

● PART 2 ends:-

fro Tel 424 16.12.83

PART 3 begins:-

AJC to PM + att 3.1.84

UNCLASSIFIED

7626 - 1

OO BRIDGETOWN

OO PORT OF SPAIN

GRS 333

UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO 161748Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 424 OF 16 DECEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE PORT OF SPAIN, GRENADA

PROPOSED VISIT BY SELECT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (FAC) TO
GRENADA, TRINIDAD AND BARBADOS

1. SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION ON 21 DECEMBER, FAC HAS DECIDED TO
HOLD A SHORT ENQUIRY INTO 'THE CAUSES OF THE POLITICAL CRISIS
IN GRENADA, PROGRESS TOWARDS THE RESTORATION OF CIVILIAN
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT, AND THE AID NEEDS OF THE ISLAND'. THE
ENQUIRY WOULD BE A FOLLOW-UP TO THE FAC'S 1982 ENQUIRY INTO THE
CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICA.

2. THEY HAVE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT THEY SHOULD VISIT
BARBADOS, TRINIDAD AND GRENADA IN THE WEEK BEGINNING 16 JANUARY.
GRATEFUL FOR ADVICE BY NOON GMT TUESDAY 20 DECEMBER ON FOLLOWING
PROPOSED OUTLINE PROGRAMME AND SUGGESTIONS OF OTHER ORGANISATIONS
AND INDIVIDUALS WHO MIGHT BE CONTACTED:

15 JAN ETA TRINIDAD 1710 FLT BW 901
16 JAN DISCUSSIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF TRINIDAD GOVT,
HIGH COMMISSION AND HIGH COMMISSIONERS OF OTHER
APPROPRIATE COMMONWEALTH STATES
17 JAN CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS: DEPART FOR GRENADA FLT
LI 310 ETA 1600
18 JAN DISCUSSIONS WITH G-G, REPRESENTATIVES OF PROVISIONAL
GOVT, HIGH COMMISSION REPS, AND REPS OF AMERICAN AND
CARIBBEAN FORCES, AND AID AND RELIEF AGENCIES
19 JAN CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS: DEPART FOR BARBADOS FLT LI 310

1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

7626 - 1

ETA 1705
20 JAN DISCUSSIONS WITH REPS OF BARBADOS GOVT, HIGH COMMISSION
AND HIGH COMMISSIONERS OF OTHER APPROPRIATE
COMMONWEALTH STATES
21 JAN CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS: DEPART FOR LONDON FLT BA 256
ETA 1150 22 JAN.

3. PLEASE MAKE PROVISIONAL BOOKINGS FOR PARTY OF SEVEN IN
SUITABLE HOTELS (COMFORTABLE RATHER THAN LUXURIOUS: ALL ROOMS
WITH BATH) AND ADVISE ROOM COST (TO INCLUDE TAX, SERVICE AND
BREAKFAST), ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER.

4. WILL TELEGRAPH CONFIRMATION OF ARRANGEMENTS REQUIRED, NAMES
OF PARTY AND FULL GUIDANCE AFTER COMMITTEE MEET ON 21 DECEMBER.

HOWE

GRENADA LIMITED

PARTY UNIT

WIAD
NAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
PUSD
DEFENCE DEPT
NEWS DEPT
INFO DEPT
PROTOCOL DEPT
ECDS

PLANNING STAFF

CCD
CONS DEPT
SOV DEPT
MAED
WED
RESEARCH DEPT
LEGAL ADVISERS
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:
PS/MR RAISON ODA
MR ANNING LACPD/ODA
MOD (DI 4)
MOD (DS11)
MOD (ROW 5)

MR VEREKER)
MR BAWDEN) ODA

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 190
CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 122315Z DEC 83
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3730 OF 12 DECEMBER
INFO PRIORITY BRIDGETOWN AND GRENADA

GRENADA: U S TROOPS WITHDRAWAL

1. OVER THE WEEKEND THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCED THAT ALL U S COMBAT TROOPS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM GRENADA BY 15 DECEMBER BUT THAT A RESIDUAL ELEMENT WILL REMAIN TO QUOTE PROVIDE SUPPORT AND AUGMENT THE SECURITY ELEMENTS OF THE CARIBBEAN PEACEKEEPING FORCE. THE RESIDUAL ORGANISATION, TO BE CALLED THE U S MILITARY SUPPORT ELEMENT GRENADA, WILL CONSIST OF APPROXIMATELY 300 MILITARY POLICE, LOGISTICIANS, TECHNICIANS AND OTHER SUPPORT PERSONNEL UNQUOTE.

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TOLD US THAT THE RESIDUAL PERSONNEL WILL INCLUDE 150 MILITARY POLICE WHO, UNDER AN ORDINANCE PASSED BY THE GOVERNOR GENERAL, WILL HAVE AUTHORITY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DETENTION AND INTERROGATION OF THOSE QUOTE DISTURBING THE PEACE UNQUOTE. THEY WOULD CARRY ARMS IF THE ACTIVITIES IN WHICH THEY WERE ENGAGED REQUIRED THIS.

WRIGHT

GRENADA LIMITED

WIAD
NAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
PUSD
DEFENCE DEPT
NEWS DEPT
INFO DEPT
PROTOCOL DEPT
ECDs
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT
PLANNING STAFF

CCD
CONS DEPT
SOV DEPT
MAED
WED
RESEARCH DEPT
LEGAL ADVISERS
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:
PS/MR RAISON ODA
MR ANNING LACPD/ODA
MOD (DI 4)
MOD (DS11)
MOD (ROW 5)

MR VEREKER)
MR BAWDEN) ODA

CONFIDENTIAL

GRENADA : SITREP 8 DECEMBER

Resignation of Attorney-General

1 Rushford tendered his resignation as Attorney-General to Commonwealth Secretariat on 5 December. He claimed Governor-General had done little to bring about restoration of constitutional government.

Commonwealth Secretariat Visit

2 Mr David Anderson, a senior Commonwealth Secretariat official, and Mr Carl Dundas, a legal adviser in Commonwealth Secretariat, are on visit to Grenada to discuss:

- a) Assistance in plans for Commonwealth Caribbean peace-keeping force. They may recruit Mr Macoun, former Overseas Police Adviser, to give advice on security needs;
- b) replacement of Mr Rushford as Attorney-General. Grenadians had had in mind to appoint a West Indian, possibly a Trinidadian, to replace Rushford.
- c) Arrangements for elections and possible Commonwealth help in supervision;
- d) continuing and possible future role of McIntyre.

Advisory Council

3 The Advisory Council has held two meetings in the last week and has begun to get to grips with the problems. A new Police Commissioner has been appointed. Financial arrangements have been put in place. The Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, has been appointed new member of Advisory Council responsible for finance, trade and planning, on an interim basis to cover McIntyre's absence.

True Murkin:

You may like to write

9/12

IMF

4 An IMF visit is due to take place shortly to discuss IMF credit which has been suspended.

Airport

5 Advisory Council have decided to complete the project and to establish a team survey consisting of representatives from the US Government, the Government of Grenada and Plesseys to assess the damage suffered. Collyer, Managing Director of Plesseys, who has just returned from Grenada, feels it is not impossible that the US will contribute financially to completion of the airport. Plesseys, who are doing a study on completion of the airport, intend to draw up discrete packages which would enable a number of companies to participate.

US Troops

6 The withdrawal is proceeding as planned: the figure of US combat forces at the beginning of December was about 2,300. It is possible all combat forces will have left before the due date of 15 December.

UN

7 The Chairman of the Credentials Committee considered there would have to be another meeting before the end of the General Assembly. This was made inevitable when the Grenadians decided to terminate the appointment of Caldwell Taylor, former Ambassador, but to keep open the Grenadian mission to the UN with the Minister-Counsellor acting as Charge d'Affaires. A form of words has been

suggested informally by the UN Secretariat which should minimise the risk of the Grenadian formal communications to the UN Secretary-General re-opening the debate about the legitimacy of the Grenadian authorities.

EC Aid

8 The Ambassador to the EC has been re-appointed so that he can make and process a request for emergency aid. The question of EDF funds for the airport may also need to be revived soon.

WEST INDIAN AND ATLANTIC DEPARTMENT

8 December 1983

ED/WIAD
 ED/S AM D
 ED/MCAD
 ED/UND
 ED/FUSD
 ED/DEF DEPT
 ED/NEWS DEPT
 ED/INFO DEPT
 ED/PROTOCOL DEPT
 ED/ECD(E)
 ED/ECD(I)
 ED/CCD
 ED/CONSULAR DEPT
 ED/SOV DEPT
 ED/PLANNING STAFF
 ED/RESEARCH DEPT
~~ED/~~
 ED/WAD

FS (2)
 PS/LADY YOUNG
 PS/MR WHITNEY
 PS/FUS
 SIR J BULLARD
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR URE
~~MR CARTLEDGE~~
 MR HANNAY
 MR ADAMS
 MR FREELAND)
 MR BICKFORD) LEGAL ADVISERS
 MR EDWARDS)
 SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE
 CABINET OFFICE
 NO 10 DOWNING ST
 MOD, RC
 MOD (DI 4)
 RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

FM GRENADA 081935Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 92 OF 8 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN AND WASHINGTON

PRIORITY MOSCOW, HAVANA, EAST BERLIN AND UKHAS NEW YORK

M.I.P.T: GRENADA: OVERSEAS REPRESENTATION

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ADVISORY COUNCIL'S STATEMENT:
 BEGINS

STATEMENT BY THE INTERIM COUNCIL OF GRENADA TO GOVERNMENTS AND
 INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

AN INTERIM COUNCIL OF GRENADA HAS ASSUMED FULL RESPONSIBILITY
 FOR THE FORMULATION OF POLICY AND FOR THE GENERAL CONDUCT OF
 THE GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA. THE INTERIM COUNCIL OF GRENADA WISHES
 TO ADVISE MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTER-
 NATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS FIRSTLY THAT THE PRESENT
 MEMBERSHIP OF THIS COUNCIL AND PRINCIPAL AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY
 ASSIGNED ARE AS FOLLOWS:-

MR NICHOLAS A BRATHWAITE, ACTING CHAIRMAN WITH RESPONSIBILITY
 FOR EDUCATION, HEALTH AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT.

DR. ARNOLD CRUKSHANK, RESPONSIBLE FOR AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRIAL
 DEVELOPMENT.

DR. PATRICK EMMANUEL, RESPONSIBLE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TOURISM
 AND CIVIL AVIATION.

DR. ALLAN KIRTON, RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE.

DR. JAMES S D PITT, RESPONSIBLE FOR CONSTRUCTION AND HOUSING.

MRS JOAN M PURCELL, RESPONSIBLE FOR LABOUR AND WOMEN'S AFFAIRS.

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

~~MR JOHN PURCELL, RESPONSIBLE FOR LABOUR AND MONEY MATTERS~~

MR RAYMOND SMITH, RESPONSIBLE FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND PUBLIC UTILITIES.

MR L F WILSON JNR., RESPONSIBLE FOR FINANCE, PLANNING AND TRADE.

MR CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS.

MEMBERSHIP OF THE INTERIM COUNCIL WILL CONSIST OF NO MORE THAN TWELVE PERSONS.

THE INTERIM COUNCIL WISHES TO INFORM ALL STATES WHICH ARE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS THAT IT WILL CONDUCT THE BUSINESS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA IN AN INDEPENDENT MANNER FREE FROM ALL FORMS OF INTERFERENCE AND WILL MAKE SUITABLE AND EARLY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE HOLDING OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN GRENADA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

THE INTERIM COUNCIL DECLARES TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT GRENADA WILL CONTINUE TO CONDUCT ITS EXTERNAL RELATIONS IN KEEPING WITH THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES AS SET OUT IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
DECEMBER 7 1983

ENDS

KELLY

GRS 00300

NNNN

ADVANCE COPY

RECEIVED

FILE 54

8 December, 1983

Grenada: Resignation of the Attorney-General

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 7 December.

A. J. COLES

P. Ri Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

NR

Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

for information.

London SW1A 2AH

A-d C. 7/12

7 December 1983

Dear John,

Grenada: Resignation of the Attorney-General
Anthony Rushford

The Prime Minister may find useful a short note about Mr Rushford who, as you will have seen from telegrams, has resigned as Attorney-General of Grenada.

Mr Rushford, though a former (retired) FCO Legal Adviser, is not in any way answerable to HMG, nor were we involved in any way in his recruitment. He was recruited by the Commonwealth Secretariat as a Constitutional Adviser to the Governor-General. Subsequently, and against the misgivings we expressed to the Governor-General, Rushford was appointed Attorney-General and member of the Advisory Council.

Rushford seems to have taken upon himself the role as spokesman for the Advisory Council and had become increasingly indiscreet especially in his dealings with journalists. In announcing to the press his resignation, Rushford criticised the Governor-General for 'appointing himself the saviour of the people' and calling in outside assistance, then doing very little to bring about the restoration of constitutional government. His gratuitous public criticism is undoubtedly something of a setback - though not a lasting one - to the Interim Administration and cannot help it in its efforts to get a grip on the country. But the Governor-General had already begun to think about replacing him and has told our Deputy High Commissioner that he was "sorry but not worried" at Rushford's departure.

The Deputy High Commissioner has said that neither he nor Mr Kelly, the High Commission Representative on Grenada, who have both seen a lot of the Governor-General in recent weeks, has received the slightest indication that Rushford's view of the Governor-General as "revelling in his new-found authority" is justified. It is certainly true that there has been some delay in getting the Advisory Council under way in Grenada, largely because of the uncertainty surrounding Mr McIntyre's position. But the Council have now held two meetings in the last week under Mr Braithwaite as Acting Chairman, and have

/started

CONFIDENTIAL



started taking the decisions required of them; for example a new Police Commissioner has been appointed and financial arrangements set in place. The Governor-General has said that it is his intention to bring Grenada to elections within 6-12 months and although much could happen in the interim, we do not at present see any great risk that this timetable might not be met.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



18

JR

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 December 1983

GRENADA

Thank you for your letter of 6 December containing your preliminary comments on the significance of the documents on Grenada forwarded to the Prime Minister by the Jamaican Deputy Prime Minister. Mrs. Thatcher has noted the contents of your letter.

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CT



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 December 1983

Prime Minister.

Dear John,

MS

A.J.C. 6/12

Grenada

In your letter of 29 November you enclosed documents relating to Grenada which were forwarded with the Jamaican Deputy Prime Minister's letter to the Prime Minister. These documents are among those referred to by Mr Dam in his conversation with the Prime Minister on 7 November. After Mr Dam's visit, we received a bundle of documents * ~ * ~ * Some are still incomplete but we have started to analyse them. They may shed some light on how Communist regimes are established in small countries and possibly provide pointers as to how to avoid such an outcome in the future.

Our preliminary comments on their significance are as follows:

Minutes of New Jewel Movement (NJM) Central Committee Meetings

- (i) The initial impression is of parish pump politics larded with Communist jargon which is barely understood by the participants. Before seeing these documents however we knew of the existence but not the depth of the personal and ideological clash between on the one hand Bishop and his supporters who were regarded as soft left or, in the jargon, 'right opportunists' and petty bourgeois and, on the other, the small hardline group of power-hungry ideologues led by Coard. The inexorable build-up of pressure on Bishop to relinquish hold on real power or to see it wrested from him is striking.
- (ii) The claims of Bishop and Coard to be operating an advanced democracy were clearly a sham. All the decisions were made by a small caucus of people. No democratic control was evident or intended for the future.
- (iii) The papers illustrate the vulnerability of small states to a determined and unscrupulous group, especially when the previous regime has been discredited through its corruption.

/(iv)

* ~ * Passage deleted and closed, 40 years, under FOI Exemption.

S E C R E T

OffWayland, 4 June 2013



- (iv) The influence of Cuba and USSR does not appear to have been very direct in the Party deliberations. The Cubans apparently were not conscious of what was going on. At one point, Bishop expressed reluctance to tell them. There are some critical references to Cuba.

The Agreements

- (i) Neither we nor the US knew about the existence of these Agreements with the Grenada Government. But there had been reports that unidentified arms had arrived at various times from Cuba. These reports which were unconfirmed were not enough for an assessment of the types and quantities to be formed.
- (ii) It is premature to make a judgement as to whether onward delivery from Cuba was a deliberate ploy to deceive international opinion about Soviet involvement or whether it was simply for convenience. But the latter seems more likely, especially when taken together with the fact that Soviet policy has been to let Cuba take the lead in that area.
- (iii) The arms found by the US on the island fit in roughly with those specified in the Agreements. It is not possible to say, at least at this stage, whether they were intended only for the Grenadians, the Ministry of the Interior as well as the Army, or for export elsewhere. The latter seems unlikely. The amounts to be provided (not specified in the papers sent to the Prime Minister) could, when all delivered, arm 6-10,000 men out of a population of about 100,000. (The wide range is due largely to the difficulty of deducing from the quantity of arms the amount of equipment intended to be kept as a reserve to cover the needs of servicing and spares.) They are comparable in type and quantity to those provided for in the Soviet/Mozambique Military Agreement of 1979.
- (iv) The agreements with the USSR provide for an unspecified number of Grenadian military to be trained in the USSR. We do not know how many went to the USSR under these provisions. Our Embassy in Moscow believes there are at present 100 Grenadians there, mainly students.

/(v)



- (v) The agreement with Cuba provides not for the supply of arms but for the attachment of 27 'military specialists' to the Grenadian armed forces. This accords roughly with US estimates of the number of the Cuban military group on Grenada at the time of the intervention. Although there is provision in the 1982 agreement with the Soviet Union for Soviet specialists to be sent to Grenada to set up training and military repair facilities, the Russians have denied they had any Soviet military personnel on Grenada and we and the US have no evidence that they maintained such personnel there.

We understand that the JIC intend to undertake a retrospective look at the Bishop regime which will also draw out the implications of these documents.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

KEY

CC	-	Central Committee
PB	-	Political Bureau (Polit Buro)
JL	-	Joint Leadership
MB	-	Maurice Bishop
Cde. B	-	Bernard Coard
Cde.	-	Comrade
HA	-	Hudson Austin
GL	-	George Louison
SD	-	Socialist Democrat
ML	-	Marxist / Leninist
NJM	-	New Jewel Movement
NYO	-	National Youth Organization
NWO	-	National Women's Organization
Pb	-	Petty Bourgeois
Rt. Opp.	-	Right (wing) Opportunist
GM	-	General Meeting
CM	-	Council Member
PRAF	-	People's Revolutionary Armed Forces
RMC	-	Revolutionary Military Council
Union of SSR	-	Soviet Union
SOC	-	Socialism
Com / Comm	-	Communism
Revo	-	Revolution
O.C.	-	Organizing Committee
RFG	-	Radio Free Grenada

SUMMARY - MINUTES - EXTRAORDINARY CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING AUGUST 26, 1983,

SEPTEMBER 14 - 17

" WHY THE MEETING

This meeting was as a result of feedback of dissatisfaction from Party Members in relation to the conclusion of the July Plenary among other things. The Membership criticised the conclusions as being politically directionless and opportunist in content."

..."At the August meeting the C.C. took the decision to recall all C.C. Members to the Country and commence a special Plenary Session on September 13 - 15. In fact the meeting commenced on September 14th and concluded on September 17th."

" WORST AND MOST DANGEROUS CRISIS

At present the Revolution is facing its worst crisis ever, and most serious in 4½ years. The mood of the masses is characterised at worst by open dissatisfaction and cynicism, and at best by serious demoralisation. Overall the mood is 1-2 on a scale of 5.

The mass organizations are in their worst state ever. The Women's Committee which leads the NWO has seriously declined and is faced with possible disintegration in 2 - 3 months since. Some of the best Party women had to be removed from that area of work, the best women outside the Party are refusing to join the Party and a numbers of sisters are contemplating resigning. "

...."The NYO is in a state of virtual collapse ."

...."Amongst the working class, persistent ideological backwardness and economism exist. At the same time we witness stepped up ideological infiltration amongst the working class by Church."

" The militia is now almost a thing of the past.....Today also we are witnessing widespread and over expanding activities by the Church. "

"POSSIBLE DISINTEGRATION OF THE PARTY

Together with all of this Comrades, we face the possibility of the disintegration of our Party which will surely come about within 3 - 6 months if we don't take steps to remedy the situation."

..." Today it is the lowest level ever in the history of the Party. All of this has only made it more difficult for the C.C. to lead the Party and already signs of Party disintegration have appeared. It is the C.C's objective appreciation of all this that led it to conclude that disintegration will be a total reality in 3-6 months unless things are corrected."

"THE REVOLUTION FACES THE DANGER OF BEING OVERTHROWN

What we face is not just simply the disintegration of the Party, but the total loss of State power because IN A SITUATION OF WIDESPREAD DISSATISFACTION, DEMORALISATION AMONGST OUR BEST SUPPORTERS AND NO PARTY IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO HOLD ON TO STATE POWER FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME. IT IS THE VIEW OF THE C.C. THAT IF STEPS ARE NOT TAKEN NOW, NOT ONLY WILL THERE BE NO PARTY IN SIX MONTHS, BUT THE REVOLUTION WILL BE OVERTHROWN WITHIN A YEAR."

"THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM: CENTRAL COMMITTEE

The Central Committee concluded that the main problem, the main reason for this most dangerous crisis that we face lies within the Central Committee."

... "The C.C. considered these views and arrived at the conclusion that the problem of the O.C. and D.C. are only symptoms of the real problem and that the real underlying problem lies within the C.C."

"RIGHT OPPORTUNIST PATH OF THE C.C."

The C.C. further concluded that the conclusion from the July Plenary to the membership that the work of the C.C. and P.B. had improved marginally is a lie and a manifestation of the Right Opportunist path that the C.C. has been on for more than a year now, hiding from the membership the truth and absolving itself of criticism from the membership, while pretending all is well."

"WHY COMRADE COARD RESIGNED"

Comrade Coard emphasized as to the reasons for his resignation from the C.C. and P.B. the slack and weak functioning of C.C. and P.B., the vacillation and lack of collective leadership manifested in the fact that P.B. and C.C. Members will come to meetings, hands and minds swinging."

"OCTOBER 1982 PLENARY"

.... The C.C. Plenary at the time stated "The Party stood at the crossroads two routes are open to the Party. The first route is the petty bourgeois route which would seek to make Cde. Bernard's resignation the issue."

.... "The second route is the communist route. The route of the Leninist standards and functioning. The route of criticism and collective leadership. The Central Committee reaffirmed the position taken by the general meeting of September 12th and 13th. The Party must be put on a Leninist footing."

"PROBLEMS IN THE C.C. "

.... The C.C. concluded the following: The Central Committee is the source of the crisis in the Party and Revolution. All members of the C.C. must be criticised for weaknesses and failure, in the form of low levels of discipline, organisation and ideological development and in particular for the failure to put the Party on Leninist Path."

"MAIN PROBLEMS"

The C.C. further concluded that the main problem in the C.C. for some time now has been the quality of the leadership of the Party and Central Committee provided by Comrade Maurice Bishop.

The C.C. is of the view that the Comrade has tremendous strengths, his ability to inspire and instill confidence in the people, his ability to unite the masses and hold so high the banner and prestige of the Revolution regionally and internationally."

... "For what the four and a half years, in particular has proved is that Cde. Maurice lacks the precise qualities and strengths that are particularly required to carry the process forward in these most difficult times today and to transform the Party into a Leninist one, namely:

- 1) A Leninist level of organisation and discipline.
- 2) Great depth in ideological clarity.
- 3) Brilliance in strategy and tactics.
- 4) The capacity to exercise Leninist supervision, control and guidance of all areas of work of the Party.

"KEY TASK; WAY FORWARD"

The C.C. went on to conclude that the Key Task facing the Party today is to marry the strengths of Cdes. Maurice and Bernard in the model of Joint Leadership of the Party."

"EXTRAORDINARY MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE NJM14 - 16 SEPTEMBER, 1983COMRADES PRESENT

Maurice Bishop
 Selwyn Strachan
 George Louison
 Unison Whiteman
 Liam James
 Chalkie Ventour
 Ewart Layne

Phyllis Coard
 Leon Cornwall
 Kamau Mc Barnette
 Tan Bartholomew
 Fitzroy Bain
 Chris Deriggs

COMRADES ABSENT

Hudson Austin	-	(Out of Country)
Ian St. Bernard	-	(Sick)

"ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THE PARTY AND REVOLUTION "

....." The situation is that the Revolution now faces the greatest danger since 1979. There is great dispiritiveness and dissatisfaction among the people."

....." Militarily, to organise the defence of the Revolution in the face of a qualitatively stepped up aggression from imperialism."....."The small Caribbean Islands are being drawn into an alliance against Grenada and all the left organisations in the region."

....." There is a serious drift away from the Party by the key supporters of the Revolution, the vocal Cdes are now passive, they are not prepared to fight the reactionary lines on the ground. Community work is not going as expected, he graded it as poor to fair. The militia is non-existent."

....." The Party has not yet developed a policy for dealing with the Church."

....." The Revolution is suffering from a serious fall of its active supporters. The Party must seek to consolidate. The Church has capitalise on our weaknesses using the tactics and strategies of the Party."

....." All programmes of the Revolution are in a very weak condition, while propaganda work is still very bad."

....." The militia is non-existent, the army is demoralise the Cdes have genuine complaints, growth in militarisation and deep economic problems."

....." The question of the ideological development of the C.C. is an issue that we need to make a decision on. If this is allowed to continue the Party will disintegrate in a matter of 5 - 6 months..."

....." the Party will collapse and the Revolution cannot continue without the Party. The Revolution can be turned back within one year."

....." The C.C. has not been able to rise to the challenge of the increasing complexity this has led it to take a number of unrealistic decisions."

.... "There is a serious crisis in the Party. There are signs of the beginning of disintegration, in the Party, drop in confidence and prestige of the C.C. If the situation is not rescued there will be no hope for the future of the Party and its ability to hold state power."

....." The C.C. will have to take an honest cold blooded and scientific approach to save the Party and Revolution."

....." It is clear that a rebellion has started, it can burst out if it is not solved in a serious way. This is because the C.C. have not lived up to expectations."

....." If we agree that the role of the Party is to build the Revolution and if we believe that an ML Party can build what we want then we have to put the Party on a ML footing."

"BROAD CONCLUSIONS PROPOSED BY CDE. MAURICE BISHOP

There is a state of deep crisis in the Party and Revolution.

The main reason for these weaknesses is the functioning of the C.C.

The crisis has also become a major contributing factor to the crisis in the Country and Revolution and the low mood of the masses."

"COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL ANALYSIS OF THE C.C."

....." The way forward is to take an honest, cold blooded, objective and scientific approach to the situation."

....." the most fundamental problem is the quality of leadership of the Central Committee and the Party provided by Cde, Maurice Bishop." "The qualities he lacks is what is needed to push the Revolution forward at this time:

- (1) A Leninist level of organisation and discipline.
- (2) Great depth in ideological clarity.
- (3) Brilliance in strategy and tactics."

....." The salvation of the Revolution calls for us to take a mature proletarian decision to save and carry the Revolution forward."

....." If we fail to transform the Party we will lose state power, lives will be lost, history has placed a great responsibility on our shoulders which we must seek to deal with in the correct and scientific way."

....." On the question of crisis and problems it is correct as the maximum leader to take the full responsibilities. He needs time to think of his own role and to give a more precise response to the problem addressed which he thinks is a correct approach."

"THE ROLE OF THE C.C. "

....." the struggle for socialism is won, lost or divided in the army. The Party must now be organise in the work places. Cdes with state post must be prepared to carry out the lines of the Party in the work places. We have experience in mobilising the masses but we do not know how to build the Party. We have to lay the basis for taking a strategic approach for the building of a M.L. Party learning from the experience of other Parties."

....." made the following proposals:-

1. The C.C. must become fully accountable to the members.....
2. All C.C. Cdes must be based in the Country at this time.
3. The C.C. and Party must study Brutens.
4. Recall the conclusions of the July Plenary.
5. Proposed a modle of joint leadership marrying the strengths of Cdes. Bishop and Coard....."

....." On the armed forces he said that no one can deny that Cuba is the most important Country to the Grenadian process...."

Comrade Maurice Bishop states -

....." He has never had any problem with sharing power, or even a bad attitude to criticisms."....."His position is that he or anybody has the right to be leader for life, he favours cooperation over competition...."

The following positions were voted on:

Formalisation of Joint Leadership:

For	-	9
Opposed	-	1
Abstain	-	3

Cde. Austin abstained because he was not present for the full discussion for the greater part of the meeting.

How to Inform the Membership:

Tell Members only through Minutes

For	-	10
Against	-	1
Abstain	-	2 "

....." that we use a break to ask Cde. Coard to come to the meeting for decision to be put to him."

....." Cde. Maurice opposed it because of the fact that he has to make a personal reflection on the issue. He proposed that the C.C. meet with Cde. Coard in his absence. He felt that modle (sic model) would be counter productive. He suggested that the C.C. meet Cde. Bernard tomorrow while he will be leaving for St. Kitts. He think that this will be in the interest of the C.C."

....." Cde. Bishop said it is difficult for him to understand the question of joint leadership and his own role and function in this modle (sic model)."

"SATURDAY 17TH SEPTEMBER, 1983

Cdes Present

Selwyn Strachan
Hudson Austin
Liam James
Ewart Layne
Chalkie Ventour

Phyllis Coard
Kamau Mc Barnette
Chris De Riggs
Leon Cornwall

Cdes Absent

Maurice Bishop	-	Out of Country
George Lousion	-	Out of Country
Unison Whiteman	-	Out of Country
Tan Bartholomew	-	Sick
Fitzroy Bain	-	Sick
Ian St. Bernard	-	Sick

....." that the C.C. have been meeting to look at the state of the Party and Revolution and to look at the way the process have been developing over the past four years. It is quite clear that there are great concerns from the G.M. of the Party."

....." The Revolution is in deep crisis, it faces the dangers of being turned back, while the C.C. is not operating in a (blank) Leninist way."....."The reason is the weak leadership exercise by Cde. Maurice Bishop. In trying to find concrete ways of reviving the situation and to put the Party of a firm M.L. base,.."
....."these qualities exists in Cde. Bernard Coard the C.C. felt that Cde. Coard was the only Cde. who had demonstrated practice these qualities over the years."

"As a result a proposal for merging these two strengths through joint leadership between Cdes Bishop and Coard was put forward...." "This proposal was voted with a majority in favour."

"Four options for leadership were identified in the earlier proceedings:-

- (1) Remove Cde. Bishop
- (2) Joint Leadership
- (3) Have a deputy to play the role that is required.
- (4) Remove Cdes. from the C.C. "

"Cde. Coard said (sic said) that his feelings of the present situation are that within six months the Party will disintegrate totally unless a fundamental package of measures are done. He had thought it would take 12 months (blank) given the (blank) of disgust, the (blank) disintegration of the Party masses that the loss of state power (sic power) is only a few months away. While all of this is happening imperialism has stepped up its range of attacks laying the basis for direct intervention in Central America. They have set up their troops and using the Korean incident as a basis. American troops are meters away from Nicaragua.

This is happening at a time when the militia is dis-integrated the Army is demoralised, we don't have the capacity of defending the Revolution.

The Party has never had such weak links and low (blank) with the masses. The image of the Party has deteriorated in the eyes of the masses."

....."Unless the C.C. is prepared to meet all petit bourgeois response he will re-draw."

....." The issue is to start collective leadership of the C.C. The lack of frank bluntness has seriously affected the Party."

"SIXTH SITTING OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENARY DATED TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20TH, 1983"PRESENT

Cdes:- Bernard Coard
 Selwyn Strachan
 Hudson Austin
 Liam James
 John Ventour
 Ewart Layne
 Phyllis Coard
 Kamau McBarnette
 Fitzroy Bain
 Tan Bartholomew
 Leon Cornwall
 Unison Whiteman

ABSCENT (SIC ABSENT)

Cdes.:- Maurice Bishop
 George Louison
 Chris Deriggs
 Ian St. Bernard

..."Stated....support for the proposals fo Cde. Bernard and other comrades."

..."that criticism and self criticism had broken down in the Party - thus the C.C. needs to take sanctions against comrades who show hostility to criticism."

..."that cadres and C.C. members must be sent to the overseas training courses since it is our experience that most junior comrades don't benefit much from them."

..."Austin stated his agreement with Cde. Bernard's proposals and further stated that that was the richest C.C. session in the Party's history and we are seeing a new awakening on serious questions and wide areas."

..."The Party School is urgently needed because study circles are not enough. We should not delay. We can start using one of ths buildings the Party has under control and asks fraternal socialist countries for assistance in tutors."

...".....stated that the party must have a system for supervision and control.... the example of the WJC of Cuba where in their secretariat there is a room with maps, charts and telephones so that constant supervision over all the work can take place."

"SEVENTH SITTING OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENARY DATED WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21ST, 1983"PRESENT

Cdes: - Bernard Coard
 Selwyn Strachan
 Hudson Austin
 Leon James
 Ewart Layne
 John Ventour
 Unison Whiteman
 Phyllis Coard
 Kamau McBarnette
 Fitzroy Bain
 Tan Bartholomew
 Leon Cornwall

ABSENT

(Three names illegible)

..."....there is a need for a committee,...that can do research for the PB and C.C..... and put its conclusions forward to the P.B. or C.C. for decision of a policy nature."

..."For the party school we should select 5 comrades to be sent in USSR to train as professors for a period of 3 to 5 years."

..." We need to rapidly and urgently raise the ideological level of the C.C."

..." That the C.C. must constitute itself as quickly as possible as a planning commission and draw on other members of the party where required so we can draw up a realistic 15 month plan for the party work."

EIGHT SITTING OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENARY DATED THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22ND, 1983"

PRESENT

Cdes.:- Bernard Coard
Selwyn Strachan
Unison Whiteman
Leon James
Ewart Layne
Phyllis Coard
Kamau McBarnette
Tan Bartholomew
Fitzroy Bain
Ian St. Bernard
Leon Cornwall

ABSCENT (SIC ABSENT)

Cdes.:- Maurice Bishop
George Louison
Chris Deriggs
Hudson Austin
John Ventour - Sick

..."...principles we used in the past for forging links with the masses. They are:

- Identifying key supporters
- The Party used unorthodox methods of organisation
- The Party developed a network of Party support groups. The fall off of these are now creating a vacuum.
- This method helped the Party to have organised links with the masses. "

"REPORT ON THE MEETING OF P.B. AND C.C. HELD ON OCTOBER 12TH"

"The PB/CC were very concerned about the situation in the Party. He referred to the C.C. decision on JL and the basis for this. However, following this Cde. M.B. felt that he could not give a position on the C.C. decision and he wanted time to reflect."

..." a blood shed could have taken place last night it was the rumour that caused it. They said that the Country can have only one P.M. because B (Bernard Coard) is a communist".

(1) ..."GL right wing opp. F. Bain has shown emotionalism..."

..."On M.B. he would have to be expelled from the Party. It won't be easy to explain to the masses. We have allowed cultism in the Party. The harsh reality of the rumours is shocking. "

..." We have to be cold blooded and cast all emotions aside, we have to be determined. M.B. is mainly responsible for the crisis in the Party. We have to see things as they are and not as we want them. This is not irreversible. It would take the Party about 5-10 yrs to come out of the crisis. This is not to scare Cdes."

..."There seems to be a mood in the Party for blood, Afghanistan. Lines being carried against him that he is ⁽²⁾SD, cultism, allegations that some C.C. members were involved."

..." H.A. (Hudson Austin)

He confessed to the GM that this present situation make him feel uncomfortable....
⁽³⁾the AF would never be used against ⁽⁴⁾the REVO or Party (appl).....when the Party makes decisions they must be carried out (appl)."

..."He told M.B. about rumours of bloodshed. PEBONG told him last week that there was an Afghanistan line M.B. said he picked it up too..... he checked HA on the matter. He asked him about the sit (sic situation) in AF."

..."The security forces has adopted a number of measures to secure the lives of C.C. and pty cdes.

Confine MB indefinitely (long applause)

Phones of MB cut off (applause)

Disarmed for his own safety by PS cdes to guarantee him safety (app)

The people spreading the rumours being called in for strict warning (others for indefinite detention) (applause)

The situation demands bolshevik staunchness (applause, chants.) The leadership of AF shares this view..... we must be ⁽⁵⁾comm in practice cause only comm can rescue the sit (sic situation) (applause)

COMM. WITHOUT BELLY BETTER HOP THE NEXT PLANE."

..." In the coming days we would not be talking of whether you are a Party member or not we will be talking about whether you are a communist or not (applause)".

- (1) George Louison right wing opportunist
- (2) Social Democrat
- (3) Armed Forces
- (4) Revolution
- (5) Communists

19th October, 1983

"REVOLUTIONARY SOLDIERS AND MEN OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES"

" Today our People's Revolutionary Army has gain victory over the right opportunist and reactionary forces which attacked the Headquarters of our Ministry of Defence."

.....".....the leadership of the counter-revolutionary elements, headed by Maurice Bishop, Unison Whiteman and Vincent Noel, knowing that we did not want to harm the people disarmed the Officers and Chiefs and soldiers and began arming people who represented their own minority class interest."

....."...because of the prompt action of the reserve force, guided by the Central Committee of the N.J.M. - these betrayers of the masses were crushed. The timely move of our Motorised Units dealt a devastating blow to these criminals,, those opportunist elements who did not want to see socialism built in our country...."

...." Comrades, today Wednesday 19th October, history was made again. All patriots and revolutionaries will never forget this day when counter-revolution, the friends of imperialism were crushed. This victory today will ensure that our glorious Party the N.J.M. will live on and grow from strength to strength leading and guiding the Armed Forces and the Revolution.

This victory is one for progress and for socialism."

...." Let our comrades death be an inspiration to us, let it be a sign of staunchness of our revolutionary Armed Forces and let us use it to strengthen our resolve to defend the Revolution and to build socialism.

Let this moment be proof to counter-revolution of our firmness, discipline and staunchness to the Party, the N.J.M., the working class, working people and to socialism. Let this be testimony of our unity behind our Party and Revolution.

We have won a victory comrades, but let us stand and be united to ensure that we achieve other victories.

LONG LIVE OUR PARTU, (Sic PARTY) The N.J.M. ! !
 LONG LIVE THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES ! !
 LONG LIVE THE GRENADA REVOLUTION ! !
 FORWARD EVER ! ! BACKWARD NEVER ! ! !

SOCIALISM OR DEATH ! ! !

" BULLETIN FROM THE MAIN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 20/10/83 "

THEIR HEROISM IS AN EXAMPLE FOR US

" Comrade soldiers, yesterday 19th October, the masses of people led by Unison Whiteman broke into the home of Maurice Bishop in defiance of warning shots fired in the air by the soldiers of the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces. They then took Maurice Bishop into the streets of St. George's. They wanted to hear Maurice Bishop speak."

".....Einstein Louison started distributing the weapons, Vincent Noel asked who were the trained militia in the crowd order them to step forward because there were some men that had 'to be (illegible) ssed out'."

"Comrades, the masses had no intention to cause bloodshed (illegible)
their confusion they were led by Maurice Bishop and his petty bourgeois and bourgeois friends as cannon fodder to cause bloodshed. Comrades it is very important to recognize the heroism of our People's Revolutionary Armed Forces."

" Comrades, the deaths of OC Conrad Mayers, WO2 Rapheal Mason, Sgt. Dorset Peters and L/Cpl. Martin Simon have not gone in vain but have further manured the struggle of our Grenadian people. Long live the Memory of our fallen comrades.

Long live the Grenada Revolution.

Forward ever, Backward Never.

Death to Imperialism. "

"Emergency Economic Programme""Economic Report No.1"

" A) First and foremost we need an Emergency Economic Commission with the following properties:-

- A political leader/Minister responsible
- A second leader who had day-to-day responsibility
- Other technical personnel
- An office with support staff..... this staff would have to be selected for their reliability
- Telephone lines should be made available for enterprises - public or private - to report any economic difficulty
- A trouble shooter
- Daily reports..... to coordinators for all areas
- Different persons in the State Sector would be given responsibility to report to the Commission members, but would be given only limited information
- This Commission would be low profile. "

(2)

It is recommended that there be two levels of responsibility - a broad Commission and a narrower Council which would be more manageable. The recommended members of the Council and of the Commission as well as their areas of responsibility are identified below:-

COUNCIL	AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY	COMMISSION MEMBER RESPONSIBLE
V. Naz Burke (Chairperson)	(Acts for DW until his return)	
C. Hinton (Deputy)	Investment & Capital projects	C.K.
	Production	C.K.
	Audit of Key Enterprise needs	C.K.
	Energy	Foulen/Stanislaw
A. Smith	Finance	A.S.
B. LaCorbiniers	International & Regional Orgs.	Merle Collins
	Budget	B. LeC.
D. Wilk's	International transport (air/sea)	Sawney
	Exports	D.W.
	Supplies	D.W./Antoine/Draton
	TRADE	L. Nelson
L. Fraser	Transport & Distribution	Fraser/Leard LYNE
Lana McPhail	Administration of Commission	L. McP.
R. Roopamine	Money & Banking	R.P.
M. Figueroa	Coordination of Statistics	Al Dragon
	Communications	Jimmy Lashley
	Foreign Exchange	M.P.
	Employment and LAB OFFICE	Chester Humphrey "

"ENERGY""Task to be completed in three (3) days

- verify existing requirements for fuel
- monitor daily consumption
- examine carefully existing agreements
- examine the Algerian swop arrangement
- ascertain existing storage capacity - including completed Airport tanks
- obtain specification range for tankers which can enter St. Georges
- Audit all personnel involved in the process of fuel import, transport, retail, storage. Identify all personnel with skills in this field."

.....

"Tasks to be completed in seven (7) days

- Identify who has these types of tankers within reach - including charter shipping firms available as well as alternative ship to shire arrangements with larger tankers - (SEE #17)
- Identify countries willing to supply fuel or act as a transshipment point.
- Identify refineries in terms of proximity to Grenada, who can supply fuel
- Work out load shedding contingency - including which enterprises to close first.
- Work out gas rationing contingency."

.....

"Task to be completed in ten (10) days

- investigate fully the possibility of using small ships, trawlers, schooners etc. to bring fuel legally or illegally from near by islands or Venezuela.
- ascertain stock of batteries in country."

.....

"RATIONING""Tasks to be completed in three (3) days

- Determine the number of registered vehicles by class - personal, private (commercial) or State.
- determine average consumption
- Study any available material on rationing experience
- Identify any personnel who have experience with rationing (including Cubans) and identify who will be responsible. "

.....

"Tasks to be completed in ten (10) days

- set up for printing of rationing cards - establish time required to print.
- Work out main lines of propoganda and public education programme
- Examine legal basis and promulgate any laws (sic laws) or regulations necessary.

"Essential serves (sic services) to receive electricity (standby) if necessary to shut down.....precise power and fuel required with range of specifications to be identified.

- Military installations
- Cold storage
- Essential communications
- R.F.G.
- vital security areas such as food storage....if lighting ia essential for security
- only vital local production areas
- hospital
- St. Georges University - some areas if necessary."

.....

"SHUT DOWN AND CONSERVATION"

"Tasks to be completed in ten (10) days

- Establish clear guidelines for public education and propoganda programme
- programme of bringing various areas of private property under Martial Law. "

.....

"COMMUNICATIONS"

"Tasks to be completed in three (3) days

- Assess our independent ability to communicate internationally ; to what extent do we depend on Trinidad, Barbados Cable & Wireless or any other country or enterprise which may be unfriendly."

.....

"Tasks to be completed in seven (7) days

- Investigate whether we are protected in this regard by any international conventions - if so make contact with these organisations and call on them to ensure that treaties are observed.
- Assess existing han radio capacity and the attitude of the operators
- Assess requirements to keep mail system going and determine level of dependence on Barbados - and how we can be protected from any sabotage by them."

.....

"INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS & CONTACTS"

"Tasks to be completed in three (3) days

- Where we understand that these organisations may be moving to take sanctions against Grenada especially where these are illegal, as a priority we must get in touch with these organisations and insist on our right to be informed of any meeting and to be heard, in keeping with whatever treaty or charter which governs the organisation.

"INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS & CONTACTS"

"Tasks to be completed in three (3) days

- Contact countries on whom we can hope to depend in the coming period. As soon as is possible we must contact them. At whatever stage our emergency programme has reached we must inform them of our needs and seek assistance.
- Contact and bring home most reliable students. "

.....

"ECCB, LIAT, OECS, CARICOM"

"Tasks to be completed in three (3) days

- Apply for money on Monday in the normal way
- If there is any hitch, we should send a submission based on the articles of agreement. (SEE ATTACHED NOTES ON ARTICLES)
- The Governor should be called upon to carry through his scheduled visit. He should be spoken to on Sunday 2nd.
- Make direct communication with LIAT Management and hold discussions with local management.
- Make direct contact with OECS & CARICOM Secretariat."

"INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT"

"Tasks to be completed in three (3) days

- All aeroplanes which can be used by the State should be identified - including doing what is necessary to put Russian plane in full operation."

2265/3961

22/10 83

NOTICE FROM THE E.M.C.

All persons who have State own vehicles in their possession, in particular Trucks and Jeeps are informed that they must deliver these vehicles by 1200 hrs today October 22nd, 1983. These vehicles must be delivered to the following Stations:

1. Vehicles in St. George's and St. David's - Tantean Pasture.
2. Vehicles in Grenville to the Grenville Police Station.
3. Vehicles in Santeurs, St. John's and St. Mark's to the Santeurs Police Station.

The safety of the Drivers carrying these vehicles to the delivery points will be guaranteed, and transport will be provided to drop back the comrades to their homes.

Any one who resist in any way on another this directive of the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) will be death with in the strictest manner.

REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL
(R.M.C.)

Palmer
Major

" A G R E E M E N T "

between the Government of Grenada and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on deliveries from the Union of SSR to Grenada of special and other equipment "

"proceeding from the desire to promote strengthening the independence of Grenada

and in connection with the request of the Government of Grenada

have agreed upon the following:

"The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall ensure in 1980-1981 free of charge the delivery to the Government of Grenada of special and other equipment in nomenclature and quantity according to the Annex to the present Agreement to the amount of 4.400.000 Roubles."

"The delivery.....shall be effected by the Soviet Party by sea, at the port of the Republic of Cuba."

"The Government of the Union of SSR....shall ensure rendering technical assistance in mastering of the equipment delivered...by receiving Grenadian servicemen for training in the USSR."

"The Grenadian servicemen shall be deputed for training in the USSR without their families."

"The expenses connected with the Grenadian servicemen's training.....shall be borne by the Soviet Party."

"The Government of Grenada and the Government of the Union of SSR shall take all necessary measures to ensure keeping in secret the terms and conditions of the deliveries, all the correspondence and information connected with the implementation of the present Agreement."

"The present Agreement comes into force on the date it is signed on.

The Annex is an integral part of the present Agreement."

"Done in Havana on October "27", 1980 in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally valid."

" FOR AND ON BEHALF
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA"

FOR AND ON BEHALF
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS"

(Signature) HUDSON AUSTIN"

(Signature: indecipherable)"

"Top Secret"

"P R O T O C O L"

" to the Agreement between the Government of Grenada and the Government of the USSR of October 27, 1980 on deliveries from the USSR to Grenada of special and other equipment"

"The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall ensure free of charge the delivery in 1981-1983 to the Government of Grenada of special and other equipment in nomenclature and quantity according to the Annex to the present Agreement to the amount of 5.000.000 Roubles."

"In all other respects the Parties will be guided by the provisions of the Agreement between the Government of Grenada and the Government of the USSR of October 27, 1980 on deliveries from the USSR to Grenada of special and other equipment."

"The present Protocol comes into force on the date of its signing.

The Annex is an integral part of the present Protocol.

Done in Havana on February "9", 1981 in two originals, each in English and Russian languages, both texts being equally valid."

"FOR AND ON BEHALF
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA"

"FOR AND ON BEHALF
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS"

(Signature) Basil H. Gahagan

(Signature: indecipherable)

A G R E E M E N T

between the Government of Grenada and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on deliveries from the Union of SSR to Grenada of special and other equipment"

- "have agreed upon the following:

"The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall ensure in 1982-1985 free of charge the delivery to the Government of Grenada of special and civil equipment in nomenclature and quantity according to Annexes 1 and 2 to the present Agreement to the amount of 10.000.000 Roubles."

"The delivery of the equipment listed in Annexes 1 and 2 to the present Agreement shall be effected at the port of the Republic of Cuba.

The order of the further delivery of the above equipment from the Republic of Cuba shall be agreed upon between the Grenadian and Cuban Parties. "

"The Government of the Union of SSR at the request of the Government of Grenada shall ensure rendering technical assistance in mastering of the equipment under delivery by receiving in the USSR Grenadian servicemen for training in the operation, use and maintenance of the special equipment as well as by sending Soviet specialists to Grenada for these purposes."

"The Government of Grenada shall provide at its own expense the Soviet specialists and interpreters with comfortable furnished living accommodation with all the municipal utilities, medical service and transport facilities for the execution of their duties and shall ensure their having meals at reasonable prices at the places of their residence."

"The Soviet Party in periods to be agreed upon between the Parties shall depute a group of Soviet specialists to Grenada to determine expediency, opportunity and scope....."

"The Government of Grenada shall not without the consent of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics sell or transfer, formally or actually, the special equipment....."

"The Government of the Union of SSR and the Government of Grenada shall take all the necessary measures to ensure keeping in secret the terms and conditions of the deliveries, all the correspondence and information connected with the implementation of the present Agreement."

"FOR AND ON BEHALF
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA"

"FOR AND ON BEHALF
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS"

(Signature) LIAM JAMES "

(Signature: indecipherable)"

" A G R E E M E N T

between the Government of Grenada and the
Government of the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea. "

- "... the free offer of military assistance to the People's Revolutionary
Government of Grenada by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea."

- "For the purposes of further cementing and developing the friendship and
solidarity between the peoples and armies of the two countries established
in the common struggle to oppose against imperialism, consolidate the
national sovereignty and safeguard independence, and strengthening the
national defence power of Grenada, the People's Revolutionary Government of
Grenada and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
have agreed as follows:"

- "The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall give, in
1983-1984, The free military assistance subject to weapons and ammunitions
covering US \$ 12,000,000. indicated in Annex to this Agreement."

- "Both sides shall strictly keep the secrecy of the military assistance
to be executed according to this Agreement and have an obligation not
to hand over any matters of this Agreement to the third country."

- "This Agreement shall come into force on the day of its signing."

- "This Agreement has been prepared in duplicate in the Korean and English
languages and signed in Pyongyang on April 14, 1983, two original equally
authentic."

"By the authority of the

People's Revolutionary

Government of Grenada."

"By the authority of the

Government of the

Democratic People's

Republic of Korea

(Signature) Maurice Bishop

(Signature: indecipherable)"

"P R O T O C O L""OF THE MILITARY COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CUBA AND THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT -
OF GRENADA"

- "The Government of the Republic of Cuba in agreement with the - request formulated by the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada, will maintain Cuban Military specialists in that country in quantities and specialists established in Annex No. 1 - of this document. (Protocol)."
- "The Military specialists from Cuba in behalf of strengthening the military capacity of the Armed Forces will assist grenadian military men on the questions of Organization of the Organic structure, Organization of the Instruction and combative and campaign training of the troops and staffs in the preparation of cadres and minor specialists, and in the elaboration of the operative and mobilization plans for the defense of the country."
- "The Government of the Republic of Cuba will grant scholarships to military personnel of Grenada in the Military Training Centres of the Revolutionary Armed Forces with the quantities - and specialist with the requirements that will be established in Annex No. 3 which will be elaborated afterwards."
- "In order to lead the activities of the Cuban Military Specialists, the post of chief of the Cuban Military Specialists is established who will develop functions in the Ministry of Defense."
- "The People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada will give facilities to the Chief of the Cuban Military specialists in the work places and for using the communication means existing in the country in order to assure the direction of his activities of Technical Military assistance to the Armed Forces."
- "The Government of the Republic of Cuba and the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada, will take all measures depending on them in order to assure the secrecy of the permanency of the military personnel in both states and the character of the activities, as well as the mail and information related to the present Protocol"

(Signature: indecipherable)
By the Government of the Republic
of Cuba

(signature: H. Austin)
By the People's Revolutionary
Government of Grenada.



cc 720
WCO
LPSO

JF

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 December 1983

Thank you for your undated telex message, received on 21 November 1983, addressed to the Prime Minister and to a number of other Ministers in the British Government. I have been asked to reply on their behalf.

The British Government has no standing in the constitutional affairs of Grenada. I have therefore been asked to say that your representations are not a matter for the British Government.

A. J. COLES

The Rt. Hon. Sir Eric Gairy

JF



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Type letter pl.

5 December, 1983

W 6.
12

ASC: to see o.v.

DWG
5/12

Dear John,

Grenada: Telex from Sir E Gairy

David Barclay in his letter of 23 November to Roger Bone, asked to see in draft the reply to a telex message received from Sir Eric Gairy, the former Prime Minister of Grenada. The message is tendentious and misleading in a number of respects (for instance the claim that the Governor-General 'belongs to' Britain). Mr Gairy also implies at a number of points that he remains the elected Prime Minister of Grenada. The view of our Legal Advisers is that when the Bishop Government suspended the 1973 constitution, the elected representatives under the 1973 constitution ceased to hold that status. In the circumstances we think the Government's reply should be brief, formal and neutral in tone. I enclose a draft.

I am copying this letter and attachment to David Watts, who also asked to see the reply in draft, and to David Heyhoe (LPS's Office).

Yours ever,

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

Peter Ricketts

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Private Secretary FCO

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

TO: The Rt Hon Sir Eric Gairy
 Post Office Box 1654
 Falls
 Virginia 22041
 UNITED STATES

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your undated telex message, received on 21 November 1983, addressed to the Prime Minister, and to a number of other Ministers in the British Government. I have been asked to reply on their behalf.

The British Government has no standing in the constitutional affairs of Grenada. *I have been asked to say that* Your representations are not ~~therefore~~ a matter for the British Government.

A.J.C. ^{6.}/₁₂

Enclosures—flag(s).....



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1049</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Letter from Ricketts to Coles dated 5 December 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR <i>40</i> YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>4 June 2013 B Wayland</i>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

Grenada
Int-SF 162

RESTRICTED

GRS 300
RESTRICTED
FM BRIDGETOWN 011600Z NOV 83
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 491 OF 1 DECEMBER
AND TO WASHINGTON AND ST GEORGES

MF
pa

MY TELNO 463: PLESSEY

1. COLLIER, PLESSEY'S MANAGING DIRECTOR, WAS IN BRIDGETOWN LAST WEEK AND HAS BEEN IN GRENADA SINCE THE WEEKEND. HE HAS PAID A NUMBER OF CALLS AND HAS BEEN PUNCTILIOUS ABOUT KEEPING US INFORMED. THE POSITION IS AS FOLLOWS.

2. DAMAGE TO PLESSEY INSTALLATIONS AT POINT SALINES AIRPORT AND LOSS AND THEFT OF EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIAL. COLLIER SAW GILLESPIE ON TUESDAY AND RECEIVED ASSURANCES THAT A SECURE SITE WILL BE PROVIDED AT POINT SALINES FOR THE STORAGE OF WHAT EQUIPMENT REMAINS. PLESSEY ARE LOOKING INTO RECRUITING SECURITY GUARDS ONCE THE US TROOPS ARE WITHDRAWN. PRELIMINARY TALKS WITH MAJOR WRIGHT OF US CLAIMS TEAM SUGGEST THAT COMPENSATION NEED NOT BE RULED OUT AT THIS STAGE.

3. IN CONVERSATION WITH MITCHELL, PERMANENT SECRETARY, GRENADA MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION, COLLIER MADE THE POINT THAT EQUIPMENT BELONGS TO GRENADA NOT TO PLESSEY. GRENADIANS SHOULD USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH US AUTHORITIES TO HAVE IT PROPERLY LOOKED AFTER.

4. PLESSEY'S AIM IS TO PRODUCE A PROGRAMME OF WORKS FOR FINISHING AIRPORT TO MINIMUM IATA STANDARDS. THIS COULD REDUCE OVERALL COST BY ABOUT 5 PER CENT, BY CUTTING OUT ITEMS LIKE THE AIRPORT RESTAURANT, BUT THE FIGURE IS UNLIKELY TO BE BELOW US DOLLARS 15 MILLION AND COULD WELL BE MORE.

5. I DO NOT THINK THE AMERICANS ARE IN ANY HURRY TO FUND COMPLETION OF THE PROJECT, HAVING REPEATEDLY SAID BEFORE THEIR INVASION THAT GRENADA DID NOT NEED A CIVIL AIRPORT OF THAT SIZE. THEY MIGHT HOWEVER PICK UP THE TAB FOR ONE OF THE 6 OR 7 PACKAGES INTO WHICH IT IS PLESSEY'S INTENTION TO SPLIT THE WORK TO MAKE IT MORE ATTRACTIVE TO INDIVIDUAL AID DONOR COUNTRIES.

6. COLLIER WILL ON PRESENT PLANS PASS THROUGH BRIDGETOWN OVER THE WEEKEND. I HAVE ASKED HIM TO CONTACT ME.

BULLARD

GRENADA LIMITED

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

- WIAD
- NAD
- S AM D
- MCAD
- UND
- PUSD
- DEFENCE DEPT
- NEWS DEPT
- INFO DEPT
- PROTOCOL DEPT
- ECDs
- PARLIAMENTARY UNIT
- PLANNING STAFF

- CCD
- CONS DEPT
- SOV DEPT
- MAED
- WED
- RESEARCH DEPT
- LEGAL ADVISERS
- PS
- PS/LADY YOUNG
- PS/MR WHITNEY
- PS/PUS
- SIR J BULLARD
- MR GIFFARD

- MR WRIGHT
- MR URE
- MR HANNAY
- MR ADAMS
- CABINET OFFICE

- COPIES TO:
- PS/MR RAISON ODA
- MR ANNING LACPD/ODA
- MOD (DI 4)
- MOD (DS11)
- MOD (ROW 5)

- MR VEREKER)
- MR BAWDEN) ODA

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

RESTRICTED

FLP SH



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 November, 1983

Excellency,

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 24 November enclosing a transcript of documents found in Grenada recently. Mrs. Thatcher looks forward to studying these documents on her return to London.

The Rt. Hon. Hugh Shearer, M.P.

FLC SA

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 November, 1983

Grenada

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister received in New Delhi from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade of Jamaica. I also enclose the documents relating to Grenada which were forwarded with Mr. Shearer's letter.

The Prime Minister has not yet seen these documents. I should be most grateful if you could let me have a brief comment on their significance before I show them to her.

AX

P. F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

OO NEW DELHI

28 NOV 1983

DUPLICATES

CONFIDENTIAL

OF LETTER.....
OF ENCLOSURES.....
LOCATION.....

IMMEDIATE

GRS 420

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 280930Z

FM BRIDGETOWN 261500Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 486 OF 26 NOVEMBER

INFO WASHINGTON PORT OF SPAIN KINGSTON UKMIS NEW YORK ST GEORGES

NEW DELHI (FOR HOGM DELEGATION)ODA

SAVING DEVDIV

MIPT (NOT TO ALL): GRENADA - POLICE FORCE

1. FIRST SECRETARY ACCOMPANIED BY GRAVES (POLICE ADVISER) MET MAJOR GENERAL FARRIS (COMMANDER, US FORCES GRENADA) AND ANTIPPAS (US CHARGE) AT US EMBASSY IN ST GEORGES ON FRIDAY 25 NOVEMBER AT THEIR REQUEST. ANTIPPAS SAID THAT THEIR OBJECT WAS TO BOLSTER THE MESSAGE WHICH MOTTLEY AND GILLESPIE HAD DELIVERED IN WASHINGTON PRESSING FOR AN URGENT RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE IN RE-BUILDING THE GRENADA POLICE. THEY WISHED US TO BE IN NO DOUBT ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN GRENADA AND THE PROBLEMS WHICH ANY DELAY IN OUR IMPLEMENTING THIS ASSISTANCE WOULD GIVE THEM.
2. GEN FARRIS HANDED OVER A PAPER PRODUCED BY HIS STAFF WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A NEW POLICE COMMISSIONER AND THE MANPOWER, TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT NEEDS OF A POLICE FORCE REVIVED WITH BRITISH ASSISTANCE. THESE SEEM SIMILAR TO RECOMMENDATIONS ALREADY PRODUCED BY BAUGH (REGIONAL POLICE ADVISER) ALTHOUGH HE HAS NOT YET HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEE THEM OR COMMENT, WITH THE ADDITION OF A PROPOSAL THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THE APPOINTMENT OF GRAVES AS COMMISSIONER OF POLICE. ANTIPPAS SAID THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS IDEA WITH THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL EARLIER. THE LATTER, WHILE NOT OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE, HAD INDICATED THAT HE WAS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING A SHORT-LIST OF TWO CANDIDATES FROM THE REGION FOR THE POST - ONE A BARBADIAN, ONE ST LUCIAN. (WE WOULD SEE DIFFICULTIES IN AGREEING TO APPOINTMENT OF A BRITISH TCO TO POST OF COMMISSIONER OF POLICE AND GRAVES WOULD NOT ACCEPT IT ANYWAY).
3. GEN FARRIS SAID THAT ALTHOUGH A US MILITARY PRESENCE WAS LIKELY TO REMAIN IN GRENADA WELL INTO 1984 (SEE MIPT) THE LOW-KEY POSTURE THEY AND THE CARIBBEAN PEACEKEEPING FORCES (CPF) PROPOSED TO ADOPT WAS DEPENDENT ON AN EFFECTIVE POLICE PRESENCE BEING SEEN TO TAKE THEIR PLACE. THEY RECOGNISED THAT IT WOULD BE MONTHS IF NOT YEARS BEFORE THE GRENADIAN POLICE FORCE COULD HOLD THE RING UNAIDED. THIS HAD PROMPTED THE SUGGESTION, WHICH THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL HAD TAKEN UP, THAT ABOUT 50 BRITISH POLICE OFFICERS SHOULD IMMEDIATELY BE SECONDED TO THE FORCE. SIMILAR ASSISTANCE WITH PRISON OFFICERS WAS NEEDED AT RICHMOND HILL PRISON WHERE THE SITUATION CONTINUED TO CAUSE THEM GREAT CONCERN. US FORCES WERE PRECLUDED FROM OPERATING AT THE PRISON. THE CPF PRESENCE THERE WAS INEFFECTIVE AND THE PRISON OFFICERS COULD NOT BE TRUSTED.
4. MOST OF THESE US CONCERNS SHOULD BE ALLAYED BY MONDAY'S AID ANNOUNCEMENT. BUT THE QUESTION OF SECONDMENTS TO THE POLICE AND PRISON SERVICES IS ONE THAT NEEDS FURTHER THOUGHT. BAUGH WILL BE LOOKING AT IT NEXT WEEK ALONG WITH THE REST OF THE POLICE PACKAGE.

BULLARD

NNNN

LUK 792

FDW G 082/126

OO PORT OF SPAIN
OO NEW DELHI

GRS 330

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 280930Z
FM BRIDGETOWN 261450Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 485 OF 26 NOVEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PORT OF SPAIN, ST GEORGES, UKMIS NEW
YORK, NEW DELHI (FOR CHOGM DELEGATION)
SAVING TO CASTRIES, ST JOHNS, KINGSTOWN

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

GRENADA - US MILITARY INTENTIONS

1. MAJOR GENERAL JACK FARRIS (COMMANDER, US FORCES GRENADA) AND ANDY ANTIPPAS (US CHARGE) TOLD MY FIRST SECRETARY ON 25 NOVEMBER THAT THEY EXPECTED A SIZEABLE MILITARY PRESENCE, CAPABLE OF DEALING WITH ANY LIKELY THREAT, TO REMAIN IN GRENADA ONCE US COMBAT TROOPS WERE WITHDRAWN IN MID-DECEMBER. THEY WERE AWAITING PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL FOR THESE DISPOSITIONS WHICH THEY WERE CONFIDENT WOULD BE FORTHCOMING.
2. GEN FARRIS SAID THAT THEY HAD PROPOSED A JOINT US/CARIBBEAN FORCE ABOUT 600 STRONG UNDER THE COMMAND OF COL ORMSBY, THE JAMAICAN CO OF THE PRESENT CARIBBEAN PEACEKEEPING FORCES, WHO WOULD HAVE A US COLONEL ACTING AS HIS ADVISER. APPROXIMATELY 450 OF THIS FORCE WOULD BE AMERICAN AND WOULD INCLUDE ONE OR TWO COMPANIES OF MILITARY POLICE. THEY WOULD BE AUGMENTED BY HEAVY LIFT HELICOPTERS, SMALLER HELICOPTERS AND OTHER APPROPRIATE SUPPORT.
3. FARRIS SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH THIS FORCE WOULD NEED TO BE SUFFICIENTLY VISIBLE TO DETER POTENTIAL TROUBLE-MAKERS, THE OBJECT WAS THAT ITS PRESENCE SHOULD BE AS LOW-KEY AS POSSIBLE, THEREBY ENABLING THE GRENADA POLICE FORCE TO RE-ESTABLISH ITSELF ON THE STREETS.
4. ASKED FOR HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY THREAT GEN FARRIS SAID THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT THE FORMER PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (PRA) HAD BEEN ABOUT 500 STRONG. OF THESE 450 HAD PASSED THROUGH US HANDS. 25 WERE UNDERGOING TRAINING IN CUBA AT THE TIME OF THE INTERVENTION. THIS LEFT ABOUT 25 UNACCOUNTED FOR, THE MAJORITY OF WHOM WERE THOUGHT TO BE IN THE HILLS, POSSIBLY WITH ONE OR TWO CUBANS. GEN FARRIS SAID THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE THREAT POSED BY THESE PEOPLE AND OTHER HARD-CORE PRA ALREADY WALKING FREE COULD BE CONTAINED BY THE DISPOSITIONS PROPOSED.
5. SEE MIFT.

BULLARD

~~PS~~

PS/No 10

~~Cabinet Secretary~~

~~PUS~~

PLEASE INDICATE ANY FURTHER DISTRIBUTION
FOR TELNO 1 from Castro's to
New Delhi

July Clerk.

The copy for Sir A. Akland
to have a copy.

A.S.C. $\frac{27}{11}$.

Delegation Secretary
26 November 1983

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

LUK 787/26
FDW 0075/26

00 NEW DELHI (COMMS NOTE: WE APPRECIATE THAT YOU HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED THIS TELEGRAM BUT DUTY CLERK NUMBER 10 WANTS IT RESENT SPECIFICALLY FOR THE ATTENTION OF MR COLES)

GRS 384

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 251641Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 392 OF 25 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE BDDC BRIDGETOWN (BHC PLEASE PASS)

INFO IMMEDIATE TO GRENADA, WASHINGTON,

UKMIS NEW YORK AND NEW DELHI (FOR CHOGM DELEGATION)

YOUR TELNO 482: AID TO GRENADA

1. IN RESPONSE TO ARRANGED WRITTEN PQ ON MONDAY 28 NOVEMBER MINISTER FOR OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT WILL MAKE STATEMENT AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE I AM TODAY LETTING THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL KNOW THAT WE HAVE AGREED TO PROVIDE A TOTAL OF 750,000 POUNDS ON GRANT TERMS TO HELP MEET IMMEDIATE DEVELOPMENT NEEDS. THIS WILL BE IN THE FORM OF BOTH CAPITAL AID AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION AND WILL BE USED TO MEET SPECIFIC REQUESTS MAINLY IN THE FIELD OF POLICE TRAINING, ADVICE AND EQUIPMENT AND SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE, IN PARTICULAR IN THE POWER, WATER AND PUBLIC WORKS SECTORS. I EXPECT THE BULK OF THIS SUM TO BE SPENT DURING THE CURRENT FINANCIAL YEAR. FURTHER CAPITAL AID AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION WILL BE CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF LONGER TERM NEEDS. UNQUOTE. YOU MAY INFORM THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN CONFIDENCE WHAT IS PROPOSED IN ADVANCE OF PARLIAMENTARY ANNOUNCEMENT. A FORMAL MESSAGE WILL FOLLOW ON MONDAY.
2. MINISTERS ATTACH PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THEIR BEING FULL CONSULTATION AND CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE HIGH COMMISSION AND DEVELOPMENT DIVISION OVER ALL MATTERS AFFECTING THIS PROGRAMME IN GRENADA.
3. THE PACKAGE IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT RECOMMENDED BY BBDC LARGELY BECAUSE MINISTERS DO NOT WANT TO INITIATE A SUBSTANTIAL PROGRAMME IN GRENADA. THE PROPOSED BREAKDOWN OF EXPENDITURE IS:
POLICE TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT - 230,000 POUNDS
PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE - 520,000 POUNDS
TOTAL 750,000 POUNDS
4. THE DETAILS OF THIS PROGRAMME SHOULD BE WORKED OUT BY THE DEVELOPMENT DIVISION IN THE NORMAL WAY AND APPROVED AT THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL ON THE BASIS OF APPRAISAL OF REQUESTS RECEIVED BY THE ADMINISTRATION, AND TAKING FULL ACCOUNT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF OTHER DONORS.
5. EXPENDITURE OF CAPITAL AID WILL REQUIRE A NEW GRANT AGREEMENT TO BE SIGNED WITH THE GRENADA ADMINISTRATION. THIS IS BEING DRAFTED AND WILL BE SENT TO BDDC AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. GRATEFUL BDDC ADVICE THEREFORE ON ALLOCATION OF 750,000 POUNDS BETWEEN TC AND CAPITAL AID.
6. LONGER TERM NEEDS FOR DEVELOPMENT AID WILL BE CONSIDERED INITIALLY AT THE CARIBBEAN GROUP MEETING IN CNBHWNGOON PROPOSED FOR FEBRUARY 1974.

HOWE

NNNN

31 2135 BHC IN
6314 UKREPSLC LC

*Checked with you 0955
26/11. message is being
dealt with.
[Signature]*

UNCLASSIFIED
GPS 230
FROM CASTRIES ST LUCIA 252015Z NOV 83
IMMEDIATE TELNO 01 TO NEW DELHI OF 25 NOVEMBER 1983

DESKBY 260230Z NOV 83

RFI IMMEDIATE FCO AND SAVING TO BRIDGETOWN (PASSED LOCALLY)

1. GRATEFUL YOU PASS TO ST LUCIAN PRIME MINISTER, JOHN COMPTON,
(BELIEVED TO BE IN GOA AT PRESENT) FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM DIRECTOR
OF ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES, DR VAUGHAN LEWIS:

BEGINS

1. SPOKE WITH GOVERNOR GENERAL SIR PAUL SCOON THIS AFTERNOON,
FRIDAY. HE WAS NOT AWARE THAT NAME OF DENIS HENRY HAD
BEEN PUT FORWARD. ALTHOUGH HE HAD BEEN THINKING OF SOME
OTHER PERSONS HE WILL BE HAPPY WITH HENRY.
2. ON THE QUESTION OF SECURITY HE SAID THAT HIS FIRST PREFERENCE
WOULD BE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER TO BE UNDERTAKEN
BY THE CARIBBEAN FORCES WHICH WERE INVOLVED IN THE INITIAL
EXERCISE IF THAT WERE AGREEABLE TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED.

A FRIENDLY COUNTRY MIGHT BE APPROACHED TO PROVIDE BACK UP
FACILITIES. TALK OF COMMONWEALTH FORCE CAUSING A CERTAIN
DEGREE OF CONFUSION.

3. HE SAID THAT APPROACHES HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE TO THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THE POLICE FORCE.
IT IS ENVISAGED THAT SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD INCLUDE THE
PROVISION OF A POLICE ADVISER, TRAINING, RECRUITMENT, SPECIAL
BRANCH, AND CID.
4. HE SAW ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AS ONE OF THE MAJOR IMMEDIATE
NEEDS.

ENDS

2. GRATEFUL YOUR URGENT ASSISTANCE SINCE OECS HERE ARE UNABLE
TO CONTACT COMPTON EITHER BY TELEPHONE OR THROUGH EAST CARIB-
BEAN HIGH COMMISSION IN LONDON. ESSENTIAL MESSAGE REACHES
COMPTON SOONEST.

LITTLEFIELD
NNNN

SENT AT: 252028Z

6314 UKREPSLC LC#
31 2135 BHC IN

*Passed to
MR. MOMINI
at GOA.
0645
26/11/83
[Signature]
D.S.P.*

LUK 619/24

OO DELHI

GRS 280

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F C O 241400Z NOV 83

TO FLASH BRIDGETOWN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 388 OF 24 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI (FOR CHOGM DELEGATION), GRENADA,
WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND UKMIS GENEVA.

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED
BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
CHANCERY DEPARTMENT
24 NOV 1983
DUPLICATES
OF LETTER.....
OF ENCLOSURES.....
LOCATION.....

cc R. Parby

GRENADA ADVISORY COUNCIL

1. MIFT CONTAINS THE XT OF A MESSAGE FROM MCINTYRE WHICH WE HAVE BEEN ASKED BY THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT TO TRANSMIT TO SCOON AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. WE THINK IT WOULD BE BEST IF YOU COULD DO THIS YOURSELF.

2. MCINTYRE'S INABILITY TO ASSUME THE POST OF CHAIRMAN OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL IS A SEVERE BLOW. HOPES OF GETTING THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION TO OPERATE REALLY EFFECTIVELY HAD LARGELY BEEN PINNED ON HIM. WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO CONSULT MINISTERS ABOUT THIS DEVELOPMENT BUT WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD DISCUSS WITH SCOON HOW THE URGENT REQUIREMENT FOR LEADERSHIP OF THE COUNCIL CAN BE MET. DOES SCOON HAVE ANY IDEAS ABOUT WHO MIGHT BE ABLE AND WILLING TO TAKE ON THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF CHAIRMAN? ARE THERE, FOR EXAMPLE, ANY EXISTING MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WHO MIGHT BE CREDIBLE CANDIDATES? SHOULD WE ASSUME THAT BRAITHWAITE DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT PERSONALITY TO TAKE OVER AS SUBSTANTIVE CHAIRMAN? ONE POSSIBILITY THAT HAS OCCURRED TO US IS SIR BENIS HENRY AND IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO HAVE SCOON'S REACTIONS TO THIS. THE NAME OF LORD PITT HAS ALSO BEEN MENTIONED IN THIS CONTEXT BUT HIS CONNECTIONS WITH GRENADA MAY BE TOO DISTANT AND HE MAY NOT HOLD A GRENADIAN PASSPORT.

3. THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO OFFER ANY ALTERNATIVES AND FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION HAVE TOLD US THAT NO FURTHER ACTION FROM THEM IS LIKELY UNTIL CHOGM IS CONCLUDED.

HOWE

NNNN



COMMONWEALTH
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
New Delhi 1983

JAMAICA

PERSONAL

24th November, 1983.

Your Excellency,

not attached

I thought you might care to see the attached transcripts of documents found in Grenada recently. These documents were laid on the table of the Jamaica House of Representatives on 14th November, 1983.


Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.


(Hugh L. Shearer)

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister
of Foreign Affairs & Foreign Trade.

OUT TELEGRAM

CC. LEBANON: Int. Situ. Part 5
 CYPRUS: Int. Situ. Feb 80.
 GRENADA: Int. Situ. Part 2
 SOV. UNION: Soviet Leadership June 1970

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby 25 11 30 Z. DESKBY 23 30 Z.

ZCZC
 GRS
 CLASS
 CAVEATS
 DESKBY
 FM FCO
 PRE/ADD
 TEL NO

1	ZCZC
2	GRS
3	CONFIDENTIAL
4	
5	DESKBY 23.30
6	FM FCO 241600Z NOV 83
7	IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI
8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
9	FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER; AND FOR PUS
10	SITUATION REPORT 23/24 NOVEMBER
11	<u>Lebanon</u>
12	1. The Israelis have begun to release about 1100 of the
13	Palestinian and Lebanese detainees in exchange for six
14	Israeli prisoners held by loyalist PLO in Tripoli. A further
15	six Israeli soldiers remain in Syrian and rebel PLO hands.
16	2. There have been indications that President Gemayel
17	and the Maronites are returning to the view that the
18	withdrawal of foreign forces should precede national
19	reconciliation. President Gemayel's planned visit to
20	London ^{on} 30 November will provide an opportunity to press ^{as has been cancelled.}
21	on Gemayel the need to push for reconciliation by the
22	early convening of Geneva II. ^{but he will still be going to Rome and Washington.}
23	3. In Tripoli, the de facto ceasefire is holding. The
24	rebel leader has extended the deadline for Arafat's
25	departure by one day to 26 November. Diplomatic activity

*Pa
 sub
 24/11*

✓
 ///
 //
 /

NNNN ends telegram		BLANK		Catchword /continues	
File number		Dept		Distribution LIMITED Private Secretary PS/Mr Rifkind PS/Lady Young PS/Mr Whitney PS/Mr Luce PS/PUS Planning Staff	
Drafted by (Block capitals) <i>Planning Staff</i>					
Telephone number					
Authorised for despatch <i>[Signature]</i> 24/11					
Comcen reference		Time of despatch			

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL

Page
2

<<<<

1 <<<<

2 continues. The UN Security Council Resolution (23 November)
3 called on the parties to "settle their differences exclusively
4 by peaceful means". The Russians are pressing Damascus
5 to halt ^{the} fighting. The PLO loyalists are said to have
6 accepted a Saudi/Syrian plan for ^a ceasefire, withdrawal of all
7 PLO forces (loyalist and dissident) from North Lebanon and
8 talks to re-establish the unity of PLO. But the rebels
9 are reported to have dismissed the proposals.

10 Cyprus

11 4. At Coreper on 24 November the Greek representative
12 called for action by the EC in the economic and social fields
13 against Turkey following the UDI by the Turkish Cypriots.
14 This is the first such call for action against Turkey.
15 The Greeks said that they had in mind that the EC should
16 freeze the current position in the EC/Turkey Association
17 Agreement (ie there should be no further liberalisation
18 as previously planned). No decisions were taken and the
19 question is likely to arise again at the Foreign Affairs
20 Council on 29 November.

21 Grenada

22 5. Motley (State Department) has reiterated to Minister,
23 Washington American concern about ^{the likely} policing problems in
24 Grenada following ^{the} withdrawal of US combat troops. Motley
25 said the Americans and the Governor-General saw a pressing
26 need for a contingent of preferably British policemen
27 to be sent to the island. He also expressed concern about
28 the situation in the prison and hoped the UK would be able
29 urgently to send trained prison warders. ~~The department is drafting~~

30 Soviet Union

/// 31 6. Moskovskaya Pravda of 23 November reported a speech
// 32 by Politburo member, Grishin, in which he referred to a
/ 33 meeting he had had with Andropov on 21 November. But there
34 have still been no Western sightings of Andropov.

NNNN ends
telegram

BLANK

Catchword

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)



Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL

Page
3

<<<<

- 1 <<<<
- 2 HOWE
- 3 NNNN
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25
- 26
- 27
- 28
- 29
- 30
- 31
- 32
- 33
- 34

///

//

/

NNNN ends
telegram

BLANK

Catchword

Greenada
(in Delhi)

CK
to file

file

BR



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 November 1983

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister and others from Sir Eric Gairy.

I imagine that you will be co-ordinating a reply on behalf of the Government. I should be grateful if we could see this in draft.

BF

(David Barclay)

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

BR

FROM THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



HOUSE OF LORDS,
SW1A 0PW

23rd November, 1983

Roger Bone Esq.,
Private Secretary to
The Right Honourable
The Secretary of State for
Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
London, SW1.

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Lord Chancellor (amongst others) has received from Sir Eric Gairy, the former Prime Minister of Grenada.

I have discussed this letter with Andrew Turnbull at No.10 and although he had not seen the Prime Minister's copy he suggested that your office would prepare a composite reply. In so doing of course you will no doubt be considering how to deal with the copies sent to Mr. Speaker and The Queen's Private Secretary.

Although the substance of any reply is very much a matter for your Secretary of State the Lord Chancellor has specifically asked if he may see a copy of the proposed reply before it is sent. I should be grateful for your advice in due course.

A copy of this letter goes to Andrew Turnbull.

D.P. Watts

*see P.M.'s
copy*

From Sir Eric GARY


R 24/11

- 1 SENT TO: THE QUEEN'S PRIVATE SECRETARY, BUCKINGHAM PALACE, LONDON SW 1
- 2 RT HON. LORD HAILSHAN OF SAINT MARYLEBONE, P.C., C.H., F.R.S., D.L., SPEAKER AND LORD CHANCELLOR OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, LONDON SW 1
- 3 LORD COEDWYN, OPPOSITION LEADER IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS, LONDON SW 1
- 4 RT. HON. BERNARD WEATHERILL, M.P., SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS LONDON SW 1
- ✓ 5 RT. HON. MARGARET THATCHER, M.P., PRIME MINISTER, 10 DOWNING ST., LONDON SW 1
- 6 RT. HON. JOHN BIFFEN, M.P., LEADER OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, LONDON SW 1
- 7 MR. NEIL KINNOCK, M.P., LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION HOUSE OF COMMONS, LONDON SW 1

GRENADA'S POPULATION SUFFERED IMMENSE HARDSHIP UNDER NON-ELECTED COMMUNIST RULE FOUR-AND-ONE-HALF YEARS. THE IMPOSITION OF A NON-ELECTED INTERIM BODY IS CAUSING MUCH ANGER AND CONCERN. THE LAST ELECTED GOVERNMENT WAS OBSTRUCTED FROM SERVING ITS FULL TERM. "UNITED GRENADIANS FOR DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESS" AND OTHERS WERE THE FIRST TO SEND OUT THE SOS FOR RESCUE, NOT FOR ANOTHER SEIZURE WHICH COMPLETELY IGNORES THE PEOPLES DULY ELECTED AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRIME MINISTER WHO WAS ELECTED EIGHT TIMES IN EIGHT GENERAL ELECTIONS----- 1951 TO 1976. GRENADIANS AT HOME AND ABROAD ARE SHOCKED AT THIS VIOLENT DEPARTURE FROM WORLDWIDE HIGHLY RESPECTED BRITISH DEMOCRATIC PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE. IT IS THE FIRST TIME IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMONWEALTH THAT A GOVERNOR-GENERAL, QUEEN'S REPRESENTATIVE, HAS ASSUMED THE POWER TO MAKE POLITICAL DECISIONS IN AN INDEPENDENT NATION. THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IS EXERCISING MUCH MORE POWER THAT THE QUEEN EXERCISES OVER GREAT BRITAIN. IN CASE OF SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES IN GREAT BRITAIN, CERTAINLY, HER GRACIOUS MAJESTY WOULD NEVER BE REQUESTED TO ASSUME SUCH A ROLE AS THAT OF SIR PAUL NOR TO IGNORE THE LAST ELECTED PRIME MINISTER NOR TO APPOINT AN INTERIM BODY WITHOUT CONSULTING THE PRIME MINISTER AND PERHAPS THE OPPOSITION LEADER. GRENADIANS FEEL VERY CHEATED.

SEVERAL COUNTRIES THAT ARE WILLING TO HELP GRENADA WILL NOT DO SO UNTIL AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT WAS ESTABLISHED. THE UNITED NATIONS STILL RECOGNIZES THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT'S REPRESENTATIVES INSPITE OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S REQUEST TO DO OTHERWISE. THIS UNWARRENTED DELAY OF SIR PAUL'S PLEA IS A SAD AND SHAMEFUL DEFEAT, AND MUST UNDOUBTEDLY REFLECT NEGATIVELY ON THE QUEEN'S OFFICE, WHICH SHOULD NEVER BE ALLOWED TO OCCUR. DIPLOMATIC, PARLIAMENTARY AND LEGAL COMMUNITIES REGARD THIS INTERIM BODY AS A MOCKERY TO DEMOCRACY AND BLAME GREAT BRITAIN TO WHOM THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL BELONGS. "INJUNCTION " AGAINST THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S ROLE AND INTERIM BODY MIGHT ADD MORE NEGATIVE REFLECTION, AND WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AT THIS TIME IF THE INTERIM BODY DEALS WITH ELECTION MACHINERY ONLY. MOREOVER, I AM GREATLY CONCERNED OVER APPARENT DIMINUTIZATION OF THE U.K.-GRENADA RELATIONSHIP, AND IT IS MY ANXIOUS DESIRE TO SPEEDILY RE-ESTABLISH GOOD, LONG AND FRIENDLY TRADITIONAL TIES WITH GREAT BRITAIN. COMMUNITIES FEEL THE INTERIM BODY AS PROPOSED IS AN INSULT TO BRITISH CONVENTION, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF EXISTING ELECTED HEAD WITH PEOPLE'S MANDATE. GRENADIANS AT HOME AND ABROAD ARE VERY ANGRY AND MAY ORGANIZE HUGE DEMONSTRATIONS IN PROTEST. MEAN- WHILE SIR PAUL HAS MOVED FROM THREE-FOUR MONTHS FOR ELECTIONS TO SIX MONTHS AND NOW TO TWELVE MONTHS. I STRONGLY SUGGEST AS A PARTIALLY ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE THAT ALISTER MCINTYRE AND TWO OTHER PERSONS RECOMMENDED BY THE ELECTED PRIME MINISTER AND THE OPPOSITION LEADER (OR MEMBER) BE APPOINTED FOR THE PURPOSE ONLY TO SET UP THE MACHINERY FOR GENERAL ELECTIONS WITHIN THREE MONTHS SO THAT THE PEOPLES ELECTED GOVERNMENT COULD BEGIN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO REBUILD OUR COUNTRY. I RESPECTFULLY SUGGEST EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT OF YOUR DECISION IN THIS MATTER THEREBY GIVING THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE TO PROSPECTIVE INVESTORS WHO WOULD PREFER TO INVEST

ELSEWHERE RATHER THAN IN GRENADA WITH THE PROPOSED INTERIM GOVERNMENT.
SENT IN PROFOUND HUMILITY AND WITH GREATEST RESPECT IN THE INTEREST OF
THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA FOR WHOM I HAVE THE STRONGEST CLAIM TO SPEAK.



RT. HONOURABLE SIR ERIC GAIRY

CONSTITUTIONAL PRIME MINISTER OF GRENADA

POST OFFICE BOX 1654

FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA 22041 USA



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1049</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>UKMIS New York telegram no. 1429 of 23 November 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR <i>49</i> YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>4 June 2013 B Wayland</i>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1049</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Washington telegram no. 3524 to FCO of 23 November 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR <i>40</i> YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>4 June 2013 B Wayland</i>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM NEW DELHI 221350Z NOV 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 919 OF 22 NOVEMBER 1983

INFO PRIORITY GEORGETOWN, ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON,
BRIDGETOWN AND CARACAS*Pa
DUB
23/11*FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY TO SECRETARY OF STATE MEETING
WITH FOREIGN MINISTER OF GUYANA

1. MEETING WAS ARRANGED AT OUR INITIATIVE. JACKSON WAS UNACCOMPANIED. FOLLOWING ARE MAIN POINTS.

GRENADA

2. JACKSON EXPLAINED THAT BURHAM HAD TRIED VERY HARD AT THE CARICOM MEETING TO PERSUADE HIS COLLEAGUES TO TAKE MEASURES OTHER THAN MILITARY ONES (ALTHOUGH HE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT HE WOULD BE READY TO CONSIDER MILITARY MEASURES IF OTHER APPROACHES WERE TRIED AND FOUND WANTING). AT THE END OF THE FIRST DAY'S MEETING, HE THOUGHT THAT HE HAD SUCCEEDED AND THAT A CONSENSUS HAD EMERGED FOR NON-MILITARY ACTION. BUT IT EMERGED THAT THE OECS COUNTRIES HAD MADE UP THEIR MINDS BEFOREHAND AND WERE DETERMINED TO STICK TO WHAT THEY HAD ALREADY DECIDED. JACKSON RETURNED TO THIS POINT MORE THAN ONCE, EMPHASISING THAT GUYANA HAD FELT BADLY LET DOWN. ALTHOUGH VERY CRITICAL OF THE OECS COUNTRIES FOR THE WAY THEY HAD TAKEN THEIR DECISION, HE WAS SURPRISINGLY MILD ABOUT THEIR ACTUAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE ACTION WHERE HE POINTED OUT THAT THEY HAD ACTED IN A POLICING ROLE.

3. AS FAR AS THE FUTURE WAS CONCERNED, JACKSON EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE AMERICAN TROOPS, FOR THE ADVISORY COUNCIL TO TAKE UP THE REINS AND FOR RECONSTRUCTION. HE AGREED WHEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE ADDED TO THIS LIST FREE ELECTIONS AND THE NEED FOR POLICE OR SIMILAR HELP TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN GRENADA. JACKSON WELCOMED THE APPOINTMENT OF MCINTYRE, OF WHOM HE HAD A GOOD OPINION, AND VOLUNTEERED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD ALREADY MADE A START ON RECONSTRUCTION.

4. QUESTIONED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE, JACKSON WAS RATHER UNCONVINCING ABOUT THE ADVISABILITY OF GUYANA'S HIGH PROFILE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE. HE ARGUED THAT THE AMERICAN ACTION HAD FRIGHTENED MANY SMALL COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD, AND POINTED OUT THAT GUYANA HAD SHOWN HERSELF FLEXIBLE ABOUT AMENDMENTS TO THE RESOLUTION. THEY WOULD ALSO HAVE BEEN PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE TRINIDAD RESOLUTION ON WHAT WAS TO HAPPEN NEXT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MENTIONED HIS OWN CONCERNS ABOUT THE SECURITY OF SMALL ISLAND STATES. JACKSON REPLIED THAT THE PROBLEM WAS NOT CONFINED TO ISLANDS. HE WELCOMED THE FACT THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD POSED THE QUESTION, AND SUGGESTED THAT THE ANSWER SHOULD BE FOUND THROUGH MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS UNDER THE COMMONWEALTH AND/OR UNITED NATIONS AUSPICES.

CONFIDENTIAL

/GUYANA/

5. JACKSON SEEMED CONTENT WITH THE RESULTS OF THE CORDOVEZ VISITS, AND MORE GENERALLY, WITH THE ROLE THAT THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL WAS PLAYING. HE DID NOT EXPECT FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS UNTIL AFTER THE VENEZUELAN ELECTIONS.

FALKLANDS VOTE

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED BY THE CHANGE IN GUYANA'S VOTE. JACKSON RECALLED HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE HIGH COMMISSIONER IN GEORGETOWN ON THIS SUBJECT. HE ARGUED, NOT VERY CONVINCINGLY, THAT GUYANA HAD HAD TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE US POSITION AND OF THEIR CONTACTS WITH ARGENTINA. HE CLAIMED THAT THE REFERENCE TO EARLIER UN RESOLUTIONS TOOK SUFFICIENT ACCOUNT OF SELF-DETERMINATION.

GUYANA ECONOMY

7. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONING FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE, JACKSON ACKNOWLEDGED THAT US AID HAD NOW BEEN ENTIRELY CUT OFF. HE SUGGESTED, WITHOUT PRESSING THE POINT, THAT GUYANA WAS BEING PUNISHED FOR HER HONESTY. THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT BURNHAM MEANT WHAT HE SAID WHEN HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT GUYANA WOULD NOT ALLOW ITSELF TO FALL UNDER THE DOMINANT INFLUENCE EITHER OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF THE SOVIET UNION. GUYANA WAS NOT A CUBA, A NICARAGUA OR EVEN A GRENADA. THEY HAD ADVISED BISHOP IN PRIVATE AGAINST SOME OF THE STEPS HE HAD TAKEN. JACKSON SAID THAT HE WAS NOT UP TO DATE ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE IMF, WHERE HE THOUGHT THAT THE GAP HAD NARROWED ALTHOUGH NOT DISAPPEARED. HE MADE ONLY A HALF-HEARTED ATTEMPT TO ARGUE THAT WE SHOULD MAKE OUR OFFER OF AID UNCONDITIONAL.

WADE-CERY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED
WLAD
NAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
PUSD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
INFO D
PROTOCOL D
ECD'S
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD
CONS D
SOV D
EED
MAED
WED
RES D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:
MR ANNING LACPD/ODA
MOD (DI 4)
MOD (DS11)
MOD (ROW 5)

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED



With the Compliments
of the
Private Secretary
to the
Lord Privy Seal



*JMB
21/11*

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AT

21 November 1983

Dear Peter,

I enclose a copy of the letter which, in common with other addressees listed in the text, the Lord Privy Seal has received from Sir Eric Gairy. You will no doubt wish to consider sending a composite reply on behalf of the Government and I would be grateful if you could send this Office a copy in due course.

*Yours ever,
David*


D C R HEYHOE
Private Secretary

Peter Ricketts Esq
Private Secretary
to the Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <u>PREM 19</u>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <u>1049</u> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <u>Folio 16:</u> <u>Minute from Coles to Armstrong</u> <u>dated 21 November 1983</u>	
CLOSED FOR YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<u>4 June 2013</u> <u>A Wayland</u>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

MR. HATFIELD
CABINET OFFICE

Grenada: United States Statements on the
Reasons for Intervention

The Prime Minister saw over the weekend
JIC(83)(N)194.

The Prime Minister has commented on the
last sentence of paragraph 2 as follows:
"We should have analysed this in advance."

A. J. COLES

21 November 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

to

CONFIDENTIAL

714 - 1

OO BRIDGETOWN
OO KINGSTON

GRS 10

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 170957Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 373 OF 17 NOVEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE KINGSTON
YOUR TELNO 441: GRENADA AND THE OECS

1. MINISTERS DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO SEND A ROUND-ROBIN MESSAGE TO THE OECS PRIME MINISTERS, BUT IN THE COURSE OF YOUR REGULAR CONTACTS WITH THEM YOU MAY SAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHARES THEIR WISH NOT TO LET THE EVENTS OF RECENT WEEKS IN GRENADA AFFECT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UK AND THE OECS STATES, AND THAT SHE LOOKS FORWARD VERY MUCH TO SEEING THE OECS PRIME MINISTERS IN NEW DELHI LATER THIS MONTH AT CHOGM.

HOWE

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED

WIAD
NAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
PUSD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
INFO D
PROTOCOL D
ECD'S
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD
CONS D
SOV D
EED
MAED
WED
RES D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

MR ANNING LACPD/ODA
MOD (DI 4)
MOD (DS11)
MOD (ROW 5)

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

GRS 300
RESTRICTED
DESKBY 180900Z
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 180215Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1385 OF 17 NOVEMBER 1983
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BRIDGETOWN, PORT OF SPAIN, GRENADA.

MIPT: GRENADA/UN

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LATEST TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO DRAFT
RESOLUTION:

BEGINS

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

REITERATING THE URGENT NEED FOR A SOLUTION TO THE GRAVE SITUATION
IN GRENADA AND THE RESTORATION OF NORMALCY,

1. NOTES WITH APPRECIATION THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,
A/38/568, SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 38/7
OF 2 NOVEMBER 1983.
2. WELCOMES THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADVISORY COUNCIL AS A
TEMPORARY MEASURE.
3. STRONGLY RECOMMENDS THE APPOINTMENT OF A BROAD-BASED CIVILIAN
INTERIM ADMINISTRATION WITH EXECUTIVE POWERS.
4. URGES IN ADDITION FOR THE EARLY RESTORATION OF NORMALCY IN
GRENADA, THE FOLLOWING:-
 - (A) STRICT RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF GRENADA AND SCRUPULOUS RESPECT
FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALL GRENADIANS;
 - (B) WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM GRENADA;
 - (C) PROMOTION OF PEACE AND STABILITY AND THE MAINTENANCE OF
LAW AND ORDER THROUGH THE EMPLOYMENT OF GRENADIAN AS WELL
AS SUCH ADDITIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT UNITS AS MAY BE DEEMED
APPROPRIATE BY THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION UPON THE
WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES;
 - (D) HOLDING OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS AT THE EARLIEST
POSSIBLE DATE UNDER INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION THUS
ENABLING THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN
GOVERNMENT;

RESTRICTED

15. CALLS

RESTRICTED

5. CALLS UPON MEMBER STATES, SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM TO ASSIST, AS APPROPRIATE, IN THE REHABILITATION OF GRENADA AND IN THE CONTINUATION OF ITS PROGRAMME OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
6. REQUESTS MEMBER STATES TO COOPERATE IN GIVING EFFECT TO THE MEASURES OUTLINED ABOVE:
7. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTINUE TO USE HIS GOOD OFFICES IN RESPECT OF THE SITUATION IN GRENADA TO SECURE THE IMPLEMENTATION, AS A MATTER OF URGENCY, OF THIS RESOLUTION AND REPORT THEREON TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

ENDS

THOMSON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED

WIAD

NAD

S AM D

MCAD

UND

PUSD

DEFENCE D

NEWS D

INFO D

PROTOCOL D

ECD'S

PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD

CONS D

SOV D

EED

MAED

WED

RES D

LEGAL ADVS

PLANNING STAFF

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR URE

MR CARTLEDGE

MR HANNAY

MR ADAMS

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

MR ANNING LACPD/ODA

MOD (DI 4)

MOD (DS11)

MOD (ROW 5)

2

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL

831 - 1

OO WASHINGTON
OO UKMIS NEW YORK
GRS 750
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 171600Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1933 OF 17 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN, ST GEORGE'S,
KINGSTON, NASSAU, PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN AND UKMIS NEW YORK

McIntyre's views on Grenada.

MS

GRENADA

1. ANDERSON OF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT HAS DISCUSSED WITH MCINTYRE IN GENEVA POSSIBLE COMMONWEALTH ASSISTANCE FOR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN GRENADA WHEN THE US FORCES LEAVE. MCINTYRE TOLD ANDERSON THAT WHILE HE WOULD NEED TO CONSULT HIS COLLEAGUES IN GRENADA, HIS PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

- (A) POLICE RATHER THAN MILITARY FORCES WOULD BE NEEDED.
- (B) US FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY.
- (C) THE PRESENT CARIBBEAN CONTINGENT SHOULD REMAIN BUT IN BARRACKS.
- (D) ABOUT 250 FROM THE EXISTING GRENADA POLICE FORCE MIGHT BE USEABLE. THESE SHOULD BE SUPPLEMENTED BY 300 POLICE FROM TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO AND THE BAHAMAS AND 50 POLICE EACH FROM JAMAICA AND BARBADOS. THIS ENTIRE FORCE WOULD BE INVOLVED IN NORMAL POLICE DUTIES UNDER A SINGLE COMMAND.
- (E) A NEW COMMISSIONER OF POLICE FOR GRENADA SHOULD BE RECRUITED FROM WITHIN THE CARIBBEAN TO BE PAID FOR BY GRENADA (A JAMAICAN CANDIDATE WAS BEING CONSIDERED).
- (F) AS SOON AS THIS ENHANCED POLICE PRESENCE WAS IN BEING, THE CARIBBEAN MILITARY FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW.

2. ANDERSON TOLD US THAT MCINTYRE HAD TAKEN NOTE OF THE OPPOSITION FROM LATIN AMERICA, ESPECIALLY VENEZUELA, TO A COMMONWEALTH PRESENCE AS SUCH IN GRENADA. MCINTYRE WOULD THEREFORE LIKE TO INVOLVE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN THIS EXERCISE IN SOME WAY AND WOULD BE SEEKING A WAY OF MAKING

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

831 - 1

CONTACT, PERHAPS THROUGH THE OAS. MCINTYRE RECOGNISED THAT THERE WOULD BE A LANGUAGE PROBLEM AND THEREFORE CONSIDERED THAT ASSISTANCE FROM LATIN AMERICA MIGHT BEST BE PROVIDED IN THE FORM OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

3. MCINTYRE ATTACHES CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO POLICE TRAINING AND HOPES THAT WE AND CANADA WILL BE ABLE TO HELP MAKING USE OF THE BARBADOS POLICE TRAINING COLLEGE WHERE APPROPRIATE. HE HOPES THE REST OF THE COMMONWEALTH MIGHT BE PREPARED TO HELP WITH FINANCE AND PERHAPS LOGISTIC SUPPORT. HE WILL BE COMPOSING A MESSAGE TO COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IN NEW DELHI SEEKING SUPPORT IN PRINCIPLE, OVER THE PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE FOR GRENADA.

4. MCINTYRE IS ANXIOUS TO HAVE AVAILABLE OVER THE COMING WEEKS AN INDEPENDENT SOURCE OF SECURITY ADVICE. ANDERSON ASKED US IF WE COULD HELP LOCATE A SUITABLE ADVISER WHO SHOULD HAVE A POLICE RATHER THAN A MILITARY BACKGROUND. HE WILL BE PAID FOR BY CFTC. WE ARE PURSUING THIS URGENTLY AND HOPE TO HAVE A CANDIDATE AVAILABLE FOR MCINTYRE TO INTERVIEW WHEN HE PASSES THROUGH LONDON ON FRIDAY NEXT WEEK EN ROUTE TO GRENADA. AS YOU KNOW, MCINTYRE HAS A HEALTH PROBLEM AND NEEDS TO SPEND A FEW DAYS IN HOSPITAL BEFORE TRAVELLING TO GRENADA. HE NOW HOPES TO ARRIVE THERE OVER THE WEEKEND OF 26/27 NOVEMBER.

5. YOU MAY PASS THE GIST OF THE ABOVE TO THE US GOVERNMENT IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE AS REPRESENTING MCINTYRE'S PRELIMINARY VIEWS. MCINTYRE IS VERY ANXIOUS TO GET ACROSS TO THE AMERICANS THE MESSAGE THAT HE IS GOING OUT TO GRENADA IN A NON-CONFRONTATIONAL SPIRIT AND FULLY RECOGNISES THAT HE NEEDS THEIR COOPERATION. HE DOES HOWEVER HAVE PRESSURES ON HIM, WHICH HE HOPES THE AMERICANS WILL RECOGNISE, AND IS VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE US IN THE PROCESS OF REPLACING THEIR FORCES WITH THE SORT OF POLICE CONTINGENT HE HAS IN MIND. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD HELP IN GETTING THIS MESSAGE ACROSS TO THE AMERICANS WHILE STRESSING THAT WE HAVE NOT (NOT) BEEN ASKED TO SPEAK ON HIS BEHALF. MCINTYRE HAS IT IN MIND TO TRY AND MAKE CONTACT

2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

831 - 1

WITH THE US GOVERNMENT, PERHAPS THROUGH THEIR EMBASSY IN LONDON WHEN HE IS HERE NEXT WEEK. BUT HE IS VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO BE DISCREET OVER ANY CONTACTS WITH US AUTHORITIES IN ORDER TO AVOID THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE MIGHT BE ACCUSED OF BEING A US PUPPET.

6. ANDERSON ALSO TOLD US THAT MCINTYRE HAS GIVEN SOME THOUGHT TO THE NEED TO GET GRENADA WORKING AGAIN AND PREPARE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE FOR ELECTIONS. HE THINKS THE IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT WILL BE FOR PEOPLE TO STRENGTHEN THE GRENADIAN CIVIL SERVICE AND HELP PRPPREPARE THE WAY FOR ELECTIONS. MCINTYRE IS ANXIOUS TO COMPLETE THIS PHASE BY JUNE NEXT YEAR WHEN HE HOPES TO BE ABLE TO RETURN TO UNCTAD IN GENEVA.

7. MCINTYRE'S IDEAS SEEM TO BE DEVELOPING ON SENSIBLE LINES AND WE VERY MUCH HOPE THAT HE AND THE US WILL BE ABLE TO WORK TOGETHER HARMONIOUSLY. THE IMPORTANCE OF RESPECTING HIS CONFIDENCE IS CLEAR: PLEASE TELL THE AMERICANS THAT WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED TO KEEP CLOSE THE KNOWLEDGE THAT HIS VIEWS HAVE REACHED US THROUGH THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT.

HOWE

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED

WIAD

NAD

S AM D

MCAD

UND

PUSD

DEFENCE D

NEWS D

INFO D

PROTOCOL D

ECD'S

PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD

CONS D

SOV D

EED

MAED

WED

RES D

LEGAL ADVS

PLANNING STAFF

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR URE

MR CARTLEDGE

MR HANNAY

MR ADAMS

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

MR ANNING LACPD/ODA

MOD (DI 4)

MOD (DS11)

MOD (ROW 5)

3

CONFIDENTIAL



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1049</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Folio 14:</i> <i>Minute from Armstrong to Cole</i> <i>dated 17 November 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>4 June 2013</i> <i>A Wayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 November 1983

AID TO GRENADA

Your letter of 14 November was discussed when the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary called on the Prime Minister this morning.

Sir Geoffrey Howe said that he was not envisaging substantial aid to Grenada but that it would be odd if Grenada were not included in our normal aid programme in future. We were not committed to any figure.

The Prime Minister said that she was content with this situation but that she certainly did not envisage much aid expenditure on Grenada and in particular did not wish us to spend money which the United States, given their new involvement, could reasonably be expected to spend.

ALL COLES

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CT.

CONFIDENTIAL

file

da

16 November 1983

Grenada: Implications for Small Countries

The Prime Minister has asked that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should see the enclosed copy of a letter which she has received from Lord Home. I imagine that the problem of small territories is being covered in the briefing for CHOGM.

A J COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

ADVANCE COPY
IMMEDIATE

ED/WIAD
ED/S AM D
ED/AD
ED/UND
ED/PUSD
ED/DEF DEPT
ED/NEWS DEPT
ED/INFO DEPT
ED/PROTOCOL DEPT
ED/ECD(E)
ED/ECD(I)
ED/CCD
ED/CONSULAR DEPT
ED/SOV DEPT
ED/PLANNING STAFF
ED/RESEARCH DEPT
ED/EED
ED/NAD

PS (2)
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
MR FREELAND)
MR BICKFORD) LEGAL ADVISERS
MR EDWARDS)
SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE
CABINET OFFICE
NO 10 DOWNING ST
MOD, RC
MOD (DI 4)



RESTRICTED

FM NEW DELHI 161235Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 892 OF 16 NOVEMBER.

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND BRIDGETOWN.

YOUR TELNO 750 : GRENADA

SUMMARY

1. INDIANS APPARENTLY FIRM IN OPPOSITION TO A COMMONWEALTH FORCE, OR ANY OTHER SUBSTANTIVE ROLE, WHILE US TROOPS REMAIN AND EVEN THEREAFTER. THEY WILL GIVE NO COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OR ADVISORY COUNCIL. MRS GANDHI WILL LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSIONS WITH MRS THATCHER.

DETAIL

2. I CALLED ON RASGOTRA ON 15 NOVEMBER. I LEFT HIM A SPEAKING NOTE BASED ON PARA 1 AND PUT TO HIM ORALLY THE POINTS IN PARA 2 OF TUR, EMPHASISING THAT WHILE WE WERE NOT LOBBYING IN FAVOUR OF COMMONWEALTH ACTION WE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT NOT TO CLOSE ANY DOORS.

3. RASGOTRA REFERRED ME TO MRS GANDHI'S STATEMENT ON THE DIFFICULTIES OF SENDING A COMMONWEALTH FORCE WHILE US TROOPS

~~DIFFICULTIES OF SENDING A COMMONWEALTH FORCE WHILE US TROOPS~~
REMAINED IN GRENADA. I SAID WE HAD NOTED RAO'S GLOSS ON THIS
WHILE IN LONDON (FCO TELNO 703). RASGOTRA SAID THAT WE SHOULD
NOT MISINTERPRET RAO'S REMARKS : MRS GANDHI REMAINED FIRMLY
OF HER VIEW THAT PRECONDITION FOR ANY SUBSTANTIVE COMMONWEALTH
ROLE (BEYOND THE DESPATCH OF TECHNICAL ADVISERS, OR PROVISION OF
AID ETC) WAS THE COMPLETE DEPARTURE OF THE US TROOPS. IN HIS
OWN VIEW SENDING A COMMONWEALTH FORCE WOULD BE A BAD
PRECEDENT. IT COULD BE SEEN AS BAILING THE AMERICANS OUT AFTER
THEIR ILL-CONCEIVED OPERATION. THIS WOULD BE BAD FOR THE
COMMONWEALTH IMAGE. PERHAPS IF ASKED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 3
OR 4 INDIVIDUAL COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES MIGHT QUOTE WORK
SOMETHING OUT UNQUOTE. I SAID THAT THOUGH WE WERE NOT
OURSELVES LOBBYING IN FAVOUR OF IT, WE THOUGHT IT RIGHT TO KEEP
AN OPEN MIND ABOUT POSSIBLE JOINT COMMONWEALTH ACTION, WHICH
MIGHT OFFER PRESENTATIONAL ADVANTAGE. BUT RASGOTRA REFUSED TO
COMMIT HIMSELF EVEN THIS FAR.

4. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE WAS NOT SURE IF THE GOVERNOR
GENERAL HAD ACTED ULTRA VIRES : AT PRESENT HE MIGHT BE SEEN AS
AN AMERICAN PUPPET. IF ELECTIONS WERE NOT TO BE HELD FOR
12-18 MONTHS WAS THERE A RISK THAT HE MIGHT EVEN DEVELOP INTO
A DICTATOR? I REMAINED HIM THAT OUR INFORMATION SUGGESTED THAT HE
ENVISAGED ELECTIONS SOONER THAN THAT, AND THAT HE WOULD BE OPERATING
THROUGH THE ADVISORY COUNCIL (RASGOTRA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT
MCINTYRE WAS AN EXCELLENT MAN).

5. I ALSO DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT WITH ALEXANDER (MRS GANDHI'S
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY) TODAY. ON SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL
AND ADVISORY COUNCIL HE WAS STRICTLY NON-COMMITAL. ON PROPOSALS
FOR COMMONWEALTH ACTION HE SAID THAT INDIA WAS OPPOSED, EVEN ONCE
THE AMERICANS HAD WITHDRAWN. HE COMMENTED THAT HE HAD READ THE
REPORT OF RAO'S DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON AND THOUGHT HE HAD HAD NO
RIGHT TO INTERPRET GOVERNMENT POLICY IN THAT WAY. ACTION TO HELP
GRENADA WAS FOR INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES, NOT FOR THE COMMONWEALTH
AS A WHOLE. HE TOO EXPECTED THE TWO PRIME MINISTERS TO DISCUSS
THIS SUBJECT.

WADE-GERY

FILE

da

16 November 1983

Grenada: Message from the Prime Minister to
OECS Heads of Government

Thank you for your letter of 14 November.

The Prime Minister agrees with the draft
telegram which you enclosed.

A J COLES

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JA

CONFIDENTIAL

GPS 62

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 152321Z

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELNO 3436 OF 15 NOVEMBER 1983,

INFO ROUTINE BRIDGETOWN, HAVANA, UKMIS NEW YORK, KINGSTON.

MY TELNO 3421: GRENADA

1. EAGLEBURGER MADE CLEAR TO ME TODAY THAT THE AMERICANS WERE ANXIOUS TO PULL OUT THEIR TROOPS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE PROBLEM WAS TO DECIDE WHO WOULD TAKE THEIR PLACE TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY. EAGLEBURGER SPECIFICALLY SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD WELCOME BRITISH ASSISTANCE ON POLICE MATTERS IN GRENADA.

WRIGHT

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED
WIAD
NAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
PUSD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
INFO D
PROTOCOL D
ECD'S
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT
OPA

CCD
CONS D
SOV D
EED
MAED
WED
RES D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:
MR ANNING LACPD/ODA
MOD (DI 4)
MOD (DS11)
MOD (ROW 5)

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

GRS 85

RESTRICTED

FM BONN 151215Z NOV 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1026 OF 15 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, ATHENS, PARIS, ROME AND UKDEL NATO

MY TEL NO 1015 FRG V-NEWS ON GRENADA

1. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION THE FRG OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN ON 14 NOVEMBER SAID THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DID NOT NOW INTEND TO MAKE ANY FURTHER STATEMENT ON THE INTERVENTION IN GRENADA: AS THE CHANCELLOR HAD MADE CLEAR AFTER THE ANGLO-GERMAN CONSULTATIONS LAST WEEK, ATTENTION SHOULD NOW BE DIRECTED TOWARDS THE FUTURE.

2. THIS IS A MARKED SHIFT IN THE GERMAN POSITION FROM THAT REPORTED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TUR AND IS DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE CHANCELLOR'S CONVERSATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.

TAYLOR

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED

WIAD
NAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
PUSD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
INFO D
PROTOCOL D
ECD'S
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD
CONS D
SOV D
EED
MAED
WED
RES D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:
MR ANNING LACPD/ODA
MOD (DI 4)
MOD (DS11)
MOD (ROW 5)

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

RESTRICTED

Spencer
file

see CRM
A5

①



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

would you like me to let

Jeffrey Howe have a copy of

this letter?

A. J. C.

14.11.83

Yes no

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Prime Minister.

London SW1A 2AH

Agree telegram?

14 November 1983

A.J.C. $\frac{14}{11}$

Yes mb

Dear John,

Grenada: Message from the PM to OECS Heads of Government

Our High Commissioner in Bridgetown has recommended that he be authorised to pass a message to OECS Heads of Government from the Prime Minister (Bridgetown telegram No 441 of 10 November attached).

The Foreign Secretary does not believe that a round-robin message from the Prime Minister would serve any useful purpose at this stage. But it might help to create the right atmosphere for CHOGM if our High Commissioners could take the opportunity of regular contacts with the OECS Prime Ministers to make some of the points recommended by Mr Bullard from Bridgetown.

I enclose a draft telegram of instructions embodying these points. The Foreign Secretary has not yet seen a copy of this; I am showing it to him in parallel.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 330

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 110900Z

FM BRIDGETOWN 102100Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 441 OF 10 NOV

AND TO IMMEDIATE KINGSTON

SAVING ST GEORGE'S CASTRIES KINGSTON ST JOHN'S (ALL PASSED LOCALLY)

GRENADA AND THE OECS

MY TELNO 397 SUGGESTING THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD WRITE TO OECS PRIME MINISTERS (LESS GRENADA AND MONTserrat) EXPLAINING OUR CASE OVER GRENADA CROSSED YOUR TELNO 323 OF THE SAME DATE ASKING ME TO CONVEY TO THEM AND ADAMS A MESSAGE FROM YOURSELF.

IT WAS AGREED WITH THE DEPARTMENT THAT I SHOULD RECONSIDER MY RECOMMENDATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE REPLIES YOUR MESSAGE RECEIVED.

2. ALL THE REPLIES ARE NOW IN. IT IS CLEAR THAT YOUR MESSAGE HAS REASSURED OECS LEADERS ABOUT OUR FUTURE POLICY TOWARDS GRENADA, ESPECIALLY OUR WILLINGNESS TO HELP WITH THE REBUILDING OF THE GRENADA POLICE FORCE , A POINT TO WHICH MANY OF THEM ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE. BUT SOME BITTERNESS REMAINS, BOTH ABOUT OUR FAILURE TO TAKE PART IN THE 'RESCUE OPERATION' WHEN ASKED TO DO SO AND ABOUT MINISTER'S SUBSEQUENT CRITICISM OF IT. THIS BITTERNESS HAS PERSISTED LONGER THAN IT MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE DONE BECAUSE OF REPORTS COMING IN FROM BRITAIN AND THE USA WHICH SUGGEST THAT INITIAL PRESS AND PUBLIC CRITICISM OF THE OPERATION HAS BEGUN TO SWING THE OTHER WAY.

3. IT WOULD I THINK HAVE A CALMING EFFECT AND MAKE EASIER THE CONDUCT OF OTHER BUSINESS AT THE CHOGM IF I COULD BE AUTHORISED TO TELL OECS PRIME MINISTERS THAT MRS THATCHER (A) UNDERSTANDS THEY STILL HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT HMG'S RESPONSE TO THE OECS INITIATIVE OF 21 OCTOBER., (B) SHARES THEIR WISH NOT TO SEE THESE RESERVATIONS AFFECT ANGLO-OECS RELATIONS, (C) LOOKS FORWARD VERY MUCH TO SEEING OECS PMS IN NEW DELHI LATER THIS MONTH, AND (D) HOPES THAT TIME MAY BE FOUND THERE FOR A PRIVATE DISCUSSION OF GRENADA OUTSIDE THE MAIN MEETING.

4. ADAMS HAS ALL ALONG TAKEN A MORE BALANCED VIEW THAN HIS COLLEAGUES FROM THE SMALLER ISLANDS , BUT IF THE PM AGREES TO MEET THE TO TALK ABOUT GRENADA I RECOMMEND HE BE INCLUDED. SUBJECT TO THE VIEWS OF HIGH COMMISSIONER, KINGSTON, THIS WOULD PRESUMABLY MEAN INCLUDING SEAGA ALSO.

BULLARD

ms

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED

WIAD
NAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
PUSD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
INFO D
PROTOCOL D
ECD'S
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD
CONS D
SOV D
EED
MAED
WED
RES D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:
MR ANNING LACPD/ODA
MOD (DI 4)

CONFIDENTIAL

OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
--	---	---------------------------------------

ZCZC
GRS
CLASS
CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

1	ZCZC
2	GRS
3	CONFIDENTIAL
4	
5	
6	FM FCO
7	TO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN
8	TELEGRAM NO
9	AND TO IMMEDIATE KINGSTON
10	Your telno 441: GRENADA AND THE OECS
11	1. Ministers do not believe that it would be useful for
12	the Prime Minister to send a round-robin message to the OECS
13	Prime Ministers, but in the course of your regular contacts
14	with them you may say that the Prime Minister shares their wish
15	not to let the events of recent weeks in Grenada affect
16	relations between the UK and the OECS states, and that she
17	looks forward very much to seeing the OECS Prime Ministers
18	in New Delhi later this month at CHOGM.
19	
20	HOWE
21	NNNN
22	
23	
24	
25	

///
//
/



NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) P F RICKETTS		
Telephone number 233-4641		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister.
✓ You may like to
discuss with the Foreign
Secretary at your next meeting.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 November 1983

A.J.C. 14/11.

Dear John,

Aid to Grenada

Thank you for your letter of 7 November recording the view of the Prime Minister that we should not ourselves give aid to Grenada.

As you know, the Foreign Secretary announced in the House during the Foreign Affairs Debate on 3 November that a message had already been sent to Sir Paul Scoon offering to resume our former bilateral aid relationship with Grenada involving capital aid and technical co-operation. As agreed at Cabinet that day, Sir Geoffrey mentioned no figure for British aid to Grenada. But this offer to resume our earlier aid relationship has been accepted by the Governor General, and, as the Prime Minister explained in her letter to Mr Seaga, a team of ODA advisers has recently been in Grenada assessing the options. This offer was made against the background that Ministers had indicated their willingness to consider a request from the previous Grenada Government to resume the capital aid programme if the regime adopted a more acceptable attitude towards human rights and the holding of elections.

There are a number of areas in which Britain would be well placed to help. The provision of advisers in the field of police training is one in which a rapid response could make a material contribution to stability on the Island. This is an area in which we have traditionally helped the Caribbean states. We also have considerable experience in assisting the banana industry in the other Windward Islands and may be able to help revive the flagging fortunes of the industry in Grenada.

The full extent of Grenada's needs is not yet clear, nor is the amount of aid which other donor countries and institutions are prepared to offer. However, initial reports from our own team of advisers suggest that the cessation of capital aid and technical co-operation from Cuba and the Eastern bloc and the breaking of trade links with these countries will quickly compound the difficulties of an already weakened economy.

/Meeting

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



Meeting the reasonable needs of the Dependencies remains a first call on the aid programme. But we currently provide aid to all of Grenada's independent Commonwealth neighbours in the Eastern Caribbean (St Lucia, Dominica, St Vincent, Antigua and Barbados, and St Kitts and Nevis) at an average rate of about £1 million a year for each country. The renewal of our commitment to Grenada at this time would undoubtedly be welcomed within the region and give practical expression to our desire to see a return to normality in Grenada as quickly as possible.

Against this background, the Foreign Secretary takes the view that we should confirm our offer to resume aid and that we should consider further the specific areas in which we could help in the light of the report of our advisory team. The Prime Minister is aware that the sum we had in mind was £2 million, to cover both immediate and longer term development needs. It would be possible for ODA to accommodate a sum of this size which would provide the basis for a programme two or more years ahead.

Yours ever,

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

Peter Ricketts

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

ADVANCE COPY

Prime Minister

HD/EMERGENCY UNIT
 HD/AM D
 HD/MCAD
 HD/UND
 HD/PUSD
 HD/DEF DEPT
 HD/NEWS DEPT
 HD/INFO DEPT
 HD/PROTOCOL DEPT
 HD/ECD(E)
 HD/ECD(I)
 HD/CCD
 HD/CONSULAR DEPT
 HD/SOV DEPT
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 HD/RESEARCH DEPT
 HD/EED
 HD/NAD

PS (2)
 PS/LADY YOUNG
 PS/MR WHITNEY
 PS/PUS
 SIR J BULLARD
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR URE
 MR CARTLEDGE
 MR HANNAY
 MR ADAMS
 MR FREELAND)
 MR BICKFORD) LEGAL ADVISERS
 MR EDWARDS)
 SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE
 CABINET OFFICE
 NO 10 DOWNING ST
 MOD, RC
 MOD (DI 4)
 RESIDENT CLERK

UNCLASSIFIED

FM GRENADA 121935Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 39 OF 12 NOVEMBER 83

INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN AND HAVANA

YOUR TEL NO 358 TO BRIDGETOWN

GRENADA: OVERSEAS REPRESENTATION.

1. THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL WILL PROVIDE ME WITH A FORMAL WRITTEN REQUEST ASKING BRITAIN TO ASSUME THE ROLE OF PROTECTING POWER FOR GRENADA WHERE THERE IS NO OPCS REPRESENTATION. JIMMY EMMANUEL, MFA, TOLD ME HE WOULD GET THIS TO ME ON MONDAY. I WILL TELEGRAPH THE TEXT.

2. THE GG HAD A LIST OF 192 GRENADIAN STUDENTS IN CUBA BUT BELIEVED THERE MAY BE MORE THAN THIS. THERE ARE 14 STUDENTS IN THE USSR AND 18 IN GDR. THERE ARE ABOUT FOURTEEN GRENADIANS WORKING IN LIBYA. THIS GROUP TRANSITTED LONDON EN ROUTE TO LIBYA LAST MARCH. EMMANUEL WAS NOT, HOWEVER, AWARE OF THESE.

KELLY.

GRS 00130



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <u>PREM 19</u>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <u>1049</u> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <u>Folio 13:</u> Washington telegian no. 3404 to FCO dated 11 November 1983	
CLOSED FOR <u>40</u> YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<u>4 June 2013</u> <u>AWayland</u>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

GRS 280

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DESKBY 111600Z

FM BONN 111420Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1015 OF 11 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, ATHENS, PARIS, ROME, UKDEL NATO

mf

MY TELNO 1000: FRG VIEWS ON GRENADA

1. CHANCELLOR KOHL SPOKE IN THE BUNDESTAG ON 10 NOVEMBER IN A SHORT DEBATE ON GRENADA INSTIGATED BY THE SPD IN CONNECTION WITH STATE SECRETARY SPRANGER'S VISIT TO THE ISLAND (SEE MIFT, NOT TO ALL). HIS STATEMENT AVOIDED EVEN IMPLIED CRITICISM OF THE US, APART FROM A RE-STATEMENT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL GERMAN COMMITMENT TO POLITICAL SOLUTIONS. IN CONTRAST TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT STATEMENT OF 26 OCTOBER (MY TELNO 949) HE NEITHER EXPRESSED REGRET AT THE INTERVENTION, NOR SAID THAT, HAD THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BEEN CONSULTED, IT WOULD HAVE ADVISED AGAINST IT. NOR DID HE ADDRESS THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE US ACTION.

2. THOUGH KOHL AGAIN MAINTAINED THAT A FINAL VERDICT COULD NOT BE REACHED TILL ALL THE FACTS WERE KNOWN, HE ARGUED THAT THE PRESENCE OF ARMED CUBANS ON THE ISLAND WAS IMPORTANT: THAT EVENTS IN NICARAGUA HAD CREATED AN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS SITUATION IN THE REGION: AND THAT

THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN GRENADA FORCED ONE TO CONCLUDE THAT THE INHABITANTS OF THE ISLAND WERE TO BE 'MADE SUBJECT TO A FOREIGN WILL'. GRENADA'S NEIGHBOURS, WHO HAD FELT THEMSELVES THREATENED, HAD APPEALED TO THE US. KOHL REJECTED ANY COMPARISON WITH AFGHANISTAN: ALL THE EVIDENCE WAS THAT THE INTERVENTION HAD BEEN ENORMOUSLY POPULAR WITH THE INHABITANTS: IT WAS INTENDED TO LEAD TO ELECTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE: MOST OF THE US TROOPS HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN AND ACCORDING TO THE US CHIEF OF STAFF, THE REMAINDER WOULD LEAVE IN TWO OR THREE WEEKS. AS HE HAD AGREED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, THE IMPORTANT THING NOW WAS TO LOOK TO THE FUTURE. GRENADA NOW HAD A CHANCE TO RESTORE DEMOCRACY, AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS WOULD BE THE GERMANS' CRITERION WHEN THEY CAME TO MAKE THEIR FINAL ASSESSMENT.

FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO HOME OFFICE, PS/MR HURD (ADVANCED AS REQUESTED)
TAYLOR

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED
WIAD
NAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
PUSD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
INFO D
PROTOCOL D
ECD'S
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD
CONS D
SOV D
EED
MAED
WED
RES D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PJS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:
MR ANNING LACPD/ODA
MOD (DI 4)
PS/MR. HURD
(HOME OFFICE)

RESTRICTED

Copy on Argentina Relations

GRS 160
UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON 102305Z NOV 83
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3395 OF 10 NOVEMBER

Read in full

WEINBERGER ON ARGENTINA AND GRENADA

1. WEINBERGER WAS ASKED THIS MORNING BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BRITISH PRESS ABOUT ARMS SUPPLIES TO ARGENTINA. WEINBERGER INDICATED THAT CERTIFICATION WOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, BUT THAT THE U.S. WOULD EXERCISE CAUTION ABOUT THE RESUMPTION OF MAJOR NEW SUPPLIES. WEINBERGER SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW IN THE FALKLANDS WAR QUOTE THE BRITISH WERE TOTALLY AND COMPLETELY CORRECT AND WE HAD A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF AID WHICH WE WERE ABLE TO GIVE VERY GLADLY TO BRITAIN IN THAT CONFLICT. WE WOULD CERTAINLY NOT WANT TO SEE THAT SITUATION DUPLICATED BY A FURTHER ATTEMPT BY ARGENTINA TO INVADE AND TRY TO TAKE-OVER THE ISLANDS UNQUOTE.
2. ON GRENADA, WEINBERGER CATEGORICALLY DENIED ALLEGATIONS OF THE BBC OVERSEAS SERVICE THAT US CASUALTY FIGURES WERE SUBSTANTIALLY HIGHER THAN HAVE BEEN ANNOUNCED: AND PLAYED DOWN US/BRITISH DIFFERENCES OVER GRENADA.

WRIGHT

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

FCO
FID
WIAD
NAD
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
FALKLAND ISLANDS

GRENADA - ANNOTATED CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS - FIRST REVISE

1974

7 February

Grenada achieves independence as a Westminster-style Parliamentary democracy. Prime Minister Sir Eric Gairy.

1979

13 March

Successful coup by the New Jewel Movement in the absence in New York of Prime Minister Gairy.

People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) led by Maurice Bishop suspends Constitution and governs through 'People's Laws'.

1983

Thursday,
13 October

Bishop ousted by hard line elements in a coup led by his deputy Bernard Coard.

Tuesday,
18 October

Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) constituted under Chairmanship of General Hudson Austin. RMC announces that lives and property of all foreign nationals would be protected.

A

Wednesday, Bridgetown
19 October Telno 304

Bishop and some of his close supporters killed. 24-hour curfew declared to last until 24 October.

/Thursday,
20 October



- B Thursday, Bridgetown
 20 October Telno 308 General Hudson Austin calls on Governor General to inform him that Revolutionary Military Council in his control, with himself as Chairman, and that he intends to announce composition of broadly based cabinet in three days. (Subsequently extended to two weeks.)
- C Port of Spain Trinidad introduces sanctions. A number of regional governments, including Cuba, as well as Commonwealth Secretary-General, express horror at killing of Bishop.
- D FCO Telno 283 Grenadian High Commissioner in London called to the FCO to be told of HMG's concern for the safety of the British Community.
- E Kingston
 Telno 291
 (sent at
 1549Z) Prime Minister Seaga announces that Jamaica would break off diplomatic relations with Grenada and ban trade.
- F Friday Bridgetown
 21 October Telno 320
 (sent at
 1815Z) PM Adams tells High Commission in Barbados that Prime Ministers Seaga and Compton pressing CARICOM Heads of Government to seek military help to re-establish legal government in Grenada.
- G FCO Telno 1752
 (sent at 2030Z) Washington Embassy asked to speak to US at appropriately senior level, passing on our concerns about Adams' ideas.

/H Washington

H Washington US assures us UK would be warned if
Telno 3064 the Americans decided to consider
(sent at 2140Z) active response to any approach
from Caribbean leaders.

I Washington US say that one US citizen may have
Telno 3070 been detained during 18 October
(sent at 2235Z) demonstration. No sign of
anti-American threat and nothing
to suggest evacuation required.

OECS Heads of Government meeting
convenes in Bridgetown to discuss
Grenada.

J Montserrat Chief Minister informs Governor that
Telno 196 OECS Heads of Government have
(sent at 2355Z) resolved unanimously to send united
military force to Grenada.

Saturday,
22 October

K Washington United States divert to Caribbean
Telno 3074 carrier group with 2,200 Marines on
(sent at 0105Z) a contingency basis in case threat
developed to US community. US under
pressure from East Caribbean States
to intervene but had taken no
decision about this. Situation
'very confused'. US told of our
concerns and need to be forewarned of
any action US might propose.

L

*Passage deleted and closed.
40 years, under FOI Exemption.
Wayland, 4 June 2013*



M FCO Telno 417 Agreement of Secretary of State
to Athens (in Athens) sought for deployment of
(sent at 1500Z) HMS Antrim to take up station
'over the horizon' from Grenada.

N Washington US National Security Council meets
Telno 3078 to consider what to do.
(sent at 1510Z)

O Bridgetown Prime Minister Adams of Barbados
Telno 329 tells High Commissioner that OECS
(sent at 1645Z) Heads of Government decided
unanimously to put together a
multinational force and to call on
other governments, including the
US, France, Venezuela and the UK
to help in restoring peace and
order in Grenada. He requests
orally but formally that UK should
participate. Letters to HMG and
other governments would be ready
later in the day.

P FCO Telno 295 Views of High Commissioner in
to Bridgetown Bridgetown sought on possibility
(sent at 1815Z) of promoting a negotiation on
restoration of constitutional
Government in Grenada.

Q Athens Telno 576 Secretary of State approves
(sent at 1940Z) redeployment of HMS Antrim.

/R Washington



R Washington NSC concludes that US should
Telno 3084 proceed very cautiously. Firm
(sent at 2150Z) request from OECS had been received
by US but no decision had been made
on how to respond. Assurance that
there would be consultation before
US decided to take any further steps.
Americans give assurances that
they are willing to help, if
necessary, with evacuation of
British citizens.

S Bridgetown High Commissioner in Bridgetown
Telno 333 reports that idea of negotiation of
constitutional Government is 'not
a starter'.

Sunday,
23 October

T Port of Spain CARICOM convenes in Port of Spain.
Telno 174 Discussion continues most of the
(sent at 1430Z) night but no consensus.

U Bridgetown Grenadian Revolutionary Military
Telno 336 Council announces a Cabinet will be
(sent at 1545Z) appointed within 10 to 14 days.

V Bridgetown Prime Minister Adams informs High
Telno 337 Commission that he expected leaders
(sent at 1625Z) of the OECS Group to send formal
requests for military support from
non-OECS countries following their
return to Barbados later in the day.

/W Washington



W	Washington Telno 3087 (sent at 2125Z)	US emissary sent to Barbados to confer with Prime Minister Adams and other OECS and Caribbean leaders. British Embassy Washington informed that US have made no decisions on further action.
X	Port of Spain Telno 175 (sent at 2400Z)	CARICOM Heads of Government meeting agrees on range of sanctions against Grenada - but no agreement on military action.
Y	Monday, 24 October Bridgetown Telnos 342 to 345 (sent at 0299Z to 0445Z)	<p>Reports of Deputy High Commissioner's visit to Grenada on 22/23 October. Governor General well, says he doubts if he could ask for outside help. (Telnos 342-344.)</p> <p>Prime Minister Adams of Barbados asks British High Commission whether HMG has decided how to respond to the OECS initiative. Emphasises that British contribution to the multi-national force would be of greatest value and suggests SAS operation to ensure Governor-General's safety. High Commissioner asks if request now formalised. Adams promises text by first thing Monday. (Telno 345.)</p> <p>ODEM meets to consider HMG's response to Prime Minister Adams' oral request for British participation in multinational force.</p>

1000 hours

/Z FCO

Z	FCO Telno 1759 to Washington (sent at 1445Z)	HM Ambassador instructed to inform US authorities that HMG sees no grounds on which military intervention could be justified internationally and Governor General should not be made focal point of any intervention.
AA	FCO Telno 298 to Bridgetown (sent at 1500Z)	Following a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Ten in Athens, Greek Presidency expresses European horror at killings. Commission decides to suspend aid payments and cancel EC Mission to Grenada.
	1550 hours	Secretary of State's first statement on Grenada in the House of Commons.
BB	FCO Telno 299 to Bridgetown (sent at 1812Z)	High Commissioner advised to warn Adams about our concern over position of Governor General.
CC	Bridgetown Telnos 347 and 348 (sent at 1907Z and 1900Z)	OECS statement handed to British High Commissioner in Barbados informing HMG and other friendly governments of intention to take action under Article 8 of the OECS Treaty for the collective defence and preservation of peace and security against external aggression and requesting assistance from friendly governments. High Commissioner recommends that we should respond providing US do so. US Ambassador says that no political decision to intervene has yet been taken.

/DD Washington



DD	Washington Telno 3096 (sent at 2105Z)	Arguments in FCO telno 1759 put to Admiral Howe in absence of Eagleburger.
EE	Bridgetown MODUK Telno 242120Z (sent at 2120Z)	DA Caribbean informed of details of invasion plan by Assistant Chief of Staff Jamaica Defence Force.
FF	Washington Telno 3099 (sent at 2130Z)	US confirm they are actively considering the possibility of responding to the request from OECS and other Caribbean States to help restore peace and order in Grenada. No decision yet on how to respond. McNeil (President's Special Representative) consulting the Eastern Caribbean Heads of Government in Barbados about what they have in mind.
GG	1915 hours	President Reagan informs Prime Minister that he is giving serious consideration to OECS request and undertakes to inform Prime Minister in advance if it is decided that US forces should take part in collective security force.
	2100 hours	HMS Antrim arrives in general area of Grenada.
	2300 hours, approx	Second message received at No 10 from President Reagan informing Prime Minister that he has decided to respond positively to OECS request.
	Tuesday, 25 October 0030 hours	Prime Minister's reply despatched to President Reagan.

/0048 hours



0048 hours

Prime Minister telephones President Reagan to say that she has replied to his messages and to ask him to consider her replies very carefully indeed. President Reagan undertakes to do so.

0745 hours

Further message to Prime Minister from President Reagan. Weighed very carefully issues raised by Prime Minister. He believes them to be outweighed by other factors.

HH

Bridgetown
Telno 349
(sent at 2345Z
24 Oct:
Deskby
0900Z
25 Oct)

British High Commissioner says evidence suggests invasion will go ahead without UK and could be mounted as early as first light 25 October but guesses it will not start for at least 48 hours.

II

FCO Telno 302
to Bridgetown
(sent at 0210Z)

High Commissioner told UK making representations in Washington and to take no action without further instructions.

JJ

FCO Telno 1768
to Washington
(sent at 0224Z)

Ambassador instructed to reinforce urgently at highest possible level point in Prime Minister's message to the President about risks to British citizens saying we look to Americans to protect British lives and property.

0940 hours

Multinational forces land in Grenada.



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minutes.

I confirm that all the
members of the new Advisory
Council in Grenada are
Grenadians.

A. J. C. 10/11.

mf

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 November, 1983

N.S.P. R.

A.J.C. /u.

Dear John,

Grenada: Interim Administration

The Prime Minister might find it useful in preparation for Mr Ramphal's call today to have some comments on the Governor-General's proclamation setting up an Advisory Council and on the statement which he made in Grenada yesterday when announcing the names of the people who had agreed to serve on the Council (copies enclosed).

We think the Governor-General has proceeded very sensibly in the way in which he has gone about setting up the interim administration. He is clearly relying extensively on the advice of Mr Rushford, the former FCO Legal Adviser. The proclamation establishing the Advisory Council steers a satisfactory course between Mr McIntyre's desire to be a technocrat and the Governor-General's duty to step back from day to day involvement in executive government. Although at first sight the Council is not automatically fully executive it must normally give advice before the Governor-General can act and the Governor-General's scope for action on his own account is extremely limited. Once the Council begins to operate, the Chairman will be able to form a judgement of its effectiveness, and to ask the Governor-General to transfer executive powers to it at an appropriate rate.

The Governor-General's statement on 9 November announcing the names of the members of the Council was also sensible. He stressed the importance of building up the Grenadian Police Force and referred to the need to continue to depend on the Commonwealth Caribbean contingent for the time being for the maintenance of law and order. He added that they were looking at contingency plans to fill any vacuum that might be created by the withdrawal of US forces.

We were glad to see that Mr Rushford had not actually been appointed Attorney-General or a member of the Council as had been proposed. We think it best that he should remain in the background as a Legal Adviser to assist the Council in its work when necessary. The membership of the Council reflects McIntyre's desire for an interim administration made up of technocrats. The people selected also reflect the Governor-General's own background in teaching. We do not have much information about most of them. But they appear to be a worthy group of people, perhaps somewhat lacking in

CONFIDENTIAL

/imagination

CONFIDENTIAL



imagination and enterprise. There are no representatives from commerce or industry on the Council but the Council will presumably work closely with the Chamber of Commerce in Grenada. Mr Cruickshank who has the crucial agriculture portfolio is very well qualified and should do a good job.

Our High Commission in Bridgetown are sending by telegram further comments on the members of the interim administration.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1049</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Text of Address delivered by Governor-General on 9 November 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR <i>40</i> YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>4 June 2013 C. Wayland</i>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED

TEL U/N OF 9 NOV

FOLLOWING FROM RUSHFORD LEGAL ADVISER TO GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF GRENADA
FOR COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL COPY TO SIR PHILLIP MOORE.
GRENADA: CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PROCLAMATION MADE ON 4 NOVEMBER
REFERRED TO IN GRENADA TELEGRAM OF 8 NOV.

BEGINS:

- 1: (1) IN THIS PROCLAMATION-
"THE EXISTING LAWS" MEANS ALL LAWS THAT WERE IN FORCE IN
GRENADA IMMEDIATELY BEFORE 19 OCTOBER 1983 (THAT IS TO SAY,
THE DAY ON WHICH THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT WAS
OVER THROWN) AND INCLUDES ANY PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF GRENADA THAT ARE DECLARED TO BE IN FORCE BY OR UNDER
THIS PROCLAMATION:

"THE CONSTITUTION OF GRENADA" MEANS THE CONSTITUTION THAT
CAME INTO FORCE ON 7 FEBRUARY 1974 AND WAS SUSPENDED BY
PEOPLE'S LAW NO.1.
- (2) REFERENCES IN THIS PROCLAMATION TO PEOPLE'S LAWS ARE
REFERENCES TO LAWS ENACTED IN 1979.
- 2: (1) IT IS HEREBY DECLARED, FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBTS, THAT THE
EXISTING LAWS CONTINUE TO BE IN FORCE IN GRENADA EXCEPT TO
THE EXTENT THAT IT IS HERINAFTER PROVIDED IN THIS PROCLAMA-
TION TO THE CONTRARY.
- (2) THE EXISTING LAWS SHALL HAVE EFFECT SUBJECT TO SUCH
ADAPTATIONS, MODIFICATIONS, EXCEPTIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS
AS MAY BE NECESSARY OR EXPEDIENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVE
OPERATION IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF GRENADA ON AND AFTER 19
OCTOBER 1983 AND (IN PARTICULAR AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO
THE GENERALITY OF THE FOREGOING) SUBJECT TO SUCH PROVISION
AS HAS HERETOFORE BEEN MADE SINCE THAT DAY BY THE GOVERNOR-
GENERAL BY PROCLAMATION.
- 3: IT IS HEREBY FURTHER DECLARED, FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBTS,
THAT (BY REASON OF THE OVERTHROW OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLU-
TIONARY GOVERNMENT ON 19 OCTOBER 1983) PEOPLE'S LAW NO.2
SO MUCH OF PEOPLE'S LAW NO.3 AS FOLLOWS THE WORDS "GOVERNOR
-GENERAL", PEOPLE'S LAW NO.10, PEOPLE'S LAW NO.16 AND
PEOPLE'S LAW NO.18 CEASED TO BE OPERATIVE AND LAPSED ON
19 OCTOBER 1983 AND ACCORDINGLY THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER
II OF THE CONSTITUTION OF GRENADA (RELATING TO THE GOVERNOR-
GENERAL) AND OF SECTION 57 (1) AND (2) OF THE CONSTITUTION
(RELATING TO THE EXERCISE OF THE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY OF
GRENADA), TO SUCH EXTENT (IF ANY) AS THEY MAY HAVE BEEN
SUSPENDED BY PEOPLE'S LAW NO.1 AND PEOPLE'S LAW NO.2 READ
WITH PEOPLE'S LAW NO.3, THEREUPON CEASED TO BE SUSPENDED,
THUS HAVING FULL FORCE AND EFFECT ON AND AFTER 19 OCTOBER
1983.
- 4: (1) IT IS HEREBY FURTHER DECLARED THAT THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER
I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF GRENADA (RELATING TO THE PROTECTION
OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS) ARE ONCE MORE IN FORCE.
- (2) SECTION 15 OF CHAPTER I (RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF
PERSONS DETAINED UNDER EMERGENCY LAWS) SHALL APPLY ONLY
IN RELATION TO SUCH PERSONS OR CLASSES OF PERSONS AS MAY
BE SPECIFIED BY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL BY ORDER.
- (3) SECTION 16 OF CHAPTER I (RELATING TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF
PROTECTIVE PROVISIONS) SHALL NOT APPLY IN RELATION TO
ANYTHING DONE BEFORE THE MAKING OF THIS PROCLAMATION.
- (4) A STATE OF EMERGENCY EXISTS FOR THE PURPOSES OF CHAPTER I.

/ 5: IT IS

- 5: IT IS HEREBY FURTHER DECLARED THAT THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, AND 74 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF GRENADA (RELATING RESPECTIVELY TO THE CONSTITUTION OF OFFICES ETC., TO THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, TO THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS, TO THE PREROGATIVE OF MERCY, TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE PREROGATIVE OF MERCY AND TO THE FUNCTIONS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE) ARE ONCE MORE IN FORCE.
- 6: IT IS HEREBY FURTHER DECLARED THAT NOTHING IN PEOPLE'S LAW NO.1 SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE AFFECTED THE OPERATION OF CHAPTER VII OF THE CONSTITUTION OF GRENADA (RELATING TO CITIZENSHIP) AND THAT CHAPTER VII, TO THE EXTENT (IF ANY) THAT IT WAS SUSPENDED, IS ONCE MORE IN FORCE.
- 7: ANY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF GRENADA THAT CONTINUE TO BE SUSPENDED BY VIRTUE OF PEOPLE'S LAW NO.1 (THAT IS TO SAY ALL OF THOSE PROVISIONS EXCEPT THOSE DECLARED BY THIS PROCLAMATION TO BE IN FORCE) MAY BE BROUGHT INTO FORCE ONCE MORE BY ORDER OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL SUBJECT TO SUCH MODIFICATIONS (IF ANY) AS MAY BE SPECIFIED IN THE ORDER AND ANY SUCH ORDER MAY BE AMENDED OR REVOKED BY FURTHER ORDER OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.
- 8: PEOPLE'S LAW NO.7, PEOPLE'S LAW NO.8, PEOPLE'S LAW NO.21 AND PEOPLE'S LAW NO.45 ARE REVOKED.
- 9: THIS PROCLAMATION MAY BE CITED AS PROCLAMATION NO.3 AND THE TWO PROCLAMATIONS MADE BY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL ON 31 OCTOBER 1983 AND PUBLISHED IN GOVERNMENT GAZETTE NO.49 MAY BE CITED RESPECTIVELY AS PROCLAMATION NO.1 AND PROCLAMATION NO.2.
- 10: THE PROCLAMATION MADE ON 1 NOVEMBER 1983 AND PUBLISHED AS STATUTORY RULES AND ORDERS NO.19 OF 1983 BEING NO LONGER NECESSARY, IS REVOKED

ENDS.

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED

WIAD
NAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
PUSD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
INFO D
PROTOCOL D
ECD'S
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD
CONS D
SOV D
EED
MAED
WED
RES D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

MR ANNING LACPD/OD
MOD (DI 4)
COMMONWEALTH
SECRETARY GENE
SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALAC

Subject

✓ the Master
of



file

BM

cfo

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 November 1983

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T180/83

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for setting out so clearly in your letter of 26 October the reasons why Jamaica decided to join with the OECS countries in military intervention in Grenada.

We had been watching the situation in Grenada closely, and were as distressed as you at the turn of events there. After very careful consideration, we came to the view that political and economic measures offered the best prospect of encouraging a return to democratic government: an objective which I know we all share. This was a very difficult decision. You came to a different conclusion on the facts available to you. Once the military operation had begun, however, my concern was to do everything possible to avoid hindering it.

I am as sad as anyone that this difference arose between us. But I believe that we must now look to the future. We stand ready to help in whatever way we can with the re-establishment of constitutional democracy in Grenada. The Commonwealth may be able to play a useful role in bringing about a return to normal life in Grenada, for instance by assisting in the organisation and holding of elections if that is what the Grenadians want. We welcome the efforts the Commonwealth Secretary-General is making to this end. Geoffrey Howe announced in the House of Commons last week that we wanted to respond positively to requests

/ for help

da

for help in this field. We have already sent a high-level team to the island to assess the problems and make proposals. We shall be resuming our bilateral aid relationship with Grenada, which will involve capital assistance as well as technical co-operation.

I would like to stay in close touch with you and with the other Commonwealth Caribbean Governments about the way ahead. There is much to be done if the people of Grenada are to profit from the second chance for democracy which has been opened up for them.

Yours sincerely
Raymond Shabbar

The Rt. Hon. Edward Seaga, M.P.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 100045Z NOVEMBER 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3383 OF 9 NOV

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN, UKMIS NEW YORK, BRIDGETOWN
KINGSTON, GEORGETOWN, PORT OF SPAIN, BELMOPAN, OTTAWA

MY TELNO 3281 (NOT TO ALL): GRENADA: US OPINION

1. US OPINION HAS CONTINUED TO SOLIDIFY BEHIND THE PRESIDENT. THE DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP, WHICH WAS INITIALLY DISPOSED TO CRITICISE THE US INTERVENTION, HAS NOW SWUNG ROUND TO SUPPORT IT. IN PARTICULAR TIP O'NEILL HAS RECANTED AND IS NOW SAYING THAT THE INTERVENTION WAS JUSTIFIED. CONGRESSMAN BARNES, A LEADING DEMOCRATIC CRITIC OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S CENTRAL AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN POLICIES, PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE IN TODAY'S WASHINGTON POST SETTING OUT IN FULL HIS REASONS FOR REACHING THE SAME CONCLUSION. THIS APPEARS OPPOSITE A FIRST LEADER ON THE POST'S NORMALLY LIBERAL EDITORIAL PAGE HEADED QUOTE GRENADA: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED UNQUOTE WHICH CONCLUDES THAT THE PRESIDENT MADE THE RIGHT DECISION, REDEEMING A TRULY DISTURBING SITUATION WITH AN ECONOMICAL USE OF FORCE BUT WARNING HIM OFF ANY GENERALISATION OF THIS PRACTICE. THERE IS A MOOD OF NATIONAL SATISFACTION AND PRIDE IN THE U.S. MILITARY, WHO WERE ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH THE TASK WITH FEW CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.

2. THIS HAS THROWN INTO SHARPER RELIEF AN UNDERCURRENT OF CRITICISM, PARTICULARLY ON THE HILL AND IN PUBLIC SENTIMENT, ABOUT THE EUROPEAN AND PARTICULARLY THE BRITISH ATTITUDE. MANY AMERICANS HAVE FELT HURT AND ANGRY THAT AFTER THEIR SUPPORT FOR US OVER THE FALKLANDS, WE HAVE BEEN SO FORTHRIGHT IN EXPRESSING OUR DISAGREEMENT WITH THEM OVER GRENADA. THIS SENSE OF INJURY HAS STRENGTHENED AS EVIDENCE HAS BEEN PUBLISHED OF THE EXTENT OF CUBAN AND EAST EUROPEAN PENETRATION IN GRENADA. AMERICANS FEEL THAT THIS, TOGETHER WITH THE OVERWHELMING GRENADIAN WELCOME FOR THE MULTI-NATIONAL INTERVENTION AS A RESCUE OPERATION, MORE THAN JUSTIFIED THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION. THEY ARE PUZZLED THAT WE AND OTHER EUROPEANS ARE SLOW TO RECOGNISE THIS.

3. SENATOR JOHN TOWER, WHO VISITED GRENADA LAST WEEKEND, TOLD THE MINISTER TODAY THAT IN HIS VIEW THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES WERE NOT AS CLEAR-CUT AS WE SUGGESTED. IN THE GRENADAN CASE, IT WAS CLEAR THAT A MILITARY GROUP HAD ESTABLISHED ITSELF IN POWER WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. HE THOUGHT THAT HISTORY WOULD JUDGE THAT THE US HAD BEEN RIGHT TO JOIN WITH THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES IN MEETING THE GRAVE THREAT THEY PERCEIVED TO THEIR OWN STABILITY. HE RECOGNISED THAT THIS PRINCIPLE COULD NOT BE APPLIED TO ALL SUCH SITUATIONS. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE PRESIDENT GOING ON A CRUSADE TO OVERTURN MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS AROUND THE WORLD. SUCH AN IDEA WAS ABSURD. BUT HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE AMERICAN ACTION IN GRENADA WOULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO STABILITY IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA AND WOULD HAVE GIVEN THE CUBANS AND THEIR ALLIES FURIOUSLY TO THINK.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. TOWER HIMSELF MUCH REGRETTED THE CONTRACTION OF BRITAIN'S INFLUENCE ROUND THE WORLD. HE RECOGNISED THE NEED FOR US TO MATCH OUR MILITARY EFFORT WITH OUR RESOURCES. BUT THE US DID NOT WANT TO BE QUOTE OUT THERE UNQUOTE ON THEIR OWN. THEY NEEDED THE BRITISH ALONGSIDE THEM. IN THE CARIBBEAN IT WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD MAINTAIN OUR GARRISON IN BELIZE. HE HAD SEEN FOR HIMSELF HOW MUCH DAMAGE OUR RESPONSE ON GRENADA HAD DONE TO CONFIDENCE IN BRITAIN AMONG THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES. HE HOPED WE WOULD MEND OUR FENCES WITH THEM.

5. TOWER AND OTHER WELL-DISPOSED SENATORS HAVE BEEN DISMAYED AT THE MOOD OF ANTI-AMERICANISM IN BRITAIN AND ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE WHICH HAS BEEN FED BY THIS EPISODE. LIKE SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATION, THEY REGRET THE PERFUNCTORY NATURE OF CONSULTATION OVER THE US ACTION IN GRENADA. BUT THEY ARGUE THAT IF ACTION WAS TO BE TAKEN, IT HAD TO BE SWIFT AND DETERMINED. GIVEN THE PRESSURES UNDER WHICH THE PRESIDENT AND HIS PRINCIPAL ADVISERS WERE WORKING, THEY TEND TO FEEL THAT FULLER CONSULTATION MAY NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE. THEY RECOGNISE THAT THIS MAY HAVE RESULTED IN SOME EROSION OF CONFIDENCE. V

6. THERE IS A GENERAL DESIRE NOW TO PUT THE DIFFERENCE OVER GRENADA BEHIND US. IT IS NOT GENERALLY SEEN AS SIGNIFICANT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP. THERE IS ADMIRATION FOR THE FIRM LINE THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN TAKING ON INF DEPLOYMENT. BUT THERE IS SOME CONCERN THAT MUTUAL IRRITATION OVER GRENADA MIGHT SPILL OVER INTO OTHER PROBLEMS, IN PARTICULAR ARGENTINA AND EVENTUAL ARMS SUPPLIES. ON THIS THE AMERICANS FACE A DIFFICULT DILEMMA. THEY HAVE A CLEAR VIEW OF THEIR OWN INTEREST IN NURTURING A HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NEW DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT IN BUENOS AIRES. BUT AT THE SAME TIME THEY ARE FULLY ALIVE TO OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE SUPPLY OF SENSITIVE ITEMS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ARGENTINA. CERTIFICATION, HOWEVER, IS LINKED EXPLICITLY IN U.S. LEGISLATION TO THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: AND IT IS REGARDED HERE AS INEVITABLE THAT CERTIFICATION WILL BE GRANTED ONCE ARGENTINA RETURNS TO CIVILIAN RULE.

WRIGHT

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED

WIAD
NAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
PUSD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
INFO D
PROTOCOL D
ECD'S
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD
CONS D
SOV D
EED
MAED
WED
RES D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:
MR ANNING LACPD/ODA
MOD (DI 4)

-2-

CONFIDENTIAL

GRENADA

ADVANCE COPIES

39

HD/ [REDACTED] WIAD.
 HD/S AM D
 HD/MCAD
 HD/UND
 HD/PUSD
 HD/DEF DEPT
 HD/NEWS DEPT
 HD/INFO DEPT
 HD/PROTOCOL DEPT
 HD/ECD(E)
 HD/ECD(I)
 HD/CCD
 HD/CONSULAR DEPT
 HD/SOV DEPT
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 HD/RESEARCH DEPT
 HD/EED
 HD/NAD

PS (2)

PS/LADY YOUNG
 PS/MR WHITNEY
 PS/FUS
 SIR J BULLARD
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR URE
 MR CARTLEDGE
 MR HANNAY
 MR ADAMS
 MR FREELAND)
 MR BICKFORD) LEGAL ADVISERS
 MR EDWARDS)
 SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE
 CABINET OFFICE
 NO 10 DOWNING ST
 MOD, RC
 MOD (DI 4)
 RESIDENT CLERK



GR 780

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKDEL NATO 091659Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 264 OF 9 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PRIORITY PARIS BONN ROME MADRID OSLO
BRUSSELSINFO SAVING ANKARA ATHENS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE LISBON LUXEMBOURG
OTTAWA REYKJAVIK UKDEL VIENNA

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, 9 NOVEMBER: PRESENTATION BY US UNDER-
 SECRETARY OF STATE DAM: GRENADA

SUMMARY

1. DAM BRIEFED THE COUNCIL ON GRENADA, INF, AND LEBANON IN THAT
 ORDER. ON GRENADA HE EXPLAINED THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS FOR US ACTION
 AND STRESSED THAT IT DID NOT CREATE A PRECEDENT. MY IMMEDIATELY
 FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS COVER INF AND LEBANON.

DETAIL

2. DAM CONCENTRATED HIS PRESENTATION ON GRENADA BECAUSE US ACTIONS
 THERE QUOTE HAVE NOT BEEN WELL UNDERSTOOD IN EUROPE AND SOME ALLIED
 GOVERNMENTS FELT COMPELLED TO ACT BEFORE THEY COULD CONSIDER
 ALL THE ARGUMENTS AND ALL THE FACTS UNQUOTE.

3. US ACTIONS WERE GROUNDED IN 3 SOURCES OF LEGAL AUTHORITY:
 A) AN APPEAL BY GOVERNOR GENERAL SCOON FOR ACTION BY THE
 ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES (O ECS) AND REGIONAL
 STATES. THE APPEAL HAD BEEN MADE ON 24 OCTOBER BUT COULD NOT BE
 MADE PUBLIC UNTIL 26 OCTOBER BECAUSE OF THE DANGER TO SIR PAUL
 SCOON'S LIFE. AFTER THE COUP AGAINST BISHOP HE REMAINED THE SOLE
 SOURCE OF GOVERNMENTAL LEGITIMACY ON GRENADA AND HIS APPEAL WAS
 THEREFORE ACCORDED QUOTE EXCEPTIONAL MORAL AND LEGAL WEIGHT
 UNQUOTE.

B. AN APPEAL TO THE US BY THE O ECS STATES TO ASSIST THEM IN
 RESPONDING TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S APPEAL. THE O ECS ACTION
 WAS LAWFUL: BOTH THE OAS CHARTER AND THE UN CHARTER RECOGNISED
 THE COMPETENCE OF REGIONAL SECURITY BODIES TO ENSURE PEACE AND
 STABILITY.

C. PROTECTION OF US NATIONALS. INTERNATIONAL LAW DID NOT REQUIRE

STABILITY.

C) PROTECTION OF US NATIONALS. INTERNATIONAL LAW DID NOT REQUIRE A GOVERNMENT TO AWAIT ACTUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST ITS CITIZENS BEFORE TAKING ACTION. THE US HAD NOT BEEN PREPARED TO RISK ANOTHER HOSTAGE-TAKING ON THE IRANIAN MODEL.

N.S. 11
4. DAM PARTICULARLY STRESSED THAT THE US HAD NOT AND DID NOT INTEND TO ESTABLISH ANY BROAD NEW PRECEDENT FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION. THE CIRCUMSTANCES WERE UNIQUE. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR US ACTION WAS NARROWLY AND PRECISELY DRAWN AND WELL WITHIN ACCEPTED CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

5. US TROOPS ON GRENADA HAD ALREADY FOUND A LARGE INVENTORY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THE ORIGINAL TEXTS OF 5 SECRET TREATIES SIGNED DURING BISHOP'S GOVERNMENT (3 WITH THE SOVIET UNION, 1 WITH CUBA, AND 1 WITH NORTH KOREA) HAD ALSO BEEN DISCOVERED. TOGETHER THEY PROVIDED FOR THE DONATION OF US DOLLARS 37.8 MILLION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO GRENADA. (COPIES OF THE SECRET TREATIES CIRCULATED BY THE US DELEGATION HAVE BEEN SENT BY BAG TO DEFENCE DEPARTMENT TOGETHER WITH DAM'S DETAILS OF ARMS FOUND. THE TEXT OF DAM'S REMARKS HAS ALSO BEEN COPIED TO WASHINGTON.)

6. THE UNITED STATES WAS WITHDRAWING ITS TROOPS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. US POLICY ON A PEACE KEEPING FORCE AND ON AID TO GRENADA WOULD BE GUIDED BY THE PREFERENCES OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL, THE ITERIM GOVERNMENT ON GRENADA, AND THE WISHES OF THE OECAS STATES.

7. IN THE DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWED I DREW ON THE SPEAKING NOTES PROVIDED BY THE DEPARTMENT. I STRESSED THAT THE UK WANTED TO CONCENTRATE ON THE WAY FORWARD, AND WAS WILLING TO HELP E.G WITH POLICE TRAINING. THERE SHOULD BE ADEQUATE PREPARATIONS TO ENSURE A FULLY DEMOCRATIC ELECTION SO THAT NO CLAIMS COULD BE MADE THAT A PUPPET GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN INSTALLED ON GRENADA. SEVERAL PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES WELCOMED DAM'S EXPLANATION OF THE LEGAL BASIS FOR US ACTION. CAHEN (DIRECTOR GENERAL, BELGIAN MFA) SAID THE BELGIAN POSITION WAS BASED ON A BALANCE BETWEEN THE PRINCIPLE OF NON INTERVENTION AND THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION. OTHERS WERE LESS KIND. NORWAY NOTED THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF NON INTERVENTION WAS OF EXTREME IMPORTANCE AND WHILE DAM'S ASSERTION THAT NO PRECEDENT HAD BEEN SET WAS SATISFACTORY THE CAPACITY OF HOSTILE STATES TO EXPLOIT THE US ACTION SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED. THE DISCOVERY OF SECRET ARMS CACHES WOULD BE DANGEROUS IF QUOTED AS A JUSTIFICATION. (DAM CONFIRMED THAT THE US HAD NO INTENTION OF USING ANY JUSTIFICATION OTHER THAN THE 3 IN PARA 3 ABOVE.) THE SPANISH REPRESENTATIVE SAID HIS COUNTRY COULD NOT CONDONE MILITARY INTERVENTION OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UN CHARTER. SPAIN WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF THE US INTERVENTION ON THE GENERAL CENTRAL AMERICAN AREA, WHERE SPAIN WAS TRYING TO BE HELPFUL. MERILLON (FRANCE) SAID BRIEFLY THAT THE FRENCH POSITION WAS CLEAR AND HAD BEEN EXPRESSED JURIDICALLY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTES.

8. THE REMARKS ABOVE DID NOT PREVENT DR LUNS FROM COMMENTING THAT DAM HAD FOUND BROAD SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED STATES FROM AROUND THE TABLE.

FCO PASS SAVING ANKARA ATHENS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE LISBON LUXEMBOURG OTTAWA REYKJAVIK UKDEL VIENNA

GRAHAM

GRS 480

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

FM BRIDGETOWN 090038Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAMNO 433 OF 8 NOV

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON ,UK MIS NEW YORK

ROUTINE DTI, ECGD

Mr. F. Fisher.

*A line to take by Owen
on all this will be needed.*

A J.C. 9/11

GRENADA

MR S HOBSON A VERY PUSHY SALESMAN OF NSG EXPORTS LTD WHO ARE ASSOCIATED WITH PLESSEY IN THE LATTER'S CONTRACT TO PROVIDE EQUIPMENT FOR THE NEW AIRPORT PROJECT IS CURRENTLY IN BARBADOS. HOBSON TELEPHONED DHC LAST WEEK TO EXPRESS HIS SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT (A) WHAT MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED TO THE EQUIPMENT ALREADY DELIVERED TO THE AIRFILED SITE BY PLESSEY AND (B) WHAT WOULD NOW HAPPEN TO THE PROJECT. MR HOBSON EXPRESSED FEARS THAT UNITED STATES COMPANIES IN THE WAKE OF US MILITARY INTERVENTION WOULD BE ABLE TO MOVE IN- THEIR ENTREE PERHAPS FACILITATED BY US AID - AND TAKE OVER THE TASK OF COMPLETING THE AIRPORT. MR HOBSON ALSO FELT THAT THE RAF HERCULES SHOULD BE USED TO TRANSPORT BRITISH BUSINESSMEN TO AND FROM GRENADA.

2. DHC SUBSEQUENTLY ARRANGED WITH US EMBASSY BRIDDGETOWN FOR HOBSON TO VISIT GRENADA COURTESY OF THE USAF. ON HIS RETURN LAST WEEK-END HOBSON REPORTED (WITH CONSIDERABLE FEELING) TO DHC THAT US ARMED FORCES HAD CAUSED A LOT OF DAMAGE TO PLESSEY EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS AT THE SITE THROUGH NEGLECT , CONFISCATION OF PROTECTIVE CONTAINERS AND COVERED STORAGE AREAS FOR THEIR OWN STORAGE REQUIREMENTS. HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT MANY ITEMS WERE MISSING. AS WAS SUBSEQUENTLY REPORTED IN BARBADOS PRESS(7 NOV) QUOTING BBC SOURCES IN LONDON, EITHER HOBSON OR PLESSEY MUST HAVE SPOKEN THE BBC.

3. KELLY WHO ARRIVED IN BARBADOS TODAY FOR A FEW DAYS LEAVE, HAS TOLDUS THAT HOBSON AND ONE OF THE PLESSEY PEOPLE LEFT IN GRENADA (MR FORBES) CALLED ON HIM ON 5 NOV. HE SUBSEQUENTLY ACCOMPANIED THEM ON A CALL ON THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL WHICH THEY HAD ARRANGED . DURING THE CALL ON THE G-G , HOBSON REPORTED THE DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT CAUSED BY THE US ARMED FORCES AND SOUGHT THE G-G'S ASSISTANCE IN (1) GAINING ACCESS TO THE SITE AND (2) HAVING THE PLESSEY OFFICES/STORAGE AREA MADE OUT OF BOUNDS TO THE US FORCES. G-G SAID HE WOULD SPEAK TO GILLESPIE.

4. HOBSON ALSO ADDRESSED G-G FOR SEVERAL MINUTES ABOUT THE NEED FOR THE UK TO BE SEEN TO MAKE SOME GESTURE EG THE PROVISION OF AID TO ENABLE THE AIRPORT TO BE COMPLETED, TO COUNTER THE "DAMAGE" DONE TO ITS IMAGE IN THE CARIBBEAN, BY ITS OPPOSITION TO THE US INTERVENTION IN GRENADA. KELLY INTERJECTED TO SAY THAT SUCH REMARKS SHOULD PROPERLY BE ADDRESSED TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. G-G COMMENTED THAT HE HAD NO QUARREL AT ALL WITH BRITAIN.

RESTRICTED

15.

RESTRICTED

5. HOBSON SAW MESSERS SPEERING AND EVANS , VISITING MP'S (FCO TEL 319 TO BRIDGETOWN) YESTERDAY AND PRESUMABLY GAVE THEM AN EARFUL, WHICH NO DOUBT INCLUDED HIS VIEWS ON WHAT BRITAIN SHOULD BE PROVIDING IN THE WAY OF AID TO ASSIST PLESSEY TO TAKE OVER THE TASK OF COMPLETING THE AIRPORT - WHICH IS WHAT MR HOBSON/ PLESSEY HAVE IN MIND.

IN THAT CONTEXT HOBSON TOLD DHC THAT PLESSEY HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED THEIR PLANS FOR COMPLETING THE AIRPORT WITH URE AND OTHERS IN LONDON , AND HAD MET WITH AN ENCOURAGING RESPONSE. GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHETHER THEREIS ANY SUBSTANCE TO THIS CLAIM.

BULLARD

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED

WIAD
NAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
PUSD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
INFO D
PROTOCOL D
ECD'S
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD
CONS D
SOV D
EED
MAED
WED
RES D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

MR ANNING LACPD/ODA
MOD (DI 4)

DTI

ECLD

-2-

RESTRICTED

GRENADA

ADVANCE COPIES

39 (45)

IMMEDIATE

WIAV
 /EMERGENCY UNIT
 HD/S AM D
 HD/MCAD
 HD/UND
 HD/PUSD (2)
 HD/DEF DEPT
 HD/NEWS DEPT
 HD/INFO DEPT
 HD/PROTOCOL DEPT
 HD/ECD(E)
 HD/ECD(I)
 HD/CCD
 HD/CONSULAR DEPT
 HD/SOV DEPT
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 HD/RESEARCH DEPT
 HD/EED
 HD/NAD

PS (2)
 PS/LADY YOUNG
 PS/MR WHITNEY
 PS/PUS
 SIR J BULLARD
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR URE
 MR CARTLEDGE
 MR HANNAY
 MR ADAMS
 MR FREELAND)
 MR BICKFORD) LEGAL ADVISERS
 MR EDWARDS)
 SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE
 CABINET OFFICE
 NO 10 DOWNING ST (3)
 MOD, RC
 MOD (DI 4)
 RESIDENT CLERK

pa

Hd wed
 [DIBY 081030Z]

ADVANCE COPY

DD FCO 081030Z

OO WASHINGTON

PP ATHENS

PP PARIS

PP ROME

PP UKDEL NATO

GRS 250

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 081030Z

FM BONN 080953Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1000 OF 08 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, PARIS, ROME, UKDEL NATO

FRG VIEWS ON GRENADA

1019

FRG VIEWS ON GRENADA

1. KOHL SAID YESTERDAY THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD MAKE AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT ABOUT GRENADA AFTER DAM'S VISIT TODAY. HE HINTED STRONGLY THAT THIS STATEMENT WOULD BE LESS CRITICAL OF THE US THAN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SO FAR HAS BEEN. ASKED WHETHER HE WOULD HAVE ADVISED AGAINST INVASION IF HE HAD BEEN CONSULTED, KOHL AVOIDED DIRECT ASSENT: HE SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE MADE A LOT OF SUGGESTIONS ABOUT DOING THE THING DIFFERENTLY. HE CLAIMED THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD NOT ABANDONED THE US IN TIME OF NEED. SOME NEWSPAPERS TODAY SEE A MARKED DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND THE EVOLVING FEDERAL GERMAN POSITIONS.

2. KOHL'S REMARKS OF COURSE REFLECT HIS CONSTANT WISH TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON. HE IS ALSO UNDER PRESSURE FROM STRAUSS AND THE CSU, WHO HAVE ATTACKED THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR BEING TOO CRITICAL OF THE AMERICANS AND ABSTAINING IN THE UN.

3. THERE IS ALSO A COALITION ROW ABOUT A VISIT TO GRENADA IN THE LAST FEW DAYS BY SPRANGER, THE CSU STATE SECRETARY IN THE FEDERAL INTERIOR MINISTRY, AS A SIDE TRIP FROM A VISIT TO THE US. THERE ARE CONFLICTING STORIES IN THE PRESS ABOUT WHETHER SPRANGER CONSULTED THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE ABOUT THE VISIT. GENSCHER HAS CRITICISED THE TRIP AS INAPPROPRIATE BECAUSE GRENADA HAS NOT BEEN VISITED SINCE THE INVASION BY ANY BRITISH MINISTER AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT CAUSE TROUBLE WITH LONDON.

4. ADVANCE TO PRIVATE SECRETARY, BULLARD AND NUMBER TEN.

MALLABY

NNNN

SENT AT 081015Z GU

P0E QSL KK

GRS 470

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRIDGETOWN 082219Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 432 OF 8 NOV

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

GRENADA

1. A SIZEABLE CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION (ABOUT 44 PEOPLE INCLUDING AIDES), LEAD BY MR T FOLEY VISITED GRENADA FROM 4-6 NOVEMBER, THEN RETURNED TO BARBADOS WHERE THEY HAVE BEEN MEETING OECS LEADERS, BARBADOS GOVERNMENT LEADERS AND THE PRESS.
2. AT THE DELEGATION'S PRESS CONFERENCE IN BARBADOS YESTERDAY MR FOLEY SAID INTER ALIA THAT THEIR GENERAL CONCLUSION WAS THAT THERE HAD INDEED BEEN A SITUATION OF GRAVE UNREST IN GRENADA FOLLOWING THE DEATHS OF BISHOP AND THE OTHERS ON 19 OCTOBER. THE RIGOROUS 24 HOUR CURFEW PERIOD AND THE INABILITY, OR ABORTIVE ATTEMPTS OF THE US CONSULAR AUTHORITIES TO EVACUATE US CITIZENS HAD ALSO BEEN MATTERS OF GRAVE CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES.
3. MR FOLEY REPORTEDLY WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO SAY WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED IF THE US HAD NOT INTERVENED BUT THE DELEGATION WERE PLEASED WITH THE CONDUCT OF AND THE EFFICIENCY WITH WHICH THE US ARMED FORCES HAD CARRIED OUT THEIR TASK.
4. AGAIN AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE, MR FOLEY APPARENTLY HINTED AT POSSIBLE UNITED STATES AID TO FACILITATE THE COMPLETION OF THE POINT SALINES AIRPORT. TODAY'S BARBADOS PRESS REPORTED HIM AS SAYING THAT THE NEW AIRPORT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR GRENADA AND THE UNITED STATES OUGHT TO PROVIDE THE ASSISTANCE NEEDED TO FILL THE VACUUM CREATED BY THE DEPARTURE OF THE CUBANS. COMMENT: A MEMBER OF THE US AID ORGANISATION IN BRIDGETOWN TELEPHONED DHC TODAY TO ENQUIRE ABOUT THE LIKELY COST OF COMPLETING THE AIRPORT. SEE MIFT FOR REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATE OF PLESSEY WHO WERE AWARDED THE TELECOMMS/NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT CONTRACT BY THE FORMER PRG REGIME.
5. TODAY'S PRESS ALSO QUOTED FOLEY AS HAVING SAID (AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE) THAT "NEWS FROM BRITAIN HAD INDICATED THAT THE HOUSE OF COMMONS HAD VOTED SOME TWO MILLION POUNDS STERLING TOWARDS THE REBUILDING EXERCISE IN THE SPICE ISLAND." WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING FURTHER ABOUT AID TO GRENADA SINCE DHC DELIVERED MESSAGE CONTAINED IN FCO TELNO 22 TO GRENADA TO GOVERNOR GENERAL. GRATEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION OR CLARIFICATION, OF REPORTED FIGURE OF TWO MILLION STERLING QUOTED BY FOLEY.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

6. US AMBASSADOR BISH WHO LEAVES HERE TOMORROW (9 NOV) FOR SOME LEAVE IN THE US TOLD HC TODAY THAT THE CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS'S OWN OBSERVATIONS IN GRENADA PLUS THE VIEWS EXPRESSED TO THEM BY OECS AND BARBADOS GOVERNMENT LEADERS HAD "TURNED THE DELEGATION ROUND". ITS MEMBERS HAD ARRIVED IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN EITHER WITH PRE-CONCEIVED IDEAS UNFAVOURABLE TO THE US ADMINISTRATION'S INTERVENTION ACTION, OR WITH SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT IT, BUT THE MAJORITY WOULD RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES CONVINCED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S ACTION HAD BEEN JUSTIFIED. FLOWER, BISH'S NO.2 AND GILLESPIE, WHO ACCOMPANIED THE DELEGATION FROM GRENADA TO BARBADOS REPORTED SIMILARLY TO DHC IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS.

BULLARD

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED

WIAD
NAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
PUSD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
INFO D
PROTOCOL D
ECD'S
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD
CONS D
SOV D
EED
MAED
WED
RES D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PJS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:
MR ANNING LACPD/ODA
MOD (DI 4)

- 2 -
CONFIDENTIAL



FILE

cc: FCO

JD

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

8 November, 1983

Dear Mr. Ramphal,

Thank you for your letter of 1 November. I am grateful to you for keeping me in touch with developments and with your thinking on the way ahead. I am glad to know that the Commonwealth, through you, has been able to offer immediate assistance to the Governor-General of Grenada during this difficult time for him.

You will know from Geoffrey Howe and from his speech to the House of Commons on 3 November that we shall want to consider sympathetically requests for help in restoring conditions of peace and security. It will of course be important that any such request has the active support of the Governor-General or of an interim administration, and that the other Commonwealth Caribbean States are as fully involved as possible; and I know that you are working on these lines.

It may well be that a lightly armed interim force will be more suitable for Grenada than a military force. I understand from Geoffrey Howe that your thinking may be moving in the same way.

I look forward to seeing you again on 10 November, when we shall be able to discuss the problem further. In the meantime, I know that Geoffrey Howe and his officials will be keen to keep in touch with you on this important subject.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Mr. Shridath S. Ramphal, AC, Kt., CMG, QC.

RM



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 November 1983

GR
PI type to
PM's sig.

8/11

Dear John,

Grenada

I attach a draft reply for the Prime Minister
to send to Mr Seaga's letter of 26 October.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

TO: The Rt Hon Edward Seaga MP
Jamaica House
KINGSTON
Jamaica

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for setting out so clearly in your letter of 28 October the reasons why Jamaica decided to join with the OECS countries in military intervention in Grenada.

We had been watching the situation in Grenada closely, and were as distressed as you at the turn of events there. After very careful consideration, we came to the view that political and economic measures offered the best prospect of encouraging a return to democratic government: an objective which I know we all share. This was a very difficult decision. You came to a different conclusion on the facts available to you. Once the military operation had begun, however, my concern was to do everything possible to avoid hindering it.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

I am as sad as anyone that this difference arose between us. But I believe that we must now look to the

/future.

Grenada
Int Sit
Pr 2

future. We stand ready to help in whatever way we can with the re-establishment of constitutional democracy in Grenada. The Commonwealth may be able to play a useful role in bringing about a return to normal life in Grenada, for instance by assisting in the organisation and holding of elections if that is what the Grenadians want. We welcome the efforts the Commonwealth Secretary-General is making to this end. Geoffrey Howe announced in the House of Commons last week that we wanted to respond positively to requests for help in this field.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We have already sent a high-level team to the island to assess the problems and make proposals. We shall be resuming our bilateral aid relationship with Grenada, which will involve capital assistance as well as technical co-operation.

I would like to stay in close touch with you and with the other Commonwealth Caribbean Governments about the way ahead. There is much to be done if the people of Grenada are to profit from the second chance for democracy which has been opened up for them.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 November 1983

Dear John,

A.J.C. $\frac{9}{4}$

f-a.

Grenada

Thank you for your letter of 3 November.

We believe that the JIC would be the right body to produce the paper for which the Prime Minister has asked. I understand that work has already been put in hand accordingly in the JIC. You will have seen that the item on Grenada in the Weekly Survey of Intelligence of 3 November went some of the way to answering a number of the questions posed in your letter.

Yours ever

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

With typical modesty, Alec Home wrote to me, enclosing the attached letter for you, on the grounds that he did not want to trouble you.

I am sure you will want to ponder Alec's constructive ideas for CHOGM.



MICHAEL ALISON

8.11.83

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Home of The Hirsel, K.T.



November 7th.1983.

John Major

You will doubtless have thought of this, but I see a chance of turning Grenada to real advantage at the Commonwealth Conference.

It is clear that we can no longer protect our ex-colonial territories. It is equally obvious that the U.N. cannot do so either.

Could you not launch the positive proposal that each Commonwealth region should organise its own collective Security Force? Canada and the Caribbean; Australia and New Zealand and the South Pacific Islands; Singapore and Malasia and Brunei; India and general supervision of the Indian Ocean; and the U.K. ready to help if required.

The timing seems right. It would lead the Commonwealth away from post-mortems to the future, and would I feel be hailed with enthusiasm here.

Geoffrey seemed to hint at something like this, but a positive proposal could to advantage be put on the table for all to see.

John Major

CONFIDENTIAL



Sub

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 November 1983

AID TO GRENADA

You will see from the record which I have sent you separately about the Prime Minister's talks with Mr. Dam today that Mrs. Thatcher stated that, in view of the clear US intention of supplying generous aid to Grenada, we should not give aid ourselves. The Prime Minister has since reinforced this point to me orally and has said that she believes the aid would be better spent on e.g. territories like Montserrat for whom we have direct responsibility.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary may wish to consider this point and let the Prime Minister have his views.

BFI

A. J. COLES

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

NR

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 November, 1983

Dear John,

Grenada

type letter pl.

AR 7/

1/11/83 at flap

You asked for a reply to the letter/which the Prime Minister has received from the Commonwealth Secretary General concerning a Commonwealth 'Interim security presence' in Grenada. I attach a draft.

The Foreign Secretary feels that the reply should be as positive as possible. He saw Ramphal on 2 November, and believes that he is conscious of the need for caution. The terms of Ramphal's letter to the Prime Minister indicate that he is himself thinking of a civilian force with a policing role. The enclosed draft is designed to encourage him further in this line.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Janet Lewis-Jones (Lord President's Office), Henry Steel (Law Officer's Department), John Kerr (HM Treasury) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Srenada Int SA #2.

DRAFT: ~~memo~~/letter/~~teletype~~/~~despatch~~/~~note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

HE Mr Shridath S Ramphal AC Kt CMG QC
 Commonwealth Secretary General
 Marlborough House
 PALL MALL
 London SW1Y 5HX

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your letter of 1 November. I am grateful to you for keeping me in touch with developments and with your thinking on the way ahead. I am glad to know that the Commonwealth, through you, has been able to offer immediate assistance to the Governor-General of Grenada during this difficult time for him.

CAVEAT.....

You will know from Geoffrey Howe and from his speech to the House of Commons on 3 November that we shall want to ~~respond positively to~~ ^{consider sympathetically} requests for help in restoring conditions of peace and security. It will of course be important that any such request has the active support of the Governor-General or of an interim administration, and that the other Commonwealth Caribbean states ^{are} ~~be~~ as fully involved as possible; and I know that you are working on these lines.

Enclosures—flag(s).....


It may well be that a lightly armed interim force will be more suitable for Grenada than a military force. I understand from Geoffrey Howe that your thinking may be moving in the same way.

/I look

I look forward to seeing you again on 10 November when we shall be able to discuss the problem further. In the meantime, I know that Geoffrey Howe and his officials will be keen to keep in touch with you on this important subject.

R 3/u.

7 NOV 1983



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DESKOT 061000 **CONFIDENTIAL**

FM GRENADA 060410Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO (FOR RESIDENT CLEARING FOR MEETING WITH MR. DAMM)
TELEGRAM NUMBER 20 OF 6 NOVEMBER 83
INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN
PRIORITY URNGS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 339 TO BRIDGETOWN

GRENADA:

1. MACKINTYRE HAD HIS FIRST MEETING WITH THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AT 1130 HOURS (LOCAL) THIS MORNING.....
2. WHEN I MET HIM BRIEFLY AT LUNCH TODAY HE SPOKE IN VERY GENERAL TERMS ABOUT HIS PLANS FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THESE WERE TO HAVE JOBS CREATED FOR THE DEMOBILIZED PRA IN ROAD-WORKS AND IN CONSTRUCTION AND TO PROVIDE TRADITIONAL PRE-CHRISTMAS WORK FOR UNEMPLOYED GRENADIANS. THIS IS IN LINE WITH THE GG'S OWN VIEWS. MACKINTYRE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED TO GET THE SECONDARY SCHOOLS FUNCTIONING PROPERLY AGAIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BY THIS HE MEANT FINDING REPLACEMENTS FOR THE RUSSIAN SCIENCE AND MATHS TEACHERS AND SOME OTHER FOREIGN TEACHERS WHO HAVE LEFT GRENADA. WE HOPED THAT BRITAIN AND OTHERS MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP WITH THIS PROBLEM. IN BOTH PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS HE INTENDED TO HAVE THE POLITICAL CONTENT OF THE CURRICULUM REMOVED.
3. MACKINTYRE SAID THAT MUCH OF WHAT HE COULD DO INITIALLY DEPENDED ON WHAT WAS LEFT OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE. HE HAD NO IDEA YET WHAT TYPE OF ADMINISTRATION HE HAD AT HIS DISPOSAL AS MANY KEY POSITIONS HAD BEEN HELD BY INTERNATIONAL WORKERS WHO ALREADY LEFT GRENADA OR WOULD BE UNSUITABLE TO KEEP ON. I SAID THAT THERE WERE STILL SOME PUBLIC SERVANTS WHO ARE POLITICALLY SUSPECT BUT THAT HE WAS LIKELY TO FIND THE MAJORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS WITH SUFFICIENT RELIABLE STAFF TO PROVIDE A REASONABLY SOUND ADMINISTRATION. HIS PROBLEM MAY BE IN GETTING THEM TO ACCEPT SOME OF THE RADICAL CHANGES THE OUTGOING GOVERNMENT MAY WISH TO INTRODUCE.

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

KELLY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED
 W/LAD
 HAD
 S AM D
 NCAD
 UNO
 PUSD
 DEFENCE D
 NEWS D
 INFO D
 PROTOCOL D
 MED'S
 PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD
 CONS D
 NOV D
 IED
 MAND
 IED
 IED D
 LEGAL ADVS
 PLACING STAFF
 PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
 PS/MR WHITNEY
 PS/PUS
 SIR J BULLARD
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR URE
 MR CARTLEDGE
 MR HANNAY
 MR ADAMS
 CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:
 MR ANNING LACPD/OMA
 MOD (DI 4)

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 510

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRIDGETOWN 060200Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 421 OF 5 NOVEMBER 83

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKNIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING TO ST GEORGE'S (GRENADA) (PASSED LOCALLY)

FOR RESIDENT CLERK

FOR MEETING WITH MR DAN

GRENADA AND THE US

1. IF US ARE IN A MOOD TO ACCEPT ADVICE FROM US, THE FOLLOWING POINTS COULD USEFULLY BE MADE.
2. COMMONWEALTH PEACEKEEPING FORCE: THERE IS LITTLE ENTHUSIASM FOR THIS IDEA AMONG US OFFICIALS I HAVE MET, AND NONE AT ALL AMONG DECS PRIME MINISTERS. YET IT DOES LOOK FROM HERE TO BE THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH THE US CAN WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS SPEEDILY. THE LONGER THEY REMAIN, THE MORE RISK THEY RUN OF GUERILLA ATTACKS, SHOULD THE REMNANTS OF THE PRA BE ABLE TO REGROUP. THESE IN TURN WOULD BECOME THE REASON FOR THE TROOPS STAYING ON, A KIND OF AFGHANISTAN IN MINIATURE. I CANNOT SEE THE CARIBBEAN POLICE FORCE ENVISAGED BY GILLESPIE HOLDING THE RING TO THE AMERICANS' SATISFACTION.
3. CIVILIAN V MILITARY. YESTERDAY WE HAD THE MIX-UP OVER THE CORDOVEZ MISSION'S FLIGHT AND THE ABORTIVE MEETING BETWEEN CORDOVEZ AND THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR, BOTH OF WHICH INCIDENTS COULD HAVE DONE UNNECESSARY DAMAGE TO THE PICTURE THE US GOVERNMENT PRESUMABLY WANTS TO PAINT OF ITSELF IN GRENADA. CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT ARE STILL I UNDERSTAND BANNED BY THE US MILITARY FROM LANDING AT PEARLS AND THIS IS CAUSING INCREASING RESENTMENT NOW THAT THE FLOW IS NO LONGER OUT OF GRENADA BUT INTO IT. NOW THAT THE FIGHTING IS EFFECTIVELY OVER, THE SOONER US CIVILIAN AUTHORITY PREVAILS OVER THE MILITARY THE BETTER.
4. GOVERNOR GENERAL AND HIS STAFF. THE AMERICANS, HAVING AT FIRST GREETED THE GOVERNOR GENERAL AS A QUAIN AND UNIMPORTANT ANACHRONISM, ARE NOW THREATENING TO SWAMP HIM AND HIS ADVISERS WITH REQUESTS, QUERIES AND CALLS. THE TEMPTATION TO DO THE WORK THEMSELVES MUST BE STRONG, BUT HAS TO BE RESISTED. GILLESPIE UNDERSTANDS THIS, BUT SOME OF HIS STAFF ARE LESS SENSITIVE. POSITION SHOULD BE EASIER ONCE PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION IS APPOINTED, BUT NEXT FEW DAYS WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR BOTH SIDES.
5. PROBLEMS OF SCALE. US DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN GRENADA IS SMALL BY AMERICAN STANDARDS, BUT US EMBASSY IS ALREADY BIGGER THAN THE OLD SOVIET EMBASSY, WHOSE SIZE ATTRACTED SUCH UNFAVOURABLE COMMENT FROM GRENADIANS. IT HAS ALSO TAKEN OVER ONE OF THE ISLAND'S BEST-KNOWN AND MOST PROMINENTLY SITUATED HOTELS, THE BOSS POINT INN. US OFFICIALS MIGHT LIKE TO CONSIDER HOW FEW PEOPLE THEY CAN DO THE JOB WITH, RATHER THAN HOW MANY THEY THINK THEY NEED.

CONFIDENTIAL

16.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. HEARTS AND MINDS. SURPLUS TROOPS BEFORE LEAVING THE ISLAND COULD WELL BE DEPLOYED MENDING ROADS, PAINTING CHURCHES, GIVING CHILDREN'S PARTIES AND BEING PHOTOGRAPHED DOING SO. THEY COULD EVEN HAVE A SHOT AT PLAYING CRICKET. LET THE GRENADIANS TEACH THEM SOMETHING.

BULLARD

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED

WLD
KAD
S AM D
MCAD
UHD
FUSD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
INFO D
PROTOCOL D
MCD'S
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD
CONS D
SOV D
HED
MAD
WHD

RES D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
MR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR USE
MR CARLEDGE
MR HARMAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

MR ANNING LACPD/ODA
MED (DI 4)

CONFIDENTIAL

01200
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM GRENADA 251855Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE URNGS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM 6 OF 9 NOVEMBER 83
AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO (FOR RESIDENT CLARK; FOR MEETING WITH MR JAM)
INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN

GRENADA:

CORDOVEZ MISSION.

1. THE VISITING GUEST SHIP GAVE A BUFFET LUNCH TODAY FOR ABOUT 40 GUESTS INCLUDING THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL. I INVITED THE SIX MEMBERS OF CORDOVEZ'S MISSION TO THIS. CORDOVEZ IS CLEARLY IMPRESSED BY THE SUPPORT SHOWN BY GRENADIANS FOR THE US INTERVENTION. HIS ESTIMATION WAS THAT THIS WAS MORE THAN 90 PER CENT OF THE POPULATION. HE SAID IT IS MOST UNLIKELY THAT THE UN WOULD WANT TO HAVE A PEACE KEEPING FORCE IN GRENADA AND FROM WHAT HE TOLD ME IT IS CLEAR THAT HE WILL NOT BE RECOMMENDING UN INVOLVEMENT IN HIS REPORT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL.
2. YESTERDAY, ON HIS ARRIVAL, HE REFERRED TO THE CUBAN PRISONERS OF WAR AS QUOTE HOSTAGES UNQUOTE. THE FACT THAT MANY OF THESE HAVE NOW LEFT GRENADA HAS CHANGED HIS PRECONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE SITUATION REGARDING THE CUBAN PRISONERS.
3. HE SAW THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY HEZD CONTINUED TO QUESTION THE LEGALITY OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S ACTION AND POSITION. CORDOVEZ CONSIDERS THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S POSITION TO BE LEGAL WITHIN THE CONSTITUTION OF GRENADA.
4. CORDOVEZ WILL LEAVE HERE AT 1930 (LOCAL) COURTESY OF THE RAF. ON HIS WAY TO POINT SALOMES AIRPORT HE IS TO BE SHOWN ONE OF THE LARGER ARMS CACHES FOUND BY THE AMERICANS.

KELLY.

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED

WLD
HAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
FUSD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
INFO D
PROTOCOL D
KED'S
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

OCD
CONS D
SOV D
KED
MAD
VED

RES D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PR/MR WITNEY
PR/FUS
MR J HILLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARLEIDGE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

MR ANNING LACPD/ODA
MOD (DI 4)

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 830

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRIDGETOWN 060105Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 420 OF 5 NOVEMBER 83

INFO IMMEDIATE OMMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, HAVANA

INFO SAYING ST GEORGE'S (GRENADA) (PASSED LOCALLY)

FOR RESIDENT CLERK

FOR MEETING WITH MR DAM

GRENADA: CORDOVEZ MISSION

1. I HAD AN HOUR WITH CORDOVEZ AT GRANTLEY ADAMS AIRPORT THIS EVENING BEFORE HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES LEFT FOR NEW YORK. THEY WILL START DRAFTING THEIR REPORT ON THE PLANE AND HAVE NOT REACHED ANY FIRM CONCLUSIONS, BUT THEY BROUGHT THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WITH THEM FROM GRENADA.

2. ELECTIONS: DATE FOR FORMATION OF PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION HAS SLIPPED AGAIN, TO WEDNESDAY OR THURSDAY OF NEXT WEEK, 9/10 NOVEMBER. ESTIMATES OF ITS SIZE VARY BETWEEN 7 (GILLESPIE) AND A MAXIMUM OF 12 (SCOOB). NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN MACINTYRE AND GOVERNOR GENERAL ARE PROCEEDING ON ASSUMPTION THAT MACINTYRE WILL BE ITS CHAIRMAN (EFFECTIVELY CHIEF MINISTER). PROBLEM IS THAT MACINTYRE DOES NOT WANT TO SPEND MORE THAN SIX MONTHS IN GRENADA, AND GOVERNOR GENERAL SEES ELECTIONS BEING HELD BETWEEN SIX MONTHS AND A YEAR FROM NOW.

3. WITHDRAWAL OF US TROOPS: GILLESPIE TOLD CORDOVEZ THAT US WERE PAT PRESENT GOVERNED BY THE WAR POWERS ACT WHICH REQUIRES ALL US TROOPS OUT OF GRENADA AFTER 60 DAYS - 'BUT THIS COULD BE EXTENDED'. BRIGADIER FARRIS, WHO WILL SHORTLY TAKE OVER THE MILITARY COMMAND OF THE ISLAND, SPOKE OF STILL FINDING THE ODD CUBAN AND PRA SOLDIER HERE AND THERE, AS WELL AS CACHES OF ARMS. NUMBER OF TROOPS, WHICH AT ONE TIME HAD BEEN AS HIGH AS 9,000, WAS NOW DOWN TO 5,000 AND WOULD SOON BE REDUCED TO 3,000. US WERE NOT YET IN A POSITION TO FORECAST FURTHER REDUCTIONS.

4. REPATRIATION OF CUBANS: (A) CORDOVEZ SUCCEEDED IN TALKING TO THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR YESTERDAY. LATTER SAID THAT GRENADA HAD NOT (REPEAT NOT) BROKEN OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA, BUT THAT GOVERNOR GENERAL HAD ASKED ALL CUBAN DIPLOMATIC STAFF BUT ONE TO LEAVE. AMBASSADOR HAD COUNTERED WITH PROPOSAL THAT FOUR SHOULD REMAIN, INCLUDING HIMSELF. GG HAD SUGGESTED TWO, NEITHER OF THEM THE AMBASSADOR. CORDOVEZ, WHO HAD CONVEYED THESE MESSAGES, DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE RESULT WOULD BE.

(B) CUBAN AMBASSADOR HAD TOLD CORDOVEZ THAT HIS GOVERNMENT NO LONGER RECOGNISED THE GG AS HEAD OF STATE, SINCE HIS INVITATION TO THE US TO INVADE GRENADA HAD BEEN A BREACH OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY. I SUGGESTED THAT THIS WITHDRAWAL OF RECOGNITION MIGHT AFFECT THE AMBASSADOR'S OWN STATUS, SINCE IT WAS PRESUMABLY TO THE GG THAT HE HAD PRESENTED HIS CREDENTIALS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(c)

CONFIDENTIAL

(C) CUBAN NON-DIPLOMATS WERE BEING FLOWN OUT IN BATCHES AND WOULD SOON ALL BE BACK IN HAVANA. THE DEAD CUBANS PRESENTED A PROBLEM. MOST COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED, AND US WERE RELUCTANT TO SHIP THEM OUT WITHOUT KNOWING WHO THEY WERE. CUBANS SAY IDENTIFICATION WILL BE EASIER IN HAVANA, BUT THIS MISSES THE US POINT. CORDOVES THINKS WHEN THE TOTALS ARE ADDED UP THERE WILL NOT BE MORE THAN 80 OR 90 CUBANS UNACCOUNTED FOR.

(D) CUBANS HAD ASKED THE US MILITARY TO HELP GET BACK TO CUBA THE EQUIPMENT THEY WERE USING TO BUILD POINT SALINES AIRPORT. ESTIMATE OF ITS VALUE IS US DOLLARS ONE MILLION.

5. **ROLE OF GOVERNOR GENERAL:** CORDOVES SHOWED KEEN INTEREST IN CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF GOVERNOR GENERAL, WHOM HE REPEATEDLY REFERRED TO AS GOVERNOR. HE THOUGHT THAT SIR PAUL SEEMED TO BE ENJOYING HIS NEW FOUND AUTHORITY. DID I THINK HE WAS ENTITLED TO IT? I SAID I WAS NOT AN EXPERT, BUT I COULD NOT SEE HOW IT COULD EASILY BE CHALLENGED. SIR PAUL HAD BEEN APPOINTED BY THE QUEEN ON THE ADVICE OF THE THEN PRIME MINISTER, AND HAD BEEN CONFIRMED IN OFFICE BY BISHOP. I GAVE CORDOVES A PHOTOCOPY OF ARTICLE 57 OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION, WHICH HE SAID HE HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY SEEN. IF THE FULL TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO HIS STAFF IN NEW YORK I THINK THIS MIGHT BE USEFUL.

6. **PUBLIC OPINION:** CORDOVES SAID HE HAD NOT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN WHAT THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE THOUGHT OF THE INVASION.

7. **BISHOP:** JUST BEFORE LEAVING CORDOVES HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE AMERICANS HAD FOUND A MAN WHO CLAIMED TO HAVE DRIVEN THE BODIES OF BISHOP AND HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES TO A SITE NEAR THE AIRPORT FOR BURIAL. THE AMERICANS WERE LOOKING FOR THE GRAVE.

8. I INTRODUCED TO CORDOVES FLIGHT LT S BARTLES AND ROBERTS, THE RAF PILOTS WHO HAD TAKEN HIM TO GRENADA AND BACK. CORDOVES EXPRESSED HIS SINCERE THANKS TO THEM AND THEIR CREWS, AND SPOKE WARMLY OF KELLY WHO HE SAID HAD BEEN OF GREAT HELP TO HIM IN GRENADA.

9. PLEASE DO NOT (REPEAT NOT) QUOTE CORDOVES' VIEWS TO A THIRD PART OR MENTION HIM AS THE SOURCE OF ANY OF THIS INFORMATION.

BULLARD

(COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST)

GREENADA LIMITED

W/AD
HAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
FUSD
INFORCE D
NEWS D
INFO D
PROTOCOL D
HCD'S
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD
COMM D
BUY D
HED
MAD
VED
RES D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WETTERBY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR UKE
MR CARLEIDGE
MR HANNEY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

MR ANNING LACPD/ODA
MCD (DI 1)

CONFIDENTIAL

9R 300
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM GRENADA 051845Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE UKMS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 5 OF 5 NOVEMBER 83
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO (FOR RESIDENT CLARK: FOR MEETING WITH MR DAM)
BRIDGETOWN, WASHINGTON AND PORT OF SPAIN

YOUR TELEGRAM NOS 1260 AND 1261 TO FCO:

RAMPHAL.

1. I SAW THE GOVERNOR GENERAL THIS MORNING AND CONVEYED TO HIM RAMPHAL'S FEARS THAT THE UN MIGHT SERIOUSLY COMPLICATE DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN GRENADA AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A LARGER COMMONWEALTH PRESENCE. HE TOLD ME THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO ANNOUNCE THE NAMES OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT THIS WEEKEND AND HE WAS UNLIKELY TO DO SO BEFORE NEXT WEDNESDAY, 9 NOVEMBER. HE DOES NOT SEE THE NEED FOR AND DOES NOT INTEND ASKING FOR A WIDER COMMONWEALTH PRESENCE.

2. LATER THIS MORNING THE GOVERNOR GENERAL WAS TO SEE THE CORDOVEZ MISSION AGAIN. SCOON SAID HE WOULD MAKE CLEAR TO CORDOVEZ HIS VIEW THAT THERE WAS NO ROLE IN GRENADA FOR ANY UN PEACE KEEPING FORCE AND NO NEED TO BROADEN THE COMMONWEALTH PRESENCE.

3. AMBASSADOR GILLESPIE SAW ME IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S MEETING WITH THE FOURTEEN VISITING US CONGRESSMEN AND THEIR AIDES. HE SAID THE GOVERNOR GENERAL HAD QUOTE PUT ON A GOOD SHOW UNQUOTE AND SAID ALL THE RIGHT THINGS. HE WAS CLEARLY PLEASED WITH THE WAY THE 90 MINUTE MEETING HAD BEEN HANDLED. SPEAKING TO A JOURNALIST AFTERWARDS SCOON SAID THAT HE HOPED US TROOPS WOULD STAY IN GRENADA FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE.

KELLY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED

WIAD
NAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
PUSD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
INFO D
PROTOCOL D
ECD'S
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD
CONS D
SOV D
EED
MAED
WED

RES D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

MR ANNING LACPD/ODA
MOD (DI 4)

CONFIDENTIAL

W140

~~ED/EMERGENCY UNIT~~
 ED/S AM D
 ED/MCAD
 ED/UND
 ED/PUSD
 ED/DEF DEPT
 ED/NEWS DEPT
 ED/INFO DEPT
 ED/PROTOCOL DEPT
 ED/ECD(E)
 ED/ECD(I)
 ED/CCD
 ED/CONSULAR DEPT
 ED/SOV DEPT
 ED/PLANNING STAFF
 ED/RESEARCH DEPT
 ED/EED
 ED/NAD

PS (2)
 PS/LADY YOUNG
 PS/MR WHITNEY
 PS/PUS
 SIR J BULLARD
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR URE
 MR CARTLEDGE
 MR HANNAY
 MR ADAMS
 MR FREELAND)
 MR BICKFORD) LEGAL ADVISERS
 MR EDWARDS)
 SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE
 CABINET OFFICE
 NO 10 DOWNING ST
 MOD, RC
 MOD (DI 4)
 RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

FM GRENADA 041730Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 24 OF 4 NOVEMBER 83

INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN, UKMMS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

FOLLOWING FROM HIGH COMMISSIONER

GRENADA AT THE UN

YOUR TEL 32 WAS RECEIVED HERE AFTER I HAD PAID MY CALL ON
 SIR PAUL SCOON, BUT IN THE COURSE OF OUR CONVERSATION HE SAID
 THAT HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE THE FORMATION OF HIS
 INTERIM ADMINISTRATION ON 8 OR 9 NOVEMBER. THIS INFORMATION
 WAS MADE PUBLIC AT SIR PAUL'S PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY, 3
 NOVEMBER

KELLY

GRS 00100

NNNN

da

4 November 1983

Grenada: Message from President of Maldives

Thank you for your letter of 2 November.

The Prime Minister has approved the telegram which you enclosed.

A J COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

4 November 1983

Dear Nelson,

Thank you very much for your frank and thoughtful letter. As always I respect your views and am glad to have them.

I will not rehearse in detail the position we took on Grenada because you will have seen full press reports. It was an extremely difficult decision, and made no easier by the failure of our American friends to consult us in time and with due explanation of their thinking. We gave full weight to US security concerns and the impact of the terrible Beirut bombings as well as the views of the OECS countries in so far as these were made known to us. But in the end we had to take our stand on the issue of principle - that an invasion, without clear justification in international law, of an independent state is contrary to Western democratic values and a dangerous precedent for the future.

But once the invasion had occurred my concern was to do everything possible to avoid hindering the operation and to minimise the danger to the Western Alliance. Thus we refused to condemn the invasion here at home and refused to join all those in the Security Council who wished to do so.

I am as sad as anyone that there has been this disagreement between ourselves and some of the Commonwealth states of the Caribbean. There is no question of deserting or condemning them at New Delhi. So far as I am concerned the differences between us are history. We shall want to work with them as closely as possible in the future.

/ I note

JS

I note your concern about East/West relations. I share it and am giving a good deal of thought to the problem.

I should welcome another good talk when you can next come to London.

Y
Lounsbury

Rayant
—

The Rt. Hon. J.M. Fraser, C.H.

GRS 650

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM KINGSTON 041838Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 327 OF 04 NOVEMBER

IMMEDIATE INFO: BRIDGETOWN, PORT OF SPAIN, BELMOPAN, NASSAU, GEORGETOWN, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, AND MONSERRAT (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).

GRENADA

SUMMARY

MR SEAGA FRIENDLY, NO RECRIMINATIONS OVER BRITAIN'S 'DIFFERENCE OF VIEW, RECOGNISED ROBUSTNESS OF OUR 'NO CONDEMNATION' STAND AT UN AND ELSEWHERE. ACCEPTANCE OF 'ERRORS' OVER CONSULTATION. NO INTENTION IN HIS RECENT COMMENTS OF REDUCING ANGLO-JAMAICAN CONSULTATION, BUT REMINDER THAT US IS NOW LARGER SUN IN JAMAICAN SKY. WELCOMES UK CIVILIAN ASSISTANCE IN GRENADIAN REHABILITATION. DISMISSIVE OF RAMPHAL'S ACTIVITIES OVER WIDER COMMONWEALTH PEACE KEEPING FORCE. WILL BE SEEING PRESIDENT REAGAN WITH ADAMS THIS SATURDAY, 5 NOVEMBER.

1. I SAW MR SEAGA THIS MORNING, 4 NOVEMBER. IT WAS VERY DIFFERENT FROM THE TENSE ACCUSATIONS OF LAST WEEK. HE WAS FRIENDLY AND, FOR ONE WHO DOES NOT EASILY ADMIT MISCONCEPTIONS, ALMOST PLACATORY. THERE WERE NO RECRIMINATIONS ABOUT OUR DECISION NOT TO JOIN IN MILITARY ACTION. HE HAD READ THE MINISTERIAL AND OTHER STATEMENTS I HAD SENT HIM AND RECOGNISED THE ROBUSTNESS OF OUR STAND IN THE UNITED NATIONS, AND OUR REFUSAL TO CONDEMN THE INTERVENTION. ON CONSULTATION AND TIMING HE ADMITTED 'ERRORS ON BOTH SIDES'. HE HAD NOT REALISED THAT, LIKE THE CANADIANS, WE HAD NEVER BEEN FORMALLY ASKED TO ASSIST. THE CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES' PLANS HAD BEEN FORMED BY THE SATURDAY, BUT THEY HAD BEEN WAITING FOR ESSENTIAL WASHINGTON SUPPORT. WHEN IT CAME AT THE LAST MOMENT THERE WAS A GREAT RUSH. HIS REMARKS IN BARBADOS LAST WEEKEND IMPLYING THAT BRITAIN SHOULD NO LONGER EXPECT TO BE CONSULTED AS OF RIGHT ON JAMAICA'S PROPOSED ACTIONS WERE AIMED AT OUT-DATED OPPOSITION ASSUMPTIONS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. (THIS WAS RATHER LAME, BUT WHEN PRESSED, IT BECAME CLEAR THAT WHATEVER HE MIGHT HAVE HAD IN MIND THEN, HE IS NOW ONLY SAYING THAT WHILE TRADITIONAL CONSULTATION BETWEEN US AS INDEPENDENT COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES IS NOT AFFECTED, THE US IS THE LARGER SUN IN THEIR SKY).

2. WE MOVED TO THE REPAIR JOB IN GRENADA. I REMINDED HIM OF WHAT YOU AND LADY YOUNG HAD SAID ABOUT OUR READINESS TO HELP IN CIVILIAN AND AID FIELDS. HE WELCOMED THIS. HE HAD TOLD SIR PAUL SCOON TO LOOK TO US FOR HELP OVER ADMINISTRATION, ELECTIONS, ETC. (WITH THEIR RECENT ENUMERATING EXPERIENCE THEY MAY BE ABLE TO HELP ON THIS TOO). WE COULD TOGETHER OFFER ASSISTANCE IN POLICE TRAINING, PARTICULARLY WITH THE TWO SENIOR BRITISH POLICE OFFICERS AT JAMAICA'S NEW POLICE ACADEMY.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 3.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. DID HE SEE THE EVENTUAL PEACE KEEPING FORCE DRAWING ON OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES ? YES, PERHAPS CANADA, BUT HE WOULD NOT BE ASKING TRINIDAD OR GUYANA. INDEED, SINCE GUYANA HAD TREACHEROUSLY WARNED AUSTIN OF THE INTENDED ATTACK HE COULD NOT SEE HOW RELATIONS WITH BURNHAM COULD EASILY BE RE-ESTABLISHED. AS FOR SONNY RAMPHAL AND HIS "RUSHING ABOUT" HE WONDERED WHETHER HE WAS MOBILISING OR STIRRING UP THE COMMONWEALTH. (SUSPICIONS OF RAMPHAL AS A GUYANESE AND UNTIL COMPARATIVELY RECENTLY BURNHAM'S MAN, ARE STRONG HERE AND PERHAPS ALSO IN BARBADOS AND OECS COUNTRIES ?) BUT HE AND ADAMS, AND POSSIBLY OTHERS AS WELL, WOULD BE GOING TO WASHINGTON THIS SATURDAY, 5 NOVEMBER AT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INVITATION. THEY WOULD THEN SORT OUT THE NEXT STEPS.

4. FINALLY, MR SEAGA WARMLY ACCEPTED THE PRIME MINISTER'S INVITATION TO LUNCH IN NEW DELHI ON 28 NOVEMBER.

SMALLMAN

(Repetition to MONTSEERRAT
referred for departmental decision,
repeated as requested to other posts.)

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED

WIAD

NAD

S AM D

MCAD

UND

PUSD

DEFENCE D

NEWS D

INFO D

PROTOCOL D

ECD'S

PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD

CONS D

SOV D

EED

MAED

WED

RES D

LEGAL ADVS

PLANNING STAFF

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR URE

MR CARTLEDGE

MR HANNAY

MR ADAMS

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

MR ANNING LACPD/ODA

MOD (DI 4)

2
CONFIDENTIAL

BILLS PRESENTED**COAL INDUSTRY**

Mr. Secretary Walker, supported by Mr. Secretary Younger, Mr. Secretary Edwards, Mr. Peter Rees, Mr. Alick Buchanan-Smith and Mr. Giles Shaw presented a Bill to increase the limit on the borrowing powers of the National Coal Board; and to make further provision with respect to grants and payments by the Secretary of State in connection with the coal industry; And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 48.]

RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES (STOCK EXCHANGE)

Mr. Secretary Tebbit, supported by Mr. Secretary Prior, Mr. Secretary Younger, Mr. Secretary Edwards, Mr. Peter Rees and Mr. Alexander Fletcher presented a Bill to exempt certain agreements relating to the Stock Exchange from the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976; And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 50.]

cc LEBANON: Internal Situation
Pt 4
DEFENCE: Arms Control Pt 4

Foreign Affairs

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Douglas Hogg.]

Mr. Speaker: Before we start this important foreign affairs debate, I should like to tell the House that many right hon. Members wish to take part. I make a special appeal for short contributions today.

3.50 pm

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Sir Geoffrey Howe): Before turning to wider issues, I shall start by bringing the House up to date on events in Grenada.

The United States Secretary of Defence has announced that hostilities ended on 2 November and that 3,000 United States troops will have left Grenada by the weekend. Pockets of resistance may, however, linger on for some time, especially in the interior of the island. Her Majesty's Government regret the loss of life that occurred at the mental hospital near Fort Frederick and sympathise with the families of those who lost their lives. Overall, however, the death toll has been relatively low, a fact for which everyone in the House can be thankful.

A British consular team has been in Grenada since last weekend. It has established the whereabouts of British nationals and has checked on their welfare. Over 100 British nationals have already left the island. I am delighted to confirm that we have received no reports of any British casualties.

The fact that the Governor-General is safe and well and firmly back in the saddle is something that the whole House will welcome. Let me emphasise one thing about which there has been some misunderstanding. The Governor-General is not in any sense a representative of the British Government. He is the representative of the Queen as the head of state of Grenada.

Powers delegated to the Governor-General in that capacity give him authority to take certain actions in the present vacuum. In the exercise of these powers he has announced that he will be calling together a group of responsible Grenadian citizens as an advisory council, to assist him in governing the country until it can be restored to normal democratic conditions. He is taking steps to assemble a small team of experienced officials to assist him in securing the resumption of civilian administration in the island.

We shall be glad to give all possible help in that process, either by ourselves or in conjunction with others, especially our partners in the Commonwealth. Mr. Rushford, a former Foreign Office legal adviser who drafted the constitution of Grenada, and Mr. Braithwaite, of the Commonwealth Secretariat, have already arrived in Grenada.

The interim administration in the island will face major tasks. It must organise free and fair elections in conditions of peace, and must put in hand the reconstruction of the island and its economy.

The organisation of elections may take some months. For them to be free and fair and above reproach they must be properly organised and properly supervised. Here again, we shall be glad to do all we can to help. As the House will be aware, that is something where we and other members of the Commonwealth have a great deal of relevant experience.

[Sir Geoffrey Howe]

If Grenada is to return to normal democratic life, it will be essential for conditions of peace and security to be restored to the island. Commonwealth assistance with an interim security force and with policing on the island have both been suggested. I have seen the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth twice in the past few days and he is now pursuing his discussions in New York. We are in close touch with Commonwealth missions there, and of course with the Governor-General in Grenada. The two functions are, of course, closely related. It will be important for any such security force to have a properly constituted structure of command, clear objectives and a time frame within which its mission must be accomplished. If it is to operate effectively it will also, of course, need the active support of the interim administration of Grenada and of other states of the Caribbean. Let me make it plain that we shall want to respond positively to requests for help in this field.

Reconstruction and economic development are a further essential ingredient in the return to normal conditions. We have already made clear to the Governor-General our willingness to help in that task. He has welcomed our offer to send a high level team of advisers, including aid experts and the regional police adviser, to assess the position and make proposals. They should arrive in Grenada tomorrow. Sir Paul Scoon has also welcomed our decision to resume forthwith our bilateral aid relationship with Grenada, which will involve capital assistance as well as technical co-operation.

In discussing Grenada, I have deliberately been looking to the future as I am sure that that is what the House would wish, but let me dispose of certain lines of argument that have been pursued over the past week.

Some hon. Members have argued that we should have condemned the intervention outright and voted against it at the United Nations. Other hon. Members have argued exactly the opposite. The position, quite simply, is this: we took the view that our participation in military intervention was not justified. We hold to that view, but we are not prepared to condemn, nor shall we condemn, the United States and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States for the action that they took. To have voted for any of the resolutions that have been before the Security Council and the General Assembly would have meant calling for an immediate withdrawal of United States and OECS troops.

Is that the result that hon. Members want who have urged me in that direction? Do they want guerrilla fighters from Cuba and the people's revolutionary army to remain free to create anarchy and bloodshed? Do they want to destroy the second chance for democracy that is now opened up to the people of Grenada? If that is what the Labour party wants, it should have the courage to say so in so many words. I must say that it is a grossly irresponsible policy, that Her Majesty's Government utterly reject.

Even more irresponsible is the way in which some Opposition Members have linked or sought to link the Grenada crisis with fundamental questions of western security in an orgy of anti-Americanism. They seem to take pleasure in criticising our most important ally, the support of which for western Europe is underlined by the presence on this side of the Atlantic of 300,000 troops and their dependants.

The leader of the Labour party said not long ago that the United States and the Soviet Union presented an almost equal threat to the security of Britain. On the basis of such a belief, the destructive rhetoric that we have heard might just be explicable. Even so, I do not understand those who warn us against megaphone diplomacy in relation to the Soviet Union while urging it upon us in our dealings with our allies.

The flames of anti-Americanism on the Opposition Benches have been fanned with notable enthusiasm—

Mr. Neil Kinnock (Islwyn): If the right hon. and learned Gentleman is going to quote me to try to improve his speeches, he had better quote me accurately. I said that there is almost an equity of menace to world stability, not an equality of threat to the security of Britain.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: What the right hon. Gentleman has just said serves only to clarify the falsity of his view. To regard that as an equity of menace is a wholly unfounded premise.

The flames of anti-Americanism have been fanned with enthusiasm by the one person in the Opposition whose major positions of responsibility in past Governments should have to taught him better. I refer of course to the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), the Labour spokesman on foreign affairs. We have witnessed the performance of a man who knows that his party will be in opposition for many years and that he will not have to account for his irresponsibility. It may have served to gain him a place in the shadow Cabinet, but at what a price.

As to the argument put forward by some of my hon. Friends, that we should have joined in the action taken by the United States, I should like to say this. Certainly we share the same objectives. We all want to see democracy and the rule of law prosper in Grenada and in the Caribbean more generally, just as we did in the south Atlantic, when we took the action that we did in the Falklands. That same rule of law informed the decision that we were called upon to take over intervention in Grenada. The case was less clear cut, of course, as General Austin and his friends had clearly shown their contempt for the values that we uphold.

We gave, as we should, full weight to the British interests at stake as well as the risks to British citizens on Grenada, and we concluded that British military intervention would not have been justified. Other countries, including some Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean, reached the same conclusion.

the whole House must realise increasingly how difficult it is in an imperfect world to deal effectively with the likely consequences of a bloody coup such as the one in Grenada. It is important that we should recognise that these events have highlighted a particular problem affecting small independent nations. As my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Sir P. Goodhart) put it to me, they can be hijacked almost as easily as an airliner. They are peculiarly vulnerable to small bands of determined people who want power and are prepared to do anything to get it. The question whether more could be done to provide security to small nations is one to which further thought should properly be given. I intend to follow this up with our friends in the Commonwealth and elsewhere.

Mr. Sydney Bidwell (Ealing, Southall): During the three years in which the Bishop Government were in

power, progressive steps were taken to improve the economy of Grenada. Will the co-operatives, fish farms and the rest be safeguarded? Will the Foreign Secretary give an assurance that he will take a special interest in the economic progress and the attack on unemployment that was made in Grenada at that time?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: The purpose of the early mission by our aid advisers is to enable us to take a view as to what can and should be preserved by economic assistance as soon as possible. If the hon. Member is right in what he has said, all the greater is the tragedy of the ruthless execution of Mr. Bishop by the murderous gang.

Some people see last week's events in the Caribbean as reflecting the continuing tension between East and West. The facts which have emerged about the extent and nature of the Cuban presence on Grenada are certainly relevant, but it is important to be clear, in each such case, just how much weight to place on what is often a more complex picture. It is important to keep a clear head about the fundamentals of the relationship between East and West.

Our first priority is and must be the security of our nation. The Russians certainly take the same view about theirs. But we have to take account, too, of the brute fact that they appear in practice to see their security as requiring the invasion of Afghanistan, the suppression of Solidarity in Poland, the shooting down of 269 innocent civilians and an arms build-up going far beyond the realistic needs of defence. So long as that is the case, the Soviet Union should not be surprised if the world outside its borders feels threatened by those very same actions and takes measures to ensure that its essential security interests are defended.

That is why the present Government, indeed the Alliance as a whole, remain determined to maintain the armed forces necessary to our security. We remain equally determined to work for balance and effective measures of disarmament. We proved once again last week our desire not to retain more nuclear weapons that are strictly necessary for deterrence when NATO defence Ministers announced a reduction of 2,000 nuclear warheads in Europe, in addition to the 1,000 removed by the United States in 1980.

We want to make headway in developing a more normal relationship between East and West over a broader front. Of course the obstacles are all too clear. We have to accept that change in the Soviet Union will be a long-term process and that western influence will probably be slight. Change in eastern Europe will also be slow, but that is no reason to confine our efforts only to maintaining adequate defences.

We must be prepared, and we are ready, to put our views directly to the Russians and to do so at all levels. Contacts between East and West are not an end in themselves. Nor should they be. They are a means to an end. Our aim is to convey our views to the Russians without unnecessary asperity, but without ambiguity. And we are very ready to listen to what they want to tell us. That was the spirit in which, two months ago, I saw Mr. Gromyko in Madrid and, more recently, Mr. Kostandov, the Soviet Deputy Prime Minister, in London. We are now looking for a similar response from the Soviet Union.

This is above all necessary in the negotiations on intermediate nuclear forces in Geneva. The House must face the probability that agreement will not be reached in Geneva before the end of the year. The Russians, with a

mixture of threats and apparent inducements, have tried their best to divert public opinion in the West. But they have not made an effort where it really matters—at the negotiating table. Nothing that they have said so far changes their fundamental position. They are still demanding that they should, but that the United States should not, be allowed medium-range missiles in Europe. That is unacceptable to us and to the Alliance as a whole.

That is why, barring some quite unexpected change in the Soviet position, it will be necessary for NATO to begin to deploy its own INF missiles by the end of this year. We hoped that this could have been avoided—we have worked hard to avoid it—but Soviet intransigence has left us with no choice.

Deployment will not in any way affect our resolve to pursue an arms control agreement after that time. If it proves necessary to implement the full deployment programme, this will take place over five years. But deployment can be and will be halted or reversed whenever progress in Geneva so warrants. I remain determined, the Government remains determined, indeed the West remains determined, to work for such an outcome.

The Soviet leaders, for their part, must make their position clear. Are they interested in balanced disarmament, or have they stayed at Geneva, as all too many people fear, merely in the hope of maintaining unilateral advantage?

We are greatly concerned also to see early progress in the other negotiations in progress in Geneva—the START talks on reductions of strategic nuclear weapons.

The INF and the START talks are of course bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. We in Britain are, however, very closely involved with our allies in the formulation of policy, particularly in INF, because it is of such vital importance to the Alliance as a whole.

As for our own strategic systems, there can be no question of agreeing to the inclusion of those weapons in the INF negotiations in Geneva. Those talks are specifically not about strategic weapons. They do not include the strategic weapons of the United States or the Soviet Union and there is no logical reason why they should include ours. As far as strategic arms control is concerned, we must remember that our force represents less than 3 per cent. of the strategic nuclear forces available to the United States or to the Soviet Union. It would make no sense as things stand for us to seek to trade reductions with the Russians.

But we have never said never. We have made it clear that if Soviet and United States strategic arsenals were to be very substantially reduced and if no significant changes had occurred in Soviet defensive capabilities, Britain would want to review her position and to consider how best we could contribute to arms control in the light of that reduced threat.

These are fundamental issues between East and West. They are crucial also to the prospects for peace in the world. But not all conflict in the world can or should be seen as a by-product of conflict between East and West.

Mr. Nigel Forman (Carshalton and Wallington): I very much welcome the positive statement of my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary about the Government's commitment to multilateral arms control

[Mr. Nigel Forman]

and disarmament. Can he say what progress is being made on the comprehensive test ban treaty in which the Government should be involved?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I am not prepared to enlarge on that matter, as my speech is already quite long enough.

Mr. Dennis Skinner (Bolsover): The right hon. and learned Gentleman will have to think on his feet.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I wish to refer to the long-drawn-out war in the Gulf. Numerous mediators have tried to end the bloody and pointless conflict between Iran and Iraq. So far, regrettably, they have all failed. The whole world would like to see a speedy settlement on terms acceptable to both sides. We shall continue to support any initiatives which offer a realistic chance of bringing that about.

Just as urgent is the need for a settlement of the wider Arab-Israel dispute. Time is not on the side of peace in that region. But the fact remains that there is no alternative to a negotiated settlement. The difficulties are formidable, but the principles spelt out in the Venice declaration and the commitment to a peaceful solution at the Arab summit at Fez provide the right landmarks and President Reagan's plan remains the best route map available. We are doing all in our power to encourage the parties to return to that road.

The urgent need is for a firm commitment by all the parties to the principles on which negotiated agreement could be based. That was the message which my right hon. Friend took with her to Washington when she had talks with President Reagan a month ago, and that is the message which is being carried by my hon. Friend the Member for Shoreham (Mr. Luce) who has just visited Israel and the West Bank and is today in Jordan. But no country outside that region can produce peace. Only the parties themselves can make that peace.

So it is with the Lebanon. The multinational force is there to give support to the Lebanese Government and armed forces in the Beirut area. The British contingent is there to help in that task. It is a delicate and dangerous mission. Our troops are carrying it out with distinction and courage. They have won the trust of all sides; and trust is a precious commodity in Lebanon.

I know the whole House shares my feelings of revulsion for the recent horrendous attack on the American and French contingents. Both countries have, of course, weighed their position very carefully in the light of their tragic losses. They have made clear their determination that those unspeakable acts will not weaken their resolve to continue that mission. I discussed the position of the multinational force with the foreign ministers of the United States, France and Italy in Paris last Thursday. The force is a symbol of our commitment to help create the circumstances in which the Lebanese Government can pursue political reconciliation and restore stability. It should not, and it will not, stay a day longer than is necessary and justified by what is happening on the ground. But there can be no question of pulling it out at this stage.

The ceasefire which came into effect on 26 September was an important step forward, but it will not last in a political vacuum. It is therefore now more important than ever, and more urgent than ever, that the Lebanese should grasp this opportunity to reach an agreement which will

help them to live together in peace. Outsiders can help create the right environment for these vital negotiations. The withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces remains a very important, and very difficult, objective, but it is for the Lebanese leaders themselves to make the painful concessions which will be needed from all sides in Lebanon if a lasting bargain is to be struck. That is the purpose of the talks which began in Geneva on Monday. It is now for the Lebanese to show that they want independence. We have made it absolutely clear to them that we are not prepared to wait indefinitely for the steps necessary to make it a reality.

It is not possible in a speech of this kind to deal with all the questions of foreign policy to which the House—and I myself—attach importance. Nor is it possible to weave the answers to all the questions into some seamless web of principle. The primary point perhaps is that as Foreign Secretary it is my duty, which I seek to discharge, to uphold the interests of this country and its people.

Against that background, I should like very briefly to say a word about Hong Kong, about which there is, quite properly, deep interest in the House. As my hon. Friend the Member for Shoreham explained in the short debate on Monday night, the most recent session of talks about Hong Kong took place on 19-20 October. That session was described by both sides as useful and constructive. We are right to take encouragement from this.

The next round of talks will be on 14-15 November. Our objective remains clear. We are seeking a settlement which will secure stability and prosperity for Hong Kong, and in a way acceptable to China and to the people of Hong Kong and to this Parliament.

I can well understand the feelings of uncertainty among people in Hong Kong, but there are solid reasons for them to face the future with confidence. Their economy has great underlying strength. The Hong Kong Government have acted decisively to stabilise the Hong Kong dollar.

I was able to discuss these questions with the Chinese Foreign Minister in New York just over a month ago. It was quite clear that we are approaching these talks with an agreed common purpose. There is still much ground—and much difficult ground—to be covered, but I have no doubt that there is a common will to bring the talks to a successful conclusion. However, it is necessary and right that these talks should be conducted in an atmosphere of complete confidentiality. I hope the House will bear with that, knowing that this is an essential element in eventual success.

We shall continue to consult closely with Hong Kong. Unofficial members of the Governor's executive council came for the second time to London early last month, and met my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and myself. We shared a complete understanding on the issues involved. That is the basis on which we intend to proceed.

Sir Paul Bryan (Boothferry): Would it not be as well to point out at this juncture how prosperous Hong Kong is in manufacturing? It is doing extremely well.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: That is one of the many aspects of Hong Kong's prosperity and one of the reasons why I say that there can be confidence on the basis on which to carry through the negotiations.

Mr. John Browne (Winchester): I support entirely my right hon. and learned Friend's wishes and the reasons for having the negotiations carried out under the strictest

confidentiality, as I believe it stops fluctuations in the market for one thing. Would he be prepared to say whether or not within that confidentiality there would be any willingness on behalf of Her Majesty's Government to take equity in things like the proposed new nuclear power station?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: That is a separate question. We are certainly interested in the prospects for a prosperous partnership between British manufacturing firms and the proposed nuclear power station at Guandong. We are prepared to consider any arrangement that would make sense to the Chinese Government and ourselves to achieve that.

Finally, I turn to the European Community. It is now certain that the future of this country lies in the Community. That was made absolutely clear by the people in the election in June. Our continuing task in the Community is to make a full success of our membership. Since the beginning of July I have spent many days in negotiation with our Common Market partners and can report to the House that throughout the Community there is greater recognition that there is a real budgetary problem for the Community as a whole to be resolved and beyond that a greater willingness to negotiate to resolve that problem. *[Laughter.]* Opposition Members may laugh, but the recognition by all the countries of the Community of the existence of this problem is a major step forward.

When Labour were thrown out of government in 1979 the budget problem was dismissed throughout Europe with the words, "What Budget problem?" I can confirm that to the House. At that time, in 1979, in day after day of negotiations, we were seeking to persuade our partners in the Community that a problem existed. If one conducts negotiations now, they start from the premise that there is a problem which goes beyond the interests of this country. It is recognised that the budget problem of the Community has to be solved if the Community is to grow successfully, as we all wish and as Britain's economic and political interests demand. Failure in the forthcoming negotiations would be a serious setback.

Spending within the community has become distorted, primarily because 65 per cent. of the budget is devoted to the common agricultural policy. Spending has also risen faster than resources. I have made it clear that we would be prepared to consider an increase in the Community's own resources provided that—I stress this—two very important conditions are met. First, agreement must be reached on an effective control of the rate of increase of agricultural and other expenditure. Secondly, this must be accompanied by an arrangement to ensure a fair sharing of the financial burden, so that no country has to pay a share disproportionate to its relative national wealth. Only in those circumstances, as the Prime Minister and I have made clear, could we consider an increase in the 1 per cent. VAT limit.

Mr. Tony Marlow (Northampton, North): Would my right hon. and learned Friend go a bit further? Since at any one time the public expenditure cake in Europe is finite, if Europe is to spend more money, that means that Europe will be controlling more policies and we will be controlling fewer policies and spending less money. That would be a surrender of sovereignty by the House. If Europe is to have more money we in this country will be seeking new schemes of public expenditure so that we can

get our share of that money. Since hon. Members on this side of the House do not wish to go for more schemes of public expenditure and since also many people on both sides of the House would resist an increase in the resources, will my right hon. and learned Friend go further and say that under no circumstances will this country agree to an increase in Community resources?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: The purpose of what I have just been saying is precisely the opposite to what my hon. Friend has invited me to say. I have set out clearly the conditions under which we would be prepared to consider an increase in those resources.

Our specific proposals on the budget concentrate on correcting inequitable burdens by setting firm limits, based on relative prosperity and gross domestic product, to the net budgetary burden that any member should be expected to bear. That is the British proposal for a safety net. If we contributed more than our due one year, our contribution the following year would simply be reduced by the amount due under the safety net arrangement.

The second crucial point is reform of the CAP. Agriculture is the largest industry in our economy. Our self-sufficiency in food products is growing. I greatly welcome that. However, the price that we have had to pay for that success has been too high—above all the cost to the taxpayer of subsidised surpluses which cannot be disposed of inside the Community or sensibly outside.

We have therefore proposed the introduction of a strict financial guideline which must be embodied in the Community's budgetary procedures. This will ensure that the rate of growth of CAP expenditure is kept markedly lower than the rate of growth of the Community's resources. That will not freeze agricultural spending or exclude flexibility to deal with unforeseen crises but it will ensure that CAP spending is kept within strictly confined limits and it will back up the measures which are necessary to bring about a better market balance for agricultural commodities.

This will be a difficult element in the negotiations that will continue at the Athens summit in December. The concept I have outlined is in tune with the Commission's intentions. It represents one aspect of the changing mood in Europe and it is in line with the intentions of most other member states. The Dutch, for example, are thinking along much the same lines as us, and I have never heard them criticised for lack of Community spirit or attachment to the CAP. Reiteration of good intentions is not enough. The fundamental requirement is that we must now achieve arrangements which guarantee results.

I am also looking forward to the development of new policies. At Stuttgart we made proposals concerning transport and energy policy, the environment, innovation and advanced technology. All are areas in which the Community should now take specific action. Such action could be taken without incurring additional expenditure and it would greatly benefit the Community.

Many more hard days and nights of negotiation lie ahead before those objectives are achieved but the mood among our Community partners on the need for change is much more evident. Our chipping away at the logjam is yielding results and we are much more likely to achieve success because, unlike the divided Labour party, there is no doubt whatsoever about the Government's commitment to Europe.

Mr. Julian Amery (Brighton, Pavilion): I understand that this is our last debate on foreign affairs before the Commonwealth conference. My right hon. and learned Friend will be aware of the deep anxiety of many hon. Members about the detention of Bishop Muzorewa. Britain might have no legal responsibility for the bishop but we have a strong moral responsibility for him as he implemented the six principles and put almost blind trust in the Government during the Lancaster House conference. Will my right hon. and learned Friend undertake to raise, or get the Prime Minister to raise, the case of Bishop Muzorewa and that of the air force officers who are still under detention when they meet Mr. Mugabe at the forthcoming Commonwealth conference?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and I will consider those points. My right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) no doubt understands the limitations of our formal responsibility, but I shall certainly bear in mind the points that he has made.

My final point follows from the observations that I have just made. Britain is no longer an imperial power, but we remain deeply respected. That respect is based on our tradition of law and fair dealing and on our readiness to take difficult decisions in Britain's interests and stand by them.

In Europe, in disarmament negotiations, in the middle east or in Grenada the answers are not to be found in the glib one-line propositions that we hear from the Opposition. They say that we should withdraw from Europe—what nonsense—abandon nuclear defence—what nonsense—pull out of Lebanon and condemn the United States. Stop the world—Labour wants to get off. That is a grotesque way for a major political party to tackle world problems. The Labour party is long on insults, short on solutions. We do not believe in trading insults with our friends. We build bridges, not demolish them. That is in the interests of Britain, of the Commonwealth, of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. That is the policy which the Government will continue to pursue.

4.24 pm

Mr. Denis Healey (Leeds, East): The right hon. and learned Gentleman has covered many issues. I shall take up many of the points that he made. I can say on behalf of many right hon. and hon. Members that as the Foreign Secretary has shown such a lack of knowledge and judgment when dealing with the problems of an independent Commonwealth country of which Britain has long experience, it is difficult to have much confidence in his knowledge or judgment on the issues that he discussed today.

It is only a few months since the House last discussed foreign affairs in their broader context. We must agree, however, that in all respects the world is now an even more dangerous place than it was in the summer. An effective dialogue between Western powers and the Soviet Union has now almost come to a halt. There are growing strains between the United States and its European allies in every aspect of policy—even in defence which is the core of our relationship. Armed conflict is growing worse in the middle east, the Horn of Africa and in central America. The background to that deterioration in the political scene is the world economy, which is threatened by a debt crisis which worsens every week. The Philippines, Hong Kong,

Israel and South Korea are all new entrants to the list of countries that suffer from the debt crisis. Moreover, there is a risk of a trade war between the European Community and the United States.

In such gloomy circumstances the House and Government must concentrate primarily on the issues of direct concern to the United Kingdom or on issues on which the British Government can hope to exert an important influence for the good. I shall deal first with the deepening conflict between Washington and Moscow and then consider some of its implications in the Caribbean, central and Latin America and in the middle east. I shall not discuss Hong Kong as it will be dealt within the Opposition's winding-up speech. Nor shall I deal with the Community budget, primarily because my imagination is still reeling from the shock of the right hon. and learned Gentleman's revelation that there is a problem with the Community budget and our partners are aware of it.

Nor shall I deal in detail with what the Foreign Secretary said about disarmament. However, I wish to make one observation about the central issue of the role of British nuclear forces in the disarmament discussions. The Foreign Secretary knows very well that the Soviet Union has not asked Britain to reduce her nuclear forces. That has not been the issue. We have been asked simply that they should be taken into account in the discussions on intermediate nuclear forces between the Soviet Union and the United States as they represent part of the western European-based threat to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Churchill (Davyhulme): Why is the right hon. Gentleman taking their side?

Mr. Healey: What I say is accepted by the Soviet and United States Governments. As I pointed out on Monday when we discussed these matters at greater length, Secretary Weinburger included British nuclear forces not in the strategic forces with which he dealt in his statement on fiscal 1984, but in the theatre nuclear forces allocated to supreme allied command Europe. It is illogical for the British Government to refuse to allow the Americans to include them in the threat as they obviously form part of it. Their range is less than that of the Russian SS20s and they were taken account of in early discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union, although that was done tacitly in protocols.

I start with the problem in Washington and I speak, as the Foreign Secretary conceded, as a man who has spent most of his political life defending the British relationship with the United States against critics, not least those in my party. Since President Reagan won office, Washington has been the theatre of a struggle between pragmatists and ideologues. There is no denying that the ideologues now have the upper hand, but the struggle continues and America's friends and allies, not only in NATO but in Latin America, can influence that struggle, and it is vital that we should seek to do so.

The ideology, which now has the upper hand and which determined the invasion of Grenada, was described in chilling terms in an interview with Mrs. Jeane Kirkpatrick in a recent issue of *Encounter* magazine, long extracts of which were published in *The Times*. It is based on the proposition that the world is exclusively the scene of a cold war between Russia and the United States, in which Russia is winning because America is not taking the cold war sufficiently seriously; that the failure of America and her

allies to take the cold war seriously enough is both a sin and a political blunder, because the cold war is a moral crusade of good against evil.

President Reagan made his views about that clear even before he was elected when he said:

"The Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they were not engaged in this game of dominoes, there would not be any hot spots in the world".

He believed that then and he believes it now. A few months ago in Orlando, Florida, he described the Soviet Union as "an evil empire" and,

"the focus of evil in the modern world".

He went on to say—I know there are ideologues on the Conservative Benches who take the same view:

"We Americans are enjoined by Scripture and the Lord Jesus Christ to oppose the sin and evil in the world."

He returned to the same theme in the television address he gave last week, which sought to justify the presence of American marines in Lebanon and the invasion of Grenada. He asked of Lebanon:

"Can the United States, or the free world for that matter, stand by and see the Middle East incorporated into the Soviet Bloc?" I shall deal with some of the implications of that in a moment. He went on to say:

"We are a nation with global responsibilities. We are not somewhere else in the world protecting someone else's interests. We are there protecting our own."

He also used those arguments and principles to justify the invasion of Grenada.

I hope that the Foreign Secretary will assure the House that he still agrees with what he said once or twice last week and with rather more force on Sunday, which was that it is unacceptable for the American President to assert the right of the United States to intervene by military force anywhere in the world where it believes United States interests to be at stake.

The United States is not the only member of the Western Alliance to have been guilty of unilateral action. The British Government took unilateral action and violated international law at Suez in 1966. I attacked their action then as I attack the American Government's action today. It is also true, as the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) said a few days ago, that President Reagan is not the first American President to have acted unilaterally. Almost exactly 10 years ago in October 1973, without consulting Her Majesty's Government, the United States put all its nuclear forces in the United Kingdom on alert, not for a purpose covered by NATO but to deter the possible dispatch of Soviet troops to Egypt during the Yom Kippur war. Sir James Cable says in a letter to *The Times* today that Secretary of State Kissinger justified the failure to consult his allies—a failure that is wholly contrary to the understandings that the Prime Minister asked us to accept on cruise—with the words:

"To be frank, we could not have accepted a judgment different from our own . . . allies should be consulted wherever possible. But emergencies are sure to arise again; and it will not be in anyone's interest if the chief protector of free world security is hamstrung by bureaucratic procedure."

Those are Secretary Kissinger's own words and they fully justify the views of those who spoke from both sides of the House during Monday's debate on the installation of cruise missiles in favour of giving the British Government physical control over the firing of those missiles, as we had physical control over the firing of the four missiles which were introduced into Britain in 1958 when Prime Minister Macmillan was head of the Government.

Such control is especially important at a time when the American Administration is guided by the ideology which, as I describe in its own words,

"reserves the right to act anywhere in the world by military force if it feels its interests threatened", and to act in areas not covered by the rules of the North Atlantic Alliance, as it did in 1973.

Mr. Churchill: Is the right hon. Gentleman suggesting that American forces are in Lebanon or in Grenada other than by the invitation of the embodiment of constitutional authority in those countries?

Mr. Healey: They were invited in by the Government of Lebanon, and I shall return to the implications of that in a moment. That is not so in Grenada, and I shall be dealing with the hon. Gentleman's point in detail shortly.

The idea that Soviet Communism is the cause of all the trouble in the modern world is just as ridiculous as its mirror image—the view of infantile pseudo-Marxists that all the trouble in the world is caused by capitalism. The world suffered from wars and revolutions for at least 2,000 years before the Spinning Jenny was invented or the Bolsheviks stormed the Winter Palace. To attribute all the complex problems of the world, with their different backgrounds and history, to this comic strip interpretation which President Reagan undoubtedly genuinely believes, is profoundly dangerous to world peace; and it is the duty of anyone who cares for world peace or for the Alliance to say so and to keep on saying so until this ridiculous fantasy disappears from the formulation of American policy.

However, the Prime Minister went out of her way to endorse President Reagan's approach on her previous trip to the United States in a speech which rightly earned her a rebuke from Lord Carrington that she was indulging in megaphone diplomacy. I hope that she recognises now where such opportunistic rhetoric has led her. If, as the Prime Minister then said,

"Force and dictatorship are the only governing principles of Soviet policy",

I ask her to ask herself, and I ask the House to ask itself, why the Soviet Union did not attack China in the early 1960s when their relations were at an all-time low, when the Soviet Union had a large arsenal of nuclear weapons and China had none? China also had no friends in the world, because at that time the United States was as hostile to Peking as was the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan because the reaction of Western Governments to the first infringements of Afghanistan's neutrality were so supine that it had installed a Communist Government—those Governments were quite wrong to do so, and we should have protested at the time—and it thought that there would be no reaction. It was wrong. I am glad that there was a reaction and that the reaction from these Benches was as strong as that from the Government Benches.

Ever since the second world war, the Soviet Union has been cautious about using the Red Army outside the area the Soviet Government believes to be recognised by the West as being within its sphere of influence. I believe that the Alliance between Europe and the United States is fundamental not just to the security of Great Britain but to the peace of the world. To those both on the Right and the Left of British politics who ask Britain to leave the Alliance, I say that there is no chance whatever that, if the Alliance broke up, the United States would revert to the

[Mr. Healey]

passive neutrality in world affairs that it observed before the second world war. If the Alliance broke up, global unilateralism would be unrestrained.

The Alliance will not survive, however, unless America's allies join the powerful forces inside the United States itself that are as worried as I am about the new elements in American policy. The views of Mr. George Ball, for example, who served America well in many Administrations as a Minister for foreign affairs, appeared in *The Times* last week. He spoke as one who believes that if America continues to go it alone in a holy war against Communism, it will be a disaster for the world and a disaster for the United States. The Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mr. Tip O'Neill, who could not be described as soft on Communism, has described the Grenada invasion as gunboat diplomacy and a breach of international law.

In an interview on Sunday, the Foreign Secretary belatedly made it clear that he shares that view. It is very disappointing that he did not join members of the Commonwealth such as New Zealand and Canada, and members of NATO such as the Netherlands and France, in condemning America's action on this occasion. By seeking to ride two horses, he has fallen between two stools. [Interruption.] The circus metaphor comes easily to mind when one is talking about the right hon. and learned Gentleman. I fear that it is irresistible.

We must join our friends in Europe and elsewhere—notably in the Commonwealth—in warning the United States administration against its current approach to foreign policy, particularly in central America and the middle east, which at present are the areas of greatest danger.

Before I deal with the broad implications for central America of what happened in Grenada, I have some questions for the Foreign Secretary about Grenada itself. The right hon. Gentleman said that the casualties had been lower than might have been expected. I am not sure whether he was referring to casualties among the fighting forces, or civilian casualties. It appears to me, however, and my view is confirmed in the newspapers, that there has been no attempt to collect figures for the civilian casualties. We learnt belatedly that in an attack on a mental hospital—a tragic error—30 people were killed, 70 reported missing and many injured. However, British journalists now on the island state that there were other civilian casualties. I wonder whether the Minister who replies to the debate will tell us whether Her Majesty's Government know how many innocent civilians were victims of the invasion.

The second question that I put to the Minister was raised a moment ago and concerns the role of the Governor-General. There must still be doubt about the timing and circumstances of the invitation that he issued for intervention, and to whom it was addressed. The Prime Minister of Dominica said that the request for intervention was made on the Friday and Saturday before the invasion. The Governor-General said that he decided to ask for intervention on the Sunday evening and confirmed his request—whatever that means—on Monday, in a letter that was delivered on Wednesday, and which some people believe was drafted by American officials rather than by him.

The Governor-General told British journalists—according to the weekend newspapers—that he had not asked for military intervention, or for intervention by the United States. However, in the "Panorama" programme on Monday he told the British television audience that he had invited the United States to intervene. My right hon. and learned Friend Lord Elwyn-Jones, who was the Lord Chancellor in the previous Labour Government, spoke in the other place on Monday. I refer hon. Members to column 516 of *Hansard*. He said not only that the Organisation of East Caribbean States had no legal right, under the 1981 treaty, to intervene or to ask others to intervene, but that the Governor-General had no right to invite a foreign power to invade his native land without first taking advice from the Queen.

The Governor-General spoke to the Palace on the Sunday, as the Prime Minister told us when she spoke on Tuesday of last week, and made no mention of his intention or desire to issue such an invitation. He was free to contact the Palace on Monday, because the invasion did not take place until Monday night. However, he did not do so, and gave no sign of an intention to do so. Yet the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, told the other place in a debate on Monday that the authority of the Governor-General derived from the Queen and that he was her representative. There was no legal authority for the intervention that the Governor-General requested, if in fact he requested it. That is one of the disturbing elements in the whole affair.

I raise these points, because if Sir Paul Scoon does not act as the focus for the restoration of democratic government on Grenada it is difficult to see what can be done. Just then, I nearly said "Barbados", but Barbados was anyway acting on behalf of Grenada last week, was it not? If Sir Paul Scoon wishes to act—as I hope he will—as a focus for the restoration of democratic government in Grenada, it is vital that he should be seen by the world and the people of Grenada as a wholly independent figure, and not as the agent of any foreign Government. It is vital that that should be made clear and that whatever may have happened in the past, there can be no imputation against Sir Paul Scoon's objectivity or his role as a completely national, independent arbitrator, who is not responsible to any foreign power.

Sir Philip Goodhart (Beckenham): Does not the right hon. Gentleman realise that the Governor-General was in an impossible position, and that if he had publicly asked for the intervention of outside forces while he was in Grenada, he would have been murdered by the leaders of the coup? Under those circumstances, how could he give clear instructions?

Mr. Healey: According to the Prime Minister of Dominica, Sir Paul Scoon asked for intervention on the previous Friday and Saturday. It was open to him to reveal his intention in his telephone conversation with the Palace, and even more so in his conversation on Sunday with the representative of the British high commissioner in his private apartment on Grenada. He did not do so, and the Prime Minister made this clear last week. Great uncertainty must remain about whether he in fact asked for intervention; if so, when, and whether he took the decision on his own or was persuaded to confirm it while he was on the battleship *Guam* and when his hosts would not allow him to contact certain people.

The House would agree that if Sir Paul Scoon accepts responsibility and free elections are held, all American troops must be out of the island and some impartial body must be present to monitor and to guarantee law and order during the election. I understand that although American troops have been reduced substantially, there are still 1,500 or 2,000 on the island which, on an island of 100,000 inhabitants, is a pretty substantial number. Therefore, it is important that some impartial body can guarantee law and order from the earliest moment. I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman agrees that the Commonwealth seems to be the most suitable and likely body to assume this role. I hope that the Minister when he replies will make it clear that when the Foreign Secretary talked about a positive response he meant that if we are asked to contribute to a Commonwealth force we shall agree. This point was not wholly clear from what the right hon. Gentleman said.

I turn to the broader implications of the invasion for the central American region as a whole. The right hon. Gentleman must know, because he has ambassadors in all of the capitals concerned, that the invasion was seen by many as a rehearsal for the invasion of Nicaragua or Cuba or for direct American military intervention in El Salvador. The circumstances in each of those three countries could justify intervention, according to the rules that President Reagan announced in his television broadcast the other day.

The Prime Minister told the world on Sunday during a television interview that she would stick her neck out—a dangerous procedure in some company—and say that America would not invade Nicaragua. I hope that the Foreign Secretary will tell us that she had some information to justify so dangerous and uncharacteristic an action. Has she been informed by the American President that this is not on? I should hope so. I can think of nothing more calculated to send a wave of anti-Americanism sweeping over the West and Europe than a repetition in Nicaragua of the Grenada invasion.

The United States intervened in Grenada in breach of American commitments under the Organisation of American States charter, the Rio treaty, and the United Nations charter. Its action has been condemned during the past week by every Latin American Government who do not owe their survival to American support. I believe that I am correct in saying that the only Latin American Governments who failed to condemn American action were El Salvador, Guatemala and Chile. The intervention was condemned by every Government in the Ponta Pora group, on which President Reagan says that he now relies to obtain a peaceful settlement in El Salvador. If the United States President were to repeat the Grenadian adventure in any other part of Latin America, he would do a disastrous disservice to his country and to world peace. At the moment, he has assembled more forces in the independent country of Honduras than have taken part in any other American exercise. They will stay there longer than any other exercise has lasted. President Reagan said at the beginning that the exercise would last six months; now, apparently, it could go on indefinitely. We know that the only reason that he is describing their presence as an exercise is that it is a means of evading control by the American Congress under the War Powers Act.

I believe that all America's friends should counsel it in its own best interest to take those troops out immediately, since that is the only way in which the United States can make it clear that it does not intend to invade Nicaragua.

The United Kingdom still has two direct responsibilities in south America—Belize and the Falkland Islands. The House can compare Her Majesty's Government's policies towards these two remaining responsibilities. The Prime Minister has chosen to spend thousands of millions of pounds to build a military base on the Falklands to defend 400 families, which are under no military threat, especially now that Mr. Alfonsín has won the election in Argentina. As the House knows, he was an outspoken opponent of the generals' invasion. He has said many times that he has no intention of pursuing Argentina's claim to the Falklands by military force. He plans to try to reorganise Argentina's forces so that they would not be capable of that type of action.

At the same time as the Government are pouring money into the Falklands, they are threatening to pull out a small British detachment from Belize to save not thousands of millions of pounds but, I believe, £25 million. Our forces are in Belize to defend a large population against a real threat from a neighbouring military dictatorship.

I suggest to the Prime Minister that she reverse her policies. She should stop talking about leaving Belize, because what she said about it—this leaked rapidly; she did not leak it herself—was an exact repetition of the blunder she had made that led to the Falklands incident. That statement was the exact equivalent to the decision to withdraw H.M.S. *Endurance* from the Falkland Islands. She was sending the wrong signal to a military dictator for the second time in the same area. It almost beggars the imagination that the Prime Minister could have acted so foolishly.

I suggest that some attempt be made while the opportunity is right to get in touch with Mr. Alfonsín and to consider how normal relations with Argentina can most rapidly be restored. Undoubtedly, the most useful first step would be a freeze on additional spending in the Falklands—something which would be welcome to the Chancellor of the Exchequer who is still trying to get £240 million knocked off this year's budget, if we are to believe the *Financial Times* which has normally been a much more reliable source of information about Her Majesty's Government than Ministers.

The United Kingdom should seriously consider what can be done to persuade Argentina and other countries in the area not to spend the same sums on building up their military forces as they have in recent years. I know that the Prime Minister is trying to dissuade President Reagan from recommencing arms deliveries to Argentina, although he could rightly protest that the first thing she did when the war with the Argentines was over was to authorise British firms to put essential machinery into German warships for delivery to Argentina this summer. More importantly, she must stop her currently planned arms deliveries to the tottering dictatorship in Chile, which is Argentina's deadly enemy. Argentina has every right to want to maintain strong forces so long as it is threatened by the Pinochet dictatorship over the many territorial disputes that they have.

I understand that HMS *Antrim*, the ship upon which we relied to rescue our citizens from Grenada, is being sold to Chile with a number of Jaguars equipped with Sea Eagle. It would make a great deal of sense for us and the

[Mr. Healey]

United States to get together and agree upon a moratorium of arms deliveries to that part of the world and, better still, if we could persuade France and Israel to join a similar moratorium.

Arms expenditure in that part of the world does not just buttress military dictatorships; it is the main cause of the debt problem which could even now bring down the private banking system in ruins.

Mr. David Winnick (Walsall, North): Is it not interesting that after the recent disturbances which took place in Chile in which children were killed, there was no condemnation of the Chilean Government's action by the Prime Minister or her Foreign Secretary?

Mr. Healey: I cannot confirm that. I have a feeling that some protest was delivered to the Chilean ambassador. An answer to that can perhaps be given later.

The troubles in the Lebanon today are not the result of a Soviet plot. Fighting has been going on between the various communities at least since the crusades. Fighting is certain to continue unless the Christian minority can be persuaded to give a fairer share of political power to the Muslim majority and Syria's historical interest in the Lebanon is recognised.

The Government should make it clear to the Governments of Lebanon and the United States that we will withdraw our participation in the peacekeeping force unless the Geneva negotiations succeed in achieving those two objects.

The settlement of the current intercommunal problem in the Lebanon will not be sufficient unless account is also taken of the 300,000 Palestinians who are not represented at Geneva, some 100 of whom are carrying weapons. It was their presence in the Lebanon nine years ago which led the Christian Government to invite Syria into the Lebanon with the agreement of Israel and the United States. I learn that there was a savage attack this morning on Yasser Arafat's men in which many were killed. There is no doubt that so long as the Palestinians remain in Lebanon they will be open to the type of massacre that they suffered in Chatila camp a year ago.

The Palestinians must be given somewhere to live, and it cannot be another Arab country. They were pushed out of Jordan and the Lebanon. Syria certainly will not accept them nor will any other Arab country. There is only one place that they can go, and that is where they came from—the West Bank of the Jordan, and Gaza.

However, the Israeli Government are colonising the West Bank. Many people believe that the main purpose of the invasion of Lebanon was to distract world attention from the build up of settlements on the West Bank which has been going on apace since then.

Mr. Cyril D. Townsend (Bexleyheath): The right hon. Gentleman will recall that a few weeks ago he called for the precipitate withdrawal of the British contingent from the Lebanon when it was helping to facilitate the current talks on the Lebanon in Switzerland. Would not such a withdrawal have given the wrong message to the Syrians, embarrass our allies and weaken Great Britain's strong position in the Middle East.

Mr. Healey: The hon. Gentleman is wrong. The House will recall that I said here, and many times on radio and

television before the House reassembled, exactly what I am saying now, that the conditions for the maintenance of British forces in the Lebanon must be a move by the Lebanese Government to a fairer sharing of power with the muslim community and recognition of Syria's legitimate, historical interests in Lebanon. I said that if that could not be achieved we should discuss multilateral withdrawal with other members of the peacekeeping force and only if that failed should we go for unilateral withdrawal.

Mr. Russell Johnston (Inverness, Nairn and Lochaber): Like many other people, the right hon. Gentleman has said that he believes that there should be a shift in the traditional balance of the Lebanese Government in favour of the Muslims. How should that be done? Is he saying that the Maronites should give up the presidency?

Mr. Healey: I will not take the decisions that the hon. Gentleman said—I agree with him on this—could be taken only by those who are present at the Geneva talks. There is a variety of methods by which an acceptable solution can be found. It will not be found if the United States Government make it clear that they will support the Maronite Christians in the argument, and still less, if they use military force to protect them while they refuse to move in that direction, which is what they did recently.

President Reagan said one helpful thing during his television speech last week—that he wanted to return to the peace plan that he launched a year ago. I suggest that we should all use our influence to achieve that, but we must not forget that the main reason that the peace plan never got off the ground was that Mr. Begin's Government rejected it out of hand from the word go and refused to discuss it. Therefore it was not worth any of the other parties to the dispute taking the risk of moving in that direction.

I fear that if we cannot achieve a rapid move in that direction, America may slip back into an alliance with Israel which would produce exactly the result that President Reagan wants to avoid. It would push the whole of the Arab middle east into the Soviet embrace.

The war between Iran and Iraq has already cost about 300,000 lives. It reduced the supply of middle east oil to the rest of the world when, fortunately, there was an oil glut so that no one was seriously inconvenienced. I believe that the French Government were profoundly unwise to have supplied the Iraqi Government with Super Etendards for delivering Exocet missiles. As I came in today I heard an unconfirmed report that one of those aircraft has sunk a Greek tanker in the Gulf.

The risk of explosion is great. The Iranians have threatened to block Hormuz. The Americans have said that if they do, they will intervene directly in the war. There is no doubt that if America intervenes there would be a grave risk of the Soviet Union intervening as well. The West must use all its influence in the search for a peaceful settlement, either along the lines of the French proposal at the security council or the Bahraini suggestion which is being discussed in the Gulf.

I do not believe that any foreseeable circumstances can justify American military intervention in the Gulf war. If the straits of Hormuz were blocked most people, including Mr. Yamani, believe that it could be cleared within a week if not days. The consumer countries have enormous stocks of oil upon which they could draw to make good a

temporary shortfall and prevent oil prices rocketing. The Saudis could send more oil through their pipeline to the Mediterranean and efforts could be made to open the Iraqi pipeline.

In a rational world, the United States, knowing what is at stake in the middle east, would be discussing these problems with the Soviet Union, but the dialogue between those countries has almost ceased. If it ever takes place it will be a dialogue of the deaf. It is vital that that dialogue be restored. It is not easy for Great Britain to play a role especially as the Prime Minister has so often supported the Americans' decision on many of these issues. The European Community might collectively play a useful role.

If we cannot restore the Soviet-American dialogue, we shall not just see an extrapolation of the trends of the past 12 months, which is bad enough, we risk a chain reaction of negative responses on both sides which could produce a complete collapse of relations within 12 months.

I conclude with some words uttered by the Canadian Prime Minister in a thoughtful speech that he made last week:

"I will tell you right away that I am deeply troubled: by an intellectual climate of acrimony and uncertainty; by the parlous state of East-West relations; by a super power relationship which is dangerously confrontational; and by a widening gap between military strategy and political purpose. All these reveal most profoundly the urgent need to assert the pre-eminence of the mind of man over the machines of war."

I believe that the influence of the British Government must be used to re-assert the pre-eminence of the mind of man. I only wish I had more confidence in their willingness and ability to do so.

Several Hon. Members *rose*—

Mr. Speaker: Order. Before I call the first of the Privy Councillors to speak, I appeal to them to display their usual restraint and to speak briefly.

5.12 pm

Mr. Geoffrey Rippon (Hexham): I shall bear in mind your injunction, Mr. Speaker.

The right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) has been playing the role of world statesman today. The tone of his speech was milder than many of his recent pronouncements, here and in the United States, but the content hardly bears examination. I shall not examine it in detail, but it is clear that if one studies carefully what the right hon. Gentleman has said and done over a great many years—his reference to Suez shows this; what he did in the far east, in the Gulf, how he turned round in his attitude to Europe—one sees that he rarely says or does anything of which in the last resort the Kremlin would disapprove.

Mr. Healey: Oh dear!

Mr. Rippon: When I listen to the right hon. Gentleman I am reminded of a Commonwealth Prime Minister who once said of him to me, "He has the best trained Marxist mind in the western world." His casuistry is marvellous. If the right hon. Gentleman went to work on a bicycle he would ride it vigorously in one direction and then turn round in front of one's very eyes and say, "I am still going in the same direction." Sometimes he speaks with such authority that people are apt to believe that he pursues a consistent purpose.

Mr. Healey: I am fascinated in that the right hon. and learned Gentleman finds it so difficult to deal with any of the points I made that he must go in for the trumpery of character assassination. But whose character is he assassinating? He began by saying that I had been an absolutely consistent agent for the Soviet Union for the last 30 years and the next moment he said that I change direction every few days. Can he help on that?

Mr. Rippon: The right hon. Gentleman makes my point. He thinks like a Marxist; he can change direction while giving the impression that he is still going the same way. I am simply saying that when we analyse what the right hon. Gentleman said we discover that we have listened to a speech today which would give great satisfaction to the Politburo, and I hope that the House will reject the attack that he made on President Reagan and the United States Administration.

I shall put my remarks in the context of what has happened in Grenada. Whatever view we take of the action and attitude that Her Majesty's Government have adopted, we are agreed, as we always are in these situations, that we should try to avoid being found in similar disarray in future.

My belief, already expressed, is that we should have given immediate support to our Commonwealth partners in the eastern Caribbean, who rightly felt threatened by a military coup and the prospect of extensive Soviet-Cuban subversion in their area. We now know, whatever the right hon. Member for Leeds, East may say—the Government have made it clear—that by one means or another the Governor-General invited the United States' Caribbean intervention in circumstances in which I believe that intervention was legitimate and, as the Governor-General said, inevitable.

I share the view expressed by Lord Home in another place that we should have supported Jamaica, Barbados and the United States in the United Nations instead of abjectly abstaining both on the vote in the Security Council and yesterday in the General Assembly. On the other hand, we are right to be concerned about the inadequacy of the machinery for consultation between ourselves and the United States. That needs to be strengthened.

But what about our special relationship with our Commonwealth countries? What concerns me greatly is that we seem to have had no clear communication from the Governor-General or from the Prime Ministers of, for example, Barbados, St. Lucia or Dominica, all of whom have expressed great dismay at the lack of support that they have received from the British Government.

Apart from the bizarre episode of the telex that somehow got misdirected, what is really of concern is that we took no steps to find out from our Commonwealth partners what was happening. After all, one can hardly expect a telephone call from the Governor-General in the middle of a bloody revolution. He was manifestly in great difficulty in that situation, so surely the onus was on the British Government to find out what was going on.

In that connection, it may be thought that our man in Grenada might have told us, but we did not have one. There were dozens of Soviet and East German officials and hundreds of Cubans there, but there was no representative of the British Government in a Commonwealth country in a situation which had been deteriorating for some time. Also in that connection, it may be remembered that the

[Mr. Rippon]

fifth report of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee drew attention to this matter during the 1981-82 session, specifically recommending that

"the post in Grenada should be strengthened"

so that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office might be adequately informed of all economic, social and political developments on the island. Instead, it seems that we have been uninformed to the bitter end.

I appreciate that there are difficulties in knowing exactly what happened in the course of the crisis, but I hope that the Government will consider issuing a document stating precisely what they did and heard during the critical period between the assassination of the Prime Minister and some of his Ministers and the commencement of the intervention.

There are, however, wider issues, to which I wish to refer, in the broader context of our foreign policy. We must above all look at why we are continually reacting to crises rather than anticipating and, hopefully, avoiding them. We tend to send the fire engines—apparently we did not even have a fire engine to send on this occasion—when the fire has broken out. There are a number of lessons that we have to learn, the first being that President Reagan was right when he said:

"Events in Grenada and the Lebanon, though oceans apart, are closely related".

That is because the interests of the free world are indivisible. So, too, is the defence of democracy, freedom and justice. There are some, not least in this House, who want to have some sort of divergence between our Atlantic, European and Commonwealth interests and they are apt to say that they are for one rather than another. In fact, they are all British interests and they are complementary.

I welcome the comment in the Foreign Secretary's speech—this is the second lesson that we must learn—to the effect that Britain can have real influence in the world only within a European context. I welcome my right hon. Friend's commitment to Europe. The Stuttgart declaration this year is worth remembering, when the Heads of State and Government, including our Prime Minister, said that they—

"reaffirm their will to transform the whole complex of relations between their states into a European union."

They particularly declared their determination

"to strengthen and develop European political co-operation, convinced, as they are, that by speaking with a single voice on foreign policy, including aspects of security, Europe can contribute to the preservation of peace."

We must set about making a reality of that rhetoric.

The third lesson that we must learn is in many ways the most important. It is the folly of spending billions of pounds on defence and yet grudging every penny spent on the pursuit of the coherent foreign policy that is necessary to prevent subversion and conflict.

We usually blame the Foreign Office for failure to provide information or to know what is happening, when we should really blame the Treasury. Whenever there is a financial squeeze, the Treasury argues that all Departments must bear their share of the economies. It says that because house improvement grants have got out of line and the Department of the Environment has to make savings it follows that the Foreign Office and other Departments must bear their share of economies. It is

dangerous as well as illogical when that policy results, as I believe it has done, in a situation such as has arisen in the Eastern Caribbean, and as it did in the Falklands, too.

The fifth report of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs gave us fair warning. It is a massive document, and it clearly showed how all the countries in the region were beset, as they are still beset, by economic problems which could be the foundations of serious conflict at any time. Freedom and poverty cannot indefinitely exist together. Britain, the United States and Europe should have been working together in the eastern Caribbean for a long time to promote the trade and interests of those small countries.

I believe, for example, that the United States was wrong, after the devastation of the banana industry in the Windward Islands after Hurricane Allen in 1981—including, of course, Grenada—to make it a condition of United States aid that no part of the funds should be allocated or made available to rehabilitate the banana industry in Grenada. That illustrates the folly at times of our foreign policy and attitudes. It also illustrates how counterproductive are economic sanctions, which are so frequently called for.

I recall that when we joined the Community we ourselves gave the eastern Caribbean countries solemn assurances that we would aid them in protecting their trading interests. I remember at that time warning the United States, which was asking them to choose preference areas between Europe and the United States, that if they were not careful—I think it was *The Voice of Lucia* in February 1971 which quoted me—and if they pursued that policy, they could find seven or eight Cubas on their hands. We got perilously close to that last week.

The West India Committee in 1981 talked about the economic problems of the area, saying:

"Any move which isolates or weakens links with Grenada is likely to push it nearer total dependence on aid donors whose presence in the islands may be detrimental to British Interests"—not just United States interests.

I am glad that the Foreign Secretary made it clear this afternoon that we shall restore bilateral aid and technical co-operation. The Minister of State in the other place said that we would be ready to send food, medical supplies and help in the process of reconstruction. The tragedy is that we are doing this after and not before the event.

We must therefore share a measure of blame with the United States for having allowed conditions to be created in the east Caribbean in which subversion and revolution flourish. We would do well to learn that lesson, perhaps above all else, if we hope to win the battle against Communist and subversive forces.

5.23 pm

Mr. James Callaghan (Cardiff, South and Penarth): The international situation is bleak. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) said, it is dangerous, but it is not hopeless.

In the short space of time in which Back Benchers are rightly circumscribed, I want to say four things. First, Britain needs a more vigorous diplomacy than we have had for some time. Secondly, the biggest cause of tension at present is the arms race. What we need, above all, is arms control and disarmament. The number of nuclear weapons now strewn in Europe is ridiculous and absurd. Thirdly, we need a continuous discussion with the Soviet Union on the matters that divide us, as well as on the few matters

that unite us. We should not hesitate to bring those issues into the open and have discussions with Soviet Union about them. Lastly, the recent unwise and impetuous actions of the United States should not be used to undermine the Alliance, which has been and is the bedrock of our security.

I welcome much of what the Foreign Secretary said this afternoon. That he is ready to listen to the Russians, that he is ready to place his views before them, and that deployment can be halted or even reversed, given favourable circumstances, all make good sense. However, I am bound to say that that is very different from what we have heard from the Prime Minister in particular and in the speeches to which my right hon. Friend referred. More of the kind of speech that we heard from the right hon. and learned Gentleman today and less of the Prime Minister's Canadian-type speech will do us a lot more good and help to reduce tension.

I ask for a more vigorous foreign policy. I say to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, in all friendliness, that he has what I believe is nowadays called a "laid back" style. I am sure that in his wildest and most outrageous moments he would not describe himself as a human dynamo.

I believe strongly that, faced with the problems that exist today, the right hon. and learned Gentleman has an opportunity to play a vigorous and important role through a number of channels, both directly and indirectly, to deal with some of the problems. Every hon. Member who moves around the world must have received calls—not always disinterested—for us to play a more important role and take an interest in and show a deeper concern for what is happening, because of our history and experience.

There is something in that. At a time when there is less cohesion in the Western Alliance than I can remember for many years, Britain could play a helpful role, both through various institutions, and directly. The plain truth—and I say this as one who is a strong supporter of the Alliance, as the House knows—is that there is less agreement, less belief, in the correctness of the United States analysis of world problems or of the remedies that it proposes in some directions than I can remember. This is an opportunity for an ally of the United States and a member of the Alliance to play a part in that situation.

It is depressing to list the regional conflicts that are incapable of settlement. As my right hon. Friend said, it is absurd to lay all the blame at the door of the Soviet Union. Many of the conflicts seem almost irreconcilable. He referred, for example, to Lebanon, and that is certainly true in that area. However, Grenada does not present such a problem. It is not divided by great differences between its own people. Nor is it divided from the neighbouring islands. There is no deep-seated history of the problem. In my view, the action of the United States, taken as it was, and in the way that it was, was unwise and precipitate. It displayed a lack of understanding of the consequences. It has brought welcome relief to the people of Grenada and out of evil can come good, as we all know, but it failed to take into account the immensely complicated problem of acknowledging the principle of the inviolable integrity of a sovereign state, however small.

I wish that British foreign policy and British diplomacy had been more vigorous and more active. We are a leading member of the Commonwealth. We were aware of the problems that were growing. Mr. Tom Adams, the Prime Minister of Barbados, made no secret of his worry and

concern about the danger, not of the invasion of Grenada particularly, but of small islands in the Caribbean being taken over by a Mafia group type of people who could make great difficulties for lightly armed islands in the Caribbean.

The Foreign Secretary, instead of waiting for that to happen—I know the problems that flow across his table—should, by inserting a jab into several people, make sure that these problems are handled more actively and positively by the Foreign Office. We could have taken the lead in an issue such as this, which was boiling up. As recently as July I was in touch with the Prime Minister of Barbados because of his desire to have some lightly armed coastal vessels because of the danger that he saw. If I knew that as a Back Bencher, the Commonwealth section of the Foreign Office must have been aware of it.

I regret that, because of a failure of dynamism and a failure to take the initiative, we now have a divided Commonwealth. I hear that Mrs. Gandhi is saying that in no circumstances will she take part in any Commonwealth force and that this matter must be left to the United Nations. This is essentially a Commonwealth problem. We should give the lead, and we could have helped to resolve this problem.

My criticism of the United States is that President Reagan is insisting on making Grenada an example of his global anti-Communist policy. I shall not linger on this topic, because my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East dealt with this effectively. President Reagan's is a doctrine that puts all conflicts, however regional, however local, whatever their origins, into an East-West context.

That is an error into which the Prime Minister frequently falls. As a consequence, small conflicts become enlarged and take on a deeper significance that they should, because they become a function of East-West conflict. I urge the Foreign Secretary—I thought that I detected this idea in his speech—to try to separate these things in the way recommended by my right hon. Friend. This simplistic trap is one from which President Reagan must be diverted, and the British Government have a big responsibility in arguing with him—as much as I hope they will argue and discuss with the Soviet Union—the way in which he should look at this problem. His way is calculated to heighten tension, worsen relations and not solve any issues.

I have heard more than one person say that the danger comes not from war in Europe, and I agree with that. I have little doubt that we shall maintain the peace in Europe. The Soviet Union attaches as high a priority to that as we do. The danger comes from some of the small regional conflicts becoming a flashpoint that will involve the super-powers and the two alliances in a situation which may become uncontrollable. These conflicts are not the central cause of our dispute with the Soviet Union, but they are used to promote the interests of either one side or the other. Therefore, they are the most likely tinderbox.

A number of these conflicts would still continue even if there were an East-West understanding. However, much of the danger of engulfing the rest of us would be removed if there were an understanding. The Soviet Union regards the present world situation as dangerous. One official said to me that it was more dangerous than at any time since the great patriotic war. Each of us regards the other as the principal threat to its security. Neither of us can be satisfied with the other's present posture.

[Mr. James Callaghan]

I believe that deterrence has been effective since the end of the second world war, but I have every desire to ensure that deterrence is kept to a minimum, both for political reasons and because of the strain on our economy and those of the other countries involved. The installation of Pershing and the Soviet counter-response, which will inevitably come, will not enhance the security of either side. It will increase joint insecurity. The arms race must be curbed.

In the Soviet Union there are great doubts about President Reagan's seriousness in embarking on such an agreement. I offer my view here, as I have offered it in my other conversations, that while this may have been true during the first two years of this presidency, both the President and the British Government are now ready to come to an arms agreement if it can be satisfactorily worked out between both sides. Given that negotiations would take place privately and there would be no attempt to make public propaganda, it is not impossible to come to an understanding and an agreement that would increase security, because it would increase the confidence that each side has in the other. I am glad to see the Foreign Secretary nodding, and I hope that means that he agrees with me.

We do not know the nature or the extent of the response of the Soviet Union to Pershing. At some lower levels the Soviets insisted that continuing the talks was useless because the Americans would by their action deploying Pershing, make it worthless to do so. I replied with the crisp comment that Mr. Attlee used to make, "Never walk out because you have only to walk back."

If the position gets worse, as it may do with the deployment of Pershing—the Soviets are not bothered about cruise, Pershing is the weapon about which they are really concerned—we should not regard that as desperate. We would find that after a time there would be a resumption of negotiations perhaps in a different forum. We must have that hope, and that is my conclusion from the conversations that I have had.

We need a new forum, and here I come to another point made by my right hon. Friend. When discussing these matters in a logical and rational way I find it difficult to resist the argument that the British and French nuclear forces are excluded from the intermediate nuclear forces talks and from START. How can one justify their exclusion from both? I have used arguments, which I shall not use again this afternoon, in reply to that point of view, but I am not satisfied that they enhance the cause of reducing tension.

I suggest to the Government, and even more to the Government of President Mitterrand, that we should not put away into the Greek caves, as President Mitterrand seemed to suggest the idea of including French nuclear forces in some distant negotiations but that perhaps the best way forward after an interim and difficult period through which we shall go, may be to bring INF talks, intermediate range talks and START together. We, the British and the French, should be prepared to be included in these discussions, as my right hon. Friend said, for the purpose of counting, whatever the views different people may take about the consequences of having or not having Trident when it comes.

I have already said that we should discuss with the Soviet Union issues on which we have fundamental differences. I can vouch that it is possible to have a

rational, logical, non-propagandist discussion with the Russians. Sir John Thomson, our ambassador to the United Nations, told me not long ago that the great thing in international relations was to explain, explain, and explain again. Having had the advantage of recent talks in the Soviet Union, I venture to say that the Russians may understand a little more of our anxieties and the reason for them than we think, and perhaps I understand a little more why they take the view that they do. There can be nothing lost by talking about the fundamental issues that divide us.

I strongly take the view that there is nothing so dangerous to us at the moment than our isolation and the mutual ignorance that we have of each other, apart from several small institutions in the heart of Moscow which make a detailed investigation of, and research into, the entrails of the Conservative party and the woes of my party. They are ready to discuss these matters in great detail and with great knowledge. Apart from that handful of people, they are ignorant of the way in which we look at these matters. I know from some of the comments that I hear that we are in the same state of blindness about them and that is dangerous.

I hope that the Foreign Secretary will follow up at all levels the views that I am putting forward. Sometimes these efforts will be harnessed through the European Community, sometimes through the Commonwealth and sometimes through the United Nations, but there is a role for Britain independently to play, with her history, experience and background knowledge, in one of the most difficult world problems through which I have lived.

The Falklands is another case where we should act ourselves. I hope that the Prime Minister will dismiss from her mind the absurd notion that 50 years must pass before we do anything about the Falklands. With a new Argentine Administration in power, we should start to talk about ways in which we can find a solution. It may involve sovereignty in one form or another, but we have been prepared to consider it—my Government were and the Prime Minister's Government have been prepared to consider it in the past. We should be prepared to consider these matters. Here is another opportunity for the Foreign Secretary to lay off the laid back approach, take on a dynamic approach, and bustle around the world and get a few things done.

I say that to the right hon. and learned Gentleman in all kindness. He knows that I seek to secure the reputation and safety of Britain and to ensure that we play our full part in securing a lessening of the tension between us and the Soviet Union. I know that some Conservative Members do not mind that tension, but I do. I believe that it is far too dangerous to permit, because of the consequences in other areas.

I think that the Soviets are ready to thicken up the channels of communication. It sounds as though the right hon. and learned Gentleman is ready to do so. We can lose nothing. I beg of him to begin a dialogue—I think that he has already started modestly—and I urge him to act quickly and, without giving away our position, to act in such a way that Britain's reputation and her history will command respect from many other people.

5.41 pm

Mr. Mark Robinson (Newport, West): It is always a special moment for a new Member of Parliament when he rises to make a maiden speech, and sometimes the culmination of the childhood aspiration which many have

to speak in this august Chamber. It is therefore with some trepidation that I make my initial intervention in the hope that this step, however tentative, will be the first of many in this historic place.

I represent the new constituency of Newport, West and as such I have no one predecessor on whom I can heap fulsome praise. My constituents, however, would wish me to mention my hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth (Mr. Stradling Thomas) and the hon. Member for Newport, East (Mr. Hughes), both of whom have looked after my constituents for many years. If I can come within a small distance of their contributions I will be worthy at least of a place in this House.

Newport, West mirrors the problems and challenges that the nation faces. It is an industrial town and the constituency takes in everything in Newport west of the river Usk and includes the outlying towns of Caerleon, Rogerstone, Bassaleg and Marshfield. It contains heavy and light industry and a strong agricultural component. The problems it faces are the problems of high unemployment, and the challenges it faces are the challenges of the new industries, particularly the high technology industries that are coming to south Wales down the M4 corridor. It is perhaps a microcosm of the nation and an exciting place to represent.

Newport is strategically located in terms of communications, particularly with the development of new roads throughout south Gwent. In that context I must mention the Severn bridge, our link with England. That has been a controversial topic in recent days but I hope that we can get back to a reasoned debate about the future of the bridge. The discussion that has been going on in the past few days has been highly damaging, particularly to the cause of the new industries that we are trying to attract not only into my constituency but to the region as a whole.

I speak today having had more than a decade of experience in international affairs; first, in the executive office of the secretary-general of the United Nations and, secondly, in a similar capacity at the Commonwealth Secretariat. I hope therefore that the House will not mind if I spend a few moments focusing my remarks on Grenada, not so much on what has happened in the past few weeks as on what lies in store for that troubled island in the future.

It is a sad day in the transition from empire to modern Commonwealth when one of our former colonies that has come to independence has had its Government changed through the intervention of an outside force, albeit that of one of our principal allies. We have steered more than forty countries to independence and we have never as yet had to intervene to change their governments. There have been tyrannies far worse than the tyranny in Grenada—I think particularly of Uganda. But the disagreements we have had with our principal ally over the past few days, as in any relationship with friends, with business partners or with allies when voiced publicly and voiced sensibly, do not weaken or destroy relationships but rather enhance them. I do not take the view that has been voiced in other quarters that this represents a fundamental change in the relationship between the United States and Britain. Far from it—I feel that the frankness that has been engendered in the debate should be a cause for reassurance in future relations with our principal ally.

The aim for Grenada must surely be the re-establishment of democracy in a way acceptable to the people of Grenada and to the wider international

community. That is an area in which Britain and the Commonwealth have the experience to help. We have a track record with Zimbabwe and we have recent experience in Uganda. I feel sure that the forthcoming Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in New Delhi offers the opportunity, in the words of the late Prime Minister Nehru, to add "a touch of healing". It is worth remembering that the Caribbean part of the Commonwealth has hitherto been peaceful and the region can only suffer if it is drawn into the vicissitudes of great power rivalry. If we can help to restore a sense of balance within that part of the Caribbean, we will have made a notable contribution.

There has been much discussion behind the scenes about the need to tackle the issue of the political and economic problems of the smaller micro states. When this sorry incident is behind us the focus of that discussion should be heightened a little in public awareness. Many small Governments face difficult problems with which they do not have the infrastructure to cope. They cannot defend themselves when their governments are taken over by a bunch of bandits and similarly they are exposed to the vicissitudes of economic change in a manner that larger independent Commonwealth Governments do not have to withstand. There is a way, through our aid and development programme, to help these smaller micro states and I urge my right hon. and learned Friend to give some further thought to this when the crisis is over.

I am mindful of your injunction to be brief, Mr. Deputy Speaker, so I will draw my remarks to a close by briefly touching upon two other areas of concern. Indeed, they have already been touched upon in this debate.

I welcome the return to democracy in Argentina. The election of Senator Raul Alfonsín may provide an olive branch on which we must not turn our backs. Even if it is only an opportunity to end the state of hostilities which still exists between our two countries, we should take it as a first and paramount step. Secure as the future of the Falkland islanders may be now, in the long term, unless Britain and Argentina can redevelop their friendship, there will always be a black cloud hanging over the long-term future of the islanders.

Hong Kong requires a creative solution. I was grateful to hear the reassurances of my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary this afternoon. But the problems of Hong Kong will be extremely difficult to solve. Business confidence and the need to secure Hong Kong's economy are important. The danger lies in negotiations dragging on for too long, thereby causing confidence gradually to be sapped. That is not something that either this Government or the Chinese Government would want.

I thank the House for listening to me so patiently this afternoon.

5.52 pm

Mr. Roy Jenkins (Glasgow, Hillhead): The hon. Member for Newport, West (Mr. Robinson) made a fluent, informed and penetrating maiden speech, to which the House listened with great attention. Although he is a relatively young Member—he was born in the year in which I made my maiden speech—he brings to the House considerable international experience.

The right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) rather rebuked the hon. Member for Buckingham (Mr. Walden) for having similar experience. I would not do

[Mr. Roy Jenkins]

that. The hon. Member for Newport, West brings valuable experience to the House. If he speaks on future occasions as he has on this occasion, he will command tremendous attention.

We read in at least one newspaper today that the Foreign Secretary is fighting for his political life. That did not make him red in tooth or claw during his speech. I hope that he survives. Any infelicities of presentation that he may have committed during the past 10 days are nothing compared with the mistaken and damaging policies that he pursued as Chancellor of the Exchequer during the past four years. He was rewarded with a transfer to the Foreign Office, with almost universal acclaim—except, perhaps, from the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East (Mr. Pym).

When I went to Brussels recently, for the first time in two and three quarter years—I have been occupied in British politics recently—I was impressed by the number of people who said that the right hon. and learned Gentleman has made an impact on the Council of Ministers as a Foreign Secretary. Admittedly, they gave a good reason for that—the right hon. and learned Gentleman is impervious to boredom, which is an important quality in the affairs of Europe. It is also—*[Interruption.]* [AN HON. MEMBER: “The lights are going out all over Europe.”]

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harold Walker): Order. This is the Deputy Speaker speaking. The sitting is suspended until lighting is restored.

5.56 pm

Sitting suspended.

5.59 pm

On resuming—

Mr. Jenkins: As it will have occurred—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I think it wise to suspend the sitting for a few more minutes until we have the engineers' report on how effectively the lighting has been restored. I hope that the House will bear with me until we have that report.

6 pm

Sitting suspended.

6.5 pm

On resuming—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I can inform the House that the engineers have been able carry out makeshift repairs which they hope will sustain us through the sitting. Therefore, it might be sensible to resume our proceedings.

Before I call the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Jenkins) to continue, I should explain that the digital clocks have been affected by the electrical fault and are not recording the correct time.

Mr. Jenkins: Perhaps I should begin Mr. Deputy Speaker, by asking the leave of the House to speak for the third time in this debate.

I shall not go back to the beginning. I was engaged in talking about the present Foreign Secretary rather than about Sir Edward Grey. At least we have had the lights lit more quickly than he expected on that evening in 1914.

Although the Foreign Secretary bears a heavy responsibility for what he did at the Treasury, he does not

deserve to be under quite as much attack as some people think. I do not quarrel with him too much on the substance of what he has done about Grenada. Certainly, I do not quarrel with his decision not to support the American invasion. Equally, in view of our relationship with the Americans—as their principal ally—to abstain in the Security Council was a sufficient condemnation.

Let us be clear that on the substance of this issue, as of others, the Prime Minister is every bit as responsible as the Foreign Secretary. Moreover, she has the special humiliation—as to some extent the real humiliation—of being so disregarded by the Americans because it is she, not the Foreign Secretary, who has so cultivated her special relationship with President Reagan. Nor would it be remotely creditable or sensible for her to consider sacking another Foreign Secretary at present. I read in one newspaper this morning that senior Conservatives were saying—it is always senior Conservatives; I wonder how senior one has to be a senior rather than a junior Conservative—

Mr. Ian Mikardo (Bow and Poplar): Senile.

Mr. Jenkins: No. For example, I am sure that the right hon. Member for Guildford (Mr. Howell) now counts as a senior Conservative and he is certainly not senile. I read that they were making the good but obvious joke that to lose one Foreign Secretary might be a misfortune but to lose three would point to carelessness. It is better to go back to the original Wilde—to lose the first is a misfortune, to lose the second careless—although perhaps a little deliberate—but to lose a third would cast grave doubt on the other partner in the relationship, the Prime Minister at 10 Downing street.

There is no doubt that all the evidence shows strongly that British foreign policy has by far the best chance of working effectively when there is a good balance of power between the Foreign Office and No. 10. When that is not so, when the power flows too much and when the Prime Minister tries to run the whole thing, it does not work well. That was true in the latter days of the Lloyd George coalition when Curzon was as weak as he was grand. It was true in the late 1930s when Neville Chamberlain tried to do far too much at No. 10 Downing Street. There was a complete contrast between the position then and that of the days of Attlee and Bevin. While there is no doubt that nobody now thinks that Attlee was weak, none-the-less prerogatives of foreign policy-making remained where they belong—with the Foreign Secretary in the Foreign Office, subject to discussion with the Cabinet.

The Foreign Office has been much maligned recently. I hold no particular brief for it. It so happens that it is the only one of the three traditionally great Departments of state in which I have never served. However, I have worked with it closely and seen it in operation. [AN HON. MEMBER: “The right hon. Gentleman is not likely to now.”] No, I am not likely to now, and nor is the hon. Member. However, he has some years to go and I may be wrong. I have worked in a close relationship with representatives of the Foreign Office, often to some extent in a semi-adversarial relationship.

My view is that if anything, compared with other Departments, there is too great, and not too small, a concentration of talent in the Foreign Office. The view that it constantly represents interests other than those of Britain is the most primitive chauvinism, and nothing else. In any

event, one would not have a good foreign policy with a demoralised Foreign Office. It is a bad Minister who blames his officials. I do not accuse the Foreign Secretary of doing that. It is a bad Prime Minister who is constantly leaking and hinting that the Department that others manage to use well enough is not worthy of her leadership.

Mr. Robert Jackson (Wantage): Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that often the attacks on the Foreign Office are a case of trying to shoot the messenger bearing ill tidings?

Mr. Jenkins: I do. I thank the hon. Gentleman for having added to the point that I was endeavouring to make.

I mentioned good foreign policy for Britain. That begs the question of what is good foreign policy for Britain in our present circumstances of limited resources, with far too much being devoted to fortress Falklands. It is a ludicrous amount. The Soviet Union, perhaps because of an uncertain internal balance, may be less predictable than at many periods in the past. It is potentially menacing. The United States Administration arouses much distrust across the political spectrum not only in this country but in the rest of Europe. I agree with the right hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham (Sir I. Gilmour), who said on Monday that this is the most unreliable United States Administration since the war. However, we have to live with it and we may have to live with it for another four years after 1984. Let us not deceive ourselves that all previous United States Administrations received unanimous trust and enthusiastic approval in the House and in this country at all periods since 1945. This Administration is not the worst. There was much distrust when Secretary Dulles dominated the Eisenhower Administration.

Mr. Mikardo: Quite right, too.

Mr. Jenkins: On the whole, quite right.

Even when the best American Administrations, as they now seem, were in full control, there were waves of distrust. I vividly remember the occasion when, at the end of 1950, it was thought that President Truman would drop the atomic bomb on the Chinese, and when panic went through the Lobbies of the House. Mr. Attlee had to announce that he would go to Washington to stop it. When he got there, he discovered that President Truman had no intention of doing any such thing. None-the-less, the mission achieved two or three minor successes. The Cuban missile crisis is now considered a classic example of cool rationalism in foreign policy. The idea that opinion here was solid throughout those anxious nine days is far from the full truth.

There are several lessons to be learnt. In a continuing alliance, which is the basis of our security and defence policy, if it is going to mean anything, we cannot call it into question every time the major partner does something that we do not like. We should also be restrained in our criticism—not necessarily in our advice or the firmness of our views—and not whip up feeling, as, to a substantial extent, the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) has done not so much today, but previously.

There is a continuing dichotomy about our attitude and the attitude throughout Europe towards the United States policy. We are torn between the fear that America will desert us and apprehension that she wants to use us as, for

her, a relatively safe battlefield. If she does nothing, we are inclined to accuse her of weakness. If she does something, we accuse her of rashness.

We should not give up our rights of independent judgment and criticism. However, we should have just a little sensitivity to how things look from the other end of the telescope. It is not enough to say, as the right hon. Member for Leeds, East has, that it is perfectly all right to say what we like because things have been said more sharply and critically inside the United States. Throughout the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the most dreadful things were said in America about him. If they had been echoed by Winston Churchill or leading Members of the House, the outlook would not have been so bright in 1941. I believe that it was a profound misjudgment to go into Grenada as the Americans did. There are law-abiding and long-term considerations that we should keep in mind.

The other lesson that we should learn is that it is highly desirable that we should strengthen the European pillar of NATO. It is a false dichotomy to say "Europe or NATO", but it is not false to say that we should have a more collective and effective political and defence policy within the European part of the NATO alliance. The European Community now has a larger gross national product than the United States. With regard to conventional forces, the EC provides the overwhelming proportion of the ground forces and most of the ships. It is in a considerable position today. The European Community will be enlarged. It will be more complete, with the inclusion of Spain and Portugal.

We should be prepared to take a more substantial political and defence role. If we want to do so, we must settle the budget question in the near future. I believe that the Foreign Secretary appreciates that. The debate has been going on for four years or more. My recollection is vivid. It is not correct, as the Foreign Secretary said, that the matter was not raised during the prime ministership of the hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Callaghan). It was. However, it was only just beginning to surface because the imbalance was beginning to surface. It became a more violent question of dispute in the year following that.

The Prime Minister has been a most powerful, some might say virulent, arguer of the British point of view. She is not always the most effective negotiator. Lord Carrington picked up a solution that was no better than the one the Prime Minister rejected in 1980. Be that as it may. The right hon. Lady is a most powerful proponent of our case.

However, if Europe is to play its full part in the world political balance, every European Council should not be turned in to an accountants' wrangle. That has happened for two, three or four years now. We have got near to getting a substantial part of what we can get. The question must be brought to an end at Athens. The sums that we are discussing are less than those involved in the Falklands. There is no reason why we should not get a good and fair deal, but there is a reason why we should see matters in proportion.

I believe that Europe must take part in the disarmament negotiations. The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth was quite correct to say that it is impossible to maintain that the British and French deterrents cannot be counted in either the intermediate or the strategic talks. Anyone who understands the subject must realise that that is a wholly untenable position.

[Mr. Jenkins]

I believe that those talks can and will continue in a new phase even after some cruise and, more dangerously, Pershing missiles have been deployed. In all our arguments on these matters, there is a danger of our becoming obsessed with a particular weapon that suddenly seizes the imagination and of not thinking out the underlying philosophy. I certainly do not believe that a few cruise missiles will make all the difference. The Russians will still talk if they judge it to be in their interests and we judge it to be in ours to do so.

The essential factor is not the deployment of a particular weapon but whether in the world as a whole we can stand back and say that there is no point and great danger in continuing with a great escalation of nuclear stocks because it will be immensely damaging and will probably ultimately destroy world civilisation. It is not true that the end of the time for negotiations has come. It may come some day, but at the moment the opportunities for negotiation are great. We should be willing to include the French and British deterrents in START and to bring a European voice to put full pressure on the Americans. We should not be washing our hands of anything to do with the nastiness of the deterrent while we shelter under its shield. That is unacceptable and hypocritical. We should be pressing for a more urgent approach and endeavouring to do so on a European basis.

6.21 pm

Mr. Cranley Onslow (Woking): First, I add my congratulations to my hon. Friend the Member for Newport, West (Mr. Robinson) on his informed, sensitive and sensible speech. We look forward to hearing from him again in the future. He brings useful experience to the House, although I am sure that he will understand when I say that I suspect that his constituents will wish him to follow more in the path of my hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth (Mr. Stradling Thomas) than in that of his other predecessor. He is most welcome to the House and I sincerely congratulate him. I was especially impressed by what he said about the relationships between this country and the United States—a subject on which I should have liked to follow the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Jenkins), but time does not permit.

When I told the Prime Minister after the last general election that I should prefer not to continue as a Minister at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, it was not because I had lost interest in foreign affairs but because I thought that my remaining would be taken to mean that I believed that my right hon. Friend the previous Foreign Secretary had been properly treated. As that was not my view, the right course seemed to me to be to return to the Back Benches where I can continue to take an interest in foreign affairs and other matters.

Today I shall confine myself to just one of the many subjects that one is always tempted to raise in debates such as this—the Caribbean. First, however, following the right hon. Member for Hillhead, I wish to say something in defence of the Foreign Office. Hon. Members may have seen the report in the *Daily Telegraph* on 28 October entitled

“Falklands ghosts in corridors of Foreign Office”.

That article set out at length a very curious view of the way in which the Foreign Office works, how it disseminates

information and how its officials conduct their business. By implication, it sought also to attribute blame to one or two named members of the service. I thought that it was an extraordinary article to have been written by such an experienced diplomatic correspondent as Mr. John Miller, so I rang him up and told him so.

It does no good to anyone to suggest that the Foreign Office was taking a battering and that the familiar questions were being asked as to who were the guilty men. It is pointless to suggest that the Foreign Office does not use telegrams, that messages are passed from desk to desk by cleft stick and that the information coming in does not reach Ministers. The Foreign Office does not work in the way suggested in that article. It certainly did not work like that when I was there and I am sure that it does not work like that now. The head of the news department at the FCO will perform a useful service if he will take Mr. Miller aside and explain to him how the Foreign Office really works.

The House should be in no doubt that whatever reports came in about the situation in the Caribbean would be seen very quickly by Ministers at the Foreign Office and by the Prime Minister, as I am sure that she would confirm. The responsibility for what happens rests with Ministers and not with officials. It is wholly unfair to blame officials and I hope that there will be less of that in the future. It is equally unfair to heap blame on my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary because he sometimes has to stonewall at the Dispatch Box. That has certainly happened before. Indeed, from time to time mumbling has been hailed as the height of statesmanship. Members of other parties have had to do their share of it, too, but it is not particularly desirable and I am sure that the House agrees that it should happen very rarely.

When I first took on responsibilities at the Foreign Office in response to the Prime Minister's invitation after the Falklands crisis, I asked whether there was in general circulation throughout the Department a concise and clear statement of British foreign policy on one sheet of paper. My admirable private secretary replied, “Minister, there certainly ought to be.” The question was oversimplified, of course, because the variations and complexities of our foreign policy in different parts of the world would make it impossible to get it all on to one sheet of paper.

Mr. Mikardo: It would take two sheets.

Mr. Onslow: If the hon. Gentleman has a simple mind, two sheets might be enough for him. Whatever the number of sheets, I believe that we need a positive, clear and coherent policy in the conduct of our overseas relations and that everyone should understand what that policy is so that we are not forced to react piecemeal to each crisis as it occurs.

I believe that the basic problem now is that for a number of years this country has not had a clear Caribbean policy. That state of affairs goes back long before 1979 and long before the independence of Grenada. It goes back over Governments of both parties and I freely accept any responsibility that I bear for it. I wish now to offer some constructive comments on this unsatisfactory situation.

The problem arises partly because as a country we never thought through our proper role in the post-colonial era. In this instance, we have not done enough to meet or to understand the legitimate concerns about security of the small east Caribbean states that we called into existence.

Individually they are very small and even when they combine they cannot command much military power. They are in a perilous environment and it is understandable that events in Grenada, like the earlier events in Surinam, should alarm them exceedingly. Given our long affinity with them, we should have recognised that and developed our policy accordingly.

We have also not shown sufficient understanding of the legitimate concerns of the United States people and government. The right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) synthesized this into a comic-strip mentality for President Reagan, but I believe that the right hon. Member for Hillhead was closer to the truth. It is clear from history as far back as the Monroe doctrine that America has always regarded itself as having a special position in its own waters. The Caribbean is so close to the Americans' back door that it is unreasonable to expect them not to take heed of what happens there.

Another deficiency is that we have not really identified where our own true interests lie. I hope that we can at least agree that if we want to evolve a coherent policy we will not do it by aid alone. Political and economic policies should go hand in hand and should be complementary. It is idle to expect economic progress in an insecure environment, so security must be a precondition of the success of aid policy. In the Commonwealth Caribbean surely we do not wish to see these small states, either singly or collectively, devoting enormous resources to building up their military capability, particularly when we know that, whatever efforts they make, they are unlikely to succeed against the threat that they can see as real from Cuban imperialism. Our aid to all Caribbean countries and dependencies there last year amounted to some £30 million; we gave Mexico £34 million and the Sudan £39 million. There is an imbalance which I hope will be detected by my right hon. and learned Friend.

It might be possible — perhaps some Opposition Members would like this to happen—for us to wash our hands of all responsibility for security in this area and simply say that time has moved on, that colonial status has ended and that we have other preoccupations, so we should leave it to others in the area to sort it out themselves. In effect, that would be to leave the area to be the cockpit for a power struggle between the Americans on the one hand and the Cubans, as Russian surrogates, on the other. I do not think hon. Members would wish to do this. I have a sincere belief that many people in the country would not wish to do it. I do not believe it is possible for us honourably to do it with the position as it is. As we have been reminded, we have a continuing security responsibility in Belize.

Mr. Donald Anderson (Swansea, East): For how long?

Mr. Onslow: The hon. Gentleman asks, "For how long?" I well remember standing at the Dispatch Box saying that a British garrison would remain in Belize for an appropriate period. It is, of course, an ideal parliamentary answer because it does not add very much to the stock of human knowledge.

Mr. George Robertson (Hamilton): Stonewalling.

Mr. Onslow: I hope the hon. Gentleman will excuse me of stonewalling, because I will readily concede, as I think he will, that the presence of that garrison acts as a

deterrent to the invasion of Belize by Guatemala. I hope he will agree that it is important that there should be security in Belize. The question, of course, is how that security is to be provided. If there are ways other than by the deployment of our own military resources that we can provide Belize with sufficient security, we should be working towards them. But it is a big "if".

We ought to reassess the situation because foreign policy in this area in particular should be driven by our real interests rather than by some imagined scarcity or lack of available military resources. The resources should be deployed, if need be, as a servant of policy rather than the other way round. Certainly we must not create or perpetuate a situation in which the Foreign Secretary of the day is left to make bricks without straw as has happened from time to time during the last 30 years.

After what has happened in Grenada, a unilateral British withdrawal from Belize would do further harm to relations between this country and the United States, as well as precipitating a further decline in the stability of the area. It is not something that we should contemplate under these circumstances. I hope very much that the Government will show that they agree.

Mr. Anderson rose—

Mr. Onslow: I am sorry, but I will not give way. I want to deal with two more points before I sit down.

As to Grenada, it is difficult for us to take a credible initiative, but it should be possible for us to respond to one. Indeed, I was glad to hear the Foreign Secretary say that we would take a positive attitude to a Commonwealth security force in Grenada if one were to be formed. I hope that means that there would be a British uniformed component in such a force.

I hope the Commonwealth Caribbean states in the area, who have been given scant attention in the House in the discussions on this subject, will feel that it would be a good time for them to call a regional security conference to which they would invite us, the Canadians, the French, who have 5,000 troops in the Caribbean on a permanent basis, and the Americans too. If such an invitation should come, the Prime Minister's response should be prompt and positive.

From such a conference might come a longer-term arrangement. Although I disapprove violently of Ministers in the Foreign Office travelling excessively—there is a terrible temptation to do so—it would be well received in the eastern Caribbean in particular if a Foreign Office Minister were to go there and talk to Miss Charles, Mr. Adams, Mr. Compton and Mr. Seaga and show them that we are prepared to listen to their side of what happened rather than rely on press reports or second-hand accounts. That should be done soon, reluctant as I am to force travel upon my right hon. and hon. Friends.

In many parts of the country from top to bottom there is a reinforced reluctance after the Falklands to contemplate the use of British troops in security exercises or commitments which will expose them to high degrees of risk. That is understandable.

Mr. Dick Douglas (Dunfermline, West): The other way round.

Mr. Onslow: I do not think the hon. Gentleman is right. *[Interruption.]* Although the lights have gone out, I can complete my speech without referring to my notes.

[Mr. Onslow]

When the hon. Gentleman reacts as he does to my statement, I hope that he will not fall into the same trap as so many of his hon. Friends, of suggesting that anyone who says from the Government Benches that our troops have a role to play in keeping peace around the world is saying that we are a war party. I do not believe that we are a war party. I do not believe that the use of British troops in support of peace-keeping operations is in any way an act of belligerence. In the context of the Caribbean, this is a course which we should be prepared to contemplate. If we were to contemplate it, albeit belatedly, that would earn this country greater respect among many of our friends.

Mr. Speaker: Order. Despite the failure of the lighting, I am afraid there is no way in which we can have injury time for this debate. Does the hon. Member for Bow and Poplar (Mr. Mikardo) require the lights for his speech?

6.38 pm

Mr. Ian Mikardo (Bow and Poplar): No, thank you, Sir. Like the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Onslow) and the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Jenkins) I should like to add my thanks to the hon. Member for Newport, West (Mr. Robinson) for what I thought was one of the best of the many maiden speeches I have heard in the House. I have a fellow feeling with him because, although the debate has now consumed more than half the time available, he and I so far are the only contributors who are not either Privy Councillors or former Ministers. I hope this means that as of now the common or garden Back Bencher will have a chance of speaking.

No doubt the hon. Member for Woking struck a chord of support in many of us when he told the House of his desire when he went to the Foreign Office to find, if I may paraphrase what he said, an established body of principle against which the Foreign Office ought to reference its policies and its actions. Perhaps he did not notice that that is in sharp contrast with a sentence that the Foreign Secretary threw in almost as an aside—perhaps I should say as a laid-back effort—during his speech. He said that he would find it difficult to relate any of the policies or actions that he discussed to any established body of principle. I might be a bit old-fashioned, but I believe that everyone should relate his actions to an established body of principle, especially when he carries high responsibility. The most important principle for all of those who are engaged in international relations on behalf of this or any other country is that, when considering the merit or demerit of action that is taken in different parts of the world, they should not apply or accept double standards. I am worried that many of the Government's attitudes, including that to the United States' invasion of Grenada, show an acceptance or application of double standards.

The Foreign Secretary reminded us of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Almost every right hon. and hon. Member strongly condemned that invasion. However, the United States invasion of Grenada is a mirror image of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Resemblances between the two are almost uncanny. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] If Conservative Members are patient I shall try to present some evidence. There are no fewer than five resemblances between the two operations.

First, the real reason for the invasion of Afghanistan was not that given by the Soviet Union. Its real reason was

its desire to ensure that Afghanistan was run by a puppet or compliant Government. The real reason for the United States' invasion of Grenada was to ensure the existence of a compliant and acceptable Government, if not one which was the puppet of Washington.

The second remarkable resemblance is that, before invading Afghanistan, the Soviet Union did not bother to find out what its allies felt about such an invasion. Nor did the United States bother to find out what its allies felt about an invasion of Grenada.

The third uncanny resemblance is that the Soviet Union went into Afghanistan because, we were told, it was invited by the authorities there. None of us believed that any more than we believe that the moon is made of green cheese. The United States says that it went into Grenada because it was invited. Anyone who believes that that invitation was spontaneous and not inspired—if not actually drafted—by the invitee must be as green as grass.

The fourth resemblance is that the Soviet Union went into Afghanistan on the grounds that there was a threat in its back yard. After changing its mind several times, the United States says that it went into Grenada as there was a threat in its back yard.

The Americans regard Grenada as being in their back yard although it is a tiny little island that is separated from the United States by a vast expanse of sea. Afghanistan shares a border with the Soviet Union. It is most certainly in the Soviet Union's back yard. What was the threat in the Americans' back yard? We are told that the Grenadians were building an airbase which could be used for military purposes. I do not know how many hon. Members have read the statement which the Plessey Company issued yesterday. It has been doing much of the work there. Plessey is scarcely a spokesman for the Kremlin.

The company described in great detail what work it has been doing and the type of base that is being made. It says that the base has exactly the same characteristics as four or five civil airports in other parts of the Caribbean. Moreover, Plessey listed about 12 things which would be required in any military airport, none of which is being installed in Grenada. Therefore, on the evidence provided by the chaps who are building the airbase, the American allegation that the airbase posed a threat in their back yard is revealed to be complete nonsense.

Use of the threat in the back yard as an excuse to send soldiers anywhere can create dangerous precedents. Turkey is part of the Soviet Union's back yard, as the two countries share a boundary. The Americans found stores of automatic rifles in Grenada and say that their existence proved that someone would attack Washington with them. It is not necessary to look far to discover nuclear warheads in Turkey which are aimed at Soviet cities. Will their existence give the Soviet Union a reason for invading Turkey? Surely we would not accept that. The similarities that I have mentioned cannot be wished away.

Mr. Peter Tapsell (East Lindsey): I do not have time to refute the four resemblances which the hon. Gentleman has drawn. They are all fallacious but the first is fundamental. He said that the Soviet Union went into Afghanistan because it wanted that country to be run by a subservient Government. I visited Afghanistan shortly before the Russian invasion and talked to Noor Mohammed Taraki who was President at the time. He was a thorough-going Communist and Marxist and told me so.

Therefore, the Soviets already had a subservient Government before he was murdered and before they invaded Afghanistan. The hon. Gentleman's comparisons between Afghanistan and Grenada are utterly false.

Mr. Mikardo: The hon. Gentleman has made my case for me. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the Soviet Union was not satisfied with the Afghanistan Government and invaded to install one that was satisfactory. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for reinforcing my case. I only regret that I shall not have time to give way to him again.

The fifth close resemblance between the two invasions is that in both cases the invaders kept the press out for as long as possible so that they could establish their own untrue version of events before the press could get the truth out. Most right hon. and hon. Members will have read the feature in *The Observer* last Sunday headed "Why Washington lied". It was a well-researched and well-documented piece, and there can be no doubt from it that Washington lied and that the American Government kept the press out of Grenada, just as the Russians kept the press out of Afghanistan, so that their lies would not be exposed.

I thought that the hon. Member for East Lindsey (Mr. Tapsell) was going to draw the distinction that has been made between the two invasions, but he was not clever enough. Mrs. Jeane Kirkpatrick made that distinction when she said that the two cases could not be compared because the Russians intended to stay in Afghanistan and the Americans to leave Grenada. The fact is that the Russians will stay in Afghanistan until they have set up a Government there that they like and believe will be completely secure when they leave. It has taken them longer than they expected. They have bitten off far more than they expected to chew. The Americans are leaving Grenada because they are satisfied that they have established the conditions for a puppet or complaisant Government which will remain in power.

The Foreign Secretary referred to the Falklands in the context of Grenada, as have other right hon. and hon. Members. If we did not apply double standards in our attitudes to other parts of the world, we would argue that when Argentina invaded the Falklands we sent a task force because a foreign power had invaded a Commonwealth territory and, therefore, we should send a task force to Grenada. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the Prime Minister said that British athletes should not go to the Moscow Olympics. The United States invaded Grenada without justification under international law, the rules of the United Nations, or the rules of the Organisation of American States, but the Prime Minister has not yet said that British athletes should not go to the Los Angeles Olympics. Those are the questions that arise when one considers double standards.

Events in Grenada and in Lebanon have been linked during tonight's debate, although I am not sure how valid that is. Many people apply double standards concerning Lebanon. Recently, I received a questionnaire about Lebanon—it may have been sent to all right hon. and hon. Members—distributed by an hon. Member on behalf of a lobbying organisation. The first question was whether the Israeli army should withdraw from Lebanon. However, there was no question about whether the Syrian army should withdraw from Lebanon. Nor did it ask whether the Iranian troops there should withdraw—Iran has a war of its own and I cannot imagine what Iranian

troops are doing in Lebanon instead of defending their own country. There was no question whether Libyan troops should withdraw from the Lebanon.

Mr. Tapsell: They should all get out.

Mr. Mikardo: That was my answer to the question. The Israeli, Syrian, Iranian, Libyan, Palestinian and all other troops should leave Lebanon. I am glad that the hon. Gentleman agrees with me. My point was that we were not asked about that, but only whether the Israeli troops should withdraw.

The Syrians justify their presence in Lebanon by saying that they came by invitation, as they did. They were invited to help in the peacekeeping process, and so they did for a little while. Since then all their efforts have been directed to destabilising the country.

There are few people in Lebanon who believe that Syria was not at the back of the blowing up of the United States embassy, and there are few people in Lebanon who believe that Syria was not at the back of the recent attacks on the French paratroopers and the United States marines. We know that Syria is at the back of the civil war in Al Fatah. The only fighting that is going on in Lebanon today as we conduct our debate is continuing in Tripoli between two sections of Al Fatah—those who support Mr. Arafat and those who are bankrolled, armed and actively supported with troops in the field by the Government of Syria.

Why does not someone say that the Syrians should leave Lebanon? In fomenting the civil war within Al Fatah, the Syrians have ruined the claims of the PLO that, as the chosen representative of the Palestinians, it should take part in negotiations about a settlement in that area. There have been previous difficulties about that, especially as the PLO has always said that it does not wish to take part in negotiations. It said that in response to the Venice agreement which Lord Carrington negotiated with great difficulty and produced with such a fanfare of trumpets. The declaration said that the PLO should be brought into the negotiations, and Lord Carrington expected the Israelis to be angry and the PLO to kiss him on both cheeks. However, the Israelis rejected it, and the PLO rejected it even more strongly. Its representatives said: "We do not want your Christmas pudding. We do not believe in negotiations. We believe that our problems will be settled by force and out of the barrel of a gun."

Mr. Ernie Ross (Dundee, West): Will my hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Mikardo: No.

Mr. Ross: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member for Bow and Poplar (Mr. Mikardo) is not giving way, and I am sure that he will bear in mind the fact that many hon. Members wish to speak in the debate.

Mr. Mikardo: That was exactly what I had in mind, Mr. Speaker. I know what my hon. Friend is going to ask, and I shall answer him privately when we leave the Chamber this evening.

The right hon. and learned Member for Hexham (Mr. Rippon) said that there was a necessity for Europe to speak with one voice. It spoke with one voice in the Venice declaration, but that was the most outstanding failure of a political initiative for as far back as I can remember. The proposal was rejected completely.

[Mr. Mikardo]

Mr. Arafat said today that Syrian and Libyan troops are shooting at him. The civil war is bound to cause people to ask, if we believe that the PLO should be brought into the negotiations, whether it should be Mr. Arafat's PLO or the anti-Arafat PLO. They say that they are the chosen representatives of their people, but who chose them? When was the election? Who was the electorate and who were the candidates? The Syrian influence in the Lebanon has been completely mischievous and we have not paid enough attention to it.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) made a superb speech today, but he made a mistake when he referred to the historic interests of Syria in Lebanon. The only historic interest that Syria has in Lebanon is the Syria conquered Lebanon and colonised it. The French have the same historic interest, and the Turks have an even longer historic interest because Lebanon was part of the Ottoman empire for much longer than it was part of greater Syria. The real menace in the middle east, perhaps second only to that of the Ayatollah Khomeini, is the fact that Syria has never abandoned the dream of recreating greater Syria, which included Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan. When King Hussein of Jordan has a sleepless night and lies there tossing and turning, he is worrying not about the wicked Israelis but about the Syrians. He knows that the real threat to him is the dream of a greater Syria.

People never think about that fundamental part of the problem of a middle east settlement. They over simplify the problem by thinking in terms only of Israeli-Arab conflict. In fact, the inter-Arab conflicts are much more dangerous, partly because some of them are inspired by religion. Not only are Moslems set against Christians, but Moslem is set against Moslem. There are more than two different groups of Moslems who treat each other with the same brotherly love as some of the Christians in Ulster. [Interruption.] Conservative Members should not laugh at that. Throughout history, religious differences have caused more bloodshed than almost any others. The rivalry between Shi'a and Sunni represents a real danger. It is no joke. Even if the callow hon. Members around him do not know that, the right hon. and learned Gentleman ought to know it. He should not laugh.

I shall end as I began. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, no.,"] These little minor public schoolboys with their little games are a poor lot. This is a schoolboy humour.

Whatever action we take in any part of the world, we ought to act with reference to a body of principle. We ought to ask ourselves whether, in taking that action, we are guilty of applying double standards. That is the litmus paper test of the decency and honour of any action that affects other peoples of the world.

Mr. Speaker: Order. As the House knows, I have no authority to control the length of speeches. However, I would ask hon. Members to bear in mind the fact that many of their colleagues wish to take part in this debate. Although the digital clocks are out of order, the clocks at the end of the Table are still working.

7.33 pm

Mr. Stefan Terlezki (Cardiff, West): I am grateful to you, Mr. Speaker, for allowing me to speak for the first time in the House, with my Anglo-Ukrainian-Welsh accent.

I should like to tell the House something about the constituency of Cardiff, West which I am honoured, proud and privileged to represent. Cardiff, West and its people could perhaps be described as the United Nations on a smaller scale. There are the Welsh, the English, the Scots, the Irish, the Ukrainians, the Poles, the Pakistanis, the Africans, the West Indians, the Indians, the Italians, the Spanish, the Portuguese and people from many other parts of the old and the new Commonwealth. Strong community links have been forged with the ethnic minorities on a very amicable basis, and social, educational and cultural understanding is being promoted. I am proud that Cardiff, West can be looked upon as a model of good relationships between different people, and those people, too, are proud to be British.

I am pleased to say that we have several colleges, high schools, and junior and infant schools, as well as a Church of England school, a Church of Wales school, Roman Catholic schools, nursery schools, and special and private schools. Again, those schools help pupils with different social and religious backgrounds to integrate into society and to be good citizens of Great Britain. There is some light industry in the constituency as well as hospitals, good shopping facilities and Cardiff City football club. Indeed, I was once privileged to be that club's chairman. Of course, there are also rugby clubs and quite a few political and non-political clubs. We also have the BBC and HTV studios in the constituency.

I hope that you will allow me, Mr. Speaker, to use two words that have echoed through the House, throughout the land, and over the oceans and hills. They are "Order, Order". Those are the words of my predecessor, Mr. George Thomas, or "our George" as he is affectionately known. He is now, of course, Viscount Tonypany and he certainly deserves that great honour. I have known him for many years, as my wife was born just a few miles up from Tonypany. He and I have much in common, in relation to not only the Rhondda and Tonypany, but the broad fabric of the social structure of our society.

Mr. Thomas served the people in Cardiff, West exceptionally well for 38 years. Although I have no intention of following in his footsteps to the Speaker's Chair, I should certainly like to follow him in being as good a Member of Parliament for Cardiff, West as he was, and in being as much in touch with the people there as he has been in the past 38 years. He is a great and much-loved man. I greatly respect him, and am very happy to have paid him a great tribute in this great House.

People matter a great deal to me, irrespective of their colour or background. We must all try to help, protect and respect one another, to be good citizens, to respect the law of the land and to be good patriots of this great country. People in many parts of the world have sought for centuries to copy our constitution and laws and so to guarantee their liberties. The antiquity and continuity of our political structure is a marvel to many. As a result of our ancestors' endeavours, our freedom and democracy are now second to none. I was not born with a silver spoon in my mouth, but I have found the silver lining in reaching the Mother of Parliaments, the cradle of freedom and democracy. I am very proud to be here and to speak, knowing very well that I do so in freedom. If my father and my friends in the Ukraine knew that I was standing here and what I was saying, their tears would flow with joy.

The purpose of our foreign policy is to help, as we have done and continue to do, in many parts of the world, materially, culturally, educationally, politically, democratically and in many other ways, when possible. Soviet foreign policy exports Marxist ideology in great quantity—most of the time against the wishes of the people. Its aim is not to introduce freedom and democracy, but to suppress and eradicate them whenever possible. If one looks at where Marxism is preached and practised, one will have no illusion about which foreign policy serves its people best—Soviet or British. I have experienced feudalism, Marxism, Communism, Fascism, Nazism and, at the age of 15, a slave labour camp. I believe that I can justifiably claim that I know how to appreciate freedom and democracy.

I knew nothing about British foreign policy or Britain's freedom and democracy until we were liberated by the British and the Americans in 1945. One may well ask: what about the Russian liberators? They liberated a part of Europe from its freedom, democracy and good living standards and they have put an iron curtain around it. Since 1945 people have been born and lived in open prisons. If people do not believe me, they should write to my friends and my father in the Ukraine. If they are allowed to tell us, they will.

British foreign policy protects and defends Britain on all fronts—land, sea and in the air. Let us not be rhetorical and use a sea of words when we talk about defending Britain. Defending Britain means that what our fathers and grandfathers have fought and died for is worth defending and protecting, so that we, our children and our grandchildren will live in freedom without experiencing slavery, tyranny and oppression, as, regrettably, some of us had to.

Communism is not interested in the flourishing of a country, the health and welfare of its people, freedom, political democracy, religion, culture or its history. Soviet imperialism has oppressed, abused and terrorised nations and has kept many in a political straitjacket in the name of Socialism, Marxism and Leninism.

There are more than 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Where are the supporters for the campaign for nuclear disarmament and all other do-gooders? Why do they not protest and go to Moscow? Why do they not go to Leningrad, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest and Afghanistan and put their arms around the Russian militarism? We should remember that there are no unilateralists in the Kremlin.

It is not a case of being better red than dead. The option is peace through deterrence and disarmament negotiations. In the Soviet Union, a person could be red and dead—and I know it. Ask the Ukrainians, the Poles, Czechoslovakians, Hungarians, Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians and Afghans the meaning of tyranny, barbarism and oppression, which are so brutally executed by the Soviet Marxist regime. If people in this great country of ours believe that the grass is greener in the Soviet Union, let them go there and find out for themselves.

Mr. Tony Banks (Newham, North-West): They are not as stupid as the hon. Member.

Mr. Terlezki: There are apparatchiks and apologists for the Soviet Union, who would dearly like the Government to disarm the Army, sink the Navy, ditch the

Air Force, and the Utopian state would be complete. That will not happen. The vast majority of the British people are too resilient to fall for that. Of course we must negotiate with the Soviets. Let us compromise if need be, but only when the compromise is on equal and realistic terms, without cheating.

The Pope speaks for peace, about multilateral, not unilateral, disarmament and about a reduction of nuclear and conventional weapons. Where are the Christians in the CND? Why do they not listen and follow their leader? I do. They are misleading the public, especially the young generation who grew up in peace, protected by military strength. Let us negotiate not only for a reduction of military arsenals, but for their dismantling. Let us negotiate for the zero option. Let the Soviets make ploughs and tractors out of their military hardware, so that they can plough the fields, seed the corn and reap the harvest to feed their people.

Mr. Andropov said that when it comes to unilateral disarmament the Soviet people are not naive. I say to Mr. Andropov that nor are the British. The British spirit of freedom is too strong and too resilient to be crushed by the tanks of tyrants. My regret is that some of the British who were born here take democracy for granted and play directly into the hands of our potential enemies.

I am proud to be British and free to speak without fear, to worship God in my own way, to stand up for what I believe to be right and to oppose what I believe to be wrong and to choose who shall govern my country. I pledge to uphold this heritage of freedom for me, Britain, the oppressed nations and all mankind.

7.18 pm

Mr. J. Enoch Powell (Down, South): The hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. Terlezki) has had a more vivid experience than most who make their maiden speeches of what awaits him when he seeks to address the House in subsequent debates, for he was kept waiting for considerably longer than is usually the lot of maiden speakers.

I do not wish to stand unnecessarily between the House and other hon. Members who wish to take part in the debate, but they will not begrudge me a moment, as one who in his former constituency had numerous and valuable Ukrainian constituents, to say to the hon. Member that we are interested to see in a new incarnation the constituency which was represented by our Speaker, and hope that he will achieve his ambitions in the place at which he has travelled so far to arrive.

One of the disadvantages of a general debate on foreign affairs on the Motion for the adjournment is that the debate swings to and fro between one subject and another and the opportunity to bring the Government to explanation and answer on any one topic is difficult to attain. I feel sometimes it is a pity that the Opposition fail to put on the order Paper a motion which might concentrate such a debate as this.

I want to direct what I have to say to one question only, which—it does no credit to the House—has not been debated earlier during the 10 months that 100 British service men have been serving in the Lebanon. It took the deaths of 300 young men for that question to be taken seriously and for the reason why our troops are there to be asked in the House or outside.

[Mr. J. Enoch Powell]

I want to put two points. First, I should like clarification of the exact status and position of those 100 British troops in the Lebanon. I should then like to consider the practical purpose and justification of their presence.

If I am correct, it is the exchange of notes reproduced in Cmnd. 8823 which is the basis of the presence of that force in the Lebanon. The exchange of notes delineates the purpose of the multinational force; but then it goes on curiously to say:

"The British Military Force shall carry out such tasks as may be agreed between the United Kingdom and Lebanese Governments, consistent with the Mandate of the MNF"

I find it difficult to read that exchange of notes and not come to the conclusion—indeed it is a conclusion which I welcome if it is correct—that our troops in the Lebanon are not part of the multinational force, but in that country under a separate agreement between this country and the Government of the Lebanon.

Mr. Mark Lennox-Boyd (Morecambe and Lunesdale): I am looking at the top of the document from which the right hon. Gentleman is reading. It says:

"Exchange of notes between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Lebanese Republic concerning the Deployment of a British Contingent for the Multi-National Force in Lebanon."

Mr. Powell: I am well aware of that, but frequently a title, as newspaper readers will be aware, does not correspond with the content.

It appears to me that these documents were carefully drawn and that we ought to understand clearly the "tasks" which have been "agreed" between our Government and the Government of the Lebanon for our troops in that place.

Their purpose there has been variously explained and justified. We were told by the Foreign Secretary this afternoon that the multinational force—for this purpose perhaps we could regard the tasks of the British troops as not necessarily distinct—was to help to support the Lebanese Government and to enable the Lebanese Government to procure reconciliation in that country because, as the Foreign Secretary said,

"Outsiders can help create the right environment".

I believe that all experience is at variance with that purpose, that it is contrary to all experience that lasting stability in a country such as Lebanon is likely to be brought about and maintained by the introduction of foreign armed forces. Consequently, there is an inescapable contradiction between the professed purpose and the likelihood of that purpose succeeding. But if that is the purpose of the relatively large American force and the French contingent, what have we to say about the presence of 100 British troops? However high may be our estimation of their value, however great our pride in their prowess, what contribution do 100 troops make to the exalted purpose of the multinational force which has been set before us?

We are told that our troops are impartial in circumstances in which an impartial presence is desirable; but that is in contradiction with the terms upon which they are there. They are there to be on the side of the Lebanese Government to carry out the tasks which have been agreed with the Lebanese Government.

There is only one purpose which can be served, only one explanation that can be given, for 100 British troops

—no less, no more—being stationed in the Lebanon. They are there as a token. In the game of 4-handed whist—the Americans, the Italians, the French and the British—the British are playing dummy; and those least friendly to the Foreign Secretary might say that was a role for which he is endowed by nature and by training.

But if we are to play dummy, if we are in the Lebanon to be a token, what support is that token intended to convey? What is the policy. What are the conceptions, what are the intentions, for which Britain is betokening support?

The United States' President recently referred to the Lebanon as an area of American vital interest. That would be an astonishing statement, if we were not so used to the light hearted use of terms such as "vital interest". After all, the Lebanon is separated from the United States by the width of the Atlantic ocean and the Mediterranean sea. What therefore, we might inquire, can be the vital, the life-concerning interest, of the United States in the state of affairs in Lebanon? The answer comes quickly: it is "To keep out the Russians." It is assumed that, were there not such a force in the Lebanon, were the Americans not involved in the Lebanon, then before you, Mr. Speaker, could say, "Order, Order," we should find the Russians in Tyre and Sidon.

That is hallucination. That is the world picture with which, apparently, the American state and those who implement its policies appear to live. It is indeed the sort of contention which it is difficult to demolish with full, logical cogency, because there is always the possibility of saying that "the Russians are not in this or that place simply because they have been prevented by American policy." It is the old, tired story of the man who threw bits of *The Times* out of the railway carriage window to keep away the elephants, and claimed that his success was proved by the absence of elephants. It is so easy to say in one theatre after another—whether it be the Caribbean or the Middle East—that it is the hand of America, the forces of America and her allies which prevent Russia filling what otherwise is represented as a vacuum.

I do not believe that we are so destitute of the means of arriving at an assessment of probability in this matter. I remember that 20 years ago there was a common metaphor in use. It was the domino metaphor. When the United States poured its forces into Vietnam, and when we in this country were urged—indeed, we came within a whisker of falling into the trap of taking that advice, to put a token force into that country in support of the United States, we were always told, "It is a question of dominoes. If Vietnam goes Communist, then Thailand goes Communist. If Thailand goes Communist, Malaysia is lost. If Malaysia is lost, Indonesia is lost."

It may seem strange and unfamiliar to hon. Members today to be reminded of that absurd notion. If so, it is only because experience and events have proved how absurd it was. No more conclusively could the United States have been defeated, more firmly could Communism—if that is what it is—have been installed than happened in Vietnam. The purposes for which the Americans fought, the purposes which they regarded as vital to themselves in Saigon were lost irrevocably. They were lost; but nothing happened. None of the dominoes fell; and south-east Asia has retained its principal features virtually unchanged since the American catastrophe.

If we were not involved in the Lebanon—if that American policy for which we are providing token support

were not being carried out there — no doubt Russia would seek what is called influence over the state which would emerge and the government which would be formed in that territory. But she would be much too wise—her performance in the past is the evidence for this—to seek physically to occupy that territory.

So we pursue a chimera. Attached to the United States and its philosophy, we place ourselves at the service of a wholly unrealistic view of the world and in particular of the middle east. Some may say: It is just a token, so why worry? It is no token for those 100 men of ours who are in the Lebanon. This House does not have the right to demand from its servicemen the risk of life and limb in the service of a policy and of purposes which are inherently unsustainable and which in that context this House has never debated or approved. We should bring our men back from the Lebanon. They had no business to be sent there in the first place.

7.32 pm

Sir Frederick Bennett (Torbay): In view of your admonition to be brief, Mr. Speaker, I shall resist the temptation to comment on the speech of the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) which, as always, I shall find easier to unravel the day after it is made, when I read it in *Hansard* tomorrow, than I do when listening to it. As the right hon. Gentleman's arguments unfold not all of them, put together, appear to be completely logical.

I wish at the outset to congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. Terlezki) on his maiden speech. It was controversial and aroused some ire on the Opposition Benches, although it drew virtually unanimous applause from the Conservative Benches. I warn him that in future he will have to put up with a less conciliatory reaction than he enjoyed today as I have often had to do, from Labour Members.

He mentioned his joint Ukrainian ancestry to me a few evenings ago. I was not surprised by what he told me, because I have been concerned with the Free Ukrainian movement since the last war. He is just the type of person we need in our midst, a man who knows from actual suffering exactly what living under the Soviet system implies. There is no need for him to read books or for us to advise him to read books on that subject. Our numbers have been strengthened by having with us someone who, it cannot be denied, has personal knowledge of the sort he described in his speech and which he mentioned to me in greater detail the other evening. I wish him luck in his various national garbs and loyalties.

We listened to a typical speech from the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), who I regret is temporarily not in his place. It was rather more muted than the speech he made last week; all the awful things that he presaged would follow from the American Caribbean intervention do not seem to be happening. The fact that his seat in the shadow Cabinet is now secure may have contributed to a quieter speech from him today.

There was no more talk from the right hon. Gentleman of a long guerrilla war waged from the mountains by indignant Grenadians with the help of construction workers from the airport which has allegedly been built for peaceful purposes. I was interested as I listened to the right hon. Gentleman last week to be instructed that the airfield was intended not for warlike but for peaceful purposes. I wondered how those Cuban construction engineers who

were taking part in such a peaceful project would be able to carry out a successful guerrilla campaign in the mountains, using their picks, shovels and cement mixers.

At the end of his speech my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hexham (Mr. Rippon) indulged in a mild reproof of the right hon. Member for Leeds, East. Considering how the right hon. Member for Leeds, East enjoys the reputation of being a political bully-boy who hurls insults at anybody and everybody, it was surprising to hear him express indignation when for once he received some of that treatment from the Conservative Benches. He seemed to adopt an attitude of pained indignation—that anyone should dare to be rude to him—when he should be the last to complain at such treatment.

Sir Paul Scoon, a distinguished individual, has not received a fair hearing from certain people in this House and outside and, being myself admittedly a not important constitutional lawyer, I believe that certain things should be put right. The right hon. Member for Leeds, East seemed to adopt an almost neo-colonial role as he spoke about what the Governor-General should or should not have done; the right hon. Gentleman having previously said that he had no responsibilities to the British Government, which of course he did not.

Constitutionally, in the absence of the Queen he was, and remains, the Head of State of Grenada. Except when the Queen is on the island, he is the Head of State and has the rights and constitutional duties reserved to him under the constitution, which was gifted to Grenada by Britain. Normally a governor-general exercising those responsibilities has the advantage of acting on the advice of his Ministers. It was difficult for him to do that when his Ministers had been murdered. Under those circumstances he had little or no option but to seek in some way to save his country.

Mr. Tony Banks *rose*—

Sir Frederic Bennett: I shall not give way. Mr. Speaker has appealed to us to make short speeches and not to give way and I propose to abide by that so as to allow time for others to speak.

Considering the duties that he had to carry out, Sir Paul was a man in a desperate position and undoubtedly he was constitutionally right to approach his neighbours in the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States for their help, and they in turn, if they so wished—as sovereign states, not as neo-colonial states—were entitled to appeal to any country to help protect their security. I regret that they did not come to us. On balance, they probably did the right thing, because, whatever our response would have been, we were not in a position to make the rapid reaction that was needed.

It is only a week since we were told—we even heard it today from the hon. Member for Bow and Poplar (Mr. Mikardo) — that there was a parallel between Afghanistan and Grenada. I do not remember many newspaper articles commenting on how the newsmen had been welcomed by the Afghans or on how wonderful it was that the Soviets had arrived. In Grenada, not even the most violent critics of American action were able to deny that the overwhelming response of the Grenadian public was to say, "Thank God you came with your friends and rescued us." So, to compare that situation with Afghanistan is not only ludicrous, but mischievous in the extreme, because it does not relate to the facts.

[*Sir Frederic Bennett*]

I shall concentrate my few remaining remarks about the Caribbean on the future. There has already been too much discussion about where a telegram went, who should have consulted whom, why someone should have consulted someone else, and whether we were right in voting, abstaining or doing otherwise in the United Nations. I believe that the Grenadians would like us to concentrate together on the future, and ensure that their country can return to economic, social and political stability. In my view, we are in the process of doing that.

I have a feeling that in six months' time, unless something goes very wrong, it will be hard for critics of Barbados, Jamaica, St. Lucia, the United States and the other countries that came to the aid of Grenada to make nasty remarks about what has happened in Grenada, when they see how the people will be living then, compared with the time when they were on the verge of being taken over as a satellite state of the Soviet Union through the medium of Cuba. That is the course on which they were set. The course was fortunately reversed, and the people of Grenada have been given the chance to regain the democratic constitution which I am confident will be to their benefit.

I shall say only one word about the middle east.

Mr. Frank Cook (Stockton, North): Only one?

Sir Frederic Bennett: It does not help to interrupt. It merely prolongs the agony of Labour Members who do not want to listen.

In my opinion, we cannot sustain for long the purpose of keeping forces in the middle east. Here I agree with the right hon. Member for Down, South—not for all the reasons that he gave, but because I believe that the forces are not performing any useful function. They are keeping peace only in the sense that it is less likely that Syria and Israel will engage in open hostilities while they are there. In so far as they are trying to create a peaceful environment for people to conduct successful negotiations, I suspect that they have a negative, not positive, role.

If the current series of negotiations fails, I hope that we shall go back to the original and only way of resolving the crisis—the Americans can do this more than anyone else—which is to ensure that all—I repeat all—foreign forces leave the Lebanon and that all forms of persuasion are used to get the Israelis, Syrians and anyone else to get out of that country and leave it to try to resolve its problems. Finally, one cannot leave on one side the problem that if the Palestinians are made to go—that may well be a necessary part of the solution to the problem—they will have to go somewhere. There is only one place where I think that they should be allowed to go, and that is where they came from and where they were driven from—that is their homes on the West Bank.

7.44 pm

Dame Judith Hart (Clydesdale): I shall try to be brief. I want to concentrate mainly on the events in the Caribbean and the perspective that stretches ahead now.

I begin with a couple of minor footnotes. The hon. Member for Torbay (Sir F. Bennett) cast doubts on whether the airport in Grenada was for tourist purposes. He revived the American canard that it was a military airport which therefore could constitute a threat to the Americans in Washington. That was one of the underlying

currents that seemed to be a motivation for the American invasion of Grenada. Of course, there are the Plessey comments, but when I was going through some of my papers this morning—in case hon. Members are interested, I shall put the document in the Library for a while—I came across a record of the proceedings of an aid donors meeting held in Brussels at the ACP House on 14 and 15 April 1981. It is about the international airport project in Grenada. It consists of a detailed analysis of the tourist potential, the economics of the tourist increase that was likely to result from the airport, tables about hotel occupancy, tax revenues, and so on, plus a brief account and comment by a French consultant who had been engaged by the European development fund as part of the exercise. It is of some interest in dispelling any view that the airport had been intended as a military airport. However, that is merely a footnote.

The House may recall that around 1977-78, when President Carter was at the White House, he and his wife became extremely interested in Latin American countries and countries in central America and the Caribbean. Mrs. Rosalynn Carter paid two well publicised visits—one to Brazil and one to Jamaica—and there was a general Carter Administration enthusiasm for doing something about the area.

That enthusiasm resulted in a proposal which emanated from the World Bank, but had been prompted by Washington, for a conference of all the major donors to countries and states in that part of the world, ranging from large ones such as Trinidad and Guyana on the one hand to the eastern Caribbean small states on the other, with European Community representatives, Canada, Japan, United States, ourselves, Venezuela, and so on. The conference was to examine how there might be a co-ordinated approach so as to assist some of the development problems in the Caribbean basin, and in that sense give greater political stability to the states and islands.

I mention that, because little was known about that conference in this country. It was hardly reported. It was one of those international conferences that pass without comment. In fact, it was an extremely successful conference. The American enthusiasm had waned. I remember that Mr. Andy Young was the main American representative, and the American keenness to put a lot of money into the enterprise had cooled.

However, there were those of us, and I admit that I was one, who insisted that the conference should be a success. Those of us who shared my view—countries like Barbados, Jamaica and Venezuela were among those who were ready to twist the arm of the World Bank and the Americans—said that we must make a success of the conference. It was agreed that a target would be set. I have not looked up my figures, but from memory I think that the target figure was about \$150 million. Studies were to be made of the precise needs of the various countries that need assistance. That led to a further conference, which took place shortly before the general election. At that time we had not hit the targets, but we had done very well. I think that about \$120 million had come from the various donor countries.

However, it was interesting that the whole political ethos of that conference began to develop because it became so evident that it was feasible, possible and would be good for the member states of the Caribbean, and particularly the eastern Caribbean, to look at the countries of central and northern Latin America rather than directly

towards Washington or even Canada. The Caribbean countries could then see themselves in stable company with countries such as Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico and so on.

The initiative was building up. Venezuela was considering putting considerable finance into transport for the eastern Caribbean states, which they desperately needed to get their produce to the markets, Venezuela and Mexico were to introduce concessionary oil prices together with low interest loans because most of the islands were oil-dependent. Something rather special was beginning to develop which could only have been good as it was a move away from the American back yard idea.

Washington does not need to regard as hostile every country that is not completely identified with every aspect of its foreign policy. Washington should be and can be content with countries that are non-aligned and independent in their approach to foreign policy. It might be more comfortable for Washington if it could always count on the votes of these countries in the General Assembly, but that will not desperately concern Washington. If Washington had a group of countries that were not far from the United States, were non-aligned and were working together, that would be preferable to the risks of intervention that go along with regarding a whole area of the world as one's backyard. That is the dangerous principle.

I am happy that in this debate most of the hon. Members who have spoken have reinforced the view that came so clearly from the Prime Minister on Sunday in her radio broadcast, that the invasion of Grenada is opposed to international law and not something of which we would ever approve. I am glad that that, in general, has been supported in the House today, with only one or two exceptions.

We are now bound to ask, as everybody is asking—what will be the future of Nicaragua. Is the principle of invasion and intervention because a country is in your back yard to be carried through there? Were that to happen, what would be the consequences? The greatest significance and danger of what Washington has done on this occasion in flouting and raping this principle, which has been well established and respected, is greatly to increase the risks of a conflagration that could escalate into something serious.

The hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Onslow) was a Minister in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and he talked about the need to organise some defence for the states in the Caribbean. I remind the House that when we talk of the Caribbean states that were so much in support of the American intervention, we are talking only of very small states of the size of Grenada, which are relatively non-viable. We all know that Seaga is very much in Washington's pocket—he is another Reagan. We know also that the substantial Commonwealth states of the Caribbean were opposed to what happened in Grenada. Trinidad and Tobago, Belize, the Bahamas and Guyana, the substantial and historically more well-established states have been clear in their opposition. Therefore, we cannot talk of the countries of the Caribbean supporting the invasion.

It is no good to quote Jamaica, because, such is their relationship, for Seaga read Reagan. Reagan gave great assistance to Seaga in getting rid of Michael Manley—as did the International Monetary Fund. If one reads what Seaga said before, during and after the election in Jamaica,

one sees that he was most welcoming to President Reagan's proposals for private investment, less public investment and so on. That is why Jamaica took the point of view that it did. It would not have taken that view if Mr. Seaga had not been Prime Minister.

The House will know of my experience next door to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and it is interesting to examine the trend of thinking in it. There is no doubt that if we were to ask what its priorities are it would say first, the Atlantic Alliance, secondly Europe and the EEC and thirdly, if it happened to think of it, the Commonwealth. For most of the officials that would certainly be the order of priorities.

The circumstances in the Caribbean offer a tremendous opportunity for us as equal members of the Commonwealth, with our historical responsibility and relationship with the Caribbean countries to offer a chance to those states to come out of America's back yard and do something of their own—stand on their own feet along with the COMACORA states of central America and northern Latin America. There is an opportunity for a new alliance there.

There is no need to build up defence forces. After all, the only need for defence forces would be to keep an American invasion out. There is no need to keep out an invasion by anybody else, and if something happens inside those countries, the general, established international law is that one does not intervene. Thus, there is an opportunity in the Caribbean that involves a complete turn-round in the attitude towards aid and the amount we spend on aid in those countries. In the Caribbean politics, development is the name of the game—politics is development and development is politics.

In a written answer I received some figures on aid to Grenada. In 1982, we spent one quarter of the amount that we had spent there in 1978. Is it any wonder that Grenada needed to look elsewhere? If a country is desperate for development it will have to have aid from somebody. The same thing happened in Mozambique. I was repeatedly attacked by the Conservative party when my Government were providing aid to Mozambique. I am happy to say that the President of that country visited London the other day. A poor under-developed country that needs help will go somewhere else if that money is not provided by the West.

There is an opportunity, which I hope will be considered and taken, to take this area out of America's back yard, build it up and give it the support it will need within the Commonwealth in association and alliance with Venezuela, Mexico and Colombia. That is the other option, and I believe that it is the one that the Caribbean states would most prefer.

Mr. Peter Shore (Bethnal Green and Stepney): On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I first apologise to the House for interrupting this important debate, but there has been a serious power failure in the Palace of Westminster and it would be for the convenience of the House if we could have a statement about it from the Leader of the House.

The Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. John Biffen): Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I understand from the resident engineer that a cable failure occurred, but I am assured that the present level of lighting can be maintained. Only one Committee is still sitting, and that has adjourned until 9.30

[Mr. John Biffen]

pm. I am also assured that the existing level of lighting can be maintained for that Committee for as long as it wishes to sit. I understand that catering facilities are available.

Mr. Shore: I am sure that the House would wish to thank the Leader of the House for that statement. It is a matter of some importance when we have a power failure of this nature in the House of Commons. Proceedings were interrupted in the Chamber at around 6 pm and in many other parts of the building where Committees were meeting and where people were assembling for various purposes.

The House will be pleased to know that, despite the power failure, our major business has been able to continue in the Chamber and in the Committee, which is continuing its business. Will the Leader of the House throw a little more light on the position and tell us when the lighting system will be fully restored. We have further proceedings tomorrow. Will he do his best to ensure that in future those responsible for the Palace of Westminster take adequate safeguards to avoid such interruptions in our proceedings?

Mr. Biffen: I am sure that those concerned will be very much disposed to ensure that the supply is made available as early as possible and on as dependable a basis as possible. I can give no specific undertakings about when the full supply will be resumed, but I very much hope that the business of the House tomorrow will not be unduly impeded.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Paul Dean): After that interlude may I remind the House that many hon. Members on both sides of the House hope to speak in this important debate. It will help us all if speeches are brief.

8.2 pm

Sir Philip Goodhart (Beckenham): I agree with the right hon. Member for Clydesdale (Dame J. Hart) that development and aid are important, particularly in the Caribbean, as my hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Mr. Onslow) said. There can be no proper economic development if there is no security. In the past 20 years successive Governments—Conservative and Labour—have given full independence to nearly 20 mini-states, some with a population of fewer than 100,000, which could not make adequate provision for their own defence. Indeed, it is probably not desirable that they should attempt to make proper and adequate provision for their defence. They do not have the resources at hand and there are better uses for those resources.

The absence of adequate defence resources means that these mini-states are almost as vulnerable as airliners to the risk of hijacking. I am delighted that earlier in the debate my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary picked up a phrase that I had used. In some cases independent states have been hijacked by tiny bands of armed men, not much larger than the gang that carried out the great train robbery.

I note that my noble Friend Lord Home, in a speech two days ago, referred to his positive response to a request for military help after a mutiny in Tanganyika within days of that country becoming independent. He did not remind us that almost at the same time the neighbouring island of Zanzibar was seized by a force later estimated to be of

platoon strength. We did not intervene there and some hundreds of Indians and Arabs were subsequently butchered. I note that at that time the Krays and the Richardsons, two gangster overlords who have some family connection with my constituency, could deploy on the streets of London more armed men than were needed for the takeover of Zanzibar.

Within the past six years we have seen the Governments in Grenada and the Seychelles overthrown by armed bands also not much larger than a Regular Army platoon. In Gambia, two and a half years ago, a semi-mutiny—semi-coup by the paramilitary police was checked by the fortuitous presence of a couple of SAS men, followed by the massive intervention of the Senegalese army. I do not recall that there was much agonised discussion between the Senegalese Prime Minister and Downing street before or after the Senegalese army invaded an independent Commonwealth country to restore order. The Prime Minister of Gambia then was safe and sound in London, attending the royal wedding. If the Zambian Prime Minister had been at home and been killed in the first uprising, I wonder whether we would have objected very much to that intervention. I doubt it.

The largest single groups of defenceless mini-states that we have created lies in the Caribbean. The first coup in Grenada in 1979 obviously caused ripples of alarm even though there was little respect or affection for Sir Eric Gairy, the deposed leader of Grenada. As we now know, the second coup, followed by the murder of Maurice Bishop and so many of his colleagues in the Grenadian Government, brought requests for action from the leaders of Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Kitts Nevis—a country to which we had given full independence a few days before—Montserrat and St. Vincent; and it is now plain that their request was supported by the Governor-General of Grenada. His voice was not heard very plainly, but is that surprising? It was obviously difficult for him to leave Grenada, and if the leaders of the military coup had known that he was asking for intervention—however oblique that request might have been—he would obviously have been killed on the spot.

The leaders of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States asked for intervention because they feared that the bloody coup in Grenada would encourage and embolden potential revolutionaries in their own countries; and each country does have potential revolutionaries. But why did the eastern Caribbean leaders get in touch with America rather than us, and why did the Americans not bother to consult us more fully? The answer to both questions, is, I suspect, the same. Both the Caribbean leaders and the Americans knew very well that, again under successive Governments, our Caribbean policy, in so far as we have had one at all, consisted of a desire to minimise commitments and not to get involved.

In the 1950s and the early 1960s the British Government had encouraged, indeed imposed, the federation of the West Indies upon the islands. The federation was meant to provide an answer to the sort of security problem that has now arisen, but the federation foundered in the face of local apathy. Since then our main endeavours have been directed to diminishing those residual commitments that remain. Some see the granting of full independence to Grenada in 1974, under the emotional and erratic Sir Eric Gairy, as a cynical abdication of responsibility for the welfare of the inhabitants of that island.

During the Prime Minister's recent visit to Washington she made it plain to her American hosts—according to well-informed press reports—that we intended to scale down our commitment to the security of Belize as quickly as possible. The Caribbean leaders and the Americans had thus been fully warned within the past month that we were anxious to shed our last major military commitment in that area. Under those circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the Americans and the Caribbean leaders did not think that we would wish to play an active role—or, indeed, any role at all.

What should happen now? This afternoon my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary laid down some sensible conditions for our participation in a Commonwealth team that may be needed in Grenada until free democratic elections can be held. I hope that those conditions can be met. Not to participate fully would be regarded as a continuation of the policy of querulousness that has sadly marked our response to the crisis so far.

I was glad to see my right hon. and learned Friend this afternoon taking a much more robust stand than he has hitherto. When elections have been held in Grenada, the problems of the other mini-state will still be with us. The prompt arrival of the Americans and the multinational force may have checked the enthusiasm of revolutionaries in other mini-states, but the problem remains.

The French generally sought to make limited defence agreements with their former colonies as they reached independence. Those agreements, at times, helped to prevent chaos. Are we now prepared to discuss limited security agreements with the Caribbean mini-states that are our partners in the Commonwealth? I was delighted to hear my right hon. and learned Friend say that he immediately intended to follow up that point with our friends in the Commonwealth. It need not be a large commitment. Obviously it should be an SAS-type of commitment, perhaps backed by a company of the Parachute Regiment, whose tie I am delighted to be wearing tonight.

I am talking not about repelling a massive Cuban invasion, but about a mini-commitment to meet a mini-threat to a mini-state. Of course there are political problems. We do not want to find ourselves committed to the defence of leaders who themselves become harsh, repressive or just plain bonkers. But there could be a de facto understanding that any use of external security forces would be followed in a matter of weeks or months by a free election.

Of course there are problems and difficulties, but if we do not learn the lessons of Grenada we will be faced with another outburst of violence in another part of the Caribbean. If we are not prepared to undertake that commitment, it is plain that many of our Caribbean Commonwealth partners will try to reach a similar agreement with the United States of America.

I happen to think that we can handle problems with greater skill and finesse than the Americans provided that we turn our minds to them. But the mishandled events of the past fortnight must surely have taught us that we can no longer muddle along and that we need a Caribbean policy that can be understood by our Commonwealth partners, by our enemies, by our allies and, not least, by the Foreign Secretary's friends and supporters in the House.

8.16 pm

Mr. David Young (Bolton, South-East): America's intervention in Grenada has been described as the action of a fireman. A better description would be the action of a ubiquitous instantaneous arsonist. Politicians who argue the right of a nation, because of its size and power, to intervene in the internal and private policies of another nation, support not the propagation of freedom, but the insanity of megalomania.

America's actions have been justified on the ground that they were welcomed in Grenada. When Germany invaded the Sudeten it was "flowers, flowers all the way". Some of us were in Dominica during the Falklands war. We spoke to people in the Caribbean who told us that they saw that war not as a conflict between Argentina and Britain, but as the invasion of a small island by a large power. They would be equally opposed to any invasion whether the aggressor was Venezuela, Cuba or the United States. They want the basic right and freedom to decide their own destiny.

It is of great concern that an alien state, posing as an ally, has invaded an independent state within the Commonwealth without reference to this country, the head of the Commonwealth. What reliance can be placed on the assurances from the United States that they will consult us in future? That country has struck a blow against the independence of another country.

It is a dangerous principle for anyone, under the guise of arguing for the freedom of man, to claim that that gives him a right to enslave other men. The criticisms that we make of Russia must apply equally to the United States. As a British Member of Parliament, I should not wish to live in the USSR—but nor would I wish to live in the United States. I am proud to live in Britain. I do not want Britain to be a satellite of either of those countries.

The Government talk to the United States on behalf of the British people. We will be stationing nuclear weapons in Britain for the defence of America. But when a British Minister stands up and says that the women of Greenham common may be shot on behalf of the Americans, I do not think that we have much ground on which to criticise other nations. I ask the Government to stand up against their allies for Britain's interests and not simply to excuse and bolster up actions that are a clear and utter breach of international law.

I and other hon. Members recently visited Cyprus and we were concerned that British troops had apparently been put there without a clear knowledge of their responsibilities and were in physical danger as a result of the position in which they were put. For right or wrong, many who have gone there as part of an allegedly peacekeeping force have appeared to be aligning with one side rather than remaining impartial. The duty of a peacekeeping force is to maintain peace, not to impose unilateral settlements. If at any time it were thought that the British forces might be in danger, I hope that we shall be told at the Dispatch Box whether a decision to provide air support which could escalate the conflict will be made at ministerial level or designated to local commanders on the spot as it has been in the past. To put in 97 men and then abrogate our responsibility by leaving the possible escalation of the conflict to local commanders is no way for the House to safeguard British lives. I hope that we shall not long be

[Mr. David Young]

denied a debate on the involvement of our forces in any further cases and I hope that such a debate will take place before and not after our forces become involved.

8.23 pm

Mr. Peter Temple-Morris (Leominster): Much as I like and admire the hon. Member for Bolton, South-East (Mr. Young), in a debate such as this it does no one any good to spread alarm that has already been established as unnecessary about what may or may not happen in extreme events at Greenham common. I was somewhat surprised to hear the hon. Gentleman say in such adamant terms that he would not live in the United States. He is not without experience of the world. I should have no hesitation in living in the United States, although I should prefer to live here. If one were to contemplate odd aspects of our own history and take the hon. Gentleman's line we would walk out of this Chamber and out of Britain and I am sure that hon. Members have no intention of doing that.

We have heard tonight two different but, in their own way, equally outstanding and impressive maiden speeches. My hon. Friend the Member for Newport, West (Mr. Robinson) made an excellent speech. He has now left the Chamber for much needed succour and relief but I hope that he will soon be back at his place and I should like him to see my comments on the record, as I would my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. Terlezki). I was an unsuccessful candidate for Newport with I fought there at a tender age in 1964 and 1966 without the aid of the boundary commissioners. Hon. Members with knowledge of the area will know what I am talking about. I like to think that I fell along the wayside, gallantly holding my party's flag high, in order that my hon. Friend the Member for Newport, West should come here and make such a splendid speech. I am sure that the late Sir Ronald Bell, who, briefly in 1945, was the last Conservative Member for Newport, would have been proud to see my hon. Friend in his place.

Cardiff happens, coincidentally, to be my home town, which my father represented in this House. It is with great pride that I see my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West here. He is a colourful tribute to his city—if I may put it like that—and I am sure that he will be an equally colourful tribute to the House.

The assessments that have been made of my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary's handling of the Grenada issue have not shown a fair consideration of the hindsight factor. There might not have been a witch hunt in the press but it has certainly treated him unkindly. This is not the only case where such attacks concentrate upon what happens in the House, the way we perform, and so on. We all know that the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) has had a field day over the past week. As long as hon. Members are not on the receiving end, it is fair to say that such attacks are received with a certain enjoyment. However, we should not forget that political life goes a little beyond performance in the House. The decision was reached in extremely difficult circumstances but was right and my right hon. and learned Friend and my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister deserve a few complimentary words from hon. Members in addition to the sort of press that my right hon. and learned Friend has been receiving.

Undue credit has been given to the fact that the invasion of Grenada was sudden. While we are all familiar with contingency plans here and there, that decision was taken suddenly by the President of the United States. I do not know exactly when it was taken. Some suggest that it was taken on Sunday evening, American time. However, it was probably taken within 24 hours of the Beirut bomb blast. That decision was about the invasion of a sovereign state and had I been invited to make the decision at the time—far from it that I would have been—I should have reached the same conclusion. In principle, it was wrong, but I appreciate that there were complicated reasons for it.

The decision was taken after limited consultation. I underline the fact that as a House we must maintain a realistic approach. Some people seem to feel that in view of our so-called special relationship, the United States should tell us every single thing on the basis of complete equality. I wish it would. However, hon. Members on both sides of the House are surely sufficient realists to know that that cannot happen. However, we would expect it if we were in a war together. Obviously, we would expect it. However, if the United States is alone as the primary power involved in Grenada or if we are alone, as we were in the Falklands, we know that the primary objective is our own interests, afterwards considering our allies and friends. When decisive, speedy action has to be taken, that is not the best background for consultation.

If one is in the shoes of the United States Government, or our Government, one has to consider security. There are too many leaks. Some are inspired but too many occur in Washington, London and other Western capitals. However, if one is in such a situation, one has to act speedily. It is a tragic fact that one has to act without certain courtesies which otherwise, in an ideal world, one would like.

The Government also had to decide whether to leap in and cause an undoubted split in the Commonwealth, which was already visible at the time. It would have become worse. Harm would have been done to unity. One also has to consider genuine political doubts. We shall see what balance of advantage emerges from the events, but it is at least arguable that the Soviet Union which, admittedly, could not lose, could in the longer term have an advantage from the invasion. It has been partly let off the hook of Afghanistan, from which it has suffered in international gatherings since it invaded in late 1979. Those who attend international gatherings will know that that is one of the few matters on which, nearly always, we have managed to unite the Third world against the Soviet Union, in spite of other allegiances at such conferences.

Against that background, there is the question whether the threat to United States security was sufficient. I say in the nicest possible way that it is unproven, in spite of the factors that have emerged. Therefore, the decision was taken in difficult circumstances. We should give more credit to that than we have done and not get carried away with the enjoyable goings on in the Chamber.

I reiterate what was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Sir P. Goodhart). He will now go down in history, because of what he said about hijacking in the context of islands rather than planes. Grenada is appropriate and is an all-too-prevalent example. The matter must be examined. It is fraught with difficulties because of the doctrine of the sovereign state. Not least because of the urgings of my hon. Friend and others, I am

grateful that my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary examined the matter constructively and will be considering the matter. The Commonwealth aspect is important. A Commonwealth contribution could be made. The Caribbean is a prime example. As another, there are an incredible number of islands in the Pacific. They have caused little trouble up to now but could do so if we do not take action. We are in the realm of security treaties, spheres of influence, aid and, not least, intelligence. Many of us, whichever side we were on in the argument over the past 10 days, felt that intelligence could have been better.

Therefore, we must follow through in a positive way. There is a Commonwealth role of presiding in the best way over the restoration of democracy in Grenada. I welcomed the statement by my right hon. and learned Friend that he would respond positively to requests for help. One appreciates that with "respond positively", one is dealing, if I may put it like that, with a governmental buzz word, which could mean little more than responding. I hope that they do a little more than just respond, and explore every avenue.

I believe that this suggestion could benefit the western Alliance. Britain needs to take a lead, especially as the Commonwealth is already divided about what to do in the future. If we fail to take positive action we may be embarrassed suddenly to find some worthy Commonwealth country such as Canada or some worthy person connected with the Commonwealth such as Sir Sonny Ramphal taking the lead while we as head of the Commonwealth tamely follow.

The task needs to be undertaken and we have the experience. One has only to think of the conduct of the recent elections in Zimbabwe when splendid town clerks and county executives were wandering around in tropical trousers as though they were born to the job, although it was in fact their forebears who originally undertook it, and they did it very well.

Ministers and Foreign Office officials may be worried at the prospect of taking on further commitments when we are already extended in Northern Ireland and the Falklands, but we cannot entirely escape historical obligation. We should therefore not fail to take measures that we ought to take because, unfortunately, we have been obliged to undertake other commitments already.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Paul Dean): It may assist hon. Members if I tell the House that the winding-up speeches are expected to begin at about 9.20 pm, so brevity will win golden opinions all round.

8.37 pm

Mr. Tony Banks (Newham, North-West): In recent months Conservative Foreign Secretaries have experienced a high mortality rate. The present Foreign Secretary, who appears to be continuing in the same mould, is becoming the political equivalent of a football manager trying to run an unsuccessful team. As Britain slips further and further down the international league, the chairman sacks the managers. It is not possible to describe British foreign policy as anything more than a total shambles, but it is now more of a shambles than usual. It is not fair to say that the shambles is the fault entirely of the Foreign Secretary. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has had a difficult and uncomfortable time in the House in the past week and he has deserved it, but the Prime Minister must take her share of the blame—and her share is by far the greatest.

During the debate on the invasion of Grenada my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) referred correctly to Britain's doormat diplomacy. The Prime Minister has turned Britain into a doormat for the United States, and doormats should not complain when feet are wiped upon them. Unfortunately for Britain, President Reagan has some pretty nasty stuff on his feet when he invaded Grenada, most of which is now sticking to the Prime Minister and her doormat Government. I do not believe that Britain has any discernible foreign policy other than that put forward by the United States. Such a development is not new. We can trace that state of affairs back to the time of Suez. Britain has become a satellite of the United States. We are in effect an occupied country.

The Foreign Secretary said that Britain had a respected place in the world. That might have been true in the past, but I challenge the accuracy of that statement now. Everything that we say or do throughout the world is judged in terms of our client status to the United States. No one respects subservience, least of all those who receive it. For Britain to have become in effect, the lackey of Ronald Reagan is the most contemptible position in which we can find ourselves. We have effectively given up our independence.

Britain has no discernible independent foreign policy, but the United States has and it is one of opposition to regimes which do not believe wholly in capitalism. To people like Ronald Reagan, freedom equals capitalism and capitalism equals freedom. Many Members on the Government Benches share that view. The theory is simple, stark, dangerous and exceedingly shortsighted because it leads this country and the Americans to give support to some of the nastiest regimes in the world merely because they are anti-Communist or anti-Cuban.

Reference has been made many times in the House in the past two weeks to the invasion of Grenada being carried out by President Reagan, to use his words, to restore order and democracy. That is hypocritical. If that really was the truth, then why did he not invade Chile, Honduras, Haiti, El Salvador, even South Africa, Bangladesh or Guatemala because all these regimes are repressive and abuse human rights? Yet all of them are supported by the United States Government. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Clydesdale (Dame J. Hart) said, United States foreign policy is effectively causing developing countries to turn to Moscow or Havana for help which is being denied them by the West. What we see in American foreign policy, echoed and mirrored by the British Government, is an obsessive, all-consuming hatred for any political system other than capitalism. That is no way to bring stability to a dangerous world.

American foreign policy has four self-fulfilling and circular processes. It starts off supporting corrupt regimes simply because they are anti-Communist or anti-Cuban. Of course, the people of those states then turn, not surprisingly, either to revolution or, if they have the opportunity, to the ballot box, as was done in Chile, to overthrow the regime. Other examples are Nicaragua, Cuba and Iran. The second stage of United States policy is to oppose the new regimes both economically and politically. As I said, they turn to Russia or Cuba for assistance. That brings us to the third stage of this circular foreign policy. It allows the United States to claim that there is a Russian conspiracy around the world. The fourth stage of that circular policy is that the United States Government move to de-stabilise or to try to destroy the new regime and

[Mr. Tony Banks]

redouble their efforts to support other corrupt, anti-Communist Governments. Then we are back to where we started.

Britain is effectively tied into this self-destructive and self-defeating foreign policy. It is morally indefensible and economically and politically disadvantageous to the British. It is morally indefensible because, as several hon. Members have said, no country has the right to determine the form of government of another country or, indeed, to support repression wherever it takes place, East or West. It is economically and politically disadvantageous to this country because it is short term in its view. It leads us to support regimes that will eventually fall. When that happens, we lose political credibility and economic advantage.

If the arguments of morality do not appeal to hon. Members on the Government Benches I would have thought that the economic arguments might have done. The classic example is South Africa. This country is the main sustainer of apartheid, which everyone will agree is immoral. The British Government find themselves in that immoral position because that is a regime where racism is enshrined in the constitution. In the long-term it represents poor economic judgment because the racist regime in South Africa will be overthrown. In the meantime we as a country are destroying what little credibility we have left in the world, the credibility that the Foreign Secretary was proclaiming so proudly from the Dispatch Box.

To be so closely identified and linked with the United States foreign policy is dangerous for Britain. It makes us look as a country hypocritical when we rightly condemn the Soviet Union for the invasion of Afghanistan. Our views as a Government and a nation are dismissed as mere United States propaganda.

This may come as a surprise to hon. Members on the Government Benches, but I am not anti-American merely because I criticise the policies of President Reagan any more than I am anti-British because I deplore and criticise the policies of this Administration. Britain should pursue an independent morally based foreign policy which enables us to criticise East or West when we see that the concepts of freedom and of human rights are under threat. There is no chance of the Government following such a moral policy. So, we must look to the next Labour Government. The events of the past few weeks have brought that prospect more closely into view. I want the next Labour Government to support all ordinary people in their struggle for freedom. I want the next Labour Government to support the liberation movements in central and south America, South Africa and the middle east morally and materially.

President Reagan has become the greatest single threat to world peace because he is so unpredictable and is likely to react with emotion and to be inspired by feelings that do not allow for cool, rational thought. It could prove fatal for Britain and to the rest of the world if we allow a second-rate actor turned third-rate politician who is advised by a bunch of religious fanatics to dictate Britain's foreign policy.

8.46 pm

Sir Julian Ridsdale (Harwich): When I hear Opposition Members criticise the United States and consider the contribution that that country has made to

European peace since the second world war as the leader of NATO I cannot help thinking that some Opposition Members should think much more deeply about what they say.

I have just completed a tour of all of the north Atlantic bases on behalf of the North Atlantic Assembly. My overriding impression is that we are dangerously under strength as we face a build up of conventional naval forces by the Soviet Union.

In the 1930s, Winston Churchill warned eloquently of the danger then posed by Germany. If he were here now he would warn us just as eloquently of the danger to NATO and the free world that the Soviet build-up poses. The Russians now have 360 submarines as compared with the 46 that Germany had in 1939.

Bearing in mind the security problems associated with the present naval imbalance, I am sure that the Americans were right to act as they did in Grenada. I do not want to suggest that there was any connection between Mr. Bishop and what happened in the Lebanon, but the Russians are good chess players and the bishop's gambit has created alarming divisions between Britain and the United States. I hope that we shall do everything possible to repair the damage which has been done to Anglo-American relations as the balance of power depends substantially on those relations and it is clear that the Soviet Union has built up substantially its nuclear and conventional forces.

8.49 pm

Mr. Dick Douglas (Dunfermline, West): I welcome what the hon. Member for Harwich (Sir J. Ridsdale) has just said. One of the things to which I took exception in the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) on Monday was his suggestion that it was difficult for the Soviet fleet to gain access to the oceans of the world. He is an erudite man and has much knowledge of defence and international matters but that was a great lapse in his judgment.

Rather than discuss Grenada or the Lebanon I shall consider my view of the division between the Soviet Union and the United States. If I had to live in either the United States or the Soviet Union, I would undoubtedly choose the United States. However, I like living in Auchtermuchty, which is near my constituency, and unlike John Junor I not only write about it but live there. British people want to live in the United Kingdom and, while maintaining friendships with all countries, we want to be able to criticise them and not be in their pockets.

It is easy to pay attention to matters of immediate import when discussing foreign affairs, but I shall consider the law of the sea, which is an international affair, and especially the United Kingdom's posture at the third United Nations conference and convention on the law of the sea. On 2 December 1982, the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the hon. Member for Edinburgh, Pentlands (Mr. Rifkind), said:

"I am not aware of any public statements that they have made in the United States, in Europe or elsewhere in which they have called for the proposals of the law of the sea convention to be accepted by nation States. If they have great enthusiasm for the proposals, they have not given that indication." — [Official Report; 2 December 1982, Vol. 33, c. 414.]

The document is vital and it took nearly 20 years to arrange negotiations on it. As I understand it, the United States has taken exception to only one of the 17 parts of the convention — that on deep-sea mining. The United Kingdom's initial view is disastrous and shameful.

However, if we wish to know American opinion against its own Government we need only turn to the views of the deputy negotiator of the United States team, Leigh S. Ratimer, who wrote this summer:

"My prediction is that eventually a future United States President will sign it, and its content will be worse than if we had compromised a little on principle to gain additional benefits".

Elliot Richardson, with whom I spent some time in Washington this summer and who led the United States team, said in a lecture given in Britain:

"The real importance of the Law of the Sea Convention cannot be found either in the sum of its parts or in its extraordinarily comprehensive whole. It lies rather in its demonstration of the capacity of 160 sovereign States to work out rational accommodations among vital competing interests. This is an achievement whose significance will loom ever larger as the world increasingly finds itself forced to come to grips with its own inseparability.

The United States especially has much to gain from the strengthening of the rule of law. Through a long succession of Presidents, Secretaries of State and Defences, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Law of the Sea Delegation heads, it held fast to the awareness that the Law of the Sea Convention could make important contributions to this objective."

We are lining up with the United States on this matter purely to accommodate commercial interests. The House passed the Deep Sea Mining (Temporary Provisions) Act 1981, but can the Minister name a company or consortium which has made use of those provisions? Other nations are using the convention and are moving on to exploit the ocean deep. Neither our legislative provisions nor those of the United States, can protect companies who wish to embark on deep ocean mining.

Another matter that has not been mentioned in the debate is the Antarctic treaty. I understand that it is under discussion at present, and that there will be a review in 1991. Britain's attitude to the treaty is to support the international view of mineral rights, which is extremely damaging to our role in trying to uphold the international rule of law. Time does not permit me to discuss the entire history of the Antarctic Treaty. I concede that it has worked fairly well, but it has become a North-South issue and Malaysia has put it on the agenda for the next session of the United Nations. What will the Government's position be, since we submitted earlier in the year that it was extremely urgent to have a minerals regime in Antarctica? If we take the view, both in the law of the sea and in relation to Antarctica, that if a country has the technological resources it can reap the benefits of mineral rights and disregard the views of other nations, it would damage our international standing.

Britain should use its experience in Antarctica to devise a solution for that ecological range which relates the Falkland Islands and their dependencies to an international regime. I know that will be difficult, but it is about time that we moved away quickly from the attitude that the Prime Minister has adopted—that we see no way of discussing the future of the Falkland Islands. I have been to the Falkland Islands: I know of our commitment to them; and I know how that commitment is distorting not only our aid expenditure but our contribution to NATO. The foreign Office must examine the relationship between Antarctica and the ecology of the Falkland Islands and dependencies, through which we might find a solution to our difficulties in the area.

8.57 pm

Mr. Jim Spicer (Dorset, West): I am sorry that the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr.

Callaghan) is not in the Chamber now, because I shall refer to his speech this afternoon. He cuts a fine figure in the House, he stands up straight and we all admire the way in which he supported the Government during the Falklands affair, but the way in which he attacked the Foreign Secretary, talked about his laid-back style, and asked the Government to pursue a more vigorous foreign policy, comes ill from the right hon. Gentleman. Those of us who can go back some way in the House might remember the events of June 1974, when, as Britain was a guarantor power for Cyprus, he, as Foreign Secretary, was invited to take action in concert with Turkey and the other guarantor powers. Had we done that we would not have a divided island in Cyprus now, because the intervention could have come from our sovereign bases there, where we had the necessary troops and aircraft. Had we done so, that wicked and evil man Nicos Sampson would not have lasted for more than two or three days. I am glad that the hon. Member for Bow and Poplar (Mr. Mikardo) agrees with me about that.

It is in the nature of this debate that we should have concentrated on Grenada and the Lebanon. As the weeks go by and Grenada falls into the background, people will once more look at the middle east. The cauldron of the middle east contains the war between Iran and Iraq, of which we have not seen the end by a long chalk, the difficulties in the Lebanon and the continuing problems, ever boiling to the surface, between the Arabs and the Israelis.

It is natural to concentrate upon the trouble spots, but the Republic of Turkey, which is one of the more stable areas in the middle east, now needs support and encouragement. I know that that idea will not find universal favour, but on Sunday the Turkish people will have their election, which comes just three years after the military takeover. Before 12 September 1980 some people might have called the country democratic, but for the ordinary Turkish people it was not. Each day armed gangs of the Left and Right slaughtered between 30 and 35 people. Determined efforts were being made to stockpile arms, especially along the Soviet border, and some elements in Turkey were determined to use those arms to overthrow democracy.

I am not certain whether most hon. Members understand the Turkish constitution. Under that constitution, the armed forces of Turkey have a duty to intervene if democracy is at risk. Before 12 September, the armed forces gave that warning three times both to the Socialists under Mr. Ecevit and to Mr. Demirel, the Prime Minister. None of the politicians heeded the warning. They allowed the decline to continue, and on 12 September the armed forces took control of the country. They took over because the alternative was total anarchy, and the Turkish people gave them their support in that action.

When that intervention took place, it was regarded as yet another military takeover by a military junta which would remain for all time. On Sunday, however, elections will take place, and the lie will then be given to that assumption. After those elections have taken place, I hope that our Government will take a lead in welcoming Turkey back to its rightful place as a strong and faithful ally of the West. Nothing has happened within NATO to upset Turkey's place, and Turkey remains the linchpin of the Alliance in the south. It is vital that in the next few weeks and months those Britons—especially the Conservatives

[Mr. Jim Spicer]

—who serve not only in the Council of Europe but in the European Parliament should welcome the Turks back on board and re-establish all links.

The election will not be all that we would wish it to be, but it is a step along the right road. There is within Turkey a desire to remain part of the Western alliance, but if Turkey is not accepted it may well adopt a neutralist attitude. Throughout the past three years people have been trying to destabilise Turkey. They will continue to do so after the election by insisting that the election did not count. Turkey is the one stable factor in the middle east. Unless our Government are prepared to support Turkey in the weeks and months ahead, it will be a bad day for the West.

Perhaps rightly, we handed over to the United Nations our responsibilities for the unhappy island of Cyprus. However, as a guarantor power, with a residual responsibility, we ought at least to take some initiatives, perhaps towards reopening Nicosia airport or funding more scholarships which would enable Turkish and Greek Cypriots to meet. After 10 years, generations of Greeks and Turks are growing up in Cyprus who have never had any contact with each other. That is a recipe for a disaster in Cyprus which could spill over into the middle east as a whole.

Several Hon. Members *rose*—

Mr. Speaker: I appeal to the next three hon. Members to speak for only five minutes each.

9.5 pm

Mr. Robert N. Wareing (Liverpool, West Derby): I am glad to be able to take part in this important debate. The speech of the hon. Member for Dorset, West (Mr. Spicer) offered a fine example of the sort of double-think that many hon. Members object to. The debate has been largely dominated by recent events in Grenada. I believe that they should be examined against the background of policies since the second world war.

I know that there are some Conservative Members who would justify the cold war attitude that also exists in the Pentagon by referring to the Russian invasions of Afghanistan and Hungary, and to the putting down of the Hungarian revolution in 1956. However, I speak as someone who was fortunate enough to visit Czechoslovakia during that marvellous Prague spring, and to drink up the atmosphere of liberation that was associated with the Government of Alexander Dubcek. The people of Czechoslovakia fought, and were suppressed by the Russians, not because they wanted to restore capitalism but because they wanted to establish a working-class socialist democracy in which working people were fully emancipated and had full rights. They did not want to restore capitalism. That Prague spring has, of course, had parallels in other parts of eastern Europe.

My objection is not that people should be opposed to Stalinist tyranny or to the statist bureaucracy in eastern Europe, but that the Prime Minister should demonstrate her congenital anti-Sovietism in every answer that she gives on foreign affairs. The hon. Member for Harwich (Sir J. Ridsdale) mentioned Sir Winston Churchill and what he would have said if he were in the House now. He was right to refer to the efforts that the Americans made to fight for freedom in Europe. When we remember our fallen in two

world wars a week on Sunday, I hope that we shall also remember the Americans who lost their lives in those two world wars. However, I hope that we shall also remember the 20 million Soviet dead who fought in the great world struggle against Fascism and who were our allies during those vital years. I can tell the hon. Member for Harwich what Winston Churchill said during those years of struggle against Fascism. He said that it was the Red Army that ripped the guts out of the Nazi war machine.

It was not a Socialist, far less a Communist, who got up at a public meeting in Britain in those days and said that we should always remember the debt that we owed the Red Army and the bravery of the Russian people in their struggle. To remember that does not mean that we are Communists. However, if we remember it, we shall have some idea of what informs Soviet foreign policy. It would be wrong to imagine that by reading the "Communist Manifesto" or "Das Kapital" one can understand what motivates the Kremlin's foreign policy. However, it should be borne in mind that Soviet foreign policy is informed by fear of overthrow of the statist regimes in eastern Europe and by fear of another invasion by the West. Hon. Members should remember that Russia has been invaded twice this century and that that invasion came from western Europe and from the very capitalist countries that the Russians even now see as a threat. As the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) said during the debate on Grenada last week, malice and bigotry are not good counsellors when it comes to moulding a foreign policy.

Let us examine not NATO's history in Europe, but its powers during the past 34 years. Hon. Members are looking at their watches. I have been looking at the clock now for five hours, and, if anyone is to stop me, it will not be Conservative Members.

Has NATO been an Alliance for peace and freedom? In fact, some members of that Alliance have been among the foulest dictatorships in Europe. For a long time, Portugal, which was a founder member of NATO, was not using NATO forces to oppose freedom in Portugal—the dictator Salazar ordered all the flags in Portugal to be flown at half mast when Hitler died—but against people who were fighting for freedom in Angola and Mozambique.

No one took action against the foul seven-year regime of the colonels in Greece. NATO was quiet about this matter; even the Council of Europe was more active. For a long period, France used NATO forces to attempt to impose oppressive colonial regimes in Vietnam and Algeria. At present, Turkey reveals one of the worst features of a dictatorship. Not one of the political parties that have been banned by the junta during the past couple of years is permitted to take part in the election on Sunday. What type of democracy is Turkey? The Prime Minister is being hypocritical when she makes speeches about the subjection of Solidarity—of course, it is right to oppose oppression in Poland—but do nothing. The Foreign Secretary is also a doormat in this matter.

For generations, people in Latin America have been oppressed. In 1954, we experienced the Eisenhower doctrine. I remind those Conservative Members who believe that only in Russia is there the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty of what one former Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs said:

"Communism is so blatantly an international and not an internal affairs, its suppression, even by force, in an American country by one or more of the republics would not constitute an intervention in the internal affairs of the former."

That is the Brezhnev doctrine long before Brezhnev.

If we are to stand for moral leadership in the world, which the Foreign Secretary thinks we do, it is high time that we opposed all oppressors and did not engage in double-think. It is not moral leadership to be associated with crooked dictators in Chile and Turkey or the Pinochet thugs who sort out democratic forces in their country every day and night. It is not moral leadership to sell arms to Indonesia which is involved in a war of genocide in East Timor where out of a population of about 650,000, 200,000 have already been annihilated. We sell Hawks and frigates to Indonesia. The East Timorese have suffered abominably. Yet the Foreign Secretary is an ally not of freedom but of oppression. The greatest danger to democracy in this country does not come from the Soviet Union, but from the Government's efforts to suppress trade unionism and local democracy which for generations have been the hallmarks of liberty in this country.

9.19 pm

Mr. Dennis Walters (Westbury): I have to be brief, so I shall not follow the hon. Member for Liverpool, West Derby (Mr. Wareing) in his rather emotive language.

Whatever view one may take of the merits of the United States intervention in Grenada, it is beyond question that the United States Government treated their allies in a cavalier fashion. That is particularly true of the United Kingdom, as Grenada is part of the Commonwealth, and the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary were correct in saying what they did.

I hope that the United States Administration are beginning to realise that this is no way to behave towards one's principal friends and allies, although with people like Mrs. Kirkpatrick around, one cannot be altogether sure.

In any event, on the assumption that the Americans wish to rebuild bridges and are in the mood to listen, this might be an opportune moment for us to call for a serious United States diplomatic initiative in the middle east an area infinitely more strategically important to the West than Grenada and where the dangers of world peace are much greater.

The potentially explosive situation in the middle east should not be allowed to continue in its present state of drift and at the same time the inadequacy and irrelevancy of short-term measures should be exposed. For it would be foolish of the Americans to persuade themselves that they could seriously improve or change matters by means of a military presence in the Lebanon. It would be even more foolish and much more dangerous if they allowed themselves to be sucked into a conflict with Syria.

There is only one way to proceed in trying to solve the several highly complicated problems in the area, and that is to hold negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive settlement. If these are to have any chance of success, they cannot exclude the Soviet Union and must plainly include Syria and the Palestinians as well as Israel and the United States.

There have been many middle east peace plans over the years, but the Venice declaration of 13 June 1980 perhaps came closest to setting out terms which could be the basis for a lasting settlement. Its central theme was the right of

Israel to security and of the Palestinians to self-determination. The Israelis, however, who have always been much more interested in territorial aggrandisement than security, rejected the plan out of hand and the United States Administration were entirely negative in their response.

Since the declaration, the situation in the whole area has steadily deteriorated. The Iraq-Iran war started in September 1980 and still lingers on, carrying with it grave economic and human consequences as well as the threat to destabilise the whole of the Gulf.

The savage Israeli invasion of the Lebanon in 1982 caused thousands of dead, untold misery and suffering and is the main cause of the present breakdown of the Lebanese state.

Then came the mildly encouraging Reagan proposals, which gave some hope that a serious diplomatic initiative was about to be launched. However, the Reagan plan never got off the ground because the United States failed lamentably to show that it had any intention of ensuring its eventual implementation. That lack of muscle exposed the plan as being half-baked and put King Hussein of Jordan in an impossible position. Since then, the outlook has worsened. Internal stresses have weakened the moderate leadership of the PLO. In the past few weeks there has been the ghastly carnage of the United States' and French Marines in Beirut.

The talks being held in Geneva between the conflicting Lebanese factions are the only positive development, but they cannot achieve anything in isolation.

Incidentally, there was a highly disquieting report in *The Times* on Wednesday which referred to the Israeli threat to close all the bridges across the Awali river and seal off southern Lebanon, effectively partitioning the country, if the talks did not follow Israel's wishes. The Awali river is even deeper into Lebanese territory than the Litani line, which figured prominently in the original Zionist expansionist map of the area. So much for United Nations resolutions calling for total Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory.

Europe should now revive the Venice declaration and spell out again in the clearest manner possible the principles that it enshrines. At the same time, a major diplomatic offensive should be mounted to persuade the United States to go along with the revived declaration and, more positively, to sponsor a conference of the relevant parties aimed at achieving an overall settlement.

If, as a result of such a European initiative, the United States agreed to do so—and accepted that at long last that the time had come to put some serious pressure on Israel, the bankrupt economy of which is propped up by the Americans and the armed forces of which depend almost entirely on American military aid—we should have taken a major step towards reaching a settlement.

It does not make sense to exclude the Soviet Union from negotiations. In any event, the Soviet Union has it within its power to render unworkable any settlement reached without its participation. The Soviet Union should therefore be asked to join in the talks in this connection, it would be a highly imaginative gesture by the Prime Minister if she were to visit Moscow in the near future to discuss this and other matters.

No one could conceivably accuse my right hon. Friend of lacking robustness in her attitude towards the Soviet Union or of failing to be a loyal friend of the United States and President Reagan. But if she could persuade the United

[Mr. Dennis Walters]

States and the Soviet Union to join in talks about a comprehensive middle east peace settlement based on proposals submitted by Europe, she would have made not only an historic contribution towards achieving a settlement in the middle east, but an invaluable contribution to the maintenance of World peace.

9.22 pm

Mr. George Robertson (Hamilton): I congratulate the two maiden speakers. The hon. Member for Newport, West (Mr. Robinson) showed authority, eloquence and great prescience in choosing this debate in which to make his maiden speech. His background and experience will obviously lead him to make many more such contributions.

The hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. Terlezki) spoke with conviction and vigour and with experience which few in this House can match. Although many of us will not agree with his analysis of foreign affairs, he has every right to make such an analysis in this House.

We had yet another maiden speech today. That was the maiden speech in the rest of the Foreign Secretary's life. I understand that his contribution was part of a great rescue effort for the right hon. and learned Gentleman's reputation, a form of political mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. I suppose we should have known that the cavalry were being called in, because, first, the lights in the Chamber went out and, secondly, his speech was ordinarily dreary, and not controversially dreary, as were his remarks all last week.

One aspect of the right hon. and learned Gentleman's speech was to some extent controversial, and that was his apparent inability to answer my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), who asked whether the Government would be sending troops, or anybody else, to Grenada for the multinational force that is being talked about. The right hon. and learned Gentleman appeared to give an indication of an agreement in principle to the force being formed, but went on to avoid the issue as to whether Britain would be sending a component to the force.

The House deserves to know tonight why the Government are being so cagey on the issue. Will we be sending people to Grenada to participate in the force and, if so, what uniform will they wear. Is it to be a security force, or is it to be a peacekeeping force? Why will the Government not say whether they are sending anyone? I hope that the Minister will answer that important question.

This valuable foreign affairs debate has ranged over a wide variety of subjects. Hon. Members have chosen to raise a number of issues that are important to them. However, at the end of the debate we still have little real knowledge of the Government's foreign policy. It is not a mystery just to the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Onslow), who has had the experience of being in the Foreign Office and asked for—and presumably was refused—the sheet of paper on which the foreign policy was written. The question is one which the House, too, must ask.

Mr. Onslow: The hon. Gentleman should not misunderstand me. The fact that I asked the question does not mean that I did not get a satisfactory answer. There was a much more coherent statement after some time, and in my opinion that was greatly to the advantage of all concerned.

Mr. Robertson: The hon. Gentleman is being his usual modest self. I am willing to accept from him that he asked for the sheet of paper, and got it. However, the probability is that he did not read it after that. As only he and I know, having spent many long evenings here on obscure orders, the evidence is clearly there for him.

Is the Government's foreign policy to be encompassed by a belief in human rights? Or is it to be based on a genuine respect for international law — not just international law in relation to invasions, but the form of international law that is being developed on the law of the sea, on which the Government have turned their back? That subject was rightly aired by my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline, West (Mr. Douglas) this evening. Is the policy to be based solely on the protection of this nation's interests abroad? Or is it just to encompass the protection of the United States foreign policy and its perception of its interests, however arbitrary and uncertain that may be? Or is Britain's role now to be a new form of Europeanism—perhaps pioneered, not too successfully, by the Venice declaration?

The Foreign Secretary's contribution to the debate on the European Community this evening seemed sterile compared with the great ideals of the European Community. If all that the Community is to be, as the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Jenkins) said, is a place for permanent discussion over Britain's budget contribution, there is little likelihood that Britain's foreign policy can be based on that. So we can search in vain in the Foreign Secretary's speech today, or indeed in any of his speeches, for a glimmer of enlightenment on any of these questions.

This week, of all weeks, is an interesting illustration of the vast pattern of issues into which a British foreign policy should fit. That framework does not have to be the seamless web of principle which the Foreign Secretary seemed to suggest he was being asked for earlier. This week has been dominated by the events in Grenada and the Caribbean as a whole, but there was also an election last weekend in Argentina. That election brought to power a civilian Government, with a moderate President who has convincing support. That must raise hopes for a long-term solution for the security of the Falkland Islanders.

Next Sunday there is to be an election—the hon. Member for Dorset, West (Mr. Spicer) referred to it—or what is called an election, in Turkey. That will end three years of military rule, but will put in its place only a counterfeit democracy.

Mr. Jim Spicer *rose*—

Mr. Robertson: The hon. Gentleman did not give way to anyone when he was speaking.

A referendum was held yesterday on a new constitution for South Africa, and my hon. Friend the Member for Newham, North-West (Mr. Banks) mentioned this. The referendum has split the country, uniting black opposition with outspoken opposition from the anti-Government Right wing as well. The outcome may be decisive in electoral terms, but the ultimate outcome will be more difficult to predict. This week, we have seen a continuation of the secret, and sometimes not so secret, negotiations on the future of the Crown colony of Hong Kong, with each bout of megaphone diplomacy bringing the Hong Kong economy nearer and nearer to nervous breakdown.

Even taking those issues alone, impinging as they do on vital British interests, whether they be the legacy of colonial power or based on our chances of influencing in the future, we must seek to put them in some context. They all focus on the fact that British Conservative foreign policy is riddled with the inconsistencies and indecisions that we saw so graphically illustrated on the Government Benches last week. Even without the Grenada invasion, and the contemptuous American dismissal of our view, and even discounting our own submission to the United States' view of peacekeeping in Beirut, we should still find it difficult to find out the values and standards of this Government's foreign policy.

I return to the Turkish elections to be held this Sunday. In August, only weeks before the Prime Minister was to barnstorm her way round America, out-Reaganing Reagan in the championing of crusades for freedom, the Turkish Foreign Minister could quote in Turkey that Britain endorsed the "return to democracy" and say that

"Britain is pleased with the developments in Turkey and has agreed that democracy in Turkey should be developed in keeping with the dictates of the stability the country needs."

It is small wonder that he was able to show his appreciation of the

"consistent support and understanding Britain has given Turkey for the past three years."

Even the Prime Minister would find it difficult to describe as democratic an election in this country which banned the leaders and organisations of the Conservative, Liberal, Labour SPD and any other parties, and substituted a sanitised, militarily approved substitute. That is what will happen on Sunday in Turkey. A fellow member of NATO, and still an ally of Britain, is receiving a disproportionate amount of our development aid. This charade in Turkey is little more than a civilian cloak—

Mr. Jim Spicer *rose*—

Mr. Robertson: No.

Mr. Spicer: The hon. Gentleman has made a ridiculous statement and should give way.

Mr. Robertson: It is little more than a civilian cloak, and the British Government devalue their proper condemnation of human rights violations in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union with their continuing support for the charade of democracy that will be conducted in Turkey on Sunday. Will the Government, with the same enthusiasm as they expressed over these fake elections, campaign to liberate those political prisoners still incarcerated in Turkey's gaols simply for indulging in political behaviour that would be regarded as normal here?

It would be difficult to avoid dealing with the subject of yesterday's referendum in South Africa. That referendum has implications not only for South Africa, because of the dangers that will arise from united black opposition to the referendum results, as well as the Right-wing breach among the white voters, but for Namibia and its future. As Great Britain is a member of the contact group of nations trying to find a solution to the Namibian problem, perhaps the Minister will report on progress in the contact group and enlighten the House on why there has been complete silence from the group since August when Senor Perez de Cuellar's report was made after his visit to Namibia.

The Namibian conflict could easily develop into one that will engulf the whole of South Africa and the

surrogates for the West and the East who are playing their parts there. It is incumbent on the Government, as they play a part in that upheaval, to give their view. If there is one beneficiary of the South African referendum it may well be Namibia because the triumph of Mr. P. W. Botha in the referendum will perhaps give him the courage and the guts to come to some agreement on Namibia.

That will be small consolation for a result that ratifies a constitution which *The Economist* recently described as

"Devoid of legitimacy and practicability . . . simply the churning chemistry of white tribal survival at work."

This new constitution, which manages the feat of uniting all black opinion with the opposition of the people whom the new constitution was to benefit as well as the hard Right of racist South African politics, will bring South Africa to the brink of yet a new crisis. It would be interesting, in the light of the strong remarks on apartheid by the Prime Minister in her recent open letter to the hon. Member for Havant (Mr. Lloyd) on the issue of sport, to hear the Government's view on how they will treat this new travesty of a constitution in South Africa.

I should like now to deal with the issue of Hong Kong, that "residual problem of empire" as Sir Nicholas Henderson described it in his open letter to the Foreign Secretary, which was published in *The Sunday Times*. I do not know how we stand in the world this week after the Granada invasion, but that invasion and its repercussions may well have an effect on the negotiations from Hong Kong. It is strange that, amid the total secrecy of the talks on Hong Kong, the vast amount of words that are being uttered about the positions, possibilities, costs, risks and eventualities, everyone seems to be having a say on that great issue except the British Parliament.

I concede that the hon. Member for Christchurch (Mr. Adley) initiated an Adjournment debate on Hong Kong on Monday of this week, but anyone reading it would recognise that so little was said that it added nothing to the debate that should be taking place on this issue. The ultimate decision on Hong Kong will have to be taken here in this Parliament by hon. Members, and if the history of the Falklands episode showed anything under the searchlight of the Franks report, it was that such decisions cannot be taken for granted.

That is why discussions on Hong Kong and on the various crucial issues involved need not necessarily be stifled simply to allow the desirable confidentiality of the negotiations to continue. The last thing we need at the conclusion of the negotiations is what the hon. Member for Christchurch described on Monday as "surprises".

The hon. Member for Buckingham (Mr. Walden), who is a new Member and writes at length in *The Times*, said recently:

"Above all do not let us behead the messenger because we do not like the message. The Franks report shows where that can lead."

That is too true, and that is why I believe it is an opportune occasion to remind the Government that, following Franks, too much will not be taken on trust by Parliament and that perhaps, despite the recognised need for secrecy and confidentiality, some of the issues must be rehearsed—and not just in response to provocative statements from the Chinese, or on World Service talk-ins, but in this Parliament where responsibility for the ultimate decision lies.

[Mr. Robertson]

The House is agreed on the objective of a settlement which does the best for the people of Hong Kong, but that must be achieved without the post-imperial hangups which too often overshadow debates on subjects of this nature.

The past two weeks have changed the face of Western postures in the international context. The American invasion of Grenada, breaching as it did the United Nations charter and international law, has not only affected the important relationship between the United States and the rest of the Atlantic Alliance, but has challenged the moral authority of the West as a whole. By apparently embracing the Brezhnev doctrine of taking on the right to decide who governs the nations inside one's sphere of influence, the underpinning has weakened seriously the West's stance on Afghanistan, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Even with Kampuchea, the West's condemnation of the Vietnamese invasion was so bitter we continue to recognise the mass-murdering regime of Pol Pot. In a host of other areas, intervention by force is the rule rather than the exception.

The saddest part of the United States action is that, whatever the eventual outcome in Grenada, and no matter how many Cubans are discovered as advisers and not as labourers on airfields, if the simplistic morality of might is right is to prevail in the West as well as in the East, the multiplication of potential crisis points threatens us all.

It should give no one in the House comfort that the United States, with all its great democratic strength, has been brought so low by its present temporary Administration. So much of what has been said today, in the wide-ranging debate across every issue of foreign policy, needs to be related to a clearer view of what British interests should be about, what values they need to mirror and what Britain's role must be in the world.

The tragedy of the Government is that the moral position of the West in international affairs has been so damaged recently that they cannot offer a clear alternative. The last election showed that foreign policy will always be a domestic political issue. The lesson for the Opposition was that people wanted foreign policy objectives clearly spelt out. We have learned that lesson, albeit expensively. As we watch the Government disarray on the Benches reach almost to the political assassination of yet another Foreign Secretary, it is clear that the Government have learned little from their temporary electoral success to help them next time around.

9.42 pm

The Minister for Overseas Development (Mr. Timothy Raison): I shall not follow all the points raised by the hon. Member for Hamilton (Mr. Robertson), but he at least had the honesty to recognise that the electorate decisively rejected the Labour party's foreign policy at the general election, and equally decisively supported that of the Conservative party.

The debate has been notable in several ways. We suddenly found the House plunged into darkness—not once, but several times. There were moments when we began to wonder whether there was not a Grenada-style coup, perhaps organised by a group devoted to preventing the televising of Parliament. But we soon heard the reassuring and familiar voice of Mr. Deputy Speaker saying, "This is your Deputy Speaker", which brought us back to sanity.

The House heard two excellent maiden speeches—from my hon. Friends the Members for Newport, west (Mr. Robinson) and for Cardiff, West (Mr. Terlezki). My hon. Friend the Member for Newport, West began by speaking about the Severn bridge. I had the alarming feeling that he was aware that I have responsibility for aid, and was about to make an application. He told us a little about his experience with the United Nations and the Commonwealth secretariat. He made some important points about Grenada. He said that it was a sad day when a Government was changed by outside intervention, but he also said—this has been the lesson of the debate—that that does not mean a fundamental change in the relationship between Britain and the United States. My hon. Friend also said that there is now an opportunity for a touch of healing in the Caribbean. I confess that for a moment I thought he said "a touch of Healey", and I began to worry.

My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West told us that he spoke with an Anglo-Ukrainian-Welsh accent. He spoke proudly of the model relationship between the different groups in Cardiff, and said that both he and they were proud to be British. He succeeded the noble Lord Tonyandy—George Thomas—whom we all know so well, and he said, rightly, that he was a great man. We are in full agreement with that. We were all deeply moved by what my hon. Friend had to say about freedom. He has cause to know what he is talking about.

The debate has been notable for its general quality and I apologise to the House because it is obviously not possible for me to try to answer every point that has been raised. There were different points of view, and some were expressed vehemently, but on the whole the tone of the debate has been thoughtful and absorbing. In that respect it followed the lead of my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary's opening speech.

We have heard a lot from the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) recently and we all know that his favourite phrase of the moment is "megaphone diplomacy". Happily, he was not in his most megaphone style today but in rather a lower key, only intermittently magaphonian. However, there were several points in his speech with which I cannot agree.

First, the right hon. Gentleman asked about civilian casualties in Grenada. As yet, no definite figures are available, but a team of 12 Red Cross representatives is now working closely with the United States forces on Grenada and it may be able to provide information before long.

The right hon. Gentleman also asked about the Governor-General's role. We all now realise that he is not the agent of any foreign Government. His constitutional position has been made clear by my right hon. and learned Friend and the House understands it. He has no formal link with Her Majesty's Government and we received no request for intervention from him.

As my right hon. and learned Friend said—this has been the essence of today's debate—what really matters now is what happens next in Grenada. Arguments about the past will, perhaps, continue, but the crucial thing is to try to work out the right answer for the future. I reiterate what we have said about the United Kingdom's participation in any schemes of Commonwealth assistance. As my right hon. and learned friend said, the Government will want to respond positively to requests for help with arrangements for ensuring that conditions for

peace and security are restored to the island. We are in close touch with the Governor-General, the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth and our Commonwealth partners to see how the Commonwealth can best help. That might include assistance with the holding of free elections. That parallels the other offers of assistance made by my right hon. and learned Friend — the willingness to resume our bilateral aid relationship with Grenada.

Mr. Healey: The right hon. Gentleman has not made it clear whether Her Majesty's Government will provide military assistance if that is requested by the Commonwealth as a whole or by the Commonwealth secretariat.

Mr. Raison: We must consider the position as it evolves. We have a little time, particularly during the elections about which my right hon. and learned Friend talked. It would be ridiculous to rush in with detailed schemes before we have had time to find out exactly what is needed on the island. It will take time and there are clearly problems, but we must find the right answers and I am not prepared to go further than my right hon. and learned Friend has gone today.

We have been challenged about the Government's policy in the Caribbean. My hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Sir P. Goodhart) challenged us, as did others. I see no reason to be defensive on this point. We are not neglecting or withdrawing from the Caribbean. We have maintained a substantial aid programme of some £25 million a year and we have extensive diplomatic representation there.

We are also giving security assistance. I visited the Caribbean in September. The Minister of State, my noble Friend Baroness Young, also visited the area in September and October. There is no doubt that the Caribbean region is important to the United Kingdom. Our policy remains to maintain and promote peace and stability in that area and to help the economies of the countries of that region to develop. I cannot altogether accept the criticisms of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hexham (Mr. Rippon), much as I respect him. It is not true that we had no representation in Grenada. We have had a resident high commission representative since 1980.

Mr. Rippon: I am glad to hear that. What communication did we have from our representative or what effort did we make to get in touch with him? How successful were we in doing so?

Mr. Raison: We have regularly maintained close communication with our representative, but my right hon. and learned Friend will acknowledge that in the arguments over the past few weeks the crucial question about whether there would be military action was not determined in Grenada. The reporting has had to come from other places. Therefore, while there are many areas in which we would have liked to have stronger representation, if resources permitted, it is not true that we have not been able to have a clear idea of the situation in Grenada in recent years.

I agree that we have substantially reduced our aid programme to Grenada, but I ask whether that is so wrong, in view of the nature of the regime. I can almost imagine my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hexham asking, in other circumstances, why we continue to prop it up. Perhaps I do him an injustice.

Whatever my right hon. and learned Friend's views, the fact is that the human rights record of that regime was

questionable. I was in St. Kitts and Nevis a few weeks ago for the independence ceremonies, and I talked to Maurice Bishop at a party. He seemed to be wondering whether there should be more movement towards the West. Perhaps he was thinking in those terms; it is hard to say. Perhaps that is what accounts for his fate. It may be so; none of us can tell. However, we do know that with so many competing claims on our aid programme, there were good reasons why Grenada could not have priority. It was getting substantial aid anyway from other parts of the world. We have a good aid programme in the Caribbean, but the Caribbean countries are not, by and large, among the poorest in the world. Opposition Members always tell us that we should focus the aid programme on the poorest countries. By the normal indices, that is not so with the Caribbean.

Dame Judith Hart: Does the Minister believe that events in Grenada would have taken the course that they did had we not reduced our aid to Grenada by three quarters?

Mr. Raison: It is highly likely, but none of us can be sure.

I accept, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary does, that we must find ways of helping what my hon. Friend the Member for Newport, West called the micro states—the ones threatened with hijack, according to the graphic description of my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Sir P. Goodhart). My right hon. and learned Friend recognised the problem of security. We already help in significant ways. For example, we help with policing. I saw the police college in Barbados a few weeks ago. We have helped with the provision of a coastguard service in the Caribbean. However, as my right hon. and learned Friend said, we shall have to consider the matter further.

The right hon. member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Jenkins), who is not present, said that he did not dissent from the line of my right hon. and learned Friend over Grenada. I believe firmly that, as the House understands what has been happening, it increasingly shares the view of the right hon. Member for Hillhead in that respect. The path that we have taken is wise. Events will justify it.

When the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) dealt with the Falklands, he seemed to suggest that there was no longer any need for Britain to defend the Falklands. I think that I heard him correctly. He said that there was now no military threat. The Government do not share the right hon. Gentleman's blind confidence that all militaristic sentiment in Argentina has evaporated overnight with the prospect of Mr. Alfonsín coming to power. We must hope that the new president will herald a commitment to peace, but we cannot be sure what will happen in Argentina in the future. If a military threat does not exist or is reduced, it is because of our defence and our resolution. That must be clearly understood.

Mr. Healey: Baloney.

Mr. Raison: There is no point in the right hon. Gentleman saying, "Baloney". The first step forward must be for Argentina to respond positively to the offers that we have made to normalise commercial and economic relations.

The right hon. Member for Leeds, East also referred to disarmament and the nuclear debate, as did the right hon.

[Mr. Raison]

Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Callaghan) to whom the House listened with particular care. The right hon. Member for Leeds, East referred to the inclusion of British systems in the Geneva negotiations. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary told the General Assembly on 28 October, our force is strategic. The Russians acknowledged that in the SALT negotiations. Our Polaris force represents less than 3 per cent. of the strategic forces of the Soviet Union. As things stand, it would be absurd to seek to trade reductions with a super-power.

Mr. Mikardo: We are not asking for a reduction.

Mr. Raison: As my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary said, Britain has never said never. If the Soviet and American strategic arsenals were to be substantially reduced, and if no significant changes had taken place in Soviet defensive capabilities, Britain would want to review its position and consider how best it could contribute to arms control, bearing in mind the reduced threat.

Mr. Healey: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the Russians are not asking for a reduction in the number of British or French forces? They are saying that, as the British forces are under the command of SACEUR and targeted against the Soviet Union by SACEUR, as the American Defence Secretary admitted, they should be counted in the negotiations as they were in SALT 1.

Mr. Raison: The right hon. Gentleman knows that the essential point is that we are referring to strategic arms. By any standard, they are strategic arms.

Mr. Healey: Will the right hon. Gentleman answer my question?

Mr. Raison: A future possibility was that START and the INF negotiations might be merged. I do not think that the Government would have anything against that in principle, provided that the Russians and the Americans believed that it would facilitate the search for an

agreement. I doubt that such a time has arrived. The obvious risk is that a premature merger might aggravate the problems which currently face the two negotiations.

The right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) referred to the Lebanon. I do not share the right hon. Gentleman's scepticism about the value of the British contingent to the multinational force in Beirut. I note that the right hon. Gentleman has joined the "troops out" movement in that respect but I do not agree with what he says.

I am sure that I speak for many hon. Members when I say that our troops in the Lebanon are performing their role with great courage and efficiency. Among other things, our troops provide an impartial guard for the meetings of the committee which supervises the ceasefire. In other words, they have a constructive role. We are not in the Lebanon because our contingent may somehow please the Americans, but because the Lebanese Government asked for it. We responded positively because to do so served our national interests as well as increasing the chances of peace in that area. Our overriding interest in the area is to prevent war between Israel and the Arabs. I am convinced that the presence of the MNF in the past 14 months has helped to control the conflict within Lebanon and to prevent it spreading. A stable Lebanon, free from Syrians, Israelis and members of the PLO, is in the interests of the United States. That we have the same interest does not make us an American dummy any more than the French or Italians are. It is an example of co-operation between western states for the common good and for the good of the Lebanon.

That brings me again to the essential point of the debate. I say it once more because it has to be said over and over again. Nothing matters more than the unity of the West; nothing matters more than NATO or our alliances. Nothing that Opposition Members have said today and none of the events of recent weeks in any way undermines the truth of that vital proposition.

Mr. Tristan Garel-Jones (Lords Commissioner to the Treasury): I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.



File 16

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 November 1983

MONTSERRAT

Thank you for your letter
of 1 November, the contents of
which the Prime Minister has noted.

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

16

Grenada
1st 2/2

175



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

3 November 1983

Dear Geoffrey,

I am most grateful for the excellent service provided by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office since the Grenada crisis began.

The situation reports and advice which I have received have been most valuable and timely. I know that behind this lies the hard work over long hours of your Emergency Unit and many other officials.

I should be grateful if you would convey my warm thanks to all concerned.

Yours
Geoffrey Howe

The Right Honourable Sir Geoffrey Howe, QC, MP.

HL

CONFIDENTIAL

HL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 November 1983

Grenada

B.F.
The Prime Minister told the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary this morning that she hoped that in due course a paper could be produced setting out the various claims made by the United States during the Grenada crisis and our own estimate of the validity of those claims. I think the Prime Minister had in mind such matters as the American assertions as to the numbers of Cubans and Russians in Grenada, the arms caches which they found after the invasion, the alleged threat of a Cuban take-over ("we got there just in time") and other matters of this kind.

I should be grateful if in due course such a paper could be produced. I leave it to you whether this is done by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office or whether a JIC paper would be more appropriate.

A. J. COLL-

JS

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Bulk to typists after office

GRENADA

ADVANCE COPIES


39

HD/EMERGENCY UNIT
 HD/S AM D
 HD/MCAD
 HD/UND
 HD/PUSD
 HD/DEF DEPT
 HD/NEWS DEPT
 HD/INFO DEPT
 HD/PROTOCOL DEPT
 HD/ECD(E)
 HD/ECD(I)
 HD/CCD
 HD/CONSULAR DEPT
 HD/SOV DEPT
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 HD/RESEARCH DEPT
 HD/EED
 HD/NAD

PS (2)
 PS/LADY YOUNG
 PS/MR WHITNEY
 PS/PUS
 SIR J BULLARD
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR URE
 MR CARTLEDGE
 MR HANNAY
 MR ADAMS
 MR FREELAND)
 MR BICKFORD) LEGAL ADVISERS
 MR EDWARDS)
 SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE
 CABINET OFFICE
 NO 10 DOWNING ST
 MOD, RC
 MOD (DI 4)
 RESIDENT CLERK

FLASH

ADVANCE COPY



ms

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 031640Z NOV 83.

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3289 OF 3 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE GRENADA, BRIDGETOWN, MEXICO CITY, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW AND HAVANA

GRENADA

1. KELLY (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS) HAS JUST TOLD US THAT AT 1300 HOURS LOCAL TIME TODAY THE US WILL BE PROVIDING TRANSPORT AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN GRENADA TO TAKE SOVIET PERSONNEL TO THE AIRPORT. THEY WOULD EMBARK AT 1600 HOURS ON A PLANE TO MEXICO CITY.

2. KELLY ADDED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF 'GUESTS' IN THEIR EMBASSY, INCLUDING EAST EUROPEANS AND NORTH KOREANS. THESE WILL ALSO BE PERMITTED TO LEAVE FOR MEXICO CITY. THE RUSSIANS, HOWEVER, ALSO HAVE A NUMBER OF CUBANS IN THEIR EMBASSY, INCLUDING PROBABLY CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL. THEIR DOCUMENTATION WILL BE CHECKED AT THE AIRPORT. ANY CUBANS WITH DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS WILL BE PERMITTED TO LEAVE. CUBANS WITHOUT SUCH DOCUMENTS WILL BE DETAINED, ON THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S INSTRUCTIONS. KELLY CONFIRMED THAT THE US UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE INSTRUCTED THEIR EMBASSY PERSONNEL TO COMPLY WITH THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S INSTRUCTIONS, AND TO LEAVE GRENADA.

3. WE IMPRESSED ON KELLY YOUR CONCERN (YOUR TELNO 25 TO GRENADA) THAT THE PROBLEMS POSED BY THE CUBAN DELAY IN WITHDRAWING THEIR DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN A CALM AND ORDERLY FASHION. THE CUBANS MUST LEAVE BUT THERE MUST NOT BE AN ARMED CLASH AT THE CUBAN EMBASSY. WE PRESUMED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD ALSO DEAL PRUDENTLY WITH ANY PROBLEMS WITH CUBAN PERSONNEL FROM THE SOVIET EMBASSY AT THE AIRPORT. KELLY TOOK NOTE.

WRIGHT

COVERING RESTRICTED

①



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Prime Minister

London SW1A 2AH

Agree message?

A.J.C. ^{3.}/₁₁

2 November 1983

Dear John

Grenada: Message from President of Maldives

^{P+1}
As requested in your letter of 27 October, I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Gayoom, cast in the form of a telegram to our High Commission in Colombo. The High Commissioner is also accredited to the Maldives and could transmit the text of the message, once approved by the Prime Minister, to President Gayoom.

Yours ever,

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

COVERING RESTRICTED

OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats RESTRICTED	Precedence/Deskby PRIORITY
--	--	---	--------------------------------------

ZCZC
GRS
CLASS
CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

1	ZCZC
2	GRS
3	RESTRICTED
4	
5	
6	FM FCO
7	TO PRIORITY COLOMBO
8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
9	GRENADA: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GAYOOM
10	1. The Prime Minister has received by telex the following
11	message from President Gayoom.
12	BEGINS: As a member of the Commonwealth The Maldives is deeply
13	concerned over the invasion of another member country, Grenada,
14	by foreign forces. While we deplore the military coup staged
15	by the left wing elements in which the Prime Minister of Grenada
16	and some of his cabinet colleagues were killed, we are unable to
17	justify the military action taken by the countries involved in
18	the invasion against, as I understand, the advice of your
19	Government. Our concern over this serious situation is in keeping
20	with the principles of the United Nations Charter and international
21	law which safeguard the right of every nation to independence and
22	self-determination. My Government is hopeful that your efforts
23	will lead to an early withdrawal of the invading forces and
24	the restoration of the rights of the Grenadian people. ENDS
25	2. Please pass the following reply from the Prime Minister to

///
//
/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword President
File number	Dept	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) PRIVATE SECRETARY		
Telephone number 233 4641		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats RESTRICTED	Page 2
--	--	-----------

<<<<

1 <<<<
2 President Gayoom as soon as possible.
3 BEGINS: Your Excellency. Thank you for your message of
4 27 October about the military intervention in Grenada. As you
5 say, we advised against this intervention and entirely share
6 your view that we must work now for an early restoration of
7 the rights of the Grenadian people. This requires the
8 re-establishment of stability and democratic Government in the
9 Island. We are doing what we can to contribute to this end.
10 ENDS.
11
12 HOWE
13 NNNN
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

///

//

/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
-----------------------	-------	-----------

CONFIDENTIAL

28926 - 2

OO BRIDGETOWN
GRS 246
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 021315Z NOVEMBER 83
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1846 OF 2 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN, GRENADA, AND UKMIS NEW YORK
TELECONS URE/AMBASSADOR: GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF GRENADA
1.

THE AMERICANS WERE PLANNING TO FLY SIR PAUL SCOON TO NEW YORK TO SUPPORT THEIR CASE AT THE UN.

2. MINISTERS HERE WERE VERY DISCONCERTED AT THIS PROSPECT, NOTABLY ON GROUNDS THAT (A) THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S PLACE AT PRESENT IS ON THE ISLAND WHERE HE IS THE SOLE CONSTITUTED AUTHORITY, AND (B) THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL WOULD RISK APPEARING BOTH AS AN AMERICAN PUPPET AND IN A CONTROVERSIAL POLITICAL ROLE SCARCELY COMPATIBLE WITH HIS POSITION AS THE QUEEN'S REPRESENTATIVE.

3. WE ACCORDINGLY ASKED YOU AND THE US EMBASSY IN LONDON URGENTLY TO CONVEY OUR DISQUIET ON THESE SCORES AND TO ASK EMPHATICALLY THAT NO ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN WITHOUT PRIOR DISCUSSION OF THE IMPLICATIONS WITH US.

4. WE WERE VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE PROMPT REASSURANCE YOU CONVEYED TO US FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT, ALTHOUGH THIS IDEA HAD BEEN MOOTED, IT HAD BEEN REJECTED BOTH BY THE US ADMINISTRATION AND BY SIR PAUL SCOON. CONFIRMATION THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT BE FLYING SIR PAUL TO THE UN WAS ALSO RECEIVED ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY VIA THE US EMBASSY.

HOWE

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED
EMERGENCY UNIT
NAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
PUSD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
INFO D
PROTOCOL D
ECD'S
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD
CONS D
SOV D
EED
MAED
WED
RES D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR UPE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:
SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE
MR ANNING LACPD/ODA
MOD (DI 4)

*Passages deleted and
closed. 40 years,
under FOI Exemption.*

CONFIDENTIAL

*Wayland
4 June 2013*



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 November 1983

Grenada

I enclose a copy of a note from the Jamaican Ministry of Foreign Affairs to our High Commissioner in Kingston and an accompanying letter of 26 October to the Prime Minister from the Prime Minister of Jamaica. Copies of the annexes to Mr. Seaga's letter are also enclosed.

I should be grateful for a draft reply to Mr. Seaga for signature by the Prime Minister.

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

GPS 646
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM HAVANA

020100Z NOV

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 276 OG 2 NOV

INFO FLASH WASHINGTON, ST GEORGES , BRIDGETOWN
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO PRIORITY OTTAWA, KINGSTON, GEORGETOWN, PORT OF SPAIN,
NASSAU, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, MADRID, BOGOTA

GRENADA/CUBA

1. AS REPORTED BY TELEPHONE TO THE EMERGENCY UNIT, I WAS SUMMONED BY THE CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER AT 5.30 THIS AFTERNOON (012230Z) TO BE INFORMED THAT IN A NOTE DELIVERED TO THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN GRENADA AT 1245 LOCAL TIME TODAY, SIR PAUL SCOON HAD ORDERED THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR AND ALL BUT ONE OF HIS STAFF TO LEAVE GRENADA WITHIN 24 HOURS, THEIR DEPARTURE TO BE CO-ORDINATED WITH THE CARIBBEAN PEACE FORCE.
2. THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAD REPLIED TO THE U S INTERESTS SECTION IN HAVANA TO THE EFFECT THAT:

- A. SIR PAUL SCOON WAS ACTING ILLEGALLY AND OBVIOUSLY UNDER U S INSTRUCTIONS (SEMI COLON)
- B. CUBAN DIPLOMATIC STAFF HAD INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO LEAVE GRENADA UNTIL ALL OTHER CUBAN PERSONNEL, INCLUDING PRISONERS, WOUNDED AND DEAD, HAD DONE SO (SEMI COLON)
- C. GOVERNOR GENERAL'S ORDER COULD ONLY BE CARRIED OUT BY FORCE BY U S TROOPS WHICH HAD SURROUNDED CUBAN EMBASSY (SEMI COLON)
- D. CUBAN GOVERNMENT HELD U S GOVERNMENT WHOLLY RESPONSIBLE FOR WHATEVER HAPPENED TO CUBAN EMBASSY AND ITS STAFF.

3. MALMIERCA ADDED THAT ACCORDING TO THE ACCOUNT OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION AND POWERS A (CONTAINED IN FCO TELNO 215) WHICH I HAD (FORTUITOUSLY) GIVEN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY EARLIER TODAY, SIR PAUL SCOON HAD CLEARLY EXCEEDED HIS POWERS. THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT FELT THAT THE QUEEN SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THE ACTION HER PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE HAD TAKEN, OBVIOUSLY ON U S INSTRUCTIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4. I SAID

CONFIDENTIAL

4. I SAID THAT WHATEVER FUNCTIONS THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL MIGHT EXERCISE AS THE ONLY SURVIVING LEGALLY CONSTITUTED POLITICAL ENTITY IN GRENADA, HE DID NOT TAKE HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE U S GOVERNMENT. I URGED PRUDENCE ON ALL CONCERNED AND UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THE CUBAN DEMARCHE IMMEDIATELY.
5. TEXTS OF GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S NOTE AND CUBAN NOTE TO U S I S IN MIFT (TO FCO AND WASHINGTON ONLY).
6. INITIAL REACTION OF HEAD OF U S INTERESTS SECTION IS THAT CUBANS ARE COURTING FORCIBLE EJECTION OF THEIR DIPLOMATIC STAFF IN ORDER TO PROMOTE FURTHER INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION OF UNITED STATES.
7. AS SEEN FROM HERE THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S ACTION SEEMS ILL-JUDGED AND THE TRUCULENT CUBAN REPLY WHOLLY PREDICTABLE. THE CUBANS CAN EXPECT CONSIDERABLE SYMPATHY FOR THEIR REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW DIPLOMATIC STAFF UNTIL CUBAN PRISONERS AND WOUNDED HAVE BEEN EVACUATED. FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL ADDRESSEES.

THOMAS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED
EMERGENCY UNIT
NAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
PUSD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
INFO D
PROTOCOL D
ECD'S
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD
CONS D
SOV D
EED
MAED
WED

RES D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:
SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

MOD (DI 4)

MR. ANNING -
LACPD/ODA

2

CONFIDENTIAL

GP 800
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM GRENADA 020025Z OCT
TO FCO IMMEDIATE ^{SIC}
TELEGRAM NUMBER 11 OF 2 NOVEMBER 83
INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN AND WASHINGTON
AND ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 18 : GRENADA

1. CALLED ON THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AT MID-DAY TODAY 1ST NOV. HIS MEETING WITH THE GRENADA COUNCIL OF CHURCHES HAD JUST ENDED AND HE WAS DUE TO MEET CHAMBER COMMERCE PEOPLE AT 1400 HOURS. HE TOLD ME THAT THE COUNCIL OF CHURCHES HAD ASSURED HIM OF THEIR FULL SUPPORT.

2. HE LISTENED INTENTLY WHILE I WENT OVER THE POINTS IN PARAS 2 - 5 OF TUR. WHEN I HAD FINISHED HE SAID THAT HE ENTIRELY UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WAS NOT FOR US TO OFFER ADVICE BUT THAT, FOR HIS PART, HE COULD NOT IMAGINE A MORE WELCOME SOURCE OF ADVICE OR COMMENT AT THIS DIFFICULT TIME THAN HIS BRITISH FRIENDS FOR WHOSE JUDGEMENTS AND EXPERIENCE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION HE HAD PROFOUND RESPECT. HE ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO YOU HOW DEEPLY GRATEFUL AND REASSURED HE WAS TO LEARN OF YOUR INTEREST IN HIS PLANS FOR BRINGING DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT BACK TO GRENADA. HE INVITED ME (OR KELLY) TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH HIM AND HE LOOKS FORWARD TO AN EARLY VISIT FROM THE HIGH COMMISSIONER.

3. WITH REGARD TO TIME SCALE, GOVERNOR GENERAL HOPES TO HAVE HIS ADVISORY COUNCIL APPOINTED AND OPERATIONAL WITHIN THE NEXT TEN DAYS. AS I HAD THE SLIGHTLY UNEASY FEELING THAT HE IS NOT FINDING IT EASY TO IDENTIFY POTENTIAL CANDIDATES TO SERVE ON THE COUNCIL, I DID NOT ENQUIRE ABOUT NAMES. WE MUST PRAY THAT HE IS NOT ENCOUNTERING A GENERAL RELUCTANCE TO SERVE ON THE COUNCIL. IF THAT WERE THE CASE THE OUTLOOK WOULD BE DISTINCTLY WORRYING.

4. THE PROCLAMATION ABOUT HIS ASSUMPTION OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY UNDER ARTICLE 57, SUB SECTIONS (1) AND (2) OF THE CONSTITUTION WAS PROMULGATED IN THE GRENADA GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, VOL 101, NO 49 PUBLISHED ON 31 OCTOBER 1983. THE SAME GOVERNMENT GAZETTE INCLUDED THE PROCLAMATION RECALLING GRENADA'S AMBASSADORS / HEAD OF MISSION OVERSEAS AND ALSO TERMINATING THEIR APPOINTMENTS. ALL WERE INSTRUCTED TO CLOSE THEIR MISSIONS AND TO REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR - GENERAL ON THEIR RETURN TO GRENADA. MFA, UNDER J EMMANUEL WHOM GG HAS ASKED TO CONTINUE AS PERMANENT SECRETARY, MFA, PRO TEM, WILL BE INFORMING AMERICANS, CANADIANS, OURSELVES AND OTHERS, AS APPROPRIATE, OF THE RECALL AND TERMINATION OF APPOINTMENTS OF HEADS OF GRENADIAN MISSION IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES. FORMAL NOTES WERE TO HAVE ISSUED TODAY, BUT OURS HAD NOT BEEN RECEIVED BY CLOSE OF PLAY TODAY (1ST NOV). SO THE POSITION OF THE OBNOXIOUS AUGUSTINE,

CONFIDENTIAL

HC

HC IN LONDON IS CLEAR. HE IS OUT OF A JOB. GG HAS REQUESTED OECS TO ASK DR.C THOMAS, TO LOOK AFTER GRENADIAN INTERESTS IN THE UK FOR THE TIME BEING.

5. SAZHENEV, SOVIET TO GRENADA , WILL RECEIVE A LETTER FROM GG TOMORROW INFORMING HIM THAT GRENADA DOES NOT WISH TO CONTINUE HAVING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND WOULD HE PLEASE LEAVE. RIZO, THE SLIMY CUBAN AMBASSADOR WHOM GG SUSPECTS OF HAVING HAD AN OFFICE IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE (THE BISHOP) WHICH MAY EXPLAIN WHY IT WAS SET ON FIRE BEFORE US FORCES SECURED IT, WILL ALSO BE TOLD TO LEAVE. BUT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA WILL NOT BE SEVERED THIS TIME ROUND. GG 'S ASSESSMENT IS THAT QUITE A LOT OF GRENADIANS REMAIN GRATEFUL TO CUBA FOR THE HELP OVER THE NEW AIRPORT PROJECT. (WE MAY BE ASKED TO LOOK AFTER GRENADIAN INTERESTS IN HAVANA).

6. GG BELIEVES THAT US FORCES WILL BE ABLE TO HAND OVER TO CARIBBEAN CONTINGENT OF MULTI NATIONAL INTERVENTION FORCES, WHO WILL ASSUME THE PEACE KEEPING ROLE IN ABOUT FOUR WEEKS TIME. HE IS ALSO HOPING THAT THE 60 STRONG CONTINGENT OF ROYAL BARBADOS POLICE NOW IN GRENADA WILL REMAIN FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. THIS GAVE ME THE LEAD TO RAISE (A) ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, (B) POLICE TRAINING AND (C) JUDICIAL ENQUIRY. HE DISCUSSED (A) YESTERDAY WITH CHIEF JUSTICE NEDD OF GRENADA. IT IS LIKELY THAT PRESENT JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN GRENADA WILL CONTINUE IN THE SHORT TERM, BUT GG ENVISAGES THAT GRENADA SHOULD RESUME IT'S MEMBERSHIP OF THE OECS JUDICIAL SYSTEM . ON (B) HE SAID THAT HE HAS ORDERED AN QUOTE INVENTORY OF WHAT IS REQUIRED TO RESTORE THE POLICE FORCE TO CREDIBILITY UNQUOTE . WHEN THIS HAS BEEN DONE HE WOULD EXPECT TO BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE . I AM IN DOUBT THAT GG WILL LOOK TO THE UK TO HELP IN THIS AREA . I THINK A TCO POLICE ADVISOR IS PROBABLY WHAT WILL BE NEEDED BUT HE WANTS TO KEEP HIS OPTIONS OPEN FOR THE TIME BEING. A NON GRENADIAN MAY HAVE TO APPOINTED COMMISSIONER OF POLICE. THERE IS NO PROBLEM ABOUT CEEEE (C) AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL ENQUIRY WILL DEFINATELY BE HELD , AND WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE HOLDING OF ELECTIONS. HE APPEARED TO HAVE THE RIGHT IDEAS ABOUT WHO SHOULD BE INVITED TO CONDUCT THE ENQUIRY IE PROMINANT NON GRENADIAN LEGAL / ACADEMIC LUMINARIES . HE SEEMS TO BE ON THE RIGHT LINES SO FAR BUT THE SHOW ^{HAS} SCARCELY BEGUN . HE WILL NEED ALL THE HELP HE CAN GET AND ONE OF THE MOST WORRYING ASPECTS OF THIS IS THAT VERY LITTLE OF THE RIGHT SORT OF HELP IS AVAILABLE IN GRENADA. HE SPOKE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AFTER THEIR MEETING WITH THE GG. HIS ATTITUDE WAS SOMEWHAT NEGATIVE. THE CHAMBER WERE NOT ALL THAT IMPREST WITH SCOON: THEY WERE NOT ENAMoured OF SOME OF THE PERSONALITIES WITH WHOME HE HAS BEEN HAVING DISCUSSIONS: THE PRIVATE SECTOR WOULD

2
CONFIDENTIAL

/ HAVE

CONFIDENTIAL

HAVE TO BE GIVEN CERTAIN ASSURANCES BEFORE THEY COULD GIVE HIM
WHOLE HEARTED SUPPORT. MEANWHILE THEY HAVE ASSURED
HIM OF THEIR SOMEWHAT GUARDED SUPPORT IN HIS
ENDAVOURS . THE CHAMBER CLEARLY INTEND TO PUT A PRICE ON THEIR
COOPERATION AND THE GG, IT SEEMS TO ME, HAS NO ROOM FOR MANOUVRE

7. THE PROCLAMATION DECLARING A STATE OF EMERGENCY WAS PROMULGATED
TODAY.

MONGOMERY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED
EMERGENCY UNIT
NAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
PUSD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
INFO D
PROTOCOL D
ECD'S
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD
CONS D
SOV D
EED
MAED
WED

RES D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:
SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE
MR ANNING LACPD/ODA
MOD (DI 4)
MR ANNING LACPA/ODA


3
CONFIDENTIAL

SITREP Distribution

GRENADA: SITREPS

1. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office SITREPS on Grenada have now ceased. The last SITREP was No 11 of today's date.

2 November 1983


C D Thorpe
Emergency Unit



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 November 1983

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 24 October. Mr. Gibbs is, of course, very welcome to meet an FCO official should he so wish. I wonder if he would like to telephone Mr. John Edwards, the Head of West Indian and Atlantic Department at the FCO, in order to arrange a mutually convenient time. Mr. Edwards has been closely involved with the FCO's work on the recent events in Grenada.

A. J. COLES

John Garrett, Esq.

NR

SECRET

FILE

da



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 November 1983

Grenada

Thank you for your letter of 1 November enclosing Mr. Renwick's letter of 28 October to Mr. Ure. The Prime Minister has read this with interest.

With regard to paragraph 7 of the first enclosure to Renwick's letter, I do not think that it is the case that the Prime Minister put our views direct to the President before the final decision to intervene was taken. Paragraph 3 of the same enclosure states that the President took his decision following a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at 3.30 pm and signed the relevant directive at 6.00 pm. The Prime Minister's message was, as you know, despatched after the equivalent British time.

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1049</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Folio 10B:</i> <i>Minute from Parsons to Coles</i> <i>dated 2 November 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>4 June 2013</i> <i>Wayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <u>PREM 19</u>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <u>1049</u> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <u>Folio 10A:</u> <u>Letter from Duff to Wright dated</u> <u>1 November 1983</u>	
CLOSED FOR YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<u>4 June 2013</u> <u>Wayland</u>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

CONFIDENTIAL

1 November 1983

Dear Eric Christie,

Your officials will have conveyed the statements I have made on recent developments on Grenada and more particularly my brief remarks at the meeting of the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa in London on Thursday last. I have consciously deferred communicating with you directly until events assumed a clearer shape. They still have not; but as world-wide demands for the early withdrawal of the intervening force from Grenada have grown steadily over recent days so also has a widely shared expectation that the Commonwealth might, responsive to the wishes of Grenada, help to ensure that withdrawal and assist a genuine process of renewal by the people of Grenada of their right to self-determination.

The major requirement of the Commonwealth may turn out to be an interim security presence designed to instil confidence and assist in the process of national reconciliation. I am assuming that such a Commonwealth contribution at Grenada's invitation would only be feasible on the basis of a withdrawal of the intervening force from Grenada, and the establishment of a credible, impartial and non-political interim administration responsible for returning Grenada to constitutional government through free and fair elections within a prescribed time-frame. If these conditions were satisfied and the Commonwealth was asked by Grenada to provide an appropriate security presence in the interim, I earnestly hope your Government would be agreeable in principle to it and would be willing to examine what contribution it might make to that joint effort in furtherance of an internationally accepted objective.

Contd... 2

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister of Great Britain
& Northern Ireland
10 Downing Street
London SW1

CONFIDENTIAL


2.

As soon as I am in a position to put more specific proposals to you I shall do so. Meanwhile, I will make such contingency plans as I can, using as my guidelines the principles of respect for the will and interests of the people of Grenada and the preservation of the island's integrity as a member state of the Commonwealth.

The Governor-General, Sir Paul Scoon, is now back in office and, despite communication difficulties, has been in touch with me about a number of immediate problems. He is keenly aware of the importance of ensuring that the head of the interim administration is a person of outstanding ability and national reputation transcending politics who would be broadly acceptable to all shades of Grenadian opinion. I have agreed to give the Governor-General what assistance I can in taking this matter further, as well as in making available through normal Commonwealth technical assistance programmes a few key advisory personnel to assist him in the difficult months ahead.

I have been in touch with Geoffrey Howe throughout these events and have been grateful for the assistance and support I have received from him and his officials. I shall maintain close contact with them.

With deep respect,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Shridath S. Ramphal', with a large, stylized initial 'S'.

Shridath S. Ramphal

PRIME MINISTER

Grenada

The FCO will produce a further SITREP tomorrow morning but then, unless the situation changes dramatically, will cease the series of SITREPs. At the same time the Emergency Unit will be disbanded. I think this is acceptable. We shall be able to brief you in the normal way from telegrams, etc,

If you feel, as I think you do, that we have received very good service from the FCO in this matter I wonder whether you would like to sign the attached letter to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

A.J.C.

1 November 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

2



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Director.

A. J. C. $\frac{1}{12}$

1 November 1983

Dear John,

mf

Montserrat

Thank you for your letter of 31 October asking for background to our refusal to agree that members of the Montserrat Defence Force should be sent to Grenada.

The main reason for this decision, which was in line with advice from the Governor in Montserrat, was that it would be inconsistent for the forces of a dependent territory (for whose external affairs we are responsible) to take part in an operation in which the United Kingdom were not participating. In addition, it would, in the view of FCO Legal Advisers, be very doubtful in law whether the Montserrat Defence Force may properly operate outside Montserrat's frontier. The Governor thought that the Chief Minister would not object to a negative reply: it might get him off the hook with his OECS colleagues. The Governor also said that in his opinion the Montserrat Defence Force was neither sufficiently trained nor equipped to take part in peace-keeping operations.

The Montserrat Government appears to have accepted the decision. There has been no reaction to it. The Governor suspects that the request was probably made mainly to demonstrate regional solidarity.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Grenada : Internal Situation. #2

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENCE

HEAD OFFICE



1 NOV 1988



11/11/88

SECRET

10



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 November 1983

Prime Minister

This is probably the best account we shall get of what happened in Washington. It is worth reading in full as an aid to our judgement on U.S.

Dear John,

Grenada

behaviour.

A.S.C. 1/4.

I enclose a copy of a personal letter to John Ure from Robin Renwick, the Head of Chancery in HM Embassy, Washington, together with copies of its enclosures. As you will see, Renwick's letter makes two crucial points: that the Americans acknowledge that a message should have been sent to the Prime Minister on Sunday evening, 23 October; and that the Beirut bomb crucially influenced the handling of Grenada in Washington.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1049</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Letter from Renwick to Ure dated 28 October 1983, with enclosures (under letter Ricketts to Coles dated 1 November 1983)</i>	
CLOSED FOR YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>4 June 2013 Wayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

It is impossible to claim that we cannot have the dual key without buying the lot simply because we bought the lot last time. Have we asked the United States for that? If so, what was the response? Let us have the details and the text. The public seem to understand this pretty well, with their 73 per cent. It is impossible to claim that you cannot see the difference, as Mr. Heseltine claimed yesterday, between a United States owned and commanded missile launched from British soil and a United States owned and commanded missile launched from a submerged submarine whose last port of call was a British one.

As to the future of Grenada, we hear that the new council to be appointed by Sir Paul Scoon is to be advisory. We take it that this means advisory to him. Under what powers will he, single-handed, be governing the country? In general, it is urgent to help the United States off the island. There have been stories about 400 vanishing Cubans. There were supposed to be between 200 and 400 Cubans who had gone to ground in the woods. They were written off when the Senate said that it was going to visit. They are no longer there. There is the question of the Cuban wounded being held up for five days before being shipped back to Cuba. We should do all what we can to help the Red Cross get to Grenada quickly. There was Admiral Metcalf's statement, reported only this morning, that

"We found a field full of bodies . . . No one wants to handle them. They are getting kinda hot".

If the United States' invading forces are not up to burying the dead, that is another reason for hurrying in the Red Cross.

We must help the United States off the diplomatic hook. Mrs. Kirkpatrick has said that

"any continued political involvement in this co-operative effort will be guided wholly by the views of the OECS and the Government being formed in Grenada."

I do not think that we should accept that. I do not think that the world should accept that it should be guided wholly by the views of some members of an association of nearby mini-island states and of non-elected persons chosen by Sir Paul Scoon to advise him.

On a wider scale, we support what we gather is the growing movement for a Commonwealth force. We must have this Commonwealth force to pacify what might be a running fear in the Commonwealth itself that an open season has been declared for landing on small Commonwealth islands whose Governments are unpopular. What about the Seychelles? I hope that Sir Sonny Ramphal will be able to pull the rabbit out of the hat in a way that will satisfy the entire Commonwealth. I commend to the Government the proposals made by my right honourable friend Dr. David Owen in an article last week.

We come back in the end to the European policy within NATO. Everything that has happened indicates that we should tackle this now and not wait until we are forced to rush in and do something in hot confusion, as we risk being if we allow things to go too long.

I have just been handed a note to the effect that two companies of United States marines have landed on a Caribbean island 30 miles north of Grenada,

Carriacou, to follow up a report that there were Cubans there. The White House says that this action is to clear away any further opposition and to take control of weapons and other material reportedly stored on the island. Carriacou is, of course, part of the sovereign territory of Grenada. The Government will perhaps take the opportunity to comment on this report when the time comes.

4.37 p.m.

Lord Home of the Hirsel: My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, I am glad that the usual channels were able to arrange this debate. In a situation where the leading members of a Commonwealth Government had been murdered, where the internal political differences in the island of Grenada were inflamed by the presence of foreign mercenaries, and where two countries, Barbados and Jamaica, judged the danger to be so acute in the context of Caribbean security that they were ready to provide troops themselves for an expedition and called on the Americans to restore law and order and sovereignty, then it is of an abnormality and of an enormity which requires that Parliament must take notice. Parliament must learn the many lessons that there are to be learned from the many aspects of the case.

There are only three matters on which I should like to comment today. Your Lordships will be grateful to my noble friend Lady Young for clarifying the constitutional position of the Queen in relation to Grenada and Her Majesty's limited responsibilities in relation to the appointment of a Governor General. Commonwealth leaders would be unanimous in acclaiming the office of the Queen, as Head of the Commonwealth, as giving the Commonwealth an identity and a cohesion that otherwise it would be difficult for it to acquire.

They would testify, too, to the scrupulous care taken by Her Majesty in never allowing in any circumstances her name to be associated with any aspect of the internal politics of any Commonwealth country. We know the constitutional significance of that, but other countries, understandably, cannot follow the niceties of the constitutional arrangements following the transition from Empire to Commonwealth. I hope, therefore, that my noble friend's very clear definition will be given the widest circulation, to stop mischievous persons associating Her Majesty's name in an undesirable way with situations of this kind.

The second matter that must concern Parliament involves the actions of the British Government in relation to the events in Grenada. Those actions were, I understand, in two parts. The first decision was not to send forces from this country to the island unless to the extent that British citizens might require rescue or evacuation. That was strictly correct in terms of both the United Nations Charter and the rules of non-intervention accepted by Commonwealth membership.

No rule can be absolute. It so happened that in the year that I was Prime Minister there was a political revolt against Mr. Nyerere in Tanzania within days of the hand over of power from this country to that Government. Technically, to intervene from this country would have been to flout the United Nations rules. I had to consider the matter and I authorised the

[LORD HOME OF THE HIRSEL.]
despatch of units of the British Army in order to save that situation and to restore the Government of Mr. Nyerere to office. That could of course have been interpreted in the way in which I have described, but I think that it was necessary to take that action because within a short time—indeed, I think, within four days—the whole of the arrangements between ourselves and the transfer of power could have been put at nought and an alien régime would have come to power.

No two cases are alike. The appeals of two responsible Commonwealth countries like Jamaica and Barbados were no doubt weighty considerations in favour of Britain's association with their action and that of the United States when they went into Grenada.

Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, will the noble Lord give way?

Lord Home of the Hirsell: No, my Lords, not for the moment. There is another case to which I will refer to little later, if the noble Lord does not mind, and that is the British troops in the Lebanon. They are not there under any international cover at all; they are simply there because the French, the Italians, ourselves and the United States considered that unless we intervened Lebanon would cease to exist.

One cannot put all these matters—with all respect to the correspondent in the *Observer*—into "a nutshell". Nevertheless, I believe that the Government were right to decide against the intervention of British forces in this case for it would undoubtedly have added to the divisions in the island, the divisions in the Caribbean and the divisions in the Commonwealth. I believe therefore that this part of the Government's action was right.

The next judgment that has to be made is whether, involving—as in fact it did—a breach of the non-intervention clause of the United Nations, the United States were nevertheless justified in taking the action that they did. In the case of the United States there are considerations which are very different from those of which the British Government have to take notice. No Commonwealth consideration or obligation arose. There were substantial Eastern Caribbean countries, members of the Association of Eastern Caribbean States—namely, Jamaica and Barbados—who had appealed to the United States for help. They knew of the stationing of armed Cubans in Grenada. The Americans had experienced the Russian-Cuban duplicity of the 1960s when they tried to place nuclear missiles on the doorstep of the United States. They were aware of course that Castro in relation to Central America, South America and Cuba, had declared and proclaimed his purpose to be revolutionary. What was paramount (and I think with substantial reason) was the Americans' concern as regards the security of the United States and of the Caribbean region.

The odd aspect is that in all the correspondence and talk—and there has been a great deal of it in the past eight days—nobody seems to have appreciated the vital importance of the Caribbean area to the Western world; it is a very important strategic area. In that context there is one piece of information for which I

would be grateful. Did the governor General directly appeal to the American Administration for military help? If he did so, who could speak with more authority than he on behalf of a sovereign state? Who was in a better position to judge the urgency of the danger and therefore to take a decision as to the power necessary and the power available to do the job, and to do it in time? If the answer to my question is, "Yes, the Governor General did directly appeal to the United States", I can still understand the decision not to send troops from Britain but I confess that I would have been very much happier if the Government had decided to support Jamaica, Barbados and the United States in the Council of the United Nations.

There is another and final angle on these matters. For many years the Soviet Union and its "cat's paws"—and by them I mean North Vietnam, Syria and Cuba—have not played by international rules; they have not observed the non-intervention rule. The result is that time and again the democracies have been placed in a stark dilemma. Do they—do we—have to sit and watch while subversion paves the way for political chaos and in the end takeover, or do we intervene and find ourselves condemned by liberal opinion all over the world as aggressors ourselves? Again these matters cannot be confined so easily in "a nutshell".

As I reminded the noble Lord, Lord Hatch, Britain has troops in Lebanon and they are not there under international law. Of course the non-intervention rule of the United Nations Charter is right in an ideal world and we must keep it in the Charter for reasons that will be clear to all of your Lordships. But when a world power like Russia subverts and overbears and does not play to the rules, then sooner or later a potential political victim—remembering that the worm will turn—will have had enough and will resist as, indeed, the Poles have done. Inevitably those countries that have the power—such as the United States and the European countries—will have to face the question whether to intervene and save sovereignty and law and order. The consideration of which they will have to take note as they make those decisions is whether, if they do nothing, democracy will not lose all along the line and the epitaph may well be written of the free world, the two words, "too late".

There has been a failure of communication—the United States has virtually admitted it; and, having admitted it, I hope that we, our allies and friends will come together and make sure that there is a complete understanding, and the machinery of consultation will really work in future. I hope that the *post mortem* now ends and we can get on with that essential job.

Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, knowing the noble Lord, I know that he will not want me to mislead the House. However, will he confirm that when the Tanzanians, the Ugandans and the Kenyans asked for military help it was a request which came from their elected representatives; that it was not in any way thrust upon them but was the response of the British Government to a request from the elected Governments?

Lord Home of the Hirsell: My Lords, of course. The noble Lord underlines my point. We had transferred

sovereignty to Tanzania. The electors had elected a new government. That government was threatened with force from outside. So, on behalf of the British Government, I decided that we had to meet that request, and a perfectly legitimate request it was. Perhaps I can remind the noble Lord—as I have been brought to my feet, again, against my will—that Mr. Nyerere found himself using force in Uganda at a later date.

Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, on our behalf.

4.51 p.m.

Lord Stoddart of Swindon: My Lords, because I am aware of the immense store of knowledge, ability, experience and expertise that resides in your noble House, it is with some trepidation that I rise to make this, my first, speech. However, I have been encouraged and, indeed, reassured by my reception so far, and I greatly appreciate the kindness already shown me by many noble Lords and, indeed, by the ready assistance rendered by officers and staff of this noble House. The welcome that I have received so far augers well for my future contentment and work in your Lordships' House.

It is my hope and belief that experience gained in other fields will prove to be of use and will enable me to contribute to the important proceedings of this House. For example, my past employment in the electricity supply industry and my participation through the trade union movement in the negotiating and joint consultative procedures of that industry may very well be of assistance in future debates on energy and industrial relations. I am also fortunate in being armed with experience gained in another place, where I was proud to serve the interests of the people of Swindon, who were good enough to elect me as their representative over a period of 13 years. It was an honour and a privilege to be their Member of Parliament and I owe them a debt of gratitude for their support over such a significant period of time.

Furthermore, because Swindon is a famous railway town which has successfully grappled with the problems of a declining industry, together with considerable expansion of its area and population, I have had the advantage of seeing how a determined community, through far-sightedness and good planning, can successfully wrestle with adversity and propel itself into a new age and an era of prosperity, as Swindon has done.

My 18 years of service as a member of Reading County Borough Council certainly gave me a good insight into the working of local government and, indeed, to some extent of Whitehall too, although that was a bit more difficult. I hope to put that experience to good use in this noble House, and I may very well find it of particular value during the present Session and the next Session when significant changes affecting local government may very well fall to be considered.

It is, of course, a convention in this place, as it is in another place, that maiden speeches should be non-controversial and as far as possible, bearing in mind the subject of this debate, I shall do my best to observe the convention. That is not to say that one should frown on controversy or shun it, for contro-

versy is the spring of enlightenment and the engine of progressive thought and action.

When I first heard that United States forces had invaded Grenada I was surprised as well as profoundly shocked. There was no reason to believe, in spite of the *coup* against Mr. Bishop's Government and his subsequent murder, that this tiny country with a population about the same size as Swindon, could in any possible sense threaten the safety of the United States of America; nor has any evidence been adduced that United States citizens in Grenada were under any serious threat.

Certainly the *coup* had been universally condemned, even by Cuba, and it was expected that some action would be taken by neighbouring states to show their revulsion and distaste at the situation in Grenada and to persuade by every peaceful means those in power in Grenada to restore democratic government without delay.

But the invasion of a sovereign state was totally unexpected, even by Her Majesty's Government, and I have to say that I welcome the much firmer stance adopted by both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary over the weekend against the invasion of Grenada, and their expressed disapproval of that invasion and disagreement with the reasons given by President Reagan for embarking upon it.

This episode can do nothing but harm—harm to Western democracy, harm to the Western Alliance and harm to the special relationship between this country and the United States. It also legitimises the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and provides a ready-made justification for the Soviets and perhaps others to take over by force countries with governments they do not like, or conceive that those countries may be a threat to their own safety because a number of foreign nationals are working there or perhaps they have accepted military equipment from the United States. The language may be different. We shall hear of Right-wing fascist thugs rather than Left-wing thugs, but the justification for the use of force will be that used by President Reagan.

There is always a danger of being labelled anti-American if one is critical of United States foreign policy. That is certainly not so in my own case, for I like the American people, I admire their dynamism, and some of their democratic rights could be imported to Britain with benefit. I also value the special relationship as I believe that, provided it exists in a real sense and on the basis of equality, it makes a contribution to world peace and retards the possible formation of yet another power *bloc* based on Europe, which would further destabilise an already unstable world.

But the special relationship must rest on a firmer base that was shown to be the case during the hours before the armed invasion of a Commonwealth country. It is simply not good enough for the United States President to telephone the Prime Minister of this country to say what he has in mind and then a couple of hours later, before the Prime Minister has had time to consult her colleagues, ring back to say that he has made a decision regardless of the British view. That is not a special relationship; it is a relationship which reduces our country to the status of

BACK TO MYKISTS INTER ACTION

GRENADA

ADVANCE COPIES

37

HD/EMERGENCY UNIT

HD/NAD
 HD/S AM D
 HD/MCAD
 HD/UND
 HD/PUSD
 HD/DEFENCE DEPT
 HD/NEWS DEPT
 HD/INFO DEPT
 HD/PROTOCOL DEPT
 HD/ECD(E)
 HD/ECD(I)
 HD/CCD
 HD/CONSULAR DEPT
 HD/SOV. DEPT
 HD/ PLANNING STAFF
 HD/RESEARCH DEPT
 /LEGAL ADVISERS (M. Freeland)
 HD/IED

PS (2)
 BS/LADY YOUNG
 PS/MR WHITNEY
 PS/PUS
 SIR J BULLARD
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR URE
 MR CARTLEDGE
 MR HANNAY
 MR ADAMS
 SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE
 CABINET OFFICE
 NO. 10 DOWNING ST
 MOD, RC
 MOD (DI 4)
 RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE
 ADVANCE COPY

GPS 450

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM WASHINGTON 011612Z NOV 83.

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3244 OF 1 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY BRIDGETOWN, PORT OF SPAIN, KINGSTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 1833: GRENADA: CONTACTS WITH THE AMERICANS ABOUT FUTURE STEPS.

1. BURT ASKED MINISTER YESTERDAY EVENING WHETHER WE HAD GOT ANY FURTHER WITH OUT THINKING ABOUT FUTURE STEPS ON GRENADA. THOMAS DREW ON YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, WHICH HAD JUST BEEN RECEIVED, TO PUT BURT IN THE PICTURE.

2. BURT SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD FROM THE US EMBASSY IN BARBADOS THAT THE OECS HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, MEETING YESTERDAY WITH THE JAMAICANS AND BARBADIANS, HAD DECIDED THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO TAKE ON AS MUCH OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PEACEKEEPING AS THEY COULD. HIS OWN VIEW WAS THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO UNDERTAKE IT ALL. BUT ONE THING HAD BEEN OBVIOUS AT THEIR MEETING: THEY WERE RELUCTANT TO SEE HELP BROUGHT IN FROM COUNTRIES


~~IT ALL BUT ONE THING HAD BEEN OBVIOUS AT THEIR MEETING~~
~~THEY WERE RELUCTANT TO SEE HELP BROUGHT IN FROM COUNTRIES~~
WHICH HAD NOT BEEN SYMPATHETIC TO THEIR CONCERNS. THIS APPEARED TO
INCLUDE TRINIDAD AND THE UK. IT MUST ALSO THROW SOME DOUBT
ON HOW THEY WILL REGARD RAMPHAL'S ROLE.

3. BURT NOTED THE PRIME MINISTER'S STRONG VIEW THAT ANY
MULTILATERAL FORCE SHOULD HAVE A PROPERLY CONSTITUTED COMMAND
STRUCTURE AND SHOULD OPERATE WITHIN A FRAMEWORK OF CLEARLY
DEFINED OBJECTIVES AND WITH A CLEAR TIME LIMIT. HE ALSO NOTED
THAT OUR PREFERENCE WOULD PROBABLY BE FOR BRITISH HELP TO TAKE
A PREDOMINANTLY CIVILIAN FORM. HE WILL LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING
HOW OUR THINKING DEVELOPS ON ALL THESE THINGS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

WRIGHT

NNNN

news from PLESSEY



Our ref 609 E 2625

1 November 1983

GRENADA - A STATEMENT FROM PLESSEY

Plessey Airports has temporarily withdrawn the majority of its employees from the construction site of the international airport at Point Salines, Grenada, pending clarification of future policy. Employees have returned to their homes in the UK.

In view of many statements which have been made, some with little basis in fact, about the military potential of the Point Salines airport, the following facts are relevant:

The airport was designed to facilitate the economic development of Grenada, especially with regard to tourism. It would enable direct international flights by wide-bodied jets to Grenada without transfer through other Caribbean countries. It was also designed to satisfy a diversionary airport requirement for other Caribbean countries including Trinidad.

The runway is 9000 feet long by 150 feet wide and is designed to the standards and practices of the International Civil Aviation Organisation. It would enable a Boeing 747 with full load short of 7 passengers to take off for a flight direct to London. Fully comparable runways exist in Antigua, Jamaica, St Lucia, and Barbados, where the runway is 11,000 feet long. Factors governing the length of runways for civilian aircraft relate primarily to payload and range at take-off and local climatic conditions.

The terminal building was designed to accept a peak flow of 350 passengers per hour, corresponding to the arrival of one Boeing 747. Floor space is 8000 square meters against the FAA standard of 10,000 square meters, the lower figure adopted in Grenada being acceptable outside the US. It includes a

duty-free shop, catering facilities, passenger handling facilities, baggage reclaim facilities, flight information systems, full customs facilities, gift shops and boutiques. It is designed to luxurious standards, with landscaped surrounds.

Navigational equipment does not include radar. Prevailing climatic conditions at Grenada allow Visual Flying Rules for most of the year.

A military airbase would require the following facilities, none of which exist at Point Salines:

- parallel taxiway
- arrangements for dispersed parking
- radar
- hardened aircraft shelters for protection against bomb blast
- secure fuel farm (i.e. underground)
- underground weapons storage
- surface-air missile sites or other anti-air defence
- perimeter security
- operational readiness platform with rapid access
- aircraft engineering workshops and major stores
- aircraft arrester gear.

- END -

Issued by Charles Barker Lyons
Technology and Industry Division
30 Farringdon Street
London EC4A 4EA

Further information from Tony Devereux, 01 236 3011 ext 479

GRENADA

ADVANCE COPIES

37

HD/EMERGENCY UNIT

HD/NAD
HD/S AM D
HD/MCAD
HD/UND
HD/FUSD
HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/INFO DEPT
HD/PROTOCOL DEPT
HD/ECD(E)
HD/ECD(I)
HD/CCD
HD/CONSULAR DEPT
HD/SOV. DEPT
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/RESEARCH DEPT
/LEGAL ADVISERS (Mr. Fairland)
HD/EED

PS (2)

BS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE
CABINET OFFICE
NO. 10 DOWNING ST
MOD, RC
MOD (DI 4)
RESIDENT CLERK

RESTRICTED

FM WASHINGTON 011745Z NOVEMBER 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3246 OF 1 NOV

INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN, HAVANA, UKMIS NEW YORK, KINGSTON,
PORT OF SPAIN, NASSAU, MODUK

GRENADA: SITREP

1. STATE DEPARTMENT TELL US THAT US CASUALTIES IN GRENADA
ARE EIGHTEEN DEAD AND EIGHTY FOUR WOUNDED, WITH ONE MISSING.

UN CREDENTIAL

2. THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S FORMAL LETTER TO THE UN SECRETARY
GENERAL (OUR TELNO 3239) IS TO BE CARRIED BY MESSENGER ON A
COMMERCIAL FLIGHT LEAVING BRIDGETOWN AT 4 PM THIS AFTERNOON,
WHICH MEANS THAT IT WILL BE DELIVERED TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR AT
10 PM THIS EVENING (BOTH TIMES LOCAL). THE AMERICANS ARE
LOOKING FOR A BARBADIAN MESSENGER. WE HAVE ASKED THE HIGH
COMMISSION IN BRIDGETOWN (TELECON FRENCH-RICKARD) TO OFFER
HELP IN FINDING A SUITABLE PERSON IF THIS IS REQUIRED.

EVACUATION OF CUBAN DEAD AND WOUNDED

3. AN ICRC CHARTERED DC 8 REMAINS AT BRIDGETOWN, THERE HAVING
BEEN DIFFICULTIES IN LANDING THE 'PLANE AT POINTE SALINES. IF IT
IS UNABLE TO GET INTO GRENADA TOMORROW, THE AMERICANS WILL START
FERRYING CUBAN DEAD AND WOUNDED (NO FIRM FIGURES AVAILABLE
HERE) ON US 'PLANES FROM POINTE SALINES TO BRIDGETOWN.

WRIGHT

HD/EMERGENCY UNIT

140 W.A.D.
HD/NAD

HD/S AM D

HD/MCAD

HD/UND

HD/FUSD

HD/DEFENCE DEPT

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/INFO DEPT

HD/PROTOCOL DEPT

HD/ECD(E)

HD/ECD(I)

HD/CCD

HD/CONSULAR DEPT

HD/SOV. DEPT

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/RESEARCH DEPT

/LEGAL ADVISERS (Mr. Freeland)

HD/EED

PS (2)

BS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR URE

MR CARTLEDGE

MR HANNAY

MR ADAMS

SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE

CABINET OFFICE

NO. 10 DOWNING ST

MOD, RC

MOD (DI 4)

RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

GRS 275

UNCLASSIFIED

FM KINGSTON 011144Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 323 OF 1 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, HAVANA, BARBADOS, PORT OF SPAIN, AND GEORGETOWN.

ADVANCE COPY

ESPIONAGE AND SUBVERSION IN JAMAICA.

1. MR SEAGA ANNOUNCED IN PARLIAMENT THIS EVENING (1 NOVEMBER) SOVIET SUBVERSION OF A JUNIOR JAMAICAN PROTOCOL OFFICER, AND A PLOT, IN WHICH OFFICERS IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY AND IBANEZ, A CUBAN IN THE PRENSA LATINA OFFICE HERE WERE INVOLVED, TO KILL A SENIOR WOMAN PROTOCOL OFFICER WHO HAD BECOME SUSPICIOUS OF WHAT WAS GOING ON. THE JUNIOR OFFICER JOSEPH BURY, HAS BEEN SUMMARILY DISMISSED. FOUR SOVIET DIPLOMATS (ANDRIANOV, BONDAREV, MALOV AND NIKIFOROV) ALL OF WHOM HE CLAIMED ON SECURITY INFORMATION TO BE KGB OFFICERS, HAVE BEEN GIVEN 72 HOURS TO LEAVE. MUSIN, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, HAS BEEN TOLD TO REDUCE THE SIZE OF HIS EMBASSY TO MORE APPROPRIATE LEVELS. IBANEZ HAS BEEN DECLARED PNC. NO MORE WORK PERMITS WILL BE GIVEN FOR THE PRENSA LATINA OPERATION.

2. SEAGA THEN GAVE THE NAMES OF 25 PEOPLE WHOM SECURITY

~~GIVEN FOR THE PRENSA LATINA OPERATION.~~

2. ~~SEAGA THEN GAVE THE NAMES OF 25 PEOPLE WHOM SECURITY~~
INFORMATION HAD SHOWN TO HAVE HAD NOTABLY REQUENT CONTACTS WITH
CUBA, USSR AND GRENADA OVER PAST MONTHS. 20 OF THESE WERE PNP
MEMBERS, INCLUDING PAST MINISTERS (E.G. DUDLEY THOMPSON, HUGH
SMALL) AND THE PRESENT GENERAL SECRETARY (ROBERTSON).
FIVE WERE WPJ, INCLUDING TREVOR MUNROE. QE WENT ON TO LINK THESE
EVENTS WITH CUBAN PLANS TO TURN GRENADA INTO A MILITARY BASE.
HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTIONS ONLY YESTERDAY FROM CUBA TO
THE WPJ TO "STEP UP ACTION" IN JAMAICA. PREVIOUSLY THE WPJ
HAD STARTED RECRUITING MEN TO FIGHT IN GRENADA FOR THE AUSTIN
REGIME, EVEN AFTER JDF SOLDIERS WERE THERE. THIS WAS SUBVERSION AND
TREACHERY, AGAINST WHICH JAMAICA SHOULD BE AWARE. HE CLOSED WITH
A WARNING TO SABOTEURS AND ASKED THE PNP WHERE IT WAS GOING.
WHO WOULD CONTROL JAMAICA IF THE ELECTORATE BROUGHT THEM BACK
AGAIN.

3. SEE MIFT.

SMALLMAN

NNNN

V

GR 450

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 012300Z NOV 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3252 OF 1 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY BIS NEW YORK, BRIDGETOWN, ALL OTHER US POSTS.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 3220: GRENADA - U.S. MEDIA COVERAGE

1. FOCUS IN THE NEWS TODAY IS ON WHAT EVIDENCE THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION CAN NOW PRODUCE TO BACK UP THE ALLEGATIONS OF CUBAN/RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN GRENADA. THE PRIME MINISTER'S COMMENTS ON THE BBC WORLD SERVICE AT THE WEEKEND, PARTICULARLY THE POINT "WHEN THINGS HAPPEN IN OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH WE DON'T LIKE, WE DON'T JUST MARCH IN - WE TRY PERSUASION" ARE WIDELY REPORTED IN THE U.S. MEDIA.

2. EDITORIAL OPINION ABOUT THE WISDOM OF U.S. ACTION IN GRENADA REMAINS DIVIDED, WITH CONSERVATIVE COLUMNISTS BROADLY SUPPORTING U.S. ACTION AND LIBERAL OPINION AGAINST. THE INFLUENTIAL COLUMNIST JOE KRAFT, ARGUES THAT THE LONG TERM COSTS OF MILITARY ACTION IN GRENADA WILL OUTWEIGH THE SHORT TERM BENEFITS. IT WILL HAVE GIVEN THE SOVIETS A PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE AND PUT THE PEACE MOVEMENTS "BACK IN BUSINESS". KRAFT CONCLUDES THAT THE REMOVAL OF A "STRATEGIC NUISANCE" IN THE CARIBBEAN HAS COST THE UNITED STATES A WEAKENING OF ITS POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND EUROPE AT A TIME OF GROWING TENSION WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

3. THE ABSENCE OF PROPER CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES ON GRENADA RAISES THE PROFILE OF TODAY'S REPORTING IN THE U.S. PRESS ON THE EMERGENCY DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT ON INF DEPLOYMENT YESTERDAY (NEW YORK TIMES HEADLINE "GRENADA HAUNTS BRITISH PARLIAMENT MISSILE DEBATE"). REGISTERING THE FACT THAT THE GOVERNMENT WON THE VOTE BY A COMFORTABLE MAJORITY, PETER OSNOS IN THE WASHINGTON POST CONCLUDES THAT MRS THATCHER "HAS REAFFIRMED HER COMMITMENT TO THE BASIC BRITISH-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP, WHICH THE ARRIVAL OF CRUISE MISSILES SYMBOLISES, WHILE DEMONSTRATING THAT SHE IS PREPARED TO CRITICIZE THE UNITED STATES WHEN SHE BELIEVES IT IS WARRANTED".

4. THE COMPARISON BETWEEN U.S. SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN DURING THE FALKLANDS CRISES AND OUR POSITION OVER GRENADA CONTINUES TO BE MADE. THE EXCLUSION OF THE PRESS FROM THE INITIAL COVERAGE OF THE MILITARY OPERATION IN GRENADA REMAINS AN ISSUE.

5. THE PRESS ALSO REPORT CIVILIAN CASUALTIES CAUSED BY THE BOMBING OF THE MENTAL HOSPITAL NEAR FORT FREDERICK AND THE FACT THAT A NUMBER OF US CASUALTIES WERE CAUSED BY 'FRIENDLY FIRE'.

WRIGHT

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED
EMERGENCY UNIT
NAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
PUSD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
INFO D
PROTOCOL D
ECD'S
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD
CONS D
SOV D
EED
MAED
WED

RES D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:
SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

MOD (DI 4)
MRANNING LACPDIODA

GRS 230

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 020003Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3255 OF 1 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE GRENADA PRIORITY BRIDGETOWN, KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN,
NASSAU, HAVANA, MOSCOW, TRIPOLI, UKMIS NEW YORK.

GRENADA: DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

1. STATE DEPARTMENT TOLD US TODAY THAT AT 1300 HOURS (LOCAL) THE GOVERNOR GENERAL HAD DELIVERED A NOTE TO THE SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES BREAKING OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND GIVING 24 HOURS NOTICE TO LEAVE. A SIMILAR NOTE WAS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE LIBYAN MISSION. THE AMERICANS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD ARRANGED TO CALL ON THE GOVERNOR GENERAL DURING THE AFTERNOON, PRESUMABLY TO PROTEST AND/OR TO ASK FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE DEADLINE.
2. STATE DEPARTMENT VOLUNTEERED THAT THESE STEPS HAD BEEN TAKEN SOLELY ON THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S INITIATIVE. THEY ALSO TOLD US THAT THE SOVIET AND CUBAN AMBASSADORS HAD BEEN FULFILLING THEIR DUTIES WITH EXCESSIVE ZEAL IN RECENT DAYS. AS A RESULT GILLESPIE HAD BEEN AUTHORISED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO RESTRICT THE MOVEMENTS OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR (AND NO DOUBT ALSO HIS CUBAN COUNTERPART) IN THE INTERESTS OF PERSONAL SAFETY. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD ACCORDINGLY BEEN CONFRONTED THIS MORNING BY AN ARMED GUARD ON HIS DOORSTEP AND HAD PROTESTED VEHEMENTLY. HE HAD INTENDED TO RAISE THE MATTER WITH THE GOVERNOR GENERAL (WHO HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED BY THE AMERICANS BEFORE THE RESTRICTIONS WERE IMPOSED) BUT THIS HAD BEEN OVERTAKEN BY THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S NOTE.
3. THE AMERICANS HAVE ASKED THAT THESE DEVELOPMENTS BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL AT PRESENT (BUT IT WOULD BE SURPRISING IF THEY REMAIN SO FOR LONG HERE).

WRIGHT

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED
EMERGENCY UNIT

NAD

S AM D

MCAD

UND

PUSD

DEFENCE D

NEWS D

INFO D

PROTOCOL D

ECD'S

PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

COD

CONS D

SOV D

EED

MAED

WED

RES D

LEGAL ADVS

PLANNING STAFF

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR URE

MR CARTLEDGE

MR HANNAY

MR ADAMS

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

SIR P MOORE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE

MOD (DI 4)

MR ANNING LACPA/ODA

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 300S

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL UK COMMS ONLY

FM CARACAS 011900Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 389 OF 1 NOVEMBER 1983

AND TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO ROUTINE OTTAWA, HAVANA, MOSCOW, BRIDGETOWN, BELMOPAN,
PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, NASSAU, MODUK
(FOR DI4E3)

MY TELNO 383: GRENADA/VENEZUELA

1. THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE ON 31 OCTOBER STATING THAT THE PRESENCE OF CONTINENTAL AND EXTRA-CONTINENTAL PEACE KEEPING FORCE IN AN INDEPENDENT AMERICAN STATE WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO VENEZUELA. FULL TEXT IN MIFT.

2. THE PREAMBLE SUGGESTS THAT THE PRINCIPAL VENEZUELAN OBJECTION IS TO A COMMONWEALTH PEACE KEEPING FORCE AND HINTS THAT THESE OBJECTIONS RELATE TO THE INVOLVEMENT OF BRITAIN (PRESUMABLY BECAUSE OF THE FALKLANDS) AND THE FACT THAT THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL IS GUYANESE. IT CONTRADICTS THE IMPRESSION GIVEN TO ME PERSONALLY ON 28 OCTOBER BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER (WHO MAY WELL HAVE BEEN OVER-RULED)

3. THE US EMBASSY HAD NO FOREWARNING THAT THE COMMUNIQUE WOULD ISSUE. THEY ARE ALSO CONCERNED BY APPARENT INCONSISTENCIES AND THE SUGGESTION THAT ANY PEACE FORCE MUST BE UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THIS IS NOT IN LINE WITH THE DISCUSSIONS THEY HAVE HAD WITH THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT AND THEY ARE SEEKING INSTRUCTIONS.

CARLESS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED
EMERGENCY UNIT

NAD

S AM D

MCAD

UND

PUSD

DEFENCE D

NEWS D

INFO D

PROTOCOL D

ECD'S

PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD

CONS D

SOV D

EED

MAED

WED

RES D

LEGAL ADVS

PLANNING STAFF

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR URE

MR CARTLEDGE

MR HANNAY

MR ADAMS

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

SIR P MOORE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE

MR ANNING, LACPD, ODA

MOD (DI 4)

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 November 1983

Dear John,

Grenada

Type letter pl.

WJY
/u.

Thank you for your letter of 26 October about Mr Oswald Gibbs. We see no objection to an FCO official seeing Mr Gibbs, at the latter's request. Without a direct request, however, there is a problem. Mr Gibbs, as you know, is a Grenadian ex-High Commissioner. If the FCO called him in, it might be interpreted in the present anomalous state of Grenadian politics as affecting the status of the Grenadian High Commission.

I therefore enclose a draft letter for your signature making it clear that Mr Gibbs would be very welcome to visit the FCO should he ask to do so.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Grenada Int Sit Pt 2

Office of the Registrar General

St. George's, Grenada



DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Private Secretary
No 10

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Mr John Garrett
44 Aylmer Road
Hampstead Garden Suburb
LONDON N2

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

The Prime Minister has asked me to

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your letter of 24 October. Mr Gibbs is, of course, very welcome to meet an FCO official should he so wish. I wonder if he would like to telephone Mr John Edwards, the Head of West Indian and Atlantic Department at the FCO, in order to arrange a mutually convenient time. Mr Edwards has been closely involved with the FCO's work on the recent events in Grenada.

ASL 2/11

Enclosures—flag(s).....

CONFIDENTIAL

175



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 November 1983

Grenada

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the Commonwealth Secretary General setting out his views on a Commonwealth "interim security presence" in Grenada.

I should be grateful for advice and a draft reply.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Janet Lewis-Jones (Lord President's Office), Henry Steel (Law Officers' Department), John Kerr (HM Treasury) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,

CONFIDENTIAL

MR

SECRET

GRENADA - ANNOTATED CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1974

7 February

Grenada achieves independence as a Westminster-style Parliamentary democracy. Prime Minister Sir Eric Gairy.

1979

13 March

Successful coup by the New Jewel Movement in the absence in New York of Prime Minister Gairy.

People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) led by Maurice Bishop suspends the Constitution and governs through 'People's Laws'.

1983

Thursday,
13 October

Bishop ousted by hard line elements in a coup led by his deputy Bernard Coard.

Tuesday,
18 October

Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) constituted under Chairmanship of General Hudson Austin. RMC announces that lives and property of all foreign nationals would be protected.

A Wednesday,
19 October

Bridgetown
Telno 304

Bishop and some of his close supporters killed. 24-hour curfew declared to last until 24 October.

/Thursday, 20 October

SECRET

B Thursday, 20 October Bridgetown Telno 308 General Hudson Austin calls on Governor-General to inform him that Revolutionary Military Council is in control, with himself as Chairman, and that he intends to announce composition of broadly based cabinet in three days. (Subsequently extended to two weeks.)

C Port of Spain Telno 170 Trinidad introduces sanctions. A number of regional governments including Cuba, as well as Commonwealth Secretary-General, express horror at killing of Bishop.

D FCO Telno 283 to Bridgetown Grenadian High Commissioner in London called to the FCO to be told of HMG's concern for the safety of the British Community.

E Friday, 21 October Bridgetown Telno 320 PM Adams tells High Commission in Barbados that Prime Ministers Seaga and Compton pressing CARICOM Heads of

E² FCO Tel No 1752 Washington Embassy asked to speak to US at appropriately senior level passing on our concerns about Adams' ideas.

F ~~Kingston~~ Prime Minister Seaga announces that Jamaica would break off diplomatic relations with Grenada and ban trade. Telno 291

G Washington Telno 3064 US assures us UK would be warned if the Americans decided to consider active response to any approach from Caribbean leaders.

H Washington Telno 3070 US say that one US citizen may have been detained during 18 October demonstration. But no sign of anti-

/American threat

American threat and nothing to suggest evacuation required.

OECS Heads of Government meeting convenes in Bridgetown to discuss Grenada.

I	Montserrat Telno 196	Chief Minister informs Governor that OECS Heads of Government have resolved unanimously to send united military force to Grenada.
J	Washington Telno 3074	United States divert to Caribbean carrier group led by USS Independence and including assault ship with 1900 Marines.
K	Saturday, 22 October Port of Spain Telno 174	CARICOM Heads of Government meeting convenes in Port of Spain. Discussion continues most of the night but no consensus achieved.
L	Bridgetown Telno 329	Prime Minister Adams of Barbados tells High Commissioner that OECS Heads of Government decided unanimously to put together a multinational force and to call on other governments including the US, France, Venezuela and the UK to help in restoring peace and order in Grenada. He requests orally but formally that UK should participate. Letters to HMG and other governments would be ready later in the day.
M	Washington Telno 3078	US National Security Council meets and concludes that US should proceed cautiously with Carrier group deployment.
N	Washington Telno 3084	UK informed that US has

made no decision beyond those deployments and would consult before taking any further steps. Americans give assurances that they are willing to help, if necessary, with evacuation of British citizens.

O	Washington Telno 3130	US receives formal request from OECS to intervene in Grenada. (Source Shultz press conference on 25 October)
P	Athens Telno 576	HMS Antrim ordered to take up station close to Grenada.
Q	Bridgetown Telno 336	Grenadian Revolutionary Military Council announces a Cabinet will be appointed within ten to fourteen days.
	Sunday, 23 October	HMS Antrim leaves Cartegena for position off Grenada
R	Port of Spain Telno 175	CARICOM Heads of Government meeting agrees on range of sanctions against Grenada - but no agreement on military action.
S	Bridgetown Telno 337	Prime Minister Adams informs High Commission that he expected leaders of the OECS Group to send formal requests for military support from non-OECS countries following their return to Barbados later in the day.
T	p.m. Washington Telno 3087	US emissary sent to Barbados to confer with Prime Minister Adams and other OECS and Caribbean leaders. British Embassy Washington informed that US have made no decisions on further action.

24 October
(continued)

and other friendly governments of intention to take action under Article 8 of the OECS Treaty for the collective defence and preservation of peace and security against external aggression and requesting assistance from friendly governments.

A2	Washington Telno 3099	US confirm receipt of firm request from OECS and other Caribbean States to help restore peace and order in Grenada. No decision yet on how to respond. Americans say they will ask the Eastern Caribbean Heads of Government to indicate more precisely what they have in mind.
A3	1915 hours	President Reagan informs Prime Minister that he is giving serious consideration to OECS request and undertakes to inform Prime Minister in advance if it is decided that US forces should take part in collective security force.
	2100 hours	HMS Antrim arrives in general area of Grenada.
	2300 hours approx	Second message received at No.10 from President Reagan informing Prime Minister that he has decided to respond positively to OECS request.
	Tuesday, 25 October 0030 hours	Prime Minister's reply despatched to President Reagan.
	0048 hours	Prime Minister telephones President Reagan to say that she has replied to

/his messages

U	FCO Telno 298 to Bridgetown	Following a meeting of Foreign of the Ten in Athens, Greek Presidency expresses European horror at killings. Commission decides to suspend aid payments and cancel EC Mission to Grenada.	
V	Washington Telno 3130	President Reagan makes tentative decision to respond positively to OECS request. (Source: Secretary of State Shultz's Press Conference)	
W	Midnight (local)	Bridgetown Telno 345	PM Adams of Barbados asks British High Commission whether HMG has decided how to respond to the OECS initiative. Emphasises that British contribution to the multi-national force would be of greatest value and suggests SAS operation to ensure Governor-General's safety. High Commissioner asks if request now formalised. Adams promises text by first thing Monday.
	Monday, 24 October 1000 hours		ODEM meets to consider HMG's response to Prime Minister Adams' oral request for British participation in multi- national force.
X	1445 hours	FCO Telno 1759 to Washington	HM Ambassador instructed to inform US authorities that HMG sees no grounds on which military intervention could be justified internationally and Governor- General should not be made focal point of any intervention.
Y	1550 hours		Secretary of State's first statement on Grenada in the House of Commons.
Z		Bridgetown Telno 348	OECS statement handed to British High Commissioner in Barbados informing HMG

/and other

SECRET

25 October
(continued)

his messages and to ask him to consider her replies very carefully indeed. President Reagan undertakes to do so.

0745 hours

Further message to Prime Minister from President Reagan. Weighed very carefully issues raised by Prime Minister. He believes them to be outweighed by other factors.

0940 hours

Multinational forces land in Grenada.

SECRET

GRENADA

ADVANCE COPIES

33 26

IMMEDIATE

[HD/EMERGENCY UNIT]

HD/NAD
HD/S AM D
HD/MCAD
HD/UND
HD/PUSD
HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/INFO DEPT
HD/PROTOCOL DEPT
HD/ECD(E)
HD/ECD(I)
HD/CCD
HD/CONSULAR DEPT
HD/SOV. DEPT
HD/ PLANNING STAFF
HD/RESEARCH DEPT
LEGAL ADVISERS: (Mr. Freeland)

HD EP

ADVANCE COPY

PS (2)
BS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY

SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE
CABINET OFFICE

NO. 10 DOWNING ST

MOD, RC
MCD (DI 4)

RESIDENT CLERK

Typhis

GR450

RESTRICTED

FM MOSCOW 311600Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1235 OF 31 OCT 83

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, HAVANA, BRIDGETOWN, UKMIS NEW YORK,
BELMOPAN, CARACAS, PORT OF SPAIN, KINGSTON, PARIS, GEORGETOWN,
UKDEL NATO, NASSAU AND MODUK.

MOSCOW TELS NOS 1222 AND 1225: GRENADA: SOVIET COMMENT.

1. SOVIET PROPAGANDA HAS CONTINUED LOUD AND AT GREAT LENGTH,
FOR THE MOST PART DEVELOPING THE THEMES REPORTED IN MOSCOW
TURS.
2. WASHINGTON'S ISOLATION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL MADE THE FRONT
PAGE OF PRAVDA WITH THE BRITISH ABSTENTION PARTICULARLY NOTED.
WESTERN AND NON-ALIGNED CRITICISM OF THE US ACTION HAS BEEN
EXTENSIVELY RELAYED. ACCORDING TO TASS, THE PRIME MINISTER'S
DOUBTS ABOUT THE INVASION WERE 'A CASE UNPRECEDENTED IN THE
HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN HER GOVERNMENT AND US ADMINISTRATION'
EXCHANGES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS HAVE BEEN GIVEN CONSIDERABLE
PUBLICITY. US CLAIMS THAT GRENADA WAS BEING TURNED INTO A CUBAN
MILITARY BASE HAVE BEEN DISMISSED. THE PROTRACTED ARMED
RESISTANCE TO US FORCES HAS BEEN PROMINENTLY REPORTED, WITH THE
IMPLICATION THAT IT IS THE GRENADIANS THEMSELVES WHO ARE
RESPONSIBLE.
3. THE PRESS HAVE REACTED SHARPLY TO REAGAN'S TELEVISION ADDRESS
ON THE LEBANON AND GRENADA (WASHINGTON TELS NOS 3181 AND 3182)

~~3. THE PRESS HAVE REACTED SHARPLY TO REAGAN'S TELEVISION ADDRESS ON THE LEBANON AND GRENADA (WASHINGTON TELS NOS 3101 AND 3102)~~ AND HAVE USED IT AS A PEG ON WHICH TO HANG A BROADER ATTACK ON AMERICAN POLICY (THIS IS TIED IN TO A GENERAL RECRUDESCENCE OF ABUSIVE COMMENT ON REAGAN PERSONALLY, ON WHICH I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY). MAJOR COMMENTARIES IN PRAVDA AND IZVESTIA OVER THE WEEKEND HAVE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-

(I) THE ATTACK ON GRENADA IS OF A PIECE WITH AGGRESSIVE US POLICIES ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD ('A DRESS REHEARSAL FOR NICARAGUE'). REAGAN'S LINKAGE OF LEBANON AND GRENADA SHOULD BE SEEN IN THIS CONTEXT.

(II) THE US HAD A CONCEPT OF ITS VITAL INTERESTS WHICH WOULD ALLOW IT TO INTERVENE IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD.

(III) THE INVASION HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN TO ERASE THE NEGATIVE INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH OF US MARINES IN BEIRUT.

(IV) THE US FAILURE TO TAKE INTO ITS CONFIDENCE ITS CLOSED ALLIES CAST DOUBT ON AMERICAN GOOD FAITH ELSEWHERE, EG INF (THE EXCHANGES IN THIS CONTEXT IN THE COMMONS ON US ASSURANCES ON THE CRUISE DUAL KEY HAVE BEEN MENTIONED).

4. MEANWHILE, THE PRESS HAVE PUBLISHED WHAT APPEARS TO BE THE TEXT OF THE SOVIET COMPLAINT TO THE US EMBASSY OF 28 OCTOBER ABOUT AN ALLEGED ATTACK BY AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT ON THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN ST GEORGE'S.

SUTHERLAND

NNNN

GRS 205
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM GEORGETOWN 011826Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 209 OF 1 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY BRIDGETOWN, KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK, NASSAU, BELMOPAN, HAVANA, OTTAWA, MOSCOW, UKDEL
NATO AND MODUK.

GRENADA

1. RUMOURS IN GEORGETOWN THAT EMISSARIES WERE SENT TO GRENADA
THE DAY BEFORE THE INVASION TO WARN THE GRENADIANS OF THE FORTH-
COMING INVASION HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED TO ME BY THE US EMBASSY
HERE. THE US CHARGE SAID THAT IN ADDITION TO WARNING THE GRENADIANS
OF THE FORTHCOMING LANDINGS THEY WERE ALSO CHARGED TO ENQUIRE WHETHER
GUYANA WOULD BE THE NEXT COUNTRY TO BE INVADED. THE US EMBASSY ALSO
SURMISED THAT BURNHAM ARRANGED FOR THE CUBANS TO BE INFORMED AND
THAT THIS WOULD ACCOUNT FOR THE ARRIVAL AT THE LAST MINUTE BEFORE
THE INVASION OF A SENIOR CUBAN MILITARY OFFICER.

2. ONE OF THE THEMES IN PRESIDENT BURNHAM'S STATEMENTS ON GRENADA
HAS BEEN THAT THE US COULD INVADE GUYANA AFTER GRENADA. THE US
EMBASSY HERE THINK, AND I AGREE, THAT THIS IS A SIGN OF THE GROWING
STRAIN HE IS UNDER ON OTHER MATTERS. NEVERTHELESS IN THE LETTERS
HE WROTE TO THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHO VOTED FOR THE
GUYANESE RESOLUTION., HE EXPRESSED HIS FEARS FOR THE SAFETY
OF GUYANA.

KINGSTON PASS BRIDGETOWN, PORT OF SPAIN AND CARACAS
FCO PASS OTHERS

SLATCHER
BT

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED
EMERGENCY UNIT
NAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
PUSD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
INFO D
PROTOCOL D
ECD'S
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD
CONS D
SOV D
EED
MAED
WED
RES D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:
SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE
MOD (DI 4)
MRANNING LACPA/ODA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

28483 - 1

OO WASHINGTON
OO UKMIS NEW YORK
GRS 703
CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 312000Z OCTOBER 83
TO IMMEDIATE ST GEORGES
TELEGRAM NUMBER 18 OF 31 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BRIDGETOWN, UKMIS NEW YORK
PERSONAL FOR MONTGOMERY (OR KELLY IN HIS ABSENCE)
GRENADA: THE FUTURE

1. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOU COULD HAVE A FURTHER DISCUSSION AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY WITH SIR P SCOON IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN AS CLEARLY AS POSSIBLE HOW HE SEES THINGS DEVELOPING IN THE FUTURE.
2. YOU SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WHILE BRITISH MINISTERS HAVE GRENADA'S PROBLEMS VERY MUCH IN THE FOREFRONT OF THEIR MINDS, WE REMAIN CONSCIOUS THAT IT IS NOT FOR US TO OFFER ADVICE TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL. HE WILL NEVERTHELESS UNDERSTAND THAT WE SHOULD BEST BE ABLE INDIRECTLY TO HELP HIM IF HE IS ABLE FOR HIS PART TO KEEP US IN TOUCH THROUGH YOU WITH HIS OWN THINKING, GIVEN THAT HE HAS SHOULDERED RESPONSIBILITY IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS DELEGATED POWERS.
3. IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL TO ME AND MY COLLEAGUES TO KNOW IN WHAT SORT OF TIMESCALE SIR P SCOON SEES DEVELOPMENTS, HOW SOON HE HOPES TO HAVE A GROUP OF SELECTED ADMINISTRATORS IN POSITION, WHEN HE THINKS IT POSSIBLE THAT THERE MIGHT BE A PEACEKEEPING FORCE TO TAKE THE PLACE OF AMERICAN TROOPS AS THE LATTER COMPLETE THE PROCESS OF PACIFICATION, AND EVEN PERHAPS WHAT HE WOULD NOW SEE AS THE MOST REALISTIC TARGET DATE FOR ELECTIONS, TO PUT INTO EFFECT THE RETURN TO STABLE CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY.
4. YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT BRITISH MINISTERS, IN ADDITION TO ACKNOWLEDGING THAT IT IS NOT FOR US TO OFFER HIM ADVICE, ARE ALSO ANXIOUS NOT TO GIVE HIM THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE TRYING TO HASTEN DECISIONS WHICH IT IS RIGHT THAT HE SHOULD TAKE ON THE BASIS OF HIS OWN JUDGEMENT. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING DIRECTLY FROM HIS INTERIM ADMINISTRATIVE TEAM, WHEN

CONFIDENTIAL

28483 - 1

THEY ARE IN PLACE, OF PARTICULAR AREAS IN WHICH THEY MIGHT CONCLUDE THAT WE COULD HELP THEM. WE ARE ANXIOUS TO KEEP CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH THE GOVERNOR GENERAL HIMSELF UNTIL HIS INTERIM ADMINISTRATION IS IN PLACE.

5. IF YOU THINK IT APPROPRIATE YOU COULD ASK THE GOVERNOR GENERAL HOW HE PROPOSES TO DEAL WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. WE HAVE IN MIND HERE THE THOUGHT, WHICH YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO MENTION, THAT THE MATTER OF JUDICIAL ENQUIRY INTO THE KILLINGS OF BISHOP AND HIS COLLEAGUES MAY BE SOMETHING WHICH IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE IF POSSIBLE TO DISPOSE OF WELL AHEAD OF ANY SELECTION OF DATES FOR THE BEGINNING OF AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN. AGAIN, WE SHOULD NOT WISH YOU TO PRESS THE POINT, BUT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO KNOW IF SIR P SCOON HAD SOME FORM OF INDEPENDENT ENQUIRY IN MIND.

6. MINISTERS HAVE BEEN THINKING THAT SOME ADVICE ON POLICE AND INTERNAL SECURITY MIGHT BE A CONTRIBUTION WHICH WE COULD MAKE IN THE RECONSTRUCTION PERIOD. I SHOULD NOT WISH YOU TO REFER SPECIFICALLY TO THIS AT THIS STAGE BUT YOU SHOULD HAVE IT IN MIND IN CASE ANYTHING SIR P SCOON SAYS SUGGESTS THAT WE COULD USEFULLY ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS ADMINISTRATORS ON THIS AS SOON AS THEY ARE IN PLACE.

7. YOU SHOULD MAKE NO COMMITMENT IN RESPONSE TO ANY REQUEST WHICH SIR P SCOON MIGHT MAKE OR IMPLY. BUT I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR A FULL REPORT OF WHATEVER HE FEELS ABLE TO TELL YOU OF HIS VIEWS ON THE WAY AHEAD.

8. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO US TO KNOW WHAT IS THE POSITION OF THE GRENADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER IN LONDON. WE UNDERSTAND THAT SCOON HAS INDICATED THAT POSTS ABROAD ARE TO BE CLOSED SO THAT GRENADIAN REPRESENTATIVES ARE NO LONGER VALID, BUT WE NEED FORMAL NOTIFICATION OF THIS.

9. YOU WILL HAVE RECEIVED A SEPARATE TELEGRAM ABOUT THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN WHO IS IN A SIMILAR POSITION AND NEEDS A LETTER OR SIGNED TELEGRAM ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE GRENADIAN REPRESENTATIVE THERE.

10. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, RUSHFORD, FORMER LEGAL ADVISER IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE, LEAVES LONDON ON 1 NOVEMBER TO TAKE UP THE

2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

28483 - 1

ADVISORY POST WHICH CFTC AND SIR S RAMPHAL HAVE ARRANGED WITH SIR P SCOON (PARA 5 OF BRIDGETOWN TELNO 392, JUST RECEIVED).
11. TO WASHINGTON. YOU SHOULD MAKE NO REFERENCE TO THIS INSTRUCTION IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE AMERICANS, BUT SHOULD BE GUIDED BY IT IN RESPONDING TO THEIR ENQUIRIES ABOUT OUR CONTACTS THROUGH MONTGOMERY WITH SIR P SCOON. YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT WE DO NOT SEE IT AS OUR BUSINESS TO TRY TO INFLUENCE DECISIONS TAKEN BY SIR P SCOON IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS DELEGATED POWERS.

HOWE

GRENADA LIMITED
EMERGENCY UNIT
NAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
PUSD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
INFO D
PROTOCOL D
ECDs
CCD
CONSULAR D
SOV D
EED
MAED
WED

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

SAFD
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT
RESEARCH D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:
SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE
MOD (DI 4)
SIR R ARMSTRONG CABINET
OFFICE
PS | NO 10
PS | S OFS MIN | DEFENCE

3
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

28487 - 2

GRS 537

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F C O 311911Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 323 OF 31 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN, BELMOPAN, NASSAU,
GEORGETOWN.

INFORMATION IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, AND
MONTserrat(PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).

PERSONAL FOR HIGH COMMISSIONER

GRENADA

1. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF HIGH COMMISSIONERS IN CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES WOULD TAKE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY OF SPEAKING TO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT TO CONVEY THE FOLLOWING THOUGHTS FROM ME AND MY COLLEAGUES.
2. WE HAVE ALL BEEN THROUGH A DIFFICULT TIME. OUR OWN VIEWS ARE ON RECORD. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE HAD DIFFERENCES OF POLICY AND PERCEPTION WITH THE AMERICANS AND DIFFICULTIES OVER CONSULTATION, JUST AS THERE HAVE BEEN DIFFERENCES OF PERCEPTION BETWEEN CARICOM COUNTRIES, I AM SURE THAT IT WOULD BE GENERALLY AGREED THAT WE SHOULD ALL NOW BE WORKING TO HELP IN WHATEVER WAY WE CAN WITH THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN GRENADA.
3. WE ARE OF COUSE IN REGULAR TOUCH WITH SIR S RAMPHAL. RAMPHAL FOR HIS PART HAS HAD SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS WITH SIR P SCOON. IT IS OF COURSE NOT FOR BRITISH MINISTERS TO ADVISE SIR P SCOON, BUT WE ARE KEEN TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO HELP FORWARD HIS OWN IDEAS FOR RECONSTRUCTION, AND TO WORK WITH THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION WHICH HE AIMS TO ESTABLISH, WITH RAMPHAL'S ASSISTANCE. WE ARE ALSO ANXIOUS TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS, AND I HOPE THAT COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN WILL UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE WHICH WE CONTINUE TO ATTACH TO THIS. PRACTICAL MODALITIES WILL ALSO OF COURSE HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON.
4. WE CONSIDER THAT THE COMMONWEALTH MAY HAVE A CONSIDERABLE

ROLE TO PLAY IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF NORMAL LIFE IN GRENADA AND WELCOME RAMPHAL'S WORK TO THIS END. WE HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT BECOMING INVOLVED DIRECTLY IN ANY PEACEKEEPING FORCE, THOUGH WE SHALL LOOK SYMPATHETICALLY AT ANY REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE WHICH WE MAY RECEIVE. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT ANY MULTI-NATIONAL OR COMMONWEALTH PEACEKEEPING FORCE WHICH MIGHT BE THOUGHT NECESSARY TO REPLACE FORCES ENGAGED IN THE RECENT INTERVENTION SHOULD BE PROPERLY CONSTITUTED WITH A COMMON STRUCTURE AND CLEARLY DEFINED OBJECTIVES. THERE SHOULD ALSO BE A CLEAR TIME SCALE FOR ITS OPERATION.

5. OUR TENTATIVE PREFERENCE IS FOR OUR OWN CONTRIBUTION TO COVER HELP OF A CIVILIAN FORM WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE ADVICE TO POLICE, INTERNAL SECURITY AND/OR ASSISTANCE WITH THE ORGANISATION OF ELECTIONS. WE ARE LOOKING AT THE POSSIBILITIES.

6. WE SHALL BE GRATEFUL IF CARIBBEAN COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS CAN KEEP US INFORMED AS THEIR OWN VIEWS DEVELOP.

7. (FOR BRIDGETOWN) YOU SHOULD SAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS GLAD TO HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MR ADAMS.

8. FOR ALL ADDRESSEES. YOU SHOULD DRAW ON THESE INSTRUCTIONS AS APPROPRIATE AT YOUR DISCRETION, STRESSING THAT WE WANT TO CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH ALL THE CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY PARTICIPATED IN, SUPPORTED OR OPPOSED THE INTERVENTION IN GRENADA. YOU HAVE AMPLE MATERIAL TO COVER OUR OWN POSITION.

9. (FOR KINGSTON) I HOPE THIS WILL MEET YOUR RECOMMENDATION THAT THERE SHOULD BE A MESSAGE TO MR SEAGA. YOU MAY EXPECT THAT HIS LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER WILL RECIEVE A SEPARATE REPLY.

HOWE

NNNN

DIST

LIMITED

HD/WIAD

HD/NAD

HD/DEF D

HD/PLANNINGS

HD/UND

HD/NEWS DEPT

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

MR URE

COPIES TO

MR FREELAND, LEGAL ADVISER

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST

PS/SOFS DEFENCE

SIR P MORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE

SIR R ARMSTRONG, CABINET OFFICE

BACK TOURIST AREA ACTION

GRENADA

ADVANCE COPIES

39 36 IMMEDIATE

[HD/EMERGENCY UNIT]

HD/NAD
HD/S AM D
HD/MCAD
HD/UND
HD/FUSD
HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/INFO DEPT
HD/PROTOCOL DEPT
HD/ECD(E)
HD/ECD(I)
HD/CCD
HD/CONSULAR DEPT
HD/BOV. DEPT
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/RESEARCH DEPT
LEGAL ADVISERS (Mr. Freedland)

HD SP

ADVANCE COPY

PS (2)

BS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY



SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE
CABINET OFFICE
NO. 10 DOWNING ST
MOD, RC
MOD (DI 4)
RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPY

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

FROM WASHINGTON 311715Z OCT 83.

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3231 OF 31 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN, KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN, NASSAU,
MODUK, HAVANA.

TELECON FRENCH/MISS RYCROFT:-

GRENADA SITREP.

- STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE LEARNED FROM GILLESPIE (WHO HAS NOW ESTABLISHED A US OFFICE AT THE ROSS POINT INN) THAT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL WILL MAKE PROCLAMATIONS TODAY:
 - RECALLING ALL GRENADAN DIPLOMATS ACCREDITED OVERSEAS:
 - REQUIRING MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY TO HAND IN THEIR ARMS. FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD RESULT IN ARREST:
 - ASKING THE OECS FORCE TO REINSTITUTE THE 190 MAN POLICE FORCE LARGELY DISBANDED BY BISHOP.
- US MARINES ARE TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM GRENADA TODAY AND WILL GO ON TO BEIRUT TO REPLACE MEN THERE. THE 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION WILL REMAIN. US FORCES ARE TODAY REPORTED TO HAVE SECURED GOUYNARE, VICTORIA, AND SAUTERS BAY. FURTHER OPERATIONS ON CARIACOU ARE PLANNED.
- US AIR AND SEA RECONNAISSANCE OF UNION AND PRUNE ISLANDS CONTINUES, BUT THERE IS SO FAR NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT EARLIER REPORTS ABOUT CUBAN MILITARY ACTIVITY THERE.

~~CONTINUES, BUT THERE IS SO FAR NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT EARLIER
REPORTS ABOUT CUBAN MILITARY ACTIVITY THERE.~~

4. IN ADDITION TO THE TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS WORTH OF FOODSTUFFS DISTRIBUTED ON 29 OCTOBER, A FURTHER TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS WORTH OF FOODSTUFFS HAS BEEN EARMARKED BY THE AMERICANS. TOTAL US FOODSTUFFS DELIVERED SO FAR AMOUNTS TO 5-6 TONS. THE AMERICANS ESTIMATE A DISPLACED PERSONS POPULATION BETWEEN NINE AND TWELVE HUNDRED PERSONS, MOST OF WHOⁿ APPEAR TO BE RETURNING TO THEIR HOMES. HOWEVER IN THE POINT SALINES VICINITY, ABOUT FIFTY HOMES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED.

5. WE UNDERSTAND FROM BRIDGETOWN (TELECON FRENCH/RICKERD) THAT UP TO TWENTY UK CITIZENS STILL WANT TO LEAVE GRENADA. STATE DEPARTMENT TELL US THAT ANY FURTHER EVACUATION OF UK CITIZENS WOULD BE TO BARBADOS AND NOT TO CHARLESTON.

6. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HAVE BEEN ASKED TO INVESTIGATE THE BOMBING OF A MENTAL HOSPITAL NEAR FORT FREDERICK, WHERE THE CUBANS HAD ESTABLISHED AN ARTILLERY POINT, IN WHICH A CANADIAN MAGAZINE HAS CLAIMED THAT SOME 47 INMATES PERISHED. PRESENT INDICATIONS HERE ARE THAT THERE WAS SUCH AN ATTACK BUT THAT THE FIGURE OF 47 IS MUCH TOO HIGH.

7. MANY COMMENTATORS HAVE SCALED DOWN THE ESTIMATES OF THE SIZE OF THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN GRENADA, THE AMERICANS ARE STILL UNCERTAIN AS TO WHETHER THERE WERE MORE THAN 800 CUBANS ON THE ISLAND AND, THEREFORE, HOW MANY HOLDOUTS THERE MAY BE.

8. WE UNDERSTAND THAT US FORCES ARE CONSTRUCTING TAXIING SPACE AT POINT SALINES AIRPORT TO HANDLE THE LARGE VOLUME OF AIR TRAFFIC.

WRIGHT

NNNN

GRENADA

ADVANCE COPIES

BACK TO TYPISTS ACTION

[HD/EMERGENCY UNIT]

- HD/NAD
- HD/S.A.M. D
- HD/MCAD
- HD/UND
- HD/FUSD
- HD/DEFENCE DEPT
- HD/NEWS DEPT
- HD/INFO DEPT
- HD/PROTOCOL DEPT
- HD/ECD(E)
- HD/ECD(I)
- HD/CCD
- HD/CONSULAR DEPT
- HD/GOV. DEPT
- HD/PLANNING STAFF
- HD/RESEARCH DEPT
- LEGAL ADVISERS (Mr. Freeland)

HO SP

ADVANCE COPY

- PS (2)
- BS/LADY YOUNG
- PS/MR WHITNEY
- PS/PUS
- SIR J BULLARD
- MR GIFFARD
- MR WRIGHT
- MR URE
- MR CARTLEDGE
- MR HANNAY

SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE

CABINET OFFICE

NO. 10 DOWNING ST

MOD, RC
MOD (DI 4)

RESIDENT CLERK

ELASW

ADVANCE COPY

GRS 620

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRIDGETOWN 311546Z OCT 83

TO F L A S H FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 392 OF 31 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND ST GEORGES

GRENADA

FOLLOWING FROM MONTGOMERY

1. ACCOMPANIED BY KELLY, I CALLED ON GOVERNOR GENERAL YESTERDAY, 30 OCTOBER. AS WE ARRIVED AT GOVERNMENT HOUSE, GENERAL VESSEY, CHAIRMAN US JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, GILLESPIE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, STATE DEPARTMENT - NOW US CHARGE D'AFFAIRS, GRENADA AND OTHERS WERE BEING USHERED IN TO SEE THE GO. SIR PAUL TOLD ME LATER THAT HE HAD ALREADY RECEIVED VISITS FROM PH'S ADAMS (BARBADOS) AND SEAGA (JAMAICA) IN THE PREVIOUS 24 HOURS, AS WELL AS DIRECTOR GENERAL OECS. HE HAD ALSO SPOKEN TO SIR P MOORE (PALACE) AND SIR S RAMPHAL BY PHONE - ALL OF WHICH ILLUSTRATES THE DRAMATIC CHANGE THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN HIS LIFESTYLE AS A RESULT OF THE EVENTS OF THE PAST THREE WEEKS IN GRENADA.
2. I FIRST PASSED ON THE MESSAGES CONTAINED IN FCO TELNOS 10 AND 11 TO GRENADA. WE THEN DISCUSSED THE IMMEDIATE STEPS HE NEEDS TO TAKE TO FILL THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATIVE POWER VACUUM IN GRENADA. AS ENVISAGED IN HIS RADIO BROADCAST ON 29 OCTOBER, HE HAS STARTED TO GET A GRIP ON THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT IN GRENADA.

Passage deleted and closed, 40 years, under
FOI Exemption. @Wayland, 4 June 2013

HE IS ALREADY

ENGAGED IN CONSULTATIONS WITH A NUMBER OF PEOPLE ABOUT THEIR SERVING ON THE ADVISORY COUNCIL. AS PART OF THAT CONSULTATIVE PROCESS HE HAS MEETINGS ARRANGED WITH THE GRENADIAN CHURCH COUNCIL

~~AT 1100 HOURS AND WITH THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AT 1400 HOURS~~
~~TOMORROW, (1 NOVEMBER).~~

3. IN HIS BROADCAST ON 29 OCTOBER SIR PAUL CALLED ON MEMBERS OF THE FORMER PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (PRA) AND PEOPLE'S MILITIA TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE DISBANDMENT OF THESE TWO BODIES. TO FACILITATE THEIR DISBANDMENT AND THE COLLECTION OF ARMS, HE PROPOSES TO DECLARE A STATE OF EMERGENCY TOMORROW INTER ALIA TO GIVE POWERS TO THE CARIBBEAN MULTINATIONAL CONTINGENT OF THE FORCE NOW IN GRENADA. AFTER THE PROCLAMATION OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY HE WILL ASK COLONEL BARNES NO 2 (JAMAICAN DEFENCE FORCE) AND CARIBBEAN CONTINGENT COMMANDER TO PURSUE THE QUESTION OF CALLING IN ARMS FROM THE FORMER PRA AND PEOPLES MILITIA. GOVERNOR GENERAL WHO HAS PRESUMABLY DISCUSSED ALL THIS WITH BARNES, INDICATED THAT A TIME LIMIT WILL BE IMPOSED. WHEN IT EXPIRES, THOSE WHO HAVE NOT REPORTED AND HANDED OVER THEIR ARMS WILL BE POSTED AS DESERTERS.

4. ONE OF SIR PAUL'S MOST URGENT PROBLEMS IS THE AVAILABILITY OF PUBLIC FUNDS. HE HAS APPOINTED LAURISTON WILSON JUNIOR, FORMERLY PERMANENT SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER UNDER GAIRY AND BISHOP, TO RUN THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND SUPERVISE THE BANKING SECTOR TEMPORARILY. WILSON'S IMMEDIATE TASK IS TO FIND EC DOLLARS 2.5 MILLION WHICH IS NEEDED TO PAY CIVIL SERVANTS TODAY. GG TOLD ME THAT HE HAS ALREADY DISCOVERED THAT THE PRA USED SOME HALF A MILLION EC DOLLARS EVERY MONTH.

5. OTHER MEASURES THE GG HAS SET IN TRAIN INCLUDE :

(A) REQUESTING THE SERVICES OF FORMER FCO LEGAL ADVISER A RUSHFORD, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE CFTC. RUSHFORD AND TWO EXPERTS IN OTHER FIELDS WHOM GG HAS ALSO INVITED ARE EXPECTED TO ARRIVE IN GRENADA LATER THIS WEEK.

(B) APPOINTMENT OF THE FORMER SUPERINTENDENT OF PRISONS, P MCLEISH, TO BE ACTING COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, HE WILL CONTINUE TO BE SUPERINTENDENT OF PRISONS. BUT THE GG KNOWS THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF A SUBSTANTIVE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE OF THE RIGHT CALIBRE IS A MATTER OF URGENCY.

(C) REQUESTS TO CERTAIN FORMER PERMANENT SECRETARIES OF MINISTRIES TO REMAIN AT THEIR POSTS. THESE INCLUDE J EMMANUEL, PERMANENT SECRETARY, MFA UNDER THE PRG REGIME. EMMANUEL RETURNED TO GRENADA TO TAKE UP THE POST OF PERMANENT SECRETARY MFA, ABOUT TWELVE MONTHS AGO, AFTER HAVING BEEN HIGH COMMISSIONER TO OTTAWA. BOTH THESE APPOINTMENTS WERE ATTRIBUTABLE TO EMMANUEL'S PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP WITH BISHOP RATHER THAN TO HIS POLITICAL LEANINGS. EMMANUEL, WHO BECAUSE OF HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH BISHOP MUST BE CONSIDERED FORTUNATE TO BE ALIVE, ALWAYS LOOKED UNCOMFORTABLE IN HIS ROLE AT THE MFA. URE (AUSS) CALLED ON EMMANUEL WHEN HE VISITED GRENADA IN JANUARY OF THIS YEAR. A NUMBER OF PERMANENT SECRETARIES WERE WAITING TO BE RECEIVED BY THE GOVERNOR GENERAL AS KELLY AND I TOOK OUR LEAVE.

FCO PLEASE REPEAT TO OTTAWA HAVNANC// HAVANA MOSCOW UKMIS NEW YORK BELMOPAN CARACAS. PORT OF SPAIN KINGSTON PARIS GEROGETOWN UKDEL NATO NASSAU AND MODUK
FCO ALSO TO PASS TO WASHINGTON AND GRENADA PLEASE .

BULLARD

MR. INGHAM

c.c. Mr. Coles *WZ* / 10

1. The Prime Minister spoke to Mr. Charles Douglas-Home on the telephone shortly after 9 a.m. on Saturday, 29 October.
2. Mr. Douglas-Home expressed concern about "pervasive anti-American feeling" following events in Grenada. He thought the BBC had been "terrible about it". The Prime Minister said that in her view anti-Americanism was now not as bad as it had been a few days ago. The 9 p.m. and 10 p.m. television news on Friday had been more balanced, and the message that the underlying purpose of the American action was to eject the Cubans was beginning to come across. Radio interviews with Grenadians had also been favourable to the Americans. The thing that counted above all with public opinion was success.
3. Mr. Douglas-Home said that he presumed Britain would be prepared to contribute to a Commonwealth Force. The Prime Minister remarked that Britain had 1100 troops in Belize - they had been there some considerable time, but no one had offered to help. British forces were also committed in Sinai, Lebanon, Diego Garcia and Cyprus. To a very significant extent the disposition of our forces was being determined by another country's foreign policy.
4. Mr. Douglas-Home feared that Anti-Americanism engendered by Grenada would feed through to the debate on Cruise missiles. The Prime Minister said that there was no real parallel - unlike with Cruise, the US had not been under any obligation to obtain our agreement before invading Grenada. Nevertheless, she thought it likely that Dr. Owen and Mr. Powell among others would use Grenada to renew their demands for dual key.
5. The Prime Minister expressed concern about the longer term effects of the American action. She had always argued that there was an essential distinction between the Soviet Union and NATO, in that the Soviet Union was an aggressive power whereas NATO was

/ purely

purely defensive, working to extend democracy in the world, but not by force. That argument was no longer so convincing.

6. The Prime Minister did not expect Commonwealth criticism of the US to be severe. Of all Commonwealth leaders, she was herself perhaps the most critical regarding the effects of the US action in the longer term. Neither the protection of US citizens, nor the obligation to respond to a request for intervention, provided a convincing justification; and both arguments had been deployed elsewhere by the Soviet Union. The only good constitutional reason for the American action was that there had in fact been no government in Grenada. Mr. Douglas-Home suggested that there was a parallel with Tanzanian actions in Uganda, to which there had been few objections.

7. Looking to the future the Prime Minister said that it was increasingly clear that small islands could not protect themselves from countries such as Cuba. Perhaps the West would have to put forces in to help them. The fundamental question, however, was whether Grenada could be treated as a difficult but isolated incident, as she would hope, or whether it marked a new departure in foreign affairs.

MR. D. BARCLAY

31 October, 1983.

A. J. C. 36/10.

f. a.

UNCLASSIFIED

28201 - 1

OO ROME

OO BRIDGETOWN

OO KINGSTON

OO PORT OF SPAIN

GRS 1709

UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO 310330Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE ROME

TELEGRAM NUMBER 310 OF 31 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN, KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN, WASHINGTON

FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

GRENADA

1. FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM PRIME MINISTER'S ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ON BBC WORLD SERVICE PHONE-IN TODAY SUNDAY 30 OCTOBER AT 1630Z. MOST OF THE QUESTIONS WERE UNRECORDED.
Q. (FROM BARBADOS)..... PM THATCHER, YOU WERE QUITE STRONG IN OPPOSITION TO COMMUNISM. WHY DID YOU FAIL TO ACT DECISIVELY?
A.....FIRST I THINK AS A GENERAL RULE WE IN THE WESTERN COUNTRIES , THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES, USE OUR FORCE TO DEFEND OUR WAY OF LIFE , WE DO NOT USE IT TO WALK INTO OTHER PEOPLE'S COUNTRIES INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN TERRITORIES, WE TRY TO EXTEND OUR BELIEFS NOT BY FORCE BUT BY PERSUASION. SO THERE IS A GENERAL RULE THAT YOU DO NOT CROSS INTO AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN COUNTRY. IT'S NOT AN INVIOLEATE RULE BUT IT'S A VERY GOOD ONE, I THINK THEREFORE THAT IF YOU ARE GOING TO GO INTO AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN COUNTRY AND DON'T FORGET GRENADA WAS GIVEN INDEPENDENCE IN 1974 WITH A FULLY INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTION WITH A LEGAL SYSTEM, WITH DEMOCRACY, IT HAD GONE BY 1979 WHEN MAURICE BISHOP SEIZED POWER AS A MARXIST BUT I THINK IT'S A GOOD THOUGHT NOT TO WALK INTO ANOTHER PERSON'S COUNTRY AND THEREFORE YOU HAVE TO BE ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN THAT IF YOU DO THERE IS NO CHOICE OR IF THERE IS NO OTHER WAY. NOW IT'S QUITE CLEAR THAT THE EASTERN

UNCLASSIFIED

28201 - 1

CARIBBEAN STATES AND JAMAICA AND BARBADOS AND THE PRESIDENT OF USA TOOK ONE VIEW AND SOME OF THE OTHER CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES TOOK ANOTHER, UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES AND WITH MY BELIEFS I DID COUNSEL CAUTION BEFORE AN IRREVOCABLE DECISION WAS TAKEN TO CROSS INTO THE COUNTRY OF AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN TERRITORY.

Q.....WAS THERE A CALL FOR HELP FROM SIR PAUL SCOON?

A.....OUR DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER SAW THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN GRENADA LAST SUNDAY, HE COMMUNICATED NO CALL FOR HELP WHATSOEVER AND AS YOU KNOW, NO CALL WAS MADE THROUGH US NOR INDEED, I UNDERSTAND FROM THE STATEMENT FROM THE PALACE NO CALL WAS MADE THROUGH THE MONARCH AND ANY CALL THAT HE MADE WAS NOT KNOWN UNTIL AFTER THOSE INVASION FORCES HAD GONE INTO THE TERRITORY. I REALLY THINK I SEE NOW LITTLE POINT IN ARGUING ABOUT IT. THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA WILL BE DELIGHTED TO BE FREE OF AN OPPRESSIVE RULE SO WOULD MANY OTHER PEOPLES AROUND THE WORLD BE DELIGHTED TO BE FREE OF OPPRESSIVE COMMUNISM, I THINK THE REASON WHY THE FORCES WENT IN WAS ONE OF REGIONAL SECURITY OF WHICH YOU AND UNITED STATES MAY WELL BE THE BEST JUDGES AND I THINK NOW WHAT WE'VE GOT TO MAKE CERTAIN IS OR TRY TO MAKE CERTAIN AS BEST WE CAN THAT DEMOCRACY IS RESTORED IN GRENADA.

Q.....(UNRECORDED)

A.....THERE WAS NO CALL THROUGH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, NOR I UNDERSTAND THROUGH THE HEAD OF STATE BEFORE INVASION, NOW THAT DOES NOT MEAN THERE WAS NOT A CALL BUT THERE WAS NO CALL THROUGH US, OR THAT WE KNEW ABOUT OR THAT WAS COMMUNICATED TO US IN ANY WAY, THE FIRST WE KNEW ABOUT IT I THINK WHEN MISS CHARLES WHO SAID THAT IT HAD TO BE CONCEALED ...(INTERRUPTION) WE UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WAS A CALL FOR HELP BUT IT WAS NOT KNOWN UNTIL SHE MADE IT KNOWN WELL AFTER THE INVASION AND I THINK SHE MADE IT KNOWN WHEN SHE WAS IN THE USA.

Q.(FROM BARBADOS).....HOW MUCH WOULD THE PM BE ABLE TO HELP IN RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IN GRENADA?

A.....WELL I INDICATED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS WE ARE ALWAYS SYMPATHETIC TO CALLS OF HELP, AFTERALL WE DID SET UP A DEMOCRACY IN GRENADA IN 1974 WITH A FULL DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION

UNCLASSIFIED

28201 - 1

AND WITH POUNDS 2 MILLION OF AID TO START IT OFF WELL, SO WE ARE NO STRANGERS TO SETTING COUNTRIES OFF ON THE COURSE TO DEMOCRACY THE COURSE THEY TAKE AFTER THAT IS UP TO THEM, NOW IF WE CAN BE HELPFUL WHEN THE USA HAS CLEARED THE ISLAND OF THE PRESENT RESISTANCE , IF THEN WE CAN BE HELPFUL, WE SHALL CERTAINLY BE VERY SYMPATHETIC TO CALLS OF HELP. CAN I JUST POINT OUT TO YOU THAT WE GAVE INDEPENDENCE ALSO TO BELIZE WITH ARMED FORCES FOR AN APPROPRIATE TIME WHICH WAS THOUGHT TO BE A FEW MONTHS, WE ARE IN FACT STILL THERE, AND BELIZE IS STILL A DEMOCRACY, NO ONE CAN STAY IN AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY, SOONER OR LATER IF THEY ARE GOING TO BE A DEMOCRACY THEY HAVE TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN WAY BUT I EMPHASIZE AGAIN, IN THE END EACH INDEPENDENT COUNTRY WILL HAVE TO CHOOSE ITS PATH AND I HOPE THAT THIS TIME AND WE ARE PREPARED TO GIVE HELP TO GRENADA AGAIN, PREPARED TO GIVE HELP TO SET UP DEMOCRACY THAT SHE WILL SUSTAIN THE DEMOCRATIC PATH AS SOME OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE CARIBBEAN HAVE.

Q.....(UNRECORDED BUT CONCERNING PEACEKEEPING FORCE)

A.....WELLNOW, THIS IS BEING TALKED ABOUT, I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT THAT ALL POCKETS OF RESISTANCE ARE CLEARED UP BY USA BEFORE ANY COMMONWEALTH FORCE GOES IN THERE AND MAY I JUST SAY A WORD ABOUT MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES, HAVING HAD A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF EXPERIENCE OF THEM ABOUT THE WORLD NOW, I THINK YOU'VE GOT TO MAKE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT BEFORE YOU GO IN YOU'VE GOT TO MAKE YOUR PURPOSE CLEAR, YOU'VE GOT TO MAKE THE OBJECTIVE CLEAR AND THE TIMING CLEAR AND THE TIMING FOR WITHDRAWAL CLEAR BECAUSE AT THE MOMENT THERE IS A TENDENCY TO GET MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES IN, PEACE-KEEPING FORCES IN WITHOUT THEIR OBJECTIVES OR THE TIME FOR WITHDRAWAL BEING CLEAR AS THEY MAY, THEY HAVE THEREFORE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES SOME OF THEM ARE UNITED NATIONS FORCES WE ARE NOW IN A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE IN SINAI I DO NOT KNOW HOW LONG IT WILL LAST WE ARE IN A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON WHICH WAS ONLY GOING TO BE FOR 3 MONTHS IT HAS BEEN EXTENDED, WE ARE IN UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN CYPRUS THATS BEEN THERE 9 YEARS SO IF THERE IS GOING TO BE A MULTI-NATIONAL COMMONWEALTH FORCE IN GRENADA IT MUST HAVE CLEAR TERMS OF REFERENCE, IT MUST HAVE A CLEAR COMMAND STRUCTURE, IT MUST

UNCLASSIFIED

28201 - 1

BE THERE FOR A CLEAR PURPOSE AND THE TIMING WHICH IT COMES OUT MUST BE EQUALLY CLEAR OTHERWISE, WE REALLY SHOULD BE SO STRETCHED IN USING OUR SCARCE ARMED FORCES AROUND THE WORLD, AND WE SHALL GET MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES IN MANY MANY PLACES WITHOUT CLEAR PURPOSE OR CLEAR TERMINATION FOR THEIR DUTY.

Q. (UNRECORDED)

A.....I HAVE ALWAYS SAID THAT THE WEST HAS DEFENSIVE FORCES IN ORDER TO DEFEND OUR OWN WAY OF LIFE. AND WHEN THINGS HAPPEN IN OTHER COUNTRIES THAT WE DO NOT LIKE WE DON'T JUST MARCH IN, WE TRY TO EVERYTHING BY PERSUASION, AND I THINK CERTAINLY THERE WERE OTHER THINGS PERHAPS WE MIGHT HAVE DONE ABOUT GRENADA. SOME OF THE CARIBBEAN SHARED OUR VIEWS, HOWEVER I THINK, THAT'S WHAT SWAYED THE PRESIDENT, AND I SAID THIS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, WAS THE CRIE DE COEUR FROM THE OTHER EAST CARIBBEAN STATES THAT THEY SAID PLEASE OUR SECURITY WILL BE THREATENED. IT WAS ALSO NOT ONLY THE OTHER EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES BUT ALSO BARBADOS AND JAMAICA. AND THEREFORE HE DECIDED FROM HIS PERSPECTIVE WHICH WAS ONE I BELIEVE OF REGIONAL SECURITY, THAT THAT JUSTIFIED HIM, PARTICULARLY AS IT WAS NOT KNOWN AT THE TIME, BUT THERE WAS A LETTER FROM THE GOV-GENERAL WHICH WE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT, THAT JUSTIFIED HIM IN CROSSING INTO GRENADA. NOW HE HAS CROSSED INTO GRENADA, HE HAS RELIEVED THAT ISLAND OF COMMUNISM AND THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE ARE VERY PLEASED. SO LET ME MAKE IT VERY CLEAR THAT WHENEVER PEOPLE HAVE THE YOKE OF COMMUNISM OR OPPRESSION LIFTED I AM DELIGHTED, BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT YOU ARE ENTITLED TO GO INTO ANY COUNTRY EITHER IN CENTRAL AMERICA OR IN EASTERN EUROPE BECAUSE THEY LIVE UNDER THE COMMUNIST YOKE. AND I THINK ITS JUST THAT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US THAT THE PRESIDENT TOOK A DIFFERENT VIEW ON REGIONAL SECURITY, AND THE CRIE DE COEUR FROM THE EAST CARIBBEAN STATES, PLUS BARBADOS AND JAMAICA, HE WAS JUSTIFIED IN GOING IN. NOW TO BE PERFECTLY HONEST, I AM DELIGHTED THAT THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA ARE FREE. I AM DELIGHTED THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE EAST CARIBBEAN SLEEP MORE SOUNDLY IN THEIR BEDS. BUT DOES THAT MEAN THAT YOU THINK YOU'RE ENTITLED TO GO INTO A WHOLE LIST OF COUNTRIES. I THINK THE ANSWER IS NO.

4

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

28201 - 1

AND I WOULD THEREFORE FAR RATHER SAY LOOK THIS I THINK IS ALMOST A UNIQUE OCCASION, I THINK THE PRESIDENT JUSTIFIED IT AS I'VE INDICATED, THE PEOPLE ARE NOW FREE WHERE THEY WEREN'T.

Q. (UNRECORDED)

A. IN INTERNATIONAL LAW IT IS JUSTIFIABLE TO GO IN AND RESCUE CITIZENS IF THEY ARE IN DANGER. I CANNOT SPEAK FOR AMERICAN CITIZENS I CAN ONLY SAY THAT OUR DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER WENT IN LAST SUNDAY, SAW THE GOV-GENERAL AND UNDERSTOOD THAT BRITISH CITIZENS AT THAT TIME WERE NOT IN DANGER. I CANNOT SPEAK FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE US. I THINK MYSELF THAT WAS ONE OF THE REASONS BUT I ALSO THINK THAT HE IS A MAN WHO FEELS VERY STRONGLY AS INDEED I DO AND NATURALLY RESPONDED TO THE CALL OF OTHER SMALL CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES. SOME OF THE OTHER CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES DID NOT SHARE THAT VIEW, BUT I CAN'T SEE THE POINT IN TRYING TO EMPHASISE THE DIFFERENCES. WE SAW THINGS THROUGH A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE, AND THE US IS ENTITLED TO TAKE A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE ON REGIONAL SECURITY, BECAUSE THIS IS IN ITS OWN BACKYARD, THAN THE ONE WE TAKE.

Q. (UNRECORDED)

I AM ALWAYS VERY CONCERNED THAT SOMETIMES ITS POSSIBLE THAT YOUR CITIZENS CAN BE PUT IN DANGER WHEN YOU ACTUALLY GET AN INVASION. AS IT WAS, LET US SAY, I THINK THE AMERICAN INVASION WAS CARRIED OUT, IF I MIGHT SAY SO, WITH GREAT CARE I THINK THAT THEY TOOK GREAT CARE NOT TO ENDANGER LIVES AND SOMETIMES MIGHT HAVE MADE IT EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR THEIR OWN SOLDIERS AND I DO ADMIRE THEM, I THINK FOR THE WAY IN WHICH THEY CARRIED IT OUT, AND I THINK THAT THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA ARE VERY VERY GRATEFUL TO THEM AND THE PEOPLE OF THE EAST CARIBBEAN AND THE PEOPLE OF BARBADOS AND JAMAICA AND THEY HAVE BEEN VERY VERY CAREFUL ABOUT LOOKING AFTER OUR OWN CITIZENS FOR WHICH WE ARE GRATEFUL TO THEM. THEREFORE THE ONLY QUESTION THAT REMAINS IS WHEN ARE YOU ENTITLED TO CROSS INTO SOMEONE ELSE'S TERRITORY. I DON'T THINK THERE IS MUCH POINT ANY MORE IN ARGUING ABOUT THAT. THEY HAVE DONE SO, GRENADA NOW HAS A SECOND CHANCE TO BE DEMOCRATIC AND I EMPHASISE A SECOND CHANCE. IT DOESN'T COUNT IN MANY NATIONS, SHE HAD IT IN 1974, IT HAD

UNCLASSIFIED

28201 - 1

GONE BY 1979. SHE NOW HAS IT AGAIN. AMERICA HAS DONE THIS ON OTHER OCCASIONS, SHE DID IT IN 1965 IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WITH GREAT SUCCESS. THAT WORKED AND LET US HOPE THAT THIS WORKS AND MAY I MAKE IT PERFECTLY CLEAR IT WAS TOTALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE FALKLANDS. I WENT TO THE FALKLANDS TO UPHOLD INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN SOMEONE ELSE HAD CROSSED INTO BRITISH TERRITORY AT NO STAGE HAVE I SET ONE SINGLE FOOT INTO SOMEONE ELSE'S TERRITORY.

HOWE

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED
EMERGENCY UNIT
NAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
FUSD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
INFO D
PROTOCOL D
ECD'S
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD
CONS D
SCV D
EED
MAED
WED
S AF D
RES D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:
SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE
MOD (DI 4)



John,

*With the Compliments
of the
Deputy High Commissioner*

*WJ 31
a
v-a*

[Handwritten signature]

31/10.

NEW ZEALAND HIGH COMMISSION
NEW ZEALAND HOUSE, HAYMARKET
LONDON SW1Y 4TQ



NEW ZEALAND

NEW ZEALAND HIGH COMMISSION NEWS BULLETIN

Statement on Grenada

New Zealand would be prepared to take part, if asked, in a Commonwealth peace-keeping force in Grenada, the Prime Minister, Mr Robert Muldoon, said in Wellington today (Oct 31).

Mr Muldoon issued the following Press Statement after the Cabinet had considered the recent events in Grenada:

"New Zealand joins with other countries in deeply regretting the events which led to the murder of the Prime Minister of Grenada, and a number of his Ministers. Subsequent action to restore order and establish democratic government in that country then eventuated.

"Information has been coming to us from many sources in recent days and the position is now much clearer. It is clear that Cuban activity on Grenada went far beyond the building of a civilian airport. Bomb proof fuel storage tanks, of a capacity far in excess of that needed for civil aircraft operations, and the provision of a command centre bunker, make it clear that what was being built was a military installation, as did the discovery of huge quantities of weapons and armaments.

.../2

"The purpose of this installation, has at this time, not been revealed, although it clearly would have had a major destabilising effect on this part of the Caribbean and the surrounding democratic countries, almost all of which are now independent states.

"Following the murder of the Prime Minister, the only constitutional authority on Grenada was the Governor-General, Sir Paul Scoon, whose authority derives from the 1973 constitution of Grenada, even though the Head of State is the Queen.

"Three independent and reliable sources have now confirmed that prior to the landing of forces from the United States and the various independent Commonwealth Caribbean countries, a request for intervention was received from the Governor-General.

"It is now desirable that order be restored on Grenada as soon as possible, that a constitutional interim administration be formed to administer the country, that foreign troops on the island withdraw as soon as possible, and that if necessary a peace-keeping force, with observers, be put in place to oversee the democratic process of electing a new government.

"It has been suggested that a peace-keeping force should be drawn from the Commonwealth. If this was so New Zealand would be prepared to participate if requested to do so."

RESTRICTED



RM

BF

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

31 October, 1983

MONTserrat

Thank you for your letter of 27 October. The Prime Minister has noted that we have declined to approve the Montserrat request that it should be permitted to send volunteer members of its Defence Force to Grenada. Mrs. Thatcher has expressed some doubt as to whether refusal was wise. I should be grateful if you could let me have a brief note of the reasons for this decision.

BF 1

A. I. COLES

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RESTRICTED

A. J. C. ³⁶/₁₀

GRENADA: SITREP No 9: 31 OCTOBER 1983 (0700 HOURS)

1. For developments prior to 300800Z see previous Sitreps Nos 1-8 attached.

Situation on the Ground

2. Mopping up operations by American forces have continued but progress is slow. Vietnam veterans estimate flushing-out time may exceed 60 days. Control is being consolidated in the capital, St Georges, and the south-west of the island where the new airport is situated.
3. Organised resistance appears to be over but scattered groups of undetermined size remain. Sniper fire is still heard around St Georges and the new airport.
4. Reconnaissance flights over Union Island (part of the territory of St Vincent and the Grenadines) report no military activity. Military operations against Carriacou Island likely within 48 hours.
5. It is now known that in addition to the Coards and Strachan, the Americans have also captured James, Lane and Cornwall, all leading members of the Revolutionary Military Council. The Americans are confident that they have also captured General Hudson Austin. He had no hostages. They will all be handed over to the Governor-General when he is ready to take them.

*Passage deleted and closed, 40 years,
under FOI Exemption.*

*Wayland
4 June 2013*

UK Consular Team

7. The Consular team continue their task of establishing the whereabouts of British nationals, checking on their welfare and ascertaining whether or not they wish to be evacuated. There are no reports of British casualties.

/Evacuation

Evacuation

8. There were no evacuation flights today. A total of 61 British nationals have now left Grenada. All the expatriate Plessey employees who were working on the new airport project have returned to Britain with the exception of the manager, who has opted to remain. It is estimated that there are approximately 50 British nationals in the area around the capital, St Georges, awaiting flights to Barbados. The US military are insisting that all evacuees travel by US military aircraft.

Repatriation of Cubans

9. Head of US Interests Section in Havana denies assertion by President Betancur (Colombia) that Americans are contemplating early evacuation of Cuban prisoners by a British ship. This assertion can only refer to the Antrim and/or the (RFA Pearleaf). Arrangements to repatriate Cuban dead and wounded in hands of International Red Cross.

Interim Arrangements

10. In a TV and radio interview on 29 October, Prime Minister Adams (Barbados) said that Barbados would continue to deploy personnel in peace-keeping force for some time, would offer assistance in arranging elections and continue to act as supply point ultimately for reconstruction work in which it would also assist. In a separate interview on 28 October published in Trinidad he said that Britain and Trinidad seemed most logical participants in Commonwealth Peace-keeping Force but not Guyanese. He thought there should be a list of persons proscribed from standing for election for a number of years.

Other Government Reactions

11. New Zealand Prime Minister Mr Muldoon regretted the recent events; acknowledged that Cuban activity in Grenada was more than required for construction of civil airport; and that this pressure could have destabilising effect on Caribbean region. He noted that Governor General was only Constitutional authority and volunteered that New Zealand would be prepared to participate in a Commonwealth Peace-keeping effort if requested to do so.

GRENADA

ADVANCE COPIES

IMMEDIATE

8

EMERGENCY UNIT

ADVANCE COPY

PS (2)

BS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY

SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE
CABINET OFFICE

NO. 10 DOWNING ST

MOD, RC
MOD (DI 4)

RESIDENT CLERK

ED/NAD
ED/S-AM D
ED/MCAD
ED/UND
ED/PUSD
ED/DEFENCE DEPT
ED/NEWS DEPT
ED/INFO DEPT
ED/PROTOCOL DEPT
ED/ECD(E)
ED/ECD(I)
ED/CCD
ED/CONSULAR DEPT
ED/30V. DEPT
HD/PLANNING STAFF
ED/RESEARCH DEPT
LEGAL ADVISERS (Mr. Freedland)

HY 9 P

SECRET

DESKBY 310500Z (FOR EMERGENCY ROOM ONLY)

FM WASHINGTON 310311Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3229 OF 31 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN

Prime Minister has seen

32. 10

MY TELNO 3215: GRENADA: NEXT STEPS.

1. MINISTER CALLED ON BURT AND MOTELY THIS AFTERNOON, FOLLOWING MY DISCUSSION YESTERDAY WITH EAGLEBURGER, TO BE GIVEN A FIRST GLIMPSE OF US THINKING ABOUT NEXT STEPS.
2. BURT SAID THAT, OVERALL, THE AMERICANS WERE KEEN TO BE GUIDED BY THOSE WHO HAD SOUGHT THEIR ASSISTANCE. THEY WOULD ALSO WISH TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US. AT THIS EARLY STAGE THEY ENVISAGED A THREE-PHASE OPERATION LEADING TO A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE: THE US HAD MADE IT CLEAR FROM THE OUTSET THAT THEIR MEN WOULD BE PULLED OUT QUICKLY. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT 330 CARIBBEAN TROOPS WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH (ALTHOUGH THIS FIGURE MIGHT YET BE INCREASED TO 500).
3. THE FIRST PHASE WOULD BE TO DISCUSS THE COMPOSITION OF A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE WITH THE OECS (PLUS BARBADOS AND JAMAICA) AND WITH THE GOVERNOR GENERAL. THE AMERICANS NOW CONSIDERED A COMMONWEALTH FORCE TO BE THE MOST SENSIBLE. ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD WISH IT TO BE

TO BE THE MOST SENSIBLE, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD WISH IT TO BE AN AD HOC AND INFORMAL ARRANGEMENT AND WERE APPREHENSIVE THAT ANY PLAN TO GIVE IT A FORMAL COMMONWEALTH MANDATE THAT MIGHT LEAD TO PROBLEMS AT CHOGM. (THEY FEARED A PARALLEL WITH THE PROBLEMS THAT HAD ARISEN OVER A UN LINK FOR OBSERVERS IN THE LEBANON) THE AMERICANS HOPED THAT THIS PHASE WOULD BE COMPLETED VERY QUICKLY AND WOULD WELCOME OUR OWN SUGGESTIONS: SPECIFICALLY, MOTELY ASKED WHETHER WE COULD HELP IDENTIFY A BLACK FORCE WITH SOME ANTI-INSURGENCY CAPABILITY. BURT WAS AWARE OF WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SAID IN THE HOUSE ABOUT HIS READINESS TO CONSIDER A REQUEST FOR UK PARTICIPATION AND SAID HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW MORE ABOUT OUR OWN ATTITUDE.

4. THE SECOND PHASE WOULD BE TO SOUND OUT POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS. THE AMERICANS IMAGINED THAT THEY, WE AND THE REGIONAL STATES MIGHT ALL HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN THIS REGARD. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO ENSURE THAT THE FORCE HAD A CLEAR THIRD WORLD DIMENSION. IT WOULD ALSO BE IMPORTANT AT THIS STAGE TO DEFINE THE MISSION OF THE FORCE, EG PUBLIC ORDER, TRAINING OF LOCAL POLICE, ELECTORAL PREPARATIONS ETC.

5. THE THIRD PHASE WOULD BE TO ISSUE INVITATIONS TO PARTICIPANTS. THESE SHOULD COME FROM THE REGIONAL STATES AND THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

6. THOMAS SAID HE COULD SEE THE LOGIC OF SUCH AN APPROACH FROM THE US STANDPOINT BUT ASKED WHAT THE AMERICANS UNDERSTOOD TO BE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S VIEWS SINCE HE WOULD HAVE TO BE SEEN TO BE THE PRIME MOVER. MOTELY OBSERVED THAT SCOON WAS A DELIBERATE PERSON, NOT GIVEN TO QUICK DECISIONS (ALTHOUGH HE HAD IMPRESSED THOSE AMERICANS HE HAD MET). HE WAS ACCORDINGLY KEEPING HIS OWN COUNSEL, ALTHOUGH ADAMS AND SEAGA WERE MEETING WITH HIM TODAY. HE ALSO APPEARED TO BE CLOSE TO THE COMMANDER OF THE CARIBBEAN DEFENCE FORCE. AS YET, HE HAD REVEALED LITTLE TO THE AMERICANS OF HIS DETAILED THINKING. MINISTER THEN SAID, IN CONFIDENCE (TELECON GIFFARD-THOMAS REFERS) THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THAT SCOON HAD ALREADY SPOKEN TO RAMPHAL AND HAD SOUGHT HIS HELP IN APPROACHING MACINTYRE TO SEE IF HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. HE HAD ALSO HOPED TO SECURE THE SERVICES OF BRAITHWAITE AND RUSHFORD. THIS SUGGESTED THAT HIS THINKING WAS CONSIDERABLY ADVANCED AND THAT HIS EMPHASIS WAS ON FIRST GETTING AN ADMINISTRATION TOGETHER TO ADVISE HIM. IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FOR HIS AND GRENADAN CREDIBILITY TO KEEP ANY US OR UK ROLE IN PUTTING TOGETHER A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE AT A VERY DISCREET LEVEL. MOTELY, WHO SAID NOTHING TO SUGGEST HE WAS ALREADY AWARE OF THE DETAILS OF SCOON'S CONVERSATIONS, WAS GRATEFUL FOR THIS INFORMATION (WHICH COINCIDED WITH THE LINE

THE DETAILS OF SCOON'S CONVERSATIONS, WAS GRATEFUL FOR THIS INFORMATION (WHICH COINCIDED WITH THE LINE SCOON HAD IMPLIED HE WOULD TAKE)

~~7. THOMAS SUGGESTED THAT SCOON AND THE REFR. -) '5-53' 2343 297, 59 574, 59 4 .CC), WHOM THEY KNOW AND RESPECTED AND HOPED THIS WOULD NOT POSE~~

~~WAS ALREADY AWARE OF THE DETAILS OF SCOON'S CONVERSATIONS, WAS GRATEFUL FOR THIS INFORMATION (WHICH COINCIDED WITH THE LINE SCOON HAD IMPLIED HE WOULD).~~

7. THOMAS SUGGESTED THAT SCOON AND THE REGIONAL STATES WERE BOUND TO TURN TO RAMPHAL, WHOM THEY KNOW AND RESPECTED AND HOPED THIS WOULD NOT POSE PROBLEMS FOR THE AMERICANS, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT WOULD BE NORMAL FOR RAMPHAL TO BE CONSULTED. BUT THE AMERICANS HOPED THAT HIS

WOULD NOT RESULT IN ANY FORMALISATION OF COMMONWEALTH PARTICIPATION. THOMAS SAID WE HAD NOTED FROM EAGLEBURGER'S REMARKS YESTERDAY THAT THE AMERICANS COULD HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF SOME COUNTRIES WHO MIGHT, IN OTHER EYES, APPEAR APPROPRIATE FOR THE PEACE-KEEPING FORCE, EG INDIA. BURT COMMENTED THAT THE FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO SEE WHAT COMPOSITION WOULD SATISFY THE REGIONAL STATES.

8. THOMAS ASKED WHETHER THE AMERICANS HAD DONE ANY THINKING BEYOND THE PEACE KEEPING FORCE. MOTELY SAID THAT, AS OF A WEEK AGO, THE OECS HAD BEEN THINKING OF ELECTIONS SIX MONTHS HENCE: THE AMERICANS HAD THOUGHT THIS RATHER LONG. THOMAS POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS SOMETHING WHICH SCOON AND HIS EVENTUAL ADMINISTRATION WOULD NEED TO DECIDE: IT WOULD BE WRONG TO RUSH THEM, BEARING IN MIND THAT IN RECENT YEARS THE GRENADANS HAD HAD VERY LITTLE EXPERIENCE OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. BURT AGREED THAT A GOOD PEACE-KEEPING FORCE AND A GOOD INTERIM GOVERNMENT MIGHT MAKE ELECTIONS LESS PRESSING. MOTELY COMMENTED THAT MISS CHARLES HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF BRINGING TECHNOCRATS, NOT POLITICIANS, INTO PLAY AT THIS STAGE.

9. THOMAS ADDED THAT WE WELCOMED THE US INTENTION TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH. WE SHARED THE SAME GENERAL OBJECTIVES. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO AVOID GETTING AT CROSS PURPOSES ON DETAILS. WE HOPED TO BE IN TOUCH AGAIN AS SOON AS OUR OWN THINKING WAS CLEARER.

PLEASE SEE M.I.F.T.

WRIGHT

ADVANCE COPIES


HD/EMERGENCY UNIT

HD/NAD
HD/S-AM D
HD/MCAD
HD/UND
HD/PUSD
HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/INFO DEPT
HD/PROTOCOL DEPT
HD/ECD(E)
HD/ECD(I)
HD/CCD
HD/CONSULAR DEPT
HD/SOV. DEPT
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/RESEARCH DEPT
LEGAL ADVISERS (Mr. Freeland)

HD
FF
P

ADVANCE COPY

PS (2)
BS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY



SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE
CABINET OFFICE
NO. 10 DOWNING ST
MOD, RC
MOD (DI 4)
RESIDENT CLERK

DESKBY 310500Z

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 310310Z OCT 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3228 OF 31 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN

Prime Minister has seen.
WJH/lo

MIPT: GRENADA: NEXT STEPS

1. IT WAS CLEAR FROM THIS DISCUSSION THAT AMERICAN THINKING HAS CONCENTRATED PRIMARILY ON THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE. THEY SEE THIS AS THE KEY TO WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR OWN FORCES. BUT THEIR IDEAS ARE NOT YET VERY FAR ADVANCED. IF WE HAVE IDEAS OF OUR OWN, WE SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO INFLUENCE THEIR THINKING BEFORE IT BECOMES SET IN CONCRETE.
2. I THINK THE AMERICANS HAVE RECOGNISED THAT THE WAY TO GET THE RIGHT ANSWER WILL BE TO BE SEEN TO BE ACTING RESPONSIVELY TO REQUESTS FROM THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL. SIR P SCOON SEEMS TO HAVE MADE A GOOD INITIAL IMPRESSION ON THEM. BUT THEY WILL WANT TO FEED HIM WITH ADVICE AS TO WHAT HE SHOULD ASK FOR. THEY WILL NEED GUIDANCE ON HOW PROPERLY TO SET ABOUT THIS.
3. AS I SEE IT THERE ARE TWO ESSENTIAL ASPECTS TO THE NEXT STEPS TO BE TAKEN: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACEKEEPING FORCE WHICH WILL

BE PHASED IN WITH US WITHDRAWAL: AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION LEADING TOWARDS ELECTIONS. ON
THE FIRST ASPECT, A COMPROMISE WILL NO DOUBT NEED TO BE STRUCK
BETWEEN THE AMERICAN PREFERENCE FOR A PREDOMINANTLY CARIBBEAN
PEACEKEEPING FORCE AND RAMPHAL'S IDEA OF BRINGING IN A
BROADER RANGE OF COUNTRIES, POSSIBLY INCLUDING NIGERIA AND INDIA.
IF THE LATTER COURSE IS PRESSED, IT IS LIKELY TO LEAD US
STRAIGHT INTO CONFRONTATION WITH THE AMERICANS. I THINK WE SHOULD
ENCOURAGE THE IDEA OF A FORCE DRAWN FROM THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
WHICH WOULD BE BASED ON CARIBBEAN CONTINGENTS, PERHAPS LARGELY
FOR APPEARANCES, AND A CANADIAN CONTINGENT, FOR ITS ESSENCE.
IT MIGHT ALSO BE APPROPRIATE TO INCLUDE A CONTINGENT FROM
BRITAIN, AS THE HEAD OF THE COMMONWEALTH, FOR WANT OF A BETTER TERM.
BUT IF WE WANT TO KEEP THE AMERICANS WITH US, I THINK WE SHOULD
AIM TO DRAW THE LINE THERE.

4. AS FOR THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION, THE AMERICANS WILL HAVE TO
UNDERSTAND THAT ELECTIONS COULD WELL TAKE CONSIDERABLY LONGER
THAN SIX MONTHS TO ORGANISE. THE PREPARATIONS WILL NEED
TO ALLOW TIME FOR POLITICAL PARTIES TO BE FORMED AND TO PUT
TOGETHER ELECTORAL PLATFORMS BEFORE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO SET A
DATE.

5. OBVIOUSLY, RAMPHAL AND THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT WILL HAVE
A PART TO PLAY IN ALL THIS. BUT GIVEN HIS CONDEMNATION OF US
INTERVENTION IN GRENADA AND HIS WHOLE POLITICAL BACKGROUND,
RAMPHAL WILL NEED TO CONVINCING THE AMERICANS THAT HE CAN
DELIVER IN WAYS THAT WOULD NOT BE SEEN HERE AS CUTTING ACROSS
US INTERESTS IN THE REGION. MOREOVER, IF THE COMMONWEALTH
SECRETARIAT AS SUCH IS TO BE INVOLVED IN THE REHABILITATION OF
THE ISLAND, I THINK THE AMERICANS WOULD MORE READILY SEE THEM
INVOLVED IN PREPARATIONS FOR THE ELECTORAL PROCESS THAN IN
PUTTING TOGETHER A PEACEKEEPING FORCE. THE SIMPLE POINT IS THAT
IF WE ARE TO KEEP THE AMERICANS ON BOARD, I THINK WE WOULD
DO WELL TO DISCOURAGE RAMPHAL FROM APPEARING TO TAKE CHARGE.

WRIGHT

NNNN

GRENADA

ADVANCE COPIES

39 36 IMMEDIATE

[HD/EMERGENCY UNIT]

HD/NAD
HD/S.A.M.D
HD/MCAD
HD/UND
HD/FUSD
HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/INFO DEPT
HD/PROTOCOL DEPT
HD/ECD(E)
HD/ECD(I)
HD/CCD
HD/CONSULAR DEPT
HD/SOV. DEPT
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/RESEARCH DEPT
HD/LEGAL ADVISERS (Mr. Freeland)

HD EF

ADVANCE COPY

PS (2)
BS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY

SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE
CABINET OFFICE
NO. 10 DOWNING ST
MOD, RC
MOD (DI 4)
RESIDENT CLERK

UNCLASSIFIED

FDESKBY 301500Z

FM BRIDGETOWN 301315Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 382 OF 30 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON KINGSTON PORT OF SPAIN PRIORITY TO
OTTAWA HAVANA MOSCOW UKMIS NEW YORK BELMOPAN CARACAS PARIS
GEORGETOWN UKDEL NATO NASSAU MODUK

A-2C - n/w
fa

GRENADA: STATEMENT BY GOVERNOR-GENERAL

1.. SIR PAUL SCOON MADE HIS LONG-AWAITED STATEMENT ON 29 OCTOBER
IT WAS BROADCAST REPEATEDLY ON BARBADOS RADIO. UNDERSTAND THAT
MAJOR POINTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN CARRIED BY NEWS AGENCIES. FOLLOWING
IS FULL TEXT (AS IT APPEARS IN THIS MORNINGS BARBADOS NEWSPAPERS).
BEGINS

FELLOW GRENADIANS, I SPEAK TO YOU TODAY AS YOUR GOVERNOR
GENERAL, ONE WHO HAS GREAT FAITH IN THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE. I AM
CONFIDENT THAT YOU WILL FIND THE COURAGE TO PUT THOSE TRAGIC EVENTS
OF THE PAST TWO WEEKS BEHIND YOU AND JOIN WITH ME IN THE TASK OF
RESTORING OUR COUNTRY TO ITS NORMAL PEACEFUL WAY OF LIFE.

AT THIS TRYING PERIOD OF OUR COUNTRYS HISTORY, WE MUST
BE GUIDED BY THOUGHTS OF RECONCILIATION, FORGIVENESS AND RECONST-
RUCTION. OUR ENERGIES MUST BE DEVOTED TO RESTORING THE PROCESS OF
DEMOCRATIC LIFE, TRUE FREEDOM AND HUMAN DIGNITY TO ALL OUR PEOPLE.

AT THE SAME TIME WE MUST INSIT ON HIGH STANDARDS OF MORALITY
IN PUBLIC LIFE. THERE IS NO NEED FOR ME TO ENUMERATE THE TRAGIC AND
UN-GRENADIAN EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE DEATHS OF PRIME MINISTER
MAURICE BISHOP AND THREE OF HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES. INNOCENT MEN,
WOMEN, AND CHILDREN WERE ALSO KILLED OR INJURED.

TO SAY THE LEAST I WAS DEEPLY SADDENED AND I SHALL LIKE TO
EXTEND MY HEARTFLET SYMPATHY TO THE BEREAVED FAMILIES. THE KILLING
OF PRIME MINISTER BISHOP AND THE SUBSEQUENT CONTROL OF OUR COUNTRY
BY THE PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARMY SO HORRIFIED NOT ONLY GRENADIANS

BY THE PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARMY SO HORRIFIED NOT ONLY GRENADIANS BUT THE ENTIRE CARIBBEAN, THE COMMONWEALTH AND BEYOND, THAT CERTAIN CARIBBEAN STATES WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DECIDED TO COME TO OUR AID IN THE RESTORATION OF PEACE AND ORDER.

OF COURSE INTERVENTION BY FOREIGN TROOPS IS THE LAST THING ONE WOULD WANT FOR ONE'S COUNTRY. BUT IN OUR CASE IT HAS HAPPENED IN DETERIORATING CIRCUMSTANCES, REPUGNANT TO THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA THE PEOPLE WHO LIVE AND WORK HERE AND WHO I AM WELL ADVISED HAVE WELCOMED THE PRESENCE OF THESE TROOPS AS A POSITIVE AND DECISIVE STEP FORWARD IN THE RESTORATION NOT ONLY OF PEACE AND ORDER BUT ALSO OF FULL SOVEREIGNTY THUS ENABLING OUR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS TO FUNCTION ACCORDING TO THE EXPRESSED WISHES OF THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME.

SAD TO SAY IT IS NOW KNOWN THAT THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (PRA) HAVE IN ITS POSSESSION AN INCREDIBLE AMOUNT OF FOREIGN SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS.

I MUST THANK THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED FOR COMING TO OUR ASSISTANCE SO READILY AND I CALL UPON YOU, THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA TO GIVE YOUR FULLEST COOPERATION TO THE PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN OUR COUNTRY. COLONEL BARNES OF JAMAICA HAS BEEN APPOINTED COMMANDER OF THE PEACE KEEPING FORCE.

IN THESE DIFFICULT TIMES I WOULD ENDEAVOUR TO DO MY BEST AS I HAVE DONE IN OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE MY APPOINTMENT AS GOVECOR GENERAL ON SEPTEMBER 30 1978.

IT IS MY INTENTION IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO APPOINT IN MY OWN DELIBERATE JUDGEMENT A REPRESENTATIVE BODY OF GRENADIANS TO ASSIST AS AN INTERIM MEASURE IN ADMINISTERING THE AFFAIRS OF OUR COUNTRY.... THIS ADMINISTRATION WILL COMPRISE PERSONS OF INTEGRITY AND ABILITY. LET IT BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS WILL NOT BE AN ADMINISTRATION OF POLITICIANS. THIS INTERIM ADMINISTRATION WILL PROVIDE US WITH THE NECESSARY BREATHING SPACE TO ENABLE ARRANGEMENTS TO BE MADE FOR AN EARLY RETURN TO FULL CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT BY WAY OF GENERAL ELECTIONS.

ALL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES MUST REPORT TO WORK ON MONDAY OCTOBER 31 AND I HEREBY ASK THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY TO REOPEN THEIR DOORS TO THE PUBLIC AS FROM TODAY. SCHOOLS WILL REOPEN ON MONDAY MORNING OCTOBER 31.

MEANWHILE IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE PEACE KEEPING FORCE WHO WILL BE ON PATROL AT NIGHT AND FOR YOUR OWN SAFETY AND PROTECTION I URGE YOU TO STAY INDOORS FROM 8 PM TO 5 AM UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

IN CONCLUSION I HEREBY DIRECT THE MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARMY AND THE MILITIA WHO ARE STILL ARMED TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS.

YOU WILL BE TOLD SHORTLY WHEN AND WHERE YOU SHOULD HAND IN THOSE ARMS PRIOR TO THE FORMAL DISBANDMENT OF THE ARMY. I WISH TO ASSURE

YOU THAT EVERY PRECAUTION WILL BE TAKEN FOR YOUR PERSONAL SAFETY LIKE ANY OTHER GRENADIAN CITIZEN.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN THE TASK AHEAD IS DIFFICULT BUT I KNOW THAT WITH OUR COOPERATION AND WITH GODS HELP WE SHALL SUCCEED. MAY GOD BLESS YOU ALL.

ENDS.

FCO PLEASE PASS ALL

BULLARD

BT

9RS750
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 302040Z OCTOBER, 1983

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3225 OF 30 OCTOBER

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO AND BRIDGETOWN
INFO SAVING MOSCOW, DUBLIN AND OTHER NATO POSTS.

GRENADA: SHORT TERM CONCLUSIONS

1. AS SEEN FROM WASHINGTON, THE FOLLOWING SHORT-TERM CONCLUSIONS CAN BE DRAWN AT THE END OF THE FIRST WEEK.
2. MILITARILY, THE BATTLE HAS BEEN TOUGHER THAN EXPECTED, BECAUSE THERE WERE MORE ARMED CUBANS ON THE ISLAND THAN EXPECTED. WE ARE TOLD THAT ARSENALS OF WEAPONS HAVE BEEN FOUND. THIS DOES NOT SAY MUCH FOR AMERICAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, BUT IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT GREATER EX POST FACTO JUSTIFICATION FOR HIS DECISION.
3. POLITICALLY, SHULTZ HAS STRESSED THE HIGHMINDED MOTIVATIONS: THE NEED TO SAFEGUARD AMERICAN LIVES: THE INVITATION FROM THE OECS. THE PRESIDENT HAS IN CONTRAST WRAPPED HIMSELF IN THE AMERICAN FLAG AND PLACED HIS DECISION FIRMLY IN THE EAST/WEST CONTEXT. THIS IS, FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST, PLAYING WELL IN PEORIA. SO WELL IN FACT THAT THE CONGRESS HAS AVERTED ITS EYES FROM THE SHOOTING WAR AND BUSIED ITSELF WITH THE WAR POWERS ACT. A NEW YORK TIMES POLL REVEALS THAT TWO-THIRDS OF THE SAMPLE BELIEVE THAT THE MARINES WENT IN PRIMARILY TO STOP THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM. TOO RIGHT, AS THEY SAY IN AUSSIE.
4. ON CONSULTATION, THE PRESIDENT AND SHULTZ DID NOT CONSULT US EARLIER BECAUSE:-
 - (A) THEY WERE IN A STATE OF SHOCK AND DRAINED BY THE EVENTS IN BEIRUT. BUT
 - (B) THE ADVICE WE WERE LIKELY TO OFFER WAS LIKELY TO BE UNWELCOME AND THEREFORE TO DISTRACT THEM FROM THE MATTER IN HAND,
 - (C) THE MORE PEOPLE THAT THERE WERE IN ON THE SECRET, THE MORE DIFFICULT A SECURE OPERATION WOULD BE AND
 - (D) THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT HAVE SEEN OUR LOCUS STANDI IN THE SAME LIGHT AS OURSELVES. THEY HAVE NEVER UNDERSTOOD THE CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CROWN. MOREOVER, FROM THEIR VIEWPOINT, OUR RECENT CONCERNS WITH GRENADA HAD NOT BEEN EXACTLY HIGH PROFILE. AND WE HAD LITTLE TO OFFER THAT THEY FELT THEY NEEDED.
5. THE LESSON ON CONSULTATION IS NOT (NOT) NECESSARILY THAT THE AMERICANS WILL RIDE ROUGHSHOD OVER US WHENEVER THEY DECIDE THAT IT IS IN THEIR INTEREST TO DO SO. NOR DO I PLACE MUCH RELIANCE ON THE PRESIDENT'S OR THE SECRETARY'S PROMISE OF IMPROVED PERFORMANCE. IN MY VIEW, THEIR JUDGEMENT OF THE AMERICAN INTEREST WILL PREVAIL IN THE FUTURE AS IN THE PAST. THAT BEING SO, THE LESSON FOR US IS THAT, IF WE WISH TO BE CONSULTED, WE HAVE SO TO CONDUCT OUR AFFAIRS THAT IT IS NECESSARY FOR THEM TO DO SO. IN THE NATO ALLIANCE CONSULTATION IS NECESSARY SINCE DECISIONS ARE TAKEN BY CONSENSUS. CONSULTATION ON INF HAS BEEN EXEMPLARY BECAUSE DEPLOYMENT COULD NOT HAVE TAKEN PLACE UNLESS IT HAD BEEN SO. IN FINANCIAL MATTERS, CONSULTATIONS IN IMF, G5, G10 ETC IS EXCELLENT BECAUSE WE ARE THERE AND WE HAVE SOME MONEY.

CONFIDENTIAL

/6.

6. THE PRICE TAG FOR CONSULTATIONS OVER A WIDER FIELD, OUTSIDE EUROPE, IS THEREFORE A POLICY AND A PRESENCE OVER THE WIDER FIELD. THAT COSTS MONEY, MILITARILY AND DIPLOMATICALLY. PAST DECISIONS OF PAST GOVERNMENTS HAVE SET THE PRESENT PATTERN. CURRENT DECISIONS OF HER MAJESTY'S PRESENT GOVERNMENT CAN MAKE THE PATTERN BETTER OR WORSE. IN CENTRAL AMERICA, FOR EXAMPLE, OUR PRESENCE IN BELIZE IS VALUABLE TO THE AMERICANS AND MAKES US AN INTERESTING INTERLOCUTOR. BUT THE ABSENCE OF REPRESENTATION IN NICARAGUA AND EL SALVADOR, DUE TO PAST EXPENDITURE CUTS, IRONICALLY IN PRECISELY THE TWO CURRENT BATTLEFIELDS, MEANS THAT WE HAVE NO MEANS OF PROVIDING OURSELVES WITH AN INDEPENDENT ON-GOING ASSESSMENT OF EVENTS THERE NOR THE AMERICANS WITH A USEFUL SECOND OPINION.

7. RUTHERFORD IN THE PINK 'UN AND WATT IN THE TIMES HAVE SUGGESTED EUROPE AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO AMERICA. I AM ALL IN FAVOUR IF IT CAN BE DONE. BUT CAN IT? THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IS CERTAINLY A VALID COUNTERWEIGHT TO AMERICA IN THE ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL SPHERE, BECAUSE THE EUROPEAN MEMBER STATES HAVE A TREATY OBLIGATION TO ACT TOGETHER. AS A RESULT WE CAN ENSURE THAT THE EUROPEAN INTEREST IS TAKEN SERIOUSLY. POLITICAL COOPERATION, BEING VOLUNTARY, IS CO-OPERATION A LA CARTE AND THEREFORE, WHEN THE CHIPS ARE DOWN, AT BEST AN IRRITANT TO THE AMERICANS AND AT WORST A BROKEN REED FOR OURSELVES.

8. FINALLY, YOUR SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND OUR VOTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE SERVED BRITISH INTERESTS IN THAT THEY HAVE ENABLED US TO KEEP OPEN THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE US ADMINISTRATION. FURTHER CONSULTATION WILL BE PUT TO THE TEST WHEN WE COME TO DISCUSS PEACE-KEEPING AND THE RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL RULE IN GRENADA. IF WE HAVE A VALID INPUT, WE SHOULD BE PRIVY TO AMERICAN THINKING AS IT DEVELOPS. AND WE CAN HELP DETERMINE THE FUTURE COURSE OF EVENTS ON THE ISLAND. SO FAR SO GOOD.

9. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

FCO PASS SAVING MOSCOW, OTHER NATO POSTS AND DUBLIN.

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

WRIGHT

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED
EMERGENCY UNIT
NAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
PUSD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
INFO D
PROTOCOL D
ECD'S
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD
CONS D
SOV D
EED
MAED
WED
S AF D
RES D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:
SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE
MOD (DI 4)

2

CONFIDENTIAL

qR 600
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 302042Z OCTOBER, 1983

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3226 OF 30 OCTOBER

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, BONN, ROME AND UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING MOSCOW, DUBLIN AND OTHER NATO POSTS.

GRENADA: THE LONGER TERM: MIPT

1. IT IS TOO SOON TO MAKE MORE THAN TENTATIVE JUDGEMENTS ABOUT ANYTHING EXCEPT THE IMMEDIATE SHORT TERM IMPACT ON US OPINION OF THE INTERVENTION IN GRENADA. BUT ALREADY THERE ARE STRAWS IN THE WIND, NO MORE, THAT THE LONGER TERM EFFECTS MAY BE DIFFERENT IN SEVERAL IMPORTANT RESPECTS.
2. FIRST, THE CONGRESS IS COLLECTIVELY INSULTED BY THE ABSENCE OF CONSULTATION. THEY WERE CONSULTED LATER THAN WE WERE. IN FACT, THEY WERE NOT CONSULTED AT ALL, ONLY INFORMED. THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS WERE NOT INVITED TO THE WHITE HOUSE UNTIL 8PM ON MONDAY 24 OCTOBER AND THEN ONLY TO BE TOLD OF THE PRESIDENTIAL DECISION, AFTER IT HAD BEEN TAKEN. THE CONGRESS IS THEREFORE LIKELY TO WISH TO MAKE LIFE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE PRESIDENT, NOT ONLY OVER THE WAR POWERS ACT BUT ALSO BY INDULGING IN ALL MANNER OF CONGRESSIONAL GAMES LIKE ADDING UNWANTED CONDITIONS TO THE BILLS THE PRESIDENT WANTS.
3. SECONDLY, THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, O'NEILL, WHO HAS A REMARKABLE NOSE, POLITICAL AS WELL AS PHYSICAL, HAS, NOW THAT THE BATTLE IS OVER, DENOUNCED THE PRESIDENT FOR GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY. HE HAS THUS OFFERED THE SEVEN DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION AN ELECTION ISSUE, SHOULD THEY WISH TO TAKE IT UP. ALL OF THEM HAVE SO FAR BEEN TOO WARY TO PICK UP THE BALL AND RUN WITH IT. IT COULD BE A WINNER WITH WOMEN VOTERS, NEVER VERY STONG FOR REAGAN.
4. THIRDLY, THE MEDIA ARE INCENSED WITH THE PRESIDENT FOR BEING DELIBERATELY CUT OUT OF THE ACTION. THEIR CRY IS "CENSORSHIP": AN OFFENCE AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION. THE WHITE HOUSE WILL BE UNHAPPY THAT WILLIAM SAFIRE, A VERY CONSERVATIVE COMMENTATOR, WHILE FAVOURING AND APPLAUDING THE INTERVENTION, HAS ACCUSED WEINBURGER OF 'LYING THROUGH TIGHT LIPS' ABOUT WHY HE BARRED THE PRESS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER AND IN WHAT WAY THEY DECIDE TO TAKE IT OUT ON THE PRESIDENT: AND IF THEY DO, WHETHER THEY MAKE ANY IMPACT ON THE ELECTORATE. THE PRESIDENT IS OBVIOUSLY VULNERABLE TO THE COMPETENCE FACTOR. THAT RAN FOR A SHORT TIME EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR BUT THEN FADED MYSTERIOUSLY. IT IS A POTENTIALLY RICH VEIN IF THEY DECIDE TO MINE IT.
5. THEN THERE IS THE EFFECT OF THE INTERVENTION ON 'WILL HE RUN AGAIN?' IF THE ELECTION WERE TODAY, OF COURSE HE'D BE HOME IN A CANTER. BUT THE PRESIDENT NEEDS TO PONDER WHAT THE MOOD (AND THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY AND NANCY'S HEALTH) WILL BE IN TWELVE MONTHS TIME. MY GUESS IS THAT HE WILL WANT TO SEE HOW IT ALL PANS OUT BEFORE DECIDING. BUT I HAVE NO INSIDE TRACK HERE: NOR, SO FAR AS I CAN JUDGE, HAS ANYBODY ELSE. THE PRESIDENT IS KEEPING HIS OWN COUNSEL.

CONFIDENTIAL

/6.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. FINALLY, THERE IS THE QUESTION OF THE FINAL DISTILLATE OF THE GENERAL INTERNATIONAL DISAPPROVAL. ONE CASUALTY COULD BE THE KISSINGER COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA. SOME OF THE LATIN, EVEN THE FRIENDLY ONES, HAVE BEEN AMONG THE MOST VOCAL IN CONDEMNATION. THE EFFECT OF THE LOSS OF MORAL ASCENDANCY AND THE EROSION OF CONFIDENCE IN THE WISDOM, JUDGEMENT AND MODERATION OF THE WESTERN SUPERPOWER WILL BE FOR OTHERS TO PRONOUNCE UPON, FOR ME TO TAKE NOTE OF.

7. THE EFFECTS ON OUR OWN RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ADMINISTRATION REMAIN TO BE SEEN. I DO NOT THINK THEY HAVE BEEN SERIOUS FOR ALL THE MUTTERINGS AT LOWER LEVELS THAT BRITAIN RATTED ON THEM IN THEIR HOUR OF NEED. THE AMERICANS RECOGNISE AS WELL AS WE DO THAT DIFFERENCES OF VIEW ARE NOT ONLY PERMISSIBLE BUT HEALTHY. OUR POSITION IS UNDERSTOOD WHEN WE EXPLAIN IT, AND EVEN APPLAUDED (BY SOME). THE STANCE YOU HAVE TAKEN, BY VOTE AND SPEECH, POSITIONS THE UK FAVOURABLY TO CONTINUE THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE YOU WISH.

FCO PASS SAVING MOSCOW, DUBLIN AND OTHER NATO POSTS.

WRIGHT

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED

EMERGENCY UNIT

NAD

S AM D

MCAD

UND

PUSD

DEFENCE D

NEWS D

INFO D

PROTOCOL D

ECD'S

PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD

CONS D

SOV D

EED

MAED

WED

S AF D

RES D

LEGAL ADVS

PLANNING STAFF

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR URE

MR CARTLEDGE

MR HANNAY

MR ADAMS

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

SIR P MOORE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE

MOD (DI 4)

2
CONFIDENTIAL

GRENADA

ADVANCE COPIES

HD/EMERGENCY UNIT

HD/NAD

HD/S. AM. D

HD/MCAD

HD/UND

HD/FUSD

HD/DEFENCE DEPT

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/INFO DEPT

HD/PROTOCOL DEPT

HD/ECD(E)

HD/ECD(I)

HD/CCD

HD/CONSULAR DEPT


HD/SOV. DEPT

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/RESEARCH DEPT

~~LEGAL~~ ADVISERS (Mr. Freedland)

HD 999



34 33 36
IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

PS (2)

BS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR URE

MR CARTLEDGE

MR HANNAY

SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE

CABINET OFFICE

NO. 10 DOWNING ST

MOD, RC

MOD (DI 4)

RESIDENT CLERK

GRS 200

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 301700Z

FM BRIDGETOWN 301350Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 383 OF 30 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON HAVANA KINGSTON PORT OF SPAIN

PRIORITY OTTAWA MOSCOW UKMIS NEW YORK BELMOPAN CARACAS PARIS

GEORGETOWN UKDEL NATO NASSAU MODUK

GRENADA

1. AS REPORTED BY TELEPHONE TO EMERGENCY UNIT, PRIME MINISTER ADAMS GAVE AN INTERVIEW ON CBC TV AND RADIO (BARBADOS) ON 29 OCTOBER, SALIENT POINTS OF WHICH ARE :

(A) HE VISITED GRENADA ON 28 OCTOBER AND MET SIR PAUL SCOON:

(B) COARD HAD BEEN CAPTURED BY US FORCES ON 29 OCT, HANDED OVER, REPORTEDLY BY GRENADIANS, AT A ROADBLOCK:

(C) IN A REFERENCE TO UK'S NON-PARTICIPATION IN INTERVENTION FORCE,

REPORTED BY GRENADINES, AT A ROADBLOCK.
(C) IN A REFERENCE TO UK'S NON-PARTICIPATION IN INTERVENTION FORCE, ADAMDS EXPLAINED THAT OPERATION WAS CONCEIVED, PLANNED AND IMPLEMENTED VERY QUICKLY. IT WAS DIFFICULT HE SAID, TO BRING TROOPS FROM FAR AWAY WHERE THE SENSE OF URGENCY MIGHT NOT HAVE MATCHED THAT FELT LOCALLY. HMGS ATTITUDE SHOUDL BE LOOKED AT IN THAT LIGHT. HE SINCERELY THOUGHT THAT NO ILL-WILL WAS INTENDED BY HMGS LACK OF ACTION:

(D) EXPLANATION OF BACKGROUND TO HIS REQUEST TO CHAMBERS FOR RECALL OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO HIGH COMMISSIONER, PITT (MY TELNO 378) "HIGH COMMISSIONERS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO ACCUSE PRIME MINISTERS OF LYING".

K(E) BARBADOS WOULD CONTINUE TO DEPLOY PERSONNEL IN SUPPORT OF THE PEACE-KEEPING FORCE "FOR SOME TIME", WOULD OFFER ASSISTANCE IN ARRANGING ELECTIONS AND WOULD CONTINUE TO ACT AS SUPPLY POINT ULTIMATELY FOR RECONSTRUCTION WORK IN WHICH IT WOULD ALSO ASSIST.

FCO PLEASE PASS ALL

BULLARD

BT

NNNN

V

SENT /RECD 301440Z LVB /BWET

6A

GRENADA

ADVANCE COPIES

39 36

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

[HD/EMERGENCY UNIT]

- HD/NAD
- HD/S-AM D
- HD/MCAD
- HD/UND
- HD/FUSD
- HD/DEFENCE DEPT
- HD/NEWS DEPT
- HD/INFO DEPT
- HD/PROTOCOL DEPT
- HD/ECD(E)
- HD/ECD(I)
- HD/CCD
- HD/CONSULAR DEPT
- HD/SOV. DEPT
- HD/PLANNING STAFF
- HD/RESEARCH DEPT
- LEGAL ADVISERS (Mr. Fieland)

- PS (2)
- BS/LADY YOUNG
- PS/MR WHITNEY
- PS/PUS
- SIR J BULLARD
- MR GIFFARD
- MR WRIGHT
- MR URE
- MR CARTLEDGE
- MR HANNAY

SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE
 CABINET OFFICE
 NO. 10 DOWNING ST
 MOD, RC
 MOD (DI 4)
 RESIDENT CLERK

HD 29

OO FCO

OO BRIDGETOWN

OO MODUK

SECRET :

FM GRENADA 301055Z OCT
 TO IMMEDIATE MODUK
 TELEGRAM NR 4 OF 30 OCTOBER 83
 AND IMMEDIATE FCO AND BRIDGETOWN

IN MODUK FOR COSSEC DEF SIT CENTRE D14

FROM BRITDEFAD GRENADA

SITREP

291200 - 300100

1. GENERAL

I HAVE SPENT MUCH ON THE DAY COLLATING THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SUNDAY MEETING, HENCE MY GRASP OF ACTUAL OPS IS NOT AS COMPLETE AS I WOULD LIKE. SADLY THE DAY DAWNED WITH TRAGEDY AS 4 BLACK HAWK HELOS COLLIDED MANOEUVERING ON THE GROUND IN FRONT OF US. HEAVEN KNOWS HOW, BUT ONLY 4 -1/75 RANGERS WERE KILLED AND 6 INJURED IN A COMBINED LOAD OF 112. PREVIOUS NIGHT OPS WERE AIMED ALMOST ENTIRELY AT PERIMETER SECURITY IN PREPARATION FOR THE GRADUAL ENLARGEMENTS OF THE CORDON SANITAIRE OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

2. STRENGTHS AND DISPOSITIONS.

THE INSERTION OF TWO INDEPENDENT BDES OF 32 AB DTV IS NOW COMPLETE AND THE 1/75 RANGER BN SUPPORTED BY ONE 105MM BATTERY IS OPERATING IN SPLIT LOCATIONS OF PEARLS AIRPORT AND CALVIGNY. THESE FORCES ARE ESTIMATED TO TOTAL 2500 PLUS 2000 SUPPORT TROOPS. THERE IS A TEN SHIP FLOTILLA SUPPORTING USS INDEPENDENCE. I HAVE SEEN IN THE AIR 3 X A7S AND 6 SPECTRES. MOVING THROUGH BARBADOS AIRPORT AND PORT SALINES WE HAVE CONFIRMED 21 SEPERATE



Handwritten signature

~~IS OPERATING IN SEVERAL LOCATIONS OF FERRIS AIRPORT AND CALVIGNY.~~
THESE FORCES ARE ESTIMATED TO TOTAL 2500 PLUS 2000 SUPPORT
TROOPS. THERE IS A TEN SHIP FLOTILLA SUPPORTING USS INDEPENDENCE.
I HAVE SEEN IN THE AIR 3 X A7S AND 6 SPECTRES. MOVING THROUGH
~~BARBADOS AIRPORT AND PORT SALINES WE HAVE CONFIRMED 21 SEPERATE~~
C 130, 12 SEPERATE C141, NUMEROUS COBRAS, 14 X CH 46 (ORGANIC TO THE
MARINES) AND 20 BLACK HAWK HELOS ARE BASED HERE AT POINT
SALINES (2 WORDS GARBLED) ALL THE TASK FORCE MAY TIE DOWN HERE
IN GRENADA, ON BOARD SHIP AND IN USA MORE THAN 20,000 PERSONNEL
EXCLAM.

3. US OPS - 29 OCT.

HAVING BRACED MYSELF FOR A STEELY TIGHT LIPPED ALLY, I HAVE
FOUND THEM (US) REMARKABLY FORTH COMING HERE IN GRENADA, DESPERATE
FOR PRAISE AND EVEN ADVICE. TODAY HAS AGAIN GONE SLOWLY WITH TWO
MAIN OBJECTIVES - THE FINAL CONSOLIDATION OF THE GROUND HELD
FROM GRAND BAY - GRAND ETANG - CALVIGNY, PRELIMINARY CLEARANCE
OF THE W COASTAL STRIP TO VICTORIA THE SE COASTAL AREA TO
ST DAVIDS. THE SECONDARY TASK FOR ONE COMPANY FOR 32ND AB,
ONE COY OF 1/75 RANGERS AND THE CARIBBEAN FORCE, WAS SIFTING OF
EVACUEES FROM ST GEORGES AND FINAL ESTABLISHMENT OF QUOTE NORMAL
UNQUOTE ACTIVITY IN THE TOWN. NONE OF THE AIMS WERE
COMPLETELY ACHIEVED. IN THE WEST THEY CLEARED ONLY TO
COUYAVE, IN THE SOUTHEAST ONLY TO WESTERHALL ENCOUNTERING SNIPER FIRE
IN THE FOOTHILLS AND APPROACH ROADS AROUND WESTERHALL. FURTHERMORE
ABOUT 200 EVACUEES ARE STILL SCATTERED WITHIN ST GEORGES AND SOME
SNIPER FIRE OCCURED DURING THE LATE AFTERNOON. ANOTHER CACHE
OF 80 X AK 47'S WERE FOUND IN THE TOWN IN A HOUSE CLOSE TO THE
CUBAN EMBASSY. COARD AND HIS WIFE WERE CAPTURED HAVING BEEN QUOTE
FINGERED UNQUOTE BY LOCAL GRENANIAN RESIDENTS AND APPARENTLY
THEY ARE CLOSE ON THE HEELS OF HUDSON.

4. CASUALTIES.

THE AMERICANS REMAIN PARTICULARLY CAGEY ON THIS ISSUE. I
KNOW THAT 27 US SOLDIERS ARE REGISTERED WITH WAR GRAVES
REP HERE AT POINT SALINES AND 24 HAVE DIED OF WOUNDS EITHER
IN US OR ON BOARD SHIP - TOTAL 51. THE PADRE BASED WITH
THE RANGERS HERE RECKONS 75 TO 80 US SOLDIERS ARE DEAD AND
MORE THAN 200 INJURED.

5. FUTURE OPS.

NO CHANGE - EXTENSION OF CORDON, CLEARANCE OF ST GEORGES
EVACUATION OF THOSE WISHING TO LEAVE.

6. SUMMARY.

US COMMANDERS SEEM MORE CHEERFUL DESPITE THE PROSPECT OF
A MIXED GROUP OF PRA/CUBANS ESTIMATED TO BE BETWEEN 500 - 800
OPERATING IN THE DLS. COMMANDERS HAVE MOVED FROM 50,000 TO
25,000 MAPS INDICATING MORE LIMITED TACTICAL PLANS. I HOPE
TO OPERATE IN ST GEORGES AND FROM LOCAL COMMAND POSTS TODAY.

FCO DIST AS APPROPRIATE.

~~██████████~~
~~██████████~~
MONTGOMERY

UNCLASSIFIED

28198 - 1

OO KINGSTON

OO BRIDGETOWN

GRS 1201
UNCLASSIFIED
FM FCO 301900Z OCT 83
TO IMMEDIATE KINGSTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 222 OF 30 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN WASHINGTON

A. J. C. 31/10.
p-a.

TELECON SMALLMAN/BROWN
GRENADA

1. FOLLOWING ARE RELEVANT EXTRACTS OF INTERVIEW WITH SECRETARY OF STATE ON LWT'S 'WEEKEND WORLD' SUNDAY 30 OCTOBER.

BRIAN WALDEN

YOU SEEM TO SAY, INDEED I THINK YOU DID SAY THAT ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS INVASION, NAMELY THE SAVING OF AMERICAN LIFE, THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD SERIOUS RESERVATIONS AS TO WHETHER THIS WAS THE BEST WAY TO DO IT. SINCE THEN OF COURSE PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS COME UP WITH QUITE A DIFFERENT JUSTIFICATION. HE NOW SAYS THAT THE REALLY IMPORTANT POINT ABOUT IT WAS THAT IT WAS A CUBAN/SOVIET BASE, IT WAS TERRIBLY DANGEROUS, THE AMERICANS ONLY GOT THERE JUST IN TIME. NOW DO I TAKE IT THAT YOU SIMPLY DO NOT SHARE PRESIDENT REAGAN'S VIEW OF THE NEED TO INVADE GRENADA FOR THAT REASON.

SIR GEOFFREY HOWE

WE DID NOT SHARE HIS VIEW FOR EITHER REASON. WE HAD A UNITED KINGDOM ROYAL NAVY SHIP IN THE VICINITY TO PROTECT BRITISH LIVES IF NECESSARY. WE HAD REPRESENTATIVES ON THE ISLAND ON THE SUNDAY, AND OUR JUDGEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE ADVICE WE THEN GOT WAS THAT INTERVENTION WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THAT REASON. THAT'S THE FIRST POINT. ON THE SECOND POINT, WHAT MAY OR MAY NOT BE DISCOVERED NOW ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF CUBANS OR RUSSIANS

UNCLASSIFIED

28198 - 1

OR ANYBODY ELSE ON GRENADA ONE COULD DISCOVER THE PRESENCE OF CUBANS AND RUSSIANS IN MANY OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD BUT IF THEY ARE IN THOSE INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES AS A RESULT OF THE INVITATION HOWEVER MISGUIDED OF THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED, HOWEVER UNWELCOME THEIR PRESENCE THAT DOES NOT IN ITSELF PROVIDE A JUSTIFICATION.

B.W.

AND THAT'S THE REASON THAT YOU DON'T AGREE WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN ON THIS. LET ME PUT IT BACK TO YOU TO BE SURE THAT WE ARE ABSOLUTELY RIGHT ABOUT THIS. YOU ARE SAYING THAT ANY GOVERNMENT EVEN AN UNFRIENDLY GOVERNMENT EVEN IF IT ACTS EXTREMELY UNWISELY, BY ASKING IN CUBANS AND RUSSIANS IF IT IS A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT AND DOES SO, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DISSENTS FROM THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT IN THINKING THAT THAT GIVES A JUSTIFICATION FOR HIM TO ACT.

G.H.

THAT'S THE PRINCIPLE WHICH WE AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE ADOPTED IN MANY SITUATIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT IT'S BEEN AN IMPORTANT ONE TO THE POSITION OF THE WEST IN THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE

B.W.

WELL, SUPPOSING IN THE FUTURE PRESIDENT REAGAN AND ONE COULD THINK OF OTHER EXAMPLES I MAY EVEN COME TO THEM IN A MOMENT BUT LET'S JUST TAKE THE GENERAL PROPOSITION FIRST BEFORE WE COME TO SPECIFICS. IF PRESIDENT REAGAN PERSISTED IN THIS VIEW THAT HE HAD SOME SORT OF JUSTIFICATION TO MOVE IN WHERE HE COULD SHOW THAT CUBANS AND SOVIETS WERE THERE AND PREPARING A BASE, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO DISSENT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW WOULD IT?

G.H.

ON THE EVIDENCE WE'VE BEEN PRESENTED WITH AND OUR JUDGEMENT SO FAR YES. IT IS OF COURSE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO DEFEND AND PRESENT ITS POSITION, AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND ELSEWHERE WHAT I THINK IS IMPORTANT ALSO IS THAT WE CERTAINLY HAVE A JOINT INTEREST JUST AS THE CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES HAVE AN INTEREST IN SEEING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONDITIONS IN WHICH AN INDEPENDENT GRENADA WITHOUT DEPENDING ON THE

UNCLASSIFIED

28198 - 1

SUPPORT OF OUTSIDE FORCES IS ABLE TO RESTORE DEMOCRACY AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE. NOW THE AMERICANS HAVE PROCLAIMED THEIR INTEREST IN THAT CERTAINLY WE SHARE THAT INTEREST.

B.W.

LET ME ASK YOU SOMETHING ELSE ON THE GRENADA BUSINESS I THINK BY THE WAY SIR GEOFFREY IF I MAY SAY SO YOUR ANSWERS ON THIS ARE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR WE NOW ALL KNOW WHERE WE STAND LET ME TAKE IT A BIT FURTHER STRANGE THINGS HAVE BEEN HAPPENING TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL FOR INSTANCE THERE DOESN'T SEEM TO BE ANY CLEAR EVIDENCE AS TO WHAT HE WAS DOING DURING THE INVASION AND FOR A PERIOD AFTER THE INVASION. AND HE WAS EXTREMELY DILATORY TO SAY THAT LEAST IN CONTACTING THE QUEEN ABOUT ALL THIS. HOW HAVE THE AMERICANS BEEN MANIPULATING THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL?

G.H.

I'VE NOT SEEN ANY EVIDENCE FOR THAT. LET ME EXPLAIN

B.W.

WHAT HAVE YOU SEEN EVIDENCE OF?

G.H.

LET ME EXPLAIN THE POSITION AS WE SEE IT. DON'T FORGET THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL BEFORE THESE THINGS HAPPENED BUT AFTER THE MILITARY REVOLUTION OF LAST WEEK WAS THE LAST SURVIVING ELEMENT OF LAWFUL CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN GRENADA HIS POSITION SURROUNDED BY REVOLUTIONARY CONDITIONS MUST HAVE BEEN VERY VERY DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO JUDGE ANYWAY. SECONDLY ONCE THE EVENTS BEGAN HAPPENING COMMUNICATIONS WITH GRENADA WERE INTERRUPTED. THE LAST WE SAW OF HIM PHYSICALLY WAS THROUGH OUR REPRESENTATIVES ON THE ISLAND ON THE MONDAY. WHEN THEY CONSULTED HIM HE WAS NOT SEEKING ADVICE OR INTERVENTION AT THAT STAGE AND HE DIDN'T SO FAR AS WE KNOW GET IN TOUCH WITH US FROM THEN ON TO DO SO.

B.W.

ISN'T THAT RATHER AN EXTRAORDINARY THING THOUGH ESPECIALLY AS THE AMERICANS APPARENTLY WHIPPED HIM OFF TO THE GUAM THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER FOR ABOUT 48 HOURS I MEAN THAT DOESN'T SOUND RIGHT DOES IT?

UNCLASSIFIED

28198 - 1

G.W.

WELL AGAIN THE REASONS WHY HE WAS REMOVED TO AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER WERE CONNECTED NO DOUBT WITH HIS PHYSICAL SAFETY AN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCE. WE AREN'T IN A POSITION TO JUDGE ALL THE FACTORS THEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

B.W.

IT'S CLEAR FROM THAT DEFINITION THAT THE MOMENT THERE IS NO ARMED OPPOSITION YOU WOULD LIKE THE AMERICANS TO LEAVE AT ONCE NO QUESTION OF THEIR HAVING RESIDUAL FORCES THERE FOR A PROLONGED PERIOD.

G.H.

NO WHEN YOU SAY AT ONCE AGAIN ONE HAS GOT TO CONSIDER THE TRANSITION FROM A SITUATION DEPENDENT ON AMERICAN FORCES HAVING ESTABLISHED ORDER. REMEMBER ALSO THERE ARE FORCES THERE FROM OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES IN THE CARIBBEAN. AND BETWEEN THEM ONE WANTS TO MOVE FROM A CONDITION DEPENDENT ON THE PRESENCE OF OUTSIDE FORCES TO A CONDITION DEPENDENT UPON THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

B.W.

BUT QUICKLY THE FORCES MUST GO QUICKLY ONCE THERE IS NO ARMED OPPOSITION.

G.H.

AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND I AM NOT EQUIVOCATING IN SAYING THAT I'M JUST SAYING THAT ITS A VERY PRACTICAL QUESTION TO MOVE FROM A SITUATION WHICH HAS BEEN SHATTERED BY THIS KIND OF INCIDENT TO THE RESTORATION OF CONFIDENCE IN INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT

B.W.

WELL NOW ON THAT THEME THERE IS A SUGGESTION THAT THERE SHOULD BE A COMMONWEALTH PEACE-KEEPING FORCE THAT GOES IN THERE FOR A PROLONGED PERIOD IN THIS CASE. WOULD BRITAIN BE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH A COMMONWEALTH PEACE-KEEPING FORCE?

G.H.

WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION TO THE POSSIBILITY. IT DOESN'T MEAN THAT WE WOULD ANSWER YES AND JOIN IN, I MEAN I SAY GIVE SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION BECAUSE WE HAVE A VERY REAL INTEREST IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STABLE

UNCLASSIFIED

28198 - 1

ORDERED GOVERNMENT IN GRENADA. NOW IF YOU THINK ABOUT THE WAY
IN WHICH WE HAVE GIVEN CONSIDERATION TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
U.N. FORCES OR MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
WE PARTICIPATED IN SOME AND NOT IN OTHERS. WE ARE PRESENT IN
CYPRUS FOR EXAMPLE. IN GRENADA I THINK THERE IS A STRONGER
CASE IF SUCH A THING IS NEEDED FOR THE PRESENCE OF FORCES
FROM OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES REALLY BECAUSE ITS A
COMMONWEALTH COUNTRY, IN A COMMONWEALTH AREA THE COMMONWEALTH IS
A NATURAL ORGANISATION TO WHICH TO TURN INSTEAD OF THE U.N
FOR EXAMPLE.

HOWE

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

GRENADA LIMITED
EMERGENCY UNIT
NAD
S AM D
MCAD
UND
PUSD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
INFO D
PROTOCOL D
ECD'S
PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

CCD
CONS D
SOV D
EED
MAED
WED
S AF D
RES D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY
MR ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:
SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE
MOD (DI 4)

GRS 540

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

FM KINGSTON 291100Z OCT 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 316 OF 29 OCTOBER

FOR WIAD AND COPY TO PRIVATE SECRETARY NO:10

GRENADA

1. LETTER FROM MR SEAGA ADDRESSED TO MRS THATCHER DATED 26 OCTOBER ,BUT RECEIVED ONLY TODAY WHICH OUTLINES JAMAICA'S INVOLVEMENT WITH GRENADA HAS BEEN SENT BY TODAYS BAG TO PRIVATE SECRETARY , NO 10.
2. LETTER REFERS TO WIDE MEASURE OF COOPERATION SINCE 1979 WITHIN CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY BETWEEN BISHOP GOVERNMENT AND CARICOM PARTNERS AND,ALTHOUGH THERE WERE IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND RESERVATIONS THAT GRENADA WAS CONDUIT FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIONS IN EASTERN CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES,A WORKING RELATION EXISTED BETWEEN JAMAICA AND GRENADA.HOWEVER,LAST WEEK'S EVENTS CREATED TOTALLY DIFFERENT SITUATION WITH EXECUTION OF BISHOP AND ALMOST ENTIRE CABINET.THUS OECS INFORMED CARICOM OF GRAVE CONCERN FOR SAFETY OF THEIR NATIONALS IN GRENADA,THAT THEY DEEMED THEIR OWN PEACE AND SECURITY TO BE UNDER SERIOUS THREAT.SANCTIONS WERE CONSIDERED TO BE INSUFFICIENT TO RESOLVE CRISIS WHICH REQUIRED URGENT ACTION. IT WAS FEARED THAT NEW REGIME COULD BECOME ENTRENCHED AND STRENGTHEN ITS POWER IN GRENADA WITH SUPPRESSION OF GRENADIAN PEOPLE.GOVERNMENT OF JAMAICA HAS BEEN UNSTINTING SUPPORTER OF PRINCIPLES OF NON-INTERVENTION AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN RESPECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. JAMAICA CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THESE PRINCIPLES.~~JAMAICA CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THESE PRINCIPLES.~~JAMAICA SHARES VIEW THAT PEOPLE OF GRENADA SHOULD HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO RETURN TO NORMALITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER.AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND WITH SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY IN OECS, DECISION WAS MADE TO JOIN WITH BARBADOS AND USA TO TAKE ACTION.THESE GOVERNMENTS INTEND THAT ACTION BE CARRIED OUT IN QUICKEST POSSIBLE TIME WITH LEAST POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE THEREAFTER AN INTERIM CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION BE ESTABLISHED BY GOVERNOR GENERAL WITH PRIME TASK OF ARRANGING FOR ELECTIONS.THESE GOVERNMENTS ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT US FORCES WILL WITHDRAW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER MILITARY ACTION IS COMPLETED.DURING THIS PERIOD CARICOM PEACEKEEPING FORCES WILL BE AVAILABLE.

7

RESTRICTED

/3. MR. SEAGA

RESTRICTED

3. MR SEAGA STRESSES THAT JAMAICA DOES NOT REGARD ACTION IN GRENADA AS INTERVENTION, BUT THAT JAMAICA ACTED IN RESPONSE TO AN URGENT PLEA FROM A GROUP OF SMALL DEFENCELESS COUNTRIES WHO ARE BOUND TOGETHER BY TREATY OBLIGATIONS ON WHICH THEY BASED THEIR APPEAL TO THREE OTHER COUNTRIES - BARBADOS, JAMAICA AND USA - TO ASSIST THEM TO RESTORE NORMALITY TO GRENADA AND REMOVE THREAT TO THEIR SECURITY POSED BY GRENADA UNDER ITS PRESENT RULERS.

4. I NOTE FROM YOUR TELEGRAM 219 THAT PRIME MINISTER DOES NOT CONSIDER THAT IT IS ~~NOT~~ AUSPICIOUS FOR HER TO COMMUNICATE WITH MR SEAGA AT THIS TIME. PRESUMABLY, HOWEVER, I CAN INFORM MR SEAGA THAT HE MAY EXPECT A REPLY FROM MRS THATCHER TO THE LETTER UNDER REFERENCE.

SMALLMAN

LIMITED
WIAD
PS
PS/PUS
MR. GIFFARD
MR. URE

COPIES TO:
PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST

²
RESTRICTED



discussed at ODEB m

31/10.

A.J.C. 21/10.

f.c.

Prime Minister

GRENADA

1. In advance of the meeting on 31 October, you may find useful some thoughts on Grenada and the points on which we may need to take decisions. These last are side-lined. I have well in mind the conclusion of Cabinet - with which I fully agree - that we should take care to avoid becoming unduly involved.
2. Even so, we have a legitimate interest - not least in light of the Commonwealth angle - in seeing the early establishment of a credible interim administration in Grenada, under the auspices of the Governor General. Two stages will be involved in reaching this objective. The first is the pacification of the island. The Americans are now in control of most of Grenada but there may continue to be some pockets of resistance. The second stage is the setting up of an interim administration by the Governor General which will restore constitutional rule and hold elections as soon as it is practicable to do so.
3. We need to consider the nature of UK interests in this crisis and what role we should play in resolving it. Our interest seems to me to be the emergence of a stable Grenada with a credibly elected democratic government ruling according to the constitution. We wish to see this achieved with the maximum degree of international support and in a way which is consistent with US political and security objectives. Ahead of all this, we shall need, of course, to fulfil our duty to care for the safety of British subjects.



4. The question of what wider role the United Kingdom should play will be the main subject for decision at our meeting. A minimalist approach would be to react to requests which are put to us without taking any more active part in resolving the situation. A maximalist approach would be to aim for the forefront of action, with offers to provide military assistance, civilian advisers, observers for the elections etc. We might be best advised to aim for something in the middle. We should try to react positively to requests put to us, and should be active diplomatically behind the scenes in encouraging others to take action consistent with the objectives I have outlined above. I think that the Commonwealth and Sir S Ramphal personally can do much to help the Americans extricate themselves from a situation where they are attracting a lot of international criticism. But we shall need to bear in mind that the Americans and Ramphal do not see the situation in identical terms and that we may need to help ease any friction which could arise between them. I had a chance to discuss some of these questions with Ramphal when I met him on Friday.

5. An additional question which we must consider at our meeting is what practical assistance we can offer Grenada. I have in mind advisers with particular administrative skills, financial assistance, and the possibility of obtaining a resumption of aid from the European Community to Grenada and even an increase. I do not believe it would be wise, even if it was acceptable, for us to become involved with the provision of troops - except possibly in a training or limited specialist role.

/ 6.



- 3 -

6. The role of the Commonwealth will have to be looked at with some care. On the one hand, there is likely to be support in this country and elsewhere in the Commonwealth for action by the Commonwealth and even for a big role for it, particularly with the meeting of its Heads of Government due to start in Delhi in 3 weeks time. On the other hand, we must remember that the Commonwealth states in the region are divided and that there have been a variety of reactions by Commonwealth governments to American intervention. Ramphal is (rightly, I believe) anxious for the nature and scale of Commonwealth involvement to be agreed before the Delhi meeting, if possible. In their turn, the Americans will be cautious about letting the Commonwealth take over a major role from them until they are satisfied that it can perform credibly: they may argue that the Commonwealth failed to prevent or reverse the coups d'etat by Bishop and Austin. The Commonwealth must not therefore be asked to take a strain greater than it can bear. Nevertheless, I think a certain amount of activity, primarily in the region, by the Commonwealth Secretary-General and Secretariat could be profitable and helpful especially if it is at the request of the Governor General, who is the only constitutional authority in Grenada. He is already in direct touch with Ramphal about the best way of establishing an interim administration and has also sought his advice on the appointment of a legal adviser. This is a helpful development. When he has a few advisers in place, it will be for the Governor General, with them, to decide how much further he wishes to call on the assistance of the Commonwealth and in what form.

7. As far as the Americans are concerned, their chief purpose will be to establish a regime which is "friendly"



- 4 -

to their security interests in the region. They may well try to promote this, regardless of how it will appear internationally. They will need to reconcile their desire to withdraw as soon as possible with their determination to ensure that the security situation is satisfactory. They may be prepared to withdraw in phases if other forces, in which those from countries in the Caribbean should ideally be prominent, arrive to take their place. But others will be reluctant to allow any of the "invading" forces - even those from the small Caribbean countries - to remain in place. Ramphal tells me that Miss Charles (Prime Minister of Dominica) accepts this argument. He is inclined to favour the inclusion of forces from a wide range of Commonwealth countries - India and Nigeria, for example. Canada sees herself as having a possible part to play. The Americans, of course, will have views on all this. I believe we should leave Ramphal in the lead here.

8. I attach great importance to our contacts with the United States on these questions and we shall need to decide how best to pursue them in the immediate future. There are three choices. We could send someone at Ministerial or senior official level to Washington to discuss the issues. This would have a positive impact on domestic opinion, even though it would suggest that the centre of action is in Washington, something we may wish to avoid presentationally. The second option is to invite someone from Washington to London. This would have the same drawback as the first choice but in reverse, namely to suggest that the centre of action was in London. It would also make much less public impact than sending someone to the United States, especially if the invitation were not immediately accepted. The third

/choice



choice is to send someone to Grenada as soon as conditions there permit: he could then have detailed discussions with the Americans on the ground. We should perhaps do the first and the third; there could be something to be said for having at least preliminary talks in Washington early next week.

9. Wherever and however we pursue our discussions with the Americans, we must expect our exchanges to include discussion of US intentions; the role the United Kingdom is willing to play and the level and nature of any assistance we are willing to give Grenada; and the role of other parties in resolving the crisis, particularly the Commonwealth and the Commonwealth Secretary-General.

10. Lastly, we shall need to consider the public presentation of the policy we decide on, bearing in mind the INF/Consultation issue. This will be particularly important in view of the debates in Parliament this week on INF and Foreign Policy.

Annex A 11. I am attaching a note on the role of the Governor General of Grenada which provides useful clarification of his
Annex B constitutional position. I also attach a list of previous joint ventures by Commonwealth countries. The latest situation report on Grenada will be available to you and to OD(EM) colleagues on Monday morning before our meeting.

12. I am sending copies of this minute to members of ODEM and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

GEOFFREY HOWE

(Approved by Sir Geoffrey and issued in his absence)

29 October 1983

POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL

The Governor-General of Grenada is Sir Paul Scoon. He is a Grenadan. The Queen is Head of State of Grenada and the Governor-General is Her representative. I should emphasise that he is neither British himself nor is he in any sense the representative of the British Government.

The Governor-General would normally act on the advice of Her Majesty's Ministers in Grenada. Although the constitution under which Grenada came to independence in 1973 was suspended at the time of the revolution in 1979, The Queen remained Head of State and the Governor-General's position as her representative remained.

Early this month the People's Revolutionary Government was deposed by the Revolutionary Military Council, which, as far as we are aware, has enacted no legislation concerning the Governor-General's functions. This left him in office as Her Majesty's representative, but, in the absence of the source of advice stipulated by the existing law, in effect in a vacuum. In the event that the Military Council is deposed this vacuum will remain.

In this situation the Governor-General will have to decide what steps are appropriate for him to ensure that Her Majesty's government in Grenada may be carried on.

PRECEDENTS FOR COMMONWEALTH JOINT ACTION

Elections

1. Commonwealth observers have monitored the following elections:

Kenya - 1954

British Guiana (Guyana) - 1964

Gibraltar - 1967 (referendum)

Mauritius - 1967

Zimbabwe - 1979/80

Uganda - 1980

Military Training

2. Commonwealth military training teams have assisted Zimbabwe (1980) and Uganda (since 1981) in training their armies.

COMMONWEALTH CO-ORDINATION DEPARTMENT

28 October 1983



BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

28 October 1983

A J Coles Esq
No 10 Downing Street

Dear Coles,

*Filed at
26. 10. 83*

/ I am enclosing a personal letter to the Prime Minister from Mr Malcolm Fraser which the Australian Embassy here have asked us to transmit to her.

Yours ever,

Peter Jenkins

P R Jenkins
Private Secretary to
Sir Oliver Wright

We should have acted first

THE invasion of Grenada will achieve its purpose, the restoration of democratic government and the ending, for at least a period, of any possibility of Grenada coming under Soviet or Cuban influence.

But at what a price. There are many people around the world who count themselves as friends of the United States who fear that price will be too high.

The United States as the only democratic super Power has a special responsibility to act at all times scrupulously within the framework of international law and practice. Once the Americans put themselves in the dock of international opinion, and particularly since they are likely to be judged guilty, we are all weakened.

Clout

It is hard to escape the conclusion that this is what they have done. Some will say there was no other course, it had to be done, *realpolitik* had to triumph. But this is not true.

There was another course open but it critically depended on a readiness by Britain to play a key role. Even after Wednesday's debate in the House of Commons, we are still left wondering whether or not Britain was prepared to play such a role. It appears that we were not.

The role that Britain should have played was as the spearhead of a Commonwealth initiative. Even if we are now less influential in the Caribbean, we still carry that all-



by
Dr DAVID OWEN

LEADER OF THE SDP AND
FORMER LABOUR FOREIGN SECRETARY

important ingredient of diplomatic activity—clout.

Britain counts for something in this area still. We could have mobilised a consensus for concerted economic and political action and also set in train a graduated military response that could have even involved a 'quarantine' of Grenada, similar to that imposed by President Kennedy on Cuba in 1962.

Support

There is little doubt that such action, preventing any temptation for Cuba or anyone else to reinforce or succour the brutal regime temporarily installed on Grenada, would have worked. It might have taken a few weeks, during which there would have been anxiety about foreign nationals on the island; but it would probably have been possible to have flown them out.

The penalty for Britain's inaction has been a perceived impotence, and in its relations with the United States, a public humiliation.

Belatedly, we should now mobilise the Commonwealth to, at the very least, ensure that U.S. troops are withdrawn as soon as possible; that the Governor-General exercises temporarily full authority; and the Commonwealth undertake responsibility for supervising fair and free elections and the return of Grenada to democracy.

For the medium term, we must do everything possible to shore up our all-important relationship with the United States.

We should not support reso-

lutions in the United Nations that use the word 'condemn' in relation to the U.S. and Caribbean States' action, but we should support resolutions that call for an immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops and the introduction of an independent U.N. or Commonwealth body—preferably Commonwealth—to bring about a restoration to democracy.

The British Government cannot sit on the fence, as Sir Geoffrey Howe tried to do in the House on Wednesday, on whether military intervention can be justified under U.N. Article 52. It cannot.

There is, however, an inescapable consequence from the whole affair.

British public opinion will simply not accept any longer the Prime Minister's refusal to insist on a dual key mechanism to cover the launching procedures for any Cruise missiles that are deployed in Britain before the end of this year.

Right

Repeatedly over the past two years I have tried to make the Prime Minister understand that relying on the verbal agreement to a joint decision procedure between a U.S. President and a British Prime Minister is insufficient to carry conviction.

I believe that the assurance on dual key is now a right of the British people. The precedent was, after all, established by the Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan.

Always sensitive to public



opinion, he knew that on the only other occasion that U.S. missiles have been deployed in Britain, a dual key arrangement was a minimum requirement for public support and ensuring Britain's rightful degree of independence.

In consequence, from 1959-62 Thor missiles operated under the dual control of service personnel from the Royal Air Force as well as the United States.

The United States have not objected to a dual key, saying it is a choice for Britain to make. Mrs Thatcher must, in the light of the changed circumstances, be forced to see the wisdom of dual key.

If she does, she will begin to demonstrate that in her second term of office, she is starting to understand her responsibility to be the Prime Minister of the whole nation.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 October 1983

Dear John,

I enclose a set of briefing notes which have been prepared for Sir Geoffrey Howe's use in public discussion of Grenada over the weekend. These may be useful to other Cabinet Ministers if asked about the Government's attitude to various issues raised by the problem of Grenada in the coming days.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to other Cabinet Ministers.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

~~ABC~~ ABC 22/10.
v-a.
The original was included
in the PM's BBC World
Service mtg colder for
Sunday on David's
advice.

Mark
29/10.

GRENADA

HMG's approach up to US intervention

- (i) Actively followed events from coup (13 October) and murder of Bishop (19 October)
- (ii) Aware from Friday 21 October that small East Caribbean states (OECS) favoured military intervention. Informed by Adams (Barbados - not a member of OECS). No written request from OECS until 1700 Monday 24 October.
- (iii) But good reasons for thinking military intervention unlikely.
- US told us on 22 October they favoured proceeding 'very cautiously'.
 - Main Caribbean body (CARICOM) on 23 October came out in favour of economic/political measures against Grenada - but no agreement on armed intervention.
 - Visit of Deputy High Commissioner to Grenada on 22/23 October: British subjects 'in no immediate danger': Governor General did not mention any request for intervention.
 - Grenada junta put out statements promising balanced Cabinet, good relations with neighbours, including US
- (iv) Despite this:
- We ordered HMS ANTRIM to Grenada on 23 October in case need for evacuation.
 - Repeated our strong doubts to Americans on Monday 24 October.

/.....

Consultation with US

- (i) Reagan seems to have made a tentative decision late on 23 October that US might respond. A 'semi-final decision' to commit US forces at 1930 GMT on 24 October. Final directive at 2200 GMT.
- (ii) Reagan told PM at 1915 on 24 October that he 'was giving serious consideration' to OECS request. At 2300 he said he had decided to respond. Message and phone call from PM around midnight but US already going ahead.
- (iii) Have told Americans consultation was inadequate. They accept this. As close allies can differ without rancour or harming defence cooperation.

Justification of Intervention

- As a matter of law, states are entitled to act to protect lives of citizens.
- As to facts, our citizens 'in no immediate danger'. US citizens in different situation (1,000, more conspicuous therefore more vulnerable). For US to make own case.

As to other objectives (democracy, constitutional government and security) we share these.

HMG's Line in Parliament, UN etc

- We disagree with US and OECS on justification.
- But didn't want to make task of US/OECS forces more difficult
- Concerned to avoid public row with US ally.

This distinct British judgement led to distinct British position at UN (where we abstained) Our doubts shared by other Caribbean countries (Trinidad, Guyana, Bahamas, Belize)

The Way Ahead

Aim must be elections, suitably supervised. Need for

- Interim administration
- Law and order

Primarily a matter for Grenada and neighbours. HMG consulting in Commonwealth, which may have significant role.

Governor General

Representative of HM Queen, as Head of State of Grenada.
No formal link with HMG. We neither received nor transmitted any request from him for military intervention.

Comparison with Afghanistan

Completely different. US/OECS intervention to protect foreign citizens and restore constitutional government.



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1049</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Folio 4:</i> <i>Minute from Coles to Prime Minister dated 28 October 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>4 June 2013</i> <i>A Wayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <u>PREM 19</u>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <u>1049</u> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <u>Folio 3</u> : Minute from Duff to Armstrong dated 28 October 1983.	
CLOSED FOR YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<u>4 June 2013</u> <u>Wayland</u>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1049</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Record of telephone call by Sonny Ramphal at 1645 GMT, 28 October 1983, with attached compliment slip</i>	
CLOSED FOR <i>40</i> YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>4 June 2013 @Wayland</i>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

PRIME MINISTER

OD(EM)

The Foreign Secretary has been holding meetings today to consider some of the points he discussed with you this morning - and in particular whether there is anything which we can properly do to assist the establishment of democracy in Grenada. He will be letting you have a minute over the weekend though I am warned that it is more likely to be a check list of points for consideration than a set of clear conclusions.

The Foreign Secretary himself will be in Rome on Monday morning. But I still think it will be desirable to have a meeting of OD(EM) to take stock of the situation after the weekend. Janet Young would attend in Sir Geoffrey's place.

The F/C.O. Emergency Unit will be working throughout the weekend. They will produce SITREPS at 0900 on both Saturday and Sunday - and others if necessary.

A.J.C.

mf

28 October 1983

GRENADA

ADVANCE COPIES

34 3B 37

2

HD/EMERGENCY UI IT

HD/NAD
HD/S AM D
HD/MCAD
HD/UND
HD/FUSD
HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/INFO DEPT
HD/PROTOCOL DEPT
HD/ECD(E)
HD/ECD(I)
HD/CCD
HD/CONSULAR DEPT
HD/SOV. DEPT
HD/ PLANNING STAFF
HD/RESEARCH DEPT
HD/LEGAL ADVISERS

HD/LED

PS (2)

BS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY

NR ADAMS

SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE

CABINET OFFICE

NO. 10 DOWNING ST

MOD, RC
MOD (DI 4)

RESIDENT CLERK

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 280410Z OCT 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3184 OF 28 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

GRENADA: GOVERNOR GENERAL'S APPEAL TO OECS

1. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE DAM'S STATEMENT TO THE SENATE RELATIONS FOREIGN COMMITTEE TODAY CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH:

'THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF GRENADA MADE A CONFIDENTIAL DIRECT APPEAL TO THE OECS TO TAKE ACTION TO RESTORE ORDER ON THE ISLAND. AS THE SOLE REMAINING AUTHORITATIVE REPRESENTATIVE OF GOVERNMENT ON GRENADA, HIS APPEAL FOR ACTION CARRIED EXCEPTIONAL MORAL AND LEGAL WEIGHT'.

2. WE ASKED THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON WHAT BASIS THIS PARAGRAPH WAS INCLUDED. OUR USUAL DESK LEVEL CONTACT DID NOT KNOW.

WE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD BY A MEMBER OF THE GRENADA TASK FORCE FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S REGIONAL MILITARY AFFAIRS OFFICE THAT, ON 21 OCTOBER, SIR PAUL SCOON DID INDEED MAKE SUCH AN APPEAL TO OECS CONTACTS (CF MRS CHARLES' SPEECH IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL). PRECISELY TO WHOM AND BY WHAT MEANS WAS NOT KNOWN. IN RESPONSE TO

~~FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S REGIONAL MILITARY AFFAIRS OFFICE THAT~~
~~ON 21 OCTOBER, SIR PAUL SCOON DID INDEED MAKE SUCH AN APPEAL TO~~
~~OECS CONTACTS (CF MRS CHARLES' SPEECH IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL).~~
PRECISELY TO WHOM AND BY WHAT MEANS WAS NOT KNOWN. IN RESPONSE TO
THIS APPEAL, IT WAS DECIDED TO SEND TO GRENADA LARRY ROSSIN,
A DESK OFFICER IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHO PREVIOUSLY SERVED IN
BRIDGETOWN AND KNEW SIR P SCOON. ROSSIN TRAVELLED TO BARBADOS
ON SUNDAY 23 OCTOBER AND, ACCORDING TO THIS INFORMANT, HE
ENTERED GRENADA ON A US LANDING CRAFT OR HELICOPTER PROBABLY
ON THE NIGHT OF 24/25 OCTOBER. HE AND A MILITARY ESCORT WENT TO THE
GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S RESIDENCE AND SCOON SIGNED DOCUMENTS APPEALING
TO THE OECS TO TAKE ACTION TO RESTORE ORDER ON THE ISLAND.

3. WE WERE TOLD THAT TWO OF THE OFFICERS WITH ROSSIN WERE WOUNDED
DURING THIS EXERCISE. ROSSIN IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN EVACUATED
TO BARBADOS WHERE HE AND, WE UNDERSTAND, THE DOCUMENTS REMAIN.

WRIGHT

NNNN

VVVVVVVVVV

XXXXX 39/27

GRENADA

ADVANCE COPIES

38 31
+33

HD/EMERGENCY UNIT
 HD/N&D
 HD/S AM D
 HD/MCAD
 HD/UND
 HD/FUSD
 HD/DEFENCE DEPT
 HD/NEWS DEPT
 HD/INFO DEPT
 HD/PROTOCOL DEPT
 HD/ECD(E)
 HD/ECD(I)
 HD/CCD
 HD/CONSULAR DEPT
 HD/SOV. DEPT
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 HD/RESEARCH DEPT
 HD/LEGAL ADVISERS

PS (2)
 PS/LADY YOUNG
 PS/MR WHITNEY
 PS/PUS
 SIR J BULLARD
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR URE
 MR CARTLEDGE
 MR HANNAY
 MR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE
 CABINET OFFICE
 NO. 10 DOWNING ST
 MOD, RG
 MOD (DI 4)
 RESIDENT CLERK

HD/CEO

ADVANCE COPY

UNCLASSIFIED
 FM UKMIS NEW YORK 280750Z OCT 83
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TEL NO 1180 OF 28 OCTOBER 1983
 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON BRIDGETOWN OTTAWA KINGSTON
 GEORGETOWN BELMOPAN NASSAU PORT OF SPAIN HAVANA MOSCOW
 CARACAS PARIS MODUK UKDEL NATO

SECOND IPT: SECURITY COUNCIL: GRENADA

1. FOLLOWING IS MY SPEECH AS DELIVERED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL:

MR PRESIDENT
 WE BEGAN THIS DEBATE AT A LATE HOUR ON TUESDAY IN RESPONSE TO AN IMMEDIATE REQUEST FROM NICARAGUA. WE HAVE HEARD MANY SPEECHES SOME OF THEM HIGHLY EMOTIONAL ABOUT THE SITUATION IN GRENADA. BY COMMON CONSENT THAT SITUATION WAS SERIOUS. AFTER ALL THE PRIME MINISTER HAD JUST BEEN MURDERED AND THE POPULATION WERE CONFINED TO THEIR HOMES AT GUN POINT. BUT APART FROM THE FACT THAT ALL DELEGATIONS AGREE ON THE SERIOUS SITUATION THAT HAD ARISEN IN THE ISLAND WE HAVE HEARD SHARP DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT THE ACTIONS TAKEN TO MEET IT. MY GOVERNMENT MADE IT PLAIN IN AN EMERGENCY DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS YESTERDAY THAT IT HAD SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT SOME OF THOSE ACTIONS. OUR POSITION IS ON RECORD AND IT WILL NOT REPEAT TODAY EVERYTHING THAT WAS SAID AT GREATER LENGTH IN LONDON YESTERDAY. WHAT I AM TO DO NOW IS TO CONSIDER WITH MY COLLEAGUES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHAT OUR COMMON AIM SHOULD BE AND HOW WE CAN CONTRIBUTE TO BRINGING IT ABOUT.

I SUGGEST THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE SPEECHES WE HAVE HEARD AND ON THE BASIS OF THE CHARTER OUR COMMON AIM SHOULD BE THE EMERGENCE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL GRENADIAN GOVERNMENT FREELY ELECTED BY THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE. I AM TALKING

mf

I SUGGEST THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE SPEECHES WE HAVE HEARD AND ON THE BASIS OF THE CHARTER OUR COMMON AIM SHOULD BE THE EMERGENCE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL GRENADIAN GOVERNMENT FREELY ELECTED BY THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE. I AM TALKING ABOUT A REAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT BASED ON THE EXERCISE OF SELF-DETERMINATION BY THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE. THIS IS A VERY DIFFERENT THING FROM THE REGIME - IT DID NOT CALL ITSELF A GOVERNMENT - WHICH WAS HOLDING HOSTAGE THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA AND POTENTIALLY SOME OTHERS RESIDENT IN THE ISLAND. IT IS EVIDENT THAT IN THE MURKY SITUATION CREATED BY THE MURDER OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GRENADIAN CABINET THERE WAS AN ATMOSPHERE OF UNCERTAINTY AND EVEN TERROR IN THE ISLAND. LIVES, LIBERTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION WERE AT RISK. INDEED IT SEEM POSSIBLE THAT MR BISHOP WAS ASSASSINATED BECAUSE HE AND SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES WERE MOVING, NOT BEFORE TIME, IN THE DIRECTION OF HOLDING ELECTIONS. AS A GREAT BRITISH HISTORIAN LORD ACTON REPEATEDLY STRESSED, POLITICAL ASSASSINATION IS THE GREAT CRIME AGAINST LIBERTY.

GIVEN THIS SITUATION IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT THE TERROR IN THE ISLAND PRODUCED A SENSE OF FEAR IN THE REGION. THE PRIME MINISTER OF DOMINICA WHO IS ALSO THE CHAIR-PERSON OF THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES TOLD US IN MEASURED AND ELOQUENT TERMS THAT ALL THE EXISTING GOVERNMENTS OF THE ORGANISATION WERE AFRAID. THEY WERE AFRAID SHE SAID THAT "THIS SITUATION WOULD CONTINUE TO WORSEN, THAT THERE WOULD BE FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE, PERSONAL INJURY AND A GENERAL DETERIORATION OF PUBLIC ORDER." HER GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS CONSIDERED THAT THE MILITARY GROUP IN CONTROL INTENDED BY IMPOSING A DRACONIAN CURFEW "TO SUPPRESS FURTHER THE POPULATION OF GRENADA, WHICH HAD SHOWN BY NUMEROUS DEMONSTRATIONS THEIR HOSTILITY TO THIS GROUP". THE ELOQUENT AND MOVING SPEECHES BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OTHER STATES OF THE OECS AND OF JAMAICA AND BARBADOS HAVE REINFORCED THESE POINTS. THESE SPEECHES HAVE, I THINK, HAD A PROFOUND EFFECT ON THOSE DELEGATIONS WHICH HAVE NOT HITHERTO BEEN CLEARLY INFORMED ABOUT THE TRUE SITUATION IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN. NOR IS IT SURPRISING THAT FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE SAFETY OF THEIR NATIONALS IN GRENADA. MY GOVERNMENT WAS ONE OF THESE. WE TOOK WHAT WE CONSIDERED WERE APPROPRIATE STEPS. WE SENT A BRITISH DIPLOMAT TO GRENADA TO INVESTIGATE THE SITUATION AND MORE OR LESS SIMULTANEOUSLY WE DIRECTED A BRITISH FRIGATE HMS ANTRIM TO PROCEED TO THE VICINITY OF GRENADA ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS IN CASE THE SITUATION SHOULD DETERIORATE TO THE POINT AT WHICH BRITISH NATIONALS HAD TO BE EVACUATED FROM GRENADA UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. WE WERE CAUTIOUS AND DID NOT GO BEYOND THESE CONTINGENCY PREPARATIONS. OTHER GOVERNMENTS WERE LIKE MINE HIGHLY CONCERNED FOR THE SAFETY OF THEIR NATIONALS. MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL BE FAMILIAR FOR EXAMPLE WITH THE STATEMENTS ON THIS POINT MADE THROUGH THE PUBLIC MEDIA BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF DOMINICA. WE MUST ALL BE GRATEFUL THAT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL, A DISTINGUISHED GRENADIAN CITIZEN AND THE ONLY REMAINING CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY IN THE ISLAND HAS SURVIVED THE BLOODY EVENTS OF RECENT DAYS. HE WILL WE ASSUME NOW HAVE TO PLAY HIS CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE AS A FOCUS FOR THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN GRENADA.

I DO NOT PRETEND TO GIVE HERE A FULL ACCOUNT OF ALL THE EVENTS OF RECENT DAYS. BUT I HOPE I HAVE SAID ENOUGH TO ILLUSTRATE THAT

~~I DO NOT PRETEND TO GIVE HERE A FULL ACCOUNT OF ALL THE EVENTS OF RECENT DAYS. BUT I HOPE I HAVE SAID ENOUGH TO ILLUSTRATE THAT~~
INTERNAL EVENTS IN GRENADA HAD CREATED A SITUATION WHICH LED TO TERROR IN THE ISLAND AND FEAR IN THE REGION AND WHICH GAVE LEGITIMATE GROUND FOR CONCERN TO MANY GOVERNMENTS ESPECIALLY THOSE WITH NATIONALS ON THE ISLAND. THERE WAS THUS A TENSE AND DIFFICULT SITUATION. MEETINGS WERE HELD OF THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES AND OF CARICOM. THIS LATTER BODY COMPRISES ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES, PLUS SIX OTHER CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES. THERE WAS IT SEEMS A DEBATE AND A LEGITIMATE DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ABOUT WHAT STEPS TO TAKE REGIONALLY TO DEAL WITH WHAT WAS EVIDENTLY BECOMING A REGIONAL PROBLEM. THESE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION HAVE BEEN REFLECTED IN THE INTERVENTIONS MADE IN THIS DEBATE.

APPROACHES WERE MADE TO MY GOVERNMENT AS TO WHAT ACTION WE WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE IN CONJUNCTION WITH CERTAIN CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES. IT IS NO SECRET THAT WE URGED ON ALL THOSE WHO CONSULTED US PRUDENCE, AND CAUTION. OTHER VIEWS PREVAILED. MY GOVERNMENT TOOK NO PART IN THE MILITARY OPERATION WHICH HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT IN GRENADA. IT IS VERY PLAIN THAT MY GOVERNMENT DID NOT SUPPORT THOSE OPERATIONS AND THAT WE WISHED A DIFFERENT COURSE OF ACTION TO BE FOLLOWED. BUT THAT IS NOT TO SAY THAT WE DID NOT CONSIDER THE SITUATION GRAVE, RISKY AND DIFFICULT. WE CAN UNDERSTAND THE CONCERNS OF THOSE WHO TOOK ACTION. WE ARE GLAD THAT SEVERAL OTHER SPEAKERS IN THIS DEBATE HAVE EXPRESSED SIMILAR UNDERSTANDING.

WE REGRET THAT THIS UNDERSTANDING IS NOT REFLECTED IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION BEFORE US. OF COURSE EMOTIONS RUN HIGH AND SOME OF THE SPEECHES WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE IN SUPPORT OF THE RESOLUTION WERE TO SAY THE LEAST HIGHLY CHARGED.

REPUTATION IS IMPORTANT IN INTERNATIONAL AS WELL AS IN DOMESTIC POLITICS. THE GOVERNMENTS WHICH TOOK ACTION IN GRENADA ARE OF THE HIGHEST REPUTATION. THE SUGGESTION THAT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IS A FOE TO LIBERTY AND DEMOCRACY AS SOME SPEAKERS HAVE ALLOWED THEMSELVES TO SAY IS SIMPLY RIDICULOUS. IT IS A PITY THAT OUR DEBATES SHOULD BE SULLIED BY SUCH UNTRUTHS. I MUST SAY, MR PRESIDENT, THAT I RESENT SUCH STATEMENTS.

SIMILARLY, I MUST DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE COUNCIL TO THE HIGH REPUTATION OF THE CARIBBEAN STATES INVOLVED IN THE GRENADA OPERATION. I AM PROUD TO ACKNOWLEDGE THEM AS FELLOW MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH. IN A WORLD WHERE ALL TOO OFTEN WE ARE FACED WITH MOVEMENTS, COUPS AND REGIMES WHICH ACT AGAINST LIBERTY AND IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION THESE ARE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS, FREELY ELECTED AND REPRESENTING PEOPLE WHO ENJOY LIBERTIES THAT HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED IN MANY OTHER COUNTRIES. IF ON OCCASION OUR JUDGEMENTS DIFFER WE DO NOT DOUBT THEIR SINCERITY OR THAT THEIR MOTIVES WERE HONOURABLE. THEIR STATED OBJECTIVE IS TO RESTORE DEMOCRATIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT TO THE ISLAND. THAT IS AN OBJECTIVE WE FULLY SHARE. I NEED HARDLY SAY THAT MY DELEGATIONS RESPECT FOR ALL THE MEMBERS OF CARICOM IS THE SAME. IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE WE AGREE WITH SOME MORE THAN WITH OTHERS BUT I REPEAT THAT WE ATTACH EQUAL IMPORTANCE TO THE VIEWS OF ALL THE HONOURABLE, INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH

RESPECT FOR ALL THE MEMBERS OF CARICOM IS THE SAME. IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE WE AGREE WITH SOME MORE THAN WITH OTHERS BUT I REPEAT THAT WE ATTACH EQUAL IMPORTANCE TO THE VIEWS OF ALL THE HONOURABLE, INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH IN THE CARIBBEAN.

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND IT WILL BE NO SURPRISE THAT MY GOVERNMENT CANNOT GO ALONG WITH A RESOLUTION WHICH DOES NOT TAKE ADEQUATE ACCOUNT OF THE CONCERNS WHICH HAVE MOTIVATED THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES, JAMAICA, BARBADOS AND THE US. BUT AS I SAID AT THE OUTSET MR PRESIDENT IT SHOULD BE THE AIM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONSIDER WAYS IN WHICH OUR COMMON AIM OF THE EMERGENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL GRENADIAN GOVERNMENT FREELY ELECTED BY THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE CAN BE PROMOTED. IT IS NOT FOR US TO TELL THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE HOW TO RUN THEIR AFFAIRS. BUT I BELIEVE WE CAN LEGITIMATELY GIVE ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE FORCES OF CONSTITUTIONALITY AND TO THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION. THAT IS THE MESSAGE WHICH MY DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO SEE GO OUT FROM THIS DEBATE.

VITUPERATION AND UNMEASURED RHETORIC WILL NOT GET US ANYWHERE. WHAT WE NEED NOW IS COMMON SENSE AND A RESPECT FOR DEMOCRATIC DECENCIES. MY GOVERNMENT KNOWS THAT THESE ARE QUALITIES WHICH PREEMINENTLY CHARACTERISE THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA WHEN ENABLED ONCE AGAIN TO PARTICIPATE IN FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS WILL THEMSELVES DISPLAY THESE QUALITIES.

THOMSON

NNNN

*Passed to E.R.
& C.H.*

WITH THESE TWO EVIDENTLY RECORDED VITUPERATION BEING THE
PRESENCE OF OBVIOUS VIOLENCE TO THE RESOLUTION TO BE
CONSIDERED, COMMITTEE THESE TWO WERE BEING A DEBATE AND A FEELING
OF THE OBVIOUSNESS OF THE SYSTEM WHICH WOULD BE THE
RESULTS AND OF THE COMMISSION THIS FURTHER WOULD BE THE
FROM FEELINGS WERE METS OF THE COMMISSION OF THE SYSTEM WHICH
WITNESS OF THE SYSTEM WHICH WOULD BE THE RESULTS WHICH
THE SECOND FOR CONCERN TO THE SYSTEM WHICH WOULD BE THE
RESULTS OF THE SYSTEM WHICH WOULD BE THE RESULTS WHICH
RESULTS OF THE SYSTEM WHICH WOULD BE THE RESULTS WHICH
RESULTS OF THE SYSTEM WHICH WOULD BE THE RESULTS WHICH
RESULTS OF THE SYSTEM WHICH WOULD BE THE RESULTS WHICH

GRENADA

ADVANCE COPIES

34 35 36



HD/EMERGENCY UNIT

HD/NAD
HD/S AM D
HD/MCAD
HD/UND
HD/PUSD
HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/INFO DEPT
HD/PROTOCOL DEPT
HD/ECD(E)
HD/ECD(I)
HD/CCD
HD/CONSULAR DEPT
HD/SOV. DEPT
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/RESEARCH DEPT
LEGAL ADVISERS (Mr. Freeland)

HD EEP

PS (2)

BS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY

SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE
CABINET OFFICE
NO. 10 DOWNING ST

MOD, RC
MOD (DI 4)

RESIDENT CLERK

O 281403Z OCT 83

FM FOF2 FLAG

TO RBDWC/MODUK NAVY

INFO RBDEC/CINCFLEET

RBDWDF/FCO LONDON

RBDWC/MODUK

RBDWW/CBNS WASHINGTON

RBDWDFG/BHC BRIDGETOWN

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIC LDQ/JDA/A3A

GRENADA CONTINGENCY SITREP. 018

1. CONTACT MADE WITH BRITISH REPRESENTATIVE JOHN KELLY ASHORE GRENADA
2. HE REPORTS THAT BRITISH CITIZENS ALL WELL SITTING TIGHT INCLUDING PLESSEY TEAM.
3. CONSULATE TEAM STILL EXPECTED BUT NOT ARRIVED.
4. KELLY ATTEMPTING TO SET UP COMMS USING CABLE AND WIRELESS
5. AMERICAN HELP BEING SOUGHT TO PREVENT FURTHER INSTANCES FORCIBLE ENTRY OF HOMES AND TO PROVIDE PETROL.

PAGE 2 RBDFOFG 066 R E S T R I C T E D

6. ONE GROUP CIVILIANS HOTEL CALABASH HAVE ENOUGH FOOD ONLY TILL THIS MORNING ANOTHER OF ABOUT 20 CAN LAST OUT UNTIL TOMORROW

BT

1516

ADVANCE COPY
IMMEDIATE

MT



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1049</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Record of conversation with Sir Paul Scoon, 14.00 GMT on 28 October 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR <i>40</i> YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>4 June 2013 Wayland</i>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1049</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Letter from Moore to Acland dated 28 October 1983, with attached compliment slip</i>	
CLOSED FOR <i>40</i> YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>4 June 2013 @Wayland</i>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1049</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Letter from Moore to Adland dated 28 October 1983, with attached compliment slip.</i>	
CLOSED FOR <i>40</i> YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>4 June 2013 @Wayland</i>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1049</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Record of conversation 1300 GMT on 28 October 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR <i>40</i> YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>4 June 2013 Wayland</i>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

GRENADA

ADVANCE COPIES

3B 37

ty. p. 10.

HD/EMERGENCY UI IT

HD/NAD
HD/S AM D
HD/MCAD
HD/UND
HD/PUSD
HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/INFO DEPT
HD/PROTOCOL DEPT
HD/ECD(E)
HD/ECD(I)
HD/CCD
HD/CONSULAR DEPT
HD/SOV. DEPT
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/RESEARCH DEPT
HD/LEGAL ADVISERS

HD/LED

PS (2)

BS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR URE
MR CARTLEDGE
MR HANNAY


~~MR PONS~~
SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE

CABINET OFFICE

NO. 10 DOWNING ST

MOD, RC
MOD (DI 4)

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~



CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 280900Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1181 OF 28 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON BRIDGETOWN OTTAWA KINGSTON PARIS
GEORGETOWN BELMOPAN NASSAU PORT OF SPAIN UKDEL NATO MODUK
HAVANA MOSCOW CARACAS.

A. d. C. 28/10
h-a

MY THIRD IFT: SECURITY COUNCIL: GRENADA

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM THE DOMINICAN DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE:

HIS EXCELLENCY MR. ABDULAH SALAH
PRESIDENT
SECURITY COUNCIL
UNITED NATIONS,

DEAR PRESIDENT,

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO CONVEY TO YOU THE TEXT OF A COMMUNICATION RECEIVED FROM THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF GRENADA:

26TH OCTOBER 1983

TO: AMBASSADOR SALAH, PRESIDENT OF UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL,

FROM: THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF GRENADA.

MAY I INFORM YOU, SIR, THAT IN OUR PRESENT SITUATION NO PERSON OR GROUP IS AUTHORISED TO SPEAK BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS WITHOUT THE EXPRESSED PERMISSION OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OR UNTIL A NEW AMBASSADOR IS APPOINTED FOR GRENADA. I FURTHER WISH TO

MAY I INFORM YOU, SIR, THAT IN OUR PRESENT SITUATION NO PERSON OR GROUP IS AUTHORISED TO SPEAK BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS WITHOUT THE EXPRESSED PERMISSION OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OR UNTIL A NEW AMBASSADOR IS APPOINTED FOR GRENADA. I FURTHER WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT I HAVE GIVEN NO SUCH AUTHORIZATION TO ANY GROUP AT THIS TIME.

SIR PAUL SCOON
GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF GRENADA.

PLEASE ACCEPT YOUR EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCE OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATIONS.

YOURS SINCERELY,

SIMON P. RICHARDS
DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE.

THOMSON

NNNN



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1049</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Letter from Adland to Moore dated 28 October 1983.</i>	
CLOSED FOR <i>40</i> YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>4 June 2013 B Wayland</i>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

WV -
MR 504
CONFIDENTIAL

GRENADA : SITREP NO 6 : 28 OCTOBER (0700 HOURS)

1. For previous developments see Sitreps 1 to 5 for period up to 271900Z.

A 2. We have just received an oral account from Mr Montgomery, DHC Bridgetown, on his visit to Grenada late evening (local time) 27 October. A telegram will follow. Main points were:

- (i) a major engagement at Calvigny, 27 October
- (ii) Americans completely under-estimated strength of resistance.
- (iii) General Crist reported a vast military complex at Calvigny.
- (iv) Hope of stabilising military position 28 October; would be followed by Governor General's broadcast.
- (v) Mr Montgomery met Governor General who is ready to take a grip.

*Passage deleted and closed,
40 years, under FOI Exemption. O'Wayland
4. June 2013*

(vi) Still precarious military position will further delay Consular visit.

• Additionally,

(vii) Mr & Mrs Kelly are at home and well. The Americans hope to bring them out of St George's 28 October.

Situation on the Ground

B 3. In TV broadcast at 280015Z, President Reagan described huge Cuban arms caches. Richmond Hill prison was finally overcome, all those inside were found to be dead. No numbers, but expected to be large. Fort Frederick captured by US Forces. Reuters report that General Austin holding hostages in southern part of island.

The Governor General

C 4. Arrangements in hand for Governor General to speak to the Palace at 1300GMT on 28 October.

/Prime

Prime Minister Adams and the OECS Request

D
Bridge-
town
tels
370 &
371]

5. On 27 October Mr Adams showed the High Commissioner the Governor General's letter, dated 24 October requesting Mr Adams' help in 'stabilising this grave and dangerous situation' and referring to Sir Paul's desire to see a peace-keeping force 'established in Grenada to facilitate a rapid return to peace and tranquility and also a return to democratic rule'. The High Commissioner believes that the signature is genuine, but the date almost certainly false.

6. Miss Charles did not sign a letter to High Commissioner. Secretary General of OECS explained on her behalf to High Commission that she did not make contact because this might complicate the discussion between Mr Adams and the High Commission.

7. Mr Adams believes 'little bubble of discord' with UK now pricked.

US Position

8. In his broadcast President Reagan indicated action taken (inter alia) to avoid another 'Tehran hostage' situation. Cuban build up of arms on island much greater than expected. US acted 'just in time'.

UK Position

9. US clearance now given for consular team to fly to Grenada in Hercules 1300 GMT 28 October (but may be delayed). HMS Antrim proceeding towards Barbados to pick up stores.

Evacuation

10. Further two British citizens have arrived at Charleston, and are being assisted at BCG Atlanta. Arrangements might be possible in slower time for evacuation of British citizens by RAF Hercules, but US will continue to be responsible at the present.

Main Government Reactions

11. Canadian opposition to invasion hardening.

Multilateral Fora

Security Council: In session overnight. At opening US Representative, Mr Liechenstern immediately challenged credentials of Grenadian representative. Compromise reached (i) Secretary General will submit a report on the Grenadian delegation and (ii) the Grenadian Deputy Representative withdrew from the Council; there was no decision on the status of Governor General's notification that Grenadian delegation no longer represented Grenada.

Guyanese resolution, with some amendment, vetoed by US in vote at 0700GMT. 11 in favour (including France, Netherlands), 3 abstentions (UK, Zaire, Togo).

PART 1 ends:-

AJe to Fco 27.10.83

PART 2 begins:-

Sitep No 6 28.10.83