

PART 1

TOP SECRET

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CAB 2

CONFIDENTIAL FILING

Request from People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada seeking assistance in the prevention of aggression by the United States against Grenada.

GRENADA

PK 1

March 1983

Internal Situation

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
27-4-83		<p>PREM 19/10/83</p> <p>Material used by Official Historian DO NOT DESTROY</p>					
9-5-83							
11-10-83							
23-10-83							
25-10-83							
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PART 1 ends:-

cc(85) 31st conclusions item 2 27/10/83

~~ASC to FCO 27.10.83~~

PART 2 begins:-

Sitrep No 6 28.10.83

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons HANSARD, 26 October 1983, columns 293 to 337: Grenada (Invasion)

House of Commons HANSARD, 25 October 1983, columns 145 to 155: Grenada

House of Commons HANSARD, 24 October 1983, columns 27 to 30: Grenada

Signed J. Gray Date 5/6/2013

PREM Records Team

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(2)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 October 1983

Prime Minister.

A.J.C. 25/10

Dear John,

Montserrat

I understand that the Prime Minister has asked for a note on the position of Montserrat as a member of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States. I enclose a short background note.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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GRENADA

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FM BRIDGETOWN 280025Z OCT

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 371 OF 27 OCTOBER

AND TO WASHINGTON PORT OF SPAIN KINGSTON UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT: GRENADA

FULL TEXT OF GOVERNOR - GENERAL'S LETTER IS AS FOLLOWS:

GOVERNMENT HOUSE
 ST GEORGES
 GRENADA

OCTOBER 24, 1983

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

YOU ARE AWARE THAT THERE IS A VACUUM OF AUTHORITY IN
 GRENADA FOLLOWING THE KILLING OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND SUBSEQUENT
 SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND BLOODSHED.

I AM THEREFORE, SERIOUSLY CONCERNED OVER THE LACK OF INTERNAL
 SECURITY IN GRENADA. CONSEQUENTLY I AM REQUESTING YOUR HELP
 TO ASSIST ME IN STABILISING THIS GRAVE AND DANGEROUS SITUATION.
 IT IS MY DESIRE THAT A PEACE KEEPING FORCE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED

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~~I AM THEREFORE, SERIOUSLY CONCERNED OVER THE LACK OF INTERNAL SECURITY IN GRENADA. CONSEQUENTLY I AM REQUESTING YOUR HELP TO ASSIST ME IN STABILISING THIS GRAVE AND DANGEROUS SITUATION. IT IS MY DESIRE THAT A PEACE KEEPING FORCE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN GRENADA TO FACILITATE A RAPID RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC RULE. IN THIS CONNECTION I AM ALSO SEEKING ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES, FROM JAMAICA AND FROM THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES THROUGH ITS CURRENT CHAIRMAN THE HON. EUGENIA CHARLES IN THE SPIRIT OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THAT ORGANISATION TO WHICH MY COUNTRY IS A SIGNATORY.~~

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO BE
SIR

(SIGNED) PAUL SCOON
GOVERNOR GENERAL

THEGT. HON J. M. G ADAMS , Q.C., M.P
PRIME MINISTER
BARBADOS

BULLARD

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read in full.

FM BRIDGETOWN 272340Z OCT 83

TO F L A S H FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 370 OF 27 OCTOBER

AND TO FLASH WASHINGTON

IMMEDIATE TO PORT OF SPAIN KINGSTON HAVANA MOSCOW GEORGETOWN OTTAWA

UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS UKDEL NATO MODUK BELMOPAN NASSAU

GRENADA

1. I CALLED ON PRIME MINISTER ADAMS THIS AFTERNOON. HE WAS LOOKING PLEASED WITH HIMSELF, WITH TWO CAPTURED CUBAN FLAGS ON HIS DESK AND A SHEAF OF PHOTOCOPIES OF A LETTER FROM SIR PAUL SCOON, HEADED "GOVERNMENT HOUSE, ST GEORGE'S, GRENADA" AND DATED 24 (REPEAT 24) OCTOBER. THE LETTER (TEXT IN MIFT, NOT TO ALL) ASKS FOR ADAMS' HELP IN "STABILISING THIS GRAVE AND DANGEROUS SITUATION" AND REFERS TO SIR PAUL'S DESIRE TO SEE A PEACE KEEPING FORCE "ESTABLISHED IN GRENADA TO FACILITATE A RAPID RETURN TO PEACE AND TRANQUILITY AND ALSO A RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC RULE".

2. I SAID THAT THIS DISPOSED OF ONE OF THE TWO POINTS I HAD INTENDED TO RAISE WITH MR ADAMS. IN HIS RADIO AND TV SPEECH LAST NIGHT HE HAD REFERRED TO BRIGADIER LEWIS HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION SIR PAUL'S "SIGNED LETTER OF INVITATION TO THE OECS AND OTHER PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS". I WAS INTERESTED TO SEE THIS DOCUMENT AND GLAD TO SEE THE DATE OF IT, SINCE THIS WOULD

...THE... GIVES CIRCULATING HERE AND ELSEWHERE THAT MY DEPUTY,
DAVID MONTGOMERY, HAD TAKEN THE LETTER WITH HIM TO GRENADA LAST
WEEKEND FOR SIR PAUL TO SIGN. AS THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD
KNOW, THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. MR ADAMS AGREED.

3. IN FACT, THOUGH THE SIGNATURE LOOKS GENUINE, THE DATE IN
MY OPINION IS ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT THAT ON WHICH THE GOVERNOR
GENERAL SIGNED. IF IT WAS SIGNED ON THE 24TH, WHY HAS ITS
APPEARANCE BEEN DELAYED UNTIL NOW? HOW CAN IT JUSTIFY MILITARY
INTERVENTION ON THE 25TH IF BRIGADIER LEWIS, WHO DID NOT
LAND IN GRENADA UNTIL AFTER THE INTERVENTION HAD BEGUN, IS THE
AGENT BY WHOM IT WAS BROUGHT TO BRIDGETOWN. BUT I THOUGHT IT BEST
NOT TO ASK MR ADAMS THESE QUESTIONS BEFORE WE HAD HAD A CHANCE TO
SPEAK TO SIR PAUL.

4. I ALSO QUERIED WITH MR ADAMS THE REFERENCE IN HIS SPEECH
TO 'A DOCUMENT OF INVITATION' TO BRITAIN TO PARTICIPATE IN
THE PEACE-KEEPING FORCE HAVING BEING DELIVERED TO ME ON
MONDAY MORNING, THE 24TH. HE HAD GIVEN ME THE TEXT OF THE OECS
DECLARATION OF 21 OCTOBER, BUT THE COVERING LETTER WHICH
HE HAD PROMISED HAD NEVER ARRIVED. (WE HAVE LEARNED THAT
THE LETTER, ALONG WITH OTHERS TO THE US AMBASSADOR, THE CANADIAN
HIGH COMMISSIONER AND THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN PORT OF SPAIN
WERE HANDED TO MISS CHARLES IN DRAFT AT 2PM ON THE 23RD, BUT
THAT SHE DID NOT SIGN THE ONE TO ME. SHE TOLD VAUGH LEWIS,
SECRETARY GENERAL OECS WHO HAS TOLD US THAT SHE HAD NOT GOT IN TOUCH
WITH ME BECAUSE SHE THOUGHT THIS MIGHT COMPLICATE THE DIRECT
DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN MR ADAMS AND THE HIGH COMMISSION).

5. MR ADAMS THANKED ME FOR THIS PIECE OF INFORMATION, WHICH HE
SAID WAS NEW TO HIM. HE WOULD NOT OF COURSE HAVE SPOKEN
AS HE DID HAD HE KNOWN THE TRUE POSITION.

6. ADAMS SAID HIS CONVERSATION WITH MRS THATCHER ON THE
MORNING OF THE COMMONS' EMERGENCY DEBATE HAD BEEN VERY FRIENDLY
AND THAT HE WAS GLAD THAT THIS 'LITTLE BUBBLE OF DISCORD'
HAD BEEN PRICKED. HE HOPED THAT PRESS AND PUBLIC CRITICISM
OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO RESPOND TO THE INTERVENTION
IN GRENADA WOULD SOON SUBSIDE.

7. ADAMS SAID THE OECS WOULD MEET AGAIN IN BARBADOS ON SATURDAY.

BULLARD



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1048</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Moore to Adlund dated 27 October 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR <i>40</i> YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>4/6/2013</i> <i>J. Gray</i>
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The National Archives

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 October, 1983

Prime Minister

To be aware.

A. J. C. 27.10

Dear John,

Grenada: Chronology

You may wish to have to hand the attached copies of
/ FCO telegram to Bridgetown no 295 of 22 October and of
/ Bridgetown telegram no 333 to the FCO of 22 October.
Although not central to the main chronology of events
which we sent you earlier today, this exchange of telegrams
records that we were exploring over the weekend the options
other than military intervention.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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FM BRIDGETOWN 222359Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 333 OF 22 OCT

AND TO IMMEDIATE PORT OF SPAIN, ATHENS(FOR PS TO SOS), KINGSTON
NASSAU WASHINGTON

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RECEIVED
24 OCT 1983

YOUR TELNO 295: GRENADA

1. THESE ARE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS TO ANSWER. MUCH OF OUR INFORMATION ABOUT THE PERSONALITIES AND POLICIES OF THE RULING FEW IN GRENADA IS EITHER SUSPECT OR SECOND HAND. WELL SERVED AS WE ARE BY KELLY IN ST GEORGE'S, HIS MOVEMENTS ARE CONSTRAINED AND HE HAS NOT, SO FAR AS I KNOW, SEEN COARD OR HUDSON AUSTIN SINCE THE MILITARY TAKEOVER. I SHOULD HAVE LIKED TO CONSULT HIM BUT SECURE COMMUNICATION IS DIFFICULT.

2. AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM EARLIER TELEGRAMS, DHC IS NOW IN GRENADA AND IS SEEKING APPOINTMENTS WITH THE MILITARY COUNCIL AND THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL: HE WILL ALSO OF COURSE SEE KELLY. WE EXPECT HIM BACK IN BRIDGETOWN TOMORROW AND I SHALL TELEGRAPH AGAIN WHEN I HAVE SPOKEN TO HIM. MEANWHILE MY COMMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS.

3. I AGREE THAT THOSE IN CONTROL OF GRENADA MUST KNOW THAT THERE IS A RISK OF FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION. TO AVOID THIS THEY COULD WELL UNDERTAKE TO HOLD ELECTIONS AND RESTORE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, KNOWING THAT THE LONGER INTERVENTION IS DELAYED THE MORE DIFFICULT IT WILL BECOME. BUT FROM WHAT I HAVE HEARD FROM COARD AND AUSTIN THEY MIGHT NOT HONOUR THEIR UNDERTAKINGS. COARD IS A HARD LINE MARXIST. AUSTIN WAS DESCRIBED TO ME TODAY BY A BARBADIAN WHO KNOWS HIM AS A NEAR-ILLITERATE THUG.

4. I CAN IDENTIFY NO OTHER POLITICAL FORCES IN GRENADA WHICH MIGHT BE BROUGHT INTO PLAY. WE CAN I HOPE EXCLUDE SIR E GAIRY. MOST OF THOSE OTHERS ROUND WHOM A CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT MIGHT HAVE COALESCED EITHER LEFT GRENADA AFTER BISHOP'S TAKEOVER OR HAVE BEEN IN DETENTION FOR SOME TIME FOR THIS VERY REASON.

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5. THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS MOST CLOSELY CONCERNED ABOUT GRENADA ARE UNLIKELY IN THEIR PRESENT MOOD TO BE PREPARED TO PROMOTE OR GO ALONG WITH ANY ATTEMPT BY A THIRD PARTY TO PROMOTE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE MILITARY COUNCIL. THE OUTRAGE EXPRESSED BY ADAMS AND OTHER CARIBBEAN LEADERS ABOUT THE KILLING OF BISHOP AND HIS COLLEAGUES IS I BELIEVE GENUINE AND SEEMS TO REFLECT PUBLIC OPINION AS A WHOLE. (THIS IS BECAUSE OF THEIR CHRISTIAN DISLIKE OF MURDER, NOT BECAUSE THEY APPROVED OF BISHOP'S POLICIES). I DISCOUNT TO A LARGE EXTENT THE CATO OFFER. WE ARE TOLD IT WAS MADE AGAINST THE STRONG ADVICE OF HIS OECS COLLEAGUES, AND IT CONTRADICTS THEIR UNANIMOUS VOTE FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION. AUSTIN'S RECORTED DESIRE FOR A RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IS AT ODDS WITH WHAT HE TOLD THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL YESTERDAY AND WITH WHAT LITTLE WE KNOW OF THE REASONS FOR HIS DISPUTE WITH BISHOP. LATEST REPORTS SUGGEST THAT THE CARRIACOU MEETING MAY NOT IN FACT TAKE PLACE.

6. I SHARE THE SURPRISE OF THOSE WHO SEE THE US AND OURSELVES BEING ASKED TO INTERVENE MILITARILY IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A CARIBBEAN COUNTRY, AND I HAVE SOME DOUBTS AS TO HOW THE OPERATION WILL TURN OUT, IF THE AMERICANS MASTER-MIND IT. BUT I DO NOT THINK YOUR IDEA IS A STARTER. PEOPLE LIKE ADAMS, COMPTON AND MISS CHARLES (I DO NOT KNOW SEAGA OR CHAMBER) ARE COMMONSENSE POLITICIANS WITH CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE, AND VERY FAR FROM BEING HAWKS. THEY ARE I THINK THE BEST JUDGES OF HOW TO HANDLE THE PROBLEM PRESENTED BY THE MILITARY COUP IN GRENADA. IF THEY AND THEIR CARICOM COLLEAGUES COME OUT IN FAVOUR OF A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE AND IF THE US SUPPORTS THE IDEA I RECOMMEND WE SHOULD GIVE OUR SUPPORT TOO OR AT THE VERY LEAST TAKE NO STEPS THAT MIGHT WEAKEN THE OPERATION.

BULLARD

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BUCKINGHAM PALACE

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FM FCO 221815Z OCT 83

TO FLASH BRIDGETOWN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 295 OF 22 OCTOBER

AND TO ATHENS (FOR PS TO S OF S), WASHINGTON

AND TO IMMEDIATE PORT OF SPAIN, KINGSTON. NASSAU GEORGETOWN.

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR HIGH COMMISSIONER

GRENADA

1. LOOKING AHEAD, IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT WE MAY BE FACED SHORTLY WITH CHOICES INVOLVING PARTICIPATION IN OR ACCEPTANCE OF PLANS FOR MILITARY ACTION WITHOUT OTHER POSSIBILITIES HAVING BEEN FULLY EXPLORED.
2. DO YOU THINK THERE WOULD BE ANYTHING TO BE GAINED BY ATTEMPTING OR INSPIRING AN ATTEMPT TO PROMOTE NEGOTIATION ABOUT THE RESTORATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN GRENADA? IS IT IN YOUR VIEW POSSIBLE THAT HUDSON AUSTIN OR COARD WOULD ENTERTAIN AN APPROACH OF THIS KIND? ARE THERE ANY OTHER IDENTIFIABLE POLITICAL FORCES IN GRENADA WHICH MIGHT COME INTO PLAY? DO YOU THINK THAT THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS MOST CLOSELY CONCERNED ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN GRENADA WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE OR

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JOIN ANY SUCH APPROACH?

3. IF YOU THINK THAT SUCH AN APPROACH MIGHT BE A STARTER HOW WOULD YOU RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD CARRY ITS CONSIDERATION FORWARD?

4. THIS IS ONLY A MOST TENTATIVE IDEA. WE HAVE IT IN MIND THAT THOSE IN CONTROL OF GRENADA MUST BY NOW BE ABLE TO SEE DANGERS OF THE KIND OF INTERVENTION WHICH WOULD AT THE LEAST THREATEN THEIR OWN POSITION. WE ASSUME THAT THE LEADERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS MOST CLOSELY CONCERNED WOULD PREFER A RESOLUTION OF THE SITUATION WHICH DID NOT INVOLVE MILITARY OPERATIONS, IF SUCH A RESOLUTION WERE OBTAINABLE.

5. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR IMMEDIATE COMMENTS.

6. SINCE THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED, WE HAVE RECEIVED A REUTERS REPORT FROM PORT OF SPAIN THAT ST VINCENTS PRIME MINISTER CATO HAS OFFERED TO TALK TO AUSTIN AND THAT THE LATTER HAS AGREED TO MEET HIM POSSIBLY IN CARRIACOU (CF PARA 4 OF MY TELNO 291). AUSTIN IS REPORTED TO HAVE EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE FOR A RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN GRENADA.

7. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS ON THIS REPORT BEFORE WE OFFER ADVICE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE DEVELOPMENT REPORTED IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO 329 (NOT TO ALL) WHICH HAS JUST COME TO HAND.

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GRENADA

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UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 280120Z OCTOBER 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3182 OF 27 OCT

AND TO IMMEDIATE OTTAWA, HAVANA, MOSCOW, BRIDGETOWN, UKMIS
NEW YORK, BELMOPAN, CARACAS, PORT OF SPAIN, KINGSTON, PARIS,
GEORGETOWN, UKDEL NATO, NASSAU AND MODUK

MIPT: GRENADA

1. IN HIS TELEVISED ADDRESS TO THE NATION, PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID:

QUOTE

GRENADA AND A HALF DOZEN OTHER CARIBBEAN ISLANDS HERE WERE, UNTIL RECENTLY, BRITISH COLONIES. THEY ARE NOW INDEPENDENT STATES AND MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH. WHILE THEY RESPECT EACH OTHER'S INDEPENDENCE, THEY ALSO FEEL A KINSHIP WITH EACH OTHER AND THINK OF THEMSELVES AS ONE PEOPLE.

IN 1979, TROUBLE CAME TO GRENADA. MAURICE BISHOP, A PROTEGE OF FIDEL CASTRO, STAGED A MILITARY COUP AND OVERTHREW THE GOVERNMENT WHICH HAD BEEN ELECTED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION LEFT TO THE PEOPLE BY THE BRITISH. HE SOUGHT THE HELP OF CUBA IN BUILDING AN AIRPORT, WHICH HE CLAIMED WAS FOR TOURIST TRADE, BUT WHICH LOOKED SUSPICIOUSLY SUITABLE FOR MILITARY AIRCRAFT INCLUDING SOVIET-BUILT, LONG-RANGE BOMBERS.

THE SIX SOVEREIGN COUNTRIES AND ONE-REMAINING COLONY ARE JOINED TOGETHER IN WHAT THEY CALL THE, QUOTE ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES. UNQUOTE THE SIX BECAME INCREASINGLY ALARMED AS BISHOP BUILT AN ARMY GREATER THAN ALL OF THEIRS COMBINED. OBVIOUSLY IT WAS NOT PURELY FOR DEFENSE.

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~~TOGETHER IN WHAT THEY CALL THE, QUOTE ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN
CARIBBEAN STATES. UNQUOTE THE SIX BECAME INCREASINGLY ALARMED
AS BISHOP BUILT AN ARMY GREATER THAN ALL OF THEIRS COMBINED.
OBVIOUSLY, IT WAS NOT PURELY FOR DEFENSE.~~

IN THIS LAST YEAR OR SO , PRIME MINISTER BISHOP GAVE INDICATIONS HE MIGHT LIKE TO BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE EVEN MADE A TRIP TO OUR COUNTRY AND MET WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT. WHETHER HE WAS SERIOUS OR NOT, WE'LL NEVER KNOW. ON OCTOBER 12TH, A SMALL GROUP IN HIS MILITIA SEIZED HIM AND PUT HIM UNDER ARREST. THEY WERE, IF ANYTHING, MORE RADICAL AND MORE DEVOTED TO CASTRO'S CUBA THAN HE HAD BEEN.

SEVERAL DAYS LATER, A CROWD OF CITIZENS APPEARED BEFORE BISHOP'S HOME, FREED HIM, AND ESCORTED HIM TOWARD THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL. THEY WERE FIRED UPON. A NUMBER, INCLUDING SOME CHILDREN, WERE KILLED AND BISHOP WAS SEIZED. HE AND SEVERAL MEMBERS OF HIS CABINET WERE SUBSEQUENTLY EXECUTED, AND A 24-HOUR SHOOT-TO-KILL CURFEW WAS PUT IN EFFECT. GRENADA WAS WITHOUT A BAND OF MILITARY MEN.

THERE WERE THEN ABOUT 1,000 OF OUR CITIZENS ON GRENADA, 800 OF THEM STUDENTS IN ST. GEORGE'S UNIVERSITY MEDICAL SCHOOL. CONCERNED THAT THEY BE HARMED OR HELD AS HOSTAGES, I ORDERED A FLOTILLA OF SHIPS, THEN ON ITS WAY TO LEBANON WITH MARINES -- PART OF OUR REGULAR ROTATION PROGRAM, TO CIRCLE SOUTH ON A COURSE THAT WOULD PUT THEM SOMEWHERE IN THE VICINITY OF GRENADA IN CASE THERE SHOULD BE A NEED TO EVACUATE OUR PEOPLE.

LAST WEEKEND, I WAS AWAKENED IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS AND TOLD THAT SIX MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES, JOINED BY JAMAICA AND BARBADOS, HAD SENT AN URGENT REQUEST THAT WE JOIN THEM IN A MILITARY OPERATION TO RESTORE ORDER AND DEMOCRACY TO GRENADA. THEY WERE PROPOSING THIS ACTION UNDER THE TERMS OF A TREATY, A MUTUAL ASSISTANCE PACT THAT EXISTED AMONG THEM.

THESE SMALL, PEACEFUL NATIONS NEEDED OUR HELP. THREE OF THEM DON'T HAVE ARMIES AT ALL AND THE OTHERS HAVE VERY LIMITED FORCES. THE LEGITIMACY OF THEIR REQUEST, PLUS MY OWN CONCERN FOR OUR CITIZENS, DICTATED MY DECISION. I BELIEVE OUR GOVERNMENT HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO GO TO THE AID OF ITS CITIZENS IF THEIR RIGHT TO LIFE AND LIBERTY IS THREATENED. THE NIGHTMARE OF OUR HOSTAGES IN IRAN MUST NEVER BE REPEATED.

WE KNEW WE HAD LITTLE TIME AND THAT COMPLETE SECRECY WAS VITAL TO ENSURE BOTH THE SAFETY OF THE YOUNG MEN WHO WOULD UNDERTAKE THIS MISSION, AND THE AMERICANS THEY WERE ABOUT TO RESCUE. THE JOINT CHIEFS WORKED AROUND THE CLOCK TO COME UP WITH A PLAN. THEY HAD LITTLE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ABOUT CONDITIONS ON THE ISLAND. WE HAD TO ASSUME THE SEVERAL HUNDRED CUBANS WORKING ON THE AIRPORT COULD BE MILITARY RESERVES. AS IT TURNED OUT, THE NUMBER WAS MUCH LARGER AND THEY WERE A MILITARY FORCE. SIX HUNDRED HAVE BEEN TAKEN PRISONER AND WE HAVE DISCOVERED A COMPLETE BASE WITH WEAPONS AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT WHICH MAKES IT CLEAR A CUBAN OCCUPATION OF THE ISLAND HAD BEEN PLANNED.

~~WAS MUCH LARGER AND THEY WERE A MILITARY FORCE. SIX HUNDRED HAVE BEEN TAKEN PRISONER AND WE HAVE DISCOVERED A COMPLETE BASE WITH WEAPONS AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT WHICH MAKES IT CLEAR A CUBAN OCCUPATION OF THE ISLAND HAD BEEN PLANNED.~~

(THE PRESIDENT THEN DEPARTED FROM THE PREPARED TEXT TO SAY THAT, TWO HOURS PREVIOUSLY, PHOTOGRAPHS HAD BEEN RECEIVED SHOWING LARGE QUANTITIES OF WEAPONS WAREHOUSED IN GRENADA. THAT COUNTRY WAS A SOVIET/CUBAN BASTION EXPORTING MARXISM AND UNDERMINING DEMOCRACY. WE GOT THERE JUST IN TIME).

I CAN'T SAY ENOUGH IN PRAISE OF OUR MILITARY — ARMY RANGERS AND PARATROOPERS, NAVY, MARINE, AND AIR FORCE PERSONNEL — THOSE WHO PLANNED A BRILLIANT CAMPAIGN AND THOSE WHO CARRIED IT OUT. ALMOST INSTANTLY, OUR MILITARY SEIZED THE TWO AIRPORTS, SECURED THE CAMPUS WHERE MOST OF OUR STUDENTS WERE, AND ARE NOW IN THE MOPPING-UP PHASE.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT IN ALL THE PLANNING, A TOP PRIORITY WAS TO MINIMIZE RISK, TO AVOID CASUALTIES TO OUR OWN MEN AND ALSO THE GRENADIAN FORCES AS MUCH AS HUMANLY POSSIBLE. BUT THERE WERE CASUALTIES AND WE ALL OWE A DEBT TO THOSE WHO LOST THEIR LIVES OR WERE WOUNDED. THEY WERE FEW IN NUMBER BUT EVEN ONE IS A TRAGIC PRICE TO PAY.

IT IS OUR INTENTION TO GET OUR MEN OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. PRIME MINISTER EUGENIAN CHARLES OF DOMINICA, SHE IS CHAIRMAN OF O.E.C.S., IS CALLING FOR HELP FROM COMMONWEALTH NATIONS IN GIVING THE PEOPLE THEIR RIGHT TO ESTABLISH A CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT ON GRENADA. WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL, A GRENADIAN, WILL PARTICIPATE IN SETTING UP A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE INTERIM.

THE EVENTS IN LEBANON AND GRENADA, THOUGH OCEANS APART, ARE CLOSELY RELATED. NOT ONLY HAS MOSCOW ASSISTED AND ENCOURAGED THE VIOLENCE IN BOTH COUNTRIES, BUT IT PROVIDES DIRECT SUPPORT THROUGH A NETWORK OF SURROGATES AND TERRORISTS. IT IS NO COINCIDENCE THAT WHEN THE THUGS TRIED TO WREST CONTROL OVER GRENADA, THERE WERE 30 SOVIET ADVISORS AND HUNDREDS OF CUBAN MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES ON THE ISLAND. AT THE MOMENT OF OUR LANDING, WE COMMUNICATED WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION AND TOLD THEM WE WOULD OFFER SHELTER AND SECURITY TO THEIR PEOPLE ON GRENADA. REGRETTABLY, CASTRO ORDERED HIS MEN TO FIGHT TO THE DEATH AND SOME DID. THE OTHERS WILL BE SENT TO THEIR HOMELANDS.

UNQUOTE

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FM WASHINGTON 272153Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3174 OF 27 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN

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GRENADA: THE FUTURE

1. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE ACCOUNT IN MY TELNO 3167 OF THE CONVERSATION I HAD TODAY WITH EAGLEBURGER ABOUT THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL. THE AMERICANS ARE BEGINNING TO GET A SOMEWHAT BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF HIS ROLE, AND THERE HAVE BEEN PRIVATE HINTS THAT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL HIMSELF HAS BEEN INSISTING ON HIS INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM OF JUDGEMENT. THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL WILL NO DOUBT BE FORMING HIS OWN CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE KIND OF INTERIM GOVERNMENT THAT MIGHT BE FORMED AND WHETHER TO TRY TO BASE THIS PRIMARILY ON CIVIL SERVANTS AND OTHER NON-POLITICAL FIGURES (IF ANY VESTIGES OF AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL SERVICE HAVE SURVIVED IN GRENADA); OR WHETHER TO INCLUDE

~~POLITICAL FIGURES (IF ANY VESTIGES OF AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL SERVICE HAVE SURVIVED IN GRENADA): OR WHETHER TO INCLUDE POLITICAL FIGURES.~~

2. AS POINTED OUT IN MY TELNO 3162, AFTER THE EFFORT THEY HAVE MADE TO DISLODGE THE REGIME AND THE CUBANS, THERE WILL BE A STRONG DISPOSITION ON THE PART OF MANY HERE TO TRY TO WORK, NOT TOO DISCREETLY, FOR THE EMERGENCE OF A QUOTE FRIENDLY QUOTE GOVERNMENT. BUT THERE SURELY IS A NEED TO SEER THINGS TOWARDS A GENUINELY FREE ELECTION. OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE AMERICANS MAY DEPEND ON WHETHER WE ARE READY OURSELVES TO CONSIDER PARTICIPATING IN HELPING TO ORGANISE SUCH AN ELECTION. THE GOVERNOR GENERAL WILL HAVE HIS OWN VIEWS ON TIMING (AS INDEED WILL THE AMERICANS), AND THERE MAY BE A DESIRE TO WANT TO DEFER THIS FOR SOME MONTHS UNTIL THINGS HAVE CALMED DOWN. THE OTHER EAST CARIBBEAN STATES MAY CONSIDER THAT THEY HAVE ENOUGHT EXPERTS AND EXPERTISE TO ORGANISE AND SUPERVISE A FREE ELECTION. BUT THERE COULD BE A ROLE FOR US IF WE WANT TO PLAY ONE. WE HAVE THE EXPERTISE.

3. SO FAR AS POLICING THE ISLAND IS CONCERNED, THE AMERICANS LOOK TO BE IN FOR MORE TROUBLE THAN THEY HAD IMAGINED IN ERADICATING GROUPS HOLDING OUT IN THE HILLS. YOUR OBJECTIVE IS TO SEE THEM LEAVE THE ISLAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER IT HAS BEEN SECURE. WE CERTAINLY DO NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS OF SECURING IT. BUT BARBADOS, JAMAICA AND THE SMALL EAST CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES BETWEEN THEM MAY NOT FIND IT EASY TO PUT TOGETHER ADEQUATE FORCES TO POLICE IT THEREAFTER. I WAS GLAD TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT TODAY THAT, IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, WE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE. I CERTAINLY WOULD HOPE THAT, IF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL SHOULD LOOK LIKE ASKING US TO DO SO, WE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO HELP WITH CIVIL POLICE, IF THE OTHER EAST CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT BE ABLE ADEQUATELY TO DO SO.

4. I PUT FORWARD THESE IDEAS VERY TENTATIVELY AT THIS STAGE, FOR THE OBVIOUS REASON THAT I CANNOT YET REALLY JUDGE THE LIKELY AMERICAN REACTION AND, ABOVE ALL, THE ATTITUDE OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL. THERE IS ALSO THE POINT THAT THE AMERICANS AND THE EAST CARIBBEAN STATES WHO SPONSORED THE INTERVENTION MAY NOT WELCOME IDEAS OF A WIDER COMMONWEALTH ROLE. BUT IT WOULD BE GOOD TO BE IN A POSITION TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL THAT WE ARE READY AND WILLING TO HELP HIM. IN DOING SO, WE COULD DO A GOOD DEAL TO HELP THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA, AS WELL

~~THAT WE ARE READY AND WILLING TO HELP HIM. IN DOING~~
~~SO, WE COULD DO A GOOD DEAL TO HELP THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA, AS WELL~~
~~AS THE AMERICANS IF THEY GENUINELY WANT TO DISENGAGE: AND~~
ENABLE GRENADA TO PROCEED AS SOON AS MAY REASONABLY BE POSSIBLE
TOWARDS AN ELECTION CONDUCTED IN CIRCUMSTANCES THE WORLD WILL
JUDGE TO BE GENUINELY FREE AND FAIR.

5. WOULD YOU PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF YOU WOULD LIKE ME TO PUT
ANY OF THESE IDEAS, VERY TENTATIVELY, TO EAGLBURGER? WE SHOULD
NOT TRY TO FORCE THEM ON THE AMERICANS, AND WE SHOULD NOT GET
INVOLVED IF WE THINK THEY ARE GOING TO DISTORT THE PROCESS.
BUT IT WOULD BE THE BEST POSSIBLE WAY OF DEMONSTRATING OUR
READINESS TO MAKE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION.

6. I MUST CONFESS THAT IN PUTTING FORWARD THESE IDEAS FOR
BRITISH INVOLVMENT IN THE POST-LIBERATION WORK OF RECONSTRUCTION,
I AM INFLUENCED BOTH BY THE VERY UNDERSTANDABLE FATIGUE I
SENSE AMONG THE POLICY MAKERS HERE, WHICH SUGGESTS THAT THEY ARE
NOT GIVING MUCH COHERANT THOUGHT TO THE FUTURE AND ALSO BY THE
NATURAL TENDANCY OF OUR AMERICAN COUSINS TO ACT LIKE BULLS IN
A CHINA SHOP ON UNFAMILIAR TERRITORY WHEN THEY DO GET GOING.
THERE COULD BE A ROLE FOR US TO PLAY IF WE WISHED TO PLAY IT
AND THE OPENING COULD COME QUITE SOON. MOREOVER IF WE WISH
TO HAVE A SAY IN THE FUTURE OF GRENADA, WE SHALL HAVE TO BE READY
TO PLAY A ROLE IN IT.

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PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
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MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
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MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY

SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE

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FM WASHINGTON 271800Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3169 OF 27 OCTOBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

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ADVANCE COPY

MT

YOUR TEL NO 1797: GRENADA - SECURITY COUNCIL

1. I CALLED ON EAGLEBURGER THIS MORNING AND CARRIED OUT THE INSTRUCTIONS IN YOUR TUR, I SAID THAT BOTH OUR VOTE AND OUR EXPLANATION OF VOTE WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH VIEW WE HAD TAKEN ALL ALONG. WE SHOULD ABSTAIN. WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY THE DECISION TO ABSTAIN, SIR JOHN THOMSON WOULD BE AS HELPFUL AS HE COULD IN NEW YORK. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THE AMERICANS COULD NOT ASK FOR MORE AND THAT THEY WOULD BE VERY GRATEFUL THAT THIS WAS OUR DECISION.

2. EAGLEBURGER SAID IT LOOKED AS THOUGH THE US WOULD BE OBLIGED TO VETO THE GUYANAN RESOLUTION. THEY HAD LEARNT THAT THE FRENCH WERE INTENDING TO VOTE FOR IT AND THAT THE DUTCH WERE LIKELY TO FOLLOW THE FRENCH LEAD. THEY CALCULATED THAT THIS WOULD LEAVE THEM WITH NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO VETO.

WRIGHT

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 October 1982

GRENADA

The Prime Minister of Canada rang the Prime Minister at 1830 this evening to discuss the present situation in Grenada.

Mr. Trudeau said that he did not have as much intelligence as we would have but the resistance to US military action appeared to be continuing. The Commonwealth Secretary-General had called for a Commonwealth initiative. It had occurred to Mr. Trudeau that we might think in terms of a role for a group of Commonwealth countries other than those who were participating in the military action. This group of countries could, perhaps, call for a truce and say that it would be prepared to help organise the departure of all forces, including the Cuban forces, from Grenada. He had given no thought to the membership of the group but Britain, Canada and perhaps India and Nigeria could play a part. He had not discussed this matter with Mr. Ramphal but thought that the offer should at least be made.

The Prime Minister said that she would be very hesitant about considering an initiative of this kind. We had advised the United States to take a different course than that which they had followed. But it was now vital that they should be successful. It was worth recalling the precedent of Dominica in 1965 when the Americans had intervened and had begun a process of restoring democracy - only after that process had started had others come in to help. She felt that Mr. Trudeau's idea was rather premature. The Commonwealth was split. It was important that the United States should finish the task. Nor would she like a Commonwealth group to become engaged in dealing with Cuban resistance.

Mr. Trudeau repeated that the resistance was stronger than any of us, including the United States, had anticipated. Doubtless the Americans hoped to bring matters to a quick conclusion. But if they failed to do so, they might welcome an initiative of the kind he had described. The alternative was to fight a war of attrition against groups who had taken

/refuge.

refuge. Perhaps both the United States and Cuba would welcome a Commonwealth initiative. If the conflict ended quickly, his suggestion would no longer have validity. But if it was not quickly terminated, the situation would not be helpful to anyone, including the United States.

The Prime Minister repeated that she would not wish to get involved in the kind of Commonwealth force described. Our resources were already very stretched. Only when the United States had completed their operations should we consider how we could help.

She repeated that we had counselled caution about the American intervention and asked them to consider certain factors.

Mr. Trudeau asked whether the Americans had told the Prime Minister that they were going to take military action. The Prime Minister said that we had received a message about 7.15 p.m. on 24 October, the burden of which had been to seek our advice. We had been ready to reply but at about 11 p.m. another message had arrived which indicated that the American attitude towards intervention was positive. We had then worked very fast but our advice had not been accepted. The pleas of the OECS countries had clearly weighed heavily with President Reagan. Their perspective was different to ours.

Mr. Trudeau said that he was considerably worried about the situation. There were a group of Canadians stranded in an area held by the Cubans.

He said that he would be visiting Europe in about ten days to see Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand and to discuss some of the matters referred to in his letter of 26 October to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister said that she hoped that Mr. Trudeau would consider including London in his itinerary. Mr. Trudeau said that he could do so if Mrs. Thatcher so wished. But he had, of course, just seen her in Canada and would be seeing her in New Delhi shortly. The Prime Minister suggested that Mr. Trudeau should think about the possibility and let her know if he wished to visit London.

The conversation ended at 1845.

ASJ

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1048</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>FCD to telegram to Washington undated</i>	
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FM PARIS 271020Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 963 OF 27 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

GRENADA

1. SECRETARY OF STATE HAD A BRIEF BILATERAL WITH SHULTZ BEFORE THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS MEETING THIS MORNING. SHULTZ EXPRESSED HIS REGRET ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH THE SITUATION HAD CREATED FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE. HE WENT ON TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(I) THE CUBAN PRESENCE ON GRENADA HAD TURNED OUT TO BE LARGER AND MORE OMINOUS THAN THE US HAD ESTIMATED. THE INSTINCTS OF THE OECS HAD TURNED OUT TO BE BETTER THAN US INTELLIGENCE. THERE WAS A MAJOR CUBAN HEADQUARTERS (A FULL COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTRE) AT SALINAS WITH HUGE STOCKS OF ARMS. GRENADIANS HAD HAD NO ACCESS TO THIS BASE. THE LATEST INFORMATION WAS THAT THERE WERE 1100 CUBANS ON THE ISLAND AGAINST EARLIER ESTIMATES OF LESS THAN HALF THAT, AND, SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION, THE AIRPORT WORKERS APPEARED TO BE SOLDIERS. THE AMERICANS HAD 700 CUBAN PRISONERS.

(II) THERE WAS A POWERFUL LEGAL CASE TO BE MADE FOR THE INTERVENTION. FIRSTLY BECAUSE OF THE DANGER TO US CITIZENS (A POINT RECOGNISED IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE, ALTHOUGH WE HAD TAKEN A DIFFERENT VIEW ON THE DANGER). SECONDLY, BOTH THE OAS AND THE UN CHARTER RECOGNISED THE LEGITIMACY OF ACTION TAKEN UNDER REGIONAL AGREEMENTS. THE OECS TREATY COULD NOT THEREFORE BE DISMISSED AS OF LITTLE IMPORTANCE. THE OECS VIEW WAS THAT THEY HAD ACTED UNANIMOUSLY BECAUSE THERE

NOT THEREFORE BE DISMISSED AS OF LITTLE IMPORTANCE. THE OECS VIEW WAS THAT THEY HAD ACTED UNANIMOUSLY, BECAUSE THERE WAS NO GOVERNMENT IN GRENADA. AND THEY WERE CONVINCED THAT THERE WAS AN EXTERNAL THREAT (BISHOP HAD BEEN MURDERED BECAUSE HE WAS THINKING OF HAVING ELECTIONS).

(III) DOMESTICALLY, THERE HAD BEEN MUCH CRITICISM AMONG CONGRESSMEN WHEN SHULTZ HAD FIRST BRIEFED. BUT THE TUNE HAD CHANGED WHEN CONGRESSMEN HAD HEARD FROM THE FOLKS BACK HOME. PEOPLE WERE OBVIOUSLY CONCERNED THAT THE US CITIZENS ON THE ISLAND WOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN HOSTAGE, AS HAD HAPPENED IN IRAN.

(IV) IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE AMERICAN POSITION AROUND THE WORLD THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD ACTED DECISIVELY AND SUCCESSFULLY.

(V) THE US ADMINISTRATION HAD TURNED THEMSELVES INSIDE OUT TO HELP US OVER THE FALKLANDS, BUT IT WAS GOOD THAT WE HAD BEEN SEEN TO STAND UP FOR WESTERN VALUES. THE GRENADIAN ACTION MIGHT HAVE THE SAME EFFECT.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN RESPONSE.

(I) THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH THE US ACTION HAD CAUSED US WENT WIDER THAN SHULTZ HAD IMPLIED. THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE REFLECTED OUR DEEPER ANXIETIES. THE IMPACT ON THE DEBATE OF CRUISE MISSILES WAS A PARTICULAR CAUSE FOR CONCERN. HE HAD ADDRESSED THE MATTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS YESTERDAY, BUT IT WOULD NOT GO AWAY. THE GERMANS HAD ALSO EXPRESSED ANXIETY.

(II) ON THE LEGAL POINTS, WE RECOGNISED THE PRINCIPLE OF ACTION TO DEFEND CITIZENS. THE JUDGEMENT DEPENDED ON THE FACTS, AND THE COUNTRY MOST IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED MIGHT HAVE THE BEST EVIDENCE. WE RECOGNISED THAT THE US COMMUNITY WAS LARGER, MORE CONCENTRATED AND MORE EXPOSED, AND WE HAD MADE CLEAR THESE DIFFERENCES IN PUBLIC. ON THE OECS TREATY, IT WAS MORE DIFFICULT TO ARGUE THE EXTERNAL AGGRESSION POINT BECAUSE THE CUBANS, HOWEVER MUCH ONE DISLIKED THEM, WERE THERE AT THE INVITATION OF THE GRENADIAN GOVERNMENT.

(III) OUR ACTION IN THE FALKLANDS HAD BEEN TAKEN IN VERY DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

(IV) THERE REMAINED GROUNDS FOR WIDER POLITICAL CONCERN ABOUT THE CONCLUSIONS WHICH SMALL COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD WOULD DRAW ABOUT INTERVENTION BY SUPER POWERS.

3. SHULTZ, WHO HAD ASKED FOR THE QUESTION OF CONSULTATION TO BE LEFT TO ONE SIDE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CONVERSATION, THEN EMPHASISED THAT THERE WAS NO TRUTH IN THE ALLEGATION THAT THE US HAD BEEN PLANNING INTERVENTION FOR WEEKS. HE HIMSELF HAD WOKEN UP THE PRESIDENT IN AUGUSTA AND THE PRESIDENT HAD HAD TO REACH CONCLUSIONS RAPIDLY. HE HAD ALSO BEEN VERY CONCERNED TO ENSURE THE SECRECY OF THE OPERATION, AS A LEAK WOULD HAVE ENDANGERED LIVES. THE AMERICANS HAD PERHAPS BEEN OVERLY SENSITIVE ON THIS COUNT, BUT THE FACT REMAINED THAT THE OPERATION HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY KEPT OUT OF THE PRESS.

THE AMERICANS HAD PERHAPS BEEN OVERLY SENSITIVE ON THIS COUNT,
BUT THE FACT REMAINED THAT THE OPERATION HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY KEPT
OUT OF THE PRESS.

4. IT WAS LEFT THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND SHULTZ WOULD TRY TO
HAVE ANOTHER WORD ABOUT FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE
GOVERNOR-GENERAL WAS BACK ON THE ISLAND AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION
OF THE ROLE HE WAS PLAYING.

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MR GIFFARD

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FM WASHINGTON 271702Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3168 OF 27 OCTOBER 1983

GRENADA: WHAT HAPPENS NEXT

MY TELNO 3162: GRENADA: WHAT HAPPENS NEXT: SECURITY.

1. YOU ARE NO DOUBT ALSO GIVING THOUGHT TO THE QUESTION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT.
2. THE AMERICANS WILL BE DETERMINED TO ENSURE THAT ANY NEW GOVERNMENT IS MADE AS SECURE AS POSSIBLE AGAINST WHAT THEY WOULD REGARD AS CUBAN SUBVERSION. THE LIKELIHOOD IS THAT THE CIA WILL MOVE IN IN FORCE IN AN EFFORT TO ENSURE THIS.
3. WE MIGHT BE ABLE, IN PART, TO FINESSE THIS IF WE WERE ABLE TO OFFER ADVICE, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND POSSIBLY PERSONNEL TO A NEW POLICE AND SPECIAL BRANCH IN GRENADA. THEY MIGHT ALSO NEED ACCESS TO OUR SECURITY RECORDS COVERING THE REGION.

~~THEY MIGHT ALSO NEED ACCESS TO OUR SECURITY RECORDS COVERING
THE REGION.~~

4. I CAN SEE THAT THERE MIGHT WELL BE HESITATION ABOUT GOING TOO
FAR DOWN THIS ROAD. HOWEVER, THE AMERICANS WILL VERY SOON FIND
THAT THEY NEED OUR HELP IN THIS FIELD AND WE SHOULD NATURALLY
BE IN A POSITION TO RESPOND.

5. FCO PSE PASS TO SIR A DUFF CABINET OFFICE.

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SECRET

FM BRIDGETOWN 271800Z OCT 83
 TO FLASH FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 368 OF 27 OCTOBER
 AND TO FLASH WASHINGTON

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GRENADA

1. BISH CALLED ON THE US AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING AT 10.30 LOCAL TIME TO EMPHASISE THE POINTS WHICH BISH HAD MADE TO HIM THE PREVIOUS EVENING ON THE TELEPHONE. THESE WERE
 (A) THAT OUR CONSULAR TEAM NEEDED TO BE GIVEN CLEARANCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO GET INTO GRENADA, AND
 (B)

CLOSED UNDER THE
 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
 ACT 2000

2. BISH EMPHASISED THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF BOTH QUESTIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR ANGLO/US RELATIONS. TO MANY PEOPLE IN BRITAIN, BISH SAID, IT MUST LOOK AS THOUGH SIR PAUL WAS BEING KEPT INCOMMUNICADO IN GRENADA BY US FORCES WHO WERE ALSO PREVENTING THE ENTRY OF BRITISH DIPLOMATS ACCREDITED TO THAT COUNTRY.

3. BISH SAID THE PROBLEM WAS THAT ALTHOUGH AIRCRAFT COULD LAND AT POINT SALINES THERE WAS NO SPARE FOOD, WATER OR ACCOMMODATION THERE AND THE ROAD INTO ST GEORGES WAS STILL NOT SECURE BECAUSE OF SNIPING. THERE WAS ALSO CONSIDERABLE CONGESTION AT THE AIRPORT. THE LOCAL MILITARY COMMANDER HAD RULED THAT NO AIRCRAFT COULD COME IN WHICH WERE NOT PART OF THE MILITARY

AIRCRAFT COULD COME IN WHICH WERE NOT PART OF THE MILITARY-
OPERATION. BISH SAID THAT HE TOO WAS WAITING CLEARANCE FOR THE
US TEAM TO GO IN, UNDER GILLESPIE WHO ON ARRIVAL WOULD BECOME
US CHARGE D' AFFAIRES.

4. BISH SAID OUR TEAM NEED NOT REMAIN AT POINT SALINES OVERNIGHT.
THEY COULD LAND, ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL,
AND RETURN THE SAME DAY. THE RAF HERCULES AND THE TEAM WERE ON
30 MINUTES NOTICE TO DEPART. IT WAS ONLY 30 MINUTES FLYING TIME TO
GRENADA. THE TEAM WOULD HAVE ITS OWN SECURE COMMUNICATIONS WITH
LONDON: THIS TOO MIGHT BE OF HELP. ONLY CLEARANCE WAS LACKING.

5. BISH GAVE ME THE STRONGEST ASSURANCES THAT MY REQUESTS WOULD BE
ACTED UPON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

6. GIST OF THIS CONVERSATION HAS ALREADY BEEN TELEPHONED TO THE
EMERGENCY UNIT AND TO THOMAS IN WASHINGTON, TO BOTH OF WHOM BISH
SUGGESTED THAT THE PLACE TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE AMERICANS IS
WASHINGTON RATHER THAN HERE. BISH IS NOT MUCH USE (THE CONSTIT-
UTIONAL POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL FOR INSTANCE IS
QUITE BEYOND HIS CAPACITY TO GRASP) AND THE US EMBASSY'S
COMMUNICATIONS WITH GRENADA ARE EXTREMELY POOR

7. BISH SHOULD ADD THAT BISH HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE LOCAL
MILITARY COMMANDERS ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AT POINT SALINES
IS INCORRECT. HE MUST ALREADY BE UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE, SO
BISH HOPE YOU CAN GO EASY ON HIM.

BULLARD

NNNN

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GRENADA: SITREP NO 5: 27 OCTOBER (1900 hours)

Prime Minister

3 Copies

A.J.C. 27/10

1. For previous developments see Sitreps 1 to 4 for period up to 270700Z. The JIC are issuing a sitrep this evening.

A. Situation on the Ground (Supplementing JIC Sitrep)

2. A battalion of the US 82nd Airborne Brigade has been sent to reinforce troops already deployed. Cable and Wireless have re-established contact and report fighting still in progress (271300Z) around Fort Frederick.

According to the logs, fighting here is now over.
A.J.C. 27/10

B. The Governor General

3. US State Department claim that Governor General, since invasion, has indicated his support for the operation. Mr Shultz confirmed to the Secretary of State in Paris that the Governor General is back on the island.

C. US Position

4. US media editorial opinion is divided on action. Congressional reaction, mainly in opposition to action, has focussed on War Powers Act.

D. UK Position

5. RAF C130 aircraft and consular team headed by Deputy High Commissioner are on stand by at Bridgetown. Bridgetown reported at 271745Z that RAF C130 and consular team are unlikely to travel today. DHC will however visit island for an hour via US aircraft at approx 271900Z.

6. UK legal view on position of Governor General given to team to pass to Governor General if he so wishes. UK paper outlining constitutional position of Governor General has been passed to the US Administration.

7. HMS Antrim remains 20N miles N. West of Grenada.

E. Evacuation

8. US has offered to take responsibility for evacuation of British citizens: current situation does not cater for landings

SECRET

/by

by non US aircraft. 7 British citizens have been evacuated to Charleston USA and 2 to Bridgetown (271730Z).

Canadian Air Force 707 is standing by at Georgetown: 30 Canadians are reported safe in an hotel near St Georges.

F. Main Government Reactions

9. Colombia, Spain, Yugoslavia and Syria have all called for the immediate withdrawal of troops. Trinidad has issued a similar statement and called for a CARICOM peacekeeping force to which it is prepared to pledge troops. The Irish Government has called for speedy resolution of the crisis.

10. Greece has condemned all outside intervention in internal affairs of countries and expressed concern about developments in Grenada.

G. Multilateral Fora

11. Commonwealth. Secretary-General has made a statement inviting views of Commonwealth members on the situation and posing possibility of formation of interim security force. He may suggest meeting of Commonwealth representatives in London.

12. EC. Greek presidency has circulated draft joint statement by the Ten which recognises legitimate protection of nationals but reaffirming objection to outside intervention.

13. Security Council debate continues today. UK abstention on Guyana resolution made known to the US and by PM during House of Commons Questions.

14. OAS permanent council ended with no resolution tabled. Strong criticism of US from Nicaragua, Mexico, Bolivia, Bahamas. Helpful statements on US position from Venezuela and other Central Americans and Caribbeans.



Bf JD

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 October 1983

GRENADA

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has received from the President of the Republic of Maldives. I should be grateful if in due course you could let me have a draft reply.

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



JS

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 October 1983

GRENADA

I enclose a message which the Prime Minister has received from the members of the Caribbean People's Congress in the United States Virgin Islands. I should be grateful if you would arrange for a suitable reply to be sent.

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

BR

Subject

Metro ops

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T167/83

Done please copy immediately to the F/C.O. (Mr. Nicholls).



A-J.C.-27/0

297711 PRDRME G
66008 MINEX MF

TO: FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE/LONDON

NO: 2136/D

DT: 27/10/1983

ADVANCE COPY

No 10 JAH
(B)

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALDIVES PRESENTS ITS COMPLIMENTS TO THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE AND HAS THE HONOUR TO QUOTE BELOW A MESSAGE FROM HIS EXCELLENCY MR. MAUMOON ABDUL GAYOOM, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALDIVES ADDRESSED TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MARGARET THATCHER, PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND X

QUOTE:

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MARGARET THATCHER,
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT
BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,
LONDON.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

AS A MEMBER OF THE COMMONWEALTH THE MALDIVES IS DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE INVASION OF ANOTHER MEMBER COUNTRY GRENADA BY FORIEGN FORCES. WHILE WE DEPLORE THE MILITARY COUP STAGED BY THE LEFT WING ELEMENTS IN WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER OF GRENADA AND SOME OF HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES WERE KILLED, WE ARE UNABLE TO JUSTIFY THE MILITARY ACTION TAKEN BY THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN THE INVASION AGAINST, AS I UNDERSTAND, THE ADVICE OF YOUR GOVERNMENT. OUR CONCERN OVER THIS SERIOUS SITUATION IS IN KEEPING WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND INTERNATIONAL LAW WHICH SAFEGUARD THE RIGHT OF EVERY NATION TO INDEPENDENCE AND SELF-DETERMINATION. MY GOVERNMENT IS HOPEFUL THAT YOUR EFFORTS WILL LEAD TO AN EARLY WITHDRAWAL OF THE INVADING FORCES AND THE RESTORATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE.

MAUMOON ABDUL GAYOOM
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALDIVES

UNQUOTE:

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALDIVES WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE WOULD TRANSMIT THE ABOVE MESSAGE TO ITS HIGH DESTINATION.

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALDIVES AVAILS ITSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW TO THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND THE ASSURANCES OF ITS HIGHEST CONSIDERATION X

MALE' 27 OCTOBER 1983

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF MALDIVES

66008 MINEX MF
297711 PRDRME G
HOW RCVD PSE



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
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NUMBER NOT USED	

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 October 1983

Dear John,

A.J.C. ²²/₁₀

Grenada

The Prime Minister may be interested to see the enclosed letter from the High Commissioner for the Commonwealth of Dominica which has just been received by the Head of the West Indian and Atlantic Department in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. It does not affect the line of briefing submitted for today's questions, but throws some light on the absence of any formal written request to us from the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States for intervention in Grenada.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF DOMINICA

10 KENSINGTON COURT
LONDON W8 5DL

TELEPHONE: 01-937-9522
01-937-0051
TELEX: 913047

DHCL/ADM/41

26 October 1983

Dear Mr. Edwards,

I have this afternoon returned to London after an absence of three days and my Prime Minister has just been in telephone contact with me from Washington, on the current situation in Grenada.

Miss Charles has asked me to express to Her Majesty's Government her regret that time and communication difficulties were the constraining factors for Her Majesty's Government not having been alerted in sufficient time of the request made by the O.E.C.S. states to the United States Administration.

Indeed, a copy of the letter of invitation had been made ready to be simultaneously sent out and to reach you about 23/24 October.

The Prime Minister, as Chairman of the O.E.C.S. states, has been in contact with the Governor General of Grenada for whom an executive role in speedily bringing Grenada back to normalcy has been conceived.

It is our expectation that the U.S. troops and indeed all foreign troops will withdraw from the territory as soon as possible and that there will be little bloodshed before a peace-keeping force, hopefully of a full Commonwealth nature, takes over a policing role; and that the island will be handed back to the people of Grenada, so that they may freely determine the nature and composition of their future government.

Yours sincerely
R.A.C. Shillingford
R.A.C. SHILLINGFORD
High Commissioner

John C. Edwards Esq.
Head
West Indian and Atlantic Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
LONDON SW1

GRENADA

ADVANCE COPIES

34 35

FLASH

ADVANCE COPY

HD/EMERGENCY UNIT

HD/NAD
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HD/CONSULAR DEPT
HD/SOV. DEPT
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/RESEARCH DEPT
HD/LEGAL ADVISERS

PS (2)

BS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY

SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE
CABINET OFFICE
NO. 10 DOWNING ST
MOD, RC
MOD (DI 4)

P.N. Lee

A.S.C. 27/10

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 270955Z OCT 83

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 3163 OF 27 OCT 83

INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL NATO

TELECON BROWN/GOMERSALL

GRENADA. GOV GENERALS REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE.

1. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN REPORTS THAT PRIME MINISTER CHARLES OF DOMINICA SPOKE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL YESTERDAY OF AN APPEAL MADE BY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL LAST WEEK FOR OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE. STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY WERE FIRST MADE AWARE OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERALS APPEAL FOR ASSISTANCE BY PRIME MINISTER ADAMS ON 24 OCTOBER.

2. REPORTS TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF CONVERSATION WITH THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL SAY THAT, SINCE THE INVASION, HE HAS INDICATED HIS SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATION.

3. STATE DEPARTMENT HAS ASKED US TO TREAT THIS INFORMATION AS CONFIDENTIAL, FOR THE TIME BEING.

WRIGHT

N.B.



CONFIDENTIAL



File 10

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 October 1983

GRENADA: JAMAICAN REACTION

The Prime Minister has seen a copy of Kingston telegram No. 304 of 26 October.

The Prime Minister does not think that a telephone call to Mr. Seaga will help at the moment. Her view is that Mr. Seaga is not alone in having strong feelings, and that it is a case of "least said soonest mended".

DAVID BARCLAY

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

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The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1048</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Sitrep N° 4 dated 27 October 1983</i>	
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SECRET UK EYES ALFA
SIC LDOXJDA
GRENADA CONTINGENCY SITREP ⁰⁰⁷ ~~PNYPPU~~

QM FOF2 CALLED ON VICE ADMIRAL METCALF (COMSECONDFLT) ONBOARD USS GUAM AT 1700 QUEBEC. ALTHOUGH VERY BUSY HE WAS RELAXED AND VERY WELCOMING. ALSO PRESENT WAS HIS MILITARY ADVISER GENERAL SCHWARTZKOPF.

2. HE OPENLY ADMITTED THAT US HAD UNDERESTIMATED THE TASK HAVING ENCOUNTERED MANY MORE CUBANS THAN THEY EXPECTED ALL OF WHOM WERE MILITARY TRAINED AND ARMED.

3. INITIAL ASSAULT CONSISTED OF PARA DROP ON PEARL AIRFIELD AND RANGER ASSAULT AT POINT SALINE FOLLOWED BY AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT GRAND MAL BAY WHERE TANKS LANDED SUBSEQUENTLY PUSHING SOUTH AGAINST RESISTANCE AROUND ST GEORGES. VERY HEAVY GROUND FIRE RESULTED IN LOSS OF TOTAL ELEVEN HELOS. ADMITTED LOSSES FIVE KILLED AND TWENTY FOUR INJURED

4. PARTICULARLY HEAVY PREPARED DEFENCES WERE EXPERIENCED AROUND ST GEORGES. FIERCE FIGHT FOR FORT FREDERICK WAS ANTICIPATED AND CLOSE AIR SUPPORT USED. ON ENTERING FORT THEY FOUND CUBANS HAD WITHDRAWN LEAVING ONE DEAD AND MUCH ARMS AND EQUIPMENT. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT ALSO USED ELSEWHERE BUT COMSECONDFLT EMPHASISED THE CARE HE HW TAKEN TO PREVENT WIDESPREAD DESTRUCTION.

HE REMARKED QUOTE NEVER EXPECTED ANYTHING LIKE THIS JCS ARE SENDING ANOTHER TWO BATTALIONS UNQUOTE

• CONTRARY TO RADIO REPORTS COMSECONDFLT ASSESSED CUBANS WITHDRAWING TO PREPARED CAMPS IN THE HILLS TO CONTINUE THE FIGHT. US MILITARY DETERMINED TO ELIMINATE CUBAN PRESENCE AND THIS WAS EXPRESSED USING THE USUAL EPITHETS. HE ALSO IMPLIED LESS DISCRIMINANT USE OF AIR ATTACK AGAINST THESE CAMPS. US RELUCTANT TO ADMIT NUMBERS OF CUBAN AND GRENADIAN DEAD BUT ACKNOWLEDGED MANY WOUNDED BEING TREATED IN US SHIPS.

6. GRENADIANS FOUGHT ALONGSIDE CUBANS INITIALLY BUT HAVE NOW CEASED RESISTANCE. GOVERNOR GENERAL AND WIFE AT SALINE IN CARE OF US ARMY.

7. UNABLE TO ESTABLISH WHEREABOUTS OR SAFETY OF BRITISH CITIZENS BUT UNDERSTAND FIVE BRITISH AND TWO WEST GERMANS EVACUATED TO USS TRENTON (LPH). CONSIDERABLE REFUGEE PROBLEM ENVISAGED.

8. ELEVEN HUNDRED CUBAN POWS HELD SALINE. FORCES HARD PRESSED TO GUARD THEM. OECS TROOPS BEING USED FOR THIS TASK BUT DO NOT APPEAR TO BE INVOLVED IN FIGHTING.

9. MY IMPRESSION IS THAT WORST FIGHTING NOW OVER BUT A CONSIDERABLE LONG TERM CUBAN GUERRILLA THREAT EXISTS. COMSECONDFLT STRESSED DIFFICULTY EXPECTED IN WINKLING CUBANS OUT OF THE HIGH GROUND.

10. CONSECONDFLT UNDERSTANDS AND ACCEPTS RN PRESENCE.

11. OVERALL IMPRESSION. US CAUGHT TOTALLY UNAWARE BY CUBAN RESISTANCE, THEIR MILITARY BLOOD IS UP AND THEY ARE READY TO USE WHATEVER MEANS ARE NECESSARY TO BRING MATTERS TO A SPEEDY CONCLUSION
BT

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NNNN

00 BRIDGETOWN

00 PORT OF SPAIN

00 KINGSTON

00 HAVANA

00 MODUK

GRS 163

RESTRICTED

DESKBY 270700

FM WASHINGTON 270500Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 3160 OF 26 OCT 83

INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN PORT OF SPAIN KINGSTON HAVANA MODUK

GRENADA : MILITARY SITUATION

1. AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM AGENCY REPORTS MR WEINBERGER AND GENERAL VESSEY (CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF) STATED THIS AFTERNOON THAT THE US FORCES HAD ENCOUNTERED STRONG AND WELL ARMED, CUBAN RESISTANCE AT SALINAS AIRPORT. THIS HAD NOW BEEN OVERCOME. HAVANA RADIO IN THE COURSE OF THE DAY HAD STARTED BROADCASTING THAT CUBAN RESISTANCE WAS AT AN END, BUT NOT ALL CUBANS ON THE GROUND SEEMED TO HAVE GOT THAT MESSAGE. 600 OR SO CUBANS HAVE BEEN CAPTURED.

2. THE STATED DEPARTMENT TOLD US THAT THE GRANDE ANSE AREA HAS NOW BEEN SECURED. THERE ARE REPORTS, THOUGH THESE HAVE YET TO BE CONFIRMED, OF THE CAPTURE OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL AT FORT FREDERICK. FIGHTING IS CONTINUING AT RICHMOND HILL PRISON. FURTHER OPERATIONS WILL BE NECESSARY TOMORROW TO MOP UP REMAINING AREAS OF RESISTANCE. THE AMERICANS CONTINUE TO HAVE NO REPORTS OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.

WRIGHT

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WI6935 4 XXX 213

PRIME MINISTER SAYS GRENADIAN GOV ERNOIR-GENERAL ASKED FOR INVASION UNITED NATIONS, WEDNESDAY - THE GOV ERNOR-GENERAL OF GRENADA ASKED CARIBBEAN LEADERS TO "BRING ASSISTANCE TO BEAR" AND INVADE THE ISLAND TO OVERTHROW ITS RULING MILITARY COUNCIL, THE PRIME MINISTER OF DOMINICA SAID TODAY.

PRIME MINISTER EUGENIA CHARLES SAID GOVERNOR-GENERAL SIR PAUL SCOON GOT WORD TO EASTERN CARIBBEAN LEADERS MEETING IN BARBADOS LAST WEEKEND "TO TAKE ACTION TO PREVENT WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN GRENADA."

"HE HAD INVITED US TO COME IN AND DO WHAT WE COULD TO BRING BACK NORMALCY TO GRENADA," MRS CHARLES AID.

ASKED AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IF THAT INCLUDED MILITARY ACTION, MRS CHARLES REPLIED, "YES."

MRS CHARLES, WHO IS CHAIRWOMAN OF THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES, TOLD THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL THAT WORD OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S REQUEST WAS NOT MADE PUBLIC UNTIL NOW BECAUSE HIS SAFETY HAD NOT BEEN ASSURED.

SHE SAID SHE COULD NOT REVEAL HOW THE OFFICIAL, WHOM SHE SAID WAS ON GRENADA, MANAGED TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE CARIBBEAN LEADERS.

U.S. TROOPS FREED SIR PAUL AND HIS FAMILY AND TOOK THEM TO A WAITING SHIP DURING FIERCE FIGHTING YESTERDAY AROUND SIR PAUL'S HOUSE, U.S. DEFENCE SECRETARY CASPAR WEINBERGER SAID TODAY.

262321 OCT 83

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RESTRICTED
FM WASHINGTON 261907Z OCT 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3146 OF 26 OCT
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, HAVANA.

GRENADA: INTERVENTION

1. YOU MAY FIND IT USEFUL TO HAVE AVAILABLE THE LEGAL AND OTHER ARGUMENTS THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE USING IN JUSTIFICATION FOR THE US INTERVENTION IN PARTICULAR IN RELATION TO THE UN AND OAS CHARTERS. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE POINTS IN THEIR INTERNAL GUIDANCE, (WHICH US OFFICIALS ADMIT PRIVATELY ARE A LITTLE THIN).

(I) THE DETERIORATING CONDITIONS ON GRENADA POSED A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE CONTINUED SAFETY OF THE APPROXIMATELY 1,000 U.S. CITIZENS THERE. THE MILITARY COUNCIL ON THE ISLAND DID NOT FULFILL ITS PROMISES TO REOPEN THE AIRPORT. A NUMBER OF U.S. CITIZENS HAD SOUGHT TO LEAVE AT GREAT RISK WITHOUT WAITING FOR AN ORGANIZED EVACUATION. THE U.S. WATCHED EVENTS WITH INCREASING CONCERN.

(II) THE UNITED STATES RECEIVED AN URGENT APPEAL FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES (O ECS), A SUB-REGIONAL BODY CREATED IN 1981 BY THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES. THE MEMBERS ARE ANTIGUA, DOMINICA, GRENADA, MONTSERRAT, ST KITTS/NEVIS, SAIT LUCIA, AND SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES. AMONG THE PURPOSES OF THE TREATY ARE THE PROMOTION OF REGIONAL COOPERATION AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY.

(III) THE ORGANIZATION MET ON OCTOBER 21 AND DETERMINED THAT THE COLLAPSE OF GOVERNMENT ON GRENADA POSED A THREAT TO THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE REGION. THE ACTING MILITARY COUNCIL DID NOT PURPORT TO BE A GOVERNMENT. THE O ECS MEMBERS DECIDED TO TAKE NECESSARY MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO THIS THREAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLES 3 AND 8 OF THE O ECS TREATY. THEY SOUGHT THE ASSISTANCE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN STATES TO PARTICIPATE IN A COLLECTIVE SECURITY FORCE. BARBADOS, JAMAICA AND THE UNITED STATES ARE CONTRIBUTING FORCES, AS ARE FOUR O ECS MEMBER STATES.

THE PURPOSE OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THIS FORCE IS TO ENSURE SAFETY OF U.S. CITIZENS. SUCH HUMANITARIAN ACTION IS JUSTIFIED UNDER WELL-ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

(V) FURTHER, THE COLLECTIVE ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, JAMAICA, BARBADOS, AND THE OECS STATES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE OAS CHARTER. THE CHARTER SPECIFICALLY ALLOWS OAS MEMBERS TO TAKE COLLECTIVE ACTION PURSUANT TO REGIONAL SECURITY TREATIES IN RESPONSE TO THREATS TO PEACE AND SECURITY. THE RIO TREATY IS ONE SUCH TREATY, THE OECS STATES ARE NOT PARTIES TO THE RIO TREATY, AND THE OECS TREATY IS THEIR REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENT. THE OECS TREATY CONCERNS ITSELF IN PART WITH MATTERS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY. ARTICLE 8 OF THE OECS TREATY AUTHORIZES THE OECS TO COORDINATE THE EFFORTS OF MEMBER STATES FOR COLLECTIVE DEFENSE.

(VI) WITH REGARD TO THE OAS CHARTER, THE OECS DECISION IS A QUOTE MEASURE ADOPTED FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN EXISTING TREATY, UNQUOTE AS CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 22 OF THE OAS CHARTER. IN ADDITION, THE OECS MEMBERS WERE, IN THE WORDS OF ARTICLE 28 OF THE OAS CHARTER, CONFRONTED BY A QUOTE SITUATION THAT MIGHT ENDANGER THE PEACE OF AMERICA, UNQUOTE AND TOOK ACTION CONSISTENT WITH A QUOTE SPECIAL TREATY ON THE SUBJECT. UNQUOTE MEASURES TAKEN PURSUANT TO COLLECTIVE SECURITY AGREEMENTS ARE NOT VIOLATIONS OF THE OAS CHARTER'S PROVISIONS PROHIBITING INTERVENTION OR THE USE OF FORCE.

(VII) REGIONAL COLLECTIVE SECURITY MEASURES ARE EXPRESSLY CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 52 OF THE UN CHARTER, PARAGRAPH 1 OF THAT ARTICLE PROVIDES FOR

... REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS OR AGENCIES FOR DEALING WITH SUCH MATTERS RELATING TO THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AS ARE APPROPRIATE FOR REGIONAL ACTION, PROVIDED THAT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS OR AGENCIES AND THEIR ACTIVITIES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRICIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

THE ACTIONS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY FORCE, IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES DESCRIBED ABOVE, ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER.

2. THE US DELEGATION TO THE OAS WILL BE DEPLOYING THE ABOVE POINTS AT THE OAS PERMANENT COUNCIL MEETING WHICH HAS BEEN CALLED FOR THIS AFTERNOON. THEY EXPECT STRONG CRITICISM FROM NICARAGUA, MEXICO AND PROBABLY BOLIVIA. HOWEVER THEY ANTICIPATE SUFFICIENT SUPPORT FROM CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AND SOME SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES THAT A RESOLUTION, REQUIRING A SIMPLE MAJORITY OF THE THIRTY MEMBERS, WILL NOT BE PASSED.

WRIGHT

APS

From: D M Bell, Emergency
Unit

26 October 1983

GRENADA

1. Mr Hart's minute about the RAF Hercules refers.
2. Late last night the MOD telephoned to say that the Hercules had been refused permission to land at Trinidad when 100 NM out, and had diverted to Barbados where immediate landing rights had been granted. No reason for the refusal was given.
3. After discussion with Mr Edwards and the Head of DS8/MOD (Mr Webster) the attached telegram was sent to interested posts. It had previously been felt that the aircraft should go to Trinidad rather than Barbados to avoid any suggestion that it was involved in military activities affecting Grenada. This consideration now seems less significant.
4. I telephoned the High Commissions in Bridgetown and Port of Spain and informed the Duty Officers of developments and of the line to take should there be any enquiries about the Trinidadian refusal.

D M Bell
D M Bell

cc: PS/PUS
Mr Giffard
Mr Wright
Mr Edwards, Emergency Unit
News Department
Resident Clerk, MOD
Mr Webster, DS8/MOD

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Cavcats

RESTRICTED

Precedence/Deskby

IMMEDIATE

1 CZC

2 GRS

3 RESTRICTED

4

5

CO

6 FM FCO

TE/ADD

7 TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TEL NO

8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

9 INFO IMMEDIATE PORT OF SPAIN, BRIDGETOWN, GOVERNOR MONTSERRAT,
10 KINGSTON, NASSAU, GEORGETOWN, BELMOPAN, UKMIS NEW YORK, HAVANA
11 MY TELNO : GRENADA

12 1. The RAF Hercules mentioned in my TUR was refused landing
13 permission at Trinidad when 100 N miles out of Piarco. It
14 diverted to Barbados. We are not yet aware of the reason for
15 the decision to refuse landing rights after dip-clear had been
16 given. The refusal is likely to become known but we do not
17 wish to make too much of it. MOD have agreed a line that the
18 aircraft ~~diverted~~ ^{repositioned} (FROM BELIZE) to Barbados in the light of today's developments
19 in Grenada in the hope that it may be able to assist in any
20 evacuation. We understand that, for the moment, the Consular
21 team is still in Barbados and that the US preference remains
22 that all evacuation be undertaken by US aircraft.

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24 HOWE

25 NNNN

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept Emergency Unit	Distribution Grenada
Drafted by (Block capitals) D M BELL		
Telephone number 233-4990		
Authorised for despatch <i>D M Bell</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

CONFIDENTIAL

KBY 270530Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 270330Z OCT

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1161 OF 26 OCTOBER 1983

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BRIDGETOWN, OTTAWA, KINGSTON,
GEORGETOWN, BELMOPAN, NASSAU, PORT OF SPAIN, PARIS, THE HAGUE.
INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO.

MY TELS NOS 1149-1151 (NOT TO ALL) : SECURITY COUNCIL : GRENADA

1. THE DEBATE RESUMED THIS AFTERNOON (26 OCTOBER). THERE WERE 19 SPEAKERS (DOMINICA, ZAIRE, VIETNAM, NIGERIA, POLAND, JAMAICA, BOLIVIA, CHINA, ARGENTINA, SEYCHELLES, ETHIOPIA, ALGERIA, SYRIA, CUBA, FRANCE, ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA, IRAN, LAOS, PAKISTAN). AS EXPECTED, DOMINICA, JAMAICA AND ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA SPOKE IN FAVOUR OF US INTERVENTION, THE LAST IN PARTICULARLY ROBUST TERMS. MRS CHARLES (DOMINICA) MADE THE POINT (REPORTED IN TELECON GORE-BOOTH/BELL) THAT THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL HAD SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED OECS ASSISTANCE, THOUGH IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO REVEAL THIS UNTIL HE WAS SAFE. OTHER SPEAKERS PREDICTABLY CONDEMNED US ACTION TO A GREATER OR LESSER EXTENT, CLAIMING THAT IT VIOLATED UN CHARTER PROVISIONS AND OTHER TREATIES. THE ALGERIAN STATEMENTS WERE STANDARD ANTI-AMERICAN HARANGUES; THAT BY CUBA (SPEAKING FOR THE SECOND TIME) WAS UNPRECEDENTED IN ITS ANTI-AMERICAN INVECTIVE. IRAN, BY CONTRAST, MADE A LOW KEY AND BRIEF STATEMENT. FRANCE (THE ONLY WESTERN SPEAKER) CONDEMNED US ACTION IN UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS DRAWING ON THE STATEMENTS REFERRED TO IN PARIS TELNO 961 (NOT TO ALL).
2. THERE WAS SPECULATION THAT THE NICARAGUANS WOULD SEEK TO CALL A VOTE ON THE GUYANESE DRAFT (MY TELNO 1156) THIS AFTERNOON BUT THE MALTESE ASKED THAT THIS BE POSTPONED TO ALLOW ALL SPEAKERS TO HAVE THEIR SAY (AND I LET IT BE KNOWN THAT I WAS WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH WAS TRUE UNTIL LATE ON). THE COUNCIL RECONVENES TOMORROW AFTERNOON (27 OCTOBER) AT 3.30PM LOCAL TIME. ST LUCIA AND BARBADOS WILL SPEAK, AS SHALL WE. THERE MAY BE ONE OR TWO OTHERS.
3. A VOTE IS VIRTUALLY CERTAIN AT THE END OF THE SESSION. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE NICARAGUANS HAVE THE NINE VOTES TO FORCE A US VETO. FRANCE AND THE NETHERLANDS ARE TOYING WITH MINOR AMENDMENTS WHICH WOULD ALLOW THEM TO VOTE IN FAVOUR. OTHERWISE THEY WILL ABSTAIN. (THE NETHERLANDS HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY WILL FOLLOW THE FRENCH VOTE). INDEED IT LOOKS INCREASINGLY LIKELY, GIVEN THE INSTRUCTIONS IN YOUR TELNO 655 (WHICH I HAVE NOT YET HAD TO REVEAL), THAT THE US WILL BE ALONE IN VOTING AGAINST THE RESOLUTION.
5. MIFT CONTAINS A SUMMARY OF THE STATEMENTS MADE THIS AFTERNOON.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEE.

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister.

MR. COLES ✓

A-46. 27/6

GRENADA

A glance at the history of the last thirty years is necessary in order to keep the American invasion of Grenada in perspective. Successive American Administrations have consistently refused to tolerate the existence of Left Wing regimes in Central America and the Caribbean. They have not hesitated to use military force in pursuit of this policy.

In 1954, the Americans intervened militarily in Guatemala to throw out the elected Left Wing President, Arbenz. The legacy of this incident has been a succession of brutal and unstable military dictatorships in Guatemala. No Americans that I know are particularly proud of this episode.

Two years after Castro came to power in Cuba, the Kennedy Administration launched the Bay of Pigs invasion. It was a military failure and the Americans have wisely not tried again. The cost would be too high. The Bay of Pigs is of course still the rallying cry of the anti-interventionist lobby in the United States.

In 1965, the Americans invaded the Dominican Republic and threw out a Left Wing Government. This was a success. They were able to instal a respectable, democratic government and to withdraw their troops quickly. The Dominican Republic has remained, by Latin American standards, a peaceful democracy ever since.

The Americans are currently doing everything short of direct military intervention to topple the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. They would not hesitate to go the whole hog if they thought that they could get away with it militarily, without unacceptable casualties, and internationally.

The only thing that is unique about Grenada is that it is the first time that the Americans have invaded a former British Colony, a member of the Commonwealth and a Monarchy.

I believe that this incident will have a decisive effect on attitudes in the Caribbean. Hitherto, my impression has been that the small islands of the Eastern Caribbean, plus of course Belize,


CONFIDENTIAL

/have been

have been disposed to look to us rather than the Americans to provide the minimal force which might be required to extricate them from local difficulties. Now, they will all realise that they have joined the Hispanic Central American states in the United States "sphere of influence".

In the short term, the next two or three weeks should demonstrate whether Grenada will be an American political success (the Dominican Republic) or a failure (Guatemala and the Bay of Pigs). In this country, indignation will continue to be expressed because of the Commonwealth and Crown connections and the rejection of our advice. This indignation is likely to spill over into the CHGM. With these considerations in mind, we should ^{not} feel obliged to show solidarity with the Americans in the Security Council, particularly if anything like the draft resolution at present circulating is brought to a vote: the Americans will of course vote against. I am not suggesting that we should make a parade of our differences, as the French would, by making anti-American statements and by voting in favour. But we should make quietly clear that there have been differences and we should, in principle, be prepared to vote one way from the Americans, ie to abstain.

When the dust has settled, we should think about the longer term implications of this incident for the high level dialogue with the Americans which we were planning to launch in the specific context of Belize. Grenada strengthens my view that we should get out of Belize at the earliest practicable opportunity before we find ourselves in another false position. While accepting American primacy throughout the area, we should do some plain speaking about the need for full consultation before the Americans decide to take military action against another Commonwealth country. It is becoming increasingly obvious that they had been planning the Grenada move for some time.



A.D. PARSONS
26 October 1983

PS Schedule of American interventions in this century (taken from The Guardian) attached.

he Grenada invasion signal to Moscow?

ashes his hawks

is that, if a deal is ever struck, the "contras" will be dropped.

The same scholar also described the debate within the administration over a "small minority" bent on the military overthrow of the Sandinistas, and the rest, who want to use military pressure only to achieve a settlement. That debate may, in the end, prove more apparent than real, when it is considered that the United States is asking Nicaragua not only to end aid and training for El Salvador and other Central American insurgents, not only to send its Cuban and other communist advisers packing, not only to reduce its armed forces, but also to establish real "pluralism." Defined, that appears to mean at least general elections supervised by outsiders. Thus majority and minority may be arguing essentially the same policy.

Among those who make Central American policy for the Reagan government there is an "either-or" attitude likely to be reinforced by the Grenada intervention. There is no notion of a gradual pushing and nudging towards adequate relations between a great power and obstreperous small neighbours, or of the way in which Soviet purposes are entangled with, rather than the cause of, local ambitions. That strategic back door upon which the Russians are hammering must be slammed shut—and the louder the slam the better.

Martin Woollacott

FOR exactly half of this century so far, a total of 42 years, American troops have been occupying one or another of the countries and islands of central America and the Caribbean. The process began in 1898, when the war between America and Spain over the remnants of the Spanish Empire saw the beginning of America's expansion into the global role. At the time, the US occupation of the Philippines seemed the most important consequence, but as the years went on, America's hegemony over its central American back yard has been the more enduring.

The war ended with the island of Puerto Rico virtually annexed to the US, and Cuba and Panama as protectorates. The treaties of

1903 with those two countries not only established permanent US bases, but also legally guaranteed America's formal right to military intervention in circumstances where Washington saw fit. And in Panama, Washington saw fit in 1908, 1912 and 1918, largely because 1914 saw the opening of America's vital strategic interest in the area, the Panama Canal.

But the United Fruit Company, whose commercial operations in central America gave birth and point to the phrase "banana republic," was swiftly establishing the plantations and opening the ports and railroads that tied US commerce to official policy. In 1954, when the CIA ran its successful coup against the liberal reform government of Jacobo Arbenz, those ties were blatant. The Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had been United Fruit's lawyer, and had also worked for the company's bankers Schroders. His brother Allen, who had been a director of Schroders, was running the CIA, which duly organised the coup to make Guatemala safe for United Fruit.

The mixture of financial and strategic motives has shaped US policy in the area throughout the century, but there has been one major policy change. Until the Roosevelt government took office in 1933, US policy had been shaped by the Monroe Doctrine, which traditionally denied other foreign powers the right to intervene in the Western hemisphere—and the Doctrine was widely ignored while the US was too weak to enforce it. But in 1904, the Roosevelt corollary to the Doctrine was promulgated, which said that the US assumed a general right to intervene to protect its own interests. Under this rubric, the US embarked on its long occupation of Haiti, Dominican Republic and Nicaragua which provoked a major diplomatic row at the 1928 International Conference of American States.

At the next conference, in 1933, the FDR government effectively renounced in principle its "right" to unilateral military intervention. Thenceforth, it became a prime object of US diplomacy to secure enough Latin support to make those interventions "multilateral." This was the justification of the

1965 invasion of the Dominican Republic, and failure to achieve such multi-national backing meant that the strikes against Guatemala in 1954 and against Cuba in 1961 had to be clandestine.

Yesterday's strike on Grenada, with the backing of other Caribbean troops, seems to follow the pattern established in 1933. But it now raises the question of further US actions against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua, according to Gordon Connell Smith of Hull University, the historian of the Organisation of American States, whose research helped establish the following chronology:

The interventions:

Mexico: 1914, the US Navy bombards Veracruz and lands troops to overthrow President Huerta. 1915: US Army "hot pursuits" of Pancho Villa.

Panama: 1903. US Marines land to block Columbian troops from aborting Panama's declaration of independence. 1908, 1912, 1918. Marines land to "restore order."

Honduras: 1912, the Marines land to protect US banana estates.

Nicaragua: 1909, 1912, Marines land to protect US commercial interests. 1927-33, US military occupation. 1981 to present, US-backed war of destabilisation against Sandinista regime.

Cuba: 1899-1900, and 1906-09, US occupation. Permanent US naval base at Guantanamo since 1903. Intermittent US "shows of force" until 1933, when US pressure led to the pro-American dictatorship of Batista. 1961, Bay of Pigs assault on Castro's Cuba.

Guatemala: 1954, US-backed guerrilla invasion to overthrow Arbenz.

Costa Rica: threat of US invasion used in 1919 to change government.

Haiti: 1905, US takes over Customs offices to guarantee debt payments. 1915-34, US military occupation, including forced labour of local population.

Dominican Republic. 1905, US takes over Customs. 1916-24, US military occupation, and setting up of local military constabulary which guarantees pro-US government is "strong man." 1965, US Marines invade to topple "progressive" government.

Martin Walker



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SECTION I

Mr Speaker, with your permission, I should like to begin by bringing the House up-to-date with the situation in Grenada. The House will appreciate that, at present, our knowledge of developments is limited.

THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND

We understand that the Americans have now secured both the airports on the island at Pearls and Salines, as well as the radio station, and Fort Rupert. But fighting is apparently continuing at Fort Fredrick and elsewhere. Two United States servicemen have been killed, there are unconfirmed reports that twelve Cubans have been killed during the fighting. There is no firm information at present of any other casualties. In addition, there are reports that a number of Soviet nationals may have been detained; and rumours that Mr Coard has sought sanctuary in the Soviet Embassy. I am not in a position to confirm these.

BRITISH CITIZENS

The latest information available to me is that there are no reports of any British casualties. The US Administration

/have

have informed us that they are willing to evacuate UK citizens to Barbados as soon as conditions allow. HMS Antrim remains ready to be called upon in case of need. And we are also making contingency arrangements for evacuation by air by British aircraft. A consular ~~team~~ *mission* from the British High Commission in Bridgetown is standing by to go to Grenada as soon as practicable to establish how many British citizens may wish to be evacuated. The majority of them are long term residents of Grenada.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL

I am glad to be able to inform the House that we have received assurances that the Governor-General, Sir Paul Scoon, is safe. He may have an important role to play in the restoration of democracy in Grenada. He represents one of the few elements of constitutional continuity in Grenada at present. The American Administration are aware of this constitutional position and have undertaken to respect it.

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SECTION II: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

Mr Speaker, the House may find it useful to be reminded of the events which have led up to the present situation.

When Grenada achieved full independence from the United Kingdom on 7 February 1974, it was as a parliamentary democracy within the Commonwealth. The Prime Minister, Sir Eric Gairy, governed the country until March 1979 when he was overthrown as the result of a coup d'etat mounted by the New Jewel Movement. A People's Revolutionary Government was set up, led by a Marxist, Mr Maurice Bishop, which suspended the Constitution and governed by promulgating so-called "People's Laws".

This was an unconstitutional regime. It lasted until 13 October, just under two weeks ago, when Mr Bishop was in turn ousted by his deputy, Mr Bernard Coard, a more radical Marxist. After several days of confusion, a Revolutionary Military Council was constituted on 18 October, under the chairmanship of General Hudson Austin.

/On the following

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On the following day, 19 October, Mr Bishop was killed, together with some of his close supporters. There has been no satisfactory explanation of these killings, which have been rightly and very widely condemned. After the killings, a twenty-four hour curfew was declared which the Revolutionary Military Council announced was to last until 24 October.

On 20 October, the day after Mr Bishop's death, General Austin called on the Governor-General, Sir Paul Scoon. He told him that the Revolutionary Military Council was in control, and that he intended to announce the composition of a new Cabinet three days later. He later extended this to two weeks. On the same day, 20 October, the Grenadian High Commissioner in London, Mr Fennis Augustine, was called to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to underline our concerns about the safety of the British Community.

On 21 October, the British High Commissioner in Barbados learnt that some Caribbean Heads of Government were pressing their colleagues in the Caribbean Community to ask for military help in restoring constitutional government in Grenada. We promptly took steps and instructed our Embassy in Washington to ascertain how the United States Government might respond to such an approach.

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On the following day, Saturday, 22 October, the United States Government diverted towards Grenada a carrier group, led by USS Independence. They stated that this was a signal to the local authorities of concern about the safety of US citizens on the island. We were informed on the same day, 22 October, that the seven Heads of Government of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States had decided to put together a multinational force and to call upon friendly governments to help restore peace and order in Grenada.

Late that evening we were informed by the American Government that they had received a firm request from the Heads of Government of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States to help restore peace and order in Grenada. They told us that no decision had been taken on how to respond, and they had concluded that they should proceed very cautiously.

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On 23 October, the British High Commission in Barbados was informed that a formal request for British participation in a Multinational force would probably be handed over later ~~in~~ the day. This did not happen, but we received later that day the conclusions of the CARICOM meeting held in Trinidad which decided in favour of political and economic measures against Grenada.

We were in close touch with the American Government throughout 23 October and two US consular officials had accompanied our Deputy High Commissioner to Grenada over the weekend to form a first-hand assessment of the risks to British and American citizens. We were assured by the US Government that we would be consulted immediately if the United States decided to take any action, and informed that a United States emissary, Ambassador McNeil, had been sent to Barbados to confer with Mr Adams and other Caribbean leaders.

It was also on 23 October that HMS Antrim was instructed to sail from Cartagena in Colombia to the vicinity of Grenada, in case the evacuation of British nationals proved necessary. I wish to emphasise that this was a precautionary move, which was entirely unrelated to the suggestion of some Caribbean leaders that a multinational force should be established.

/Ministers

Ministers met early on Monday morning, 24 October, to consider events over the weekend. We also had available a report from the British Deputy High Commissioner in Bridgetown, Mr Montgomery, who had visited Grenada over the weekend to assess the situation and the risk to the safety of British citizens on the island. Following that meeting, our Ambassador in Washington was instructed to put to the United States Government factors which would have to be carefully weighed before firm conclusions were reached. I shall come back to these later.

On Monday evening we received in London the text of a statement by the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States which had been handed to the British High Commission in Barbados, informing the British Government, among others, of the Organisation's intention of taking action under Article 8 of the 1981 Treaty of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, for the collective defence and preservation of peace and security against external aggression, and requesting assistance from friendly governments.

Also on Monday evening President Reagan informed my Right Honourable Friend, the Prime Minister, that he was giving serious consideration to the request from the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States and would welcome her thoughts. He undertook to inform my Right Honourable Friend in advance of any decision taken by the United States.

/While our

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While our response to that message was being considered, a second message arrived from the President saying that he had decided to respond positively to the request that had been made to him. Ministers met immediately to discuss the situation and, shortly after midnight on Monday 25 October, my Right Honourable Friend sent a reply to the President in which, as she told this House yesterday, she reiterated the considerations which we had already put to the United States Government the previous day and expressed our concern at the course of action which he was contemplating.

She also phoned the President to underline the importance she attached to the matter. Early on Tuesday morning my Right Honourable Friend received a message from President Reagan informing her that he had weighed the issues raised in her letter very carefully but had decided that United States participation in the multinational force should, nevertheless, go ahead.

That then is the sequence of events leading up to yesterday's military intervention.

As I have told the House, Her Majesty's Government directed the attention of the United States to certain factors that should be taken into account. They included the safety of our own community; the position of the Governor-General; and the fact that the CARICOM countries, although agreed on the need for political and economic measures, were divided on the advisability of military intervention.

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Sub

The situation in short was that the United States and ^{the other} some Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean took our view of the risk to which their citizens were exposed and of the action which was called for. The United Kingdom and a number of other Commonwealth Caribbean countries took a different view.

The fact that, despite the reservations we had expressed to them, the Americans decided to intervene in Grenada may be a matter of regret, but it should not be a matter for surprise. We do not agree with the Americans on every issue, any more than they always agree with us. Nor would we expect to. On some issues our perceptions and those of the Americans are bound to be different.

In this case, the United States had particular reason to consult most closely with those Caribbean countries which had called on it to help resolve the crisis. Nevertheless, ~~their~~ ^{what} lack of consultation was regrettable. *less than we would have wished.*

But the fact that that has happened in this case does not, and must not be allowed, to weaken the essential fabric of our alliance. In particular it does not and must not be allowed to cast any doubt on the firmness of our commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and all that means. One Right Honourable Gentleman suggested that this week's events

/are relevant

are relevant to decisions that might have to be taken about the use of nuclear weapons. There is no credible analogy between our exchanges with the Americans on Monday night and the consultations that would take place before any decision could be taken to fire American nuclear missiles from Britain. As we have made clear to the House there are quite specific understandings between the British and United States' Governments on the use by the Americans of their nuclear weapons and bases in Britain. These have been jointly reviewed in the light of the planned deployment here of cruise missiles and we are satisfied that they are effective. As I say these understandings are specific as are the arrangements for implementing them. They mean that no nuclear weapon would be fired or launched from British territory without the British Prime Minister's agreement.

To return to the Caribbean. It must not be overlooked that seven independent Caribbean countries have joined with the United States in this intervention, and indeed urged it on the United States. It is not perhaps sufficiently recognised that, although these islands enjoy full independence, they also have a high degree of mutual interdependence. There have been democratic elections in most of these islands very recently, and they attach great importance to the consolidation of democratic processes within the region.

This is why the original coup of 1979 in Grenada was so disturbing to them, and why the bloody events of last week so deeply affronted them. The breakdown of constitutional government, the rule of law and public safety in one of their members, was perceived as a dangerous disruption by the others.

Not only was that the case, but we must remember that just as the United States had some 1000 citizens in Grenada, so the other Caribbean countries who have intervened have nationals of their own on Grenada and have Grenadans in their own islands. This is a very close family of states.

Just as this fact explains much of what has happened, so also it perhaps provides the key to the way ahead. Countries which have participated in the present operation will be well placed to assist the Grenadans to restore and set up the necessary machinery to ensure an early return to constitutionality and democracy.

Ever since the overthrow of Sir Eric Gairy's government by the coup of 1979, Grenada has been without constitutional government. Mr Bishop declined to hold elections and was himself the victim of violent overthrow. We must all hope that this was the last act in a tragic history of tyranny.

The countries which have intervened are democratic countries. Their stated objective is to restore democratic and constitutional government to the island. That is an objective we fully share. It may be necessary and desirable for other Commonwealth states to play a part in this process. We shall be in touch with our Commonwealth partners about this and we welcome the willingness of the Commonwealth Secretary-General to help towards that end. The Americans, as the House will be aware, have made plain their wish to withdraw from the Grenadan scene at the earliest reasonable opportunity.

Meantime, their forces and those of Commonwealth countries involved are exposed to great danger. We shall do nothing to make their task more difficult. We must all wish for a speedy and successful outcome. One that will quickly pave the way for genuine elections in Grenada, for the first time in many years.

/The whole

The whole House will hope that Grenada will once again be able to move forward along the path of democracy. That will improve the prospects for peace throughout the Caribbean. Something of real value will thus have been achieved.



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T 166 B / 83
The F.C.O. have been
asked to draft a reply.

MJ

26th October 1983

Dear Prime Minister,

You will be aware of a military action involving Grenada which commenced yesterday morning and which has attracted considerable international attention. I know that you will be deeply interested in this matter and I feel that I should write to you to explain the background against which this action has been taken.

You will remember that in March, 1979, Mr. Maurice Bishop overthrew the Government of Grenada led by Mr. Eric Gairy in what was a bloodless coup. At that time Caribbean Governments, and indeed many others, expressed strong disagreement with this method of changing government, and at that time the strongest concern was expressed at the importation of this method of governmental change into the English-speaking Caribbean which had up till then an unblemished record of changing governments through the electoral process. In making a judgement about our relations with the new Government under Maurice Bishop, note was, however, taken of the fact that that Government enjoyed a wide measure of support by the Grenadian people who obviously saw it to be a release from the tyrannical excesses which the previous Prime Minister, Eric Gairy, had imposed on his people notwithstanding the fact that he had been constitutionally elected by them.

Since 1979 there has been a wide measure of cooperation within the Caribbean Community between the Bishop Government and their CARICOM partners. In the background to this cooperation there have however been differences over the ideological stance of the Bishop Government, and more particularly, there have been reservations connected with the strongly held suspicions that Grenada was serving as a conduit for subversive actions in a number of the Caribbean countries in the Eastern Caribbean. The fact is, however, that there was a continuing working relationship between us.

The events of last week created a totally different situation. What seemed to begin as internal Party dissension over the leadership developed into a situation in which Prime Minister Bishop and almost the entire Cabinet was executed, and on that and subsequent occasions a number of leading trade unionists, other citizens and children of Grenada have also been killed. The precise numbers are not yet known. Following the execution of Prime Minister Bishop and in response to the large public support which he obviously enjoyed the entire population of Grenada was subjected to virtual house arrest through the imposition of a 96-hour curfew.

This was the situation that confronted the English-speaking Caribbean Governments last week, and which led them to the decision to meet for a full discussion of the matter in Port of Spain over the weekend.

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 166 B / 83



Jamaica House
Kingston, Jamaica

In those discussions the Governments comprising the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Vincent and The Grenadines, St. Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia and Montserrat) which had met among themselves the previous day informed their other CARICOM colleagues of the situation and of their grave concern for the safety of their nationals in Grenada, and that they deemed their own peace and security to be under serious threat. The depth of their anxiety was evident. They pointed out that under the Treaty establishing their Organization there is provision for them to take joint action to protect the security of their region; and they invited their other CARICOM colleagues to join them in such action.

There was discussion about a range of sanctions against Grenada which had been previously determined both by the OECS countries themselves and by certain other CARICOM countries including Jamaica. It was strongly argued, however, that none of these sanctions would deal with the situation sufficiently quickly to resolve the real crisis which was seen to require urgent action. The fear was that the new regime would be allowed sufficient time to become entrenched and to strengthen its hold on power in Grenada and in its suppression of the Grenadian people.

In order for you to understand the degree of concern that is felt it is useful for you to know that in a population of about 100,000 people the Grenadian army numbers about 3,000 or 3% and there is in addition a very large people's militia. None of the OECS Governments has an army numbering more than about 200 men. Indeed Grenada, while among the smallest countries, has the largest army in the English speaking Caribbean. It is in fact one and a half times the size of the Jamaican Defence Force although our population is two million persons. In addition Grenada has a broadcasting capability vastly greater than any of those countries, which has been used in the past as a subversive tool. Behind all this it is also known that the regime has been sustained by substantial external support in men and materials.

The Government of Jamaica has always been a firm and unstinting supporter of the principles of non-intervention and self-determination of peoples and of respect for human rights. We continue our support for those principles.

There are times when Governments face painful choices. This was one of those occasions. In the face of a plea by the Governments of small countries, who feel themselves threatened by unfolding events in a close neighbouring country but do not have the capacity to defend themselves in any way and who realise that the new military leadership of Grenada was now hard-line Marxist in ideology and vicious beyond the worst atrocities of this nature committed elsewhere in many, many years.

Jamaica shares the view that the people of Grenada ought to be given the opportunity to return to normality and a constitutional order in which they can decide for themselves what kind of Government they want and who they want to lead them.



Jamaica House
Kingston, Jamaica

It is against all of this background and with a solemn sense of responsibility to our partners in the Caribbean Community of the Eastern Caribbean that the decision was made to join with Barbados and the United States of America, to whom the OECS had also made this plea for assistance, in the action which commenced yesterday morning.

The firm intention of all these Governments is that this action is carried out in the quickest possible time and with the least possible loss of life, and that thereafter an interim civilian administration be established by the Governor General with the prime task of arranging for the holding of elections. It is also the understanding of all these Governments that the United States forces will withdraw from Grenada as soon as possible after the military action is completed. During this interim period the CARICOM Peace Keeping Forces will be available to the interim administration for whatever purposes the administration deems appropriate.

The recent developments in Grenada are regarded by Caribbean Governments as a dangerous aberration which contains a serious threat to countries in the region. It is this that has led to what is acknowledged to be an unusual decision. As I have already said it was not an easy decision, but in the final analysis the interests of the Eastern Caribbean countries (including Grenada) and their concern for the peace, security and stability in the region were compelling.


I am aware of the strong principles which guide your own consideration in matters of this kind, and of the wider implications that these actions can be deemed to have for the international community. I hope that in judging this you will also take account of the factors which I have outlined to you at some length, and in particular the deep anxieties of the several small countries which are most closely affected.

I wish to stress that Jamaica does not regard the action in Grenada as intervention, nor is intervention a practice to which we would subscribe. We acted in response to an urgent plea from a group of small defenceless countries who themselves are bound together by treaty obligations on which they based their appeal to three other countries - Barbados, Jamaica and the United States - to assist them to restore normality in the beleaguered country of Grenada and to remove the threat to their security posed by Grenada under its present rulers who have comparatively awesome military capabilities at their command and external support from Nations with a known record for subversion.

As additional information I am attaching the following:

- letter from the Chairman of the OECS requesting our assistance in the joint action
- my statement to the Jamaica House of Representatives on 25th October
- the Resolution adopted without division by the House of Representatives on 25th October.

Yours sincerely,


Edward Seaga
Prime Minister



With the compliments of
THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION
P.O. BOX 575
TRAFALGAR ROAD
KINGSTON 10
JAMAICA

ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES

Telegraphic Address: OECAS ST. LUCIA

Telex: 6248 OECAS LC

Telephone: 22537-8 & 23185

Our Ref:

Your Ref:

Central Secretariat

P.O. Box 179,

Bridge Street,

Castries, St. Lucia,

West Indies

Dear Prime Minister

The Chairman of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States presents her compliments to the Rt. Honourable Edward Seaga, Prime Minister of Jamaica and has the honour to transmit herewith a request for assistance under Article 8 of the Treaty establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States.

The Chairman of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States avails herself of this opportunity to renew the assurances of her highest consideration.

Sincerely
Jugenia Charles
Chairman

Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States

23rd October, 1983

1. The Authority of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) met at Bridgetown, Barbados on Friday 21st October, 1983, to consider and evaluate the situation in Grenada arising out of the overthrow of the Government led by Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and the subsequent killing of the Prime Minister together with some of his colleagues and a number of other citizens.
2. The Authority is aware that the overthrow of the Bishop Administration took place with the knowledge and connivance of forces unfriendly to the OECS, leading to the establishment of the present military regime.
3. The meeting took note of the current anarchical conditions, the serious violations of human rights and bloodshed that have occurred, and the consequent unprecedented threat to the peace and security of the region created by the vacuum of authority in Grenada.
4. The Authority was deeply concerned that military forces and supplies are likely to be shortly introduced to consolidate the position of the regime and that the country can be used as a staging post for acts of aggression against its members.

5. The Authority further noted that the capability of the Grenada armed forces is already at a level of sophistication and size far beyond the internal needs of that country. Furthermore the member states of the OECS have no means of defence against such forces.
6. The Member Governments of the Organisation hold the strong view that such a situation would further undermine political, social and economic stability, and would have extremely dangerous consequences for the preservation of peace and security in the OECS sub-region as a whole.
7. The Authority noted that the present regime in Grenada has demonstrated by its brutality and ruthlessness that it will stop at nothing to achieve its ends and to secure its power
8. Under the authority of Article 8 of the Treaty establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, the Authority proposes therefore to take action for collective defence and the preservation of peace and security against external aggression by requesting

assistance from friendly countries to provide transport, logistics support and additional military personnel to assist the efforts of the OECS to stabilize this most grave situation within the Eastern Caribbean.

9. The Authority of the OECS wishes to establish a peace keeping force with the assistance of friendly neighbouring states to restore on Grenada conditions of tranquillity and order so as to prevent further loss of life and abuses of human rights pending the restoration of constitutional Government.

STATEMENT TO THE NATION
BY THE PRIME MINISTER, RT. HON. EDWARD SEAGA,
ON DEVELOPMENTS IN GRENADA

YESTERDAY I RETURNED TO JAMAICA AFTER A WEEKEND OF CLOSE CONTACT WITH MY EASTERN CARIBBEAN COLLEAGUES, PARTICULARLY PRIME MINISTER ADAMS OF BARBADOS AND PRIME MINISTER CHARLES OF DOMINICA WHO IS CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES. I RETURNED WITH A SOBER AWARENESS OF THEIR DEEP ANXIETIES AND FEARS OVER THE SITUATION IN GRENADA AND A SOLEMN SENSE OF OUR RESPONSIBILITY AS A CARIBBEAN PEOPLE. WE CANNOT BE OBLIVIOUS TO THE FACT THAT IF A WHOLE GOVERNMENT AND LEADING CITIZENS CAN BE WIPED OUT WITHOUT STRONG ACTION TO BACK PROTEST THEN THERE IS NO LIMIT TO THE ENCOURAGEMENT THAT THIS WILL GIVE TO MADMEN OF EITHER THE RIGHT OR THE LEFT.

LAST/

ADVISE HIM OF MY INTENTION TO COMMIT THE BRAVO COMPANY OF THE 2ND BATTALION OF THE JDF TO A MILITARY OPERATION IN GRENADA FOR WHICH HIS APPROVAL WOULD BE REQUIRED BY LAW IN HIS CAPACITY OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE JDF. AFTER FULLY BRIEFING HIM ON THE SITUATION, THE GOVERNOR GENERAL GAVE HIS APPROVAL.

EARLIER IN THE DAY, IMMEDIATELY AFTER MY RETURN FROM BARBADOS I SUMMONED A MEETING OF CABINET WHERE I SOUGHT AND OBTAINED APPROVAL FOR JAMAICAN FORCES TO PARTICIPATE IN A MULTINATIONAL MILITARY OPERATION AGAINST GRENADA.

THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION WAS ADVISED BY ME THIS MORNING BY LETTER.

THE PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY OPERATION NOW UNDER WAY IN GRENADA IS TO RESTORE THE COUNTRY TO NORMALITY WITH A MINIMUM LOSS OF LIVES, TO FREE THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA FROM THE TERRORISM AND BRUTALITY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN SUFFERING AND TO ELIMINATE THE

PERCEIVED/

3
PERCEIVED THREAT OF HOSTILITY AND AGGRESSION BY GRENADA TO NEIGHBOURING CARIBBEAN STATES CAUSED BY NATIONS UNFRIENDLY TO THE CAUSE OF DEMOCRACY WHICH WERE AT THE SEAT OF INFLUENCE IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE ISLAND.

THE CARIBBEAN SECURITY FORCE IS COMPRISED OF EIGHT COUNTRIES: 6 MEMBERS OF THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES (OECS), (MONTserrat, ANTIGUA/BARBUDA, ST. KITTS/NEVIS, ST. LUCIA, ST. VINCENT AND DOMINICA) BARBADOS AND JAMAICA.

THE LEADER OF THE CARIBBEAN SECURITY FORCE IS COLONEL KEN BARNES OF THE JAMAICA DEFENCE FORCE WHO ARRIVED IN BARBADOS TO PARTICIPATE OVER THE WEEKEND IN PLANNING THE OPERATION SUBJECT TO FINAL DECISIONS TO BE TAKEN IN JAMAICA AS TO OUR OWN PARTICIPATION.

I NOW REPORT TO PARLIAMENT AND THE NATION THAT GRENADA WAS THIS MORNING INVADED BY UNITED STATES MARINES BACKED BY TROOPS FROM A CARIBBEAN SECURITY FORCE OF WHICH JAMAICAN TROOPS ARE A PART. THE LATEST INFORMATION THAT I HAVE REGARDING THE SITUATION ON THAT ISLAND IS THAT ALL MAJOR INITIAL OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN SECURED. THE TWO

AIRFIELDS/

FIELDS, THE TWO MEDICAL SCHOOLS, THE POWER STATION AND THE BROADCASTING STATION HAVE BEEN TAKEN.

THE ONLY FIGHTING IN ST. GEORGES, THE CAPITAL OF GRENADA, IS SOME SPORADIC SHOOTING. HEAVY FIGHTING HOWEVER IS TAKING PLACE AROUND GOVERNMENT HOUSE WHERE THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL LIVES, AND IN THE HILLS AROUND FORT FREDERICK WHERE THE POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE BEING HELD.

AS FAR AS CASUALTIES ARE CONCERNED, THE NUMBERS REVEALED SO FAR ARE LOW, BUT IT IS BELIEVED THAT ALL HAVE NOT YET BEEN REPORTED. THE FIGURES AS OF MIDDAY WERE: 3 CIVILIANS DEAD, 12 CUBANS KILLED AND 22 CAPTURED. THE CUBAN FATALITIES RESULTED FROM THE FACT THAT CUBANS WHO WERE SUPPOSED TO BE TECHNICIANS TURNED OUT TO BE SOLDIERS AND WERE OFFERING HEAVY FIRE TO THE INVADING FORCES.

IT IS REPORTED THAT A NUMBER OF SOVIET TECHNICIANS HAVE ALSO BEEN HELD BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THEY WERE ALSO INVOLVED IN ANY EXCHANGE OF GUNFIRE.

WHAT HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS A VAST QUANTITY OF

SOVIET /

SOVIET ARMS WAS SEIZED AT THE POINT SALINE AIRPORT WHERE THE BRAVO COMPANY OF THE JDF IS IN PLACE. THESE INCLUDE AK 47 SOVIET ASSAULT RIFLES.

I WOULD REMIND PARLIAMENT OF THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN GRENADA SINCE THE 13TH OF OCTOBER. ON THAT DAY WORD WAS RECEIVED THAT MR. MAURICE BISHOP, THE PRIME MINISTER OF GRENADA, WAS BEING KEPT UNDER HOUSE ARREST AT HIS OFFICIAL RESIDEN

IN/

IN ST. GEORGES BY A FACTION OF HIS PARTY, THE NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT, WITH WHOM HE WAS IN DISAGREEMENT. HOWEVER, IT BECAME CLEAR AS EVENTS UNFOLDED THAT THIS WAS NO ORDINARY INTERNAL POWER STRUGGLE BUT A WELL PLANNED AND ORCHESTRATED COUP WHICH WAS CARRIED OUT WITH A SAVAGERY AND BRUTALITY WITHOUT PRECEDENT IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN.

ON WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 19, AFTER HAVING BEEN RELEASED BY A LARGE CROWD OF HIS SUPPORTERS, MR. BISHOP, HIS MINISTER OF EDUCATION, MISS JACQUELINE CREFT, HIS FOREIGN MINISTER, MR. UNISON WHITEMAN, MR. NORRIS BAIN, MINISTER OF HOUSING, MR. VINCENT NOEL, LEADER OF THE BANK AND GENERAL WORKERS UNION, AND MR. FITZROY BAIN, ANOTHER TRADE UNION LEADER, ^{HAD} BEEN BRUTALLY EXECUTED BY CUBAN-TRAINED MILITARY OFFICERS WHO HAD SEIZED POWER. WE ALSO LEARNED SUBSEQUENTLY THAT THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY HAD FIRED ON A CROWD OF DEMONSTRATORS WHICH INCLUDED MANY WOMEN AND CHILDREN AND THAT SEVERAL OF THESE HAVE NOT BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR AND ARE PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN KILLED. AN EYEWITNESS REPORTS HAVING SEEN A CHILD ATTEMPTING TO JUMP TO SAFETY HAVING HIS LEGS BLOWN OFF.

THE SEEDS OF THIS TRAGIC SITUATION WERE SOWN FIVE YEARS AGO WHEN THE CORRUPT GOVERNMENT OF ERIC GAIRY WAS OVERTHROWN BY A COUP LED BY MR. MAURICE BISHOP. WHILE THERE WAS NO QUESTION THAT THE GAIRY ADMINISTRATION HAD FORFEITED THE RESPECT OF ALL DECENT CITIZENS OF THE CARIBBEAN, THIS GOVERNMENT, WHICH WAS THEN IN OPPOSITION, FROM THE OUTSET TOOK THE VIEW THAT A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT HAD BEEN SET WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY HAVE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES. I URGED AT THE TIME THAT RECOGNITION OF THE BISHOP REGIME SHOULD BE WITHHELD UNTIL IT SECURED A MANDATE FROM THE ELECTORATE. THIS WOULD MAKE CERTAIN, I SAID THEN, THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF ARMED OVERTHROW OF A GOVERNMENT IS NOT ACCEPTED IN THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN, AND WOULD REINFORCE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AS THE ONLY RECOGNISED BASIS OF SELECTING A GOVERNMENT. FROM THE OUTSET THIS ADMINISTRATION VIEWED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GOVERNMENT BY COUP IN GRENADA IN 1979 AS HAVING FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS ON WHICH ALL THE GOVERNMENTS OF THIS REGION ARE BASED.

WE DID NOT ACCEPT THE MODE OF REVOLUTION AS A MEANS OF CHANGING GOVERNMENTS, NOR DID WE HAVE SYMPATHY FOR THE IDEOLOGY WHICH MR. BISHOP ESPOUSED. BUT NOTWITHSTANDING THIS, THERE ARE DEEP PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN THE EVENTS THAT TRANSPIRED IN GRENADA SINCE THE 13TH OF OCTOBER WHICH HAVE CAUSED THE GOVERNMENT TO TAKE A NUMBER OF GRAVE DECISIONS WITH REGARD TO OUR OWN POSITION. AT THE ROOT OF THESE PRINCIPLES, IS THE INESCAPABLE FACT THAT REVOLUTION BREEDS REVOLUTION BECAUSE IT MAKES NO ALLOWANCE TO INSTITUTIONALISE OPPOSITION AND TO CHANGE ADMINISTRATIONS PEACEFULLY.

DURING THE PAST WEEK WE WITNESSED IN GRENADA NOT ONLY A REVOLUTION SPAWNING ITS OWN DESTRUCTION BUT A BRUTAL MILITARY TAKE-OVER OF A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT.

IT MAY BE FELT THAT THESE MATTERS DO NOT CONCERN US. BUT MOST CERTAINLY THEY DO. IF A WHOLE GOVERNMENT CAN BE WIPED OUT OVERNIGHT EITHER BY POLITICAL OR MILITARY EXTREMISTS AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE CARIBBEAN REMAIN SILENT AND PASSIVE THEN NO GOVERNMENT ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE CAN BE SAFE FROM

MADMEN/

MADMEN OF ONE TYPE OF ANOTHER WHO WOULD SEEK TO REPLACE
A GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE, ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE WITH
ONE SELECTED BY A CHOSEN FEW OF WHATEVER NATURE.

IF WE IGNORE THE OCCURRENCE OF BRUTAL MILITARY
TAKE-OVERS OR POLITICAL OVERTHROWS OF GOVERNMENTS, WE
WOULD IMMEDIATELY GIVE HEART TO EVERY SUBVERSIVE GROUP
WITHIN THE REGION TO ENGINEER DISORDER AND INSTABILITY
AS A MEANS OF OVERTHROW. NO DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE A CHANCE OF CARRYING OUT THE
PROGRAMMES OF DEVELOPMENT WHICH IT WAS ELECTED TO
IMPLEMENT IF IN ITS MIDST WAS A GROUP OF SUBVERSIVES,
ANARCHISTS AND TERRORISTS BENT ON DESTRUCTION OF THE
FOUNDATIONS OF STABILITY WHICH UNDER-PIN THE WHOLE SYSTEM
OF DEMOCRACY. THE FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH
NEGLECT ON OUR PART WOULD BE AWESOME, AND WOULD HAVE THE
EFFECT OF CREATING AN UNSURE AND INSECURE FUTURE FOR
ALL OF US.

FOR THE SAKE OF THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT WHICH WE ALL AGREE TO BE THE ONE WHICH ALLOWS

THE/

THE MAXIMUM FREEDOM OF CHOICE TO A PEOPLE AND PROTECTS THEIR RIGHT TO ELECT A GOVERNMENT OF THEIR CHOICE, WE CANNOT IGNORE THE EVENTS WHICH DEFEAT THESE PURPOSES WHEREVER THEY OCCUR IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN.

IN THE STATES IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN THERE IS AT THIS MOMENT NOT ONLY A STRONG REVULSION AGAINST THE RECENT ATROCITIES IN GRENADA, WHICH WE SHARE, BUT ALSO OVERWHELMING ANXIETY - INDEED FEAR - FOR THEIR OWN SECURITY THIS ADDED URGENCY TO THE NEED TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE GRENADA CRISIS.

THE TIME HAS NOW COME WHEN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES HAS MADE IT UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR THAT WE WILL NOT TOLERATE SUBVERSION AND REVOLUTION, AND THAT WE WILL TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION TO DEAL WITH ALL SUCH INSTANCES EMPHATICALLY AND DECISIVELY.

IT IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY RECOGNISED THAT THE CHARACTER OF TODAY'S CARIBBEAN LEADERSHIP HAS CHANGED AS A RESULT OF THE EVENTS OF THE 1970'S.

TODAY'S CARIBBEAN LEADERSHIP IS DETERMINED THAT INSTANCES OF MILITARY AND REVOLUTIONARY TAKE-OVERS MUST

BE DEALT WITH IN SUCH A MANNER AS WILL LEAVE NO ROOM FOR DOUBT WHATSOEVER AS TO THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN.

IT IS IN OUR INTEREST THAT WE SHOULD NOT ENCOURAGE REVOLUTION AND THE INTRODUCTION OF TOTALITARIAN STYLE GOVERNMENT TO DISPLACE DEMOCRACY.

IT IS IN OUR INTEREST THAT WE SHOULD NOT ENCOURAGE THE ARMED OVERTHROW OF GOVERNMENTS.

IT IS IN OUR INTEREST THAT WE SHOULD NOT ENCOURAGE THOSE WHO DESIRE TO SEIZE POWER BY ILLEGAL MEANS TO BRUTALLY LIQUIDATE A COUNTRY'S LEADERSHIP AND DEFENCELESS CITIZENS.

IT WAS THEREFORE IN OUR INTEREST THAT WE SHOULD JOIN WITH OUR CARIBBEAN COLLEAGUES - BARBADOS, DOMINICA, ST. VINCENT, ST. LUCIA, ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA, ST. KITTS/NEVIS AND MONTSERRAT IN TAKING THE PRESENT ACTION.

THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT EVENTS SINCE THE 13TH OF OCTOBER MARK A TURNING POINT IN THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN, AND IT IS EQUALLY CERTAIN THAT THE AFTERMATH OF THESE EVENTS WILL LEAVE NONE OF US UNTOUCHED.

WE HAVE HAD TO TAKE ACTION TO DEFEND OUR
DEEPEST VALUES FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF OUR OWN SELF-RESPECT
IN HELPING OUR SISTER NATIONS IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN
TO PRESERVE THEIR PEACE AND SECURITY.

IT IS INTENDED THAT THE LIBERATION OF THE
GRENADIAN PEOPLE WILL BE FOLLOWED BY A RESTORATION OF FULL
DEMOCRACY AS A MATTER OF URGENCY WITH THE HOLDING OF
ELECTIONS. IN THE MEANTIME, AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION
WILL BE INVITED TO LOOK AFTER THE AFFAIRS OF THE COUNTRY.

THE EVENTS IN GRENADA FALL INTO TWO PARTS:
THE TOTAL BREAKDOWN OF INTERNAL ORDER AS A RESULT OF THE
KILLING OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND ALMOST THE ENTIRE
CABINET LEAVING A VACUUM OF AUTHORITY WHICH WAS FILLED
BY MEN OF THE MOST BRUTAL TYPE WHO PROCEEDED TO COMMIT
ATROCITIES AGAINST PEOPLE AND EVEN LITTLE CHILDREN,
LEADING TO A LARGE, AND AS YET UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF
DEATHS.

THE EXTERNAL COMPONENT OF THIS TRAGEDY IS BASED
ON THE PERCEIVED THREAT ARISING FROM THE CAPACITY OF THE
LEADERSHIP/

LEADERSHIP WHICH SEIZED POWER, TO USE THE ARMED CAPABILITIES AND MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE OF GRENADA FOR ACTS OF HOSTILITY AGAINST NEIGHBOURING STATES.

THE SIZE AND SOPHISTICATION OF THE ARMED FORCE OF GRENADA CAN BE MEASURED BY A COMPARISON WITH THOSE OF JAMAICA. GRENADA, HAVING ONLY ONE-TWENTIETH OF THE POPULATION OF JAMAICA HAD MOBILISED AN ARMY THAT WAS ONE AND A HALF TIMES AS LARGE AS THE JAMAICA DEFENCE FORCE. SOME OF GRENADA'S NEIGHBOURS HAVE NO ARMY AT ALL! OTHERS HAVE ARMIES OF LESS THAN 200 MEN.

THE NEW AIRSTRIP, IN THE FINAL STAGES OF COMPLETION BY CUBANS, ADDED ANOTHER CAPABILITY WHICH, IN THE HANDS OF SANE MEN WOULD HAVE OFFERED NO THREAT BUT AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE INSANITY OF THE PAST 2 WEEKS WOULD BE A LOGICAL STAGING AREA FOR COUNTRIES WHOSE INTERESTS ARE SIMILAR, AND WHO HAVE AMBITIONS FOR USING GRENADA AS A CENTRE FOR SUBVERSION, SABOTAGE AND INFILTRATION WITHIN THE AREA AND AGAINST MEMBER STATES OF THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES.

AGAIN/

AGAIN, THE POWERFUL BROADCASTING STATION IN GRENADA, STANDING ON ITS OWN, ALTHOUGH CAPABLE OF REACHING FROM ONE END OF THE CARIBBEAN TO THE OTHER, FAR EXCEEDING THE POWER OF ANY STATION IN JAMAICA WOULD, IN ITSELF NOT NECESSARILY BE A THREAT, BUT IN THE HANDS OF EXTREMISTS OF A MILITARY OR IDEOLOGICAL NATURE, BOTH OF WHOM EXIST IN GRENADA, CONSTITUTES A POTENT WEAPON FOR SUBVERTING NEIGHBOURING STATES.

WHILE MAURICE BISHOP WAS ALIVE THERE WAS SOME INDICATION THAT THESE CAPABILITIES COULD AND WOULD BE USED IN THIS SUBVERSIVE MANNER AGAINST NEIGHBOURING STATES AS THERE WERE COMPLAINTS REGARDING TRAINING OF A PARA-MILITARY AND MILITARY NATURE TAKING PLACE IN GRENADA AMONG CITIZENS OF NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES KNOWN FOR THEIR OWN SUBVERSIVE INTERESTS.

HOWEVER, WHATEVER MAY HAVE BEEN THE THREAT, IT WAS MINIMAL IN THE HANDS OF MAURICE BISHOP WHO WAS A MODERATE IN COMPARISON WITH THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERS OF THE REGIME WHICH OVERTHREW HIM.

A TOTALLY DIFFERENT PICTURE EMERGES WHEN THIS ARRAY OF MILITARY AND SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITY CAME TO BE AT THE DISPOSAL OF ONE OF THE MOST EXTREMIST GROUPS OF MEN TO ASSUME CONTROL OF ANY COUNTRY IN RECENT TIMES. FEW COUNTRIES CAN HAVE CLAIMED THE EXPERIENCE OF HAVING ITS ENTIRE CABINET WIPED OUT IN THE MANNER IN WHICH THAT OF GRENADA WAS EXTERMINATED.

WHO THEN CAN BLAME THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES FOR PERCEIVING THIS COMBINATION OF AWESOME MIGHT AND BRUTAL MEN, WHO APPARENTLY HAD NO CONCEPT OF WHERE TO STOP IN TAKING HUMAN LIFE, AS A PRELUDE TO HOSTILE ACTION BEING TAKEN, BEYOND THEIR OWN BORDERS BY THOSE IN POWER IN GRENADA?

THESE CONSIDERATIONS ARE SET OUT IN A DOCUMENT PRESENTED BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES, WITH AN ACCOMPANYING LETTER AS THE BASIS OF THE INVITATION TO FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS TO COME TO THEIR AID IN RESTORING NORMALITY TO GRENADA AND IN REMOVING THE PERCEIVED THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN THEIR REGION.

I SET OUT HERE THE CONTENTS OF THE ANNEXURE
THE LETTER OF INVITATION:

1. THE AUTHORITY OF THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES (OECS) MET AT BRIDGETOWN, BARBADOS, ON FRIDAY, 21ST OCTOBER, 1983, TO CONSIDER AND EVALUATE THE SITUATION IN GRENADA ARISING OUT OF THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT LED BY PRIME MINISTER MAURICE BISHOP AND THE SUBSEQUENT KILLING OF THE PRIME MINISTER TOGETHER WITH SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES AND A NUMBER OF OTHER CITIZENS.
2. THE AUTHORITY IS AWARE THAT THE OVERTHROW OF THE BISHOP ADMINISTRATION TOOK PLACE WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONNIVANCE OF FORCES UNFRIENDLY TO THE OECS, LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PRESENT MILITARY REGIME.
3. THE MEETING TOOK NOTE OF THE CURRENT ANARCHICAL CONDITIONS, THE SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND BLOODSHED THAT HAVE OCCURRED, AND THE CONSEQUENT UNPRECEDENTED THREAT TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE REGION CREATED BY THE VACUUM OF AUTHORITY IN GRENADA.

4. THE AUTHORITY WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT MILITARY FORCES AND SUPPLIES ARE LIKELY TO BE SHORTLY INTRODUCED TO CONSOLIDATE THE POSITION OF THE REGIME AND THAT THE COUNTRY CAN BE USED AS A STAGING POST FOR ACTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST ITS MEMBERS.
5. THE AUTHORITY FURTHER NOTED THAT THE CAPABILITY OF THE GRENADA ARMED FORCES IS ALREADY AT A LEVEL OF SOPHISTICATION AND SIZE FAR BEYOND THE INTERNAL NEEDS OF THAT COUNTRY. FURTHERMORE THE MEMBER STATES OF THE OECS HAVE NO MEANS OF DEFENCE AGAINST SUCH FORCES.
6. THE MEMBER GOVERNMENTS OF THE ORGANISATION HOLD THE STRONG VIEW THAT SUCH A SITUATION WOULD FURTHER UNDERMINE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY, AND WOULD HAVE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE OECS SUB-REGION AS A WHOLE.
7. THE AUTHORITY NOTED THAT THE PRESENT REGIME IN GRENADA HAS DEMONSTRATED BY ITS BRUTALITY AND RUTHLESSNESS THAT IT WILL STOP AT NOTHING TO ACHIEVE ITS ENDS AND TO SECURE ITS POWER.

8. UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES, THE AUTHORITY PROPOSES THEREFORE TO TAKE ACTION FOR COLLECTIVE DEFENCE AND THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION BY REQUESTING ASSISTANCE FROM FRIENDLY COUNTRIES TO PROVIDE TRANSPORT LOGISTICS SUPPORT AND ADDITIONAL MILITARY PERSONNEL TO ASSIST THE EFFORTS OF THE OECS TO STABILIZE THIS MOST GRAVE SITUATION WITHIN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN.

9. THE AUTHORITY OF THE OECS WISHES TO ESTABLISH A PEACE KEEPING FORCE WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF FRIENDLY NEIGHBOURING STATES TO RESTORE ON GRENADA CONDITIONS OF TRANQUILITY AND ORDER SO AS TO PREVENT FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE AND ABUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS PENDING THE RESTORATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.

THE LETTER ITSELF READS AS FOLLOWS:

"DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES PRESENTS HER COMPLIMENTS TO THE RT. HONOURABLE EDWARD SEAGA, PRIME MINISTER OF JAMAICA/

JAMAICA AND HAS THE HONOUR TO TRANSMIT HERewith A REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE UNDER ARTICLE 8 OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES.

"THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES AVAILS HERSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW THE ASSURANCES OF HER HIGHEST CONSIDERATION

"SINCERELY

(SGD.) EUGENIA CHARLES

CHAIRMAN

ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES"

23RD OCTOBER, 1983.

IT WAS ON THIS BASIS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF JAMAICA DECIDED TO ENGAGE ITS DEFENCE FORCE IN A MULTINATIONAL MILITARY ACTION TO CARRY OUT A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE TO REMOVE THE THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE AREA AND AT THE SAME TIME TO RESTORE NORMALITY TO THE ISLAND OF GRENADA.

THE BRAVO COMPANY OF THE 2ND BATTALION OF THE JDF DEPARTED FOR GRENADA AND IS PRESENTLY STATIONED AT POINT SALINE, THE CUBAN BUILT AIRPORT IN GRENADA, WHICH WAS

CAPTURED/

CAPTURED THIS MORNING AND MUST BE KEPT SECURE.

CONTACT WITH MEN OF BRAVO COMPANY INDICATES THAT THEY ARE IN HIGH SPIRITS AND HAVE SUFFERED NO CASUALTIES SO FAR.

LET IT BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS BOLD AND HISTORIC ACTION WHICH A NUMBER OF CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES HAVE JOINTLY TAKEN (WHILE OTHERS HAVE STOOD ASIDE) CANNOT BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF CHANGING AN AUSTIN FOR A GAIRY.

IN THE SAME WAY THAT WE HAVE PROCLAIMED BY THIS ACTION, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, THAT ASSASSINATION AND REVOLUTIONARY OVERTHROW OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENTS HAVE MET THEIR MATCH IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE NEW CHARACTER OF CARIBBEAN LEADERS - WHETHER THROUGH THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AS WAS THE CASE IN 1980 AND 1981, OR BY THE MILITARY ACTION CARRIED OUT TODAY - SO TOO MUST THE GAIRY'S MEET THEIR MATCH BY A NEW RESOLVE OF THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO A FIRST DECREE FROM THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT PLACING A BAN ON THE GAIRY'S AND THE AUSTIN'S AND WHAT THEY REPRESENT, FROM PARTICIPATION IN

THE CONSTITUTIONAL OR ELECTORAL PROCESS.

THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA CAN BE ASSURED THAT THIS ACTION IN WHICH WE HAVE JOINED TODAY IS INTENDED TO FREE THEM FROM BEING PAWNS IN A POWER PLAY WHICH HAD CONVERTED THEIR LOVELY SPICE ISLAND TO A FEARSOME CAMP. FROM THIS ACTION WE HOPE THEY WILL DERIVE A NEW FREEDOM AND A NEW OPPORTUNITY TO BUILD A NEW FUTURE.

AS CARIBBEAN BROTHERS WILLING AND ABLE TO ASSIST EACH OTHER, WE MUST NOW ENSURE THAT THE FUTURE CAN BE ONE OF SOLID COOPERATION IN WHICH GRENADA WILL NO LONGER BE THE ODD MAN OUT, BUT BE ONCE AGAIN WELCOMED INTO THE FAMILY OF CARIBBEAN NATIONS.

IN CLOSING, I PAY TRIBUTE TO THE VALIANT MEN OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES WHO LED THIS THRU TOGETHER WITH OUR OWN BRAVE SOLDIERS DRAWN FROM THE RANKS OF THE DEFENCE FORCES OF 8 CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES.

THERE ARE NO WARS WITHOUT GRIEF, WITHOUT DEATH, WITHOUT INJURY; BUT WE PRAY GOD TODAY THAT HE WILL GIVE PROTECTION TO THOSE WHO FIGHT SO THAT THEY MAY RETURN SAFELY TO THEIR FAMILIES.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Notice of Resolution given by H. L. Shearer,
M.P., for South East Clarendon

WHEREAS

the House has been following with deep concern the tragic and appalling events in Grenada since October 13 culminating in the brutal and horrifying executions of Government Ministers, trade union leaders and other citizens carried out by a murderous group which had seized power in Grenada; and

WHEREAS

these events caused profound shock and deep revulsion throughout the Caribbean region and other parts of the world which are wedded to democratic values of peaceful and orderly political change based on the will of the people; and

WHEREAS

the violent methods of political change in Grenada are alien to Caribbean democracies and confirm and highlight the dangers of undemocratic and totalitarian systems of Government; and

WHEREAS

the self-styled Revolutionary Military Council in Grenada had embarked on a ruthless and violent campaign of suppression of the rights of the Grenadian people; and

WHEREAS

Jamaica has an obligation to do everything possible to join in assisting the Grenadian people to recover their freedom and full enjoyment of their human rights:

BE IT RESOLVED THAT THIS HOUSE

1. Resolutely condemns the brutal executions and violent suppression of the rights of the people in Grenada carried out by the military regime;
2. Expresses its horror and indignation at the violent and barbarous methods that emerged in Grenada last week;
3. Endorses fully the measures adopted by the Government of Jamaica in dealing with the crisis;
4. Extends its deep sympathy and condolences to the families of the victims of the violence in Grenada;
5. Urges the Government to continue to assist in ensuring the restoration to the people of Grenada of constitutional Government through the holding of free elections and their full enjoyment of human rights.



3/421/52

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the British High Commission and has the honour to request that the enclosed envelope which is addressed to The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher be transmitted to her at the earliest opportunity.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the British High Commission the assurances of its highest consideration.



British High Commission
Kingston, Jamaica

27 October, 1983

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PS/MR WHITNEY
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SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY

SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE
CABINET OFFICE
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FM WASHINGTON 270600Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3161 OF 26 OCTOBER

AND TO PARIS (FOR PS/SECRETARY OF STATE)

INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN ROUTINE KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN, NASSAU,
BELMOPAN AND GEORGETOWN

YOUR TELNO 1796: ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL

1. I CALLED ON EAGLEBURGER THIS EVENING AND LEFT WITH HIM A PIECE OF PAPER REGARDING THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL WHICH WAS BASED ON PARAGRAPHS 2-4 OF YOUR TUR. HE WAS VERY GLAD TO HAVE IT.
2. I SAID THAT AS WE SHARED THE OBJECTIVE OF RESTORING CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN GRENADA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, I THOUGHT HE MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN HAVING THE BRITISH VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION. OF COURSE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL HIMSELF KNEW THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION AND SO DID THE OEC STATES TAKING PART IN THE OPERATION. I EXPRESSED THAT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION IT WAS NOT OPEN TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO OFFER THE GOVERNOR GENERAL ADVICE, STILL LESS TO GIVE HIM INSTRUCTIONS.
3. EAGLEBURGER SAID HE WOULD TELEGRAPH THE PIECE OF PAPER THAT I WAS LEAVING HIM TO SHULTZ, WHO WAS AT THAT MOMENT IN THE AIR ON HIS WAY TO PARIS. HE THOUGHT IT PROBABLE THAT SHULTZ WOULD WISH TO HAVE A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION WITH YOU TOMORROW.
4. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR US TO GET ROUND THE TABLE AND DISCUSS THE FUTURE AS SOON AS THE ADMINISTRATION HAD PUT ITS THOUGHTS IN ORDER. THE ADMINISTRATION DID NOT HAVE A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT LINED UP AND WOULD BE HOPING FOR VIEWS FROM THE OECs AND OTHERS.

I SAID THAT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL WOULD BE BEST PLACED TO KNOW WHO TO CALL ON. MOTLEY, WHO WAS PRESENT, SAID THAT SOME OF THE CANDIDATES MIGHT BE IN THE ISLAND PRISON, WHICH WAS STILL THE SCENE OF SOME FAIRLY INTENSE FIGHTING. IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHETHER THEY

FAIRLY INTENSE FIGHTING. IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHETHER THEY WOULD HAVE SURVIVED.

5. YOUR PARA 6. MOTLEY SAID THAT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL WAS AT PRESENT IN A HOUSE ON A PIECE OF HIGH GROUND ABOVE THE RUNWAY AT SALINAS. HE DOUBTED HE WAS CONTACTABLE OVER TELEPHONE. ONE OF THE FIRST AMERICAN OBJECTIVES HAD BEEN TO LOCATE HIM. A TEAM OF ''SEALS'' HAD SUCCEEDED IN THIS YESTERDAY MORNING BUT HAD THEN COME UNDER ATTACK FROM A CUBAN FORCE. IT WAS ONLY THIS MORNING THAT THEY HAD BEEN RELIEVED BY REINFORCEMENTS. THEY HAD THEN TRANSPORTED THE GOVERNOR GENERAL BY HELICOPTER TO HIS PRESENT LOCATION. EAGLEBURGER SAID HE WOULD GIVE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE US AMBASSADOR IN BARBADOS TO TELL MR BULLARD HOW CONTACT COULD BE ESTABLISHED WITH THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

7. PLEASE SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL)

WRIGHT

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FM WASHINGTON 270008Z OCT 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3158 OF 26 OCTOBER
INFO PRIORITY BRIDGETOWN, UKMIS NEW YORK AND MODUK

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MY TELNO 3131: GRENADA: CONGRESSIONAL REACTIONS

1. DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION TO THE US ACTION HAS HARDENED IN THE COURSE OF TODAY. AS THE DEMOCRATS REALISE THAT THE ACTION AGAINST THE CUBANS IN GRENADA MAY PROVE POPULAR IN MIDDLE AMERICA, CRITICISM IS FOCUSSED MAINLY ON THE PROCEDURAL QUESTION OF THE WAR POWERS ACT, WHICH BOTH THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ARE CLAIMING HAS NOT BEEN PROPERLY APPLIED OVER GRENADA. THESE CRITICISMS ARE INCREASINGLY BEING LINKED TO MOVES BY DEMOCRATS IN BOTH HOUSES, IN THE WAKE OF THE LEBANON BOMBINGS, TO REOPEN THE WAR POWERS ACT COMPROMISE REACHED OVER THE LEBANON AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER (WHEREBY CONGRESS AUTHORISED THE CONTINUED DEPLOYMENT OF US MARINES IN LEBANON FOR A FURTHER 18 MONTHS).

2. WRITTEN NOTIFICATION OF THE GRENADA ACTION WAS GIVEN TO BOTH HOUSES UNDER THE WAR POWERS ACT YESTERDAY EVENING. BUT BECAUSE THE NOTIFICATION DID NOT INVOKE THE CONSULTATIVE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT (ARTICLE 4(A)), AND DOES NOT THEREFORE IMPOSE AN AUTOMATIC TIME-LIMIT ON US TROOP DEPLOYMENTS IN GRENADA, THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE HAS SAID THAT HE IS NOT SATISFIED WITH IT. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, CONGRESSMAN ZABLOCKI, HAS ACCUSED THE PRESIDENT OF REFUSING TO COMPLY FULLY AND PROPERLY WITH THE LAW, AND IS INTENDING TO INTRODUCE A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WAR POWERS ACT AND CONSEQUENT APPLICATION OF AN AUTOMATIC LIMIT OF 60 DAYS ON TROOP DEPLOYMENTS IN GRENADA. THIS TIME LIMIT IS OF COURSE UNLIKELY TO AFFECT THE GRENADA OPERATION DIRECTLY BUT IT IS THE LACK OF PRIOR CONSULTATION, RATHER THAN THE FACT OF THE US INTERVENTION, THAT PARTICULARLY IRKS MOST CONGRESSMEN. SEVERAL OF OUR CONTACTS ON THE HILL HAVE POINTED TO PARALLELS WITH THE LACK OF CONSULTATION WITH HMG.

3. IN SEPARATE MOVES IN THE SENATE TODAY A GROUP OF DEMOCRATIC

WITH HMG.

3. IN SEPARATE MOVES IN THE SENATE TODAY A GROUP OF DEMOCRATIC SENATORS HAVE DECIDED TO GO ALL OUT FOR A REOPENING OF THE WAR POWERS COMPROMISE OVER THE LEBANON. SENATOR KENNEDY HAS TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT HE INTENDS TO TRY TO GET DEPLOYMENTS IN THE LEBANON LIMITED TO TWO MONTHS, RENEWABLE ONLY WITH THE SPECIFIC AGREEMENT OF CONGRESS. THIS SORT OF INITIATIVE IS UNLIKELY TO MAKE MUCH HEADWAY IN THE SENATE, WHERE THE REPUBLICAN MAJORITY WILL PROBABLY REMAIN LOYAL TO THE PRESIDENT. BUT IF ENOUGH INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE (WHERE THE DEMOCRATS HAVE THE MAJORITY) FOLLOW ZABLOCKI'S LEAD, THE SCENE COULD BE SET FOR A FURTHER STRUGGLE OVER THE WAR POWERS ISSUE.

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PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
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FM WASHINGTON 262319Z OCT 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 3155 OF 26 OCT 83
INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN

MS

YOUR TELNO 1787 AND TELECON WOODLEY-ATTEWELL: GRENADA

1. STATE DEPARTMENT COORDINATOR OF EVACUATION PLANS HAS SUGGESTED THAT, TO AVOID COMPLICATING MATTERS, THE AMERICANS SHOULD CONTINUE FOR NOW TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRITISH CITIZENS SEEKING TO LEAVE. IF THE NUMBERS WERE SMALL, THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO COPE WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. IF LARGER NUMBERS OF BRITISH CITIZENS WISHED TO LEAVE AT A LATER STAGE THE AMERICANS WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR OUR ASSISTANCE. THE PENTAGON, HOWEVER, HAVE MADE CLEAR TO DEFENCE COLLEAGUES THE PRESENT PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES SURROUNDING POSSIBLE USE OF THE AIRPORTS BY NON-US AIRCRAFT. A CANADIAN OFFER OF ASSISTANCE HAS ACCORDINGLY BEEN TURNED DOWN. AT PRESENT COMMUNICATIONS REMAIN DOMINATED BY MILITARY TRAFFIC AND IT IS NOT YET POSSIBLE TO ESTIMATE EITHER THE NUMBERS INVOLVED OR THE TIME SCALE. DECISIONS WERE BEING MADE ON THE GROUND. THE HANDFUL OF UK NATIONALS WHO HAD SO FAR PRESENTED THEMSELVES HAD BEEN PUT ON THAT FLIGHT. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD NOT LEARNT OF TODAY'S EVACUATION TO CHARLESTON OF THE FIRST 141 PEOPLE UNTIL IT WAS UNDER WAY.

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT UNDERTOOK TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH. THE CASE FOR A UK MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO ASSIST WITH EVACUATION MIGHT CHANGE ONCE ST GEORGE'S WAS FULLY SECURED AND THE NUMBERS WERE LARGE ENOUGH TO JUSTIFY THIS. WE WERE NO DOUBT IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE AMERICANS IN BARBADOS.

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FM BRIDGETOWN 262310Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 361 OF 26 OCTOBER

AND TO WASHINGTON KINGSTON PORT OF SPAIN

MIPT: GRENADA

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IMMEDIATE

1. ADAMS TELEPHONED ME AGAIN AT LUNCHTIME. HE HAD BEEN READING THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS YESTERDAY ABOUT PRECISELY WHEN AND WHERE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN INFORMED. SOME PEOPLE LIKE DENIS HEALEY WERE SAYING THAT WE HAD ONLY HEARD OF THE MATTER FROM THE US GOVERNMENT, BUT HE HAD A RECORD IN HIS LOG THAT HE HAD ASKED ME TO INFORM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FORMALLY ON SATURDAY MORNING.

2. I SAID I THOUGHT THERE WAS NO DISPUTE BETWEEN US. HE AND I KNEW THAT I HAD BEEN TOLD ON THE EVENING OF THE 21 ST WHAT HAD BEEN CONVEYED FORMALLY TO ME ON THE MORNING OF THE 22ND. BOTH COMMUNICATIONS HAD BEEN FORWARDED BY ME TO LONDON. WHAT MR HEALY WAS TALKING ABOUT WAS NOT THE OECS DECISION TO ASK FOR HELP BUT THE AMERICAN DECISION TO GIVE IT - AND THIS AS I UNDERSTOOD HAD NOT BEEN PASSED TO MR ADAMS TILL LATE IN THE EVENING OF THE

~~BUT THE AMERICAN DECISION TO GIVE IT -~~ AND THIS AS I UNDERSTOOD
HAD NOT BEEN PASSED TO MR ADAMS TILL LATE IN THE EVENING OF THE
24TH. MR ADAMS SAID THAT HE HAD MADE A NOTE OF THE TIME IN HIS
LOG, IT WAS 8.10 PM ON THE 24TH (0010 GMT ON THE 25TH).
HE BELIEVED THE AMERICANS HAD TOLD MRS THATCHER AND HIMSELF AT
ABOUT THE SAME TIME.

3. ADAMS SAID THAT HE VERY MUCH HOPED THAT THIS MISUNDERSTANDING
IF THAT WAS WHAT IT WAS, COULD BE RESOLVED. HE WOULD HATE ABOVE
ALL THINGS TO QUARREL WITH THE BRITISH, WITH WHOM HE, ALONG WITH
ALL OTHER BARBADIANS, SHARED A FUNDAMENTAL COMMUNITY OF
INTEREST. BARBADOS HAD INTRICATE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE BUT THEY DID NOT LIKE TO HEAR IT SUGGESTED
THAT THEY REGARDED THE UNITED STATES AS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE
COMMONWEALTH. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. "NOR IS IT TRUE THAT
THE AMERICANS TOOK ADVANTAGE OF US. IT WAS THE OTHER WAY ROUND:
JOHN COMPTON AND I TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THEM".

4. ADAMS IS BROADCASTING TO THE NATION AT 9.30 LOCAL TIME THIS
EVENING. I HAVE SENT HIM THE TEXT OF YOUR OPENING SPEECH IN THIS
AFTERNOON'S EMERGENCY DEBATE AND HAVE ASKED FOR AN APPOINT-
MENT WITH HIM TOMORROW. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF BEFORE THEN I
COULD BE TOLD THE GIST OF THE CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH THE
PRIME MINISTER EARLIER TODAY.

BULLARD

NNNN

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FM KINGSTON 261938Z OCT 83
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 305 OF 26 OCTOBER
ROUTINE INFO BRIDGETOWN ,GEORGETOWN,PORT OF SPAIN AND WASHINGTON

MT

GRENADA: PRIME MINISTER SEAGA'S STATEMENT

1. MR SEAGA ADDRESSED PARLIAMENT LAST EVENING SAYING THAT GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN DECISION TO ENGAGE ITS DEFENCE FORCE IN A MULTI-NATIONAL MILITARY ACTION TO CARRY OUT A PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE TO REMOVE THE THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE AREA AND ALSO TO RESTORE NORMALITY TO GRENADA. HE SAID "LET IT BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS BOLD AND HISTORICAL ACTION JOINTLY TAKEN BY CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES (WHILE OTHERS HAVE STOOD ASIDE) CANNOT BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF CHANGING AN AUSTIN FOR A GAIRY. THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA CAN BE ASSURED THAT THIS ACTION IS INTENDED TO FREE THEM FROM BEING PAWNS IN A POWER PLAY WHICH HAD CONVERTED THEIR LOVELY SPICE ISLAND TO A FEARSOME CAMP.....THE MILITARY OPERATION IS TO RESTORE THE COUNTRY TO NORMALITY WITH MINIMUM LOSS OF LIVES, TO FREE THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA FROM TERRORISM AND BRUTALITY AND TO ELIMINATE THE PERCEIVED THREAT OF HOSTILITY AND AGGRESSION BY GRENADA TO NEIGHBOURING CARIBBEAN STATES.....A VAST QUANTITY OF SOVIET ARMS WAS SEIZED AT PORT SALINE AIRPORT, INCLUDING AK 47 SOVIET ASSAULT RIFLES." HE SAID "THE SEEDS OF THIS TRAGIC SITUATION WERE SOWN 5 YEAR AGO WHEN GAIRY WAS OVERTHROWN. I URGED AT THE TIME THAT RECOGNITION OF THE BISHOP REGIME SHOULD BE WITHHELD UNTIL IT SECURED A MANDATE FROM THE ELECTORATE..... IT MAY BE FELT THAT THESE MATTERS DO NOT CONCERN US (SEMI-COLON) BUT MOST CERTAINLY THEY DO. IF A WHOLE GOVERNMENT CAN BE WIPED OUT OVERNIGHT THEN NO GOVERNMENT ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE CAN BE SAFE FROM MADMEN WHO SEEK TO REPLACE A GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE, ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE, WITH ONE SELECTED BY A CHOSEN FEW OF WHATEVER NATURE..... IF WE IGNORE THE OCCURRENCE OF BRUTAL MILITARY TAKEOVER OR POLITICAL OVERTHROWS OF GOVERNMENT, WE WOULD IMMEDIATELY GIVE HEART TO EVERY SUBVERSIVE GROUP WITHIN THE REGION TO ENGINEER DISORDERS AND INSTABILITY."

7

(HE CONTINUED

HE CONTINUED.....'IT IS IN OUR INTEREST THAT WE SHOULD NOT ENCOURAGE REVOLUTION AND THE INTRODUCTION OF TOTALITARIAN STYLE GOVERNMENT TO DISPLACE DEMOCRACY.IT IS IN OUR INTEREST THAT WE SHOULD NOT ENCOURAGE THOSE WHO DESIRE TO SEIZE POWER BY ILLEGAL MEANS TO BRUTALLY LIQUIDATE A COUNTRY'S LEADERSHIP.IT WAS THEREFORE IN OUR INTEREST THAT WE SHOULD JOIN WITH OUR CARIBBEAN COLLEAGUES IN TAKING THE PRESENT ACT ON.'

SMALLMAN

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SIR J BULLARD

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR URE

MR CARTLEDGE

MR HANNAY

MR ADAMS

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

SIR P MOORE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE

MOD (DI 4)

THIS TELEGRAM

WAS NOT

ADVANCED

GRENADA - ANNOTATED CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1974

7 February

Grenada achieves independence as a Westminster-style Parliamentary democracy. Prime Minister Sir Eric Gairy.

1979

13 March

Successful coup by the New Jewel Movement in the absence in New York of Prime Minister Gairy.

People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) led by Maurice Bishop suspends the Constitution and governs through 'People's Laws'.

1983

Thursday,
13 October

Bishop ousted by hard line elements in a coup led by his deputy Bernard Coard.


Tuesday,
18 October

Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) constituted under Chairmanship of General Hudson Austin. RMC announces that lives and property of all foreign nationals would be protected.

A Wednesday, Bridgetown
19 October Telno 304

Bishop and some of his close supporters killed. 24-hour curfew declared to last until 24 October.

/Thursday, 20 October



B Thursday, 20 October
Bridgetown
Telno 308
General Hudson Austin calls on Governor General to inform him that Revolutionary Military Council is in control, with himself as Chairman, and that he intends to announce composition of broadly based cabinet in three days. (Subsequently extended to two weeks.)

C Port of Spain
Telno 170
Trinidad introduces sanctions. A number of regional governments including Cuba, as well as Commonwealth Secretary-General, express horror at killing of Bishop.

D FCO Telno 283 to Bridgetown
Grenadian High Commissioner in London called to the FCO to be told of HMG's concern for the safety of the British Community.

E Friday, 21 October
Bridgetown
Telno 320
PM Adams tells High Commission in Barbados that Prime Ministers Seaga and Compton pressing CARICOM Heads of

E² FCO Tel No 1752
Washington Embassy asked to speak to US at appropriately senior level passing on our concerns about Adams' ideas.

Telno 291
Jamaica would break off diplomatic relations with Grenada and ban trade.

G Washington
Telno 3064
US assures us UK would be warned if the Americans decided to consider active response to any approach from Caribbean leaders.

H Washington
Telno 3070
US say that one US citizen may have been detained during 18 October demonstration. But no sign of anti-

American threat and nothing to suggest evacuation required.

OECS Heads of Government meeting convenes in Bridgetown to discuss Grenada.

I	Montserrat Telno 196	Chief Minister informs Governor that OECS Heads of Government have resolved unanimously to send united military force to Grenada.
J	Washington Telno 3074	United States divert to Caribbean carrier group led by USS Independence and including assault ship with 1900 Marines.
K	Saturday, 22 October Port of Spain Telno 174	CARICOM Heads of Government meeting convenes in Port of Spain. Discussion continues most of the night but no consensus achieved.
L	Bridgetown Telno 329	Prime Minister Adams of Barbados tells High Commissioner that OECS Heads of Government decided unanimously to put together a multinational force and to call on other governments including the US, France, Venezuela and the UK to help in restoring peace and order in Grenada. He requests orally but formally that UK should participate. Letters to HMG and other governments would be ready later in the day.
M	Washington Telno 3078	US National Security Council meets and concludes that US should proceed cautiously with Carrier group
N	Washington Telno 3084	deployment. UK informed that US has

made no decision beyond those deployments and would consult before taking any further steps. Americans give assurances that they are willing to help, if necessary, with evacuation of British citizens.

O	Washington Telno 3130	US receives formal request from OECS to intervene in Grenada. (Source Shultz press conference on 25 October)
P	Athens Telno 576	HMS Antrim ordered to take up station close to Grenada.
Q	Bridgetown Telno 336	Grenadian Revolutionary Military Council announces a Cabinet will be appointed within ten to fourteen days.
Sunday, 23 October		HMS Antrim leaves Cartegena for position off Grenada
R	Port of Spain Telno 175	CARICOM Heads of Government meeting agrees on range of sanctions against Grenada - but no agreement on military action.
S	Bridgetown Telno 337	Prime Minister Adams informs High Commission that he expected leaders of the OECS Group to send formal requests for military support from non-OECS countries following their return to Barbados later in the day.
T p.m.	Washington Telno 3087	US emissary sent to Barbados to confer with Prime Minister Adams and other OECS and Caribbean leaders. British Embassy Washington informed that US have made no decisions on further action.

SECRET

24 October
(continued)

and other friendly governments of intention to take action under Article 8 of the OECS Treaty for the collective defence and preservation of peace and security against external aggression and requesting assistance from friendly governments.

A2

Washington
Telno 3099

US confirm receipt of firm request from OECS and other Caribbean States to help restore peace and order in Grenada. No decision yet on how to respond. Americans say they will ask the Eastern Caribbean Heads of Government to indicate more precisely what they have in mind.

A3 1915 hours

President Reagan informs Prime Minister that he is giving serious consideration to OECS request and undertakes to inform Prime Minister in advance if it is decided that US forces should take part in collective security force.

2100 hours

HMS Antrim arrives in general area of Grenada.

2300 hours
approx

Second message received at No.10 from President Reagan informing Prime Minister that he has decided to respond positively to OECS request.

Tuesday,
25 October
.0030 hours

Prime Minister's reply despatched to President Reagan.

0048 hours

Prime Minister telephones President Reagan to say that she has replied to

SECRET

/his messages

U	FCO Telno 298 to Bridgetown	Following a meeting of Foreign of the Ten in Athens, Greek Presidency expresses European horror at Killings. Commission decides to suspend aid payments and cancel EC Mission to Grenada.
V	Washington Telno 3130	President Reagan makes tentative decision to respond positively to OECS request. (Source: Secretary of State Shultz's Press Conference)
W	Midnight (local) Bridgetown Telno 345	PM Adams of Barbados asks British High Commission whether HMG has decided how to respond to the OECS initiative. Emphasises that British contribution to the multi-national force would be of greatest value and suggests SAS operation to ensure Governor-General's safety. High Commissioner asks if request now formalised. Adams promises text by first thing Monday.
Monday, 24 October 1000 hours		ODEM meets to consider HMG's response to Prime Minister Adams' oral request for British participation in multi- national force.
X	1445 hours FCO Telno 1759 to Washington	HM Ambassador instructed to inform US authorities that HMG sees no grounds on which military intervention could be justified internationally and Governor- General should not be made focal point of any intervention.
Y	1550 hours	Secretary of State's first statement on Grenada in the House of Commons.
Z	Bridgetown Telno 348	OECS statement handed to British High Commissioner in Barbados informing HMG /and other

SECRET

25 October
(continued)

his messages and to ask him to consider her replies very carefully indeed. President Reagan undertakes to do so.

0745 hours

Further message to Prime Minister from President Reagan. Weighed very carefully issues raised by Prime Minister. He believes them to be outweighed by other factors.

0940 hours

Multinational forces land in Grenada.

SECRET

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for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

NNNN

26 OCT 1983/2141

CZC DLM0475 TCB031 PJA203 TXX2990020

GBXX CO UNCD 288

CHRISTIANSTEDSTCROIX 0288/0274 26 1650

PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER
NO.10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON ENGLAND SW1

Handwritten signature

WE, THE MEMBERS OF THE CARIBBEAN PEOPLES CONGRESS, ARE MEMBERS OF AN ORGANIZATION OF CARIBBEAN PEOPLES IN THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS. OUR DESIRE IS TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES IN THE VIRGIN ISLANDS AND THE WIDER CARIBBEAN.

WE, THE MEMBERS, THEREFORE ORGANIZED TO PERPETUATE A REPRESENTATIVE, EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIBLE VEHICLE TO ADVANCE THE PRINCIPLES AND TO UPHOLD HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS OF ALL CARIBBEAN PEOPLES.

IN THIS RESPECT WE SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING RESOLUTION TO YOU:

BE IT RESOLVED THAT:

1. THERE SHOULD BE NO MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE
2. SITUATION IN GRENADA.
3. THE OECS SHOULD MINIMIZE THE NEED TO USE FORCE RELATIVE TO THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA.
4. THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL SHOULD BE CONDEMNED.
5. THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL SHOULD

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TELECOM

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T 1291

Telegram

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SHOULD BE CONTACTED

WITH A VIEW TO ESTABLISH A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION RATHER THAN A
MORE BLOODY SOLUTION.

5. THE MILITARY INTERVENTION FROM THE CARIBBEAN AND THE
U.S.A. TO THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF GRENADA SHOULD BE
TOTALLY CONDEMNED.

6. THERE SHOULD NOT BE ANY SANCTIONS AGAINST FOOD

S AND

MEDICINE GOING TO THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE.

7. ALL CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS REMOVE THE RESTRICTIONS
TO ENTRY OF GRENADIANS INTO THEIR COUNTRIES.

8. THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF GRENADA BE RESPECTED.

9. EVERYTHING POSSIBL

? POSSIBLE, DIPLOMATICALLY, SHOULD BE DONE

TO RESTORE PEACE IN GRENADA.

10. ALL CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS SHOULD CONDEMN THE INVASION
OF GRENADA.

11. FINALLY, ALL ORGANIZATIONS TO WHICH GRENADA IS A
MEMBER SHOULD PUT PRESSURE ON THE INVADING FORCES
TO LEAVE GRENADA TO THE GRENADIANS

FROM THE CARIBBEAN PEOPLES CONGRESS, INCORPORATED
OF THE USVI

COL CHKD

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GRS 350

CONFIDENTIAL

SKRY 270530Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 270330Z OCT

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1161 OF 26 OCTOBER 1983

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BRIDGETOWN, OTTAWA, KINGSTON,
GEORGETOWN, BELMOPAN, NASSAU, PORT OF SPAIN, PARIS, THE HAGUE.
INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO.

MY TELS NOS 1149-1151 (NOT TO ALL) : SECURITY COUNCIL : GRENADA

1. THE DEBATE RESUMED THIS AFTERNOON (26 OCTOBER). THERE WERE 19 SPEAKERS (DOMINICA, ZAIRE, VIETNAM, NIGERIA, POLAND, JAMAICA, BOLIVIA, CHINA, ARGENTINA, SEYCHELLES, ETHIOPIA, ALGERIA, SYRIA, CUBA, FRANCE, ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA, IRAN, LAOS, PAKISTAN). AS EXPECTED, DOMINICA, JAMAICA AND ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA SPOKE IN FAVOUR OF US INTERVENTION, THE LAST IN PARTICULARLY ROBUST TERMS. MRS CHARLES (DOMINICA) MADE THE POINT (REPORTED IN TELECON GORE-BOOTH/BELL) THAT THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL HAD SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED OECS ASSISTANCE, THOUGH IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO REVEAL THIS UNTIL HE WAS SAFE. OTHER SPEAKERS PREDICTABLY CONDEMNED US ACTION TO A GREATER OR LESSER EXTENT, CLAIMING THAT IT VIOLATED UN CHARTER PROVISIONS AND OTHER TREATIES. THE ALGERIAN STATEMENTS WERE STANDARD ANTI-AMERICAN HARANGUES: THAT BY CUBA (SPEAKING FOR THE SECOND TIME) WAS UNPRECEDENTED IN ITS ANTI-AMERICAN INVECTIVE. IRAN, BY CONTRAST, MADE A LOW KEY AND BRIEF STATEMENT. FRANCE (THE ONLY WESTERN SPEAKER) CONDEMNED US ACTION IN UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS DRAWING ON THE STATEMENTS REFERRED TO IN PARIS TELNO 961 (NOT TO ALL).
2. THERE WAS SPECULATION THAT THE NICARAGUANS WOULD SEEK TO CALL A VOTE ON THE GUYANESE DRAFT (MY TELNO 1156) THIS AFTERNOON BUT THE MALTESE ASKED THAT THIS BE POSTPONED TO ALLOW ALL SPEAKERS TO HAVE THEIR SAY (AND I LET IT BE KNOWN THAT I WAS WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH WAS TRUE UNTIL LATE ON). THE COUNCIL RECONVENES TOMORROW AFTERNOON (27 OCTOBER) AT 3.30PM LOCAL TIME. ST LUCIA AND BARBADOS WILL SPEAK, AS SHALL WE. THERE MAY BE ONE OR TWO OTHERS.
3. A VOTE IS VIRTUALLY CERTAIN AT THE END OF THE SESSION. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE NICARAGUANS HAVE THE NINE VOTES TO FORCE A US VETO. FRANCE AND THE NETHERLANDS ARE TOYING WITH MINOR AMENDMENTS WHICH WOULD ALLOW THEM TO VOTE IN FAVOUR. OTHERWISE THEY WILL ABSTAIN. (THE NETHERLANDS HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY WILL FOLLOW THE FRENCH VOTE). INDEED IT LOOKS INCREASINGLY LIKELY, GIVEN THE INSTRUCTIONS IN YOUR TELNO 655 (WHICH I HAVE NOT YET HAD TO REVEAL), THAT THE US WILL BE ALONE IN VOTING AGAINST THE RESOLUTION.
5. MIFT CONTAINS A SUMMARY OF THE STATEMENTS MADE THIS AFTERNOON.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEE.



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1048</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Telno 1156 dated 26 October 1983</i>	
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
APS

From: D M Bell, Emergency
Unit

26 October 1983

GRENADA

1. Mr Hart's minute about the RAF Hercules refers.
2. Late last night the MOD telephoned to say that the Hercules had been refused permission to land at Trinidad when 100 NM out, and had diverted to Barbados where immediate landing rights had been granted. No reason for the refusal was given.
3. After discussion with Mr Edwards and the Head of DS8/MOD (Mr Webster) the attached telegram was sent to interested posts. It had previously been felt that the aircraft should go to Trinidad rather than Barbados to avoid any suggestion that it was involved in military activities affecting Grenada. This consideration now seems less significant.
4. I telephoned the High Commissions in Bridgetown and Port of Spain and informed the Duty Officers of developments and of the line to take should there be any enquiries about the Trinidadian refusal.


D M Bell

cc: PS/PUS
Mr Giffard
Mr Wright
Mr Edwards, Emergency Unit
News Department
Resident Clerk, MOD
Mr Webster, DS8/MOD

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

RESTRICTED

Precedence/Deskby

IMMEDIATE

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1 CZC
2 GRS
3 RESTRICTED
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6 FM FCO
7 TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 INFO IMMEDIATE PORT OF SPAIN, BRIDGETOWN, GOVERNOR MONTSERRAT,
10 KINGSTON, NASSAU, GEORGETOWN, BELMOPAN, UKMIS NEW YORK, HAVANA
11 MY TELNO : GRENADA
12 1. The RAF Hercules mentioned in my TUR was refused landing
13 permission at Trinidad when 100 N miles out of Piarco. It
14 diverted to Barbados. We are not yet aware of the reason for
15 the decision to refuse landing rights after dip-clear had been
16 given. The refusal is likely to become known but we do not
17 wish to make too much of it. MOD have agreed a line that the
18 aircraft ~~diverted~~ ^{repositioned} to Barbados ^(from BELIZE) in the light of today's developments
19 in Grenada in the hope that it may be able to assist in any
20 evacuation. We understand that, for the moment, the Consular
21 team is still in Barbados and that the US preference remains
22 that all evacuation be undertaken by US aircraft.
23
24 HOWE
25 NNNN

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept Emergency Unit	Distribution Grenada
Drafted by (Block capitals) D M BELL		
Telephone number 233-4990		
Authorised for despatch <i>D M Bell</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

GRS 750

D

127

RESTRICTED

FM WASHINGTON 261907Z OCT 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3146 OF 26 OCT
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, HAVANA.

GRENADA: INTERVENTION

1. YOU MAY FIND IT USEFUL TO HAVE AVAILABLE THE LEGAL AND OTHER ARGUMENTS THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE USING IN JUSTIFICATION FOR THE US INTERVENTION IN PARTICULAR IN RELATION TO THE UN AND OAS CHARTERS. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE POINTS IN THEIR INTERNAL GUIDANCE, (WHICH US OFFICIALS ADMIT PRIVATELY ARE A LITTLE THIN).

(I) THE DETERIORATING CONDITIONS ON GRENADA POSED A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE CONTINUED SAFETY OF THE APPROXIMATELY 1,000 U.S. CITIZENS THERE. THE MILITARY COUNCIL ON THE ISLAND DID NOT FULFILL ITS PROMISES TO REOPEN THE AIRPORT. A NUMBER OF U.S. CITIZENS HAD SOUGHT TO LEAVE AT GREAT RISK WITHOUT WAITING FOR AN ORGANIZED EVACUATION. THE U.S. WATCHED EVENTS WITH INCREASING CONCERN.

(II) THE UNITED STATES RECEIVED AN URGENT APPEAL FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES (O ECS), A SUB-REGIONAL BODY CREATED IN 1981 BY THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES. THE MEMBERS ARE ANTIGUA, DOMINICA, GRENADA, MONTSERRAT, ST KITTS/NEVIS, SAINT LUCIA, AND SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES. AMONG THE PURPOSES OF THE TREATY ARE THE PROMOTION OF REGIONAL COOPERATION AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY.

(III) THE ORGANIZATION MET ON OCTOBER 21 AND DETERMINED THAT THE COLLAPSE OF GOVERNMENT ON GRENADA POSED A THREAT TO THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE REGION. THE ACTING MILITARY COUNCIL DID NOT PURPORT TO BE A GOVERNMENT. THE O ECS MEMBERS DECIDED TO TAKE NECESSARY MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO THIS THREAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLES 3 AND 8 OF THE O ECS TREATY. THEY SOUGHT THE ASSISTANCE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN STATES TO PARTICIPATE IN A COLLECTIVE SECURITY FORCE. BARBADOS, JAMAICA AND THE UNITED STATES ARE CONTRIBUTING FORCES, AS ARE FOUR O ECS MEMBER STATES.

SAFETY OF U.S. CITIZENS. SUCH HUMANITARIAN ACTION IS JUSTIFIED UNDER WELL-ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

(V) FURTHER, THE COLLECTIVE ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, JAMAICA, BARBADOS, AND THE OECS STATES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE OAS CHARTER. THE CHARTER SPECIFICALLY ALLOWS OAS MEMBERS TO TAKE COLLECTIVE ACTION PURSUANT TO REGIONAL SECURITY TREATIES IN RESPONSE TO THREATS TO PEACE AND SECURITY. THE RIO TREATY IS ONE SUCH TREATY, THE OECS STATES ARE NOT PARTIES TO THE RIO TREATY, AND THE OECS TREATY IS THEIR REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENT. THE OECS TREATY CONCERNS ITSELF IN PART WITH MATTERS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY. ARTICLE 8 OF THE OECS TREATY AUTHORIZES THE OECS TO COORDINATE THE EFFORTS OF MEMBER STATES FOR COLLECTIVE DEFENSE.

(VI) WITH REGARD TO THE OAS CHARTER, THE OECS DECISION IS A QUOTE MEASURE ADOPTED FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN EXISTING TREATY, UNQUOTE AS CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 22 OF THE OAS CHARTER. IN ADDITION, THE OECS MEMBERS WERE, IN THE WORDS OF ARTICLE 28 OF THE OAS CHARTER, CONFRONTED BY A QUOTE SITUATION THAT MIGHT ENDANGER THE PEACE OF AMERICA, UNQUOTE AND TOOK ACTION CONSISTENT WITH A QUOTE SPECIAL TREATY ON THE SUBJECT. UNQUOTE MEASURES TAKEN PURSUANT TO COLLECTIVE SECURITY AGREEMENTS ARE NOT VIOLATIONS OF THE OAS CHARTER'S PROVISIONS PROHIBITING INTERVENTION OR THE USE OF FORCE.

(VII) REGIONAL COLLECTIVE SECURITY MEASURES ARE EXPRESSLY CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 52 OF THE UN CHARTER, PARAGRAPH 1 OF THAT ARTICLE PROVIDES FOR

... REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS OR AGENCIES FOR DEALING WITH SUCH MATTERS RELATING TO THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AS ARE APPROPRIATE FOR REGIONAL ACTION, PROVIDED THAT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS OR AGENCIES AND THEIR ACTIVITIES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRICIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

THE ACTIONS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY FORCE, IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES DESCRIBED ABOVE, ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER.

2. THE US DELEGATION TO THE OAS WILL BE DEPLOYING THE ABOVE POINTS AT THE OAS PERMANENT COUNCIL MEETING WHICH HAS BEEN CALLED FOR THIS AFTERNOON. THEY EXPECT STRONG CRITICISM FROM NICARAGUA, MEXICO AND PROBABLY BOLIVIA. HOWEVER THEY ANTICIPATE SUFFICIENT SUPPORT FROM CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AND SOME SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES THAT A RESOLUTION, REQUIRING A SIMPLE MAJORITY OF THE THIRTY MEMBERS, WILL NOT BE PASSED.

WRIGHT

OO BRIDGETOWN

OO PORT OF SPAIN

OO KINGSTON

OO HAVANA

OO MODUK

GRS 160

RESTRICTED

DESKBY 270700

FM WASHINGTON 270500Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 3160 OF 26 OCT 83

INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN PORT OF SPAIN KINGSTON HAVANA MODUK

GRENADA : MILITARY SITUATION

1. AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM AGENCY REPORTS MR WEINBERGER AND GENERAL VESSEY (CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF) STATED THIS AFTERNOON THAT THE US FORCES HAD ENCOUNTERED STRONG AND WELL ARMED, CUBAN RESISTANCE AT SALINAS AIRPORT. THIS HAD NOW BEEN OVERCOME. HAVANA RADIO IN THE COURSE OF THE DAY HAD STARTED BROADCASTING THAT CUBAN RESISTANCE WAS AT AN END, BUT NOT ALL CUBANS ON THE GROUND SEEMED TO HAVE GOT THAT MESSAGE. 600 OR SO CUBANS HAVE BEEN CAPTURED.
2. THE STATED DEPARTMENT TOLD US THAT THE GRANDE ANSE AREA HAS NOW BEEN SECURED. THERE ARE REPORTS, THOUGH THESE HAVE YET TO BE CONFIRMED, OF THE CAPTURE OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL AT FORT FREDERICK. FIGHTING IS CONTINUING AT RICHMOND HILL PRISON. FURTHER OPERATIONS WILL BE NECESSARY TOMORROW TO MOP UP REMAINING AREAS OF RESISTANCE. THE AMERICANS CONTINUE TO HAVE NO REPORTS OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.

WRIGHT

NNNN

DID YOU GET THAT PSE

①

YES TVM CYAKK

002/26

Phone call would help at
he has met. He is making only
one with store between hearts and
M. So not needed

261653

ZZ

GRS 655
CONFIDENTIAL
FM KINGSTON 261533Z OCT 83
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 304 OF 26 OCTOBER
AND TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK
IMMEDIATE INFO WASHINGTON
PRIORITY INFO BRIDGETOWN, GEORGETOWN, AND PORT OF SPAIN
TELECON SMALLMAN/EDWARDS

Prime Minister

Would you be prepared
to ring Mr. Seaga?

A.J.C. 26/10

GRENADA

1. A BITTER MR SEAGA SUMMONED ME THIS MORNING. IN ADVANCE OF A MEETING WITH ALL HEADS OF MISSION LATER IN THE DAY, HE WANTED TO TELL ME HOW DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED HE HAD BEEN BY THE TERMS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPORTED INTERVENTION IN YESTERDAY'S (25TH) DEBATE ON THE GRENADA OPERATION. PERCEPTIONS MIGHT BE DIFFERENT FROM A DISTANCE, BUT HE HAD BEEN CONCERNED THAT THE OECS DECLARATION SHOULD BE FULLY REASONED AND PERSUASIVE IN SUPPORT OF THEIR APPEAL. HE HAD HOPED THIS WOULD BE TREATED SYMPATHETICALLY. BRITAIN'S REACTION HAD GREAT WEIGHT HERE. JAMAICA LOOKED TO BRITAIN FOR UNDERSTANDING. THEY HAD SUPPORTED US OVER THE FALKLANDS AND WERE STILL BEING ASKED TO DO SO. AND NOW THIS "UNKINDEST CUT OF ALL" WITHOUT AN ATTEMPT TO SEEK HIS VIEWS. HE HOPED SOME COMPENSATING COMMENT COULD BE MADE IN FURTHER DEBATE IN THE HOUSE TODAY AND IN ANY SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE. HE ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS FEELINGS TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND HOPED THAT HE COULD EXPECT SOME MESSAGE FROM HER.

2. I SAID I WAS SORRY HE FELT AS HE DID. I HAD NOT SEEN A TEXT OF WHAT HE CLAIMED THE PRIME MINISTER TO HAVE SAID, SO I COULD NOT COMMENT ON IT. THERE WAS, HOWEVER, NO QUESTION OF BRITAIN'S LACK OF SUPPORT FOR JAMAICA. OVER GRENADA OUR ENDS WERE THE SAME. MINISTERS HAD BEEN KEPT AS CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN OECS AND CARICOM MEETINGS AS THEY COULD HAVE BEEN. THEIR CONCLUSION IN THE LIGHT OF THIS AND IN RESPONSE TO THE APPEAL WAS THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO TRY A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SOLUTION FIRST. I KNEW THAT THESE CONSIDERATIONS HAD BEEN PUT TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, BUT THEY APPEARED TO HAVE GONE AHEAD WITH THEIR DECISION WITH A TIMING THAT HAD APPARENTLY RULED OUT FURTHER CONSULTATION (HE ACCEPTED THIS). I WAS SORRY HE FELT HIS VIEWS HAD NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY TAKEN. HE HAD MENTIONED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE AMERICANS BEFORE LEAVING AT SHORT NOTICE FOR THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN. HE HAD NOT APPARENTLY THEN HOWEVER THOUGHT IT WAS NECESSARY TO SEE ME. AS I SAID, WE HAD DONE OUR BEST IN A FAST MOVING SITUATION TO KEEP ABREAST OF ALL DEVELOPMENTS AND VIEWS. I WOULD, HOWEVER, FULLY REPORT HIS DEEP CONCERN.

3. SEAGA WILL NO DOUBT SIMMER DOWN, BUT HIS VERY REAL DISAPPOINTMENT WITH WHAT HE HAS CHOSEN TO SEE, HOWEVER UNJUSTIFIABLY, AS A CASUAL DISREGARD OF JAMAICA'S POSITION WILL, I FEAR, RUN DEEP FOR SOME TIME. (HIS HINT OVER FUTURE JAMAICAN FALKLANDS DEBATE SUPPORT WAS SIGNIFICANT.) HE IS NO DOUBT THE MORE SENSITIVE BECAUSE OF HIS FRONT RUNNING IN SUPPORT OF A MILITARY SOLUTION. NO DOUBT TOO HE WOULD HAVE WISHED NOT TO BE SEEN TO BE DEPENDING WHOLLY UPON THE U.S. FOR EXTERNAL HELP. MEANWHILE, HOWEVER, SOME QUICK, IF COSMETIC, EVIDENCE OF UNDERSTANDING OF JAMAICA'S POSITION A PERHAPS BY WAY OF AN APPROPRIATE PASSAGE IN A MINISTERIAL SPEECH IN TODAY'S DEBATE - COULD HELP TO LIMIT DAMAGE. SOME MESSAGE IN RESPONSE WOULD ALSO HELP, PARTICULARLY IF I WERE AUTHORISED TO PASS IT TO HIM LATER TODAY.

4. ONLY INTERVENTION BY PRIME MINISTER THAT I HAVE SEEN ON MY RETURN FROM SEAGA IS IN RETRACT 044 OF 25 OCTOBER. WAS THERE ANY OTHER? IF SO, GRATEFUL TEXT EARLIEST.

SMALLMAN

Have

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister Adams is annoyed about the impression he has gained that we see the Grenadian action as purely American, and about our apparent distancing from the OECS.

The FCO suggest three points to make:

1. We have no criticism of him or other Caribbean leaders.
2. Explain that we have a different perspective from the Americans on how best to protect our citizens in Grenada.
3. OECS request was very carefully considered.

OB

26 October 1983



Acked

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 October, 1983.

Grenada

of 24 Oct

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mr. John Garrett suggesting that the previous Grenada High Commissioner in London, Mr. Oswald Gibbs, should be invited to meet an official from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Provided you see no objection, I should be grateful if such a meeting could be arranged, and if I could be informed so that I may reply to Mr. Garrett on the Prime Minister's behalf.

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 260800Z

FM WASHINGTON 260430Z OCTOBER 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3134 OF 26 OCT

INFO BRIDGETOWN, UKMIS NEW YORK, OTTAWA, MODUK, PORT OF SPAIN, HAVANA.

GRENADA: DEBATE IN THE HOUSE.

1. IN VARIOUS TELEGRAMS I HAVE KEPT YOU UP TO DATE WITH THE SEQUENCE OF DECISION-TAKING HERE AND WITH SITREPS OF THE COURSE OF EVENTS ON THE GROUND IN GRENADA. BUT YOU WILL NO DOUBT WISH TO HAVE IN MIND THE MOOD IN WASHINGTON AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF WHICH THE DECISIONS WERE TAKEN.

2. THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION, TO JUDGE FROM SHULTZ'S CALM ANSWER TO A QUESTION ON TV THIS AFTERNOON, WILL NOT TAKE IT AMISS IF WE SAY, WHICH IS TRUE, THAT OUR JUDGEMENT OF WHAT COURSE OF ACTION TO TAKE DIFFERED FROM THIERS. THEY WILL NOT UNDERSTAND IT IF WE PUBLICLY CRITICISE THEIR ACTIONS WHILE THEIR TROOPS ARE STILL ENGAGED. THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, TIP O'NEILL, ACCURATELY REFLECTED THE GENERAL MOOD WHEN HE SAID THAT IT WAS NOT THE TIME TO CRITISE THE ADMINISTRATION WHILE AMERICAN BOYS WERE FIGHTING. THIS MOOD WILL BE REINFORCED WHEN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LEARNS THAT THEIR TROOPS ARE FACING CONSIDERABLY MORE DIFFICULT ODDS THAN THEY HAD EXPECTED, WITH AN ESTIMATED 1500 CUBAN TROOPS FIGHTING AGAINST THEM. THE EMBASSY HAS MOREOVER BEEN RECEIVING A NUMBER OF TELEPHONE CALLS SAYING IN EFFECT: QUOTE WE SUPPORTED YOU OVER THE FALKLANDS: WHY AREN'T YOU SUPPORTING US NOW UNQUOTE. MY POINT IS NOT WHETHER THE CALLERS ARE RIGHT OR WRONG BUT THAT THAT IS WHAT THEY ARE SAYING. THIS FEELING IS ALSO REFLECTED IN THE ADMINISTRATION. 77

3. NOW THAT INTERVENTION IS UNDER WAY, IT IS, OF COURSE, BY SUCCESS OR FAILURE THAT THE PRESIDENT IS LIKELY TO BE JUDGED. IN MY VIEW, IT IS HARDLY LIKELY THAT SUCCESS WILL BE DENIED HIM, EVEN IF IT TURNS OUT TO BE MESSIER THAN HE WOULD HAVE WISHED. THAT BEING SO, I HOPE THAT YOU WILL JUDGE THAT A SWIFT AMERICAN SUCCESS, SINCE THAT IS WHAT WILL MOST LIKELY ACHIEVE OUR COMMON OBJECTIVES - THE SAFEGUARDING OF BRITISH LIVES AND THE RETURN OF THE ISLAND TO CONSTITUTIONAL RULE IS ALSO A MAJOR BRITISH INTEREST AT THIS TIME AND THAT YOU WILL BE PREPARED TO SAY SO IN THE DEBATE. THE FACT THAT IS WILL ALSO HAVE CLEANED OUT A NEST OF CUBANS - PERHAPS MORE SIGNIFICANT THAN WE HAD ALL REALISED - WILL BE AN UNCOVENANTED BONUS. SUCH A STATEMENT, BESIDES BEING TRUE, IS MOST LIKELY TO KEEP SENTIMENT ON THE RAILS HERE AND, MORE IMPORTANT, KEEP OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF OUR BEING ABLE TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE FUTURE, WHETHER CONSTITUTIONALLY OR OTHERWISE ON GRENADA ITSELF, AND MORE WIDELY IN THE CARIBBEAN COMMONWEALTH.

4. IF AS I HOPE, YOU WILL AGREE TO MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT IN THE COURSE OF THE DEBATE, I HOPE YOU WILL ALSO FEEL ABLE TO TELL ME SO IN ADVANCE SO THAT I CAN PRIVATELY TELL THE WHITE HOUSE AND STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THAT IS YOUR INTENTION. NOTHING THAT I CAN THINK OF WOULD BETTER ENSURE BOTH THAT WE ARE KEPT IN THE PICTURE AS EVENTS UNFOLD AND ALSO THAT WE CAN AVOID ANY DISRUPTIVE EFFECTS ON OUR COOPERATION IN A PART OF THE WORLD THAT IS BOTH OUR COMMONWEALTH AND AMERICA'S BACK YARD. THE SAME GOES, MUTATIS MUTANDIS, FOR THE LINE WE TAKE IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL WHERE THE AMERICANS HAVE ALREADY NOTED OUR SILENCE WITH CONCERN.

WRIGHT

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DESKDY 260800

FM WASHINGTON 260435Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 3135 OF 26 OCT 83

INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN UKMIS NEW YORK MODUK

PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY OF STATE FROM LUCE

GRENADA

I AGREE, BROADLY SPEAKING, WITH THE MESSAGE FROM THE AMBASSADOR IN HIS TELNO 3134.

2. THE FACT IS THAT FEELINGS ARE VERY SORE ON BOTH SIDES. BUT THIS IS NOW PART OF HISTORY. THE AMERICANS HAVE TAKEN ACTION. IT MUST NOW BE IN OUR OVERALL INTERESTS TO MAKE THE BEST OF A BAD JOB. THIS MEANS GETTING OUR RELATIONS BACK ON A SOUNDER FOOTING AND WORKING CONSTRUCTIVELY, POLITICALLY AND DIPLOMATICALLY, TO HELP EASE THE PATH TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND TO HELP MOBILISE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT (AT THE UN AS ELSEWHERE) FOR THE OBJECTIVES. I HOPE THAT THIS CAN BE Borne IN MIND FOR THE DEBATE.

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Subject
✓ Master
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SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 October 1983

GRENADA

President Reagan rang the Prime Minister at 1730 hours today. He began by saying that if he was in London he would throw his hat in the door first. He very much regretted the embarrassment that had been caused and wanted the Prime Minister to know how it had happened. He had been woken at three o'clock in the morning, when on a so-called golfing vacation, with an urgent plea from the OECS. A group had convened in Washington to study the matter. The Americans had been greatly concerned because they had a problem of a leak. It was important that they should move ahead of Cuba which was already making tentative moves and sending some command personnel into Grenada. The Administration had been so cautious that it had not given firm assurances of intervention to the Caribbean States. Again they were worried about the leak and the fact that lives were at stake. By the time he had received the Prime Minister's message setting out her concerns the zero hour had passed and forces were on their way. He wanted the Prime Minister to know that there was absolutely no feeling of a lack of confidence in the British Government. But this was the first decision he had taken during his Administration which had been properly kept secret. The military had only a matter of hours.

Now the Governor General and his wife were safe and their security had been one of America's primary goals. The military action had gone very well. The two airfields had been taken with comparative ease, as had the medical school which had some 800 American students. There was still some resistance. He thought that the 800 or so Cuban construction personnel must have been military reserves. A group of Cubans had arrived in Grenada before the American forces and they had turned out to be military commanders. They were apparently now leading the continued resistance at three points. The Americans had 250 Cuban prisoners.

/The Prime Minister

SECRET AND PERSONAL

The Prime Minister said that she hoped that the operation would soon be over and that democracy could be restored. President Reagan said that the British role would be important. The aim would be to secure democracy under the Constitution which we had left behind. The Prime Minister observed that that Constitution had been suspended in 1979.

President Reagan said that the Americans believed that Bishop had been murdered because he was trying to get on better terms with the Americans. He had visited the State Department.

The Prime Minister asked whether there was any information about Coard. The President replied in the negative. It was possible that Coard had gone the same way as Bishop. But he was very optimistic about the military situation. Casualties had been very limited.

The OECS States had been wonderful. The Prime Minister of Dominica had taken Washington by storm. The Prime Minister of Barbados was going to visit Washington shortly and would be appearing on television. The OECS countries tended to think of themselves as one group. The Americans wanted to get them out ahead in restoring democratic government.

The Prime Minister commented that there would still be much to do in Grenada and it could be very tricky. President Reagan said that the military phase would end very shortly. He did want the Prime Minister to understand the worry about leaks which had been at the root of American behaviour.

The Prime Minister thanked the President for his telephone call. The conversation ended at about 1745 hours.

I should be grateful if you would ensure that the contents of this letter are very carefully protected.

Yours ever

John G. ...

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

McMaster



File 116

Subject

10 DOWNING STREET

cc FERB

From the Private Secretary

26 October 1983

GRENADA : CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRIME
MINISTER OF BARBADOS

The Prime Minister, having heard that the Prime Minister of Barbados was trying to get in touch with her, telephoned him at five minutes past three this afternoon. Some of the conversation was not very audible owing to a bad telephone line but the main substance was as follows.

The Prime Minister said that she had made clear in the House yesterday that although we had counselled caution upon the United States we recognised that there might be different perspectives in the Caribbean and that the attitudes of the Caribbean countries would have weighed significantly with President Reagan. We had been taken by surprise by the decision to embark upon military action because there had been previous indications that there were divided opinions and that there was a substantial view in the Caribbean in favour of non-intervention, but there had been a sharp change on Monday evening and we had naturally wondered whether we had been kept in the dark.

Mr. Adams said that he had no quarrel with anything said on the Conservative side in the House on Monday. He much appreciated the views of the Prime Minister. A majority of CARICOM had always been in favour of military intervention and had begun to plan it last week. When Bishop had still been alive, there had been talks with the United States about the possibility of recovering the situation in Grenada. Last Friday morning the OECS had met in Barbados and decided to invoke their treaty. It was ironic that the clause under which they had acted had been inserted at the insistence of Bishop who was believed to have taken it from the Warsaw Pact. The OECS had then decided to invite the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Venezuela and the other CARICOM States to join in military action. But the Bahamas had been against intervention. Belize had said it would be governed by the attitude of the British Government. No serious approach had been made to Guyana because the OECS did not

/particularly

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do

particularly want it to intervene. Trinidad had later expressed reservations. But it had never been true that a majority in CARICOM were against intervention. Contact with the United Kingdom had been made through diplomatic channels.

He regretted the difference between the United States and the United Kingdom. Barbados was caught in the middle. It had done everything to try to get agreement with HMG. It had emphasised that the role of the Governor General was crucial. Ideally, Barbados would have wanted the Governor General to invite in the OECS forces. But the Governor General had said that he could not do this because of the constraints upon him. It was against this background that he (Adams) had conveyed to us the OECS wish that we should take part in the operation. He had had no way of knowing that the United States had been less than forthcoming in its discussions with us.

The Prime Minister said that we had no criticism of Mr. Adams or other Caribbean leaders. Whatever our feelings about the American attitude, the operation was now taking place. We hoped that it would succeed and be over quickly and that democracy would restore. We wanted to avoid harm to the Alliance. That was the approach which she would take.

Mr. Adams said that he had heard that in the House on Monday the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had been asked for an assurance that the United States would not intervene. The Prime Minister explained the circumstances and said that Sir Geoffrey Howe's wording had been correct. But the situation had then changed. The United States had contacted us at 1915 hours on Monday but told us at 2300 hours that they were going ahead any way.

Mr. Adams said that Barbados had not been formally notified that the operation was going ahead until the time when Britain received this information. But because military planning had been proceeding it had been able to deduce that it was unlikely that there would be no military action. His impression was that the Americans had not wanted to say anything earlier because already too many people were privy to the plans. They took the position that they would say nothing until the last possible moment. But he had believed it likely that the Americans would have told us more than the OECS States. It had come as an enormous shock to him to discover that so little was known in London. He had full sympathy with HMG. But the effect of the Anglo/US differences on the Caribbean was awkward. Public opinion in the area fully supported the operation but public opinion tended still to be guided by Britain.

The Prime Minister said that she thought that Mr. Adams had put his finger on a missing factor. The sudden decision had come as a surprise to us. But he should understand that there were no hard feelings as far as Caribbean countries were concerned.

/The conversation

The conversation ended shortly before 1530 hours.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Janet Lewis-Jones (Lord President's Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

No copies should be made except where this is operationally essential.

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

GRENADA

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SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 261255Z OCT 83

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3136 OF 26 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN, KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN, HAVANA

GRENADA

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAY THAT THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE MILITARY ACTION OVERNIGHT. SOME RESISTANCE CONTINUES, NOTABLY AT RICHMOND HILL PRISON AND FORT FREDERICK.

2. US FORCES HAVE LOST 14 KILLED AND 39 WOUNDED. THESE FIGURES HAVE NOT BEEN RELEASED AND MUST BE PROTECTED. THE CUBAN 'CONSTRUCTION WORKERS' AT THE AIRPORT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN MEMBERS OF A MILITARY CONSTRUCTION BATTALION, WHO PUT UP STIFF RESISTANCE.


3. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAY THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS OF CASUALTIES TO CIVILIANS OR TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, THOUGH THEY

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Prime Minister has

seen.

26/10



3. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAY THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS OF CASUALTIES TO CIVILIANS OR TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, THOUGH THEY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY CANNOT CONFIRM THIS. THEY HAVE STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT US FORCES WILL AFFORD ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO UK CITIZENS WISHING TO LEAVE THE ISLAND. CLEARLY, HOWEVER, THERE CAN BE NO EVACUATION OF FOREIGN CITIZENS FROM ST GEORGE UNTIL THE AREA HAS BEEN FULLY SECURED.

4. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE CONFIRMED REPORTS YOU WILL HAVE RECEIVED ON OTHER CHANNELS THAT THINGS ARE LOOKING BETTER AS REGARDS THE GOVERNOR GENERAL. THIS CANNOT YET BE REVEALED FOR OPERATIONAL REASONS. THIS WILL BE CONFIRMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

5. ABOUT 140 AMERICAN STUDENTS AT THE MEDICAL SCHOOL HAVE BEEN MOVED FROM THE GRAND ANSE CAMPUS TO SALINES AIRPORT. THERE ARE PLANS TO EVACUATE THEM TODAY TO BARBADOS OR THE US.

6. CUBAN ARMED FORCES WERE PLACED ON FULL ALERT YESTERDAY BUT THIS IS NOT UNUSUAL IN TIMES OF CRISIS. STATE DEPARTMENT DISCOUNT SPECULATION ABOUT ANY POSSIBLE CUBAN ACTION EG AGAINST GUANTANAMO.

7. THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IN SURINAME ARE REPORTED TO HAVE REQUESTED THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR AND CUBAN PERSONNEL.

8. THIRTY TO FORTY RUSSIANS ARE IN PROTECTIVE CUSTODY. THERE ARE LESS WELL CONFIRMED REPORTS OF 200 CUBAN PRISONERS. THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE SIGNIFICANTLY MORE CUBANS ON THE ISLAND THAN THEY HAD ESTIMATED.

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FM THE HAGUE 261115Z OCT 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 302 OF 26 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO PRIORITY EC POSTS BRIDGETOWN AND GEORGETOWN

ms

GRENADA : NETHERLANDS REACTION

1. THE PUBLIC MFA REACTION HAS SO FAR BEEN LOW KEY AND LARGELY INTERROGATIVE, EXPRESSING DOUBTS AS TO WHETHER THE US ACTION ACCORDS WITH THE UN CHARTER AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. THE DUTCH PRESS IS UNIFORMLY CRITICAL OF THE US.
2. JACOBOVITS (POLITICAL DIRECTOR) HAS TOLD ME THAT HIS MINISTER IS NOT AT ALL HAPPY BUT RELUCTANT TO BE TOO OPENLY CRITICAL OF THE US (CF THE DEGREE OF UNDERSTANDING VAN DEN BROEK EXPRESSED DURING LAST WEEKEND'S EC DISCUSSION OF THE US APPROACH TO CENTRAL AMERICA - FCO TELNO. 422 TO ATHENS). THE NETHERLANDS AMBASSADOR IN TRINIDAD HAD REPORTED ON THE EVE OF THE INVASION THAT THE DUTCH COMMUNITY IN GRENADA WERE NOT REPEAT NOT IN ANY DANGER.
3. VAN DEN BROEK'S PRIVATE SECRETARY HAS TOLD US THAT HIS MINISTER IS ANGRY NOT LEAST BECAUSE THE US ACTION WILL INFLAME THE MOOD OF THE MASS 'PEACE MOVEMENT' DEMONSTRATION DUE TO TAKE PLACE IN THE HAGUE ON 29 OCTOBER. THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN A MINOR DEMONSTRATION AT THE US EMBASSY.
4. THE SECOND CHAMBER FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE WILL NOW DISCUSS THE INVASION WITH VAN DEN BROEK ON 27 OCTOBER.
5. THE MFA REPORT THAT IN SURINAME BOUTERSE HAS DECIDED - IN THE WAKE OF THE INVASION - TO EXPEL ALL CUBANS, INCLUDING EMBASSY PERSONNEL, FROM THE COUNTRY. THEY ARE SAID TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN SIX DAYS TO LEAVE.

MANSFIELD

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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Mr Adams

SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 261613Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 962 OF 26 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ROUTINE BONN, ROME,
KINGSTON, GEORGETOWN, PORT OF SPAIN, HAVANA.

MIPT: GRENADA: FRENCH REACTIONS.

1. THERE HAS SO FAR BEEN SURPRISINGLY LITTLE EXPLICIT LINKAGE IN THE MEDIA WITH FRANCE'S OWN INTERESTS IN THE CARIBBEAN. AS YOU KNOW, THEY HAVE FOR SOME TIME BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT EXTERNAL INFLUENCES PROVOKING UNREST IN FRENCH GUIANA AND GUADELOUPE. AND FROM MARTINIQUE THEY KEEP A PARTICULARLY CLOSE INTEREST IN SECURITY AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEIGHBOURING ISLANDS. THEIR SOURCES OF INFORMATION ARE USUALLY GOOD.
2. HOWEVER, WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY THE QUAI THAT THEY WERE NOT CONSULTED BY THE US IN ADVANCE, THOUGH THE AMERICANS DID MAKE AN OFFER TO EVACUATE ANY FRENCH CITIZENS ON GRENADA IN THE EVENT OF

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~~2. HOWEVER, WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY THE QUAI THAT THEY WERE
NOT CONSULTED BY THE US IN ADVANCE, THOUGH THE AMERICANS DID MAKE
AN OFFER TO EVACUATE ANY FRENCH CITIZENS ON GRENADA IN THE EVENT OF
AN EVACUATION OPERATION BY US TROOPS. THERE ARE IN FACT ONLY TWO
FRENCHMEN ON THE ISLAND.~~

FRETWELL

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SENT AT 1714/026 IA

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 260820Z OCT 83

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1149 OF 26 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BRIDGETOWN, OTTAWA, KINGSTON,
GEORGETOWN, BELMOPAN, NASSAY, PORT OF SPAIN
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO.

MY TEL 1142: GRENADA.

SUMMARY

1. TIMETABLE IN TUR PROVES OPTIMISTIC. NICARAGUA, WITH SUPPORT FROM ZIMBABWE, GUYANA AND USSR PUSHES THROUGH REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE MEETING OF SECURITY COUNCIL LATE ON 25 OCTOBER. APART FROM VIGOROUS DEFENSE OF US ACTION BY MRS KIRKPATRICK, ALL SPEAKERS ARE CRITICAL OF US ACTION. GUYANESE TABLE DRAFT RESOLUTION (TEXT IN MIFT). COUNCIL MEETS AGAIN AT 1530Z LOCAL TIME ON THIS SUBJECT.

DETAIL

2. WHEN THE NAMIBIA DEBATE CLOSED LAST EVENING, 25 OCTOBER, NICARAGUA RAISED THE REQUEST FOR AN URGENT MEETING OF THE COUNCIL REFERRED TO IN TUR SAYING THAT THIS REQUEST WAS NOW FOR AN IMMEDIATE MEETING. THIS REQUEST WAS SUPPORTED BY GUYANA, ZIMBABWE AND THE USSR. THE PRESIDENT AGREED TO CONSIDER THE REQUEST AT THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN CALLED TO DISCUSS IRAN/IRAQ (MY TELNO 1147).

3. THERE WAS A LENGTHY PROCEDURAL TUSSLE OVER WHETHER GRENADA SHOULD BE TAKEN IN THE COUNCIL LATER THE SAME EVENING (AS DEMANDED BY NICARAGUA AND ITS SUPPORTERS) OR BE POSTPONED UNTIL THIS AFTERNOON TO ALLOW THE PRIME MINISTER OF DOMINICA TO ARRIVE TO ARGUE THE CASE FOR THE OECS (AS DEMANDED BY MRS KIRKPATRICK WITH SUPPORT IN WRITING FROM ST LUCIA) AND, IF THE FORMER, WHETHER GRENADA OR IRAN/IRAQ SHOULD HAVE PRIORITY. IT WAS EVENTUALLY AGREED THAT IRAN/IRAQ SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS FOR ONE HOUR AFTER WHICH THE COUNCIL WOULD MEET IN FORMAL SESSION TO CONSIDER 'THE SITUATION IN GRENADA'.

4. WHEN THE COUNCIL OPENED THERE WAS A CHORUS OF CRITICISM FROM MEXICO, NICARAGUA, GUYANA, CUBA, LIBYA, USSR, YEMEN AS WELL AS GRENADA. THE AMERICANS ALSO SPOKE ONCE IN RIGHT OF REPLY TO NICARAGUA AND AGAIN IN DEFENCE OF THEIR ACTION.

THE GUYANESE SPOKE AS IN THE TEXT OF THEIR DRAFT RESOLUTION IN MIFT, THE COUNCIL ADJOURNED AT 0225 LOCAL TIME WITH THE

IN MIFT. THE COUNCIL ADJOURNED AT 0225 LOCAL TIME WITH THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCING THAT DISCUSSION WOULD RESUME THIS AFTERNOON, 26 OCTOBER.

5. THE CRITICISM WAS DIRECTED ALMOST ENTIRELY AT THE US WITH BARELY A MENTION OF THEIR EAST CARIBBEAN 'MERCENARIES' (USSR). IT WAS RATHER TELLING. THROUGHOUT THE DAY, THE EXTREMEIST DELEGATIONS, LED BY NICARAGUA, LOBBIED AND MANOEUVRED EFFECTIVELY. BY CONTRAST THE US WERE SLOW, UNIMAGINATIVE AND INSUFFICIENTLY ENERGETIC. THEIR ALLIES IN THE CARIBBEAN WERE CONSPICUOUS BY THEIR ABSENCE. IT WAS LEFT TO THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ST LUCIA TO ACT FOR ALL OF THEM. THE AMERICANS DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE A PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. THEY SEEMED TO PUT ALL THEIR EMPHASIS ON THE MEETING OF THE OAS IN WASHINGTON ON THE MORNING OF 26 OCTOBER. IT IS TO BE HOPED THAT THE PERFORMANCE WILL IMPROVE WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER OF DOMINICA AND OTHER CARIBBEANS SPEAK HERE IN THE AFTERNOON.

6. IT IS HARD TO PREDICT HOW LONG THE DEBATE WILL LAST ESPECIALLY IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY SETTLED US TACTICS. I SUSPECT THE AMERICANS WILL DISMISS THE IDEA OF A RESOLUTION OF THEIR OWN AND WILL AIM TO VOTE DOWN THE GUYANA DRAFT LEAVING ANY POSITIVE ACTION TO THE OAS. THE ODDS WILL BE EASIER TO JUDGE IN THE LIGHT OF REACTIONS TO EAST CARIBBEAN STATEMENTS. IT SEEMS MORE LIKELY THAN NOT THAT THE VOTE WILL TAKE PLACE ON 28 OCTOBER OR CONCEIVABLY LATER. I RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD VOTE AGAINST THE GUYANA DRAFT WHICH STRONGLY CONDEMNS SEVEN OF OUR COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS AS WELL AS THE US.

7. MY SECOND IFT CONTAINS A SUMMARY OF THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THE COUNCIL.

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PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR URE

MR CARTLEDGE

MR HANNAY

SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE

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~~10/15/83~~

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AM MOSCOW 261433Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1222 OF 26 OCT

INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, HAVANA

INFO ROUTINE GEORGETOWN, PORT OF SPAIN, NASSAU

MY TEL NO 001 TO BRIDGETOWN : GRENADA

1. AS YET THERE HAS BEEN NO FORMAL SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON THE EVENTS ALTHOUGH IT CAN BE ONLY A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE ONE APPEARS.
2. MEANWHILE, AFTER A SLOW START WHEN, FOR INSTANCE, SOVIET TELEVISION NEWS THOUGHT GRENADA WAS A PROVINCE IN SOUTHERN SPAIN, THE PROPAGANDA MACHINE HERE IS NOW FIRING ON ALL CYLINDERS.
3. A PLETHORA OF TASS PIECES, MANY OF WHICH HAVE APPEARED IN THE SOVIET PRESS, HAVE COVERED EVENTS, INCLUDING DETAILED ACCOUNTS

~~SOVIET PRESS, HAVE COVERED EVENTS, INCLUDING DETAILED ACCOUNTS~~
OF THE FIGHTING BETWEEN US MARINES AND LOCAL FORCES. THE ALLEGEDLY
HEROIC CUBAN ROLE IN RESISTING THE INVASION HAS BEEN UNDERLINED. JB
DETAILS OF CUBAN CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN GIVEN, QUOTING GOVERNMENT
STATEMENTS FROM HAVANA.

4. IN COMMENTING ON THE US ACTION THE SOVIET MEDIA HAVE ASSERTED
THAT THE REQUEST FROM THE EAST CARRIBEAN STATES FOR ASSISTANCE
IN MAKING A JOINT EFFORT TO RESTORE ORDER AND DEMOCRACY IN GRENADA
HAD SERVED AS A PRETEXT FOR AMERICAN GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY. THE
INVASION HAD BEEN PLANNED BEFORE THE CARICOM MEETING AT PORT OF
SPAIN WHICH HAD RUBBER STAMPED A DECISION DICTATED TO IT BY
WASHINGTON. THE 300 STRONG CARRIBEAN CONTINGENT WAS AN ALIBI
FOR THE MUCH LARGER US FORCE. SO FAR AS THE REASONS GIVEN BY
REAGAN FOR THE INVASION WERE CONCERNED, THESE WERE "PURE LIES".
THE "BANDIT STYLE ARMED INTERVENTION" HAD BEEN PLANNED TO CUT
SHORT THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS ON THE ISLAND. IT WAS AN ACT OF
DIRECT AND UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION AGAINST A UN MEMBER IN TOTAL
DISREGARD FOR WORLD OPINION. AMERICAN LIVES HAD NOT BEEN IN DANGER.
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS CRIMINAL ACT LAY
PERSONALLY WITH REAGAN.

5. THE SOVIET MEDIA HAVE ALSO RELIED HEAVILY ON WESTERN PRESS
EDITORIALS CONDEMNING THE US ACTION, INCLUDING ALLEGEDLY THE
TIMES. TASS IN ENGLISH HAS ALSO REPORTED A US AGENCY STORY THAT
350 BRITISH TROOPS TOOK PART IN THE LANDING.
THERE HAS SO FAR BEEN NO MENTION OF TODAY'S BBC WORLD SERVICE
REPORT THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD ADVISED AGAINST THE INVASION.

6. COMMENT. THE US ACTION HAS GOT THE RUSSIANS OFF THE HOOK OF
EXPLAINING BISHOPS OVERTHROW AND OF DECIDING WHICH SIDE TO
TAKE IN AN INTERNAL GRENADAN AFFAIR. SHORTLY BEFORE THE INVASION
THE RUSSIANS HAD TAKEN A FIRST STEP BY LINING UP BEHIND THE CUBANS
AND REPLAYING IN FULL IN THE SOVIET PRESS THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT
STATEMENT REPORTED IN HAVANA TEL NO 249. ALL THIS IS NOW OVERTAKEN
BY EVENTS AND THE FOCUS OF SOVIET COMMENT WILL BE THE U.S. ACTION.

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FM HAVANA 261600Z OCT

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 257 OF 26 OCT

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BRIDGETOWN, KINGSTON
INFO PRIORITY PORT OF SPAIN, NASSAU, GEORGETOWN, OTTAWA,
MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, MEXICO CITY, BELMOPAN

MY TELNO 256 (NOT TO ALL): GRENADA: CASTRO PRESS CONFERENCE

1. FIDEL CASTRO GAVE A ONE AND THREE QUARTER HOURS
PRESS CONFERENCE, BROADCAST LIVE ON CUBAN TV AND RADIO, IN
THE EARLY HOURS OF THIS MORNING (ENDING AT 0210 LOCAL TIME)

PRESS CONFERENCE, BROADCAST LIVE ON CUBAN TV AND RADIO, IN THE EARLY HOURS OF THIS MORNING (ENDING AT 0210 LOCAL TIME) TO A LARGELY FOREIGN AUDIENCE INCLUDING NUMEROUS US CORRESPONDENTS FLOWN IN FOR THE PURPOSE.

2. AVOIDING RHETORICAL FIREWORKS, CASTRO READ OUT A LONG STATEMENT DESCRIBING CUBAN POLICY AND ACTIONS VIS-A -VIS THE GRENADAN AND US GOVERNMENTS OVER THE PAST FOUR DAYS, INCLUDING TEXTS OF MESSAGES EXCHANGED WITH THEM, AND THEN ANSWERED QUESTIONS. MAIN POINTS WERE:

A. CUBA HAD SCRUPULOUSLY REFRAINED FROM INTERFERING IN GRENADAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. BUT NOTWITHSTANDING ' ' EXTREMELY COLD AND EVEN TENSE' ' RELATIONS WITH NEW GRENADAN LEADERSHIP FOLLOWING BISHOP'S DEATH, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN DISHONOURABEE TO HAVE WITHDRAWN CUBAN PERSONNEL FROM GRENADA IN THE FACE OF APPROACH OF US NAVAL TASK FORCE. HOWEVER, GRENADANS WERE TOLD THAT IT WOULD BE MILITARILY IMPOSSIBLE AND POLITICALLY UNTHINKABLE FOR CUBA TO ACCEDE TO THEIR REQUESTS FOR MILITARY REINFORCEMENTS.

B. THE 700-ODD CUBAN PERSONNEL IN GRENADA (COMPRISING 550 CONSTRUCTION WORKERS, PLUS DOCTORS AND OTHER CIVILIANS AND ONLY SOME TENS OF MILITARY ADVISERS, ALL EQUIPPED ONLY WITH LIGHT ARMS AND LIMITED AMMUNITION) WERE INSTRUCTED ON 22 OCTOBER THAT IN THE EVENT OF US LANDINGS THEY WERE TO OFFER RESISTANCE ONLY IF DIRECTLY ATTACKED. IF US LANDINGS WERE SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF EVACUATING US CITIZENS, CUBANS WERE NOT TO INTERVENE.

C. ALSO ON 22 OCTOBER, CUBA CONTACTED US GOVERNMENT DRAWING ATTENTION TO COMMON CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF THEIR CITIZENS AND PROPOSING THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS MAINTAIN CONTACT IN ORDER TO SOLVE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITHOUT VIOLENCE OR INTERVENTIONS (MY T.U.R.). US REPLY, OFFERING GUARANTEES OF SAFETY OF CUBANS IN GRENADA, WAS ONLY DELIVERED AT 0830 ON 25 OCTOBER, THREE HOURS AFTER US LANDINGS' AND ONE AND A HALF HOURS AFTER US ATTACK ON CUBAN POSITIONS.

D. FOLLOWING CARICOM MEETING ON 23 OCTOBER THE GRENADANS HAD AGAIN REQUESTED, AND CUBA AGAIN REFUSED MILITARY REINFORCEMENTS. CUBAN PERSONNEL WERE AGAIN INSTRUCTED TO FIGHT ONLY IN DEFENCE OF THEIR OWN POSITIONS.

E. AT 1700 HRS LOCAL TIME ON 25 OCTOBER CUBA RECEIVED FURTHER MESSAGE FROM US GOVERNMENT REGRETTING UNINTENDED

~~E. AT 1700 HRS LOCAL TIME ON 25 OCTOBER CUBA RECEIVED~~
~~FURTHER MESSAGE FROM US GOVERNMENT REGRETTING UNINTENDED~~
~~CLASHES BETWEEN CUBANS AND US FORCES AND URGING EVACUATION~~
~~CUBAN PERSONNEL, WHICH US WOULD NOT REGARD AS SURRENDER.~~
CUBANS DELIVERED TEN-POINT REPLY AT 2030 HOURS TO
THE EFFECT THAT IF THE US REALLY WANTED TO AVOID FURTHER
BLOODSHED THEY SHOULD STOP ALL ATTACKS ON CUBAN AND
GRENADAN POSITIONS: CUBANS WERE PREPARED TO PARLEY
BUT WOULD NEVER SURRENDER: AND IF ATTACKED WOULD CONTINUE
TO RESIST: ALTHOUGH OUTNUMBERED AND OUTGUNNED, THEY
COULD STILL INFLICT COSTLY MORAL DEFEAT ON UNITED STATES.

3. IN ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS CASTRO SAID HE FOUND IT IMPOSSIBLE
TO UNDERSTAND THE RATIONALE OF THE US ACTION. US CITIZENS
IN GRENADA HAD NOT BEEN IN DANGER. WHY SHOULD THE MOST
POWERFUL COUNTRY IN THE WORLD ATTACK A COUNTRY AS SMALL
AND WEAK AS GRENADA, WHICH HAD SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
AND WHOSE LEADERS HAD BY THEIR OWN ERRORS CREATED SERIOUS
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION FOR THEMSELVES?
HE WAS FORCED TO CONCLUDE THAT THE US ACTION WAS " AN
ABSURD EXPRESSION OF A PHILOSOPHY OF FORCE". HE SPECULATED
THAT THE US AIM WAS TO ELIMINATE THE SYMBOL OF REVOLUTION
REPRESENTED BY GRENADA. IF SO, IT WAS A HUGHE AND UNJUSTIFIABLE
ERROR (FROM WHICH CUBA HAD EVEN TRIED TO SAVE THE UNITED
STATES) AND WOULD COST THE US DEAR IN THE EYES OF WORLD
PUBLIC OPINION. IT WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT EVEN THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT HAD MADE STATEMENTS CRITICAL OF THE US ACTION.

4. SEE MIFT.

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FM BONN 261700Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 949 OF 26 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS ROME MOSCOW HAVANA

INFO ROUTINE MEXICO CITY CARACUS BRIDGETOWN KINGSTON PORT OF SPAIN

UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING ATHENS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN EMBASSY BRUSSELS THE HAGUE

LUXEMBOURG UKREP BRUSSELS

MS

INTERVENTION IN GRENADA: FRG REACTION

1. THE FRG OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT THIS AFTERNOON:

'THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REGRETS THE INTERVENTION IN GRENADA. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WILL ONLY BE ABLE TO MAKE A DEFINITIVE JUDGEMENT OF EVENTS WHEN IT HAS ALL THE DETAILS. THIS IS NOT THE CASE EVEN AFTER THE BRIEFING GIVEN BY THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR. IN CONTRAST TO THE UK, WHICH HAS THE COMMONWEALTH LINK WITH GRENADA, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS NOT CONSULTED BEFORE THE INTERVENTION. IF IT HAD BEEN, IT WOULD HAVE ADVISED AGAINST IT. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EXPECTS THAT THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA WILL SOON

~~IN CONTRAST TO THE UK, WHICH HAS THE COMMONWEALTH LINK WITH GRENADA, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS NOT CONSULTED BEFORE THE INTERVENTION. IF IT HAD BEEN, IT WOULD HAVE ADVISED AGAINST IT.~~
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EXPECTS THAT THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA WILL SOON BE ABLE FREELY TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE.''

2. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY A CLOSE ADVISOR OF THE CHANCELLOR THAT THIS MORNING'S FEDERAL CABINET AGREED THAT THE US ACTION WAS MOST UNWELCOME FOR ITS LIKELY EFFECTS ON THE INF DEBATE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND ON US/FRG RELATIONS. KOHL HOWEVER HAD ARGUED THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT EXAGGERATE ITS CRITICISM OF THE AMERICAN ACTION, (FOR WHICH, IN KOHL'S VIEW WERE SOME GOOD REASONS). AND THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD NEITHER THE COMMONWEALTH LINK WITH GRENADA NOR THE POLITICAL CAPITAL IN WASHINGTON WHICH WOULD ALLOW IT TO FOLLOW A LINE AS SHARP AS THAT WHICH HE UNDERSTOOD THE PRIME MINISTER HAD TAKEN. AT THE SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONFERENCE THEREFORE THE SPOKESMAN RESISTED ALL PRESSURE TO GO BEYOND THE WRITTEN STATEMENT. GENSCHER MAY HOWEVER HAVE TO APPEAR BEFORE THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE THIS EVENING AND THERE WILL BE AN EMERGENCY DEBATE IN THE BUNDESTAG TOMORROW MORNING. THE CDU IS LIKELY TO BE FAIRLY ROBUST, BUT PUBLIC CRITICISM HAS BEEN VOICED EVEN BY MEMBERS OF GENSCHER'S FDP, AND THE SPD AND THE GREENS WILL TRY AND TURN THE DEBATE INTO AN ANTI-AMERICAN FIELD-DAY.

3. ONLY THE SPRINGER PRESS (WELT AND BILD) WELCOME WHAT IT DESCRIBES AS REAGAN'S STRONG AND DECISIVE RESPONSE TO APPEALS FROM THE REGION. MOST OTHER RIGHT WING PAPERS WITHHOLD JUDGEMENT, BUT ELSEWHERE IN THE MEDIA THERE IS WIDESPREAD REFERENCE TO A PARALLEL BETWEEN AMERICAN ARGUMENTS AND THOSE USED BY THE RUSSIANS TO JUSTIFY THEIR INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. THE TIMING IS WIDELY SEEN AS LIKELY TO REINFORCE ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT IN THE RUN-UP TO INF STATIONING HERE.

4. OFFICIALS HAVE SAID TO US PRIVATELY THAT THE POSITION MAY BE PARTLY RECTIFIED IF THERE IS A SWIFT US WITHDRAWAL BUT THEY FIND IT DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT SORT OF POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL STABILITY THE MARINES CAN LEAVE BEHIND THEM.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ABOVE ADDRESSEES

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 119 OF 26 OCT 1983
AND TO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN

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GRENADA

1. I WAS SUMMONED TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE THIS MORNING (26 OCT) TO BE TOLD BY PRIME MINISTER BIRD OF CABINET'S VIEW THAT MRS THATCHER'S STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE YESTERDAY (25 OCT) WAS SEEN AS QUOTE UNFRIENDLY UNQUOTE AS IT REFERRED TO BRITISH QUOTE ADVICE UNQUOTE TO THE U S AGAINST A LANDING ON GRENADA. I WAS ASKED TO PASS THIS TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

2. I LEFT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER COPIES OF ALL RETRACTS RECEIVED HERE ON SUBJECT. NONE OF THE STATEMENTS RECORDED IN THEM REFER TO BRITAIN GIVING ADVICE, ONLY TO THE U S SEEKING IT (RETRACT NR 04425 OCT 83). GRATEFUL FOR IMMEDIATE CONFIRMATION THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO REFERENCE IN GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS IN THE HOUSE OR ELSEWHERE TO BRITAIN GIVING ADVICE TO THE U S ON GRENADA.

3. FULL REPORT FOLLOWS.

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LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
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MR. COLES

GRENADA

A glance at the history of the last thirty years is necessary in order to keep the American invasion of Grenada in perspective. Successive American Administrations have consistently refused to tolerate the existence of Left Wing regimes in Central America and the Caribbean. They have not hesitated to use military force in pursuit of this policy.

In 1954, the Americans intervened militarily in Guatemala to throw out the elected Left Wing President, Arbenz. The legacy of this incident has been a succession of brutal and unstable military dictatorships in Guatemala. No Americans that I know are particularly proud of this episode.

Two years after Castro came to power in Cuba, the Kennedy Administration launched the Bay of Pigs invasion. It was a military failure and the Americans have wisely not tried again. The cost would be too high. The Bay of Pigs is of course still the rallying cry of the anti-interventionist lobby in the United States.

In 1965, the Americans invaded the Dominican Republic and threw out a Left Wing Government. This was a success. They were able to instal a respectable, democratic government and to withdraw their troops quickly. The Dominican Republic has remained, by Latin American standards, a peaceful democracy ever since.

The Americans are currently doing everything short of direct military intervention to topple the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. They would not hesitate to go the whole hog if they thought that they could get away with it militarily, without unacceptable casualties, and internationally.

The only thing that is unique about Grenada is that it is the first time that the Americans have invaded a former British Colony, a member of the Commonwealth and a Monarchy.

I believe that this incident will have a decisive effect on attitudes in the Caribbean. Hitherto, my impression has been that the small islands of the Eastern Caribbean, plus of course Belize,

CONFIDENTIAL

/have been

have been disposed to look to us rather than the Americans to provide the minimal force which might be required to extricate them from local difficulties. Now, they will all realise that they have joined the Hispanic Central American states in the United States "sphere of influence".

In the short term, the next two or three weeks should demonstrate whether Grenada will be an American political success (the Dominican Republic) or a failure (Guatemala and the Bay of Pigs). In this country, indignation will continue to be expressed because of the Commonwealth and Crown connections and the rejection of our advice. This indignation is likely to spill over into the CHGM. With these considerations in mind, we should ^(not) feel obliged to show solidarity with the Americans in the Security Council, particularly if anything like the draft resolution at present circulating is brought to a vote: the Americans will of course vote against. I am not suggesting that we should make a parade of our differences, as the French would, by making anti-American statements and by voting in favour. But we should make quietly clear that there have been differences and we should, in principle, be prepared to vote one away from the Americans, ie to abstain.

When the dust has settled, we should think about the longer term implications of this incident for the high level dialogue with the Americans which we were planning to launch in the specific context of Belize. Grenada strengthens my view that we should get out of Belize at the earliest practicable opportunity before we find ourselves in another false position. While accepting American primacy throughout the area, we should do some plain speaking about the need for full consultation before the Americans decide to take military action against another Commonwealth country. It is becoming increasingly obvious that they had been planning the Grenada move for some time.



A.D. PARSONS
26 October 1983

P.S. Schedule of American interventions in this century (taken from The Guardian) attached.

he Grenada invasion signal to Moscow?

ashes his hawks

is that, if a deal is ever struck, the "contras" will be dropped.

The same scholar also described the debate within the administration over a "small minority" bent on the military overthrow of the Sandinistas, and the rest, who want to use military pressure only to achieve a settlement. That debate may, in the end, prove more apparent than real, when it is considered that the United States is asking Nicaragua not only to end aid and training for El Salvador, and other Central American insurgents, not only to send its Cuban and other communist advisers packing, not only to reduce its armed forces, but also to establish real "pluralism." Defined, that appears to mean at least general elections supervised by outsiders. Thus majority and minority may be arguing essentially the same policy.

Among those who make Central American policy for the Reagan government there is an "either-or" attitude likely to be reinforced by the Grenada intervention. There is no notion of a gradual pushing and nudging towards adequate relations between a great power and obstreperous small neighbours, or of the way in which Soviet purposes are entangled with, rather than the cause of, local ambitions. That strategic back door upon which the Russians are hammering must be slammed shut—and the louder the slam the better.

Martin Woollacott

FOR exactly half of this century so far, a total of 42 years, American troops have been occupying one or another of the countries and islands of central America and the Caribbean. The process began in 1898, when the war between America and Spain over the remnants of the Spanish Empire saw the beginning of America's expansion into the global role. At the time, the US occupation of the Philippines seemed the most important consequence, but as the years went on, America's hegemony over its central American back yard has been the more enduring.

The war ended with the island of Puerto Rico virtually annexed to the US, and Cuba and Panama as protectorates. The treaties of

1903 with those two countries not only established permanent US bases, but also legally guaranteed America's formal right to military intervention in circumstances where Washington saw fit. And in Panama, Washington saw fit in 1908, 1912 and 1918, largely because 1914 saw the opening of America's vital strategic interest in the area, the Panama Canal.

But the United Fruit Company, whose commercial operations in central America gave birth and point to the phrase "banana republic," was swiftly establishing the plantations and opening the ports and railroads that tied US commerce to official policy. In 1954, when the CIA ran its successful coup against the liberal reform government of Jacobo Arbenz, those ties were blatant. The Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had been United Fruit's lawyer, and had also worked for the company's bankers Schroders. His brother Allen, who had been a director of Schroders, was running the CIA, which duly organised the coup to make Guatemala safe for United Fruit.

The mixture of financial and strategic motives has shaped US policy in the area throughout the century, but there has been one major policy change. Until the Roosevelt government took office in 1933, US policy had been shaped by the Monroe Doctrine, which traditionally denied other foreign powers the right to intervene in the Western hemisphere—and the Doctrine was widely ignored while the US was too weak to enforce it. But in 1904, the Roosevelt corollary to the Doctrine was promulgated, which said that the US assumed a general right to intervene to protect its own interests. Under this rubric, the US embarked on its long occupation of Haiti, Dominican Republic and Nicaragua which provoked a major diplomatic row at the 1928 International Conference of American States.

At the next conference, in 1933, the FDR government effectively renounced in principle its "right" to unilateral military intervention. Thenceforth, it became a prime object of US diplomacy to secure enough Latin support to make those interventions "multilateral." This was the justification of the

1965 invasion of the Dominican Republic, and failure to achieve such multi-national backing meant that the strikes against Guatemala in 1954 and against Cuba in 1961 had to be clandestine.

Yesterday's strike on Grenada, with the backing of other Caribbean troops, seems to follow the pattern established in 1933. But it now raises the question of further US actions against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua, according to Gordon Connell Smith of Hull University, the historian of the Organisation of American States, whose research helped establish the following chronology:

The interventions:

Mexico: 1914, the US Navy bombards Veracruz and lands troops to overthrow President Huerta. 1915: US Army "hot pursuits" of Pancho Villa.

Panama: 1903. US Marines land to block Columbian troops from aborting Panama's declaration of independence. 1908, 1912, 1918. Marines land to "restore order."

Honduras: 1912, the Marines land to protect US banana estates.

Nicaragua: 1909, 1912. Marines land to protect US commercial interests. 1927-33, US military occupation. 1981 to present, US-backed war of destabilisation against Sandinista regime.

Cuba: 1899-1900, and 1906-09. US occupation. Permanent US naval base at Guantanamo since 1903. Intermittent US "shows of force" until 1933, when US pressure led to the pro-American dictatorship of Batista. 1961, Bay of Pigs assault on Castro's Cuba.

Guatemala: 1954. US-backed guerrilla invasion to overthrow Arbenz.

Costa Rica: threat of US invasion used in 1919 to change government.

Haiti: 1905, US takes over Customs offices to guarantee debt payments. 1915-34, US military occupation, including forced labour of local population.

Dominican Republic. 1905, US takes over Customs. 1916-24, US military occupation, and setting up of local military constabulary which guarantees pro-US government is "strong man." 1965, US Marines invade to topple "progressive" government.

Martin Walker



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GRENADA: SECRETARY SHULTZ'S PRESS CONFERENCE

1. SHULTZ GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE AT 1900Z TODAY. HE SAID THE US HAD TAKEN ACTION FOR TWO REASONS: TO PROTECT THE WELFARE OF US CITIZENS IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF VIOLENT UNCERTAINTY ON THE ISLAND; AND BECAUSE OF THE URGENT REQUEST FROM THE OECS STATES. IN SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONING HE SAID THAT CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET OR CUBAN INVOLVEMENT, OR A US DESIRE TO GIVE A SIGNAL TO OTHER NATIONS WERE NOT REASONS FOR THE US DECISION: THE REASONS WERE AS STATED. THE US HAD NO (NO) INFORMATION THAT CUBA WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OVERTHROW OF BISHOP: ALTHOUGH THE OECS STATES BELIEVED THAT TO BE THE CASE.

2. SHULTZ SAID US OBJECTIVES WERE TO SECURE THE SAFETY OF US AND FOREIGN CITIZENS ON THE ISLAND AND TO HELP THE OECS STATES TO ESTABLISH LAW AND ORDER, WITH GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS RESPONSIVE TO THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE.

3. SHULTZ DESCRIBED THE CHAIN OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE US DECISION. HE SAID A MEETING LATE ON 20 OCTOBER UNDER VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S CHAIRMANSHIP, HAD REVIEWED THE GRAVE TURN OF EVENTS AND DECIDED TO DIVERT US NAVAL SHIPS TO THE AREA AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE. THE REQUEST OF THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES FOR INTERVENTION HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY SHULTZ IN AUGUSTA IN A CABLE FROM BRIDGETOWN AT 2.45 AM ON SATURDAY 22 OCTOBER, AND CONSIDERED LATER THAT DAY AT A MEETING IN WASHINGTON UNDER BUSH'S CHAIRMANSHIP. ON SUNDAY 23 OCTOBER THEY HAD BEEN PREOCCUPIED BY THE LEBANON BOMBINGS, BUT LATER ON SUNDAY THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE A TENTATIVE DECISION THAT THE U S MIGHT RESPOND TO THE OECS REQUEST. MILITARY PLANNING AND PREPARATIONS HAD TAKEN PLACE ON MONDAY 24 OCTOBER, AND, FOLLOWING A MEETING WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ENDING AT 3.30 PM, THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE A SEMI-FINAL DECISION TO COMMIT US FORCES. THE DIRECTIVE TO DO SO HAD BEEN SIGNED AT 6.30 PM ON MONDAY 24 OCTOBER.

4. SHULTZ SAID THERE WERE STILL POCKETS OF RESISTANCE IN THE ST GEORGE'S AREA, BUT OTHERWISE ADDED NOTHING ON THE CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION.

5. QUESTIONS CONCENTRATED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND SOVEREIGNTY. SHULTZ DENIED THERE WAS ANY VIOLATION OF THE OAS CHARTER SINCE THE OECS STATES WERE NOT MEMBERS OF THE RIO TREATY. THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION CERTAINLY APPLIED TO GRENADA, WHOSE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN EXECUTED, AND WHERE A SHOOT ON SIGHT CURFEW WAS THE ONLY REMNANT OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY.

5. SHULTZ WAS QUESTIONED ABOUT THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO QUESTIONS AND YOUR STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TODAY. WHY HAD THE US DISREGARDED BRITISH ADVICE: AND DID THE FACT THAT THEY HAD DONE SO MEAN THAT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL COULD PLAY NO CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE IN FUTURE? SHULTZ RECOGNISED BRITISH TIES WITH THE CARIBBEAN, BUT SAID THAT THE US ALSO HAD ITS OWN LEGITIMATE AFFINITY FOR THE AREA. EACH STATE HAD TO TAKE ITS OWN DECISIONS AND THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED FOR THE US, ON THE GROUNDS OF THE URGENT REQUEST FROM STATES IN THE AREA. THE US WAS ALWAYS IMPRESSED WITH THE VIEWS OF HMG AND MRS THATCHER, BUT DID NOT ALWAYS HAVE TO AGREE WITH THEM.

7. SHULTZ SAID THEY HAD INFORMED THE CUBANS AND THE SOVIET UNION OF THEIR ACTION AS IT GOT UNDER WAY, AND UNDERTAKEN TO ASSURE THE SAFETY OF THEIR NATIONALS. WHILE HE WOULD NOT GO INTO DETAILS, THE RUSSIANS AND CUBANS HAD STRENUOUSLY OBJECTED. ALL THE RUSSIANS ON THE ISLAND HAD BEEN SAFELY TAKEN CARE OF. A NUMBER OF THE CUBANS WERE RESISTING.

WRIGHT

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FM WASHINGTON 251709Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3118 OF 25 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN, KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN AND UKMIS NEW YORK

GRENADA

1. DAM TOLD MR LUCE TODAY THAT AT THE REQUEST OF THE OECS A FORCE DRAWN FROM THOSE COUNTRIES, BARBADOS, JAMAICA AND THE US HAD LANDED IN GRENADA THIS MORNING AND SECURED THE TWO AIRFIELDS. SOME RESISTANCE HAS BEEN ENCOUNTERED. THE US INTENTION WAS THAT THE FORCE SHOULD REMAIN ON THE ISLAND FOR AS SHORT A TIME AS POSSIBLE, AND THAT A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR EARLY ELECTIONS. THEY UNDERSTOOD THAT THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL HAD POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (WHICH IN THE US VIEW WAS STILL IN FORCE) TO APPOINT SUCH A GOVERNMENT.
2. MR LUCE SAID THAT OUR ASSESSMENT HAD BEEN THAT FOREIGN NATIONALS WERE AT NO IMMEDIATE RISK: WE HAD BEEN SURPRISED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REFERENCE TO THE DANGER TO US CITIZENS. DAM SAID THAT FOREIGN NATIONALS HAD HAD NO MEANS OF LEAVING GRENADA, THERE WAS CONTINUING DISORDER AND NO OBVIOUS GOVERNMENT AND THAT IF THE OPERATION HAD BEEN DELAYED UNTIL FOREIGN NATIONALS WERE ATTACKED OR KILLED THE ADVANTAGE OF SURPRISE WOULD HAVE BEEN LOST. THE SAFETY OF ALL FOREIGN NATIONALS WAS A PRIME US CONCERN WHICH THEY HAD ALREADY EXPLAINED TO THE CUBANS AND RUSSIANS.
3. WHEN MR LUCE DREW ATTENTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES, INCLUDING THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL, AND TO THE PROBABLE INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS, ESPECIALLY AT THE UN, DAM SAID THAT THE OECS HAD ALREADY REQUESTED A DEBATE IN THE OAS AND WERE CONFIDENT OF SUPPORT THERE. THERE WOULD NO DOUBT BE A GREAT DEAL OF CRITICISM FROM SOME AT THE UN. IT WAS FOR THE OECS THEMSELVES TO INTERPRET THEIR OWN TREATY. THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA HAD HAD NO OPPORTUNITY TO ASK FOR OUTSIDE INTERVENTION. HE ADDED THAT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF HIGH RANKING CUBANS HAD ARRIVED IN GRENADA YESTERDAY.
4. DAM MENTIONED THAT THE US INTENDED TO ESTABLISH AN EMBASSY IN GRENADA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
5. THE SAME POINTS WERE MADE IN A SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH ADMIRAL HOWE. HOWE GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS (REPORTED SEPARATELY). THE AMERICANS WOULD SHORTLY BE FLYING THE EAST CARIBBEAN TROOPS INTO GRENADA. THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S HOUSE HAD BEEN REACHED, BUT HE WAS NOT THERE. THE GRENADIANS, SO FAR HAD NOT BEEN PUTTING UP MUCH RESISTANCE: BUT THE CUBANS HAD BEEN FIGHTING HARD AT SALINAS AIRPORT. THERE WAS ALSO FIGHTING AROUND THE PRISON. THE LARGEST COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN CONTINGENT WOULD COME FROM JAMAICA. AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEY WOULD TAKE OVER. US FORCES WOULD BE THERE TO ASSIST THEM AND WOULD WITHDRAW AS SOON AS THE SITUATION HAD BEEN SECURED. (THE EAST CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS WOULD BRING IN PEOPLE TO HELP MAINTAIN GOVERNMENTAL CONTINUITY. THERE

A. J. C. 26/10

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WOULD BE A CALL FOR FREE ELECTIONS. THE AMERICANS PURPOSE WOULD BE TO KEEP THE EAST CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS OUT IN FRONT). THERE WOULD BE STRONG POLITICAL CRITICISM EG AT THE UN. THE AMERICANS HAD INFORMED THE RUSSIANS AND THE CUBANS OF THE ACTION THEY WERE TAKING. THERE WOULD ALSO BE ACTION IN THE OAS. IN INTERNATIONAL FORA THEY WOULD BE HOPING FOR SUPPORT FROM THEIR ALLIES.

6. MR LUCE SAID THAT, AS ADMIRAL HOWE KNEW, WE HAD THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE MILITARY ACTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN. HOWE SAID THAT THIS HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR BY ME TO HIM AND TO EAGLEBURGER YESTERDAY. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ALSO SENT A MESSAGE.

7. MR LUCE SAID THAT WE WERE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL. HE HAD MADE CLEAR TO US HIS ANXIETY THAT IF HE WERE CAUGHT UP IN EVENTS OF THIS KIND, HE MIGHT BE KILLED. IT WAS A VERY NASTY REGIME. BUT WE WERE NOT IN A SITUATION IN WHICH THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA HAD ASKED FOR INTERVENTION. THIS HAD SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS, NEXT WORD UNDERLINED, INTER ALIA, FOR THE SAFETY OF OUR CITIZENS.

8. ADMIRAL HOWE SAID THAT THE JUNTA HAD COME TO POWER BY SHOOTING THE MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT. THEY HAD BEEN MAKING SOOTHING NOISES IN AN ATTEMPT TO FORESTALL INTERVENTION. BUT THIS COULD HARDLY BE REGARDED AS A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT. WHAT THE AMERICANS WERE RESPONDING TO WAS THE EAST CARIBBEAN REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE. THEY WERE OF COURSE ALSO CONCERNED NOT TO PERMIT THE CUBANS TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR HOLD ON GRENADA. THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE CLEAR HIS VIEWS ON THIS IN HIS BROADCAST SOME TIME AGO ABOUT THE AIRPORT THE CUBANS WERE BUILDING IN GRENADA. THERE WAS AN INCREASINGLY STRONG SOVIET/CUBAN CONNECTION. PRIME MINISTER ADAMS AND THE OTHER PRIME MINISTERS OF THE EAST CARIBBEAN STATES CONSIDERED THAT THIS POSED A THREAT TO THEIR SECURITY AS WELL. BISHOP HAD BEEN MAKING TENTATIVE STEPS TOWARDS SOME ACCOMMODATION WITH THE AMERICANS WHEN HE HAD BEEN KILLED. THE AMERICANS WOULD BE PLACING THE MAIN EMPHASIS ON THE FACT THAT THEY WERE ACTING AT THE BEHEST OF THE EAST CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS: AND THAT IT WOULD BE FOR THESE GOVERNMENTS TO ORGANISE THE FUTURE POLICING OF FREE ELECTIONS IN GRENADA.

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ZZ UKMIS NEW YORK

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FM FCO 251900Z OCT 83

TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 646 OF 25 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON BRIDGETOWN KINGSTON GEORGETOWN

BELMOPAN NASSAU PORT OF SPAIN

A.S.C. 26/10.
h-a.

GRENADA

1. WE UNDERSTAND THAT NICARAGUA HAS REQUESTED A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON GRENADA AND THAT THE COUNCIL WILL BE MEETING IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS AT ABOUT 2100Z TODAY TO CONSIDER THIS REQUEST.
2. YOU SHOULD ADOPT A LOW PROFILE IN THESE CONSULTATIONS, TAKING NO (NO) INITIATIVE YOURSELF. YOU SHOULD RAISE NO (NO) OBJECTIONS TO THE HOLDING OF A FORMAL MEETING. WE SHOULD PREFER YOU NOT (NOT) TO BE DRAWN ON THE SUBSTANCE AT THIS STAGE.
3. YOU SHOULD PRIVATELY DO WHAT YOU CAN TO ENSURE THAT THE AMERICANS GET THEIR PARTNERS IN THE MILITARY OPERATION AND ANY OTHER CARIBBEAN SYMPATHISERS TO PLAY AN ACTIVE PART IN THE FORMAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE COUNCIL.
4. YOU WILL NOW HAVE SEEN THE TEXT OF MY STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS THIS AFTERNOON. YOU SHOULD DRAW ON THIS AS NECESSARY IN CONTACTS WITH FRIENDLY DELEGATIONS. YOU SHOULD BE THAT IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE LEGALITY OF THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES, BARBADOS AND JAMAICA, WE ARE TAKING THE LINE THAT IT IS FOR THEM IN THE FIRST PLACE TO EXPLAIN THE LEGAL BASIS OF THEIR ACTION. WE ARE ALSO SAYING THAT STATES HAVE THE RIGHT TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO SECURE THE SAFETY OF THEIR NATIONALS. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, BARBADOS AND JAMAICA BASE THEIR ACTION ON THEIR INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY OF THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES. WE REGARD

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THIS AS A VERY SHAKY BASIS.

5. THERE WILL BE A DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TOMORROW
26 OCTOBER. MY STATEMENT WILL AGAIN BE TELEGRAPHED TO YOU FLASH.

6. PLEASE TELEGRAPH YOUR REPORT OF THIS EVENING'S PROCEEDINGS
AND YOUR ASSESSMENT OF LIKELY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY
COUNCIL TO REACH US DESKBY 260600Z.

7. SINCE THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED WE HAVE HEARD FROM BELMOPAN THAT
GUYANA IS SEEKING THE SUPPORT OF BELIZE, BAHAMAS AND TRINIDAD
FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CRITICAL OF THE AMERICAN
ACTION.

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ZZ BRIDGETOWN
OO KINGSTON
OO PORT OF SPAIN
GRS 102
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 251720Z OCT 83
TO FLASH BRIDGETOWN
TELEGARM NUMBER 305 OF 25 OCTOBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, KINGSTON AND PORT OF SPAIN

A. J. C. 26/10.
h.a.

YOUR TELNO 353: GRENADA

1. THE PUS HAS TELEPHONED TO THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON INSTRUCTING THEM TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE AMERICANS ONCE AGAIN AT A HIGH LEVEL THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL (IF AND WHEN HE IS FOUND SAFE AND SOUND) MUST (REPEAT MUST) BE RESPECTED. HE DESCRIBED AS OUTRAGEOUS THE SUGGESTION THAT SCOON SHOULD BE ASKED TO SIGN AN ANTE-DATED LETTER.
2. PLEASE MAKE THIS CLEAR ALSO TO ADAMS AND TO GILLESPIE IF HE IS STILL IN BRIDGETOWN.

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FROM F C O 251620Z OCT 83

TO FLASH WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1774 OF 25 OCTOBER

INFO FLASH BRIDGETOWN, IMMEDIATE PORT OF SPAIN, KINGSTON,
NASSAU, UKMIS NEW YORK, OTTAWA, MODUK
GRENADA: CONVERSATION WITH SHULTZ

A. J. C. 26/10.

h-a-

1. SHULTZ SPOKE TO ME BY TELEPHONE AT 1345Z TO BRING ME UP-TO-DATE ON THE SITUATION IN GRENADA. HE SAID THAT THE US HAD RECEIVED AN URGENT REQUEST FROM THE SIX OECS STATES UNDER THEIR TREATY ASKING FOR US HELP IN EFFORTS TO RESTORE ORDER. THE US WERE ALSO VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE WELFARE OF THEIR CITIZENS ON GRENADA (ABOUT 1,000) NOT BECAUSE THEY FACED A DIRECT THREAT, BUT BECAUSE OF THE CHAOTIC AND ESSENTIALLY MURDEROUS SITUATION ON THE ISLAND. THE OECS STATES TOGETHER WITH BARBADOS AND JAMAICA HAD CONCLUDED THAT THEY COULD NOT MOUNT AN OPERATION ON THEIR OWN. THE ACTUAL DECISION FOR THE US FORCES TO GO INTO ACTION HAD NOT BEEN MADE UNTIL LATE ON 24 OCTOBER. SHULTZ ADDED THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT: THE AMERICANS HAD VERY MUCH IN MIND THE SAFETY OF UK CITIZENS.
2. ON THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND, SHULTZ SAID THAT THE TWO AIRPORTS HAD BEEN SECURED. US TROOPS HAD BEEN TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S HOUSE BUT THE LATTER HAD NOT BEEN THERE. REPORTS FROM THE ISLAND WERE STILL FRAGMENTARY. THE US WOULD PASS ANY FURTHER INFORMATION TO US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THROUGH HM EMBASSY WASHINGTON. SHULTZ EMPHASISED THAT THIS WAS PRIMARILY AN ACTION OF THE REGIONAL STATES. THE PRIME MINISTER OF DOMINICA WHO WAS IN WASHINGTON WAS NOW INTENDING TO CONVENE THE OAS TO SEEK BROADER SUPPORT.
3. I SAID THAT SHULTZ WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT WE SAW DIFFERENT FACTORS. SOME OF THESE HAD BEEN SET OUT IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. THERE WAS VERY REAL CONCERN HERE, NOT LEAST AT THE IMPACT OF THE OPERATION IN EUROPE. ONE DIFFICULTY WAS THAT I HAD MADE A STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE ON 24 OCTOBER BASED ON THE

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INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US FROM THE US AT THAT TIME IN WHICH I HAD SAID THAT THERE WAS NO LIKELIHOOD OF MILITARY INTERVENTION. THE DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN LESS THAN 24 HOURS AFTERWARDS, AND BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER HAD HAD A CHANCE TO REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.

4. SHULTZ APOLOGISED FOR HAVING PUT US IN THIS POSITION. THE OECS REQUEST HAD ARRIVED IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT OF 23 OCTOBER. MCNEIL HAD BEEN SENT TO BRIDGETOWN AND HAD REPORTED THE STRONG CONCERNS OF THE REGIONAL STATES. ON THE STRENGTH OF THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED TO ACT.

5. I SAID THAT ON OUR READING OF THE OECS TREATY IT WAS NOT OPEN TO ONE MEMBER STATE TO REQUEST INTERVENTION OF ANOTHER. I ALSO UNDERLINED OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND ASKED SHULTZ TO LET US KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHERE HE WAS STAYING.

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Sir Peter Emery: Did any British troops take part in the landing of American and Commonwealth forces in Grenada? Were there consultations between the United States and the British Government? What action has the Commonwealth Secretariat taken on this matter?

Mr. Speaker: Order. I must tell the hon. Gentleman and the House that this question relates to the Prime Minister's official engagements.

The Prime Minister: I should be quite happy to answer my hon. Friend's points on an open question. No British troops took part. As to consultations, we received a message some three or four hours after my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary spoke in the House yesterday on a statement. The United States sought our advice at that time. We communicated to the United States our considerable doubts about initiating action. We asked them to weigh several points carefully before taking any

irrevocable decision to act. We understand that the view of several Caribbean states weighed heavily and conclusively with the United States. The perspective of those Caribbean states is undoubtedly different from ours as they are much closer to what is happening. As my hon. Friend knows, they have been prepared for a landing and contributed to the forces that landed on Grenada today.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell: Having heard her Foreign Secretary yesterday say that he had been in the closest possible touch with the Americans and had no reason to think that there was any likelihood of their military intervention in Grenada, will the Prime Minister learn the lesson that no undertakings that may be offered by the United States—either as to the use that they might make of missiles stationed in this country or as to the consultation that would precede such use—ought to be relied upon?

The Prime Minister: What my right hon. and learned Friend said yesterday was the accurate information available to us then. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman would not wish to misrepresent anything that my right hon. and learned Friend said. My right hon. and learned Friend did not mention any United States undertaking not to intervene, for the simple reason that there had been no such undertaking. The right hon. Gentleman, whose questions we always listen to with the greatest possible interest, tried to draw a parallel with cruise missiles. With the greatest respect, there is no parallel at all.

PRIME MINISTER'S
QUESTION TIME

25 OCTOBER '83

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 October, 1983

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 25 October enclosing a message from the President of the United States.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency The Honourable
John J. Louis, Jr.

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EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

October 25, 1983

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to forward to you the enclosed message from President Reagan which was received at the Embassy this morning.

Sincerely,


John J. Louis, Jr.
Ambassador

Enclosure:

SECRET

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

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FM KINGSTON 251441Z OCT 83

TO FLASH BRIDGETOWN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 33 OF 25 OCTOBER

IMMEDIATE INFO FCO AND WASHINGTON

GRENADA

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1. SIGNATURE OF LOAN AGREEMENT THIS MORNING GAVE OPPORTUNITY OF EARLY WORD WITH SEAGA. HE WAS PLEASED WITH PROGRESS OF ASSAULT, THOUGH ANNOYED AT AMERICAN BUNGLER IN SUPPLY OF AIRCRAFT WHICH DELAYED ARRIVAL OF JAMAICAN FORCE. HE IS MAKING A STATEMENT TO PARLIAMENT AT 1400 LOCAL TIME THIS AFTERNOON. WOULD CHECK URGENTLY WHETHER GOVERNOR GENERAL'S STATEMENT WOULD BE MADE BY THEN ? IF SO, HE WANTED TO REFER TO IT.

URGENTLY WHETHER GOVERNOR GENERAL'S STATEMENT WOULD BE MADE BY
THEN ? IF SO, HE WANTED TO REFER TO INT.

2. GRATEFUL ADVICE BY 1315 LOCAL.

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FM MASSAU 251305Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 129 OF 25 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BRIDGETOWN, PORT OF SPAIN AND BELIZE
INFO PRIORITY HAVANA

IMMEDIATE

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GRENADA

1. I SOUGHT A MEETING WITH ADDERLEY (FOREIGN MINISTER) TODAY
25 OCTOBER, FOR HIS REACTIONS TO THE OUTCOME OF THE PORT OF SPAIN
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING. HE HAD NOT IN THE EVENT ATTENDED, BUT
SAID HE HAD BEEN WELL BRIEFED BY PINDLING (PM) AND HANNA (DEPUTY PM)
WHO DID.

2. ADDERLEY SAID THAT THE BAHAMAS WERE VERY MUCH OPPOSED TO THE
PROPOSALS FOR USING MILITARY FORCE AGAINST GRENADA. HE SAID THERE
HAD BEEN A COMPLETE LACK OF AGREEMENT ON THIS AT PORT OF SPAIN.
TRINIDAD, GUYANA AND BELIZE SHARED THE BAHAMIAN VIEW THAT FORCE
WOULD NEITHER BE JUSTIFIED NOR LIKELY TO ACHIEVE THE DESIRED
RESULTS. HE SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT NEITHER THE UK NOR THE US WOULD
BE PERSUADED, AND STILL LESS RUSHED, INTO SUCH AN ACTION. BUT FOR
FOR THE PRESENT HE SAID THE SMALLER EAST CARIBBEAN STATES WERE
FEELING VERY (BUT UNNECESSARILY) THREATENED BY EVENTS IN GRENADA
"AND WERE NOT LISTENING TO REASON". JAMAICA AND BARBADOS WERE
ALSO IN SUPPORT.

3. HE SAID THEY HAD AGREED AT PORT OF SPAIN THAT CHAMBERS WOULD
CONTACT AUSTIN IN GRENADA TO SEE WHAT THE OTHER CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS
COULD DO TO HOLD HIM TO HIS PROMISES TO TURN OVER TO A CIVILIAN
GOVERNMENT, TO HOLD ELECTIONS ETC. ADDERLEY SAID THAT SINCE CHAMBERS
HAD AN INTEREST IN HEADING OFF MILITARY ACTION HE ASSUMED THAT HE
WOULD ACT AT ONCE. HE SAID HE WAS SURE THAT THIS WAS THE WAY TO GO
TO INFLUENCE THE GRENADA ADMINISTRATION AND PEOPLE RATHER THAN USING
FORCE.

~~TO INFLUENCE THE GRENADA ADMINISTRATION AND PEOPLE RATHER THAN USING FORCE.~~

4. ADDERLEY ASKED IF WE KNEW ANYTHING ABOUT AUSTIN AND WHO IF ANYONE LAY BEHIND HIM. I SAID I HAD SEEN LITTLE YET BUT THAT I HOPED WE WOULD BE ABLE TO LET HIM KNOW IF ANYTHING CAME TO LIGHT. HE SAID HE THOUGHT IT PROBABLY WAS NOT COARD, WHOSE WIFE HAD LEFT GRENADA BY PRIVATE PLANE AT THE WEEKEND, AND PROBABLY NOT CUBA EITHER DESPITE AUSTIN HAVING BEEN ON A SIX MONTH COURSE IN HAVANA.

5. I TOLD ADDERLEY OF HMS ANTRIM'S MOVEMENTS, STRESSING THAT IT WAS ONLY A PRECAUTION AGAINST THREATS TO BRITISH LIVES. HE SEEMED TOTALLY UNDERSTANDING.

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CCN SECOND LINE PSE READ 24 OCTOBER

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FM WASHINGTON 251415Z OCT 83

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3111 OF 25 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN, OTTAWA, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO

MY TELNO 3108: GRENADA PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PRESS CONFERENCE

1. AT 1300Z THIS MORNING, PRESIDENT REAGAN MADE A TELEVISED STATEMENT ON THE LINES OF MY TUR. SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES WERE:

(A) IN PARA 1, HE REFERRED TO SIX CARIBBEAN STATES, OMITTING MENTION OF ST KITTS.

(B) HE OMITTED THE PASSAGE FROM "WHAT APPEARS TO HAVE BEGUN" IN PARA 3 TO THE END OF PARA 5 "EAST CARIBBEAN REGION".

2. THE PRESIDENT WAS ACCOMPANIED ON THE ROSTRUM BY PRIME MINISTER CHARLES OF DOMINICA, CHAIRMAN OF THE OECS. SPEAKING VERY ROBUSTLY, SHE SAID ALL EAST CARIBBEAN STATES WERE ONE FAMILY, FOR WHOM DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS WERE VERY IMPORTANT. GRENADA HAD BEEN AN ABERRATION, BUT THEY HAD HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT BISHOP WAS BEGINNING TO SEE THINGS THEIR WAY AND PAVING THE WAY FOR ELECTIONS.

THIS WAS PROBABLY WHY HE HAD BEEN KILLED. THE

ASSASSINATIONS LAST WEEK HAD LEFT OECS GOVERNMENTS WITHOUT ANY CHOICE. ~~IN REPLY TO A QUESTION ON WHETHER THE US HAD THE RIGHT TO~~

~~THIS WAS PROBABLY WHY HE HAD BEEN KILLED. THE ASSASSINATIONS LAST WEEK HAD LEFT OECS GOVERNMENTS WITHOUT ANY CHOICE. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION ON WHETHER THE US HAD THE RIGHT TO INVAD~~
INVAD ANOTHER COUNTRY, SHE SAID EMPHATICALLY 'THIS IS NOT AN INVASION'. THE OECS WERE ASKING FOR SUPPORT BECAUSE THEY LACKED THE MEANS TO TAKE NECESSARY ACTION THEMSELVES. SHE ENVISAGED THAT AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT OF GOOD NON-POLITICAL ADMINISTRATORS, WHO WOULD BE GRENADIANS, WOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO ORGANISE ELECTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, WITHIN A FEW MONTHS, SO THAT THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE COULD CHOOSE THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT.

3. ASKED ABOUT SOVIET AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT, MRS CHARLES SAID THERE HAD BEEN INDICATIONS IN THE TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE ASSASSINATIONS TOOK PLACE OF CONTACTS BETWEEN THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN CUBA AND KNOWN GRENADIAN ACTIVISTS SOME OF WHOM HAD RETURNED TO THE ISLAND SOON BEFORE THESE EVENTS.

4. PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY AT THIS STAGE HOW LONG THE US FORCES WOULD REMAIN ON THE GROUND. AS FAR AS HE KNEW, ALL US CITIZENS WERE SAFE. ASKED WHY THIS ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN WHEN YESTERDAY THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD MAINTAINED THAT THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE DANGER TO US CITIZENS, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT MANY AMERICANS HAD SAID THEY WANTED TO LEAVE THE ISLANDS, BUT COULD NOT DO SO. IT WAS A CASE OF NOT WAITING UNTIL SOMETHING HAPPENED TO THEM. REPORTS FROM THE ISLANDS INDICATED THAT A 24 HOUR CURFEW, WITH ORDERS FOR VIOLATORS TO BE SHOT ON SIGHT, WAS IN FORCE.

WRIGHT

NNNN

No 10
Prime Minister

GRENADA: SITREP No 1 25 OCTOBER 1983 (2030 hours GMT)

Military Action

1. The State Department informed us that a contingent of US marines landed in Grenada at 05.30 hours local time (0930 GMT) 25 October. There was some shooting but it was not heavy. 11 CI30s went in with at least 1 helicopter group. There was some resistance in the Port Salines area and particularly round the prison. US Forces secured the US medical school and Salinas and Pearls airports. There were 800 US troops on the ground at Salinas and 1,000 US marines landed at Pearls.

2. 2 CI30s with Caribbean forces numbering 300 landed later at Pearls.

President Reagan's Statement

3. At 1300 GMT President Reagan issued a statement outlining the reasons for the invasion. The US responded to an urgent formal request from the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) to assist in a joint effort to restore order and democracy in Grenada. There were three reasons:

1. to protect innocent lives (1,000 US nationals)
2. to forestall further chaos
3. to assist in the restoration of democracy

4. This evening it was reported that the US marines encountered unexpectedly stiff opposition in St George's itself. But they were making progress compatible with keeping civilian casualties to a minimum.

Casualties

5. 20 Americans were reported wounded and it is believed 1 helicopter was lost. No civilian casualties have been reported.

Cubans and Russians

6. There was stiff Cuban resistance at Pearls Airport and elsewhere. 20 were captured and 2 killed. There was no confirmation of a Reuter report that some Russians may have been detained.

/Governor

Governor General

7. US Rangers entered the Governor-General's residence after the 10.45 landing at Pearls Airport. The Governor-General was not there. It was reported at 2000 hours GMT that he was safe and well in his residence with US marines present but the house was surrounded by Armoured Personnel carriers of the Grenadan regime.

Foreign Reactions

8. a) Soviet Union. Tass put out a statement beginning 'Foreign armed intervention guided by the US administration was unleashed....' Later it condemned the attack as 'an act of banditry and terrorism'.
- b) Cuba. Only a brief factual statement so far.
- c) Nicaragua. Condemned the attack.

Security Council

9. Nicaragua has asked for an urgent meeting of the Security Council. It is likely that this request will be considered by the Council in informal consultations at about 2100Z this evening and that a formal meeting will be held tomorrow. We have learned from Belize that Guyana is seeking the support of Belize. Trinidad and Bahamas for a resolution critical of the United States.

10. Sir J Thomson has been instructed to adopt a low profile in the informal consultations, taking no initiative. He is to raise no objection to the holding of a formal meeting and to avoid being drawn on the substance at this stage.

Distribution

Private Secretary
PS/Lady Young
PS/Mr Whitney
PS/PUS
Mr Giffard
Mr Wright
Mr Ure
Mr Cartledge
PUSD (3)
Defence Department
WIAD
News Department
Emergency Unit
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Buckingham Palace
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PS/Secretary of State for Defence
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D14 MOD
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GRENADA

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PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR URE

MR CARTLEDGE

MR HANNAY

SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE

CABINET OFFICE

NO. 10 DOWNING ST

MOD, RC

MOD (DI 4)

RESIDENT CLERK

LDK 761/25

00 FCO

00 BRIDGETOWN

00 KINGSTON

00 PORT OF SPAIN

00 NASSAU

00 WASHINGTON

GRS 165

CONFIDENTIAL

FM GEORGETOWN 251325Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 198 OF 25 OCTOBER

AND IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN, KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN, NASSAU AND WASHINGTON

GRENADA

1. PRESIDENT BURNHAM HAS ISSUED A STATEMENT TOTALLY CONDEMNING THE INVASION OF GRENADA. HE HAS ALSO STATED THAT HE IS TOTALLY OPPOSED TO FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN CARICOM COUNTRIES.
2. FOREIGN MINISTER JACKSON HAS TOLD ME THAT UNDERLYING THE CARICOM DISCUSSIONS IN PORT OF SPAIN OVER THE WEEKEND WAS THE FACT THAT BARBADOS AND JAMAICA APPEARED PRIVY TO PLANS FOR AN INVASION. WHETHER JACKSON SAW THIS AT THE TIME OR WAS SPEAKING WITH BENEFIT OF HINDSIGHT IS NOT CLEAR. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THIS MADE IT

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY



p.r. inf'd.

AR 25/10

OF HINDSIGHT IS NOT CLEAR. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THIS MADE IT
DIFFICULT FOR A CONSENSUS TO BE REACHED ON MATTERS SUCH AS THE
DESPATCH OF A FACT FINDING MISSION, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS OR THE
SUSPENSION OF GRENADA FROM CARICOM (TO WHICH GUYANA WAS OPPOSED).

3. IN MY HEARING, JACKSON ARRANGED WITH CHEDDI JAGAN, LEADER OF
THE OPPOSITION PPP, TO ARGANISE DEMONSTRATIONS OUTSIDE THE US
EMBASSY AND CARICOM HEADQUARTERS.

FCO PASS NASSAU AND WASHINGTON
KINGSTON PASS OTHERS

SLATCHER

NNNN

GRENADA ADVANCE COPIES

23

~~18~~ COPIES

HD/WIAD
HD/NAD
HE/MCAD
HD/PUSD (2)
HD/DEF D
HDNEWS D

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR URE

CABINET OFFICE

NO 10 DOWNING STREET (3)

SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE

MOD RC

MOD CSDO D14

RC

NR (ARTICLE 6)

Hd Protocol Dept.

FLASH

ZZ FCO

ZZ MODUK

OO BRIDGETOWN

GRS300

PR inf'd.

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 251657Z OCT 83

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3115 OF 25 OCTOBER

AND TO FLASH MODUK

INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN

25.
6

GRENADA

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT TELL US THAT TWO C130S WITH CARIBBEAN FORCES ELEMENTS LANDED AT PEARLS AIRPORT AT 1045 HOURS. THE AIRPORT HAS BEEN SECURED AND THE EASTERN PART OF THE ISLAND IS QUIET. US RANGERS HAVE ENTERED THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S HOUSE. AS REPORTED BY TELEPHONE, THE GOVERNOR GENERAL WAS NOT THERE. THE AMERICANS DO NOT KNOW IF HE HAS GONE TO GROUND OR BEEN ABDUCTED BY THE REGIME. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO ADMIRAL HOWE THAT THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF H.M. THE QUEEN APPOINTING AN ACTING GOVERNOR GENERAL IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. (BRIDGETOWN TELEGRAM NO 353 TO YOU AND TELECON PUS/RENWICK). THIS WILL BE RELAYED TO GILLESPIE.

2. US TROOPS HAVE NOT YET SECURED THE PRISON OR THE REVOLUTIONARY GROUP'S HEADQUARTERS. SOME FIGHTING IS CONTINUING AT GRANDE ANSE AND AT SALINAS AIRPORT, WHERE THE CUBANS HAVE BEEN PUTTING UP QUITE STIFF RESISTANCE. THE AMERICANS HAVE NO CONFIRMATION OF A REUTER

REPORT THAT SOME RUSSIANS MAY HAVE BEEN DETAINED. RADIO FREE GRENADA
INTERRUPTED BROADCASTING FOR SOME TIME BUT HAS NOT YET BEEN SECURED.
3. THE AMERICANS WILL BE GIVING US HOURLY SITREPS. THEY ARE CONCERNED
THAT THESE SHOULD REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL.

WRIGHT

NNNN

H 3 A 1 7

STATEMENT ON THE SITUATION IN GRENADA MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS TO THE HOUSE:

25 OCTOBER 1983

I reported to the House yesterday about the disturbing developments in Grenada and outlined the steps which Her Majesty's Government were taking to protect our own citizens, and to keep in close touch with our Commonwealth partners in the region and others concerned. Since then events have moved rapidly and I owe the House a further report.

Last Saturday, the Prime Minister of Barbados (which is not a member of the Organisation of East Caribbean States) told us that that organisation was contemplating intervention in Grenada, and invited our participation. The status of this request was unclear.

We had already taken measures to keep ourselves informed of the state of affairs on the island; and we concluded at that time that such intervention would be unjustified and might indeed put our citizens at risk. We communicated this view to the American Government. We were told that they too were watching events with close attention, but we were given no indication that they favoured encouraging or joining in any military intervention.

/We subsequently

We subsequently learned that the leaders of the CARICOM organisation (which includes the members of the OECS) at a meeting in Trinidad were divided on the question of military intervention, and concluded by a majority in favour of political and economic measures against Grenada.

The Prime Minister discussed these developments with colleagues early yesterday. It was on this basis that I reported to the House yesterday that we had no reason to think that military intervention in Grenada was likely. That was indeed the case.

/Yesterday

Yesterday evening, events began to move more rapidly. We were informed that a formal request had been conveyed by the Organisation of East Caribbean States to the United States requesting participation in a military intervention in Grenada. Subsequently, the Prime Minister received a message from President Reagan indicating that he was giving serious consideration to this OECS request. When the Prime Minister was on the point of transmitting her response to this message, a further message was received from President Reagan, explaining why he thought a positive response to the request for military action was desirable. After further discussion with her colleagues, the Prime Minister drew President Reagan's attention to a number of factors which should be very carefully weighed before a decision was taken to intervene. The President later replied saying that he had weighed very carefully the points which the Prime Minister had raised and had reached the conclusion that, for the US and for those Caribbean states who had proposed it, intervention was the right course to pursue. President Reagan assured the Prime Minister that he would comply fully with her request that the lives of British citizens should be safeguarded.

The Considerations

The considerations facing him were not the same as those facing us. The American community in Grenada is five times larger than the British community and more exposed. President Reagan received reports that a large number of them were seeking to escape the island; and the closing of Grenada Airport, which effectively prevented the Americans from undertaking a peaceful evacuation by air, no doubt weighed heavily on him.

We understand that troops from the United States, Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, St Kitts, St Lucia and St Vincent landed on the Island early this morning. It is too soon to know how the operation has fared or what the long term consequences will be. The House will follow these events with great concern. We must all hope that the outcome will be to establish peace and democratic government for the people of Grenada, with the least possible loss of life.

FO/BR1003/25

ZZ BRIDGETOWN

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SECRET

FM F C O 250328Z OCT 83

TO FLASH BRIDGETOWN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 303 OF 25 OCTOBER

GRENADA

SHOULD BRITISH LOAN SERVICE PERSONNEL SEEK YOUR ADVICE OR THAT
OF DEFENCE ATTACHE, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE SHOULD NOT (NOT)
WISH THEM TO BE INVOLVED IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST GRENADA

HOWE

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SENT AT 250336Z MB

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OK ANYMORE FOR ANYMORE ? K

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FM FCG 250224Z OCT 83

TO FLASH WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1768 OF 25 OCTOBER

*mm 25/w
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GRENADA

YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT THAT SHE REFERRED STRONGLY TO THE RISK TO BRITISH CITIZENS IN THE EVENT OF INTERVENTION.

2. PLEASE REINFORCE THIS POINT URGENTLY AND WITHOUT FAIL TO-NIGHT AT THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVEL, TELLING THE AMERICANS THAT WE LOOK TO THEM TO PROTECT BRITISH LIVES AND PROPERTY.

HOWE

cc Mudi
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T/62/83
208

S E C R E T

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

DEAR RON,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TWO MESSAGES ABOUT GRENADA.

I WAS ABOUT TO REPLY TO YOUR EARLIER MESSAGE INVITING MY THOUGHTS WHEN YOUR SECOND ONE ARRIVED.

I MUST TELL YOU AT ONCE THAT THE DECISION WHICH YOU DESCRIBE CAUSES US THE GRAVEST CONCERN.

I MUST ASK YOU TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS INTO ACCOUNT.

(A) THE ONLY JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERVENTION WHICH IS LIKELY TO SEEM CREDIBLE IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD IS THE NEED TO PROTECT THE SAFETY OF US AND BRITISH CITIZENS. THE REPORTS WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM GRENADA SO FAR SUGGEST THAT THE LIVES OF THESE CITIZENS ARE NOT AT RISK. THEY COULD BE PUT VERY MUCH AT RISK IF AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO TAKE THE ISLAND BY MILITARY FORCE.

(B) THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS RECEIVED NO FORMAL REQUEST FROM THE OECS.

(C) JAMAICA AND BARBADOS ARE NOT MEMBERS OF THE OECS.

(D) OUR INFORMATION IS THAT CARICOM, WHICH INCLUDES THE MEMBERS OF THE OECS, WAS DIVIDED IN ITS VIEWS WHEN IT MET YESTERDAY, THAT A MAJORITY WERE AGAINST A RESORT TO FORCE AND THAT THE DECISION TAKEN WAS TO ADOPT A SERIES OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEASURES INSTEAD.

(E) I HAVE A PARTICULAR CONCERN ABOUT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN GRENADA. AS THE QUEEN'S REPRESENTATIVE ON THE ISLAND HE IS IN A VERY DELICATE POSITION. HE TOLD A BRITISH OFFICIAL WHO VISITED GRENADA ON 23 OCTOBER THAT IF HE MADE ANY MOVE WHICH DIRECTLY CHALLENGED THE AUTHORITY OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL, HE WOULD PROBABLY BE KILLED. IN A DISCUSSION TODAY OF POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO THE PRESENT SITUATION IN GRENADA, HE STRESSED THE POSITIVE EFFECT THAT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MEASURES COULD HAVE ON AUSTIN.

(F) WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY CREDIBLE ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP WHO COULD BE ESTABLISHED IN THE AFTERMATH OF A MILITARY OPERATION (BISHOP HIMSELF WAS, OF COURSE, A MARXIST AND WAS IN POWER UNCONSTITUTIONALLY).

(G) THIS ACTION WILL BE SEEN AS INTERVENTION BY A WESTERN DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A SMALL INDEPENDENT NATION, HOWEVER UNATTRACTIVE ITS REGIME. I ASK YOU TO CONSIDER THIS IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR WIDER EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND OF THE FACT THAT WE WILL BE HAVING IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO PRESENT TO OUR PARLIAMENT AND PEOPLE THE SITING OF CRUISE MISSILES IN THIS COUNTRY. I MUST ASK YOU TO THINK MOST CAREFULLY ABOUT THESE POINTS. I CANNOT CONCEAL THAT I AM DEEPLY DISTURBED BY YOUR LATEST COMMUNICATION. YOU ASKED FOR MY ADVICE. I HAVE SET IT OUT AND HOPE THAT EVEN AT THIS LATE STAGE YOU WILL TAKE IT INTO ACCOUNT BEFORE EVENTS ARE IRREVOCABLE.

YOURS EVER,

MARGARET THATCHER.

SUBJECT

T/63/83

3 DUTY CLERK

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O 250656Z OCT 83
FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO CABINET OFFICE
ZEM
S E C R E T VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WHO8211

DEAR MARGARET,

I APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE ON GRENADA. I HAVE WEIGHED VERY CAREFULLY THE ISSUES YOU HAVE RAISED AND HAVE REACHED THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS.

I CONTINUE TO BE GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE WELFARE OF OUR CITIZENS. THE VIOLENT EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS HAVE CAUSED A LARGE NUMBER OF THEM TO SEEK ANY POSSIBLE MEANS OF EVACUATION. GIVEN THE COMPOSITION OF THE GOVERNING MILITARY COUNCIL, AND ITS PROVEN BRUTALITY, WE ARE NOT SANGUINE THAT THE SITUATION WILL HOLD MUCH LONGER. I WILL APPRECIATE THE DANGERS INHERENT IN A MILITARY OPERATION TO ASSURE THE SAFETY OF THESE CITIZENS, BUT, ON BALANCE, I SEE THIS AS THE LESSER OF TWO RISKS. IN THIS REGARD YOU MAY BE SURE THAT WE WILL COMPLY FULLY WITH YOUR REQUEST THAT WE SAFEGUARD ALL BRITISH CITIZENS. SPECIAL CONSIDERATION HAS GONE INTO OUR OPERATIONAL PLANNING TO PROTECT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

ON OCTOBER 23 I RECEIVED A FORMAL REQUEST IN WRITING FROM THE OECS ASKING FOR OUR SUPPORT FOR THEIR EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION IN GRENADA. JAMAICA AND BARBADOS HAVE GIVEN THEIR STRONG SUPPORT. QUITE FRANKLY, THIS REQUEST HAS WEIGHED HEAVILY IN MY CONSIDERATION ON WHETHER TO COMMIT US FORCES. WITH SO CLEAR AN EXPRESSION OF THE WILL OF THE NATIONS OF THE REGION I WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN EITHER TO THEM OR TO OTHERS WHO DEPEND UPON US WHY WE HAD NOT ACTED.

FINALLY, I HAVE ALSO WEIGHED U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN MY DECISION. AS YOU KNOW WE HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY CONCERNED BY GRENADA'S RECENT DRIFT INTO THE SOVIET BLOC. THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS HAVE DONE NOTHING TO EASE OUR CONCERNS. TO THE CONTRARY, IT IS CLEAR THAT GRENADA HAS NOW BEEN TAKEN OVER BY A GROUP OF LEFTIST THUGS WHO WOULD LIKELY ALIGN THEMSELVES WITH CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION TO AN EVEN GREATER DEGREE THAN DID THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT. THE ARRIVAL MONDAY IN GRENADA OF A HIGH LEVEL CUBAN DELEGATION HIGHLIGHTS THIS CONCERN. THE ALTERNATIVE TO DECISIVE ACTION ON OUR PART MAY WELL BE TO ALLOW THE IMPOSITION BY THE CUBANS OF A REGIME WHOSE ACTIONS WOULD BE EVEN MORE INIMICAL TO OUR INTERESTS. IN OUR VIEW, RELYING UPON ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SANCTIONS WOULD PROVIDE TIME FOR CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION TO CONSOLIDATE THE POSITION OF THE NEW REGIME.

AGAIN, I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS= I SHARE MANY OF YOUR CONCERNS, BUT BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE OUTWEIGHED BY THE FACTORS OUTLINED ABOVE. I WOULD HOPE THAT AS WE PROCEED, IN COOPERATION WITH THE OECS COUNTRIES, WE WOULD HAVE THE ACTIVE COOPERATION OF HER MAJESTYS GOVERNMENT AND, IN PARTICULAR, THAT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL WILL EXERCISE HIS CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS TO FORM AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD RESTORE DEMOCRACY TO GRENADA AND FACILITATE THE RAPID DEPARTURE OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES.

WARM REGARDS,
RON

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TOP SECRET - DEYOU

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ZZ WTON
GRS 515
DEYOU
TOP SECRET
FM FCO 250123Z OCT 83
TO FLASH WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1767 OF 25 OCTOBER

Mr Coles.
N°10 Downing St

NO DISTRIBUTION

AR 25/6
f.a.

GRENADA

1. STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION AND THAT OF RICHARD LUCE AT THIS STAGE THE PRIME MINISTER HAS RECEIVED TWO MESSAGES FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO-NIGHT THE SECOND OF WHICH INFORMS HER OF AN AMERICAN DECISION TO INTERVENE MILITARILY IN GRENADA FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO THIS SECOND MESSAGE WHICH HAS BEEN SENT DIRECTLY ON THE HOT LINE -

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

DEAR RON,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TWO MESSAGES ABOUT GRENADA

I WAS ABOUT TO REPLY TO YOUR EARLIER MESSAGE INVITING MY THOUGHTS WHEN YOUR SECOND ONE ARRIVED.

I MUST TELL YOU AT ONCE THAT THE DECISION WHICH YOU DESCRIBE CAUSES US THE GRAVEST CONCERN.

I MUST ASK YOU TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS INTO ACCOUNT

(A) THE ONLY JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERVENTION WHICH IS LIKELY TO SEEM CREDIBLE IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD IS THE NEED TO PROTECT THE SAFETY OF U.S. AND BRITISH CITIZENS THE REPORTS WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM GRENADA SO FAR SUGGEST THAT THE LIVES OF THESE CITIZENS ARE NOT AT RISK. THEY COULD BE PUT VERY MUCH AT RISK IF AN

ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO TAKE THE ISLAND BY MILITARY FORCE

(B) THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS RECEIVED NO FORMAL REQUEST FROM THE OECS.

(C) JAMAICA AND BARBADOS ARE NOT MEMBERS OF THE OECS

(D) OUR INFORMATION IS THAT CARICOM WHICH INCLUDES THE MEMBERS OF THE OECS, WAS DIVIDED IN ITS VIEWS WHEN IT MET YESTERDAY THAT A MAJORITY WERE AGAINST A RESORT TO FORCE AND THAT THE DECISION TAKEN WAS TO ADOPT A SERIES OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEASURES INSTEAD

(E) I HAVE A PARTICULAR CONCERN ABOUT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN GRENADA. AS THE QUEEN'S REPRESENTATIVE ON THE ISLAND HE IS IN A VERY DELICATE POSITION. HE TOLD A BRITISH OFFICIAL WHO VISITED GRENADA ON 23 OCTOBER THAT IF HE MADE ANY MOVE WHICH DIRECTLY CHALLENGED THE AUTHORITY OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL HE WOULD PROBABLY BE KILLED. IN A DISCUSSION TODAY OF POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO THE PRESENT SITUATION IN GRENADA HE STRESSED THE POSITIVE EFFECT THAT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MEASURES COULD HAVE ON AUSTIN

(F) WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY CREDIBLE ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP WHO COULD BE ESTABLISHED IN THE AFTERMATH OF A MILITARY OPERATION (BISHOP HIMSELF WAS OF COURSE A MARXIST AND WAS IN POWER UNCONSTITUTIONALLY)

(G) THIS ACTION WILL BE SEEN AS INTERVENTION BY A WESTERN DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A SMALL INDEPENDENT NATION HOWEVER UNATTRACTIVE ITS REGIME I ASK YOU TO CONSIDER THIS IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR WIDER EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND OF THE FACT THAT WE WILL BE HAVING IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO PRESENT TO OUR PARLIAMENT AND PEOPLE THE SITING OF CRUISE MISILES IN THIS

COUNTRY.

I MUST ASK YOU TO THINK MOST CAREFULLY ABOUT THESE POINTS
I CANNOT CONCEAL THAT I AM DEEPLY DISTURBED BY YOUR LATEST
COMMUNICATION. YOU ASKED FOR MY ADVICE. I HAVE SET IT OUT
AND HOPE THAT EVEN AT THIS LATE STAGE YOU WILL TAKE IT INTO
ACCOUNT BEFORE EVENTS ARE IRREVOCABLE.

YOURS EVER

MARGARET THATCHER

2. YOU SHOULD TAKE NO REPEAT NO ACTION ON THIS WITHOUT
FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

HOWE

File No.

Department *Mr Coles*

Drafted by *10 Downing St.*
(Block Capitals)

Tel. Extn.....

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification <i>TOP SECRET</i>
Precedence <i>FLASH</i>
DESKBYZ

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE

Despatched (Date)
(Time)Z

POSTBYZ

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) *250123*Z(G.M.T.)

(Security Class.)

(Codeword)

(Restrictive Prefix).....

(Caveat/ Privacy Marking).....*DEYOU*

(Deskby).....Z

TO *FLASH* *WASHINGTON* Tel. No. *1767* of
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....

REPEATED TO (for info).....

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

*All copies to
10 Downing St.*

Copies to:-

[TEXT]

GRENADA

1. Strictly for your own information and that of Richard Luce at this stage, the Prime Minister has received two messages from President Reagan, ^{to-night} the second of which informs her of an American decision to intervene militarily in Grenada. Following is the text of the Prime Minister's

I reply

reply to this second
message which has been
sent directly on the hot line:-
[A - B]

2. You should take no
report no action on this
without further instructions.

ADL $\frac{25}{10}$

A
MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Input on hot
line immediately
with 3 copies to
Mr. Cohen. MA
A.J.C. ²⁵/₁₂

Dear Ron,

Thank you for your two messages about Grenada.

I was about to reply to your earlier message inviting my thoughts when your second one arrived.

I must tell you at once that the decision which you describe causes us the gravest concern.

I must ask you to take the following points into account.

- (a) The only justification for intervention which is likely to seem credible in the eyes of the world is the need to protect the safety of US and British citizens. The reports we have received from Grenada so far suggest that the lives of these citizens are not at risk. They could be put very much at risk if an attempt was made to take the island by military force.
- (b) The United Kingdom has received no formal request from the OECS.
- (c) Jamaica and Barbados are not members of the OECS.
- (d) Our information is that CARICOM, which includes the members of the OECS, was divided in its views when it

/ met yesterday,

met yesterday, that a majority were against a resort to force and that the decision taken was to adopt a series of political and economic measures instead.

- (e) I have a particular concern about the Governor General in Grenada. As The Queen's representative on the island he is in a very delicate position. He told a British official who visited Grenada on 23 October that if he made any move which directly challenged the authority of the Military Council, he would probably be killed. In a discussion today of possible responses to the present situation in Grenada, he stressed the positive effect that economic and political measures could have on Austin.
- (f) We have not been able to identify any credible alternative leadership who could be established in the aftermath of a military operation (Bishop himself was, of course, a Marxist and was in power unconstitutionally).
- (g) This action will be seen as ~~an~~ intervention by a Western democratic country in the internal affairs of a small independent nation, however unattractive its regime. I ask you to consider this in the context of our wider East/West relations and of the fact that we will be having in the next few days to present to our Parliament and people the siting of cruise missiles in this country.

/Even at

SECRET

~~Even at this very late stage,~~ I must ask you to think most carefully about these points. I cannot conceal that I am deeply disturbed by your latest communication. You asked for my advice. I have set it out and hope that even at this late stage you will take it into account before events are irrevocable.

Yours ever,

Margaret Thatcher

B

BRIDGETOWN

GRS 91

DEDIP

SECRET

FM FCO 250210Z OCT 83

TO FLASH BRIDGETOWN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 302 OF 25 OCTOBER

19
ML 25
/w
h-a.

GRENADA: FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR HIGH COMMISSIONER

1. WE ASSUME THAT YOU ARE AWARE OF ALL THE INFORMATION IN COLONEL BEAUMONT'S TEL NO 242120Z TO MODUK. YOU SHOULD KNOW, STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, THAT WE ARE MAKING REPRESENTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ON THE SAME SUBJECT. WE CANNOT KNOW WHETHER THESE REPRESENTATIONS WILL AFFECT THE TIMING OR DIRECTION OF EVENTS.
2. YOU SHOULD NOT (NOT) TAKE ANY ACTION YOURSELF IN THIS SITUATION WITHOUT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

HOWE

NNNN

SUBJECT

SECRET



14 19

cc M. A. S.
+
O. W.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 October 1983

GRENADA

The purpose of this letter is to record certain action taken yesterday evening.

As you know, a message from President Reagan reached No. 10 at about 1915. The President stated that he was giving serious consideration to an OECS request for military action and asked for the Prime Minister's thoughts and advice. I briefly consulted the Prime Minister and conveyed to you her initial reactions. Later in the evening, you provided a draft reply to the President's message. A slightly amended version of this was awaiting the Prime Minister's return to No. 10 from an outside engagement when, shortly after 2300, a second message arrived from the President. This stated that he had decided to respond positively to the request for military action. At 2335 the Prime Minister held a meeting here which was attended by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, Sir Antony Acland, Mr. Giffard and Mr. Edwards. A reply was then drafted to the President's two messages and was despatched at about 0030.

A copy of the President's two messages and the Prime Minister's reply is enclosed with this letter.

At 0048 the Prime Minister spoke to President Reagan on the secure telephone. She told the President that she did not wish to speak at length by this means but she wished to draw his attention to the fact that she had replied to his messages and further wished to urge him to consider her reply very carefully indeed. The President undertook to do so but said, "We are already at zero".

At 0745 this morning a further message from President Reagan arrived. A copy is enclosed. He states that he has weighed very carefully the issues raised by the Prime Minister but believes them to be outweighed by other factors, which are outlined in the message.

To return to the Prime Minister's meeting of last night, after the despatch of the Prime Minister's message there was a discussion of a number of points requiring urgent action.

/ It was

It was decided that HM Embassy in Washington should be instructed to request the United States to take all necessary steps to protect the lives of British citizens on Grenada.

At about 0200 the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Chief of the Naval Staff joined the meeting which considered what instructions should be sent to HMS ANTRIM. It was agreed that in the circumstances that were likely to develop ANTRIM would probably not be able to play any useful role immediately with regard to the evacuation of British citizens. It was desirable that it should not become caught up with the US task force. On the other hand it might have some role in helping with the evacuation of British citizens at a later stage. It was decided that the Ministry of Defence should instruct ANTRIM to distance itself from the likely area of task force activity.

The question of the British Loan Service Personnel working in Barbados was raised. It was decided that if the advice of the British High Commission was sought they should reply to the effect that our Loan Service Personnel should not take part in aggressive action against Grenada.

The meeting also gave preliminary consideration to possible developments on the following day at the United Nations and to the question of public presentation. No conclusions were reached.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Janet Lewis-Jones (Lord President's Office) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office). These papers should be very carefully protected. No further circulation should be given to them except where this is operationally essential.

Yours are

John G. ...

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

To be made at about-
1300 Z

TEXT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT ON GRENADA

Begins" Early this morning forces from 7 Caribbean democracies and the United States landed on the island of Grenada in the East Caribbean.

I ordered American participation in this multilateral effort which was organised at the urgent formal request of the 5 democracies in the OECS. Forces from 8 countries including contingents from Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, St Kitts, St Lucia, St Vincent and the United States are now on Grenada.

We have taken this decisive action for three reasons. First and foremost, because of the overriding importance to protect innocent lives, including up to 1,000 Americans whose personal safety is my paramount concern. Two, to forestall further disorder. Three, to assist in the restoration of democracy in the island of Grenada where a brutal group of leftist thugs silently seized power killing the Prime Minister, three Cabinet members, two Labour leaders and other civilians including children.

Let there be no misunderstanding. This collective action has been forced on us by events that have no precedent in the Eastern Caribbean and no place in any civilised society. American lives are at stake. What appears to have begun the evening of 12 October as a struggle for power among contending

/factions

factions of a dictatorship degenerated into wide-scale murder. In the midst of this extraordinarily dangerous situation the only visible act of authority has been the imposition of a shoot-on-sight curfew. We have witnessed a complete disintegration of any organised authority.

The Caribbean democracies and the United States have since 1980 been concerned by Grenada's tightening links to Cuba and the Soviet Union. The tragic events of the last ten days appear to have had no direct relation to either the Soviets or Cubans. We do know, however, that Grenada's self-proclaimed leaders are hard-line communists with close and long held ties to Moscow and Havana. These new rulers have not succeeded in establishing peace or stability.

Last weekend Grenada's neighbours in the OECS were still unable to receive reliable information or assurances. They decided they had to take collective action to restore constitutional and democratic order in Grenada. The Organisation formally appealed for assistance to their Caribbean neighbours and friendly governments. They pointed out that the stakes included not only the physical safety of the people in Grenada - both foreigners and citizens of that country - but the peace and security of the entire East Caribbean region.

We have been following the situation as closely as possible. 800-1,000 Americans, including many medical students and senior citizens, make up the largest single group of foreign residents in Grenada. From the start of these latest troubles, we have

/consciously

consciously sought to calm fears. We were determined not to make an already bad situation worse and increase the risk our citizens faced.

But when I received reports that a large number of our citizens were seeking to escape the island thereby exposing themselves to great danger, and after receiving a formal request for help from neighbouring states, I concluded the US had no choice but to act strongly and decisively. I thus agreed to the urgent request from Grenada's neighbours to participate in the joint effort now under way. Let me repeat. US objectives are clear - to protect the lives of innocent citizens, to facilitate the evacuation of those who want to leave and help restore democratic institution in Grenada.

I understand that several Caribbean states have already asked that the OECS consider the situation in Grenada. Our diplomacy will work in close cooperation with the OECS and the other countries participating in this multilateral effort." End.

GRENADA ADVANCE COPIES

18 COPIES

17

HD/WIAD

HD/AD

HD/AD

HD/PUSD

HD/DEF D

HDNEWS D

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR URE

CABINET OFFICE

NO 10 DOWNING STREET ✓

SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE

MOD RC

MOD CSDO D14

RC

A.F.C. 25/10

ZZ F C O

GRS 60

D E D I P

ADVANCE COPY

FLASH

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 250315Z OCT 83

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 3104 OF 25 OCT 83

YOUR TELNO 1768 : GRENADA

1. I TOOK ACTION WITH EAGLEBURGER WHO CAME OUT OF A MEETING WITH SHULTZ AT 0300Z. HE TOOK CAREFUL NOTE OF YOUR MESSAGE AND UNDERTOOK TO PASS IT ON.

WRIGHT

NNNN

TO THE PRIME MINISTER
MRS M. THATCHER.

MR J. E. GARRETT

44 Aylmer Road,
Hampstead Garden Suburb,
London N2 NOT CONST.

Tel. 01-341-2327

24/10/83

REF GRENADA

Dear Prime Minister,

Mr Oswald Gibbs whom you have met on two occasions at F.W.C.C. functions has asked me to prompt some immediate discussion between he and the U.K. Authorities regarding Grenada.

I respectfully ask that someone from the Caribbean Desk at the Foreign Office be allowed and encouraged to talk to him. You may recall that Mr Gibbs was previously H/C for Grenada in London and more distantly H/C for the Federation.

Mr Gibbs is at the present Chairman of these organizations - The Caribbean Chamber of Commerce, The Unity Association & The Nottinghill Hill Carnival Committee

cont. -

44 Aylmer Road,
Hampstead Garden Suburb,
London N2

Tel. 01-341-2327

W-Gibb present address is

73A WOODSIDE GREEN S.E.25.

654 0795

OFFICE 229-2255

Thank you for your time

Yours
John Garrett

GRENADA ADVANCE COPIES

18 COPIES

HD/WIAD
HD/NAD
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HDNEWS D

X16

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR URE
CABINET OFFICE
NO 10 DOWNING STREET
SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE
~~MOD RC~~
MOD CSDO
~~RC~~

IMMEDIATE

GRS 110

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 241000Z

ADVANCE COPY

FM BRIDGETOWN 240135Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 341 OF 24 OCTOBER 83

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

GRENADA

1. I HAVE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING TELEX MESSAGE:

BEGINS:

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
MILITARY COUNCIL PRESENTS ITS COMPLIMENTS TO THE EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM AND HEREBY EXTENDS A CORDIAL INVITATION TO H.E.
MR G.L. BULLARD C.M.G., HIGH COMMISSIONER TO VISIT GRENADA DURING
THIS WEEK TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS WITH MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
MILITARY COUNCIL REGARDING THE PRESENT SITUATION IN GRENADA.
THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS LOOKS FORWARD TO A FAVOURABLE
RESPONSE AND AVAILS ITSELF OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW THE
ASSURANCES OF ITS HIGHEST CONSIDERATIONS. ENDS.

2. I PROPOSE TO SEND NO REPLY.

BULLARD

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

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OO FCO DESKBY 240900Z

OO WASHINGTON

OO PORT OF SPAIN

OO TFC RELAY

GRS 1303

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 240900Z

FM BRIDGETOWN 240552Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 346 OF 24 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND PORT OF SPAIN

MY TELNO 331: GRENADA - REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

1. THE FOLLOWING PERSONALITY SKETCHES OF THE MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL HAVE BEEN PUT TOGETHER FROM SOURCES AVAILABLE TO US.

GENERAL

2. MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, ALMOST WITHOUT EXCEPTION, HAVE TWO COMMON CHARACTERISTICS - THEIR RELATIVE YOUTH AND THE FACT THAT THEY ALL TOOK A LEADING PART IN THE ATTACKS WHICH SECURED THE COUP ON 13 MARCH 1979 WHEN THE NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT (NJM) OF MAURICE BISHOP SEIZED POWER. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF HUDSON AUSTIN WHO IS 45 THE OTHERS ARE ALL IN THEIR TWENTIES - AVERAGE AGE 26. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE 1979 COUP THESE MEN BECAME THE NUCLEUS AROUND WHICH THE PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARMY WAS FORMED. WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF AUSTIN NONE OF THEM HAD PREVIOUS MILITARY EXPERIENCE, THOUGH SOME MAY HAVE RECEIVED LIMITED TRAINING IN CUBA. ANOTHER COMMON FEATURE IS THAT MOST HAVE A REPUTATION FOR VIOLENCE, IN MANY CASES AGAINST THEIR OWN FAMILIES - AND THREE, AT LEAST, ARE DOCUMENTED IN PAPERS THAT ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN SENT TO AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AS HAVING TORTURED DETAINEES IN RICHMOND HILL PRISON.

3. HUDSON AUSTIN OWES HIS POSITION AS CHAIRMAN TO THE FACT THAT HE WAS COMMANDER OF THE PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (PRA) NOW RESTYLED THE PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES (PRAF). HE IS A MAN OF ERRATIC JUDGEMENT, FICKLE LOYALTIES AND NO PARTICULAR INTELLECT. HE HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS BOTH A 'LOUD-MOUTH' AND A 'THUG'.

4. WE ASSESS AUSTIN TO BE A FIGUREHEAD CHAIRMAN. THE THREE KEY OFFICERS IN THE COUNCIL ARE JAMES, LAYNE AND CORNWALL. ALL THREE ARE INTELLIGENT, AMBITIOUS AND RUTHLESS. TOGETHER WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL THEY IMBIBED POLITICAL THEORY AND MARXISM-LENINISM UNDER BERNARD COARD AND HIS WIFE PHYLLIS AND WERE GENERALLY CONSIDERED TO BE HIS CLOSEST ADHERENTS AND IDEOLOGICALLY PRO-MOSCOW. THEY WERE ALL MEMBERS OF COARD'S MARXIST CELL AND STUDY GROUP - 'THE ORGANISATION FOR REVOLUTIONARY EDUCATION AND LIBERATION' (OREL). COARD WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR MANOEUVRING THEM INTO THE TOP POSTS IN THE PRA AND MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHERE JAMES AND LAYNE WERE DEPUTY SECRETARIES (JUNIOR MINISTERS). CORNWALL WAS AMBASSADOR TO CUBA UNTIL LAST WEEK AND, AS A MOSCOW-MAN, COARD'S TROJAN HORSE WITHIN THE BISHOP-CUBA RELATIONSHIP. IF BERNARD COARD IS NOT STILL ALIVE AND CONTROLLING (SIC) EVENTS WE WOULD EXPECT THESE THREE TO BE DOING SO TOGETHER. WHEN AUSTIN HAS EXHAUSTED HIS USEFULNESS WE WOULD EXPECT THEM TO REMOVE HIM.

5. INDIVIDUAL DETAILS AND COMMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. HUDSON AUSTIN

COMMANDER OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY. MINISTER OF CONSTRUCTION AND PUBLIC UTILITIES. SECRETARY OF DEFENCE AND INTERIOR IN THE PRG.

BORN 26 APRIL 1938. HIS FATHER WAS A SHOEMAKER IN MORNE JALOUX (4 MILES FROM ST GEORGES). MARRIED WITH THREE CHILDREN.

GRADUATE IN CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING OF THE JAMAICA INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. MEMBER OF THE GRENADA VOLUNTEER CONSTABULARY IN THE 1950S. ATTENDED 6 MONTHS COURSE IN TRINIDAD IN 1958 IN WEAPONS, TACTICS, RECONNAISSANCE AND MAP-RADING. PRISON OFFICER FROM 1960-69.

CHARGED WITH LARCENY OF 50 RIFLES FROM THE CADET FORCE IN 1973. A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF MAURICE BISHOP UNTIL HE SWITCHED ALLEGENCIES TO BERNARD COARD PROBABLY ONLY ABOUT 6 MONTHS AGO. HE WAS ONE OF THOSE WITH BISHOP BEATEN UP BY GAIRY'S MONGOOSE GANG IN THE 1973 BLOODY SUNDAY INCIDENT. HE LED THE 13 MARCH 1979 TAKEOVER OF THE DEFENCE FORCE BARRACKS AT TRUE BLUE. HE TOOK LITTLE PART IN LOCAL POLITICS UNTIL MID-1980 WHEN HE STARTED MAKING SPEECHES AT POLITICAL RALLIES. HE IS HOWEVER A POLITICAL LIGHTWEIGHT AND HAS BEEN KNOWN TO CRITICISE THE REVOLUTION.

AUSTIN HAS BEEN VARIOUSLY DESCRIBED AS TOUGH, VAIN, A LOUD-MOUTH, PRONE TO FITS OF TEMPER, A SURVIVOR AND AT HIS HAPPIEST WHEN IN UNIFORM. GRENADIANS HAVE COMMENTED THAT THEY DO NOT BELIEVE HE IS CAPABLE OF RUNNING A COUNTRY. HE IS SAID OFTEN TO HAVE BEATEN UP HIS WIFE (FROM WHOM HE NOW LIVES APART) AND, ON ONE OCCASION A DAUGHTER. HE USES HIS POWER AND INFLUENCE TO ATTRACT WOMEN.

B. LT COL LIAM 'OUSO' JAMES - VICE CHAIRMAN

FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENCE AND INTERIOR.

BORN ST GEORGES, GRENADA 8 MAY 1955. EDUCATED PRESENTATION BOYS COLLEGE (PBC). DESCRIBED AS ACADEMICALLY GIFTED BY A CONTEMPORARY. MEMBER OF OREL.

BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN UNDER ARREST AT THE TIME OF THE 1979 COUP ON ARMS SMUGGLING CHARGES (WITH VINCENT NOEL). TRAINED IN 'GUERRILLA WARFARE' BY THE CUBANS. ALLEGED TO HAVE TORTURED DETAINEES.

A GRENADIAN ACQUAINTANCE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED JAMES HAD DRAFTED SOME OF THE EARLY STATEMENTS OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL. HE DESCRIBED JAMES AS A SHADOWY FIGURE WHO IS RARELY SEEN IN PUBLIC BUT WHO SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED.

C. LT COL EWART LAYNE - VICE CHAIRMAN

FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENCE AND INTERIOR

AGE ABOUT 26. SINGLE. MIDDLE-CLASS BACKGROUND - HIS FATHER WAS A SENIOR POLICE OFFICER IN GAIRY'S TIME. SCHOOL - PBC. THE BROTHERS (BOTH WERE IN THE PRA), ONE IS NOW PRODUCTION MANAGER AT GRENADA AGRO INDUSTRIES.

LAYNE WAS ANOTHER CLOSE DISCIPLE OF COARD. MEMBER OF OREL AND HARDLINE MARXIST-LENINIST. WAS ONE OF THE FEW WHO WERE INJURED DURING THE COUP IN 1979. HE IS DESCRIBED BY A CONTEMPORARY AS BRIGHT, ARROGANT AND POLITICALLY AMBITIOUS.

D. MAJOR LEON 'BOGO' CORNWALL

(SEE ALSO MY TELNO 343)

GRENADA AMBASSADOR TO CUBA FROM 7 OCTOBER 1982.

BORN ST PAULS, GRENADA 15 MAY 1954. POOR FAMILY. EDUCATED GRENADA BOYS SECONDARY SCHOOL (GBSS) WHERE HE SUBSEQUENTLY TAUGHT SCIENCE. MEMBER OF OREL. MARRIED.

TOOK PART IN 1979 COUP IN AUSTIN'S GROUP. CHAIRMAN OF NATIONAL YOUTH ORGANISATION AND SECRETARY FOR SPORTS (1981). DEEPLY INVOLVED IN INDOCTRINATION OF THE YOUTH. MEMBER OF THE CENTRE COMMITTEE OF THE NJM.

E. MAJOR TAN BARTHOLEMEW

AGE 24. FROM POOR COUNTRY FAMILY. DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN 1979 COUP. UNTIL 1982 WAS GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL YOUTH ORGANISATION.

F. MAJOR IAN ST BERNARD

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND COMMISSIONER OF POLICE UNTIL 1982

BORN 26 JANUARY 1958. EDUCATED GBSS. SHIPPING CLERK. INVOLVED IN 1979 COUP ATTACK. WRITER FOR FREE WEST INDIAN NEWSPAPER. 1980 - DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE RESPONSIBLE FOR POLITICAL EDUCATION. SPENT ONE AND A HALF MONTHS IN CUBA IN 1982 FOR 'MEDICAL' TREATMENT.

G. MAJOR CHRIS STROUD

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENCE IN PRG

AGE 26. EDUCATED GBSS. MARRIED (WIFE, TESSA, WAS INVOLVED WITH NATIONAL WOMEN'S ORGANISATION). INSTRUCTOR IN POLITICAL EDUCATION FOR PRA.

H. MAJOR KEITH ROBERTS

BORN 11 SEPTEMBER 1958. EDUCATED PBC. FAMILY COME FROM PETIT MARTINIQUE, NOW LIVE IN ST GEORGES. A CLOSE FRIEND OF LAYNE. DESCRIBED AS ONE OF THE NJM PROPAGANDISTS.

I. MAJOR BASIL HENRY GAHAGEN

BORN 14 JULY 1954. EDUCATED PBC. HIS FAMILY SUFFERED AT THE HANDS OF GAIRY'S MONGOOSE GANGS. MEMBER OF NJM ORGANISATION COMMITTEE (YOUTH ARM) 1974. ONE OF THE COMMANDERS OF THE

GROUPS IN THE 1979 COUP. REPORTED NOT TO BE POLITICALLY MOTIVATED. DOCUMENTED AS HAVING TORTURED DETAINEES IN RICHMOND HILL PRISON.

J. CAPTAIN HUGH ROMAIN

BORN 2 SEPTEMBER 1956. A MARXIST-LENINIST FROM HIS SCHOOL DAYS. DOCUMENTED AS HAVING TORTURED DETAINEES, INCLUDING HIS OWN BROTHER.

K. 1ST LT CECIL PRIME

NOT KNOWN.

L. 1ST LT RUDOLPH OGILVIE

AGE 25. FROM ST PAULS.

M. 1ST LT IMAN ABDULLAH

AGE 24. EDUCATED PBC. LATE FATHER WAS DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE IN GAIRY'S DAY. SAID TO BE INTELLIGENT. FOR A TIME STATIONED IN A PRA UNIT IN CARRIACOU.

N, 1ST LT LESTER REDHEAD

BORN 17 FEBRUARY 1960. IN 1980 WAS A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL YOUTH ORGANISATION. IN 1980 WAS SUBJECT OF A COMPLAINT BY THE PRG WHEN HE WAS QUESTIONED BY IMMIGRATION OFFICIALS AT HEATHROW. HE WAS ON HIS WAY TO DENMARK TO ATTEND A WFDY CONFERENCE.

O. 2ND LT RENRICK FRAZIER

AGE 24. EDUCATED GBSS. TOOK PART IN 1979 COUP.

CONFIDENTIAL

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P. 2ND LT RAEBURN NELSON

NOTHING KNOWN.

BULLARD

CONFIDENTIAL

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GRENADA ADVANCE COPIES

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PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR URE
CABINET OFFICE
NO 10 DOWNING STREET
SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE
MOD RC
MOD ~~ESDO~~ D14
RC

IMMEDIATE



CONFIDENTIAL

FM GEORGETOWN 241326Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 195 OF 24 OCTOBER

AND IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN, PORT OF SPAIN, KINGSTON, NASSAU
AND WASHINGTON.

GRENADA

1. AT THE MEETING OF CARICOM LEADERS HELD IN PORT OF SPAIN OVER THE WEEKEND, PRESIDENT BURNHAM EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT TAKING PART IN ANY JOINT EXPEDITION BY CARICOM STATES AGAINST GRENADA. HE DID SO ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE SITUATION WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT IF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF A CARICOM STATE HAD BEEN IN QUESTION, AND THAT GUYANA WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE TROOPS FOR THE DEFENCE OF A CARICOM COUNTRY BUT WOULD NOT DO SO FOR INTERNAL SECURITY PURPOSES, OR TO TAKE PART IN A PUNITIVE EXPEDITION. ACCORDING TO THE MFA, WHO ALSO PROVIDED THE ABOVE INFORMATION, GUYANA'S POSITION ON THIS POINT WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF JAMAICA AND BARBADOS.

2. ACCORDING TO THE MFA NO DECISION WAS TAKEN ON WHETHER OR NOT TO SEND A FACT FINDING MISSION TO GRENADA, SINCE IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO WORK OUT THE COMPOSITION OF SUCH A MISSION OR THE MECHANICS OF

~~2. ACCORDING TO THE MFA NO DECISION WAS TAKEN ON WHETHER OR NOT TO SEND A FACT FINDING MISSION TO GRENADA, SINCE IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO WORK OUT THE COMPOSITION OF SUCH A MISSION OR THE MECHANICS OF HOW TO GO ABOUT IT.~~

3. MFA DO NOT KNOW ATTITUDE OF OTHER CARICOM COUNTRIES TOWARDS GUYANA'S POSITION OR WHETHER IT WILL HAVE ANY EFFECT ON ANY ACTION THEY MIGHT HAVE IN MIND.

FCO PASS WASHINGTON AND NASSAU
KINGSTON PASS OTHERS

SLATCHER

NNNN

ODEM: 1000, 24 OCTOBER, 1983

Item 1: Grenada

Sitrep by Foreign and Commonwealth Office as at 1530 hours,
23 October, 1983

1. Grenada achieved independence on 7 February 1974 as a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy. HM The Queen remained sovereign, represented by a Governor-General, Sir Paul Scoon, a Grenadian, who is still in office. On 13 March 1979 the opposition New Jewel Movement staged a successful coup during the absence of Prime Minister Sir Eric Gairy. The People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) led by Maurice Bishop suspended the constitution and governed by promulgating a series of 'People's Laws'. Following the revolution the PRG steadily expanded its links with Cuba and, to a lesser extent, with the Soviet Union.

2. Bishop, whose Marxism was tempered by pragmatism, lost a power struggle with hard-line elements led by his deputy, Bernard Coard, and was ousted in a coup on 13 October. On 19 October Bishop and some of his close supporters were shot, probably in cold blood. Nothing has been heard of Coard since the killings. There is no evidence of Cuban or Soviet involvement in these events. Cuba publicly condemned the killings and announced three days of mourning. The Soviet line is to suggest that the US Government is using the safeguarding of its citizens as a pretext for intervention.

3. Grenada is now administered by a 16-member Revolutionary Military Council led by General Hudson Austin, Commander of the 1,000-1,500 strong People's Revolutionary Army, who has the reputation of being a thug but about whom we know little. A 24-hour curfew has been imposed until Monday, 24 October, but the British High Commission Representative, Mr John Kelly, has been given a special pass enabling him to travel around between 6 am - 6 pm.

/4. General

4. General Austin called on the Governor-General on 20 October to tell him that the Military Council was in control and that within 3 days he intended to announce the composition of a broadly based Cabinet on which the military would not be represented. There would not be 'at this stage' a return to constitutional government. Austin added that he would not fill the rôle of Prime Minister. The Governor-General has reported that neither he nor his wife are in danger.

5. There are about 200 British citizens in Grenada, the majority of whom have lived there for some time. The few tourists could probably be moved in one charter flight. Additionally there are apparently 1,000 US citizens, 85 Canadians and a few other nationalities. The Military Council has publicly undertaken to protect the lives and property of foreign nationals and at present neither we nor the Americans have reason to believe that they are in danger.

6. On 22 October the United States diverted a carrier group led by USS Independence carrying 1,900 marines towards Grenada. This was announced publicly as being a signal to the local authorities of US concern for their nationals on the island. There is also a US warship at St Vincent about 70 miles away. HMS Antrim, the Caribbean guardship which was on an informal visit to Cartagena, Columbia, has sailed for Grenada where she is due to arrive (remaining over the horizon) at 2100 (local time) on 24 October. This movement was explained as being a prudent precaution for the protection of our nationals.

7. On 22 October the US National Security Council met under Vice-President George Bush to consider further moves, and again on 23 October. We have received undertakings from the Americans that we shall be consulted if they decided to consider any more active steps.

8. The British Deputy High Commissioner flew from Barbados to Grenada on 22 October on a charter flight with two US colleagues. He is due to return to Barbados on 23 October and

will make an immediate report. Over the telephone he described the capital, St Georges, as being outwardly calm but tense. He hopes to see the Governor-General and Major Cornwell of the Military Council (and concurrently Grenadian Ambassador to Cuba).

Reactions

9. Commonwealth Governments in the Caribbean and particularly members of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) have reacted strongly to the events in Grenada. Jamaica has broken off all diplomatic relations and trade links. On 22 October Prime Minister Adams of Barbados told a member of the High Commission that OECS Heads of Government had decided unanimously to put together a multi-national force and to call on other Governments, including the US, France, Venezuela and the UK, to help in restoring peace and order in Grenada. The request to Britain was made orally but formally to our High Commissioner later that day. Letters to HMG and other Governments would follow immediately. Adams emphasised that since action would be taken under Article 8 of the OECS Treaty there would be no need for the Governor-General of Grenada to be involved. CARICOM Heads of Governments are meeting in Port of Spain today (23 October) to decide what joint action they should take against the new regime in Grenada, and will have the OECS proposal before them. Prime Ministers Seaga (Jamaica) and Compton (St Lucia) are known to be pressing hard for joint military action. Reports currently conflict as to whether or not CARICOM Heads of Government will endorse OECS proposals for military action.

TO BE CHECKED
AGAINST DELIVERY

STATEMENT ON THE SITUATION IN GRENADA TO BE MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, SIR GEOFFREY HOWE QC MP, IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON MONDAY 24 OCTOBER 1983

With permission, Mr Speaker, I will make a statement on the situation in Grenada. The House will be aware of the violent events of last week on the independent Commonwealth island of Grenada. Her Majesty's Government join with those in the Caribbean region and elsewhere who have deplored the killings, and we view with grave concern the existing state of unconstitutional government and insecurity on the island.

We are particularly conscious that there are some 200 British citizens on Grenada including a number of British tourists. The Resident Representative of the British High Commission has been active in maintaining contact with this community and reports that no British citizens appear to be in immediate danger. The Deputy High Commissioner also visited Grenada from Barbados yesterday to make contact with the new authorities and to speak with the Governor General. He found the island calm but tense and confirmed that neither the Governor General nor members of the British Community appeared to be in any imminent danger.

Nonetheless the position remains extremely volatile. It is for this reason that Her Majesty's Government have instructed HMS Antrim to be prepared to evacuate our community should the situation worsen and make this necessary.

/Meanwhile

to remove the power
of military authority etc

Meanwhile we remain in close touch with the governments of the other Commonwealth Caribbean countries, whose leaders have been meeting in Trinidad. We shall be discussing with them and with other interested states the best prospects of helping to achieve a restoration of constitutional government, peace and security in Grenada.

I shall keep the House informed of developments.

'Cap included to Terrorism
'Play to doing harm'

Healy - own intervention.

P. Tapell - Cuba - Soviets.

Antony? authority to remove Grenada.

U.S. - to remove own community.

Seek restriction of demonstrating in Grenada.

Spain - Harass Grenada End 1989

No reason to think that military intervention
is likely to take place.

1000 U.S. citizens.

Not good time for taking new decisions.
Review not good counter-

"Gulf War".

-179" case free.

Thought about not suppose

Sitting down for another
General job.

SUBJECT

cc MJDW
+
OW T160/83

16

ZCZCWAG085
TQ00 WTE24
DE WTE £8192 2971819
O 241847Z OCT 83
FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO THE CABINET OFFICE
ZEM

S E C R E T VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WHO8192
OCTOBER 24, 1983

DEAR MARGARET,

I HAVE FOLLOWED CLOSELY THE POLITICAL TURMOIL IN GRENADA IN RECENT DAYS. I KNOW THAT YOU SHARE MY CONCERN FOR THE IMPACT WHICH THE KILLING OF THE LEADERSHIP THERE HAS HAD ON OUR FRIENDS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PARTICULARLY ON THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN STATES. THE PROSPECT THAT THE BLOOD-STAINED GROUP WHO APPEAR TO BE THE ONLY AUTHORITY ON THE ISLAND COULD PERPETUATE THEIR POWER ALSO RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT THE WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA THEMSELVES, AS WELL AS OUR OWN NATIONALS RESIDENT THERE.

THE MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES (O ECS) HAVE RAISED SIMILAR CONCERNS WHICH ARE, OF COURSE, MAGNIFIED BY THEIR PROXIMITY TO AND LIMITED ABILITY TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST THE THREAT WHICH GRENADA NOW POSES. THEY HAVE A WELL FOUNDED FEAR OF AGGRESSION BY OR SUBVERSION FROM GRENADA, OR THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEIR OWN DEMOCRATICALLY-CONSTITUTED GOVERNMENTS MAY BE CHALLENGED BY SOME WHO MIGHT SEEK TO IMITATE THE EXAMPLE SET BY GENERAL AUSTIN AND THE PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARMY IF THIS SITUATION IS NOT RECTIFIED. THE NATIONS OF THE O ECS HAVE UNANIMOUSLY DECIDED TO PURSUE A COLLECTIVE SECURITY EFFORT TO RESTORE PEACE AND ORDER IN GRENADA AND HAVE FORMALLY REQUESTED UNITED STATES SUPPORT AND PARTICIPATION. I UNDERSTAND THAT A SIMILAR REQUEST WAS TO HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO HER MAJESTYS GOVERNMENT.

I AM WRITING TO INFORM YOU THAT I AM GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE O ECS REQUEST. ON SUNDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1983, I DISPATCHED A SPECIAL EMISSARY, AMBASSADOR FRANCIS MCNEIL, TO BRIDGETOWN TO CONFER WITH PRIME MINISTER ADAMS AND OTHER O ECS AND CARIBBEAN LEADERS REGARDING THEIR PLANS. I UNDERSTAND THAT THEY HAVE ALREADY ASSEMBLED FORCES IN BARBADOS FROM THE VARIOUS ISLAND NATIONS. AMBASSADOR MCNEIL HAS INFORMED PRIME MINISTER ADAMS THAT THE UNITED STATES FIRMLY ENDORSES THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF THEIR PROPOSED OPERATION- NAMELY, TO RESTORE ORDER AND SECURITY SO AS TO PERMIT THE FORMATION OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD HOLD EARLY ELECTIONS.

WE BELIEVE THAT HER MAJESTYS GOVERNOR GENERAL IN GRENADA COULD BE A KEY FIGURE IN THIS OPERATION, SINCE HE IS THE ONLY

END OF PAGE 01

REMAINING VOICE OF LEGITIMACY ON THE ISLAND AND SHOULD BE THE ONE WHO DESIGNATES A NEW PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. SUCH A GOVERNMENT COULD BE FORMED SHORTLY AFTER THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY FORCE LANDS IN GRENADA. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS BE HELD AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE TO RE-ESTABLISH A TRULY DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT.

AMBASSADOR MCNEIL HAS ALSO CONSULTED WITH THE CARIBBEAN STATES ON THEIR INTENTION TO REQUEST AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, IN WHICH THEY WOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN SEEKING AN ENDORSEMENT OF THEIR COLLECTIVE SECURITY EFFORT.

I WELCOME YOUR THOUGHTS ON THESE MATTERS. I KNOW THAT YOU WOULD WANT TO BE KEPT INFORMED OF ANY ROLE THE UNITED STATES MAY DECIDE TO PLAY IN SUPPORT OF THE ISLAND NATIONS OF THE CARIBBEAN. I WILL, THEREFORE, UNDERTAKE TO INFORM YOU IN ADVANCE SHOULD OUR FORCES TAKE PART IN THE PROPOSED COLLECTIVE SECURITY FORCE, OR OF WHATEVER POLITICAL OR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS WE PLAN TO PURSUE. IT IS OF SOME ASSURANCE TO KNOW THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOUR ADVICE AND SUPPORT ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

RON

0632
£8192

NNNN

QSL AT 24/1858Z PJ

SUBJECT

cc Martin
+
Ond

T 161/83

15

ZCZC

WAGO85
TOO WTE24
DE WTE £0000 2972216
O 242200Z OCT 83
FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO THE CABINET OFFICE
ZEM

Prime Minister.

A.F.C. 25/10.

S E C R E T VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WHO8195

DEAR MARGARET,

IN A MESSAGE TO YOU EARLIER TODAY, I EXPRESSED MY DESIRE TO KEEP YOU INFORMED OF THE UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO A FORMAL REQUEST BY THE ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES (OECS) TO SUPPORT AND PARTICIPATE IN A COLLECTIVE SECURITY EFFORT TO RESTORE PEACE, ORDER, AND DEMOCRACY IN GRENADA. I HAVE DECIDED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THIS REQUEST. I UNDERSTAND THAT BARBADOS AND JAMAICA HAVE ALSO RESPONDED FAVORABLY.

OUR FORCES WILL ESTABLISH THEMSELVES IN GRENADA. THE COLLECTIVE CARIBBEAN SECURITY FORCE WILL DISEMBARK ON GRENADA SHORTLY THEREAFTER. YOU WILL APPRECIATE THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS INFORMATION TO THE SECURITY OF THESE OPERATIONS AND THE SAFETY OF MILITARY PERSONNEL.

WE WILL INFORM YOU OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY OCCUR. OTHER ALLIES WILL BE APPRISED OF OUR ACTIONS AFTER THEY ARE BEGUN.

I EXPECT THAT A NEW PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT WILL BE FORMED IN GRENADA SHORTLY AFTER THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY FORCE ARRIVES. WE HOPE THAT HER MAJESTYS GOVERNMENT WILL JOIN US BY EXTENDING SUPPORT TO GRENADAS NEW LEADERS. THE UNITED KINGDOM CAN PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN STRENGTHENING THE NEW GOVERNMENTS POSITION BY OFFERING POLITICAL SUPPORT AND BY PROVIDING A PROGRAM OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

RON

0255
£0000

NNNN

COVERING SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

B

24 October 1983

Dear Sir, Grenada

Overleaf
25/10

/ I attach a draft reply to President Reagan's message to the Prime Minister. I am sending a copy in parallel to Sir Geoffrey Howe. You said that you had already discussed in general terms with Mr Heseltine.

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

COVERING SECRET

11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/teletype/letter/despatch/box~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

PRESIDENT REAGAN

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Dear Hon,

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your message of 24 October about the situation in Grenada. I too have been deeply disturbed about the recent events there and I very much agree with the objective of restoring security and democracy in Grenada. I also agree that we should consult closely on how best to achieve this.

I welcome the fact that you have sent an emissary to Barbados. It is of course essential that we should have the support of the democratic governments in the area. But it is difficult in present circumstances to establish their precise views. The Prime Minister of Barbados has made his position clear to us, as he has to you. But Barbados is not a member of the OECS; and our information is that at the most recent collective discussion of this question at the CARICOM Heads of Government meeting in Port of Spain, there was agreement on the need to secure the safety and welfare of the Grenadian people, but no unanimity on how this should be achieved.

Enclosures—flag(s).....


I have a particular concern about the Governor-General in Grenada. As the Queen's representative on the island, he is in a ^{very} ~~particularly~~ delicate position. He told a British official who visited Grenada on 23 October that if he made any move which directly challenged the authority of the RMC, he would probably be killed. In a discussion today of possible responses to the present situation in Grenada, he stressed the positive effect that economic and political measures could have on Austin.

You mentioned the possibility of forming a new provisional government, shortly after a collective security force landed in Grenada, as a prelude to the free and fair elections which we would both like to see take place as soon as possible. This is a point which I should like our people to explore together in more detail. As things stand, we have not been able to identify any credible alternative leadership who could be established in the aftermath of a military operation.

The safety of US and British citizens on Grenada is another point which would require very careful consideration before any decision were taken to launch a military operation. The reports we have received from Grenada so far suggest that the lives of British and US citizens are not at risk; and we could not therefore justify intervention on these grounds. On the other hand, they could be put ^{very much at} ~~at serious~~ risk if an

attempt was made to take the island by military force.

In short, I have serious doubts about mounting a military operation. It could endanger the lives of those we wish to protect. And it is hard to see how such an operation against the regime in Grenada, however repellent it may be, could be justified to the world. I should like to ^{consider} ~~discuss~~ this further with you. As a first step, I should like one of the Ministers in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Richard Luce, to have urgent confidential talks with your people. He is already in Washington, and the arrangements could be made very quickly.



attempt was made to take the island by military force.

In short, I have serious doubts about mounting a military operation. It could endanger the lives of those we wish to protect. And it is hard to see how such an operation against the regime in Grenada, however repellent that regime may be, could be justified to the world. The course of events in the Lebanon has shown very clearly how difficult it is, once you become involved in a complex situation, to achieve your aims and to extract your troops.

I am sure that we need to weigh very carefully whether, given all these problems, a policy of bringing to bear the maximum economic, political and diplomatic pressure would not be wiser than military action.

I do hope that our two governments can consider this further and in much more detail before any decisions are taken. As a first step, I should like one of our Foreign Office Ministers, Richard Luce, to have urgent confidential talks with your people. He is already in Washington and the arrangements could be made very quickly.

Do let us keep in touch. I have the feeling that we might regret any precipitated decision.

Will let you

you see

Regent.

ODEM 1000 24 OCTOBER, 1983

Item 1: Grenada

Updated Sitrep by Foreign and Commonwealth Office as at 0900 hours
on 24 October, 1983

1. At a meeting mainly at Heads of Government level on 23 October the other members of CARICOM agreed by a majority to suspend Grenada from the Community. Political and economic sanctions were imposed, including the severance of trade and transport links. Agreement on military intervention was not reached. Belize, Guyana and Trinidad were reported to be opposed to such measures, which had been strongly advocated by Barbados and Jamaica.

2. The Deputy High Commissioner in Bridgetown returned on 23 October from a day's visit to Grenada. Reports on his visit are contained in the attached telegrams. They confirm that British citizens are safe and that the regime in Grenada is willing to allow arrangements to be made for them to leave if they wish. The Governor General is well and in reasonably good heart.

CONFIDENTIAL



cc MOD
LPO
CO

HL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 October 1983

Grenada

This is to record that on the evening of 22 October the Prime Minister spoke on the telephone to Mr. Luce (in the absence of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in Athens), the Lord President and the Secretary of State for Defence.

It was agreed by all concerned that our attitude to the proposal of some of the CARICOM states that we should consider military intervention in Grenada should be extremely cautious. There were many arguments against such dramatic action. Following the telephone conversations, the Prime Minister approved the proposal that HMS Antrim should sail from Colombia to the area of Grenada (while remaining over the horizon) but that it should be made abundantly clear in public that this was a precautionary move designed purely to help with the evacuation of British subjects from Grenada should this be necessary. It was further agreed that there should be a meeting of OD(EM) first thing on Monday morning.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Janet Lewis-Jones (Lord President's Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

gl

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

T

BRIFO 022/24

ZZ MODUK

ZZ FCO

ZZ WASHINGTON

ZZ TFC RELAY

FLASH
ADVANCE COPY

VZCZCFDG SECRET
FLASH
242120Z OCT 83
FROM BRIDGETOWN
TO MODUK

SECRET
SIC U2A

GRS 560
SECRET
FM BRIDGETOWN 242120Z OCT 83
TO FLASH MODUK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 242120Z OF 24 OCTOBER 83
INFO FLASH FCO AND WASHINGTON

GRENADA: FROM COL BEAUMONT IN BRIDGETOWN FOR COSSEC
REF: CONNECT MY U2A OF 241400Z OCT (NOTAL)

1. DURING THE COURSE OF DISCUSSIONS WITH COL BARNES (ASST CHIEF OF STAFF, JAMAICA DEFENCE FORCE) ON FLIGHT 419 YESTERDAY, WE AGREED TO MAINTAIN CONSULTATION SHOULD EACH THINK FIT. HEARING OF CLAND- STINE BRIEFINGS AT BARBADOS DEFENCE FORCE (BDF) HQS I SOUGHT AN INTERVIEW WITH BARNES, THE DETAIL OF WHICH FOLLOWS:
2. THE BRIEFING WAS GIVEN JOINTLY BY COL RUDYARD LEWIS (COMND BDF) AND MAJOR GENERAL CRIST, A US MARINE GENERAL (HE THOUGHT WORKING DIRECT TO/FROM US CHIEFS OF STAFF.
3. THE PLAN WAS BROAD IN THAT THE ACTION WAS TO BE IN THREE PHASES:
 - (A) PHASE ONE (UNDERLINED). A MASSIVE HELIBORNE ASSAULT ON THE KEY POINTS DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:
 - (I) FORT RUPERT.
 - (II) RADIO STATION.
 - (III) RUSSIAN EMBASSY (ALONGSIDE 3A(II)).
 - (IV) CUBAN EMBASSY.
 - (V) PEARLS AIRPORT.
 - (VI) POINT SALINES AIRPORT.
 - (VII) GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS, INCLUDING GOVERNOR GENERAL'S RESID- ENCE.
 - (VIII) CALIVIGNY MILITARY COMPLEX.
 - (B) PHASE 2 (UNDERLINED). TRANSPORTATION OF A MIXED FORCE FROM BARBADOS AIRPORT BY US AIRCRAFT TO PEARLS AIRPORT AND THEREAFTER TRANSSHIPPED BY HELI TO TAKE OVER KEY POINTS FROM US. THE 'CARICOM' FORCE OF 300 TO CONSIST OF:
 - A. 150 JAMAICAN SOLDIERS
 - B. 50 BARRADIAN SOLDIERS

RC 12
 HD/WIAD
 HD/NAS
 HD/MCAS
 HD/PUS D
 HD/DEF S
 HD/NEWS D.
 PS
 PS/LADY YOUNG
 PS/M WHITNEY
 PS/PUS
 M GIFFARD
 M URE
 M COLES N^o 10
 JOURNALING ST

Sir P. Moore
Buckingham Palace

AR 24/10.
h.a.

BARBADOS AIRPORT BY US AIRCRAFT TO PEARLS AIRPORT AND THEREAFTER
TRANSSHIPPED BY HELI TO TAKE OVER KEY POINTS FROM US. THE
'CARICOM' FORCE OF 300 TO CONSIST OF:

- A. 150 JAMAICAN SOLDIERS
- B. 50 BARBADIAN SOLDIERS
- C. 100 RSS SOLDIERS.

(C) PHASE 3. DEPARTURE OF THE US INTERVENTION FORCE,
THE MAINTENANCE OF STABILITY BY THE 'CARICOM' FORCE FOR AN APPROP-
RIATE PERIOD UNTIL ELECTIONS COULD BE ORGANISED.

4. GENERAL POINTS DISCUSSED DURING THE COURSE OF MY HALF-HOUR
INTERVIEW WERE:

(A) TIMINGS DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE 'CARICOM'
FORCE WAS NOT FULLY ASSEMBLED IN BARBADOS (BUT EXPECTED TO BE SO
BY MIDNIGHT TONIGHT), THE OPERATION SO TIMED TO COMMENCE ANYTIME
FROM FIRST LIGHT TOMORROW 25 OCTOBER.

(B) DURATION THE ESTIMATE BY CRIST WAS THAT THE
OPERATION WOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN 24 HOURS BUT MAY TAKE 48 HOURS.
WHATEVER THE CASE, US FORCES WOULD STAY NO LONGER THAN 30 DAYS.
BARNES CONSIDERED SIX MONTHS AS A REASONABLE PERIOD FOR PHASE 3
TO BE COMPLETED.

(C) GOVERNOR GENERAL (GG). I ENQUIRED WHAT PART THE
GG HAD TO PLAY IN THE EVOLUTION OF AFFAIRS AFTER THE LANDINGS.
US MILITARY PLANNERS HAD DECIDED, ON INFORMATION FROM THOSE THAT
KNEW GG AND HIS STATUS WITH THE PEOPLE, THAT HE WAS NOT RESPECTED.
HIS GAIRY CONNECTIONS, HIS EMASCULATION DURING THE BISHOP ERA ALL
LED TO HIS BEING KEPT WELL APART FROM ANY CRITICAL ROLE - THEY
ACCEPTED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION. PLANNERS HAD DECIDED THAT
A 'MEMBER' OF THE INTERVENTION FORCE WOULD 'CALL THE CITIZENS TO
ORDER'.

(D) LOGISTICS. I ASKED BARNES HOW THE CARICOM FORCE
WOULD BE RESUPPLIED/FINANCED DURING THE COURSE OF A PROTRACTED
STAY. HE RAISED HIS ARMS AND SUGGESTED THE 'MANNA' WOULD COME
FROM THE US - CERTAINLY HE SAID 'THEY' COULD NOT AFFORD IT.

(E) COMND AND CONTROL. THE OPERATION WOULD BE COMMANDED
INITIALLY BY THE US TASK FORCE COMMAND WITH COL LEWIS ABOARD SHIP.
AFTER HANDOVER OF KEY POINTS TO CARICOM FORCE LEWIS WOULD ASSUME
COMMAND OF LAND FORCES. INTENTIONS THEREAFTER WERE VAGUE.

5. BARNES PROMISED TO CONTACT ME AT MY HOTEL IF HE HAD ANY
ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF MOMENT. HE ASKED ME TO PROTECT THE SOURCE.
PLEASE DO SO.

BULLARD
BT

Supps U.S. -
Neutral
about U.S.

o
o

they are behind us

Antirion

local time 1.0 AM



5.30 ?

our time 5.0 AM

+ 4 1/2

9.30 AM


=

Gov. General

=
do nothing - where? close in

=
where is she?

12 men
1 helo




request safety of Br citizens.

(1) Do we know what they are going to do

a) Antirion

b) P.R.


Public Reaction



GRENADA ADVANCE COPIES

18 COPIES

HD/WIAD

HD/NAD

HD/MCAD

HD/PUSD

HD/DEF D

HDNEWS D

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR URE

CABINET OFFICE

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE

MOD RC

MOD ~~ESDO~~ D14

RC

IMMEDIATE

ALY/10.
h.a.

GRS 400

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 250900Z

DM BRIDGETOWN 242345Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 349 OF 24 OCTOBER

AND TO MODUK (DESKBY 250900Z) IMMEDIATE PORT OF SPAIN WASHINGTON

DESKBY TO MOD 250900Z

YOUR TELNO 1759 TO WASHINGTON: GRENADA

ADVANCE COPY

1. I CAN SEE THE FORCE OF THESE ARGUMENTS AND ASK ONLY FOR REASSURANCE THAT THE FOLLOWING POINTS TOO HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED:
 - (A) IT IS NOW PUBLICALLY KNOWN THAT A NUMBER OF CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES SUPPORT THE IDEA OF A MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. RADIO FREE GRENADA IS BROADCASTING REGULAR BULLETINS ABOUT THE IMMINENT DANGER OF INVASION;
 - (B) THOUGH THE LIVES OF BRITISH AND OTHER NON-GRENADIANS ON THE ISLAND ARE NOT AS FAR AS WE KNOW AT PRESENT AT RISK, THE POSITION COULD CHANGE VERY QUICKLY IF THE YOUNG AND INEXPERIENCED

~~ON THE ISLANDS ARE NOT AS FAR AS WE KNOW AT PRESENT AT RISK, THE POSITION COULD CHANGE VERY QUICKLY IF THE YOUNG AND INEXPERIENCED MEN WHO MAKE THE RMC COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE BEST WAY TO PREVENT FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION IS TO TAKE SOME FOREIGNERS HOSTAGE, PERHAPS ALSO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL:~~

(C) WE WERE UNABLE TODAY TO FLY IN A CHARTER PLANE TO BRING OUT FROM GRENADA THOSE BRITISH CITIZENS (ABOUT 45) WHO WANT TO LEAVE. THE GOVERNMENT OF ANTIGUA HAS ORDERED THE AIRLINE LIAT TO CEASE ALL FLIGHTS INTO GRENADA IN CONFORMITY WITH YESTERDAY'S CARICOM DECISION. WE ARE TRYING HARD TO MOUNT THE CHARTER OPERATION

TOMORROW BUT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF OBSTACLES TO BE OVERCOME. EVEN IF THE OPERATION IS SUCCESSFUL THERE WILL STILL BE APPROXIMATELY 150 BRITISH CITIZENS ON THE ISLAND.

2. I DO NOT THINK IT IS ADAMS' IDEA THAT RESCUING THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL SHOULD BE CITED IN ADVANCE AS THE REASON FOR THE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. THE REASONS WHATEVER ONE MAY THINK OF THEIR LEGITIMACY, WOULD BE THOSE GIVEN IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE OECS DECLARATION. BUT ADAMS SEES THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AS THE NATURAL AND ONLY LEGITIMATE POINT AROUND WHICH AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION COULD BE FORMED, PENDING A RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT. HE ALSO SEES THE SAFETY OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, AS A DIRECT BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY. ON THIS AT LEAST WE ARE ALL AGREED (PARAGRAPH 8 OF YOUR TUR), THE ONLY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US BEING HOW BEST TO ACHIEVE THIS END.

3. THE OFFER OF BRITISH SUPPORT FOR A MULTI-NATIONAL OPERATION WOULD PERHAPS ALLOW US TO EXERCISE SOME CONTROL OVER ITS NATURE AND TIMING, WHILE WE LEND IT OUR KNOWLEGE OF THE ISLAND AND ASSEMBLE OUR CONTRIBUTION FOR EXAMPLE THE SAS EXTRACTION TEAM SUGGESTED BY ADAMS LAST WEEK. AT THE MOMENT ALL THE EVIDENCE HER SUGGESTS THAT THE OPERATION IS GOING AHEAD WITHOUT US AND THAT IT COULD BE MOUNTED AS EARLY AS FIRST LIGHT TOMORROW, 25 OCTOBER, THOUGH MY GUESS IS THAT IT WILL NOT START FOR AT LEAST 48 HOURS.

BULLARD

GRS 420
 UNCLASSIFIED
 FM BRIDGETOWN 241900Z OCT 83
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELGRAM NUMBER 348 OF 24 OCTOBER
 AND TO WASHINGTON PORT OF SPAIN KINGSTON AND CARACAS

HWR 014/2		
RECEIVED		
25 OCT 1983		
DESK OFFICER	REGISTRY	
INDEX	PA	Action Taken

MIPT: GRENADA

134

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF OECS STATEMENT :

QUOTE:

THE AUTHORITY OF THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES (OECS) MET AT BRIDGETOWN, BARBADOS ON FRIDAY 21ST OCTOBER, 1983 TO CONSIDER AND EVALUATE THE SITUATION IN GRENADA ARISING OUT OF THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT LED BY PRIME MINISTER MAURICE BISHOP AND THE SUBSEQUENT KILLING OF THE PRIME MINISTER TOGETHER WITH SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES AND A NUMBER OF OTHER CITIZENS.

2. THE AUTHORITY IS AWARE THAT THE OVERTHROW OF THE BISHOP ADMINISTRATION TOOK PLACE WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONNIVANCE OF FORCES UNFRIENDLY TO THE OECS, LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PRESENT MILITARY REGIME.

3. THE MEETING TOOK NOTE OF THE CURRENT ANARCHICAL CONDITIONS, THE SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND BLOODSHED THAT HAVE OCCURRED, AND THE CONSEQUENT UNPRECEDENTED THREAT TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE REGION CREATED BY THE VACUUM OF AUTHORITY IN GRENADA.

4. THE AUTHORITY WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT MILITARY FORCES AND SUPPLIES ARE LIKELY TO BE SHORTLY INTRODUCED TO CONSOLIDATE THE POSITION OF THE REGIME AND THAT THE COUNTRY CAN BE USED AS A STAGING POST FOR ACTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST ITS MEMBERS.

5. THE AUTHORITY FURTHER NOTED THAT THE CAPABILITY OF THE GRENADA ARMED FORCES IS ALREADY AT A LEVEL OF SOPHISTICATION AND SIZE FAR BEYOND THE INTERNAL NEEDS OF THAT COUNTRY. FURTHERMORE THE MEMBER STATES OF THE OECS HAVE NO MEANS OF DEFENCE AGAINST SUCH FORCES.

6. THE MEMBER GOVERNMENTS OF THE ORGANISATION HOLD THE STRONG VIEW THAT SUCH A SITUATION WOULD FURTHER UNDERMINE POLITICAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY, AND WOULD HAVE EXTREMELY DAGEROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE OECS SUB-REGION AS A WHOLE.

17.

7. THE AUTHORITY NOTED THAT THE PRESENT REGIME IN GRENADA HAS DEMONSTRATED BY ITS BRUTALITY AND RUTHLESSNESS THAT IT WILL STOP AT NOTHING TO ACHIEVE ITS ENDS AND TO SECURE ITS POWER.

8. UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES, THE AUTHORITY PROPOSES THEREFORE TO TAKE ACTION FOR COLLECTIVE DEFENCE AND THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION BY REQUESTING ASSISTANCE FROM FRIENDLY COUNTRIES TO PROVIDE TRANSPORT, LOGISTICS SUPPORT AND ADDITIONAL MILITARY PERSONNEL TO ASSIST THE EFFORTS OF THE OECS TO STABILIZE THIS MOST GRAVE SITUATION WITHIN THE CARIBBEAN.

9. THE AUTHORITY OF THE OECS WISHES TO ESTABLISH A PEACE KEEPING FORCE WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF FRIENDLY NEIGHBOURING STATES TO RESTORE ON GRENADA CONDITIONS OF TRANQUILITY AND ORDER SO AS TO PREVENT FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE AND ABUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS PENDING THE RESTORATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.

UNQUOTE.

BULLARD

GRENADA LIMITED

WIAD
NAD
MCAD
PUSD
DEF D
NEWS D
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

MR GIFFARD
MR URE
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:-
SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE
MOD (CSDO)
" (re)

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

134

HWR 014/2	
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY	
CONF 25 OCT 1983 L	

TOP COPY

GRS 400
CONFIDENTIAL UK COMMS ONLY

FM BRIDGETOWN 241907Z OCT 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 347 OF 24 OCT
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PORT OF SPAIN, KINGSTON, CARACAS
MODUK, OTTAWA.

f.a.

ADL 27/10

GRENADA

1. CHAMBERS PRESS CONFERENCE OF 23 OCTOBER HAS PUT THE BALL BACK IN THE OECS'S COURT, FROM WHICH IT FIRST CAME. MIFT CONTAINS THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT PUT OUT BY THE OECS AFTER THEIR MEETING IN BRIDGETOWN ON 21 OCTOBER. THE COPY WE HAVE RECEIVED IS ON PLAIN PAPER, UNDATED AND UNSIGNED, AND BEARS NO SECURITY CLASSIFICATION. IT WAS HANDED OVER TO THE DHC THIS MORNING (MONDAY) BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S SECRETARY, THE PM HIMSELF HAVING GONE TO THE AIRPORT TO SEE SEAGA OFF.

2. THE IMPORTANT PART OF THE STATEMENT IS PARAGRAPH 3, IN WHICH 'THE AUTHORITY PROPOSES THEREFORE TO TAKE ACTION FOR COLLECTIVE DEFENCE AND THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION BY REQUESTING ASSISTANCE FROM FRIENDLY COUNTRIES TO PROVIDE TRANSPORT, LOGISTICS SUPPORT AND ADDITIONAL MILITARY PERSONNEL TO ASSIST THE EFFORTS OF THE OECS TO STABILISE THIS MOST GRAVE SITUATION WITHIN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN.'

ADAMS HAS ALREADY TOLD US (MY TELNO 329) THAT HE HOPES BRITAIN WILL RESPOND TO THIS INITIATIVE. I RECOMMENDED (MY TELNO 333) THAT WE SHOULD DO SO, PROVIDING THE US RESPONDS. MY US COLLEAGUE TELLS ME THAT US MILITARY DISPOSITIONS IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN ARE FAR ADVANCED, THOUGH THE POLITICAL DECISION HAS YET TO BE TAKEN. HE HAS BEEN TOLD BY ADAMS THAT A WRITTEN OECS REQUEST FOR US SUPPORT WILL NOT BE MADE UNTIL THE AMERICANS CONFIRM THAT SUCH SUPPORT WILL BE FORTHCOMING. I TOLD BISH THAT ADAMS SAID THE SAME THING TO ME (MY TELNO 320 PARA 5). THE US AND OURSELVES WERE IT SEEMED TO ME IN PRECISELY THE SAME POSITION, IN THAT WE HAD BEEN ORALLY AND FORMALLY APPROACHED BY ADAMS ON BEHALF OF THE OECS, JAMAICA AND BARBADOS, BUT NOT AS YET IN WRITING BY THE OECS ITSELF.

3. I SAW SYMONDS, EX-HIGH COMMISSONER IN LONDON AND NOW PUS IN THE PM'S OFFICE, THIS MORNING AND ASKED HIM WHAT OTHER COUNTRIES HAD BEEN APPROACHED FOR MILITARY HELP. WE HAD HEARD FRANCE, VENEZUELA AND CANADA MENTIONED. HE SAID HE THOUGHT FRANCE A NON-STARTER. THEY MIGHT DO THE JOB THEMSELVES AND DO IT WELL, BUT HE DID NOT THINK THEY WOULD WANT TO BE PART OF A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE. VENEZUELA HAD BEEN INFORMALLY CONSULTED AND HAD SHOWN INTEREST

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IN HELPING ,THOUGH NO COMMITMENT HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM THEM.
CANADA HAD NOT BEEN ASKED :THE OPERATION WOULD NOT HE THOUGHT BE
CANADA'S STYLE. THE KEY COUNTRY WAS THE USA.WE DID NOT DISCUSS
THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF GRENADA WHICH I BELIEVE
TO BE ADAMS' CHIEF REASON FOR WANTING BRITISH PARTICIPATION.

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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1759 OF 24 OCTOBER

AND TO BRIDGETOWN, KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN, NASSAU

GRENADA

1. ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO CONSULT US I AM CONCERNED AT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MIGHT BE MOVING TOWARDS EARLY DIRECT INTERVENTION IN GRENADA. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE TAKE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY OF PUTTING THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS TO THEM AT THE HIGHEST AVAILABLE LEVEL. PLEASE KEEP RICHARD LUCE FULLY INFORMED, BUT I AM CONTENT THAT YOU SHOULD MAKE YOUR INITIAL APPROACH BEFORE HIS ARRIVAL IF THIS CAN BE ARRANGED. I FEEL THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO GET OUR WORD IN QUICKLY.

2. AS THE AMERICANS WILL KNOW THERE HAS BEEN A REQUEST FOR INTERVENTION BY A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE. MR ADAMS OF BARBADOS AWAITS OUR RESPONSE ON THIS, BUT THE WIDER MEETING OF CARICOM GOVERNMENTS IN PORT OF SPAIN HAS EVIDENTLY DECIDED IN FAVOUR OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON GRENADA.

3. I WELL UNDERSTAND THAT SOME OF GRENADA'S NEIGHBOURS SHOULD SEE THE PRESENT SITUATION AS PROVIDING AN OPPORTUNITY TO CLEAN UP THE MESS IN GRENADA AND TO PREVENT IT FROM BECOMING IRREVERSIBLY COMMUNIST. WE WISH TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THEIR DESIRE FOR ACTION TO RESTORE LAW AND ORDER IN GRENADA, AND A RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT

4. BUT I AND MY COLLEAGUES SEE NO GROUNDS ON WHICH MILITARY INTERVENTION COULD BE JUSTIFIED INTERNATIONALLY. UNLESS IT WERE REQUIRED TO PROTECT LIVES. THIS DOES NOT AT PRESENT SEEM TO BE THE CASE. FURTHERMORE. THERE IS NO ORGANISATION IN GRENADA WITH WHICH AN INVADING FORCE COULD WORK. EXTRICATION COULD BE DIFFICULT AND LIVES WOULD BE AT RISK BOTH DURING AN OPERATION AND SUBSEQUENTLY. WESTERN INTERVENTION WOULD

Seen by the P.R.
on 24/10.

A.J.C. 25/10

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BE MISREPRESENTED IN PROPAGANDA WITH DAMAGING EFFECT.

THE CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES ARE NOT CAPABLE OF MOUNTING A RAPID AND EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION ON THEIR OWN ACCOUNT.

5. WE ARE THEREFORE IN FAVOUR OF JOINING THE COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES, WITH THE HELP OF THE UNITED STATES IF THEY AGREE AND OF OTHER LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES TO BRING MAXIMUM PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE AUTHORITIES IN GRENADA BY THE THREAT OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEASURES IF THEY DO NOT TAKE EARLY AND EFFECTIVE ACTION TO PUT THEIR HOUSE IN ORDER

6. WE HAVE IT IN MIND, IF THE GRENADANS GIVE SOME GROUND UNDER THIS PRESSURE, TO TRY TO WORK FOR ELECTIONS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION SUSPENDED IN 1979, WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MIGHT BE SUPERVISED BY A COMMISSION OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM CARIBBEAN AND/OR OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES.

7. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR AN EARLY INDICATION OF AMERICAN REACTIONS TO THIS LINE OF THINKING, WHICH I INTEND TO DEPLOY WITH THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED AND WITH THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL. WHOSE INTERVENTION COULD I BELIEVE BE USEFUL.

8. IN PUTTING THESE THOUGHTS TO THE AMERICANS YOU SHOULD REPEAT OUR CONCERN THAT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN GRENADA WHO HAS NOT ASKED FOR PROTECTION OR INTERVENTION AND WHOSE LIFE COULD EASILY BE JEOPARDISED, SHOULD NOT BE MADE THE FOCAL POINT OF ANY FORM OF OUTSIDE INTERVENTION. I SEE HIS ROLE AS POSSIBLY BEING CRUCIAL AT A LATER STAGE PROVIDED THAT HIS POSITION IS NOT PREJUDICED NOW.

9. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT WE ARE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS AS TO THE CHARACTER OF THOSE CURRENTLY IN AUTHORITY IN GRENADA. IT IS ONLY AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF THE ALTERNATIVES THAT WE HAVE REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE PRIMARILY FROM WITHIN THE REGION, BUT WITH OUTSIDE SUPPORT, IS THE BEST WAY OF DEALING WITH THEM.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 250730Z

TELEGRAM NUMBER 177 OF 24 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN KINGSTON AND WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY GEORGETOWN MASSAU AND BELIZE

MY TELNOS 175 AND 176: GRENADA

1. I CALLED THIS AFTERNOON ON THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND GAVE HIM THE TEXT OF YOUR STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT, WHICH HE READ WITHOUT COMMENT. I THEN, WITH HIS AGREEMENT, ASKED VARIOUS QUESTIONS TO CLARIFY THE OUTCOME AS ANNOUNCED BY PRIME MINISTER

~~WITHOUT COMMENT. I THEN, WITH HIS AGREEMENT, ASKED VARIOUS QUESTIONS TO CLARIFY THE OUTCOME, AS ANNOUNCED BY PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERS, OF THE WEEKEND CARICOM MEETING. THE FOLLOWING EMERGED FROM OUR CONVERSATION.~~

2. INCE THOUGHT THAT, EXCEPT FOR GUYANA, ALL CARICOM STATES WOULD STRAIGHTWAY IMPLEMENT THE DECISIONS REPORTED IN PARA 2 OF MY FIRST TUR. THE COMMITTEE OF ATTORNEY GENERALS WOULD IN EFFECT TIDY UP THE LEGALITIES AFTERWARDS.

3. INCE SAID THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE SANCTIONS, TOGETHER WITH THOSE IMPOSED INDEPENDENTLY BY TRINIDAD AND OTHER COUNTRIES, WAS TO HELP GRENADA TO RETURN TO NORMALCY AND BRING ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT. (THIS IS DIFFERENT FROM CHAMBERS' EXPLANATION YESTERDAY.) THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF SANCTIONS MIGHT ALREADY BE HAVING SOME EFFECT. THE REGIME HAD INVITED CARICOM TO SEND A TEAM TO INSPECT THE SITUATION IN GRENADA, AND HAD SAID THAT IT AIMED TO ESTABLISH A BROAD-BASED CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT WITHIN 10-14 DAYS. THE TRINIDAD GOVERNMENT, WHILE OF COURSE REFUSING TO DEAL WITH THE REGIME, WAS IN TOUCH WITH THE GOVERNOR GENERAL ABOUT THIS. AS TRINIDAD HELD THE CARICOM CHAIR, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE THEY WHO WOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN CONSIDERING THE SITUATION AND, AS THINGS EVOLVED, PROPOSING FURTHER CARICOM ACTION, EG ON THE POINTS IN PARA 3 OF MY SECOND TUR.

4. OF COURSE THE REGIME, AFTER HAVING GONE TO SUCH LENGTHS TO SECURE POWER, WOULD NOT SIMPLY DROP ITS WEAPONS. THE GOVERNMENT IT PUT TOGETHER MIGHT BE ONE OF CIVILIANS WHO WOULD SIMPLY DO WHAT THEY WERE TOLD. THIS MIGHT BE ONE STAGE IN THE PROCESS: BUT TRINIDAD WANTED TO PRESS FOR ELECTIONS AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME. INCE SAID FIRMLY THAT SANCTIONS WOULD OF COURSE CONTINUE UNTIL THEN. THIS WOULD BE THE MAIN FACTOR IN BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE REGIME SO THAT A MORE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM COULD COME ABOUT.

5. ON THE QUESTION OF TRINIDADIAN ON GRENADA, INCE HAD HEARD THERE WERE AT LEAST 80 WHO WANTED TO LEAVE. BWIA WERE TRYING TO LAY ON A CHARTER FLIGHT FOR THEM.

6. INCE SAID THAT A CARICOM PEACE KEEPING FORCE WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY IF MATTERS EVOLVED WITHOUT FURTHER CONFLICT. SOME OF CHAMBERS' CARICOM COLLEAGUES WERE MORE HAWKISH THAN HE WAS. THEY THOUGHT THAT UNLESS GRENADA WAS DEALT WITH, WHAT HAD HAPPENED THERE COULD SPREAD IN THE CARIBBEAN. TRINIDAD WAS NOT UNAWARE OF THE DANGERS, BUT DID NOT WANT TO CREATE ANY PRECEDENTS IN THE REGION BY INVITING PEOPLE IN; SHE WOULD RATHER HAVE CARIBBEAN PROBLEMS SOLVED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE REGION. HE ASKED WHETHER I HAD HEARD ANYTHING OF THE QUOTE AMERICAN INVASION UNQUOTE WHICH THE GRENADIAN REGIME WAS ALLEGING WAS IMMINENT. I SAID I HAD ONLY HEARD OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT A SHIP WAS TO BE AVAILABLE TO EVACUATE THE SIZEABLE AMERICAN COMMUNITY IF THIS SHOULD BE NECESSARY

~~PROBLEMS SOLVED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE REGION. HE ASKED WHETHER I HAD HEARD ANYTHING OF THE QUOTE AMERICAN INVASION UNQUOTE WHICH THE GRENADIAN REGIME WAS ALLEGING WAS IMMINENT. I SAID I HAD ONLY HEARD OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT A SHIP WAS TO BE AVAILABLE TO EVACUATE THE SIZEABLE AMERICAN COMMUNITY IF THIS SHOULD BE NECESSARY.~~

7. COMMENT. THE TRINIDAD GOVERNMENT SEEM TO HAVE COME TO CONCLUSIONS QUITE CLOSE TO THOSE IN YOUR TELNO 1759 TO WASHINGTON. BEFORE I SAW INCE I ASCERTAINED FROM THE DEPARTMENT THAT YOU DID NOT WISH ME TO TAKE ANY ACTION ON THAT TELEGRAM HERE. I DID NOT THEREFORE TELL INCE ANYTHING ABOUT YOUR THINKING IN THAT TELEGRAM, THOUGH I OBSERVED TO HIM THAT HMG'S GOALS, AS SET OUT AT THE END OF YOUR PARLIAMENTARY STATEMENT, SEEMED CLOSE TO THE TRINIDAD GOVERNMENT'S. I HOPE THAT I MAY BE AUTHORISED TO GIVE THE TRINIDAD GOVERNMENT AN URGENT INDICATION OF YOUR VIEWS. THESE MIGHT REINFORCE WHAT I ASSUME THEY MAY BE SAYING TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING THE AMERICANS.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 175 OF 23 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN KINGSTON GEORGETOWN NASSAU BELIZE
WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 174: GRENADA

1. THE CARICOM MEETING CONTINUED UNTIL THIS AFTERNOON, WHEN MOST OF THE VISITING DELEGATIONS WERE TAKEN TO THE AIRPORT BY HELICOPTER.
2. PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERS THEN GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE ANNOUNCING, AS CHAIRMAN OF CARICOM, THAT THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT HAVE AGREED

(A) TO DEEM GRENADA SUSPENDED FROM CARICOM UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE BECAUSE

- (1) OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE REGIME HAD COME TO POWER
- (2) IT DID NOT REPRESENT THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE
- (3) IT CONSTITUTED A THREAT TO OTHER MEMBER STATES
- (4) IT THREATENED THE INTEGRITY OF THE COMMUNITY THROUGH ITS VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL CARICOM PRINCIPLES
- (5) THERE WAS A NEED TO SECURE THE SAFETY AND WELFARE OF THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE:

(B) TO ENDORSE THE FOLLOWING SANCTIONS PROPOSED BY THE OECS:

- (1) NO OFFICIAL CONTACT WITH THE AUTHORITIES IN GRENADA
- (2) NO GRENADIAN PARTICIPATION IN OECS BUSINESS OR OECS

- (2) NO GRENADIAN PARTICIPATION IN OECS BUSINESS OR OECS
DEALINGS WITH INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES
- (3) GRENADA TO CEASE TO ENJOY TRADE BENEFITS DERIVING FROM
OECS MEMBERSHIP
- (4) QUOTE NO NEW CURRENCY ISSUES WITHIN OECS UNQUOTE
- (5) AIR AND SEA LINKS WITH GRENADA TO BE SUSPENDED
- (C) TO ESTABLISH A COMMITTEE OF ATTORNEY GENERALS TO ADVISE
GOVERNMENTS ON THE STEPS REQUIRED TO GIVE LEGAL EFFECT
TO (A) AND (B) ABOVE.

3. CHAMBERS SAID THAT THE ABOVE DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN BY A
MAJORITY, NOT UNANIMOUSLY. THEIR PURPOSE WAS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT
SUCH EVENTS AS HAD OCCURRED IN GRENADA WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE,
AND THUS TO ENSURE THAT A SIMILAR SITUATION WOULD NOT ARISE AGAIN.
OTHER PROPOSALS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED, BUT NO DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN
ON THEM. HE WOULD NOT COMMENT ON THESE AS CHAIRMAN OF CARICOM,
BUT ONLY IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRIME MINISTER OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
(SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM).

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FM BRIDGETOWN 240523Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 344 OF 23 OCTOBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND PORT OF SPAIN

MIPT: GRENADA: GENERAL IMPRESSIONS

FOLLOWING FROM MONTGOMERY

1. I TRAVELLED TO GRENADA IN A SMALL CHARTER AIRCRAFT WITH TWO COLLEAGUES FROM THE US EMBASSY. APART FROM ABOUT 25 FULLY ARMED WATCHFUL SOLDIERS, PEARLS AIRPORT (GRENADA) WAS DESERTED. MINUTES LATER WE WERE ON OUR WAY TO ST GEORGE'S IN TWO PRIVATE CARS DRIVEN BY STEEL-HELMETED, ARMED AND WORDLESS SOLDIERS. THE TWENTY-MILE DRIVE WAS AN UNNERVING (PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE APPALLING ROAD) AND EERIE EXPERIENCE. IT WAS LIKE DRIVING ACROSS A GHOST ISLAND. APART FROM THE OCCASIONAL CHILD PLAYING IN FRONT OF A HOUSE OBSERVANCE OF THE CURFEW WAS TOTAL. THE FEW ADULTS I SAW LOUNGING ABOUT LOOKED SULLENLY AT OUR CARS (NO WAVING AT THE SOLDIERS). THAT PICTURE WAS REPEATED IN ST GEORGE'S. GRENADIANS, ESPECIALLY THE WOMEN, DON'T TAKE EASILY TO BEING PUSHED AROUND. BUT PERHAPS WITH THE MEMORY OF THE INDISCRIMINATE SHOOTING BY THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (PRA) AT FORT RUPERT ON 19 OCTOBER STILL FRESH IN THEIR MINDS, NO ONE WAS TAKING ANY CHANCES.
2. ALTHOUGH THE CURFEW PREVENTED ME FROM TALKING TO AS MANY PEOPLE AS I WOULD HAVE WISHED I WAS NEVERTHELESS ABLE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH A NUMBER OF LONG-^{TIME} ~~THE~~ RESIDENTS OF GRENADA AND WITH OTHERS (INCLUDING EYEWITNESSES) WHO HAD LIVED THROUGH THE EVENTS OF THE PAST TWO WEEKS.
3. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW GRENADA CAN AVOID FURTHER INTERNAL INSTABILITY. TOURISM WHICH IS A MAJOR PROP OF THE PRECARIOUS ECONOMY HAS NOW BEEN EFFECTIVELY DESTROYED FOR SOME TIME TO COME. THE BITTERNESS, NOT TO MENTION THE DESIRE TO EXACT RETRIBUTION, OVER THE DEATHS AT FORT RUPERT ON 19 OCTOBER WILL NOT GO AWAY. THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL WAS IN NO DOUBT ABOUT THIS. NEITHER AM I. AGRICULTURE, THE OTHER MAIN PROP OF THE ECONOMY, WAS AILING BEFORE THE LATEST CRISIS DEVELOPED, AND COMMERCE AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR WERE PUTTING VIRTUALLY NO CAPITAL AT RISK. CARICOM HEADS OF GOVERNMENT HAVE JUST IMPOSED TRADE SANCTIONS, AND GRENADA HAS NOW BEEN EFFECTIVELY CRIPPLED, FINANCIALLY, BY BEING DEPRIVED OF THE FACILITIES OF THE RECENTLY ESTABLISHED EASTERN CARIBBEAN CENTRAL BANK.
4. THE RELAXATION OF THE CURFEW WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR ORDINARY PEOPLE TO EXPRESS THEIR FEELINGS. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THEIR ANGER IS SIMMERING. I AND OTHERS, INCLUDING THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL, HAVE SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT THE CAPABILITY OF THE PRA TO RUN THE COUNTRY UNTIL THE BROADLY-BASED CABINET THEY ENVISAGE HAS

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BEEN APPOINTED, STILL MORE ABOUT THEIR ABILITY TO PRODUCE THAT CABINET IN TWO WEEKS TIME. THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE IS THEREFORE AT BEST BLEAK. I INCLINE TO A MORE PESSIMISTIC VIEW. I THINK THERE IS A SERIOUS RISK OF EITHER:

(A) FACTIONAL BICKERING RESULTING IN THE RMC FALLING APART - WHICH IS A RECIPE FOR ANARCHY, OR
(B) BISHOP'S SUPPORTERS JOINING FORCES WITH THE SIGNIFICANT PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION WHO WISH TO RETURN TO A DEMOCRATIC FORM OF GOVERNMENT, AND THEN HAVING A SHOWDOWN WITH THE PRA, EG A GENERAL STRIKE.

5. I FELT GUILTY ABOUT RETURNING TO BARBADOS, LEAVING KELLY AND HIS WIFE. BOTH HAVE BEEN A CREDIT TO THE SERVICE IN THESE PAST TEN WORRYING DAYS. BUT I FELT EVEN MORE SORRY FOR THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA, WITH THEIR FATE IN THE HANDS OF A CLUTCH OF INEXPERIENCED POLITICAL OPPORTUNISTS DRESSED UP AS SOLDIERS.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 343 OF 23 OCTOBER 83

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND PORT OF SPAIN

MIPT: GRENADA: RMC

FOLLOWING FROM MONTGOMERY

1. I THEN HAD A MEETING WITH MAJ LEON CORNWALL, WHO WAS UNTIL A FEW WEEKS AGO GRENADIAN AMBASSADOR TO CUBA, BUT IS NOW A MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL (I HAD ASKED FOR A MEETING WITH GENERAL AUSTIN). THE MEETING WAS ARRANGED FOR 1100 HOURS. CORNWALL ARRIVED (BY HIS CHOICE AT MY HOTEL) WELL OVER AN HOUR LATE, WITHOUT AN APOLOGY. HE IS TALL, ATHLETIC, BETWEEN 30-35, SMOOTH, PERSONABLE, CLEVER AND, I HAVE NO DOUBT WHATEVER, COMPLETELY RUTHLESS WHEN THE NEED ARISES. HE WAS IN JUNGLE-TYPE UNIFORM.
2. KURZE (US EMBASSY, BRIDGETOWN, WHOM I ACCOMPANIED TO GRENADA) AND KELLY WERE ALSO PRESENT. KURZE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HIS PRESENCE WAS QUOTE INFORMAL UNQUOTE. CORNWALL SAID HE WAS PLEASED THAT I HAD COME TO GRENADA TO SEE FOR MYSELF THAT ALL WAS WELL IN GRENADA. I SAID THAT I FOUND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ASSESS WHAT THE SITUATION WAS IN GRENADA WITH A 24-HOUR CURFEW IN FORCE. HE REMINDED ME THAT THE CURFEW WOULD BE LIFTED TOMORROW (24 OCTOBER) AT 0600 HOURS. IT SUBSEQUENTLY EMERGED THAT CURFEW WILL ONLY BE RELAXED, NOT LIFTED, IE NIGHT CURFEW FROM 2200 HOURS TO 0500 HOURS WILL REMAIN. I TOLD CORNWALL THAT THE RMC'S STATEMENTS ABOUT LIFTING OF CURFEW HAD BEEN MISLEADING AND ASKED HIM TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT TO CLARIFY THE POSITION. HE AGREED. (TWO HOURS LATER I HEARD SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT BEING MADE ON RADIO FREE GRENADA - SO CORNWALL CAN GET POLICY THINGS DONE, AND QUICKLY).
3. CORNWALL SAID THAT THE RMC STOOD READY TO HOLD BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS AT ANY TIME TO REASSURE THE BRITISH AND OTHER FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS THAT IT IS WELL ABLE TO DEAL WITH ANY PROBLEMS THAT MAY FACE GRENADA AT THE PRESENT TIME. I ASKED HOW WE SHOULD COMMUNICATE WITH THE RMC. HE REPLIED QUOTE THROUGH THE MFA, IN THE NORMAL WAY UNQUOTE. I ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANYONE IN PARTICULAR WE SHOULD CONTACT. HE REPLIED QUOTE ME OR MAJOR STROUD UNQUOTE (ANOTHER RMC MEMBER). I ENQUIRED WHEN IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE OVERSEAS TELEPHONE CALLS FROM GRENADA. HE REPLIED QUOTE FROM TOMORROW UNQUOTE IE 24 OCTOBER. (WHEN I ASKED TO BE REMINDED OF THE 16 NAMES OF THE RMC, HE WAS UNABLE TO REMEMBER ALL OF THEM). WE THEN HAD SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR EVACUATING BRITISH AND OTHER FOREIGN NATIONALS. HE OBJECTED TO THE USE OF THE WORD QUOTE EVACUATING UNQUOTE

THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR EVACUATING BRITISH AND OTHER FOREIGN NATIONALS. HE OBJECTED TO THE USE OF THE WORD QUOTE EVACUATING UNQUOTE, WHICH SUGGESTED IMMINENT DANGER/NATURAL DISASTER - QUOTE WHICH DO NOT EXIST AT PRESENT IN GRENADA UNQUOTE.

4. HE REPEATED THAT A BROADLY-BASED CABINET WOULD BE APPOINTED WITHIN 10 DAYS/TWO WEEKS, TO RUN THE COUNTRY. MEANWHILE AS FROM TOMORROW (24TH), WHEN THE CURFEW WOULD BE RELAXED, GRENADA WOULD RETURN TO NORMAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LIFE. THE AIRPORT WOULD BE OPEN. IT WOULD BE QUOTE BUSINESS AS USUAL UNQUOTE.

5. I MADE SEVERAL ATTEMPTS TO DISCUSS RECENT EVENTS, WHO WOULD BE LIKELY TO SERVE ON THE PROPOSED NEW CABINET, AND THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES THEY WOULD BE LIKELY TO FOLLOW. CORNWALL GOOD-HUMOUREDLY BUT FIRMLY DECLINED TO DISCUSS SUCH QUOTE POLICY UNQUOTE MATTERS, HE SUGGESTED THAT THEY COULD BE DISCUSSED BILATERALLY TOMORROW MORNING. I TOLD HIM I WAS LEAVING GRENADA IN A FEW HOURS, BUT HE WOULD NOT BUDGE.

6. MY LAST QUESTIONS WERE ABOUT COARD AND THE STATUS OF LOUISON, RADIX AND ALISTER HUGHES. CORNWALL SAID THAT THE RMC DID NOT KNOW THE WHEREABOUTS OF MR AND MRS COARD. HE REPEATED THAT LOUISON, RADIX AND HUGHES WERE ALIVE AND WELL.

7. CORNWALL ARRIVED AT THE HOTEL WITH AN ARMED ESCORT. WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT THE LIFE OF AN AMBASSADOR WAS PROBABLY MORE AGREEABLE AND LESS DANGEROUS THAN THAT OF A SOLDIER IN A REVOLUTIONARY SETTING HE SMILED AND SAID THAT HE WAS ENJOYING HIS PRESENT JOB. I WOULD NEVER BUY A SECONDHAND CAR FROM MAJ CORNWALL.

8. FOR MY GENERAL IMPRESSIONS SEE MIFT.

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IMMEDIATE

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SECRET

FM BRIDGETOWN 240299Z OCT 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCC
TELEGRAM NUMBER 342 OF 23 OCTOBER 83
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PORT OF SPAIN

CLOSED UNDER THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT 2000

WR 25/9

FOLLOWING FROM MONTGOMERY

GRENADA: GOVERNOR GENERAL

1. I RETURNED FROM A BRIEF (24 HOUR) VISIT TO GRENADA AT 1630 HOURS TODAY (23 OCTOBER).
2. AT 1100 HOURS THIS MORNING I CALLED ON SIR PAUL SCOON, GOVERNOR GENERAL. AS ALWAYS HE WAS CALM AND DIGNIFIED BUT I FORMED THE IMPRESSION THAT HE HAD BEEN DEEPLY AFFECTED BY THE EVENTS OF THE PAST TEN DAYS. HE REPEATED SOME OF THE COMMENTS HE HAD MADE IN PARTICULAR HIS URGING OF GENERAL HUDSON AUSTIN, CHAIRMAN REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL (RMC), TO HOLD AN ENQUIRY INTO THE DEATHS OF BISHOP AND OTHERS AT FORT RUPERT ON 19 OCTOBER. UNTIL LATE AFTERNOON ON 19 OCTOBER GOVERNOR GENERAL WAS CERTAIN THAT COARD WAS IN FULL CONTROL. HE DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER COARD IS STILL AROUND BUT FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THE CONTENTS AND STYLE OF THE RECENT PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS (INCLUDING THEIR MAJOR POLICY STATEMENT) OF THE RMC COULD HAVE BEEN DEVISED/DRAFTED BY THE 'IGNORANT, DIFFICULT AND UNSTABLE' OFFICERS THAT CONSTITUTE THE RMC.
3. WHEN THE CURFEW IS RELAXED TOMORROW (24TH) AT 0600 HOURS, GOVERNOR GENERAL BELIEVES THAT IT WILL NOT BE LONG BEFORE PEOPLE OF GRENADA WILL DEMAND THAT THE RMC GIVE AN EXPLANATION OF FORT RUPERT DEATHS. HE WOULD ALSO EXPECT PEOPLE TO DEMAND BODIES OF BISHOP, WHITEMAN AND OTHER MINISTERS TO BE PRODUCED. HE ALSO SAID THAT HIS UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THE EXECUTIONS OF BISHOP MISS CREEK

THAT HIS UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THE EXECUTIONS OF BISHOP, MISS CREFT, WHITEMAN, AND BAIN (MINISTER FOR HOUSING) WERE CARRIED OUT BY THREE MEMBERS OF THE RMC AND THAT THESE NAMES ARE KNOWN. HE DOUBTS THAT THESE THREE OFFICERS (WHOM HE DID NOT NAME) WILL BE ALLOWED TO GO UNPUNISHED. HE ALSO BELIEVES THAT PEOPLE OF GRENADA HAVE LEARNED THEIR LESSON. HE COMMENTED THAT THE 'BISHOP EXPERIMENT HAD NOT WORKED'. HE DOES NOT EXPECT THE BROADLY BASED ~~CABINET~~ ^{CABINET} - ENVISAGED BY THE RMC - TO FUNCTION. TOO MANY FAMILIES IN GRENADA HAD BEEN TOUCHED BY THE EVENTS OF THE PAST FOUR AND A HALF YEARS.

4. I STEERED THE CONVERSATION ROUND TO THE MEETINGS OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF OECS AND CARICOM TO CONSIDER GRENADA CRISIS, AND SAID THAT HE WAS WIDELY REGARDED BY HIS FELLOW WEST INDIANS AS THE SYMBOL IN GRENADA OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT. HE SAID HE HAD EXPECTED AS MUCH. HE HAD CONSIDERED HIS POSITION CAREFULLY AND HAD DECIDED THAT HIS BEST COURSE WOULD BE TO REMAIN AT GOVERNMENT HOUSE AND WAIT FOR AN APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY TO ARISE WHERE HE COULD PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE. I THEN REFERRED TO PRESS AND OTHER REPORTS THAT A US NAVAL TASK FORCE HAD BEEN DIVERTED TO THE CARIBBEAN. SOME PEOPLE WERE INTERPRETING THIS AS MEANING THAT THE UNITED STATES, SUPPORTED BY A CARICOM FORCE, WOULD INTERVENE MILITARILY IN GRENADA TO STABILISE THE PRESENT EXTREMELY WORRYING SITUATION SO THAT PEOPLE OF GRENADA COULD CHOOSE HOW THEIR COUNTRY SHOULD BE GOVERNED IN FUTURE. I ENQUIRED WHETHER, IF SUCH MILITARY INTERVENTION TOOK PLACE, HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT IT BY EG BROADCASTING A MESSAGE TO THE PEOPLE ONCE THE INTERVENING FORCE HAD SECURED THE COUNTRY. HE REPLIED, WITHOUT ANY HESITATION, THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY BE ELIMINATED IF HE MADE ANY MOVE THAT DIRECTLY CHALLENGED THE AUTHORITY OF THE RMC. HE DOUBTED THEREFORE THAT HE COULD ASK FOR OUTSIDE HELP. SHORT OF THAT HE COULD BE RELIED UPON TO DO WHATEVER WAS REQUIRED OF HIM, INCLUDING THE BROADCASTING OF AN APPROPRIATE MESSAGE TO HIS PEOPLE.

5. I THEN CALLED ON MAJOR CORNWALL (RMC): SEE MIFT.

BULLARD

NNNN

[Send to cabinet office]

correction

WA BROADLY BASED CABINET

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18 COPIES

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PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR URE
CABINET OFFICE
NO 10 DOWNING STREET
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~~MOD RC~~
MOD CSDO
~~RC~~

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IMMEDIATE

GPS 300

SECRET

FROM WASHINGTON 232125Z OCT 83.

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3087 OF 23 OCTOBER.

INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN, PORT OF SPAIN, MODUK (FOR RC AND CSDO).

MY TELNO. 3084: GRENADA.

AD 24/8
L.A.

RAPHEL (DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS) HAS TOLD US THAT A FURTHER INTER-AGENCY MEETING WAS HELD TODAY. THE AMERICANS ARE AWAITING REPORTS FROM THEIR TWO CONSULAR OFFICERS ON THEIR RETURN FROM GRENADA. THE TWO CONSULAR OFFICERS HAVE JUST ARRIVED IN BARBADOS AND MAY BE ASKED TO COME BACK TO WASHINGTON TO REPORT FURTHER. THE AMERICANS ARE ALSO WAITING TO HEAR FURTHER FROM THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN LEADERS FOLLOWING THEIR MEETING IN PORT OF SPAIN. THEY ARE IN TOUCH WITH ADAMS (CF BRIDGETOWN TELNO. 337 TO YOU). AMBASSADOR FRANK MCNEIL, AN EXPERIENCED CAREER FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER WITH A GOOD KNOWLEDGE OF THE AREA HAS BEEN ASKED TO GO TO BRIDGETOWN WITH A SMALL GROUP TO TALK PRIVATELY TO THE EAST CARIBBEAN LEADERS AND GET THEIR VIEWS. HE WILL RETURN TO WASHINGTON TO REPORT TOMORROW EVENING. NO DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN ON FURTHER ACTION. WORK IS PROCEEDING ON THE VARIOUS OPTIONS. THE AMERICANS WILL BE IN TOUCH IMMEDIATELY IF THEY COME TO MORE DEFINATE CONCLUSIONS.

2. AS YOU KNOW, THE AMERICANS IN THE COURSE OF THE DAY ASKED US FOR THE ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND KELLY. THESE HAVE BEEN PASSED TO THEM. THEY HAVE NOW ASKED FOR ANY INFORMATION WE CAN PROVIDE AS TO WHERE HUDSON AUSTIN IS OPERATING FROM. WE HAVE POINTED OUT THAT THE INFORMATION IS MORE LIKELY TO BE AVAILABLE LOCALLY E.G. IN BARBADOS.

WRIGHT

WRIGHT

[Send to the Relay & Lab. office]

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
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OO WASHINGTON DESKBY 231700Z

OO PORT OF SPAIN DESKBY 231700Z

OO TFCRELAY DESKBY 231700Z

GRS 320

SECRET

TFCRELAY

FM BRIDGETOWN 231625Z OCT 83

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 337 OF 23 OCTOBER

IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON PORT OF SPAIN

Lead WIA (2)
Lead NAT
Lead MCAB
Lead Post (2)
Lead Jett
Lead News

Ps (6)
Ps Lady Young
Ps Mr Whitley
Ps Ros
Mr Gilford
Mr Lee
Dio Cab. Office
No 10 Jett (2)
Sir P. Moore, Buckingham Palace.

Mr 24/10
h-a-

GRENADA

Re/Mtd.
CSB/Mtd.

Rc.

1. PRIME MINISTER ADAMS HAS BROUGHT US UP TO DATE WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN TRINIDAD YESTERDAY. HE HAS ASKED US TO GIVE THIS INFORMATION PARTICULAR PROTECTION. HE IS NOT ATTENDING TRINIDAD MEETING BUT IS BEING KEPT CLOSELY INFORMED.
2. ADAMS SAID THAT CARICOM GOVERNMENTS WERE DIVIDED INTO TWO CONVERGING (SIC) GROUPS, ONE GROUP BEING THE OECS COUNTRIES, BARBADOS, JAMAICA AND POSSIBLY THE BAHAMAS: THE OTHER, TRINIDAD BELIZE AND GUYANA. ADAMS SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE LIKELY OUTCOME OF THE TRINIDAD MEETING WOULD BE A CALL TO THE MILITARY COUNCIL TO LAY DOWN ITS ARMS AND HAND OVER THE GOVERNMENT TO A REPRESENTATIVE COMMITTEE, PROBABLY CHAIRED BY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL, WHICH WOULD ARRANGE EARLY ELECTIONS. THE OECS GROUP WOULD SEE THIS AS AN 'ULTIMATUM' THE MINORITY AS A 'PLEA'. THE POSITION OF THE MINORITY GROUP ON MILITARY ACTION WAS THEREFORE LIKELY TO BE NEUTRAL, NOT OPPOSED.
4. ADAMS SAID HE EXPECTED THAT THE LEADERS OF THE OECS GROUP WOULD RETURN TO BARBADOS THIS AFTERNOON (SUNDAY) FOLLOWING WHICH

NEUTRAL, NOT OPPOSED.

4. ADAMS SAID HE EXPECTED THAT THE LEADERS OF THE OECS GROUP WOULD RETURN TO BARBADOS THIS AFTERNOON (SUNDAY) FOLLOWING WHICH FORMAL REQUESTS FOR MILITARY SUPPORT FROM NON-OECS COUNTRIES WOULD BE SENT. CANADA MIGHT BE ADDED TO THE FOUR COUNTRIES ALREADY AGREED UPON.

5. ADAMS SAID THAT VIRTUALLY EVERYONE SAW THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL PLAYING THE KEY ROLE. IN ANY MILITARY ACTION ENSURING HIS SAFETY WOULD BE PARAMOUNT. ADAMS SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT THE UK WOULD BE ASKED TO UNDERTAKE THIS TASK.

6. ADAMS SAID THAT THE LOCAL MILITARY ASSESSMENT (HE IMPLIED THAT THERE WAS ALREADY A US CONTRIBUTION TO THIS) WAS THAT THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE, ALREADY LOST, WAS NOT CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF A MILITARY OPERATION, THOUGH TACTICAL SURPRISE WOULD BE IMPORTANT. THE GRENADIANS WERE ASSESSED AS BEING AS WELL PREPARED TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AS THEY EVER WILL BE. THE CUBANS IN GRENADA WOULD NOT SUPPORT THE MILITARY COUNCIL. ADAMS BELIEVED THE OPERATION WOULD BE CONCLUDED IN ABOUT HALF A DAY.

7. ADAMS CONFIRMED THAT US HELICOPTERS HAD BEEN BROUGHT IN LAST NIGHT IN C 130S AND WERE NOW IN HANGERS AT BARBADOS AIRPORT.

8. ADAMS SAID THAT COMPTON (PM ST LUCIA) HAD TOLD HIM IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT THE CATO /AUSTIN MEETING WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE.

BULLARD

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IMMEDIATE

GRS 200

CONFIDENTIAL UK COMMS ONLY

FM KINGSTON 231813Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 296 OF 23 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR COSSEC)

IMMEDIATE INFO PORT OF SPAIN, BRIDGETOWN, WASHINGTON, GEORGETOWN
AND NASSAU.

PRIORITY INFO HAVANA

ADVANCE COPY

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GRENADA

BEFORE LEAVING FOR BRIDGETOWN THIS MORNING (23RD) DA LEARNED FROM GENERAL NEISH (NOT CLEAR HOW CONFIDENTIALLY) THAT A COMPANY OF THE JDF UNDER COL BARNES, HIS 2IC, WILL BE LEAVING FOR BARBADOS BY AIR JAMAICA TONIGHT. INSTRUCTIONS CAME FROM PORT OF SPAIN YESTERDAY AFTERNOON, I.E. BEFORE FULL CARICOM MEETING.

2. THOUGH THIS IS TOKEN FORCE, HASTILY AND INCOMPLETELY EQUIPPED, SENIORITY OF COMMANDER SUGGESTS IT COULD SERVE AS NUCLEUS FOR MORE. IN ANY EVENT THIS IMMEDIATE PRECAUTIONARY MOVE NEARER THE ACTION VISIBLY DEMONSTRATES JAMAICAN READINESS TO SUPPORT AND CONTRIBUTE TO MILITARY SOLUTION.

3. DA WILL REPORT FURTHER FROM BRIDGETOWN.

SMALLMAN

BT

AR 24/w.

h-a.

[Send to Lab. Office & TFC Relay]

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ADVANCE COPY

GRS 270

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 24C73CZ

FM PORT OF SPAIN 232409Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 176 OF 23 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOW KINGSTON GEORGETOWN NASSAU BELIZE
WASHINGTON

IMMEDIATE

See by P.R.
24/10

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM NO 175: GRENADA

1. SPEAKING AS PRIME MINISTER OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, CHAMBERS SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN A DIFFICULT MEETING. IT WAS NOT TECHNICALLY ACARICOM HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING BUT AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF 12 OF THE 13 CARICOM MEMBERS.
2. CHAMBERS SAID THAT TRINIDAD WAS STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF RESOLVING THE MATTER WITHIN THE REGION, AND PARTICULARLY WITHIN A CARICOM FRAMEWORK, WITHOUT THE INVOLVEMENT OF NON-REGIONAL STATES. ANY SUCH ACTION MUST COMPLY WITH THE UN CHARTER, AND SHOULD BE CONFINED TO RESTORING NORMALCY IN GRENADA.
3. HE SAID THAT, BESIDES THE MATTERS ON WHICH DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN, THE MEETING HAD ALSO DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF

(A) USING THE GOVERNOR GENERAL AS THE LEGITIMATE POINT OF CONTACT IN GRENADA

(B) ESTABLISHING A BROAD -BASED CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT

- (B) ESTABLISHING A BROAD -BASED CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT WITH MEMBERS ACCEPTABLE TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL, THE PURPOSE OF WHICH WOULD BE TO ORGANISE ELECTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
- (C) THE APPOINTMENT OF A FACT FINDING MISSION OF EMINENT CARICOM REPRESENTATIVES:TERMS OF REFERENCE TO BE WORKED OUT
- (D) MEASURES FOR PROTECTING ALL NON-GRENADIANS AND THEIR EVACUATION IF NECESSARY
- (E) THE DEPLOYMENT OF A CARICOM PEACE KEEPING FORCE IN GRENADA.

CHAMBERS INDICATED THAT ACTION ON ALL THESE LINES WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO TRINIDAD.

4. CHAMBERS SAID THAT THE MEETING ALSO DISCUSSED HOW ANY SUCH DEMANDS , ONCE AGREED, WOULD BE PUT TO GRENADA, AND HOW FAR SANCTIONS SHOULD REMAIN IN FORCE QUOTE WHILE THE SITUATION CONTINUED UNQUOTE.

5. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FROM THE PRESS, CHAMBERS DECLINED TO COMMENT ON THE PRESENCE OF A US TASK FORCE IN THE AREA, BUT REAFFIRMED TRINIDAD'S COMMITMENT TO A REGIONAL /CARICOM SOLUTION. HE SAID THAT TRINIDAD WOULD CONSIDER ANY REQUEST FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM ON ITS MERITS.

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ADVANCED TO R.C.

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UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 240730Z

IMMEDIATE

FM PORT OF SPAIN 232400Z OCTOBER

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 175 OF 23 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN KINGSTON GEORGETOWN NASSAU BELIZE
WASHINGTON

Mr 24/10

MY TELNO 174: GRENADA

1. THE CARICOM MEETING CONTINUED UNTIL THIS AFTERNOON, WHEN MOST OF THE VISITING DELEGATIONS WERE TAKEN TO THE AIRPORT BY HELICOPTER.
2. PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERS THEN GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE ANNOUNCING, AS CHAIRMAN OF CARICOM, THAT THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT HAVE AGREED

(A) TO DEEM GRENADA SUSPENDED FROM CARICOM UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE BECAUSE

- (1) OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE REGIME HAD COME TO POWER
- (2) IT DID NOT REPRESENT THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE
- (3) IT CONSTITUTED A THREAT TO OTHER MEMBER STATES
- (4) IT THREATENED THE INTEGRITY OF THE COMMUNITY THROUGH ITS VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL CARICOM PRINCIPLES
- (5) THERE WAS A NEED TO SECURE THE SAFETY AND WELFARE OF THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE:

(B) TO ENDORSE THE FOLLOWING SANCTIONS PROPOSED BY THE OECS:

- (1) NO OFFICIAL CONTACT WITH THE AUTHORITIES IN GRENADA
- (2) NO GRENADIAN PARTICIPATION IN OECS BUSINESS OR OECS DEALINGS WITH INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES

(2) NO GRENADIAN PARTICIPATION IN OECS BUSINESS OR OECS
DEALINGS WITH INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES

(3) GRENADA TO CEASE TO ENJOY TRADE BENEFITS DERIVING FROM
OECS MEMBERSHIP

(4) QUOTE NO NEW CURRENCY ISSUES WITHIN OECS UNQUOTE

(5) AIR AND SEA LINKS WITH GRENADA TO BE SUSPENDED:

(C) TO ESTABLISH A COMMITTEE OF ATTORNEY GENERALS TO ADVISE
GOVERNMENTS ON THE STEPS REQUIRED TO GIVE LEGAL EFFECT
TO (A) AND (B) ABOVE.

3. CHAMBERS SAID THAT THE ABOVE DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN BY A
MAJORITY, NOT UNANIMOUSLY. THEIR PURPOSE WAS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT
SUCH EVENTS AS HAD OCCURRED IN GRENADA WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE,
AND THUS TO ENSURE THAT A SIMILAR SITUATION WOULD NOT ARISE AGAIN.
OTHER PROPOSALS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED, BUT NO DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN
ON THEM. HE WOULD NOT COMMENT ON THESE AS CHAIRMAN OF CARICOM,
BUT ONLY IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRIME MINISTER OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
(SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM).

LANE

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(716)

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UNCLASSIFIED
FM BRIDGETOWN 231545Z OCT 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 336 OF 23 OCTOBER

IMMEDIATE

GRENADA

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT BY REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL, AT 1800Z 22 OCTOBER:

1QUOTE:

THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL WILL BE APPOINTING A NEW CABINET WITHIN THE NEXT TEN TO FOURTEEN DAYS. GIVEN THE SAD EVENTS AND TURMOIL WHICH GRENADA HAS RECENTLY EXPERIENCED THE BASIC WISH OF OUR PEOPLE AT THIS TIME IS FOR PEACE, NATIONAL UNITY AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. THEREFORE, IN APPOINTING A NEW CABINET THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL WILL OPERATE ON THE BASIS OF ENSURING THAT ALL SOCIAL CLASSES AND INTERESTS IN OUR COUNTRY ARE REPRESENTED.

THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL BELIEVES THAT THE MOST URGENT TASK FACING OUR PEOPLE IS THE ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION OF OUR COUNTRY IN ORDER THAT THE MAJOR PROBLEMS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND POVERTY AMONG OUR PEOPLE MAY BE SOLVED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

IN THIS REGARD THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL WILL CONTINUE TO PLACE PRIORITY ON THE BUILDING OF OUR AGRICULTURAL BASE, WHILE SEEKING TO BUILD UP OUR MANUFACTURING SECTOR BASED BOTH OF FULL UTILISATION OF OUR FARMERS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AS WELL AS OTHER RESOURCES WHICH GRENADA POSSESSES.

THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL BELIEVES THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF GRENADA'S TOURISM INDUSTRY IS A CRITICAL FACTOR IN ENSURING THE MOST RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF OUR COUNTRY. THEREFORE, STRONG EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO HAVE OUR INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT COMPLETED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AS WELL AS TO ENSURE THAT HOTELS, RESTAURANTS, AND

Seen by P.R.

M 24/10

~~MOST RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF OUR COUNTRY. THEREFORE, STRONG EFFORTS~~
~~WILL BE MADE TO HAVE OUR INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT COMPLETED AS SOON AS~~
~~POSSIBLE,~~ AS WELL AS TO ENSURE THAT HOTELS, RESTAURANTS, AND
OTHER FACILITIES ARE BUILT TO SERVICE THE TOURIST INDUSTRY. IN THIS
RESPECT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR AGRICULTURE AND CRAFT SECTORS
IS ALSO OF GREAT IMPORTANCE.

THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL BELIEVES THAT THE POLICY OF A
MIXED ECONOMY WITH STATE, COOPERATIVE AND PRIVATE SECTORS, IS THE
CORRECT ONE TO ENSURE GRENADA'S MOST RAPID DEVELOPMENT.

HOWEVER, THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL ALSO ANALYSE THAT IN
ORDER TO ENSURE THE MOST RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOURISM INDUSTRY
AND ALSO MANUFACTURING, THERE IS NEED TO ENCOURAGE MUCH MORE
POSITIVELY THE NEED OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT, INCLUDING BOTH LOCAL AND
FOREIGN INVESTMENT.

GRENADIANS LIVING ABROAD SHOULD ALSO BE ACTIVELY ENCOURAGED TO
PARTICIPATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR TOURISM AND MANUFACTURING
SECTORS.

THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL IS COMMITTED TO FURTHER IMPROVING
THE LIVING CONDITIONS OF OUR PEOPLE, INCLUDING THE SOLVING OF
UNEMPLOYMENT AS THE FIRST PRIORITY.

WE WILL ENSURE THAT FIRM CONTROL OVER HIRING AND FIRING OF WORKERS
IS EXERCISED IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE PRACTICE OF EMPLOYMENT OR
DISMISSALS ON THE BASIS OF FAVOURITISM, BECAUSE OF FAMILY
PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP OR OTHER TIES WHICH HAVE RESULTED IN THE
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MANY GENUINE AND HARD WORKING SUPPORTERS OF
THE REVOLUTION.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION, HEALTH SERVICES, HOUSING, AND OTHER
SOCIAL SERVICES FOR OUR PEOPLE WILL BE PAID FULL
ATTENTION. THE PROGRAMMES PARTICULARLY DIRECTED AT ASSISTING OUR
POORSET PEOPLE - MILK DISTRIBUTION, AND HOUSE REPAIR WOULD
CONTINUE AND EFFORTS WOULD BE MADE TO IMPROVE THEIR ORGANISATION
FOR US TO ENSURE THAT THEY REACH OUT TO EVEN MORE PEOPLE.

IN THE AREA OF FOREIGN POLICY, THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL
WISHES TO SEE GOOD RELATIONS CONTINUE WITH ALL THOSE COUNTRIES WITH
WHOM GRENADA HAS ESTABLISHED RELATIONS OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS. WE
INTEND TO CONTINUE PLAYING AN ACTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE PART IN ALL
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS TO WHICH GRENADA BELONGS.

EFFORTS WOULD BE MADE IMMEDIATELY. EXPLAIN THE REAL SITUATION IN
GRENADA TO THE MANY COUNTRIES AND ORGANISATIONS AS WELL AS TO OUR
CARIBBEAN NEIGHBOURS TO COUNTER THE LIES BEING TOLD IN THE FOREIGN
PRESS.

EFFORTS MADE RECENTLY TO BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE. GRENADA WOULD CONTINUE TO PERSUE
AN INDEPENDENT AND NON-ALIGNED FOREIGN POLICY BASED ON MUTUAL
RESPECT WITH ALL COUNTRIES WITH WHICH WE HAVE RELATIONS AND
IS COMMITTED TO SEEK FRIENDSHIP GOODWILL AND PEACE BUILT IN PLACE
OF TODAY'S UNSTABLE WORLD CLIMATE.

THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL NOW APPEALS TO ALL THE
PEOPLE OF GRENADA TO UNITE AS ONE PEOPLE. AS A PEOPLE WE HAVE
BEEN THROUGH A VERY DIFFICULT AND TERRIBLE EXPERIENCE. HOWEVER
PEACE AND GOOD ORDER HAVE RETURNED TO OUR COUNTRY AND WE MUST PULL
OURSELVES TOGETHER AND FACE THE FUTURE WITH COURAGE TO BUILD
OUR NATION AS ONE PEOPLE.

IN ^{THE} FUTURE, THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL WILL PERMIT NO
HARASSMENT, INTIMIDATION OR VICTIMISATION ON ANY PERSONS OR
SOCIAL GROUPS IN GRENADA. OUR COUNTRY CANNOT BE BUILT ON THE BASIS

~~THE~~ IN THE FUTURE, THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL WILL PERMIT NO HARASSMENT, INTIMIDATION OR VICTIMISATION ON ANY PERSONS OR SOCIAL GROUPS IN GRENADA. OUR COUNTRY CANNOT BE BUILT ON THE BASIS OF HATRED OR BITTERNESS.

AS A PEOPLE, OUR GREATEST NEED IS FOR NATIONAL UNITY WHICH WOULD ALLOW US TO WORK TOGETHER TO RUBUILD OUR REVOLUTION TO ENSURE THAT THE GAINS MADE IN THE LAST FOUR AND A HALF YEARS ARE NOT LOST, TO ENSURE OUR ECOMONMY IS BUILT UP RAPIDLY AOUR PEOPLE ALL RECEIVE WORK AND THAT THE BENEFITS OF THE REVOLUTION CONTINUE TO REACH ALL OUR PEOPLE.

IT IS THIS NATIONAL UNITY WHICH WOULD ENABLE US TO BEAT BACK ANY ATTEMPT AT FOREIGN MILITARY AGGRESSION AGAINST OUR COUNTRY. LET US NOW IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF CALM AND OR LOVE FOR ONE ANOTHER, UNITE AS ONE PEOPLE . LONG LIVE OUR GRENADIAN PEOPLE. LONG LIVE OUR UNITY AS ONE PEOPLE. LONG LIVE THE REVOLUTION. FORWARD EVER, BACKWARD NEVER.

UNQUOTE

BULLARD

CCN : TO BUILD OUR NATION AS ONE PEOPLE,
IN THE FUTUE

CCN :
TO BUILD OUR NATION AS ONE PEOPLE.
IN THE FUTURE, THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNTCIL WILL PERMIT
NO HARASSMENT ETC

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[Send to Lab. Office + TFC Relay]

GRENADA ADVANCE COPIES

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MOD CSDO
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FM BRIDGETOWN 240445Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCC

TELEGRAM NUMBER 345 OF 23 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PORT OF SPAIN AND KINGSTON

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h-a.

GRENADA

1. ADAMS CALLED AT MIDNIGHT LOCAL TIME TO ASK ABOUT THE LIKELY RESPONSE OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF GRENADA (ONCE HIS PERSON HAD BEEN SECURED) TO A REQUEST FROM THE OECS THAT HE SHOULD SUMMON A PROVISIONAL COUNCIL. I SAID THAT FROM WHAT MONTGOMERY HAD TOLD ME OF THEIR CONVERSATION THIS MORNING I HAD LITTLE DOUBT THAT SIR PAUL WOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY. ADAMS SAID THIS WOULD BE REASSURING NEWS TO SEAGA AS WELL AS HIMSELF.
2. ADAMS ASKED WHETHER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED YET HOW TO RESPOND TO THE OECS INITIATIVE (MY TELNO 329). I ASKED WHETHER IT WAS NOW FORMALISED. ADAMS SAID I COULD HAVE THE TEXT FIRST THING TOMORROW MORNING, MONDAY. HE EMPHASISED THAT A BRITISH CONTRIBUTION TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE WOULD BE OF THE GREATEST VALUE. HE HAD PARTICULARLY IN MIND AN SAS OPERATION TO ENSURE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S SAFETY. I SAID I WAS SURE THIS WOULD BE ONE OF THE OPTIONS BEING CONSIDERED. ADAMS MENTIONED ALSO HIS WISH TO SEE ALL GRENADIAN TROOPS DISARMED, THEIR ARMS DUMPED IN THE SEA, AND THEIR DUTIES REALLOTTED TO AN EXPANDED (IF NECESSARY) POLICE FORCE. HERE TOO BRITISH HELP MIGHT BE NEEDED.

BULLARD

[Sent to cabinet office]

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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

This is the report that
I mentioned to you
this afternoon.

It is little more than
a summary of events
to date.

Juty Clerk
23/10

ZZ ATHENZ
 ZZ BRIDGETOWN
 OO KINGSTON
 OO PORT OF SPAIN
 OO GEORGETOWN
 GRS 443
 CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 221500Z OCTOBER 83
 TO FLASH ATHENS (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE)
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 417 OF 22 OCTOBER 1983
 AND FLASH TO WASHINGTON AND BRIDGETOWN
 AND IMMEDIATE TO KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN NASSAU, BELMOPAN AND
 GEORGETOWN MODUK FOR RC AND CSDO
 GRENADA

X Foreign Secretary
 has now agreed
 that HMS Antrim
 should sail
 tomorrow.

X || 1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED ON FRIDAY THAT WE SHOULD NOT
 MOVE THE CARIBBEAN GUARDSHIP HMS ANTRIM PREMATURELY FROM
 CARTAGENA, WHERE SHE IS DUE TO REMAIN UNTIL 24 OCTOBER BUT SHOULD
 KEEP THE SITUATION UNDER REVIEW OVER THE WEEKEND. WHILE THERE
 HAVE SO FAR BEEN NO DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENTS IN GRENADA SINCE FRIDAY
 AFFECTING THE SAFETY OF BRITISH CITIZENS THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER
 DEVELOPMENTS OF WHICH THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS AWARE. WE HAVE
 THEREFORE SOUGHT THE HIGH COMMISSIONER'S VIEWS BY TELEPHONE.
 ALTHOUGH WE HAVE AN INTERIM ASSURANCE FROM THE US THAT THEY WOULD
 LOOK AFTER OUR CITIZENS IF THEY WERE AT RISK THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
 FEELS THAT IT MIGHT BE UNWISE TO RELY TOTALLY ON US FACILITIES. THOSE
 AT PRESENT AVAILABLE WOULD NOT, WE ARE INFORMED, BE ADEQUATE TO
 EVACUATE THE ENTIRE BRITISH AND AMERICAN COMMUNITIES IN ONE
 OPERATION, AND THE US CARRIER TASK FORCE NOW EN ROUTE TO GRENADA
 COULD PROVE A HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL VEHICLE OF EVACUATION FOR NON-
 AMERICAN CITIZENS. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER WOULD THEREFORE FEEL
 MORE COMFORTABLE IF ANTRIM WERE NOW TO START MOVING TO A POSITION
 JUST OVER THE HORIZON FROM GRENADA WHERE SHE COULD BE AVAILABLE
 IN CASE THE NEED ARISES TO EVACUATE BRITISH CITIZENS BY SEA.
 WRIGHT AND URE SHARE THE HIGH COMMISSIONER'S VIEW AND HAVE
 CONSULTED WITH MR LUCE ACCORDINGLY. MR LUCE CONSIDERS THAT THE
 SAFETY OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY SHOULD BE OUR FIRST PRIORITY AND

THAT WE MIGHT BE OPEN TO CRITICISM IF WE HAD TAKEN NO INDEPENDENT ACTION TO SAFEGUARD OUR OWN PEOPLE. HE THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT IF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREES, WE SHOULD NOW REQUEST MOD TO ORDER ANTRIM TO LEAVE CARTAGENA AS SOON AS CONVENIENT AND MAKE ALL DELIBERATE SPEED TOWARDS GRENADA. MR LUCE THINKS IT IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD ENDEAVOUR NOT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF ACTING IN PANIC OR OVER DRAMATICALLY, AND THAT WE SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR PUBLICLY WHAT WE ARE DOING, AND STRESS THAT ALTHOUGH THE BRITISH COMMUNITY IN GRENADA IS NOT UNDER ANY IMMEDIATE THREAT WE THINK IT WISE TO MAKE THIS PRECAUTIONARY MOVE IN ORDER TO ENABLE US TO EVACUATE BRITISH CITIZENS BY SEA IF NECESSARY IF THE AIRPORT REMAINS CLOSED.

2. IF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREES WITH MR LUCE'S RECOMMENDATION ANTRIM COULD LEAVE ABOUT FOUR HOURS AFTER AN ORDER WAS GIVEN AND PROCEEDING AT REASONABLE SPEED COULD BE OFF GRENADA IN 48 HOURS. THE MOD HAVE BEEN ALERTED TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT WE MIGHT BE ASKING FOR ANTRIM TO LEAVE CARTAGENA EARLY.

HOWE

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MR WRIGHT

MR GIFFARD

MR URE

CAB OFFICE

PRIME MINISTER

MS

Situation in Grenada as at 1730 hours

The Foreign Office have received Montserrat tel. 196 which indicates that OECS Heads of Government have agreed to send a united military force to Grenada. Miss Charles and Adams have been instructed to seek assistance from the US and UK.

There has been speculation in the media that as many as ten US ships are en route for Grenada. I understand from the Foreign Office that Washington earlier this afternoon confirmed that a "carrier group" was on its way, but as yet we do not know how many ships are involved. The ships are expected to arrive in the vicinity tomorrow.

I have asked the Foreign Office to keep me closely informed of any developments.

DUTY CLERK
22 October 1983

From Montserrat to FCO tel. No. 196

OECS Meeting in Barbados

Chief Minister just telephoned from Barbados to say OECS Heads of Government resolved unanimously that they combine to form and send united military forces to Grenada. Each State agreed to contribute troops including Montserrat.

Chief Minister told me that Miss Charles and Adams were mandated to contact US and British authorities in Barbados for assistance to mount operation. So far Chief Minister heard nothing of this aspect, but there will probably be further OECS meetings in Barbados on 22 October.

I told Chief Minister and Weekes, his Permanent Secretary, that he does not have authority to commit Montserrat to such military venture and that I have advised HM Government of this but he was upset.

Understand there will be CARICOM Heads of Government meeting in Trinidad on 22 October at which OECS will propose military intervention. Chief Minister is scheduled to leave Barbados at 1300 hours for Trinidad.

22 October 1983

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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GRS 353

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 221815Z OCT 83

TO FLASH BRIDGETOWN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 295 OF 22 OCTOBER

AND TO ATHENS (FOR PS TO S OF S), WASHINGTON

AND TO IMMEDIATE PORT OF SPAIN, KINGSTON. NASSAU GEORGETOWN.

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR HIGH COMMISSIONER

GRENADA

1. LOOKING AHEAD, IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT WE MAY BE FACED SHORTLY WITH CHOICES INVOLVING PARTICIPATION IN OR ACCEPTANCE OF PLANS FOR MILITARY ACTION WITHOUT OTHER POSSIBILITIES HAVING BEEN FULLY EXPLORED.
2. DO YOU THINK THERE WOULD BE ANYTHING TO BE GAINED BY ATTEMPTING OR INSPIRING AN ATTEMPT TO PROMOTE NEGOTIATION ABOUT THE RESTORATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN GRENADA? IS IT IN YOUR VIEW POSSIBLE THAT HUDSON AUSTIN OR COARD WOULD ENTERTAIN AN APPROACH OF THIS KIND? ARE THERE ANY OTHER IDENTIFIABLE POLITICAL FORCES IN GRENADA WHICH MIGHT COME INTO PLAY? DO YOU THINK THAT THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS MOST CLOSELY CONCERNED ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN GRENADA WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE OR

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JOIN ANY SUCH APPROACH?

3. IF YOU THINK THAT SUCH AN APPROACH MIGHT BE A STARTER HOW WOULD YOU RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD CARRY ITS CONSIDERATION FORWARD?

4. THIS IS ONLY A MOST TENTATIVE IDEA. WE HAVE IT IN MIND THAT THOSE IN CONTROL OF GRENADA MUST BY NOW BE ABLE TO SEE DANGERS OF THE KIND OF INTERVENTION WHICH WOULD AT THE LEAST THREATEN THEIR OWN POSITION. WE ASSUME THAT THE LEADERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS MOST CLOSELY CONCERNED WOULD PREFER A RESOLUTION OF THE SITUATION WHICH DID NOT INVOLVE MILITARY OPERATIONS, IF SUCH A RESOLUTION WERE OBTAINABLE.

5. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR IMMEDIATE COMMENTS.

6. SINCE THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED, WE HAVE RECEIVED A REUTERS REPORT FROM PORT OF SPAIN THAT ST VINCENTS PRIME MINISTER CATO HAS OFFERED TO TALK TO AUSTIN AND THAT THE LATTER HAS AGREED TO MEET HIM POSSIBLY IN CARRIACOU (CF PARA 4 OF MY TELNO 291). AUSTIN IS REPORTED TO HAVE EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE FOR A RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN GRENADA.

7. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS ON THIS REPORT BEFORE WE OFFER ADVICE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE DEVELOPMENT REPORTED IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO 329 (NOT TO ALL) WHICH HAS JUST COME TO HAND.

HOWE

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00 WASHINGTON

00 KINGSTON

00 NASSAU

00 TFC RELAY

GRS 550

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 230600Z

FM BRIDGETOWN 222359Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 333 OF 22 OCT

AND TO IMMEDIATE PORT OF SPAIN, ATHENS (FOR PS TO SOS), KINGSTON
NASSAU WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 295: GRENADA

1. THESE ARE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS TO ANSWER. MUCH OF OUR INFORMATION ABOUT THE PERSONALITIES AND POLICIES OF THE RULING FEW IN GRENADA IS EITHER SUSPECT OR SECOND HAND. WELL SERVED AS WE ARE BY KELLY IN ST GEORGE'S, HIS MOVEMENTS ARE CONSTRAINED AND HE HAS NOT, SO FAR AS I KNOW, SEEN COARD OR HUDSON AUSTIN SINCE THE MILITARY TAKEOVER. I SHOULD HAVE LIKED TO CONSULT HIM BUT SECURE COMMUNICATION IS DIFFICULT.

2. AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM EARLIER TELEGRAMS, DHC IS NOW IN GRENADA AND IS SEEKING APPOINTMENTS WITH THE MILITARY COUNCIL AND THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL. HE WILL ALSO OF COURSE SEE KELLY. WE EXPECT HIM BACK IN BRIDGETOWN TOMORROW AND I SHALL TELEGRAPH AGAIN WHEN I HAVE SPOKEN TO HIM. MEANWHILE MY COMMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS.

3. I AGREE THAT THOSE IN CONTROL OF GRENADA MUST KNOW THAT THERE IS A RISK OF FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION. TO AVOID THIS THEY

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DIO Cabinet office

No 10 PS (2)

MOD - R.C.

(45)

IS A RISK OF FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION. TO AVOID THIS THEY COULD WELL UNDERTAKE TO HOLD ELECTIONS AND RESTORE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, KNOWING THAT THE LONGER INTERVENTION IS DELAYED THE MORE DIFFICULT IT WILL BECOME. BUT FROM WHAT I HAVE HEARD FROM COARD AND AUSTIN THEY MIGHT NOT HONOUR THEIR UNDERTAKINGS. COARD IS A HARD LINE MARXIST. AUSTIN WAS DESCRIBED TO ME TODAY BY A BARBADIAN WHO KNOWS HIM AS A NEAR -ILLITERATE THUG.

4. I CAN IDENTIFY NO OTHER POLITICAL FORCES IN GRENADA WHICH MIGHT BE BROUGHT INTO PLAY. WE CAN I HOPE EXCLUDE SIR E GAIRY. MOST OF THOSE OTHERS ROUND WHOM A CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT MIGHT HAVE COALESCED EITHER LEFT GRENADA AFTER BISHOP'S TAKEOVER OR HAVE BEEN IN DETENTION FOR SOME TIME FOR THIS VERY REASON.

5. THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS MOST CLOSELY CONCERNED ABOUT GRENADA ARE UNLIKELY IN THEIR PRESENT MOOD TO BE PREPARED TO PROMOTE OR GO ALONG WITH ANY ATTEMPT BY A THIRD PARTY TO PROMOTE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE MILITARY COUNCIL. THE OUTRAGE EXPRESSED BY ADAMS AND OTHER CARIBBEAN LEADERS ABOUT THE KILLING OF BISHOP AND HIS COLLEAGUES IS I BELIEVE GENUINE AND SEEMS TO REFLECT PUBLIC OPINION AS A WHOLE. (THIS IS BECAUSE OF THEIR CHRISTIAN DISLIKE OF MURDER, NOT BECAUSE THEY APPROVED OF BISHOP'S POLICIES). I DISCOUNT TO A LARGE EXTENT THE CATO OFFER. WE ARE TOLD IT WAS MADE AGAINST THE STRONG ADVICE OF HIS OECS COLLEAGUES, AND IT CONTRADICTS THEIR UNANIMOUS VOTE FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION. AUSTIN'S REPORTED DESIRE FOR A RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IS AT ODDS WITH WHAT HE TOLD THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL YESTERDAY AND WITH WHAT LITTLE WE KNOW OF THE REASONS FOR HIS DISPUTE WITH BISHOP. LATEST REPORTS SUGGEST THAT THE CARRIACOU MEETING MAY NOT IN FACT TAKE PLACE.

6. I SHARE THE SURPRISE OF THOSE WHO SEE THE US AND OURSELVES BEING ASKED TO INTERVENE MILITARILY IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A CARIBBEAN COUNTRY, AND I HAVE SOME DOUBTS AS TO HOW THE OPERATION

CARIBBEAN COUNTRY, AND I HAVE SOME DOUBTS AS TO HOW THE OPERATION WILL TURN OUT, IF THE AMERICANS MASTER-MIND IT. BUT I DO NOT THINK YOUR IDEA IS A STARTER. PEOPLE LIKE ADAMS, COMPTON AND MISS CHARLES (I DO NOT KNOW SEAGA OR CHAMBER) ARE COMMONSENSE POLITICIANS WITH CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE, AND VERY FAR FROM BEING HAWKS. THEY ARE I THINK THE BEST JUDGES OF HOW TO HANDLE THE PROBLEM PRESENTED BY THE MILITARY COUP IN GRENADA. IF THEY AND THEIR CARICOM COLLEAGUES COME OUT IN FAVOUR OF A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE AND IF THE US SUPPORTS THE IDEA I RECOMMEND WE SHOULD GIVE OUR SUPPORT TOO OR AT THE VERY LEAST TAKE NO STEPS THAT MIGHT WEAKEN THE OPERATION.

BULLARD

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 221510Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3078 OF 22 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY) BRIDGETOWN
KINGSTON PORT OF SPAIN NASSAU BELMOPAN MODUK (RC,CDSO)

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBERS 1753 AND 1754: GRENADA

1. THE AMERICANS HAVE AVAILABLE A CARRIER GROUP BASED ON THE USS INDEPENDENCE: AND 1,900 MARINES OF THE AMPHIBIOUS REACTION GROUP. THE LATTER WERE EN ROUTE TO LEBANON FROM NORFOLK, VIRGINIA AND HAVE BEEN DIVERTED TO THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN. THE AMERICANS WILL PROVIDE OPERATIONAL DETAILS, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH THEM ON MILITARY CHANNELS ABOUT THIS. THE ADMINISTRATION IS STATING THAT THIS IS A SIGNAL TO THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF CONCERN ABOUT THE SAFETY OF U.S. CITIZENS ON THE ISLAND.

2. WE HAVE RELAYED TO THE AMERICANS MR LUCE'S REQUEST THAT IF U.S. FORCES ACT TO EVACUATE U.S. CITIZENS, THEY SHOULD INCLUDE U.K. CITIZENS WANTING TO LEAVE. RAPHEL (DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR POLITICO MILITARY AFFAIRS) TOOK NOTE OF THIS REQUEST AND SAID THAT HE WAS CERTAIN THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD HELP. THE REQUEST HAS ALSO BEEN PUT TO THE U.S. NAVY, WHO RESPONDED POSITIVELY.

3. THE PRESIDENT AND SHULTZ AT PRESENT ARE IN GEORGIA. THE U.S. DEPLOYMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL IS MEETING UNDER VICE PRESIDENT BUSH TO CONSIDER WHAT TO DO. ADMIRAL HOWE WILL GIVE US AN ACCOUNT OF U.S. THINKING ONCE THAT MEETING HAS CONCLUDED. IT MAY GO ON FOR MUCH OF THE DAY.

4. WE HAVE PASSED TO THE AMERICANS THE GIST OF YOUR TELNO 291 TO BRIDGETOWN, EMPHASIZING THE SENSITIVITY OF THESE CONTACTS. THEY WERE GRATEFUL FOR THIS INFORMATION.

WRIGHT

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00 ATHENS

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00 KINGSTON

D10 - Cabinet Office

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM WASHINGTON 222150Z OCT 83.

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3084 OF 22 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY), BRIDGETOWN, PORT OF SPAIN, KINGSTON, NASSAU, MODUK (FOR RC AND CSDO).

MY TELEGRAM NO. 3078: GRENADA.

ADMIRAL HOWE TOLD HEAD OF CHANCERY THIS AFTERNOON THAT THE CONCLUSION OF THE NSC MEETING WAS THAT THE U.S. SHOULD PROCEED VERY CAUTIOUSLY. THE CARRIER GROUP BASED ON THE U.S.S. INDEPENDENCE, WHICH HAD BEEN HEADING FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN, HAD BEEN DIVERTED SOUTH TO THE CARIBBEAN. ITS PRESENT POSITION WAS EAST OF THE SOUTHERN TIP OF FLORIDA AND DUE NORTH OF PUERTO RICO. THE AMPHIBIOUS GROUP INCLUDING 1,900 MARINES AND TWO LANDING CRAFT WAS TWO HUNDRED MILES FURTHER EAST. THE INDEPENDENCE WOULD REACH THE AREA TOMORROW, BUT WOULD REMAIN WELL TO THE EAST OF DOMINICA, AND WELL NORTH OF GRENADA. THE AMPHIBIOUS GROUP WOULD REACH THE SAME AREA LATER TOMORROW. THIS WOULD GIVE THE U.S. THE OPTION TO REACT IF THE SITUATION WARRANTED IT.

2. HOWE EMPHASIZED HOWEVER, THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE MADE NO DECISIONS GOING BEYOND THESE CONTINGENCY DEPLOYMENTS. THEY HAD RECEIVED A FIRM REQUEST FROM THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT TO HELP THEM RESTORE PEACE AND ORDER IN GRENADA. THE PRIME MINISTER OF JAMAICA AND BARBADOS WERE SUPPORTING THIS REQUEST (WE CONFIRMED THAT ADAMS HAD RELAYED A SIMILAR MESSAGE TO US). NO DECISION HAD YET BEEN MADE ON HOW TO RESPOND. THERE WAS A NEED TO FIND OUT MORE ABOUT WHAT WAS HAPPENING ON THE ISLAND. THE U.S. CITIZENS AT THE MEDICAL SCHOOL SAID THAT THEY WERE ALRIGHT. THE AMERICANS WERE TRYING TO GET TWO CONSULAR OFFICERS IN TO TALK TO THEM AND OTHER U.S. CITIZENS. THE PRIME MINISTER OF BARBADOS DID NOT WANT THEM TO TALK TO AUSTIN. OBVIOUSLY, HOWEVER, THEY WOULD LISTEN TO WHATEVER WAS SAID TO THEM. THE REGIME SEEMED TO BE AN UNPLEASANT BAND OF EXTREME LEFT WING THUGS. BOTH AUSTIN AND THE CUBANS WERE SHOWING ACUTE NERVOUSNESS AT THE POSSIBILITY OF COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN AND U.S. INTERVENTION. HOWE AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE CARIBBEAN LEADERS THEMSELVES TO CONTINUE TO TAKE THE LEAD. THE AMERICANS WOULD BE ASKING THEM TO INDICATE MORE PRECISELY WHAT THEY HAD IN MIND, IN TERMS OF ACTION TO RESTORE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.

3. HOWE GAVE A CATEGORICAL ASSURANCE THAT IF THE AMERICANS TOOK ACTION TO EVACUATE U.S. CITIZENS, THEY WOULD EVACUATE BRITISH CITIZENS AS WELL. RENWICK THANKED HIM FOR THIS. WE HAVE RECEIVED SIMILAR ASSURANCES WITH THE PENTAGON. HOWE ALSO ASSURED US THAT THERE WOULD BE CONSULTATION IF THE AMERICANS DECIDED TO TAKE ANY FURTHER STEPS.

4. HOWE ASKED ABOUT HMS ANTRIM. WE SAID THAT YOU WERE CONSIDERING WHETHER ANTRIM SHOULD MOVE CLOSER TO THE AREA (AND HAVE NOW TOLD HIM THAT THIS IS BEING DONE).

5. WE ALSO MENTIONED THE REPORTS THAT AUSTIN MAY MEET CATO. THE AMERICANS AGREE THAT IT WILL BE WORTH SEEING IF ANYTHING POSITIVE COMES OF THIS.

6. HOWE AGREED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH.

WRIGHT

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The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1048</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Telno 329 dated 22 October 1983</i>	
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FM BRIDGETOWN 221957Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 332 OF 22 OCT

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 328:GRENADA

1. AMERICANS DECIDED AT LAST MINUTE NOT TO TAKE EQUIPMENT. MONTGOMERY HAS THEREFORE LEFT ON CHARTER AIRCRAFT WITH TWO US OFFICIALS, HURZE AND FLOHR.

2. MONTGOMERY WILL STAY OVERNIGHT AND HOPES TO RETURN TOMORROW MORNING.

BULLARD

HD/ WIAD

DIO Cabinet Office

NO 10 DS (2)

R.C - MOD

(45)

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MUFAX(1)

DWF G 079/22

LGQ 521/22

LJR 741

OO FCO

OO WASHINGTON

OO PORT OF SPAIN

OO NASSAU

OO KINGSTON

OO BELNAPAN

OO TFC RELAY

GRS 450

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FM BRIDGETOWN 22/1432Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 330 OF 22 OCTOBER

MIPT: MEETING WITH GEORGE PRICE

*and to Washington Port of Spain Nassau
Kingston + Belnapan*

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*Head W/As.
1010 28 (2)
Dio Cab. Office
Rc/Mot
Rc*

1. PRICE TOLD ME THAT BELIZE HAD BEEN ASKED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE FORCE. THIS PLACED HIM IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION. AS HE SAW IT THERE WERE THE FOLLOWING PROBLEMS:

A. GUYANA WOULD NOT BE ATTENDING THE CARICOM MEETING IN TRINIDAD.

B. ADDERLSLEY (FOREIGN MINISTER, BAHAMAS) HAD TOLD HIM HE WOULD BE ADVISING PINDLING NOT TO COMMIT BAHAMAS.

C. IN HIS VIEW INTERVENTION WOULD CONSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN ANOTHER COUNTRY'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. (THOUGH SEAGA HAD ARGUED FORCIBLY THAT THIS WAS NOT SO).

E. HE COULD FORESEE REPERCUSSIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA
A COMPARISON WITH RECRUIT KILLINGS IN HONDURAS.

2. PRICE SAID THAT BEFORE HE COULD REPLY TO THE OECS/CARICOM REQUEST HE WOULD NEED TO KNOW THE UK POSITION AND TO CONSULT HIS CABINET. HE ASKED ME WHAT THE UK'S POSITION WAS. I SAID:

A. I WOULD BE REPORTING ADAMS' MESSAGE TO LONDON IMMEDIATELY.

B. HMG WERE DISPOSED TO HELP IN ANY WAY THAT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO BRINGING PEACE TO GRENADA AND HELP RESTORE THE COUNTRY TO CONSTITUTIONAL RULE.

C. WE COULD NOT TAKE A FORMAL POSITION UNTIL WE RECEIVED THE OECS LETTER AND SAW ITS PRECISE TERMS.

3. I ADDED THAT WE FOUND THE SITUATION IN GRENADA DISTRESSING, BUT THAT WE WERE BEING ASSURED BY THE MILITARY COUNCIL THAT FOREIGN CITIZENS WERE IN NO DANGER AND WOULD BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE.

4. PRICE WENT ON TO SAY THAT:

A. GRENADA HAD SUPPORTED BELIZE DURING THE MOVES TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE IN 1981.

B. THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN HAD REFUSED TO CONTRIBUTE TO A MILITARY TRAINING TEAM IN BELIZE IN 1981. THIS POINT STILL RANKLED.

C. PRICE ENDED BY SAYING THAT HE DID NOT KNOW HOW FORBES BURNHAM WOULD REACT TO THESE PROPOSALS. HE REMAINED A MOST INFLUENTIAL FIGURE IN THE REGION. I SAID TO PRICE THAT HE MUST ULTIMATELY BE THE BEST JUDGE OF WHERE BELIZE'S INTERESTS LAY. HE REPLIED THAT HIS JUDGEMENT AT THE PRESENT WAS TO KEEP BELIZE OUT.

BULLARD

CCN. PARA 1. BM ADDERSLEY

NNNN

Sent ✓

PRIME MINISTER FROM DUTY CLERK

YOU WILL SEE FROM THE BRIDGETOWN TELEGRAM NO. 329 THAT
ADAMS HAS NOW FORMALLY REQUESTED ASSISTANCE, ALBEIT ORALLY.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY HAS AGREED THAT HMS ANTRIM SHOULD DEPART
FROM CARTAGENA (~~SPAIN~~) TOMORROW MORNING - THE SHIP SHOULD
ARRIVE IN APPROX 48 HOURS. FOREIGN OFFICE ARE ANXIOUS
THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE SEEN TO BE OVER-REACTING - HENCE THE
DELAY OF SAILING UNTIL THE MORNING.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ARE AWARE OF THESE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
AND ARE CONSULTING THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE.
MR. LUCE HAS BEEN KEPT INFORMED OF ALL DEVELOPMENTS.

22 October, 1983.



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
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PP HAVANA

PP WASHINGTON

GRS 210

RESTRICTED

FM KINGSTON 211549Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 291 OF 21 OCTOBER

PRIORITY INFO BRIDGETOWN, GEORGETOWN, PORT OF SPAIN, NASSAU, HAVANA AND WASHINGTON.


MY TELNO 290 (NOT TO ALL): GRENADA

1. IN A NATION WIDE BROADCAST LAST NIGHT, BEFORE LEAVING TODAY (21ST) FOR THE BARBADOS MEETING, MR SEAGA FURTHER CONDEMNED THE BRUTALITIES OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT GROUP IN GRENADA. JAMAICA WOULD BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS UNTIL THERE WERE SIGNS OF THE RESTORATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, SUSPEND TRADE, BAN VISITS BY MEMBERS OF THE NEW REGIME (EXCEPT WHEN INTERNATIONALLY REQUIRED) AND CALL ON THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS TO INVESTIGATE BISHOP'S EXECUTION. THROUGHOUT THE SPEECH MR SEAGA NOTICEABLY AND DELIBERATELY ASSERTED AND EMPHASISED A CUBAN CONNECTION. HE REPEATEDLY DESCRIBED THE TROOPS AS CUBAN TRAINED AND ASCRIBED BISHOP'S OVERTHROW TO CUBAN DISPLEASURE AT HIS FAILURE 'TO MOVE FAST ENOUGH TO TRANSFORM GRENADA TO A CUBAN TYPE SOCIETY'.

2. MANLEY HAD EARLIER STRONGLY DENOUNCED THE BRUTAL KILLINGS BY THE 'NEW RULING CLIQUE'. THE PNP REPUDIATED THEM AND THEIR RIGHT TO SPEAK FOR THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE, HAD SEVERED RELATIONS WITH THE NJM AND WOULD RECOMMEND IST EXPULSION FROM THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL.

3. PREDICTABLY, TREVOR MUNROE OF THE WORKER'S PARTY OF JAMAICA WHO IN A BROADCAST INTERVIEW ADMITTED TO RECENT CONTACTS WITH BOTH BISHOP AND COARD, SUPPORTED THE NEW REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.

SMALLMAN



~~NO LO Downing St~~

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

75

RC
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 NEWS } HOS
 REITAD
 REURE

A handwritten signature in blue ink, possibly 'MS', located at the bottom right of the page.



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1048</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Folio 4</i> <i>Telno 320 dated 21 October 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR <i>40</i> YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>5/6/2013</i> <i>S. Gray</i>
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LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1048</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Folio 2B</i> <i>Copies to PM dated 21 October 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>5/6/2013</i> <i>S. Gray</i>
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LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1048</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Folio 2A</i> <i>FCO R5/B5 dated 21 October 1983</i>	
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RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>5/6/2013</i> <i>G. Gray</i>
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GRS 216

UNCLASSIFIED

FM MONTERRAT 201100Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NUMBER

192 OF 20 OCTOBER REPEATED TO DEVDIV

BRIDGETOWN FOR INFO.

THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF CHIEF MINISTER'S
STATEMENT ON YESTERDAYS EVENTS IN GRENADA.

'THE EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS IN GRENADA,
CULMINATING IN THE WANTON MURDER OF PRIME MINISTER
MAURICE BISHOP, MINISTERS OF GOVERNMENT AND
OTHER PROMINENT GRENADIANS, HAVE CAST A DARK
SHADOW OVER THE CARIBBEAN.

I AM SHOCKED AND DEEPLY DISTRESSED AT THE WAY
PEOPLE PURPORTING TO ACT ON BEHALF OF A REVOLUTION,
CAN TURN AGAINST AND MURDER THEIR OWN POLITICAL
LEADERS WHOM THEY ORIGINALLY ASSISTED TO GAIN POWER.
AS A MEMBER OF CARICOM THE GOVERNMENT OF MONTERRAT
FEELS VERY STRONGLY THAT WE MUST MEET AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER OUR FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH
GRENADA UNDER ITS SO-CALLED REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.
WORDS CANNOT EXPRESS THE SHOCK AND HORROR OF THESE
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GRENADA.
OUR SYMPATHY GOES OUT TO THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA.'

2. PRIME MINISTER CHARLES OF DOMINICA (ALSO CHAIRMAN
OCCS) SPOKE TO CHIEF MINISTER THIS A.M. AND ASKED IF

/ HE WOULD

HE WOULD AGREE TO EARLY MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT
TO CONSIDER OECS/CARICOM FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH
GRENADA UNDER ITS SO CALLED REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. CHIEF
MINISTER AGREED WHOLEHEARTEDLY WITH PROPOSAL.

3. GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE HERE ARE DEEPLY SHOCKED BY EVENTS.

DALE

LIMITED

WIAD

MCAD

NEWS D

INFO D

SOVIET D

RESEARCH D

PUSD

CCD

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR URE

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FM BRIDGETOWN 201405Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 309 OF 20 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PORT OF SPAIN GEORGETOWN KINGSTON

NASSAU HAVANA

SAVING COPY PASSED LOCALLY TO ST GEORGES GRENADA

MY TELNO 309: GRENADA

ms

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A FURTHER STATEMENT MADE BY THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES (PRAF) OF GRENADA LAST EVENING (19 OCTOBER):

QUOTE.... YESTERDAY THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL WAS CONSTITUTED TO FORM THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL IS COMRADE HUDSON, GENERAL OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES WITH OTHER MEMBERS OR OFFICERS OF SECTIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES. THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL HAS FULL LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWERS. IT HAS DISSOLVED THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT AND DISMISSED ALL MEMBERS OF THE PRESENT CABINET AND NOW LEGALLY CONSTITUTES THE GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA. THE LIVES AND PROPERTY OF ALL FOREIGN CITIZENS ARE FULLY PROTECTED AND GUARANTEED. THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL HEREBY DECLARES THAT ANY ATTEMPT AT FOREIGN AGGRESSION WILL BE RESTISTED BY THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES TO THE LAST MAN AND CALLS UPON ALL COUNTRIES TO RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF GRENADA AND TO STRICTLY ADHERE TO THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER STATES.UNQUOTE.

BULLARD

LIMITED

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MEAD

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INFORMATION D

SOV D

RESEARCH D

PUSD

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PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

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MR WRIGHT

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UNCLASSIFIED

FM BRIDGETOWN 201930Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 311 OF 20 OCTOBER

INFO KINGSTON PORT OF SPAIN GEORGETOWN WASHINGTON

GRENADA: REGIONAL REACTIONS

1. FOLLOWING HIS ROUND-UP OF REACTIONS OF DEATH OF BISHOP AND OTHERS IN GRENADA.
2. ADAMS (BARBADOS) SAID HE WAS 'HORRIFIED AT THESE BRUTAL AND VICIOUS MURDERS - THE MOST VICIOUS ACT TO DISFIGURE THE WEST INDIES SINCE THE DAYS OF SLAVERY'. HE DOUBTED THAT NEW REGIME COULD HAVE NORMAL RELATIONS WITH 'AN ASSOCIATION OF PEACEFUL AND PEACE LOVING CARICOM STATES' AND SAID THE WHOLE STATUS OF CARICOM AS AN ASSOCIATION OF DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE TO BE REVIEWED. IMPLICATIONS OF GRENADA'S NEW REGIME, HE SAID, MAKES THE RANGE OF GOVERNMENTS IN CARICOM 'TOO WIDE': 'THIS GOES FAR BEYOND IDEOLOGICAL PLURALISM' (A REFERENCE TO OCHO RIOS COMMUNIQUE IN 1982): 'IT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BARBARIANS AND HUMAN BEINGS'. THE BEHAVIOUR OF THESE 'DISGUSTING MURDERS' HAD 'MAJOR IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTINUED ASSOCIATION WITH GRENADA UNDER THIS REGIME'.
3. BARROW (OPPOSITION LEADER, BARBADOS) EXPRESSED HIS PARTY'S DEEP SHOCK OVER THE CALLOUS AND BRUTAL MURDER OF BISHOP, HIS COLLEAGUES AND OTHER GRENADIAN LEADERS AND CITIZENS, AND DEMANDED THAT THE PERPETRATORS OF 'THIS VICIOUS CRIME' SHOULD NOT GO UNPUNISHED. HE CALLED FOR IMMEDIATE INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO RELIEVE THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE FROM THE SCOURGE OF A STALINIST DICTATORSHIP', AND DESCRIBED THE EVENTS OF 19 OCTOBER AS ONE OF THE MOST INHUMAN AND DISGRACEFUL EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF THE CARIBBEAN. HE SAID IT WAS VITAL THAT THE 'INSTIGATORS' BE OSTRACISED FROM THE REST OF THE CARIBBEAN AND BE GIVEN NO SUCCOUR OR SHELTER WITHIN ITS SHORES. THE DLP CONDEMNED UNEQUIVOCALLY THE 'SAVAGERY' IN ST GEORGES. NO BARBADOS GOVERNMENT OF ANY POLITICAL PERSUASION SHOULD HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE GRENADA REGIME. RESPONDING TO REPORTERS' QUESTIONS, BARROW SAID HIS IDEA OF 'INTERNATIONAL ACTION' WAS ACTION AT HIGHEST LEVEL AT UN, WHETHER SANCTIONS OR OTHER MEASURES, AND OFFERS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES OF POLITICAL ASYLUM AND ASSISTANCE FOR GRENADIANS WISHING TO LEAVE.

/H.

4. MISS CHARLES (DOMINICA), SEAGA AND MANLEY (JAMAICA) ALL ROUNDLY CONDEMNED THE NEW REGIME FOR THE MURDERS. SEAGA CALLED FOR GRENADA'S EXPULSION FROM CARICOM. COMPTON (ST LUCIA) AND LEWIS (DIRECTOR GENERAL OECS) BOTH TOLD ME PRIVATELY IN CASTRIES ON 19 OCTOBER OF THEIR SHOCK AND DISGUST AT THE DISGRACEFUL EVENTS IN GRENADA THAT DAY. COMPTON MADE A PUBLIC STATEMENT TODAY (20 OCT) SAYING ST LUCIA COULD NOT CONDONE THE 'SLAUGHTER' WHICH WAS UNWARRANTED IN THE CARIBBEAN. HE APPEALED TO WHAT NOT TO FLY INTO GRENADA: TO EAST CARIBBEAN CENTRAL BANK NOT TO SUPPLY CURRENCY TO GRENADA: TO TRADE UNIONISTS NOT TO LOAD OR UNLOAD SHIPS TO OR FROM GRENADA: AND GOVERNMENT LEADERS IN OECS NOT TO HAVE ANY CONTACT WITH GRENADA.
5. REV ALLAN KIRTON, GENERAL SECRETARY OF CARIBBEAN CONFERENCE OF CHURCHES (CCC, PUBLISHER OF 'CARIBBEAN CONTACT' MONTHLY NEWSPAPER) SAID CCC WOULD BE SUSPENDING ALL RELATIONS WITH NEW REGIME IN GRENADA INCLUDING ITS AID PROJECTS UNTIL A PROPER RETURN TO STANDARDS OF DECENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. (CCC HAD OFFERED TO IMMEDIATE EARLIER IN THE CRISIS).
6. ARCHBISHOP OF WEST INDIES (WOODROFFE) CALLED FOR CARIBBEAN PEOPLE TO PRAY FOR GRENADIANS: DECLARED SUNDAY 23 OCTOBER A DAY OF PRAYER FOR GRENADA: AND CALLED ON RMC TO LIFT CURFEW DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS.
7. US EMBASSY AND CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSION IN BRIDGETOWN BOTH ISSUED STATEMENTS. US VOICED CONCERN AT TERMS OF 'SHOOT ON SIGHT' CURFEW. CANADIAN HC SPOKESMAN SAID THEY HAD HOPED THE PROBLEMS WOULD HAVE BEEN RESOLVED WITHOUT RESORT TO ARMS. WHE HAVE NOT ISSUED A STATEMENT, ALTHOUGH REQUESTS FOR SUCH A STATEMENT HAVE BEEN RECEIVED.

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PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR. WHITNEY

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MR. GIFFARD

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 289 OF 14 OCTOBER 83

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PORT OF SPAIN

INFO ROUTINE KINGSTON, NASSAU, GEORGETOWN

GRENADA

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

From BRIDGETOWN

(17)

HDS/WIAD
NEWS DEPT

INFO DEPT

POST

PS(6)

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

MRCIFFARD

MR URE

MR WRIGHT

RC

CABINET OFFICE

No 10

1. THE SITUATION AT 1700 HOURS (LOCAL) TODAY WAS THAT:
 - (A) SCHOOL CHILDREN WERE SENT HOME AT LUNCH TIME TODAY:
 - (B) CROWDS (MOSTLY YOUNG PEOPLE) HAD GATHERED IN THE STREETS OF ST GEORGE'S:
 - (C) THERE WAS A LOT OF EVIDENCE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IN ST GEORGE'S:
 - (D) MILITARY PRESENCE AROUND RADIO FREE GRENADA WAS SOLDIERS IN FULL BATTLEDRESS. THEY HAVE TAKEN UP DEFENSIVE POSITIONS:
 - (E) ST GEORGE'S REMAINS GENERALLY CALM BUT ATMOSPHERE OF TENSION REMAINS:
 - (F) SOME MINISTERS DID NOT GO TO THEIR OFFICES TODAY EG RADIX (PARA 2 OF TUR) MISS CREFT (EDUCATION - FORMER GIRL FRIEND OF BISHOP):
 - (G) NEWS MEDIA IN EASTERN CARIBBEAN HAVE NOW JOINED IN THE FUN LARGELY AS A RESULT OF A SERIES OF ANNOUNCEMENTS BY RADIO FREE GRENADA (RFG) SINCE MIDDAY TODAY. THESE REPORTED THAT CHIEF OF PM'S SECURITY UNIT HAD BEEN ARRESTED FOR HIS INVOLVEMENT IN A PLOT TO KILL BISHOP. INVESTIGATIONS CONTINUING: COARD HAD RESIGNED FOLLOWING ALLEGATIONS OF HIS INVOLVEMENT IN A PLOT TO KILL BISHOP. HIS RESIGNATION WAS SUPPOSED TO NAIL THE LIE OF HIS ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT: A SPOKESMAN FOR 'SECURITY FORCES' WHO WARNED AGAINST DANGER OF COUNTER REVOLUTION. HE PROMISED VIGOROUS ACTION BY SECURITY FORCES AGAINST RUMOUR MONGERS AND COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES.
 - (H) AT ONE POINT LOCAL RADIO REPORTED SELWYN STRACHAN (MINISTER FOR NATIONAL MOBILISATION AND INFORMATION) HAD ANNOUNCED THAT COARD HAD TAKEN OVER AS PRIME MINISTER BUT THE SOURCE WAS NOT CLEAR AND IT WAS NOT REPEATED.
2. IT SEEMS THAT THERE WAS A STORMY CABINET MEETING ON THE EVENING OF 12 OCTOBER (AT WHICH THERE MAY EVEN HAVE BEEN A FRACAS). COARD APPARENTLY TRIED TO FORCE THE ISSUE OF ACCELERATING GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND ALSO INCREASING THE PRESSURE ON THE 'BOURGEOIS' ELEMENT IN GRENADA. BISHOP OPPOSED THIS AND DEFENDED HIS PRESENT POLICY OF DEALING WITH THESE TWO ELEMENTS BY STEALTH. LOUISON (MINISTER FOR AGRICULTURE) ACCUSED COARD OF SEEKING POWER. IT WAS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THIS CABINET MEETING THAT BISHOP MADE THE BRIEF EARLY MORNING BROADCAST REFERRED TO IN PARA 2 OF THE

WITH THESE TWO ELEMENTS BY STEALTH. LOUISON (MINISTER FOR AGRICULTURE) ACCUSED COARD OF SEEKING POWER. IT WAS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THIS CABINET MEETING THAT BISHOP MADE THE BRIEF EARLY MORNING BROADCASTS REFERRED TO IN PARA 3 OF TUR.

3. THE SITUATION REMAINS CONFUSED, BUT I FEEL THAT DESPITE HIS APPARENT RESIGNATION, COARD SEEMS TO BE marginally AHEAD OF THE GAME. HE IS FREE AGENT WHEREAS THERE SEEMS LITTLE DOUBT THAT BISHOP IS UNDER HOUSE ARREST. KELLY BELIEVES THAT LAYNE (PARA 2 OF TUR) AND LT COL LIAM JAMES (THE OTHER DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR DEFENCE) HAVE EFFECTIVELY TAKEN OVER FROM GENERAL HUDSON AUSTIN, COMMANDER, PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (PRA) AND A BISHOP MAN. HE ALSO SUSPECTS THAT THEY HEAD A GROUP OF PRA OFFICERS WHO PROVIDE THE MAIN SUPPORT FOR COARD WITH THE MAJORITY OF RANK AND FILE OF PRA PROBABLY LOYAL TO BISHOP. I SEE NO REASON TO DOUBT THIS VIEW WHICH WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE PRESENT PERIOD OF CON-FUSION/INDECISION. KELLY ALSO BELIEVES THAT COARD HAS THE ADVANTAGE AT THIS STAGE.

4. UNISON WHITEMAN, FOREIGN MINISTER, PASSED THROUGH BARBADOS TODAY EN ROUTE TO GRENADA. INTERVIEWED AT THE AIRPORT HE FUDGED MOST QUESTIONS BUT COMMENTED THAT QUOTE IF WE SWITCH PRIME MINISTERS, WE SWITCH PRIME MINISTERS, THE REVOLUTION GOES ON UNQUOTE. THIS SOUNDS RATHER PRO COARD.

5. COARD (WHO HAS LITTLE, IF ANY, GRASS ROOTS SUPPORT, IN CONTRAST TO BISHOP) HAS CLEARLY MADE A TAKEOVER BID WHICH HAS NOT BEEN IMMEDIATELY SUCCESSFUL; BUT HE STILL LOOKS TO HAVE SOMETHING LIKE A STRAIGHT FLUS IN THIS PARTICULAR GAME OF POKER.

MONTGOMERY

NNNN

File

889

9 May 1983

GRENADA

Thank you for your letter of 5 May,
the contents of which the Prime Minister
has noted.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

File

255

9 May 1983

GRENADA

Thank you for your letter of 5 May,
the contents of which the Prime Minister
has noted.

A.J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

I think we have made
our point.

5 May 1983

A.S.C. 5/5.

Dear Sir,

Grenada

In your letter of 27 April you said that the Prime Minister wished us to ask why the Commonwealth Secretary-General had considered it necessary to circulate a message from the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada, seeking assistance in the prevention of aggression by the United States.

We are not of course in any way responsible for the actions of the Commonwealth Secretary General, but we have pursued this with the Secretariat (Mr Ramphal is at present away sick). Hugh Craft, a senior Australian member of his staff, has told us that, normally speaking, Mr Ramphal would feel bound to circulate in this way a message of substance addressed to him by a member Government. He recalled that the Government of Lesotho had used this channel recently to express their concern about aggression from South Africa; and that Mr Ramphal had himself used it on our behalf during the Falklands conflict (and, according to Craft, had been privately criticised by some member Governments for doing so). We pointed out that the Grenadan message was different in a number of ways; most important, it accused the United States Government of aggressive intent without producing a shred of evidence. Craft took note, and undertook to report the conversation to Mr Ramphal.

We have therefore registered the point with the Commonwealth Secretariat. Given that Mr Ramphal was so helpful to us over the Falklands, Mr Pym does not think that it would be helpful to pursue it further with him. He is also doubtful of the wisdom of circulating a reply to the Government of Grenada's message. Mr Onslow has told the Grenadan High Commissioner that we regard his Government's allegations as fanciful. To do more would, in Mr Pym's view, risk investing the message with more importance than it deserves. It would also go one step further in involving the Secretary-General in an exchange of controversial messages between Heads of Government.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

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FILE

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 April 1983

Grenada

With your letter of 21 April you enclosed a message from the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada seeking our assistance in the prevention of aggression by the United States against Grenada.

The Prime Minister has expressed some surprise that the Commonwealth Secretary-General should have circulated such a message and believes that we should ask why he considered it necessary to do so.

For your information, in the light of any comments you may have as a result of an approach to the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Prime Minister may wish to consider circulating a reply to the Government of Grenada's message.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

NR

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister

You should perhaps know that Grenada is circulating the Commonwealth about

"U.S. aggression." We can simply ignore it.

A.J.C. 21/4.

Dear John,

Grenada

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 April, 1983

I really don't think we can ignore it. Why don't we respond to it. We really must ask the

We have been asked by the Commonwealth Secretary-General to forward the enclosed message from the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada in which they seek our assistance in the prevention of aggression by the United States against Grenada.

The Grenadans have been unable to produce any evidence to substantiate the allegations against the US. When the Grenadan High Commissioner called on Mr Onslow on 30 March, Mr Onslow firmly rebutted the suggestion that the US posed any threat to Grenada, which he described as fanciful. This latest message does nothing to change this view.

Yours ever
J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

CABLES: COMSECGEN LONDON SW1
TELEX: 27678
TELEPHONE: 01-839 3411 Ext:

MARLBOROUGH HOUSE,
PALL MALL,
LONDON, SW1Y 5HX

Your ref:
Our ref:

Circular Letter No. 28/83

29 March 1983

I would be grateful if you could transmit the following message from the Secretary-General to your Head of Government by the speediest means possible.

BEGINS

I have received the attached message from the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada. In communicating this message to you I have been particularly asked to draw attention to the real and urgent concern of the Government of Grenada on this matter and the request contained in the penultimate paragraph.

With deep respect,

Shridath S. Ramphal

ENDS

HWR 020/1	
- 7 APR 1983	
SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
FBI - NEW YORK	
APR 11 1983	

E.C. Anyaoku

E.C. Anyaoku
Deputy Secretary-General

distribution

WIND - ACTION ✓

NAD

MR Cooper

M. Pappas

We spoke. Will

C31/ you please draft on your return?

RSP

TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT
OF GRENADA TO THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth of Nations, and has the honour to request that the following information be transmitted urgently to all Commonwealth Member Countries:

As has often been stated by the Government of Grenada, the United States began a policy of economic, political and military aggression against our country since the triumph of our Revolution on March 13, 1979.

The U.S. is continuing its acts of economic aggression against our small country. Attempts have been made to prevent us from receiving assistance from regional and international financial institutions. Our regional institution, the Caribbean Development Bank, was offered U.S. \$4 million for basic needs projects on condition that Grenada was excluded from such assistance. Only recently, as part of the U.S. attempts to prevent our country from receiving any funds for our public investment programme, the United States wielded its power, within the International Monetary Fund in such a manner that the I.M.F. applied to us a special kind of cross-conditionality never before applied to any other country; they insisted that before we were afforded a loan, the World Bank would have to approve our public investment programme.

We are now increasingly concerned because these attacks on our economy have also been given political impetus in the form of direct adverse pronouncements by top United States personnel.

In December of 1982, at the Miami Conference on the Caribbean, Vice-President Bush attacked our country. In January of this year, a U.S. document circulated at the Managua Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement specifically attacked Grenada and once more there was hostile propaganda against our international airport vital to our economic and social development; on 27 February, a Washington Post article exposed a C.I.A. plan of destabilization against our country, including propaganda, economic and military methods; the article also referred to, quote, unusual and unspecified components, unquote, of the plan. For us the most serious comment came from the President of the United States himself, who, in response to an argument that Grenada poses no real

problem because its only important product was nutmegs, stated in an address to the Association of Manufacturers of America on 10th March, that, quote, it is not nutmeg that is at stake in the Caribbean; it is the United States National Security, unquote.

Given the historic record of U.S. military interventionism, it is our opinion that the pronouncement of the President of the United States that Grenada constitutes a threat to the national security of the United States of America is an indication of hostile designs. This is for us cause for grave concern.

Our interests lie in seeking economic advancement for the 110,000 people of our small country. We have consistently sought good relations with the United States; we have requested accreditation of Ambassadors to each other's countries, a proposal consistently ignored by the United States of America. Two letters written by Prime Minister Maurice Bishop to President Reagan in March and again in August of 1981, proposing discussion to effect mutual understanding were ignored. Our position is, and has always been, that we seek better relations with the United States Government, and remain willing to work towards the establishment of normal relations based on mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and national aspirations.

In our concern, we draw these matters to your attention for your information and close consideration and for whatever assistance you can provide to prevent this ominous threat of aggression against our country from materialising.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth of Nations the assurances of its highest consideration.