEQUENTLY HE HAD NOT SPOKEN MORE STRONGLY. THE UK WAS ALSO A  
PRAGMATIC COUNTRY AND TURKEY LOOKED TO HER TO DEVISE EFFECTIVE  
DIPLOMATIC FORMULAE. WHEN I SAID THAT DENKTASH'S ACTION THREATENED  
TO PUT PAID TO THE 1960 TREATIES, TURKMEN MADE LIGHT OF THE UK'S  
ROLE AS A GUARANTOR POWER AND, AS HE HAS PREVIOUSLY DONE, CRITICISED  
OUR LACK OF ACTION WHEN APPROACHED BY TURKEY IN 1974. HE IMPLIED  
THAT WE HAD LITTLE STANDING NOW IN OUR GUARANTOR POWER CAPACITY  
TO CALL FOR ACTION.

6. AFTER REMINDING TURKMEN THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT AT ALL  
LEVELS HAD BEEN LEFT IN NO DOUBT OVER THE PRECEDING MONTHS THAT  
HMG COULD ONLY TAKE A VERY SERIOUS VIEW OF UDI, WERE TOTALLY OPPOSED  
TO IT AND WOULD NOT RECOGNISE A TURKISH CYPRIOT STATE, I ASKED  
HIM FOR HIS VIEWS ON THE PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM YOU TO INITIATE  
TALKS BETWEEN THE 3 GUARANTOR POWERS. HE SAID HE WOULD NOT WISH  
TO COMMIT HIMSELF AND WOULD CERTAINLY REFLECT ON ANY MESSAGE YOU  
MIGHT SEND. BUT IN HIS VIEW IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH BETTER IF THE  
IF THE PROPOSAL FOR TRIPARTITE CONSULTATION HAD BEEN MADE BEFORE  
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD ISSUED ITS VERY STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENT  
TODAY. THE TURKISH SIDE IN PARTICULAR FOUND IT HARD TO ACCEPT  
THAT WE RECOGNISED KYPRIANOU'S GOVERNMENT AS REPRESENTING  
THE WHOLE ISLAND IGNORING THE TURKISH EXISTENCE. BUT HE REITERATED  
THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO GIVE A CONSIDERED REPLY BEFORE CONSULTING  
PRESIDENT EVREN AND ALSO SEEING ANY FURTHER MESSAGE FROM YOU.

7. I THEN ASKED TURKMEN FOR HIS VIEW ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S  
VERY STRONG REQUEST TO THE PRESIDENT TO ASSIST IN SECURING  
A REVERSAL OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT ACTION. HE REPLIED 'THERE IS NO  
REVERSE GEAR IN THIS CAR'. THE WAY AHEAD WAS FORWARD THROUGH  
THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WHICH DENKTASH AND THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT  
SUPPORTED.

8. I ASKED TURKMEN WHETHER HE REALLY BELIEVED THAT THE  
RESUMPTION OF THOSE TALKS HAD BEEN FACILITATED BY DENKTASH'S  
MOVE. TURKMEN REPLIED THAT HE CERTAINLY DID. DENKTASH'S  
CONDITION OF EQUALITY WAS NOW MET. IT WOULD BE MUCH EASIER FOR  
HIM TO ACCEPT NEGOTIATIONS. WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT ANY GAIN FOR

HIM TO ACCEPT NEGOTIATIONS. WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT ANY GAIN FOR DENKTASH MUST HAVE ITS OBVERSE ON THE GREEK SIDE, TURKMZMSA

DENKTASH MUST HAVE ITS OBVERSE ON THE GREEK SIDE, TURKMAN SAID THAT IF THE GREEKS WERE REALISTIC THEY WOULD SEE THAT THE WAY TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WAS OPEN.

9. HE CONCLUDED BY UNDERTAKING AGAIN TO PUT THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

RUSSELL

BT

NNNN

THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSIONS THAT TOOK PLACE AT THE MEETING HELD IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER ON 12 SEPTEMBER 1974. THE DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE TURKISH DELEGATION. THE PRIME MINISTER STATED THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO MAKE CONSIDERABLE SACRIFICES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE SUCH A SETTLEMENT. HE STATED THAT HE WAS NOT INTERESTED IN A MILITARY SOLUTION AND THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT A SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND EQUALITY. THE TURKISH DELEGATION STATED THAT THEY WERE INTERESTED IN A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AND THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO MAKE CONSIDERABLE SACRIFICES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE SUCH A SETTLEMENT. THEY STATED THAT THEY WERE NOT INTERESTED IN A MILITARY SOLUTION AND THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT A SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND EQUALITY. THE PRIME MINISTER STATED THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AND THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO MAKE CONSIDERABLE SACRIFICES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE SUCH A SETTLEMENT. HE STATED THAT HE WAS NOT INTERESTED IN A MILITARY SOLUTION AND THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT A SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND EQUALITY. THE TURKISH DELEGATION STATED THAT THEY WERE INTERESTED IN A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AND THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO MAKE CONSIDERABLE SACRIFICES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE SUCH A SETTLEMENT. THEY STATED THAT THEY WERE NOT INTERESTED IN A MILITARY SOLUTION AND THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT A SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND EQUALITY.



file

BAC

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

15 November 1983

Cyprus: Message to President Evren

Thank you for your letter of 15 November.

As I told Roger Bone earlier today, the Prime Minister has agreed that the proposed message from herself to the President of Turkey may be despatched.

B/12

I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

gjc

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 November 1983

*Dear John,*

Cyprus: Message to President Evren

Following the declaration of independence by the Turkish Cypriot authorities this morning and the Prime Minister's telephone conversation with President Kyprianou of Cyprus, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes that it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister to send a message as soon as possible to President Evren of Turkey.

I enclose a draft telegram to Ankara which I think is self-explanatory.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,*

(B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

File No. ....

Department SED

OUTWARD

Security Classification  
CONFIDENTIAL

Drafted by  
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TELEGRAM

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TO IMMEDIATE ANKARA  
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AND TO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE DESKBY PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
WASHINGTON

AND TO SAVING.....

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKREP

BRUSSELS, MODUK CBFC

INFO SAVING.....

Distribution:-

Limited Cyprus  
Cyprus Additional

[TEXT]

UDI: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT EVREN  
FOR ANKARA

1. You should deliver the following message from the  
Prime Minister to President Evren as soon as possible.

'I note with concern that the ''Assembly'' of the Turkish  
Cypriot Administration in Northern Cyprus passed a  
resolution on 15 November which purports to approve the  
establishment of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus and  
the declaration of independence.

When Mr Heseltine saw you on 18 October he told you of  
our anxiety about reports that the Turkish Cypriot  
authorities were contemplating an action of this sort  
and our hope that they would be dissuaded. Lady /Young

Copies to:-

Young spoke similarly to Mr Denktash on 22 October.

As a guarantor power under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee the British Government deplore this action on the part of the Turkish Cypriot authorities. It is clearly incompatible with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. It can only complicate the already difficult task of reaching a settlement in Cyprus acceptable to the people of both communities and the activities of the United Nations Secretary General to achieve such a result.

I should like to appeal to you, as President of one of the signatory States of the Treaty of Guarantee to do your utmost to secure a reversal of this action by the Turkish Cypriots and, meanwhile, not to support the declaration which they have already made. I believe that we must both keep in close touch on this matter. Sir Geoffrey Howe ~~is separately~~ <sup>will be</sup> sending a message to Mr Turkmen proposing that there should be consultations between the three guarantor powers on how to respond to the move by the <sup>ish</sup> ~~Turkish~~ Cypriot authorities. ''

FOR PARIS, BONN, ROME, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

2. You should ~~then~~ inform the governments to which you are accredited and the UN Secretary General of the terms of this message.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



## Cyprus (Turkish Community)

3.31 pm

**Mr. Denis Healey** (Leeds, East) (*by private notice*) asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the decision of the Turkish community in Cyprus to opt for a unilateral declaration of independence.

**The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Sir Geoffrey Howe):** The position is that this morning the body calling itself the Assembly in northern Cyprus passed a resolution approving the establishment of a Turkish Republic of North Cyprus and a declaration of independence. Her Majesty's Government deplore this action by the Turkish Cypriot community, which amounts to a declaration of secession. We have issued a statement which makes it clear that it is incompatible with the 1960 treaties.

Our position has always been that we recognise only one Republic of Cyprus. That remains the position today. In our view, this latest move cannot be seen as altering the status of the Turkish Cypriot community. We would deeply regret it if, as seems all too likely, this action provokes the breakdown of the inter-communal talks and the consultations carried out by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Both have had our full support.

There have for some time been reports that a move of this sort was being contemplated by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. We have throughout made it clear, most recently, both to Mr. Denktash personally and at a high level at Ankara, that we would strongly disapprove such a move. It must be a matter for deep regret that those representations have apparently been disregarded. Our ambassador at Ankara has this morning, on my instructions, called on the Turkish Government not to associate themselves with this move by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has sent a similar message to President Evren urging him to help secure a reversal of the declaration.

In accordance with British responsibilities under the 1960 treaty of guarantee, I shall be proposing urgent consultations to both the Turkish and the Greek Governments. We are also in direct contact with the Government of Cyprus. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister spoke this morning to President Kyprianou, and I have just seen the Cyprus high commissioner in London.

We shall consult urgently other interested Governments and also the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who has been playing a key role in the search for a peaceful solution to the longstanding Cyprus problem. In addition, we are approaching the President of the Security Council with a view to securing an early meeting.

**Mr. Healey:** I should like to associate the Labour Opposition with Her Majesty's Government's position on this matter, as explained by the Foreign Secretary and set out in the statement issued by the Foreign Office this morning, and, in particular, with the statement that Cyprus is a single state with a single President, Mr. Kyprianou. I also want to associate the Opposition with the condemnation of the act of the Turkish Cypriot Assembly, an act which is bound to have a damaging effect on the interests of its own people and on all people on the island of Cyprus, particularly the 200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees from the areas that are now under Turkish control.

I welcome the fact that the right hon. and learned Gentleman has approached the Turkish Government on the matter. Can he say whether Her Majesty's Government have any evidence that the action taken by the Assembly was instigated or approved by either the Turkish army or the Prime Minister-elect of Turkey? Second, in his approach to NATO and the European Community, will he ask them to warn the Turkish Government that any support they might give to the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot Assembly would be contrary to the interests of the Alliance and the Community, and would be bound to have a damaging effect on Turkish relations with both those bodies? Finally, will he tell us whether the United States Administration are taking the same position as Her Majesty's Government take on this matter?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** I express my gratitude to the right hon. Gentleman for his support of the position that we have adopted. I entirely agree with what he said about the potentially damaging effects of the action; as he described them. Evidence of instigation is plainly not a matter on which I can have any certainty, but the latest evidence suggests that the Turkish Government have been taken by surprise. Of course, there have been rumours and suggestions that something of this kind would happen, and that is why we made representations to the Turkish Government.

I entirely accept the force of the right hon. Gentleman's remarks about the need for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Community to give the warning that he suggests to the Turkish Government. We do not yet fully understand the position of the United States Government, but preliminary indications show that they are likely to take a similar view.

**Mr. Julian Amery** (Brighton Pavilion): Does my right hon. and learned Friend recall that the 1960 treaty of guarantee, which I helped to negotiate, placed an obligation on the British Government to intervene to maintain the constitution of Cyprus, then agreed? Does he also agree that the Government of the day, under the leadership of the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Callaghan), made a historic mistake when they declined the invitation of the Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Ecevit, to intervene alongside the Turks to restore the constitution? In view of that mistake—probably an irretrievable mistake, which led to the widening gap between the two parties in Cyprus—will my right hon. and learned Friend be very cautious about taking sides in the dispute, remembering the importance of the sovereign base areas and the importance of Turkey, as well as Greece, as one of our allies?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** I recall, of course, my right hon. Friend's role in the original 1960 treaties. If I remember correctly, it was recalled by the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Callaghan) when he was questioned about this matter in a not dissimilar situation in 1974. Although the treaty gives the guarantors the right to take certain action, and obliges us to consult one another, it does not oblige us to take action of the kind that my right hon. Friend may have in mind. It is clear that this is not a military problem. The guarantor powers should be drawn together in consultation to see what further action can be taken with a view to reversing the Turkish Cypriot

**Mr. Needham:** Notwithstanding the reduction in the level of home improvement grants, will my right hon. Friend confirm that the real level of spending on such grants is much higher than it was under Labour?

**The Prime Minister:** The Government's record on home improvement grants is outstanding. The Labour Government spent £90 million a year on home improvement grants. That expenditure is expected to reach about £650 million this year. That is an excellent record.

**Mr. Kilroy-Silk:** Why has crime increased so much since the right hon. Lady came to office?

**The Prime Minister:** For the answer to that, the hon. Gentleman should go to the many reports that have been written. In fact, crime has increased in all countries of the world — [Hon. Members: "No"] — and as the reports

show, it is not directly related to unemployment. Crime increased during periods when unemployment was decreasing.

**Mr. Fairbairn:** Has my right hon. Friend noticed the reports in the newspapers today of the suppression and outlawing of all peace movements in the satellite countries that attempt to object to the deployment of Russian missiles in their nations? Will she notice that in this country, where that does not happen, three forces are now aiming at the same purpose—the Labour party, CND, and the Communist party? All are attempting to achieve the same aim as Soviet Russia?

**The Prime Minister:** I understand what my hon. and learned Friend is saying. Many brave and courageous lives have been lost defending the right of those people to say what they do. I wish that more people realised that.

decision. It is also clear, as my right hon. Friend points out, that we shall certainly not seek to take sides in the matter.

**Mr. James Callaghan** (Cardiff, South and Penarth): Without trying to refight old battles, is not the situation now a little different from what it was in 1974, when the Turkish Government asked us to help them to invade the island to support a gangster called Nicos Sampson, who had taken control of the island and deposed Archbishop Makarios, and who was supported by the Greek colonels—a dictatorship, fortunately later replaced by Prime Minister Karamanlis?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** The position is, of course, very different from that which the right hon. Gentleman had to face, but the treaty obligations and the rights of the powers are precisely the same as they were then.

**Sir Frederic Bennett** (Torbay): I do not dissent from anything that my right hon. and learned Friend said in his statement, but, on the suggestion that the Turkish Government in some way instigated this action, is it not true that not only the existing although outgoing military Government but the new prospective Government have made it clear on all occasions that they want, not territorial aggrandisement in Cyprus to the benefit of Turkey—the last thing they want is to take on that responsibility—but to achieve the only conceivable solution to the problem, a genuine federal single state within Cyprus itself? That has always been the position of the Turkish Government and it remains so today.

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** I am grateful to my hon. Friend for drawing my attention to the position of the Turkish Government as he sees it. The objective must be to secure the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of what may well be a federal state.

**Mr. Norman Atkinson** (Tottenham): Is it not a fact of life that Mr. Denktash must have sought permission from General Evren before daring to make such a statement? Is it not true that Mr. Ozal, the Prime Minister-elect of Turkey, said last week and repeated earlier this week that, should Mr. Denktash declare independence unilaterally for the Turkish-occupied part of Cyprus, he would give full support to that declaration, and it would certainly have the backing of the Turkish occupying troops?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** The hon. Gentleman is right to draw attention to the two press reports of Mr. Ozal's views. One of those reports was a correction of the other, and they are both slightly confusing. Regardless of the outcome of the recent elections in Turkey, we have been making our views absolutely plain to the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish Government for a long time. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence was in Ankara last month, and my right hon. Friend the Minister of State, Baroness Young, saw Mr. Denktash in Nicosia recently. I myself have seen Mr. Turkmen twice since the late summer, and have discussed the matter at the United Nations. We have taken every opportunity to make our view plain.

**Mr. Cyril D. Townsend** (Bexleyheath): My right hon. and learned Friend's firm statement will be warmly welcomed on this side of the House. Does he appreciate that the declaration of independence could lead to further violence in Cyprus and further destabilisation of the eastern Mediterranean and that, over the years, many

Turkish Cypriots have been strongly opposed to such a declaration? Will he continue to take the lead in the international community in working for a peaceful and unified Cyprus?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his interest in this subject, which he made plain in initiating the Adjournment debate on 27 July, and I entirely agree with him about the necessity for warning about the possible consequences of this unwise action.

**Mr. Eric Deakins** (Waltham Forest): Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman prepared to put the strongest possible pressure on Turkey, and does he recognise the crucial importance of the United States of America in this matter? The United States may carry more weight with Turkey than the whole of the rest of the Western Alliance.

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** I shall bear in mind the important role that the United States could play.

**Sir Ian Gilmour** (Chesham and Amersham): The position as it existed in Cyprus until today suited too many people in both halves of the island and too many foreign Governments as well, though not Her Majesty's Government. Should we not therefore avoid trying to return to the status quo of yesterday, but rather work towards a comprehensive settlement?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** My right hon. Friend is right to stress the need to work towards a comprehensive settlement. It was to that end that the United Nations Secretary-General resumed his initiative, and to that end that I have discussed the matter twice with president Kyprianou and twice with the Secretary-General.

**Mr. Robin Corbett** (Birmingham, Erdington): While condemning this impudent and dangerous action, may I ask the Foreign Secretary whether he will confirm that it remains Government policy to work for the restoration of the territorial independence and sovereignty of the island of Cyprus?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** Yes indeed—the independence, sovereignty and integrity of that state.

**Sir Hugh Rossi** (Hornsey and Wood Green): Does not today's deplorable event mean an end to the intercommunal talks? Will there not therefore be a greater need than at anytime since 1974 for active participation by Her Majesty's Government in seeking a just solution?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** I agree with my hon. Friend about the need for us to take all possible steps to promote a more effective search for a solution. However, as I have made plain in my statement and my answers this afternoon, we have already been extremely active in promoting moves in that direction.

**Mr. Alfred Dubs** (Battersea): The Turkish-occupied part of Cyprus is not economically viable. It is totally dependent upon economic support from Turkey. Must not the responsibility for the unilateral declaration of independence rest to a large extent upon our NATO partners in Ankara? Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman therefore take appropriate action to ensure that a Government who condone military invasion do not remain part of NATO?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** I would not be disposed to take the hon. Gentleman's advice in that respect. I remind the House again that the Prime Minister has already sent an

[*Sir Geoffrey Howe*]

urgent message to President Evren, urging him to secure a reversal of the declaration. I understand that the Turkish national security council was convened at about noon today and is still meeting. We shall have to await the result of our representations.

**Sir Kenneth Lewis** (Stamford and Spalding): Has not what has taken place arise out of sheer frustration that the attempt to solve the problem by the United Nations and by other powers has dragged on over a number of years with no apparent result?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** Plainly, frustration is likely to be increased if the search for a peaceful solution is prolonged. Everyone would wish that a solution could have been found earlier. The true foundation for a peaceful solution, however, must depend on the attitude of the communities concerned.

**Mr. Jeremy Corbyn** (Islington, North): Will the Foreign Secretary assure the House that there is no question of the Government recognising the new regime in the northern part of Cyprus? When the right hon. and learned Gentleman communicates with the Government of Turkey, will he deplore their support for the UDI? Will he also consider whether it is appropriate for the British Government to have any relationship with the repressive military junta in Ankara which has imprisoned thousands of people, including, very recently, the president of the Turkish Peace Association and 17 of his colleagues? Is it not possible that the support given by the British Government to the junta has led to take the foolish course of supporting UDI?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** We have taken every opportunity to express to the Turkish Government our firm opposition to any step of this kind. I therefore repudiate the suggestion implied in the last part of the hon. Gentleman's question.

Since we are in a treaty relationship with the Government of Turkey as well as with that of Greece, it is important for us to take steps jointly as guarantor powers

to find a solution. We deplore what has taken place, and there can be no question of the recognition of more than one Government for Cyprus.

**Mr. John Corrie** (Cunninghame, North): For the last nine years there have been, de facto, two states in Cyprus and the intercommunal talks between the two ethnic groups have got nowhere. In order to bring some sense to both sides, do not the British Government need to exert more influence, and should not British diplomacy be brought in to work out an agreement for that sad island?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** It would be highly desirable, if it were possible, to end the division of the island. It must be remembered that in such an intercommunal conflict the power of the British Government, with all our diplomacy, must be limited, but we shall continue to do everything that we can.

**Mr. Healey:** What has emerged from this exchange is that, at the moment, the prime responsibility lies with the Government in Ankara. If they wish, they can be responsible for a major move forward to a general solution on the island. If they take the other course of recognising an independent Turkish state in the north of Cyprus, they will gravely damage their relations with their friends and allies and their partners in the Community, and will embark on a course that will progressively estrange them from all their Western friends. I hope that the Foreign Secretary will make that clear to the Prime Minister-elect of Turkey.

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** It would not be right to conclude that the prime responsibility for what has happened so far rests on the Turkish Government. I do not believe that that is what the right hon. Gentleman meant to imply. The responsibility rests upon the shoulders of Mr. Denktash and his colleagues. Plainly, however, the attitude of the Turkish Government could be crucial to the prospect of moving in a sensible, or unwise, direction. That was why I acted as soon as I could this morning to make our view clear to the Turkish Government, and why the Prime Minister has urged President Evren to try to secure a reversal of the declaration.

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

~~MR JAMES~~

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TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY FCO

TELEGRAM NO 288 OF 15 NOVEMBER 1983.

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

INFO ROUTINE PARIS, ROME, BONN, UKDEL NATO, MODUK AND CBFC.

YOUR TEL 219 : TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION OF STATEHOOD.

DINOS MICHAELIDES, ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER (WITH IAKOVOU AND VENIAMIN AWAY) SUMMONED ME ON THE EVENING OF 15 NOVEMBER TO COMMUNICARE TWO

MESSAGES FROM KYPRIANOU TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

2. THE FIRST (IN MIFT) WAS PREPARED AFTER THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION REPORTED IN YOUR TUR. I GOT MICHAELIDES TO CONFIRM THAT THE REFERENCES TO "DEFENCE" IN THE LAST TWO PARAGRAPHS DID NOT (NOT) CONSTITUTE REFERENCE TO ANY KIND OF MILITARY ACTION, WHICH NO-ONE WAS CONTEMPLATING.

3. THE SECOND MESSAGE OF WARM SATISFACTION (IN MY SECOND MIFT) WAS PREPARED AFTER THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT HAD RECEIVED THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE FCO SPOKESMAN. MICHAELIDES IMPLIED THAT IT HAD REALLY OVERTAKEN THE FIRST MESSAGE. NEITHER SEEMS TO ME TO CALL FOR A REPLY AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE.

WILBERFORCE

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~83-11-15~~ 15:38

TO THE RT HON MARGARET THATCHER MP  
PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

FOLLOWING URGENT FROM SECRETARY-GENERAL RAMPHAL

BEGINS

I AM SURE ALL COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS WILL WISH TO IMMEDIATELY  
DENOUNCE THE PURPORTED DECLARATION OF CESSION AND INDEPENDENCE BY MR  
DENTASH IN RELATION TO THE TURKISH OCCUPIED NORTHERN ZONE OF CYPRUS,  
TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WILL NOT RECOGNISE THIS ILLEGAL AND  
UNILATERAL ACT AND IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE TO SHOW THEIR SOLIDARITY  
WITH THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS AND WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU.

SONNY RAMPHAL  
COMSECGEN LONDON

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SIR J BULLARD

~~MR JAMES~~

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TELEGRAM NO 289 OF 15 NOVEMBER 1983.

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INFO ROUTINE PARIS, ROME, BONN, UKDEL NATO, MODUK AND CBFC.

MIPT : TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION OF STATEHOOD

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF KYPRIANOU'S FIRST MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER DATED 15 NOVEMBER.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, REFERRING TO HIS CONVERSATION THIS MORNING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, WISHES FORMALLY TO DRAW HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S ATTENTION TO THE PURPORTED DECLARATION OF THE INDEPENDENT TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS IN THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS NOW OCCUPIED BY TURKEY.

THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS, IN TERMS OF THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE, UNDERTAKEN TO GUARANTEE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS AND ALSO THE STATE OF AFFAIRS ESTABLISHED BY THE BASIC ARTICLES OF ITS CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 185 INTER ALIA EXCLUDING SEPARATIST INDEPENDENCE AND PROVIDING THAT THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC IS ONE AND INDIVISIBLE.

THE REPUBLIC NOW CALLS UPON HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO ACT IN COMPLIANCE WITH ITS GUARANTEE, INCLUDING CALLING UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY, AS A CO-GUARANTOR OCCUPYING AND IN CONTROL OF THE TERRITORY WHERE THE PURPORTED DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE HAS OCCURRED, TO RESTORE THE STATE OF AFFAIRS ESTABLISHED BY THE BASIC

WHERE THE PURPORTED DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE HAS OCCURRED,  
TO RESTORE THE STATE OF AFFAIRS ESTABLISHED BY THE BASIC  
ARTICLES OF THE 1960 CONSTITUTION.

FURTHERMORE, HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IS PARTY TO THE  
TREATY OF ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS. ACCORDING  
TO ARTICLE 1, THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS COMPRISES THE ISLAND  
OF CYPRUS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE SOVEREIGN BASE AREAS.

IN TERMS OF ARTICLE 3, HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND THE  
REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, GREECE AND TURKEY ARE BOUND TO CONSULT  
AND CO-OPERATE IN THE COMMON DEFENCE OF CYPRUS.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC CALLS UPON HER MAJESTY'S  
GOVERNMENT TO FULFIL ITS OBLIGATIONS TO CONSULT AND CO-OPERATE  
IN SUCH DEFENCE, CYPRUS BEING THE VICTIM OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT  
AGGRESSION.

WILBERFORCE.  
BT

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file BFF  
BFF

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

15 November 1983

CYPRUS

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the Cyprus High Commissioner which contains the text of a message from the President of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft reply to President Kyprianou, for signature by the Prime Minister, in due course.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. L. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

15 November 1983

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 15 November containing the text of a message from the President of the Republic of Cyprus.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency Mr. Tasos Panayides



CYPRUS HIGH COMMISSION

93, PARK STREET,  
LONDON, W1Y 4ET

TEL.: 01-499 8272

cc MASTER  
OPS

15th November, 1983

The Right Honourable  
The Prime Minister  
Mrs. Margaret Thatcher.

**PRIME MINISTER'S**  
**PERSONAL MESSAGE**  
**SERIAL No. T 187/83**

*Dear Prime Minister,*

I have the honour to set out herein-below the following urgent request by the President of the Republic of Cyprus Mr. Spyros Kyprianou for your consideration.

Text Begins

"On 15th November, 1983, the so-called Assembly of the Turkish Federated State of Kibris purported to declare independence in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus now occupied by Turkey, thereby attempting to secede from the Republic of Cyprus and to destroy the territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus, a Member State of the United Nations.

Such illegal activities are contrary to the numerous U.N. Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions, the U.N. Charter, to International Treaties registered with the United Nations and to peremptory norms of International Law. Such illegal activities are made possible by the presence of a large Turkish occupation force and by the economic maintenance of the illegal Turkish Cypriot regime by Turkish Financial support.

The purported proclamation of independence and secession by the so-called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" involves international aggression, direct and indirect, attacks on the territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of the Republic of Cyprus, violation of its frontiers and interference in its domestic jurisdiction. The action constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security and creates a most explosive situation in the whole Eastern Mediterranean area.

We seek your assistance in helping the Republic of Cyprus both within the U.N. and in all other spheres


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to demand of the Government of Turkey to take all effective measures to eliminate any authority of the usurpers and to bring the illegal Turkish Cypriot regime in the Turkish occupied area of Cyprus to an immediate end.

Spyros Kyprianou."

Text Ends

Yours Sincerely,



(Tasos Panayides)  
High Commissioner

10 Downing Street,  
London S.W.1.

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**15 NOV 1954**



## CYPRUS

The position, (as I understand it), is that this morning the body calling itself the Assembly in Northern Cyprus passed a resolution approving the establishment of a Turkish Republic of North Cyprus and a declaration of independence. Her Majesty's Government deplore this action by the Turkish Cypriot community, which amounts to a declaration of secession. We have issued a statement which makes it clear that this is incompatible with the 1960 Treaties.

Our position has always been that we recognise only one Republic of Cyprus. That remains the position today. In our view this latest move cannot be seen as altering the status of the Turkish Cypriot community. We would deeply regret it if, as seems all too likely, this action provokes the breakdown of the inter-communal talks and the consultations carried out by the Secretary General of the United Nations. Both have had our full support.

There have for some time been reports that a move of this sort was being contemplated by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. We have throughout made it clear, most recently both to Mr Denktash personally and at a high level in Ankara, that we would strongly disapprove such a move. It must be a matter for <sup>deep</sup> regret that these representations have ~~not had the desired effect~~ <sup>apparently been disregarded</sup>. Our Ambassador at Ankara has this morning, on my instructions, called on the Turkish Government not to associate themselves with this move by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. My right hon Friend the Prime Minister has sent a similar message to President Evren urging him to help secure a reversal of the declaration.

In accordance with British responsibilities under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee I shall be proposing urgent consultations to both the Turkish and the Greek Governments. We are also in direct contact with the Government of Cyprus. My right honourable Friend the Prime Minister spoke this morning to President Kyprianou and I have just seen the Cyprus High Commissioner in London.

We shall consult urgently with other interested governments and also with the Secretary General of the United Nations, who has been playing a key role in the search for a peaceful solution to the long standing Cyprus problem. In addition, we are approaching the President of the Security Council with a view to securing an early meeting.





file B BK

cc MASTER SET

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 November 1983

CYPRUS : TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION OF  
INDEPENDENCE

President Kyprianou telephoned the Prime Minister at 1016 this morning.

The Prime Minister said that we were deeply disturbed by this morning's news of a Turkish Cypriot Declaration of Independence. We had made clear to the Turkish Government and to Mr. Denktash earlier our opposition to such a move. President Kyprianou said that he had no information in addition to that which had appeared in the media. The Prime Minister said that we similarly had no first hand information. We now had to find out precisely what had happened. We should then consider what action to take. But we would not recognise an independent state in Northern Cyprus. We would keep in close touch with President Kyprianou.

President Kyprianou asked whether there was any scope for pressure upon the Turkish Government to denounce the move. The Prime Minister replied that, when we had clarified the situation, we expected to be in touch with the Turkish Government.

President Kyprianou said that the Cyprus Foreign Minister would be leaving this afternoon for New York to see the UN Secretary General and to call a meeting of the Security Council. He had spoken with Mr. Papandreou and the Greek Government were at present meeting to consider the situation. What kind of common action could the guarantor powers take? The Prime Minister said that we first needed to establish the facts and we would then be in touch with the Cyprus Government. She repeated that we would not recognise a Turkish Cypriot State. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary would doubtless be considering with our partners in the Ten how to respond.

/President Kyprianou

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- 2 -

President Kyprianou said that if it emerged that the Turkish Cypriot Declaration was final, the question would arise of whether we could neutralise it or reverse it. He would be sending a request to us based on the Treaty of Guarantee. He relied very much on the United Kingdom. If he had anything further to communicate to us, he would do this through the High Commission in London.

In conclusion, the Prime Minister said that she had been hoping to see President Kyprianou at CHOGM but clearly this development would be the most important matter on his agenda. We would remain in close touch.

The discussion ended at 1025.

I received separately this morning a letter to the Prime Minister from Mr. Denktash. I enclose a copy, together with copies of the accompanying documents. I should be grateful for your advice on how these should be handled.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS  
~~TURKISH FEDERATED STATE OF KIBRIS~~

PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

**PRIME MINISTER'S**  
**PERSONAL MESSAGE**  
**SERIAL No. T 186/83**

Lefkoşa,  
15 November, 1983

cc MASTER  
OPS

Dear Prime Minister,

At this crucial moment in the life of the Turkish Cypriot People, who by their own free will have decided, through their legitimate representatives of our Parliament, to exercise their right to self-determination to proclaim the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, I wish to inform you personally of what this step means for us as well as for the future of Cyprus as a whole.

The Declaration and the Resolution adopted by our legislative Assembly today -copies of which I enclose herewith- explain why the Turkish Cypriot People have been left with no other alternative but to take this vital step based on our equal co-founder partnership status in the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus.

In the face of constantly mounting provocations and the uncompromising, insincere attitude of the Greek and Greek Cypriot leadership, the Turkish Cypriot People have tried to restrain their frustration. They have patiently waited to see the emergence of the slightest sign of moderation and common sense that could allow a renewed effort by the two sides for exploring, through direct negotiations, the real chances of an agreed solution on the basis of equality within the existing valid framework of the intercommunal negotiating process.

./...

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
London S.W.1,  
ENGLAND.

For over a year and particularly since last May, all the efforts of the Greek and Greek Cypriot leadership have been directed at destroying a sustained negotiating process in Cyprus, the basis on which this process rests and consequently the agreed points of fundamental importance leading to a bi-zonal federation, aiming at the restoration of a partnership deliberately terminated by them 20 years ago. This unfortunate attempt to demolish the only valid procedure that could lead to an agreed solution in Cyprus and to deny the agreed concepts and criteria for a federal settlement, was coupled with a persistent and blind attack on our political status as one of the co-founder partners.

We have, over and over again, called on the Greek Cypriot leadership to refrain from actions that would severely hamper the chances of reconciliation between the two peoples of Cyprus. Our sincere calls were countered by propaganda rhetorics out of touch with any reality, by political intrigues (planned in collaboration with Greece, with the sole intention of deceiving world public opinion), and by sheer tactical manipulations. Such shallow practices could obviously deceive neither world public opinion, nor the Turkish Cypriot People, or for that matter, the more honest Greek Cypriots who felt the need to take a stand against the dubious and short-sighted policies of their own leadership. But these practices have done a lot of harm to the chances of a negotiated solution and have exposed the lack of political will and insincerity of the Greek Cypriot leadership. We have observed with regret that the side with whom the Turkish Cypriot People were negotiating was no longer the Greek Cypriot community, with whom we had to co-exist in peace in this island, but, on an ever increasing scale, Greece itself. This country has been imposing its own interests and policies on the Greek Cypriots, intervening constantly in a process which should have remained in the exclusive domain of the two national communities, and going even so far as to proclaim Cyprus as "part of the national territory of Greece".

./...

As you are aware, last month I called upon the Greek Cypriot leader to meet me in a new summit, under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, in order to identify the genuine intentions of the two sides for a federal solution through direct negotiations. This proposal was made in sincerity and good will, and the prospects of a negotiated settlement obviously depended on the reconfirmation of the joint intents and common understanding of the two sides with regard to the aims, the method and the basis and framework within which we would work.

We had hoped that this sincere offer of the Turkish Cypriot side would meet with an unequivocal immediate positive response and would be put to good use and thus help to pave the way for resumed negotiations. We are deeply disappointed with the totally irresponsible treatment this proposal has received from the Greek Cypriot leadership and the attempts to turn it into another futile exercise of political manoeuvring and familiar delaying tactics.

You will appreciate that the Turkish Cypriot People could not possibly remain under an uncertain political status for another 20 years and sacrifice its rights and its very existence to the whims of the Greek and Greek Cypriot leadership.

Therefore, my People have taken the legitimate step for re-defining their political status in the form of an independent and non-aligned Republic by exercising their natural right to self-determination.

The Declaration and the Resolution adopted by our Parliament clearly state the peaceful aims and principles which will guide us in our approach to the Greek Cypriot community as well as to all other countries.

./...

Your Excellency,

As stated in our Declaration of independence, the Turkish Cypriot People are extending once more their hands in peace and friendship to the Greek Cypriot People.

We sincerely hold the view that the two Peoples in Cyprus can, and must, find peaceful, just and durable solutions to all the differences between them, through negotiations on the basis of equality. Therefore, it is our firm conviction that the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will not hinder, but facilitate the re-establishment of the partnership between the two Peoples within a federal framework.

We earnestly hope that negotiations will be carried out, on the basis of equality and under the auspices of UN Secretary-General, with a view to resolving in a peaceful and conciliatory manner, all the outstanding issues between the two Peoples.

The two peoples of Cyprus are destined to co-exist side by side in the same island.

We have to find the way to live in peace, security, and freedom, without fighting each other, without trying to eliminate, subjugate, dominate or exploit one another.

I reiterate once more that the best way to achieve this is to reach a federal solution, the foundations of which have already been laid down.

If there is one lesson to be drawn from our experiences in Cyprus (and from experiences in federalism throughout the world), it is that a true federation can only be established between equal partners having the same political status.

The Greek Cypriot side's main mistake has been to try to forget, and conceal from the world, the fact that the Turkish Cypriot People are not a mere "minority", but an equal co-founder partner.

./...

The United Kingdom, with which we have had historical ties, is the country which is in the best position to know that sovereignty and independence has not been transferred solely and exclusively to one of the two peoples living in Cyprus, but to both of them.

The "functional federal system" of 1960 has collapsed and the bi-zonal federation which could enable both communities to co-exist in peace, tranquillity, security and prosperity has not been achieved so far, because the Greek Cypriot side, blindly and obstinately, refused to recognize us as an equal co-founder partner.

The Turkish Cypriot People, whose representative has signed on an equal footing with the representative of the Greek Cypriots, all the 1960 documents concerning the independence and transfer of sovereignty, is not a mere "minority" but a co-founder partner with equal rights.

I would like to assure you that the expression of the legitimate and irrepressible will of the Turkish Cypriot People concerning the exercise of the right to self-determination will not in the slightest way hinder the establishment of a genuine federation by two partners having equal political status; on the contrary a prerequisite for such a solution is now fulfilled. In this respect, may I draw your attention particularly to paragraphs 22 and 23 of the Declaration adopted by the democratically elected representatives of our People.


As will be seen from the text of our Declaration, the new Turkish Cypriot Republic adheres to the Treaties of Establishment, Guarantee and Alliance. Some elements in Southern Cyprus have, from time to time, tried to undermine, or even to deny, the very existence of, these Treaties. We attach the greatest importance to full respect for the sovereign rights of the United Kingdom in the island, recognised by the Treaties. I would like

./...

to state most clearly that all legitimate interests of your country and of your citizens will be fully respected by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

It is the sincere wish of the People of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to maintain and further develop the closest possible ties of friendship and collaboration with the People of your country.

Please accept, Prime Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration.

  
(Rauf R. DENKTAŞ)  
President



## DECLARATION

Introduction.

Developments which have taken place in Cyprus for the last 20 years, and the critical stage which these developments have reached at present, necessitate the placing of certain facts with clarity before world public opinion.

We expect all those who desire peace and fundamental human rights to prevail on earth, who reject discrimination among men on grounds of race, national origin, language or religious belief and who are against colonialism and racism, to give serious consideration to these indisputable facts free from prejudice and preconception.

Destruction of the Partnership State by Greek Cypriots.

1. The establishment of the Republic of Cyprus as an independent State was based on the partnership of the Turkish Cypriot People and the Greek Cypriot People. This joint Republic, which was established through the agreement of the two national communities, has been deliberately undermined and destroyed by the Greek Cypriot Administration since 1963. The Legislative, Executive and Judiciary of the partnership State, its entire Civil Service, from the most senior to the most junior ranks, have been usurped and taken over by the Greek Cypriots, placing them under the monopoly of only one of the two co-founder national communities.

Police and armed forces consisting exclusively of Greek Cypriots were formed and

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these armed elements have been used against the Turkish Cypriot People as an instrument of oppression and persecution.

For the past 20 years, the Turkish Cypriot People has been in a state of legitimate resistance and self-defence in the face of threats and attacks directed against its fundamental rights and freedoms, its political status and its very existence in Cyprus.

Usurpation of  
the Legislature.

2. There has not been a single Turkish Cypriot member since 1964 in the "House of Representatives" of the so-called "Republic of Cyprus" whose bi-communal partnership character had been abrogated in December 1963 by brute force and armed violence. The right to elect and to be elected to this assembly, has been under the de facto monopoly of the Greek Cypriots for the past 20 years. A "House of Representatives" elected exclusively by the Greek Cypriots, and to which only the Greek Cypriots could be elected, cannot under any circumstances be regarded as the parliament of a partnership state based on two national communities. Although according to the Constitutional structure of 1960, religious affairs and similar communal functions of the Turkish/Muslim and the Greek/Orthodox communities had been entrusted to two separate Communal Chambers, the Greek Cypriot Communal Chamber was unconstitutionally and unilaterally abolished by the Greek Cypriot side and its functions were transferred to the so-called "House of Representatives". Even this fact alone is sufficient to show that the said House had become the legislative assembly of only the Greek/Orthodox community.

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Such an assembly to which no Turkish Cypriot can be elected and in the election of which no Turkish Cypriot can participate surely cannot in any way represent the Turkish Cypriot People. The only assembly which can represent the free will of the Turkish Cypriots is the parliament elected by the Turkish Cypriot People themselves through democratic elections.

The fact that the so-called "House of Representatives of the Republic of Cyprus", which had thus come under the monopoly of the Greek Cypriots by force and armed violence, could not represent the entire population of the island had also been acknowledged by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe as far back as 1964. In spite of this fact the Greek Cypriot leadership has, in complete disregard of every principle of equity and justice, recently attempted to create yet another fait accompli with a view to having Cyprus represented in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe unilaterally by the Speaker of the Greek Cypriot parliament. The call made by the Speaker of the Turkish Cypriot parliament, proposing that the Speakers of the national assemblies of the two communities should meet to resolve this question, was not even given a reply by the Speaker of the Greek Cypriot assembly.

Usurpation of  
the Executive.

3. Like the parliament of the so-called "Republic of Cyprus", its executive organ also came under the de facto monopoly of the Greek Cypriots. The leader of the Turkish Cypriot Community, who was empowered to exercise executive powers jointly with the leader of the Greek

Cypriot community, has been prevented from doing so by brute force and intimidation, since 1963. For 20 years, the seats in the Council of Ministers belonging to the Turkish Cypriots have been unlawfully occupied by the Greek Cypriot "Ministers".

Such an executive organ, of course, is obviously not entitled to act or speak on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot People.

The only President entitled to speak on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot People is the President empowered to do so through democratic elections by the Turkish Cypriot People themselves. The only Government that can represent the Turkish Cypriot People is the Government responsible to the Parliament elected by the free will of the Turkish Cypriot People.

Usurpation of  
the Judiciary.

4. Even after the premeditated armed attacks against the Turkish Cypriot People in 1963, Turkish Cypriot judges had tried to continue to perform their duties. In a short while, however, these judges were also ejected from the judiciary by armed threats and brute force. There is not a single Turkish Cypriot judge in any of the judicial organs since established by the Greek Cypriot Administration in complete disregard of the Agreements and in violation of Constitutional provisions.

Just like the legislative and executive organs, the Greek Cypriot leadership had also put an end to the joint judicial organs of the

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partnership State and placed them completely under the monopoly of the Greek Cypriots. In these circumstances, the Turkish Cypriot People were obliged to establish their own independent courts in order to meet their judicial requirements.

Monopolization  
of the Civil  
Service.

5. The Greek Cypriots had seized all the public posts, ranging from under-secretary to messenger, which under the partnership State had to be shared by both communities. Obviously, the Turkish Cypriot People cannot regard such a Civil Service as their own legitimate public administration.

Unilateral  
Foreign  
Representation.

6. All the representatives of the so-called "Republic of Cyprus" assigned to foreign countries and international organizations, without a single exception, belong to the Greek Cypriot community. There is not a single diplomat or even a secretary belonging to the Turkish Cypriot community in the entire foreign service of the Greek Cypriot Administration.

This foreign service protects only the interests of the Greek Cypriots and regards the political and economic strangulation of the Turkish Cypriot Community as a prime duty. Such a foreign service and its members abroad, who have constantly been acting in hostility against the Turkish Cypriots, cannot possibly be accepted by the Turkish Cypriot People as their own representatives.

Police and  
Armed Forces.

7. It was an obligation arising from the Agreements leading to the establishment of the partnership State, that the police, gendarmerie

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and the armed forces should consist of persons belonging to both national communities. The Head of one of the armed forces had to be a Turkish Cypriot and the Heads and Deputy Heads of each of the armed forces had to belong to different communities.

In the past 20 years, there has not been any Turkish Cypriot of any rank in the police and armed forces, which have completely been taken over by the Greek Cypriot Administration. Can these armed elements, who have in the past held under siege Turkish Cypriot villages and Turkish quarters of the towns, be possibly regarded by the Turkish Cypriot People as their own "security forces"? Can it ever be possible for the Turkish Cypriot People to entrust its life, property, honour and dignity to these armed elements who have in the past, hand in hand with the EOKA terrorists, set Turkish Cypriot villages on fire and indiscriminately massacred Turkish Cypriots without even sparing women, children and the elderly?

Budget and  
Public  
Services.

8. Not a single penny from the budget of the so-called "Republic of Cyprus" is ever spent on the Turkish Cypriots. Notwithstanding the fact that all the public establishments and institutions which have been set up with the contribution of the Turkish Cypriot People are the common property of both national communities, the State machinery which has been usurped by the Greek Cypriots, naturally, does not extend to the Turkish Cypriot People any of the public services required of a State.

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In the past, the Greek Cypriot Administration, purporting to be the "Government of Cyprus", while providing electricity and water for the Greek Cypriot villages, has deliberately left even the neighbouring Turkish Cypriot villages without electricity and water. For many years, a veritable siege had been imposed on Turkish Cypriot enclaves prohibiting the provision of even the most basic items such as medicine, foodstuffs, construction material and even Red Crescent assistance. Turkish Cypriots who were studying abroad faced obstacles on returning to their own homeland. Obstacles were even created for the registration of newly born children and, in fact, the majority of Turkish Cypriot children born after 1963 were not registered at all. On the "State" television, Greek Cypriot primary school children were told that the Turkish Cypriots were their "national enemy". In brief, the Greek Cypriot Administration has pursued a relentless policy of discrimination against the Turkish Cypriots.

What has compelled the Turkish Cypriot People to establish its own administration, to prepare its own budget and to organize its own public services is precisely this hostile and discriminatory attitude of the Greek Cypriot Administration.

Economic  
Warfare  
Against  
Turkish  
Cypriots.

9. The above-mentioned discriminatory policies and practices have also aggravated the economic and social disparity between the Turkish Cypriot People and the Greek Cypriots. This obvious economic gap between the two co-founder partners is closely related to the

Greek Cypriot policies of domination and exploitation.

Even today, the Greek Cypriots are trying to impose an all-out embargo on the Turkish Cypriot People and to create every conceivable obstacle in order to strangle, by economic means, the Turkish Cypriot People whom they have not been able to subjugate through armed violence and terrorism. This attitude has assumed the dimensions of an aggression directed against the fundamental rights and freedoms of the Turkish Cypriot People.

Armed  
Onslaught and  
Extermination  
Plans.

10. The Greek Cypriot leadership has in the past tried to force a choice on the Turkish Cypriots between "death or exile". In order to eradicate totally the Turkish-Islamic presence in the island, numerous plans of aggression and massacre, all well documented and verified, such as the notorious Akritas plan, the "extermination" plans for implementation by the Greek Cypriot National Guard against the Turkish Cypriot People and the "Ioannides-Sampson" plan, were prepared.

Ever since 1955, when the EOKA terrorist organisation first launched its campaign of terror and violence, intimidation and extermination plans have been put into operation on many occasions in hundreds of Turkish Cypriot villages and in the Turkish Cypriot quarters of towns.

Even today, the Greek Cypriot leadership refuses to recognize the Turkish



Cypriot Community's right to live in security and freedom in its own zone. It has become more and more evident with every passing day that the aim of the Greek Cypriot leadership is none other than to force the Turkish Cypriot People to live as a "subject community" with the status of second class citizens within a State which in practice would be dominated by the Greek Cypriots.

A faction of the Greek Cypriot leadership, and the pan-Hellenists in Greece who manipulate them, have not given up the illusion of totally hellenising the island of Cyprus, in which two separate national communities live and where these two communities must co-exist in peace.

The fanatical Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus, which does not even make any secret of its aim of hellenising the entire island, continues to prevail over the Greek Cypriot Administration.

Inhuman  
Discrimination.

11. The afore-mentioned facts clearly demonstrate that the Greek Cypriot Administration's claim to represent also the Turkish Cypriot People is incompatible with the principles of democracy, human rights, the principles of the United Nations and with reason and morality. The Greek Cypriot leadership, who wishes to subjugate the Turkish Cypriots to alien domination and who has placed all State organs under the monopoly of the Greek Cypriots, has in fact displayed one of the most flagrant examples of discrimination based on race, national origin, language and religion.

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Why We Owe No  
Allegiance to  
the Greek Cypriot  
Administration.

12. The Greek Cypriot leadership which denies to the Turkish Cypriot People the right to security, equality and fundamental freedoms; the right to participate effectively in the administration of the State; the right to self-government and the right to self-determination; and even the right to existence, can no longer claim any legitimate connection whatsoever with the Turkish Cypriot People.

The Turkish Cypriot People could owe no allegiance whatsoever to an administration;

which has implemented racist and discriminatory policies;

which has attempted to usurp all the rights of the Turkish Cypriot People emanating from History, from international Agreements, and from Declarations and Conventions on human rights;

which has lost all legitimacy by totally ignoring and violating international Agreements and the constitutional order;

which has placed all the organs of the State under the monopoly of the Greek Cypriots;

which has become exclusively the administration of the Greek Cypriots, not only because of its composition, but also because of the policies it continues to pursue;

which is serving the interests of pan-hellenist expansionism; and

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which aims at the very elimination of the Turkish Cypriot existence in the island.

A Fully Working  
Democracy.

13. Today the Turkish Cypriot People has a democratically-elected President chosen by the people through direct universal suffrage; a democratically elected Parliament which represents the free will of the Turkish Cypriot People within a democratic multi-party system; a Government which is responsible to this Parliament; an independent Judiciary with a Supreme Court which also reviews the constitutionality of all legislation; a public administration which covers all the functions of a contemporary State; security forces which maintain law and order; laws enacted through the votes of the elected representatives; taxation imposed by these laws; its own budget and its own social security institutions.

A People  
Determined to  
Live Together  
in Security  
and Freedom.

14. In order to save themselves from oppression and tyranny and from the constant danger of being annihilated, and in order to be able to live in security and freedom amongst their own national community; thousands of Turkish Cypriots who had been living in South Cyprus had clandestinely crossed over to the North through mountain passes, leaving all their belongings behind and at the risk of their lives. As a result of the opportunity provided by the "Vienna Agreement" of 2 August 1975, the Turkish Cypriot People in its entirety have settled in Northern Cyprus.

The Turkish Cypriot People are determined to live together; they are determined to protect their national identity, to govern

themselves in a democratic manner. They are willing to reach just and peaceful solutions, on all issues, through negotiations on the basis of equality with the Greek Cypriot People.

Rejection of  
Re-colonization  
by Greece.

15. Although Cyprus has never been a part of Greece, either geographically or historically, the Greek Cypriot leadership, under the influence of Greece, has never given up the aim of annexing Cyprus to Greece.

The Turkish Cypriot People, who have all along rejected all forms of colonialism, have always defended the independence of Cyprus at the cost of their lives, by resisting against ENOSIS. Had it not been for this valiant resistance of the Turkish Cypriot People, the whole of Cyprus would have been annexed to Greece long ago, the independence of Cyprus terminated and the Turkish Cypriot People once again put under colonial rule.

The Turkish Cypriot People, after having freed themselves from colonial rule and after having established a bi-communal State as a co-founder partner, and subsequently having been ejected from all the organs of that State, could never accept to live once again as an oppressed "subject community" under an administration totally in the monopoly of the Greek Cypriots; nor could they accept to be put, as a result of ENOSIS, under the rule of a foreign nation.

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Turkish Cypriot  
Efforts for a  
Bi-zonal Federal  
Solution.

16. The Turkish Cypriot People have earnestly strived for years for the re-establishment of an order which would be based on the equal partnership of the two peoples within a bi-zonal federal solution.

The Turkish Cypriot People, faced with the continued need for self-government, while formally establishing its own state in 1975, had adopted the name and status of a "federated state" in order to pave the way for the foundation of a federal union.

In the Summit Agreement of 1977, concluded between the leaders of the two communities, the establishment of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation was accepted as the common aim. This aim was later confirmed in the 1979 Summit Agreement, in the Opening Statement of the UN Secretary-General of 1980 and in the UN Evaluation Document of 1981.

In order to achieve this aim, direct negotiations between the two national communities, and on the basis of equality, under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, have been accepted as the only valid method. Believing that a just and lasting solution could only be achieved through this process, the Turkish Cypriot People and its leadership have made sincere efforts within this framework.

Destruction of  
the Negotiating  
Process by Greek  
Cypriot Leader-  
ship.

17. The Greek Cypriot leadership, especially since towards the end of 1981, under the negative influence of Greece, constantly has acted with the intention of undermining the

negotiating process, of destroying the framework of the negotiations as well as eroding the major points of agreement on which the negotiations were based. All warnings and calls made by the Turkish Cypriot side in order to preserve the basic points of agreement achieved through great efforts and patience and in order not to jeopardize the negotiating process have all gone unheeded with blind intransigence.

In the course of the last three years, while the intercommunal talks were continuing, the Turkish Cypriot side actively made constructive contributions to the negotiating process, with a view to giving effect to the agreed basis for a bi-zonal federal solution. The basic negotiating position of the Turkish Cypriot side took into account the agreed criteria in the Summit Agreements of 1977 and 1979, and was in harmony with the approach in the UN Secretary-General's Opening Statement of 1980 and the UN Evaluation Document of 1981. The Turkish Cypriot side made comprehensive proposals on all aspects of the problem, explored all constructive means and approaches in order to pave the way for a compromise and was prepared to make great sacrifices to this end.

However, all proposals made in good will and all steps taken by the Turkish Cypriot side to pave the way for a compromise have remained unreciprocated. Although it had been emphasized on numerous occasions that the Turkish Cypriot side was ready for meaningful

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negotiations in order to move rapidly towards a federal solution, the Greek Cypriot leadership first slowed down and frustrated the negotiating process, and then they abandoned the negotiating table altogether, eventually taking the Cyprus question to international fora where the Turkish Cypriot People had no opportunity of being heard, and of defending their rights.

It has become quite clear that the Greek Cypriot leadership does not wish to accept the Turkish Cypriot People as an equal co-founder partner within a federal structure.

A negative attitude, especially in recent months, has been predominant in the Greek Cypriot leadership - an attitude which is not compatible with the concept of a federal state and the concept of co-founder partnership; which does not take into account the bitter experiences of the past; which does not recognize the right of the Turkish Cypriot People to live in security and freedom in their own zone; and which even aims at destroying mutually agreed fundamental points of agreement.

Under these circumstances, the Turkish Cypriot People has been confronted with the necessity of determining its own destiny.

Inalienable Right  
to Self-  
Determination.

18. The Parliament elected by the free will of the Turkish Cypriot People has, as the only legitimate body capable of representing them, already declared to the world that the Turkish Cypriot People possess the right of self-determination.

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The right of self-determination of the Turkish Cypriot People stems naturally from the fundamental rights and freedoms possessed by all men. Many a State, large or small, have been established through the exercise of the right of self-determination.

This right constitutes one of the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 1 of the "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" as well as Article 1 of the "International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" also confirm the inalienable right of the Turkish Cypriot People to "self-determination".

As stated in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights". All of the international documents relating to fundamental human rights emphasize that these rights must be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, language, religion or national origin.

The participation of every citizen, directly or through freely chosen representatives, in the conduct of public affairs, and access, on terms of equality, to public service, are among the fundamental rights protected by basic documents relating to human rights.

As mentioned before, the Turkish Cypriot People have been prevented from all kinds of



participation in the conduct of the public affairs of the so-called "Republic of Cyprus". The Greek Cypriot leadership has, for long years, given the most inhuman examples of discrimination based on national origin, language and religious belief. Turkish Cypriot citizens of the partnership State have been deprived of all their civil, political and social rights, and of all economic opportunities and public services.

Even individuals known by the Greek Cypriot Administration to have committed crimes and atrocities against Turkish Cypriots have gone unpunished and not a single Greek Cypriot official who had oppressed and discriminated against Turkish Cypriots has ever been prosecuted for his offences.

The Greek Cypriot Administration, by its very composition and its own actions; by destroying the partnership State; by trying to deprive the Turkish Cypriots of their fundamental rights and liberties; and by pursuing a policy of hostility against them, has disqualified itself from any claim to be the legitimate "Government" of the whole of Cyprus.

The exercise of the right of self-determination has become an imperative for the Turkish Cypriot People.

Not Only a Right  
But Also a Duty.

19. For years, the Turkish Cypriot People, having been deprived of its fundamental rights, has sacrificed the lives of many of its sons in order not to bow to servitude and domination.

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It is the inalienable right of the Turkish Cypriot People to live freely in security, peace and happiness under a government emanating from its own free will and to determine its own destiny. To declare that we have decided to do so has become not only a "right" for us, but also a "duty" towards future generations.

Eternal and  
Universal  
Principles.

20. No one can expect the Turkish Cypriot People to renounce the principle that:

"All people have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development".

No one can prevent the Turkish Cypriot People from declaring the following eternal truths;

"...all men are created equal, they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness... Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed."

The Turkish Cypriot People believe that there must be in the world:

"...peaceful and friendly relations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples, and of universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for

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all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion".

The Turkish Cypriot People have as much right to live in freedom and independence as the Greek Cypriots.

Confirmation of  
an Existing  
Reality.

21. The Turkish Cypriot People have in fact exercised this right a long time ago; they have established their own State with all its organs. All that is being done today is the confirmation and declaration of an existing reality and the re-naming of our State.

An Appeal to  
the Greek Cypriot  
People for Peace  
and Friendship.

22. On this historic day, we extend once again our hand in peace and friendship to the Greek Cypriot People:

Peaceful Solu-  
tions to All  
Differences.

a) We firmly believe that the two Peoples, who are destined to co-exist side by side in the island, can and must find peaceful, just and durable solutions to all the differences between them, through negotiations on the basis of equality.

Door Open to  
Federation.

b) The proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will not hinder the two equal Peoples and their administrations from establishing a new partnership within the framework of a genuine federation; on the contrary, such a proclamation can facilitate efforts in this direction by fulfilling the necessary requisites for the establishment of a federation. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, determined to make every constructive effort in this direction, will not unite with any other State.

U.N. Mission of  
Good Offices.

c) The Turkish Cypriot side desires the continuation of the mission of good offices of the UN Secretary-General for a peaceful and conciliatory solution of all the issues between the two Peoples and urges the pursuit of negotiations under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General.

Good Will  
Measures.

d) We urge the Greek Cypriot Administration to abandon, once and for all, its illusion of "Enosis" which aims at subjugating the Turkish Cypriot People to a foreign State; to give up its false pretence of speaking on behalf of all Cyprus in the international field; to accept the fact that it has no authority whatsoever to represent the Turkish Cypriots and to facilitate the immediate taking of measures of good will on matters which can be resolved in the short term, with the object of narrowing the gap between the two Peoples.

Basic Policy.

23. We consider it our duty to announce that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus which we are declaring:

a) Is, and shall remain, faithful to the principles of the United Nations Charter,

b) Shall adhere to no other policy than non-alignment,

c) Shall, in her relations with the two Super Powers and with all other countries, attach the greatest importance to the need for peace and stability and for the preservation of the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean and shall not join any military bloc,

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d) Shall endeavour to establish friendly relations with all countries and shall remain firmly decided not to allow any hostile activity against any country on its territory.

e) Shall continue to adhere to the Treaties of Establishment, Guarantee and Alliance,

f) Shall strive to establish the closest possible ties and relations with the Islamic countries, the Non-Aligned countries and the Commonwealth countries.

We are resolved and determined to preserve Northern Cyprus as an independent and non-aligned region of tranquility and stability which will serve the cause of peace in the world and in the Mediterranean.

Declaration.

24. Expressing the legitimate and irrepressible will of the Turkish Cypriot People, in the light of the aforesaid realities, convictions and necessities, we hereby declare before the World and before History the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as an independent State.

On this historic day, we reiterate our gratitude to our Martyrs who sacrificed their lives in order that the Turkish Cypriot People may never again be subjected to servitude under foreign domination and may live in dignity and freedom. May God's mercy be upon our Martyrs.

## RESOLUTION

Our Assembly,

- Representing the free will of the Turkish Cypriot People;

- Believing that all human beings, who are born free and equal, should live in freedom and equality;

- Having declared, in this belief, the right of the Turkish Cypriot People to self-determination, by its Resolution of 17 June 1983;

- Rejecting discrimination between human beings on grounds of race, national origin, language, religion or any other grounds; and rejecting also all forms of colonialism, racism, oppression and domination;

- Expressing the hope that peace and stability will prevail and that freedom and human rights will flourish not only in Cyprus, but also in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and the world at large;

- Believing that the two Peoples in Cyprus each has the right to live and govern itself in its own territory in peace and security, and has the right to preserve its own national identity;

- Firmly adhering to the view that these two Peoples, who are destined to co-exist side by side in the island, can and must find peaceful, just and durable solutions to all the differences between them, through negotiations on the basis of equality;

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- Firmly convinced that the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will not hinder but facilitate the re-establishment of the partnership between the two Peoples within a federal framework and will also facilitate the settlement of the problems between them;

- Earnestly hoping that negotiations will be carried out, on the basis of equality and under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, with a view to resolving in a peaceful and conciliatory manner, all the outstanding issues between the two Peoples, and convinced that the proposed Summit Meeting would be useful in this regard;

And acting on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot People,

Approves the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the "Declaration of Independence"

CONFIDENTIAL



JWP

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

7 November 1983

CYPRUS: POSSIBLE TURKISH CYPRIOT  
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

The Prime Minister was grateful for your letter of 4 November and the enclosed paper. She has noted the contents of both these documents. With regard to paragraph 24 of the paper, Mrs. Thatcher has recorded her agreement with the statement in Annex A, should the need arise for it. With regard to paragraph 27, she agrees that we should rule out the use of force by the UK to ensure the Treaty of Guarantee.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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CYPRUS: ADVANCE COPIES 13 (x11)

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PS/MR WHITNEY  
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SIR J BULLARD

PS/No 10 DOWNING STREET  
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~~MR JAMES~~  
... ..  
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TO IMMEDIATE FC

TELEGRAM NO 273 OF 7 NOVEMBER 83.

INFO IMMEDIATE DESKBY PARIIS (PLEASE PASS COPY TO WILSON).

INFO PRIORITY ANKARA, ATHENS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
BONN, ROME, MODUK AND CBFC.

INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO.

MT

YOUR TEL 206 : CYPRUS : CONFIDENTIAL CONSULTATIONS.

1. AFTER A SPATE OF RUMOURS HERE LATE LAST WEEK THAT DENKTASH INTENDED TO DECLARE INDEPENDENT STATEHOOD TO COINCIDE WITH THE TURKISH ELECTIONS, DENKTASH MADE IT CLEAR IN BRIEFING TO THE PRESS ON 5 NOVEMBER THAT SUCH A DECLARATION WAS NOT IMMINENT. HE TOLD A MEETING OF TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY LEADERS THAT THE MOVE HAD BEEN DELAYED BECAUSE OF "DEVELOPMENTS", NOTABLY KYPRIANOU'S AGREEMENT TO A HIGH LEVEL MEETING. DENKTASH CLAIMED THAT HIS OBJECTIVE WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BIZONAL, BICOMMUNAL REPUBLIC : "IF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS RECOGNISE THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY AS ONE OF THE TWO PEOPLES OF CYPRUS WITH THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION, THERE IS NO NEED FOR A NEW STEP. THE BALL IS IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT COURT". DENKTASH CALLED FOR WITHDRAWAL OF THE TWO GREEK CYPRIOT REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE ASSEMBLY, REPORTEDLY ADDING THAT "OTHERWISE IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO RESUME THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS".

2. DENKTASH, WHO ALMOST CERTAINLY WAS PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RUMOURS, SEEMS TO HAVE WANTED TO KEEP EVERYONE GUESSING UP TO THE LAST MINUTE BEFORE THE TURKISH ELECTIONS. PART OF HIS INTENTION IS NO DOUBT TO SOFTEN-UP THE GREEK CYPRIOTS, WITH A VIEW TO EXTRACTING CONCESSIONS PERHAPS AT THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING, OR AT LEAST TO DETERRING ANTI-TURKISH CYPRIOT MOVES IN INTERNATIONAL FORA (EG THE CHOGM). DENKTASH MAY ALSO HAVE HOPED TO DETECT SOME WEAKENING OF ANKARA'S RESOLVE WHICH WOULD HAVE ENABLED HIM TO MAKE A BREAK FOR INDEPENDENCE. WHEN THE CYPRUS FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED ME AND MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE ON 4 NOVEMBER IF WE HAD ANY INFORMATION THAT A DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE WAS IMMINENT, I TOLD MACOVOU IN CONFIDENCE OF THE LATEST INDICATIONS WE HAD OF TURKISH ATTITUDES IN ANKARA TEL 509.

3. HOLDER TOLD THE COUNSELLOR ON 7 NOVEMBER THAT HE HAD HEARD OVER THE WEEKEND THAT GOBBIN HAD NOT YET LEFT BUENOS AIRES AND THAT HIS APPOINTMENT AS ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD BE ANNOUNCED ON 7 OR 8 NOVEMBER (HOLGER ASKED FOR THIS INFORMATION TO BE PROTECTED). ALTHOUGH GOBBIN WOULD PROBABLY COME BRIEFLY TO CYPRUS TO SAY GOODBYE, HE WOULD NOT GET INVOLVED IN SUBSTANTIVE CONSULTATIONS. HOLGER HAD RECEIVED THE INSTRUCTIONS REFERRED TO IN UKMIS NEW YORK TEL 1243 AND WAS STARTING FURTHER SOUNDINGS WITH THE TWO SIDES ABOUT THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING. SHERRY HAD TOLD HIM THAT, IF THESE MADE PROGRESS, THE SECRETARY GENERAL ENVISAGED INVITING SENIOR GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOT REPRESENTATIVES TO NEW YORK TO DISCUSS WITH HIM PERSONALLY THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MEETING.

4. FCO PLEASE PASS SAYING UKDEL NATO.

WILBERFORCE.

BT

071202Z NOV 83  
FCO CONFIDENTIAL HSP

NNNN



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 November 1983

*John T. [unclear]*

*Prime Minister  
in answer A should  
we need write  
MS  
A.S.C. 4/11*

Cyprus: Possible Turkish Cypriot Declaration of Independence

Thank you for your letter of 31 October saying that the Prime Minister had commented on the need for contingency planning for a possible Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence and on the difficulty of fulfilling the guarantee in the 1960 Treaties.

I enclose a copy of a paper which describes the implications of a declaration of independence and possible action both immediately and in the longer term. The paper is being submitted in parallel to the Secretary of State in his box this evening.

As the paper makes clear, we believe our reactions should be coloured by the need to be seen to fulfil our treaty obligations; the desirability of maintaining good relations with the Republic of Cyprus in the interest of preserving trouble-free use of the SBAs, and, for more general reasons, with Greece; the implications for NATO; and the implications for Turkey's relations with the West. Possible immediate action following a declaration of independence might include:

- (a) a statement condemning Turkish Cypriot action and calling for its reversal;
- (b) representations to the Turkish Government;
- (c) co-ordination of our efforts with our main allies and with the UN Secretariat;
- (d) consultations with the Cyprus Government;
- (e) calling for consultations with Greece and Turkey under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee (although such consultations are unlikely to be fruitful and one or other of the guarantor powers might refuse to take part we should be seen to fulfil our obligations under the Treaty for the guarantor powers to consult together);
- (f) initiatives in the Ten and in NATO;
- (g) calling a meeting of the UN Security Council and possibly taking the initiative in tabling a draft resolution.



Such tactics envisage seizing the diplomatic initiative in an effort to meet inevitable calls from the Greek Cypriots and the Greeks for some form of immediate response to UDI. It is most unlikely that they would succeed in reversing UDI; but there is a good chance that they will serve to limit a further deterioration in the situation.

We would not wish to recommend any military action in attempting to "deliver" the guarantee in the Treaty. To do so would involve a direct clash with a major NATO ally (the Turks have some 17,000 troops in northern Cyprus). Although the Treaty might seem to give us the right to take such action, in the absence of a decision by the Security Council it would in any case probably be incompatible with the UN Charter. We believe it is correct to conclude, as the Prime Minister has done, that we could not in practice deliver the guarantee of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus to which the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee refers. Nor indeed have the guarantor powers been able to preserve the 1960 constitutional arrangements referred to in the Treaties which broke down in 1963 when, following intercommunal violence, the Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the federal government.

UDI would not of itself pose any threat to the Sovereign Base Areas: the Turkish Cypriots would argue that it does nothing more than formalise the situation which has effectively existed since 1963. There is some possibility, however, that heightened tension could lead to sporadic acts of violence on the ground in Cyprus which might spill over into the vicinity of the SBAs. This risk has already been assessed and will need to be checked constantly in the light of further developments.

Copies of this letter go to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



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## TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION OF STATEHOOD: THE CONSEQUENCES

### Introduction

1. Since May this year the Turkish Cypriot leader has renewed earlier threats to declare an independent Turkish Cypriot state. The immediate likelihood of such a move has receded. But the threat remains real and could be revived at any moment if Denktash or the Turks think it could be to their advantage.
2. This paper considers the implications of a Turkish Cypriot unilateral declaration of independence (UDI); HMG's responsibilities; the need for action to prevent a declaration; and what we should do if it occurred nevertheless. UDI is used as a term of convenience. What is involved is secession from the Republic of Cyprus.

### Turkish Cypriot Position

3. The Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktash, has long wanted to announce the establishment of an independent Turkish Cypriot state. Following the UN debate on Cyprus in May, resulting in a Resolution favourable to the Greek Cypriots (the UK abstained), he has stepped up and persisted with threats to do so, possibly around the time of the Turkish elections (6 November) or towards the end of the year. He has called for a summit meeting with President Kyprianou (who has agreed in principle) and may hope to link action on UDI to the outcome of such a meeting. The Turkish Cypriots would claim that UDI would do no more than formalise the current status quo (the Turkish Cypriot community ended their participation in the Government of Cyprus in 1963).

### Turkish Position

4. The Turkish Government appear to have successfully restrained Denktash from declaring UDI in the past and to have exercised similar restraint again recently. They will have judged that the international reaction which this would provoke would be against their wider interests. But there are signs that their will and ability to continue to exercise restraint over the longer term may

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have diminished. They will nonetheless probably continue to try to delay UDI for the time being, at least until their tactical position is stronger.

#### Greek Cypriot Position

5. The Greek Cypriots realise that a Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence would probably end all chance of a solution to the Cyprus problem on terms even remotely acceptable to them. They are firmly opposed to it. But President Kyprianou is aware of the risks of provoking the Turkish Cypriots and is apparently trying to avoid giving Denktash a pretext for UDI.

#### Greek Position

6. The Greeks are bound strongly to oppose UDI. But Papandreou sees Cyprus as part of the wider Greek/Turkish struggle and there are signs that the Greek Government would privately not find UDI so unwelcome. Having little real concern for the welfare of either community in Cyprus they could use UDI for their own purposes in lining up Western support for the Greek case vis à vis Turkey. It would provide them with a pretext for being even less cooperative with NATO and EC if their Western partners could be presented as not having reacted sufficiently strongly to UDI. It could also provide them with a pretext, if they wanted one, to withdraw again, or at least to threaten to withdraw, from NATO's integrated structure.

#### HMG's Responsibilities

7. The relevant UK obligations, which are shared with Greece and Turkey, derive from the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee (copy attached). They are broadly:

- (a) to 'guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus...';
- (b) to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at partition of the Island;
- (c) in the event of a breach of the Treaty, to consult with the other guarantor powers on representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of it.

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8. If common or concerted action above proves impossible, the Treaty preserves the right of each of the guarantor Powers 'to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty'. So far as the use of force is concerned, it is open to question whether this right is compatible with obligations under the UN Charter.

9. In view of our obligations and the consequences for the UK (see below) our first objective should clearly be to oppose the idea of UDI and seek to prevent it.

Probable Consequences of UDI

(a) In Cyprus

10. Although UDI in itself would have little practical effect, the definitive separation of North and South would be seen in Cyprus and elsewhere as signifying the final abandonment of the concept of a unified state which is enshrined in the 1960 Treaty of Establishment. There would be a fierce Greek Cypriot and international political reaction. General intercommunal violence would be unlikely: the Turkish Cypriots would have no incentive for it and neither Greece nor the Greek Cypriots have the means to engage in hostilities. But some violence by extremists on the Greek Cypriot side cannot be ruled out. The present forces in UNFICYP should be able to cope with 'brush fires' although they could not deal with a general conflagration.

11. The Greek Cypriots would probably impose a complete embargo on North/South contacts. Continued sharing of the key common services (electricity, which goes from south to north; water which goes mainly from north to south) would also be jeopardised. Cutting these services, particularly electricity, would cause serious inconvenience and heighten tension.

12. Denktash claims that he would continue the intercommunal talks. This is consistent with his line that UDI has little

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practical significance (para 3). But the Greek Cypriots would break off the talks. The UN Secretary General would then find it extremely difficult to continue his 'good offices' role and might abandon it altogether. In these circumstances, the prospects of any agreed long-term solution would recede, if not disappear.

(b) For the UK

13. The UK's principal practical interest in Cyprus is the Sovereign Base Areas which we retain under the 1960 Treaty of Establishment and our rights over them are guaranteed by the Treaty of Guarantee. Claims that the Treaty of Guarantee no longer had any effect and criticism of the UK's failure to carry out its guarantee of the territorial integrity of Cyprus could call into question, at least politically, the continued validity of the Treaty of Establishment and the justification for our use of the SBAs.

14. Serious political tension between the communities could also threaten our ability to maintain trouble-free use of the SBAs. Provided there was no large-scale violence our main need would be to maintain Greek Cypriot goodwill. In the short term we might be able to satisfy the Greek Cypriots with strong statements and diplomatic action. In the long term, if we decided for example not to join an economic embargo against Northern Cyprus, relations would probably become strained. Pressure on us to withdraw from the Island altogether might increase.

15. Apart from the question of the SBAs, there would be political and moral pressure on the UK to take a conspicuous lead because of our Treaty obligations and because of our present and historic ties with Cyprus.

16. There would be domestic political pressure, especially from the small but vocal pro-Greek Cypriot lobby in the House of Commons, to take specific action to restore the situation laid down by the Treaty of Guarantee. Our right to take action alone (para 6 above) would no doubt be interpreted by some as an



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obligation to do so (a point made in 1974 at the time of the Turkish invasion).

17. Any such action on our part would risk jeopardising our currently good relations with Turkey with consequent implications for trade, and, in the wider context, Turkey's relations with the West generally.

18. There is also a sizeable British Community on the Island, including property owners (2,400). They might be at some risk if any violence occurred and could become targets in the event of dissatisfaction by either side about HMG's stance.

19. Trade with the Island is small (about £125m pa).

International

20. UDI would give rise to strong international condemnation of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. The Turks would feel obliged to stand by the Turkish Cypriots even if they disapproved or were unhappy about the timing. The Greeks and Greek Cypriots would orchestrate action in all available fora, notably in the UN (especially as regards Chapter VII in the UN Charter on Threats to Peace), in the EC and in NATO. Greece would want the UK (and others) to join in diplomatic action, to join their economic embargo against Northern Cyprus, and to impose sanctions on Turkey.

Preventative Action

21. If the risk of UDI increases, as it has done on occasions throughout the past months, strong representations should be made to the Turkish Government and Denktash through our posts in Ankara and Nicosia. Such representations can be reinforced at Ministerial level (as in October). Representations to Denktash are unlikely to be effective. But the Turks have responded in the past by renewing their efforts to restrain Denktash. If UDI appeared imminent we should reinforce other representations with personal messages to the Turkish Government from the Secretary of State or the Prime Minister.

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22. We should also continue to take the lead in pressing our major allies (US, France, FRG and Italy) to act similarly. The US has most leverage with Turkey.

Immediate Action Post-UDI

By the UK

23. Assuming Western representations failed and the establishment of an independent Turkish Cypriot state was announced, British reactions should be coloured by:

- (a) } the need to be seen to fulfill our treaty obligations;
- (b) the desirability of maintaining good relations with the Republic of Cyprus in order to preserve our use of the SBAs and, for broader reasons, avoiding a serious conflict with Greece;
- (c) the need to limit damage (in Cyprus, in NATO and in Turkey's relationship with the West).

24. Our immediate reactions could be:

- (a) A British Government statement condemning the Turkish Cypriot action, calling for its reversal and making it clear that there could be no recognition (a draft is at Annex A); *Amend mt*
- (b) Representations to the Turkish Government, on both legal and political grounds, including a request to bring about a reversal of the Turkish Cypriot action;
- (c) Consultations with our main allies - the other Western members of the Security Council (US, France and at present the Netherlands), and the rest of <sup>the</sup> 'European Four' with whom we have confidential discussions on Cyprus (France, FRG and Italy) - and with the UN Secretariat;
- (d) Consultations with the Cyprus Government which might cover British action in the Security Council (see below);
- (e) A proposal of consultations with Greece and Turkey under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee. Turkey might refuse

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- to take part. (Consultations would be unlikely to be effective and would probably break down in recriminations; but we should propose them nevertheless to fulfill our Treaty obligations);
- (f) Initiatives in the Political Cooperation machinery of the Ten, and in NATO. A common view from either body would be greatly complicated by Greece's membership of both and Turkey's membership of the latter;
- (g) Calling a meeting of the UN Security Council; possibly tabling a draft resolution.

25. (a), (b) and (c) could take place immediately. Action under (g) might depend on the result of these moves and might also await the results of consultations under (d) and (e). The precise form of moves in the Security Council would depend to a large extent on the strength of Greek and Greek Cypriot reaction (if they had already discounted UDI, we should avoid over-reacting ourselves). An immediate call for informal consultations in the Security Council, tabling a draft resolution and pressing for its immediate adoption, might help retain us the initiative and pre-empt a more extreme resolution which we would have difficulty in supporting. An illustrative draft resolution is at Annex B.

26. For similar reasons, it would be important to seize the initiative under (f) in the EC and NATO. The Greeks would use the Presidency of the EC to promote their interests if UDI occurred before the end of 1983. Immediate proposals for diplomatic action would help avoid proposals for less suitable action.

27. It is assumed that the use of force by the UK to enforce the Treaty of Guarantee is ruled out (see para 34). *Amend not*

28. The Greeks might use UDI as justification for stationing additional troops in Cyprus in order to counter-balance the Turkish military presence. Papandreou has said that such a move has been considered, although it is unlikely that any final decision has been taken. At present the Greeks have about 1800 troops in Cyprus (they are allowed 950 under the 1960 Treaty of Alliance); the Turks have about 17,000 (they are allowed 650). This would be one aspect of Greece's desire to use the declaration of UDI to their own ends (see para 6 above). While this would heighten tension and increase Cyprus' ties with Greece, it is most unlikely in itself to presage military action.

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Medium and Long Term Policy

29. In the longer term our aims should be:
- (a) to avoid being drawn into action (eg open-ended economic sanctions against Turkey) which clashed with other UK/Western interests;
  - (b) to contain Greek Cypriot and Greek frustrations;
  - (c) to maintain some working contact with the Turkish Cypriots;
  - (d) to discourage any further deterioration in the situation, or violence.

Further Action

To Placate the Greek Cypriots

30. The consultations referred to in para 24 above would be in part designed to placate the Greek Cypriots. We should continue to work to contain their frustrations (and those of the Greeks) and bring every reasonable means to bear to strengthen Greek Cypriot links with the West and encourage moderate tendencies in Athens. In doing this, we would hope also to minimise the scope for trouble making by the Greek Cypriot and Greek Communist Parties.

31. Recognition of the Turkish Cypriot 'state' should be withheld indefinitely (this could, however, lead to a North Korea-type situation where what is, in reality, an independent sovereign state is treated as if it did not exist). But some arrangements to deal with the Turkish Cypriot authorities would have to be evolved.

32. The hope of eventual settlement should not be abandoned but publicly encouraged. We should contradict any Greek claim that UDI means the end of the intercommunal talks. But UDI would make any settlement even more difficult. Only a conjunction of strong and moderate administrations in Nicosia, Ankara and Athens would render a breakthrough feasible. Meanwhile we should continue to be guided by the aims in para 29 above.

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33. It might be necessary to try to 'buy' Greek Cypriot political goodwill for the sake of preserving our interest in the SBAs. We should comply with physical Greek Cypriot measures to cut road links with northern Cyprus (we shall probably have no choice). There may be a case for special treatment of the Greek Cypriots over certain forms of aid. We might raise the subsidy for student fees. In consultation with EC partners, we should press the EC to accede to the Greek Cypriot request for full Customs Union with the Community, without necessarily much regard for benefits to the Turkish Cypriots. Legal difficulties are likely to arise over applying the EC/Cyprus Association Agreements to northern Cyprus at all.

Other Action

34. We would not wish to take military action. To do so would involve a major clash with a NATO ally (the Turks have some 17,000 troops in the North). Although Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee might seem to give us the right to take independent military action in the absence of a decision by the Security Council, such action would probably be incompatible with our obligations under the UN Charter, which override all other Treaty obligations. Nor should we wish to take economic sanctions against Turkey which would clash with other important interests. We should try to placate the Greek Cypriots by explaining to them clearly at an early stage the limits of our actions as well as what we could do.

35. There is a range of other possible measures open to us affecting trade; contacts with the Turkish Cypriot 'Government' and the present 'TFSC' office in London; aid; and cultural contacts. None is likely to reverse a decision on UDI or is particularly attractive. A boycott of the Turkish Cypriots, even for a limited period, would affect consular and compensation matters <sup>/and</sup> trade (approximately £14m p.a.). These interests are all relatively small. It might also lead to heightened tension along the common boundary between northern Cyprus and ESBA.

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36. We do not have the legal power to close the unofficial 'TFSC' office London. But we would cease to facilitate its operations by allowing in staff from Northern Cyprus. (The Home Office issue work permits to its expatriate employees). The Turkish Cypriots could no doubt find sufficient talent in the Turkish Cypriot community already in London to keep the office open but we would have made a political point by not actively conniving in its existence.

37. In practice, the British Council office in northern Cyprus would probably have to close because travel into northern Cyprus would be stopped by the Greek Cypriots.

38. It would probably not be appropriate to withhold aid to Turkish Cypriot students in the form of fee subsidies. In practice, as the money is paid in the UK to individuals, we could probably not discriminate against them even if we wished to do so.

39. In the longer term we should work towards the re-establishment of intercommunal contact. But we should not be under any illusions that this could be achieved either easily or quickly.

Conclusion

40. Our main tactics would be:

- (a) to seize the initiative and hold it as long as possible in order to minimise the calls for practical action that we would not wish to undertake.
- (b) to that end, to work on a wide variety of diplomatic fronts.

41. Such tactics envisage seizing a diplomatic initiative in an effort to meet inevitable calls from the Greek Cypriots and the Greeks for some form of immediate response to UDI. It is most unlikely that they would succeed in reversing UDI, but there is a good chance that they will serve to limit a further deterioration in the situation.

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## DRAFT STATEMENT BY HMG IN THE EVENT OF UDI

1. We understand that Mr Denktash, leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, has purported to declare unilaterally the establishment of an independent State in the Turkish-occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus. The British Government deplore Mr Denktash's action. The British Government recognise only one Cypriot State; the Republic of Cyprus under the Government of President Kyprianou.
2. Such a declaration of secession is incompatible with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. It can only complicate the already difficult task of reaching a settlement in Cyprus acceptable to the people of both communities. The British Government have made clear their opposition to any actions which make a settlement to the Cyprus problem more difficult.
3. In accordance with Britain's responsibilities under the Treaty of Guarantee we are calling for urgent consultations with the Greek and Turkish Governments. We shall also be consulting the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and be in touch with other interested governments including EC and NATO partners.

*Agreed*



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## DRAFT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

1. Greatly deplores the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus.
2.
  - (a) Calls for the revocation of the declaration.
  - (b) Requests the Secretary General to pursue his mission of good offices and to discuss urgently with the two communities and with <sup>the</sup> Governments of Greece and Turkey ways by which the intercommunal negotiations may be resumed in order to achieve early progress towards a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus.
  - (c) Calls upon the two communities to co-operate fully with the Secretary General in his mission of good offices.
3. Calls upon all states to respect the sovereignty independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.
4. Calls upon all states not to recognise any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus.
5. Calls upon all states and the two communities in Cyprus to refrain from any action which might exacerbate the situation.
6. Reaffirms its resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975) and subsequent resolutions, and calls for their urgent and effective implementation.
7. Requests the Secretary General to keep the Security Council fully informed.

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## TREATY OF GUARANTEE

The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part,

- I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest,
- II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that Constitution,

Have agreed as follows:

### ARTICLE I

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.

### ARTICLE II

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.

### ARTICLE III

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus<sup>(1)</sup> signed at Nicosia on to-day's date.

### ARTICLE IV

In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.

### ARTICLE V

The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia.

The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

31 October 1983

Cyprus - Threat of Turkish/Cypriot UDI

The Prime Minister saw over the weekend the passage in JIC(83)(WSI)43 on this subject.

Mrs. Thatcher has commented that we must now make contingency plans for a possible Turkish/Cypriot declaration of UDI. She has added that at present she does not see how we could deliver the guarantee.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Remarks made on JIC (83) WSI 43  
Weekly Survey of Intelligence  
21-27 Oct. '83.

Part I Page 4.

Letter to F/C.O.

↓ A.C. 31/10

We must  
consider ←  
the reasons  
contrary to  
I do not at  
present see how  
we could possibly  
defeat the present  
not

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DESKBY FCO 241030Z

FM NICOSIA 241000Z  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELEGRAM NO 258 OF 24 OCTOBER 83.

INFO PRIORITY ANAKRA, ATHENS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
 MODUK.  
 INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN AND ROME.  
 INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO AND CBFC.

MY TEL 257 : CYPRUS PROBLEM : LADY YOUNG'S VISIT.

SUMMARY : LADY YOUNG'S MEETINGS WITH IACOVOU AND KYPRIANOU.  
 CAUTIOUS GREEK CYPRIOT APPROACH TOWARDS A HIGH LEVEL MEETING  
HMG'S OPPOSITION TO UDI REPEATED TO DENKTASH. THE LATTER  
STOUTLY DEFENDING HIS POSITION BUT NOT COMMITTING HIMSELF  
TO ANY DEFINITE COURSE OF ACTION. DANGER OF AN EARLY UDI,  
PROBABLY RECEDING. LADY YOUNG'S VISIT SUCCESSFUL IN PUBLIC  
 RELATIONS TERMS AS WELL AS SUBSTANCE.

1. LADY YOUNG'S CONVERSATIONS WITH IACOVOU ON 21 OCTOBER  
 CONTAINED MUCH EXPLANATION BY THE LATTER OF THE RESTRAINT  
 WHICH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD BEEN SHOWING (EG IN THE COUNCIL  
 OF EUROPE) FOR THE SAKE OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE,  
 AND OF THEIR POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE LATTER ON BOTH METHOD  
 AND SUBSTANCE. IACOVOU STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THE TEXT OF  
 THEIR COMMENTS ON SUBSTANCE WAS BEING HELD SECRET BOTH IN  
 NEW YORK AND HERE. HE DID NOT THEREFORE GO INTO ANY DETAIL  
 ABOUT IT. LADY YOUNG WAS ALSO EXPOSED PRIVATELY TO THE  
 CONTRARY VIEW OF CLERIDES AND OF ROLANDIS, THAT KYPRIANOU  
 (IN AGREEMENT WITH PAPANDREOU) HAD IN EFFECT KILLED THE  
 SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE BY FAILING TO ACCEPT THE  
 INDICATORS OUTRIGHT.

2. AS TO THE FUTURE, IACOVOU'S MAIN POINTS WERE:-

- (A) THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE ANXIOUS TO KEEP ALIVE THE SECRETARY-  
 GENERAL'S "INITIATIVE" (AT TIMES THEY INSISTED ON THE  
 INDICATOR METHODOLOGY, AT OTHERS SIMPLY ON HIS PERSONAL  
 INVOLVEMENT). FAILURE WOULD LEAVE NO OTHER AVENUE OF  
 PROGRESS.
- (B) A TURKISH CYPRIOT CHANGE OF NAME FROM "TFSC" TO "REPUBLIC  
 OF NORTH CYPRUS" WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO UDI. IT WOULD MEAN

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Prime MinuteHighlighted passages

only.

A.S.C. 24/10

MT

THE END OF NEGOTIATION AND WOULD EVOKE A VERY STRONG GREEK CYPRIOT RESPONSE. LADY YOUNG DID NOT PROBE WHAT THIS MIGHT MEAN BUT MADE CLEAR OUR OWN OPPOSITION TO UDI OR ANY OTHER ACTION THAT WOULD SET BACK THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

(C) THERE SEEMED TO BE ACCEPTANCE OF THE NEED, WHICH LADY YOUNG URGED, FOR GREEK CYPRIOT RESTRAINT AT THE PRESENT DELICATE JUNCTURE.

(D) THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD ESSENTIALLY BE GUIDED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S JUDGMENT ON THE CONDITIONS FOR CONVENING A NEW KYPRIANOU/DENKTASH MEETING AND ON THE CONTENT AND TIMING OF WHAT SHOULD BE SAID ABOUT THIS AS CONSULTATIONS PROCEEDED.

3. LADY YOUNG'S TALK WITH KYPRIANOU EARLY ON 22 OCTOBER DID NOT ADD MUCH TO THIS. KYPRIANOU RECITED THAT A NEW HIGH LEVEL MEETING MUST HAVE AN AGREED AGENDA, MUST BE SET IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE AND MUST BE PREPARED IN A MANNER TO GIVE SOME ASSURANCE OF SUCCESS ON ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE. THE DATE (JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1984 AT THE EARLIEST) SHOULD NOT BE FIXED BEFORE THESE CONDITIONS HAD BEEN FULFILLED.

4. AT A TWO AND A HALF HOUR WORKING LUNCH FOR LADY YOUNG, DENKTASH GAVE HIS OWN LIVELY ACCOUNT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND A SPIRITED DEFENCE OF HIS TREATMENT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE, OF THE NEED FOR INDEPENDENT STATEHOOD TO PLACE THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS ON AN EQUAL FOOTING WITH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS, AND OF HIS CALL FOR A HIGH LEVEL MEETING WITH KYPRIANOU TO DETERMINE FINALLY WHETHER THE LATTER ACCEPTED FEDERATION ON THE BASIS OF PARTNERSHIP OR NOT. LADY YOUNG MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT HMG WOULD VIEW ANY MOVE TOWARDS INDEPENDENT STATEHOOD WITH VERY SERIOUS CONCERN AND WOULD BE UNABLE TO RECOGNISE AN INDEPENDENT STATE IN THE NORTH. DENKTASH RESPONDED THAT TO ANY OTHER COUNTRY HE WOULD HAVE ANSWERED 'SO WHAT?' BUT SUCH A STATEMENT COMING FROM BRITAIN COULD NOT FAIL TO AFFECT HIM. HE SEEMED TO BE RENDERED THOUGHTFUL BY LADY YOUNG'S OBSERVATION THAT THE PROPOSED EXERCISE OF SELF DETERMINATION BY A COMMUNITY WITHIN A STATE WOULD BE VIEWED WITH ALARM BY THE LEBANON AND QUITE A NUMBER OF OTHER COUNTRIES AS A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT AFFECTING THEMSELVES. THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION DENKTASH REFRAINED FROM COMMITTING HIMSELF TO ANY DEFINITE COURSE OF ACTION. THIS, TOGETHER WITH DENKTASH'S PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ON 20 OCTOBER THAT INDEPENDENCE MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE BEFORE THE TURKISH ELECTIONS, RATHER BEARS OUT THE ASSESSMENT WHICH MY US COLLEAGUE GAVE TO LADY YOUNG THAT THE DANGER OF AN EARLY UDI IS PROBABLY RECEDING.

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5. IN GENERAL LADY YOUNG WAS STRUCK BY THE WAY IN WHICH THE ATTITUDES OF THE TWO SIDES MIRROR EACH OTHER. EACH CLAIMED THAT THE OTHER WAS NOT STANDING BY THE PRINCIPLES OF A SETTLEMENT CONTAINED IN THE 1977 AND 1979 HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENTS AND IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S OPENING STATEMENT OF AUGUST 1980. KYPRIANOU CLAIMED THAT DENKTASH'S PURPOSE IN CALLING FOR A NEW HIGH LEVEL MEETING (IF IT WAS NOT SIMPLY TO SECURE IT FAILURE) WAS TO TRY TO RENEGOTIATE THOSE PRINCIPLES MORE TO HIS ADVANTAGE. DENKTASH CLAIMED THAT KYPRIANOU CONSTANTLY TRYING TO WRIGGLE OUT OF THE COMMITMENT TO A BIZONAL FEDERATION. EACH ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE OTHER HAD NO INCENTIVE TO REACH A SETTLEMENT, THE GREEK CYPRIOTS BECAUSE THEY ENJOYED THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION, THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS BECAUSE THEY WERE SITTING PRETTY ON 36 PER CENT OF THE TERRITORY UNDER THE PROTECTION OF THE TURKISH ARMY.

6. LADY YOUNG'S VISIT RECEIVED EXTENSIVE COVERAGE IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT PRESS, WHICH UNSURPRISINGLY JUDGED IT BY THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE BRITISH POSITION ACCORDED WITH THAT OF THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT. SINCE OUR DIFFERENCES ARE AT THE MOMENT MORE WITH THE TURKISH SIDE LADY YOUNG'S DINNER SPEECH AND HER SHORT STATEMENT ON TAKING LEAVE OF KYPRIANOU WERE WELL RECEIVED, WITHOUT ANY ADVERSE COMMENT. THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PRESS HAS REPORTED PROMINENTLY (WITHOUT COMMENT SO FAR) THAT LADY YOUNG TOLD DENKTASH THAT BRITAIN WOULD NOT RECOGNISE AN INDEPENDENT STATE IN THE NORTH.

7. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO UKDEL NATO AND CBFC.

WILBERFORCE.

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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SED	PS
ECD	PS/LADY YOUNG
UKD	PS/MR WHITNEY
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CONFIDENTIAL

FM ANKARA 181515Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 486 OF 18 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE TO NICOSIA, ATHENS AND MODUK (PS S OF S)

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, ROME, CBFC

VISIT OF DEFENCE SECRETARY: CYPRUS

1. MR HESELTINE DISCUSSED CYPRUS WITH BOTH THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND PRESIDENT EVREN THIS MORNING. WITH BOTH HE EXPRESSED HMG'S SUPPORT FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND CONCERN AT THE POSSIBILITY OF A DECLARATION OF UDI BY THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS. HE EXPLAINED THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES FOR TURKEY WHICH WE SAW FLOWING FROM SUCH A MOVE.

2. TURKMEN EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT THE UK'S CONCERN UDI WOULD NOT

2. TURKMEN EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT THE UK'S CONCERN. UDI WOULD NOT BE A TRAGEDY. IT WOULD MERELY BE A CONFIRMATION OF THE EXISTING SITUATION. EVEN IF UDI WERE DECLARED, IT WOULD NOT RULE OUT A CONTINUATION OF THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. THE TSFC WAS IN ANY CASE A STATE IN ALL BUT NAME. THAT SAID, TURKMEN DID NOT FAVOUR UDI AT THIS TIME. BUT THERE WERE LIMITS TO TURKEY'S ABILITY TO CONTROL DENKTASH. PREVIOUSLY THE GREEKS HAD SAID THAT THEY COULD NOT CONTROL MAKARIOS. THE TURKS DID NOT BELIEVE THEM. BUT NOW THEY UNDERSTOOD THE PROBLEM. OF COURSE TURKEY HAD FORCES IN CYPRUS BUT SHE COULD NOT USE THEM. DENKTASH WOULD UNQUESTIONABLY RECEIVE THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE TURKISH PUBLIC OPINION IF HE DECLARED UDI. TURKMEN THEN REITERATED THAT HE DID NOT SUPPORT SUCH A MOVE NOW. THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WERE DOING THEIR BEST TO DISSUADE DENKTASH. BUT IF HE DECLARED UDI TURKEY COULD NOT PREVENT IT. IT SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS A TRAGEDY BUT AS A NORMAL PART OF A LONG SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.

3. IN REPLY, MR HESELTINE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT IN THE REAL WORLD MR TURKMEN'S DESCRIPTION OF A (NEXT TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) DE FACTO STATE IN CYPRUS MIGHT NOT BE FAR OUT. BUT THAT WAS NOT THE WHOLE STORY. IF UDI WERE DECLARED MUCH HEAT WOULD BE GENERATED AT THE UNITED NATIONS. HMG AS A GUARANTOR POWER COULD NOT IGNORE THE NEW SITUATION. TURKMEN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WOULD BE A ROW BUT HE COULD NOT SEE THE SITUATION IN TRAGIC TERMS IN COMPARISON WITH EG THE LEBANON. THE UNITED KINGDOM DID NOT ALWAYS ABIDE BY UN RESOLUTIONS. WHAT COULD HAPPEN AT THE UNITED NATIONS DID NOT WORRY TURKEY. MR HESELTINE HAD REFERRED TO BRITAIN'S POSITION AS A GUARANTOR POWER. BUT TIMES HAD CHANGED. THE EVENTS OF 1974 HAD SHOWN THAT THE UK COULD NOT ACT IN THE CAPACITY AND THEREFORE HE COULD NOT SEE THAT THIS AFFECTED OUR POSITION.

4. WHEN MR HESELTINE SAID THAT A DECLARATION OF UDI WOULD HAND THE PROPAGANDA GAME TO THE GREEKS BY PUTTING TURKEY ON THE WRONG FOOT, TURKMEN REFERRED TO GREECE'S PERFORMANCE IN NATO AND SAID THAT IF THAT DID NOT PUT GREECE ON THE WRONG FOOT, THEN TURKEY SHOULD BE IN THE CLEAR. BUT WE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THE HE, TURKMEN, HAD PUT A GREAT DEAL OF PRESSURE ON DENKTASH. BUT DENKTASH WAS PROVING DEFIANT. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT TURKEY'S FRIENDS SHOULD UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION IN WHICH SHE FOUND HERSELF. FINALLY IN ANSWER TO MR TURKMEN'S QUESTION, MR HESELTINE SAID THAT WE WERE ALSO PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE GREEKS AND INDEED LADY YOUNG WAS VISITING CYPRUS WHERE SHE WOULD TALK TO THE GREEK SIDE. MR TURKMEN COMMENTED THAT PAPANDEOU CARRIED GREAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE



~~COMMENTED THAT PAPANDEOU CARRIED GREAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE~~  
PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS TO WHICH MR HESELTINE REPLIED THAT IF  
TURKEY WERE TO CONDONE ACTION WHICH CAUSED A BREAKDOWN OF THE  
INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, THEY WOULD SIMPLY SUCCEED IN MAKING  
PAPANDEOU SEEM TO BE IN THE RIGHT. TURKMEN CONCLUDED BY POINTING  
TO THE FACT THAT GERMANY AND KOREA, SINGLE NATIONS, WERE DIVIDED.  
CYPRUS CONTAINED TWO NATIONS AND THE DIVISION INTO TWO WOULD  
NOT BE TRAGIC.

5. PRESIDENT EVREN SPOKE IN GENERALLY SIMILAR TERMS. HE  
SAID THAT THE TURKISH COMMUNITY IN CYPRUS HAD SUFFERED EXPLOITATION  
AND A STATE OF SEIGE AND EMBARGO FOR TWENTY YEARS. IF THAT COMMUNITY  
DECIDED TO TAKE ITS FREEDOM INTO ITS OWN HANDS, EVEN THOUGH TURKEY  
HAD PREVENTED IT DOING SO UP TO NOW. IT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO DO SO  
IN THE FUTURE. THE GREEKS FELT FREE TO RESORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
WHenever THEY PLEASED. PRESIDENT EVREN DID NOT SEE HOW THEY COULD  
STOP THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS ALSO GOING THEIR OWN WAY. SMALL COUNTRIES  
OF 50 THOUSAND PEOPLE HAD GAINED THEIR INDEPENDENCE. HOW COULD THE  
TURKISH CYPRIOTS BE PREVENTED FROM DOING SO ALSO ? HE URGED THAT  
PRESSURE SHOULD BE PUT ON THE GREEK SIDE TO COMPEL THEM TO REACH  
A SOLUTION. TURKEY HAD DONE ALL SHE COULD UP TO NOW. A DECISION ON  
INDEPENDENCE COULD NOT BE POSTPONED INDEFINITELY. IN PARTICULAR  
THERE WOULD SHORTLY BE AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT IN TURKEY WITH AN  
OPPOSITION THAT WOULD MAKE THE HANDLING OF THE PROBLEM MORE  
DIFFICULT.

6. MR HESELTINE REPLIED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE  
TURKISH SIDE. BUT IF UDI WERE TO BE DECLARED THE PROPAGANDA WHICH  
WOULD THEN BE DEPLOYED WOULD CERTAINLY BE HARMFUL TO TURKEY. THE  
GREEKS WOULD TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION.  
MR HESELTINE AGREED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE  
GREEK SIDE AND LADY YOUNG WOULD BE TALKING TO THEM IN CYPRUS THIS  
WEEK.

7. SEE MIFT.

RUSSELL

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17 October 1983

Cyprus: Possible Turkish Cypriot Declaration of  
Independence

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The Prime Minister has noted the contents  
of your letter of 14 October.

JOHN COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

~~John. M<sup>17</sup>/<sub>10</sub>.~~

A copy of the letter  
you asked me to  
put in the box on  
Friday night.

Nicky 14/10



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 October, 1983

for John,

MB

Cyprus: Possible Turkish Cypriot Declaration of Independence

You asked for an assessment of the latest developments concerning a possible declaration of independence by the Turkish Cypriots in Northern Cyprus. In the time available, this letter has not been seen by the Foreign Secretary: I shall be showing him a copy in the box tonight.

The Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr Denktash, has long favoured the establishment of a separate Turkish Cypriot state. Periodically in the past he has threatened to declare independence. These threats were renewed with unprecedented persistence shortly after the UN debate on Cyprus in May this year when the resolution passed by a large majority (we abstained) was strongly pro-Greek Cypriot. More recently, when he was in London on 10 October on a private visit, Denktash described the Secretary General's latest ideas on Cyprus as a 'dirty trick drawn up in collusion with the Greek Cypriots'. The next day, in Strasbourg, he said that he would begin moves towards independence at the time of the Turkish elections (on 6 November). He threatened to declare independence by the end of the year if the Greek Cypriots did not withdraw their representatives from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and if Kyprianou refused to take part in a summit meeting with him as Denktash had suggested.

The key factor restraining Denktash from declaring independence in the past has been the views of the Turkish Government who have not seen it in their interests that he should do so. But there are signs that the Turkish Government's influence over Denktash, and their willingness to restrain him, may not be as great as formerly.

As a co-signatory of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, the UK has obligations to guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus and to prohibit activity aimed at the partition of the island. We therefore have a direct interest in this question. Just as we do not recognise Denktash's current administration in northern Cyprus (the 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus') so we could not recognise an independent state.

It is still by no means clear whether or not Denktash



is bluffing, as he has so often in the past. Much may depend on how the Secretary General plays his hand over setting in train arrangements for a high level meeting between Denktash and Kyprianou. There is a reasonable chance that Denktash can be deterred from actually declaring independence in the near future, although he might still take some significant step pointing in that direction.

In view of the background described above we nevertheless believe it is right to take Denktash's threats seriously. Consequently we have instructed HM Representatives in Nicosia and Ankara to make further strong representations to Denktash and to the Turkish Government, backing up those which we made in the summer. We have also suggested to those allies with whom we co-operate most closely on Cyprus (the Americans, Germans, French and Italians) that they should act similarly. The Americans, who have the most influence with the Turkish authorities, have already spoken strongly to the Turks about the need to resume the intercommunal talks. They have also made it clear to the Turks that they would be opposed to a declaration of independence by northern Cyprus. For the moment, however, they appear to be reasonably sanguine that the Turks will be able to restrain Denktash from declaring independence or taking a significant step in that direction.

We intend to follow up this action as necessary. Lady Young, who is visiting Cyprus on 19-22 October, will underline our views with Denktash personally. Mr Heseltine's visit to Ankara on 17 October also provides an opportunity to make further representations to the Turks.

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

BF

NICOSIA Tel

244  
11/10/83



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PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
MR JAMES

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FROM COMMCEN HSP

TO MODUK

INFO CBFC

ADVANCE COPY

**FLASH**

I have asked the  
F.C.O. to provide an early  
assessment to the Prime Minister.

A.J.C. 12/10

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FM NICOSIA 111500Z

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NO 244 OF 11 OCTOBER 83.

INFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA, UKMIS NEW YORK.

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, WASHINGTON, MODUK.

INFO ROUTINE CBFC, BONN, PARIS, ROME, UKDEL NATO.

MY TEL NO 242 : CYPRUS PROBLEM.

1. IN MY HOUR LONG INTERVIEW WITH IACOVOU ON THE MORNING OF 11 OCTOBER HE BRIEFED ME ON KYPRIANOU'S MEETINGS WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN NEW YORK, ALONG THE GENERAL LINES OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH US OFFICIALS ON 5 OCTOBER (PARA 4 OF WASHINGTON TEL NO 2905). HE STRESSED THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOT RESPONSE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S INDICATORS AND ON OTHER POINTS WHICH WOULD NEED TO BE COVERED HAD BEEN DESCRIBED PRIVATELY BY PEREZ DE CUELLAR AS MORE POSITIVE THAN HE COULD EVER HAVE EXPECTED. IT EXPRESSED GREEK CYPRIOT PREFERENCES ON THE SUBJECTS COVERED BUT ALWAYS LEFT THE DOOR OPEN TO NEGOTIATION AND CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS. KYPRIANOU HAD AGREED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL COULD CONVEY THE GIST OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT RESPONSE ORALLY TO THE TURKISH SIDE BUT NOT HAND OVER THE TEXT IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EQUIVALENT RESPONSE FROM THE TURKISH SIDE. IACOVOU SAID THAT HE WOULD BE SEEKING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S AGREEMENT TO THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATING THE TEXT OF THEIR RESPONSE TO A NUMBER OF FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS, AS WELL AS AT A LATER STAGE TO ITS EVENTUAL PUBLICATION.

2. IACOVOU CONTRASTED THIS SERIOUS GREEK CYPRIOT SUPPORT FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE WITH THE 'FLIPPANT AND UNCONSIDERED' REJECTION OF IT BY THE TURKISH SIDE. HE WAS MORE CALM THAN I EXPECTED IN THE FACE OF DENKTASH'S LATEST PUBLIC THREAT OF PROCEEDING TO INDEPENDENCE UNLESS KYPRIANOU HAD SAT DOWN WITH HIM WITHIN THREE WEEKS (BY WHICH HE APPEARS TO MEAN THE END OF OCTOBER). IACOVOU TREATED THIS AS ABSURD GIVEN THE PREPARATION THAT WOULD ON PAST FORM BE REQUIRED AND THE FACT THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL COULD NOT MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE BEFORE

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL COULD NOT MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE BEFORE JANUARY. HE BY NO MEANS RULED OUT HOWEVER A HIGH LEVEL MEETING WHICH WOULD ADDRESS ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE AS A STAGE IN THE PURSUIT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE.

3. THE THREE FORMS OF ACTION WHICH IACOVOU SAID HE WAS ASKING THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE AT THIS JUNCTURE WERE :

- (A) TO ENCOURAGE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PERSEVERE WITH HIS INITIATIVE AND NOT TAKE NO FOR AN ANSWER FROM THE TURKISH SIDE AT THIS STAGE (I DETECTED A FEAR THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR MIGHT HAVE BECOME TOO DISCOURAGED).
- (B) TO ENCOURAGE THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS AND THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO COOPERATE WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BY GIVING HIM A SUBSTANTIAL RESPONSE OF THEIR OWN IN PARALLEL TO THE GREEK CYPRIOT ONE :
- (C) TO MAKE CLEAR TO THEM THAT DENKTASH'S THREATS WERE UNHELPFUL IN SPOILING THE ATMOSPHERE FOR A SETTLEMENT. IACOVOU EMPHASISED THAT HE HAD DONE HIS UTMOST TO AVOID DISTURBING THE ATMOSPHERE. HE CITED NOT ONLY THE POSTPONEMENT OF A DECISION ON CYPRIOT REPRESENTATION IN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE ASSEMBLY BUT ALSO HIS OWN RESTRAINT AT STRASBOURG ON THE ISSUE OF TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE. (HE READ TO ME A WARMLY APPROVING COMMENT ON THIS FROM MILLIYET).

4. IACOVOU CLEARLY SEEMED STILL TO WANT TO MAINTAIN AN ATMOSPHERE OF CALM DESPITE DENKTASH'S LATEST THREATS. HE WOULD SAY NO MORE TO THE PRESS ABOUT HIS CONTACTS TODAY WITH ME AND MY COLLEAGUES THAN THAT HE HAD BRIEFED US ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.

5. IN CONTRAST TO THIS NOTABLY MODERATE GREEK CYPRIOT DEMARCHE, THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE IS MOUNTING OF DENKTASH CAREERING TOWARDS UDI AND THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT FAILING TO REIN HIM IN. DENKTASH IS COMING DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TO REACHING HIS LONG-STANDING AIM OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES I THINK WE SHOULD NOT DELAY FURTHER IN MAKING FIRM REPRESENTATIONS TO THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT BOTH ON THE LINE OF PARA 3 (B) AND (C) ABOVE BUT ALSO AGAINST THEIR INCREASINGLY COMPLAISANT LINE OVER UDI BY DENKTASH. OUR 1980 CONTINGENCY PAPER FOR THIS EVENT (SEE DAIN'S LETTER TO SYNNOTT OF 21 SEPTEMBER NOT COPIED TO ALL) ENVISAGED THAT WE WOULD EXERT OURSELVES MORE STRONGLY THAN WE HAVE YET DONE IN ORDER TO



EXERT OURSELVES MORE STRONGLY THAN WE HAVE YET DONE IN ORDER TO PREVENT A UDI. WE COULD PUT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT CLEARLY ON NOTICE OF THE INCONSISTENCY WITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE (ON THE BASIS OF WHICH THEY CLAIM TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHTS IN CYPRUS) AS WELL AS OF THE DAMAGE WHICH TURKEY WOULD DO TO HERSELF BY PUTTING HERSELF IN THE WRONG AT THE VERY MOMENT OF THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY.

6. I WILL COMPARE NOTES WITH MY U.S. COLLEAGUE ON 12 OCTOBER.

WILBERFORCE.

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DESKBY 040830Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 032310Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 989 OF 3 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME,

BONN ROUTINE UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING MOSCOW

Prime Minister

par. 1 only.

MR  $\frac{4}{16}$

CYPRUS: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU,  
MR TURKMEN AND MR DENKTASH

**SUMMARY**

1. SECRETARY-GENERAL SAW KYPRIANOU AND TURKMEN ON 30 SEPTEMBER AND DENKTASH ON 1 OCTOBER. ACCORDING TO THE SECRETARIAT KYPRIANOU'S RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S IDEAS WAS REASONABLY CONSTRUCTIVE

BUT BOTH TURKMEN AND DENKTASH REJECTED THEM COMPLETELY. ALL THEY WOULD AGREE TO WAS THE RESUMPTION OF THE INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS ON THEIR EXISTING BASIS. DENKTASH ALSO PROPOSED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ARRANGE A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING WITH HIM AND KYPRIANOU. GOBBI AND THE SECRETARIAT ARE NOW CONSIDERING HOW TO PICK UP THE PIECES. THEY FEAR THAT DENKTASH SEES A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING AS A MAKE OR BREAK EXERCISE WHOSE FAILURE WOULD PROVIDE AN EXCUSE TO DECLARE UDI. GOBBI'S INSTINCT IS TO CONTINUE TO PUSH FOR A RESUMPTION OF THE INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS, BUT TO ARRANGE THE HIGH-LEVEL MEETING ONLY IF IT CAN BE PROPERLY PREPARED SO AS TO ENSURE THAT IT DOES NOT FAIL.

**DETAIL**

2. SHERRY AND GOBBI BRIEFED US (AND THE AMERICANS) TODAY (3 OCTOBER) ON THESE THREE MEETINGS. THEY SAID GLOOMILY THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN AN ENCOURAGING WEEKEND.

3. SHERRY SAID THAT KYPRIANOU HAD BROUGHT WITH HIM A WRITTEN REPLY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S IDEAS. SHERRY DID NOT REVEAL ITS CONTENTS BUT SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN FAIRLY CONSTRUCTIVE. KYPRIANOU HAD GIVEN AN UNQUALIFIED YES TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSED METHOD OF PROCEEDING. HE HAD BEEN FAIRLY CONSTRUCTIVE ABOUT THE THREE INDICATORS AND HAD MADE LENGTHY SUGGESTIONS ON THE CONTENT OF ANY FUTURE INDICATORS. AFTER THE MEETING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S SPOKESMAN HAD ISSUED A STATEMENT IN WHICH HE SAID THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONSIDERED KYPRIANOU'S RESPONSE 'A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE STEP'.

4. TURKMEN, HOWEVER, FORESHADOWING DENKTASH'S CALL THE NEXT DAY, HAD RESPONDED NEGATIVELY TO THE IDEAS. HE REJECTED THE INDICATORS ALREADY PUT FORWARD AND SAID THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO FUTURE INDICATORS EITHER. IT WAS ALL, HE SAID, A PLOT TO GET RID OF THE EVALUATION DOCUMENT FROM THE INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS. TURKEY WANTED TO GET BACK TO THE EVALUATION DOCUMENT. (SHERRY BLAMED TURKMEN'S RESPONSE ON THE BRIEFING PAPER WHICH HE HAD BEEN GIVEN BY HIS OFFICIALS).

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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5. DENKTASH, ON 1 OCTOBER, HAD BEEN EQUALLY NEGATIVE. HE WOULD NOT AGREE TO HAVING INDICATORS AS A METHOD OF PROCEEDINGS NOR DID HE ACCEPT THE SPECIFIC INDICATORS PUT FORWARD. ALL HE WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER WAS A RESUMPTION OF THE INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS ON THEIR EXISTING BASIS IN WHICH THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO DISCUSS THE EVALUATION DOCUMENT. HE ALSO PROPOSED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONVENE A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING WITH HIMSELF AND KYPRIANOU. HE EMPHASISED THAT THE GREEK-CYPRIOIS WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT DEALING WITH THE TURKISH-CYPRIOIS ON A BASIS OF PARTNERSHIP AND EQUALITY. AFTER THE MEETING, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S SPOKESMAN HAD PERJURED HIMSELF BY SAYING THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONSIDERED THIS MEETING TOO TO HAVE BEEN 'POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE'.
6. SHERRY SAID THAT HE PERCEIVED NO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TURKISH AND TURKISH-CYPRIOIS REACTIONS. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD BECOME VERY ANGRY AND ASKED DENKTASH HOW HE COULD BE EXPECTED TO CO-OPERATE IF HE RECEIVED NO CO-OPERATION. TURKMEN HAD EMPHASISED THAT THE TURKISH SIDE HAD DISLIKED BEING TAKEN BY SURPRISE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S IDEAS, AND THAT THE PUBLICITY WHICH THESE IDEAS HAD RECEIVED HAD KILLED THE EXERCISE. THE ONLY POSITIVE ELEMENT HAD BEEN THE WILLINGNESS TO RESUME THE INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS ON THEIR EXISTING BASIS, WHICH SHERRY BELIEVED WAS AN UNDERTAKING WHICH TURKMEN HAD GOT OUT OF DENKTASH IN RETURN FOR AGREEING TO SUPPORT HIM IN REJECTING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S IDEAS.
7. GOBBI AND SHERRY HAD HAD A DEPRESSING LUNCH WITH ATAKOL TODAY (3 OCTOBER). THE LATTER HAD AGAIN EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR GREEK-CYPRIOIS ACCEPTANCE OF EQUALITY AND PARTNERSHIP. HE HAD ALSO ENLARGED ON DENKTASH'S PROPOSAL FOR A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING. ATAKOL WANTED THIS MEETING TO TAKE PLACE AT THE END OF OCTOBER OR IN THE FIRST WEEK OF NOVEMBER BEFORE A RESUMPTION OF THE INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS AND BEFORE THE TURKISH ELECTIONS. GOBBI'S IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE TURKISH-CYPRIOIS WERE THINKING OF THE MEETING AS A MAKE-OR-BREAK OCCASION AT WHICH PERHAPS DENKTASH WOULD DELIVER AN ULTIMATUM. IF KYPRIANOU DID NOT RESPOND SATISFACTORILY, THEN DENKTASH WOULD PROCEED TO UDI.
8. GOBBI, APPARENTLY THINKING ALOUD, SAID THAT DESPITE THE SETBACK THE UN WOULD JUST HAVE TO PUSH AHEAD. AT LEAST BOTH SIDES ACCEPTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT EVEN IF THE TURKISH SIDE HAD TURNED DOWN HIS RECENT IDEAS. THE UN SHOULD TRY TO ARRANGE A RESUMPTION OF THE INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING BUT ONLY IF THE GROUND HAD BEEN PROPERLY PREPARED IN ADVANCE AND HE COULD BE SURE THAT IT WOULD SUCCEED AND NOT LEAD TO A BREAKDOWN OF THE WHOLE PROCESS. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL COULD NOT GIVE UP, HE WOULD JUST 'HAVE TO PUT HIS PRIDE IN HIS POCKET'. HE COULD STILL TRY OUT VARIOUS IDEAS, PERHAPS EVEN THE MINI-PACKAGE, BUT WOULD HAVE TO DO SO IN A WAY WHICH AVOIDED SPRINGING SURPRISES ON EITHER SIDE. GOBBI MEANWHILE WAS GOING TO ARGENTINA WHERE HE WILL BE UNTIL AT LEAST 21 OCTOBER.
9. THE US MISSION HAVE TOLD US THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS SUMMONING THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR THIS AFTERNOON TO EXPRESS CONCERN AT THE TURKISH SIDE'S RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S IDEAS.

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# CONFIDENTIAL

10. KYPRIANOU HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE HERE TODAY (3 OCTOBER) WHICH HE SAID CYPRUS WAS READY TO CO-OPERATE FULLY AND IN GOOD FAITH WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. ASKED ABOUT DENKTASH'S PROPOSAL FOR A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING, HE RECALLED THE PREVIOUS HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS OF 1977 AND 1979 AND SAID THAT HE WAS UNCERTAIN OF DENKTASH'S REASONS FOR SEEKING ANOTHER ONE. IT WOULD NOT BE WISE TO HAVE A MEETING MERELY FOR THE SAKE OF MEETING OR TO HAVE ONE WHICH WOULD FAIL. HIS RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSAL WOULD BE DETERMINED AFTER CONSULTING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

11. DENKTASH ALSO HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE AT WHICH HE APPARENTLY SAID THAT HE HAD ASKED FOR THE HIGH-LEVEL MEETING BECAUSE HE NEEDED TO SEE KYPRIANOU. HE DID NOT MENTION HIS RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S IDEAS.

12. MIFT REPORTS KYPRIANOU'S SPEECH TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS MORNING.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO MOSCOW

THOMSON

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
MR JAMES

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TO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 106 OF 29 JUNE  
AND TO PRIORITY ATHENS,  
AND INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL  
NATO

YOUR TELNO 129, ATHENS TELNO 256 AND ANKARA TELNO 256: REFERENDUM  
ON TURKISH CYPRIOT INDEPENDENCE

1. ALTHOUGH THE PROSPECTS OF A TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE SEEMED TO BE RECEDED, YOUR TUR SHOWS THAT A REFERENDUM REMAINS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY.
2. WHEN YOU SEE DENKTASH YOU SHOULD REPEAT THAT HMG WOULD BE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE DECLARATION OF AN INDEPENDENT TURKISH CYPRIOT STATE OR A REFERENDUM ABOUT IT. HMG DO NOT RECOGNISE THE 'TFSC', NOR COULD THERE BE ANY QUESTION OF OUR RECOGNISING AN INDEPENDENT TURKISH CYPRIOT STATE IN NORTHERN CYPRUS. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH A 'STATE' WOULD BE CLEARLY INCONSISTENT WITH THE 1960 TREATY ARRANGEMENTS, AND WOULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE THE PROSPECTS FOR AN INTERCOMMUNAL SETTLEMENT.
3. FOR ANKARA. WE BELIEVE THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FULLY AWARE OF OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS A DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (OR A REFERENDUM). NEVERTHELESS WE SEE ADVANTAGE IN MAKING OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS RECOGNITION CRYSTAL CLEAR IF THE SUBJECT IS RAISED AGAIN. YOU THEREFORE HAVE DISCRETION, WHEN APPROPRIATE, TO DRAW ON PARA 2 ABOVE IN YOUR CONTACTS WITH THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT.

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7 TO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA  
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T61B/83**

9 1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister  
10 to President Kyprianou:  
11 BEGINS: As you will have heard I have decided to ask Her  
12 Majesty The Queen to dissolve Parliament prior to holding a  
13 General Election on 9 June. With the election campaign starting  
14 immediately, I am forced to cancel all my other engagements.  
15 I am particularly sorry that this means we shall be unable to  
16 meet on 17 May as planned. I was looking forward to our meeting  
17 and hope that, as one who has recently gone through an election  
18 period yourself, you will understand the reasons for the  
19 unavoidable change of plans. I do hope it will be possible  
20 to rearrange your visit at a mutually convenient date later  
21 in the year. ~~after the elections are over.~~ ENDS

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Drafted by (Block capitals) R B BONE		
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Authorised for despatch <i>[Signature]</i>		
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7 TO PRIORITY NICOSIA  
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 58B/83**

9 INFO ROUTINE ATHENS, ANKARA  
10 SAVING TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BONN, PARIS, ROME.  
11 YOUR TELNO 75: CYPRUS: ARMENIAN TERRORISM  
12 1. Please pass the following reply from the Prime Minister to  
13 Kyprianou's letter of 19 April.  
14 Quote  
15 Thank you for your letter of 19 April about allegations that the  
16 Republic of Cyprus is being used as a base for Armenian terrorists  
17 This matter has been the subject of diplomatic exchanges between  
18 our two <sup>countries</sup> ~~Governments~~ in Nicosia. We share your concern that it  
19 should not lead to an increase in tension in Cyprus. Accordingly,  
20 following a meeting between your Foreign Minister Mr Rolandis  
21 and our High Commissioner in Nicosia on 26 March, we told the Turk  
22 ish Government at a high level that we ourselves had no evidence  
23 of Armenian terrorist bases in southern Cyprus. We also told  
24 them of the assurances of your Government that you have no  
25 intention of allowing Cyprus to be used for Armenian terrorist

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File number	Dept SED	Distribution Limited SED MAED PUSD Security Dept Defence Dept UND News D PS PS/Mr Hurd PS/Lord Belstead PS/Mr Rifkind PS/PUS
Drafted by (Block capitals)		Mr Wright Mr Goodison Additional: International Terrorism and Hijacking
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch	<i>[Signature]</i> 6/5	
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Page 2
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 2 activities. I understand that, in addition, the United Nations,  
 3 having made their own investigations in southern Cyprus, *and have*  
 4 told the Turkish Government that these have revealed no Armenian  
 5 terrorist presence.  
 6 I share your concern that nothing should be done to endanger  
 7 peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean. In particular,  
 8 I hope nothing will damage the prospects for a solution to the  
 9 Cyprus problem through the Intercommunal talks. I look forward  
 10 to our meeting in London on 17 May when we can discuss all  
 11 these matters further.

12 Unquote

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RM

BAK

10 May, 1983

VISIT OF PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS

Thank you for your letter of 9 May. The Prime Minister has approved the proposed message to President Kyprianou (subject to the deletion of the last five words). I should be grateful if you could arrange for its despatch.

A. J. COLES

R. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

N

RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 May 1983

*Jan 2/83*

/ The Prime Minister was due to see President Kyprianou of Cyprus on Tuesday, 17 May. I enclose a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Kyprianou regretting the necessity of changing plans. Good relations with the Cyprus Government are important to us because of our bases on the island. President Kyprianou's disappointment at not being able to call on the Prime Minister (when he would have spoken about the Cyprus problem following the UN debate this week) might best be tempered by suggesting a visit later in the year.

*See over,*  
*R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

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TO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER

1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to President Kyprianou:  
 BEGINS: As you will have heard I have decided to ask Her Majesty The Queen to dissolve Parliament prior to holding a General Election on 9 June. With the election campaign starting immediately, I am forced to cancel all my other engagements. I am particularly sorry that this means we shall be unable to meet on 17 May as planned. I was looking forward to our meeting and hope that, as one who has recently gone through an election period yourself, you will understand the reasons for the unavoidable change of plans. I do hope it will be possible to rearrange your visit at a mutually convenient date later in the year. ~~after the elections are over.~~ ENDS

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Drafted by (Block capitals) R B BONE		
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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

6 May 1983

Cyprus

Thank you for your letter of 4 May. The Prime Minister agrees that a reply should be sent from her to President Kyprianou in terms of the draft telegram enclosed with your letter subject to replacing the words "Governments in Nicosia" in the second sentence by the word "countries".

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RM



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

Agree attached reply to  
President of Cyprus?

4 May 1983

A.F.C. 5/5.

Dear John,

Drew  
notCyprus

dated 19/4/83.

I enclose a copy of an unsigned letter to the Prime Minister from President Kyprianou of Cyprus about Turkish allegations of an Armenian terrorist presence in the Republic of Cyprus. It was delivered to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office by the Cyprus High Commission. I also enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister in the form of a telegram to Nicosia. We understand from Nicosia that a similar letter has been sent to all permanent members of the Security Council and members of the Council of Europe.

We have no evidence from any source that Armenian terrorists have established bases in southern Cyprus. But Turkish fears that this is the case, and reactions to those publicly expressed fears by the Cyprus or Greek Governments, could nevertheless themselves create an atmosphere of crisis on the island. Accordingly, we have tried (together with the Americans and the United Nations) to reduce tension by reassuring the Turks to the best of our ability and knowledge and by calming down the Governments of both Cyprus and Greece. The draft letter from the Prime Minister, which is largely self-explanatory, is in line with that policy.

Yours very truly,  
R B Bone

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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 PRE/ADD 7 TO PRIORITY NICOSIA  
 TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
 9 INFO ROUTINE ATHENS, ANKARA  
 10 SAVING TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BONN, PARIS, ROME.  
 11 YOUR TELNO 75: CYPRUS: ARMENIAN TERRORISM  
 12 1. Please pass the following reply from the Prime Minister to  
 13 Kyprianou's letter of 19 April.  
 14 Quote  
 15 Thank you for your letter of 19 April about allegations that the  
 16 Republic of Cyprus is being used as a base for Armenian terrorists  
 17 This matter has been the subject of diplomatic exchanges between  
 18 our two <sup>countries.</sup> ~~Governments in Nicosia.~~ We share your concern that it  
 19 should not lead to an increase in tension in Cyprus. Accordingly,  
 20 following a meeting between your Foreign Minister Mr Rolandis  
 21 and our High Commissioner in Nicosia on 26 March, we told the Turk  
 22 ish Government at a high level that we ourselves had no evidence  
 23 of Armenian terrorist bases in southern Cyprus. We also told  
 24 them of the assurances of your Government that you have no  
 25 intention of allowing Cyprus to be used for Armenian terrorist

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Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

Mr Wright  
 Mr Goodison  
 Additional:  
 International  
 Terrorism and  
 Hijacking

Classification and Caveats

Page

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2 activities. I understand that, in addition, the United Nations,  
3 having made their own investigations in southern Cyprus, ~~and~~ have  
4 told the Turkish Government that these have revealed no Armenian  
5 terrorist presence.

6 I share your concern that nothing should be done to endanger  
7 peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean. In particular,  
8 I hope nothing will damage the prospects for a solution to the  
9 Cyprus problem through the Intercommunal talks. I look forward  
10 to our meeting in London on 17 May when we can discuss all  
11 these matters further.

12 Unquote

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
*Agreed*

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5 MAY 1983





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19/4

19th April, 1983.

The Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
London S.W.1.

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T498/83.**

Dear Prime Minister,

I have the honour to bring to your attention the following in connection with recent threats by Turkey against the Republic of Cyprus:

Over the last few months the Turkish press has carried with regularity reports claiming that the "Armenian A.S.A.L.A." is using Cyprus as a base for its attacks against Turkish diplomatic personnel. These entirely unfounded allegations have been vehemently denied by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. Last November following the above allegations, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus invited the special representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to conduct an investigation in connection with the above, through officers of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). This offer included an invitation to conduct surprise visits to any area of their choice in the free part of Cyprus. After a thorough investigation the United Nations Force Commander General Greindl reports that there was absolutely no evidence to support the above allegations. A similar invitation was addressed to Turkish journalists, who accepted it and after investigating reported in the same way.

It is with great concern that we noted a recent statement made by the Foreign Minister of Turkey. The statement is as follows:

"There are indications that the Leaders of an Armenian terrorist organization moved to other countries in the region. In any case, who gave asylum to the Leadership of the Armenian organization will be revealed. The place where most of the attention is directed is south Cyprus. Then, it will certainly not be difficult for anybody to predict Turkey's reaction. I said before that south Cyprus will be making a historical mistake by harboring the Armenians".

This statement was followed by a series of new completely unfounded allegations in the Turkish press. Taking into account the influence of the Turkish Government on the Turkish press we can only surmise that the above constitute an orchestrated attempt to prepare international opinion for an unprovoked military operation against Cyprus.

I would like Madame Prime Minister to assure you that all these allegations are mere fabrications. We have shown

our good faith in the past and have invited international independent investigation to be carried out anywhere on our territory. We would welcome again such an investigation at any time.

I would be grateful, Your Excellency, if you could use your influence to dissuade Turkey from taking any action which will certainly endanger peace security in the whole area of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Yours sincerely,

SPYROΣ KYPRIANOU  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS"

/MJ

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OO UKMIS NEW YORK

PP WASHINGTON

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FM FCO 071655Z APR 83

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 132 OF 7 APRIL

AND TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, ROME

INFO ROUTINE ANKARA, ATHENS, NICOSIA, CBFC

MODUK (DS11)

YOUR TELNO 198: CYPRUS

1. WE AGREE THAT YOU SHOULD NOW APPROACH URQUHART. IN DOING SO PLEASE SPEAK ON THE FOLLOWING LINES.

A) WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED THE UN'S EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND WISH TO CONTINUE DOING SO.

B) DISCUSSION OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S 'EVALUATION' OVER THE LAST 18 MONTHS HAS BEEN USEFUL, AND THE TALKS HAVE PRODUCED SOME LIMITED PROGRESS. BUT DISCUSSION OF THE EVALUATION IS NOW ALMOST COMPLETE AND THE TALKS ARE IN DANGER OF RUNNING OUT OF STEAM.

C) IN ORDER THAT UN EFFORTS RETAIN CREDIBILITY IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE MOMENTUM OF THE TALKS SHOULD BE KEPT UP. NEW IDEAS NEED TO BE INJECTED.

D) THERE SEEMS NO IMMEDIATE PROSPECT OF GETTING THE PARTIES TO AGREE TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. NOR IS ANY ALTERNATIVE TO THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS ATTRACTIVE. AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD NOT LEAD TO PROGRESS. IT WOULD BECOME A PROPAGANDA BATTLE AND PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNHELPPFUL MEDDLING BY THE RUSSIANS.

E) WE UNDERSTAND THAT GOBBI HAS BEEN WORKING ON A NEW SCHEME FOR A STAGED APPROACH TO A SETTLEMENT. (AS RECOMMENDED IN NICOSIA TELNO 61 YOU MAY SHOW THAT WE KNOW ABOUT GOBBI'S IDEAS BUT SHOULD NOT REVEAL THAT WE HAVE SEEN THE ACTUAL TEXT.) IN OUR VIEW THESE IDEAS REPRESENT THE BEST AVAILABLE MEANS OF CARRYING FORWARD THE INTERCOMMUNAL DIALOGUE. (YOU SHOULD DRAW ON PARA 3 OF NICOSIA TELNO 61.)

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F) THE FIRST REACTIONS OF SOME GREEK CYPRIOTS, INCLUDING MAVROMMATIS, HAVE BEEN NOT UNFAVOURABLE. IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT KYPRIANOU WOULD BE NEGATIVE. BUT PEREZ DE CUELLAR NEED NOT BE PUT OFF BY THIS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN GIVEN A FULL PICTURE OF GOBBI'S PROPOSALS. THIS SUGGESTS THAT GOBBI SHOULD BE AUTHORISED TO EXPLORE HIS IDEAS FURTHER WITH BOTH SIDES. IT APPEARS (FROM NICOSIA TELNO 62) THAT GOBBI THINKS HE IS DEBARRED FROM FURTHER CONSULTATIONS AT THE MOMENT.

2. IF URQUHART CASTS DOUBT ON GOBBI'S IDEAS YOU SHOULD ASK WHAT ALTERNATIVES PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAS IN MIND. YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UN TAKING ACTION, AND BEING SEEN TO TAKE ACTION, DURING THE 'PERIOD OF OPPORTUNITY' THIS YEAR. YOU MAY ALSO SAY THAT IT WILL BE IMPORTANT, IF WE AND OTHERS ARE TO MAINTAIN OUR SUPPORT, FOR THE UN TO BE SEEN TO BE ACTIVE.

3. FOR WASHINGTON. PLEASE TELL THE AMERICANS IN DETAIL OF THIS APPROACH AND SUGGEST THAT THEY ACT SIMILARLY.

4. FOR BONN, PARIS AND ROME. PLEASE TELL HOST GOVERNMENTS THAT WE ARE APPROACHING THE UN SECRETARIAT ON THIS QUESTION. WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAIL, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT OUR INTENTION IS TO RE-ITERATE SUPPORT FOR THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, TO EXPRESS OUR VIEW THAT NEW IDEAS SHOULD BE INJECTED INTO THEM BY THE UN AND TO ENQUIRE FURTHER ABOUT WHAT PLANS THE SECRETARY GENERAL OR GOBBI HAVE FOR USING THE 'PERIOD OF OPPORTUNITY' THIS YEAR. AT THIS STAGE YOU SHOULD NOT (NOT) GIVE ANY MORE DETAILS OF GOBBI'S PLANS.

5. WE SHALL CONSIDER LATER, IN LIGHT OF URQUHART'S REACTIONS, WHETHER TO CONCERT APPROACHES TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL WITH THE AMERICANS AND THE OTHER THREE EUROPEANS.

PYM

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 010303Z APR 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 208 OF 31 MARCH 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT NICOSIA CBFC MODUK DS11

INFO ROUTINE ATHENS ANKARA WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 69 TO ANKARA (NOT TO ALL): CYPRUS: ARMENIAN TERRORISM

*mt*

1. WE SPOKE TO SHERRY WHO WAS GRATEFUL FOR THIS RESPONSE.
2. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IN VIEW OF THE MORE TENSE SITUATION, GENERAL GREINDL HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN TO THE SECRETARIAT AT THE CONTINUED ABSENCE FROM UNFICYP OF THE SCOUT CAR SQUADRON IN BEIRUT. THE GENERAL HAD SAID THAT WITHOUT THE SQUADRON THE FORCE HAD LOST A LARGE PART OF ITS FLEXIBILITY INCLUDING ITS MOBILE RESERVE FOR AN EMERGENCY. HE FELT IT IMPORTANT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT THE FORCE SHOULD BE UP TO STRENGTH AND FULLY OPERATIONAL. GREINDL HAD ASKED THAT THE SECRETARIAT SHOULD SEEK OUR AGREEMENT THAT THE BEIRUT SQUADRON SHOULD BE RETURNED TO UNFICYP BY THE 'PLANNED AND PROMISED DATE OF 10 MAY'. SHERRY ASKED IF WE COULD CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF DOING THIS.
3. WE SUBSEQUENTLY CHECKED THE ABOVE WITH URQUHART. HE SAID THAT HE RECOGNISED HOW DIFFICULT IT MIGHT BE FOR US TO WITHDRAW THE SQUADRON FROM BEIRUT AT THIS JUNCTURE. HE ENDORSED GREINDL'S JUDGEMENT. BUT THE UN'S REQUIREMENTS WOULD BE MET IF WE COULD PROVIDE AN EQUIVALENT UNIT FROM SOME OTHER SOURCE. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO RESTORE UNFICYP'S MOBILE RESERVE AT THIS JUMPY TIME. HE RECALLED THAT IN DECEMBER I HAD TOLD HIM THAT EMERGENCY REINFORCEMENTS WOULD BE AVAILABLE FROM THE SBAS IF REQUIRED (MY TELNO 2124 OF 1982).
4. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW WE SHOULD REPLY TO THIS UNWELCOME REQUEST. URQUHART SAID THAT THERE WAS NO GREAT HURRY. BUT HE WOULD CLEARLY LIKE TO BE ABLE TO REASSURE GREINDL SOON.

THOMSON

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NEWS D  
SIR J BULLARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GOODISON  
MR EVANS  
MR GILLMORE  
MR ADAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

CONFIDENTIAL

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21 March 1983

The Prime Minister has received the attached letter from Mr. Denktas which you will wish to retain for your records. Unless I hear to the contrary, I assume that no reply will need to be sent.

Timothy Flesher

R. B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JR



TURKISH FEDERATED STATE OF KIBRIS  
PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

*P. -*  
*would you handle it?*  
*there are people*

*AG 15-*  
*3*

Lefkoşa, via Mersin 10 - Turkey

Lefkoşa,

28 February, 1983

Your Excellency,

In view of the recently increased efforts by the Greek side, assisted by some misinformed philhellenes, to exploit the issue of missing persons in Cyprus against the Turkish side at international fora I feel obliged to provide you with further information on the matter.

Basic information concerning the issue of missing persons in Cyprus is presented in Appendix I which also refers to the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (the CMP) which was established as a result of the agreement reached between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot sides on 22 April 1981 and charged with the specific task of investigating the missing persons of both communities.

Following its first meeting on 14 July 1981 the CMP held regular meetings until 1 September 1981. Since then the Greek side has repeatedly boycotted the CMP and having deliberately created a situation of pseudo stalemate used this as a pretext to internationalize the issue for political propaganda against the Turkish side.

As an unacceptable part of the Greek Cypriot propaganda efforts the missing persons' issue in Cyprus was lately taken to the European Parliament. In the report drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee of the European Parliament and based solely on the information received from the Greek side it is argued that no problem of missing exists for 300 of the missing Turkish Cypriots since those 300 missing persons are deemed dead by the Turkish Cypriot side. In fact this is a deliberate misinformation, because the number of missing Turkish Cypriots was around 800 but about 300 of these were found in common graves. The purpose of this letter is to draw your attention to a legislation by the Greek Cypriot administration in the South on the missing Greek Cypriots (Appendix 2). By similar argument one must conclude that, as in the case of 300 Turkish Cypriots considered dead, in the case of Greek Cypriot missing persons as well the issue of "missing" has been disposed of as a result of the aforementioned legislation which has treated them all as dead. But this legislation was not placed before the European Parliament!

H.E. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain  
and Northern Ireland,  
London.


Obviously the Greek side deliberately did not inform the rapporteur of the Political Affairs Committee about the law 69/1978 but claims that the "missing" Greek Cypriots are being detained by the Turkish side. This Greek Cypriot claim is completely untrue.

The ICRC reported as early as on 11 March 1976 that all prisoners of war taken to Turkey were listed and returned to the Greek Cypriot side. It is our view that had the Political Affairs Committee been informed about the fact that the Greek Cypriot side had been treating all the missing Greek Cypriots who were not recovered within 6 months of their disappearance as dead, there would not have been lamentations about the uncertainty of the fate of missing Greek Cypriots and the problem would have been treated as closed similarly to the problem of 300 Turkish Cypriots referred to above.

As I have already stated the purpose of this letter is merely to bring to your notice the legislation 69/1978 by the Greek Cypriot administration in support of our argument that the search for the missing is for the Greek Cypriots a mere propaganda stunt.

This indicates once again that the Greek side is not genuinely interested in solving the humanitarian issue of missing persons in Cyprus once and for all within the agreed framework of the CMP but is intent on continuing to keep the issue alive and exploit it for political propaganda against the Turkish side.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.



(Rauf R. DENKTAŞ)  
President of the  
Turkish Federated State of  
Kibris



APPENDIX I

TALKING POINTS ON  
THE QUESTION OF MISSING PERSONS IN CYPRUS

1. The Turkish Cypriot community was the first to experience the agony of missing persons in Cyprus. During the Greek Cypriot onslaught of December 1963 and the years of oppression that followed it, many Turkish Cypriots were abducted from the roads, from their places of work and even from hospitals where they were receiving medical treatment.

2. Various reports of the U.N. Secretary General to the Security Council give authentic information regarding Turkish Cypriot missing persons prior to 1974.

3. The Greek Cypriot authorities have persistently declined to account for the fate of missing persons since the Greek Cypriot attacks of December 1963, as well as those missing since 15 July 1974.

4. On 15 July 1974, the Greek Cypriots, in collaboration with the junta of Greece, staged a coup in Cyprus. During the coup there was heavy loss of life. This fact was acknowledged by Archbishop Makarios in the statement he made before the UN Security Council on 19 July 1974. He stated the following:

“The coup caused much bloodshed and took a great toll of human lives. I am afraid that the number of casualties is large and that the material destruction is heavy.”

5. Following the coup of 15 July 1974, many Greek Cypriots disappeared and the number of the missing Turkish Cypriots increased considerably.

6. The Greek majority of the missing Turkish Cypriots were civilians, including children and elderly people.

7. As a result of the attack of the combined Greek and Greek Cypriot armed forces on the Turkish Peace Force during the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, many people on both sides lost their lives. In addition to those killed in action, thousands of Greek Cypriots were killed during the internecine fighting among the opposing Greek Cypriot factions during the coup of 15 July 1974, before the Turkish intervention.

8. Greek Cypriot casualties during the coup were rated to be as high as three to four thousand by the Greek Cypriot press. Revealing disclosures were made by a Greek Cypriot cemetery priest named Papatsestos about the burial of truck-loads of dead Greek Cypriots in massgraves without any record and without any attempt to identify the bodies. The disclosures of Papatsestos were published by the Greek newspaper Ta Nea of Athens and reproduced in all Greek Cypriot newspapers on 28 February 1976.

9. Therefore, the question of missing persons in Cyprus is not an issue which arose as a result of the Turkish intervention. It became a common problem to both communities after the coup of 15 July 1974. Until then, it existed as a problem affecting the Turkish Cypriot community only.

10. Despite the fact that the missing persons issue concerns both communities in Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot side has been presenting it as an exclusive Greek Cypriot problem and blaming the Turkish Cypriot side for it.

11. This humanitarian question would have been settled long ago had the Greek Cypriot side been sincere about resolving it, instead of exploiting the issue for political propaganda purposes.

12. The Greek Cypriot side who claimed there were 2,500 missing persons from the Greek Cypriot community, has recently lowered this figure to 1,619. Between December 1963 and 15 July 1974, 203 Turkish Cypriots disappeared in the hands of the Greek Cypriot administration. Following the coup, the number of the missing Turkish Cypriots rose to 803.

13. The question of missing persons was discussed in detail during the summit meetings held between President Denktas and Archbishop Makarios on 27 January and 12 February 1977. During these meetings, Makarios admitted that the Greek Cypriot side was exploiting the issue for propaganda purposes.

14. An agreement was reached during these summit meetings to establish a mechanism covering the missing persons of both communities. This agreement could not be implemented since the Greek Cypriot side later refused to follow such a course.

15. In 1977 the matter was raised by the Greek Cypriot side at the Third Committee of the UN and a unanimous resolution was adopted to the effect that the ICRC should participate in an Intercommunal Committee. The Turkish Cypriot side accepted the establishment of a Missing Persons Committee envisaged by this resolution even though it was not represented or heard at the U.N.

16. The Greek Cypriot side, after wasting 12 months, referred the issue back to the Third Committee in 1978 in order to keep it alive at the international level as an instrument of its political propaganda, despite the repeated calls by the Turkish Cypriot side for a bilateral meeting to resolve the outstanding differences with regard to the establishment of a Missing Persons Committee. This Greek Cypriot attitude blocked the way to any positive development until 1981.

17. With the help of the UN Secretary General and his Special Representative in Cyprus, an agreement was reached on 22 April 1981 by the two communities on the terms of reference for the establishment of a Committee on Missing Persons (CMP).

18. The CMP consists of three members: one member from each of the two communities and a third member, being an ICRC official and appointed by the UN Secretary General with the approval of the two sides.

19. The CMP is an autonomous body and functions independently according to its terms of reference which is confidential.

20. The CMP held its first meeting on 14 July 1981 and took up procedural questions. However, in September 1981, the Greek Cypriot side boycotted the CMP meetings for more than two months. Having thus created a situation of pseudo-stalemate, the Greek Cypriot side used it as a pretext to take the issue once again to the UN Third Committee. Meanwhile, the CMP's confidential documents, including its terms of reference were disclosed on the Greek Cypriot side. Extensive propaganda activities were carried out in various international fora and the third member of the CMP, as well as the Turkish Cypriot member were faced with accusations and insulting charges of the Greek Cypriots.

21. The last meeting of the CMP was held on 25 February 1982. By then, the Turkish Cypriot side having accepted in full the compromise proposals put forward by the third member, there were no outstanding procedural questions that prevented the CMP to embark upon its humanitarian task of dealing with the cases of missing persons from both communities in accordance with its terms of reference. However, the Greek Cypriot member intentionally blocked the way to further meetings and rejected the compromise proposals of the ICRC Representative which would have enabled the CMP to fulfill its humanitarian mission. The Greek Cypriot side, by choosing once again to exploit the issue of missing persons in international fora, dealt a severe blow to the CMP which has been inoperative due to the Greek Cypriot refusal to participate in its work.

22. The Turkish side has displayed its will to resolve the question of missing persons within a humanitarian context. For the Turkish Cypriot side, the CMP continues to be the proper venue where the two sides can discuss and resolve this issue which is of concern to both communities.

23. The Turkish Cypriot side has stated its readiness to resume the work of the CMP whenever the other side is willing to participate in the CMP meetings.

24. The question of missing persons is solely a humanitarian issue and all efforts aimed at politicizing this problem should be resisted. No political considerations can therefore be allowed to be brought into this issue.

The law issued by Greek Cypriot  
Administration concerning the definition of Greek Cypriot  
"missing persons"

"Law No 69/1978"

In this law, unless the context otherwise provides :

"missing" means every Greek Cypriot who disappeared on or after 21st December 1963 for a continuous period of at least six months due to the conditions created as from 21st December 1963, and every Greek Cypriot who disappeared on or after the coup d'état of the 15th July 1974 for a continuous period of at least six months due to the conditions created by the coup d'état of the 15th July 1974 or due to the Turkish invasion as from 20th July 1974 and for whom, in any of the cases, the government of the republic does not have any definite information that he is found in life and the word "you disappear" shall be interpreted accordingly.

"fallen" means every Greek Cypriot who :

1) was killed during active service on the Turkish air attacks against Cyprus which took place before 15th December 1966 or as a direct result of any other circumstances which might be considered as arising from the conditions created after 21st December 1963 or by the illegal conditions of EOKA or, before or after the coup d'état of 15th July 1974 or at the Turkish invasion as from 20th July 1974.

2) died as a result of wounds or illness directly due to services given and includes :

a) every missing, and

(b) every disabled having a degree of incapacity exceeding forty nine per cent who died because of any reason, and every other disabled who according to the report of the medical board, dies from the relapse due to the disability suffered, if in either case, the disabled had acquired the right of allowance and did not lose it before his death.

Committee of Allowances :

There shall be established a Committee of Allowances composed of a chairman and four members, all of whom shall be appointed by the Council of Ministers for such period of service and under such conditions as it shall prescribe.

Allowance :

The dependants of the fallen, or missing and the disabled are entitled to allowance under the provisions of this law.

The dependants of the fallen or missing and the disabled must submit an application for allowance to the Committee of Allowances, within three months from the date on which the death took place or is considered to have taken place or on which the applicant became disabled."

**SUBJECT**

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T238/83**

CYPRUS.

DISTRIBUTION SELECTORS  
FILE COPY

GRS 95

cc Ops  
Master

UNCLASSIFIED  
FM NICOSIA 280950Z  
TO ROUTINE FCO  
TELEGRAM NO 32 OF 28 FEBRUARZ 83

YOUR TEL 21: CYPRUS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

1. I HAVE BEEN ASKED BY THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE  
TO FORWARD THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER  
FROM PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU:

'WARMEST THANKS FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE OF  
CONGRATULATIONS AND WISHES ON MY REELECTION AS PRESIDENT.

I RECIPROCATE YOUR GOOD WISHES AND EXPRESS ALSO  
MY GRATIFICATION FOR THE EXCELLENT RELATIONS HAPPILY  
EXISTING BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES''.

WILBERFORCE

LIMITED  
SED  
PCD  
UND  
NEWS D  
PS  
PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
MR GOODISON

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED.

COPIES SENT TO  
No 10 DOWNING STREET

SUBJECT cc Ops  
Master

TOP COPY (14)

UNCLASSIFIED

2081 - 1

PP NICOSIA  
RR ATHENS  
RR ANKARA

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T156/83

GRS 99  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FM FCO 151630 FEB 83  
TO PRIORITY NICOSIA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 21 OF 15 FEBRUARY 1983  
INFO ROUTINE ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, CBFC,  
MOD UK (FOR DS11)  
INFO SAVING PARIS, ROME

YOUR TELNO 20: CYPRUS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

9 → 1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT  
KYPRIANOU FROM THE PRIME MINISTER: ''CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR  
RE-ELECTION AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS. I SEND YOU  
AND THE PEOPLE OF CYPRUS ALL BEST WISHES FOR THE FUTURE AND LOOK  
FORWARD TO A CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT EXCELLENT RELATIONS  
BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES''.

PYM

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DISTRIBUTION  
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PS  
PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
MR GOODISON

1

UNCLASSIFIED

Cyprus: Feb 80: Relations





Cyprus  
File No

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 February 1983

CYPRUS

Thank you for your letter of  
14 February.

✓ As I told you on the telephone  
this morning, the Prime Minister has  
approved the text of the congratulatory  
message to President Kyprianou. I  
should be grateful if you would arrange  
for its despatch.

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

NR



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 February 1983

*Joe S...*Cyprus: Congratulatory Message to President Kyprianou

The first round of the Cyprus Presidential elections was held on Sunday 13 February. President Kyprianou gained 56% of the popular vote, enough to defeat his two opponents, Mr Clerides and Mr Lyssarides, without the need for a second ballot.

Kyprianou has been President of the Republic of Cyprus since the death of Archbishop Makarios in 1977. He was re-elected unopposed in 1978. He has won his first opposed election by an impressive majority. This is due partly to the support he has gained from AKEL, the Greek Cypriot Communist Party, and partly to the inability of opponents to unite the forces opposed to him. The ease with which he has won the election should help him to keep AKEL at arms length in the future, while the inadequacy of the opposition should enable him to keep his freedom of action towards the UN sponsored dialogue between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Good relations with President Kyprianou's Government are important to us because of the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus, which depend to a large extent for untroubled operation on Greek Cypriot goodwill. We also have a broader interest in the Cyprus problem in view of our status as a signatory of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.

We recommend that, in view of these interests, and the fact that President Kyprianou is a Commonwealth leader of some years standing, the Prime Minister should send a message of congratulations, as in the attached draft telegram.

/I have

CONFIDENTIAL



I have not been able to show this recommendation today to Mr Pym. I shall be doing so in tonight's box.

*Yours ever,*  
*R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. ....

OUTWARD

Security Classification  
UNCLASSIFIED.

Department .....

Drafted by .....

(Block Capitals) .....

TELEGRAM

Precedence  
PRIORITY

Tel. Extn. ....

DESKBY .....Z

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched (Date) .....  
(Time) .....Z

POSTBY .....Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin).....Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.) UNCLASSIFIED

(Caveat/  
Privacy marking).....

(Codeword).....

(Deskby).....Z

TO.....PRIORITY NICOSIA.....  
(precedence) (post)

Tel. No. ....of.....

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND TO SAVING.....

INFO.....ROUTINE ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, CBSC

(VIA NICOSIA), MOD UK (FOR DS 11)

INFO SAVING...PARIS, ROME.....

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

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- News D
- PS
- PS/Lord Belstead
- PS/PUS
- Sir J Bullard
- Mr Goodison

YOUR TELNO 20: CYPRUS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

1. Please pass the following message to President Kyprianou from the Prime Minister: 'Congratulations on your re-election as President of the Republic of Cyprus. I send you and the people of Cyprus all best wishes for the future and look forward to a continuation of the present excellent relations between our two countries'.

Copies to:-

4 FEB 1983

12  
2  
3  
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5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
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CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 January 1983

*John Tim,*

Cyprus

*H*  
*26/1*

Thank you for your letter of 12 January enclosing one to the Prime Minister dated 27 December from Mr Denktash the 'President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus' (TFSC). I am also replying to a letter from John Coles of 17 January enclosing another letter from Mr Denktash dated 30 December.

It would not be appropriate for the Prime Minister to reply to Mr Denktash's letters. As you know, the British Government do not recognise the 'TFSC', and do not therefore have official dealings with its 'government'. Mr Denktash, who regularly writes such letters, will not be expecting a reply.

You may like to have some comments on the points that Mr Denktash raises in his letters. His first letter is an attack on the Cyprus policy of Prime Minister Papandreou of Greece. Its main theme is that Mr Papandreou dominates the Greek Cypriots. Mr Denktash over-states his case. He is probably reacting to allegations that his own Community's policies are dictated from Ankara and trying to suggest that there is a similar relationship between Athens and the Greek Cypriots. But the relationship between Greece and the Greek Cypriots is not so simple and Mr Denktash is wrong in saying, for instance, that Athens has dictated Greek Cypriot policy on the problem of missing persons and on recourse to the UN General Assembly. Nevertheless, issues like missing persons are often taken up more strongly by the Greeks (certainly with us) than by the Greek Cypriots themselves. This is the grain of truth behind Mr Denktash's allegations.

Another main theme of the letter is that Mr Papandreou is aiming to torpedo the talks currently being held in Nicosia between the two communities in Cyprus under UN auspices. Our view is that the talks offer the best hope of a solution to the Cyprus problem. Mr Denktash is well aware of this. No doubt he hopes that his complaints will find a ready ear. There is a certain amount in what he says about Mr Papandreou's negative

/attitude

CONFIDENTIAL



attitude to the talks. Mr Papandreou undoubtedly believes that the talks are a waste of time. He wants more international pressure put on Turkey to withdraw her troops from the island. He knows that Turkey will not do so in the absence of a settlement providing security guarantees for the Turkish Cypriots. But it is a good issue with which to pillory the Turks. Against this, it is also true that the Turkish Cypriots have for a long time sheltered behind the intercommunal talks, being reasonably satisfied with the current status quo on the island and fairly certain that the talks will not make significant progress. For ourselves, we take every opportunity (for example, during Lord Belstead's recent visit to Athens and Ankara) to hammer home to all the parties the need for progress in the talks. We believe there will be a 'period of opportunity' during the summer, after the Greek Cypriot Presidential elections and before the expected return to democracy in Turkey, when substantial progress could be made if the parties were prepared to seize the opportunity. During this period, Mr Gobbi, the UN Representative on Cyprus, who thinks that a final settlement is too difficult for the two parties at present, plans to launch proposals for a settlement to be agreed and implemented in stages.

Mr Denktash's second letter refers to the UN resolution on missing persons debated in the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly in early December. The Greek Cypriots claim that up to 2,000 of their community have been missing since 1974. The Turkish Cypriots claim some 300 missing since 1963. An inter-communal Committee on Missing Persons was set up in 1981 to investigate the problem. It has not met since February 1982 and has more or less run into the sand. The UN resolution invited the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance of the Commission on Human Rights to assist the Committee to overcome its procedural difficulties. The resolution, sponsored by the Greeks and Greek Cypriots, was essentially a propaganda ploy designed to embarrass the Turkish Cypriots. We abstained because we did not wish to lend ourselves to this ploy. It is for this that Mr Denktash thanks us.

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

Tim Flesher Esq  
10 Downing Street

Cyprus  
Int Sit  
Feb 80



25 JAN 1983







FILE Copy RW

SPR

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

17 January, 1983

CYPRUS

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mr. Rauf Dentas. I should be grateful for advice on whether the Prime Minister should reply and, if so, for a draft.

A. L. COLES

R. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

FILE

da

12 January 1983

SK/ I attach a letter the Prime Minister has received from Mr. Denktás, the "President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus", about the situation in Cyprus. I should be grateful for advice on whether the Prime Minister should reply to the letter and, if so, on the form and content of such a reply.

Timothy Flesher

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



TURKISH FEDERATED STATE OF KIBRIS  
PRESIDENT'S OFFICE  
(Lefkoşa, Mersin 10-TURKEY)

123/1  
30 December 1982


Your Excellency,

I have the honour, on my behalf and on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot Community, to express my gratitude for the impartial stance adopted by the U.K. delegation on the question of missing persons in Cyprus, at the recent deliberations of the Third Committee of the U.N. General Assembly.

This impartiality, which has manifested itself in an affirmative vote for a right of hearing to the Turkish Cypriot Representative at the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, and a vote of abstention on the resolution adopted, which the Turkish Cypriot Community considers unacceptable, has been noted with satisfaction by our Community which aspires to a solution of this humanitarian problem within the existing framework of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, established by the mutual agreement of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

I am confident that the U.K., in its desire to help bring about a final solution to this humanitarian problem, will continue to show the same impartiality and fair-mindedness in the future.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

  
(Rauf R. Denktaş)  
President

Her Excellency Margaret Thatcher  
Prime Minister of the  
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,  
London.

Cyprus Relations Feb 80



(LONDON, 15 FEBRUARY 1980)

20 December 1980

Dear Sir,

I have the honour, on your behalf and on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot Community, to express my gratitude for the report of the U.K. delegation on the question of missing persons in Cyprus, which was presented to the Committee of the U.N. General Assembly.

This report, which was presented last in an alternative vote for a right of hearing to the Turkish Cypriot representative at the Committee, a missing persons in Cyprus, and a vote of abstention on the resolution adopted, which the Turkish Cypriot Community considers unacceptable, has been noted with satisfaction by the

Community which aspires to a solution of this humanitarian problem within the existing framework of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, established by the mutual agreement of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

I am confident that the U.K., in its desire to help bring about a final solution to this humanitarian problem, will continue to show the same impartiality and fairness in the future.

Please accept, Sir, my sincere thanks for the assurance of your highest consideration.

(Name of the person)  
President

Her Excellency Margaret Thatcher  
Prime Minister of the  
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,  
London.



R1211

TURKISH FEDERATED STATE OF KIBRIS  
PRESIDENT'S OFFICE  
(Lefkoşa, Mersin 10, TURKEY)

27 December 1982

Your Excellency,

I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to bring to your kind attention the well-orchestrated, and concerted propaganda campaign currently being waged in international fora by the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Andreas Papandreou, against the intercommunal talks in Nicosia, and sincerely to state our considered view that such unwarranted and unfair attacks on the validity, and usefulness of the talks between the two Cypriot sides may, if it were to continue unopposed, and unchecked for a longer time, gain enough momentum finally to lead to their premature death; a development, I am sure Your Excellency will agree with me, of the first magnitude.

This by and large, is the scenario written by Mr. Papandreou according to which, the Greek Cypriot Administration of Mr. Kyprianou, is being forced to act. This is not to argue, however, that there has been a change or a reversal in the attitude of Mr. Papandreou towards the intercommunal talks between the two communities. On the contrary, he has never been too careful to conceal his dislike for result-oriented talks, and his preference for clamorous, abusive propaganda at international fora. What has, infact, taken place, is a change of emphasis in his behaviour and attitude. Until recently, Mr. Papandreou may have been a non-believer in the usefulness of the dialogue in Nicosia. We are now, however, confronted with a radically different attitude of Mr. Papandreou towards the intercommunal talks.

./...

Her Excellency The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom  
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,  
London.

His speech and behaviour at the EEC Summit in Copenhagen, seems to us to provide ample proof to convince any sceptic that Mr. Papandreou has finally made up his mind to deal the fatal last blow to the on-going dialogue between the two communities, come what may. I am afraid this new attitude of his, is infinitely more destructive than his previous scepticism regarding the talks. He has now singled out the intercommunal negotiations as his main target to be torpedoed once and for all and, in order to achieve his aim, it has become obvious that he is prepared to pressurise and threaten even the Greek Cypriot leadership to fall in line with his whims, and ride roughshod over their feelings and desires.

The unpleasant truth has, at last, emerged as clear as the daylight; that Mr. Papandreou does not want the Cyprus conflict to be solved between the two communities, through the medium of the intercommunal negotiations, which have now been going on for a good while and, in the words of the Secretary-General of the U.N., His Excellency, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, have led to "significant narrowing of differences" in many hitherto contentious areas. (Secretary-General's report to the Security Council, S/15149, dated 1 June 1982, paras 55, 56.)

Notwithstanding the existence of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, and in the face of wide-spread acknowledgement of, and support, for the intercommunal talks as not only the best, but as the only means for reaching a speedy and mutually acceptable solution on the Cyprus conflict, Mr. Papandreou still insists on the odd view that the talks are useless, and should be discontinued, calling at the same time, for further internationalisation of the issue.

I am sure, Your Excellency will agree with me that, when contrasted with the views of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and with the assessment of most of the world leaders, Mr. Papandreou's assessment and claims about the intercommunal talks are undoubtedly devoid of any credibility and should not therefore be heeded.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, His Excellency Mr. Perez de Cuellar, under whose auspices the intercommunal talks are held, had this assessment to make about the talks, in his latest report to the Security Council, S/15502, dated 1 December, 1982:

"The intercommunal talks in my opinion, still represent the best available means of pursuing a concrete and effective negotiating process with the object of achieving an agreed, just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question."

In paragraph 59 of the same report, the Secretary-General talks about a "window of opportunity", pointing out the fact that important progress has been achieved at the talks and that, a comprehensive settlement may be built on this progress:

"It is the responsibility of all concerned not to let that window be closed. It is my earnest hope that all the leaders involved will exercise the statesmanship and courage required in this regard. I shall do my utmost to assist them in this endeavour."

The President of the United States, His Excellency Mr. Ronald Reagan, in a report submitted to Congress on 30 November, 1982, agrees fully with the views and assessment of the Secretary-General, and with that of the Turkish Cypriot Community as to the indispensability of a serious, constructive dialogue between the two sides. President Reagan, inter alia said:

"The two parties remain committed to these U.N. sponsored talks and to working for progress in this forum. We continue to believe that it represents the most fruitful course for negotiating progress. The parties are engaged in a genuine dialogue which has made it possible for each side to define its positions."

Even the Government of the Soviet Union, whose country might be thought to be standing to gain from a prolonged conflict in Cyprus and who are in favour of an international conference on Cyprus, have advised Mr. Kyprianou, during his last visit to that country, to engage in serious, constructive talks, and not to think of abandoning them.

Irrespective of the overwhelming weight of opinion in favour of the intercommunal talks, Mr. Papandreou, clinging obstinately on to his blatant chauvinism, continues his frontal attacks on the intercommunal dialogue, trying all the time to undermine the talks by urging and pressurising the Greek Cypriot leadership to disavow and reject all the bilateral agreements concluded with the Turkish Cypriot Community; agreements, on the basis of which the negotiations have so far progressed.

It has now become a public knowledge that, because of unrelenting pressure exerted by the Prime Minister of Greece to make a somewhat reluctant Greek Cypriot leadership to toe the line, relations between Athens and the Greek Cypriot side have considerably worsened.

The decision by the two-party alliance in South Cyprus to continue seeking a satisfactory solution to the conflict through the intercommunal talks, has angered Mr. Papandreou to such an extent that he saw it fit to take the unprecedented step of admonishing the alliance in public.

I would like, here, to stress to Your Excellency that the decision to take the Cyprus issue once again to the United Nations' General Assembly after the leadership elections in the South has been reached in Athens, and subsequently imposed upon the Greek Cypriot leadership. Furthermore, the decision which saw the missing persons issue - exclusively a subject matter for the autonomous Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus - debated umpteenth time at the Third Committee of the United Nations, was also the result of pressure from Athens.


As Your Excellency is no doubt aware, such moves as instigated by the Prime Minister of Greece in international fora, are diametrically opposed to the understanding, and to the agreements between the two sides, and are also incompatible with the serious negotiating process. The Turkish Cypriot Community, whose only aim is to find a speedy, negotiated solution to the Cyprus conflict, through serious, result-oriented dialogue with the Greek Cypriot Community, is increasingly being confronted with hurdles artificially and purposefully created by Mr. Papandreou. While the Prime Minister of Greece is, on the one hand making false propaganda to the effect that "the negotiations are in effect being conducted between Turkey and the Greek Cypriots", he himself, by his continued interference and by the imposition of his views on the Greek Cypriot Community, has practically replaced the latter, as one of the protagonists in the talks. Faced with the prospect of continued interference by Mr. Papandreou in the normal process of negotiations, the Turkish Cypriot Community can not, but be pessimistic about the chances of success at the talks.

./...



In view of the above, I am sure that Your Excellency will be sympathetic to the views of the Turkish Cypriot Community, and will not be grudging in your response to our appeal for Your Excellency's good offices and influence in order to help convince Mr. Papandreou that the Cyprus conflict can not be solved by sheer propaganda and distortions in the international arena and, that he should come to terms with the fact that Turkish and Greek Cypriots are the two principal sides to the conflict, and should be left alone to carry on with constructive negotiations unhindered, so that, a mutually agreed, just, and lasting solution is found to the conflict.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.



(Rauf R. DENKTAS)

President of the  
Turkish Federated State of Kibris.

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T 179/82

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SUBJECT



Cyprus

c. flo

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

14 September 1982

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 179/82**

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of 31 July drawing my attention to recent action by the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

The United Kingdom follows carefully all developments in Cyprus and is studying closely the measures recently introduced by the Turkish Cypriots which you describe in your letter. We are concerned at the implications that the amendment to the "Equivalent Property Law" and the economic measures recently announced in northern Cyprus might have for the intercommunal process and the search for a settlement to the Cyprus problem. We have made our concern on these matters clear to the Turkish authorities. We do not, however, believe that the measures concerned are designed to integrate northern Cyprus more closely with Turkey or lead to partition of the island. I am confident that the Turkish authorities are fully aware of the grave consequences of such a step.

You can rest assured that the British Government will not lose sight of the gravity of the situation in Cyprus. As you know, it is our firm belief that the intercommunal talks which are being held under the auspices of the UN Secretary General

/ offer the best

JWP

offer the best way forward in the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem. I sympathise with those who are concerned that the talks have moved slowly but I have been encouraged to note the real, if limited, progress which they have recently made. The United Nations Secretary General knows that we stand ready to assist him or his representatives in any way he would consider appropriate. I am confident that you will continue yourself to give your fullest support to the intercommunal talks.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

---

His Excellency Mr. Spiros Kyprianou

Cyprus



CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 September 1982

Dear John,

Type letter p.

AL 13/4.

Letter from President Kyprianou to the Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 31 August conveying the Prime Minister's request for a more detailed draft reply to the letter from President Kyprianou about developments in Northern Cyprus. I enclose a further draft for the Prime Minister's signature.

The background to President Kyprianou's letter was set out in John Holmes' letter to Tim Flesher of 26 August. We have now been given more details by the French of how they propose to reply to the identical letter sent by President Kyprianou to President Mitterrand. The Quai d'Orsay have sent an acknowledgement to the Cyprus Embassy in Paris and said that they are studying the letter. They have also asked their Embassy at Nicosia to look into President Kyprianou's allegations. But they intend to reply in general terms, not taking up specific points President Kyprianou has made. Our own proposed reply will therefore be as forthcoming a response as President Kyprianou will receive from any of our major allies. It is very likely that the letter will be published. Although even-handed, it could elicit a protest from the Turks, which the original, shorter, draft reply sent with John Holmes' letter of 26 August might have avoided. But if we are to send a more detailed reply this risk is unavoidable.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT: ~~XXXXXX~~ letter ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:  
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:  
President Kyprianou

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your letter of 31 July drawing my attention to recent action by the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

*The United Kingdom follows carefully*

~~It goes without saying that the United Kingdom is against any action which might make a settlement of the Cyprus problem more difficult to find. We continue to follow with care all developments in Cyprus and are studying closely the measures recently introduced by the Turkish Cypriots which you describe in your letter. We are concerned at the implications that the amendment to the 'Equivalent Property Law' and the economic measures recently announced in northern Cyprus might have for the intercommunal process and the search for a settlement to the Cyprus problem. We have made our concern on these matters clear to the Turkish authorities. We do not, however, believe that the measures concerned are designed to integrate northern Cyprus more closely with Turkey or lead to partition of the island. I am confident that the Turkish authorities are fully aware of the grave consequences of such a step.~~

Enclosures—flag(s).....

You can rest assured that the British Government will not lose sight of the gravity of the situation in Cyprus. As you know, it is our firm belief that the intercommunal talks which are being held under the auspices of the UN

/Secretary

Secretary General offer the best way forward in the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem. I sympathise with those who are concerned that the talks have moved slowly but I have been encouraged to note the real, if limited, progress which they have recently made. The United Nations Secretary General knows that we stand ready to assist him or his representatives in any way he would consider appropriate. I am confident that you will continue yourself to give your fullest support to the intercommunal talks.

1987

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

31 August 1982

Thank you for your letter of 26 August enclosing a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to President Kyprianou of Cyprus. The Prime Minister takes the view that a more detailed response is needed to President Kyprianou's letter; she has commented that "we have great interest in the sovereign bases in Cyprus and we must take that interest into account in our dealings with President Kyprianou".

I should be grateful therefore if you could arrange for the submission of a draft reply which deals in more detail with the points raised in President Kyprianou's original letter.

Timothy Flesher

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

BT

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 August, 1982

Dear Tim,

*I thank it needs drafted  
a much more carefully  
letter than the one enclosed.  
We have great interests in  
the Sovereign bases in Cyprus  
Please that interest  
not its security*

Murster:  
If you agree  
a draft reply to  
President Kyprianou is  
attached to your correspondence

Thank you for your letter of 4 August enclosing a letter to the Prime Minister from President Kyprianou of Cyprus. The letter is a round robin, which has been circulated widely to Heads of State or Government. I enclose a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature. JR  
26/8

Under an 'Equivalent Property Law' passed by the Turkish Cypriot authorities in 1977, Greek Cypriot land in the 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus' is allocated to Turkish Cypriot refugees by the 'Government' in proportion to land abandoned by the refugees in the South. The refugees obtain no title to the property but only a certificate of use. Until recently, they could not sell or mortgage the property and were thus unwilling to invest or develop it. There were also problems caused by the haphazard implementation of the 'law', which left many claims unsettled and involved many changes of allocations. On 27 July 1982 the 'law' was amended, following a promise given by Mr Denktash during the 1981 election campaign, to give occupants of Greek Cypriot property a 'permanent certificate of use'. This does not convey a legal title but is designed to offer sufficient security of tenure for banks to give mortgages and for occupiers to develop their land.

In recent months the Turkish Cypriot authorities have also announced proposals for a number of economic measures, including the establishment in Cyprus of a branch of the Turkish Central Bank; the establishment of a development bank; the replacement of the Cyprus pound by the Turkish lira as the official currency in the 'TFSC'; and the signing of an economic protocol with Turkey. Our own view of these proposed measures is that they breach the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. But we do not agree with Greek Cypriot claims that they represent a step on the road to the establishment of a separate state or that, together with the amendment to the 'Equivalent Property Law', they reflect partitionist aims on Mr Denktash's part. Nor should we raise the question of the Treaty of Guarantee since this would simply be fashioning a stick for our own backs; the Greek Cypriots would demand that, as a Guarantor power, we should try to stop the Turkish Cypriots from carrying out their proposals.

/Against

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL



Against this background, the arguments as to whether or not we should recommend that the Prime Minister answer President Kyprianou's letter are finely balanced. Other Western Governments are approaching the question in different ways: the French are proposing to reply more sympathetically than we would recommend: the Americans and Italians are replying on similar lines to the enclosed draft; and the West Germans are planning a laconic and late reply - if any. There is much to be said for our not replying to all. It might discourage President Kyprianou from attempts to make further propaganda out of the measures and from further internationalising the Cyprus problem. However, the UK has a special role to play in Cyprus, which suggests that we should at least acknowledge President Kyprianou's letter, especially as the Americans, French and Italians are doing so. A letter from the Prime Minister would also provide a useful opportunity to reiterate support for the intercommunal talks. President Kyprianou intends to have the Cyprus problem raised at the UN General Assembly this autumn. This will hamper the prosecution of the talks. It is unlikely that we can do anything to make him change his mind. But we ought to lose no opportunity to make the point (in this case implicitly) that we do not think that this is the best course. The draft reply accordingly avoids detailed discussion of the Turkish Cypriot measures and confines itself to a general expression of support for the intercommunal talks and of the need to avoid any action which might damage them.

*Yours ever*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

T Flesher Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: President Kyprianou

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your letter of 31 July drawing my attention to recent action by the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

It goes without saying that the United Kingdom is against any action which might make a settlement of the Cyprus problem more difficult to find. We continue to follow with care all developments in Cyprus, including the measures recently introduced by the Turkish Cypriots which you describe in your letter.

You can rest assured that the British Government will not lose sight of the gravity of the situation in Cyprus. As you know, it is our firm belief that the intercommunal talks currently being held under the auspices of the UN Secretary General offer the best way forward in the search for a peaceful, just and lasting settlement to the Cyprus problem. I have been encouraged to note the real, if limited, progress which the talks have made recently. The United Nations Secretary General knows that we stand ready to assist him or his representatives in any way

/he

Enclosures—flag(s).....

*Does this imply we can't do anything - by mistake*

he would consider appropriate. I am confident that you will continue yourself to give the fullest support to the intercommunal talks.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your letter of 31 July drawing my attention to recent action by the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

It goes without saying that the United Kingdom is against any action which might make a settlement of the Cyprus problem more difficult to find. We continue to follow with care all developments in Cyprus, including the measures recently introduced by the Turkish Cypriots which you describe in your letter.

You can rest assured that the British Government will not lose sight of the gravity of the situation in Cyprus. As you know, it is our firm belief that the intercommunal talks currently being held under the auspices of the UN Secretary General offer the best way forward in the search for a peaceful, just and lasting settlement to the Cyprus problem. I have been encouraged to note the real, if limited, progress which the talks have made recently. The United Nations Secretary General knows that we stand ready to assist him or his representatives in any way he would consider appropriate. I am confident that you will continue yourself to give the fullest support to the intercommunal talks.

His Excellency Mr. Spiros Kyprianou.

file OK  
Cyprus

4 August 1982

BF 181

CYPRUS

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the President of the Republic of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if you could provide a draft reply in due course.

A J COLES

Francis Richards, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office


92



CYPRUS HIGH COMMISSION

93, PARK STREET,  
LONDON, W1Y 4ET

TEL.: 01-499 8272



Ref: M.100.

The Cyprus High Commission presents its compliments to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has the honour to enclose a message from H.E. the President of the Republic of Cyprus Mr. Spyros Kyprianou to the Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher M.P., Prime Minister, and request that it may be forwarded to its destination.

The Cyprus High Commission avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurances of its Highest consideration.

London,  
2nd August, 1982.





CYPRUS HIGH COMMISSION

93, PARK STREET,  
LONDON, W1Y 4ET

TEL.: 01-499 8272

*Master  
Ops*

*SUBJECT*

31st July, 1982.

*cc*  
The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
London S.W.1.

**PRIME MINISTER'S**

**PERSONAL MESSAGE**

**SERIAL No. T 156A/82**

Avaling myself of the bonds of friendship between our two countries and of Her Majesty's Government principled position and concern for International Order, I would like to call your attention to a new Fait Accompli created in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus occupied by the armed forces of Turkey, providing further evidence clearly manifesting Turkey's partitionist and annexationist designs against Cyprus and its people.

The Turkish Cypriot leadership, acting as the mouth-piece and instrument of Ankara, has passed a so-called "law" on 27th of July, 1982, expropriating and confiscating the property of the Greek Cypriot refugees - one third of the island's total population, who have been uprooted by the Turkish Forces of invasion and occupation - and enabling the usurpers of these homes and lands to claim ownership and sell, transfer, lease and mortgage, these properties in clear violation of International Law and of specific U.N. General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Cyprus. According to this "law", so-called "Final Possession Certificates" will be issued to the usurpers of the Greek Cypriot property and a special provision is made for the Turkish colonisers including members of Turkish armed forces, who settled in the occupied territory, after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, enabling them to benefit and take the "lion's share" from this arbitrary decision. This action, coupled with the continuing implantation in the occupied area of thousands of colonists-settlers from Turkey, comes as a further affirmation of Ankara's policy never to allow the expelled indigenous inhabitants to return to their ancestral homes and property, as consistently called for by the relevant United Nations Resolutions, the decisions and declarations of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth and other International Organizations and the Agreements of 12th

February 1977 and 19th May 1979. Furthermore, the "decision" to grant title deeds to settlers from Turkey shows clearly that the Turkish Cypriots must have begun to feel the merciless consequences of the Turkish invasion.

My Government considers the above Turkish decisions and actions as null and void and it reserves its right to defend, preserve and protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of all Cypriots and take whatever measures it may deem appropriate under the circumstances.

It should be clear that this new arbitrary Turkish action, following last month's decision by Turkey to proceed with the establishment in the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus of a "Central Bank" and a "Development Bank" and with the introduction of the Turkish Lira as "legal tender" in all transactions in the occupied area with the simultaneous abolition of the Cyprus pound, leaves no doubt as to the ultimate objective of partition and annexation of the occupied part of Cyprus to Turkey. The fact that these new *Faits Accomplis* take place after the recent visit to the occupied areas of the Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Bulent Ulusu, disillusions those who expected an immediate change in the Turkish position and proves once more that decisions are taken in Ankara and implemented accordingly by the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

The purpose of the above Turkish action is quite evident and it must be evaluated in view of their efforts to pave the way for the consolidation and the legalization of the De Facto situation, created by the Turkish invasion and occupation. I should not fail from mentioning that even Turkish Cypriot leaders and other prominent members of the Turkish Cypriot community criticized these actions as emanating from the partitionist policy followed by Denktash's regime on the Cyprus problem. It has been customary for the Turkish Cypriot press to include in their columns statements and articles revealing this policy "to separate the two communities from one another and to intergrate the occupied region with Turkey".

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus respects, preserves and protects all the human rights and fundamental



freedoms. It protects the homes and lands of the Turkish Cypriots situated in the free areas of the Republic and which have been abandoned by their legitimate owners, after being forced by their leadership, through promises or threats, to move into the occupied part of Cyprus. My Government fully recognizes that these properties belong to the Turkish Cypriots and that in case of their return to the Government controlled area, they will be given to them.

The above mentioned illegal actions diminish the prospects for an early peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem.

It is my earnest hope that Her Majesty's Government will not lose sight of the extreme gravity of the situation in Cyprus and its implications, both in the general terms of the maintenance of peace and security in the region and more specifically, in terms of the observance of human rights so flagrantly violated by the Turkish occupation forces. 36.3% of my country's territory is still under the occupation of Turkey, one third of the population are still refugees in their own country, and we are still trying to trace almost 2,000 missing persons.

In strongly protesting the aforementioned arbitrary and inhuman Turkish actions, which unmistakably betray Ankara's ruthless determination to impose by force a partitionist solution of the Cyprus problem, I wish to express the hope that Her Majesty's Government will do everything possible to take all necessary steps towards arresting this abhorrest process of manifest illegalities and *Faits Accomplis* and to impress upon Turkey that these actions, apart from being totally illegal, are proof of a policy intolerable and condemnable by the International Community. Furthermore, individual and concerted action is necessary to force Turkey to abandon her expansionist and partitionist policy and to act in strict conformity with the resolutions of the United Nations.

Please, accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Spyros Kyprianou  
President of the Republic  
of Cyprus. > )



Cyprus  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 April 1982

Dear John

Mr 27/4

h-a.

Cyprus

Thank you for your letter of 16 April enclosing a letter which the Prime Minister has received about the question of missing persons in Cyprus from Mr Denktash, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community.

You will by now have received my letter of 20 April enclosing a draft reply to President Kyprianou's letter to the Prime Minister on the same subject. The proposed reply to President Kyprianou is worded in a manner to which the Turkish Cypriots cannot reasonably object. We do not consider a reply from the Prime Minister to Mr Denktash to be either appropriate or necessary. Not only is it a circular; Mr Denktash is writing in his capacity as "President" of the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus", the existence of which we do not recognise.

Yours over,

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 1AA

26 APR 1982

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SUBJECT

cc Mester  
cps

THE PRIME MINISTER



10 DOWNING STREET

cypr  
cc FCO  
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PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No: 183/82

26 April 1982

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of 29 March about the problem of missing persons in Cyprus.

I share your concern that so little progress has been made in resolving this serious humanitarian problem. The sympathy of the British Government is with all those in Cyprus who have suffered what you so eloquently describe as the agony of uncertainty about the fate of their loved ones. We welcomed the establishment of the Committee on Missing Persons in April last year as a major step forward in the process of resolving this difficult issue. It is certainly a matter of great regret that procedural difficulties have prevented the Committee from operating in the manner envisaged and getting down to the substantive task of investigating individual cases of missing persons.

Despite the problems encountered so far, I remain convinced that the Committee is the correct vehicle for tackling this serious problem and that the best course is to continue to try to make sure that it works effectively. To this end it is essential that both sides should make maximum efforts, on humanitarian grounds, to allow the Committee's work to proceed and not permit political

/ considerations

fu

considerations to impede progress. With flexibility and goodwill on both sides it should surely be possible to bridge the remaining differences over procedure.

Over the problem of missing persons, as in the case of the wider issue of the intercommunal talks, the United Nations Secretary General knows that we stand ready to assist him or his representatives in any way he would consider appropriate.

Yours sincerely  
Raymond Beckett

---

His Excellency Mr. Spiros Kyprianou



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 April 1982

*Please type letter**AR 21:  
4**Dear John,*Cyprus

Thank you for your letter of 6 April enclosing one which the Prime Minister has received from Mr Kyprianou. I enclose a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature.

The background to the very difficult problem of missing persons in Cyprus is complicated. Following the Turkish invasion in 1974, the Greek Cypriots claimed that some 2,000 persons were missing; the Turks, in turn, claimed that some 300 of their own people were missing from the period of intercommunal fighting in 1963-74. A number of unsuccessful attempts were made to deal with the problems between 1974 and 1980. In September 1980, with the resumption of the intercommunal talks on the wider Cyprus problem, a further attempt was made and, after a UN "shuttle" between the two sides, an Intercommunal Committee on Missing Persons (ICMP) was eventually set up in April 1981 under the Chairmanship of M. Pilloud of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

The newly established ICMP ran into procedural difficulties almost immediately. An unofficial group, representing Greek Cypriot missing persons' families, demanded the right of attendance at meetings. The Greek Cypriots insisted that they (and not just the ICRC) should be allowed into the Turkish area to investigate evidence submitted by the Turks. The two sides disagreed about how proceedings of the Committee should be recorded. And the Turkish side complained that the Greek Cypriots had leaked "confidential" Committee documents to the press. In addition, M. Pilloud fell ill, causing further delays.

In late November the Greek Cypriots tabled a draft resolution in the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly urging the ICMP to get down to work without further delay. The Turks saw this as essentially a move to pillory them internationally (they were probably right to see it in these terms). The resolution was adopted, but we abstained on the grounds that it was unnecessary (M. Pilloud had formally presented new proposals to break the deadlock) and unlikely to improve the atmosphere in the Committee.



Meetings of the Committee continued in the first months of 1982, but were bedevilled by the continuing inability of either side to agree on procedures. At the end of February the Turkish Cypriot side gave their agreement to procedures proposed in September 1981 by M. Pilloud, but the Greek Cypriots insisted that these had been superseded by new procedures proposed in November, which the Turkish side have not accepted. The ICMP is therefore for the moment in suspense, although the practical difference between the two sides on procedures does not appear to be very great, at least as regards supplementary investigations and record-keeping; the central problem seems to be the role of observers.

You should also know that in 1978 the UN Commission on Human Rights set up a Working Group to deal with the problem of disappeared persons throughout the world: the current Chairman, in his personal capacity, is Viscount Colville of Culross, the Leader of the UK Delegation to the Human Rights Commission. The Greek Cypriots have recently been pressing the Group to visit the island, but the Group has so far taken the line that the ICMP is the appropriate forum in which the matter should be pursued.

It is certainly regrettable that no practical progress has been made on the problem of missing persons in Cyprus. In part this is indeed due to what President Kyprianou describes as Turkish Cypriot intransigence. Nevertheless it is clear that the Greek Cypriot side have less interest in dealing with the practical humanitarian problem than in exploiting it to the maximum for propaganda purposes. The Turkish Cypriots could well argue that they have recently made substantive concessions over the procedures involved and that it is the Greek Cypriots themselves who have unilaterally declared that the proceedings of the ICMP are stymied. The situation is further complicated by the fact that M. Pilloud has lost the confidence of both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides; a UN official is at present attempting to shuttle between them to save the situation.

We have an interest in seeing progress on the missing persons issue, both for humanitarian reasons and to prevent this problem further impairing the prospects for the intercommunal talks themselves. Any Greek Cypriot move to internationalise the issue again would have the latter effect as well as damage the chances for real progress on the missing persons issue. Any suggestion on our part that we support Greek Cypriot moves to place the issue before international bodies would be very ill-received by the Turkish Cypriots and lessen our ability to

/influence



influence them over the broader issue of the intercommunal talks. The draft reply is therefore cast in sympathetic but essentially non-committal terms.

*Yours ever,*

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Francis Richards".

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

The Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

His Excellency Mr Spyros Kyprianou  
President of the Republic of Cyprus

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

21 Thank you for your letter of 29 March about  
the problem of missing persons in Cyprus.

CAVEAT.....

2. I share your concern that so little progress  
has been made in resolving this serious humanitarian  
problem. The sympathy of the British Government is  
with all those in Cyprus who have suffered what you  
so eloquently describe as the agony of uncertainty <sup>about</sup> ~~as~~  
~~to~~ the fate of their loved ones. We welcomed the  
establishment of the Committee on Missing Persons  
in April last year as a major step forward in the  
process of resolving this difficult issue. It is  
certainly a matter of great regret that procedural  
difficulties have prevented the Committee from  
operating in the manner envisaged and getting down  
to the substantive task of investigating individual  
cases of missing persons.

3. Despite the problems encountered so far, I  
remain convinced that the Committee is the correct  
vehicle for tackling this serious problem and that  
the best course is to continue to try to make sure <sup>that</sup>  
it works effectively. To this end it is essential  
that both sides should make maximum efforts, on human-  
itarian grounds, to allow the Committee's work to  
proceed and not permit political considerations to  
impede progress. With flexibility and goodwill on  
both sides it should surely be possible to bridge

/the

Enclosures—flag(s).....

50 163 1985

the remaining differences over procedure.

4. Over the problem of missing persons, as in the case of the wider issue of the intercommunal talks, the United Nations Secretary General knows that we stand ready to assist him or his representatives in any way he would consider appropriate.

11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

20 APR 1982

File

R M

Mr. DENKTAS  
closed 28/4

28/4

~~Kay~~  
Danks  
19/4

16 April, 1982

CYPRUS

I enclose a copy of a long letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mr Denktas about the question of missing persons in Cyprus. It appears to be a circular letter and was received here through the post. I should be grateful if you could consider whether a reply from the Prime Minister would be appropriate, and, if so, let me have a draft in due course.

F Richards, Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

JSS



TURKISH FEDERATED STATE OF KIBRIS  
PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

Lefkoşa, via Mersin 10, Turkey

Lefkoşa,

7 April, 1982

Your Excellency,

*John Rd. 16/4 via Post  
against the Turkish  
Embassy*

Recent press reports indicate that the Greek Cypriot Administration, under the guise of the Government of Cyprus and in close collaboration with the so-called 'Pancyprian Committee of the Relatives of the Undeclared Prisoners and Missing Persons', has embarked on a propaganda campaign, in various countries, concerning the issue of missing persons in Cyprus.

In this connection I should like to inform you that the question of missing persons in Cyprus concerns both communities in the island and it existed as an exclusively Turkish Cypriot problem between the years 1963-1974.

A joint Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus was established, last summer, in accordance with the agreement reached by the two sides. The Turkish Cypriot side which considers the question of missing persons a solely humanitarian issue has, in good will, made persistent efforts to enable the CMP to fulfil its humanitarian task. There remains no procedural difficulty to prevent the CMP from taking up and investigating individual cases of the missing persons of both communities.

The Turkish Cypriot side has stated that it is ready to present its first case of the missing Turkish Cypriots to the CMP, to be followed by a Greek Cypriot case. Even this proposal has been rejected by the Greek Cypriot side which has, once again, deliberately obstructed the work of the CMP and preferred to internationalize this humanitarian issue with the intention of exploiting it for political propaganda.

Under these circumstances, to put the record straight, I feel it incumbent upon me to provide you with factual information on the issue of missing persons in its proper relation to the Cyprus problem.

The facts about the Cyprus problem and the question of missing persons in Cyprus are as follows :

H.E. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom  
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,  
London.

1. The Cyprus problem arose as a result of the planned attack on the Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriots in December 1963.

The aim of this attack was to destroy the 1960 Cyprus Agreements (which outlawed the policy of Union with Greece and guaranteed the intercommunal partnership state against such a union) with a view to annexing the island with Greece.

Turkish Cypriots strongly objected to such annexation and were thus declared to be "national and religious enemies" of the Greek Cypriots. Under the guidance of Archbishop Makarios and with the direct military help of Greece, secret armies had been formed in accordance with the notorious "Akritas Plan" and an attack was launched on the Turkish Cypriots on 21 December 1963.

2. As a result of this attack the Turkish Cypriot members of the Government of Cyprus (viz., the Vice-President, three Cabinet Members, all Civil Servants) and the Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives, all the Turkish Cypriot members of the Police, Gendarmerie and of the Cyprus Army were forcefully ejected from their posts or prevented from performing their duties. The legitimate bi-communal Government of Cyprus was thus brought to an end and the Greek Cypriot elements of this Government illegally assumed the right to rule the country. The Turkish Cypriots defied this assumption and continued their resistance to this lawlessness at great risk to themselves.

103 Turkish Cypriot villages were destroyed. 30,000 Turkish Cypriots, the inhabitants of the destroyed villages, became refugees, half of the Turkish Cypriot population lived on aid received from Turkey as the whole Turkish Cypriot population (one fourth of the population of Cyprus) was cut off from the budget of Cyprus, hundreds of Turkish Cypriots were killed, more than 200 civilians were abducted from their homes, places of work and from roads, never to be seen again.

U.N. Secretary-General's reports on the missing Turkish Cypriots are pertinent. Relevant extracts from these reports are given in Appendix 1.

The whereabouts of these people are still unknown as the Greek Cypriot Administration refused to give any information about them.

3. From 1963 to 1974, the Turkish people of Cyprus lived in scattered Turkish Cypriot areas with the moral and material burden of 30,000 refugees without any help or assistance from the outside world (except Turkey) resisting the unlawful and merciless Greek Cypriot oppression at all levels.

By 1974 Archbishop Makarios, a Royalist, had fallen out with the Junta, which had earlier been given the care and training of 40,000 Greek Cypriot "National Guardsmen" (another unconstitutional body created for the suppression of the Turkish Cypriots!). On 15 July 1974, the Junta tried to overthrow Makarios and a blood-bath ensued. Foreign press reported "thousands of dead" in the Greek sectors of Cyprus. Various sources indicated that the number of the Greek Cypriots who perished during the coup of 15 July 1974 was very high (Appendix 2).

4. In view of the danger in which the independence of Cyprus stood together with the fate of the Turkish Cypriots, as a result of the coup, Turkey used her Treaty rights and intervened in Cyprus on 20 July 1974.

The so-called "President" of Cyprus, the notorious killer Nicos Sampson, immediately released all the Greek Cypriots, in their thousands, whom he had rounded up and put in custody as pro-Makarios and issued them with arms calling upon them through the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation to unite in "throwing out the enemy back to the sea."

Thus, the Greek Cypriots in their thousands, were armed and put into action while the unconstitutional Greek Cypriot National Guard and the Greek Cypriot policemen (nearly 40,000 gunmen) with their heavy armoury turned against Turks!..

All the Turkish Cypriot inhabitants (all non-combatants) in Paphos, Larnaca, Limassol and Famagusta Districts were put under detention in stadiums and similar open-air detention camps under terrible conditions.

5. In Paphos, on 14 August 1974 a blood-bath took place when Turkish Cypriots, including a three year old girl, were shot in presence of their families and friends. On the same day about one hundred male Turkish Cypriots were

collected from their homes in Tokhni, Zyyi and Mari by the Greek Cypriot armed elements. These people have never been seen again. All the inhabitants of the villages of Aloa, Sandallaris and Maratha were rounded up and killed in cold blood on 14 August and buried in mass-graves which were subsequently unearthed in the presence of the UNFICYP and foreign correspondents.

Detailed accounts of some of these Greek Cypriot atrocities are presented from the mouths of the relatives of the victims (Appendix 3).

6. At the beginning of 1975 a bi-communal Committee was set up in the course of the inter-communal talks with the participation of the U.N. and ICRC representatives to deal with the humanitarian cases.

This Committee looked into all alleged cases of the missing and, by mid-1975, the ICRC handed over to me and to Mr. Clerides (the then Greek Cypriot negotiator) about 30 cases for further investigation as they had dealt with the rest of the cases. Later I provided the answer for about 8 of these cases to Mr. Clerides and to Archbishop Makarios.

7. At the summit meeting of 12 February 1977 between myself and Archbishop Makarios we agreed to set up an inter-communal committee to investigate the question of missing persons, subject to an all-out investigation in chronological order.

On 26 April 1977, however, the former Greek Cypriot negotiator, Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos, wrote to us to say that the Greek Cypriot side could not agree to such a course.

In 1977 the matter was raised by the Greek Cypriot side at the Third Committee of the U.N. and a unanimous resolution was passed on 12 December 1977, which was subsequently adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 1977 (Res. No. 32/129) to the effect that the ICRC should participate in the inter-communal Committee.

The Turkish Cypriot side accepted this and through the help of Mr. Crawford, the then U.S.A. Ambassador in Cyprus, the procedural aspect of the question was settled 95%. Appendix 4 incorporates this aspect in my letters which I addressed to His Excellency Mr. Kurt Waldheim on 9 February 1978 and 19 October 1978.

The whole difficulty was due to the insistence of the Greek Cypriot side that the third member of the investigatory Committee, originally an ICRC representative as envisaged by the U.N. General Assembly resolution 32/128, should have the decisive vote in the event of disagreement between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot members of the Committee. The Turkish Cypriot side on the other hand wanted all decisions of the Committee to be taken by consensus (as it is customary in such matters), so as to prevent the exploitation of this humanitarian issue for political purposes. On this point the views of the Turkish Cypriot side and those of the ICRC, as also presented in paragraph 43 of the U.N. Secretary-General's report S/12946 of 1 December 1978 in the following terms, are identical :

“ The ICRC, though willing to take on functions conferred upon it by the agreement of both sides was not prepared to be placed in the midst of political controversy. ”

The justified refusal of the ICRC to be dragged into political controversy over the question meant that the decisions of the Committee would be taken on a no-objection basis, and not by majority vote as the Greek Cypriots wanted, and that the Greek Cypriot side would be unable to use the Committee as a forum from where it could disseminate further anti-Turkish propaganda. This was the reason why the Greek Cypriot side found it necessary to push aside this perfectly logical and constructive arrangement, and take the question back to the Third Committee of the U.N. in 1978. The resolution adopted by the Third Committee on 12 December 1978 and later approved by the U.N. General Assembly (resolution 33/178) on 20 December 1978 was not found to be acceptable by the Turkish Cypriot side which made this fact known to the Secretary-General in a letter addressed to him on 13 December 1978. The clause urging the establishment of an investigatory body “ under the chairmanship of a representative of the Secretary-General ”, who “ shall be empowered, in case of disagreement, to reach a binding independent opinion which shall be implemented ”, was particularly unacceptable, since it did not even conform with the established international practice with regard to the settlement of disputes of this nature. It is relevant to note here that the legal advice sought from the United Nations

in this respect stated that in the absence of the explicit consent of both sides, the General Assembly could not confer upon the Secretary-General and, for that matter, upon his representative, the role of a compulsory arbitrator, that there was no precedent for conferring such a role upon the Secretary-General in the absence of the consent of both parties and finally that established international practice in the matter of dispute settlement attaches primacy to the consent of the parties. It also stated that such consent should be express and not implied.

Later, in 1979, the then U.N. Secretary-General, Mr. Waldheim, proposed what he called a "mid solution" which I undertook to take to my Government and did so. The decision of the Government of the Turkish Federated State of Kibris was that the Turkish Cypriot side considered the 1977 unanimous resolution (32/128) as valid and workable and was prepared to set up the Committee in question in line with my letters to the Secretary-General (Appendix 4).

On 21 March 1980 the Turkish Cypriot side made certain proposals on the subject of "missing persons", through the U.N. Secretary-General, in the form of a "Talking Paper" (Appendix 5).

8. A 'Shuttle' was started on 12 December 1980 after the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot sides agreed that paragraphs 3 to 13 of this Talking Paper, leaving out the date in paragraph 7 as an open question, should constitute the basis for the commencement of the 'Shuttle'.

At the successful conclusion of the 'Shuttle' which lasted for nearly four and a half months, from 12 December 1980 till 21 April 1981, an agreement was reached by the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot sides on the Terms of Reference for the establishment of a Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP). This agreement was formally announced at a press conference, held on 22 April 1981, by Dr. Hugo Gobbi, the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General, in the presence of the representatives of the two sides (Appendix 6).

The CMP is composed of three members, one member from each side and Mr. Claude Pilloud, a retired ICRC official and a Swiss lawyer. Mr. Pilloud was first designated by the International Committee of Red Cross and appointed by the Secretary-General of the U.N. as the third member of the CMP with the approval of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot sides.

Following the appointment of its members the CMP, which functions as an independent and autonomous body, held its first meeting on 14 July 1981 and continued to meet in accordance with its schedule until 1 September 1981 when it decided to have its usual recess until 25 September 1981. Before leaving for this recess for his native Switzerland, however, Mr. Pilloud submitted to the two sides, on 2 September 1981, his compromise proposals on the outstanding procedural matters before the CMP.

In the morning of 25 September 1981 shortly before the CMP was to convene Mr. Pilloud was informed by the Greek Cypriot member that he could not participate in that morning's meeting (Appendix 7). Therefore the CMP could not hold its meeting pre-scheduled for 25 September, nor could it meet for many weeks to come due to the persistent boycotting of its meetings by the Greek Cypriot side, despite intensive efforts made by the other two members to convene the CMP.

In the meantime, on the Greek Cypriot side, a propaganda campaign was waged against both Mr. Pilloud and the Turkish Cypriot side and the CMP's confidential documents and material were disclosed to the public at a press conference held on 30 October 1981 (Appendix 8) in gross and deliberate violation of the Terms of Reference of the CMP.

While holding the work of the CMP in abeyance and thus preventing it from discussing the compromise proposals submitted by Mr. Pilloud on 2 September 1981, the Greek Cypriot side attempted to enter into unilateral consultations with the U.N. Secretariat in New York with the intention of securing the revision and modification of these proposals.

Finally, the Greek Cypriot side agreed to participate in a CMP meeting scheduled for 20 November 1981 amidst Greek Cypriot press reports that preparations were "in hand for an appeal to the Third Committee of the U.N." (Appendix 9). When the 20 November meeting had to be postponed due to Mr. Pilloud's sudden illness, which the Greek Cypriot side described as "political", a statement was issued by the United Nations Force in Cyprus on 21 November

1981 saying that Mr. Pilloud was indeed ill "undergoing medical attention and supervision" and that any suggestion made which was contrary to that actuality was devoid of truth (Appendix 10).

Long before the CMP met on 26 November 1981 the Greek Cypriot side had decided and made its preparations to submit a draft resolution to the Third Committee of the U.N. (Appendix 11). At the 26 November meeting, the Turkish Cypriot side, tried in goodwill to persuade the Greek Cypriot side to withdraw its draft resolution from the Third Committee of the U.N., pointing out that such a move would seriously harm the autonomous and independent nature of the CMP and put its future work in jeopardy. Nothing, not even the revised 2 September proposals submitted by Mr. Pilloud to the Committee at its 26 November meeting, could stop the Greek Cypriot side from taking the missing persons issue away from the CMP to the United Nations.

When the CMP reconvened on 10 February 1982 the calendar of its work pointed at 2 September 1981, the date on which Mr. Pilloud submitted to the two sides his compromise proposals which had not yet been discussed by the Committee. The Greek Cypriot side, however, flatly refused to enter into any discussion on the basis of 2 September proposals.

During the last session of the CMP the Turkish Cypriot side made intensive efforts to help the Committee to overcome its procedural difficulties and put forward useful suggestions that could enable the CMP to begin its humanitarian task of actual investigation of individual cases. To further help the CMP in its investigative task the Turkish Cypriot side accepted Mr. Pilloud's 2 September proposals on the method of investigations as well as on reports at the CMP meeting held on 25 February 1982. This acceptance was welcomed by Mr. Pilloud who remarked that the CMP was ready to proceed with its humanitarian task of investigating the individual cases of the missing. Mr. Pilloud's remark elicited an unjustified protest from the Greek Cypriot member who claimed that the CMP was deadlocked and prevented it from fixing a date for its future meeting (Appendix 12).

A few days later a delegation headed by the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Greek Cypriot Administration was dispatched to Geneva by the Greek Cypriot side to invite the members of the Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances to Cyprus, in an effort to further internationalize the issue of the missing persons.

Now, the Greek Cypriot side refuses to participate in the CMP's meetings unless they are attended by the representatives of the so-called "Pancyprian Committee of the Relatives of Undeclared Prisoners and Missing Persons" (PCRUPMP).

The Turkish Cypriot side maintains that the question of missing persons is a humanitarian issue which can be best solved by the CMP established as a result of the agreement reached between the two sides. In the CMP's Terms of Reference there is no provision whatsoever which suggests even remotely that observers should be admitted to the Committee's meetings. On the contrary, its Terms of Reference states explicitly that no person directly involved in the issue of missing persons can assist any member of the CMP. Besides, the issue of observers has no bearing on the work of the CMP, itself, whose main task is to investigate the cases.

At the interview I had with Mr. Papachristophorou, the chairman of the 'PCRUPMP' on 26 March 1981, I promised to help him attend the CMP's meetings as an observer on the condition that the Greek Cypriot side should stop exploiting the missing persons issue for both internal and international propaganda. In proposing such a condition I was merely interested in protecting the CMP against any future propaganda. Stating that the representatives of the 'PCRUPMP' worked in close cooperation with the Greek Cypriot Administration Mr. Papachristophorou accepted my condition by saying "I guarantee that all propaganda will be stopped."

On the basis of my promise, the Turkish Cypriot side, trusting that Mr. Papachristophorou would keep his promise, agreed to discuss the question of observers at the meetings of the CMP, without first asking for an official confirmation about the condition accepted by Mr. Papachristophorou. As a matter of fact following its first meeting on 14 July 1981, the CMP took up the procedural matters, including the question of observers, on which both sides put forward their views. Later, too, the Turkish Cypriot side stated that it was ready to discuss, with a positive and constructive approach, all the issues



in Mr. Pilloud's compromise proposals of 2 September 1981, including that on observers. As a result of the boycotting of the CMP's meetings by the Greek Cypriot side for many weeks, however, the Committee could not discuss and finalize this issue as well as all other issues in Mr. Pilloud's 2 September proposals.

Acting contrary to his promise to me Mr. Papachristophorou was engaged as the chairman of the 'PCRUPMP' in the following activities harming the autonomous and independent nature of the CMP :

1. He lobbied in October 1981 at the United Nations in New York for propaganda purposes (Appendix 13).

2. He disclosed the CMP's confidential documents and material including its confidential Terms of Reference at a press conference he held on 30 October 1981 (Appendix 8).

3. He carried out propaganda activities at the Third Committee of the U.N. during November - December 1981 (Appendix 14).

4. He sent a propaganda memorandum, on 6 February 1982, to the Conference on European Security and Cooperation in Madrid, although it was earlier announced that the CMP would meet on 10 February 1982.

5. He lobbied in Geneva with the purpose of getting the Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights involved in the missing persons issue in Cyprus and thus rendering the CMP ineffective.

6. He made efforts to exploit the missing persons issue at Strasbourg.

7. On many occasions he directed accusations against the third member of the CMP.

8. He made personal and insulting charges and accusations against the Turkish Cypriot member of the CMP.

From the above it is evident that Mr. Papachristophorou and his group have not kept the promise they made to me. They have not only made every effort to take the issue of missing persons to international fora but also acting in gross violation of the CMP's Terms of Reference disclosed it, together with other confidential documents and material related to the CMP. In doing so, Mr. Papachristophorou and his group have put the work of the CMP in serious jeopardy and thus proved to be unfit to become observers.

In fact all the available evidences indicate that the main interest of the Greek Cypriot side in the issue of missing persons originates exclusively from its desire to exploit this sensitive issue for political propaganda purposes rather than from humanitarian considerations.

Finally I should like to stress the fact that, within the framework of the CMP's Terms of Reference, the Turkish Cypriot side is ready, as it has been before, to help the Committee in performing its humanitarian task of investigating and finalizing the individual cases of the missing persons of the two sides without further delay.

*Rauf R. Denktas*

(Rauf R. DENKTAS)  
President  
Turkish Federated State of  
Kibris.

APPENDIX 1

U.N. Secretary-General's reports on the missing  
Turkish Cypriots:

(a) "142. In my report of 15 June 1964, I indicated that as of 8 June, a total of 483 Turkish Cypriots and 52 Greek Cypriots were reported as missing. As a result of intensive searches effected since then, carried out with the assistance of UNFICYP and the International Committee of the Red Cross, 251 Turkish Cypriots and 9 Greek Cypriots have been found... Among those who remain missing are many persons who disappeared during the December 1963 events, and there seems little hope of finding them alive. The same may be said of all those who were abducted after the Famagusta incident of 11 May 1964." (33 Turkish Cypriots).

(S/5950 of 10 September 1964)

(b) "93. In the report of 10 September, it was indicated that as of 1 September 232 Turkish Cypriots were missing, according to the list compiled by the Turkish Cypriot Missing Persons Bureau. Since that date, UNFICYP was informed that twenty-three Turkish Cypriots have been accounted for and their names have been deleted from the list of missing persons; this leaves 209 Turkish Cypriots still missing. Efforts to trace those missing will be continued by ICRC and UNFICYP, but there seems to be little prospect of finding them alive."

(S/6102 of 12 December 1964)

(c) "117. Figures supplied by the Turkish Cypriot Missing Persons Bureau as at 1 March 1965 show that 209 Turkish Cypriots are still missing. This figure is the same as that given in the last report (S/6102, para. 93-94). Efforts to trace these persons have been continued by ICRC and UNFICYP without result and there is little prospect of finding them alive."

(S/6228 of 11 March 1965)

(d) "76..... Only one case of 212 Turkish Cypriots listed as missing has been closed since my last report, a man now found to have been killed in April 1964."

(S/7350 of 10 June 1966)

APPENDIX 2

That the number of those killed during the coup of 15 July 1974 was very high is evidenced by:

- a) An article in the local daily 'Haravgi' of 22 November 1975 in which a Greek Cypriot editor wrote:

" Innocent Turkish women and children together with thousands of democratic elements among the Greek Community were wantonly killed by EOKA hordes during the coup ".
- b) The disclosures made in an Athens newspaper, Ta Nea, by a Greek Cypriot priest, Papatsestos of Nicosia, who was forced to bury the dead, some of whom while still alive. (Appendix 15)
- c) The statement made to the Greek Assize Court in Nicosia, in August 1976, by Mr. Loucaides, the Deputy Attorney-General of the Greek Cypriot Administration. (Appendix 16)
- d) The contents of a letter, written on 31 August, 1974 by a Greek Professor to Prof. Alper Orhon, describing the "awful events" during the coup. (Appendix 17)
- e) Archbishop Makarios' address to the U.N. Security Council on 19 July 1974, in which, about the coup of 15 July 1974, he said "... I am afraid that the number of losses are heavy... The coup has cost much bloodshed and many lives."
- f) The statement made by the former Greek Cypriot negotiator, Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos, at a press conference on 12 December 1977 and published by the local English language daily "Cyprus Mail", on 13 December 1971, where the following extract comes from:

" 'The number of the Greek Cypriots who lost their lives during the short-lived coup in July 1974 did not exceed 504', the Greek Cypriot negotiator Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos said yesterday".

TRAGEDIES IN TOKHNI FROM THE MOUTHS OF SURVIVERS

Tokhni is a village situated in the north east of Limassol, a sea port in southern Cyprus. Until the year 1974, five hundred Turkish Cypriots and about the same number of Greek Cypriots lived there in separate quarters. Massive tragedy struck the Turkish inhabitants of the village on the 14th August, 1974, when armed Greeks took away at gun point all the available able-bodied males of ages ranging from 13 to 74 and massacred them together with 15 other Turkish Cypriot men from the neighbouring villages of Mari and Zyyi. Only eighteen men managed to get away. They hid in the mountains until they could smuggle themselves from the surrounding Greek areas into Kophinou, a Turkish Cypriot village, where they lay low until they could be singly smuggled to the Turkish quarter of Nicosia.

The women of Tokhni were evacuated on the 25th October, 1974, by UNFICYP to Northern Cyprus and the village has now been re-constituted at Vouno, 10 miles from Nicosia. Turks now call it "New Tokhni", in other words Yeni Taşkent, where women never smile but children grow up in security.

Below are the accounts of the tragic events that took place in Tokhni, as related by some of the survivors in their own words.

The Account of the 15th August, 1974 massacre related by Suat Hüseyin, an eye witness and the sole survivor, who got away miraculously:

"On August 14, 1974, some 20 Greek gunmen entered our village, Tokhni, and gathered 69 Turkish Cypriot men between the ages of 13 and 74. These gunmen had been patrolling the town daily.

"The following day, the 15th August, 1974, they brought to our village 15 more Turkish Cypriot men they had rounded up from the villages of Mari and Zyyi. They divided us into two groups. I was one of the 50 who boarded a bus guarded by four Greeks armed with automatic weapons.

"We passed Limassol, arriving at the Ayia Phyla-Palodhia road junction. Our captors ordered us down and told us to walk towards the isolated countryside. When we were told to stop, I noticed that the earth had been dug in places. These I grasped then, were to be our graves. The four gunmen offered each Turkish Cypriot a cigarette. It was, I think at the third puff that the bullets came. I fell, I was shot in the belly and legs. I fell with the others, pretending to be dead. My face was covered with blood and the spattered brain of another victim. I then heard the four gunmen speak in the mainland Greek accent. 'That is the end of them, let's now go and bring a bulldozer and bury them.'

When they were safely away I gathered all my strength and crawled to the trees nearby. No one else appeared to have survived. Later I watched the common grave of my fellow-villagers bulldozed over.

I hid in the hills for six days, managing in the end to get to the village of Moutayiaka. Gradually my wounds were getting worse. I was then taken by a U.N. ambulance to the Episkopi British base."

Zerin Mehmet of Tokhni recounts the tragedy of her life:

"I was happily married with a loving husband and three little sons, and was seven months pregnant with my fourth baby. The 15th July, 1974, when opposing Greek camps assaulted each other, was the beginning of our misfortune. On that day we heard gunshots fired by some Greek gunmen of the village. We were terrified. Later we learned that some Eoka (Greek Cypriot underground movement) gunmen were celebrating their victory over the Makarios supporters. These shots signalled our future ordeal in the hands of the Greek Cypriot gunmen.

In early August 1974 my husband, whom I loved dearly, was collected from the village street by the Greeks. They wished to interrogate him about the arms

and ammunition which they suspected to be in possession of the Turkish inhabitants of the village. They knew where the few arms that the Turks had were kept. In fact they had collected all the arms and ammunition that we had on 22nd July 1974. When interrogated, my husband told them the truth. One of the gunmen then commented: 'You are lucky you told us the truth, otherwise we would have shot you'. My husband knew how cruel these men were. He was caught and taken prisoner by them in 1963. We were not married then but he used to tell me how they arrested him on his way to work and how hard the Turkish authorities had tried to obtain his release, for which they had to pay a large sum of money.

In early August, 1974, armed Greek men arrested many Turkish Cypriot able-bodied men and tortured them with the purpose of extracting information about the imaginary weapons they possessed.

I shall never forget how our neighbour, Münir, suffered in their hands. He was a fat man. As he was very kind, we nicknamed him Ata (father). One day the Greek Cypriot gunmen arrested him too. He was taken away for sometime. When he returned, his back was as red as beetroot. He told us that they beat him with a hot iron bar. 'When the hot bar touched our bodies we cried our heads off' he said. Few days later he was to meet his death, the same fate as his fellow village men.

I vividly remember the 14th August, 1974. It was just before noon. We were sitting in the yard of the house of my mother-in-law, Sultan Kaşif. Her house was at a rather protected location. So, eleven men, many women and children, all relatives, gathered there. The men were digging a trench for the women and children to hide in, in case of a Greek assault on them. The women and children were eating grapes. Suddenly a gunshot was heard. We panicked. The men ordered the women and children to go into the trench they were in the process of digging. The Greek gunmen were already in the house.

They made their way into the yard by jumping over the wall, breaking through the windows and doors, and jumping into the yard. There were six Greek gunmen led by Andrikko, a Greek Cypriot from our village. They ordered everybody to come out: 'If the men do not come out we'll shoot the women and children.'

The Greek gunmen fired shots in the air in the Turkish quarter of the village. It was doomsday for our village. Women and children were crying, children were embracing their fathers and mothers. Some women fainted and fell on the ground. The gunmen declared that they would take away the men only. My mother-in-law, horrified, clung to her 13 year old son. 'Leave him' she pleaded with the gunmen. 'You silly dog of a Turk, are you still breast feeding him?' was the shuddering reply. They took away her husband and four sons.

My husband's aunt had a sole son. She begged Andrikko not to take him from her. Our sorrow and horror met with their sinister laughter.

Just before they took him away, my husband Mehmet took me in his arms and said, 'Zerin, if I don't come back bring up our children with feelings of vengeance.' Then he kissed his three sons, the eldest, Kâşif, 5 years old. Kâşif ran after his father shouting 'Don't go, daddy, don't go, they will kill you!.' Even now Kâşif wakes up with a nightmare, shouting 'Mummy, don't let him go! Daddy, don't go!'

The women and children who were left behind stayed and waited together in the hope that they might return. The Greek gunmen patrolled the streets day and night. They broke into some houses and stole valuables. They picked up an old man of 76, İzzet Gönelli by name, and took him away too. Nothing has been heard of him since. We spent many fearful days. It was not until the third day after the abductions that some members of the U.N. Peace Force arrived at the village. They set up check posts at the access points to the Turkish quarter of the village. Although armed Greeks were not supposed to enter our quarter some EOKA gunmen disguised as policemen managed to enter.

For two weeks we had received no news about our captive men. We were so worried and anxious that some women slipped away in search of their men. I was then eight and a half months pregnant with my daughter Ozlem. Dying to get some information about our men taken away I decided to make a point of my pregnancy to secure the assistance of the Red Cross in reaching Nicosia safely. At first objections were raised to my three children accompanying me, but upon my insistence they finally gave in and allowed my children to go with me. I reached Nicosia in the first week of September, and on the 15th of September I gave birth to my fourth child, a daughter. Poor thing, she was never to see her father."

#### THE FORCED PARTING OF A FATHER AND HIS CHILDREN

Mübeccel Raşit relates how she, her two brothers and two sisters were torn apart from their father:

"On the 22nd July, 1974, some armed men dressed in U.N. uniforms surrounded our village and collected the few guns that we had in the Turkish quarter. They were using U.N. cars, but one of them spoke perfect Greek. On the 6th August my father and some able-bodied Turkish Cypriot men were taken by the Greek gunmen to the police station of the nearest Greek village of Kalavassos, and subjected to torture by beating with hot iron bars. The Greek gunmen wanted to know if there were more guns in the village. In fact there were none left. After torturing my father they let him free. He was beaten so badly that he could not even lie down or drink the milk we offered him.

My father was a shepherd. The Greek gunmen kept pestering him. They mocked him saying 'You, there, look after your herd well; we'll need them all.

My father was 43 years old then. On the 14th August, 1974 heavily armed Greek Cypriots entered our village. They were firing their guns indiscriminately. We were frightened to death. My father, who suspected that they



had come for the men of the village, hid away. They forced him out of his hiding place saying that they would kill us, his five children, if he did not come out. For fear that they would carry out their threat he emerged from his hiding place. He handed his watch and the money that he had in his pocket to me. His five children were all there. He looked at us earnestly and with tears in his eyes asked our next door neighbour to take care of us as my mother was stranded in another village. He was rushed away at gun point. He kept turning his head back and looking at us until he was completely out of sight.

The following day he was taken away from the village together with 68 other men from Tokhni. We have not heard from him since."

EXTRACTS FROM THE DIARY OF MERYEM MEHMET, A GIRL FROM TOKHNI

21st July, 1974

..... Ill fate was menacing our village. The Greek gunmen demanded our surrender through the UN Peace Keeping Force. No one wanted to give in. It was getting dark. With the sunset our dark moments were to set in. That night all the women of the village gathered together at the centre of the village. We did not know what was going on. The men told us to be calm. Women and children we all spent a nightmarish night in the yard.

22nd July, 1974.

..... Some soldiers of U.N. Peace Keeping Force came back to ask us to surrender as we could not resist with the few guns that we had. So we surrendered our guns to the Greeks, who then left our village and went to the nearby village Mari.

Later fighting broke out at the village of Mari. The ground was shaking with heavy gunfire. The villagers of Mari would not surrender although they were outmanned and outgunned by the Greeks. The fighting was still going on. Smoke over Mari could be seen at Tokhni. Suddenly we could hear no more gunshots. The village had surrendered before the cease fire arranged for 4 p.m.

./...

Some soldiers of the U.N. Peace Keeping Force were on duty in the village. News reached us that by 4 p.m. all the Turkish men were required to be present at the village church in order to discuss certain matters. At 3.15 p.m. a gun shot was heard. It was intended to scare the Turkish villagers and was followed with more shots. In horror we waited for the end to come, for we had no weapons to defend ourselves with. Our only hope was the Turkish Peace Force.....

It was a horrifying night. We were left defenceless at the mercy of the merciless Greeks.

23rd July, 1974.

..... The village was thrown into an instant confusion. News went round that the Greek gunmen would search our houses for weapons. Anxiety and fear gripped everybody. They eventually did search some Turkish homes but they could not find any weapons.

24th July - 12 August, 1974.

Everyday we were left face to face with new troubling incidents..... Many Turkish men of the village were taken away and beaten up with hot iron bars. One of the tortured men related: "The Greek gunmen arrested us and took us to Kalavassos. There they beat us mercilessly. Later they made us dig some graves and in them buried us up to our necks. 'Tell us, do you have any more weapons?' they demanded. 'No' I answered. A shot was fired and whizzed over my head. 'Tell me if you have any, otherwise I will shoot you like a dog.' I heard a distant shot of fire. 'You see, we've just shot your friend. It is your turn next,' he said. 'I have no weapons' I replied. They dug me out of the grave. Exhausted I was dragged indoors. I had no hope for my friend. I thought he was really shot. They ruthlessly beat us up all one by one with hot iron bars until we were stiff with exhaustion."

./...

14th August, 1974.

.....We were praying hopefully. At 10 a.m. we were glued to the radio, listening to the news. On raising our heads we found ourselves face to face with the Greek dogs of war. "Any men in there?" One of them demanded in Greek. "Don't worry, we'll take the men to the school building for questioning." I understood him all right, but I said in Turkish, "We don't know Greek, What's that you said?" He repeated his question. He took away all our men there. They even took away my elderly father. ....They were going round the houses. They broke down doors and wardrobes. They even smashed plates and stole money. Many of the men including Mustafa, Yüksel and Ahmet hid themselves but Andrikko, a local Greek gunman, was barking out: "Either all the men come out or I will kill anyone I find."

We were brought up to believe that prisoners came to no harm in the hands of their captors. All the ones they took they shut in the school which was surrounded by the Greek gunmen. Worried about the fate of our men we were in continuous tears. At nightfall we sent them food, cigarettes and blankets. We trusted them to God. We were praying God that He might at least take pity on the children.

15th August, 1974.

In the morning we sent some more food to the captives. Later we noticed a landrover full of men in black uniforms come to the village. We thought they were mainland Greeks. We were scared stiff and shut ourselves in our homes. We saw two buses come and take our men away. We were not sure where they were being taken. Some said they would be taken to Kalavassos and some to Limassol.

We gathered at Hürmüse's house and prayed for our captive men and for those who evaded capture and fled.

16th August, 1974.

.....We were left all alone in the village. Later some members of the U.N. Peace Keeping Force moved in and set up camp. Now we felt somewhat secure.

./...

A BLOODY DAY IN PAPHOS - the 14th August, 1974.

Emboldened by the fact that the Turkish inhabitants of Paphos were unarmed, about 200 Greek gunmen attacked the Turkish quarter of the town on the 14th August, 1974, Walking or running in the streets the Greek gunmen fired indiscriminately at the windows and doors of the Turkish houses. The Turkish quarter of the town was thrown into instant chaos. Seven Turkish Cypriots including a three year old girl were mowed down. Detailed accounts of what happened on that day are presented from the mouths of the relatives of the victims.

Salih H. Kiral gives an account of the day when his daughter Rahme was murdered by the Greeks:

"The Greeks entered the Turkish quarter of Paphos on the 14th August, 1974. They gunned down the Turkish men that they lay their eyes on, and beat up the women and the old with the butt-ends of rifles. A few minutes later a Greek gunman called us to come out. We opened the door to come out. He moved us down instantly with an automatic weapon. We were bathed in blood. We were wounded, I on the head and the leg, my brother on the leg, my nephew on the belly and my daughter on the arm. The body of my other daughter Rahme who was 3 years old, was riddled with 40 bullets. A Greek who came in through the backdoor forced me and my daughter in my arms out although we were both wounded. A landrover belonging to UN Peace Keeping Force that was passing by halted on seeing us. Those in the landrover took us immediately to the Greek Hospital. After a few hours my daughter Rahme passed away. After bandaging my wound they took me to the prisoner's camp. Having spent five days there I was taken back to the Greek Hospital. My wounds were bleeding. As there was no vacant bed there I was sent to the Turkish hospital.

Five months later I was taken by the Red Cross to the Liberated Turkish Zone."

Zehra H. Kiral, recalls the day when her son Hasan and her grand-daughter Rahme were murdered by the Greeks:

"The barbaric Greeks encircling the Turkish quarter of Paphos entered it on the 14th August, 1974. They plunged into the streets of the Turkish quarter, gunned down the men, beat up the women and the old with the butt-ends of rifles. Faced with this situation we shut ourselves in our homes. Five or six minutes later a Greek named Ghatti having smashed the pane of the front door ordered us out. My son Hasan Kiral and myself came out into the yard to open the door. The Greek shouted out to my son, 'Come out, you dog.' 'Let me call the others inside' replied my son. But he forced my son out at gun point saying, 'Let the others come out later.' As my son stepped out he was seriously shot by the two bullets from the rifle of the barbaric Greek. Amidst the shots fired by the Greek I went to the open space, where the Turks were gradually gathering. The Greeks kept all the men there and ordered women and children to go back home. When I got back home my son was lying on the ground in a pool of blood. I then learned that my other two sons Ismail and Salih and my grand children Ilhan and Zehra were wounded and that my grand-daughter Rahme was murdered. Thereupon I lost consciousness."

Akile Çakır's daughter, Melek İbrahim, an eyewitness, recalls the day her two brothers were brutally murdered by the Greeks:

"It was the 14th August, 1974, All the family including brothers and sisters gathered together at my brother's, Erdoğan Çakır's home. My brothers were marked men by the Greeks. My brothers knew that they could be murdered at any time so much so that an hour before he was shot Mustafa made his last

wish saying 'I know very well that Greeks will murder us. When I die let the inscription, Long Live the Motherland, God Protect the Turks, be written on my tombstone.'

Soon the Greeks attacked the Turkish quarter. They walked directly to Erdoğan Çakır's home and knocked hard at the door. The Eoka men told my brother to open the door otherwise they would use force. My younger brother Mustafa opened the door. The Eoka man at the door unloaded his gun into him. Mustafa fell down in a heap at the doorway. Erdoğan who was standing behind was fired on. He did not die instantly. Other members of the family started coming out. The women hid my remaining brother, Mehmet, among themselves in order to save him. When all the Turks in Paphos were herded to the playing field Mehmet was taken prisoner.

U.N. Peace Keeping Force took my two brothers, Erdoğan and Mustafa, to the Greek hospital. Erdoğan was still alive. The following day when the bodies were handed in Erdoğan was in an unrecognizable condition. They had tortured him to death."

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APPENDIX 4

9 February, 1978

Your Excellency,

When we last parted from your luncheon meeting in Nicosia, Mr. Kyprianou had said that he would study the question of setting up the joint investigatory body to resolve the problem of missing persons in Cyprus, as envisaged by the resolution of the United Nations Third Committee adopted on 12th December, 1977.

Unfortunately since then, the Greek Cypriot side has continued to exploit the question of missing persons with ulterior political motives, and a great deal of propaganda has been made on this matter thus causing an unnecessary delay in the setting up of the joint investigatory body.

In view of the delay caused by the Greek Cypriot leadership on procedural matters, this is to inform, Your Excellency, that the Turkish Cypriot side is ready and willing, as always, to set up the investigatory body with the participation of the ICRC, as envisaged by the Resolution of the Third Committee, immediately.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Rauf R. DENKTAŞ)  
President of the  
Turkish Federated State of Cyprus

His Excellency, Dr. Kurt Waldheim,  
Secretary General,  
United Nations Organization,  
New York,  
U.S.A.

APPENDIX 4

19 October 1978

Your Excellency,

You will no doubt recall that operative paragraph 2 of the General Assembly Resolution (32/128), concerning missing persons in Cyprus, envisages the cooperation of the two communities to work out the modalities relating to the functioning of the investigatory body.

As we have stated repeatedly, and as I personally reiterated once again to Your Excellency on 7 October, 1978, the Turkish Cypriot side is, and has always been, ready and willing to have a meeting with the Greek Cypriot side, under Your Excellency's auspices in accordance with operative paragraph 2 of the above mentioned General Assembly resolution.

I would, therefore, be most grateful, Your Excellency if you could use your good offices to arrange a meeting of the representatives of the two communities, as envisaged by the said General Assembly resolution, in order to finalize the work on the modalities concerning the functioning of the investigatory body and with a view to activating it expeditiously.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Rauf R. Denktas  
President  
Turkish Federated State of Cyprus

H.E. Dr. Kurt Waldheim  
Secretary-General of  
the United Nations  
NEW YORK.



TALKING PAPER ON  
COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS

1. A Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus will be formed immediately consisting of three members; the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities will each appoint one humanitarian person to the Committee. The third member will be an official of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). His selection will be agreed to by the two other members of the Committee.
2. The decisions of the Committee will be taken by consensus.
3. Each of the Committee members can be assisted by up to two staff assistants as necessary. No other persons will participate in the deliberations or investigative work of the Committee. No person directly involved with the issue of missing persons may be appointed as staff assistant. The Committee will not request outside expert assistance.
4. The Committee will not have a chairman, but the meetings will be directed by the members on a rotation basis for a period of one month's duration; the first director will be the representative of the ICRC, to be followed by the Turkish Cypriot member or the Greek Cypriot member, to be determined at the first meeting by lot.
5. The three members of the Committee will meet immediately and will continue in regularly-scheduled sessions for as long as required.
6. All parties concerned shall cooperate with the Committee to ensure access throughout the island for the investigative work of the Committee.
7. The Committee shall look only into the cases of persons reported missing in the intercommunal fighting and in the events after July 15, 1974.

./...

8. The order of investigation of cases will be decided by the Committee, but it is agreed that the first investigative case will be put forward by the Turkish Cypriot member of the Committee. This will be followed by a case put forward by the Greek Cypriot member. The investigations will rotate to the extent possible until all cases have been examined.

9. The Committee's entire proceedings and findings will be strictly confidential. Any violation of this rule would place the work of the Committee in jeopardy.

10. The Committee will determine whether to issue public statements or reports without prejudice to Paragraph 9.

11. The Committee will not attempt to attribute responsibility for the deaths of any missing persons or make findings as to the cause of such deaths.

12. No disinterment will take place under the aegis of this Committee. The Committee may refer requests for disinterment to the ICRC for processing under its customary procedures.

13. The Committee will use its best efforts to draw up comprehensive lists of missing persons of both communities, specifying as appropriate whether they are alive or dead, and in the latter case approximate time of the deaths.

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Text of the statement made by Dr. Hugo Gobbi, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General at Ledra Palace and simultaneously released in New York and Geneva

On behalf of the Secretary-General, I am very pleased to announce that agreement has been reached by the two sides on the terms of reference for the establishment of a Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus.

The Secretary-General has asked me to thank both sides for their important co-operation which has made this agreement possible. In particular, I wish to thank the representatives of the two sides who, over the past few months, were engaged in intensive efforts to bring about the setting up of this Committee. The Secretary-General also wishes to thank the International Committee of the Red Cross for its co-operation in facilitating this significant achievement.

On the basis of this agreement it is possible now to proceed to the establishment of the Committee.

This development represents a very important step forward in the solution of a long-standing issue of great concern to the two sides.

Furthermore, we hope the efforts of the Committee on Missing Persons will strengthen the spirit of co-operation and the joint endeavour undertaken in the framework of the inter-communal talks.

APPENDIX 7

UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN CYPRUS

Office of the Spokesman

Nicosia, 29 September 1981

The following press statement is issued on behalf of Mr. Pilloud:

"Kypros" stated on 28 September 1981 that Mr. Claude Pilloud of the Committee on Missing Persons unexpectedly convened a meeting of that body under "strange conditions" on 25 September while, it said, the Secretary-General was continuing his consultations with the parties and after the Greek Cypriots had made it clear that they would not attend meetings until the problems of substance were solved.

The fact is that the 25 September meeting was scheduled at the tenth meeting of the Committee on Missing Persons, which was held on 1 September. Mr. Pilloud arrived in Cyprus for this prescheduled meeting of the Committee on 24 September. The prescheduled meeting was cancelled on 25 September because the Greek Cypriot representative said that he could not participate while consultations were going on in New York.

"Kypros" announced also in the middle of September that Mr. Pilloud was in New York for consultations with the Secretary-General. This is incorrect as Mr. Pilloud was in Europe from 2-24 September 1981 and never went to New York.

Extract from 'Cyprus Press Digest' of 30 October 1981, Page 5

MISSING PERSONS

ELEFTHEROTYPIA says while the Pancyprian Committee of Missing Persons is determined to give today the announced press conference at which it will reveal a number of confidential documents concerning the consultations for the functioning of the investigatory committee for missing persons, an authoritative source disclosed yesterday that the Greek Cypriot side has in its possession evidence that missing Greek Cypriots were alive at least a few months ago. The said source did not reveal this evidence nor did it comment on the report in an evening paper yesterday that missing persons have been seen in the occupied area. According to the evening paper MESSMVRINI, a Greek Cypriot accompanying a West European during a visit to the north said he had seen about 30 missing Greek Cypriots cleaning ditches by the side of the road under the supervision of Turkish troops. He recognised among them the relative of a friend of his. ELEFTHEROTYPIA says foreign diplomats are making efforts to prevent the holding of today's press conference of the Committee of Relatives of Missing Persons. It has been learned that the Committee will include in a special booklet all the documents it will disclose at the press conference within the framework of its decision to mount a campaign to enlighten world opinion,

APPENDIX 8

Attached is the first page of the 19 pages long memorandum, published by the so-called Pancyprian Committee of Undeclared Prisoners and Missing Persons, in which confidential documents and material related to the CMP, including its confidential Terms of Reference, were disclosed to the public at the Press Conference held on 30th October 1981 on the Greek Cypriot side.

MEMORANDUM

THE REAL FACTS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT  
OF THE INVESTIGATIONS COMMITTEE FOR MISSING  
PERSONS IN CYPRUS

With this Memorandum the Pancyprian Committee of Relatives of Undeclared Prisoners and Missing Persons intends to place before you the actual facts regarding the Investigation Committee, on the basis of which, one can arrive at the right conclusions.

EFFORTS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE

From the beginning of 1976 the Greek-Cypriot side had made it clear that the question of the Missing Persons would be solved with the setting up of an Investigation Committee which would examine in depth the case of each of the Missing.

In this connection Rev. Father Christoforos and Mr. A. Fissentzides, representatives of our Committee, met with the United Nations Secretary-General Dr. Waldheim at Vienna in March, 1976. It was suggested to him that a three-member Investigation Committee, in which the two sides would be represented, should be set up within the framework and under the auspices of the United Nations Organization.

Dr. Waldheim found the suggestion realistic and practical and having elaborated upon by U.N. Secretariat it was officially proposed to the two sides. This U.N. proposal, which provided for the establishment of a three-member Committee consisting of a Greek-Cypriot representative, a Turkish-Cypriot representative and a representative of the International Red Cross, was accepted by the Government of Cyprus and Dr. Waldheim was accordingly informed by letter from the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. J. Christophides. But the Turkish side rejected the proposal. Despite all the efforts made by the United Nations the Turkish side did not consent.

In an effort to secure a U.N. Resolution for the establishment of the Investigation Committee, on the lines suggested to the two sides by Dr. Waldheim, the Cyprus Government decided in September, 1977 to place the question before the Third Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations. When this decision of the Cyprus Government became known mediation efforts began with a view to developing an acceptable scheme without recourse to the Third Committee. Consultations on such a scheme carried on till December, 1977 when it appeared that although the two sides agreed to most of the fourteen points of the revised scheme (copy attached as Appx. 1) yet there was disagreement on two very important points:-

Extract from 'Cyprus Mail' of 20 November 1981

Pilloud Ill

Foreign Minister Mr. Rolandis yesterday had a meeting with the U.N. Special Representative Mr. Gobbi at which the question of the Tripartite Investigatory Committee sessions was discussed.

The Committee was to have held a meeting today which had to be postponed because Mr. Claude Pilloud, the Swiss representative of the UN Secretary General, is ill and cannot return to the island in time. The meeting will now be next week.

The possibility of holding the meeting with a proxy for Mr. Pilloud was discussed.

Meanwhile preparations are in hand for an appeal to the Third Committee of the U.N.



APPENDIX 10

UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN CYPRUS

Office of the Spokesman

PRESS RELEASE: CYP/81/58

Nicosia, 21 November 1981

MISSING PERSONS COMMITTEE

The following was stated by the United Nations Spokesman in Nicosia:

Claude Pilloud, the third member of the Committee on Missing Persons, nominated by the International Committee of the Red Cross, is ill at home in Geneva, and undergoing medical attention and supervision.

Any suggestion made which is contrary to this actuality is devoid of truth.

Mr. Pilloud has suggested that, subject to his recovery in time, meetings resume on 26 November.

Extract from 'Cyprus Mail' of 22 November 1981

ROLANDIS TAKES PROBLEM OF MISSING PERSONS TO UN

Foreign Minister Mr. Nicos Rolandis has accused the Turkish side of systematic obstruction of progress in the Investigatory Committee for Missing Persons and announced that instructions have been given to Cyprus' permanent representative in New York to pursue the matter through the Third Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly.

26.2.1982

STATEMENT BY THE TFSK MINISTER OF THE  
INTERIOR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE,  
DR. KENAN ATAKOL

The Greek Cypriot administration has unfortunately once again chosen to mislead both its own people and world opinion on the missing persons issue. The Turkish Cypriot side has, in a spirit of goodwill, exerted a lot of effort to get the Committee, for months boycotted by the Greek Cypriots, to resume its work and solve procedural matters. To this end, the Turkish Cypriot side has submitted proposals for surmounting these obstacles without delay and get down to examining actual cases. It has accepted in their entirety those parts of the proposals submitted to the two sides by Mr. Pilloud, the third member (from the International Red Cross) in September, 1981, which concern investigations and reports.

Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriot side has declared that it is ready to submit to the Committee forthwith the first missing person case for examination.

Unfortunately, the Greek Cypriot side has only sought political advantage at the latest round of talks which started on February 10, 1982, as has been proved by its action in taking out of its humanitarian context a direct matter between the two communities; in divulging secret information and documents concerning the Committee's work, on October 30, 1981, thus gravely violating the principle of secrecy - a basic element of the Committee's terms of reference; and in submitting the missing persons issue to the UN Third Committee.

The solution of procedural matters before the Committee and consequent examination of individual cases have deliberately been hampered by the Greek Cypriot side.

./...

It was also admitted by the third member, Mr. Pilloud, at yesterday's meeting of the Committee, that thanks to the constructive and conciliatory attitude adopted by the Turkish Cypriot side, a significant point had been reached. This would have ensured the holding of investigations in an effective manner to satisfy humanitarian needs, but the Greek Cypriot side deliberately hampered both the completion of the minutes and the fixing of a date for another meeting, obstinately blocking the Committee's work.

The attitude followed by the Greek Cypriot side, in spite of the call which the UN Secretary-General conveyed to the parties yesterday, concerning the continuation of its work and the suggestion made by him in this direction, is regrettable.

The conclusion drawn from yesterday's and earlier meetings is that the Greek Cypriot side lacks the will to solve the missing persons issue by talks between the two communities, so that it can continue political exploitation. Consequently the Greek Cypriot side has, unfortunately, chosen to break off a branch of the dialogue between the two communities.

The Turkish Cypriot side will, however, maintain its constructive approach in this matter as is the case in all other matters.

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Extract from 'Cyprus Press Digest' of 4 October 1981

RELATIVES OF MISSING PERSONS IN NEW YORK

It was officially announced yesterday that a team of the Committee of Relatives of Missing Persons will visit New York to make efforts, in cooperation with the Foreign Minister, Mr. Rolandis, for the overcoming of the difficulties in the functioning of the Investigatory Committee for Missing Persons. TA NEA says it is expected that the UN Secretary-General will exert pressures on the delegation of relatives of missing persons to accept a compromise formula regarding the investigatory committee. In an effort to prevent a breakdown of the work of the committee Mr. Waldheim will submit to the two sides concrete proposals in the form of a formula which will refer to the manner of functioning of the committee. Circles close to the Committee of Relatives of Missing Persons stressed categorically that the Greek Cypriot side will not accept any compromise solution that would abolish the three points of the agreement already made which is being violated by the Turkish side with the tolerance of the United Nations. The same circles also said that if the present gulf in the missing persons issue is not bridged they will announce formally the collapse of the investigatory committee.

Extract from 'Cyprus Mail' of 9 December 1981

Relatives Committee in Athens

The members of the Committee of Relatives of Missing Persons gave a press conference in Athens yesterday about the work of the Tripartite Investigatory Committee and the reasons for the lack of progress so far.

The Chairman of the Cyprus Committee of Relatives, Father Christoforos, said that for the committee to lead to positive results, the Turkish side must be made to show genuine co-operation.

Father Christoforos had been in New York during the Third Political Committee's debate which ended in the passage of a resolution calling upon the "parties concerned" to facilitate, in a spirit of co-operation and goodwill, the Committee on Missing Persons in its attempt to carry out the investigative task.

The Third Political Committee resolution in its preamble reaffirms "the basic human need of families to be informed, without further delay about the fate of their missing relatives".

It also takes account of the agreement reached on 19 May 1979 during the high level meeting in Nicosia (Kyprianou-Denktash) under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary General, whom it requests to continue to provide his good offices "for the unhindered functioning" of the Committee.

The following are the highlights of Papatsestos's interview with the correspondent of 'Ta Nea', which was reproduced in all the local Greek newspapers on 28 February, 1976:

"PAPATSESTOS: Two days after the coup, on 17 July, I witnessed something which has perhaps never been witnessed by any mortal before: I saw a young Greek Cypriot buried alive! That was when two Junta officers came to my house and ordered me to accompany them to the cemetery. I thought they were going to kill me, but they said they only wanted me for burying some dead people.

In the cemetery there were two open graves and two bodies lying beside them. I went to see if I could recognize them. One was dead. But the other, a curly haired, fair complexioned 18-year-old youth was moving. Startled, I turned back and shouted: 'But Officer, this man is alive!'

'Shut up you dirty priest, or I will shut you up for good', the officer retorted. Then the youth was pushed into the open grave which was filled with earth. 'I swear to God that they buried this youth while he was still alive'.

Pointing at the cemetery, Papatsestos said: 'Here people were buried like dogs by the Junta. There were also bodies which had been dumped outside the cemetery. They were not identified, and not claimed. As a priest my conscience is troubled, but they were holding a pistol to my head at the time.

I remember the day they first came to me. They said: 'Father, we have some dead bodies which we want you to bury 'With pleasure', I replied and asked how many bodies they had. 77 they said. An hour later a lorry arrived and I heard someone order: 'Dump them outside'. They were the dead bodies; they were all put in one common grave, without waiting for identification by their relatives. The Junta men produced some small crosses, (seven only!) wrote some names on them and put them on the grave.

The Junta men scornfully called 'Muskos supporters' persons loyal to Makarios, and wanted to bury them 'like dogs', in a sheep-fold outside the cemetery. And that is what they did in the end. They dug two graves with excavators one inside and the other outside the cemetery. They buried their own dead (27) inside the cemetery and others (50) outside.

TA NEA: Father, about the young man buried alive, could he have been saved?

PAPATSESTOS: Of course he could have been saved. He had a wound in the right leg. I went to the hospital and asked a doctor there, if a dead man could move. The doctor laughed, I could not. But I was not the one who had buried him alive.

TA NEA: Could you recognize any of the Junta men?

PAPATSESTOS: They had all come from Greece for the coup. They were looting, and they even broke into my house. They entered houses on the pretext of searching for deserters but actually stole valuable articles from them.

TA NEA: Have you witnessed any other atrocities?

PAPATSESTOS: I listened to telephone conversations between Junta men. In one case they were talking about the people resisting at Kaimakli suburb, and saying: 'Shoot them all, have no mercy at all!' I also noticed that in the hospital they were giving polluted water to the sick.

TA NEA: Father, could you swear that you have not secretly buried dead Turks in the cemetery?

PAPATSESTOS: Only about 10. We did not know who they were and where they were found.

TA NEA: How many bodies did you bury during the coup?

PAPATSESTOS; 127. Fifty of them were collected from the streets and they were buried outside the cemetery; the other 77 were buried inside.

TA NEA: If the Turkish invasion had not taken place, would more Greek Cypriots have been killed in the coup?

PAPATSESTOS: Oh yes, many more. They wanted to kill me too. It is rather a hard thing to say, but it is true that the Turkish intervention saved us from a merciless internecine war. They had prepared a list of all Makarios supporters and they would have slaughtered them all.

TA NEA: Now, father tell me sincerely, were people brutally killed in those days?

PAPATSESTOS: Yes, my son. Massacres were committed outside Kykko Monastery and in Limassol. I heard with my own ears the order: 'All of them to the last man, must be killed tonight!'

Those who have witnessed these crimes are afraid to speak. As a matter of fact most of them are Grivas supporters and they will never speak."



APPENDIX 16

In August 1976, Mr. L. Loucaides, the Deputy Attorney General of the Greek Cypriot Administration, stated before the Greek Cypriot Assize Court in Nicosia, where the trial of Nicos Sampson was taking place, that "the military operation were extended on 15 July in the same well-organized manner, with the help of tanks and other heavy or light weapons, to the other towns except Paphos. Most of these armed attacks ended in blood baths due to the number of injured and killed among the 'lawful' security forces and civilians. Material damage was enormous."

APPENDIX 16

In August 1976, Mr. L. Loucaides, the Deputy Attorney General of the Greek Cypriot Administration, stated before the Greek Cypriot Assize Court in Nicosia, where the trial of Nicos Sampson was taking place, that "the military operation were extended on 15 July in the same well-organized manner, with the help of tanks and other heavy or light weapons, to the other towns except Paphos. Most of these armed attacks ended in blood baths due to the number of injured and killed among the 'lawful' security forces and civilians. Material damage was enormous."

APPENDIX 17

Additional evidence regarding the Greek Cypriots killed during the coup is contained in a letter, dated August 31, 1974, written by a Greek Professor to Prof. Alper Orhon, in which he describes the events at the time of the coup in the following terms:

"I was there (Cyprus) during the coup d'etat too! Ah! it was awful. They were fighting all day and all night. I was in Limassol then. At my sisters. Makarios' residence and the Archbishopric are burned to the ground. There were quite a few dead; close to 1,000. Imagine that they used to bury them in the fields, gardens etc. with the "buldozers"! well, one thing that the Turks can always count on is that the Pro-Makarios and the Pro-Grivas ranks will never cease fighting each other. I guarantee, that that is a safe assumption to go by.

Anyway. After the first round of the war I managed to get out of Cyprus. I came here exactly 2 weeks ago. Things down in Cyprus are very bad. A lot of dislocation, economic depression, uprooting from homes of both sides, and plenty of dead. I mean plenty of dead. Businesses as well as the economic life of Cyprus came to a standstill. The worse is to come with the winter settling in. A lot of people suffer and the worse is to come. And neither the Americans nor the Greeks nor the Turks are going to pay for it: Only the Cypriots. And alas to them. Sometimes when I think what happened to this sweet land I go crazy. It never had a moment of peace from way back. Yet, ironically enough, they learned nothing from their past. Nothing."

MFJ

6 April 1982

Cyprus

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mr. Kyprianou. I should be grateful if you could provide a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature in due course.

JC

F N Richards Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SUBJECT



PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T527/82

R6

Nicosia, 29th March, 1982.

cc Ops  
+ Mavis

Your Excellency,

I am addressing this message of appeal to you in connection with the tragic and purely humanitarian problem of missing persons in Cyprus.

More than seven years have elapsed since Turkey invaded militarily the Republic of Cyprus in July/August 1974. As you are aware, this flagrant violation of the sovereignty of Cyprus has created, inter alia, the grave problem of 1,619 persons reported missing, whose families have been living ever since in the agony of uncertainty as to the fate of their loved ones. There is concrete evidence that a number of missing persons were captured alive by the Turkish invading forces. Yet they were not released after the cessation of the fighting and no explanation whatsoever has been given as to their disappearance.

Despite repeated efforts by the United Nations Secretary-General and in complete disregard of several Special Resolutions adopted on this matter by the General Assembly of the United Nations and the United Nations Human Rights Commission, Turkey has unfortunately not responded to the humanitarian appeal for information as to the fate of missing persons.

The most recent striking example of Turkey's intransigent attitude in the matter is illustrated by the failure of the Committee on Missing Persons to function, despite a year of intensive efforts and the goodwill shown on our part. This Committee was established after long and arduous efforts culminating in the adoption of a number of United

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom  
and Northern Ireland,  
10 Downing Street,  
London.



- 2 -

Nations resolutions and included amongst its members the Representative of the Secretary-General. The obstructionist attitude of the Turkish Cypriot side has completely blocked the Committee's work and rendered its existence meaningless.

In view of the above-mentioned developments we earnestly request that you and your Government take an active interest in this humanitarian issue and lend your valuable assistance and support to our efforts which we intend to pursue before appropriate international bodies and forums, aiming at convincing Turkey to cooperate constructively in tracing the missing persons, so that the agony and suffering of their unfortunate families may be alleviated.

Please accept, your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Spyros Kyprianou)  
President of the Republic of Cyprus.

GRS 370

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 300104Z MAR 82

PS TO PM . NO.10 DOWNING STREET.

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 329 OF 29 MARCH.

INFO PRIORITY NICOSIA, ANKARA, ATHENS, WASHINGTON.

YOUR TEL NO 156 TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND 76 TO ATHENS: CYPRUS.

1. I CALLED ON PEREZ DE CUELLAR THIS MORNING (29 MARCH), GAVE HIM A COPY OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO PAPANDREOU AND SPOKE AT LENGTH ON THE LINES IN YOUR TEL NO 176. HE READ THE LETTER CAREFULLY AND SAID THAT IT EXPRESSED PRECISELY HIS VIEWS. HE WAS GREATLY ENCOURAGED BY OUR SUPPORT.

2. HE SAID THAT HE INTENDED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF HIS LONGSTANDING PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH KYPRIANOU TO SPEAK FRANKLY TO HIM IN ROME ABOUT THE SITUATION. AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE TURKS TO PROVIDE SOME QUOTE MEAT UNQUOTE FOR THE MEETINGS WITH KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH IN ORDER FOR HIM TO BE ABLE TO PUT A STRONG CASE TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS FOR CONTINUING TO WORK THROUGH THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. HE THOUGHT THAT IN ALL HONESTY THERE WAS SOME TRUTH IN THE GREEK CYPRIOTS' CHARGE THAT THE TURKS HAD BEEN DRAGGING THEIR FEET OVER THE YEARS. RATHER THAN GO THROUGH KIRCA, THE TURKISH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK WHO TENDED TO BE SOMEWHAT INFLEXIBLE, HE WAS THINKING OF CONTACTING THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER DIRECTLY TO REQUEST THE TURKS TO BE FLEXIBLE.

3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR CONCLUDED THAT HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO KEEP THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS GOING PAST THE POINT WHEN THE GREEKS COULD SEEK RECOURSE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS SUMMER.

4. GOBBI IS LIKELY TO BE IN NEW YORK AT LEAST UNTIL 1 APRIL. BARTHOLOMEW CAME HERE TO SEE HIM ON 25 MARCH. ACCORDING TO THE US MISSION GOBBI WAS SOMEWHAT GLOOMY ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE TALKS BUT HAD STRESSED THAT HIS ONE OBJECTIVE WAS TO KEEP THEM GOING. THE AMERICANS HAD DONE THEIR BEST TO STRENGTHEN HIM IN THIS. HE HAD UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO HAVE FURTHER QUOTE TRUMP CARDS UNQUOTE FOR HIS MEETINGS WITH KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH. HE THOUGHT THAT THESE WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM THE TURKS. THEY COULD BE EITHER AGREEMENT TO THE DROPPING OF RESERVATIONS ON THE POINTS OF COINCIDENCE, OR BETTER STILL SOMETHING SUBSTANTIVE ON TERRITORY. THE US MISSION ARE NOW DISCUSSING WITH WASHINGTON THE POSSIBILITY OF A US APPROACH TO THE TURKS ON THESE LINES.

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CYPRUS

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

25 March 1982

CYPRUS

Thank you for your letter of 23 March. The Prime Minister agrees to write to Mr. Papandreou in the terms you suggest and I enclose a letter which Mrs. Thatcher has signed.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SUBJECT



PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T52/82

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

25 March 1982

cc Kester  
CPS

Dear Mr. Papandreu,

Thank you for your letter of 4 March about Cyprus.

I entirely agree on the urgent need for a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem and share your concern about the risks inherent in the present situation. We have consistently tried to do what we can to help, both through our contribution to the United Nations peacekeeping force and through diplomatic efforts. We played our part in encouraging the resumption of intercommunal talks under United Nations auspices in Nicosia and have continued to give full support to the United Nations' efforts.

In my view the intercommunal talks have in recent months shown better prospects than before. I understand that a number of important areas remain for discussion within the terms of the evaluation made by the UN Secretary General. It seems to me that predictions of deadlock could in the end prove self-fulfilling. I believe that all concerned should do their utmost to help maintain momentum in the talks. I hope that you will feel able to use your influence to this end.

I have taken careful note of your offer to withdraw the Greek military contingent. So far as the question of foreign troops in the Republic is concerned, the British

/Government

sls



Government have always taken the view that a just settlement must be on the basis of the relevant United Nations Resolutions. But it is important to be realistic about what can be achieved in this respect in advance of more general progress towards an intercommunal settlement.

It seems to me imperative to avoid action which might cut across or undermine the intercommunal talks and the initiative which has been taken by the United Nations Secretary General. A settlement will only be achieved by agreement between Cypriots. In my view the countries of the Ten must concentrate on sustaining the intercommunal dialogue, which constitutes the only effective avenue towards a solution. I can assure you that the British Government will play their full part in this.

Yours sincerely  
Raymond Baxter

His Excellency Mr. Andreas Papandreou

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 March 1982

*Please type letter &  
return to me.*

*A.J.C. 24/3.*

*Dear John,*

Thank you for your letter of 12~~th~~ March, with which you enclosed one dated 4~~th~~ March to the Prime Minister from the Prime Minister of Greece. I enclose a draft reply for consideration by the Prime Minister.

Mr Papandreou has written in similar terms to other heads of government of the Ten. His letter appears to be part of a campaign to internationalise the Cyprus problem. His visit to the island last month had the effect of raising the political temperature and he has since canvassed a number of ideas designed essentially to push the West into twisting Turkish arms. These include endorsement of the idea of an international conference (mentioned in guarded terms in his letter - the proposal was originally made by the Russians, who are trying to get in on the act); and a proposal that Herr Willy Brandt should use his good offices. What precisely Mr Papandreou hopes to get from the Ten may become clearer at the European Council meeting on 29 - 30 March. It will doubtless include general endorsement of the Greek position and pressure on the Turks.

Mr Papandreou's activities have inevitably done much to undermine the intercommunal talks. These resumed in Nicosia towards the end of 1980 after a lapse of more than a year. Progress was initially slow, but in November last year the then UN Secretary General came forward with an "evaluation", describing points on which the two parties were close to agreement and proposing compromises in areas of disagreement. This is now under detailed discussion in the talks, and the parties seem close to agreement on a statement of basic principles on the constitutional item. The Secretary General's representative in Cyprus hopes to open discussion soon on the evaluation proposals about territory, the other main item on the agenda. But the Greek Cypriots, partly under the influence of Mr Papandreou, are showing increasing signs of impatience; President Kyprianou has threatened recourse to international fora within weeks if there is no major breakthrough in the talks.

/In our

CONFIDENTIAL



In our view, none of the ideas advanced by Mr Papandreou offers any realistic hope of helping towards a settlement. Any form of internationalisation would be anathema to the Turks (who, under the military government in Ankara, have shown signs of greater flexibility on Cyprus) and, if pressed, would precipitate the collapse of the intercommunal talks. Action by the Ten, in particular, would be bound to be seen by Turkish Cypriots and Turks as the Greek tail wagging the Community dog.

For the moment our priority must be to sustain the intercommunal talks. We have given some thought to alternative ways forward should they collapse, including Papandreou's idea of the use of good offices by someone like Herr Brandt (although this would risk usurping the UN Secretary General's role). But even in such circumstances, our main objective would be to work for the resumption of direct negotiations between the two communities. It is important at this stage to give Mr Papandreou no encouragement in his hopes of internationalisation.

We have been in touch about Mr Papandreou's approach with the French, Germans and Italians (with whom we co-operate closely on policy towards Cyprus). They are all recommending a similar line.

When the Prime Minister's reply is handed over we would like the Ambassador to reinforce our concern that the intercommunal talks should not be undermined. The attached draft telegram to Athens covers this point, and also the need to tell allies how we have responded.

When the Prime Minister has agreed the terms of her reply to Mr Papandreou we will telegraph the text to Athens. The original signed letter might then follow by bag.

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

*for*

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

DRAFT: minute/letter/teletype/letter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

HE MrAG Papandreou

Secret

Prime Minister of Greece

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your letter of 4 March about Cyprus.

I entirely agree on the urgent need for a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem and share your concern about the risks inherent in the present situation. We have consistently tried to do what we can to help, both through our contribution to the United Nations peacekeeping force and through diplomatic efforts.; We played our part in encouraging the resumption of intercommunal talks under United Nations auspices in Nicosia and have continued to give full support to the United Nations' efforts.

In my view the intercommunal talks have in recent months shown better prospects than before. I understand that a number of important areas remain for discussion within the terms of the evaluation made by the UN Secretary General. It seems to me that predictions of deadlock could in the end prove self-fulfilling. I believe that all concerned should do their utmost to help maintain momentum in the talks. I hope that you will feel able to use your influence to this end. // I have taken careful note of your offer to withdraw the Greek military contingent.. So far as the question of foreign troops in the Republic is concerned, the British Government have always taken the view that a just settle- ment must be on the basis of the relevant United Nations

/resolutions.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Resolutions. But it is important to be realistic about what can be achieved in this respect in advance of more general progress towards an intercommunal settlement.

It seems to me imperative to avoid action which might cut across or undermine the intercommunal talks and the initiative which has been taken by the United Nations Secretary General. A settlement will only be achieved by agreement between Cypriots. In my view the countries of the Ten must concentrate on sustaining the intercommunal dialogue, which constitutes the only effective avenue towards a solution. I can assure you that the British Government will play their full part in this.

File No. ....

OUTWARD

Security Classification

Department .....

Drafted by .....

(Block Capitals) .....

TELEGRAM

Precedence

Tel. Extn. ....

DESKBY .....Z

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched (Date) .....  
(Time) .....Z

POSTBY .....Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin).....Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.).....CONFIDENTIAL.....

(Caveat/  
Privacy marking).....

(Codeword).....

(Deskby).....Z

TO..... PRIORITY ATHENS ..... Tel. No. ....of.....  
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)..... PRIORITY NICOSIA, ANKARA, PARIS,  
ROME, BONN, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

AND TO SAVING.....

INFO.....

INFO SAVING..... COPENHAGEN, BRUSSELS, UKREP BRUSSELS, DUBLIN, THE HAGUE

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Cyprus Standard  
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Cyprus Additional

Copies to:-

No 10 Downing St

[TEXT]

MY TELNO 46: PAPANDEOU'S LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. The Prime Minister's reply to Papandreou's letter of 4 March is in MIFT. Please hand it over now at the level you think appropriate. Signed copy follows by bag.


2. When handing over the letter you should stress that we continue to see hope of progress in the intercommunal talks. Without prejudging any further ideas Papandreou may have, we believe that the / <sup>talks</sup> are the only realistic way forward. Pressing for internationalisation at this stage risks undermining the talks and deepening the differences between the two sides. Furthermore, we believe the Turks would be most unlikely to cooperate in any form of action outside the intercommunal talks framework.

3. Paris, Bonn, Rome. Please give host governments a copy of the Prime Minister's letter and say that we would be grateful to know how their Heads of Government are replying.

4. Nicosia; Ankara; You have discretion to draw on the reply to explain how we have responded to the Papandreou letter, but we do not wish to take the initiative in publicising the exchange or to hand over texts.

5. Washington, UK Mis New York. Please give a copy of the Prime Minister's letter in confidence to the State Department and UN Secretariat.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



24 MAR 1982

12 March, 1982

I write to thank you for your letter of 12 March enclosing a letter to the Prime Minister from the Prime Minister of Greece. I shall place Mr Papandreou's letter before the Prime Minister.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency Monsieur Eustace P. Lagacos



The Ambassador

at 7360/82  
Greek Embassy  
London


A.J. Coles Esq.,  
Private Secretary to the  
Prime Minister (Overseas  
Affairs),  
10 Downing Street,  
London SW 1.

12 March 1982.

Dear Sir,

I have been asked to forward to you the enclosed letter addressed to the Prime Minister by the Prime Minister of Greece. This arrived in the diplomatic bag sent from Athens yesterday.

Yours faithfully,



Eustace P. Lagacos

Enc.



LM

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. ....

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

12 March, 1982

Cyprus

I enclose a copy of a letter, dated 4 March but received here on 12 March, which the Prime Minister has received from the Prime Minister of Greece. Mr Papandreou urges a contribution by the member states of the European Community towards the settlement of the Cyprus problem and also states that Greece is prepared to consider favourably the convening of an international conference.

B/P  
I should be grateful for advice and a draft reply for signature by the Prime Minister.

F N Richards, Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREECE

36A/82  
PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. ....

Athens, March 4, 1982

cc OP's  
+  
Master

Her Excellency  
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP  
Prime Minister  
of the United Kingdom

Dear Prime Minister,

On several occasions in the last few months I had the opportunity to refer to the problem of Cyprus within the context of the more general problems facing us today. In this communication, I would like to be more specific on the role the countries of the European Community could assume towards the resolution of this problem. The need for a European Community contribution has become more imperative today since it is increasingly more evident that the intercommunal talks are headed towards a deadlock and there is an urgent need for new international initiatives.

Concerning the character of the problem of Cyprus, it seems to me necessary to point out from the beginning that it has an international and an internal, intercommunal dimension.

The international dimension, which constitutes the essence of the problem, consists of the continued Turkish military occupation of 36,4% of the territory of an independent state, member of the United Nations and an associate member of the EEC. The coup d'etat which was mounted against the Cypriot President, the late Archbishop Makarios, by the Greek military regime can by no means be an excuse for the policy of invasion and conquest carried out by Turkey in Cyprus, the first such violation of international norms of conduct in postwar Europe.

The presence of foreign occupation troops makes impossible any productive dialogue since the real interlocutor of the Cypriot government is not the Turkish Cypriot leadership but the government of Turkey. The intercommunal talks are looked upon by Turkey as a means for diverting international pressure and misrepresenting the issue as a dispute between the two communities. It is not surprising in this respect that, in spite of Greek Cypriot concessions and the continued United Nations efforts over the last five years, there has been no substantial progress in the intercommunal talks.

./..

The intercommunal dimension of the problem consists of establishing certain principles of coexistence between the two communities. There is no doubt that this question can be easily solved, provided that the Turkish troops are withdrawn from the island. Under the auspices of the United Nations, a constitutional charter can be agreed upon, which will safeguard the independence and the unity of the Republic while at the same time ensuring equal rights and obligations for the members of the two communities. In this respect, the constitutional arrangement must guarantee the freedom of movement and settlement of all the citizens of the Republic in any part of their own country.


Following the departure of the Turkish troops, an expanded United Nations Force could be assigned to Cyprus to guarantee the achievement of a final and just solution. Greece is ready to make a substantial financial contribution towards meeting the additional expenses such a force would require. My government is also ready to withdraw from Cyprus even its small military contingent which is stationed there by virtue of the Zurich and London Agreements of 1959-60.

The countries of the European Community could make a major contribution towards the settlement of the problem. They should let it be known that what Turkey is doing in Cyprus is incompatible with the conduct of an associate member of the EEC, that is, Turkey, and that they will not accept the Turkish fait accompli in Cyprus and the continued presence of Turkish occupation troops on the Republic of Cyprus.

On the other hand, Greece which is a guarantor power of the Republic of Cyprus, is prepared to consider favorably the convening of an international conference for the implementation of the UN Resolutions on Cyprus, if this could contribute towards the resolution of the problem.

It is our view that the Cyprus crisis, although seemingly latent, is particularly dangerous, while its resolution can lessen the tension and facilitate the solution of other problems in the area.

Yours faithfully,



Andreas G. Papandreou

GRS 1090  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM NICOSIA 020840Z FEB 82  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 52 OF 2 MARCH  
INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, ANAKRA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, ROUTINE  
PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO  
INFO SAVING CBFC (ACTIONED NICOSIA)

*Cyprus*  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

Prime Minister  
Papandreu's activities in  
Cyprus could be raised at  
Osaka time.

A.S.C. 3/3

PAPANDREOU'S VISIT

1. PREDICTABLY, DESPITE PREVIOUS GREEK CYPRIOT ASSERTIONS TO THE CONTRARY, SHOW AND RHETORIC PLAYED THE MAJOR PART IN THE VISIT OF THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER WHICH LASTED JUST OVER 48 HOURS. (SINCE IT RAN FROM NOON ON 27 FEBRUARY TO THE AFTERNOON OF 1 MARCH COMMENTATORS, AND PAPANDREOU HIMSELF, DESCRIBED IT AS A 3-DAY VISIT.) WHAT WE SAW HAD THE FLAVOUR OF A CONSUMMATE PERFORMANCE IN AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

2. THE TONE WAS SET WHEN ON HIS ARRIVAL PAPANDREOU PROMISED TO CYPRUS THE SUPPORT OF GREECE, QUOTE THE METROPOLIS OF HELLENISM UNQUOTE FOR THE STRUGGLE TO FINAL VICTORY. HE SAID THAT A WORLD-WIDE QUOTE CRUSADE UNQUOTE HAD BEGUN TO PUBLICISE THE QUOTE CRIME COMMITTED AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PEOPLE OF CYPRUS UNQUOTE AND THAT QUOTE INTERNATIONALISATION UNQUOTE OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM WOULD BRING A HARSH REALITY BEFORE THOSE WHO DID NOT WANT TO KNOW. AS HE PUT IT, WITH THIS NEW PHASE OF THE STRUGGLE QUOTE THE SUN HAS BEGUN TO RISE AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL UNQUOTE.

3. THOUSANDS OF GREEK CYPRIOTS TURNED OUT TO WELCOME THIS FIRST VISIT BY A GREEK PRIME MINISTER : AT THE AIRPORT; AT THE ENTRY TO NICOSIA WHERE HE RECEIVED A SYMBOLIC GOLDEN QUOTE HALF KEY UNQUOTE OF THE CITY; AT THE ARCHBISHOPRIC AND ON THE ROAD TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. NO DOUBT THE NUMBERS WERE SWELLED BY THE EARLY CLOSURE OF SCHOOLS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICES AND THE CANCELLATION OF SPORTING EVENTS. BUT IT WOULD BE WRONG TO UNDERESTIMATE EITHER THE GENUINE WARMTH OF THE WELCOME FROM ALL SECTIONS OF THE POPULATION, OR THEIR CAPACITY FOR WISFUL THINKING ABOUT PAPANDREOU'S ABILITY TO BRING CLOSER A SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. THIS HE FREQUENTLY EMPHASISED MUST INCLUDE THE REMOVAL OF TURKISH (AND ALL FOREIGN) FORCES FROM THE ISLAND AND THE RETURN OF ALL REFUGEES TO THEIR QUOTE ANCESTRAL HOMES UNQUOTE. THE THEATRICAL ATMOSPHERE WAS EMPHASISED BY THE ARCHBISHOP'S SPEECH WHEN HE PRESENTED PAPANDREOU WITH A GOLD MEDAL OF ST BARNABAS, THE HIGHEST CHURCH HONOUR OF CYPRUS. THE ARCHBISHOP DECRIED WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE IDEAS OF WALDHEIM AS WRONGLY SEEING THE PROBLEM AS SIMPLY INTERCOMMUNAL. HE THEN ATTACKED THOSE WHO DESCRIBED POLITICS AS THE QUOTE PURSUIT OF THE POSSIBLE UNQUOTE. WHEN ALL HAS BEEN LOST QUOTE THE IMPOSSIBLE BECOMES POSSIBLE IN THE SOUL AND THOUGHT OF HIM WHO STRUGGLES UNQUOTE.

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## CONFIDENTIAL

4. APART FROM GENERAL ATMOSPHERICS FOUR PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS OF PAPANDEOU ARE NOTABLE:

(A) INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS: ON ARRIVAL, AT HIS ADDRESS TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE PAPANDEOU EMPHASISED THAT HE AND KYPRIANOU AGREED THAT THE TALKS SHOULD CONTINUE BUT ADDED THAT THERE WAS NO OPTIMISM ABOUT THEIR LIKELY OUTCOME. HE SAID THAT BOTH HE AND THE PRESIDENT FELT THAT THEY HAD A DUTY NOT TO REJECT ANY MEANS WHICH COULD LEAD TO PROGRESS BUT WENT ON TO REFER TO THE LIKELY QUOTE DEGENERATION UNQUOTE OF THE TALKS AND SAID THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO WAIT FOR THEIR COLLAPSE BEFORE PROCEEDING ON THE PATH OF INTERNATIONALISATION. AT THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HE SAID THAT THE TALKS WERE IN ANY CASE NOT CONCERNED WITH THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE WHICH COULD BE SUMMED UP IN THE WORD QUOTE OCCUPATION UNQUOTE:

(B) INTERNATIONALISATION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM:

APART FROM THE QUOTE CRUSADE UNQUOTE (PARA 1 ABOVE) PAPANDEOU REFERRED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF RECOURSE TO THE UNGA AND OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO BE HELD UNDER UN AUSPICES. HE SAID THAT BOTH THE GREEK AND CYPRUS GOVERNMENTS AGREED ON THE DESIRABILITY OF SUCH A CONFERENCE AND APPEARED TO ENVISAGE IT AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR A GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION OR AS AN ADDITIONAL MOVE AFTER RECOURSE TO THE GA. HE SAID THAT THE METHOD AND TIMING OF ANY SUCH MOVES WERE A QUESTION OF TACTICS ON WHICH HE COULD NOT ELABORATE:

(C) HE DID NOT DIRECTLY ANSWER A QUESTION ABOUT THE RUMOURS OF QUOTE INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES UNQUOTE BUT SAID THAT HE WAS NOT THINKING OF FORMAL MEDIATION. IF HE WERE ASKED WHAT INTERNATIONAL FIGURE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO BE HELPFUL HE WOULD NAME WILLI BRANDT:

(D) ASKED ABOUT GREECE'S ROLE AS A GUARANTOR POWER PAPANDEOU SAID THAT THIS CREATED A FORMAL OBLIGATION WHICH HIS GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED. BUT THE REAL POINT WAS THAT A CRIME HAD BEEN COMMITTED AGAINST AN INDEPENDENT MEMBER OF THE UN. HE ADDED THAT WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT BRITAIN WAS ALSO A GUARANTOR POWER WHICH HAD NOT FULFILLED ITS DUTY.

### COMMENT

5. TO JUDGE FROM HIS PUBLIC PERFORMANCE PAPANDEOU'S AIM WAS TO EMPHASISE THAT HIS ADVENT TO POWER REPRESENTED A GENUINE BREAK WITH THE PAST AND A FRESH START FOR GREECE AND CYPRUS. HE REFERRED TO THE GREAT QUOTE BETRAYAL UNQUOTE REPRESENTED BY THE COUP FOR WHICH GREECE MUST ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY: BUT THE IMPLICATION WAS THAT HE AND HIS PARTY WERE NOT THE GUILTY ONES AND THAT THEY WOULD NOW WORK GENUINELY TO PUT THINGS RIGHT.

6. CYPRIOTS ARE ALL TOO READY TO BELIEVE THAT OTHERS CAN AND SHOULD SOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS. WITH HIS EMOTIONAL ASSURANCES OF SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT PAPANDEOU WILL HAVE ENCOURAGED THIS ILLUSION. WHATEVER IMMEDIATE POLITICAL BENEFIT PAPANDEOU MAY HAVE ACQUIRED

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## CONFIDENTIAL

IN CYPRUS OR IN GREECE, OR KYPRIANOU IN CYPRUS, THE END RESULT WHEN IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT HE CANNOT DELIVER WILL BE EVEN GREATER FRUSTRATION.

7. MUCH OF WHAT PAPANDEOU SAID PUBLICLY WILL BE BOUND TO BE SEEN BY THE TURKS AS PROVOCATIVE. HE REFERRED TO QUOTE TURKISH EXPANSIONISM UNQUOTE AS THE COMMON LINK BETWEEN THE AEGEAN AND CYPRUS PROBLEMS. ON HIS DEPARTURE HE SAID THAT GREECE SOUGHT PEACE IN THE AEGEAN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN BUT THERE WAS NO REASON WHY SHE SHOULD GIVE UP ANY TERRITORY OR AIR SPACE OR WHY SHE SHOULD CONTINUE TO ACCEPT THE OCCUPATION OF ANY PART OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS. ALL THIS WILL GIVE THE TURKS A PRETEXT, OR REASON, TO GO SLOW IN THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, IF THEY DO NOT REACT IN OTHER WAYS. WHATEVER PAPANDEOU MAY HAVE SAID IN GREECE ITSELF IT IS QUITE ANOTHER THING FOR HIM TO MAKE SUCH A DEMONSTRATION IN CYPRUS.

8. PAPANDEOU'S FAINT PRAISE FOR THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, SET AGAINST HIS OTHER PRONOUNCEMENTS, CAN ONLY FURTHER UNDERMINE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE TALKS.

RHODES

STANDARD  
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ECI  
CLAIMS D  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN  
CYPRUS

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

## CONFIDENTIAL

Cyprus

PS TO PM . NO.10 DOWNING STREET.

# CONFIDENTIAL

MA

GR 450

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FM NICOSIA 241055Z FEB 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 47 OF 24 FEBRUARY 1982

AND IMMEDIATE TO ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON, INFO PRIORITY UKMIS

NEW YORK, ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING MODUK (DS11) AND CBFC (ACTIONED BY NICOSIA)

## PAPANDREOU'S VISIT TO CYPRUS

1. THE CYPRUS FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED ME TO CALL ON 24 FEBRUARY. ROLANDIS SAID THAT THE CYPRIOT AND GREEK AUTHORITIES HAD INFORMATION, PARTLY FROM INTELLIGENCE SOURCES, THAT THE TURKS WERE PLANNING ACTION DESIGNED TO EMBARRASS THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER DURING HIS VISIT TO CYPRUS FROM 27 FEBRUARY TO 1 MARCH. ACCORDING TO ONE SOURCE THE TURKS MIGHT "CREATE INCIDENTS OF A MILITARY NATURE". ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WAS THAT THEY MIGHT FLY MILITARY AIRCRAFT AT LOW ALTITUDE OVER NICOSIA AND OTHER PARTS OF THE REPUBLIC AT IMPORTANT MOMENTS OF THE VISIT, FOR EXAMPLE WHEN PAPANDREOU WAS ADDRESSING THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OR LAYING A WREATH AT THE TOMB OF MAKARIOS.
2. ROLANDIS SAID THAT THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED THAT THE INFORMATION SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE NOTICE OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TOGETHER WITH AN EXPRESSION OF THEIR SERIOUS CONCERN AT THE EFFECT OF ANY SUCH TURKISH ACTION. IT WOULD OF COURSE NOT BE HELPFUL FOR THE INTERCOMMUNAL DIALOGUE. THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT HAD NOT DECIDED WHAT THEIR REACTION WOULD BE. ONE CONTINGENCY PLAN WAS TO CALL FOR AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
3. ROLANDIS SAID THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO CONVEY THIS INFORMATION TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED. HE WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY ASKING THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE ANY ACTION. IT MIGHT HOWEVER BE CONSIDERED IN LONDON THAT, IF THERE WAS SUBSTANCE IN THE REPORTS, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO SPEAK TO THE TURKISH AUTHORITIES IN ADVANCE OF PAPANDREOU'S VISIT WITH A VIEW TO DETERRING THEM FROM CREATING SUCH INCIDENTS.

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14.



# CONFIDENTIAL

4. I UNDERTOOK TO REPORT WHAT ROLANDIS HAD SAID. I ADDED THAT I HAD NO INFORMATION TO SUPPORT WHAT HE HAD SAID ABOUT POSSIBLE TURKISH INTENTIONS.

5. UNLESS THERE IS GOOD REASON TO SUSPECT THAT THE TURKS PLAN ACTION OF THE KIND SUGGESTED BY ROLANDIS, THERE IS OF COURSE THE RISK THAT ANY FORMAL APPROACH IN ANKARA WOULD SUGGEST THAT WE HAD SWALLOWED A GREEK LINE. YOU MAY WISH TO CONSULT THE AMERICANS. TO BE EFFECTIVE ANY ACTION WOULD NO DOUBT NEED TO BE TAKEN IN CONCERT WITH THEM.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING MODUK (DS11)

RHODES

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MR WOODISON

PS

MR GILLMORE

2

# CONFIDENTIAL

GR 1400

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*Prime Minister*  
*You should be aware of*  
*Papandreu's more active policy*  
*on the Cyprus question - and his*  
*desire to "internationalise"*  
*the issue, perhaps through the*  
*European Council.*

CONFIDENTIAL

FM ATHENS 240930Z FEB 1982

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 65 OF 24 FEB 1982  
RPTD PRIORITY INFO NICOSIA, ANKARA, WASHINGTON, BONN  
AND UKMIS NEW YORK

*A. J. C.*

SAVING INFO TO PARIS, ROME, UKDEL NATO, MADRID AND MOSCOW

ATHENS TELNO 63: CALL ON PAPANDREOU, 23 FEBRUARY, CYPRUS

*MS*

1. I CALLED ON PAPANDREOU ON 23 FEBRUARY. THE APPOINTMENT WHICH HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO GIVE TO ME BEFORE THE EC HEADS OF MISSION CONFERENCE CAME THROUGH ON THAT DAY, CONVENIENTLY BETWEEN HIS SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH KYPRIANOU IN ATHENS AND THE LIAISON VISIT I SHALL BE MAKING NEXT WEEK TO ANKARA. THE MAIN SUBJECT DISCUSSED WAS CYPRUS: I ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF SPAIN AND NATO, AND THE GREEK APPROACH TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, FOR WHICH SEE MY TWO FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS. THE MEETING WHICH TOOK PLACE AT PAPANDREOU'S PRIVATE HOUSE AT KASTRI LASTED OVER AN HOUR. HE WAS ALONE. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY LLEWELLYN SMITH.

2. PAPANDREOU GAVE A LENGTHY DISCUSSION ON THE CYPRUS ISSUE FOLLOWING KYPRIANOU'S VISIT, BUT DID NOT SAY HOW HE SAW HIS OWN VISIT TO CYPRUS, NOW CONFIRMED BY THE GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN FOR 27 FEBRUARY TO 1 MARCH. HIS EVALUATION, BASED ON WHAT KYPRIANOU AND ROLANDIS SAID, WAS THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WERE NOT GOOD. THEY WOULD CONTINUE—HE COULD NOT SAY HOW LONG—AND THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT INTERRUPT THEM. WHEN THEY CAME TO AN END THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO MAKE SOME MOVE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. RECOURSE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON ITS OWN WAS NOT PROMISING, SINCE ON PAST FORM, THIS COULD NOT LEAD TO A SETTLEMENT.

3. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND PAPANDREOU HAD BEEN CONSIDERING WAYS OF ESCAPING FROM THE DEADLOCK. ONE RECOURSE WHICH HE PERSONALLY FAVOURED WAS MEDIATION BY A PROMINENT OR PROMINENT FIGURES UNDER UN AUSPICES. SOME PEOPLE, INCLUDING BRANDT TO WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN IN BONN, WERE INTERESTED. MEDIATION WOULD INVOLVE GREECE, TURKEY AND CYPRUS AND THEREFORE COULD NOT TAKE PLACE WITHOUT TURKISH AGREEMENT. BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO CONTACT WITH THE TURKS YET.

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*14. AS WELL*

4. AS WELL AS DISCUSSING CYPRUS RECENTLY WITH SCHMIDT, FANFANI, BRANDT, MITTERAND AND OTHERS, HE HAD DECIDED TO TALK TO THE RUSSIANS: THIS WAS ONE OF THE MAIN REASONS WHY HE HAD CALLED IN THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR LAST WEEK. THE SOVIET POSITION HAD NOT BEEN SATISFACTORY TO GREECE. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION ABOUT RECENT COMMENDATORY REFERENCES IN THE LOCAL PRO-GOVERNMENT PRESS TO AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE UNDER UN AUSPICES, PAPANDEOU IMPLIED THAT THE IDEA WAS OF MORE INTEREST TO KYPRIANOU, FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL REASONS, THAN TO GREECE. HE DID NOT DIRECTLY LINK IT TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR'S CALL, BUT I ASSUME KABOSHKIN HAS BEEN PUSHING THE IDEA. STATEMENTS MADE BY FIORAKIS, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE KKE AND KYPRIANOU AFTER THEIR MEETING IN ATHENS ON 23 FEBRUARY REFER POSITIVELY TO THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, KYPRIANOU SAYING THAT HE HAD CONCLUDED WITH PAPANDEOU THAT IT SHOULD BE PROMOTED QUICKLY.

5. PAPANDEOU SAID THAT APART FROM MEDIATION, THERE COULD BE AN "INITIATIVE" TAKEN BY EUROPEAN POLITICAL PERSONALITIES. HE WOULD PROBABLY SUGGEST SOME SUCH INITIATIVE TO COLLEAGUES IN THE MARGINS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON 29-30 MARCH. REFERRING TO THE ZURICH AGREEMENT, PAPANDEOU WENT ON TO SAY THAT IF NO OTHER SOLUTION WORKED MAYBE THE ROLE OF GUARANTOR POWERS SHOULD BE REVIVED. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD CONSIDER THIS. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL THREE GUARANTOR POWERS.

6. HE SUMMED UP THESE VARIOUS SUGGESTIONS AS AN ATTEMPT BY GREECE TO OPEN UP NEW AVENUES TOWARDS A SOLUTION. THE CYPRUS PROBLEM WAS DANGEROUS BECAUSE IF TURKEY DECIDED TO TAKE A BIGGER SLICE OF CYPRUS THIS COULD LEAD TO DIRECT CONFLICT WITH GREECE. THE CARD OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NATO MILITARY STRUCTURE PLAYED BY KARAMANLIS IN 1974 COULD NOT BE PLAYED AGAIN.

7. IN RESPONSE I DISCOUNTED SUGGESTIONS OF A FURTHER TURKISH MILITARY MOVE IN CYPRUS, AND ARGUED THAT THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WERE THE RIGHT AND ONLY PROMISING AVENUE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. KYPRIANOU SHOULD BE GIVEN EVERY ENCOURAGEMENT TO PURSUE THEM. INTERNATIONALISATION WOULD NOT HELP AND THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IF REALISED COULD PREJUDICE THE CHANCES OF ANY PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. THE RUSSIANS WERE WONT TO PROMOTE IT WHENEVER THERE SEEMD TO BE MOVEMENT IN THE CYPRUS ISSUE SINCE THEIR INTEREST WAS, WITHOUT PROVOKING A CONFLIGATION, TO PREVENT A SETTLEMENT AND TO MAINTAIN TENSION BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY.

8. PAPANDEOU DID NOT DISPUTE MY ANALYSIS OF SOVIET MOTIVES BUT REPLIED THAT THE TWO ASPECTS OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM MUST BE KEPT DISTINCT. THE INTERCOMMUNAL ASPECT (CONSTITUTION, TERRITORY, FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT ETC) WAS AN INTERNAL PROBLEM TO BE DISCUSSED BY THE CYPRIOT PARTIES UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UN. BUT THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION WAS CREATED BY THE TURKISH MILITARY OCCUPATION. THE SOLUTION TO THIS—DEMILITARISATION— MUST BE SOUGHT INTERNATIONALLY. THE TURKS SAID THIS WOULD LEAVE THEIR MINORITY UNPROTECTED. BUT GREECE WAS PREPARED TO RECOMMEND AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF THE UN FORCE, AND TO PUT UP A LARGE PART OF THE COSTS REQUIRED TO POLICE CYPRUS FOR AS LONG AS IT SHOULD BE NECESSARY. GREECE WOULD ALSO WITHDRAW HER OWN TROOPS. OF COURSE THIS HAD TO BE NEGOTIATED WITH TURKEY WITH GUARANTEES TO MAKE IT STICK. PAPANDEOU ADDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THESE INTERNATIONAL ISSUES INFORMALLY IN BRUSSELS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON 29-30 MARCH.

9. I URGED THAT HE AND KYPRIANOU SHOULD GIVE EVERY SUPPORT TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, SINCE AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES WAS AN ESSENTIAL PRE-REQUISITE OF A SETTLEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS HE REFERRED TO. IT HAD BEEN ENVISAGED IN THE PAST, FOR EXAMPLE AT THE TIME OF THE US/CANADIAN/BRITISH INITIATIVE, THAT AN INTERCOMMUNAL SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE SEALED BY SOME FORM OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE, BUT IT WAS DANGEROUS TO INTRODUCE THIS ELEMENT IN ADVANCE OF AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES.

10. THE OFFICIAL BRIEFING OF THE GREEK VISS ON KYPRIANOU'S VISIT IS LARGELY CONSISTENT WITH WHAT PAPANDEOU TOLD ME. IT REFERS TO THE WILLINGNESS OF A DISTINGUISHED PERSONALITY TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE DISPUT AND TO THE NEED OF THE TWO SIDES TO REPLY TO SOUNDINGS ON THE ACCEPTABILITY OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. A JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED AFTER THE CYPRUS PRESIDENT'S LAST MEETING WITH PAPANDEOU NOTED "FAVOURABLE PROSPECTS" FOR THE CYPRUS PROBLEM OF CONCERTED EFFORTS CONTINUED. KYPRIANOU RETURNED TO NICOSIA ON 23 FEBRUARY.

#### COMMENT

11. INTENSIVE EFFORTS WILL BE REQUIRED TO KEEP KYPRIANOU WITH PAPANDEOU'S ENCOURAGEMENT FROM "INTERNATIONALISING" THE PROBLEM IN SOME FORM. PAPANDEOU APPEARS TO HAVE THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN MIND AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE HIS CONCERNS ABOUT CYPRUS, AND IT MAY BE NECESSARY BEFORE THEN AND AT THE COUNCIL FOR EUROPEAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT TO STEER HIM AWAY FROM THIS COURSE. TO THE EXTENT THAT MEDIATION BY AN INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY OR A GROUP OF EUROPEANS COULD BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONALISATION (E.G. RECOURSE TO THE GENERAL

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ASSEMBLY OR WORSE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE) PAPANDEOU'S IDEAS MAY LATER DESERVE CONSIDERATION. THE POINT AT WHICH MEDIATION MIGHT HELP WOULD BE AFTER KYPRIANOU HAD DECIDED TO ABANDON THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS BUT BEFORE HE HAS INTERNATIONALISED THE PROBLEM. BUT, AS I SEE IT, WHILE THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS REMAIN ACTIVE, ANY ENCOURAGEMENT TO PAPANDEOU THAT MEDIATION IS A SUBSTITUTE TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY WOULD RELIEVE HIM AND KYPRIANOU OF THE MOTIVE TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE INTERCOMMUNAL FRAMEWORK.

12. THE POINT THAT PAPANDEOU AND KYPRIANOU HAD DISCUSSED AN APPROACH TO BRITAIN TO REACTIVATE THE ROLE OF THE GUARANTOR POWERS WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY MODIANO IN THE TIMES OF 22 FEBRUARY. BUT PAPANDEOU DID NOT SEEM TO ATTACH HIGH PRIORITY TO IT WHEN HE TALKED TO ME, AND INDEED SAID THAT THERE WAS NO 'TIME SCHEDULE' TO HIS SUGGESTION.

FCO PSE PASS ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

SUTHERLAND

[REPEATED AS  
REQUESTED]

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1

3 December 1981

*h.g.*  
*Paul*

*Dear Hugh,*

I have seen a copy of the Prime Minister's letter to you of 1 December about the Greek Cypriot dinner which you are attending in London on 5 December.

The Government's policy on Cyprus is of course clearly stated in the Prime Minister's letter to you of 24 November. For what it is worth however you may like to be reminded of what I said in the House on 18 November, when the subject arose most recently. I enclose a copy of the relevant Hansard extract.

*Yours etc*

*Sheffield*

Hugh Rossi Esq MP  
House of Commons  
London SW1A 0AA

BC: Mike Paterson Esq,  
10 Downing Street.

4 DEC 1981

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JW

1 December 1981

I enclose a copy of an exchange of letters between the Prime Minister and Mr. Rossi, together with the earlier exchange to which these latter letters refer. (The original draft came to us from the Lord Privy Seal's Office.)

You will see that Mr. Rossi's constituency dinner takes place this weekend. If there is any further material on the question that usefully could be supplied to Mr. Rossi I should be grateful if you could ensure that this is done.

M. A. PATTISON

F.N. Richards, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

KL





UB  
c. FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

1 December 1981

*Dear Hugh,*

Thank you for your letter of 27 November, following our earlier exchange of letters about Cyprus.

I am of course entirely content that, at your dinner on 5 December, you should make the position clear on the basis of my letter of 24 November. I am also sending a copy of this letter to Peter Carrington, in case he can provide you with any more information which might help you for your dinner.

*Yours*

*Rogers*

Hugh Rossi, Esq., M.P.

*HR*

From : Hugh Rossi, MP.



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

27 November 1981

Dear Margaret,

I am most grateful to you for your personal letter of the 24 November concerning your discussions with the Commonwealth Heads of Government in Melbourne regarding Cyprus. It had not been my intention to trouble you personally with this.

I did not realise that there was no text of a speech available, not having seen the reports myself but only having received them third or fourth hand from constituents who had picked them up from reports circulating in Cyprus.

I shall be attending a Greek Cypriot dinner in London on the 5 December at which Glafos Clerides will be present from Cyprus and I shall seek to make the position clear to him on the basis of your letter; that is if you have no objection to my doing this. Although I shall be attending purely as constituency M.P. and do not intend to speak, inevitably I feel that I will be called upon "to say a few words", and this will give me an opportunity of putting the matter on record if you and Peter Carrington have no objection.

Yours ever,  
A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Hugh Rossi', with a long horizontal stroke underneath.

The Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
London, SW1.

CLK PP.  
R228/11

Man the report  
attached is 'SECRET'  
for CF to  
keep?  
Key  
25/11



cc 710  
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Cyprus

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

24 November 1981

Dear Hugh:

Thank you for your letter of 4 November about Cyprus. At the time of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Melbourne, it was reported in the Cypriot Press that I had referred to the Cyprus problem as a dispute over territory. It was doubtless these reports which caused concern to your Cypriot constituents.

The discussion at the Commonwealth Meeting of 'the World Political Scene' was one of the confidential exchanges between Heads of Government. No verbatim records are kept, so I am unable to send you a text.

I can however assure you that there has been no change in the Government's policy on Cyprus. We are giving the fullest support to efforts to help achieve a just and lasting settlement within a single, independent state. The guidelines agreed by President Makarios and Mr. Denktash in 1977 recognised that this would be on a federal basis. 'Territory', which is doubtless to include negotiation to demarcate the areas under the administration of each community within the federal structure, is one of the four agenda items under discussion in the inter-communal talks which are being held under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Other aspects, and

/ notably

55

notably constitutional arrangements, are at least as important; and it was certainly not my intention to suggest otherwise when advocating to Commonwealth leaders that all should offer support to the efforts of those involved in the intercommunal talks.

Y  
Lansdown

Rogers

---

Hugh Rossi, Esq., M.P.



10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

Hugh Rossi wrote to seek (for his Cypriot constituents) clarification of remarks attributed to you in Melbourne.

The draft below notes that there is no verbatim record. Beneath the draft, I have attached a copy of the Commonwealth Secretariat's Summary Record. If you wished, you could send this to Mr. Rossi, on a strictly personal basis, but I doubt whether it would be of much assistance. It is perhaps safer to leave it out.

J.D.  
H.F. MAP

23 November, 1981.

(has added)

it, it could be said that there had been a tendency to increasing disorder and that the prospects of the future were far from cheerful. The first step for the cure for disorder was to try to diagnose its causes. She would divide her diagnosis into two sections. She would try to look at the present conflicts and see how many of them had a deep-rooted, traditional, historic basis, what new factors had arisen, how those interacted with the historic basis, and to see where there was a good deal to be cheerful about and how it was possible to go forward.

SAD

She would quickly go through what she believed was one of the main historic causes of disorder in the world. Many of the present conflicts had one thing in common: they were about disputed territory. She would not go into the problem of Southern Africa because there would be separate debates upon it. Namibia, of course, was in part about disputed territory. It would be said that the whole of the South African problem was about who should govern the area, but she would not go into that at present except to point out that it had a "disputed territory" element to it, although there were other very considerable elements.

NEAD

One of the biggest disputes in the world, in what she called the wider Middle East definition, was the Arab-Israel conflict. Again, it was a conflict about disputed territory, a conflict deeply embedded in history. Of course, views on who had the right to the territory depended on the chosen starting point in history but at the moment the conflict was about disputed territory and whether Israel had a right to exist. It was generally agreed that it had the right to exist behind secure borders. Nevertheless, Israel did not seem to recognise the right of the Palestinians to exist equally with a national identity of their own behind secure borders. It was one of the most obvious conflicts of disputed territory which, in spite of United Nations resolutions, it had not been possible to resolve. It was constantly being said to both sides that they could not demand for themselves an independent security behind secure borders unless they equally recognized the right of someone else to live in that way. Essentially, it was a conflict about disputed territory.

SED

SAD

The present conflict in Cyprus was about disputed territory. She would leave that subject to the President to raise and discuss, but she hoped they could all agree to offer those involved in the inter-communal talks under the auspices of the United Nations support for their efforts. It was another deep, historic conflict about disputed territory. In the conflicts in Central and South America, border disputes proliferate. Other people would be familiar with those. Again, many of them had their origin deep in history. Some of the disputes could, perhaps, even go to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. Some might be decided by that Court



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 November 1981

Dear Mike,

*to Rodney Lyle*

Thank you for your letter of 6 November. I enclose a self-explanatory draft reply from the Prime Minister to Mr Rossi. In his letter Mr Rossi asks for a full text of the Prime Minister's speech. So far as we know, no such thing exists. I enclose a copy of the confidential summary record prepared by the Commonwealth Secretariat and circulated to member governments. It would clearly not be appropriate, or indeed helpful, to pass this to Mr Rossi. It is classified 'Secret' by the Commonwealth Secretariat.

*Yours ever*  
*S J Gomersall*

S J Gomersall  
PS/Lord Privy Seal

M A Pattison Esq  
No 10 Downing Street

**DRAFT:** minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

**TYPE:** Draft/Final 1+

**FROM:**

Prime Minister

Reference

**DEPARTMENT:**

**TEL. NO:**

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

**TO:**

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Hugh Rossi MP  
 House of Commons  
 LONDON SW 1

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**SUBJECT:**

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your letter of 4 November about Cyprus. At the time of the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Melbourne, it was reported in the Cypriot press that I had referred to the Cyprus problem as a dispute over territory. It was doubtless these reports which caused concern to your Cypriot constituents.

CAVEAT.....

The discussion at the Commonwealth Meeting of 'the World Political Scene' was one of the confidential exchanges between Heads of Government. No verbatim records are kept, <sup>so</sup> and I am unable to send you a text.

I can however assure you that there has been no change in the Government's policy on Cyprus. We are giving the fullest support to efforts to help achieve a just and lasting settlement within a single, independent state. The guidelines agreed by President Makarios and Mr Denktash in 1977 recognised that this would be on a federal basis. 'Territory', which is doubtless to include negotiation to demarcate the areas under the administration of each community within the federal structure, is one of the four agenda items under discussion in the inter-communal talks which are being held under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Other aspects, and notably constitutional arrangements, are at least as important; and it was certainly not my intention to suggest otherwise when advocating to Commonwealth leaders that all should offer support to the efforts of those involved in the intercommunal talks.

Enclosures—flag(s).....



20/11

Hugh Rossi MP

6 November, 1981

I enclose a copy of a letter the Prime Minister has received from Mr Hugh Rossi, MP, who expresses his Cypriot constituents concern about remarks made by the Prime Minister during CHGM.

Could you please let me have a suitable draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to Mr Rossi. It would be helpful to have something from you by Friday, 20 November.

M. A. PATTISON

Roderic Lyne, Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

JL

6 November, 1981

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to acknowledge your letter of 4 November. I will place your letter before the Prime Minister and you will be sent a reply as soon as possible.

M. A. PATTISON

Hugh Rossi, Esq, MP

From : Hugh Rossi, MP.

cc: 15/6/11



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA


4 November 1981

Dear Mr Patterson,

A number of my Cypriot constituents have expressed concern at some statement allegedly made by the prime Minister about Cyprus, apparently using the phrase "disputed territories".

The whole of the Cyprus question is an extremely sensitive one for me in my constituency and I have always taken the line that it was our policy to respect the Treaty of Guarantee and work for a united and independent and sovereign state under the terms of that Guarantee, which is in fact what I have always understood to be our position.

If there has been any change I would be grateful if you could advise me of this; and in particular send me a copy of the full text of the prime Minister's speech to which reference has been made.

Yours sincerely,  


Mr. Michael Patterson,  
Private Office of The Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
SW1.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 141619Z OCT 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1034 OF 14 OCTOBER.

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PRIORITY NICOSIA ATHENS ANKARA BONN  
PARIS AND ROME.

MY TEL NO 1033: CYPRUS.

1. URQUHART BRIEFED ME THIS MORNING (14 OCTOBER). GOBBI AND SHERRY WERE PRESENT.
2. URQUHART SAID THAT WALDHEIM'S SECOND MEETING WITH KYPRIANOU HAD BEEN VERY UNPLEASANT. KYPRIANOU AND ROLANDIS HAD SAID THAT THEY WERE QUOTE AMAZED UNQUOTE BY GOBBI'S IDEAS. THEY CLAIMED DISINGENUOUSLY THAT THEY HAD KNOWN NOTHING OF THEM UNTIL THE PREVIOUS DAY. GOBBI, THEY SAID, WAS GIVING EVERYTHING TO THE TURKS AND NOTHING TO THE GREEKS. SPECIFICALLY THEY REJECTED THE ROTATING PRESIDENCY AND THE PROPOSED VETO IN THE FEDERAL COUNCIL. THEY WERE ALSO VERY CRITICAL OF THE NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT FUND, WHICH THEY PRETENDED TO BE A NEW IDEA, ALTHOUGH IT HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE 1978 WESTERN PLAN. ON TERRITORY, THEY COMPLAINED LOUDLY ABOUT GOBBI'S INTENTION TO START FROM 30 PER CENT FOR THE TURKS: MAKARIOS HAD ONLY ALLOWED CLERIDES TO NEGOTIATE UP TO 25 PER CENT. URQUHART SAID THAT KYPRIANOU'S STATEMENT OF HIS POSITION HAD BEEN SO QUOTE PRECIPITATE AND DESTRUCTIVE UNQUOTE THAT WALDHEIM HAD HAD NO CHANCE TO DEPLOY THE TWO OPTIONS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF MY TEL NO 1028.
3. URQUHART SAID THAT KYPRIANOU HAD CLEARLY BEEN ENGAGED ON A WRECKING OPERATION. I ASKED WHY HE THOUGH KYPRIANOU SHOULD HAVE ACTED NOW RATHER THAN SEVERAL WEEKS AGO: HE HAD AFTER ALL TOLD THE US AND UK IN NICOSIA 3 WEEKS AGO OF HIS DISTASTE FOR GOBBI'S IDEAS (NICOSIA TEL NO 253). NO-ONE HAD A CLEAR ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION, THOUGH THERE WAS A GENERAL FEELING THAT KYPRIANOU HAD BEEN GAMBLING ON PAPANDEOU WINNING THE GREEK ELECTIONS.
4. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, URQUHART SAID THAT A PERIOD OF PRE-NEGOTIATION NOW SEEMED INESCAPABLE. GOBBI WOULD LEAVE FOR CYPRUS TONIGHT OR TOMORROW AND WOULD TRY TO SEE KYPRIANOU, ROLANDIS AND IOANNIDES TOGETHER TO SEE WHAT COULD BE SALVAGED. HE WOULD PROBABLY THEN GO TO ANKARA TO TRY TO KEEP THE TURKS IN THE GAME. ROLANDIS HAD TOLD GOBBI TODAY THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED IN GOING

/AHEAD

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AHEAD IF CERTAIN MODIFICATIONS COULD BE MADE TO GOBBI'S IDEAS, ESPECIALLY OVER THE ROTATING PRESIDENCY AND THE VETO IN FEDERAL COUNCIL. GOBBI THOUGHT THAT KYPRIANOU DID NOT INTEND TO CONSULT THE NATIONAL COUNCIL UNTIL AFTER A FURTHER ROUND WITH GOBBI. URQUHART WAS LESS SURE ON THIS POINT. INDEED THERE SEEMED TO BE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION BETWEEN URQUHART AND GOBBI ON KYPRIANOU'S INTENTIONS GENERALLY; URQUHART THOUGHT THAT HE WAS KEEN TO GET INTO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY QUICKLY, WHEREAS GOBBI THOUGHT THAT THIS REMAINED A LONGER TERM INTENTION.

5. MY OWN JUDGEMENT IS THAT KYPRIANOU PLAYED HIS HAND CLEVERLY WITH WALDHEIM BY SEIZING THE INITIATIVE AND GETTING HIS BLOW IN FIRST. HE MAY NOW BE TRYING TO PERSUADE THE UN TO MODIFY GOBBI'S IDEAS IN THE FAVOUR OF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS. IF HE SUCCEEDS, HE WOULD THEN ANNOUNCE THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO SETTLE ON THIS BASIS, KNOWING THAT IT WOULD BE REJECTED BY THE TURKS. HAVING THUS, AS HE WOULD HOPE, WRONG-FOOTED THE TURKS, HE WOULD GO INTO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

6. I ASKED URQUHART WHAT WE AND OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES COULD DO TO HELP. HE SAID THAT THE MAIN THING WAS TO TRY TO PREVENT THE TURKS REACTING TOO NEGATIVELY. HE WAS WORRIED THAT TURKMEN HAD GOT HIMSELF OUT ON A LIMB AND THAT HIS POSITION MIGHT INDEED BE IN DANGER. THE UN WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANYTHING WE COULD DO TO MODERATE THE TURKISH REACTION AND ASK THEM TO BE PATIENT WHILE THE UN TRY TO PERSUADE KYPRIANOU TO BE MORE REASONABLE. I UNDERTOOK TO PASS ON THIS REQUEST.

7. SECONDLY, URQUHART SAID THAT THE UN WOULD APPRECIATE ANYTHING WE COULD DO TO REINFORCE THEIR OWN EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS NOT TO GO PUBLIC ON THE SUBSTANCE BEFORE THEY HAD TALKED FURTHER WITH GOBBI. TO JUDGE FROM THE PRESS CONFERENCE KYPRIANOU GAVE IN NEW YORK THIS MORNING (SEE MIFT), THOSE EFFORTS HAVE ALREADY PARTIALLY FAILED. I SAID THAT I WOULD ENQUIRE WHETHER MINISTERS WOULD BE ABLE TO SPEAK TO KYPRIANOU AND ROLANDIS AS THEY PASS THROUGH LONDON TOMORROW. BUT I NOW UNDERSTAND (TELECON GOULDING/DAUNT) THAT THIS WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE.

8. SEE MIFT.

PARSONS

[CYPRUS]

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*Prime Minister*

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~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS NEWYORK 131304Z OCT 81  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1028 OF 13 OCTOBER  
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON ANKARA ATHENS NICOSIA BONN PARIS  
ROME

MY TELNO 1014: CYPRUS.

1. KYPRIANOU SAW WALDHEIM ALONE FOR AN HOUR ON 12 OCTOBER. DISCUSSION CONTINUED OVER LUNCH. THERE WILL BE A FURTHER MEETING THIS AFTERNOON (13 OCTOBER).
2. URQUHART TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT THE MEETING HAD NOT GONE WELL. THOUGH URQUHART HAD NOT YET HAD A FULL ACCOUNT FROM WALDHEIM, IT WAS CLEAR THAT KYPRIANOU HAD BEEN VERY OBSTINATE, AND THAT HE DID NOT WANT A GENUINE NEGOTIATION. KYPRIANOU HAD AS GOOD AS SAID OVER LUNCH THAT HE WANTED TO GO BACK TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HIS ENTOURAGE, INCLUDING ROLANDIS, HAD LOCKED MISERABLE BUT HAD SAID NOTHING.
3. KYPRIANOU HAD DEPLOYED ALL THE USUAL ARGUMENTS FOR DELAY AND HAD PRESSED THE CASE AGAINST A PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE TABLING OF THE UN EVALUATION. HE HAD STRONG RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE ROTATING PRESIDENCY, THE FEDERAL COUNCIL AND GOBBI'S CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS

SAID NOTHING.

3. KYPRIANOU HAD DEPLOYED ALL THE USUAL ARGUMENTS FOR DELAY AND HAD PRESSED THE CASE AGAINST A PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE TABLING OF THE UN EVALUATION. HE HAD STRONG RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE ROTATING PRESIDENCY, THE FEDERAL COUNCIL AND GOBBI'S CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS GENERALLY. HE HAD ALSO SHOWN AN INTENSE PREOCCUPATION WITH RECOVERING MORPHOU.

4. URQUHART SAID THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND SECRETARIAT OFFICIALS HAD IN TURN STRESSED THE ARGUMENTS FOR GOING AHEAD NOW: THIS WAS THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY SINCE THE 1974 COUP FOR GENUINE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE TURKISH MILITARY GOVERNMENT WAS BETTER PLACED TO SETTLE THAN ANY CONCEIVABLE SUCCESSOR. KYPRIANOU REMAINED UNMOVED.

5. URQUHART SAID THAT IF, AS HE EXPECTED, KYPRIANOU MAINTAINED HIS POSITION IN THE SECOND ROUND OF TALKS, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD HAVE TWO OPTIONS: TO LET KYPRIANOU SPIN THINGS OUT INDEFINITELY OR TO TAKE THE RISK OF SAYING THAT THERE HAD BEEN ENOUGH DELAYS AND THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO GO AHEAD ON 24 OR 26 OCTOBER WITH THE TABLING OF AN EVALUATION, WITHOUT ANY PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT. WHAT DID I THINK?

6. I SAID THAT OUR STRONG PREFERENCE WOULD BE FOR THE LATTER. PROVIDED KYPRIANOU DID NO MORE THAN DISAGREE WITH WALDHEIM, WE AND OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE TEN DAYS IN WHICH TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON KYPRIANOU. URQUHART SAID THAT HE AGREED. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT KYPRIANOU COULD POISON THE WELL IN ATHENS AND/OR CHALLENGE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE GOOD OFFICES FRONT THROUGH THE RUSSIANS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. ON THE OTHER HAND, RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING OR HOLDING UP EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE CLEARLY PINNED ON KYPRIANOU AND AT LEAST CLERIDES AND IOANNIDES WOULD BE UNHAPPY AT SUCH ACTION.

7. I AGREED THAT THERE WAS A GOOD CHANCE THAT KYPRIANOU'S BLUFF COULD BE CALLED. HE MUST KNOW THAT RECOURSE TO THE ASSEMBLY WOULD BE A LEAD BALLOON AND THAT, IF THE S-G'S EFFORTS COLLAPSED, IT WOULD BE CLEAR WHERE THE RESPONSIBILITY LAY. I ASKED URQUHART TO ASSURE WALDHEIM THAT, IF HE WENT AHEAD, HE WOULD HAVE OUR FULL SUPPORT. IT MIGHT ALSO BE POSSIBLE TO ORGANISE REPRESENTATIONS TO KYPRIANOU BY THE FRENCH, GERMANS AND ITALIANS.

8. URQUHART AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE USEFUL BUT WOULD LIKE TO KEEP THE AMERICANS OUT FOR THE MOMENT. THEY HAD DONE MORE THAN ENOUGH. ANY FURTHER PRESSURE BY HAIG WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

9. WHEN THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED I HAD NOT RECEIVED YOUR TELNO 599. ONE PROBLEM REGARDING OUR PARTNERS IS THAT THE FRENCH, GERMAN AND ITALIAN MISSIONS HAVE NOT BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE SECRETARIAT RECENTLY. THE SECRETARIAT DO NOT WANT TO APPEAR TO SUMMON THEM TO INVITE THEM TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS TO KYPRIANOU. IT WOULD LOOK

SUPPORT. IT MIGHT ALSO BE POSSIBLE TO ORGANISE REPRESENTATIONS TO KYPRIANOU BY THE FRENCH, GERMANS AND ITALIANS.

8 . URQUHART AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE USEFUL BUT WOULD LIKE TO KEEP THE AMERICANS OUT FOR THE MOMENT. THEY HAD DONE MORE THAN ENOUGH. ANY FURTHER PRESSURE BY HAIG WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

9. WHEN THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED I HAD NOT RECEIVED YOUR TELNO 599. ONE PROBLEM REGARDING OUR PARTNERS IS THAT THE FRENCH, GERMAN AND ITALIAN MISSIONS HAVE NOT BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE SECRETARIAT RECENTLY. THE SECRETARIAT DO NOT WANT TO APPEAR TO SUMMON THEM TO INVITE THEM TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS TO KYPRIANOU; IT WOULD LOOK BETTER IF THE MISSIONS CONCERNED ASKED FOR A BRIEFING ON KYPRIANOU'S TALKS WITH WALDHEIM. WE SHALL DO WHAT WE CAN TO STIMULATE SUCH ENQUIRIES. BUT DAUNT MAY ALSO WISH TO BE IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH HIS COUNTERPARTS IN CAPITALS.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 252044Z SEPT 81  
TO ROUTINE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 952 OF 25 SEPTEMBER  
INFO WASHINGTON ANKARA ATHENS NICOSIA MELBOURNE (FOR PS).  
INFO SAVING TO BONN PARIS AND ROME.

MY TEL NO 194: CYPRUS: INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS.

1. THE CYPRUS FOREIGN MINISTER HAD BREAKFAST WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL THIS MORNING (25 SEPTEMBER).
2. ACCORDING TO SHERRY, WHO WAS PRESENT, ROLANDIS AND WALDHEIM DISCUSSED AT LENGTH THE TIMING AND PRESENTATION OF NEW IDEAS. WALDHEIM URGED THAT KYPRIANOU SHOULD LEAVE MELBOURNE EARLY AND GET HERE IN TIME FOR MEETINGS WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON 2/3 OCTOBER. ROLANDIS MENTIONED 9 OCTOBER AS A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE.
3. SHERRY SAID THAT WALDHEIM HAD PRESSED ON ROLANDIS THE NEED FOR THE UN TO INTRODUCE NEW IDEAS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY ON 7 OCTOBER. THE SECRETARY GENERAL MADE CLEAR THAT HE SAW NO POINT IN WAITING AND THAT EXTERNAL FACTORS (IE THE GREEK ELECTIONS) WERE NOT RELEVANT. THE SECRETARIAT ALSO REITERATED TO ROLANDIS THAT IT WAS A QUESTION NOT OF PROPOSALS TO BE ACCEPTED OR REJECTED BUT OF AN EVALUATION OF THE PRESENT STAGE, INTENDED TO SERVE AS A VEHICLE FOR NEGOTIATIONS.
4. SHERRY COMMENTED THAT ROLANDIS HAD AS USUAL BEEN THOROUGHLY SENSIBLE. BUT HE HAD INSISTED THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR KYPRIANOU TO REFER BACK TO THE NATIONAL COUNCIL. ROLANDIS HAD ALSO ARGUED STRONGLY THAT IT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE IF GOBBI PUT FORWARD THE EVALUATION ON 14 OCTOBER. THIS WAS TOO CLOSE TO THE GREEK ELECTIONS AND PAPANDREOU WOULD BE BOUND TO REACT UNHELPFULLY. THE SECRETARIAT HAD MENTIONED THE IDEA THAT THERE MIGHT BE AN ANNOUNCEMENT IN THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS THAT THE EVALUATION WOULD BE PRESENTED AT A SPECIFIC LATER MEETING: ROLANDIS HAD GULPED AND TAKEN NOTE.
5. IN REPLY TO THE ARGUMENT THAT, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE PROPOSED TIMING OF THE INTRODUCTION OF UN IDEAS, IT WAS VITAL THAT THE SECRETARIAT SHOULD NOT BE SUCKED INTO A PRE-NEGOTIATION, SHERRY SAID THAT THIS POINT WAS FULLY TAKEN. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS WELL AWARE OF THE DANGERS AND WOULD RESIST THEM.
6. SHERRY SAID THAT HE WISHED IN TURN TO MAKE AN IMPORTANT POINT TO US. IT WOULD BE MOST UNFORTUNATE IF IT BECAME KNOWN THAT WESTERN GOVERNMENTS WERE PRESSING THE UN TO COME FORWARD WITH IDEAS. WE SHOULD THEREFORE ACT WITH GREAT DISCRETION. HE MADE CLEAR THAT IN THE SECRETARIAT VIEW THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN INDISCREET. SHERRY SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD ALREADY GOT WIND OF WESTERN REPRESENTATIONS. THEY WERE SPREADING WORD IN THE CORRIDORS HERE THAT THERE WAS A NATO PLOT TO IMPOSE A SOLUTION. ROLANDIS HAD SAID TODAY THAT AKEL WERE COOLING RAPIDLY.

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7. IT WAS NEWS TO SHERRY THAT THERE MIGHT BE A PROBLEM ABOUT HOLDING AN INTERCOMMUNAL MEETING ON 7 OCTOBER BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF ONAN (NICOSIA TEL NO 255). SHERRY SAID THAT THE SECRETAR- IAT WOULD ENQUIRE AND IF NECESSARY PRESS THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT WHEN TURKMEN SAW WALDHEIM ON 26 SEPTEMBER.

8. URQUHART CONFIRMED MOST OF THE ABOVE TO ME SUBSEQUENTLY. HE TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE THAT ROLANDIS PERSONALLY WOULD BE HAPPY FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO GO AHEAD AND FELT IT ESSENTIAL THAT KYPRIANOU SHOULD BE PERSUADED TO COME TO NEW YORK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. URQUHART WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE BULLDOZING METHODS OF THE AMERICANS WHICH WAS HAVING THE OPPOSITE OF THE DESIRED EFFECT ON THE GREEK CYPRIOTS. ROLANDIS HAD SAID THAT YOU HAD UNDERSTOOD THE CYPRIOT POINT OF VIEW ALTHOUGH YOU HAD NOT AGREED WITH IT; THE AMERICANS DID NOT SEEM TO UNDERSTAND ANYTHING. URQUHART IS PLAINLY HOPING THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO TALK KYPRIANOU INTO LEAVING MELBOURNE FOR NEW YORK LATE NEXT WEEK.

9. MEANWHILE, IN HIS SPEECH TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE AFTERNOON OF 24 SEPTEMBER, ROLANDIS QUOTED THE REFERENCE IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S ANNUAL REPORT TO CYPRUS. HE SAID THAT THE CYPRUS GOVERN- MENT WERE QUOTE CONSIDERING METICULOUSLY THE ABOVE POSSIBLE INITIAT- IVE. WE TRUST THAT ANY PROPOSED ACTION OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL WILL BE BASED ON HIS GOOD OFFICES' MANDATE AND MUST BE WITHIN THE FRAME- WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS RELEVANT TO THE QUESTION OF CYPRUS AND THE HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENTS ....UNQUOTE. EARLIER IN HIS STATEMENT ROLANDIS HAD DESCRIBED THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS AS QUOTE MINIMAL AND INADEQUATE UNQUOTE AND SAID THAT QUOTE THE FOREIGN OCCUPATION - AND NOT JUST QUOTE THE COUP AND SUBSEQUENT ENDS UNQUOTE - IS STILL THE CAUSE OF THE POLITICAL MALAISE WHICH PERMEATES THE COUNTRY UNQUOTE (IE AN IMPLICIT REBUKE TO WALDHEIM FOR THE WORDING OF HIS REPORT). ROLANDIS ALSO SAID THAT THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT WOULD INSIST ON A FULL-SCALE DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION OF CYPRUS AT THE G.A. QUOTE OR AT A RESUMED OR OTHER SESSION LATER ON, IF DEVELOPMENTS MILITATE FOR SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION, UNQUOTE.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO BONN PARIS AND ROME  
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]  
PARSONS

CYPRUS LIMITED

SED PS/LPS  
ECD PS/MR HURD  
UND PS/PUS  
PUSD  
INFORMATION D MR BULLARD  
NEWS D MR FERGUSSON  
CCD LORD N G LENNOX  
PS MR GOODISON

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 220425Z SEP 81

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 881 OF 22 SEPTEMBER 1981

INFO NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, ROME.

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH UN SECRETARY GENERAL 21 SEPTEMBER:  
CYPRUS.

1. REFERRING TO HIS RECENT DISCUSSION WITH THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER AND TO THE FORTHCOMING GREEK ELECTIONS, LORD CARRINGTON STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF EARLY ACTION BY THE UN. BOTH SIDES HAD TABLED INADEQUATE PROPOSALS. HE HOPED THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD DO SOMETHING TO PUSH THE MATTER FORWARD.
2. WALDHEIM SAID HE WAS STILL INCLINED TO BE CAUTIOUS. HE WAS WORRIED THAT REJECTION OF PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY THE UN BY ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER WOULD KILL OFF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEDIATION. LAST WEEK DENKTASH HAD URGED HIM NOT TO PUT FORWARD FORMAL PROPOSALS YET. KYPRIANOU HAD SUBSEQUENTLY TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT HE WOULD STOP IN NEW YORK ON 12 OCTOBER ON HIS WAY HOME FROM THE CHGM AND TO ASK THAT GOBBI'S PROPOSALS SHOULD NOT BE UNVEILED BEFORE THIS DISCUSSION. WALDHEIM AGREED THAT HE OUGHT TO DO SOMETHING. HE WOULD HAVE TO TRY TO FIND A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE TWO POSITIONS. BUT THE ESSENTIAL QUESTION WAS ONE OF TIMING. WAS IT BETTER TO GO AHEAD AND RISK A BLAST FROM ONE OR OTHER PARTY, OR TO WAIT FOR KYPRIANOU'S VISIT TO NEW YORK? ALTHOUGH HE WAS ALWAYS ACCUSED OF DRAGGING HIS FEET, WALDHEIM WAS READY TO ACT. HE ASKED FOR LORD CARRINGTON'S VIEW.
3. LORD CARRINGTON THOUGHT THAT KYPRIANOU WAS PLAYING FOR TIME AND DID NOT WANT A SETTLEMENT. THE SAME WAS PROBABLY TRUE OF DENKTASH, BUT TURKMEN COULD TWIST HIS ARM - AND HAD SHOWN BY HIS ATTITUDE IN LONDON THAT HE WAS FULLY PREPARED TO DO SO. LORD CARRINGTON WAS INCLINED TO FEEL THAT WALDHEIM SHOULD FORCE THE PACE. TIME WAS VERY SHORT BEFORE THE GREEK ELECTION. THERE WAS OF COURSE A RISK THAT HIS PROPOSALS WOULD BE REJECTED: BUT THIS RISK WOULD REMAIN EVEN IF THEY WERE DELAYED.
4. WALDHEIM ADMITTED THAT PROPOSALS FROM THE UN WOULD PUT KYPRIANOU ON THE SPOT. HE THOUGHT THE MANNER OF PRESENTATION WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT. THEY SHOULD NOT BE FORMAL PROPOSALS BUT SHOULD BE EMBODIED IN A WORKING PAPER FROM GOBBI. URQUHART SAID THAT GOBBI HAD ALREADY PREPARED A MEMORANDUM ON POINTS OF AGREEMENT AND POINTS OF EQUIDISTANCE. HE WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HIS PROPOSALS AT THE MEETING ON 7 OR 14 OCTOBER. THE LATTER DATE WOULD BE TOO CLOSE TO THE GREEK ELECTION.

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5. WALDHEIM SAID THAT HAIG HAD ALSO PRESSED FOR EARLY ACTION.  
HE SEEMED INCLINED TO ACCEPT THAT THIS WOULD BE DESIRABLE,  
AS ALSO DID URQUHART.

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FM FCO 261500Z AUGUST 81

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 462 OF 26 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, BONN

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, ANKARA, NICOSIA

YOUR TELNO 754: CYPRUS: INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

1. THIS IS REASONABLY ENCOURAGING, BUT WE SHARE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT TIMING: TO THINK IN TERMS OF MID-SEPTEMBER FOR UN ACTION MAY BE REALISTIC, BUT THE RISKS OF SLIPPAGE WILL BE STRONG. THE SECRETARIAT'S WISH TO AVOID A 'UN PROPOSALS' LABEL IS UNDERSTANDABLE, IF REGRETTABLE. BUT THE TERMINOLOGY MAY BE UNIMPORTANT: WHAT IS ESSENTIAL IS THAT THE UN'S IDEAS EMERGE IN A BALANCED AND COMPREHENSIVE FORM, WHICH THE WESTERN PARTNERS COULD SUPPORT AND THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BE CLEARLY SEEN TO BE 100 PERCENT BEHIND ANY INITIATIVE GOBBI TAKES: THE GREEK CYPRIOTS IN PARTICULAR WILL RUTHLESSLY EXPLOIT ANY SUGGESTION TO THE CONTRARY.
2. FOR WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN AND ROME: IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY ACTED ON MY TELNO 146, YOU SHOULD ADDITIONALLY DRAW ON THE ABOVE AND ON UKMIS TUR.

CARRINGTON

CYPRUS LIMITED

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PS/MR HURD  
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MR BULLARD  
MR FERGUSSON  
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FM NICOSIA 180915Z AUG 81

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 203 OF 18 AUGUST 1981

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, ATHENS, ANKARA, PARIS,

BONN, ROME,

INFO SAVING MODUK (DS11) AND CBFC (ACTIONED BY NICOSIA)

MY TELNO 201: CYPRUS: INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

1. WHEN I SAW THE FOREIGN MINISTER THIS MORNING HE EMPHASISED THE DISAPPOINTMENT FELT BY ALL MEMBERS AT THE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING ON 14 AUGUST OVER THE TURKISH PROPOSALS. ROLANDIS SAID THAT EVEN THE MOST MODERATE AND CONSTRUCTIVE MEMBERS, INCLUDING CLERIDES AND AKEL, HAD FELT THAT THE TURKS HAD NOT COME NEARLY FAR ENOUGH TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR PROGRESS. LYSSARIDES HAD BEEN IN FAVOUR OF REJECTING THE PROPOSALS AND BREAKING OFF THE DIALOGUE. THE DECISION FOR THE COUNCIL HAD BEEN CONFINED TO THE QUESTION WHETHER THE DIALOGUE SHOULD BE CONTINUED, DESPITE THE INADEQUACY OF THE TURKISH PROPOSALS. IN THE EVENT IT HAD BEEN DECIDED TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE.

2. REFERRING TO THE TERRITORIAL ASPECTS, ROLANDIS AGAIN SAID THAT THE MOST MINUTE CALCULATIONS CONDUCTED BY MRS SOULIOTIS AND THE LAND REGISTRATION BOARD SHOWED THAT THE TURKS WOULD RETAIN 33.5 PER CENT OF THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC. THE CYPRIOTS HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE, NOT LEAST ON THE BASIS OF THE IMPRESSIONS OF MITSOTAKIS AFTER HIS TALK WITH TURKMEN, THAT THE TURKISH OFFER WOULD BE MUCH BETTER THAN THIS. I SAID THAT I HAD HEARD A FIGURE NEARER 32 PER CENT FOR TERRITORY TO BE RETAINED BY THE TURKISH SIDE BUT IT SEEMED TO ME A NARROW APPROACH TO JUDGE THE TERRITORIAL PROPOSALS ONLY ON A BASIS OF PERCENTAGES. WERE NOT THE PROPOSALS THE BEST WHICH THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE HAD SO FAR RECEIVED? THERE HAD BEEN A MOUNTING DEMAND FOR TERRITORIAL PROPOSALS FROM THE TURKISH SIDE. THEY HAD COME, INCLUDING A MAP, AND THIS WAS SURELY A STEP FORWARD IN ITSELF. MOREOVER I GATHERED THAT THE VAROSHA ELEMENT WAS MORE FAVOURABLE TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS THAN ANYTHING SO FAR PROPOSED.

3. ROLANDIS ACCEPTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A MOVE. THE FACT THAT THERE WAS A DETAILED MAP WAS CERTAINLY A STEP FORWARD AS WAS THE PRESENTATION OF THE VAROSHA ELEMENT. BUT THESE WERE VERY SMALL STEPS.

4. I ASKED WHAT THEIR TACTIC WOULD NOW BE. I HAD NOTED THE PRESIDENT'S REFERENCES TO A "DEMAND FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE". WHAT DID THIS MEAN? DID THEY HAVE IN MIND SOMETHING LIKE A SPECIAL U.N. SESSION, AND IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES?

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*See especially the*  
*last paragraph.*

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5. ROLANDIS SAID THAT THE NEXT MEETING (ON 19 AUGUST) WOULD BE CONCERNED WITH PROCEDURE. THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE WOULD ANNOUNCE THEIR DECISION TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE BUT WOULD NOT GO FURTHER IN COMMENTING ON THE TURKISH PROPOSALS. AT THE FOLLOWING MEETING THEY WOULD PUT FORWARD A PAPER THE COMPOSITION OF WHICH HAD NOT YET BEEN DECIDED. IT WOULD CERTAINLY CONTAIN AN EXPLANATION OF THE REASONS WHY THE GREEK CYPRIOTS FOUND THE TURKISH PROPOSALS UNACCEPTABLE. BUT BEFORE SETTLING THE FORM OF THIS PAPER THE CYPRIOTS NEEDED TO CONSULT OTHERS, ESPECIALLY THE GREEKS. ROLANDIS SAID THAT DURING HIS VISIT TO ATHENS TODAY AND TOMORROW HE WOULD BE SEEING RALLIS, MITSOTAKIS AND ALL PARTY LEADERS INCLUDING PAPANDREOU. HE DID NOT WISH TO IMPLY THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD MAKE DECISIONS FOR THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT BUT THE GREEKS ALWAYS SUPPORTED CYPRUS AND THEIR VIEWS WOULD BE OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE IN REACHING A DECISION ON THE WAY FORWARD.

6. ROLANDIS SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN GENERAL AGREEMENT AT THE NATIONAL COUNCIL THAT THE OPPORTUNITY OF RECOURSE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD NOT BE LOST FOR A SECOND TIME. THE FORM THIS WOULD TAKE HAD NOT BEEN DECIDED. HE WOULD BE GOING TO NEW YORK FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION ON NAMIBIA STARTING ON 6 SEPTEMBER AND WOULD TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SOUND OUT THE NON-ALIGNED.

7. MAKING USE OF UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 734, I SAID THAT THE IDEA OF A SPECIAL SESSION ON CYPRUS SEEMED UNLIKELY TO PROSPER EVEN IF ONE THOUGHT IT A GOOD IDEA. RECOURSE TO THE UN WOULD SURELY BE BOUND TO UNDERMINE THE PROCESS OF THE TALKS WHICH PROVIDED THE BEST PROSPECT FOR PROGRESS. MOREOVER INTERNATIONALISATION MUST PLAY FURTHER INTO THE HANDS OF THE RUSSIANS AND THEIR FRIENDS. DID ROLANDIS THINK THAT HE WOULD HAVE MUCH SUPPORT IN NEW YORK FOR ANY SPECIAL MOVE OR INDEED FOR RECOURSE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WHEN THE TURKS HAD JUST MADE AN OFFER ON TERRITORY, HOWEVER INADEQUATE?

8. ROLANDIS SAID THAT THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT'S PLANS FOR RECOURSE MUST BE SEEN AS CONTINGENCY PLANS. THEY WERE FOR THE EVENT THAT THE TALKS FAILED (HE CONFIRMED THAT BY THIS HE MEANT WERE BROKEN OFF). IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD HAVE NO OTHER CHOICE. THEY MUST PREPARE THE GROUND AGAINST THE WORST OUTCOME.

9. ROLANDIS ADDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD MY POINTS ABOUT A SPECIAL SESSION. ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO AIM AT SUCH A SESSION AFTER THE FORTHCOMING GENERAL ASSEMBLY IF BY THEN IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE TALKS HAD FAILED. ANOTHER MIGHT BE TO DECLARE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY STILL IN SESSION FOR CYPRUS IN CASE THERE WERE

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A NEED FOR A SPECIAL MEETING ON CYPRUS. THIS PROCEDURE, OR SOMETHING LIKE IT, HAD BEEN FOLLOWED IN THE CASE OF THE MIDDLE EAST SOME YEARS AGO.

10. I CONCLUDED BY ASKING HIM WHETHER THE CYPRIOT PAPER TO BE PRESENTED AT THE MEETING FOLLOWING THAT ON 19 AUGUST WOULD INCLUDE COUNTER-PROPOSALS. ROLANDIS SAID HE COULD GIVE NO OFFICIAL REPLY SINCE NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN. HE DID NOT HOWEVER RULE OUT THIS POSSIBILITY, BUT THE TURKISH PROPOSALS DID NOT ENCOURAGE MORE THAN A MINIMAL MOVE BY THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE.

### COMMENT:

11. DESPITE WHAT HE SAID, I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT ROLANDIS EXPECTED THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD IN FACT MAKE COUNTER-PROPOSALS, THOUGH THESE WOULD BE VERY LIMITED. I AM STRENGTHENED IN THIS VIEW BY THE FACT THAT THE GREEK AMBASSADOR HAS CONFIRMED TO GOBBI THAT COUNTER-PROPOSALS ARE LIKELY. CLERIDES HAS ALSO TOLD ME THAT HE EXPECTS COUNTER-PROPOSALS TO BE MADE.

12. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT, AS ROLANDIS FINDS IT IN ATHENS, WILL PLAY A KEY ROLE IN DETERMINING FUTURE GREEK CYPRIOT TACTICS.

FCO PASS SAVING MODUK (DS11)

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ADDITIONAL DISTN:  
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TELEGRAM NUMBER 201 OF 17 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, ATHENS, ANKARA, PARIS, BONN, ROME

INFO SAVING CBFC (ACTIONED NICOSIA), MOD (DS 11)

MIPT: CYPRUS: INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

1. IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE RALLY OF MORPHOU REFUGEES PROVIDED KYPRIANOU WITH A PLATFORM FOR THIS CHARACTERISTICALLY INTRANSIGENT STATEMENT. IT IS NEVERTHELESS ENCOURAGING THAT THE PRESIDENT CONFIRMED THE NATIONAL COUNCIL'S DECISION TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE, THOUGH NOTHING WHICH HE SAID GIVES ANY GROUND FOR OPTIMISM THAT THERE WILL BE EARLY PROGRESS.

2. THE REFERENCES TO INTERNATIONALISATION ARE VAGUE SEMI-COLON BUT IT IS NOTICEABLE THAT KYPRIANOU AVOIDED ANY COMMITMENT TO IMMEDIATE RECOURSE TO THE UN. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS LYSSARIDES PRESSED FOR THIS AT THE NATIONAL COUNCIL BUT WAS OVERRULED.

4. MY YUGOSLAV COLLEAGUE HAS TOLD GOBBI THAT ROLANDIS SUGGESTED TO KYPRIANOU AT THE COUNCIL THAT THERE SHOULD BE A SPECIAL UN SESSION ON CYPRUS ON THE LINES OF THE SPECIAL SESSION ON NAMIBIA. KYPRIANOU HAD BEEN TAKEN WITH THIS IDEA WHICH HE MAY HAVE HAD IN MIND WHEN HE SPOKE TO THE MORPHOU REFUGEES ABOUT QUOTE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE UNQUOTE. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD APPARENTLY BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SOUND OUT THE YUGOSLAV ON THIS IDEA. JOB HAD BEEN DISCOURAGING, POINTING OUT THAT IN THE CYPRUS CASE THERE WAS NO QUOTE ENEMY UNQUOTE WHO COULD BE EQUATED WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS.

5. WHEN I SEE ROLANDIS TOMORROW I WILL ASK HIM WHAT IS MEANT BY THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT'S PLANS FOR FURTHER "INTERNATIONALISATION". I WILL SAY THAT PX SEEMS TO US THAT EFFORTS SHOULD BE CONCENTRATED ON MAKING PROGRESS THROUGH THE TALKS. I WILL ALSO EXPRESS STRONG RESERVATIONS ABOUT ANY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD BE LIABLE TO UNDERMINE THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WHICH PROVIDE THE BEST FORUM FOR PROGRESS, AND WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR MISCHIEF-MAKING BY THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING MODUK (DS11)

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(Summary attached.)

(Our post in New York advise strongly against this.)

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FM NICOSIA 170830Z AUG 81  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 200 OF 17 AUGUST  
INFO PRIORITY NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, ATHENS, ANKARA, ROME, PARIS,  
BONN.  
INFO SAVING CBFC (ACTIONED NICOSIA), MOD (FOR DS 11)

MY TEL NO 199 CYPRUS: INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

1. PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU ADDRESSED A RALLY OF MORPHOU REFUGEES ON 16 AUGUST. AFTER STATING THAT THE TURKISH PROPOSALS COULD NOT FORM THE BASIS FOR A SOLUTION HE SAID THAT THE GREEK SIDE WOULD CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE IN AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE PROGRESS. THE TALKS WOULD BE APPROACHED WITH GOODWILL AND IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT. IT WOULD BE THE FAULT OF THE TURKISH SIDE IF NO PROGRESS WAS MADE.
2. PARALLEL WITH THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS THE GREEK SIDE WOULD CONTINUE EVERY EFFORT QUOTE IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONALISATION UNQUOTE, PUTTING FORWARD MORE CATEGORICALLY THAN IN THE PAST THEIR DEMAND FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. AT THE SAME TIME THE CLIMATE WOULD BE PREPARED FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES ON THE INTERNATIONAL PLAIN.
3. IN AN APPARENT REFERENCE TO THE TURKISH CYPRIOT CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS KYPRIANOU SAID THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD ACCEPT A FEDERATION BUT NOT A CONFEDERATION OR TWO SEPARATE STATES. THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO PARTITION.
4. SEE MIFT.

FCO PASS SAVING TO MOD (FOR DS 11)

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 196 OF 13 AUGUST 1981

AND TO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, INFO ROUTINE ATHENS, ANKARA, ROME, BONN, PARIS

INFO SAVING TO MODUK (DS11) AND CBFC (ACTIONED BY NICOSIA)

MY TELNO 195: INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

1. THE HEAD OF CHANCERY SAW FANTIS, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (AKEL) THIS MORNING. FANTIS CONFIRMED THAT THE AKEL LEADERSHIP HAD BEEN STUDYING THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS IN ADVANCE OF TOMORROW'S MEETING OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL, WHICH WOULD BE ATTENDED BY PAPAIOANNOU.

2. FANTIS SAID THAT THE PROPOSALS REPRESENTED PROGRESS IN COMPARISON WITH THE LINE TAKEN BY THE TURKISH SIDE HITHERTO. THERE WERE NEVERTHELESS A NUMBER OF NEGATIVE ASPECTS:

(A) PRIORITY WAS NO LONGER TO BE GIVEN TO VAROSHA AS AGREED BY KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH IN 1979. WHILST THIS WOULD NOT MATTER IF THERE WERE A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION, THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD LOSE OUT IF THEY GAVE UP THIS POINT NOW AND THE TALKS THEN RAN INTO THE GROUND.

(B) THE TERRITORIAL OFFER WAS INSUFFICIENT AND AMOUNTED TO LITTLE MORE THAN A STRAIGHTENING OF THE LINE (BUT FROM OTHER COMMENTS MADE BY FANTIS IT SEEMS THAT AKEL MAY NOT HAVE BEEN GIVEN A COPY OF THE MAP). FANTIS THOUGHT THAT SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS COULD BEGIN IF THE TURKS OFFERED A 70:30 SPLIT. THE AIM OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A FIGURE SOMEWHERE BETWEEN 25 AND 28 PERCENT.

(C) AKEL DISLIKED THE FACT THAT THE TERRITORIAL PROPOSALS WERE BEING MADE DEPENDENT ON AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

3. FANTIS SAID THAT AKEL WAS NEVERTHELESS OPPOSED TO REJECTION OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS. THEY BELIEVED THAT THE GREEK SIDE SHOULD MAKE THE ABOVE POINTS BUT THEN STATE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSALS. IF THE TURKISH SIDE SHOWED THEMSELVES WELL DISPOSED THE GREEK SIDE MIGHT THEN COME FORWARD WITH COUNTER PROPOSALS ON THE CONSTITUTION. AKEL DID NOT THINK THERE SHOULD BE ANY RECOURSE TO THE U.N. UNLESS THERE WAS NO PROGRESS.

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4. MARTIN ASKED FANTIS WHETHER HE FORESAW GOBBI PLAYING A MORE ACTIVE ROLE. FANTIS ACCEPTED THAT GOBBI HAD MADE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION BUT DID NOT THINK THAT HE COULD GO BEYOND HIS PRESENT GOOD OFFICES ROLE WITHOUT A NEW MANDATE FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

COMMENT:

5. JUDGING FROM THIS CONVERSATION AKEL ARE LIKELY TO TAKE A FAIRLY CONSTRUCTIVE LINE AT THE NATIONAL COUNCIL. BUT FANTIS WAS CLEARLY SUSPICIOUS OF THE WESTERN ROLE SUGGESTING THAT WE HAD IN SOME WAY BEEN INVOLVED IN THE FORMULATION OF THE TURKISH SIDE'S PROPOSALS. THIS SUSPICION MAY BE BEHIND AKEL'S APPARENT HESITATION OVER GOBBI PLAYING A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THE TALKS AND COULD PARTLY EXPLAIN KYPRIANOU'S OWN NEGATIVE ATTITUDE ON THIS POINT.

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FM FCO 121820Z AUGUST 80

TO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 138 OF 12 AUGUST

AND TO PRIORITY ANKARA, ATHENS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, ROME.

YOUR TELNOS. 192 AND 193: INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS

1. MR HURD RAISED THIS SUBJECT WITH DR WALDHEIM DURING HIS MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THIS AFTERNOON. DE CUELLAR WAS ALSO PRESENT.

2. WALDHEIM SAID THAT THE TURKISH PROPOSALS ON TERRITORY AND THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDED AN IMPORTANT OPENING. THOUGH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD INITIALLY REACTED FAVOURABLY, KYPRIANOU IN HIS MOST RECENT TALKS WITH GOBBI HAD BEEN DISCOURAGING. BUT THE TURKISH PROPOSALS, BY DECREASING THEIR AREA OF OCCUPATION FROM 36 PERCENT TO 28 OR 29 PERCENT (SIC), REPRESENTED A REAL OPPORTUNITY WHICH WE MUST DO OUR UTMOST TO USE.

3. MR HURD SAID THAT WE SHARED WALDHEIM'S ANALYSIS. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD BE MISTAKEN NOT TO RESPOND. WE WELCOMED THE FORCE WITH WHICH WE UNDERSTOOD GOBBI HAD SPOKEN TO KYPRIANOU. WE HOPED THAT WHEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL JUDGED THE MOMENT OPPORTUNE THE UN WOULD PUT FORWARD ITS OWN IDEAS TO THE TWO PARTIES. WALDHEIM SAID HE HAD GIVEN FIRM INSTRUCTIONS TO GOBBI. HE HIMSELF WAS PREPARED TO MAKE A PERSONAL VISIT TO CYPRUS IF THIS COULD HELP. DE CUELLAR MENTIONED OUR PRESIDENCY OF THE TEN AND ASKED THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD LEND THEIR SUPPORT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS BY ENSURING THAT KYPRIANOU SAID NOTHING IN PUBLIC AGAINST THE TURKISH PROPOSALS WHICH MIGHT THEN BLOCK FURTHER PROGRESS. WALDHEIM ENDORSED THIS: THERE HAD NEVER BEFORE BEEN IN TURKEY SUCH AN IMPRESSIVE ARRAY OF GOVERNMENT FIGURES WHO SEEMED SINCERELY TO WISH TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM. MR HURD SAID THAT WE WOULD DO OUR BEST TO HELP.

4. AS YOU ARE AWARE, WE HAVE ALREADY MADE THIS POINT ON A NUMBER OF RECENT OCCASIONS TO KYPRIANOU AND ROLANDIS. WE

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AGREE PARAGRAPH 7 OF YOUR TELNO. 193: IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO MAKE A FURTHER DEMARCHE AT PRESENT. BUT YOU SHOULD CLEARLY TAKE SUCH OPPORTUNITIES AS PRESENT THEMSELVES TO EMPHASIZE THAT, WHILE IT IS NOT FOR US TO OFFER COMMENT ON THE DETAIL OF TURKISH PROPOSALS, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THIS EVIDENCE OF TURKISH READINESS TO MAKE PROGRESS IS NOT THROWN ASIDE BY PUBLIC STATEMENTS WHICH COULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE TWO SIDES TO CONTINUE THE PRESENT DIALOGUE.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 187 OF 6 AUGUST 1981

INFO ATHENS, ANKARA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN,  
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INFO SAVING MODUK (DS11) AND CBFC (ACTIONED BY NICOSIA)

M.I.P.T. (NOT TO ALL) : CYPRUS: INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

1. I HAD A PRELIMINARY WORD WITH GOBBI THIS MORNING ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE TURKISH PROPOSALS. GOBBI IS QUITE PLEASED WITH THE CONTENT OF THE PROPOSALS. HE SEES SCOPE FOR NEGOTIATION OVER THE EXTENT OF THE AREA OF THE MESAORIA OFFERED EAST OF NICOSIA. HE UNDERSTANDS THE TURKISH FAILURE TO OFFER MORE IN THE AREA OF MORPHOU. TO DO SO WOULD HAVE INTERFERED WITH THEIR MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS. HE WELCOMES THE ADVANCE IN THE WAY VAROSHA IS OFFERED, PARTICULARLY THE REMOVAL OF ANY SUGGESTION THAT VAROSHA WOULD BE AN ENCLAVE. NO DOUBT THE PRESENT VAROSHA OFFER (WHICH MUST IN ANY CASE BE SEEN AS PART OF AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT) WILL NOT BE GREETED WITH MUCH ENTHUSIASM BY THE VAROSHA REFUGEES. BUT THE AREA INCLUDED DOES CONTAIN A LARGE NUMBER OF HABITABLE HOUSES AND PROVIDES SCOPE FOR FURTHER BUILDING.

2. GOBBI RIGHTLY SEES KYPRIANOU AS THE MOST LIKELY OBSTACLE TO A REASONABLE GREEK CYPRIOT REACTION. HE HOPES, WHEN HE SEES KYPRIANOU, TO PERSUADE HIM THAT THE OPPORTUNITY OFFERED BY A DEFINITE MOVE FORWARD BY THE TURKISH SIDE SHOULD NOT BE LOST AND THAT ANYTHING LEADING TO AN INTERRUPTION OR BREAK IN THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS COULD HAVE INCALCULABLE CONSEQUENCES.

3. IN THE MEANTIME ZACHARAKIS' ACCOUNT (MY TELNO 188) OF THE ATTITUDES OF THE PARTY LEADERS DURING THEIR TALKS WITH MITSOTAKIS IS RELATIVELY ENCOURAGING. WITH THE COMMUNISTS AND CLERIDES OPPOSING ANY BREAK IN THE TALKS AND ADVOCATING NEGOTIATIONS THE PRESIDENT WILL BE UNDER STRONG PRESSURE NOT TO RESPOND NEGATIVELY. THIS PRESSURE WILL BE INCREASED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND IOANNIDES, THE INTERLOCUTOR. THE PRESIDENT'S OWN PARTY ARE NOT LIKELY TO SUPPORT ANYTHING SO DRASTIC AS REJECTION OF THE TURKISH SIDE'S PROPOSALS. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT THE GREEK AMBASSADOR, AT HIS COMMUNITY BRIEFING ON MITSOTAKIS' VISIT, AGREED THAT IT DID NOT REPEAT NOT SEEM CONCEIVABLE THAT THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT WOULD GO SO FAR AS TO REJECT THE TURKISH PROPOSALS OR REFUSE TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS.

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4. MY CONCLUSION IS THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS ARE LIKELY GRUDGINGLY TO ACCEPT THAT THE PROPOSALS MUST BE CAREFULLY EXAMINED AND THAT AN ATTEMPT MUST BE MADE TO USE THEM AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION DESPITE THE REMAINING LARGE GAP BETWEEN THE ATTITUDES OF THE TWO SIDES.

5. GOBBI'S TACTIC WILL BE TO AWAIT THE GREEK CYPRIOT REACTION WHILE STRESSING PRIVATELY TO THEM THE IMPORTANCE OF A POSITIVE RESPONSE AND THE DANGERS OF A BREAKDOWN IN THE TALKS. HE WILL KEEP IN RESERVE THE POSSIBILITY OF COMING FORWARD WITH HIS OWN SUGGESTIONS AT AN APPROPRIATE MOMENT. THE FACT THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAVE NOT TAKEN OVER HIS CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS LEAVES HIM IN A BETTER POSITION TO MOVE WHEN HE THINKS THE TIME RIGHT.

6. AS SEEN FROM HERE THERE IS NO IMMEDIATE ACTION FOR US OR OUR FRIENDS TO TAKE EXCEPT TO USE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO URGE ON THE GREEK CYPRIOTS THE ADVANTAGES FOR THEM OF A POSITIVE RESPONSE AND THE DISADVANTAGES OF FAILING TO EXPLOIT WHAT MUST BE SEEN AS A MOVE TOWARDS A REAL NEGOTIATION. IN ANY CASE WE CANNOT ADMIT TO DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROPOSALS. IF QUESTIONED BY THE PRESS, I SUGGEST THAT WE MIGHT SAY THAT WE WELCOME ANY MOVE WHICH CONTRIBUTES TO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. WE HOPE THAT BOTH SIDES WILL NOW BE ABLE TO FIND A WAY, THROUGH CONTINUED NEGOTIATION, TO A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 181 OF 3 AUGUST 1981

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AND PRIORITY TO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, ~~NO, 10 DOWNING ST.~~ ANKARA, ATHENS

INFO SAVING MODUK (DS11) AND CBFC (ACTIONED BY NICOSIA)

MY TELNO 178: CYPRUS: INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

1. GOBBI HAS TOLD ME THAT HE HAD WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS A TOUGH TALK WITH MITSOTAKIS ON 1 AUGUST.

2. GOBBI GAVE MITSOTAKIS AN OUTLINE OF THE TURKISH SIDE'S TERRITORIAL PROPOSAL SO FAR AS HE HAS BEEN ABLE TO DEDUCE THIS, EMPHASISING THAT HE HAD NOT SEEN THE MAP. MITSOTAKIS' REACTION WAS THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS FAR FROM SATISFACTORY. HE WAS MUCH DISAPPOINTED AFTER WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE ASSURANCES WHICH HE HAD RECEIVED FROM TURKMEN. THE TURKS HAD IN THE PAST TALKED ABOUT BEING SATISFIED WITH A 28 PER CENT SHARE. DID GOBBI HAVE AN IDEA OF THE PERCENTAGE WHICH THEY WOULD GIVE UP UNDER THE PRESENT PROPOSAL QUERY.

3. GOBBI SAID THAT HE COULD MAKE NO FIRM ESTIMATE OF A PERCENTAGE. SO FAR AS HE COULD JUDGE THE TURKISH OFFER MIGHT REPRESENT A CONCESSION OF SOMETHING LIKE 3 PER CENT (EXCLUDING THE BUFFER ZONE). HE WONDERED WHETHER TURKMEN HAD SPOKEN TO MITSOTAKIS OF A SPECIFIC PERCENTAGE.

4. MITSOTAKIS CONTINUED TO DESCRIBE THE PRESENT TURKISH OFFER AS UNSATISFACTORY AND, APPARENTLY AT THE INSTIGATION OF THE GREEK AMBASSADOR WHO WAS PRESENT, ASKED WHETHER GOBBI COULD NOT GO BACK TO THE TURKS AND GET THEM TO IMPROVE THEIR OFFER.

5. GOBBI RESPONDED STRONGLY BY SAYING THAT THE POSITION REACHED MUST BE PUT IN ITS PROPER PERSPECTIVE. NO-ONE HAD EXPECTED THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES TO BE RESUMED AND TO SURVIVE. NO-ONE HAD EXPECTED AGREEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS. ALL HAD DEMANDED PROPOSALS ON TERRITORY FROM THE TURKISH SIDE. ALL THREE OF THESE POINTS HAD BEEN OR WERE ABOUT TO BE MET. IT WAS OF COURSE THE RIGHT OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE TO REJECT WHAT THE TURKS WERE OFFERING BUT TO DO SO WOULD IN GOBBI'S VIEW BE A SERIOUS, PERHAPS AN "HISTORIC" MISTAKE. MANY OF THE FRIENDS OF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND SUCH AN APPROACH AND THE GREEK SIDE WOULD BE LIKELY TO FIND ITSELF ISOLATED, FOR EXAMPLE AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

6. GOBBI MADE QUITE CLEAR THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF GOING BACK AT THIS STAGE TO THE TURKS AND PRESSING FOR

IMPROVEMENTS. SO FAR AS HE UNDERSTOOD THE OFFER IT SHOULD FORM A REASONABLE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION.

7. MITSOTAKIS THEN PRESSED GOBBI TO AVOID 5 AUGUST AS THE DATE FOR PRESENTATION OF THE TURKISH PROPOSALS. HE EMPHASISED THAT HE COULD IN NO WAY BE INVOLVED WITH THE TIMING OF THE PROPOSALS. THE FACT THAT HE WAS LEAVING CYPRUS ON 5 AUGUST, THE DAY PLANNED FOR THE MEETING AT WHICH THE TURKISH PROPOSALS WOULD BE SUBMITTED, WOULD BE MISINTERPRETED. THE PROPOSALS SHOULD BE PRESENTED LATER.

8. GOBBI SAID THAT THE MINISTER'S REQUEST PUT HIM IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION. HE HAD BEEN URGING THE TURKISH SIDE TO COME FORWARD QUICKLY WITH PROPOSALS. HE HAD TOLD, AMONG OTHERS, THE RUSSIANS THAT HE EXPECTED A MOVE ON 5 AUGUST. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN HIS CHANGE OF ATTITUDE TO THE TURKISH SIDE. NEVERTHELESS HE WOULD TRY.

9. MITSOTAKIS AND ZACHARAKIS PRESSED FOR A WEEK'S DELAY. GOBBI DOES NOT CONSIDER THAT HE CAN OR SHOULD MEET THEM TO THAT EXTENT. HE HOPES TO POSTPONE THE MEETING DUE ON 5 AUGUST UNTIL 7 AUGUST USING TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES AS A REASON.

10. MITSOTAKIS WAS MET AT LARNACA AIRPORT BY A GROUP OF SOME HUNDREDS REPRESENTING REFUGEES FROM KYRENIA. A SMALLER GROUP, APPARENTLY OF SUPPORTERS OF EDEK GREETED HIM BY THROWING EGGS AND TOMATOES AT HIS CAR AND DISPLAYING PLACKARDS SAYING THINGS LIKE "GO HOME TRAITOR". THE PRESIDENT AND ALL THE MAJOR PARTIES, (EXCEPT EDEK) HAVE BEEN QUICK TO CONDEMN THE FORM OF THIS DEMONSTRATION. BUT IT MAY HAVE PUT MITSOTAKIS AND ZACHARAKIS A LITTLE OFF THEIR STROKE. BEFORE SEEING GOBBI MITSOTAKIS HAD HAD A TWO HOUR MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADVISERS ON THE INTERCOMMUNAL PROBLEM AFTER WHICH IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT FUTURE TACTICS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. NO DOUBT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAVE MADE CLEAR THEIR FEARS OF BEING FACED BY TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS WHICH THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO REJECT AND WHICH WILL IN EFFECT CONSTITUTE PRESSURE ON THEM TO MOVE ON THE CONSTITUTION.

11. DURING HIS SPEECH AT THE DINNER GIVEN BY ROLANDIS ON 1 AUGUST MITSOTAKIS TWICE CONFUSED CYPRUS WITH CRETE.

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FM NICOSIA 280613Z JUL 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 174 OF 28 JULY 1981

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, INFO ROUTINE ATHENS, ANKARA

INFO SAVING MODUK (DS11) AND CBFC (ACTIONED BY NICOSIA)

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M.I.P.T.: **CYPRUS: INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS**

1. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO MAKE A FIRM JUDGEMENT ON THIS PROJECTED TURKISH MOVE UNTIL WE SEE DETAILS OF WHAT IS TO BE PROPOSED ON TERRITORY. ON THE FACE OF IT THE TURKISH SIDE HAVE SETTLED ON AN ASTUTE TACTIC. IF THE TERRITORIAL OFFER IS REALLY NEAR 70/30 THIS WILL PUT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS ON THE SPOT. ROLANDIS, WHO YESTERDAY AGAIN CONFIRMED TO ME THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD CONSIDER ANY TURKISH OFFER VERY CAREFULLY INDEED, HAS SAID THAT HE WOULD RECOMMEND AGAINST REJECTION OF A 70/30 OFFER (MY TELNO 167).

2. THE LINKAGE WHICH THE TURKISH SIDE ARE MAKING BETWEEN TERRITORY AND CONSTITUTION WILL MEAN THAT A RESPONSE FROM THE GREEK CYPRIOTS MUST ENTAIL A MOVE ON CONSTITUTION.

3. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS MAY JIB AT ANY CHANGE IN THE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF THE TALKS BUT THEY HAVE ALWAYS ADMITTED THAT THE BASIC BARGAIN MUST BE BETWEEN CONSTITUTION AND TERRITORY AND GOBBI HAS ALREADY BEEN ABLE TO GET OVER THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN TOPICS BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER FORMAL SESSIONS OF THE TALKS. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WILL NO DOUBT OBJECT TO THE INCLUSION OF VAROSHA IN TERRITORIAL PROPOSALS, ARGUING THAT VAROSGA SHOULD BE HANDED OVER AS A GESTURE TO IMPROVE THE CLIMATE. (THE PRESIDENT SPOKE ON THESE LINES WHEN I SAW HIM ON 22 JULY) BUT IF THE AREA INCLUDED WITH VAROSHA IS SOMEWHERE NEAR WHAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE VAROSHA REFUGEES IT WILL AGAIN BE DIFFICULT FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS NOT TO TAKE PROPOSALS ON THESE LINES SERIOUSLY.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 173 OF 28 JULY 1981

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, INFO ROUTINE ATHENS,  
ANKARA

INFO SAVING MODUK (DS11) AND CBFC (ACTIONED BY NICOSIA)

## CYPRUS: INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

1. WHEN I SAW THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR YESTERDAY EVENING HE SAID THAT DENKTASH, WHO WAS IN A MUCH BETTER MOOD, HAD BEHAVED IN ANKARA IN WHAT BATU DESCRIBED AS A QUOTE STATESMANLIKE MANNER UNQUOTE. HE HAD AGREED TO PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS ON TERRITORY, CONSTITUTION AND SECURITY PUT TO HIM BY THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO SECURE AMENDMENTS.

2. BATU SAID THAT DENKTASH WOULD SEE GOBBI (WHO RETURNED YESTERDAY) AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO MAKE TWO POINTS:-

(A) THE PRESENT PATTERN OF THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WHICH DIVIDED THE TOPICS INTO WATERTIGHT COMPARTMENTS MUST BE CHANGED. FUTURE SESSIONS SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO DISCUSSION OF A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION WHICH WAS BASICALLY CONCERNED WITH TERRITORY AND CONSTITUTION. THERE WAS NO PLACE FOR SEPARATE MEETINGS ON VAROSHA SINCE THIS SHOULD BE INCLUDED UNDER TERRITORY. PRACTICAL MEASURES, AS SUCH, SHOULD ALSO FALL AWAY WHEN ATTENTION WAS FOCUSED ON A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

(B) THE TURKISH SIDE THOUGHT GOBBI'S IDEAS ON TERRITORY AND ON THE CONSTITUTION A REASONABLE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION. NEVERTHELESS THEY WERE READY TO PUT FORWARD THEIR OWN PROPOSALS (INCLUDING A MAP) ON THESE TWO TOPICS AND ON SECURITY AS SOON AS GOBBI COULD ORGANISE A MEETING ON THE BASIS DESCRIBED IN (A) ABOVE. THIS THEY WOULD DO WITHOUT INSISTING ON AN IMMEDIATE BALANCING MOVE BY THE GREEK CYPRIOTS.

3. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS BATU SAID THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT MAP WOULD NOT BE BASED EXACTLY ON A 70/30 FORMULA BUT WOULD BE QUOTE NEAR THAT FIGURE UNQUOTE. THERE WOULD BE NO EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO PERCENTAGES SEMI-COLON MORE IMPORTANT WAS THE TYPE OF TERRITORY, E.G., VILLAGES, WHICH ZEY WERE READY TO HAND OVER. THE AREA INCLUDED WITH VAROSHA WHICH WOULD FORM A PART OF THE TERRITORIAL PROPOSAL WOULD BE INCREASED FROM THAT PREVIOUSLY OFFERED FOR INTERIM U.N. ADMINISTRATION. VAROSHA WOULD NOT, REPEAT NOT, BE AN ENCLAVE. THERE WOULD BE NO OFFER TO RETURN MORPHOU.

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4. ON CONSTITUTION BATU SAID THAT THE TURKISH PROPOSALS WOULD BE SIMILAR, IN SOME PARTS IDENTICAL, TO GOBBI'S IDEAS. THE PROPOSALS WERE OFFERED AS A PACKAGE, I.E. THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS GETTING THE TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS WITHOUT MOVING ON THE CONSTITUTION. WHILE THE TURKISH SIDE WERE NOT MAKING THEIR PROPOSALS CONDITIONAL ON AN IMMEDIATE GREEK CYPRIOT MOVE, THEIR AIM WAS OF COURSE TO PUSH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO ADVANCE FROM THEIR PRESENT UNREALISTIC ATTITUDE ON THE CONSTITUTION.

5. AS BATU PUT IT, THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD HAVE TO SHOW WHETHER THEY ARE REALLY PREPARED TO SHARE POWER WITH WHAT THEY HAVE CALLED THEIR QUOTE TURKISH CYPRIOT BROTHERS UNQUOTE. BATU ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE VERY UNWISE FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO FAIL TO RESPOND TO THIS TURKISH CYPRIOT MOVE. HE HOPED THAT WE WERE USING OUR INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE THEM TO BE REASONABLE. I SAID THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD BE IN NO DOUBT OF OUR VIEW THAT FLEXIBILITY WAS REQUIRED ON BOTH SIDES.

6. BATU CONFIRMED THAT PLANS WERE BEING MADE FOR A VISIT TO NORTH CYPRUS BY THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE AIM OF THIS WAS PRECISELY TO BALANCE THE VISIT OF MITSOTAKIS. TURKMEN WOULD PROBABLY SPEND 4 DAYS IN CYPRUS. 20 AUGUST WAS A POSSIBLE DATE FOR HIS ARRIVAL .

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8. PLEASE SEE M.I.F.T.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 5183 OF 25 NOVEMBER 1980

INFO PRIORITY PARIS BONN ATHENS UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON NICOSIA

ANKARA UKDEL NATO

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

*MS* *Rather less gloomy than*  
*Michalides.***SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALK WITH THE CYPRUS FOREIGN MINISTER**

1. LORD CARRINGTON MET MR ROLANDIS IN THE MARGINS OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL HERE TODAY.
2. ROLANDIS SAID THAT THE EC/CYPRUS AGREEMENT WAS NOT EXACTLY WHAT HE HAD WANTED, BUT THE MOVEMENT FROM STAGE 1 TO STAGE 2 A QUOTE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BREAK-THROUGH UNQUOTE. STRONG LEFTIST PRESSURE HAD BEEN GROWING IN CYPRUS TO RE-ORIENT ECONOMIC POLICY, EG BY ECONOMIC MISSIONS TO EASTERN EUROPE. THE PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE LOST CREDIBILITY IF THIS AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN REACHED, AND KYPRIANOU HAD BEEN VERY GRATIFIED BY THE RESULTS WHEN ROLANDIS HAD INFORMED HIM YESTERDAY EVENING. ROLANDIS REALISED THAT IT WOULD BE A LONG AND HARD ROAD TO A FULL CUSTOMS UNION, AND HOPED HE COULD RELY ON BRITISH HELP. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT WE WOULD TRY TO HELP TO GET BETTER TERMS IN 1982-3.
3. ROLANDIS SAID THAT RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNITY WOULD BE INFLUENCED BY EVENTS IN CYPRUS ITSELF. THE CLIMATE OF THE INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS WAS VERY GOOD. NOBODY HAD EXPECTED AN EARLY BREAK-THROUGH, BUT THERE WERE SIGNS OF SOME MOVEMENT HERE AND THERE. ABOVE ALL THE DIALOGUE HAD IMPROVED THE ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES. THE IDEA OF MOVING THE TALKS TO NEW YORK (WHICH HE DID NOT THINK HAD COME FROM WALDHEIM HIMSELF) WOULD HAVE BEEN DISASTROUS. WALDHEIM HAD ALWAYS RECOGNISED THAT PATIENCE ABOVE ALL WAS NEEDED. ROLANDIS HAD GONE OUT OF HIS WAY TO ENSURE THAT REFERENCE TO CYPRUS AT THIS YEAR'S GENERAL ASSEMBLY WOULD BE CONFINED TO A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT SAYING THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DISCUSSION THIS YEAR BECAUSE OF THE INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS, AND INSCRIBING THE ITEM ON NEXT YEAR'S AGENDA. HE HIMSELF MIGHT GO TO NEW YORK IN THE CONTEXT OF THE STATUS OF THE FORCES DISCUSSION IN DECEMBER TO ENSURE THAT WALDHEIM DID NOT REVERT TO THE IDEA OF MOVING THE TALKS.
4. ROLANDIS AGREED WITH LORD CARRINGTON THAT TURKMEN WAS A MODERATE. HE WAS MAKING POSITIVE NOISES, AND EVREN LISTENED TO HIM. IF HE CONTINUED AS AT PRESENT, THERE COULD BE SOME RESULTS. THE TALKS THEMSELVES WERE CONCENTRATING ON THE PRELIMINARY ISSUES OF VAROSHA, FAMAGUSTA AND CBMS. BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP ONE'S EYE ON THE OVERALL PACKAGE WHENEVER THIS RISKED PRE-EMPTING POSITIONS ON THE

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WIDER CONSTITUTIONAL AND TERRITORIAL ISSUES. THE CYPRIOTS INTENDED TO USE THE CHRISTMAS BREAK IN THE TALKS TO COLLECT THEIR IDEAS. THE TALKS SHOULD CONTINUE SLOWLY, BUT NOT TOO SLOWLY. THE MOST POSITIVE SIGN WAS THAT THE TURKS WERE SOUNDING OUT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS INFORMALLY (EG DURING THE COFFEE BREAKS WHICH WERE MORE PRODUCTIVE THAN THE MEETINGS THEMSELVES) ABOUT WHAT MIGHT SATISFY THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TERRITORIALY. THE TURKISH MILITARY WERE NATURALLY INTERESTED HOWEVER IN ENSURING THAT THEY RETAINED A SUFFICIENT HINTERLAND.

5. ON CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS, ROLANDIS SAID THAT THE TURKS WERE STILL DEMANDING EQUALITY, BUT QUOTE EQUALITY BETWEEN TWO UNEQUAL COMMUNITIES PRODUCES INEQUALITY UNQUOTE. GREEK-CYPRIOT CONSTITUTIONAL THINKING WAS ON THE THRESHOLD BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND THE UNITARY STATE. THE TURKS WERE THINKING ALONG CONFEDERAL LINES. HE DID NOT EXCLUDE A COMPROMISE, IF THE TURKS WERE PREPARED TO MOVE. THE IMPLICATIONS OF A FAILURE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE APPALLING: THE DIALOGUE WOULD STOP, AND THEY WOULD BE IN A VACUUM.

6. LORD CARRINGTON SUGGESTED THAT A TIME MIGHT COME WHEN BOTH SIDES NEEDED A BROKER. HE RECALLED THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR, BESIDES HAVING DEALT WITH CYPRUS BEFORE, HAD BEEN REMARKABLY OBJECTIVE AS A UN OBSERVER IN ZIMBABWE. THE POSSIBILITY OF THE COMMUNITY POLITICAL COOPERATION MACHINERY HELPING, EG BY PRODUCING A DUTCH MEDIATOR DURING THE DUTCH PRESIDENCY, WAS DISCUSSED, THOUGH IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT LEFT-WING SUSPICIONS OF THE COMMUNITY MIGHT DAMAGE SUCH A MEDIATOR'S PROSPECTS.

7. LORD CARRINGTON STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENT CONJUNCTURE IN TURKISH POLITICS. THE MILITARY THERE WERE WELL PLACED TO TAKE DECISIONS, AND HAD SHOWED THEMSELVES SENSIBLE SO FAR, EG OVER THE AEGEAN. ROLANDIS AGREED. THE MILITARY WERE ALSO MORE OPEN TO ADVICE FROM THE WEST. THE MAIN INGREDIENTS FOR PROGRESS WERE THERE, AND HE HAD HEARD THAT EVREN'S PRIORITIES WERE: A. THE AEGEAN; B. CYPRUS; AND C. GREEK-TURKISH BILATERAL RELATIONS. HENCE EVREN'S PRESENT FOCUS ON CYPRUS. LORD CARRINGTON WONDERED WHETHER THE GREEK ATTITUDE MIGHT SOUR IF PAPANDEOU WON THE ELECTION. ROLANDIS THOUGHT THAT PAPANDEOU WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL ON CYPRUS, AND MIGHT FEEL BOUND TO DO SOMETHING ON NATO.

8. FINALLY ROLANDIS SAID THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY ACCOMPANY KYPRIANOU (WHOSE HEALTH WAS MUCH BETTER) TO LONDON. HE HOPED THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD AGREE TO RECEIVE THE PRESIDENT IN DECEMBER. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THIS WAS BEING CONSIDERED AT THE MOMENT. (I GATHER NOW THAT A CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER HAS BEEN FIXED ON 19 DECEMBER.)

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 209 OF 4 AUGUST 1980

AND TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, ATHENS, ANKARA, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
BONN, PARIS, TRIPOLI, MODUK (PLEASE PASS DS11), AND CBFC.  
INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO.

*Prime Minister*

*MAD*

*ms*

MY TELEGRAM 202: **CYPRUS: LIBYAN INITIATIVE.**

1. **THE LIBYANS HAVE BEEN KEEPING UP THEIR PRESSURE FOR A SUMMIT MEETING IN TRIPOLI.** THE LIBYAN MINISTER OF INFORMATION, HIJAZI, ARRIVED ON 31 JULY FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH BOTH SIDES. IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENT AT THE AIRPORT HIJAZI TOOK IT FOR GRANTED THAT THE MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE IN EARLY SEPTEMBER.

2. GORGE TOLD ME TODAY THAT HIJAZI HAS TOLD BOTH SIDES THAT WALDHEIM HAS NOW AGREED TO A MEETING ON 7 SEPTEMBER. HIJAZI INDICATED THAT LIBYA WANTS THE MEETING TO TAKE PLACE WHETHER OR NOT THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS ARE RESUMED AND HAS THREATENED NOT TO LEAVE UNTIL BOTH SIDES HAVE AGREED TO ATTEND. ROLANDIS TOLD GORGE ON THE TELEPHONE OVER THE WEEKEND THAT ALL THIS WAS PROOF THAT, WHATEVER LIBYA'S MOTIVES, THE PRIMARY CONCERN WAS NOT THE BEST INTERESTS OF CYPRUS.

3. THE EFFECT, GORGE SAID, HAS BEEN TO CONCENTRATE MINDS ON BOTH SIDES WONDERFULLY. GOBBI HAS BEEN PRESSING BOTH KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH TO ACCEPT AN UPDATED VERSION OF THE OPENING STATEMENT WHICH RETAINS THE ESSENTIALS OF THE VERSION PEREZ DE CUELLAR TRIED TO SELL TO BOTH SIDES DURING HIS RECENT VISIT. KYPRIANOU IS STILL HESITATING SINCE, APPARENTLY UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF MRS PALLEY, HIS BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL ADVISER, HE BELIEVES THAT THE PRESENT VERSION COULD LATER BE REPRESENTED BY THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS AS PAVING THE WAY FOR A CONFEDERAL SOLUTION. GOBBI IS SEEKING TO SURMOUNT THIS OBJECTION BY INTRODUCING THE OPENING STATEMENT WITH A SHORT STATEMENT OF HIS OWN IN WHICH HE WILL REFER TO THE AIM OF BOTH SIDES AS BEING A FEDERAL REPUBLIC. KYPRIANOU'S ADVISERS ARE MEETING TO CONSIDER THIS THIS MORNING. IF THEY AGREE, KYPRIANOU INTENDS TO CALL A NATIONAL COUNCIL LATER TODAY. IF, AFTER THIS, KYPRIANOU ACCEPTS THE NEW GOBBI

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FORMULA, GOBBI INTENDS TO SEE DENKTASH TOMORROW WHEN HE WILL REFER IN GENERAL TERMS TO THE IDEA OF MAKING A FEW INTRODUCTORY REMARKS OF HIS OWN. HE WILL NOT REPEAT NOT GIVE DENKTASH ANY DETAILS OF WHAT THESE MIGHT BE.

4. WHEN I ASKED HIM HOW HE RATED GOBBI'S CHANCES OF SUCCESS, GORGE REPLIED THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS ARE STILL AS ANXIOUS AS EVER TO GET OFF THE LIBYAN HOOK. DENKTASH TOO HAD TOLD GOBBI LAST WEEK THAT HE DID NOT FAVOUR A MEETING IN TRIPOLI IN SEPTEMBER AND WOULD MUCH PREFER TO RETURN TO THE LEDRA PALACE. THIS GAVE GROUNDS FOR CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM. THE AIM WAS TO HOLD A BRIEF FORMAL MEETING OF THE INTERLOCUTORS BEFORE THE END OF THIS WEEK. THE TALKS WOULD THEN BE ADJOURNED UNTIL EARLY SEPTEMBER WHEN THEY WOULD TURN TO MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE. (KYPRIANOU WILL BE ON HOLIDAY IN GREECE FOR MOST OF AUGUST).

5. GORGE ADDED THAT, AS FAR AS HE KNEW, THERE WAS NO TRUTH IN HIJAZI'S ASSERTION (PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE) THAT WALDHEIM HAD ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING IN TRIPOLI ON 7 SEPTEMBER. WALDHEIM HAD MERELY TOLD TREIKI LAST WEEK THAT, CONTRARY TO TREIKI'S IMPRESSION, THE U.N. BELIEVED THAT BOTH SIDES WERE STILL FAR APART. WALDHEIM SUGGESTED THAT THE LIBYANS SHOULD EXPLORE THE MATTER FURTHER. GORGE WAS SURE THAT IF BOTH SIDES ACCEPTED TO RETURN TO THE TABLE THEY WOULD PRESS WALDHEIM VERY STRONGLY TO TELL THE LIBYANS THAT A SUMMIT MEETING IN TRIPOLI AT THIS STAGE WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO UKDEL NATO.

O'KEEFFE

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]  
[REPETITION TO TRIPOLI REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION,  
REPEATED AND REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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CYPRUS



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

6 May 1980

Dear Mr. Price.

Thank you for your letter of 21 April about Cyprus.

The Government's position on payments for facilities within the Republic of Cyprus is well-known. All payments specified in the 1960 Treaties have been made, both in respect of facilities for British forces in the Republic and in respect of financial aid, and all obligations have been met. The Cyprus Government disagree with our view of our obligations under the treaties; this is the subject of continuing discussions between the two Governments. As you may have seen from reports of the Lord Privy Seal's recent visit to Cyprus, the Cyprus Government have promised us an aide-memoire on the subject.

The answer to your question whether any new arrangements were entered into when I met President Kyprianou is that they were not. We agreed that discussions should continue between our High Commissioner at Nicosia and the Cyprus Foreign Minister. Meanwhile we have reiterated our hope that progress can be made over reaching agreement on the use of the £7.5 million loan, offered to the Cyprus Government in 1978 for projects benefiting the whole island, which has not yet been signed.

Yours sincerely  
Raymond Thatcher

Christopher Price, Esq., MP.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 126 OF 24 APRIL 1980,

INFO ROUTINE ATHENS, ANKARA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND CBFC.

**VISIT BY THE LORD PRIVY SEAL**

1. THE VISIT BY SIR IAN GILMOUR AND LADY CAROLINE GILMOUR WAS VERY SUCCESSFUL. COMING AS IT DID AT A TIME OF FRUSTRATION OVER THE LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A RESUMPTION OF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS THE VISIT WAS ESPECIALLY WELCOME. THE LPS' RECEPTION, BOTH BY GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS, COULD NOT HAVE BEEN WARMER. THE TROUBLE TAKEN AND THE GENUINELY CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE OF THE TALKS SHOWED THE PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE WHICH CYPRIOTS ATTACHED TO THIS FIRST VISIT BY A SENIOR MEMBER OF HMG. WHEN I SAW ROLANDIS YESTERDAY HE WAS FULL OF ENTHUSIASM FOR THE WAY IN WHICH THE TALKS HAD BEEN CONDUCTED.

2. I HOPE THAT THE VISIT WAS AS USEFUL TO THE LORD PRIVY SEAL AS TO US. THE CONTENT OF THE FORMAL TALKS ON BOTH SIDES WAS LARGELY PREDICTABLE AND UNDERLINED THE CONCLUSION THAT THE TWO COMMUNITIES WILL NOT BY THEMSELVES FIND A SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. BUT THE CYPRUS FOREIGN MINISTER WAS READY TO GO FURTHER IN PRIVATE. HE SAID THAT HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO CONTINUE TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER THROUGH THE GREEK AND TURKISH REPRESENTATIVES TO THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, DESPITE PRESS LEAKS OVER HIS RECENT TALK WITH ERKMEN. ON SUBSTANCE ROLANDIS SAID THAT HE WELL UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ESSENTIAL BARGAIN MUST BE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN THE RETURN OF TERRITORY TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS AND THE DETAILS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY DOUBTED WHETHER THE GREEK CYPRIOT GOVERNMENT COULD AT PRESENT PUT ACROSS AND MAKE STICK THE SORT OF CONCESSIONS WHICH WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR A SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES.

3. ROLANDIS TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT HE HAD BEGUN TALKING TO KYPRIANOU ABOUT THE NEED TO SHOW MORE FLEXIBILITY OVER THE CONSTITUTION IF THERE WERE SIGNS OF A MOVE BY THE TURKISH SIDE ON TERRITORY. THE PRESIDENT HAD NOT YET EXPRESSED A FIRM VIEW ON THIS. I TOLD HIM OF THE LPS' IMPRESSION (REFLECTED AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE) THAT WHEN THE ARGUMENTS WERE BOILED DOWN TO THEIR ESSENCE THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL OBSTACLE TO A RESUMPTION OF TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THE LPS' TALK WITH MR DENKTASH HAD SHOWN THAT THEORETICALLY BOTH SIDES VIEWED THE CONTENT OF THE TALKS (THOUGH NOT OF COURSE THE AIM) IN A SIMILAR MANNER. BUT THERE WAS OF COURSE THE QUESTION WHETHER THE TURKISH SIDE WANTED TALKS AT ALL AT THIS TIME. WE AGREED TO KEEP IN TOUCH IN CASE THERE WAS SCOPE FOR ANY POSITIVE FOLLOW-UP TO THE LPS' TALKS.

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4. THE ONLY JARRING NOTE HAS BEEN THE INTERPRETATION BY THE GREEK CYPRIOT PRESS OF WHAT THE LPS SAID AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE ABOUT THE TURKISH QUOTE INVASION UNQUOTE. THE PRESS HAVE SEIZED ON SIR IAN GILMOUR'S EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO GET AWAY FROM THE TYRANNY OF WORDS AND HIS COMMENT THAT QUOTE INVASION UNQUOTE MEANS DIFFERENT THINGS TO DIFFERENT PEOPLE. THEY SUGGEST THAT HIS REMARKS IMPLY A CYNICAL AND INDIFFERENT ATTITUDE BY BRITAIN TOWARDS THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. IN THE SHORT TERM THIS IS UNFORTUNATE, BUT IT MAY PROVE SALUTARY FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO REALISE THAT WE ARE IN NO DOUBT THAT NEITHER PARTY HAS ALL THE RIGHT ON ITS SIDE.

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Subject on Cyprus:  
Visit of Kyprianou. Dec  
1979. CYPRUS.

RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT  
OF CYPRUS (MR. SPYROS KYPRIANOU), AT NO. 10 DOWNING STREET ON  
29 FEBRUARY 1980 AT 1200 HOURS

<u>Present:</u> Prime Minister	President Kyprianou
The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	Mr. Rolandis, Foreign Minister
Mr. J.L. Bullard	Mr. Pelagias, Director General Ministry of Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. P. Rhodes	Mr. Vovides, Director of the President's Office
Mr. Alexander	Mr. Panayides, High Commissioner for Cyprus

\* \* \* \* \*

The Cyprus problem

President Kyprianou said that although five years had passed since the Turkish invasion and although repeated efforts had been made to find a solution to the Cyprus problem, no progress whatever had been made. He did not know what Turkey wanted. If Turkey was interested in the welfare or security of Turkish Cypriots, a solution could be found; but if they were interested in expansionism or separatism, then no peaceful solution would be possible. No clear answer had ever been forthcoming about Turkish objectives. Until there was one, no progress would be made.

President Kyprianou said that despite the breakdown last June and the subsequent difficulties, his Government still wished to make progress. They wished to take up the talks at the point where they had been left and on the basis of the ten points agreed in May. The Turks however were insisting on preconditions. There would have to be a change in Turkish attitudes if further talks were to be fruitful. The time had come therefore for the countries of Western Europe to bring their influence to bear in Ankara. There was a tendency to argue that because Turkey was an important ally and because it was going through a difficult period, this was a bad time for the West to try to bring pressure to bear. President Kyprianou said that this was not his view. The moment when the Turkish Government needed the West and when they were receiving so much help, was the time to offer them "advice". The problem could not be solved

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without the involvement of the major countries that wanted to see a solution. Mr. Rolandis pointed out that the Western world as a whole had an interest in finding a solution. At the moment NATO ended in Italy. Greece and Turkey could not become proper allies so long as the Cyprus problem persisted. The consequences of a persistence of the present situation would also be disastrous for Cyprus. Sooner or later a liberation movement would start. The acceptance of partition, or indeed of double union, would result in guerilla warfare.

President Kyprianou said that Britain had a particular role to play. There were special links between the two countries, both directly as a result of the sovereign base areas and of Britain's status as a guarantor power, and as a result of the Commonwealth relationship. The Cypriots did not expect impartiality from Britain: they expected support. Cyprus was at present under British influence and played a pro-Western role in the non-aligned movement. This might change if no solution could be found. It was therefore both important and appropriate for Britain to seek to take the initiative - not in substitution of the efforts of Mr. Waldheim but to assist him.

The Prime Minister said that HMG wanted to see the inter-communal talks start again. We had said so in Ankara and in London. She recognised the importance of the talks for those directly involved, for the people of Cyprus as a whole, and for the Western world. Britain had done, and would go on doing, everything to encourage progress. Why had the talks broken down in June?

President Kyprianou said that at the time the ten points had been agreed, the atmosphere had been good but subsequently the Turks had given the impression that they had changed their mind. In June they had insisted on the acceptance of bizonality as a precondition for progress. Bizonality, as expressed by the Turks, meant not federation but partition. The Greek/Cypriot side had not refused discussion of bizonality but had only refused to accept it as a precondition. The Turks had also talked about the security of the Turkish/Cypriot community in a way which had led the Greek Cypriots to think they envisaged partition. The Greek Cypriots for their part, wanted to talk about the security of all Cypriots.

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The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether it was really the case that bizonality meant partition. If this was the case, there was of course nothing to talk about. But did the Turkish Cypriots not accept the concept of a central authority. While agreeing that they did, President Kyprianou said that it was clear that Mr. Denktash was seeking a form of sovereignty and regarded the relationship between the two parts of Cyprus as essentially an international one. Mr. Rhodes pointed out that the Turks wanted a secure boundary between the two parts of the island with customs and immigration formalities. The Turkish Cypriots' basic worry related to their security. This flowed from what had happened between 1963 and 1974. President Kyprianou said that it was important to differentiate between the attitude of Mr. Denktash and of other Turkish Cypriots, many of whom had made it clear that they would be happy to come to live in "free Cyprus". The Cypriot Government had made proposals for complete demilitarisation. They would be prepared to have an international police force in the country until the sense of insecurity had been removed. In parallel with that there could be a mixed Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot police force as there had been in the past. If the worry about security was a genuine one, it could be solved. His concern was that it was in fact an artificial obstacle.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether the new Turkish Government was likely to be any more helpful than its predecessor. President Kyprianou thought not. It was the military leaders who took the decisions about Cyprus. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recalled that during his recent visit to Ankara he had pressed for the resumption of the inter-communal talks. Mr. Demirel had said flatly that his Government had no influence with the Turkish Cypriots. This might suggest that President Kyprianou's analysis was correct.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that in the end the problem always came back to the fears of the Turkish Cypriots about their security. Was there no form of reassurance that they could be offered or would accept. Mr. Rhodes expressed doubt about this. They wanted a clear line between the two communities. He

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saw no prospect of an early return of refugees. President Kyprianou said that the Greek Cypriot refugees were prepared to live under a Turkish administration if a federal solution could be found. But it was essential to attach precise and agreed meanings to such concepts as federation. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that this was precisely what the negotiations should be about. President Kyprianou said that the Turkish Cypriots could raise anything they liked in renewed talks. The Prime Minister said that it might be dangerous to reopen talks that had broken down without the most careful prior preparation. A further breakdown might be definitive. President Kyprianou said that at present no preparations were in progress, only arguments about concepts. This suited the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community well enough since the longer the deadlock persisted, the more likely it was that the de facto situation would be accepted as de jure. Mr. Denktash and Mr. Caylangil had both made it clear that what they were seeking was the legalisation of what had been "achieved" in 1974. If this was their true objective, no progress would ever be made. The Prime Minister commented that the absence of movement on the Turkish side was depressing.

President Kyprianou said that Cyprus was entitled to justice and to assistance in the achievement of a viable solution. Mistakes might have been made in the past. If so, many people had been responsible. But the real problem was what to do now. The Cypriot Government would like the help of the British Government in resolving the tragedy and in enabling Cyprus to become once more a united country, closely linked with the United Kingdom. Mr. Denktash was not interested in this last point. He had claimed to various Arab countries that while he wanted the British out of the base areas, the Greek Cypriots wanted to keep the bases. Mr. Rhodes commented that Mr. Denktash was probably trying to prove that he was more genuinely non-aligned than President Kyprianou. The Prime Minister repeated Britain's willingness to help but said that the problem seemed to be to give the Turkish Cypriots some assurance that they would be safe in a federal state and that there would be no repetition of earlier events. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the Turkish Cypriots would accept nothing that was unsatisfactory to them in relation to security. Was it realistic to suppose that a solution could be found which everyone would welcome at once, i.e. a federal republic with a measure of devolution.

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Would it not be necessary to approach the problem more gradually. Both sides would have to make sacrifices. President Kyprianou said that if an evolutionary approach was adopted it would be the end of Cyprus. The existing divisions would become deeper and deeper. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the divisions already existed. The idea would be to try to move away from them. There would have to be initial compromises by both sides.

The Prime Minister said that any such compromises would have to be prepared before the talks began. They should be prepared in private. Mr. Rolandis commented that no major problem had ever been solved in public. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary suggested that, given the lack of confidence between the two sides, it might be possible initially to have the two delegations in the same building with an intermediary going between them. This was a technique which had been used frequently during the Rhodesia Conference. The Prime Minister, re-emphasising the need for careful preparation for any new round of talks, said that all options should be explored. In reply to a request from Mr. Rolandis that HMG should use their good offices, the Prime Minister said that we would do what we could to get the Turks to the table. If the talks were restarted, it would be essential to keep them going and to avoid the kind of adjournment that had occurred last June.

#### Cypriot students in the UK

President Kyprianou and Mr. Rolandis expressed dismay at the problems which would be faced by Cypriot students in the United Kingdom who had to pay the full cost of their education here. Mr. Rolandis said that there were 2,500 students in the country at the moment. He added that there was no university in Cyprus and that the fees for a university education in the United Kingdom could not be met by even the most prosperous Cypriot parents. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether the Cypriot Government could not subsidise their students to some extent. Mr. Rolandis said that the left wing parties in Cyprus would never agree to this, particularly as they could point out that many universities in Eastern European countries were only too anxious to educate students free of charge. The Prime Minister said

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
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that she was unable to hold out much hope that the Government's position would change. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he saw no prospect of aid funds being diverted to help with the problem.

Mr. Rolandis asked whether it would be possible for any arrangements introduced to benefit students from EEC countries to be extended to cover Cypriot students. Cyprus was after all an associate member of the EEC. Mr. Bullard said that so far as he was aware no scheme had yet been agreed to cover EEC students. However, he undertook to ensure that the possibilities were investigated.

(Part of the above discussion took place over lunch. The lunch was attended by Mr. Pattie and Mr. Knighton in addition to those listed at the beginning of this record.)

The discussion ended at 1420.




29 February 1980

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