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FILE TITLE: COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AND		SERIES DEFENCE
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (CTB + SALT)		
MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS (MBFR)		PART: 4
PART BEGINS: 25 TH DECEMBER 1982	PART ENDS: 23 RD NOVEMBER 1983	CAB ONE: 

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PART 4 ends:-

Hansard Statement Col 328 23.11.83

PART 5 begins:-

UKDEL NATO Tel 348

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(83) 34 th Meeting, item 2	17/11/1983
CC(83) 32 nd Meeting, item 2	3/11/1983
CC(83) 29 th Meeting, item 1	6/10/1983
CC(83) 6 th Meeting, item 2	24/2/1983
CC(83) 3 rd Meeting, item 2	3/2/1983

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES**

Signed J. Gray

Date 17/1/2013

PREM Records Team

Graphical Association, regrets that anyone should have been injured in the dispute but recognises that this morning the TUC came out in support of the NGA on the core of the issue—the victimisation of six former members of Mr. Shah's staff whom he has refused to reinstate? Is he further aware that it would be greatly appreciated by the trade union movement if he ensured that his officials acted as constructively as possible to secure conciliation because the only issue now at stake is that of the six members, and the union is looking to the right hon. Gentleman for support on that issue?

Mr. King: As I said in my statement, ACAS, which is independent, is seeking to achieve a settlement of the dispute. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will lend his good offices to ensuring that the NGA, in wishing to prosecute an industrial dispute—which it is entitled under the law of the land to do—will ensure that it conducts it within the law.

Mr. Dennis Skinner (Bolsover): On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. A few days ago you were asked, as the result of a newspaper article, about the SDP and Liberals in particular not getting a fair crack of the whip in relation to speaking opportunities in the House. It may be remarkable to people outside Parliament—though it is not to most hon. Members—that when we get into the sharp end of politics, as we have just been doing—with the Tories supporting the bosses and the Labour party supporting the workers—SDP and Liberal hon. Members are not to be found.

Mr. Speaker: That is not a point of order for me.

Intermediate Nuclear Force Talks

3.58 pm

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Richard Luce): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement about the INF negotiations.

As hon. Members may be aware, the Soviet delegate to the Geneva INF talks has made it clear this morning that the Soviet Union does not intend to continue the present round and has given no date for the resumption of the talks.

The Government regret this Soviet decision and can see no justification for it. As recently as 15 November the United States tabled a further constructive proposal in the negotiations, which was rejected out of hand by the Soviet Union. The Russians may seek to justify their interruption of the talks by the final preparations for initial Western INF deployment. But the House will recall that the West has remained at the conference table while the Soviet Union has increased its own deployments of SS20s by over 40 per cent.

The NATO Alliance has made its first priority the achievement of a balanced and verifiable agreement to reduce and if possible to eliminate these weapons worldwide. At the same time, we have made it clear that until such an agreement can be attained the Alliance will proceed in accordance with its decision in 1979 to work towards a balance which would safeguard Western security. We will not be deflected from achieving the first stage of this objective by the end of this year.

I wish to emphasise that the Alliance remains ready to halt or reverse at any time the deployment of the missiles if only we can secure an agreement with the Soviet Union that would allow us to do so. The achievement of such an agreement remains our unshakeable objective. The Alliance will spare no effort to secure it. We remain convinced that an agreement is possible and that it remains in the interests of East and West that the negotiations should resume at the earliest possible date. We therefore urge the Soviet Union to demonstrate an equally sincere commitment to arms control by returning to the negotiating table.

Mr. Denis Healey (Leeds, East): Is the Minister aware that he has made a serious and disturbing statement, although the news was not unexpected? Does he recall that Her Majesty's Government have been arguing for four years that the moment the West began to deploy cruise and Pershing missiles agreement would be reached at the disarmament talks? Is it not clear that that could not have been more wrong? As the Soviet Union has frequently warned, it has produced a breakdown in the talks.

The Minister suggested that the responsibility for the breakdown lay exclusively with the Soviet Government. Is he aware that Her Majesty's Government's refusal to allow their Polaris force to be included in the balance has been a major obstacle to the talks until last week?

Mr. Churchill (Davyhulme): Whose side is the right hon. Gentleman on?

Mr. Healey: I am on the side of peace and disarmament. Is the Minister aware that, only last week, the Soviet Government, at the last moment, offered not to include British and French nuclear forces in the balance and to reduce the number of their SS20s to half those

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deployed in 1979 and their warheads to well under half those deployed in 1979? How can the hon. Gentleman justify the action of Western governments in rejecting that offer out of hand and leaking the proposal? This is a repetition of their action over a similar proposal after the so-called "walk in the woods" a few months ago. Does the hon. Gentleman believe that this treatment of the serious proposals by the Soviet Government is consistent with the sincere negotiations on disarmament to which Western Governments committed themselves in December 1979?

Is the Minister aware that the decision to deploy cruise and Pershing missiles is opposed by a substantial majority of people in Britain and Germany—the two countries which are so far involved—and has done more damage to public support for the NATO Alliance than any other action during the past 34 years? Will the Government now insist that the United States Government should offer not to deploy any more missiles if the Soviet Union will agree to resume the talks? Will they also insist that the West should seek to take the latest Soviet offer as a starting point in renewed negotiations which, even at this late moment, might save us from an acceleration and escalation of a nuclear arms race which can only decrease the security of the British people and present a greater threat to the prospects for peace in the world?

Mr. Luce: The House will agree with the last remarks of the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) that it is our desire to see an end to an escalation of the arms race. I am surprised that the right hon. Gentleman lays the responsibility for this latest development on the Western world and ignores essential facts. Since 1979 there has been a trebling of the number of SS20s. Since 1981 the numbers have increased by 40 per cent., and they are increasing at an average of one a week. The right hon. Gentleman seeks to ignore those salient facts that threaten our national security.

With his wealth of experience as Secretary of State for Defence, the right hon. Gentleman surely would agree that the prime duty of the Secretary of State for Defence and Her Majesty's Government is the security of the nation. That should be our first and ultimate objective.

I am surprised also at the right hon. Gentleman's comments about the United Kingdom and French strategic nuclear force. He knows that we are not talking about mixing like with like. The main point to come out of the discussions in public and at the INF level is that, whatever the Soviet Union's proposals, it wishes to retain a monopoly of intermediate range nuclear weapons. We believe that that poses a threat to our security, and we must consider that. Our genuine aim is to reach an agreement in Geneva, and we do not believe that we can do that by moving away from the negotiating table.

Mr. Healey: Is the Minister aware that the Soviet Government have had a monopoly of intermediate range missiles in Europe for over 20 years and that this was accepted by all previous British Governments—of both parties—since it was offset by the allocation of 400 Poseidon warheads to SACEUR? Is he aware also that the Soviet Government have offered to reduce the number of warheads deployed to half those that were deployed in 1979? Why did he not persuade the Americans to accept that offer as a basis for agreement? Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the Labour party regard the deployment of what

has been described by the American negotiator, Mr. Perl, as a weapon of no obvious military utility—the cruise missile—is a means to increase Britain's insecurity rather than contribute to its support?

Mr. Luce: Against the background of the twin-track decision, the principle of which was supported by the Labour Government, I am surprised that the right hon. Gentleman is suggesting that the Soviet Union should continue—whatever proposals it has put forward so far—with an overwhelming superiority and monopoly of those weapons? Does he believe that that is in the interests of Western security? I must ask the right hon. Gentleman that question, because it is a serious consideration in our national interests. The United States, with the full support of the NATO Alliance, has put forward proposals which, in broad terms, suggest a balance. We stand ready at any time to halt or reverse the deployment if the Soviet Union responds to our proposals.

Mr. Healey rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. It might be fairer to the House if the right hon. Gentleman were to speak again at the end of questions.

Mr. Julian Amery (Brighton, Pavilion): Does my hon. Friend agree that, far from being scared by the Soviet walkout during the talks, most Europeans, especially in Britain and in Germany, will sleep more safely and securely in their beds now they know that the Soviet monopoly of these weapons is ending and some equilibrium is slowly on the way to being achieved?

Mr. Luce: It is essential that the Soviet Union—let alone our public—should understand that the resolution of the British and other Western Governments is to ensure the safety of our people. That is a prime objective. Allied to that, we have a genuine and earnest desire to seek an agreement that leads to a broad balance in weapons. We believe that that would be in the interests of all concerned. If the Soviet Union were ready to respond to those flexible proposals, we might make some progress.

Mr. David Steel (Tweeddale, Etrick and Lauderdale): Does the Minister agree that the Soviet decision prematurely to end the talks should be universally deplored? Does he accept, however, that after four years the talks cannot be regarded as a great success, since they were billed as arms reduction talks but we have ended up with the deployment of cruise and Pershing in the West and a new generation of missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia? In the light of that, what is the Government's response to Prime Minister Trudeau's suggestion of a summit meeting of the five nuclear powers?

Mr. Luce: On the first point, I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman that the Soviet decision this morning is to be deplored. The Secretary-General of NATO, Dr. Luns, made exactly the same comments this morning in response to that decision. The Government remain ready to work as closely as possible with our allies, as we have done for a long time, to try to persuade the Soviet Union that it is in its own interests as well as ours that we should reach an agreement on balanced and verifiable arms reductions. That is our aim and any proposals, including those from Mr. Trudeau, must be seriously considered.

Sir John Biggs-Davison (Epping Forest): Have the Government received an assurance that the United States

is ready to resume negotiations at the earliest possible moment and has not been discouraged by the somewhat childish tactics of Moscow?

Mr. Luce: President Reagan has already made it plain, not only that he joins us in regretting the Soviet decision this morning, but that the United States, with the full support of the rest of us, stands ready at any moment to resume discussions, and the sooner the better.

Dr. David Owen (Plymouth, Devonport): Is the Minister aware that the central aim of all of us must be to restore the negotiations? In the meantime, is he aware that for very similar reasons, and with some of the same hesitations as Helmut Schmidt, I believe that NATO has no alternative but to continue with the first stage of the deployment? Will NATO Foreign Ministers now meet and consider seriously the possibility of declaring a freeze on first stage deployment of the 41 missiles when they become operational to allow time for the Soviet Union to reconsider its position and return to the negotiations, and will NATO maintain that freeze so long as there is any chance that the Soviet Union will negotiate a substantial reduction in the SS20s?

Mr. Luce: I am grateful for the right hon. Gentleman's first remarks. We now have no alternative but to proceed with deployment, but he is absolutely right to suggest that we should be ready at any moment to respond to any possibility of halting or reversing that if there is genuine progress in discussions. The sooner the discussions are resumed, the better.

As for consultation with other Foreign Ministers, the right hon. Gentleman will be aware that there is shortly to be a discussion at NATO level. All these matters can be assessed at that stage in the light of this morning's events. I am sure that there will be a renewed strong commitment to do whatever we can to try to get discussions going again.

Mr. Patrick Thompson (Norwich, North): While we must all agree that the breakdown of the talks is most unfortunate and distressing, does my hon. Friend agree that responsibility for the Russian walk-out must be shared by all those people, including many Opposition Members, who have encouraged the so-called peace movements, which have increased the likelihood of a tactical walk-out of that kind?

Mr. Luce: My hon. Friend is right in the sense that, however sincere the people who have joined in the protest movements and however much we all share the desire for a lowering of tension, the Soviet Union has tried to use the protest movements to undermine the elected Governments of the Western world and the unity of the Western Alliance. Although the people concerned are extremely sincere in their intentions, the Soviet Union has tried to use them as a tactical ploy to its own advantage.

Mr. Donald Stewart (Western Isles): Is the Minister aware that many people in the West who have no illusions about the Soviet system cannot understand why the British and French nuclear capability is not included on the side of the West? Does he agree that in a two-sided confrontation no one would imagine that capability being used in support of the Warsaw Pact and that that cannot be overlooked in negotiations?

As the CIA has announced that the Americans overestimated Russian missile deployment by 100 per

cent., what is the basis for suggesting that the Soviet Union has an overwhelming lead over the nuclear forces of the West?

Mr. Luce: I should first correct a point that I made to the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen). My reference to discussions at NATO level related to a meeting of Defence Ministers, not Foreign Ministers.

In answer to the right hon. Member for Western Isles (Mr. Stewart), we have discussed many times, including the recent debate on the twin-track policy, the position of the United Kingdom and French strategic deterrents. We have made it absolutely clear that we are talking about strategic weapons and not intermediate weapons, so we are not comparing like with like. My right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary has made it plain both at home and at the United Nations that if START makes progress and there is no strengthening of Soviet defences we could review our position and consider whether the United Kingdom and French strategic deterrents should be included in the discussions. At present, however, we are dealing with intermediate and not strategic weapons.

Mr. Stuart Bell (Middlesbrough): Does the Minister agree that the timing of the introduction of Cruise and Pershing in Europe was a negotiating ploy to get the Russians to take the SS20s away from Eastern Europe? That ploy having failed, does he agree that there will now be more SS20s and other Russian nuclear missiles? Having failed to call the bluff of the Russian bear, will the Government now call President Reagan's bluff and return the cruise missiles already here to the United States?

Mr. Luce: We shall do no such thing in the absence of any agreement with the Soviet Union. I am surprised at some of the Opposition comments, which seem to ignore the facts of the case. They describe what the western world, led by the United States, has been doing in the negotiations as a ploy, but it is clear from President Reagan's published proposals that there has been any amount of flexibility—zero option proposals or, in the absence of that ideal solution, an interim agreement at a lower level, and the latest proposal for a global figure of 420 warheads. So far, however, the Soviet Union has made it plain that it wishes to maintain a monopoly. That is the key point. It is the overall balance that we must aim for because that is how we believe that we can best achieve security.

Mr. Churchill (Davyhulme): Is it not disturbing that, thus far, the Soviet Union has shown itself unwilling to enter into any agreement between East and West based on equality in numbers of warheads of this kind? Is it not appalling that the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) on behalf of the Labour party should put forward the case for a Soviet monopoly in these weapons? Bearing in mind that in the past four years the Soviet Union has added 200 SS20s with 600 warheads while we have remained at the negotiating table, what earthly justification is there for the Soviet Union to leave the talks when the first score of Cruise and Pershing missiles arrive in Europe?

Mr. Luce: I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. Indeed, I go further. I hope that the situation is never reached, but even if we deploy the 572 Cruise and Pershing 2 missiles over a five-year period there would

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still be a Soviet monopoly, for which we would allow, in terms of the SS20s. There are more than 700 Ss20 warheads now targeted on Western Europe.

In addition, the NATO Alliance has shown a genuine desire to make progress and to reduce tensions by the recent announcement that we shall reduce our arms by a further 2,000 shorter-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe. That is further evidence of the Western world's genuine desire to make progress in the negotiations. If the Soviet Union would only respond, there would at least be some hope.

Mr. Dick Douglas (Dunfermline, West): Is not one of the most disturbing aspects of the Soviet withdrawal from the talks the view expressed by leading United States commentators that the Soviet Union will continue to be removed from the negotiating table until after the American elections? The Minister says that he will spare no effort. Will he apply his mind to linking the strategic arms negotiations with the INF talks because the nature, range and delivery capability of the weapons blurs the two issues? Does he agree that we should therefore link the two and come to the negotiating table on all these issues before we blow one another up?

Mr. Luce: I remind the House, in answer to the hon. Gentleman, that the Soviet Union said this morning that it did not wish to continue the present round. Compared to previous rounds, this one has already gone on longer than any previous round. All that the Soviet Union has done is to say that it has not given a date for the resumption of talks on INF. I am not talking about START. The Soviet Union has given no indications on that matter. Obviously, we all hope that the talks will continue until they are due to adjourn, very shortly. All that I can say to the hon. Gentleman is that we can keep an open mind about the relationship between INF and START. At present they are divided between the two sets of talks, and we think that that is the best way to proceed.

Mr. George Walden (Buckingham): I accept the implication in the Minister's statement that there is no reason for alarm or despondency, or for a change in Western policy over deployment. However, will the Minister accept that the West should not merely return to the nuclear counting-house, but seek actively to create the political atmosphere for the eventual success of the negotiations, and that Britain should be more prominent in the search to promote that atmosphere?

Mr. Luce: I agree entirely with my hon. Friend that there should be no undue alarm. Indeed, the Soviet Union should understand the very genuine and strong desire of the Western world, including our Government, to achieve agreement as soon as possible, and to make progress in the Geneva discussions. Against that background, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, have said that we wish to have a dialogue with the Soviet Union. At least, we have to acknowledge that we live on the same planet, however much we may disagree with each other. We must find a way of living together. We shall certainly pursue that policy.

Mr. Bill Michie (Sheffield, Heeley): Will the Minister state more clearly his answer to remarks by Conservative

Members about the peace movement helping to make the situation worse between East and West? Is the Minister saying that the peace movement, which includes ordinary people who want peace, the Roman Catholic Church, the Church of England, the Free Churches and the Quakers, has somehow connived to undermine the security of the Western world? Is the Minister saying that those people are naive, and do not understand all the problems that we are arguing about?

Mr. Luce: I do not believe that anybody is questioning the sincere desire of people in the protest movements for progress, and a reduction in arms. The point that I was making, in reply to an earlier question, is that the Soviet Union is and has been, taking advantage of the protest movements to try to challenge the authority of elected Governments in the Western world, and to undermine the cohesion of the Western Alliance. That is not in our interests.

Mr. Michael McNair-Wilson (Newbury): Does my hon. Friend agree that the walk-out proves that the Soviet Union's attachment to the INF talks lay in their hope, or belief, that they could reach an agreement with the West that left them with some supremacy in theatre nuclear weapons? If that is the case and, as the deployment of cruise and Pershing is going ahead in western Europe, is there any real purpose in holding the talks again in their present form, or is it not time for both sides to take a breather and consider the situation anew?

Mr. Luce: We have been talking for just over two years, since the first Geneva talks started. It is fairly evident that the objective of the Soviet Government was to try to achieve an agreement that enabled them to have a strong monopoly of nuclear weapons. However, now that they see our resolution in starting to fulfil the principles of the twin-track policy, we must all earnestly hope that they understand that we are determined to defend ourselves and have a credible deterrent. At the same time, we are most anxious to reach an agreement with them. Against that background it is in all our interests—the Soviet Union's as well as Great Britain—that they resume their position at the negotiating table.

Mr. Martin Flannery (Sheffield, Hillsborough): Is it not a fact that, by deploying cruise missiles on our territory, the Government in no way represent the wishes of the majority of the British people and that the same is true of the Government in Western Germany? Has not the belligerent posture of the President of the United States over many areas of the world made mankind more fearful than ever before of those dreadful weapons and brought into the struggle against those weapons many people who were not in that struggle before? Has not the Prime Minister met real criticism in the meetings that she has had with the Heads of Government in India today? Does not all that mean that we should use our immense prestige and influence to bring back the Russians to the conference table so that the future can be discussed rationally, whether it be peace for all or Armageddon?

Mr. Luce: The British electorate had a chance in June this year to express their views on the Government's defence policy. They overwhelmingly endorsed it. Moreover, the German Bundestag, by a substantial majority, gave the go-ahead to the policy of deployment unless there were a negotiated settlement, and in Italy

there was a majority of 132 in favour of that policy. It is evident that the United States is demonstrating its commitment to the defence of the free and democratic way of life in western Europe. The Soviet Union should be under no misunderstanding that the United States is committed to the defence of western Europe and the Western world. If the Soviet Union has no misunderstanding about that, there is a better chance in the longer term of getting stronger security and peace.

Mr. Andrew MacKay (Berkshire, East): Is it not both extraordinary and sad that no Labour Member, not even the former Secretary of State for Defence the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), has condemned Soviet withdrawal from the peace talks?

Mr. Luce: I agree with my hon. Friend. It is totally incomprehensible.

Mr. Ioan Evans (Cynon Valley): As we now have enough nuclear weapons on this planet to destroy it 10 times over, is it not a human tragedy that more resources will be devoted to building up a larger stock of nuclear weapons in the nuclear arms race? What positive initiatives will the Government take in view of the recent CIA report that the Russian build-up of arms had been greatly exaggerated? What positive response will the Government make if the Commonwealth should support the call by Premier Trudeau for a summit conference now not only of the United States and the Soviet Union, but of China, France and Britain, to get us out of this nuclear madness?

Mr. Luce: It is for the reason that the hon. Gentleman gave at the beginning of his question that we want a reduction in armaments. That makes it all the more regrettable that the Soviet Union took the decision that it did this morning. It is only by talking and negotiating in the conference chamber, not by declaratory measures or rhetoric, that we shall make any progress. That is why we regret and deplore the decision all the more. The NATO Alliance has undertaken a net reduction of 2,400 short range nuclear warheads. That, if anything, is a demonstration of our desire to make progress. That will lead to the lowest level of such warheads for 20 years.

Mr. Peter Bottomley (Eltham): Does my hon. Friend agree that the Russians are probably watching reactions in democratic countries to their tactical and, I hope, temporary withdrawal from the talks? Would it not be right for the Russians to realise that every major political party in this country disapproves of their withdrawal from the talks? Would it not help if every major party made it clear that it did not want the Russians to have a monopoly of those types of weapons? Would it not be a helpful gesture to make sure that the Metropolitan police were deployed in large numbers round the Russian embassy today just in case the CND so disapproves of what the Russians are doing that it holds a demonstration there?

Mr. Luce: I think that the best contribution that the Leader of the Opposition and the Labour party could make to our security and the prospects for peace would be to stand up now and say that they believe we should stick together, that we believe in a balance of armaments, and that the best hope for the peace of the world is to fulfil the principle that successive Governments have accepted—a twin-track policy decision.

Mr. James Callaghan (Cardiff, South and Penarth): Is it not to be remarked that the hon. Gentleman speaks of it being necessary for us to be at the negotiating table when he is reporting upon a series of talks in which we have played no part and have no power to influence what is taking place at the negotiating table? Is it not time therefore for us to consider very seriously the propositions that have half been put forward that this serious decision by the Soviet Union to withdraw provides an opportunity for a pause, for reflection, and perhaps for a new forum in which these matters can be discussed?

Should not the British and French weapons be included in one set of negotiations or the other so that if they are brought together they can be put on the table and be counted? I do not say that we should destroy our own weapons. That is not my position; I have never said that. Is there not a rational ground for the Soviet Union to say that these weapons, whether they crawl, swim or fly, are directed against them and therefore should be counted in the total?

Is not this a moment when we should not seek to condemn Moscow? I told them when I was there Clem Attlee's old dictum when it was suggested that the Labour party should walk out of the Chamber—"Don't walk out, you have only got to walk back some time". Is not that the position in which the Soviet Union will find itself?

Is it not the case that we cannot accept a Soviet veto in principle on the deployment of American nuclear weapons in Europe? Once that fact is accepted by the Soviet Union, is it not possible, as I believe firmly that it is, to reach an agreement since the issues that divide us are getting narrower the whole time? Therefore, although this breakdown if serious, does it not provide us with a fresh opportunity for beginning negotiations not in public, not making public offers, but in private in order to reach an agreement?

Mr. Luce: I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman that discussions in private in order to get agreement is the only sensible way to proceed and, with all his experience, he is in the best position to reflect on that. I wish that other Opposition Members would reflect his view that it is unacceptable to have a Soviet veto over the United States and Western policies in this field.

Earlier the right hon. Gentleman suggested that we do not have influence over the discussions in Geneva. We do. The NATO Alliance is consulting very closely and we fully support the flexible proposals that President Reagan has put forward.

In answer to the right hon. Gentleman's point about the need for time to reflect, as I said earlier, very shortly the Defence Ministers in NATO will be meeting and no doubt that will be a sensible occasion on which to reflect on the present position. But no one must be in any doubt about our sense of resolution in the Western world with regard to the twin-track policy.

Mr. Nigel Forman (Carshalton and Wallington): Is it not abundantly clear from everything my hon. Friend has said this afternoon that Her Majesty's Government remain strongly committed to the cause of multilateral and genuine and balanced disarmament? However, is it not also important for the House to bear in mind that there is a danger of over-reacting to this Soviet walk-out that may have more to do with internal political difficulties in the

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Kremlin than with a long-term strategic decision to boycott the negotiations? Will the Government therefore keep up the pressure in the way my hon. Friend suggested?

Mr. Luce: On the question of multilateral and balanced disarmament, I reaffirm that we are utterly committed to seeking ways in which we can achieve viable multilateral and balanced disarmament and we feel that this is the only safe way to proceed in arms control policies. Indeed, the House will have noted that some time ago Mr. Andropov himself intimated that he believed that this was the best way to proceed when he said that one-sided or unilateral disarmament was in itself naive.

I agree with my hon. Friend entirely that it would be wrong to over-react. We continue to invite the Soviet Union to return to the negotiating table, pointing out all the time that we believe that it is as much in their interest as it is in ours that the discussions should resume as soon as possible.

Mr. Roland Boyes (Houghton and Washington): If the peace movement is helping the Soviet Union, how is it that the only party that is losing members faster than the British Communist party is the SDP?

Why has the Minister concentrated on only half the formula? He said that the talks had to lead to balanced and verifiable reductions. The big problem in the talks is that cruise missiles cannot be verified for a number of reasons. First, they are very small. Secondly, they are mobile. How can the Soviet Union count them their satellites — [Interruption.] An hon. Member refers to SS20s. They are launched from concrete pads —

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member should not allow himself to be distracted. He must ask his question.

Mr. Boyes: I agree and I apologise, Mr. Speaker. I should not be distracted by buffoons.

Is it not a fact that these weapons are mobile, and if there is a dozen here today and a dozen there tomorrow the Russians will not know whether it is the same dozen? Is it a fact that cruise missiles can be hidden away? Is not the fact being overlooked that not 400 or 500 but 5,000, 6,000, 7,000 or perhaps 10,000 cruise missiles are being produced —

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman must bring his question to a close. He has had a very fair run. He may say his last words.

Mr. Boyes: My last word is that not just a question of 400 or 500 cruise missiles being produced but up to 10,000 can be hidden in submarines? How can they be verified? Will the Minister concentrate on the verification of cruise missiles apart from trying to achieve balanced reductions?

Mr. Luce: It is difficult to discover precisely the point of the hon. Gentleman's remarks. If he suggests that balanced reductions is the wrong way to proceed and that a Soviet monopoly is acceptable, I find that quite astonishing. Does he not realise that that in itself poses a threat to the security of our interests? As with every other kind of disarmament or arms control discussion, verification must be a salient part. It is essential that we should at least have the ability to ensure that agreements on both sides are being fulfilled. Surely he can see the point of that.

Several Hon. Members *rose* —

Mr. Speaker: Order. This is a very important matter, but I must protect the business of the House. I shall allow these questions to continue until a quarter to five.

Mr. Ian Lloyd (Havant): Should not the House remind itself, especially in this difficult and dangerous context, of two fundamental differences between the Soviet Union and the West? The first is that no Soviet Minister, official or general — and we do not know who it should be — will today or tomorrow be answering at any dispatch box in public for his country's policy. The second is that the Soviet people would not have had the opportunity that the American people had last week to see the film "The Day After" which showed in the most dramatic and lurid form the consequences of a nuclear war. If the Russians are to return to the negotiating table in Geneva, would it not be a very good idea to challenge them to show that film in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Luce: The difference between ourselves and Moscow in terms of our way of life is stark. There would be no opportunity to discuss, as we are doing in this Chamber in a democratic fashion and with a variety of views, how we can best achieve peace and security. It is that democratic way of life that we are trying to preserve by our policies.

With regard to the film to which my hon. Friend referred and which I believe is to be shown in this country shortly, our policies are designed to avoid just that kind of catastrophe. It is with that in mind that we are pursuing our present policy on defence and disarmament.

Dr. John Marek (Wrexham): Will the Minister stop misrepresenting the position and trying to mislead the country by equating the cruise missile with the SS20? The cruise missile is a cheap, accurate, new generation weapon with a first strike capability — [HON. MEMBERS: "Rubbish".] I regret that the Soviet Union has walked out of the negotiations, but some Labour Members in the recent defence debate warned that that was likely, if only because of President Reagan's ludicrous proposals — which were meant for home public consumption rather than serious negotiations — and the problem of verification. The Minister should not be ingenuous about this. Otherwise we might believe him if he continues to adopt the attitude that this is not a serious problem for the Soviet Union. If he accepts these points, how long will it be before he realises that his policies will merely result in nuclear war in our lifetime?

Mr. Luce: I cannot understand why some Labour Members constantly ignore what has happened over the last few years. The SS20s pose a threat to western Europe. We have a primary duty to defend ourselves. We merely wish to ensure that we have a credible deterrent policy. We are not talking about first strike. The NATO Alliance is concerned with the defence of the Western world. I and many others are disturbed and alarmed at the fact that people, such as the hon. Gentleman, seem to want to ignore the facts and evidence that confront us.

Mr. Nicholas Soames (Crawley): The Russian walk out at Geneva should be deeply regretted. Nevertheless, should not Great Britain, with all its experience and expertise in world affairs, be involved in regular talks with Russia on other matters so that a useful and valuable line of communication can remain open to deal with these local difficulties?

Mr. Luce: I agree with my hon. Friend. That is what the Prime Minister recently said. My hon. Friend the Minister of State, the hon. Member for Edinburgh, Pentlands (Mr. Rifkind), was in Moscow earlier this year. My right hon. and learned Friend has visited Hungary, and the Prime Minister will be doing so shortly. Our objective is to have a dialogue with the Soviet Union, and we invite it to respond.

Mr. Robert Litherland (Manchester, Central): Is the Minister aware that the NATO Commander-in-Chief is reported to have said that if he were losing a traditional battle on European soil, he would use nuclear weapons, and that he had the political backing to do so? Will the Government give him that backing? Does not deployment of these weapons reflect the United States fallacy of a limited nuclear theatre war?

Mr. Luce: We are precisely in line with the policies pursued by previous Governments, including Labour Government. Our first priority is the defence of our way of life. At all costs, if we possibly can, we wish to avoid any conflict. That is what our policies are designed to achieve.

Mr. John Maples (Lewisham, West): One hopes that the breakdown in the talks will be temporary. However, has not every position adopted by the Soviet Union and every offer made by them, when unwrapped, effectively meant that it will continue to deploy several hundred SS20 warheads but that there will be no American deployment of Cruise or Pershing 2's?

Mr. Luce: That is exactly the point, and it is essential that people should understand it. The Russians wish to maintain a monopoly. They wish to prevent the United States from deploying these weapons and showing their commitment to the defence of Western Europe.

Mr. Paddy Ashdown (Yeovil): As the Minister—and the Secretary of State in his statement on the arrival of Cruise in Britain—placed great emphasis on the withdrawal of a significant number of nuclear weapons from Europe, may I draw to his attention the comments of Mr. Richard Wagner to the Military Constructions appropriations Sub-Committee of the House of Representatives on 20 April, when he said:

"Withdrawing weapons which are needed goes counter to everything we are trying to do to strengthen our posture in Europe. We do, however, frequently review our nuclear weapons posture and as we modernise the stockpile we do withdraw older unneeded warheads. For example, we have in the last year or so withdrawn 1,000 older weapons which we no longer need?"

Does the Minister agree that those weapons have been withdrawn not because they are a threat to the Russians, but because they are so old and out of date that they are probably a threat to our own troops? To represent that as a concession is damaging to our sincerity and negotiating posture. Does the Minister also recognise that far from imbalance—as agreed by a House of Representatives Congressional hearing recently—since START began 20 months ago, the United States has added—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman should watch the clock.

Mr. Ashdown: This is my last point, Mr. Speaker.

Since those talks began, the United States has added 900 warheads to its stockpile whereas the Soviet Union has added 600.

Mr. Luce: I continue to find it extraordinary that the hon. Gentleman does not find it possible to welcome the fact that the NATO Alliance has decided to reduce the number of warheads. The latest decision is to reduce this by another 2,000 short range nuclear weapons. That in itself must contribute to peace, and is a demonstration of our sincerity and desire to make progress. While we are reducing weapons, there is an increase in weapons on the other side. One additional SS20 a week has been deployed. We are now asking for a genuine response from the Soviet Union. We want that, await it and are ready to respond to it.

Mr. Healey: Do not these exchanges show that we all deplore the Soviet withdrawal from the talks? That is why I described it as serious and disturbing news, and suggested the steps that the West might take to secure a resumption of the talks. I regret that the Minister did not respond to that suggestion. If the talks can be resumed, the West is bound to take the view that President Reagan now takes—that equivalence in nuclear weapons does not require equality in every particular nuclear weapon. The Russians have a substantial superiority in intercontinental land-based missiles, but the Americans have a superiority of 5,000 to the Russians' 2,000 in submarine-launched warheads. Those are the figures in the Scowcroft report. A similar equivalence exists in Europe. All previous American and British Governments have accepted that the Soviet monopoly of land-based missiles was offset by the Western allocation of submarine-based missiles to SACEUR.

Is the Minister aware that the systematic leaking of the critical Soviet proposal—the one that arose from the so-called "walk in the woods" a few months ago—by the United States, and the leaking by the German Government of the so-called "walk in the park" proposal damaged the credibility of Western Governments in the disarmament talks? It is essential that we should now resume the talks in private, accept that equivalence, not equality, is the objective, and take the first step to secure resumption by freezing further deployment of nuclear weapons on our side on condition that the Soviets resume talks. We should then seriously explore the Soviet offer to reduce their SS20s by half compared with the number they have deployed now, and the number of warheads by more than half compared with those deployed in 1979.

Mr. Luce: I welcome the fact that the right hon. Gentleman deplores the withdrawal. As he rightly said, we cannot make progress with the Soviet Union unless we have proper discussions round the negotiating table and in private. I agree that our first priority must be to persuade the Soviet Union to have these discussions in private.

Mr. Healey: On all sides.

Mr. Luce: I agree. That is the first priority. At the same time, I am surprised that the right hon. Gentleman, with all his knowledge and experience, does not acknowledge that the Soviet Union is still insisting on an overwhelming monopoly of these weapons.

The right hon. Gentleman is right to suggest that we should seek a broad balance. It is essential that we have adequate deterrence. However, the right hon. Gentleman has not acknowledged the essential fact that the Soviet Union insist on having an overwhelming monopoly. Until

[Mr. Luce]

the Russians agree to talk about a balanced reduction of forces, it is difficult to envisage how we can make progress.

Emphysema (Compensation of Coal Miners)

4.50 pm

Mr. Geoffrey Lofthouse (Pontefract and Castleford):
I beg to move,

That leave be given to bring in a Bill to provide compensation for mineworkers under the Industrial Injuries Acts for emphysema.

Having discussed at some length the problem of the arms race and the millions of pounds that it will probably cost to blow us off the face of the earth, it is ironic that I, in my meak and mild way, should request the Government to provide a few measly pounds to protect and comfort the living.

Hon. Members will be aware that this is the third time that I have brought this matter to the attention of the House. I presented a Bill in October 1982 and a further Bill in March 1983. I make no apology for my persistence. I consider that those who suffer from emphysema and have become incapacitated, because they are or were coal miners, should be recognised as suffering from an industrial injury.

Miners suffer from many industrial diseases—for example pneumoconiosis and silicosis—which are recognised as being industrial illnesses. However, some are not. Unfortunately, emphysema falls into the latter category. The reason is that there is insufficient evidence to show that it is an occupational rather than a generalised disease. Recent research has shown that emphysema should no longer be classified in this way. It must be put alongside industrial diseases in the primary class, and thereby enable sufferers to receive compensation. As a result of the overwhelming research carried out in this sphere, it is unlikely that subsequent research will reveal anything new. In October 1982 I presented a detailed list of research. I do not intend to cite that detail again. I assure the House that it was scholarly and decisive.

Yesterday morning I received a letter from a constituent who is a consultant in respiratory diseases. He referred to the case of a non-smoking miner who was refused compensation by a pneumoconiosis panel. The same panel deals with cases of emphysema. He considered that the panel's reasoning for refusing compensation was poor. The letter states:

"Whilst I would accept the assessment of the pneumoconiosis panel that this man only qualifies for 10 per cent. compensation with regard to pneumoconiosis, I think that his respiratory disability is almost entirely related to his work in the colliery, and as such that it severely limits his exercisability.

I would strongly support his claim to receive further compensation on the basis of an obstructive airways disease related to the pneumoconiosis."

I challenge the authority of the pneumoconiosis panels. Rumour has it that many such panels consist of retired medical practitioners who need ready cash. I wonder how many members of the panels in Sheffield or in other parts of the country have specific qualifications in respiratory research or have attended courses on this subject in the past five years?

An editorial in *The Lancet* in March, which relied on a body of recent research, stated that emphysema in coal workers was an occupational illness and that sufferers should receive compensation. All hon. Members are aware that *The Lancet* has great authority. Eight months have

WEST GERMAN VOTE PAVES WAY FOR SOVIET WALKOUT

GENEVA, WEDNESDAY - WEST GERMANY'S DECISION TO GO AHEAD AND INSTALL PERSHING NUCLEAR MISSILES AFTER MONTHS OF POLITICAL SOUL-SEARCHING PAVED THE WAY FOR A SOVIET WALKOUT FROM EAST-WEST ARMS REDUCTION TALKS TODAY.

WHILE THE UNITED STATES BREATHED A SIGH OF RELIEF AND SAID IT WELCOMED LAST NIGHT'S 286 TO 226 BONN PARLIAMENT VOTE, NATO SOURCES IN GENEVA SAID THERE WERE SIGNS THAT THE KREMLIN WOULD USE THE DECISION TO WALK OUT FROM TWO AND-A-HALF YEARS OF TALKS ON LIMITING NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE.

THE FIRST OF A PLANNED TOTAL OF 108 AMERICAN PERSHING-2 MISSILES WERE EXPECTED TO ARRIVE IN WEST GERMANY TODAY FOR DELIVERY TO TWO U.S. MILITARY BASES NEAR FRANKFURT AND STUTTGART. SECURITY MEASURES AT THE TWO BASES WERE STEPPED UP IN CASE OF FRESH PROTESTS BY ANTI-NUCLEAR DEMONSTRATORS.

SOVIET OFFICIALS DECLINED TO COMMENT ON NATO PREDICTIONS OF A POSSIBLE WALKOUT, BUT THEY POINTED TO SOVIET PRESIDENT YURI ANDROPOV'S STATEMENT THAT THE APPEARANCE OF NEW AMERICAN PERSHING AND CRUISE MISSILES IN EUROPE WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTINUE THE GENEVA TALKS.

PRESS LINE

Lead across to
Janice at 1430
23/11

SOVIET UNION AND INF TALKS

It is a matter of profound regret that the Soviet Union has discontinued with no date for resumption the Geneva INF talks.

The first priority for the NATO Alliance since 1979 has been to seek a balanced and verifiable agreement to limit and if possible eliminate the deployment of ^{intermediate range nuclear} these missiles.

The West has proposed a number of ideas to achieve this and we have done all in our power to continue with these crucial negotiations. *my last week for US. put forward a new w construction proposal which remains on the table.*

During this period since we first gave the Soviet Union formal notice of our concern about ^{the} SS20 they have almost tripled the number of these missiles deployed.

Since 1981 when the first negotiations began, they have increased the numbers deployed by over 100 which is an increase of more than 40% over their 1981 position.

Throughout this build-up of Soviet SS20s, the West has remained at the Conference table. We have made it clear that we wish the negotiations to continue. This remains our firm position. Our first priority is a negotiated agreement.

Today not a single weapon of this sort is operationally deployed

in Europe on the Western side. The Soviet Union has 243 SS20s targetted on Western Europe.

There could be no justification therefore for a breakdown in the negotiations and we sincerely hope that these will be resumed as early as possible in the New Year.

Four years ago we made it clear to the Soviet Union that whilst our first priority was to conclude a satisfactory agreement, in the absence of such an agreement we would have to go ahead with the modernisation of our own intermediate range weapons systems by the end of 1983.

Final preparations for deployment have begun. In the interests of Alliance security, we will not be deflected from our intention to achieve operational deployment by the end of this year.

But it is important to stress that we remain prepared to halt or reverse any deployment that takes place if we are able to achieve an acceptable agreement with the Soviet Union; and we will spare no efforts to achieve this.

We must hope that an early Soviet return to the negotiating table will make this possible.

Prime Minister

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

I suspect that there will be greatly increased anti-nuclear agitation after the promised showing of the nuclear war film in this country.

This is a long shot, but I wonder whether it might not be worthwhile suggesting again, as the West did in 1946, the internationalisation of all nuclear energy?

This is still one simple and obvious way that the risk of nuclear war could seriously be diminished. The Acheson-Lilienthal plan of 1945/46 might just have been accepted by Stalin had not the US in 1946 written into the scheme a provision whereby, in cases in which there was a breach of the arrangement, the veto in the Security Council would not apply to the 'condign' punishment of an offending state.

Probably, however, Stalin would never have accepted a state of affairs in which the USSR would have had to live with a world in which the US had residual knowledge of how to split the atom, and they did not. But now? I just wonder.

Could someone look into the idea? It might mean major sacrifices by all of us - France above all - who had invested heavily in "atoms for peace". But it would have great benefits. If the Russians were to turn it down there would be a propaganda advantage to us.

Even if nothing were to come of any such proposal (and the odds must be that it would not) it might be helpful to you politically to propose such an idea; perhaps especially so with the US, if you were to couch the proposal in terms to recall Truman and Acheson-Lilienthal. Am I being too cynical? (Lord Salisbury in his last phase?) *As well as naive?*

Hugh Thomas

Lord Thomas.

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister.

22nd November 1983.

Box

Refer to

As they do not

Letter to F/C.O.

A.S.C. 8/12.



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~8307822~~ 218 6169

MO 18/1/2

22nd November 1983

*nbpm
DMS
22/11*

Dear Janet,

Following the recent decision by NATO Ministers at their meeting in Canada to reduce further the number of NATO nuclear warheads in Europe, we have had prepared the attached unclassified briefing note which might be drawn upon by Ministers in constituency, etc, speeches and discussions. As such, it forms a supplement to this Department's booklet "Nuclear Deterrence and Disarmament: Briefing Notes", copies of which I am also circulating with this letter.

Copies of this letter and of the enclosures go to John Coles at No 10, to Private Secretaries to other members of the Cabinet, and to Richard Hatfield in Sir Robert Armstrong's office.

*Yours sincerely,
Barry Neale*

(B P NEALE)
Private Secretary

Miss Janet Lewis-Jones
Private Secretary to the Lord President of the Council

BRIEFING NOTES FOR MINISTERS: REDUCTIONS IN NATO'S NUCLEAR STOCKPILE

At the meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in Canada on 27/28 October 1983, NATO's Defence Ministers endorsed the recommendations of a comprehensive review of the size and composition of NATO's nuclear forces in Europe. Their decisions will lead to the most radical reduction in the number of warheads in Western Europe ever to have taken place, and will reduce the stockpile of nuclear warheads to its lowest level in 20 years.

2. Since December 1979 - when NATO agreed to the 'dual track' approach to the modernisation of its intermediate range nuclear forces and to arms control efforts aimed at reducing the level of forces of both superpowers in a balanced and verifiable way - NATO has withdrawn 1,000 US nuclear warheads in Europe. In October this year NATO agreed to reduce the stockpile by a further 1,400 warheads. In addition NATO is committed to withdrawing one warhead from Europe for each Pershing II or cruise missiles it proves necessary to deploy. So over the next five to six years NATO plans to withdraw some 3,000 nuclear warheads. Even if full deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles take place, the number of warheads in Europe will have been cut by a third, and the number of warheads for shorter-range systems (eg aircraft and 'battlefield' nuclear weapons) will have been cut by a half. Five nuclear warheads will have been withdrawn for each new warhead deployed.

3. The reductions are not, as some critics have suggested, a propaganda ploy designed to offset the impact of the deployment of new NATO missiles in Europe. The report considered by Ministers represented the result of four years of intensive study by experts from NATO's capitals and military authorities. Nor will the warheads to be withdrawn consist solely of obsolete or unuseable weapons - all types of weapons system will contribute to the reductions. It is true of course to say that NATO has sought reductions in a way which would not compromise its essential security requirements. It would be quite wrong to do otherwise. Indeed the report considered by NATO's Defence Ministers also addressed possible improvements to shorter-range weapons systems and their supporting infrastructure - [although it should be stressed that such improvements are likely to be essentially evolutionary; the deployment of enhanced radiation or 'neutron' weapons was not considered.]

4. But NATO is a defensive Alliance. None of its weapons will ever be used except in response to attack. This enables NATO to review its stockpile carefully to ensure that not one weapon more than is needed for the purposes of deterrence is retained. The reductions agreed by all NATO nations demonstrate clearly that the West is not guilty of 'fuelling the arms race', that the Warsaw Pact has no cause to feel threatened by NATO and no

cause to continue the relentless quantitative and qualitative improvement of its own weapons systems, nuclear and conventional, and that NATO has no plans for 'limited nuclear warfare' in the European theatre.

5. In contrast, the Soviet Union is continuing to improve the quality and increase the numbers of its equivalent weapons systems, including in some cases their deployment forward in Eastern Europe. Soviet threats of 'countermeasures' to the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles are empty gestures. Such measures had been planned for years; in some cases the new missile systems concerned were in development even before NATO's December 1979 decision. There is no reason however why the Soviet Union should not now match NATO's action and make a substantial reduction in its own stockpile. This is what the peace movement should be calling for. NATO has made clear its determination to reduce its stockpile to the lowest level consistent with its security: it is now up to the Soviet Union to demonstrate whether it has an equal commitment to peace.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND DISARMAMENT

BRIEFING NOTES

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND DISARMAMENT

INTRODUCTION

1. The issues of nuclear deterrence and disarmament are of major public interest and debate. The Government welcomes informed discussion of these questions.

2. These briefing notes are designed for those who want information on the Government's policies in these fields. Much of the material is presented in the form of answers to the questions most frequently asked. But the opportunity has also been taken to include some relevant background material. The notes cover not only nuclear deterrence, but also the closely related issues of arms control and disarmament (principally the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and civil defence (a Home Office responsibility).

3. The notes are divided into 7 main sections: Pages

I. Key Points (Yellow Pages): Summary of the main points in the nuclear debate including Deterrence, Disarmament, Trident, Cruise Missiles and Civil Defence. 1-6

II. Speaking Notes on Nuclear Policy: Covering

- Deterrence 7
- Independent Nuclear Deterrent (Incl Trident) 8
- Cruise Missiles 10
- Disarmament (Incl INF, START) 12
- Unilateral Disarmament 13
- Civil Defence 15

<u>III. Questions and Answers on Nuclear Policy.</u>	16-50
<u>IV. Ethical Aspects:</u> Text of a speech by Sir John Nott.	51-58
<u>V. The Balance of Nuclear Forces.</u>	59-61
<u>VI. The British strategic deterrent and disarmament negotiations</u>	62-64
<u>VII. Government material on nuclear issues.</u>	65-68

4. In addition to these notes the Government has published a range of material on nuclear issues in the form of factsheets, brochures and films. Some of these are described in Section 7. For further information about these notes and other material please contact:

Ministry of Defence
Defence Secretariat 17
Room 9156
Main Building
Whitehall
London SW1

Telephone: 01-218 6016/2971

Ministry of Defence
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I - BRITAIN'S NUCLEAR POLICY: THE KEY POINTS TO MAKE

1. GENERAL

- a. The Government understands public concern about nuclear weapons; but they cannot be disinvented.
- b. The Government shares the same aim as the unilateral disarmers to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used; but we differ on the means to achieve this.
- c. We have avoided war in Europe for nearly 40 years. Anyone who wants to tear up existing policy must show that their alternative will work as well.

2. THE SOVIET THREAT

- a. Soviet ideology seeks to impose communist values if necessary using force or blackmail backed by threat of force.
- b. The Soviet Union has immense military power which is increasing all the time. In both nuclear and conventional forces it outnumbers NATO in Europe (Soldiers 1.2:1, Tanks 2.5:1, artillery 3:1, aircraft over 2:1) (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces 5:1).
- c. There is a proven Soviet willingness to resort to force to pursue its aims when they think they can get away with it (eg. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan).
- d. The Soviet threat can be resisted provided NATO has sufficient modern conventional and nuclear forces to deter aggression at any level.

3. THE CASE FOR DETERRENCE

- a. The aim of deterrence is to prevent war - nuclear or conventional - by persuading anyone thinking of attacking us that it would not be worth their while.
- b. As long as the Soviet Union possesses massive nuclear and non-nuclear forces, NATO needs sufficient of both to convince them that they could not hope to gain by using these forces.
- c. But deterrence is not the whole story: in parallel, whilst a military balance is maintained, we are constantly seeking lower levels of forces on both sides through arms control and disarmament.

4. THE CASE AGAINST ONE-SIDED NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

- a. One-sided nuclear disarmament by Britain would destabilise NATO and thus reduce the West's ability to deter aggression or the threat of force.
- b. It would not make UK any less of a target for attack because Soviet systems would still be aimed at us as a member of the Alliance.
- c. It takes no account of the existing Soviet conventional superiority (tanks, aircraft, guns) in Europe.
- d. The Russians, who give such priority to their military power, would never follow our example: they have said as much.
- e. It would cut no ice with countries thinking of acquiring nuclear weapons. Their actions will not be influenced by what the UK does, but by their own regional security interests.

f. It would undermine a number of important disarmament negotiations now in train aimed at reaching balanced multilateral force reductions and not merely limitations on growth. If the Russians believe that the West is going to disarm anyway this removes the incentive for them to negotiate seriously. In the START talks the US has proposed large cuts in the number of strategic nuclear missiles and a cut of a third in the numbers of warheads. At the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force talks in Geneva, the US has proposed the Zero Option which would eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons from both sides. If that is too radical for the Soviet Union, NATO would accept equal numbers of missile warheads at as low a level as the Soviet Union will accept. The Russians have submitted counter-proposals and both talks will take time.

g. There is no moral merit in abandoning nuclear weapons yet remaining in NATO and relying on US nuclear forces.

5. THE CASE FOR TRIDENT

a. The British independent deterrent strengthens our security by increasing the risks and uncertainties facing a potential aggressor in Europe. Our Polaris force has been supported by all recent Governments. The decision to acquire Trident has been welcomed by our NATO allies.

b. Polaris will need to be replaced by about 1995; the Trident decision has been taken to maintain this capability. Submarine launched cruise missile alternative would be more expensive. Failure to replace Polaris would be unilateral disarmament.

c. During the period when it is introduced into service Trident will account, on average, for only about 3% of the defence budget per year.

Its estimated cost will be less than that of the current Tornado aircraft programme. Trident is a more advanced system than Polaris. Its extra capability gives us an insurance against any advances in Soviet ABM defences well into the next century, and so strengthens its value as a deterrent.

6. THE CASE FOR NATO INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE (INF) MODERNISATION

a. NATO needs INF to deter the Russians from threatening limited nuclear strikes on Europe in the expectation that the USA would stand aside. The need for them was pressed mainly by the Europeans to convince the Russians that the USA is firmly committed to Europe's defence. This is not to suggest that we have any doubts about the resolve of the US to protect Europe. Deterrence is a matter not of what we think but what any would-be aggressor might think.

b. Imbalance of 5 to 1 in intermediate range nuclear forces in or targetted on Europe. Soviet SS20s already deployed; NATO's comparable capability (largely of US F111 aircraft) ageing and increasingly vulnerable. Cruise and Pershing II missiles are NATO means of modernising this capability.

c. The unanimous NATO decision to modernise its Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) was accompanied by a parallel offer to negotiate limitations with the Russians on these weapons. Negotiations began in 1981. The NATO aim is to eliminate INF land-based missiles of most concern to both sides (the zero option). However the US announced in March 1983 that they are prepared to negotiate an interim agreement, under which NATO would reduce its planned deployment if the Soviet Union would reduce their corresponding missile warheads to an equal level. This demonstrates our flexibility and determination to reach an agreement if at all possible.

7. MYTHS ABOUT CRUISE MISSILES

Cruise missiles are not:

- an American plan to fight a limited nuclear war in Europe; they are to deter the Russians from thinking they could do so.
- a new capability: US and UK aircraft based in Britain have been doing the same job for years.
- first strike weapons: NATO have no such policy and cruise missiles are too slow, too few and too limited in range.
- under sole US control. Matter for joint US/UK decision.

8. THE CASE FOR CIVIL DEFENCE

a. Deterrence can prevent war, but as long as the Soviet Union poses a threat to our security, any humane Government must cater for even the remotest possibility that war might come. Civil defence is not specific to nuclear attack but relevant to any form of attack affecting the civil population.

b. No civil defence measures could make any kind of war acceptable. But Government at all levels has a duty to help people if we were ever attacked.

c. Any form of attack short of thousands of nuclear bombs would leave many millions of survivors whose numbers could be increased by even elementary civil defence measures. Their survival and recovery would depend largely on the plans which had been made in peacetime and on the implementation of plans by the surviving agencies of government.

d. Our civil defence arrangements, are not so good at, say, public shelter provision, as those of such countries as Switzerland and Sweden. But they are as good if not superior to that of many other major nations. Warning of enemy attack, monitoring of intensity of fallout radiation, plans for continuation of government and essential services, and public information in a crisis, are all areas where our arrangements are at least as good as other countries. However we are constantly considering what improvements should be made in the light of the risk of war and available finances.

e. The Government is to strengthen the regulations placing civil defence functions on local authorities. The regulations will raise the standard of the nation's civil defence.

II - SPEAKING NOTES ON NUCLEAR POLICY

1. DETERRENCE

We in Britain belong to NATO, an organisation which was set up by the countries of Western Europe and North America after the Second World War, because of the fears caused by Russian expansion into Eastern Europe. NATO is a defensive Alliance; its members regard an attack on one as an attack on all, and are pledged to assist each other. The Alliance has no aggressive intentions against the Soviet Union or any other country. It is, however, the countries of the Warsaw Pact and in particular the Soviet Union, which present the greatest threat to our security. The Soviet Union has immense conventional and nuclear forces - far more than could reasonably be required for purely defensive purposes. The invasion of Afghanistan is only the most recent demonstration that the Soviet Union is prepared to use military strength to achieve its political objective. While, of course, NATO does not need to match the Warsaw Pact weapon for weapon, we do need a range of forces, nuclear and conventional, so as to be able to show that we can defend ourselves against attack at any level. By demonstrating this we aim to deter such an attack from ever being mounted against us in the first place.

Deterrence is not an attractive way of ensuring peace. But at least it has worked: it has helped to keep Europe at peace for almost 40 years, despite circumstances that were often difficult. To abandon our security system now, in favour of some alternative which would be quite unproven would be immensely dangerous. Deterrence provides the necessary stability to enable us to negotiate international agreements on disarmament measures which will really give us a safer world if they are verifiable and apply equally to both sides. The possession of nuclear weapons is an essential fact of deterrence: in a world where such weapons exist the NATO alliance must be able to deter their use by an enemy or to resist blackmail based on the threat of nuclear attack.

2. THE CASE FOR AN INDEPENDENT BRITISH NUCLEAR DETERRENT

Britain's nuclear forces are fully committed to the NATO Alliance, but they remain ultimately under the control of the United Kingdom Government. It is this independent control which makes their contribution to deterrence so important. Even if the Russians, perhaps some time in the future, thought they could take the risk of attacking the Alliance in the mistaken belief that the United States would not be prepared to use its nuclear weapons, they would also have to take account of those weapons - with enormous destructive power - in European hands. The risks and uncertainties they would face in starting a war would be so much greater. So, therefore, would the likelihood that they would be deterred. We have made this unique contribution to Alliance deterrence for over twenty-five years. Our Allies have repeatedly and clearly recognised its importance. To give it up, or let it fade away, would be an act of folly at a time when Soviet military power is growing at an alarming rate, and the disparity between the forces of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact is continuing to widen.

The Decision to Acquire Trident

Our Polaris submarines first came into service in the 1960s. They will continue to provide a formidable deterrent for the next decade or so. But it will become increasingly difficult and costly to maintain both submarines and missiles in service beyond the mid 1990s. In addition to being fully under United Kingdom control, any replacement system must be able to pose a convincing threat. In other words it must be able to inflict damage on the Soviet Union out of all proportion to any gains they might hope to make by attacking us. It must also be invulnerable to surprise attack. The choice of another nuclear-propelled submarine, like the Polaris boats, as the vehicle to carry the weapons was essentially dictated by this need for invulnerability. Unlike any land-based system, these submarines are almost impossible to detect once deployed in the deep oceans.

The choice of missile lay between another ballistic missile like Polaris, or a cruise missile. Cruise missiles cost less each. But much larger numbers are needed to provide an equivalent deterrent threat, and they are much more vulnerable to likely long-term improvements in Soviet defences. Because of the larger numbers, cruise missiles would need many more submarines, and these are the most expensive single component of a new force. A cruise missile force would therefore cost more. For a deterrent capability intended to last well into the next century, Trident has clear advantages over any other ballistic missile system on both operational and cost grounds. Its purchase from the US, on very favourable terms, will allow us to continue the highly successful collaboration which we have over Polaris. The decision to go for the Trident II (D5) system rather than the previously announced Trident I (C4) system is to retain commonality with the US Navy and avoid problems of the UK having to operate a unique system. This will save money overall. It is not because we need the increased accuracy or capability of the D5 missile. The decision to process Trident missiles in the US is also to take advantage of commonality and save money. It will not lessen the independence of the UK deterrent.

The Cost of Trident

Trident will clearly be a major item in the defence programme. But it is similar to other major programmes like the Tornado aircraft, taking about 3% of the total defence budget on average during the period when it is introduced into service. Once in service it will, like Polaris, be very economical in running costs and its demand on skilled Service manpower. Over the last twenty-five years we have devoted between 2% and 10% of the defence budget to our strategic nuclear forces, so Trident does not represent any dramatic change. It should not be seen as an addition to the defence programme, but an integral part of it. The Trident programme will not prevent continued improvements in other areas of Britain's contribution to NATO. But it is hard to imagine any way in which this money could be spent on other defence uses which

would make such a major contribution to the collective security of the Alliance. The most costly part of the system, the Trident submarines, will be built in the UK. Over its life, cost will be less than 20 pence per person per week.

3. GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (GLCMs)

Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have had intermediate or medium range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe for many years. For over ten years NATO's longer range forces of this type have been the F111 and the Vulcan aircraft based in the UK. The Vulcans were retired in 1982, leaving approximately 170 F111 aircraft. The force is ageing and becoming increasingly vulnerable to new Soviet weapons. Over the period the Russians have been modernising and increasing their equivalent forces, so that they have some 850 INF missiles and aircraft aimed at Europe, including the formidable SS20 missile system. Over 350 SS20s, each with 3 warheads, have now been deployed, two-thirds threatening Western Europe. For NATO to do nothing could give the Russians the impression that they could use their growing nuclear arsenal to threaten limited strikes against Western Europe from a sanctuary in the Soviet Union - strikes which they would judge as being not sufficiently devastating as to provoke an all-out response by NATO's strategic weapons. For these reasons the Alliance judged that some modernisation of its capability was necessary to sustain deterrence. Therefore, in December 1979 NATO Ministers decided unanimously to introduce Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles in Europe, starting in 1983.

In parallel with this decision to deploy GLCMs and Pershings the Alliance offered to negotiate limits on the numbers of intermediate range nuclear weapons. To show that NATO was not seeking an arms race, the US unilaterally withdrew 1000 nuclear warheads from Europe and have undertaken to withdraw further warheads on a one-for-one basis as the new missiles are deployed. In response to this offer, the Soviet Union initially refused to talk, but eventually they agreed to negotiations which began on 30 November 1981. Just

before the start of these negotiations NATO proposed the 'zero option' solution, ie cancellation of the planned Pershing II and cruise deployments if the Russians would dismantle all their similar missiles, notably the SS20s. The limits must be on all missiles world-wide. The SS20 has sufficient range to strike targets in Europe when based east of the Ural Mountains.

NATO is pursuing the zero option as far and away the best solution to the problem of medium range missiles, but if that is too radical for the Soviet Union, we are prepared to agree to equal numbers of missile warheads at as low a level as the Soviet Union will accept. The end of 1983, when the first cruise and Pershing II missiles will be installed, will be no deadline for the negotiations. They can continue. The programme to install NATO missiles stretches over five years and could at any stage be stopped, changed or reversed following success in the negotiations. But postponement or cancellation of NATO's plans to introduce Cruise and Pershing II missiles would certainly wreck the chances of agreement to reduce missile numbers on both sides.

If it could be achieved such an agreement would increase confidence between East and West and pave the way for further negotiations on other systems, such as medium range aircraft.

The NATO decision of December 1979 underlines the Americans commitment to the defence of Europe. It is not part of some plot to ensure that a limited war can be fought on European soil which will not involve the superpowers. Nor does it mean that Britain is made more of a target for nuclear attack. The Americans have never assumed that they could limit a nuclear war to Europe. It was in fact the Europeans themselves who wanted cruise missiles in Europe to deter the Russians from any belief that they could fight a nuclear war in Europe without putting Russian territory at risk. Cruise missiles do not give NATO a new capability. They simply modernise an existing capability hitherto provided by Vulcan and F111 aircraft.

4. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Britain is committed to international negotiations for agreement on measures to limit and reduce the high level of armaments throughout the world. In the words of the Prime Minister at the second UN Special Session on Disarmament in June 1982, we are working for 'the balanced and verifiable reduction of armaments in a manner which enhances peace and security'. Britain, with its allies, was responsible for the zero option on INF. British delegations play a full role in negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament (CD) at Geneva, in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) at Vienna, and the review meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) at Madrid. Britain takes part in regular disarmament discussions at the United Nations, in the European Community and in NATO.

We have now entered an important new phase of disarmament negotiations. The prizes are high and the path may be difficult; but there is no substitute for the patient work of diplomatic negotiation. The radical proposals which NATO has put forward offer an unprecedented opportunity for the nations of East and West to reach agreement on practical measures of nuclear arms control and disarmament. Serious negotiations are now taking place between the United States and the Soviet Union on reducing both strategic arms (START) and intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). Britain is involved through the close consultations which take place in NATO.

For example, Britain strongly supports the so-called 'zero option' for long-range INF missiles, under which NATO would scrap its plans to deploy Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe, in return for the dismantling of the comparable SS4, SS5 and SS20 missiles targetted on Western Europe. This would be far and away the best solution. But in the absence of agreement on it, there would have to be balanced numbers, agreed at the negotiating table in Geneva.

Britain has warmly welcomed the opening of the US/Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in June 1982. These concern the central strategic systems of the two sides: Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and long-range bombers. Britain has given its backing to the radical proposal made by the US for large cuts in strategic ballistic missiles and warheads. The Soviet counter-proposal of a 25% cut in strategic systems does not go so far, but signifies a willingness to move towards substantial reductions.

Success in these negotiations would be helpful to progress in other areas of arms control, such as achieving a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons tests. Our negotiations with the US and USSR from 1977 to 1980 failed because the three parties could not agree on measures to prevent cheating. The verification problem is being studied by a working group in the Committee on Disarmament, to which British experts are contributing ideas.

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to further countries is essentially a political problem which must be tackled by international cooperation. Efforts in recent years have concentrated on making the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) more effective. Britain plays a leading part in these efforts to improve access to the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy, while minimising the risk of transferring sensitive technology. We also support the setting up of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) by international agreement in areas against which nuclear weapons are not deployed, as in Latin America.

5. ONE-SIDED DISARMAMENT

Against this background of multilateral effort, the Government does not accept that unilateral disarmament is a rational policy. NATO's strategy of deterrence has helped keep the peace in Europe for nearly 40 years. To abandon

our security system now, in favour of an untried and unproven alternative would be immensely dangerous. Unilateral nuclear disarmament by the UK would do nothing to reduce the risk of war - indeed by undermining NATO's ability to deter aggression, such a move might make war more likely. Proposals of unilateral nuclear disarmament overlook the existing imbalance in conventional forces in Europe in favour of the Warsaw Pact. Without the restraint imposed by nuclear weapons, there would be greater uncertainty and instability.

There is no evidence to suggest that unilateral nuclear disarmament by the UK would persuade others to follow suit. Mr Andropov has said quite clearly that the Soviet Union would not do so. Indeed the whole history of unilateralism is a succession of unrequited gestures. To take but a few examples: the events of the 1930s show only too clearly how restraint by one side in the face of re-armament by the other can lead to disaster. After the Second World War, Britain unilaterally destroyed its offensive capability in chemical weapons and the US has allowed its capability to decline (NATO as such does not possess chemical weapons); by contrast the Soviet Union has continued to build up its CW capability (estimated as at least 300,000 tonnes of chemical agents, much of it in forward areas with modern delivery systems) and to develop a chemical war-fighting doctrine. Between 1968 and 1974 the US carried out a planned reduction of its defence budget, whereas the Soviet Union proceeded with a programme of military expansion. While NATO's collective military expenditure fell in real terms by 9.4% between 1969 and 1978, that of the Warsaw Pact rose by 31.5%. Since 1968, when the superpowers agreed to start negotiations on nuclear disarmament, NATO has deliberately refrained from deploying new Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe. In 1976 - within one year of signing the Helsinki Final Act on Security and Co-operation in Europe - the Soviet Union began to install the new SS-20 missiles targetted on European cities. In 1981 the US completed a unilateral withdrawal of 1000 nuclear warheads from Europe; the response from the Russians has been nil.

The weight of evidence shows that unilateral action by one side removes the incentive for the other to negotiate. There is a danger that talk of one-sided disarmament moves - however well intentioned - will encourage the Russians to block present multilateral negotiations in the belief that if they wait long enough the West will disarm on its own, damaging its security interests, without obtaining Soviet concessions in return.

6. CIVIL DEFENCE

NATO and the UK seek to avoid war through deterrence. That policy has succeeded and will continue to do so provided the Alliance maintains its unity and strength. But as long as we believe that the Soviet Union proves a real threat to our security any humane Government must cater for even the remotest possibility that deterrence might fail and that war might come. If that ever happened our basic civil defence arrangements could save millions from the effects of attack. These arrangements include an effective warning of attack and fallout radiation, practical advice to help people survive the attack, stockpiles of vital supplies, arrangements for medical care and the continuation of government at all levels to organise recovery. No civil defence arrangements could possibly reduce the consequences of a large scale nuclear attack to a level which would make nuclear war acceptable to the UK. But it is the Government's duty to be able to help survivors if we were ever attacked, remote as that possibility is.

For this reason the Government is to strengthen the regulations placing civil defence functions on local authorities, which will be required to arrange for the peacetime training and exercising of staff and volunteers. Local authorities (including district councils and London boroughs) will also have to provide emergency headquarters. The new regulations will raise the standard of the nation's civil defence.

III - QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT NUCLEAR POLICY

Q1. ISN'T HIGH EXPENDITURE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNACCEPTABLE AT A TIME WHEN SPENDING ON, FOR EXAMPLE, HEALTH, EDUCATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE IS BEING DRASTICALLY REDUCED?

A1. The Government understands and sympathises with the feelings of those people who believe that money devoted to defence would, at a time of economic stringency, be better spent on other areas of public expenditure. No Government in a democratic state wants to pile up weapons which are unnecessary. There are many ways of spending money which would be more popular with the electorate. The Government of the Soviet Union - which is not responsible to any electorate - spends twice as high a proportion of its resources on defence as we do. However, the first responsibility of the Government must be the security of the nation, and if they were to put that security at risk by inadequate precautions they would inevitably endanger all the things such as health, education and social welfare, which we quite rightly value in our society. We, and a good many others, learnt that lesson the hard way in the 1930s and World War II. Unilateral disarmament was tried then, and failed. It must not be allowed to happen again. Our nuclear forces cost us well under one half of one per cent of total government expenditure.

Q2. ISN'T IT BETTER TO BE RED THAN DEAD?

A2. You say that you would rather be "red" than "dead". It would be a miserable choice to have to make; but fortunately it is not one that any of us has to face. The main object of the defence policy of this and preceding Governments is to ensure that we shall never have to do so. We belong to NATO, and we are committed with our Allies to the strategy of deterrence. The aim of this strategy is to make it clear that any attack on any NATO member would involve risks to the aggressor out of all proportion to the advantages which he might hope to gain. This firm defence strategy of deterrence has kept peace and maintained freedom in Western Europe for some 38 years now. As long as we maintain deterrence, there is no reason why the British people should ever have to decide to be "red" or "dead". This is a bogus choice: it is better to be neither than either.

Q3. ISN'T 'DETERRENCE' AN OBSOLETE EXCUSE FOR THE ARMS RACE?

A3. Deterrence means preventing war. We have to accept that nuclear weapons, including the knowledge, technology and materials necessary to make them, exist in both East and West. The policy of all British Governments in recent times, and all our Western Allies, is based on nuclear deterrence: to ensure that the Soviet leadership can never calculate that any possible gain from starting a war against us would be worth the risks. But that is not the end of it. No-one, especially from within the ethical traditions of the free world, can rest comfortably on such a policy alone as the basis of international peace for the rest of time. That is why we have to search unremittingly for better ways of ensuring a stable world. Vital amongst these is the Government's commitment to pursue effective measures of arms control and disarmament. But in the meantime, for deterrence to remain effective, we must from time to time modernise our equipment as existing systems become obsolete.

Q4. AREN'T YOU NOW PLANNING FOR A LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR?

A4. The West does not believe that nuclear weapons could be used to achieve a military victory in any meaningful sense; and once nuclear exchanges began there would be an appalling risk of escalation into all-out nuclear war. We and our Allies need no convincing of this.

But we also have to convince the Russians that they could not hope to win a limited nuclear war either. With the deployment of accurate modern weapons like the SS20 missile system, the Russians have greatly improved their ability to mount limited nuclear strikes on our military bases and shipping. The purpose of, for example, mobile cruise missiles is to demonstrate that we have the means of responding to such attacks (and of evading them) without having to resort immediately to all-out retaliation.

We have no desire to fight a limited nuclear war and no belief that we could in any sense win one; our aim is simply to ensure that the Russians do not believe that they could win one.

(See also All)

Q5. WHY HAVE YOU DECIDED TO BUY TRIDENT?

A5. The existing Polaris force entered service in the 1960s. By the 1990s it will be approaching the end of its useful life - in particular the submarine hulls and associated machinery will start wearing out. To fail to plan to replace it - which means taking decisions now because of the long time it takes to get defence equipment into service - would be to give up unilaterally our independent deterrent which has helped keep the peace in Europe for over 30 years. It could make war more likely, not less. All the options for a successor system were carefully examined and it was decided that once again a ballistic missile force based on nuclear powered submarines (which can hide deep in the oceans, virtually invulnerable from attack) was the most appropriate system.

Q6. WHY IN PARTICULAR HAVE YOU GONE FOR THE TRIDENT D5 SYSTEM?

A6. It was originally intended to adopt the Trident I C4 system, which would be adequate to meet the UK's deterrent needs. However this will be phased out of US service earlier than expected. So as to retain commonality and avoid problems of the UK having to support a system which only it operates ("uniqueness") the Government has decided to go instead for the Trident II (D5) system. This will be cheaper in the longer run, and it will still only cost on average about 3% of the defence budget over the next 18 years. D5 was not chosen because of the increased accuracy or capability of the missile system.

Q7. ISN'T TRIDENT D5 MORE THAN THE UK NEEDS? WHAT ABOUT PROLIFERATION?

A7. Certainly the C4 system would have met the UK's deterrent needs. But Trident has to provide the UK's strategic deterrent until well into the 21st century. It has to be capable of coping with advances in Soviet missile defences. Like Polaris, Trident will consist of 4 submarines each with 16 missile tubes. Trident certainly has the capability to carry more warheads. But it has been made clear that there is no intention of using the full capability of the system. When it enters service in the 1990s, Trident will represent the same small proportion of Soviet Strategic forces (even if these are reduced on the lines of the US START proposals) as did Polaris when it entered service in 1970.

Q8. WHY DID YOU DECIDE TO PROCESS TRIDENT MISSILES IN THE US?

A8. Again, to take advantage of commonality with the US Navy System and to save money (several hundred million pounds compared with earlier plans).

Q9. CRUISE MISSILES ARE "FIRST STRIKE" WEAPONS - HOW DO YOU RECONCILE THIS WITH A POLICY OF DEFENCE AND DETERRENCE?

A9. NATO concepts of deterrence do not envisage any type of "first strike" - the main aim is to maintain the peace. But in any event, as the Soviet Union can see quite clearly, the West has not and is not developing the physical capability for a "first strike" strategy even if we wanted one.

A "first strike" means a surprise attack intended to destroy an opponent's nuclear weapons and, hence, remove his ability to retaliate. Cruise missiles are neither intended for a "first strike" role, nor are they capable of it.

Cruise missiles, because of their slow speed, would take 3-4 hours to reach the Soviet Union from the UK. Any kind of mass attack by cruise missiles would be detected in plenty of time for the Soviet authorities to mobilise their own nuclear forces before it arrived. The number to be deployed in Europe is much smaller than the number of Soviet missile silos, many of which are beyond the range of cruise missiles based in Europe, and in addition the Russians have now deployed over 350 mobile SS20 ballistic missiles, of which about two thirds face Western Europe. These are invulnerable to attack once they have deployed away from their main bases. Like the West, the Soviet Union also has missile-firing submarines with nearly 1,000 ballistic missiles which provide the ultimate guarantee against any attempt to mount a first strike attack.

These factors were a consideration in the NATO decision to deploy cruise missiles, it was intended that they should be clearly deterrent and defensive rather than aggressive systems.

Q10. YOU SAY THAT NATO DOES NOT PLAN A FIRST NUCLEAR STRIKE, BUT SURELY THAT IS NOT WHAT MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAVE SAID?

A10. NATO is a purely defensive Alliance and its leaders have pledged that none of its weapons conventional or nuclear would ever be used except in response to attack. NATO leaders solemnly committed themselves to this in Bonn in June 1982. NATO's strategy of flexible response makes clear that, faced with the possibility of overwhelming defeat at the conventional level, the Alliance reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in its defence. The purpose of this strategy is to create the strongest doubt in the mind of Soviet planners about their ever being able to limit the extent of a war to Europe. The fact that the Alliance has necessarily thought through all its possible courses of action in the worst possible case should not be interpreted to mean that such an outcome is regarded as probable or even likely; nor should it be allowed to obscure the fact that NATO's strategy remains essentially one of deterrence.

[Note: Essential for questioner to recognise 'first strike' and 'first use' are technical terms which often become confused. As explained in the answer to Q9 'first strike' means a surprise nuclear attack designed to destroy an opponent's nuclear weapons and hence his ability to retaliate. It forms no part of any NATO intentions. 'First use' means using nuclear weapons first in an existing conventional conflict. NATO recognises this is a course which cannot be ruled out in advance, for example, in a situation where the Alliance was facing defeat at the conventional level. This is not to say that it would not be a course involving a very great degree of risk.]

(See also A12)

Q11. WHY SHOULD WE TRUST THE UNITED STATES WHEN THEY CLEARLY INTEND TO LIMIT ANY FUTURE WAR TO EUROPE?

A11. If the US wanted to limit any future war to Europe without themselves being involved, the last thing they should do would be to station their forces and their nuclear weapons in Europe. The decision to deploy US Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe enhances deterrence by demonstrating to the Russians that the US see the defence of Europe as indissoluble from the defence of their own country. The Russians would know very well that the US President had agreed to any decision to fire the missiles and in fact they have stated that they would regard any attack by US nuclear weapons in Europe as coming from the US itself. There can be no illusion therefore on either side that Europe can be fought over in a limited war, away from superpower sanctuaries.

Q12. WHY IS NATO UNWILLING TO FOLLOW THE SOVIET UNION'S PLEDGE NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

A12. The first thing to say here is that the NATO Heads of Government made a promise at their meeting in Bonn in June last year that no NATO weapons, nuclear or conventional, will ever be used, except in response to attack. The Government believe that a declaration of "no first use" of nuclear weapons would not reduce the chance of war, but would in fact increase the risk. Their reasoning is as follows: The fact is that NATO is confronted by massive Warsaw Pact conventional forces. In foreseeable circumstances, therefore, there could be a temptation for the Russians to threaten to fight a successful limited war in Europe which, they might gamble, need not provoke the Americans into using intercontinental nuclear weapons. NATO policy is to ensure that the Russians can never be certain that they will be able to fight a limited war in Europe. If we were to make a "no first use" declaration we would risk removing the uncertainty in the Russians' minds and thereby greatly increasing the risk of their being tempted into a conventional attack on Europe. They would also be in a far stronger position to limit our freedom by threatening such an attack. This does not mean that NATO are in any sense committing themselves to any decision in principle to use nuclear weapons first if we found ourselves losing a war fighting with conventional weapons. It simply means that we think it would be wrong, in the interests of preventing war, to volunteer to renounce the option. The Soviet pledge is selective; it does not rule out aggression with conventional weapons (like the Bonn declaration), and is of doubtful value since it could never be sufficiently relied on should war ever break out.

Q13. WHY DO WE NEED CRUISE MISSILES?

A13. At the beginning of NATO's history it was assumed that any serious Soviet attack on the West would be met by the full strength of the Western nuclear strategic force. This was called the doctrine of 'massive retaliation'. It was the agreed strategy of the Alliance for several years. It became, however, steadily more clear that this was not an entirely credible deterrent, particularly as the Soviet Union acquired its own strategic nuclear arsenal. The Russians might well doubt whether the Alliance would in fact respond with a full nuclear strike against Soviet use of its massive superiority in conventional forces. Thus, there came into being the present Alliance strategy of flexible response. This strategy does not mean that we need to match the Russians exactly at all levels of armaments. It does mean that if we are to have an effective deterrent, that deterrent must operate at all levels, and not just at the level of strategic nuclear forces.

The Soviet Union has modernised and significantly upgraded its capability at the so called 'intermediate range' level. The European allies become worried in the late 70s that the Soviet Union was building up medium-range nuclear forces (the SS20s) whereas NATO had nothing comparable. It was feared that this growing imbalance in this particular range of weaponry might tempt the Soviet Union into adventures in Europe. The Russians might well believe that their medium range nuclear forces would enable them in a crisis to bring coercive pressure to bear on Europe with impunity. Hence the 'double track' decision by NATO in December 1979. We agreed that we would, if necessary, modernise our intermediate medium-range forces (consisting of ageing aircraft) by introducing Cruise and Pershing to replace out-of-date weaponry thus reasserting the NATO deterrent at every level. At the same time, however, we would try to open negotiations with the Soviet Union which would make this INF modernisation unnecessary by persuading them to get rid of the SS20s. This NATO decision has now led to the negotiations in Geneva. Without that NATO

A13. Continued

decision there would have been no negotiations, and if we now abandon the decision to modernise if necessary, then it is clear that the negotiations would not succeed. The Russians may agree to a workable arrangement at Geneva, provided they are clear in their own minds that without such an arrangement we have the determination to modernise our own forces. Failure by the West to modernise would demonstrate that we had neither the capability nor the will to provide credible deterrent forces.

Q14. WHAT ARE THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONTROL OF CRUISE MISSILES IN THE UK?

A14. Arrangements for the control of cruise missiles will be exactly the same as those which have governed the use of all the US nuclear weapons systems - aircraft and ballistic missile submarines - which have been based in the country for over 30 years. These are provided for in an understanding, first reached between Mr Attlee and President Truman in 1951, reaffirmed by Mr Churchill and President Truman in 1952 and subsequently reaffirmed on each change of President or Prime Minister, which lays down that any such use would be a matter for joint decision by the two Governments. The arrangements for implementing the understanding have recently been reviewed in the light of the planned deployment of US cruise missiles in the UK, and both the Prime Minister and the President have satisfied themselves that they are effective. As the Prime Minister has said: "The effect of the understandings and of the arrangements for implementing them is that no nuclear weapon would be fired or launched from British territory without the agreement of the British Prime Minister" (Hansard 12 May 1983, Column 435)

Separate point: The understanding will apply to all US cruise missiles based in the UK whether on or off base.

Q15. WHY CAN WE NOT HAVE A "DUAL KEY" SYSTEM OF CONTROL?

A15. The option of having a "dual key" was open to the British Government in 1979 when the decision was taken to deploy US cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe. This would however have involved buying the missiles and the supporting equipment and providing British Servicemen to man them with the United States providing only the nuclear warheads. The cost of this would have been in the order of a billion pounds together with the cost of well over 1000 British Servicemen. The Government was entirely satisfied with the existing arrangements for joint decision making which had applied to US weapons in this country for over 30 years, and decided that the money would be better spent on other items in the defence budget.

Q16. IF THE EXISTENCE OF SOVIET SS20's WITH NO CORRESPONDING WESTERN SYSTEMS TO MATCH THEM CONSTITUTES AN UNACCEPTABLE THREAT TO THE WEST, HOW HAVE WE LIVED SAFELY THROUGH THE LAST FEW YEARS?

A16. NATO's earlier LRINF eg British Vulcan bombers and US F111's have either been phased out or are ageing and increasingly vulnerable to Soviet air defence. Meanwhile Soviet SS20s have grown to their present level of 1000 warheads. As men like Helmut Schmidt and Henry Kissinger have pointed out, this situation risks becoming very unhealthy for European security and stability. Even in peace-time we have seen the effect of the SS20 programme on public confidence. In the event of major crisis it could give rise to dangerous Soviet miscalculations or at the very least a temptation to apply coercive pressure on Western Europe. The price of freedom is eternal vigilance and a continuous readiness to keep the deterrent in good repair.

Q17. SURELY CRUISE MISSILES ARE A NEW TYPE OF WEAPON, AND REPRESENT AN ESCALATION OF THE ARMS RACE?

A17. Cruise missiles incorporate advanced technology; but there is nothing new about the basic concept. Cruise missiles are unmanned missiles which fly at slow speed (about the same as a commercial jet) and low level (to avoid radar detection). The German doodlebug of World War II was a first generation cruise missile. Advantage has now been taken of modern technology to enable cruise missiles to fly accurately over longer distances, by using onboard computers and guidance equipment to guide a course to the target. There is nothing new either about the idea of intermediate range nuclear forces - ones which can reach targets in Western Europe from bases in the Soviet Union and vice-versa. The Russians have had this capability in the form of ballistic missiles (SS4, SS5) for many years. NATO has had it in the form of UK Vulcan and US F111 aircraft based in the United Kingdom. The Russians have elected to modernise their capability; the SS20 is mobile where the SS4 and SS5 were not; it has longer range; and it has multiple warheads. Modernisation is necessary on the NATO side because aircraft are becoming increasingly vulnerable to Warsaw Pact air defences. Cruise missiles will maintain and modernise a Western capability which has up to now been provided by aircraft.

Cruise missiles will not escalate the "arms race". It is the Soviet Union who in recent years have greatly expended their nuclear forces, in particular with the introduction of large numbers of SS20- missiles, threatening Western Europe from bases in the Soviet Union. There is no attempt by the West to match the Soviet forces exactly; cruise is of shorter range than the SS20, has a much longer flight time, has only one warhead (SS20 has three) and total numbers planned involve fewer warheads or launchers than the Soviet Union has already deployed. They are on the contrary designed to strengthen deterrence by maintaining a credible capability in an area where the Russians have greatly improved theirs.

The Soviet Union is also devoting significant resources to developing cruise missile technology for deployment in the land, sea or air modes. We expect Soviet missiles of this kind to be in service in the next few years.

Q18. HAVEN'T CRUISE MISSILES TURNED THE UNITED KINGDOM, ESPECIALLY GREENHAM COMMON AND MOLESWORTH, INTO A PRIME SOVIET TARGET?

A18. Soviet missiles have been targetted on Western Europe, including the UK, for many years. In the unlikely event of conflict our political, geographical and industrial importance inevitably makes the United Kingdom a primary target. But there is no reason to suppose that the cruise missile peacetime bases at Greenham Common and Molesworth would be priority targets. The missiles would be moved from their bases to secret locations in times of tension to prevent the enemy being able to make a direct attack on them. These dispersal locations do not need any advance preparation since the only requirement is for a reasonably level piece of ground with some concealment against air attack. Cruise missiles can be moved from one site to another at frequent intervals. However the key point is that the presence of cruise missiles will strengthen deterrence and make a war less likely in the first place. Nuclear weapons have been based in the UK for more than 30 years with precisely this aim.

The only way to remove this threat is to remove the Soviet missiles themselves.

Q19. WHY HASN'T PARLIAMENT BEEN CONSULTED?

A19. You allege a lack of democratic involvement in the decision to site cruise missiles in the UK. Parliament has in fact been kept fully informed of the Government's policy on this issue. Mr Pym, who was then Defence Secretary, told the House of Commons on 13 December 1979 of NATO's 'double decision' to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles from the end of 1983 and to offer the Russians negotiations to limit this class of weapon. In January 1980 he initiated the first debate on nuclear weapons in the House of Commons for 15 years. This debate covered the whole field of Britain's nuclear defence policy, including of course the prospect of the deployment here of cruise missiles, and in the vote at the end of the debate the Government's policy was clearly endorsed. Since then the House has on three major occasions debated nuclear defence issues, the latest debate being on 15 December 1982, which again focussed on the NATO 'double track' decision of December 1979. The issue has been raised in both Houses on a number of occasions, and there will no doubt continue to be many opportunities for Parliament to express itself on these matters. The general election on 9 June 1983 clearly demonstrated that the majority of the British public preferred the defence policies of the Government.

NATO's programme to deploy the new intermediate range missiles in Europe is of course not irreversible. It is to be spread over 5 years and could at any time be amended, stopped or reversed if agreement in the arms control negotiations warranted it. The choice therefore lies with the Russians, if they are prepared to negotiate seriously and in good faith about the missiles in question. But it is only because NATO has remained firm and united that the Russians have been brought to the negotiating table at all.

O20. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ZERO OPTION?

A20. The United States - on behalf of NATO and with the support of all the NATO Governments - has offered to cancel all plans for Pershing 2 and Cruise Missiles in Europe if the Russians will dismantle their similar missiles (the older generation of SS4s and SS5s and the notorious SS20s). This radical proposal to cut nuclear weapon levels is argueably the most important arms control offered since the SALT negotiations began. It would eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. Bilateral US/Soviet negotiations about these missiles opened in Geneva on 30 November 1981 and the fifth round began in May 1983.

While the zero option is far and away the best solution to improve East/West stability NATO has always said that it would consider any serious and fair proposal from the Russians. In the absence of agreement on the zero option NATO would be guided by the principle of seeking, across the negotiating table, balanced reductions for both sides.

Q21. MR ANDROPOV'S OFFER TO REDUCE SS20s?

A21. The Soviet Union is seeking to use the INF negotiations to prevent NATO modernisation without any meaningful concessions on their part. The Russians original proposals (reduction to 300 of what they call "medium-range systems" on each side) would have left them with all their SS20 missiles but permitted NATO no installation of Cruise or Pershing II missiles to counter the Soviet threat. This is because the Soviet Union includes in its calculation of the balance the British and French independent strategic deterrents, as well as large numbers of US nuclear capable aircraft, while ignoring comparable systems on their side. In December 1982 Mr Andropov offered to reduce the numbers of SS20s in Europe - a step in the right direction if the Russians are finally acknowledging the special threat posed by SS20s, and an offer to be probed at the negotiations. But the offer is, like the original Russian proposals, conditional upon no installations of Cruise or Pershing II missiles by NATO and so would leave the Russians with a monopoly in this type of missile. Clearly this would not amount to fair or balanced arms control.

The Soviet claim that Soviet SS20s match the independent forces of Britain and France is no excuse. The British force is a submarine force, excluded from the negotiations by definition, just in the same way as US and Soviet submarines. These Strategic missiles are for a different purpose and are in no way comparable to the SS20s.

O22. WHAT ABOUT STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATIONS AND WHY AREN'T BRITISH FORCES INCLUDED?

A22. You ask why the British strategic nuclear deterrent is excluded from the current negotiations on nuclear arms control. The first point to make is that the British nuclear deterrent is very small in proportion to the forces of the superpowers. This will still be the case once Trident replaces Polaris. Our Polaris force of four submarines has a maximum 64 missiles. The same goes for Trident. This compares with the Soviet Union's 2,350 missiles of strategic range (to say nothing of almost 2000 Soviet nuclear missiles of lower ranges including over 350 SS20s). Secondly the British force of four submarines is the minimum required to provide an effective deployment: we could not reduce from this number. The small British deterrent is a weapon of last resort - the final guarantee of national sovereignty.

There are two negotiations on nuclear arms control in progress in Geneva at the moment. The Russians are now demanding that our sea-based strategic nuclear weapons should be taken into account in the negotiations on land-based Intermediate range Nuclear Forces (INF). This is a curious demand. The INF talks are specifically not about strategic weapons. British Polaris submarines (like Trident to come) can no more be part of INF negotiations than the American and Russian missile-firing submarines of comparable type. The reason for the Russians' demand is not hard to discover. Despite the fact that there are no NATO counterparts to their SS20 missiles targetted on Europe, they have been trying to claim that there is already a balance between the two sides' intermediate range weapons which NATO deployments would upset. To 'justify' this they make the claim that our strategic weapons are INF. This claim cannot be substantiated in fact. Britain's independent deterrent is a sea-based strategic weapon of last resort. It is different in character and purpose to that of INF. Furthermore the Russians themselves have recognised their status in the SALT I Agreement in which they added a unilateral footnote to the effect that

A22. Continued

they believed that the British and French nuclear deterrents should be counted in agreements as strategic weapons. There is a further important point. What the Russians are in effect demanding is that they should be allowed the same number of intermediate nuclear missiles as the rest of the nuclear powers together thus codifying a Soviet superiority over the United States. This would be quite wrong and damaging to East/West security. Furthermore it is difficult to see how any US administration (or Congress) could agree to it. The Soviet Union is seeking to demonstrate 'balance' to prevent NATO's INF deployment. Their aim is to deny the Alliance a capability it needs and weaken the coupling between the defence of Western Europe and that of the United States.

As for the other set of talks in Geneva - which are on strategic (inter-continental) nuclear missiles and bombers, the first priority is to reduce the huge Russian and American armouries. The Americans have made proposals which would reduce the number of intercontinental missiles by more than one half. These negotiations are of course bilateral between the Russians and the Americans and it would not only be wrong but it would be a distraction for them to seek to put limitations on British (or French) forces. But if the threat that Soviet forces posed to Britain were substantially reduced we would of course be prepared to review our position on arms control and the British deterrent. This point would seem to be a long way off; the first aim is to get agreement between the Americans and the Russians.

(See also Section VI - page 62)

Q23. ISN'T THE POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IMMORAL?

A23. The whole question of nuclear weapons raises grave and difficult ethical issues just as much for pacifists as for anyone else. The most central issue is whether it is morally wrong to threaten to use nuclear weapons in order to prevent others using them. The greater good is undoubtedly served by preventing nuclear war.

We accept of course that there is room for differing views about the morality of nuclear deterrence just as there have always been different views about the morality of war itself even in defence of justice and freedom. But in an imperfect world political responsibility often means choosing the least of several evils. The Government does not accept that it is immoral to retain nuclear weapons to prevent other using them against us. Since 1945 up to 10 million people have died in well over 100 wars by so-called conventional weapons. During that time there has been no war in Europe. We believe that stable nuclear deterrence remains the policy most likely to prevent the outbreak of war of any kind between East and West (including nuclear war). There is therefore a moral duty not to abandon that policy, except for one which makes the risks of war even less. We continue to strive for more lasting peace and justice in the world. Short of that goal, the Western Alliance remains the best guarantee of the values we seek to defend.

In addition, unilateral disarmament by Britain would not prevent others from using nuclear weapons against us; if it increased the risk of nuclear war, then many would argue that unilateral disarmament would be morally wrong itself. Nor is it likely to persuade any other nuclear weapon state to give up their weapons, or influence any non-nuclear weapon power determined to acquire a nuclear capability from doing so. What they do will be determined by regional security considerations - not by anything Britain does. Britain is working through the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons but should other countries acquire nuclear weapons in the future then that is hardly an argument for giving up ours.

A23. Continued

Speaking in November 1980, the Archbishop of Canterbury said that unilateral disarmament by Britain "might serve to destabilise a balance which has undoubtedly contributed to the peace of Europe for 35 years". At the recent Church of England General Synod debate on 'the Church and the Bomb' the Archbishop stated "Since I believe that the unilateralist approach would undermine disarmament negotiations in progress without exerting much exemplary influence, I cannot accept unilateralism as the best expression of a Christian's prime moral duty to be a peace maker".

(See also Section IV - Ethical Aspects)

Q24. THE NEUTRON BOMB IS A PARTICULARLY HORRIFIC WEAPON WHICH KILLS PEOPLE AND LEAVES PROPERTY INTACT. SURELY WE SHOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH IT?

A24. The 'neutron bomb' which is more correctly known as the enhanced radiation weapon (ERW) differs from current nuclear warheads only in that a greater proportion of energy released is in the form of radiation, with correspondingly smaller effects from heat and blast. In other words, there is no difference in principle to nuclear weapons already deployed by both NATO and the Soviet Union. ERWs offer one way of deterring a massed armoured attack by the Warsaw Pact against Western Europe - they currently have an advantage over NATO in Central Europe of approaching three to one in main battle tanks. Of course, there are other ways - both nuclear and conventional - to deter such an attack, and the task of NATO is to find the most efficacious.

It is a gross distortion of the facts to claim that ERWs can destroy people but not property. The point is that they could knock out a Soviet tank attack on the territory of Western Europe without causing massive damage and civilian casualties nearby.

The US decision to proceed with the production of ERWs does not represent a change in the direction of US policy - indeed, when President Carter deferred a decision on the production of ERWs in 1978 he stated that his ultimate decision would be influenced by the degree to which the Soviet Union showed restraint in its own arms programmes, and his Administration continued the production and stockpiling of ERW components in advance of this.

No proposals have been made for the deployment of ERWs outside the United States, and the US Administration have made it clear that they will consult within the Alliance on any proposals of this kind.

Q25. WOULDNT' T UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT BE THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT?

A25. One-sided nuclear disarmament is not a step towards multilateral disarmament; it is a step away from it. The one is the enemy of the other. For Britain to give up its nuclear weapons unilaterally would do nothing to reduce the dangers of war. Indeed by undermining NATO's ability to deter aggression it might make war more likely. There is no evidence to suggest that any other country would follow our example. In particular the Russians have made it clear that they would not give up their nuclear weapons. Britain is the only nuclear power in Europe which is committed to the common defence of NATO countries. We are an integral part of the balance of power within Europe. The Government would certainly like to see a world in which nuclear weapons for deterrence were not needed. Our approach however is to work towards a steady reduction in both conventional and nuclear armaments on both sides. The Soviet Union has made it clear that it will not disarm unilaterally; neither does it expect unilateral disarmament by the West.

(See also A27)

Q26. WHY DOES NATO NOT IMPLEMENT A BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONE AS SUGGESTED BY THE PALME COMMISSION AND OTHERS?

A26. There are a number of difficulties with the Palme Commission's proposal of a 150km Battlefield Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (BNWFZ) in Central Europe.

Militarily a BNWFZ would be of little value, because targets inside it could still be attacked by accurate longer-range systems stationed outside it. Moreover, shorter range systems or warheads could easily be moved back into the zone in time of crisis. A BNWFZ would not, as its proponents claim, raise the "nuclear threshold". This threshold would be determined by the strength of NATO's conventional defences.

Verification of a BNWFZ would be extremely difficult because the systems concerned are mobile and relatively small and because some are also "dual capable" - that is, aircraft and artillery which have nuclear roles as well as essential conventional ones. But without effective verification a BNWFZ could hardly be expected to build up mutual confidence: on the contrary an inadequately verifiable zone would only increase mutual suspicion.

NATO is concerned to maintain strong conventional forces in order to enhance deterrence and maintain the nuclear threshold as high as possible. That was the primary objective of the Long Term Defence Programme initiated in 1977. In addition NATO is currently reviewing the numbers and types of its short-range nuclear weapons to see if any changes are needed. The unilateral establishment of a BNWFZ by NATO would do nothing to enhance deterrence, would imply that the territory concerned was less important to NATO than other areas, and would not help current efforts in the Geneva negotiations to reduce (rather than redistribute) nuclear weapons.

Q27. WHY NOT TRY UNILATERALISM SINCE MULTILATERALISM HAS FAILED?

A27. Multilateral disarmament has not failed. It may be a slow process; but there have been important successes in the past. The Americans and Russians reached the important SALT I agreement in 1972 which for the first time fixed agreed ceilings on nuclear weapons. At the same time they agreed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which put an effective stop to any destabilising competition in strategic defensive systems. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 has been signed by well over a hundred countries and has limited the proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond the five existing nuclear weapon states. Between 1961 and 1979 the multilateral arms control process produced some 18 separate agreements on subjects such as nuclear testing, hot lines, reducing the risk of nuclear war by accident, arms control in outer space, on the seabed and in the Antarctic. There is of course much more to do, but these were all important steps along the road to greater international security and stability. Britain will continue to play an active part in these endeavours as we have all along. Now there are negotiations aimed at reducing not merely controlling nuclear weapons. In both the INF and START talks the Soviet Union has accepted the idea of reductions in its nuclear forces. The fact that the multilateral road is a difficult one is not an argument for abandoning it.

(See also A25)

Q28. WHAT ABOUT THE WARSAW PACT'S WIDE-RANGING DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES?

A28. The NATO Heads of Government issued a historic statement after their summit meeting in June 1982: the Bonn Declaration. In it they reaffirmed their policies on non-aggression, on the preservation of peace, on the relaxation of tension and the building of confidence in Europe, on the improvement of East/West relations, and on proposals for the balanced reduction of forces and weapons. They called on the Warsaw Pact to make a positive response.

In January 1983 the Eastern side responded with the Prague Declaration, issued after a Warsaw Pact meeting. This lists a number of measures which the Warsaw Pact has supported in the past: many of them were agreed by the United Nations in 1978 as desirable features of a long-term disarmament programme, and are under discussion in various arms control fora. Britain has welcomed the Prague Declaration as a possible indication of Eastern willingness to move towards the goals set by NATO in the Bonn Declaration.

An older proposal revived in the Prague Declaration is for a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. NATO has no difficulty about a commitment not to use force except in response to an attack. It made one at the Bonn summit in June 1982. We are willing to consider proposals for new agreements provided we can be convinced that these will strengthen rather than weaken existing obligations, eg the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. But there is already a busy international arms control agenda which concentrates on priority areas: strategic and intermediate-range nuclear missiles, conventional forces, chemical weapons etc. So any new proposals must take their place in the queue. If substantial progress is made in key areas like START and INF, that would be the best incentive for considering what the next stage in negotiated arms control agreements should be. Meanwhile we shall have some questions to put to the Warsaw Pact. In particular we should wish to know whether the offer of non-aggression extends to countries outside the two alliances, like Afghanistan, or to members of the Warsaw Pact itself, like Poland.

Q29. IS NUCLEAR WAR BECOMING MORE LIKELY?

A29. Far from it. Since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, there has never been an occasion when the use of nuclear weapons has been remotely likely. Deterrence is not an attractive way of keeping the peace, but it has worked. The ability of both sides to retaliate from invulnerable submarines, the agreements between West and East on preventing nuclear war by accident or miscalculation, the existence of a broad parity between the superpowers at the strategic level, and an awareness of the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons have all contributed to a lowering of the risk of nuclear war. In addition, the West has now made major proposals at the INF and START talks aimed at reducing the number of nuclear weapons held by both sides and further reducing the risk of war. These include:

- i. substantial reductions in strategic ballistic missiles and warheads, with particular emphasis on the most destabilising weapons;
- ii. eliminating the most threatening weapons in Europe (long-range INF missiles);
- iii. strengthening East/West confidence building measures (eg extension of notification of test missiles firings).

The Soviet Union appears to have accepted the concept of reductions, and serious talks have begun aimed at preserving peace at lower levels of forces on both sides.

Q30. ISN'T THERE A DANGER THAT FAILURE OF WARNING SYSTEMS WILL PLUNGE US INTO ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR?

A30. All complex detection systems can produce ambiguous data, and early warning systems are no exception. However, highly trained personnel are constantly on watch to evaluate such data and cross checks would be made with other systems. Also, the decision to use nuclear weapons would have to be taken at the highest political level. They could never be used automatically in response to an early warning system alone.

There are agreements between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union (and between the United States and the USSR) specifically to prevent the outbreak of accidental nuclear war: there are also 'hot lines' for communication.

Neither the US nor the UK has a policy of launching nuclear weapons purely on early warning evidence, nor do we need any such policy; this is one of the many advantages of having strategic deterrent weapons at sea in submarines, which are virtually invulnerable to attack.

O31. WILL NOT THE SHORT FLIGHT TIME OF THE PERSHING II MISSILE CAUSE THE SOVIET UNION TO ADOPT A LAUNCH ON WARNING POLICY?

A31. The flight time of the Pershing II - approximately 14 minutes (not the 6 minutes claimed by the Soviet Union) - is certainly short. But the flight times of the SS20s are of the same order. The shortness of flight time could be destabilizing if a "first strike" was a viable risk or if either side had a "launch-on-warning" policy. NATO has not adopted a "launch-on-warning" policy in response to Soviet deployments of SS20s since 1977; and there are no grounds for the Soviet Union doing so because of the much smaller planned deployments of Pershing II.

Q32. WHY NOT AGREE TO A FREEZE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

A32. You advocate a freeze in nuclear weapons. A freeze would remove much of the incentive for the Soviet Union to agree to recent United States proposals, made at the START and INF talks in Geneva, for radical cuts in nuclear weapons levels. It is hard to imagine that the Soviet Union would have responded, in the START talks, with a proposal to cut the superpowers' strategic forces by 25% had they not been faced with the prospect of the United States' Trident and MX missile programmes. Similarly, it is unlikely that they will make any concessions in the INF negotiations unless they see that NATO is determined to proceed with its planned deployments of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe from late 1983. A nuclear freeze would also confirm the current imbalances, including the massive Soviet superiority in intermediate range nuclear forces.

A freeze would in any case be difficult and time consuming to negotiate, and difficult to verify. It would also divert effort away from the urgent and important task of seeking to negotiate reductions in the levels of nuclear forces of both sides (as is happening in talks in Geneva) rather than merely seeking to hold forces at existing levels.

Q33. SURELY THERE ARE ALREADY ENOUGH NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE WORLD TO PRESERVE THE PEACE?

A33. Peace is most likely to be maintained if there is a balance between East and West. We do not seek, nor need, to match the Soviet Union weapon for weapon, but we do need to have a range of forces to deter a potential aggressor from action at any level. Otherwise he might believe that we would not have the capability or will to respond. The West has introduced very few nuclear weapons over the past decade; by contrast the Soviet Union has introduced large numbers of modern and accurate missiles (eg 750 ICBMs (SS17, 18, 19) and over 350 intermediate range SS20s). The West needs to modernise its forces so that they continue to be a credible deterrent, thus preventing war and keeping the peace.

There are indeed a great number of nuclear weapons in the world. We must continue to do all we can to reduce their number. But reductions must be made in a fair and balanced way. The focus here is inevitably on the USSR and the USA - the two superpowers - with their large arsenals. The US, with the full support of ourselves and our NATO allies, has made radical and imaginative proposals for reductions in nuclear forces in negotiations with the Soviet Union in Geneva:

- In strategic forces (START), a cut of one third in ballistic missile warheads, involving large reductions in the number of missiles themselves.
- In talks on nuclear weapons in Europe (INF); the zero option. This would completely eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapon (longer range land based missiles).

A33. Continued

In an effort to make progress in the INF talks, the US (with NATO's full support) has made clear that if the Zero Option is too radical for the Soviet Union, we are prepared to agree to equal numbers of missile warheads at as low a level as the Soviet Union will accept. NATO has already made it clear that, if no arms control agreement is reached and cruise and Pershing have to be deployed, one warhead will be withdrawn from the NATO stockpile for every new warhead that is deployed on Cruise and Pershing missiles.

On shorter range nuclear forces, the US has already removed 1000 nuclear warheads from Europe. This was announced in 1979 and completed in 1981. This led to no reciprocal action by the Soviet Union. NATO is now reviewing its holdings of these weapons in Europe, to see if further reductions can be made. The aim is to have no more weapons than are necessary for deterrence.

One final point. It is not true that more weapons make war more likely. They do not, because what matters is the existence on both sides of our assured second strike capability (invulnerable submarines). There are also agreements and hot lines to prevent accidental nuclear war. But none of this means that we should not do all we can to get the numbers of weapons down. NATO and the West is working hard to that end.

Q34. WHY DON'T WE SPEND MORE ON CIVIL DEFENCE?

A34. The whole purpose of the Government's defence policy is to prevent war. So long as the NATO Alliance maintains a strong deterrent, the risk of a war in Europe at any level will remain a remote possibility. The Soviet leadership know that if they used nuclear weapons against us they would be running a very grave risk of massive retaliation against Soviet territory. But should such an attack take place, even though the consequences would be appalling, there would still be millions of survivors. No one pretends that survival is possible near the centre of a nuclear explosion. But the further away you are, the better would be your chances of survival with some form of shelter and basic precautions. It is therefore the duty of any humane Government to make some provision for such an eventuality, however remote it might be. However, the Government do not believe that it is necessary to spend large sums on civil defence as long as we maintain our deterrent policies. The purpose of civil defence is to enable our civil resources to respond if peace is broken and there is an enemy attack. The amount of money we spend on it reflects this aim. The introduction of the new civil defence regulations will confer additional functions on local authorities. To meet these, the Government proposes to increase the area of local authority civil defence expenditure entitled to 100% grant aid (instead of 75% at present). Total expenditure on civil defence in 1983/84 will increase to about £67m.

Q35. HOW COULD ANYTHING BE DONE IF WE HAVE ONLY FOUR MINUTES WARNING?

A35. It is extremely unlikely that the first hint of Soviet aggression would be a few minutes warning from the Fylingdales Early Warning System. In such circumstances, it is true, we would have no time to activate our civil defence arrangements. But while a missile attack "out of the blue" is theoretically conceivable, the Soviet Union would have to calculate that Western response to such an attack might be massive retaliation by an invulnerable submarine-launched strategic missile. There is no likelihood that war could start without some sort of political crisis and at least a short warning period of some days during which Soviet military preparations were apparent. Such a warning period might well be followed by a conventional conflict lasting for some days, possibly weeks, before the war either stopped or escalated to some level of nuclear exchange. During all this time the Government would be implementing its plans for advice to, and protection of, the public, for the continuation of essential services, and for the continuity of organised government. If, during a period of conventional war, the Soviet Union attacked us with missiles, people would be prepared and ready to take the immediate self protective action necessary in response to broadcast public announcements and the sounding of the attack sirens.

Q36. BUT WHY NOT BUILD MORE SHELTERS?

A36. Successive Governments have accepted that the low risk of war in Europe balanced against the enormous cost (billions of pounds) does not justify a programme of purpose-built shelters. Our civil defence policy represents an insurance policy against such a risk, which will remain remote provided we maintain our policy of deterrence. Our major Allies follow a similar policy, including the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. However, we are by no means complacent and within the inevitable financial constraints ways of improving our arrangements are constantly under review. In particular we intend that local authorities should conduct a survey of their areas to identify existing structures suitable for adaptation in crisis as communal shelters for the public.

Q37. SURELY THE ARRANGEMENTS MERELY ENSURE THE SURVIVAL OF A GOVERNING AND MILITARY ELITE?

A37. Certainly not. Senior Ministers, officials and Service officers would remain in London should a war break out. The Ministers and staffs of decentralised or regional government in emergency headquarters are essentially reserves in the event of a nuclear attack on Central London. The Armed Forces have similar arrangements. The aim would be for local authorities to continue to provide essential services, and for a form of regional government until central control could be resumed. But control would remain firmly in civilian hands and law and order would be administered under regulations approved by Parliament before an attack took place. The whole purpose of the surviving administrations would be to help the survivors by providing emergency services and information.

Q38. WHAT WILL THE GOVERNMENT DO IF LOCAL AUTHORITIES REFUSE TO CO-OPERATE IN CIVIL DEFENCE PLANNING?

A38. The Government is confident that the great majority of local authorities will continue to discharge their statutory obligations. The new civil defence regulations will confer additional functions on them to make provision in peacetime for the protection of the public and the continuation of essential services in war and to participate in civil defence activities. The Government hopes that, in a matter so closely related to the nation's vital defence interest, of which the Government is elected to be the judge, local authorities will wish to follow the policy determined by central government and make use of the additional resources which central government has decided to allocate to local civil defence planning.

IV - THE ETHICAL ASPECTS

The following is the text of an address given by the then Secretary of State for Defence, Sir John Nott, on the morality of Trident, in November 1982.

What are the realities which form the basis upon which a moral decision on our deterrent must rest?

There are three, namely war, weapons and warlike Governments. First war. I do not intend to debate whether war is a natural condition for man, though I certainly do not believe that it is an integral part of God's purpose for man. But, at a time when 30-40 wars or lesser conflicts are in progress throughout the world, I cannot avoid the conclusion that wars do happen and will doubtless continue to happen unless effective steps are taken to prevent them.

Second, weapons. In the last world war - which was for the most part a European war - some 50 million people were killed, the majority civilians. That was with conventional weapons. What by modern standards were rather primitive conventional weapons, with much less destructive power than those we possess today.

The reality in the case of nuclear weapons - a truism but one worth repeating - is that they inescapably exist and we have to live with that fact. Even if every weapon were dismantled tomorrow, the knowledge of how to make them will be with man for the rest of his time on earth.

The third reality is the existence of warlike Governments. I have never claimed that the Soviet Union is seeking war with the West. I do not doubt that the people of the Soviet Union are as concerned as all of us to avoid a war with NATO. But it is clear from recent history that the Russian

leadership will use military force when it thinks it can get away with it. And a country's behaviour when faced with the prospect that its aggression will meet an effective and determined response - the position today - is no guide to how it would behave in completely different circumstances. So we cannot deduce from the absence of war in Western Europe that Soviet intentions are fundamentally benign - I only wish that the world was that simple.

So these are the realities upon which any moral discussion must be founded. The reality of war, the reality that weapons of mass destruction - including nuclear weapons - exist, and the reality that some Governments are apparently prepared to pursue their ideologies by warlike means.

Let me then pose a few questions - without answering them. The argument is often advanced that since nuclear weapons have the power to destroy on a greater scale than conventional weapons, they are in some way more evil. The argument has considerable emotional appeal but is it valid? The danger of a single nuclear release certainly involves the danger of escalation right up the scale to a strategic conflict, but there is no certain reason why the release of a nuclear weapon should actually kill or maim more people than a conventional war in which 50 million die and many millions more are maimed. Where is the moral issue here?

There is a variant of this "moral" argument put forward against nuclear weapons. It is that they can only be weapons of mass destruction, targetted against cities, whereas conventional weapons are targetted against military concentrations. But is this true? The Second World War was a total war - from the fire bombing of cities to the horrors of the concentration camps.

Modern nuclear weapons possess an accuracy which would actually permit their use against military concentrations - that is not an argument for "war fighting" ie using them in such a role. It is a statement of fact. Would it

be less immoral to fire bomb a city with conventional weapons - or to attack a military concentration with nuclear weapons? Is there a moral answer to this question?

Even to pose such questions means of course that some people may misrepresent the argument and accuse me of advocating the use of nuclear weapons. I do no such thing. I merely pose the moral dilemmas inherent in these issues - which are seldom considered because of the understandable moral repugnance for nuclear weapons.

And another question - for historical reasons the United States and Britain happen to provide nuclear deterrence on behalf of the Alliance as a whole. Is it moral to forego our own nuclear weapons to shelter under those of another Ally? It certainly might provide some comfort to the conscience. But remember we start from a position as a nuclear power - not a non-nuclear or a neutral one - and we have to weigh both the consequences of change and where it leaves us. We might also take account of the views of our Allies who at this year's NATO meeting supported the determination of the United States and the United Kingdom to ensure the deterrent capabilities of their strategic nuclear forces.

Is it seriously suggested that if we give up our weapons, the West would remain as secure as it is today? Would not it make war more likely? I think so. If so, why should it be a morally defensible act?

So I come to some more practical questions! Do I think the United Kingdom can be properly defended against nuclear powers over future generations, without a nuclear deterrent - and my answer is No. It may be a simple view - but I hold it.

In his address the other day the Bishop of London made the point that no Government can abdicate their responsibility to ensure the survival of the state, preserve the lives of their citizens and provide a framework for the exercise of human dignity in the pursuit of a Christian life. As Secretary of State for Defence, my task is to defend the British people. And defend them against the only real threat to our way of life and to our independence as a sovereign nation - a threat which comes from a nuclear power. The Soviet Union unquestionably possesses nuclear weapons, its armoury is huge and, like it or not, no Government can exercise its duty to the British people unless it considers these difficult problems in the context of power in the real world.

I cannot close my eyes to the realities of the world in the late 20th Century. I cannot be satisfied with a policy that might be adequate for the conscience of a private citizen. I cannot, as an extreme example, adopt a pacifist approach and rely on the good will of others - or be prepared to suffer the consequences for myself, because those consequences, in my case as a Government Minister, would fall not only on me, but on every citizen in these islands. I do not question the moral integrity of the genuine pacifist, but pacifism is not a morally responsible position for a politician, much less one charged with the defence of his people.

In my judgement it would certainly be immoral to contemplate the first use of strategic nuclear weapons in order to make a pre-emptive strike or in support of aggression generally. But the conditional threat of their use in response to aggression is an entirely different question. If by the credible threat of a nuclear response we successfully deter war, then I believe that the good that comes from this must exceed the risks in spite of the moral complexities involved.

This is why the possession of nuclear weapons of a kind like Trident which possess what is known as a second strike capability, seems to me to be grounded on an ethical basis. The whole rationale behind the need for Trident is that it is itself invulnerable to first attack. In the perception of our enemies it is a system which cannot be destroyed in a pre-emptive strike by them. It is within their knowledge that should they ever deliver a conventional or nuclear attack upon the North Atlantic Alliance the choice, I emphasise the choice, for retaliation would still rest in the hands of the British Government. And that choice - by a second centre of decision making within the Alliance - adds immeasurably to nuclear deterrence, which is an essential part of NATO strategy given the awesome armoury of nuclear weapons now possessed by the Soviet Union.

Is then the sheer cost of Trident immoral? Either because it is a maldistribution of resources and we would be better advised to place an equivalent sum in conventional weapons (although that seems to me to be a practical defence question, not a moral one); or should we be spending the money on something else, helping the poor, or education?

First should we be spending the money on conventional defence instead? Would this be a more effective use of defence resources? After all an extra £400M a year or so for 18 years (out of the annual defence budget of £15,000M) would buy quite a lot of conventional defence - for example about two extra armoured divisions with 300 additional tanks for BAOR. Another two armoured Divisions would of course add to NATO's conventional capability, although in the context of the massive Warsaw Pact tank superiority the effect of this enhancement would be small.

I do not believe that any equivalent spending on conventional weapons and forces could possibly be of the same value in preventing war. We must never forget that deterrence is a matter of perception. What is important is not what we think, but what the other side may think.

If you were sitting in Moscow, would you be more deterred by 300 tanks than by Trident? Of course not. How could we actually resist the threat to destroy one of our cities if the other side knew we did not possess a capability to hit one of his cities or one of his military installations in return. The extra tanks would not help. In his perception we would have no credible response if he sought to blackmail us into surrender.

Next, is there not a cheaper deterrent than Trident such as Cruise missiles?

Of course it is possible to think of cheaper alternatives. But the risks are usually not spelled out. A system which the other side sees as having little or no chance of reaching targets of importance to him poses no deterrent threat - it is simply a waste of money. A system which was vulnerable to pre-emption on the other hand would be a positive menace - it would invite the very nuclear attack on this country which our strategic nuclear deterrent is intended to prevent.

Second, and the more difficult question, should we be spending this money on something else say on social welfare or education or other programmes at home or abroad? In times of economic difficulty it is always difficult to justify expenditure on defence, but we must not forget that ultimately it is only by ensuring our security that we can choose our own social welfare and other programmes. The Government's first responsibility is the security of the nation. Of course we have to weigh the consequences of spending on defence against spending in other fields. But we also have to weigh the consequences of not spending enough on defence against the heavy costs in lives and freedom which we might later incur. Peace is expensive - but it is never as expensive as war. We have discovered that simple truth quite recently.

Trident in fact will represent a very small proportion of the defence budget, about 3%. Defence is in turn some 12% of total Government expenditure. If resources have to be found for other programmes, there is no reason why we should look first at Trident: it is not at the margin of the defence programme or the Government's programme as a whole. It is at the heart of our future security.

We must finally consider what failure to replace Polaris with Trident could entail for ourselves and Europe. Such a unilateral act of disarmament - for it would be no less than this - is unlikely to lead to any reciprocal act which would reduce the threat to us. Rather, as the Archbishop of Canterbury has said, it might serve to destabilise a balance which has undoubtedly contributed to the peace in Europe for 35 years. There is no evidence that the Soviet Union - or any other country - is influenced by unilateral moral gestures - particularly of a sort which could be perceived as showing weakness and a lack of resolve. Countries, for better or worse, operate on the basis of a calculation of their interests.

I believe then, that despite all the difficulties it presents for us, the decision on Trident is necessary and morally correct, because it will contribute to deterrence and make a major war - whether nuclear or conventional - significantly less likely. At the same time, the moral dilemma surrounding deterrence cannot be dismissed. We cannot be satisfied with threatening mutual destruction for the rest of time. Deterrence is, as I have said, reliable but nothing human is infallible. We must seek a better means of assuring peace. But we cannot pretend that such a means is already within our grasp or that it will be easy to find.

As a first step what we can do is help to stabilise deterrence at lower levels of forces on both sides. We can maintain and indeed enhance our security with fewer and more stable weapons on both sides. These current negotiations are seeking arms reductions and not just, as in the past, arms control - this is I believe a major advance.

I know that all of those who oppose Trident support this objective. But I do not understand how - in the light of past experience - they expect that it will be brought about by a one-sided lowering of our guard. I hope that the unilateral disarmers have thought through the moral responsibility which they might bear for their actions. I believe unilateral disarmament by Britain would not only reduce our security but would seriously undermine the achievement of multilateral nuclear weapons reductions on all sides. Why should the Soviets reduce their armoury if they can achieve their objectives through the so-called peace movements of the West?

I will take my concluding words from the Pope's message to the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, in June this year.

"In current conditions, deterrence based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself, but as a step towards progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable. I reaffirm my confidence in the power of true negotiations to arrive at just and equitable solutions. Such negotiations demand patience and diligence and must notably lead to a reduction of armaments that is balanced, simultaneous and internationally controlled".

I fully endorse this message, and I would commend it to you all.

It is difficult to make a simple comparison between the nuclear forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Any numerical "balance" cannot take account of such factors as age, operational capability, and numbers and yields of warheads. Comparisons of warhead numbers are particularly difficult since many delivery systems can carry different numbers of warheads and neither side publishes figures about the total number of warheads in its stockpiles.

Moreover since there is plainly little sense in attaching the same weight to an inter-continental ballistic missile and a short-range howitzer, any attempt to draw up a nuclear balance must involve placing the systems into various categories, and these necessarily must to some extent be arbitrary. Overleaf is a diagram showing the total number of systems deployed at the end of 1982, broken down in strategic systems (eg those defined as such in the SALT agreements) and longer and shorter range intermediate nuclear forces (INF) and short range systems based in Europe. Although the presentation of the figures can be varied, it can be seen that the Soviet Union has a marked superiority both in the total number of systems and in almost every individual category.

Despite this the Russians have claimed that a broad parity already exists in "medium range" systems, and that NATO will be upsetting this balance by its programme to modernise its longer-range INF systems. However the figures they have produced to support this claim make it clear that their balance has been constructed by selective inclusion and exclusion of systems on either side. Thus they include NATO strategic systems (eg Polaris) but not Soviet equivalents; US aircraft based in the United States but not Soviet aircraft based in the Far East; NATO aircraft (F4, A6, A7) but not equivalent Soviet aircraft (Fitter, Flogger, Fencer). Although it is possible to argue about where the line should be drawn, any objective balance must include systems of approximately equivalent capability on both sides. If only the longer range INF land based systems on both sides are counted, the Soviet Union has a superiority of about 5:1. If shorter range INF systems are added to the comparison, the ratio is more than 3:1.

It is also worth noting that the Soviet Union first made the claim that parity exists in 1979. Although since then they have withdrawn about 175 of their older SS4 and SS5 missiles, each with one warhead, they have deployed more than 200 of their new and formidable SS20s, each with three warheads - an overall increase of about 500 warheads. A total of over 300 SS20s is now in service. Meanwhile NATO has not made any increases in its own systems, so, if there was parity in 1979, it cannot exist now. Additionally the Soviet claims about the NATO modernisation programme ignore the fact that the US unilaterally withdrew 1,000 warheads from its European stockpile in 1980/81; that Pershing II will replace Pershing I on a one-for-one basis; and that NATO will withdraw a further warhead as each new cruise missile is deployed. Moreover the first of the new NATO missiles will not be deployed until the end of 1983; by which time well over 350 SS20s can be expected to have been deployed.

THE BALANCE OF NUCLEAR FORCES - END 1982 (1) (2)

STRATEGIC SYSTEMS (3)

<u>Soviet Union</u>	818 MIRV	228 MIRV	
	1398 ICBMs	950 SLBMs	356 Bombers

<u>NATO</u> (excluding France)	550 MIRV	520 MIRV	
	1052 ICBMs	584 SLBMs	410 Bombers

EUROPEAN SYSTEMS (Land Based) (4) (5)

		INF				
		LONG RANGE		SHORTER RANGE		SHORT RANGE
<u>Soviet Union</u>	235 MIRV					
		510 Missiles	350 Aircraft	600 Missiles	2000 Aircraft	950 Missiles and Artillery

		INF			
		LONGER RANGE	SHORTER RANGE	SHORT RANGE	
<u>NATO</u> (excluding France)					
		170 Aircraft	180 Missiles	630 Aircraft	1100 Missiles and Artillery

NOTES: ICBM = Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.

SLBM = Submarine Launched Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.

MIRV = Multiple Independently Targettable Re-entry Vehicles.

(1) French systems are not included in this diagram. They comprise 64 SLBM, 36 Mirage IV bombers, 18 S3 missiles and shorter range Mirage IIIA and Jaguar aircraft and Pluton missiles.

(2) The diagram does not include defensive systems such as ABM or air defence missiles and aircraft.

(3) The diagram of strategic forces covers operational strategic delivery systems of the types defined in SALT as well as Soviet Backfire and US FB111 bombers which have intercontinental capabilities.

(4) The European figures do not include some 250 aircraft of the Soviet Naval Air Forces or some 20 aircraft of NATO Air Forces which have an antiship capability; nor do they include sea-based nuclear capable systems on both sides which are normally deployed in the European theatre and which have a land attack capability, eg 18 SS-N-5 on Soviet Golf class submarines in the Baltic and 20 A6 and 48 A7 aircraft on US carriers in the Mediterranean.

(5) It is difficult to define precisely the exact ranges of many INF systems particularly aircraft. These categories are therefore necessarily somewhat arbitrary. For the purpose of this diagram longer range INF systems have been taken as those with an approximate range exceeding 1000 kms; shorter range INF as those with an approximate range between 150 kms and 1000 kms; and short range forces as less than 150 kms. (Note: some authorities refer to LRINF as medium range systems to distinguish them from the longer range strategic systems.)

VI - EXCLUSION OF BRITISH STRATEGIC DETERRENT FROM DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

A. The British Strategic Deterrent Force

1. There has been an independent British nuclear deterrent since 1955. It is and has always been a weapon of last resort. Since the late 1960s the deterrent has been provided by a small force of four submarines armed with Polaris missiles; this allows Britain to keep one submarine on patrol at all times. We have the minimum number of submarines; we cannot reduce that number.
2. Polaris is a strategic deterrent. It is of the same character as the US and Soviet strategic systems covered by the SALT agreement. The Soviet Union has accepted publicly during the SALT I negotiations that Polaris is a strategic system. All French nuclear missiles also have a strategic role.

B. Polaris and the INF Talks

3. Intermediate range nuclear force reduction (INF) talks in Geneva are - as their name indicates - about intermediate range land-based nuclear systems, not strategic systems. It would be illogical and in-appropriate to take account of Polaris (which is strategic and sea-based) in the INF forum. All the NATO allies agree that Polaris should not be included.
4. The Soviet Union wants to include Polaris in the INF talks:
 - a. As a negotiating gambit designed to divide the NATO allies and prevent deployment of cruise and pershing II and

- b. Because the inclusion of British and French forces is critical to Soviet claims that a nuclear balance exists in Europe at the intermediate level.

This last claim is false. There is a massive Soviet superiority over NATO in Europe (about 5:1) in intermediate range missiles and aircraft. Since 1979 the number of SS20s deployed (each with 3 warheads) has trebled to a total of 351, whilst NATO has not increased its forces. The number of comparable NATO missiles remains the same - zero. Yet the Soviet Union still claims that a balance exists.

5. Further, both the Russians and Americans both have considerable numbers of strategic nuclear weapons, which are specifically excluded from the INF talks; there is no logical reason why British and French strategic systems should be included.

C. Polaris and the START Talks

6. Some people argue that Polaris should be considered in the Strategic arms reduction talks (START) also being held in Geneva. In fact:

- a. The START talks, as with the SALT talks before them, were begun and are being conducted by the US and Soviet Union. They are bilateral talks between the superpowers, in which they are discussing their own strategic systems.

- b. The US and Soviet Union are rightly concerned to secure reductions in their own strategic nuclear arsenals.

- c. In SALT talks in the 1970s the Russians accepted that British and French forces should not be included. There is no reason why they should take a different view now.

D. Polaris and Arms Control

7. The British Government has made clear that they are very anxious to see balanced reductions between the superpowers in all nuclear weapons. If the threat posed to this country by the extensive Soviet forces is significantly lessened the Government has said that it will look again at the position of Polaris. But that time has not yet arrived and the issue must be kept in perspective. The British strategic force is a very small proportion (less than 3%) of the equivalent forces of the Soviet Union. Our first priority must continue to be to play our full part in NATO's objective of fair and balanced arms control measures which would increase all-round security.

VII - GOVERNMENT MATERIAL ON NUCLEAR POLICY ISSUES

Copies of MOD and FCO brochures are available on request. The following list describes some of them briefly.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

DEFENCE FACT SHEET 1 - ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

DEFENCE FACT SHEET 2 - NATO

DEFENCE FACT SHEET 3 - DETERRENCE

DEFENCE FACT SHEET 4 - THE NUCLEAR BALANCE

The Defence Fact Sheets are designed for background information, rather than 'handout material'.

'NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PREVENTING WAR' Essay on the deterrent philosophy which was first published in the Statement on Defence Estimates 1981.

'A NUCLEAR FREE EUROPE - Why it wouldn't work' This explains the fallacy of the European nuclear free zone proposal and includes a map showing how Russian SS20s can strike at the whole of Europe from behind the Ural Mountains.

'CRUISE MISSILES - Some Important Questions and Answers' covers the reasons behind the 1979 double decision on INF modernisation and arms control, and issues such as whether Britain has become more of a target, cost and control.

'ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY' - Essay reprinted from the Statement on Defence Estimates 1982 explaining the Government's attitude to arms control and disarmament.

'NUCLEAR DEFENCE: KEY POINTS' - Aide Memoire for speakers.

'THE FUTURE UNITED KINGDOM STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT FORCE' Defence Open Government Document 80/23 July 1980. A memorandum setting out the rationale for an independent strategic deterrent and the reason for choosing Trident to replace Polaris. An additional Open Government Document 82/1 'THE UNITED KINGDOM TRIDENT PROGRAMME', dealing with the decision to purchase the Trident II D5 system, was published in March 1982.

Copies of the above material can be obtained from

Ministry of Defence (DS 17)
Room 9156
Main Building
Whitehall SW1 2HB
Tel: 01-218-6016

A Film entitled 'The Peace Game' explaining how the West has kept the peace is available to clubs, groups, etc from:

Central Film Library
Central Office of Information
Chalfont Grove
Gerrards Cross
Bucks SL9 8TN
Tel: Chalfont St Giles (02407) 4111

The Peace Game is ideal for use with a speaker; as a centre-piece for a group discussion; or for watching without any accompaniment. However used, it will offer a sensible view of a topic often clouded by rhetoric and confusion.

The Peace Game is offered free to borrowers. It is 24 minutes long and available on 16mm film and videocassette systems VHS, Betamax, Philips 2000 and Sony U-matic.

A short audio-visual presentation on the deterrence strategy entitled 'A Better Road to Peace' is available from the same source.

FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Arms Control and Disarmament (Quarterly) - Review of Developments in the various negotiations

Peace and Disarmament - a short guide to the arms control negotiations

The Nuclear Debate - sets out the two schools of thought (unilateralism and multilateralism)

Britain and Arms Control - Summary of proposals supported by the UK.

Copies of the above brochures, and further information on arms control and disarmament can be obtained from:

Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street (East)
SW1
Tel: 01-233-3907

HOME OFFICE

Civil Defence is the responsibility of the Home Office and Scottish Home and Health Department. Copies of official background material on civil defence including a free pamphlet "Civil Defence - why we need it" can be obtained from:

Emergency Services (F6) Division
Home Office
50 Queen Anne's Gate
SW1H 9AT
Tel: 01-213-4018



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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

MR. GOODALL
CABINET OFFICE

Arms Control and Disarmament

Thank you for your minute of 11 November.

I note the arguments for postponing the proposed Ministerial meeting on arms control issues until January but I am clear that the Prime Minister would find this too long a delay. I think, therefore, that we should aim for a meeting as early in December as is practicable. I do not think the Prime Minister envisages this meeting taking the form of a seminar. It would rather be a Ministerial meeting, perhaps with officials present, to take such decisions as are necessary. For example, I note that you say that the Alliance has a comprehensive package of proposals virtually ready to put on the table at the CDE. The Prime Minister has no knowledge of this package of proposals. Decisions may also be necessary on some of the ideas which the Canadian Prime Minister has been ventilating.

BF I should therefore be grateful if arrangements could be made for a meeting and if a proposed agenda could be put to me for consideration by the Prime Minister after her return from the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting.

I am copying this minute to Mr. Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Mr. Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

18 November 1983

SECRET

16.11.83

AJC

to see

David Fishlock looks at the U.S. stock of nuclear weaponry

Smaller but more effective arsenal

WHEN Mrs Margaret Thatcher, the Prime Minister, said earlier this week that the U.S. now had one-third fewer nuclear weapons than in 1967, and only 25 per cent of the megatonnage it had in its nuclear arsenal in 1960, she was not telling the whole story.

Her figures are a far cry from the European public perception of a burgeoning U.S. nuclear stockpile, constantly growing since the end of the Second World War. Yet they are the official U.S. position—so far as it goes.

The accompanying chart, released recently by the Pentagon, does not show absolute figures, which are still highly classified, but does suggest that the U.S. has retired far more weapons from the stockpile than it added during the 1970s.

What has actually happened is that, after an initial enthusiasm for more megatonnage during the 1950s, the emphasis has changed to increasing precision of delivery. This followed agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on a test ban limitation of 150 kilotonnes equivalent of TNT—10 times the estimate of the Hiroshima explosion—in the early 1960s.

The official U.S. picture thus shows a stockpile of just two nuclear weapons in 1945 expanded to 13 in 1946, 13 in 1948, and 50 in 1949, when Moscow carried out its first atom-bomb test.

It expanded at an accelerating rate in the late-1950s and early-1960s, when large new sources of nuclear explosive came on-stream. The stockpile is officially acknowledged to have peaked "at a few tens of

thousands" in the mid-1960s. Unofficially, this peak has been put at 32,000.

Since the mid-1960s the Pentagon says it has withdrawn many large, high-yield weapons from stock. The emphasis has shifted to smaller explosive power and greater accuracy. The Pentagon says the obsolete weapons are disassembled and destroyed, but the nuclear explosives, highly enriched uranium and plutonium, can be reconditioned and used in new weapons.

What the Pentagon graph does not show is what has been happening since 1980. This appears to have been the low point in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, from which the Reagan Administration has begun to rebuild, continuing the re-expansion policy agreed late in the Carter Administration.

According to Dr Richard Wagner, chief adviser on nuclear weapons to the U.S. Defence Secretary, in evidence to the Congressional committee on the armed services, the U.S. is planning to build from the low point around 1980 by some 13 per cent in numbers by the mid-1980s.

Each November the U.S. President signs the highly classified presidential stockpile memorandum. For 1984, the Pentagon has been asking—and is expected to get—a total of about \$3.9bn for nuclear weapon spending. Of this, \$1.8bn is earmarked for the seven factories which manufacture parts for and assemble nuclear weapons.

The money includes large sums for refurbishing production facilities which had been

comparatively neglected during the 1970s. For example, there is \$443m for construction and \$114m for capital equipment. The research, development and testing programme for 1984 is put at \$1.4bn.

During the 1970s funding in constant dollars had declined by about 37 per cent, and employment in the nuclear weapons industry by 35 per cent.


Weapons now being retired from the stockpile include several old free-fall bombs such as the B-28, B-43 and B-53, the Nike Hercules surface-to-air missile, the Honest John short-range surface-to-surface missile, the Asroc and Subroc anti-submarine rockets, the Titan II intercontinental ballistic missile, and the U.S. Navy's Terrier missile.

The new weapons just coming into service include the well-publicised ground-launched cruise missile which has just arrived in Britain, the Pershing 2, the B-83 bomb, air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles, the 8-inch shell, known as the "neutron bomb" or enhanced radiation weapon, the Trident C-4 missile and the B-61 bomb.

Not yet in production are some major new developments such as the Trident D-5 missile, the 155 mm nuclear shell, the nuclear anti-submarine stand-off weapon and the Sentry anti-ballistic missile warhead.

Individually, the new weapons differ considerably in their purpose and hence their design. Common features, however, include greater safety against accidental explosion and greater military effective-

How the US nuclear stockpile has changed



ness. The enhanced radiation weapons, for example, are designed principally to knock out tanks and their crews; the Pershing 2 to penetrate "hardened" enemy battle management bunkers.

A new reference work on the U.S. nuclear stockpile is being collated by three scientists in Washington, without the approval of the Pentagon, but with much help from the U.S. Freedom of Information Act.

In an interview with the Washington paper *Defense Week* the authors explained that their book estimates a growth in the stockpile from about 26,000 warheads this year to about 30,000 by the end of the decade. This suggests the withdrawal of about 12,000 in total, and will leave the stockpile just short of its peak of the mid-1960s.

**The Nuclear Weapons Data Book*, Ballinger Books, \$38.95.

Towards a nuclear morality

Throughout October I attended the International Synod of Bishops in Rome which brought together bishops from every part of the world to explore the question of how to make peace with God and with other people in today's world. The Synod deplored and condemned "warlike aggressiveness, violence and terrorism; the building up of arsenals of both conventional, and especially nuclear arms, and the scandalous trade in all weapons of war".

The sense of anxiety felt by the Synod in the face of these terrors was reflected by Pope John Paul II, who declared himself "very troubled" at the tense international situation and sent urgent messages to the Russian and American leaders.


On returning to London I found new undercurrents of anxiety and disquiet caused by the impending arrival of cruise and Pershing missiles. In recent days the debate about nuclear armaments and possible nuclear conflict has been brought home to people much more sharply than before. It is not an easy task to see clearly the way forward and to come to terms with these complex and threatening issues.

Tension has undoubtedly increased because of the public protests and mass demonstrations of the recent past. In a free society, the peace movements play an important role. They bring before us the terrible questions we might otherwise ignore but which must be answered. They rightly alert us to the dangers of nuclear escalation and proliferation. They compel us to question whether new weapons are intended to deter or whether they serve an aggressive purpose.

Inevitably, though, the peace movements bring pressure to bear primarily on the governments of the West and not on those of the East. In communist regimes movements critical of official policy are rarely tolerated. There are different perceptions in East and West about the threat to peace.

No one can deny the moral dilemma which faces us today. On the one hand we have a grave obligation to prevent nuclear war from ever occurring. On the other hand, the state has the right and duty of legitimate self-defence, thus ensuring for its citizens justice, freedom and independence. Although nothing could ever justify the use of nuclear arms as weapons of massive and indiscriminate slaughter, yet to abandon them without adequate safeguards may help to destabilize the existing situation and may dramatically

As controversy over Mgr Bruce Kent's role in CND continues, Cardinal Basil Hume (right) declares his belief that the bomb is the lesser of two evils, and explains how its possession — under strict conditions — need not conflict with Christian ethics



increase the risk of nuclear blackmail.

There is a tension, then, between the moral imperative not to use such inhuman weapons and a policy of nuclear deterrence with its declared willingness to use them if attacked. To condemn all use and yet to accept deterrence places us in a seemingly contradictory position.

It is then perhaps surprising, and puzzling to some Christians, that Pope John Paul II could say to the United Nations on June 11 1982: "In current conditions 'deterrence' based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself, but as a stage on the way towards a progressive disarmament, can still be judged morally acceptable. None the less, in order to preserve peace, it is indispensable not to be satisfied with this minimum which is always susceptible to the real danger of explosion".

It is noteworthy that every Catholic bishops' conference pronouncing subsequently on these issues has followed this judgment. As an authoritative pronouncement of the Holy Father, it is an important contribution to Catholic thinking.

In the first place, this view recognizes that, because of the world situation, deterrence may be accepted as the lesser of two evils, without in any way regarding it as good in itself. Furthermore this view can be held even by those who reject the morality of nuclear deterrence. It constitutes an acknowledgment that even a morally flawed defence policy cannot simply be dismantled immediately and without reference to the response of potential enemies.

To retain moral credibility, however, there must be a firm and effective intention to extricate ourselves from the present fearful situation as quickly as possible. We

must work towards our declared objective of deescalation and disarmament. But mutual and verifiable disarmament can be achieved only in stages, and so gradually. This approach is both realistic and morally acceptable.

The acceptance of deterrence on strict conditions and as a temporary expedient leading to progressive disarmament is emerging as the most widely accepted view of the Roman Catholic Church.

It may in some respects be an untidy view, risky and provisional, yet it is at the same time important. It has immediate consequences.

First, the Church hereby gives a strictly qualified assent to the policy of deterrence but solely on condition that it constitutes a stage towards disarmament. This is a crucial condition. If any government, in the East or West, does not take steps to reduce its nuclear weapons and limit their deployment, it must expect its citizens in increasing numbers to be doubtful of its sincerity and alienated from its defence policies.

Second, it would be wrong to apply to the policy of nuclear deterrence the same moral condemnation that would be given to the actual use of nuclear weapons against civilian targets.

Third, since the purpose and intention of deterrence is to avoid war and keep the peace, service personnel can be rightly commended as custodians of the security and freedom of their fellow countrymen and as contributors to the maintenance of peace. None the less they, too, face grave moral issues which they themselves do not ignore.

Fourth, deterrence has to be seen clearly as a means of preventing war and not of waging it. If it fails and the missiles are launched, then we shall have moved into a new situation. And those concerned will have to bear a heavy responsibility.

Disarmament is hindered by mutual fear and hostility between the superpowers. They already have the capacity to destroy each other many times over. There is urgent need to halt the spiral of armaments. Our vast expenditure on national defence is out of balance and should be cut back. It necessarily diverts resources from other needs, both those of the Third World and our own at home. People everywhere have a right to know in what ways their governments are pursuing policies that will lead to disarmament. Without such policies, deterrence has to be condemned.

We are all faced with an agonizing and unclear situation, further complicated by state secrecy on security matters. Christians must themselves recognize that there is room for differences of opinion in the present situation. All of us must retain the right to our conscientious beliefs. And I would judge that this does not give us the right seriously to defy the law in the present situation. We must have due regard for democratic processes and for the institutions of a free society.

Within the framework of our democratic system, the Christian can find scope enough to work with wholehearted enthusiasm and commitment for the cause of peace and for the making of a world where both sides in our present confrontation will be encouraged to enter with greater determination the path of negotiation and effective disarmament.

It seems to me that we often approach the problem from the wrong angle. Our representatives have spent many hours of negotiation over the contents of successive disarmament proposals. But disarmament will follow the lowering of tension and the building of confidence and not vice versa. We have to stress rather the need for political will on both sides to achieve "detente".

It is possible, if leaders and people want it, to overcome fears and insecurity in international relationships. History abounds in examples. If the confidence to live and let live is built up on both sides then it should not prove impossible to reflect a newly found security by means of progressive disarmament proposals. Here is a task for all of us, but especially for our political parties and leaders.

The present situation is grave. Those with political power must have the will to discover a better way to achieve peace than through amassing nuclear weapons. The future of humanity depends on it.

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Ref: B06900

MR COLESArms Control and Disarmament

In your minute to Sir Robert Armstrong of 17 October you recorded the Prime Minister's wish for a paper on INF and START which would examine the scope for a British arms control initiative. The paper was to be for discussion "by an appropriate group of Ministers in the next few weeks".

2. When you and I discussed this at the time I suggested that the right moment for Ministers to review the state of the arms control negotiations and to consider the scope for a possible British initiative would not be until after the German Bundestag debate on 21 November. It would then finally be clear whether cruise missile/ Pershing 2 deployment was going ahead on schedule and whether the Russians had any fresh initiative up their sleeve designed to throw the Alliance off course.

3. I have discussed the Prime Minister's remit with those concerned in the FCO and MOD and the preparation of the paper has been put in hand. On timing, the Prime Minister will be away from 21-30 November at the CHOGM; thereafter the Defence Secretary will be attending the Defence Planning Committee in Brussels, which leads into the NATO Council meeting which the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will be attending. The earliest practicable time for a Ministerial discussion will therefore be in the week beginning 12 December. We are treating this as the deadline for circulating the paper. By that time the Defence Secretary hopes also to have circulated his promised paper on chemical weapons and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to have circulated a paper on non-proliferation (items (a) and (d) in paragraph 8 of Sir Robert Armstrong's minute to the Prime Minister of 11 October.

4. The paper by officials will review the state of play in the arms control negotiations (INF, START, MBFR and CDE) and will aim to indicate areas in which there may be scope for movement and possibly some British initiative or initiatives to that end. The main area of likely movement in the immediate future will be CDE, which opens on 17 January and where the Alliance has a comprehensive package of proposals virtually ready to put on the table. But if we are right in expecting

the Russians to walk out of the INF (and possibly START) negotiations shortly after cruise missile deployment begins, mid-December is unlikely to be the right moment for taking decisions about possible initiatives in the INF/START context. It will by then still be too early to judge the reactions of our principal allies, especially the Americans, French and Germans, to what may turn out to be the interruption or collapse of the Geneva negotiations; and a good deal of inter allied consultation will be needed before we can define the options which may be open to the British Government in the new situation. From this point of view it may make more sense for Ministers to address the issues in January rather than in December. I gathered from a discussion between Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr Butler yesterday that this might also be more convenient from the point of view of the Prime Minister's timetable. Decisions on the chemical weapons and non-proliferation papers could, if necessary, also wait until then. Perhaps you would like to consider this and let me have your views.

5. I am sending copies of this minute to Mr Brian Fall (FCO) and Mr Richard Mottram (MOD) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

David Goodall

11 November 1983

A D S GOODALL

Defence Army Control

12 NOV 1983

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

21A



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~830 7022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 13/1

7th November 1983

pa.
D
7/4

Dear John

HIGH LEVEL GROUP (HLG) REPORT

Thank you for your letter of 25th October about the recommendations in the HLG Report.

While the details of the proposed reductions in the stockpile of shorter range nuclear weapons deployed in Europe have yet to be worked out by NATO, it is very unlikely that any UK weapons will be involved. This being so there will be no expenditure implications for this country in the short term. In the longer term it is possible that extra expenditure might be involved in enhancing the security and survivability of the reduced stockpile; but it is not yet possible to estimate what this might be or indeed what part of it might fall to the UK rather than to the NATO infrastructure budgets.

Copies of this letter go to John Coles (No 10), Brian Fall (FCO and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours etc,


Richard Mottram

(R C MOTTRAM)
Private Secretary

J O Kerr Esq

Defence
Arms Control
P24

7



1986

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons Hansard,
3 November 1983, columns 1012 - 1090
"Foreign Affairs"

Signed AWayland Date 17 January 2013

PREM Records Team

GPS 230

UNCLASSIFIED

FM OTTAWA 271345Z OCT 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 566 OF 27TH OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW

DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS: CANADIAN POSITION ON FRENCH AND
BRITISH MISSILES

1. MR TRUDEAU SAID IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS ON 24 OCTOBER:

" THOSE WHO LISTENED TO RUMOURS AT WILLIAMSBURG WILL KNOW THAT THE
QUESTION OF COUNTING THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH MISSILES, AT SOME
POINT, IN SOME WAY IN SOME TALKS, IS NOT UNREASONABLE. I HAVE
SAID THAT ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS. THEREFORE, I AM NOT DISMISSING
IT OUT OF HAND. I HAVE NOT DISMISSED IT. IT IS A VERY COMPLEX
NEGOTIATION.

WHEN WE ARE TALKING OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA, I DO NOT
THINK IT IS RIGHT TO CONTEMPLATE INCLUDING THE BRITISH AND THE
FRENCH SYSTEMS, BECAUSE THEY ARE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. THEY ARE
NOT THEATRE, OR THEY ARE NOT INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCES. THEY
ARE CONSIDERED BY THOSE SOVEREIGN NATIONS AS STRATEGIC FORCES
AND, THEREFORE, THE SOLUTION MIGHT BE TO COUNT THEM AT SOME
POINT IN THE START TALKS BUT NOT IN THE INF TALKS.

I CANNOT SPEAK FOR FRANCE AND BRITAIN. I DO NOT WANT, AS A
NATO ALLY, TO STATE ANY POSITION WHICH WOULD NOT BE AGREED TO BY
THEM. I KNOW THAT FOR THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE GERMANS, FOR
INSTANCE, THEY CANNOT COUNT ON THE FRENCH OR THE BRITISH NUCLEAR
ARMS BECAUSE THEY ARE STRATEGIC ARMS USED BY THOSE COUNTRIES
TO PROTECT THEIR SOVEREIGNTY. THE GERMANS, WHO HAVE NO NUCLEAR
ARMS UNDER THEIR TOTAL CONTROL, HAVE TO COUNT ON THE AMERICANS".

MORAN

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PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR JAMES
MR CARTLEDGE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
START

COPIES TO:
MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING STREET

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

Subject

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. *T168/83*

CAB/WTE001/27

*cc. Master
ops.*

IMMEDIATE 271635Z OCT 83

FM CABINET OFFICE

TO WHITE HOUSE

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

BEGINS,

DEAR RON,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER ABOUT THE NUCLEAR PLANNING
GROUP MEETING IN CANADA.

I AGREE WHOLEHEARTEDLY WITH YOUR VIEWS ON THE IMPORTANCE
OF THE NPG DECISIONS ON THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF NATO'S
NUCLEAR STOCKPILE. OUR REPRESENTATIVES ON THE HIGH LEVEL
GROUP HAVE WORKED VERY CLOSELY TOGETHER TO PRODUCE A MOST
VALUABLE REPORT WHICH HAS MY FULL SUPPORT. WE HERE WILL
BE TAKING EVERY STEP WE CAN TO ENSURE THAT THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF THESE DECISIONS IS FULLY RECOGNISED BY PUBLIC OPINION IN
THIS COUNTRY.

YOURS EVER,
MARGARET.

ENDS
BT

NNNN

sent at 271644Z MJW

RECD OK ?

DE WHITEHOUSE AND QSL AT 27/1644Z

CONFIDENTIAL

271635Z.
IMMEDIATE



T168/83

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Dear Ron

Thank you for your letter about the Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Canada.

I agree wholeheartedly with your views on the importance of the NPG decisions on the size and composition of NATO's nuclear stockpile. Our representatives on the High Level Group have worked very closely together to produce a most valuable report which has my full support. We here will be taking every step we can to ensure that the significance of these decisions is fully recognised by public opinion in this country.

*Yours ever
Margaret*

The President of the United States of America

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-230 7032 218 2111/3

MO 25/2/27/2

26th October 1983

Type letter pl.
✓ A.S.C. 26/10

New Inn,

NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP

attached
Thank you for your letter of 25th October enclosing a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from President Reagan about the next meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group.

The Defence Secretary suggests that the Prime Minister might send a short reply on the lines of the attached draft.

I am copying this letter and the attachment to Roger Bone (FCO) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours etc,

Richard Mottram

(R C MOTTRAM)

A J Coles Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE USA


Thank you for your letter about the Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Canada.

I agree wholeheartedly with your views on the importance of the NPG decisions on the size and composition of NATO's nuclear stockpile. Our representatives on the High Level Group have worked very closely together to produce a most valuable report which has my full support. We here will be taking every step we can to ensure that the ^{significance} ~~importance~~ of these decisions is fully recognised by public opinion in this country.

A-JC $\frac{26}{u}$

REFERENCE
Arms Control

26 OCT 1963



SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 October, 1983

Nuclear Planning Group

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from President Reagan about the next meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group. The President seeks the Prime Minister's public support for his own statements on the significance of the decision to be taken by NATO Defence Ministers on the future size and composition of NATO's nuclear stockpile.

I should be grateful for a draft reply as soon as possible.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Roger Bone (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

SECRET

Defense : Army Control Tables. Pt 4.



Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

25 October 1983

Richard Mottram Esq
Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State for Defence

Dear Richard,

A.S.C. 26/10

f.a.

HIGH LEVEL GROUP REPORT

The Chancellor has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 21 October, and has asked whether the recommendations which Mr Heseltine proposes to support, at this week's NPG meeting, have any expenditure implications for this country.

Copies of this letter go to John Coles (No.10), Brian Fall (FCO), and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office.)

Yours ever,
John Kerr

J O KERR
Principal Private Secretary

Reference,
Arms Control,
Pt 4

26 OCT 1993

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15 16 17 18 19
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01 - 6H

Subj cut

Prime Minster.

191A

SECRET

We shall let you have a
ref. A.S.C. 25/10.

MINI
PERSONAL MESSAGE
T161A/83
SERIAL No.

Dear Margaret:

Our defense ministers will shortly meet in Canada at the autumn meeting of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), where they will review a comprehensive study, prepared by the NPG's High Level Group (HLG), on the future size and composition of NATO's nuclear stockpile. The decision to be taken by our defense ministers is important both to the Alliance's future military credibility and effectiveness and to public understanding and support for our defense posture.

If the NPG adopts the HLG recommendations, the Alliance will reduce its European nuclear stockpile to its lowest level in over twenty years. It is imperative that we explain to our publics our concerted efforts to sustain a credible deterrent force, and that we can safely undertake these reductions only if we remain committed to essential force improvements. We will have reduced our arsenal as far as we possibly can on a unilateral basis, and hope that the USSR will exercise similar restraint.

Secretary Weinberger has kept me closely informed of the HLG's work. We will be strongly endorsing -- as I hope you will -- the balanced approach which the HLG has recommended. Moreover, if the ministers approve the HLG's recommendations it will be essential that NATO's decision to reduce further its nuclear stockpile receive the public attention and understanding it merits. In that respect, I believe that we must avoid prior publicity about the HLG recommendations and work to focus maximum attention on the NPG ministerial decision once it is made.

For my part, I plan to highlight the importance of the NPG ministerial meeting by giving Secretary Weinberger a public send-off emphasizing our support for the current work of the NPG. Following the meeting, I plan to speak out publicly on the significance of the ministerial decision. I will be emphasizing that NATO nuclear forces are fundamental to the maintenance of peace and freedom and that these reductions in our nuclear stockpile are aimed both at enhancing stability at the lowest possible level of forces and at reducing tensions in Europe. I hope you will be able to join me in publicly underscoring the importance of these reductions and their contribution to a more stable military balance at the lowest possible level.

SECRET

We should be especially proud of NATO's success in maintaining peace for nearly four decades. We clearly demonstrated our commitment to reductions in our nuclear arsenal when we withdrew one thousand warheads in accordance with NATO's 1979 dual-track INF decision. Similarly, the 1979 decision's provision for replacement of existing warheads with LRINF warheads on a one-for-one basis, should deployments prove necessary, further underlined our dedication to maintaining deterrence at the lowest possible level of forces. The additional reductions now recommended by the HLG are further evidence of our determination in this regard.

We should thus take this opportunity to demonstrate the Alliance solidarity behind this new initiative -- supporting not only the welcome reductions envisioned, but, equally importantly, the actions recommended to upgrade and thereby to maintain the credibility and effectiveness of the resulting posture. These steps taken together will ensure that for the foreseeable future, we shall, as we have done so well in the past, be able successfully to deter Soviet aggression or intimidation. As leaders of the free world, I am sure you agree that we have no more important and urgent task than to communicate clearly to our publics our unceasing efforts to maintain peace and safeguard our freedom.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ron

Defence

Arms Control Talks

#4

24 OCT 1983

10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

CONFIDENTIAL

vc

24 October 1983

High Level Group Report

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's two minutes of 21 October on this subject.

AJC

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

R



19

Prime Minister

MO 13/1

Reduction of 2000 warhead
 on shorter range nuclear weapons.

A.S.C. 24/10.

PRIME MINISTERHIGH LEVEL GROUP REPORT

During our meetings in early September we discussed briefly the review by the NATO High Level Group of officials (HLG) of the stockpile of shorter-range nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. The position was summarised in Sir Robert Armstrong's minute of 11th October but as we are approaching an important Alliance decision, I think it is worth setting it out a little more fully.

2. The HLG's report will be taken at the Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Canada on 27th/28th October. It is their second main report. The first of course was the basis of the December 1979 double-track decision on longer-range INF. This one deals with the shorter-range systems (nuclear capable artillery, aircraft and missiles, NIKE HERCULES surface-to-air missiles and Atomic Demolitions Munitions). It notes a number of deficiencies in present systems and proposes measures to ensure their continued effectiveness, including in the shorter term the replacement of obsolescent warheads (though not with enhanced radiation weapons) and technical improvements to communications; and in the longer term, replacements for existing shorter-range missiles and air-delivered weapons (although there is no suggestion we shall be faced with an American request to deploy further new missiles in Europe in the short-term). The Group also took into account plans, already agreed by Ministers, to introduce conventional replacements for the aging NIKE HERCULES surface-to-air missiles and warheads.



3. On warhead numbers, the Group have proceeded from the assumption that what matters is deterrence and that if deterrence at this level (as at others) is to be credible, gaps in capability should be avoided. The difficulty with short-range systems on the one hand and a long frontier with the Warsaw Pact on the other is that if gaps are to be avoided that will tend to drive the number of short-range systems up. The alternative approach would have been to have fixed the stockpile on the (relatively much smaller) number of weapons that would, under current NATO doctrine, actually be used to restore deterrence should it fail. But circumstances are far too uncertain to make a calculation of that kind possible and, further, a very small stockpile might tempt the Russians to think that they could quickly locate and destroy it.

4. The Group are recommending an overall stockpile level (including 572 GLCM and Pershing IIs) of 4600 warheads. This would represent a further reduction of 2000 warheads in addition to the 1000 removed as part of the 1979 decision, to be completed in parallel with the deployment of the 572 Pershing II and Cruise missiles. The reductions would be drawn from all the categories of shorter-range warheads though the delivery systems themselves would not be affected nor would the British nuclear air-delivered bombs assigned to NATO. The latter were taken into account by the Group though its recommendations do not affect their numbers.

5. Such reductions would be clear evidence of NATO's determination to maintain its security whilst exercising genuine restraint - a policy which can be contrasted sharply with that of the Soviet Union - and will help to counter accusations that the West is fuelling the arms race, at a time immediately prior to the expected first deliveries of major GLCM equipment. Mr Weinberger - and perhaps also President Reagan - intends to draw attention to the positive results of the Group's work at the meeting of the NPG and subsequently. (It will however be important to ensure that the decision itself is not



announced until the NATO meeting). Following agreement at the NPG, SACEUR would undertake detailed planning to determine which warheads should be withdrawn.

6. I intend in Canada to welcome the report and its conclusions warmly, both for the reasons in paragraph 5 and as a successful collective effort to bring together the views of the Allies into an agreed report. I shall be considering how best we might, nationally, present the report's conclusions to Parliament and to the public.

7. I am copying this minute to our OD colleagues and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence

21st October 1983



18

MO 13/1

Prime Minutes

A.J.C. 24/10

mt

PRIME MINISTER

HIGH LEVEL GROUP REPORT

In my minute of today's date to you and OD colleagues I reported the outcome of a review by NATO's High Level Group of the stockpile of shorter-range nuclear weapons systems in Europe. It might be useful if I set out briefly (for you and Geoffrey Howe only) a little more of the methodology which underlay the Group's analysis, and its conclusions with regard to the composition of the stockpile, than was appropriate given the more general distribution of my previous report.

2. An illustrative table of how the stockpile of warheads for intermediate and short-range nuclear weapons in Europe might be constituted in five years time, as compared to present levels, is given below:

	<u>1983</u>	<u>1988</u>
GLCMs		
Pershing II		
F111 aircraft (bombs)		
Pershing I missiles		
Dual capable aircraft (bombs)		
LANCE missiles		
HONEST JOHN missiles		
Nuclear artillery rounds		
NIKE HERCULES surface-to-air missiles		
Atomic Demolition Munitions		
TOTAL		

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT



I would stress that the second column of figures is illustrative only, since the task of deciding precise levels of deployment for each system within the reduced stockpile level will properly fall to SACEUR. The figures have however been agreed at official level with the US. You will also note that the current stockpile has already fallen below 6000, due primarily to early retirement of NIKE HERCULES warheads.

3. You might like to note the following points in elaboration of the Group's methodology:

a. for the shortest range systems (nuclear artillery, LANCE and HONEST JOHN missiles) relatively high numbers are required in order to maintain adequate coverage along the long NATO border with the Warsaw Pact. The Group assumed that for deterrence to be credible the Soviet Union should judge that we had the means to impose significant military damage on all of their forward divisions using our short-range weapons (although short of all-out nuclear war NATO's capability would of course never be used in full within our overall requirement at this range). The Group assumed that all LANCE missiles - the most flexible of our short range systems - would be maintained, numbers of the ageing and inaccurate HONEST JOHN systems would be halved, and reductions of 2-300 warheads achieved in nuclear artillery shells;

b. for dual-capable aircraft which are of longer range and thus more flexible in their target coverage, the Group assumed that we needed to retain an ability to mount a wide range of selective nuclear strikes against important military targets in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact, as well as reserving a significant number of systems for general nuclear response. For aircraft, the Group also took into



account the likely availability of aircraft to mount such strikes. For Pershing I, the plans to replace US Pershing Is in Germany (leaving only 72 German operated missiles) were reflected;

c. the existing plan for conversion of our high altitude surface-to-air missiles from nuclear-armed NIKE HERCULES to conventionally armed PATRIOT was reflected; and reductions in atomic demolition munitions - which have few effective applications and hence little deterrent value - were assumed;

d. the reduced stockpile includes full deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles, and retention of the current force of Flls. (Nothing significant should be read into the increase in Flll warheads; this is a consequence of the mathematical approach adopted and is unlikely in practice to lead to any substantive change). It also includes the British nuclear bombs assigned to NATO. The approach adopted leaves their numbers unchanged.

4. I am copying this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

WJH

Ministry of Defence
21st October 1983

GRS 570

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 170230Z

IPS TO PM . 10, DOWNING ST.

FM BONN 170130Z OCT83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO [sic]

TELEGRAM NUMBER 926 OF 17 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, EAST BERLIN, WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, AND
MODUK (DS 17, AUS D STAFF)

INFO PRIORITY THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, ROME, -ATHENS, UK DEL VIENNA AND
VIENNA

INFO SAVINGS CICC(G)

GENSCHER/GROMYKO TALKS, VIENNA, 16-17 OCTOBER

SUMMARY

1. GROMYKO SAID NOTHING NEW ON THE SUBSTANCE OF INF. HE KEPT
COMPLAINING ABOUT THE WESTERN INSISTANCE ON AMERICAN STATIONING
AND REFUSAL TO COUNT BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS. REGARDING THE
FUTURE OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION
WAS CONSIDERING WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE DOUBLE DECISION WAS
CARRIED OUT AND STATIONING BEGAN

2. GENSCHER AND GROMYKO REACHED AGREEMENT ON BILATERAL MEETINGS OF
OFFICIALS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS. THE GERMANS HOPE THAT THIS IS AN
INDICATION THAT EAST-WEST CONTACTS CAN CONTINUE AFTER STATIONING
STARTS.

REPORT

3. RUTH (UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL) AND VON BRAUNMUEHL (UNDER
SECRETARY FOR WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES) OF THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT
BRIEFED AMBASSADORS OF THE TEN THIS EVENING ABOUT THE GENSCHER/
GROMYKO TALKS.

4. THE TALKS LASTED ELEVEN HOURS, CONSIDERABLY LONGER THAN PLANNED.
THREE MAIN SUBJECTS WERE DISCUSSED: ARMS CONTROL ESPECIALLY INF, EAST-
WEST RELATIONS AND BILATERAL RELATIONS. THE LAST TWO ARE COVERED IN
MIFT.

5. ON INF, GENSCHER MADE THREE MAJOR POINTS. THE INF TALKS WERE
NOT THE WHOLE OF THE ARMS CONTROL AGENDA, ALTHOUGH AN IMPORTANT
PART OF IT. THE WESTERN NEGOTIATION POSITION WAS NOT A UNILATERAL
US POSITION BUT ONE DRAWN UP BY NATO AND FULLY SUPPORTED BY
THE FRG (GENSCHER'S AIM HERE WAS TO FORESTALL ANY EFFORTS TO
ISOLATE THE US AS THE CULPRITS OF THE GENEVA TALKS BREAK DOWN).
NATO WOULD CONTINUE TO UPHOLD BOTH PARTS OF THE DOUBLE DECISION. IF
THERE WAS NO NEGOTIATION RESULT THIS YEAR, STATIONING WOULD
TAKE PLACE ON TIME. BUT IT WOULD NOT BE IRREVERSIBLE AND
NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD CONTINUE.

CONFIDENTIAL

/6

6. GROMYKO SAID THAT THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS PESSIMISTIC. THE WEST WAS TO BLAME: IT WAS NOT WILLING TO CONSIDER ARRANGEMENTS THAT DID NOT INVOLVE US STATIONING AND WAS REFUSING TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS.

REAGAN,S RECENT PROPOSALS DID NOT ADDRESS THESE POINTS AND COULD NOT ADVANCE THE NEGOTIATIONS. GENSCHER RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION THAT GROMYKO UNDER-ESTIMATED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF REAGAN,S MOVES, AND EXPLAINED THEM IN DETAIL TO HIM. GROMYKO SAID THAT THE SOVIET

UNION WAS AT PRESENT CONTINUING THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS AND CONSIDERING IN PARALLEL WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN IF THE DOUBLE DECISION WAS CARRIED OUT AND STATIONING BEGAN. HE GROMYKO MADE CLEAR THAT THIS MEANT THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT DECIDED WHETHER TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS. HIS REFERENCES TO WARSAW PACT COUNTER MEASURES FOLLOWING WESTERN STATIONING WERE VERY BRIEF AND TO THE EFFECT THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE PACT WOULD DO WHAT WAS NECESSARY FOR THEIR SECURITY. GROMYKO MADE NO THREAT ABOUT CUTTING OFF OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

7. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION BETWEEN GENSCHER AND GROMYKO ABOUT WHAT CONSTITUTES A STRATEGIC WEAPON. GROMYKO SAID THAT, FOR THE SOVIET UNION, PERSHING 2 AND CRUISE WERE OF STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE BECAUSE THEY COULD REACH SOVIET TERRITORY, WHEREAS SOVIET INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES WHICH COULD NOT REACH US TERRITORY WERE NOT STRATEGIC BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT THREATEN THE OTHER SUPER-POWER. GENSCHER IN REPLY SAID THAT THE SS20 POSED A STRATEGIC THREAT TO THE FRG, WHICH WAS WHY THE LATTER, A STATE WHICH HAD UNDERTAKEN NOT TO OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MUST SEEK US SUPPORT.

8. COMMENTING ON THE ABOVE, RUTH SAID THAT GROMYKO HAD SHOWN NO FLEXIBILITY AND HAD NOT INDICATED THAT ANY NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS WERE IN PREPARATION. BUT IT HAD BEEN USEFUL TO HEAR SOVIET VIEWS FROM GROMYKO HIMSELF AND TO MAKE SURE THAT THE SOVIET UNION AT THIS LEVEL KNEW AND HAD FULL AND CLEAR KNOWLEDGE OF THE WESTERN POSITION. GROMYKO WAS NOW VISITING EAST BERLIN, WHERE HE MIGHT SAY IN PUBLIC SOME OF THE THINGS HE HAD SAID TO GENSCHER.

BONN PASSING THEIR OWN SAVING
TAYLOR

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PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR JAMES
MR CARTELEDGE

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START

COPIES TO:
MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING STREET

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cc FCO
MOD

17 tel

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Arms Control and Disarmament

The Prime Minister has read your minute of 11 October setting out an agenda of issues for Ministerial consideration in the next three months and proposals for handling the various discussions.

Mrs. Thatcher is content to proceed on the basis you describe.

BF) But the Prime Minister also considers that it is desirable that Ministers should have, from time to time, an opportunity to consider our general strategy in the field of arms control and disarmament as they did at Chequers in September. To this end, she would like a paper to be prepared soon describing the stage which we have reached in the most important arms control talks, especially INF and START, and considering whether there is any scope for a British initiative, either in suggesting changes to the Western position, or in putting new forms of pressure on the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister would like this paper to be discussed by an appropriate group of Ministers in the next few weeks.

I am copying this minute to Mr. Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Mr. Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

17 October 1983

SECRET

16

PRIME MINISTER

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

I attach a minute by Sir Robert Armstrong which proposes, following the Chequers meeting, a draft agenda of issues for Ministerial consideration.

The list of likely decisions for Ministers seems alright as far as it goes. But I think it is minimalist. There is no suggestion that Ministers should at any stage collectively review where we have got to in the most important arms control talks - INF and START - and decide whether there is any scope for a fresh initiative, either in suggesting changes to the Western position, or in putting new forms of pressure on the Soviet Union. This in my view is the strategic element which has been missing from internal discussion in the past. *I agree - that is why we had the seminar and must continue to pursue these matters.*

I wonder therefore whether, in endorsing the agenda proposed by the Cabinet Secretary, you might wish to ask that a paper on INF and START on the above lines be prepared for discussion by Ministers in the next few weeks. *Yes please*

On another matter, I have, as you asked, requested the FCO to consider whether we can take the initiative in tabling a U.N. Resolutions in this field. They will be supplying advice. We shall have to bear in mind that any Resolution we table risks being defeated in the U.N. General Assembly.

A.J.C.

MS

12 October 1983



Ref.A083/2859

PRIME MINISTER

Arms Control and Disarmament

At the conclusion of your meeting at Chequers on 9 September, you asked me to circulate a draft agenda of issues in the field of arms control and disarmament which Ministers would need to consider in the next three months, and to recommend how these issues might best be considered by Ministers. My minute of 3 October to Mr Coles contained proposals for Ministerial consideration of these issues, which you approved.

2. Officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Office have now prepared an agenda and programme of work. This can be conveniently divided into

- a. the key decisions on the Trident programme;
- b. the public handling of the United Kingdom deterrent in relation to arms control; and
- c. other arms control issues.

Trident

3. The Government has taken and announced decisions on the size of the Trident force (four boats), the number of missile tubes per boat (sixteen) and the type of missile to be procured (D5). It has yet to take decisions on the number of missiles, and of warheads, to be procured. These decisions depend on a judgment of what will, when Trident is deployed, provide a minimum credible deterrent. The JIC are accordingly undertaking an assessment of the minimum level of damage which the Soviet leadership might regard as unacceptable; the Chiefs of Staff will, on the basis of that assessment, form a judgment on the deterrence criteria that the Government should be recommended to adopt; and the Ministry of Defence will work out what mix or mixes of missiles and warheads (the latter may in turn involve a mix or mixes of live warheads and penetration aids) satisfy these criteria at minimum cost.



4. As much as possible of this work will, to save time, be done in parallel. The JIC assessment is planned to be available in January 1984 and the intention is that subsequent steps should be completed so that advice can be tendered to the Secretary of State for Defence by about mid-February 1984 for subsequent discussion in MISC 7. This proposed timetable is a little in advance of that originally forecast at Chequers on 9 September. It could be further accelerated if the JIC assessment were to be dispensed with; but since that assessment is clearly crucial to the eventual judgment that Ministers will make, this is not a course that officials would recommend. There are no immediate operational time constraints on the decisions about numbers of missiles and warheads: Ministerial approval will be required by the end of March 1984 for further financial commitments to the Trident programme as a whole, but very little of the sum involved is likely to be sensitive to the decisions of the missile/warhead mix.

United Kingdom Deterrent/Arms Control: Public Handling

5. Although pressure on the Government to clarify or refine its position on the relationship between the United Kingdom deterrent and the arms control process may increase during the run-up to cruise and Pershing 2 deployment, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary considers that the position staked out in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly on 28 September (excerpt attached at annex) should be sustainable until the end of 1983 and possibly beyond. The arguments, in logic and commonsense, against taking account of the United Kingdom (and French) strategic deterrents in the current INF negotiations are so strong that patient explanation, coupled with the assurance that the Government is not claiming that the United Kingdom deterrent will never be relevant to arms control, should enable the Government to hold the line until the review of the future of our irreducible deterrence requirement is completed, at the end of March 1984. In the meantime, it will be especially important to keep senior members of the United States Administration on board. Mr Shultz raised the issue with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in Washington just prior to Vice President Bush's unfortunate remarks to journalists. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is writing to Mr Shultz.



6. There are two possible developments which could change this situation. If next year there were to be a proposal from either the United States or the Soviet Union for a merger of the START and INF negotiations or, alternatively, if the United States and the Soviet Union were to move towards a Vladivostok-type framework agreement on strategic arms reductions, the debate on the relevance of United Kingdom and French systems would rapidly move on to different and more difficult ground. It is much easier to defend the exclusion of strategic systems from a negotiation on intermediate range missiles than it is to defend their indefinite exclusion from a process of strategic arms reductions. In the present East-West climate, however, neither development seems very likely to occur during the next six months. If, against expectation, the negotiating situation were to change in either of these ways, it should be possible to shade or refine the Government's present public position sufficiently to meet increased Alliance or public pressures without prejudicing the outcome of the review of our deterrence requirement. It is essential that this review should not be rushed or skimmed simply to meet short-term problems of public presentation. Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence officials are considering possible reformulations on a contingency basis which would be submitted to Ministers at the appropriate time.

Other Arms Control

7. The outlook for the other arms control issues which were mentioned in the Ministerial discussions on 9 September has been reviewed in order to identify questions which might require collective Ministerial decision during the next three months:-

- (a) START Apart from the aspect discussed in paragraph 6, the START talks will not call for any United Kingdom decisions, though as President Reagan's recent proposals for a "build down" of strategic nuclear forces on both sides has shown, they will continue to have a presentational aspect on other arms control negotiations.

(b) INF There could be developments at Geneva requiring adjustment of the United States negotiating position.

(c) Battlefield Nuclear Weapons NATO has since 1979 reviewed its stockpile of shorter range nuclear weapons (the so-called battlefield nuclear weapons) in Europe. Subject to approval by NATO Defence Ministers at the end of October, it has been agreed that the minimum requirements of this element of NATO's deterrent permit substantial reductions - in the order of 2,000 warheads - to be made in the stockpile. Although this is not an arms control measure as such, it will be important to make the best possible presentational advantage out of these reductions when they are announced.

(d) MBFR The possibility that the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany might, in order to inject new movement into the MBFR negotiations, come forward with proposals unacceptable to the United Kingdom has temporarily receded. If it re-emerges, the United Kingdom may, in the interests of preserving Alliance unity in the negotiations, wish to table within the Alliance counter-proposals designed to move the negotiation forward without detriment to Western security interests. If this becomes necessary, Ministers will be asked to approve the United Kingdom proposals.

(e) Chemical Weapons The Defence Secretary proposes to circulate a paper on this subject before the end of October. Ministers will need to decide, in the light of that paper, whether the United Kingdom should continue to take a leading role, in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, in seeking a verifiable agreement on a chemical weapons ban.



(f) Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures in Europe (CDE) The Alliance is engaged in elaborating a set of proposals which would be tabled as a common Alliance position when this new forum opens in Stockholm in January 1984. This will probably be the first Western arms control initiative after the beginning of deployment of NATO's INF missiles. Ministers will, at the appropriate stage, be invited to give the United Kingdom's approval to that position.

(g) Outer Space Further discussions with the Americans are needed before a firm United Kingdom policy can be established towards the various arms control proposals, including that of the Soviet Union. Ministers may be asked to review the options before the end of this year.

(h) Non-Proliferation Treaty Ministers will, before the end of this year, be invited to approve proposals which the United Kingdom might put, in the first instance, to its close allies on ways in which the Non-Proliferation Treaty might be revitalised, in order to help the NPT regime to survive the NPT Review Conference in 1985.

(i) Comprehensive Test Ban No requirement for Ministerial decision is envisaged on this subject.

(j) Radiological Weapons Again there is unlikely to be any requirement for Ministerial decision.

Handling

8. The Trident procurement issues should be ready for discussion in MISC 7 in about March 1984. The remaining issues would fall to the new Disarmament Sub-Committee of OD. Unless it proves necessary to reformulate the Government's public position on the relationship between the British deterrent and the arms control process, the only subjects which at present seem likely to require Ministerial decision in the next three months are:-



- (a) chemical weapons, in the light of the Defence Secretary's forthcoming paper;
- (b) the Alliance's position on the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures in Europe;
- (c) outer space (possible);
- (d) non-proliferation.

9. I should be grateful to know whether you are content to proceed on this basis.

10. I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary.

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of the letters 'R' and 'A' in a stylized, cursive font.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

11 October 1983

ANNEX

OUR OBJECTIVE IN THESE AND OTHER NEGOTIATIONS IS SIMPLE: WE WANT REALISTIC, BALANCED AND VERIFIABLE MEASURES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT WHICH WILL ENHANCE PEACE AND SECURITY. NOT JUST FOR OURSELVES, BUT FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS. WE DO NOT SEEK UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. NOR SHALL WE GIVE IN TO THOSE WHO SEEK IT AT OUR EXPENSE.

THAT, FOR THE MOMENT, IS WHAT THE SOVIET UNION IS TRYING TO DO BY CLAIMING THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. THE TWO PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, HAVE AGREED THAT THEIR OWN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED. THERE CAN BE NO REASON IN EQUITY OR LOGIC WHY THE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS OF NON PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE INCLUDED. THE SOVIET ATTEMPT TO SUGGEST OTHERWISE SHOULD PERHAPS BE DISMISSED AS A SMOKESCREEN, DESIGNED TO HIDE WHAT I HOPE IS ONLY A TEMPORARY UNWILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY.

BUT, TAKEN LITERALLY, WHAT THE SOVIET LEADERS ARE ASKING FOR IS EITHER THE UNILATERAL STRATEGIC DISARMAMENT OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE, OR A MONOPOLY OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES.

THESE DEMANDS ARE UNACCEPTABLE AND WILL REMAIN SO. NOT BECAUSE BRITISH WEAPON SYSTEMS WOULD BE AFFECTED - BUT BECAUSE WHAT IS PROPOSED IN UNBALANCED AND INEQUITABLE, AND WOULD BENEFIT ONE SIDE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER.

WHEN IT COMES TO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, WE IN BRITAIN CLAIM NO SPECIAL PRIVILEGES AND NO SANCTUARY. THE RECORD MAKES THIS CLEAR, AND WE REMAIN READY TO PLAY A FULL PART IN THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT PROCESS.

AS FAR AS THE BRITISH DETERRENT IS CONCERNED, WE MUST NATURALLY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT OUR FORCE IS A STRATEGIC ONE, AND THAT IT REPRESENTS LESS THAN 3 PERCENT OF THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED STATES OR TO THE SOVIET UNION. IT WOULD BE ABSURD AS THINGS STAND FOR US TO SEEK TO TRADE REDUCTIONS WITH A SUPER POWER. BUT WE HAVE NEVER SAID "NEVER". ON THE CONTRARY, WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT, IF SOVIET AND US STRATEGIC ARSENALS WERE TO BE VERY SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED, AND IF NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES HAD OCCURED IN SOVIET DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES, BRITAIN WOULD WANT TO REVIEW HER POSITION AND TO CONSIDER HOW BEST SHE COULD CONTRIBUTE TO ARMS CONTROL IN THE LIGHT OF THE REDUCED THREAT. THAT REMAINS OUR POSITION.

GR 250

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2868 OF 4 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR DUS(POL), AUS D STAFF,
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO PRIORITY BONN, MOSCOW, PARIS.

MY TELNOS 2853 AND 2854 AND MIPT : START

1. IN HIS STATEMENT THE PRESIDENT EMPHASIZED POTENTIAL US FLEXIBILITY ON THE QUESTION OF THROW-WEIGHT. IN THE LAST ROUND OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, ROWNY TOLD THE SOVIET DELEGATION THAT THE US WAS PREPARED TO DROP THE 110/210 SUB-LIMITS FOR MEDIUM AND HEAVY ICBMS AND THE 2,500 SUB-LIMIT FOR LAND-BASED ICBMS IF THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS DIRECT LIMITS ON THROW-WEIGHT. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STATEMENT - ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NOT MADE EXPLICIT - WAS THAT THE US WOULD NOT NECESSARILY INSIST ON EQUALITY IN MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT.

2. YOU WILL NOTE THE PASSAGE IN THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT WHICH STATES THAT THE US IS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN MISSILES AND BOMBERS. THE NSC AND STATE DEPARTMENT EXPERTS REGARD THIS AS THE MOST IMPORTANT FEATURE OF THE WHOLE STATEMENT. FOR THIS, POTENTIALLY, MARKS A DEPARTURE FROM THE REQUIREMENT SO FAR FOR EQUAL LIMITS ON MISSILES AND EQUAL LIMITS ON AIRCRAFT BACK TOWARDS POSSIBLE TRADE-OFFS, OF THE KIND CENTRAL TO THE SALT II NEGOTIATIONS, BETWEEN THE SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN MISSILES AND MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT AND THE US ADVANTAGE IN STRATEGIC BOMBERS. THERE WILL NOW BE INTER-AGENCY DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF DEVISING SUCH POTENTIAL TRADE-OFFS.

WRIGHT

LIMITED

DEFENCE DEPT

ACDD

EED

SOV DEPT

NAD

WED

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

MR JAMES

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2867 OF 4 OCTOBER 1983

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR DUS(POL), AUS (D STAFF), DS17).

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO.

PRIORITY BONN, MOSCOW, PARIS.

START

1. AS ANTICIPATED, THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED THIS AFTERNOON HIS INTENTION TO PURSUE THE QUOTE BUILD-UP UNQUOTE CONCEPT AS A WAY OF HELPING TO ACHIEVE THE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS WHICH IS THE OBJECT OF THE US START PROPOSAL. THE PRESIDENT EMPHASISED THAT:

A) THE US WILL ACCEPT ANY EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT THAT STABILISES FORCES AT LOWER LEVELS THAN CURRENTLY EXIST:

B) THE US HAS SHOWN FLEXIBILITY IN DEALING WITH THE DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY OF BALLISTIC MISSILES, INCLUDING THEIR THROW-WEIGHT.

2. THE PRESIDENT ADDED THAT THE US WOULD INTRODUCE A QUOTE BUILD-DOWN UNQUOTE PROPOSAL DESIGNED TO ENCOURAGE STABILISING SYSTEMS, INCLUDING THE REDUCTION OF BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS AND A PARALLEL BUILD-DOWN FOR BOMBERS. THE US WOULD PROPOSE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A US-SOVIET WORKING GROUP IN THE GENEVA TALKS. THE US WILL BE PREPARED TO EXPLORE WAYS FURTHER TO LIMIT THE SIZE AND CAPABILITY OF ALCM FORCES, IN EXCHANGE FOR RECIPROCAL SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON MATTERS OF CONCERN TO THE US. IN SEEKING LIMITS ON THE DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY OF MISSILES, THE US RECOGNISES THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL SEEK LIMITS ON BOMBERS IN EXCHANGE. QUOTE THERE WILL HAVE TO BE TRADE-OFFS AND THE US IS PREPARED TO MAKE THEM, SO LONG AS THEY RESULT IN A MORE STABLE BALANCE OF FORCES UNQUOTE. THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED THE APPOINTMENT OF JIM WOLSEY, FORMER NSC STAFF MEMBER AND UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY IN THE LAST DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION, TO JOIN THE U.S. START DELEGATION IN GENEVA.

/3. IN

3. IN FURTHER GUIDANCE THE WHITE HOUSE STATED THAT THE QUOTE BUILD-DOWN UNQUOTE PROPOSAL WOULD INCLUDE:

A) A PROVISION LINKING REDUCTIONS TO MODERNISATION USING VARIABLE RATIOS WHICH IDENTIFY HOW MANY EXISTING NUCLEAR WARHEADS MUST BE WITHDRAWN AS NEW WARHEADS OF VARIOUS TYPES ARE DEPLOYED:

B) A PROVISION CALLING FOR A GUARANTEED ANNUAL PERCENTAGE BUILD-DOWN (AN APPROXIMATELY FIVE PER CENT MANDATORY BUILD-DOWN PER YEAR):

C) THE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE PACED BY WHICHEVER OF THE ABOVE RULES PRODUCED THE GREATER REDUCTIONS.

4. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

WRIGHT

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From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

The Prime Minister agrees that a new Sub-Committee of OD, as described in paragraph 4 of your minute, should be created.

A. J. COLES

4 October 1983

Ref. A083/2740

MR COLES ✓



Yes

Prime MinisterAgree to a new sub-committee
of OD as in para. 4?A.J.C. $\frac{3}{10}$ Arms Control and Disarmament

Your letter of 12 September to Brian Fall recording the conclusions of the Chequers' discussion on arms control and disarmament instructed me to circulate a draft agenda of issues in this field which Ministers would need to consider in the next three months; to recommend how those issues might be best considered by Ministers; and to arrange for the preparation by officials of the issues to be discussed.

2. Officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Office are working to produce an agenda and programme of work, and I expect to submit proposals to the Prime Minister soon.

3. So far as Ministerial consideration of these issues is concerned, I believe that it would be best to create a small Sub-Committee of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, chaired by the Prime Minister, especially for the purpose. This might be designated OD(D). Another possibility would be to put these issues to the existing Ministerial Group on Nuclear Defence, MISC 7, which will probably have a role to play in Trident procurement decisions to be taken next spring; but MISC 7 (on which the Lord President and the Chancellor of the Exchequer sit, as well as the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary) is perhaps not the right body to consider the whole field of disarmament, including its non-nuclear aspects such as MBFR.

4. If the Prime Minister agrees to the proposal to establish a new Sub-Committee of OD for this purpose, I believe there would be advantage in keeping it small and confining membership, in addition to the Prime Minister, to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence, with provision for them to be accompanied by the two Ministers of State with responsibilities in this area (Mr Luce and Mr Stanley) when they so wish, and also for official and military



advisers to be invited where this would be useful. Such an arrangement would not of course preclude invitations to other Ministers (eg the Chancellor of the Exchequer) to attend, if the Sub-Committee was going to discuss a matter in which the other Departmental interests were involved.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

3 October 1983

conqueror

DEFENCE: Arms Control

Pt 4



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FORM 130 C - 5 OCT 1986



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MO 25/3/4

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2111/3 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

23rd September 1983

*Prime Minister**I should prefer not to carry this delicate paper to the U.S.**Dear John perhaps you could read above we go.**A.J.C. 23/9*PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO CANADA
AND THE UNITED STATES

One of the remits from yesterday afternoon's briefing for the Prime Minister was, I understand, the production of a background note on the present United States' chemical warfare capability and their modernisation plan.

I attach a note on these topics. Copies of this letter and of the attachment go to Roger Bone (FCO) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,
Barry Neale*

(B P NEALE)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq

UNITED STATES OFFENSIVE CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY: BACKGROUND NOTE

Present Capability

1. All US chemical weapons pre-date 1969 when they took a unilateral decision to stop production. They are becoming increasingly obsolescent. The total stockpile is some 30,000 tons of agent of which only some 6500 tons are serviceable. The majority of the stocks are held in the United States. Only some 400 tons are held in the Central Region of Europe, in the form of artillery shells. These stocks are not assigned to NATO and are held under strict national control. Their use by SACEUR in support of non-US units would require Presidential approval.

Congressional Position on Funds for Modernisation

2. The US Administration sought Congressional approval in February 1982 to recommence production of chemical weapons with a view to encouraging the Soviet Union to negotiate an arms control agreement banning such weapons completely or to providing an effective deterrent capability should negotiations fail. Approval has proved difficult though we believe some R&D work has proceeded in the interim.

3. Congress has just authorised \$114.6M for the production of binary chemical weapons as part of the Defence Authorisation Bill for FY 1984. (This decision was due almost entirely to the KAL incident.) \$18.1M is for the procurement of components for 155mm artillery binary projectile and \$96.5M for the procurement of facilities for the manufacture of the Bigeye bomb system. There are also Congressional stipulations attached. A serviceable 155mm round must be withdrawn from the existing stockpile for each new round brought into service. (Initial assembly would probably start in 1985.) The actual production of Bigeye bombs must not start until 1985 and only then if the President certifies that production is in the national interest.

4. However, the issue is not yet finally resolved. Key opponents of CW can be expected to resume the battle during the appropriations stage which is just starting.

23 SEP 1983





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Prime Minister

London SW1A 2AH

You asked for a note
on this.

21 September, 1983

A.S.C. 23/1

John T. ...

MS

MBFR

One of the subjects which cropped up in Ministerial discussion on 9 September was the MBFR negotiations in Vienna and I understand that the Prime Minister expressed a wish to be brought up-to-date with developments. The following amplifies the information already contained in the background to the Prime Minister's brief for Washington.

The Prime Minister will already be aware from the briefing papers for Chequers that the central reason for the deadlock in MBFR has been the refusal of the East to admit its existing force superiority in Central Europe. Without agreement on initial force strengths, it has not been possible to agree on the numbers for each side's reductions to the acknowledged goal of parity of 900,000 ground and air forces. This year the East has made new initiatives during February and June which in effect propose that the impasse over initial force strengths should be side-stepped, each side deciding for itself the numbers for its necessary reductions: in return for this, the East offers to go some way to meet Western requirements on verification and has for example already conceded in principle that verification measures should include permanent exit/entry points with observers and on-site inspection.

In the light of these developments the Allied negotiators in Vienna (whose report is enclosed with this letter for your information in case the Prime Minister asks for a more detailed account) have recommended to the North Atlantic Council that the West now needs to evaluate its position. So far no clear view among the Allies has emerged. Some feel (including the energetic and intelligent US chief negotiator in Vienna) that the West should seek actively to exploit apparent Soviet flexibility over verification (particularly because of its wider significance for other arms control negotiations); and that we should offer an inducement in the form of a less rigid Western position on initial force strengths, at least in so far as quantified US and Soviet preliminary force reductions are concerned. This was indeed the sense of Secretary Shultz's bilateral probe addressed to the Russians via Ambassador Dobrynin in June. There is also some feeling among the Germans that a Western counter-move in MBFR could be politically useful in helping the Federal Government through its public debate on INF this autumn.



As against that, it is obviously important that the Alliance do nothing to jeopardise key negotiating principles and security interests and that we should not offer moves which the West might subsequently regret or take Soviet statements at face value without cast iron guarantees that the West would be able to monitor events and verify compliance.

Until it was postponed at US request following the recent KAL incident, the UK had intended hosting a trilateral meeting with the Germans and Americans to concert our positions before wider NATO consultation and resumed MBFR negotiations in Vienna next month. For this purpose the UK had circulated a discussion paper, with the endorsement of FCO and MOD Ministers, incorporating the following key elements:

- (a) If the Russians would agree to remove 60,000 Soviet troops (against a US reduction of 25,000) on a formal, quantified and observable basis as a first step, we would not insist on explicit prior agreement about the starting level of overall Soviet forces in the reductions area.
- (b) But the Russians would also have to agree at the outset on numerical ceilings, to be reached after these initial reductions, which would be verified by Western measures already tabled. The Soviet ceilings would be set at a level below the figure obtained simply by subtracting 60,000 from what we know to be their present force level. Establishing whether or not this ceiling had been reached by the Russians would tell us whether they had begun to take additional 'surreptitious' reductions of the kind necessary ultimately to eliminate their ground and air force superiority. If they had not, Soviet bad faith would have been confirmed, but at least we would have gained the removal of 60,000 Soviet troops, (albeit at the cost of some US reductions).
- (c) All further formal reductions by the Russians and other Eastern participants would have to be on the basis of comprehensive data on initial force strengths fully agreed beforehand, together with the full Western requirement on verification.

The purpose of this limited idea was to head off less watertight proposals such as the Germans and even some Americans are known to have been tinkering with; and to provide a means by which Soviet good faith could be tested (if, as is perhaps improbable, they were to accept our proposal), before the process went any further. We also had in mind here that the concept of initial US and Soviet token reductions has been a feature of earlier proposals in

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MBFR, from the West as well as from the East. If opinion in Washington were to be strongly influenced by German thinking for political reasons; and if the Americans really wished to offer to withdraw some US forces from Germany as part of an initial US/Soviet agreement, there is probably not much HMG could do to prevent it. As always therefore, the UK aim in MBFR is essentially damage limitation.

It remains to be seen however whether matters will reach this point. There is as yet no consensus in Washington as to whether a new move is required in Vienna, although we know that Secretary Shultz had earlier expressed personal interest in this. The KAL incident and the sour atmosphere of the Shultz/Gromyko meeting in Madrid have cooled enthusiasm in Washington. If and when the process of trilateral consultation resumes, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary proposes to instruct the UK officials concerned to be guided by the considerations set out in summary form above. Any possible move which survive preliminary trilateral discussion among officials would of course then need to be referred further to Ministers.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD) and to David Goodall (Cabinet Office).

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

July 6, 1983

AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO THE NAC
ON THE JUNE 23 EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT

Introduction

1. On June 23, 1983, the East tabled a new draft agreement. The draft embodies the Eastern proposal of February 17, 1983, for reductions to equal collective levels with each side determining the size of its own reductions. The other two proposals presented by the East on February 17 -- for the reduction of US and Soviet forces by mutual example and for a freeze on the forces of all direct participants -- remain on the table.
2. By formalizing only one of the three elements of the February 17 set of proposals, the East has highlighted the fact that the other two elements are to be non-contractual political commitments, outside a treaty framework. Eastern representatives have explained that all three elements represent an integral, consistent scheme, which could be considered and agreed in parallel or individually. In addition to showing this procedural flexibility, Eastern representatives in bilateral contacts have characterized their new draft as a negotiating document which has not been tabled on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The East has again contended that the sides should now be able to conclude an agreement within one year.
3. This report assesses the main features of the new Eastern draft agreement and discusses Eastern tactics.

It concludes with an overall evaluation of the Eastern move and describes how the Group will handle this development until the end of the round.

Assessment

4. In tabling this draft agreement, the East has replaced its February 1982 draft, which focussed on initial US/Soviet reductions, with one which focusses on reduction of the forces of all direct participants to parity. The new draft incorporates in detailed treaty form an earlier Eastern undertaking for achieving parity in military manpower at the level of 900,000 men, with ceilings of 700,000 on ground force manpower and 200,000 on air force manpower. It proposes parity be reached in one stage in three years rather than the four-stage, seven-year process proposed in the Western draft treaty.

5. The new Eastern draft falls short of meeting a number of requirements in the Western draft treaty:

- It excludes agreement on initial data prior to reductions;
- It does not specify reduction amounts nor the schedule of reductions;
- It fails to provide for adequate cooperative verification of the reductions to parity;
- While it provides for a package of measures for verifying adherence to the common ceilings, most of these measures are inadequate.

The East acknowledges that its draft does not contain the first three points above, but it maintains that these omissions were necessary in order to get around the data impasse. The East argues that since agreement on initial data is not possible, reduction amounts cannot be specified and that if the reductions process were fully verified under these conditions, the data dispute would only continue. The East claims that it has now provided adequate measures to verify the fact that substantial reductions are being taken and ceilings respected.

6. On the other hand, the draft agreement appears to be an effort to take into account a number of Western concerns:

- It is an ostensible commitment by the East to enter into binding obligations to reach parity in the size of Eastern and Western forces in Central Europe within a specified time frame;
- It provides that, on a voluntary basis, each side will invite observers of the other side at reductions/withdrawals of the most substantial contingents of indigenous/non-indigenous forces.
- It endorses the concept of non-interference with national technical means.

-- It suggests a more intrusive set of verification measures, including the permanent exit/entry points with observers, and also the possibility, provided the requested side agrees, of some form of on-site inspection, but only to monitor compliance with ceilings once reductions have been completed.

-- It adopts the Western formula that each direct participant with major formations in the area should take a "significant share" of the overall reductions of its side.

7. The associated measures in the new draft agreement seem designed to support an Eastern claim that the East has now adopted a package of measures analogous to that proposed by the West. Most Western measures are ostensibly matched by an Eastern measure somewhat similar in form but in most cases different in substance:

-- Inspections. Article 19 of the draft allows each side to request inspections when it suspects the other side has exceeded the common collective ceiling. But the Eastern draft clearly states the right to refuse an inspection request while the Western measure stresses the right to inspection and the extraordinary nature of denying that right. While the Western measure provides for an annual quota of inspec-

tions, the Eastern measure lacks any numerical specification.

- Permanent Exit/Entry Points. Article 18 of the Eastern draft provides for establishing 3 or 4 permanent EEPs on each side after the completion of reductions. Formations, units and sub-units of all direct participants entering and leaving the area are required to pass through these points, raising the question whether or not this would apply to the Soviet semi-annual rotation.
- Observation of Reductions. While the Eastern draft makes no provision for exit/entry points to observe the withdrawal of forces from the reduction area, it provides for observation on an invitational basis of reductions of "the most substantial contingents" of indigenous and non-indigenous forces.
- Exchange of Information. Article 14 requires the mutual exchange of data on the size of each side's forces following the completion of all reductions and annually thereafter, as well as the notification by each party of any change in the size of its own forces in the area. In addition to being

postponed until after the completion of reductions, the extent of the information to be exchanged under this measure remains unclear.

-- Non-interference with National Technical Means. Article 12 of the Eastern draft is now essentially the same as the similar measure in the Western treaty.

-- Pre-notification of movements. Article 15 of the Eastern draft requires pre-notification of all movements of ground forces with over 20,000 men within, into and out of the reductions area. This measure would go into effect only after the completion of all reductions and, unlike the Western measure, it includes pre-notification of movements within and out of, as well as into the area and provides for a higher notification threshold.

-- Pre-notification of Out-of-Garrison Activities. As noted above, Article 15 of the new draft provides for pre-notification of movements of forces exceeding 20,000 men, to be implemented after all reductions, including within the area. Article 16 provides for pre-notification of military exercises of over 20,000 men within the area. Taken together these provisions

amount to something analogous to the Western measure, although the notification threshold and other criteria are different. None of these measures applies outside the reduction area, as does the Western measure.

- Observers at Pre-Notified Activities. The Eastern draft makes no provision for observers at pre-notified activities, as called for by the West.
- Limitations on Size of Exercises. The East continues to call for a limitation on the size of exercises.

8. Beyond the shortcomings in many of the measures individually, a major flaw is that most of the measures would not be put into effect until after all reductions are complete. This significant gap in the Eastern verification system means the West would be reducing its own forces without adequate cooperative verification of the size and scope of Eastern reductions. Moreover, the measures now proposed by the East for monitoring common ceilings do not yet meet Western requirements.

9. On other issues, the draft provides specifically that armaments of withdrawn non-indigenous forces are not to be stored in the area of reductions. It also says that the armaments of indigenous forces would be

"excluded from the table of organization and equipment" of their armed forces. The meaning of this formulation is unclear. The draft provides for a Joint Commission, for the duration of the agreement, which would meet twice yearly to consider questions of compliance and related ambiguous situations and to provide information for assuring confidence in compliance. Unlike the Western draft, the Eastern draft does not specify any duties of the Commission regarding arrangements for associated measures, including observers or inspections. The draft does not meet Western requirements with regard to measures for confidence building.

10. The draft retains the Eastern position on a separate air force ceiling, specifically excludes temporary exceptions to the common ceilings, and does not provide for numerical ceilings on US and Soviet forces, but confirms that the 50% rule on the combined common collective ceilings of 900,000 would remain.

11. The Eastern draft agreement retains the flank security provision of its February 1982 draft which is similar to that contained in the West's July 8 draft agreement. In accordance with the consistent Eastern position, the draft applies only to direct participants.

Eastern Tactics

12. Whatever the motives underlying the Eastern move, which is a matter for conjecture, it does seem safe to

assume that by tabling a new draft and claiming that it addresses fundamental Western concerns, the East, particularly the Soviet Union, is also trying to enhance its public relations position in the arms control field. As may already have been signalled by its special press conference on June 23, we expect the East to seek full public impact for its new initiative.

13. In this effort, the East is emphasizing the allegedly simple, direct and "realistic" character of its basic program: initial US/Soviet cuts this year; a freeze on all armed forces in the reduction area; a comprehensive treaty for follow-on reductions to parity by all direct participants in 3 years (which the East will argue gets around the data impasse); and a "complete package" of verification measures, including on-site inspection. The East will publicly highlight this approach as constructive and of a compromise nature. They will contrast this approach and the Eastern call for an agreement within one year with alleged Western foot-dragging in Vienna, arguing that the West has not changed its proposal in one year and that the Western package of associated measures has not been modified to take account of Eastern criticism in almost four years. The East is already claiming publicly that the ball is in the West's court.

14. Tactically within the negotiations themselves, the East is building upon its February 1983 proposals in an

attempt to supplant the West's July 1982 draft agreement. Eastern reps will also use their new draft agreement to claim that they have, in fact, basically agreed to the package of associated measures proposed by the West and to criticize the West for ignoring armaments. They will use their draft to respond to the repeated Western charge that their February 1983 proposals were ambiguous.

15. Although there is no concrete evidence so far for this, it cannot be excluded that Eastern representatives may also revive their earlier drafting proposals by arguing that given the fact that two comparable drafts are on the table, the two sides should begin joint drafting of an agreement. In the June 21 informal session the East claimed that the new draft provides the basis for "further common work" in the negotiations with the aim of concluding the Vienna talks within one year.

Evaluation and Prospects

16. On balance, the Eastern draft agreement moves the East somewhat closer to the Western concept of what an MBFR agreement should look like, specifically as regards the crucial objective of verifiable parity in military manpower in the reductions area. The Eastern position still does not, however, provide verifiable assurances that the Warsaw Pact will actually take the asymmetrical reductions necessary to reach the agreed common ceilings and that reductions are taking place, and its proposed

measures for monitoring those ceilings are still inadequate.

17. While the Eastern draft provides the East with a certain tactical advantage, it provides the West with a new opportunity to press the East to accept the basic, long-term Western goal of verifiable, substantial reductions to equal collective manpower levels. It is questionable, however, whether further Eastern moves will be forthcoming without some indication of Western flexibility.

18. In the meantime, pending Council review, over the next few weeks allied delegations will be seeking further clarification of specific aspects of the Eastern draft and will criticize its obvious shortcomings and continue to advocate the Western draft as a better basis for an agreement. The Ad Hoc Group will keep the Council informed of anything significant that emerges from this probing.

19. In the light of the tactical situation presented by the Eastern draft, the Ad Hoc Group believes that the West now needs to evaluate its position. In doing so the West should also take into account the possibility offered by the MBFR forum for strengthening the Alliance's overall public posture on arms control. We also urge that an effort be made to ensure that the shortcomings

CONFIDENTIAL

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of the East's June 23 draft agreement are understood by informed Western public opinion.

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SUBJECT

cc Master

also copy in Foreign Policy
Strategy on Foreign: April 1983

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 September 1983

Dear Brian,

POLICY ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

On 9 September the Prime Minister held a meeting at Chequers to review our policy in the field of arms control and disarmament. A list of those who attended is enclosed. The meeting had before it papers on (a) Arms Control: The Strategic Agenda; (b) Western Defence Strategy; (c) Nuclear and Conventional Force Arms Control; and (d) Multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament.

The purpose of this letter is to record the conclusions which were reached.

The question of whether it would be right at some stage to agree that the British strategic nuclear deterrent should be taken account of in arms control negotiations was discussed at length. It was noted that pressure was growing among our allies for us to find some way of doing so but it was by no means certain that they had thought through the implications.

It was clear that we must continue to resist the Soviet argument that the British and French strategic deterrents should be included in the INF negotiations. The question was rather whether there would be a case at some stage for including them in the START negotiations. At present the number of British (and French) strategic nuclear warheads was extremely small in relation to the known holdings of the super-powers. But decisions in the near future on Trident D5 procurement would be likely to result in due course in a significant increase in the Western holding of strategic warheads. This would lend more plausibility to the Soviet argument that the British and French deterrents were a major factor for them.

A key factor in determining whether there was any scope for taking account of the British deterrent in START was our estimate of the irreducible minimum holding of strategic nuclear weapons necessary to deter the Soviet Union. It was clear that the present Polaris deterrent could not be reduced. Officials were at present considering what the irreducible minimum would be in the Trident era in relation to the increased Soviet capability which we should then face. This would to some extent depend on eventual Ministerial decisions on the targetting of Trident.

/ It was recalled

It was recalled that while Polaris was indeed a weapon for use by the United Kingdom in a situation of last resort, it was also assigned to SACEUR who had the power to use it in situations short of last resort. This was one reason why some of our allies saw substance in the Soviet argument that the British deterrent should be included in negotiations. There was a need to find some way of making our position more plausible to our allies.

But great care was necessary. Any suggestion that the United Kingdom should participate in negotiations about strategic arms implied that we were willing to consider reducing our deterrent. Alternatively, it implied that the United States would emerge from such negotiations in a position of less than parity with the Soviet Union (and this was unrealistic since such an agreement would probably not be accepted by the US Congress).

①
B/F
It was agreed that there could be no question of making any move towards including our deterrent in arms control negotiations without the most thorough prior consultations with the United States. But whether any such move should be made depended on the outcome of the current work on the concept of the irreducible minimum. The Ministry of Defence were asked to consider how quickly that work could be completed (the current target of spring, 1983 was felt to be too distant) and to report.

②
B/F
Since it was clear that at least for the time being there could be no question of changing our present position, further thought needed to be given to the handling of public opinion on this question. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office were asked to consider urgently, together with the Ministry of Defence, and to report.

The task of the Alliance in retaining the support of public opinion could be greatly aided if current work resulted in an announcement in the autumn of a decision significantly to reduce the Alliance's holdings of battlefield nuclear weapons.

③
B/F
The present state of the MBFR negotiations was described and it was noted that Germany appeared to wish to make a significant departure from the West's position of insisting on agreement on data before reductions could be agreed. We had it in mind to make an alternative proposal which would avoid the dangers of the German proposal. This should be considered by Ministers (and the Prime Minister wishes to see the text).

④
B/F
Concern was expressed about the threat posed by Soviet chemical weapons holdings. The Secretary of State for Defence said that he proposed to put a paper to the Prime Minister about this matter.

⑤
B/F
In conclusion, the Prime Minister asked the Secretary to the Cabinet:

- (a) to circulate shortly a draft agenda of issues in the field of arms control and disarmament which Ministers would need to consider in the next three months;

/(b)

- (b) to recommend how those issues might best be considered by Ministers;
- (c) to arrange for preparation by officials of the issues to be discussed.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Bob Cole.

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Prime Minister

Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Howe, MP

Rt. Hon. Baroness Young

Mr. Richard Luce, MP

Sir Antony Acland

Sir Julian Bullard

Mr. Bryan Cartledge

Rt. Hon. Michael Heseltine, MP

Mr. John Stanley, MP

Sir Clive Whitmore

Field Marshal Sir Edwin Bramall

Mr. John Blelloch

Sir Robert Armstrong

Mr. David Goodall

Mr. J.M. Mackintosh

Sir Anthony Parsons

Mr. Robin Butler

Mr. John Coles

DPM 081/23

Departmental Series
Defence Department
DS No 2/83

MBFR: 30TH ROUND (16 MAY - 21 JULY 1981)

Head of Delegation to MBFR at Vienna to the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth AffairsDA
31/2

SUMMARY

1. The East has tabled in draft agreement form its proposal of 17 February providing for reductions to parity at 900,000 ground and air forces. The draft agreement contains verification measures reminiscent of those in the West's July 1982 proposals, but ignores the need for data agreement. It also maintains the East's hard line on other issues of importance to the West (paragraphs 1-4).
2. As circumscribed, the verification measures would be ineffective. There is striking imprecision about the reduction process. The emphasis on the achievement of parity would give the Russians the chance to take asymmetrical reductions, but the West would have to trust the Russians for three years meanwhile. We should highlight such unacceptable features (paragraphs 5-8).
3. The West has not responded formally to the draft agreement. There is opinion in the Ad Hoc Group favouring a "flexible" response in the search for progress in conventional disarmament in the period before installation of Pershing II and Cruise missiles. But others in the Group favour a more robust reply indicating clearly where the East's offer must be improved (paragraph 9-14).
4. The Americans have told the Russians they are prepared to be flexible, but have had no response. The FRG and the UK have prepared options for trilateral consideration. Agreement on a text and a programme for tabling will need Alliance endorsement and will take time. Meanwhile, pressure for significant revision of the Western stand is likely to increase (paragraph 15-18).
5. Diluting the West's requirements could lead to the "toothless" kind of agreement the East favours, conveying international recognition of its military predominance in Central Europe. The West is divided over how best to try and exact the terms we require by taking advantage of the East's interest in such an agreement. Some concessions could be exacted from the East if we maintain the pressure (paragraphs 19-20).

Vienna
1 August 1983

Sir,

BACKGROUND

1. In my report on the last Round, the 29th, I referred to the statement in the Warsaw Pact's 5th of January Declaration in Prague that all the conditions existed for working out an MBFR

agreement quickly. The East had followed this by the tabling in Vienna on the 17th of February of a three-part proposal involving small-scale initial US and Soviet withdrawals outside any treaty framework: a "political" commitment to a subsequent freeze on the forces and armaments of all participants; and eventual reductions, the size of which each side would decide for itself, to parity at 900,000 ground and air forces.

2. The proposal on reductions to parity was accompanied by an offer to consider the question of mutually acceptable verification of the final ceiling on condition that the West agreed to the "principle" of the Eastern approach - to forgo any interest in resolving the crucial data question, and leave reduction amounts unstated. In the Western view the East has about 235,000 more men than it admits in Central Europe, and thus would have to accept large asymmetrical reductions if it were to reach parity. This is not a matter that can be ignored.

LATEST EASTERN PROPOSAL

3. On the 23rd of June the East tabled the proposal on reductions to parity in draft treaty form, indicating that the sides should undertake binding obligations to reach parity in three years. Although the West had not accepted the "principle" of the East's approach, the East has come forward with certain verification measures - reminiscent of elements in the Western draft treaty of the 8th of July 1982. For example that national technical means of intelligence should not be interfered with, that maintenance of final ceiling figures should be guaranteed by permanent exit/entry points and exchanges of information, and that there should be authorisation of on-site inspection - albeit on circumscribed terms like those in the Soviet draft Convention on Chemical Weapons tabled at the UN General Assembly on the 18th June 1982. There is provision for each side to invite representatives from the other to observe certain reductions, and for a Joint Commission to consider questions of compliance with agreement obligations. The East has also adopted the Western formulation that each party to the Agreement with major formations in the area should implement a significant share of reductions to parity.

4. But the East has maintained its previous stand - contrary to Western interests - opposing temporary exceptions to final ceilings (for reinforcement exercises or other purposes) and requiring the inclusion of a sub-ceiling on air force manpower, and armament reductions. It has categorised the West's July 1982 draft treaty as incapable of serving as the basis for an agreement, and as having been overtaken by Eastern proposals.

ASSESSMENT OF THE LATEST PROPOSAL

5. The Eastern moves on verification are welcome: the provision for permanent entry/exit points, and acceptance of the principle of on-site inspection have long been sought by the West. But as defined the moves are inadequate. Permanent exit/entry points would only begin to function after establishment of the final ceiling, and would provide no assurance that troops who should previously have left had done so; the right is affirmed for each side to refuse an inspection request from the other (although in response to Western questioning the East has said that it "believes" that requests would normally be met). Further, an invitation to send observers during the reduction process would be at the discretion of the side withdrawing or reducing forces, and would apply only for contingents of "the most substantial size". There would be no exchanges of information to show what was happening during this period; furthermore the Joint Commission would have no powers to resolve disputes, being empowered only to make reference in its minutes to opinions reached by consensus - an unlikely event. All of this falls far short of acceptable verification.

6. Lack of precision about the reduction process is a striking feature of the whole approach. The East has not responded to Western questions about the extent of observation and hence of

knowledge that would be achievable; evidently neither reduction amounts nor the schedule of reductions to parity would be specified, and there would be no serious effort to provide for cooperative verification of reductions. This is in line with the overall Eastern approach, placing the emphasis on the end result - achievement of parity.

7. The approach would offer a way out for the Russians if they were minded to accept the asymmetrical reductions necessary to reach parity but wanted to avoid being pilloried for having lied about the East's previous strength. But it would involve the West's agreeing to trust the East for the entire 3-year reduction period, although there are currently no grounds for believing that the East intends to undertake asymmetrical reductions of the necessary size; on the contrary the East contends that approximate parity now exists. My view is the straightforward one, that the imprecision of the references to reductions is accounted for by the East's determination to preserve its present superiority in conventional force levels (and that the draft agreement's terms are intended to make this palatable to the West).

8. I therefore see the East's proposal as an audacious move, intended to put paid once for all to the Western concept of an agreement, as exemplified in our July 1982 draft text: a staged reduction and limitation process, with effective verification measures operating on the basis of agreed data from the start. But the East's acknowledgement of the need for observation of reductions and limitations and of the principle of on-site inspection - however circumscribed - represent critical concessions from which we should derive benefit in the negotiations and in public. Our attack should be focussed on the incompatibility between the means proposed and the acknowledged ends; the East's replies will be a touchstone of Eastern willingness to come to a reasonable accommodation.

ARGUMENT ABOUT THE PROPER WESTERN RESPONSE

9. During the Round Western negotiators in Vienna have continued to point out unacceptable features of the first two parts of the East's 17th of February proposal. They have contented themselves, about the East's draft agreement, by saying that this was being carefully studied, and have taken the opportunity to reiterate our essential requirements for a viable agreement as exemplified in our July 1982 text. A report to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) by the Ad Hoc Group (AHG), the West's steering group, has highlighted the draft agreement's shortcomings. But the AHG is divided over how to proceed.

10. Certain colleagues believe that the East may be signalling serious interest in a mutually acceptable outcome and that the negotiations have reached a turning point. The report, which the NAC accepted, therefore proposed that there should be an evaluation of the Western position. The colleagues to whom I refer, favour the West's responding to the East's proposal by tabling fresh terms of our own. Otherwise, in this view, we shall remain tactically at a disadvantage at a period when there is much public interest in arms' control negotiations.

11. My Netherlands' colleague is the main protagonist for the view that to encourage the East to improve its verification terms we should show "flexibility". This is generally taken to mean that the West should no longer require agreement on data from the outset (partly as an earnest of Eastern preparedness to implement any agreement and partly because it would be easier to enforce an agreement based on it) but should postpone this until later when it might be possible to create an agreed data base as a result of verified limitations. He would also like our side to be prepared now to concede other, less important, elements on which we have previously insisted.

12. An important underlying consideration for him and others is that their governments would find it helpful in the controversy over the installation of Pershing II and Cruise missiles to be able to

point to progress in Vienna as the result of Western moves. My German colleague takes a similar line; despite being well aware of the unsatisfactory nature of the East's proposal, he is concerned in case the West incurs the criticism that we are no more interested in disarmament than the Russians are. He would like to respond with a major gesture of some sort. The Americans sympathise with the German predicament and would like to help. My US colleague, who is an activist, is keen to explore alternative solutions to the long-standing deadlock (although I am unclear how far his view coincides with those of the upper reaches of the US Administration); sceptical of Eastern motives, he nonetheless believes that further Eastern movement over verification, which could, indeed, have ramifications outside MBFR, might be achievable provided that the West first showed "flexibility". The balance of opinion in the AHG has tilted towards the view that Western insistence on agreement on initial data, however reasonable, should be dispensed with in the search for a worth-while Soviet response.

13. The contrary view, in which I have been supported by my Italian, Belgian, Turkish and Greek colleagues (out of an AHG complement of twelve) is that there is no immediate requirement for the West to make a major move which could risk compromising some of our security objectives - although we could well, on a contingency basis, consider the terms of an agreement that we could live with and which might be advanced at some time in future. Meantime there is scope for pursuing elements in the East's proposal in our own interest.

14. In a reasoned reply to the proposal we could welcome its positive aspects, but should point up its inadequacies - indicating clearly how the East should remedy them if it has an interest in an agreement to which the West could subscribe. We owe the East a reply, and it is unlikely that anything more elaborate than the foregoing could secure Alliance agreement by September when the next Round begins. Some of my colleagues are unduly impressed by Soviet protestations that nothing more should be expected of the East since "the ball is in the West's court". In my view there is no need for our side to match the East - draft agreement for draft agreement. More fundamentally, the argument is a dangerous one that steps should be taken in MBFR with an eye to the position created by INF; the issues in Vienna are too important for Europe's future to be handled as an adjunct of problems elsewhere.

US-SOVIET CONTACT

15. A factor in the equation known only in broad terms to the AHG as a whole, although suspicions have been aroused that only half the story has been told, is that the US has already conveyed to the Russians its preparedness to be flexible. On the 18th of June the US Secretary of State after consultations with the trilateral allies (ourselves and the FRG) informed the Soviet Ambassador in Washington that the Americans might be prepared to consider implementing initial reductions without prior agreement on data - provided that the Russians accepted our verification package. There has been no reply, although the Russians know that the Americans do not consider the East's 23rd of June draft Agreement to be an adequate response. It would be sensible to await an indication of Soviet views before making any major Western move. I should add that when the Americans suggested making their approach to the Russians it emerged that they had no clear idea of how to follow up an Eastern response if this were positive, although several ideas are currently under consideration in Washington.

FRG OPTION

16. Meanwhile the Germans have submitted for trilateral consideration a scheme approved at a high level in Bonn - and of whose existence the Russians already seem to know - providing for initial US/Soviet reductions followed by a general numerical "freeze" without prior data agreement.

The Germans propose to rely on verification of the "freeze" to secure data agreement prior to later reductions to parity. The UK has argued that the German option goes too far, as it abandons the requirement for initial data agreement in the West's July 1982 proposal in circumstances where there would be a real risk of nothing more being offered in return than a discussion about verification procedures. It provides the Russians with a chance to withdraw troops without acknowledgement; but the outcome could be to confirm existing disparities in force levels, thereby setting the scene for a renewal of data disagreement in circumstances where the Russians would have no incentive to move further.

UK ALTERNATIVE

17. The UK has therefore circulated for trilateral consideration a more cautious proposal which concentrates on large and observed asymmetrical Soviet and US initial reductions followed by a requirement for agreed residual ceilings, including sub-ceilings on US and Soviet forces, to provide the main data base for later obligations. Although postponing data agreement until after initial reductions involves certain risks, we could live with it provided that the later obligations were sufficiently tautly drawn. Our alternative is safer for the West than the German option, but the establishment of a clear link between initial reductions and the achievement of parity will not be easy; and the alternative might not be attractive enough to the Russians for it to be negotiable with them.

PROSPECT

18. How these and other ideas may coalesce to form an agreed response to the East will firstly be for trilateral decision during the Recess, and the outcome will require Alliance endorsement. All this and agreement on a programme for tabling will take time. Meanwhile agitation may increase for an early and significant revision of the West's position, as installation of Pershing II and Cruise missiles draws near and on the assumption that the negotiations in INF and START fail to progress much. Some colleagues also have in mind that convening a Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe would be likely to divert attention and effort from MBFR, and that the present may be the last chance for MBFR to seize an initiative; this does not seem to me to be a crucial factor.

19. I do not suspect any colleagues of wishing to undermine the Western negotiating position - and there are built-in obstacles in Brussels and in capitals against excessive zeal for an agreement. But paring down our requirements could lead to moving closer to the kind of agreement without "teeth" that the Russians have been pursuing from the start: one that would secure international recognition for the current Central European military imbalance in Soviet favour - incidentally giving the Russians a droit de regard over the West German armed forces and complicating American reinforcement capability.

20. The stakes for the Soviet Union are high, therefore, and it would make sense for the Russians to be prepared to concede more in pursuit of them. We can take advantage of this - while not for a moment ignoring Soviet objectives. At issue in the West is the most effective means of doing so. In my view an improvement on the Eastern verification position could be expected in response to Western pressure and if we resisted calls to adopt a fall-back position. We could then face the Russians with the need for a data move.

21. A more detailed report on the Round is being sent separately to the foreign and Commonwealth Office.

22. I am sending copies of this Despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in NATO and Warsaw Pact capitals; at Vienna, Helsinki, Stockholm, Berne, Belgrade, Tokyo and Peking, to the United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council at Brussels, the United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the United Nations at New York, the Leader of the United Kingdom Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, and the Leader of the United Kingdom Delegation to the CSCE Review Meeting at Madrid.

I am, Sir,
Yours faithfully

A M Simons

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FM UKDEL NATO 281220Z JUL 83

TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 6 OF 28 JULY

INFO PRIORITY FCO MODUK (FOR DS17 AND AUS (D STAFF))

ROUTINE BONN PARIS MOSCOW UKDIS GENEVA

INFO SAVING ROME THE HAGUE OSLO COPENHAGEN OTTAWA TOKYO

[Handwritten signature]

FOLLOWING FROM WESTON

START: ROWNY'S VISIT TO LONDON

1. GENERAL ROWNY, THE US START NEGOTIATOR, CALLED ON MR LUCE IN LONDON ON 22 JULY AND SUBSEQUENTLY DISCUSSED THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GREATER DETAIL WITH OFFICIALS OVER LUNCH AND TALKS AT THE US EMBASSY. MUCH OF WHAT HE SAID HAD BEEN FORESHADOWED BY YOUR REPORTING (NOT TO ALL) OF THE CHANGES IN THE US START POSITION. BUT THERE WERE SOME INTERESTING NUANCES. THESE SHOULD NOT, PLEASE, BE QUOTED OR ATTRIBUTED TO ROWNY UNLESS THEY ALSO APPEAR IN HIS NAC BRIEFING ON 1 AUGUST.

2. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON 8 JUNE OF GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE US POSITION HAD BEEN FOLLOWED, DURING THIS CURRENT ROUND, BY THE AMERICANS PUTTING TO ONE SIDE A NUMBER OF THE COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS WHICH THEY HAD BEEN PROPOSING SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE TALKS. THUS THE US PROPOSALS THAT:

A. ICBM WARHEADS SHOULD BE REDUCED TO HALF OF THE PROPOSED TOTAL OF 5000 FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS,

B. HEAVY AND MEDIUM SOVIET ICBMS SHOULD BE REDUCED TO A MAXIMUM OF 210,

C. SOVIET THROW-WEIGHT SHOULD, OVER 2 PHASES OF START, BE REDUCED TO 1.9 MILLION KG,

HAVE ALL BEEN ABANDONED. THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE AMERICANS WERE READY TO NEGOTIATE ANY REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF BRINGING SOVIET THROW-WEIGHT DOWN. THE US WOULD IN FACT WANT TO SEE A SOVIET THROW-WEIGHT OF LESS THAN 3.0 MILLION KG, ROWNY SAID. THE 5000 BALLISTIC MISSILE CEILING IS THUS THE ONLY SPECIFIC FIGURE FORMALLY REMAINING IN THIS PART OF THE US PROPOSAL AND THE EMPHASIS ON A 2 PHASE APPROACH HAS ALSO BEEN DROPPED.

3. THE RUSSIANS WERE CLAIMING PUBLICLY THAT THE AMERICANS REMAINED INFLEXIBLE BUT THIS WAS ONLY TO BE EXPECTED. THEY HAD IN FACT SHOWN LIMITED FLEXIBILITY OF THEIR OWN BY DROPPING THEIR PROPOSED LIMIT OF 4-6 BOATS ON OHIO/TYPHOON CLASS SUBMARINES AND THEIR PROPOSED BAN ON ALCMS (YOUR TELNO 1962).

4. ROWNY DID NOT EXPECT THAT THE AUTUMN ROUND OF START WOULD YIELD MUCH FURTHER PROGRESS - ALL EYES WOULD BE ON INF. HE DID NOT ATTACH MUCH CREDENCE TO THE SOVIET THREATS, BEING MADE INFORMALLY TO NITZE'S PEOPLE, TO SUSPEND START AS WELL AS THE INF NEGOTIATIONS FOLLOWING THE FIRST DEPLOYMENTS OF NATO'S INF MISSILES AT THE END OF 1983. (THIS VIEW WAS ALSO SHARED BY PERLE AT TODAY'S HLG).

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/ S. THE

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5. THE RUSSIANS WERE ALSO SUGGESTING, AGAIN INFORMALLY AND NOT AT THE START TALKS, A MERGER BETWEEN START AND THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. BOTH ROWNY AND NITZE WERE AGAINST A MERGER AT THIS STAGE. BUT ROWNY'S VIEW WAS THAT, SHOULD THE INF NEGOTIATIONS ABORT AFTER NATO DEPLOYMENTS, THE POSSIBILITY OF TAKING US QUOTE FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS UNQUOTE (I.E. US INF MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT) INTO START SHOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE EXCLUDED. HE ALSO SAID, IN HIS OBLIQUE ALLUSION TO THIRD PARTY SYSTEMS, THAT IF SUCH SYSTEMS STOOD IN THE WAY OF A US/SOVIET START AGREEMENT QUOTE THEY MIGHT NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE EXCLUDED. UNQUOTE

6. WHEN PRESSED ON BACKFIRE ROWNY SAID, AS EXPECTED, THAT THIS ELEMENT COULD NOT BE SWITCHED FROM START TO THE INF NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SHORT RUN WITHOUT A HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL DECISION. BUT HE ADDED, IN CONFIDENCE, THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO COUNTEANCE COUNTING ONLY THE SOVIET AIR FORCE BACKFIRE AND TO EXCLUDE THE SNAF BACKFIRE FROM START, AT A PRICE. (PLEASE PROTECT).

7. ROWNY SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD DECIDED NOT TO CIRCULATE THE US DRAFT TREATY TABLED ON 8 JULY TO THE ALLIES FOR THE TIME BEING. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ABOUT NON-CIRCUMVENTION LANGUAGE HE SAID THAT THE US HAD INCLUDED NONE. HE WOULD LEAVE THE RUSSIANS TO BE DEMANDEURS. BUT THE US WOULD ENSURE THAT NO LANGUAGE MORE RESTRICTIVE THAN THAT IN SALT II WOULD BE ALLOWED IN.

8. ROWNY CONFIRMED THAT, IN SAYING THAT ALL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS WERE ON THE TABLE, THE US DID NOT EXCLUDE SLCMS IN PRINCIPLE. BUT THEY WOULD ARGUE THAT IT WAS FOR THE RUSSIANS TO PUT FORWARD A NEGOTIATING POSITION ON SLCMS TOGETHER WITH PROPOSALS ABOUT HOW ANY LIMITS COULD BE VERIFIED. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, ROWNY SAID THAT A PROPOSAL TO BAN ALL NUCLEAR SLCMS (WHICH WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE EXISTING SOVIET NUCLEAR SLCMS AT SHORTER RANGE) WOULD PROBABLY BE WORTH SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON.

9. RECORD OF ROWNY'S CALL ON MR LUCE WILL FOLLOW BY BAG.

FCO PASS SAVING ROME THE HAGUE OSLO COPENHAGEN OTTAWA TOKYO

ALSTON

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1612 OF 10 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY MODUK (FOR DUS(POL), AUS D STAFF, DS 17), UKDEL NATO,
MOSCOW, BONN, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL VIENNA, UKDIS GENEVA.
INFO SAVING TO OTHER NATO POSTS.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 875 (NOT TO ALL): US POLICIES ON ARMS CONTROL

SUMMARY

1. WITH THE WHITE HOUSE TAKING AN INCREASINGLY DIRECT INTEREST IN THE PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, THE BALANCE WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION HAS SHIFTED IN FAVOUR OF THOSE WHO WISH SERIOUSLY TO EXPLORE WITH THE SOVIET UNION THE PROSPECTS FOR A NEW STRATEGIC ARMS AGREEMENT. THE PRESIDENT WILL REMAIN DETERMINED THAT AGREEMENTS BOTH IN START AND INF MUST BE BASED ON REDUCTIONS, GENUINE EQUALITY AND ADEQUATE VERIFICATION. THERE IS POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER MOVEMENT IN THE US POSITION, BUT THIS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN BOTH NEGOTIATIONS WILL DEPEND ON A SIGNIFICANT SOVIET RESPONSE, OF WHICH THERE HAS SO FAR BEEN LITTLE SIGN.

DETAIL

2. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS COME UNDER INCREASING POLITICAL PRESSURE TO ADOPT A MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE TO ARMS CONTROL. WHILE FEW AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS CAN MAKE MUCH REAL CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL SECURITY, THERE IS PUBLIC CONCERN AT THE BREAKDOWN OF DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE APPARENTLY INDEFINITE ACCUMULATION OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS ON BOTH SIDES. ALL THE DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES HAVE BEEN PAYING LIP SERVICE TO THE IDEA OF A MUTUAL AND VERIFIABLE "FREEZE", WITHOUT REALLY BELIEVING IN THE CONCEPT (A "FREEZE" WOULD PROHIBIT MODERNISATION AND WOULD NOT BE FULLY VERIFIABLE OR CAPABLE OF IMPLEMENTATION FOR MORE THAN A VERY LIMITED PERIOD).

3. DESPITE THE FREEZE CAMPAIGN, THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL BOTH IN INCREASING REAL DEFENCE SPENDING BY VERY LARGE AMOUNTS (WELL OVER FIVE PER CENT) IN SUCCESSIVE FISCAL YEARS AND IN SECURING CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL FOR THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF HIS PLAN TO MODERNISE US STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES (TRIDENT II, THE B1 BOMBER AND MX MISSILE). APPROVAL FOR CONTINUED FUNDING OF THE MX MISSILE, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN LINKED BY SEVERAL INFLUENTIAL SENATORS TO A GREATER DISPLAY OF ZEAL IN PURSUIT OF ARMS CONTROL.

4. THE US ALLERGY TO NON-VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS HAS BEEN INCREASED BY

A) THE EVIDENCE OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA AND, POSSIBLY, AFGHANISTAN:

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(8)

B) SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF AMBIGUITIES IN THE SALT II TREATY TO TEST TWO NEW TYPES OF ICBM:

C) SUSPICIONS THAT THE SOVIET UNION MAY HAVE TESTED ABOVE THE 150 KILOTON LIMIT IN THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY (SEE PARA 10 BELOW).

INF

5. THE ADMINISTRATION IS FIRM ON THE COMPLETE EXCLUSION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR SYSTEMS FROM INF AND WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT AGREEMENT MUST BE BASED ON EQUAL US AND SOVIET INF WARHEADS. THE AMERICANS AT PRESENT CAN SEE NO SIGN OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE SOVIET POSITION. THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL ONLY NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ONCE DEPLOYMENT IS UNDER WAY. GIVEN SOVIET NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY AND THE PROBABILITY OF FURTHER SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS, OTHERS ARE LESS SANGUINE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE AN INF AGREEMENT EVEN AT THAT STAGE. THE AMERICANS EXPECT THE RUSSIANS TO DEPLOY UP TO 100 MORE SS20S IN SOVIET ASIA, AND TO INCREASE THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS IN EASTERN EUROPE. NITZE HAS AUTHORITY TO EXPLORE THE SOVIET POSITION AND WILL DO SO SERIOUSLY. THE ADMINISTRATION IS LOOKING AT WAYS OF FLESHING OUT THE PROPOSAL FOR RECIPROCAL RESTRAINTS ON SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS. BECAUSE OF THE MOBILITY OF THE SS20S, AND THE IMPLICATIONS VIS A VIS THE JAPANESE AND CHINESE, THE AMERICANS WILL RESIST ANY FORMAL DEPARTURE FROM THE CONCEPT OF GLOBAL CEILINGS, THOUGH PRIVATELY THEY DO NOT EXCLUDE COMPLETELY SOME LIMITED ALLOWANCE FOR MISSILES IN SOVIET ASIA IF ALL OTHER ISSUES COULD BE SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED. THEY ARE CONTEMPLATING PROPOSING EQUAL LIMITS ON CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE AIRCRAFT.

START

6. THE PRESIDENT'S CRITICISM OF THE SALT AGREEMENTS WAS BASED IN PART ON THE FACT THAT BOTH SALT I AND SALT II PERMITTED FURTHER MASSIVE INCREASES IN WARHEAD NUMBERS. IN THE RECENT REVIEW OF THE US POSITION THE ADMINISTRATION HAS RETAINED THE CENTRAL FEATURE OF THE START PROPOSAL, WHICH IS THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD REDUCE TO 5,000 WARHEADS ON INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES (FROM CURRENT LEVELS OF 7,200 FOR THE UNITED STATES AND 7,900 FOR THE SOVIET UNION). THE CONCENTRATION ON BALLISTIC MISSILES, RATHER THAN AIRCRAFT AND CRUISE MISSILES, IS JUSTIFIED BY THE FACT THAT ICBMS ARE THE MOST THREATENING, FAST-MOVING SYSTEMS, USEABLE IN A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE. THE US OBJECTIVE IS ALSO TO REDUCE THE FIVE TO TWO SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN THROW-WEIGHT.

7. THE US HAS PROPOSED EQUAL BOMBER LIMITS, INCLUDING BACKFIRE: AND LIMITS ON AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (SLCMS) ARE NOT YET COVERED IN THE US PROPOSAL, IT BEING ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONALLY ARMED SLCMS, OR TO VERIFY THEIR RANGE. THE PRESIDENT HAS NOW SAID THAT THE US IS PREPARED TO RAISE THE LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES. THE RUSSIANS HAVE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS TO 1800 LAUNCHERS ON EACH SIDE, BUT SO FAR HAVE REFUSED TO INDICATE WHAT THIS WOULD MEAN IN TERMS OF WARHEADS.

THE GAP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IS WIDE. THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT CHANGED THE PROPOSED SUB-LIMITS WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE RUSSIANS TO DISMANTLE A HIGH PROPORTION OF THEIR HEAVY AND MEDIUM LAND-BASED MISSILES. WHILE STILL DETERMINED TO REDUCE THE SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN THROW-WEIGHT, THE AMERICANS WOULD BE PREPARED TO MODIFY THIS ASPECT OF THEIR PROPOSALS IF THERE WERE CORRESPONDING SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY ON THE SOVIET SIDE. IF PRESIDENT REAGAN DECIDES TO RUN FOR RE-ELECTION, THERE COULD BE OBVIOUS POLITICAL ADVANTAGES IN SEEKING TO ACHIEVE A NEW VLADIVOSTOK TYPE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT IN START. IF SUCH AN AGREEMENT WERE ACHIEVABLE, IT COULD BE ENDORSED AT A SUMMIT EARLY NEXT YEAR. THE PRESIDENT IS NOT THE MAN, HOWEVER, TO MAKE MAJOR CONCESSIONS AGAINST HIS JUDGEMENT OR THE ADVICE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO ACHIEVE THIS: AND ANDROPOV IS UNLIKELY TO DO HIM ANY FAVOURS TO HELP SECURE HIS RE-ELECTION.

MBFR

8. SHULTZ HAS TAKEN A PERSONAL INTEREST IN TRYING TO GIVE SOME NEW IMPETUS TO MBFR. THE AMERICANS WILL SOUND OUT THE RUSSIANS BILATERALLY ON THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE WESTERN PACKAGE ON VERIFICATION MEASURES IN EXCHANGE FOR REDUCED EMPHASIS ON PRIOR AGREEMENT ON DATA. THESE IDEAS ARE NOT FULLY WORKED OUT AND THE AMERICANS ACCEPT THAT THE DATA ISSUE COULD NOT BE SET ASIDE FOR ANYTHING OTHER THAN A PRELIMINARY PHASE. WHETHER THESE MOVES LEAD ANYWHERE WILL DEPEND ON THE SOVIET RESPONSE ON VERIFICATION.

CSCE/CDE

9. IN THE CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE IN MADRID THE AMERICANS ARE INSISTING, WITH ALLIED SUPPORT, ON IMPROVEMENTS TO THE PASSAGES IN THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT DEALING WITH HUMAN RIGHTS. THEY ALSO INSIST THAT THERE MUST BE IMPROVEMENT IN THE SOVIET PERFORMANCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS BEFORE THERE IS AGREEMENT TO MOVE ON TO A CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE). THE AMERICANS HAVE ACHIEVED PROGRESS ON THE QUESTION OF THE PENTECOSTALISTS AND ARE CONTINUING THEIR EFFORTS TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF SHCHARANSKY. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SEE ATTRACTIONS IN MOVING TOWARDS A CDE NEXT YEAR, BUT WILL NEED TO ACHIEVE ENOUGH ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO SATISFY CONGRESSIONAL CRITICS HERE WHO CONTEND THAT SOVIET PERFORMANCE, INCLUDING THE DETENTION OF THE HELSINKI MONITORING GROUPS, HAS MADE NONSENSE OF THE CSCE PROCESS.

NUCLEAR TESTING

10. U.S. ESTIMATES OF SOVIET UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS HAVE LED TO THE CONCLUSION HERE THAT THERE IS A NINETY PER CENT PROBABILITY (THOUGH NO ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY) THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE CONDUCTED SOME TESTS ABOVE THE 150 KILOTON LIMIT SPECIFIED IN THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY. THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF THE SENATE RATIFYING A TREATY THE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS OF WHICH ALLOW A 100 PER CENT MARGIN OF ERROR IN THE ESTIMATE OF TEST YIELDS. THE RUSSIANS HAVE REJECTED U.S. PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVED VERIFICATION THROUGH INSPECTION OF TESTS ABOVE 75 KILOTONS. THE U.S. IS CONSIDERING WAYS OF PURSUING A DIALOGUE ABOUT VERIFICATION. THERE WILL BE NO INTEREST IN IDEAS OF A DEGRESSIVE THRESHOLD UNTIL VERIFICATION PROBLEMS CAN BE RESOLVED.

CHEMICAL WARFARE

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11. THE PENTAGON ARE CONCERNED AT THE EXTENT TO WHICH SOVIET MILITARY EXERCISES ARE ACCOMPANIED BY TRAINING IN CHEMICAL WARFARE. THE ADMINISTRATION IS SEEKING FROM CONGRESS AUTHORITY TO MODERNISE THE U.S. CW STOCKPILE IN THE U.S. THROUGH THE PRODUCTION OF BINARY WEAPONS (SAFER TO OPERATE THAN EXISTING CHEMICAL WEAPONS) AS A DETERRENT TO SOVIET CW USE. THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT OF CONGRESS VOTING FUNDS FOR THIS PURPOSE, THOUGH THEY WILL DO SO FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF CW DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT. THE ADMINISTRATION IS CONTENT FOR US TO PURSUE OUR EFFORTS TOWARDS A CW AGREEMENT IN THE DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE, BUT IS EXTREMELY SCEPTICAL ABOUT SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE ANY AGREEMENT ENTAILING ADEQUATE VERIFICATION, AND GENERALLY DISTRUSTFUL OF WHAT THEY REGARD AS THE DISPOSITION OF THE CD TOWARDS PURELY DECLARATORY ARMS CONTROL MEASURES.

OUTER SPACE

12. THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION CAN SEE NO INCENTIVE TO PURSUE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS IN OUTER SPACE GIVEN, THE DIFFICULTIES OF VERIFICATION: THE INCREASING MILITARY APPLICATION OF SATELLITES: THE POTENTIAL U.S. TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE AND THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALREADY TESTED ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS.

COMMENT

13. WHILE ATTENTION IS BEING DEVOTED TO NEW MOVES IN MBFR AND, SUBJECT TO SOME SATISFACTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE POSSIBILITY FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS A CDE, THE MAIN FOCUS OF INTEREST IS ON NUCLEAR ISSUES. THERE IS POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. POSITION IN START. FOR INSTANCE, WE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT, IN THE INTEREST OF PUTTING FORWARD A COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL, THE U.S. SHOULD BE PREPARED TO STATE A READINESS IN PRINCIPLE TO EXAMINE WAYS TO ACHIEVE EQUAL LIMITATIONS ON SLCMS, LEAVING THE VERY COMPLEX TECHNICAL ISSUES INVOLVED TO BE THE SUBJECT OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATION. THOUGHT IS BEING GIVEN TO WAYS OF INCORPORATING A QUOTE BUILD DOWN UNQUOTE INTO THE U.S. POSITION (IE THE IDEA THAT MORE THAN ONE EXISTING WARHEAD SHOULD BE RETIRED FOR EACH NEW WARHEAD DEPLOYED). THE U.S. WILL BE SEEKING TO PROBE THE SOVIET POSITION IN SHULTZ'S PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH DOBRYNIN, AS WELL AS THROUGH THE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. IF THE PRIVATE SOVIET RESPONSE IS AS DISMISSIVE AS THE INITIAL TASS REACTION, THERE WILL BE A REDUCED DISPOSITION HERE TO CONSIDER FURTHER MOVEMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ON THE SOVIET SIDE.

F C O PASS SAVING TO ANKARA, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, OTTAWA, OSLO, ROME, REYKJAVIK, THE HAGUE.
WRIGHT [REPEATED AS REQUESTED] [THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 614 OF +0 JUN

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BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, EAST BERLIN, WARSAW, PRAGUE

WASHINGTON TEL NO 1593: START

1. THE FIRST SOVIET PUBLIC RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON START CAME IN AN AUTHORITATIVE TASS COMMENT ON 9 JUNE (PRAVDA 10 JUNE).
2. THIS DISMISSED THE PROCLAIMED NEW US FLEXIBILITY: IN NO WAY DID IT AFFECT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE AMERICAN POSITION WHICH CONTINUED TO BE DIRECTED AT ACHIEVING MILITARY SUPERIORITY AND SOVIET UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT. THE US ADMINISTRATION HAD FIRST ENBARBED UPON PLANS TO BUILD UP ITS STRATEGIC ARMS, AND ONLY THEN ON TALK ABOUT SO-CALLED FLEXIBILITY AND A NEW APPROACH. THIS INDICATED NO STRIVING FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT. ON THE CONTRARY, REAGAN'S STATEMENT REVEALED THE WISH TO UNDERMINE THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY ON WHICH THE SALT 1 AND 2 NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN BASED. IN PARTICULAR THE ESSENCE OF HIS SO-CALLED INITIATIVE WAS STILL FIRST OF ALL TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF MISSILES, ESPECIALLY LAND-BASED, WHICH CONSTITUTED THE CORE OF SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENCE. THE AMERICAN READINESS TO RAISE THE CEILING ON THE TOTAL NUMBER OF MISSILES WAS A MOVE TOWARDS TOUGHENING THEIR POSITION IN CONNECTION WITH PLANS FOR TWO NEW ICBMS.
3. REAGAN HAD IGNORED SOVIET PROPOSALS. HE HAD GIVEN NO REACTION TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT OF 28 MAY, WHICH PUT FORWARD CONCRETE WAYS TOWARDS ACCORD IN GENEVA. TASS SAID IN CONCLUSION THAT HIS REFERENCES TO SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE AND TO HIS FIRM COMMITMENT TO TAKE ANY NECESSARY MEASURES TO ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS WERE 'WORDS AND NOTHING MORE'.

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COMMENT

4. THE CRITICISM OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT IS CURTLY PHRASED AND SHOWS NO SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO GIVE THE AMERICANS ANY BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT. THERE IS NO EXPLICIT MENTION OF REAGAN'S CALL FOR A SOVIET RESPONSE OR OF HIS WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER THEIR IDEAS. NOR DOES TASS SUGGEST SOVIET PREPAREDNESS TO EXPLORE THE NEW AMERICAN APPROACH AT THE RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS. EVEN SO, THE TASS COMMENT IS NOT WHOLLY CATEGORICAL IN ITS REJECTION OF REAGAN'S MOVE. IT AMOUNTS LARGELY TO A CRITIQUE OF ALLEGED US INTENTIONS RATHER THAN TO DETAILED ANALYSIS OF START PROBLEMS. IT DOES NOT MENTION ANY FIGURES FOR REDUCED LEVELS, OR THE QUESTIONS OF THROW WEIGHT AND "BUILD DOWN". ONCE AGAIN (CF NY TEL 504) IT SEEKS TO PORTRAY THE SOVIET STATEMENT OF 28 MAY AS CONSTRUCTIVE.

SUTHERLAND

(Repetition to REYKJAVIK
referred for departmental decision,
repeated as requested to other posts.)

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Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

You will I will to be
aware of the new US
position on START.

10 June, 1983

A.J.C. ^{13.}/₆

You John,

Strategic Arms Control: Change to US START Proposals

You asked for a commentary on President Reagan's speech on 8 June in which he announced amended proposals for the START talks.

The President announced that he was prepared to relax the US proposal for a limit of 850 strategic ballistic missile launchers. Although no figure has been made public, a possible limit of 1250 has been given to the US START negotiator to work on at Geneva. The announcement brings the US position into line with the recommendations of the President's advisory commission (the Scowcroft Commission) on the future of US land-based strategic missiles.* The Commission recommended that the primary focus in arms control should be on restricting warheads rather than launchers, on the grounds that the growth and development of MIRVed systems is threatening the survivability of land-based missiles. The Commission therefore proposed the development of a new small land-based missile with a single warhead. A switch to single warhead missiles would be impossible to accommodate under a ceiling of 850 for all strategic ballistic missiles. The Americans' proposal for reductions in the number of strategic missile warheads remains as it was - viz a limit of 5000, as compared to current levels of about 7,500.

The US proposals for limits on aircraft and air-launched cruise missiles are also unchanged. The President made clear that the further main US requirement to reduce Soviet superiority in the throw-weight (a major element in calculating destructive power) of strategic nuclear forces, also stands. In this context the President did not indicate any change in US proposals for highly restrictive sub-ceilings for the heavier Soviet land-based missiles. But he conspicuously avoided a rigid position on throw-weight and there are indications, including remarks by Mr Shultz at the North Atlantic Council on 9 June, that the Americans may be prepared to be more flexible on this. This would further increase the negotiability of their position.

The President's statement was marked by an important change in tone, indicating that the new proposals are not made on a take it or leave it basis and that the Americans are prepared to negotiate seriously. This to some extent reflects Congressional

* It also has the effect of narrowing the gap between the US and Soviet position on this specific point.

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pressures. The President also announced that the Scowcroft Commission would remain in existence; this could have an important contribution to make to the restoration of an effective bi-partisan approach in Washington to arms control issues.

Yours sincerely,
R B Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 206 OF 18/4/83

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INF AND JAPAN.

1. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT JAPANESE THINKING ON INF IS STILL EVOLVING AND COULD REQUIRE CAREFUL HANDLING IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
2. AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS MONTH THE JAPANESE WERE VERY STRONG SUPPORTERS OF THE ZERO-ZERO OPTION BUT HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IF THERE WAS TO BE AN INTERIM AGREEMENT THIS SHOULD NOT WORK TO THE DETRIMENT OF JAPAN BY PERMITTING THE TRANSFER OF SS20S FROM THE EUROPEAN THEATRE TO SIBERIA. THEY ARE INSISTENT THAT INF SHOULD BE SEEN AS A GLOBAL PROBLEM.
3. IN THE PAST TWO WEEKS THE JAPANESE HAVE SOUGHT TO ENUNCIATE A POSITION WHICH GOES FURTHER THAN THIS IN A WAY WHICH COULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES FOR THE WEST'S NEGOTIATING POSITION AND OFFER THE RUSSIANS SCOPE FOR MISCHIEF-MAKING. DURING WOLFOWITZ'S VISIT HERE TEN DAYS AGO THE JAPANESE SOUGHT TO OBTAIN AMERICAN AGREEMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME, ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY COMPARABLE, REDUCTION IN SS 20S IN SIBERIA IN ANY AGREEMENT INVOLVING A REDUCTION OF SS20S IN THE EUROPEAN THEATRE. THE AMERICANS SOUGHT TO RIDE THEM OFF THIS BY RE-EMPHASISING THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE ZERO-ZERO OPTION, BY RE-ACKNOWLEDGING THAT INF WAS A GLOBAL ISSUE AND ACCEPTING THAT ANY AGREEMENT WHICH LED TO A REDUCTION OF INF IN THE EUROPEAN THEATRE WOULD ONLY BE A PARTIAL TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENT AND SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY ARRANGEMENTS DEALING WITH OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. THE AMERICANS JIBBED, HOWEVER, AT A JAPANESE SUGGESTION THAT THIS LATTER REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE WRITTEN INTO ANY AGREEMENT WITH THE RUSSIANS.

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4. DESPITE THIS JAPAN-US EXCHANGE KITAMURA, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS BUREAU IN THE MFA, REPEATED TO THE MINISTER AT THE END OF LAST WEEK THE MAXIMUM JAPANESE DEMANDS AS SET OUT ABOVE AS AN EXAMPLE OF A PROBLEM WHICH COULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE AMERICANS IN THE COMING MONTHS. WHITEHEAD SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKE TO KATO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE EUROPEAN AFFAIRS BUREAU, TO POINT OUT THAT IF MAINTAINED IN THEIR PRESENT FORM THESE DEMANDS COULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES FOR EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS, WHICH HAD ENOUGH PROBLEMS WITH THEIR OWN ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENTS AND WOULD NOT WELCOME ANY JAPANESE DEMANDS WHICH EFFECTIVELY ACTED AS A ROAD BLOCK TO PARTIAL TEMPORARY AGREEMENTS TO A REDUCTION OF INF IN EUROPE. KATO, WHO WHO WILL BE PRESENT AT SOME OF THE SESSIONS DURING GILLMORE'S TALKS HERE NEXT WEEK, TOOK CAREFUL NOTE AND THEN SOUGHT TO TEMPORISE. HE SUGGESTED THAT GROMYKO'S REJECTION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENT PROPOSAL ON 2 APRIL PROVIDED THE WEST WITH A BREATHING SPACE IN WHICH TO CONSIDER THEIR POSITION FURTHER. BUT JAPAN REMAINED CONCERNED TO TRY TO ENSURE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A REDUCTION IN SS20S IN SIBERIA, ALTHOUGH SHE RECOGNISED THAT THIS MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE BECAUSE THE AMERICANS (AND THE JAPANESE) HAD NOTHING TO PUT INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS AS A COUNTERWEIGHT OTHER THAN, FOR EXAMPLE, US FORWARD BASE SYSTEMS IN KOREA AND JAPAN, WHICH THE AMERICANS HAD SO FAR MADE CLEAR WOULD NOT BE THE SUBJECT OF INF NEGOTIATIONS. KATO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE COULD ALSO BE A COMPLICATION OVER CHINA.

5. WE HAVE CHECKED WITH CLARK, MINISTER IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, WHO HAS CONFIRMED THE SUBSTANCE OF JAPAN-US RECENT EXCHANGES ON THIS SUBJECT AS SET OUT ABOVE AND CONCEDED THAT WAYS OF BRINGING ABOUT A REDUCTION OF SS20S IN SIBERIA ARE LIKELY TO BE HARD TO FIND. IN THE MEANTIME ONE JAPANESE AIM WILL BE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TO LOCK THE SIBERIAN PROBLEM INTO EUROPEAN THEATRE DISCUSSIONS AS BEING THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND "ACCEPTABLE" MEANS OF EXERCISING LEVERAGE ON THE RUSSIANS.

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6. THESE MORE DIFFICULT THOUGHTS ON THE PART OF THE JAPANESE HAVE NOT YET BEEN REFLECTED IN THE PRESS. IN VIEW OF THE VERY SPEEDY MARKERS WHICH HAVE BEEN PUT DOWN BY THE AMERICANS AND OURSELVES IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE JAPANESE MAY DRAW BACK AND THAT THERE WILL THEREFORE BE NO PUBLICITY. BUT THE IDEAS ARE STILL AROUND AND COULD SURFACE AGAIN DURING GILLMORE'S TALKS.

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From the Private Secretary

MR HATFIELD

The Soviet Attitude to Arms Control
and Disarmament

The Prime Minister has seen your minute of 5 April and JIC(83)(N)4 which you attached.

Mrs. Thatcher felt that some of the paper required further elucidation. This has been provided in a subsequent discussion with officials.

15 April 1983

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A. J. COLES

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What is known of the alleged SA-12

Soviet ? handwritten

Prime Minister.

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Ref. A083/1016

MR COLBY

is anti ballistic missile. Some of this needs further elucidation

The Soviet Attitude to Arms Control and Disarmament

I attach the Prime Minister's copy of JIC(83)(N) 4, a Note on the above subject, which was approved by the JIC on 30 March. Last October the JIC produced an assessment on the Soviet attitude to MBFR: this Note looks at Soviet attitudes across the whole spectrum of arms control negotiations.

2. The Note assesses that the Soviet Union does not regard disarmament as an end in itself but it displays a strong and continuing interest in arms control and disarmament discussions. It seeks to use negotiations to maintain or achieve military superiority; to foster the impression that the Soviet Union is a peace-loving nation; to contain both Western defence expenditure and its own defence costs; and to seek visible endorsement by the United States of its superpower status.

3. The Soviet Union is genuinely concerned to prevent Western deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles and its current massive propaganda campaign will continue. The approach of initial deployment may bring some flexibility in the Soviet negotiating position over INF but the JIC cannot yet say what concessions the Soviet Union might be prepared to make in return for the West cutting its planned INF deployment.

4. The JIC assesses that the Soviet Union is seriously concerned to reach a settlement in strategic arms reductions. It may seek to link the START and INF talks if this would improve its negotiating position but for the moment it will probably be content to leave the two sets of discussions separate. A major breakthrough in START is not thought to be imminent, but there is some basis for limited optimism over the prospects of an eventual agreement. In other arms control talks (for example on MBFR and chemical and space-based weapons) progress is less likely.

3. Copies of the Note are being passed to the American, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand intelligence authorities; and the text is also being released to NATO.

Lindsay Wilkison

R P HATFIELD

5 April 1983

EXTRACT FROM JIC(83)(N)4 31 March 1983

THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

[This text has been released to NATO]

INTRODUCTION

1. The Soviet Union does not regard disarmament as an end in itself. But it displays a strong and continuing interest in arms control and disarmament discussions. We examine below its aims and motives.

GENERAL OBJECTIVES

2. Soviet arms control and disarmament policy must be seen in the context of the Soviet leadership's determination to play a major and preferably dominant role in world affairs and the Soviet belief that a high absolute level of military strength is an essential element in status and in the preservation of Soviet security. The general Soviet objectives in the arms control field are as follows -

a. Security: To maintain or achieve a degree of military superiority over NATO and other potential enemies, particularly China, and so ensure security of the homeland. The Soviet Union will therefore seek to limit Western capabilities while at the same time preserving its own ability to make whatever improvements are important to it. Restrictions resulting from arms control agreements on programmes to improve Soviet military capabilities have been relatively modest, and the research and development on which future advances depend has scarcely been affected. In particular the Soviet Union will seek to prevent improvements in Western capability in areas where it enjoys or hopes to enjoy an advantage, both directly and by attempting to undermine the West's political will to improve its military capability.

b. Strategic stability: To reduce the uncertainty associated with the advent of new weapons systems by limiting such systems both numerically and qualitatively. More generally, the negotiating process gives an added measure of predictability to strategic arms competition and hence added stability in the United States-Soviet strategic relationship.

c. To contain the growth in Western defence capability: To encourage the Western public to press arms reduction on their own governments and to persuade both Western and non-aligned opinion that NATO bears a heavy responsibility for any arms race. Arms control agreements to date have generally operated satisfactorily for the Soviet Union not only because of their contents but also, on occasions, because of the effect they have had in limiting Western defence allocations.

d. To contain the costs of defence: The rate of Soviet economic growth has declined significantly in recent years and is expected to be lower still during the period up to 1985. If defence expenditure continues to grow at current rates the Soviet leadership will have to face choices in resource allocation and living standards might well suffer - though we do not doubt that the Soviet Union would be willing to pay that price if it was judged necessary to ensure continued security. Moreover, the Soviet Union probably fears that Western technology is better equipped than its own to secure a quantum leap forward in military capability. It may also fear that Western technology will be more closely safeguarded in a period of tension than in one of apparent detente.

e. Propaganda: To foster the impression that the Soviet Union is a peace-loving nation against which further military build-up is unnecessary and that peace is to be equated with socialism. To that end the Soviet Union seeks to exploit declarations and proposals on arms control and disarmament and pursues associated negotiations. The negotiating process itself provides major opportunities for Soviet propaganda which has influenced some sectors of Western, non-aligned and perhaps domestic opinion in the Soviet Union, and has caused difficulties for some NATO governments. Provided it can successfully portray an image of genuine desire for arms reduction, the Soviet Union will often benefit as much, and sometimes more, from initiatives and the process of negotiations than from any outcome. Such an approach is exemplified by the Prague declaration of 6 January 1983* where the centrepiece proposal (a Treaty on Mutual Non-Use of Military Force between NATO and the Warsaw Pact) is for the most part a propaganda exercise.

*JIC(83)(WSI) 2 dated 13 January 1983

f. Super power status: To seek and maintain visible endorsement by the United States of its super power status and its right to be consulted on major world issues.

g. Droit de regard: To establish as far as it can a Soviet droit de regard over Western military programmes, particularly in Western Europe.

h. Decoupling: To further through arms control negotiations its wider objectives of decoupling the defence of NATO Europe from the United States nuclear umbrella, in particular by weakening the link between deterrence in Europe and the United States strategic nuclear forces.

i. Proliferation: To prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

3. The Soviet Union does not regard disarmament as an end in itself. We would not expect it to undertake significant disarmament obligations except in the interest of achieving some, or all the above objectives.

VERIFICATION

4. The Soviet Union is traditionally reluctant to accept Western requirements on verification for disarmament agreements. It regards these as an intrusion and a threat to its security as well as making evasion harder. It has for example refused to allow on-site inspection of suspected Biological Warfare (BW) establishments. (There are no concrete verification provisions in the 1972 BW Convention, to which the Soviet Union is a signatory.) It would prefer to maintain the paramountcy of "national technical means", for example, telemetry intelligence, seismography and satellite based imagery. The Soviet stance on this subject is causing difficulties in a number of arms control negotiations.

SCOPE OF SOVIET POLICIES

5. Soviet arms control and disarmament policy has over the past twenty years covered a wide spectrum of weapons systems. Examples of agreements signed by the Soviet Union and initiatives and negotiations in which it is at present involved are listed at Annex. Many Soviet proposals aim to capture public opinion (Western, Third World and domestic) through emotive appeal rather than their negotiable content. Those having the greatest impact are resurrected from time to time in different guises. The Soviet Union clearly calculates that a continuing propaganda onslaught can be combined with the conduct of serious negotiations on arms control. We examine in the following paragraphs how the Soviet Union has sought to achieve the objectives in paragraph 2 above in the various sets of current arms control negotiations.

START

6. In the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), as in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) which preceded them, the Soviet Union aims to prevent, restrict or delay deployment by the United States of new strategic weapons. It also aims to stabilise general United States-Soviet relations by removing the uncertainties which the introduction of a new generation of Western weapons systems might cause. The Soviet Union seeks to achieve these objectives not only in the talks in Geneva, but also through encouraging opposition in the United States and Europe to the introduction of those weapons. The Soviet Union's negotiating targets include the full range of current United States strategic programmes: long range sea and air launched cruise missiles (SLCMs and ALCMs), the MX intercontinental range ballistic missile (ICBM), the D5 submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM), and (reflecting Soviet insistence on the strategic capability of these systems) Pershing II and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM). At the same time the Soviet Union is seeking to preserve its own current advantages, especially in the numbers and throw-weight of ICBMs; also the freedom to improve its own weapons, particularly in the areas of accuracy and reliability where they have often been inferior to United States systems.

Warheads by $\frac{1}{3}$ - Cut of $\frac{1}{2}$ in missiles

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Am. - limits on strategic bombers.

And as in SALT II - limits on ALCM (for bombers) ¹²⁰ ^{London} ²⁰ ^{ALCMs}

144000
2 nos.
2nd stage
START
= weight
Rebo present
is 5-6000 mt
by Russian
More than
double weight
U.S.

7. The Soviet Union has rejected the opening United States proposals which would require the Soviet Union to make a major shift in emphasis away from land based systems, of which it possesses the largest, and the greater number, to submarine based systems. It has included in its own proposal measures which would restrict the United States SLBM advantage. ? Sea launched cruise missiles.

(Domehead) ALCM.

8. On launcher numbers, time has seen a modification in the Soviet approach. In SALT 1, where Soviet weapons were acknowledged to be qualitatively inferior, the Soviet Union obtained an asymmetrical treaty which sanctioned its numerical superiority. In SALT 2, when the qualitative gap was narrower, it was agreed that numbers should be equal, but the Soviet Union demanded far higher levels than the United States desired and refused to cut its own forces by more than 10 per cent. At the START talks it has offered in response to United States initiatives a 25 per cent reduction in strategic system numbers and a cut to unspecified but equal levels in warheads. This offer is, however, conditional on, inter alia, agreement that NATO does not deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe.

unacceptable

9. We believe that the Soviet Union is seriously concerned to reach a settlement on strategic arms reduction and may be prepared to offer some concessions. It will be cautious about any agreement to a major reduction of emphasis on ICBMs given the possible implications for its own security, or to accept rigorous on-site inspection, despite the fact that alleged inadequacies in verification procedures were a major factor in the US refusal to ratify SALT 2. The need for some co-operative verification has, however, been acknowledged. Western determination to proceed with the upgrading of its own forces will probably increase the likelihood of an agreement, provided the Soviet Union does not conclude that the United States is itself unwilling to negotiate genuine reductions.

INF

10. Although a START agreement is of major importance to the Soviet Union it regards the intermediate range nuclear force (INF) talks as more urgent and these will have top priority in 1983. Its overriding objective is to frustrate NATO's attempt to reinforce the coupling of the United States nuclear deterrent

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729
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F111 -170
[Vulcan - force]
F4 - cant

Bomber
State aircraft
B-70, B-52, B-1
- need everywhere in Europe
+ F-15 (500) - up to 1,600 km

750 km
Jaguar +
American
= cant
reach
US
F-104
500 km

and Europe which was the main objective of the Alliance's 1979 "dual-track" decision. The Soviet Union wishes to prevent the deployment of GLCM and what it claims to regard as the even more threatening Pershing II, in order

(a) to preserve its overwhelming advantage in intermediate range missiles, (b) to forestall targetting of the Soviet Union from NATO Europe which would present military difficulties for the Soviet Union, and (c) to establish an important new principle concerning the non-stationing of longer-range INF ballistic missiles by NATO in continental Europe. The Soviet Union is conducting a massive publicity campaign to bring popular pressure to bear on NATO governments to abandon their deployment plans. It is unlikely to make major concessions unless and until it is clear that the propaganda has failed.

11. The Soviet Union claims that the "zero option" is unacceptable and tantamount to a call for unilateral Soviet disarmament. The Soviet propaganda offensive stresses the dangerous nature of NATO's plans, not the need for mutual reductions. Nevertheless Andropov's initiative on 21 December 1982*, in which he suggested that, provided Pershing II and GLCM deployment plans were abandoned, the Soviet Union would reduce its SS20 holdings in Europe to the level of British and French nuclear strategic forces, highlights the Soviet concern to appear flexible. NATO has always made it clear that the British and French nuclear forces cannot be counted as INF or included in any sense in an INF agreement. Andropov also insisted that any agreement on missiles must be accompanied by an agreement on medium range nuclear capable aircraft. This would in effect maintain the Soviet Union's advantage in this field.

MBFR

12. We consider that the Soviet Union's main interest in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations is to secure political gains (eg by causing division between the United States and Western Europe) while preserving the military status quo. But it might consider it advantageous to make minor reductions in conventional manpower in Central Europe in return for the achievement of other major goals, provided its overall superiority in manpower was maintained. The Soviet Union only agreed to participate in discussions in exchange for the West accepting the Conference on Security

* JIC(82)(WSI) 51 dated 22 December 1982

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and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and there are no indications that it is interested in any MBFR agreement which would significantly alter the present level of forces in Central Europe, unless it did so in its favour. Indeed, since the West lacks any leverage comparable to that which the Pershing II and GLCM deployments have given it in the INF talks, the Soviet Union has managed to stall the negotiations by presenting and essentially sticking to figures designed to prove that parity already exists. At the same time it has been active and skilful in the negotiations in pursuing a range of particular objectives, including (a) a limited initial agreement which would have the advantage for the Soviet Union of securing juridical sanction for its current military superiority in Central Europe and (b) a ceiling on the manpower of the Federal Republic of Germany (set at about 450,000 for land and air-force manpower combined). Demographic trends and wastage in numbers seem likely to lead to the latter even in the absence of an agreement.

13. The Soviet Union nevertheless seeks to give the appearance of flexibility. Over the years it has modified its original position in relatively minor matters and has hinted recently at some flexibility over verification. Such hints have been studiously vague. The reduction area covered by MBFR does not include Soviet territory, and the Soviet Union might therefore be prepared to offer concessions and "confidence building measures"; but we do not expect any major Soviet move such as would lead to the kind of substantive agreement acceptable to the West. The February 1983 proposals by the Soviet Union for initial and limited Soviet and United States troop reductions, and for an informal political commitment to a general freeze on forces and armaments until negotiations for reductions were complete, would not have been expected by the Soviet Union to lead to purposeful negotiations. The proposals ignored the longstanding Western insistence on data agreement and made only the vaguest suggestion of a move towards improved verification measures. Similarly the recent Eastern hints that the talks might be used as a forum to develop a Swedish proposal for a battlefield nuclear weapon free zone in Central Europe is largely political in motivation, as it is known that the West would not contemplate such a zone which would put it at a serious disadvantage.

14. The current international climate is not favourable to an agreement involving the Soviet Union scaling down its military strength in Central Europe, even though evidence that a "businesslike" agreement were possible could be used to Soviet advantage in other talks. The conclusion of an INF agreement providing for broad parity of certain nuclear forces in Europe might, indeed, strengthen the Soviet Union in the conviction that it must retain clear numerical superiority in military manpower in Central Europe.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

Improved verification
 15. The Soviet Union was an original signatory, with the United States and the United Kingdom, of the Partial Test ban of 1963. It also took part from 1977 to 1980 in trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive ban, but these were broken off by the United States because it did not believe that in the circumstances such a ban could help to reduce the threat of nuclear war or maintain the stability of the nuclear balance. They have not been resumed.

E
 16. Since 1980 Soviet policy appears to have been generally to support calls by non-aligned states in the UN General Assembly and in the Committee on Disarmament (CD) for negotiations leading to a comprehensive test ban and for the resumption of trilateral negotiations. The Soviet Union's interest in concluding a ban of limited duration appears to be genuine but it is unwilling to agree to one of unlimited duration unless France and China also sign the treaty. The Soviet Union might see a ban as a means of holding back Western nuclear arms development as well as a step towards limiting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. It remains however very cautious with respect to verification, and it seems improbable that it would be prepared to make substantial concessions in this field in order to achieve a treaty. It has for example recently turned down a United States proposal for improvements in the verification procedures of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty ¹⁹⁷⁴ and the Treaty on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy ¹⁹⁷⁸ (neither of which the United States has ratified). For the moment the Soviet Union risks nothing, since the United States has stated that it regards a comprehensive test ban as a long term objective.

USSR/USA
 1574

10 verification status

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

17. The Soviet Union currently possesses a substantial advantage over the West in chemical warfare capability*. It is a signatory to the 1925 Geneva Convention banning the use of chemical weapons (CW) although, like other states, it reserves the right to retaliate. Between 1976 and 1980 the Soviet Union took part in bilateral discussions with the United States aimed at concluding a comprehensive ban but no agreement was reached, in part because of characteristic Soviet reluctance to accept on site verification. The Soviet Union is now one of 40 countries taking part in a working group of the CD whose present mandate is to elaborate the terms of a convention to ban CW.

18. The Soviet Union publicly supports the objective of a CW convention. It wishes to prevent the United States from modernising its CW arsenal by developing binary chemical weapons** It is also subject to increasing pressure from Western and non-aligned delegations in the CD to be more forthcoming, particularly over on-site inspection.

19. In response to these combined pressures, the Soviet Union tabled a draft treaty at the second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSD II) in June 1982, which included qualified provision for on-site inspection of some aspects of the convention under certain circumstances. In subsequent discussion in the CD the Soviet Union has refused to be more specific about the arrangements it would entertain, in spite of persistent questioning from Western and non-aligned delegations. A recent United States proposal has called for the destruction of all chemical weapons over a ten year period and the opening of all production facilities to systematic checks by international inspectors, but a temporary suspension of meetings of the working group has saved the Soviet Union from the need to make an immediate formal response. The working group is to reconvene shortly.

*JIC(81) 20 and JIC(80)(N) 14

**A binary chemical weapon is defined as a harmful agent produced by the mixing together of two relatively harmless substances inside a warhead during its flight to the target.

Annex

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Review

- Nuclear v2



20. The Soviet Union is reluctant to negotiate seriously in a multilateral forum where it is exposed to non-aligned as well as Western criticism and would prefer to resume the bilateral talks with the United States. In the meantime, it will continue where possible to try and exploit negotiations in the multilateral forum so as to maintain pressure on the United States to abandon its binary programme. This would enable the Soviet Union to retain its present advantage in that field. In general it is likely to remain obstructive in CW discussions to a greater degree of on-site inspection.

ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE

21. The Soviet Union is a signatory of all the various treaties and agreements governing activities in space. The major treaties with arms control implications are -

- a. the 1967 multilateral Outer Space Treaty which laid down the principles governing the peaceful use of space, inter alia banning the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in space or in earth orbit; and
- b. the bilateral Soviet-United States treaties: the 1972 ABM Treaty prohibiting development, testing or deployment of space-based anti-ballistic missiles or their components*, and the (unratified) SALT II treaty banning fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOB's) i.e the launching of nuclear weapons in sub-orbital trajectory.

Passage of nuclear weapons through space in a ballistic trajectory is, of course, uncontrolled.

22. In 1978 and 1979 the United States and Soviet Union held a series of bilateral meetings with a view to banning the placing in orbit of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons but little progress was made, partly because of Soviet reluctance to consider effective verification measures. In 1981 the Soviet Union proposed a wide-ranging treaty which would prohibit the stationing of weapons of any kind in Outer Space, including 'reusable' manned space vehicles, and destruction or interference with the functioning of satellites. However, the proposals made no clear reference to ASAT systems or to

* This treaty which is still in force is subject to review every five years, but the Soviet Union probably remains largely content with its terms.

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satisfactory measures for verification and appear to be designed to preserve the present Soviet ASAT advantage, which might quickly be eroded if the United States devoted its energies to this field, while countering potential military uses for the US 'Shuttle'. The Soviet treaty has been submitted to the CD along with an alternative Western approach focusing on ASATs. Soviet negotiating objectives may become clearer if, as is expected, a working group is established in Geneva to consider the subject. President Reagan's recent speech in which he called for long-term research on space-based anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence provoked a strong reaction from Moscow, which roundly condemned the President's approach which, it claimed, could undermine the ABM Treaty.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

23. Before the opening of the Madrid CSCE Review Meeting in November 1980, the Soviet Union made clear its interest in a Conference on Military Detente and Disarmament in Europe (CMDDE) as part of the CSCE process. This would offer the Soviet Union a useful forum for largely declaratory measures, and discussion of the mandate might help to distract public attention from Western criticism on human rights. In the event negotiation at Madrid has been on the basis of a Western (French) proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) focusing on "confidence and security building measures". The Soviet Union has provisionally conceded that the "confidence building measures" to be agreed at the CDE should be militarily significant, binding, verifiable, and extend to the whole European area of the Soviet Union, but is pressing for a 'corresponding' concession westwards into the Atlantic which is still under discussion. The Soviet Union appears to attach considerable importance to a CDE as part of its public posture on disarmament, but the final outcome at Madrid is in doubt because the West insists that the CDE must be 'balanced' by progress in human rights.

24. There is little evidence of any link in Soviet thinking between CDE and MBFR but it is not inconceivable that the new Soviet leadership might prefer to seek its political aims in the wider CDE forum and would look for a suitable pretext for subsuming MBFR within it. There are, however, powerful disincentives from the Soviet point of view to this course of action in the geographical area comprised in CDE (which unlike MBFR includes all of European Russia), and in CDE's emphasis on confidence building measures. The Soviet Union is therefore likely to be hesitant about adopting it.

OUTLOOK

25. In arms control and disarmament negotiations Soviet motivation will remain partly substantive and partly presentational, the exact mix depending on circumstances.

26. The Soviet concept of equality and equal security differs from the Western idea of parity in that the Soviet Union expects a degree of "overinsurance" which it will not concede to others. Moreover, as much for historical as ideological reasons, the Soviet Union regards a high absolute level of military power as an essential element in its status as a super power. Nevertheless, the Soviet concern to avoid deployment by the West of new missile systems (particularly Pershing II and GLCM) is genuine and it probably recognises that some concessions in the various arms negotiations may be necessary to limit this deployment.

27. In the run up to the initial NATO deployment of cruise missiles by the end of 1983 the massive Soviet propaganda campaign will continue and all disarmament initiatives will be designed to contain major sections whose principal aim is to portray the Soviet Union as a peace loving nation diligently seeking an accommodation with the inflexible and hawkish NATO alliance. If that propaganda campaign is not successful, however, the approach of the first deployment of NATO's modernised INF may result in some flexibility in the Soviet position on that issue but we cannot yet say what concessions the Soviet Union might be prepared to make in return for the West cutting its planned INF deployment. Although the Soviet Union might suspend negotiations on INF, it is unlikely to break them off entirely in a situation in which its aim is to prevent a significant enhancement in NATO's nuclear capability in Europe.

28. We believe that the Soviet Union is seriously concerned to reach a settlement on strategic arms reductions although current controversies in the West (eg over INF and MX deployment) suggest that major Soviet concessions are unlikely in the near future. It may seek to link the START and INF talks if it believes this will improve its negotiating position but for the moment we think it will be content to leave the two sets of discussion separate. A major

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break-through in START is not thought to be imminent, but we believe there is some basis for limited optimism over the prospects of an eventual agreement. In the other arms control talks progress is less likely, particularly if the Soviet Union maintains its current objections to adequate verification procedures.

31 March 1983

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ANNEX

- A. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS SIGNED BY THE USSR
1. Antarctic Treaty (1959)
 2. Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963)
 3. Soviet/United States Hotline Agreement (1963) updated in 1971
 4. Soviet/United Kingdom Hotline Agreement (1967)
 5. Outer Space Treaty (1967)
 6. Treaty of Tlatelolco prohibiting Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (1967)
 7. Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968)
 8. Soviet/United States Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of the Outbreak of Nuclear War (1971)
 9. Sea Bed Treaty (1971)
 10. Biological Weapons Convention (1972)
 11. Soviet/United States Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty - SALT I (1972)
 12. Soviet/United States Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972)
 13. Soviet/United States Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War (1973)
 14. Soviet/United States Treaty on Limiting Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests - the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974). United States not prepared to ratify in present form
 15. Soviet/United Kingdom Joint Declaration on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1975)
 16. Soviet/United States Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes-PNE Treaty (1976). United States not prepared to ratify in present form
 17. Soviet/French Joint Declaration on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1977)
 18. Soviet/United Kingdom Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Nuclear War (1977)
 19. Environmental Modification Convention (1977)
 20. Soviet/United States Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty - SALT II (1979). United States not prepared to ratify in present form
 21. Agreement on Celestial Bodies and Moon (1979)

B. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES AND NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING THE USSR*

1. Strategic Arms Reduction - START
2. Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Reductions - INF
3. Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions - MBFR
4. Ban on Chemical Weapons
5. Limitation of Conventional Arms Transfer
6. Limitation on Military Activity in the Indian Ocean
7. Ban on Nuclear-Weapon-Carrying Naval Vessels in the Mediterranean
8. Non-extension of NATO and Warsaw Pact Activities to Asia, Africa and Latin America
9. Agreement not to hinder the Use of Major Sea Lanes
10. Extension of Security Guarantees to Non-Nuclear States
11. Cessation of Nuclear-Weapon-Carrying Aircraft Flights over Europe
12. Cessation of all Nuclear Tests
13. Prohibition of New Weapons of Mass Destruction
14. Ban on Radiological Weapons
15. Treaty on the Non-First Use of Nuclear Weapons
16. Treaty on the Non-First Use of Conventional Weapons
17. Withdrawal of Foreign Troops to within their own Frontiers
18. Multilateral Reduction of Military Budgets
19. Elimination of Military Bases
20. Freezes on Nuclear and Conventional Arsenals
21. Ban on Neutron Weapons
22. Ban on Weapons in Outer Space
23. Adoption of "Confidence-Building Measures"
24. Calls for Disarmament Conferences
25. Abolition of NATO and the Warsaw Pact
26. Establishment of Nuclear-Free Zones and Zones of Peace

* All but three of these measures (Nos 9, 11 and 13) were explicitly mentioned in the 5 January 1983 Prague declaration of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee.

Defense Arms Control Cabl x ref
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FM MOSCOW 241538Z FEB 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 196 OF 24 FEB

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BONN PARIS

INFO SAVING OTHER NATO AND ALL EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS,
UKDEL MADRID, UKDEL VIENNA, UKDIS GENEVA, TOKYO, PEKING

GROMYKO INTERVIEW ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

SUMMARY

1. PRAVDA ON 24 FEBRUARY PUBLISHED AN INTERVIEW WITH GROMYKO ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL. HIS REPLIES WERE ALONG STANDARD LINES. THERE HAD BEEN NO PROGRESS IN THE GENEVA TALKS BECAUSE OF THE AMERICAN POSITION AIMED AT MILITARY SUPERIORITY. WESTERN EUROPEAN TALK OF A POSSIBLE INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ON INF WAS AN INDICATION OF THE DIFFICULTY OF DEFENDING THE ZERO OPTION. BUT THE NATO POSITION WAS STILL TO DEPLOY NEW US MISSILES. DEPLOYMENT WOULD UNDERCUT THE TALKS. A SOLUTION IN GENEVA WAS POSSIBLE IF THE US ADOPTED A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH.

DETAIL

2. THE MAIN POINTS OF GROMYKO'S REPLIES WERE :

(A) US AND SOVIET ATTITUDES TO NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL:

MOVEMENT IN THE DIRECTION OF CURBING THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE HAD HALTED. THE BLAME LAY WITH WASHINGTON WHICH WAS AFTER MILITARY SUPERIORITY AT ANY PRICE. THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE OF PRINCIPLE IN SOVIET AND US APPROACHES TO NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATIONS, WHICH DETERMINED THEIR POSITIONS AT THE GENEVA TALKS. THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO REDUCE AND LIMIT NUCLEAR ARMS ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS. WASHINGTON DEMONSTRATED BY ITS DEEDS A RELUCTANCE TO FOREGO THE COURSE OF SPURRING THE ARMS RACE AND BREAKING PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS. THE CHIEF OBSTACLE AT BOTH SETS OF GENEVA TALKS WAS THAT WASHINGTON SOUGHT SOVIET UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT.

(B) NUCLEAR BALANCE: CLAIMS THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD UPSET THE BALANCE WHILE THE USA ONLY STROVE TO RESTORE IT WERE A DECEPTION. AS RECOGNISED IN SALT 2 THERE WAS PARITY IN STRATEGIC ARMS. IN EUROPE, THE USSR AND NATO EACH HAD ABOUT 1,000 MEDIUM RANGE DELIVERY VEHICLES.

(C) START: (AFTER GROMYKO HAD SET OUT THE STANDARD SOVIET POSITION) 'NATURALLY ALL THESE LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION'. WASHINGTON'S POSITION WAS AIMED NOT AT THE REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS BUT AT LEGALISATION OF A RACE, IN THE HOPE OF UNILATERAL AMERICAN ADVANTAGES.

RESTRICTED

(D)

(D) INF: "THE SOVIET UNION SUGGESTED AGREEMENT ON THE RENUNCIATION OF ALL TYPES OF ARMS INTENDED TO HIT TARGETS IN EUROPE, BOTH MEDIUM RANGE AND TACTICAL". ALTERNATIVELY THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSED A TWO THIRDS CUT IN MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IT WAS PREPARED TO KEEP IN EUROPE THE EXACT NUMBER OF MISSILES THAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE HAD, WITH EQUAL LEVELS OF SOVIET AND NATO MEDIUM RANGE AIRCRAFT. THE RESULT WOULD BE A GAIN FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY: OVER 1,300 MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE REDUCED IN THE AREA. "AFTER THESE REDUCTIONS THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS ON OUR MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES IN THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE USSR AND THE TOTAL NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON THEM WOULD BE LOWER, I REPEAT, LOWER THAN IN 1976. THAT IS BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE

MODERNIZATION OF MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES BY THE SOVIET UNION."

(E) STATE OF THE GENEVA TALKS: DESPITE THE CLAIMS OF AMERICAN PROPAGANDA THERE WAS NO HEADWAY AT THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS A DELIBERATE PROPAGANDA DEVICE, UNWORTHY OF SERIOUS NEGOTIATING PARTNERS, TO PUT ABOUT THE IDEA THAT THE CHANCES OF AGREEMENT WOULD BE WORSE IF THE US DEPARTED FROM ITS PRESENT STAND.

(F) THE POSITION OF OTHER NATO COUNTRIES: THERE WERE DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW. THERE WAS A GROWING AWARENESS OF THE DANGER WHICH INF DEPLOYMENT WOULD BRING. AT THE SAME TIME SUPPORT WAS EXPRESSED FOR THE ZERO OPTION. THE PRONOUNCEMENTS OF SPOKESMEN OF NATO COUNTRIES RANG FALSE. TO COME OUT IN FAVOUR OF THE ZERO OPTION MEANT TO SUPPORT THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW AMERICAN MISSILES IN EUROPE. WESTERN EUROPE WAS WRONG TO PLAY THE ROLE OF OBSERVER FROM THE SIDELINES AND COULD SPEAK UP IN FAVOUR OF JUST SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

(G) INTERMEDIATE SOLUTIONS: WESTERN EUROPEAN TALK ABOUT POSSIBLE AMERICAN INTERMEDIATE VERSIONS WAS A DEFINITE INDICATOR THAT NATO FOUND IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO DEFEND THE PRESENT AMERICAN POSITION. REGRETTABLY NO HEADWAY TOWARDS GREATER REALISM HAD BEEN SEEN. "IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS EVERYTHING REVERTS TO THE ORIGINAL POSITION WHICH IS TO IMPLEMENT ONE WAY OR ANOTHER THE NATO PLAN AND TO RAILROAD NEW US MISSILES INTO WESTERN EUROPE". NO PROPOSALS MEETING THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY HAD SO FAR EMANATED FROM THE US AND NATO.

(H) DEPLOYMENT: IT WAS A DELUSION THAT DEPLOYMENT WOULD NOT CONFLICT WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF THE GENEVA TALKS AND THAT AFTER THE BEGINNING OF DEPLOYMENT THE TALKS WOULD PROCEED AS IF NOTHING WAS HAPPENING. NEW US MISSILES WOULD RESULT IN A QUALITATIVELY NEW SITUATION. THE AMERICANS WOULD THEREBY UNDERCUT THE TALKS.

(I) PROSPECTS FOR SOLUTIONS AT GENEVA: THE POSSIBILITY DID EXIST IF WASHINGTON ADOPTED A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH. IT WAS NOW THE TURN OF THE US TO SPEAK UP.

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3. THE PURPOSE OF THE INTERVIEW IS PROBABLY, BY LENDING GROMYKO'S NAME TO IT, TO ENSURE THAT SOVIET PROPAGANDA IS GIVEN GOOD COVERAGE IN THE WESTERN PRESS, ESPECIALLY IN THE FRG IN THE RUN UP TO THE ELECTIONS ON 6 MARCH.

4. GROMYKO SAYS NOTHING ESSENTIALLY NEW ABOUT THE SOVIET APPROACH TO INF AND START. SUPERFICIALLY GROMYKO ATTEMPTS TO REJECT INTERMEDIATE SOLUTIONS. BUT HE DOES NOT CLOSE SOVIET OPTIONS AND ENDS HIS REMARKS WITH A HINT THAT AGREEMENT WAS STILL POSSIBLE IF THE US CAME UP WITH NEW PROPOSALS.

5. HIS REFERENCES TO VERIFICATION OF START AND THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS REMAINING UNDER THE ANDROPOV INF PROPOSAL ARE INTENDED TO IMPROVE THE PRESENTATION OF THE SOVIET CASE. (TZHP RAPIDLY DRAWN IDELDMERATE ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO THE PASSAGE QUOTED AT THE END OF PARA 2(D) ABOVE) THE SLIGHTLY REVISED FORMULA FOR THE MAXIMALIST VERSION OF THE SOVIET INF PROPOSALS (NO MEDIUM RANGE OR TACTICAL WEAPONS AIMED AT EUROPE RATHER THAN IN EUROPE) ALSO SURFACED IN DEFENCE MINISTER USTINOV'S ARTICLE TO MARK ARMED FORCES DAY IN PRAVDA ON 23 FEBRUARY. THE CHANGE SEEMS OF LITTLE OR NO RELEVANCE TO THE GENEVA TALKS. IT MAY BE INFLUENCED BY THE SWEDISH PROPOSAL FOR A BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE AND CRITICISM THAT THE ZONE COULD BE TARGETTED FROM OUTSIDE.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

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FROM MOSCOW 231415Z FEBRUARY

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 190 OF 23 FEBRUARY

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO , WASHINGTON, PARIS AND BONN

INFO SAVING TO EAST EUROPEAN POSTS, PEKING , UKDEL VIENNA
UKMIS GENEVA, THE HAGUE, ROME, BRUSSELS AND TOKYO.

ARMS CONTROL : UNOFFICIAL US/SOVIET EXCHANGES.

1. A MEETING OF THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL PANEL OF THE AMERICAN UN ASSOCIATION WAS HELD IN MOSCOW LAST WEEK. THE LEADERS OF THE LARGE AND PARTICULARLY STRONG US TEAM WERE WALTER STOESSEL (FORMERLY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE AND AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW), ELLIOTT RICHARDSON (FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENCE) , HAL SONNENFELDT (FORMERLY KISSINGER'S ASSISTANT IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL) AND STAN RESOR (FORMER MBFR NEGOTIATOR). THE MEETING WAS CHAIRED BY ARBATOV OF THE USA/CANADA INSTITUTE, BUT ON THE SOVIET SIDE WAS DOMINATED BY COLONEL-GENERAL CHERVOV OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHO, THE AMERICANS BELIEVE, PLAYS A KEY ROLE IN THE FORMULATION OF ARMS CONTROL POLICY. ACCORDING TO MY US COLLEAGUE, HIS INTERVENTIONS WERE DETAILED AND ARTICULATE BUT HIS ATTITUDE HIGHLY POLEMICAL. HE DECLINED TO DISCUSS ANY OF THE SPECULATIVE IDEAS PUT FORWARD BY THE ACADEMIC EXPERTS IN THE US TEAM , AND REVERTED TIME AND TIME AGAIN TO THE THEME THAT US OFFICIAL POSITIONS WERE NOT ONLY UNREASONABLE BUT NOT HELD IN GOOD FAITH. HARTMAN COMMENTED THAT THE AMERICAN RESPONSES WERE ILL-COORDINATED AND , IN HIS VIEW, THE DELEGATION WOULD HAVE DONE WELL TO CUT SHORT THE FORMAL SESSIONS OF THE MEETING WHICH WERE IN THE ESTIMATION OF THE U S EMBASSY THE LEAST PRODUCTIVE EVER HELD BY THE PANEL.

2. I.N.F. SONNENFELDT, WHO GAVE A LOCAL BRIEFING TO REPRESENTATIVES OF NATO MISSIONS , SAID THAT THE SOVIET ACCOUNT OF START AND INF WAS EXPOUNDED IN STANDARD TERMS WITHOUT THE LEAST SIGN OF FLEXIBILITY AND WAS COMPLETELY NEGATIVE ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR BOTH SETS OF GENEVA TALKS. STOESSEL TOLD ME THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD EVEN HINTED AT THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR BREAKING OFF EITHER OR BOTH NEGOTIATIONS UNLESS THERE WAS SOME MOVEMENT ON THE AMERICAN SIDE.

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/ 3. THE SOVIET

3. THE SOVIET TEAM SAID THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING WAS UNACCEPTABLE IN PRINCIPLE AND DECLINED TO BE DRAWN INTO DISCUSSION OF AN INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION. THE AMERICANS HAD TOLD THEM THAT THE CHOICE WAS BETWEEN " UNCONSTRAINED OR CONSTRAINED " PERSHING DEPLOYMENT. THE RUSSIANS THREATENED COUNTER- DEPLOYMENT . SONNENFELDT SAID THAT IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION ABOUT PERSHING'S RANGE WITH CHERVOV (WHO CLAIMED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE CONCEALING ITS TRUE EXTENT), HE HAD SUGGESTED THAT IN ANY INF AGREEMENT, THIS COULD BE THE SUBJECT OF " COLLATERAL RESTRAINT ". CHERVOV REJECTED THIS ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT IMPLIED SOME DEPLOYMENT 9% 034'28,8. SONNENFELDT SAID AT HIS BRIEFING THAT HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE CONCERNED THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD COME UP WITH A COUNTER PROPOSAL TO ANDROPOV'S 21 DECEMBER INITIATIVE WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR LIMITED PERSHING DEPLOYMENT AND SUCCESSFULLY APPEAL TO PUBLIC OPINION IN WESTERN EUROPE.

THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS.

4. CHERVOV, APPARENTLY READING FROM A SOVIET RECORD OF THE VLADIVOSTOK NEGOTIATIONS, SAID IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRESENTATION THAT IT HAD BEEN CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BY THE UNITED STATES THAT FORWARD-BASED AND THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS SHOULD BE RAISED AT A FUTURE DATE. SONNENFELDT COMMENTED TO US THAT THE SOVIET CASE FOR SS20'S IN COMPENSATION FOR BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS WAS "PHONEY". IN THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE 1972 US/SOVIET SUMMIT , KISSINGER AND THE RUSSIANS HAD WORKED OUT A FORMULA FOR NUMBERS IN THE SALT I AGREEMENT. THIS HAD PROVIDED FOR CEILINGS ON SEA AND LAND - BASED MISSILE FORCES , WITH PROVISION FOR REPLACEMENTS, IN THE SOVIET CASE , OF SS7'S AND 9'S BY " BOATS AND SUBMARINE- LAUNCHED SYSTEMS " AT THE TIME OF SIGNATURE. THIS HAD BEEN INTENDED AS A " BUILT-IN CUSHION " TO COVER THE FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS. THE RUSSIANS WERE NOW AMPLY COMPENSATED BY THEIR SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED SYSTEMS AND THOSE ICBM'S TARGETTED ON WESTERN EUROPE.

5. THE RUSSIANS MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN INFORMAL EXCHANGES :

- (A) THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED LIMITS ON SS20'S EAST OF THE URALS.
- (B) US INTENTIONS TO DEPLOY NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN THE EAST (SONNENFELDT TOOK THIS TO MEAN SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES) GAVE THE SOVIET UNION THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION THROUGH SS20 DEPLOYMENT EAST OF THE URALS.
- (C) ARBATOV HAD INDICATED THAT THE SOVIET " WHITE HOUSE WATCHERS " WERE ASSUMING THAT REAGAN WOULD RUN AND

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WIN IN 1984 AND THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD THERE-
FORE HAVE TO COME TO TERMS WITH HIM AND , AT SOME
STAGE, CONTEMPLATE A SUMMIT. BUT ANDROPOV WOULD DO
NOTHING TO HELP REAGAN WIN.

CONCLUSION

6. BOTH STOESSEL AND SONNENFELDT CONCLUDED THAT, WITH NO INCENTIVE TO SUGGEST IN ADVANCE OF THE OUTCOME OF THE FRG ELECTIONS THAT THERE COULD BE ANY MODIFICATION OF THEIR POSITION ON INF , THE RUSSIAN INTENTION APPEARED TO BE TO SIGNAL THE TOUGHEST POSSIBLE MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON. THE EXCHANGES HAD PROVIDED NO INDICATION AS TO WHETHER THEY MIGHT BE PREPARED TO BUDGE AFTER THE ELECTIONS. SONNENFELDT COMMENTED THAT IF THERE WERE TO BE A SHIFT THEY HAD A NUMBER OF OPTIONS INCLUDING MATCHING SS20'S WITH FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS ON THE BASIS OF A WARHEAD COUNT WITH A PROVISION FOR SUBSEQUENT COMPENSATION FOLLOWING THE MIRVING OF THESE SYSTEMS.

7. FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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CC: USA - United 5
Via President Bush to UK
June 1981



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 February 1983

~~Prime Minister~~

A.2.C. 9/2.

John [unclear]

Secretary of State's discussion with Vice-President Bush:

9 February: Defence Issues

The Secretary of State raised defence issues very briefly with Vice-President Bush this morning, making clear that the Prime Minister would wish to go into detail on the subject this evening. He said that we remained fully convinced that the zero/zero option would be by far the best outcome to negotiations, and that HMG fully supported the US in that aim. While not abandoning that objective, and at the point in the negotiations when it became absolutely clear that the Russians would not accept it, it would be important to consider the possibilities of an intermediate solution, provided that it was firmly based on the principle of balance. It was of course axiomatic that if we moved towards an intermediate solution, deployment must take place. In the UK view, the moment to move from the zero option might be very close, although in Mr Pym's personal view it might be best to leave it until after the FRG elections. It was very difficult to judge what the effect of any move before the FRG elections might be. Perhaps the best moment might be very soon thereafter.

Bush said that these comments were very helpful. He would of course be reporting all his European consultations very carefully to the President. He had been at pains, in particular, to dispel any illusion that the US Government was not interested in negotiating constructively about arms reductions. In particular, President Reagan's open message had been carefully designed to shoot down the myth that the President was not prepared to meet Andropov. Mr Pym said that there was no doubt about the strength of support and admiration in the UK for the US defence commitment to Europe. He was bound to say, however, that on occasions some of the language used in Washington about defence issues had tended to frighten public opinion, eg reference to limited nuclear war, and the confused signals about MX siting. There had also been a suspicion that Reagan's message to Andropov had

/perhaps been

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perhaps been unfortunately couched, ie in terms which would make it impossible for the Russians to react constructively. The Vice President said that he was particularly grateful to hear these impressions, but slightly surprised by the latter point. It was very important to know exactly how Western European opinion reacted. His own judgement was that Chancellor Kohl greatly welcomed the open message to Andropov, as indeed had the Dutch. In the FRG in particular it had served to take some of the heat out of public opposition to deployment. Mr Pym said that, if that had been the effect, then the open message had been indeed very worthwhile. His own comment on the open message was directed primarily to the impact he sensed it might have had in the United Kingdom.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram at the Ministry of Defence.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Defence
Cabinet

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 February 1983

MR 7/2
per.

Dear John,

INF: The Zero Option

Our Embassy in Washington told us yesterday that some of the staunchest opponents to any move from the zero option within the Administration now appear to accept that a new initiative, on the general lines discussed at the Prime Minister's briefing meeting at Chequers on 30 January, may now be inescapable. They may however try to dilute the effectiveness of a move of this kind (say to 300 warheads on each side) by making it a pre-condition in the negotiations that the Russians must accept now in principle that this is merely an intermediate solution which would lead at a certain date in the future to a full implementation of the zero option.

This is clearly not a proposition which we could endorse. The Russians are no more likely to accept a zero option in principle now for execution at some future date than they are now to agree to its implementation at the outset. A pre-condition of the kind suggested would, to all intents and purposes, remove any impact which an initiative on the lines we have discussed with the Prime Minister might have, either in the negotiations themselves or more widely with Western public opinion.

It is perhaps unlikely that this will be raised at the meeting with Vice-President Bush this evening. But the Prime Minister, if a suitable occasion arises, may wish to make clear that an initiative hedged about with a pre-condition of this kind is not what we have in mind and would not in our view be helpful.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).


Yours ever

RB
(R B Bone)
Private Secretary
John Hides

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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TELEGRAM NO. 074 OF 08 FEB 83

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VISIT OF VICE PRESIDENT BUSH

SUMMARY

1. BUSH CAME, SAW AND HAD NO NEED TO CONQUER. HIS PRESENTATION ON INF WAS SIMILAR TO THAT IN OTHER CAPITALS, COMBINING A FIRM RESTATEMENT OF THE ZERO OPTION WITH WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE OTHER POSSIBILITIES. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CONFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO GLCM BASING. THERE WAS AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

DETAIL

2. BUSH LEFT ROME THIS MORNING AFTER A BUSY 3-DAY VISIT. HE SAW PERTINI, FANFANI, COLOMBO, MORLINO (PRESIDENT OF SENATE), GORIA (TREASURY MINISTER), CIAMPI (BANK OF ITALY), SPADOLINI AND THE HEADS OF ALL COALITION PARTIES EXCEPT DE MITA (ILL) AND ZANONE (AWAY, SUBSTITUTED BY MALAGODI). HE ALSO PAID A VISIT TO THE VATICAN. HE CHOSE NOT TO CALL ON IOTTI (PCI PRESIDENT OF CHAMBER) OR BERLINGUER (PCI SECRETARY).

3. THE MFA (TALIANI AND MOSCATO) GAVE A COMMUNITY BRIEFING TODAY ON BUSH'S TALKS WITH COLOMBO. INF DOMINATED THEM. BUSH SAID THAT ZERO OPTION REMAINED THE GOAL OF THE U S GOVERNMENT, BUT THEY WERE DETERMINED TO EXPLORE IN GENEVA EVERY OPPORTUNITY OF REACHING AGREEMENT. THE ZERO OPTION WAS NOT A "TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT" PROPOSAL. HE UNDERLINED U S DETERMINATION TO CONSULT NATO ALLIES AND TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY IN GENEVA FOR A LOWER LEVEL OF NUCLEAR BALANCE. IT WAS ESSENTIAL NOT TO LET THE USSR SEIZE THE INITIATIVE OR PORTRAY THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TO WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION AS BEING IN FAVOUR OF AN ARMS RACE. ANDROPOV'S PROPOSALS WERE REPETITIVE AND REJECTED THE ESSENTIAL CONCEPT OF BALANCE.

4. COLOMBO STRESSED THE NEED FOR CLOSE COORDINATION WITHIN NATO

4. ~~COLOMBO STRESSED THE NEED FOR CLOSE COORDINATION WITHIN NATO~~
IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANT NEW ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET POSITION. THE ALLIES MUST NOT BE SLOW TO REACT. ITALY TOO WAS CONVINCED THAT THE ZERO OPTION SHOULD REMAIN THE FINAL OBJECTIVE, BUT THIS DID NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERMEDIATE ARRANGEMENTS. NATO COULD NEVER ACCEPT A SOVIET MONOPOLY OF INF, AND MUST INSIST ON THE ESSENTIAL CRITERIA OF SECURITY, PARITY AND BALANCE. BUSH'S VISIT WAS WELCOME, NOT LEAST BECAUSE IT WOULD SHOW THE ITALIAN PUBLIC THAT THE U S GOVERNMENT WERE SENSITIVE TO THE VIEWS OF EUROPEAN ALLIES.
5. BUSH CONFIRMED THAT NITZE HAD A MANDATE TO EXPLORE ANY SIGN IN GENEVA OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY. NATO ALLIES WOULD BE KEPT INFORMED OF PROGRESS. HE AND COLOMBO AGREED THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR SYSTEMS MUST BE COMPLETELY EXCLUDED FROM THESE TALKS.
6. TALIANI COMMENTED THAT BUSH WAS MORE CONCERNED TO HEAR AND REPORT ITALIAN VIEWS THAN TO CONVINCe COLOMBO OF THE U S NEGOTIATING POSITION. IN PRIVATE AS IN PUBLIC HE HAD INSISTED ON THE NEED FOR THE USSR TO MAKE THE NEXT MOVE IN GENEVA. COLOMBO HAD FOUND BUSH WELL AWARE OF EUROPEAN CONCERNS BUT RATHER VAGUE ON THE MECHANISM OF CONSULTATION.
7. THE MIDDLE EAST WAS DISCUSSED BRIEFLY WITH BUSH BUT IN GREATER DETAIL WITH HABIB, WHO VISITED ROME YESTERDAY EN ROUTE FOR JERUSALEM. THE AMERICANS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR THE LEBANESE/ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS. HABIB'S THREE AIMS REMAINED WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS FROM LEBANON, RESTORATION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, AND ADEQUATE SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR ISRAEL'S NORTHERN FRONTIER. AN AGREEMENT ON PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT FIND FAVOUR WITH THE U S GOVERNMENT: COLOMBO REPLIED THAT IT COULD BE A VALUABLE FIRST STEP TOWARDS FULL WITHDRAWAL. COLOMBO RESTATED ITALY'S WILLINGNESS TO HELP IN LEBANON AND SAID THAT GEMAYEL'S TASK WAS GETTING HARDER.
8. IN A PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY, BUSH INSISTED ON THE MORAL ARGUMENT FOR THE SZERO OPTION AND EXPRESSED OPTIMISM AT THE END OF HIS TALKS IN ITALY. HE SIDE-STEPPED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION (AS DID THE MFA AT TODAY'S BRIEFING).
9. PRESS COMMENT HAS BEEN GENERALLY FAVOURABLE, BUT WITH THE USUAL POLITICAL COLOURING OF EACH NEWSPAPER. THOSE ON THE RIGHT EMPHASISED ITALIAN LOYALTY TO NATO AND THE U S, WHILE THOSE ON THE LEFT CLAIMED THAT THE ITALIANS HAD BEEN SOFT AND HAD NO NEW IDEAS OF THEIR OWN TO OFFER. ACCORDING TO UNITA (PCI) THE BUSH TALKS WERE A PROPAGANDA EXERCISE. THE CENTRE PRESS STRESSED THAT ITALY WAS ASKING TO PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS. AVANTI (PSI) GAVE PROMINENCE TO A STATEMENT BY CRAXI THAT DECISIONS ON MISSILES IN EUROPE WERE FIRST AND FOREMOST FOR EUROPEANS TO MAKE.
10. WE ARE SEEKING AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT FROM THE U S EMBASSY.

10. WE ARE SEEKING AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT FROM THE U S EMBASSY.

F C O PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSES EXCEPT HOLY SEE

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Lead in full.

A.S.C. 7/2.

VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH'S VISIT TO LONDON: INF

1. BUSH'S FINDINGS ON HIS RETURN FROM EUROPE WILL BE OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE US ADMINISTRATION'S THINKING ON INF.
2. WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION AT PRESENT THERE ARE DIVIDED VIEWS. SHULTZ HAS BEEN ARGUING BEHIND THE SCENES FOR AN APPROACH WHICH CORRESPONDS VERY CLOSELY TO THE LINE TAKEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN PARLIAMENT ON 18 JANUARY, WHICH WAS WIDELY WELCOMED HERE. SHULTZ FAVOURS HOLDING ON TO THE ZERO OPTION AS THE LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE, WHILE SUGGESTING INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS BASED ON EQUAL NUMBERS OF US AND SOVIET INF WARHEADS AT SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED LEVELS, SHULTZ HAS BEEN WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE VICE-PRESIDENT. THE PRESIDENT, WE ARE TOLD, HAS SEEMED REASONABLY SYMPATHETIC. THE ADMINISTRATION IS LIKELY TO MOVE TO THIS POSITION IN DUE COURSE. WEINBERGER, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN ARGUING AGAINST ANY FALLING AWAY FROM THE ZERO OPTION: AND IT HAS NOT BEEN THOUGHT DESIRABLE TO MAKE ANY MOVE FOR THE TIME BEING BECAUSE KOHL HAS BEEN UNDEMANDING OF ANY CHANGE BEFORE THE GERMAN ELECTIONS.
3. THE VICE-PRESIDENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION GENERALLY, HOWEVER, HAVE BEEN SHOWING AN INCREASED REALISATION OF THE DANGERS VIS A VIS EUROPEAN OPINION OF APPEARING TO SUGGEST THAT THE ZERO OPTION IS AN ALL OR NOTHING, TAKE IF OR LEAVE IT PROPOSAL. INSTEAD, THEREFORE, OF ANY FORMAL CHANGE IN THE NEGOTIATING POSITION, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN ADJUSTING THE LANGUAGE IN WHICH IT IS PRESENTED. THE PRESIDENT IN RECENT STATEMENTS ON ARMS CONTROL HAS BEEN PUTTING THE EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR EQUAL, BALANCED AND FULLY VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS AT REDUCED LEVELS. IN HIS SPEECH IN BERLIN (BONN TELNO 109 TO YOU) BUSH EMPHASIZED THAT THE IRREDUCIBLE ELEMENTS WERE:
 - I) THE NUCLEAR THREAT MUST BE REDUCED TO THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL:
 - II) THERE MUST BE A BALANCED OUTCOME WITH NO SOVIET MONOPOLY:
 - III) CIRCUMVENTION OF ANY KIND MUST BE PREVENTED.
4. THIS LATTER POINT IS VERY IMPORTANT. SHULTZ HAS JUST HAD AN EARFUL FROM NAKASONE ON THE UNACCEPTABILITY TO JAPAN OF ANY AGREEMENT WHICH RESULTED IN THE SOVIET UNION SIMPLY TRANSFERRING MORE SS20S EAST INTO SOVIET ASIA. THE AMERICANS, WITH GOOD REASON, WOULD NOT REGARD ANY AGREEMENT OF THAT KIND AS WORTH HAVING.

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5. YOU WILL WANT TO ASK BUSH WHAT IMPRESSIONS HE HAS DERIVED FROM HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER EUROPEAN LEADERS. KOHL WILL HAVE GIVEN THE PRIME MINISTER HIS OWN ACCOUNT OF HIS TALKS WITH BUSH: NO DOUBT WE WILL BE IMPRESSING ON THE VICE-PRESIDENT OUR DETERMINATION TO PROCEED WITH THE DEPLOYMENT IF THE NEGOTIATIONS DO NOT PRODUCE AN ACCEPTABLE RESULT. CLEARLY A ZERO OUTCOME SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AS THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE. BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR SYSTEMS MUST BE EXCLUDED. IF WE HAVE OURSELVES COME TO THAT CONCLUSION, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO BUSH THAT IN OUR VIEW AN AGREEMENT BASED ON GENUINELY EQUAL NUMBERS, AND NO BOGUS COUNTING, SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIANCE: AND THAT IT WILL PUT ALLIANCE GOVERNMENTS IN A STRONGER POSITION TO GET THE DEPLOYMENT THROUGH IF IT IS MADE CLEAR THAT, FOR OUR PART, WE CAN ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT BASED ON GENUINE EQUALITY. ANY SUCH PROPOSAL SHOULD CORRESPOND TO THE PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN YOUR MESSAGE OF 26 JANUARY TO COLOMBO (YOUR TELNO 23 TO ROME). WE MIGHT ALSO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING TO EMPHASIZE THAT NITZE HAS FULL AUTHORITY TO EXPLORE ANY SIGNS OF MOVEMENT IN THE SOVIET POSITION. THIS WOULD AFFORD THE BEST POSSIBLE BASIS ON WHICH TO SEE THE DEPLOYMENT THROUGH.

6. NONE OF THIS WOULD COME AS ANY SURPRISE TO BUSH. MUCH WILL DEPEND, HOWEVER, ON KOHL'S ATTITUDE. THE TIMING OF AN EVENTUAL MOVE WOULD REQUIRE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION, IN RELATION TO THE GERMAN ELECTIONS.

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BONN TELNO 103 TO FCO:

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S OPEN LETTER: ANDROPOV'S RESPONSE

1. PRAVDA ON 2 FEBRUARY CARRIED ANDROPOV'S RESPONSE, IN THE FORM
OF REPLIES TO TWO QUESTIONS. THE MAIN POINTS WERE:

A) ATTITUDE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER AND THE PROPOSAL TO SIGN
AN AGREEMENT ON THE LIQUIDATION OF MEDIUM RANGE LAND BASED
MISSILES ?

- THERE WAS NOTHING NEW IN THE PROPOSAL. IT WAS STILL THE
UNACCEPTABLE ZERO OPTION. THIS UNREALISTIC US POSITION WAS
BLOCKING PROGRESS IN THE GENEVA TALKS. REAGAN'S RECONFIRMATION
OF THIS POSITION SHOWED THAT THE US DID NOT WANT TO SEEK A
MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT AND WAS THEREBY DELIBERATELY
CONDEMNING THE TALKS TO FAILURE.
- THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT ENGAGE IN UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT, AND,
IF NEW AMERICAN MISSILES WERE DEPLOYED, WOULD RESPOND
APPROPRIATELY.
- AS THE US WAS NOT WILLING TO AGREE TO THE ELIMINATION OF MEDIUM
RANGE AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE EUROPEAN ZONE, THE
SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO HAVE NO MORE MISSILES THAN THERE
ALREADY WERE IN EUROPE ON THE NATO SIDE. MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR
CARRYING AIRCRAFT SHOULD ALSO BE REDUCED TO EQUAL LEVELS. THE
RESULT WOULD BE FULL EQUALITY AT AN INCOMPARABLY LOWER LEVEL.
WAS THE US WILLING TO SIGN SUCH AN AGREEMENT BASED ON EQUALITY
AND EQUAL SECURITY ?

B) A SUMMIT TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT AS SUGGESTED BY REAGAN ?

- SUMMITS HAD A SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE SOLUTION OF COMPLEX
PROBLEMS. A MEETING BETWEEN SOVIET AND US LEADERS AIMED AT
FINDING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DECISIONS ON CURRENT ISSUES AND AT
THE DEVELOPMENT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE
USSR, US, EUROPE AND THE WHOLE WORLD.
- FOR REAGAN TO MAKE A MEETING CONDITIONAL UPON SOVIET AGREEMENT
ON HIS UNACCEPTABLE PROPOSAL ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE WAS
NOT EVIDENCE OF A SERIOUS APPROACH TO THIS QUESTION.
THAT WAS ONLY TO BE REGRETTEED.

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/COMMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMENT

2. THE TONE IS FIRMER THAN ANDROPOV'S KINGSBURY-SMITH INTERVIEW AT THE END OF DECEMBER (MOSCOW TELNO 298). BUT THERE IS THE SAME CAREFULLY CULTIVATED IMAGE OF MODERATION AND "SERIOUSNESS" (A WORD USED TWICE TO CONTRAST THE SOVIET AND US APPROACHES). ON SUBSTANCE (INF) THERE IS NO HINT OF FURTHER MOVEMENT IN THE SOVIET POSITION BUT THE PRESENTATION IS AGAIN CAREFUL. ANDROPOV IS AT PAINS TO PUT ACROSS THE CLAIM THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS INVOLVE EQUALITY AND WILL LEAD TO EQUAL LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS.

3. AS FAR AS THE U.S. AMBASSADOR HERE IS AWARE THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT GIVEN ADVANCE WARNING OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER: IF SO, THE SOVIET RESPONSE IS UNUSUALLY PROMPT. HARTMAN TELLS ME THAT, IN ADDITION TO ITS OBVIOUS PROPAGANDA ELEMENT, HE SEES IN ANDROPOV'S REPLIES A FURTHER INDICATION ("COMPLEMENTING THE HINTS WE HAVE HAD FROM OTHER SOURCES") OF A GENUINE SOVIET DESIRE FOR A SUMMIT IN DUE COURSE.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES

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 Deployment of INF
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B/F

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MR COLES ✓

A.S.C. 1/2
 h.a.

Nuclear Defence Policy - Arms Control

--- I attach a copy of a note of the discussion that took place at Chequers last Sunday on this subject.

2. Copies of this minute and the attachment go also to Brian Fall and Richard Mottram.

R P HATFIELD

1st February 1983

SECRET

Note of a discussion at Chequers on Sunday
30th January 1983 at 10.30 am

Nuclear Defence Policy - Arms Control

The Prime Minister held a discussion with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence; also present were Sir Julian Bullard, Mr Wright and Mr Gillmore (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), the Chief of the Defence Staff, Mr Whitmore, Mr Blelloch and Colonel Cross (Ministry of Defence); Sir Robert Armstrong, Mr Goodall and Mr Facer (Cabinet Office) and Mr Butler, Mr Coles and Mr Jackling (Prime Minister's Office).

2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office gave an account of the background to the current Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) negotiations and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) at Geneva, the present state of the negotiations and possible ways in which they might be carried forward. The meeting also considered the line to be taken on arms control with the Federal German Chancellor, Dr Kohl, during his visit to London on 4th February and with the Vice President of the United States, Mr Bush, during his visit on 9th February.

3. The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that in public presentation of the need for the deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles the emphasis should be placed on the role of the weapons (and of nuclear weapons generally) in deterring war rather than in their ability to destroy particular targets if deterrence failed. It would be helpful to have the arguments set down in a form which Ministers could use in Parliament. It was also important to make it clear to the public that it was the Soviet Side, not the Americans, which has put an end to the exploratory contacts between the Heads of the United States and Soviet Delegations to the INF talks at Geneva, Mr Nitze and Mr Untsinsky, which had pointed to the possibilities of an interim agreement. It was clearly the Soviet tactic to make no early move in the negotiations in the hope that public opinion in the West would make concessions on their part unnecessary. Dr Kohl,

would be seeing the United States Vice President, Mr Bush, later that day and on 31st January and 1st February. It was not clear what view the German Government collectively took on the timing of any change in the United States negotiating position in the INF talks: The Foreign Minister, Herr Genscher, and the Leader of the Christian Social Union, Herr Strauss, appeared to hold different views from those of Dr Kohl. While it seemed that some of Dr Kohl's advisers were not in favour of any move away from the "zero option" before the German Elections on 6th March, political pressures in Germany might force him to change his position during the Election campaign. If the United States did not show signs of flexibility soon, Western public opinion could increasingly turn against them. It was in the United Kingdom's interest that there should be a fairly early initiative by the United States to seek an interim agreement whereby limited reductions on the Soviet Side would be balanced by reduced deployments on the part of the United States, without abandoning the "zero option" as the ultimate aim. Rather than sending a message in this sense to reach Dr Kohl before he saw Mr Bush, it would be better to explain these considerations to Dr Kohl personally when he visited London. In the light of the discussions with Dr Kohl, she would tell Mr Bush that the credibility of the United States negotiating position could be put at risk, with serious effects on the cohesion of the Alliance, if the United States did not take a new initiative in the INF negotiations in the direction she had indicated. She would also register with him the Government's wish to be kept fully informed on the progress of the START negotiations.

4. The meeting -

Invited the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to provide briefing material to the Prime Minister on:-

- (a) the value in deterrent terms of stationing long-range nuclear theatre forces in Europe;
- (b) the background to the Soviet decision to end the exploratory talks between the leaders of the United States and Soviet Delegations to the INF negotiations;
- (c) the latest position on the comprehensive test-ban treaty negotiations, developments in chemical warfare, and the recent Soviet proposals for a nuclear free zone.



010

Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

You will want to
see the supplementaries
at B.

31 January 1983

Dear John

WJ
3/1

Nuclear Issues: Briefing for the Prime Minister

At her meeting at Chequers yesterday to discuss nuclear issues, the Prime Minister asked for briefing on a number of points which arose during the discussions. This is required in time for Prime Minister's questions on 1 February.

I attach a briefing pack, which I shall be submitting in parallel to Mr Pym. It is divided into three sections:

- (a) a copy of the speaking notes used by Patrick Wright and David Gillmore in their briefing yesterday on START and INF respectively;
- (b) points for supplementary questions for use in the House. These cover in particular two issues on which the Prime Minister requested a line: deterrence and the Nitze/Kvitsinsky exchange in the margins of the INF negotiations in the summer of 1982;
- (c) a list of 'devil's advocate' questions and proposed line for answers.

We will continue to keep the list of 'devil's advocate' questions under review with the MOD and expand, revise and add to the list as necessary. It would be helpful to know of any particular points which the Prime Minister wishes to deal with in greater detail.

I am sending copies of this letter to PS/Mr Heseltine and PS/Sir R Armstrong.

Yours ever,
E

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street



NUCLEAR ISSUES

TEXT OF BRIEFING FOR THE PRIME MINISTER AT CHEQUERS: 30 JANUARY 1983

A. INF

1. The rationale(s). As Prime Minister aware, concern in Europe in 1970's over implications of strategic nuclear parity (consecrated in SALT) for effectiveness of US nuclear umbrella (extended deterrence). PM explained on TV importance of Schmidt Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture. These concerns reinforced by two important factors:

(i) obsolescence/vulnerability of NATO's existing LRINF capability (F1-11s and Vulcans);

(ii) development of large SS20 programme at range just beneath SALT II floor (5500 kilometres).

2. The 1979 Decision and the Integrated Decision Document (IDD).

Both these strands, interlinked though separate, addressed in work of two NATO groups (HLG and SCG). Their work brought together in IDD. Objectives were to enhance coupling of US strategic capability to defence of Europe and to counter latest threat to Europe created by SS20 deployments. Hence 13 December decision enshrined in communiqué: '2-track approach'. Alliance did not at that juncture put forward a proposal on numbers. Internally, however, it was agreed that somewhere between 200 and 600 warheads would meet the Alliance requirements for coupling. Some officials argued that the figure could be even lower than 200.

/3.



3. The Zero Option. US/Soviet meeting in Geneva in October 1980. Very much pro forma: in shadow of US presidential elections. Arrival of President Reagan in White House. New defence programme. Announcement of US major review of arms control policy. Zero option decision not reached until November. President's speech on 18th. Opening of first round of negotiations in Geneva in December. Worth noting that zero option of considerable political/propaganda advantage to West. This remains the case in many respects (viz threat of launch on warning). But in logic, zero option is hard to square with basic Alliance concerns of late 1970s about US extended deterrence and decoupling. Nor does zero option help problem of obsolescence.

4. Negotiations So Far. US negotiating position based on zero option approach tabled in form of formal agreement in February 1982. Essential elements well known to all. No need to go into details. But worth noting that approach was global, ie the zero ceilings would be applied worldwide and would include Soviet systems in Far East in the same way as Soviet systems within range of Europe.

5. Soviet approach tabled in May 1982 quite different. Characterised by following:

- (i) regional approach leaving Soviet Far Eastern deployments unconstrained;

/(ii)



- (ii) inclusion of aircraft;
- (iii) counting based on launchers not warheads;
- (iv) inclusion of third party systems in counting base.

Data tabled by Soviet Union carefully rigged to illustrate the fundamental contention which is vital to their case, namely that balance exists; bogus counting. The Prime Minister is aware of details (FBl-11s, F4s, A6 and A7 included on Western side with Fencer SU 24 excluded; in addition inclusion of British and French systems). Mr Genscher particularly fond of making the telling point that if balance existed in 1979 as Russians say, it cannot possibly exist now since they have deployed about 200 new missiles since then.

6. Russians proposed initially a 2-stage reduction to 600, then 300 launchers/aircraft. Subsequently, amended this to single stage reduction to 300 launchers/aircraft. But on basis of same counting rules.

7. During Summer round, Soviet and US negotiators discussed privately and without commitment alternative scheme. Details not wholly clear but basically idea was limited deployment of US cruise/no Pershing in exchange for reductions to equivalent levels of Soviet SS20s in range of Europe; freeze on Soviet systems in the Far East; exclusion of third party systems; ceilings set on aircraft but at high level. US informed us privately of these discussions. Some concern

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in certain quarters in Washington that Nitze had gone beyond instructions. However, when negotiations resumed in October, Kvitsinsky made clear at once that he had no authority from Moscow to continue private discussions on these lines. Russians determined to sit tight on basic position in hope that Western public opinion would make Soviet concessions at negotiating table unnecessary.

8. In November 1982 Russians suggested in negotiations that they might be ready to accept sub-ceiling on missiles. They suggested figure of 162. But made clear that this would include in American count UK and French systems which, according to Soviet data, were at level of 162, ie proposal would effectively block cruise/Pershing deployments. This proposal made public by Andropov in his speech on 21 December. Has been followed in Europe and US by public questioning of viability of zero option in short term. Need to demonstrate Alliance readiness to look constructively at serious alternatives. PM's broadcast on 16 January and statement in House on 18 January disarmed critics who alleged rigidity in our approach.

9. Position of other Euro Allies of course crucial. Italians: apparently remain rock solid. Not a major public issue. Germans: Kohl firm on dual track decision, ie deployments by end '83 if no results in Geneva. SPD increasingly turning against idea of deployment even if no result in Geneva. Belgians: equivocal but not unhelpful; but no work

/yet



yet started on GLCM base. Dutch: in spite of change of Government must be reckoned unlikely to grasp nettle and will continue to equivocate about final decision.

Options

10. For some time it has been clear that zero option unlikely in short term to be negotiable. MOD and FCO officials have discussed very privately with certain Americans possible alternatives based on concept of interim arrangement as first step. In essence this would involve no concession whatever on basic Alliance principles agreed in 1979. But figure for SS20s and Cruise/Pershings would be set at 300 warheads. Figure of 300 is useful because Russians have already proposed this (though not for warheads) and because it is roughly half currently planned deployments of 572.

11. We have been informed extremely privately that a proposal to this effect, submitted by a very limited group of officials in Washington, has been endorsed by Mr Shultz and that there has already been at least one discussion with the President, with Weinberger and Clark from NSC in attendance. Our information is that Weinberger is opposed to this. In our view, some of Weinberger's advisers are using spurious arguments (eg negative impact on European public opinion and inadequate target coverage of 300 warheads).

/12.



12. Additional option would be to accept something similar to Soviet proposal for a geographical split, ie ceilings on warheads capable of striking Europe and freeze on Far East systems. Some indications that Germans are thinking of move on these lines. We believe, however, that at this juncture at least US should continue to stick to single global ceiling. Indications of Japanese disquiet. China factor may also be important.

B. LINE TO TAKE AT MEETINGS WITH KOHL AND BUSH

13. Clear hints from Washington that Bush will look to Prime Minister for view on options for a new move in INF negotiations. Our recommendation would be that a new initiative is desirable; that it should be on the lines already being considered in Washington; that we should continue on basis of global approach (keeping option of geographical split under consideration for possible use eg later in year); and that the timing be discussed soon with the Americans and Germans.

14. German Government's collective position however far from clear. Recent indications are that:

Kohl, while not necessarily against a move, might prefer for electoral/tactical reasons to sit tight on zero option until 6 March.

Genscher for party political reasons may prefer move before elections.

Strauss clearly on record as favouring move off zero option.

/In



In the end believe Americans will, at least as regards timing if not substance, be guided by Kohl's own views.

15. Do not believe it would be right to move now to a position involving geographical split. Russian position unlikely to stand still. If at a later stage this year there are indications that the Russians might accept major elements of the Western position (eg West's counting systems, in particular the exclusion of third party systems) an arrangement involving fixed and equal US/Soviet ceilings on systems in or targettable on Europe, combined with a freeze on Soviet systems in the Far East plus perhaps reciprocal US rights, might be an attractive option. It of course raises problems (eg with the Japanese, possibly with Congress). We need in any event to keep some further flexibility up our sleeve. All the arguments point to not using it now.



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STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS

TEXT OF BRIEFING FOR THE PRIME MINISTER AT CHEQUERS: 30 JANUARY
1983

1. First I will remind you briefly of the background to major international arms control efforts over the past two decades. Second, I will recall the main elements of the US/Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaties and rehearse the origins of the present Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START). Third, I will discuss the respective US and Soviet positions, the stage which the negotiations have now reached on the eve of the third round of talks, and some of the possible future US negotiating options.

A BACKGROUND

2. The present nuclear arms control negotiations have evolved from a pattern of arms control activities over the past two decades. Between 1961 and 1979 the negotiated arms control process produced some eighteen separate arms control agreements (not all bilateral and not all exclusively nuclear). The Cuba missile crisis in 1962 created the political conditions which led to the Partial Test Ban Treaty the following year. This, together with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, were the most important landmarks of the 60s. In 1967, President Johnson and Mr. Kozygin reached agreement in principle to move on to discussions on the limitation of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive weapons. The word "strategic" is of course carefully defined in the SALT agreements: essentially it applies to weapons which can strike the United States from Soviet Territory (or waters) and vice-versa. These discussions were postponed when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968. But by the end of 1969 the SALT I Talks had begun, against the background of sharply divided views in the US

/Congress



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Congress and public over whether to develop an anti-ballistic missile deployment in the US. This heralded the 70s as the decade for arms control on strategic nuclear weapons, opening with the ABM Treaty and the interim agreement limiting strategic offensive arms (SALT I) - both in 1972, and closing with the signing of SALT 2 in Vienna in 1979.

3. To complete the arms control picture during this period, I should mention the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972; the opening of the MBFR negotiations in Vienna in 1973 and the conclusion of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, these last two bearing on conventional force levels and confidence-building measures respectively.

SALT I AND ABM

4. The ABM Treaty, amended by a subsequent protocol, limits the Russians and the Americans to one ABM deployment, each of not more than a hundred ABM launchers, so restricted and located that they cannot provide a nationwide ABM defence. The Russians chose to put their ABM system around the National Command Authority in Moscow. The Americans chose to defend their ICBM field at Grand Forks, North Dakota, but did not subsequently build the ABM system. The Treaty is of unlimited duration, and reviewed at five year intervals. A routine US/Soviet review of it was completed this year. The continuing integrity of the ABM Treaty is in our interest, because if Soviet capability to defend against strategic missile attack was not severely limited, it would have serious implications for our own (and French) small independent deterrents and their credibility.

5. The SALT I Treaty of 1972 froze, at then existing but unequal levels, the number of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) launchers which were either operational or under construction on each side. At the same time, it permitted an increase in SLBM launchers up to an agreed level for each part, subject to the dismantling or destruction of a corresponding number of /older

[CHART 17

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older ICBM or SLBM launchers. American ICBMs were fixed at 1,054 and Soviet ICBMs at 1,618: American SLBMs were fixed at 710 (working from a base level of 656 SLBMs) and Soviet SLBMs at 950 (from a base level at that time of 740). Heavy bombers, in which the Americans were greatly superior, were not included. In a unilateral statement during SALT I, the Soviet Union asserted that if other NATO allies increased the number of their modern ballistic-missile-firing submarines, the Soviet Union would have the right to increase its SSBNs accordingly. The US declared that it did not accept this claim. The SALT I Treaty was an interim agreement for five years. But both sides continue to treat it as in force as you can see from the figures in Chart 1. The Russians honour the relevant dismantling provisions, and regular meetings to discuss the operation of the Treaties are still held in the Joint Standing Consultative Commission (created by the ABM Treaty).

SALT 2 TREATY

6. The principal American objective in SALT 2 was to provide equal ceilings on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for each side, that is ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers; to begin the process of reduction; and to impose restraints on qualitative developments which could threaten future stability. The main ceilings were 2,400 on each side, to be lowered to 2,250 within eighteen months, with further sub-ceilings on Mirv-ed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers with long-range cruise missiles. The Mirv-ing of ICBMs and SLBMs was also limited. There was a restriction on the development of new types of ICBMs (to one new type each). There was also a protocol, which expired at the end of 1981, designed in particular to prevent deployment or flight testing of certain types of cruise missiles and Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles pending resumption of negotiations on what at the time was conceived as SALT III. SALT 2 also banned the construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers, or the relocation of existing launchers. The Backfire bomber was not

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Charts 2
and 37



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explicitly covered in SALT 2, but was the subject of a separate agreement at the time of signature in 1979, limiting production to thirty per year. A joint statement of principles charted the pattern for future negotiations under "SALT 3".

7. Although the SALT 2 Treaty was never ratified by Congress (and there is some doubt whether Congress would have agreed even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which finally put paid to any chance of ratification), the Americans have since reaffirmed that they would not be the first to undercut existing arms control agreements. Until the recent controversy over MX basing, neither side has seriously accused the other of so doing in relation either to SALT 1 or SALT 2.

START

8. The Reagan Administration's position on entering office was that the SALT 2 Treaty was fatally flawed, in particular in relation to its provisions (or lack of them) on heavy missiles (the Russians having been allowed to keep SS18 with no reciprocal rights for the Americans to build heavy missiles, though there were of course no plans to do so); on verification (particularly problems over encryption by the Russians of flight test data); and on the Backfire bomber (which the Russians claimed was not strategic because it did not have the range for the return flight to US; while the Americans argued that in certain flight profiles and with, for example, air-to-air refuelling it could strike US). It was also claimed that SALT 2 would do little to prevent the theoretical vulnerability of US ICBMs to a disarming but limited first strike by Soviet ICBMs, particularly the Mirv-ed heavy SS18. (A modern heavy ICBM missile is defined as any ICBM with a launch weight and throw-weight greater than 90,000 kgs and 3,600 kgs respectively, which are estimates based on the Soviet SS19. The only modern heavy ICBM on either side is the Soviet SS18. The MX would fall below these weight ceilings.) President Reagan initially concentrated on modernising the US /strategic


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strategic armoury. This made some Europeans uncomfortable at the thought that the Americans might be more interested in winning the arms race than bringing it under control. In fact none of the strategic programmes President Reagan inherited - MX, the B1 supersonic bomber, or the D5 Trident Missile - would have been precluded by SALT 2. But by the time of his November 1981 speech to the Washington Press Club, President Reagan had made clear his readiness to resume arms control negotiations with the Russians. Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) began in Geneva in June 1982. President Reagan stated as his goal a significant reduction of the most destabilising systems (ICBMs), the number of warheads they carry and their overall destructive potential. The most significant change from SALT was the objective of deep cuts in the strategic inventory on both sides.

9. The essential elements of the US negotiating position are as follows. Phase 1: each side to reduce from the present level of more than 7,500 warheads to 5,000 warheads on no more than 850 ICBMs and SLBMs. Because the Soviet Union deploys more missiles (2,400) than the US (1,700), the Soviet Union would have to cut twice as many missiles. Further restraints would limit the Russians to a maximum of 110 SS18 heavy ICBMs within this total. Of the 5,000 warheads permitted to each side, no more than 2,500 should be on ICBMs. All these reductions are to be accomplished over an eight year period. In addition the Americans would be prepared for equal but separate limits on number of heavy bombers, providing Backfire is included. In a second phase the Americans would propose to reduce total throw-weight on ballistic missiles on each side to equal ceilings below current US levels at 1.9 million kilograms; a ban on all heavy missiles; and further constraints on slow flying systems, including cruise missiles. President Reagan recently added into the US position an offer to negotiate certain nuclear CBMs, such as prior notification of all test missile launches, and notification of major military exercises.

10. The Soviet position is as follows. A freeze on all intercontinental systems. A reduction from SALT 2 levels

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down to equal ceilings on each side of 1,800 ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers by 1990. The Russians have however not disclosed how they would break down their figure of 1,800 as between the relevant categories. They have also proposed unspecified limits on warhead numbers; no increase in deployments of US forward-based systems in Europe including Pershing 2 and GLCM; a ban on long-range cruise missiles and limits on numbers of deployed modern SSBNs. Other elements in the Soviet position are proposals for ASW-free sanctuaries for SSBNs, limitations on the operating areas of aircraft carriers and of bomber aircraft, and compensation for Chinese nuclear systems.

C US NEGOTIATION OPTIONS

11. Although the START negotiations have been going for a shorter period of time than the INF talks, the scope for agreement, on the face of it, may be greater. Subject to a resolution of the primary counting unit (warheads versus launchers) and of the position on heavy bombers (separate or integrated ceilings, and a decision on Backfire), it would seem as if the progression from SALT 2 ceilings of 2,250 through Soviet ceilings of 1,800 to US ceilings of 850 missile launchers (plus provision for bombers) is well within the field of the negotiable.

12. To sum up, viewed as a series, strategic talks have marked a progression: from a crude freeze on missiles in SALT I; through equal ceilings and marginal reductions on missiles and heavy bombers in SALT 2; toward steep cuts and the inclusion of Backfire in START I; with the prospect, in START II, of also limiting aggregate missile throw-weight and more definitive arrangements for strategic cruise missiles. But for the moment the American assessment is that the Russians are holding the START negotiations hostage to progress over INF.

13. The possibility that President Reagan might aim for the swift conclusion of a simple framework agreement on START nearer the elections (like the Vladivostock Agreement in 1974) should certainly not be excluded. At the heart of the matter,



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agreement would probably have to involve some trade-off between the American interest in limits of aggregate Soviet missile throw-weight and the Russian desire to curtail the full potential of US cruise-missiles, especially longer range SLCMs.

14. We need to keep close in touch with the Americans on this. So far they have kept us pretty well informed of what is going on. But, if the President does decide for political reasons to make a concerted effort to reach an interim agreement of some kind before the US Presidential electoral process begins in 1984, we have a strong national interest in keeping a close eye on a number of aspects, particularly

- a. non-circumvention provisions (including transfer to third parties);
- b. any provision affecting third party systems;
- c. potentially damaging constraints on US Forward-Based Systems (FBS) which could have implications for the INF negotiations.



INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF)

A. Deterrence

The INF modernisation programme is designed to ensure adequate deterrence against aggression. Deterrence has kept the peace in Europe. Our objective has been, and will remain, to ensure that Soviet planners never misjudge Western resolution or capabilities. Must avoid giving Soviet Union temptation to start a military adventure in Europe in the hope that this can be done without unacceptable risk.

B. INF Modernisation and Deterrence

The objective of the INF Modernisation is to reinforce the link between the United States and Europe. The Soviet Union must not believe that use of force in Europe can be confined to European territory outside the Soviet Union. Deployments therefore designed to deter any aggression at whatever level in Europe.

INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF)

UK POSITION

We strongly support the proposal put forward by NATO: the zero option. If the Russians dismantle their SS20, SS4 and SS5 missiles, we shall forego the plans for cruise and Pershing II missiles. This is a radical proposal for the elimination of the class of sub-strategic or intermediate range nuclear weapons which is of most concern to both sides, that is the missiles which can reach Western Europe from the Soviet Union and vice versa. The zero option would be much the best solution to the problem of INF missiles. But in the absence of zero we must have a balanced agreement and balanced numbers.

SOVIET OFFER TO REDUCE INF MISSILES IN EUROPE

We have made it clear, publicly and to the Russians, that their statement may be a step in the right direction, if it means that they recognise that SS20 missiles must be reduced. But to demand a continuing Soviet monopoly of such longer range INF missiles would be unacceptable.




INCLUSION OF BRITISH SYSTEMS IN GENEVA INF NEGOTIATIONS

The NATO position, fully supported by all the NATO Allies, is that the negotiations concern the intermediate range land based missiles of the United States and the Soviet Union. Inclusion of the independent British force, which is strategic and sea-based, would be contrary to this principle and in addition would grant the Soviet Union superiority over the US. The Russians, moreover, want to include them in the INF negotiations because unless these systems are counted it is impossible to sustain the Russian argument that a balance exists. (see also supplementary on inclusion of British systems in START)

NATO SHOULD DELAY ITS DEPLOYMENT PROGRAMME IF THERE ARE SIGNS OF PROGRESS IN INF NEGOTIATIONS

NATO sincerely hopes that the Russians' response to their offer will allow the Alliance to cancel the Modernisation Programme. But there is no question of abandoning or postponing the first deployments at the end of this year if the zero level is not successfully negotiated.



"ZERO OPTION" IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS UNFAIR TO THE
RUSSIANS.


The NATO position rightly takes account of the massive imbalance between the US and the Soviet Union in land-based INF missile systems. That the Soviet Union will, if they accept the American proposal, have to dismantle their INF missiles is the consequence of the unrestrained build-up of Soviet INF over the last few years.

RUSSIAN MORATORIUM

The unilateral Soviet moratorium does not solve the INF imbalance. A moratorium agreed by both sides would freeze that imbalance in intermediate-range nuclear forces, which is about four to one in favour of the Soviet Union. It would not reduce the threat posed by the Soviet long range land-based missile systems. NATO at present has none of these.

RUSSIAN CLAIMS OF EXISTING BALANCE IN INF

The Russians' claims are bogus when like is compared with like. Any objective comparisons between systems of similar operational capability on both sides reveals a wide and growing disparity of nuclear systems in the European theatre in favour of the Soviet Union. The ratio of the Warsaw Pact's intermediate range nuclear forces to the equivalent NATO forces is currently about four to one.




DANISH PARLIAMENTARY VOTE TO SUSPEND FUNDS FOR INF
BASING

The Danish parliamentary vote does not affect either the NATO twin-track decision on INF modernisation and arms control or the Danish Government's support for that decision. Nor will the vote affect practical preparations for INF basing (in which Denmark is not in any way participating)

INF: NITZE/KVITSINSKY EXCHANGES: SUMMER 1982

US Government did not instruct US chief negotiator to discontinue exploration of alternatives discussed privately with Soviet negotiator. Nitze has authority to explore any flexibility in Soviet position. This is in line with President's reaffirmation that serious proposals from Soviet Union would be looked at carefully. It was Soviet side which at outset of autumn negotiating round broke off discussions initiated in summer. Thus, slight indications of Soviet flexibility in the summer round of negotiations unfortunately not borne out in subsequent experience.



HMG AWARE OF INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS/AGREEMENT BETWEEN US
AND SOVIET INF NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA IN MID 1982?

It is for the Governments of the United States and the
Soviet Union to comment about ideas exchanged informally
between Ambassadors Nitze and Kvitsinsky.

(If pressed: During a visit to London in 1982 Professor
Rostow talked of signs of movement at Geneva but made it
clear that they had led nowhere).

DUAL-KEY

For about 20 years no US nuclear weapons based in the UK have been on a double-key arrangement. But successive Governments have been satisfied that our national interests are protected by the arrangements for joint decision. Any use of the cruise missile bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision between the British and American Governments in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. This arrangement also applies, for example, to the bases at which US F-111 aircraft (which have been assigned a nuclear role by NATO and like cruise missiles have the range to reach the Soviet Union) are stationed in this country. The Government have satisfied themselves that the current arrangements remain effective.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START)

UK POSITION

We strongly support the United States' proposal for reductions of one third in the total numbers of ballistic missile warheads in the strategic arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. The numbers of ballistic missiles would be cut in half. The American proposals rightly concentrate on the most destabilising element of strategic forces, that is the intercontinental ballistic missiles.

US PROPOSALS FOR START UNFAIR TO RUSSIANS BY
CONCENTRATING ON ICBMs/IGNORING CRUISE MISSILES AND
BOMBERS

Not at all. US proposals concentrate on most destabilising elements - ballistic missiles, particularly land-based ballistic missiles. But the Americans have made clear their willingness to include in negotiations other classes of system.



INCLUSION OF UK/FRENCH IN SYSTEMS IN START

The British Polaris force is equivalent to a very small percentage of the Soviet strategic force and is clearly of marginal significance to strategic arms control. The Government have made it clear that if the present situation were to change significantly, and for example the Soviet threat to us were greatly reduced, they would be prepared to look again at the position of British forces in relations to arms control.

FATE OF SALT II

The Americans have made it clear that pending the outcome of the new START negotiations they will continue not to undercut the unratified SALT II treaty, provided that the Russians continue to do the same.

MODERNISATION OF US STRATEGIC FORCES

We welcome the modernisation of the triad of US strategic nuclear forces, the land-based missiles, the sea-based missiles and the aircraft. The modernisation programmes were sanctioned by President Carter's Administration. As long as the Russians have strategic nuclear forces the US forces continue to form the foundation of NATO's strategy of deterrence. The American forces must therefore be kept credible.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES' VOTE TO CUT FUNDS FOR MX
PRODUCTION

How the US strategic land-based forces are modernised is a matter for the United States Administration and Congress to decide. We would not presume to offer them better advice than they already have in Washington. The important point is that the Russians should continue to believe in a US ability to retaliate: In that way NATO will continue to deter any aggression.

STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AND MX

The MX missile, which was sanctioned by the Carter Administration, is fully compatible with the provisions SALT II. There will be no increase in the total number of US land-based missiles because older missiles will be retired. Indeed the United States has offered, in the Strategic Arms Reduction talks in Geneva, radical proposals for deep cuts in strategic nuclear missiles for both sides.

MX IN DENSE PACK COMPATIBLE WITH SALT II ?

The US Administration have stated repeatedly that it is and I know that this is a point that they have considered carefully. The issue of MX basing is in any case currently being reconsidered in Washington.



SOVIET TESTING AND THREAT TO DEPLOY NEW ICBM

I cannot see a legitimate security need for the Soviet Union to deploy a further intercontinental ballistic missile. She has deployed three types of new missiles, the SS17, the SS18 and the SS19 forces, since the American Minuteman ICBM force was deployed over a decade ago. The throw-weight of Soviet strategic missiles, that is a measure of the missiles' potential for destruction, is more than twice that of the Americans'.

US READY TO REDUCE SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES AS PART OF START AGREEMENT?

Yes. The United States proposals for the START talks would require the retirement of much of their existing force of Poseidon submarine launched ballistic missiles.



NUCLEAR FREEZE UK POSITION

A freeze in INF at current levels would be unacceptable given the massive Soviet superiority. At the strategic level the US Administration has made clear its desire to go well beyond mere limits of strategic systems at their current level, and to make significant reductions. We support their efforts to achieve radical cuts in the existing strategic arsenals. A freeze would reduce the incentive for the Soviet Union to negotiate such cuts.

US OVERKILL?

There is no link between the size of the superpowers' nuclear arsenals and the likelihood of their being used. For the maintenance of the Alliance's confidence to withstand nuclear blackmail its nuclear forces must be modernised as necessary to preserve their capability to deter aggression.



NEUTRON WEAPONS (ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS)

The US has decided to assemble enhanced radiation weapons and to retain those on its own territory. There has been no discussion of deployment in Europe. The US has said it will consult its NATO allies if the question of European deployment arises.



MR GROMYKO'S PROPOSAL FOR A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

The Government wish to see the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva continue its examination of the outstanding issues of verification and compliance for a comprehensive test ban. We do not believe that Mr Gromyko's proposals, reflecting only that measure of agreement achieved in the 1977-80 trilateral negotiations, help to resolve those issues.

SWEDISH AND SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR A BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

We believe that a battlefield nuclear weapon free zone would not increase our security, or East/West stability. The territory of a zone could be targetted by nuclear weapons stationed just beyond its limits. Such a zone would not raise the nuclear threshold, which depends on the strength of NATO's conventional defences. We believe that the priority should remain the balanced reduction, rather than the redistribution, of nuclear weapons in Europe.



CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)

Britain decided in 1969 to destroy all its chemical weapons stocks. The Americans retain a limited CW stockpile. The Soviet Union has developed a large, modern chemical force which is not matched on the NATO side. The Americans have kept open the options of modernising their chemical capability. NATO's first priority is to seek a total ban on CW through a negotiated convention in the Committee on Disarmament.



INF: QUESTIONS FROM THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATE

Question 1

If the existence of Soviet SS20s with no corresponding Western systems to match them constitutes an unacceptable threat to the West, how have we lived safely through the last few years?

Answer

NATO's earlier LRINF e.g. British Vulcan bombers and US F111s, have either been phased out or are ageing and increasingly vulnerable to Soviet air defences. Meanwhile Soviet SS20s have grown to their present level of 1,000 warheads. As men like Helmut Schmidt and Henry Kissinger have pointed out, this situation risks becoming very unhealthy for European security and stability. Even in peace-time, we have seen the effect of the SS20 programme on public confidence. In the event of major crisis it could give rise to dangerous Soviet miscalculations or at the very least a temptation to apply coercive pressure on Western Europe. The price of freedom is eternal vigilance and a continuous readiness to keep the deterrent in good repair.



Question 2

Is it not the case that any use of Cruise missiles based in Britain would cause the Russians to retaliate with SS20s against British cities? If so, are not these cities more rather than less likely to be attacked than if the Cruise missile were not introduced?

Answer

We can be sure that many sites in Britain, including our cities, are already on the Russians' target list and would stay there even if Cruise missiles were not deployed here. This makes it all the more important that we should maintain our ability to deter any and every sort of threat. Cruise missiles will help us do so by underlining for an aggressor the fact that he would lose far more than he could hope to gain. No NATO weapon will ever be used except in response to attack.



Question 3

Is there not something in the Soviet argument that an attack on the Soviet Union by Cruise and Pershing II missiles based in Western Europe is just as much 'strategic', in Soviet eyes, as attacks on the Soviet Union by American SLBMs or other intercontinental weapons?

Answer

In this sense Soviet nuclear weapons which can reach NATO territory anywhere in Europe are also strategic for the European country concerned. Under the North Atlantic Treaty an armed attack against one member whether in Europe or North America, is an armed attack against them all. NATO security is thus indivisible, even if Warsaw Pact security is not.



QUESTION 4

WOULD NOT THE AVAILABILITY OF AMERICAN-OPERATED INF SYSTEMS IN WESTERN EUROPE ENABLE THE UNITED STATES TO USE THESE RATHER THAN AMERICAN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, THUS IN EFFECT FIGHTING AN AMERICAN WAR IN EUROPE?

ANSWER

If the Americans had any such idea the last thing they would do would be to station in Europe missiles whose key feature is their ability to reach Soviet territory. The Russians have said that any US weapon reaching their territory would be regarded as coming from the United States. The problem of INF missiles in Europe is a potent reminder that NATO's security is indivisible. In any event the use of cruise missile bases in the UK in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time.



QUESTION 5

IN 1979 IT WAS THE EUROPEANS WHO WANTED THE UNITED STATES TO DEPLOY NEW INF SYSTEMS AND THE AMERICANS WHO WONDERED WHETHER THESE WERE REALLY NECESSARY. IF EUROPE IS NOW QUESTIONING THE NEED, WHY SHOULD THE AMERICANS BE CHANGING SIDES IN THE ARGUMENT?

ANSWER

In the years immediately preceding the 1979 decision both the US and all the European allies rightly foresaw a need to modernise LRINF in order to maintain deterrence. The European governments have not now changed their minds about the need for new missiles in the absence of agreement on the zero option.




QUESTION 6

GIVEN THE LOCATION OF THE PERSHING II LAUNCH SITES, WOULD NOT THE UNITED STATES HAVE TO FIRE THEM ALMOST AS SOON AS HOSTILITIES STARTED, LEST THEY BE OVERRUN? IF SO, DOES THIS NOT LOWER RATHER THAN RAISE THE THRESHHOLD OF ESCALATION?

ANSWER

Pershing II missiles will replace, on a one-for-one basis, existing US nuclear missiles in West Germany - the Pershing I missiles. The mobility of the Pershing II missiles prevents them from becoming attractive targets for any pre-emptive strike. Their ability to reach Soviet territory is an important element in our ability to deter initial hostilities, because they diminish the risk that a would-be aggressor might calculate that he could get away without unacceptable risks.



Question 7

How can we possibly expect the Soviet Union to accept that no account should be taken, in the INF talks or in the START talks, of British and French nuclear systems which in the case of Britain are integrated into NATO's forces and planning?

Answer

The British Polaris force is a strategic deterrent of last resort. It is already of minimum size viable for that purpose. It is excluded from the INF negotiations on US and Soviet sub-strategic land-based missiles by definition, just like comparable American (and Soviet) missile firing submarines.

In the START talks the Polaris force is not on the agenda. In terms of strategic nuclear weapon launchers and warheads it represents only a very small fraction, a mere 2.3% and 2.2% respectively of the 2,700 Soviet launchers and 8,500 Soviet warheads. If the present situation were to be significantly changed, we should of course be prepared to look again at British systems in relation to strategic arms control. In the meantime, the priority must be to reduce the arsenals of the superpowers.



CONFIDENTIAL

Question 8

If part of our argument is that the West must match the East level by level and roughly type by type, why are we not urgently developing a chemical warfare capability to match that of the Soviet Union?

Answer

It has never been NATO policy to match the Warsaw Pact weapon for weapon, but to ensure that deterrence works at all levels. Britain gave up her chemical weapons in 1969. The Soviet Union continues to modernise its chemical weapon capabilities. The US has maintained limited stocks of chemical weapons, but has kept open the option to modernise its capability if necessary. Our overriding objective in the immediate future is to seek a comprehensive international ban through an arms control convention. Britain and other Western countries have tabled concrete proposals in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Success in this will depend on Soviet willingness to accept reasonable provisions for inspection and verification. [We were pleased to see Vice-President Bush announce a new US initiative during his visit to Europe.]

CONFIDENTIAL

31 JAN 1983





*Original filed
on Defence A3
Deployment INF Cmb1*

SECRET AND PERSONAL *From Control*

PM/83/9

THE PRIME MINISTER

INF Negotiations

1. We shall be discussing in MISC 7 on 27 January two important issues related to the planned deployment of American intermediate range missiles in Europe later this year: the question of control and the timetable for deployment. After that, we shall be meeting at Chequers on 30 January, and I hope that we shall take that opportunity to focus our attention on the situation in the negotiations themselves. It will be important to clear our minds about what should be said on this subject to the US Vice-President when he is here on 9/10 February. You might welcome a brief update in the meantime on the latest developments.

2. The next round of negotiations on INF begins in Geneva on 27 January. Since the last round ended before Christmas there has been a good deal of speculation, much of it unfortunately in the press, about the continued viability of the zero option approach as the basic Western negotiating position. Some of this speculation has been misinformed. But there are clear indications from Rome and Bonn that the Italians and Germans are moving to the view that the Americans should now consider seriously a new move in the INF negotiations involving a proposal for some form of interim agreement. We have also learned from private sources that a good deal of discussion on the same lines is going on in Washington. Officials here and in the MOD have been examining the options and I hope to be in a position to give you a fully up-to-date account of the latest developments at the meeting at Chequers.

/3.


SECRET AND PERSONAL



3. My own view is that we must continue to insist on the essential criteria which you established clearly in your interview with Brian Walden on ITV on 16 January and again in the House during questions on 18 January. The key points are that we must have an agreement which is balanced, i.e. which provides for equal numbers of warheads on weapon systems of similar type as between the US and the USSR; and that the counting system (used to decide which systems are included and which excluded) must not be bogus. Furthermore I see no reason to depart from our position that the zero level is the best long-term outcome. I think too that we need to keep in mind that, for the first part of this year at least, the contest between the Soviet Union and the NATO allies will be one for the hearts and minds of Western public opinion. The Americans have made it clear that they do not intend to make any move from their present position at any rate in the opening stages of the INF talks when they reconvene on 27 January. But there may be much to be said for a move very soon in the negotiations which preserves absolutely intact our main objective and our basic criteria but which provides the Alliance with the high ground in terms of its public posture.

4. I look forward to discussing these points at Chequers on 30 January. It is clear from what we have heard about Vice-President Bush's visit that he will look to you for a clear statement of the British position. I have no doubt that this will be of particular importance in Washington as possible negotiating options are considered.

5. I am copying this minute to Michael Heseltine and Sir Robert Armstrong.


(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign & Commonwealth Office
25 January 1983

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
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