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PREM 19/1070

with the Taoiseach.

Irish Joint Studies.

Anglo-Irish Summit.

IRELAND.

Part 1: May 1979.

Part 6: Nov 1981.

PART 6.

| Referred to | Date | Referred to | Date | Referred to | Date | Referred to | Date |
|---------------------|------|--------------------|------|---------------------|------|-------------|------|
| 4.81 | | 31.3.82 | | 14.3.83 | | | |
| 2.11.81 | | 15.4.82 | | 22.3.83 | | | |
| 12.81 | | 23.4.82 | | 27.6.83 | | | |
| 1.12.81 | | 25.5.82 | | 30.6.83 | | | |
| 1.12.81 | | 26.5.82 | | 30.6.83 | | | |
| 6.12.81 | | 16.7.82 | | 8.7.83 | | | |
| 31.12.81 | | 23.7.82 | | 11.7.83 | | | |
| 2.1.82 | | 30.7.82 | | 18.7.83 | | | |
| 1.1.82 | | 6.8.82 | | 27.7.83 | | | |
| 17.1.82 | | 9.8.82 | | 17.10.83 | | | |
| 21.1.82 | | 13.1.83 | | 24.10.83 | | | |
| 21.1.82 | | 17.1.83 | | 25.10.83 | | | |
| 23.1.82 | | 24.1.83 | | 3.11.83 | | | |
| 27.1.82 | | 9.3.83 | | 31/10/83 | | | |
| 29.3.82 | | | | >EWAS< | | | |

PREM 19/1070

PART 6 ends:-

AJC to PM + attached 31/10/83

PART 7 begins:-

AJC to RTA 1/11/83

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

| Reference | Date |
|-----------------------------------|----------|
| CC(81) 36th Conclusions, Minute 3 | 12.11.81 |
| OD(81) 55 | 23.11.81 |
| OD(AI)(82) 1 | 23.11.81 |
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The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed AWayland Date 12 April 2013

PREM Records Team

PRIME MINISTER

ANGLO/IRISH SUMMIT

You asked that Michael Alison should look through the draft
communique and draft report. He has now done so and I attach
his comments.

Would you like me, in conveying your agreement to paragraphs
6 and 7 of Sir Robert Armstrong's minute of 28 October, to
ask that Mr. Alison's points be taken account of in the
further drafting?

This is somewhat urgent since Sir Robert will be meeting Mr. Nally
on 2 November.

Yes, please

A.J.C.

31 October 1983



John Coles

As you know, the PM asked me to look carefully through the text of the draft Joint Studies Review, to comment on aspects with which might not qualify as "essentially analytical texts" (as Robert Armstrong put it).

I suggest three places where further thought or re-drafting might be worth considering:

(a) Paras 1.3 & 1.4: the Encounter Organisation is presented, in effect, as a precursor to an Advisory Committee; the latter is to be "associated with the AIC".

But the scope proposed for the independent development of Encounter - with emphasis on independence of government control - fits rather uneasily into the (apparently) more "official" status of the Advisory Committee, as and when it materializes as successor body.



to Encounter. The latter looks set to bloom with great diversity!

(b) paras 3.19/20 : the final para on

this page might cause some

raised eyebrows. The Border Areas

are the most sensitive in security

terms, and many isolated farmsteads

have been the targets for PIRA &

INLA cross-border terrorist attacks

- with a number of ^{Protestant} farmers in NI

being (deliberately) driven to evacuate

border farmlands. A lot of local

controversy on the NI side has

arisen ^{issue of the} around the closure of cross border

roads, the setting up of road blocks,

regularity of S.F. patrols etc. The paragraph

in the text which I refer to would



I fear provoke anger & revision of
 head aloud in the NI Assembly!
 The "improved tourist maps" etc would
 be seen as an aid to terrorism
 (however unjustifiably).

(c) Para 4.4

Secondary education in NI is a
 touchy topic, with the sectarian
 divide in schooling being regarded
 as the root cause of much of the
 persistence of the "troubles". This
 para. seems to portray very much a
 "one-way traffic" in exchanges, ie from
 South to North; it could be represented as
 almost a subversive flow!

with ADR.

WFO

*cc NIO
FIO
CO
Press
MA*



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

31 October 1983

Dear Sir,

Thank you for your letter of 22 October.

I do not believe that any meeting between myself and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland can be interpreted in the way you suggest. Good relations between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland are in the interests of all the peoples of both our countries. The pursuit of such relations in no way affects the constitutional status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom.

I cannot therefore accept that any talks which I might have with Dr. FitzGerald give support for the belief that the United Kingdom Government is seeking to change that status against the wishes of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland. There is no question of that. Nor do I think that the possibility of misunderstanding or misrepresentation should prevent such exchanges at Prime Ministerial or other levels as seem right to the United Kingdom Government. Rather, I would hope that such /exchanges can

JR

exchanges can be seen for what they are, as normal dealings between neighbouring states.


As your own letter was released to the press I am arranging for my reply to be similarly published.

*Y
Lansdown
Raymond*

The Rt. Hon. James H. Molyneux, J.P., M.P.

Ref. A083/3090

MR COLES



Anglo-Irish Summit

Agree that
 (a) Sir R. Armstrong should make it plain that you would not contemplate joint sovereignty
 (b) a notetaker should be present at the talks - a - talks

A.J.C. 31/10

I am due to visit Dublin on Wednesday 2 November for a meeting with Mr Nally, to tie up the documentation for the forthcoming Anglo-Irish Summit. I am minuting you separately on this; and I shall also be sending forward next week the assessment requested by the Prime Minister of the various ideas that the Irish Government have been trying out at various levels for moving the Northern Ireland problem forward. In the meantime there are two points on which I need to know the Prime Minister's mind before I go to Dublin.

2. First, there are apparently rumours circulating in Dublin to the effect that, while the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is firmly against any "joint sovereignty" solutions, the Prime Minister is "interested in new approaches", not excluding some form of joint sovereignty. My understanding is that the Prime Minister is no less firmly opposed to any kind of "joint sovereignty" solution in Northern Ireland (not least because of its implications for Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands). If that is right, I hope that the Prime Minister will agree that, if I become aware of any signs that the Irish Government attach some credence to these rumours about her attitude, I should scotch them. I would do so by saying that, while the Prime Minister would not want to exclude any ideas which might, without altering the constitutional position of Northern Ireland, help to contribute to lowering tension and reducing violence, she would have great difficulty with any proposals for "joint sovereignty".

3. The second point is this. I do not suppose that the Taoiseach is in a hurry with the sort of ideas he appears to be canvassing: it is all still very exploratory. He is not likely to want to discuss them in detail with the Prime Minister at the forthcoming Summit meeting. But I suspect that he will be very anxious to discover for himself, and directly, what the Prime Minister's own



thoughts, hopes and expectations are in this area. I am not surprised to learn therefore that he is pressing for a period of time en tete-a-tete with the Prime Minister without colleagues, advisers or note-takers. I think that this is a prospect which entails considerable dangers for us. He is, as we know, a very rapid and indistinct talker, and (I have sometimes felt) not always an attentive listener, and I should be nervous about the possibility of his going away with some misconception of what the Prime Minister had said or thought which would subsequently give rise to trouble. So I should have thought that the Prime Minister would be well advised to have someone with her throughout her tete-a-tete with the Taoiseach. But she may take a different view, and I should be glad to know how she would like me to react, if this question comes up when I meet Mr Nally.

BA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

28 October 1983

Ref. A083/3067

PRIME MINISTER

Would you ask
Richard (Harris)
to go through this
very carefully
I double
check

Prime Minister
Agree with the proposals in
paragraphs 6 and 7?

A.J.C. 3/10.

Anglo-Irish Summit: Joint Studies Review

British and Irish officials, meeting as the Co-ordinating Committee of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council (AIIC), have now reached agreement on the draft of an annotated version of the check list of "Possible action points in the Joint Studies" along the lines forecast in paragraph 3 of my minute of 14 July, together with a draft covering report to the two Heads of Government from the Chairmen of the AIIC Steering Committee (Mr Dermot Nally and myself). The two drafts are attached. Mr Nally and I are due to meet in Dublin on 2 November to approve them; and they will then be formally submitted to the two Heads of Government for consideration and endorsement at the Summit on 7 November.

2. The check list (now entitled "Review of Activity Since November 1981") is in five sections corresponding to the five areas covered by the Joint Studies: New Institutional Structures; Citizenship Rights; Economic Co-operation; Measures to Encourage Mutual Understanding; and Security. Under each head there is a factual statement, item by item, of the co-operation which has taken place, drafted as far as possible in politically neutral language. The Irish agreed to include security co-operation in the review on the understanding that, following the precedent of the Joint Studies, the section on security would not be published or publicly commented on (apart from a reference to the fact that it exists: see paragraph 5 of the draft communique). For the rest, the review and covering report have been drafted in terms suitable for publication. The Irish proposal is that the texts, once approved by the two Heads of Government, should be released as annexes to the communique. This would be consistent with what has been done at previous Anglo-Irish Summits.

3. The texts are the result of a laborious joint drafting process in which virtually every word has been weighed from the point of view of both British and Irish sensitivities. On the British



side our objectives have been to achieve a fair balance between the North-South and the United Kingdom-Republic dimensions; to avoid any suggestion of constitutional change or movement towards a united Ireland; and to ensure that the co-operation under review is described in terms consistent with a close relationship between two friendly, adjacent but separate countries. The trickiest passages have been those under Items 1.2 (Parliamentary links) and 2.1 and 2.2 (citizenship rights), where the Irish predictably wanted an emphasis different from ours. But I believe that the texts which have emerged satisfactorily accommodate both points of view.

4. On security, there was initial Irish reluctance to co-operate in a detailed review of the items under this heading because of its domestic sensitivity for the Irish Government and their belief that any focussing of public attention on intergovernmental co-operation in this area could prejudice co-operation between police and security forces at working level where it really matters. It was however made clear to them that there could be no question of allowing security to be excluded - or to appear to be excluded - from any review of systematic co-operation between the United Kingdom and the Republic. The outcome, whereby the Irish have in effect participated in a review of security items and accepted a reference to this in the communique, reflects the generally co-operative and businesslike approach which the Irish side have shown throughout the drafting process.

5. There are one or two minor drafting points still to be settled between Mr Nally and myself; but the texts are now substantially in the form in which officials would propose to put them forward to the two Heads of Government. They correctly reflect the sort of Anglo-Irish relationship we are aiming at and the sort of role which we have all along envisaged for the AIIC. The publication of these essentially anodyne texts should help to defuse the inevitable Unionist attack on the Summit itself and the AIIC process.



6. I should be grateful to know whether you are content for me to tell Mr Nally on 2 November that we can accept these drafts (subject to editorial or other minor amendments) for submission to the two Heads of Government; and that we agree that (with the exception of the section on security) the Joint Report and Review should be published at the forthcoming Summit. If any proposals for major changes in the texts emerge from the meeting with Mr Nally, I would of course seek fresh instructions.

7. When Mr Nally and I meet on 2 November, we shall also need to consider the structure and content of a draft communique. There has been some discussion of this in the Co-ordinating Committee, from which one can reasonably deduce that the Irish Government are not likely to be pressing us to include material or sentiments which could present us with serious problems at home. I attach a draft outline; I should be grateful for authority to use this as a basis for my discussions with Mr Nally. Those discussions will of course be ad referendum, and a further draft will be submitted after my meeting.

8. I am copying this minute and its attachments to the Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Northern Ireland and Defence.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

28 October 1983



Communique: Draft Outline

The Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP, and the Taoiseach, Dr Garret FitzGerald TD, met at today in a meeting of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council. This Council was set up as a result of their meeting on 6 November 1981, and this was the first meeting of the Council at the level of Heads of Government.

2. The Prime Minister was accompanied by
3. The Taoiseach was accompanied by
4. The two Heads of Government discussed current issues in Anglo-Irish relations including the situation in Northern Ireland.
5. They reviewed the state of work in the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council at both Ministerial and official levels. In this connection they considered a joint report reviewing co-operation between the two countries since the publication of the Anglo-Irish Joint Studies in November 1981. They approved this report which deals with institutional structures, citizenship rights, security matters, economic co-operation and measures to encourage mutual understanding. They agreed that the report, with the exception of the section on security matters, would be issued as an annex to this communique.
6. They also welcomed the recent establishment of the Encounter Organisation which they believe will contribute to the improvement of relations between their peoples in the interests of peace, reconciliation and stability.
7. They reaffirmed their steadfast opposition to violence and expressed satisfaction with the co-operation between the security forces of the two countries.
8. They welcomed the satisfactory conclusion of negotiations for the supply of Kinsale Gas to Northern Ireland.
9. The two Heads of Government also discussed a wide range of international issues. In particular, they reviewed the main issues current in Community discussions notably the future financing of the Community, the Community budget and the Common Agriculture Policy.

JOINT REPORT OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE OF THE AIIC TO THE ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT
ON ANGLO-IRISH CONTACTS AND CO-OPERATION

1. The co-chairmen of the Steering Committee of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council (AIIC) have examined the range of co-operation and contacts between the two countries since the establishment of the AIIC following the Summit meeting between the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister on 6 November 1981, having in mind that it is a purpose of the AIIC to encourage contacts between the two Governments within the Council framework at Ministerial and official level, and more widely outside the Council framework. A detailed review by the Co-ordinating Committee of the AIIC is annexed.
2. The first meeting of the AIIC took place in early 1982, at official level on 20 January and at ministerial level on 29 January. To date there have been nineteen bilateral ministerial meetings within the framework of the Council (a full list is attached) and a wide range of political, economic and cultural matters has been discussed. At official level, both the Steering Committee and the Co-ordinating Committee have met three times. Outside the immediate framework of the AIIC, there have been a very large number of contacts between officials of both state and semi-state bodies.
3. Major progress has been made in the energy field, where agreement has been reached on the supply of natural gas to Northern Ireland from the Kinsale field in the Republic. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in Belfast on 10 October 1983. The contract is to extend to the year 2006. The United Kingdom is investing £162.5 million in the project over a period of 20 years, including £5 million towards the cost of the Dublin/Border section of the pipeline. The project safeguards the gas industry of Northern Ireland which would otherwise have closed. It is a welcome example of North/South economic co-operation of advantage to both sides and is consistent with our view that **close** relations are in our common interest. Several other examples of economic co-operation are given in the attached report.
4. Among measures to encourage greater mutual understanding, the two Governments agreed in July 1983 to support the establishment of a new Anglo-Irish organisation, Encounter. The Co-Chairman, Sir David Orr and Dr K Whitaker,

have co-opted an Executive Board which met for the first time on 2 November. Encounter aims to organise meetings and seminars on matters of interest to the people of the two countries in the economic, social and cultural fields. It is independent of either government though it will receive some financial support from both. The Co-Chairmen plan to hold their first seminar in the spring of 1984.

5. Extensive contacts continue also in the fields of education, sport and youth exchanges. Co-operation in the cultural field, involving museums, libraries and Arts Councils, is also close. As the review indicates, there may be scope for intensifying co-operation in the educational and cultural fields. This is an area where further work could usefully be done. There is moreover considerable scope for joint efforts to promote greater understanding among the people of both countries and of the two major traditions that exist in the two parts of Ireland.

6. It would be inappropriate to deal here with co-operation in the security field.

7. The co-chairmen conclude that the recent intensification of bilateral contacts has been positive and useful and has led to a genuine increase in co-operation. They invite the Taoiseach and Prime Minister to take note of the annexed review of activity and authorise the Co-ordinating Committee to continue its work.

Cabinet Office
25 October 1983

25 October 1983

Institutional Structures

1.1. Intergovernmental body

In December 1980 the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister commissioned Joint Studies to examine possible new institutional structures, citizenship rights, economic cooperation, measures to encourage mutual understanding and security matters. At their meeting on 6 November 1981 the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister received a joint report on these studies which had been prepared by officials. Recognising the unique character of the relationship between the two countries, they decided to establish an Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council through which more comprehensive institutional expression could be given to the relationship between the two Governments. It was envisaged that regular meetings between the two Governments could take place within the Council framework at Ministerial and official level to discuss matters of common concern. At official level the Council consists of a Steering Committee and a Coordinating Committee.

The first meetings of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council took place in January 1982, at official level on the 20th of that month and at Ministerial level on the 29th.

To date there have been nineteen bilateral meetings within the framework of the Council (a full list is attached) and a wide range of political, economic and cultural matters has been discussed. Successive Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland have met in the framework of the Council on five occasions. The provision of gas from the Kinsale field to Northern Ireland has been discussed at Ministerial level in the Council on six occasions. The first summit level meeting of the AIIC between the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister is taking place in November 1983 and several other Ministerial level meetings are expected in the coming months.

At official level, the Steering Committee has met on three occasions. The Coordinating Committee convened in September 1983 and has met three times in order to prepare the present report.

AIIC Ministerial Meetings 1982-1983

| No. | Date | Participants | Subject |
|-----|---------|--|---|
| 1. | 29.1.82 | Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lord Privy Seal and Minister for Foreign Affairs | Anglo-Irish relations |
| 2. | 30.3.82 | Minister for the Gaeltacht and Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Welsh Office | Language questions and regional development |
| 3. | 31.3.82 | Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Minister for Foreign Affairs | Anglo-Irish relations |
| 4. | 17.5.82 | Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office and Minister for the Environment | Cross Border infrastructure |
| 5. | 18.5.82 | Minister of Industry and Energy and Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office | Kinsale Gas |
| 6. | 28.5.82 | Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office and Minister for Industry and Energy | Kinsale Gas |
| 7 | 16.8.82 | Minister for Fisheries and Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office | Fisheries |
| 8. | 3.11.82 | Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office | EEC issues |
| 9. | 1.2.83 | Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Minister for Foreign Affairs | Anglo-Irish relations |
| 10. | 3.2.83 | Minister for Industry and Energy and Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office | Kinsale Gas |

| No. | Date | Participants | Subject |
|-----|------------|--|---|
| 11. | 10.2.83 | Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office and Minister for Industry and Energy | Kinsale Gas |
| 12. | 12-14.4.83 | Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Welsh Office and Minister for the Gaeltacht | Language questions and regional development |
| 13. | 18.7.83 | Minister for Industry and Energy and Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office | Kinsale Gas |
| 14. | 27.7.83 | Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Minister for Foreign Affairs | Anglo-Irish relations |
| 15. | 27-29.7.83 | Minister for the Gaeltacht and Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Welsh Office | Language questions and regional development |
| 16. | 5.10.83 | Secretary of State for Energy and Minister for Industry and Energy | Oil production policy |
| 17. | 6.10.83 | Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Department of the Environment and Minister of State for the Environment | Local Government |
| 18. | 10.10.83 | Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office and Minister for Industry and Energy | Kinsale Gas |
| 19. | 19.10.83 | Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Minister for Foreign Affairs | Anglo-Irish relations |

1.2 Parliamentary Links

In the Joint Report* on the Anglo-Irish Studies, received by the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister at their meeting on 6 November 1981, it was stated that the officials had examined inter alia "how the parliamentary links between the two countries might most appropriately be developed as the natural and desirable complement to the establishment of a new intergovernmental body". (The Joint Study which dealt specifically with institutional structures had reached the conclusion that "it would be a natural and desirable development for the establishment of a new intergovernmental body to be complemented at an appropriate moment by the development of an inter-parliamentary body").

At their meeting on 6 November 1981, the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister agreed that it would be for the Irish and British Parliaments to consider at an appropriate time whether there should be an Anglo-Irish body at parliamentary level. Irish Ministers have subsequently reverted to this matter at meetings of the AIIC.

* Note: this report, subsequently referred to as "The Joint Report", is the initial document in the "Anglo-Irish Joint Studies," published in Dublin as Pl 299 and in London as Cmnd 8414.

1.3 and 1.4 Advisory Committee of the AIIC and the Encounter Organisation

Following meetings between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Northern Ireland on 27 July 1983, it was announced that the two Governments had decided to support the establishment of an Anglo-Irish Encounter Organisation as recommended in the Joint Report which foresaw the setting up of the Encounter Organisation as an interim measure, pending the creation of an Advisory Committee on economic, social and cultural co-operation, associated with the AIIC. The main activity of Encounter will be to hold periodic conferences and seminars, with a wide range of representation, on economic, social, cultural and other matters of common interest with a view to promoting mutual understanding, useful co-operation and good relations.

Dr T K Whitaker and Sir David Orr are Joint Chairmen of Encounter. They have recently completed the process of co-opting an Executive Board and have indicated that the first conference will take place early in 1984. The Organisation is independent of government control. The Irish and British Governments are providing a measure of financial support.

Citizenship Rights

2.1 and 2.2 Extension of Irish franchise to resident UK citizens and possible removal of differences in treatment of Irish citizens as between Great Britain and Northern Ireland

The Electoral (Amendment) Bill 1983, which proposes to confer voting rights at Dail and Presidential elections and referenda on British citizens resident in the Republic on the same basis as Irish citizens, was presented to Dail Eireann on 11 May. The Bill has recently received its second reading in the Dail.

There has been no change in the long standing voting rights exercised by Irish citizens in the United Kingdom.

At meetings subsequent to the publication of the Joint Studies, the Irish side have drawn attention to the other differences in this area, on which the position remains unchanged from that described in the Joint Studies.

Economic Co-operation

3.1 Monitoring of Economic Co-operation

The joint study group on Economic Co-operation noted the satisfactory working relationship which already existed in many areas either bilaterally or in the context of existing international agencies, and saw a continuing need for a senior official body to pursue matters of economic co-operation.

It was subsequently agreed that the Co-ordinating Committee of the AIIC would take over the role of the Anglo-Irish Economic Steering Group (AIESG) and co-ordinate and encourage economic co-operation.

Bilateral contacts between officials and public bodies in the economic field have continued and are being centrally monitored, and specific instances are dealt with in subsequent paragraphs. At Ministerial level various exchanges of views on economic issues have taken place, as set out in section 1.1 above.

3.2 Bilateral exchanges on energy matters

Since November 1981 there has been contact in the following areas:

i. Kinsale Gas

At the meeting in London on 6 November 1981, the Taoiseach and Prime Minister gave special consideration to the question of co-operation on energy matters and approved in particular negotiation on the possibility of supplying natural gas from the Kinsale field to Northern Ireland. Negotiations at ministerial level on the supply of natural gas to Northern Ireland began on 10th December 1981 and culminated in a memorandum of understanding signed on 10th October 1983, by the Irish Minister for Industry and Energy and the Minister of State at the Northern Ireland Office. The memorandum of understanding provides for the supply of 1720 million therms of gas over a twenty-two year period. The gas should come on stream in Belfast in late 1985. This arrangement will provide substantial economic benefits to the Republic and to Northern Ireland where it will ensure the continuance of the Northern Ireland gas industry which employs over 1,000 people.

ii. Electricity

At their meeting on 6 November 1981, the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister agreed on the desirability of restoring the interconnector between the Northern Ireland Electricity Service and the Electricity Supply Board in the South. Although the restoration of the link remains desirable, the interconnector has been out of use for several years because of repeated terrorist attacks within Northern Ireland.

The proposal for an electricity interconnector between South Wales and Wexford has been the subject of several meetings at official level. The latest took place in Dublin on 6 April 1983. A review of the economic feasibility of establishing such an interconnector is in now in train.

3.3 Bilateral exchanges on marine pollution and counter measures

A meeting at Ministerial level took place in Belfast in May 1982 between the then Minister for the Environment and his Northern Ireland counterpart. Matters discussed included the disposal of toxic waste, the monitoring of water pollution in Lough Erne and Lough Foyle and the development of North/South liaison on oil pollution of coastline and estuaries. These discussions are continuing at official level.

Government Departments have had contacts in the following areas:

a. Radioactive waste

The discharge of radioactive waste into the sea and questions concerning possible accidental radioactive emissions into the air have been raised in exchanges between the two Governments. Further cooperation is under discussion.

b. Oil Pollution

There is communication and information exchange on marine pollution and there is cooperation between the British and Irish authorities on the coordination of response to marine pollution emergencies.

c. Foyle River System

The management of the fisheries in Lough Foyle is carried out by the Foyle Fisheries Commission on which the relevant authorities, North and South, are represented.

The relevant Departments, North and South, have agreed to set up a joint group to consult on water quality management of the Foyle River System. Consultations will involve exchange of monitoring information, hydrometric statistics, action on problem areas and arrangements for dealing with oil pollution in Lough Foyle, should the need arise.

d. Erne River System

Departments, North and South, are currently establishing a joint group to develop a coordinated approach to the Erne River System.

3.4 Direct broadcasting by satellite

There have been informal consultations between the relevant Irish and British authorities on the potential for co-operation on direct broadcasting by satellite.

3.5 Co-operation in the fields of Animal and Plant Health

Since the beginning of 1982 Dublin officials have had nine meetings with Northern Ireland officials and three with Whitehall officials on the subject of animal health. On plant health there have been two meetings with Northern Ireland officials.

The arrangements for the protection and improvement of animal and plant health have worked to the mutual advantage of both agricultural industries. The meetings have led to complementary and practical action on each side of the border. The existing flexible arrangements should be continued and developed to meet changing needs.

3.6 Lough Foyle and Carlingford Lough

At the request of the Foyle Fisheries Commission, biologists from the Departments of Fisheries and Forestry and the Department of Agriculture for Northern Ireland carried out a joint survey of the mussel resources in Lough Foyle and consideration is being given to ways of encouraging the development of shellfish culture in both Loughs.

[The wider issues remain unresolved.]

3.7 Transport and road safety

Co-operation on transport matters has been handled for several years in the Anglo-Irish Joint Communications Group, under alternating British and Irish chairmanship. The Group has met once since the publication of the Joint Studies, in June 1982.

There have been consultations between the Irish and British authorities on the weights and dimensions of commercial vehicles in the context of EC regulations.

There has also been co-operation on the administration of the Joint Agreement on Road Haulage. Since the early 1970's the authorities concerned have been in continuous contact about improving the Newry/Dundalk road link. The Newry-Dundalk road forms part of the Larne-Rosslare section of the European Route E01. The European Community assists in funding improvements on this route. Proposals for the improvement of the Newry-Dundalk road have been the subject of a technical evaluation by an Foras Forbartha (the National Institute for Physical Planning and Construction Research) and the British Transport and Roads Research Laboratory. The result of this evaluation will be available later this year.

In addition, there have been North/South exchanges on such matters as traffic management including road safety, and these will be continued.

3.8 Efforts to stimulate co-operation in scientific and technological fields

A good deal of informal contact has taken place between the Irish and British authorities within the context of the European Community, the United Nations, the OECD and the European Space Agency. There is considerable interaction between the relevant academic and other institutions. Both Governments favour such contacts and will encourage their development.

3.9 Anglo-Irish Co-operation in the European Community and Political Co-operation

The two countries are common partners in the European Community and an increasing amount of co-operation between the two governments takes place in a Community framework. There are at the same time extensive bilateral contacts between the two Governments in this field and in the field of Political Co-operation. The Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs recently reviewed current Community issues with the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and is shortly due to meet the British Minister of State responsible for European affairs. Senior Irish and UK officials hold bilateral discussions on Community issues, issues current in European Political Co-operation and on other international issues.

3.10 Consultations between agricultural authorities

There is regular and useful contact between Irish and British officials on agricultural matters, and in particular those concerned with animal health and beef. There is also frequent contact at working level between the Departments of Agriculture, North and South. Other topics recently dealt with in this way include plant health, drainage questions such as the Ulster Blackwater scheme, and the operation of the West of Ireland and Northern Ireland Agricultural Development Programmes for Less Favoured Areas.

3.11 to North/South cooperation in the border areas
3.13

There have been close consultations on the implementation of three economic studies of cross-border areas. As noted above, a drainage scheme for the River Blackwater is also being undertaken. A meeting of the East Border Region Committee in Downpatrick, Co. Down, on 19 October 1983 was attended by the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Northern Ireland Minister for Economic Development. A proposal for a further cross-border study in relation to Lough Melvin, which straddles the border at Counties Leitrim and Fermanagh, is under consideration. There has been close contact also in relation to the non-quota section of the Regional Fund and specifically its application to border areas. The total allocations by the European Community for its Special Border Areas Programme for Ireland, mainly in respect of tourism and small firms, are £4.5 million (sterling) for Northern Ireland and £9 million (sterling) for the Republic.

The Economic and Social Committee of the EC has established a study group to examine the development needs and potential of the border areas. The study group visited Ireland on a number of occasions. Meetings have taken place with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Ministers at the Northern Ireland Office. The study group hopes to complete its work this Autumn.

3.14/15 Cooperation on industrial development

There have been informal contacts between the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) and the Invest in Britain Bureau, and between the IDA and the Industrial Development Board for Northern Ireland. It is intended that these contacts will be maintained.

3.16 Joint trade promotion activities

In the course of 1983 visits have been exchanged between senior members of the Executives of the Industrial Development Board for Northern Ireland and of the Coras Trachtala (Irish Export Board) and the Irish Goods Council. Dialogue was opened up on the possibilities for trade co-operation and joint promotional activities, and this exchange of ideas is continuing. Some Northern Ireland firms have participated in Irish stands organised by the Irish Export Board at various trade fairs and this continues.

One joint promotional activity is already at detailed planning stage. The Industrial Development Board and the Irish Goods Council are jointly sponsoring an exhibition in Craigavon, Northern Ireland on 15 and 16 November at which products and components used by industry throughout Ireland but presently sourced outside the island will be displayed. Manufacturers from north and south of the border will be invited to the exhibition to identify potential opportunities and to obtain further information about components and their present users from the staff of both the Industrial Development Board and the Irish Goods Council who will be in attendance.

Further joint exhibitions of this kind including one in Dublin next year, are being considered.

3.17 Scope for co-operation on the facilitation of trade

There is continuing scope for co-operation in trade facilitation and with this in view contacts will continue between the Simplification of International Trade Procedures Board (SITPRO) and Coras Trachtala (Irish Export Board).

3.18 Senior management in industrial training to report on the position and scope for development

AnCO (the Irish Industrial Training Authority) maintains close contact with the Manpower Services Commission in Great Britain on matters such as training in small businesses, employment training schemes for young people, corporate planning in manpower training and the design of Skillcentres. Existing co-operation between AnCO and the Manpower Service Commission in Great Britain and the Northern Ireland Department of Economic Development has been valuable and it would be useful to continue to develop it where relevant opportunities and needs are identified.

AnCO maintains contact with the Northern Ireland Training Executive and Industrial Training Boards. This co-operation has led to a number of North-South exchange visits and participation in training programmes.

There are close contacts between the Irish Department of Labour's industrial inspectorate and the British Health and Safety Executive. Talks between the Northern and Southern factory inspectorates on the subject of dangerous substances are being arranged.

The Council for Education, Recruitment and Training (CERT), has a close working relationship with the Catering Industry Training Board (Northern Ireland). Since 1982, two tripartite meetings have been held involving CERT, the Northern Ireland Board and the UK Training Board. Such meetings are held at six-monthly intervals. Since early 1982, CERT has made three visits to the Northern Ireland Board to hold exchange meetings on training.

3.19/20 Cooperation between the tourist authorities

Since November 1981, the tripartite committee comprising the British Tourist Authority (BTA), the Northern Ireland Tourist Board (NITB) and Bord Failte (BFE) has continued to function and there has been co-operation on market research and development.

There is also close contact between officials of the Department of Trade, Commerce and Tourism and their counterparts in the NI Department of Economic Development, as well as co-operation at local authority level on tourist promotion and on the undertaking of specific studies, eg Newry/Dundalk tourism study, and proposed cross-border study of Lough Melvin. The NITB and several Northern Ireland district councils participated in the Dublin Holiday and Leisure Fair while BFE attends tourist exhibitions in Belfast.

Since the beginning of 1982, Ministers at the Department of Trade, Commerce and Tourism have travelled to Belfast twice, in May 1982 and in August 1983, to attend BFE tourism promotion functions.

Plans are well advanced for the Northern Ireland Tourist Board in association with the British Tourist Authority to open a tourist information centre in Dublin. This should be operational in 1984.

Officials of NITB and BFE meet regularly and co-operate in several ways, for example compiling statistics, exchanging promotional literature for public use at various offices and they have shared exhibition stands at promotional ventures abroad.

The two Boards have in recent years provided advice to their respective Government Departments on the tourism schemes included in the European Community Special Programme for the Border Areas. Three tourist information maps which together cover the entire border area have been jointly prepared in order to promote tourism in that area.

3.21 Officials to discuss scope for co-operation in public purchasing

Relevant officials will discuss, where appropriate, the scope for co-operation in public purchasing which would be mutually beneficial to both Governments and consonant with Community and other international obligations.

Measures for the Encouragement of Mutual Understanding

Youth Affairs and Sport

4.1 The Irish Government makes financial assistance available to youth groups from the Republic to visit Britain and for hosting visits to the Republic by British youth groups. Financial support is given by the British Council for youth exchanges to the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland arrangements for the support of group visits by youth clubs have been continued. In February of this year an Irish-British Youth exchange training workshop was held in Dublin under the auspices of the National Youth Council and the British Central Bureau for Educational Visits and Exchanges. The Irish Department of Labour also makes financial assistance available to youth groups for visits to Northern Ireland or for hosting visits of youth groups from Northern Ireland. In 1983 1500 people have already availed themselves of this scheme.

The Irish Minister of State responsible for Youth Affairs has initiated contacts with his counterpart in Northern Ireland to discuss developments in youth policy generally, including youth exchanges.

The Irish Industrial Training Authority, ANCO, and the Department of Economic Development in Northern Ireland have financially supported a training programme for unemployed young people. This has been done with co-operation of the voluntary organisation, Hope, in Dublin (in respect of young people from deprived backgrounds in Dublin) and a voluntary body operating a Work Preparation Unit (as part of a Youth Training Programme) in respect of young people in the Omagh area. In addition ANCO has co-operated with the Northern Ireland Department of Economic Development on youth exchange arrangements in Italy and Holland.

There is close co-operation between Cospoir, the Irish Sports Council, which is funded by the Department of Education in Dublin, and the Sports Council in Northern Ireland, which is funded by the Northern Ireland Department of

Education and also between Cospoir and the British Sports Council. Specific discussion is in train about joint themes and joint publication for the International Year of Youth 1985.

Cross-border co-operation between sporting bodies has continued to develop. A Commission has been formed for cycling consisting of the governing bodies North and South, and the Mountain Rescue Committees in the North and South are establishing cross-membership.

4.2 Work of Voluntary Organisations in Community Relations

The contacts referred to in the Joint Studies Report have continued. In addition Cooperation North has launched its Working Together Award Scheme. Cooperation North has received financial assistance from both the Irish and British Governments in recognition of its contribution towards better relations between North and South in various fields. This Governmental support will be continued in 1983. The Glenree Reconciliation Centre has received grants from the Irish Government in both 1982 and 1983 to help with its work in promoting reconciliation and the British Government is continuing its support to a number of organisations, such as Corrymeela, Churches Central Committee for Community Work, Harmony Community Trust and Protestant and Catholic Encounter, which are seeking to promote improved community relations.

4.3 Co-operation between UNESCO National Commissions on exchanges between schools and teacher training institutions

Student teachers have participated in North/South exchanges. Schools contacts have also continued. The Northern Ireland UNESCO Committee intends to invite a number of pupils from the Republic to participate in a model United Nations Assembly to be held in Ballymena in March 1984.

4.4 Exchanges between school inspectors and between teachers

There are regular North-South contacts at inspector level and members of each inspectorate have frequently attended their counterparts' meetings. North/South inter-departmental discussions have taken place on teacher qualifications. The twenty-one teacher in-service training centres in the Republic have all been encouraged by the Department of Education in Dublin to develop closer cooperation with their Northern counterparts. The Church of Ireland Teacher Training College in Dublin sends a number of its students to Northern Ireland for teaching experience. Adult education organisers in the Republic are encouraged to attend courses at Magee College in Northern Ireland and twenty-eight of the fifty organisers in the South have attended such courses.

4.5 Churches' existing collaborative work in education field to be encouraged

The Irish Council of Churches and the Justice and Peace Commission have almost completed a project to provide community relations teaching material for primary and secondary schools. This material will be available for use by schools of all denominations and types of management both North and South. It deals with issues such as relationships within society, the development of a positive approach to diversity, and the use of words and symbols in dividing communities or promoting reconciliation between them. Follow-up action to ensure maximum use of this material is being supported by both governments.

4.6 Matching Resources and Requirements for Third Level Places in Northern Ireland and the Republic

Discussions have taken place at official level about the scope for greater and mutually beneficial use of higher education places in Northern Ireland by students from the Republic, and vice versa. Since 1981 steps have been taken by the South to encourage students to go to Northern Ireland higher education institutions by changes in their student support grants. The Department of Education in Dublin have, in the case of students eligible for higher education grants and Vocational Education Committee scholarships who would wish to study in Northern Ireland, decided to award the same number of pounds sterling as Irish pounds normally allowed. At present twenty students have availed themselves of this provision. It is estimated that about 700 students from Northern Ireland are at present studying at third level in the South. There are about 150 students from the South attending higher education courses in Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland Economic Council and the National Economic and Social Council in Dublin have commissioned a joint study on the scope for co-operation in higher education.

4.7 Possible Co-operation between the National Institute for Higher Education in Dublin and the British Open University

An Open University (OU) Working Group has had discussions with the Irish National Institute for Higher Education (NIHE) covering several aspects of distance learning. Proposals are under discussion for the OU to provide, on a commercial basis, specialist advice and technical assistance to the NIHE's Distance Study Unit.

Agreement has been reached on credit transfers for students between the OU and Trinity College Dublin.

4.8 Secondment of Officials and other Public Services matters

Since the establishment of the AIIC there have been discussions between officials of the Department of the Public Service in Dublin and their British counterparts on a possible format for reciprocal secondment of officials on the lines of similar arrangements between other member states of the European Community. Following further recent contacts it is now hoped that such a scheme can be operational in the near future.

There have been several meetings already this year on other technical and managerial questions related to the public service between the Department of the Public Service in Dublin and officials in London and Belfast. Further meetings are scheduled.

4.9 Co-operation in the Cultural Field

The cultural relationship between the peoples of the two countries at all levels is uniquely close. Some current examples of institutional cooperation in this field are the following:

Museums and Galleries

There have been close and active contacts between museums in the two countries. The British Museum and the National Museum of Ireland (NMI) have been in close touch on conservation matters and the check listing of the NMI's ethnographical collection. The British National Maritime Museum (NMM) is working with the NMI on the excavation of a Viking Age ship and a currach is being built for the NMM in County Kerry. There have been loans of objects and pictures for exhibition in each direction. Discussions continue in order to resolve a legal difficulty which has arisen in connection with the exhibition of paintings under the terms of the Lane Bequest. There has also been extensive co-operation between the museums of Northern Ireland and of the Republic. This has included joint exhibitions, visits from schoolchildren, and curatorial and professional co-operation. Notable examples are the transfer of the finds from the Armada wreck "Trinidad Valencera" to the Ulster Museum by the Irish Government and the location of an Irish Museums Trust Scholarship at the Ulster Folk and Transport Museum.

Libraries

Trinity College Dublin continues to be a copyright library in common with the five UK libraries and British material is deposited there. Similarly, Irish material is deposited in the British Library. Loans and copies are provided to all Irish organisations by the British Library on the same basis as to British organisations.

Films

The British Film Institute involve themselves in the Dublin Film Festival and subsidise some of the exhibitors. They have a good working relationship with the Irish Film Archive and there is frequent interchange of material. Five Irish films supported by An Bord Scannan (The Irish Film Board) are being shown at the London Film Festival in November 1983.

Arts Councils

Two young Irish musicians are being trained in the United Kingdom on Irish Arts Council scholarships supplemented by scholarships from a trust administered by the Arts Council of Great Britain. Touring drama companies subsidised by the Arts Council of Great Britain have visited Ireland and in 1982 the British Council made a financial contribution to the Dublin Theatre Festival where a number of British companies appeared and also to the Wexford Festival Opera.

The Arts Councils of Northern Ireland and the Republic have exchanged annual visits. Views have been exchanged on general policy issues and areas for practical cooperation have been examined including touring arrangements for theatre and ballet companies. Other areas of cooperation have included exhibitions, joint funding of independent film projects, magazines, books and music; the interchange of educational material relevant to the arts; mutual representation on bursaries and award panels; the joint administration and funding of the Tyrone Guthrie Centre as a residential facility for creative artists. There have been annual meetings between the Directors of the Arts Councils of the Republic, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.

Consideration is being given to co-operative activities in connection with European Music Year 1985.

4.10 Continuing Education

There have been close contacts between the Council for Continuing Education in Northern Ireland and AONTAS, its counterpart in the South. The voluntary providers - eg. Workers' Educational Association (WEA) and the Education Guidance Service for Adults (EGSA) are also in regular contact with the sponsors of specific projects and individuals in this field.

Security Matters

5.1 Co-operation in air/sea search and rescue

Co-operation in this field is intensive. Shannon Marine Rescue Co-ordination Centre has the support of British rescue crews for life-saving operations in its area of responsibility. Since November 1981 British aircraft have carried out 28 sorties in support of Shannon MRCC resulting in 33 lives being saved. There have been many other examples of the British authorities assisting the Irish authorities on search and rescue tasks. Co-operation and communication between Shannon and MRCC Swansea have significantly improved.

Visits have been exchanged at official level. Most recently (March 1983) an officer of the RAF handling the co-ordination of air/sea rescue operations in the Ministry of Defence in London visited Casement Aerodrome and the Marine Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Shannon Airport. The desirability of increased co-operation was discussed, as was the planning of joint rescue operations in the event of an aircraft or shipping accident.

5.2 Development of co-operation on hydrographic surveys

On the British side, work has continued on a programme of surveys in the Irish Sea and off the South Coast of Ireland and it is hoped to complete this programme by the end of 1983. The British authorities have almost completed the metrication and modernisation of charts of Irish waters.

The authorities of both countries would be ready to consider ways of improving communication and exchange of information in regard to these surveys.

The Irish authorities are reviewing their requirements for hydrographic surveys. The possibility of co-operation with the British authorities is being considered.

5.3 Expansion of co-operation in fishery protection

The main practical aspect is co-operation in surveillance. There have been regular contacts at official level to discuss common problems and promote co-operation. Information has been exchanged from time to time on activities by third country vessels in British and Irish waters. Three Irish Sea Fishery Officers and one Irish Naval Officer have attended Fisheries Enforcement courses in Britain over the past two years. It is agreed that further and improved co-operation on these lines is desirable.

5.4 Co-operation on aircraft movements

In the Joint Study Group report the British side indicated that they were satisfied with current emergency diversion arrangements. The Study Group report also indicated that the Irish authorities would consider whether, in cases where flights additional to those included in block bookings were required at short notice, it might be possible, where appropriate, to convey diplomatic clearance. The Irish side are studying this possibility.

5.5 Movement of certain fishing and other merchant vessels

There is exchange of information on this matter. Information in relation to the movement of certain fishing vessels in Irish waters has been furnished to the British authorities regularly since 1964. Following the suggestion in the report of the Joint Study Group on Security Matters, the Irish authorities have also supplied details of the movement of certain merchant and research vessels in Irish waters. For their part, the British authorities have provided information on the movements of certain vessels as well as analytical comment.

- 5.6 a. Development of co-operation in civil defence at technical level
- b. Joint exercises in relation to early warning and monitoring of nuclear fallout
- c. Co-operation in civil defence between North and South to be explored

There has been regular official contact and co-operation in civil defence matters.

The existing arrangements for co-operation in the field of early warning and monitoring, ie. the exchange of information in the event of a wartime emergency, have continued and have been strengthened since the Joint Studies Report. In particular, there is now regular contact between the Irish Warning and Monitoring Organisation and the United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation. Since the Joint Studies Report, there have been three meetings of the two Organisations, the most recent at Oxford in 1983. The Organisations have sent observers to each others exercises. Joint exercises took place in November 1982 and in October 1983.

There have been periodic Irish visits to Britain for training purposes and for attendance at conferences and courses. British guest lecturers have attended the Civil Defence School at the Department of Defence. In June 1983 the Director Civil Defence attended a Civil Defence/Emergency Planning Study at Bournemouth.

Consideration has also been given to closer cross-border co-operation. It has been agreed by authorities North and South that an exploratory meeting should take place between mid-October and mid-November 1983 to discuss planning for the aftermath of a nuclear strike, civil defence planning in general, and planning for peace-time emergencies or disaster.

5.7 Discussions on the interest and involvement of British and Irish forces in UN forces

The matter has been discussed in the course of exchanges at Ministerial and official level.

5.8 Experts to consult about the working of the criminal law, other than as it relates to terrorists

In 1982 officials of the Department of Justice met their counterparts in the Home Office to discuss matters of mutual interest in the criminal law field, including such matters as police powers, changes in the law of evidence and complaints against the police. Further meetings are envisaged.

5.9 Public understanding of the present level of security co-operation

The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland have publicly stated their appreciation of Irish co-operation on security matters. British Ministers will continue to take available opportunities to publicise the Irish commitment to combatting terrorism. This is appreciated by the Irish side.

The Irish Government, concerned at the problem of insufficient public understanding, has itself continued to stress its commitment to security co-operation. It has also sought to promote a fuller awareness and understanding of the substantial financial burden which it undertakes on Border security.

5.10 Police and the Law Officers' Department in both countries should hold early consultations to examine what scope exists for improving the gathering of evidence and other aspects of the operation of the reciprocal extra-territorial legislation

The Attorneys-General of the two countries have met to consider these matters. Further meetings will take place as occasion demands. There are continuing informal talks between the Metropolitan Police, the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Garda at the operational level.

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1

28 October 1983

Dear John

Typ letter

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It has been agreed that I should reply to your letter of 24 October to Peter Ricketts which requested a draft reply to Mr Molyneaux's letter of 22 October to the Prime Minister.

I attach a draft reply which firmly rebuts the charge that the forthcoming Summit will have 'disastrous consequences' in Northern Ireland because it will be interpreted as paving the way for some form of Irish unity.

In anticipation of the Summit the Unionist Parties in the Northern Ireland Assembly have called a debate on Anglo-Irish relations for 2 November. There will be advantage in Mr Molyneaux receiving a reply to his letter before then. We also recommend that the Prime Minister's reply should be published (Mr Molyneaux released the text of his letter to the Press on 24 October); this will help to counter the more extreme conspiracy theories which may be aired in the Assembly debate.

I am sending copies of this letter to Peter Ricketts and Richard Hatfield.

Yours ever

D A Hill

D A HILL

CAM

DRAFT LETTER

FILE NUMBER.....

ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE.....

To The Rt Hon James H
Molyneaux JP MP
Ulster Unionist Council
Unionist Headquarters
3 Glengall Street
Belfast
BT12 5AE

Enclosures

Copies to be sent to

(Full Postal Address)

(Full Address, if Necessary)

LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY.....

PRIME MINISTER

(Name of Signatory)

Thank you for your letter of 22 October.

I do not believe that any

~~I note what you say about the interpretation which you see
being attached to a meeting between myself and the Prime
Minister of the Republic of Ireland. I can only say that there
is no justification for any such interpretation. Good relations
between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland are in
the interests of all the peoples of both our countries. The
pursuit of such relations in no way affects the constitutional
status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom.~~

*can be interpreted
in the way you
suggest.*

I cannot therefore accept that ^{any} talks ^{which} I might have with
Dr FitzGerald give support for the belief that the United Kingdom
Government is seeking to change that status against the wishes
of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland. Nor do I

*There is no question of
that.*

.... / think that



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think that the possibility of misunderstanding or misrepresentation should prevent such exchanges at Prime Ministerial or other levels as seem right to the United Kingdom Government. Rather, I would hope that such exchanges can be seen for what they are, as normal dealings between neighbouring states. ~~Any possibility of adverse "consequences" could arise only from misrepresentation of the motives for and substance of the discussions.~~

As your ^{own} letter was released to the press I am ~~taking steps to publish my reply.~~ *arranging for my reply to be similarly published.*

WJ $\frac{L.F.}{\omega}$

Mr. Coburn



CABINET OFFICE

With the compliments of

Mr. Goodall

**70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS
Telephone 01 233**

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FM DUBLIN 271330Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 313 OF 27 OCTOBER 1983

YOUR TELNOS 135 TO 138: ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: PROGRAMME

1. I CALLED ON NALLY OF THE TAOISEACH'S OFFICE TODAY AND HANDED HIM THE PROGRAMME CONTAINED IN YOUR TELNO 136. I ALSO DISCUSSED OTHER DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS.

2. THE TAOISEACH AND MRS FITZGERALD INTEND TO FLY TO MANCHESTER ON FRIDAY, 4 NOVEMBER, POSSIBLY ACCOMPANIED BY DONLON AND LILLIS, TO SEE THEIR DAUGHTER. THEY WILL PROBABLY FLY BY COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT. ALTHOUGH THIS PART OF THE VISIT IS PRIVATE, YOU WILL WISH TO OFFER APPROPRIATE COURTESIES AND I HOPE THAT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE COULD BE AT MANCHESTER AIRPORT. I SHOULD LIKE TO BE THERE MYSELF IF MY OTHER DUTIES PERMIT.

3. THEY WILL MOVE TO THE IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON, WHERE THEY WILL BE STAYING, ON SATURDAY AND THE OTHER OFFICIALS WILL ARRIVE IN LONDON ON SUNDAY. THEY WILL SPEND THE WEEKEND PRIVATELY. THEY ARE GRATEFUL FOR THE OFFER OF HOSPITALITY AND ACCOMODATION FOR OFFICIALS, BUT THE IRISH THINK IT BEST TO MAKE THEIR OWN ARRANGEMENTS. MRS FITZGERALD WILL PROBABLY NOT REQUIRE ANY PROGRAMME AT ALL, BUT SHE HAS STILL TO BE CONSULTED. THE IRISH WOULD WELCOME HELP WITH TRANSPORT TO AND FROM CHEQUERS.

4. THE OFFICIAL PARTY WILL IN PROTOCOL ORDER .CONSIST OF:

- TAOISEACH
- TANAISTE
- MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (bony)
- DERMOT NALLY, DEPARTMENT OF THE TAOISEACH
- SEAN DONLON, SECRETARY, DFA
- NOEL DORR, AMBASSADOR
- MICHAEL LILLIS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, DFA
- PETER PRENDERGAST, GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICER
- BRIAN MCCARTHY, DEPT OF TAOISEACH
- DECLAN KELLY, PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE TAOISEACH.

*Mr. Nally
Mr. Donlon
Mr. Lillis
Mr. Prendergast
Mr. Kelly
Mrs. Fitzgerald
Mr. Nally
Mr. Donlon
Mr. Lillis
Mr. Prendergast
Mr. Kelly*

*+1 for
Nally
Kelly*

I EXPLAINED THAT THE LUNCH TABLE WOULD ONLY HOLD 18. WE AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR MCCARTHY AND KELLY TO TO LUNCH ELSEWHERE, RATHER THAN TO EXCLUDE ONE LONELY OFFICIAL. BOTH ARE OF COUNSELLOR RANK.

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SECRET

5. THE IRISH SIDE HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR THE TANAISTE TO MEET MR KINNOCK ON THE MORNING OF 7 NOVEMBER AND TO ARRIVE AT CHEQUERS ONLY AT MID-DAY. THEY WOULD LIKE THE TETE-A-TETE TO LAST UNTIL THEN AND SUGGEST THAT THERE SHOULD THEN BE A PHOTO CALL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER WITH THE TAOISEACH AND THE TANAISTE, AND ALSO FOR ALL THE MINISTERS, AT 12 NOON. THEY SUGGEST THAT THE PLENARY TAKE PLACE IMMEDIATELY AFTER. IF THEY CANNOT FIND ANOTHER ENGAGEMENT FOR THE TANAISTE, THEN HE WILL JOIN MR BARRY FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU AND MR PRIOR AT 1000 HOURS. THEY WILL LET ME KNOW MR SPRING'S PLANS LATER.

6. DR FITZGERALD WISHES TO HOLD A PRESS BRIEFING AT THE IRISH EMBASSY LATER IN THE AFTERNOON. HE DOES NOT WISH TO USE RAF HALTON. HE DOES NOT HAVE IT IN MIND TO PROPOSE A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH MRS THATCHER.

7. HE WOULD PREFER THE TETE-A-TETE TO BE HELD WITHOUT NOTETAKERS, BUT WOULD NO DOUBT FALL IN WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S WISHES IF SHE SUGGESTED THAT NOTETAKERS BE PRESENT FOR PART OF THE TIME.

8. NALLY SAID HE HOPED WE DID NOT REGARD THE DEPARTURE TIME OF 1430 AS RIGID. I TOOK NOTE.

9. THE TAOISEACH ALSO WISHES TO MEET MR KINNOCK, MR STEEL AND DR OWEN. HE IS CONSIDERING A PROPOSAL THAT HE MEET THE ANGLO-IRISH PARLIAMENTARY GROUP. THESE PROPOSALS ARE BEING PURSUED BY THE IRISH EMBASSY IN LONDON. HE HAS NOT YET FIXED THESE ENGAGEMENTS AND IT IS UNCERTAIN, THEREFORE, WHETHER HE WILL RETURN TO DUBLIN ON THE EVENING OF 7 NOVEMBER OR ON 8 NOVEMBER. IT IS EQUALLY UNCERTAIN WHETHER HE WILL RETURN BY COMMERCIAL OR PRIVATE AIRCRAFT. HIS OFFICE WILL LET ME KNOW IN DUE COURSE.

10. MIFT RECORDS DISCUSSION OF THE AGENDA.

GOODISON

LIMITED

RID

PROTOCOL D

HD. NEWS D

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR JAMES

COPIES TO:

SIR R ARMSTRONG

MR GOODALL

MR COLVIN

CAB
OFFICE

PS/SOTS

PS/SIR P WOODFIELD

MR BRENNAN

MR ANGEL

MR BAYS-SMITH

NLD.

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FM DUBLIN 271405Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 314 OF 27 OCTOBER 1983

YOUR TELNO 138 AND MIPT: ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: AGENDA

1. I ASKED NALLY OF THE TAOISEACH'S OFFICE WHAT TOPICS HE THOUGHT THE TAOISEACH WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.

2. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT IN THE PERIOD BEFORE ATHENS AND BEFORE THE REPORT OF THE FORUM, THE TAOISEACH WOULD BE LOOKING FOR A RELATIVELY RELAXED DISCUSSION OF THE LONG-TERM POSSIBILITIES FOR CHANGE RATHER THAN VERY SPECIFIC ISSUES. HE THOUGHT THE FOLLOWING TOPICS WOULD BE RAISED:

(A) NORTHERN IRELAND. THE TAOISEACH WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DETERIORATION OF THE POSITION OF THE SDLP. HE WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS MEANS OF SECURING THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE MINORITY IN THE NORTH WITH THE INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT AND WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY. HE WOULD NO DOUBT TELL THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT THE FORUM. SINCE, HOWEVER, THIS WAS AN INTER-PARTY AFFAIR AND NOT A GOVERNMENTAL ONE, HE HOPED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD NOT TELL THE PRESS AFTERWARDS THAT THE FORUM HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. HE WOULD WANT TO ALLUDE TO SECURITY MATTERS AND PERHAPS EXTRADITION. I SAID THAT IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S POINT OF VIEW THAT THEY SHOULD REFER TO SECURITY. MIPT GIVES AN ACCOUNT OF OUR DISCUSSION OF THE NANGLE AFFAIR. HE HOPED IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY TO RAISE THIS AGAIN WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.

(B) BILATERAL ISSUES. HE WOULD WANT TO DISCUSS HOW THE AHC COULD BE MAINTAINED AND DEVELOPED. HE WOULD ALSO WANT TO RAISE THE PARLIAMENTARY TIER.

(C) COMMUNITY MATTERS. IT WAS DOMESTICALLY NECESSARY FOR HIM TO BE ABLE TO SAY AFTERWARDS THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED MILK WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. HE WOULD ALSO WISH TO DISCUSS THE FORTHCOMING ATHENS SUMMIT IN GENERAL TERMS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THE COMMUNITY. I SAID I BELIEVED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT WELL WISH TO RAISE SOME COMMUNITY ISSUES.

(D) WORLD ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, ON WHICH THE TAOISEACH WOULD NO DOUBT BE GLAD OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VIEWS.

SECRET

/3. I HOPE

SECRET

3. I HOPE TO SEE THE TAOISEACH MYSELF, PERHAPS NEXT WEEK, AND TO EXPLORE FURTHER WHAT HE HAS IN MIND.

4. AS FOR YOUR AND MR PRIORS DISCUSSIONS WITH MR BARRY, WE AGREED THAT YOU WOULD PROBABLY WISH TO DISCUSS CURRENT INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, SOME COMMUNITY MATTERS AND, PERHAPS, OTHER BILATERAL MATTERS. THESE COULD INCLUDE KINSALE GAS, THE ELECTRICITY INTER-CONNECTORS, SECURITY AND ANY OTHER POINTS ARISING FROM THE REPORT ON THE JOINT STUDIES. NALLY SAID THAT MR BARRY MIGHT ALSO WISH TO ASK MR PRIOR WHETHER HE HAD ANY NEW INITIATIVES IN MIND AND HOW HE VIEWED THE ASSEMBLY AT PRESENT.

5. YOU MAY WISH TO DRAW ON THE ABOVE TO AMEND PARAGRAPH 12 OF THE DRAFT GENERAL BRIEF CONTAINED IN YOUR TUR.

GOODISON

LIMITED

R/D

PROTOCOL.D.

HD/NEWS.D.

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/PUS

SIR. J. BULLARD

MR. JAMES

COPIES TO:

SIR. R. ARMSTRONG } CABINET

MR. GOODALL } OFFICE

MR. COLVIN }

PS/SOFS

PS/SIR. P. WOODFIELD } N. I. O.

MR. BRENNAN }

MR. ANGEL }

MR. BAYS. SMITH }

²
SECRET

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GRS 200

SECRET

FM DUBLIN 271310Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 315 OF 27 OCTOBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE NIO(B) NIO(L)

MIPT (NOT TO ALL): ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: AGENDA

1. WHEN I CALLED ON NALLY OF THE TAOISEACH'S OFFICE TO DISCUSS THE AGENDA, HE SAID HE HOPED THAT THE TAOISEACH WOULD NOT BE FORCED TO RAISE ONCE AGAIN WITH THE PRIME MINISTER THE AFFAIR OF GARDA NANGLE. I SAID I HOPED NOT TOO. MR WREN'S LETTER HAD BEEN A HELPFUL INITIATIVE AND I HOPED THAT SIR JOHN HERMAN WOULD BE REPLYING TO IT, HAVING MADE CERTAIN ENQUIRIES, BEFORE THE END OF OCTOBER. NO DOUBT THAT LETTER MIGHT NOT CONTAIN ALL THAT THE IRISH HOPED FOR, BUT I BELIEVED IT COULD AND SHOULD LEAD TO RENEWED DIALOGUE. NALLY SAID THAT THIS WAS VERY MUCH WHAT THEY WANTED.

GOODISON

LIMITED

RID

PROTOCOL D

HD. NEWS D.

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR JAMES

COPIES TO

SIR R ARMSTRONG

MR GOODALL

MR COLVIN

CAS
OFFICE

PS/SOFS

PS/SIR P WOODFIELD

MR BRENNAN

MR ANGEL

MR BAYS-SMITH

NIO

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall
London SW1A 2AS

26 October 1983

PS(83) 29

Dear Private Secretary,

Anglo-Irish Summit: 7 November 1983

With my letter of 24 October I attached at Annex A a list of briefs to be prepared for the Anglo-Irish Summit. This list has now been revised. I attach the revised list and should be grateful if briefs could be prepared as appropriate.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to Sir Antony Acland, Sir Philip Woodfield and Sir Clive Whitmore, and to John Coles at No 10.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) LINDSAY WILKINSON
Assistant Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

LIST OF BRIEFS FOR ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT
7 NOVEMBER 1983

| <u>DMV(83)</u> | <u>Subject</u> | <u>Lead Department</u> | <u>In consultation with</u> |
|----------------|---|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. | General Brief | FCO NIO Cabinet Office | |
| 2. | Republic of Ireland: Political and Economic Situation | FCO(RID) | |
| 3. | Bilateral Issues: | | |
| | (a) Irish Lights | FCO(RID) | |
| | (b) Irish Soldiers and Sailors Land Trust | FCO(RID) | |
| | (c) MV Sharelga | FCO(RID) | |
| | (d) Carlingford Lough and Lough Foyle | FCO(RID) | |

The Joint Studies

| | | | |
|----|---|----------------|----------------|
| 4. | The Joint Studies: | | |
| | (a) Progress and Future | Cabinet Office | as appropriate |
| | (b) Institutional Structures | Cabinet Office | as appropriate |
| | (c) Citizenship Rights | Cabinet Office | as appropriate |
| | (d) Security Matters | Cabinet Office | as appropriate |
| | (e) Economic Co-operation | Cabinet Office | as appropriate |
| | (f) Measures to Encourage Mutual Understanding | Cabinet Office | as appropriate |

Northern Ireland

| | | | |
|----|---|-----|--|
| 5. | Political Situation | NIO | |
| 6. | Security | NIO | |
| 7. | Kinsale Gas and Related Energy Matters | NIO | |

100(83)SubjectLead
DepartmentIn consultation
withOther

8. European Community Issues:
- | | |
|-----------------|-------------|
| (a) Financing | FCO(ECD(I)) |
| (b) CAP | FCO(ECD(I)) |
| (c) Enlargement | FCO(ECD(E)) |
9. International Affairs:
- | | |
|--------------------------|------------------|
| (a) Lebanon: Arab/Israel | FCO(NENAD, MED) |
| (b) East-West Relations | FCO(Soviet Dept) |
| (c) Iran/Iraq | FCO(MED) |
| (d) Central America | FCO(MCAD) |
| (e) Falkland Islands | FCO(FID) |

MR COLES

Summit.
3.
u

IRISH BILATERAL

It might be useful if I gave you my thoughts on media arrangements for the above, on the assumption it is at Chequers.

The fact that it is at Chequers makes handling the media difficult and we ought to consider how that is to be coped with.

First, photographs. This causes no difficulty. We can organise a restricted pool for a photo on the doorstep or in the grounds. But that would have to be the extent of any media facilities at Chequers.

Second, pre-Summit briefing. There has already been publicity, notably in the Guardian, about the forthcoming Summit and the timing. All our experience shows that dates of Summits leak in Dublin. We need therefore to decide whether to brief in advance of the occasion. There is presumably less security concern about a bilateral in London. Subject to security considerations, there is in my view advantage in preparing the way - eg. by briefing on the Friday and thereby influencing presentation.

Third, briefing during the bilateral. This in turn depends on whether there is to be a press conference (which would have to be at RAF Halton). So to deal first with a press conference.

Our experience of these bilaterals shows that while secrecy does not pay, neither necessarily does a reasonable openness. In short, the Irish play it for what they want out of it.

But because they do that my advice would be:

- no press conference, singly or joint;
- no radio or tv interviews afterwards;
- a communiqué which sets out conclusions in careful terms, to be supplemented only by factual elaboration by spokesmen.

If this is agreed, we could brief to an agreed line, at lunchtime, prior to the issue of a communiqué later in the day.

All this does not mean that we shall entirely control presentation, or allay suspicions, because neither is possible in the Irish context. What it does mean, if the Irish can be tied down to this, is that we only say on-the-record to the press what we want to say.


If the Irish do not fall in with this, we need to consider whether our approach should change.

Do we wish to appear to be less forthcoming? Are we prepared to let the Irish make the running?

If the Irish do fall in with the idea of a communiqué and tight briefing how do we respond to the question:

"Why no press conference/interviews with an Irish bilateral when they are a familiar (if not invariable) part of the bilateral scene in Europe?"

You may think we ought to discuss with the Prime Minister.



B. INGHAM

25 October 1983

Romula

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.....*hope*.....*this*.....*is*.....*useful*

Patrol.

Mr Barrie

cc: Mr Colvin, Cabinet Office
Mr Angel, NIO(L)
Mr Tatham, DUBLIN
Mr Reeve, NIO(B)

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS

1. I had lunch today, at his request, with Michael Wills, one of the producers of ITV's Sunday programme 'Weekend World'. He had asked for an unattributable background briefing in anticipation of the Anglo-Irish Summit. Before agreeing to see Mr Wills, in view of Cabinet Office responsibilities, I confirmed with Mr Goodall that he saw no objection to RID taking this on; and confirmed with News Department that ~~Wills~~ was considered trustworthy.
2. Mr Wills explained that he hoped that a programme on Anglo-Irish relations would be broadcast on 6 November to set the scene for subsequent reporting of the Summit on 7 November. I commented that no date had been announced, and declined to confirm or deny the 7th.
3. Mr Wills started by asking me what I saw as the purpose of the Summit. I said that I thought it was about normalisation of relations, recalled at some length the historical background to the coolness which for so long marked relations between governments in Dublin and London and contrasted it with the closeness of relations between peoples in the two countries. I made much also of the extent to which our problems arose because of the relative lack of interest in and knowledge of the Republic in Great Britain and the intense interest in the Republic in British affairs and in the relationship between the two countries. I explained that after the coolness of the last two years both governments wished to restore relations, having in mind what was natural between two equal partners in the European Community, because relations between the communities in Northern Ireland could hardly improve if relations between Dublin and London were strained. I said that the plat de consistance at the Summit was likely to be a review of activity in the last two years under the aegis of the AIIC and consideration of the areas in which more could be done in future, explaining that we saw one of the aims of the AIIC as being the generation of more frequent and easier contacts between Ministers and officials of the two countries, contacts which would with time increase understanding between them and make for an easier and more productive relationship. I drew attention to the value for Franco-German relations of the frequent meetings which they had formally agreed should take place.
4. Mr Wills said that he wondered whether it would not be possible to make a link between the Summit and progress in Northern Ireland. I said that I did not think that this was what the Summit would be about. For his part, Dr FitzGerald would have nothing concrete to propose until the Forum had reported and he would hardly expect the

/Prime

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister to want to talk about courses of action which were entirely hypothetical.

5. Mr Wills then started to come clean and said that he and his team had had the impression from "people like Mary Holland" but also "other well-informed sources" that there was a lot going on as a result of the work of the Forum. The Irish were becoming more realistic and concerned at the threat to the stability of the Republic arising from the troubles in the North and were looking very hard at new ideas. One of the ideas which seemed to be in the air was an Irish contribution to security in the North; another was joint sovereignty; and of course links were made between the two.

6. I said that I had seen ideas of this sort bruted about in various articles in the press. As I had said, I did not think that this was what the Summit was about. Such ideas as I had seen set out seemed pretty half-baked. Mr Wills pressed me on the question of joint sovereignty and implied that his programme might go into this as a possible approach. I said that it seemed to me that none of the accounts I had seen advocating joint sovereignty had really faced up to the facts. Joint sovereignty if it meant anything meant joint control. How would that be operated? And it would involve a substantial change in the status of the Province. The position in law was well-known: there can be no change in the constitutional position in Northern Ireland without the consent of a majority of the people of the Province. Did those who advocated joint sovereignty suppose that it could be imposed without the consent of a majority in the Province? Or did they imagine that that consent could be obtained in some way? It was unrealistic to believe that either of these was politically possible. Would there not be a risk of substituting terrorism stemming from the majority community for terrorism stemming from the minority?

7. Other points I made included pointing out that Mr Prior was committed, and rightly committed, to the principle that there should be no secret deals but also that the unionists could not be allowed to dictate HMG's policies towards Anglo-Irish relations as long as they respected the principle embodied in the law.

8. We shall have to give thought to the line to take if we are pressed on similar lines by other journalists. The best occasion to discuss it might be Mr Goodall's meeting on Friday, if he agrees.

Patrick Eyers

P H C Eyers
Republic of Ireland Department

25 October 1983



By
X

10 DOWNING STREET

MR. COLES

Can I leave you to handle
this in the way you think
most appropriate.

(I have acknowledged Sir
John's letter)

Stephen

Stephen

25th October 1983

X
B. U. with papers

to Anglo / Irish Summit
in due course.

A. J. C. - 25.
6



10 DOWNING STREET

25th October, 1983

Thank you for your letter of October 21st.

The Prime Minister has already read your submission to the New Ireland Forum but I will place it before her again as you suggest.

Stephen Sherbourne
Political Secretary

Sir John Biggs-Davison, MP

From: Sir John Biggs-Davison, M.P.



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

Mr MP Sherbourne.

21st October, 1983

I should be grateful if my submission to the New Ireland Forum, a copy of which I sent to the Prime Minister on 16th September could be placed before her in advance of her meeting with the Taoiseach.

Yours sincerely,

John Biggs-Davison

Stephen Sherbourne, Esq.,
10 Downing Street,
London, SW1.

'NEW IRELAND FORUM'

A PERSONAL SUBMISSION BY SIR JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON, MP

(Formerly the Official Conservative Spokesman on Northern Ireland and currently Chairman of the Conservative Parliamentary Northern Ireland Committee.)

In view of the origins of the New Ireland Forum, it is hardly surprising that the various Unionist, and the Alliance, Parties in Northern Ireland have refused to take part. As for Her Majesty's Government, the Northern Ireland Office has made it clear that whilst there is nothing to stop people in Northern Ireland participating in such discussions, they cannot affect the fundamental principle that Northern Ireland is and will remain part of the United Kingdom whilst a majority of its people so wish. The Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 sets this out and the Government of the Republic for its part in a communiqué issued after the Sunningdale conference in December 1973

'fully accepted and solemnly declared that there would be no change in the status of Northern Ireland until a majority of the people of Northern Ireland desired a change in that status'.

The object of this Submission is to place before the Forum facts and considerations which may be ignored in the absence of Unionist participants.

The purpose of the Forum has been stated by the Irish Government to be

'consultation on the manner in which lasting peace and stability can be achieved in a new Ireland through the democratic process'.

However the phrase 'new Ireland' is to be defined, it is my submission that 'lasting peace and stability' are most likely to be achieved throughout the island of Ireland if the Republic so amends its constitution as to give up its claim to the North. Such a gesture of goodwill would relieve the minds of many in Northern Ireland, both Catholic and Protestant, who wish for nothing better than good neighbourly relations with their fellow-Irishmen in the South. For many, if not most Northern Ireland men and women regard themselves as as much Irish as British. Indeed, Mr John Hume's opening statement to the Forum (30 May 1983) that 'the Protestant ethos... contains... a strong element of political allegiance to Britain' is misleading. Allegiance to the Crown extends across the religious divide to embrace many Catholics.

The separatist minority in the North is not to be equated with Roman Catholicism. It is too simple to divide the people of Ulster into those who call themselves 'British' and those who call themselves 'Irish'. Dr Garret FitzGerald was nearer the mark when he referred on 30th May to the 'Irish/Irish sense of identity of the Nationalist minority, and the British/Irish identity of the Unionist majority'. I know Ulster Unionists who describe themselves as Irish, and who take part in all-Ireland religious, cultural, economic and sporting activities.

/....

Mr Haughey's opening statement to the Forum (30th May) reads somewhat strangely. The former Taoiseach declared that:

'Britain... whether she recognizes it or not (is) acting in a partisan role, supporting unconditionally the basic Unionist position, by military, political and economic power'.

Many Unionists would assert the precise opposite, namely that successive British Governments before and since the Labour Administration of 1964-70 have tried to nudge the people of Northern Ireland, against the wishes of the majority, into the arms of the Republic and so rid themselves of an intractable problem. But British troops and many men of goodwill, on both sides of the Border, have found themselves between two fires. This in itself constitutes evidence of a kind. If the British Government, as Mr Haughey alleges, has been 'supporting unconditionally the basic Unionist position', why did it suspend Stormont? Why did it try to introduce a power-sharing executive, and why did it conduct a Border Poll?

The truth is that successive British Governments were persuaded that Catholics in the North had legitimate grievances which the Stormont authorities did too little to redress. The hope of that 'lasting peace and stability' which both sovereign Governments seek would be dashed if mainland 'military, political and economic power' were withdrawn. The resulting turmoil would not stop at the Irish Border or even the Irish Sea.

The Northern Ireland majority will not be coerced, bombed or bullied into the Republic: they would, if necessary, fight, even if mainland power were withdrawn. This is a fact which successive British Governments have had to face even when they have been tempted to seek an easy way out. The principal terrorist groups declare themselves to be in permanent revolt against the Government in Dublin and are determined to overthrow it. Can Mr Haughey be so sure that the withdrawal of mainland power from the North would not stimulate the forces of anarchy in Dublin as well as in Belfast?

The Unionist case is founded on the democratic will of the distinct Ulster people and the right to self-determination successfully asserted by Southern Ireland. It follows that any form of 'new Ireland' will still contain a Border. Nevertheless this should not constitute a barrier to all-Ireland co-operation.

There are probably few if any independent sovereign States in the world which have closer links already than the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Recognition of an 'Irish dimension' to the Northern Ireland 'problem' requires also a corresponding recognition by the Republic of a 'British dimension' even to its own internal relationships.

Those who design a 'New Ireland' must reckon with reality. It is inescapable that Northern Ireland can neither be coerced nor seduced into the Republic. It is futile and insulting to suggest that Ulster Unionism is less love of the Union than hatred of Rome and that if the Republic, with its Catholic ethos, became a permissive society, a United Ireland could be brought about 'by consent'.

Rather, there is a mutual interest in the preservation of the distinctive Irish contribution to Western Christian civilisation. It is not a question of contraceptives but of the Crown. Abortion is as repulsive to most Northern Protestants as an all-Ireland Republic -

whether Catholic, socialist or secular.

Mrs Thatcher has spoken of a 'unique relationship' between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, and also of standing 'rock firm for the Union' of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The dialogue must primarily be East-West (London-Dublin) rather than North-South. The form of devolution contemplated by successive British Governments since the suspension of Stormont can only increase the distrust of the Unionist majority in that Government's good intentions. Moreover, it also alarms Nationalists, who fear that the way is being paved to a revival of devolved government on the old Stormont model of Protestant ascendancy.

But the chief impediment to the closer association of the two sovereign partners in these islands is Dublin's failure so to amend its constitution and its policy as to honour the solemn Tripartite Declaration of 1925 under which the Free State accepted the Border as the international frontier.

It is the frontier between two Community partners whose ties are multifarious. The Anglican, Roman Catholic and other communions transcend the Irish Border. Both countries benefited when their currencies were at parity, and the recent separation of the Irish pound from the pound sterling has been mutually inconvenient and detrimental to business in both countries. A number of learned societies, and societies less learned, some of them still styled 'Royal', function on both sides of the Border. The British Isles (including the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man) form a Common Travel Area. The Commissioners of Irish Lights constitute a 'Trinity House' for the whole island; and Parliamentary Questions have shown that they are accountable to the Oireachtas Eireann as well as to the United Kingdom Parliament. It is to be hoped that legislation to provide full reciprocity of voting rights will soon be enacted. The question of Parliamentary association is discussed in the Report of the Proceedings of the Fourteenth British Islands and Mediterranean Regional Conference of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association held in London in June 1983. A copy of these proceedings is annexed.

Such links could be further strengthened without impairing national sovereignty. The pattern of such bodies as the Nordic Council is worthy of consideration. The felicitous acronym IONA (Islands Of the North Atlantic) has been invoked by some of us. But the immediate, over-riding interest of the two sovereign powers is the irreversible defeat of terrorists bent on overturning by violence the constitutional order, in both South and North, and its replacement by a republic not so much Catholic as 'Cuban'.

NOTE ON THE NORDIC COUNCIL

Like the islands of the North Atlantic, the lands grouped around the Baltic have a history of both conflict and co-operation. From 1397 to 1523 they were united under Danish leadership in the Union of Kalmar.

/.....

Between 1563 and 1720 there were wars between the Danish-Norwegian and the Swedish-Finnish Kingdoms; and in Napoleonic times they were on different sides. The Russians conquered Finland and in 1814 the King of Denmark/Norway was forced to cede Norway to the King of Sweden. This did not prevent the Norwegians claiming independence which they finally gained in 1905. Finland became independent in 1917 after the Russian Revolution.

The Nordic Council, formed in 1953 (Finland acceded in 1955) is a joint Parliamentary body. In 1962 on its initiative, the Nordic Convention on Cooperation - the Helsinki Convention - was adopted. The Statutes of the Nordic Council are accepted as part of national legislation and in 1971 were incorporated in an international treaty. A Council of Ministers was to be created. To the Helsinki Convention was added a Cultural Agreement (1971), a Transportation Treaty (1972) and an Environment Protection Convention (1974).

The Nordic Council consists of seventy-eight representatives of national legislatures plus about fifty Cabinet Ministers who have a voice but no vote in the Council's plenary assemblies.

Sources

- Allardt, Erik and others: Nordic Democracy. Det Danske Selskab, Copenhagen, 1981.
- Derry, T K: History of Scandinavia. 1979.
- Turner, Barry (and G Nordquist): The Other European Community. 1982.

FERB

CONFIDENTIAL

Cabinet Office,
70 Whitehall,
London SW1A 2AS

24 October 1983

PS(83) 28

Dear Private Secretary.

Anglo-Irish Summit: 7 November 1983

This letter sets out the briefing arrangements for the Anglo-Irish Summit which is to take place at Chequers on 7 November 1983.

The list of briefs to be prepared, with an indication of Departmental responsibility, is at Annex A. Instructions on format are at Annexes B and C. Those preparing briefs should note carefully the details on the format of briefs set out in Annex B. Departments should, therefore, aim to ensure that, apart from the general brief, individual subject briefs do not exceed two sides of paper. Departments should ensure that the résumés of their briefs are with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office by close of play on 28 October 1983 at the latest.

70 copies of each brief should be sent to the Cabinet Office as soon as they are ready. They should reach the Cabinet Office by 12.00 noon on Tuesday 1 November. They should be addressed to Mr R D Roscoe in Committee Section, who should be consulted (tel no 233 7343) about any technical points arising.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to Sir Antony Acland, Mr P E Middleton, Sir Clive Whitmore, Sir Philip Woodfield, Sir Brian Cubbon, Sir Anthony Rawlinson, Sir Brian Hayes, Sir Kenneth Couzens, Sir Michael Franklin, Sir George Moseley, Mr D J S Hancock and Mr H Steel, and to John Coles at No 10.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) LINDSAY WILKINSON (MISS)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX A

LIST OF BRIEFS FOR ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT
7 NOVEMBER 1983

| <u>DMV(83)</u> | <u>Subject</u> | <u>Lead Department</u> | <u>In consultation with</u> |
|--------------------------|--|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. | Steering Brief | FCO NIO Cabinet Office | |
| 2. | Republic of Ireland: Political and Economic Situation | FCO | |
| <u>The Joint Studies</u> | | | |
| 3. | The Joint Studies: Progress and Future | Cabinet Office | as appropriate |
| 4. | Institutional Structures | Cabinet Office | as appropriate |
| | Citizenship Rights Security Matters Economic Co-operation Measures to Encourage Mutual Understanding | | |
| <u>Northern Ireland</u> | | | |
| 5. | Political Situation | NIO | |
| 6. | Security | NIO | |
| 7. | Kinsale Gas and Related Energy Matters | NIO | |
| <u>Other</u> | | | |
| 8. | European Community Issues | FCO | |
| | Financing CAP Enlargement | | |
| 9. | International Affairs | FCO | |
| | Lebanon: Arab/Israel East-West Relations Iran/Iraq Central America Falklands | | |

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THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT FORMAT SHOULD BE FOLLOWED CAREFULLY

All briefs should be laid out in the same way with a top page in accordance with the specimen layout at Annex C. Those preparing briefs should pay particular attention to ensuring that the following instructions are fully observed:

Content

- (a) Briefs should be concise. Each brief should whenever possible be no more than two sides long.
- (b) The main body of each brief should comprise three sections: a very brief statement of the United Kingdom Objective (normally no more than a couple of lines); a concise list of Points to Make; and a factual Background section which distinguishes clearly between information which can be freely used and information which should not be disclosed.
- (c) Briefs should be complete and self-contained with all the information required on that particular subject. Briefs should not be divided into separate self-contained subsections.

Layout

- (d) Briefs should be typed in double spacing, using both sides of the paper. Pages should be numbered at the foot of each page.
- (e) As shown in the specimen at Annex C, the top page only of each brief should contain the following details: the symbol and number of the brief in the top left-hand corner (eg DMV(83) 10) with the date of circulation below; a copy number in red at the top right-hand corner; the visit heading; the title of the brief (in capitals) and the name of the Department responsible.
- (f) At the foot of the last page and on the left-hand side, briefs should bear the name of the originating Government Department and the date of origin.

Reproduction

- (g) Briefs should be reproduced throughout on plain white paper, with each page bearing a security classification at top and bottom (as in Annex C). Care should be taken that the reproduction method employed results in clear readable copies.
- (h) It is important that, on arrival at the Cabinet Office, briefs should be complete in all detail - collated, stapled and copy numbered and ready for immediate circulation.

Updating

- (i) If late developments require a brief to be amended or updated, a revise should be prepared. It should be set out in the form described at (e) above, with the brief number amended to show that it is a revise (eg DMV(83) 10 (Revise)). Subsequent revises should be numbered (eg DMV(83) 10 (Revise 2), etc). If it is a question of adding material to the brief rather than revising its existing contents, an addendum may be prepared, in the form described at (e) above with the brief number (eg DMV(83) 10 Addendum) and title to which it relates at the top of the front page. The Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet should be informed when a revise or an addendum is in preparation and also about corrigenda to briefs.

- (j) Additions to the list of briefs in Annex A require the authorisation of the Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet.

[CLASSIFICATION]

ANNEX C

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

[Leave
1½"
margin]

DMV(83) [Serial No as specified in Annex A] COPY NO [in red]

[Date]

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT
7 NOVEMBER 1983

[SUBJECT] [Insert subject in capitals]

Brief by [name of originating Department, eg Foreign and
Commonwealth Office]

[At foot of last page on left-hand side:-]

[Originating Government Department, eg Foreign and Commonwealth
Office or Department of Energy, not a subordinate section or
division]

[Date of origin]

[CLASSIFICATION]

CONFIDENTIAL



de re

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 October 1983

Anglo/Irish Summit

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mr. James Molyneaux, MP, arguing that the holding of the Summit will bring "disastrous consequences" to Northern Ireland.

NIO dealing B.F.

I should be grateful if you would let me have a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature by 27 October.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Lyon (Northern Ireland Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



Hu

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

MISS WILKINSON
CABINET OFFICE

Anglo/Irish Summit

Thank you for your minute of 21 October.

BF

I agree that those whom you list should be invited to the briefing meeting on 4 November.

Incidentally, since we remain concerned to protect the date of the Summit it might be better if these papers were graded "Confidential".

A. J. COLES

24 October 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

gl

SECRET

HL



cc FCO
NIO

12

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

MR. GOODALL
CABINET OFFICE

Anglo/Irish Summit: Programme

Thank you for your minute of 20 October.

The Prime Minister is content with the proposed programme for the Summit subject to the following points:

(a) The tête-à-tête between herself and the Taoiseach will be attended by note-takers on either side. It may be that 45 minutes will be too short. The tête-à-tête will therefore continue as long as necessary.

(b) This may involve a rather shorter plenary session.

In addition, the Prime Minister has confirmed that she does not wish to give a joint press conference. Mrs. Thatcher has also further considered Ministerial participation in the Summit. In the light of John Holmes's letter of 20 October she has decided that she would not wish to ask Ministers other than the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Northern Ireland Secretary to join her.

I am copying this minute to Mr. Ricketts (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Mr. Lyon (Northern Ireland Office).

A. J. COLES

24 October 1983

sc

SECRET

CIF papers

C-81

2



Ulster Unionist Council

Unionist Headquarters
3 Glengall Street, Belfast, BT12 5AE
Telephone Belfast 224601 (3 lines)

22 October 1983

The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP
10 Downing Street
London SW1

Prime Minister

we will let you have a
ref. A.S.C. 24/10.

Dear Prime Minister

It is widely reported but not, I think, officially confirmed that you intend in the next few weeks to hold a meeting with the Premier of the Irish Republic in continuation of those held with him and his predecessor in November 1981 and December 1980 respectively. I thought therefore I should not delay any longer before representing to you the disastrous consequences which such a meeting would entail upon Northern Ireland.

You will be aware that the arrangements to which you agreed at the previous meetings were seen by the Irish Republic and widely interpreted elsewhere as intended - if I may use the words in the Conservative briefing of 25th April 1979 so often quoted since inside and outside the House - as "paving the way for a federal constitution linking Ulster to the Irish Republic".

The belief that these are the Government's real intentions is a powerful encouragement to the IRA and the INLA to persevere with their murderous campaigns despite increasing pressure from the security forces of the Crown, whence the grave repercussions in the province which followed the previous meetings.

I am reluctant to believe that, warmly sympathising as you do with the people of Ulster, you will want to incur those consequences yet again; but I should be at fault if I did not reaffirm on this occasion, as respectfully but firmly as I can, the warning which has proved only too well-founded in the past.

Yours ever
Jim

JAMES MCLYNEAUX

1/2 (m) 1/2
Troy. with
Toswell
H. b.

ms

PRIME MINISTER

Anglo/Irish Summit : 7 November

The Cabinet Office have suggested the following programme which has not yet of course been put to the Irish.

| | | |
|------|---|----------------|
| 0950 | Participants arrive at <u>Chequers</u> | <i>+ notes</i> |
| 1000 | Tete-a-tete between <u>yourself and the Taoiseach</u> . Other Ministers meet with officials in another room. | |
| 1045 | Coffee | |
| 1100 | Plenary | |
| 1300 | Lunch | |
| 1430 | Departure | |

Some questions arise:

- (a) Is a 45 minute tete-a-tete long enough?
- (b) I understand that Dr. FitzGerald is not asking for a joint press conference but wishes to brief selected Irish journalists afterwards. Shall we now abandon the idea of a joint press conference? *Yes*
- (c) Ministerial participation. You asked me to consider whether it would be a good idea for the Home Secretary or the Trade and Industry Secretary to attend. The Departments concerned have given thought to this. There is no business to justify their attendance - if we include the Home Secretary the Irish will raise matters such as the transfer of prisoners from British to Northern Ireland jails which we would rather not discuss. I suggest therefore that we stick to yourself, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Northern Ireland Secretary as the British team. Agree? *Yes no*

A.J.C.

21 October 1983



Ref. A083/2982

MR COLES

Prime Minister's Briefing Meeting for Anglo-Irish Summit:
7 November 1983

I should be grateful for your agreement to the following Ministers being invited to attend the Prime Minister's briefing meeting at 3.00 pm on Friday 4 November 1983:

Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland

2. You may also wish the following officials to be invited:

| | |
|-----------------------|--|
| Sir Antony Acland | FCO |
| Sir Julian Bullard | FCO |
| Mr P H C Eyers | FCO |
| Sir Philip Woodfield | NIO |
| Sir Ewart Bell | Head of Northern Ireland Civil Service |
| Mr A J E Brennan | NIO |
| Mr G L Angel | NIO |
| Mr Alan Goodison | Her Majesty's Ambassador, Dublin |
| Sir Robert Armstrong) | Cabinet Office |
| Mr A D S Goodall) | |


Lindsay Wilkinson
LINDSAY WILKINSON

21 October 1983



COMPTROLLER

21 OCT 1983



SECRET

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

10

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

21 October 1983

A.J.C. ²⁴/₁₀
f.a.

Dear John

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

Mr Prior has seen John Holme's letter of 20 October about the Anglo-Irish summit. He very much agrees that it would be unwise to include Mr Brittan and Mr Tebbit in the ministerial team, for the reasons John sets out.

with Ase

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (FCO) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever
Derek Hill

D A HILL


SECRET

SA

Ireland: Mky with Taiseach. Pt 6

27 OCT 1983

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Ref: 06881

MR COLES

Anglo-Irish Summit Programme

I attach a self-explanatory letter from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office covering two draft telegrams to Dublin about arrangements for the Anglo-Irish Summit.

2. The draft telegrams seem to me consistent with what I know of the Prime Minister's wishes for the Summit and I have no amendments to suggest unless the Prime Minister is ready to rule out the idea of a joint press conference altogether (this would be welcome to the Irish). If you are content I will so inform the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

David Goodall

20th October 1983

A D S GOODALL

S E C R E T

8



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 October 1983

A D S Goodall Esq CMG
Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall
London SW1



Dear Janid,

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: PROGRAMME

1. I enclose draft telegrams to HM Ambassador, Dublin, instructing him to pass detailed proposals on the programme for the Summit to the Department of Foreign Affairs. I should be grateful to know if we may despatch them. The Irish Embassy will have many consequential arrangements to make, and I therefore propose to call in Paul Dempsey to give him the programme also as soon as the telegrams are approved.

2. As you know, the Prime Minister has deferred making a decision about how she wishes to handle the press after the Summit meeting (John Coles' letter to John Holmes of 7 October). John Goulden has agreed to contact Bernard Ingham in order to find out informally what arrangements the Prime Minister is likely to prefer. We have, however, as you know been given clear indications both by Mr Lillis and the Irish Ambassador that Dr FitzGerald is likely to opt for a briefing session with selected Irish journalists at the Irish Embassy in London following the Summit, and the programme is drafted accordingly. The idea of a joint press conference therefore seems likely to fall by the wayside unless the Prime Minister wished to press for it.

Yours ever,

Patrick

P H C Eyers
Republic of Ireland Department

cc: S W Boys Smith Esq, NIO(L)
R D Gordon Esq, Protocol Department

S E C R E T

OUT TELEGRAM

| | | | |
|--|--|---|---------------------------------------|
| | | Classification and Caveats SECRET | Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE |
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| ZCZC | 1 | ZCZC |
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| CAVEATS | 4 | |
| DESKBY | 5 | |
| FM FCO | 6 | FM FCO |
| PRE/ADD | 7 | TO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN |
| TEL NO | 8 | TELEGRAM NUMBER |
| | 9 | ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: PROGRAMME |
| | 10 | 1. An outline programme for the Summit meeting on 7 November is |
| | 11 | contained in MIFT. Please put this to the Irish authorities |
| | 12 | stressing that for security reasons it remains our wish that |
| | 13 | knowledge of the date and details should continue to be closely |
| | 14 | held. |
| | 15 | 2. My second IFT contains a series of questions for the Irish. |
| | 16 | Grateful to know the answers to these as soon as possible. Two |
| | 17 | glosses on them for your own information only: the Prime |
| | 18 | Minister has yet to decide how she wishes to handle the press, |
| | 19 | but it is unlikely that she will wish to hold a joint press |
| | 20 | conference. And we should much prefer not (not) to have to |
| | 21 | organise a dinner on 6 November. |
| /// | 22 | |
| // | 23 | HOWE |
| / | 24 | NNNN |
| | 25 | |

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| NNNN ends telegram | | BLANK | | Catchword | |
| File number | | Dept RID | | Distribution As attached. | |
| Drafted by (Block capitals) P H C Eyers | | | | | |
| Telephone number 233 3994 | | | | | |
| Authorised for despatch | | | | | |
| Comcen reference | | Time of despatch | | | |

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats
SECRET

Precedence/Deskby
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| ZCZC | 1 | ZCZC | |
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| DESKBY | 5 | | |
| FM FCO | 6 | FM FCO | |
| PRE/ADD | 7 | TO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN | |
| TEL NO | 8 | TELEGRAM NUMBER | |
| | 9 | MIPT: ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: PROGRAMME | |
| | 10 | 7 NOVEMBER | |
| | 11 | 0950 | Participants arrive at Chequers. Greeted by Prime |
| | 12 | | Minister, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and |
| | 13 | | Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. |
| | 14 | 1000 | Tete-a-tete between Prime Minister and Taoiseach. |
| | 15 | | Other Ministers meet, with officials, in another room. |
| | 16 | 1045 | Coffee. |
| | 17 | 1100 | Plenary session. |
| | 18 | 1300 | Lunch |
| | 19 | 1430 | Departure. |
| | 20 | | |
| | 21 | HOWE | |
| /// | 22 | NNNN | |
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telegram

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File number

Dept
RID

Distribution
As attached.

Drafted by (Block capitals)
P H C EYERS

Telephone number
233 3994

Authorised for despatch

Comcen reference

Time of despatch

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats
SECRET

Precedence/Deskby
IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
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 FM/FCO
 PRE/ADD
 TEL NO

1 ZCZC
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 3 SECRET
 4
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 6 FM FCO
 7 TO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN
 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
 9 MY 2 IPT: ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: PROGRAMME
 10 1. Grateful if you would ask the Irish authorities for their
 11 views on the points set out below:
 12 (a) we understand that the Irish Ministerial party will wish
 13 to arrive on Sunday 6 November. It would seem most
 14 convenient that their aircraft should land at Heathrow
 15 (RAF Northolt is not open on Sundays). Grateful for
 16 Irish views on this. When would they expect their
 17 aircraft to arrive? What would its details be?
 18 (b) Grateful to know if Mrs FitzGerald will be
 19 accompanying the Taoiseach, so that we can make
 20 arrangements for separate entertainment if she wishes it.
 21 (c) We understand that the Irish are unlikely to require
 22 entertainment on 6 November but should be grateful for
 23 confirmation.
 24 (d) Grateful for details of overnight accommodation
 25 requirements for Irish party.

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| File number | Dept RID | Distribution As attached. |
| Drafted by (Block capitals) P H C EYERS | | |
| Telephone number 233 3994 | | |
| Authorised for despatch | | |
| Comcen reference | Time of despatch | |

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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|--|--------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| | Classification and Caveats SECRET | IMMEDIATE | Page 2 |
|--|--------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|

<<<< 1 <<<<

2 (e) We understand from Mr Lillis and the Irish Ambassador
 3 that Dr FitzGerald is likely to wish to hold a press
 4 briefing at the Irish Embassy. We should be grateful
 5 for confirmation of this. It is not possible to hold
 6 press conferences at Chequers (the nearest place to
 7 Chequers where a press conference can conveniently be
 8 held is RAF Halton).

9 (f) We understand that the Taoiseach is likely to be
 10 accompanied by the Tanaiste and Mr Barry. We should be
 11 grateful for confirmation that this is correct and also
 12 for an indication of what officials are likely to come.

13 (g) Accommodation for lunch at Chequers is very limited (18 is
 14 the absolute maximum) but it is usual to make arrangements
 15 for officials not lunching with the Heads of Government to
 16 eat at ^{a nearby hotel, e.g.} the Bell Inn at Aston Clinton. We should be
 17 grateful for an indication of which officials the Taoiseach
 18 would like to lunch at Chequers.

19 2. It may be helpful for the Irish to know for the planning of
 20 their press conference that it is usually sufficient to allow one
 21 ~~hour~~ (? one and a quarter hours) for the journey between Chequers
 22 and central London.

23

24 HOWE

25 NNNN

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| NNNN ends telegram | BLANK | Catchword |
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 October 1983

*Dear John,*Anglo-Irish Summit

Thank you for your letter of 7 October.

We have given thought to the Prime Minister's question about inviting the Home Secretary and the Trade and Industry Secretary to attend the Summit meeting, in consultation with the Home Office and the Department of Trade, as well as the Cabinet Office and the Northern Ireland Office. The presence of either Minister would help to prevent any public impression that the Summit was devoted to Northern Ireland and constitutional issues. But we have now established that there are no points which the Home Office or the Department of Trade wish to pursue with the Irish at Ministerial level, and the presence of either the Home Secretary or the Trade Secretary might encourage the Irish to add further members to their ministerial team. This in turn could lead to an unnecessary expansion of the agenda. In the case of the Home Secretary, there is also the risk that the Irish might feel obliged to raise matters (such as the transfer of prisoners from British to Northern Ireland jails) which we would prefer not to discuss. The Foreign Secretary is therefore inclined to conclude that, on balance, it would be better not to include Mr Brittan or Mr Tebbit.

I am copying this letter to John Lyon (Northern Ireland Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Ireland
mtg with
Taoiseach
PT5



20 OCT 1985

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SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Irish Sailors and Soldiers Land Trust

The Prime Minister has seen your minute of 12 October and the accompanying documents. She notes that you will be providing briefing on this subject for her meeting with Dr. Fitzgerald at the next Anglo/Irish Summit.

JOHN COLES

17 October 1983

HL

Ref. A083/2887

MR COLES

Prime Minister

You will be briefed on this for the next Anglo / Irish Summit. At this stage you need only look at the highlighted passages in the attached letter. A.D.C. 13/10

When the Taoiseach comes for his meeting with the Prime Minister next month, he may raise with the Prime Minister the question of the future of the Irish Sailors and Soldiers Land Trust.

- 2. The background to this question is set out in the attached copy of a letter which I sent to Sir Antony Acland last week.
3. Sir Edmund Compton has now formally submitted the Report foreshadowed in the letter; I attach a copy of the Report herewith.
4. Lord Killanin, the Trustee appointed by the Taoiseach, is transmitting a copy of the Report to the Taoiseach.
5. We shall of course arrange briefing for the Prime Minister on this subject for her meeting with the Taoiseach.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

12 October 1983



c- H. Goodall

70 WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AS

01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet and Head of the Home Civil Service

CABINET OFFICE

Sir Robert Armstrong GCB CVO

Ref. A083/2788

6 October 1983

| |
|----------------|
| 207 |
| INSTRUCTIONS |
| FILE NO. _____ |

Irish Sailors and Soldiers Land Trust

I have been approached by Sir Edmund Compton, a former Treasury colleague, about the future of the Irish Sailors and Soldiers Land Trust. This Trust was established at the beginning of 1924 under a United Kingdom statute to provide housing in Ireland for Irishmen who had served in the British forces in the First World War. Though the Trust was set up by United Kingdom statute, its establishment was confirmed by legislation of the Irish Free State which conferred on it certain powers in what is now the Republic of Ireland. The Government of the Irish Republic, as the successor to the Irish Free State, is in this sense a party to the establishment of the Trust.

I understand that this came about in the following way. During the 1914-18 War (after the Easter rising in 1916), Lord Ypres (formerly Sir John French, and himself an Irishman) went to Ireland to encourage Irishmen to join the British forces. In so doing he gave what amounted to a pledge that those who joined would be provided with housing after the War was over. In pursuance of this pledge the British Government (whose writ still covered the whole of Ireland) after the War undertook the building of cottages for Irish ex-servicemen. When the Irish Free State was set up, it was agreed between the three Governments concerned (in Westminster, Belfast and Dublin) that the responsibility for providing and maintaining this housing should be devolved upon a Trust, which would be a non-political Anglo-Irish body. The Government of the Irish Free State made over to the Trust the stock of houses then already built or under construction in the Irish Free State; the Government of Northern Ireland did likewise with houses in Northern Ireland; and the British Government provided the Trust with an endowment in the form of a grant of money.

/ Over the

Sir Antony Acland KCMG KCVO

Northern
Ireland

X
Over the years the Trust has continued to provide and maintain houses for the ex-servicemen beneficiaries at very low or (in the Republic) no rent. More recently, where the tenants have been prepared to buy, the Trust has been selling houses to sitting tenants for a small sum. Where houses have fallen vacant upon the departure or death of sitting tenants or their widows, the Trust has sold houses on the market. As a result the Trust's stock of houses is now down to 30 in the Irish Republic and 170 in ~~the Irish Free State~~; and they have surplus funds held in British Government Stocks or Treasury Bills amounting to about £5 million. The remaining tenants are all elderly, mostly widows, and the stock of houses held by the Trust is likely to be reduced to nothing in the next few years.

I understand that the Treasury has been arguing that the Trust has now virtually exhausted its mandate, and is pressing for the whole of the surplus funds to be paid into the Exchequer and the Trust to be wound up. It is recognised, however, that the Irish Government has an interest in this matter, and this proposition has not so far been put to the Government of the Irish Republic.

In the meantime, the Trustees (whose Chairman Sir Edmund Compton is) have been considering other possibilities. They do not need or wish to hold the whole of the surplus funds, though they need to hold about £1½ million to provide them with an income with which to maintain the properties they still hold. Sir Edmund Compton has prepared a report suggesting that the Trust should return £1,630,000 of the surplus to the British Government and £750,000 to the Government of the Irish Republic: these figures are proportionate to the original stakes of the British Government and the Northern Ireland Government on the one hand and the Government of the Irish Free State on the other. This report will further propose that future surpluses, which will accrue as the remaining properties are sold, should be paid by the Trust to Irish charities on both sides of the border (and to all Irish charities if there are any) over the next few years. This report is likely to be agreed by three of the other four Trustees within the next two weeks: the remaining Trustee, a former Treasury official, will express some reservations, in view of the Treasury's position.

One of the Irish Trustees, Lord Killanin, has leaked this report to the Taoiseach, to whom he will formally submit it once it is finalised. Sir Edmund Compton proposes simultaneously to submit the report to me, at the same time, for onward transmission to the Prime Minister. I suppose that it is very possible that this subject may come up for a mention at the forthcoming Anglo-Irish Summit.

As I understand it, the Treasury proposal that the whole of the surplus should be transferred to the British Exchequer and the Trust wound up would require legislation at Westminster. Given that Irish Free State legislation was also involved in the establishment of the Trust, presumably some form of Irish

/ legislation, or

legislation, or at least confirmation, would be needed: it would not be possible to act unilaterally or without the agreement of the Irish Government. Equally, any proposal for the distribution of present and future surpluses on the lines envisaged in Sir Edmund Compton's report would also require amending legislation in the British Parliament, and would presumably have to be at least agreed with the Irish Government.

I suppose that, if the Government were to decide to follow the line suggested in Sir Edmund Compton's report, it would be worth considering whether the powers of the Trust to distribute surpluses might be so extended that funds could be used for purposes to promote Anglo-Irish relations. It might even be that this could be a source of funds for the Anglo-Irish Encounter which is now being set up; this would avoid the Joint Chairmen of Encounter having to compete with the British-Irish Association in seeking funds from private and corporate supporters.

When we have Sir Edmund Compton's report, we shall clearly need to provide the Prime Minister with defensive briefing, in case the Taoiseach raises this at the Anglo-Irish Summit later in the year. For that purpose we presumably ought to agree among ourselves what line we should recommend her to take. I will put some discussion of this in hand in the context of the preparations of the Anglo-Irish Summit.

I am sending copies of this letter to Peter Middleton and Philip Woodfield.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

At a meeting of the Trust held on 7th October 1983, the Trustees present being Sir Edmund Compton (Chairman), Col. J.Hughes and Mr. D.McKean and constituting a quorum, it was resolved as follows:-

1. To adopt the substance of the Chairman's Report and Recommendations on the Future of the Trust, a copy of which is attached.
2. To record that of the Trustees unable to be present, Lord Killanin had expressed his approval of the substance of the Report and recommendations: the opinion of Lt. Col. Hamilton Stubber is awaited.
3. To record that as regards 5(b) and 5(c) of the summary of recommendations, Mr. McKean questioned the propriety of granting the Trust a discretion to distribute future surpluses to Irish charities at large. He was disposed to recommend that, in line with the original purposes of the Trust, the assistance to be given should be confined to charities devoted to the welfare of ex-servicemen in Ireland.
4. To authorise the transmission of the Report, with a copy of this minute, to the Government of the UK and the Government of the Irish Republic.

E. C.

12.X.83

FUTURE OF THE IRISH SAILORS & SOLDIERS LAND TRUST

Introduction

1. This Report is the outcome of the Trustees' Meeting held on 30 April, 1982, when they discussed the future of the Trust on the footing that "it was their duty to form a positive view of the proper disposition of this money, and of their own future: and, in the knowledge that any disposition required legislation, to make recommendations to the authorities with the power to take action, namely to H.M.G. and to the Government of the Irish Republic".

The Treasury proposal: The Trust to be wound up, the U.K. Exchequer to take the surplus assets

2. This proposal is made in a Treasury letter dated 10 March, 1981, to the Chairman of the Trust, as follows:-

"It is our intention that the future of the Trust should be clarified at an early date to enable the Trust to be determined at some appropriate future date and its assets disposed of in a proper manner. It is the Treasury's view that the Exchequer is the logical remainderman having regard to the fact that it was the Exchequer that provided the funds to enable the Trust to function".

(The reference is to the grants totalling £1,300,000 voted by the U.K. Parliament in 1923 - 1925)

With the Treasury letter as the starting point, this Report comments and recommends under the following heads:

Winding up the Trust

Surplus funds: the "remainderman" option

Surplus funds: the "repay and recycle" option

New trust objects.

Comments on the Treasury proposal

3. Winding up the Trust

It must be a very considerable time before the Trust can be determined. The Trust's operations in Ireland (N.B. throughout this report "Ireland" means "all-Ireland") may be residual, but they are not insignificant. There are 30 tenanted properties to be managed in the South, and 170 in the North. On the credit side, each will realise (at today's prices) some £15,000 when the occupant buys or dies, i.e. a potential £3,000,000; but most of the occupants being widows, it will take a long time. Meantime, they pay no rent (South) or a nominal rent (North), and the annual running cost to the Trust is high for properties which are over 50 years old.

4. Apart from its landlord functions, the Trust has other forms of property in Ireland, such as parcels of land (mostly worthless or even a liability when identified) and leasehold purchasers with right to convert to freehold. The transfer of these properties to a successor body would be very time-consuming and legally expensive, and lead to demands to be indemnified for unknown risks.
5. Financially, it seems unlikely that any successor body or bodies could be found or created that would not require a substantial endowment, especially in the South. Finally, it seems certain that legislation by the Irish Republic would be needed to validate the wind-up of the present Trust, seeing that it was the Saorstát Éireann-Land Trust Powers Act, 1923 (16 July, 1923) that completed the incorporation of the Trust by conferring on it the power to own land in the (then) Irish Free State. Identical legislation for Northern Ireland was enacted by the N.I. Parliament - the Land Trust (Powers) Act, Northern Ireland 1923 (22nd June, 1923).

Apart from the possibilities of political obstacles, which are outside the scope of this Report, it is not suggested that the difficulties in the way of determining the present Trust cannot be overcome, given time, goodwill and generosity in the funding of the body or bodies, that would succeed to the residual functions of the present Trust in Ireland. But time it must take. Meantime the surplus funds are mounting.

7. It is, therefore, recommended that as a practical way of proceeding, (a) the Trust should be allowed to continue in being, as at present constituted, and exercising its present powers, (b) decision and legislative action should be limited to the disposition of the funds that are surplus to the fulfilling of its present objects.

Surplus Funds: the "remainderman" option

8. It may be doubted if "remainderman" is the proper expression for the course proposed by the Treasury, when expressing the view that the U.K. Exchequer is the logical recipient of the surplus funds because it was the Exchequer that provided the funds to enable the Trust to function (i.e. the grants totalling £1,300,000 voted by Parliament in 1923-1925). But accepting the logic, it does not follow that the Exchequer is the only remainderman.
9. For Parliamentary grants provided only a part of the Trust's initial capital. The Government of the Republic might with equal logic claim to be remainderman in respect of land and houses (some completed, some under construction) which the Irish Free State transferred without payment to the Trust when the legislation was completed and the Trust came into being on 31 December, 1923. Likewise H.M.G. should be credited with the value of the land and houses which the Northern Ireland Government transferred without payment to the Trust at the same date.

10. There might also be remainderman claims in the private sector. Indeed one has been identified. A Trustee in the 1940s was Col. Blakiston-Houston, of Killeleagh. In 1948 his brother donated a site in what was then the outskirts of Belfast, close to Stormont, on which the Trust built no less than 62 houses - the Barnetts Road estate. By now, the Trust has sold most of these.
11. On remainderman logic the Blakiston-Houston successors would have a substantial claim, given that site value would have been a big element in the sale price in a favoured residential area.
12. There may well have been other private donations of land by well-wishers of the Trust in its early days, on both sides of the Border. The Blakiston-Houston case, which occurred when the Trust was already 25 years old, is the only one cited because it is within the recollection of the Chairman who personally negotiated it, and is well documented as the only post-war (1939-45) building carried out by the Trust. But once it is publicised, other donors or their successors may well come forward to claim.

Surplus Funds: the "repay and recycle" option

13. Given the complications and prospects of controversy over the fairness of the "Remainderman" option as analysed above, there may be better prospects of general acceptance and legislative action on an alternative scheme, named in this Report "the repay and recycle" option.

The scheme is as follows:- the figures are indicative.

Repayment of the initial donors

14. The first charge on the £5m. invested capital of the Trust should be the repayment to the donors, at the value at the time of the donation, of the resources in cash or kind, that they put into the Trust at its inception in 1924. (The argument is that any increase over that value is not due to the donors but is the net result of the Trust's operations from 1924 to date (1983-84).

15. The donors are H.M.G. and the Republic and the donations to be repaid are:-

| | | | |
|---------------------|-------------|------------|--|
| In cash: | to H.M.G. | £1,300,000 | voted in 1924-25 |
| In kind: | to H.M.G. | £ 326,000 | for N.I. houses transferred to Trust 1.1.24 |
| | | <hr/> | |
| | | £1,626,000 | |
| In kind: | to Republic | £ 754,000 | for houses transferred to Trust 1.1.24 |
| | | <hr/> | |
| Total of repayments | | £2,380,000 | say £2.4m. |
| | | <hr/> | |

16. The numbers of houses on which these figures are calculated are -
transferred from Irish Free State, 1,508: transferred from Northern
Ireland Government, 652: valued overall at £500 each.

These are the houses built under the 1919 Act by the U.K. Government in
North and South, when U.K. meant the "United Kingdom of Great Britain and
all-Ireland". They became the property of the Irish Free State and the
Northern Ireland Governments when Partition took effect on 6 December 1922,
and it was the I.F.S. Act of 16 July 1923 and the Northern Ireland Act of
22 June 1923 which provided for the transfer by those Governments to the
Trust of their respective properties.

17. It may be mentioned that the suggested £500 figure takes account of the
fact that a number of the houses were only part-built at the time of transfer,
leaving the Trust to pay for their completion; also that in February 1924 a
Treasury letter to the Trust said that the cost of building a cottage in
Ireland had been £700 on average but that the I.F.S. Government was understood
to be imposing a limit of £400, and the Treasury wanted the Trust to adopt
this figure for their building programme.

Retention of funds for continuing operations

18. The Trust's invested fund at October 1983 stands at £4.5m. By the end of
the year it will be £5m. Payments of £2.4m. to Republic and U.K. would
reduce it to £2.6m. The Trust's present running account deficit is £140,000
a year, indicating the retention of at least £1.5m. capital. The adequacy

of this in future years will depend on the future course of property maintenance costs, the rate at which properties are sold, and the future of rates of interest. Therefore the amount available at the outset for a further distribution might be the interest on the remaining £1.1m. capital, say £100,000.

19. The logic pointing to an annual determination of the disposable surplus needs explaining.

It has been said that the administration of the Trust's remaining properties in Ireland will continue for a number of years. Provision for funding this must be made before any surplus is declared and disposed of. The Trust is bound to play for safety in deciding what capital is to be retained, and to cover inflation risks. For as long as the present Trust lasts, virtually all its continuing operations in Ireland involve expenditure, and the only input of funds is when a "cottage" is sold. Sooner or later, all the 200 "cottages" now tenanted will be sold; but most of the tenants being widows, it may well be later, and meantime the Trust (which cannot borrow) might spend beyond investment income and dip into capital. The margin of safety required to guard against this, would seriously reduce the amount to be distributed as surplus, if the distribution were to be a once-for-all event.

New Trust objects

20. It is recommended that the annual surplus should be used to assist charities operating in Ireland, but it is not recommended that eligible objects should be spelled out in the legislation. Given the origins of the Irish Sailors & Soldiers Land Trust, it would be natural to specify the welfare of ex-servicemen in Ireland as one object. But the definition of "ex-serviceman" at this date poses an immediate problem; and Trustees in discussing this alternative have expressed the view that the scope of the new objects should extend to the civilian sphere and should not be confined to housing but include the support of educational and cultural causes.

21. Also it is important to provide for flexibility as time passes; there will be changes in the amounts available for distribution and the priorities of needs, also perhaps in the capacity of assisted bodies to meet those needs.

The annual distribution would proceed on the following lines.

22. At the end of each financial year, the Trust on the basis of the year's Accounts and the estimates for the year ahead, would determine the surplus available for distribution, decide which charities in Ireland should benefit and the amounts that each should get, and pay out accordingly.
23. The present practice of the Trust is to submit its Annual Report and Accounts to the Secretary of State and the Treasury. If the Trust were given additional power of making donations to charitable bodies in Ireland, the Annual Report and Accounts should also be submitted direct to the Taoiseach.

Legislation and other governmental action

24. It should count in favour of this scheme that it avoids the creation of new governmental bodies, with (subject to legal advice) the consequence that the legislation can be minimal and non-controversial, consisting of two provisions:
- (a) requiring the Trust to pay specified sums to H.M.G. and the Republic respectively
 - (b) conferring on the Trust the power to donate surplus funds to Irish charities.

Summary of Recommendations

- (1) The Trust, as constituted by the legislation enacted in the U.K. and Ireland in 1922-1923, should continue to operate for some years before winding it up is considered. But action to dispose of its surplus funds should be taken now, including the necessary legislation.
- (2) The surplus after retention by the Trust of funds to finance its remaining operations might be of the order of £3.5m. The Treasury view is that this should be paid to the U.K. Exchequer as "remainderman" because the Exchequer provided the Trust's initial capital (£1,300,000 voted by Parliament in 1922-25).
- (3) But the U.K. Exchequer was not the sole source of initial capital for the Trust. The Irish Free State transferred 1,508 cottages to the Trust in 1923; and the Trust received at least one private donation, the Blakiston-Houston 1948 gift of land for the Barnett's Road estate of 62 houses. The identification of claimants and the division of the surplus between them would be a complicated and controversial process, and is not recommended if an alternative, satisfactory to both H.M.G. and the Irish Republic, is available.
- (4) In place of a "remainderman" arrangement, the disposition of the Trust funds could be effected by legislation providing for repayment to the U.K. and the Republic of their respective inputs of capital into the Trust at its inception; the retention by the Trust of the funds required to maintain its remaining 1914-18 ex-service housing operations; and the expenditure of the remainder on assistance for charitable bodies operating in Ireland.

(5) This is the course that this Report recommends, under the following scheme:

- a) The Trust would be required to make a once-for-all payment of two sums, specified in the legislation, to H.M.G. and to the Irish Republic respectively, representing the value at the time (1924-25) of the resources that they put into the Trust as its initial capital.

As at present advised, the sums might be:-

| | |
|--|-------------------|
| For Republic (Property transferred 1.1.24) | £ 754,000 |
| For U.K. | |
| N.I. property transferred 1.1.24 | £ 326,000 |
| Grants under 1922 Act 1924-25 | <u>£1,300,000</u> |
| | £2,380,000 |

- b) The Trust would be required to make an annual determination of the funds that it should retain to cover its future expenses on its original objects, and make annual payments from the emerging surplus to assist charitable bodies operating in Ireland.



(Note: The first such distribution would necessarily be small. In para 18 of this Report it is calculated to be of the order of £100,000)

- c) The objects of such charitable assistance would not be specified in the legislation; but the identity of the charities assisted, and the amounts given to each, would be available for scrutiny by H.M.G. and the Government of the Irish Republic in the Annual Report and Accounts submitted to them by the Trust.

(Note: For the purpose of this Report, "Ireland" does not denote a political entity but means "All-Ireland.")

Edmund Compton

7 October, 1983



112 OCT 1983

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 October 1983

ANGLO/IRISH SUMMIT

Thank you for your letter of 4 October.

The Prime Minister would be grateful if the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland would accompany her at the above summit.

She doubts whether it would be a good use of the time of the Chancellor of the Exchequer for him to be present. Mrs. Thatcher has asked whether the subject matter would be likely to justify the presence of the Home Secretary or the Trade Secretary. I should be grateful for your advice.

The Prime Minister is broadly content with the outline programme which you enclosed. She would, however, not wish you to give the Irish the impression that the plenary session could be continued after lunch. The time for discussion seems to be relatively generous and it could continue during the working lunch if necessary.

With regard to a press conference, the Prime Minister will take a decision on this nearer the time. She would certainly not wish to commit herself now to a joint press conference.

I am copying this letter to John Lyon (Northern Ireland Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Could I possibly have
your decision on the
attached form.

M G
/10.

PRIME MINISTER

mt.

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: 7 NOVEMBER: CHEQUERS

It would be helpful if you could decide on the following points:

(a) Who should participate on our side?

You will presumably be accompanied by the Foreign Secretary and the Northern Ireland Secretary. In order to avoid the impression that the Summit is devoted entirely to Northern Ireland and constitutional issues, would you like to have another Minister from one of the economic departments with you? There is little on the agenda to justify it, but would you, for example, wish to ask the Chancellor to join the Summit?

Lead? and/or lead.

No - a waste of his time. I hear.

(b) Are you content with the attached outline programme?

The FCO say that the Irish might complain that the time for discussion is limited. They accordingly suggest that we should say to the Irish that you would not mind the plenary session continuing after lunch if necessary. It looks to me, however, as though there is plenty of time for discussion. I believe we should tell the Irish that discussion could continue during lunch if necessary and not commit you to further meetings in the afternoon. Agree?

Yes

(c) A press conference

The choice is between a joint press conference and independent briefing by both sides. I suggest that you defer a decision until nearer the time. If we commit ourselves to a joint press conference now, we may regret it in the event.

Agree? Yes mt

A. J. C.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 October 1983

*Dear John,*Anglo-Irish Summit: Chequers

In accordance with the guidelines issued by the Cabinet Office earlier this year, I am writing to make proposals both on Ministerial participation and on the programme for the Summit (we delayed putting these forward in order to take account of any developments at the Official Co-ordinating Committee of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council in Dublin on 28 September).

The question of Ministerial participation at the Summit was discussed between Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr Nally, Secretary to the Irish Government, at their meeting on 11 July. Sir Robert told Mr Nally that the Prime Minister would probably be accompanied by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Mr Nally said that Dr FitzGerald would be accompanied by the Irish Foreign Minister, Mr Barry, and possibly by Mr Spring, the Tanaiste (Deputy Prime Minister). It is likely in practice that Mr Spring will insist on coming, since it would be politically embarrassing for the leader of the Labour Party, the junior partner in the Irish coalition government, to be excluded from an Anglo-Irish Summit. Both sides accept that the main purpose of the Summit will be to provide public evidence of the normalisation of Anglo-Irish relations. And there are no major bilateral issues which entail any additional Ministerial presence on the British side (although Kinsale gas might be a possible agenda item). On the other hand, the presence of other ministers, eg on the economic side, could help to prevent any public or Irish Government impression that the Summit was entirely devoted to Northern Ireland and constitutional issues. The Foreign Secretary recalls attending at least one previous Summit as Chancellor.

/I enclose

London and Birmingham

London SW1A 1AA



London



1-4 OCT 1 11

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/ I enclose a draft programme. The Irish may be inclined to argue that the time for discussion is a little limited. It would accordingly be helpful if we could be authorised to say, in putting the programme to the Irish, that the Prime Minister could contemplate the plenary session being continued after lunch if this proved necessary.

I should be grateful for your advice on press conferences. The choice in practice is between a joint press conference or no press conference. Simultaneous press conferences would be a nonsense and there are great dangers in consecutive conferences. A joint press conference is also a little risky, as well as a tiresome chore, but is probably the best option since if there is no formal press conference at all Dr FitzGerald will undoubtedly brief the press in London on his own terms.


I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Your ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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OUTLINE PROGRAMME FOR THE ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT MEETING

- 0950 Participants arrive at Chequers
(assume that Irish party will arrive previous night and travel up from London by car)
- 1000-
1045 Tête-a-tête. Other Ministerial participants to meet in separate room, together with officials.
- 1045 Coffee
- 1100-
1245 Plenary session.
- 1300-
1430 Lunch
- 1435 Depart for RAF Halton
- 1450 Press conference in Officers' Mess at RAF Halton.
- 1530 Depart for RAF Benson.
- 1615 Irish party depart from RAF Benson.

File

DSF

held at

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

ANGLO-IRISH ENCOUNTER

Thank you for your minute of 26 July.
The Prime Minister is content with the
proposed announcement today of the establish-
ment of the Anglo-Irish Encounter organisation.

A. J. COLES

27 July 1983



Prime Minister 5

To note.

WOL 27/7.

DA

1/8

Handwritten signature

Ref. A083/2254

MR COLES

Irish Summit

I was authorised to say to Mr Nally, when he was here on other business yesterday, that the Prime Minister would find it difficult to go to Dublin for the summit meeting on 7 November, and hoped that the Taoiseach would be prepared to come either to London or to ~~Checkers~~.

2. Mr Nally has now confirmed the Taoiseach's acceptance of the Prime Minister's invitation to ~~Checkers~~.

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Re

Approved by
ROBERT ARMSTRONG
and signed in his absence

26 July 1983

Ref. A083/2255

MR COLES

Anglo-Irish Encounter

When the Prime Minister met the Taoiseach in Stuttgart last month, they agreed to go ahead with the establishment of the Anglo-Irish Encounter organisation envisaged in the statement issued after their meeting in November 1981.

2. Mr Nally and I had a meeting on Monday 25 July with Sir David Orr, the proposed British Chairman of the Encounter, and with Dr T K Whitaker, the proposed Irish Chairman.

3. The Irish Government are anxious to announce the establishment of the Encounter after tomorrow morning's meeting between the Irish Foreign Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Northern Ireland Secretary. We were able to agree with Sir David Orr and Dr Whitaker the terms of a draft press statement incorporating terms of reference for the organisation; I attach a copy of the statement herewith.

4. Mr Nally said that, though Mr Haughey approved the proposal to establish the Encounter organisation when he was Taoiseach, recently, Mr Haughey's party Fianna Fail had decided not to send representatives to the forthcoming conference of the British Irish Association at Balliol College, Oxford, on the grounds that it was not prepared for a conference of such an Association at such a place to discuss the Irish neutrality. This reaction made it, in the present Taoiseach's view, important to check with Mr Haughey before an announcement was made about the Encounter organisation, that he was still in favour of it, and would not oppose it. The Taoiseach would have an opportunity of doing this with Mr Haughey the following day (today) in time to postpone an announcement if Mr Haughey's reaction was adverse. I have just heard that Mr Haughey's reaction was not adverse, and the announcement can therefore go ahead.

Prime Minister

Content with this announcement?

Yes mh

FERB
26.7.

26 July 1983

Approved by
ROBERT ARMSTRONG
and signed in his absence

ANGLO-IRISH ENCOUNTER ORGANISATION: DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT

Following today's meetings between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Ireland, Mr Peter Barry TD, and the Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Right Honourable Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP, and Northern Ireland, the Right Honourable James Prior MP, it was announced that the two Governments have decided to support the establishment of an "Anglo-Irish Encounter" organisation as recommended in the Anglo-Irish Joint Studies of 1981. Sir David Orr MC LLB has agreed to be United Kingdom Chairman; Dr T K Whitaker has agreed to be Irish Chairman. It is hoped that Encounter's activities will start early in 1984.

2. The terms of reference for the organisation will be:
"The objective of both Governments in initiating the Anglo-Irish Encounter organisation is to contribute to the improvement of relations between their peoples in the interests of peace, reconciliation and stability. Encounter will organise periodic conferences and seminars, with a wide range of representation, on economic, social, cultural and other matters of common interest with a view to promoting mutual understanding, useful co-operation and good relations. Encounter will be an independent non-governmental organisation but it is envisaged that the ideas generated at its conferences and seminars may be submitted to the two Governments for their consideration".

NOTES FOR EDITORS

The establishment of an Anglo-Irish Encounter organisation was recommended in the report of the Anglo-Irish Joint Studies (Cmnd 8414) which was approved by the two Heads of Government at their meeting in November 1981. It will be for the two Chairmen and the Executive Board - whose members will initially be co-opted by the Chairmen - to decide how the organisation should develop. Encounter will, however, receive an initial measure of financial support from the two Governments.

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HL



a FC0
N10
MOD

10 DOWNING STREET

bcc TF

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG
CABINET OFFICE

Anglo/Irish relations

The Prime Minister has seen your minute of 14 July.

She agrees that British and Irish officials may meet as necessary between now and the Anglo/Irish Summit for the purposes described in paragraph 3 of your minute.

As regards the venue for the Summit, the Prime Minister would wish it to be either at 10 Downing Street or at Chequers - and you may offer the latter alternative if you think it would help. You could also say that the Prime Minister has to be in Bonn all day on 9 November for the Anglo/German Summit and that it would therefore help her if the Anglo/Irish Summit could be in the UK.

The Prime Minister further agrees that you and Mr. Nally should explain your thinking on the "Encounter" organisation with a view to an announcement of the establishment of Encounter being linked to Mr. Barry's talks in London with Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mr. Prior on 27 July.

I am copying this minute to Mr. Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Mr. Lyon (Northern Ireland Office) and Mr. Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

18 July 1983

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Ref. A083/2081

PRIME MINISTER

Prime MinisterSee 3 points For decision
in margins below.See comments
not.A.S.C. 15.
7Anglo-Irish Relations

Mr Nally, Secretary of the Irish Government, and I met as planned in London on 11 July. Mr Nally was accompanied by a small team of senior officials including Mr Donlon, Permanent Secretary to the Irish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the outgoing Irish Ambassador, Dr Eamon Kennedy. I was accompanied by Mr Goodall, and by Mr Evers (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Mr Angel (Northern Ireland Office), and by our Ambassador in Dublin, Mr Alan Goodison. It was agreed that our meeting should constitute a meeting of the Steering Committee of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council (AIIC), set up at your meeting with the Taoiseach in November 1981.

AIIC

2. The Irish began by making it clear that they were not seeking to force the pace on the AIIC. Bearing in mind your reservations expressed in Mr Coles' minute of 11 July, I emphasised that the British Government would wish to proceed cautiously; and we agreed that any conclusions we might reach should be ad referendum to you and to the Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and for Northern Ireland here and to the Taoiseach there.

3. It seemed that the best way to start would be to pick up at the point we had reached early in 1982. We therefore reviewed the check list of "possible action points raised in the Joint Studies" (copy attached) drawn up and agreed at the November 1981 Summit, omitting the section on security. After going through the list, we came to the conclusion that before the next Summit meeting between you and the Taoiseach, officials would need to examine the action check list in greater detail. It was proposed that this should be done through the Co-ordinating Committee machinery provided for in the intergovernmentally agreed Joint Memorandum of 20 January 1982 (copy attached). I agreed to recommend accordingly, but I made it clear that the Committee's remit should be strictly

defined and limited. After some discussion it was agreed that the remit might be on the following lines: to compile an agreed version of the action check list (since it turned out that there were some variations between the Irish and British versions); to establish the extent of existing official contacts on each of the points listed; to identify other areas in which economic or cultural contact is taking place or might be useful; to report accordingly to the two Heads of Government; and to prepare for the next Anglo-Irish Summit. The Co-ordinating Committee would report progress to the Steering Committee (in effect Mr Nally and me) in time for us to complete preparations for the Summit. It seemed to me that this would be a limited and practical exercise, which would not call constitutional issues in question, and which would be a normal and necessary part of the preparations for the Summit. I seek your agreement accordingly to officials meeting as necessary for these purposes between now and the Summit.

Prime
Minister

Agree? 15.
A.S.C. 7

Yes not

4. The Irish put down a marker that they would welcome bilateral discussion with us on European Community questions, including questions on the Political Co-operation agenda; and it was agreed that this should be pursued at a forthcoming meeting between the Irish Foreign Minister, Mr Barry, and the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr Rifkind.

Summit

5. After briefly rehearsing the various considerations bearing on the date of the Summit - your programme of meetings and the Taoiseach's desire to have the Summit before the Forum reported - I conveyed your invitation to the Taoiseach to a meeting in London on 7 November. Mr Nally, on the Taoiseach's behalf, welcomed and accepted that date, but extended a counter invitation to have the meeting in Dublin rather than London. He pointed out that, since the last Summit (in November 1981) had been in London, it was now Dublin's turn; and that, for domestic political reasons, the Taoiseach hoped that it might be possible to maintain the alternation between the two capitals. I made it clear that my instructions were to invite the Taoiseach to London; but I undertook to put the

shall we say that as you have to be in Bonn all day on 9 November for the Anglo/German summit, it would be helpful, if the 7 November meeting could be in London.

Irish point to you. I should be grateful for instructions. I am sure that this will not be a sticking point, but it seemed to be something that mattered. I wonder whether, if you would prefer not to go to Dublin, it would help to suggest Chequers: or even the Isle of Man. London or Chequers

6. We said that you would be accompanied by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Mr Nally said that the Taoiseach would be accompanied by Mr Barry, and possibly by the Tanaiste.

Encounter

7. We discussed the proposal to set up an organisation. An important Irish concern is to establish a non-governmental forum which stands some chance of attracting participation by representatives of the nationalist trend in Irish opinion (including members of Fianna Fail) in a way which the British-Irish Association with its "Anglo-Irish" overtones has been unable to do. They do not rate the chance of success very high, but they think the attempt is worth making. They thought it would be for the two Chairmen, when appointed, to decide how to proceed - eg whether to aim for a conference on the Königswinter model, or start with a series of small, expert seminars; and they agreed that there was no prospect of the organisation mounting any form of conference before 1984. Some financial pump-priming would be needed from both Governments; and the Irish have Ir £30,000 in mind and in their budget for this purpose. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office have £20,000. It was agreed that the next step would be for Mr Nally and me to explain our thinking to Sir David Orr and Senator Whitaker, with a view to an announcement of the establishment of Encounter being linked to Mr Barry's forthcoming talks in London with Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mr Prior on 27 July. Both sides agreed that, as the decision to set up Encounter had been taken in November 1981, the establishment of the organisation was not of sufficient importance to justify delaying the announcement until the November Summit.

Forum

8. Over lunch there was some informal discussion of the prospects for the Forum for a New Ireland and the situation in the North. My impression was that there are divided counsels within the Irish

Prime Minister

Agree?

A.S.C.
15/7

Government as to what they want the Forum to produce. Mr Nally laid great emphasis on its "educational" aspects, ie that it would help to bring home to nationalist and Republican opinion in the South the reality of the political and economic difficulties attaching to Irish unity. He was at pains to emphasise that it was not intended to constitute an alternative to the Assembly, or to recommend ways forward which would have the effect of invalidating the Assembly concept. The other members of the Irish team were less categorical about this, and stressed that it was too early to predict what the Forum's recommendations would be. They thought the likeliest outcome would be a series of options ranging from unification at one end of the spectrum to condominium at the other. Mr Nally commented somewhat cryptically that the two most difficult issues would be "the Crown and the Commonwealth": this observation appeared to cause the Irish Ambassador to decide to bring the discussion to an end, and we wondered whether Mr Nally was felt to have let slip a little more than he was meant to as to the direction of that thinking. On timing, they were not certain that the Forum would finish its work by the end of the year but did not think it would slip by more than a few weeks.

Situation in the North

9. The Irish were not inclined to take too tragic a view of the relative performance of the SDLP and Sinn Fein in the General Election; but they were genuinely apprehensive at what they see as the growing polarisation of opinion in the North, and the consequences for stability throughout the island of Ireland if this process is not reversed and Sinn Fein continues to attract political support. It once again emerged very clearly that it is this fear, rather than the desire for Irish unity as a short or medium-term objective, which is the determining factor in the FitzGerald Government's approach to the Northern Ireland question.

10. Viewed as a holding operation, this round of talks with Mr Nally was reasonably satisfactory. The Irish showed no sign of entertaining exaggerated expectations about the prospects for progress. They made it clear that their immediate objective was normalisation of relations with the United Kingdom, and recognised that the initiative for this had to come from them. Although they



might have welcomed a more ambitious programme of official meetings over the next few months, they accepted our more cautious approach and in particular were ready to agree to the restricted role envisaged for the Co-ordinating Committee at this stage.

11. If you agree I should like to tell Mr Nally that you are content for officials to meet on the basis described in paragraph 4 above; and for the establishment of the Encounter organisation to be announced in connection with Mr Barry's visit to London on 27 July. I should also be grateful to know what response you would like me to make to the Irish proposal that the November Summit should be held in Dublin.

12. I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Secretary of State for Defence.

Peter Martin

approved by

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

and signed in his absence.

14 July 1983

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POSSIBLE ACTION POINTS RAISED IN THE JOINT STUDIES

(Those marked * are referred to in the summary for publication)

1 Structures

- * 1.1 Intergovernmental body to be created
- * 1.2 Consideration to be given to ways of strengthening parliamentary links
- * 1.3 Anglo/Irish Encounter organisation to be formed.
- * 1.4 Consideration to be given to creation of Advisory Committee on economic, social and cultural matters.

2 Citizenship rights

- 2.1 Result of Irish decision to extend Irish franchise to resident UK citizens to be awaited.
- * 2.2 Irish request for further consideration to be given to possible removal of differences in treatment of citizens of the Republic as between Great Britain and Northern Ireland

3 Security

- * 3.1 Further cooperation in air/sea rescue to take place
- * 3.2 Further cooperation on hydrographic surveys to take place
- 3.3 Increased cooperation on fishery protection to be undertaken
- 3.4 Further cooperation on aircraft movements to be undertaken
- 3.5 Arrangements for the transmission of information about certain fishing vessels and other sensitive matters to be pursued with continuing discretion.
- 3.6 Scope for cooperation on civil defence to be explored
- 3.7 Discussions to take place about United Nations peace-keeping forces.
- * 3.8 Experts to consult about the administration and working of the criminal law (other than terrorism).
- 3.9 Scope for publicising Irish commitment to and cooperation in combatting terrorism to be kept under review.
- * 3.10 Attention to be given to improved evidence gathering and the operation of reciprocal extra-territorial legislation by means of

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consultations between the two countries' police and law officers departments.

4 Economic Cooperation

- * 4.1 Joint grouping of senior officials to oversee agreed measures for enhancing economic cooperation
- * 4.2 Further bilateral exchanges to take place on energy matters
- * 4.3 Further bilateral exchanges to take place on questions of marine pollution and counter measures.
- * 4.4 Implications of and potential for collaboration on direct broadcasting by satellite (DBS) to be discussed
- * 4.5 The possibility of closer cooperation in the fields of animal and plant health to be considered
- * 4.6 Examination to be given to possibility of settling boundaries in Lough Foyle and Carlingford Lough, extending to the limit of the territorial sea, or finding other ways of removing inhibitions to economic development in those areas.
- 4.7 Further coordination to be undertaken in matters of transport and road safety.
- * 4.8 Efforts to be made to stimulate cooperation in scientific and technological fields.
- 4.9 Irish Department of Agriculture and UK Agriculture Departments to consult periodically
- * 4.10 Officials to examine ways of increasing coordination in economic development of border areas, and Ministers to be involved in monitoring progress of cross border study on the Erne Catchment area.
- * 4.11 Officials to explore further scope for cooperation on industrial development
- * 4.12 Continuing contact between Industrial Development Authority and Northern Ireland Department of Commerce in promoting small and craft industries in border area to be encouraged.
- * 4.13 Discussions on joint trade promotion to be continued
- 4.14 SITPRO and IREPRO to introduce joint report on further scope for trade facilitation.

- * 4.15 The bodies responsible for industrial training to compare notes
- * 4.16 Cooperation between tourist promotion bodies to be encouraged
- 4.17 Officials to discuss scope for cooperation in public purchasing.

5 Measures to encourage mutual understanding

- * 5.1 Encouragement to be given to further meetings between Ministers and agencies responsible for youth and sport including possibility of Irish-British exchange scheme for young people
- * 5.2 The work of the voluntary agencies in community relations field to be welcomed
- * 5.3 North/South cooperation between the two countries' UNESCO National Commissions on exchanges between schools and teacher training institutions to be encouraged
- * 5.4 Existing exchanges between schools inspectors to be encouraged and possibility of similar exchanges for teachers to be explored
- 5.5 Churches' existing collaborative work in educational field to be encouraged
- * 5.6 Examination to be made of scope for better matching resources and requirements for university places in Northern Ireland and the Republic
- * 5.7 Encouragement to be given to the development of collaboration between (Irish) National Institute for Higher Education and (British) Open University
- * 5.8 Agreement for exchanges of officials to be drawn up
- * 5.9 Existing cooperation between the two countries' Arts Councils, and between other professional and academic bodies, to be encouraged.

Joint Memorandum on the Anglo-Irish
Intergovernmental Council

1. The joint communiqué of 6th November, 1981 recorded that "recognising the unique character of the relationship between the two countries, the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach have decided to establish an Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council through which institutional expression can be given to that relationship between the two Governments. This will involve regular meetings between the two Governments at Ministerial and official levels to discuss matters of common concern".
2. It will be a basic purpose of the Council to contribute to the achievement of peace, reconciliation and stability and to the improvement of relations between the peoples of the two countries. Within the framework of the Council there will be the closest bilateral consultation at Ministerial or official level, as appropriate, on matters relating to these purposes and on matters of common interest or concern.
3. Meetings of the Council may take place at two levels: Ministerial and Official.
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incidental meetings such as those between Ministers in the margins of meetings held in the European Community or other international organisations would not be Council meetings unless both sides agreed otherwise.

6. At Official level, the Council will comprise a Steering Committee and a Co-ordinating Committee. Meetings of these committees will constitute meetings of the Council; meetings of specialist working groups at official level would not normally do so but either side would be free to propose that a given meeting should be regarded as a Council meeting; and it would be so provided the other side agreed.

7. The Co-ordinating Committee will supervise and co-ordinate co-operation and stimulate and monitor new co-operation in all areas of common interest and concern, and, as necessary and appropriate, prepare meetings of Ministers. The membership of the Co-ordinating Committee may alter depending on the agenda for particular meetings and it may meet in an East-West, North-South or mixed configuration.

8. In accordance with the joint study proposal, each Government has designated an official to act as Secretary of the Council. These two officials will each be responsible for ensuring that there is an appropriate secretariat (of one or more persons) on each side for Council meetings. They will also be responsible for ensuring that in any case of doubt a joint decision is taken on whether a particular meeting is or is not a Council meeting.

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11. It is accepted that the contents of this Memorandum will be reviewed after an interval of not more than one year from the date below.

20 January, 1982.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

(C)

MR HATFIELD

Anglo-Irish Relations

As I told Sir Robert Armstrong this morning, the Prime Minister is not happy with the approach proposed in his minute of 8 July for his meeting with the Irish Government Secretary, Mr Dermot Nally, in London today.

Mrs. Thatcher has commented on that minute to the effect that we have little to discuss with the Irish Government except security and European Community matters. In her view, no amount of activity relating to new committees can conceal that fact - indeed it only reveals it more starkly. She has added that it is activity of this kind that gets HMG into difficult situations with the Unionists. Finally, Mrs. Thatcher has expressed doubt as to whether the fact that there is an established dialogue between Dublin and London on relatively uncontentious subjects will give a lower profile to the report of the Forum for a New Ireland.

I am copying this minute to Mr Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Mr Lyon (Northern Ireland Office) and Mr. Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

11 July 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

010

Prime Minister

Ref.A083/2019
PRIME MINISTER

*! don't like this at all. - Content with this approval?
The work is that - we
haven't any way to talk about -
A.J.C. 8/7.*

Anglo-Irish Relations

*sure family' and
G.B.K. matters. No*

When you met Dr FitzGerald in Stuttgart on 19 June, you agreed to look at possible dates for an Anglo-Irish Summit in the autumn, before the Forum for a New Ireland reports at the end of the year. We need therefore to consider how to manage Anglo-Irish relations between now and the Summit, and the position which you would like to have reached by the time it takes place. As I think you know, I am due to meet the Irish Government Secretary, Mr Dermot Nally, in London next Monday, 11 July. He and I have agreed that the purpose of our meeting should be to discuss plans for future meetings in the context of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council (AIIC) at various levels, including meetings at the Summit, and to carry further our discussions of the proposed Encounter organisation. You have authorised me to propose the date of 7 November for the next Summit.

*around
of talk
about -
new
committees
can
concern
that fact -
without it
only
remains it -
more fluidly*

2. What follows has been agreed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

3. With the British General Election over, Anglo-Irish relations have entered a new phase, and some intensification of the contacts between the two Governments is both necessary and desirable. For the first time for years neither the Irish nor the British Government faces the prospect of an early election; and the Government in Dublin is committed to seeking a closer relationship with London both as an end in itself and as a means of easing tension and making progress on the Northern Ireland question. On the British side, no major initiative or change of direction is contemplated in our Northern Ireland policy, the latest authoritative statement of which was the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland's speech of 28 June to the Northern Ireland Assembly. On the Irish side, interest in the Northern question is focussed for the moment on the Forum for a New Ireland, which is due to report at the end of the year; but the Irish Government is anxious to be able to demonstrate in the meantime that

*This is how we put
into depth with that change
with the Government*

relations with London are developing positively. This is also the United Kingdom's interest: the Forum's report, when it emerges, may well be unwelcome to us and could have an unsettling effect in the North. It will help to give it a lower profile if there is already an established dialogue between Dublin and London on other, less contentious, subjects. We also need to bear American sensitivities in mind: a closer and developing relationship between Dublin and London will make it easier for the United States Administration to stick to its policy of non-involvement - particularly important in a pre-election period.

4. Given that neither side, at least for the moment, has substantive proposals to make, it would seem that the right course now would be to agree with the Irish on a measured resumption of business within the framework of the AIIC on the basis of the Joint Memorandum (attached) which was agreed on 20 January 1982 but which, because of the subsequent deterioration in relations, was in effect put into cold storage. Although there have since then been bilateral meetings of Ministers which have been treated as being within the AIIC framework, there has been no Summit, and none of the meetings of officials foreseen in the Memorandum has taken place: neither the Steering Committee nor the Co-ordinating Committee has met.

5. My meeting with Mr Nally on 11 July will constitute the first meeting of the Steering Committee since January 1982. It would, I think, be logical for it to be followed fairly soon by an initial meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee. This is the group of officials which, within the AIIC structure, has the task of supervising and co-ordinating co-operation in all areas of common interest and concern and also with preparing meetings of Ministers as necessary. Although the Irish wanted this to be, formally speaking, a single body, they deferred to our wish that it should meet under three different aspects to deal with economic, cultural and security matters and that each side could field a different team depending on the subject matter under discussion. Mr Nally and I could perhaps agree that this Committee should meet as appropriate between now and November to take stock of our bilateral relations under each of these


headings and measure progress against the possibilities for practical co-operation identified in the Joint Studies Report; and that it should be mandated to report its findings to the two Heads of Government for consideration at the Summit. You and Dr FitzGerald could then formally authorise whatever further work - possibly including meetings of one or two specialist working parties - the Co-ordinating Committee might have recommended.

6. The other item I shall be discussing with Mr Nally is the setting up of Encounter. This has already been agreed in principle: but it remains to work out the details. There are several difficult issues here including finance, administration and the relationship of the new organisation to the British Irish Association, and I am not certain that Mr Nally and I will be able to reach agreement on all these points on 11 July. But we should certainly be able to demonstrate sufficient seriousness of intent to satisfy the Irish desire for progress.

7. All this should, I believe, be enough to enable both sides to demonstrate that mutual confidence has been restored between Dublin and London and that momentum is returning to the development of bilateral relations, without unjustified fears or expectations being raised on either side. It should at the same time provide a reasonable slice of bilateral business for you and Dr FitzGerald to discuss at the Summit, without carrying any constitutional implications or committing us to any departure from our current policies.

8. If you are content that we should proceed on this basis I will be guided accordingly in my talks with Mr Nally.

9. I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to the Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland and for Defence.



ROBERT ARMSTRONG

8 July 1983

Joint Memorandum on the Anglo-Irish

Intergovernmental Council

1. The joint communiqué of 6 November, 1981 recorded that "recognising the unique character of the relationship between the two countries, the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach have decided to establish an Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council through which institutional expression can be given to that relationship between the two Governments. This will involve regular meetings between the two Governments at Ministerial and official levels to discuss matters of common concern".
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11. It is accepted that the contents of this Memorandum will be reviewed after an interval of not more than one year from the date below.

20 January 1982

4



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 June 1983

A.J.C. ³⁰ / 6
h.a.

Dear John,

Anglo-Irish Summit

Thank you for your letter of 27 June. We have agreed with Sir Robert Armstrong that the best way of putting the date you propose to the Irish Government would be for Sir Robert to raise it with Mr Nally when he sees him in connection with the AIIC Steering Group meeting to be held on 11 July.

We shall, of course, ensure that knowledge of the proposal is strictly limited, as you ask.

I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield and John Lyon.

Your eyes
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Number 10 Downing Street

Anglo/...
NORTHERN IRELAND : ADVANCE COPIES 20 ²²

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR JAMES

PS/S of S Rm 66 A/2 GOGGS

SIR P WOODFIELD)

MR BRENNAN)

MR ANGEL)

MR BOYS SMITH)

NIO

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RESIDENT CLERK

SIR R ARMSTRONG)

DIO)

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PS/No 10 DOWNING STREET (3)

CABINET OFFICE

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00 NIO LONDON

GRS220

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DUBLIN 271206Z JUN 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 199 OF 27 JUNE 1983

INFO NIO BELFAST, NIO LONDON

MR BARRY: VISIT TO ENGLAND

1. THE IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER PLANS TO VISIT ENGLAND AT THE
END OF NEXT MONTH. I UNDERSTAND THAT HE HAS AGREED TO MEET MR
PRIOR FOR A PRIVATE LUNCH ON 27 JULY, TO BE FOLLOWED BY TALKS.

MR BARRY HAD INTENDED TO VISIT IRISH COMMUNITIES IN LONDON

1243/

2. MR BARRY HAD INTENDED TO VISIT IRISH COMMUNITIES IN LONDON, BIRMINGHAM, MANCHESTER AND LIVERPOOL AND WILL PROBABLY GO AHEAD WITH THESE MEETINGS, ALTHOUGH EXACT DETAILS HAVE YET TO BE FIXED. IRISH OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT THEIR COMMUNITY IN BRITAIN IS IN DANGER OF BECOMING RADICALISED AND WISH TO PAY IT MORE ATTENTION.

3. MR BARRY ALSO HOPES TO MEET SOME CONSERVATIVE MPS WHILE HE IS IN LONDON.

4. IF YOU OR LADY YOUNG WERE FREE TO SEE MR BARRY, I THINK HE WOULD BE PLEASED IF WE COULD OFFER A MEETING.

GOODISON

NNNN



File

Sub

3

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 June 1983

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

As you know, when the Prime Minister met Dr. Fitzgerald in Stuttgart recently she agreed that we would consider holding an Anglo-Irish Summit in London in the autumn and before the Forum completed its work.

I have discussed possible dates with the Prime Minister. The most convenient day for her would be Monday, 7 November. We would envisage a programme on the usual lines comprising, essentially, talks on the morning of 7 November, followed by lunch.

I should be grateful if this proposal could be put to the Irish Government at a suitable moment. For security reasons, we would not envisage any prior announcement of the visit. This consideration also means that maximum protection should be given to all arrangements for the visit. I should therefore be grateful if you, Richard Hatfield and John Lyon, to whom I am copying this letter, could ensure that knowledge of the proposal is strictly limited to those who have an essential need to know of it.

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SUBJECT

✓✓ Master

SECRET

FILE

2



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 June 1983

Dear John,

MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER
AND DR: GARRET FITZGERALD

The Prime Minister had a meeting with Dr. Garret FitzGerald in the margins of the European Council at Stuttgart on Sunday, 19 June. I enclose a record of the conversation.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Lyon (Northern Ireland Office), Tony Rawsthorne (Home Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office). I should be grateful if you and they could ensure that the record is carefully protected.

Yours ever

John Lyson.

J:E. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
TAOISEACH AT STUTTGART AT 0830 HOURS ON SUNDAY, 19 JUNE 1983

Present

The Prime Minister
Sir Robert Armstrong
Mr. A J Coles

Dr. Garret FitzGerald
Mr. D. Nally

* * * * *

After a brief exchange of views about the progress of the European Council, Dr. FitzGerald said he had one or two points to raise in the security field. There had recently been very effective cooperation between the respective police authorities on a matter of serious concern. There was one question affecting police cooperation which had just come to his attention. A few years ago a Police Consultative Council had been appointed. He had just discovered that it had not been operating in the last year. This had gone into abeyance when Mr. Haughey was Taoiseach, and had not yet resumed activity because of doubts shared by the Commissioner of Police in the Irish Republic and the Chief Constable in Northern Ireland about reviving it before progress had been made in settling an allegation of conspiracy between the police authorities of the Republic and a senior policeman in Northern Ireland to frustrate the course of justice in a case involving the brother-in-law of the former Minister of Justice in the Republic. The respective police authorities had taken the matter up; the authorities in the Republic had clear evidence of collusion. The Irish authorities had hoped that a British Chief Constable would carry out an investigation. It was unfortunate that because of this matter the Consultative Council was not in operation. The Prime Minister commented that it was probably better not to revive the Council in a bad atmosphere. In other words we should first solve the particular question raised by Dr. FitzGerald. Dr. FitzGerald said that the new Commissioner of Police and the new Head of Security in the Republic of Ireland were very reliable and most anxious to cooperate with the authorities in Northern Ireland. It would be helpful if the British Government could try to get things moving. The Prime Minister asked Sir Robert Armstrong to follow this matter up.

/Dr FitzGerald

Dr. FitzGerald said that he was also anxious to make progress with the McGovern case. A warrant had been sent to the Irish authorities but had had to be returned on 8 June because it contained an error. On another matter, the Attorney General had told him before he left Dublin that he was confident that the courts were now moving in a positive direction and that many of the former difficulties would be removed.

Turning to the recent General Election, he was greatly disturbed by the quite extraordinary extent of intimidation and impersonation by Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF). There had been a striking case of a woman in Londonderry who had refused to bow to intimidation. He had little doubt that the SDLP had lost Armagh because of impersonation by PSF. It was important to realise that the great increase in the Sinn Fein vote was attributable to a large extent to the fact that they were contesting more constituencies, i.e. the outcome did not represent a popular surge in favour of Provisional Sinn Fein. The Prime Minister commented that, whatever the explanation was, the situation was very worrying. She had discussed the matter with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland who had asked whether there was not some way of persuading the SDLP to take part in the Northern Ireland Assembly. Dr. FitzGerald said that he did not see any possibility of this at present but it might come in the future. He wondered whether, now that John Hume had been elected to Westminster, the Prime Minister would be willing to receive him. The Prime Minister said that perhaps Mr. Hume would like to come to discuss with her the problem of impersonation in elections. It would be best if he wrote a letter to her which could form the basis for a meeting. Dr. FitzGerald asked whether it would not be possible for the Prime Minister to see him as the leader of a new Party who had arrived in the House of Commons. The Prime Minister recalled that she used to receive Mr. Gerry Fitt, who was a very brave man. It was her habit to see leaders of Parties. A meeting with Mr. Hume would, of course provoke demands for meetings from others, including Mr. Paisley.

/Dr. FitzGerald

Dr. FitzGerald said that the Forum had made a good beginning. It had produced a series of ideas which showed sensitivity to Unionist thinking. He hoped that Unionists other than politicians would give evidence to the Forum so that people in the Republic would come to understand Unionist attitudes. It was not certain whether Mr. Haughey would continue to cooperate over the Forum. The hope was that positive results would be produced which, while expressed in terms of Irish nationalism, would be constructive for Northern Ireland and give a new impetus to North/South relations. He was determined that the Forum should finish its proceedings by the end of the year. This could create a better atmosphere for moving forward on other fronts.

He believed that there was agreement between us that the final details of the Encounter organisation should be discussed between officials. Sir Robert Armstrong commented that he was to see Sir David Orr next week. The Taoiseach had already appointed the Irish representative.

The Prime Minister said that she thought it would be possible for there to be another Anglo/Irish Summit. She knew that Dr. FitzGerald would prefer this to be held before the Forum had finished its work. We would look at possible dates with a view to planning to meet before the Forum concluded.

The discussion ended at 0900.

After the meeting, the attached press release was agreed at official level.

A.S.C.

PRESS STATEMENT

As arranged earlier this year at the European Council in Brussels, the Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald, met the Prime Minister the Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher briefly in Stuttgart today.

In a friendly and constructive atmosphere, they discussed matters of mutual concern, including arrangements for future contacts between the two Governments.

19 June 1983

EUROPEAN COUNCIL: STUTTGART 17/19 JUNE: MEETING BETWEEN
THE PRIME MINISTER AND DR GARRET FITZGERALD

DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT

The Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP, and the Taoiseach of the Republic of Ireland, Dr Garret FitzGerald TD, met today in Stuttgart in the margins of the European Council. Their talk lasted about minutes. It was informal in character and covered Anglo-Irish relations, Northern Ireland and other international issues [specify as appropriate].

Draft

As arranged earlier this year at the European Council in Brussels, the Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald, met the Prime Minister The Right Honourable Mrs. Margaret Thatcher briefly in Stuttgart today.

They discussed matters of mutual concern in a friendly and constructive atmosphere and agreed arrangements for future meetings.

19th June, 1983

C O N F I D E N T I A L

IMMEDIATE STUTTGART

GRS 350

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 171455Z JUN 83

TO IMMEDIATE STUTTGART

TELEGRAM NUMBER 16 OF 17 JUNE

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER AND

PRIVATE SECRETARY TO SECRETARY OF STATE

MIPT: EUROPEAN COUNCIL STUTTGART: MEETING WITH DR FITZGERALD
THE MCGOVERN CASE

LINE TO TAKE(UNDERLINED)

1. I AM NATURALLY ANXIOUS THAT ALL SUSPICIONS ABOUT THIS MATTER SHOULD BE CLEARED UP AS FAR AS POSSIBLE. I GATHER VARIOUS POINTS HAVE BEEN PUT TO THE RUC. TO GET ANYWHERE WE NEED HARD EVIDENCE NOT JUST ALLEGATIONS. I KNOW THE CHIEF CONSTABLE WILL ENSURE THAT ANY EVIDENCE IS FULLY INVESTIGATED.

BACKGROUND(UNDERLINED)

2. THE MCGOVERN CASE CONCERNS THE ARREST BY THE RUC OF A KEY WITNESS IN THE TRIAL OF THE BROTHER-IN-LAW OF THE THEN MINISTER OF JUSTICE IN THE REPUBLIC IN MR HAUGHEY'S GOVERNMENT, SHORTLY BEFORE THE IRISH GENERAL ELECTION LAST YEAR. THE BROTHER-IN-LAW WAS ACQUITTED FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE. THE CASE ACQUIRED NOTORIETY IN THE REPUBLIC, AND ALLEGATIONS WERE MADE IN THE PRESS OF COLLUSION BETWEEN THE TWO FORCES AT THE BEHEST (IT WAS SUGGESTED) OF THE IRISH MINISTER. THE SUSPECTED ORIGINATOR IN THE REPUBLIC WAS THE THEN HEAD OF SPECIAL BRANCH UNDER MR HAUGHEY WHO RESIGNED FOLLOWING DR FITZGERALD'S APPOINTMENT AS TAOISEACH.

3. THE CHIEF CONSTABLE OF THE RUC HAS MADE CLEAR HIS WILLINGNESS TO INVESTIGATE ANY EVIDENCE OF COLLUSION OFFERED BY THE GARDA, ALTHOUGH HE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO FIND ANY EVIDENCE INDEPENDENTLY WITHIN THE RUC AS A RESULT OF THE INQUIRIES HE HAS CONDUCTED. THE CHANCES OF FINDING EVIDENCE OF A KIND WHICH

/CAN BE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CAN BE SATISFACTORILY PURSUED ARE VERY SLIM. THE GARDA COMMISSIONER RECENTLY WROTE TO THE CHIEF CONSTABLE WITH A NUMBER OF POINTS CONCERNING A SENIOR OFFICER, ALTHOUGH NO EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE THEM. THE DIFFICULTY IS THAT THE LETTER FROM THE GARDA IS NOT IN A FORM WHICH PROVIDES USEFUL LEADS WHICH CAN BE FOLLOWED UP BY INVESTIGATION. THE CHIEF CONSTABLE FOLLOWED THE PROPER COURSE AND DREW THE LETTER FROM THE GARDA TO THE ATTENTION OF THE POLICE AUTHORITY. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE POLICE AUTHORITY WILL INSTRUCT HIM TO SEEK FURTHER EVIDENCE FROM THE GARDA IN A FORM WHICH CAN BE PURSUED.

HOWE

NNNN

DISTRIBUTION

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P S TO PRIME MINISTER

DUTY CEERK NO 10

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

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GRS 163

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 171455Z JUN 83

TO IMMEDIATE STUTTGART

TELEGRAM NUMBER 15 OF 17 JUNE

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER AND
PRIVATE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

EUROPEAN COUNCIL STUTTGART: MEETING WITH DR FITZGERALD

1. THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE HAVE ASKED US TO PASS ON THE
FOLLOWING.

THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GARDA LAST NIGHT WARNED THE RUC
OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT DR FITZGERALD MIGHT RAISE WITH THE
PRIME MINISTER WHEN THEY MEET IN STUTTGART THE MCGOVERN CASE.
IT CONCERNS ALLEGATIONS OF COLLUSION BETWEEN THE TWO FORCES LAST
YEAR WHEN THE RUC ARRESTED A KEY WITNESS IN A CASE IN THE
REPUBLIC AGAINST THE BROTHER-IN-LAW OF THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE
IN MR HAUGHEY'S GOVERNMENT, WHICH WAS THEN IN OFFICE. THERE HAS
BEEN NO PREVIOUS INDICATION FROM THE IRISH THAT THIS MIGHT COME
UP, AND WE DO NOT CONSIDER IT IS AN APPROPRIATE TOPIC FOR A
MEETING OF THIS KIND. MIFT CONTAINS A NOTE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER
IN CASE DR FITZGERALD MENTIONS IT.

HOWE

NNNN

SENT AT 171616Z DD

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From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

ASC
075



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

John Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

17 June 1983

ADL 20/6

p.a.

Dear John

EUROPEAN COUNCIL STUTTGART: MEETING WITH DR FITZGERALD

The Commissioner of the Garda last night warned the RUC of the possibility that Dr FitzGerald might raise with the Prime Minister when they meet in Stuttgart the McGovern case. It concerns allegations of collusion between the two forces last year when the RUC arrested a key witness in a case in the Republic against the brother-in-law of the Minister of Justice in Mr Haughey's Government, which was then in office. There has been no previous indication from the Irish that this might come up, and we do not consider it is an appropriate topic for a meeting of this kind. But I attach a note against the possibility that Dr FitzGerald mentions it.

Copies of this letter and its enclosure go to John Holmes (FCO) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Dave

D A HILL

Enc

P.S. I am arranging to have this telegraphed to Stuttgart.

JLD

CONFIDENTIAL

McGOVERN CASE

Line to Take

1. I am naturally anxious that all suspicions about this matter should be cleared up as far as possible. I gather various points have been put to the RUC. To get anywhere we need hard evidence not just allegations. I know the Chief Constable will ensure that any evidence is fully investigated.

Background

1. The McGovern case concerns the arrest by the RUC of a key witness in the trial of the brother-in-law of the then Minister of Justice in the Republic in Mr Haughey's Government, shortly before the Irish General Election last year. The brother-in-law was acquitted for lack of evidence. The case acquired notoriety in the Republic, and allegations were made in the press of collusion between the two forces at the behest (it was suggested) of the Irish Minister. The suspected originator in the Republic was the then Head of Special Branch under Mr Haughey who resigned following Dr Fitzgerald's appointment as Taoiseach.

2. The Chief Constable of the RUC has made clear his willingness to investigate any evidence of collusion offered by the Garda, although he has been unable to find any evidence independently within the RUC as a result of the inquiries he has conducted. The chances of finding evidence of a kind which can be satisfactorily pursued are very slim. The Garda Commissioner recently wrote to the Chief Constable with a number of points concerning a senior officer, although no evidence to substantiate them. The difficulty is that the letter from the Garda is not in a form which provides useful leads which can be followed up by investigation. The Chief Constable followed the proper course and drew the letter from the Garda to the attention of the Police Authority. It is likely that the Police Authority will instruct him to seek further evidence from the Garda in a form which can be pursued.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 June 1983

AR 20/6

Dear John,

Meeting Between The Prime Minister and
Dr Garret FitzGerald at the European Council

/ I enclose short briefs for the Prime Minister's
meeting with Dr Garret FitzGerald in the margins of
the European Council in Stuttgart on 17 and 19 June.
They cover Anglo-Irish relations and Northern Ireland
and were prepared in the FCO and NIO. Where
appropriate they have been agreed by the Cabinet Office.
/ I also enclose a scene-setting telegram from Dublin, a
/ personality note on Dr FitzGerald and a draft press
/ statement which you might wish to put to Dr FitzGerald's
Private Secretary after the meeting.

I am copying this letter and enclosures to
Derek Hill (NIO) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).


Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
No 10 Downing Street

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EUROPEAN COUNCIL: STUTTGART 17/19 JUNE: MEETING BETWEEN THE
PRIME MINISTER AND DR GARRET FITZGERALD

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS

UK OBJECTIVES

1. To sound out Dr FitzGerald's thinking on the way ahead and to confirm our readiness to resume official contacts within the framework of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council; and more particularly to agree in principle on the establishment of 'Encounter', subject to agreement on details.

POINTS TO MAKE

General


2. Happy that improvement in Anglo-Irish relations continues slowly but steadily. Important to avoid raising false expectations and fears by too-rapid movement. Suggest that official contacts within the framework established two years ago should be resumed and taken forward at the level of Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr Dermot Nally.

Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council

3. Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council is suitable framework within which to continue to develop Anglo-Irish relations. See no advantage in giving Council more prominence in public pronouncements.

Encounter Organisation

4. Agree in principle to establishment of Encounter, subject



to satisfactory settlement of details, including finance. These should be discussed by Sir R Armstrong and Mr Nally. Inappropriate to announce publicly in the meantime.

New Ireland Forum

5. It is of course open to Irish political parties, and to Northern Ireland parties who may wish to participate, to exchange views on long term future of the island. But this cannot affect fundamental position that Northern Ireland is and will remain part of the United Kingdom while majority of its people so wish.

6. Majority community in Northern Ireland have expressed serious reservations on work of Forum. It could be damaging to the climate of Anglo-Irish relations (and you might also think unhelpful to the SDLP) if these are not kept in mind. Important to avoid raising unjustified expectations or fears in this context too.

Possibility of Anglo-Irish Summit (if raised by Dr FitzGerald)

7. Too early to make a decision, but will reflect on the idea. Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr Nally might perhaps discuss the possibilities in due course.

Proposed new Irish Ambassador: Mr Noel Dorr [if raised]

8. Understand request for agrément is being dealt with expeditiously. Grateful for Dr Kennedy's contribution to Anglo-Irish relations.

Republic of Ireland Department

16 June 1983

EUROPEAN COUNCIL: STUTTGART 17/19 JUNE: MEETING BETWEEN
THE PRIME MINISTER AND DR GARRET FITZGERALD
ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS

BACKGROUND

1. At their last meeting in the margins of the European Council in Brussels on 22 March, the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed that the resumption of contacts between British and Irish Ministers should be carried forward in a slow and deliberate way. Since that meeting the Irish Government have seemed to put that approach into practice, showing generally much greater discretion than their predecessors.
2. The Irish have indicated that Dr FitzGerald does not envisage a fixed agenda for this meeting but will wish to discuss the implications of the results of the general election in Northern Ireland for Anglo-Irish relations (they are concerned at the alienation of Catholic opinion from constitutional politics), and future measures to improve relations.
3. The line to take is intended to remind Dr FitzGerald of the continuing need for circumspection if we are to avoid false expectations and fears about what closer Anglo-Irish relations entail for Northern Ireland (though the signs are that Dr FitzGerald is well aware of the dangers).

Encounter Organisation

4. The Anglo-Irish Joint Studies recommend the establishment

of an 'Encounter' organisation. 'Encounter's' major function was to be the organisation of an annual conference bringing together participants drawn from wider circles than those traditionally concerned with the discussion of Irish questions, and looking at a wide range of aspects of the Anglo-Irish relationship, rather than concentrating on constitutional and political questions. At a meeting with the Secretary of the Irish Government, Mr Nally, in January 1982, Sir Robert Armstrong presented a paper setting out the UK view of the organisation's development. The Irish Embassy, on instructions, have now formally suggested that the setting up of Encounter might be confirmed at this meeting. They left a speaking note (copy attached) setting out how they see the body being constituted. The Irish note is broadly in line with our own thinking but is not a sufficiently detailed response to our own 8-page paper to allow matters to be taken forward immediately. The details could usefully be discussed by Sir R Armstrong and Mr Nally.

5. It would not be desirable to give publicity to the agreement in principle to establish Encounter. There are many details still to be settled (including its financing). The Irish speaking note does not dissent from this view.

Possibility of Anglo-Irish Summit

6. Dr FitzGerald may well raise the possibility of an Anglo-Irish summit meeting. It would be difficult to turn the idea down without appearing to rebuff Dr FitzGerald's declared policy of

/seeking



seeking closer relations with the United Kingdom. A summit could not be expected to make any great advances but would be valuable if it made it possible to develop further an atmosphere of mutual confidence, and, in particular, to steer the conclusions of the Forum in the direction least harmful to our interests. It seems likely that the Irish have not decided whether to go for a date before the Forum for a New Ireland concludes its work at the end of the year, or after. A summit meeting in late October or early November might provide a suitable opportunity to steer things as we would wish. A meeting after the Forum had reached its conclusions would run the risk of being interpreted as concerned with their implementation.

Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council

7. With the marked coolness in Anglo-Irish relations which developed during the Haughey administration the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council has had little chance to develop, though a number of Ministerial meetings, mainly to discuss technical matters such as the Kinsale Gas project, have been agreed to be meetings of the Council. It seems right that the resumption of Anglo-Irish contacts should take place within the framework of the Council, without, however, too much stress being laid on the Council for the moment.

New Ireland Forum

8. The Irish Government's 'Forum for a new Ireland' held its first meeting in Dublin Castle on 30 May. It was attended by the three main political parties in the Republic and the SDLP. Further meetings are planned and Dr FitzGerald has said that the

/Forum

Forum must complete its work by the end of the year.

9. We cannot know what conclusions the Forum will reach. It seems likely that Mr Haughey will press for an unacceptable 'green conclusion': early negotiations between the United Kingdom and the Republic on 'British withdrawal' from the province. But Dr FitzGerald, Mr Spring and Mr Hume seem likely to take a far more moderate line, maintaining Irish unity as a distant aspiration, but accepting that it can only come about with a change in Northern opinion which may take many years to develop; and perhaps encouraging Northern Catholics to play a greater role in the political life of the province, and to work for reconciliation between the communities. Such an approach would on the whole be in the UK interest, and would deserve encouragement.

New Irish Ambassador to London

10. The present Irish Ambassador, Dr Eamon Kennedy, has requested agrément for his proposed successor, Mr Noel Dorr, who is currently Irish Permanent Representative at the United Nations in New York. This request is being processed. Preliminary reports suggest that he is a sincere, serious and intelligent man, if rather heavy-going, and would be likely to make a suitable Ambassador. He played an unwelcome role at the United Nations during the Falklands crisis, but this was clearly on the instructions of Mr Haughey. He expresses moderate views on Northern Ireland and is an implacable opponent of the men of violence.

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EUROPEAN COUNCIL: STUTTGART, 17-19 JUNE
MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND DR GARRET FITZGERALD

NORTHERN IRELAND

UK Objectives

1. To reiterate to Dr Fitzgerald the UK Government's commitment to the Northern Ireland Assembly and its belief that only through the participation in the Assembly of all constitutional parties can there be satisfactory development. To reassure Dr Fitzgerald that we have no intention of changing our policy towards Sinn Fein, and will maintain our links with the SDLP, though neither they nor HMG can disregard Unionist concerns.

Points to Make

2. The Government remains firmly committed to the Assembly and to the approach (devolution on a basis commanding widespread acceptance throughout the community) which it embodies. The General Election does not affect this commitment.

3. We continue to regret the SDLP's abstention from the Assembly, whilst recognising that they are not likely to make significant moves before the likely outcome of the New Ireland Forum is known. We are glad that the Election leaves the SDLP as the main voice of the minority community. We hope however that discussion in the Forum will lead the SDLP to reinvolve itself in Northern Ireland politics.

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4. The Government has not changed its attitude towards Sinn Fein, with which it will not have dealings on anything other than minor, purely constituency matters. The revocation of the exclusion order on Mr Adams was a necessary consequence of his election but does not indicate a different approach by the Government. Mr Prior has already made clear that he will not meet Mr Adams.

5. We value the excellent cross-border co-operation between the Garda and the RUC and will play our full part in continuing it.

6. We were encouraged by recent developments in the Irish courts on fugitive offenders, but our view remains that they are best dealt with by extradition.

7. (Defensive only)

We have not been able to reach agreement so far on the provision of Kinsale Gas to Northern Ireland. The terms of gas supply must permit a financially viable gas industry in Northern Ireland. The most crucial element remains the formula for the price of the gas. I hope that the Republic's Government will be able to accommodate our position when the two Ministers next meet. It would be most unfortunate if this good opportunity for cross-border co-operation is lost.

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EUROPEAN COUNCIL: STUTTGART, 17-19 JUNE

MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND DR GARRET FITZGERALD

NORTHERN IRELAND

Background

1. Dr Fitzgerald will wish to hear our assessment of the effect upon Northern Ireland of the outcome of the General Election. He is likely to repeat the sensitivity he has shown over recent months about Sinn Fein and its impact on the SDLP (concern for the SDLP being the main reason for the Irish Government's supporting the New Ireland Forum). He will view matters particularly with an eye to the Forum, which he sees as a major factor that will bear on debate not only about the longer future but about the way ahead for the Assembly and the attitude of the minority towards it.

Northern Ireland Political Affairs

2. The election was a success for the Official Unionist Party (34% of the vote, 11 seats out of 17, including 2 where a divided unionist vote might have lost them the seat); a considerable disappointment for the DUP (20% of the vote and 3 seats, the same as in the last Parliament, failing to win one of which they had been confident); a mild encouragement to the SDLP (18% of the vote and 57% of the nationalist vote, with one seat - Mr Hume's - but their vote held up better than some had expected); reasonably encouraging for Sinn Fein (13.5% of the vote and 43% of the nationalist vote with one seat - Mr Adams - and one near miss); a marked disappointment for the Alliance

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Party (8% of the vote and no where near success in any constituency, indicating they were unable to increase their support despite their activity in the Assembly); Mr Kilfedder easily won his seat.

3. It is too early to assess clearly how the Election results will affect the Northern Ireland Assembly, though there are already indications that the Official Unionist Party will intensify its efforts to secure devolution without the necessary cross-community support. The fact that the SDLP is still the main representative of the minority is helpful, although the size of the Sinn Fein vote will not increase their freedom of manoeuvre. The Dublin Forum will loom large in the SDLP's mind, as that of the Irish Government, and the party is not likely to see its way ahead more clearly until the Forum is further developed.

Security

4. Professional co-operation at a working level between the RUC and the Garda, and between the Garda and GB forces remain productive, although recent changes at a senior level on the Irish side have not yet settled down. This co-operation is a crucial element in the security policies of both countries, and HMG will continue to play its full part in fostering it. Whilst we are grateful for this co-operation it is thought best not to make much of it in public.

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5. The Irish often argue that existing extra-territorial legislation is enough to deal with fugitive offenders. This underestimates the symbolic importance of extradition and the likely beneficial longer-term effects. A recent Irish Supreme Court judgement appeared to undermine the Irish court's traditional reluctance to extradite the so-called "political" offenders, and we hope that this will lay the basis of a more forthcoming approach by their courts towards the extradition of terrorists.

Kinsale Gas

6. Last year Ministers approved the establishment of a natural gas industry in Northern Ireland based on gas piped from the Republic's Kinsale Field, subject to acceptable terms of supply being agreed with the South.

7. Subsequent negotiations, involving two meetings between Mr Butler and Mr Bruton (Republic of Ireland Minister of Industry and Energy) identified the main areas of difficulty. The most important was the formula for the price of gas in the years ahead. Satisfactory pricing is of critical importance to the financial viability of a Northern Ireland gas industry.

8. The Republic has proposed a new pricing formula which moves some way towards the UK position. But further negotiation is required to determine whether this can provide a basis for agreement.

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9. A third meeting between Mr Butler and Mr Bruton was due when the Election was called. This will be rearranged soon.

Northern Ireland Office

16 June 1983

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 185 OF 15 JUNE 1983

AND TO IMMEDIATE NIO (LONDON)

INFO PRIORITY NIO (BELFAST)

INFO SAVING TO WASHINGTON

STUTT GART: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH DR FITZGERALD

1. I SPOKE TODAY TO LILLIS, THE HEAD OF THE ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION, ABOUT MATTERS THE TAOISEACH WOULD WISH TO RAISE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER IN STUTT GART.

2. LILLIS SAID THAT THE IRISH WERE PLEASED WITH THE PROSPECT OF A STRONG GOVERNMENT IN LONDON WHICH SHOULD RUN ITS FULL TERM. THE COALITION HERE FELT INCREASINGLY CONFIDENT THAT THEY WOULD SEE THEIR TIME OUT, SO THERE WAS A REAL OPPORTUNITY FOR A NEW START IN ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS.

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THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WERE MOST CONCERNED AT SINN FEIN'S INCREASED SUPPORT AND THE ALIENATION OF CATHOLIC OPINION FROM CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS, AND INDEED AUTHORITY IN LONDON AND DUBLIN.

(B) THE NORTHERN IRELAND FORUM:

HE WOULD PRESENT THIS AS A RESPONSIBLE INITIATIVE WHICH COULD BE OF BENEFIT TO BOTH SIDES, AND EXPLAIN HOW HE SAW WORK PROGRESSING.

(C) AN ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT:

THE IRISH DO NOT HAVE A FIRM DATE IN MIND. LILLIS BELIEVED THAT A SUMMIT BEFORE THE FORUM REPORTS (IN LATE DECEMBER) WOULD ENDANGER CONSENSUS THERE AS MR HAUGHEY WOULD BE OBLIGED TO SCORE PARTY POLITICAL POINTS. I ARGUED THAT FOR A SUMMIT TO FOLLOW THE REPORT MIGHT OBLIGE HMG TO TAKE A FIRMER VIEW ON THE FORUM'S CONCLUSIONS THAN WOULD REALLY SUIT EITHER OF US AND COULD INCREASE UNIONIST HOSTILITY. IN ANY CASE, MR HAUGHEY APPEARED TO BE UNDERMINING THE END OF YEAR DEADLINE. LILLIS SAW THE FORCE OF THESE ARGUMENTS AND I SUSPECT THAT THE TAOISEACH WILL NOT HAVE FIXED IDEAS ON A DATE.

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(D) THE ENCOUNTER ORGANISATION:

THE IRISH HOPE THAT AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED ON THE LINES
SKETCHED OUT AT OFFICIAL LEVEL.

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LILLIS SAID THE RE-INTRODUCTION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN BRITAIN
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LAW AND ORDER AND OUR ANGER AT IRISH TERRORISM. BUT EXECUTIONS
WOULD HAVE A DISASTROUS EFFECT ON ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS AND
COULD EVEN ENDANGER THE STABILITY OF THE REPUBLIC.

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TATHAM

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FITZGERALD, DR GARRET MICHAEL DESMOND TD

An Taoiseach (elected 14 December 1982). Leader of Fine Gael.

Born: 6 February 1926 in Dublin. Education: Belvedere College, Dublin; University College Dublin (BA in History and French, PhD in Economics); King's Inns Dublin (called to bar in 1947 but never practised).

Worked 1947 to 1958 for Aer Lingus, mainly as economic planner. Journalist since 1953 (has been Irish correspondent of the BBC, the Financial Times and the Economist). Lecturer in Economics, UCD, 1959-73. Managing Director, Economist Intelligence Unit of Ireland, 1961-72. Joined Fine Gael 1964; Fine Gael Senator 1965-69. Fine Gael Deputy for Dublin South-East since 1969; spokesman on Education 1969-72; Finance 1972-73. Minister for Foreign Affairs 1973-77; Leader of Fine Gael since 1977. Taoiseach June 1981 - March 1982.

Dr Garret FitzGerald has a family background which he believes gives him a special interest in and insight into the conflicting traditions in Ireland. His parents took part in the 1916 Rising. His mother, Mable McConville, was a Presbyterian from Belfast; his father, Desmond FitzGerald, was a Roman Catholic, born and brought up in London, who was Minister for External Affairs and then Defence in the 1922-32 Governments.

Dr FitzGerald contributed greatly to the policies which reshaped Fine Gael in the 1960s. In 1972 his book 'Towards a New Ireland' argued that reconciliation required radical changes in the Republic as well as in Northern Ireland. These ideas were elaborated in his (uncompleted) 'crusade', launched in 1981 during his first short spell as Taoiseach, to amend the Republic's Constitution in a non-confessional direction. His ideas on the whole subject were spelt out in his Dimpleby Lecture 'Irish Identities' delivered on BBC TV in May 1982.

He was elected unopposed to lead Fine Gael following Mr Cosgrave's resignation in July 1977. Since then the party has benefitted electorally from the widespread popularity which he has enjoyed (in particular contrast to Mr Haughey) as an honest and unselfish politician ('Garret the Good'). He is also widely respected overseas and was an impressive Minister for Foreign Affairs during the Republic's first spell in the Presidency. He is a committed European.

He sees himself as a social democrat and his front-bench appointments in 1981 and again in 1982 have given the party a less conservative image than in the past. But his reforming instincts are subject to current financial constraints and the conservative instincts of some of his

own party. In general he is happier adumbrating reforms than pushing them through. At times he will use Labour's weight in Coalition to offset his own right-wing. While generally a defender of civil liberties, he is also a devout Catholic and finds difficulty on issues like abortion and divorce in squaring his personal orthodoxy with his belief in a pluralist United Ireland.

He is an intelligent and often over-fluent speaker who is still learning not to get bogged down in detail. Personally easy and approachable, he is quick to respond and to engage in debate. He likes his professorial image and is most at home with journalists and academics. A degree of self-righteousness, reinforced by impetuosity and reliance on a coterie of advisers, can lead him into major errors of judgment. His ill-considered intervention with HMG over the H-Block hunger strike in 1981; his tough but insensitive 1982 budget (which brought down his first Government) and his proposed all-Ireland courts and police force in the November 1982 campaign were all own goals. But his personal appeal, his intellect, energy and sense of mission make him a formidable, if rather unorthodox, political leader.

He is deeply devoted to his wife Joan (née O'Farrell) who has a strong personality and influence on him. In recent years she has been crippled by severe arthritis. They have two sons and one daughter.

EUROPEAN COUNCIL: STUTTGART 17/19 JUNE: MEETING BETWEEN
THE PRIME MINISTER AND DR GARRET FITZGERALD

DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT

The Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP, and the Taoiseach of the Republic of Ireland, Dr Garret FitzGerald TD, met today in Stuttgart in the margins of the European Council. Their talk lasted about minutes. It was informal in character and covered Anglo-Irish relations, Northern Ireland and other international issues [specify as appropriate].

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cc Mr. Jackling

(4)

MR. COLES *AL 1/6*

Prime Minister


THE NEW IRISH AMBASSADOR

The FCO told me yesterday that the Irish Government have proposed Noel Dorr, my Irish colleague in New York, to succeed the present Irish Ambassador in London!

Noel Dorr's behaviour during the Falklands Crisis was intolerable, and I left him in no doubt as to what I thought of him. He was also a boring, long-winded and irritating member of the Security Council in other respects. Dorr originally trained for the Priesthood. He is a prig who manages to give the infuriating impression that he is in sole and permanent possession of the high moral ground.

Having said all this, I do not think that we should try to persuade the Irish to nominate someone else. Dorr has considerable advantages to offset his failings. He is intelligent and experienced in EC questions. He was the Irish Political Director before going to New York. He is also extremely sound on Anglo-Irish relations, particularly in the Northern Ireland context. In New York, he was a consistent and courageous opponent of Noraid and the rest of the Irish Lobby. Being myself an Anglo-Irishman, I used to have long talks with him about the problem and always found his views most reasonable. I am confident that he will not make problems for us here. Apart from anything else, he is a quiet and private man and is not the kind of person who would go around stirring up the Irish community in Britain.

Since I left New York, he has got married - something which I would have thought most improbable. The change can only improve him.




A.D. PARSONS
15 June 1983

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STUTTGART: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH DR FITZGERALD

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TATHAM



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 June 1983

Anlgo/Irish Relations: Meeting with Dr. Fitzgerald
at Stuttgart

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 13 June, John Lyon's letter of the same date and Sir Robert Armstrong's minute of 14 June.

Mrs Thatcher agrees that there should be a meeting between her and Dr. Fitzgerald in the margins of Stuttgart. I should be grateful if you could so inform the Irish Government, state that I shall be glad to discuss precise timing on arrival in Stuttgart and that we should wish, as on the last occasion, to keep publicity to the minimum and agree on a short statement to be issued after the meeting.

On the other points in your letter, the Prime Minister is content that at the meeting with Dr. Fitzgerald it should be confirmed that official contacts should be resumed at the level of Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr. Nally. She will also be ready to agree in principle to the establishment of "Encounter" subject to agreement on details to be discussed further between Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr. Nally.

The Prime Minister wishes to reflect further about the question of a Summit. I therefore suggest that the brief merely sets out the various factors involved in consideration of this matter.

I am copying this letter to John Lyon (NIO) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A.J. COLES

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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MS

PRIME MINISTER

Anglo/Irish Relations

The attached FCO letter contains some recommendations for a possible meeting with Dr. Fitzgerald at Stuttgart. The Northern Ireland Secretary has expressed his agreement with it.

May we confirm to the Irish that you will have a brief meeting with Dr. Fitzgerald during the European Council, and agree with them that publicity should, as last time, be minimal?

Do you agree to the other points in this letter, namely:

(a) that we should confirm agreement that official contacts should be resumed at the level of Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr. Nally?

Yes

(b) that if Dr. Fitzgerald raises the possibility of a Summit, we should agree to one in late October or early November; partly in order to influence the conclusions of the "Forum" which is expected to end its work by the end of the year?

Commonwealth Conference in Nov.

(c) that at your meeting with Dr. Fitzgerald you should agree in principle to the recent formal Irish proposal that the "Encounter" organisation ~~had~~ be established, subject to agreement on details to be discussed further by Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr. Nally?

Yes
ms

14 June, 1983.

A.S.C.

P.S. I attach a further minute from Sir R. Armstrong which has just arrived



Ref. A083/1675

MR COLES

Anglo-Irish Relations: Meeting with Dr FitzGerald
at Stuttgart

The Prime Minister may find it helpful to have one or two comments on the advice contained in Mr Holmes's letter to you of 13 June about her forthcoming meeting with Dr FitzGerald in the margins of the Stuttgart European Council. The Irish are taking it for granted that this meeting will take place: I received a message this afternoon via the Irish Embassy from the Taoiseach's office, to say that Dr FitzGerald was hoping to discuss with the Prime Minister the implications for Anglo-Irish relations of the General Election results in Northern Ireland; and, more generally, future measures to improve Anglo-Irish relations. He is hoping for "agreement in principle" on the establishment of the Encounter Organisation.

2. I agree with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that the Prime Minister's objectives at the Stuttgart meeting should be to sound out Dr FitzGerald's thinking on the way ahead and to confirm our readiness to resume official contacts within the framework of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council. You will recall that this was in effect agreed between the Prime Minister and Dr FitzGerald when they met in Brussels on 22 March. I had therefore arranged to meet my Irish opposite number in London on 20 May but postponed the meeting when the Election was called. Mr Nally and I agreed at that time that, subject to developments, we might aim to reinstate the meeting some time in the second half of June.

3. I think it very likely that Dr FitzGerald will, as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office letter predicts, press for a full scale Anglo-Irish Summit fairly soon: I see from today's Times that the



Irish Foreign Minister, Mr Barry, has already called for a return to the system of twice yearly Summits; and this may well reflect Dr FitzGerald's own thinking. If he does press for a Summit later this year, it will clearly be difficult for the Prime Minister to turn the idea down without appearing to rebuff Dr FitzGerald's declared policy of seeking closer relations with the United Kingdom. I am inclined to agree with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that, for the reasons given in Mr Holmes' letter, it would be to our advantage to agree to a Summit in late October or early November. But if the Prime Minister prefers not to commit herself on this so soon she could perhaps ask for time for reflection and suggest that the subject should be pursued at an early meeting between senior officials.

4. As to the Encounter Organisation, I see no difficulty about going along with Dr FitzGerald's wish for agreement in principle that the Organisation should be set up, on the understanding that no announcement should be made until the details had been settled by officials. But we should disabuse him of the illusion that the British Government are committed to match the £30,000 which the Irish Government have provided in their budget for the Encounter. It was made clear in earlier discussion that there was no such provision in the British budget, and that the British Chairman of Encounter would be expected to raise the money from outside sources. That was also made clear to Sir David Orr, when he was asked to undertake the chairmanship.

5. I am making sure that Sir David Orr is still prepared to take this on.

6. If the Prime Minister is content with the foregoing I would propose to see Mr Nally in Stuttgart, before the Prime Minister meets Dr FitzGerald, in order to prepare the ground with him.

7. Copies go to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

14 June 1983

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



CONFIDENTIAL

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

John Coles Esq
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON

13th June 1983

Dear John,

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS: MEETING WITH DR FITZGERALD AT
STUTTGART

The Secretary of State has seen the letter of today's date
from John Holmes about a meeting with Dr FitzGerald in Stuttgart. *with ABC*

Mr Prior very much agrees that, for the reasons given, it would
be right to have a meeting with Dr FitzGerald. Anticipation
of the report of the Dublin Forum, and its terms once it is
received, will be significant factors in Northern Ireland during
the rest of this year and into next. It is desirable that we
should be in a position to exert such influence as we can both
over the report and over the position of the Irish Government
towards Northern Ireland after the Forum has completed its work.
A brief meeting of the kind proposed, and expected, by the Irish,
would help set the right tone and pattern for our contacts, and
he hopes that it will prove possible to arrange.

Mr Prior also agrees with the lines suggested on the possibility
of a Summit meeting and on the Encounter organisation.

Copies of this letter go to John Holmes at the FCO and
Richard Hatfield at the Cabinet Office.

*Yours sincerely,
John Lyon*

JOHN LYON

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 June 1983

Dear John,

Anglo-Irish Relations: Meeting with Dr FitzGerald at Stuttgart

You will recall that when the Prime Minister saw Dr FitzGerald in the margins of the European Council on 22 March, she indicated that she would be prepared to meet him again at Stuttgart. The Irish have made clear that they expect this meeting to take place. To disappoint that expectation could sour relations with Dr FitzGerald.

A brief meeting of the sort envisaged would not allow any discussion of great substance. But it could lead to discussion of the general pattern of contacts in Anglo-Irish relations over the next six months or so. There would be advantage in this. However the situation in Northern Ireland develops in the next year or so, our need to secure the continuation of close co-operation in the field of security, the influence of the Dublin Government on the minority community in the North, and the implications for opinion in Northern Ireland of the Dublin Forum, make it desirable that we should be in a position to exert whatever influence we can on Dr FitzGerald's Government.

In these circumstances, our aim for a meeting in Stuttgart might be to sound out Dr FitzGerald's thinking on how he sees the way ahead in the next year or so and to confirm agreement that official contacts within the framework established two years ago should be resumed at the level of Sir R Armstrong and Mr Nally. For his part, Dr FitzGerald is likely to raise the possibility of an Anglo-Irish summit meeting. He might well suggest this Autumn. There could be attractions in that timing. The Irish plan that their Forum for a new Ireland should reach a conclusion by the end of the year. A summit meeting in late October or early November would be an opportunity to try to steer the conclusions in the direction least harmful to our interests, while avoiding the appearance of a meeting directly related to the Forum's conclusions (as a summit meeting after the Forum had pronounced might appear to be).

/This is

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This is not to say that a summit meeting could be expected to make any great advances. But the absence of likely progress in areas attractive to the Irish make personal relations and mutual confidence the more important. Delay could make this most difficult.

The Irish have already proposed one specific piece of business. At the meeting on 22 March Dr FitzGerald suggested that progress might be made with the proposed "Encounter" organisation (which would run conferences covering a wide range of issues of Anglo-Irish concern on lines similar to the Koenigswinter conferences, though on a more modest level as far as attendance and subject matter are concerned). The Irish Embassy, on instructions, have now formally suggested that the setting up of this body might be confirmed when the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach meet, although the announcement of an agreement might be made later. I enclose a copy of the speaking note left behind.

The Irish may see this proposal as something of a test of HMG's readiness to take things forward and we believe that it would be wrong entirely to disappoint the Taoiseach. At the same time the Irish note makes no reference to the earlier British paper which was put to them with the Prime Minister's agreement in February last year, and leaves a number of loose ends. In the circumstances the best approach might be for the Prime Minister to indicate that HMG is agreeable in principle to the establishment of Encounter, subject to agreement on details (which should not be difficult to achieve) and that this should be taken forward in discussion between Sir R Armstrong and Mr Nally. Meanwhile it would be inappropriate to make an announcement.

If the Prime Minister is content with this general approach we will send a separate short brief for a meeting with Dr FitzGerald and confirm to the Irish that the Prime Minister is ready to meet Dr FitzGerald briefly in the margins of Stuttgart (at a moment to be fixed between respective delegations). We would say to them at the same time that publicity should be minimal, as on the last occasion.

I am sending a copy of this letter, which is being submitted in parallel to Sir G Howe, to John Lyon (NIO) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office). The approach set out in it reflects discussion at official level in both departments.

Yours ever
J E Holmes
 (J E Holmes)
 Private Secretary

ASÁID NA HÉIREANN, LONDAIN.



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON.

(A)
17, GROSVENOR PLACE
SW1X 7HR

The Irish Government consider that the establishment of the Encounter Group might usefully be confirmed when the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister meet at Stuttgart although the announcement of agreement might be made later. The function of the Encounter Group should comprise the organisation of high-level conferences on the Koenigswinter model by an Executive Board composed of independent public figures of repute and ability as well as Government figures.

The Irish Government will appoint Dr T K Whitaker as Irish Chairman of the Executive Board. It is understood that the British Government also have a nominee in mind. It is suggested that the initial Executive Board might have fourteen members, four each from Dublin, London and Belfast to be suggested by the Chairmen. The membership of the Board should comprise one official each from Dublin, London and Belfast as well as others drawn from public life as envisaged in paragraph 20 of the Institutions Joint Study.

The location and nature of a possible secretariat would be matters for the Chairmen.


The Irish Government has set aside Irish £30,000 as initial funding for the organisation and understand that the British Government will contribute a similar sum. Future financing should be on the basis of a continuing commitment by the two Governments, supplemented by private funding.

The organisation should aim to hold its first major conference in Autumn 1983. It is proposed that this should take place in Northern Ireland and that the theme might include the Report of the Joint Study Group on Measures to Encourage Mutual Understanding.

In order to get the organisation off the ground the two Chairmen and appropriate officials should meet as soon as possible after the announcement of the establishment of Encounter with a view to completing the nomination of the other members of the Executive Board and preparing the first Encounter conference.

London 8th June 1983

13 JUN 1983



*Tealand
Lisbon*

2 copies



With the compliments of

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LONDON, SW1A 2AH

AMBASÁID NA HÉIREANN, LONDAIN.



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON.

(A)

17, GROSVENOR PLACE
SW1X 7HR

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London 8th June 1983

ANGLO-IRISH ENCOUNTER ORGANISATION

Introduction,

1. The report of the Anglo-Irish Joint Study Group on Institutional Structures suggested that 'there was an immediate need, as an interim measure, to provide a satisfactory structure for the promotion and review, in a central forum, of contacts and exchanges between wider economic, social and cultural circles.'. The Group therefore proposed that an 'Anglo-Irish Encounter' organisation should be established.
2. This paper considers what the aims and purposes of the interim Encounter organisation should be, how these might be achieved and how the organisation might be created. At this stage it is too early to take any firm decisions. This paper therefore limits itself to drawing attention to matters on which decisions will need to be taken and to suggesting how they might be dealt with. Attached as Annexes A - C are descriptions of three existing organisations - Koenigswinter, the Franco-British Council and the Nordic Council - which offer precedents.

Aims and Purposes

3. The ultimate purpose of the 'Encounter organisation' would be to contribute to the improvement of relations between the peoples of the two countries and thereby to the achievement of peace, reconciliation and stability. More immediately, the aims and purposes of the Encounter

/organisation

organisation were suggested by the Joint Study Group on Institutional Structures. The Group thought that:-

'the proposed body, rather than concentrating on constitutional or political problems within these islands, as some existing bodies have tended to do, should seek, in its activities, to comprehend different aspects of the totality of relationships. Its major function should be to organise a high-level annual conference on the Koenigswinter model, which could bring together participants drawn from wider circles than those traditionally concerned with the discussion of Irish questions. Trade unionists, agriculturalists and Irish/British residents in Britain/Ireland might be included as well as industrialists, academics, journalists, church leaders, politicians and officials. Smaller periodic seminars on specialised themes could also be arranged. There could be a changing participation or involvement appropriate to the subject.'

The Study Group also proposed that the ideas generated at such conferences or seminars might usefully be considered by the two Governments at appropriate meetings of the Intergovernmental Council.

4. It is assumed in what follows that there is agreement that the Encounter organisation should concentrate more on the practical than the political; that it should be a forum to promote new ideas for consideration by the two Governments; and that it should have a wide membership, representative of a broad cross-section of ordinary people and organisations

with interests in both countries. (It should be noted that this implies that the reference above to the Koenigswinter model may be misleading since the Koenigswinter conferences are attended by key politicians, industrialists and other leading members of the British and West German communities and the subjects of Conferences are issues of high politics.)

5. It is clearly consistent with the overall objectives that the Encounter organisation should attempt to attract the sceptics and those who for historical and political reasons are not well disposed to cooperation between the two countries. This will not be easy. The experience of other organisations has shown that the sceptics and the antagonistic are frightened off if meetings merely become the fora for discussion of Northern Ireland and related political issues. This underlines the need for the organisation to concentrate on practical issues and for it to be able to show, at an early stage, that it can bring about practical benefits. Three appropriate areas have already been identified in the Report on Measures to Encourage Mutual Understanding:-

- (a) the work of voluntary agencies in the community relations field;
- (b) the encouragement of the Churches' existing collaborative work in the educational field;
- (c) the encouragement of existing cooperation between the Arts Councils of the two countries and between other professional bodies.

Apart from these considerations, those participating in meetings should reflect the wide range of possible subjects. As well as those referred to in the Joint Study (and quoted in paragraph 3 above), people concerned with social matters will need to be drawn in. Environmental bodies, housing associations, those concerned in youth exchanges, sport and cultural matters tend to have many problems in common.

Form of Meetings

6. The Joint Study on Institutional Structures suggested an annual conference and possibly smaller period seminars on specialised themes. Such smaller seminars would be valuable. They would be able to do the preparatory work which would be essential if an annual conference were to tackle a particular subject thoroughly enough for the ideas that it produced to be of value to the two Governments. Allied to this question is that of the number of participants that should attend a conference or seminar and the way in which the conferences and seminars should be run. Should they attempt to make recommendations to the Governments which have a broad consensus, which might lead to blandness, or should the stimulation of fresh ideas have precedence? The latter would probably be preferable since it would offer the Governments a range of ideas to consider with the result that they would not be under pressure to accept any particular proposal. The precise relationship between the Encounter organisation and the AIIC would have implications for this point. There seems to be no reason for it formally to have any more than a right to communicate the conclusions of its conference to the two

/Governments

Governments for consideration at the periodic summit meetings. If this were done, it would give the organisation visible influence on the Governments and help attract a high calibre of participants. If a parliamentary tier of the AIIC is established, the Encounter organisation's relationship with that will also need to be clarified.

Status of the Encounter Organisation

7. The relationship between the two Governments on the one hand and the Encounter organisation on the other will need to be carefully considered. One of the reasons for the success of the Koenigswinter conferences is that although they include governmental representatives and are partly financed by government, they are seen to be independent. The Encounter organisation is to have an advisory role. It will make it all the more important that it should be independent, in order to maintain its credibility; but it will also be important that its independence should not be of such a nature that it will become a vehicle for the promotion of ideas which are unacceptable to either or both Governments. The role of the Governments is also central to the administrative support of the organisation and its finance. The Joint Study on Institutional Structures envisaged that the organisation should 'be financed, at least in part, by the two Governments'. HMG provide 40% of the financing for a Koenigswinter conference held in the United Kingdom, while the Franco-British Council is

/entirely

entirely funded by a grant-in-aid. To help retain its independence, it might be advisable for the Encounter organisation to look as much as possible to the private sector.

Other Organisations

8. Various bodies already exist in the field in which the Encounter organisation would operate. Two particular bodies which have held useful conferences or seminars on different aspects of relations between the two countries are the British-Irish Association and Cooperation North. It will be important to avoid any appearance of encroaching on their activities, or attempting to supplant them, when they have been effective. The Encounter organisation as envisaged would have rather different functions, and aim at a broader range of participants. But to ensure that this is understood by existing bodies, and to enable the Encounter organisation to draw on the experience of the existing bodies, it would seem wise to seek to associate leading members of these bodies with the Encounter organisation from the earliest possible stage.

Establishment of the Encounter Organisation

9. The Joint Study envisaged that the Encounter organisation would be established under the direction of an Executive Board 'composed of independent public figures of repute and ability, and Government representatives'. If the Encounter organisation is to follow the high standard set by the Koenigswinter Conferences, and its independence be apparent from the start, the Executive Board will have

to be carefully chosen. It should no doubt include prominent figures from a wide range of vocations and balanced representation from Northern Ireland. It will be for consideration how the Board will operate, how large it should be and how the Chairmanship would be decided. It would be difficult to try to establish a full Executive Board at once. It might therefore be sensible to establish as a first step a committee; as it were a proto-Executive Board. This might consist of one or two officials from each country plus five or six members from public life; including representatives of the British-Irish Association and Cooperation North. The two Governments would invite the proto-Board to advise them on the establishment of the organisation and thereafter to organise a first conference and co-opt further members to create a balanced Board.

Summary of Conclusions

10. (a) The Encounter organisation should be established soon and it should aim to hold its first conference at an early date.
- (b) As a first step a proto-Executive Board should be established in order to involve non-official people in consideration of the role, functioning and financing of the organisation.
- (c) The organisation should be independent of Government.
- (d) It should concentrate on discussing practical issues and on giving advice on them to the two Governments.

- (e) It should aim to produce a range of fresh ideas rather than be required to arrive at a consensual view.



*John R. J.
Ireland*

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 March 1983

Dear John,

Prime Minister's Meeting with Dr. FitzGerald

I enclose the record of the Prime Minister's informal talk with the Taoiseach in the margins of the European Council in Brussels this morning.

I am copying the record and enclosure to John Lyon (Northern Ireland Office), Tony Rawsthorne (Home Office), Henry Steel (Law Officers' Department) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office). I should be grateful if you and they would ensure that the contents of the record, which should not be distributed beyond private offices, are closely protected.

*You see
John Holmes.*

John Holmes Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

V/B

SUBJECT
cc Martin

Ireland

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
TAOISEACH, DR GARRET FITZGERALD, AT THE CHARLEMAGNE BUILDING
IN BRUSSELS AT 0830 ON TUESDAY 22 MARCH

Present:

| | |
|----------------------|----------------------|
| Prime Minister | Dr Garret FitzGerald |
| Sir Robert Armstrong | Mr Dermot Nally |
| Mr. A.J. Coles | |

Dr FitzGerald said that he was glad that he was in contact with the Prime Minister and he hoped it would be possible to strengthen contact in the future.

First, he wished to raise a number of security issues. He had just heard about the case of two Irish terrorists in Paris who were considered to be a threat to Her Majesty's Ambassador in Paris and who were also wanted for murder in Ireland. There was no extradition treaty with France and the FCO had suggested that there should be talks on how to proceed. A member of the Irish Embassy would be calling at the FCO today to discuss this matter. He himself proposed to speak to the French Foreign Minister. He was not certain that there was enough evidence to prosecute the terrorists but if the French agreed to deport them, the Irish Government would do its best.

/The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister said that this was an important matter, both for the reasons given by Dr FitzGerald and because of French attitudes towards terrorism.

Dr. FitzGerald recalled the recent case in the Irish Supreme Court which had had the successful outcome of the extradition of an IRA murderer to Northern Ireland. Although the Court's judgment was rather obscure he wished to build upon it. The Irish Attorney General had recently had talks with Sir Michael Havers on this matter. They had selected a case (the murder of Sir Norman Strong and his son) which had the potential for building on the previous case. If there were difficulties in taking up this matter in the Supreme Court, he was perfectly prepared to use the normal procedures.

Another complex case concerned the four members of the RUC who had become involved in a brawl at a dance hall in the Republic. It appeared that this episode may not have been so innocent as it had been portrayed. The Irish DPP had prepared charges. The RUC men in question were to be extradited to Irish jurisdiction. This had provoked complaints from some of the Unionists. If we preferred to proceed under the Criminal Law Jurisdiction Act, the Irish Government would have no objection.

/In general

In general he was anxious to help in the security field. The Prime Minister expressed gratitude and said we were examining the specific matters which the Taoiseach had raised.

Dr FitzGerald said that he wanted to reopen the Anglo-Irish relationship which had been developing earlier and to proceed at whatever pace and in whatever way the Prime Minister found possible. He suggested that official level contacts should be reactivated without publicity. The Prime Minister said that it was necessary to proceed slowly. We could co-operate quite extensively in the security field because everybody understood the importance of this. But Dr FitzGerald's proposal for a forum had immediately raised Unionists' fears and created a difficult atmosphere (though she understood why he had made the proposal). We could establish one or two private contacts but it was important to move slowly.

Dr FitzGerald said that the aim of re-establishing contact should be to lay a foundation for the future relationship. The Prime Minister said that she regarded it more as a matter of keeping in touch.

Dr FitzGerald said that one motive for his proposed forum was to help the SDLP. The Prime Minister said that Mr Concannon had recently explained to her the Taoiseach's pre-occupation with this aspect. Dr FitzGerald said that he had tried to present the proposal in the most helpful way possible. He was very worried. Younger people in Northern Ireland were becoming either apolitical or supporters of

Sinn Fein. He was very anxious to stop this process. But there was another reason for the forum. People in Northern Ireland had exaggerated ideas about the aspirations of the South. If the forum was used to present models for the future, Unionist fears might be reduced. In 1979 his party had put forward a policy document on confederation. The reaction had been by no means as hostile as might have been expected.

The Prime Minister said that if the idea of a forum was pursued at the present time, this would be very dangerous to the Unionist case. The Unionists would refuse to take part because the idea aroused all the Sunningdale ghosts. It was not a matter for her but for the Northern Ireland Assembly. However, it would be a mistake to press ahead quickly.

Dr FitzGerald said that he had expected hostile reactions but he hoped to use the forum to allay fears.

The Prime Minister said that the last thing she wanted was that Sinn Fein should get more support. But the SDLP was anti-Unionist. Dr FitzGerald said that they were also anti-IRA. Anything that could be done to strengthen the SDLP against Sinn Fein would be helpful.

The Prime Minister asked for Dr FitzGerald's assessment of the likely results in the 17 Northern Ireland seats in the next General Election. She presumed the Unionists would

get 12 seats. Dr FitzGerald said that he found it very difficult to assess but that he hoped that the SDLP would win at least 3 seats and that Sinn Fein would not win more than 2. He did not think that Mr. Enoch Powell was entirely safe. He hoped that Northern Ireland would not become an issue in our election campaign. The Prime Minister said that she would not make it an issue. She would stick by past undertakings but recent Labour Party statements cast doubt on whether a bipartisan policy could be maintained. Dr FitzGerald said that he hoped we would not give prominence to the local government aspect, given the continued discrimination at that level.

As regards other developments, he wondered whether progress could not be made with the "Encounter" organisation which had been referred to in the joint studies. The Prime Minister said that she would like to consider this. It would be a better approach than any more formal grouping. We should need to consider where meetings would be held. Sir Robert Armstrong said that this matter had not yet been discussed. He recalled that there was to be a council of six people on each side which would include a Junior Minister. The Prime Minister said that she did not think it would be useful to have ministerial members. As regards venue, we must avoid places where extensive security would be necessary. But the "Encounter" route was perhaps the most promising one to pursue. Officials should begin to discuss this but the resumption of contacts, other than

/in the

in the security field, should be undertaken very slowly. With the prospect of an election campaign at some point in the future we had to be extremely careful. Dr FitzGerald said that he understood this but he hoped that after the election it would be possible to revive the old basis for the relationship.

It was then agreed that the following statement would be issued to the press:-

"The Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP, had a meeting today with the Taoiseach, Dr Garret FitzGerald TD. Both were attending the European Council in Brussels. The talks lasted about 45 minutes. They were informal and introductory in character, and covered a number of matters of mutual concern and common interest. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach expect to meet again at the next European Council."

The discussion ended at 0912.

A.S.C.

22 March 1983

Briefs in separate folder.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 March 1983

Dear John,

Meeting between the Prime Minister and Dr Garret Fitzgerald at
the European Council

/ I enclose short briefs for the Prime Minister's
meeting with Dr Garret FitzGerald in the margins of next
week's European Council, covering Anglo-Irish relations,
Northern Ireland, and the European Parliament and Northern
Ireland. The briefs were prepared in the FCO and NIO and
have, where appropriate, been seen in draft by the Cabinet
Office. A scene-setting telegram from Dublin and a personality
/ note on Dr FitzGerald are also enclosed together with a draft
/ press statement which, if you agree, you could put to
Dr FitzGerald's Private Secretary after the meeting. No
separate briefing on Community issues has been provided but
the Prime Minister will no doubt wish to raise the budget
with Dr FitzGerald.

As you know the meeting is expected to last about
45 minutes. It will be informal and we do not expect
Dr FitzGerald to have any specific issue to discuss. The
Prime Minister will not be expected to make any definite
response to the Irish Government's proposal for a forum for
discussions on a 'New Ireland'. Our main objectives remain
to encourage Dr FitzGerald in his moderate low key approach
and to persuade him to say as little as possible about
Northern Ireland in the coming months.

I am copying this letter and enclosures to Derek Hill
(NIO) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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GRPS 300

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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FM DUBLIN 161630Z MAR 83

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION 17 MARCH 1983

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 88 OF 16 MARCH 1983

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO NIO(BELFAST)

EUROPEAN COUNCIL: BILATERAL WITH THE IRISH PRIME MINISTER

1. DR FITZGERALD HAS TOLD ME THAT HE HOPES TO HAVE A GENERAL DISCUSSION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND TO PICK UP THE THREADS AFTER HIS ABSENCE FROM POWER FOR MOST OF LAST YEAR. BUT YOU MAY FIND A NOTE ON HIS CURRENT PREOCCUPATIONS USEFUL.
2. DOMESTICALLY THE OUT-LOOK IS CHEERLESS. HIS PERFORMANCE DURING THE FIRST 3 MONTHS OF HIS NEW ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT BEEN HAPPY. ALTHOUGH HIS PARLIAMENTARY POSITION IS REASONABLY SECURE, SEVERAL DEPUTIES AMONG HIS LABOUR ALLIES ARE THREATENING TO OPPOSE HIGHER SOCIAL WELFARE CONTRIBUTIONS. THE ECONOMIC SCENE IS PARTICULARLY DEPRESSING WITH UNEMPLOYMENT APPROACHING 200,000, TWELVE PERCENT INFLATION AND THE PAINFUL PROCESS OF REDUCING THE CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT ONLY BEGINNING. THE IRISH POUND IS OVERVALUED AGAINST STERLING.
3. THE TAOISEACH IS ALSO EMBARRASSED BY HIS COMMITMENT TO A REFERENDUM ON WHETHER THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE AMENDED TO RULE OUT ABORTION (WHICH IS IN ANY CASE ILLEGAL). THE LIBERAL WING OF HIS OWN PARTY AND THE LABOUR PARTY ARE UNHAPPY WITH THIS PROPOSAL, WHICH THEY SEE AS SECTARIAN, WHILE MR HAUGHEY IS ACCUSING THE TAOISEACH OF BEING SOFT ON ABORTION.
4. ON NORTHERN IRELAND, THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S IMMEDIATE CONCERN IS TO BOLSTER THE SDLP IN THE FACE OF SINN FEIN'S ELECTORAL ADVANCES LAST OCTOBER AND THE PROSPECT OF FURTHER GAINS IN A BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION. HENCE DR FITZGERALD'S CAUTIOUS ADOPTION OF JOHN HUME'S PROPOSED COUNCIL TO BECOME A "FORUM" FOR A NEW IRELAND. THE TAOISEACH MAY URGE HMG TO DO MORE TO HELP THE SDLP, BUT WHEN PRESSED FOR SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS THE IRISH HAVE SO FAR HAD LITTLE TO SAY.

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5. ON ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS GENERALLY, THE IRISH ARE WAITING FOR A BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION BEFORE TAKING ANY FURTHER INITIATIVES AND ARE NOT EXPECTING ANY NEW MOVES FROM US EITHER. ONCE AN ELECTION HAS TAKEN PLACE, THEY WILL HAVE A CLEARER IDEA OF CATHOLIC LOYALTIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND OF A NEW BRITISH GOVERNMENT WITH WHICH THEY WILL HAVE TO DEAL.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO NIO(BELFAST)
FIGG

NORTHERN IRELAND

LIMITED

| | |
|------------|----------------------|
| RID | PS/MR RIFKIND |
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| INFO D | PS/PUS |
| WED | SIR J BULLARD |
| MAED | MR WRIGHT |
| NEWS D | LORD N GORDON LENNOX |
| SEC D | MR GIFFARD |
| PUSD | MR ADAMS |
| PS | MR GOODISON |
| PS/MR HURD | MR URE |

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From the Private Secretary.

14 March 1983

Meeting between the Prime Minister and Dr. Garret FitzGerald at the
European Council

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 10 March and
Derek Hill's letter of the same date.

In response to the Irish request that the meeting between
the Prime Minister and Dr. FitzGerald should be rather longer
than we envisaged originally, could you please say that the Prime
Minister has asked me to make contact with Dr. FitzGerald's staff
on arrival in Brussels and see whether we can make provision, as
the Taoiseach wishes, for a 45 minute talk. I see little difficulty
about doing this but will find it easier to arrange on the spot.

I am copying this letter to Derek Hill (Northern Ireland
Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

11 March 1983

I am putting this to the P.S.

ASL 11/3

Dear John

MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND DR GARRET FITZGERALD
AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

Mr Prior has seen John Holmes' letter to you of 10 March and hopes that it will be possible for the Prime Minister to see Dr FitzGerald for 45 minutes when they attend the European Council. There may be little substantive that can be done at this stage on either side, but Mr Prior thinks that it would be all the more useful to make the meeting a little longer than was originally planned.

I am sending a copy of this letter to John Holmes (FCO) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever


Derek Hill

DEREK HILL

Inland:

Mtgs with Tairach
PTG

11 MAR 1983





Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

May I say that we take
the point and will see on
arrival in Brussels whether
we can fit in 45 minutes or so ?

10 March 1983

A.S.C. 1/2.

Yes

Dear John,

Meeting between the Prime Minister and
Dr Garret FitzGerald at the European Council

I enclose a report of a talk HM Ambassador Dublin had with Dr Garret FitzGerald on 7 March. As you will see Dr FitzGerald put in a plea for his meeting with the Prime Minister at the European Council to be longer than the 20-30 minutes suggested by us. Sir L Figg has commented that there would be great advantage to us in the future if the time available could be extended to, say, 45 minutes.

Although the pressures on the Prime Minister's time at the European Council are fully recognised, Mr Pym wonders whether there might not be advantage in being flexible over the time. Dr FitzGerald evidently attaches great importance to it. To fall in with his wishes should be helpful in achieving our major objective (paragraph 3 of my letter of 28 February) of ensuring that he does and says very little in connection with Northern Ireland for as long as possible. A longer meeting could also help to reduce the pressure on the Irish Government to seek an early summit meeting, before the general election.

I am sending a copy of this letter to John Lyon (Northern Ireland Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

John Holmes

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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GRS 240
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FM DUBLIN 071642Z MAR 83
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 71 OF 7 MARCH 1983
INFO ROUTINE NIO (LONDON) (PERSONAL FOR PUS)

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS
PERSONAL FOR PUS

1. THE TAOISEACH AND HIS WIFE CAME TO LUNCH WITH US TODAY AND I HAD HALF-AN-HOUR ALONE WITH HIM AFTERWARDS. HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD ASKED THROUGH THE IRISH EMBASSY FOR, IF POSSIBLE, AN HOUR WITH THE PRIME MINISTER SOME TIME DURING THE NEXT EUROPEAN COUNCIL. HE HAD JUST HEARD THAT ONLY 20 TO 30 MINUTES WOULD BE POSSIBLE. IN HIS SHORT PERIOD DURING HIS PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION HE HAD NOT HAD TIME TO GET TO KNOW THE PRIME MINISTER AND MUCH WANTED AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY OF DOING SO QUIETLY AND WITHOUT THE POMP AND CIRCUMSTANCE OF A BILATERAL MEETING. HE HAD NOTHING SPECIFIC TO DISCUSS AND THIS WAS PRECISELY WHY HE WANTED MORE THAN 20 TO 30 MINUTES, WHICH WOULD NOT GIVE TIME FOR THEM TO HAVE A MEETING OF MINDS OR A TOUR D'HORIZON.

2. I KNOW THE PRIME MINISTER'S TIMETABLE IS VERY TIGHT. HOWEVER, I THINK THERE WOULD BE GREAT ADVANTAGE TO US IN THE FUTURE IF SHE COULD POSSIBLY EXTEND THE TIME AVAILABLE TO SAY 45 MINUTES. AT THE MOMENT WE HAVE LITTLE COMFORT TO OFFER A WELL DISPOSED IRISH GOVERNMENT ON THE NORTH AND THEY ARE DESPERATELY WORRIED ABOUT THE POSITION OF THE SDLP. IN THIS SITUATION I THINK IT WOULD BE PSYCHOLOGICALLY VERY IMPORTANT TO DR FITZGERALD IF HE COULD HAVE A LONGER TIME TO DISCUSS THINGS GENERALLY WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND TO TRY AND ESTABLISH SOME MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. FITZGERALD SHOULD BE WITH US FOR FOUR OR FIVE YEARS AND, AS I HAVE SAID, I AM SURE THAT IF WE ACCEDE TO HIS WISHES WE WILL FIND THE GOING EASIER IN THE FUTURE.

FIGG

LIMITED
RID
PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR GOODISON

CONFIDENTIAL

AMBASÁID NA HÉIREANN, LONDAIN.



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON.

9 March 1983

17 Grosvenor Place
SW1X 7HR

Handwritten: Ireland
Handwritten: A.S.C. 10/3

Dear Mr. Coles,


att
Thank you for your letter of 4 March about the meeting between the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister in the margins of the European Council later this month. I have conveyed the contents to Dublin.

Yours Sincerely,
Paul D. Dempsey

Paul D. Dempsey
Minister Plenipotentiary.

A.J. Coles Esq.,
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister,
No. 10 Downing Street,
London SW1.

10 MAR 1983



10 MAR 1983





FILE

RWJ

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 March, 1983

Thank you for your letter of 1 March in which you conveyed the Taoiseach's interest in a meeting with the Prime Minister in the margins of the European Council Meeting in Brussels later this month.

The Prime Minister would be glad to have an informal meeting with the Taoiseach in the margins of the Council. But, given the pressures of the Council timetable, and the likelihood of other bilateral meetings, Mrs. Thatcher thinks that it would be best to plan on the basis that this informal meeting will be comparatively short, lasting from some 20 - 30 minutes.

I suggest that we do not try to fix a precise time now. I shall be glad to make a definite arrangement with the Taoiseach's staff on arrival in Brussels.

As regards publicity, we should prefer that no announcement be made to the press in advance and that the terms in which the press are informed afterwards about the meeting should be agreed in Brussels.

A. J. COLES

Paul D. Dempsey, Esq.,

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 March, 1983.

Meeting between the Prime Minister and Dr. Garret Fitzgerald
at the European Council

Thank you for your letter of 28 February about the above subject.

Shortly after I received it, the Charge d'Affaires of the Irish Embassy wrote to me to convey the Taoiseach's wish for a meeting with the Prime Minister. I enclose a copy of his letter from which you will see that Dr. Fitzgerald proposed a meeting of one hour during which there would be a "relaxed general discussion with the Prime Minister of all matters in the Anglo-Irish relationship".

I have consulted the Prime Minister who has stipulated that the meeting must not be a formal one, and that it should not last for more than 20-30 minutes at most.

After consulting you on the telephone today, I replied to the letter from Mr. Dempsey. I now enclose a copy of that reply.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosures to John Lyon (Northern Ireland Office), and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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BPP



file

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Meeting between the Prime Minister and Dr. Fitzgerald

Thank you for your minute of 4 March about your conversation with Mr. Nally.

The Chargé d'Affaires of the Irish Embassy wrote to me earlier this week conveying the Taoiseach's request for a meeting with the Prime Minister at the European Council.

I consulted the Prime Minister and the FCO and replied to Mr. Dempsey last week. A copy of my reply is attached.

You may care to draw on my letter to Mr. Dempsey should you wish to speak to Mr. Nally again - though he will hear soon enough from the Irish Embassy.

As I have said in my letter to Mr. Dempsey, I would rather wait until I get to Brussels before arranging a definite time for the meeting. We may well have to fit in other bilaterals and there may be other claims on the Prime Minister's time which we cannot foresee now.

AJCOB

4 March 1983

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Ref. A083/0738

MR COLES

Mr Dermot Nally, the Government Secretary in Dublin, rang at 5.00 pm this evening.

2. He said that he had been instructed by the Taoiseach to say that the Taoiseach hoped that there would be an opportunity for the Prime Minister and him to have a bilateral meeting in the margins of the European Council at Brussels on 21 and 22 March. He envisaged a general talk, but something more than a mere reprise de contact. The hope and aim would be that there should be no press reporting of the meeting. The Taoiseach would not be accompanied by his Foreign Minister; only by Mr Nally.

3. I said that I thought that the Prime Minister would indeed be expecting to meet the Taoiseach in the margins of the European Council; but I should like to report our conversation to her, and to confirm her agreement when I had done so. I said that I thought that the Prime Minister would be content that such a meeting should be tete-a-tete, with Dr FitzGerald accompanied only by Mr Nally and the Prime Minister accompanied only by me (or you). I thought that the Prime Minister might well sympathise with the aim of avoiding any press reporting of the meeting, but I wondered whether this was entirely feasible: the press were almost bound to ask whether there had been a bilateral contact, and it would be necessary to be prepared with a reply to any such questions as might be asked.

4. I should be grateful if you could let me know whether I may confirm to Mr Nally that the Prime Minister will be content to meet the Taoiseach on this basis in the margins of the meeting of the European Council on 21 and 22 March. We can then consider at what point during the two days such a meeting might best be held: perhaps before the opening of the session on the Tuesday morning, so that the bilateral meeting cannot drag on indefinitely.

RCA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

4 March 1983

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PRIME MINISTER

Possible Meeting with Dr. FitzGerald at the European Council

I attach a letter from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office which refers to your earlier agreement that you would meet Dr. FitzGerald in the margins of the European Council and suggests that we plan for such a meeting.

The Charge d'Affaires at the Irish Embassy has since spoken to me on the telephone and written to me, stating that the Taoiseach would be interested in holding a meeting with you. He proposed a meeting of about an hour and wanted to have it at a time when it would not awaken great press interest. I merely undertook to report the request to you and said that, in the event of a meeting, I thought it would be sufficient to tell the press simply that it had happened.

There is no suggestion that this should be a formal Anglo/Irish meeting.

It must not be a formal meeting - nor last word.

Can I confirm to Mr. Dempsey that you will be prepared to have an informal meeting with the Taoiseach in the margins of the Council and agree with him on a suitable time?

20-30 mins at most.

A.J.C.

3 March, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

AMBASÁID NA HÉIREANN, LONDAIN.



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON.

17 Grosvenor Place
SW1X 7HR

1 March 1983

Dear Private Secretary

Further to our telephone conversation this morning I am writing to confirm the Taoiseach's interest in a meeting with the Prime Minister en marge of the European Council meeting in Brussels later this month. As I mentioned, the Taoiseach would wish to have a relaxed general discussion with the Prime Minister of all matters in the Anglo-Irish relationship and for this purpose would welcome a meeting lasting about an hour. He would consider it useful to have such a discussion at a time when there will be no special press focus on their meeting. You asked me about a press communique. I can confirm that the Taoiseach would wish any communique to be simple in accordance with the spirit in which he is approaching the meeting.

Yours sincerely

Paul D. Dempsey
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

Mr. A.J. Coles
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
No. 10 Downing Street
London SW1.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 February 1983

Dear John,

Meeting Between the Prime Minister and Dr Garret FitzGerald at
the European Council

The Prime Minister agreed last month that if asked by his Irish counterpart about the possibility of a meeting between herself and Dr FitzGerald in the margins of the European Council in March, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should say that the Prime Minister would indeed expect to meet Dr FitzGerald in the margins of that meeting (your minute of 17 January to Sir R Armstrong).

This subject did not come up when Mr Pym met Mr Peter Barry in Brussels on 24 January, but it was briefly touched on at the meeting in London on 1 February between Mr Barry and the Northern Ireland Secretary. It is clear that the Irish expect such a meeting to take place, even though they have not yet formally suggested it; on past form they may not do so until just before the European Council. Subject to your views, it would nonetheless be sensible to plan on the basis that a meeting between the two Heads of Government will take place.

We assume that the Prime Minister would wish any meeting to be short and informal. The objectives might be to indicate HMG's approval of the cautious and studied way in which Dr FitzGerald has chosen to approach Northern Ireland policy, and to encourage him to make the minimum of public statements on the subject for as long as possible. The meeting could also be used to make the Government's position on Northern Ireland clear to Dr FitzGerald, and in particular to enlighten him on certain aspects of our policy, eg in relation to the SDLP, on which his Ministers have shown themselves to be poorly informed.

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It is possible that Dr FitzGerald will try to get the Prime Minister to agree that an Anglo-Irish summit meeting should be held after the British election. It would be difficult to refuse without endangering the present relatively helpful approach of the Irish Government. The Prime Minister might say that she would be prepared to consider a summit then provided that excessive expectations about what such a meeting might achieve can be kept in check and as long as UK domestic political considerations allow.

I am sending a copy of this letter to John Lyon (Northern Ireland Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever
J E Holmes


(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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Ireland: meetings with
Taoiseach P.H.

8 FEB 1983



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IRELAND

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FROM UKREP BRUSSELS 241955Z JAN
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 329 OF 24 JANUARY
INFO DUBLIN

FOLLOWING FROM SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY
ANGLO/IRISH RELATIONS.

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD TWENTY MINUTES OR SO PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH THE IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER THIS AFTERNOON.
2. BARRY SAID THAT, GIVEN THE NUMBER OF PROBLEMS WHICH THE UK AND IRELAND HAD IN COMMON, HE WAS SURE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A SENSIBLE AND BUSINESSLIKE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DUBLIN AND LONDON, AND THAT CONTACT BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD BE CLOSE. HE HOPED THAT, IF EVER DIFFICULTIES AROSE, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO GET IN TOUCH BY TELEPHONE RATHER THAN LET DIFFERENCES OF VIEW EMERGE, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE PRESS. MR PYM SAID HE ENTIRELY AGREED WITH THIS. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THEY SHOULD BOTH FEEL FREE TO RAISE TOPICS INFORMALLY WITH EACH OTHER. HE CERTAINLY AGREED THAT THE HABIT OF TELEPHONE CONTACT WOULD BE USEFUL: IT WAS NOT, IN ANY CASE, HIS STYLE TO AIR DIFFERENCES OF VIEW IN THE MEDIA. HE ASKED THAT HIS GOOD WISHES SHOULD BE CONVEYED TO GARRETT FITZGERALD.
3. BARRY SAID THERE WERE MANY ISSUES WHICH COULD USEFULLY BE DISCUSSED. HE HOPED IN PARTICULAR THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO LIMIT THE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENCES ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND ON THE DISCUSSION OF FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES GENERALLY. CLOSE CONSULTATION WOULD BE VALUABLE. MR PYM AGREED.
4. TURNING TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM, MR PYM SAID THAT THE CRITICAL THING WAS THE SECURITY ISSUE. IT WAS PARTICULARLY GRATIFYING THAT THE HABIT OF COOPERATION ON SECURITY ISSUES, PARTICULARLY ALONG THE BORDER, HAD RECENTLY GROWN: IT REMAINED OUR HOPE THAT THIS SITUATION COULD BE MAINTAINED AND IMPROVED. BARRY AGREED, AND SAID THAT HE THOUGHT COOPERATION WAS ALREADY AT A HIGH LEVEL. THE UNDERLYING DIFFICULTY WAS, OF COURSE, THE POLITICAL SITUATION. MR PYM SAID THAT HMG CONTINUED TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO WORK TOWARDS A SOLUTION. WHATEVER PROPOSAL ONE PUT FORWARD, HOWEVER, THERE WERE ALWAYS THOSE WHO FOUND DIFFICULTIES. BARRY SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT IN DUBLIN HAD BEEN RATHER LESS ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE IDEA OF AN ASSEMBLY. IN HIS VIEW, HOWEVER, THE PROBLEM WAS THAT LOCAL POLITICIANS IN NORTHERN IRELAND HAD THEMSELVES RUN OUT OF IDEAS. MR PYM AGREED AND SAID HE WAS GLAD THAT BARRY WOULD SHORTLY BE MEETING MR PRIOR, AND WAS SURE THAT THAT WOULD PROVIDE A GOOD OCCASION TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION IN MORE DETAIL.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4.

4. THERE WAS A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ISSUES. ON THE CFP BARRY SAID THAT THE IRISH STILL SOUGHT TWO POINTS OF CLARIFICATION BEFORE KNOWING WHETHER THEY COULD SIGNAL THEIR AGREEMENT IN THE COUNCIL TOMORROW. ON OWN RESOURCES, BARRY SAID THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT DID NOT UNDERSTAND HOW COMMUNITY POLICIES COULD BE DEVELOPED WITHOUT AN EXPANSION OF OWN RESOURCES TO FUND THEM. MR PYM EXPLAINED THE UK POSITION.

5. THERE WAS A GENERAL TOUR D'HORIZON ON A NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, INCLUDING THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND BELIZE/GUATEMALA. THERE WAS ALSO AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP. BARRY REFERRED TO RUMOURS IN THE IRISH PRESS ABOUT THE ALLEGED PREPARATION OF SITES IN NORTHERN IRELAND TO STORE OR SET UP CRUISE MISSILES. MR PYM SAID THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO QUESTION OF THIS, AND CONFIRMED, IN ANSWER TO BARRY'S QUESTION, THAT THE PRESS COULD BE SO INFORMED. THERE WAS THEN A BRIEF EXCHANGE ON GENERAL ECONOMIC QUESTIONS, TOUCHING ON INFLATION, UNEMPLOYMENT ETC.

6. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE PRESS SHOULD BE TOLD THAT THIS WAS AN INTRODUCTORY MEETING BETWEEN MR BARRY AND MR PYM: THAT IT REFLECTED A DESIRE TO ESTABLISH BETTER ANGLO/IRISH RELATIONS: AND THAT THE MINISTERS HAD DISCUSSED A NUMBER OF MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST, INCLUDING BOTH COMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. THEY HAD ALSO BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND, WHILE NOTING THAT THIS WOULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER WITH MR PRIOR. IT WAS ALSO AGREED TO SAY, IF ASKED, THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF THE STORIES IN THE IRISH PRESS ABOUT THE ALLEGED BUGGING OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY.

FCO COPY TO:

PS PS/MR HURD PS/LORD BELSTEAD SIR J BULLARD MR GOODISON
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(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

NORTHERN IRELAND

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG
CABINET OFFICE

ANGLO/IRISH RELATIONS

Thank you for your minute of 13 January. The Prime Minister is content that Anglo/Irish relations should be handled in the immediate future in the way you propose.

If Mr Barry, when he meets the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on 24 or 25 January, suggests a meeting between the Prime Minister and Dr. FitzGerald in the margins of the European Council in March, Mrs Thatcher would be content for Mr Pym to reply that she would indeed expect to meet Dr. FitzGerald in the margins of that meeting.

I am copying this minute to Brian Fall (FCO), John Lyon (Northern Ireland Office) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

17 January, 1983

RW

Content that Anglo-Irish relations should be handled as proposed in the immediate future?

Ref. A083/0123

PRIME MINISTER

Agreed
ms

A.J.C. 14/1.

Anglo-Irish Relations

I held a meeting on 6 January with Sir Antony Acland, Sir Philip Woodfield and Mr Clive Whitmore to consider the prospects for Anglo-Irish relations following the change of Government in Dublin. Our expectation (now confirmed - see paragraph 4 below) was that Ministers could expect early overtures from Dublin about a return to normal relations, and we thought that Ministers would need to consider how to respond.

2. We concluded that the responsibility for the deterioration in Anglo-Irish relations under Mr Haughey lay with the Irish, and that it was for the Irish Government to take the initiative in restoring them. The British Government has no interest in seeking to force the pace, still less in appearing to woo or pursue the Irish. I assume that we do not expect or perhaps want to see before the Election any dramatic changes in Northern Ireland, of a kind for which we should want to seek some measure of support from the Irish Government; and any major development in relations between London and Dublin might be more unsettling than reassuring in Northern Ireland. Dr FitzGerald will no doubt understand that we are not in any hurry, and may have his own reasons for not trying to force the process. But it would not be in our interests to appear to rebuff any efforts which Dr FitzGerald may make to get relations back on to a more nearly normal footing; and the United States Administration might find it increasingly difficult to sustain its attitude of non-involvement if it appeared that we were resisting an attempt by the Irish Government to improve Anglo-Irish relations. In this connection we have to remember that President Reagan will be making his usual St Patrick's Day statement on 17 March.

3. Against this background, my meeting considered that the right course would be to let contacts between British and Irish Ministers resume, but take matters along as slowly and deliberately as possible, leaving it to the Irish to make the running. This would mean that

we would take no initiative ourselves; that bilateral contacts at normal Ministerial level should be well spaced out; and that we should avoid being drawn into discussion of possible new initiatives on the Irish question. The most appropriate first contact would be between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Mr Barry, preferably on non-Irish matters; the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Mr Barry would in any case both be at the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the European Community on 24 and 25 January, and that would provide an unforced opportunity for such a contact, if the Irish sought it. This could appropriately be followed by a meeting between Mr Barry and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, if the Irish proposed it.

4. Since my meeting the Irish Ambassador has spoken to Sir Antony Acland on 11 January. He said that he had been in Ireland over Christmas and had joined in discussions with Irish Ministers on Anglo-Irish relations. The new Irish Government had concluded that they should work for better relations with London and proposed to set about this in a steady and deliberate way. They were considering the possibility of movement on extradition and on voting rights for British residents. As a first step they suggested that Mr Pym and the new Irish Foreign Minister, Mr Barry, should meet in Brussels in the margins of the Foreign Affairs Council on 24 and 25 January, perhaps for half an hour. Mr Barry would like to see Mr Prior later, in London or Dublin, preferably at the end of January or in early February. Dr Kennedy said that he was instructed to ask for an early response. He also spoke in similar terms to Sir Philip Woodfield, though less formally.

5. Although the timing of the proposed meeting between Mr Prior and Mr Barry is rather sooner than we would have wished, the Irish have made it clear that they envisage no more than a preliminary and informal discussion and do not intend to get into substance. They have also stressed that they are seeking a 'steady and deliberate' approach to the restoration of relations. This is consistent with the view expressed at my meeting that Dr FitzGerald probably recognises that it would be unrealistic for him to look for any significant fresh movement from London in advance of a British General Election.

6. He is nevertheless likely before long to seek a bilateral meeting with you. He might well do this at the March meeting of the European Council, if not before. You told me that you would not wish to meet him before then, but might be prepared to meet him then; if he then proposed a Summit meeting in London or Dublin, you were likely to say that your schedule was very full, and you could not see any early opening for such a meeting. If Mr Pym meets Mr Barry on 24 or 25 January, Mr Barry may suggest a meeting between you and Dr FitzGerald in the margins of the European Council in March; Mr Pym will need to know how you would like him to respond. We think that it would in any case be unwise to give a negative answer to such an approach before St Patrick's Day, for the reasons given in paragraph 2 above.

7. Looking ahead to the question of contacts at junior Ministerial and official level, routine meetings on practical questions (nominally within the framework of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council (AIIC)) have continued to take place in recent months, and we propose that the policy should be business as usual in this regard. It is possible that Mr Nally may approach me to suggest either an informal meeting or a meeting of the Steering Committee of the AIIC (which has not met since January of last year). I have no indication that he intends to do this. If he does, I shall consult you before making any commitment. But my present inclination is to think that, if our general position is to be as suggested in this minute, we should fall in with an Irish request if one is made. Meanwhile officials will continue their examination, on a strictly in-house and contingency basis, of the various ideas which have been put forward from the Irish side for developing the AIIC, including those aired by Dr FitzGerald during his election campaign.

8. I understand that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is in agreement with the general approach which I have described above, and has asked Sir Antony Acland to tell the Irish Ambassador that he will be happy to meet Mr Barry in Brussels as proposed. It has not been possible to put the point specifically to Mr Prior, who is on his way back to London, but before going on leave he too had endorsed the general approach. I am sure that he would be content

Prime Minister
Content for
Mr. Pym to
say that
you would
expect to
meet Dr.
Fitzgerald in
the margins
of the European
Council?

A.J.C. 14
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For
mt



if Sir Antony Acland, when he sees the Irish Ambassador tomorrow, were to say that we would welcome, in principle, Mr Barry's suggestion for a meeting with Mr Prior.

9. I should be grateful to know whether you are content that we should be guided by the considerations I have set out in this minute in handling our relations with Dublin over the next few months.

10. Finally, I should add that security co-operation with the Irish, which was not affected when political relations deteriorated, remain satisfactory.

11. I am sending copies of this minute to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Secretary of State for Defence.

R.T.A.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

13 January 1983

CONFIDENTIAL



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e

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

MR. HATFIELD
CABINET OFFICE

The Prime Minister has seen Sir Robert Armstrong's minute of 6 August (reference A09227) about Anglo/Irish relations. The Prime Minister has noted that the Irish Government are taking steps to implement their undertaking to enfranchise British citizens living in the Irish Republic, although she has noted further that the situation has changed considerably since that undertaking had been given. For the present, the Prime Minister has commented that she has no intention of having further bilateral meetings with the Taoiseach.

I am sending a copy of this to Francis Richards (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

T. FLESHER

9 August 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. A09227

MR COLES

I am aware of this - but
events have changed
matter since then. Certainly, I JF
have no intention of having further 6/8
Anglo-Irish Relations *bilateral meetings with*
the Taoiseach, not

You wrote to Mr Richards on 20th July, reporting the Prime Minister's comments on FCO telegram no. 87 to Dublin.

2. Sir Leonard Figg confirmed when he was over here yesterday that the Irish Government were taking steps to implement their undertaking to enfranchise British citizens living in the Republic. He thought that the Irish Attorney General would probably succeed by the end of the year in circumventing a constitutional obstacle which has been delaying matters.

3. The undertaking stems from the joint studies which preceded and were endorsed by the Prime Minister's meeting with the then Taoiseach on 6th November 1981. The White Paper of 15th November 1981 on the Joint Studies (Cmnd 8414) noted the Irish Government's intention to introduce legislation to enable United Kingdom citizens resident in the Republic to vote in elections to the Dail and the Irish Government's intentions to introduce legislation to this effect, and went on: "the British side welcomed this intention which would, if fulfilled, result in greater reciprocity in voting rights at national elections".

4. As to numbers, the 1971 census showed that there were about 50,000 citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies resident in the Irish Republic. There are thought to be about 500,000 citizens of the Republic resident in the United Kingdom.

5. I am sending a copy of this minute to Mr Richards in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

6th August 1982

IMMEDIATE

Inland

NORTHERN IRELAND:

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FM DUBLIN 301040Z JULY 1982

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 224 OF 30 JULY

AND TO IMMEDIATE N I O (BELFAST)

FROM TATHAM

M I P T

1. THE GOVERNMENT STATEMENT AND PRESUMABLY THE DECISION TO SUMMON THE AMBASSADOR EMERGED FROM AN IRISH GOVERNMENT MEETING YESTERDAY AT WHICH DR EAMONN KENNEDY WAS PRESENT.

2. I BELIEVE THE GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT IS PRIMARILY INTENDED TO DAMAGE DR FITZGERALD AND TO PORTRAY THE TAOISEACH ONCE AGAIN AS THE DEFENDER OF "THE NATIONALIST COMMUNITY IN IRELAND" FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS. IT WILL BE BEST IF WE CAN AVOID COMMENTING ON THE STATEMENT, JUST AS THERE IS NO REASON TO HURRY WITH A REPLY TO THE AIDE MEMOIRE WHICH MR COLLINS DELIVERED

~~FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS, IT WILL BE BEST IF WE CAN~~
~~AVOID COMMENTING ON THE STATEMENT, JUST AS THERE IS NO REASON TO~~
~~HURRY WITH A REPLY TO THE AIDE MEMOIRE WHICH MR COLLINS DELIVERED~~
TO THE AMBASSADOR LAST NIGHT. OUR POSITION HAS BEEN MADE QUITE
CLEAR BY MR HURD ON 26 JULY AND BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE
HOUSE YESTERDAY. ANY FURTHER RIPOSTES WILL GET HEADLINE TREATMENT
HERE, PROVOKE THE IRISH GOVERNMENT INTO LENGTHY REPLIES AND DO
NOTHING TO IMPROVE RELATIONS OR ENHANCE THE CHANCES OF
THE S D L P PARTICIPATING IN THE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS.

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TWO SENT AT / RECDAT 30/1055Z DH/RJ

IMMEDIATE

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UNCLASSIFIED

FM DUBLIN 300955Z JULY 1982

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 223 OF 30 JULY

AND TO IMMEDIATE N I O (BELFAST)

MY TELNO 222: ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS

1. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT LAST NIGHT RELEASED A STATEMENT ON ANGLO-IRISH AFFAIRS WHICH, WHILE MAKING THE SAME POINTS AS MR COLLINS MADE TO ME, IS PRIMARILY DEVOTED TO A SCATHING ATTACK ON DR FITZGERALD AND HIS STATEMENT OF 27 JULY (COPIES SENT TO R I D AND N I O).

2. THE GOVERNMENT STATEMENT BEGINS BY REGRETTING THAT EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE TO PAINT AS GLOOMY A PICTURE AS POSSIBLE OF THE STATE OF ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS. IT QUOTES PARAGRAPH FOUR OF THE COMMUNIQUE OF DECEMBER 1980, ADDING THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO FIND ANY JUSTIFICATION FOR RECENT BRITISH CLAIMS THAT THERE WAS NO COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF H M G TO CONSULT WITH DUBLIN ON MATTERS AFFECTING NORTHERN IRELAND. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT REGRET THAT BRITAIN HAS TURNED AWAY FROM A COURSE WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY CONTAINED THE POSSIBILITY FOR A LONG TERM SOLUTION TO THE SITUATION IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THIS ISLAND AND HAS

~~TO THE SITUATION IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THIS ISLAND AND HAS~~
TAKEN AN INITIATIVE ALMOST CERTAIN TO FAIL''.

3. THE MEAT OF THE STATEMENT IS AN ATTACK ON DR FITZGERALD, WHO IS ACCUSED OF ''TAKING SIDES WITH BRITAIN'' AND OF BLAMING ANY DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS ON THE IRISH GOVERNMENT. HE IS ACCUSED OF BEING READY TO SUPPORT THE PRIOR INITIATIVE AND HIS INTENTION TO PUT DOWN A MOTION IN THE DAIL TO ESTABLISH A ''WATERED DOWN'' ANGLO-IRISH PARLIAMENTARY TIER IS ALLEGED TO BE ''AT THE SUGGESTION OF BRITISH MINISTERS''. IN THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S VIEW, THE PARLIAMENTARY TIER SHOULD BE SET UP BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND, IF IT IS NOT, IT WOULD BE ''OF LITTLE MORE VALUE THAN A SOCIAL CLUB FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS''.

4. THE STATEMENT ADDS: '' QUESTIONS ALSO NEED TO BE ASKED ABOUT THE RECENT ACTIVITIES OF DR FITZGERALD IN LONDON WHERE HE MET MR PRIOR WITHOUT REVEALING TO THE GOVERNMENT OR PUBLIC WHAT WAS SAID''. IF DR FITZGERALD SPOKE TO MR PRIOR ON THE LINES OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE DUKE OF NORFOLK (THE DUKE IS QUOTED - HOUSE OF LORDS, 8 JULY - AS SAYING THAT DR FITZGERALD SEES THIS BILL ''AS BEING A WONDERFUL STEP FORWARD'') THEN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE OPPOSITION LEADER MUST BECOME A CAUSE OF CONCERN ''NOT MERELY TO THE IRISH GOVERNMENT BUT TO THE ENTIRE NATIONALIST COMMUNITY IN IRELAND''.

5. DR FITZGERALD HAS ISSUED A BRISK REPLY, CALLING THE GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT BLATANT ATTEMPT TO DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THEIR OWN MISHANDLING OF ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS. THE CHARGE THAT HE ACTED AT THE SUGGESTION OF BRITISH MINISTERS IS DESCRIBED AS ''FALSE AND MALICIOUS''. HE MENTIONS THAT HE URGED MR PRIOR TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR SENATOR MALLON TO TAKE PART IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY AND REGRETS THAT THE TAOISEACH SHOULD ''SEEK TO COVER HIS OWN INEPTITUDE IN HANDLING IRISH-BRITISH RELATIONS BY THE USE OF INNUENDOES AND UNTRUTHS OF A KIND HAPPILY RARE IN IRISH POLITICS''.

6. THE FULL TEXT OF BOTH STATEMENTS FOLLOWS BY BAG TO R I D AND N I O LONDON AND BELFAST.

7. SEE M I F T.

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From the Private Secretary

30 July 1982

Anglo-Irish Relations

The Prime Minister saw FCO telegram number 87 reporting the conversation between the Minister of State (Mr. Hurd) and the Irish Ambassador. With regard to the latter's reference to legislation enabling UK citizens resident in Ireland to vote in elections to the Dail, the Prime Minister has commented: "We do not want the Irish Government to give the vote to British citizens. They are pitifully few and it would not be a quid pro quo for the vote of the millions of Irish citizens who reside here".

A. J. COLES

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM DUBLIN 291655Z JULY 1982

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 222 OF 29 JULY

AND TO INFO PRIORITY N I O (BELFAST)

YOUR TELNO 87 : ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS.

1. MR COLLINS, THE FOREIGN MINISTER, ASKED TO SEE ME AT FIVE PM THIS EVENING. HE READ TO ME FROM AN AIDE MEMOIRE WHICH REFERRED TO MR HURD'S MEETING WITH THE IRISH AMBASSADOR ON 26 JULY. THE MAIN THRUST OF THE PAPER, WHICH IS NOT LONG, IS TO TRY AND SHOW THAT WE ARE UNDER SOME KIND OF OBLIGATION TO CONSULT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND AFFAIRS. REFERENCE IS MADE TO PARAGRAPHS FOUR AND FIVE OF THE COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWING THE 8 DECEMBER 1980 SUMMIT AND TO PARAGRAPH TWO OF THE JOINT MEMORANDUM ON THE ANGLO-IRISH INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL OF 29 JANUARY 1982. IT ALSO QUOTES PARAGRAPH 21 OF MR ATKINS'S

~~29~~ JANUARY 1982. IT ALSO QUOTES PARAGRAPH 21 OF MR ATKINS'S WHITE PAPER OF JULY 1980. HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD GIVE THESE QUESTIONS CAREFUL CONSIDERATION AND PROVIDE ANSWERS IN DUE COURSE. HE GAVE ME A COPY OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE WHICH FOLLOWS BY BAG (ALSO TO BLELLOCH, N I O (L)).

2. I SAID THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR ME NOT TO ATTEMPT TO REPLY TO ANY OF THE POINTS NOW. I WOULD SEE THAT THE PAPER WAS FULLY CONSIDERED. HOWEVER, I WOULD LIKE TO RESERVE OUR POSITION ON HOW WE MIGHT REPLY. I HAD JUST HEARD THAT MR PRIOR WAS PROPOSING TO COME TO DUBLIN IN SEPTEMBER AND THIS VISIT ALONE MIGHT HAVE SOME BEARING ON HOW WE MADE A REPLY.

3. THERE WILL OF COURSE BE LITTLE DIFFICULTY IN DRAFTING A WRITTEN REPLY IF WE WISH TO GIVE ONE. PERHAPS THIS IS SOMETHING WHICH MIGHT BE DISCUSSED DURING NEXT MONTH. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO MAKE A WRITTEN REPLY WITHOUT WORSENING RELATIONS. THE WAY IN WHICH MR COLLINS SPOKE TO ME, WHICH WAS LOW KEY, SUGGESTED TO ME THAT THEY WERE REALLY GOING THROUGH THE MOTIONS. AND TO SCRATCH AROUND IN COMMUNIQES AND JOINT MEMORANDA TO MAKE THEIR CLAIM TO CONSULTATION INVITES A SHARP REJOINDER IN THE LIGHT OF THE TAOISEACH'S MOUNTING HOSTILITY TO THE DEVOLUTION PROPOSALS FROM HIS FIRST DAY IN OFFICE WITHOUT ANY ATTEMPT TO FIND OUT FROM US WHAT THEY MIGHT INVOLVE.

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SENT AT RECD AT 291720Z DJ/MD

Clangston

*We do not want
the Irish to go to
the US to protest
here. They are pitifully
few and do not have
a million who might have
done it*

PS TO PM, NO 10 DOWNING STREET.

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FM FCO 261843Z JUL 82
TO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 87 OF 26 JULY
INFO ROUTINE NIO BELFAST

YOUR TEL NO 208: ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS

1. MR HURD SUMMONED THE IRISH AMBASSADOR TODAY (26 JULY) TO EXPRESS CONCERN AT THE CRITICISMS MADE BY MR COLLINS AND THE TAOISEACH IN THE DAIL ON 15-16 JULY (YOUR TELS NOS 197 AND 201). HE UNDERLINED THAT IT WAS WRONG AND PROFOUNDLY UNHELPFUL TO IMPLY THAT HMG HAD ENTERED INTO ANY COMMITMENT TO CONSULT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ABOUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND THAT THE CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS FULLY SAFEGUARDED THE POSITION OF THE MINORITY IN THE PROVINCE. CLOSER ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS REMAINED IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH COUNTRIES AND HE HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DRAW A LINE UNDER THE PRESENT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS. IN PARTICULAR HE HOPED THAT ANY FUTURE STATEMENTS BY THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE CAREFULLY MEASURED.
2. DR KENNEDY TOOK CAREFUL NOTE. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE RETURNING TO DUBLIN ON 28 JULY AND WOULD BE SEEING MR COLLINS AND THE TAOISEACH. MR COLLINS' SPEECH SHOULD BE READ IN FULL. IT HAD BEEN INTENDED TO CLARIFY THE IRISH POSITION, IN PARTICULAR OVER THE DEVOLUTION PROPOSALS. RATHER THAN ATTACK HMG. KENNEDY THEN REHEARSED IRISH MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE DEVOLUTION INITIATIVE ON FAMILIAR LINES: A POINT OF PARTICULAR CONCERN WAS THAT THE DISQUALIFICATION OF SEAMUS MALLON FROM THE NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS COULD EASILY PROVIDE A PRETEXT FOR THE SDLP TO BOYCOTT THE ELECTIONS. BUT LATER IN THE CONVERSATION HE ADMITTED THAT HE TOO HAD BEEN WORRIED BY MR COLLINS' SPEECH.
3. KENNEDY SAID THAT HE WAS ANXIOUS TO TRY TO FIND SOME WAY

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OF IMPROVING RELATIONS. HE AGREED THAT A PAUSE WOULD BE NECESSARY BEFORE ANY MAJOR INITIATIVES COULD BE TAKEN BUT HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE SOME PROGRESS AFTER THE SUMMER BREAK. HE WOULD BE PUTTING THE FOLLOWING IDEAS TO HIS MINISTERS ON A PERSONAL BASIS LATER THIS WEEK:

(A) WHILE A MEETING BETWEEN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY OUT OF THE QUESTION BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO INTENSIFYING OFFICIAL LEVEL CONTACTS ON ISSUES SUCH AS ECONOMIC COOPERATION, ENERGY, TOURISM AND AGRICULTURE:

(B) CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO SPEEDING UP THE INTRODUCTION OF IRISH LEGISLATION ENABLING UK CITIZENS RESIDENT IN THE REPUBLIC TO VOTE IN ELECTIONS TO THE DAIL IN ORDER TO COUNTER THE STRONG PUBLIC PRESSURE HERE IN FAVOUR OF REMOVING SIMILAR RIGHTS ENJOYED BY IRISH CITIZENS IN THE UK.

4. IF ASKED NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL CONFIRM THAT THE MEETING TOOK PLACE AND INDICATE THAT MR HURD USED THE OPPORTUNITY TO PLACE ON RECORD THE FACT THAT NO COMMITMENT EXISTS FOR HMG TO CONSULT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ON MATTERS AFFECTING NORTHERN IRELAND.

5. FULL RECORD WILL FOLLOW BY BAG.

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D I O)

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FROM DUBLIN 231129Z JULY 1982.
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 216 OF 23 JULY.

IMMEDIATE

AND TO PRIORITY INFO N I O BELFAST

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MY TELNO 208: ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS.

1. NELIGAN, THE HEAD OF THE ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION OF THE DFA, ASKED ME TO CALL THIS MORNING. HE SAID THAT MR COLLINS, THE FOREIGN MINISTER, HAD BEEN MOST CONCERNED BY THE WAY THE IRISH NEWSPAPERS, IN PARTICULAR THE IRISH PRESS, (MYTEL NO 198), HAD REPORTED HIS SPEECH IN THE ADJOURNMENT DEBATE IN THE DAIL. THE SUGGESTION THAT SECURITY COOPERATION MIGHT BE IN SOME WAY CONDITIONAL WAS QUITE WRONG AND UNSUPPORTED BY ANYTHING HE HAD SAID. NELIGAN ADDED THAT MR COLLINS WAS PARTICULARLY UPSET IN VIEW OF HIS CLOSE EXPERIENCE OF SECURITY MATTERS WHEN HE WAS MINISTER OF JUSTICE IN THE PREVIOUS FIANNA FAIL ADMINISTRATION. HE WANTED MR PRIOR TO KNOW THAT HE SHOULD HAVE NO WORRIES AT ALL ON THIS SCORE. I THANKED NELIGAN AND SAID I WOULD PASS ON BY TELEGRAM AT ONCE WHAT HE HAD SAID.

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~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

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FM DUBLIN 161120Z JULY 1982

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 199 OF 16 JULY

AND TO INFO IMMEDIATE N 10 (BELFAST), AND PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

F C O PASS SAYING TO BRUSSELS, UKREP BRUSSELS, PARIS, COPENHAGEN
THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, BONN, ATHENS, ROME AND B I S NEW YORK

MY TWO I P T'S : ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS

1. MR COLLINS REMARKS IN THE ADJOURNMENT DEBATE (MAIN POINTS
IN MY TELNO. 197) WERE MOST UNHELPFUL. THEY WERE STRONGLY
ATTACKED BY MR BRUTON, WHO OPENED FOR FINE GAEL. HOWEVER,
THE MAIN FINE GAEL COMMENTS CAN BE EXPECTED WHEN DR FITZGERALD
SPEAKS IN THE DEBATE THIS AFTERNOON. THE SECRETARY OF THE D F A
TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT FIVE OUT OF 40 PAGES PREPARED FOR
MR HAUGHEY'S SPEECH THIS AFTERNOON ARE ON NORTHERN IRELAND.

2. THE U S EMBASSY HAVE TOLD US THEY WERE PARTICULARLY SURPRISED AT MR COLLINS'S SPEECH. WHEN THEIR AMBASSADOR MET MR COLLINS ON THE EVENING OF 14 JULY HE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS MR PRIOR'S PROPOSALS WERE WELL KNOWN AND HE DID NOT FEEL THERE WAS ANY NEED NOW FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO SAY MUCH MORE ABOUT IT. THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT ONE FACTOR MAY BE THE GALWAY EAST BY-ELECTION ON 26 JULY (JUST AS THE DUBLIN WEST BY-ELECTION SEEMED TO BE A FACTOR IN IRELAND'S CHANGE OF POLICY OVER THE FALKLANDS). INCIDENTALLY, WASHINGTON WILL WISH TO KNOW THAT AMBASSADOR DAILEY IS RETURNING TODAY FOR CONSULTATIONS WHICH THE EMBASSY TOLD US WILL INCLUDE U S POLICY ON NORTHERN IRELAND.

3. THE BY-ELECTION MAY PARTLY EXPLAIN THE HOSTILITY TO MR PRIOR'S DEVOLUTION PLANS, HOPING TO BRING OUT SOME OF THE GREENER FIANNA FAIL SUPPORTERS IN GALWAY EAST. HOWEVER, WORSENING ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS DID NOT HELP FIANNA FAIL IN THE DUBLIN WEST BY-ELECTION. THE COMMENT IN TODAY'S IRISH INDEPENDENT (MY TELNO. 198 PARA. 3) IS CERTAINLY TYPICAL OF MOST INFORMED PUBLIC OPINION IN DUBLIN AND PROBABLY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

4. THE ADJOURNMENT DEBATE WAS EXPECTED TO CONCENTRATE ON THE ECONOMY AND A BATTLE IN THE DAIL ABOUT ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS PROVIDES A DIVERSION FROM THE COUNTRY'S SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. HOWEVER, THE SIMPLEST EXPLANATION FOR MR COLLINS' SPEECH IS PERHAPS THAT THE GOVERNMENT EXPECTED TO BE CRITICISED FOR DAMAGING ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS AND JUDGED IT BEST TO COUNTER-ATTACK, FOR EXAMPLE, BY POINTING TO THE COSTS TO THE REPUBLIC OF SECURITY COOPERATION AND TO THE ALLEGED LACK OF CONSULTATION ON NORTHERN IRELAND. THE D F A HAVE TOLD US THAT THE REFERENCE BY MR COLLINS TO A RECENT P Q ANSWERED BY MR PRIOR WAS TO THE WRITTEN ANSWER GIVEN TO MR PROCTOR ON 17 JUNE ABOUT WHETHER OFFICIALS OR MINISTERS HAD DISCUSSED THE WHITE PAPER WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC (VOL 25 NO. 134 COL 331).

5. I WILL COMMENT FURTHER AFTER WE HAVE HEARD MR HAUGHEY'S REMARKS THIS AFTERNOON.

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FM DUBLIN 160850Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 198 OF 16 JULY 1982

REPEATED FOR INFO TO IMMEDIATE NIO (BELFAST)

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO OTHER EC POSTS , WASHINGTON AND BIS NEW YORK.

M.I.P.T.: ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS: PRESS COMMENT

1. MR COLLINS SPEECH IN THE ADJOURNMENT DEBATE (MAIN POINTS IN MIPT) PRODUCED HEADLINES IN TODAY'S PAPERS:

"ANGLO-IRISH RIFT GROWS AS COLLINS ATTACKS BRITAIN" (IRISH TIMES)

"COLLINS HINTS ON SECURITY" (IRISH PRESS)

"BLISTERING ATTACK ON BRITAIN" (IRISH INDEPENDENT).

2. IN EDITORIAL COMMENT THE IRISH PRESS CLAIMS THAT A "FIXATION WITH SECURITY" HAS DOMINATED THE BRITISH VIEW AND CONTINUES:

"NOW IT IS ONE THING TO PROVIDE THESE SECURITY MEASURES AS PART OF AN OVERALL PLAN LEADING, IT WOULD BE HOPED, TO A POLITICAL

SOLUTION WHICH WOULD MAKE SUCH MEASURES UNNECESSARY. IT IS QUITE ANOTHER MATTER TO BE ASKED TO SUSTAIN THESE MEASURES INDEFINITELY IN A POLITICAL VACUUM WHEN, AT THE SAME TIME, ALL OUR GOVERNMENT'S ADVICE IS IGNORED AND WE ARE SUBJECTED TO A BARRAGE OF ABUSE FOR NOT TOEING THE BRITISH LINE ON THE FALKLANDS.''

AFTER CLAIMING THAT MR PRIOR'S PLAN ''IGNORED THE ADVICE OF BOTH THE FIANNA FAIL GOVERNMENT AND THE COALITION GOVERNMENT'' THE EDITORIAL CONCLUDES::

''IN OTHER WORDS WE ARE BEING TOLD ONCE AGAIN TO MIND OUR OWN BUSINESS. IT IS WELL TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO BRITAIN THAT IF THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTH IS NOT OUR BUSINESS THEN THE SECURITY OF THE NORTH IS NOT OUR BUSINESS EITHER. IT IS MRS THATCHER, NOT MR HAUGHEY, WHO HAS MOST TO LOSE.''

3. BY CONTRAST THE IRISH INDEPENDENT, SAYING THAT THE SPEECH WAS ''UNTYPICAL OF THIS NORMALLY LEVEL-HEADED MINISTER'', CONTINUES:

''IT'S ALL BRITAIN'S FAULT, THE MINISTER SEEMED TO BE SAYING, THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN IRELAND AND BRITAIN ARE SO BAD. WHAT DID THE GOVERNMENT EXPECT TO HAPPEN AFTER AFTER IT HAD STOOD ON ITS HEAD OVER THE FALKLANDS ISSUE? DOES THE MINISTER REALLY EXPECT US TO BELIEVE THAT HIS TAOISEACH AND MRS THATCHER HAD, EVEN BEFORE THE FALKLANDS, A GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP? MR PRIOR IS PLOUGHING A LONELY FURROW IN TRYING TO GIVE BACK TO THE NORTH SOME FORM OF DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT AND HE HAS HAD TO WARD OFF BOTH THE TORY RIGHT WING AND THE EFFORTS OF OUR PRESENT GOVERNMENT TO GET HIS MEASURE THROUGH. HE SHOULD HAVE HAD SUPPORT.

4. FOR COMMENT SEE M.I.F.T.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO OTHER EC POSTS, WASHINGTON AND BIS NEW YORK.

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FM DUBLIN 160800Z JUL 82
TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 160930Z FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 197 OF 16 JULY 1982

AND REPEATED FOR INFO TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 160930Z NIO (BELFAST)
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BIS NEW YORK.

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS: SPEECH BY IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER

1. MR COLLINS OPENED THE ADJOURNMENT DEBATE IN THE DAIL YESTERDAY
EVENING WITH A PREPARED SPEECH WHICH HAD A LONG SECTION ON ANGLO-
IRISH RELATIONS. AFTER SUMMARISING THE FIANNA FAIL VIEW OF
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE 1980 SUMMIT, THE MAIN POINTS WERE:

"I REGRET THAT IN RECENT MONTHS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE
BEEN LESS THEN WHOLEHEARTED IN THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE APPROACH
WHICH THEY HAD AGREED WITH US. EARLIER THIS YEAR THEY EMBARKED ON A
MISGUIDED AND UNILATERAL INITIATIVE WHICH IN EFFECT IGNORES THE
WIDER ANGLO-IRISH DEMENSION WITHIN WHICH THE TAOISEACH AND PRIME
MINISTER HAD AGREED TO TACKLE THE PROBLEM OF THE NORTH - A

WIDER ANGLO-IRISH DIMENSION WITHIN WHICH THE TAOISEACH AND THE
MINISTER HAD AGREED TO TACKLE THE PROBLEM OF THE NORTH - A
PROBLEM WHICH AFFECTS BOTH OUR COUNTRIES SO MUCH. MR PRIOR'S
FAILURE TO PROPERLY CONSULT WITH THE GOVERNMENT HERE IN THE
ELABORATION OF HIS PROPOSALS HAS ALREADY BEEN PUT ON RECORD BY ME -
AND INDEED ADMITTED BY HIM IN A RECENT PARLIAMENTARY REPLY IN
WESTMINSTER - AND I WISH TO STATE MY VIEW THAT THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH ON THIS MATTER HAS BEEN CONTRARY NOT ONLY
TO THE SPIRIT BUT ALSO TO THE LETTER OF OUR NEW ARRANGEMENTS.
THE DEGREE OF REASONED OPPOSITION TO THE BRITISH PROPOSALS, AND
AS DEPUTIES ARE FULLY AWARE THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN UNABLE TO
APPROVE OF THEM, OUGHT TO HAVE MADE MR PRIOR THINK AGAIN. INSTEAD
THEY HAVE NOW COMPLETED THEIR PAINFUL PASSAGE THROUGH THE HOUSE
OF COMMONS AND MR PRIOR SEEMS DETERMINED TO FORCE HIS SCHEME ON
NORTHERN IRELAND BY WHAT CAN ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS DESPERATE MEANS."

"THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY MADE CLEAR OUR FEAR AT THE
CONSEQUENCES WHICH MAY FOLLOW FROM YET ANOTHER FAILED BRITISH
GOVERNMENT INITIATIVE. WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN THE LAST FEW DAYS OF
VOTING IN THE AUTUMN FOR THE PROPOSED NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY,
OUR APPREHENSION GROWS GREATER. THIS INSTITUTION IS TO BE IN AND
FOR NORTHERN IRELAND ALONE, AND ITS INTENDED ROLE IS TO RESTORE A
DEVOLVED EXECUTIVE IN AND FOR NORTHERN IRELAND ALONE. FEW
DEPUTIES I BELIEVE WILL NOT SEE SUCH A CONCEPT AS RETROGRADE AND
INSUFFICIENT, AND FEW IN THIS HOUSE WILL LIKewise FAIL TO
DEPLORE THE RETREAT BY THE PRESENT BRITISH GOVERNMENT FROM THE
COMMITMENT TO PRESCRIBED POWERSHARING IN NORTHERN IRELAND.
THIS COMMITMENT HAS BEEN A CONSTANT IN THE POLICY OF VARIOUS
BRITISH GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1973. INSTEAD, THE EVOLUTION OF
AFFAIRS WITHIN THE NEW ASSEMBLY IS TO BE LEFT TO THE FREE PLAY
OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES. EVERYBODY KNOWS WHICH POLITICAL
TRADITION WILL DOMINATE IN SUCH A SITUATION, AND WE HEAR ALREADY
THAT DOMINANT UNIONIST INTEREST DECLARE ITS ATTITUDE - AN ATTITUDE
WHICH HAS NOT VARIED OVER SIXTY YEARS AND WHICH, NOT SURPRISINGLY,
IS MARKED BY CONTEMPTUOUS REJECTION OF THE PRESENT BRITISH PLAN.
IRISH NATIONALIST OPINION IS ALERT TO THE DANGERS AHEAD. THEY ARE
THE SAME DANGERS NATIONALISTS THOUGHT THEY HAD LEFT BEHIND THEM
QUITE A LITTLE TIME AGO."

"I REGRET THE PRESENT LINE OF POLICY OF BRITISH MINISTERS
BUT DESPITE THIS WE ARE DETERMINED TO USE AND TO PURSUE THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK ESTABLISHED BY THE TWO
GOVERNMENTS. IT IS STILL THERE AND IN FACT HAS BEEN FUNCTIONING
NORMALLY IN RECENT MONTHS WITH FIVE MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETING SINCE
THIS GOVERNMENT CAME TO OFFICE."

"..... WE ANTICIPATE FUTURE MEETINGS OF THE ANGLO-IRISH
INTER GOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL IN THIS SPIRIT OF CONSTRUCTIVE CO-
OPERATION AS APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY, AND AT EVERY LEVEL. BUT

INTER GOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL IN THIS SPIRIT OF CONSTRUCTIVE CO-OPERATION AS APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY, AND AT EVERY LEVEL. BUT LET ME MAKE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT CO-OPERATION IS BY DEFINITION A TWO-WAY PROCESS. IN THE FIELDS OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY CO-OPERATION THIS GOVERNMENT IS DETERMINED TO PLAY ITS FULL PART IN BRINGING PEACE, STABILITY AND RECONCILIATION TO OUR PEOPLE. AND WE EXPECT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO DO THE SAME - WHATEVER OUR TEMPORARY DIFFERENCES WE IN THESE TWO ISLANDS HAVE SO MUCH IN COMMON THAT ANGLO-IRISH CO-OPERATION IS VITAL IN OUR JOINT INTEREST. BUT IT MUST BE FULL AND WHOLEHEARTED IN ITS INSPIRATION AND IN ITS WORKING. WE CANNOT ACCEPT A SELECTIVE OR INCONSISTENT APPROACH TO MUTUAL CO-OPERATION."

"..... WE HAVE MADE EFFORTS TO OBTAIN THE UNDERSTANDING OF ALL OTHER CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS FOR OUR OBJECTIVES. THERE ARE ENCOURAGING SIGNS THAT OUR POSITION IN GAINING UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS IN THE UNITED STATES....."

".... IN OUR CONTACTS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS TOO, PARTICULARLY AMONG OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS, THERE IS INCREASING UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POLICIES ON NORTHERN IRELAND AND IN PARTICULAR A READY SUPPORT FOR A JOINT ANGLO-IRISH APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM."

2. SEE ALSO M.I.F.T.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO OTHER EC POSTS, WASHINGTON AND BIS
NEW YORK

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2 - Ireland

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FM DUBLIN 271650Z MAY 1982

Prime Minister

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

For some reason

TELEGRAM NUMBER 164 OF 26 MAY

in full

AND TO INFO IMMEDIATE N I O (B) , UKMIS NEW YORK AND
 PRIORITY INFO WASHINGTON.

the

28v.

YOUR TELNO 74 (NOT TO ALL): MEETING WITH TAOISEACH

MS

1. I AM GRATEFUL FOR THESE INSTRUCTIONS. I SAW THE TAOISEACH
 AT THREE O'CLOCK THIS AFTERNOON AND THE CONVERSATION WAS ALMOST
 ENTIRELY ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE FALKLANDS CRISIS.

NORTHERN IRELAND

2. THE TAOISEACH MADE THE USUAL NOISES ABOUT THE FAILED POLITICAL
 ENTITY. SECONDLY, HE SAID THAT THE SPIRIT OF THE ANGLO-IRISH
INITIATIVE WHICH HE HAD LAUNCHED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER WAS NOW
 QUITE DEAD BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE TO CONSULT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT
 BEFORE PUTTING FORWARD DEVOLUTION PROPOSALS. HE WENT ON TO SAY
 THAT THE PREVIOUS COALITION GOVERNMENT HAD ALSO WARNED US
 THAT OUR PROPOSALS WOULD BE UNWORKABLE. I WAS ABLE TO DEAL WITH THIS
 POINT QUICKLY BY POINTING OUT THAT PROFESSOR DOOGE'S LETTER WAS BASED
 ON THE WRONG ASSUMPTION THAT OUR PROPOSALS WOULD BE IN SOME WAY
SIMILAR TO THE CONVENTION REPORT OF 1975. I WENT ON TO TELL MR
 HAUGHEY THAT I HAD SEEN PROFESSOR DOOGE ONLY TWO DAYS BEFORE WHO HAD
 CONFIRMED THIS. WHILE ACCEPTING THIS, HE CRITICISED THE PROPOSALS FOR
 HAVING NOTHING IN THEM OF AN IRISH DIMENSION. I SAID HE REALLY MUST
 STOP CRITICISING IN THIS WAY AND SEE THE MATTER MORE FROM THE
 POINT OF VIEW OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND,
 WHO HAD COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT DIRECT RULE COULD NOT
 CONTINUE INDEFINITELY AND WHAT THE PROVINCE WAS SUFFERING FROM WAS
 LACK OF ANY POLITICAL LIFE WORTH HAVING. THE PROPOSALS, WHICH
HAVE YET TO PASS THROUGH PARLIAMENT, PROVIDE COPPER-BOTTOMED
 GUARANTEES FOR THE MINORITY COMMUNITY THAT IF THERE WERE NOT
 PROPER CROSS-COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS THEN THEY
 WOULD NOT HAPPEN. I ALSO MADE THE POINT IN PARAGRAPH FIVE OF
T U R ABOUT THE PARLIAMENTARY TIER BUT HE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO SUGGEST
 THAT THIS MIGHT BE AN ALTERNATIVE. I ADDED THAT WITHOUT AN ASSEMBLY
 THERE WOULD NEVER BE ANY ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES TO TAKE PART
 IN ANYTHING. THIS PART OF THE CONVERSATION WAS CONCLUDED BY HIS
 SAYING THAT WE MUST AGREE TO DIFFER.

FALKLAND ISLANDS

3. I SAID THAT THE TABLING BY THE IRISH REPRESENTATIVE OF A
RESOLUTION WHICH THE IRISH KNEW WE COULD NOT ACCEPT, FOLLOWING ON
 HIS RADIO INTERVIEW ON SUNDAY CRITICISING IN SUCH EXTREME TERMS THE
 DEVOLUTION PROPOSALS, HAD MEANT OUR RELATIONS HAD TAKEN A
 CONSIDERABLE TURN FOR THE WORSE. THIS NETTLED HIM AND HE SAID THAT

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ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS WERE OFTEN TAKING CONSIDERABLE TURNS FOR THE WORSE. HOWEVER, THEIR ACTIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WERE CONCERNED TO PREVENT A MORE UNWELCOME PANAMANIAN RESOLUTION. HE THREW IN THE OLD POINT ABOUT IRELAND BEING A SOVEREIGN AND INDEPENDENT COUNTRY NOT BOUND TO FOLLOW OUR LEAD. I SAID THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF OUR EVER CONTESTING IRELAND'S TAKING AN INDEPENDENT LINE, BUT IT WAS A PECULIAR SITUATION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHEN 3 AFRICAN NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS HAD TO AMEND AN IRISH DRAFT RESOLUTION TO MAKE IT ACCEPTABLE TO US. FURTHERMORE, NO ONE COULD SUGGEST THAT UGANDA OR OTHER MEMBERS OF THE AFRICAN OR CARIBBEAN COMMONWEALTH WERE IN ANY SENSE NOT INDEPENDENT. IF THE IRISH HAD THOUGHT THEY WERE BEING HELPFUL, WHY DID THEY NOT ASK US FIRST? THIS LED TO SOME RATHER INCONCLUSIVE TALK ABOUT THE DEGREE OF THE COLLABORATION BETWEEN OUR TWO MISSIONS IN NEW YORK. I DID NOT EXPECT TO GET ANYWHERE ON THIS TOPIC, BUT AT LEAST I WAS ABLE TO MAKE THE POINTS IN WHAT WAS A RATIONAL AND COHERENT CONVERSATION.

4. WE ENDED OUR TALK BY AGREEING ON THE IMPORTANCE OF PUSHING FORWARD WITH OUR VARIOUS CROSS-BORDER AND EAST-WEST PROJECTS AND CONTACTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE AIIC. I AM GLAD TO SAY THAT CROSS-BORDER SECURITY COOPERATION WAS NOT MENTIONED NOR WERE ANY COMMUNITY ISSUES.

5. I SAID THAT I WAS GOING TO ENGLAND TOMORROW AND WOULD PROBABLY BE HAVING TALKS AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL EARLY NEXT WEEK. HE THANKED ME FOR KEEPING IN TOUCH WITH HIM AND HOPED I WOULD COME AND SEE HIM ON MY RETURN.

6. COMMENT. OUR CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE JUST AS EARLY INDICATIONS WERE COMING IN THAT THE OPPOSITION LOOKED LIKELY TO RETAIN THEIR SEAT IN THE DUBLIN WEST BY-ELECTION. CONSIDERING THE ENORMOUS EFFORT MR HAUGHEY HAS PUT IN TO THE CAMPAIGN, THE NEWS MUST COME AS A CONSIDERABLE DISAPPOINTMENT. BUT HE DID NOT LET THIS SHOW, NOR DID HE MENTION IT. I AM NOT SURE WHAT IMPRESSION I MADE AND ANY EFFECT CAN ONLY BE SEEN IN WHAT HE DOES IN THE NEAR FUTURE AS REGARDS OUR AFFAIRS. AT THE LEAST I THINK HE KNOWS THAT OUR RELATIONS WILL NEED TIME AND EFFORT TO PUT RIGHT. IF SO, I SHOULD LIKE TO THINK HE WILL DO NOTHING TO MAKE THEM EVEN WORSE.

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TO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 74 OF 25 MAY.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO.158 AND TELECON TATHAM/ELDON : MEETING WITH
TAOISEACH

1. THE FOLLOWING MAY BE USEFUL FOR YOUR MEETING WITH MR HAUGHEY
TOMORROW. AS FAR AS THE GENERAL TONE OF THE INTERVIEW IS CON-
CERNED YOU SHOULD LEAVE MR HAUGHEY IN NO DOUBT THAT WE REGARD
ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS AS HAVING TAKEN A CONSIDERABLE TURN FOR
THE WORSE.

FALKLAND ISLANDS.

2. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN ALL THE TELEGRAMS REGARDING PRESENT
NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. YOU WILL NEED NO FURTHER
BRIEFING FROM US ON THE POSITION ADOPTED BY THE IRISH REPRES-
ENTATIVE, OR OF OUR VIEWS ABOUT IT. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF
YOU WOULD PUT THESE IN AS EFFECTIVE A WAY AS POSSIBLE TO
HAUGHEY.

3. OTHER MAIN POINTS TO MAKE ARE AS FOLLOWS:-

- (A) WE ONLY LANDED FORCES AT SAN CARLOS BAY FOLLOWING ARGENTINE
REFUSAL, DESPITE SEVEN WEEKS OF DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER
GRADUATED PRESSURES, TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES IN COMPLIANCE
WITH SCR 502. WE HAD ALWAYS MADE PLAIN THAT FORCE WOULD BE
USED IF NECESSARY. THIS IS IN EXERCISE OF OUR INHERENT RIGHT
TO SELF-DEFENCE, AS RECOGNISED IN ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN
CHARTER:
- (B) OUR PROPOSED INTERIM AGREEMENT SHOWS HOW FAR WE WERE
PREPARED TO GO IN THE SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.
IT FOUNDERED ON THE ROCK OF ARGENTINE OBDURACY, AND
INSISTENCE ON A TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY TO ARGENTINA
AGAINST THE CLEAR WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS:
- (C) ANY CEASEFIRE NOT LINKED TO THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF
THE ARGENTINE AGGRESSORS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE:

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(D) WE ARE NOT TURNING OUR BACK ON A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. A CHANGE OF HEART BY ARGENTINA TO ACCEPT THE NEED FOR WITHDRAWAL UNDER SCR 502 WOULD TRANSFORM THE PROSPECTS FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION.

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS

4. THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 135 ARE UNLIKELY TO MAKE MUCH PROGRESS UNTIL THE SITUATION HAS QUIETENED DOWN SUFFICIENTLY TO ALLOW A CONSIDERED ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE OF ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS TO BE MADE. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE BEST LINE TO TAKE WITH MR HAUGHEY MIGHT BE TO POINT OUT THAT RECENT IRISH ACTIONS AT THE UN AND THE VERY CRITICAL REFERENCES TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND DEVOLUTION PROPOSALS IN HIS RECENT RTE INTERVIEW COULD WELL BE INTERPRETED IN THE UK - AND NOT LEAST BY THE BRITISH PRESS - AS SIGNS THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ARE NO LONGER INTERESTED IN GOOD RELATIONS. THE FACT THAT IRELAND PUT FORWARD A DRAFT RESOLUTION IN THE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH THEY KNEW WE WOULD HAVE TO VETO REINFORCES THIS IMPRESSION. IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE MR HAUGHEY'S INTERPRETATION OF ALL THESE DEVELOPMENTS. YOU COULD ADD THAT WHILE IT WOULD BE IDLE TO DENY THAT RECENT IRISH STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTING TO US IT REMAINS OUR BELIEF THAT CLOSER RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES ARE IN THE LONGER-TERM INTERESTS OF BOTH.

5. IN ANY DISCUSSION OF THE DEVOLUTION PROPOSALS, YOU COULD RE-EMPHASISE THAT HMG'S AIM IS TO GIVE THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND A GREATER DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN AFFAIRS, BUT ON TERMS WHICH WOULD ENSURE THAT CROSS-COMMUNITY SUPPORT WAS AN ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITE TO EVEN PARTIAL DEVOLUTION. IF NECESSARY YOU COULD SAY THAT WE REMAIN

WILLING TO SEE THAT PROCESS ACCOMPANIED BY MOVES TO DEVELOP THE AIIC, INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT BY THE TWO PARLIAMENTS OF AN INTER-PARLIAMENTARY BODY. BUT MR HAUGHEY MUST RECOGNISE THAT IF HE REPRESENTS THIS BODY AS BEING IN SOME WAY AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S INITIATIVE OR AS AFFECTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF NORTHERN IRELAND, HE WILL EXCITE NEGATIVE PARLIAMENTARY REACTIONS TO IT AND WILL, AT BEST, POSTPONE ITS CREATION.

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COMMUNITY ISSUES

6. THERE ARE NO MAJOR POINTS THAT WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO MAKE TO MR HAUGHEY. BUT IF THE COMMUNITY IS DISCUSSED, YOU COULD MAKE THE POINT THAT WE REMAIN VERY CONCERNED BY THE AGRICULTURE COUNCIL DECISION ON 18 MAY TO OVERRIDE THE LUXEMBOURG COMPROMISE. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT IMPORTANT BRITISH INTERESTS WERE INVOLVED AND IT MUST NOW BE IN ALL OUR INTERESTS TO ESTABLISH A CLEAR LINE ON COMMUNITY DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES WHICH MUST BE APPLIED TO ALL MEMBER STATES ON ALL OCCASIONS.

PYM

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PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/PUS
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SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

ANGLO-IRISH ENCOUNTER

Thank you for your minute of 13 April.
The Prime Minister is content that you should
sound out Sir David Orr about his becoming
the British Chairman of the Anglo-Irish
Encounter.

A.J. COLES

15 April 1982



Prime Minister

Content that Sir R. Armstrong
should sound out Sir David Orr?

Ref. A08106

MR COLES

Yes not

A.J.C. $\frac{14}{4}$

Anglo-Irish Encounter

In the last paragraph of my minute of 26th March (Ref A07948) to the Prime Minister on Anglo-Irish Relations, I asked if I might sound Mr Nally to see whether we were clear to proceed with work on the Anglo-Irish Encounter.

2. As you will have seen from my letter of 6th April to John Humes, I had a conversation with Mr Nally in the margins of the European Council which made it clear that the new Taoiseach was content for this to go forward.

3. I should therefore be grateful for authority to sound Sir David Orr about his becoming the British chairman. He would be very well suited to the job; and I should like to approach him before he gets too heavily committed to other things when he leaves Unilever next month.

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

13th April 1982

A. J. Coles, Esq.

Ireland



CABINET OFFICE

[Handwritten signature]

With the compliments of
Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO
Secretary of the Cabinet

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS
Telephone: 01-233 8319

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(4)



Prime Minister

CABINET OFFICE

MR 7/4

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet: Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO

MR 13/4

Ref.. A08049

6th April, 1982

on attached Euro Council file at flap

John Coles wrote to you on 30th March to record the Prime Minister's meeting with the Taoiseach on 30th March.

Later that same morning, Mr. Nally returned for a conversation with me. He told me that, so far as the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council was concerned, the message was "business as usual" - if you can talk about usual for something which has only just begun. The Taoiseach regarded the Council as springing from the initiative which the Prime Minister and he took in Dublin in December 1980. The next day's meeting between Mr. Prior and Mr. Collins could therefore be in the framework of the AIIC. We ought to think before long of holding a meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee.

Mr. Nally said that Mr. Haughey would be content for work to go forward on the Anglo-Irish Encounter, though he did not know whether Mr. Haughey would share Mr. FitzGerald's preference for Dr. Whittaker as the Irish Chairman. Mr. Nally said that Mr. Haughey would want to put the main emphasis on an Anglo-Irish Parliamentary body. I said that he would find the Prime Minister sticking very much to the position she took in November 1981: that it was for the Parliaments concerned to decide whether and when they wanted to establish such a body.

Mr. Nally and I reverted briefly to the question of the date of the next Summit, noting that it could not be before July. We agreed that arrangements for that should be left to be made through the usual channels.


I am sending copies of this letter to John Coles and Stephen Boys-Smith.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

John Holmes, Esq.

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7 APR 1982



Hr
Ireland

31 March 1982

Dear Sir Peter,

Thank you for your letter of 25 March.

I am glad to hear that you have won the £14 million contract for the supply of railway equipment to Ireland, especially against such tough competition. This sort of news is always very encouraging. I hope that the contract is indeed extended to its full value of £22 million.

With best wishes. and many congratulations,

Yours sincerely,

MT

Sir Peter Parker, M.V.O.

Jep

BRS 395

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FLASH

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FM F C O 290925Z MAR 82

TO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 254 OF 29 MARCH. FOR PS/PM
 FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF RID WAS
 RECEIVED FROM DUBLIN TELEGRAM NO 80 OF 26 MARCH TO FCO
 AND TO PRIORITY INFO N I O (BELFAST)
 INFO SAVING TO WASHINGTON.

AMBASSADOR'S TELEGRAM NUMBER 76: MR HAUGHEY AND ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS

1. BEFORE ANY POSSIBLE MEETING AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, IT IS WORTH ASKING WHY MR HAUGHEY HAS ADOPTED HIS PRESENT FUNDAMENTALIST FIANNA FAIL POSITION ON IRISH UNITY AND TAKEN AN UNHELPFUL LINE ON MR PRIOR'S NORTHERN INITIATIVE.

2. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF FACTORS AND PROBABLY NO INDIVIDUAL ONE IS DECISIVE. MR HAUGHEY'S OWN BACKGROUND IS NATIONALIST AND HIS COMMITMENT TO IRISH UNITY ENABLED HIM TO OUST MR LYNCH IN 1979. HE ORIGINALLY HOPED THAT THE ANGLO-IRISH PROCESS WOULD INDUCE HMG TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE UNIONISTS AND HE CERTAINLY IMPLIED TO HIS OWN PARTY AND THE SDLP THAT THIS WAS PART OF THE DEAL. BY THE TIME HE LEFT OFFICE LAST YEAR IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE ANGLO-IRISH TALKS HAD NOT LIVED UP TO HIS ORIGINAL EXPECTATIONS (HOWEVER UNREALISTIC) AND HAD DONE NOTHING TO EASE THE PRESSURE WHICH THE HUNGER STRIKE IMPOSED ON THE IRISH GOVERNMENT.

3. THERE IS ALSO THE BLANEY FACTOR. THE TAOISEACH NEEDS DEPUTY BLANEY'S SUPPORT IN THE DAIL AND BLANEY MADE CLEAR THAT HE REQUIRED A FIRM STATEMENT THAT "WE WANT BRITAIN OUT OF THIS COUNTRY". SOME CYNICAL COMMENTATORS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT MR HAUGHEY IS EMPHASISING THE NORTHERN ISSUE IN ORDER TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM HIS OTHER DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. THERE IS PROBABLY SOMETHING IN THIS TOO: THE ECONOMIC NEWS HAS BEEN BAD AND MAY GET WORSE DESPITE YESTERDAY'S BUDGET. BEATING THE NATIONALIST DRUM UNITES THE FIANNA FAIL PARTY BEHIND HIM, EVEN IF IT FAILS TO AROUSE A WIDER NATIONAL RESPONSE.

4. WHEN ALL THESE FACTORS ARE COMBINED WITH THE ELATION OF VICTORY AND THE MUTUAL CONGRATULATION OF ANY IRISH AMERICAN FUNCTION, IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT MR HAUGHEY SHOULD LOSE SIGHT OF THE MORE PROSAIC REALITIES OF THE ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONSHIP AND LET HIS NATIONALIST ENTHUSIASM RUN AWAY WITH HIM. SO FAR, HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN NO SLACKENING IN SECURITY COOPERATION (THOUGH WE MUST WATCH THIS CAREFULLY) AND I BELIEVE HE CAN BE EDGED INTO A MORE REALISTIC RELATIONSHIP THROUGH RELATIONSHIPS WITH BRITISH MINISTERS. BUT WE CANNOT EXPECT HIM TO BE AS SYMPATHETIC TO PROPOSALS TO RESTORE DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT TO NORTHERN IRELAND. AS FAR AS HE IS CONCERNED, ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE NORTH IS A "FAILED POLITICAL ENTITY" IS GRIST TO HIS MILL AND THE EMPHASIS HE PLACES ON ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS IS LARGELY EXPLAINED BY HIS DESIRE TO AVOID CONFRONTING THE REALITY OF THE UNIONIST MAJORITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

CARRINGTON

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Original filed on:-

Euro 90: Council meetings: Pt 10

PRIME MINISTER

Anglo-Irish Relations

As you know, the Irish election interrupted a certain amount of ongoing business, following up the Summit which you had with Dr. FitzGerald on 6th November 1981. In particular you and the then Taoiseach committed yourselves to holding the next Anglo-Irish Summit "in the spring". Clearly, if Dr. FitzGerald had been returned, Anglo-Irish activity would have resumed at the point where it was broken off when the election was called. But since he was not returned, the question arises whether we should revert to business as usual and, if so, how.

2. Given Mr. Haughey's utterances since the election and during his visit to the United States about British withdrawal from Northern Ireland and reunification, I see no case for taking the initiative: that could be misunderstood in Dublin. Nevertheless, there remains the question of what, if anything, you should say about these matters to Mr. Haughey, if you see him and if he raises them with you at the European Council next week.

3. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office view is that what Mr. Haughey has recently been saying does not go much beyond what he said as long ago as June 1980. Moreover, bombast apart, there remains a careful obscurity in his language which leaves him uncommitted.

4. I understand that Mr. Haughey has now asked for a meeting in Brussels next week, at which he will no doubt wish to discuss Northern Ireland. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office will advise that you should see him. It would clearly be difficult to refuse to do so. It is also likely that I will myself see Dermot Nally, my opposite number on the Irish side, in Brussels next week; so the question also arises of what I should say to him on Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council (AIRC) business if he raises the matter.

5. I think that the correct line to take is that we remain ready to carry on with business as usual but that the running will have to be made by the Irish. There is to be another Ministerial meeting, which will (unless we specify

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otherwise) be in the AIIC framework, when Mr. Wyn Roberts meets Mr. Flynn, Irish Minister for the Gaeltacht, on 30th March. Other meetings are in the offing, for example between Mr. Adam Butler and the new Irish Energy Minister on Kinsale Gas. If Mr. Haughey talks about a Summit, you could say that we have assumed the new Government would need more time than a Summit as early as May would allow them, and that May would now be very difficult for you. Similarly, I could say to Mr. Nally that we shall expect to hear from them in due course about dates for a meeting of the Official Co-ordinating Committee. All this would be in low key and handled very much as a routine resumption of business.

6. If you agree to see Mr. Haughey in Brussels, and if he is to be accompanied by Mr. Nally, it would be a help to me if I could be with you, so as to know how to deal with Mr. Nally in the light of your meeting.

7. There is another loose end which might usefully be tied up. I sought your agreement last January to my inviting Sir David Orr to be British Chairman of the Executive Board of the Anglo-Irish Encounter organisation. You thought that a decision on this should be deferred until after the election. If Mr. Nally raises AIIC business with me, I should be grateful for authority to mention this to him in order to confirm that there will be no difficulty from the Irish side, and then to approach Sir David himself. I should like to get ahead with this because Sir David's name has come up in connection with an appointment in Northern Ireland, and I should not wish to risk losing such an ideal candidate for the Encounter organisation.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Robert Armstrong

26th March 1982

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

John Coles Esq
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

Original filed on: -
Euro RSI: Brussels Council Meeting March 82
PK10.

26 March 1982

Dear John,

MEETING WITH MR HAUGHEY

... In the light of your letter earlier today I enclose briefing for the Prime Minister's use when she meets Mr Haughey in Brussels next week. It focuses on the points Mr Haughey will have in mind or which should be made to him, and does not of course attempt to give full summary of the scheme. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has not been able to see it.

Copies of this letter and its enclosure go to Francis Richards (FCO) and David Wright (Cabinet Office)

Francis
Steph

S W BOYS SMITH

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MEETING WITH MR HAUGHEY IN THE MARGINS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL:

29/30 MARCH 1982

NORTHERN IRELAND

POINTS TO MAKE

1. HMG has yet to reach decisions on Mr Prior's proposals but they involve very substantial safeguards for the minority.
2. Devolution of powers would require the consent of Parliament which would not be forthcoming unless arrangements were acceptable to both sides of the community.
3. It is difficult to see how Northern Ireland could be properly represented in an Anglo-Irish inter-parliamentary body unless there were an elected regional Assembly - Mr Haughey has publicly suggested either special elections or appointment of Northern Ireland representatives by Mr Prior, both are impracticable.
4. Direct rule is unsatisfactory. If devolution proves impossible we may have to consider integration or a system of regional councils, or more powers to local government.
5. The initiative has many hurdles to surmount from Unionist as well as nationalist opinion. If it is seen to founder on account of unwillingness to compromise by the minority, British opinion could well draw the conclusion that the majority deserve more sympathy, support and freedom of action.

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

26 March 1982

RESTRICTED

MEETING WITH MR HAUGHEY IN THE MARGINS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL:

29/30 MARCH 1982

NORTHERN IRELAND

BACKGROUND

Mr Haughey has sought the meeting. He knows that decisions on Mr Prior's proposals (details in the paper considered by OD on 25 March) are imminent. In a joint statement with the SDLP on 22 March he said "the proposals as they were emerging were unworkable" and "deficient in that they concentrated on the details of an administration for Northern Ireland without due regard for the broader dimensions of the problem". He may want to press for a stronger Irish dimension, particularly through the setting up of an inter-parliamentary body, but he has in fact shown little inclination to support the concept of a devolved government for Northern Ireland. His recent speeches, including at the White House on 17 March, have sought to put pressure on HMG to express support for Irish unity.

2. One cannot hope to persuade Mr Haughey to support Mr Prior's proposals. But he could be urged to adopt a less negative approach. It is in the interests of both sides of the community in Northern Ireland and Anglo-Irish relations to promote political development there.

3. Mr Prior has offered to see the new Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs in London on Wednesday to explain the proposals at more length than is feasible in a meeting in the margin of the Council.

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

26 March 1982

RESTRICTED

26 MAR 1982



British Railways Board

Sir Peter Parker MVO
Chairman

25th March, 1982

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10, Downing Street,
LONDON, S.W.1.

Pneumas pps
Trade to WR
5/11/81

Your Prime Minister.

I want to thank you for your support in the winning battle we have just had to secure the sale to Ireland of approaching £14 m. of railway equipment which we confidently expect will be extended up to a full value of £22 m.

Rickett
You will recall that at your E.D.C. meeting last year, when my paper on Exports & Public Enterprise was discussed, you concluded the discussion by saying you were ready to take a personal interest in our export effort. So I rang your office some months ago to seek your help on this particular contract, where we were competing with the West Germans and were about to be closed out of a second tendering. I spoke to Mr. Rivett on the day that you were meeting with the Irish Prime Minister; we were then given a fair crack and won the order.

All this is good news - especially as these are struggling times.

James ...
Peter Parker

Peter Parker

MR COLES

*Inland
22 May (by hand)*

IRISH BILATERALS

I think I should bring you up-to-date on the above as we are about to run into difficulties.

I now have four dates blocked out in the Prime Minister's diary for talks:-

- Monday, 3 May (Bank Holiday in this country)
- Friday, 7 May (possible lunch for Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq)
- Monday, 21 June (date convenient for the Prime Minister)
- Wednesday, 23 June (date convenient for the Prime Minister but Cabinet Office not happy as the Irish tend to blow things up on this date!)

But the Foreign Secretary has the following difficulties:-

- Monday, 3 May - he is being given a secret treat by his family for his wedding anniversary
- Friday, 7 May - he will be in the United States
- Monday, 21 June - he will be in Brussels

Which leaves 23 June which the Cabinet Office are not happy with. (en passe!)

ed.

9 February, 1982



FILE

SW

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG
Cabinet Office

cc. Miss Stephens

Next Anglo/Irish Summit

Thank you for your minute of 2 February.

We shall do our best to keep 7 May and 21 June clear in the Prime Minister's diary, but I understand that on both days the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has unavoidable commitments abroad. We have therefore provisionally blocked off Saturday, 22 May as well, though this is Cup Final day and the Prime Minister may decide that she must attend this event. There appear to be no other possibilities.

I shall assume that we need do nothing more until the results of the Irish election are known.

A. J. COLES

CS

9 February, 1982



Friday 3 May
7 May USA
2 June Bonn
23 June Paris
up-

10 DOWNING STREET

Willie

Can you pl. investigate. I
think 7 May would mean moving
the launch to the Iraqi. Can
this be done?

A.T.C.

3/2

John

The Iraqis are in the diary for 7 May
or 16 June. I have asked the
FCO to let us know

- whether a date has been chosen; or
- whether there are any other dates
the Iraqis can do.

Willie

WJ
3/2

Thank you. Can you let me know
the outcome? A.T.C. - 3/2



Ref. A07311

MR. COLES

Next Anglo-Irish Summit

I have seen your minute of 1st February to Mr. Wright.

2. I think that it is very difficult to take this matter any further until after the Irish election on 18th February. In the meantime, I suggest that you should endeavour to keep 7th May and 21st June clear in the Prime Minister's diary, so that we do not add to the difficult problem of finding a date, if after the election it seems that we are going to need an Anglo-Irish Summit in May or June.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

2nd February, 1982



Ireland

JR

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

MR. WRIGHT
CABINET OFFICE

NEXT ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

In my minute of 14 January to Sir Robert Armstrong I said that the Prime Minister would prefer to hold the next Summit much later than May but that the possibility of a meeting in May could be mentioned should this prove necessary during the Cabinet Secretary's meeting with Mr. Dermot Nally on 20 January. I indicated that the most convenient date in May for the Prime Minister would be 3 May.

In his minute of 22 January Sir Robert Armstrong stated that he had accordingly told Mr. Nally, in answer to the latter's question, that May might be a possibility.

Since my minute of 14 January, I have learned that 3 May is not a very suitable date for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. I do not know whether the difficulties they see are overriding but you should be aware that the possibility of finding another date in May is very slight. I have not consulted the Prime Minister but she might just be able to manage 7 May on the assumption that the lunch that she is giving for the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq on that day can be moved. I see no other possible date in May.

If at a later stage we wish to think in terms of June, the only two possibilities that I can see at the moment are 21 June and 23 June.

We probably do not need to take any further action pending the outcome of the Irish elections later this month. But, subject to that and since the Prime Minister's diary for both May and June is already under considerable pressure, the Cabinet Secretary may wish to examine the problem further and consider whether to advise that any of the dates mentioned above be firmly earmarked for a possible Summit at the present stage. There is some danger that unless contingency action of this kind is taken we may discover later that we cannot find a suitable day.

1 February 1982

A. L. COHEN

WR

B/F
8/2

CONFIDENTIAL

Ireland (2)
Prime Minister



A.S.C. 29.
1

Ref. A07287

MR COLES

P.A.
AOL 1/2.

Anglo-Irish Encounter

Thank you for your minute of 28 January.

2. As you say, since my minute of 26 January the Irish Government has fallen. I had occasion to have a word with Mr Nally on 27 January, and we agreed that action on the choice of Chairmen for the Anglo-Irish Encounter should be put into cold storage, and considered again after the election.

3. I am sending copies of this minute to Mr Fall and to Mr Boys-Smith.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

29 January 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

Ireland

CONFIDENTIAL

du B



Q

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 January 1982

Anglo-Irish Relations

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 26 January containing your Secretary of State's views on the question of the establishment of a Parliamentary tier in the Anglo-Irish institutional structures. Mrs Thatcher has noted Mr. Prior's comments.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Halliday (Home Office), David Heyhoe (Lord President's Office), Michael Arthur (Lord Privy Seal's Office), Jim Nursaw (Law Officers' Department), Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

M.W. Hopkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Ireland

CONFIDENTIAL

de 15



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Anglo-Irish Encounter

The Prime Minister has seen your minute of 26 January proposing that we should invite Sir David Orr to be the British Chairman of the Encounter. Since your minute was written, the Irish Government has fallen. The Prime Minister has accordingly asked whether we ought not to hold up these things in view of the Irish election. Unless you wish to put further advice to the Prime Minister, therefore, I shall assume that this matter will be looked at again when we know the results of the election.

I am sending copies of this minute to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Stephen Boys-Smith (Northern Ireland Office).

A. J. COLES

28 January 1982

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②

Prime Minister



A.J.C. 25/1

Government Chief Whip
12 Downing Street, London SW1

ms

p.a.

M 28/1

27th January 1982

Dear John,

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS

The Chief Whip has seen a copy of Sir Robert Armstrong's minute of 22nd January.

Mr Jopling thinks it would be more appropriate for the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to make a direct approach to the Shadow spokesman on this matter rather than to undertake consultations through the usual channels. If it would in any way help smooth the arrangements he would, of course, be more than willing to talk to the Opposition Chief Whip about this.

i.e. on Anglo-Irish parliamentary links A.J.C.

The Chief Whip has however also asked me to say that he shares the concern expressed by Mr Prior about early progress on the Parliamentary Tier. He believes that this would be a wholly inopportune time to have this question raised within the Conservative Parliamentary Party.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the recipients of Sir Robert Armstrong's minute of 22nd January.

Yours ever,

M. MacLean

(M. MacLEAN)

John Coles Esq,
10 Downing Street
SW1.



Government of the Republic of South Africa
Pretoria

28 JAN 1982



**CONFIDENTIAL**

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

John Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

Prime Minister

A.T.C. 27-1

26 January 1982

Dear John,

MS

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS

Sir Robert Armstrong's minute to you of 22 January invited those concerned to say whether or not they saw any objections to the Joint Memorandum on the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council, which was agreed at official level in Dublin on 20 January. My Secretary of State has no points to raise on the Joint Memorandum.

Mr Prior has, however, noted with interest the renewed persistence of the Irish side on the question of an early move towards the setting up of a Parliamentary tier in the Anglo-Irish institutional structures. This is a matter which will no doubt be raised by Professor Dooge in the course of his discussions with my Secretary of State at the end of this week. Anglo-Irish relations overall are of course a matter primarily for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary; but Mr Prior will take the opportunity to make the point that, so far as Northern Ireland is concerned, excessive pressure to make early progress on the Parliamentary tier - and particularly any attempt now to tie such a move into the creation of a devolved Assembly in Northern Ireland - would be likely to produce an adverse reaction on the part of Unionists in Northern Ireland, and could seriously jeopardise the difficult and fragile discussions which the Secretary of State is having with the Northern Ireland political parties about a possible political initiative. Furthermore, it is not to be expected, if and when a devolved Assembly comes into existence, that the question of participation in such an Anglo-Irish Parliamentary tier would be a suitable topic for early discussion there. Such a move could only be divisive at a time when - in the wider interests of peace and stability in Ireland as a whole - it would be desirable to let the Assembly concentrate on less delicate issues.

I am sending copies of this letter to those who had copies of Sir Robert Armstrong's minute of 22 January.


Yours sincerely
Julie Hopkins

M W HOPKINS

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
LIBRARY
DIVERSITY

26 JAN 1982



Content, subject to views of
Lord Carrington and Mr. Prior?

Ref. A07239

PRIME MINISTER

Should we hold up these
things in view of the Irish
election.
Anglo-Irish Encounter

A.S.C. 27.

mb

The Joint Report of the Anglo-Irish Studies (Cmnd 8414,
paragraph 3(iv)) proposed:

"the establishment as an interim measure, pending the creation of an
Advisory Committee, of an Anglo-Irish Encounter organisation, under
the direction of an Executive Board composed of independent public
figures of repute and ability and government representatives, with the
major function of organising high-level conferences on the
Koenigswinter model".

2. This agreed recommendation has now been formally accepted by both
Governments.

3. When I was in Dublin on 20th January, I had some discussion with
Mr. Nally about how to get this going. We agreed, subject to your approval and
that of the Taoiseach, to proceed as follows:

- (i) each side should identify and approach a national chairman;
- (ii) there should be a meeting between the two national chairmen, Mr. Nally
and me, with a view to agreeing the next steps;
- (iii) subject to their agreement, each side should find someone (who would
have to be paid at least expenses) to act as organising national
Secretary, and three or four other independent people to be members of
an Executive Board. It would be the responsibility of the national
chairman to approach these people;
- (iv) each Government would nominate one or two Government representatives
(perhaps Ministers from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the
Northern Ireland Office) to the Board.

4. It would then be up to the Board to decide what activities the Encounter
should undertake.

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5. Mr. Nally told me that the Irish Government were providing a small amount of money in their 1982 budget for a grant towards the expenses of the Encounter. I indicated that we hoped to raise the finance required for the British contribution from private sources.

6. Mr. Nally said that he had not yet discussed with the Taoiseach who the Irish chairman might be, but he was thinking of proposing Senator Kenneth Whitaker. Dr. Whitaker, who is 65, became a Senator in 1976. He was Secretary to the Department of Finance and Head of the Irish Civil Service from 1956 to 1969, and Governor of the Central Bank from 1969 to 1976. He has been Ireland's economic guru: he had a large share of the responsibility for the resurgence of the Irish economy in the 1960s and early 1970s (but not for its more recent troubles). He is well-regarded in this country, and he also has many contacts in Northern Ireland. He would be an admirable choice as Irish chairman.

7. I should like to propose that we should invite Sir David Orr, the retiring Chairman of Unilever, to be the British chairman of the Encounter. He is 59; and about to retire from the chairmanship of Unilever. He is Dublin-born, and was at Trinity College Dublin. He takes an active interest in Anglo-Irish relations; and he is known to be keen to take on public or semi-public work with an international dimension.

8. I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. I should be glad to know whether, subject to their views, you would be content for me to approach Sir David Orr with a view to persuading him to take on the British chairmanship of the Anglo-Irish Encounter.

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

26th January, 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref: B06388

Ireland
 1) Mr. Pattison to me
 2) f-a.
 A.F.C. 26/1

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

cc Mr Coles, No. 10 ✓
 Mr Marshall, NIO
 Mr Eyers, FCO
 Mr Wenban-Smith

Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council

Mr Kirwan from the Taoiseach's office rang me at 12.30 pm today, with apologies for short notice, to say that the Taoiseach had to answer an oral Parliamentary Question this afternoon on whether there had been any developments arising out of the Anglo-Irish joint studies since his summit meeting with the Prime Minister last November. He was proposing to reply as follows.

"The Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council met for the first time at official level in Dublin recently. It is envisaged that the first meeting at Ministerial level, involving the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, will take place in the near future. Other matters arising out of the Anglo-Irish joint studies are currently the subject of discussions with the British authorities."

This was based on the document agreed ad referendum by Mr Nally and yourself in Dublin last week. On the Irish side the position was that that document was at this moment in front of a Ministerial meeting which was expected to have approved it before the Taoiseach's Parliamentary Answer was given. What was the position on the British side?

2. I agreed that the proposed answer was correctly based on last week's document. We had submitted this to Ministers here and expected to be able to let the Irish know the outcome tomorrow. I personally had no reason to expect that the outcome would be other than approval. But unfortunately there was no way in which I could establish this in time for the Parliamentary Answer which I understood the Taoiseach would be giving at 2.30 pm today. In these circumstances I would not personally be surprised if the Taoiseach chose to go ahead and answer the PQ in the terms indicated. But Mr Kirwan must clearly understand that the document was not at this stage Ministerially approved on the British side; and that there was a finite, if fairly remote, chance, that British Ministers might raise some objection to it. Mr Kirwan accepted this.


3. Although I did not say so, it has in fact already been informally established that neither the Prime Minister nor the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland have any objection to the latter's meeting with the Irish Foreign Minister on 29th January being regarded as the first meeting of the Council at Ministerial level.

4. I have since learnt that the Prime Minister is tomorrow answering a Written PQ from Mr Kilfedder in broadly the same area. The terms of the draft answer do not require any alteration in the light of the proposed Irish reply today. But it would be useful if Mr Wenban-Smith, in consultation with Mr Evers,

a. could ensure that the Embassy in Dublin telegraph the text of the Taoiseach's answer this afternoon, together with any supplementaries, so that it is available to the Prime Minister for tomorrow;

b. could telephone Mr Kirwan this afternoon, or failing that tomorrow morning, to give him the draft form of words which the Prime Minister is being advised to use tomorrow afternoon.

26th January 1982



R L WADE-GERY

Agreed - but as a final
check - could I or (how)
look at the Joint Memorandum
for sensitive points

mt.

Mr. Goss

Are you content?

A.J.C. $\frac{25}{1}$

discussed.

MR 26/1

h.c.

Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. A07217

MR COLES

Are you content with para 2 (a), (b) and (c) and the joint memorandum attached to this minute, subject to the views of the other Ministers concerned?

The Prime Minister agreed subsequently.

Cabinet Office informed A.F.C. $\frac{26}{1}$

A.F.C. $\frac{22}{1}$

p.a.

Anglo-Irish Relations

At their meeting on 6th November 1981 the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed to establish an Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council through which institutional expression could be given to the unique relationship between the two countries. The communique made clear that this would involve regular meetings between the two Governments at Ministerial and official level to discuss matters of common concern. Mr Nally (Secretary to the Irish Government) and I have kept in touch since then on the arrangements for implementing that decision; and accompanied by officials from the Cabinet Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Northern Ireland Office, I visited him in Dublin on 20th January we reached agreement on the attached document, ad referendum to Ministers on both sides.

- 2. On three associated matters we further agreed as follows.
 - (a) Subject to Ministerial concurrence the Council should be deemed to exist from the date of the document, i.e. 20th January; my meeting with Mr Nally should therefore constitute its first meeting at official level; and if neither side dissented the meeting in London on 29th January between the Irish Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland should constitute its first meeting at Ministerial level.
 - (b) Mr Nally and I should formally act as the two designated Secretaries of the Council (paragraph 8 of the document).
 - (c) The Co-ordinating Committee at official level (paragraph 7 of the document) will meet in London during February; the Foreign and Commonwealth Office are making the necessary arrangements.

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3. The document is based on a British draft which was entirely procedural. At the very last moment - just as we were due to arrive in Dublin - the Irish produced a redraft, into which they had inserted a number of unacceptable suggestions designed to give the Council a stronger "North-South" dimension and image. We got rid of all these insertions, save for a rhetorical flourish in paragraph 2 which talks about "the two countries" and now contains no North-South reference. It is no more than repetition of language ~~already~~ used in the November communique and the Joint Studies. The whole document is to remain confidential unless both Governments ever decide otherwise. The arrangements it sets out, and the associated arrangements at (a) and (b) of paragraph 2 above, can be drawn on by either side in answering factual questions about the Council's operation.

4. Officials in the Departments concerned regard the document in its present form as unexceptionable. I should like to let Mr Nally know, in advance of the meeting on 29th January, that British Ministers are content with the document and with (a)-(c) in paragraph 2 above. Unless you or other recipients of this minute indicate otherwise by 26th January, I will assume that I may do so on 27th January.

5. Mr Nally and I discussed a number of other points arising from the 6th November Summit.

- (i) I notified him that British Ministers had now formally endorsed all the agreed recommendations put forward by officials in the joint studies (see paragraphs 2 and 4 of OD(81)55). He will let me know when Irish Ministers have done the same (he expects them to do so very soon).
- (ii) Mr Nally asked me about the date of the next Summit. As authorised by your minute of 14th January, I said that there was nothing at all firm, but on the basis of the reference to "in the Spring" in the November communique May might be a possibility.
- (iii) Referring to the remit to the two Attorneys General to consider further the problem of extradition and related matters, I told Mr Nally privately of our concern that following a useful initial meeting between Sir Michael Havers and Mr Sutherland in November things seemed to have got stuck

on the Irish side. Perhaps more political input was required from Mr Sutherland's colleagues, and from the Taoiseach in particular. The matter was of course of critical importance if support for the Special London-Dublin relationship was to be widened and deepened not only among moderate Unionists in Northern Ireland but also as regards public opinion in Great Britain. Mr Nally took the point. He explained that the delay on the Irish side was due to intense Ministerial preoccupation with domestic economic issues, in preparation for a Budget which would be crucial for the Government's survival. The Attorney General was to make proposals to his colleagues shortly, and expected to be able to resume the dialogue shortly. They would like to be able to make more use of extradition. The possibility under consideration was that of finding ways, acceptable to their Supreme Court, of narrowing the definition of "political offences" which in the Supreme Court's eyes were non-extraditable under the terms of the Constitution. The Irish courts were sensitive to any suggestion that extradition was sought for the purposes of "interrogation", because of the overtones of this word. It would be important to use more neutral words, such as "questioning". If an extradition order was granted and the suspect was subsequently believed to have been subject to improper methods of interrogation, the courts could well invalidate the order.

6. The imminence of the meeting between Professor Dooge and Mr Prior made it comparatively easy for me to duck questions about our ideas on devolution in Northern Ireland. But Mr Nally predictably pressed me hard on the prospects for a Parliamentary tier in the new Anglo-Irish institutional relationship. There was no doubt that the Dail was strongly in favour of this, and Dr Fitzgerald had been much criticised for not carrying it further in November. I said that British Ministers remained clear that on our side this should be a matter for Parliament "to consider at an appropriate time" (in the words of the November communique), and that it would be much resented if the Government sought to give a lead. The British Government would not seek to resist the establishment of closer parliamentary links, but would not wish to countenance any development which gave the parliamentary body any formal status or responsibility in relation



CONFIDENTIAL

to the activities and decisions of the Intergovernmental Council. Mr Nally said that the Irish Government would regard the "appropriate time" as having been reached as soon as a devolved Assembly had been established in Northern Ireland; they therefore hoped that we would at least take steps, eg through "the usual channels", to find out before then what the British Parliament's view were and what were the prospects of the development of closer Parliamentary links.

7. I do not think Ministers need to decide now whether to start such enquiries via the Whips or in any other way, and if so when and in what terms; but the matter will have to be addressed before the next Summit, and the Prime Minister would no doubt be interested if the Lord President, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland or the Chief Whip wished to offer any preliminary observations at this stage. We shall no doubt have to continue to discourage the Irish from trying to rush ahead too fast in this area. I warned Mr Nally that it would not be sensible to ask a newly-established and probably fragile Assembly in Northern Ireland to address itself at any early stage to the controversial question of whether and how its members should be represented in an Anglo-Irish Parliamentary forum.

8. I am copying this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Lord President, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the Lord Privy Seal, the Attorney General and the Chief Whip.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

22nd January 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

Joint Memorandum on the Anglo-Irish
Intergovernmental Council

1. The joint communiqué of 6th November, 1981 recorded that "recognising the unique character of the relationship between the two countries, the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach have decided to establish an Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council through which institutional expression can be given to that relationship between the two Governments. This will involve regular meetings between the two Governments at Ministerial and official levels to discuss matters of common concern".

2. It will be a basic purpose of the Council to contribute to the achievement of peace, reconciliation and stability and to the improvement of relations between the peoples of the two countries. Within the framework of the Council there will be the closest bilateral consultation at Ministerial or official level, as appropriate, on matters relating to these purposes and on matters of common interest or concern.

3. Meetings of the Council may take place at two levels: Ministerial and Official.

4. Meetings at Ministerial level may involve Heads of Government, accompanied by other Ministers or not so accompanied; or one or more other Ministers on either side.

5. Meetings at Ministerial level will constitute meetings of the Council, except where one side proposes that a given meeting should not be so regarded. It is accepted that

incidental meetings such as those between Ministers in the margins of meetings held in the European Community or other international organisations would not be Council meetings unless both sides agreed otherwise.

6. At Official level, the Council will comprise a Steering Committee and a Co-ordinating Committee. Meetings of these committees will constitute meetings of the Council; meetings of specialist working groups at official level would not normally do so but either side would be free to propose that a given meeting should be regarded as a Council meeting; and it would be so provided the other side agreed.

7. The Co-ordinating Committee will supervise and co-ordinate co-operation and stimulate and monitor new co-operation in all areas of common interest and concern, and, as necessary and appropriate, prepare meetings of Ministers. The membership of the Co-ordinating Committee may alter depending on the agenda for particular meetings and it may meet in an East-West, North-South or mixed configuration.

8. In accordance with the joint study proposal, each Government has designated an official to act as Secretary of the Council. These two officials will each be responsible for ensuring that there is an appropriate secretariat (of one or more persons) on each side for Council meetings. They will also be responsible for ensuring that in any case of doubt a joint decision is taken on whether a particular meeting is or is not a Council meeting.

9. The secretariats will be jointly responsible for preparing agreed records of Council meetings. These will be submitted to the two Secretaries of the Council, who will use them for preparing for each Head of Government meeting a report on the activities of the Council at other levels as envisaged in the Joint Study.

10. The agreed records of Council meetings need normally include only the following information: date and place of meeting; participants; subjects discussed; and decisions reached. From time to time, if necessary, the texts of documents exchanged and/or agreed can be annexed. The records within each series will be identified by their date. Thus AIIC (M) 21.12.82 and AIIC (O) 6.3.83 would be the agreed records of, respectively, a Ministerial meeting of the Council on 21st December, 1982 and an Official meeting on 6th March, 1983.

11. It is accepted that the contents of this Memorandum will be reviewed after an interval of not more than one year from the date below.

20 January, 1982.

GRS 160

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DUBLIN 211655Z JAN 1982

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 15 OF 21 JANUARY

AND TO PRIORITY CABINET OFFICE AND N I O (BELFAST)

ANGLO-IRISH INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL: MINISTERIAL MEETINGS

1. WHEN SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG DISCUSSED THIS TOPIC IN DUBLIN YESTERDAY, IT WAS AGREED THAT MEETINGS OF BRITISH AND IRISH MINISTERS WOULD CONSTITUTE MEETINGS OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL EXCEPT WHERE ONE SIDE PROPOSED OTHERWISE. "INCIDENTAL" MEETINGS IN THE MARGINS OF OTHER EVENTS WOULD NOT QUALIFY UNLESS BOTH SIDES AGREED OTHERWISE.

2. WE HAVE THREE MEETINGS BETWEEN BRITISH AND IRISH MINISTERS PLANNED AT PRESENT:

23 JANUARY: MR NICHOLAS SCOTT AND MR MICHAEL KEATING IN DUBLIN

29 JANUARY: PROFESSOR DOOGE AND MR PRIOR IN LONDON

10 FEBRUARY: MR ADAM BUTLER AND THE TANAISTE, MR O'LEARY, IN DUBLIN.

3. I CONSIDER THAT THE FIRST OF THESE FALLS INTO THE "INCIDENTAL" CATEGORY AND, FROM INFORMAL SOUNDINGS HERE, THIS APPEARS ALSO TO BE THE IRISH VIEW. I RECOMMEND THEREFORE THAT WE INFORM THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THAT IN OUR VIEW THE SECOND AND THIRD MEETINGS WOULD QUALIFY BUT NOT THE FIRST.

FIGG

LIMITED

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PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR BULLARD
MR GOODISON
LORD N G LENNOX

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
NORTHERN IRELAND

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED


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10 DOWNING STREET

MR. COLES

The Foreign Office have suggested Wednesday 23 June for the Irish bilaterals. When you receive their letter can you be sure to have a word with me as I wish to explain to you the pros and cons of this particular date.



18 January 1982

Free



bc: Miss Stephens

089

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

DATE OF NEXT ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

The Prime Minister has seen your minute of 12 January. She considers that it would be better to hold the Summit much later than May since she doubts whether much progress will have been made by the Spring. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister agrees that you may say during your meeting with Mr. Dermot Nally, if necessary, that she is thinking in terms of a meeting some time in May. Should the matter come up, you may wish to have in mind that there is very little free time in the Prime Minister's diary for May. The most convenient date for a Summit would probably be Monday, 3 May which is a Bank Holiday here but not in Dublin.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), and Stephen Boys-Smith (Northern Ireland Office).

E.C. COLES

14 January 1982

NW

MR. COLES

I can now confirm that Monday 3 May will be a Bank Holiday in this country this year. But as we discussed yesterday it really is the only date I can offer you in May for a visit to Dublin. Would you like to proceed?

If you offer it to the Prime Minister please remind her that she will be staying at Milton with Stephen Hastings over the weekend.

es.

Conline *es. 14/1*

14 January 1982

*P. N. has agreed that
3 May can be mentioned
as a possibility.*

MR 14/1



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

The only date you have available
in May for an Anglo-Irish Summit
is Monday, 3 May. This is a Bank
Holiday here but not in Dublin.

2. Agree that, if the question is
raised with him, the Cabinet
Secretary should say that you are
thinking in terms of May - and that
he should add if necessary that 3
May would be the most convenient
day for you?

A. T. C.

13/1/82.

Ref. A07118

PRIME MINISTER

Date of Next Anglo-Irish Summit

I have arranged to go to Dublin for a meeting with Mr. Dermot Nally on 20th January. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss the implementation of proposals contained in the joint studies and agreed at your meeting with the Taoiseach on 6th November 1981. The meeting will be a procedural one to discuss proposals we have put to the Irish about the practical arrangements for the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council; and to explore with them how we might bring into being the "Encounter" organisation envisaged in the joint studies as a preliminary stage in the establishment of an Advisory Committee.

2. Mr. Nally may ask me about the date of the next Anglo-Irish Summit. The 6th November communique records that "The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach looked forward to holding their next meeting in the spring of next year in Dublin in the framework of the new institutional arrangements agreed upon at this meeting". Meetings are supposed to take place not less frequently than once a year. We have tended to resist Irish attempts in the past to interpret this to mean every six months. But in the present instance it would be difficult to maintain that a meeting later than May would still be "in the spring". There is in any case something to be said for a date in May, since the early part of June is very busy (the Economic Summit, and probably a State Visit), and from about the middle of June onwards the political temperature in Northern Ireland tends to rise with the approach of the marching season. Both FCO and NIO think that May would be about right.

3. I do not propose to raise this topic with Mr. Nally, but if he should do so, it would be helpful if I could give them a preliminary indication of your views. May I be authorised to say, if necessary, that you are thinking in terms of a meeting some time in May?

*Yes - but - it would be better
much later. We shall*

4. I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

not now

REA

for Jan by Spring,

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

not

12th January, 1982

RESTRICTED



BRITISH EMBASSY,
DUBLIN.

31 December 1981

G Angel Esq
Under Secretary
Northern Ireland Office
LONDON

N. B. P. N.

A. J. C. $\frac{4}{1}$

Re Angel

FOLLOW-UP TO MEETING OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL

1. It is disappointing to see from Steel's letter of 16 December that the meetings are not going at the tempo we want. You may now have heard that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland told me when I saw him on 23 December that at his next meeting with the Irish Foreign Minister he would want to review with him the state of play on the Attorneys General's talks. This meeting has now been fixed for 29 January which I hope will give enough time for another meeting between Sir Michael Havers and Mr Sutherland.
2. However, we have to adjust ourselves to things going slower than we would like in some of our other dealings with the Irish, and a good contemporary example is our negotiation with them about arbitration on the Continental Shelf. And from my own experience in the last few weeks it is all too clear that the forthcoming budget has made it very difficult to see the Taoiseach or any of his Cabinet.
3. Meanwhile, I hope I may be consulted if you or Steel think that we should put pressure on the Irish.

Yours sincerely

Leon Kin.

L C W Figg

cc: P H C Eyers Esq MVO, RID, FCO
A P Wilson Esq, Asst. Secretary, Home Office
N Wenban-Smith Esq, Cabinet Office
M Alexander Esq, No.10 Downing Street
H Steel Esq, Attorney General's Chambers

RESTRICTED

- 4 JAN 1982



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ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHAMBERS,
LAW OFFICERS' DEPARTMENT,
ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE,
LONDON, W.C.2.

Our Ref: 400/81/310

16 December 1981

G Angel Esq
Northern Ireland Office
Great George Street
LONDON S W 1

N. L. P. D.

*16.
12*

Dear Sir,

FOLLOW UP TO MEETING OF ATTORNEYS-GENERAL

✓ This letter is itself a follow up to my letter to you of 11 December and, again, is intended to record in more detail what I have already told you briefly on the telephone.

I telephoned Quigley yesterday afternoon, as arranged. I was told - and was not surprised to be told - that the Irish side were not ready to proceed with the proposed meeting next week. Quigley's explanation was that his colleagues in other Departments would not proceed without clearance from their own Ministers; that, in view of the issues involved, such clearance could not be obtained without collective discussion at Ministerial level i.e. in the Irish Cabinet; and that, because they were in the middle of their Budget season, there was no possibility of such discussions taking place in the near future. He therefore suggested that we give up hope of any meeting before the New Year but he promised to be in touch with me again as soon as possible after the New Year. I expressed pained regret; said that I would of course report this to my own colleagues; and indicated that I thought that there might be representations made through other channels.

Quigley said that he had been told that Mr Sutherland was hoping to telephone our own Attorney General in the course of the afternoon to explain the position personally. This telephone call was indeed made not long after my conversation with Quigley. As I understand it, Mr Sutherland gave the same explanation to the Attorney General, with heavy emphasis on the pressure which Irish Ministers were at present under because of their Budget. He said that he himself was going to be out of the country for two weeks as from this coming Sunday but would take the problem up as soon as he got back. He would seek the necessary "decisions in principle" from his colleagues (but presumably not until the New Year) and would then want to have a further meeting with the Attorney General at which "more specialised discussions" could take place.

/Only

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Only after that did he envisage that there would be any point in having a meeting between officials. He apparently added that he had kept closely in touch with the Taoiseach who was fully aware of how matters stood.

This seems to me to be a thoroughly unsatisfactory situation, but one which we have seen coming for some time. I think that there is little that we can now do until the first week in January. If we have not heard from the Irish by, say, the middle of that week (i.e. about 6 January) I would propose either to telephone Quigley myself or to ask the Attorney General to telephone Mr Sutherland. Depending on what reaction we get, it may then be necessary to concert views on how best to put pressure on.

I am copying this letter to Patrick Eyers (FCO), Austin Wilson (HO), Nigel Wenban-Smith (Cabinet), Michael Alexander (No 10) and David Tatham (HM Embassy, Dublin).

*Yours ever,
Henry*

H STEEL

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ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE,
LONDON, W.C.2.

11 December, 1981

N. S. R.

M $\frac{14.}{12}$

FOLLOW UP TO MEETING OF ATTORNEYS-GENERAL

1. I am sorry that you could not be present at my meeting with Quigley. I hope that you are now fit again. In your absence, I asked David Haggan to join me. Quigley was accompanied by Matthew Russell, a member of his own departments.
2. Very early on in the discussion three things became clear to me, though I had already suspected them. The first is that Quigley had done virtually nothing to follow up the various points agreed between his Attorney-General and ours. The second is that a number of matters which Mr. Sutherland agreed should be discussed by officials fell outside his own Ministerial competence and the relevant departments in the Irish administration have made it clear to Quigley that they do not regard themselves as bound by anything that he said about these matters and will not embark on discussions of them with us unless and to the extent that they are so authorised by their own Ministers - and they will look to their own Ministers and not Mr. Sutherland to give them their negotiating briefs. Thirdly, Quigley himself, though by no means hostile or obstructive, lacks the necessary drive and commitment to move this exercise along effectively on the Irish side. I can see the time coming when we shall have to find somebody else - perhaps Russell, who struck me as bright and alert, or perhaps somebody from another department of government - whom we can look to as our principal interlocutor.
3. When we managed to get Quigley to get down to concrete business (which was not easy), I gave him a copy of a note of the meeting between

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/the

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-2-

the two Attorneys-General which, as I had agreed with you and the others present at the meeting in your room on 3 December, I had concocted by a process of bowdlerising my letter to you of 27 November. I now enclose a copy of that note. We took Quigley through it, more or less paragraph by paragraph, and got his confirmation that it was an accurate account of what had passed between the two Attorneys-General. We then identified the specific concrete decisions which were recorded: these are shown in the passages that I have sidelined. We then got Quigley to agree to show this note (or, if he preferred, his own version of it) to his colleagues in other departments when he got home and to get them to obtain whatever authority was necessary for them to come and discuss with us the matters for which they are responsible.

4. On timing, I impressed on Quigley the importance which we attached to getting concrete discussions under way before Christmas. We agreed that our aim should be to have these discussions take place, in London, on Monday 21 December. I arranged to telephone Quigley next Tuesday, 15 December, to confirm that they (and I suppose we) would be ready. I hope that I have not caused you, and the others who will be involved on our side, great inconvenience by going nap on this date without first consulting you. In practice, no other date before Christmas seemed possible: next week is too early for the Irish to sort themselves out and anything later takes us too close to Christmas (though Tuesday 22 December may not be totally ruled out). I thought that if I did not pin Quigley down to ^aspecific date there and then, I could abandon all hope of a meeting this side of the New Year.

5. Though I tried to confine our talk to the agenda for the future substantive discussions and to the procedure for those discussions, Quigley kept wandering off into disquisitions on the substance. In a few cases I found it convenient to let him do so since it either gave us

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-3-

a better insight into what his colleagues' attitude was likely to be or gave me an opportunity to fire a warning shot across his bow about what he should expect from us. The major points of interest were the following:

- (a) In relation to extradition, it was clear from what Quigley said that the Irish have virtually closed minds on our suggestion that the international law dispute might be resolved by getting an independent authoritative ruling. This is not to say that I think that we should not press that suggestion very hard (because of the tactical advantage which the Irish refusal will give us), and I made it clear to Quigley that we should certainly do so. But I do not think that we should entertain any illusion that they will give way on this.
- (b) As regards Mr. Sutherland's promise to seek authority from his Ministerial colleagues to pursue the "Hanlon v Fleming line" in the Irish courts, Quigley in effect served notice on me not only that Mr. Sutherland might fail to get such authority (which I think is fair enough) but that he might himself come to the opinion that a rebuff by the court would be so damaging that the risk ought not to be incurred and the authority to run it should therefore not even be sought (which is perhaps not so fair). But I, personally, have always been a bit sceptical about whether this approach to the problem could give us very much of value - and the Irish would certainly try to represent it as letting them off the hook of our more far-reaching demands.
- (c) In relation to the proposals to replace a backing of warrants system by an orthodox extradition system, Quigley put forward arguments which, if taken to their logical conclusion, suggested that he would favour such a change across the whole board and not merely in relation to political offences. But I do not know how far he (and Mr. Sutherland) spoke for other departments on this.
- (d) As regards facilities for what Quigley tactfully described as "joint interviewing", it was evident that Mr. Sutherland had done nothing in pursuance of his promise to take our suggestion up with the Minister of Justice and the Garda. Quigley made it clear that, if and when it was taken up, he expected it to be given a totally negative reception.

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-4-

- (e) In the context of our suggestion about the transfer of exhibits, Quigley said that he and his colleagues had a number of other suggestions for the technical improvement of the reciprocal extra-territorial jurisdiction arrangements. I said that we should be delighted to discuss any and every suggestion of that kind and that I hoped that they might let us have a note of what they had in mind so that we could come prepared for a useful discussion.
- (f) In relation to the *All-Ireland Court" it became clear from what Quigley said that he did not share (though he had visibly indicated his assent at the time) Mr. Sutherland's view that those who had thought in 1974 that a constitutional amendment would be required were mistaken. More important perhaps, it also became clear that the proposal which he had in mind related not to a "Single Court" but to "Joint Courts" (or "Mixed Courts"). It also emerged that he did not envisage that the place of trial would be the place where the offence was committed: it would be where the offender was apprehended, though the court would somehow be empowered to take evidence from witnesses in the country other than the place of trial. Even on this basis which, as I pointed out, seems to me to represent little advance on straight extra-territorial jurisdiction, I got the impression that there might be constitutional difficulties which the Irish might find it difficult to duck except by some reliance (of course unacceptable to us) on Article 2 of their Constitution. But Quigley was more than usually difficult to pin down on this and I think that it would be a mistake to get too excited about it at this stage. I impressed on him - and he appeared to accept - the need for the Irish to let us have a paper, in advance of the substantive discussions, in which they set out in detail what their proposals really are on this issue.

6. I have to say that I shall be agreeably surprised if, when I telephone next Tuesday, I find that his side is ready, able and willing to come over for proper substantive discussions on the following Monday. We must wait and see. But if the position then is that they either are not ready or are prepared to discuss only a limited range of topics, we may have to consider whether to put pressure on at the political level,

/either

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-5-

either by our own Attorney-General getting in touch with Mr. Sutherland or by sending in the Ambassador in Dublin or even, perhaps, by some approach at the Heads of Government level.

7. I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Patrick Eyers in the FCO, Austin Wilson in the Home Office, Nigel Wenban-Smith in the Cabinet Office and Michael Alexander at No.10. At Patrick's suggestion I am also sending a copy to David Tatham in Dublin. If any of the recipients have any comments to make which I ought to bear in mind before I speak to Quigley on Tuesday afternoon, perhaps I could have them by telephone. I should also be grateful for confirmation that there is no insuperable difficulty on our side about having the meeting on Monday 21 December.

H. STEEL

G Angel Esq
Northern Ireland Office
Great George Street
London, SW1

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GRPS 100 AMENDED DISTRIBUTION 7 DECEMBER 1981

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM DUBLIN 041615Z DEC 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 416 OF 4 DECEMBER 1981

AND REPEATED FOR INFO TO PRIORITY PARIS AND NIO(B)

TAOISEACH'S VISIT TO PARIS

1. THE FRENCH EMBASSY (PLEASE PROTECT) HAVE TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE THAT THE TAOISEACH, DR FITZGERALD WILL VISIT PARIS FOR TALKS WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND ON 15 DECEMBER. THE VISIT WAS AGREED DURING THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN LONDON AND THE TALKS WILL CENTRE ON THE CAP. IT IS QUITE LIKELY HOWEVER THAT NORTHERN IRELAND WILL BE DISCUSSED.

2. THERE ARE RUMOURS THAT PRESIDENT MITTERRAND WILL VISIT DUBLIN IN JANUARY.

TATHAM

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

LIMITED

RID

NAD

INFO DEPT

WED ← ECD (2)

MAED ← ECD (1)

NEWS D

SECURITY D

PUSD

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR HURD

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

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1 December 1981

Anglo-Irish Joint Studies

Thank you for your minute of
30 November. The Prime Minister is
content.

MODBA

CJ

David Wright Esq
Cabinet Office

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370
Ref: A06151

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Prime Minister.

①

MR. ALEXANDER


I have assumed that you were content. Is this correct?

Anglo-Irish Joint Studies
(OD(81) 55)

And 30/11

This note by the Secretaries invited OD to approve, subject to exceptions spelt out in the note, the outstanding proposals which emerged from the Anglo-Irish Joint Studies. The note explained that, in the absence of any contrary indication by 27th November, the Committee's approval would be assumed. The Cabinet Office have established that no other member of the Committee intends to comment. May we take it that the Prime Minister is also content?

Yes - but I hope
we make haste very slowly.
pub


D. J. Wright

30th November 1981

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NOTE OF MEETING BETWEEN BRITISH AND IRISH
ATTORNEYS-GENERAL ON WEDNESDAY, 25 NOVEMBER

1. The meeting took place in Sir M Havers's room in the Royal Courts of Justice, London, beginning at 11.30 a.m. and continuing, with a break for lunch, until mid-afternoon. Mr. Sutherland was accompanied by Mr. Quigley. Sir M Havers was accompanied by Mr. Steel.
2. At the beginning of the meeting it was agreed that both sides would maintain the strictest confidentiality about the contents of the discussions. This would apply not only to this first meeting but also to all subsequent discussions between the two Attorneys-General arising out of the recent Summit between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach and also to any follow-up meetings at official level. It was also agreed that all these discussions would be strictly on a lawyer-to-lawyer or technician-to-technician basis, concerned only with the technical merits and feasibility of the various ideas that might be canvassed, and that nothing said in them would imply any commitment on the part of either Government to adopt any particular course that might be discussed: in this sense, so far as concerned the implementation of what might be agreed to be technically possible, the discussions would be completely ad referendum the politicians on both sides.

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3. Sir M Havers then suggested that at this initial meeting he and Mr. Sutherland should have a general discussion of the various topics covered by their remit from the Summit and that the points which they identified for further exploration should be pursued in more detail in discussions between officials of the two Governments. The result of these detailed discussions would then be reported back to the two principals. He identified the three topics which he considered as falling for discussion in the light of the remit from the Summit :-

- (a) extradition
- (b) extra-territorial jurisdiction; and
- (c) an All-Ireland Court.

4. Mr. Sutherland agreed with the procedure proposed by Sir M Havers and he confirmed that he had the same interpretation of the remit from the Summit. He suggested, and Sir M Havers agreed, that the three topics should be taken in the above order.

EXTRADITION

5. Starting from the premise that international law precluded the extradition of political offenders and that Article 29.3 of the Irish Constitution therefore precluded the amendment of the Extradition Act 1965 to permit such extradition, Mr. Sutherland emphasized the disadvantages, as he saw them, of seeking a solution through the amendment of existing Irish legislation.

There was an emotional aversion among substantial sections of opinion in the Republic to handing accused persons over to the custody of the RUC and this would make it difficult to get the required result in a referendum where that appeared to be what was at stake. It would, in any case, be difficult to justify deleting or amending Article 29.3 of the Constitution which, on the face of it, stated a principle which nobody could find fault with.

6. Sir M Havers pointed out that if, as the British side believed, Mr. Sutherland's initial premise (ie that international law precluded the extradition of political offenders) was not correct, the need to amend Article 29.3 of the Irish Constitution before amending the Extradition Act did not arise. Mr. Sutherland accepted this but said that he thought that the Irish Supreme Court would endorse the view, taken by most members of the Irish team on the Law Enforcement Commission in 1974, that international law did preclude the extradition of political offenders. He personally shared that view. Sir M Havers suggested the possibility of seeking an authoritative opinion on this question of international law from some independent source. Mr. Sutherland said that he doubted whether this offered a useful way forward, since the Supreme Court could not be bound by any such opinion and might even resent it as an improper attempt to influence their own decision. But he agreed

that that possibility should be pursued in discussions at official level.

7. Mr. Sutherland then suggested that an alternative course might be to build upon some obiter dicta made by Henchy, J. in the recent case of Hanlon v Fleming. He suggested that what Henchy, J. had said pointed to the possibility of persuading the Irish courts to be more discriminating in characterising offences as political offences - in effect, that they might in future cases be willing to order the return of persons wanted for crimes of pure terrorism which had been committed against ordinary members of the public, as distinct from such targets as members of the security forces, government officials and government installations. He recognised that this would cover only a small part of the total of terrorist offences for which (in the absence of a political offender exception) extradition would be granted and that it would require a cautious case-by-case approach. But he thought that even a few successful cases might constitute the thin end of the wedge and could lead to a greater awareness on the part of the courts of the responsibility which rested on them to consider the intrinsic merits of the cases which came before them. He himself thought that this was a promising line to pursue and he intended, if so authorised by his colleagues, to put the weight of his office behind it by himself taking part in the proceedings to urge that line of argument upon the court in the first case in which

it could profitably be deployed. He said that he would put the matter to his colleagues, and seek such authority, as soon as possible after his return to Dublin.

8. Sir M Havers expressed interest in this suggestion from Mr. Sutherland and welcomed his intention to follow it up personally. It would of course be only a partial solution to the problem of preventing persons who had committed crimes of violence from escaping justice by fleeing across the border. But even if it offered the possibility of only a few such offenders being brought to justice, it would be worth pursuing.

9. Mr. Sutherland promised to send Sir M Havers a transcript of the judgment in Hanlon v Fleming as soon as possible after his return to Dublin.

10. Mr. Sutherland then put forward two further suggestions in relation to extradition which Sir M Havers agreed should be followed up at official level:

- (a) there might be a need for legislation on one or both sides - probably not difficult or politically controversial - to ensure that there were no problems about "corresponding" offences.
- (b) Some part of the reluctance of the Irish courts in the past to order the extradition of persons wanted for terrorist offences might be due to the fact that the extradition process between the two countries operated through a simple backing of

warrants system. This reluctance might be lessened if that system were replaced by an orthodox extradition system requiring the demonstration to the court that there was a prima facie case against the wanted person. Sir M Havers pointed out that the backing of warrants system worked very well, and was valued by the law enforcement authorities of both countries, in the vast majority of cases, where there was no terrorist or political element: it would be a pity to lose that benefit. Mr. Sutherland agreed and suggested that his proposal might be confined to cases involving a possible political element: the requesting authorities might be given an option as to which procedure they invoked.

EXTRA-TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

11. On this topic Sir M Havers put forward two suggestions:

- (a) The authorities of the Republic should provide facilities for members of the RUC to interview and question persons who were held in custody in the Republic and who either were themselves suspected of offences committed in Northern Ireland or were thought to have information which could help in the prevention or detection of offences by others or in bringing such others to justice. On this, Mr. Sutherland said that the need for the Garda to be present at any such interviews, and to be seen to be co-operating in them with the RUC, would make them targets for the IRA (and, in the eyes of some sections of public opinion, legitimate targets) in a way which had not hitherto been the case. He thought that, for this and other reasons, the Garda would be reluctant to co-operate. Sir M Havers reminded Mr. Sutherland of the immense benefit which could be obtained if IRA suspects in the Republic were amenable to questioning by skilled and expert operators from Northern Ireland who were necessarily more familiar with the background and circumstances of the events being investigated than the Garda could be. (He mentioned the possibility that, if it was the participation of members of the RUC as such that was the stumbling block, it might be

possible for their place to be taken in some instances by specialists from the Metropolitan Police.) Though Mr Sutherland maintained his doubts, he agreed to pursue Sir M Havers' suggestion with the Minister of Justice and the Garda when he returned to Dublin and he agreed that the matter should be followed up in the discussions at official level.

- (b) There should be reciprocal arrangements for the transfer of exhibits between the courts of the Republic and Northern Ireland, ie exhibits that are in the custody of one court but are needed for the purposes of a trial taking place in the other. Sir M Havers explained that the Northern Ireland authorities were actively considering what steps would be needed on their part to give effect to such arrangements: it might be possible to proceed simply by an amendment to the Rules of Court but there was the possibility that substantive legislation would be required. But there should be no difficulty in doing whatever was necessary once that had been identified and the necessary reciprocal arrangements agreed. Mr Sutherland agreed that it would be useful to have such arrangements. He could foresee no difficulty about taking the necessary steps on the Irish side. It was agreed that this matter should be pursued in the discussions at official level.

ALL-IRELAND COURT

12. Mr Sutherland explained that the idea which he was now pursuing was (in 1974 terms) the "Single Court" rather than the "Mixed Court". He made it clear that the court which he envisaged and which would have jurisdiction throughout Ireland would ordinarily sit, for the purposes of a trial, at the place where the offence was committed, so that a person accused of a bomb outrage in, say, Belfast but apprehended in, say, Dublin would find himself returned to Belfast for trial. If there were witnesses in the Republic who, for good reason, would not go, and could not be brought, to Belfast, the court would have jurisdiction to hear their evidence in the Republic. Sir M Havers pointed out that it had been thought in 1974 that such an arrangement would necessitate an amendment of the Irish Constitution and that this had then been thought to present an insuperable barrier. He asked why that barrier was no longer

regarded as so formidable. Mr Sutherland said that it was his view that those who had thought in 1974 that a constitutional amendment would be required were mistaken: he thought that his proposed court could be set up under the existing Irish Constitution (like a Special Court).

13. Sir M Havers said that, if it was indeed the case that no amendment to the Irish Constitution would be necessary, the discussion could proceed to an examination of the practical implications and difficulties which it had not been thought necessary to pursue in 1974. There were, of course, also major political difficulties but, in accordance with the understanding reached at the beginning of the meeting, these should be left for consideration at the political level if and when the lawyers and technicians reported that the proposal was technically feasible. He suggested that the details of Mr Sutherland's proposals should be pursued in the discussions at official level. Mr Sutherland agreed.

14. Having concluded their initial examination of the topics covered by the Summit remit, the two Attorneys General then considered how the detailed discussions by officials should be taken forward. It was agreed that the two Law Officers' Departments (Mr Steel and Mr Quigley) should be charged with organising the arrangements on their respective sides and with general co-ordination. It was agreed that the meetings of officials from the two sides should get under way before Christmas with a view to a report being made to the two Attorneys General so that these could meet again early in the new year.

15. After the meeting had concluded, and when it became known that news reports of the fact of its having taken place were already circulating, a formula for public use was discussed and agreed (and was subsequently drawn upon by spokesmen for both sides). It was agreed not to go beyond this.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 November 1981

VISIT OF THE TAOISEACH

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 23 November. She is content to let the matter rest.

I am sending copies of this letter to Roderic Lyne (FCO) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Mike Hopkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

N



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 November 1981

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS: POSSIBLE BILATERAL MEETING
BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND DR. FITZGERALD

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 24 November about the Taoiseach's request for a bilateral during the European Council. The Prime Minister does not think that, given her pre-occupations as Chairman of the meeting, it will be possible to arrange a bilateral with Dr. FitzGerald. However, she naturally expects to be able to have a word with him during the informal discussions which will take place as the Council proceeds.

I spoke along these lines to the Irish Ambassador last night but you may like to convey the Prime Minister's regret more formally.

Copies of this letter to to Stephen Boys-Smith (Northern Ireland Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

*I don't think a
we don't in the place to
discuss these matters.*



Prime Minister

①

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

*Repeat
not*

London SW1A 2AH

*The simplest would be to say that
as President it would not be easy for
you to fix a bilateral in advance (you are not having
any others) but that you hope to be able to have a private chat
with the Taoiseach in the course of the meeting. Agree?*

24 November 1981

Dear Michael,

1/11/81 24/11

Anglo-Irish Relations: Possible Bilateral Meeting Between
The Prime Minister and Dr Fitzgerald

You will have seen in Dublin telegram No 394 of 19 November an indication that the Taoiseach was likely to propose that the Prime Minister and he should have a bilateral meeting during the European Council on 26 - 27 November.

The Irish Embassy have now confirmed this proposal. They say that the Taoiseach has in mind only a short meeting to review developments since 6 November. They indicated that the Taoiseach is concerned that, if there were no meeting, it would be widely assumed in the Republic that this reflected a change in British policy following developments in Northern Ireland.

A short meeting would no doubt help to sustain the progress made in Anglo-Irish relations during the Prime Minister's meeting with Dr Fitzgerald on 6 November.

The Northern Ireland Office, who have been consulted at official level, see no objection to a meeting given that such bilateral meetings are a normal aspect of European Councils. However, the Prime Minister will clearly have little time available during the Council, and I imagine that for diary reasons alone it may not be possible to meet the Irish request. I should be grateful to know how we should reply to them.

A copy of this letter goes to Stephen Boys Smith at the Northern Ireland Office and to David Wright at the Cabinet Office.

*Yours Pvr
Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

cc Mr. Ingham

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

23 November 1981

Dear Michael

*Yes
Prime Minister
wonder to leave matter
on this basis?
23/x1*

VISIT OF THE TAOISEACH

Under cover of your letter of 9 November you sent Stephen Boys Smith a copy of a list handed over by the Taoiseach of alleged instances of sectarian practice by District Councils in Northern Ireland.

We have checked through the list and it is a reasonably accurate summary. There are a few very minor errors of detail, and certain omissions of cases that could have been included. But generally it is difficult to challenge it. Unfortunately there have been cases of sectarian practice by District Councils and the Irish know it as well as we do. (It should however be borne in mind that the majority of these cases have been brought to light and followed up by the existing machinery and safeguards.)

In these circumstances my Secretary of State sees nothing to be gained from responding to the list. We would only have to accept its basic validity. He therefore feels that we should let the matter rest.

I am copying this letter to Roderic Lyne (FCO) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely
Julie Stephens*

M W HOPKINS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

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FROM DUBLIN 121530Z NOVEMBER 1981.
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 383 OF 12 NOVEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE N I O BELFAST

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Ireland

MY TELNO 376: ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: FURTHER FIANNA FAIL REACTIONS.

1. THE FIANNA FAIL LEADER, MR HAUGHEY, HAS MADE FURTHER CRITICAL REMARKS ABOUT THE SUMMIT AND THE JOINT STUDIES.
2. DURING QUESTION TIME IN THE DAIL ON 11 NOVEMBER HE DREW THE TAOISEACH'S ATTENTION TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S AFFIRMATION THAT NORTHERN IRELAND WAS AS MUCH PART OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AS HER OWN CONSTITUENCY OF FINCHLEY, CALLING IT "UNHELPFUL" AND "TENDENTIOUS". ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, DR FITZGERALD REPLIED THAT NORTHERN IRELAND WAS PART OF THE UK AND HAD BEEN RECOGNISED AS SUCH BY SUCCESSIVE IRISH GOVERNMENTS.
3. IN THE EVENING, MR HAUGHEY HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWING THE PUBLICATION OF THE JOINT STUDIES. ACCORDING TO TODAY'S IRISH PRESS, HE ALLEGED THAT THE INPUT TO THE STUDIES FROM THE IRISH SIDE HAD BEEN WATERED DOWN SINCE FIANNA FAIL LEFT OFFICE IN JUNE AND THAT HMG HAD BACKED AWAY FROM THE POSITION WHICH IT HAD HELD IN DECEMBER 1980. HE ASSERTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S COMMENTS ABOUT FINCHLEY AND HER VIEW THAT THE NORTH WAS ENTIRELY A MATTER FOR HMG WERE AT VARIANCE WITH ALL THAT HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS. HE CLAIMED THAT A THREE TIER ANGLO-IRISH COUNCIL WITH A PARLIAMENTARY ELEMENT ORGANICALLY LINKED TO IT FLOWED NATURALLY FROM THE DECEMBER 1980 COMMUNIQUE, AND SAID THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOT BE PREVENTED FROM BEING SET UP IN THIS FORM MERELY BECAUSE SOME NORTHERN POLITICIANS WOULD VETO THE DEVELOPMENT. IN HIS VIEW, HMG WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY IN NOMINATING SUITABLE PEOPLE FROM THE NORTH TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH A COUNCIL.

COMMENT

4. MR HAUGHEY SEEMS DETERMINED TO PRESS HIS CRITICISM OF THE LONDON SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE AND THE JOINT STUDIES AS PUBLISHED, TAKING THE LINE THAT HE COULD HAVE OBTAINED A BETTER DEAL FOR THE REPUBLIC. I DO NOT THINK THAT WE SHOULD BE TOO DISMAYED BY THIS. DR FITZGERALD

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WAS RATHER DISMISSIVE OF MR HAUGHEY'S CLAIM AFTER THE DECEMBER SUMMIT AND IT IS PROBABLY INEVITABLE THAT THE OPPOSITION WILL PLAY POLITICS ON THIS ISSUE. MR HAUGHEY NO DOUBT WISHES TO BRUSH UP HIS REPUBLICAN CREDENTIALS FOR THE CAVAN / MONAGHAN BY-ELECTION NEXT SPRING.

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MR FERGUSSON
LORD N G LENNOX
MR BRAITHWAITE 2

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
NORTHERN IRELAND

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From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

(2) GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Prime Minister

The Prime Minister mentioned this to you briefly.

Paul

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

MS

12 November 1981

Dear Michael,

The Prime Minister may like to know that my Secretary of State has decided that, as a way of pre-empting the more extreme Protestant opposition in Northern Ireland, and with a view to calming fears among moderates which last week's meeting with the Prime Minister of the Republic may have aroused, he will hold a Press Conference in Belfast on Friday morning. In this he will be emphasising that the London/Dublin talks are primarily an East/West matter, but that he is looking for legitimate benefits - particularly in the economic field - for Northern Ireland as a result of the closer relations between the two Governments. He will also make it quite clear that, while any interested party is at liberty to argue that the Government's policy is wrong, he will not countenance force or threats of force. This last point is of course aimed directly at the kind of noises which Dr Paisley has made on one or two occasions recently.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Roderic Lyne (FCO).

*Yours,
Stephen*


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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

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SUBJECT.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 November 1981

cc Master set

VISIT OF THE IRISH PRIME MINISTER

I enclose a copy of the record of the discussion in plenary session held here between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald, on Friday 6 November.

I am sending copies of this letter, and its enclosure, to Stephen Boys-Smith (Northern Ireland Office), Julian West (Department of Energy) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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RECORD OF PLENARY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER
AND THE IRISH PRIME MINISTER, AN TAOISEACH, HELD AT
10 DOWNING STREET ON FRIDAY, 6 NOVEMBER 1981

Present:

| | |
|--|-------------------------|
| The Prime Minister | Dr Garret FitzGerald TD |
| The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary | Mr M O'Leary TD |
| The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland | Senator J Dooge |
| The Secretary of State for Energy | Dr E Kennedy |
| Mr Ian Gow MP | Mr D Nally |
| Sir Leonard Figg | Mr S Donlon |
| Sir Robert Armstrong | Mr D Neligan |
| Mr P Woodfield | Mr M Lillis |
| Mr W E Bell | Mr L Hourican |
| Mr R L Wade-Gery | Mr W Kirwan |
| Mr J A Marshall | Mr F Murray |
| Mr C A Whitmore | Mr D Grafton |
| Mr C C Wilcock | Mr F O'Muircheartaigh |
| Mr M O'D B Alexander | |
| Mr B Ingham | |
| Mr P H C Eyers | |

1. After arrangements had been agreed for the Prime Minister to give a press conference at 5.00 pm and the Taoiseach a press conference at 6.00 pm, the Prime Minister welcomed the Irish side to the Plenary. She said that her talk with the Taoiseach that morning had centred on the communiqué. It was proposed that the communiqué to be issued that afternoon should have attached to it a summary reflecting the Joint Studies and that the Joint Studies themselves should be published next Wednesday. She would herself almost certainly make a statement in the House of Commons on Tuesday and understood that the Taoiseach was to make a statement in the Dáil at the same time.

2. The Taoiseach noted that the Joint Report contained a summary of the Security document. He thought this should not present a problem. Professor Dooge wondered whether it might not be a problem after all. The question might be put whether the summary was a summary of the part or of the whole document. The Taoiseach said that it would be understood to be a summary of the part. If it were asked whether the other part had included defence matter he would say 'no'. Professor Dooge said it was important to avoid being negotiated into a false position - there had after all been discussion of defence facilities. The Prime Minister said that it was most important that there should be no inaccuracy. She wondered whether the passage should not be deleted. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland pointed out that it was desirable to keep the language on extradition. The Taoiseach suggested that it would be possible to say that 'Nothing had been discussed which impinged on Ireland's neutrality.'. Sir Leonard Figg remarked that it was important to remember that the training of members of the Irish Defence Forces in the UK was public knowledge. There had been recent newspaper articles. The Prime Minister said that even so a new reference to this would trigger off further discussion. It would be better to say simply that we never revealed details of security matters. The Prime Minister noted that there was a parliamentary convention that required that any paper quoted or summarised must, if necessary, be made available in full. She feared that any reference in the Joint Report to security would fall under this rule. After further discussion it was agreed to delete those paragraphs in the Joint Report which referred to security matters and to make consequential amendments to the communiqué.

3. The Prime Minister asked the Taoiseach what she should say in answer to any question about what was meant by the public commitment to which paragraph 4 of the draft communiqué referred. The Taoiseach suggested that she should refer to his Senate speech of 9 October and to the interview he gave on the radio on 27 September.

4. Turning to the fifth paragraph of the draft communiqué, the Taoiseach said that it was the wish of the Irish side that Sunningdale language should be included. It would be difficult for them if the UK seemed to be slipping back from that. The Prime Minister pointed out that its inclusion would have the opposite effect for some people in the United Kingdom. There was discussion of whether it was right to say in the last sentence of the paragraph that both Governments 'were ready to join in promoting arrangements' rather than 'would be'. The Prime Minister accepted 'were ready' on the understanding that certain arrangements already existed.

5. The Prime Minister said that on reflection she thought that if she spoke of 'supporting' rather than 'accepting' a decision of a majority in Northern Ireland, in favour of a change in the constitutional status of the Province, she would be acting against Unionist wishes. She could say for instance that she would accept a Labour Government but she could not support one. The Taoiseach pointed out that the two Governments had made solemn declarations in 1974. For their part the Irish Government had acknowledged Northern Ireland as a part of the United Kingdom and acknowledged the principle of consent. This had been controversial and difficult for them. On the UK side, the UK Government had undertaken to support the

decision of the majority if it were in favour of a change. The Irish side had maintained their position. There would be concern if the UK side did not. The Prime Minister said that she could uphold the decision but she could not speak of supporting it. After further discussion, the Prime Minister proposed that it should be said that the British Government would of course accept a decision and would support a decision in the British Parliament to give effect to it. The Taoiseach thought that this would be defensible and accepted it. *legislation*

6. Turning to paragraph 7 of the communiqué, the Taoiseach asked whether in the Prime Minister's view, there was any limitation on what the Attorneys-General could consider. The Prime Minister said that she saw none. The communiqué was then agreed in the form attached.

7. The Prime Minister then invited Lord Carrington to say what he and his colleagues had discussed that morning.

8. Lord Carrington said that the discussion had been divided between Community questions, Energy questions and Northern Ireland questions. As far as Community questions were concerned, they had discussed the Mandate. They had noted that there was not much time to do more than seek to get hard and fast guidelines agreed. It was to be hoped that flesh could be put on these without reopening the questions of principle. This process should be pursued by bilateral discussions. He had himself also raised Insurance and the question of liberalisation of Air Fares. He had asked Senator Dooge that the Irish should not stand in the way of British proposals in the EC. Senator Dooge had undertaken to look at the questions. Professor Dooge said that he was content with this summary. In answer to the

Prime Minister's question, Lord Carrington said that the Middle East had only been discussed informally at lunch.

9. The Secretary of State for Energy said that the three Energy questions discussed were those mentioned in the communiqué: the supply of gas from Kinsale to Northern Ireland - there was agreement that this was an economic proposition, the question was whether terms could be agreed. The North/South Interconnector had been discussed and there was agreement that this was an economic proposition and desirable but that there was a problem over security. As for the East/West Interconnector there was no security problem but the economics were doubtful. There was agreement that the best way forward was to undertake further economic and technical studies. The Tánaiste agreed. He added that the interruption of the North/South Interconnector was a political victory for the IRA. There had been consideration of whether it would be possible to restore the interconnector so that it supplied a limited area in Armagh and interference with the interconnector would mean automatic discontinuation of supply. He confirmed that the Irish side were ready to discuss the supply of Kinsale gas and wished to see a feasibility study for the East/West connector. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said that he would ask Mr Butler to take up the question of a supply of gas from Kinsale with his opposite number as soon as possible. Price was the key issue. He doubted whether it would be possible to introduce now an arrangement whereby destruction of the interconnector brought with it immediate local penalties. This would be too transparent.

10. The Prime Minister asked about other issues: about the papers on Economic Cooperation and Measures to Encourage Mutual Understanding. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland mentioned Cooperation North. The Taoiseach explained that this was a private organisation concerned to establish closer relations between the two parts of Ireland without strings. It had had considerable success. There had been no adverse feedback, even from extremists in the North. The question was whether it should be given assistance by Government. He felt some hesitation. Funding by Government might lead it to become suspect. Senator Dooge said that Cooperation North had received some support from the Community under funds reserved for the Republic of Ireland but had absorbed almost the totality of these funds and this was not desirable. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said that he would like to see some help given. The Prime Minister agreed that it would be a pity if Cooperation North broke down. She thought spontaneous efforts of this sort were the most valuable.

11. The Prime Minister said that she knew that the Irish Government, like the UK authorities, were concerned about terrorism. She asked about the political problems which terrorism created. The Taoiseach said that there had been significant successes lately against the IRA but the level of violence had risen. In the last year or two it had become the case that when intercepted, terrorists shot policemen. This was a worrying development, though it did increase public antipathy to the terrorists. There had been a significant riot in Dublin but, no doubt because of the sharp reaction to it, there had been no recurrence.

The police response to it had been a bit rugged. It was hard to judge the political support of the IRA. Surveys suggested that it was small. But there had been much more support for the H-Block candidates than had been expected. The issue had now diminished in importance. He was happy to say that co-operation between the police forces in North and South was very close. Exchange of intelligence and information was very effective but it would never be possible to eradicate terrorism without eradicating its causes.

12. The Prime Minister asked whether polarisation of the communities which had been observed was disappearing. The Taoiseach said that it was in the Republic but from such information as he had had at second hand he found it hard to assess the position in Northern Ireland. What he had said about the constitution had helped with middle-class unionists but he doubted whether this was the case among working-class unionists. He was concerned that the SDLP should retain the bulk of the support of the minority. If that did not happen the consequences of polarisation could show in 6 months' time or so.

13. The Prime Minister asked how he thought that the Joint Studies would be received in the Republic. The Taoiseach said that expectations had been raised in November that had since been somewhat reduced. It was hard to say what the expectation was now. He hoped that there would be a positive reaction. He would of course present the communiqué positively. But the Opposition would wish to get the credit for what had been done. The Prime Minister noted that this was why the decision had been taken to publish. Accusations could then

be avoided. The Prime Minister noted that the Opposition in the United Kingdom was no longer pursuing a bipartisan policy on Northern Ireland. The Tánaiste interjected that he doubted however if they would see anything in the Joint Studies to attack. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said the problem was rather that Dr Paisley would attack the Joint Studies.

14. The Taoiseach said that he was concerned at the suggestion that there might be an increase in powers of local government. Several Councils had recently been found guilty of discrimination of one sort or another and he handed over a paper recording instances. His Government had doubts about any proposal to devolve further powers. That being said, he would be very happy to see progress towards devolved government though it was a very difficult field. He would be happy to talk about this question with the British Government. The Irish Government had good contacts with everyone in the North except paramilitaries. There had been times when it was difficult for the British to be informed. The Irish Government would be ready to help. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said in that connection that he would like to pay more visits to the South to discuss these matters.

15. In answer to a question from the Prime Minister, the Taoiseach said that the Irish authorities used every opportunity to influence the Americans. He hoped to invite the Friends of Ireland to come to Ireland soon and hoped they would visit also Northern Ireland. They had shown goodwill and were very courageous in their attacks on the terrorists. The Irish had done what they could to head-off Biaggi. Mr Prior interjected

that he had much admired Senator Dooge's speech at the United Nations.

16. The Prime Minister suggested that she and the Taoiseach should agree that they would both present their meeting positively. They would note that nothing had been said that would affect the neutrality of the Republic. They could describe the meeting as friendly, constructive and practical. The Taoiseach agreed with this but indicated that he would prefer to avoid any comparison with the last meeting.

17. The meeting ended at 4.20 pm.

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SUBJECT.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 November 1981

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Visit to Dr. Garret Fitzgerald

I enclose a copy of the record of the tete-a-tete discussion between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach which took place here on Friday 6 November. I should be grateful if you could ensure that this record receives a very limited distribution.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure, with the same caveat, to Stephen Boys-Smith (Northern Ireland Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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From the Secretary of the Cabinet

Mr. Alexander, No 10.

We spoke.

J. Wright



NOTE of a Meeting held at
10 Downing Street on
FRIDAY 6 NOVEMBER 1981 at 11.30 am

PRESENT

The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister

Dr Garret Fitzgerald TD,
An Taoiseach

The Rt Hon James Prior MP
Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland

Mr Michael O'Leary TD
An Tanaiste

Sir Robert Armstrong
Secretary of the Cabinet

Mr Dermot Nally
Secretary to the Government
Republic of Ireland

THE PRIME MINISTER thanked the Taoiseach for his visit to the soldier who had been injured in the recent IRA bomb outrage in Chelsea. She also expressed her appreciation of the determination and success of the Irish authorities in rooting out those people in the Republic of Ireland who were responsible for violence.

THE TAOISEACH said that the security authorities had enjoyed considerable success in recent weeks. He welcomed (as did the Prime Minister) the close co-operation between the security authorities on the two sides of the border in Ireland, and noted with approval the effective arrangements which now existed for the quick closure of the border. A new development in the fight against terrorism in the Republic was that PIRA terrorists were now shooting at numbers of the Gardai when they were cornered. This demonstrated the extent to which the PIRA had now gone in detaching themselves from their former links and loyalties in the community. The uniformed police in the Republic were still unarmed, following the tradition which had been established in the Civil War and had been inherited from the British, but all detectives were now carrying guns. The terrorists' targets had now changed: the banks had improved their security, and the terrorists were now tending to go for jewellers. Some raids had been made suspiciously shortly after the arrival of consignments of jewellery from Britain; this suggested that the IRA might have sources of intelligence in the trade in this country.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND said that the main target of terrorists in the North was Post Offices.

THE TAOISEACH said that his visit to the wounded soldier had, he hoped, helped to bring home to the public that the terrorists were the enemies of all the people, in the Republic as well as in the United Kingdom.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked whether it was the case that members of the terrorists organisations in the Republic were banned from broadcasting.

THE TAOISEACH confirmed that they were. In some cases it was not easy to justify: where, for instance the duly elected Chairman of a local authority was a member of a proscribed organisation, it was not easy to justify a ban which prevented him from broadcasting about purely local matters. But he agreed with the Prime Minister that the ban against those who resorted to terrorism had to be regarded as indivisible.

Referring to the Dunne case, the Taoiseach said that he had ruled that no money must be allowed to reach the kidnappers. It had not been an easy or pleasant decision to take, given that there might be a life at stake; but to have allowed the kidnappers to receive money would have been to encourage future kidnapping. THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that the Taoiseach's decision had been absolutely right.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND recalled that the Provisional Sinn Fein were now talking about political participation in local authority elections in Northern Ireland. It was going to be difficult to distinguish the "political" members of Sinn Fein from the "military" members of the IRA.

THE TANAISTE recalled that at the recent Provisional Sinn Fein Annual Conference speakers had referred to the need to go forward with a ballot box in one hand and an armalite rifle in the other. The only answer to the Provisional Sinn Fein's proposals to involve themselves in political activity was to make the SDLP effective as a political party.

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THE TAOISEACH said that one of the encouraging things in Northern Ireland had been the emergence of a Nationalist Party which was fully engaged in the democratic political process. It was important that the SDLP should continue in being and healthy: if SDLP supporters swung to the Provisional Sinn Fein or to the PIRA, there would be a danger of polarisation on both sides of the political and community divide in Northern Ireland.

THE TANAISTE said that the Taoiseach's initiative on the Irish constitution was a development full of hope. It had the full support of the other Party in the Government Coalition. If it could be encouraged, there was a possibility of dramatic change in attitudes in the Republic of Ireland.

THE PRIME MINISTER invited the Taoiseach to explain the nature of his initiative. As she understood it, he was proposing that the constitution should be secularised.

THE TANAISTE said that it would be impolitic (in the Irish context) to describe what was proposed as "secularisation".

THE TAOISEACH said that his proposal was that the constitution should be amended, so that, while the aspiration to Irish unity remained, the Republic no longer claimed jurisdiction in Northern Ireland. His proposal also sought to remove the confessional aspects from the constitution, so that the constitution would reflect the views of all the Irish people. In other words, he was proposing that the constitution should be changed in such a way as to reflect the ethos of all the people of Ireland, and to remove anything that might be seen as reflecting confessional aspects.

THE PRIME MINISTER recalled that she had been asked about the Taoiseach's initiative while she was in Australia; she had said that it was an encouraging development, which would help towards the reconciliation which was the aim of all concerned. She had hesitated to say much more by way of commendation, for fear that her doing so might not be helpful. She asked what kind of reception the Taoiseach's initiative had had in the Republic.

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THE TAOISEACH said that the impact on the media had been considerable. He had introduced his initiative in an hour-long radio programme, which had launched a great debate. He had chosen a radio programme in which to introduce the initiative, because he thought that that would make more impact on the general public than a speech in the Dail or the Senate, and because talking directly to people on a radio programme seemed likely to be the best means of conveying to them his own strength of conviction in the matter. Following the radio programme he had made a more considered statement in the Senate; in that statement he had been able to draw upon statements made by past leaders of Fianna Fail. The Leader of the Opposition, Mr Haughey, had at first attacked his initiative strongly, but had then pulled back, because he had discovered that many members of his party agreed with it. He thought that he had reflected the feelings of a lot of people in the Republic, though not perhaps yet of a majority. He recalled that on 18 September 1969 he had committed his own party to the principle of "no reunification without consent". Later the Fianna Fail had come into line with this principle, and Mr Lynch had been fully committed to it at the Sunningdale Conference. This demonstrated how it was possible to lead public opinion. There had been a good reaction to his initiative in Northern Ireland; even such an entrenched unionist as Mr John Taylor had shown some degree of response to it.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the support of those who, like herself and the Taoiseach, believed in democracy and consent, was strengthened by the activities of the terrorists. She noted that even in the United States the Friends of Ireland had made it clear that they agreed that change could come only by consent.

At this point the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Tanaiste left the meeting.

Continuing the previous discussion, THE TAOISEACH said that the rationale of the inclusion in the 1937 Constitution of the confessional elements, the removal of which he was now proposing, was that without them Mr De Valera would not have had the support of the Roman Catholic Church, and would not

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have been able to get the constitution through. The inclusion of the confessional elements in the constitution had been contrary to Mr De Valera's own views, and he had privately regretted having to include them. Both of his successors, Mr Sean Leamass and Mr Jack Lynch, had publicly taken the same view. The Leader of the Opposition in the Senate had gone on the radio the day after his own statement, saying that it was possible for Article 3 of the Constitution to be changed. The Taoiseach went on to say that this was his own passionate conviction. He recalled that his mother had been a Protestant in the North, and that he had many relatives who were Northern Protestants. The main reason he was in politics was to give effect to his convictions in this matter. He was in politics to provide a lead, and he would do so, even though he enjoyed only a small majority. It was a welcome and unexpected development that his initiative had actually strengthened his political position: two of the three independent members of the Dail were men who, though they did not share his other political views, shared his views on the need to remove the confessional aspects from the Constitution, as well as his opposition to the Provisional IRA; his political position had thus been strengthened.

THE PRIME MINISTER then suggested that they should discuss whether the reports on the joint studies should be published in full.

THE TAOISEACH said that he had been very disturbed at the way in which Dr Paisley had been able to make mischief by exploiting the confidentiality of the studies in order to arouse fears. People like Dr Paisley thrived on uncertainty. While he was still in opposition he had said publicly that he thought that the studies should be published, so that people should be able to see that the British and Irish Governments were not plotting behind the backs of the unionists.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that in politics she and the Taoiseach had to deal with the fears of people, and the danger that things that were said could be twisted. She was inclined to favour publication of the joint studies in full. But they had to take account of the fact that there were a number

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of things in the joint studies which would come as a considerable surprise. She instanced the proposal that there should be an Anglo-Irish Parliamentary Body. For her to recommend that would not be the best way of commending it to the British Parliament. It was one of the ideas that should be opened up for public discussion. After her meeting with the Taoiseach's predecessor in December 1980 people had suggested, wrongly, that there were a lot of undisclosed things and secret agreements behind the communiqué. She had suffered political damage from this criticism, when in fact she had reached no such agreements, and there was nothing more than the communiqué. She had had to insist that there was no question of the studies considering constitutional matters, and that they would be concerned only with institutional issues. For these reasons she would now prefer to publish the joint studies in full, except for the one on security. The Taoiseach and she should not underestimate the way in which they would be used. She would say that they were studies, and that the Taoiseach and she had not decided what to do. That would protect both of them.

THE TAOISEACH said that he had a strong sensitivity to unionist opinion, and a lot of contact among unionists. He recalled that a group of unionist businessmen and lawyers had recently come down to Dublin and stated the unionists' point of view unambiguously and vigorously; afterwards the leader of the delegation had written a letter, in which he had said that he did not know whether Dr Fitzgerald's policy would lead to Irish unity, but he was sure that Mr Haughey's would certainly not do so. The weakness of the Unionists was not helping the situation. He noted that Mr Taylor and Mr Bradford were now seeking to merge with Dr Paisley; if this merger came off, it would be very dangerous, because there would be no middle ground. If the British and Irish Governments were open and honest with the Unionists, there should be greater readiness of the moderate unionists to stand up to Dr Paisley.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed upon the need to proceed by persuasion. The joint studies would arouse a great deal of debate and discussion. Before decisions were taken, people had to get used to the ideas. In Britain there would certainly be a demand for a debate in Parliament on the joint studies. Public discussion and debate should help to dissipate fears. She and the Taoiseach

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would have to be ready to say that there was no secret agreement, and that these matters were being set out for discussion. She thought that the joint studies were very interesting.

THE TAOISEACH agreed; he thought that a lot had gone into them. They were not just fine words; they went into considerable detail.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed. Things of this kind lived in their practical detail. Her idea was to proceed by practical co-operation, and the studies were evidence of that.

THE TAOISEACH asked about the timing of publication of the joint studies.

THE PRIME MINISTER and the Taoiseach noted that both of them would be making statements in Parliament on Tuesday 10 November at 3.30 pm. They agreed that it would be preferable to publish the joint studies after they had made their statements. It might be better to publish them the day after the statements, rather than later the same day. It was accordingly agreed to publish the joint studies on Wednesday 11 November, at a time to be agreed between Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr Nally. After discussion, they agreed that it would be helpful to publish the joint report as an annex to the communiqué; it helped to fill out the communiqué, and to provide a basis for discussion at press conferences and in the media through the weekend, until they made their statements and published the joint studies.

THE PRIME MINISTER and THE TAOISEACH then considered three outstanding points of difference on the draft communiqué -

- i. the Prime Minister said that she would not wish in the communiqué to commit herself to recommending the establishment of an Anglo-Irish Parliamentary Body. For her to do so would be likely to ensure Parliamentary opposition to it. It must be left as an idea for Parliaments themselves to consider. The Taoiseach said that he agreed that that was more in accordance with the dignity of Parliament, and that he was content with the latest British draft of that point.

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ii. It was pointed out that the latest British redraft of the communiqué omitted any reference to the possibility that the British and Irish Attorneys General might consider the possibility of establishing an All Ireland Court. The Prime Minister said that the inclusion of such a reference could make difficulties for her, although she was content that the idea should be further studied. The Taoiseach said that the redraft as it stood could now make problems for him, because it might be taken to refer to extradition. After discussion, a revised redraft of the relevant sentence was agreed.

iii. It was pointed out that the latest British draft omitted a sentence proposed by the Irish Government which had appeared in a previous draft, which would have committed the British Government to being ready to join in working towards arrangements which might be agreed between the peoples of the two parts of Ireland for co-operation between them. The Prime Minister said that this sentence created great difficulties for her, and she would be unable to say what were the arrangements to which reference was made. The Taoiseach said that there were all-Irish institutions in a number of fields: for example the Irish Council of Trade Unions, all the Churches, the Irish Rugby Union, the Irish Banks Standing Committee, the Royal Dublin Society, and a number of cultural institutions including the Royal Irish Academy. There were also the arrangements envisaged in paragraphs 8 and 10 of the draft communiqué. Without some sentence on the lines suggested he could find himself in difficulties in the Dail. After discussion, the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach approved a sentence which read: "The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed that both Governments would be ready to join in promoting arrangements that might help to reduce tensions between and to reconcile the peoples of the two parts of Ireland".

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THE PRIME MINISTER and THE TAOISEACH instructed Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr Nally to revise the draft communiqué in the light of the discussion, and to take account of any other points that needed to be cleared up, and to prepare a revised draft for circulation to the Plenary Session in the afternoon.

The meeting ended at 1.10 pm.

10 November 1981

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ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: REPORT TO THE DAIL

1. THE TAOISEACH, DR FITZGERALD, MADE A REPORT TO THE DAIL ON THE ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT THIS AFTERNOON. MR HAUGHEY MADE A STATEMENT FOR THE OPPOSITION, BUT THERE WAS NO DEBATE. (TEXTS FOLLOW BY BAG TO RID, NIO LONDON AND NIO BELFAST.)
2. DR FITZGERALD SAID THAT HE HAD DECIDED NOT TO ASK FOR A DEBATE IN CASE IT SHOULD RAISE UNNECESSARY CONTROVERSY. HE OUTLINED THE 3 INSTITUTIONAL TIERS THAT WERE CONSIDERED AND POINTED OUT THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN GOING AHEAD WITH THE PARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL AT THIS STAGE.
3. DR FITZGERALD THEN DEALT WITH A SUCCESSION OF OTHER POINTS:
 - (A) CONSIDERATION BY THE TWO ATTORNEY-GENERALS OF THE PROSECUTION OF CRIMINALS: AN ALL IRELAND COURT WOULD COME

- (A) CONSIDERATION BY THE TWO ATTORNEY-GENERALS OF THE PROSECUTION OF CRIMINALS: AN ALL IRELAND COURT WOULD COME WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THEIR STUDY.
- (B) VOTING RIGHTS FOR BRITISH CITIZENS IN THE REPUBLIC: "OFFERING A RELATED RECIPROCITY".
- (C) ECONOMIC ISSUES, COVERING KINSALE GAS, THE INTERCONNECTOR ("WHOSE REPEATED DESTRUCTION CAN ONLY BE SEEN AS AN ACT OF SABOTAGE AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF THIS PART OF IRELAND") AND THE WALES/WEXFORD INTERCONNECTOR WHICH WOULD LINK IRELAND TO BRITAIN AND THROUGH TO THE CONTINENT.
- (D) THE JOINT STUDIES: CONFIDENTIALITY HAD FOSTERED SUSPICION. THE STUDIES CONTAINED "NOTHING DRAMATIC BUT MUCH SOLID USEFUL WORK UPON WHICH WE CAN BUILD CLOSER RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND IRELAND AND BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH". THE (UNPUBLISHED) SECURITY STUDY CONTAINED NOTHING THAT "IMPINGES IN ANY WAY ON OUR NEUTRALITY".
- (E) THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO REUNIFICATION: THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE FORMULA USED THIS TIME AND EARLIER SUMMIT COMMUNIQUES. THE POSITIONS OF THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS NOW ARE IN CLOSER ACCORD.
- (F) THE NEED FOR RECONCILIATION: "OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS ARE NOW JOINTLY COMMITTED."

4. THE FIANNA FAIL LEADER MR HAUGHEY DELIVERED A LONG STATEMENT ATTACKING THE OUTCOME OF THE ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT. HE SAID "STRIPPED OF ALL THE CLEVERLY ORCHESTRATED PROPAGANDA BUILD-UP, THE LONDON MEETING WAS CLEARLY A SET BACK FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THIS COUNTRY." HE CRITICISED THE SUMMIT ON THREE GROUNDS. FIRST, THERE WAS A RESTORATION "IN A NEW CATEGORICAL FORM OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF THE UNIONIST POSITION IN NORTHERN IRELAND BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND NOW AGREED TO BY THE TAOISEACH." SECOND, THE NEW ANGLO-IRISH COUNCIL WAS TOO LIMITED IN ITS FORM AND SCOPE. HE LAMENTED AT LENGTH THE FAILURE TO ESTABLISH A PARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL TO WHICH BOTH GOVERNMENTS COULD HAVE NOMINATED REPRESENTATIVES FROM NORTHERN IRELAND. THIRD, THERE HAD BEEN A LOSS OF MOMENTUM IN ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS SINCE THE DUBLIN SUMMIT OF DECEMBER 1980. THE BULK OF MR HAUGHEY'S STATEMENT, WHICH WAS 40 PAGES IN LENGTH, CONTAINED HAIRSPLITTING COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE COMMUNIQUES OF DECEMBER 1980 AND NOVEMBER 1981 IN AN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH A BASIS FOR THIS LAST CRITICISM.

Anglo-Irish Bilateral Talks

The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement—

Rev. Ian Paisley (Antrim, North): On behalf of the people of Ulster—*[Interruption.]*

Mr. Speaker: Order. I think that the kindest thing for us to do is to continue.

The Prime Minister: With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement—

Mr. Peter Robinson (Belfast, East): On behalf of the people of Ulster—*[Interruption.]*

The Prime Minister:—about the meeting which I had with the Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald, in London on 6 November.

This meeting was one in a regular series. It was held on a similar basis to those which take place with other Heads of State and of Government of the European Community. However, it was—*[Interruption.]*

Mr. Speaker: Order. The Prime Minister should be heard.

The Prime Minister: However, it was exceptional in that on this occasion the Taoiseach and I received the joint studies commissioned at my meeting with the then Taoiseach in Dublin on 8 December 1980.

The House will recall my undertaking to place before it the recommendations on matters of policy arising out of the studies. The studies, other than that on security matters, will be laid before the House tomorrow. They deal with possible new institutional structures, citizenship rights, economic co-operation and measures to encourage mutual understanding. I have already placed in the Library of the House copies of the joint report of senior officials on the studies and of the communiqué which the Taoiseach and I issued on Friday.

At our meeting the Taoiseach and I affirmed our agreement on a number of points which are fundamental to relations between the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic.

We were agreed on the benefits of close relations between our two countries. We are determined to work for a deepening and strengthening of those relations.

We were agreed on the need to find ways to reduce the tensions between and to reconcile the peoples of the two parts of Ireland.

We were agreed on the need to intensify economic co-operation between both countries and in particular between Northern Ireland and the Republic. Such co-operation should assist the economies of both countries as well as encouraging further co-operation in other fields.

We were agreed in our resolute opposition to violence and terrorism. We are determined to maintain the very high level of co-operation between the security forces of both countries. As the communiqué states, we noted with approval the efforts being made to ensure that those who commit crimes in one country should not be able to escape prosecution and conviction by seeking refuge in the other.

We were agreed, finally, that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would require the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. This is a fact which both the present Taoiseach and his two predecessors have publicly accepted.

It is against this background that the joint studies must be seen. Many of the suggestions in the joint studies are for further consideration, but the Taoiseach and I agreed that an Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council should be established. It will provide a framework which will facilitate more regular and more frequent contacts between Ministers and officials. It involves no change whatever in the constitutional position as regards relations between the United Kingdom and the Republic.

In the same context, there was agreement to work towards the establishment of an advisory committee on economic, social and cultural co-operation. Closer co-operation and friendship are not matters for Governments only. I hope that this committee will have a wide membership, representative of a broad cross-section of ordinary people and organisations with interests in this country and in the Republic of Ireland.

The suggestion was made in the studies that an Anglo-Irish interparliamentary body might be established at an appropriate time. It was envisaged that the members of such a body would be drawn from the British and Irish Parliaments, the European Parliament and any elected assembly that may be established for Northern Ireland. The Taoiseach and I agreed that this would be a matter for the two Parliaments themselves to pursue.

This was a friendly and constructive meeting. It has helped to consolidate the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. The Government's objective is to create a situation in which meetings between the British Prime Minister and the Taoiseach are seen to be routine. We took a significant step in that direction on Friday.

Mr. Michael Foot (Ebbw Vale): The Opposition agree that there should be continuous and close meetings and discussions between the Government of this country and the Government in Dublin. Therefore, we greatly welcome these discussions, as well as those which have preceded them. Our criticism previously was that the results of discussions were not made public to the House. We are glad that there has been a change of feeling on that subject and that full reports are now to be made to the House.

We ask that the new Anglo-Irish Council should report persistently to the House on any discussions it may have.

We especially welcome the statement to which the right hon. Lady drew attention—that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would require the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. We accept that principle of consent, and we wish the whole future of our two countries to be based upon it. The Opposition have put forward proposals for advancing towards a united Ireland. We believe that that is the right course that we should travel. There can be fruitful discussions about that. That view is one that is generally in accordance with that of the present Taoiseach in Dublin. He takes much the same view. But I emphasise again that we believe that his emphasis on the process of consent is of great importance.

In view of the major matters that have arisen in these discussions and are presented to the House and the country by them, may the House have an early debate on the matter?

Another matter has arisen today, on a similar subject. Representations were made this morning by many of my hon. Friends in respect of the breakdown of the arrangements about the Belfast-Liverpool ferry. This

of spies and traitors must the media reveal before the Prime Minister comes clean and accedes to my demand for a full-scale public inquiry into this Establishment cover-up?

The Prime Minister: These matters, all concerning the same group of people, have been investigated time and again, and I have been very forthcoming in the amount of information that I have tried to give to the House, while still retaining the interests of security.

I have made it clear in my replies—I believe that most hon. Members would agree with me—that we should never use parliamentary privilege to imply guilt by association or by accusation, nor should we use it to name people, knowing that we have not sufficient evidence to mount a prosecution. That, I believe, is the right view to take, and it is the view that I shall continue to take.

Mr. Proctor: While I welcome the Prime Minister's full and frank statement yesterday, may I ask her to confirm whether investigations were made about Mr. Leo Long's activities between 1946 and 1952, when he held important and more senior positions in intelligence and had access to more sensitive information than he had prior to 1945? Or are we relying on his own words as a self-confessed Soviet spy?

The Prime Minister: I gave a very full reply about Mr. Long and I would not wish to add to it without further very careful notice of a specific question.

Mr. Leadbitter: Although the Prime Minister has gone a considerable way in these matters, will she accept that the official statements and events in the period of the Philby and Blunt exposures, and now the Long exposure, have caused increasing public concern? The various cover-ups, the non-prosecution of treachery, the continuation of people in office, and the special privilege for special persons, are matters which should not have been tolerated. Will she therefore agree—I go no further than this because it is an important matter which should not be dealt with loosely—that importance must be attached to the non-disclosure concerning other persons who have committed offences or who are security risks? Will she agree that this applies to those of the Blunt and Long school who may be in office?

The Prime Minister: I believe that most of what the hon. Gentleman has said would be covered by the reply that I gave previously. I have tried to be as frank as I possibly can with the House, but it would be totally wrong for me to name names of people knowing that we could not mount a prosecution against them, or that their confessions had been obtained in a way which would render those confessions inadmissible. That is the honourable course to take, and I believe that it is the right one to continue to take.

matter is of great concern to people in Northern Ireland. Many people's jobs are involved. Does the right hon. Lady not consider it wise, particularly in these circumstances, to take special action on this matter, which could assist the general atmosphere in Ireland and the general approach to fresh arrangements for Ireland generally?

The Prime Minister: First, I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his welcome for the meeting and for the statement.

Secondly, the joint studies will be published in full tomorrow. I hope that they will give rise to discussion and debate. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will pursue the matter of a debate at some appropriate time with my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House.

Thirdly, the constitutional position of Northern Ireland is set out in the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, under which Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom unless the majority of the people of Northern Ireland wish otherwise, as shown by a poll conducted in a way set out in that Act. That guarantee is enshrined in our law and totally remains and will remain.

With regard to P & O, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland saw a group of people about the matter this morning. I must, however, tell the right hon. Gentleman that it is not the Government's intention to provide a subsidy or to intervene in the dispute.

Mr. James Kilfedder (Down, North): Regardless of what the Prime Minister has said, the cold reality is that the terms of the communiqué and the consequential events that will flow from it represent a significant first step by a Tory Government towards easing Northern Ireland out of the United Kingdom with the consequent betrayal of the birthright of Ulster Loyalists.

Does the Prime Minister now realise, following the further sickening, cowardly murders of Protestants in Northern Ireland by the vile sectarian Provisional IRA, that her talks with the Dublin Prime Minister will not stop the Republican atrocities in Northern Ireland particularly as the Dublin Government refuse to extradite the terrorists who seek sanctuary in the Republic and especially as Cardinal O'Fiaich, shedding corcodile tears over the victims of these atrocious thugs, refuses to excommunicate the terrorists?

The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman will not be surprised that I disagree with much of what he says. The reality is that the guarantee to Northern Ireland remains. It is a part of the United Kingdom and will stay a part of the United Kingdom unless its people both wish and consent to do otherwise.

With regard to security and the combating of terrorism and crime, our security forces—the Army, the police and the Ulster Defence Regiment—do a superlative job that I am sure the hon. Gentleman would wish to acknowledge. I might also remind him that we are receiving wonderful co-operation across the border concerned with catching terrorists wherever they commit their offences and trying them either in the North or in the South. That co-operation is very valuable in enabling us to combat terrorism.

Mr. James Molyneux (Antrim, South): Can the Prime Minister not begin to understand the feelings of ordinary people in Northern Ireland who are experiencing a sense of betrayal that no amount of explanation or denial can remove?

The Prime Minister: I try all the time to understand the feelings of the people in Northern Ireland. I remind the hon. Gentleman that this Taoiseach and the two previous Taoiseachs have both accepted publicly that any change could come about only with the consent of the people of Northern Ireland. That in itself is a great advance on the position that used to be taken up. *[Interruption.]* The right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell), sitting next to the hon. Gentleman, says, "No, no." In the meantime, the guarantee that Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom is enshrined in the 1973 Act, and it remains.

Mr. Stephen Ross (Isle of Wight): Is the right hon. Lady aware that we on the Liberal Benches assure her of our support for these tangible signs of closer co-operation between the United Kingdom and the Dublin Government? May we impress on the right hon. Lady the fact that she should not be put off, in her determination to pursue the talks, by noises on or off the stage in this Parliament? Was any further progress made during the talks on extradition and also on the subject of the inter-parliamentary grouping that has been suggested? How will that proceed from now on? What talks will take place on that subject?

The Prime Minister: With regard to the hon. Gentleman's first question, it seems to me reasonable to try to have friendly relations with an adjacent State. I am sure that this is the right policy to pursue and that it is in the interests of the people of the United Kingdom, including Northern Ireland, and also in the interests of the people of the Republic.

As the hon. Gentleman knows, we in this country abide by the extradition treaties. We extradite people even to the Republic should the circumstances warrant it. The hon. Gentleman is right in his assertion that the Republic does not have extradition. I doubt very much whether we shall succeed in persuading the Republic to have extradition but the matter is pursued with it from time to time. Inter-parliamentary proceedings are a matter for this House and for the similar House in the Republic of Ireland. I would not wish to interfere. Now that the idea has been put up, I hope that it will be discussed in the appropriate forum here.

Mr. Michael McNair-Wilson (Newbury): In consideration of parliamentary or possible parliamentary representation on the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental council, has my right hon. Friend given thought to the possibility that it could change the constitutional relationship between two friendly nations? Has she also given thought in particular to the possibility that if she goes ahead with such a proposal some of the parliamentary representation might come from Northern Ireland?

The Prime Minister: There must be a slight misunderstanding. It is not expected that there would be any parliamentary representation on the intergovernmental council except insofar as Ministers are themselves Members of Parliament. There is co-operation at three levels—first, at the level of Government and officials, all of whom are associated with Government. That is the intergovernmental council. Secondly, it is for consideration whether Members of Parliament of this House and Members of Parliament of the House in the Republic of Ireland should think it right to have co-operation between

[The Prime Minister]

themselves. That would be co-operation at the parliamentary level. The third level would be at advisory committee level where people who are neither members of Governments nor Members of Parliament wish to take part in closer relations. There are three distinct levels.

Mr. Gerard Fitt (Belfast, West): Will the Prime Minister accept that the vast majority of people in the island of Ireland and in this island will welcome these talks for what they are—an attempt to cement friendly relations? Is she aware that the secrecy that surrounded the talks with the previous Taoiseach has left one party to the talks in the position where a debate is taking place today in the Irish Parliament with the intention of sabotaging the talks that took place between the right hon. Lady and the Taoiseach last week?

Will she also appreciate that there needs to be a sense of urgency about the creation of the parliamentary forum as agreed at the Downing Street talks? Will she accept that there would be very few objections from the Opposition side of the House to the setting up of that parliamentary forum? There might even be a number of supporters on her own Benches.

The Prime Minister: I thank the hon. Gentleman for what he says. With regard to the parliamentary aspect, I believe that there is an Anglo-Irish all-party group, which could perhaps consider these matters further. A sense of urgency would have to come from hon. Members on both sides of the House. I do not think it is necessarily right that the Government themselves should interfere in these things.

Sir John Biggs-Davison (Epping Forest): Have not these exchanges shown how important it is to carry Ulster Unionists with the Government's endeavours and to show them that they will not be abandoned to the embraces of so-called loyalist extremists and exhibitionists?

The Prime Minister: I agree totally with my hon. Friend about this matter. That is why we have always stressed the importance and the significance of the guarantee. We hope thereby to retain the confidence of our Ulster Unionist friends.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell (Down, South): Does the Prime Minister not recognise that a nation cannot secure its own peace and security by entering into arrangements which its own people rightly regard as a conspiracy against them with their enemies?

The Prime Minister: The people I represent are all the people of the United Kingdom. I do not think that they would take the view that the right hon. Gentleman takes.

Several Hon. Members *rose*—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I propose to call three more hon. Members from either side before moving onto the next business.

Mr. Nicholas Winterton (Macclesfield): Although one appreciates the frankness of my right hon. Friend's statement, how can she explain the fact that so many IRA confirmations of their involvement in atrocities come from Dublin if we are getting so much co-operation from the Dublin Government? Will she confirm that the party that we both represent still remains the Conservative and Unionist Party?

The Prime Minister: Yes, indeed. That is one reason why the guarantee was enshrined in an Act of Parliament. That guarantee wholly remains. With regard to the IRA and activities south of the border, the Government of the Republic are very active indeed in trying to trace all people who commit acts of terrorism or crime. They recognise that those people are enemies of democracy and are a menace to the Government of the Republic as well as to the Government and the people of the United Kingdom.

Mr. Neville Sandelson (Hayes and Harlington): I welcome the initiatives that have been taken by the Government, which will have our firm support, but what consideration has been given by the right hon. Lady and Dr. FitzGerald to the introduction of a wider dimension as an aid to further progress? Is it not possible that the European Community and its agencies can be of great practical assistance, and that an international solution, universally accepted as disinterested, is more likely to succeed than is a purely British solution?

The Prime Minister: The future of Northern Ireland is a matter for the United Kingdom, because Northern Ireland is a part of the United Kingdom. That is a matter wholly for the United Kingdom, for the people of Northern Ireland and for this Parliament. In answer to what the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (Mr. Sandelson) said about the wider dimension, the talks take place against the background of bilateral discussions that we have with our partners in the EEC. That is precisely how this set of bilateral discussions started.

Mr. Ivor Stanbrook (Orpington): Will my right hon. Friend confirm that it is not the Government's policy to encourage the concept of a united Ireland, even in the long term?

The Prime Minister: It is not for me to say what the people of Northern Ireland may wish to do. I take the view that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom. It is accepted that it is part of the union. It will remain so unless they wish to the contrary.

Mr. Kevin McNamara (Kingston upon Hull, Central): The right hon. Lady will recall that the Labour Party conference voted in favour of a united Ireland and to campaign vigorously for that by consent. Will the intergovernmental council which is to be established be statutory or conventional? Will it publish agendas? How often will it meet? What are the topics on the agenda likely to be? Can the right hon. Lady confirm or deny the rumours that there will be certain appeasement to Unionists, by giving powers to local authorities, and in particular, will she deny the canard that it is intended to give planning powers back to local authorities in Northern Ireland?

The Prime Minister: The intergovernmental council is an informal organisation which will not publish agendas. It is a framework against which many ministerial meetings and meetings of officials will take place. Some of those meetings already take place. Now they will perhaps take place more often against that general framework. Secondly, on the question of any future devolvement of government in Northern Ireland or greater powers for local authorities, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State is constantly seeking a way to return more responsibility for the affairs of Northern Ireland to

the people of Northern Ireland. That search will continue. Thirdly, planning powers would also be part of that process.

Mr. Christopher Murphy (Welwyn and Hatfield): Will my right hon. Friend confirm that she is satisfied with the rate of progress in the Republic towards reciprocal arrangements for voting in its general elections for British citizens?

The Prime Minister: I understand from the Taoiseach that he is likely to bring forward a measure to his own Parliament shortly.

Mr. Harold McCusker (Armagh): In view of the Prime Minister's studied neutrality at her press conference on the matter of Irish unification, of which we have heard some echoes here today, can she repeat with the same sense of personal conviction as she did in Belfast three years ago that she still stands rock firm for the Union?

The Prime Minister: I find it difficult to understand the precise point of the hon. Gentleman's question. Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom—as much as my constituency is.

Mr. Robert Parry (Liverpool, Scotland Exchange): On a point of order, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker: Before the hon. Gentleman puts his point of order, may I make it clear that I shall take a very dim view of it if it is not a point of order, but only a question that would have been asked if I had called any hon. Member.

Mr. Parry: My point of order, Mr. Speaker, is that the Prime Minister, in an earlier reply to my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, said that her right hon. Friend the Secretary of State this morning met a group of people to discuss the P and O ferry closure. In fact, the right hon. Gentleman met seven right hon. and hon. Members of the House—

Mr. Speaker: Order. That cannot be a point of order for me. I cannot rule on it.

Mr. Michael English (Nottinghamshire, West): On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I wish to raise a point of order which was not the question that I intended to ask. Do you think that only one Labour Back Bencher is a disproportionately small number to call?

Mr. Speaker: No I do not, or I should have done otherwise.

Mr. A. E. P. Duffy (Sheffield, Attercliffe): On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. In view of the constitutional aspect of the Prime Minister's statement and the fact that it occupied less than 30 minutes, I hope that you will look at the list of speakers that you have called, in which case you might think that it is not as balanced as usual. You might at least have called those hon. Members who were on their feet. That would have occupied only another five minutes.

Mr. Speaker: Order. I understand—

Mr. Gerard Fitt (Belfast, West) *rose*—

Mr. Speaker: Very well.

Mr. Fitt: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. When the Prime Minister rose this afternoon to make her statement, you will no doubt have heard the voice of Ulster from the Side Gallery. It happened to be two Members the House. Can I ask whether you will take any sanction against those two Members, who are Members of this House, who interrupted from the Gallery?

Mr. Speaker: Order. Obviously, the hon. Gentleman is under a misapprehension. Any hon. Member is entitled to call his question from the Side Galleries. It is a long-established custom, and it has been done, but not before during my Speakership. I have not named people for interrupting, or I should have been kept very busy.

Mr. Michael Foot (Ebbw Vale): On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I understand the reply that you made a moment ago, and I do not question your ruling, but I invite you to look afresh at the number of Labour Members who were called from the Back Benches. If you do so, you may think that it will help the House to make a further statement. It is an extremely important matter, and one on which we have not had debates in the House in the past. Surely, it would not exceed normal time to have half an hour on a statement of such significance. I hope, therefore, that you will look at the matter afresh and perhaps make a further statement. [*Interruption.*]

Mr. Speaker: Order. I shall answer the Leader of the Opposition. I regret to say that I do not think that I ought to give further consideration to the matter, having dealt with it before the whole House this afternoon. It is unfair that any Speaker should be subjected to such pressure.

Mr. Norman Atkinson (Tottenham) *rose*—

Mr. Speaker: I shall listen if it is a genuine point of order.

Mr. Atkinson: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. In a reply just now, the Prime Minister stated that Northern Ireland is as much an integral part of the United Kingdom as her own constituency. If that is so, how is it that people can be repatriated to Northern Ireland, which happens at the moment—

Mr. Speaker: Order. With every respect, that is not a point of order. It is a point of debate in reply to what the Prime Minister said.

Statutory Instruments, &c.

Mr. Speaker: By leave of the House I shall put together the three questions on the motions relating to Statutory Instruments.

Ordered,

That the C. K. Marr Educational Trust Scheme 1981 (S.I., 1981, No. 857) be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c.

That the Rating (Repayment Procedures etc.) (Scotland) Regulations 1981 (S.I., 1981, No. 1045) be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c.

That the Rating (Timetable and Procedures) (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 1981 (S.I., 1981, No. 1046) be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c.—[*Mr. Pym.*]

Orders of the Day

Debate on the Address

[FIFTH DAY]

Order read for resuming adjourned debate on Question [4 November]

That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, as follows:

Most Gracious Sovereign,

We, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Parliament assembled, beg leave to offer our humble thanks to Your Majesty for the Gracious Speech which Your Majesty has addressed to both Houses of Parliament.—[*Mr. Michael Shaw.*]

Question again proposed.

Nationalised Industries

Mr. Speaker: I have selected the amendment in the name of the Leader of the official Opposition.

3.59 pm

Mr. Merlyn Rees (Leeds, South): I beg to move, That as an amendment to the Address, at end add—

But humbly regret that the Gracious Speech contains proposals which, in putting private profit before the public interest, strip the nation's North Sea gas and oil assets, create great uncertainty in the coal industry's future and wreck any prospect of an overall energy policy.

In the past two years we have seen the Government operate in a way that amounts to a landmark in Conservative attitudes to economic affairs. They are doctrinaire and believe in a single approach to the economic affairs of the nation. They believe in monetarism, not as one arm of a policy to be reviewed in the light of a changing economic climate, but as a policy to be followed relentlessly. They are a Government who believe in ideology, and we can all see the results of their policy.

The new Secretary of State for Energy is an arch supporter of that policy. He believes in free market forces, as others believe in the State. I wish to make it clear that I believe in neither. There is a growing role for the State and, in certain circumstances, there is a role for free market forces, but they must be justified, in each case, on their merits. In natural resources, the State's role must be paramount.

A corollary to the Government's economic policy is their worship of the graven image of the public sector borrowing requirement. Much of their policy in the public sector is motivated by the aim to reduce it by selling capital assets. I refer to energy assets that could generate income in the future. We will be selling—perhaps at too low a price—our birthright. Above all, the Government and their supporters are motivated by a feeling against the public sector that can be described as vindictive as well as doctrinaire. That feeling ignores the different types of public ownership. The reasons for nationalising coal, oil or gas are different from the reasons that may apply to other types of industry and to different types of nationalisation and public ownership.

A Tory Government took Rolls-Royce into public ownership. They were right not to nationalise it, but they were also right, in the circumstances of the engineering

industry, to take it into public ownership. Whatever the reasons for public ownership, or the different types of public ownership, the Government take every opportunity to denigrate such activities, and in that the Prime Minister takes the lead. In the foreseeable future there will be a large public sector and we should constantly consider how best it can be organised. I accept that we should consider the role of private capital in some public sector industries. However, the Government's attitude to the public sector represents a negation of the responsibility of the Government, or at least of a Government who seek to govern on behalf of all the community.

In the public sector, the Government's policy is to treat all parts in the same way. They are fundamentally wrong about oil and gas. Oil and gas are natural resources. In the last century there were grave arguments in the House about land. In the same way, to use the political terminology of that century, the natural resources of oil and gas are "God given". They belong to the people and are not to be wasted by a wanton belief in free market forces. By their very nature free market forces are short-run, and decisions on oil and gas need long-term vision.

Mr. Peter Rost (Derbyshire, South-East): Can the right hon. Gentleman explain why he and the previous Labour Government sold a large chunk of British Petroleum?

Mr. Rees: Yes. I have a note in front of me to the effect that an hon. Member would interrupt at that point. British Petroleum is a different organisation from the British National Oil Corporation. It was set up in 1914 for different purposes. It may well be that there should be a change in the organisation of BP. All aspects of energy policy should be looked at time and again. The company was set up for a different purpose and the BNOC is not BP. [*Interruption.*] If the Minister thinks that BP is run as a State organisation and is under the control of the Secretary of State for Energy, he has something to learn. It is not run in that way. British Petroleum is a different type of organisation from BNOC.

We shall have to wait and see the legislation on oil to discover whether one or two Bills are involved. However, I shall refer to an oil Bill. We shall have an opportunity to deal with the Bill when it comes before the House in the new year. I have no desire—and I do not know whether it would be in order—to turn this into a pre-Second Reading debate. However, as the Secretary of State made a pre-Gracious Speech type of statement two weeks ago, I assume that I should not be creating a precedent.

I shall ask the Secretary of State for information on oil, gas and coal in order to illuminate the hazy words of the Gracious Speech and, in some respects, the even hazier words of the Secretary of State's apparent statement of clarification.

If a major need of Government policy is to reduce the public sector borrowing requirement, why not deal with the convention of the public sector borrowing requirement? It is not true that capital expenditure is treated in the same way for all the 100 per cent.-owned firms. Why does a holding of less than 50 per cent. not count in relation to the public sector borrowing requirement, given that substantial sums of money could be involved in a very large firm? Is that the only reason—we do not yet know the precise figure—for a figure of less than 50 per cent. being struck for the BNOC?

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

Anglo-Irish Bilateral Meeting

With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement about the meeting which I had with the Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald, in London on 6 November.

This meeting was one in a regular series. It was held on a similar basis to those which take place with other Heads of State and of Government of the European Community. However, it was exceptional in that on this occasion the Taoiseach and I received the Joint Studies commissioned at my meeting with the then Taoiseach in Dublin on 8 December 1980.

The House will recall my undertaking to place before it the recommendations on matters of policy arising out of the Studies. The Studies, other than that on security matters, will be laid before the House tomorrow. They deal with possible new institutional structures, citizenship rights, economic co-operation and measures to encourage mutual understanding. I have already placed in the Library of the House copies of the Joint Report of Senior Officials on the Studies and of the Communique which the Taoiseach and I issued on Friday.

At our meeting the Taoiseach and I affirmed our agreement on a number of points which are fundamental to relations between the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic.

- We were agreed on the benefits of close relations between our two countries. We are determined to work for a deepening and strengthening of those relations.

- We were agreed on the need to find ways to reduce the tensions between and to reconcile the peoples of the two parts of Ireland.

- We were agreed on the need to intensify economic co-operation between both countries and in particular between Northern Ireland and the Republic. Such co-operation should assist the economies of both countries as well as encouraging further co-operation in other fields.

- We were agreed in our resolute opposition to violence and terrorism. We are determined to maintain the very high level of co-operation between the security forces of both countries. As the Communique states, we noted with approval the efforts being made to ensure that those who commit crimes in one country should not be able to escape prosecution and conviction by seeking refuge in the other.

- We were agreed, finally, that "any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would require the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland". This is a fact which both the present Taoiseach and his two predecessors have publicly accepted.

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It is against this background that the Joint Studies must be seen. Many of the suggestions in the Joint Studies are for further consideration. But the Taoiseach and I agreed that an Anglo-Irish Inter-governmental Council should be established. It will provide a framework which will facilitate more regular and more frequent contacts between Ministers and officials. It involves no change whatever in the constitutional position as regards relations between the United Kingdom and the Republic.

In the same context, there was agreement to work towards the establishment of an advisory committee on economic, social and cultural co-operation. Closer co-operation and friendship are not matters for governments only. I hope that this committee will have a wide membership, representative of a broad cross-section of ordinary people and organisations with interests in this country and in the Republic of Ireland.

The suggestion was made in the studies that an Anglo-Irish Inter-parliamentary Body might be established at an appropriate time. It was envisaged that the members of such a body would be drawn from the British and Irish Parliaments, the European Parliament and any elected assembly that may be established for Northern Ireland. The Taoiseach and I agreed that this would be a matter for the two Parliaments to pursue.

This, Mr. Speaker, was a friendly and constructive meeting. It has helped to consolidate the relationship between the United

/ Kingdom and the

Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. The Government's objective is to create a situation in which meetings between the British Prime Minister and the Taoiseach are seen to be routine. We took a significant step in that direction on Friday.

10 November 1981



Original FCO draft,
And

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

1. With permission, Mr Speaker, I should like to make a statement about the meeting which I had with the Taoiseach, Dr Garret FitzGerald, on 6 November, at which we reviewed the Joint Studies commissioned at my meeting with the then Taoiseach in Dublin on 8 December 1980. (I make this statement having in mind my undertaking to this House to place before it recommendations on matters of policy arising out of the Studies.)

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2. The Summary Report of Senior Officials on the Joint Studies was annexed to the Joint Communiqué issued on Friday, 6 November, after our meeting. The Joint Studies, other than that on Security matters, will be laid with that Report before the House tomorrow.

3. We took decisions on a few ~~several~~ matters referred to by that the Studies had highlighted. We were of one mind on the benefits that closer relations could have for all the peoples of both countries. We therefore agreed upon the establishment of an Anglo-Irish Inter-governmental Council. This will be a framework which I hope will facilitate more regular and more frequent contacts between Ministers and officials, the sort of contacts which mark a normal, friendly, relationship. It involves no change in the constitutional position as regards the United Kingdom and the Republic. So far as Northern Ireland is concerned, the communiqué confirms an

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agreement 'that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would require the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister said that, if that consent were to be expressed as a result of a poll conducted in accordance with the Northern Ireland Constitution Act of 1973, the British Government would of course accept their decision, and would support legislation in the British Parliament to give effect to it.'

4. The suggestion is made in the Studies that there could be at an appropriate time an Anglo-Irish inter-parliamentary body comprising members to be drawn from the British and Irish Parliaments, the European Parliament and any elected assembly that may be established for Northern Ireland. The Taoiseach and I agreed that this would be for the two Parliaments to decide at an appropriate moment.

5. We also agreed to work towards the establishment of an Advisory Committee on economic, social and cultural cooperation. Closer cooperation and friendship are not matters for governments only. I hope that this Committee will have a wide membership, representative of a broad cross-section of ordinary people and organisations who have interests both in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland.



- 3 -

6. The Taoiseach and I were of one mind in our undeviating opposition to terrorism. We have invited the British and Irish Attornies-General to consider what might be done to improve the efforts now being made under the Criminal Law Jurisdiction Legislation to ensure that those who commit crimes in one country should not be able to escape prosecution and conviction by seeking refuge in the other.

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~~MR FERGUSSON~~

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 377 OF 09 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE N I O (BELFAST)

M I P T: THE ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: IRISH MEDIA REACTIONS.

THE ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT OF 06 NOVEMBER WAS THE MAIN ITEM OF NEWS IN THE DUBLIN DAILIES ON 7 NOVEMBER. THE HEADLINES WERE : "ANGLO IRISH COUNCIL AGREED AT SUMMIT" (IRISH TIMES), "COUNCIL BID TO INVOLVE NORTH" (IRISH PRESS), AND "SUMMIT LEADERS SET UP AN ANGLO-IRISH COUNCIL." (IRISH INDEPENDENT.) THE SUMMIT WAS ALSO EXTENSIVELY REPORTED IN THE REPUBLIC'S SUNDAY NEWSPAPERS, AND FURTHER EDITORIAL COMMENT APPEARS TODAY. IN GENERAL, THE IRISH MEDIA HAVE WELCOMED THE OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT, ALTHOUGH THE IRISH PRESS DISSENTS FROM THIS JUDGEMENT.

2. THE IRISH TIMES OF 7 NOVEMBER CONCLUDED THAT "OVERALL THE MOVEMENT IS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION", ALTHOUGH IT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS NOTHING "TO TRUMPET UNDULY ABOUT". THE IRISH PRESS SPOKE MORE GRUDGINGLY OF THE NORTH'S DESPERATE NEED NOT FOR "A PLETHORA OF PLATTITUDES AND EXPRESSIONS OF GOODWILL" BUT "SOME INDICATION OF DECISIVE ACTION ON THE POLITICAL FRONT. JUDGED ON THAT BASIS, YESTERDAY'S MEETING PRODUCED PRECIOUS LITTLE." THE IRISH INDEPENDENT WAS MORE GENEROUS: "INSOFAR AS POLITICS REALLY EMBRACE THE GOVERNING OF ALL THE AFFAIRS OF PEOPLE, THE CONFERENCE MARKED AN ADVANCE..."

3. THE EDITORIAL IN THE SUNDAY INDEPENDENT OF 8 NOVEMBER CONGRATULATED THE TAOISEACH ON THE SUMMIT WHICH IT DESCRIBED AS "THE MOST SIGNIFICANT STEP SINCE SUNNINGDALE." THIS WAS ECHOED BY THE SUNDAY TRIBUNE WHICH SAID THAT "FRIDAY WAS A GOOD DAY'S WORK IN LONDON."

4. EDITORIAL COMMENT IN TODAY'S DUBLIN DAILIES CONCENTRATES ON MR HAUGHEY'S ATTACK ON THE SUMMIT (SEE M I P T) THE IRISH INDEPENDENT ASSERTS THAT THE FIANNA FAIL LEADERS CRITICISMS SHOW THAT "AS A POLITICAL LEADER HE LACKS THAT CERTAIN SPARK WHICH CAN LEAP ACROSS FROM HIS OWN RANKS TO THE PEOPLE OUTSIDE FIANNA FAIL". THE IRISH PRESS (USUALLY REGARDED AS PRO FIANNA FAIL) SOMEWHAT SURPRISINGLY CRITICISES MR HAUGHEY FOR HIS ATTITUDE, AND DESCRIBES THE PROSPECT OF A "POLITICAL DOG FIGHT IN THE DAIL" DURING TOMORROW'S DEBATE ON THE SUMMIT AS "PROFOUNDLY DEPRESSING".

TATHAM

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

ANGLO-IRISH JOINT STUDIES:
WHITE PAPER

The Prime Minister has seen the proof copy of the White Paper enclosed with your minute to me of 6 November. She is content that the White Paper should be printed.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

9 November 1981

CONFIDENTIAL



File 16

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 November 1981

VISIT OF THE TAOISEACH

In the course of the plenary meeting during Dr. FitzGerald's visit to London on Friday, there was a brief discussion of local government. When, in the course of this, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said that the Government were thinking of taking steps to strengthen local government in the Province, the Taoiseach drew attention to what he described as a number of proven cases of sectarian discrimination. In saying this, he handed over the enclosed list of examples and offered to produce more.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Roderic Lyne (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Stephen Boys-Smith, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Some Examples of Sectarian Practices by Northern
Ireland Local Authorities 1973-81

Armagh

The Council was found guilty by the Fair Employment Agency of discrimination in the appointment of a wages clerk in the Council in September 1981.

Ballymena

The Commissioner of Complaints criticised the Council for its "sectarian stance" in refusing to publish Sunday sport items in its Calendar of Events. The exclusion of Gaelic words from the Calendar was also declared an "offence against Gaelic culture in general."

Coleraine

The SDLP accused the Council (1977-81) majority of blatant discrimination following a decision by the Local Government Staff Commission that the Council had not followed the procedures laid down in the 1973 Local Government Act in its recruitment of a tourism development officer.

Cookstown

The Ombudsman found the Council guilty of discrimination against two Catholics who had unsuccessfully applied for posts in the Council in August 1977.

In February 1981 the Fair Employment Agency told the Council to take a series of actions to correct what was said to be a "substantial religious imbalance" in their work force. According to the FEA report the Council salaried staff consisted of 13 Protestants and only two Catholics with none of the Catholics being employed in head office and one of the two of whom was only appointed after the FEA had commenced its

investigations. On the manual side the FEA noted that out of the 57 employees 42 were Protestants and only 15 were Catholics. The FEA discovered that since 1977 about 45% of those who applied for jobs in the Council were Catholics and 55% Protestants but only 33% of the Catholics were successful compared to 68% of the Protestants. In a heated discussion by the Council of the FEA report it was thrown out by one vote.

Craigavon

In December 1978 the Council was accused by the FEA of political or religious discrimination following the rejection of an application by Mr. Tim Duffy for the post of the outdoor recreation officer. In the appeal by the Council to Armagh County Court the Court decided that there was a case for the Council to answer and in June 1980 the Court of Appeal decided that Mr. Duffy had indeed been discriminated against.

In October 1980 the FEA backed a case in which it was claimed that because of the fact that an employee was a Roman Catholic he had only been allowed progress so far up the management ladder but was then effectively blocked. In the Court case the judge said that the FEA had established a prime facie case of not only discrimination but discrimination on religious grounds.

Fermanagh

In April 1975 the Council was instructed by the Local Government Staff Commission to reverse its decision not to appoint a Catholic as recreation officer.

Limavady

It is understood that there is only one Catholic (a female clerical employee) on the staff of the Council.

Magherafelt

The High Court ruled that the Council had acted unlawfully in not including Gaelic football in its summer recreation scheme.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 November, 1981.

You may have heard by now that the Prime Minister hopes to make a statement tomorrow on her talks last Friday with the Taoiseach. She cannot do so today, because she is having a session of bilateral meetings with the Italians.

We are, however, placing in the Library today the Joint Communique, and a Joint Report on the Anglo-Irish Joint Studies. You will see that paragraph 7 of the communique refers to publication next Wednesday of all but one of the full studies.

I am now enclosing copies of the documents which we have placed in the Library.

M. A. PATTISON

Sir Tom McCaffrey



Handwritten initials and a small mark.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 November 1981

original filed on:-

Euro PSI: Future dates of Euro Council Mtgs: June 1979.

FUTURE MEETINGS OF THE
EUROPEAN COUNCIL

You should be aware that in the course of her lunch with Dr. FitzGerald on Friday, the Prime Minister said that she was thinking seriously of proposing to her colleagues during the meeting of the European Council later this month, that in future there should be only two meetings of the Council each year. Dr. FitzGerald encouraged the Prime Minister in this intention and said that he would support her.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

F. N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL


PART 5 ends:-

Transcript of Press conference of 6/4/57

PART 6 begins:-

MODSA to FLO of 9/4/57.

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