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FILE TITLE:

Deployment of Intermediate Nuclear Force in Europe (INF)
Modernisation of theatre Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe

CLOSED

SERIES

DEFENCE

PART: 3

PART BEGINS: October 1982

PART ENDS: 21 September 1983

CAB ONE:

PART CLOSED

PREM 19/999

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TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(83) 22nd Meeting, item 2	07/07/1983
MISC 7(83) 3rd Meeting, item 1	28/03/1983
MISC 7(83) 2nd Meeting, only item	10/03/1983
MISC 7(82) 4th Meeting, only item	16/11/1982

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed J. Gray Date 20/2/2013

PREM Records Team

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S E C R E T

FROM MOSCOW 211000Z SEPTEMBER

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1047 OF 21 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS) BONN, WASHINGTON, PARIS AND UKDEL NATO

PERSONAL FOR SIR J BULLARD.

FRG/USSR.

THE FRG AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING TOLD US AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS AND MYSELF , IN STRICT CONFIDENCE , (PLEASE PROTECT), THAT FOR PRIMARILY INTERNAL POLITICAL REASONS CONNECTED WITH THE INF CAMPAIGN GENSCHER HAD CONCLUDED THAT HE MUST SEEK NEW ARRANGEMENTS FOR AN EARLY MEETING WITH GROMYKO NOW THAT THE LATTER IS NOT GOING TO THE UNGA. MEYER-LANDRUT, WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM HASTILY ARRANGED CONSULTATIONS IN BONN, IS DUE TO CALL ON GROMYKO LATER TODAY '' TO SOUND HIM OUT VERY GENTLY ''. THE GERMAN PROPOSAL WILL BE FOR A MEETING ON NEUTRAL TERRITORY , SINCE GENSCHER COULD IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES NEITHER COME HERE NOR INVITE GROMYKO TO BONN.

RATFORD.

NNNN

276

RESTRICTED

GRS 290
RESTRICTED
FM BONN 201240Z SEP 83 PS TO PM 10 DOWNING ST.
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 855 OF 20 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE CINCC(G) (FOR PM'S PARTY) WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO
INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DS17) ROME BRUSSELS THE HAGUE

MY TELNO 844: INF: GERMAN PRESS SPECULATION ON NEW WESTERN NEGOTIATING MOVES.

1. THE GERMAN PRESS HAS, IN THE LAST COUPLE OF DAYS, CARRIED LEAKS ABOUT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER TO WESTERN LEADERS WHICH SEEM TO REFLECT MORE THAN JUST A PLAY-BACK OF US NEWSPAPER REPORTS. MONIAC, THE WELL-CONNECTED DEFENCE CORRESPONDENT OF THE RIGHT-WING DAILY DIE WELT, HAS BEEN LEADING THE PACK - PERHAPS IN HOPES OF FORCING FEDERAL POLITICIANS TO DISAVOW THE MORE EXTREME OF THE RUMOURS. A PARTIAL DEMENTI ISSUED BY THE FEDERAL SPOKESMAN YESTERDAY HAS NOT (NOT) SILENCED SPECULATION.

2. ON 19 SEPTEMBER MONIAC REPORTED THAT REAGAN'S LATEST LETTER TO WESTERN LEADERS HAD HELD OUT THE PROSPECT OF A) EXEMPTING A CERTAIN NUMBER OF ASIAN SS-20S FROM REDUCTIONS AS TACIT COMPENSATION FOR FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS, B) SETTING A CEILING OF 300 WARHEADS ON EACH SIDE FOR EUROPEAN INF, AND C) REDUCING THE PLANNED DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING IIS TO 60 WITHIN THIS TOTAL. TODAY, MONIAC ADDS THAT SOME ''GOVERNMENT EXPERTS'' IN NATO ARE CONTEMPLATING FURTHER CONCESSIONS SUCH AS INCLUDING FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN BALANCE, DROPPING PERSHINGS ALTOGETHER AND BRINGING FRG-OWNED PERSHING 1 AS INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS.

3. AT YESTERDAY'S GOVERMENT PRESS CONFERENCE, THE FEDERAL SPOKESMAN CONFIRMED THAT REAGAN HAD SENT A LETTER PROPOSING A NEW NEGOTIATING APPROACH AND THAT THIS MIGHT AFFECT INTER ALIA THE HANDLING OF SOVIET SYSTEMS IN ASIA. HE WOULD NOT CONFIRM MONIAC'S 300 FIGURE, OR GIVE ANY FURTHER DETAILS. MOST OF TODAY'S GERMAN NEWSPAPERS REPORT THESE OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AT FACE VALUE AND INTERPRET THEM TO MEAN THAT NO IMMEDIATE CONCESSION ON THIRD PARTY SYSTEMS IS UNDER DISCUSSION. THE KOELNER STADT ANZEIGER, HOWEVER, SUGGESTS THAT OTHER ALLIES WILL BE PRESSING FRANCE AND THE UK HARD BEHIND THE SCENES TO AGREE ON COUNTING-IN THEIR SYSTEMS EITHER IN START OR IN A NEW INTERNATIONAL FORUM, AND THAT THIS POINT COULD BE RAISED ON 21 SEPTEMBER WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER MEETS CHANCELLOR KOHL.

TAYLOR

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PS/MR LUCE
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OO THE HAGUE
PP UKDEL NATO
RR BRUSSELS
RR PARIS
GRS 390
UNCLASSIFIED
FM BONN 190935Z SEP 83
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 851 OF 19 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE THE HAGUE (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER),
INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DS12, DS17), UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON,
INFO ROUTINE BRUSSELS, ROME, PARIS, MOSCOW,
INFO SAVING CICC(G).

FRG VIEWS ON INF: BUNDESTAG SECURITY-POLICY DEBATE 16 SEPTEMBER

1. IN THIS FIRST FULL DEBATE OF THE AUTUMN SESSION ON INF AND RELATED ISSUES, COALITION AND OPPOSITION PARTIES WERE AT ONE IN GREETING THE OUTCOME OF THE MADRID CSCE CONFERENCE AND CONDEMNING SOVIET BEHAVIOUR OVER THE KAL INCIDENT. BUT THE SPD DISTANCED ITSELF MORE SHARPLY THAN EVER BEFORE FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THE GENEVA INF NEGOTIATIONS AND THE TIMING OF DEPLOYMENT.

2. FOR THE GOVERNMENT, FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER CONFIRMED THAT INF STATIONING WOULD GO AHEAD IF NECESSARY THIS AUTUMN BUT STRESSED THAT IT NEED NOT MEAN THE END OF TALKS, NOR PROVE IRREVERSIBLE. AN INTERMEDIATE AGREEMENT BEFORE END-83 WAS STILL POSSIBLE, IF THE USSR WOULD GIVE UP ITS INSISTENCE ON INCLUDING THIRD-PARTY SYSTEMS. GENSCHER HINTED AT THE PROSPECT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WEST'S NEGOTIATING POSITION ON INF, AND AT POSSIBLE WITHDRAWALS OF OLD NATO SHORT-RANGE SYSTEMS ON A MORE THAN ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS. IN A PASSIONATE SPEECH, DEFENCE MINISTER WOERNER REJECTED THE GREEN PARTY'S CONTENTION THAT THE PERSHING II WAS A FIRST-STRIKE WEAPON, AND ARGUED THAT ONLY BY NEGOTIATING FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH COULD THE WEST HOPE TO REDUCE OR ELIMINATE INF ON BOTH SIDES.

3. THE SPD SPOKESMEN (EHMKE, VOIGT AND SCHEER) STOPPED SHORT OF GIVING A SIMPLE NO TO INF STATIONING, WHICH WOULD HAVE ANTICIPATED THE DECISION OF THEIR PARTY CONFERENCE PLANNED FOR MID-NOVEMBER, BUT MADE CLEAR THAT IF NOTHING HAD CHANGED AT GENEVA BY THAT TIME THEY WOULD CALL FOR THE TALKS TO BE PROLONGED AND DEPLOYMENT POSTPONED. THEY ACCUSED THE GOVERNMENT OF INERTIA AND OF FAILING TO USE ITS INFLUENCE OVER WASHINGTON TO OBTAIN A MORE REASONABLE WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION. THE WEST'S PRESENT INSISTENCE ON EXCLUDING THIRD-PARTY SYSTEMS WAS UNRESONABLE AND UNREALISTIC. STARTING DEPLOYMENT WITHOUT SUCCESS IN THE GENEVA TALKS WOULD PRECIPITATE A BREAKDOWN IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND WOULD DOAU SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THE INTERESTS OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE.

4. COALITION SPOKESMEN RETORTED THAT THIS SPD ATTITUDE WAS CALCULATED TO WEAKEN THE WEST'S BARGAINING POSITION AT GENEVA, AND THAT THE SPD WOULD BEAR A HEAVY SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY IF NEGOTIATIONS FAILED.

5. FURTHER DETAILS OF THE DEBATE FOLLOW BY TELELETTER.

BONN WILL PASS SAVING TO CICC(G).

TAYLOR

NNNN

SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 September 1983

INF

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 13 September which contained a report on a meeting of NATO's Special Consultative Group on 11 and 12 September and, in particular, Mr. Burt's confidential information that President Reagan was concerned over the problem of how, in due course, the UK and French national nuclear deterrents might be associated with the arms control process.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and to David Goodall (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 160
CONFIDENTIAL
FM THE HAGUE 141500Z SEP 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 255 OF 14 SEPTEMBER
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON

Read in full.

THE NETHERLANDS AND INF DEPLOYMENT

1. QUEEN BEATRIX GAVE AN AUDIENCE ON 13 SEPTEMBER TO JESSE JACKSON, THE US POLITICIAN. HE SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD AN AP CORRESPONDENT THAT DURING THE AUDIENCE THE QUEEN HAD SAID THAT IF THE GENEVA TALKS FAILED, INF DEPLOYMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE SHOULD IN HER VIEW BE POSTPONED.

2. THE PUBLICATION OF THIS STORY CAUSED UNDERSTANDABLE CONSTERNATION HERE. LUBBERS TELEPHONED THE QUEEN, WHO DENIED HAVING SPOKEN AS REPORTED, AND THE GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SERVICE (RVD) THEN MADE STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO CONTACT JACKSON TO GET A RETRACTION. EVENTUALLY JACKSON WAS CONTACTED. HE SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD THE RVD THAT THE AP STORY WAS INACCURATE: ''AT NO TIME DID I QUOTE HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN ABOUT ANY SUBJECT. TO DO SO WOULD BE A BREACH OF PROTOCOL WHICH I WOULD CONDEMN''.

COMMENT

3. IT SEEMS THAT JACKSON IS SOMETIMES LESS THAN RELIABLE. IT IS HOWEVER CLEARLY POSSIBLE THAT HIS COMMENTS TO AP REFLECTED THE THRUST OF WHAT QUEEN BEATRIX SAID TO HIM. SINCE THE PRIME MINISTER IS DUE TO HAVE AN AUDIENCE WITH QUEEN BEATRIX ON 19 SEPTEMBER, SHE MAY NEED TO BE BRIEFED ON THIS EPISODE.

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Duty Clerk.

Dame

Please arrange for this message to be despatched to Brussels at once on President Mayer at the hot line.

Copies of the message in final form should be sent to

me
Mr. Bone (FCO)
Mr. Norton (ROD)
Mr. Hatfield (CO).

14.9.83

Subject

✓ Master
Ops

cc Bone (FCO)
Nottram (MOD)
Hatfield (CO)

53

US Declassified

CAB/WHØØ1/14

IMMEDIATE 141525Z SEP 83

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T131A/83

FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

TELNO MISC 2Ø1 OF 14 SEPTEMBER 1983

DEAR RON,

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 1Ø SEPTEMBER ABOUT THE ALLIED APPROACH TO THE INF NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. I AGREE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ENSURING THAT OUR PEOPLES UNDERSTAND FULLY THE EFFORTS WE ARE MAKING TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT IN GENEVA, PARTICULARLY NOW THAT INITIAL WESTERN DEPLOYMENTS ARE ABOUT TO BEGIN. I QUITE SEE THAT IT WILL BE USEFUL FOR AMBASSADOR NITZE IN THIS CONTEXT TO HAVE THE NECESSARY DISCRETION TO FILL OUT AND EXPLAIN OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION, WHILE REMAINING TRUE TO NATO'S FUNDAMENTAL NEGOTIATING PRINCIPLES.

I AM IN GENERAL VERY CONTENT WITH THE SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS OUTLINED IN YOUR MESSAGE FOR POSSIBLE ELABORATION OF THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING HAND. BUT I HOPE THAT IF IT COMES TO THE POINT OF INDICATING OUR READINESS TO CONSIDER PROPOSALS INVOLVING THE US AND SOVIET LRINF AIRCRAFT, THE ALLIED POSITION WILL MAKE CLEAR THAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT (FOLLOWING WORD UNDERLINED) GLOBAL LIMITATIONS. NATO RIGHTLY ATTACHES PRIMACY TO GLOBAL LIMITS ON MISSILES (RATHER THAN PURELY REGIONAL LIMITS AS THE RUSSIANS WOULD PREFER) IF WESTERN SECURITY IS TO BE ENHANCED BY AN INF AGREEMENT. THE ARGUMENT SEEMS TO ME EVEN STRONGER IN RESPECT OF AIRCRAFT, SINCE THESE ARE BY DEFINITION THE MOST HIGHLY MOBILE WEAPONS PLATFORMS OF ALL.

IT IS PERHAPS MAINLY A TACTICAL QUESTION WHETHER TO INCLUDE ALL THESE ELEMENTS SIMULTANEOUSLY IN ONE ELABORATION OF THE WESTERN POSITION AT GENEVA, OR TO PROCEED IN PHASES DEPENDING ON SOVIET REACTIONS. IN THE LATTER CASE (FOR WHICH I HAVE SOME PREFERENCE) THERE MIGHT BE ADVANTAGE IN INTRODUCING OUR DETAILED POSITION ON AIRCRAFT (FOLLOWING WORD UNDERLINED) BEFORE GOING ON TO THE QUESTION OF SUB-CEILINGS ON MISSILES, SINCE THIS WOULD ENABLE US TO SECURE THE PRINCIPLE OF GLOBAL CEILINGS AT THE OUTSET. BUT I ACCEPT THAT YOU WILL WISH TO GIVE FULL WIEGHT TO AMBASSADOR NITZE'S RCOMMENDATIONS ON THIS SCORE.

I AM SURE THAT NATO HAS EVERYTHING TO GAIN BY REMAINING FIRM OVER THE BASIC CRITERIA AND PRINCIPLES EMBODIED IN THE ZERO/ZERO AND INTERIM AGREEMENT PROPOSALS. YOU MAY REST ASSURED OF OUR WHOLE-HEARTED SUPPORT IN THIS AND I WELCOME YOUR CONTINUED READINESS TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH ALLIES ABOUT HOW BEST TO ACHIEVE OUR JOINT OBJECTIVES.

WITH BEST WISHES

YOURS EVER

MARGARET.

GRS 730
RESTRICTED
FM MOSCOW 141258Z SEP 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1021 OF 14 SEP
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON,
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS,
INFO ROUTINE ROME, BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE, TOKYO
INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS, SOFIA, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST,
BUDAPEST, EAST BERLIN, WARSAW, PRAGUE

INF

INF : SOVIET PRESS CONFERENCE

SUMMARY

1. ON 14 SEPTEMBER KORNIENKO, FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, AND MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV, FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE ON INF. THE MAIN AIM WAS PROBABLY TO BRING THIS SUBJECT TO THE FORE AGAIN AFTER ALL THE ATTENTION GIVEN TO THE KOREAN AIRLINER INCIDENT. THE SOVIET SPEAKERS REHEARSED FAMILIAR SOVIET POSITION EXCEPT THAT FIGURES WERE GIVEN FOR THE MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR BALANCE IN EUROPE WHICH SHOWED A SOVIET ADVANTAGE OF 126 DELIVERY VEHICLES. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS THEY REJECTED ANY LINKAGE BETWEEN THE AIRLINER INCIDENT AND THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS: STRESSED THE NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS: AND DESCRIBED AS WISHFUL THINKING GENSCHER'S INTERPRETATION OF GROMYKO'S REMARKS TO HIM IN MADRID (BONN TELNO 823 NOT TO ALL.)

DETAIL.

2. IN HIS OPENING REMARKS AKHROMEYEV SAID THAT NATO HAD 857 MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES IN EUROPE, CONSISTING OF US F111 AND F4 AIRCRAFT IN THE FRG AND UK, A6 AND A7 ON AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (A TOTAL OF OVER 650), 64 BRITISH POLARIS, AND FRANCE'S 98 MISSILES AND 44 MIRAGE 4. THIS ADDED UP TO 162 MISSILES AND ABOUT 700 AIRCRAFT. THE SOVIET TOTAL WAS 983 (SS20, SS4 AND BOMBERS). AKHROMEYEV ALSO CLAIMED THAT THERE WERE MORE THAN 3000 US, BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR CHARGES THAT COULD HIT THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES.

3. KORNIENKO IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS REPEATEDLY SAID THAT THERE WAS NOT, AND COULD NOT BE, ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE AIRLINER INCIDENT AND INF. IT WAS NOT FOR THE SOVIET UNION, BUT FOR THOSE WHO HAD LAUNCHED THIS ''PROVOCATION'' TO PAY COMPENSATION.

4. BOTH SOVIET SPEAKERS STRESSED THAT THE TWO ''PRINCIPLES'' OF THE SOVIET INF POSITION WERE NO DEPLOYMENT AT ALL OF NEW AMERICAN WEAPONS AND ACCOUNT TO BE TAKEN OF BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS. GENSCHER'S ACCOUNT OF HIS MEETING WITH GROMYKO WAS INACCURATE: HIS COMMENTS WERE WISHFUL THINKING WITHOUT BASIS:

IT WAS ''ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL'' TO COUNT BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS AS MEDIUM RANGE WEAPONS IN EUROPE, WHETHER YOU CALLED THEM MEDIUM RANGE OR STRATEGIC. THE IDEA OF EXTRICATING BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES FROM THE INF TALKS NOW AGAINST THE HYPOTHETICAL POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING THEM IN OTHER TALKS WAS ''NOT ON''.

5. OTHER POINTS MADE IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS INCLUDED:

(A) ''LIQUIDATION'' OF REDUCED MISSILES UNDER ANDROPOV'S LATEST PROPOSAL MEANT THE LIQUIDATION OF BOTH THE LAUNCHING EQUIPMENT AND THE MISSILES BY PROCEDURES WHICH COULD BE WORKED OUT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. ''DISMANTLING'' SHOULD ALSO APPLY TO US FACILITIES DESIGNED FOR PERSHING AND CRUISE MISSILES (AHKROMEYEV).

(B) ''WALK IN THE WOODS''. THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO GIVE ITS BLESSING TO DEPLOYMENT. THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT YET HEARD ANY REALISTIC US PROPOSALS EITHER AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE OR ELSEWHERE (KORNIENKO).

(C) DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PERSHING AND CRUISE. THEY WERE DIFFERENT BUT BOTH WERE DANGEROUS (AKHROMEYEV).

(D) SUBSTITUTION OF SOME CRUISE OR PERSHING FOR PRESENT US AIRCRAFT WITHIN AN OVERALL REDUCTION: SOVIET PROPOSALS RELATED ONLY TO PRESENT WEAPONS. THERE SHOULD BE NO NEW ONES (KORNIENKO)

(E) NATURE OF SOVIET RESPONSE TO DEPLOYMENT. THE SOVIET MORATORIUM ON SS20S IN EUROPE WOULD END: EXTRA WEAPONS WOULD BE DEPLOYED BY AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION'S ALLIES AS A COUNTER-BALANCE TO THE NEW AMERICAN MISSILES: AND MEASURES WOULD BE TAKEN AFFECTING US TERRITORY. NO FURTHER DETAILS WERE GOING TO BE GIVEN NOW: THIS WAS A MILITARY SECRET (AKHROMEYEV).

(F) SOVIET MORATORIUM AND LATEST US CLAIM THAT NEW SS20 SITES WERE BEING CONSTRUCTED. NO EXTRA MISSILES WERE BEING DEPLOYED IN THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION. AS FOR THE SPECIFIC AMERICAN CLAIM, AKHROMEYEV REFUSED TO COMMENT ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS INVOLVED MILITARY SECRETS.

6. KORNIENKO ENDED ON THE NOTE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS TAKING A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO THE GENEVA TALKS BUT THERE WAS A LIMIT TO SOVIET FLEXIBILITY. THOSE WHO EXPECTED LAST MINUTE SOVIET CONCESSIONS ON THE ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE (NO DEPLOYMENT AND BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS) WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES
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From the Private Secretary

14 September 1983

INF: PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE OF 10 SEPTEMBER

Thank you for your letter of 13 September enclosing a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Reagan. I have received confirmation that the Defence Secretary is content with the reply.

The Prime Minister has approved the text which is being sent on the hot-line to Washington this afternoon. Copies will reach you separately.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and David Goodall (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 September, 1983

Mr. Andropov's Message to the Prime Minister about INF

Thank you for your letter of 13 September.

I enclose a draft reply to Mr. Andropov's message which has been approved by the Prime Minister. Mrs. Thatcher agrees that we should now show the draft to the French and the Americans. In the light of any comments they may wish to offer, she would then sign a final version. The question of publicity could be considered at that stage.

The wording of the approved draft closely follows the draft which you forwarded with your letter. Apart from purely drafting changes, I should draw your attention to two points:

a) On page 3 of the text the Prime Minister preferred to delete the sentence (which related to British strategic weapons): "They can have no significant effect on the overall balance of nuclear forces between East and West". She considers that such a statement invites the suggestion that in that case there should be no difficulty about including them in negotiations.

b) The Prime Minister did not wish to insert in this text a new formula on the question of including the British deterrent in arms control negotiations. Following recent Ministerial discussion, she would prefer that a paper be presented on this matter which would suggest possible new formulae and draw attention in detail to all their implications. Meanwhile, she would prefer to rest on our present position as, I understand, the Secretary of State for Defence would.

/I am

SECRET

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and David Goodall (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

R. B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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FOR DFB

IMMEDIATE/ROUTINE 132340Z SEP 83

FROM BDS WASHINGTON
TO MODUK
INFO CABINET OFFICE

R E S T R I C T E D
SIC A2P
DESKBY 140900Z SEP
1. FOR EVANS FROM MOTTRAM. YOUR 131820Z SEP. (CABINET PASS 10 DOWNING STREET (FOR COLES))
2. ON PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE MESSAGE TO ANDROPOV, THE DEFENCE SECRETARY PREFERS THE CABINET OFFICE FORM OF WORDS IN BOTH CASES. HE IS CONTENT THAT THE MESSAGE SHOULD BE PUBLISHED.
3. THE DEFENCE SECRETARY IS CONTENT WITH THE REPLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ON INF
BT

14/9

h.a.

SECRET

Prime Minister

Important - especially x on page 2.

A J. C. 13/9.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 September, 1983

Dear John,

INF

The Prime Minister may wish to have a short report on the meeting of NATO's Special Consultative Group (SCG) which took place here on 11 and 12 September. The SCG is the forum in which the United States consults its Allies on the conduct of the INF negotiations in Geneva and keeps them informed of developments. The Group normally meets in Brussels but this meeting in London was the first of a series which will take place in the capitals of stationing countries in order to give a higher public profile to the process of Alliance consultation.

It had been hoped that President Reagan's decision on possible US moves in the new round of the INF negotiation (which was the subject of his message to the Prime Minister over the weekend) would have been taken in time for the SCG to discuss his proposals. In the event, the timing was too tight and Mr Richard Burt, the US Chairman of the Group, was under severe constraints from Washington about revealing the contents of the President's message in advance of its receipt by Allied Heads of Government. Consequently there could be very little substantial discussion of the United States negotiating position; but Burt informed the Group that if the President's proposals met with a favourable response from the Heads of Government of the 5 stationing countries, the President would, at the end of this week, address similar messages to all the Allies so that their reactions could be pooled and discussed at a special meeting of the SCG on or soon after 19 September. In the light of this discussion, fresh instructions will then be sent to Ambassador Nitze in Geneva.

A member of Ambassador Nitze's negotiating team, reporting to the Group, provided some useful insights into the discrepancy between Soviet statements designed to convey an impression of flexibility and the actual Soviet position at the negotiating table. For example, although President Andropov stated publicly on 26 August that any Soviet SS 20s which might be withdrawn from their present positions as a result of an INF agreement would be 'liquidated', the Soviet negotiations at Geneva have been studiously vague on the point, indicating for example that the 'liquidation' might apply only to the launchers rather than to the missiles themselves; equally, it has been made clear in Geneva that the Soviet Union has no intention of suspending the production of SS20s following an agreement on deployment.

Similarly, despite recent hints - for example, in Mr Gromyko's meeting with Herr Genscher in Madrid - that the Russians might be prepared to regard the UK and French deterrents as strategic rather than intermediate for negotiating purposes, the Soviet position at Geneva so far remains completely unchanged. Indeed, it is now clear that continuing Soviet insistence on their right to deploy as many warheads on intermediate range missiles as the UK and France dispose of in their national nuclear forces also means the right to add to their deployment of SS20s during the 5-year period which an INF agreement would cover if, during that time, the number of UK and French warheads were to increase.

The Group's discussions revealed that the Soviet line on the inclusion of UK and French nuclear systems in the arithmetic of any INF agreement has made considerable impact on public opinion in some Allied countries, particularly in the FRG and in the Netherlands. With the exception of Greece, all our NATO allies remain firm on the principle of the exclusion of third country systems from the Geneva INF negotiations; but in the SCG meeting they made it clear that a public indication from the UK and France to the effect that they do not regard their nuclear weapons as permanently immune from the arms control process would be very helpful politically, particularly in Bonn and The Hague. We took the line that the Alliance should not, by putting this issue at the centre of its discussions, appear to acquiesce in the bogus Soviet contention that the UK and French systems constitute the main obstacle to progress in the Geneva negotiations; rather, the Alliance should emphasise that the main obstacle is Soviet insistence on a monopoly of INF systems on the European continent. This argument was reflected in the public statement made by the Chairman of the SCG at the conclusion of the meeting.

The Prime Minister should know that, in the margins of the meeting, Mr Burt told the UK representative (Mr Cartledge), in the strictest confidence, that one of the reasons for the delay in President Reagan's decision on the new US negotiating position (as now outlined in his message to the Prime Minister) was - in addition to the impact of the Korean airliner disaster - his concern over the problem of how, in due course, the UK and French national nuclear deterrents might be associated with the arms control process. Mr Burt made it clear that the fact that President Reagan is beginning to address this problem in his own mind would of course have no effect on the completely firm US position on the issue so far as the INF talks are concerned; he also stressed that, in the US view, the direct inclusion of UK and French systems in the START negotiation offered no solution. He did, however, wish the Prime Minister and her ministerial colleagues to be aware that the problem was on the President's mind and was likely, therefore, to figure in the Prime Minister's discussions with the President later this month.

It is perhaps worth adding to this account the fact that, during a working breakfast with Mr Cartledge this morning, the FRG State Secretary, Herr Alois Mertes, who is paying an official visit to London at the invitation of Lady Young, raised the same issue from a slightly different and longer-term standpoint. He pointed out that, in the FRG, many ofthe younger generation have irrespective of their political views, a strong moral aversion to nuclear weapons as such. If their commitment, which is at present strong, to the Western Alliance and its values is to be maintained, and if they are to continue to shun the alternative path of neutralism, it is important that all the Western nuclear powers should be seen to be committed to the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. Quite apart from immediate INF purposes, therefore, some renewed public statement of this goal on the part of the UK and France, as well as by the United States, would be of great value to the Federal Republic. As you know, the revised draft of the reply which the Foreign Secretary has suggested the Prime Minister might send to President Andropov's message about INF contains a passage which, if made public, might be helpful to the FRG and to our other allies.

I shall be showing a copy of this letter to the Foreign Secretary on his return from Budapest. I am also sending copies to Richard Mottram (MOD) and to David Goodall (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

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49

PRIME MINISTER

Message to Andropov

I attach an FCO letter, which is worth reading in full, and the proposed reply to Mr. Andropov about INF.

I do not think there is any hurry about replying. President Reagan has delayed his reply because of the Korean airliner incident. You would probably want to do the same.

As regards the draft, there is one important question of substance. This concerns the wording describing the circumstances in which we would review our position on the British strategic deterrent. I have put into the text wording which I think cannot cause any difficulty (from "if Soviet and United States strategic arsenals . . . " to "intermediate range weapons".)

But the Foreign Secretary much prefers a different formula which would read:

I have now heard that the Defence Secretary prefers my wording.
A.J.C. 14/1

"If, by the time the United Kingdom Trident begins to be deployed, Soviet and United States strategic arsenals have been substantially reduced and no significant changes have occurred in Soviet defensive capabilities, Britain would consider how she could contribute to arms control by placing verifiable limits on her strategic nuclear forces at levels compatible with the need to ensure minimum deterrence."

My concern about this formula is not so much what it says but rather whether it is wise to put in a letter to Andropov a brand new formula which has not been carefully examined by Ministers on the basis of a paper which draws attention to all the implications. We decided at Chequers that we should try to hurry up the MOD work on minimum deterrence and that meanwhile Mr. Luce should consider how we could best handle the presentational problem. I should still prefer to proceed in that way. If we adopt a new

SECRET / formula

formula we shall have to live with it for a long time and you may well feel that it should be discussed in MISC 7. But I must stress that that is not the Foreign Secretary's view.

Do you want me to insert his formula instead?

If you are content with the text, agree that we should show it to the French and the Americans before you sign the final version?

The FCO letter raises the question of whether we should make public your reply but I think we can return to that later.

A. J. C.

13 September 1983

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Do you want me to insert his formula instead?

If you are content with the text, agree that we should show it to the French and the Americans before you sign the final version?

The FCO letter raises the question of whether we should make public your reply but I think we can return to that later.

A. J. C.

13 September 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT MESSAGE TO MR. ANDROPOV FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

I thank you for your message of 27 August on the Geneva talks on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and for sending me the text of your Pravda interview.

must at once emphasise

In response I ~~should begin by re-emphasising to you, in absolute~~ sincere ~~sincerity,~~ the British Government's desire ~~for~~ that the negotiations in Geneva ~~to~~ should succeed. It is still possible to reach agreement to ban completely those weapons on both sides which are of particular concern - the SS20s, SS4s and SS5s on your side and the Cruise and Pershing II missiles on NATO's side. If such an agreement can be reached by the end of this year NATO need never deploy any of the new weapons.

I note with interest your statement that, in the context of an overall agreement, you would be prepared to destroy SS20 missiles now stationed in the Western part of the Soviet Union. As you know we had been under the impression that you had intended only to move those weapons to Soviet Asia. This was unacceptable to us, firstly because these mobile missiles could quickly be moved back again to Europe in a time of crisis and second because we had no wish to increase the number of weapons facing our friends in Asia. We hope you will expand upon your proposal at the negotiations in Geneva and also address the important question of how destruction of missiles would be verified.

But I believe that your message reveals some misunderstanding of the basic security requirements which underlie NATO's position in the INF talks. The security of Western Europe demands that there is a balance between ~~established~~ Soviet and American intermediate range

/nuclear

nuclear forces. It is simply not possible for us to accept that you should maintain a monopoly of missiles of this range while insisting that the Americans should not be allowed to install a single new missile. The problem of the disparity in these forces became acute for us when in the late 1970s the Soviet Union began the massive build-up of SS20s, for which we could see no defensive purpose, at a time when, as now, NATO had no comparable missiles. We were thus forced to modernise our forces. To do so NATO planned to install Cruise and Pershing II missiles but we have always made it clear that there would be no increase in the number of NATO's warheads as a result of this. We said from the start that we would review the plans if we achieved concrete results in arms control negotiations. Our preference would still be that there should be no missiles of this type on either side. As long as this solution is not acceptable to you, we and our Allies will pursue an interim agreement; but this will have to respect the principle of balance between yourselves and the Americans.

Thus, the deployment of new weapons would be matched by the withdrawal of old.

It follows from what I have said that NATO cannot accept that account should be taken of the strategic nuclear forces of Britain in the INF negotiations. This is a position unanimously agreed by NATO since 1979 for reasons of the security of the Alliance as a whole. That our nuclear forces in question are strategic was acknowledged by the Soviet Union itself during the SALT talks. They have no place in negotiations on intermediate range weapons, where we need to address the problems of the Soviet and American ground-launched weapons which are of such concern to both sides.

/ I must

I must say in all frankness that it is difficult to understand your preoccupations with British strategic weapons. They represent a tiny fraction of yours (the British deterrent is less than three per cent of the size of your strategic missile and bomber force). ~~They can have no significant effect on the overall balance of nuclear forces between East and West~~. In that they constitute our ultimate national deterrent they are weapons of last resort which are in no sense comparable to your SS20 force. They are the minimum necessary for effective deterrence. But it is worth adding that we are not trying to claim that British nuclear weapons should never be relevant to any arms control negotiations. If Soviet and United States strategic arsenals were to be very substantially reduced and no significant change had occurred in Soviet defensive capabilities, Britain would of course want to review her position and to consider how best she could contribute to arms control in the light of the reduced threat. But I must repeat that British nuclear strategic forces can have no place in any negotiations about intermediate range weapons.

I note with disappointment what you say in your message about Soviet intentions to take "counter-measures" following any new NATO deployments. If by this you have in mind steps towards increasing the nuclear arms race, that, as you say yourself, would be in nobody's interest.

For our part we shall remain committed to the search for arms control measures which are balanced and can be

/ verified

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT MESSAGE TO MR. ANDROPOV FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

I thank you for your message of 27 August on the Geneva talks on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and for sending me the text of your Pravda interview.

In response I must at once emphasise the British Government's sincere desire that the negotiations in Geneva should succeed. It is still possible to reach agreement to ban completely those weapons on both sides which are of particular concern - the SS20s, SS4s and SS5s on your side and the Cruise and Pershing II missiles on NATO's side. If such an agreement can be reached by the end of this year NATO need never deploy any of the new weapons.

I note with interest your statement that, in the context of an overall agreement, you would be prepared to destroy SS20 missiles now stationed in the Western part of the Soviet Union. As you know we had been under the impression that you had intended only to move those weapons to Soviet Asia. This was unacceptable to us, firstly because these mobile missiles could quickly be moved back again to Europe in a time of crisis and second because we had no wish to increase the number of weapons facing our friends in Asia. We hope you will expand upon your proposal at the negotiations in Geneva and also address the important question of how destruction of missiles would be verified.

But I believe that your message reveals some misunderstanding of the basic security requirements which underlie NATO's position in the INF talks. The security of Western Europe demands that there is a

/balance

balance between Soviet and American intermediate range nuclear forces. It is simply not possible for us to accept that you should maintain a monopoly of missiles of this range while insisting that the Americans should not be allowed to install a single new missile. The problem of the disparity in these forces became acute for us when in the late 1970s the Soviet Union began the massive build-up of SS20s, for which we could see no defensive purpose, at a time when, as now, NATO had no comparable missiles. We were thus forced to modernise our forces. To do so NATO planned to install Cruise and Pershing II missiles but we have always made it clear that there would be no increase in the number of NATO's warheads as a result of this. Thus, the deployment of new weapons would be matched by the withdrawal of old.

We said from the start that we would review the plans if we achieved concrete results in arms control negotiations. Our preference would still be that there should be no missiles of this type on either side. As long as this solution is not acceptable to you, we and our Allies will pursue an interim agreement; but this will have to respect the principle of balance between yourselves and the Americans.

It follows from what I have said that NATO cannot accept that account should be taken of the strategic nuclear forces of Britain in the INF negotiations. This is a position unanimously agreed by NATO since 1979 for reasons of the security of the Alliance as a whole. That our nuclear forces in question are strategic was acknowledged by the Soviet Union itself during the SALT talks. They have no place in negotiations on intermediate range weapons, where we need to address the problems of the

/Soviet

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I must say in all frankness that it is difficult to understand your preoccupationswith British strategic weapons. They represent a tiny fraction of yours (the British deterrent is less than three per cent of the size of your strategic missile and bomber force). In that they constitute our ultimate national deterrent they are weapons of last resort which are in no sense comparable to your SS20 force. They are the minimum necessary for effective deterrence. But it is worth adding that we are not trying to claim that British nuclear weapons should never be relevant to any arms control negotiations. If Soviet and United States strategic arsenals were to be very sustantially reduced and no significant change had occurred in Soviet defensive capabilities, Britain would of course want to review her position and to consider how best she could contribute to arms control in the light of the reduced threat. But I must repeat that British nuclear strategic forces can have no place in any negotiations about intermediate range weapons.

I note with disappointment what you say in your message about Soviet intentions to take "counter-measures" following any new NATO deployments. If by this you have in mind steps towards increasing the nuclear arms race, that, as you say yourself, would be in nobody's interest.

For our part we shall remain committed to the search for arms control measures which are balanced and can be

/verified

verified properly and which thus protect the security of both sides. If it is necessary for NATO to begin deployment of the new weapons by the end of this year, this can be discountinued or reversed at any time that a satisfactory agreement is reached. But, I repeat, our hope remains that there can still be an agreement this year which makes it unnecessary for NATO to begin deployment.

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CC DP (1)
48

Prime Minister

Agree the attached reply to President Reagan?

A.J.C. 13/9

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 September 1983

Dear John.

INF: President Reagan's Message of 10 September

The Prime Minister will wish to reply soon to President Reagan's message of 10 September, in which he asks for HMG's views within the next few days. Mr Richard Burt, the American Chairman of NATO's Special Consultative Group which met in London yesterday, has told us that the Administration are hoping for the Prime Minister's comments by Thursday this week at the latest. I enclose a draft reply which has been cleared by telegram with Sir Geoffrey Howe who is at present in Budapest.

President Reagan's message comes as no surprise. The substantive elements in it have been under discussion among key Allies over recent weeks, and they are consistent with our own approach to the INF negotiations as recently endorsed by Sir Geoffrey Howe and MOD Ministers.

The three substantive elements in President Reagan's message are largely acceptable. The offer to include Pershing II missiles pro rata in any reductions taken by NATO as a result of an INF agreement has been implicit in NATO's own thinking from the beginning. Spelling it out has the merit of making clear conversely that the option of excluding Pershing IIs altogether from NATO's intended deployments is not on offer.

The President's proposal with respect to US deployments of LRINF missiles in Europe is also satisfactory. Without conceding the essential NATO principle of strict US/Soviet parity it explains that the United States would not deploy its entire global entitlement to LRINF missiles in Europe, on the assumption that part of the Soviet global entitlement would be reserved for Soviet Asian deployments against China. This is in effect to introduce the concept of European sub-ceilings, an element which again has been part of NATO's thinking since the original 1979 dual track decision.

/As for

SECRET

As for the passage on possible proposals involving US and Soviet LRINF aircraft, this too is consistent with all the major principles of NATO's negotiating position. The draft reply to President Reagan does however bring out one possible point to which the UK attaches importance, namely that any limitations on LRINF aircraft should be on a global basis: regional limits on aircraft make little sense given the very short time that aircraft need by definition need to deploy from one area to another.

It could be argued that, strictly on the merits of the negotiations themselves, it is not for the West to initiate further moves, but for the Russians to make substantive concessions. We know, however, that the Americans are very concerned to take account of German political requirements; and that Chancellor Kohl attaches great importance to ensuring that the Allied negotiating position is as detailed and comprehensive as possible, consistent with NATO's main principles, before deployments begin to take place. This is the over-riding reason, in the view of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, for giving a positive response to President Reagan's message. Whether all the elements in that message should be used simultaneously, or whether it would be better to eke them out over a period during the current negotiating round, is perhaps ultimately for the US chief negotiator Ambassador Nitze to judge; but the draft reply also addresses this point.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram in the Ministry of Defence and David Goodall in the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever

Roger Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DS. 1 (Revised)

SECRET

MESSAGE

4 copies to D clerk.

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/telegram/despatch/note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

THE PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT: **TEL. NO:**

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

TO:

PRESIDENT REAGAN

Your Reference

Copies to:

US Declassified

SUBJECT:

Dear Ron,

1. Thank you very much for your message of 10 September about the Allied approach to the INF negotiations in Geneva. I agree on the importance of ensuring that our peoples understand fully the efforts we are making to achieve agreement in Geneva, particularly now that initial Western deployments are about to begin. I quite see that it will be useful for Ambassador Nitze in this context to have the necessary discretion to fill out and explain our negotiating position, while remaining true to NATO's fundamental negotiating principles.

2. I am in general very content with the substantive elements outlined in your message for possible elaboration of the Western negotiating hand. But I hope that if it comes to the point of indicating our readiness to consider proposals involving the US and Soviet LRINF aircraft, the Allied position will make clear that we are talking about <u>global</u> limitations. NATO rightly attaches primacy to global limits on missiles (rather than purely regional limits as the Russians would prefer) if Western security is to be enhanced by an INF agreement. The argument seems to me even

Enclosures—flag(s).....

me even stronger in respect of aircraft, since these are by definition the most highly mobile weapons platforms of all.

4. It is perhaps mainly a tactical question whether to include all these elements simultaneously in one elaboration of the Western position at Geneva, or to proceed in phases depending on Soviet reactions. In the latter case (for which I have some preference) there might be advantage in introducing our detailed position on aircraft before going on to the question of sub-ceilings on missiles, since this would enable us to secure the principle of global ceilings at the outset. But I accept that you will wish to give full weight to Ambassador Nitze's recommendations on this score.

5. I am sure that NATO has everything to gain by remaining firm over the basic criteria and principles embodied in the zero/zero and interim agreement proposals. You may rest assured of our whole-hearted support in this and I welcome your continued readiness to consult closely with Allies about how best to achieve our joint objectives.

With best wishes

Yours ever

Margaret

A.J.C. 14.
9

SECRET

cc AP 47

Defence INT

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 September 1983

Dear John.

Mr Andropov's Message to the Prime Minister on INF

Robin Butler telephoned me on 1 September to relay the Prime Minister's initial comments on the draft reply to Andropov which we sent to you on 31 August.

There was as anticipated some discussion on the best way to respond to Andropov at the NATO Special Consultative Group (SCG) meeting in Brussels on 2 September. It was confirmed that Andropov had written personally to heads of Government of the five basing countries (UK, FRG, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium), President Reagan, Mr Trudeau, President Mitterrand and also (reportedly) to Mr Nakasone. (The Chairman circulated the text of the letter to Chancellor Kohl. The early parts of the text are identical to the letter received by the Prime Minister; there are divergences in the second half which make specific British/German points.) Our representative at the SCG told the meeting of the general lines of the reply which we had recommended to the Prime Minister and urged that others reply on equally firm lines.

/ I now send you a redraft of the reply which takes account of the Prime Minister's initial comments. MOD officials agree. New passages are sidelined. The passage in paragraph 6 as originally drafted on the position of British and French nuclear systems in arms control was drawn from three sources; the Prime Minister's interview in Time Magazine of 20 June; the Open Government Document on the Trident II programme which was put out by Sir John Nott in March last year; and statements in the Defence Estimates debate in July by
/ Mr Heseltine and Mr Pattie; I enclose the relevant extracts. In the redraft now offered we have also tried to take account of discussion at Chequers and the Prime Minister's view on that occasion. Thus the present formula steps back from the implications of the Prime Minister's "Time Magazine" interview ("counting in"). But it has the merit of underlining to the Russians that the onus is on the Soviet Union to change the overall strategic context by reducing the threat; and it firmly safeguards our position on the need to ensure minimum deterrence by avoiding any reference to the concept of reductions.

/As reported

As reported in my letter of 1 September about Sir Geoffrey Howe's recent meeting with the French, German and Italian Foreign Ministers, we are likely to come under increasing pressure from the allies, as well as perhaps from informed domestic critics in weeks to come to go further on the position of British systems in relation to future strategic arms control negotiations. The Dutch Foreign Minister made some unhelpful remarks in a parliamentary debate last week in which a motion was adopted which called for inclusion of British and French systems in INF and START. When Sir Geoffrey Howe took this up with Van den Broek in Madrid on 7 September the response included a plea (tacitly supported by the Danish Foreign Min ster) for us and the French to find a more "credible formula", without selling the pass. Van den Broek said that the Italian Foreign Minister had made the same point to Cheysson recently. On 1 September the principal coalition Party in Belgium issued a statement on INF which included an acknowledgement that these systems should be "taken into account".

Gromyko, incidentally, continued to lay great stress on the need to take account of British and French weapons when he met Sir Geoffrey Howe in Madrid on 7 September. Although Genscher believes from his own meeting there with Gromyko on 8 September that the Soviet position is less absolute than formerly in relation to INF, there has so far been no indication of this at the negotiating table in Geneva. In his talks with Cheysson in Paris last week, Gromyko's line was as hard as ever.

The Americans said at the 2 September SCG meeting that they did not think that President Reagan would reply to Andropov for a few days at least in the wake of the Korean airliner outrage. There may be some merit in the Prime Minister also delaying her response; this would in any event give us time to consult the French about the reply. On this we would propose, once the Prime Minister has agreed precise wording, to ask the Embassy in Paris to show it to the Elysee/Quai d'Orsay and give the French an opportunity to say if they have any points to make on the passage on British systems. We would also propose to show the reply in advance to the Americans.

There remains the question of whether, when the reply issues, we should make it public. At the SCG the Americans said that they would almost certainly not publish President Reagan's reply since they did not believe it right to jeopardise bilateral confidential exchanges with the Russians by doing so. The Germans said they thought they might publish Chancellor Kohl's reply (but not Andropov's letter); the Italians are apparently releasing extracts from Mr Craxi's reply. We could consider the question further in the light of any developments before the Prime Minister replies. Our instinct here at this stage is that publication of the full text of a response to a confidential message might be unhelpful (unless of course the Russians go public) but that

there would be no harm in your briefing the press unattributably. As you will see from the third paragraph of this letter, it would be helpful to at least some of our allies to be able to cite an up-to-date statement of HMG's position on UK systems in rebutting arguments that they should be included in the INF count as the Russians wish; if the Prime Minister agrees with it, there might therefore be advantage in releasing to the press, along with a summary of the rest of the reply, the text of its sixth paragraph.

I should add that Sir Geoffrey Howe, whom we have consulted on this by telegram in Budapest, has specifically commended the wording in the draft reply on British strategic weapons.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD) and to David Goodall (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11 (Revised)

MESSAGE

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note~~ XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

The Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: **TEL. NO:**

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

Mr Andropov

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

1. I thank you for your message of 27 August on the Geneva talks on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and for sending me the text of your Pravda interview.

2. In response I should begin by re-emphasising to you, in absolute sincerity, the British Government's desire for the negotiations in Geneva to succeed. It is still possible to reach agreement to ban completely those weapons on both sides which are of particular concern - the SS20s, SS4s and SS5s on your side and the Cruise and Pershing II missiles on NATO's side. If such an agreement can be reached by the end of this year NATO need never deploy any of the new weapons.

3. I note with interest your statement that, in the context of an overall agreement, you would be prepared to destroy SS20 missiles now stationed in the Western part of the Soviet Union. As you know we had been under the impression that you had intended only to move those weapons to Soviet Asia. This was unacceptable to us, firstly because these mobile missiles could quickly be

/moved back

Enclosures—flag(s).....

moved back again to Europe in a time of crisis and secondly because we had no wish to increase the number of weapons facing our friends in Asia. We hope you will expand upon your proposal at the negotiations in Geneva and also address the important question of how destruction of missiles would be verified.

4. But I believe that your message reveals some misunderstanding of the basic security requirements which underlie NATO's position in the INF Talks. The security of Western Europe demands that a balance be ~~allowed~~ maintained between Soviet and American intermediate range nuclear forces. It is simply not possible for us to accept that you should maintain a monopoly of missiles of this range while insisting that the Americans should not be allowed to install a single new missile. The problem of the disparity in these forces became acute for us when in the late 1970s the Soviet Union began the massive build-up of SS20s, for which we could see no defensive purpose, at a time when, as now, NATO had no comparable missiles. We were thus forced to modernise our forces. To do so NATO planned to install Cruise and Pershing II missiles. We said from the start that we would review the plans if we achieved concrete results in arms control negotiations. Our preference would still be that there should be no missiles of this type on either side. As long as this solution is not acceptable to you, we and our Allies will pursue an interim agreement; but this will have to respect the principle of balance between yourselves and the Americans.

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5. It follows from what I have said that NATO cannot accept that account should be taken of the strategic nuclear forces of Britain in the INF negotiations. This is a position unanimously agreed by NATO since 1979 for reasons of the security of the Alliance as a whole. That our nuclear forces in question are strategic was acknowledged by the Soviet Union itself during the SALT talks. They have no place in negotiations on intermediate range weapons, where we need to address the problems of the Soviet and American ground-launched weapons which are of such concern to both sides.

6. I must say in all frankness that it is difficult to understand your preoccupations with British strategic weapons. They represent a tiny fraction of yours (the British deterrent is less than three per cent of the size of your strategic missile and bomber force). They can have no significant effect on the overall balance of nuclear forces between East and West. ~~They are in no sense comparable to your SS20 force. They are weapons of last resort: our ultimate national deterrent.~~ They are the minimum ~~force compatible with~~ effective deterrence. But it is worth adding that we are not trying to claim that British nuclear weapons should never be relevant to any arms control negotiations. If, ~~by the time the UK Trident begins to be deployed,~~ Soviet and United States ~~strategic~~ arsenals have ~~been~~ substantially reduced and no significant changes ~~have~~ occured in Soviet defensive capabilities, Britain would ~~consider how~~ she could contribute to arms control ~~by placing verifiable limits on her strategic nuclear forces at levels compatible with the need to ensure minimum~~

deterrence. But I must repeat that they can have no place in any negotiations about intermediate range weapons.

7. I note with disappointment what you say in your message about Soviet intentions to take "counter-measures" following any new NATO deployments. If by this you have in mind steps towards increasing the nuclear arms race, that, as you say yourself, would be in nobody's interest.

8. For our part we shall remain committed to the search for arms control measures which are balanced and can be verified properly and which thus protect the security of both sides. If it is necessary for NATO to begin deployment of the new weapons by the end of this year, this can be discontinued or reversed at any time that an agreement at the negotiating table warrants it. But, I repeat, our hope remains that there can still be an agreement this year which makes it unnecessary for NATO to begin deployment.

PRIME MINISTER'S INTERVIEW 'TIME'
MAGAZINE JUNE 20 1983

On Britain's nuclear weapons. So long as there are immense ballistic missiles in the world, we have to have an independent nuclear deterrent. It adds to the general deterrent effect of the NATO alliance, just as the French force does. But if, between the two big powers, the numbers went down massively and enormously and we moved into a totally different world—a far greater reduction than I can foresee certainly within the next five years—then there may be circumstances when ours will have to be counted [in arms negotiations]. But I cannot foresee that at the moment.

MR PATTIE, DEFENCE ESTIMATES DEBATE
JULY 20 1983

Although the independent British deterrent represents only a few per cent. of the massive Soviet strategic force, we have not ruled it out of the strategic arms control negotiations. As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said yesterday, we have made it clear that if circumstances change and the Soviet threat to the United Kingdom is substantially reduced, we are prepared to review our position. Furthermore, we have made it clear that the British force would be of the minimum size compatible with ensuring a cost-effective deterrent at all times.

Our decision to procure the Trident D5 does not necessarily imply that we intend to deploy the maximum theoretical capability of that force. My right hon. Friend made it clear yesterday that if START led to a substantial breakthrough in the scale of world deployment, the Government would take that into account in deciding our irreducible level of deterrent. At present, however, the priority must be to achieve parity between the two super powers at substantially reduced levels of strategic forces.

MR HESELTINE, DEFENCE ESTIMATES DEBATE:
JULY 19 1983

I shall outline to the House this agenda for peace, because it is comprehensive. In the strategic arms reduction talks, which cover United States and Soviet intercontinental nuclear weapons, the United States proposes a reduction in warheads on strategic missiles to 5,000 on each side. That would reduce existing deployment by about one third from present levels. If those negotiations were to lead to a substantial breakthrough, we have made it clear that Britain, in reviewing the future size of its irreducible minimum deterrent, would not stand aside from such a breakthrough. In the intermediate range nuclear weapons talks——

Dr. David Owen (Plymouth, Devonport): When the Secretary of State uses the words "Would not stand aside", is he saying that we would reduce substantially the number of Trident missiles and warheads and that we would be prepared to put the Trident missile system into the negotiations and effectively take it into account in such a substantial reduction of strategic weaponry?

Mr. Heseltine: I thought that the right hon. Gentleman would understand that what I am saying is that, if in the strategic arms reduction talks there were to be a substantial breakthrough in the scale of world deployment, that would be taken into account by the British Government in deciding their own irreducible level of deterrent in the new context that would then exist. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will welcome that statement.

DEFENCE OPEN GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT 82/1
MARCH 1982

35. Furthermore, even with the adoption of the D5 missile the number of warheads deployed on the British strategic force will account for no more than a very small fraction of the total size of the strategic nuclear forces maintained by the United States and the Soviet Union, as would have been the case with C4. The British force will, however, be of the minimum size compatible with ensuring a cost-effective deterrent at all times. If these circumstances were to change significantly, eg if Soviet military capabilities and the threat they pose to the United Kingdom were to be reduced substantially, we would of course be prepared to review our position in relation to arms control. But this point would appear to be a long way off.

10 DOWNING STREET

John

DR 13/9

h-c.

You will want to see the attached. I can explain background if it is not self-explanatory.

Robin

Mr. Coles (France)

DRAFT MESSAGE TO MR. ANDROPOV

Note:
I conveyed Her Prime Minister's comments to Mr. Bone (FCO) on Thursday 1 September. We agreed that that those attending the Senior officials meeting in Brussels would be instructed to take account of them in clearing the UK's response with colleagues and the FCO would then submit a revised draft reply.
FERB 7.9

I THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 27 AUGUST ON THE GENEVA TALKS ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) AND FOR SENDING ME THE TEXT OF YOUR PRAVDA INTERVIEW. IN RESPONSE I SHOULD BEGIN BY RE-EMPHASISING TO YOU, IN ABSOLUTE SINCERITY, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA TO SUCCEED. IT IS STILL POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT TO BAN COMPLETELY THOSE WEAPONS ON BOTH SIDES WHICH ARE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN - THE SS20s, THE SS4s AND THE SS5s ON YOUR SIDE AND THE CRUISE AND PERSHING II MISSILES ON NATO'S SIDE. IF SUCH AN AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED BY THE END OF THIS YEAR NATO NEED NEVER DEPLOY ANY OF THE NEW WEAPONS.

I NOTE WITH GREAT INTEREST YOUR STATEMENT THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF AN OVERALL AGREEMENT, YOU WOULD BE PREPARED TO DESTROY THE SS20 MISSILES NOW STATIONED IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAD BEEN UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT YOU HAD INTENDED ONLY TO MOVE THOSE WEAPONS TO SOVIET ASIA. THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO US, FIRSTLY BECAUSE THESE MOBILE MISSILES COULD QUIKCLY BE MOVED BACK AGAIN TO EUROPE IN A TIME OF CRISIS AND SECONDLY BECAUSE WE HAD NO WISH TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF WEAPONS FACING OUR FRIENDS IN ASIA. WE HOPE YOU WILL EXPAND UPON YOUR PROPOSAL WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA RESUME ON 6 SEPTEMBER.

BUT I BELIEVE THAT YOUR MESSAGE REVEALS SOME MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE BASIC SECURITY REQUIREMENTS WHICH UNDERLIE NATO'S POSITION IN THE INF TALKS. THE SECURITY OF WESTERN EUROPE DEMANDS THAT A BALANCE BE ALLOWED BETWEEN SOVIET AND AMERICAN INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES. IT IS SIMPLY NOT POSSIBLE FOR US TO ACCEPT THAT YOU SHOULD MAINTAIN A MONOPOLY OF MISSILES OF THIS RANGE WHILE INSISTING THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO INSTALL A SINGLE MISSILE. THE PROBLEM OF THE DISPARITY IN THESE FORCES BECAME ACUTE FOR US WHEN IN THE LATE 1970s THE SOVIET UNION BEGAN THE MASSIVE BUILD-UP OF SS20s, FOR WHICH WE COULD SEE NO DEFENSIVE PURPOSE, AT A

/TIME WHEN,

TIME WHEN, AS NOW, NATO HAD NO COMPARABLE MISSILES. OUR PREFERENCE WOULD STILL BE THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO MISSILES OF THIS TYPE ON EITHER SIDE. AS LONG AS THIS SOLUTION IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO YOU, WE AND OUR ALLIES WILL PURSUE AN INTERIM AGREEMENT; BUT THIS WILL HAVE TO RESPECT THE PRINCIPLE OF BALANCE BETWEEN YOURSELF AND THE AMERICANS.

IT FOLLOWS FROM WHAT I HAVE SAID THAT NATO CANNOT ACCEPT THAT THE NUCLEAR FORCES OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE SHOULD BE TAKEN ACCOUNT OF IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS A POSITION UNANIMOUSLY AGREED BY NATO SINCE 1979 FOR REASONS OF SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. OUR NUCLEAR FORCES ARE STRATEGIC WEAPONS. THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF ACKNOWLEDGED DURING THE SALT TALKS THAT THIS WAS THE CASE. THEY HAVE NO PLACE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE WEAPONS WHERE WE NEED TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS OF THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN GROUND LAUNCHED WEAPONS WHICH ARE OF SUCH CONCERN TO BOTH SIDES.

I MUST SAY IN ALL FRANKNESS THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND YOUR PREOCCUPATION WITH BRITISH AND FRENCH STRATEGIC WEAPONS. THEY REPRESENT A TINY FRACTION OF YOURS. (THE BRITISH DETERRENT IS LESS THAN 3 PER CENT OF THE SIZE OF YOUR STRATEGIC MISSILE AND BOMBER FORCE). THEY CAN HAVE NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE OVERALL BALANCE OF NUCLEAR FORCES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THEY ARE WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT; OUR ULTIMATE NATIONAL DETERRENTS. THEY ARE IN NO SENSE COMPARABLE TO YOUR SS20 FORCE. BUT IT IS WORTH ADDING THAT WE ARE NOT TRYING TO CLAIM THAT BRITISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD NEVER BE THE SUBJECT OF ANY ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. I REPEAT WHAT I HAVE SAID PUBLICLY BEFORE: IF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US SUCCEED IN ACHIEVING IN NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS SUFFICIENTLY LARGE REDUCTIONS IN THEIR OWN ARSENALS FOR PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO BE ~~V~~ SUBSTANTIALLY ALTERED WE ~~WILL~~ WOULD, OF COURSE, BE PREPARED TO LOOK AT THE POSSIBILITY OF BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES BEING INCLUDED IN THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS. BUT THEY CAN HAVE NO PLACE IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT INTERMEDIATE RANGE WEAPONS.

(although our numbers could not be reduced because we have only the minimum required to be /I NOTE

This fits in here somewhere

enormously different

Our deterrent is less than the French (and

I NOTE WITH DISAPPOINTMENT WHAT YOU SAY IN YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS TO TAKE "COUNTER MEASURES" FOLLOWING ANY NEW NATO DEPLOYMENTS. IF BY THIS YOU HAVE IN MIND STEPS TOWARDS INCREASING THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE, THAT, AS YOU SAY YOURSELF, WOULD BE IN NOBODY'S INTERESTS.

FOR OUR PART, WE SHALL REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE SEARCH FOR ARMS CONTROL MEASURES WHICH ARE BALANCED AND THUS PROTECT THE SECURITY OF BOTH SIDES. IF IT IS NECESSARY FOR NATO TO BEGIN DEPLOYMENT OF THE NEW WEAPONS BY THE END OF THIS YEAR, THIS CAN BE DISCONTINUED OR REVERSED AT ANY TIME THAT AN AGREEMENT AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WARRANTS IT. BUT, I REPEAT, OUR HOPE REMAINS THAT THERE CAN STILL BE AN AGREEMENT THIS YEAR WHICH MAKES IT UNNECESSARY FOR NATO TO BEGIN DEPLOYMENT.

SUMMARY OF FOREIGN OFFICE NOTE

SIMILAR MESSAGES FROM ANDROPOV WERE ALSO RECEIVED BY OTHER STATIONING COUNTRIES (THE FRG, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM) AND THE US.

NOTHING IN THE MESSAGE, NOR THE ASSOCIATED INTERVIEW, REPRESENTS A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE SOVIET POSITION. RATHER IT IS A FURTHER STEP IN THEIR CAMPAIGN TO IDENTIFY THE EXCLUSION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS AS THE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO AN INF AGREEMENT. THE DRAFT REPLY IN SIR GEOFFREY HOWE'S VIEW SHOULD THEREFORE ACKNOWLEDGE THE CONCESSION - SUCH AS IT IS - WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAVE MADE BUT AT THE SAME TIME POINTS TO THE UNREASONABLENESS OF THEIR POSITION AND REJECT THE IMPLICATION THAT WE ARE TO BLAME FOR THE FAILURE TO REACH AGREEMENT AT THE GENEVA TALKS. THE REPLY THEREFORE HAS TWO AUDIENCES: FIRST THE RUSSIANS; AND SECOND PUBLIC OPINION, SHOULD IT BE PUBLISHED. THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT LIKE TO KNOW THAT IT IS BERNARD INGHAM'S VIEW THAT OUR REPLY SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC.

ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ANDROPOV MESSAGE, THE FCO ASSESSMENT IS THAT THE COMMITMENT TO DESTROY SOME SS20s IS A NOT WHOLLY NEGLIGIBLE CONCESSION. THEY BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THIS IS FAIRLY MEANINGLESS IN SECURITY TERMS SO LONG AS IT IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY AN OFFER TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF NEW MISSILES IN SOVIET ASIA. Verification.

3

THE FCO BELIEVE THAT THERE IS ONE POSSIBLE SIGNAL IN ANDROPOV'S MESSAGE OF FUTURE SOVIET TACTICS. THERE ARE REFERENCES TO THE PRESENT TALKS BECOMING "MEANINGLESS" AFTER NATO DEPLOYS INF; AND TO AN AGREEMENT BEING POSSIBLE BEFORE DEPLOYMENT BUT, IMPLICITLY, NOT AFTERWARDS. THE FCO ASSESSMENT OF THIS IS THAT WE CAN EXPECT TO SEE THE EXPLICIT THREAT BY THE RUSSIANS TO DISCONTINUE ALL DISCUSSION ON INF PERHAPS COUPLED WITH A THREAT TO WALK OUT OF THE START TALKS.

/ON THE

ON THE TIMING OF A REPLY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY SUGGESTS THAT WE OUGHT FIRST TO CONSULT ALLIES WITH THE PURPOSE OF ENSURING CONSISTENCY AND OF STIFFENING THE RESPONSES OF OTHERS. AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THIS WILL TAKE PLACE TOMORROW AT THE SENIOR OFFICIALS GROUP (THE FCG MEETING IN BRUSSELS). IF THE PRIME MINISTER AGREES OUR FCG REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO DESCRIBE TO THE ALLIES THE OUTLINE OF ANDROPOV'S MESSAGE AND OF THE DRAFT REPLY AND TO URGE FIRMNESS OF RESPONSE. GEOFFREY HOWE ADVISES THAT WE SHOULD REPLY SHORTLY AFTER THAT MEETING AND MAKE THE EXCHANGE PUBLIC

THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT ALSO LIKE TO KNOW THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN IS NOW REVIEWING THE NEGOTIATING POSITION ON OUTSTANDING SECONDARY ISSUES IN THE INF TALKS. HE MAY PROPOSE SHIFTS IN THE NEGOTIATING POSITION IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

TIM FLESHER

1 SEPTEMBER 1983

SECRET

Ref: B06848

See minute 6 P.R.

A.J.C. 14/9

MR COLES

Mr Andropov's Message to the Prime Minister on INF

Mr Bone kindly sent me a copy of his letter to you of 13th September covering a revised draft reply to Mr Andropov's recent message about INF. I note that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has specifically commended the wording in paragraph 6 of the draft on British strategic weapons, and I know that a great deal of thoughthas gone into this formulation. But in the light of the discussion of this point at Chequers last week it does seem to me that the wording exposes rather more surface than is desirable or necessary in a response to a message from Andropov, even bearing in mind the pressures we are under from some of our allies to be more forthcoming. In particular, I wonder whether it is wise for us to link the possibility of a change in the British position explicitly to the deployment of Trident and to offer what is liable to be read as a broad hint that we might be prepared to scale down our Trident deployment to some theoretical minimum. It is perhaps rather early in the debate to be introducing ideas of this kind, especially in a communication to the Russians. A possible alternative would be to recast the last two sentences of paragraph 6 to read:

> "If Soviet and United States arsenals were to be very substantially reduced without any significant change in Soviet defensive capabilities Britain would of course want to review her position and to consider how best she could contribute to arms control in the light of the reduced threat. But I must repeat that British nuclear strategic forces can have no place in any negotiations about intermediate range weapons."

2. Earlier in the same paragraph there is the statement that British strategic weapons are "weapons of last resort: our ultimate national deterrent". For reasons which were discussed at Chequers, I think this formulation could create difficulties for us in relation to the fact that these forces are assigned to SACEUR and could in principle be used at some intermediate stage of a nuclear conflict. It might be better if the fourth, fifth and sixth sentences of paragraph 6 were to read -

> "In that they constitute our ultimate national deterrent, they are weapons of last resort which are in no sense comparable to your SS20 force; and they comprise the minimum necessary for effective deterrence."

3. I am sending copies of this minute to Mr Bone, FCO; Mr Mottram, MOD and Mr Hatfield.

David Goodall

13th September 1983

A D S GOODALL

SECRET

FM

FILE

45

12 September, 1983

INF

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister received from President Reagan over the weekend. Advance copies were sent to the Resident Clerks at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence and to the Cabinet Office.

The Prime Minister would be grateful for an early draft reply.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

R. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

TEXT OF TELEGRAM NO. 811 FROM PARIS TO FCO, 10 SEPTEMBER

MY TELNO. 810: GROMYKO'S VISIT TO PARIS

1. I asked Andreani, Political Director at the Quai, whether Gromyko had said anything of significance on any of the subjects under discussion. Andreani's judgement was that nothing new or of particular note had been said. Gromyko had given the stock Soviet line on a whole range of subjects. He had been particularly hard on Afghanistan, Poland and on the INF discussions.

2. I asked whether Gromyko had said anything which could account for Genscher's remarks in Madrid indicating a readiness to look on the French and British deterrents as being at least in part strategic (Bonn Telno. 823). Andreani replied that Genscher must have been dreaming. In his talks in Paris Gromyko had asserted categorically that French and British nuclear forces had to be taken into account in the INF negotiations.

Fretwell

CONFIDENTIAL

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FM PARIS 101130Z SEP 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 811 OF 10 SEPTEMBER
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BONN, MOSCOW
INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS

MY TELNO 810: GROMYKO'S VISIT TO PARIS

1. I ASKED ANDREANI, POLITICAL DIRECTOR AT THE QUAI, WHETHER GROMYKO HAD SAID ANYTHING OF SIGNIFICANCE ON ANY OF THE SUBJECTS UNDER DISCUSSION. ANDREANI'S JUDGEMENT WAS THAT NOTHING NEW OR OF PARTICULAR NOTE HAD BEEN SAID. GROMYKO HAD GIVEN THE STOCK SOVIET LINE ON A WHOLE RANGE OF SUBJECTS. HE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY HARD ON AFGHANISTAN, POLAND AND ON THE INF DISCUSSIONS.

2. I ASKED WHETHER GROMYKO HAD SAID ANYTHING WHICH COULD ACCOUNT FOR GENSCHER'S REMARKS IN MADRID INDICATING A READINESS TO LOOK ON THE FRENCH AND BRITISH DETERRENTS AS BEING AT LEAST IN PART STRATEGIC (BONN TELNO 823). ANDREANI REPLIED THAT GENSCHER MUST HAVE BEEN DREAMING. IN HIS TALKS IN PARIS GROMYKO HAD ASSERTED CATEGORICALLY THAT FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS.

FCO PASS SAVING BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, MADRID, OSLO, REYKJAVIK, UKDEL VIENNA, OTTAWA, ANKARA, ATHENS, ROME

FRETWELL

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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MR COLVIN)
MR WILLIAMSON)
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CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

John

This came in on Sunday morning.

I gave a copy to the Prime Minister.

Copies also sent to Resident Clerks at FCO, & MOD & to Mr Goodall.

Nicky
11/9

... a MASTER
OPS

Defence: INF
Pt 3

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 128A/83

US Declassified

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FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO CABINET OFFICE
ZEM
S E C R E T VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WHØ6593
SEPTEMBER 1Ø, 1983

DEAR MARGARET,

I DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR STEADFAST SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIANCE'S DUAL TRACK POLICY ON INF.

OUR PREFERENCE FOR THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF U.S. AND SOVIET LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES REMAINS UNCHANGED. THIS PROPOSAL REMAINS THE OPTIMAL OUTCOME FOR THE U.S., FOR NATO, FOR EUROPE AND, I BELIEVE, FOR THE SOVIET UNION. AT THE SAME TIME, IN THE INTEREST OF EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES, WE HAVE ACTIVELY PURSUED IN GENEVA AN INTERIM AGREEMENT THAT WOULD PROVIDE FOR EQUALITY IN THIS CATEGORY OF WEAPONS. BOTH OF THESE PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO THE SOVIET UNION.

REGRETABLY, THE SOVIETS HAVE YET TO OFFER A SERIOUS RESPONSE. THEY HAVE NOT ACKNOWLEDGED THE REQUIREMENT FOR EQUALITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION OR OFFERED A SERIOUS ALTERNATIVE OF THEIR OWN. WHILE GENERAL SECRETARY ANDROPOV'S MOST RECENT STATEMENT ON INF HAS SOME POSITIVE ELEMENTS, IT FALLS FAR SHORT OF THE ALLIANCE'S NEEDS IN REDUCING THE SS-2Ø THREAT. IT REPEATS UNACCEPTABLE SOVIET DEMANDS FOR COMPENSATION FOR BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES, FOR A BAN ON U.S. DEPLOYMENTS, AND FOR THE EXCLUSION OF SS-2Ø MISSILES IN THE ASIAN USSR.

IN ADDITION, THE BRUTAL SOVIET DOWNING OF THE KOREAN AIR LINES JET, THE SOVIETS' CONTEMPT FOR EXPRESSIONS OF WORLD OUTRAGE, THEIR EFFORT TO MASK THE TRUTH, AND THEIR CALLOUSNESS TOWARDS THE VICTIMS OF THIS TRAGEDY AND THEIR FAMILIES, HAVE SERIOUSLY DAMAGED THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THE GENEVA TALKS TAKE PLACE. LET ME REASSURE YOU, HOWEVER, THAT DESPITE THIS DAMAGE, MY PROFOUND COMMITMENT TO REACHING AGREEMENT IN GENEVA REMAINS UNDIMINISHED.

WHILE THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET CHOSEN TO FOLLOW A COURSE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AGREEMENT, IT REMAINS CRUCIAL THAT WESTERN PUBLICS UNDERSTAND THAT THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES ARE MAKING EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT. THIS WILL BE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATING ROUND AT GENEVA, THE LAST BEFORE UNITED

END OF PAGE Ø1

STATES DEPLOYMENTS ACTUALLY BEGIN. THUS, I HAVE BEEN EXAMINING WHAT FURTHER STEPS WE MIGHT TAKE TO MOVE THE TALKS FORWARD. THIS REVIEW, WHICH IS NOW WELL ALONG, HAS PROFITED FROM THE IDEAS AND CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY YOUR REPRESENTATIVES IN RECENT MEETINGS OF THE NATO SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP.

I AM WRITING TO SEEK YOUR PERSONAL VIEWS BEFORE I REACH ANY FINAL DECISIONS. I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE CRITERIA AND PRINCIPLES EMBODIED IN THE ZERO/ZERO AND INTERIM AGREEMENT PROPOSALS REMAIN VALID AND NECESSARY FOR AN EFFECTIVE INF AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, IN ADVANCING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT PROPOSAL LAST MARCH, I DECIDED TO LEAVE CERTAIN ELEMENTS UNSPECIFIED IN ORDER TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY FOR AMBASSADOR NITZE TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR PROGRESS. IN THE COURSE OF THE FALL ROUND, IT MAY PROVE USEFUL TO ELABORATE FURTHER ON THE INTERIM AGREEMENT PROPOSAL, AND I BELIEVE WE SHOULD PREPARE TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO DO SO. OUR OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY AND IMAGINATION OF ITS OWN= TO SHOW OUR OWN PUBLICS THAT OUR PROPOSALS ARE CONCRETE, COMPREHENSIVE AND EQUITABLE= AND TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WE HAVE CREATED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR AGREEMENT, IF THE SOVIETS ARE INTERESTED IN A FAIR OUTCOME.

IN THIS LIGHT, AMBASSADOR NITZE COULD INITIATE THIS COURSE BY PRESENTING GENERAL STATEMENTS REGARDING THE SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS ADDRESSED BELOW. IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, GREATER DETAIL COULD BE ADDED AS APPROPRIATE. OUR OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO POSITION OURSELVES SO THAT WE WOULD HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THE U.S., IN CONCERT WITH ITS ALLIES, HAD MADE A COMPREHENSIVE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT BEFORE DEPLOYMENTS BEGAN.

THE SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS OF THIS APPROACH WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

1. THE PERSHING II SYSTEM MUST BE RETAINED SHORT OF SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE ZERO/ZERO OUTCOME. AT THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ASSURE THE SOVIETS AND WESTERN PUBLICS THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT INVOLVING SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS FROM CURRENT SOVIET AND PLANNED NATO DEPLOYMENT LEVELS, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO APPORTION, IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER, THE REDUCTIONS OF PERSHING II AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. THIS OFFER SHOULD HELP MEET THE SOVIET CONCERN THAT THE PERSHING II REPRESENTS A PARTICULARLY SERIOUS THREAT TO ITS SECURITY. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH OUR AGREEMENT IN NATO THAT A MIXED FORCE OF BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILES PROVIDES THE BEST DETERRENT.

END OF PAGE Ø2

2. WE SHOULD OFFER, IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR EQUAL, GLOBAL LIMITS ON LRINF MISSILES, TO CONSIDER A U.S. COMMITMENT NOT TO OFFSET THE ENTIRE SOVIET GLOBAL LRINF MISSILE DEPLOYMENT BY U.S. DEPLOYMENTS OF LRINF MISSILES IN EUROPE. TO IMPLEMENT THIS, I WOULD AUTHORIZE AMBASSADOR NITZE= IN THE CONTEXT OF SUCH A GLOBAL AGREEMENT, TO EXPLORE IN GENERAL TERMS SOVIET VIEWS ON ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF IMPLEMENTING THIS COMMITMENT. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, RETAIN THE RIGHT TO DEPLOY LRINF MISSILES ELSEWHERE TO REACH THE GLOBAL CEILING. SUCH A MOVE WOULD MEET A MAJOR STATED SOVIET CONCERN WHILE MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF OUR GLOBAL APPROACH.

3. WHILE WE MUST CONTINUE TO FOCUS ON LRINF MISSILES AS THE SYSTEMS OF GREATEST CONCERN TO BOTH SIDES, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER PROPOSALS INVOLVING US AND SOVIET LRINF AIRCRAFT THAT ARE CONSISTENT WITH ALLIED CRITERIA FOR AN INF AGREEMENT. THUS, I WOULD AUTHORIZE AMBASSADOR NITZE TO EXPLORE IN GENERAL TERMS POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON LONGER-RANGE INF AIRCRAFT, AND TO INVITE THE SOVIETS TO OFFER THEIR VIEWS ON HOW SUCH A LIMITATION COULD BE FORMULATED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK WHICH ADDRESSES EQUAL VERIFIABLE LIMITS ON U.S. AND SOVIET LRINF AIRCRAFT AND WHICH DOES NOT DEGRADE NATOꝛS CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT. AS WITH THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF OUR APPROACH, THIS WOULD DEMONSTRATE U.S. FLEXIBILITY IN MEETING A MAJOR SOVIET CONCERN WHILE UPHOLDING OUR CRITERIA FOR AN INF AGREEMENT.

THROUGH THE END OF THE YEAR, WE MUST WORK CLOSELY TO ENSURE THE PLANNED DEPLOYMENTS TAKE PLACE IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT MAKING THEM UNNECESSARY. AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST CONTINUE TO PURSUE VIGOROUSLY THE NEGOTIATING TRACK OF THE 1979 DECISION. WE MUST ALSO USE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO ENSURE THAT OUR DEEP COMMITMENT TO SUCCESS IN GENEVA IS WIDELY UNDERSTOOD.

IT WOULD ENORMOUSLY ASSIST OUR REVIEW IF I COULD HAVE THE BENEFIT OF YOUR VIEWS ON THE ABOVE PROPOSALS WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. WHILE TIMING OF ANY MOVES REMAINS TO BE DETERMINED, I KNOW YOU WILL AGREE THAT IT IS MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER THAT WE AGGRESIVELY PURSUE AN INF AGREEMENT THAT FULFILLS OUR CRITERIA. I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR RESPONSE.

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TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 818 OF 9 SEPTEMBER
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO
INFO SAVING PARIS ROME THE HAGUE EMBASSY BRUSSELS MOSCOW CDCC(G)

FRG POLICY ON INF: BUNDESTAG DEBATE

SUMMARY

1. THE SECOND DAY OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET DEBATE ON 8 SEPTEMBER WAS AS USUAL DEVOTED TO GENERAL POLICY ISSUES, THIS TIME INCLUDING THE KAL AIRLINER INCIDENT (ON WHICH KOHL PRAISED THE MODERATION OF REAGAN'S REPSONSE) AND INF. ON THE LATTER, KOHL REPEATED HIS RESOLVE TO GO THROUGH WITH ALL ASPECTS OF THE DOUBLE DECISION IF NECESSARY, THUS KEEPING UP THE NEGOTIATING PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION. HE STRESSED THE EXISTING FLEXIBILITY IN THE WEST'S POSITION. VOGEL, FOR THE SPD, PRESSED THE GOVERNMENT TO SEEK US AGREEMENT TO COMBINING THE START AND INF NEGOTIATIONS. KOHL REJECTED THIS AS A DELAYING TACTIC.

DETAIL

2. KOHL CALLED ON THE SOVIET UNION TO GIVE UP ITS ATTEMPTS TO MANIPULATE WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION. SOVIET PROPOSALS SO FAR WERE DESIGNED TO RETAIN A UNILATERAL SECURITY ADVANTAGE. THE CONTINUING DEMAND FOR INCLUSION OF FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS WAS BLOCKING THE INF TALKS. ANDROPOV'S LATEST PROPOSAL BROUGHT NO IMPROVEMENT IN THESE RESPECTS. AN ASSURANCE OF PROPER VERIFICATION FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF SS-20S WAS ALSO LACKING.

3. THE WEST COULD ONLY ACHIEVE A SATISFACTORY COMPROMISE IN THE GENEVA TALKS BY STANDING FIRM ON THE QUESTION OF DEPLOYMENT, INCLUDING THE TIME-SCALE AND THE WEAPON MIX. THIS WAS NOT A TIME FOR UNILATERAL CONCESSIONS. THE SOVIETS MUST MOVE. BUT THE CAREFULLY-CONCERTED WESTERN POSITION ALREADY CONTAINED ENOUGH FLEXIBILITY TO PROVIDE A FOUNDATION FOR VIABLE COMPROMISES. NITZE HAD TOLD KOHL HIMSELF LAST WEEKEND THAT THE US, NOTWITHSTANDING THE KAL DISASTER, WERE DETERMINED TO PURSUE THE NEGOTIATIONS QUOTE WITH FLEXIBILITY UNQUOTE.

/ H. VOGEL

4. VOGEL AGREED WITH MUCH OF WHAT KOHL SAID ON THE KAL CASE AND THE NEED FOR SOVIET MOVEMENT IN INF. BUT HE WENT ON TO DEMAND THAT KOHL INDUCE WASHINGTON TO MOVE AS WELL, IN THE DIRECTION OF A COMBINATION OF THE START AND INF TALKS WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE THIRD-PARTY PROBLEM TO BE RESOLVED. THE AIM MUST BE TO ACHIEVE A SUFFICIENTLY DRASTIC REDUCTION IN SS-20S TO ALLOW INF STATIONING TO BE ABANDONED. VOGEL ADDED THAT FOR THE SPD AS A WHOLE THE FRG'S NATO MEMBERSHIP WAS NOT OPEN TO QUESTION AND LAFONTAINE'S RECENTLY REPEATED PROPOSALS FOR LEAVING NATO MUST BE SEEN AS A DEVIATION. (VOGEL DID NOT REPEAT NOT MAKE PLAY WITH THE WALK-IN-THE-WOODS CONCEPT OR THE IDEA OF A STRAIGHTFORWARD INF MORATORIUM).

5. ANSWERING THE START/INF POINT, KOHL SAID THAT VOGEL'S PROPOSAL WAS REALLY AIMED AT POSTPONING THE COMMENCEMENT OF STATIONING. IT WOULD QUOTE RELEASE THE SOVIET UNION FROM ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS IT HAS CREATED ITSELF UNQUOTE.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ABOVE ADDRESSEES E EXCEPT CICC(G)

TAYLOR

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Copy to:- Mr Pascall, No10
Resident Clerk.

IMMEDIATE

I have asked the F.I.C.O. for a letter of clarification.

A.J.C. 12/9

SECRET - 9 SEP 1983

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 091800Z SEP 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2529 OF 9 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR PS/MR STANLEY: DUS(POL): AUS D STAFFL
PRIORITY: UKDEL NATO, BONN, MOSCOW.

INF

1. WHEN MR STANLEY CALLED ON HIM, ADELMAN (DIRECTOR OF ACDA) SAID THAT NITZE HAD SOUGHT CLARIFICATION FROM KVITSINSKY AS TO WHAT PRECISELY ANDROPOV HAD MEANT BY HIS OFFER TO ''LIQUIDATE'' SOME SS20S. KVITSINSKY HAD REPLIED THAT THE MISSILES WOULD NOT
2. BE DESTROYED, ONLY THE TELS. THE MISSILES WOULD BE PUT INTO STORAGE.

2. THE AMERICANS ARE LIKELY TO MENTION THIS ACCOUNT OF THE SOVIET POSITION AT THE SCG MEETING AND TO WISH AT SOME STAGE TO PUBLICISE IT.

WRIGHT

MJ

8 September 1983

This is just to record that the Prime Minister has seen and noted your letter of 5 September about Sir Geoffrey Howe's recent meeting with Italian, German and French Foreign Ministers.

TIM FLESHER

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

DD.

1619.

+89

ADVANCE COPY

Ps

Ps/Lady Young

Mr Cartledge

Mr James

Hd/Def Dept

Hd/ACDD

Hd/WED

RC

Mr Pascall No 10 Ds

Prime Minister

See pars 3 & 4

A.J.C. 7/9.

HAGFO 007/06

DD FCO 061630Z

PP UKDEL NATO

PP WASHINGTON

PP BONN

PP ROME

PP PARIS

GRS 280
CONFIDENTIAL
FM THE HAGUE 061545Z SEP 83
TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 061630Z FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 242 OF 06 SEPTEMBER
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO WASHINGTON BONN ROME AND PARIS

MY TELNO 240: BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR DETERRENTS

1. THE SECOND CHAMBER HAS NOW FINISHED ITS DEBATE ON THIS SUBJECT. THE OPPOSITION MOTION REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TUR WAS ADOPTED, WITH ABOUT TWO-THIRDS OF THE CHAMBER (INCLUDING THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS) IN FAVOUR. OF THE MAJOR PARTIES, ONLY THE LIBERALS VOTED AGAINST.

2. FOR THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS FRINKING MADE A STUDIOUSLY VAGUE STATEMENT. HE SPECIFICALLY DIS-ASSOCIATED HIS PARTY FROM THE CURRENT SOVIET APPROACH TO THIS QUESTION, AND STRESSED THAT THEY HAD NO WISH TO INFRINGE THE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF FRANCE AND THE UK. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THEY RECOGNISED ''THE OBJECTIVE NECESSITY'' OF BRINGING THE FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES IN SOME WAY INTO THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS.

3. VAN DEN BROEK STRESSED ONCE MORE HIS OBJECTIONS TO BRINGING BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS INTO ''THE PRESENT PHASE OF THE INF

~~3. VAN DEN BROEK STRESSED ONCE MORE HIS OBJECTIONS TO BRINGING BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS INTO ''THE PRESENT PHASE~~ OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS'', BUT ADDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT ALSO RECOGNISED THAT ''IN SOME WAY, IN ONE FORUM OR ANOTHER, IT WAS OBJECTIVELY NECESSARY FOR THE BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS'' TO BE BROUGHT ''AT SOME POINT'' INTO THE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

4. THE OPPOSITION THEN SOUGHT, AFTER THE VOTING, TO PIN THE MINISTER DOWN MORE CLOSELY, ASKING FOR CONFIRMATION THAT HE INTENDED TO IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION. IN REPLY VAN DEN BROEK UNDERTOOK TO RAISE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE THE QUESTION OF HOW BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS COULD IN SOME WAY BE BROUGHT INTO THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS (THOUGH NOT, HE REPEATED, INTO THE INF NEGOTIATIONS). AN OPPOSITION SPOKESMAN THEN POINTED OUT THAT THE RESOLUTION SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS SHOULD BE INVOLVED EITHER IN THE INF TALKS OR IN START. VAN DEN BROEK IN REPLY UNDERTOOK ONLY TO RAISE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO INVOLVE BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS IN START.

MANSFIELD

NNNN

SENT AT 061616Z NJB

SECRET

44 (2)

PRIME MINISTER

INF

The Foreign Secretary has sent you an account of a recent discussion with the Italian, German and French Foreign Ministers. I do not think you need to read the attached papers but you will wish to note that:

(a) The new Italian Foreign Minister was as firm as the others in rejecting the recent Greek proposal that deployment should be postponed;

(b) We can expect further pressure from Genscher to state when and how our strategic deterrent can be taken account of in the arms control process.

A.J.C.

6 September 1983

SECRET

SECRET

43

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 September 1983

Dear John,

INF

/ Sir Geoffrey Howe thought the Prime Minister might be interested to see the enclosed account of his meeting with the Italian, German and French Foreign Ministers in the margins of the Special Council in Brussels on 30 August. The meeting had been called at short notice by Genscher.

Several points of interest arose. It was encouraging that all three Foreign Ministers were robust on the need to maintain the deployment schedule and the need for a firm response to Andropov's messages. Particularly notable here is the new Italian Foreign Minister's firm line on the Greek proposal to postpone deployment. (There had earlier been a slight question mark in our minds over his attitude.)

You will note too Genscher's remarks about the problem of the exclusion of British and French systems from the negotiations. He has on several occasions recently referred publicly to the Soviet position on this issue as the major obstacle to an agreement. In his message to Gromyko on
/ 25 August (also enclosed) he argued this point at length and in stressing firm opposition to the Soviet position stated remarkably explicitly the argument that the Germans' security depended upon observation of the unwritten understanding whereby they had foresworn their own nuclear weapons in return for protection under the American nuclear umbrella.

This sort of statement is helpful to us in as far as it underlines that the policy of exclusion is supported by the Alliance as a whole for reasons of national security interest, and that it is not simply falling in with French and British (or US) wishes. But the Germans will not do us a favour if they highlight the issue to the exclusion of all others. It is also quite clear from Genscher's remarks in Brussels that we may soon be facing a German campaign (to which some other Allies would be sympathetic) to persuade the French and ourselves to go further than we have before in defining

/when

when and how our nuclear weapons could be fitted into the arms control process. They may well have already made this point in Washington.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram. Mr Heseltine might like to look at the record of the conversation in Brussels before his own forthcoming trilateral meeting with the French and German Defence Ministers.

Yours ever,

Roger Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Submission from 2/9.

Mr Fuller, Defence Dept

INF

Genscher, Andreotti, the Secretary of State and Cheysson met for almost an hour in the FRG delegation room in the margins of the Special Council in Brussels on 30 August to discuss INF. Genscher's Private Secretary and I were present. Cheysson and Andreotti were unaccompanied.

Genscher referred to the Soviet demand for UK and French systems to be included in the INF negotiations. He had written to Gromyko on 25 August to reaffirm the FRG view that UK and Frency systems should not be included. He thought it important to continue to say this. For its part, FRG would do so, even if it were sometimes not easy. The problem, so far as the FRG was concerned, was (i) the Social Democratic Party had adopted the Soviet line of argument, and (ii) that in public discussion in the West, the Soviet argument still met with "open ears". It was therefore essential for Paris and London to take every opportunity to explain their positions, e.g. when Gromyko passed through Paris en route to Madrid next week. Genscher said that he thought it very possible that, at a certain point, the Soviet Union might well make a move on this issue, in the sense that they might say that if the question of UK and French systems were not to be negotiated in the context of INF, the West should make clear where precisely it would be negotiated. It was important, in the FRG view, to anticipate this question and to prepare an appropriate reply. Had it been discussed in Paris or London?

Genscher said that Ambassador Ruth was in Washington on 29 and 30 August. The general assumption was that the Americans would take a decision during the course of this week on instructions for Nitze. The latter would be passing through Bonn next Sunday. The three elements which appeared to be under discussion in Washington were: (i) the position on aircraft, on which Genscher thought there were certain reservations on the UK side; (ii) the position on Pershings. The FRG believed that any deployment reductions in the West should cover both Pershings and cruise missiles proportionately (Genscher mentioned a ratio of 20%/80%; (iii) the question of regional sub-ceilings. Genscher said that the FRG had advised the Americans that, at the opening of the resumed session of negotiation in Geneva, the US should make a public declaration of the importance they attached to attaining a solution. It would be helpful, in Genscher's view, if something similar could be said at that time in Paris and London.

/Genscher

Genscher said he believed the negotiations in Geneva were by no means a lost cause. The sooner the USSR were convinced that deployment would take place, the sooner they would negotiate properly. They were still going through the motions of testing whether deployment could be prevented. The FRG for its part would stand firm on this. That was why the FRG had expressed disagreement very rapidly with the Greek proposal for a postponement. Genscher added that, in all frankness, he did not feel like discussing this point with the Greeks at the Athens PoCo meeting. If the Greek Foreign Minister brought it up, Genscher proposed to say that he did not agree with the Greek proposal, but that it was a subject for discussion in NATO. Andreotti and Cheysson agreed with this. Cheysson added that INF might, perhaps, be a suitable topic for discussion at a Gymnich type weekend, but certainly not in PoCo. The Secretary of State said that he had not yet replied to Haralambopoulos's letter but his reaction was very much the same. It was important to remain resolute on the 1979 NATO decision. Any postponement of deployment would jeopardise the chance of bringing the Russians to the negotiating table. There was general agreement with both these points.

The Secretary of State said that, as colleagues would have seen from the press, Andropov had written to Mrs Thatcher about the recent Soviet declaration of willingness to dismantle a certain number of SS20s. The letter was clearly part of an exercise in wedge driving. It was perhaps true that the Soviet proposal represented a movement in the Soviet position. But he agreed with Genscher that the Soviet objective remained the prevention of deployment in the West. It was very important for the West to concert positions carefully. Sir G Howe said he had one anxiety in particular. The Soviet Union was trying not only to influence public opinion by making proposals such as these, but also to secure a negotiating advantage without having to make concessions themselves. The West must be careful not to give anything away. This was not to say that, in the context of negotiations and at the right time, the West might not be able to consider changes on secondary issues eg perhaps on aircraft, and perhaps on regional sub-ceilings. But this could only be as part of serious negotiation. Once we were informed of results of US review of negotiating position the European allies would need to consult and react quickly.

The Secretary of State said that a reply would be prepared for Mrs Thatcher to send to Andropov. As colleagues would have seen from the press, our initial reaction to the letter was (i) that perhaps the recent Soviet proposal suggested some movement by the USSR, but (ii) it did not amount to a change of real substance.

Genscher returned to the question of how the UK and France would react if the Russians asked where discussion about the UK and French systems should be taken into account. Cheysson said that Mitterand had already made clear that if US/USSR

/negotiations

negotiations led to a very substantial reduction in nuclear arms, France might be prepared to participate in discussions which might include consideration of French systems. It might, perhaps, be useful for discussions to take place among the five nuclear powers. France had never attempted to quantify the reductions necessary in US/USSR strike power, but obviously a drastic reduction would be required, probably by at least 50%. The Secretary of State said that the Prime Minister had also made a statement to the effect that if there were a substantial change as a result of US/USSR negotiations, then the UK would be prepared to reconsider, but - like France - the UK had not attempted to quantify this, or to say where such further discussions should take place. He would not wish to comment further on this at this stage. It was, of course, important to maintain a very clear distinction between the INF talks and any possibility of discussion involving the UK and French systems. It was also important that the USSR should not be encouraged to focus on the latter point, although of course it was entirely understandable that Genscher should have written to Gromyko in the terms he had.

Andreotti said that the Italian Government had also made clear that unless the Soviet Government were prepared to negotiate seriously, the 1979 NATO decision would be maintained. He agreed that the West should be prepared for further questions from the USSR about UK and French systems. He had listened carefully to Cheysson's comments, but would only add that, in general, this whole issue needed to be handled extremely carefully. Discussion focussed on the five nuclear powers would obviously cause difficulties for Italy. Andreotti thought it likely that the USSR would make further proposals. On the Greek proposal, Andreotti had noted that one of the suggestions which had emerged from the US Senators' visit to Moscow (he was not explicit about its provenance) was that the West might entertain postponement for say two months instead of six. In the Italian view, great care was needed on this: if the Russians were offered even a couple of months, they would merely wait and expect further postponement. There was general agreement with this.

Genscher said that in any further declaration by France it would be very helpful to refer specifically to the suggestion for further discussion by the five nuclear powers. FRG had always maintained that the nuclear powers had an obligation under the NPT to negotiate nuclear arms reduction. He wished, however, to emphasise again that he thought it very probable that a situation would arise within the next few weels in which the question of the right forum for discussion of the

/French

French and the UK systems would arise.

The Secretary of State said that the discussion had illustrated the great importance of close consultation on all these issues. It was important to be ready to make the right public responses to Soviet statements. At the same time we needed to ensure that we did nothing to jeopardise our defence and security interests. We needed to weigh carefully the balance between short term presentational points and long term security interests. There were thus, in a sense, two different objectives: we must ensure that we secured both.

Andreotti asked whether it would be right for speeches at the CSCE meeting in Madrid to include a word about an appropriate forum for further discussion of strategic problems. Cheysson said he thought not. These were problems for discussion in NATO. It might, perhaps, be possible to include a section on strategic arms in a statement at the UN General Assembly in the context of disarmament generally.

Andreotti said in conclusion that it was important for the West to concert tactics for the CDE conference in Stockholm. This was agreed. Genscher said he thought the FRG delegation were circulating a paper on this to Permanent Representatives in NATO on 30 August.

31 August 1983

(R B Bone)

cc: PS/Mr Luce
PS/Mr Rifkind
PS/PUS
Sir J Bullard
Mr Wright
WED
Mr Cartledge or

Provisional Translation

M e s s a g e

from

Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

to

The first Vice-President of the Ministerial Council of the USSR and the Minister for External Affairs of the USSR, Mr. A.A. Gromyko, Moscow.

Dear Mr. President of the Ministerial Council,
Dear Colleague,

the new round of the American-Soviet negotiations on medium-range weapons will start in Geneva in a few days time. The Federal Government attaches great importance to the successful proceeding of these negotiations. I have noted with interest the view of the Soviet leadership, that there is an opportunity for still achieving concrete results in these negotiations this year. I share this view.

The successful efforts of the participants in the CSCE-Follow-up Meeting in Madrid to arrive at a positive result have shown that, given the respective willingness of all involved, it is possible even today to obtain agreement in important issues of international politics. I like to see this as a good omen also for the negotiations in Geneva.

I am convinced - as I had the opportunity to explain to you in our talks at the beginning of July, 1983 in Moscow - that the main obstacle on the way to success in the Geneva negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union consists in the Soviet demand to include British and French systems. I reminded you then and should like to do this again by way of this message, that the Soviet Government still stated in summer 1980 during our talks in Moscow that it regards the British and French systems as strategic systems that do not belong

into the context of the Geneva negotiations on Soviet and American medium-range weapons.

In this context, I should like to draw your attention to the fact that the demand to include British and French systems in the Geneva INF-negotiations presents a particular problem for the non-nuclear states of Europe, i.e. also for the Federal Republic of Germany: with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Federal Government renounced the production and the control of nuclear arms. This has been done after being given the assurance that instead of possessing nuclear arms of our own we would enjoy protection by the nuclear potential of the United States. The Soviet leadership, when being consulted on these questions in the late 1960s, has equally and explicitly drawn our attention to this American protection. Neither Great Britain nor France can give this nuclear guaranty to our country.

If one takes into account the present Soviet potentials, the inclusion of British and French systems in the INF-negotiations as requested in Geneva by the Soviet Union would drastically to our disadvantage alter overall security in Europe.

I should, therefore, like to ask you, dear Colleague, to re-examine the Soviet position in this question before negotiations start again. If the Soviet Government returned to its position of summer 1980 this could make possible the breakthrough in the negotiations which we are all hoping for. Such a result would be of the greatest importance not only for the Geneva negotiations as such, but also for the efforts to obtain progress in other negotiations that are currently under way.

I hope that we shall have an opportunity to pursue our

exchange of views on this topic during the final conference of the CSCE-Follow-up Meeting in Madrid and later on in New York during the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Sincerely yours,
Hans-Dietrich Genscher
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Federal Republic of Germany

GRPS380

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FM BRUSSELS 021800Z SEP 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 194 OF 02 SEPT

INFO PRIORITY TO UKDEL NATO WASHINGTON BONN ROME AND THE HAGUE

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BELGIAN VIEWS ON MISSILE DEPLOYMENT.

1. AT THE CLOSE OF A SPECIAL MEETING YESTERDAY TO CONSIDER INF DEPLOYMENT AND THE BELGIAN BUDGET FOR 1984, THE LEADING FLEMISH CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY(CVP) WHICH IS A MEMBER OF THE GOVERNING COALITION, ISSUED A STATEMENT WHICH, AS REGARDS MISSILE DEPLOYMENT, EXPRESSED FIDELITY TO THE DECISION OF DECEMBER 1979, CALLED ON THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AT THE END OF THE YEAR BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER AND ACCEPTED AS REASONABLE THE DEMAND THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH DETERRENTS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

2. THE STATEMENT INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-

(A) THE CVP REMAINS FAITHFUL TO THE DECISIONS OF DECEMBER 1979. IT ACCEPTS THE OUTCOME OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS AND SUPPORTS THE DECISIONS OF THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT.

(B) IT BELIEVES THAT IT IS REASONABLE, IN CALCULATING ARSENALS ON BOTH SIDES, TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FRENCH AND BRITISH MISSILES.

(C) IF, AS THE LAST FOUR HYPOTHESES OF THE SITUATION AT THE END OF THIS YEAR, THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BROKEN DOWN, NATO WILL FULLY IMPLEMENT THE DEPLOYMENT PROGRAMME DECIDED IN 1979: BUT IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCESTHE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD MAKE ITS OWN INDEPEDENT STUDY BEFORE TAKING PART IN JOINT NATO DECISION-MAKING.

(D) STRESSING THAT PEACE SHOULD BE THE PRIME CONCERN OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY, THE CVP GIVES IT SUPPORT TO THOSE SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS AND PACIFIST MOVEMENTS WHICH WORK FOR PEACE IN JUSTICE, IN LIBERTY AND WITH RESPECT FOR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS.

Defence Deployment pt 3.

3. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS, THE PARTY CHAIRMAN(SWAELENS-A FORMER MINISTER OF DEFENCE) EXPLAINED THAT THE CVP WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE AS SUCH IN THE ANTI-MISSILE DEMONSTRATION DUE TO TAKE PLACE IN BRUSSELS ON 23 OCTOBER, BUT THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT MANY INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OR CONSTITUENT GROUPS WITHIN THE PARTY MIGHT PARTICIPATE IN ORDER TO GIVE FREE EXPRESSION TO THEIR WISH FOR PEACE.

4. PRESS REACTIONS THIS MORNIN INTERPRET THE DOCUMENT AS A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE POSTURE OF THE PRINCIPAL COALITION PARTNER. IT IS SEEN AS A RESPONSE TO PRESSURE WITHIN THE PARTY FROM BOTH THE YOUNG CVP AND FROM THE POWERFUL CHRISTIAN WORKERS ORGANISATION, WHICH HAVE BOTH PLEDGED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE OCTOBER DEMONSTRATION.

YARNOLD

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Defence & ISI

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 August, 1983

Dictated to be
PMs party at am 31/8.
PMs comments conveyed
to FCO pm 1/9

DT
2/9.

Dear Tim,

Mr Andropov's Message to the Prime Minister of INF

The Prime Minister has asked to see an early draft response to the message from Mr Andropov which the Soviet / Embassy delivered over the weekend and this I enclose. It is agreed by the MOD.

We understand that the other stationing countries (FRG, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium) and the United States have also received messages from Andropov, as well as some others, at least, including Canada. The text of / the message to the Italian Prime Minister is attached. This is similar to ours.

Neither Andropov's message nor his Pravda interview contained anything which marks a fundamental shift in the Soviet negotiating position on INF. The message, which is a fairly hard line attempt at wedge-driving, is clearly designed for presentational purposes with the domestic audience in Britain and the other European members of NATO as the targets. It marks a further step in the Soviet campaign to identify the exclusion of British and French systems as the major obstacle to an INF agreement. (They have been by no means unsuccessful in this campaign as is demonstrated by the stress laid in recent public statements by Allies on this aspect; particularly, Genscher's recent open message to Gromyko which came near to dangerous ground in its assertion that the Soviet attitude to British and French weapons was the great stumbling block at Geneva. In discussion yesterday in the margins of the Special Council in Brussels, Genscher emphasised the importance of the UK and France taking every opportunity to make clear our position on this. Sir G Howe agreed with this but underlined the importance of not encouraging the Russians to focus on this point). The Russians may well have assumed that the text of the message will be shown to other Allies. Sir Geoffrey Howe believes that our reply should be drafted with these two audiences in mind and against the possibility that we may need to publish it or refer to its contents at some stage. The draft

therefore acknowledges the concession - such as it is - which the Russians have made, but then points up the unreasonableness of their position and rejects the implications that we are to blame for the failure to reach agreement in Geneva.

The Russians can have little serious expectation that the message to the Prime Minister will cause any second thoughts on the cruise missile deployment programme in Britain. The Pravda interview has so far been reported in the Western media for what it is - viz essentially a restatement of the previous Soviet position. It is unlikely in itself to put undue pressure on the Alliance. But these are only the first shots in the Soviet autumn campaign and we must expect further moves which will be more difficult to counter.

The commitment to destroy some SS-20s currently deployed in Europe if an agreement at Geneva can be achieved is a not wholly negligible concession. The previous Soviet position had been somewhat ambiguous but this is the first time that we have seen an explicit statement that reductions in the SS-20 force would involve destruction rather than the movement of the missiles to Soviet Asia (whence of course they could easily be returned). It is of interest that the Russian leadership sees sufficient potential propaganda mileage in this to warrant overriding what we must assume to be the Soviet military's reluctance to offer to destroy such new and sophisticated weapons. The concession is fairly meaningless in security terms as long as it is not accompanied by an offer to limit the number of new missiles in Soviet Asia.

There is one possible signal, contained in the message to the Prime Minister, of future Soviet tactics. There are references to the present talks becoming 'meaningless' after NATO deploys INF; and to an agreement being possible before deployment (but, implicitly, not afterwards). It was perhaps never likely that the Russians would agree to the INF talks continuing after deployment as though nothing had happened, and we would not have expected them not to cause at least a hiatus. But we should not under-estimate the effect on other Allies, particularly the Germans, of an explicit threat by the Russians to discontinue all discussion on INF missile control, and this is a card we can expect to see played. It could even be coupled with a threat to walk out of, or suspend for some time, the START talks, though the Russians would need to think hard whether a lengthy break would not be detrimental to their security interests or whether it would be desirable from their point of view in terms of US domestic policies in an election year.

Sir Geoffrey Howe suggests that the Prime Minister might wish to delay sending a reply until after we have had time to consult Allies. We have a suitable opportunity on Friday 2 September when there are meetings in Brussels of the senior officials' group (the SCG) where we could discuss the response with the inner group of stationing countries and if necessary with the representatives of the whole Alliance. The purpose would not be in any sense to clear the Prime Minister's reply but rather to use it as a means of stiffening the responses of others. It is also in our interests to set the example to other Allies of initiating consultation about contacts with Moscow on this subject since this may help prevent some of them sending ill-considered messaged to the Russians on future occasions. If the Prime Minister agrees, our SCG representative will be instructed to describe to the Allies the outline of Andropov's message and of the draft reply, to set out our analysis of Soviet motives and urge firmness in response (public or private).

Even if the Russians do not decide to publish the exchanges, it will be for consideration whether it would be in our interests to release unilaterally either the text or at least the gist of the Prime Minister's reply. The advantages of going public with our point of view are clear - it is important not to allow Andropov a free audience here without exercising a full right of reply; on the other hand we have in the past criticised the Russians for conducting the negotiation in public rather than in Geneva and should be careful not to lay ourselves open to the same accusation. This again might be a subject for discussion with the Allies. Sir Geoffrey Howe believes we should keep the contents of the exchange confidential at least until after the SCG Meeting but that it may be right to go public after that.

I might take this opportunity to report that the inter-agency review in Washington of the negotiating position on outstanding secondary issues in the INF talks (regional missile sub-limits, limits on aircraft etc) was completed last week. The President is now looking at option papers and may well send a message to the Prime Minister within a day or so if his decision is to propose to the Allies any shift in the negotiating position. The Americans are coming under pressure from the Germans to show flexibility on these secondary issues; but there should be no risk of their wishing to move on the major issues of principle.

You will have seen theletter from Mr Whitney's office of 23 August about the suggestion from the Greek Foreign Minister that NATO should postpone deployment for six months. Sir G Howe has approved a formal reply (copy enclosed), but its despatch will be delayed until after Mr Heseltine's visit to Athens on 2 September.

/I

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram in the MOD.

Yours ever,

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

T Flesher Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11C

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR ANDROPOV

1. I thank you for your message of 27 August on the Geneva talks on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and for sending me the text of your Pravda interview.

2. In response I should begin by re-emphasising to you, in absolute sincerity, the British Government's desire for the negotiations in Geneva to succeed. It is still possible to reach agreement to ban completely those weapons on both sides which are of particular concern - the SS20s, SS4s and SS5s on your side and the Cruise and Pershing II missiles on NATO's side. If such an agreement can be reached by the end of this year NATO need never deploy any of the new weapons.

3. I note with great interest your statement that, in the context of an overall agreement, you would be prepared to destroy SS20 missiles now stationed in the Western part of the Soviet Union. As you know we had been under the impression that you had intended only to move those weapons to Soviet Asia. This was unacceptable to us, firstly because these mobile missiles could quickly be moved back again to Europe in a time of crisis and secondly because we had no wish to increase the number of the weapons facing our friends in Asia. We hope you will expand upon your proposal when the negotiations at Geneva resume on 6 September.

/4.

A.W.O. Ltd. 11.82. 56-3683. 200m.

DSR 11C

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR ANDROPOV

1. I thank you for your message of 27 August on the Geneva talks on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and for sending me the text of your Pravda interview.

2. In response I should begin by re-emphasising to you, in absolute sincerity, the British Government's desire for the negotiations in Geneva to succeed. It is still possible to reach agreement to ban completely those weapons on both sides which are of particular concern - the SS20s, SS4s and SS5s on your side and the Cruise and Pershing II missiles on NATO's side. If such an agreement can be reached by the end of this year NATO need never deploy any of the new weapons.

note with great interest

3. I welcome your statement that, in the context of an overall agreement, you would be prepared to destroy SS20 missiles now stationed in the Western part of the Soviet Union. As you know we had been under the impression that you had intended only to move those weapons to Soviet Asia. This was unacceptable to us, firstly because these mobile missiles could quickly be moved back again to Europe in a time of crisis and secondly because we had no wish to increase the number of the weapons facing our friends in Asia.

We hope you will expand your proposal upon the restrictions of Geneva rounds on 6 September.

/4.

A.W.O. Ltd. 11.82. 56-3683. 200m.

4. But I believe that your message reveals some misunderstanding of the basic security requirements which underlie NATO's position in the INF Talks. The security of Western Europe demands that a balance be allowed between Soviet and American intermediate range nuclear forces. It is simply not possible for us to accept that you should maintain a monopoly of missiles of this range while insisting that the Americans should not be allowed to instal a single missile. The problem of the disparity in these forces became acute for us when in the late 1970s the Soviet Union began the massive build-up of SS20s, for which we could see no defensive purpose, at a time when, as now, NATO had no comparable missiles. Our preference would still be that there should be no missiles of this type on either side. As long as this solution is not acceptable to you, we and our Allies will pursue an interim agreement; but this will have to respect the principle of balance between yourselves and the Americans.

5. It follows from what I have said that NATO cannot accept that the nuclear forces of Britain and France should be taken account of in the INF negotiations. This is a position unanimously agreed by NATO since 1979 for reasons of the security of the Alliance as a whole. Our nuclear forces are strategic weapons. The Soviet Union itself acknowledged during the SALT talks that this was the case. They have no place in negotiations on intermediate range weapons, where we need to address the problems of the Soviet and American ground-launched weapons which are of such concern to both sides.

/6.

6. I must say in all frankness that it is difficult to understand your preoccupation with British and French strategic weapons. They represent a tiny fraction of yours (the British deterrent is less than three percent of the size of your strategic missile and bomber force). They can have no significant effect on the overall balance of nuclear forces between East and West. They are weapons of last resort; our ultimate national deterrents. They are in no sense comparable to your SS20 force. But it is worth adding that we are not trying to claim that British nuclear weapons should never be the subject of any arms control negotiations. I repeat what I have said publicly before: if the Soviet Union and the US succeed in achieving in negotiations on strategic arms sufficiently large reductions in their own arsenals for present circumstances to be very substantially altered we will, of course, be prepared to look at the possibility of British nuclear forces being included in the arms control process. But they can have no place in any negotiations about intermediate range weapons.

7. I note with disappointment what you say in your message about Soviet intentions to take 'counter measures' following any new NATO deployments. If by this you have in mind steps towards increasing the nuclear arms race, that, as you say yourself, would be in nobody's interests.

/8.

A.V.O. Ltd. 11482. 56-3683. 200m.

6. I must say in all frankness that it is difficult to understand your preoccupation with British and French strategic weapons. They represent a tiny fraction of yours (the British deterrent is less than three percent of the size of your strategic missile and bomber force). They can have no significant effect on the overall balance of nuclear forces between East and West. They are weapons of last resort; our ultimate national deterrents. They are in no sense comparable to your SS20 force. But it is worth adding that we are not trying to claim that British nuclear weapons should hence be the subject of any arms control negotiations. I repeat what I have said publicly before: if the Soviet Union and the US succeed in achieving in negotiations on strategic arms sufficiently large reductions in their own arsenals for present circumstances to be totally altered we will, of course, be prepared to look at the possibility of British forces being included in the arms control process. But they can have no place in any negotiations about intermediate range weapons.

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/8.

A.W.O. Ltd. 11:82. 56-3683. 200m.

8. For our part we shall remain committed to the search for arms control measures which are balanced and thus protect the security of both sides. If it is necessary for NATO to begin deployment of the new weapons by the end of this year, this can be discontinued or reversed at any time that an agreement at the negotiating table warrants it. But, I repeat, our hope remains that there can still be an agreement this year which makes it unnecessary for NATO to begin deployment.

GRS 455
UNCLASSIFIED
FM ROME 301145Z AUG
TO IMMEDIATE FCO **TELNO 405 OF 30 AUGUST 1983**
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN, TOKYO, BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE.
INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS.

MIPT: INF NEGOTIATIONS: ANDROPOV PROPSALS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SUBSTANCE OF LETTER FROM ANDROPOV TO CRAXI, WHICH WAS DELIVERED BY THE SOVIET CHARGE ON MONDAY 29 AUGUST.

2. BEGINS:- A VERY GREAT DEAL WILL DEPEND ON THE OUTCOME OF THE NEXT ROUND (OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA.) IF, AS A RESULT OF AN UNCONSTRUCTIVE U S POSITION, IT IS AGAIN NOT POSSIBLE TO MAKE A DECISIVE STEP TOWARDS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT, AND IF THE INSTALLATION OF NEW AMERICAN MISSILES BEGINS IN EUROPE, INCLUDING IN ITALY, THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS WILL LOSE THEIR POINT. THE SOVIET UNION AND HER ALLIES WILL BE FORCED TO TAKE NECESSARY COUNTER MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO THE U S ATTEMPT TO UPSET THE GLOBAL AND REGIONAL BALANCE OF FORCES IN ITS OWN FAVOUR. IN OTHER WORDS, IF THE U S UNDERMINES THE NEGOTIATIONS AND MOVES TOWARDS THE DEPLOYMENT OF ITS OWN MISSILES, THAT WILL INEVITABLY CAUSE A SUDDEN INCREASE IN THE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION AND AN INCREASE IN NUCLEAR DANGER. NO-ONE WILL WIN FROM SUCH A DEVELOPMENT. EVERYONE WILL LOSE.
IN ORDER TO AVOID THIS, THE SOVIET UNION HAS TAKEN ANOTHER BIG STEP AIMED AT FACILITATING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AN AGREEMENT. WE HAVE DECLARED OUR READINESS TO ELIMINATE IN THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION THOSE OF OUR MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES WHICH WOULD BE SUBJECT TO REDUCTION. AMONG THEM WOULD BE INCLUDED A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE SS20 MISSILES, EXACTLY THAT PORTION WHICH EXCEEDED THE TOTAL NUMBER OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE.
ONE WOULD LIKE TO HOPE THAT YOU WILL APPRECIATE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STEP TAKEN BY THE SOVIET UNION. IT WAS NOT EASY FOR US TO TAKE THIS DECISION, AND WE HAVE THE RIGHT TO EXPECT THAT REAL STEPS WILL FINALLY BE TAKEN BY THE OTHER SIDE AS WELL, WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO WORK OUT AN HONEST AND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT AT GENEVA.
YOU, PRIME MINISTER, IN THE PROGRAMME DECLARATION OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WHICH YOU LEAD, SAID THAT YOU WERE IN FAVOUR OF NEW PROPOSALS: YOU SPOKE OF THE NEED FOR PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THERE IS A REAL POSSIBILITY OF SUCH PROGRESS. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THIS POSSIBILITY DOES NOT BECOME A MISSED OPPORTUNITY.
UNTIL THE NEW AMERICAN MISSILES ARE BROUGHT TO WESTERN EUROPE, AN AGREEMENT IS STILL A POSSIBILITY, AND ITALY, WHICH HAS THE MOST DIRECT INTEREST IN THE QUESTION, CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THIS IMPORTANT CAUSE. ENDS.

3. FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

RICHARDSON [REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

LIMITED
DEFENCE D
ACDD
EESD
NAD
WED
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR JAMES

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
START

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 August 1983

You will by now have received a copy of the message from President Andropov to the Prime Minister about disarmament as well as the interview given by President Andropov to Pravda. As you know, the Prime Minister spoke to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary about the message over the weekend. This note is formally to commission advice on the timing and content of a reply from the Prime Minister to President Andropov as soon as possible.

I am sending a copy of this, together with the text of the message and interview to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

TIM FLESHER

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

10 DOWNING STREET

– Rec'd at
1605.

– Mutaxed to
PM

– Comes of Russian
text + translation
Sent to FCO
at 1640. Advice
requested.

P.E.
28/8

SUBJECT

cc Master
OPS

Translation from Russian
(Unofficial)

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T122A/83

Dear Mrs.Prime Minister,

I considered it necessary to draw your attention again to the question which took now a special place in the East-West relations. I mean the problem of limiting nuclear arms in Europe.

I think you will agree with me that the forthcoming round of the Soviet-American talks in Geneva acquires decisive significance. If in the next few months an agreement is not reached and the deployment in Western Europe of new American missiles begins then the present talks will become meaningless. The world will find itself dragged into another round of the arms race with all consequent repercussions. As we have repeatedly stated in response to the US attempt to upset the global and regional balance of forces in its favour, the USSR and its allies will be compelled to take the necessary counter-measures.

In other words, if the USA goes along the above-mentioned way, it will inevitably lead to a sharp rise of the level of nuclear confrontation and, accordingly, to an increased risk of a nuclear conflict. At the same time co-operation between states in different fields will suffer. Nobody will gain anything from this course of events,but everybody will lose.

Striving to prevent it, the Soviet Union made another major step designed to facilitate the agreement. We declared our readiness to liquidate in the European part of the USSR those of our medium-range missiles, which would be subject to reductions. Their number would include also a considerable part of the "SS-20" missiles, particularly, the part which would be in excess of the aggregate number of the British and French medium-range missiles.

Naturally, this can be implemented only if a mutually acceptable agreement is reached on the whole problem of limiting medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, including the US refusal to deploy new American missiles there.

Thus, none of the medium-range missiles which would be subject to reductions in the European part of the USSR would be relocated to the Asian part of our country. Therefore, allegations that we are going to create in the East, from the missiles relocated there, a certain "reserve" for their repeated deployment in Europe, would in this case be devoid of any sense whatsoever. If your Government also had any, though unjustified, doubts on that score, now there shall be no more ground for that.

I hope that you, Mrs. Prime Minister, will fully appreciate the significance of the step, which the Soviet Union is making. It was not at all easy for us to take this decision. And we have the right to expect that the other side will at last make real steps towards the working out in Geneva of an honest and mutually-acceptable agreement.

Britain does not take part in the Geneva talks. But owing to the actual state of affairs, it also lies with Britain whether there is an agreement there or not. Indeed, the American side cites as one of the main pretexts for avoiding an agreement, the refusal of Britain and France to agree with the Soviet position.

However, the solution, proposed at the talks by the Soviet Union, in the part related to corresponding British nuclear forces, i.e. taking them into account as a real quantity, without any consequent obligations for Britain itself, can, in our profound conviction, inflict no damage whatsoever to its interests. And for us the question of the British, as well as the French nuclear weapons, is not at all an abstract one. We cannot but take them into account in the sense of maintaining the balance of nuclear forces. Hence, if the USA wrecks the agreement in Geneva by starting the deployment of its missiles in Europe, and the USSR, accordingly, is compelled to implement counter-measures, then inevitable in this case raising of the level of nuclear confrontation in Europe will hardly meet the interests of Britain as well.

We are aware of statements of the British side about its interest in reaching the agreement between the USSR and the USA in Geneva. Before new American missiles appeared in the territory

of Britain and other European countries such an agreement is possible. It is important not to miss such an opportunity. Britain, which is directly affected by the problem of the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe, can play its part in this important matter. We would like to expect that that will be the case.

With respect

(Signed) Y.ANDROPOV

August 27, 1983

Translation from Russian
(Unofficial)

YURI ANDROPOV'S ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS OF THE NEWSPAPER "PRAVDA"

QUESTION. As another round of Soviet-U.S.negotiations on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe is about to begin, we would like to inquire whether it is true, as is being alleged in the West, that at the previous round of the negotiations the U.S. side put forward some flexible proposals which allow to hope for progress.

ANSWER. No, it is not. There has as yet been no progress at the negotiations and, regrettably, there can be no hope for it if the United States' position remains as it is now.

The entire "flexibility" of the U.S. position boils down to the following.

Previously the United States proposed that the USSR should reduce to zero, i.e. destroy, all its medium-range missiles - and not only in the European but also in the Eastern part of our country /which is completely irrelevant to the subject-matter of the Geneva negotiations/, whereas nothing at all would be destroyed on the NATO side - not a single missile or a single aircraft - or, figuratively speaking, their reductions would be nothing but zero. That was the essence of the U.S. "Zero option": zero missiles for the USSR and zero reductions for NATO.

And now the United States deigns to agree that the USSR retains a certain number of its medium-range missiles, but in this case as well the United States, while not reducing a single medium-range nuclear system, would even gain the "right" to deploy in Europe - in addition to the British and French missiles already present here - as many new American missiles as the

number of Soviet missiles that would remain. In other words, not only would we have reduced unilaterally our arsenal of medium-range nuclear systems, but we would also have to give our blessing to the deployment of new American missiles targeted against us and our allies.

Calling this flexibility can only be a mockery of common sense.

If one were to speak of flexibility in the real, constructive sense of the word, it is the Soviet Union - and not in the least the United States - that has been displaying it for the entire duration of the negotiations.

It was the Soviet Union that proposed a genuine, and not a false, zero solution for Europe: to destroy both medium-range and tactical nuclear systems in their entirety. The United States, however, does not even want to discuss the idea.

Since the West is not ready for such a radical solution, while we remain prepared for it, we have proposed another variant, which, though less radical, is also far-reaching: to forgo deployment in Europe of any new medium-range systems, whereas the existing ones would be reduced by approximately two-thirds, with the USSR and NATO each retaining for the time beign 300 such systems.

In view of the assertions made in the West to the effect that such a solution would be unfair since the USSR could, within the allowed number of 300 systems, allegedly retain more missiles than the number existing on the side of NATO, we declared our readiness to retain after the reductions in Europe precisely as many medium-range missiles as Britain and France possess. Accordingly, both sides would also retain an equal number of medium-range nuclear delivery aircraft.

Then certain people mounted a new "hobby-horse" by claiming that even with an equal number of missiles on both sides the Soviet Union would allegedly have

an advantage in the aggregate number of warheads on its "SS-20" missiles. But they could not ride that "hobby-horse" for a long time either, for the Soviet Union expressed its consent to reach agreement on equality both as regards the delivery vehicles (missiles and airplanes) and as regards the weapons on them.

As a result, the Soviet Union would have in the European zone significantly fewer medium-range missiles and warheads on them than prior to 1976 when we did not have any "SS-20" missiles, which, according to the NATO version, were the spark that set the forest on fire.

What, then, is unfair and unacceptable in our position? This is an honest, consistent and at the same time flexible position based on the principle of equality and equal security of the sides. Should the United States and its NATO allies become even the least bit willing to come to an agreement on equal terms, the Geneva negotiations would proceed quite differently and one would not have to wait long for an accord.

QUESTION: In addition to the evasive arguments of the United States and NATO that you have mentioned, it is often alleged in the West that the USSR, while agreeing to reduce the number of its medium-range missiles in the European part of the country, intends merely to relocate them to its eastern regions. What could you say in this regard?

ANSWER: Such allegations are patently untrue. There is no ruse here. We ourselves proposed some time ago that the principal method of reducing medium-range nuclear arms in Europe should be their dismantling, destruction. At the negotiations we straghtforwardly said to the Americans: let us agree on what will be destroyed on both sides and how. But they shun this subject too.

Today I can say that we are ready to make another major step.

Should a mutually acceptable agreement be achieved, including renunciation by the United States of the deployment in Europe of new missiles, the Soviet Union, in reducing its medium-range missiles in the European part of the country to the level equal to the number of missiles of Britain and France, would liquidate all the missiles to be reduced. In this event a considerable number of the most modern missiles, known in the West as the "SS-20"s, would be liquidated as well.

It is hardly necessary to emphasize the exceptional importance of this new manifestation of good will on the part of the Soviet Union.

First, it renders totally groundless the assertions circulated in the NATO countries alleging that in actual fact the Soviet Union intends to retain the "SS-20" missiles which are to be reduced, by merely relocating them from Europe to the East.

Second, no grounds whatsoever remain for the concerns that are at present expressed by China and Japan with regard to the possibility of such relocation.

The above makes it clear to any unprejudiced person that the Soviet Union has done and is doing everything in its power to find solutions at the negotiations and to achieve a mutually acceptable agreement which would prevent a new and extremely dangerous round in the nuclear arms race in Europe.

Whether such agreement is reached, depends on the United States, on NATO as a whole. The forthcoming round of the negotiations, beginning on September 6, will be decisive in this regard.

Throughout the negotiations the Soviet Union, and I wish to emphasize this once again, has manifested a constructive and flexible approach. But I would emphasize another thing too: our flexibility has its limits which are dictated by the security interests of the Soviet state and its allies.

And if the position of the United States at the negotiations continues to be unconstructive and lopsided, and if it actually comes to the deployment in Europe of American "Pershings" and cruise missiles, we shall naturally be compelled to take appropriate counter-measures to preserve the balance of forces both on the regional, European, and on the global scale. This should be quite clear to everyone.

QUESTION: Since you have mentioned China in the context of the question of nuclear arms in Europe, what is the position of the PRC on the questions of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament in general?

ANSWER: As is known, the People's Republic of China has its own nuclear potential; it has gradually been growing. So far China has not been taking any part in the negotiations on the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms. At present, as we understand, the leaders of the PRC seem to become interested in some questions concerning nuclear and other arms, which are discussed at the United Nations and in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament. Should this trend develop further, China could undoubtedly make a substantial contribution to the solution of problems relating to the prevention of nuclear war and the cessation of the nuclear arms race.

QUESTION: Would you like to say anything about Soviet-Chinese relations?

ANSWER: We have regarded and continue to regard as abnormal the state of Soviet-Chinese relations that existed for two decades.

Recently some positive tendencies have become discernible in our relations. Political consultations are held between the two countries at the level of special representatives; their next round will begin in Peking on October 6. The volume of trade is growing; contacts have been gradually developing in a number of other fields.

The present level of bilateral relations is, however, far from being one that should, in our view, exist between such big and, moreover, neighbouring powers as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

Much could be done in further expanding trade and developing economic, scientific and technical cooperation, and in the field of cultural, sports and other ties. Joint efforts in working out and implementing confidence-building measures in the area of the Soviet-Chinese border would significantly contribute to improving the climate in relations between the two countries.

We are also ready for a political dialogue with China on fundamental questions of world development, above all on problems of strengthening peace and international security.

Of course, we have substantial differences with China in approaches to some important international problems and relations with certain states. But we firmly believe that Soviet-Chinese relations should evolve in such a manner as not to be detrimental to third countries. We expect the same from the Chinese side too.

Achieving healthier relations between the USSR and the PRC becomes of special and topical importance in the context of the current aggravation of the international situation. We are confident that objectively the interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples do not diverge as regards the elimination of the threat of war and the strengthening of peace. Not to mention the fact that peace is Socialism's ideal, our two countries face major long-term economic tasks, the successful accomplishment of which requires favourable external conditions.

Thus, both our countries stand to gain from a positive development of Soviet-Chinese relations, and this would also undoubtedly be beneficial for the entire international situation.

Уважаемая госпожа премьер-министр,

счел необходимым вновь привлечь Ваше внимание к вопросу, который занял сейчас особое место в отношениях между Востоком и Западом. Я имею в виду проблему ограничения ядерных вооружений в Европе.

Полагаю, Вы согласитесь со мной, что предстоящий раунд советско-американских переговоров в Женеве приобретает решающее значение. Если в ближайшие месяцы договоренность не будет достигнута и в Западной Европе начнется размещение новых американских ракет, то ведущиеся сейчас переговоры потеряют смысл. Мир окажется втянутым в новый виток гонки вооружений со всеми вытекающими из этого последствиями. Как нами неоднократно заявлялось, в ответ на попытку США сломать глобальный и региональный баланс сил в свою пользу СССР и его союзники будут вынуждены предпринять необходимые ответные меры.

Иначе говоря, если США пойдут по упомянутому пути, то это неизбежно приведет к резкому повышению уровня ядерного противостояния и, соответственно, к увеличению риска ядерного конфликта. Пострадает при этом и сотрудничество между государствами в различных областях. Выиграть от этого развития событий никто ничего не выиграет, а проиграют все.

Стремясь не допустить этого, Советский Союз сделал еще один крупный шаг, призванный облегчить достижение договоренности. Мы заявили о готовности ликвидировать в Европейской части СССР те наши ракеты средней дальности, которые подлежали бы сокращению. В их число вошла бы и значительная часть ракет СС-20, а именно та их часть, которая была бы сверх суммарного количества ракет средней дальности у Англии и Франции.

Само собой разумеется, что это может быть осуществлено только в том случае, если будет достигнута взаимоприемлемая договоренность в целом по проблеме ограничения ядерных средств средней дальности в Европе, включая отказ США от размещения там новых американских ракет.

Таким образом, никакие ракеты средней дальности, которые сокращались бы в Европейской части СССР, не перебазировались бы

в Азиатскую часть нашей страны. Следовательно, утверждения о том, будто мы собираемся создать на Востоке за счет перебазируемых туда ракет некий "резерв" для повторного развертывания их в Европе, были бы в этом случае лишены вообще всякого смысла. Если и у вашего правительства были какие-либо, хотя и неоправданные, сомнения на этот счет, то теперь тем более никаких оснований для этого нет.

Надеюсь, что Вы, госпожа премьер-министр, в полной мере оцените значение шага, на который идет Советский Союз. Нам было отнюдь не просто принять это решение. И мы вправе ожидать, что с другой стороны также будут сделаны наконец реальные шаги для выработки в Женеве честного взаимоприемлемого соглашения.

Англия не участвует в женевских переговорах. Но в силу фактического положения вещей от нее тоже зависит, быть там договоренности или нет. Ведь в качестве одного из основных предлогов для ухода от договоренности американская сторона ссылается на несогласие Англии и Франции с советской позицией.

Между тем предлагаемое Советским Союзом на переговорах решение в части, касающейся соответствующих английских ядерных средств, - их засчет как реальной величины без каких-либо вытекающих из этого обязательств для самой Англии, - по нашему глубокому убеждению, не может нанести никакого ущерба ее интересам. Для нас же вопрос об английских, как и французских, ядерных вооружениях является вовсе не каким-то абстрактным. Мы не можем не учитывать их в плане поддержания равновесия ядерных сил. Следовательно, если США сорвут договоренность в Женеве, приступив к размещению своих ракет в Европе, а СССР, соответственно, будет вынужден осуществить контрмеры, то неизбежное в этом случае повышение уровня ядерного противостояния в Европе вряд ли будет отвечать интересам и Англии.

Нам известны заявления британской стороны о ее заинтересованности в достижении договоренности между СССР и США в Женеве. Пока новые американские ракеты не появились на территории Англии и других европейских стран, такая договоренность возможна. Важно не упустить эту возможность. Англия, которую проблема ограничения

ядерных вооружений в Европе затрагивает самым непосредственным образом, может сыграть свою роль в этом важном деле. Хотелось бы рассчитывать, что так оно и будет.

С уважением

Ю.АНДРОПОВ

27 августа 1983 года

ОТВЕТЫ Ю.В.АНДРОПОВА НА ВОПРОСЫ ГАЗЕТЫ "ПРАВДА"

ВОПРОС. В преддверии нового раунда советско-американских переговоров об ограничении ядерных вооружений в Европе хотелось бы узнать, соответствуют ли действительности имеющие хождение на Западе утверждения о том, что на предыдущем раунде этих переговоров американская сторона выдвинула какие-то гибкие предложения, позволяющие надеяться на продвижение вперед?

ОТВЕТ. Нет, не соответствуют. Никакого продвижения на переговорах пока нет и надеяться на него при сохранении нынешней позиции США, к сожалению, не приходится.

Вся "гибкость" американской позиции сводится к следующему.

Раньше США предлагали, чтобы СССР сократил до нуля, то есть уничтожил все свои ракеты средней дальности, причем не только в Европейской, но и в Восточной части страны /что вообще не имеет отношения к предмету переговоров в Женеве/, в то время как со стороны НАТО вовсе ничего не уничтожалось бы - ни одной ракеты, ни одного самолета - или, образно говоря, их сокращения равнялись бы нулю. В этом и заключался смысл американского "нулевого варианта" - для СССР ноль ракет, а для НАТО ноль сокращений.

Теперь же США согласны, видите ли, чтобы СССР сохранил определенное количество своих ракет средней дальности, но в этом случае США не только опять-таки не сокращали бы ни одной единицы ядерных средств средней дальности, а, более того, получали бы "право" разместить в Европе - в дополнение к уже имеющимся здесь английским и французским ракетам - новые американские ракеты в количестве, равном числу остающихся советских ракет. Другими словами, мало того, что мы в одностороннем порядке сократили бы свой арсенал ядерных средств средней дальности, мы должны были бы еще и благословить размещение новых американских ракет, нацеленных на нас и наших союзников.

Называть это гибкостью можно лишь в порядке издевательства над здравым смыслом.

Если говорить о гибкости в подлинном, конструктивном смысле этого слова, то на всем протяжении переговоров ее проявляет Советский Союз, но никак не Соединенные Штаты.

Именно Советский Союз предложил не фальшивый, а настоящий нулевой вариант для Европы - уничтожить все ядерные средства как средней дальности, так и тактические. Но США и разговаривать об этом не хотят.

Коль скоро Запад не готов к такому радикальному решению, - а наша готовность к нему остается в силе, - мы предложили другой, не столь радикальный, но тоже далеко идущий вариант: отказаться от развертывания в Европе любых новых средств средней дальности, а все существующие сократить примерно в три раза, оставив пока по 300 единиц таких средств у СССР и на стороне НАТО.

В связи с утверждениями на Западе о несправедливости такого варианта, поскольку СССР мог бы, дескать, в пределах разрешенных 300 единиц сохранить больше ракет, чем их есть на стороне НАТО, мы заявили о готовности оставить после сокращений в Европе ровно столько ракет средней дальности, сколько их имеется у Англии и Франции. Соответственно, у сторон оставалось бы и по равному числу самолетов-носителей ядерного оружия среднего радиуса действия.

Тогда кое-кто сел на нового "конька": стал утверждать, что при равном количестве ракет у сторон Советский Союз будет, мол, иметь преимущество по суммарному числу боеголовок на своих ракетах СС-20. Но и на этом "коньке" долго удержаться не удалось, поскольку Советский Союз выразил согласие договориться о равенстве как по носителям /ракетам и самолетам/, так и по боезарядам на них.

В итоге Советский Союз имел бы в Европейской зоне и ракет средней дальности, и боеголовок на них значитель-

но меньше, чем до 1976 года, когда у нас вообще не было ракет СС-20, из-за которых, по версии НАТО, загорелся сыр-бор.

Так что же, спрашивается, несправедливого и неприемлемого в нашей позиции? Это - честная, последовательная и одновременно гибкая позиция, основанная на принципе равенства и одинаковой безопасности сторон. И появись у США и их союзников по НАТО малейшее желание действительно договариваться на равных, дела на переговорах в Женеве пошли бы совсем по-другому, и соглашение не заставило бы себя долго ждать.

ВОПРОС. Помимо упомянутых Вами увертюк со стороны США и НАТО, на Западе нередко утверждают, что, соглашаясь сократить число своих ракет средней дальности в Европейской части страны, СССР имеет в виду всего лишь перебросить их в Восточные районы. Что вы скажете на этот счет?

ОТВЕТ. Подобные утверждения являются заведомой неправдой. Никакой хитрости здесь нет. Мы сами предложили уже некоторое время тому назад, чтобы основным методом сокращения ядерных вооружений средней дальности в Европе был их демонтаж, уничтожение. На переговорах мы прямо сказали американцам: давайте условимся, что и как будет уничтожаться с обеих сторон. Они и от этого уходят.

Сегодня я могу сообщить о нашей готовности сделать еще один крупный шаг.

В случае достижения взаимоприемлемого соглашения, включая отказ США от развертывания в Европе новых ракет, Советский Союз при сокращении своих ракет средней дальности в Европейской части страны до уровня, равного числу ракет у Англии и Франции, ликвидировал бы все сокращаемые ракеты. В этом случае ликвидировано было бы и значительное количество самых современных ракет, известных на Западе под названием СС-20.

Вряд ли есть необходимость подчеркивать исключительную важность этого нового проявления доброй воли Советским Союзом.

Во-первых, это выбивает всякую почву из-под распространяемых в странах НАТО утверждений, будто Советский Союз на самом деле намеревается сохранить подлежащие сокращению ракеты СС-20, просто перебазировав их из Европы на Восток.

Во-вторых, лишается каких-либо оснований и высказываемая сейчас Китаем и Японией озабоченность по поводу возможности такого перебазирования.

Из всего сказанного для любого непредубежденного человека должно быть ясно: Советский Союз делал и делает все от него зависящее для нахождения развязок на переговорах, для достижения взаимоприемлемой договоренности, которая предотвратила бы очередной, причем чрезвычайно опасный, виток гонки ядерных вооружений в Европе.

Быть или не быть такой договоренности, зависит от США, от НАТО в целом. Предстоящий раунд переговоров, начинающийся 6 сентября, будет в этом смысле решающим.

Советский Союз на всем протяжении переговоров - хочу это еще раз подчеркнуть - проявляет конструктивный и гибкий подход, но подчеркну и другое: у нашей гибкости есть свои пределы - они диктуются интересами безопасности Советского государства и его союзников.

И если позиция США на переговорах останется по-прежнему неконструктивной и однобокой, и дело дойдет до фактического размещения в Европе американских "Першингов" и крылатых ракет, нам, естественно, придется принять соответствующие контрмеры для сохранения баланса сил и в региональном, европейском, и в глобальном масштабе. Ни у кого не должно быть никакой неясности на этот счет.

ВОПРОС. В связи с упоминанием Вами Китая в контексте вопроса о ядерных вооружениях в Европе хотелось бы спросить, какова позиция КНР по вопросам ограничения ядерных вооружений и разоружению в целом?

ОТВЕТ. У Китайской Народной Республики, как известно, есть свой ядерный потенциал; он постепенно растет. Какого-либо

участия в переговорах по ограничению и сокращению ядерных вооружений Китай пока не принимает. Сейчас, насколько мы понимаем, у руководителей КНР как будто появляется интерес к некоторым вопросам, касающимся ядерных и других вооружений, обсуждаемым в ООН и в женевском Комитете по разоружению. Если эта тенденция получит свое развитие, то нет сомнения, что Китай мог бы внести немалый вклад в решение проблем, связанных с предотвращением ядерной войны и прекращением гонки ядерных вооружений.

ВОПРОС. Вы не хотели бы сказать что-либо о советско-китайских отношениях?

ОТВЕТ. Мы считали и считаем аномалией то состояние советско-китайских отношений, в котором они находились на протяжении двух десятилетий.

За последнее время в наших отношениях наметились некоторые положительные тенденции. Между двумя странами ведутся политические консультации на уровне специальных представителей; очередной их раунд начнется 6 октября в Пекине. Растет объем торговли, постепенно развиваются контакты в ряде других областей.

Однако нынешний уровень двусторонних отношений далеко еще не тот, который должен бы быть, по нашему убеждению, между такими крупными и к тому же соседними державами, как Советский Союз и Китайская Народная Республика.

Многое можно сделать в сфере дальнейшего расширения торговли, налаживания экономического и научно-технического сотрудничества, в области культурных, спортивных и иных связей. Улучшению атмосферы в отношениях между двумя странами в значительной степени способствовали бы совместная разработка и осуществление мер доверия в районе советско-китайской границы.

Готовы мы к политическому диалогу с Китаем и по коренным вопросам мирового развития, прежде всего - по вопросам укрепления мира и международной безопасности.

Конечно, у нас с Китаем есть немалые различия в подходах к некоторым важным международным проблемам, к отношениям с отдельными государствами. Но мы твердо исходим из того, что советско-китайские отношения должны строиться таким образом, чтобы они не наносили ущерба третьим странам. Этого мы ожидаем и от китайской стороны.

Оздоровление отношений между СССР и КНР приобретает особую важность и актуальность в условиях нынешнего обострения международной обстановки. Мы уверены, что объективно интересы советского и китайского народов не расходятся в том, что касается устранения военной опасности и упрочения мира. Не говоря уже о том, что мир является идеалом социализма, у обеих наших стран есть большие долгосрочные хозяйственные задачи, для успешного решения которых необходимы благоприятные внешние условия.

Таким образом, от положительного развития советско-китайских отношений в выигрыше будут и наши страны, да и для всей международной обстановки это, несомненно, пойдет на пользу .

2

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 August 1983

Prime Minister

24/8

Dear Willie,

THE GREEK PROPOSAL TO POSTPONE DEPLOYMENT ON INF MISSILES

Mr Whitney thought you may like a note on the message which the Greek Foreign Minister sent to his European Community colleagues early last week (and published on 18 August). This proposed the postponement of the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles for a suggested period of six months in order to 'give the Geneva negotiations the breathing space they certainly need', and suggested that the proposal might be discussed informally at the next Political Co-operation Meeting of Foreign Ministers on 12 September.

Immediately after the publication of this message the FCO News Department gave an 'on the record' answer to a question as contained in FCO telno 272 to Athens (enclosed). On the day before (ie before publication of the message) an official here had made similar points to the Greek Charge; and had added the point that it was difficult to understand why non-stationing countries found it necessary to compound, in this way, the political difficulties which stationing countries are currently facing.

This is the worst example to date of the Greeks dissociating themselves from the agreed Alliance position on INF. It is particularly reprehensible that they should have publicised this message (no doubt for domestic political reasons); that they should be seeking to use the Presidency to further their maverick views; and that they raised the subject in the Ten instead of in the Alliance where it belongs and has been handled up to now.

Several other Community partners, including especially the Germans, have also given the Greeks a suitably firm response. We have little doubt that in sending a formal reply on his return to London Sir Geoffrey Howe will wish to underline the unacceptability of the Greeks' activities. But in deciding on the timing of this reply we shall have to bear in mind that the Defence Secretary is to visit Athens to see Papandreou on 2 September in order to promote the sale of Tornado, on which a decision is expected from the Greeks by 10 September. The total value of the deal is £700m, with a British content of £300-350m. We should probably seek to avoid allowing the message to coincide with this important visit.

/...

W F S Rickett Esq
Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Over the weekend messages were distributed by Ceausescu on lines similar to the Greek Foreign Minister's letter. It could well be that there has been some consultation between Ceausescu and Papandreou.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram in the MOD.

Yours sincerely

Richard Kinchen

R Kinchen
Private Secretary
to Ray Whitney MP

(40)

GRS 295 12890 - 3
UNCLASSIFIED
FM FCO 191230Z AUGUST 1983
TO IMMEDIATE ATHENS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 272 OF 19 AUGUST
AND TO IMMEDIATE ALL NATO AND EC POSTS
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, E.BERLIN, WARSAW, PRAGUE, SOFIA, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, TOKYO, UKDIS GENEVA, UKDEL VIENNA, CANBERRA, UKREP BRUSSELS, MODUK (DS17).

MIPT: GREEK PROPOSAL TO POSTPONE NATO'S DEPLOYMENT OF INF MISSILES

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AN ON THE RECORD ANSWER GIVEN BY NEWS DEPARTMENT AT 1230 ON 19 AUGUST:

'I CAN CONFIRM THAT THE GREEK EMBASSY DELIVERED ON 17 AUGUST A LETTER FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE PROPOSING THE TEMPORARY POSTPONEMENT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE AND PERSHING II MISSILES, AND SUGGESTING THIS BE DISCUSSED INFORMALLY AT THE NEXT MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE TEN.

THE LETTER IS RECEIVING ATTENTION AND WE EXPECT A FORMAL REPLY TO BE SENT AFTER SIR GEOFFREY HOWE'S RETURN TO LONDON.

IN THE MEANTIME WE HAVE ALREADY EXPRESSED TO THE GREEK EMBASSY AT OFFICIAL LEVEL OUR SURPRISE THAT SUCH A PROPOSAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE AND OUR FIRM OPPOSITION TO IT.

IT REMAINS THE POSITION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES AND PERSHING II MUST BEGIN AS PLANNED BY THE END OF THIS YEAR UNLESS PROGRESS AT THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD MAKE THIS UNNECESSARY.

WE REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL NOT NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY TOWARDS THE ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES WHICH ALL THE ALLIES SHARE, UNLESS THEY IN TURN REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THE ALLIES WILL OTHERWISE DEPLOY THE NEW WEAPONS AS DETERMINED IN NATO'S 1979 'DUAL-TRACK' DECISION. POSTPONEMENT OF DEPLOYMENT WOULD CAST DOUBT ON NATO'S DETERMINATION TO STICK TO THIS DECISION AND WOULD THUS CUT ACROSS OUR ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES.

THE MATTER HAS FOR OBVIOUS REASONS BEEN HANDLED IN THE ALLIANCE, NOT IN THE TEN.'

WHITNEY

DIST:

LIMITED	NEWS D
DEFENCE D	PS
ACDD	PS/LADY YOUNG
SED	PS/MR LUCE
EESD	PS/MR WHITNEY
NAD	SIR J BULLARD
WED	MR WRIGHT
ECD(E)	MR JAMES

DPN 083/43
22 AUG 1983
INDEX

RESTRICTED

GR 445
RESTRICTED
FM BUCHAREST 221310Z AUG 83
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 196 OF 22 AUG
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON , MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO

CEAUSESCU'S MESSAGES ON INF

1. IN MY TEMPORARY ABSENCE FROM BUCHAREST HEAD OF CHANCERY WAS SUMMONED TO THE MFA YESTERDAY (SUNDAY) TO RECEIVE FROM DUMA UNSIGNED MESSAGES FROM CEAUSESCU ADDRESSED TO HER MAJESTY AND TO THE PRIME MINISTER. TEXTS ARE IDENTICAL. MESSAGES, WITH UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION, FOLLOW BY BAG. THE MAIN POINTS ARE AS FOLLOWS.

2. (A) CEAUSESCU REFERS TO RECENT MESSAGES ABOUT INF SENT TO ANDROPOV AND REAGAN (TEXTS PUBLISHED THIS MORNING: SEE PARA 4 BELOW.)

(B) HE CONSIDERS IT IMPORTANT FOR THE UK '' TO TAKE ACTION SO THAT THE USSR AND THE USA DO EVERYTHING TO REACH AGREEMENT THIS YEAR''.

(C) IF NO UNDERSTANDING IS REACHED AT GENEVA THIS YEAR IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ''TO DO ALL IT CAN IN ORDER THAT THE US AND SOVIET UNION AGREE'' TO POSTPONE THE INSTALLATION OF NEW MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES AT LEAST UNTIL THE END OF 1984 SEMI COLON DURING THIS PERIOD OF CONTINUING NEGOTIATION THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD GUARANTEE TO STOP DEVELOPING AND MODERNISING NEW MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES AND TO REDUCE UNILATERALLY PART OF THOSE STATIONED ON SOVIET TERRITORY IN EUROPE.

(D) IF NO AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON THIS PROPOSAL ROMANIAN CONSIDERS IT IMPORTANT THAT THE UK SHOULD TAKE ACTION SO THAT AT LEAST NO MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES SHOULD BE STATIONED ON THE TERRITORY OF THE FRG, GDR, CZECHOSLOVAKIA ''OR OTHER STATES''.

(E) AS AN INTERMEDIATE MEASURE BRITISH SUPPORT FOR THE CREATION OF DE-NUCLEARISED ZONES IN THE BALKANS, NORTHER EUROPE AND OTHER PARTS OF THE CONTINENT WOULD BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE.

(F) IN HIS MESSAGE TO ANDROPOV AND REAGAN CEAUSESCU HAS PROPOSED THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD DECIDE UNILATERALLY TO FREEZE MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN 1984 AND 1985 AT THE LEVEL OF 1983, MEANWHILE CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN UNDERSTANDING TO REDUCE MILITARY EXPENDITURE.

RESTRICTED

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(G) THERE SHOULD BE AN INTENSFIFICATION OF POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY WITH THE OBJECT OF ENSURING A STOP TO THE INSTALLATION OF NEW MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE AND THE WITHDRAWAL AND DESTRUCTION OF EXISTING ONES. THIS WOULD CONFORM TO THE ASPIRATIONS AND INTERESTS OF ALL PEOPLES, AND WOULD IMPROVE THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CLIMATE.

(H) WE SHOULD WORK TOGETHER FOR THE REALIZATION OF PRACTICAL MEASURES FOR DISARMAMENT, ESPNCIALLY NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.

3. I UNDERSTAND THAT SIMILAR MESSAGES ARE BEING HANDED INTER ALIA TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OTHER STATIONING POWERS .DENMARK AND SWITZERLAND HAVE ALSO RECEIVED MESSAGES.

4. '' ROMANIA LIBERA'' PUBLISHED TODAY (22 AUGUST) TEXTS OF CEAUSESCU'S MESSAGES TO ANDROPOV AND REAGAN. THEY MAKE, MUTATIS MUTANDIS, THE SAME POINTS. UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATIONS FOLLOW BY BAG.

HOLMER

LIMITED
DEFENCE D
ACDD
EESD
NAD
WED
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR JAMES

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
START

pa. disarmament/
HVF

PS TO PM 10 DOWNING ST.

CONFIDENTIAL

12791 - 1

GRS 485
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 181555Z AUG
TO IMMEDIATE ATHENS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 270 OF 19 AUGUST
REPEATED FOR INFO TO IMMEDIATE BONN, PARIS, WASHINGTON, ROME, UKDEL NATO, PRIORITY OSLO, ANKARA, OTTOWA, MOSCOW AND OTHER EC POSTS
INF : GREEK PROPOSAL TO POSTPONE NATO DEPLOYMENT PROGRAMME
1. THE GREEK CHARGE DELIVERED ON 17 AUGUST A LETTER FROM HIS FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, DATED 13 AUGUST WHICH PROPOSES THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE AND PERSHING II MISSILES FOR A SUGGESTED PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS IN ORDER 'TO GIVE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS THE BREATHING SPACE THEY CERTAINLY NEED'. THE LETTER SUGGESTED THAT THE PROPOSAL MIGHT BE DISCUSSED INFORMALLY AT THE NEXT POLITICAL CO-OPERATION MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS (12 SEPTEMBER).
2. ACTING HEAD OF DEFENCE DEPARTMENT TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF A CALL ON 18 AUGUST BY THE CHARGE (ON ANOTHER MATTER) TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
(A) THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S ABSENCE WOULD INVOLVE SOME DELAY IN A REPLY BUT AT OFFICIAL LEVEL WE WERE GREATLY SURPRISED THAT THE GREEKS SHOULD MAKE SUCH A PROPOSAL AND WERE FIRMLY OPPOSED TO IT:
(B) PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS HAD ALWAYS DEPENDED ON THE RUSSIANS BEING CONVINCED THAT THE ALLIANCE WAS DETERMINED TO STICK TO ITS 1979 DECISION INCLUDING THE DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE UNLESS PROGRESS AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WARRANTED OTHERWISE:
(C) THUS POSTPONING DEPLOYMENTS WOULD CUT RIGHT ACROSS THE ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES WE ALL SHARE BY UNDERMINING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ALLIANCE'S COMMITMENT TO THE 1979 DECISION:
(D) THE GREEK PROPOSAL, PARTICULARLY IF FOR ANY REASON IT BECAM PUBLIC, WOULD ONLY SERVE TO INCREASE THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES OF STATIONING COUNTRIES. IT WAS NOT EASY FOR US TO UNDERSTAND WHY NON-STATIONING COUNTRIES SHOULD FIND IT NECESSARY TO ADD TO

/OUR

OUR PROBLEMS IN THIS WAY:

(E) IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE TEN TO DELIBERATE ON A PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF RADICALLY ALTERING NATO POLICY. ANY DISCUSSION ON THIS SHOULD INCLUDE ALL ALLIES AND PARTICULARLY THE AMERICANS: NATO WAS THE OBVIOUS FORUM.

3. THE CHARGE UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THIS RESPONSE IMMEDIATELY TO ATHENS.

4. WE SHOULD NOT WISH YOU TO INITIATE FURTHER ACTION WITH THE GREEKS AT THE MOMENT BUT WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD FIND OUT WHICH OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS HAVE BEEN SENT THIS MESSAGE.

5. THE FOLLOWING ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN IN OTHER NATO REPEAT NATO CAPITALS:

(A) TO DISCOVER WHICH OTHER ALLIES HAVE RECEIVED A SIMILAR MESSAGE FROM THE GREEKS (AS OF 17 AUGUST WE UNDERSTAND THE AMERICANS HAD NOT: IT SEEMED FROM A CONVERSATION WHICH BULLARD HAD WITH PFEFFER THAT THE GERMANS PROBABLY HAD):

(B) TO INFORM THEM OF OUR INITIAL RESPONSE:

(C) TO URGE WHERE NECESSARY THE IMPORTANCE OF DEALING WITH THE GREEK PROPOSAL PROMPTLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY.

6. WE SHALL TAKE ACCOUNT OF RESPONSES IN DRAFTING A FORMAL REPLY TO THE GREEKS. THIS MAY NOT BE SENT UNTIL AFTER THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S RETURN AT THE BEGINNING OF SEPTEMBER.

WHITNEY

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NAD
WED
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR JAMES

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

START

p.a. disarmament/INF

GR 290
UNCLASSIFIED
FM ATHENS 190600Z AUG 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO.,
TELNO 376 OF 19 AUGUST 1983.,
REPEATED AS IMMEDIATE INFO TO UKDEL NATO.,
REPEATED AS PRIORITY INFO TO ALL EC POSTS, WASHINGTON, ANKARA.,
REPEATED AS ROUTINE INFO TO OTHER NATO POSTS AND NICOSIA.

INF TALKS: GREEK PROPOSAL TO POSTPONE DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES

1. THE GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN PUBLISHED ON 18 AUGUST THE TEXT OF A LETTER DATED 13 AUGUST FROM HARALAMBOPOULOS TO HIS EC COLLEAGUES.

2. TEXT AS FOLLOWS:-

'' MY GOVERNMENT IS VERY MUCH PREOCCUPIED BY THE POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS, BOTH INTERNALLY AND AS REGARDS THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN GENERAL, OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PERSHING II AND CRUISE MISSILES IN CERTAIN NATO COUNTRIES, SHOULD THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS FAIL TO PRODUCE TANGIBLE RESULTS BETWEEN NOW AND NEXT DECEMBER.
UNFORTUNATELY, THE PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SO FAR DOES NOT SEEM TO JUSTIFY THE HOPE THAT SUCH RESULTS CAN BE EXPECTED UNTIL THEN. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT EVERY CHANCE SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE TWO MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON AN ISSUE OF SUCH PRIMORDIAL IMPORTANCE.

'' THESE CONSIDERATIONS INCITE MY GOVERNMENT TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF A POSTPONEMENT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE ABOVE MISSILES FOR A PERIOD, OF, SAY SIX MONTHS. THIS EXTENSION WOULD GIVE THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS THE BREATHING SPACE THEY CERTAINLY NEED.

'' I WOULD BE VERY MUCH INTERESTED TO HAVE YOUR REACTIONS ON THE ABOVE SUGGESTION. I WOULD OF COURSE ALSO BE WILLING TO HAVE THE MATTER DISCUSSED INFORMALLY AT OUR NEXT MEETING ON POLITICAL COOPERATION, SHOULD YOU AND OTHER COLLEAGUES THINK THAT SUCH A DISCUSSION WILL BE USEFUL.''

LLEWELLYN SMITH

LIMITED
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WED
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PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
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MR WRIGHT
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PS TO PM 10 DOWNING ST.

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GPS 125
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FROM WASHINGTON 182338Z AUG 83.
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2317 OF 18 AUGUST
INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DS17), MOSCOW, DUBLIN, UKREP BRUSSELS,
ALL NATO POSTS.

GREEK LETTER ON POSTPONEMENT OF INF DEPLOYMENTS.

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT WE AND OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE RECEIVED HARALAMBOPOULOS'S LETTER WILL NOT ONLY REJECT THE GREEK PROPOSAL IMMEDIATELY AND FIRMLY BUT (NOW THAT THE GREEKS HAVE PUBLICISED THEIR MOVE) WILL ALSO DO SO PUBCLY.

2. BURT IS TO SEE THE GREEK AMBASSADOR THIS AFTERNOON AND INTENDS TO REBUKE HIM IN THE MOST SEVERE TERMS. THE AMERICANS ARE OF COURSE FURIOUS NOT ONLY ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE GREEK PROPOSAL BUT ALSO ABUT THE FACT THAT IT HAS BEEN ADDRESSED TO COMMUNITY RATHER THAN ALLIANCE COUNTRIES.

THOMAS

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SIR J BULLARD
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SECRET UK EYES A

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 26 July 1983

The Ground Launched Cruise Missile Programme

The Prime Minister has seen and taken note of Mr. Heseltine's minute of 21 July in which he explains that he has concluded that the presentational benefits from increasing the British component of the RAF/USAF Defence Force are outweighed by the practical penalties; that we are making arrangements for independent secure communications to the RAF Command at Greenham Common; and that consultations are in hand with regard to off-base training deployments.

A. J. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET UK EYES A

le

41

MO 11/2/2

Prime Minister

To note.

A.J.C. 25/7

PRIME MINISTER

MG

THE GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE (GLCM) PROGRAMME

When we discussed cruise missile deployment at MISC 7 on 8th March, I suggested that we might increase the size of the British component of the joint RAF/USAF Defence Force. I have now looked in detail at what would be involved in increasing the size of the British component from one-third (220 men) to two-thirds (about 440 men).

2. The task of this force is to protect the missiles and their associated equipment when on base - or, more importantly, deployed in the field - in time of tension and war. They are not responsible for ordinary base security functions in peacetime, or for dealing with demonstrators, which are the tasks of the MOD and civil police. The British element of the force will be clearly in evidence at Greenham Common and when there are training deployments and be a visible symbol of UK involvement in the GLCM programme. But these personnel will have no part in the command and control of the weapon system itself, and could not be represented in any meaningful way as providing British control over the launching of the missiles. With one-third of the force we can show a substantial presence; two-thirds would add to this visibility but not in any decisive way.

3. On the other hand, increasing our contribution to the joint Defence Force above the presently planned level would have significant penalties. It would very soon run us into substantial extra cost over and above the £4M "in cash or in kind" which we originally agreed to contribute. To find the manpower, there would either have

to be an increase in the level of uniformed manpower provided for in the RAF programme or other high priority RAF tasks would have to suffer. In either case I would prefer not to take on an extra task when I am seeking to contain service manpower numbers and direct as much of the available effort as possible to our own front-line.

4. We need to look at this issue in the light of the progress we have made with the US Government on the public presentation of the joint decision arrangements and of the movement in public opinion since our discussion in March. I have concluded that, against this background, the presentational benefits from increasing the force are outweighed by the practical penalties. It is, however, important that we should have independent secure communications to the RAF Command at Greenham Common. This is being provided in the form of a secure telephone on the MOD net provided for the RAF Station Commander. In future by this means we shall be able to keep an independent national check on all movement of missiles on the base or entering and leaving the base.

5. Once GLCMs are based at Greenham Common, off-base training deployments would of course provide an opportunity and a focus for protestors trying to disrupt the cruise missile programme. I have registered with Mr Weinberger the need for the timing and location of off-base deployments to be carefully considered jointly. Consultations are in hand with the relevant police forces and the Americans, and plans are being prepared which would involve the use of MOD Training Areas and give the protestors minimum opportunity to interfere. I intend to report on this again later.

6. I am copying this minute to the other members of MISC 7 and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
21st July 1983

C. Sir A. Parsons.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 July, 1983

N. B. P. M.

A J C 19/7.

Dear Tony

Chancellor Kohl: Visit to Moscow

Thank you for your letter of 8 July. attached.

Although Kohl's visit has been well covered in telegrams from Bonn and elsewhere, you may still like to have the attached note by the Department drawing the threads together.

Yours ever

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

CHANCELLOR KOHL'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION (4-8 JULY)

General

1. Chancellor Kohl's visit to the Soviet Union continued the practice of regular FRG/Soviet high level contacts. It was in return for Brezhnev's visit to Bonn in November 1981. Herr Kohl's purpose was not so much to transact business (no major contracts were signed or agreements reached) but to demonstrate Alliance firmness, while at the same time signalling (in part to domestic German opinion) that the FRG remains ready to work for a less strained East/West relationship. He appears to have made an impact on his Soviet interlocutors, and to have got over the message that the strength and determination of Western policy on arms control stems from the close understanding between Western leaders and governments. He was helped by his strong domestic position. The German media have commented in glowing terms on his performance.

Soviet Leadership

2. The visit has provided a valuable insight into the workings of the Soviet leadership. Despite his ill-health (on which a detailed note is being prepared separately) Andropov gave an impressive performance. He was intellectually very much in command. The various meetings showed that his pre-eminence is based upon a clear grasp of the issues as well as firm control over the Party machinery. He appears to have conducted the meetings with some skill and backed away from superficial wedge-driving, although there is little doubt that his underlying objective was to search for evidence of discord within the Alliance. Herr Kohl's discussion with Ustinov showed the Soviet military as a relatively closed group, conscious of their power but lacking in much wider understanding of the problems confronting them.

3. The Russians showed a keen interest in the mechanics of Western consultation. They were clearly impressed by the unity achieved in the Williamsburg Summit declaration. The somewhat less striking results of the Moscow summit on 28 June may have been at the back of their minds.

East/West Relations and INF

4. The Russians had little new to say on INF, and appear to have taken a hard line - placing the emphasis on British and French systems, and not apparently trying to distract Kohl by putting forward any "carrot" (for instance an offer - which had been rumoured - to dismantle some SS20 systems in return for a delay in deployment). But Herr Kohl resisted the Soviet threats that missile deployment would damage Soviet/German relations and he spoke forcefully in support of the agreed NATO position. He and Genscher made it very clear that the inclusion of UK and French forces was unacceptable. Genscher had the impression that there might be some flexibility on this point in advance of deployment, but Kohl's Diplomatic Adviser disagrees. The Russians themselves said no more than that there might still be room for manoeuvre in their position. The Russians will have been impressed by the determination of the German Government and firmness of support for both parts of the double decision.

5. The Russians did not speak of breaking off the INF negotiations, and appeared to envisage that they would continue in some form after deployment. Herr Kohl's comment that the Russians would make a propaganda fuss over deployment but in the medium term will not wish to upset "sensible and reasonable relations" is an important judgement, although it to some extent reflects the outcome which the Germans are hoping to see. More generally, it is

signficant that Andropov did not demur when Herr Kohl said that he should expect President Reagan to be in office for another term. As expected Herr Kohl voiced his own support for a US/Soviet summit.

CSCE

6. The discussion of CSCE reflected the moves which the Russians are now taking with a view to closing the remaining gap. Gromyko described CSCE as "an example of how the most difficult issues could be successfully handled".

German/Soviet and Inner-German Relations

7. In their briefing so far the Germans have said relatively little about their bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and inner German relations. This is their normal practice. They take the view that quiet diplomacy has served their interest better in the past in getting exit visas for ethnic Germans and others. Herr Kohl spoke firmly about well known dissidents. He also surprised even his own supporters in the FRG by his forthright reminder to the Russians on the ultimate goal of conditions of peace in which the German people will regain their unity in free self-determination. He also emphasised Bonn's desire to normalise relations with the GDR. The Russians appear to have hinted that inner-German relations might suffer if INF deployment went ahead; Herr Kohl for his part may have hoped, in drawing attention to the FRG's recent DM1 billion credit guarantee to the GDR, to signal that a deterioration in East/West relations could also hurt the Eastern side.

East/West Economic Relations

8. On economic relations, the Russians mentioned some sort of concept of cooperation with the West for the remainder of the century. This no doubt in part reflects the familiar Soviet desire to establish a long term framework (advantageous to the USSR) for trade with their more

important Western partners such as the FRG - an indication perhaps that the Russians are conscious of their own economic weakness and Western strength.

Public Presentation

9. In propaganda terms the Russians used the visit as a further opportunity for rhetoric over INF and criticised Kohl for some of the positions which he took. Critical comment appeared in their press while the visit was still in progress, which is unusual in Soviet terms. Nevertheless the underlying Soviet interest has been to record the visit as an important and serious East/West occasion, albeit in terms which gave prominence to Soviet "peace-loving" policies.

10. The indications are that public opinion in the FRG appreciate that Herr Kohl is the first Western Head of Government to meet Andropov. The Press has commended the firmness and clarity with which he expounded the FRG and Western positions. Comment has not surprisingly placed particular emphasis on the signs (including Andropov's acceptance of an invitation to the FRG) that FRG/Soviet relations will survive INF deployment.

Conclusion

11. The visit, although not an occasion for negotiation, proved of considerable value. The most important point is that it enabled Herr Kohl to put Western views on strategic issues directly and firmly to the Soviet leaders. While the Russians will certainly continue to probe for weaknesses in the German position and will try to exploit any domestic tensions within the FRG as deployment comes closer, Herr Kohl's performance will have served as a healthy antidote to some of the more optimistic reports of the likely success of their propaganda initiatives which may have been reaching the Soviet leaders on their own channels.

12. From the general Western point of view the visit has given the first opportunity to assess the new Soviet leadership in direct action with one of their major Western interlocutors. Andropov emerged as having a clear understanding of the key issues of East/West and also of FRG/Soviet relations. Herr Kohl's impression confirms earlier reports that Andropov has a formidable intellectual quality. It also confirms observations of his physical ill-health. The overall impression however, was one of rigidity in which Andropov's health must play a part. The Soviet leaders appear to have an understanding of the problems which confront them. It is not yet clear whether they have the necessary imagination or will to arrive at solutions. In such circumstances the power of inertia, which has always been a striking Russian as well as Soviet characteristic, should not be underestimated.

GBVAAT

Mr. Hordern: Does not my right hon. Friend agree that it would be a good idea if the reasons why local authorities apparently need to borrow so much money were made known earlier so that markets could know where they stand? When will the Government require local authorities to sell some part of the 100,000 acres of surplus development land that they own so that more houses can be built and the construction industry put to work?

The Prime Minister: I have great sympathy with what my hon. Friend says, especially about the disposal of land that has been in the hands of local authorities for a long time. They also have access to capital by virtue of selling council houses. My hon. Friend is right. We do not have the means of controlling local authority borrowing. The extent to which they are borrowing is one of the causes of overexpenditure at the moment.

Nuclear Weapons

Q2. **Mr. Stuart Holland** asked the Prime Minister whether she will seek to negotiate with President Reagan an agreement on joint control of United States nuclear weapons on British soil.

The Prime Minister: I have already reviewed with President Reagan the existing understandings between the United Kingdom and the United States governing the use by the United States of nuclear weapons and bases in this country. I have described the effect of these understandings in answer to a question on 12 May and again on 30 June.

Mr. Holland: Is the Prime Minister aware of the great concern inside and outside the House about the lack of transparent agreement on these matters? If, in fact, there can be no guarantee of dual control of these weapons, does she agree that the so-called nuclear defence strategy of the Government will be seen to be neither independent of, nor co-dependent with, the United States but utterly dependent on President Reagan?

The Prime Minister: If the hon. Gentleman has indeed read the reply that I gave again on 30 June, he will know that joint decision means exactly what it says. It would require the decision of both President Reagan—or the then President of the United States—and the current Prime Minister before any such weapon could be fired. President Reagan has already made that perfectly clear and has said in the United States that it is tantamount to a veto.

Mr. Faulds: Gullible lady.

Mr. Stokes: Is my right hon. Friend aware that while most people are quite satisfied with the arrangements for the control of nuclear weapons here what does concern them, and concerned them at the last general election, is the utter lack of concern shown by Opposition Members to the huge build-up of Soviet arms facing this country and threatening our way of life?

The Prime Minister: I agree with my hon. Friend. It is NATO that has made extensive proposals in Geneva and, for many years in Vienna, for disarmament.

Dr. Owen: Do logistic difficulties mean that it might not be possible to deploy Pershing 2 in Germany and cruise missiles in Italy at the end of this year, should it be necessary? Does this not underline the importance of having RAF personnel involved in the dual key mechanism if Britain alone of the NATO allies has to deploy cruise missiles at the end of the year?

The Prime Minister: I am not aware of any such logistic difficulties, particularly with regard to Germany. It is Germany's intention to deploy at the end of the year in accordance with our agreements.

Mr. Dykes: Was not a striking feature of the election campaign the complete public satisfaction and calm on the issue of joint decision-making and supervision? It was not an election issue, despite Left-wing attempts to build it up as such. Does not my right hon. Friend agree that public acceptance of an obviously sensitive arrangement that has lasted for many years will continue in the future?

The Prime Minister: I agree with my hon. Friend. The last election showed two things very clearly; first, that the British people believe that Britain's defences should remain strong and part of NATO and, secondly, that disarmament should be on a multilateral, balanced and verifiable basis.

Administration (Scotland)

Q3. **Mr. Foulkes** asked the Prime Minister if she will consider reviewing the arrangements for the administration of matters affecting Government Departments in Scotland.

The Prime Minister: I am satisfied with the present arrangements and have no plans to review them.

Mr. Foulkes: Does the Prime Minister recall that in her Scottish manifesto she promised to consider further changes to improve the government of Scotland? When does she plan to bring forward those changes, or is this another promise that will be reneged on, like her promise to protect the Health Service?

The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman asked about "arrangements for the administration of matters affecting Government Departments in Scotland."
I have no complaint about those but if the hon. Gentleman has proposals to put forward, we shall consider them.

Mr. Foulkes: The right hon. Lady said that she would put them forward.

Mr. Canavan: As the Prime Minister was decisively rejected at the general election by more than 70 per cent. of Scottish voters, will she admit that she received no mandate from the people of Scotland, the majority of whom voted for candidates who stood on manifestos containing commitments to set up a Scottish assembly? If the Prime Minister pays any more than lip service to democracy, will she now take steps to deliver to the people of Scotland what they voted for?

The Prime Minister: On the basis of the hon. Gentleman's criteria, four out of the last five Labour Governments had no mandate to govern England.

Mr. Henderson: Is my right hon. Friend aware that outside the immediate vicinity of Glasgow, Conservativ candidates received more votes than Labour candidates the recent election? Is she further aware that Scotla appreciates the fact that she has provided not only a m admirable team of Scottish Office Ministers and La Officers but, just as important, has ensured t continuation of Scottish influence in the United Kingdo Government?

Defence : INF.

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PS/Lady Young
PS/Mrs Luce
Mr Carthedge Sir J Bullard
Mr James Mr Wright

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FM BONN 111130Z JUL 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 697 OF 11 JULY
INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DUS(P), DS 17) UKDEL NATO WASHINGTON PARIS
INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW
INFO SAVING THE HAGUE BRUSSELS ROME CICC(G)

MY TELNO 688: KOHL'S VIEWS ON TREATMENT OF THIRD-COUNTRY SYSTEMS IN INF/START

SUMMARY

1. IN A NEWSPAPER INTERVIEW THIS WEEKEND KOHL EXPRESSED HIS VIEWS ON THIRD-COUNTRY SYSTEMS IN TERMS BROADLY COMPATIBLE WITH OUR OWN POSITION. PRESS RUMOURS OF FRG INTEREST IN NEW FORA FOR DEALING WITH THE THIRD-COUNTRY ISSUE (EG CSCE/CDE) SEEM TO HAVE ORIGINATED FROM JENNINGER, MINISTER OF STATE IN THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE.

DETAIL

2. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH SCHELL OF QUOTE DIE WELT UNQUOTE ON 9 JULY, KOHL WAS ASKED WHETHER DISCUSSING FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS IN START WOULD BE A WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE CREATED BY SOVIET DEMANDS IN INF. KOHL'S REPLY WAS: QUOTE FRENCH AND BRITISH WEAPONS PLAYED A GREAT PART IN THE SOVIET PRESENTATION. BUT IF PEOPLE REALLY WANT AN AGREEMENT, THE THING WON'T BREAK DOWN JUST BECAUSE OF THESE NATIONAL WEAPONS OF DEFENCE. YOUR MENTION OF P

AGREEMENT, THE THING WON'T BREAK DOWN JUST BECAUSE OF THESE NATIONAL WEAPONS OF DEFENCE. YOUR MENTION OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THESE SYSTEMS MIGHT BE DISCUSSED, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE START NEGOTIATIONS, CORPECT. BUT IN THE VIEW OF OUR BRITISH AND FRENCH FRIENDS, THIS COULD ONLY COME INTO QUESTION IF BOTH SUPER-POWERS HAD SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF THEIR OWN STRATEGIC WEAPONS UNQUOTE.

3. AN ARTICLE IN THIS WEEK'S QUOTE DER SPIEGEL UNQUOTE ALLEGED THAT JENNINGER, MINISTER OF STATE AT THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE, SAW THE EXCLUSION OF THIRD-COUNTRY SYSTEMS AS THE WEAKEST POINT IN NATO'S INF NEGOTIATING POSITION AND WAS CONCERNED TO OVERCOME IT BY TAKING THESE FORCES INTO ACCOUNT IN CDE OR SOME OTHER FORUM. A MEMBER OF CHANCERY SPOKE TO JENNINGER THIS MORNING. JENNINGER SAID IT WAS THE RUSSIANS WHO HAD ATTACKED THE EXCLUSION OF THIRD-PARTY SYSTEMS FROM INF/START AS THE WEAKEST POINT IN THE WESTERN POSITION: HE AND KOHL CERTAINLY DID NOT REGARD IT AS SUCH. IN MOSCOW, THE GERMAN SIDE HAD MADE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR TO THE RUSSIANS THAT THEY SAW THE DIFFICULTY OVER THIRD-PARTY SYSTEMS AS ONE RECENTLY MANUFACTURED BY THE USSR FOR REASONS OF ITS OWN. KOHL HAD STRESSED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE START TALKS WAS TO ACHIEVE WORTHWHILE REDUCTIONS IN US AND SOVIET FORCES.

4. JENNINGER WENT ON, HOWEVER, TO SAY THAT HE HAD BEEN MUSING ON THE RELEVANCE OF THE CDE - A PAN-EUROPEAN, ESSENTIALLY OPEN-ENDED FORUM - FOR RESOLVING THE THIRD-COUNTRY ISSUE, AND MIGHT HAVE MENTIONED THIS TO JOURNALISTS DURING A SLACK MOMENT AT MOSCOW. BUT HE STRESSED THE INCHOATE NATURE OF HIS IDEAS. INDEED HE SEEMED ILL-INFORMED ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE CSCE PROCESS. HE WAS REMINDED OF THE STANDARD BRITISH POSITION.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO THE HAGUE BRUSSELS AND ROME

MALLABY

NNNN

SECRET AND PERSONAL

HL
cc Sir AP
File cc MASTER 40

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 July 1983

Dear Brian,

Chancellor Kohl: Visit to Moscow

Chancellor Kohl rang the Prime Minister this morning and gave her an extended account, lasting for some thirty minutes, of his visit to Moscow. I should be grateful if those to whom this letter is copied would ensure that it is not copied beyond Private Offices and that only those who have an essential operational need to know of its contents are given some account of them.

Chancellor Kohl said that on the morning before he arrived Gromyko had asked the German Ambassador to call and had explained that for reasons of health Andropov could not meet the Chancellor on that day. This was not a political excuse. The Russians were clearly very embarrassed. This change of plan had had the advantage that on the next day the two had been able to talk in a favourable overall situation and atmosphere. Andropov had tried to dispel the impression that he was not able to do business.

On the Tuesday morning the Chancellor and Mr. Andropov had had a private conversation, with only interpreters present, lasting for nearly two hours. In the afternoon they had been joined by Mr. Genscher and Mr. Gromyko.

As to Andropov's personality and health, it was clear that on the previous Sunday he had suffered from a very serious kidney problem. Given that background, he had been in fairly good shape on the Tuesday. While the Chancellor laid no claim to medical knowledge his impression was that Andropov suffered from grave kidney difficulties and that this had an impact on his blood circulation. This was evident from the way he moved. When he rose from his chair he walked for only a few steps and clearly found difficulty in walking. In advance of his visit, the Chancellor had been briefed by doctors especially on Parkinsons disease. But he had detected in Andropov none of the classical symptoms of this disease. He had occasional problems with his hands but this was not a permanent difficulty.

/ Andropov

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Andropov in discussion was absolutely brilliant - very logical and very skilful in presenting and using his arguments. He was imbued with natural authority and was clearly in charge. This was reflected in the attitude towards him of Gromyko, Ustinov and Tikhonov. Andropov was very strong-willed and this was to be felt in the intensive way in which he looked at people. He reminded one of the traditional German concept of the Head of a Grammar School. But he had a sense of humour and was able to laugh warmly.

The talks had been very plain and direct. They were also very tough on substance but the tone had never been offensive. Given the background of firmness, an interesting feature of the talks was the desire of each side to invite understanding of its position. The Russians kept saying that they did not want to drive a wedge between the allies. They made some anti-American remarks but when the Chancellor immediately countered these his answers were accepted. They had made no negative remarks about the Europeans and were very well aware that Europe was sticking firmly and closely together at present. The Russians seemed to have the clear impression that the Alliance was in good shape on defence matters. They got the message that deployment would go ahead. Nor did they expect demonstrations to change that prospect. But they kept saying that this was not the right approach.

On INF, he would not say very much but the Russians had used the old argument about British and French strategic deterrents and had attacked the German arguments in explanation of our position very strongly. This matter had been brought up again and again. He had told Ustinov that in reality this was for the Russians only a tactical argument - what mattered to them in fact was the deployment of Pershing.

As for the future, he thought that the Russians would continue to probe the Western position at Geneva and might wish to make new proposals. Andropov was ready and wanted to meet Reagan, not in the very near future but in the foreseeable future. Nor did he demur when the Chancellor had said that he should expect Reagan to be in office for another term. If there were no results at Geneva, they would raise a clamour when we started deployment. They in turn would deploy weapons in the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. It was his firm impression (though he had no evidence of this) that the Russians did not want a Cold War. In the medium term they wanted a Conference to follow up Madrid so there was a prospect of a negotiating forum for the future.

This desire for reasonable relations was also reflected in the exchanges about economic matters. They had a concept of co-operation with the West for the remainder of this century. The whole leadership, because of its age, was in a static frame of mind. We should take comfort from that fact.

He had had a separate meeting with Ustinov, who had been assisted by the Chief of the General Staff, the latter's deputy and two other officers. This had been an unusual conversation - very direct with little diplomatic finesse. But on account of its frankness it had been very helpful. Ustinov was a bear of a man. He could have been a spokesman for the German farmers. There

was an element of brutality in him but, like German farmers, he wanted to lead a good life and let others do so. Good eating and drinking were part of his way of life. He was very well informed and very much aware of his power.

All these military figures formed a caste. In discussion they used all the usual propaganda about the evils of NATO. But there had been one nuance. When he had told Andropov that the West would not move unless the Soviet Union showed flexibility, Andropov had not demurred. But the military had taken the line that they had made their offer and could not do more. So their game of poker was a tougher one. But it was not his impression that the military would have the last word.

Tikhonov was an economic expert and very well informed on economic matters. He had been interested to hear of the discussions of the European Council at Stuttgart. But when defence matters were raised, it became obvious that these were not his first subject.

Gromyko still had considerable authority. He was "Mr. Foreign Policy". But it was very clear that Andropov was in command.

The visit had been a working visit. He had not intended to negotiate on anything. The Russians were now in no doubt as to what the West would do. But his clear feeling was that, even after deployment, the Russians wanted life to go on. It was obvious that the Soviet Union was faced with enormous problems in the economic area. When he had raised Afghanistan and Poland they had not countered very vigorously. They seemed embarrassed by discussion of Poland and wanted to leave the subject quickly.

As regards East Germany, the Russians, because of economic difficulties and their intention to deploy SS 20s in the GDR, wished to keep open for the East Germans some freedom of movement.

They had been very interested in discovering how the Europeans dealt with each other and how they communicated. The Chancellor had said that the Europeans had their problems but their co-operation was very friendly. They had listened attentively when he had said that he would be talking to the Prime Minister, President Mitterrand and Mr. Lubbers today and that Genscher would be going to Washington over the weekend. He drew the conclusion that the more clearly we demonstrated our solidarity and co-operation, the better would be our position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

The Prime Minister said she wished to thank the Chancellor warmly for his brilliant account. She was very grateful for the trouble he had taken to keep us informed. She had been especially interested in the Chancellor's impressions of Andropov and the people around him. She looked forward to further detailed discussion when they next met.

Meanwhile she had one comment. It seemed to her that the stated wish of the Russians for co-operation and good relations was to some extent at odds with their position on defence. If they really wanted co-operation, it would be easy for them not to deploy SS 20s in Eastern Europe. Her impression was that the INF

negotiations were deadlocked. We should have to think further about this situation.

Chancellor Kohl said that deployment of SS 20s in the GDR was, though the Russians would never admit it, part of their policy of domesticating the GDR. But he had no doubt that for them Pershing was the dominant subject and on that matter the Soviet position was no longer rational. Once Pershing was deployed he believed that the Russians might be ready to make some move in return for a certain reduction in the numbers of Pershings deployed.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

John Coles.

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

39

GRS 560

S E C R E T

FM BONN 011653Z JUL 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 675 OF 1 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DUS(P), AUS (D STAFF), DS 17, DS 12)

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO

MY TELNO 639: INF STATIONING IN FRG

SUMMARY

1. THE AMERICANS HAVE MADE CLEAR TO KOHL THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT THE BUNDESTAG RESOLUTION OF 23 JUNE. US/FRG TALKS HAVE NOT YET BEGUN ON THE DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DELAYED ARRIVAL OF MISSILES AND PARTS IN THE FRG.

DETAIL

2. THE US EMBASSY HAVE TOLD US IN STRICT CONFIDENCE WHAT WAS SAID ON THIS SUBJECT WHEN NITZE SAW KOHL HERE YESTERDAY. NITZE ASKED WHETHER THE BUNDESTAG RESOLUTION MEANT THAT THE DATE WHEN AN INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (IOC) WOULD BE IN PLACE IN THE FRG WOULD HAVE TO BE DELAYED. KOHL CONVINCED NITZE THAT HE STILL WANTED THE IOC TO BE IN PLACE BY 1 JANUARY 1984. KOHL WAS RATHER APOLOGETIC ABOUT THE RESOLUTION. HE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT UNTIL THIS EPISODE BEEN FULLY INFORMED OF THE INTENDED TIMETABLE FOR ARRIVAL OF EQUIPMENT. HE ADMITTED THAT THE RESOLUTION HAD GIVEN THE SPD OPPOSITION A LEVER FOR REPEATEDLY QUIZZING THE GOVERNMENT IN THE AUTUMN ABOUT WHAT PREPARATIONS WERE BEING MADE FOR STATIONING AND FOR TRYING TO MAKE OUT THAT THE GOVERNMENT WERE NOT ABIDING BY THEIR UNDERTAKINGS REGARDING THE TIMETABLE.

3. MAJOR GENERAL TANDECKI, THE RESPONSIBLE PERSON IN THE FEDERAL MOD, TOLD MINISTER TODAY THAT BURT AND WOERNER HAD DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT IN GENERAL TERMS TODAY. AMERICAN SUSPICIONS THAT THE RESOLUTION MIGHT IMPLY SOME KIND OF GERMAN RETREAT FROM THE DOUBLE DECISION HAD BEEN DISPELLED. BUT THE GERMANS HAD HAD TO ADMIT THE CLEAR FACT THAT THE RESOLUTION HAD BEEN PASSED WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH THE US OR THE OTHER ALLIES CONCERNED.

4. TANDECKI ALSO ADMITTED TO MALLABY THAT THE SINGLING OUT OF THE DATE OF 15 NOVEMBER MIGHT WELL BE UNHELPFUL TO THE BRITISH AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS. ALTHOUGH THE RESOLUTION HAD SO FAR ATTRACTED VERY LITTLE ATTENTION IN THE GERMAN MEDIA, IT WAS BOUND TO DO SO SOONER OR LATER. TANDECKI SAID THAT GERMAN MINISTERS WOULD WANT BOTH TO STICK TO THE OIC ON 1 JANUARY AND TO OBSERVE THE BUNDESTAG RESOLUTION BY NOT BRINGING MISSILES OR PARTS OF THEM INTO THE COUNTRY BEFORE THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE. THE TASK OF GERMAN OFFICIALS NOW WAS TO ESTABLISH WITH US OFFICIALS WHETHER THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE. TANDECKI WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON THE LIKELY OUTCOME OF SUCH DISCUSSIONS. HE MENTIONED IN STRICT CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) HIS IDEA THAT THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT WISH TO BRING FORWARD THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE AND HOLD IT SOONER THAT 15 NOVEMBER (THE

/TUESDAY

TUESDAY OF A WEEK WHEN NO MEETINGS ARE SCHEDULED) ALTHOUGH THE RESOLUTION SAYS IT SHOULD BE AFTER THAT DATE. ON THE TIMING OF DETAILED TALKS WITH THE AMERICANS, TANDECKI SAID THAT NOTHING HAD YET BEEN FIXED BUT THAT THE GERMANS WANTED THEM TO TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

5. TANDECKI CONFIRMED THAT THE ARRIVAL OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT, THE MODIFICATION OF THE PERSHING LAUNCHERS, BUILDING WORKS AND TRAINING PROGRAMMES IN PREPARATION FOR STATIONING WOULD PROCEED BETWEEN NOW AND 15 NOVEMBER. HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE THE VIEW THAT THE TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION ALLOWED THEM TO BRING MISSILES OR PARTS INTO THE COUNTRY BEFORE 15 NOVEMBER AND TO ARGUE THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF FULL ASSEMBLY, THIS DID NOT AMOUNT TO QUOTE STATIONING UNQUOTE.

6. THE US EMBASSY EXPECT IT TO BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE AN IOC BY 1 JANUARY ON THE BASIS THAT MISSILES AND PARTS WILL START ARRIVING VERY SOON AFTER 15 NOVEMBER. BUT MANY OF THE COSTS, INCLUDING TRANSPORTATION, WILL BE HIGHER.

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INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO UKDEL MADRID MODUK
(DUS (P), AUS (D STAFF), DS 17, DS 12)
INFO ROUTINE PARIS

MY TELNO 669: INF, CSCE AND KOHL'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

SUMMARY

1. KOHL'S MEETING YESTERDAY WITH NITZE AND KAMPELMAN REVEALED THAT HE IS EXPECTING THE RUSSIANS TO OFFER TO DISMANTLE ONE BATTERY OF SS20S IN RETURN FOR A 6 MONTH DELAY IN WESTERN STATIONING.

DETAIL

2. THE US EMBASSY HAS GIVEN US IN STRICT CONFIDENCE AN ACCOUNT OF KOHL'S MEETING YESTERDAY WITH NITZE AND KAMPELMAN.

3. NITZE REPORTED THAT HIS RECENT CONTACTS WITH THE RUSSIANS, INCLUDING A LONG DINNER ON 29 JUNE WITH KVITSINSKY, HAD PRODUCED NO SIGNS OF PROGRESS. THE RUSSIANS WERE REFUSING TO CONTEMPLATE ACCEPTING ANY LEVEL WHATEVER OF US DEPLOYMENTS AND WERE STILL INSISTING THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. KVITSINSKY HAD TOLD HIM THAT, SINCE KOHL WOULD BE REHEARSING ONLY US VIEWS ON INF IN MOSCOW, THIS SUBJECT SHOULD PLAY A MINOR PART IN HIS DISCUSSIONS THERE.

4. KOHL SAID THAT HE EXPECTED THE RUSSIANS TO APPLY BOTH STICK AND CARROT IN HIS TALKS WITH THEM ON INF. AMONG THE STICKS MIGHT EVEN BE SOME REFERENCE TO BERLIN (A POINT WHICH SURPRISED THE AMERICANS). KOHL SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT OFFER TO DISMANTLE ONE BATTERY OF SS20S FACING EUROPE IN RETURN FOR 6 MONTHS' DELAY IN US STATIONING. (THE US EMBASSY COMMENTED THAT KOHL WAS CLEARLY REFERRING TO SOME SPECIFIC HINT FROM THE RUSSIANS AND THAT NITZE, WHO HAD NOT SEEMED SURPRISED BY THIS REMARK, MIGHT HAVE RECEIVED SIMILAR HINTS). KOHL SAID THAT, IF THE RUSSIANS TRIED ON HIM ANYTHING LIKE THIS, HE WOULD SAY THAT HE WAS NOT THE NEGOTIATOR ON INF AND THAT THE RUSSIANS SHOULD PUT THEIR PROPOSALS FORWARD IN GENEVA.

5. KOHL TOLD KAMPELMAN THAT HE WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH A CDE BEGINNING IN JANUARY 1984 WITH A PREPARATORY MEETING IN AUTUMN 1983. COMMENT: THE US EMBASSY AND WE HAVE HOWEVER NOTICED ONE OR TWO SIGNS THAT GENSCHER MIGHT LIKE TO CONCEDE TO THE RUSSIANS THAT THE CDE SHOULD BEGIN THIS YEAR, WHICH WOULD ANYWAY BE HIS OWN PREFERENCE: BUT, GIVEN KOHL'S POSITION, GENSCHER MAY NOT ACT ON THIS. KAMPELMAN WILL BE BACK HERE ON 2 JULY TO SEE GENSCHER.
TAYLOR

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 712 OF 1 JUL 83
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO,
INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DS17), BONN, ROME, OTTAWA, WASHINGTON, PARIS

UKDEL NATO'S TELS NOS 177 AND 179 (NOT TO ALL)

MESSAGES FROM ANDROPOV

1. THE ITALIAN EMBASSY HAVE CIRCULATED TO COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES THE FULL TEXT OF ANDROPOV'S MESSAGE TO THEIR PRIME MINISTER WHICH IS DATED 17 JUNE (OUR TRANSLATION OF THE RUSSIAN FOLLOWS BY TELELETTER TO FCO AND UKDEL NATO ONLY). THE LETTER ADDRESSES INF. IT CONTAINS NOTHING SUBSTANTIVELY NEW. BUT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF POINTS OF INTEREST, PARTICULARLY WHEN SET AGAINST THE RECENT WARSAW PACT STATEMENT (MY TELS NOS 699 AND 704).

2. THE LETTER THREATENS COUNTER-MOVES IF THE DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN MISSILES TAKES PLACE. THESE MOVES WOULD BE MADE ''INDIVIDUALLY AND TOGETHER WITH OUR ALLIES''. THE USE OF THE RUSSIAN WORD ''INDIVIDUALLY'' IS STRIKING, BUT THIS IS NOT DESCRIBED AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO COLLECTIVE MEASURES. THE PHRASE THEREFORE PROBABLY REFERS TO NO MORE THAN THE RANGE OF MEASURES DESCRIBED IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT OF 28 MAY (MY TEL NO 556) COUNTER-DEPLOYMENTS AIMED AT US TERRITORY WOULD PRESUMABLY BE UNDERTAKEN ''INDIVIDUALLY'' BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THOSE INVOLVING ADDITIONAL MISSILES IN EUROPE WOULD BE ''TOGETHER WITH OUR ALLIES''.

3. THE LETTER MORE THAN ONCE REFERS TO THE WILLIAMSBURG AND NATO MINISTERIAL MEETINGS AGAIN REFLECTING THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN DISCONCERTED BY THEIR OUTCOME. ANDROPOV ALSO MENTIONS SHULTZ'S RECENT REMARKS, IN PARTICULAR HIS ATTEMPT TO LINK THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS WITH ''COMPLETELY ARTIFICIAL'' AND UNRELATED QUESTIONS, AS FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT THE AMERICANS ARE TRYING TO BLOCK AGREEMENT THERE. THIS IS IN LINE WITH THE SOVIET PRESS COMMENT ON SHULTZ'S TESTIMONY TO THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE (MY TEL NO 701).

4. ON THE BRITISH AND FRENCH DETERRENTS, THE LETTER SAYS THAT IN REFUSING TO TAKE THEM INTO ACCOUNT, ''THEY ARE ASKING US TO CLOSE OUR EYES TO HUNDREDS OF NATO NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CHARGES WHICH EXIST IN REALITY AND ARE TARGETTED ON US.'' SUCH AN APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD NEVER BE CALLED SERIOUS.

5. ANDROPOV POURS COLD WATER ON THE ''THESIS'' ASCRIBED TO WASHINGTON THAT SERIOUS TALKS WILL ONLY BE POSSIBLE AFTER INF DEPLOYMENT (C.F. PARA 5 OF MY TELNO 704 ON THE MEETING OF WARSAW PACT LEADERS). ''TO ASSERT THAT THE SOVIET SIDE MIGHT BECOME MORE PLIANT, WHEN AMERICAN ROCKETS APPEAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, IS NOT ONLY SELF DECEPTION, BUT A PREMEDITATED ATTEMPT TO CONFUSE SOCIETY.''

6. THE CHOICE OF ADDRESSEE FOR THIS AND THE OTHER TWO LETTERS IS PERHAPS AS INTERESTING AS THE MESSAGE ITSELF. THE INF PRINCIPALS IN SOVIET EYES - U.S ., BRITAIN, FRANCE - HAVE BEEN LEFT OUT. THE LETTERS SHOULD THEREFORE BE CONSTRUED AS YET ANOTHER WEDGE-DRIVING EXERCISE AIMED AT NATO MEMBER STATES WHO FOR DIFFERENT REASONS MAY BE CONSIDERED TO BE VULNERABLE TO SOVIET PRESSURE.

7. IN TONE THE MESSAGE IS A MIXTURE OF MELODRAMA, THREAT, AND REASONABLENESS. IT IS PERHAPS THE KIND OF STATEMENT WHICH THE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE LIKED THE PACT LEADERS TO ADOPT. BUT THE DATE AND SUCH INFORMATION AS IS AVAILABLE TO ME HERE TENDS TO CONFIRM MY ASSESSMENT THAT THE RUSSIANS DECIDED THAT THEY WOULD NOT FORCE THE ISSUE AT THE MEETING IN MOSCOW SOME TIME BEFORE 28 JUNE.
SUTHERLAND

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 660 OF 29 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO ROME WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW
INFO ROUTINE OTTAWA
INFO SAVING PARIS

UKDEL NATO TELNO 177: MESSAGES FROM ANDROPOV ON INF

1. THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT TELL US THAT THE TEXT OF ANDROPOV'S LETTER TO KOHL IS GENERALLY IN LINE WITH THAT TO THE ITALIANS AS DESCRIBED AT THE NATO PERMREPS' LUNCH YESTERDAY. THEY SUSPECT THERE MAY BE SOME SMALL DIFFERENCES OR OMISSIONS BUT CANNOT BE SURE OF THIS WITHOUT SIGHT OF THE ITALIAN TEXT. IN PARTICULAR, THE LETTER TO KOHL DOES NOT REFER TO FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS SPECIFICALLY AND MAKES ONLY A BRIEF, OBLIQUE REFERENCE TO THEM IN TECHNICAL LANGUAGE.

2. THE FRG DELEGATION TO NATO DID NOT RECEIVE IN TIME THEIR INSTRUCTIONS TO COMMUNICATE EXTRACTS FROM THE ANDROPOV - KOHL LETTER AT YESTERDAY'S PERMREPS LUNCH. THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT ARE NOW PLANNING TO GIVE NATO A BRIEFING ON THE LETTER, AND ALSO ON KOHL'S REPLY, AT THE NEXT PERMREPS' LUNCH ON 5 JULY. THE REASON THEY HAVE TURNED RELUCTANT TO REVEAL DETAILS EARLIER IS THAT THE QUESTION OF A REPLY IS NOT UNDER VERY HIGH-LEVEL CONSIDERATION IN THE CHANCELLOR'
S
OFFICE AND HAS BECOME SIGNIFICANT IN CONNECTION WITH KOHL'S IMMINENT VISIT TO THE USSR. KOHL MUST CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHETHER TO REPLY AT ALL TO ANDROPOV BEFORE 4 JULY. IF HE DOES SO, HE MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN OFFERING A BRIEF RESTATEMENT OF THE ALLIED POSITION OR EXPANDING ON SOME POINTS OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE TO THE FRG WHICH HE WILL WANT TO GET ACROSS PERSONALLY TO ANDRNUOPOO IN MOSCOW .

3. IN EITHER EVENT, THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT ASSURE US THAT THE CHANCELLOR'S LETTER WILL HOLD NO UNWELCOME SURPRISES FOR THE REST OF NATO. FOR INSTANCE, THE DRAFTS NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION CLEARLY RESTATE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S REASONS FOR OPPOSING INCLUSION OF FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, QUOTE ON THE USUAL LINES UNQUOTE.
FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ABOVE ADDRESSEE
TAYLOR

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Prime Minister

I bow to the experts but I do wonder whether (d) in the attached telegram is not sufficiently close to Western wording to be interesting.

C J Wallace

A.J.C. 30/6.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 June, 1983

Warsaw Pact

Warsaw Pact Summit, 28 June

You asked for a note on the implications, particularly in the INF context, of the Warsaw Pact Summit on 28 June. I enclose for ease of reference Moscow telno 699 which contains the main points of the Summit statement.

The statement contains little which is new and reflects the various proposals associated with the Warsaw Pact Prague Declaration of 6 January, eg for a nuclear freeze, a non-use of force treaty, nuclear free zones, etc.

There is, however, one point of possible interest in this litany. This is the statement that a START agreement could be reached 'if both sides strictly observed the principle of equality and equal security'. This could be read as a conciliatory remark in the wake of President Reagan's public statement earlier this month on modifications to the US position.

It is difficult to be sure whether the Summit entirely fulfilled Moscow's intentions. It appears to have been arranged at short notice and its purpose was no doubt to counter recent displays of Western firmness on INF - ie the Williamsburg Declaration and the communique of the Paris NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting. A 'peace-loving' statement of this sort would make some sense in the context of Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow next week. At that meeting the Russians are, however, likely to adopt a much tougher line. But there had been previous indications from Eastern European sources that the Summit would adopt a more threatening tone and in particular include an announcement of Soviet intention to deploy new missiles in Czechoslovakia and East Germany as a response to NATO's INF deployment. This failed to materialise, but we tend to discount press speculation that the Romanians prevented it. We doubt whether the Romanians are in a position to oppose a decision of this sort to the point of refusing to put their name to a joint statement. The Russians could, furthermore, deploy in East Germany and Czechoslovakia at any time without needing an endorsement from the Warsaw Pact as a whole and it is open to them to announce such deployments at any time that suits them later in the year. It is possible

30.6.83

that the Russians did not wish to force the issue yet and risk indications that unity within the Warsaw Pact was under strain.

Against this background, I also send you, as requested, a suggested Line to Take for the Prime Minister if this subject comes up in Question Time tomorrow.

It has not been possible, in the time available, to show this letter or enclosure to the Secretary of State. A copy will be in his box tonight, and I will let you know of any comments he has in the morning.

Yours ever

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

WARSAW PACT SUMMIT: LINE TO TAKE

1. We shall consider this statement and discuss it with our Allies. But at first sight it seems to add little, if anything, to previous Warsaw Pact and Soviet statements. The Russians would do better spending less time trying to influence Western public opinion and more on taking seriously the negotiations in Geneva, where NATO has tabled proposals for radical reductions.

Why no announcement of Soviet counter-deployments in Czechoslovakia and East Germany?

2. The Russians have for many years deployed some short range nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe. It would not be surprising if they were later to try to threaten NATO by deploying more. But the only way they can change NATO's plans to restore the balance in intermediate-range missiles by deploying cruise missiles and Pershing 2 is to negotiate a satisfactory arms control agreement at Geneva.

GRS 920
UNCLASSIFIED
FDESKBY 290830Z
FM MOSCOW 290730Z JUN 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 699 OF 29 JUN 83
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO
INFO PRIORITY ANKARA, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON,
LUXEMBOURG, MADRID, OSLO, OTTAWA, REYKJAVIK, ROME,
THE HAGUE, UKDEL VIENNA, BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST, SOFIA,
E.BERLIN, WARSAW, PRAGUE, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA,
UKDEL MADRID, HELSINKI

MY TEL 690 AND TELCON BUTT/RESIDENT CLERK:

MEETING OF WARSAW PACT LEADERS

1. THE MEETING ENDED EARLY YESTERDAY AFTERNOON, 28 JUNE, WHEN OFFICIAL CAVALCADES WERE OBSERVED HEADING FOR THE AIRPORT. IT WAS ATTENDED BY THE PARTY LEADERS, PRIME MINISTERS, DEFENCE MINISTERS, AND FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ALL THE WARSAW PACT MEMBER STATES.

2. A JOINT STATEMENT WAS PUBLISHED YESTERDAY EVENING, OF WHICH THE FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS:

(A) THE PARTICIPANTS EXPRESSED CONCERN AT THE CONTINUING GROWTH OF TENSION IN EUROPE AND THE WORLD. THEY CONFIRMED THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE PRAGUE DECLARATION ON THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. THE US AND ITS ALLIES WERE CRITICISED FOR SEEKING MILITARY SUPERIORITY AND PURSUING THE ARMS RACE ON A WIDE SCALE.

(B) THE PARTICIPANTS EXPRESSED ALARM AT THE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS IN THE GENEVA (START, INF, AND COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT) AND VIENNA TALKS.

(C) THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION WAS BEING STILL FURTHER AGGRAVATED BY A TOUGHENING OF THE IMPERIALIST POLICY OF FORCE AND ''DIKTAT.'' THE QUESTION FACING ALL STATES WAS HOW TO AVOID THE SLIDE TO CATASTROPHE. THE PRAGUE DECLARATION HAD LAUNCHED A BROAD PROGRAMME TO REMOVE THE THREAT OF WAR. THE TOPICALITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAMME WAS CONFIRMED. THE PARTICIPANTS WERE AGAINST MILITARY COMPETITION, INCLUDING NUCLEAR. NO WORLD PROBLEMS INCLUDING THE HISTORICAL DISPUTE BETWEEN SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM COULD BE SOLVED BY MILITARY MEANS. THE PARTICIPANTS CONFIRMED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO ACHIEVE AN END TO THE ARMS RACE AND DISARMAMENT BY WAY OF TALKS.

(D) THE REMOVAL OF THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE HAD THE HIGHEST SIGNIFICANCE. WITH THE AIM OF ELIMINATING ALL MEDIUM-RANGE AND TACTICAL WEAPONS FROM EUROPE, IT WAS NECESSARY AT LEAST TO ACHIEVE SUCH AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD RULE OUT THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW AMERICAN NUCLEAR MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE AND

/ WOULD

WOULD PROVIDE FOR A CORRESPONDING REDUCTION OF EXISTING MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPON SYSTEMS IN EUROPE SO AS TO ACHIEVE BALANCE AT THE LOWEST LEVEL. SUCH AN AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED IF BOTH SIDES SHOWED MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND POLITICAL WILL, AND PROCEEDED FROM BROAD CONSIDERATIONS OF PEACE AND SECURITY. FULL SUPPORT WAS EXPRESSED FOR SOVIET PROPOSALS AIMED AT A JUST REDUCTION OF EXISTING MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE PARTICIPANTS CALLED FOR AGREEMENT AT THE TALKS THIS YEAR ON THE NON-DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE OF NEW MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES AND ON THE REDUCTION OF EXISTING MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS, BASED ON PROPOSALS ACCEPTABLE TO EACH SIDE.

(E) A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ACCORD ON START COULD BE REACHED IF BOTH SIDES STRICTLY OBSERVED THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY.

(F) TALKS ON PROHIBITING THE DEPLOYMENT OF ALL TYPES OF WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE SHOULD BE BEGUN MORE QUICKLY.

(G) A FREEZE ON THE NUCLEAR ARMS OF ALL THE NUCLEAR POWERS, AND FIRSTLY OF THE USSR AND US, SHOULD BE PROMPTLY EFFECTED AND A NO FIRST USE COMMITMENT ASSUMED BY THOSE NUCLEAR POWERS WHICH HAD NOT ALREADY TAKEN THIS STEP.

(H) THE PARTICIPANTS CALLED ON NATO STATES TO OPEN DIRECT TALKS WITHOUT DELAY ON AN AGREEMENT NOT TO INCREASE MILITARY EXPENDITURE FROM 1 JANUARY 1984 AND ON CONCRETE MEASURES FOR THE PRACTICAL MUTUAL REDUCTION OF SUCH EXPENDITURE IN THE SUBSEQUENT PERIOD SO AS TO RELEASE RESOURCES FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT NEEDS, INCLUDING THOSE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. THE HOPE WAS EXPRESSED THAT NATO WOULD RESPOND.

(I) THE NATO STATES WERE EXPECTED TO AGREE TO BEGIN THE PRACTICAL EXAMINATION OF THE PROPOSAL TO CONCLUDE A TREATY ON THE MUTUAL NON-USE OF MILITARY FORCE, AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS, BETWEEN THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO, OPEN TO ALL STATES.

(J) APPROVAL WAS EXPRESSED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES IN NORTHERN EUROPE, THE BALKANS, AND OTHER REGIONS OF EUROPE.

(K) THE QUICKEST POSSIBLE CONCLUSION OF THE MADRID CSCE CONFERENCE, WITH POSITIVE RESULTS WAS NEEDED, TO MEET THE EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN PEOPLES, TO ENSURE THE CONVOCATION OF A CDE, AND TO CONTINUE THE HELSINKI PROCESS.

(L) THE PARTICIPANTS REAFFIRMED THEIR OPPOSITION TO ANY EXPANSION OF NATO'S SPHERE OF OPERATION OR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANY NEW MILITARY POLITICAL GROUPING. THEY DID NOT SEEK TO EXPAND THE SPHERE OF OPERATION OF THEIR OWN ALLIANCE.

(M) THE PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT PERMIT MILITARY SUPERIORITY TO BE ACHIEVED OVER THEM. THEY FAVOURED A BALANCE OF FORCES AT THE LOWEST LEVEL.

/(N)

(N) PARTICIPANTS REAFFIRMED THEIR PRINCIPLED POSITION THAT THE TERRITORIAL-POLITICAL REALITIES IN TODAY'S EUROPE WERE INVIOLABLE

.

(O) PEACE COULD NOT BE STRENGTHENED THROUGH THE ARMS RACE. ONLY THE LIMITATION, REDUCTION, AND DESTRUCTION OF WEAPONS LEADING TO GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT UNDER STRICT INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COULD BRING PEACE.

(P) THE PARTICIPANTS DECLARED THAT, GUIDED BY THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE SOLEMN COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN AT HELSINKI, THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE WITH OTHER STATES AND SEEK PEACE AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE. THEY URGED THE MEMBER-STATES OF NATO AND ALL OTHER COUNTRIES TO EXAMINE IN A SOBER AND OBJECTIVE WAY THE THREATENING TRENDS IN THE CURRENT DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND TO DRAW RATIONAL CONCLUSIONS. THEY EXPRESSED READINESS TO POOL THEIR EFFORTS WITH THOSE OF ALL COUNTRIES IRRESPECTIVE OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS TO TAKE PRACTICAL STEPS TO AVERT THE WORST. THE TIME TO ACHIEVE THIS SHOULD NOT BE LOST.

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AND TO MOD (DS17)
INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, ROUTINE MOSCOW, ROME, OTTAWA AND WASHINGTON
INFO SAVING PARIS.

MOSCOW TELNO 689: MESSAGES FROM ANDROPOV

SUMMARY

1. ANDROPOV HAS WRITTEN TO THE CANADIANS, GERMANS AND ITALIANS ABOUT INF, REPEATING FAMILIAR THEMES, INCLUDING CRITICISM OF THE ALLIANCE'S POSITION ON BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR SYSTEMS.

REPORT

2. AT TODAY'S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES' LUNCH, THE ITALIAN CIRCULATED A SYNOPSIS OF A LETTER FROM ANDROPOV TO THE ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER DATED 23 JUNE (COPIES BY BAG).
IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT ANDROPOV HAD ALSO WRITTEN TO THE CANADIAN AND GERMAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT (BUT APPARENTLY TO NO-ONE ELSE, ALTHOUGH IT HAD BEEN SUGGESTED AT THE MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE EARLIER IN THE DAY THAT ANDROPOV HAD ALSO WRITTEN TO THE FRENCH).

3. ANDROPOV'S LETTER TO THE ITALIANS ALLEGES THAT NATO STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS ON INF TEND TO MAKE THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS MEANINGLESS. THE WEST'S POSITION ON BRITISH AND FRENCH WEAPONS IS NOT A SERIOUS ONE. AMERICAN FLEXIBILITY AT GENEVA IS A MERE FACADE. IF US MISSILES ARE DEPLOYED, THE SOVIET UNION, BY ITSELF OR TOGETHER WITH ITS ALLIES, WILL BE COMPELLED TO TAKE ADEQUATE MEASURES IN RESPONSE.

BUT AGREEMENT AT GENEVA IS WITHIN REACH IF NEITHER SIDE ATTEMPTS TO SECURE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. THE RESULT MUST BE EQUALITY BETWEEN NATO AND THE USSR AT LEVELS - INCLUDING THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON LAUNCHERS - CONSIDERABLY LOWER THAN THE 1976 LEVEL (I.E. PRE-SS20 DEPLOYMENT). THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO WORK FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT AND GENERAL DETENTE.

4. NEITHER THE CANADIAN NOR THE GERMAN HAD DETAILS OF TEXTS BUT THOUGHT THEIRS WERE SIMILAR. THE CANADIAN REVEALED THAT TRUDEAU WAS NOW SITTING ON TWO LETTERS FROM ANDROPOV, SINCE GORBACHEV HAD SOME TIME AGO DELIVERED ONE WHICH DEALT WITH QUOTE BILATERAL SUBJECTS UNQUOTE. THE CANADIAN INCLINATION WAS TO MAKE A SINGLE RESPONSE TO THE TWO LETTERS.

5. THE INITIAL ITALIAN ASSESSMENT WAS THAT THEIR LETTER CONTAINED NO SUBSTANTIAL NEW ELEMENT AND WAS DESIGNED FOR EARLY PUBLICATION. LEDOGAR (US) APPEALED FOR COORDINATION OF RESPONSES IN NATO.

FCO PASS SAVING PARIS.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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PS TO PM 10 DOWNING ST.

GRS 185
UNCLASSIFIED
FM MOSCOW 280904Z JUN 83
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 692 OF 28 JUN
INFO ROUTINE BONN, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON

FRG SOVIET RELATIONS AND INF

1. THE SOVIET PRESS ON 28 JUNE REPORTED PROMINENTLY THE PUBLICATION BY THE WEST GERMAN PUBLISHERS PAHL-RUGENSTEIN-VERLAG OF A COLLECTION OF ANDROPOV'S SPEECHES AND ARTICLES. IN A FOREWORD, WHICH REFERRED NOSTALGICALLY TO COOPERATION IN THE SEVENTIES, ANDROPOV SPOKE OF THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF FRG-SOVIET RELATIONS, WHICH IN 1983 HAD REACHED AN ''EXTREMELY RESPONSIBLE MOMENT'' IN VIEW OF THE PLANNED DEPLOYMENT IN THE FRG OF AMERICAN MISSILES. DEPLOYMENT WOULD NOT ADD TO THE SECURITY OF EITHER THE SOVIET UNION OR THE FRG: IT WOULD UNDERMINE EXISTING SECURITY.

2. ANDROPOV ALSO WROTE : ''WE DO NOT DEMAND UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT FROM THE WEST. NOR SHOULD UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT BE DEMANDED OF US. WHEN WE SPEAK OF DISARMAMENT WE ALWAYS HAVE IN VIEW ARMS REDUCTION AND DISARMAMENT BOTH IN THE EAST AND IN THE WEST.''

COMMENT

3. ALTHOUGH ANDROPOV'S FOREWORD WAS PRESUMABLY DRAFTED SOME TIME AGO THE BOOK'S PUBLICATION IS CLEARLY TIMED WITH KOHL'S VISIT NEXT WEEK IN MIND.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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(2)

38

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 June, 1983

Prime Minister

15 November is not likely to be the concluding date for the INF talks - only for the autumn round.

A.J.C. 29/6.

Dear John,

German Position on INF

In your letter of 27 June you asked whether a firm date for conclusion of the INF negotiations in Geneva had been set, given the significance that the German Bundestag resolution attaches to 15 November.

The significance of 15 November for the Germans appears to be that it is likely to be the concluding date for the autumn round of the INF negotiations. The Americans and the Russians have agreed to begin that round on 15 September and each round normally lasts for two months. However we understand very informally from the Americans that an earlier start to the autumn round is now under consideration and, although we do not yet know the Soviet reaction, this might affect the issue.

In any event, there is from the NATO point of view no question of the INF talks in Geneva concluding altogether after the autumn round. Our own expectation would be for them to resume on the normal basis early in the new year. We would not expect the initiation of actual deployments in Britain, Germany and Italy to affect the tempo of INF negotiations, unless of course the Russians have different thoughts.

Yours ever,

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

SECRET

Defense
INF, Pt 3

SECRET

FCO 84

37

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 June, 1983

German Position on INF

The Prime Minister saw your letter of 24 June shortly before the IDU dinner on Friday night which she and Chancellor Kohl were to attend.

On arrival at the dinner the Prime Minister described the contents of your letter to Vice-President Bush. They then both had a word with Chancellor Kohl to express their concern at the various indications that the Federal Government might be wavering over INF deployment.

Chancellor Kohl said with some emphasis that there was no question of wavering. Deployment would go ahead. But he had found on his files a commitment made by the former Chancellor, the precise nature of which is not altogether clear to me, but which seemed to involve an undertaking that there would be no stationing of missiles or parts of missiles before 15 November. Chancellor Kohl made it clear that it would nevertheless be possible to bring in a large quantity of equipment before that date, provided that this could not be construed as "stationing of missiles or parts of missiles".

Chancellor Kohl gave the impression that the significance of the date of 15 November is that it is the concluding date for the INF talks in Geneva. I should be grateful to know whether a firm date for conclusion has indeed been set and whether this is unalterable.

A. J. COLES

B. Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

filed on USA:
Visit of Vice Pres. Bush June 1983
cc) Defence Pt 3 : INF
2) Middle East Pt: Situation
3) Hong Kong: future of. Pt 6
4) Foreign Pol:
East/West
Callaghans Pt 3

Defence
36

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 June, 1983

Visit of Vice-President Bush

The Prime Minister has directed that no record should be circulated of her talk with Vice-President Bush on Friday, 24 June. Mr. Bush particularly requested this, stating that some of the information which he wished to pass to the Prime Minister was very sensitive.

The subjects covered were the Middle East, Hong Kong and China, East/West Relations and the INF negotiations.

You will wish to know that the question of Hong Kong was raised by Mr. Bush. The Prime Minister explained the present situation regarding our talks with the Chinese.

With regard to East/West Relations, you should be aware of two points:

a) The Prime Minister told Mr. Bush that she was fully behind President Reagan in his wish to strengthen COCOM.

b) Mr. Bush said that the previous American Ambassador in Prague was now a member of the National Security Council and that his views on East/West Relations were worth having. The Prime Minister thought that it might be useful for Sir Oliver Wright to talk to him in the next few weeks (I regret that I cannot supply his name, since Mr. Bush was unable to recall it!).

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

B. Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 738
CONFIDENTIAL
FM BONN 241345Z JUN 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 639 OF 24 JUNE
INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DUS(P), AUS (D STAFF), DS17, DS 12), WASHINGTON,
UKDEL NATO.
INFO ROUTINE ROME, BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE, PARIS.
INFO SAVING ANKARA, ATHENS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG,
MADRID, OSLO, OTTAWA, REYKJAVIK, MOSCOW. EAST BERLIN, CICC(S)

PS TO PM 10 DOWNING ST.

Read in full.

MISS BAILES' TELELETTER OF 16 JUNE TO MUNRO:

INF: TIMETABLE FOR STATIONING AND ROLE OF THE GERMAN PARLIAMENT

SUMMARY

1. THE BUNDESTAG HAS ADOPTED A GOVERNMENT MOTION UNDER WHICH A MAJOR INF DEBATE WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE BUNDESTAG AFTER 15 NOVEMBER AND NO PERSHING II OR CRUISE MISSILES OR PARTS THEREOF WILL BE QUOTE STATIONED UNQUOTE BEFORE THE DEBATE. THE GOVERNMENT ARE LIKELY TO ARGUE THAT THE REFERENCE TO PARTS OF MISSILES DOES NOT COVER LAUNCHERS OR ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT OR BUILDING WORKS IN PREPARATION FOR STATIONING. BUT THE SPD RECKON THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL GET INTO DIFFICULTY IF THEY HAVE LATER TO UNDERTAKE DETAILED EXPLANATIONS OF WHY DELIVERY OF ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT IS NOT RULED OUT BY THE WORDING OF THE RESOLUTION.

DETAIL

2. IN THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE ON SECURITY POLICY ON 15 JUNE, THE SPD TABLED A MOTION DEMANDING THAT THE BUNDESTAG BE GIVEN THE RIGHT TO TAKE A DECISION FOR OR AGAINST INF STATIONING THIS AUTUMN IN THE LIGHT OF THE OUTCOME OF THE GENEVA TALKS, AND THAT NO DELIVERIES OF ANY (EVEN MINOR) INF-RELATED EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE MADE TO THE FRG BEFORE THE BUNDESTAG HAD PRONOUNCED. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT MADE CLEAR ON 15 JUNE THAT A BUNDESTAG DECISION AS SUCH WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION, THE SPD HAVE CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE PAST WEEK TO EXERT HEAVY PRESSURE OVER THE ISSUE, INCLUDING A LETTER FROM VOGEL TO KOHL AND A THREAT TO RECONVENE THE BUNDESTAG DURING THE SUMMER RECESS. THEY HAVE PARTICULARLY PRESSED THE GOVERNMENT FOR AN UNEQUIVOCAL PLEDGE ON SUSPENSION OF ALL INF DELIVERIES, MAKING USE OF THE DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF US DELIVERY PLANS WHICH THEY ACQUIRED WHEN IN GOVERNMENT.

3. ON 23 JUNE THE SPD MOTION WAS VOTED DOWN IN THE BUNDESTAG BY THE PRO-GOVERNMENT MAJORITY. BUT THE LATTER PUT FORWARD AND ADOPTED AN ALTERNATIVE MOTION (TRANSLATION IN MIFT) INCORPORATING ASSURANCES BY KOHL THAT:

(A) AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER 15 NOVEMBER, THE BUNDESTAG WOULD DEBATE THE OUTCOME OF THE GENEVA TALKS ON THE BASIS OF A GOVERNMENT STATEMENT AND WOULD BE ABLE TO CONSIDER WHETHER THAT OUTCOME REQUIRED CANCELLATION OF ALL OR PART OF THE PLANNED DEPLOYMENTS (OF THE TERMS OF THE DOUBLE DECISION ITSELF):

(B) NO STATIONING OF INF MISSILES OR PARTS OF MISSILES WOULD TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE DATE OF THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE.

4. THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO OFFER THESE ASSURANCES WAS TAKEN AS A MATTER OF POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY AFTER CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN KOHL, GENSCHER AND WOERNER. THE PROVISION FOR A BUNDESTAG DEBATE IN NOVEMBER, GIVEN THE COALITION'S STRONG MAJORITY, IS NOT (NOT) REGARDED HERE AS SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKENING THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION OR THEIR COMMITMENTS TO NATO. THE FORMULA ON THE TIMETABLE FOR STATIONING IS MORE PROBLEMATIC. OFFICIALS ARE NOW CONSIDERING ITS PRECISE IMPLICATIONS. BUT STATE SECRETARY RUEHL, WHO COVERS THIS SUBJECT IN THE FMOD, TOLD MINISTER TODAY THAT IN THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEW STATIONING WOULD HAVE OCCURRED ONLY WHEN AN INITIAL OPERATING CAPABILITY WAS IN PLACE. THE GOVERNMENT, HE ARGUED, WOULD THEREFORE BE ABLE IF NECESSARY TO ALLOW ARRIVAL IN THE FRG OF MISSILES BEFORE 15 NOVEMBER AND CLAIM THAT THIS DID NOT CONSTITUTE STATIONING. HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT IT LIKELY, SUBJECT TO DETAILED DISCUSSIONS NOW NEEDED WITH THE AMERICANS, THAT NO MISSILES OR WARHEADS WOULD ARRIVE HERE BY 15 NOVEMBER. AS FOR PARTS OF MISSILES, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD PROBABLY TAKE THE POSITION THAT THE WORDING OF THE BUNDESTAG MOTION DID NOT COVER ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT, THE MODIFICATION OF THE PERSHING LAUNCHERS WHICH ARE ALREADY IN GERMANY OR OF COURSE THE BUILDING WORKS IN PREPARATION FOR STATIONING. THE SPD FORESEE THIS LINE BUT BELIEVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY IN PUTTING ACROSS PUBLICLY THE DETAILED ARGUMENTS WHY DELIVERY OF ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT IS NOT COVERED BY THE TERMS OF THE MOTION. THEY ALSO HOPE THAT IF A DELAY DEVELOPS BETWEEN THE 15TH OF NOVEMBER AND THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE, THIS COULD DELAY DELIVERIES IN A WAY THAT MEANT ACTUALLY PUSHING BACK THE IOC. ON THE FORMER POINT, THE SPD MAY WELL BE RIGHT: IT IS SOMEWHAT DEPRESSING THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAVE FELT IT NECESSARY AT THIS STAGE TO RUN THIS RISK. ONE WONDERS WHETHER THEY WILL WANT TO MAKE FURTHER CONCESSIONS AFTER THE SUMMER RECESS AS STATIONING GETS MUCH NEARER.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ABOVE PLUS MOSCOW, EAST BERLIN.
WE WILL PASS SAVING TO CINCC(G).

TAYLOR

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND VICE PRESIDENT BUSH ON FRIDAY 24 JUNE AT 10 DOWNING STREET

Present: Prime Minister
Mr. A.J. Coles

Vice President Bush
Admiral Murphy

* * * * * * *

Mr. Bush congratulated the Prime Minister on the outcome of the General Election. He asked a number of questions the answers to which could be relevant to President Reagan's prospects of success should he decide to run again.

Mr. Bush then asked how the INF issue had been handled during the campaign. The Prime Minister said that the Conservative Party had in effect defeated the Opposition on the broad general issue of defence policy. So there had been little discussion of INF and the dual key issue had arisen only once or twice. Mr. Bush enquired how the Prime Minister had handled the latter question. The Prime Minister said that she had emphasised that joint decision meant what it said. We had reviewed the arrangements in relation to Cruise and had found them satisfactory. She had also taken the line with Conservative MPs that the whole dual key debate had anti-American over-tones with which she strongly disagreed. Mr. Bush said that this matter might be raised at his Press Conference later in the day. There was some discussion of the line he should take and the Prime Minister gave him a copy of her written Parliamentary Answer to Mr. Anthony Buck, M.P. of 12 May.

Mr. Bush then asked how the Greenham Common women were faring. The Prime Minister said that they had become an eccentricity. Their activities had been inflamed by the media. They were very unpopular in the area of Greenham Common because of the disruption caused to normal life.

She had no doubt that when the time came to deploy Cruise there would be further problems but these would have to be surmounted. She doubted whether Mr. Andropov would negotiate until deployment began.

/ She

She had been very surprised to hear President Mitterrand say at the recent European Council that the Soviet Union now wanted Cruise and Pershing to be deployed. She did not agree with this view. The only possible explanation for it was that the Russians sought a justification to deploy more nuclear weapons themselves.

Mr. Bush then said that he wanted to talk to the Prime Minister in great confidence about a matter which he had not discussed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and which was not widely known in the American Administration. Mr. Habib would shortly go back to the Middle East with a new proposal. The problem was how to get the Syrians out of Lebanon. It was necessary to dissuade Israel from embarking on partial withdrawal which would only increase the risks of the present situation. American objectives were still the withdrawal of all foreign troops, the reconstitution of Lebanon and security in the Galilee area.

Mr. Habib would try to persuade Mr. Begin to modify the existing Israel/Lebanon agreement. He would be asked to name a definite date for Israeli withdrawal. If he did so, the Americans would try to persuade the Syrians to name a definite date. These dates might not be the same because the Syrians were opposed to the agreement but they would be close enough so that the Israelis could show that their objective of withdrawal was being achieved.

It would be fatal to the initiative if news of it leaked. The Prime Minister said that she would keep this information to herself. In her view Syria was the key to the present situation. It was clearly much under Soviet influence. The question arose of how the West could acquire more influence in Damascus.

Mr. Bush said that money had a role to play. The Saudis were willing to send a large cheque to Syria. He had recently heard why it was that Syria had rejected a proposal that Habib should visit Damascus. This was because, at an earlier stage when Habib was negotiating the eleventh ceasefire in the Lebanon, President Asad had given his word that Syrian troops would observe the ceasefire. Begin had similarly given his word about Israeli troops but the day after the ceasefire agreement Israeli troops had moved forward. Asad had been extremely angry and held Habib responsible for this to this

 day.

day. Begin had attempted to argue that the ceasefire agreement did not rule out troop movements. The Prime Minister commented that this was typical of him. She well understood Asad's position. Her own confidence would have been undermined in similar circumstances.

Mr. Bush said that Israel had mounting public opinion problems. The Prime Minister reiterated that in her view more attention should be given to Asad and Khaddam. Arab confidence would be undermined if the Americans did not produce movement in the situation.

Mr. Bush said that President Reagan was well aware of this. His initiative was not dead. Moreover, Begin was less formidable now that Sharon was not with him.

The Prime Minister said that the speech made by President Reagan last September was absolutely first class. But, following Israel's rejection of the initiative, the Arab world had been disappointed at the American failure to follow up the initiative vigorously. They felt that one small country in the Middle East ought not to be able to deter a great power.

She had seen reports about Begin's present frame of mind. But this could have two alternative results. He could become less interested in the problem or more determined.

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Mr. Bush said that he found Begin very unattractive. When he had visited Washington he had behaved as though the Israelis had never entered the Lebanon, bombed Beirut etc. Nevertheless the Americans would try to move things forward. They felt that they must have a Lebanon settlement before they could focus again on Arab/Israel. The Prime Minister said that we must also support King Hussein. He was a remarkable man and had made strenuous efforts with the PLO. But when there was no response from Begin, he had practically given up. She believed that Arafat might have made a more positive move if Begin had made some move on Israeli settlement policy.

Mr. Bush said that [redacted] The revolution within the PLO could be serious. A recent report suggested that Syria might

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side with the non-Arafat section. The Prime Minister commented that there was a choice between trying to do something while Arafat remained in the leadership or take the risk of waiting until the real terrorists took over.

Mr. Bush then raised the question of Hong Kong and China. American relations with China were a little better. They had made the mistake earlier of not following up their undertakings to the Chinese. In negotiations with China you had to keep your word. So earlier undertakings on the transfer of technology would now proceed. Taiwan was the exacerbating factor. With regard to relations with Taiwan the Americans had done what their law required them to do. The Chinese had not reacted vehemently. Taiwan remained a very difficult issue but the US Ambassador in Peking was now more optimistic that China and Taiwan might be able to arrive at a settlement of their differences. Was China also likely to get a reasonable arrangement over Hong Kong?

The Prime Minister said that our talks with the Chinese were now entering a more intensive phase. China was suddenly giving more attention to the issue. We had now reached agreement on an agenda for the talks. She took the view that it would be absurd if the United Kingdom and China could not make arrangements for the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong to continue. But that required continuing British administration in one form or another. It might be possible to find a solution which salvaged China's pride but preserve Hong Kong's system. The Chinese would have in mind that if they disrupted the situation in Hong Kong this would have a negative impact on Taiwan.

Mr. Bush asked where the talks with the Chinese were taking place. The Prime Minister said that they were being conducted through diplomatic channels in Peking.

The Prime Minister said that she found it disturbing that Andropov had never set foot in a democratic country. Mr. Bush said that the Administration had divided views on Andropov's health. The Finns had told them that Andropov's health was not as bad as reported. But some sources, [redacted] reported that he had only two months to live. Mr. and Mrs. Harriman, who had recently visited Moscow, had also said that Andropov's health did not seem to be as bad as reported though he had kept his hands under the

table during their talk. A family doctor who had had access to Andropov's medical records had given the view that he had only two months to live. The Prime Minister said that she wondered about the quality of decisions taken by a person in Andropov's health. But perhaps this was not of great importance in a collective system.

She was more anxious about the future of East/West relations. It was necessary to reassess them. The West must keep up its strength. But now that the Soviet Union knew that the West would do so, it was necessary to consider how to deal with them in the non-military field. She was fully behind the President in his wish to strengthen COCOM. We should consider how we could best influence the Soviet people and how best we could carry forward relations. We could trade to mutual advantage. Chancellor Kohl would visit Moscow on 4 July. She had every confidence in him. She told Mr. Bush in confidence that she would be reviewing our strategy in September. When she had completed this review it might be useful for her to visit Washington and compare notes. She had the impression that the West had been staggering from decision to decision without an overall concept.

Mr. Bush said that Mr. Harriman had reported a remark by Andropov to the effect that the Russians had no communication with the Americans. But Mr. Shultz had met Dobrynin eleven times, most recently last Saturday. In the Vice President's judgement, President Reagan now had Soviet attention. They might not like American rhetoric but they had been using rhetoric themselves. The onset of the long United States election period was worrying. Mr. Mondale was saying publicly that the first thing he would do, if elected, is visit Andropov. So there was a danger of East/West relations becoming an issue in the election campaign.

The Prime Minister commented that in her view the aim should be to persuade Andropov to visit the West. But we needed a strategy. Otherwise one Head of Government after another would visit Moscow. If Mrs. Gandhi's proposal for a meeting of Heads of Government at the UNGA came to anything, and if this provided possibilities for meetings between Andropov and Western leaders in New York, it could be useful.

Mr. Bush said that the previous American Ambassador in Prague

 / was now

was now a member of the National Security Council. It might be useful for one of our people to talk to him before our strategy review. Mr. Bush undertook to send the Prime Minister a copy of Mr. Harriman's report on his visit to Moscow.

The discussion ended at 1235.

24 June 1983

SECRET

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 June, 1983

Dear John,

German Position on INF

The Prime Minister will wish to be aware before seeing Herr Kohl that the German position over INF appears to be becoming distinctly shaky. The CDU coalition put forward a resolution (in response to an SPD resolution) which was passed by the Bundestag last night and which would appear to give the Bundestag the right of veto over INF deployments in Germany. The key points of the resolution are:

(a) The Federal Government provide an assurance that as soon as possible after 15 November the Bundestag will have a chance of debating the INF negotiations in Geneva, including the question of any cancellation of part or all the deployments, which might be necessary as a result of the negotiations; and

(b) No stationing of missiles or parts of missiles will take place before the Bundestag debate.

The latter point will cause particular difficulty for the Americans who were envisaging starting to move INF equipment into the Federal Republic in August. It is also most unhelpful to UK interests, since it is bound to draw unwanted public attention to the deployment programme here.

Earlier this week FCO and MOD officials were in Bonn to discuss aspects of the INF negotiating position with the Germans. The UK party were disturbed to find that the German attitude at working level is wavering on such key elements of the Alliance position as

1. The need for equality (this has implications for the Soviet claim to compensation for British and French systems)

2. The need for global (as distinct from purely regional) limits.

3. Whether to include aircraft on essentially Soviet terms.

4. The timing of any new Western move in the negotiations, which the Germans now wish to see introduced earlier in the next round.

From contacts today with Vice President Bush's officials, it is clear that the Americans are also alarmed at these developments. They would welcome anything we were able to do to impress upon Herr Kohl the need for us all to keep our nerve and to stick by the agreed Alliance position. Mr Burt, the key State Department official accompanying the Vice President, will be recommending to Mr Bush that he do likewise: this may be the last opportunity to do so with Herr Kohl in person before he leaves for Moscow at the beginning of July.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram, Ministry of Defence.

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Private Secretary

DD 170800Z STUTTGART

IMMEDIATE

GRS 288
UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 170800Z FCO
~~DESKBY 170700Z~~ STUTTGART (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
FM MOSCOW 161727Z JUN 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 644 OF 16 JUN 83
INFO IMMEDIATE STUTTGART (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, PEKING
INFO ROUTINE UKDIS GENEVA
INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK, OTHER NATO POSTS, SOFIA, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, EAST BERLIN, WARSAW, PRAGUE, TOKYO, UKMIS VIENNA

MY TELNO 635:

SUPREME SOVIET: CALL FOR NUCLEAR FREEZE BY ALL NUCLEAR POWERS

1. THE SUPREME SOVIET ON 16 JUNE ADOPTED A RESOLUTION ON FOREIGN POLICY WHICH INTER ALIA CALLED ON THE FOUR OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES TO JOIN THE SOVIET UNION IN A FREEZE OF THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS.

2. WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN A FULL TEXT BUT ACCORDING TO TASS THE KEY PASSAGE WAS:

''THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET CHARGES THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO ADDRESS A PROPOSAL TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR A SIMULTANEOUS QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE FREEZE BY ALL NUCLEAR POWERS OF ALL NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS POSSESSED BY THEM. SUCH A FREEZE COULD ENTER INTO FORCE FIRST WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES FROM A CERTAIN DATE, SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT, IMPLYING THAT THE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD ACT IN A SIMILAR WAY. THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT THE SUPREME LEGISLATIVE BODIES AND GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WILL ADOPT A RESPONSIBLE, CONSTRUCTIVE POSITION AS REGARDS THE NUCLEAR FREEZE PROPOSAL AND DISPLAY POLITICAL WILL IN ORDER TO BREAK, AT LAST, THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF THE ARMS RACE IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL PEOPLES OF OUR PLANET.''

3. THE RESOLUTION ALSO CALLED ON THE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS TO FOLLOW

3. THE RESOLUTION ALSO CALLED ON THE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS TO FOLLOW THE SOVIET EXAMPLE AND PLEDGE NOT TO MAKE FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. '

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES

SUTHERLAND

NNNN

SA SENT/RECD 161849Z TC/JMR

GR 120
UNCLASSIFIED
FM BUDAPEST 101420Z JUN 83
TO ROUTINE FCO
TZLNO 170 OF 10 JUNE 1983
INFO ROUTINE ATHENS, MOSCOW, PARIS, UKDEL NATO AND WASHINGTON

ATHENS TELNO 258 TO FCO. GREEK PRIME MINISTER'S VIEW ON INF

1. WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN A TRANSCRIPT OF PAPANDREOU'S TZLEVISION INTERVIEW BUT I HAVE SPOKEN WITH ONE OF THE PROGRAMME PRODUCERS WHO SAYS THAT PAPANDREOU GAVE IT '' AS HIS PERSONAL OPINION'' THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH WARHEADS SHOULD BE COUNTED.

2. THE OFFICIAL HUNGARIAN NEWS AGENCY HAS GIVEN A SUMMARY OF THE INTERVIEW, HELD ON 2 JUNE. THE RELEVANT PARAGRAPH READS:

''PAPANDREOU ANSWERED POSITIVELY THE QUESTION OF WHETHER FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN THE EUROPEAN BALANCE, AND SAID ' THE BASIS OF OUR STAND IS THAT NO MORE NUCLEAR WARHEADS SHOULD BE DEPLOYED IN EUROPE ' ''.

BIRCH

LIMITED

DEFENCE D
ACDD
EESD
NAD
WED
PS

PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR JAMES

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

START

Prime Minister (2)

To be aware (in case Mr Healey raises it tomorrow morning), especially of X and the line to take in para 3.

MLS 26/5

Mr Gillmore

Copied to: Private Secretary
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
Sir J Bullard
Mr Wright
Mr Goulden
Mr Stewart, MOD

DANISH PARLIAMENT DEBATE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INF

1. The Embassy in Copenhagen telephoned me this afternoon to report the outcome of today's debate in the Folketing. The Government coalition were defeated (83 to 70 with 24 paired absentees and two social democrat abstentions) on an Opposition Social Democrat resolution about INF. The Embassy will telegraph the full text, but the main points were as follows:

X

1. If necessary the INF negotiations should be extended.
2. While the negotiations are continuing, there should be no deployments of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles, ~~nor~~ and preparations for deployments and present systems should be frozen on both sides.
3. French and British systems should be included in a merged INF/START negotiation.
4. The West should seek reductions in Soviet SS20s, to the point where new Western deployments become unnecessary.

2. The Danish Foreign Minister made clear in his speech during the debate that the Danish Government would not be moved in its commitment to the 1979 NATO double track decision. He asked the leader of the Social Democrat Opposition whether the latter regarded the resolution as compatible with the NATO double track decision.

Mr Budtz replied that he did. On the basis of this assurance (apparently agreed beforehand) the present Danish Government has chosen not to record the vote as one of no confidence and will not resign.

3. The Ambassador saw the Danish Foreign Minister after the debate and the latter said he knew that this result would not be easy for the Alliance. The Danish Prime Minsiter, Foreign Minsiter and Defence Minister will meet tomorrow to consider the implications for NATO. Mr Mellon has an appointment to see the Danish Defence Minister thereafter.

4. Comment. This resolution is not good for the Alliance, but it could be worse.

1. Since we do not regard the negotiations as having any deadline, the question of extension as such does not arise in our view.
2. The plea for no deployments while negotiations continue certainly runs counter to the NATO position. It can only be rebutted by pointing out that to make such a gesture would precisely weaken the Western negotiating hand.
3. By linking the inclusion of French and British systems to a future merged INF/START, the resolution has avoided arguing for direct inclusion in the present INF negotiations.

4. The only point to which SS20s could be reduced, which would make Western deployments unnecessary, would be zero, in the orthodox NATO view. But of course the implications of the resolution go beyond tha

3. I recommend that if questioned, News Department should take the following line:

Line to Take

We are of course aware of today's Folketing debate and vote. We note in particular that the Danish Foreign Minister made it clear that the Danish Government would not be moved in its commitment to the NATO double track decision. We also note that the Danish Opposition leader confirmed, when asked, that he regarded the Folketing resolution as compatible with continued Danish adherence to NATO's double decision.

That decision means that in the absence of an agreed arms control agreement obviating the need for deployments, the new NATO deploymen will begin by the end of 1983 and proceed in accordance with the agreed schedule. At the same time HMG fully supports the Allied aim of seeking agreement in Geneva at the earliest possible moment and being prepared to pursue negotiations as long as necessary to achieve success.

4. The above formulation draws on draft communique language being prepared for the NATO Ministerial in Paris on 9/10 June. Mr Goulden will no doubt also wish to coordinate News Department response with the MOD and to let them know the line we are taking. He may also wish to ensure that the NO 10 press office are informed.

P J Weston
Defence Department

26 May 1983

file

da

ccfo

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 May 1983

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter to her of 5 May, under cover of which you sent her the full text of Mr. Andropov's speech of 3 May.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency Mr. V.I. Popov

D8/7

Defence : Int
A3

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 May 1983

Typed letter.
A.J.C. 19/5.

INF Negotiations

In your letter of 6 May you asked for advice on whether the Prime Minister should reply to the Soviet Ambassador's letter of the previous day enclosing an English translation of Mr Andropov's speech at a Kremlin dinner for Mr Honecker during which the Soviet leader inter alia made new proposals on INF.

It has for some time been the practice of the Soviet Embassy to send translations of what they regard as important statements by the Soviet leadership under cover of personal letters to FCO Ministers and senior officials. The trend has grown since Mr Andropov's election as General Secretary of the Communist Party last November. This is a routine exercise on their part, and we therefore see no need for the Prime Minister to reply personally to the Ambassador's letter. On the other hand, it would be courteous to send a short acknowledgement at Private Secretary level. I enclose a short draft from you to the Ambassador.

/

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
No 10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~minute~~/letter/~~telegram~~/despatch/~~note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

PS/No 10

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Enclosures—flag(s).....

TO:

HE Mr V I Popov
Ambassador of the USSR
13 Kensington Palace
Gardens
London
W8 4QX

Your Reference

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter to her of 5 May, under cover of which you sent her the full text of Mr Andropov's speech of 3 May.

A. J. C. 14/5.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 May 1983

INF NEGOTIATIONS

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the Ambassador of the USSR, together with an unofficial translation of Mr. Andropov's speech on 3 May in which he expressed the latest Soviet position on the INF negotiations.

I should be grateful for your advice on whether the Prime Minister should reply personally to this letter and, if so, for a suitable draft.

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

ПОСОЛЬСТВО
СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

The Rt.Hon.Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister of Great Britain,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1

5 May, 1983

Dear Prime Minister

I am sending herewith the full text of the speech by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Y.V.Andropov on May 3 in the hope that you'll find time in your busy schedule to study some new important proposals, put forward in this speech on the topical problem of limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe, as well as on burning international issues of the day.

I trust that our new proposals will be given due attention and consideration.

Yours sincerely,

V.I.Popov
Ambassador of the USSR

Unofficial translation from Russian

YURI ANDROPOV'S SPEECH AT KREMLIN DINNER

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yuri Andropov on the 3rd of May, 1983 made a speech at a Kremlin dinner in honour of the party and state delegation from the German Democratic Republic headed by Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the State Council of the GDR.

"First of all, - Yuri Andropov said, - allow me to greet cordially on behalf of the Soviet leadership and the whole our people the dear guests - the party and state delegation from the German Democratic Republic.

We exchanged substantial information on each other's affairs at the just held talks. Soviet communists, all Soviet people are glad that the GDR's working people accomplished tangible successes in fulfilling decisions of the 10th party congress under the leadership of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, its Central Committee headed by Comrade Honecker.

We wish wholeheartedly our dear friends to continue to implement with confidence their plans. Convey, comrades, sincere wishes of happiness and prosperity to the whole fraternal people of the German Democratic Republic.

Our conversations focused on questions of developing relations between the two countries. They followed in all recent years and are following at present the line of ascent. This applies to the inter-party ties between the CPSU and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, interaction between state bodies, public organisations and labour collectives, exchange of cultural values and other forms of human relationships.

The USSR and the GDR have for many years been each other's largest trade partners. At present, cooperation directly in the sphere of production play an increasingly greater part in our economic relations.

Advancement onward in the key areas of scientific and technical progress acquires special significance in our time. The Soviet Union, the GDR and other countries of the socialist community possess a great creative potential, skilled cadres of scientific reserchers, specialists and factory workers. The better we can combine, set into motion this invaluable capital, the sooner and more successfully will we be able to resolve diverse economic and social questions handled by our peoples.

Comrades, today, on the eve of the 165-th anniversary of the birth of Karl Marx, we, communists, declare with pride: history has evolved according to Marx, Engels and Lenin.

Marxism-Leninism, constantly enriched by the practice of communist and workers' parties, international experience of building socialism and struggling for it, continues to remain the sole correct and reliable guide to action.

Our ideological opponents reacted in their own way to the Marx year. U.S. President Reagan even called for a "Crusade" against communism, prophesying its death. Washington does not limit itself to mere words. Plans to gain military superiority over the USSR and other countries of socialism are openly prepared there. The United States resorts to unceremonious interference in the affairs of other nations, imposing on them the American way of life, and is trying, in fact, to gain world domination. This is the true root of evil perpetrated in the world, the evil which threatens the very existence of mankind .

We proceed from the premise that the historical competition of the two social systems, the struggle of ideas is quite a natural phenomenon stemming from the very fact of the existence of socialism and capitalism. But we are emphatically against this historical confrontation being directed at curtailing peaceful cooperation and the more so switched to the plane of nuclear war.

In conditions when the whole of mankind is threatened by nuclear catastrophe it is the duty of all who deal with the adoption of political decisions to put concern for the preservation of peace above everything else. Is it not time for the American leaders to display more political restraint, responsibility and common sense?

This relates first of all to the most pressing need of the day - to prevent a new cycle of the nuclear-missile race, to avert war.

The countries of socialism approach these questions with the highest sense of responsibility. Our proposals have been outlined in a number of joint documents, including in the Prague declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Treaty member states. They provide both for the removal of the material means of waging war and for the creation of political barriers to unleashing war. They take into account the lawful interests of the security both of the European peoples and of the peoples of the whole world. To this day the NATO countries are avoiding giving an answer to the new peace initiatives of the socialist states.

We have stated more than once our readiness to consider any other initiatives based on the principle of the equality and equal security of the sides. No attempt to violate this principle has any chance of success. We will not be deceived.

The present moment is a very responsible one: one just has to pull a string and the ball will start rolling. And the deployment of the American "Pershing" missiles and cruise missiles in Western Europe is capable of playing exactly such a role. If, contrary to all arguments of reason, matters will go in this direction, then a chain reaction is inevitable. The USSR, the GDR, the other Warsaw Treaty countries will be compelled to take reply measures.

I would not like to think that such a prospect suits the American leadership. But how then must one assess its statements and actions? For it is clearly realised in Washington that neither the "zero" nor the "interim" options, designed to secure the unilateral disarmament of the Soviet Union and to give the United States military superiority in Europe, can serve as a basis for a just settlement acceptable to both sides.

Likewise, the position of the governments of some other NATO countries cannot but cause perplexion. It is known, for instance, that the FRG statesmen have repeatedly expressed agreement that war should never again be unleashed from German soil. How can this be

squared with support for the plans to deploy American missiles on West German soil? For these are first-strike weapons. Besides, the decision to fire the missiles would be made by those who are across the ocean.

The Soviet Union has stated readiness not to have in Europe a single missile and a single plane more than possessed today by NATO countries. We are told that in this event the Soviet Union would have more missile nuclear warheads. Alright, we are prepared to reach agreement on the equality of nuclear potentials in Europe both as regards delivery vehicles and warheads with due account, of course, for the corresponding armaments of Britain and France.

In other words, we stand for the USSR to have no more missiles and warheads mounted on them than on the side of NATO in each mutually agreed-upon period. In the event of a reduction of the number of warheads on British and French missiles, the number of warheads on our medium-range missiles would be cut by as much. The same approach would be applied also to the aviation systems of this class deployed in Europe. Thereby an approximate equality would be maintained between the USSR and NATO both as regards medium-range nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, that is missiles and aircraft, and by the number of warheads carried by them. More than that, this equality would be on a much lower level than now.

I particularly want to stress that the fulfilment of this new proposal would bring about a situation when in the European part of the Soviet Union we would have much fewer medium-range missiles and warheads on them than before 1976 when we did not have SS-20 missiles.

Those who will again say "no" also to this our proposal will assume grave responsibility before the peoples of Europe and the whole world because every week, every day lost for the attainment of agreement increase the nuclear danger.

All the peoples and governments must realise the extent of this danger and do everything to protect peace, to turn the development of events back in the direction of detente.

From our side we are doing everything within our power for this. And here, and I want to emphasise this, we have a full unity of views and intentions with the German comrades".

In conclusion Yuri Andropov proposed a toast to comrade Honecker, the members of the GDR party and state delegation, the inviolable friendship of the peoples of the USSR and the GDR, the new successes of the cause of socialism, and peace in Europe and in the whole world.

Defence.

GRS 313

UNCLASSIFIED

FM MOSCOW 040552Z MAY 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 463 OF 4 MAY 83

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO , WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, ROME, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, OSLO.
ROUTINE INFO SOFIA, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, EAST BERLIN, WARSAW, PRAGUE.

SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS, ULAN BATOR,TOKYO,PEKING.

YOUR TEL NO 371 (NOT TO ALL): INF: ANDROPOV ON WARHEADS.

1. IN HIS DINNER SPEECH FOR HONECKER ON 3 MAY ANDROPOV SPOKE AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT INF. HIS KEY POINT WAS A 'NEW PROPOSAL' ON WARHEAD EQUALITY. ON THIS HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE EQUALITY OF NUCLEAR POTENTIALS IN EUROPE BOTH AS REGARDS DELIVERY VEHICLES AND WARHEADS WITH DUE ACCOUNT FOR THE CORRESPONDING ARMAMENTS OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE. '' IN OTHER WORDS WE STAND FOR THE POSSESSION BY THE USSR OF NO MORE MISSILES AND WARHEADS MOUNTED ON THEM THAN ON THE SIDE OF NATO IN EACH MUTUALLY AGREFMD PERIOD. IN THE EVENT OF A REDUCTION OF THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON BRITISH AND FRENCH MISSILES, THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON OUR MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES WOULD BE CUT BY AS MUCH. THE SAME APPROACH WOULD BE APPLIED ALSO TO THE AVIATION SYSTEMS OF THIS CLASS DEPLOYED IN EUROPE ''.

2. ANDROPOV'S OTHER POINT ON INF INCLUDED:
(A) THE FULFILLMENT OF THIS NEW PROPOSAL WOULD MEAN THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD MUCH FEWER MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES AND WARHEADS ON THEM THAN BEFORE 1976 WHEN THE SOVIET UNION HAD NO SS20S:

(B) IN THE EVENT OF PERSHING AND CRUISE DEPLOYMENT A CHAIN REACTION WAS INEVITABLE. THE USSR, GDR AND OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WOULD BE COMPELLED TO TAKE MEASURES IN RESPONSE:

(C) NEITHER THE ZERO NOR THE INTERIM OPTIONS COULD SERVE AS A BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES:

/(D)

(D) THE POSITION OF SOME OTHER NATO GOVERNMENTS WAS PERPLEXING. FOR EXAMPLE HOW COULD FRG STATEMENTS THAT WAR SHOULD NEVER AGAIN BE UNLEASHED FROM GERMAN SOIL BE SQUARED WITH SUPPORT FOR DEPLOYMENT ON WEST GERMAN SOIL OF FIRST STRIKE WEAPONS.

3. ANDROPOV DID NOT SPELL OUT THE NUMBERS OF WARHEADS INVOLVED IN HIS NEW PROPOSAL NOR GIVE ANY INDICATION OF WHAT SORT OF MEASURES THE WARSAW PACT WOULD TAKE IN RESPONSE TO DEPLOYMENT.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

SUTHERLAND

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

LIMITED
DEF.D
EESD
ACDD
NEWS.D
PS
PS|MR HURD
PS|LORD BELSTEAD
PS|PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GOODISON
MR GILLMORE

ADDITIONAL DIST:

START | INF

With the compliments of

THE NEWS DEPARTMENT

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LONDON, SW1A 2AH

John Coles

TEXT OF SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENT AT 1230 TODAY ON INF

Mr Andropov's reported remark that the Russians would be prepared to negotiate on the basis of parity of warheads on the intermediate nuclear forces of both sides is a step in the right direction and is to be welcomed if, as we hope, it is a signal that the Russians will now begin to negotiate seriously at Geneva.

But Mr Andropov's assertion that British and French nuclear weapons must be counted in the negotiations, remains completely unacceptable to us and to our allies. It is based on a transparently false premise. The British (and French) weapons are strategic weapons of last resort. The Russians and the Americans each have very much larger numbers of weapons of this type and they are specifically excluded from the INF talks. There is no reason why ours should be included. The Soviet argument that they should be counted because they can reach Soviet territory from Western Europe conveniently ignores the fact that Western Europe is targetted by an unknown but doubtless very large number of Soviet strategic missiles in addition to the intermediate range weapons which are the subject of the INF negotiations.

GRS 140
RESTRICTED
FM WASHINGTON 032346Z MAY 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1216 OF 3 MAY 83
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO MOSCOW BONN MODUK (FOR PS/SOS DUS(POL)
AUS D STAFF AND DS17)M
PRIORITY PARIS AND OTHER NATO POSTS

INF

1. WE INFORMED THE STATE DEPARTMENT THIS EVENING OF THE LINE MR HURD AND THE FCO SPOKESMAN ARE TAKING ON ANDROPOV'S LATEST STATEMENT. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TAKEN ACCOUNT OF THIS IN THEIR OWN GUIDANCE, WHICH IS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THE US ADMINISTRATION WELCOMES ANDROPOV'S SOMEWHAT BELATED RECOGNITION THAT WARHEADS ON LAUNCHERS ARE THE APPROPIRATE UNIT OF ACCOUNT
(B) IT REJECTS THE SOVIET CLAIM TO BE ALLOWED NUCLEAR FORCES EQUAL TO THOSE OF ALL OTHER NATIONS COMBINED.
(C) ANDROPOV'S STATEMENT ONCE AGAIN IGNORES THE FACT THAT MOST OF THE SS20S OUTSIDE THE WESTERN REGIONS OF THE SOIVET UNION ARE NO LESS THREATENING TO, AND TARGETABLE ON, EUROPE.

WRIGHT

LIMITED

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PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR GOODISON

CONFIDENTIAL

INF

GRS 695
CONFIDENTIAL
FM MOSCOW 051500Z APR 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 331 OF 5 APR
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, MODUK (DS17),
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS,
INFO ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS, SOFIA, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST,
BUDAPEST, EAST BERLIN, WARSAW, PRAGUE, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING ULAN BATOR

Prime Minister

para. 4 seems right to me.

A.J.C. 6/4.

MY TEL NO 325: GROMYKO'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON 2 APRIL

COMMENT

1. THIS WAS AN IMPRESSIVE PERFORMANCE BY THE 72 YEAR OLD GROMYKO, WHO ONLY ONCE OR TWICE HAD TO REFER TO NOTES, AND WHO INDICATED THAT HIS NEW APPOINTMENT AS FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER MEANT CONTINUING AND INCREASED RESPONSIBILITIES FOR FOREIGN POLICY. THE CONFERENCE WAS TIMED, OVER A WESTERN HOLIDAY WEEKEND TO ENSURE MAXIMUM PRESS COVERAGE AND TO COINCIDE WITH ANTI-INF DEMONSTRATIONS IN EUROPE. GROMYKO'S REMARKS ABOUT OTHER, MORE GENERAL SOVIET DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES, WITH WHICH HE PRECEDED HIS COMMENTS ON INF, WERE DESIGNED TO APPEAL TO WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION AND TO BALANCE HIS NEGATIVE MESSAGE ON THE NEW AMERICAN INF PROPOSAL. IN PARTICULAR HE CALLED UPON BOTH GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES TO RESPOND TO THE WARSAW PACT'S PROPOSAL FOR A TREATY ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE. GROMYKO THROUGHOUT WAS, BY SOVIET STANDARDS, RELATIVELY RESTRAINED IN HIS CRITICISM OF THE AMERICANS AND THE WEST.

2. THE MAIN INTEREST LAY IN THE FIRST OFFICIAL PUBLIC RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S NEW INF PROPOSAL OF WHICH A FULLER ACCOUNT OF WHAT GROMYKO SAID IS IN MIFT. HIS REJECTION OF THE AMERICAN POSITION, AT LEAST AS CURRENTLY FORMULATED, WAS TO BE EXPECTED. BUT HE WAS CAREFUL TO APPEAR REASONABLE AND INTERESTED IN A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. HE DID NOT TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO HINT THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BREAK OFF THE GENEVA TALKS IN THE EVENT OF DEPLOYMENT, NOR DID HE WARN OF SOVIET COUNTERDEPLOYMENTS EXCEPT IN THE MOST GENERAL TERMS.

3. YET THERE WAS NO MISTAKING THE UNDERLYING FIRMNESS OF HIS POSITION. ON INF, BOTH THE ORIGINAL ZERO-ZERO SOLUTION AND NOW THE INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION PROPOSALS ARE IN GROMYKO'S BOOK RULED OUT AS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE POINT OF BEING UNWORTHY OF DISCUSSION (''ABSURD'' AND ''NOT SERIOUS''). MEANWHILE HE NOT ONLY STANDS PAT ON SS20 DEPLOYMENT AND ON GENERAL SOVIET DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS, BUT ALSO MAKES PROPAGANDA CAPITAL OUT OF OUR DESIRE NOT TO APPEAR TO REJECT THESE LATTER OUT OF HAND - HENCE HIS REPETITION OF THE COMPLAINT THAT SOVIET PROPOSALS ARE LEFT IN LIMBO, PERMANENTLY UNDER STUDY BY WESTERN GOVERNMENTS AND IGNORED BY THE WESTERN PRESS.

4. THE GROUNDS FOR HIS REJECTION OF THE NEW AMERICAN INF PROPOSAL HAD ALREADY BEEN SKETCHED OUT IN A PRAVDA ARTICLE ON 1 APRIL, AND IN OTHER SOVIET MEDIA COMMENT. THE NEW ELEMENT OF EMPHASIS IS THE REFUSAL TO ENVISAGE THE DESTRUCTION OF MISSILES IN SOVIET ASIA, A POINT MADE AT RATHER GREATER LENGTH THAN THOSE ABOUT BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS AND AMERICAN AIRCRAFT. FOR THE RUSSIANS THIS ASPECT OF THE NEW AMERICAN POSITION REPRESENTS A RETROGRADE STEP COMPARED TO THE NITZE-KVITSINSKI ''WALK IN THE WOODS''. GROMYKO DID NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF EQUAL LIMITS FOR LAND-BASED MISSILES, NOR EQUATE THE EVENTUAL LEVEL WITH THE NUMBERS OF BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS. ANDROPOV'S 21 DECEMBER PROPOSALS WERE NOT RESTATED. GROMYKO'S SILENCE IN THESE RESPECTS COULD BE CONSISTENT WITH A MORE SERIOUS SOVIET NEGOTIATING POSITION IN GENEVA OR ALTERNATIVELY WITH A NEW PUBLIC INITIATIVE RESERVED FOR A LAUNCH AT A LATER STAGE AND POSSIBLY A HIGHER LEVEL.

5. I THINK IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT, AFTER HAVING BRIEFLY TURNED DOWN THE PROPAGANDA VOLUME DURING THE LATER STAGES OF THE FRG ELECTION CAMPAIGN, AND HAVING TAKEN STOCK SINCE, THE RUSSIANS HAVE CONCLUDED THAT FOR THE TIME BEING THERE IS ADVANTAGE FOR THEM IN CONTINUING TO PLAY A WAITING GAME. THEY MAY WELL STILL HOPE THAT, AT SOME STAGE BETWEEN NOW AND DECEMBER, WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION WILL DO THEIR WORK FOR THEM AND DELIVER INTO THEIR HANDS DECISIONS TO CANCEL OR AT LEAST RESTRICT THE WESTERN DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE AND PERSHING WHICH THEY WOULD BE UNABLE TO WIN AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE EXCEPT IN RETURN FOR CONDITIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE SS20S WHICH THEY WOULD REGARD AS UNACCEPTABLE. THEY WILL USE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO PLAY TO THE WESTERN GALLERY, USING A JUDICIOUS COMBINATION OF CARROT AND STICK, LEAVING THE DOOR OPEN TO NEGOTIATION AND PERHAPS HINTING AT POSSIBLE FURTHER SOVIET DEPLOYMENT. IN MY VIEW (THOUGH I ADMIT THAT IT IS NOT ENTIRELY SHARED BY MY US, FRENCH AND FRG COLLEAGUES, WHO, IN VARYING DEGREE, ARE MORE INCLINED TO SEE POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN GROMYKO'S REMARKS) THIS PRESS CONFERENCE MUST BE REGARDED AS A SKILLFUL CONTRIBUTION TO THE MANIPULATION OF WESTERN OPINION.

6. MY SECOND MIFT (NOT TO ALL) CONTAINS COMMENT ON WHAT GROMYKO SAID IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ULAN BATOR

SUTHERLAND

Repetition to REYKJAVIK
referred for departmental decision,
repeated as requested to other posts.

FCO
EESD
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

31 March 1983

INF

Thank you for your letter of 29 March about President Reagan's new initiative. Mrs Thatcher has noted the contents of the statement of welcome by HMG which you issued yesterday. She doubts whether it is necessary for her to send a further message to President Reagan on this subject at the present time.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

PS TO PM 10 DOWNING ST.

GR 750
UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON 302130Z MAR 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 805 OF 30 MARCH
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DUS(P), AUS(D STAFF) DS 17) UKDEL NATO,
MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN,
ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS, UKDEL VIENNA, UKDIS GENEVA, UKMIS NEW YORK,
UKREP BRUSSELS, DUBLIN.

MIPT (NOT TO ALL): INF: NEW US PROPOSAL

1. THE PRESIDENT BEGAN HIS NATIONALLY TELEVISED STATEMENT THIS MORNING BY DRAWING ATTENTION ONCE MORE TO THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS. HE CRITICISED THEM FOR REFUSING TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY IN GENEVA, AND FOR THE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN DESIGNED TO DRIVE WEDGES BETWEEN THE ALLIES. THE PRESIDENT THEN ANNOUNCED THAT NITZE HAD MADE NEW PROPOSALS, OF WHICH HE PROVIDED DETAILS, TO THE RUSSIANS IN GENEVA ON 28 MARCH. THE PRESIDENT CONCLUDED HIS STATEMENT WITH A TRIBUTE TO THE ALLIANCE AND TO THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATIONS WHICH HAD FRAMED THE NEW US POSITION. THIS PROCESS WAS A MODEL FOR HOW A FREE ALLIANCE SHOULD WORK TOGETHER. THE FULL TEXT OF HIS STATEMENT COVERING THE NEW POSITION AND THE ALLIANCE WAS AS FOLLOWS.

2. ''I HAVE REPEATEDLY URGED THE SOVIETS TO RESPOND TO OUR ZERO-ZERO PROPOSAL WITH A PROPOSAL OF THEIR OWN. I HAVE ALSO REPEATED OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER ANY SERIOUS ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL. THEIR FAILURE TO MAKE SUCH A PROPOSAL IS A SOURCE OF DEEP DISAPPOINTMENT... BUT I DO NOT INTEND TO LET THIS SHADOW THAT HAS BEEN CAST OVER THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS FURTHER DARKEN OUR SEARCH FOR PEACE. WHEN IT COMES TO INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HAVE NONE THAN TO HAVE SOME. BUT, IF THERE MUST BE SOME, IT IS BETTER TO HAVE FEW THAN TO HAVE MANY. IF THE SOVIETS WILL NOT NOW AGREE TO THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THESE WEAPONS, I HOPE THEY WILL AGREE TO JOIN US IN AN INTERIM AGREEMENT THAT WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE THESE FORCES TO EQUAL LEVELS ON BOTH SIDES.
TO THIS END AMBASSADOR PAUL NITZE HAS INFORMED HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE AN INTERIM AGREEMENT IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE ITS PLANNED DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING II AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES PROVIDED THE SOVIET UNION REDUCED THE NUMBER OF ITS WARHEADS ON LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES TO AN EQUAL LEVEL ON A GLOBAL BASIS. AMBASSADOR NITZE HAS EXPLAINED THAT THE UNITED STATES VIEWS THIS PROPOSAL AS A SERIOUS INITIAL STEP TOWARDS THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THIS CLASS OF WEAPONS.... OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE ENTIRE ELIMINATION OF THESE SYSTEMS REMAINS ON THE TABLE. WE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE NEGOTIATORS RESUME SEVERAL WEEKS EARLIER THAN ORIGINALLY PLANNED. THE SOVIETS HAVE AGREED TO THAT AND TALKS WILL RESUME ON MAY 17.''

/3.

3. ''I INVITED THE NATO AMBASSADORS HERE TODAY NOT ONLY TO REVIEW THESE DEVELOPMENTS BUT TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR THE FIRM SUPPORT WHICH THE ALLIES HAVE GIVEN TO OUR NEGOTIATING EFFORT IN GENEVA. AND I CAN ASSURE THEM OF MY PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE CONSULTATIONS WITH THEM ON INF. THIS CONSULTATION PROCESS HAS ALREADY PROVEN ONE OF THE MOST INTENSIVE AND PRODUCTIVE IN THE HISTORY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. IT HAS MADE THE INITIATIVE ANNOUNCED TODAY AN ALLIANCE INITIATIVE IN THE BEST SENSE OF THAT TERM. OVER THE PAST MONTHS WE AND OUR ALLIES HAVE CONSULTED INTENSIVELY ON THE INF NEGOTIATIONS.... THE NATO SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP HAS MET REGULARLY TO REVIEW THE NEGOTIATIONS AND CONSIDER CRITERIA WHICH SHOULD FORM THE BASIS OF THE ALLIANCE POSITION IN INF. THEY VERY THOUGHTFUL VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THE ALLIES IN THESE CONSULTATIONS HAVE BEEN OF SIGNIFICANT HELP IN SHAPING THIS NEW INITIATIVE. THIS PROCESS IS A MODEL OF HOW AN ALLIANCE OF FREE AND DEMOCRATIC NATIONS CAN AND MUST WORK TOGETHER ON POLITICAL ISSUES. IT IS THE SOURCE OF OUR UNITY AND GIVES US THE STRENGTH THAT NO-ONE CAN HOPE TO MATCH. AND IT GIVES ME GREAT CONFIDENCE IN THE EVENTUAL SUCCESS OF OUR EFFORTS IN GENEVA TO CREATE A SAFER WORLD FOR ALL THE EARTH'S PEOPLE''.

WRIGHT

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GRS 420
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FM WASHINGTON 302120Z MAR 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 803 OF 30 MARCH
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS
INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS, MOSCOW

MY TELNO 800: INF

1. THE PRESIDENT CERTAINLY PUT ON THE DOG THIS MORNING TO ENABLE HIM TO MAKE HIS STATEMENT ON INF WITH THE MAXIMUM SYMBOLIC AND VISUAL DEMONSTRATION OF ALLIED UNITY. AND, INCIDENTALLY, TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE WAS IN CHARGE.

2. FIRST THE AMBASSADORS/CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE NATO ALLIANCE WERE SUMMONED TO THE CABINET ROOM AT THE WHITE HOUSE. THE PRESIDENT WAS JOINED ON HIS SIDE OF THE TABLE BY THE VICE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND OF DEFENSE AND THE WHOLE TOP HAMPER OF THE WHITE HOUSE ADVISERS: MEESE, BAKER AND CLARK. LESSER MORTALS OCCUPIED THE OUTER CIRCLE.
AFTER A PHOTO OPPORTUNITY, THE PRESIDENT MADE A STATEMENT TELLING US WHAT WE KNEW NITZE HAD BEEN AUTHORISED TO PUT FORWARD AT GENEVA AND PRAISING THE ALLIED CONSULTATIONS WHICH HAD LED UP TO IT AND THE ALLIED UNITY WHICH LENT IT AUTHORITY. INVITED BY THE PRESIDENT TO SPEAK, SECRETARY SHULTZ THEN DELIVERED A SHORT COMMENTARY ON THE MERITS OF ALLIED CONSULTATIONS AND UNITY IN DEFENCE OF SHARED DEMOCRATIC VALUES. THE TASK OF MAKING A SHORT REPLY ON BEHALF OF THE ASSEMBLED AMBASSADORS FELL TO THE DEAN OF THE NATO AMBASSADORS, THE AMBASSADOR OF LUXEMBOURG.

3. WE WERE THEN ESCORTED TO THE EAST ROOM OF THE WHITE HOUSE WHERE AN EVEN MORE IMPRESSIVE ARRAY OF MEMBERS OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION WERE ASSEMBLED, INCLUDING MOST OF THE CABINET AND PRACTICALLY THE WHOLE OF THE TOP HAMPER OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, INCLUDING THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. THERE WAS OF COURSE THE USUAL IMPRESSIVE BARRAGE OF TELEVISION CAMERAS. THE PRESIDENT THEN JOINED US AND MADE HIS PUBLIC STATEMENT IN OUR PRESENCE (SEE MY SECOND IFT). AFTER A CUP OF COFFEE WE ALL LEFT.

CONFIDENTIAL

14.

4. THERE WAS OF COURSE AN ELEMENT OF THEATRE IN ALL THIS. BUT IT CERTAINLY SERVED ITS PURPOSE IN SYMBOLISING AND MAKING PUBLIC ALLIED UNITY ON THE NEXT STAGE IN THE INF SAGA. AS AN OLD HAM MYSELF, I WAS IMPRESSED. PLEASE SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

FCO PASS SAVING ANKARA, LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE, ATHENS, COPENHAGEN OTTAWA, ROME, BRUSSELS, LISBON, OSLO, REYKJAVIK, UKDEL VIENNA AND MOSCOW

WRIGHT

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR GOODISON

GR 860
CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKDEL NATO 301610Z MAR 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 90 OF 30 MARCH
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON MODUK (FOR DS17) ROUTINE BONN PARIS MOSCOW
INFO SAVING ANKARA ATHENS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE LISBON
LUXEMBOURG OSLO OTTAWA REYKJAVIK ROME MADRID UKDEL VIENNA
UKDIS GENEVA
NATO CONSULTATION ON START TALKS

1. ROWNY, THE US START NEGOTIATOR, BRIEFED THE COUNCIL ON 30 MARCH ON THE THIRD ROUND OF THE START TALKS. (THE ROUND FINISHES ON 31 MARCH.) HIS DEPUTY, GOODBY, SUBSEQUENTLY FOLLOWED UP WITH A SHORT MEETING WITH EXPERTS FROM CAPITALS.

SUMMARY

2. THE PRINCIPAL MESSAGE OF ROWNY'S STATEMENT TO THE COUNCIL (COPY BY BAG) WAS THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN STONE-WALLING. THEY HAD EVEN GONE SO FAR AS TO RESIST STRONGLY DISCUSSION OF A SECONDARY AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OVER WHICH THE AMERICANS HAD GONE OUT OF THEIR WAY TO FIND COMMON GROUND. THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT (REPEAT NOT) BROKEN DOWN THEIR PROPOSED FIGURE OF 1800 FOR ALL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. THEY HAD REMAINED STUDIOUSLY VAGUE ON THE SUBJECT OF WARHEAD LIMITS. AS A RESULT A REDUCTION IN SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES TO A LEVEL OF 1800 COULD STILL MEAN NO OVERALL DECREASE IN BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEAD NUMBERS, IF FOR EXAMPLE THE RUSSIANS REMOVE SINGLE WARHEAD SS11S AND SS13S BUT INCREASED THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON THEIR SS17S AND SS19S. THEY HAD ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT IF NATO DEPLOYED GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES AND PERSHING II MISSILES THEY WOULD RE-EXAMINE THEIR FIGURE OF 1800.

DETAIL

3. DURING THE THIRD ROUND THE RUSSIANS HAD PUT FORWARD, CLAUSE BY CLAUSE, LANGUAGE FOR A NEW TREATY. THIS WAS MODELLED CLOSELY ON SALT II AND CHANGES FROM SALT II WERE MOSTLY UNHELPFUL. (IN THE MARGINS OF THE EXPERTS MEETING, GOODBY GAVE US (ONLY) THE DRAFT SOVIET LANGUAGE ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION - SEE MIFT, NOT TO ALL.)

4. IN ROWNY'S VIEW, THE RUSSIANS' PRIMARY PURPOSE REMAINED TO SPLIT THE ALLIANCE. THEY WERE CONCENTRATING ON INF. IN START THEY PROBABLY SAW PLENTY OF REASONS TO DELAY SERIOUS NEGOTIATION: THE HOPE OF INFLUENCING THE INF DEPLOYMENTS, THE PROSPECT OF THE REPORT OF THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION ON MX BASING, THE POSSIBILITY OF A WINDFALL FROM THE US FREEZE MOVEMENT LATER IN THE YEAR AND THE POSSIBLE ATTITUDES OF NEW PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. NEVERTHELESS, ROWNY CONTINUED TO THINK THAT THE RUSSIANS BELIEVED THAT AGREEMENT WOULD BE IN THEIR INTEREST. HE REMAINED GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE LONGER TERM PROSPECTS OF A START AGREEMENT.

5. IN THE THIRD ROUND THE US DELEGATION HAD TABLED TWO DOCUMENTS:
A) THE QUOTE BASIC ELEMENTS UNQUOTE OF A START AGREEMENT, WHICH FOCUSSED ON BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEAD REDUCTIONS BUT ALSO SOUGHT TO GIVE TANGIBLE PROOF THAT FOR THE AMERICANS QUOTE EVERYTHING WAS ON THE TABLE UNQUOTE, BY SUGGESTING A SEPARATE LIMIT OF 400 (FOUR HUNDRED) ON HEAVY BOMBERS AND STATING THAT THE AMERICANS COULD AGREE TO SALT II-TYPE LIMITS ON ALCMS:

/B) A

B) A DRAFT SUBSIDIARY TREATY ON THE SECONDARY ISSUE OF NUCLEAR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES COVERING THE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF ALL STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHES AND OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS, SSBNS AND BALLISTIC MISSILES, WHICH WOULD COVER SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT PRE-NOTIFICATION OF THE MASS TAKE-OFF OF HEAVY BOMBERS. THEY HAD NOT INCLUDED A THIRD US PROPOSAL FOR AN EXPANDED DATA EXCHANGE, BECAUSE THE RUSSIANS HAD OPPOSED THIS IDEA. BUT KARPOV, THE SOVIET NEGOTIATOR, HAD BEEN ADAMANT IN REJECTING THE NEGOTIATION OF NUCLEAR CBMS UNTIL IT COULD TAKE PLACE IN PARALLEL WITH THE NEGOTIATION OF A START AGREEMENT ITSELF.

THE AMERICANS WERE STILL CONSIDERING WHETHER TO TABLE A FULL DRAFT TREATY OF THEIR OWN WHEN THE FOURTH ROUND BEGAN ON JUNE 8.

6. KARPOV HAD RAISED, IN A PLENARY ON 29 MARCH, THE PRESIDENT'S 23 MARCH SPEECH ABOUT DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND GIVEN A HIGHLY NEGATIVE REACTION, QUOTING ANDROPOV'S COMMENTS.

7. IN QUESTIONS, TALIANI (ITALY) AND CITRON (FRG) WERE CRITICAL OF THE FOUR-MONTH GAP SINCE ROWNY'S LAST VISIT TO THE COUNCIL. THE NORWEGIAN AND GERMAN PERMREPS, AMONGST OTHERS, ALSO INDICATED QUITE FIRMLY THAT THE PRESIDENT'S 23 MARCH SPEECH HAD CREATED DIFFICULTIES FOR THEIR GOVERNMENTS. IN MY INTERVENTION I NOTED THAT THE ABM QUESTION WAS VERY CLOSELY LINKED TO START - THE PRESIDENT HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THE DANGERS OF THE COMBINATION OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS IN HIS SPEECH. I EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THERE WOULD BE CLOSE CONSULTATION OVER FUTURE AMERICAN PLANS. ROWNY ACCEPTED, AND INDEED DESCRIBED AS HIS OWN VIEW, THAT TALK OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS MEANT THAT THE US ATTEMPT TO REDUCE THE LEVELS OF OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS SHOULD BE STRESSED.

8. A NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES RAISED THE QUESTION OF SEA LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (SLCMS). ROWNY, AND LATER GOODBY AND ADMIRAL WILLIAMS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE QUESTION OF LIMITS ON SLCMS IN START WAS UNRESOLVED IN WASHINGTON. THE AMERICANS' HOLDING POSITION WAS IN EFFECT TO ASK THE RUSSIANS, WHEN THEY RAISED THE ISSUE, HOW THEY WOULD VERIFY LIMITATIONS ON SLCMS. THE AMERICANS WERE GOING TO TAKE THEIR TIME TO WORK OUT THEIR POSITION ON SLCMS AND ARMS CONTROL.

9. THE AMERICANS CIRCULATED EXTENSIVE TALKING POINTS ON THE US AND SOVIET START PROPOSALS WHICH THEY INVITE THE ALLIES TO DRAW UPON FREELY AFTER PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEECH ON ARMS CONTROL ON 31 MARCH, (COPY BY BAG).

FCO PASS SAVING ANKARA ATHENS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE LISBON LUXEMBOURG OSLO OTTAWA REYKJAVIK ROME MADRID UKDEL VIENNA UKDIS GENEVA

GRAHAM

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 March, 1983

INF

Thank you for your letter of 29 March enclosing a copy of President Reagan's message to the Prime Minister of the same date about the new American initiative on INF.

President Reagan's meeting with NATO Ambassadors at which the US initiative will be announced will take place tomorrow morning, Washington time. This will permit us to release a statement by HMG before close of play in London on 30 March. I enclose a form of words for the purpose which we are submitting to Mr Pym in the box tonight. We shall of course also prepare material for the Prime Minister's Question Time in the normal way and this will be made available to No 10 (with copies for the MOD) via the Parliamentary Unit. This material should also be sufficient for any media interview which Ministers closely concerned may be asked to give about the President's initiative.

In the event President Reagan did not find it possible to bring forward the timing of his West Coast speech scheduled to take place on 31 March. Nevertheless in deciding to meet NATO Ambassadors in Washington and to issue a public statement on 30 March he has clearly done his best to meet the Prime Minister's concern to avoid the news falling on a day when there are no UK national newspapers. I enclose a short draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Reagan expressing appreciation for this.

I am copying this letter with enclosures to Richard Mottram (MOD) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

STATEMENT BY HMG ON INF

The British Government warmly welcome the new American proposal for an interim agreement to limit warheads on US and Soviet intermediate range land-based nuclear missiles. The decision to make this proposal was preceded by the closest consultation between the allies. It enjoys our wholehearted support.

Our main objective must remain to get rid of such systems altogether. We have urged the Russians to accept this approach; it is one which will bring the greatest stability to Europe. But, in nearly 18 months of negotiations the Soviet Union has shown no readiness to agree to such a radical proposal. The allies therefore decided to take this new initiative in the interests of breaking the deadlock in progress in the Geneva negotiations. An interim limit on warhead numbers at the lowest level the Soviet Union can agree to would be a significant achievement in itself and would also contribute greatly to East/West stability and security. It must of course be based on the principles of balance and equality between the United States and the Soviet Union. Our objective in this first step would be to achieve limits set substantially below the number of warheads planned for deployment in the decision of 1979.

We call on the Soviet Union to consider this important offer with the utmost seriousness and to respond positively when negotiations resume next month in Geneva.

DSR (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: PRIME MINISTER

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: President Reagan

Your Reference

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

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CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your message of 29 March informing me of your decision about the new INF initiative. You may rest assured that we shall speak warmly in support of it in London. I am glad to note your intention to arrange a meeting with NATO Ambassadors followed by the public statement on 30 March. And I very much appreciate your readiness to take account of my concern that the news of the move should not break on a day (Good Friday) when there are no national newspapers here.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

SECRET

cc MOD
CO

HL

34

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 March 1983

INF

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has just received from President Reagan describing the initiative which the United States will announce in Washington on Wednesday 30 March and which the President's speech on 31 March will set against the background of arms control activities more generally.

In delivering the message, the United States Embassy said that the American administration would welcome statements of support for the initiative as soon as possible after the President's meeting with NATO Ambassadors tomorrow when it will be announced. It would be helpful if you could provide a draft press line to meet that contingency. Prime Minister's Question time on the morning of Thursday 31 March may also give us an opportunity for public comment.

BL

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

HL

29 March 1983

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 29 March about the INF negotiations.

JOHN COLES

The Honourable Edward J. Streator

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

March 29, 1983

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver the enclosed message to you from President Reagan, which was received at the Embassy this morning.

Sincerely,

Edward J. Streator
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

Enclosure:

SECRET

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
London.

SUBJECT.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T41/83

SECRET

33

Prime Minister

A.J.C. 29/3

March 29, 1983

Dear Margaret:

I much appreciate the very positive reactions I have received to suggestions put forward in my letter of March 22 to you and our other allied colleagues for a new initiative in the INF negotiations. Based upon these responses and upon the discussions at last Friday's special Consultative Group meeting, we are now proceeding in the manner I outlined to you in that letter.

This Tuesday, March 29, Paul Nitze will inform his Soviet interlocutor that the United States is prepared to negotiate an interim agreement in which the United States would accept a limit at a finite, but yet unspecified number of warheads on INF land-based missile launchers, provided the Soviet Union is prepared to reduce the number of warheads on its LRINF missile launchers to an equal level on a global basis. He will explain that the United States views this proposal as a serious initial step toward the total elimination of this class of weapons, and that we hope the Soviet Union joins us in this view. The U.S. proposal to eliminate these systems entirely would, of course, also remain on the table, along with the new alternative proposal for an interim agreement.

I have concluded that we should not put forward a specific number in the context of the interim proposal at this time. In leaving the number open I believe that we can demonstrate flexibility, complicate Soviet efforts to criticize our proposal, and open an avenue for possible further development of our position. As I suggested to you earlier, Ambassador Nitze will also suggest that the negotiations resume May 10 or 17, as opposed to June 3.

On Wednesday, March 30, I intend to invite your Ambassador in Washington to meet with me so that I can officially inform him of the new arms control initiative. We will use this meeting as an occasion to issue a public statement announcing the new initiative and, at the same time, release the NATO special Consultative Group Chairman's statement endorsing the proposal. My speech on the following day will provide our publics with the full context of our arms control activities against which this new initiative is best understood.

(together with all NATO Ambassadors)

SECRET

Your counsel and that of our other allied colleagues has been of invaluable help to me. Our recent consultations have again demonstrated the strength of our common determination to implement fully NATO's December 1979 decision. I am particularly pleased that we have taken this new step in the INF negotiations with such clear evidence of your support, and that of our other allies.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ron

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T38A/83

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

24 March, 1983.

US Declassified

Dear Ron,

I was very grateful for your message of 23 March on the INF negotiations. I welcome particularly the close consultation between us which has marked our efforts to bring about progress in Geneva.

Your conclusions are very similar to those which I had reached. I therefore welcome your decision to instruct Ambassador Nitze to put a concrete proposal to the Soviet negotiators in Geneva before the end of the current round. I am sure that this will have a favourable impact on public opinion in the West.

As you know, I share your view that the zero-zero outcome is the best solution. It is clear that in the immediate term this is not achievable, but in my view, we should retain it as a longer term objective. I also welcome your proposal to call a meeting of SCG principals for consultation in Brussels on 25 March, and I strongly endorse your idea of calling for a shorter recess. Indeed, there may be advantage in proposing a resumption even earlier than you suggest, say towards the end of April.

You asked for my views about whether the new initiative should contain specific numbers. I believe there is much to be said for instructing Ambassador Nitze to put forward a proposal which would include a specific number of warheads set at a figure of 300 on each side. But I leave this to your judgement. You and your advisers

will have the feel of the negotiations.

May I add one further thought? You propose to make a statement on this issue on 31 March. This will mean that reports in the media in Europe can be expected on the morning of Good Friday, 1 April. In the case of the UK, there are no national newspapers on Good Friday. Would you therefore consider the possibility of bringing forward your speech by 24 hours? We all have an interest in ensuring that your statement is given the widest possible publicity. This will also help to pre-empt some of the impact of Easter peace movement demonstrations both here and elsewhere.

With best wishes

Yours ever

Margaret.

The President of the United States of America

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T38/83

US Declassified

CAB/WHØØ1/24

OO WHITEHOUSE
GR 5ØØA

SECRET

FROM CABINET OFFICE LONDON 241Ø4ØZ MAR 83
TO IMMEDIATE THE WHITE HOUSE
TELEGRAM NUMBER MISC Ø92 OF 24 MARCH 1983

FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM PRIME MINISTER.

+DEAR RON,
I WAS VERY GRATEFUL FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 23 MARCH ON THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. I WELCOME PARTICULARLY THE CLOSE CONSULTATION BETWEEN US WHICH HAS MARKED OUR EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT PROGRESS IN GENEVA.

YOUR CONCLUSIONS ARE VERY SIMILAR TO THOSE WHICH I HAD REACHED. I THEREFORE WELCOME YOUR DECISION TO INSTRUCT AMBASSADOR NITZE TO PUT A CONCRETE PROPOSAL TO THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA BEFORE THE END OF THE CURRENT ROUND. I AM SURE THAT THIS WILL HAVE A FAVOURABLE IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION IN THE WEST.

AS YOU KNOW, I SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT THE ZERO-ZERO OUTCOME IS THE BEST SOLUTION. IT IS CLEAR THAT IN THE IMMEDIATE TERM THIS IS NOT ACHIEVABLE, BUT IN MY VIEW, WE SHOULD RETAIN IT AS A LONGER TERM OBJECTIVE. I ALSO WELCOME YOUR PROPOSAL TO CALL A MEETING OF SCG PRINCIPALS FOR CONSULTATION IN BRUSSELS ON 25 MARCH, AND I STRONGLY ENDORSE YOUR IDEA OF CALLING FOR A SHORTER RECESS. INDEED, THERE MAY BE ADVANTAGE IN PROPOSING A RESUMPTION EVEN EARLIER THAN YOU SUGGEST, SAY TOWARDS THE END OF APRIL.

YOU ASKED FOR MY VIEWS ABOUT WHETHER THE NEW INITIATIVE SHOULD CONTAIN SPECIFIC NUMBERS. I BELIEVE THERE IS MUCH TO BE SAID FOR INSTRUCTING AMBASSADOR NITZE TO PUT FORWARD A PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD INCLUDE A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF WARHEADS SET AT A FIGURE OF 3ØØ ON EACH SIDE. BUT I LEAVE THIS TO YOUR JUDGEMENT. YOU AND YOUR ADVISERS WILL HAVE THE FEEL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

MAY I ADD ONE FURTHER THOUGHT? YOU PROPOSE TO MAKE A STATEMENT ON THIS ISSUE ON 31 MARCH. THIS WILL MEAN THAT REPORTS IN THE MEDIA IN EUROPE CAN BE EXPECTED ON THE MORNING OF GOOD FRIDAY, 1 APRIL. IN THE CASE OF THE UK, THERE ARE NO NATIONAL NEWSPAPERS ON GOOD FRIDAY. WOULD YOU THEREFORE CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF BRINGING FORWARD YOUR SPEECH BY 24 HOURS? WE ALL HAVE AN INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT YOUR STATEMENT IS GIVEN THE WIDEST POSSIBLE PUBLICITY. THIS WILL ALSO HELP TO PRE-EMPT SOME OF THE IMPACT OF EASTER PEACE MOVEMENT DEMONSTRATIONS BOTH HERE AND ELSEWHERE.

WITH BEST WISHES,

MARGARET+

NNNNM
SENT 24/1Ø58Z WH

KK

DE WHITEHOUSE AND QSL UR MSG AT Ø6Ø1LOCAL.

KK
RRRR MANI TKS OM CUL BIEEE

SECRET

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31

23 March 1983

Prime Minister

Agree message?

Dear John,

See minute A.J.C. 23/3

MM 24/3

INF

The Prime Minister has asked for a draft reply to President Reagan's message of this morning on INF in time for her box tonight. I enclose a draft. We have been able to consult Mr Pym during his stopover in Bahrain on the way to Bangkok and the draft has his endorsement.

It is gratifying that President Reagan has taken considerable account of our views, notably the points made to Vice-President Bush by the Prime Minister. The American review process has led to conclusions very similar to those which we reached here some time ago.

We think that there are strong arguments for shortening the recess even more drastically than President Reagan proposes: we need to be seen to be on the offensive in the Geneva negotiations rather than tagging along behind the Russians. Hence the reference in the draft to prosing an even earlier date for the resumption.

You will note also that the draft suggests that the President might consider bringing forward his statement next week by 24 hours. It would be a pity if the President's statement did not get proper coverage in the UK because there are no national newspapers on Good Friday. If the President's statement is made on 31 March as proposed, reports on it would not appear in the British national press until Saturday.

The draft has been cleared with the Ministry of Defence.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (MOD) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Robin Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

SECRET

[redacted] 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~Minute/letter/telegram/despatch~~ **TYPE:** Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

The Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~Top Secret~~

Secret

~~Confidential~~

Restricted

~~Unclassified~~

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CAVEAT.....

Enclosures—flag(s).....

TO:

President Reagan

Your Reference

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

I was very grateful for your message of 23 March on the INF negotiations. I welcome particularly the close consultation between us which has marked our efforts to bring about progress in Geneva.

~~It is clear that~~ your ~~review of the negotiations has brought you to~~ conclusions very ~~close~~ to ~~my own~~. I therefore welcome your ~~proposal~~ to instruct Ambassador Nitze to put a concrete proposal to the Soviet negotiators in Geneva before the end of the current round. ~~I believe this is particularly important. There is every advantage in your being seen to take the initiative before the coming recess and~~ I am sure that this will have a favourable impact on public opinion in the West.

As you know, I share your ~~veiw~~ that the zero-zero outcome is the best solution. ~~But~~ It is clear that in the immediate term this is not achievable. In my view, ~~therefore~~, we should retain ~~this~~ as a longer term objective. I also welcome your proposal to call a meeting of SCG

SECRET /principals

principals in Brussels on 25 March. I know that our allies attach particular importance to consultations in this forum. I also strongly endorse your idea of calling for a shorter recess. Indeed, there may be advantage in proposing a resumption even earlier than you suggest, say towards the end of April.

You asked for my views about whether the new initiative should contain specific numbers. I believe there is much to be said for instructing Ambassador Nitze to put forward a concrete proposal which would include a specific number of warheads set at a figure of 300 on each side. I am, however, content to leave this to your judgement. If you feel, from what you know of the negotiations and of the views of our closer allies, that it will be better to avoid specific figures at this stage.

May I add one further thought? You propose to make a statement on this issue on 31 March. This will mean that reports in the media in Europe can be expected on the morning of Good Friday, 1 April. In the case of the UK, there are no national newspapers on Good Friday. Would you therefore consider the possibility of bringing forward your speech by 24 hours? I am sure that we all share an interest in ensuring that your statement is given the widest possible publicity. This will also help to pre-empt some of the impact of Easter peace movement demonstrations both here and elsewhere.

SECRET

30

Defence

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 March 1983

INF

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has just received from President Reagan seeking her views on a new proposal which the American Administration are considering putting to the Soviet Union in Geneva before the end of the current round of negotiations on 29 March. The President further proposes that "a principals only meeting of the SCG be convened in Brussels on 25 March to further our consultations".

I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft reply to the President's message, if possible for tonight's box.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A.J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

March 23, 1983

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver the enclosed message to you from President Reagan, which was received at the Embassy this morning.

Sincerely,

Edward J. Streator
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.

Enclosure:

SECRET

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
London.

SUBJECT
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T34/83

29

SECRET

March 23, 1983

US Declassified

Dear Margaret:

Since the commencement of the INF negotiations, and particularly in recent months, our two governments have taken every appropriate opportunity to consult with each other concerning the conduct of the talks. Now I again invite your views so as to insure that we maintain the best possible and most united position and thus counter Soviet efforts both to delay or prevent the NATO deployment or to block any real progress in Geneva.

Based upon our previous consultations, the situation at the negotiating table in Geneva, and the deployment schedule for the Pershing II and GLCM missile, I have directed a review of the U.S. negotiating position. That review is now complete, and before I make final decisions, I would greatly appreciate your personal views on the tentative conclusions I have reached.

The United States continues to believe that the zero-zero outcome is the optimal solution.

The United States also remains firmly committed to both tracks of the NATO 1979 decision. Without an agreement that satisfies the criteria established in that decision, the United States will deploy LRINF land-based missiles as planned by NATO.

However, while maintaining the other essential elements of the current U.S. position, and we would hope, as an interim step toward the ultimate elimination of all LRINF land-based missiles, the United States could agree to terminate deployment at one of a number of discrete levels provided that the level chosen is militarily viable and satisfies the criteria mentioned earlier and provided that the Soviet Union agrees to reduce its corresponding LRINF land-based missile forces to an equal level.

I am seriously considering directing Ambassador Nitze to make the following proposal to the Soviet Union in Geneva before the end of the current round of negotiations on March 29. He would notify the Soviet Union that the United States is prepared to negotiate an interim agreement to the effect that the U.S. would stop its deployment at a finite (but as yet unspecified) number of warheads, on LRINF land-based missiles on launchers if the Soviet Union reduces the number of warheads on its LRINF missiles on launchers to an equal level on a global basis.

The United States would view such a proposal as a serious interim step on the road to the total elimination of this class of weapons. We would do so in the hope that the Soviet Union could join us in this view.

It is my tentative judgment that it would be best not to deal in specific numbers at this time, since to do so would invite preemptive Soviet criticism during the recess. If presented in general terms, they would be in the position of criticizing a proposal before it had been presented in detail. As an earnest of our good faith, I believe it would also be useful to propose that the talks resume May 10th or 17th vice June 2nd.

Given the short time remaining before the end of this negotiating round, I would greatly appreciate your personal views on this approach as soon as possible so that I can benefit from them before making a final decision. In addition, I suggest that a principals only meeting of the SCG be convened in Brussels on March 25 to further our consultations.

I plan to make a general statement about our willingness to negotiate an interim LRINF solution during a speech I am scheduled to make on March 31.

Margaret, our close collaboration in implementing the December 1979 decision has demonstrated the vitality and strength of the relationship between our two nations. I have full confidence that this important collaboration will continue throughout this year.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ron

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T32A/83

SECRET - VIA HOT LINE

211203Z

28 cpa

SUBJECT

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE USA, THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

US Declassified

Dear Ron,

Thank you for your message of 14 March in which you set out your present thinking about the INF negotiations.

I warmly welcome your decision to review the negotiating position with a view to introducing an interim proposal in Geneva. As you know, we believe there are strong grounds for taking an initiative very soon which will offer the Russians an interim agreement fully consistent with the principles set out in your speech to the American Legion on 22 February. Ideally this should be introduced before the current negotiating round concludes.

The zero option would remain our longer-term objective. But as I told Vice-President Bush, I think that any attempt to make the proposal for an interim arrangement explicitly conditional upon prior Soviet acceptance of the zero option as the eventual outcome would nullify the purpose of the interim proposal and would therefore be a mistake.

Meanwhile, I wholeheartedly agree with the need for caution over public statements at this delicate juncture for INF. We need to be aware of the effect such statements can have on one another's public opinion. For our part we shall certainly avoid any implication that the US Administration is reluctant

/on

on INF arms control: this would be untrue in itself and damaging in terms of public presentation on both sides of the Atlantic. I shall, as you suggest, continue to look for opportunities to underline in public our full satisfaction with Alliance consultation. May I say how much I value being kept in close touch with your thinking in this way, and your undertaking of further consultation before long on this important issue.

Yours ever,

Margaret

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T32A/83

Despatched at
21/1220Z

US Declassified

IMMEDIATE 211203Z MAR 83

FM CABINET OFFICE

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

BT
S E C R E T

FOLLOWING FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER.

BEGINS:-

DEAR RON,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 14 MARCH IN WHICH YOU SET OUT YOUR PRESENT THINKING ABOUT THE INF NEGOTIATIONS.

I WARMLY WELCOME YOUR DECISION TO REVIEW THE NEGOTIATING POSITION WITH A VIEW TO INTRODUCING AN INTERIM PROPOSAL IN GENEVA. AS YOU KNOW, WE BELIEVE THERE ARE STRONG GROUNDS FOR TAKING AN INITIATIVE VERY SOON WHICH WILL OFFER THE RUSSIANS AN INTERIM AGREEMENT FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN YOUR SPEECH TO THE AMERICAN LEGION ON 22 FEBRUARY. IDEALLY THIS SHOULD BE INTRODUCED BEFORE THE CURRENT NEGOTIATING ROUND CONCLUDES.

THE ZERO OPTION WOULD REMAIN OUR LONGER-TERM OBJECTIVE. BUT AS I TOLD VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH, I THINK THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO MAKE THE PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT EXPLICITLY CONDITIONAL UPON PRIOR SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE ZERO OPTION AS THE EVENTUAL OUTCOME WOULD NULLIFY THE PURPOSE OF THE INTERIM PROPOSAL AND WOULD THEREFORE BE A MISTAKE.

MEANWHILE, I WHOLEHEARTEDLY AGREE WITH THE NEED FOR CAUTION OVER PUBLIC STATEMENTS AT THIS DELICATE JUNCTURE FOR INF. WE NEED TO BE AWARE OF THE EFFECT SUCH STATEMENTS CAN HAVE ON ONE ANOTHER'S PUBLIC OPINION. FOR OUR PART WE SHALL CERTAINLY AVOID ANY IMPLICATION THAT THE U.S ADMINISTRATION IS RELUCTANT ON INF ARMS CONTROL: THIS WOULD BE UNTRUE IN ITSELF AND DAMAGING IN TERMS OF PUBLIC PRESENTATION ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC. I SHALL, AS YOU SUGGEST, CONTINUE TO LOOK FOR OPPORTUNITIES TO UNDERLINE IN PUBLIC OUR FULL SATISFACTION WITH ALLIANCE CONSULTATION. MAY I SAY HOW MUCH I VALUE BEING KEPT IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOUR THINKING IN THIS WAY, AND YOUR UNDERTAKING OF FURTHER CONSULTATION BEFORE LONG ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE.

YOURS EVER,

MARGARET.

ENDS
BT

SECRET

Copy: N. Lankley (2)

28 B

Prime Minister

A.J.C. 25/3

MO 11/9/4

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE DEFENCE SECRETARY AND MR WEINBERGER IN VILAMOURA, PORTUGAL AT 1900 HRS ON MONDAY 21ST MARCH 83

Present:

The Rt Hon Michael Heseltine MP
Secretary of State for Defence

HE Sir John Graham Bt KCMG
United Kingdom Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council

Mr J N Blelloch
Deputy Under Secretary for Policy and Programmes

Mr R C Mottram
Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence

The Hon Caspar W Weinberger
Secretary of Defense

The Hon W Tapley Bennett Jr
Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative to NATO

General John W Vessey
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Hon Richard N Perle
Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Policy

The Hon Henry E Catto Jr
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs

Major General Carl R Smith
Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

and others

INF DEPLOYMENT

1. Mr Weinberger said that there had been major increases in US defence expenditure over the previous two years, and inevitably there was now a reaction in Congress to the need for further increases. Last December, Congress had declined to fund Pershing II until there was evidence of successful test firings but ways existed to maintain

the programme and it was going well. The ground launched cruise missile (GLCM) programme was on schedule and the US Administration were happy to time the arrival of the equipment to meet the wishes of the British and German Governments. There was reasonable flexibility in the programme and the most intrusive items of equipment could be delivered as late as the beginning of November while still meeting the agreed deployment date. The Secretary of State said he was most grateful for American co-operation in adjusting the timing of the arrival of equipment. The British Government remained fully committed to the agreed deployment date but there were important political considerations over the timing of the arrival of equipments prior to this.

GREENHAM COMMON

2. Mr Weinberger asked about the demonstrators at Greenham Common. The Secretary of State said that they were still outside the base. There would be major demonstrations over Easter with an attempt to form a human chain linking a number of defence establishments. The campaign was well organised and the peaceful approach adopted helped to maintain public support. Should those who wanted to adopt a more militant campaign gain influence, this could help the Government by alienating public opinion.

INF NEGOTIATIONS

3. Mr Weinberger said that he would have nothing new to say at the NPG the following day about the US negotiating position at Geneva. He recognised that many people now wanted an offer of an interim step, although at one time everybody had wanted the zero option. It was most important to avoid public comment about the zero option. If Dr Luns said that it was not attainable, that was just what the Soviet Union wanted to hear, and he intended to make this clear privately to the Secretary General.

4. The proposal put forward by Mr Andropov was not a serious basis for negotiations. It would leave the Soviet Union with a monopoly in land-based systems, would eliminate US dual-capable aircraft in Europe, brought in the British and French deterrents, and posed an unconstrained threat to China and Japan. It was important to try to bring out more clearly the nature of the threat posed by the SS20. Despite Mr Brehznev's claim that the Soviets would freeze the number of SS20s, deployment continued and had now reached 369 systems (the US was at present quoting in public a figure of 351). The problems posed by the mobility of the SS20 and its re-fire capability were insufficiently stressed. It was also important to avoid any suggestion that NATO needed to take a further decision before deployment could take place. The position on this was clear and the basing countries were giving their full support to deployment: the Dutch had agreed that the Americans could now carry out surveys of their GLCM site.

5. The Secretary of State said that he was fully aware of the position on the possibility of the US side making an interim offer. He entirely shared Mr Weinberger's concern about unhelpful public statements and we had responded positively to President Reagan's message about this. The difficulty was simultaneously to provide for the real defence needs of the Alliance and to maintain public confidence. The public relations aspect was crucial. Mr Weinberger commented that he had particularly admired Mr Heseltine's efforts in strengthening public support for the Alliance position. The Secretary of State said that he believed that we would find in the event that these issues were not as crucial in electoral terms as many people thought. This had been the case in the German election and he felt that it would also prove so in Britain. One difficulty he did face was that in their editorial line most British newspapers were opposed to the Government's position on dual key and it was important to be able to counter that effectively. We also needed a positive line on reductions in the nuclear stockpile in order to improve public confidence and this was why we attached so much importance to the work of the high level group. He recognised the difficulty of the US Administration in trying to present a human face to the Europeans while bringing out the nature of the Soviet threat to United States opinion. But it would be helpful if the US Administration could make clear their willingness to maintain and develop a dialogue with the Soviet Union with the proviso that this would have to be done privately. Mr Weinberger agreed with this.

6. The Secretary of State asked whether it would be possible to have a shorter break in the INF negotiations in order to emphasise our interest in achieving a solution. Mr Weinberger said this was feasible. It was not yet clear whether any new US initiative would be made before the break or immediately after it.

7. Mr Weinberger said that he was very anxious to avoid any interim offer which ruled out the zero option in the longer term. He was concerned that if the US side tabled a specific figure now such as 300 warheads, this would be rejected by the Soviet Union and further negotiations would inevitably involve higher and higher figures. Some way was needed of linking any interim figure to the ultimate zero option in order to avoid establishing numbers on a plateau which proved impossible to move away from. He was almost certain that whatever was proposed would be rejected by Mr Andropov and he was therefore reluctant to move away from zero. He recalled that at the time of the Gleneagles conference it was the Europeans who had pressed him strongly for a zero solution. The Secretary of State commented that the difficulty we faced was the impression that the West was not willing to look at alternatives and was therefore inflexible. Mr Andropov had managed to capture the initiative and the negotiating high ground. Mr Weinberger commented that it was curious how Mr Andropov's reputation in the media had changed so much since he had ceased to be Head of the KGB. He had played the hand skilfully particularly by bringing in the British and French forces on which there was no way we could respond positively. But President Reagan had made it clear that he was willing to consider any reasonable proposal.

REPLACEMENT OF NIKE HERCULES WITH PATRIOT

8. Mr Weinberger said that the US Government was anxious to see Patriot substituted for Nike Hercules in the air defence role. We should not seek to link this with an arms control proposal and thereby give the Soviet Union a handle on our own modernisation.

OUT OF AREA

9. Mr Weinberger said that, although this was more a point for the next DPC meeting, he wanted to stress the importance he attached to the question of out of area activity in support of Alliance interests. The US Government believed that the role of the rapid deployment force in the defence, for instance, of the Middle East was of vital importance to the Alliance and represented a form of forward defence for Alliance countries. The DPC had agreed to study how European NATO members might compensate within Europe for the US forces that had to be deployed elsewhere. The US Government was also anxious that some other NATO members should consider participating in the planned out of area activity itself. He hoped that progress could be made at the June DPC meeting and wanted to let Mr Heseltine know that he felt quite strongly about the issue. The Secretary of State said that he appreciated this was not a question for the current meeting. The British Government had given the RDF concept itself its broad support but it had to be recognised that it was fraught with difficulties for the European members of the Alliance.

OXFORD UNION

10. Mr Weinberger said that he had been invited to debate at the Oxford Union at the end of May on the motion that there was no moral difference between the foreign policies of the US and the Soviet Union. He wondered whether Mr Heseltine, as a former president of the Union, would recommend that he should take part. The Secretary of State said that he was sure that Mr Weinberger would enjoy participating but he might not wish to be involved in such a debate if there was then an election campaign in Britain. He might prefer to look for a date later in the year.

BELIZE

11. General Vessey said that he wanted to ask about the position on the British garrison in Belize. This was an area of vital importance to the US and he was concerned that, if the British withdrew, the Cubans would rapidly establish themselves there. The Secretary of State said that as Mr Weinberger knew we intended to withdraw the Belize garrison. When Mr Shultz had written to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary stressing the importance that the US Administration attached to our presence in Belize, we had

decided to look again at ways of strengthening the defence of the country. We were considering what more we could do to help in the Caribbean by strengthening our general capability before we withdrew the garrison itself but our intention to withdraw remained. Mr Weinberger commented that he had discussed Belize many times with John Nott and this had also been his position. The Secretary of State said that perhaps the Americans could interest other countries - such as Canada - in helping to provide for Belizean security. This provoked some amusement on the American side.

12. The meeting ended at 1945 hours.

Ministry of Defence

24th March 1983

DISTRIBUTION:

PS/Prime Minister
PS/Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
PS/Secretary of Cabinet

HE Sir John Graham Bt KCMG

CONFIDENTIAL

File

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 March 1983

INF

Thank you for your letter of 17 March.

The Prime Minister agrees that the proposed message from herself to President Reagan may be despatched. Would you, in the first sentence, replace the word "current" with "present" and the words "negotiating position" with "negotiations".

Would you please let Tim Flesher know whether Mr. Pym is also content with the message. He will then arrange for its despatch.

I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 March 1983

Prime Minister

Agree message to President Reagan?

A.J.C. 18/3

Dear John,

INF

Thank you for your letter of 14 March enclosing a copy of a further message from President Reagan to the Prime Minister.

The message contains a welcome confirmation that the President is reviewing the INF negotiating position with a view to introducing an interim proposal. The Embassy in Washington reports that the State Department have put proposals which are very close to our own ideas to the White House; the President has not yet discussed these with principal advisors. But Mr Weinberger and some of his team have been promoting the idea that any proposal for an interim agreement should be tied to prior Soviet agreement that the zero option is the long-term objective. This would kill any prospect for Soviet agreement to an interim solution, and nullify the impact of an interim step on public opinion.

The President's request that there should be no public calls from European capitals for change in the US negotiating position is no doubt aimed more at the Germans and Italians than at ourselves. Mr Pym entirely shares President Reagan's point, and spoke strongly to this effect with the German and Italian Ambassadors in the margins of an EC Presidency working lunch in London yesterday. Chancellor Kohl, Herr Genscher and Signor Colombo have all made recent public statements which can be interpreted as calling for change. Yesterday the CDU disarmament spokesman (in what appears to have been an unauthorised statement) specified what he thought the new US negotiating position should be.

Our advice is that the Prime Minister should respond to the President to make it clear that:

a. It remains our view that an interim proposal should be offered soon, ie ideally before the recess in the INF talks at the end of this month;

b. We accept the need for caution over public statements about INF and related matters: this goes for the Americans too;

/c.

c. The condition for an interim agreement apparently favoured by Mr Weinberger (paragraph 2 above) would abort the exercise (The Prime Minister raised this point with Vice-President Bush on his recent visit.)

I enclose a draft message from the Prime Minister to the President which has been agreed with the Ministry of Defence. Wehave heard today in confidence from the Americans that President Reagan is due to address the INF interim proposal decision at a meeting of the National Security Council tomorrow. It would therefore be particularly timely if the Prime Minister's reply could be despatched first thing tomorrow morning.

Given the time factor, Mr Pym has not yet seen the draft reply. I shall be showing it to him in the box tonight.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever,

Roger Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~Top~~ Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
~~Unclassified~~

TO:

President Reagan

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your message of 14 March in which you set out your ~~current~~ present thinking about the INF negotiating ~~position~~ ons.

I warmly welcome your decision to review the negotiating position with a view to introducing an interim proposal in Geneva. As you know, we believe there are strong grounds for taking an initiative very soon which will offer the Russians an interim agreement fully consistent with the principles set out in your speech to the American Legion on 22 February. Ideally this should be introduced before the current negotiating round concludes. // The zero option would remain our longer-term objective. But as I told Vice-President Bush, I think that any attempt to make the proposal for an interim arrangement expliclty conditional upon prior Soviet acceptance of the zero option as the eventual outcome would nullify the purpose of the interim proposal and would therefore be a mistake.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/Meanwhile

Meanwhile, I wholeheartedly agree with the need for caution over public statements at this delicate juncture for INF. We need to be aware of the effect such statements can have on one another's public opinion. For our part we shall certainly avoid any implication that the US Administration is reluctant on INF arms control: this would be untrue in itself and damaging in terms of public presentation on both sides of the Atlantic. I shall, as you suggest, continue to look for opportunities to underline in public our full satisfaction with Alliance consultation. May I say how much I value being kept in close touch with your thinking in this way, and your undertaking of further consultation on this important issue before long.

SECRET

28

GRS 520
SECRET
DESKBY 151030Z
FM BONN 150930Z MAR 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 253 OF 15 MARCH
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON MODUK UKDEL NATO
INFO ROUTINE PARIS THE HAGUE BRUSSELS ROME MOSCOW

GERMAN VIEWS ON INF

SUMMARY

1. THE GERMANS PLAN TO PRESS THE AMERICANS AT MEETINGS THIS WEEK AND NEXT FOR AN EARLY MOVE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT KOHL DOES NOT THINK THAT A MOVE WILL BE POSSIBLE BEFORE THE PRESENT ROUND ENDS. THE GERMANS PROBABLY INTEND TO DISCUSS VARIOUS IDEAS FOR SUCH A MOVE WITH THE AMERICANS, RATHER THAN MAKING A SPECIFIC SUGGESTION. THE EXISTING TIMETABLE FOR STATIONING WOULD NEED TO BE PRESERVED: SO, AT THIS STAGE, WOULD THE INCLUSION OF PERSHING.

DETAIL

2. FOLLOWING KOHL'S CALL IN HIS WASHINGTON POST INTERVIEW ON 13 MARCH FOR A US MOVE IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS, MALLABY WENT OVER THE GROUND YESTERDAY EVENING WITH TELTSCHIK, KOHL'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISER.

3. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT KOHL DID NOT WANT THE US ADMINISTRATION TO FORM THE IMPRESSION THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AFTER THEIR ELECTION VICTORY WERE NO LONGER SO INTERESTED IN VISIBLE US EFFORTS FOR SUCCESS IN GENEVA. THERE WOULD BE DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST INF STATIONING IN THE FRG, STARTING AT EASTER. WHILE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE DEFLECTED FROM STATIONING, THE SCALE OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS AND OF THE INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS CAUSED BY STATIONING WOULD BE FAR GREATER IF THE AMERICANS WERE NOT SEEN TO BE NEGOTIATING REALLY SERIOUSLY. HENCE KOHL'S REMARKS TO THE WASHINGTON POST, WHICH (AS THE FEDERAL SPOKESMAN POINTED OUT YESTERDAY) WERE FULLY IN LINE WITH THE VIEWS HE HAD PUT TO REAGAN IN MESSAGES AND TO BUSH PERSONALLY BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS.

4. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DID NOT EXPECT THE RUSSIANS TO MAKE AN EARLY MOVE IN GENEVA. ALTHOUGH SOME FEDERAL OFFICIALS THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT SOON WALK OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, SAYING THAT THEY WOULD RETURN WHEN THE AMERICANS MADE A SERIOUS PROPOSAL, THE CHANCELLOR WAS INCLINED NOT TO EXPECT THIS. ALTHOUGH THE OUTCOME OF THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS HAD PROBABLY ENDED THE SOVIET HOPE OF STOPPING INF STATIONING BY MEANS OF PROPAGANDA, MOSCOW WOULD STILL HOPE THAT PUBLIC PRESSURE IN WESTERN EUROPE WOULD INFLUENCE THE US NEGOTIATING POSITION. THUS THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT PUT THEMSELVES IN THE WRONG WITH PUBLIC OPINION BY WALKING OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, EVEN TEMPORARILY.

5. TELTSCHIK CONTINUED THAT KOHL WANTED THE AMERICANS TO MAKE A MOVE IN GENEVA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ALTHOUGH IT WAS DESIRABLE THAT THIS SHOULD HAPPEN BEFORE THE CURRENT ROUND ENDS ON 28 MARCH, KOHL THOUGHT THIS WOULD PROVE UNREALISTIC. THERE SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION OF A US MOVE AT THE SCG ON 18 MARCH AND AMONG MINISTERS DURING THE NPG NEXT WEEK. FEDERAL DEFENCE MINISTER WOERNER WOULD RAISE THE SUBJECT DURING HIS BILATERAL MEETING WITH WEINBERGER IN THE MARGINS OF THE NPG. A MOVE MIGHT BE DEVISED WHICH WENT FURTHER THAN THE PRINCIPLES ALREADY STATED PUBLICLY BY REAGAN BUT STOPPED SHORT OF A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL INVOLVING ACTUAL NUMBERS OF MISSILES OR WARHEADS. IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL THAT SUCH A MOVE SHOULD PRESERVE PERSHING AND MAINTAIN THE EXISTING TIMETABLE FOR STATIONING. TELTSCHIK IMPLIED THAT THE GERMANS WOULD NOT ADVOCATE ANY PARTICULAR PROPOSAL TO THE AMERICANS, BUT WOULD TRY TO MOVE THE LATTER TOWARDS MAKING A NEW PROPOSAL BY ENGAGING THEM IN DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE PACKAGES. HE ADDED THAT PERSHING MIGHT BE GIVEN UP LATER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IF THE RUSSIANS WERE PREPARED TO DESTROY A REALLY SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF SS20S. IN THAT CASE, SOME OF THE CRUISE MISSILES AVAILABLE FOR STATIONING NEXT WINTER IN OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD NEED TO BE DIVERTED TO THE FRG, SO THAT STATIONING COULD BEGIN HERE AT THE SAME TIME AS ELSEWHERE.

TAYLOR

LIMITED
DEFENCE D
ACDD
NEWS D
EESD
NAD
WED
PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR GOODISON

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

START

Defence: I~F ~~Atlantic~~. P+3.

PRIME MINISTER

INF: PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS

In the light of President Reagan's latest message to you, he would no doubt be grateful if you were able to say in the House this week something like:

"The United States Government have been meticulous in consulting their Allies about all aspects of the INF negotiations. I am confident that this close co-ordination will continue. It demonstrates the Alliance's commitment to genuine negotiations and the earliest possible achievement of an agreement on deep reductions in INF missiles on both sides, leading ultimately to the complete removal of that class of weapons."

A. J. COLES

15 March 1983

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

INF

You had difficulty in reading President Reagan's latest message. The text is as follows: (T 30A/83)

"In my message of February 16, I invited your views on how to treat the INF issue so as to assure a united allied position and thus, counter Soviet efforts to delay or prevent the deployment or any real progress in Geneva. It seems to me that our consultations, particularly during the Vice President's trip and in written exchanges since, have served that purpose very well.

As I stated in my message, my foremost concern is to proceed in a way which complements your own efforts and which sustains support for both tracks of the December 79 decision. I remain committed to these goals. Toward that end I have directed that a prompt review of our position be undertaken discreetly so as not to invite a spate of Soviet pressure to which we would ultimately appear to be yielding. I expect that this review will produce the basis for new instructions to Paul Nitze providing for his introducing an interim proposal even as we maintain zero-zero as our goal. I will keep you informed and will of course, seek your comments before reaching any decisions.

As we proceed, however, it would be helpful if we could avoid public calls from European capitals for change or greater flexibility . Here again, since we are moving in this direction, it is unnecessary to put us in the apparent position of being the reluctant partner, which of course, we are not. Indeed, it would be helpful if you were to find it possible to express your confidence in the extremely close co-ordination which has been and remains underway which makes clear the Alliance's commitment to good faith negotiations and the earliest possible achievement of an agreement calling for deep reductions leading ultimately to zero-zero.

As stated above, you may be confident that I will remain in close touch with you on this matter and will, within the next ten days, be seeking your views as to how best to go forward together."

15 March 1983

SECRET

Defence
Cabinet Office

278. Sec

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 March 1983

INF

I enclose a copy of a further message which the Prime Minister has received from President Reagan on the above subject. In essence, it is an appeal to us and our European colleagues to avoid making public requests to the US Administration to show greater flexibility in the INF negotiations.

I should be grateful for your advice on whether the Prime Minister should reply to this message and, if so, for a draft.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

SUBJECT

T 27A

Prime Ministers
Duty Clerk
1413

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T30A/83

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DE WTE £1785 0731845
O 141841Z MAR 83
FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON
ZEM
S E C R E T SENSITIVE VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WHO1785
MARCH 14, 1983

US Declassified

DEAR MARGARET:

IN MY MESSAGE OF FEBRUARY 16, I INVITED YOUR VIEWS ON HOW TO TREAT THE INF ISSUE SO AS TO ASSURE A UNITED ALLIED POSITION AND THUS, COUNTER SOVIET EFFORTS TO DELAY OR PREVENT THE DEPLOYMENT OR ANY REAL PROGRESS IN GENEVA. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT OUR CONSULTATIONS, PARTICULARLY DURING THE VICE PRESIDENTS TRIP AND IN WRITTEN EXCHANGES SINCE, HAVE SERVED THAT PURPOSE VERY WELL.

AS I STATED IN MY MESSAGE, MY FOREMOST CONCERN IS TO PROCEED IN A WAY WHICH COMPLEMENTS YOUR OWN EFFORTS AND WHICH SUBSTAINS SUPPORT FOR BOTH TRACKS OF THE DECEMBER 79 DECISION. I REMAIN COMMITTED TO THESE GOALS. TOWARD THAT END I HAVE DIRECTED THAT A PROMPT REVIEW OF OUR POSITION BE UNDERTAKEN DISCREETLY SO AS NOT TO INVITE A SPATE OF SOVIET PRESSURE TO WHICH WE WOULD ULTIMATELY APPEAR TO BE YIELDING. I EXPECT THAT THIS REVIEW WILL PRODUCE THE BASIS FOR NEW INSTRUCTIONS TO PAUL NITZE PROVIDING FOR HIS INTRODUCING AN INTERIM PROPOSAL EVEN AS WE MAINTAIN ZERO-ZERO AS OUR GOAL. I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED AND WILL OF COURSE, SEEK YOUR COMMENTS BEFORE REACHING ANY DECISIONS.

AS WE PROCEED, HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF WE COULD AVOID PUBLIC CALLS FROM EUROPEAN CAPITALS FOR CHANGE OR GREATER FLEXIBILITY. HERE AGAIN, SINCE WE ARE MOVING IN THIS DIRECTION, IT IS UNNECESSARY TO PUT US IN THE APPARENT POSITION OF BEING THE RELUCTANT PARTNER, WHICH OF COURSE, WE ARE NOT. INDEED, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOU WERE TO FIND IT POSSIBLE TO EXPRESS YOUR CONFIDENCE IN THE EXTREMELY CLOSE COORDINATION WHICH HAS BEEN AND REMAINS UNDERWAY WHICH MAKES CLEAR THE ALLIANCES COMMITTMENT TO GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATIONS AND THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE ACHIEVEMENT OF AN AGREEMENT CALLING FOR DEEP REDUCTIONS LEADING ULTIMATELY TO ZERO-ZERO.

AS STATED ABOVE, YOU MAY BE CONFIDENT THAT I WILL REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU ON THIS MATTER AND WILL, WITHIN THE NEXT TEN DAYS, BE SEEKING YOUR VIEWS AS TO HOW BEST TO GO FORWARD TOGETHER.

SINCERELY,

~~END OF PAGE 01~~

RON

24

GRS 650
S E C R E T
FROM UKDIS GENEVA 101730Z MAR 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 19 OF 10 MARCH
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, PARIS

INF

1. MR HURD HAD HALF AN HOUR THIS MORNING WITH NITZE. NITZE SAID THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE GOING THROUGH A ''GRUBBING'' PERIOD WHICH WAS THE BEST THAT COULD BE EXPECTED AT PRESENT. HE FELT THAT SOME SMALL HEADWAY HAD BEEN MADE BOTH IN GENEVA AND IN MOSCOW ON THE BASIC ISSUES. THE SOVIET UNION WAS CONTINUING TO PRESS STRONGLY ITS ARGUMENTS FOR INCLUSION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS: THEY MAY HAVE BEEN SURPRISED BY THE RESILIENCE WITH WHICH THE AMERICAN SIDE HAD STUCK TO ITS GUNS. HE HAD HAD PRIVATE AND VERY TENTATIVE INDICATIONS FROM THE SOVIET TEAM THAT MOSCOW MIGHT BE ABLE TO MOVE AWAY FROM THIS ARGUMENT IF SOME INDIRECT WAY COULD BE FOUND AROUND IT. HE REHEARSED AT LENGTH THE ARGUMENTS HE WAS USING ON THE POINT. HE SAID HE WAS NOT WORRIED. NITZE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD ALSO TAKEN A COMPLETELY UNREASONABLE STAND ON DATA IN THE PUBLIC SESSIONS. THEY HAD REACHED THE POINT OF INCLUDING ALMOST ANY AMERICAN AND NATO WEAPON, EVEN THOSE BASED IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE FAR EAST, IN THE DATA EQUATION, ARGUING THAT THESE COULD ALSO BE A THREAT SHOULD ANY OF THEM BE MOVED TO WITHIN RANGE OF A WARSAW PACT STATE.

2. MR HURD ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW PUBLIC PROPOSAL FROM THE US BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS WENT INTO RECESS ON 29 MARCH. IT COULD BE PRESENTATIONALLY DIFFICULT IF THE ALLIANCE STAYED TOO LONG IN THE SAME NEGOTIATING POSTURE. NITZE SAID, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, THAT HE HAD TO LOOK AT THE POSSIBILITIES FROM A NEGOTIATING VIEWPOINT. HE WANTED THE BEST RESULT POSSIBLE FOR THE WEST. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO RELATE ANY POSSIBLE COMPROMISE TO OUR FUNDAMENTAL POSITION. OTHERWISE THERE WAS A RISK EITHER THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD POCKET CONCESSIONS WITHOUT RECIPROCATING THEMSELVES , (AS HAD HAPPENED AT SALT I) , OR THAT THEY WOULD USE CONCESSIONS AS A MEANS OF NIBBLING AWAY AT THE WEST'S POSITION. ALL THE IMPLICATIONS, THEREFORE, HAD TO BE EXAMINED THOROUGHLY. NITZE AGREED THAT WORK WAS BEING DONE ON THESE QUESTIONS IN WASHINGTON, BUT HE AND HIS TEAM IN GENEVA WERE RIGHTLY NOT KEPT FULLY IN THE PICTURE.

3. MR HURD EXPLAINED THE POSSIBLE POLITICAL PROBLEM OF A LONG RECESS IF NO NEW NEGOTIATING FORMULA WAS ANNOUNCED. IN RECENT WEEKS THE PUBLIC DEBATE HAD GONE CLEARLY IN OUR FAVOUR. BUT EASTER WOULD BE A PERIOD OF ANTI-NUCLEAR DEMONSTRATIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE IN WHICH GOVERNMENTS COULD AGAIN LOSE THE ADVANTAGE. THE WAY THE NEGOTIATING RECESS WAS HANDLED WAS OF MUCH POLITICAL

/ IMPORTANCE.

IMPORTANCE. IF THERE WAS NOTHING TO SAY ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS, WE WOULD NEED TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY HOW WE PRESENTED WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED SO FAR. WE NEEDED, FOR EXAMPLE, TO FIND WAYS OF SHOWING IN PUBLIC THE UNREASONABLENESS OF THE PRESENT SOVIET POSITION. MR HURD ADDED AS A PERSONAL SUGGESTION THAT A SHORTER RECESS THAN TWO MONTHS WOULD GIVE A BETTER PUBLIC IMPRESSION OF THE ALLIANCE'S COMMITMENT TO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. NITZE AGREED ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC OPINION AND FINDING THE RIGHT PUBLIC POSTURE. THIS WOULD NEED CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. THE RECESS DID NOT HAVE TO BE FOR 60 DAYS. THIS WAS A MATTER FOR JOINT DECISION BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. HE DID NOT THINK PERSONALLY THAT IT WOULD BE A PROBLEM TO PERSUADE THE SOVIETS TO AGREE TO A RECESS OF PERHAPS 30 DAYS.

4. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION NITZE SAID HE WAS NOT WORRIED BY THE SLIGHT DIFFERENCES OF EMPHASIS IN THE ARGUMENTS USED BY BRITAIN AND FRANCE TO JUSTIFY KEEPING THEIR OWN SYSTEMS OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER MR HURD AND ANDREANI HAD COVERED THE POINT IN SPEECHES THIS MORNING IN THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT, MR HURD PUT THE SAME QUESTION TO ANDREANI, WHO SAID HE WAS A LITTLE UNEASY THAT THE BRITISH ARGUMENTS MIGHT UNDERCUT THE FRENCH AND VICE-VERSA(UNDERLINED). MR HURD WENT OVER THE GROUND WITH HIM ON THE SAME LINES AS GILLMORE RECENTLY. HE UNDERTOOK THAT WE WOULD LET THE FRENCH KNOW IN ADVANCE IF AT ANY TIME WE PROPOSED TO ALTER OUR PRESENT VERY GENERAL WHITE PAPER FORMULA ABOUT THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH WE MIGHT REVIEW THE NEED FOR OUR STRATEGICAL NUCLEAR FORCE.

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INFO RBDWDFA/PRODROME WASHINGTON
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S E C R E T 'UK COMMS ONLY
FCO LONDON TO PASS IMMEDIATE TO PRODROME WASHINGTON
FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY TO SECRETARY OF STATE
INF
I BRIEFED BURT THIS EVENING ON MR PYMS TALK WITH WEINBERGER (REPORTED SEPARATELY FROM HMCG SAN FRANCISCO). HE SAID THAT WE WERE FIGHTING THE FIGHT OF THE ANGELS. HE ADDED THAT SHULTZ HAD SEEN THE PRESIDENT TO-DAY, AND NOW HAD AUTHORITY TO PUT IN HAND A REVIEW OF THE US NEGOTIATING POSITION (WITH A NEW PROPOSAL VERY MUCH IN MIND). BURT SAID THAT WE SHOULD HAVE NO DOUBT THAT A NEW PROPOSAL WAS WHAT SHULTZ WANTED, AND AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE
BT

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GRS 900

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FM SAN FRANCISCO 050300Z MAR 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 17 OF 4 MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SECRETARY WEINBERGER 4 MARCH

1. WEINBERGER, WHO WAS IN SAN FRANCISCO FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DINNER FOR THE QUEEN, CALLED ON THE SECRETARY OF STATE AT HIS HOTEL. HE WAS UNACCOMPANIED. SIR O WRIGHT AND I WERE PRESENT. THE MEETING LASTED FOR 30 MINUTES.

INF

2. THIS WAS THE MAIN SUBJECT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SET OUT THE CASE FOR A WESTERN PROPOSAL BEFORE THE END OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATING ROUND ON THE SAME LINES AS HE HAD PREVIOUSLY WITH SHULTZ (SAN FRANCISCO TELNO 9). WEINBERGER RESPONDED BY PUTTING TWO ARGUMENTS AGAINST MOVING FROM THE PRESENT POSITION:

(I) NO-ONE WAS KEENER TO GET ARMS REDUCTIONS THAN PRESIDENT REAGAN. THAT WAS WHY HE HAD PUT FORWARD THE ZERO OPTION. THIS WAS A SERIOUS PROPOSAL. THE RUSSIANS FOR THEIR PART HAD YET TO MAKE ONE: THEY KNEW PERFECTLY WELL THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT AGREE TO INCLUDING BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS OR TO ALLOWING THE RUSSIANS A MONOPOLY. SO IT WAS NOW UP TO THE RUSSIANS TO MAKE A MOVE.

(II) IF WE WERE TO MOVE AWAY FROM ZERO, EVEN WHILE MAINTAINING IT AS THE LONGER TERM OBJECTIVE, HOW WOULD WE GET BACK TO IT ? WHAT WOULD BE THE INCENTIVE FOR THE RUSSIANS TO RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE ?

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT OUR PRESENT POSITION IN GENEVA WAS ONE WHICH COULD BE EXPLAINED TO PUBLIC OPINION: WE WERE LOOKING VERY THOROUGHLY AT WHAT THE RUSSIANS HAD SAID AND EXAMINING ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THIS POSITION COULD NOT BE HELD BEYOND THE END OF THE PRESENT ROUND. THERE WERE STRONG PRESSURES IN EUROPE TO WORK FOR A BALANCED STEP TOWARDS OUR OBJECTIVE IF IT REMAINED CLEAR FROM THE SOVIET POSITION THAT IT COULD NOT BE ATTAINED IN ONE GO. WEINBERGER ASKED WHAT SUCH A WESTERN PROPOSAL MIGHT CONSIST OF. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR US/SOVIET PARITY AND SAID THAT THE FIGURE OF 300 HAD BEEN MENTIONED ON A GLOBAL BASIS. WEINBERGER SAID THAT THE JAPANESE WERE INDEED VERY STRONG ON THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL DEAL. HE COMMENTED THAT THE RUSSIANS NOW HAD 351 SS 20'S (AND PROBABLY TWO MORE WHICH THE US HAD NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM). HE MADE NO DIRECT COMMENT ON THE FIGURE OF 300, BUT EMPHASISED THAT IT MUST INCLUDE A PERSHING ELEMENT IN WHATEVER ALLIANCE DISTRIBUTION WAS AGREED. SOVIET RADAR TECHNOLOGY HAD IMPROVED THEIR ABILITY TO COPE WITH GLCM'S AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE PREVENTION OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHINGS WAS THEIR MAJOR OBJECTIVE.

4. WEINBERGER IMPLIED TOWARDS THE END OF THE CONVERSATION THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT THE US TO STAY PUT ON THE ZERO OPTION OVER THE LONG HAUL, THOUGH HE ADDED THAT THIS COULD BE ARGUED TO BE THE BEST NEGOTIATING TACTICS:- HISTORY HAD SHOWN THAT THE RUSSIANS TENDED TO COME FORWARD UNEXPECTEDLY IN NEGOTIATIONS AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD HATE TO MAKE A MOVE A WEEK BEFORE THE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE DONE SO IN ANY CASE. HE CONCLUDED THAT THE QUESTION OF WHEN A MOVE MIGHT BEST BE MADE AND OF WHAT PROPOSAL SHOULD BE PUT FORWARD WAS REALLY ONE OF TACTICS. THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HIS POSITION WAS NOT ALL OR NOTHING.

/ISOLATIONISM

ISOLATIONISM

ISOLATIONISM

5. IN MORE GENERAL CONVERSATION, WEINBERGER SAID THAT ISOLATIONISM WAS NEVER FAR BELOW THE SURFACE IN THE UNITED STATES. THERE WAS A DANGER THAT ITS PROPONENTS, THOSE IN THE UNITED STATES WHO SUPPORTED A NUCLEAR FREEZE AND THOSE IN EUROPE TENDING TOWARDS NEUTRALISM, WOULD PRODUCE A DANGEROUS COMBINATION. IT WAS CLEAR ALSO THAT IF THINGS WENT WRONG IN EL SALVADOR AND THE UNITED STATES WAS FACED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER CUBA IN MEXICO, THE PRESSURES TO TURN AWAY FROM EUROPE AND CONCENTRATE ON THE THREAT NEARER HOME WOULD BE VERY STRONG.

DEFENCE BUDGET

6. WEINBERG SPOKE BRIEFLY ABOUT HIS PROBLEMS WITH CONGRESS ABOUT THE BUDGET. HE SEEMED REASONABLY OPTIMISTIC. THE SPECIFIC ITEMS ON THE BUDGET WERE NOT UNDER MAJOR ATTACK AND THERE WAS GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE THREAT (AN UP-DATED ADMINISTRATION ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET CAPABILITIES, WHICH WOULD BE OUT VERY SHORTLY, WOULD HELP). BUT THERE WAS NEVERTHELESS A GENERAL FEELING, SHARED BY MEMBERS OF THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY, THAT THE OVERALL TOTAL WAS TOO HIGH.

FCO PLEAS PASS TO WASHINGTON

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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FM SAN FRANCISCO 040453Z MAR 83 PS TO PM 10 DOWNING ST.

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 9 OF 4 MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SHULTZ AT PAOLO ALTO ON 3 MARCH: INF

1. SHULTZ OPENED BY SAYING THAT THE CONSULTATIONS DURING BUSH'S TOUR HAD BEEN USEFUL. THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON 22 FEBRUARY HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO REFLECT THE RESULTS AND SEEMED TO HAVE HIT THE RIGHT NOTE. BUT WE NEEDED TO KEEP THINKING ONCE THE GERMAN ELECTIONS WERE OVER.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED WITH THE ASSESSMENT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEECH AND THE BUSH VISIT. WE WERE ON TOP OF THE ARGUMENT AT THE MOMENT, BUT WE HAD TO MAKE SURE WE STAYED THERE. THE BREAK IN THE GENEVA TALKS AT THE END OF MARCH WOULD BE CRUCIAL. WE NEEDED BEFORE THEN A PUBLICLY CONVINCING EXPLANATION OF WHAT WAS WRONG WITH THE SOVIET PROPOSALS AND OF WHAT WE WERE PREPARED TO DO. NITZE'S VISIT HAD BEEN VERY USEFUL AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE RECOGNISED THE FORCE OF HIS ARGUMENTS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE NEGOTIATOR. WE AGREED THAT HE SHOULD EXPLORE FULLY THE CHANCES FOR AN AGREEMENT BUT THOUGHT ALSO THAT THERE SHOULD BE A SPECIFIC US PROPOSAL BEFORE THE END OF THE SESSION. IF FOR REASONS OF NEGOTIATING TACTIS IT WAS THOUGHT RISKY TO PUT NUMBERS ON THE TABLE TOO SOON, THE PROPOSAL MIGHT HAVE TO BE DESIGNED WITHOUT THEM (WITH PROPER EMPHASIS ON EQUALITY BETWEEN THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EXCLUSION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS).

3. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION SHULTZ, AND MORE PARTICULARLY BURT MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE A PROPOSAL GOING USEFULLY BEYOND REAGAN'S SPEECH OF 22 FEBRUARY, AND YET NOT QUOTING FIGURES. MR PYM EMPHASISED THAT HE WOULD REGARD A PROPOSAL INCLUDING FIGURES AS MUCH THE EASIEST TO PRESENT PUBLICLY: UNLESS THERE WERE STRONG TACTICAL OBJECTIONS, THERE WAS NO POINT IN THINKING OF ALTERNATIVES. SHULTZ CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT IF THE PRESIDENT DECIDED TO MAKE A MOVE THE INCLUSION OF FIGURES WOULD BE HELPFUL IN DECIDING DISTRIBUTION IN THE ALLIANCE. THREE HUNDRED WAS GOOD FROM THAT POINT OF VIEW AND IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT PERSHINGS SHOULD BE IN THE PICTURE. IN HIS VIEW, THE MAIN SOVIET OBJECTIVE DURING THE WALK IN THE WOODS HAD BEEN TO EXCLUDE PERSHING AND THUS DELAY INF DEPLOYMENT IN GERMANY UNTIL 1985, WHICH HE ASSUMSD WOULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES BOTH FOR US AND FOR THE ITALIANS. MR PYM AGREED.

4. SHULTZ EMPHASISED TWO OTHER POINTS:

(I) THE AMERICANS COULD NOT POSSIBLY ABANDON THEIR INSISTENCE ON A GLOBAL DEAL. IF PUBLIC OPINION DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT WAS WRONG WITH ANDROPOV'S PROPOSALS, THEY SHOULD ASK THE JAPANESE AND THE CHINESE.

(II) HE ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED MR PYM'S CONFIRMATION THAT WE SHOULD STICK TO ZERO AS OUR OBJECTIVE.

MR PYM SAID THAT THE SECOND HALF OF MARCH MIGHT BE THE BEST TIME FOR A WESTERN PROPOSAL.

5. FINALLY, SHULTZ SAID THAT THE QUESTION OF THE TIMING OF DEPLOYMENT IN THE UK SEEMED TO BE ON THE WAY TO RESOLUTION : THE AIR FORCE WOULD PROBABLY CONCLUDE THAT THEY COULD DELIVER LATER THAN FIRST ENVISAGED AND STILL MAKE THE EQUIPMENT OPERATIONAL IN TIME. MR PYM SAID THAT WE SHOULD WAIT UNTIL NOVEMBER FOR THE MAJOR ITEMS. MEANWHILE WE WOULD CONCENTRATE ON PRESSING HOME TWO POINTS: FIRST, THAT WE WERE TRYING SERIOUSLY TO GET AGREEMENT AND, SECONDLY, THAT THE ESSENTIAL CORROLLARY OF A WESTERN PROPOSAL LESS RADICAL THAN ZERO WAS THAT DEPLOYMENT (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) WOULD TAKE PLACE.

FCO PASS WASHINGTON

BEAVEN

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? SEE FCWIC 17
020/312/1

TO FCO TELNO 001 SAVING OF 3 MARCH 1983

INFO WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, ROME, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, EAST EUROPEAN POSTS, MODUK DS17, UKDEL VIENNA, UKDEL MADRID, UKDIS GENEVA

– See S6

MY TEL NO 216: INF: SOVIET COMMENT

1. The following is a detailed account of the indications in Soviet official statements and press comment that they may be preparing for the possibility of disengaging from Andropov's 21 December proposals, if this proves necessary in the light of the FRG elections.

ANDROPOV'S 21 DECEMBER PROPOSALS:
BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS

2. The Russians, in discussing INF, usually continue to include the Andropov equation (Soviet medium range missiles should equal the number of British and French forces). But the only recent press articles to develop at all the case for inclusion of British and French systems was a Tass commentary on French forces on 14 February (clearly aimed at Cheysson's visit) and a routine piece by Portugalov in Moscow News on 24 February. Gromyko in his recent Pravda interview (Moscow tel no 196) omitted to argue the point. Nor was the issue addressed in an unfocussed article in Pravda on 21 February which criticised a recent speech in which you had discussed INF (presumably your speech to the European Atlantic Group on 14 February).

3. This was a central issue during Cheysson's recent visit (Moscow tels nos 179 and 204 and UKREP Brussels tel no 739). But according to one account from the French Embassy his Russian interlocutors had only gone through the motions in countering Cheysson's lengthy exposition of the French case for non-inclusion of their weapons in the Geneva talks.

4. A front page leader on the struggle for peace in Izvestia on 17 February, and a lengthy front page article on INF in another daily, Sovietskaya Rossiya, on 24 February, noticeably failed to set out the Andropov INF proposal.

INTERMEDIATE SOLUTIONS

5. Gromyko in his Pravda interview, while very sceptical, did not rule out in terms any possibility of an intermediate solution. A constant theme of Soviet public comment is the failure of the US to provide concrete evidence of a more constructive approach to

/the

the Geneva talks. According to Pravda and several Tass reports this had been the message of NATO's Special Consultative Group meeting in mid-February. Pravda's weekly international review on 20 February and a Tass commentary on 25 February said that rumours of US flexibility were just delaying tactics and a cover for eventual deployment. The latter article, not published in the Soviet press, was the first for some time to describe what was meant by an intermediate solution: it reported General Rogers as suggesting that the US would deploy less missiles than originally intended while the Soviet Union would keep some of its intermediate range missiles. Echoing Gromyko's Pravda interview Tass commented that the US had not yet proposed any "qualitatively new variants".

6. The same Tass piece also noted that Roger's version involved deployment of Pershing 2. Other articles have also focussed on Pershing (Tass and Sovietskaya Rossiya, both on 24 February), but nothing has recently appeared specifically on cruise. There were Soviet hints during the recent visit by the American United Nations Association that, while Pershing was totally unacceptable, cruise was not necessarily so (Moscow tel no 190 and Jack's teleletter to Gozney of 1 March). A distinction between the two systems was also implied in an article in the latest issue of "Kommunist" by General Tolubko, Commander of Soviet strategic rocket forces (details by bag to Defence Department).

"AUTOMATICITY" AND THE FRG ELECTIONS

7. Several recent Soviet articles have attacked the idea of automatic deployment later this year if no agreement had been reached in Geneva. Recent remarks by the Dutch Prime Minister which seem to reject automaticity have been reported (Tass, 16 February, and Pravda's international review, 20 February). But this issue is presented primarily in West German terms (Tass 14 February, and Pravda 28 February). INF and the FRG elections continue to be closely linked in the Soviet Press.

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GR 272

FROM MOSCOW 031415Z MARCH 83

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 216 OF 3 MARCH

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, ROME , THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS
UKDEL NATO, EAST EUROPEAN POSTS, MODUK (FOR DS17)

INFO SAVING UKDEL VIENNA, UKDEL MADRID, UKDIS GENEVA, PEKING
TOKYO, ULAN BATOR, AND OTHER NATO POSTS.

INF : SOVIET COMMENT.

1. BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, THE RUSSIANS MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS PENDING THE FRG ELECTIONS. BUT I SEE POSSIBLE SIGNS THAT THEY MAY BE PREPARING , IF NECESSARY, TO DISENGAGE FROM ANDROPOV'S 21 DECEMBER PROPOSALS.

2. THE EVIDENCE IS NECESSARILY SPECULATIVE, CONSISTING PRIMARILY OF CLOSE ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF RECENT SOVIET STATEMENTS AND PRESS COMMENTARIES , WITH AN EYE AS MUCH TO WHAT IS OMITTED AS TO THEIR ACTUAL CONTENT. BUT I FIND IT INTERESTING THAT PUBLICLY THE RUSSIANS HAVE RECENTLY DRAWN LESS ATTENTION TO THE BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS. THESE WERE NOT HIGHLIGHTED IN GROMYKO'S RECENT PRAVDA INTERVIEW (MY TELNO 196), AND HAVE HAD ONLY SUMMARY TREATMENT ELSEWHERE. ON THE INF TALKS THEMSELVES, THE SOVIET LINE CONTINUES TO BE THAT THE AMERICANS ARE NOT SERIOUS AND RUMOURS OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE US POSITION ARE DISMISSED AS UNPROVEN. FOR THEIR PART, THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT SAID ANYTHING AMOUNTING TO A CATEGORIC REJECTION OF AN INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION. NOR HAVE THEY RESTRICTED THEIR FUTURE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT BY COMMENTING ON REAGAN'S FOUR INF PRINCIPLES (HIS SPEECH TO THE AMERICAN LEGION). IN THE EXPECTATION OF NEW US PROPOSALS THEY SEEM NOW TO BE SIGNALLING THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING MISSILES WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THEM , WITH THE IMPLICATION THAT CRUISE CAUSES THEM LESS DIFFICULTY.

3. THE FIRM LINE BEING TAKEN COLLECTIVELY BY WESTERN LEADERS AND REPRESENTATIVES MAY BE MAKING SOME IMPACT. IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO CONTINUE TO DRUM HOME OUR MESSAGE AS THE RUSSIANS REVIEW THEIR TACTICS IN THE LIGHT OF THE FRG ELECTIONS.

4. A MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS IS RECORDED IN MY SAVINGRAM NO. 1 (NOT TO ALL).

5. FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

SUTHERLAND

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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TOPRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 194 OF 24 FEB
INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS, WASHINGTON

INF

DEFENCE

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEECH TO THE AMERICAN LEGION ANNUAL CONFERENCE:

SOVIET COMMENT

1. THE FIRST SOVIET REACTION TO THE SPEECH APPEARED IN A TASS DESPATCH FROM WASHINGTON CARRIED IN PRAVDA OF 24 FEBRUARY. THIS FAILED TO MENTION REAGAN'S INF PRINCIPLES AND MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) THE SPEECH, WHICH CONTAINED NOTHING NEW, SHOWED THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION WAS INTENT ON CONFRONTATION AND THE BLOCKING OF ARMS NEGOTIATIONS.

(B) THE IMPRESSION HAD BEEN CREATED THAT WASHINGTON WANTED TO PLAY DOWN THE PROVOCATIVE AND ANTI-SOVIET TONE OF THE SPEECH.

(C) REAGAN HAD SAID THAT HE DID NOT EXCLUDE PRODUCTIVE US/SOVIET RELATIONS. BUT HE HAD DEMANDED CONCESSIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION WHICH WOULD, TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES, CHANGE SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TO SUIT WASHINGTON.

(D) REAGAN HAD SAID THAT US FOREIGN POLICY AIMS REMAINED THE SAME AS SET OUT IN HIS ''CRUSADE AGAINST COMMUNISM'' SPEECH TO THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT LAST SUMMER. HE HAD AGAIN CRUDELY DISTORTED SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND OPENLY SLANDERED THE SOVIET UNION. ''BLINDED BY PATHOLOGICAL HATRED FOR SOCIALISM,'' REAGAN HAD RESORTED TO DEMAGOGY ABOUT THE COMMUNIST YOKE. HE NEEDED THESE FANTASIES TO JUSTIFY GLOBAL MILITARY PLANS INCLUDING THE PREPARATION OF CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WAR.

(E) REAGAN HAD CATEGORICALLY REJECTED THE CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET PROPOSALS ON INF. HE HAD REPEATED HIS PROPOSAL FOH A US/SOVIET SUMMIT ''EXCLUSIVELY TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT BASED ON THE DEMANDS OF THE UNITED STATES''.

SUTHERLAND

STANDARD
NAD
EESD
WED
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

Defence PA 3 1/11

GR 1300
UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON 191645Z FEB 83
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 412 OF 19 FEBRUARY 1983

FOR GILLMORE

INF STATIONING

BURT HAS PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING TEXT OF THE ARTICLE TO WHICH HE REFERRED IN LONDON. THIS APPEARED IN THE NEW YORK TIMES ON 20 JANUARY 1979.

WEST IS CONSIDERING MISSILE FOR EUROPE ABLE TO HIT SOVIET

A REPLY TO MOSCOW'S BUILDUP

WEAPON, DISCUSSED AT GUADELOUPE PARLEY, SEEN AS RESPONSE TO SS.20 AND NEW BOMBER

WASHINGTON. JAN. 19 - THE LEADERS OF THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, FRANCE AND WEST GERMANY ARE CONSIDERING DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILE THAT WOULD BE BASED IN WEST -ERN EUROPE AND BE CAPABLE OF STRIKING THE SOVIET UNION, CARTER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS SAID TODAY.

THEY SAID THE MISSLE WOULD BE DEVELOPED BY THE UNITED STATES. THE FOUR WESTERN LEADERS VIEW IT, THE OFFICIALS SAID, AS A POSSIBLE RESPONSE TO A NEW GENERATION OF SOVIET NUCLEAR MISSILES AND BOMBERS THAT ARE DIRECTED AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE AND ARE NOT LIMITED BY EXISTING AGREEMENTS.

THE MATTER WAS DISCUSSED AT THE SUMMIT MEETING IN GUADELOUPE EARLIER THIS MONTH BY PRESIDENT CARTER, PRIME MINISTER JAMES CALLAGHAN OF BRITAIN, PRESIDENT VALERY GISCARD D ESTAING OF FRANCE AND CHANCELLOR HELMUT SCHMIDT OF WEST GERMANY. BUT, THE ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS SAID, THE LEADERS MADE NO FIRM DECISION ON THE MISSILE QUESTION.

SOVIET SS.20 A THREAT

THE FOUR LEADERS CONCLUDED, HOWEVER, THAT A NEW SOVIET INTERMEDIATE RANGE WEAPON KNOWN AT THE SS.20 POSED AN UNACCEPTABLE SECURITY THREAT TO THE WEST. ACCORDINGLY, A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL SAID, THEY AGREED THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION ''SHOULD EXPLORE VERY ACTIVELY'' ITS OPTIONS FOR COUNTERING THE SOVIET MISSILE, INCLUDING THE DEPLOYMENT OF A SIMILAR WEAPON IN WESTERN EUROPE IN THE 1980'S.

THE DISCUSSIONS AT GUADELOUPE WERE SAID TO HAVE UNDERSCORED WHAT THE OFFICIAL CALLED ''THE BEWILDERING ARRAY'' OF TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS THAT MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE A FINAL DECISION IS MADE.

/OFFICIALS

Mr Gillmore
He stops but Fcot
of time with, but
not much more
to write in
parliamentary terms.
Bruce
22/2

Linda
Could you please arrange to have this copied to NO 10 (for Mr Coles)
22/2

OFFICIALS HERE REPORTED THAT A CONSENSUS WAS GROWING WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE ALLIANCE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO ADD A LONG RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILE TO THE ARSENAL OF SHORTER RANGE ONES NOW DEPLOYED IN WESTERN EUROPE IF IT WAS TO MAINTAIN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE ON THE CONTINENT OVER THE COMING DECADE.

3 MISSILES NOW DEPLOYED

THE UNITED STATES NOW DEPLOYS THREE TYPES OF NUCLEAR MISSILES THERE - THE PERSHING, THE LANCE AND THE HONEST JOHN - BUT NONE HAS A RANGE EXCEEDING 450 MILES.

PENTAGON AIDES SAID ABOUT DLRS 350 MILLION HAD ALREADY BEEN INCLUDED IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET FOR THE 1980 FISCAL YEAR TO SPEED DEVELOPMENT OF SEVERAL NEW WEAPONS FOR POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE, INCLUDING SEA AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES, AN EXTENDED-RANGE PERSHING AND A NEW MEDIUM-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE.

EACH OF THESE WOULD BE ABLE TO TRAVEL ABOUT 1,000 MILES, SUFFICIENT RANGE FROM WEST GERMANY TO STRIKE KEY MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION. DEFENSE OFFICIALS SAID THAT THE CRUISE MISSILES AND THE LONGER-RANGE VERSION OF THE PERSHING COULD BE DEPLOYED IN THE EARLY 1980'S BUT THAT IT WOULD TAKE MORE THAN FIVE YEARS TO DEVELOP A NEW INTERMEDIATE-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE.

ACCORDING TO OFFICIALS, THE QUESTION WHETHER THE WEST NEEDS TO FIELD A NEW CLASS OF LONG-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE HAS EMERGED AS A MAJOR ISSUE IN EUROPEAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS BECAUSE IT IS VIEWED AS HAVING ENORMOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF ALLIANCE UNITY AS WELL AS FOR PROSPECTS OF FURTHER PROGRESS IN SOVIET-AMERICAN ARMS CONTROL.

IF A DECISION IS MADE LATER THIS YEAR TO BASE A NEW AMERICAN MISSILE IN EUROPE, IT WOULD MARK A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN WESTERN STRATEGY, FOR IT WOULD BE THE FIRST TIME THE UNITED STATES DEPLOYED A WEAPON IN EUROPE WITH THE SPECIFIC AIM OF ATTACKING THE SOVIET UNION. IN THE 1960'S, THE UNITED STATES PROMOTOED THE IDEA OF AN ALLIANCE WIDE ''MULTILATERAL FORCE'' OF NUCLEAR MISSILES FOR EUROPE, BUT THE CONCEPT WAS ABANDONED AFTER IT WAS SHARPLY CRITICISED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC.

IN AN EFFORT TO AVOID REPETITION OF THAT CONTROVERSY OR OF THE MORE RECENT ONE INVOLVING THE NEUTRON OR ENHANCED-RADIATION WEAPON, WHITE HOUSE AND STATE DEPARTMENT AIDES SAID THAT ALLIANCE GOVERNMENTS WERE MAKING A SPECIAL EFFORT TO EXAMINE THE IMPLICATIONS OF PUTTING A NEW MISSILE IN EUROPE.

ALLIANCE MILITARY ANALYSTS ARE WEIGHING THE PROS AND CONS OF EACH OF THE THREE MISSILE SYSTEMS BEING CONSIDERED IN THE UNITED STATES, AND WHILE NO DECISION HAS BEEN MADE, SOME OFFICIALS INDICATED THAT THE LONGER-RANGE PERSHING WAS THE LEADING CANDIDATE.

/THE

THE DEBATE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE OVER A NEW MISSILE BEGAN IN 1977 AS ALARM GREW IN WEST EUROPE OVER MOSCOW'S DECISION TO BEGIN DEPLOYING THE SS.20, A MOBILE MISSILE EQUIPPED WITH THREE MULTIPLE WARHEADS. ALTHOUGH A SOVIET FORCE OF SOME 500 INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES HAD BEEN AIMED AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE SINCE THE EARLY 1960'S, THE SS.20, TOGETHER WITH A NEW SOVIET BOMBER CALLED THE BACKFIRE, WAS VIEWED IN SOME QUARTERS AS AN ATTEMPT BY MOSCOW TO MAKE WESTEN EUROPE A ''NUCLEAR HOSTAGE.''

THE CONCERNS WERE REINFORCED EARLY LAST YEAR WHEN WEST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS LEARNED THAT THE PROPOSED SOVIET-AMERICAN ACCORD LIMITING STRATEGIC MISSILES AND BOMBERS WOULD NOT HINDER MOSCOW'S ABILITY TO DEPLOY EITHER THE SS.20 OR THE BACKFIRE BOMBER.

EUROPEANS FEAR NEGLECT

IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS LAST YEAR, SEVERAL EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS EXPRESSED FEARS THAT IN NEGOTIATING WITH MOSCOW THE UNITED STATES MIGHT NEGLECT EUROPEAN SECURITY CONCERNS.

IN AN ATTEMPT TO ALLAY THESE FEARS, THE ADMINNSTRATION SET UP SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE MACHINERY ON PROBLEMS POSED BY THE SS.20 INCLUDING A SO CALLED ''HIGH-LEVEL GROUP'' OF DEFENSE OFFICIALS THAT MET SEVERAL TIMES IN 1978. IN ADDITION, DELEGATIONS FROM BRITAIN, FRANCE AND WEST GERMANY QUIETLY CAME TO WASHINGTON LAST FALL FOR DISCUSSIONS. ENDS

WRIGHT

LIMITED)
DEFENCE D)
PLANNING STAFF
NAD)
PS
PS/MR HURD)
PS/LORD BELSTEAD)
PS/PUS
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE

COPIES TO:
DS 17, M.O.D)

181954Z. £0529 MISC 066.

22

10 DOWNING STREET

Duty Clerk

This should be despatched at once on the hot line, with copies to:

Mr. Bone - F.C.O.

Mr. Mottram - MOD

Mr. Hatfield - Cabinet Office

A.J.C. 18/2

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T18/83

Defence ~~MJC~~ 22

Cc R. Bone
R. Moltram
R Hatfield

US Declassified

A. J. C. 21/2
L.a.

OO WHITE HOUSE

GRS 700

SECRET
FROM CABINET OFFICE LONDON 181954Z FEB 83
TO IMMEDIATE WHITE HOUSE
TELEGRAM NUMBER MISC 066 DATED 18 FEBRUARY 1983

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN:
DEAR RON,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 16 FEBRUARY ABOUT THE INF NEGOTIATIONS.

GEORGE BUSH'S VISIT TO LONDON WAS EXTREMELY HELPFUL TO US AND HIS TOUR OF EUROPE AN OUTSTANDING SUCCESS.

I ENTIRELY SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT THE TIMING OF A MAJOR NEW INITIATIVE INVOLVING A PROPOSAL FOR FIXED LIMITS ABOVE ZERO ON INF WEAPONS WILL NEED TO BE CONSIDERED VERY CAREFULLY. I AGREE THAT THIS IS NOT A STEP TO BE TAKEN BEFORE THE GERMAN ELECTIONS. BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE STRONG GROUNDS FOR CONSIDERING SUCH AN INITIATIVE VERY SOON AFTER THOSE ELECTIONS.

I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON THE STATEMENT YOU PROPOSE TO MAKE ON 22 FEBRUARY. MY VIEWS ARE AS FOLLOWS.

THE VICE-PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO EUROPE HAS AROUSED PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS THAT WE ARE NOW CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INTERMEDIATE STEP ON THE ROAD TO OUR FINAL OBJECTIVE, THE ZERO OUTCOME. THE PHRASE HE USED, WHICH CAUGHT THE PUBLIC IMAGINATION, WAS THAT THE ZERO OPTION WAS ''NOT A TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT PROPOSAL''. I THINK IT MOST IMPORTANT THAT YOUR STATEMENT ON 22 FEBRUARY SHOULD REINFORCE THAT POINT. WHILE IT SHOULD NOT INFLATE EXPECTATIONS, I HOPE IT WILL NOT ONLY TAKE THE FORM OF A CLEAR AND BASIC RE-STATEMENT OF THE US POSITION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BUT ALSO BEGIN TO INDICATE HOW THAT POSITION MIGHT BE DEVELOPED. THIS WILL MAINTAIN THE TREND OF GROWING UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR THE WESTERN POSITION WHICH THE VICE-PRESIDENT'S VISIT DID SO MUCH TO ENCOURAGE.

YOU MIGHT CONSIDER STRESSING THAT NATO, WITH NO INF DEPLOYED, IS TODAY AT THE LEVEL OF THE ZERO OPTION: THAT WE DO NOT WANT TO MOVE FROM THAT SITUATION BUT THAT WE HAVE BEEN FORCED TO PREPARE OURSELVES FOR THIS BY THE SOVIET UNION'S LARGE-SCALE DEPLOYMENT OF INF: AND THAT IF ONLY THE RUSSIANS WOULD ACCEPT THE AGREEMENT WHICH THE US HAVE OFFERED THEM, NATO COULD REMAIN AT THE ZERO LEVEL AND BE JOINED THERE BY THE SOVIET UNION. THAT REMAINS THE BEST PROSPECT OF REMOVING A WHOLE CLASS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM THE FACE OF THE EARTH.

IT WILL THEN BE IMPORTANT, I THINK, TO STATE THAT AMBASSADOR NITZE HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO EXAMINE URGENTLY AND WITH THE UTMOST CARE ANY SERIOUS SOVIET INITIATIVE. BUT IT WOULD BE A PITY TO LIMIT OUR WILLINGNESS ''TO CONSIDER ANY REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE'' TO IDEAS WHICH WILL PRODUCE ''THE SAME RESULT''. I BELIEVE THAT THAT WOULD LOOK TOO MUCH LIKE A RIGID ADHERENCE TO THE ZERO OPTION. I WOULD MUCH PREFER A STATEMENT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS IN GENEVA ANY PROPOSAL CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES TO WHICH THE ALLIANCE SUBSCRIBES.

THE KEY PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN YOUR MESSAGE SEEM TO ME TO BE RIGHT. BUT I HOPE THEY WILL BE EXPRESSED IN THAT CLEAR AND SIMPLE LANGUAGE WHICH YOU ALWAYS USE TO SUCH GOOD EFFECT. YOU WILL WANT YOUR STATEMENT TO REACH AND INFLUENCE A WIDE PUBLIC ACROSS THE WORLD.

I SHOULD PREFER THE SECOND PRINCIPLE TO READ ''THE BRITISH AND FRENCH STRATEGIC SYSTEMS ARE BY DEFINITION EXCLUDED FROM THESE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AND CANNOT THEREFORE BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT''. I ALSO SUGGEST THAT THE FOURTH PRINCIPLE MIGHT REFER TO ''LIMITS WHICH, BY ESTABLISHING A BALANCE, WOULD MAINTAIN THE UNITED STATES' COMMITMENT TO DETERRENCE IN EUROPE''.

I HAVE ONE FURTHER POINT WHICH IS, OF COURSE, ENTIRELY FOR YOU TO DECIDE. YOUR MESSAGE TO THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE, IN WHICH YOU STATED YOUR READINESS TO MEET ANDROPOV TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT ON THE ZERO OUTCOME, PLAYED A MOST USEFUL ROLE IN IMPRESSING WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION DURING GEORGE BUSH'S VISIT. BUT I THINK IT MAY BE WORTH REFLECTING ON WHETHER REITERATION OF THAT PROPOSAL WILL HELP THE KIND OF MESSAGE YOU HAVE IN MIND FOR 22 FEBRUARY. YOUR READINESS TO MEET ANDROPOV FOR THIS PURPOSE IS NOW A MATTER OF RECORD AND, FOR THE REASONS I HAVE ALREADY SUGGESTED, I AM INCLINED TO THINK THAT YOUR MESSAGE WILL BE MOST EFFECTIVE IF ITS EMPHASIS IS ON YOUR READINESS TO CONSIDER ANY REASONABLE PROPOSALS WHICH ARE BALANCED AND VERIFIABLE.

I HOPE THAT YOU WILL FIND THESE SUGGESTIONS HELPFUL. WE ARE AT ONE ON THE OBJECTIVES. YOUR STATEMENT ON 22 FEBRUARY WILL BE VERY IMPORTANT AND I AM GLAD TO HAVE HAD THIS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ABOUT IT. HELMUT KOHL'S REACTION TO YOUR IDEAS WILL BE MOST IMPORTANT. I AM SURE THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME WE SHOULD BE VERY MUCH INFLUENCED BY HIS VIEWS.

MY PERSONAL BEST WISHES TO YOU AND NANCY. I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL HAVE A WONDERFUL TIME DURING THE QUEEN'S VISIT. I KNOW HOW VERY MUCH SHE IS LOOKING FORWARD TO IT.

YOURS EVER,

MARGARET

NNNNZMRRX/)2.-.+8Ø)5(

KILS94Ø43877✠'==11 QSL AT 18/2Ø41Z FEB 83

KKK

SECRET

~~DRAFT~~ MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Dear Ron,

Thank you for your message of 16 February about the INF negotiations.

George Bush's visit to London was extremely helpful to us and his tour of Europe an outstanding success.

I entirely share your view that the timing of a major new initiative involving a proposal for fixed limits above zero on INF weapons will need to be considered very carefully. I agree that this is not a step to be taken before the German elections. But I do believe that there are strong grounds for considering such an initiative very soon after those elections.

I am grateful for the opportunity to comment on the statement you propose to make on 22 February. My views are as follows.

The Vice-President's visit to Europe has aroused public expectations that we are now considering the possibility of an intermediate step on the road to our final objective, the zero outcome. The phrase he used, which caught the public imagination, was that the zero option was "not a take it or leave it proposal". I think it most important that your statement on 22 February ~~cannot be interpreted as a retreat from the position~~ should reinforce that point. While it should not inflate expectations, I hope it ~~can~~ will not only take the form of a clear and basic re-statement of the US position in the negotiations but also begin to indicate how that position might be developed. This will

/maintain

maintain the trend of growing understanding and support for the Western position which the Vice-President's visit did so much to encourage.

You might consider stressing that NATO, with no INF deployed, is today at the level of the zero option; that we do not want to move from that situation but that we have been forced to prepare ourselves for this by the Soviet Union's large-scale deployment of INF; and that if only the Russians would accept the agreement which the US have offered them, NATO could remain at the zero level and be joined there by the Soviet Union. That remains the best prospect of removing a whole class of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.

It will then be important, I think, to state that Ambassador Nitze has instructions to examine urgently and with the utmost care any serious Soviet initiative. But it would be a pity to limit our willingness "to consider any reasonable alternative" to ideas which will produce "the same result". I believe that that would look too much like a rigid adherence to the zero option. I would much prefer a statement that the United States is prepared to discuss in Geneva any proposal consistent with the principles to which the Alliance subscribes.

The key principles set out in your message seem to me to be right. But I hope they will be expressed in that

/clear

clear and simple language which you always use to such good effect. You will want your statement to reach and influence a wide public across the world.

I should prefer the second principle to read "The British and French strategic systems are by definition excluded from these bilateral negotiations and cannot therefore be taken into account". I also suggest that the fourth principle might refer to "limits which, by establishing a balance, would maintain the United States' commitment to deterrent~~s~~ce in Europe".

I have one further point which is, of course, entirely for you to decide. Your message to the people of Europe, in which you stated your readiness to meet Andropov to sign an agreement on the zero outcome, played a most useful role in impressing Western public opinion during George Bush's visit. But I think it may be worth reflecting on whether reiteration of that proposal will help the kind of message you have in mind for 22 February. Your readiness to meet Andropov for this purpose is now a matter of record and, for the reasons I have already suggested, I am inclined to think that your message will be most effective if its emphasis is on your readiness to consider any reasonable ~~alternatives~~ proposals which are balanced and verifiable.

I hope that you will find these suggestions helpful. We are at one on the objectives. Your statement on 22 February will be very important and I am glad to have had this exchange

/of

of views about it. Helmut Kohl's reaction to your ideas will be most important. I am sure that at the present time we should be very much influenced by his views.

My personal best wishes to you and Nancy. I am sure that you will have a wonderful time during the Queen's visit. I know how very much she is looking forward to it.

Yours ever

Margaret.

SECRET

FILE

21

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 February, 1983

INF: President Reagan's Message of 16 February

Thank you for your two letters of today's date. You will also have seen Richard Mottram's letter to me today conveying the views of the Secretary of State for Defence.

Taking into account all the correspondence, and some preliminary points made by the Prime Minister earlier today, I enclose a redraft of the reply to President Reagan which I should like to put before the Prime Minister as soon as possible tomorrow with a view to its despatch to Washington in the course of the day.

There is one point of substance where it has not been easy to reconcile views. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary considers it important that President Reagan should not refer again to his message to the people of Europe. The Secretary of State for Defence takes a different view. My draft has been influenced by the Prime Minister's initial view which coincided with that of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. But in putting the draft to the Prime Minister I shall, of course, convey to her the differing views about this point.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

R. B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Thank you for your message of 16 February about the INF negotiations.

George Bush's visit to London was extremely helpful to us and his tour of Europe an outstanding success.

I entirely share your view that the timing of a major new initiative involving a proposal for fixed limits above zero on INF weapons will need to be considered very carefully. I agree that this is not a step to be taken before the German elections. But I do believe that there are strong grounds for considering such an initiative very soon after those elections.

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The Vice-President's visit to Europe has aroused public expectations that we are now considering the possibility of an intermediate step on the road to our final objective, the zero outcome. The phrase he used, which caught the public imagination, was that the zero option was "not a take it or leave it proposal". I think it most important that your statement on 22 February ~~cannot be interpreted as a retreat from~~ should reinforce that point. ~~the position~~ that. While it should not inflate expectations, I hope it ~~can~~ will not only take the form of a clear and basic re-statement of the US position in the negotiations but also begin to indicate how that position might be developed. This will

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maintain the trend of growing understanding and support for the Western position which the Vice-President's visit did so much to encourage.

You might consider stressing that NATO, with no INF deployed, is today at the level of the zero option; that we do not want to move from that situation but that we have been forced to prepare ourselves for this by the Soviet Union's large-scale deployment of INF; and that if only the Russians would accept the agreement which the US have offered them, NATO could remain at the zero level and be joined there by the Soviet Union. That remains the best prospect of removing a whole class of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.

It will then be important, I think, to state that Ambassador Nitze has instructions to examine urgently and with the utmost care any serious Soviet initiative. But it would be a pity to limit our willingness "to consider any reasonable alternative" to ideas which will produce "the same result". I believe that that would look too much like a rigid adherence to the zero option. I would much prefer a statement that the United States is prepared to discuss in Geneva any proposal consistent with the principles to which the Alliance subscribes.

The key principles set out in your message seem to me to be right. But I hope they will be expressed in that

/clear

clear and simple language which you always use to such good effect. You will want your statement to reach and influence a wide public across the world.

I should prefer the second principle to read "The British and French strategic systems are by definition excluded from these bilateral negotiations and cannot therefore be taken into account". I also suggest that the fourth principle might refer to "limits which, by establishing a balance, would maintain the United States' commitment to deterrents in Europe".

I have one further point which is, of course, entirely for you to decide. Your message to the people of Europe, in which you stated your readiness to meet Andropov to sign an agreement on the zero outcome, played a most useful role in impressing Western public opinion during George Bush's visit. But I think it may be worth reflecting on whether reiteration of that proposal will help the kind of message you have in mind for 22 February. Your readiness to meet Andropov for this purpose is now a matter of record and, for the reasons I have already suggested, I am inclined to think that your message will be most effective if its emphasis is on your readiness to consider reasonable alternatives.

I hope that you will find these suggestions helpful. We are at one on the objectives. Your statement on 22 February will be very important and I am glad to have had this exchange

/of

of views about it. Helmut Kohl's reaction to your ideas will be most important. I am sure that at the present time we should be very much influenced by his views.

SECRET

20

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01 ~~930 7022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 11/9/4

17th February 1983

Dear John,

INF: PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE OF 16TH FEBRUARY

Roger Bone's letter of 17th February said that Mr Heseltine was being consulted urgently about the draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to President Reagan's message. The Defence Secretary has now been able to consider this and he has asked me to let you have the following points.

First, he thinks it important that the Prime Minister in her reply reinforces what the President says in his message about the paramount need to protect Chancellor Kohl's position in the run up to the German elections. With this in mind he suggests that a final sentence should be added at the end of the last paragraph of the draft reply on the following lines:-

> "Finally, Helmut Kohl's reactions to your ideas will be most important: at the present juncture we must be very much influenced by what he says".

It would also be worthwhile slightly strengthening the beginning of the last sentence in the first paragraph to read:-

> "I am sure therefore that it is right that we should not take such a step at this juncture ....."

The Defence Secretary is very conscious that we cannot attempt to write the President's speech for him but he fears that if what he says is based on his message to the Prime Minister, it will be an arid and bureaucratic presentation of the western case which will do nothing to meet the expectations of European public opinion. He recognises that if we go too far in offering ideas on what the President might say, this runs the risks of irritating the White House and so being counter productive. None-the-less, he thinks that it would be worth revising the second paragraph of the draft reply to read:-

A J Coles Esq

"The Vice President's visit to Europe has however aroused significant public expectations in Europe that consideration is now being given to the possibility of an intermediate step on the road to our final objective, the zero outcome. A public statement of the kind you are proposing to make next week could therefore be an important measure to contain public expectations and to prepare the ground for a major new initiative after 6th March. For these reasons I hope that your speech next week can not only take the form of a clear and basic re-statement of the US position in the negotiations but also begin to indicate how that position might be developed. What I have in mind is that you might stress that NATO, with no INF deployed, is today at the level of the zero option; that we do not want to move from that situation but that we have been forced to prepare ourselves to do so by the Soviet Union's large scale deployment of INF; and that if only the Russians would accept the agreement which the US have offered them, NATO could remain at the zero level and be joined there by the Soviet Union. That remains the best prospect of removing a whole class of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. But you have also made it clear that in your search for peace you are not prepared to neglect any opportunity and that Ambassador Nitze has had instructions to examine urgently and with the utmost care any serious Soviet initiative ....."

Finally, Mr Heseltine does not agree that we should suggest to the President that he should omit from his speech any reference to his readiness to meet Andropov to sign an agreement on the zero outcome. While it is true that President Reagan undermined his proposal by his own remarks describing it as a public relations gesture, it would be incredible if, in a speech of the kind he is now proposing to make, he passed over his recent initiative in silence. Moreover, to suggest to the Americans that he should would probably only cause irritation.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Roger Bone (FCO) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

R. Mottram

(R C MOTTRAM)

Mr Coles DOR 18/2
We spoke; signed letter follows.
RLB.
17.2.1983

SECRET DRAFT

CSCS
ACDS(Overseas).
Please arrange as proposed.
17/2

20

INF: PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE OF 16 FEBRUARY

DRAFT LETTER TO MR COLES, NO 10

Roger Bone's letter of 17 February said that Mr Heseltine ~~had been~~ was being consulted urgently about the draft reply for the Prime Minister ~~sent~~ to send to President Reagan's message. The Defence Secretary has now been able to consider this and he has asked me to let you have the following points.

First, he thinks it important that the Prime Minister in her reply reinforces what the President says in his message about the ~~importance of~~ paramount need to protect Chancellor Kohl's position in the run up to the German elections. With this in mind he suggests that a final sentence should be added at the end of the last paragraph of the draft reply on the following lines:-

" Finally, Helmut Kohl's reactions to your ideas will be most important: at the present juncture we must, ~~to a large extent,~~ be very much influenced by what he says ~~guided by him~~".

It would also be worthwhile slightly strengthening the beginning of the last sentence in the first paragraph to read:-

"I am sure therefore that it is right that we should not take such a step at this juncture ....."

The Defence Secretary is very conscious that we cannot attempt to write the President's speech for him but he fears that if what he says is based on his message to the Prime Minister, it will be an arid and bureaucratic presentation of the western case which will do nothing to meet the expectations of European public opinion. He recognises that if we go too far in offering ideas on what the President might say, this runs the risks of irritating the White House

and so being counter productive. None-the-less, he thinks that it would be worth revising the second paragraph of the draft reply to read:-

"The Vice President's visit to Europe has however aroused significant public expectations in Europe that consideration is now being given to the possibility of an intermediate step on the road to our final objective, the zero outcome. A public statement of the kind you are proposing to make next week could therefore be an important measure to contain public expectations and to prepare the ground for a major new initiative after 6 March. For these reasons I hope that your speech next week can not only take the form of a clear and ~~public~~ basic re-statement of the US position in the negotiations but also begin to indicate how that position might be developed. What I have in mind is that you might stress that NATO, with no INF deployed, is today at the level of the zero option; that we do not want to move from that situation but that we have been forced to prepare ourselves to do so by the Soviet Union's large scale deployment of INF; and that if only the Russians would accept the agreement which the US have offered them, NATO could remain at the zero level and be joined there by the Soviet Union. That remains the best prospect of removing a whole class of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. But you have also made it clear that in your search for peace you are not prepared to neglect any opportunity and that Ambassador Nitze has had instructions to examine urgently and with the utmost care any serious Soviet initiative."...

Finally, Mr Heseltine does not agree that we should suggest to the President that he should omit from his speech any reference to his readiness to meet Andropov to sign an agreement on the zero outcome. While it is true that President Reagan undermined his proposal by his own remarks describing it as a public relations gesture, it would be incredible if, in a speech of the kind he is now proposing to make, he passed over his recent initiative in silence. Moreover, to suggest to the Americans that he should would probably only cause irritation.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Roger Bone.

SECRET

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 February, 1983

Dear John,

INF: President Reagan's Message of 16 February

With my earlier letter of today's date I enclosed a draft reply to President Reagan's message of 16 February, making clear that we had not yet received comments from Mr Pym.

I can now confirm that Mr Pym is content with the text. He wonders, however, whether we need make the point about 'profound moral objective' in the fourth paragraph of the draft. In his judgement the phrase was not too bad in context. It is the point about the meeting with Andropov in the second half of the paragraph which is the important one to make.

Mr Pym has asked to be consulted again if, during consideration in London, any significant change is suggested to the basic line proposed in the draft.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 February, 1983

Dear Tony,

INF: President Reagan's Message of 16 February

The Prime Minister asked for a draft reply to President Reagan's message of 16 February on INF by lunchtime today. As you know, Mr Pym is at present in Houston, Texas and although we have been able to get copies of the President's message to him, we have not yet received his comments on the draft reply.

Nevertheless, in view of the urgency of the deadline, I attach a draft reply which the Prime Minister may wish to consider, subject to comments from Mr Pym. This draft has been cleared at official level with the MOD. Officials there are consulting Mr Heseltine urgently.

The President's proposal seems to be a somewhat mangled version of an idea which we believe to have been recommended by officials in the State Department who accompanied Vice-President Bush. The basic plan would appear to be a statement clarifying and elaborating on the existing US position delivered by the President himself on 22 February, ie before the German elections; this would be followed at a later date, after the German elections, by a more substantive initiative proposing as a first step in the direction of zero a limitation on INF warheads on both sides at a figure above zero but below NATO's currently planned deployment of 572 warheads. In our view there is merit in this idea provided that the message from the President on 22 February is clear. The attached draft reply is designed to ensure that this is the case. In particular, we believe it important that the President should state categorically that the US would be prepared to discuss in Geneva any proposal providing for agreement based on the principles of balance which the Alliance agreed in 1979. In our view this would be regarded in Europe as a significant elaboration of the existing position and would be a useful trailer to a substantive initiative after 6 March.

I am copying this to Richard Mottram (MOD) and to Richard Hatfield (Attorney General).

Yours ever,

Roger Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

DRAFT REPLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Thank you for your message of 16 February. I was grateful to you for this opportunity to comment on the statement you propose to make on 22 February. I, too, found Vice-President Bush's visit extremely helpful. It was a useful occasion on which to exchange our views about the INF negotiations and the options open to the Alliance as we deal with this difficult issue. I entirely share your view that the timing of a major new initiative in the negotiations involving a proposal for finite limits above zero on INF levels will need the most careful consideration. Like you, I am conscious that there is a risk that any such initiative taken before the German elections could be exploited by the Opposition in Bonn. It seems to me right therefore that we should not at this juncture take such a step, although I believe there are good grounds for considering an initiative on these lines very soon after the elections.

The Vice-President's visit to Europe will however have aroused significant public expectations in Europe that consideration is now being given to the possibility of a step on the road to our final objective, the zero outcome. A public statement of the kind you are proposing to make next week could therefore be a useful measure to contain public expectations and to prepare the ground for a major new initiative after 6 March. I believe, however, that [redacted] your statement should be seen in public as being a preparation for such an initiative. While, therefore, I agree with the outline of what you propose I think it is important that your statement should be seen as a substantive development and refinement of the present US position in the negotiations. It would therefore in my view be helpful if

your statement could recall that Ambassador Nitze has instructions to examine urgently and with the utmost care any serious Soviet initiative and, above all, to make clear that for your part the US would be prepared to discuss in Geneva any proposal which provided for an agreement based on the principles to which the Alliance as a whole subscribes.

The key principles, set out in your message seemed to me to be right. I have however the following comments on points of detail. Under (B) I would be reluctant to refer to 'compensation for third country systems'. I would prefer to see reference to the fact that, by definition, British and French strategic systems are excluded from these bilateral negotiations and cannot therefore be taken into account. Under (D) there would, I think, be advantage in rejecting limits which would have the effect of undermining the US commitment through its nuclear forces to deterrence in Europe.

I believe it will be extremely important to make clear again that our long term objective is the elimination of all long range land-based nuclear missiles from Europe. As I have made clear in public statements here, we believe that the zero outcome is the best solution which is consistent with the principles which underlie our position. There is however a risk that in describing this as our profound moral objective we might undermine a strategy which involved as a first step any solution in excess of zero. For the same reasons, I have doubts about whether it would be right in this particular statement to reiterate your readiness to meet Andropov to sign an agreement on the zero outcome. While your message to the People of Europe played a useful role

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in gaining the high ground with Western public opinion during George Bush's visit, I believe that in the context of the kind of statement which you intend to make on 22 February a reiteration would be less appropriate.

Finally, in your reference to the Vice-President's reaffirmation of our willingness to consider any reasonable alternative, I think it would be wrong to link this with ideas which would produce 'the same result'. My strong preference would be for language which referred to alternative ideas which are based on the principles which underlie the Alliance's approach.

I hope that you will find these suggestions helpful. I know that we share the same objectives and I am grateful to you for this opportunity to offer my views on what will certainly be seen here as a most important statement.

Defence:
INF Pt 3
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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 February 1983

original with
ASC 16/2

INF

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has just received from President Reagan. You will see that, following the visit by Vice-President Bush to Europe, the President seeks the Prime Minister's views on a statement which he may make on Tuesday, 22 February about the INF negotiations in Geneva.

The President asks that the Prime Minister should let him have her views on this statement this week if possible. The Prime Minister is leaving London after Parliamentary Questions tomorrow for a regional tour and will not return until Friday evening. It would therefore be helpful to have a draft reply by 1 pm tomorrow, 17 February.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office). I should be grateful if all recipients would carefully guard the contents of the President's message and if they would circulate this letter and its enclosure only to those who have a strict operational need to know of their contents.

FCO cart received 13.01 17/2

MoD —

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

SUBJECT
of Mark
Opn

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T154/83

US Declassified

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FEBRUARY 16, 1983

DEAR MARGARET

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH HAS BRIEFED ME ON HIS RECENT MEETING WITH YOU. HE AND I ARE MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE WARM RECEPTION YOU GAVE HIM AND THE CANDID INSIGHTS YOU PROVIDED ON A NUMBER OF MATTERS, PARTICULARLY INF.

WITH RESPECT TO INF, I WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE IN A WAY WHICH WILL BE MOST HELPFUL TO YOU IN SUSTAINING THE INF DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE AND THEREBY PROVIDING THE INCENTIVES NEEDED TO REACH AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT. BASED UPON THE VIEWS EXPRESSED TO THE VICE PRESIDENT, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT OUR CURRENT POSITION -- ONE OF COMMITMENT TO ZERO-ZERO AS THE OPTIMAL AND MOST MORAL OUTCOME -- BUTTRESSED BY CLEAR OPENNESS TO CONSIDER ANY REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE, IS AS FAR AS WE SHOULD GO AT THIS TIME. IN THE CONTEXT OF REAFFIRMING OUR COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH, IT OCCURS TO ME THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR ME TO PUT ON THE PUBLIC RECORD A MORE PRECISE STATEMENT OF THE CRITERIA WE ARE FOLLOWING IN THE TALKS. I WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DO THIS IN PUBLIC REMARKS NOW SCHEDULED FOR NEXT TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22. AT THAT TIME I MIGHT SAY THAT THE U.S. IS SETTING FORTH IN GENEVA CERTAIN PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES WHICH MUST SHAPE ANY OUTCOME. THESE CRITERIA INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

(A) EQUAL RIGHTS AND LIMITS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION.

(B) BILATERAL LIMITS WITHOUT COMPENSATION FOR THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS.

(C) APPLICATION OF LIMITS TO INF MISSILES REGARDLESS OF LOCATION (AS A COROLLARY, NO EXPORT OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY PROBLEM TO THE FAR EAST).

(D) NO LIMITS THAT WOULD RESULT IN WEAKENING THE U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO NATOS CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE.

(E) VERIFIABILITY OF TREATY PROVISIONS.

MY REMARKS COULD CONCLUDE WITH A PARAGRAPH SUCH AS THE FOLLOWING:

END OF PAGE 01

THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THE STRONG ALLIED SUPPORT FOR THE PROFOUND MORAL OBJECTIVE OF ELIMINATING THE ENTIRE CATEGORY OF LONG-RANGE LAND-BASED NUCLEAR MISSILES. THE VICE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED TO THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE MY READINESS TO MEET WITH GENERAL SECRETARY ANDROPOV TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ACHIEVE THIS HISTORIC GOAL. HE ALSO REAFFIRMED OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY ANY REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE IDEA FOR PRODUCING THE SAME RESULT. THAT IS OUR PLEDGE, AND I HAVE REINFORCED TO MY NEGOTIATOR, AMBASSADOR NITZE, MY INSTRUCTIONS TO RENEW HIS EFFORTS TOWARD THIS END.

I WOULD DEEPLY APPRECIATE RECEIVING YOUR VIEWS ON THE VALUE OF SUCH A PUBLIC STATEMENT. IT WILL VERY CAREFULLY CONSIDER YOUR COMMENTS AS WELL AS THOSE OF OTHERS VISITED BY THE VICE PRESIDENT.

IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO ME TO HAVE YOUR VIEWS IF POSSIBLE THIS WEEK.

MARGARET, I WAS STRUCK BY YOUR PROPOSAL THAT WE MAKE A NEW INITIATIVE AT SOME FINITE LEVEL OF WEAPONS ABOVE ZERO AND CONSIDERED IT AT SOME LENGTH. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE MAY WELL REACH A POINT WHERE SUCH A PROPOSAL WILL BE NECESSARY. TIMING IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT IN THIS REGARD AND FOR THE MOMENT MY FOREMOST CONCERNS ARE FOR THE OUTCOME OF THE GERMAN ELECTION. ON THAT SCORE, HELMUT KOHL IS UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE LEFT TO GO FOR AN INTERIM POSITION NOW. TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH A PROPOSAL BY US NOW MIGHT BE EXPLOITED BY HIS OPPOSITION AS RESULTING FROM THEIR PRESSURE, I AM DISINCLINED TO EVEN MENTION IT NOW. NEVERTHELESS I VALUE YOUR COUNSEL ON THIS VERY DEEPLY AND WOULD WELCOME YOUR THOUGHTS ON BOTH THE SUBSTANCE AND TIMING ASPECTS.

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Ref. A083/0353

MR COLES A.S.C. 1/2 h.a.

Nuclear Defence Policy - Arms Control

--- I attach a copy of a note of the discussion that took place at Chequers last Sunday on this subject.

2. Copies of this minute and the attachment go also to Brian Fall and Richard Mottram.

R P HATFIELD

1st February 1983

SECRET

Note of a discussion at Chequers on Sunday
30th January 1983 at 10.30 am

Nuclear Defence Policy - Arms Control

The Prime Minister held a discussion with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence; also present were Sir Julian Bullard, Mr Wright and Mr Gillmore (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), the Chief of the Defence Staff, Mr Whitmore, Mr Blelloch and Colonel Cross (Ministry of Defence); Sir Robert Armstrong, Mr Goodall and Mr Facer (Cabinet Office) and Mr Butler, Mr Coles and Mr Jackling (Prime Minister's Office).

2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office gave an account of the background to the current Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) negotiations and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) at Geneva, the present state of the negotiations and possible ways in which they might be carried forward. The meeting also considered the line to be taken on arms control with the Federal German Chancellor, Dr Kohl, during his visit to London on 4th February and with the Vice President of the United States, Mr Bush, during his visit on 9th February.

3. The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that in public presentation of the need for the deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles the emphasis should be placed on the role of the weapons (and of nuclear weapons generally) in deterring war rather than in their ability to destroy particular targets if deterrence failed. It would be helpful to have the arguments set down in a form which Ministers could use in Parliament. It was also important to make it clear to the public that it was the Soviet Side, not the Americans, which has put an end to the exploratory contacts between the Heads of the United States and Soviet Delegations to the INF talks at Geneva, Mr Nitze and Mr Untsinsky, which had pointed to the possibilities of an interim agreement. It was clearly the Soviet tactic to make no early move in the negotiations in the hope that public opinion in the West would make concessions on their part unnecessary. Dr Kohl,

would be seeing the United States Vice President, Mr Bush, later that day and on 31st January and 1st February. It was not clear what view the German Government collectively took on the timing of any change in the United States negotiating position in the INF talks: The Foreign Minister, Herr Genscher, and the Leader of the Christian Social Union, Herr Strauss, appeared to hold different views from those of Dr Kohl. While it seemed that some of Dr Kohl's advisers were not in favour of any move away from the "zero option" before the German Elections on 6th March, political pressures in Germany might force him to change his position during the Election campaign. If the United States did not show signs of flexibility soon, Western public opinion could increasingly turn against them. It was in the United Kingdom's interest that there should be a fairly early initiative by the United States to seek an interim agreement whereby limited reductions on the Soviet Side would be balanced by reduced deployments on the part of the United States, without abandoning the "zero option" as the ultimate aim. Rather than sending a message in this sense to reach Dr Kohl before he saw Mr Bush, it would be better to explain these considerations to Dr Kohl personally when he visited London. In the light of the discussions with Dr Kohl, she would tell Mr Bush that the credibility of the United States negotiating position could be put at risk, with serious effects on the cohesion of the Alliance, if the United States did not take a new initiative in the INF negotiations in the direction she had indicated. She would also register with him the Government's wish to be kept fully informed on the progress of the START negotiations.

4. The meeting -

Invited the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to provide briefing material to the Prime Minister on:-

(a) the value in deterrent terms of stationing long-range nuclear theatre forces in Europe;

3/F

(b) the background to the Soviet decision to end the exploratory talks between the leaders of the United States and Soviet Delegations to the INF negotiations;

(c) the latest position on the comprehensive test-ban treaty negotiations, developments in chemical warfare, and the recent Soviet proposals for a nuclear free zone.

Original filed at Defence A3 Nuclear Release Procedure Cabl

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17

Prime Minister

A.J.L. 28/1

Ref. A083/0328

PRIME MINISTER

Meeting at Chequers on 30 January: Arms Control Issues

BACKGROUND

At your briefing meeting on 20 December which concentrated on the United Kingdom nuclear understandings with the United States, it was agreed to resume discussion early in the New Year in order to concentrate on current arms control negotiations, particularly the intermediate nuclear force (INF) negotiations in Geneva. Meanwhile supplementary briefing on our understandings with the Americans and the nuclear weapons systems covered by those understandings was provided in the notes by officials annexed to my minute of 25 January.

2. The need to focus on the INF negotiations has become more urgent because of the impending visit to the United Kingdom on 9 February of the Vice President of the United States, Mr Bush. The INF negotiations are entering a critical phase and it has been made clear in Washington that Mr Bush (who will have visited Bonn and other European capitals first) is hoping to learn from you personally what the British Government considers that the next steps in these negotiations should be.

3. Mr Bush's visit will also be an opportunity to raise other related nuclear issues with him, notably the timing of the deployment of the United States ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in the United Kingdom; and public concern about the question of control over the GLCMs once they are deployed here. A series of decisions on these latter questions was taken at MISC 7 on 27 January, but the Chequers meeting will provide an opportunity to explore the background further if you so wish. The primary objective of the meeting however is to decide what is to be said to Mr Bush about INF.

4. The following have been invited to attend.

SECRET

FCO

Secretary of State
Sir Julian Bullard (in Sir Antony Acland's absence)
Mr Patrick Wright
Mr David Gillmore

MOD

Secretary of State
Chief of the Defence Staff
Mr Clive Whitmore
Mr John Blelloch
Colonel J Cross

Cabinet Office

Sir Robert Armstrong
Mr David Goodall
Mr Roger Facer

Mr Roger Jackling will also be present.

HANDLING

5. You will wish to invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to introduce the subject. He will then ask Mr Gillmore to give a presentation on the INF negotiations. This will cover the political and strategic background; the stage which the negotiations have now reached; and the attitude to them of our principal allies. It will also contain an account of the latest (very secret) thinking in Washington and Bonn on the form which a new Western offer in the negotiations might take and offer advice (agreed with the Ministry of Defence) on what the British response to the American ideas should be.

6. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary would then like to ask Mr Wright to give a short presentation on the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START). This is not an area on which fresh decisions are required from the British Government at the moment; but Mr Wright will describe the various options which the Americans are considering and which need careful monitoring from the point of view of their possible impact on British interests.

7. When the foregoing discussion has been concluded you might find it useful, in the light of the conclusions reached at MISC 7 on 27 January, to discuss exactly what should be said to Mr Bush about the political pressures here to strengthen the dual control arrangements over United States nuclear weapons based in the United Kingdom, including the growing demand for "dual key" control over GLCMs.

8. It would not be appropriate to raise specifically with Mr Bush the need to update the provisions of the Murphy-Dean agreement of 1958 relating to the procedures for implementing the United Kingdom/United States nuclear understandings, since he will not be familiar with the agreement and is leaving Washington for Europe on 30 January. I will raise this on the Cabinet Office-White House channel which has been used for these subjects before.

9. You will wish to bear in mind the sensitivity of the "dual key" issue in the run-up to the Federal German elections on 6 March and the consequent importance of saying nothing to Chancellor Kohl (who will be in London on 4 February) which might weaken his resolve to stand by the NATO "two-track decision" of December 1979. If time permits you might like to ask the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence officials present to remind you of the political considerations within the Alliance which led up to that decision.

10. Finally, you might invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence to advise on how best to present to the Americans and Germans our decision to opt for deployment of GLCMs to the United Kingdom in November (instead of the early summer as at present planned) and on what should be said about this to Dr Kohl and Mr Bush.

CONCLUSIONS

11. You will wish to reach conclusions on the following points.

(i) the line to take with Mr Bush about the next steps in the INF negotiations;

(ii) whether anything needs to be said to him about the START negotiations;

(iii) what to say to Mr Bush about dual control;

(iv) what should be said to Dr Kohl and Mr Bush about the November deployment of GLCMs.

RCA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

28 January 1983

Note for the file

Misc 7 (83) 1st Meeting Minutes 27/1/83 are filed on Defence Pt 3. Nuclear Release Procedures.

24.1.83.

Original filed on TOP SECRET
Defence FA3
UK Nuclear Release Procedures Cabl

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Ref. A083/0283

PRIME MINISTER

MISC 7: Basing of United States Cruise Missiles

BACKGROUND

At the last meeting of MISC 7 in November 1982 Ministers discussed a number of problems associated with the basing of United States Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) in the United Kingdom later this year. It was agreed to defer until early this year a decision on whether to invite the Americans to delay the timing of the arrival of the GLCM equipment so as to avoid a possible overlap with a General Election. The Secretary of State for Defence has circulated a minute dated 25 January reporting where matters stand on this question. Since then you have had a briefing meeting on the political control of nuclear weapons, and in particular on the various Anglo-United States understandings; and there is to be a meeting at Chequers on Sunday 30 January to discuss arms control issues, with particular reference to the line to be taken with the United States Vice President, Mr Bush, about the handling of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) negotiations in Geneva.

2. The purpose of this MISC 7 meeting is to consider the possibilities of seeking "dual key" control of the United States GLCMs to be based in the United Kingdom. The Secretary of State for Defence has circulated a minute dated 25 January and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is also intending to minute. Also relevant is my minute to you dated 25 January covering a note by the Cabinet Office on the Murphy-Dean Agreement and one by the Ministry of Defence on United States and United Kingdom nuclear weapons systems.

3. The Secretary of State for Defence's minute sets out four options for improving the United Kingdom's control over the use of United States GLCMs based here:

(a) to announce that we have updated the United Kingdom-United States understanding on political consultation and to seek United States agreement on a more forthcoming public formula;

(b) to enlarge the British presence at Greenham Common, for example by expanding the British security force;

(c) to have a control mechanism in the weapons system itself;

(d) to own and man the missiles.

Only (c) or (d) would give us "dual key" control: the purpose of (a) and (b) would be presentational.

4. Mr Heseltine says that he believes that there are no defence grounds for seeking new control arrangements. He also believes that we need more evidence on public attitudes before making such a far-reaching policy change, and that we should take no steps to seek a British key or full British manning before the general election in West Germany on 6 March.

5. The account of the existing arrangements for political consultation contained in the note attached to the Secretary of State for Defence's minute is perhaps slightly misleading. It singles out as of crucial importance what it calls the "specific understanding": this is not defined, but appears to refer to the Murphy-Dean Agreement of 1958. In fact, the definitive statement of our understandings with the Americans is in the memorandum attached to your letter to President Reagan of February 1981, which is up to date. The Murphy-Dean Agreement specifies the procedures to be followed in carrying out the understandings; and it is these which have not been regularly updated. The only understanding which is publicly acknowledged is the Truman-Churchill understanding of 1952, the essence of which is that the two Governments will reach a joint decision "in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time". But you stated in the House on 18 January and repeated on 25 January "I have satisfied myself that they (the arrangements for joint decision) are effective".

6. Paragraph 6 of the note attached to the Secretary of State for Defence's minute mentions the nuclear weapon systems in service which require the co-operation of British and United States personnel before the weapon is released. The examples given, Lance, nuclear artillery and nuclear depth bombs, are in fact the only systems in this category.

7. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute will set out the international complications involved in seeking from the Americans a degree of control over GLCMs based here which they would be unable to concede to the Germans and the other Allies on whose territory GLCMs would be based.

HANDLING

8. You should invite the Secretary of State for Defence to speak first. The points to cover in the subsequent discussion are:

(a) Advocates of a "dual key" arrangement base their case on the lack of a physical key in British hands, since agreements to consult, however watertight on paper, could be broken under the stress of events. How will this criticism be met by negotiating a more forthcoming public position on political consultation with the Americans, since it will not tackle the fundamental area of concern?

(b) Could strengthening the British security presence at Greenham Common help, to the extent that it would then be open to the Government - at least in principle - to order RAF security personnel at the site not to allow the cruise missiles to leave the base (although the Americans could still launch the missiles from within the base)?

(c) The Government turned down in 1979 an American offer of "dual key" control because it would have involved the United Kingdom buying and manning the missiles (option (d) in Mr Heseltine's minute). Even assuming that what was on offer then could be obtained now, if we were prepared to meet the money and manpower costs, would a change of mind look like a wavering in the staunch support which the United Kingdom has given to the NATO double decision of December 1979? What would be its impact on the United Kingdom's other European allies (notably the FRG)? Might the consequences for our ability to meet the NATO-agreed operational date of December 1983 be more severe than stated in paragraph 8 of the MOD note?

(d) How would the Americans regard any request from us for a form of "dual key" control, bearing in mind that a primary purpose of the deployment of INF in Europe is to strengthen the "coupling" of the United States strategic nuclear deterrent in the face of European fears that the Americans would not be willing to use nuclear weapons to protect Europe?

(e) Is providing a "dual key" without having to buy and man the whole system (option (c)) in any circumstances negotiable with the Americans?

(f) The meeting seems likely to endorse Mr Heseltine's view that we should analyse more fully the nature of public opposition to cruise missile deployment and the extent to which changes in the control arrangements would affect it. But is it wise for the MOD to commission polls itself? The MORI poll published in the Sunday Times on 23 January showed that 54 per cent of the population were against the basing of cruise missiles in the United Kingdom and 93 per cent were in favour of "dual key" (compared with 2 per cent who were willing to let the Americans have sole control).

CONCLUSION

9. The Committee might be guided to the conclusion that it is still too early to take a final decison on this question. Ministers will in any case wish to discuss again, when the Secretary of State for Defence is ready, whether to ask the Americans to postpone the date of arrival of the cruise missile equipment. A great deal will depend on the outcome of the German election in early March and on progress in the INF negotiations in Geneva, on which you are being briefed at Chequers on Sunday 30 January in preparation for the visit of Vice President Bush.

10. Since, however, the Americans have already agreed that GLCMs should be brought within the scope of the Anglo-United States understandings, there is probably advantage in a discreet approach to them fairly soon with a view to revising the procedures in the

Murphy-Dean Agreement so as to bring them up to date and to provide for specific procedures governing the GLCMs. This would be done on the basis that the revised procedures would remain secret; we would not, at this stage at any rate, raise with the Americans the question whether any changes should be made in the public formula.

RCA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

26 January 1983

Original filed on Defence P13 UK Nuclear Release Procedures Cab1

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TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

UK EYES A

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THE PRIME MINISTER

Control Arrangements for UK-Based Cruise Missiles

1. I have seen a copy of Michael Heseltine's minute to you of 25 January. I agree with him about the penalties involved in seeking to change the present arrangements, in terms of deterrence, cost and possible delay to the whole NATO programme.

2. There are also political difficulties about any major new initiatives on the control issue. First, there is the question of confidence. It would in my view risk causing damaging repercussions if the UK (of all Allies) were to be responsible at this critical stage for reopening the control issue, which could only be interpreted publicly as a lack of confidence in the good faith or good judgement of the US Administration in time of crisis. Second, the Americans certainly will not thank us for the complications that this will bring for them in respect of other basing countries, particularly the FRG and Italy. The argument that as a nuclear power the UK enjoys special status may be true as an explanation of why the longstanding UK/US nuclear understandings go further than what other Allies have so far obtained. But if today we ourselves are seen to find these arrangements insufficient, the Americans will rightly fear that the anxieties of less privileged Allies (notably the Italians) will thereby be greatly fuelled. As for the Germans, no Government in Bonn emerging from the March elections is likely to wish to alter the present arrangements. But if we ask for a change the German Government would paradoxically be exposed to even sharper criticisms from the anti-nuclear

/movement

movement there, for apparently being ready to live with a 'risk' that even the British have judged insupportable. The wider effects for all nuclear basing throughout NATO Europe are difficult to predict, but the Americans will be understandably nervous.

3. Finally, we should not ignore the potential disadvantages for our arms control objectives. The possible delays in the GLCM programme and the certain impression of lack of confidence will combine to erode allied firmness over the 1979 deployment decision, which is our best card for persuading the Russians to make real concessions at the INF negotiating table. In addition, any new arrangements which blur the perception of cruise missiles here as a wholly US-owned and operated system and introduce more overt British involvement could weaken our position that the British deterrent as such has no place in the INF negotiations. The argument would be made that if cruise missiles 'under British control' are covered by INF negotiations, there is no good reason why Polaris should not be included too, as the Russians insist.

4. These considerations lead me to the conclusion that if after further reflection some adjustment of the present position on control proves unavoidable, the best course is that indicated by Michael Heseltine, namely to review and up-date the existing UK/US understandings, modifying our public line accordingly; and to combine this with an announcement of our intention to increase the level of participation of UK service personnel, putting the accent on physical security procedures at the bases. How much time we have for this further reflection will of course depend partly on our decision about the dates for delivery of cruise missiles and associated equipment, on which I have seen Michael Heseltine's separate minute.

/5.

5. I am sending copies to Michael Heseltine, Geoffrey Howe, William Whitelaw and Sir Robert Armstrong.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

26 January 1983

Original filed on Defence A+3 UK Nuclear Release Procedures Cab 1

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AND PERSONAL

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PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

MO 11/2/2

PRIME MINISTER

CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS FOR UK BASED CRUISE MISSILES

We are to discuss at MISC 7 on Thursday the issue of dual-key arrangements for UK-based ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs).

Options for Change

2. I attach a note which sets out - in some detail - options for change:

a. to update and to refine the present UK/US agreement covering political consultation and announce publicly that we have done so; and to seek US agreement to being more forthcoming about the consultative process (paragraphs 2-5 of the attachment);

b. to enlarge the UK presence at Greenham Common e.g. by expanding the UK security force (paragraphs 12-15);

c. to provide a control mechanism in the weapon system (paragraphs 6-9);

d. to own and man the missile system with the US retaining the warheads (paragraphs 10-11).

a and b could be useful presentationally but would do very little to counter the arguments advanced for dual-key; but c or d would be required to achieve full physical control.

Defence Considerations

3. My first consideration must be the effects of adopting a dual-key arrangement from a defence standpoint. The degree of concern that the cruise and Pershing decision has produced in the Soviet Union is apparent and anything that might diminish the deterrent effect of these systems - and the incentive they provide towards reaching an arms control agreement - would be a positive gain for them. They will undoubtedly see advantage in dividing the control of the systems on the at least hypothetical possibility that a British or European government might be that much less likely to agree to the use of the missiles than their American partners. The Soviets might perceive that under the existing control arrangement in the last resort the Americans would act alone within a European context. The system would therefore have more deterrent effect the less physical control that exists in Europe, whatever the political arguments.

4. The present system has operated for the control of F111 aircraft and Poseidon submarines under successive governments. It can be claimed to have worked to their satisfaction. Any change now would be interpreted as reflecting a lack of confidence on our part in the Americans with implications for Alliance credibility as a whole. Changes like c and d above could lead to a delay in the deployment date of December 1983 with a possible impact in other basing countries and could again affect the Soviet view of our resolve. Finally, the most realistic option for effective dual control (2d above) has significant cost and manpower implications for the rest of our defence effort. There are therefore, I believe, no defence grounds for seeking new arrangements for control (although clarifying the existing arrangements is a different matter).

Parliamentary and Public Opinion

5. The key question is, of course, whether we can hold the present line in the light of the parliamentary and public concern partly

focussed on the control issue. If by standing by existing arrangements the deployment itself were to come unstuck, the impact on our security would obviously be much more serious than that from modifying our position now. The poll evidence on public attitudes suggests there is widespread anxiety about cruise missiles but it is difficult to guage from the published polls the strength of feeling and its political impact. (These polls may also be understating the "don't knows"). We need to consider how far reasonable opinion could be won over by careful presentation of the joint decision arrangements, and we must recognise that concessions on control are unlikely to affect the hard-core opposition. In short, I believe we need more in-depth evidence on public attitudes before making policy changes with major defence implications.

Impact on our Allies

6. A change in our position on control would be very sensitive in West Germany and I believe we should take no steps to seek control by a British key or full British manning before the General Election there.

7. I have had no opportunity to sound out myself US opinion on dual-control. I understand that this was originally on offer but we rejected it in the light of our experience of existing arrangements and the foreseen cost involved in purchasing and manning the missiles system in order to achieve dual-control. If we wish to re-open the issue, we must ensure our demands are realistic and be prepared to press them home: the worst of all worlds would be to ask for changes and to be rebuffed. It would be necessary to undertake any exploration at a very high level.

Conclusions

8. My own view is that:

a. There would be advantage in updating and refining the present US/UK agreements and taking a more positive line on them in public;

b. there could be presentational advantage in stepping up our contribution to the manning of the force and I propose to study this in more detail;

c. neither of these steps will be seen as more than palliatives by those arguing against us and will have only limited effect on public opinion;

d. we could not seek dual-control itself without risking a major impact on the deterrent effect of INF deployment and potentially large costs to the defence programme. Before accepting these major penalties, we should analyse more fully the nature of the public opposition to cruise missile deployment and the extent to which changes in the control arrangements would affect it;

e. in the meantime, we should launch ourselves with energy into the advocacy of the policies we are pursuing. We are to discuss this matter elsewhere;

f. we should make no approach to the Americans before the German elections unless we were totally satisfied that such an approach was secure.

9. I am copying this minute to the other members of MISC 7 and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
25th January 1983

THE OPTIONS FOR CHANGE

1. The options for change fall within the following, not mutually exclusive, categories:

a. to refine or improve existing arrangements for political consultation (e.g. through a revision of the 1958 "Murphy-Dean" agreement taking particular account of the GLCM deployment, and of our public statements on control);

b. provide a physical control mechanism, not necessarily linked to UK ownership or operation (i.e. through the provision of a control mechanism within the GLCM launch control centre or missile which would preclude release without the specific authority of the Prime Minister);

c. changes in the manning arrangements by:
i. complete British manning of the system (less warheads);
or ii. an increase in the British elements by expanding the contribution to the security force or joint manning of the system itself.

REVISION OF THE SPECIFIC UNDERSTANDING

2. The provisions of the 'specific understanding' reflect the shared status of the US and UK as nuclear weapons states and thus go beyond the arrangements which the US maintains with other NATO countries which act as hosts to US nuclear weapons. The agreement was concluded in June 1958 and has not been substantially revised since then. The US Administration has however indicated that the agreement will also apply to US GLCMs deployed to the UK. The strength of the existing agreement lies in the fact that it has been accepted and endorsed as satisfactory by successive Administrations on both sides of the Atlantic. Its weakness lies in the fact that it is secret and relies fundamentally on mutual

trust and good faith. Moreover critical observers can claim with some justice (and have done so already) that the secret understanding requires revision given that 24 years have elapsed since the agreement was concluded (30 years since the Churchill/Truman agreement to which we can publicly refer).

3. There would thus be merit in both presentational and substantive terms in seeking a revision of the agreement, with particular emphasis on the arrangements for GLCM. It would be a wise precaution to annex to the agreement a definitive document embodying the mutual US/UK understandings on the basing arrangements for GLCMs, and covering such matters as the safety standards for US nuclear warheads, the security of warhead storage sites, the control of access and egress at the two RAF bases, command and control, and the arrangements for off-base training deployments in peacetime and in war.

4. Any re-negotiation of the "Murphy-Dean" agreement would necessarily take place on a very restricted basis and the terms of the revised understanding would need to remain highly classified. But the aim would be to make public the fact that the existing understandings had been reviewed in detail with the US Administration and that specific agreement had been reached with the US on all aspects of GLCM basing. Such a statement should be linked (with US agreement) to a more forthcoming line on the joint decision - i.e. we might make clear in public that joint decision procedures applied to nuclear weapons systems and not just the bases from which they operate, and seek to remove from the public line the qualifying clause on decision "in the light of the circumstances at the time". In order not to indicate a lack of confidence in the existing arrangements (which have repeatedly been endorsed by Ministers) or in the US Administration, and in order to avoid creating difficulties with other basing countries, the changes would need to be presented as evolutionary (i.e. a revision of existing arrangements to take into account the new factor of GLCM deployment) rather than fundamental.

5. Such a revision should have some value in dealing with the criticism of the existing arrangements and as a demonstration of the Government's concern. It would not in itself satisfy critics of the present arrangements for control. Whatever revision is sought, it must prima facie be negotiable with the Americans. We have to recognise that the US have inthe past been reluctant to be more forthcoming about the terms of public reference to the secret understanding, and could be expected to create difficulties over any future revision, particularly because of their concern over control arrangements in other basing countries and because of the sensitivities of Congress. We should have to explain to them the extent to which circumstances have changed in terms of public opinion.

PHYSICAL CONTROL MECHANISMS

6. There is a number of nuclear weapons systems currently in service for which the co-operation of both British and US personnel is required before an armed weapon can be released (e.g. Lance, nuclear artillery and nuclear depth bombs). The UK has, however, never exercised physical control over a US owned and manned system (Thor was owned and manned by the UK).

7. It is not a simple matter to introduce dual control of release. In the case of GLCMs, release has three stages; deployment of the weapon with its warhead from its bunker; the arming of the warhead; and the launch of the weapon with the armed warhead. We believe the Americans insist on two-man operation at each of these stages. In theory UK authorisation could be required at each stage but launch is the critical point, and it would be sensible to concentrate on this. We understand that the launch control centres for the GLCMs provide for two US Servicemen both of whom are required to enter simultaneously the authenticating code for the launch of the missiles before release can be effected. The simple substitution of a UK Serviceman for a US Serviceman would not constitute dual control. The UK operator would still be dependent

on a release authorisation emanating from the White House and could at any time be replaced by a US Serviceman. For us to gain an absolute physical veto on the release of weapons, it would be necessary to re-engineer and reprogramme the launch control system so that release of the weapon could only be effected once two separate "codes" (one authorised by the US President, one by the Prime Minister) had been entered. Even with such a safeguard, regular access to the control mechanisms would be needed to ensure that UK control had not been circumvented by the US.

8. The British Government could be expected to bear the costs of any such modification, and in addition to provide communications facilities to ensure that the Prime Minister can remain in contact with the launch control centres at all times whether on or off base. The costs are difficult to quantify without detailed discussion with the US, although they might be expected to be in tens, rather than hundreds, of millions of pounds. Because of the time required to modify equipment and train British operators, there could be significant delays in deployment if we were to insist on such modifications before the first missiles entered service. This could have an impact in other basing countries.

9. More fundamentally, it seems extremely doubtful that the US Administration would accept a dual key control of this sort in what was otherwise a US owned and manned system not least because of the likely attitude of Congress. If we were to insist on a physical dual key mechanism, we must anticipate the American argument that this would need to be accompanied by a substantial (perhaps complete) contribution to the manning of the system, together with a transfer of ownership of the delivery system.

UK MANNING

Complete British manning

10. The establishment of a wholly British team to man, maintain and support the GLCM system would provide the clearest evidence of

effective British control over the possible employment of the missiles, as demanded by critics of the present arrangement. The weapons themselves would, of course, remain in US hands and their release would be subject to the authority of the US President.

11. The main arguments against introducing this arrangement can be summarised as follows:

a. changing the arrangements now could be seen as showing a lack of confidence in the US, could affect our relations with them and the resolve of other basing countries, and thereby weaken the deterrent effect in Soviet eyes of INF modernisation;

b. if the US were to insist that we purchased at full cost the entire system (less warheads) as a condition of UK operation, the procurement cost (over 10 years) could be in the region of £1 billion for a 160 missile force. While it is possible that the US Administration would be prepared to transfer ownership of the missiles and their supporting equipment without costs or at something less than full cost, we need to consider if in its present mood Congress would be likely to support this. If the UK were to provide operational and support personnel on the scales which the US propose to adopt (a total of about 3,300 split between the two bases) this might lead to a total personnel cost of about £35M a year (excluding initial training costs).

Mixed British/US Manning

12. Presently planned basing arrangements provide for a role for the RAF and the MOD Police in the organisation of the GLCM force which might be stressed more in public:

a. The GLCMs will be based, like other USAF assets in this country, on an RAF base which remains in RAF ownership and for presentational purposes, under RAF command. (This has, however, no relevance to operational control of the weapons, which remains in American hands);

b. the RAF Regiment and RAF Police will be providing approximately one third of the security force for the GLCM systems (128 out of 385 at Greenham Common; 92 out of 275 at Molesworth) both at the bases and when deployed off-base;

c. MOD Police will control access and egress at both stations.

13. Increasing the level of participation of UK Service personnel would be a useful method of demonstrating the close integration of US and UK interests. Increased UK participation at levels short of full manning might for example, be achieved by:

a. Option A. Substantially increasing the UK contribution to the joint UK/US security force. The external guarding of the perimeters of the GLCM bases with Service policemen is already a UK function. But the defence of the system from possible hostile attack is the job of a jointly manned force to which the UK contribution is roughly one-third - 220 men. Organisationally the joint defence force is intended to be fully integrated. We understand that both British and US personnel will be employed without distinction to protect the cruise missile alert and maintenance area (GAMA) and the Alert Bunker. If the UK element were to be increased to more than one-half of the total force - up to perhaps 75% - this would both substantially increase the British presence and minimise

the future risk of some direct confrontation between American security personnel and members of the British Public. The additional manpower might be around 200 personnel and the cost would be in excess of £2M a year in pay and allowances, plus costs for initial training and accommodation.

b. Option B. Providing a proportion of manpower for the operation and immediate support of the transporter-erector-launchers and launch control centres. Definition of the precise manpower requirements would entail detailed discussion with the US although for such an option between 200 and 400 additional men might be needed, at an annual cost of between £2M and £4M, plus substantial additional costs for initial training.

14. Of the two options for mixed manning, Option B would allow us to demonstrate that the missiles were operated by a closely integrated force, while keeping manpower requirements and costs within reasonable limits (though there would be problems over the availability of personnel and training). The Americans could, however, be very reluctant to accept this arrangement, which would be bound to take time to implement. Option A also has presentational attractions: there would again be manpower problems since it would place an extra burden on the RAF Regiment which is a small force already overstretched with particular problems at NCO level. Whilst both mixed manning options increase our insurance that the US would not act in a manner contrary to our wishes and provide a capability to impede US operations should such a need ever arise, neither of them provides an absolute physical guarantee that the missiles would not be fired without UK consent. But Option A could be presented in a manner from which it came to be inferred that there was a largely British force controlling access and egress to and from the weapons' Alert Bunker and off base deployments.

15. Option A could probably be managed relatively quickly. Option B would inevitably take a longer time to put into effect since additional personnel would have to be recruited for training in the UK

and possibly specific training on GLCM equipment in the US. There would be insufficient time to introduce such a new system to become operational by December 1983. The UK might therefore need to accept that the systems will enter service entirely US manned: the Government could, of course, announce, prior to deployment, that it planned to introduce an element of mixed manning into the GLCM force, and the training process was being set in hand. Mixed manning would provide a useful first step towards full manning and the introduction of a physical dual key if these were held to be necessary in the longer term.

16. The question of joint training in the operation of cruise missiles was raised by the then Defence Secretary with Mr Weinberger in December. Mr Weinberger said that he thought it would not present problems for the US Government.

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PM/83/9

THE PRIME MINISTER

INF Negotiations

1. We shall be discussing in MISC 7 on 27 January two important issues related to the planned deployment of American intermediate range missiles in Europe later this year: the question of control and the timetable for deployment. After that, we shall be meeting at Chequers on 30 January, and I hope that we shall take that opportunity to focus our attention on the situation in the negotiations themselves. It will be important to clear our minds about what should be said on this subject to the US Vice-President when he is here on 9/10 February. You might welcome a brief update in the meantime on the latest developments.

2. The next round of negotiations on INF begins in Geneva on 27 January. Since the last round ended before Christmas there has been a good deal of speculation, much of it unfortunately in the press, about the continued viability of the zero option approach as the basic Western negotiating position. Some of this speculation has been misinformed. But there are clear indications from Rome and Bonn that the Italians and Germans are moving to the view that the Americans should now consider seriously a new move in the INF negotiations involving a proposal for some form of interim agreement. We have also learned from private sources that a good deal of discussion on the same lines is going on in Washington. Officials here and in the MOD have been examining the options and I hope to be in a position to give you a fully up-to-date account of the latest developments at the meeting at Chequers.

/3.

3. My own view is that we must continue to insist on the essential criteria which you established clearly in your interview with Brian Walden on ITV on 16 January and again in the House during questions on 18 January. The key points are that we must have an agreement which is balanced, i.e. which provides for equal numbers of warheads on weapon systems of similar type as between the US and the USSR; and that the counting system (used to decide which systems are included and which excluded) must not be bogus. Furthermore I see no reason to depart from our position that the zero level is the best long-term outcome. I think too that we need to keep in mind that, for the first part of this year at least, the contest between the Soviet Union and the NATO allies will be one for the hearts and minds of Western public opinion. The Americans have made it clear that they do not intend to make any move from their present position at any rate in the opening stages of the INF talks when they reconvene on 27 January. But there may be much to be said for a move very soon in the negotiations which preserves absolutely intact our main objective and our basic criteria but which provides the Alliance with the high ground in terms of its public posture.

4. I look forward to discussing these points at Chequers on 30 January. It is clear from what we have heard about Vice-President Bush's visit that he will look to you for a clear statement of the British position. I have no doubt that this will be of particular importance in Washington as possible negotiating options are considered.

5. I am copying this minute to Michael Heseltine and Sir Robert Armstrong.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign & Commonwealth Office
25 January 1983

13

MO 11/2/2

PRIME MINISTER

BASING OF CRUISE MISSILES

Prior to our meeting on Thursday, you will wish to know where matters stand on the timing of the deployment of GLCMs at Greenham Common.

2. You will recall that, in his minute of 15th December, my predecessor said that we expected to hear from the Americans in January to follow up his own discussion with Mr Weinberger. Richard Perle of the Pentagon explained the present position when he met his opposite number here, John Blelloch, on Friday. He revealed that both the US Air Force (USAF) and the US Department of Energy (who are responsible for nuclear safety) are finding some difficulty with the new proposed timetable. This is because there is a problem for both of them in trying to reconcile different deployment dates with the various tests and standards associated with declaring, formally, an "initial operational capability". It has, accordingly, been registered with the Americans that this is, in UK and for that matter Alliance terms, really a secondary issue: what matters is that unless the INF talks produce an acceptable arms control solution, the first missiles should have arrived in the basing countries by the end of 1983.

3. I have asked whether the Americans, for some reason, might be stalling. Officials' judgement is that they are not: that they understand the importance of the November date: and will find our attitude on the secondary importance of achieving initial operating

capability helpful. They are also clear that the sooner the final timetable is settled, the better.

4. There is to be a further meeting in Washington on 25th January of which I hope to hear the outcome before our own meeting. If so, I will report the latest position then.

5. I am sending copies of this minute to our MISC 7 colleagues, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
25th January 1983

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UK Detement
Pt 1

CABINET OFFICE

Deployment

With the compliments of

A.J.C. 25/1
p.a.

R. L. L. FACER

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS
Telephone 01 233

010

Defence c/ Sue Goodall

CONFIDENTIAL

CABINET OFFICE
70 WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AS

01-233 - 7280

24 January 1983

T.05926

Dear Roger.

Prime Minister's Briefing on Nuclear Issues

I am writing to confirm the arrangements for attendance at the Prime Minister's briefing meeting on nuclear issues on Sunday, 30 January at Chequers at 10.30 am. The meeting will be followed by lunch. The Prime Minister would like the following to be invited:-

FCO

Secretary of State
Sir Julian Bullard (in Sir Antony Acland's absence abroad)
Mr Patrick Wright
Mr David Gillmore

Ministry of Defence

Secretary of State
CDS
Mr Whitmore
Mr Blelloch
Colonel J Cross

Cabinet Office

Sir Robert Armstrong
Mr Goodall
Mr Facer

In addition, Mr Roger Jackling from the Prime Minister's office will be present.

2. I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD), John Coles (No.10) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever.
Roger Facer.
R L FACER

Roger Bone Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

MR. GOODALL
CABINET OFFICE

PRIME MINISTER'S BRIEFING ON
NUCLEAR ISSUES

Thank you for your minute of 20 January. I confirm that the Prime Minister would like all those mentioned in your minute to be invited to the briefing on 30 January at Chequers. She would also be grateful if Mr. Roger Jackling, who is to join this office the next day, were able to attend.

May I leave it to you to contact all those concerned?

A. J. COLES

24 January 1983

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Defence Cab Department

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SOVIET VIEWS ON I.N.F.

SUMMARY

1. INF WAS DISCUSSED DURING THE UK/SOVIET PLANNING TALKS ON 20 JANUARY. THE RUSSIANS GAVE A CAREFULLY PRESENTED STATEMENT OF THEIR POSITION, QUESTIONING THE LOGIC OF THE NON-INCLUSION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS. THEY ALLEGED THAT THE BRITISH AND FRENCH WERE HELPING THE AMERICANS TO BLOCK THE GENEVA TALKS: CHALLENGED THE INDEPENDENCE OF OUR NUCLEAR DETERRENT ON THE GROUND OF COORDINATED TARGETTING OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN WEAPONS: AND AT ONE POINT SEEMED TO SUGGEST THAT THE UK AND FRANCE JOIN THE GENEVA TALKS ALTHOUGH THEY REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT THEY RECOGNISED OUR POSITION AS NON-PARTICIPANTS.

DETAIL

2. BELONOGOV (DEPUTY HEAD OF THE MFA'S PLANNING ADMINISTRATION)

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DEF
ACDD
ESD
PS
PS/M'Hred
PS/PUS...
M' Wright
M' Gillmore
No 10 D.Str.
i.e. George Walden.

2. BELONOGOV (DEPUTY HEAD OF THE MFA'S PLANNING ADMINISTRATION) ARGUED THAT IT WAS THE US AND NOT THE SOVIET UNION WHICH WAS IN THE FOREFRONT OF THE ARMS RACE. NEW AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY WAS MAKING AGREEMENTS DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. CRUISE MISSILES,WHICH COULD REACH TARGETS UNDETECTED, THE STEALTH BOMBER, AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS CLOSER TO SOVIET TERRITORY LED THE SOVIET UNION TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE US WAS DEVELOPING A FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY AND WAS SEEKING MILITARY SUPERIORITY.

3. TURNING TO INF, BELONOGOV READ CAREFULLY FROM A PREPARED STATEMENT. AMERICAN NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN EUROPE WERE THE MAIN ISSUE IN THE COMPLEX OF EUROPEAN PROBLEMS. THE SOVIET UNION SOUGHT A JUST AGREEMENT. BUT THE US WAS NOT WILLING TO REACH A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT. THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT SHARE THE OPTIMISM PROCLAIMED BY WASHINGTON TO PLACATE WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION. EARLIER SOVIET PROPOSALS HAD BEEN IGNORED IN WASHINGTON. ANDROPOV'S LATEST PROPOSAL WAS ALSO BEING REJECTED. BUT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF ALL STATES, ABOVE ALL THE EUROPEAN NUCLEAR STATES (IE UK AND FRANCE). THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT DEMANDING THAT THE DESTINY OF UK AND FRENCH SYSTEMS BE DECIDED IN THE TALKS. BUT THEY COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE LOGIC OF THE BRITISH AND FRENCH POSITION. ON THE ONE HAND LONDON, BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, SEEMED TO FAVOUR PROGRESS IN THE GENEVA TALKS. ON THE OTHER ITS OFFICIAL POSITION WAS THAT BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. THESE FORCES REPRESENTED A FORMIDABLE REALITY WHICH THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT IGNORE. THE US DELEGATION IN GENEVA PRETENDED TO IGNORE THEIR EXISTENCE, AND THEREBY CREATED DEADLOCK IN THE TALKS. THE EUROPEAN NUCLEAR POWERS WERE HELPING WASHINGTON TO DO THIS. IF WE WERE INTERESTED IN DEPLOYMENT RATHER THAN RESULTS IN GENEVA, OUR POSITION MADE SENSE. TO SUPPORT THE ZERO OPTION MEANT TO FAVOUR DEPLOYMENT.

4. BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES WERE FAR FROM INSIGNIFICANT. ONE NUCLEAR ARMED SUBMARINE HAD THE DESTRUCTIVE CAPACITY OF ALL THE EXPLOSIVES USED IN WORLD WAR II. THE UK AND FRANCE HAD MORE THAN ONE SUBMARINE. THEY ALSO HAD PLANS FOR A CONSIDERABLE BUILD-UP OF WARHEADS: BRITAIN PLANNED AN INCREASE TO BETWEEN 500 AND MORE THAN 900 DEPENDING ON THE TYPE OF MIRV-ING. 200 OR 500 OR 900 AIMED AT THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES COULD NOT BE IGNORED. IF THE SOVIET UNION WERE TO GIVE TWO ALLIES SOME OF ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND TO DEMAND THAT THEY NOT BE COUNTED, THE WEST WOULD PROTEST. WHETHER WE INTENDED, WE WERE EFFECTIVELY HELPING THE US TO BLOCK THE TALKS.

5. WALDEN REJECTED THIS ASSERTION AND DEPLOYED OUR ARGUMENTS FOR NON-INCLUSION. IT WAS THE SOVIET POSITION WHICH LACKED BOTH LOGIC AND CONSISTENCY. THE INF NEGOTIATIONS WERE BILATERAL: THE RUSSIANS SEEMED TO WANT TO MATCH EVERYONE ELSE PUT TOGETHER: AND THEY THEMSELVES HAD DESCRIBED OUR DETERRENT AS STRATEGIC IN SALT I. MOREOVER GROMYKO, IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE IN BONN, NOW SEEMED TO WANT TO HAVE IT BOTH WAYS. THE UK DETERRENT WAS AN INDEPENDENT, MINIMUM, ULTIMATE STRATEGIC DETERRENT. COMMON SENSE AND STATISTICS SHOWED THAT IT WAS OF MARGINAL SIGNIFICANCE TO ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS: IT WAS LESS THAN 2.5% OF TOTAL SOVIET STRATEGIC SYSTEMS.

6. BELONOGOV WAS CLEARLY PREPARED TO COUNTER THESE ARGUMENTS:

(A) INF AS BILATERAL US/SOVIET TALKS: THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF DISCUSSING THE SIZE, TYPE AND MODERNISATION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS. THAT WAS A SOVEREIGN DECISION FOR THOSE COUNTRIES. BUT THEY HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ANY CEILINGS.

(B) THE SOVIET UNION WANTED AS MANY WEAPONS AS EVERYONE ELSE PUT TOGETHER: WE SEEMED TO BE CASTING DOUBT ON WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD HAVE A COUNTERBALANCE TO UK AS WELL AS US FORCES. THEY COULD NOT OVERLOOK FORCES AIMED AT THEM WHEN COUNTING THE ABSOLUTE LEVEL OF THEIR ARMED FORCES. THIS VIEW WAS RECOGNISED ABROAD AND INDEED BY UK OPINION. (BELONOGOV READ FROM A CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR EDITORIAL IN FAVOUR OF ACCOUNT BEING TAKEN OF BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS).
IF THE UK AND FRANCE WANTED TO TAKE PART IN THE INF TALKS NO-ONE WOULD OBJECT. THE USSR HAD PROPOSED AND STILL FAVOURED NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT INVOLVING ALL NUCLEAR POWERS.

(C) THE STRATEGIC NATURE OF BRITISH FORCES: THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN STRATEGIC AND NON-STRATEGIC WAS VAGUE, RELATIVE AND NOT THE POINT. FOR THE SOVIET UNION ANY WEAPONS WHICH COULD REACH ANYWHERE WHERE SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES WERE DEPLOYED WAS STRATEGIC. BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES WERE STRATEGIC IN THIS SENSE. THE SOVIET UNION HAD TO HAVE A COUNTERWEIGHT. IT WAS FOR THEM TO DECIDE THE TYPE - MEDIUM RANGE WEAPONS OR ICBMS - JUST AS THE UK HAD DECIDED TO HAVE SUBMARINES RATHER THAN LAND BASED MISSILES.

(D) INDEPENDENCE OF BRITISH SYSTEMS: THE SOVIET UNION TOOK ACCOUNT OF THEIR INDEPENDENT NATURE. BUT THE SINGLE SYSTEM OF TARGETTING OF US AND BRITISH FORCES CAST DOUBT ON THEIR INDEPENDENCE. THE SOVIETHU ION WOULD NATURALLY PREFER THAT SUCH COORDINATION DID NOT EXIST. THEY WOULD THEN HAVE MORE CONFIDENCE

~~INDEPENDENCE. THE SOVIETHU ION WOULD NATURALLY PREFER~~ THAT SUCH COORDINATION DID NOT EXIST. THEY WOULD THEN HAVE MORE CONFIDENCE THAT BRITISH MISSILES WOULD NOT BE LAUNCHED AUTOMATICALLY AT THE SAME TIME AS AMERICAN.

7. WALDEN SAID THAT THERE WAS CLEARLY A BASIC DISAGREEMENT HERE BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS, WHICH GILLMORE'S VISIT AT THE BEGINNING WOULD HELP TO CLARIFY. BUT OUR POSITION WAS BOTH FIRM AND LOGICAL.

SUTHERLAND

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

(1)

Agreed

Ref: B06682

Deployments

MR COLES

c Mr Hatfield

Prime Minister's Briefing on Nuclear Issues:
Sunday, 30th January 1983

A.D.C. 20/1.

You asked me to make arrangements for attendance at the briefing meeting on nuclear issues which has been fixed for 10.30 am on Sunday, 30th January at Chequers, to be followed by lunch. I have been in touch with the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and there are the following bids for attendance.

Ministry of Defence

Mr Heseltine
Mr Whitmore
Chief of the Defence Staff
Mr Blelloch
Colonel J Cross (DPS(N))

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr Pym
Sir Julian Bullard (in the absence abroad of Sir Antony Acland)
Mr Patrick Wright
Mr Gillmore

Cabinet Office

Sir Robert Armstrong
Mr Goodall
Mr Facer

The Ministry of Defence have explained that the CDS would like Colonel Cross to attend if convenient: but his presence is not indispensable if the Prime Minister wants to keep numbers down. Similarly, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have explained that, in Sir Antony Acland's absence, Sir Julian Bullard would very much like to come; but that, if a choice has to be made between Sir Julian Bullard and Mr Wright the latter is the one who should come.

If the Prime Minister is content with this list I will confirm to Departments that the people concerned are invited and will be receiving direct from you cards to admit them to Chequers.

20th January 1983

A D S GOODALL

This would mean a total of 14 for lunch.

2. do you want to reduce it by deleting Colonel Cross or Patrick Wright?

No

3. Roger Tackley join us at No. 10 the next day. Shall I see if he can come?

Yes

Defence

Deployment

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE SW

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 January, 1983

Alliance and Nuclear Matters

The Prime Minister has seen the minute of 13 January by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

You will already know that we have had to postpone the briefing on the arms control aspects of nuclear issues until the weekend of 29/30 January. MISC 7 will, as Mr. Pym suggests, be able to deal on 27 January with the questions of the timetable for Cruise missile deployment and dual key. I wrote separately yesterday about a meeting to discuss the handling of the Government's public case on nuclear strategy and arms control.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office)

A. J. COLES

R. B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

Dartmouth

(1).

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

Nuclear Issues

You asked whether 29 January would not be too late for the briefing on INF issues (see the attached minute).

I had the same thought when I saw that Misc 7 would meet on 27 January and indeed that the INF negotiations will resume on the same day. But Sir Robert Armstrong told me that this point had been carefully considered. Officials saw no difficulty about Ministers considering in Misc 7 the question of dual key and the cruise missile deployment timetable before the briefing, because the briefing will be largely about the negotiations in Geneva. Nor do I think there are any decisions for us to take before the re-opening of negotiations on 27 January.

We could, if you wished, try to have the briefing during the coming weekend (22/23 January). But in the light of the above, are you content to wait until 29/30 January?

Yes

A.J.C.

17 January, 1983.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Coles, No. 10



CABINET OFFICE

Replacement copy?

With the compliments of

Mr. Goodall

14/1

h.a.

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS
Telephone 01 233

SECRET

Defence 12

CABINET OFFICE
70 WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AS

01-~~233 XXXXXX~~ 233 8378

14th January 1983

Ref: B06674

Dear Richard.

Nuclear Issues: Prime Minister's Briefing

The Prime Minister's second briefing meeting on nuclear issues provisionally arranged for 9.30 am on Tuesday, 18th January, has now been postponed. I understand that No. 10 hope to find a date later in the month when it can be reinstated, but this has not yet been fixed.

As agreed with John Blelloch and David Gillmore, the Cabinet Office is preparing a note on the Muprhy-Dean agreement to meet the Prime Minister's request for further analysis of its provisions, which we will circulate separately to those who were to attend the briefing. And John Blelloch will do the same with his briefing note on the United Kingdom and United States nuclear forces based in the United Kingdom.

Yours sincerely

David Goodall

A D S GOODALL

R C Mottram Esq.
Ministry of Defence

cc Mr Fall, FCO
Mr Coles, No.10

OPD — Replacement cover?

SECRET

Prime Minister

You have since agreed that the briefing on INF issues should be postponed until the weekend of 29 January. A.J.C. 14/1

11 ①.

PM/83/5

PRIME MINISTER

Is it worth a word?

Alliance and Nuclear Matters

1. Events within the Alliance and in relation to the nuclear debate are gathering pace. INF negotiations resume in Geneva on 27 January. Vice President Bush will be in London on 9/10 February. We need to establish the British position on several especially important issues, but there is not much time. I therefore welcome the fact that arrangements have been made to complete the briefing on the arms control issues, and (with those colleagues principally involved) to discuss cruise missile deployment dates and the dual key question, all of which were unfinished business before Christmas.

2. If for any reason (for example, preoccupation with the Franks report which is due to be published on 18 January) the resumed briefing on arms control were to slip, I nevertheless hope that it could be reinstated as soon as possible. The meeting of MISC 7 (provisionally set for 27 January) would then be the moment to deal with the timetable for cruise missile deployment and the question of dual key. There would in my view also be advantage in spending some time, perhaps at Chequers, thinking inter alia about the substance of the INF negotiating position and how to respond to current Soviet tactics, in preparation for Vice President Bush's visit. He will certainly expect to be in a position to report your views to President Reagan. We therefore need to clear our minds beforehand.

3. I am minuting separately on the related question of arrangements for improving the handling of the Government's public case on nuclear strategy and arms control.

4. I am sending a copy of this minute to Michael Heseltine and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

13 January, 1983

M. Cole

Caroline

I think AJC has organized this

CABINET OFFICE

I have set up - please file.

With the compliments of

A.J.C. 12

M. Goodall

930-11.00 on TUE 18 JAN

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS
Telephone 01 233

SECRET

Ref: B06666

MR FACER

cc Mr Blelloch, MOD
Mr Gillmore, FCO
Mr Coles, No.10

Nicko Sloglem

10

Can you pl. propose a date as soon as possible in January for another meeting on nuclear issues, similar to that held yesterday. We shall need the FCS, Home Secretary and Officials.

A.J.C. 21/12

Nuclear Issues: Prime Minister's Briefing

I have spoken to Mr Coles about the follow up to the Prime Minister's briefing on nuclear issues yesterday. He will shortly be proposing a date in January for a second instalment at which we should aim to cover the ground left uncovered yesterday. If the ensuing discussion identifies issues on which Ministerial decision(s) are required, papers on these can be commissioned for consideration at a meeting of MISC 7. (There is in any case due to be a meeting of MISC 7 in January to decide the timing of GLCM deployment in the United Kingdom in the light of the further exploratory talks which the Defence Secretary was to have on this subject with the Americans and the Germans.)

2. I think it would be sensible for us to have another preparatory meeting with Mr Blelloch and Mr Gillmore before the briefing in January to discuss how the remaining ground can best be covered. Mr Coles thought, and I agree, that it would probably only confuse matters to prepare background papers on the arms control issues ahead of the briefing. But if Mr Blelloch is content it might save time if the factual content of his presentation (describing United Kingdom and United States nuclear forces based in the United Kingdom, together with their roles and the background to the United States nuclear presence here) could be put into a note and circulated in advance. We could then aim for a single presentation covering the START and INF negotiations, including the issues these raise for the United Kingdom and the Alliance. It will be important to ensure that this should deals in some detail with the overall purposes of the proposed GLCM and Pershing II deployments and the consequences for these purposes of a decision by the United Kingdom to opt for a dual key system of control.

21st December 1982

A D S GOODALL

copy filed on
Defence DS
Nuclear Release Procedures Cab1
Deployment

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 December 1982

Dear Richard,

INF Deployment

As I told you on the telephone today, the Prime Minister has just asked for a brief for her talks with Mr. George Shultz on Friday covering INF deployments and the INF negotiations.

We have talked separately about the Prime Minister's wish to look again at the dual key question and I note from Mr. Nott's minute of today to the Prime Minister that he will be offering further advice. In advance of further discussion of this question, the Prime Minister has asked for advice on whether she should raise this issue with Mr. Shultz and if so in what terms.

It would be helpful if your briefing on these matters could be agreed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

I am copying this letter to Brian Fall (FCO) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

John Coles

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

SECRET

Prime Minister

8

A.J.C. 15/12

MO 11/2/2

PRIME MINISTER

BASING OF CRUISE MISSILES AND ARMS CONTROL

When we discussed this in MISC 7 on 12th November it was left that we should reflect further but that in the meantime I should make clear to Herr Woerner and Mr Weinberger the difficulties for us that would be created by the Germans' wish to delay the arrival of initial equipments until September 1983, and our view that the right choice lay between an early July delivery of the launchers and missiles or a revised deployment date in early November 1983.

2. I had bilateral talks with Herr Woerner and Mr Weinberger (in that order) in the margins of the NATO Ministerial meetings at the beginning of the month. In so doing, I made sure, as we had agreed, that the Germans made as much of the running as possible - Herr Woerner saw Mr Weinberger before I did. Our respective officials followed up with a trilateral discussion. Records of all three meetings have been circulated. I also mentioned to Mr Weinberger the possibility of some joint training and this too has been followed up by officials. I did not, of course, mention training to the Germans.

3. We had agreed to resume our discussion in the New Year. The Americans have said that they will let us know in January how far they have got with revising the programme and this fits in well enough with the timetable we had in mind. I do not think there is any point in further discussion before that.

4. We also agreed that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and I should press for early completion of the NATO studies on short range battlefield nuclear weapons. Our officials have, I think, succeeded in injecting a certain amount of urgency into the work of the High Level Group of officials and that group is now committed to an interim report for the next Ministerial NPG meeting in March 1983. This commitment was endorsed in the Agreed Minute of the DPC though not highlighted in the communique: the time for that will be later when there is more to say. As with deployment, the action now rests with the Americans and we shall have some idea in January how well they are getting on in this field too.

5. There remains the problem of confidentiality. As you know, there has been some speculation about INF deployment timetables in the German Press which is accurate enough to suggest some official background briefing. In our contacts with the Germans and the Americans during the last week we have stressed the importance of maintaining security while timetable problems are being sorted out but I will be surprised if further leaks do not occur, in Washington as well as in Bonn. If so, then I think we maintain the line already proposed to you for dealing with possible questions last Tuesday.

6. Finally I should like to re-iterate the point that I made orally at our last meeting. The deployment of Cruise in the UK - an American nuclear missile under American control - is likely to cause my colleagues (particularly those who are unfamiliar with these issues) very considerable political problems in 1983. All the other political parties will either be opposed to Cruise deployments - or in favour of a dual-key system. We will be very vulnerable politically to the charge of hazarding the UK for an American system. My concern is that the row on this issue does not spill over into opposition against the national deterrent

where we can win the political argument. I think it is vital that you continue to pursue the revised deployment dates - and insist on joint training (as some offset to the lack of dual-key). In the end, I suspect you will be forced to concede the arguments for dual-key. I think this matter can only be re-opened direct between you and President Reagan. If we were to go to dual-key I shall certainly then sleep more safely in my bed.

7. I understand that you have asked for further advice on the dual-key question and I will let you have this soon.

8. I am sending copies of this to MISC 7 colleagues and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
15th December 1982

Drafted by Mr Nott and signed in his absence

SECRET

Defence
Pme Minister.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~930 XXXX~~ 218 2111/3

MO 25/2/24/2

3rd December 1982

Dear Roger.

INF BASING

I attach your copies of the records of bilateral meetings between Mr Nott and Herr Wörner and Mr Weinberger in the margins of this week's NATO meetings, at which Mr Nott pursued the question of INF basing on the lines agreed by MISC 7.

Following Mr Nott's meeting with Mr Weinberger, there was a further private meeting between Mr Perle, Mr Blelloch here and General Tandecki of the German MOD at which Mr Perle agreed to consider further the points which had been raised. The note of this meeting will be circulated separately.

I am copying this letter to John Coles (No 10) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Richard Mottram

(R C MOTTRAM)

R Bone Esq

SECRET

MO 25/2/24/2

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE DEFENCE SECRETARY AND THE US DEFENSE SECRETARY AT THE US MISSION TO NATO ON 30TH NOVEMBER AT 1740

Present:

The Rt Hon John Nott MP
Secretary of State for Defence

Mr R C Mottram
Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State for Defence

(from Item 2 onwards)

The Hon Caspar W Weinberger
US Defense Secretary

Major General Carl R Smith USAF
Military Assistant to the
Defense Secretary

The Hon W Tapley Bennett Jr
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary, US Mission to
NATO

The Hon R N Perle
Assistant Secretary of Defense,
International Security Policy,
Department of Defense

Brigadier General J R Lasater USAF
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European and NATO Policy,
International Security Policy,
Department of Defense

INF Basing

1. The Secretary of State enquired whether Herr Wörner had raised with Mr Weinberger, during their meeting earlier in the day, the question of synchronisation of INF deployments. Mr Weinberger at first said this subject had not been raised but Major General Smith confirmed that it had been mentioned. The Secretary of State said he wished to explain very privately the British position. We remained fully committed to the deployment of GLCMs within the agreed timetable of December 1983. The present delivery programme as explained by US experts envisaged the equipment being delivered over an extended period next summer beginning with the control vans, followed by the transport/erector/launchers, with the missiles arriving in September. Missiles arriving in the early Autumn could cause controversy if a British general election campaign was then underway and such controversy would do no good for INF deployments in Europe generally. The British Government would be happy to proceed on the existing basis but with the deliveries speeded up so that all of the equipment was at Greenham Common by July but

was conscious that this would not meet German concerns. If it were felt that the deliveries should be synchronised, the September date envisaged by the Germans would not suit us and it would be necessary to look to the equipment arriving in the UK in November or December. Mr Weinberger said that he was not sure that he understood the basis of German concerns. At present deliveries were being programmed essentially in accordance with the manufacturing schedule and logistic considerations. Alternatives could certainly be looked at. He was not sure whether deliveries in say November would be compatible with a planned initial operational capability of December. Experts might look at the problem together.

2. The Secretary of State said that regardless of when the main equipment was delivered, it should all be taken direct by air to Greenham Common. It would not be sensible for these very large vehicles to move there by road. Off-base training should be avoided until after the Autumn. He also wondered whether some British personnel might be given familiarisation training on how the cruise missile flights were to be operated. In Britain cruise missiles were perceived as American weapons outside British control and general references to the understandings over the use of UK bases were not sufficient to meet such concern. Some form of joint training would give the impression of closer British involvement and help to diffuse criticism. Mr Weinberger indicated that he thought none of these points would present problems for the US Government. In conclusion, the Secretary of State emphasised that his concern was to minimise political controversy over the deployment of GLCMs: our commitment to the deployment programme itself was firm.

Belize

3. The Secretary of State said that he hoped the US Government appreciated that our garrison in Belize could not remain there indefinitely. We had small armed forces and a large number of commitments: moreover we did not normally, and should not, maintain British forces in an independent country. Mr Weinberger commented that our force level in Belize was itself fairly small but made a most important contribution. He hoped that we would stay there as long as we possibly could.

Falkland Islands Report

4. The Secretary of State said that he wished briefly to mention his concern over the risk of controversy arising from the report being prepared by General Shutler about the Falkland Islands campaign which would draw upon British information. He wondered if we might have a sight of the report before it was finalised to ensure that the information we had supplied was properly reflected

and that the report was factually correct. Mr Weinberger, who seemed unaware of the Shutler Report, said he felt this would cause no problem.

Technology Transfer

5. The Secretary of State said that he was concerned that the US Administration's efforts to limit technology transfer to the Soviet Union could be very divisive within the Alliance and that US companies were using the issue as an excuse for limiting industrial co-operation. We did not want another row like that over the Soviet pipeline. UK industrialists were representing to him that the attitude of US companies towards co-operation was hardening. Mr Perle said that any change in attitudes had not been influenced by the Department of Defense. If we had specific complaints, he would be happy to look at them. It would be helpful if the British Government would take a more positive attitude to the reform of the COCOM machinery and particularly to the need for a military sub-committee. As presently constituted, COCOM was a joke - its total budget was only $400,000 a year. The Secretary of State said that his experts doubted the value of a military sub-committee but he would certainly look at it again. He wondered whether sufficient attention was being given to technology acquired by the Soviet Union from Japanese civil industry. Mr Weinberger said that he was certainly conscious of this.

Out of Area Planning

6. Mr Weinberger said that he hoped that the British Government would back the proposed revised language on out of area planning in the DPC Communique. It was most important that this was not watered down. The US Government remained committed to the forward defence of NATO and its reinforcement. They believed that it was only sensible that NATO planning should take account of the possible use of US forces in other areas in support of the interests of the West as a whole. He found it difficult to understand why European countries were not prepared to support this when they would be the primary beneficiaries from any US action - the US, and indeed Britain, could do without Middle East oil but European countries certainly could not. The Secretary of State said that the European countries were unlikely to give in advance the sort of assurances and backing which the Americans seemed to want: but, on the day, he was confident that any deployment of the RDJTF would have their support. It would be better not to try to define in detail now what could be involved. Mr Weinberger commented that any deployment would be far more effective if it had been properly planned in advance and the implications for NATO recognised and allowed for. The support of NATO countries was also needed in relation to the US Congress. There was a strong feeling there that the US had global responsibilities and its forces had been over-committed to the European theatre. The willingness of the

Europeans to be flexible over US deployments would assist greatly in responding to this sort of criticism. There was nothing in the proposed language in the Communique which could be objected to. The Secretary of State said that we were certainly prepared to back the Americans over the revised proposed wording for the Communique.

Lebanon

7. Mr Weinberger asked whether there was any possibility that we could assist in the Lebanon - he understood that we might provide a training team which would be very helpful. The Secretary of State said that the Director of our Military Assistance Office was about to submit a report on the training option. He would look at where matters stood on his return to London.

8. The meeting closed at 1810.

Ministry of Defence

3rd December 1982

DISTRIBUTION:

PS/Prime Minister ←
PS/Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
PS/Secretary of the Cabinet
Sir O Wright, HM Ambassador Washington
Sir J Graham, UK Permanent Rep, UKDEL NATO
Sir J Taylor, HM Ambassador, Bonn

SECRET

MO 25/2/24/2

NOTE OF A MEETING HELD AT 0830 ON 30TH NOVEMBER WITH THE GERMAN DEFENCE SECRETARY AT THE UK DELEGATION NATO HQ

Present:

The Rt Hon John Nott MP
Secretary of State for Defence

Mr Blelloch
Deputy Under Secretary(Policy and Programmes)

Herr Woerner
German Secretary of State for Defence

Dr Ruhl
State Secretary, Ministry of Defence

The Secretary of State thanked Herr Woerner warmly for his help over securing a decision on RB 199 sales to India. Herr Woerner said that it had not been easy and had required the support of the Chancellor. There could be no question of any further decision on sales of Tornado itself until after the FRG elections in March 1983. The Secretary of State acknowledged the reasons for this.

2. The Secretary of State asked Herr Woerner for an account of his discussions with the US Administration in Washington. Herr Woerner said that he had made two main points about INF deployment as the FRG saw it:-

a. The 1979 decision related only to 108 Pershings and warheads, plus as many missiles as might be required purely for maintenance backing. The Americans had appeared to be contemplating much larger numbers in support of the original deployment.

b. It was most important that deployment in the basing countries should be closely synchronized, within a period of about 4 weeks and that so far as the Germans were concerned this should not be before September 1983. They remained committed to the target date for I.O.C. of December 1983.

He had also discussed out of area issues, pointing out to the Americans the very significant steps the FRG had already taken to increase manpower, the impossibility of going beyond this to finding the 93,000 additional men which on certain assumptions about RDJTF deployment might be required and drawing the Americans attention to the acute manpower difficulties the FRG would face in the late 1980s when the number of young men becoming available for the draft might be cut by nearly a half.

3. The Secretary of State asked how the UK might help the FRG Government on nuclear issues in the period leading up to the March 1983 election. Herr Woerner said that help might best be provided by the UK stressing, in public, its determination to go ahead with deployment plus its firm commitment to arms control. In private it would also be helpful if we could continue to urge on the US the need to use every opportunity to develop and maintain strong public negotiating positions in Geneva.

4. The Secretary of State then asked about battlefield nuclear weapons and the contribution that progress in this area might make towards winning public opinion. Herr Woerner said that, for the FRG, the less said about this in public before the election the better. As regards the role of these weapons the Germans strongly favoured a shift from the shortest to the longer range classes of weapons given the importance they placed on them as a contribution to deterrence rather than to war fighting. Herr Woerner however agreed that it was important for the work of the HLG to be pressed forward.

5. The Secretary of State asked Herr Woerner if he would develop further his account of German thinking about the timing of INF deployment. Herr Woerner confirmed that in the German view deployment beginning as early as May 1983 as currently planned for the UK, would be represented by the Russians as pre-empting the outcome of arms control negotiations. The Russians would no doubt also exploit the fact that Herr Schmidt and Herr Genscher were on the record as having acknowledged that a key time in the negotiations would be the summer of 1983. On these grounds deployment before September would raise very great difficulty for the Germans and he had said so to the Americans in Washington. Among officials the reception had been hostile: Mr Weinberger himself had appeared non-commital.

6. The Secretary of State said that in the UK public opinion would attach less importance to the question of synchronized delivery and its link with arms control negotiations. What was less satisfactory about present plans was the fact that they provided for delivery of equipments over an extended period from May (launch control vehicles) through July (the launchers) to September (missiles). It would be far better either for deliveries, including missiles, to be completed by, say, July or for them to be postponed until November. Herr Woerner said that November would be perfectly satisfactory for the FRG.

7. The Secretary of State asked how matters might now be taken forward. He wished to be helpful but felt that it would be much better for the Germans to continue to take the initiative. Herr Woerner said that he would be seeing Mr Weinberger later in the morning and would raise the question of synchronisation with him. The Secretary of State agreed with this proposal and said he himself would touch on the matter when he saw Mr Weinberger later in the day. Whether or not there would be advantage in a tri-partite meeting could be left for later decision.

8. The Ministers touched on two other matters:-

a. Herr Woerner confirmed German agreement to more infra structure funds but noted that, the agreement having been given, the US Administration was already pressing for more.

b. Herr Woerner said that the Portuguese had told him that the British were committed to helping them over frigates. The Secretary of State said that this was not so but that we were prepared to repeat our offer of Rolls Royce engines on favourable credit terms. The Ministers agreed to keep in touch.

9. The meeting ended at 0920.

Ministry of Defence

2nd December 1982

DISTRIBUTION:

PS/Prime Minister
PS/Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
PS/Secretary of the Cabinet
Sir O Wright, HM Ambassador Washington
Sir J Graham, UK Permanent Rep, UKDEL NATO
Sir J Taylor, HM Ambassador, Bonn

GR 1150
CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKDEL NATO 301830Z NOV 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 447 OF 30 NOVEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (AUS(D STAFF)
INFO IMMEDIATE BONN WASHINGTON MOSCOW PRIORITY PARIS OSLO THE HAGUE ATHENS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN UKDEL VIENNA UKDIS GENEVA UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING ANKARA LISBON LUXEMBOURG OTTAWA REYKJAVIK ROME MADRID STOCKHOLM HELSINKI WARSAW BERLIN PRAGUE BUCHAREST SOFIA BUDAPEST

MIPT: NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP
FOLLOWING IS AGREED TEXT OF NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE:

BEGINS

THE NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP (NPG) HELD ITS THIRTY-SECOND MINISTERIAL MEETING AT NATO HEADQUARTERS, BRUSSELS, ON 30 NOVEMBER, 1982. MINISTERS ADDRESSED A WIDE RANGE OF SECURITY MATTERS INCLUDING THE TRENDS IN THE BALANCE OF NUCLEAR FORCES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT, THE PREPARATIONS FOR NATO'S INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS AND THE STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES AND ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES.

2. MINISTERS REAFFIRMED THAT THE PURPOSE OF DETERRENCE IS TO PRESERVE SECURITY, PEACE AND FREEDOM BY CONVEYING TO A POTENTIAL ADVERSARY THAT THE COST OF ANY AGRESSION AGAINST NATO WOULD FAR EXCEED ANY CONCEIVABLE GAINS. TO DO THIS SUCCESSFULLY, NATO MUST POSSESS A SPECTRUM OF FORCES TO DEMONSTRATE THAT IT HAS BOTH THE WILL AND THE ABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF. FOR ITS STRATEGY TO BE CREDIBLE, THE ALLIANCE MUST MAINTAIN AN INTERLOCKING TRIAD OF FORCES: STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES, INTERMEDIATE- AND SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES. NO ONE PART OF THE NATO TRIAD CAN BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR ANOTHER. IN THIS CONTEXT, MINISTERS REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING ADEQUATE NUCLEAR FORCES AS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF NATO'S DETERRENT.

3. THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LED A DISCUSSION ON THE STATUS OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES. MINISTERS NOTED THE CONSISTENCY AND CONTINUITY OF THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR POLICY DESIGNED TO ENABLE THE ALLIANCE TO CARRY OUT ITS DETERRENCE STRATEGY MORE EFFECTIVELY. IN THE FACE OF A SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED SOVIET THREAT, MINISTERS STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO'S STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES FROM THE STANDPOINT OF DETERRENCE AND STABILITY. FROM THIS STANDPOINT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RECENT DECISION ON MX BASING WHICH IS DESIGNED TO ENHANCE THE SURVIVABILITY OF NATO'S STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES WAS EMPHASIZED. MINISTERS RECOGNIZED THAT STABILITY WOULD BE FURTHER ENHANCED AND THAT THE SECURITY OF ALL COUNTRIES CONCERNED WOULD BE GREATLY IMPROVED /BY AN

BY AN EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS, AS THE UNITED STATES HAD PROPOSED AT THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START) IN GENEVA. THEY WELCOMED THE RECENT UNITED STATES PROPOSALS TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIET UNION EXPANDED NUCLEAR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AIMED AT FURTHER ENHANCING INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS IN THIS AREA.

4. MINISTERS NOTED WITH CONCERN THAT THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO IMPROVE THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF ITS NUCLEAR FORCES FROM STRATEGIC TO SHORT-RANGE. THESE OVERALL IMPROVEMENTS TO THE SOVIET NUCLEAR ARSENAL, PARTICULARLY IN THE FIELD OF LONGER-RANGE INF, HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN SPITE OF THE DECADE OF RESTRAINT SHOWN BY THE ALLIANCE. SINCE THE PUBLICATION BY NATO OF QUOTE NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT - FORCE COMPARISONS UNQUOTE IN MAY 1982, MORE SS-20 MISSILES HAVE BECOME OPERATIONAL. THE SOVIET UNION NOW HAS 324 SS-20 LAUNCHERS DEPLOYED AND OPERATIONAL WORLD-WIDE, COMPRISING 972 WARHEADS SEMI COLON WHEN THESE ARE COMBINED WITH THE SS-4 AND SS-5 MISSILES STILL OPERATIONAL, THE SOVIETS HAVE MORE THAN 1,200 LONGER-RANGE LAND-BASED INF MISSILE WARHEADS COMPARED WITH NONE DEPLOYED BY NATO.

5. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, NATO'S INF MODERNIZATION PROGRAMME IS MOVING AHEAD WITH DEVELOPMENT AND FLIGHT TESTING OF GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (GLCMS) AND PERSHING II MISSILES IN THE UNITED STATES AND PREPARATION FOR DEPLOYMENT IN THE EUROPEAN BASING COUNTRIES. MINISTERS REITERATED THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF A CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT, THESE DEPLOYMENTS WOULD BEGIN ACCORDING TO SCHEDULE AT THE END OF 1983.

6. MINISTERS DISCUSSED THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES AND WELCOMED THE CONTINUOUS AND CLOSE CONSULTATION ON THE PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THE SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP (SCG). THEY REITERATED THEIR STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED STATES NEGOTIATING POSITION, DEVELOPED IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE ALLIES, WHICH CALLS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ALL EXISTING AND PLANNED SOVIET AND UNITED STATES LONGER-RANGE LAND-BASED INF MISSILES, THUS RESULTING IN THE ELIMINATION OF AN ENTIRE CATEGORY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MINISTERS STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO THE NEGOTIATIONS SEMI COLON THEY NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT WHILE THERE HAD BEEN SOME PROGRESS IN THEM, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET MADE ANY MOVE ON THE CENTRAL ISSUE AND ARE MAINTAINING THEIR /POSITION

POSITION WHICH WOULD PERMIT THEM TO RETAIN THEIR SS-20S WHILE PRECLUDING NATO FROM DEPLOYING ANY LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS' POSITION CALLS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALMOST ALL UNITED STATES DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT FROM NATO EUROPE, WHICH ARE AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN NATO'S CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE. THE RESULT OF THIS POSITION WOULD BE TO ERODE SERIOUSLY THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT AND THE DEFENCE OF NATO EUROPE AND LESSEN NATO'S CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR DEFENCE CAPABILITES. MINISTERS AGAIN WELCOMED THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES REMAINS PREPARED TO GIVE FULL CONSIDERATION TO ANY SERIOUS SOVIET PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD ENHANCE CHANCES FOR EFFECTIVE AND VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AND WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT LEGITIMATE WESTERN SECURITY CONCERNS.

7. MINISTERS ALSO DISCUSSED THE PROGRESS IN THE IMPORTANT ONGOING WORK OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP, WHICH, AS A MATTER OF PRIORITY AND AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF INF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, IS EXAMINING THE PRECISE NATURE, SCOPE AND BASIS OF THE ADJUSTMENTS WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED BY LONGER-RANGE INF DEPLOYMENTS AS WELL AS THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE DEPLOYMENTS FOR THE BALANCE OF ROLES AND SYSTEMS IN NATO'S NUCLEAR ARMOURY AS A WHOLE.

8. MINISTERS REAFFIRMED THAT NATO'S NUCLEAR POSTURE IN NO WAY REPRESENTED A POLICY OF SEEKING TO FIGHT AND WIN A NUCLEAR WAR, AND UNDERLINED THEIR FIRM COMMITMENT TO THE EXISTING POLICY OF COLLECTIVE DETERRENCE INCLUDING A NUCLEAR COMPONENT, DESIGNED TO PREVENT WAR AND TO PROTECT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF ALLIANCE MEMBER COUNTRIES. MINISTERS RESTATED THAT NATO'S STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE REMAINED UNCHANGED SEMI COLON THE ALLIANCE DOES NOT THREATEN ANYONE AND NONE OF ITS WEAPONS WILL EVER BE USED EXCEPT IN RESPONSE TO ATTACK.

9. GREECE HAS EXPRESSED ITS VIEWS ON THE ISSUES DISCUSSED IN A STATEMENT INCLUDED IN THE MINUTES.
ENDS

FCO PASS ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

GRAHAM

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NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP

1. THE NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP (NPG) OF DEFENCE MINISTERS MET TODAY. THE COMMUNIQUE IS IN MIFT. THE MAIN POINTS TO EMERGE WERE:

(A) MX MISSILE

SECRETRAY WEINBERGER SPOKE IN FAMILIAR TERMS AND SOUGHT TO INTRODUCE INTO THE COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE ASSOCIATING ALLIANCE MINISTERS WITH THE MX BASING DECISION. THE DUTCH AND DANISH MINISTERS TOOK THE LEAD IN RESISTING THIS.

(B) INF DEPLOYMENT

WOERNER (FRG) PUT IN A STRONG PLEA FOR ALL THE MEMBERS OF NATO, NOT JUST BASING COUNTRIES, TO GIVE ACTIVE AND UNEQUIVOCAL SUPPORT FOR GLCM AND PERSHING II DEPLOYMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF SATISFACTORY ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT. THE ONLY RESISTANCE TO THIS IDEA CAME FROM DE RUITER (NETHERLANDS) WHO ARGUED THAT ANY SUGGESTION OF AUTOMATICITY ABOUT DEPLOYMENT, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT, WOULD GO BEYOND HIS GOVERNMENT'S AGREED POSITION AS SET OUT IN THEIR COALITION STATEMENT. THIS POSITION IS NOT REFLECTED IN THE COMMUNIQUE BUT OCCASIONED AN AMENDMENT TO THE CONFIDENTIAL AGREED MINUTES. VREVEN (BELGIUM) SAID THAT A CHOICE OF SITE FOR GLCM BASING IN BELGIUM SHOULD BE CONFIRMED BY THE END OF THE YEAR. SJAASTAD (NORWAY) MADE TWO POINTS:

I) A PLEA FOR NATO TO KEEP OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT TO REDUCED LEVELS OF DEPLOYMENTS SHOULD AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF ZERO/ZERO PROVE IMPOSSIBLE:
II) A REQUEST THAT DEPLOYMENTS IN 1982 SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE AHEAD OF THEIR SCHEDULED DATE (AT THE END OF THE YEAR).

ENGELL (DENMARK) EXPLAINED THAT DESPITE THE DEBATE IN THE DANISH PARLIAMENT ON THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO GLCM INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING AND THEIR VOTE IN THE UN ON A FREEZE RESOLUTION, DANISH DEFENCE POLICY HAD NOT CHANGED AND THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE 1979 DOUBLE DECISION REMAINED FIRM, ON THE BASIS THAT WHAT IT REPRESENTED WAS THE BEST CHANCE OF PUSHING THE SOVIET UNION TOWARDS AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT.

THE DEFENCE SECRETARY INFORMED HIS COLLEAGUES OF THE STATUS OF UK PREPARATIONS FOR BASING AND MADE THE POINT THAT ANY HESITATION OVER MODERNISATION OF THE UK NATIONAL DETERRENT WOULD INEVITABLY ADVERSELY AFFECT ALSO THE BASING OF GLCMS IN THE UK. /(C)

(C) REVIEW OF NATO STOCKPILE

IT WAS AGREED THAT THE WORK OF THE NATO HIGH LEVEL GROUP TO REVIEW THE SIZE AND SHAPE OF THE NUCLEAR STOCK PILE IN EUROPE SHOULD PROCEED AS A MATTER OF URGENCY. THE DEFENCE SECRETARY STRESSED THE URGENCY OF THE NEED TO REVIEW THE NATO STOCKPILE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF SHOWING CLEARLY NATO'S DETERMINATION NOT TO RETAIN MORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAN WERE NECESSARY TO MEET THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT OF DETERRENCE. IT WAS HIS VIEW THAT THE PRESENT NUMBER OF SHORT-RANGE WEAPONS COULD BE REDUCED WITHOUT NECESSARILY IMPAIRING NATO SECURITY. WOERNER AGREED WITH MR NOTT BUT EMPHASISED THAT IT WAS VITAL TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIAL-ITY ABOUT THIS REVIEW UNTIL MINISTERS HAD TAKEN DECISIONS.

(D) GREEK POSITION

AS AT PREVIOUS NPG MEETINGS, THE GREEKS ENTERED A GENERAL RESERVATION INTO THE COMMUNIQUE AND MADE A STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD. THEIR POSITION ON NUCLEAR MATTERS IS VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL TO THAT AT THE PREVIOUS NPG MEETING.

(E) NUCLEAR AIR DEFENCE

MINISTERS AGREED TO RETURN TO THE QUESTION OF THE CONVERSION OF NUCLEAR AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS TO CONVENTIONAL AT THE NEXT NPG IN ORDER TO CONSIDER THE QUESTIONS OF ARMS CONTROL AND PUBLIC PRESENTATION. WEINBERGER SAID THAT THE US WAS STEADILY WITHDRAWING NUCLEAR AIR DEFENCE WARHEADS FROM EUROPE. IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO USE THESE AS A BARGAINING CHIP IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, BUT HE HOPED THAT BY NEXT SPRING ENOUGH WOULD HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN FOR A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT TO HAVE SOME IMPACT.

2. AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY THE DEFENCE SECRETARY, LUNS AND WEINBERGER AFTER THE MEETING, QUESTIONS FOCUSSED ON THE NOVOSTI ARTICLE ABOUT QUOTE LAUNCH-ON WARNING UNQUOTE, AND ON THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A US MOVE FROM THE ZERO OPTION IN THE INF. MR NOTT WAS ALSO PRESSED ABOUT THE INCLUSION OF UK/FRENCH SYSTEMS IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA. IN SUBSEQUENT CONTACTS WITH THE PRESS, WHICH IS SHOWING INTEREST IN THE ZERO OPTION POINT, WE HAVE TAKEN THE LINE THAT IT IS IMPLICIT IN THE WEST'S READINESS TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER SERIOUS PROPOSALS FROM THE OTHER SIDE, BUT THAT THIS BETOKENS NO CHANGE IN THE US NEGOTIATING POSITION: THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE US AND THE ALLIES ON THIS.

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TOP SECRET

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PRIME MINISTER

MISC 7: Nuclear Defence Issues

BACKGROUND

The meeting has been arranged at the Secretary of State for Defence's request to discuss the issues raised in his minute of 20 October supplemented by his minute of 4 November. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary commented briefly in his minute of 25 October and more fully in his minute of 3 November.

2. The Secretary of State for Defence's main concern is with the public presentation of the Government's policies. His suggestions relate to:

a. the basing of United States Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) in the United Kingdom, in accordance with NATO's "two-track" decision of December 1979;

b. the possibility of an arms control initiative involving reductions in the number of NATO's battlefield nuclear weapons.

3. On GLCMs, the Secretary of State for Defence raises three issues:

a. The possibility of deferring the arrival of the equipment at Greenham Common (the airfield outside Newbury which will be the first operational GLCM base in the United Kingdom - the other, Molesworth in Cambridgeshire, will not be activated until much later). Under present plans, the vehicles will arrive in June 1983, the first missiles in August and the whole system will become operative in December, thus being visible during an autumn General Election. Mr Nott reports that the new German Defence Minister, Herr Worner, would like the arrival of the equipment in the United Kingdom delayed to bring it into line with the arrival time in Germany.

b. The need for British personnel to be involved in guarding the missiles (which will be deployed from time to time on large vehicles outside the base, for training purposes).

TOP SECRET

c. The need for British personnel to be trained to operate the missiles, so as to keep open the possiblity of moving at some later date to a 'dual-key' arrangement. ('Dual-Key' means physical arrangements which require the co-operation of personnel of both countries before the weapon can be fired; they exist for the American-owned but British-operated battlefield nuclear weapons in Germany such as the Lance missile. The Government decided in December 1979 not to have dual-key arrangements for GLCMs since the Americans would have required us to buy the missile system itself and operate it with our own personnel.)

4. On arms control, the Secretary of State for Defence suggests that a British initiative to secure reductions in NATO's battlefield nuclear weapons would help to reassure British public opinion that the Government believes in the disarmament process.

5. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is against making amy move to defer the deployment of cruise missiles because any sign of British vacillation could lead to the unravelling of Alliance support for NATO's 1979 decision; risk bringing about the collapse of the NATO long-range theatre nuclear weapon deployment programme; and significantly reduce the pressure on the Russians to make concessions in the Geneva negotiations on reductions of intermediate range nuclear forces (INF). The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is also doubtful about the scope for a specifically British arms control initiative on short range battlefield nuclear weapons, bearing in mind that these are American weapons deployed in Germany, and that the possiblity of making reductions is already under active study within the Alliance.

HANDLING

6. A convenient order for discussion would be:

a. GLCMs - i. Guarding
ii. 'Dual-Key' and Training
iii. Timing of Deployment

b. Battlefield Nuclear Weapons

7. Guarding should present no real problem. It would be normal for perimeter security at Greenham Common, and guarding of cruise missile vehicles deployed outside the bases, to be done by RAF or civil police, while the Americans guard their warheads (which would never in peacetime leave the special store inside the base).

8. The Secretary of State for Defence does not propose to reopen with the Americans the decision not to have a 'dual-key' arrangement (the Germans would certainly not want a 'dual-key' arrangement). His concern is to keep the option open for a later stage. If this is his objective, it seems neither desirable nor necessary to seek to arrange for British personnel to be trained now to operate the missiles: this would involve telling the Americans why we wanted the training, thus in effect reopening the 'dual-key' question; and the training could in any case be carried out relatively quickly if, at some later date, we did decide to buy the missiles in order to have a 'dual-key' arrangement.

9. The Secretary of State for Defence may in fact have in mind the need to give the appearance of British control through British servicemen being seen to be involved. You will recall that the Americans have agreed that GLCMs will be subject to the same United Kingdom/United States understandings as are other United States nuclear weapons based in the United Kingdom. The public formula governing American nuclear bases in this country is that "use of the bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time". Privately, the understandings require the President to speak personally to the Prime Minister regarding joint decision to commit forces located in the United Kingdom. (But, of course, the United Kingdom has no physical control.)

10. The timing question is more complex. The key date is December 1983, when NATO has agreed that the missiles should be deployed and in service unless sufficient progress has been achieved in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union to make this unnecessary. It is accepted that preparations for deployment will have to start well before that date: on present plans Britain would be the first

country to receive the equipment, starting in June 1983. Information from Bonn subsequent to the Secretary of State for Defence's minute is that the Germans' real concern is not so much at Britain getting ahead of the FRG; rather they think that deployment to any country as early as June 1983 would risk arousing public criticism that the Alliance had not given the arms control negotiations enough time to make progress: and the Russians might use the first deployment of GLCMs or GLCM-related equipment to Europe as an excuse to walk out of the Geneva INF talks. A further complication is that the deployment date for the Pershing IIs, due to be in place and operational in Germany by December 1983, may slip beyond September because of delays in the production programme.

11. For the United Kingdom, there would be no difficulty about putting off the arrival of the equipment by two or three weeks to avoid a June 1983 election; nor is there a risk of any close connection with a 1984 election. The potential difficulties arise over an October 1983 election, and could be avoided only by postponing arrival of the first equipment until late November or December.

12. The issues therefore are:

a. Do Ministers prefer to stick to existing deployment plans and ride out criticism if necessary during an election campaign?

b. If not, should we leave it to the Germans to make the running with the Americans on the need for a later date (November or December 1983) for GLCM deployment to the United Kingdom? This would deflect on to the Germans any criticism of lack of staunchness, since we have to reckon with the likelihood that any request to the Americans would leak in Washington.

13. On the possibility of a British arms control initiative on battlefield nuclear weapons, you should ask the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to report on the ideas which have been put forward privately by Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence officials to the Americans and the Germans for speeding up the work of the NATO group which is studying the rationalisation and reduction of the stockpile of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe, with a view to

enabling NATO to announce a reduction in the stockpile by mid-1983. An ill-timed British initiative could upset our allies and impede the work already under way: on the other hand it is highly desirable that the work should be pushed ahead without delay. The Secretary of State for Defence might be encouraged to speak to Mr Weinberger privately in this sense. But there does not seem to be much scope for a public United Kingdom initiative at the present time.

CONCLUSION

14. Subject to the discussion, you might guide the meeting to reach the following conslusions:

a. On balance, we should stick to the existing timing for GLCM deployment and avoid giving any impression of wavering in the face of public pressures over Greenham Common.

b. If the Americans themselves propose any delay, whether for their own reasons or because of pressure from the Germans, we should be prepared to agree.

c. Security arrangements similar to those at existing United States nuclear bases in the United Kingdom should apply to the GLCMs.

d. We should not at present ask the Americans to train British personnel to operate GLCMs or their vehicles.

e. The United Kingdom should take no public initiative on arms control for the time being, but we should work bilaterally and within NATO to expedite the current Alliance review of its battlefield nuclear weapons with a view to achieving an early reduction.

RCA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

11 November 1982

SECRET UK EYES A

Prime Minister 5

These timing issues are presumably quite sensitive for Britain too, in political as well as strategic terms.

FERB
16.9.

MO 18

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

NUCLEAR ISSUES

I have read with interest the correspondence following my minute of 20th October and I understand that a meeting of MISC 7 has been arranged on 12th November. I do not intend to circulate a more formal paper prior to this meeting but there is one further point which I think I should record.

2. At the Bonn summit - without raising my own concerns over our decisions on GLCM deployments - I asked Herr Wörner how he saw matters generally on nuclear weapon modernisation. Interestingly, after expressing his Government's support for the twin track decision, he himself raised one of the points of concern to me - the question of the timing of the arrival of new missiles in the receiving countries. He said it seemed unlikely that any Pershing 2 equipment would reach West Germany before September 1983 but he understood that equipment would reach the UK in the spring or summer. He believed this would be damaging for his Government because it would appear that the UK was moving in advance of West Germany. All countries needed to move in parallel to sustain the twin track policy.

3. I confirmed that present US thinking was that deliveries of GLCM transporters would begin in the spring or summer of 1983 with the missiles following in the autumn. Herr Wörner indicated that he very much wanted to raise the problem with the US. I said that I would be entirely happy for this to be done on the basis that there might be alignment of the arrival dates in the receiving countries within the agreed timescale for the deployment

of the new missiles in Europe by the end of next year. I emphasised that Britain stood firmly behind the twin track decision.

4. Subject to the forthcoming discussion in MISC 7, I suggest that I should speak privately to Mr Weinberger in the margin of the NATO meetings at the end of November about whether he has been approached by the Germans and explain that we should be willing to fall in with German wishes. I would emphasise that the best way to bring about any change would be by Mr Weinberger himself taking the initiative to adjust programmes - he could act in a way which would not lead to suggestions that changes were being made which called into question the European commitment to TNF modernisation.

5. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, to our MISC 7 colleagues, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Approved by the Defence Secretary and signed in his absence.

Ministry of Defence
4th November 1982

Deployment

4

SECRET UK EYES A

PM/82/94

PRIME MINISTER

Nuclear Issues

1. I welcome the opportunity to discuss at our meeting on 12 November the issues raised by John Nott in his minute to you of 20 October, on which I have already commented briefly in my minute of 25 October.

2. I am sure John Nott is right to emphasise the need for a positive approach by HMG to nuclear arms control if we are to meet effectively the understandable public concern on this subject. This will be particularly important in 1983, both for Alliance and domestic political reasons. There is already a growing belief among our European Allies and in some quarters in Washington that some rationalisation and restructuring of the shorter range nuclear inventory in Europe, involving a net reduction in warheads, is indeed overdue. As John Nott is aware, work on this subject has been under way for some time in the NATO High Level Group. We know from recent contacts with them that both the State Department and the Germans are interested in examining this further, to see whether it can be turned to Alliance advantage in the public debate, for example by new Ministerial communique language over the next few months.

3. I am less sure about the room here for a British initiative as such. The review of essential requirements in NATO's sub-strategic nuclear forces is already part of Alliance agenda. The actual nuclear warheads are of course all American and are sited mostly on German soil. If we take up this issue as a means of striking a distinctive British note on nuclear arms for public consumption, we risk complicating NATO's re-examination of short range systems; we would also need to tread very carefully if we were not to risk creating problems with Bonn and Washington, and we could raise new difficulties for ourselves in relation to UK nuclear systems. This need not, however, by any means prevent us from pushing hard within the Alliance forum to keep the necessary

work on the move; and we should do so.

4. As for John Nott's preoccupations about forthcoming cruise missile deployments in the UK, I am completely at one with him that we should not seek to go back on the decisions we took in 1979. But I would go further than that. If HMG were to give any hint that we were having second thoughts about the timing or the scope of UK responsibilities in the NATO programme decided by Ministers in December 1979, we would seriously prejudice relations with Washington and risk bringing about the total collapse of the NATO deployment programme. It is going to be difficult enough to keep the other basing countries up to the mark, given that the political sensitivity in Germany and the Netherlands is much greater than here. The UK is regarded as the staunchest of the Allies in this regard. The Americans look to us for the lead that will encourage the others to overcome their own political difficulties. Any sign of vacillation over timing of initial GLCM deployments in the UK would be a gift to Moscow. The harder line which the Russians have taken since the beginning of the autumn round of the INF negotiations in Geneva has underlined the fact that they are clearly hoping for a collapse of Western political confidence to frustrate the NATO decision, thus releasing them from the need for any real concessions at the negotiations. Conversely, if by our lead we help the NATO deployments to go ahead on time, and if meanwhile the Alliance manages intelligently the battlefield nuclear weapon problem referred to above, not only shall we stand a far better chance of forcing the Russians to make serious negotiating offers in Geneva but we shall have gone a good way towards allaying the public concern about shorter range systems to which John Nott has rightly drawn attention.

5. On the three immediate issues raised in John Nott's minute I have the following comments:-

(a) I believe it is absolutely necessary for HMG to stick to the schedule for deployment of cruise missiles in the UK agreed with the Americans. We should minimise the visibility of the systems in question by flying them in direct to the base and by ensuring that there are no

/practice

practice dispersals outside the base this side of a General Election. I understand that these practical details are already under discussion with the Americans at the technical level and are unlikely to cause difficulty.

(b) I see no particular objection to emphasising British responsibility for the peacetime security of GLCMs based in the UK, particularly when on training deployments. If the security force is to be wholly British, however, I suppose more expense may be involved.

(c) The issue of dual key control is less straightforward. I fully take the point that the question of control is important in relation to minimising public opposition. It is not widely enough known that the Americans did in fact offer dual key arrangements to all the basing countries at the outset. It might be worth discussing with them whether there is any scope for highlighting, or indeed repeating, this offer. But I suspect that the Germans will in any event not wish to alter their own decision that the missiles should be under single US key control; and that there would be complications in having different arrangements for different basing countries. This question may need looking at further.

6. In summary, I do not under-estimate the tricky period ahead both for the Alliance and for the UK. I remain, however, convinced that staunchness of purpose by HMG will have a crucial effect on the success of the Alliance enterprise as a whole. For this, unswerving determination in deployment and tactical adroitness on the arms control side will both be necessary. If we falter on the one, our influence on the other will be nugatory.

7. I am copying this minute to MISC 7 colleagues and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

3 November, 1982

DEFENCE: The future of the UK deterrent

4 NOV 1982

SECRET - UK EYES A

cc: Ch. Exchequer
Home Secretary
S/S Defence
CO

27 October 1982

NUCLEAR ISSUES

The Prime Minister has seen the minute of 25 October by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on this matter.

Mrs. Thatcher looks forward to a discussion of the issues raised in the minute of 20 October by the Secretary of State for Defence but, since there has been no time to address these matters before tomorrow's Summit in Bonn, she has asked me to say that she would not wish the German side to obtain any impression during the Summit that our existing policy on nuclear matters may change.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of MISC 7 and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET - UK EYES A

Prime Minister

3

SECRET/UK EYES A

Since we need to speak with one voice at the Bonn summit, and there is no time to discuss these difficult issues before then, I suggest that I tell those participating that you would not wish the German side to get any impression that our policy on these issues may change. Agree?

Yes A.J.C. 25/10

PM/82/88

PRIME MINISTER

I have seen John Nott's minute of 20 October on nuclear issues. It raises a number of very sensitive questions which I believe we must discuss with our colleagues before any of the ideas are pursued further.

So far we have been the most staunch and dependable of the allies in our support for the modernisation programme. Any hint at this stage that we were having second thoughts about the 1979 decision on GLCM deployments could put at risk the whole enterprise. The impact of this, in particular on the Americans, would be extremely serious. I am sure it would be unwise to raise any suggestion of these ideas in the forthcoming Anglo-German summit. I am in favour of a more positive line on the arms control side. John Nott's ideas on this are welcome, but they will require the most careful preparation if they are to stand any chance of success.

I am sending copies of this minute to our colleagues on MISC 7 and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
25 October 1982

SECRET/UK EYES A

Defence. 2

copy Salt
Subsequent

SECRET - UK EYES A

RM

KLE

cc: HO HMT.
FO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 October, 1982

NUCLEAR ISSUES

The Prime Minister read over the weekend your Secretary of State's minute of 20 October about this question. She has noted its contents without comment. Mrs Thatcher understands that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary may wish to comment on the various issues raised by Mr Nott.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the members of MISC 7 and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

A. J. COLES

R Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

SECRET
UK EYES A

MO 18

PRIME MINISTER

NUCLEAR ISSUES

I mentioned to you recently that we need a wide-ranging discussion fairly soon about nuclear matters and I think a date is being pencilled in for the first half of next month. Due to my visit to the Falkland Islands, I shall not be seeing you before the German Summit and I think you should know more about my concerns in case the issues arise in your talks with Herr Kohl. I would intend to follow up this minute with something more considered for our meeting in November.

2. The evidence suggests that there is still majority support amongst the Electorate in favour of our maintaining an independent UK deterrent although there is less support for Trident as a successor to Polaris, primarily perhaps because it is seen as an American weapon and because of doubts over cost. There is, however, an unease about NATO's nuclear strategy generally and a feeling that the Alliance places too much reliance on nuclear weapons, is unwilling to contemplate anything other than a growing nuclear stockpile, and attaches too little importance to disarmament. This is not being helped by the attitude of the present US Administration (although of course, under pressure from the Europeans, President Reagan proposed the "Zero option".) As well as this general unease which I believe goes beyond CND and the Labour Party - there is particular concern over the basing of US weapons - much more Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) than US aircraft - in this country which I am sure will become an issue of much higher political importance over the next year or so as the time for deployment of GLCMs approaches.

SECRET
UK EYES A

Prime Minister

The Foreign Secretary will be commenting. He apparently thinks that any or all of these proposed changes of policy would have a very upsetting effect on the Alliance unless carefully prepared - and that it would be most unwise even to hint at them with Herr Kohl.

MT

A.J.C. 22/10.

3. So far as GLCMs are concerned, our room for manoeuvre is of course fairly limited. The options were gone into very carefully in 1979 when, as you will recall, MISC 7 looked at three basic alternatives - the basing of new US-owned systems in the UK (with the possibility of our manning and operating them for the US); the acquisition of new UK-owned GLCMs with US warheads under dual-key arrangements; and the acquisition of UK-owned GLCMs with UK warheads. The last option was ruled out on cost grounds and because we do not have the capability to produce the warheads; the second option was ruled out essentially because it was felt that it would involve us in large costs without the benefits of operational independence; and this left us the US option. We subsequently agreed to provide some UK support for the US force as part of the two-base deal including the provision of some 220 security personnel.

4. The experience of the last 3 years suggests to me that in our original decisions we under-estimated the problem of possible public opposition to the arrival at Greenham Common of a force very different in purpose, character and presence from the dual capable US aircraft that it was replacing - without the increase in British control that might have compensated for some of the force's less desirable characteristics. I do not believe that we should at present seek to go back on the decisions we took. But I do think we need to leave open the possibility of moving towards a dual key arrangement in the medium term and in the meantime take all steps to minimise public opposition to the presently planned force. Three immediate issues arise on this:

a. The NATO decision is based upon GLCMs entering service in December 1983 but, on present plans equipment will begin to arrive in the UK well before it arrives in Italy and in Germany. Large vehicles are planned to arrive here in June next year and missiles for the first flight from August onwards. I believe that I must leave Mr Weinberger in no doubt as to the risk we run with this timing since the issue could be very visible at an autumn General Election.

This could be very damaging to the Alliance as a whole. I would like personally to be satisfied that deployment as early as is proposed is necessary to meet Alliance objectives.

b. Present planning assumes that protection of the GLCMs against armed attack in war will be provided by a mixed contingent of RAF and USAF personnel. In peacetime the missiles will be deployed in training areas to practise wartime dispersal but they will need to travel on public roads. I do not believe that we can afford to ignore the likely public reaction to the deployment of these huge vehicles known to be for cruise missiles on British roads and in the countryside, and we shall need to ensure that on their training deployments they are accompanied by adequate numbers of RAF and civilian police to protect them from interference and to emphasise British responsibility for their peacetime security. Indeed I think we need to look again at whether the security force should not also be wholly British.

c. As part of our co-operation with the Americans on the deployment of the missiles, we should seek to ensure that our personnel learn how to operate the missiles and their vehicles so that we have the necessary background information should we at a later stage want - or be forced by political pressures-to move towards UK operation under a dual key arrangement.

5. On arms control generally, we need to strike a more positive tone over its value and no longer to look - as the public sees it - to be the creature of the Americans. We do not want gratuitously to upset the Americans, to hinder their own efforts in START and INF, or to do anything which adds to the present

tensions within the Alliance generally. But I believe there is scope for our taking more initiative over reductions in NATO's battlefield nuclear inventory whose huge scale reflects history rather than political or military requirements. Such a British initiative, if handled carefully, would I am sure be welcomed by the Germans (there is some evidence that the Americans have been in touch with them about this problem already over the last year). It would also help politically in this country to reassure the public that the Conservative government genuinely believes in the disarmament process where it can be achieved without endangering our security.

6. These propositions would of course need very careful handling. We need to avoid openly implying that we lack faith in the existing arrangements for consultation over the arms control process or over the use of bases in the UK or to do anything which encourages our Allies to back away from their theatre nuclear force modernisation commitments. I think these problems are manageable and it is worth taking the sort of steps I have outlined, while recognising that they will not in themselves solve what I believe will be a growing problem over GLCM deployment in this country. My final warning is this: it may be difficult to make these fairly modest moves - but if we do not contemplate some changes which recognise growing public awareness of these issues - we may find that public opinion runs away from us. If this happens we will lose our strategic deterrent - and much else besides.

7. I am copying this minute to our colleagues on MISC 7 and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Michael Heseltine

[Drafted by Mr Holt and signed in his absence]

Ministry of Defence

20th October 1982

PART 2 ends:-

Pty to Zuckerman 10.3.89

PART 3 begins:-

S/S Mod to 14 No 18 26.10.82