308

PREM 19/1074

PART 3

MT

Confidential filing

Internal Situation
Israeli / Lebanese hostilities
UK / Lebanese relations

LEBANON
Pt. 1: July 1979
Pt. 3: July 1982

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~12.7.82~~		~~4.11.82~~					
~~15.7.82~~		~~15.11.82~~					
~~20.7.82~~		~~26.11.82~~					
~~22.7.82~~		~~30.11.82~~					
~~29.7.82~~		~~6.12.82~~					
~~1.8.82~~		~~16.12.82~~					
~~4.8.82~~		~~14.12.82~~					
~~6.8.82~~		~~16.12.82~~					
~~10.8.82~~		~~21.12.82~~					
~~16.8.82~~		~~29.12.82~~					
~~26.8.82~~		~~5.1.83~~					
~~8.9.82~~		~~20.1.83~~					
~~15.9.82~~		~~25.1.83~~					
~~21.9.82~~		~~10.2.83~~					
~~30.9.82~~		~~14.2.83~~					
~~11.10.82~~		~~17.2.83~~					
~~14.10.82~~		~~11.4.83~~					
~~21.10.82~~		~~14.4.83~~					
~~28.10.82~~		~~20.4.83~~					
~~1.11.82~~		~~19.5.83~~					
		~~14.6.83~~					
		~~28.6.83~~					
		~~22.7.83~~					
		~~31.8.83~~					
		5/9/83					

PREM 19/1074

PART 3 ends:-

AJC to FCO 5/9/83

PART 4 begins:-

Washington tel 2480 6.9.83

~~AJC to MoD 7/9/83.~~

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(83) 26th Meeting, item 2	28/07/1983
CC(83) 15th Meeting, item 1	05/05/1983
CC(83) 14th Meeting, item 2	28/04/1983
CC(83) 5th Meeting, item 2	17/02/1983
CC(83) 1st Meeting, item 2	20/01/1983
CC(82) 53rd Meeting, item 2	16/12/1982
CC(82) 47th Meeting, item 2	04/11/1982
CC(82) 44th Meeting, item 2	21/10/1982
CC(82) 42nd Meeting, item 2	30/09/1982
CC(82) 40th Meeting, item 2	29/07/1982
CC(82) 39th Meeting, item 2	22/07/1982

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed J. Gray Date 15/4/2013

PREM Records Team

Lebanon file

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 September 1983

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 30 August.

AJC

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

cc Sir AP.

2

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-~~930 7022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 3/7/4

2nd September 1983

Prime Minister

2/9

Dear John

BRITFORLEB - OPTIONS FOR EMERGENCY WITHDRAWAL

Although morale amongst our forces in Beirut is high, and we continue to assume they will remain in place, in view of the current situation in the Lebanon we have reviewed our contingency plans for their emergency withdrawal should this prove necessary. The Prime Minister may wish to be aware of the options available to us: they have yet to be considered by the Defence Secretary who will be reviewing the state of our planning on his return from Greece. These options depend to some extent on whether our action is part of a general pull out of the Multi-National Force (MNF) or is on a purely national basis. In either case our forces could withdraw initially to the US base at Beirut airport as a temporary measure if our presence at our Hadath base becomes untenable.

Our preferred option would be to withdraw to Cyprus with the assistance of the US Marine Corps and the US 6th Fleet. Informal arrangements for this already exist, and the Commander of our force in the Lebanon is currently discussing more formal plans with the American forces in Beirut. However, we cannot be sure that this assistance would be available if we wished to withdraw while the Americans remained. In this event we would need to evacuate our force by sea or air using national resources. The use of RN warships would depend on their availability in the Mediterranean at the right time, but we have 3 small craft based in Cyprus. These have sufficient capacity to evacuate all our men and some equipment but they may be restricted to fair weather operations. It might be possible to charter a civil vessel, but this could not be guaranteed and would take at least 3 days to arrange.

A J Coles Esq

If Beirut airport is open we could evacuate all our personnel in about 14 hours using Hercules aircraft. It would take a further 30 hours to remove our equipment. However, in the more likely event of the airport being closed, withdrawal by air would depend on helicopters. We have 5 Wessex based at Cyprus, but with a limited payload they are not ideal for the task, and would each have to make several trips. A Chinook (which could carry up to 80 men in an emergency) could be provided from the UK in 60 hours, but we are examining pre-positioning one in Cyprus in case the situation deteriorates. A combination of Wessex and Chinook helicopters might well represent the best chance, in an emergency, of getting our men out quickly and safely. We might have to leave some equipment behind (either stored in the US area or destroyed) and the operations could subject the helicopters to some risk.

We believe that the range of options described above is sufficiently flexible to enable us to select the best combination in the light of circumstances at the time, and we are of course keeping a very close watch on developments in Beirut.

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (FCO) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Richard

(R C MOTTRAM)
Private Secretary

Prime Minister.
30.8.83

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 August 1983

Dear Tim

Recent Developments in Lebanon

You will have seen a number of telegrams and other reports about the fighting in Beirut over the weekend. The Prime Minister may like to have a short summary of recent events and an assessment of the implications for the Multinational Force.

The fighting in the Shouf mountains south east of Beirut has been going on intermittently for some weeks. But developments in Beirut itself over the weekend have given a more serious twist to the deteriorating security situation. A minor clash on Sunday evening (28 August) between the Lebanese Army (LAF) and the Shia (Muslim) militia escalated yesterday into fierce fighting between the army and a variety of armed militias. This in turn drew renewed shelling of the city and the airport from Druze controlled areas in the mountains. The airport is again closed and two US marines were killed. For the first time in its deployment the US contingent returned fire.

Meanwhile heavily armed militias took over for a time some areas of west Beirut which they controlled before the Israeli invasion last year. Lebanese army positions were overrun and some army vehicles destroyed. One militia briefly occupied the Government TV station in west Beirut. The army managed to regain control of some parts in west Beirut. A ceasefire was agreed late yesterday, with the army returning to barracks and armed militias to their homes. Casualties are reported to have been between 30 and 40 dead, including 15 LAF.

Beirut today has been fairly quiet, with some minor clashes continuing in the southern suburbs between the army and the militias. We have not so far heard any reports of damage to British lives or property. A patrol from the British contingent in the MNF came under fire earlier today but suffered no casualties (it is not clear whether this was deliberate or accidental).

/Beirut telno

/ Beirut telno 450 (copy enclosed) sums up the implications of the fighting. The Lebanese Government's credibility has been further eroded. Its lack of control of the city has been demonstrated. The Muslim sections of the population, whose support the Government badly needs in its attempts to rebuild a national consensus, has been further alienated. The Lebanese army, now preoccupied with events in Beirut, is even less likely to be able to take control outside Beirut following an Israeli withdrawal.

Mr McFarlane, who was in Jerusalem earlier today, has apparently succeeded in securing postponment of the partial withdrawal of Israeli forces by 3 - 4 days. The Lebanese Government will then face a crucial test. Unless an agreement can be reached with the Druze, which seems unlikely, further fighting in the Shouf seems inevitable either between the Druze and Christian militias or, if the LAF attempts to deploy, between the Druze and the LAF.

Mr McFarlane was in London briefly on 28 August. As far as the Multinational Force is concerned, the Americans consider that the situation in the Shouf is at present too confused to allow a considered discussion on whther MNF should deploy patrols there in support of the Lebanese army. They would only consider agreeing to an extension of the MNF's deployment if there was first a political agreement and assurances from the parties concerned that they wanted an MNF presence. These are clearly sensible conditions. We have ourselves not received any formal request from the Lebanese Government. We have made clear to the Americans that we have very strong reservations about deployment of our contingent into the Shouf.

You may have seen reports that Mr Denzil Davies MP called yesterday for a statement by the Government on the position of our MNF contingent. I enclose a copy of the
/ statement made by the FCO spokesman made at 1230 today.

Yours ever
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

Tim Flesher Esq
10 Downing Street

FCO SPOKESMAN, 30 AUGUST

LEBANON: MULTINATIONAL FORCE

Legal Basis of Deployment

British contingent of Multinational Force is in Beirut at request of and by agreement with Lebanese Government. Agreement contained in exchange of letters published as a Command Paper in the Treaty series. Further exchanges of letters covering extended deployment took place on 8 May and 7 August 1983. Parliament informed of Government's decision on each occasion - most recently on 20 July 1983.

Deployment Outside Beirut

No formal request from Lebanese Government. Any such change in MNF's mandate would need to be considered with other contributors. Small size of our contingent does not allow deployment far from its present base. Internal Lebanese disputes are for Lebanese Government to settle, not for foreign forces.

Rules of Engagement?

We do not comment on ROEs. But Exchange of Letters specifies that British contingent may exercise the right of self-defence.

How Long Will MNF Stay?

Deployment of British contingent will be kept under review. No intention of being drawn into a lengthy commitment.

GR 400

CONFIDENTIAL

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DESKBY FCO 300900Z
FM BEIRUT 300740Z AUG 83
TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.
TELEGRAM NUMBER 450 OF 30 AUGUST 1983
INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, MODUK
PRIORITY AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDA, PARIS, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 448: LEBANON

1. BEIRUT HAD A RELATIVELY QUIET NIGHT AFTER A FULL DAY OF FIERCE FIGHTING BETWEEN THE LEBANESE ARMY AND MUSLIM, MOSTLY SHI'A , MILITIAS. ALTHOUGH BBC REPORTS YESTERDAY (29 AUGUST) OF THE INTENSITY OF THE FIGHTING MAY HAVE BEEN EXAGGERATED, NONETHELESS THE CLASHES, ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL PRESS, HAVE LEFT BETWEEN 30 AND 40 DEAD, INCLUDING 15 LEBANESE ARMY.

2. I HAVE SO FAR HEARD NO REPORTS OF DAMAGE TO BRITISH LIVES OR PROPERTY. THE STAFF OF THIS EMBASSY ARE SAFE, AS ARE BRITFORLEB.

3. WE SHALL NOT BE ABLE TO SEND YOU A FULL ASSESSMENT UNTIL THE DUST HAS SETTLED. ADA IS REPORTING THE MAIN EVENTS ON HIS CHANNELS. MY PRELIMINARY REACTION IS TO AGREE WITH JIM MUIR OF THE BBC THAT THIS REPRESENTS A SEVERE BLOW TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S CREDIBILITY - MORE SEVERE THAN THEIR CLASH WITH THE PSP EARLIER THIS MONTH BECAUSE THESE EVENTS TOOK PLACE IN BEIRUT, WHERE THE GOVERNMENT'S WRIT IS SUPPOSED TO RUN.

4. THE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FIGHTING ARE:

(A) THE WEST BEIRUT MILITIAS HAVE SHOWN THAT WHEN UNITED THEY CAN STILL CHALLENGE SUCCESSFULLY THE LEBANESE ARMY IN AN AREA WHERE IT IS SUPPOSED TO BE ESTABLISHED. SOME AREAS OF BEIRUT - E.G. THE STRONGLY NATIONALIST AREAS OF THE BASTA AND MAZRAA - ARE CURRENTLY UNDER MILITIA CONTROL.

(B) WITH WEST BEIRUT MILITIAS ACTIVE ON THEIR SIDE OF THE FORMER GREEN LINE AND THE PHALANGE REPORTED TO BE ACTIVE ON THEIRS, THERE IS A RISK OF BEIRUT BECOMING DIVIDED ONCE AGAIN.

(C) WITH THE ATTACK ON THE US MARINES AND THEIR RETALIATION, THE MNF HAS BEEN DRAWN FOR THE FIRST TIME INTO COMMUNAL CONFLICT.

(D) THE GOVERNMENT HAVE ALIENATED ANOTHER LEBANESE COMMUNITY - THE SHI'A. ALTHOUGH THE ARMY APPEAR TO HAVE THE UPPER HAND IN THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS, THE RESENTMENT THERE SMOULDERS AND CAN EXPLODE AT ANY TIME.

CONFIDENTIAL

/5. I BELIEVE

5. I BELIEVE THAT THESE EVENTS HAVE SHOWN THAT THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT IMPOSE ITS AUTHORITY BY FORCE. IF IT DOES SO, IT WILL EXPOSE THE ARMY TO FURTHER CONFRONTATION, WHICH IT MAY NOT WIN. THE ARMY CANNOT TAKE MUCH MORE OF THIS WITHOUT A DISASTROUS EFFECT ON ITS INTERNAL COHESION. PUTTING THE ARMY INTO THE HEART OF THE SHOUF AGAINST THE WILL OF THE DRUZE IS NO LONGER FEASIBLE (IF IT EVER WAS). THE GOVERNMENT NOW HAS FEW OPTIONS OTHER THAN NEGOTIATION. MOREOVER IT WILL BE NEGOTIATING FROM WEAKNESS.

PALMER

MIDDLE EAST

STANDARD

NENAD	MAED
MED	ESSD
NAD	ERD
SAD	ESID
UND	CONS D
EESD	CONS EM UNIT
ECD	MR EGERTON
WED	MR THOMAS
RID	
SEC D	CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

LEBANON

The position in Beirut is, as usual, extremely confused with heavy shelling and small arms fire. It is not clear whether the MNF are a target but the British contingent and the Embassy are safe and keeping their heads well down. Mr. Luce will be announcing on radio this lunchtime that the British Government is seeking an urgent meeting of MNF contributors in Washington today to review the position.

TIM FLESHER

31 August, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 300
CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 222316Z JUL 83
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2081 OF 22 JULY
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, ROUTINE DAMASCUS, AMMAN, JEDDA, CAIRO, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING PARIS ROME MOSCOW

LEBANON

SUMMARY

1. HABIB IS RETURNING TO PRIVATE LIFE. MCFARLANE IS TO REPLACE HIM.

DETAIL

2. AFTER HIS TALKS WITH GEMAYEL TODAY, PRESIDENT REAGAN ANNOUNCED THE APPOINTMENT OF BUD MCFARLANE AS HIS SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST IN SUCCESSION TO HABIB WHO, HE SAID, HAD QUOTE OBLIGATIONS TO RETURN TO PRIVATE LIFE UNQUOTE. MCFARLANE IS TO RETAIN HIS POST AS DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.

3. FAIRBANKS (STATE DEPARTMENT) HAS TOLD US THAT HE AND MCFARLANE EXPECT TO LEAVE FOR VISITS TO THE MIDDLE EAST WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK OR TEN DAYS. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD, IN CONFIDENCE, THAT DRAPER IS TO TAKE LEAVE AND THAT IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER HE WILL RETAIN ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR LEBANON.

4. HABIB HAS BEEN ANXIOUS FOR SOME TIME TO BE RELIEVED OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES, PARTLY FOR HEALTH REASONS AND PARTLY BECAUSE HIS USEFULNESS IS LIMITED BY THE SYRIAN REFUSAL TO RECEIVE HIM. THE APPOINTMENT OF MCFARLANE HAS NEVERTHELESS COME AS SOMETHING OF A SURPRISE AND IS BEING INTERPRETED AS AN INDICATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S DISSATISFACTION WITH SHULTZ'S HANDLING OF LEBANON AND DETERMINATION TO GIVE NEW IMPETUS TO MOVES TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. VELIOTES, HOWEVER, REFUTED THIS AT A BACKGROUND PRESS BRIEFING THIS EVENING: MCFARLANE HAD BEEN SHULTZ'S PERSONAL CHOICE TO SUCCEED HABIB.

5. MCFARLANE HAS BEEN FOLLOWING MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY AND ENJOYS THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PRESIDENT. BUT THERE REMAINS A QUESTION MARK OVER HIS RELATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS: ON HIS LAST VISIT TO ISRAEL AFTER THE RAID ON THE IRAQUI NUCLEAR REACTOR HE HAD A WELL-PUBLICISED ROW WITH BEGIN.

F C O PASS SAVING TO: PARIS ROME MOSCOW
WRIGHT

MIDDLE EAST
STANDARD

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

NENAD	MAED
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ECD	MR EGERTON
WED	MR THOMAS
RID	MR HAYES
SEC D	CABINET OFFICE

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6

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG
CABINET OFFICE

Multinational Force in the Lebanon

The Prime Minister has seen your minute of 14 July, Mr. Heseltine's minute of 15 July and Sir Geoffrey Howe's undated minute on the above subject.

In Mrs. Thatcher's view, we cannot respond positively to the suggestions by Mr. McFarlane that we should consider expanding the British contingent in the MNF or consider putting together a Commonwealth contingent. She believes that we must be frank in our reply on both these points so that there can be no misunderstanding.

As regards the wording of your proposed reply, the Prime Minister would like the fourth sentence of your second paragraph to read:

> "My impression is that Ministers could not contemplate an increase in the existing contingent to enable it to take on additional responsibilities".

This would probably make the last sentence of that paragraph unnecessary.

The Prime Minister agrees with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that it would be better to delete the third paragraph of your draft.

Finally, she would prefer the fourth paragraph to be retained in its present form.

The Prime Minister has considered whether it would be desirable to hold a Ministerial discussion on this matter but would prefer not to have one at this very busy time. There will of course be an opportunity for discussion of the issues involved at the session on the Middle East which will be included in the series of meetings at Chequers in September on our strategy in international affairs.

B/F

I am copying this minute to Mr. Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Mr. Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

21 July 1983

PRIME MINISTER

We can't do either and we must be very firm & frank about it. MT

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN THE LEBANON

I apologise for a minute of some length but the object is to make it unnecessary for you to read all the attached papers.

On 2 June Sir Robert Armstrong received a telegram from Mr. McFarlane in the White House. It was a somewhat curious approach, saying that the Americans were carrying out a comprehensive review of their planning to facilitate the total withdrawal of foreign troops from the Lebanon and asking whether:-

No (a) it might be feasible to expand the British unit; or — No we are already overstretched

No (b) put together a Commonwealth contingent.

No - we haven't even been able to do this ourselves for Belize.

McFarlane said that these thoughts had no standing within the US Government.

Sir Robert Armstrong sought instructions on the reply which he should send. He proposed to make three points:-

(a) "My impression is that Ministers ~~would see serious difficulty about a proposal to~~ cannot increase the existing contingent". Later in the draft, he would state "In my judgement, therefore, Ministers would find it very difficult to contemplate that the British contingent could be increased".

(b) "I am afraid that I also have to be discouraging about the prospects for assembling a Commonwealth Force".

(c) "Of course, it would be a great prize to reach agreement for the withdrawal of all Israeli, Syrian and PLO Forces from the Lebanon; and Ministers might feel that, if a temporary increase in the British contingent was an essential element in an agreed plan that was going to have that result, they should consider it very seriously".

No

/On (a) above

On (a) above, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has said that we should make the reply slightly more negative. Rather than stating "Ministers would not find it easy to contemplate that the British contingent could be increased" we should say that they "would find it very difficult .....". I agree with this.

On (b) above, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary thought we could be a little more positive and say "I am rather doubtful whether Commonwealth countries would be willing to contribute to the Force, but I see no harm in your putting the question to, say, the Governments of Australia, Canada and New Zealand and should you do so we would be glad to give you support".

On (c) there is a disagreement. The Defence Secretary believes that we should confirm to the Americans that if it would help to bring about total withdrawal we should be willing to contemplate an enhanced British contribution. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary takes the opposite view. He believes that any hint we give on these lines runs the risk of being taken by the Americans as a commitment. Sir Anthony Parsons agrees with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. So do I. I think we should delete this thought from Sir Robert Armstrong's reply. Agree?

Finally, the Defence Secretary said that he would favour a discussion before we reached a view on the reply to be sent to the White House. I really doubt whether it is worthwhile getting Ministers together to discuss the drafting of a reply to a rather curious White House document. I suggest that I say to the Defence Secretary that you doubt whether a discussion is necessary now but that you hope that the Chequers discussion of the Middle East in September will enable us to reach a clear view on what may and may not be possible in the Lebanon. Agree?

We cannot overstretch ourselves any more. No need for a discussion. MT

A.J.C.

20 July 1983

Middle East

FILE

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 July 1983

UK Contribution to the Multinational Force (MNF)

Thank you for your letter of 19 July.

As I told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister is content that Mr. Luce should reply to an oral Question on the MNF today on the lines you propose.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Terry Matthews (HM Treasury).

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

N. B. P.R.

AR 20/7

h.a.

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

B J P Fall Esq
Private Secretary
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AL

20 July 1983

Dear Brian

UK CONTRIBUTION TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE (MNF) IN LEBANON

The Chief Secretary has seen your letter of 18 July to Richard Mottram and your letter of 19 July to John Coles. This is to confirm that he can now agree to the extension of the UK contribution to the MNF and to the replacement of the existing contingent by troops drawn from the UK, providing that the cost is shared between FCO and MOD and accommodated within their existing expenditure provisions.

with AJC?

The Chief Secretary notes Sir Geoffrey Howe's view that, if the commitment is continued beyond November, the costs could not be met by the FCO. The Chief Secretary reserves his position on that: he cannot of course accept the concept that longer term recurring commitments are a proper charge on the Contingency Reserve. If FCO now consider that UK participation in the Lebanon MNF is a long term commitment, provision should be made for it in departmental expenditure programmes. If necessary, the question could be considered in the Public Expenditure Survey. In any event in the Chief Secretary's view officials should consider the means of financing any further extension to our present commitment to the MNF in good time before the matter is raised again at Ministerial level.

The Chief Secretary has noted also Sir Geoffrey Howe's position on the current review of the UK contribution UNFICYP. He too has no wish to prejudge the outcome of this review but nevertheless considers that we should make every effort to secure worthwhile economies in this area of FCO expenditure.

Turning to the draft Parliamentary answer. He would favour the addition of an extra sentence on the following lines: "The cost will be met from within existing expenditure provisions."

I am copying this to John Coles and to Richard Mottram.

Yours sincerely

J.G. Gieve

JOHN GIEVE

Middle East
Situation Vent 15

cc Sir A. Parsons

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-~~930 7022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 3/7/4

19th July 1983

N.B.D.R.

Dear Brian,

UK CONTRIBUTION TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE (MNF)

Mr Heseltine has seen your letter to me of 18th July on the future funding arrangements for our contingent (BRITFORLEB) serving with the Multinational Force (MNF) in Lebanon.

It is his view that peacekeeping operations are foreign policy initiatives and should therefore remain the financial responsibility of the FCO. He sees no difference between the roles of the MNF and the conventional or traditional UN peace-keeping role, which was described by our Ambassador at the UN during the debate on the Renewal of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Mandate on 18th July as "the role of holding the ring militarily whilst politicians and diplomats attempt to solve the underlying problems".

Mr Heseltine does, however, recognise that the FCO's short term financial problems are not eased by our preference for undertaking the commitment in Lebanon using troops normally based in the UK. He is therefore prepared for the MOD to bear the difference in the costs to the FCO between this course and your preferred option of again drawing troops from our UNFICYP contingent. The resulting provision of £370,000 from the MOD budget to cover the three month period from August to November is made without prejudice to the funding of BRITFORLEB after November, to how any such commitment should be undertaken, or to the established MISC 42 principle of how peacekeeping operations should be funded. MOD officials have agreed with the Treasury that a PESC transfer from this Department to yours will be necessary in order to make this provision.

Mr Heseltine fully agrees with Sir Geoffrey Howe's comments on the UNFICYP Review.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Prime Minister and to the Chief Secretary.

Yours ever,

Jane Ridley

(J E RIDLEY) (MISS)

B J P Fall Esq

cc Sir A Parsons

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 July 1983

Dear John

UK Contribution to the Multinational Force (MNF)

Richard Mottram informed me by telephone this morning that in view of the Ministry of Defence's strong preference to use UK-based troops for the extension of our contribution to the Multinational Force, Mr Heseltine had agreed with Sir Geoffrey Howe's suggestion (my letter of 18 July) that the Ministry of Defence would meet the full additional cost of £370,000 which would otherwise fall to the FCO budget. The way is now clear therefore for us to inform the Lebanese Government of the extension of our deployment and to make a public announcement.

In his letter of 5 July to John Coles, John Holmes said that Sir Geoffrey Howe believed that we should not carry conviction if we were to say publicly yet again that our contribution is limited to a further 3 months. He therefore proposed that we should inform the Lebanese and other parties concerned that we shall keep our continued participation under close review, and that we have no intention of being drawn into a lengthy commitment. We would, nevertheless, for our own purpose reconsider the position after 3 months.

It would be appropriate to announce the extension of our contribution in the House during oral Questions to the FCO tomorrow. Mr Robert Brown MP has put down a question to ask the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary 'whether he has had discussions with the Lebanese Government concerning the future deployment of the British contingent to the Multinational Force in Lebanon'. Sir Geoffrey Howe proposes that the reply (which would be given by Mr Luce) should be as follows:

> 'We are informing the Lebanese Government that we are willing to extend our deployment for a limited period beyond 7 August. We shall

/continue

continue to keep in close touch with the Lebanese government and the other contributors to the Multinational Force, and the deployment of the British contingent will be kept under review.'

Sir Geoffrey Howe would be grateful to know before mid-day tomorrow (Wednesday) whether the Prime Minister, Mr Heseltine and the Chief Secretary are content with what he proposes. If so, we would at the same time inform the Lebanese government and the other troop contributors of our decision. We would also tell the United Nations Secretariat and the Cyprus Government that we intend after 7 August to use UK-based troops, and thus to restore our UNFICYP contingent to its full strength.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Terry Matthews (Treasury).

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

5

PM/83/53

PRIME MINISTER

Multinational Force in the Lebanon

1. On my return from Washington I have seen Robert Armstrong's minute of 14 July to Mr Coles and Michael Heseltine's minute of 15 July on the same subject.

2. I agree with Michael Heseltine that in the circumstances described in paragraph 2 of his minute we might feel it necessary to contemplate an enhanced British contribution for a very short period. However, I think it would be better not to hold out this possibility to the Americans at this stage, when the prospects of achieving an agreed withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Lebanon in the near future are so uncertain, to say the least. Anything that we said about this now would inevitably be taken by those concerned in Washington as a commitment more or less. It would, therefore, be better in my view if paragraph 3 of Robert Armstrong's proposed reply were omitted. On the other hand the last sentence of the previous paragraph might, perhaps, be toned down by saying that 'Ministers would not find it easy to contemplate that the British contingent could be increased' rather than 'would find it very difficult ...'

3. I agree with Michael Hesltine that the passage on the Commonwealth in paragraph 4 of the draft reply could be made rather more positive. I suggest something along the following lines:

/'I am

'I am rather doubtful too whether Commonwealth countries would be willing to contribute to the Force, but I see no harm in your putting the question to, say, the governments of Australia, Canada and New Zealand and should you do so we would be glad to give you support.'

4. I should be happy to have a discussion, as Michael Heseltine suggests, if you think it necessary.

5. I am sending copies of this minute to the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of the Cabinet.

GH.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

19.7.83

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 July 1983

Dear Richard,

UK Contribution to the Multinational Force (MNF)

Sir Geoffrey Howe has seen Jane Ridley's letter of 8 July giving Mr Heseltine's view on the extension of our contribution to the Multinational Force (MNF) and John Gieve's letter of 12 July about the financial aspects. Since then, MOD officials have given us revised figures for the full costs to be charged for a three month deployment. These are £790,000 if troops from the UK are used, and £720,000 if we continue to use troops drawn from our UNFICYP contingent.

Sir Geoffrey Howe has noted the Chief Secretary's view that the FCO's unallocated provision was designed to accommodate foreign policy initiatives of this sort. He does not necessarily accept that deployments which are not United Nations peacekeeping operations are a proper charge on the FCO. Moreover he considers that it was not envisaged that the FCO's contingency reserve would be drained by large recurring payments of the size of our contribution to the MNF, nor that they should cover such longer term commitments which in his view are a proper charge on the Central Contingency Reserve.

Nevertheless, in view of the urgent need for the Ministry of Defence to decide whether the troops to be used after 7 August should be drawn from the UK or from UNFICYP, Sir Geoffrey Howe is willing to meet, without prejudice to the principle, out of the FCO's unallocated reserves the costs of a further three month extension of our contribution. He has noted the strong preference of Mr Heseltine to draw on UK-based forces and he realises that the absence of part of our contingent is unwelcome to the UN Commander and the Cyprus government. However, bearing in mind the substantial offsetting saving to the FCO contribution to UNFICYP of £300,000 from using troops from there, he hopes that Mr Heseltine will agree either that we should continue to draw on our UNCIFYP contingent or that the MOD should finance the total £370,000 difference if troops from the UK are used. Even with this saving, the costs of one more extension of BRITFORLEB will almost entirely exhaust the FCO's unallocated reserve for this financial year. If therefore there is to be any continuation of this commitment after November, Sir Geoffrey Howe will expect the costs to be met from elsewhere.

CONFIDENTIAL /Sir Geoffrey

Sir Geoffrey Howe has also noted the Chief Secretary's views about the current review of the UK contribution to UNFICYP. He sees no reason to prejudge the outcome of this review and in any case he understands that the review is unlikely to affect the scout car squadron at present deployed in Lebanon.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Prime Minister and to the Chief Secretary.

Yours ever

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

R Mottram Esq
Ministry of Defence

4

MO 3/7/4

Copy to:

Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary

Secretary of the Cabinet

PRIME MINISTER

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN THE LEBANON

will ASC?

I read with interest Robert Armstrong's minute to Mr Coles of 14th July enclosing a possible draft reply to the message received from the White House about the use of the Multinational Force (MNF) in the Lebanon.

2. I do not myself see much evidence that there is a realistic prospect that Israeli, Syrian and PLO forces might be removed from the Lebanon. We must also do nothing which might suck us into an open-ended commitment on a large scale whose contribution was in reality not much greater than that provided by our present highly effective but limited force. This said, I believe that, were a great prize in prospect, we should be willing to contemplate an enhanced British contribution and that the Americans would not understand a reply to the contrary. We should also not discard the possibility of involving our Commonwealth partners in such an enterprise without satisfying ourselves that it really would not be feasible.

3. I would therefore favour a discussion of what may and may not be possible in the Lebanon before you reach a view on the reply to be sent to the White House. At the very least, I am sure that we should couch the message in less negative terms generally and leave in Paragraph 3.

Michael Heseltine

Ministry of Defence
15th July 1983

Middle East: Iraq: Pt 11

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

FROM TEL AVIV 141313Z JUL 83
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 193 OF 14 JUL 83
INFO PRIORITY MODUK, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS - NEW YORK, PARIS, ROME.
INFO SAVING CAIRO AND JEDDA

MY TELEGRAM NO 189 : ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. THE DA IS REPORTING TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE INDICATIONS THAT SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF ISRAELI ARMOURED VEHICLES HAVE BEEN MOVING SOUTH THROUGH LEBANON TOWARDS THE ISRAELI BORDER. MILITARY ATTACHE HAS TODAY OBSERVED EMPTY TRANSPORTERS HEADING NORTH FROM ISRAEL INTO LEBANON (I.E. PRESUMABLY TO BRING BACK TANKS, APC'S ETC).

2. THE ISRAELI CHIEF OF STAFF GAVE A TELEVISION INTERVIEW LAST NIGHT (13 JULY) IN WHICH HE SPOKE OF A WITHDRAWAL BY THE IDF TO A LINE ALONG THE AWALI RIVER. TRANSCRIPT IS NOT YET AVAILABEL BUT LEVY IS QUOTED IN TODAY'S PRESS AS SAYING THAT :
A) A CABINET DECISION ON REDEPLOYMENT WOULD BE TAKEN SOON (HE WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON WHETHER BEFORE OR AFTER BEGIN'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON) SEMICOLON
B) THE WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT BE UNILATERAL BUT SHOULD BE SEEN AS PART OF A PLAN TO IMPLEMENT THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT, ONE AIM OF WHICH WAS THE COMPLETE EVACUATION OF THE IDF FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY SEMICOLON
C) LEBANESE MILITARY LEADERS HAD ASSURED HIM RECENTLY THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY COULD NOW TAKE OVER THE WHOLE OF SOUTHERN LEBANON '' IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE'' (SIC). HE THOUGHT THE LEBANESE SHOULD HAVE NO PROBLEMS IN TAKING OVER THE 20 PER CENT OF ISRAELI HELD TERRITORY COVERED BY THE REDEPLOYMENT PLAN.

3. LEVY ALSO MADE THE OBVIOUS POINT THAT THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES IN LEBANON WAS NOT NECESSARILY A FUNCTION OF THE AMOUNT OF TERRITIORY CONTROLLED BY THE IDF.

4.. PRESS REPORTS SUGGEST THAT WHEREAS ARENS FAVOURS A WITHDRAWAL TO THE AWALI IN STAGES LEVY WANTS TO DO IT IN ONE FELL SWOOP

(LESS COSTLY IN MILITARY TERMS).

PRENDERGAST
BT

MIDDLE EAST
STANDARD

NENAD	MAED
MED	ESSD
NAD	ERD
SAD	ESID
UND	CONS D
EESD	CONS EM UNIT
ECD	MR EGERTON
WED	MR THOMAS
RID	MR HAYES
SEC D	CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

RESTRICTED

3

Ref. AO83/2064

MR COLES

With my minute of 4th July (AO83/1946) I sent you a copy of a signal which I had received from the White House about the use of the multinational force (MNF) in Lebanon.

2. It was a curious document: sent as a personal 'feeler', but the author can hardly have expected me to reply without consultation and would hardly attach much value to the reply unless he thought that I had at least some reason to write as I did.

--- 3. I now attach a possible draft reply. It is in general negative, and designed to crush any expectation that we might agree to increase the size of the British contingent in the MNF. The question is whether I should offer any chink in the door, to suggest that Ministers might be prepared to think again if an increase in the British contingent was an essential element in an agreed plan that was going to result in the intolerance of Israeli, Syrian and PLO forces from the Lebanon. That would be a great prize: do we want the Americans to think that there are no circumstances in which we would help them to achieve it? If we do, paragraph 3 of the draft must come out. If we want to leave a little chink, paragraph 3 offers that.

4. I should be grateful for instructions.

5. I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence.

RTA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

14 July 1983

DRAFT LETTER FROM SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG TO MR ROBERT C MCFARLANE, THE WHITE HOUSE

Thank you for your personal message of 2 July about the withdrawal of foreign forces from the Lebanon. I appreciate your consulting me on a personal basis while your thinking is still at a formative stage, and I am replying in the same spirit.

Without wider consultation than I have thought it right to undertake on the basis of your message, I cannot say with certainty how British Ministers would react to a considered American request that the British contingent to the multinational force (MNF) should be expanded for the purposes you have in mind. The British Government, as you know, warmly supports the efforts your Government is making to find a peaceful and lasting solution in the Lebanon. That was why we agreed to provide the existing British contingent to the MNF. But my impression is that Ministers would see serious difficulty about a proposal to increase the existing contingent to enable it to take on additional responsibilities. You yourself refer to the strains imposed on Britain by the many overseas commitments which we are carrying. Our armed forces are already overstretched to meet these commitments while at the same time discharging their primary NATO roles on the European mainland and in the Eastern Atlantic; and we have been able to find

the men for the existing British contingent to the MNF only by some diversion of resources from inescapable commitments elsewhere. In my judgment, therefore, Ministers would find it very difficult to contemplate that the British contingent could be increased.

Of course it would be a great prize to reach agreement for the withdrawal of all Israeli, Syrian and PLO forces from Lebanon; and Ministers might feel that, if a temporary increase in the British contingent was an essential element in an agreed plan that was going to have that result, they should consider it very seriously. But I think that they would need to feel sure that the prize was firmly within your grasp; and, if they were prepared to contemplate any increase in the British contingent, they would certainly want to set a strict and short time limit to the period.

I am afraid that I also have to be discouraging about the prospects for assembling a Commonwealth force. There is no Commonwealth country with as strong an interest in the Middle East as the countries which are at present contributing to the MNF, and I just do not think that Britain would be able to persuade the Commonwealth as such to become directly involved. It is conceivable that one or two of them - Australia or Canada for example - might respond to a direct approach from the Government of the United States: but I would not rate the prospects very high.

cc NO

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

See later correspondence.

J E Holmes Esq
Private Secretary
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AL

12 July 1983

Dear John

LEBANON: UK CONTRIBUTION TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE (MNF)

with AJC?

The Chief Secretary has seen copies of your letter of 5 July to John Coles and of Jane Ridley's letter of 8 July. In his view it would be quite wrong to agree to the extension of the deployment of the UK contingent in the Lebanon MNF until the financing question has been settled; nor can he accept any claim on the Contingency Reserve for this purpose. The importance of keeping down public expenditure this year does not need any further underlining. In the Chief Secretary's view the proper course is for FCO and MOD together to work out the cost of the proposed extension and how it can be accommodated within their existing expenditure provisions. The FCO's unallocated provision was of course designed to accommodate foreign policy initiatives of this sort. If neither Department is prepared to accept the cost (which I understand is in the order of £700,000 - £1 million for a three months' extension), the conclusion should be that the policy is not of sufficient priority to be worth pursuing.

On the question of whether the UK contingent should continue to be drawn from Cyprus or from the UK the Chief Secretary notes Mr Heseltine's preference for drawing on UK based forces and for returning the present contingent to Cyprus. Both the Chancellor and the Chief Secretary however are convinced that it would not be appropriate to restore the strength of the UK contingent in UNFICYP until Ministers have seen the findings of the current review of the level of our commitment to this force which should be available in early October. As you may know, that review, is not simply a "housekeeping" exercise. Its objective is to assess the maximum possible scope for economies. If in advance of the review Mr Heseltine wishes to replace our contingent in the Lebanon with UK based troops, the Chief Secretary considers that MOD should be prepared to bear the additional cost.

As regards the time limit for any extension, the Chief Secretary is content with Sir Geoffrey Howe's proposal that if Ministers agree to an extension this decision should be considered again in three months time. He notes Mr Heseltine's view that from a military planning point of view a six months extension would be preferable but considers that the decision on this matter should rest with the Department which is responsible for paying for the contribution.

I am copying this letter to John Coles and Richard Mottram.

Yours sincerely

J.S. Gieve

JOHN GIEVE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-~~930 0222~~ 218 2111/3

MO 3/7/4

8th July 1983

See later correspondence.

Dear John

LEBANON: UK CONTRIBUTION TO THE MNF

with DOC?

Thank you for your letter of 30th June which has been seen by the Defence Secretary. This raises three main issues.

First, I can confirm that Mr Heseltine accepts that there is a strong political case, for the reasons set out in your letter, for a continuing British contribution to the MNF. If we do remain, however, it would be preferable from a military planning point of view for this to be for a period of six months rather than three (subject of course to the possibility that our contribution might no longer be needed from some earlier date).

Secondly there is the question of whether the force should continue to be drawn from Cyprus or from the UK. The Defence Secretary's view on this remains as expressed in his minute of 3rd May to the then Foreign Secretary. Our strong preference would be to draw on UK based forces for any future deployment in the Lebanon. As Mr Heseltine's minute pointed out, the absence of two thirds of the UNFICYP squadron is placing unreasonable demands on the remaining two troops, and as you will be aware, the UN have made strong representations to have the force restored to full strength. The Defence Secretary has noted the view expressed in John Gieve's letter of 1st July to John Coles that the current review of UNFICYP should have a bearing on this question. However, it is our understanding that the scope of this review, agreed between Treasury, FCO and MOD officials, is that it should be a primarily "housekeeping" exercise designed to see if we can carry out effectively the functions entrusted to UNFICYP more economically by reduction, for example, in logistic support. It is thus most unlikely that the review will suggest any significant changes in the armoured reconnaissance capability which is the most valuable operational contribution we make to the force. Moreover we face the problem of replacing the BRITFORLEB contribution now, whereas the review of UNFICYP is scheduled to allow decisions to be taken in time for the next renewal of the mandate at the end of this year. The review should therefore not stand in the way of the early restoration of the UNFICYP squadron to full strength.

J E Holmes Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

This raises the third issue, that of finance. We appreciate that to cease to fund BRITFORLEB from resources originally intended for UNFICYP will place an additional burden on the FCO budget. But MISC 42 was quite clear that peacekeeping operations, which are carried out for essentially political rather than defence policy reasons, should be paid for by the FCO, and Mr Heseltine sees no reason for re-opening this issue. He would, however, be willing to support the Foreign Secretary in an approach to the Chancellor for an additional allocation to FCO votes to meet the cost of BRITFORLEB. Although the original decision was that the contribution should be met from existing programmes, this was on the understanding that the commitment would be for three months only. Now that we are considering a second extension of the force there is clearly a case for reconsidering this point.

Finally I should also mention the question of the possible deployment of BRITFORLEB outside the Beirut area. While we remain opposed to the original Lebanese proposal for an extension into the Chouf, another proposal has now been put forward for a more limited extension involving patrolling the coast road from Beirut to Damour. This is something which we would not rule out, provided there were corresponding reductions in our present patrol programme and that there was no requirement for additional UK forces. The details of this proposal are being studied further at present.

Yours ever,

Jane Ridley

(J E RIDLEY) (MISS)

Middle East Situation, Pt II

Sir A. Parsons.

Prime Minister

For information.

6/7.

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. COLES

MNF LEBANON - THE BRITISH CONTINGENT

On the assumption that it is decided to extend our contingent for a further three months from 7 August, the next problem which the Prime Minister will have to face is the question of redeployment following a partial Israeli withdrawal. This problem could easily come up during the recess. The Prime Minister may therefore like to be briefed on the background as it is at present.

There is a coordinating committee in Beirut under Lebanese Army chairmanship, comprising the Ambassadors and military commanders of the various contingents in the MNF. Fortunately, the British Commander, Colonel Cochrane, is obviously a man of outstanding ability and political sense. He is more than holding his own in the Committee.

The situation as of last weekend is as follows. The Committee is considering contingency plans for redeployment of the MNF in the event of partial or total Israeli withdrawal. The current idea is that the MNF should not be deployed in the hinterland if the Israelis withdraw. The Lebanese Army would deploy in the inland areas evacuated by the Israelis and the MNF would be used to patrol the main roads. The latest sugestion is that the French would be responsible for the main road between Beirut and the Syrian frontier: the Italians would look after the road running north from Beirut to Tripoli: and the British and Americans would be responsible for the road running south along the coast from Beirut to the Awali River. In order to avoid our being too identified with and integrated with the American contingent, Colonel Cochrane has suggested that the best redeployment for the British contingent would be to look after the short stretch of road running south from Beirut for about 25 miles to the Damour River. This seems to me a very sensible suggestion.

It is, of course, likely that the various Lebanese factions will not consent to the Lebanese Army on its own being responsoble for internal security in their areas and that they may insist on the MNF being deployed in the hinterland. If so, I believe that we should strongly resist such a deployment for the British contingent and should insist on our force being used to patrol a stretch of main road such as the one suggested above. It would be both wrong and dangerous for a small reconnaissance unit to become embroiled in the civil war situation which is likely to continue in the mountains south of Beirut.

/I will

I will continue to keep an eye on these developments.

A.D. PARSONS
6 July 1983

Prime Minister

Read in full.

So much for the Bush's insistence that we should not divulge this information!

A.J.C. 6/7.

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 450
CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 052333Z JUL 83
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1878 OF 5 JULY
INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, MUSCAT,
ROUTINE CAIRO, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, ROME, MOSCOW, MODUK

ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. THE MEDIA HERE HAVE GIVEN PROMINENCE TO A STORY FIRST LEAKED TO THE MIDDLE EAST POLICY SURVEY LAST WEEK THAT HABIB SUGGESTED TO THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY SHOULD CONSIDER SETTING A TIMETABLE FOR UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON.

2. PENDLETON (STATE DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR FOR ISRAEL) HAS TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE THAT HABIB, WITH THE APPROVAL OF SHULTZ AND THE WHITE HOUSE, PUT THIS TO THE ISRAELIS AS AN OPTION WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION, THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF AMERICAN PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS TO ACCEPT IT. THE ISRAELIS, PREDICTABLY, HAD BEEN VERY UNENTHUSIASTIC, NOT LEAST BECAUSE THE PROPOSAL WAS VERY CLOSE TO WHAT THE ISRAELI LABOUR PARTY ARE ADVOCATING. HABIB'S APPROACH DID HOWEVER SEEM TO HAVE STIMULATED THE ISRAELIS TO NEW THINKING ABOUT POSSIBLE WAYS FORWARD. BUT THIS PROCESS HAD BEEN STOPPED BY THE LEAK: THE ISRAELIS WERE DETERMINED TO DO NOTHING TO REINFORCE THE SYRIAN IMPRESSION THAT ALL THEY HAVE TO DO IS SIT TIGHT. PENDLETON AGREED THAT THE LEAK, ALMOST CERTAINLY FROM AN AMERICAN SOURCE, HAD SET BACK THE PROSPECTS FOR A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.

3. THE STATE DEPARTMENT BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET IS LIKELY SOON TO TAKE A DECISION IN PRINCIPLE IN FAVOUR OF PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL, BUT THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH A DECISION IS LIKELY TO BE DELAYED UNTIL AFTER BEGIN'S VISIT HERE. THE ISRAELIS HAVE NOT CONSULTED THE AMERICANS IN DETAIL ABOUT PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL AND, SO FAR AS THE STATE DEPARTMENT KNOW, HAVE NOT DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT WITH THE LEBANESE. PENDLETON DREW SOME COMFORT FROM THE POSTPONEMENT OF DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE BY THE ISRAELI CABINET: HE SUGGESTED THAT THE DECLINE IN IDF CASUALTIES OVER THE LAST FORTNIGHT MIGHT TEMPORARILY HAVE TAKEN SOME OF THE HEAT OUT OF THE ISSUE.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 4. FOR

4. FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH, PENDLETON SAW LITTLE CHANCE OF A BREAKTHROUGH AS A RESULT OF SHULTZ'S CURRENT VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT SHULTZ THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO ENGAGE THE SYRIANS DIRECTLY AND TO TALK FURTHER TO GEMAYEL AND BEGIN BEFORE THEIR VISITS TO WASHINGTON LATER THIS MONTH.

WRIGHT

MIDDLE EAST

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CONS D
CONS EM UNIT
MR EGERTON
MR THOMAS
MR HAYES
CABINET OFFICE

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THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

PS/TO. NO. 10. DOWNING STREET.

GR 750

CONFIDENTIAL

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FROM TEL AVIV 051315Z JUL 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 186 OF 5 JULY 1983

INFO BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK.

INFO SAVING JERUSALEM, PARIS AND ROME.

Read in full.

MY TELNO 177: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. HOW BADLY ARE THE ISRAELIS STUCK IN LEBANON?

2. OF COURSE THEIR POSITION LOOKS THOROUGHLY UNCOMFORTABLE. THE GAINS FROM THEIR INVASION OF LEBANON A YEAR AGO REMAIN TANTALISINGLY OUT OF REACH. THE CASUALTY FIGURES DEEPLY TROUBLE EVERYONE FROM RESERVISTS TO MR BEGIN HIMSELF. IF THERE WAS A CONSENSUS TO CLEAR THE PLO OUT OF SOUTHERN LEBANON IN THE FIRST PLACE, NOW THERE IS A CONSENSUS TO BRING THE BOYS HOME - IF ONLY SECURITY FOR NORTHERN ISRAEL COULD BE ASSURED. THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT SEEMED THE WAY TO SQUARE THAT CIRCLE, ONLY TO BE BLOCKED BY DAMASCUS.

3. HENCE THE GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION TO RE-DRAW ISRAELI FORWARD POSITIONS AS A STOPGAP. DEFENCE MINISTER ARENS TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT ISRAEL IS NOT PREPARED INDEFINITELY TO DO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S WORK FOR HIM, MEANING THAT THE ISRAELIS FEEL THEY ARE STAYING IN THE THANKLESS SURROUNDINGS OF THE SHOUF AREA BECAUSE THE LEBANESE (AND AMERICANS) ARE UNWILLING TO EXERT THEMSELVES.

4. WOULD ISRAEL SAVE ON CASUALTIES AND ON THE COSTS OF OCCUPATION BY PULLING BACK SOME MILES? ARENS WAS CONFIDENT THAT THIS WOULD BE SO. HE RECOGNISED THE NEED OF COURSE FOR SOME EFFECTIVE FILL-IN AS THE IDF WITHDRAWS TO AVOID THE SYRIANS AND THEIR ALLIES MOVING IN BEHIND. WOULD IT SOLVE ANYTHING IN THE LONG RUN? THE ANSWER TO THIS IS ONE STEP AT A TIME. IDF REDEPLOYMENT IS BEING PRESENTED HERE AS A PHASED PULL-BACK (MOST LIKELY NEW LINES: DAMOUR OR AWALI). IN MY VIEW THIS IS DESIGNED TO LEAVE LONGER-TERM OPTIONS OPEN. THE LEBANESE ARMY MAY GAIN IN STRENGTH AND EFFECTIVENESS, ALTHOUGH THE ISRAELIS ARE LESS OPTIMISTIC THAN THE AMERICANS ABOUT THAT PROCESS. ASSAD, FOR WHOM THE ISRAELIS HAVE CONSIDERABLE RESPECT AS A POLITICAL OPERATOR, MAY EVENTUALLY NEGOTIATE. ONLY TIME WILL SHOW THE ISRAELIS. MEANWHILE THEY ARE WILLING TO WAIT AND NOT BURN THEIR BOATS OVER TOTAL WITHDRAWAL.

5. PLENTY OF ISRAELIS CRITICISE THE GOVERNMENT. A FEW ADVOCATE UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL. BUT I BELIEVE MOST STILL PREFER TO HANG ON UNTIL A DEAL IS TO BE HAD. THE GOVERNMENT CAN PROBABLY SURVIVE THE DOMESTIC PRESSURES OVER LEBANON ON ITS PRESENT COURSE. ITS UNPOPULARITY OWES MORE TO ITS ECONOMIC POLICIES.

/6.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. THE RISE IN ISRAEL'S STOCK ABROAD, PARTICULARLY IN THE UNITED STATES, AFTER SIGNING THE LEBANON AGREEMENT WAS WELCOMED WITH RELIEF HERE. I SUSPECT IT MAY REPRESENT A PLATEAU. A DRIFT INTO APPARENTLY INDEFINITE OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN LEBANON COULD WELL FRAY TEMPERS AGAIN IN WASHINGTON, NOT TO MENTION THE COMMUNITY CAPITALS.

7. NOT ALL IS GLOOM FROM ISRAEL'S POINT OF VIEW:-
(A) ARAFAT. THE ISRAELIS CAN SCARCELY CONCEAL THEIR GLEE AT HIS DISCOMFORTURE. THIS MAY SEEM SHORTSIGHTED. BUT AS ARENS PUT IT TO ME, ISRAEL'S WORST FEAR IS A COALITION OF ARAB ENEMIES AND ANYTHING WHICH UNDERMINES THAT PROSPECT IS GOOD FOR ISRAEL. ARENS ADDED THAT IT ALSO SUITS ISRAEL FOR THE PLO TO BE BROUGHT UNDER THE CONTROL OF A SOVEREIGN STATE SINCE ITS ACTIONS ARE PREDICTABLE AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM CAN BE PINPOINTED. INDEED THE PRESS IS HAILING CUM-UPPANCE FOR THE PLO AS AN INDIRECT GESULT OF ISRAEL'S ACTIONS IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE WAR SEMICOLON
(B) WEST BANK. THE SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME CONTINUES APACE WHILE THEY EYES OF THE WORLD REMAIN ON LEBANON. THIS MAY NOT HAVE BEEN A DETERMINING FACTOR FOR ISRAELI POLICY IN LEBANON, BUT IT CERTAINLY SUITS MR BEGIN. PEACE IN LEBANON WOULD SHIFT THE SPOTLIGHT AGAIN TO THE WEST BANK. IF THE ISRAELIS ARE BREWING UP SOME NEW INITIATIVE TO NEGOTIATE ARAB AUTONOMY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, TAKING ADVANTAGE PERHAPS OF CURRENT PLO WEAKNESS, THEY ARE KEEPING QUIET ABOUT IT SEMICOLON
(C) SHARON. THE ARCHITECT OF THE LEBANESE CAMPAIGN STAYS RELEGATED TO THE SIDELINES. ALTHOUGH STILL IN THE CABINET, FEW PEOPLE BELIEVE HE NOW EXERCISES REAL INFLUENCE AND FEWER STILL AMONG THOSE WHO COUNT WOULD WELCOME HIS RETURN. THIS WAS ONE CLEAR GAIN FROM THE REFUGEE MASSACRE INQUIRY. SHARON'S SUCCESSOR IS TOUGH BUT LEVEL-HEADED AND LESS LIABLE TO DRAG ISRAEL INTO WILD VENTURES.

8. THE LESSON OF LEBANON HAS BEEN HARD BUT I BELIEVE IT IS SINKING IN: THAT COMPLEX POLITICAL CHALLNGES CANNOT EASILY BE RESOLVED BY MILITARY MEANS. MY IMPRESSION IS THAT ISRAEL'S PRESENT LEADERS ARE MORE CALCULATING AND HAVE A FIRMER GRASP OF REALITY THAN THE STOCK PUNCH AND JUDY FIGURES THEY ARE SOMETIMES PORTRAYED AS. IT IS IRONIC THAT OPERATION ''PEACE FOR GALILEE'', WHICH AT ITS OUTSET CARRIED OVERTONES OF MUCH WIDER ISRAELI OBJECTIVES, SHOULD NOW HAVE COME DOWN TO ITS ORIGINALLY DECLARED AIMS FOR LEADERS AND LED ALIKE. IF THEY THOUGHT THEY COULD ACTUALLY GET PEACE FOR GALILEE THEY WOULD LEAVE LEBANON TOMORROW.

9. FCO PASS SAVING PARIS AND ROME.
MOBERLY

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

MIDDLE EAST

STANDARD

NENAD	MAED
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ECD	MR EGERTON
WED	MR THOMAS
RID	MR HAYES
SEC D	CABINET OFFICE

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CONFIDENTIAL

cc Sir AP

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 July 1983

See later correspondence.

Dear John,

UK Contribution to the Multinational Force (MNF)

Sir Geoffrey Howe has seen a copy of John Gieve's letter of 1 July to you.

He considers that, if we decide to extend the commitment after the second three month period which ends in August, we should make absolutely clear to the Lebanese and other parties concerned that we shall keep our continued participation under close review and that we have no intention of being drawn into a lengthy commitment. He is content that this should mean for our purposes that we reconsider the position after three months, and that there is no agreement to deployment beyond that time, but believes that we should not carry conviction if we were to say publicly yet again that our contribution is limited to a further three months.

As far as future financing is concerned, Sir Geoffrey Howe is unable to agree that the cost of any extension in Lebanon should simply be met from his existing expenditure programmes. The expenditure has already been borne by the FCO for six months on a full-costs basis. He is unable to identify off-setting savings in other programmes which would enable him to fund a further extension, even of only three months. Our small contingency reserves would be virtually exhausted if he did so (particularly if the considerably more expensive option of using troops from the UK rather than Cyprus were adopted). While of course we hope that the MNF contingent will not be a continuing liability, its extension beyond the existing period does mean, in Sir Geoffrey Howe's view, that it is no longer an appropriate use of these small reserves but rather a proper call on the Central Contingency Reserve which exists for these purposes. If the Chief Secretary insists that the financial implications should be agreed before a decision on

/extension

extension is made, Sir G Howe will wish to make a bid for provision from the CCR accordingly. In any event, as I indicated in my letter of 30 June, he will wish at least to discuss the existing 'full costs' formula with his colleagues.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Chief Secretary to the Treasury and the Defence Secretary.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Number 10 Downing Street

MIDDLE EAST. Situation
Pt 11

2

Ref. A083/1946

MR COLES Await further advice.
A.J.C. 4/7 p.a.

I attach a copy of a signal which I have received from the White House about the use of the multinational force in the Lebanon.

2. It is a curious document. In effect it invites my personal comments on a proposition which, if the message is to be believed, has no greater authority within the United States Government than the standing of its sender, Mr Robert C McFarlane; and I am told that he does not wish to get my colleagues in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office stirred up.

3. You will see that the request is for my comment whether it might be feasible to expand the British force in Lebanon - or to supplement it with a Commonwealth contingent - so that it can not only maintain a reassuring presence in the city of Beirut but can also keep a watch on the port and the airhead.

4. I am meeting Sir Antony Acland and Sir Clive Whitmore tomorrow afternoon on other business, and propose to take the opportunity of discussing this message with them. In the light of that, I will submit further advice about how to deal with this curious approach.

RTA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

4 July 1983

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PERSONAL FOR SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG FROM ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJ: LEBANON--WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES

SIR ROBERT,

1. FOR REASONS YOU WILL APPRECIATE, WE ARE ON THE VERGE OF A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF OUR PLANNING TO FACILITATE THE TOTAL CONCURRENT AND PROMPT WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI, SYRIAN AND PLO FORCES FROM LEBANON. THAT REVIEW MIGHT INCLUDE SOME CONSIDERATION OF HOW WE CAN USE OUR MULTINATIONAL FORCES IN THE FIRST INSTANCE TO FACILITATE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL THE OCCUPATION FORCES. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE MAY ALSO WANT TO CONSIDER HOW WE COULD USE THE MNF TO ACTIVELY TRAIN THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES (LAF) IN THE MISSION OF PROVIDING FOR THE LONG-TERM SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY WITHIN RESTORED FRONTIERS. THAT SAID, THE FOREGOING SHOULD NOT IMPLY THAT WE ARE THINKING OF VOLUNTEERING THE MNF TO UNDERTAKE EITHER AN INTERNAL SECURITY ROLE OR AN ACTIVE COMBAT MISSION.

2. MY OWN THINKING IS THAT ONE POSSIBLE WAY TO RECONCILE ISRAELI AND SYRIAN CONCERNS FOR THE SECURITY OF THEIR BORDERS WITH THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON WOULD BE TO DEPLOY THE LAF WITH CORRESPONDING MNF CONTINGENTS INTO THE AREAS GRADUALLY VACATED BY ISRAELI, SYRIAN, AND PALESTINIAN FORCES. THE CORRESPONDING MNF CONTINGENTS (HIGHLY MOBILE UNITS SPECIALIZED FOR SURVEILLANCE AND PATROL) MIGHT BE CHOSEN IN A WAY WHICH TAKES CAREFUL ACCOUNT OF THE PECULIAR SENSITIVITIES OF THE WITHDRAWING PARTIES. FOR THAT REASON THE USMNF WOULD PROBABLY BE MOST HELPFUL IN THE SOUTHERN ZONE, CONTIGUOUS TO ISRAEL, AND THE EUROPEAN CONTINGENTS IN THE NORTH AND EAST.

3. RECOGNIZING THE STRAIN IMPOSED BY THE MANY OVERSEAS COMMITMENTS YOUR COUNTRY HAS ALREADY UNDERTAKEN, I AM INCLINED TO THINK THAT WHILE THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN CONTINGENTS MIGHT HELP IN THE EASTERN AND NORTHERN SECTORS, THERE WOULD BE A CRUCIAL ROLE FOR BRITISH FORCES IN BEIRUT. DO YOU THINK IT NIGHT BE FEASIBLE TO EXPAND THE BRITISH UNIT--OR POSSIBLY UNDERTAKE TO PUT TOGETHER A COMMONWEALTH CONTINGENT--TO KEEP A WATCH ON THE PORT AND THE AIRHEAD AS WELL AS TO MAINTAIN A REASSURING PRESENCE IN THE CITY.

4. SIR ROBERT PLEASE BEAR IN MIND THAT THE FOREGOING REPRESENTS VERY

END OF PAGE 01

TENTATIVE AND PRELIMINARY THINKING OF MY OWN. THESE THOUGHTS HAVE NO STANDING WITHIN THE US GOVERNMENT AND THUS, I DO NOT WISH TO GET YOUR COLLEAGUES IN THE FCO STIRRED UP. BUT... BEFORE THE DISCUSSION HERE IN WASHINGTON GETS TOO FAR ALONG, I WOULD GREATLY PROFIT FROM YOUR SAGE ADVICE ON WHAT, IF ANYTHING, IN YOUR JUDGMENT CAN BE DONE ALONG THE LINES DISCUSSED ABOVE.

WARMEST REGARDS,
BUD.

DECL: OADR
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Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London SW1

1 July 1983

See later correspondence.

MR 20/6.

Dear Tim.

LEBANON: UK CONTRIBUTION TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE (MNF)

with DOZ?

The Chief Secretary has seen John Holmes' letters of ~~28~~ and ~~30~~ June to you and Richard Mottram respectively. It is in his view essential that the financial implications of extending the UK's commitment to the MNF should be considered before, not after, a decision is taken. Whilst he recognises the political difficulty in withdrawing the UK contingent (despite the original intention that it should not remain longer than 3 months whatever the circumstances in the Lebanon), he doubts whether it is wise to extend our commitment without specifying any time limit. He also questions whether the present contingent needs to be replaced by UK based troops rather than from UNFICYP, given the current review of the level of the UK commitment there requested by Sir Geoffrey Howe as Chancellor. In any event the Chief Secretary is firmly of the view that the cost of any extension of our commitment to the MNF in Lebanon should be met from existing programmes in line with the Prime Minister's original decision.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Holmes and Richard Mottram

Yours sincerely
Tim Gieve

JOHN GIEVE
Private Secretary

Middle East, Situation, PT 11

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 June 1983

See later correspondence

MR 20/9

Dear Richard,

Lebanon: UK Contribution to the Multinational Force (MNF)

As you know, we need to reach an early decision on the future of our contingent with the Multinational Force (MNF) in Lebanon. At present our contingent (BRITFORLEB) is committed until 7 August 1983, or until a substantial Israeli withdrawal. Although the Lebanese have not yet made a formal request for a further extension, they clearly expect us to stay. They have also recently asked all MNF contributors to be prepared to deploy their contingents outside Beirut if, as seems likely, the Israelis resort to a partial withdrawal of their forces to Southern Lebanon.

Sir Geoffrey Howe is all too conscious of the danger of being drawn into an indefinite commitment in Lebanon. It is always going to be difficult to find a right time to withdraw and our luck on casualties may not hold. But having considered this carefully he is convinced that, despite the risks, we should maintain our contribution to the MNF for the time being. The combination of the following arguments seems to him to be compelling:

(a) We have a clear interest in supporting the Lebanese Government and the Lebanese army. Their need for such support is very great.

(b) The Lebanese are delighted with our contingent's performance and will be severely disappointed if we desert them now.

(c) Our participation gives us the possibility of influence on US policy and credibility for a wider Middle East role.

(d) The Americans would not understand why we were withdrawing now, when the situation demands a calming international presence more than ever. They have put in a strong plea to us to stay on (Mr Habib spoke particularly eloquently to Sir Anthony Acland in Washington last week) and would react very badly if we decided to pull out.

/(e)

(e) It would be, to say the least, difficult for us to explain to the French and Italians, who both have far larger contingents than us, why we were leaving, particularly in the light of the Stuttgart reaffirmation of support for Lebanon.

(f) A decision to pull out would also attract domestic criticism, including in Parliament, and would not be easy to present.

If we decide to stay on, we must obviously do all we can to limit the risks. In particular, in confirming to the Lebanese our willingness to maintain our contribution to the MNF for the time being, Sir Geoffrey Howe would propose to make clear that BRITFORLEB should stay within the Beirut area, whether or not the MNF as a whole took on a wider role, as the Lebanese wish (although we should recognise that we may come under pressure on this in some circumstances). We would also make clear that while we wanted to maintain our support for the Lebanese government we could not afford an indefinite commitment to the Multinational Force, from which we would be looking for an early withdrawal. And we propose to explore the possibility of our own contingent being rotated with another contributor (Belgium is a possibility), and to look again at alternative ways of helping the Lebanese Army and Internal Security Forces eg through training.

Our understanding at official level is that the Ministry of Defence should be able to find the men for an extended deployment in Lebanon at BRITFORLEB's present strength. But if the Defence Secretary agrees to extension, we also need to decide whether the men should come from Cyprus as at present, or from the UK, as we understand would be the military preference (and no doubt that of the UN Commander).

Sir Geoffrey Howe is very concerned that if the contingent is found from the UK the cost will increase considerably. A further three months from August could cost almost one million pounds, compared with some £1.2 million for the six months February - August. So far the cost has been borne entirely on the FCO vote on a full costs basis. Sir Geoffrey Howe very much doubts that this is manageable in the future, particularly if the cost increases . If it is agreed that the contingent should stay for the time being, therefore, he will need to pursue this question with the Defence Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

/I am

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

R Mottram Esq
Ministry of Defence

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 15

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FM BEIRUT 301130Z JUN 83
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 352 OF 30 JUNE 1983
AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON
AND TO ROUTINE AMMAN, CAIRO , JEDDA, PARIS, ROME
SAVING TO OTHER ME POSTS, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 343. LEBANON/ISRAEL AGREEMENT

1. HABIB SAW ME AND MY FRENCH AND ITALIAN COLLEAGUES ON 30 JUNE. DRAPER AND FAIRBANKS WERE PRESENT. PALMER ACCOMPANIED ME.

2. HABIB BELIEVED THAT A PARTIAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WAS INEVITABLE. THE DECISION COULD BE TAKEN AS SOON AS THIS WEEKEND. HE SAID THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT DID NOT LIKE PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL BECAUSE IT WOULD PROLONG THE PRESENT PARTITION OF LEBANON AND MIGHT HASTEN THE DETERIORATION OF THE INTER-COMMUNAL CONSENSUS. BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT, AS THE BBC HAVE TODAY (30 JUNE) REPORTED, THE LEBANESE REFUSE TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT. (CF ALSO MY TELNO 349).

~~(30 JUNE) REPORTED, THE LEBANESE REFUSE TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT.~~
~~(CF ALSO MY TELNO 349).~~

3. HABIB ASKED US ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR THE MNF DEPLOYMENT IN THE CHOUF FOLLOWING AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AREA - WHICH THE ISRAELIS COULD DO VERY QUICKLY ONCE A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR ARGUED VERY STRONGLY FOR THE EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF THE LEBANESE ARMY BACKED BY THE MNF INTO ALEY. THE SYMBOLIC PRESENCE OF THE MNF WOULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT AND WOULD CREATE A NEW AND PROBABLY BETTER POLITICAL SITUATION IN THAT TROUBLED AREA.

4. HABIB WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE LEBANESE REQUEST TO THE MNF PARTICIPANTS TO DEPLOY THEIR CONTINGENTS IN THE CHOUF (PARA 4 OF MY TELNO 315) WAS A FORMAL REQUEST OR NOT. HOWEVER WE AGREED THAT AT THE VERY LEAST THE LEBANESE HAD PUT US ON NOTICE AND THAT IT WOULD BE WISE FOR GOVERNMENTS TO PREPARE THEIR POSITIONS SOONER RATHER THAN LATER.

5. F C O PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

ROBERTS
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FROM TEL AVIV 281140Z JUN 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 177 OF 28 JUNE 1983

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND MODUK.

INFO SAVING JERUSALEM, PARIS AND ROME.

MY TELNO 171: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. ALL THE EVIDENCE, BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, IS THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE DETERMINED BEFORE LONG TO PULL BACK IN LEBANON. BUT THEY ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE NEED TO DO IT WITH AS MUCH LEBANESE AND AMERICAN COOPERATION AS POSSIBLE. THEY HAVE AS GOOD AS PROMISED NOT TO MAKE ANY MOVE BEFORE BEGIN'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON AT THE END OF JULY.

2. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WAS AT PAINS TO DESCRIBE A POSSIBLE REDEPLOYMENT CONSTRUCTIVELY WHEN I SAW HIM ON 27 JUNE. KIMCHE SAID THAT:-

(A) REDEPLOYMENT SHOULD BE SEEN AS ENABLING THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO EXTEND ITS AUTHORITY, AN OBJECTIVE WE ALL SUPPORTED. HE HOPED IT WOULD ALSO SHOW THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS COOPERATING TOGETHER IN THE SPIRIT OF THEIR BILATERAL AGREEMENT AND REFUSING TO BOW TO SYRIAN PRESSURES.

(B) ISRAEL DID NOT SEEK A DIVIDED LEBANON. BUT ASSAD WOULD BE MAKING A PROFOUND MISTAKE IF HE THOUGHT THE IDF WOULD GET OUT OF LEBANON WHILE SYRIAN FORCES REMAINED. ON THE CONTRARY, THERE WOULD ONLY BE ANY PROSPECT OF A CHANGED SYRIAN ATTITUDE ONCE THEY WERE PERSUADED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE PREPARED TO STICK IT OUT IF NECESSARY AND WERE NOT ON THE POINT OF CRUMBLING SEMICOLON

(C) NOR DID KIMCHE ACCEPT THAT A DIVIDED LEBANON WAS INEVITABLE. THE ONUS WAS NOW ON DAMASCUS. LEBANON'S OWN GOVERNMENT WANTED SYRIAN FORCES OUT. THE EUROPEANS SHOULD BE DOING MORE TO BRING THIS HOME NOT ONLY TO THE SYRIANS BUT TO ARAB MODERATES SEMICOLON

(D) THE ISRAELIS WERE PLEASED WITH THE STUTTGART STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND WERE GRATEFUL FOR BRITISH HELP IN GETTING THE COMMUNITY MEASURES AGAINST ISRAEL LIFTED. IF ANY COUNTRY NOW DESERVED DISCRIMINATORY MEASURES IT WAS SYRIA SEMICOLON

(E) HE ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS LIKELY TO BE AN INCREASED BRITISH CONTRIBUTION TO THE MNF WHICH COULD HELP FILL THE GAP IF THE ISRAELIS PULLED BACK. IDF REDEPLOYMENT MIGHT BE QUITE LIMITED IN SCALE. THEY WERE PARTICULARLY KEEN TO GET OUT OF THE AREA AROUND BHAMDOUN AND ALEY. KIMCHE ADDED THAT ISRAEL WAS URGING BOTH PHALANGE AND DRUZE TO AGREE IN ADVANCE TO A STAND-OFF IN THEIR ARMED STRUGGE IN ANY PART OF THE SHOUF FROM WHICH THE IDF WITHDREW.

3. IN MY VIEW A REDEPLOYMENT DECISION OF THIS KIND, EVEN IF PRESENTED AS A STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL BY ALL FOREIGN FORCES, WOULD STILL FACE THE ISRAELIS WITH CONFLICTING PRESSURES. THEIR AIM IS TO REDUCE IDF EXPOSURE AND HENCE CASUALTIES. THE SMALLER THE AREA VACATED, THE LESS WILL THIS EXERCISE ACHIEVE ITS PURPOSE IN MILITARY AND DOMESTIC TERMS.

CONFIDENTIAL

/YET

YET A BIGGER PULLBACK COULD WELL OVER-TAX THE LEBANESE ARMY'S ABILITY TO POLICE THE NEW AREA (NOT TO MENTION ADDITIONAL RISKS FOR ANY MNF INVOLVEMENT), THUS GIVING THE SYRIANS AND PLO THE VERY OPENING OF WHICH ISRAEL IS AFRAID.

4. I SUSPECT THE ISRAELIS WILL SETTLE FOR A RELATIVELY SMALL REDEPLOYMENT IN THE FIRST PLACE MAINLY TO IMPROVE MORALE. THIS HOWEVER WILL STILL LEAVE THEM DEEPLY ENMESHED IN SOUTHERN LEBANON BUT WILL AT LEAST, SO THEY HOPE GIVE THEM A BREATHING SPACE. THEY REALISE, IN KIMCHE'S WORDS, THAT ISRAEL IS GOING TO HAVE TO PLAY ITS HAND WITH ENORMOUS CARE AND PATIENCE IN THE COMING MONTHS. THE BASIC DILEMMA NEVERTHELESS REMAINS: HOW TO EXTRACT THEMSELVES FROM AN UNDERTAKING WHICH LOOKS INCREASINGLY OPEN-ENDED.

5. FCO PASS SAVING PARIS AND ROME.

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MR THOMAS
MR HAYES
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 June 1983

3/7/4

Dear John,

Lebanon: UK Contribution to the Multinational Force (MNF)

We need to reach an early decision on the future of our contingent with the Multinational Force (MNF) in Lebanon. At present our contingent (BRITFORLEB) is committed until 7 August 1983, or until a substantial Israeli withdrawal. Although the Lebanese have not yet made a formal request for a further extension, they clearly expect us to stay. They have also recently asked all MNF contributors to be prepared to deploy their contingents outside Beirut if, as seems likely, the Israelis resort to a partial withdrawal of their forces to Southern Lebanon.

Sir Geoffrey Howe is all too conscious of the danger of being drawn into an indefinite commitment in Lebanon. It is always going to be difficult to find a right time to withdraw and our luck on casualties may not hold. But having considered this carefully, he is convinced that, despite the risks, we should maintain our contribution to the MNF for the time being. The combination of the following arguments seem to him to be compelling:

(a) We have a clear interest in supporting the Lebanese Government and the Lebanese army. Their need for such support is very great.

(b) The Lebanese are delighted with our contingent's performance and will be severely disappointed if we desert them now.

(c) Our participation gives us the possibility of influence on US policy and credibility for our wider Middle East role

(d) The Americans would not understand why we were withdrawing now, when the situation demands a calming international presence more than ever. They have put

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in a strong plea to us to stay on (Mr Habib spoke particularly eloquently to Sir Anthony Acland in Washington last week) and would react very badly if we decided to pull out.

(e) It would be, to say the least, difficult for us to explain to the French and Italians, who both have far larger contingents than us, why we were leaving, particularly in the light of the Stuttgart reaffirmation of support for Lebanon.

If we decide to stay on, we must obviously do all we can to limit the risks. In particular, in confirming to the Lebanese our willingness to maintain our contribution to the MNF for the time being we would make clear that BRITFORLEB should stay within the Beirut area, whether or not the MNF as a whole took on a wider role, as the Lebanese wish (although we should recognise that we may come under pressure on this in some circumstances). We would also make clear that while we wanted to maintain our support for the Lebanese government we could not afford an indefinite commitment to the Multinational Force, from which we would be looking for an early withdrawal. We intend to explore the possibility of our own contingent being rotated with another contributor (Belgium is a possibility), and to look again at alternative ways of helping the Lebanese Army and Internal Security Forces e.g. through training.

I understand that the Ministry of Defence could find the men for an extended deployment in Lebanon at BRITFORLEB's present strength. But their strong military preference is to draw on UK forces beyond August 1983, and to return our UNFICYP commitment to its full strength. We accept that the absence of two-thirds of UNFICYP's armoured reconnaissance squadron has imposed a severe strain on our remaining forces there and has naturally been unwelcome to the UN commander. To continue to deplete our contribution to UNFICYP could be seen as a weakening of our commitment to Cyprus and to UN peacekeeping.

But if the contingent is found from the UK in future, the cost will increase considerably. A further three months from August could cost almost one million pounds, compared with some £1.2 million for the six months February-August. So far the cost has been borne entirely on the FCO vote on a full costs basis. Sir Geoffrey Howe very much doubts that this is manageable in the future, particularly if the cost increases.

/If

If it is agreed that the contingent should stay for the time being, therefore, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will need to pursue this question with the Defence Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of the Defence Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

HL

28 June 1983

Lebanon

I enclose a copy of a note which the Prime Minister has received from the Lebanese Embassy which contains the text of a cable from the Lebanese President about that part of the Stuttgart conclusions which relates to the Lebanon. I doubt if a reply is necessary.

JOHN COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

010 SUBJECT

cc mustapha
Ops

LEBANESE EMBASSY

TELEPHONE: 229-7265/6.
TELEGRAMS: AMBALIBAN LONDON.
TELEX 262048.

21, KENSINGTON PALACE GARDENS,
LONDON, W. 8.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 92A/83

Ref: 401/AEH/LH

London, 22nd June, 1983

The Embassy of Lebanon presents its compliments to the Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher H, MP, Prime Minister, and has the honour to transmit her the following text of a cable from His Excellency the President of the Republic of Lebanon:

"The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher H, MP,
Prime Minister"

The Statement issued at the closure of the "Stuttgart" Conference relating to Lebanon, was highly appreciated by myself and the people of Lebanon. Your kind reference to my endeavours and those of the Lebanese Government, to reestablish the authority of the State over the whole Lebanese territory deeply touched me. It strengthens our determination to carry on our endless strive to liberate Lebanon from all foreign armies which are on our territory.

The determination of your friend country to stand by Lebanon, preserving its independence, sovereignty and its territorial integrity, and the contribution of an elite of your sons in the multi-national forces contingent bring tangible of your attachment to the principles of Freedom, Democracy and Justice, which are the bases of Lebanon existence.

Respectfully yours.

Amine Gemayel".

The Embassy of Lebanon avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher H, MP, Prime Minister, the assurance of its highest consideration.

EMBASSY OF LEBANON LONDON

The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher H, MP,
Prime Minister
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Protocol and Conference Department
London SW1

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FM WASHINGTON 212350Z JUN 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1711 OF 21 JUNE

INFOR PRIORITY BEIRUT DAMASCUS TEL AVIV ROUTINE CAIRO AMMAN JEDDA ROME PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW MODUK

ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. DESPITE ISRAELI ASSURANCES THAT IT WAS NOT ON HIS AGENDA, PARTIAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WAS THE FIRST SUBJECT KIMCHE RAISED WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT LAST WEEK. HE GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS WAS A MATTER OF URGENCY, BY IMPLICATION BECAUSE OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURE, THOUGH HE ADMITTED THAT IT WOULD NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF CONTINUING IDF CASUALTIES. HE SUGGESTED THAT PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL MIGHT BE PRESENTED AS THE FIRST STAGE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT, INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION HAVING FIRST BEEN EXCHANGED, AND THAT AFTER THE TWELVE WEEK PERIOD FORESEEN IN THE AGREEMENT FOR THE COMPLETION OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL HAD ELAPSED, IT MIGHT SIMPLY BE ANNOUNCED THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SUSPENDED. THE STATE DEPARTMENT REGARD THIS PROPOSAL, WHICH DID NOT APPEAR TO BE WELL THOUGHT OUT, AS UNREALISTIC.

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET HAS NOT

~~THIS PROPOSAL, WHICH DID NOT APPEAR TO BE WELL THOUGHT OUT, AS UNREALISTIC.~~

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET HAS NOT YET CONSIDERED PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL. BUT ISRAELI MILITARY PLANNERS ARE ACTIVELY EXAMINING VARIOUS OPTIONS AND THE AMERICANS HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE ISRAELIS REGARD KIMCHE'S TALKS IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK AS BEGINNING THE CONSULTATIONS THEY HAVE PROMISED. THEY REMAIN CONFIDENT THAT THERE WILL BE NO SURPRISE MOVES AND THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL CONSULT FULLY WITH THEM AND THE LEBANESE BEFORE WITHDRAWING.

3. MEANWHILE, KHADDAM HAS ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE AN INVITATION EXTENDED LATE LAST WEEK TO VISIT WASHINGTON, THOUGH AT SUCH VERY SHORT NOTICE HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSED DATES OF 20/21 JUNE.

4. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IS TO VISIT WASHINGTON ON 22 JULY. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAY THAT THIS IS A LEBANESE INITIATIVE THOUGH THEY HAD IT IN MIND TO INVITE HIM TO BALANCE BEGIN'S VISIT, NOW ARRANGED FOR 27/29 JULY.

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FROM TEL AVIV 201200Z JUN 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 171 OF 20 JUNE 1983

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND MODUK.

INFO SAVING JERUSALEM.

Read in full.

MY TELEGRAM NO 170: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. POLITICAL COUNSELLOR AT THE US EMBASSY CONFIRMED OVER THE WEEKEND THAT THE MESSAGE WHICH MY US COLLEAGUE DELIVERED TO BEGIN LAST WEEK CONTAINED THE EXPECTED INVITATION TO PAY A WORKING VISIT TO WASHINGTON NEAR THE END OF JULY. LEWIS HAD ALSO BRIEFED BEGIN ON US DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO OVERCOME THE SYRIAN STUMBLING BLOCK TO WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES.

2. POLITICAL COUNSELLOR, WHO WAS PRESENT AT THE MEETING, DESCRIBED BEGIN AS ATTENTIVE BUT SUBDUED AND OBVIOUSLY MUCH PREOCCUPIED WITH THE CONDITION OF HIS DEPUTY PGIME MINISTER EHRLICH (WHO HAS SINCE DIED).

3. AS REGARDS PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL BEGIN HAD TOLD US AMBASSADOR THAT THE IDF WERE WORKING ON THE MODALITIES OF A POSSIBLE SHORTENING OF LINES IN LEBANON. HE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SURPRISES AND THAT ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN ONLY AFTER FULL CONSULTATION. BEGIN HAD EXPRESSED DISTRESS AT RECENT IDF CASUALTIES WHICH HE HAD DESCRIBED AS ''OUR PERMANENT PAIN''. MY GERMAN COLLEAGUE ALSO HAS IT THAT BEGIN ASSURED US AMBASSADOR THAT ISRAELI CABINET HAD TAKEN NO DECISION ON REDEPLOYMENT YET EVEN IN PRINCIPLE.

4. I WOULD EXPECT CONTACTS AND DELIBERATE HINTS ABOUT POSSIBLE IDF REDEPLOYMENT TO CONTINUE FOR THE NEXT WEEKS, WITH THE FIRST ACTUAL MOVEMENT ON THE GROUND COMING ONLY AT THE END OF A FAIRLY EXTENDED PROCESS OF CONSULTATION.

MOBERLY

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ECD	MR EGERTON
WED	MR THOMAS
RID	MR HAYES
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TO PRIORITY MODUK
TELNO U2G 130805Z JUN 83
AND TO PRIORITY FCO.
MODUK FOR D14

1. IT HAS BEEN A BAD WEEKEND FOR IDF IN LEBANON. A SPATE OF ATTACKS HAS RESULTED IN THREE KILLED AND TWO WOUNDED.

2. PUBLIC CONCERN ABOUT IDF CASUALTIES IS GROWING AND TODAYS JERUSALEM POST REPORTS PGESSURE WITHIN CABINET FOR AN EARLY MILITARY REDEPLOYMENT IN LEBANON. ON SUNDAY THE PRESS REPORTED THAT ISRAEL WOULD APPLY A 3 WEEK DEADLINE FOR A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN SYRIAN ATTITUDE TO THE ISRAELI/LEBANESE AGREEMENT. IF THIS CHANGE IS NOT FORTHCOMING ISRAEL WOULD CONSIDER, IN CONJUNCTION WITH U.S. AND LEBANON, A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL. THIS IS THE FIRST OCCASION THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE MENTIONED A TIME LIMIT.

3. AS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY, THE IDF HAS GIVEN UP OR LOST THE MILITARY INITIATIVE IN LEBNON AND HAS BEEN SUCKED INTO PRECISELY THE SORT OF ATTRITION SITUATION THEY HAVE BEEN DESPARATELY TRYING TO AVOID. IT REMAINS DIFFICULT TO SEE AN EASY WAY OUT FOR THEM.

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RID	MR HAYES
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FM DAMASCUS 191305Z MAY 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 144 OF 19 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV
INFO ROUTINE AMMAN, BAGHDAD, JEDDA, ALGIERS, TUNIS, RABAT, MOSCOW, CAIRO

YOUR TELNO 89: LEBANON

SUMMARY

1. WHEN I HANDED THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER YOUR MESSAGE ON LEBANON HE EXPLAINED SYRIAN OBJECTIONS TO THE AGREEMENT ON FAMILIAR LINES SEMI CLN SAID THAT THE (NEXT TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) STATUS QUO WAS BAD BUT WOULD GET WORSE UNLESS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY BROUGHT ABOUT UNCONDITIONAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL SEMI CLN CLAIMED THAT MAJORITY OPINION IN LEBANON ITSELF AND IN THE ARAB WORLD GENERALLY WAS AGAINST THE AGREEMENT SEMI CLN AND HINTED OMINOUSLY THAT THIS WOULD BECOME CLEAR WHEN MEASURES WERE TAKEN AS THEY HAD BEEN AGAINST EGYPT.

DETAIL.

2. I SPENT THE BETTER PART OF AN HOUR IN A REASONABLY RELAXED ZEEETING WITH KHADDAM ON 19 MAY. I HANDED HIM THE MESSAGE IN YOUR TELNO 208 TO BEIRUT AS AMENDED BY PARAGRAPH 2 OF TUR, AND SPOKE AS IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF TUR.

3. KHADDAM ASKED ME TO EXPRESS HIS THANKS FOR YOUR INTEREST AND FOR YOUR MESSAGE. HIS IMMEDIATE COMMENTS ON THE LATTER WERE THAT YOUR CONFIDENCE IN GEMAYEL'S DETERMINATION IGNORED THE FACTS THAT THIS WAS NOT A QUESTION WHICH DEPENDED ON PERSONALITIES AND THAT GEMAYEL HAD SHOWN HIMSELF INCAPABLE OF SECURING LEBANESE INTERESTS AND (NEXT TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) A FORTIORI WAS UNABLE TO PROTECT SYRIA'S.

4. KHADDAM THEN EMBARKED ON A LENGTHY EXPOSITION OF SYRIA'S DETAILED OBJECTIONS TO THE AGREEMENT :-
(A). ENDING THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY MEANT THE RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL CONTRARY TO LEBANON'S OBLIGATIONS TO THE ARAB LEAGUE. SYRIA WAS SEEKING A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT AS AGREED AT FEZ AND NOT A SERIES OF SEPARATE SETTLEMENTS SEMI CLN
(B). ARTICLE NINE (CANCELLATION OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE PRESENT ONE) MEANT THAT LEBANON WOULD BE SEPARATED FROM THE ARAB WORLD SEMI CLN
(C). NORMALISATION, THE OPENING OF BORDERS, THE FREE FLOW OF GOODS AND PEOPLE AMOUNTED TO THE DENIAL OF LEBANON'S ARAB IDENTITY AND WOULD LEAD TO THE SWAMPING OF THE LEBANESE MARKET BY ISRAELI INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS WITH WHICH

/ LEBANESE

LEBANESE GOODS WOULD BE UNABLE TO COMPETE SEMI CLN
(D). THE LEBANESE STATE WOULD BE TURNED INTO A TOOL FOR USE AGAINST THE LEBANESE PEOPLE WHO WOULD BE UNABLE TO EXPRESS ANY OPPOSITION TO ISRAEL, AND THIS WAS BOUND TO LEAD TO INSTABILITY SEMI CLN
(E). THE LEBANESE WOULD BE FORBIDDEN TO DEPLOY ADVANCED AIR DEFENCE EQUIPMENT OR TO STATION THEIR FORCES IN CERTAIN AREAS SUCH AS BAROUK SEMI CLN
(F). THE LEBANESE WOULD NOT EVEN BE ALLOWED TO HAVE MILITARY EQUIPMENT DESTINED FOR ANOTHER ARAB COUNTRY TRANSIT THEIR TERRITORY SEMI CLN
(G). OVER AND ABOVE THESE ''SHACKLES'' THE AGREEMENT CUT OFF A PART OF LEBANON WHICH WOULD BE UNDER JOINT CONTROL WITH THE ISRAELIS. THIS WAS A FLAGRANT INFRINGEMENT OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, AS WAS THE POSITION ACCORDED TO HADDAD AND HIS MILITIAS: FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY, A SOVEREIGN STATE WOULD BE COMPELLED TO INCLUDE WITHIN ITS OWN ARMED FORCES MILITIAS CONTROLLED BY HOSTILE ELEMENTS FROM INSIDE AND OUTSIDE.

5. KHADDAM ASKED RHETORICALLY WHAT WOULD BE LEFT OF LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND HOW IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES GEMAYEL COULD GUARANTEE SECURITY TO LEBANON OR TO SYRIA. THE AGREEMENT ITSELF WAS NOT WORTH THE NAME BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN CONCLUDED BETWEEN UNEQUAL SIDES: THE LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER HIMSELF HAD SAID THAT IT WAS IMPOSED UNDER THE HEAVY HAND OF OCCUPATION. IT HAD CAUSED RIFTS WITHIN LEBANON. THE COUNTRY WAS RULED BY EYALANGJ TS WHO WERE IN COLLUSION WITH ISRAEL AND WITH WHOM THEY HAD PERPETRATED THE SABRA AND CHATILA MASSACRES IN ORDER TO CREATE PANI AND SO SOFTEN UP THE LEBANESE PUBLIC FOR THESE LATER DEMANDS. SYRIA WAS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW ALONG WITH ALL OTHER FORCES, UNCONDITIONALLY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY, AND FOR A PLEBISCITE ON THE AGREEMENT TO BE HELD, THE RESULT OF WHICH SYRIA WOULD ACCEPT. BUT THE IMPOSITION OF THE AGREEMENT UNDER OCCUPATION MEANT THE DIVISION OF LEBANON, AND PROVIDED NO GUARANTEE OF PRESERVING THE COUNTRY'S SOVEREIGNTY, WHICH SYRIA WANTED AS MUCH AS BRITAIN DID.

6. KHADDAM THEN WENT ON TO TALK ABOUT THE OBJECTIONS TO THE AGREEMENT FROM THE STRICTLY SYRIAN POINT OF VIEW. A LEBANON UNDER THE PROTECTION OF ISRAEL WOULD PRESENT DIRECT THREATS TO SYRIA. ISRAEL WOULD HAVE MILITARY POSITIONS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON CLOSE TO SYRIA'S BORDERS SEMI CLN LEBANON WOULD BECOME AN OPEN COUNTRY FROM WHICH ISRAEL AND ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE ACCESS TO SYRIA SEMI CLN AS WE AND THE FRENCH KNEW BETTER THAN ANYONE, LEBANON WAS AN ARAB COUNTRY WHOSE INTERESTS WERE INTERTWINED WITH SYRIA'S.

7. REVERTING TO THE TEXT OF YOUR MESSAGE, KHADDAM SAID THAT SYRIAN FORCES ENTERED LEBANON NOT ONLY AT THE INVITATION OF THE THEN PRESIDENT BUT AT THE REQUEST OF THE VARIOUS LEBANESE

FACTIONS AND IN ORDER TO PRESERVE LEBANESE UNITY AND MAINTAIN THE NATIONAL BALANCE. THE PRESENT AGREEMENT CONTRAVENED BOTH THOSE PURPOSES AND MADE THE LEBANESE PRESIDENT NO LONGER FREE TO SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THE LEBANESE PEOPLE. THE NATIONAL BALANCE WOULD BE UPSET, THE PREVIOUS TROUBLE REVIVED AND THIS WOULD AFFECT SYRIA. IF THE ISRAELIS HAD THE RIGHT TO SEEK SECURITY, SO DID SYRIA.

8. ANSWERING THE TWO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TUR, KHADDAM SAID THAT
A. THLUSYRIANS DID NOT WISH THE (NEXT TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) STATUS QUO TO CONTINUE - BUT NEITHER DID THEY WISH IT TO DETERIORATE. THIS COULD BE AVOIDED ONLY IF THE LEBANESE ACHIEVED COMPLETE AND GENUINE INDEPENDENCE AND IF ISRAEL WAS DENIED ANY GAIN FROM HER AGGRESSION SEMI CLN
B. THE POINT AT WHICH ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL COULD PROCEED WOULD BE THE POINT AT WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ASSUMED ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AND SECURED UNCONDITIONAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. AS THINGS WERE ISRAEL HAD ACHIEVED POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND DELEGATED THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO PROTECT THESE GAINS.

9. I SAID THAT GRANTED THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS LESS THAN PERFECT, AND CONTAINED PROVISIONS WHICH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT THEMSELVES HAD ADMITTED THAT THEY DID NOT LIKE, THE FACT REMAINED THAT IT WAS THEIR JUDGEMENT THAT THIS WAS THE BEST ARRANGEMENT POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. NOR DID THERE APPEAR TO BE AN OVERWHELMING DENUNCIATION OF THE AGREEMENT IN THE REST OF THE ARAB WORLD, PARTICULARLY AS COMPARED WITH THE POSITIONS TAKEN UP OVER CAMP DAVID. WAS IT NOT ALSO AN INFRINGEMENT OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY TO DENY THEM THIS OPPORTUNITY ? KHADDAM INSISTED THAT MAJORITY OPINION IN BOTH LEBANON ITSELF AND THE ARAB WORLD GENERALLY WAS AGAINST THE AGREEMENT: THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE LEBANESE PARLIAMENT HAD BEEN A FARCE, AND POSITIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD HAD NOT YET HARDENED AS THEY WOULD WHEN MEASURES HAD BEEN TAKEN AS THEY HAD BEEN AFTER CAMP DAVID. HE COMMENTED THAT IT WAS CURIOUS THAT IF THE LEBANESE SUBMITTED TO ISRAELI/PHALANGIST

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PRESSURES THEY SHOULD BE REGARDED AS ACTING FREELY, YET IF THEY REJECTED THE AGREEMENT THIS WAS INTERPRETED AS DUE TO OUTSIDE DICTATION'@

10. I ASKED KHADDAM WHETHER THE PRESENT SITUATION IN WHICH ISRAELI ARTILLERY WAS WITHIN 25 KILOMETRES OF DAMASCUS WAS PREFERABLE TO THAT IN WHICH THERE WOULD ONLY BE JOINT PATROLS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. HE REPLIED THAT EITHER WAY TEL AVIV WAS WITHIN RANGE OF SYRIAN GUNS.

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DESKBY FCO 060930Z
FROM TEL AVIV 060810Z MAY 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 136 OF 6 MAY 1983
INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, JEDDA, JERUSALEM AND MODUK.
INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS AND ROME.

MY TELNO 135: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. WITH AGREEMENT NOW IN THE BALANCE, EVENTS SINCE MR SHULTZ ARRIVED IN THE AREA HAVE BROUGHT OUT MORE CLEARLY THAN EVER THE FOLLOWING IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAEL:

(A) THE BASIC DILEMMA FACING MR BEGIN AND HIS COLLEAGUES: HOW TO EXTRICATE THEMSELVES FROM LEBANON ON TERMS WHICH WILL NOT ONLY PROVIDE REASONABLE ASSURANCE OF SECURITY BUT WILL BE SEEN BY ISRAELIS GENERALLY AND THE OPPOSITION IN PARTICULAR AS AN IMPROVEMENT ON PRE-JUNE 1982. IT HAS BEEN MY VIEW ALL ALONG THAT ONLY A FEW PEOPLE HERE HANKER AFTER A PERMANENT ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON. MOST ISRAELIS WANT TO GET OUT IF THEY CAN, AND THIS I BELIEVE GOES FOR A MAJORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT, ALL THE MORE SO IN VIEW OF THE STEADY TRICKLE OF CASUALTIES WHICH THE IDF IS TAKING ALMOST DAILY.

(B) AGREEMENT WITH LEBANON IS ONE THING, ACTUAL WITHDRAWAL QUITE ANOTHER. EVEN AFTER SIGNATURE, THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION WILL CONTINUE AND MAY PARADOXICALLY BE GREATER IF WITHDRAWAL SEEMS TO BE BLOCKED IN DAMASCUS ONCE THE ISRAELIS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO LEAVE ON AGREED TERMS. BUT IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES ISRAELI OFFICIALS ARE CLEAR THAT ISRAEL WILL BE BETTER OFF WITH AN AGREEMENT THAN WITHOUT ONE SEMICOLON

(C) THE KEY ROLE OF THE SYRIANS. WHEN I SPOKE BRIEFLY TO MR SHULTZ AT YESTERDAY EVENING'S INAUGURATION OF THE NEW PRESIDENT, HE SAID IT WAS STILL UNCERTAIN HOW FAR THE SYRIANS INTENDED TO PUSH THEIR OPPOSITION TO AN AGREEMENT ALTHOUGH YESTERDAY'S SHELLING NEAR BEIRUT (WHICH HE ASSUMED TO BY SYRIAN-INSPIRED) WAS NOT ENCOURAGING. HE HOPED TO HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF THE SYRIAN POSITION

NEAR BEIRUT (WHICH HE ASSUMED TO BY SYRIAN-INSPIRED) WAS NOT ENCOURAGING. HE HOPED TO HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF THE SYRIAN POSITION WHEN HE VISITED DAMASCUS BEFORE GOING ON TO PARIS. ASSAD'S TALKS IN RIYADH WOULD ALSO HAVE BEEN IMPORTANT.

2. I WAS TOLD AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY YESTERDAY THAT ISRAELI NEGOTIATORS WERE STILL SEEKING IMPROVEMENTS ON SEVERAL POINTS IN THE TEXT WHICH MR SHULTZ BROUGHT BACK FROM BEIRUT ON THURSDAY BEFORE IT IS CONSIDERED BY THE ISRAELI CABINET TODAY. BUT I FEAR IT MAY BE HOPING TOO MUCH THAT THE CABINET WILL ACTUALLY ENDORSE A TEXT WITHOUT FURTHER ADO. NOR IS THE DEVICE OF SIDE LETTERS FOR THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL POINTS LIKELY TO GO FAR IN MASKING DIFFERENCES OF SUBSTANCE.

3. ACCORDING TO THE MINISTER/COUNSELLOR AT THE US EMBASSY YESTERDAY, THE DRAFT AGREEMENT DEALS WITH THE MAIN OUTSTANDING ISSUES AS FOLLOWS (ALTHOUGH FLATEN SAID HE HAD NOT SEEN AL THE FINAL FORMULAE):

A) HADDAD WOULD NOT BE MENTIONED IN THE AGREEMENT NOR IN ANY OF THE ANNEXES. THERE WAS AN UNDERSTANDING NEARER TO THE LEBANESE THAN THE ISRAELI POSITION (IE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE SOUTHERN BRIGADE WITH SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR INTELLIGENCE OR SOMETHING SIMILAR) SEMICOLON

B) OPERATIONAL CENTRES WOULD PROBABLY BE LIMITED TO TWO. UP TO 8 JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS, EACH WITH LEBANESE AND UP TO TEN IDF, WOULD OPERATE IN SOUTH LEBANON AT ANY ONE TIME. THERE WAS AN UNWRITTEN UNDERSTANDING THAT LEBANESE ARMY OFFICERS IN SOUTH LEBANON WOULD BE INDIVIDUALLY ACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL SEMICOLON

C) INTELLIGENCE. FLATEN PRESUMED THAT COVERT INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION WOULD CONTINUE, AS NO DOUBT WOULD THE PRESENCE OF ISRAELI ADVISERS SEMICOLON

D) UNIFIL. THERE WAS A FORMULA GIVING THE LEBANESE ARMY PRIME RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTING THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS, WITH UNIFIL IN A BACKUP ROLE SEMICOLON

E) HOT PURSUIT. THIS WAS ACCEPTED BY THE LEBANESE. FLATEN DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THERE WOULD BE SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE CONCEPT OR TO THE NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SEMICOLON

F) MOVEMENT OF PERSONS. VISAS WOULD BE REQUIRED SEMICOLON

G) MOVEMENT OF GOODS. THE FINAL FORMULA WAS NEAR THE LATEST LEBANESE POSITION, IE NO IMPORTS FROM ISRAEL OF GOODS PRODUCED AND EXPORTED BY LEBANON SEMICOLON

F) DIPLOMATIC OFFICES. THERE WAS PROTOCOL ON RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES. DOUBTFUL IF THE ISRAELI OFFICE IN BEIRUT WOULD BE CALLED ''DIPLOMATIC''. THE LEBANESE WOULD NOT ESTABLISH AN OFFICE IN JERUSALEM SEMICOLON

G) SIGNATURE. THE AGREEMENT WAS LIKELY TO BE SIGNED NY MEMBERS OF THE NEGOTIATING TEAM RATHER THAN FOREIGN MINISTERS.

4. FLATEN WAS EMPHATIC THAT SHULTZ HAD RULED OUT THE IDEA (PARAGRAPH 3 OF WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 1198) THAT IF ALL ELSE FAILED THE AMERICANS MIGHT PGOPOSE AND EXPANSION OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND ITS DEPLOYMENT TO SOUTH LEBANON. I AM NOT SURE IN ANY CASE THAT THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO CALLING MR BEGIN'S BLUFF. THE ISRAELIS HAVE HITHERTO BEEN ADAMANT THAT THEY COULD NOT RELY ON OUTSIDERS TO KEEP SOUTHERN LEBANON CLEAR OF PLO INFILTRATORS.

5. FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

MOBERLY

FILE

RM

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 May, 1983

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 4 May enclosing a message from President Reagan.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency the Honourable John J. Louis Jr.

FILE

RM

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 May, 1983

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has received from President Reagan about the recent attack upon the American Embassy in Beirut. I should be grateful if you would arrange for the President's thanks to be sent to H.M. Ambassador in Beirut and his staff for the help which they have given to the American Embassy.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RM

GR 400
SECRET
FM WASHINGTON 052329Z
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1246 OF 5 MAY 1983
INFO CAIRO, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, BEIRUT, JEDDAH, PARIS, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MIDDLE EAST: SHULTZ MISSION

AT A RESTRICTED BRIEFING EAGLEBURGER TODAY GAVE US THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF WHERE THINGS STAND. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THERE WAS A MODERATE DEGREE OF OPTIMISM IN THE AMERICAN CAMP. THE ISRAELI/LEBANON DOCUMENT WHICH SHULTZ WAS NOW TRYING TO SELL TO THE ISRAELIS WAS ABOUT THE BEST THE AMERICANS COULD DO. THE MAIN STUMBLING BLOCK MIGHT BE TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO ACCEPT THE FORMULA ON HADDAD. EAGLEBURGER AGREED THAT THE DOCUMENT ISELF WAS CLOSE TO WHAT SHULTZ HAD WORKED OUT WITH SHAMIR ON THE LATTER'S LAST VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

2. SHULTZ WOULD BE GOING TO DAMASCUS, NOT TO NEGOTIATE, BUT SIMPLY TO TWLL THE SYRIANS THE STAGE THAT HAD BEEN REACHED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. IT WAS VERY HARD TO GET A PRECISE FIX ON SYRIAN INTENTIONS. DAM AND HIMSELF HAD THIS MORNING HAD A SESSION WITH DOBRYNIN, BUT ALL DOBRYNIN HAD DONE WAS TO FILIBUSTER. EAGLEBURGER THOUGHT THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL PROBABLY CONSIDERED THAT HE HAD 6 MORE MONTHS TO GET AN AGREEMENT BEFORE HIS POSITION BECAME IMPOSSIBLY DIFFICULT. IT MIGHT WELL BE THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD ACCEPT THE ISRAEL/LEBANON DOCUMENT IN THE BELIEF THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD REFUSE TO PLAY THEIR PART IN IT. BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THE SITUATION WAS NOT WITHOUT PRESSURES ON ALL SIDES. THE SYRIANS MIGHT FEAR AN ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE SAM SITES WHICH THE ISRAELIS COULD TAKE OUT, PROVIDED THEY WERE READY TO ACCEPT LOSSES. ON THE OTHER HAND THERE WERE PRESSURES ON THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO WITHDRAW SINCE THE ISRAELI ARMY WAS DAILY TAKING CASUALTIES WHICH WERE UNWELCOME AT HOME. EAGLEBURGER ADDED THAT THE COMMANDER OF THE US MARINES IN THE LEBANON HAD NOT TOO HIGH AN OPINION OF THE ISRAELI FORCES. THEY WERE SCRUFFY AND UNSANITARY: MORE TO THE POINT, THEIR RECENT CASUALTIES HAD BEEN SUFFERED BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE MILITARY VIGILANCE.

3. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT EVERYBODY WAS LOUD IN THEIR PRAISES OF THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE. HE ADDED THAT THE LEBANESE THEMSELVES WERE IMMENSELY GRATEFUL. HE ALSO MADE THE POINT THAT WHILE THE SYRIANS MIGHT BE DEPENDENT ON THE RUSSIANS FOR ARMS, THEY WERE DEPENDENT ON THE SAUDIS FOR MONEY. IT WAS FOR THAT REASON THAT SHULTZ WOULD BE GOING TO RIYADH ALSO.

4. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT, IN ADDITION TO ALL HIS OTHER PROBLEMS, SHULTZ HAD HAD A BAD DOSE OF FLU.

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THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
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PM's Box.

(2)

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

May 4, 1983

Prime Minister

AR 5/5

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver the enclosed message to you from President Reagan, which was received at the Embassy.

Sincerely,

John J. Louis, Jr.
Ambassador

Enclosure

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
London.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T56 'A' /83
CL MASTER
OPS

UNCLASSIFIED

Dear Margaret:

Your most thoughtful cable of sympathy following the tragic attack upon our Embassy in Beirut has been a source of comfort and encouragement both to me personally and to the relatives of those Americans killed or wounded.

I am most grateful, too, for the extremely valuable assistance which your Embassy in Beirut has rendered and continues to render to us during this most difficult time. I wish you would send my personal thanks to HMG's Ambassador in Beirut and his entire staff.

The F.C.O. have been asked to do this. MCS/S.

As you know, we will not be deterred from our goals in Lebanon nor from our efforts to achieve lasting peace in the Middle East. Indeed, it would be a greater tragedy were we to allow the noble ends, for which those in Lebanon sacrificed their lives, to be frustrated by this cowardly and senseless act.

Thank you again for your support.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ron

PS TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET.

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FROM TEL AVIV 031335Z MAY 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 135 OF 3 MAY 1983

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, JEDDA, JERUSALEM, AND MODUK.

INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS AND ROME.

MY TELEGRAM NO 134 AND WASHINGTON TELNO 1198: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. MINISTER/COUNSELLOR AT THE US EMBASSY CONFIRMED TODAY (3 MAY) THAT SHULTZ CONTINUED TO INCH FORWARD. HE DESCRIBED THE MAIN OUTSTANDING DIFFICULTIES AS FOLLOWS:

A) SECURITY. THE ISRAELIS WERE STILL INSISTING THAT HADDAD SHOULD BE COMMANDER OF THE SOUTHERN REGION OR AT LEAST THE SOUTHERN BATTALION. THE LEBANESE WERE OFFERING HIM THE POST OF DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE SOUTHERN BATTALION WITH SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE. FLATEN THOUGHT (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT THE KEY TO THE HADDAD PROBLEM, AS WELL AS TO OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY, LAY IN WHATEVER COVERT ARRANGEMENTS FOR INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION COULD BE WORKED OUT. THE LESS SAID ON THIS SUBJECT THE BETTER. BUT THE AMERICANS WERE CURRENTLY PROBING HOW FAR THE LEBANESE COULD GO TO SATISFY THE ISRAELI REQUIREMENT FOR INTELLIGENCE ON SOUTHERN LEBANON SEMICOLON

B) UNIFIL. FLATEN CONFIRMED OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE READY TO SETTLE FOR SOME UNIFIL PRESENCE TO PROTECT THE REFUGEE CAMPS. BUT HE ADDED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD WISH FOR CAREFUL SAFEGUARDS TO ENSURE THAT UNIFIL DID NOT SERVE AS A SHIELD FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITY BASED IN THE CAMPS. (FLATEN SPOKE FIN TERMS WHICH IMPLIED THAT ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING WORKED OUTZFOR PROTECTION OF THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS AS A JOINT RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN THE LEBANESE ARMY AND UNIFIL, POSSIBLY WITH THE LATTER IN A BACK-UP ROLE) SEMICOLON

C) MOVEMENT OF GOODS. AS WE KNEW, THE MAIN LEBANESE CONCERN WAS TO ENSURE THAT THEY COULD ARGUE CONVINCINGLY TO THE OTHER ARABS THAT THEY WERE NOT SERVING AS A CHANNEL FOR ISRAELI EXPORTS TO THE ARAB WORLD. THE LATEST FORMULA THEY WERE FLOATING WAS THAT THE IMPORT FROM ISRAEL OF GOODS PRODUCED AND EXPORTED BY LEBANON WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED. (FLATEN MENTIONED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD UNILATERALLY REINED IN THEIR OWN EXPORTERS SEMICOLON BUT HE SAID THAT THEY HAD BEEN MUCH DISTURBED BY RECENT WARNINGS BY THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES TO WERCHANTS IN SIDON TO CEASE IMPORTING ISRAELI GOODS.) SEMICOLON

D) ARAB BOYCOTT. FLATEN SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS WANTED A LEGAL INSTRUMENT. THE LEBANESE WERE ARGUING THAT THE FACT OF TRADE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON DEMONSTRATED THAT THE BOYCOTT NO LONGER APPLIED.

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2. FLATEN CONFIRMED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD PUT FORWARD IN WRITING SOME IDEAS TO BRIDGE THE OUTSTANDING GAPS.BUT, SO FAR AS HE KNEW, THIS DID NOT DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF HADDAD, ON WHICH THEY MEANT TO KEEP THEIR POWDER DRY. FLATEN SAID THAT ON OTHER ISSUES TOO THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT SEEK TO PROMOTE DETAILED FORMULAE UNTIL THEY JUDGED THAT AGREEMENT COULD BE CLINCHED.

3. ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A UNILATERAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO THE AWALI RIVER (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 168 TO BEIRUT) FLATEN SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER SHULTZ HAD RAISED THIS IN THE CURRENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS. BUT HE DID SAY THAT THE AMERICANS HAD TOLD THE ISRAELIS REPEATEDLY THAT THEY WERE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO ANY UNILATERAL PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL: HABIB HAD DONE SO IN THE BLUNTEST TERMS. FLATEN PERSONALLY WAS CONVINCED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT FALL BACK UNILATERALLY UNLESS THEY CONCLUDED THAT THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS HAD FAILED. (THIS IS MUCH THE SAME AS US AMBASSADOR WAS SAYING: MY TELNO 134). THEREAFTER, THEY MIGHT SHORTEN THEIR LINES IF IMPLEMENTATION PROVED IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE SYRIANS: BUT FLATEN THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE PREPARED TO SIT TIGHT FOR QUITE A WHILE YET.

4. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO LEAHY, EGERTON AND NENAD.
PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

(ADVANCED AS REQUESTED)

MOBERLY

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(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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FM BEIRUT 031215Z MAY 83
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 236 OF 3 MAY 1983
AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS
INFO ROUTINE AMMAN, CAIRO
INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK, UKREP BRUSSELS, PARIS, ROME, OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

MT

MY TELNO 232 OF 12 APRIL. LEBANON/ISRAEL.

1. I WENT WITH LORD CARRINGTON TO SEE SHULTZ ON 1 MAY.

2. ESSENTIALLY, SHULTZ SAID THE FOLLOWING.

A. HE THOUGHT HE COULD PULL OFF AN AGREEMENT WITH THE ISRAELIS.

B. HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE ISRAELIS GENUINELY WANTED AGREEMENT (A MATTER ON WHICH LORD CARRINGTON HAD SOME DOUBTS).

C. THE DRAFT AGREEMENT ALREADY IN BEING WAS A CONSIDERABLE ACHIEVEMENT.

D. THE REMAINING POINTS WERE VERY DIFFICULT.

E. HE HAD YET TO EXPLORE THE SYRIAN POSITION.

3. LORD CARRINGTON ALSO TOLD ME THAT WHEN HE MET SEVERAL EX-PRIME MINISTERS AND OTHER LEBANESE NOTABLES ON 30 APRIL, THE CONSENSUS WAS:

A. THAT COMMERCE WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR OF ALL SINCE, IF FRONTIERS WERE CLOSED TO THE LEBANON, THERE WOULD BE RUIN SEMI-COLON.

B. THAT THEY WERE THEREFORE AFRAID THAT ELIE SALEM AND PRESIDENT GEMAYEL MIGHT CONCEDE TOO MUCH AND THEREBY RUN THE RISKS ENTAILED IN 'A' ABOVE.

4. LORD CARRINGTON AND I HAD LUNCH WITH AMIN GEMAYEL ON 1 MAY BUT NOTHING VERY MUCH EMERGED.

/5. AT

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5. AT THE COORDINATION COMMITTEE TODAY, THE LEBANESE COORDINATOR OF NEGOTIATIONS SHOWED US, BUT DID NOT QUOTE FROM , A DRAFT AGREEMENT WHICH WAS AT THE MOMENT BEING PUT TO THE ISRAELIS. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE 3 DIFFICULT POINTS NOW AT ISSUE. FIRST, THERE WAS THE QUESTION OF AN OPERATIONS CENTRE OR, AS THEY PREFERRED TO CALL IT, A SUPERVISION CENTRE. THE ISRAELIS WANTED A MUCH LARGER ORGANISATION THAN THE LEBANESE WERE PREPARED TO PERMIT. SECONDLY, THERE WAS THE QUESTION OF SUPERVISORY TEAMS. THE ISRAELIS WANTED THEM TO HAVE AN OPERATIONAL CAPACITY AND TO BE IN EFFECT MILITARY UNITS, THUS CONSTITUTING AN ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE LEBANON. THE LEBANESE ON THE OTHER HAND WANTED ESSENTIALLY TEAMS OF OBSERVERS. THIRDLY, THERE WAS A DISPUTE ABOUT THE COMPOSITION OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, ON WHICH THE LEBANESE SOUGHT PERMANENT UNITED STATES REPRESENTATION WHILE THE ISRAELIS ONLY WANTED THE AMERICANS THEN BY ADHOC INVITATION.

6. AS A RESULT OF QUESTIONING, THE FOLLOWING POINTS ALSO EMERGED. I ASKED WHETHER SAAD HADDAD HAD NOW CEASED TO BE AN ISSUE AND RECEIVED A SLIGHTLY EVASIVE REPLY. SECONDLY, TUENI SAID THAT NOTHING NEW HAD EMERGED FROM ELIE SALEM'S VISIT TO DAMASCUS. THIRDLY, HE REVEALED THAT THE PALESTINIANS AT NEW DELHI HAD STIPULATED THAT THEIR WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE CONDITIONAL UPON THE MNF OR UNIFIL OCCUPYING AND GUARDING THEIR CAMPS.

7. F C O PLEASE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

ROBERTS

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

MIDDLE EAST

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BEIRUT.

A.D.C. 3.
Mr. Coles (NOID)
for info.
J Hibbs
29/4.

R O Miles Esq
NENAD
FCO
London SW1

25 April 1983

Dear Oliver,

MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE

1. Before he left, Mr Callaghan asked me to ask the Department to inform the Secretary of State that he would be sending a note to Mr Pym and the Prime Minister about the Multi-National Force.

2. He did not discuss the exact contents of the note. His public and private announcements however were in favour of our extending the Mandate still further, if necessary.

3. His visit to the British contingent was a most successful one. He was received with a Guard of Honour and had lunch with the officers and sergeants. He also addressed the men.

4. I enclose two extra copies of this letter.

5. I also enclose a copy of Mr Callaghan's programme.

Yours ever

David

David Roberts

GR 300

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FM WASHINGTON 222236Z APR 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1098 OF 22 APRIL 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, JEDDA,

ROUTINE TUNIS, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK

SHULTZ'S VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST

1. PRESIDENT REAGAN TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE TODAY THAT AFTER THE BEIRUT EMBASSY BOMBING HE WAS MORE RESOLVED THAN EVER TO HELP ACHIEVE THE URGENT AND TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. HE ADDED (AS WE FOREWARNED THE DEPARTMENT) THAT SHULTZ WOULD BE LEAVING ON 24 APRIL TO VISIT THE AREA. HIS PRIMARY PURPOSE WOULD BE TO BRING THE NEGOTIATIONS ON LEBANON TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

2. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID THAT THE PLO SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO TORPEDO PEACE EFFORTS. NEGOTIATIONS DID NOT HAVE TO HINGE ON THE PLO'S PRESENCE.

3. CLUVERIUS (STATE DEPARTMENT) HAS TOLD US THAT SHULTZ WILL BE GOING FIRST TO CAIRO TO ATTEND A MEETING OF US AMBASSADORS AND FOR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EGYPTIANS. HE WILL THEN GO ON TO ISRAEL AND LEBANON. POSSIBLE VISITS TO SYRIA, JORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA WILL BE CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF PROGRESS, BUT CLUVERIUS EXPECTED SHULTZ TO HAVE TO UNDERTAKE A SHUTTLE BETWEEN BEIRUT AND JERUSALEM. THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES WERE NOW CLEARLY DEFINED AND COULD BE RESOLVED ONLY BY POLITICAL DECISIONS AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS IN THE TWO CAPITALS: THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE TO GIVE MORE GROUND.

4. CLUVERIUS WILL BE ATTENDING THE HEADS OF MISSION MEETING IN CAIRO AND RETURNING VIA LONDON TOWARDS THE END OF THE WEEK. HE HAS OFFERED TO BRIEF SIR J. LEAHY OR EGERTON THEN. THE US EMBASSY WILL BE IN TOUCH WHEN HIS PLANS ARE CLEARER.

WRIGHT

MIDDLE EAST

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SENT 21 APR 1983

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 202306Z APR 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1064 OF 20 APRIL 1983
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, PRIORITY DAMASCUS, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, CAIRO, TUNIS, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK

LEBANON

1. A STATE DEPARTMENT DELEGATION LED BY EAGLEBURGER AND VELIOTES WILL BE GOING TO BEIRUT TOMORROW TO ESCORT HOME THE BODIES OF THE VICTIMS OF THE ATTACK ON THE AMERICAN EMBASSY. EAGLEBURGER IS EXPECTED TO PAY A COURTESY CALL ON PRESIDENT GEMAYEL BUT NOT TO HAVE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS.

2. HABIB MEANWHILE, HAS BEEN PURSUING HIS NEGOTIATIONS AND WILL HAVE FURTHER TALKS WITH THE LEBANESE TOMORROW. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAY THAT SOME MODEST PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE BUT THERE IS STILL NO AGREEMENT ON THE NATURE OF THE ISRAELI ROLE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, THE FUTURE OF MAJOR HADDAD, THE ISRAELI DEMAND FOR EXPLICIT MUTUAL RECOGNITION AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR FREE ACCESS FOR ISRAELI

GOODS TO THE LEBANESE MARKET. THE NSC WILL BE CONSIDERING THE NEXT STEPS AT A MEETING TOWARDS THE END OF THIS WEEK. A VISIT BY SHULTZ TO THE MIDDLE EAST NEXT WEEK IS ONE OF THE OPTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

3. WITH ONE OR TWO EXCEPTIONS, CONGRESS HAS SUPPORTED THE ADMINISTRATION'S DETERMINATION NOT TO QUOTE CUT AND RUN UNQUOTE IN THE WAKE OF THE EMBASSY BOMBING. THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, HOWEVER, YESTERDAY ATTACHED A RIDER TO THE DLRS 251 MILLION SUPPLEMENTARY FOR AID TO LEBANON REQUIRING EXPLICIT CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF ANY FURTHER DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES TO LEBANON IN THE WAKE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL OR TO TAKE PART IN A NEW PEACE-KEEPING FORCE.

WRIGHT

NNNN

Lebanon

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 April, 1983

N. B. P. R.

A. J. C. 14/4

Dear John,

Lebanon: UK Contribution to the Multinational Force

In your letter of 11 April you asked for the precise new terminal date for the UK contingent. The main body of our force arrived in Lebanon on 8 February. If they stay for the maximum period now agreed, their departure date will be 7 August 1983.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), John Gieve (Chief Secretary's Office, HM Treasury) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

LEBANON : INT. SIT. : PL-3

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr VC
Lebanon

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 April 1983

Lebanon: UK Contribution to the Multi-National Force

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 8 April. She agrees with Mr. Pym's recommendation, supported by the Secretary of State for Defence, that we should tell the Lebanese Government that we can agree to keep the UK contingent at its existing strength in Lebanon for a further three months from May, or until there is a substantial Israeli withdrawal, whichever is the earlier.

B/F

For the future, it would be useful to know what the precise new terminal date for the UK contingent's presence will be.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), John Gieve (Chief Secretary's Office, HM Treasury) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

SB

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Middle East

No. 1334

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Prime Minister

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FM BEIRUT 081200Z APR 83
TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.
TELEGRAM NUMBER 173 OF 8 APRIL 1983
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, PARIS
SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK, CAIRO, JEDDA, ROME.

MY TELNO 170 OF 6 APRIL AND PARIS TELNO 274:

LEBANON ISRAEL.

1. THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER TODAY BRIEFED THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES ABOUT HIS RECENT TRIP.

2. ESSENTIALLY HIS ACCOUNT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE LEBANON AND ISRAEL BORE OUT THE INFORMATION IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. THEY WERE CLOSE TO AN AGREEMENT, BUT THERE WERE STILL DIFFICULT PROBLEMS.

3. I ASKED HIM ABOUT SYRIAN INTENTIONS. HE REPLIED THAT HE HAD HAD CATEGORICAL ASSURANCES FROM THE SYRIAN PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN

3. I ASKED HIM ABOUT SYRIAN INTENTIONS. HE REPLIED THAT HE HAD HAD CATEGORICAL ASSURANCES FROM THE SYRIAN PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER THAT IF THE ISRAELIS WITHDREW TOTALLY FROM THE LEBANON, THE SYRIANS WOULD DO THE SAME.

4. ON JORDAN AND THE PLO HE SAID THAT HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SYRIANS WERE THREATENING KING HUSSEIN WITH TROUBLE IF HE ENTERED INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO LEAVE SYRIA ISOLATED. THE SAME APPLIED A FORTIORI TO ARAFAT.

---

5. FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

[REPEATED SAVING AS REQUESTED]

ROBERTS

NNNN

Prime Minister

Mr Pym proposes that we should keep the UK contingent at its existing strength for a further 3 months from May (or until there is a substantial Israeli withdrawal). The FCO would find the cost of some £790,000.

PM/83/32

PRIME MINISTER

Agreed MT

WM 8/4

Lebanon: UK Contribution to the Multinational Force

1. You will know that during Douglas Hurd's visit to Beirut last week the Lebanese President formally requested that the UK contingent with the Multinational Force should stay on in Lebanon until an agreement for the withdrawal of foreign forces had been signed. I have discussed with the Secretary of State for Defence both this request and earlier Lebanese suggestions that we should increase the size of our contingent with the Multinational Force and agree in principle to its deployment outside the Beirut area. This minute represents our joint recommendations.

2. First, we see no merit in agreeing to any increase in the size of the UK contingent. Even if the extra men and money involved were available we would expose ourselves needlessly to the risk of being dragged into a wider and more indispensable role in Lebanon, with the corresponding difficulty of extracting ourselves later. The Lebanese have made contingency plans for extending their control outside Beirut. These envisage BRITFORLEB operating in an area south-east of the capital. There are considerable military objections to this. Our contingent is not equipped to operate either in the rough terrain outside Beirut or in the face of the possible threats it could meet there. Operations outside the Beirut area would place our forces at increased risk and would inevitably lead to requests for reinforcements and additional equipment. The Chiefs of Staff have therefore recommended that BRITFORLEB should not be deployed outside Beirut. This will disappoint the Lebanese government, who always envisaged calling on the MNF to help restore its authority outside Beirut, and other MNF contributors who are prepared to put their forces at risk outside the city. But we shall have a perfectly defensible case, and our contingent will still have an important role in the Beirut area, which is the

/government's

government's power base and totals some sixty-four square miles.

3. There are clear attractions to extending the period of BRITFORLEB's deployment in Lebanon. As Douglas Hurd was able to see for himself, our contingent is doing a valuable job, out of all proportion to its size. The Lebanese President and Foreign Minister told him that they were delighted with our contingent's performance. Our involvement with the MNF also gives us a political position in Lebanon close to the President which is valuable in itself, and may have commercial benefits in due course. Our presence in Lebanon is also welcome to other MNF contributors, particularly the Americans. George Shultz recently sent me a message (text enclosed) in which he expressed the hope that our contingent would stay on. We share with the Americans an interest in restoring a measure of stability in Lebanon and ensuring that it does not again become a battle ground for inter-Arab and Arab/Israeli conflict. By the beginning of May the negotiations for the withdrawal of Israeli and other forces are likely to have reached a crucial stage. I believe it is important that we should show that we are willing to continue to take an active part in helping the US pursue their objectives in the Middle East, where success in securing the withdrawal of forces from Lebanon has become a prerequisite for progress on the wider Arab/Israel issues. We shall be in a much weaker position to push the Americans and moderate Arabs in the right direction if we are at the same time withdrawing even our limited help in Lebanon. While other contributors remain committed to the MNF (indeed the French have recently increased their contribution), it would be hard to defend a decision to withdraw as early as May.

4. I am of course concerned about the risk of being drawn into an indefinite and expensive commitment in Lebanon. I therefore propose that we tell the Lebanese Government that we can agree to keep the UK contingent at its existing strength in Lebanon for a further 3 months from May, or until there is a substantial Israeli withdrawal, whichever is the earlier.

5. As you know, our contingent with the MNF is drawn from our troops serving with UN forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The Commander of UNFICYP has indicated his opposition to the continued absence of our squadron in Beirut. If a further extension is agreed, we shall consider separately with the MOD whether we should meet this commitment by keeping the present unit in Lebanon, or by drawing on other forces in Cyprus or in the UK. This will mean consultations with the UN and others, which we cannot begin until we have made a decision in principle to extend the stay of our contingent.

6. As for the present deployment the FCO will be responsible for finding funds for the second 3-months deployment. The MOD estimate that this will cost about £0.79 million.

7. I am sending copies of this minute to the Secretary of State for Defence, the Chief Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
8 April, 1983

Prime Minister

GRS240

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FM WASHINGTON 070030Z APR 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 885 OF 6 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, KUWAIT, JEDDA, CAIRO, TEL AVIV,
UKMIS NEW YORK, ROUTINE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, ALGIERS, TUNIS, RABAT.

MIPT

ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. VELIOTES TOLD MINISTER THIS EVENING THAT THE TALKS WERE OBVIOUSLY STALLED. HABIB INTENDED TO RETURN TO ISRAEL THIS WEEKEND TO SEE IF THE ISRAELIS HAD DIGESTED HIS WARNINGS ABOUT THE PRACTICAL LIMITS ON LEBANESE ABILITY TO REACH AN AGREEMENT. HE WOULD ALSO SEE IF THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG REMARKS ABOUT WITHOLDING THE F16S HAD SUNK IN. HE EXPECTED THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE TRUCULENT TO BEGIN WITH, BUT SOONER OR LATER THEY MUST RECOGNISE THAT THEIR CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN LEBANON HAD RAISED DEEP CONCERN IN THE U S, NOT LEAST WITH THE PRESIDENT, WHO WAS NOW FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT ISRAEL'S QUOTE ARMY OF OCCUPATION UNQUOTE MUST BE WITHDRAWN BEFORE FULL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE U S AND ISRAEL CAN BE RESTORED.

2. VELIOTES SAID THAT SHAMIR HAD RECENTLY ARGUED IN WASHINGTON THAT THE F16S SHOULD BE RELEASED IN ORDER TO SHOW THE RUSSIANS THAT NOTWITHSTANDING U S CONCERN ABOUT ISRAELI BEHAVIOUR IN THE LEBANON, THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT LEAVE ISRAEL AT THE MERCY OF THE SOVIET ARMS RECENTLY SUPPLIED TO SYRIA. THIS HAD BEEN EXHAUSTIVELY DISCUSSED IN THE WHITE HOUSE, BUT THE DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN TO CONTINUE TO DENY THE AIRCRAFT.

3. VELIOTES ADDED THAT THE JEWISH LOBBY IN THE U S HAD BEEN COMPARATIVELY RESTRAINED ON THE F16S SINCE ISRAEL'S OCCUPATION OF LEBANON WAS STRIKINGLY UNPOPULAR IN CONGRESS.

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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 554 OF 5 APRIL
INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT AND TEL AVIV
ROUTINE DAMASCUS, AMMAN, JEDDA, CAIRO, PARIS, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW AND MODUK.

YOUR TELNO 853: MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON

1. U.S. EMBASSY DELIVERED FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SHULTZ TO ME ON 5 APRIL:

BEGINS. DEAR FRANCIS: AS YOU KNOW, WE BELIEVE THAT THE MNF PRESENCE IN LEBANON IS CRUCIAL TO THE EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM THAT COUNTRY. WE GREATLY APPRECIATE HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S CONTRIBUTION AND LOOK FORWARD TO THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF A BRITISH MNF CONTINGENT IN BEIRUT.

DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES, I AM OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS AND AM CONVINCED THAT THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THE MNF IS CRITICAL TO THE ULTIMATE SUCCESS OF OUR COMMON EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL, SECUR AND INDEPENDENT LEBANON.

I KNOW WE CAN COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT. SINCERELY YOURS, GEORGE. ENDS.

PYM

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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FINANCE DEPT
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PS/MR HURD
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PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR EGERTON
MR SHEETON

COPIES TO:

SIR A PARSONS.
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UNCLASSIFIED
FROM WASHINGTON 011825Z APR 83.
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 841 OF 1 APRIL
INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, JEDDA.

LEBANON/ISRAEL.

1. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS AFTER HIS SPEECH IN LOS ANGELES YESTERDAY PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT (NOT) APPROVE DELIVERY OF 75 F-16'S TO ISRAEL WHILE ISRAELI FORCES CONTINUED TO OCCUPY LEBANNON. HE SAID THAT THE US WAS FORBIDDEN BY LAW TO RELEASE THE PLANES, IMPLYING THAT ISRAEL HAD VIOLATED THE TERMS OF ITS ARMS SUPPLY AGREEMENT WITH THE US WHICH PROVIDES IN ACCORDANCE WITH US LAW, THAT US SUPPLIED MILITARY EQUIPMENT CAN BE USED ONLY FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES.

2. THE DECISION, ANNOUNCED LAST WEEK, TO SELL ISRAEL A FURTHER 200 SIDEWINDERS, IS NOT AFFECTED.

3. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE TAKING THE LINE THAT EACH CASE IS A QUESTION OF JUDGEMENT. THE PRESIDENT WAS NOT MAKING A DETERMINATION UNDER US LAW OF ISRAEL'S INELIGIBILITY TO RECEIVE FURTHER US ARMS. BUT CONCERNS AROSE OVER WHETHER IT WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW TO GO AHEAD WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION IN RESPECT OF THE F-16'S WHICH HAD BEEN HELD UP SINCE THE ISRAELIS WENT INTO LEBANNON.

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DESKBY 301330Z
FM BEIRUT 301130Z MAR 83
TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.
TELEGRAM NUMBER 161 OF 30 MARCH 1983.

FOLLOWING FROM MINISTER OF STATE.

MY TELNO 157 OF 29 MARCH:

BRITISH CONTINGENT IN MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE.

1. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL TODAY REPEATED TO ME THE REQUEST MADE YESTERDAY BY HIS FOREIGN MINISTER.

2. HAVING VISITED OUR FORCE AND DISCUSSED ITS WORK WITH HM AMBASSADOR AND COLONEL COCHRANE, I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THEY ARE DOING A VALUABLE JOB OUT OF PROPORTION TO THEIR NUMBER. THEIR PATROLS DETER TROUBLEMAKERS AND GIVE THE LEBANESE FORCES THE ENCOURAGEMENT THEY NEED TO ASSERT THEIR OWN AUTHORITY. THE VERY VISIBLE AND WELCOME BRITISH PRESENCE GIVES US A POLITICAL POSITION HERE CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENT WHICH IS VALUABLE IN ITSELF AND COULD HAVE A COMMERCIAL BENEFIT LATER. CONVERSELY, A DECISION TO WITHDRAW IN MAY WOULD BE HARD TO EXPLAIN AND MIGHT MAKE US LOOK SLIGHTLY RIDICULOUS UNLESS THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS WAS BY THEN GOING SMOOTHLY, WHICH SEEMS UNLIKELY.

3. I HOPE THEREFORE THAT WE WILL AGREE TO KEEP THE EXISTING NUMBER OF MEN HERE FOR A FURTHER THREE MONTHS FROM MAY, OR UNTIL THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, WHICHEVER IS THE EARLIER. ONCE WE HAVE BEEN HERE SIX MONTHS WE WILL HAVE MADE AN APPRECIABLE CONTRIBUTION TO RESTORING THE SECURITY OF LEBANON AND COULD REASONABLY CALL IT A DAY.

ROBERTS

NNNN

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MR EGERTON
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CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 292357Z MAR 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 795 OF 29 MARCH
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT MODUK PARIS ROME TEL AVIV
ROUTINE OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

BEIRUT TEL NO 157: LEBANON/ISRAEL

1. BEFORE RECEIPT OF TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE MACK (STATE DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR FOR LEBANON) TOLD US THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN VERY DISAPPOINTED BY THE ISRAELI RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSALS IN THEIR NON-PAPER, WHICH HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE LEBANESE. THE ISRAELIS CONTINUED TO DEMAND THAT HADDAD SHOULD COMMAND THE SOUTHERN BRIGADE, JOINT PATROLS, AND THE RIGHT OF HOT PURSUIT INTO LEBANON IF THEY WERE NOT TO HAVE SURVEILLANCE STATIONS IN THE SOUTH.

2. MACK SAID THAT THE LEBANESE WERE WILLING TO INTEGRATE PERSONNEL FROM HADDAD'S MILITIA INTO THE LAF AND TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF ISRAELI SENSITIVITIES IN ASSIGNING LAF PERSONNEL TO THE SOUTH. BUT THEY HAD TO RETAIN THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO APPOINT THEIR OWN OFFICERS

~~SENSITIVITIES IN ASSIGNING LAF PERSONNEL TO THE SOUTH. BUT THEY HAD TO RETAIN THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO APPOINT THEIR OWN OFFICERS~~ IN THEIR ARMED FORCES. THE LEBANESE WERE PREPARED TO FIND AN HONOURABLE AND PERSONALLY ATTRACTIVE SOLUTION FOR HADDAD HIMSELF. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT HADDAD WAS NO LONGER A FREE AGENT: HE WAS CONSTANTLY ACCOMPANIED BY AN ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICER. MACK NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF POSSIBLE SYRIAN REACTIONS TO ANYTHING THEY AGREED WITH THE ISRAELIS. IF HADDAD WERE TO COMMAND THE SOUTHERN BRIGADE FOR EXAMPLE, THE SYRIANS WOULD DEMAND THAT AHMED KHATIB COMMANDED THE LAF BRIGADE IN THE BEKA'A.

3. MACK DID NOT KNOW HOW THIS PROBLEM COULD BE RESOLVED. HABIB PLANNED TO MAKE ONE FURTHER VISIT TO ISRAEL BEFORE RETURNING TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATIONS.

4. AFTER SEEING TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE LEAHY TOLD VELIOTES THAT SALEM HAD BEEN SHAKEN BY THE LATEST ISRAELI DEMANDS AND THAT HE SEEMED TO BE CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF BREAKING OFF THE TALKS, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY. VELIOTES SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD JUST RECEIVED A SIMILAR MESSAGE. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT SAEB SALAM HAD PUBLICLY CRITICISED BOTH THE LEBANESE AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS. THE AMERICANS WERE DOING THEIR BEST TO REASSURE THE LEBANESE OF THEIR CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR THEIR POSITIONS. HABIB WAS EXPECTED BACK IN WASHINGTON TOWARDS THE END OF THIS WEEK.

WRIGHT

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CONFIDENTIAL

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 25 March, 1983

Multi-national Force in the Lebanon

You will no doubt be letting me have in due course advice for consideration by the Prime Minister on the future of the British contingent in the multi-national force. In this connection, you should know that when the Prime Minister saw Washington Telegram No. 657 she commented that she was opposed to an expansion of the role of the MNF in assisting the Lebanese army in areas from which the Israelis and Syrians might withdraw.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 16

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR EGERTON
SIR J BULLARD
HD/NENAD
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ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 142205Z MAR 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 623 OF 14 MARCH
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, TEL AVIV ROUTINE DAMASCUS, AMMAN, CAIRO,
JEDDA, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING PARIS, ROME.

ISRAEL/LEBANON

SUMMARY

1. SHAMIR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON PRODUCED LITTLE PROGRESS TOWARDS AGREEMENT ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. THE ISRAELI DEMAND FOR A RESIDUAL IDF PRESENCE REMAINS THE PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE. MORE US/LEBANESE TALKS THIS WEEK.

DETAIL

2. SHAMIR LEAVES WASHINGTON TOMORROW AFTER A THREE DAY VISIT DURING WHICH HE HAD THREE LENGTHY SESSIONS OF TALKS WITH SHULTZ, AND CALLED ON PRESIDENT REAGAN. THE LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS HELD SEPARATE TALKS WITH SHULTZ.

3. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TOLD US THAT SHULTZ' TALKS WITH SHAMIR FOCUSSED ON LEBANON, THOUGH THE ISRAELIS MENTIONED A NUMBER OF BILATERAL ISSUES INCLUDING THE CONTINUED WITHHOLDING FROM CONGRESS OF THE PROPOSAL TO SELL THEM MORE F-16S AND THE NEED FOR BETTER LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE US CONTINGENT IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND IDF OFFICERS IN BEIRUT. THERE WAS LITTLE PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. THE AMERICANS HAD NOT EXPECTED THE VISIT TO PRODUCE ANY MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH. SHAMIR HAD HAD NO FLEXIBILITY TO NEGOTIATE: HIS ROLE HAD BEEN TO

~~NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE DISCHARGE OF [illegible] HAD NOT EXPECTED THE VISIT TO PRODUCE ANY MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH. SHAMIR HAD HAD NO FLEXIBILITY TO NEGOTIATE; HIS ROLE HAD~~ BEEN TO DESCRIBE THE ISRAELI POSITION. THE STATE DEPARTMENT BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELIS SAW A NEED TO MAKE THEIR CASE TO SHULTZ IN PERSON BECAUSE THEY THOUGHT HABIB UNSYMPATHETIC TO THEIR DEMANDS. SHULTZ HAD GIVEN SHAMIR A FULL AND SYMPATHETIC HEARING.

4. THE MAIN PROBLEM WAS THE ISRAELI DEMAND FOR A RESIDUAL IDF PRESENCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. THEY WERE ASKING, (UNDERLINE FOLLOWING TWO WORDS) INTER ALIA, FOR DAILY PATROLS BY THE IDF WITH IDF SECURITY PROTECTION AND AN UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ISRAELIS COULD TAKE QUOTE INDEPENDENT ACTION UNQUOTE IF NECESSARY. THE LEBANESE WERE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE OF ANY KIND. THE MOST THEY WERE PREPARED TO CONCEDE (PLEASE PROTECT) WAS THAT LEBANESE ARMY TEAMS INSPECTING THE SECURITY ZONE MIGHT BE ACCOMPANIED BY INDIVIDUAL IDF OFFICERS ON A REGULAR BASIS. NORMALISATION HAD NOT BEEN AS DIFFICULT AN ISSUE. THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS SEEM TO HAVE REACHED AN UNDERSTANDING WHICH WILL BE COVERED IN SIDE LETTERS AND ORAL UNDERSTANDINGS IN ORDER NOT TO EMBARRASS THE LEBANESE WITH THE ARABS.

5. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAY THAT THE NEXT STEPS ARE FOR THE ISRAELI CABINET TO RE-ASSESS THEIR POSITION IN THE LIGHT OF SHAMIR'S TALKS IN WASHINGTON AND FOR HABIB AND DRAPER TO RETURN TO THE MIDDLE EAST TOWARDS THE END OF THIS WEEK TO ATTEMPT TO NAIL DOWN AN AGREEMENT.

6. MEANWHILE ELIE SALEM AND HIS PARTY ARE EXPECTED TO REMAIN IN WASHINGTON UNTIL 17 MARCH FOR FURTHER TALKS WITH SHULTZ AND A MEETING WITH REAGAN ON 16 MARCH. WE UNDERSTAND THAT SALEM DOES INTEND TO RETURN VIA LONDON (BEIRUT TELNO 129) AND ARE IN TOUCH WITH THE LEBANESE EMBASSY ABOUT HIS PLANS.

FCO PASSING SAVING PARIS, ROME.

WRIGHT

!REPEATED SAVING AS REQUESTED!

NNNN

GR 220
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM TEL AVIV 081355Z MAR 83
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 84 OF 8 MARCH 1983
INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, AMMAN, DAMASCUS AND MODUK.

MY TELEGRAMS NOS 81 AND 82: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. IT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED THAT THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER IS TO VISIT WASHINGTON SHORTLY.

2. THE MINISTER/COUNSELLOR AT THE US EMBASSY TOLD US TODAY THAT SHAMIR WAS LIKELY TO LEAVE HERE ON 11 MARCH, WITH TALKS WITH THE ADMINISTRATION BEGINNING AFTER THE WEEKEND. IN THE HOPE OF AVOIDING A SITUATION IN WHICH SHAMIR ARRIVED WITH UNREALISTIC AND INFLEXIBLE INSTRUCTIONS, THE AMERICANS WERE TRYING TO ENSURE THAT THE CABINET DID NOT CONSIDER THE COUNTER PROPOSALS WHICH ISRAELI OFFICIALS WERE CURRENTLY DRAFTING AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER THERE HAD BEEN A FIRST ROUND OF TALKS IN WASHINGTON.

3. FLATEN DESCRIBED THE VISIT AS A FIRST SUCCESS FOR THE NEW ISRAELI MINISTER OF DEFENCE, WHOSE IDEA IT WAS. HE WANTED SHAMIR TO BE EXPOSED TO DIRECT HIGH LEVEL AMERICAN PRESSURE RATHER THHAN ARENS HIMSELF HAVING TO ARGUE THE CASE FOR MODERATION IN MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS HERE.

4. FLATEN SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD SEE RECENT FLUCTUATIONS IN THE ISRAELI POSITION IN TERMS OF TWO STEPS FORWARD ONE STEP BACK. AS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, HE WAS FULL OF PRAISE FOR KIMCHE'S ROLE IN THE ISRAEL/LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS. KIMCHE WAS GOING FLAT OUT FOR A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. HE WAS TAKING CONSIDERABLE PERSONAL RISKS IN THE PROCESS, AND HAD NOT BEEN DETERRED BY GEBUKES FOR HAVING MORE THAN ONCE EXCEEDED HIS INSTRUCTIONS BY A FAIRLY WIDE MARGIN.

5. FCO: PLEASE ADVANCE TO NENAD.

MOBERLY

ADVANCED AS REQUESTED

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WED	MR THOMAS
RID	MR HAYES
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SIR J BULLARD
HD/NENAD
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~~HD/CONSULAR DEPT~~

... ...

Mr Wright

PUSD/ (2)

SIR A Parsons

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IMMEDIATE/ADVANCE C

GRS 200

Prime Minister

The F/C.O. and ROD will be letting you have advice.

A. & C. 1/3

CONFIDENTIAL
FM BEIRUT 011220Z MAR 83
TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.
TELEGRAM NUMBER 110 OF 1 MARCH 1983
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV
ROUTINE CAIRO
SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, ROME.

MIPT: MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE.

1. THE MEETING WENT ON TO DISCUSS THE COROLLARIES OF THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 2.

2. IT BECAME CLEAR THAT ALL EXCEPT THE FRENCH WERE BEING ASKED TO CONSIDER INCREASING THE SIZE OF THEIR CONTINGENTS. I ASKED WHETHER I SHOULD NOW REPORT TO MY GOVERNMENT THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS MAKING A FORMAL REQUEST TO US SEMI COLON AND WAS TOLD THAT I SHOULD.

No

3. NO FORMULA WAS PUT TO ME, BUT IT WAS SUGGESTED TO THE AMERICANS AND THE ITALIANS THAT THEY SHOULD DOUBLE THEIR CONTINGENTS, BRINGING THE FORCE NEAR TO A FIGURE OF 15,000.

4. WE THEN TURNED TO GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE [illegible]

4. WE THEN TURNED TO GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE. BY QUESTION AND ANSWER WE ELICITED FROM THE LEBANESE THAT THEY WOULD BE ASKING US TO AGREE TO THE OPERATION OF OUR CONTINGENTS ON THE SAME BASIS AND WITH THE SAME MANDATE AS AT PRESENT, BUT IN THE WHOLE OF LEBANESE TERRITORY ''IN PRINCIPLE''.

5. ALTHOUGH THE QUESTION NEVER AROSE AT THE MEETING, I THINK IT CAN BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED NOW THAT THE LEBANESE WILL ASK US TO EXTEND THE DURATION OF THE STAY OF OUR CONTINGENT IN THE LEBANON.

6. IF WE WERE TO INCREASE THE SIZE OF OUR CONTINGENT WE SHOULD BY DOUBLING IT BE MOVING PARI PASSU WITH THE AMERICANS AND THE ITALIANS, WHO ALREADY SEEM DISPOSED TO CONCUR.

7. THIS IS ALL CONTINGENCY PLANNING SEMI COLON AND I KNOW HOW TIRESOME HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS ARE. IT SEEMS TO ME, HOWEVER, THAT THE QUESTIONS CAN NOW BE CONSIDERED AS LIKELY TO ARISE. I DOUBT WHETHER PRESIDENT GEMAYEL WOULD HAVE SPOKEN AS HE DID UNLESS NEGOTIATIONS HAD ADVANCED TO A SUITABLE POINT.

8. FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

ROBERTS
BT

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SIR J LEAHY
MR EGERTON
SIR J BULLARD
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CONFIDENTIAL
FM BEIRUT 011215Z MAR 83
TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.
TELEGRAM NUMBER 109 OF 1 MARCH 1983
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV
ROUTINE CAIRO
SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK, BONN, PARIS, ROME.

ISRAEL/LEBANON.

1. PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL GAVE THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE TODAY HIS MOST OPTIMISTIC REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATIONS UP TO DATE. HE SAID THAT A DRAFT BY THE LEBANESE AND THE AMERICANS HAD NOW BEEN TAKEN TO ISRAEL. MUCH DEPENDED UPON NEGOTIATIONS THERE WHICH HABIB WAS AT THIS VERY MOMENT BEGINNING.

2. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT, WHEN AND IF AN AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED, IT WOULD PROVIDE FOR A FAIRLY RAPID WITHDRAWAL, PERHAPS TO A TIME-TABLE OF 8 TO 10 WEEKS. IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY AND THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE SHOULD NOT BE CAUGHT NAPPING BY SUCH A DEVELOPMENT.

~~3. CLEARLY IN ORDER TO EMPHASISE THAT THIS WAS A SOMEWHAT~~

3. CLEARLY IN ORDER TO EMPHASISE THAT THIS WAS A SOMEWHAT SPECIAL OCCASION, THE LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER WAS ALSO PRESENT AND SAID A FEW WORDS ON MUCH THE SAME LINES AS PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. THE PRESS AND PHOTOGRAPHERS WERE ALSO INVITED AT THE BEGINNING.

4. SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

5. FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

ROBERTS
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Middle East

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM TEL AVIV 281320Z FEB 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 74 OF 28 FEBRUARY 1983

INFO PRIORITY BONN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS AND MODUK.

MY TELEGRAM NO 69 (NOT TO ALL): ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. AT TODAY'S MEETING OF THE TEN, THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF A CONVERSATION ON 27 FEBRUARY WITH THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY, MAINLY ABOUT ISRAEL/LEBANON.

2. KIMCHE SAID THAT MORE PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE LAST WEEK. FORMULAE HAD NOW BEEN AGREED AD REFERENDUM ON MANY POINTS AND AGREEMENT WAS SHAPING UP ON OTHERS. KIMCHE STRESSED THE HIGH DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY SHOWN BY ISRAEL, WHO WANTED TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SUGGESTIONS THAT ISRAELIS WERE ENGAGING IN FOOT DRAGGING IN ORDER TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WERE UNTRUE. KIMCHE WOULD NOT HOWEVER FORECAST WHEN AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE SIGNED: MANY PROBLEMS REMAINED AND HE COULD NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER CRISES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

3. KIMCHE SAID THAT IN ALL LIKELIHOOD THERE WOULD BE AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON SIGNED BY FOREIGN MINISTERS. THE PREAMBLE HAD BEEN AGREED AND WORK ON THE WORDING OF THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR WAS MORE OR LESS FINISHED. THE MAIN REMAINING DIFFICULTIES CONCERNED MUTUAL RELATIONS, AND SECURITY QUESTIONS INCLUDING WITHDRAWAL. APART FROM THE FINAL CLAUSES, THERE WOULD ALIO BE MANY APPENDICES. THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE RATIFIED BY BOTH PARLIAMENTS, EVEN THOUGH THIS WAS NOT A LEGAL REQUIREMENT IN ISRAEL.

4. KIMCHE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LIAISON COMMITTEE WHICH WOULD BE SET UP BY THE AGREEMENT. THIS WOULD NOT MERELY SUPERVISE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT BUT WOULD ALSO DEAL WITH ALL PENDING BILATERAL ISSUES. THERE WOULD BE SUB-COMMITTEES ON ECONOMIC AND SECURITY QUESTIONS.

5. ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, KIMCHE SAID THAT THE KEY PROBLEM WAS THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND GOODS ACROSS THE ISRAEL/LEBANON BORDER. THIS WAS OF PRIME IMPORTANCE FOR ISRAEL. THE LEBANESE CLAIMED THAT IT WAS CORRESPONDINGLY DIFFICULT FOR THEM BECAUSE THE SYRIANS WERE THREATENING NOT TO WITHDRAW IF TOO MUCH WAS GIVEN TO ISRAEL. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION COULD BE A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF NOT MORE THAN SIX MONTHS DURING WHICH THE ECONOMIC SUB-COMMITTEE WOULD DEAL WITH APPLICATIONS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE. IF SO, ISRAEL WOULD NEED SUBSTANTIAL GUARANTEES THAT THE PROBLEM WOULD BE TACKLED FORMALLY NOT MORE THAN SIX MONTHS AFTER SIGNATURE OF THE MAIN AGREEMENT.

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6. KIMCHE SAID THAT THERE WERE ALSO PROBLEMS OVER THE ARAB BOYCOTT, WHERE THE LEBANESE WERE PREPARED TO GIVE ORAL UNDER-TAKINGS WHICH THE ISRAELIS WANTED FORMALISED. AS REGARDS DIPLOMATIC OFFICES, THE ISRAELIS INTENDED TO ESTABLISH ONE IN OR AROUND BEIRUT: THE LEBANESE WERE NOT PREPARED TO DO LIKEWISE AT PRESENT.

7. KIMCHE TOLD HANSEN THAT THE LEBANESE HAD ALSO EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW THE RESERVATIONS REGARDING ISRAEL THEY HAD LODGED IN VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL BODIES. THIS HAD IMPORTANT PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS IN THE POSTAL AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS FIELDS. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE POLICE FORCES ON THE CURTAILMENT OF DL,5.89=98GLING.

8. KIMCHE SAID THAT MANY SECURITY ISSUES REMAINED UNRESOLVED. ISRAEL HAD NOT YET WITHDRAWN HER DEMVND FOR FIVB BASES. BUT SHE WAS FLEXIBLE AND KIMCHE HAD HINTED THAT IF ISRAELI AIMS COULD BE ACHIEVED BY OTHER MEANS THE DEMAND WOULD BE DROPPED. MEANWHILE, THERE WAS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON JOINT PATROLS SEMICOLON HANSEN PRESUMED THAT ISRAELI FORCES WOULD NOT STAY IN LEBANON OVERNIGHT.

9. KIMVHE SAID THAT AGREEMENT ON A TWO PART SECURITY ZONE WAS SHAPING UP. UP TO THE LITANI, SECURITY WOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE HADDAD MILITIA WHO WOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO THE LEBANESE ARMY (KIMCHE SAID THAT THESE ARRANGEMENTS DID NOT NECESSARILY INCLUDE HADDAD PERSONALLY). ONLY ONE BRIGADE WOULD BE ALLOWED SOUTH OF THE LITANI. A LARGE NUMBER OF COMPLEX TECHNICAL QUESTIONS REMAINED TO BE SETTLED.

10. KIMCHE STATED THAT ISRAEL WAS AGAINST AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE (WHETHER MNF, UNIFIL OR MARINES) IN SOUTH LEBANON. HE SUBSEQUENTLY SAID THAT THEY WERE ''FOR THE TIME BEING'' OPPOSED TO UNIFIL GUARDING THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN THE SOUTH: THIS SHOULD BE DONE BY THE LEBANESE ARMY, WHO COULD DEPLOY MOSLEM UNITS IF85 291T WOUL:D HELP.

11. KIMCHE SAID THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO FIX A TIMETABLE FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THE ISRAELIS COULD FIT IN WITH WHAT OTHERS, IE, THE SYRIANS AND PLO, COULD MANAGE (BUT SEE PARAGRAPH 139:C)&'?3)92). PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL TO THE 45 KMS LINE EVEN BEFORE AN AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED WAS THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE DUT IN PRACTICE UNLIKELY. MEANWHILE, THE LEBANESE WERE HAPPY TO OVERLAP WITH IDF FORCES EG IN THE CHOUF MOUNTAINS.

12. KIMCHE TOLD HANSEN THAT HE WAS VERY WORRIED ABOUT THE SYRIANS (HANSEN COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS A CHANGE FROM KIMCHE'S USUAL ATTITUDE). THE SYRIANS HAD AN ECONOMIC AS WELL AS POLITICO/MILITARY INTEREST IN STAYING IN LEBANON, SINCE THEY CONTROLLED THE TRADE IN HASHISH. THE RUSSIANS WERE ENCOURAGING THEM TO BE INTRANSIGENT. THERE WAS ALARMING EVIDENCE OF SOVIET VISITS AND FURTHER ARMS SUPPLIES TO SYRIA IN THE PAST WEEK, THOUGH TALK OF A PGE-EMPTIVE ISRAEL STRIKE AGAINST SAM-5 SITES WAS NONSENSE.

CONFIDENTIAL

/THE

THE ISRAELIS WERE URGING HABIB TO VISIT DAMASCUS, BUT HE UAS NOT KEEN TO GO UNTIL MORE PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN THE ISRAEL/LEBANON TALKS. KIMCHE SUGGESTED THAT THE SAUDIS AND EUROPEANS HAD A ROLE TO PLAY IN CONVINCING THE SYRIANS TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING.

13. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR (STRESSING THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO BE QUOTED BACK TO HIS COLLEAGUE IN BEIRUT OR TO THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY) READ RAPIDLY FROM A TELEGRAM REPORTING ON A CONVERSATION BETWEEN HABIB AND THE FRENCHMAN IN BEIRUT ON 26 FEBRUARY. THIS WAS BROADLY CONSISTENT WITH KIMCHE'S ACCOUNT OF THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. BUT THE FOLLOWING GLOSSES MAY BE WORTH ADDING:

A) IT WAS CLEAR THAT HABIB AND THE LEBANESE ENVISAGE A COMPLETELY SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON NORMALISATION, TO BE CONCLUDED AT A LATER STAGE (IE 6 MONTHS AFTER SIGNATURE OF THE MAIN AGREEMENT) SEMICOLON

B) HE AND THE LEBANESE SEEM TO BE PLANNING THAT THE LEBANESE SHOULD PRESENT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL A REQUEST FOR A CHANGE IN THE UNIFIL MANDATE, TO ALLOW IT TO PERFORM ITS NEW ROLE SEMICOLON

C) THE LEBANESE WANT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO TAKE PLACE OVER AN EIGHT WEEK PERIOD, WITH THE ISRAELIS ASKING FOR EI 233(' SEMICOLON

D) HABIB WAS HOPEFUL THAT AN AGREEMENT COULD BE SIGNED BY LATE MARCH, IN WHICH CASE IDF WITHDRAWAL COULD START AT THE BEGINNING OF APRIL AND BE COMPLETED BY THE END OF MAY.

14. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO NENAD.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 February 1983

Lebanon: MNF

The Prime Minister was grateful for your letter of 14 February enclosing Mr. Egerton's detailed report on his recent visit to Beirut, which she has read with interest.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

(2)

Prime Minister

I think you will find this detailed report very valuable.

A.J.C. 15/2

cc. Sir A. Parsons
Mr. Fadling.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 February 1983

Dear John,

Lebanon: MNF

Mr Pym mentioned to the Prime Minister the visit to Beirut of Stephen Egerton and Colonel Stevenson to look at the arrangements for the British contingent to the MNF. You may like to see a copy of Mr Egerton's report. I understand that Colonel Stevenson may be producing a separate report on the military nuts and bolts of the operation.

I am copying this to Richard Mottram (MOD).

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

VISIT TO BEIRUT 9-11 FEBRUARY 1983

1. Accompanied by Colonel Peter Stevenson of the Directorate of Military Operations, I was asked to visit Beirut to appraise the settling in of the British contingent to the Multinational Force; to look at its liaison arrangements with HM Embassy, other MNF elements, the Israeli Defence Forces and the Lebanese Army; and to see if HM Embassy was adequately staffed to perform its increased duties, given HMA's responsibility for 'the daily political and military direction of the British Force in Lebanon' (BRITFORLEB).

2. Our contingent of approximately 98 men forming a Squadron of the Queen's Dragoon Guards (4 troops with 4 Ferret APCs each) is housed near the suburb of Hadath in a large square-built five-storey concrete block of flats, basically sound and dry, but superficially damaged by small arms fire. The windows have been largely filled in with breeze blocks for security, except for small openings to admit light. The Lebanese authorities are spending approx. £15,000 to repair plumbing and put the building basically to rights; a small detachment of Royal Engineers is helping. The men are comfortably housed and told me they much preferred being in this building to under canvas. The block is situated at a corner of a large and functioning tobacco factory (Régie du Tabac), on the lower slopes of a hill overlooking Beirut Airport and the dug-in US MNF contingent totalling some 1,800 Marines, with support units including tanks and helicopters. There is a superb field of all round vision from the roof of the British HQ, which is manned throughout daylight hours. Our building is on a side road off the old Sidon road which, joining the Beirut/Damascus road closer into town, form an Israeli Main Supply Route (MSR) to their troops further north and east.

3. The day I visited Hadath the Israelis, concerned by terrorist incidents earlier in the week along the MSR, were establishing a Battalion HQ of some 100 men, with two dug-in Centurion tanks and several APCs, some 250 yards west of the British HQ. The Israeli position commands the MSR as it leads into Beirut and should ensure that the sporadic Kataib (Phalange) - Druze artillery exchanges just inland from the British position will be less frequent in future, or nil.

4. I found that the arrival of our troops had been most warmly welcomed by Lebanese civilians in the area, who had sent them settling-in gifts of food, sweetmeats etc to the value of some Lebanese £2,000 (Leb. £6 = £1). A group of pressmen who have been much in evidence have promised our men a second television set, for the joint officers' and senior NCOs' mess.

/5.

5. Our contingent is commanded by Lt Colonel John Cochrane of the Royal Irish Rangers, an alert 40 year old with whom I had several talks, some private. This officer realises that his role as leader of an 'interposition force' is as much political as military, entailing constant liaison with HM Ambassador and the avoidance of all unnecessary risk in carrying out the squadron's function of providing mobile patrols on the flanks of the other (largely infantry) MNF contingents' areas and (probably from 14 February) into East Beirut. Our contingent's Rules of Engagement are tightly drawn, and each solder's Yellow Card summarising the rules stresses that fire-arms may only be used as a last resort and in self-defence: we may not identify ourselves with any of the local factions, and our job is to spot and report trouble to the LAF, not deal with it ourselves. The CO fully accepts, indeed welcomes these limitations, which differ considerably from the QDG's standing orders in Northern Ireland. He realises the need constantly to remind his men of them. In the Ambassador's view, the main danger to our contingent lies in the risk of ambushes by trouble-makers seeking to involve the Americans, Israelis, or the Phalange; and of straight traffic accidents resulting from the chaotic Beirut traffic conditions. Our base was selected in part because it could be more easily guarded from terrorist action (eg car bombs) than a site in the built-up area.

Lebanese Armed Forces.

6. An important new development of which I was told is the establishment at US initiative of an intra-MNF contingent communications net centred in the Lebanese Presidency, which is sited about two miles from the British base and manned by liaison officers from all MNF contingents and the Lebanese Army for 24 hours a day. This net includes the Israelis, but not the Phalange or the Druze in the Chouf. It is hoped to keep its existence secret but it seems likely to become known through the Arabic (or British) media sooner rather than later. Militarily it could prove invaluable.

7. Even before the Israelis established their Battalion HQ 250 yards west of our position, liaison between Lt Colonel Cochrane and the local Israeli commander had started. After some initial Israeli concern at our choice of site for the British contingent, which we stressed was at Lebanese suggestion as well as being militarily the most suitable, relations have been good in consequence of our stated intention not to interfere with the Israeli MSR. The Israelis claim that the MSR was established in September 1982 by agreement with Ambassador Draper as part of the price of Israeli withdrawal from West Beirut, and as a consequence of the re-entry of US troops to hold Beirut Airport, as they still do with the Sixth Fleet standing off, a most impressive sight. Our repeated enquiries of the Americans, both in Beirut and in Washington, have elicited the statement that the 'Draper understanding' is unwritten and that they (the US) have nothing against our presence in Hadath in a patrolling role, provided that the Israeli MSR remains unaffected

Main Supply Route.

/Ambassador

Ambassador Dillon repeated this to me when I called with HMA on him on 10 February, adding that misunderstandings between the US and Israelis on the extent of the US Marines' 'area of responsibility' had now been sorted out on American not Israeli terms. We told Dillon that we did not see BRITFORLEB having a similar area of responsibility which, given its numerical strength, would be absurd; but rather an area of British interest for patrolling purposes - soon likely to be extended to include East Beirut, at President Gemayel's request. As we saw it, the UK contingent was not responsible for holding, far less holding the ring in, any territorial area, especially in cases of eg hot pursuit by the Israelis against a terrorist target. 'The British are not the enemy'. Dillon listened to these clarifications with interest, adding that the US were glad to have us alongside near the Airport.

8. Given the heavily political and flag-showing role of our contingent, liaison arrangements with HM Ambassador and the Chancery (some seven miles to the North) are obviously crucial. I found them on the whole satisfactory. A UHF radio link between our base at Hadath and Chancery is now operational, though the additional device necessary for secure speech has not yet been delivered or installed because of ex-UK supply difficulties. MOD are following this up urgently. Weekend arrangements, when the Embassy is shut and HM Ambassador up the mountain at his house in 'Abey (one hour's drive), will probably be handled by a link Hadath - British Liaison Officer at Presidential Palace - HMA at ' Abey, and it is Sir D Roberts' intention that this link should be functioning by the weekend beginning 19 February at latest.

9. Lt Colonel Cochrane has his own secure link to MODUK via Cyprus. This is used mainly for administrative, logistic and staff welfare matters, as well as for formal reporting to MOD, but could be used in an emergency (eg if the open link to the Embassy was inoperable, or judged too insecure) for political or intelligence traffic or for seeking political guidance. Normally, however, COMFORLEB would use the Embassy channel for political and intelligence matters. I should add that he has an I-Corps staff sergeant on strength who by US invitation sees their military SIGINT daily at their MNF HQ near the Airport. This is valuable but unprocessed and can defeat readers by its volume. Lt Col Cochrane told me that nevertheless he values the US 'take' highly as it generally gives advance information of local incidents, eg Druze/Kataib. In return the US Marines are likely to ask for de visu information from our Ferret Commanders about other force dispositions in the Beirut area. This seems to me a useful give and take, provided it is kept strictly confidential.

/10.

10. Ordinary telephoning both within the Lebanon and for international calls is highly temperamental and totally insecure. There is no possibility of MODUK arranging a satellite phone link between either the Chancery or the BRITFORLEB base and UK during the three month period of the force's stay at Hadath. It may be feasible to arrange such a 'suitcase link' via DWS, but I am told the cost would be very high. So long as the secure link between COMFORLEB and MODUK via Cyprus exists, I am not sure that the cost of a satellite link (as well) would be justified, but we can ask Hanslope to look into this if Ministers wish.

11. As regards future operational developments, Lt Col Cochrane has it in mind if the settling-in process (and co-existence with the newly-installed Israeli Batallion HQ) go well, to start routine patrols along the old Sidon road towards Beirut and in the Damascus road area assigned to us by LAF in the week beginning 14 February. But if by then President Gemayel has sewn up his discussions with the Phalange so as to enable MNF patrols to operate in the much more densely populated area of East Beirut, our squadron will also mount reconnaissance patrols there (an area completely free of the IDF). This should emphatically demonstrate the central Government's intention to reassert its authority over all its constituent parts, including the Phalange itself: if successful, it should revive Muslim confidence in Gemayel's leadership.

12. I am covering Diplomatic Service and MOD staffing matters in a separate minute. There are some obvious but probably temporary deficiencies and I do not believe that the Embassy can be left understaffed (for whatever accidental, routine or 'rotational' reason) while BRITFORLEB remains in Lebanon and requires exceptional servicing.

13. As well as my call on US Ambassador Dillon, I was taken by HM Ambassador to meet Dr Elie Salem, the Foreign Minister, at the Airport on 11 February. I explained the purpose of my rapid visit to Dr Salem, said that I had seen our contingent settling in at Hadath, and thanked him for the arrangements made by his Government to render our HQ building habitable. Dr Salem repeated his thanks to HMG for making a contingent available - 'each of your Ferret cars flying the Union flag is an Ambassador here for Britain' - and said he had learned a great deal from his calls on Mr Pym and the Prime Minister in November. He hoped he might be able to drop in again during 1983 in London, without formality or fuss, for informal exchanges of view on his way to or from Washington or Paris (I said I felt sure Ministers would welcome this). He sent his warmest personal regards and good wishes to Mr Pym, and through him to Mrs Thatcher. Lebanon would not forget Britain's gesture to her at her time of need. When I asked how the tripartite talks at Khaldeh were going, he said that some progress was

/being

being made on security arrangements, thanks to US help; but not yet on 'normalisation'. The Israelis in any case had other things on their mind. He then left to greet the Netherlands Foreign Minister, arriving for a short visit to discuss Israeli harassment of Dutch troops seconded to UNIFIL.

Comment

14. This was on the whole a reassuring visit. Lt Colonel Cochrane's calm and methodical approach (and political sense) are complementary to the profound commitment and energy of HM Ambassador, and they have established a sound relationship which should survive the emergencies likely to occur. The base our troops find themselves in was one of at least three originally offered by the Lebanese: in the crowded Phalange-held port, in the Hamra area dominated by the French, and at Hadath, on an unbuilt-up hillside not far from the Presidential Palace and the Ministry of Defence. MOD chose the Hadath site, with HM Ambassador's concurrence, because of its greater military suitability. Once the Israelis convince themselves that we are not there to impede their operations along the MSR, the concern caused by our arrival should dwindle away. A different but very plausible threat identified by HM Ambassador lies in unforeseeable incidents caused by anti-Israeli terrorism or sheer factional mischief-making, which would result in our Ferrets or Land Rovers getting caught in crossfire or contrived traffic accidents. Colonel Cochrane is very aware of these possibilities and has already instructed that when regular patrolling starts (probably on 14 February), our units will avoid setting out whenever an Israeli supply convoy is expected down the old Sidon road: the times can be checked in advance on the intra-MNF signals network which includes the IDF. Similarly, if our patrols hit an Israeli convoy coming back along the MSR, they will pull over and let it through or otherwise direct themselves away from it. The longer withdrawal hangs fire, the greater the dangers of terrorist incidents.

15. I found Beirut itself fairly relaxed and, apart from the terrible but localised devastation, much as I remembered it in the 60's. (Hadath is of course on the road between Beirut and Shemlan.) But the 'business as usual' atmosphere is a front, and trouble between feuding Lebanese factions could start again any time, though the Phalange-Druze truce in the Aley area, and the possibility of Phalange forces moving out of East Beirut by stages from 14 February are modestly encouraging. The presence of the various MNF contingents with part of the Sixth Fleet standing off should be a stabilising factor. However, everything will depend on whether progress towards withdrawal of all foreign forces is made in the tripartite talks. Here the Lebanese believe that President Reagan's prestige is involved and therefore he cannot let the talks fail in the end, even though they may prove very lengthy.

/16.

16. All the signs are that the other MNF contingents are settling in for a long stay. HM Ambassador believes that approaches to us to extend our contingent's stay will start being made in March. From the remarks made to me by Dr Elie Salem about informal visits to London (para 13 above), I judge that he intends to see Mr Pym and the Prime Minister himself, to plead the case for an extension beyond 7 May, if earlier appeals to Sir D Roberts are inconclusive.

14 February 1983

S L Egerton

SUBJECT

CONFIDENTIAL

bc RJ Lebanon
AP

cc Master

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 February 1983

LEBANON

When the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary called on the Prime Minister this morning he gave Mrs. Thatcher a brief account of the outcome of Mr. Egerton's visit to Beirut last week and the current position of the British contingent in the multi-national force. Mr. Pym explained that he had asked Mr. Egerton to undertake this visit because he was concerned about some of the signals we were receiving from the area.

Mr. Pym described the position on the ground, illustrating this with a map. He told the Prime Minister that Mr. Egerton had expressed confidence in the British officers commanding the force.

The Prime Minister said that she was somewhat reassured by the proximity to the British contingent of the US troops and of the new Israeli command post which had been established.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM PARIS 101800Z FEB 83
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 112 OF 10 FEBRUARY 1983
AND TO INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON TEL AVIV
DAMASCUS

A curious episode.

LEBANON

MT

1. DE GROSSOUVRE, PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S COUNSELLOR FOR SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS, ASKED ME TO CALL TODAY. HE SAID THE WANTED TO LET ME KNOW VERY INFORMALLY ABOUT A REMARK MADE BY AMIN GEMAYEL WHOM HE HAD SEEN IN BEIRUT LAST WEEK. GEMAYEL HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT WHAT HE INTERPRETED AS AN UNFAVOURABLE DRIFT IN BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS THE LEBANON. HE HAD PREVIOUSLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS DOING ITS BEST TO WORK FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES AND THE RESTORATION OF THE UNITY OF THE LEBANON, IN PARTICULAR BY EXERCISING PRESSURE IN WASHINGTON. BUT IT NOW SEEMED TO HIM THAT BRITISH EFFORTS HAD STOPPED AND THAT BRITAIN WAS GOING ALONG WITH THOSE WHO WANTED THE LONG TERM DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY.

?

2. GROSSOUVRE ADDED BY WAY OF BACKGROUND THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD AUTHORISED HIM TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH VARIOUS HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WHOM HE HAD PREVIOUSLY KNOWN AND TO ACT AS AN UNOFFICIAL PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY TO THEM. HE SAID HE WAS IN ALMOST DAILY CONTACT WITH GEMAYEL BY TELEPHONE. HE EMPHASISED THAT HE WAS NOT MAKING AN OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION TO ME: HE SIMPLY THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO LET US KNOW WHAT HAD BEEN SAID.

3. I THANKED HIM FOR PASSING THIS ON AND SAID THAT WE WERE INDEED CONCERNED THAT BRITISH POLICY SHOULD BE PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD. I SAID I WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY CHANGE IN THAT POLICY: WE HAD CONSISTENTLY FAVOURED THE INDEPENDENCE AND UNOTY OF THE LEBANON. I WAS NOT SURE THAT IT WAS RIGHT TO TALK OF EXERCISING PRESSURE ON THE US GOVERNMENT, BUT WE WERE IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH THE AMERICANS AND IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY TOO WERE WORKING TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES AND HAD RECENTLY BEEN PUTTING PRESSURE ON ISRAEL FOR THAT PURPOSE. I THOUGHT THEREFORE THAT BRITISH, AMERICAN AND FRENCH EFFORTS WERE ALL DIRECTED TO THE SAME END. GROSSOUVRE SAID HE WAS VERY GLAD TO HEAR THIS AND THAT WHEN HE NEXT SPOKE TO GEMAYEL HE WOULD ALLUDE TO HIS CONVERSATION WITH ME AND SAY THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN BRITISH POLICY.

4. GROSSOUVRE CLAIMED CREDIT FOR HAVING IN THE COURSE OF HIS VISIT TO BEIRUT ALERTED THE FRENCH COMMANDER TO THE FACT THAT THE BRITISH CONTINGENT IN THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE WAS BEING PLACED IN AN ISOLATED AND EXPOSED POSITION. HE BELIEVED THAT ACTION WAS NOW BEING TAKEN TO REMEDY THIS.

/COMMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMENT

5. GROSSOUVRE IS A PECULIAR OPERATOR WHO AROUSES MUCH DISTRUST IN THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT MACHINE. THIS AND THE ODDNESS OF HIS TALE MAKE IT HARD TO AVOID THE SUSPICION THAT HE HAS SOME ULTERIOR MOTIVE, PERHAPS TO SHOW GEMAYEL THAT THE FRENCH HAVE INFLUENCE OVER THE BRITISH. IT CANNOT HOWEVER BE RULED OUT THAT ON THIS OCCASION GROSSOUVRE WAS GENUINELY TRYING TO BE HELPFUL.

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Extracts from the Report of the
Judicial Commission of Inquiry

The recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry were already reported in the media. The following extracts from its Report illuminate some additional aspects of its findings.

1) Israeli intentions

Contentions and accusations were advanced that even if I.D.F. personnel had not shed the blood of the massacred, the entry of Phalangists into the camps had been carried out with the prior knowledge that a massacre would be perpetrated there and with the intention that this should indeed take place, and therefore all those who had enabled the entry of the Phalangists into the camps should be regarded as accomplices to the acts of slaughter and sharing in direct responsibility. These accusations too are unfounded. We have no doubt that no conspiracy or plot was entered into between anyone from the Israeli political echelon or from the military echelon in the IDF and the Phalangists, with the aim of perpetrating atrocities in the camps. The decision to have the Phalangists enter the camps was taken with the aim of preventing further losses in the war in Lebanon, to accede to the pressure of public opinion in Israel, which was angry that the Phalangists, who were reaping the fruits of the war, were taking no part in it, and to take advantage of the Phalangists' professional service and their skills in identifying terrorists and in discovering arms caches. No intention existed on the part of any Israeli element to harm the non-combatant population in the camps. It is true that in the war in Lebanon, and particularly during the siege of West Beirut, the civilian population sustained losses, with old people, women and children among the casualties, but this was the result of belligerent actions which claim victims even among those who do not fight. Before they entered the camps and also afterwards, the Phalangists requested I.D.F. support in the form of artillery fire and tanks, but this request was rejected by the Chief of Staff in order to prevent injuries to civilians. It is true that IDF tank fire was directed at sources of fire within the camps, but this was in reaction to fire directed at the IDF from inside

/cont...

the camps. We assert that in having the Phalangists enter the camps, no intention existed on the part of anyone who acted on behalf of Israel to harm the non-combatant population, and that the events that followed did not have the concurrence or assent of anyone from the political or civilian echelon who was active regarding the Phalangists' entry into the camps.

2) Could Israelis see or hear what happened in the camps?

It was alleged that the atrocities being perpetrated in the camps were visible from the roof of the Forward Command Post, that the fact that they were being committed was also discernible from the sounds emanating from the camps, and that the senior I.D.F. commanders who were on the roof of the Forward Command Post for two days certainly saw or heard what was going on in the camps. We have already determined above that events in the camps, in the area where the Phalangists entered, were not visible from the roof of the Forward Command Post. It has also been made clear that no sounds from which it could be inferred that a massacre was being perpetrated in the camps reached that place. It is true that certain reports did reach officers at the Forward Command Post - and we shall discuss these in another section of this Report - but from the roof of the Forward Command Post they neither saw the actions of the Phalangists nor heard any sounds indicating that a massacre was in progress.

Here we must add that when the group of doctors and nurses met I.D.F. officers on Saturday morning, at a time when it was already clear to them that they were out of danger, they made no complaint that a massacre had been perpetrated in the camps. When we asked the witnesses from this group why they had not informed the I.D.F. officers about the massacre, they replied that they had not known about it. The fact that the doctors and nurses who were in the Gaza Hospital - which is proximate to the site of the event and where persons wounded in combative action and frightened persons from the camps arrived - did not know about the massacre, but only about isolated instances of injury which they had seen for themselves, also shows that those who were nearby but not actually inside the camps did not form the impression, from what they saw and heard, that a massacre of hundreds of people was taking place. Nor did members of a unit of the Lebanese Army who were

/cont...

stationed near the places of entry into the camps know anything about the massacre until after the Phalangists had departed.

3) Direct responsibility

Our conclusion is therefore that the direct responsibility for the perpetration of the acts of slaughter rests on the Phalangist Forces. No evidence was brought before us that Phalangist personnel received explicit orders from their Command to perpetrate acts of slaughter, but it is evident that the forces who entered the area were steeped in hatred for the Palestinians, in the wake of the atrocities and severe injuries done to the Christians during the Civil War in Lebanon by the Palestinians and those who fought alongside them, and these feelings of hatred were compounded by a longing for revenge in the wake of the assassination of the Phalangists' admired leader Bashir and the killing of several dozen Phalangists two days before their entry into the camps. The execution of acts of slaughter was approved for the Phalangists on the site by the remarks of the two commanders to whom questions were addressed over the radios, as was related above.

4) Indirect responsibility of others

We would like to note here that we will not enter at all into the question of indirect responsibility of other elements besides the State of Israel. One might argue that such indirect responsibility falls, inter alia, on the Lebanese Army, or on the Lebanese Government to whose orders this army was subject, since despite Major General Drori's urgings in his talks with the heads of the Lebanese Army, they did not grant Israel's requests to enter the camps before the Phalangists or instead of the Phalangists, until 19.9.82. It should also be noted that in meetings with U.S. Representatives during the critical days, Israel's spokesmen repeatedly requested that the U.S. use its influence to get the Lebanese Army to fulfil the function of maintaining public peace and order in West Beirut, but it does not seem that these requests had any result. One might also make charges concerning the hasty evacuation of the multi-national force by the countries whose troops were in place until after the evacuation of the terrorists. We will also not discuss the question of when other elements besides Israeli elements first learned of the massacre, and whether they did all they could to stop it or at least to immediately bring the reports in their possession to Israeli and other elements.

/cont...

We do not view it as our function to discuss these issues, which perhaps should be clarified in another framework, we will only discuss the issue of Israel's indirect responsibility knowing that if this responsibility is determined, it is not an exclusive responsibility laid on Israel alone.

5) Closing remarks

In the witnesses' testimony and in various documents, stress is laid on the difference between the usual battle ethics of the I.D.F. and the battle ethics of the bloody clashes and combat actions among the various ethnic groups, militias, and fighting forces in Lebanon. The difference is considerable. In the war the I.D.F. waged in Lebanon, many civilians were injured and much loss of life was caused, despite the effort the I.D.F. and its soldiers made not to harm civilians. On more than one occasion, this effort caused I.D.F. troops additional casualties. During the months of the war, I.D.F. soldiers witnessed many sights of killing, destruction and ruin. From their reactions (about which we have heard) to acts of brutality against civilians, it would appear the despite the terrible sights and experiences of the war and despite the soldier's obligation to behave as a fighter with a certain degree of callousness, I.D.F. soldiers did not lose their sensitivity to atrocities that were perpetrated on non-combatants either out of cruelty or to give vent to vengeful feelings. It is regrettable that the reaction by I.D.F. soldiers to such deeds was not always forceful enough to bring a halt to the despicable acts.

It seems to us that the I.D.F. should continue to foster the (consciousness of) basic moral obligations which must be kept even in war conditions, without prejudicing the I.D.F.'s combat ability. The circumstances of combat require the combatants to be tough - which means to give priority to sticking to the objective and being willing to make sacrifices - in order to attain the objectives assigned to them, even under the most difficult conditions. But the end never justifies the means, and basic ethical and human values must be maintained in the use of arms.

Among the responses to the Commission for the public, there were those who expressed dissatisfaction with the holding of an inquiry on a subject not directly related to Israel's responsibility. The argument was advanced that in previous instances of massacre in Lebanon, when the lives of many more people were taken than those of the victims who fell in Sabra

/Cont...

and Shatilla, world opinion was not shocked and no inquiry commissions were established. We cannot justify this approach to the issue of holding an inquiry and not only for the formal reason that it was not we who decided to hold the inquiry but rather the Israeli Government resolved thereon. The main purpose of the inquiry was to bring to light all the important facts relating to the perpetration of the atrocities. It therefore has importance from the perspective of Israel's moral fortitude and its functioning as a democratic state that scrupulously maintains the fundamental principles of the civilized world.

We do not deceive ourselves that the results of this inquiry will convince or satisfy those who have prejudices or selective consciences, but this inquiry was not intended for such people. We have striven and have spared no effort to arrive at the truth, and we hope that all persons of good will who will examine the issue without prejudice will be convinced that the inquiry was conducted without any bias.

9th February 1983

Middle East DSG

File

bc: Sir A. Parsons
Mr. Jackling

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 February 1983

Dear Richard,

LEBANON - DEPLOYMENT OF MNF

Your Secretary of State minuted to the Prime Minister on 4 February about the deployment of the UK contingent which is to join the Multinational Force in the Lebanon.

As I told Jane Ridley on Friday evening, I have discussed this matter with the Prime Minister who is concerned about the possibility of the UK contingent becoming involved in incidents provoked by others around the UK base but, in the light of your Secretary of State's advice, will not raise objection to the deployment taking place on 7 February.

The Prime Minister has, however, asked me to emphasise that the information in Mr. Heseltine's minute makes it all the more necessary to ensure that the UK contingent leaves the Lebanon at the end of the three month period previously agreed.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the members of OD.

Yours ever

Colin Cole.

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

DSG

(1)

Prime Minister
The UK contingent for the MNF have Cyprus for Beirut on Monday. Their base camp is not ideal but there seems to be no alternative. They would be in some danger wherever they were in Beirut.
(see Mr. Jackling's minute attached).
A. L. C. 4/2.

MO 3/7/4

PRIME MINISTER

LEBANON - DEPLOYMENT OF MNF

You will wish to be aware of recent developments in the deployment of the UK contingent joining the Multinational Force (MNF) in the Lebanon.

2. The 22 man advance party of the UK contingent was flown from Cyprus to Beirut on 1st February. They are engaged in preparations for the arrival of the main force, which will follow on 7th February by chartered Ro-Ro ferry, arriving in Beirut on 8th February. To provide the force with secure communications and a security section, we have had to increase the strength of the armoured reconnaissance unit from 80 to 97 men.

3. A base camp for the UK contingent has been selected at Hadath in the southeast suburbs of Beirut. This is an area disputed by Christain and Druze militias and the camp could be subject to accidental shelling during their occasional skirmishes. It is also very close to Israeli positions and a major Israeli supply route. The Israelis have already accused the US MNF contingent, which is deployed in and around Beirut airport, and between the airport and Hadath, of abetting Palestinian guerillas, and in a series of increasingly provocative incidents have probed US positions, sometimes using tanks. They may attempt to provoke incidents around the UK base in an attempt to force us to move to a less sensitive area, and thereby undermine both the MNF's authority and UK prestige.

4. Nevertheless both the Force Commander and our Ambassador in Beirut are satisfied that the Hadath site is the only satisfactory

base that we and the Lebanese have been able to identify. It provides hard standing and cover for the unit's vehicles and a degree of protection for the personnel. A substantial amount of work has already been carried out on the site by the Lebanese Army and our advance party to prepare it for the arrival of the main force. The only alternative to Hadath would be permanently to base our force with another MNF contingent, almost certainly with the Americans. There is no guarantee that this would be safer than Hadath, and it would be seen as a British climbdown. It would also risk our being regarded simply as agents of the Americans.

5. I am therefore satisfied that the Hadath site is the most suitable base available to us, and I therefore propose to authorize the deployment of the UK contingent from Cyprus as planned on 7th February.

6. I will keep you and OD colleagues, to whom I am copying this note, informed of further developments as they occur.

G. Ridley
(Private Secretary. Draft approved by the Secretary of State and signed in his absence.)

Ministry of Defence
4th February 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

cc Sir Anthony Parsons

MR. COLES

THE LEBANON

I gather that the Defence Secretary will today seek the Prime Minister's concurrence to the deployment and disposition of the Btitish element of the Multinational Force (MNF). Decisions are needed in time for a move to be made on Monday of next week. A ferry has been chartered for that day to carry the Armoured Recce Squadron and its vehicles from Cyprus to the Lebanon. The British element is due to deploy near the village of Hadath in the South East sector of Beirut. It will be adjacent to an area occupied by the US element of the MNF, and near to one of the main supply routes for Israeli forces.

The Prime Minister will obviously be concerned about the safety of our soldiers. Recent newspaper reports have highlighted the potential risk to all members of the MNF. I have spoken to the Officer who led the reconnaissance party to the Lebanon recently. He tells me that the area around Hedath is relatively open, and therefore more suitable than other areas for operations by an Armoured Recce Squadron equipped with "Ferret Scout Cars". $75,000 has been spent to provide secure and comfortable accommodation for the British element, which will be sited away from local housing, and should not, therefore, be at risk from ill-directed bombardment.

There is obviously a risk that British soldiers will come under fire either while on patrol or in their base. Ministers have recognised this risk all along. That said, both the reconnaissance party, and the Commander of the British element believe that the area around Hedath is the most appropriate for us, and considerably safer than any other area in which the British element might be deployed.

R.T. JACKLING
4 February 1983

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Lebanon

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FM BEIRUT 250655Z JAN 83
TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.
TELEGRAM NUMBER 32 OF 25 JANUARY 1983
AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK
INFO IMMEDIATE CBFC, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON
ROUTINE CAIRO, DAMASCUS, AMMAN
SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, ROME, JEDDA.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 22 OF 19 JANUARY (NOT TO ALL):

MNF/HYPERION.

1. DRAPER ASKED ME TO CALL ON 24 JANUARY. HE HAD COME BACK EARLY FROM KHALDE TO SEE ME.

2. ESSENTIALLY HE HAD MISGIVINGS OVER OUR BASING THE BRITISH CONTINGENT IN THE REGIE DU TABAC AT HADATH, AS OPPOSED TO THEIR OPERATING IN AND THROUGH THE AREA. THE MARINES HAD RECENTLY HAD BRUSHES WITH THE ISRAELIS IN THE AREA. THE BRITISH POSITION WOULD LIE JUST OFF A MAIN ISRAELI SUPPLY ROUTE, THROUGH WHICH THE ISRAELIS OFTEN PUT UP TO 150 VEHICLES A DAY. THEY WERE ALSO GETTING JUMPY, OR PRETENDING TO BE, ABOUT PALESTINIAN INFILTRATION AND OPERATIONS IN THE AREA SEMI COLON AND AS A CONSEQUENCE HAD INTENSIFIED PATROLS AND WERE USING A TECHNIQUE OF ''RECONNAISSANCE BY FIRE'', WHICH INVOLVED SHOOTING UP THE COUNTRY EITHER SIDE OF THE MAIN ROAD THROUGH HADATH. FINALLY, THE ISRAELIS MIGHT USE INCIDENTS WITH THE LEBANESE AND MNF TO STALL NEGOTIATIONS. HE ADDED THAT THE LEBANESE WERE SHOWING SIGNS OF BEING TOO COCKY WHEN THEY THOUGHT THE MNF WOULD BEAR THE BRUNT. THIS MIGHT HAVE BEEN THEIR MOTIVE IN STEERING US TOWARDS HADATH.

3. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTIONS DRAPER SAID THAT HE WAS WORRIED AND FELT BOUND TO MAKE HIS MISGIVINGS CLEAR, BUT WAS NOT FORMALLY ASKING US NOT TO OCCUPY THE HADATH POSITION. I THANKED HIM AND UNDERTOOK TO REPORT: I WOULD ALSO SEND MY ASSISTANT DEFENCE ATTACHE TO CONFER WITH HIS MILITARY AIDE FORTHWITH.

4. THIS IS LATE IN THE DAY FOR THE AMERICANS TO EXPRESS THIS VIEW. I SUSPECT THAT THERE WAS NOT MUCH LIAISON BETWEEN THEIR VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS. NEVERTHELESS WE SHOULD PAY SOME ATTENTION TO THEIR VIEWS SINCE THEY ARE CARRYING THE BALL IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

5. THERE ARE 2 QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED ABOUT ANY OPERATION OF THE BRITISH CONTINGENT:

/(A)

CONFIDENTIAL

(A) IS IT MILITARILY FEASIBLE (ON WHICH THE FORCE COMMANDER MUST ADVISE ME)?

(B) IS IT POLITICALLY EXPEDIENT (ON WHICH I MUST MAKE MY OWN MIND UP, CONSULTING AS NEED BE)? SEE PARA 2 ABOVE, LAST THREE SENTENCES.

6. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT THE ADVANCE PARTY SHOULD COME AS PLANNED. (THEY ARE TO LODGE WITH THE AMERICANS AND CAN OBSERVE THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND ''NEXT DOOR''). WHEN THEY HAVE ANSWERED QUESTION (A) ABOVE, IF THE ANSWER IS ''YES'' DRAPER AND I CAN CONSIDER QUESTION (B) QUICKLY AND I CAN CONSULT THE LEBANESE IF NECESSARY.

7. I PUT THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPH S 5 AND 6 ABOVE TO DRAPER. HE DID NOT DISSENT.

8. FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

ROBERTS

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ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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DESKBY 051430Z
FM FCO 051145Z JANUARY 1983
TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4 OF 5 JANUARY
INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, NICOSIA, CBFC
ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, BURSSELS, UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK
YOUR TELNO 845 (NOT TO ALL): MULTINATIONAL FORCE

1. MOD ARE PLANNING DEPLOYMENT OF ADVANCE PARTY OF MNF CONTINGENT ON 1/2 FEBRUARY WITH MAIN PARTY TO FOLLOW ON 8/9 FEBRUARY. TIMING IS SLOWER THAN WE WOULD IDEALLY HAVE WISHED. BUT APART FROM THE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS TO BE DISCUSSED BY THE RECONNAISSANCE TEAM, FITTING IN WITH ROULEMENT OF ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON IN UNFICYP IS A MAJOR FACTOR. EARLIER DEPLOYMENT WOULD INVOLVE SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL COSTS.

2. NO (NO) DETAILS OF DATE OF DEPLOYMENT OR COMPOSITION OF CONTINGENT WILL BE MADE PUBLIC UNTIL AFTER THE RECONNAISSANCE TEAM HAS RETURNED TO THE UK. IF ASKED NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL CONFIRM THAT THE RECONNAISSANCE TEAM IS VISITING LEBANON TO DISCUSS ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE UK CONTINGENT, THAT THIS CONTINGENT WILL CONSIST OF A UNIT OF ABOUT 80 MEN DRAWN FROM UK FORCES CURRENTLY SERVING IN CYPRUS AND THAT IT WILL BE DEPLOYED IN LEBANON AS SOON AS THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE WITH THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES AND OTHER CONTRIBUTORS TO THE MNF.

PYM

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~~MR EGERTON~~
~~SIR J BULLARD~~ Mr Goodison
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NO 10 DOWNING STREET

CABINET OFFICE D10

SENT 29 DEC 1982

ADVANCE COPY

DBy 291700Z

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FM BEIRUT 291515Z DEC 82
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 854 OF 29 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS AND AMMAN
INFO ROUTINE TUNIS
INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, PARIS AND ROME.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

1. AS YOU WILL KNOW, A LEBANESE DELEGATION LED BY ANTOINE FATTAL, A FORMER AMBASSADOR, AN ISRAELI DELEGATION LED BY DAVID KIMCHE, AND AN AMERICAN DELEGATION LED BY MORRIS DRAPER MET ON 28 DECEMBER AT KHALDE JUST TO THE SOUTH OF BEIRUT. THEY WILL MEET ON 30 DECEMBER AT KIRYAT SHIMOUNA.

2. THE US AMBASSADOR, WHO WAS NOT TOTALLY AU COURANT, TOLD ME TODAY THAT THE ACCOUNTS IN THE NEWS AGENCIES AND THE RADIO WERE BROADLY CORRECT. THEY HAD NOT YET AGREED ON THE AGENDA. THE CRUX SEEMS TO BE THAT THE ISRAELIS, AS THE PRICE

RADIO WERE BROADLY CORRECT. THEY HAD NOT YET AGREED ON THE AGENDA. THE CRUX SEEMS TO BE THAT THE ISRAELIS, AS THE PRICE OF WITHDRAWAL, WANT SOMETHING LIKE A PEACE TREATY, WHILE THE LEBANESE CANNOT GIVE THEM ONE.

3. KIMICHE'S STATEMENT THAT HE HOPED THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD RESULT IN SOMETHING ''A STEP AWAY FROM'' A PEACE TREATY, MAY REPRESENT A WELCOME LOWERING OF ISRAELI SIGHTS. ON THE OTHER HAND, A NEW MEMBER OF THE US EMBASSY TOLD ME (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD SAID THAT THEY WOULD NOT EVEN CONTEMPLATE AN INITIAL WITHDRAWAL UNTIL THE PALESTINIANS WERE OUT OF THE LEBANON.

4. I AM SEEING THE ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON 31 DECEMBER , AFTER THE KIRYAR SHIMOUNA MEETING FOR A TOUR D'HORIZON.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

ROBERTS [REPEATED SAVING AS REQUESTED]

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

MFJ.

Lebanon.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 December 1982

MNF

We discussed your letter of 17 December. As you know, the Prime Minister had some reservations about the idea of high level approaches to the Israelis, Syrians and the PLO urging them to withdraw their forces from the Lebanon. But I have explained to Mrs. Thatcher that the primary purpose of the approaches was to explain our decision to participate in the MNF and that action was already in hand.

As I told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister saw no objection to an Ambassadorial approach to the PLO since this did not infringe our policy that there should be no contact between British Ministers and that organisation.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 924 OF 20 DECEMBER

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 831 OF 20 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, NICOSIA, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, JEDDA, PARIS, TUNIS, ROME, BRUSSELS
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INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, ANKARA, BONN, THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, DUBLIN, COPENHAGEN, ATHENS, BOGOTA, LISBON, BRASILIA, VIENNA, SEOUL, OSLO, MODUK, CBFC AND MOD DS11.

YOUR TELNO 556 OF 16 DECEMBER: UK CONTRIBUTION TO THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE (MNF) IN LEBANON.

1. YOUR PARA 3. I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR THESE INSTRUCTIONS. I TOOK ACTION YESTERDAY WITH THE LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER AT HOME.

2. SALEM WAS DELIGHTED. HE SAID THAT THIS HAD MADE HIS MOST ENJOYABLE VISIT TO LONDON REALLY WORTHWHILE. HE ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS THANKS TO YOU IMMEDIATELY.

3. I AM SENDING A NOTE THIS MORNING TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. SALEM FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE NEED TO KEEP IT CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL PARLIAMENT HAD BEEN INFORMED.

ROBETS
BT

NNNN

RR BONN

RR THE HAGUE

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

Agree that the Ambassador in Tunis may speak to Arafat about this:

A. J. C. 17/12

17 December 1982

I think this operation will be useless and could be damaging. Either I send a message to Begin or Assad saying why we have decided to participate in the peacekeeping force - or we leave it alone. It would be especially unhelpful in the case of a call to Our Ambassador returning.

Dear John,

MNF

You may wish to know that Mr Pym is instructing our Ambassadors to make high-level approaches to the Israelis, Syrians and PLO between now and 22 December urging them to break the deadlock and withdraw their forces from Lebanon. Our decision to the participate in the MNF gives us a particular reason for taking this action now in support of US efforts. It will also be helpful to refer to these representations in explaining our decision to participate in Parliament (which will be announced through a written question on 20 December and explained further during oral questions on 22 December).

In the case of the PLO, the most effective approach would be by HM Ambassador in Tunis to Arafat himself. I would be grateful if you could let me know whether the Prime Minister is content with the idea of such a meeting, (which would not of course set any precedent) as soon as possible on 20 December. Mr Pym considers that such a meeting might also be useful in the context of our difficulties over the Arab League mission to London (about which I shall be writing separately soon). Although we must conduct discussions over how to resolve the PLO problem through King Hassan, he will then have to clear his lines with the PLO and a direct contact with them at a high level might be valuable.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

With regard to PLO, I have no objection to an Ambassadorial approach, because there we do NOT deal through Ministers.

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

LEBANON

GR 300 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 162120Z DEC 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2124 OF 16 DECEMBER 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA,
INFO PRIORITY MODUK, CBFC, BEIRUT.

YOUR TELNO 1129 AND TELECON GOULDING/WILSON: UK CONTRIBUTION TO LEBANON MULTINATIONAL FORCE.

1. I SPOKE TO URQUHART THIS MORNING (16 DECEMBER) HIS FIRST REACTION WAS ONE OF CONCERN BUT WHEN I TOLD HIM THAT ONLY 80 MEN WERE INVOLVED, HE RELAXED AND SAID THAT HE SAW NO PROBLEM. YOUR DECISION STRUCK HIM AS SENSIBLE IN THE LEBANON CONTEXT AND IT MIGHT EVEN SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE IN CYPRUS IF IT HELPED TO SUGGEST TO THE GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS THAT THE WORLD WAS NOT PREPARED TO WAIT INDEFINITELY FOR THEM TO RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES. HE WAS A LITTLE WORRIED THAT THE TROOPS TO BE WITHDRAWN REPRESENTED UNFICYP'S EMERGENCY FORCE BUT HE WAS REASSURED WHEN I MADE THE POINT ABOUT EMERGENCY REINFORCEMENTS BEING AVAILABLE FROM THE SBAS IF NEEDED. HE WAS RATHER MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF YOUR DECISION ON SOME OF THE UNIFIL TROOP CONTRIBUTORS WHO WERE INCREASINGLY UNHAPPY ABOUT THE ROLE BEING ASSUMED BY THE MNF WHILE THEIR OWN TROOPS REMAINED IN LIMBO IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. HE THEREFORE ASKED THAT IN OUR PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT WE SHOULD NOT ONLY REAFFIRM OUR COMMITMENT TO UNICYP BUT ALSO, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, OUR COMMITMENT TO UN PEACE-KEEPING GENERALLY. I SAID THAT I SHARED THIS VIEW ON THIS AND WOULD RECOMMEND TO YOU ACCORDINGLY.

2. URQUHART ASKED THAT, ONCE IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT WE WERE GOING AHEAD, I SHOULD COMMUNICATE OUR DECISION IN WRITING TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR THE RECORD. GRATEFUL THEREFORE TO RECEIVE BY TELEGRAM THE TEXT OF YOUR EVENTUAL ANNOUNCEMENT IN PARLIAMENT, WHEN IT HAS BEEN MADE.

THOMSON

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 December 1982

LEBANON: UK CONTRIBUTION TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE

Having seen your Secretary of State's minute of 14 December and the minute of the same date by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Prime Minister has decided that there is no need for a meeting on this subject today.

Mrs. Thatcher agrees that the United Kingdom should provide an armoured reconnaissance of approximately 80 men for the multinational force for a period of three months. She considers that these should be taken from UNFICYP and agrees with Mr. Pym's views on the handling of the UN Secretary General and the Cyprus Government. She agrees that the costs of this deployment should be met from the FCO's existing resources.

The Prime Minister also agrees with your Secretary of State that it should be made quite clear from the outset that there would be no question of our remaining in Lebanon beyond a period of three months.

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

A. J. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

Your meeting with Mr. Pym and Mr. Nott at 1730 was arranged to discuss the multi-national force in the Lebanon. I attach an MOD letter about this question.

It would also be a convenient time to settle the question of whether or not we are prepared to sell six Hunter aircraft to the Zimbabwe Air Force. I attach papers about that as well.

A.J.C.

14 December 1982

PM/82/107

PRIME MINISTER

Lebanon: UK Contribution to the Multinational Force

1. I have seen the Defence Secretary's minute of 14 December about a possible UK contribution to the Multinational Force in Lebanon, which we are to discuss at our meeting tomorrow.

2. In the circumstances, and given Dr Salem's attitude in his talk with you, I agree that deployment of men from UNFICYP is the best option. We shall need to convince both the UN Secretary-General and the Cyprus government that this does not mean any weakening in our commitment to UNFICYP. But an assurance that we can reinforce UNFICYP from the Soveriegn Base Areas in time of emergency should be sufficient for this purpose. If necessary I have no doubt that the US and Lebanese governments would make representations to the Cyprus government in our support.

3. Another argument in favour of the UNFICYP option is financial: subject to an exact calculation of the costs involved, we shall probably be able to meet the extra costs of deployment from UNFICYP from the FCO's existing resources.

4. I am copying this to the Defence Secretary.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

14 December 1982

MO 3/7/4

PRIME MINISTER

LEBANON

You asked me to look into the possibility of providing a small contribution to the Lebanon Multinational Force for a period of three months.

2. It would be possible for us to provide an armoured reconnaissance unit of approximately 80 men for this period without undue penalty, subject to the resolution of a satisfactory status of forces agreement and command and control. There are two armoured reconnaissance squadrons in Cyprus: one with UNFICYP and one dedicated to the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs). Both consist of six troops each of four Scout cars. I would envisage deploying a squadron headquarters and four troops. My preferred option would be to take these from the UNFICYP squadron, leaving two troops in situ; but the Foreign Secretary will wish to advise on whether this is likely to prove acceptable to the UN Commander in Cyprus and to the Cypriot Government. As a sweetener, we could offer to reinforce the two troops from the SBA squadron in time of emergency.

3. Failing this, we could provide a squadron from the SBA. This would leave a gap in our force levels, but I believe this would not be unacceptable for three months. If, however, there were any question of the commitment extending beyond that period it would be necessary to replace the squadron with one from UK; this would take eight weeks and could add considerably both to turbulence for the men involved and their families, and to the overall cost of the exercise. We should moreover need to begin contingency preparations almost immediately. I would not recommend

attempting to form an ad hoc unit, since our experience has shown that such units lack cohesion and can have problems of morale, administration and discipline.

4. In short, the best option would be to withdraw the majority of the squadron from UNFICYP. As a fall-back option, we could send a squadron from the SBA. Whichever we do, I believe we must be quite clear from the outset that there would be no question of our remaining in Lebanon beyond the three months.

5. I am copying this to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

G. Ridley
(Private Secretary)
Draft agreed by the Defence Secretary and signed in his absence.

Ministry of Defence
14th December 1982

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

10 December 1982

N. B. P.R.

A.S.C. 10/12.

Dear John

UK ASSISTANCE TO THE LEBANON

The Home Secretary has seen a copy of the Secretary of State for Defence's minute to the Foreign Secretary of 6 December.

He very much shares Mr Nott's doubts about the involvement of British personnel with a force whose role is far from clear. It might be possible for us in the short term to provide some limited assistance to the ISF by lending them a forensic scientist, or offering a few Lebanese officers places on detective courses in this country; but we are not sure that they could make effective use of the sophisticated expertise we have to offer. The Home Secretary doubts whether assistance of this sort would make much political impact, and he fears that it might lead to our being sucked into an increasing commitment which would place a strain on our limited resources. In present circumstances the Home Secretary would be strongly against committing any sizeable number of British police personnel in the Lebanon.

I am copying this letter to John Coles (No. 10) (I understand the Prime Minister will be seeing the Lebanese Foreign Minister this morning) and to Jane Ridley (Defence).

Yours sincerely

Colin Walters

C J WALTERS

J E Holmes, Esq.

CONFIDENTIAL

Lebanon : Internal Situation.
Pt 3

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 December, 1982.

Dear John,

Call on the Prime Minister by the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Lebanon

Dr. Salem called on the Prime Minister this morning. I enclose a record of the conversation.

Following the meeting, the Prime Minister said that she would like the possibility of a British contribution to the Multinational Force in the Lebanon to be urgently re-examined. She made no commitment to Dr. Salem, but would like now to consider the possibility of a purely token British contribution to the Multinational Force. This should involve not more and perhaps less than 100 personnel. The Prime Minister would prefer not to add to the numbers of British forces now engaged in overseas commitments, and would therefore like the possibility of moving personnel from Cyprus to the Lebanon to be considered. If it were decided to make such a contribution, it would have to be made clear both publicly and privately to the Lebanese that our contribution would last for three months only, whatever the situation in the Lebanon at the end of that period.

Mrs. Thatcher will wish to discuss this question with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary at an early opportunity. We shall be in touch separately to arrange a meeting.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

John Coles

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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cc MASTER

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Record of a Conversation between the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Lebanon at 1000 hours on Friday, 10 December, 1982, at No.10 Downing Street

Present:

Prime Minister	Dr. Elie Salem
Sir John Leahy	The Lebanese Ambassador
Mr. Coles	Private Secretary

Dr. Salem opened the conversation by handing to the Prime Minister a letter from the President of the Lebanon, a copy of which is annexed to this record. He said that he wanted to talk frankly to the Prime Minister. President Gemayel and he himself much admired the Prime Minister's strong support of fundamental principles, and were particularly appreciative of the stand on the Falkland Islands. Lebanon admired her Government and the way she handled political issues.

For the first time in the history of Lebanon, the country had a strong leader who worked 20 hours a day. Lebanon had always been a democracy. But in the past it had suffered from weak Governments, and freedom had been allowed to develop into anarchy. The country had been destroyed by the Palestinians and the Israelis. Now there was a determination to build a strong Lebanon. Democratic traditions would be preserved. The Army would be strengthened from 30,000 to 60,000, and the internal security forces doubled as well. The Government would govern. It would not negotiate with outlaws and criminals.

But at present one third of the country was under the control of Israel, and nearly two thirds was under Syrian control. The immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops was imperative. The longer the Israelis stayed, the more they exploited sectarian differences.

/ Meanwhile,

Meanwhile, Syria had brought Iranian troops into the Lebanon. The latter were changing the character of the city of Baalbek. So the withdrawal of foreign forces was the highest priority for the Lebanese. They could not wait for six months - that would be too late. He urged the Prime Minister to work together with President Reagan to restore democracy inthe Lebanon before circumstances made that impossible. If the Israelis started establishing settlements in South Lebanon, the country would be finished.

It was above all political support which was needed. A contribution by Britain to the Multinational Force would be very helpful. He was not asking for a large contribution. Several hundred men or even 100 would be useful, and they need stay only for a limited period.

The Prime Minister said that we were already very severely stretched. We had our NATO commitments and garrisons in the Falklands, Belize, Gibraltar, Cyprus and Hong Kong. British military personnel were also serving in various ways in the Gulf, Zimbabwe, Diego Garcia and Sinai. Our troops were much in demand because of their high professional standards. Our resources were more stretched than those of any other country apart from the United States.

She was also worried about the possibility of becoming involved in an unpredictable situation. Quite apart from the complications created by the presence in the Lebanon of Syrian and Israeli troops and the PLO, the country faced disturbing underlying problems. We had experience in Northern Ireland of divisions created by religious differences. We fully supported the Lebanon's demand for the withdrawal of foreign troops, but that would take time and would need a very skilled negotiation. If withdrawal was complete in six months, this would be an outstanding success.

We certainly could not take on an indefinite obligation. What was the Multinational Force doing at present?

Dr. Salem said that they were providing support for the Lebanese Army. Sir John Leahy commented that, if the force was expanded, the idea was that it would extend beyond Beirut, and fill gaps left by the departing Syrian and Israeli forces.

Dr. Salem said that what he wanted was a gesture of political support as much as a military contribution. Pressure had been put upon him in the Arab world not to visit Britain. But he was as much opposed to terrorism as we were. Lebanon would never again be a base for the PLO. The 7,000 PLO forces in the North would have to leave. His country was the most stable society in the Middle East. Before the present troubles, the only serious disturbances had been those of 1958. Dr. Makkawi said that from 1943-1975 Lebanon had been stable. Recent problems had been inspired by outside forces. In the areas where the Multinational Force was currently deployed, there was no shooting. The only trouble occurred in the area under foreign occupation.

Dr. Salem asked that Britain should commit itself to a contribution for three months. For if foreign troops were still in Lebanon in six months time, there would be an extremely dangerous situation. The Israelis were arming both Muslims and Christians to fight against each other. They were playing with fire. Lebanon must be given back to the Lebanese. The Prime Minister said that she completely agreed. She was well aware of the Israeli practice of creating facts, and was totally opposed to Israel's settlement policy.

Dr. Salem said that he could agree now that whatever happened in three months time any British personnel with the Multinational Force could be withdrawn. But it was essential for a democracy of

Britain's stature to be involved in supporting Lebanese democracy. If the West could save Lebanon there would be an excellent opportunity to solve the Arab/Israel problem. If it did not, the world would have another Middle Eastern problem on its hands. The Lebanese crisis could then become the cause of a major regional war.

The Prime Minister asked whether the problems caused by the arming of separate factions in the Lebanon were being solved. Dr. Salem said that all the militias except one had handed in their arms, and the single force which still retained them had promised to hand them over as soon as the PLO left the Lebanon.

Lebanon wanted the opportunity to roll back Soviet influence in the Middle East. The liberal, democratic trend must be given a base in the Lebanon. Otherwise, the area would have to choose between the two alternatives of the Soviet Union and Khomeini. He had to disagree with the Prime Minister's description of Lebanon as a shaky society. His country was quite different from Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister said that she had not used the word "shaky". She had referred to deep undercurrents in Lebanese society.

As regards the Multinational Force, she could give no undertaking today. If we decided to make a contribution, it would be symbolic, small, and for a limited period. But Dr. Salem could be assured that Lebanon had our political support. Dr. Salem expressed his gratitude for this statement.

The conversation ended at 1050.

A.S.C.

10 December, 1982.

(1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 December 1982

Prime Minister

It looks as though Mitterrand was wrong.

A.J.C. 9/12

Dear John,

Multinational Force in Lebanon

You mentioned to me that at the European Council in Copenhagen President Mitterrand had said the US contingent in the Multinational Force in Lebanon was over-cautious, not being prepared to move out of the Beirut port area, and was leaving the dangerous tasks to the French and Italian contingents.

So far as we know this was only true of the first deployment of the Multinational Force in August, when the US contingent was largely confined to the port. During the second deployment, following the Beirut massacres, the US contingent has been stationed around Beirut international airport. The Italian units have been in the southern suburbs and the French in West Beirut. All three contingents, including the US, have been occasionally deployed in support of the Lebanese army in East Beirut and beyond.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 December 1982

Dear John,

Call by Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister

10 December at 1000

I attach a brief for this meeting, together with a personality note on Dr Salem.

As the Secretary of State mentioned to the Prime Minister, at his meeting with Mr Pym yesterday Dr Salem repeated with some feeling the Lebanese Government's request for British participation, however small, in the Multinational Force in Lebanon. The current position is that Mr Pym is considering further with Mr Nott what response we might be able to give to the Lebanese Government, before coming back to the Prime Minister. Dr Salem is likely to raise the issue. The Prime Minister can assure him that we are fully aware of the importance the Lebanese Government attaches to British participation.

Dr Salem (pronounced SAHLEM not SAYLEM) speaks fluent English and is no mean orator.

I am copying this to Jane Ridley (MOD).

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY LEBANESE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER, Dr ELIE SALEM - 10 DECEMBER at 10 a.m.

Points to make

1. Glad to see Dr Salem in London. Very useful to have first hand assessment of situation in Lebanon.

2. Fully support Lebanese wish to see all foreign forces out of Lebanon as soon as possible. Doing all we can diplomatically direct with US and Israel. (If raised) Also considering very carefully request for British contribution to Multinational Force. Our commitments worldwide make this very difficult for us but will respond as soon as we can.

3. Glad to have been able to provide aid for emergency relief needs. We are also ready to consider modest contribution to reconstruction. Hope to see UK/Lebanese trade prosper.

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY LEBANESE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER, DR ELIE SALEM, 10 DECEMBER AT 10 AM

Essential Facts

1. Dr Salem is on an official visit to London as Mr Pym's guest. This is the first official visit to the UK by a Lebanese Foreign Minister.

2. Dr Salem is an academic rather than a politician (CV attached), one of a small Cabinet of technocrats appointed in October 1982, whose main tasks are the restoration of the machinery of government as far as possible throughout the country and making a start with reconstruction. New elections to Parliament are planned for April/May 1983, after which the various political factions will insist on their share of power.

3. The optimism surrounding the election of Amin Gemayel as President in September 1982, following his brother Bashir's assassination, is now fading. The government's writ runs only in the immediate area of Beirut and even here security has deteriorated with the Druze (Muslim) leader Mr Jumblatt narrowly avoiding assassination in a car bomb explosion on 1 December. The government's weakness elsewhere is illustrated by recurrent clashes in the mountains south-east of Beirut between Christian and Druze militias. There has also been trouble in Eastern Lebanon where pro-Iranian/Lebanese Shia Muslims aided by Iranian Revolutionary Guards recently attacked a Lebanese Army barracks.

4. During his recent trip to the area Habib made no progress. Israel is still insisting that negotiations should take place alternately in Beirut and Jerusalem. They seem ready to leave their forces (18,000) in Lebanon for several months if necessary to extract concessions on security arrangements (early warning stations, over-flights) and normalisation eg of trade and travel. Lack of progress is making life more difficult for President Gemayel who is under pressures from Kataib (Christian) hawks to make concessions to Israel, but

/knows

knows that such concessions would undermine the internal Christian/ Muslim consensus.

5. In his meeting with Mr Pym on 8 December, Dr Salem emphasised the dangers of lack of progress in the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon (record attached). He repeated the Lebanese Government's request, first made in a letter from Dr Salem to Mr Pym on 11 November, that Britain should participate in the Multinational Force. Dr Salem made clear that even a symbolic British presence was important and that a refusal to participate would be a hard blow for Lebanon. Mr Pym will be considering further with Mr Nott what response should be given to the Lebanese government.

6. HMG has provided £4 m of emergency relief aid since the Israeli invasion: £2 m through the EC, £1 m food aid via UNRWA and £0.5 m bilaterally through voluntary agencies and the ICRC. The Lebanese Government has estimated that reconstruction will cost approximately $12-15 billion but has yet to establish priorities. We supported the US idea that the World Bank should coordinate reconstruction aid and are awaiting the report of a recent Bank mission to Lebanon. The Ten are committed to help with reconstruction and will produce proposals in January 1983. Ministers have not yet agreed on a bilateral UK contribution but provisional agreement has been reached on the allocation of £2.5 million in 1983/84 from ODA's unallocated reserve for reconstruction and assistance to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

Near East and North Africa Department
9 December 1982

DR ELIE SALEM

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Born 1930 Koura (North Lebanon). Greek Orthodox. Graduate of the American University of Beirut and various universities in the United Sates of America. PHD in Political Science from the Aub 1953. Dean of various colleges in Lebanon and abroad. Since 1974 Dean of the Faculty of Science and Arts at AUB. Author of various books.

Despite being a political scientist he admits to knowing nothing about the new job. Intends to improve the working of his Ministry by delegating work downwards (long overdue). Although formerly something of a left-winger he has moved to the right and wa a close friend of the late Bashir Gemayel. Nonetheless claims through his students still to be in touch with the Left-wing/Muslim National Movement. A charming and cultivated man. His wife is American and he is very much orientated towards the USA. Speaks fluent English (English rather than American).

His wife, Phyllis Salem, was born in Pottstown, Pennsylvania, i 1930. They met in Washington in 1951, when he was a graduate student and she was working at the State Department. They married in Lebanon in 1954. She has an MA in Philosphy from the American University of Beirut. She is relaxed and informal. She is very interested in Lebanese affairs and speaks quite good Arabic. They have four children.

OUT TELEGRAM

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CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE

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FM FCO 090915Z DECEMBER 1982
TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT
TELEGRAM NUMBER
REPEATED FOR INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, CAIRO, TUNIS, JEDDA, (SAVING) PARIS, ROME, BRUSSELS, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO

VISIT OF LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER

1. I had an hour's talk with Dr Salem before lunch today, 8 December. Following were main points.

2. Salem gave an impressive account of Lebanon's plight. He said he had not come to plead the general cause of Middle East peace but to discuss what concrete steps could be taken to help Lebanon. Lebanon could no longer bear the burden of all the Middle East's problems. She was tired of being kidnapped, first by the PLO, now by Sharon. The present situation was very dangerous. The government could do nothing in the way of reconstruction and building up security forces until foreign forces had first withdrawn. Both the Israelis and Syrians thought they could manipulate sectarian divisions within Lebanon. They were mistaken and were playing with dynamite.

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File number	Dept: NENAD	Distribution: Middle East Standard, Arab/Israel Dispute
Drafted by (Block capitals): E G M CHAPLIN		
Telephone number: 233 4856		
Authorised for despatch		
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Classification and Caveats		Page
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There was a real danger of renewed civil war which would affect the whole region and wipe out chances of all progress with the Reagan initiative.

3. Salem said that Israel was imposing impossible conditions for withdrawal negotiations. Lebanon was ready to meet her legitimate security concerns. She accepted that a price had to be paid for Israeli withdrawal. But she was not prepared to make concessions eg on a peace treaty which would damage the internal consensus, relations with the Arab world or Lebanese sovereignty. Syria would withdraw once the Israelis had moved. The PLO would be forced to follow; and in any case posed less of a problem. Habib was convinced that the Israelis did not really want to negotiate. Sharon had the upper hand. The issue of Jerusalem as a venue for negotiations had come out of the blue. There was no way the Lebanese could accept it.

4. Salem said that the Lebanese Government was well pleased with Britain's general reaction to events in Lebanon, but needed to know what concrete help Britain could give. Participation in the MNF was less important in a military sense but of the highest importance politically. At present Lebanon's existence depended on symbolic gestures of support. She was counting on other democracies to help. There was not much time. Help given to Lebanon would also sustain the Reagan initiative. The Lebanese were fully aware of British commitments elsewhere. But a refusal by Britain to help would be devastating blow. In any case British participation would help forward her policies in the Middle East.

5. I told Salem that we had greatly admired the government's efforts to re-establish democracy and would give every support we could. We agreed that the first priority was the withdrawal of all forces. I had always thought this difficult to achieve and that the Israelis and Syrians would both find reasons for not going. The Lebanese request for British participation in the

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MNF was still being carefully considered. As Salem knew we had military commitments stretching from South Atlantic to Hong Kong. Other problems might arise in the coming year. We could not afford to be over-stretched. But we well understood Salem's point about the importance of a symbolic presence. What did he have in mind? Salem said that to be useful a British contribution would have to be a visible part of the MNF (not UNIFIL). It could take the form of a symbolic force of men or ancillary support such as Sweden's medical contingent in UNIFIL or major logistical support. I said we would inform the Lebanese Government as soon as we had reached a decision.

6. I told Salem we agreed that time was short. With tensions elsewhere eg Israel's policies on the West Bank, there was a difficult period ahead in the Middle East. A long delay in achieving the withdrawal of forces from Lebanon would greatly undermine US credibility. We were using what influence we had both with the United States and direct with Israel. I would discuss the problem again with Shultz in meetings this week and next. The Danish Foreign Minister had recently been in Israel on behalf of the Ten.

7. Salem said he was fearful of Israel's intentions in Southern Lebanon. The international community should be alert to Israeli attempts to create new facts eg settlements. He wondered whether the UK together with the United States and France would consider issuing a declaration that under no conditions would they countenance annexation of any part of Lebanon or other attempts to threaten Lebanon's security and independence. I said there was some merit in this thought but doubted whether it was a useful idea to pursue now. It would have little effect on Israel. But we fully appreciated Lebanese anxiety about Israeli aims. We would regard any attempt eg to establish settlements in Southern Lebanon as a very serious step.

8. ~~I asked about PLO fighters and Palestinian civilians~~

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~~remaining in Lebanon. Where would the fighters go? Were remaining Palestinian civilians a great problem for the government?~~ 8. Salem said that negotiations had not yet reached the stage of discussing destinations for PLO fighters. But they would have to go. Lebanon would never again allow itself to be a base for military activity against Israel or anyone else. According to the Moroccans, the Jordanians were prepared to take 5,000 ~~fighters~~. Syria and Iraq might take the rest. As a last resort the government might agree to disarming them and allowing them to stay as civilians. Both Lebanese and Palestinian civilian refugees posed a huge humanitarian problem. Lebanese policy was clear. They supported ~~the~~ legitimate Palestinian rights including their right to an independent state. They were fully committed to those Palestinians legally residing in Lebanon (238,000) but a large number were there illegally or with forged papers. Accounts in the Western press of mistreatment of Palestinians were greatly exaggerated. Of 1000 people under arrest, only 300 were Palestinians.

9. Salem said that Lebanon was prepared to meet the Israeli demand that Haddad's forces should be reintegrated into the Lebanese Army. Haddad himself would have to be sent away as an Ambassador somewhere. As for UNIFIL, it was important as a symbol of the Lebanese Government's legitimacy in the South. But in the face of Israeli intransigence it was useless in operational terms and therefore highly demoralized. UNIFIL and MNF should cooperate in maintaining peace as foreign forces withdrew.

10. Finally Salem drew attention to the danger of Soviet influence regaining the upper hand in Lebanon. From 1975-1982 the Soviet Union had made considerable inroads. The Communist Party had grown and Marxist Parties had proliferated. For the time being they had been greatly weakened and the Soviet Union's reputation in Lebanon was low. Whatever they said in public

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the National Movement was urging the government to keep Lebanon in the Western camp. But if this failed to produce results there would be an irresistable wave of popular feeling in the opposite direction. This could take two forms; either radical Marxism or Khomeni-style revivalism. Either would pose great risks to the Middle East. That was why action was so urgent.

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A. J. C. 10/12

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

UK MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON

We agreed to examine the possibility of offering limited military training assistance to the Lebanese Government. A small team from the MOD and the Home Office consequently visited Beirut and has now reported on its findings.

2. The Lebanese Armed Forces proper evinced little enthusiasm for UK training assistance, probably as a result of overwhelming US influence. The team therefore concluded that in the circumstances the most useful training contribution we would make would be project-related assistance to the Ministry of the Interior's Internal Security Force (ISF). The ISF includes the Central Government's police forces and will, it is hoped, eventually replace the Army in maintaining law and order within Lebanon. The US are keen for the UK to take a lead in this area, since US domestic legislation prohibits them from providing aid to para-military police bodies, although there have been recent indications of US interest in the ISF as a sales market.

3. An illustrative list of projects for assisting the ISF is attached at Annex A. Many of them are police projects, on which the Home Secretary will no doubt wish to comment. Having seen the Team's report I am, however, very doubtful as to whether a training contribution on these lines would be advisable. The

exact role envisaged for the ISF remains unclear, and there is a danger that it will not prove an effective alternative to the Lebanese Army. For this and other reasons the ISF may come to employ methods which we could not condone and with which we would not want our trainers to be associated. In the circumstances I am not attracted to our Armed Forces undertaking any military training in the Lebanon. However, the problems implicit in our participation in an expanded Multinational Force as an alternative contribution to Lebanese security remain unsolved. As I pointed out in my minute of 26th November, all the available options have operational penalties for our already overstretched Services.

4. I am copying this to the Prime Minister and to the Home Secretary.

SN

Ministry of Defence
6th December 1982

ANNEX A

ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF PROJECTS FOR UK ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON

MILITARY PROJECTS

PROJECT 1 - STUDY OF ISF ROLES, ORGANISATION, EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING REQUIREMENT

1. The Team consider that this study should take place as soon as possible. It should be headed by the future UK Team Commander supported by appropriate police and military experts. The study would aim to analyse how the ISF is to play its part in conjunction with the LAF over the next few years. It would take about 4 weeks to complete.

2. Once the ISF role is fixed, the study would define and make recommendations as to its organisation, equipment and training requirements. This initial study would provide an earnest of UK involvement and would seek to ensure that planning was along practical lines, in coordination with similar activity by the US with the Lebanese Army.

3. The study would keep the UK abreast of any sales prospects and equally provide us with a means of monitoring French and Italian activities. If this project were successful it could result in the definition of several other training projects which, if expedient, we could pursue. The team believes that the project could lead to substantial sales of UK products to support the ISF (similar to the effects of Bartlett's report on US sales prospects).

PROJECT 2 - FULL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS OF THE ISF

4. This study flows logically from Project 1 since it would represent a continuation of the same "package" of advice. The study would address the present (interim) training facilities and Lebanese plans for their development against the major personnel increases under consideration. It would also need to assess the basic training of new recruits, continuation training and, above all, instructor training to ensure an organic capability within a given period. This latter would dictate the amount of training required in UK and how much should be done in the Lebanon.

PROJECT 3 - ADVICE ON COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

5. The Lebanese are likely to require two separate countrywide communications systems - one for the ISF alone, and the second as a joint Army/ISF/Civil Administration network. The study would therefore need to examine the complete spectrum of Government Communications in close liaison with US activities. It would entail a major report and require a large team of military and commercial experts.

6. The study might therefore be better managed as a sub-contract to one of the UK's major electronic firms, not least because of the substantial sales prospects. Whilst such purchase of UK equipment would continue to require major commercial involvement in both installation and training, there would still be a military training requirement though this cannot yet be quantified.

PROJECT 4 - EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD) TRAINING

7. The training could follow a progressive pattern as follows:

a. Team Leader would conduct detailed in-country study to assess both equipment and training required.

b. Provision of UK equipment, followed by a small military team to train one or more Lebanese EOD teams in country over a period of two months (similar to planned UK activity in Bahrein).

c. Further training of more teams and of Lebanese instructors both of which could be done either in-country or in UK.

d. Small UK team remains in Lebanon for continuation training.

The UK is very experienced in putting together packages of EOD training of this sort.

POLICE PROJECTS

PROJECT 5 - FORENSIC SCIENCE LABORATORY AND KINDRED MATTERS

8. The ISF currently have a laboratory which they term their Technical Support Branch dealing with fingerprints, ballistics, handwriting, forgery and criminal records. They are in the process of building a new laboratory which is intened for the forensic aspects of criminal investigation. This building is at an advanced stage of construction and due to open in mid 1983. The ISF have provided the proposed layout of equipment and scale of implementation, but are in desperate need of advice from an experienced forensic scientist on the compatibility of equipment and the recruitment of suitable scientific personnel. In view of this there is an urgent need for a forensic science expert to visit the Lebanon for about 10 days, not only to advise on the scale of equipment (which has yet to be ordered) but also on the scale and qualifications of scientific personnel subsequently required to man the laboratory.

9. When suitable staff have been selected in the Lebanon, we consider that they could be seconded to the Forensic Science Service in UK where they could study all aspects of police work in the forensic field. There will be a need for British Police expertise in the ISF laboratory, as it nears completion, to train police staff in scenes of crime work. This will be in addition to any scenes of crime courses which Lebanese officers may undertake in this country and we would see 2 officers of the British Police Service, in the rank of Chief Inspector or Inspector, being seconded to the Lebanon perhaps up to 6 months at a time to act as advisors, for liaison between the Lebanese Police and laboratory staff and to reinforce the training of ISF scenes of crime officers.

10. With the opening of the forensic laboratory there would be a need for a much higher standard of training and expertise on the part of local police personnel in this specialist field. The ISF have already requested courses for members of their force in photography, and scenes of crime work with the intention of using such officers in future training. We endorse this approach but consider that it could be reinforced by the secondment of UK police officers to assist with in-force training. This could be done by personnel additional to the Forensic Chief Inspector/Inspector, or by these officers undertaking the dual role. If additional personnel are seconded this could also be for 6 months in the first instance.

PROJECT 6 - TRAINING OF INSTRUCTORS

11. The ISF Training School need instructor training and the British Police Central Planning and Instructor Training Unit at Pannal Ash, Yorkshire is uniquely qualified to carry out such courses for the Police Service. It should be possible to provide a course of instruction and additionally to give some training in planning and course design to Lebanese officers. It would be extremely difficult to achieve worthwhile results in this field by seconding UK officers to the Lebanon because the necessary facilities do not exist in that country.

PROJECT 7 - TRAINING AIDS

12. The ISF Training School is acknowledged to be totally inadequate and is currently housed in temporary accommodation. There is a serious need for modern training aids such as video cassette recorders, overhead projectors and associated equipment. Although we could not recommend the secondment of UK police officers to undertake instructor training in the Lebanon, we feel that there may be a role for seconded personnel once the ISF have a nucleus of personnel who have attended courses at the Central Planning and Instructor Training Unit. UK assistance in such follow up training could be of value and one or two personnel for this purpose could be considered in due course. Such a secondment need not be extensive and perhaps 6 months in the first instance would suffice.

13. An approach was made to see whether existing UK police training video films could be made available : we consider that this would provide no great difficulty, providing the very modest finance needed to purchase the tapes could be made available. Thought could be given to considering whether some training equipment should not be provided gratis, since once a limited amount of modern teaching aids were in use, further orders could well follow.

PROJECT 8 - PROVISION OF COURSES REQUESTED BY ISF

14. The team were aware of the recent request by the ISF (through the British Council) for places on the Criminal Investigation (Operational) Course run by the West Yorkshire Metropolitan Police and courses in photography, both black and white and colour, together with courses for Scenes of Crime (Forensic Science) This request is under consideration and we would recommend favourable response as soon as possible. In addition, we were asked about General Management and Public Relations courses. These would have to be provided in the UK. Frequent mention was made of the 2 places agreed on the Overseas Command Course at Bramshill in 1982 for Lebanese officers who were unable to attend because of the internal security situation. The Lebanese are eager to ensure that these places are made available to them during 1983 and confirmation as soon as possible is highly desirable.

PROJECT 9 - COMPUTER PROJECTS

15. The ISF are currently using an Army computer for various administrative functions, (i.e. pay and statistical matters) but want to computerise their fingerprint collection, criminal statistics and what would appear to be a project similar to the Police National Computer for criminal records and wanted persons. The requirement would be for one or preferably 2 UK personnel to advise on the proposed applications and on how such projects should be managed in the planning stage. A senior specialist from the Home Office Scientific Research and Development Branch and a police officer from the Police Research Scientific Unit could best achieve this by an initial visit of three to four weeks to ascertain exactly what the ISF intend and to adivse on how they should undertake the various tasks.

16. It is obvious that the ISF are looking for something beyond just advice on how to undertake computer projects and we feel that there is a distinct opening in this field for sales of British equipment.

17. This will be a long term project which will involve UK personnel in frequent visits in addition to Lebanese officers coming to the UK to study our systems in operation.

Lebanon.

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 500

PS TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET.

Prime Minister
He is coming to see you on 10 December.
A. J. C. 6/12

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 060930Z
FM BEIRUT 060700Z DEC 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 814 OF 6 DECEMBER
INFO AMMAN, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM, JEDDA, TUNIS, PARIS, ROME, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.
INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE, OSLO, VIENNA AND SEOUL.

YOUR TELNO 537: BRITISH PARTICIPATION TO THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON.

MT

1. I SAW THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON 4 DECEMBER. I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF TUR.

2. DR SALEM SAID THAT HE KNEW THAT THE CHANCES OF SENDING COMBAT TROOPS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MNF WERE SLIM. NONETHELESS HE HOPED THAT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAKE A TOKEN CONTRIBUTION. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WANTED BRITAIN VISIBLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE MNF. HE MENTIONED OUR LOGISTIC SUPPORT FROM CYPRUS TO UNIFIL AS AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT HE HAD IN MIND.

3. DR SALEM WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A NEGATIVE DECISION DURING HIS VISIT TO LONDON. HE SAID IT WOULD BE A BIT OF A SLAP IN THE FACE AND BAD FOR LEBANESE MORALE. MOREOVER, THE LEBANESE HAD JUST ASKED BRAZIL, PORTUGAL AND COLOMBIA TO SEND TROOPS TO THE MNF. AN ANNOUNCEMENT MIGHT HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE DECISION OF THOSE COUNTRIES. HE WONDERED WHETHER THERE NEEDED TO BE ANY ANNOUNCEMENT AT ALL. I SAID THAT MINISTERS WERE LIKELY TO BE PRESSED EVENTUALLY TO DECLARE THEIR POSITION EG THROUGH QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE. IN THAT CASE, SAID DR SALEM, COULD NOT A DECENT INTERVAL ELAPSE BETWEEN HIS VISIT AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT.

4. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SPOKE TO ME IN SIMILAR TERMS AT A SOCIAL OCCASION ON 5 DECEMBER. HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR EUROPE TO BE SEEN TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE MNF. IN PRACTICE, THAT MEANT US. HE CITED MINE DETECTION AND TRAINING IN EXPLOSIVE ORDINANCE DISPOSAL AS EXAMPLES OF A SYMBOLIC PRESENCE. I MENTIONED TRAINING THE ISF. HE SAID THAT THIS MIGHT PASS MUSTER - JUST. HE SAID THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT THEMSELVES PROVIDE ''SYMBOLIC'' TRAINING FOR ISF OFFICERS IN FRANCE, BUT HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE FRENCH DID NOT REGARD THE ISF AS THEIR ''CHASSE GARDEE''.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 5. MY

5. MY CONCLUSIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THE LEBANESE HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY LOWERED THEIR SIGHTS. I WONDER IF, IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE IS A CHANCE OF MINISTERS AGREEING TO MAKE A SYMBOLIC CONTRIBUTION.

(B) I HOPE THAT AT LEAST WE CAN MEET DR SALEM'S REQUEST FOR DELAYING ANY ANNOUNCEMENT UNTIL SOME TIME AFTER HIS VISIT.

(C) IF ALL WE CAN OFFER IS A TRAINING PACKAGE FOR THE ISF, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE TEAM SHOULD BE LED BY A HIGH RANKING OFFICER. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR TOLD ME THAT IF WE PARTICIPATED, HOWEVER, SYMBOLICALLY, IN THE MULTI NATIONAL FORCE, WE COULD CLAIM A SEAT ON THE COMMITTEE WHICH DECIDES WHAT IT IS TO DO AND WHICH IS CHAIRED BY THE LEBANESE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER.

6. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THIS TELEGRAM COULD BE SHOWN TO MR ROBERTS.

FCO PASS ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

PALMER

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

STANDARD

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

bcc CS HL

Lebanon.

6 December 1982

BF

Visit to UK of Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 2 December.

The Prime Minister will be glad to see Dr. Salem at 1000 on Friday 10 December.

JOHN COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



LE PRÉSIDENT

T 205D/82.

3 December 1982

Dear Prime Minister;

I appreciate the opportunity you are giving our Foreign Minister to brief you on policies we are following to restore Lebanon's freedom and sovereignty. The support of the great democracies is essential for us at this stage. We need your help to effect the withdrawal of all foreign armies and forces from Lebanon and to support our army, for a transitional period, in maintaining peace and order throughout the country.

Lebanon is now on the threshold of a great future. The prospects of salvaging Lebanese democracy from the conflicts of the region are good; and a restored and strengthened Lebanon will itself be a leading force in the resolution of hitherto intransigent regional conflicts.

The United Kingdom has an important role to play in the Middle East, and Lebanon now provides it with the opportunity to play this role in the context of a partnership for peace, justice and freedom.

Amine GEMAYEL

The Right Honorable Mrs. Margaret Thatchef
Prime Minister
United Kingdom

①

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 December 1982

Prime Minister

Yes MT

Agree to see him at 10.00 on Friday, 10 December.

AR 2/12

Dear John,

Visit to UK of Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister

The Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Dr Elie Salem, will be paying an official visit to Britain as Mr Pym's guest from 8-10 December.

This will be the first official visit to Britain by a Lebanese Foreign Minister and our first substantial contact at ministerial level with the new Lebanese Government.

The main subject which Dr Salem will wish to discuss here will be the Lebanese Government's request for a British contribution to the Multinational Force. Mr Pym will explain to Dr Salem the reasons why we cannot meet this request. As you know, the Secretary of State for Defence will shortly be putting to the Prime Minister proposals for military training. If approved, these will be put to Dr Salem and will, we hope, go some way to reducing Lebanese disappointment at our response over the Multinational Force.

You may remember that we asked for a courtesy call on the Prime Minister by the previous Foreign Minister of Lebanon, Mr Boutros, who was due here in June. The Prime Minister was not at that time able to receive him, and the visit was in any case postponed due to the Israeli invasion.

Mr Pym believes that on this occasion we should do everything we can to demonstrate that, after the terrible suffering Lebanon has endured recently, we remain sympathetic to the Lebanese Government's aim of ridding the country of foreign occupying forces and restoring Lebanon's independence. Gestures of moral support are useful in this context, particularly since we shall have to disappoint the Lebanese on their MNF request, to which they attach considerable importance. Mr Pym therefore recommends that if possible Dr Salem, who is Deputy Prime Minister as well as Foreign Minister, should be invited to pay a courtesy call on the Prime Minister. As the programme now stands, 10 December would be the best day for such a call, but time could also be found on 8 or 9 December.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

GR 450

CONFIDENTIAL

LEBANON.

CONFIDENTNAL
FM BEIRUT 301145Z NOV 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 805 OF 30 NOVEMBER.
INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, PARIS, ROME, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND MODUK.

LEBANON: MULTI - NATIONAL FORCE.

1. THE UNITED STATES DCM CONFIRMED TO ME ON 30 NOVEMBER PRESS REPORTS THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD ASKED THE THREE CONTRIBUTORS TO THE FORCE TO DOUBLE THE SIZE OF THEIR CONTINGENTS.

2. PUGH SAID THAT IN PRINCIPLE THIS PRESENTED NO PROBLEM TO HIS GOVERNMENT. NOR WOULD IT CAUSE DIFFICULTY FOR THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS. ALL HAD AT VARIOUS TIMES INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE THE SIZE OF THEIR CONTINGENTS WHEN THEY SAW THE NECESSITY TO DO SO. HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE NEED FOR AN INCREASE (SEE PARA 4 BELOW) AND THE AMERICANS HAD NOT DECIDED HOW THEY WOULD RESPOND. PUGH SPECULATED THAT THEY MIGHT ANNOUNCE PUBLICLY THEIR DECISION IN PRINCIPLE TO DO SO. HE JUDGED THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S MAIN MOTIVE IN MAKING THIS REQUEST NOW WAS TO CONVEY TO THE LEBANESE THE IMPRESSION OF CONTINUING ACITIVITY AND PROGRESS ON THE WITHDRAWAL FRONT WHEN THERE WAS IN FACT VERY LITTLE.

3. VPUGH TOLD ME THAT HABIB HAD NOT SUCEEDED IN RESOLVING THE PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND THE ISRAELIS WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE TALKS ON WITHDRAWAL TO GET UNDER WAY. THE STICKING POINT WAS ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON HOLDING EVERY OTHER MEETING IN JERUSALEM. THIS THE LEBANESE WOULD NOT ACCEPT, AND INDEED COULD NOT WITHOUT SEVERE DAMAGE TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD (THE EGYPTIAN CHARGE, WHOM I SAW ON 29 NOVEMBER, SAID THE SAME). THE AMERICANS WERE CURRENTLY REASSESSING THE POSITION. DRAPER DID NOT KNOW WHERE TO GO FROM HERE. HABIB IS NOT EXPECTED TO RETURN TO BEIRUT BEFORE REGAINING WASHINGTON.

4. AS FOR THE SUBSTANCE OF THE LEBANESE/ISRAELI TALKS , IF THEY EVER GOT GOING, PUGH CONFIRMED THAT DRAPER AS A FIRST STAGE WAS LOOKING FOR A DISENGAGEMENT OF SYRIAN/PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES IN CAZA ALEY, THE CHOUF AND THE HIGH METN. THE MNF WOULD THEN DEPLOY ALONG THE BEIRUT/DAMASCUS ROAD, FILLING THE VACUUM THUS CREATED. IT WOULD BE LEFT TO THE LEBANESE ARMY TO ESTABLISH CONTROL IN THE AREAS TO THE NORTH AND SOUTH VACATED BY THE SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS RESPECTIVELY. THE PRESENCE OF THE MNF ON THE ROAD WAS DISIGNED TO REASSURE EACH OF THE SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS THAT THE OTHER COULD NOT REGAIN CONTROL OF THE ROAD. REINFORCEMENTS TO THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED UNTIL THE DISENGAGEMENT STARTED. AT THAT STAGE THE ENLARGED MNF WOULD REQUIRE A PROPER COMMAND STRUCTURE, ORBAT ETC.

5. PUGH AND I AGREED THAT THIS PROSPECT NOW LOOKED MORE DISTANT THAN EVEN 10 DAYS AGO.

PALMER
BT

STANDARD		ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
NENAD	SECURITY D	ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE
MED	MAED	
NAD	ES & SD	
SAD	ERD	
UND	ESID	
EESD	CONS D	
ECD	CONS EM UNIT	
WED	CABINET OFFICE	
RID		

(2)

Prime Minister

You will wish to read this. But following your meeting with Mr. Pym last Friday I wrote to the F/C.O confirming your earlier decision against participation in the Multinational Force.

A.J.C. 29/11

MO 3/7/4

THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

MT

Thank you for your minute of 16th November. I am still certain that now is not the time to take on new military commitments. You may be interested to see the breakdown at Annex A of our already substantial out-of-area commitments, which includes a large programme of military assistance to friendly countries throughout the world. Any British participation in an expanded Multinational Force in the Lebanon could only be undertaken at considerable detriment to other high priority tasks, such as BAOR. We have prepared an analysis of the cost and practical consequences of a number of alternative contributions to the Multinational Force. This is attached at Annex B.

2. There are other practical difficulties. British involvement would almost certainly be difficult to terminate once established: the international community might well condemn a unilateral withdrawal (for whatever reasons) more than a failure to participate in the first place. There is also a danger that if the situation in Lebanon deteriorates again, the Multinational force itself might be left with no alternative to a difficult, dangerous and potentially embarrassing evacuation. Unless we were prepared to abandon all our equipment, this would have to involve an evacuation by sea perhaps from unprotected Lebanese beaches.

3. I am not convinced that the political benefits of British participation in the Multinational Force outweigh the detrimental effect on our overstretched military resources and the risks of such an operation. Moreover, our initial assessment is that although there are opportunities for defence sales these may prove difficult

to bring to fruition. We have been careful to emphasize to our friends in the Arab World that our commitment in the South Atlantic has led to an inevitable reduction in our capability elsewhere, at least for the time being. They will expect Britain to do something to help Lebanon, but an offer of training assistance following the Director of the Military Assistance Office's current visit to Beirut, together with logistic support from Cyprus such as we now provide for UNIFIL, may be seen as more appropriate contributions; particularly - in the first case - in view of our continuing role in Zimbabwe as well as in many countries in the Gulf.

4. As Annex A shows, we are already contributing a great deal, both in the Arab World and elsewhere. I consider that our willingness to help in the Lebanon must reflect our capabilities, seen against our many other important responsibilities.

5. I am sending copies of this minute to the recipients of yours.

Jane Ridley
Private Secretary.
(Draft approved by the Secretary of State and signed in his absence).

Ministry of Defence
26th November 1982

Annex A

UK MILITARY COMMITMENTS (EXCLUDING UK AND NATO/BAOR)

1. SOUTH ATLANTIC:

RN - 1 Nuclear powered attack Submarine,
5 Destroyers or frigates (reducing to 4)
plus 2-3 for roulement,
RFA support

Army - currently 2600-3500 personnel including 1 Infantry battalion reinforced by one company,
Air Defence battery (RAPIER) plus an Air Defence troop (BLOWPIPE),
Artillery battery,
2 Engineer Squadrons (plus 5 squadrons as a short term increment),
Composite Logistic battalion,
Headquarters elements

RAF - 1450 personnel:
8 Phantoms
6 Harriers
2 Hercules
5 Chinooks
3 Sea Kings
1 Air Defence Squadron (RAPIER)

2. GIBRALTAR:

RN - 1 Destroyer or frigate

Army - 820 personnel including 1 Infantry battalion and Headquarters elements

RAF - 368 personnel

3. HONG KONG:

RN - 5 Patrol Boats

Army - 6700 personnel including 5 Infantry battalions (4 Gurkha), Headquarters elements

RAF - 242 personnel: 8 Wessex

4. CYPRUS (including UNFICYP):

Army - 3300 personnel including 2 Infantry battalions,
2 Armoured Reconnaissance Squadrons,
Headquarters elements

RAF - 1370 personnel:
5 Wessex
1 RAF Regiment Squadron

5. BELIZE:

RN - 1 Destroyer or frigate
RFA support

Army - 1400 personnel including 1 Infantry battalion,
Artillery battery,
Armoured Reconnaissance troop,
Headquarters elements

RAF - 500 personnel: 4 Harriers
4 Pumas
1 Air Defence Squadron (RAPIER)

6. SINAI:

Army - 37 personnel as part of HQ MFO

7. BRUNEI:

Army - 980 personnel including 1 Infantry battalion (Gurkha) and
Headquarters elements

8. INDIAN OCEAN (ARMILLA Patrol):

RN - 2 Destroyers or frigates
RFA support
Diego Garcia - 29 man Naval Party

9. /NAMIBIA: Proposed contribution 150 Army personnel/

10. Major Loan Service Personnel (LSP) deployments as part of military assistance programmes:

BRUNEI:	142
KUWAIT:	134
NIGERIA:	49
OMAN:	174
SAUDI ARABIA:	64
ZIMBABWE:	92

Total LSP worldwide is almost 800 personnel in 33 countries of which about 400 are in the Gulf/Middle East.

Annex B

POSSIBLE UK CONTRIBUTION TO A FUTURE LEBANON MULTINATIONAL FORCE

1. In considering a possible UK contribution to a future Multinational Force in the Lebanon we must look at all our other commitments and assess the effect of a new deployment on our operational capability, on training requirements and on the unaccompanied tour interval (the Army Board optimum interval between unaccompanied tours is 24 months).

2. Outline costs of the following options are at Appendix:

a. Armoured Recce Squadron: This could be armed with either Scorpion (a tracked vehicle) from the War Maintenance Reserve (which would be significantly depleted as a consequence), or with Ferrets (a wheeled vehicle no longer on general issue to armoured reconnaissance units but available in sufficient numbers from old stock and an easy vehicle to learn to operate). To meet the requirement we would envisage using UKLF-based armoured recce units. Their other current commitments are UNFICYP and Belize; the tour interval if they deployed to the Lebanon would be about 20 months. Two out of the three UKLF armoured recce units have a Priority 1 role in Europe, and any deployment to Lebanon would be at the expense of training for this role.

b. Infantry: With UKLF infantry units now committed to Northern Ireland, Falklands (four months), Belize and UNFICYP there is already considerable overstretch of infantry resources, and the unaccompanied tour interval is currently just below twelve months; this reduces further if major exercises are taken into consideration. Any additional commitment would decrease the number of battalions available to UKLF for both the SPEARHEAD and Emergency Tour rosters and would further increase overstretch. For this reason any infantry contribution for the Lebanon would be drawn from BAOR. However, of the fourteen BAOR-based battalions one is already commited to Northern Ireland, and to take on another task - even for only twelve months - would be at operational penalty to our NATO Assigned Forces (reducing them by one sixth). In addition, a unit deployed to Lebanon might not be able to be extracted and returned to BAOR within the 48 hours of a short-warning scenario. Training in the mechanised infantry role would also be effectively lost for one training season. This would be a serious penalty since mechanised battalions only have three or four training seasons in this role; to reduce even more would be unacceptable. The penalties of deploying an infantry company are similar (it would also have to come from BAOR); the removal of even one company seriously reduces the effectiveness of the parent unit. The deployment of an infantry unit may also create problems, similar to those currently being faced as a result of the Falklands, in the provision of a theatre pool of unit stores for the task.

c. Headquarters Unit: We no longer have a surplus of staff officers owing to the rundown in Army manpower. HQ units are now deployed with six out-of-area garrisons and the Sinai MFO (See Annex A), and major HQs in the UK and BAOR are already

understaffed as a result of our new commitments in the Falklands and Sinai. The creation of an additional HQ could only be undertaken by withdrawing individuals from these already depleted HQs or from operational units, with further consequential detriment. Experience has also shown that ad hoc units, similar to our Sinai contribution, are unsatisfactory in that they lack the cohesion of a formed unit, with all the associated penalties of lower morale, extra administrative requirements and disciplinary problems. The provision of such a unit for Lebanon would therefore be inadvisable.

APPENDIX 1
TO ANNEX B

OUTLINE ANNUAL COSTS OF AD CONTRIBUTION TO LEBANON MULTINATIONAL FORCE

Ser	Element	Approx Size	Capitation Cost (£M) (1)	Running Costs (£M) (2) (3)	Interest on Eqpt Capital Outlay (£M)	Roulement Cost (£M) (4)	Total Cost (£M) (5)
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
1	Infantry Battalion	650	9.14	1.2	.04	1.16	11.54
2	Infantry Company	150	2.18	.4	.01	.29	2.88
3	Armoured Recce Sqn (Ferrets)	140	1.97	.15	.004	.29	2.42
4	Armoured Recce Sqn (SCORPION)	140	1.97	.46	.04	.29	2.76
5	HQ Unit	40	.56	.1	.01	.14	.81

Notes

1. All costings at 1982/83 prices.
2. No inclusion is made for cost of base overhaul of equipment before deployment; in the case of Ferret this could be as high as £1.2M.
3. No inclusion is made for increasing base overhaul of major assemblies or preparation of spares package; in the case of Ferret this could cost up to £1.25M.
4. Roulement costs are based on the use of the RAF transport fleet, the contingent changing over biannually.
5. Does not include costs of spares packages or any costs for deployment - in the case of an Armoured Recce Squadron, if by air, £1.2M. Sea movement costs would be considerably cheaper.

"MASTER"

CONFIDENTIAL

LEBANON

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 November 1982

BRITISH CONTRIBUTION TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON

When the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary called on the Prime Minister today for a general discussion about various foreign policy issues, reference was made to Mr. Pym's minute of 16 November about the British contribution to a multinational force in the Lebanon.

The Prime Minister confirmed her earlier view that there should be no British participation in the force.

Mr. Pym informed the Prime Minister that, in consultation with the Secretary of State for Defence, he would be putting forward a proposal for the provision of training facilities for the Lebanese forces.

The Prime Minister does not think it necessary for this and the other issues referred to in Mr. Pym's minute of 16 November to be discussed in OD at present.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the members of OD and Sir Robert Armstrong.

A. J. COLES

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

"MASTER"

PRIME MINISTER

Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

Mr. Pym is calling tomorrow at 9.30. His office say that he wants to discuss the following subjects:-

a) Lebanon: Multinational force
You minuted on the attached minute that you wanted to have a word with him about it.

b) Relations with France
See your minute at Flag A - I thought you might like to discuss with the Foreign Secretary how we should handle this.

c) East/West Relations
There is no new point here. But Mr. Pym may suggest that we find time for a small meeting, perhaps ~~through~~ during the recess, to have a more thorough discussion of East/West relations than is normally possible. In particular he thinks it will be useful to consider how we can best work to ensure that NATO's double track decision is not damaged next year by some of the smaller European countries.

d) Gibraltar
He may want to have a word about how to handle the new Spanish Government on this issue.

e) Zimbabwe
He will be submitting to you in due course a paper on our general policy about aid to Zimbabwe - but a preliminary word might be helpful.

f) Overseas Students
I believe that Mr. Pym thinks we should try to find a little money to help with students from particular countries such as Hong Kong and Malaysia.

A.J.C.

25 November 1982

How does this by us to change with what I.S. said to-day? No - we said No at the last meeting. Force to put this on the agenda of OD? and FS clearly said he was [illegible] for [illegible] We must stick to NO policy.

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

Can I have a word with FS, pls

PM/82/97

PRIME MINISTER

British Contribution to a Multinational Force in Lebanon

1. The Lebanese Foreign Minister has now made a formal request to me for British participation in an expanded Multinational Force (MNF) in Lebanon. I enclose the text of his message. The Americans, who have already made an informal bid for British participation, have so far heeded hints from us through diplomatic channels that we would rather not be pressed by them formally; but Mr Habib has recently repeated the strong US desire for a British contribution and the US may not hold off for long (see paragraph 6 below).

2. I have publicly acknowledged the Lebanese request and said that the Government will give it careful consideration, while drawing attention to our heavy commitments elsewhere.

3. We have already had a preliminary discussion of possible British participation in Cabinet on 4 November. Your summing up indicated that a formal US request, when it came, should be handled in a way which did not result in the contribution of a British unit to the MNF. I very much agree that we should be careful not to get over-committed or stretch our reserves too thinly. But the Lebanese request is important, and it also raises wider questions about how we should react to requests for British support in other contexts. I therefore think that it is right to set out the arguments more fully than hitherto and that it would be useful for colleagues to discuss the issue before we send a final reply to the Lebanese. I suggest that the following points need to be considered.

why?

AGAINST PARTICIPATION

4. There are of course penalties attached to British participation:

(a) Cost Deployment of even a small unit would be an expensive operation. How expensive would depend on what exactly we were asked to do and for how long. It might be helpful if the Defence Secretary were to supply some illustrative figures. We should have to consider carefully

/how

how to finance any participation since this would not be covered by any existing provision.

(b) An open-ended commitment? The Americans are talking about a 12-month deployment for the Multinational Force by which time they hope that the Lebanese Army will be strong enough to carry out security duties alone. The Lebanese Foreign Minister insists in his message to me that the commitment would not be open-ended and that we would be free to withdraw; but there is always a risk that it would be difficult to do so when we felt we should. It is likely to take more than 12 months to build up the Lebanese Army.

(c) Casualties The Americans and French have already suffered casualties from mines and in one case from a car bomb. Any MNF contingent could expect some casualties, even if only from accidents. The situation is relatively quiet at present, but this may not last.

(d) Involvement in Lebanese affairs Present contributors have already suffered some political embarrassment from the association of their contingents with sensitive operations conducted by the Lebanese forces eg searches for illegal residents, particularly Palestinians.

(e) Mandate and Command Structure As the force is now constituted (three contingents, short term) these are largely lacking. If (but only if) we were to go in, we would need to seek urgently to create an effective structure, in collaboration with other contributors.

IN FAVOUR OF PARTICIPATION

5. A contribution to a Multinational Force in Lebanon would advance British interests in three areas (and refusal would bring corresponding penalties):

Why not?

(a) Lebanon It is in our interests that Lebanon should be stable; but the Lebanese need help. We should not leave the work entirely to others. It is clear to me from my recent visits that Britain counts far more in the Middle East than we often think, and the prestige of our armed forces is particularly high. A refusal to participate would disappoint and discourage the Lebanese. Our influence in Lebanon, which will remain a very difficult but also very important focus of

attention in the Middle East, would count for less. At a purely commercial level we are likely to pick up a larger share of reconstruction business and defence sales if we participate in the Multinational Force. The rewards, while difficult to quantify now, could be considerable:

(b) Relations with the Arab World At present our policy is to press the moderate Arabs as well as the Palestinians to seize the opportunities for progress presented by the Reagan proposals. Such arguments carry less weight if we show ourselves unwilling to match our words with actions. In Arab eyes our participation in Sinai is not enough. As the attached table shows, we are second from the bottom of 21 countries contributing troops to Middle East peace-keeping - only New Zealand does less (the FRG is debarred from sending troops overseas). Whether we like it or not, owing to our historic connections with the Palestinian question, more is expected of us in the Middle East than of others. By not contributing we would undermine our claim to an active role in the Middle East. This role brings us weighty benefits, not least in the field of defence and defence-related equipment sales. (The French have of course a particular connection with Lebanon, but this does not apply to others, eg the Italians).

Fact? Please

(c) The US Angle The President and his Administration have pledged themselves to make progress towards a Middle East peace settlement and are now better placed than for many years to do so. We have given them public and diplomatic support: but we must be careful not to get a reputation for offering advice without commitment. There are clear political risks for President Reagan, both international and domestic, if they fail. The Americans see an expanded Multinational Force as having a vital role to play in achieving the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, and the Lebanese Foreign Minister has stressed this point in a message to me. Failure for lack of support from US allies could derail the Reagan peace initiative. That will be in no one's interests. Moreover our standing in the Arab world depends in part on their belief in our influence over American policy. King Hussein left me in no doubt about the importance of this in his eyes. We shall put this at

!!! We should be all over the world!

/risk

Nonsense

risk if we refuse to help with an operation which the President regards as crucial.

6. We know that the Americans are planning to expand their MNF contingent and have asked the French and Italians to do the same. The Italians may respond, but the French have told us that they are unlikely to be able to do much more. The Lebanese have also approached Belgium, The Netherlands, Sweden, Austria and South Korea as well as ourselves for a contribution; and the Americans have followed up in each case with a high-level message. Of these, the Belgians have now responded favourably. The Dutch and Swedes have refused (both are already with UNIFIL in South Lebanon, and the latter are debarred by a 1974 law from deploying troops abroad in a non-UN force). We do not know whether South Korea or Austria will be able to respond.

7. We have already firmly told both the Americans and the Lebanese that we are fully stretched around the world, particularly in the Falklands. We can meet some of the points in paragraph 5 by responding in other ways. One possibility, which you and the Defence Secretary are agreeable to in principle, is to offer help in training the Lebanese Army. A substantial contribution to building up Lebanon's armed forces would meet some of the political requirement, and might really help Lebanon in the long term more, but it is not what we are asked for. There will be advantage in getting our offer in very soon, if we are to go down this course.

They do not in the Lebanon.

8. More widely, I feel strongly that our Falklands commitment should not automatically rule out further commitments, particularly where the circumstances affect British interests significantly. As we have discussed in separate correspondence there may for example be a need in due course for a British contribution to the UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia. The ability and will to take part in international cooperative efforts influence our standing in the world, as well as being in our interest in so far as they contribute to international stability. I am strongly of the belief that we should not take too narrow or insular a view of our international role.

/9.

9. I hope that all these points can be considered at an early meeting of OD. We must think carefully about appearing less willing than before to play a part in peacekeeping and similar operations in circumstances where they are generally acknowledged to be in a wider Western interest.

10. I am sending copies of this minute to OD colleagues and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

16 November, 1982

Troop Contributions to Peace-Keeping Forces in the Middle East

	UNIFIL	MNF	SINAI/MFO	UNDOF	TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS
UK			37		37
US		1100	1200		2300
France	419	1657*	37		2113
Ireland	722				722
Italy	40	1291	86		1417
Netherlands	810		105		915
Sweden	144				144
Norway	837		4		841
Austria				528	528
Finland				396	396
Poland				131	131
Canada				222	222
Australia			108		108
New Zealand			35		35
Fifi	629		499		1128
Colombia			482		482
Uruguay			75		75

	UNIFIL	MNF	SINAI/MFO	UNDOF	TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS
Ghana	558				558
Nepal	462				462
Nigeria	696				696
Senegal	561				561

* Includes 482 troops transferred temporarily from UNIFIL to MNF

LEBANESE EMBASSY

TELEPHONE: 229-7265/6.
TELEGRAMS: AMBALIBAN LONDON.
TELEX 262048.

21, KENSINGTON PALACE GARDENS,
LONDON, W. 8.

Ref: 639/2/KM/JS

12th November 1982

The Rt Hon Francis Pym, MC, DL, MP
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
House of Commons
London SW1A OAA

Dear Mr Pym,

I am writing to ask for your support in participating in the multi-national force, now cooperating with our army in maintaining peace and order in Lebanon.

I have always admired your courageous stand on the fundamental freedoms of mankind. We, in Lebanon, are proud to affirm that we also adhere to these fundamental freedoms and consider them to be inseparable from our national existence.

Now, after eight years of war and destruction, Lebanon has an opportunity to restore its independence and to reclaim the values for which it was proverbial in the Middle East. To achieve, again, these objectives, however, Lebanon needs the support of the great democracies, foremost among which is the United Kingdom. Discussions of the withdrawal of Israeli, Syrian and Palestinian forces from Lebanon have begun. The success of these discussions depends, to a great extent, on the strengthening of the multi-national force now serving in Lebanon.

Your participation in this force is extremely important for us. I am aware, of course, of your widespread commitments throughout the world in the name of freedom and democracy. The United Kingdom may rest assured that your participation would not be an open-ended commitment. Any multi-national force contingent the United Kingdom may provide could be withdrawn at an early stage, if necessary, regardless of progress made in expanding the capabilities and size of the Lebanese armed forces.

The restoration of a free sovereign Lebanon now offers our friends a great opportunity for action in the cause of peace. I am sure you will agree with me that peace in Lebanon will contribute to the peace of the entire Middle East.

Yours sincerely,

Elie A K Salem
Minister of Foreign Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

BDC

file Lebanon

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 November 1982

LEBANON: UK PARTICIPATION IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 11 November to John Holmes conveying the view of the Secretary of State for Defence that, subject to the Prime Minister's views, we could agree in principle to training for the Lebanese Army.

The Prime Minister considers that we could agree to provide limited training facilities.

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and John Rhodes (Department of Trade).

A J COLES

Miss J.E. Ridley,
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

(1)

CONFIDENTIAL Would you be prepared in principle to consider proposals for training the Lebanese army?

A.J.C. 11/11

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~XXXXXX~~ 218 2111/3

Yes - limited training facilities. MT

MO 3/7/4

11th November 1982

Dear John,

MT

LEBANON: UK PARTICIPATION IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE

The Secretary of State for Defence has seen your letter of 28th October and notes that the Lebanese have now made a formal request for our participation. Like the Prime Minister he is concerned that we should not take on new military commitments at the present time. Aside from our NATO commitments, the continuing need to protect the Falklands, and the Gibraltar problem to which John Coles has referred, we also have an outstanding request from you to contribute a signals squadron to the UN force in Namibia. Moreover, the continued presence of a British garrison in Belize does nothing to relieve the current severe strain on our resources.

The question of training for the Lebanese Army may be less difficult. Mr Nott believes, subject to the Prime Minister's views, that we could agree to this in principle, although we would need to look very carefully at the requirement in relation to all our other current and proposed commitments. There could be problems of availability if we were asked to provide either a large number of trainers or certain specialists. We would also need to have adequate notice in order to make any necessary administrative arrangements. I understand that the Americans have prepared a survey of Lebanese training needs, and it would be helpful to see this as soon as possible. In addition to this, Mr Nott would propose that a member of the Military Assistance Office should visit the Lebanon as soon as possible to assess the requirement and report on the feasibility of providing such assistance. We could then more fully assess the implications. We would, of course, expect the costs to be met by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and I understand that you are currently looking into this.

Finally, the Defence Secretary believes that one of the most useful and visible ways in which the UK could help the Lebanese to reconstruct their army as a serious force for law and order is the provision of ECGD-backed credit for both defence and civil sales in suitable cases.

J E Holmes Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

I am copying this letter to John Coles (No 10) and to John Rhodes (DOT).

Yours ever,

Jane Ridley

(J E RIDLEY)(MISS)

Lebanon

Internal situation

Lebanon

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 17

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR MOBERLY
SIR J BULLARD
HD/NENAD
HD/MED
HD/UND
~~HD/SEC DEPT~~
HD/DEFENCE D
...
HD/CONSULAR DEPT
... ...
... ...
PUSD (2)
NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

CABINET OFFICE D10

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

Prime Minister
I have reminded the F.C.O. of your views.
AR 2/11

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 011800Z NOV 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3512 OF 1 NOVEMBER 1982
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK AND BEIRUT.

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1747: LEBANON/MULTINATIONAL FORCE (MNF).

We should regret especially now not

1. I ENDORSE MR HURD'S VIEW THAT WE SHOULD NOT RESPOND NEGATIVELY TO THE LATEST U S INFORMAL REQUESTS FOR A CONTRIBUTION TO THE MNF, AND THAT WE SHOULD BE AS POSITIVE AS POSSIBLE OVER TRAINING.

2. I REALISE THAT, IN ADDITION TO OUR NATO COMMITMENT, WE HAVE OBLIGATIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND, THE FALKLANDS, BELIZE ETC. ON THE OTHER HAND, WITH RESERVES, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND STERLING STRONG, WE ARE IN OTHER RESPECTS BETTER PLACED TO MAKE SOME CONTRIBUTION. SEEN FROM HERE, THERE IS A POTENTIAL DANGER THAT WHILE WE FOCUS ON PARTICULAR TROUBLE-SPOTS FOR US, OUR ATTENTION MAY BE DISTRACTED FROM OTHER AREAS WHICH ARE OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS, WITH A CONSEQUENT REDUCTION IN THE ROLE WE ARE PREPARED TO PLAY IN SUCH AREAS. THE MIDDLE EAST IS JUST SUCH AN AREA, BOTH NOW AND IN THE LONGER TERM.

3. THERE IS ALSO A SPECIAL U S STAKE IN THE AREA. THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ENTIRE ADMINISTRATION HAVE PLEDGED THEMSELVES TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS A LASTING PEACE AND WE HAVE GIVEN THEM PUBLIC AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT. THE U S ARE NOW BETTER PLACED THAN FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS TO ACHEIVE THIS GOAL. BUT THERE ARE CLEAR POLITICAL RISKS, INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC, FOR THEM IF THEY DO NOT. FAILURE TO BRING ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON COULD DERAIL REAGAN'S PEACE INITIATIVE. AND THAT WOULD BE IN NO ONE'S INTEREST.

FROM LEBANON COULD DERAIL REAGAN'S PEACE INITIATIVE. AND THAT WOULD BE IN NO ONE'S INTEREST.

4. IN THE SHORT TERM, A UK CONTRIBUTION TO THE MNF WOULD DEMONSTRATE WIDER EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR AMERICAN POLICY IN LEBANON AND HELP TO DEFUSE CONGRESSIONAL CRITICISM OF AMERICAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT THERE. THE HIGH REPUTATION OF OUR ARMED SERVICES FOR PROFESSIONALISM WOULD ADD GREATLY TO THE CREDIBILITY OF THE MNF AND HELP TO ENSURE THAT IT ACHIEVES WHAT IT SETS OUT TO ACHIEVE.

5. MORE GENERALLY, SUCH A CONTRIBUTION WOULD HAVE TWO LASTING ADVANTAGES:
I. IT WOULD REINFORCE OUR ROLE IN AN AREA OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO OUR OWN INTERESTS AND THOSE OF THE WEST AND THUS CONFIRM THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT AT BRIGHTON THAT "BRITAIN IS A RELIABLE ALLY, RELIABLE IN NATO, RELIABLE BEYOND NATO...".
II. IT WOULD ADD TO THE WEIGHT WE ALREADY CARRY WITH THE PRESENT U S ADMINISTRATION IN THE CONDUCT OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

WE CAN SURELY DO AS MUCH AS THE FRENCH AND CANNOT WISH TO DO LESS THAN THE ITALIANS. THE GERMANS, WITH THEIR HISTORY, ARE OF COURSE OUT OF THE RUNNING.

WRIGHT

NNNN

LEBANON -

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 November 1982

LEBANON

Thank you for your letter of 28 October proposing that the Prime Minister might send a message to President Gemayel in order to establish a dialogue with him.

The Prime Minister thinks it would be a little awkward to send Gemayel a general message. She recalls that she sent him one on his appointment. She would prefer to wait until there is a specific point to make.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 November 1982

LEBANON: UK PARTICIPATION IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE

Thank you for your letter of 28 October. The Prime Minister notes that Mr. Pym will be sending further advice on how we should respond to the American request that we should participate in the Multinational Force. But you should know that Mrs. Thatcher remains convinced that we should not participate. She feels that we are already over-stretched - and thinks we must bear in mind the possibility of a deterioration in the situation with respect to Gibraltar.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A J COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE JERUSALEM POST October 29, 1982

Behind the lies in Lebanon

Pearl Sheffy Gefen learns about the discrepancies between media reports of the war and an eminent military historian's own observations

A rocket trail across the skyline during the height of the fighting in West Beirut.

A WEST POINT graduate who is equally at home in Damascus, Amman, Jerusalem and Cairo says he is appalled by the "falsification and distortion of historical facts by those who know better" in media reports on the war in Lebanon.

U.S. Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, Ret., is the president and executive

director of the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, and the author of 80 books on military history, including his latest, *Great Battles on the Eastern Front: the Soviet-German War*, co-authored by Soviet military affairs authority, Paul Martell.

The son and grandson of professional soldiers, Col. Dupuy has just spent several days in Lebanon on his second intensive visit to that country since the war began in June, gathering material for his next book. His last on the Middle East, *Elusive Victory: the Arab-Israeli Wars 1947-1974*, has frequently been cited as the most authoritative military survey of those conflicts. He is regarded as an objective, open-minded historian in defence ministries and military headquarters around the world.

This tall, calm man of military bearing is concerned only with facts. "I will speak only of what I myself saw in Lebanon," he cautions, "and of calculations I can make and conclusions I can draw from professional military training, experience and study.

"One of my purposes in visiting Lebanon this summer — at my own expense and on my own initiative — was to see for myself how much truth there was to the press and television reports I had seen since early June."

His conclusion: "I am disgusted by the many false and irresponsible media reports by those who have a moral responsibility to present facts truthfully and objectively. Stories of harsh occupation policies and Israeli atrocities, which have sometimes been eagerly compared to the Nazi holocaust of World War II, could have been reported only by those who had no idea of what the Nazi Holocaust was.

"Tales of wanton destruction and devastation of such cities as Tyre, Sidon, Damour and Nabatiye are not only inconsistent with my own combat experience and the various studies I have made on the nature of urban destruction in past wars, but were obviously contrary to what I saw in those cities.

"Assertions that the Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon has been marked by a harshness comparable to the Nazi actions would be laughable, were it not for the tragic and brutal enormity of the comparisons."

AMONG Dupuy's most startling examples were the reports of the bombing of West Beirut on August 12.

"According to headlines all over the world, on that day the Israeli air force launched its most intensive and devastating attack of the war on West Beirut. It was reported that hundreds of buildings were destroyed and nearly 1,000 people killed or wounded.

"Well, on that day I spent about five hours observing this bombardment. During that time, it was apparent from my observation that no more than 150 bombs, probably 200 to 500 kilograms each, were dropped on Beirut. As far as artillery bombardment was concerned, in the many Israeli positions I visited in and around East Beirut, I saw fewer shell bursts than bomb explosions during the time I was there.

"It must have been extremely unpleasant for people in West Beirut during that time, and the refugees I saw streaming through the Galerie Samaan checkpoint were obviously happy to be out. However, to any veteran who has been under air or artillery attack in 'normal' combat situations, this was relatively modest harassment.

"Therefore I was surprised to learn from a BBC broadcast that night that the bombardment was so intensive that President Reagan telephoned Prime Minister Begin to express 'outrage.'

"My surprise turned to astonishment when I read in the August 14 issue of the *International Herald Tribune*, quoting PLO communiques, that the warplanes dropped 44,000 bombs and that 700 houses collapsed. The article did not comment on these statistics or present any differing assessment. So the reader could only conclude that the *Herald Tribune* believed these figures.

"I later discovered that *The Washington Post* of August 13 reported, again without comment, a statement made by the PLO representative in New York that 1,600 bombs and rockets were dropped and 42,000 shells fired.

"NOW, let's suppose that I am not a very good observer, that instead of 150 bombs, 2,000 were dropped during the five hours I was there watching. This means that 42,000 bombs would have had to be dropped in the remaining six of the 11 hours during which the attack was reported to have taken place.

"That means 7,000 bombs per hour, or more than 100 per minute. No air force in the world could drop 42,000 substantial bombs on one target the size of Beirut in six hours, or drop 44,000 bombs — 4,000 per hour or 70 per minute — in 11 hours.

"The Israeli air force has fewer than 600 combat aircraft. In a maximum effort, it might be able to commit 300 of these to such a mission, and these could probably fly three combat sorties each during 11 hours. That is a maximum potential of 900 sorties; and if each plane carried four bombs on each sortie, that would be an absolute maximum of 3,600 bombs, less than one-tenth of the number that the *Herald Tribune* reported.

"But I stick to my on-the-spot observation that the actual intensity was probably about one-tenth of that theoretical maximum, and thus less than one one-hundredth of the reported intensity.

"As to the *Washington Post* report, the figure of 1,600 bombs was theoretically possible, but suggests an intensity at least four times greater than what I saw. The reported 42,000 rounds of artillery fire would have required a bombardment averaging nearly 4,000 shells per hour. On the basis of what I saw, this could not possibly be true.

"How could responsible reporters present such figures without a word of comment?"

COL. DUPUY cites another report in the *International Herald Tribune* on August 16, in which the *Los Angeles Times* correspondent in Beirut, J. Michael Kennedy, wrote: "In a little more than two months, the Israelis have inflicted damage on West Beirut and Southern Lebanon to a degree that makes the year and a half of civil war 1975-76 seem almost minor."

Dupuy retorts: "One wonders if Mr. Kennedy ever visited Damour — once one of the most beautiful cities in Lebanon and now a ghost town. It was totally destroyed and many of its Christian inhabitants were killed by the PLO fighters in 1976."

Early in June, *The New York*

Times reported that Nabatiye and Sidon were destroyed. "When I drove through Nabatiye in mid-August," says Dupuy, "there were few signs of war damage. When I approached Sidon, I expected to see a ghost town with remnants of houses and rubble everywhere.

"After driving all through the city, I found some five blocks in the centre totally destroyed, and a number of houses along a 200-metre stretch of the waterfront seriously damaged. I estimate that this amounted to about 5 per cent of the city's dwellings. A number of other office buildings and houses suffered minor damage, but most were intact and untouched.

"The city itself was teeming with life, with thousands of people shopping at stores full of goods. Movie theatres were open and the traffic was worse than a New York rush hour."

As another example of misrepresentation in the media, he describes a photograph of a woman mourning at a graveside in Beirut, which appeared in the August 2 issue of *U.S. News and World Report*. "Those who read Arabic could see, from the words on the tomb, that this was the grave of Halad Belaty who died on 29 Ramadan 1400, that is on August 10, 1980, almost two years before the Israeli invasion.

SPEAKING about the grossly exaggerated figures of civilian casualties, Dupuy says: "The sensational reports of tens of thousands of civilian casualties, some asserting 60,000 in South Lebanon alone, were clearly false and should have been recognized as such by the newsmen who made the reports. It should have been equally evident to those reporters that their stories of 600,000 homeless refugees were impossible, since this is roughly equal to the total population under Israeli control in Lebanon.

"There could have been no more than 20,000 refugees, many of whom I saw returning from the north to their homes in South Lebanon, and most of whom had become refugees when they were forced from their homes by the PLO occupation of South Lebanon in the late 1970s."

COL. DUPUY insists that "not only have I ground no one's axe in the Arab-Israeli conflict, I do not intend to do so with respect to this latest eruption. As a historian, it seems to me too early to judge whether the Israeli operation in Lebanon was warranted, but the image and horrors of the war which I have seen between commercials on television in the U.S. were quite different from the picture I encountered in Lebanon.

"By focusing their television cameras exclusively on selected destroyed buildings, without showing the untouched neighbouring structures on the same street, the electronics journalists dramatically exaggerated the degree of devastation and failed to beam a balanced and comprehensive coverage.

"My own investigation on the spot led me to believe that there was nothing that could be termed either genocide or massacre committed by Israeli troops, as reported by some Western journalists.

Of the Beirut massacre he says: "It is too early to judge whether Israel's failure to prevent the bloodshed in the Shatilla and Sabra camps was due to negligence, blundering or worse. But whatever the Israeli responsibility for the tragic massacre of the Palestinians in those camps, this issue should not be confused with earlier accusations against Israel.

"Already it has been suggested that the massacre was confirmation of earlier charges about Israeli disregard for civilian lives in Lebanon, and that therefore the case against the Israelis may be taken as proved. This would be a grave injustice, because I think the record reveals that, prior to the Beirut massacre, the Israeli forces did in fact demonstrate a commendable concern for the safety of civilians — both Palestinians and Lebanese — in the war zone.

"WHETHER OR NOT the IDF should have been in Lebanon at all, or as far north as Beirut, are matters far too complex to debate in limited time. But I am convinced that, during the first three months of this latest Arab-Israeli war, the Israelis operated with punctilious respect for the laws of war and precepts of international morality.

"War has always been a bloody, destructive affair. It produces casualties, suffering and distress. But what was unusual in this particular war was, as the many Lebanese with whom I talked emphasized; that the Israelis seem to have sincerely tried to keep the destruction and bloodshed to a minimum, and succeeded in doing so, scrupulously endeavouring to relate all their actions to legitimate military targets.

"I saw Israeli leaflets, and heard from local people, of warning announcements by loudspeakers before Israelis initiated attacks in civilian areas. The result, of course, was not only to permit non-combatants to take refuge, but also to alert the defending Arab forces, thereby increasing the likelihood of Israeli casualties.

"A number of other writers have already pointed out that the truth of what has happened in Lebanon is quite different from the media reports. Yet despite these fairly extensive and objective efforts to set the record straight, the press in general still tends to equate the performance of the Israeli forces in Lebanon with that of the hordes of Attila the Hun, Tamerlane and Himmler.

"It seems clear that the press and general public are much more interested in bad or inhumane performances by the Israelis than they are in similar performances by the PLO. There is a clear double standard here.

AS A MILITARY historian, I can think of no war in which greater military advantages were gained in combat in densely populated areas at such a small cost in civilian lives lost and property damaged, and this despite the PLO's deliberate emplacement of weapons in civilian communities, on and around hospitals.

"This, of course, forced the Israelis to attack such places, and the PLO gained a propaganda victory in the Western world and even in Israel, because of the double standard applied by the news media, which grossly distorted the facts and failed to present all the considerations.

"The Lebanese people were, for the most part, unimpressed by these reports, for several reasons. They had suffered severely for more than six years from the PLO influence in their country, and were prepared to welcome the Israelis as 'rescuers.'

"Secondly, they could see for themselves how the PLO used inno-

cent civilians as hostage shields around their weapon sites, and the moderation exercised by the Israelis in dealing with this situation. As a result, the Israelis were able to operate in an essentially friendly environment and allow local Lebanese authorities full responsibility for local affairs.

"IN THE TOWNS and villages I saw, there was no occupying force dominating the townspeople with emplaced weapons. The only signs of an Israeli military presence was a passing truck or jeep, or a few soldiers strolling through teeming outdoor markets. At the same time, farmers till the fields and harvest crops all around the Israeli positions and even in no-man's-land between Israeli and Syrian lines."

However, Dupuy warns, "any army on foreign soil eventually wears out any welcome it may have enjoyed, and the tragedy in West Beirut indicates that time is running short for the Israelis in Lebanon. No matter how wise and benevolent the occupation policy has been, the cruel massacre of Palestinian Moslems by Phalangist Christians in an area under Israeli control has grievously stained the Israelis and their image.

"It is clear that Israel must be ready to leave Lebanon at the same time as do the Syrians and the remnants of the PLO and it is in their best interest to hasten such a simultaneous withdrawal. Then they can perhaps still capitalize on the goodwill of their earlier occupation policy and form a strong bond with a free Lebanon."

OID

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

I should prefer to have a specific point to make – I do not like a general message – we have one on hand spoken. And I have not met him. MT

28 October 1982

Prime Minister:
Do you wish to send the message proposed?
28/10

Dear John,

Lebanon

We plan to invite the new Lebanese Foreign Minister, Mr Elie Salem, to visit Britain soon (his predecessor was originally due to come in the summer). In the meantime Mr Pym thinks it would be useful to demonstrate our interest in establishing a dialogue with President Gemayel by means of a message from the Prime Minister. I enclose a draft. If the Prime Minister agrees, this could be delivered to President Gemayel by Sir John Leahy, who will be visiting Beirut from 3-6 November.

Yours ever
J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
No 10 Downing Street

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL

I have been following with great admiration since your election as President the progress you have made towards establishing the conditions for a reunification of the Lebanese people and the reconstruction of your country. Your speech at the General Assembly was a powerful call for the help and understanding of the international community in bringing to Lebanon the peace which your people so urgently need. As you know, the British Government share your wish to see all foreign forces withdrawn from Lebanon as soon as possible, so that she can once again enjoy her right to sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. We wish to see a stable and prosperous Lebanon once again playing her part in Middle East and international affairs.

With our partners in the European Community we have shown our concern for the appalling suffering of Lebanese civilians in the recent fighting and we shall continue to provide all the help we can for relief and reconstruction. We are very conscious of the difficulties which you still have to confront, not only within Lebanon herself but also in the search for a just solution to the Palestinian problem, without which peace must remain a distant prospect for the whole regi n. I wanted to let you know that you and your Government have our support and good wishes in the formidable tasks which lie ahead of you.

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 October 1982

Lebanon: UK Participation in the Multinational Force

As you will have seen from UKMIS telnos 1746 and 1747 (copies enclosed) the Americans have made an informal request for a British contribution to the Multinational Force in Lebanon. In the American view, an expanded force has an essential role to play in ensuring the complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon. We know that the Lebanese are also keen on a British contribution.

This is an unwelcome if not unexpected request. No immediate decision is needed. Mr Pym is aware of the Prime Minister's unwillingness to take on another military commitment overseas, but believes that we should await further details before considering carefully how we should react. Meanwhile the Americans are approaching a wide range of other potential contributors and would probably find particularly unhelpful any early negative indication from us in public. For the moment we are discussing with the Ministry of Defence and the Treasury what we might be able to offer the Lebanese in the way of traning for the Lebanese army, and perhaps police force.

I am copying this to Richard Mottram (MOD).

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 272345Z OCT 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1746 OF 27 OCTOBER
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKMIS GENEVA.

FROM PS/MR HURD

LEBANON

1. DURING SEPARATE MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON TODAY WITH WEINBURGER AND DAM, MR HURD WAS ASKED WHETHER HMG WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE TO A MULTINATIONAL FORCE (MNF) IN LEBANON. BOTH WEINBURGER AND DAM MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS WAS AN INFORMAL REQUEST AT THIS STAGE. SOUNDINGS WOULD ALSO BE TAKEN SHORTLY OF OTHER POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS: A FINAL LIST WAS STILL TO BE PUT TOGETHER, WHICH WAS LIKELY TO RANGE MORE WIDELY THAN THE EUROPEANS WHO HAD BEEN APPROACHED ON THE SINAI MFO AND INCLUDE ONE OR MORE NORTH AFRICAN STATES. WEINBURGER SAID THAT ALL THOSE WHO DID EVENTUALLY CONTRIBUTE WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE LEBANESE.

2. BOTH MEN SAID THAT THE MNF HAD AN ESSENTIAL ROLE TO PLAY IN FACILITATING DISENGAGEMENT AND THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES IN THE LEBANON. UNTIL THIS WAS ACHIEVED, THE REAGAN PLAN FOR THE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE COULD NOT BE CARRIED FORWARD SUCCESSFULLY. WEINBURGER STRESSED THAT THE PRESIDENT, WHO WAS NOW DEEPLY AND PASSIONATELY INVOLVED ON A DAILY BASIS IN THE SEARCH FOR A LASTING MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT, FELT STRONGLY ABOUT THESE PROBLEMS.

3. THE FIRST TASK WAS TO SECURE THE FULL WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLO FROM LEBANON. THIS WOULD EASE THE SUBSEQUENT WITHDRAWAL OF THE SYRIANS AND THE ISRAELIS. DRAPER WOULD FROM TODAY BE NEGOTIATING IN THE AREA WITH THESE OBJECTIVES. ALTHOUGH SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL WAS THE IDEAL, IT WAS MORE LIKELY THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO COME ABOUT IN POSSIBLY TWO STAGES. THE AMERICANS WANTED INITIALLY TO BE ABLE TO DEPLOY THE MNF ALONG THE BEIRUT/DAMASCUS ROAD TO FACILITATE DISENGAGEMENT. THEY COULD NOT YET ESTIMATE HOW MANY ADDITIONAL TROOPS WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR THIS. THEREAFTER, IN THE FIRST STAGE OF WITHDRAWAL, THE ISRAELIS MIGHT WITHDRAW TO THEIR SECURITY ZONE FORTY KILOMETRES NORTH OF THE INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER, AND THE SYRIANS FROM MOUNT LEBANON TO SHTAURA. IN THE SECOND STAGE, WHICH COULD FOLLOW ALMOST IMMEDIATELY, BOTH SIDES WOULD WITHDRAW TOGETHER. THE LEBANESE COULD NOT ACHIEVE THIS ON THEIR OWN. THE US GOVERNMENT WAS READY TO ASK CONGRESS FOR A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO LEBANON'S EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING NEEDS. BUT IT LOOKED TO US TO CONTRIBUTE TO A LARGER MNF. WEINGBURGER STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT: WITHOUT IT, CONGRESS MIGHT FALL PREY TO TRADITIONAL AMERICAN ISOLATIONISM. IF THIS EXERCISE WAS NOT TAKEN FORWARD,

 / THE MOMENTUM

THE MOMENTUM OF THE PEACE PROCESS COULD BE LOST. THE LARGER THE INITIAL CONTRIBUTION TO AN MNF, THE SHORTER THE TIME FOR WHICH TROOPS WOULD NEED TO BE DEPLOYED.

4. WEINBURGER SAID THAT THE US WOULD NOT BE HAPPY ABOUT INVOLVING THE UN TOO DEEPLY IN THIS EXERCISE. UN OBSERVERS MIGHT BE ATTACHED TO THE MNF, BUT TO GIVE RESPONSIBILITIES TO UNIFIL AND PLACE THE QUESTION IN THE HANDS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD ONLY PROVIDE AN UNWELCOME OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO INTERFERE.

5. MR HURD SAID THAT WE WELL UNDERSTOOD THE THINKING BEHIND THIS INFORMAL APPROACH. THIS WAS NOT AN EASY MATTER FOR US. WE HAD BEEN HOPING THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ASKED TO CONTRIBUTE. THERE WAS LITTLE NATURAL OR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN BRITAIN OF LEBANON'S PROBLEMS: AND OUR RESOURCES WERE PRESENTLY STRETCHED. BUT WE WOULD LOOK CAREFULLY AT THESE SUGGESTIONS. IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR US TO HELP ON TRAINING. DAM SAID THAT A MILITARY MISSION, LED BY GENERAL BARTLETT, HAD RECENTLY RETURNED FROM LEBANON AND WOULD BE PRODUCING A REPORT ON TRAINING NEEDS: THIS COULD BE MADE AVAILABE TO US. MR HURD WELCOMED THIS.

6. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

THOMSON

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1747 OF 27 OCTOBER
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BEIRUT.

MY IPT: LEBANON

FOLLOWING FROM MINISTER OF STATE

1. THIS IS AWKWARD BUT NOT UNEXPECTED. AFTER THESE CONVERSATIONS VELIOTES AND HABIB URGED PRIVATELY THAT WE SHOULD NOT RETURN A PLAIN NO OR DISMISS THE IDEA OF UK PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC. WE WOULD NOT BE ASKED TO CONTRIBUTE A LARGE CONTINGENT, NOR WOULD IT BE FOR A LONG TIME. THE EXACT FORM OF THE FORMAL REQUEST WOULD DEPEND ON HOW DRAPER GOT ON.

2. I TOO HOPE THAT WE CAN KEEP THE POSITION OPEN AS REGARDS A UK CONTRIBUTION TO THE MNF. THERE ARE STILL MANY QUESTION MARKS. BUT WE ARE BACK ON CLOSE TERMS WITH THE AMERICANS OVER THE MIDDLE EAST, AND OUR STANDING WITH THE ARABS DEPENDS IN PART ON THEIR BELIEF IN OUR INFLUENCE OVER AMERICAN POLICY. IT WOULD BE A PITY TO PUT THIS AT RISK BY REFUSING IN PRINCIPLE TO HELP WITH AN OPERATION WHICH THE PRESIDENT REGARDS AS CRUCIAL.

3. THERE IS NO NEED FOR AN IMMEDIATE REPLY AND I SUGGEST THAT WE PROBE FOR FURTHER DETAILS NEXT WEEK AND AT THE SAME TIME REPLY AS POSITIVELY AS WE CAN ON TRAINING. THE FIRST STEP ON TRAINING SHOULD PRESUMABLY BE FOR HM EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON TO ESTABLISH WHAT THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES PROPOSE TO DO, AND THEN FOR US TO SEND SOMEONE TO BEIRUT.

4. I SHOULD WELCOME THE CHANCE TO DISCUSS ALL THIS WITH YOU NEXT WEEK.

THOMSON

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1747 OF 27 OCTOBER
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THOMSON

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MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES ~~16~~ (18)

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IMMEDIATE

Prime Minister
I have asked that you should be consulted before anything else happens.
A.J.C. 28/10

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FROM PS/MR HURD

LEBANON

1. DURING SEPARATE MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON TODAY WITH WEINBURGER AND DAM, MR HURD WAS ASKED WHETHER HMG WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE TO A MULTINATIONAL FORCE (MNF) IN LEBANON. BOTH WEINBURGER AND DAM MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS WAS AN INFORMAL REQUEST AT THIS STAGE. SOUNDINGS WOULD ALSO BE TAKEN SHORTLY OF OTHER POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS: A FINAL LIST WAS STILL TO BE PUT TOGETHER, WHICH WAS LIKELY TO RANGE MORE WIDELY THAN THE EUROPEANS WHO HAD BEEN APPROACHED ON THE SINAI MFO AND INCLUDE ONE OR MORE NORTH AFRICAN STATES. WEINBURGER SAID THAT ALL THOSE WHO DID EVENTUALLY CONTRIBUTE WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE LEBANESE.

2. BOTH MEN SAID THAT THE MNF HAD AN ESSENTIAL ROLE TO PLAY IN FACILITATING DISENGAGEMENT AND THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES IN THE LEBANON. UNTIL THIS WAS ACHIEVED, THE REAGAN PLAN FOR THE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE COULD NOT BE CARRIED FORWARD SUCCESSFULLY. WEINBURGER STRESSED THAT THE PRESIDENT, WHO WAS NOW DEEPLY AND PASSIONATELY INVOLVED ON A DAILY BASIS IN THE SEARCH FOR A

FULLY. WEINBURGER STRESSED THAT THE PRESIDENT, WHO WAS NOW DEEPLY AND PASSIONATELY INVOLVED ON A DAILY BASIS IN THE SEARCH FOR A LASTING MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT, FELT STRONGLY ABOUT THESE PROBLEMS.

3. THE FIRST TASK WAS TO SECURE THE FULL WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLO FROM LEBANON. THIS WOULD EASE THE SUBSEQUENT WITHDRAWAL OF THE SYRIANS AND THE ISRAELIS. DRAPER WOULD FROM TODAY BE NEGOTIATING IN THE AREA WITH THESE OBJECTIVES. ALTHOUGH SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL WAS THE IDEAL, IT WAS MORE LIKELY THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO COME ABOUT IN POSSIBLY TWO STAGES. THE AMERICANS WANTED INITIALLY TO BE ABLE TO DEPLOY THE MNF ALONG THE BEIRUT/DAMASCUS ROAD TO FACILITATE DISENGAGEMENT. THEY COULD NOT YET ESTIMATE HOW MANY ADDITIONAL TROOPS WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR THIS. THEREAFTER, IN THE FIRST STAGE OF WITHDRAWAL, THE ISRAELIS MIGHT WITHDRAW TO THEIR SECURITY ZONE FORTY KILOMETRES NORTH OF THE INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER, AND THE SYRIANS FROM MOUNT LEBANON TO SHTAURA. IN THE SECOND STAGE, WHICH COULD FOLLOW ALMOST IMMEDIATELY, BOTH SIDES WOULD WITHDRAW TOGETHER. THE LEBANESE COULD NOT ACHIEVE THIS ON THEIR OWN. THE US GOVERNMENT WAS READY TO ASK CONGRESS FOR A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO LEBANON'S EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING NEEDS. BUT IT LOOKED TO US TO CONTRIBUTE TO A LARGER MNF. WEINGBURGER STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT: WITHOUT IT, CONGRESS MIGHT FALL PREY TO TRADITIONAL AMERICAN ISOLATIONISM. IF THIS EXERCISE WAS NOT TAKEN FORWARD, THE MOMENTUM OF THE PEACE PROCESS COULD BE LOST. THE LARGER THE INITIAL CONTRIBUTION TO AN MNF, THE SHORTER THE TIME FOR WHICH TROOPS WOULD NEED TO BE DEPLOYED.

4. WEINBURGER SAID THAT THE US WOULD NOT BE HAPPY ABOUT INVOLVING THE UN TOO DEEPLY IN THIS EXERCISE. UN OBSERVERS MIGHT BE ATTACHED TO THE MNF, BUT TO GIVE RESPONSIBILITIES TO UNIFIL AND PLACE THE QUESTION IN THE HANDS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD ONLY PROVIDE AN UNWELCOME OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO INTERFERE.

5. MR HURD SAID THAT WE WELL UNDERSTOOD THE THINKING BEHIND THIS INFORMAL APPROACH. THIS WAS NOT AN EASY MATTER FOR US. WE HAD BEEN HOPING THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ASKED TO CONTRIBUTE. THERE WAS LITTLE NATURAL OR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN BRITAIN OF LEBANON'S PROBLEMS: AND OUR RESOURCES WERE PRESENTLY STRETCHED. BUT WE WOULD LOOK CAREFULLY AT THESE SUGGESTIONS. IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR US TO HELP ON TRAINING. DAM SAID THAT A MILITARY MISSION, LED BY GENERAL BARTLETT, HAD RECENTLY RETURNED FROM LEBANON AND WOULD BE PRODUCING A REPORT ON TRAINING NEEDS: THIS COULD BE MADE AVAILABE TO US. MR HURD WELCOMED THIS.

6. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

THOMSON

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 262315Z OCT 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1730 OF 26 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT,

INFO ROUTINE DAMASCUS, CAIRO, AMMAN, JEDDA, PARIS

WASHINGTON TELNO 3420: LEBANON

1. I INVITED BRIAN URQUHART TO LUNCH WITH THE MINISTER OF STATE TODAY (26 OCTOBER).

2. URQUHART SAID, ON THE BASIS OF A CONVERSATION WITH DRAPER ON 17 OCTOBER, THAT HE THOUGHT THE AMERICANS WERE AIMING FOR A SETTLEMENT CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS, WHICH DRAPER BELIEVED THE ISRAELIS COULD BE BROUGHT TO ACCEPT:

(A) ALL PALESTINIAN, SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM LEBANON: DRAPER HAD SAID THAT ONLY THE TIMING OF THESE WITHDRAWALS REMAINED TO BE NEGOTIATED BUT HAD HAD NO ANSWER WHEN URQUHART ASKED WHERE THE PALESTINIANS WERE TO GO OR HOW THE AMERICANS INTENDED TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENT ON SO COMPLEX A PROBLEM.

(B) THE ''SECURITY ZONE'' BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER AND THE LITANI WOULD BE CONTROLLED BY THE LEBANESE ARMY.

(C) THE HADDAD MILITIA WOULD BE MERGED INTO THE LEBANESE ARMY, WITH HADDAD HIMSELF BEING COURT-MARTIALLED AND/OR SENT OVERSEAS AS A MILITARY ATTACHE. THE ISRAELIS HAD AT FIRST INSISTED THAT THE

A MILITARY ATTACHE. THE ISRAELIS HAD AT FIRST INSISTED THAT THE SECURITY ZONE SHOULD BE ENTRUSTED TO HADDAD BUT HAD BEEN SURPRISED AT THE DEGREE OF AMIN GEMAYEL'S ANTIPATHY FOR HADDAD AND NOW, DRAPER THOUGHT, RECOGNISED THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO GIVE WAY.

(D) UNIFIL WOULD BE BASED ON SIDON AND WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR A SECTOR RUNNING EAST FROM THE COAST ACROSS THE BEKAA AND UP TO THE SYRIAN FRONTIER, ACTING AS A CORDON SANITAIRE TO PREVENT INFILTRATION OF PALESTINIAN OR OTHER ARMED ELEMENTS INTO THE SECURITY ZONE TO THE SOUTH CONTROLLED BY THE LEBANESE ARMY.

3. MR HURD EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE PRACTICABILITY OF ALL THIS. URQUHART AGREED. IT WAS POSSIBLE TO CONCEIVE OF MUTUAL SYRIAN AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. BUT THE ISRAELIS WOULD INSIST THAT THE PALESTINIANS TOO LEAVE NORTH LEBANON. MANY OF THOSE WHO HAD LEFT BEIRUT HAD ALREADY RETURNED AND THE PLO HAD A SUBSTANTIAL ARMED PRESENCE IN THE NORTH. THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE REMOVED EITHER BY ARMED FORCE (AND WHO WAS GOING TO PROVIDE THAT?) OR BY PERSUASION. THE ONLY INCENTIVE WHICH MIGHT PERSUADE THEM TO GO WOULD BE SOME POLITICAL CONCESSION BY THE AMERICANS, EG AGREEMENT TO DEAL WITH THE PLO DIRECT, BUT IT SEEMED UNLIKELY THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD MAKE THIS CONCESSION OTHER THAN IN THE CONTEXT OF PALESTINE. THERE WAS ALSO THE VERY DIFFICULT QUESTION OF WHERE THE PALESTINIANS WOULD GO.

4. URQUHART DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF UNIFIL PLAYING THE ROLE DESCRIBED AT 2(D) ABOVE. BUT HE DID NOT LIKE IT. AS BEFORE, HE STATED A PREFERENCE FOR UNIFIL BEING USED AS UNEF II WAS IN IMPLEMENTING THE DISENGAGEMENT IN SINAI NEGOTIATED BY KISSINGER IN 1973/4. HE WOULD ALSO LIKE UNIFIL TO BE USED TO PROTECT THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN THE SOUTH BUT THERE WOULD FIRST HAVE TO BE A LEBANESE REQUEST FOR THIS. HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE TWO YEARS BEFORE THE LEBANESE ARMY WOULD BE ABLE TO ASSUME CONTROL OF THE SECURITY ZONE.

5. URQUHART WAS SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE FEASTIBILITY OF THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE ASSUMING NEW RESPONSIBILITIES OUTSIDE ITS PRESENT AREA OF DEPLOYMENT. IT SUFFERED FROM THE BASIC WEAKNESS OF NOT HAVING A SINGLE COMMANDER. INSOFAR AS THERE WAS ANY CORDINATED DIRECTION, IT CAME FROM THE THREE AMBASSADORS IN BEIRUT. THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO COPE IF THE FORCE BECAME INVOLVED IN SHOOTING INCIDENTS.

6. URQUHART SAID THAT UNIFIL AND THE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS WERE IN REASONABLY GOOD HEART. HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE FACT THAT THE FINNS HAD VOLUNTEERED TO REPLACE THE NEPALESE BATTALION.

7. BUT IN GENERAL URQUHART WAS HIS USUAL PESSIMISTIC (BUT PROBABLY REALISTIC) SELF ABOUT BOTH THE LEBANON AND THE WIDER PALESTINE PROBLEM. HE FEELS THAT LIKUD-STYLE GOVERNMENTS ARE HERE TO STAY IN ISRAEL AND THAT THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF THEIR MAKING CONCESSIONS ON THE WEST BANK OR GAZA UNLESS PLACED UNDER VERY SEVERE PRESSURE BY THE AMERICANS WHICH MAY NOT BE FORTHCOMING. THAT THE REAGAN PLAN

ISRAEL AND THAT THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF THEIR MAKING CONCESSIONS ON THE WEST BANK OR GAZA UNLESS PLACED UNDER VERY SEVERE PRESSURE BY THE AMERICANS WHICH MAY NOT BE FORTHCOMING: THAT THE REAGAN PLAN IS BEGINNING TO RUN OUT OF STEAM: THAT IT WILL ONLY WORK IF HUSSEIN IS PROVIDED WITH A REASONABLE DEGREE OF ARAB SUPPORT: AND THAT IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE AMERICANS KNOW HOW TO MOBILISE THIS OR, IF THEY DID, COULD MANAGE TO DELIVER IT ON THEIR OWN.

THOMSON

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FM WASHINGTON 202218Z OCT 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3406 OF 20 OCTOBER 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, TEL AVIV ROUTINE, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, ROME, MOSCOW, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, JEDDA, CAIRO

LEBANON: GEMAYEL'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES

1. DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON 19 OCTOBER GEMAYEL SAW THE PRESIDENT, SHULTZ AND WEINBERGER, AS WELL AS CLAUSEN (WORLD BANK). THE AMERICANS PROFESS TO BE PLEASED WITH THE TONE OF THE DISCUSSIONS, THOUGH THERE IS A CONSIDERABLE GAP BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI POSITIONS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON.

2. ACCORDING TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT, GEMAYEL MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE COULD NOT ACCEPT MOST OF THE ISRAELI PROPOSALS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES (WASHINGTON TELNO 3361). HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO ENTER INTO ANY AGREEMENT WITH THE ISRAELIS BEFORE THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR FORCES OR TO DO ANYTHING TO PREJUDICE LEBANESE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION OR HIS RELATIONS WITH THE OTHER ARAB STATES TO WHOM HE WAS LOOKING FOR FUNDS FOR REHABILITATION IN LEBANON. ~~GEMAYEL DID HOWEVER, EXPRESS WILLINGNESS TO TALK DIRECTLY TO THE ISRAELIS UNDER US AUSPICES. THE LEBANESE WERE~~

~~IN LEBANON~~. GEMAYEL DID HOWEVER, EXPRESS WILLINGNESS TO TALK DIRECTLY TO THE ISRAELIS UNDER US AUSPICES. THE LEBANESE WERE ALREADY IN TOUCH WITH BOTH THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR FORCES AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT HOPE THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS MAY BEAR FRUIT WITHOUT THE AMERICANS HAVING TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE.

3. ON SOUTH LEBANON GEMAYEL APPEARED WILLING TO CONSIDER INCLUDING SOME HADDAD MILITIA IN THE LEBANESE ARMY AND A POSSIBLE FUTURE ROLE FOR UNIFIL. HE RECOGNISED THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY COULD NOT AT PRESENT COVER THE WHOLE COUNTRY. THE AMERICANS STRESSED THE VALUE OF UNIFIL AS A 7000-MAN FORCE ALREADY IN PLACE. GEMAYEL RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EXPANSION OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE FOR ADDITIONAL DUTIES IN THE BEKA'A VALLEY AND NORTHERN LEBANON: THE AMERICANS GAVE A NON-COMMITTAL ANSWER.

4. GEMAYEL SUBMITTED A NUMBER OF REQUESTS FOR MILITARY AID, INCLUDING TRAINING, CLOTHING AND TENTAGE TO MEET THE ARMY'S IMMEDIATE NEEDS, ARMOURED PERSONNEL CARRIERS AND HOWITZERS. HE OUTLINED HIS PLANS FOR AN EXPANSION OF THE ARMY, FOR A TEN-FOLD EXPANSION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES, AND FOR THE CREATION OF A BORDER PATROL FORCE. ALL THESE MIGHT TOTAL ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND MEN. THE AMERICANS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEIR RESPONSE WOULD DEPEND ON THE REPORT OF THE SIXTEEN MAN MILITARY ADVISORY MISSION WHICH HAS JUST RETURNED FROM THREE WEEKS IN LEBANON, DURING WHICH THEY HAD SEVERAL MEETINGS WITH GEMAYEL HIMSELF. THEY SAID THAT THEY COULD NOT MEET ALL LEBANON'S NEEDS BUT WOULD LOOK TO OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES TO HELP. GEMAYEL MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE EXPECTED THE AMERICANS TO TAKE THE LEAD. THE STATE DEPARTMENT (PLEASE PROTECT) HAVE TOLD US THAT HE EVEN HINTED AT THE POSSIBILITY OF OFFERING THE AMERICANS ANY MILITARY FACILITIES THEY MIGHT REQUIRE IN LEBANON, THOUGH HE WAS CLEARLY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE POSSIBLE ARAB REACTION. THE STATE DEPARTMENT COMMENTED TO US THAT LEBANON'S MAIN REQUIREMENT WOULD BE FOR TRAINING FOR THE PROPOSED EXPANDED SECURITY FORCES: IN ADDITION TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE, THE UK, SPAIN AND GREECE MIGHT PERHAPS BE ABLE TO HELP.

5. GEMAYEL SAID THAT LEBANON REQUIRED DLRS 10 BILLION FOR RECONSTRUCTION, OF WHICH DLRS 1 BILLION WOULD BE NEEDED IN THE COMING YEAR. HE EXPECTED THE WORLD BANK AND THE UNITED STATES (WHICH HAS ALREADY OFFERED DLRS 100 MILLION) TO GIVE A LEAD, BUT THAT THE BULK OF THE FUNDS WOULD BE PROVIDED BY ARAB INVESTORS, BOTH GOVERNMENTAL AND FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR, ONCE A CLIMATE OF SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE HAD BEEN RESTABLISHED. A WORLD BANK MISSION IS TO BE SENT TO LEBANON NEXT MONTH TO IDENTIFY ITS NEEDS

MISSION IS TO BE SENT TO LEBANON NEXT MONTH TO IDENTIFY ITS NEEDS.

5. GEMAYEL PUBLICALLY ENDORSED REAGAN'S MIDDLE EAST PEACE INITIATIVE WHICH HE SAID HAD CREATED UNPRECEDENTED OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE.

WRIGHT

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MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 17

Lebanon

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GRS 380
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FM TUNIS 140912Z OCT 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 212 OF 14 OCTOBER
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ALGIERS, AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, RABAT, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON
INFO SAVING MOSCOW

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PLO

1. CHEYSSON HAD A TWO-HOUR MEETING WITH ARAFAT IN TUNIS ON 13 OCTOBER. THE PLO REPRESENTATIVES IN LONDON AND PARIS WERE PRESENT. ARAFAT ARRIVED FROM AMMAN THAT MORNING. CHEYSSON WAS HERE FOR LESS THAN 24 HOURS AND CONVEYED APOLOGIES FOR NOT HAVING ARRANGED A COMMUNITY BRIEFING.

2. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR TOLD ME AFTER THE MEETING THAT ARAFAT HAD SPENT MOST OF THE TIME TALKING ABOUT THE SITUATION IN LEBANON, EXPRESSING ALARM ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE LEBANESE ARMY AND CHRISTIAN MILITIAMEN AND URGING THAT THE FRENCH CONTINGENTS WITH THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND UNIFIL SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE PALESTINIANS WERE PROPERLY PROTECTED. HE HAD, HOWEVER, REITERATED HIS GENERAL [illegible] ACCORDING TO THE AMBASSADOR ARAFAT HAD

WERE PROPERLY PROTECTED. HE HAD, HOWEVER, REITERATED HIS GENERAL SUPPORT FOR AMIN GEMAYEL. ACCORDING TO THE AMBASSADOR, ARAFAT HAD BEEN NON-COMMITTAL ABOUT HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN AND, IN SPEAKING OF A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT, HAD SAID LITTLE MORE THAN THAT HE STOOD BY THE FEZ SUMMIT RESOLUTION. HE HAD NOT ASKED FOR FRENCH OR EUROPEAN INTERVENTION WITH THE US OR ISRAEL.

3. IN A PRESS STATEMENT, CHEYSSON SAID THAT HIS INTERVIEW WITH ARAFAT HAD DEALT MAINLY WITH THE POSITION OF PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS IN LEBANON, THAT FRENCH RECOGNITION OF THE PLO HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED, THAT ARAFAT WAS WELCOME IN FRANCE AT ANY TIME, BUT THAT A MEETING BETWEEN ARAFAT AND MITTERRAND WAS NOT ENVISAGED AT PRESENT. CHEYSSON ALSO SAID THAT FRANCE HAD WARMLY WELCOMED THE RESULTS OF THE FEZ SUMMIT, WHICH HAD SHOWN ALMOST COMPLETE ARAB UNANIMITY AND HAD ACCORDED THE SECURITY COUNCIL A LEADING ROLE IN REACHING A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEE THE PLO WORKING FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. HOWEVER, THE PLO NEEDED A PROPERLY DISPOSED PARTNER AND ISRAEL HAD SO FAR SHOWN NO SIGN OF BEING READY TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

4. ARAFAT TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE MEETING HAD BEEN FRUITFUL, BUT THAT THE EUROPEAN POSITION ON THE PALESTINE PROBLEM STILL SUFFERED FROM AMERICAN PRESSURE. IN AN EARLIER STATEMENT ON HIS ARRIVAL IN TUNIS, HE SAID THAT THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE DID NOT TAKE PROPER ACCOUNT OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS WITH THE PLO AS THEIR SOLE REPRESENTATIVE. ANSWERING A QUESTION, HE SAID THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD FORMALLY STATED HIS READINESS TO WELCOME ANY PALESTINIAN MILITANT OR FIGHTER IN JORDAN.

5. ARAFAT IS EXPECTED TO CALL ON KING HASSAN IN RABAT BEFORE THE FEZ COMMISSION TEAM LEAVES FOR WASHINGTON. KADDOUMI IS TO REPRESENT THE PLO AT THE COMMISSION MEETING ON 15 OCTOBER.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO MOSCOW.

STIRLING

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MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 17

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 121940Z OCT 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1619 OF 12 OCTOBER.
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT TEL AVIV,
PRIORITY AMMAN DAMASCUS WASHINGTON KUWAIT PARIS MOSCOW AND UKMIS GENEVA.
INFO SAVING TO UKMIS VIENNA.

YOUR TEL NO 428: PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND UNIFIL.

1. I HAD A LONG CONVERSATION WITH RYDBECK (COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF UNRWA) TODAY, 12 OCTOBER, WHICH I SHALL BE REPORTING SEPARATELY. I QUIZZED HIM ABOUT SECURITY IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN SOUTH LEBANON. HE SHOWED GREAT CONCERN. HE SAID THAT NASTY INCIDENTS WERE OCCURING AND THE SITUATION WAS SUCH THAT PARENTS WERE AFRAID TO SEND THEIR CHILDREN TO SCHOOL. WHEN I ASKED WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE HE MENTIONED BOTH HADDAD AND THE PHALANGISTS. HE ALSO EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE RELIABILITY OF THE LEBANESE ARMY AND RECOUNTED A CONVERSATION WHICH HE HAD HAD ON 1 OCTOBER WITH WAZZAN IN WHICH THE LATTER HAD HINTED AS MUCH. RYDBECK SAID THAT IT WOULD BE SPLENDID IF UNIFIL COULD GUARD THE CAMPS BUT ALL OF THEM WERE OUTSIDE THE PRESENT AREA FOR WHICH UNIFIL HELD A MANDATE AND HE WAS SURE THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT AGREE.

2. I TOLD URQUHART OF RYDBECK'S CONCERN AND HIS JUDGEMENT ABOUT THE

2. I TOLD URQUHART OF RYDBECK'S CONCERN AND HIS JUDGEMENT ABOUT THE ISRAELIS. URQUHART SAID THAT THIS JUDGEMENT WAS CORRECT AS THINGS STOOD BUT THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD GIVE WAY IF THE AMERICANS PUT ENOUGH PRESSURE ON THEM.

3. URQUHART SAID THAT MY SOVIET COLLEAGUE HAD JUST TOLD HIM THAT HE COULD AGREE TO A TWO MONTH EXTENSION FOR UNIFIL FROM 19 OCTOBER, BUT NOT A DAY LONGER. URQUHART SAID HE DOUBTED IF THIS MATTERED VERY MUCH BECAUSE HE FELT THAT THIS WAS LIKELY TO BE THE ATTITUDE OF MOST OF THE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS ANYWAY. I ASKED HIM IF HE THOUGHT THERE WAS ANY CHANCE THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE OUT OF LEBANON BY MID-DECEMBER. HE THOUGHT THE CHANCES WERE VIRTUALLY NIL AND SAID THE SITUATION IN LEBANON WAS AGAIN DETERIORATING.

4. IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE THE INTRODUCTION OF SOME UN PRESENCE INTO THE MAIN REFUGEE CAMPS IN SOUTH LEBANON THIS SHOULD BE DONE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RENEWAL OF THE UNIFIL MANDATE. BUT WE STILL DO NOT KNOW WHAT ATTITUDE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT WE MAY NOT DO SO UNTIL GEMAYEL COMES HERE JUST BEFORE RENEWAL IS DUE ON 19 OCTOBER. UNLESS THE LEBANESE CLEARLY REQUEST THAT UNIFIL'S ROLE BE EXTENDED TO INCLUDE TYRE AND SIDON TAKING IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS, THEN IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO MAKE PROGRESS, OR TO GET THE AMERICANS TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS. ONE FALLBACK POSITION WHICH WE MIGHT TRY TO GET THE LEBANESE (AND THROUGH THE AMERICANS THE ISRAELIS) TO CONSIDER IS THE INTRODUCTION OF UNTSO OBSERVERS INTO THE CAMPS. WHILE THEY WOULD NOT ACT AS A PHYSICAL DETERRENT LIKE UNIFIL'S FORCES THEY WOULD BE A DETERRENT OF SORTS. IF YOU AGREE, I COULD FLOAT THIS IDEA, IF AND WHEN IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT THE LEBANESE ARE NOT GOING TO ASK FOR UNIFIL TO BE STATIONED IN THE CAMPS. HOWEVER AS SEEN FROM HERE IT IS VERY MUCH A SECOND BEST AND WOULD BE WIDELY JUDGED AS SUCH. IF WE WANT TO PLAY A PART IN EXTENDING THE UNIFIL MANDATE TO COVER AT BLEAST SOME OF THE CAMPS IT IS BY NO MEANS TOO SOON TO START. A FIRST STEP MIGHT BE FOR ME TO APPROACH THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON INSTRUCTIONS. IT WOULD ALSO BE NECESSARY TO SPEAK SOON WITH THE AMERICANS AND THE FRENCH.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO UKMIS VIENNA

THOMSON

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GRS 669
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FM FCO 111600Z OCTOBER 82
TO PRIORITY BEIRUT
TELEGRAM NUMBER 428 OF 11 OCTOBER
AND TO PRIORITY TEL AVIV
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, KUWAIT, UKMIS GENEVA, WASHINGTON, DAMASCUS, AMMAN,
S LEBANON: PALESTINIAN REFUGEES

1. MR STRINGER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL OF OXFAM, ACCOMPANIED BY MR MCDOWALL, AN OXFAM REPRESENTATIVE UNTIL RECENTLY BASED IN LEBANON, CALLED AT THEIR REQUEST TO SEE MR HURD ON 11 OCTOBER.

2. OXFAM'S CONCERN OVER THE CONTINUED DEPRIVATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS SET OUT IN TWO OXFAM REPORTS, ONE BY SHEARS DATED 5 SEPTEMBER AND THE OTHER BY MCDOWALL DATED 22 SEPTEMBER, (COPIES OF WHICH WERE SENT TO UKMIS NEW YORK BY BAG ON 8 OCTOBER). STRINGER SAID THAT THE GREATEST DANGER FOR THE PALESTINIANS WOULD BE IF THE ISRAELIS LEFT SOUTHERN LEBANON AND HANDED OVER TO THE MILITIAS. THERE WAS THE POSSIBILITY OF A FURTHER MASSACRE. MURDERS OF PALESTINIANS IN THE AREA WERE CONTINUING AS THE MILITIAS WANTED TO FRIGHTEN ALL PALESTINIANS INTO LEAVING FOR THE BEQAA, FROM WHERE THEY WOULD BE FORCED INTO SYRIA. MCDOWALL COMPLAINED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE NOT PROTECTING THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AS REQUIRED UNDER THE 4TH GENEVA CONVENTION. HE ALLEGED THAT THE BURNING OF THE MIEH MIEH CAMP WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE ISRAELIS. VOLUNTARY AGENCY STAFF WERE NOW AT RISK AS THEY WERE UNINTENTIONALLY BECOMING INVOLVED IN HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN THE AREA AND WERE THEREFORE BEING WATCHED BY THE ISRAELIS AND MILITIA. THE DELEGATION ALSO COMPLAINED THAT TENTS WERE BEING ALLOWED (BELATEDLY) TO BE ERECTED ON THE CAMPS RATHER THAN MORE PERMANENT BUILDINGS. APART FROM THE HEALTH PROBLEMS THIS CAUSED, EG AN INCREASE IN THE DEATH RATE AMONG INFANTS AND THE AGED THEY WERE A SYMBOLIC INVITATION TO THE MILITIAS TO REGARD THE PALESTINIANS IN THE CAMPS AS BEING THERE ONLY ON A TEMPORARY BASIS.

/STRINGER

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STRINGER ASKED THAT MORE OF THE INTERNATIONAL AND VOLUNTARY AGENCIES SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SET UP TEMPORARY OFFICES IN THE CAMPS AT MOST RISK (AIN AL HELWUH AND ONE OTHER IN SIDON AND 3 IN TYRE) AND THAT UNIFIL'S MANDATE BE CHANGED TO ALLOW IT TO PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IN THE CAMPS AND IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. HE ALSO ASKED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A LARGER UNIFIL PRESENCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON SO THAT THERE COULD BE PHYSICAL PROTECTION ON THE GROUND. IF THESE STEPS WERE NOT TAKEN THEN THERE WAS A DANGER OF ANOTHER MASSACRE FOR WHICH THE UN WOULD BE BLAMED.

3. MCDOWALL, WHO USED TO WORK FOR UNWRA, ALSO CRITICISED THEIR ROLE SINCE THE INVASION. ITS OUTDATED MANDATE MEANT THE ORGANISATION WAS TOO RIGID - IT WOULD NOT INVOLVE ITSELF IN HUMAN RIGHTS. THE APPOINTMENT OF UNWRA'S DIRECTOR FOR THE JERUSALEM AREA TO LOOK AFTER SOUTHERN LEBANON AFTER THE ISRAELI INVASION HAD MEANT THAT UNWRA TURNED TO THE ISRAELIS ON ALL POINTS. IT WAS THIS WHICH HAD LED TO THE FOUR MONTH DELAY IN TENTS BEING ERECTED IN THE OLD CAMPS, AS THE ISRAELIS TOLD THE DIRECTOR IT WAS THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS OBJECTING TO THE ERECTION OF PERMANENT BUILDINGS AND THE UNWRA DIRECTOR DID NOT CHALLENGE THIS. MR HURD EXPLAINED THE ISRAELI OBJECTIONS TO UNIFIL AND SAID THAT WE HAD TAKEN UP THE TREATMENT OF CIVILIANS WITH THE ISRAELIS. ON THE QUESTION OF PERMANENT BUILDINGS FOR REFUGEES WE WERE AWAITING A REPLY FROM THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. HE ALSO EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE PARTICIPATING IN PRELIMINARY UN DISCUSSIONS ABOUT A NEW MANDATE FOR UNIFIL, BUT THIS WOULD TAKE TIME. OXFAM CONFIRMED THAT THEY WOULD BE GIVING THESE QUESTIONS PUBLICITY BOTH THROUGH MPS AND THE MEDIA.

4. MR HURD PROMISED TO RAISE THE QUESTION WITH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL WHEN HE MEETS HIM IN NEW YORK LATER THIS MONTH. ANY COMMENTS YOU OR UKMIS NEW YORK MAY HAVE ON THE ABOVE WOULD BE WELCOME DURING THE COURSE OF THIS WEEK.IT IS CLEARLY DESIRABLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME U.N. PRESENCE AROUND THE MAIN REFUGEE CAMPS IN SOUTH LEBANON TO DETER HARASSMENT OR ATTACKS ON PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS. IN MR HURD'S VIEW THE OXTAM ASSESSMENT MUST BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY

/5.

5. MCDOWALL IS DUE TO VISIT KUWAIT LATER THIS WEEK WHERE HE HOPES TO SEE THE KUWAIT FOREIGN MINISTER TO PRESS FOR THE GCC TO RAISE THESE ISSUES AT THE UN.

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LEBANON.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 October, 1982

Lebanon

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has received from the Lebanese President in response to the message sent by Mrs. Thatcher on his assumption of the presidency.

A. J. COLES

J. E. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

ORS 325

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FM BEIRUT 130900Z OCT 82
TO ROUTINE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 661 OF 13 OCTOBER 82
INFO ROUTINE DAMASCUS TEL AVIV AMMAN MODUK(DI4)
SAVING FOR INFO WASHINGTON CAIRO JEDDA UKMIS NEW YORK UKREP
BRUSSELS BONN PARIS ROME

SECURITY SEARCHES IN BEIRUT

1. THE LEBANESE ARMY HAVE BEEN CARRYING OUT AN INTENSIVE SEARCH FOR ARMS, CRIMINALS, RESIDENTS WITHOUT PAPERS AND PALESTINIANS IN WEST BEIRUT IN THE LAST FEW DAYS. THEY BLOCK OFF STREETS, HOLD UP CARS, AND SEARCH HOUSES, USING SOLDIERS ON FOOT SUPPORTED BY TANKS, ARMOURED CARS, AND ARMOURED PERSONEL CARRIERS.

2. FRENCH AND ITALIAN TROOPS OF THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE HAVE STOOD BY IN SUPPORT. THE FRENCH SEEMED TO BE PARTICIPATING IN THE OPERATION IN THE FIRST FEW DAYS.

3. THE AUTHORITIES CLAIM TO HAVE CAPTURED SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITIES OF ARMS AND TO HAVE APPREHENDED CRIMINALS AND ILLEGAL RESIDENTS, INCLUDING SEVERAL BAADER-MEINHOF AND RED BRIGADE TERRORISTS. THEY HAVE LET IT BE KNOWN THAT THEY WILL EXTEND THE OPERATION TO EAST BEIRUT.

4. THERE HAVE BEEN PROTESTS SEMICOLON AND THE PRESS, BOTH LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL, HAVE POINTED TO DISTRESS AND ABUSESC. ARAFAT HAS PROTESTED, AS HAS WALID JUMBLATT (IN PARIS). MUSLIMS ARE ALSO NATURALLY ALARMED, SINCE THEIR MILITIAS ARE MORE OR LESS DEFEATED IN BEIRUT AND THE KATAEB ARE AT LARGE.

5. JUMBLATT AND ARAFAT ARE THE MOST LIKELY PROPRIETORS OF THE ARMS FOUND SO FAR IN WEST BEIRUT. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT ABUSES OCCURRED. INDEED IT WOULD BE ASTONISHING IF THEY DID NOT IN AN OPERATION OF THIS KIND. I HAVE HEARD OF NO INJURY TO BRITISH SUBJECTS OR DAMAGE TO BRITISH PROPERTY.

6. THE OBJECT OF THIS RATISSAGE SEEMS TO BE TWO-FOLD:

(A) TO STAMP OUT THE HORNET'S NEST OF WEST BEIRUT
(B) TO LET THE LEBANESE ARMY ASSERT ITSELF.
I AM DOUBTFUL OF THE SUCCESS OF (A). THE AUTHORITIES MUST HAVE FOUND TONS OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION, BUT THERE MUST BE MORE IN THE SORT OF PLACE THAT WEST BEIRUT HAS BEEN FOR THE LAST EIGHT YEARS. IN (B), I SUSPECT THEY ARE SUCCEEDING.

7. ON BALANCE, I CAN SEE NOTHING BUT GOOD SO FAR IN THE EXERCISE, PROVIDED THAT IT IS KEPT UNDER REASONABLE CONTROL. IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE A LONG TIME (7 YEARS) AGO.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

RODERTS....

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ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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SUBJECT " OPS MATTER

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T 190/82

PRIME MINISTER'S (4)
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 190/82

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Prime Minister

5/10.

ETAT
H.E. MRS MARGARET
THATCHER
PRIME MINISTER
LONDONSW1

I WAS DEEPLY TOUCHED BY YOUR KIND MESSAGE AT THE OCCASION OF THE ASSUMPTION OF MY CONSTITUTIONAL DUTIES WHILE I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO DEVELOP FURTHER THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS EXISTING BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES I WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU OF MY BEST WISHES FOR YOUR PERSONAL WELLBEING AND FOR THE PROSPERTY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AMIN GEMAYEL PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON

COL LONDONSW1

Lebanon

Duty Clerk.
Pl. copy the message to the Speaker's Office.
MR 1/10.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 September 1982

See Mag 'A' ← Where is the message?

Now p.a.
MR 1/10.

MR 1/10

Dear Michael,

Thank you for your letter of 21 September enclosing a message to the Prime Minister from a speaker of the Lebanese National Assembly, Mr Kamel al-Assad.

The Parliamentary delegation referred to by the Lebanese Speaker consisted of Mr David Watkins, Mr Cyril Townsend and Mr Russell Johnston. They attended the election of Mr Bashir Gemayel as observers. As you know Mr Gemayel was assassinated shortly afterwards and his brother Mr Amin Gemayel has subsequently been elected as President. We do not think it necessary for the Prime Minister to send any reply to what is essentially a thank you letter, but you might wish to send a copy of the message to the Speaker's Office.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

M Scholar Esq
10 Downing Street

Lebanon, Int Sit, Pt 3

GR 1500

Lebanon

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 300805Z SEP 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1505 OF 29 SEPTEMBER 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV,
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, DAMASCUS, AMMAN,
INFO CAIRO, BEIRUT.

Read in full.

AR 30/9

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

UNGA: SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER

MS

1. SHAMIR CALLED ON THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN HIS HOTEL AT 1730 ON 29 SEPTEMBER. THE MEETING LASTED 45 MINUTES.

ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. SHAMIR SAID THAT DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON FOLLOWING RECENT ISRAELI MILITARY OPERATIONS WERE RATHER POSITIVE AND NOT ONLY FOR ISRAEL. BEIRUT NO LONGER BELONGED TO THE PLO, BUT WAS ONCE MORE THE CAPITAL OF LEBANON, AND THERE WAS A GOOD PROSPECT FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM THE COUNTRY. ONCE SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE TO PREVENT THE RETURN OF THE PLO, THERE COULD BE PEACE IN AND WITH LEBANON, WHICH WOULD ONCE AGAIN BE PART OF THE FREE WORLD AND NOT SUBJECT TO SOVIET INFLUENCE. ISRAEL HAD HAD TO PAY A PRICE FOR THESE ACHIEVEMENTS, AS ONE ALWAYS DID IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE SOMETHING POSITIVE. NO OTHER COUNTRY FACING SUCH A TERRORIST THREAT WOULD BE ACTED DIFFERENTLY. HE HOPED THAT ONCE THE SOLDIERS HAD LEFT LEBANON THERE MIGHT BE PROGRESS ON THE WIDER ISSUES.

3. MR PYM SAID THAT MR SHAMIR MUST KNOW THAT MOST OF THE WORLD TOOK A DIFFERENT VIEW OF ISRAELI ACTIONS. BRITAIN BELIEVED THAT THE ISRAELI MILITARY INVASION OF LEBANON WAS UNJUSTIFIED, AND RECENT EVENTS IN BEIRUT, WHATEVER THEIR ORIGIN, HAD HORRIFIED THE WHOLE WORLD AND CONSTITUTED A SET BACK FOR PEACE. HE WELCOMED WHAT SHAMIR HAD SAID ABOUT WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON, WHICH HE ASSUMED TO MEAN ALL OF LEBANON. SHAMIR SAID THAT IT HAD ALWAYS BEEN THE ISRAELI POSITION THAT THEIR TROOPS WOULD LEAVE LEBANON AS PART OF A GENERAL EVACUATION OF FORIEGN FORCES FROM THE WHOLE OF LEBANON. THERE WERE NO OTHER PRECONDITIONS. THE AMERICAN POSITION WAS THAT FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD ALL GO SIMULTANEOUSLY: ISRAEL AGREE. MR PYM ASKED WHY THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO EVACUATE BEIRUT AIRPORT. SHAMIR SAID THAT THEY HAD FELT THAT THERE WAS ADVANTAGE IN RETAINING USE OF A CORNER OF THE AIRPORT WHILE ISRAELI FORCES REMAINED IN THE AREA. BUT THEY HAD NOT INSISTED.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE EVENTS OF RECENT MONTHS HAD LEFT GREAT BITTERNESS, NOT LEAST IN THE ARAB WORLD. HE TRUSTED

/ THAT THE

THAT THE ISRAELI REACTION TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSALS WOULD NOT INFLUENCE THEIR ATTITUDE TO WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. SHAMIR SAID THAT THEY HAD NO HESITATION ON THIS SCORE, AND NO WISH TO PROLONG THEIR STAY IN LEBANON. THE ISRAELIS HAD HELPED THE MARONITES SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY WERE THE ONLY ENEMIES OF SYRIA AND OF THE PLO IN LEBANON, AND THEY COULD BE PROUD THAT A MARONITE PRESIDENT NOW HAD SUPPORT FROM ALL ELEMENTS OF LEBANESE SOCIETY INCLUDING MUSLIMS. ISRAEL HAD BEEN DOUBLY SHOCKED BY THE TRAGEDY IN THE CAMPS, FIRST BY THE LOSS OF LIFE ITSELF AND SECOND BY THE ATTEMPTS THAT HAD BEEN MADE TO PUT RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT ON ISRAEL. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WAS MOUNTING EVIDENCE IT WAS STILL NOT FINALLY CLEAR WHERE RESPONSIBILITY LAY. SHAMIR SAID THAT IT WAS PERFECTLY CLEAR. THERE WOULD BE AN ISRAELI ENQUIRY, BUT THE ONLY QUESTION IT HAD TO ANSWER WAS WHETHER INDIVIDUAL ISRAELIS SERVING IN LEBANON COULD HAVE ACTED EARLIER TO STOP WHAT WAS HAPPENING. THE LEBANESE THEMSELVES WANTED TO PUT THE INCIDENT BEHIND THEM AND GET ON WITH BUILDING A NEW LEBANON. MR PYM SAID THAT MANKIND DID FORGET MASS MURDER. SHAMIR SAID THAT MURDER HAD BEEN ONLY TOO FAMILIAR A FEATURE OF RECENT LEBANESE HISTORY. IT WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT MUSLIM ELEMENTS IN LEBANON, SUCH AS KARAHEH, STILL SUPPORTED PRESIDENT GEMAYEL THOUGH HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FALANGE.

ARAB/ESRAEL

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT BRITAIN HAD WELCOMED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE, WITH ITS RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE BOTH OF SECURITY FOR ISRAEL AND OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. SHAMIR SAID THAT THIS DID NOT REPRESENT A NEW DEPARTURE OF US THINKING. THE OFFICIAL US POSITION SINCE 1967 HAD BEEN THAT A SOLUTION MUST BE FOUND FOR THE TERRITORIES CONCERNED WHICH DID NOT ENTAIL LEAVING THEM UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL. REAGAN WAS A GOOD FRIEND OF ISRAEL BUT THE ISRAELI POSITION WAS DIFFERENT. NIXON AND CARTER HAD HAD SIMILAR IDEAS AT EARLIER PERIODS, BUT TO NO PURPOSE. A PALESTINIAN STATE IN 5,000 SQUARE KILOMETRES WOULD NOT SOLVE THE SO-CALLED PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, AND WAS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH ISRAELI SECURITY, WHICH MR PYM CLAIMED TO WANT TO SEE ASSURED. ISRAEL LIVED IN SPECIAL CONDITIONS AND HAD TO DEFEND ITSELF, AND IT DID SO. IT COULD NOT ACCEPT A RETURN TO THE PRE-1967 BOUNDARIES, WHICH WOULD PLACE ALL THE HIGH GROUND OUT OF HER CONTROL.

6. MR PYM ASKED WHETHER SHAMIR WAS TRYING TO SAY THAT THERE WAS NO PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. SHAMIR SAID THAT THERE WERE 4 MILLION PALESTINIANS IN THE WORLD, AND JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA WOULD TAKE 1 AND A HALF MILLION AT MOST, INCLUDING THE 1.2 MILLION ALREADY THERE. THIS WOULD NOT SATISFY THE PLO: A PALESTINIAN STATE OF THIS SIZE WOULD MERELY BE A BASE FOR FURTHER AGGRESSION AGAINST ISRAEL AND PERHAPS JORDAN. MR PYM ASKED WHETHER THE PROBLEM WAS NOT WORTH AT LEAST DISCUSSING. SHAMIR SAID THAT THERE WAS NO HARM IN DISCUSSING, BUT SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE FOR ISRAEL. THE RIGHT SOLUTION WAS AUTONOMY, AS LAID

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DOWN AT CAMP DAVID. MR PYM SAID THAT LIFE HAD MOVED ON SINCE THEM. IT WORRIED HIM THAT SHAMIR APPEARED NOT TO RECOGNISE THE EXISTENCE OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, AND THAT HE ASSUMED FROM THE OUTSET THAT A PALESTINIAN STATE WOULD BE A HOSTILE NEIGHBOUR. SHAMIR SAID THAT ISRAEL KNEW THE MENTALITY, INTENTIONS AND IDEOLOGY OF HER ARAB NEIGHBOURS.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT ONCE FOREIGN FORCES HAD LEFT LEBANON, THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE READY TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF THE REAGAN PLAN. IT DISTURBED HIM THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD DISMISS IT OUT OF HAND. SHAMIR SAID THAT THIS WAS A MATTER OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND SURVIVAL. ISRAEL COULD NOT ALLOW AN UNNACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO BE IMPOSED ON HER. MR PYM SAID THAT THE RIGHT TO SECURITY WAS NOT CONFINED TO ISRAEL. SHAMIR SAID THAT THE CAMP DAVID NEGOTIATIONS HAD SHOWN THAT ISRAEL WAS READY TO TAKE GREAT RISKS AND MAKE GREAT SACRIFICES FOR PEACE. SINAI WAS THE ONLY STRATEGIC DEPTH THAT ISRAEL HAD EVER HAD. BUT SHE COULD NOT BE ASKED TO GO BEYOND THE ACCEPTABLE, TO TAKE STILL GREATER RISKS AND MAKE STILL MORE SACRIFICES.

8. MR PYM SAID THAT HE FOUND THIS A DEPRESSING, UNCONSTRUCTIVE AND ONE-SIDED APPROACH, ALMOST IMPLYING A LACK OF DESIRE FOR A SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES. TO INSIST ON GETTING ALL ONE WANTED WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE OTHER SIDE HAD A POSITION WAS NOT AN ATTITUDE WITH WHICH WE COULD SYMPATHISE. SHAMIR REPEATED THAT CAMP DAVID WAS THE ONLY BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THE PALESTINIANS HAD ALWAYS BEEN AND STILL WERE DOMINATED BY AN EXTREMIST MINORITY. THEY HAD ALWAYS REJECTED ALL ISRAEL'S REASONABLE OFFERS OF COMPROMISE. AS FOR HUSSEIN, ISRAEL HAD HAD SIX SECRET MEETINGS WITH HIM IN 1974-76, BUT HE HAD PROVED EXTREMELY NEGATIVE. MR PYM SAID THAT THE WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS WERE PROVOCATIVE. SHAMIR SAID THAT ISRAEL WANTED FULL AGREEMENT ON AUTONOMY, LEADING TO FREE ELECTIONS. THE SETTLEMENTS HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH IT: A FEW THOUSAND ISRAELIS WOULD NOT BE HARMFUL TO PEACE OR TO THE ARAB INHABITANTS. ISRAEL WAS LINKED TO JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA BY HISTORICAL TIES AND FOR SECURITY REASONS, BUT SHE ACCEPTED THAT A PROBLEM EXISTED, WHICH WAS WHY SHE HAD PUT FORWARD HER PROPOSALS FOR AUTONOMY.

9. MR PYM ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN NEXT. SHAMIR REPLIED THAT ISRAEL WOULD CONTINUE TO DISCUSS WITH THE US AND THE EUROPEANS. HE IMPLIED THAT ISRAEL WAS READY TO SIT IT OUT UNTIL THE ARABS WERE READY TO TALK ON ISRAELI TERMS. MEANWHILE LIFE WOULD GO ON.

BILATERAL RELATIONS

10. SHAMIR SAID THAT LORD CARRINGTON'S VISIT TO ISRAEL IN THE SPRING HAD BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL. IT HAD NOT SETTLED ALL THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, BUT IT HAD IMPROVED

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UNDERSTANDING, AND HAD PROVIDED THE START OF A DIALOGUE. WE SHOULD GO ON TALKING AND TRY TO NARROW OUR DIFFERENCES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE DIFFERENCES HAD CERTAINLY BROADENED IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS. IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE ISRAELI IDEA OF A DIALOGUE HAD NOT EXTENDED TO TELLING LORD CARRINGTON WHAT THEY INTENDED TO DO IN LEBANON. SHAMIR SAID THAT THEY HAD OBVIOUSLY NOT PROVIDED OTHER COUNTRIES WITH DETAILS OF THEIR PRECISE MILITARY INTENTIONS, BUT THEY HAD MADE NO SECRET, TO THE AMERICANS OR TO OTHERS, OF THE FACT THAT ISRAEL WOULD TAKE DRASTIC STEPS IF THE PLO CONTINUED TO ATTACK HER. HE LOOKED FORWARD TO CONTINUING THE USEFUL DIALOGUE WHICH THE ISRAELI CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN LONDON HAD ESTABLISHED AT OFFICIAL LEVEL IN THE FCO, AND WOULD SHORTLY BE NOMINATING A NEW AMBASSADOR. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MADE NO COMMENT. THE MEETING ENDED WITH AN EXCHANGE OF NEWS AND SYMPATHY ON THE HEALTH OF AMBASSADOR ARGOV.

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TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 766 OF 26 SEPT 81
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT: TEL AVIV: DAMASCUS: WASHINGTON: PARIS:
ROME: HONG KONG (FOR PM'S PARTY).
INFO PRIORITY CAIRO: TUNIS: JEDDA: AMMAN
FROM NEWS DEPARTMENT

LEBANON

1. MR HURD GAVE AN INTERVIEW TO LONDON WEEKEND TELEVISION FOR THEIR PROGRAMME QUOTE WEEKEND WORLD UNQUOTE BROADCAST TODAY AT NOON. FULL TRANSCRIPT FOLLOWS BY BAG.

2. THE FOLLOWING EXTRACT FROM THE INTERVIEW, WHICH DWELT LARGELY ON THE THEME OF PEACEKEEPING IN THE LEBANON, PROVIDES A USEFUL SUMMARY OF OUR CURRENT THINKING ON BRITISH PARTICIPATION.

INTERVIEWER: I WONDER IF I COULD SUM UP YOUR VIEW ON THIS POINT BEFORE MOVING ON TO OTHERS, SIMPLY TO SEE WHETHER YOU AGREE THAT THIS IS AN ACCURATE SUMMATION OF WHAT IN FACT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S CURRENT POLICY IS. YOU TAKE THE VIEW THAT BRITAIN HAS NOT AT THE MOMENT BEEN ASKED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS FORCE, SO THERE IS NO IMMEDIATE PROBLEM THERE FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, BUT IF YOU WERE ASKED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN OR BY THE UNITED STATES OR BY SOME OTHER INTERESTED PARTY WITH WHOM BRITAIN HAS GOOD RELATIONS, YOU WOULD GIVE THAT VERY SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION AND IT'S POSSIBLE THAT BRITISH TROOPS MIGHT FORM PART OF THAT PEACEKEEPING FORCE. NOW IS THAT A FAIR SUMMATION?

MR HURD: I THINK YOU'VE PUSHED THE LAST SENTENCE A BIT FAR. WE WOULD LOOK AT SUCH A REQUEST TO SEE WHAT WE COULD DO AS A RESPONSIBLE MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

INTERVIEWER: BUT YOU SEE ALL THAT DISPOSES ME TO - WHEN POLITICIANS SAY QUOTE A SYMPATHETIC LOOK UNQUOTE, THAT USUALLY MEANS THAT THEY WILL SAY YES.

MR HURD: IT DOESN'T REALLY. IT SIMPLY MEANS THAT WE'RE BEING ASKED A QUESTION WHICH ISN'T ACTUALLY BEING ASKED YET IN REAL LIFE, AND THEREFORE BEING CAUTIOUS I GIVE A CAUTIOUS ANSWER. THAT'S NOT THE POSITION WE'RE IN ACTUALLY AT THE MOMENT AND I'VE NO REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT WE'RE GOING TO BE PUT IN THAT POSITION IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. BUT IF IT WERE TO HAPPEN - AND THAT'S WHERE YOU PRESS ME - IF IT WERE TO HAPPEN THEN OBVIOUSLY WE WOULD LOOK AT IT TO SEE WHAT WE COULD DO TO HELP.

INTERVIEWER: WELL, YOU COULDN'T LOOK AT IT SYMPATHETICALLY AND SAY NO, COULD YOU?

MR HURD: YOU COULD LOOK AT IT SYMPATHETICALLY AND SAY QUOTE I'M VERY SORRY, BUT IT HAPPENS THAT THE THINGS YOU NEED ARE IN THE FALKLANDS OR THEY'RE COMMITTED TO NATO AND THEREFORE WE CAN'T HELP IN THE WAY THAT YOU WANT. UNQUOTE. THAT WOULD BE A POSSIBLE ANSWER.

INTERVIEWER: AND SUPPOSING, FOR INSTANCE, THE AMERICANS SAID TO YOU QUOTE WELL, WE DO UNDERSTAND THAT. YOU DO HAVE A LOT OF PROBLEMS IN THE WORLD, BUT DON'T WORRY ABOUT NATO. WE'RE QUITE PREPARED TO ALLOW YOU TO TAKE TROOPS OUT TEMPORARILY BECAUSE IT IS SO CRUCIAL THAT THEY GO IN THIS PEACEKEEPING FORCE. UNQUOTE.

MR HURD: WELL, I WOULDN'T EXCLUDE US SAYING YES, BUT I'M SIMPLY REMINDING YOU AGAIN THAT IT'S VERY HYPOTHETICAL AT THE MOMENT.

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FM F C O 271700Z SEP 82
TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NUMBER 784 OF 27 SEPTEMBER
FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF
PRIVATE OFFICE WAS RECEIVED FROM TEL AVIV TELNO 393 OF 26/9/82.
FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY.
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AND TO PRIORITY BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDA, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK, TUNIS, RABAT, JERUSALEM.
SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO.

YOUR TELNO 266: BEIRUT MASSACRES

1. I SAW DEPUTY DIRECTOR-GENERAL THIS MORNING WITH HEAD OF CHANCERY. I READ TO BAR-ON THE TEXT OF PARA7 2 OF TUR VIRTUALLY VERBATIM. AT ONE POINT I CHANGED THE WORDING TO REFER MERELY TO RECENT REPORTS OF HARRASSEMENT OF PALESTINIANS BY HADDAD'S MEN IN SOUTHERN LEBANON (YOUR TELNO 267).

2. BAR-ON NOTED THAT WE ACCEPTED THAT THE IDF HAD NOT BEEN DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE SLAUGHTER OF PALESTINIANS, WHICH HAD DEEPLY CONVULSED THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF ISRAEL AND LEFT A SENSE OF MORAL OUTRAGE. THE ATTENTION OF ALL ISRAELIS WAS SHARPLY FOCUSSED ON THE NEED FOR A INVESTIGATION. HE HOPED THAT, IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FELT THE NEED TO ADD ITS VOICE, WE WOULD NOT DRAW CONCLUSIONS IN ADVANCE AS WAS IMPLIED IN SOME OF MY QUESTIONS, AS IF THE FACTS OF THE IINCIDENT WERE FULLY KNOWN TO US, WHICH WAS NOT THE CASE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE IMPLICATION OF POINT(C) WAS THAT THE PERPETRATORS HAD COME FROM SOUTH LEBANON. WHIS WAS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS SO FAR AS THEY WERE KNOWN TO THE ISRAELIS . HADDAD HAD HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE MASSACRE, THOUGH BAR-ON COULD NOT ENTIRELY EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT INDI-VIDEAL MEMBERS OF HIS MILITIA WERE PRESENT.

3. BAR-ON SAID THAT, WHILE THERE WOULD BE AN INVESTIGATION, HE COULD NOT SAY WHAT FORM IT WOULD TAKE . AS WE KNEW , THERE WAS A COMPLICATION AS REGARDS THE PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME COURT AND IT WAS ALWAYS POSSIBLE THAT THE CABINET WOULD DECIDE ON SOME OTHER FORM OF ENQUIRY.
THE FACTS OF THE MATTER AS REGARDS ISRAEL WOULD BE FULLY BROUGHT OUT AND PUBLISHED: IN THAT RESPECT ISRAELI COMMISSIONS OF ENQUIRY GENERALLY FOLLOWED BRITISH PRACTICE. BUT IT WAS FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE THE INVOLVEMENT OF THEIR NATIONALS, AND BAR-ON NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD ALREADY INSTICATED AN INVESTIGATION. (BAR-ON ASKED WHETHER IN THIS CONNECTION WE WERE MAKING A CORRESPONDING APPROACH IN BEIRUT: I TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD SPOKEN TO THE LEBANESE AMBASSADOR IN LONDON.)

4. BAR-ON ACCEPTED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD PERHAPS BEEN NAIVE. BUT HE DOUBTED WHETHER ANYBODY HAD IMAGINED SUCH AN ACT WOULD BE PERPETRATED BY A FORMED MILITARY UNIT. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF ISRAEL, NOR THE IDF , BORE A MAJOR MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OUTRAGE.
THE ENQUIRY MIGHT SHOW THAT THERE HAD BEEN ERRORS OF JUDGEMENT, PERHAPS BUT NOT NECESSARITLY SOLELY AT THE PROFESSIONAL LEVEL. HE PERSONALLY WAS SCEPTICAL WHETHER THE EXACT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WOULD EVER BE FULLY KNOWN. EVEN WITH OUR FALKLANDS ENQUIRY THERE WOULD NO DOUBT BE AREAS WHERE IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO RECONSTRUCT AN INDIVIDUAL INCIDENT AFTERWARDS.

5. BAR-ON SAID THAT TO SINGLE OUT HADDAD (PARAGRAPH 2 (D) OF TUR) WAS TO PUT THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE. THE LEBANESE SITUATION WAS THE RESULT OF INSTABILITY GOING BACK MANY YEARS . APART FROM THE EXISTENCE OF AUTONOMOUS MILITIAS, THE INABILITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO EXERCISE SOVEREIGNTY STEMMED FROM THE EXISTENCE OF A STATE WITHIN A STATE (IE THE PLO) AND SIX YEARS OF SYRIAN OCCUPATION. THERE WAS STILL AREAS SUCH AS TRIPOLI AND EASTERN LEBANON WHERE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD NO AUTHORITY. THIS WAS LESS SO IN THE SOUTH WHERE THE ISRAELIS WERE AT LEAST TRYING TO ADMIT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. ONLY TIME WOULD TELL WHETHER HADDAD, THE DRUSE, KATAEB, FRANJIEH AND AMAL COULD ALL BE REINTERGRATED INTO THE LEBANESE BODY POLITIC. MUCH DEPENDED ON WHETHER THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES COULD BE RECONSTITUTED (OR RATHER, AS BAR-ON PUT IT,''CONSTITUTED''). THIS INVOLVED AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS IN WHICH ISRAEL WOULD HELP IF ASKED.
WHAT CONSTITUTED INTERFERECNCE COULD NOT BE JUDGED BY EUROPEAN OR AMERICAN STANDARDS,. THE LEBANESE TRAGEDY WAS UNIQUE. NEVERTHELESS ISRAEL'S BASIC OBJECTIVE WAS STILL THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

6. BAR-ON TOOK UP MY REFERENCE TO THE NINE MONTHS OF RELATIVE P PEACE BETWEEN JULY 1981 AND APRIL 1982 (PARAGRAPH 2 (E) OF TUR). THIS MIGHT BE FACTUALLY CORRECT . BUT IT IGNORED THE EXISTENCE IN SOUTH LEBANON OF A MINI-STATE DIRECTED SOLELY AGAINST ISRAEL, WHOSE RAISON D'ETRE WAS THE ARMED STRUGGLE ANJ WHICH THEREFORE POSED A CONSTANCE MENACE. IT WAS NOT SO MUCH WHAT HAD HAPPENED AFTER JULY 1981, THOUGH THERE HAD BEEN INCIDENTS, INFILTRATIBN VIA JORDAN, AND TERRORIST ATTACKS OR PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACKS AROUND THE WORLD, BUT RATHER THE PROSPECT OF PERMANENT HARRASSMENT SO LONG AS THE PLO ENTERTAINED NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE ARMED STRUGGLE. EVEN NOW, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF PLO READINESS TO SEEK A SETTLEMENT TO THE PALESTINIAN QUESTIONBY NEGOTIATIONS. SADAT HAD MADE A QUANTUM LEAP WHICH NO ONE ELSE HAD FOLLOWED. BAR-ON EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT WITH KING HUSSEIN, WHO HAD SEIZED ON THE MASSACRE AS A NEW EXCUSE TO AVOID DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

7. IN REPLY I MADE POINTS:

A) AS REGARDS THE ARMED STRUGGLE, WE HAD NEVER CEASED TO URGE THE PLO TO ABANDON VIOLENCE, COME TO TERMS WITH THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL, AND PURSUE THEIR AIMS THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS. THE BIGGEST SINGLE CRITICISM OF ISRAELI ACTIONS IN LEBANON HAD BEEN THAT IT COULD HAVE DAMAGED THE PROSPECTS FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. I HOPED THAT THIS MIGHT NOT PROVE TO BE THE CASE AND THAT THE PLO HAD BEEN CONVINCED THAT THEY SHOULD NOW ABANDON TERRORISM AND OPT FOR NEGOTIATIONS. I HAD BEEN CORRESPONDINGLY DISAPPOINTED THAT THE OPENING OFFERED BY THE REAGAN PLAN AND THE FEZ SIMMIT HAD FOUND NO ECHO HERE. I HAD NOT EXPECTED THE ISRAELIS TO SWALLOW SUCH IDEAS WHOLE. BUT THEY WERE A STARTING POINT:

B) IT WAS NOT THE CASE THAT WE PREJUDGED THE OUTCOME OF AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE MASSACRE. WE WERE PUTTING TO THE ISRAELIS POINTS WHICH TROUBLED US IN THE SPIRIT OF CONTINUING DIALOGUE. INITIAL STATEMENTS HERE HAD NOT ALWAYS BEEN CONSISTENT OR WHOLLY CLEAR. MY GOVERNMENT WERE GENUINELY PUZZLED AND WANTED AN AUTHORITATIVE PICTURE:

C) TO THE EXTENT THAT MANY QUESTIONS REMAINED ABOUT THE MASSACRE, THE SOONER THE INVESTIGATION WAS COMPLETED AND THE RESULTS PUBLISHED THE BETTER.

D) AS REGARDS WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES IN LEBANON, I SUGGESTED THAT AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE COULD HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN SUPPORTING THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND ASSURING STABILITY. THE IDEA HAD NOT APPEALED TO THE ISRAELIS HITHERTO. COULD WE EXPECT A MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE IN THE WAKE OF RECENT EVENTS?

8. BAR-ON SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD FOUND THE FEZ DECLARATION ENTIRELY NEGATIVE: IT WAS WATERED DOWN FAHD. HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND EUROPEAN ENTHUSIASM FOR IT. THE REAGAN PROPOSALS CONTAINED POSITIVE FEATURES, BUT THE ISRAELIS DID NOT LIKE THE WAY IN WHICH THE OUTCOME OF THE AUTONOMY PROCESS WAS PREJUDGED. ISRAEL ENDORSED THE IDEA OF THE RESUMPTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

9. AS REGARDS AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE, ISRAEL WANTED SECURITY ARRANGEMENT IN SOUTH LEBANON AGREED BETWEEN THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE GOVERNMENTS. THEY WOULD LIKE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ITSELF TO ASSUME FORMAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY ON LEBANESE TERRITORY . TO INJECT AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE INTO A SITUATION WHICH WAS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM THE SINAI OR GOLAN WOULD BE A HINDRANCE RATHER THAN A HELP. HE DOUBTED WHETHER A UN OR INTERNATIONAL FORCE WOULD PROVIDE EFFECTIVE SECURITY OR HELP RESTORE THE AUTHORITY OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT: RATHER THE CONTRARY. THE LEBANESE SHOULD NOT BE ENCOURAGED IN THEIR TENENCY TO ABDICATE RESPONSIBILITIES.

UNIFIL HAD BEEN IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION. THE ONLY REAL SOLUTION WA
S
FOR LEBANON TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH BOTH ITS NEIGHBOURS, WHICH MEANT THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT ALLOW INTO THE COUNTRY ELEMENTS WHICH THREATENED ONE OR OTHER OF THEM.

10 . I SUGGESTED THAT THIS POSED A DILEMMA FOR ISRAEL . AN INDEPENDENT LEBANON MUST BE ALLOWED TO MAKE UP ITS OWN MIND. WHAT IF THE THE LEBANESE THEM SELVES ASKED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE? . BAR-ON SAID THAT HE WAS NOT RULING ANYTHING OUT. A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE WAS PROBABLY THE QUICKEST AND EASIEST, BUT NOT A LASTING, SOLUTION. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING WAS THAT THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE SHOULD TALK AND AGREE WHAT WAS NEEDED.
MOBERLY

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UNCLASSIFIED
FM FCO 241736Z SEP 82
TO IMMEDIATE PEKING
TELEGRAM NUMBER 455 OF 24 SEPTEMBER

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU FOR PS/PM AT REQUEST OF PLANNING STAFF WAS RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 3139 OF 23 SEPTEMBER.

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, PRIORITY PARIS, ROME, MOSCOW, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, JEDDA, TUNIS AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

LEBANON

1. AS THE EXTENT OF ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT IN LAST WEEK'S MASSACRE IN LEBANON IS BECOMING KNOWN AND THE ISRAELI CABINET STATEMENT OF 19 SEPTEMBER (WHICH APPEARED AS A FULL PAGE ADVERTISEMENT IN LEADING U S NEWSPAPERS) REVEALED AS INSENSITIVE AND INACCURATE, AMERICAN CRITICISM OF BEGIN HAS REACHED UNPRECEDENTED LEVELS. HIS REFUSAL OF AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION HAS ATTRACTED CENSURE, EVEN FROM POLITICIANS AND JOURNALISTS WHO ARE NORMALLY WHOLLY COMMITTED TO ISRAEL. SENATOR KENNEDY HAS CALLED FOR A FULL ENQUIRY. SENATOR CRANSTON, IN A LETTER TO BEGIN, SAID THAT THE RECENT BEHAVIOUR OF ISRAELI FORCES N BEIRUT WAS CAUSING DEEP CONCERN AND EXPRESSIONS OF OUTRAGE. IT INCREASINGLY APPEARED THAT BEGIN-SHARON HAD SUBSTITUTED NAKED MILITARY FORCE FOR A BALANCED FOREIGN POLICY WHICH SHOULD REFLECT ''A DECENT RESPECT FOR THE OPINION OF MANKIND'' (A DELIBERATE QUOTE FROM JEFFERSON). CRANSTON ALSO CALLED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON WHEN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE ARRIVED AND FOR BEGIN TO RECONSIDER THE PRESIDENT'S MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE.

2. THE PRESS HAVE BEEN EQUALLY CRITICAL. EVEN GEORGE WILL AND WILLIAM SAFIRE HAVE BROUGHT THEMSELVES TO CRITICISE BEGIN.

LEBANON WHEN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE ARRIVED AND FOR BEGIN TO RECONSIDER THE PRESIDENT'S MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE.

2. THE PRESS HAVE BEEN EQUALLY CRITICAL. EVEN GEORGE WILL AND WILLIAM SAFIRE HAVE BROUGHT THEMSELVES TO CRITICISE BEGIN. OTHER COLUMNISTS HAVE BEEN MORE OUTSPOKEN. MARY MCGRORY (WASHINGTON POST) SAYS THAT BEGIN'S DISCLAIMERS OF ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MASSACRES ARE NOT MERELY SHAMEFUL, BUT ABSURD, AND ANTHONY LEWIS (NEW YORK TIMES) DESCRIBES BEGIN'S CLOSING HIS EYES TO EVEL AS AN ASTOUNDING OFFENCE TO JEWISH VALUES. IRVING HOWE, IN A NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE WHICH REFLECTS THE VIEWS OF MANY JEWISH-AMERICANS, SAYS THAT AFTER BEIRUT SILENCE IS IMPOSSIBLE ''FOR WARM FRIENDS OF ISRAEL, OPEN CRITICS OF BEGIN-SHARON''. FOUR LEADING US-JEWISH ORGANISATIONS, INCLUDING B'NAI B'RITH AND THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE, HAVE CALLED FOR A FULL ENQUIRY.

3. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE AWARE OF THE DANGER OF BECOMING INVOLVED IN THE POLITICAL DEBATE IN ISRAEL, WHICH MIGHT GIVE BEGIN A PRETEXT TO RALLY POLITICAL SUPPORT AGAINST U.S GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE. IN PUBLIC COMMENT, THEY HAVE DISCLAIMED ANY INTEREST IN BRINGING ABOUT A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL AND HAVE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE ALLOWED THE FACTS OF LAST WEEK'S EVENTS TO SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. VELIOTES REFUSED YESTERDAY TO TESTIFY TO A HOUSE SUB-COMMITTEE IN OPEN SESSION. NE E EESSZ YEN ARTICLE ZS ZES E EAY'S NEW YORK TIMES WHICH CLEARLY REFLECTS WHITE HOUSE BREIFING, DESCRIBES THE PRESIDENT'S GROWING FRUSTRATION IN DEALING WITH THE ISRAELI LEADERS AND IRRITATION THAT THEY HAVE MISID TO HAVE BEEN DEEPLY SHOCKED BY THE BEIRUT MASSACRES. BUT THE ARTICLE ALSO QUOTES PRESIDENTIAL AIDES AS SAYING THAT REAGAN CONSIDERS BEGIN'S FUTURE PURELYH AN INTERNAL ISRAELI MATTER AND IS AWARE THAT ANY ECONOMIC, MILITARY OR POLITICAL PRESSURE AGAINST ISRAEL WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

4. U S OFFICIALS ARE, HOWEVER, ARGUING THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO INCREASE IN THE ADMINISTRATIONS PROPOSED DOLLARS 2.4 BILLION AID PACKAGE FOR ISRAEL. ISRAEL'S SUPPORTERS IN CONGRESS EARLIER THIS YEAR ADDED TO THE PACKAGE DOLLARS 200 MILLION - DOLLARS 300 MILLION IN NEW MILITARY GRANTS AND DOLLARS 125 MILLION TO COVER INTEREST ON OLD U S LOANS TO ISRAEL.

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SUBJECT

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PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T 182 B/82

OO BEIRUT DESKBY 230600Z
GRS165
RESTRICTED
DESKBY 230600Z BEIRUT
DESKBY 230030Z PEKING
FROM F C O 221937Z SEP 82
TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT
TELEGRAM NUMBER 393 OF 22 SEPTEMBER
AND TO PEKING
INFO DAMASCUS TEL AVIV AMMAN WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING EC POSTS

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT.

1. AS AGREED (FCO TELNO 373 AND YOUR TELNO 570) YOU SHOULD REPRESENT HMG AT INAUGURATION OF AMIN GEMAYEL AS PRESIDENT ON 23 SEPTEMBER.

2. FOR PEKING: WE RECOMMEND THAT HMA BEIRUT BE AUTHORISED TO DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO MR GEMAYEL FROM THE PRIME MINISTER:-

BEGINS:
I SEND YOU MY CONGRATULATIONS ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR ASSUMPTION OF THE PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON. I WAS GREATLY SHOCKED BOTH BY THE ASSASSINATION OF YOUR BROTHER AND THE RECENT APPALLING MASSACRES IN BEIRUT. I WISH YOU EVERY SUCCESS IN RESUMING THE TASK BEGUN BY YOUR LATE BROTHER IN RESTORING PEACE AND ACHIEVING THE RECONCILIATION SO NECESSARY TO THE FUTURE OF YOUR COUNTRY. YOU AND THE LEBANESE PEOPLE HAVE THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AT THIS DIFFICULT TIME.
ENDS.
PYM

LIMITED	PS/MR HURD
NENAD	PS/PUS
PCD	SIR J BULLARD
MED	SIR J LEAHY
PS	

RESTRICTED

GRS165

RESTRICTED

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T182B/82

IMMEDIATE

DESKBY 230600Z BEIRUT

DESKBY 230030Z PEKING

FROM F C O 221937Z SEP 82

TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT

TELEGRAM NUMBER 393 OF 22 SEPTEMBER

AND TO PEKING

INFO DAMASCUS TEL AVIV AMMAN WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING EC POSTS

Prime Minister

Agree to send message?

AJC 22/9

RECEIVED 22 SEP 1982

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT.

Agreed MT

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ENDS.

MT

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 222145Z SEP 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3119 OF 22 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING BEIRUT TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS ROME
ROUTINE DAMASCUS AMMAN CAIRO JEDDA TUNIS MOSCOW.

MY TELNO 3103 AND UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1423 (NOT TO ALL): LEBANON: PEACE-KEEPING FORCES

1. MS JONES (STATE DEPARTMENT DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR LEBANON) TOLD US TODAY THAT THE AMERICANS HOPED THAT THE BULK OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE (MNF), NUMBERING ABOUT 3000 MEN, WOUOC BE DEPLOYED IN BEIRUT BY 26 SEPTEMBER. THE ISRAELIS HAD GIVEN NO ASSURANCES ABOUT WITHDRAWAL BUT THE AMERICANS WERE ASSUMING THAT THE IDF WOULD WITHDRAW AS THE MNF ARRIVED. THE MNF WOULD NOT ENTER AREAS OCCUPIED BY ISRAELI FORCES, BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THEY SHOULD TAKE CONTROL OF BEIRUT AIRPORT.

2. THE AMERICANS PREFERRED THAT THE MANDATE OF THE FORCE SHOULD NOT BE TOO SPECIFIC. ITS TASKS WERE AS DESCRIBED BY EAGLEBURGER (MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE). IT WOULD NOT TAKE OVER POSITIONS DIRECTLY FROM THE ISRAELIS, BUT WOULD ASSIST THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES TO DO SO. THE AMERICANS DID NOT SUPPORT THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL THAT THEY SHOULD TAKE PART IN A COORDINATING COMMITTEE IN BEIRUT: THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MNF SHOULD BE AGREED BETWEEN THE PARTICIPATING STATES AND THE LEBANESE AND THEN COMMUNICATED TO THE ISRAELIS.

3. THE MNF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WERE STILL UNDER DISCUSSION. THE TWO OPTIONS WERE THAT IT SHOULD OPEN FIRE ONLY IN SELF-DEFENCE (AS WAS THE RULE FOR THE LAST MNF) OR THAT IT SHOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO PREVENT ARMED MILITIA PASSING THROUGH ITS LINES. MS JONES THOUGHT THAT THE LATTER, WHICH WAS MORE RELEVANT TO THE BEIRUT SITUATION, WOULD BE ADOPTED. THE AMERICANS WERE ASSUMING THAT OTHER ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MNF (CUSTOMS, IMMUNITY, ETC) WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THOSE AGREED IN AUGUST.

4. MS JONES SAID THAT THE LENGTH OF THE MNF'SSTAY IN BEIRUT HAD NOT BEEN DETERMINED. THIS WOULD BE REVIEWED REGULARLY BY THE CONTRIBUTING STATES AND THE LEBANESE. THE TIMING OF ITS DEPARTURE WOULD DEPEND ON A NUMBER OF FACTORS INCLUDING THE ABILITY OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES TO CONTROL BEIRUT, PROGRESS IN RESTORING CONFIDENCE AND ELIMINATING THE ''GREEN LINE'' AND IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS ON WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR FORCES. THE AMERICANS DID NOT MEANWHILE FORESEE A NEED FOR ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MNF.

5. MS JONES STRESSED THAT THE MNF MANDATE WOULD BE LIMITED STRICTLY TO BEIRUT, AND THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NO THOUGHT OF EXTENDING IT IN CONNECTION WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES. THERE WOULD NOT BE THE SAME NEED FOR PEACEKEEPING FORCES IN THE BEKA'A OR SOUTHERN LEBANON WHERE LOCAL TENSIONS WERE NOT AS HIGH AS IN BEIRUT, (THOUGH HADDAD COULD BE A PROBLEM). UN OBSERVERS MIGHT PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IN SUPERVISING DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES. THERE WAS LITTLE CHANCE THAT CONGRESS WOULD ACCEPT THE DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN TROOPS OUTSIDE BEIRUT.

6. MS JONES CONFIRMED THAT THE AMERICANS FAVOURED THE RENEWAL OF UNIFIL'S MANDATE. THEIR AIM WAS TO GET THE ISRAELIS BACK TO THEIR ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE OF A 40 KILOMETER BUFFER ZONE, WHICH SHOULD BE POLICED BY UNIFIL IN COOPERATION WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT FORCES. THERE SHOULD BE NO ISRAELIS OR ARMED HADDAD MILITIA IN THE BUFFER ZONE: (IE THE PRESENT UNIFIL AREA SHOULD BE EXTENDED SOUTHWARDS TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER AND NORTHWARDS TO A LINE 40 KILOMETERS FROM METULLA). THE AMERICANS WERE DISAPOINTED AT NEPAL'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW FROM UNIFIL AND AWARE OF THE NEED FOR DISCUSSIONS OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR SYRIAN AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND OF UNIFIL'S ROLE TO BE SEEN TO MAKE PROGRESS BEFORE THE DEBATE ON THE RENEWAL OF UNIFIL'S MANDATE. DRAPER WOULD BE PURSUING THIS AS SOON AS THE MNF WAS DEPLOYED AND HABIB WOULD DISCUSS IT IN JERUSALEM AND DAMASCUS LATER THIS WEEK BEFORE REPORTING TO THE PRESIDENT.

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Lebanon

LDW NR 608/21

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GRS 60

CONFIDENTIAL

FM TOKYO 210215Z SEP 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 568 OF 21/9/82

FOLLOWING FOR F C O FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER.

BEGINS:

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 426 OF 20 SEPTEMBER : LEBANON

THE PRIME MINISTER IS NOT, REPEAT NOT, AT ALL INCLINED TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE IN BEIRUT. SHE CONSIDERS THAT WE HAVE SUFFICIENT MILITARY COMMITMENTS AT PRESENT.

CORTAZZI

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File No. .....

Department .....
Drafted by
(Block Capitals) .....

Tel. Extn. .....

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

600

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence
IMMEDIATE
DESK BY ..... Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) ..... (Time) ..... Z	POST BY ..... Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z(G.M.T.)

(Security Class.) .....

(Codeword) .....

(Restrictive Prefix) .....
(Caveat)
(Privacy marking) .....

(Desk by) ..... Z

TO IMMEDIATE (precedence) LONDON (post) Tel. No. 568 of .....

AND TO (precedence/post) .....

AND TO SAVING .....

INFO .....

INFO SAVING .....

Distribution:—

Copies to:—

[TEXT]

Following for FCO from Private Secretary to Prime Minister

BEGINS:

Your telegram no. 426 of 20 September: Lebanon

The Prime Minister is not, repeat not, at all inclined to make a contribution to the multi-national force in Beirut. She considers that we have sufficient military commitments at present.

ENDS

AR 21/9

Dd 8303038 400M 2/82 Ed (18543)

FILE Lebanon da

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 September 1982

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mr. Kamel El-Assad, President of the Lebanese National Assembly. I should be grateful for advice on what action needs to be taken in response to this letter.

M. C. SCHOLAR

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 September 1982

Prime Minister

Dear John.

Casualties in the Lebanon

I understand that this question came up at the Prime Minister's lunch for M. Thorn on 14 September.

Israeli government casualty figures have dried up recently but on the basis of earlier official figures our best estimate is 340 killed and over 2,000 wounded. On the Arab side we have tried hard to get accurate figures of the number of casualties. The various authorities who might be able to help (the Governments, UNRWA, UN, ICRC) all have their own reasons for refusing to help, or alternatively providing statistics which one must assume are distorted either deliberately or by the real difficulties.

At the beginning of September the Lebanese police published figures of 17,285 killed in Lebanon since 4 June of whom 5,515 were in Beirut and 30,103 wounded of whom 11,139 were in Beirut. Even this figure must be suspect for the reasons given above.

We are left with the probability that the total number killed is somewhere between ten and twenty thousand. But we are not even in a position to use such vague figures as this without being challenged.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

D

LDW 657

LDX 51/21

FDW G042/21

OO TEL AVIV
OO DAMASCUS
OO AMMAN
OO CAIRO
OO JEDDA
OO ROME
OO MOSCOW
OO TOKYO

GRS 570

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 210040Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3103 OF 20 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT TEL AVIV DAMSCUS AMMAN CAIRO JEDDA TUNIS
PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW ROME TOKYO

INFO SAVING ATHENS BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN LUXEMBOURG
THE HAGUE UKREP BRUSSELS OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

M I P T : LEBANON

1. IN A BRIEFING FOR WESTERN DIPLOMATS EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THE TASKS OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE (MNF) WOULD BE TO END BLOODSHED IN BEIRUT AND TO SEEK TO REESTABLISH THE CONFIDENCE OF BOTH THE INHABITANTS AND THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES WHICH HAD BEEN BADLY SHAKEN BY THE ISRAELI MOVE INTO WEST BEIRUT. ONCE LEBANESE CONTROL OF BEIRUT WAS REESTABLISHED THE NEXT TASK WOULD BE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON, BUT THE MANDATE OF THE MNF WAS LIMITED TO BEIRUT.

2. THE MNF WOULD PROBABLY NUMBER 2500 - 3000. THE FIRST UNITS COULD BE IN BEIRUT WITHIN 72 HOURS. NO TIME LIMIT HAD BEEN SET FOR ITS MISSION: THIS WOULD BE DISCUSSED BY THE PARTICIPANTS WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. IT WAS TOO EARLY TO SAY HOW LONG IT WOULD BE NEEDED. THE US WOULD COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE WAR POWERS ACT REGARDING CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.

3. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE ISRAELIS WHOSE OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSAL TO REVIVE THE MNF WAS EXPECTED AFTER THEIR CABINET MEETING ON 21 SEPTEMBER. THE MNF WOULD NOT DEPLOY TO BEIRUT WITHOUT ISRAELI AGREEMENT. HE WOULD NOT SPECULATE ON WHAT WOULD BE DONE IF THE ISRAELIS REJECTED THE MNF, BUT NOTED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD COOPERATED IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF 25 MORE UN OBSERVERS IN BEIRUT ON 20 SEPTEMBER AND THAT THE PROCESS OF TURNING OVER ISRAELI POSITIONS IN BEIRUT TO THE LEBANESE ARMY SEEMED TO HAVE ACCELERATED.

4. EAGLEBURGER REVEALED THAT SHULTZ HAD CONVEYED TO THE ISRAELIS A SUGGESTION FROM PEREZ DE CUELLAR THAT SOME UNIFIL FORCES SHOULD BE DESPATCHED TO BEIRUT. THE ISRAELIS HAD REPLIED THAT THIS WOULD BE QUOTE TROUBLESOME UNQUOTE (THOUGH AN OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN HAD SAID THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET REJECTED IT). THE OTHER OBJECTIONS TO THE USE OF UNIFIL WERE THAT IT WOULD REQUIRE A NEW SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATE, WHICH WOULD INVOLVE DELAY AND AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE RUSSIANS TO MAKE TROUBLE, AND THAT THE LEBANESE PREFERRED AN MNF AND HAD SO INFORMED PEREZ DE CUELLAR.

5. IF ISRAEL ACCEPTED THE MNF THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSIONS ON THE MODALITIES OF ITS DEPLOYMENT. EAGLEBURGER THOUGHT THAT THE OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE FOR THE IDF TO WITHDRAW AS THE MNF ARRIVED. THE PRESIDENT WAS INSISTENT THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM BEIRUT : THE AMERICANS HAD SUGGESTED TO THEM PRIVATELY THAT THEY SHOULD WITHDRAW TO POSITIONS SOUTH OF BEIRUT AIRPORT, WHICH COULD THEN BE REOPENED.

6. EAGLEBURGER EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY COULD EXERCISE ITS AUTHORITY IN BEIRUT (THOUGH IT OBVIOUSLY COULD NOT TAKE ON THE ISRAELIS) : THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF ITS FAILURE TO DO SO IN ANY AREA IN WHICH IT HAD ESTABLISHED ITSELF. ASKED ABOUT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MASSACRES, HE REPLIED THAT THE FACTS WOULD COME OUT IN DUE COURSE BUT THAT THE ISRAELIS BORE A SUBSTANTIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTIONS WHICH OCCURRED AFTER THEIR MOVE INTO WEST BEIRUT.

7. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT BREZHNEV'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF 19 SEPTEMBER EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER EVENTS IN BEIRUT AND WAS POLEMICAL BUT NOT THREATENING. THE AMERICANS WERE NOT TAKING IT TOO SERIOUSLY.

FCO PASS SAVING ATHENS ABU DHABI ADEN ALGIERS BAGHDAD BAHRAIN BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DOHA DUBAI DUBLIN JERUSALEM KHARTOUM KUWAIT LUXEMBOURG MUSCAT RABAT SANA'A THE HAGUE TRIPOLI UKREP BRUSSELS

WRIGHT

NNNNQQ

OO MOSCOW
OO TOKYO

MT

Mr Darroch

cc PMs Party

GRS 700

UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON 210035Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3102 OF 20 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT TEL AVIV DAMSCUS AMMAN CAIRO JEDDA TUNIS
PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW ROME TOKYO

INFO SAVING ATHENS BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN LUXEMBOURG
THE HAGUE UKREP BRUSSELS OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

LEBANON

1. IN A STATEMENT ON TELEVISION ON 20 SEPTEMBER PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID THAT RECENT HEARTRENDING EVENTS IN LEBANON WERE A REMINDER OF THE IMPERATIVE OF BRINGING PEACE TO LEBANON AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THE BASIC US OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON, WHICH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT SHARED, WERE UNCHANGED. THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS THE RESTORATION OF A STRONG, STABLE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BROUGHT INTO BEING BY ORDERLY CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD AN OBLIGATION TO ASSIST SUCH A GOVERNMENT TO REASSERT ITS AUTHORITY OVER ALL ITS TERRITORY, TO PAVE THE WAY TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES.

2. IN CONSULTATION WITH THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS, AND IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FROM THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, HE HAD AGREED TO FORM A NEW MULTINATIONAL FORCE TO ASSIST THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO RESUME FULL SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS CAPITAL. THE FORCE WOULD BE IN BEIRUT FOR A LIMITED PERIOD, NOT AS A POLICE FORCE, BUT TO ENABLE THE LEBANESE TO DISCHARGE POLICING DUTIES FOR THEMSELVES. THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO THIS ACTION.

3. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM BEIRUT. SHULTZ HAD TOLD THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR THAT UNLESS ISRAEL MOVED TO WITHDRAW IT WOULD BECOME EVER MORE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN PROBLEMS NOT ITS OWN WHICH IT COULD NOT SOLVE.

4. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE REMOVAL OF ALL FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES FROM LEBANON HAD BEEN REQUESTED BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND ENDORSED BY MANY OTHERS, INCLUDING ARAB STATES. BOTH ISRAEL AND SYRIA CLAIMED TO HAVE NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS IN LEBANON AND WERE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW. IT WAS URGENT THAT SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS BE AGREED. THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF NEIGHBOURING STATES, ESPECIALLY NORTHERN ISRAEL, HAD TO BE PROVIDED FOR, BUT THIS WOULD NOT BE A DIFFICULT TASK GIVEN THE POLITICAL WILL.

5. DRAPER WOULD REMAIN IN THE AREA TO WORK FOR THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS. HABIB WOULD JOIN HIM AND REPRESENT THE PRESIDENT AT THE INAUGURATION OF THE NEW PRESIDENT OF LEBANON, CONSULT WITH LEADERS IN THE AREA AND RETURN TO WASHINGTON TO REPORT.

6. THE PRESIDENT CONCLUDED THAT HE WAS ESPECIALLY ANXIOUS TO END THE AGONY OF THE LEBANESE BECAUSE THIS WAS BOTH RIGHT AND IN THE US NATIONAL INTEREST. HE WAS DETERMINED TO PRESS AHEAD WITH A BROADER EFFORT TO ACHIEVE PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS ARAB NEIGHBOURS. LAST WEEK'S EVENTS IN BEIRUT HAD ONLY REINFORCED HIS CONVICTION THAT LASTING PEACE WAS DESPERATELYNNEEDED AND THAT THE INITIATIVE HE HAD ANNOUNCED ON 1 SEPTEMBER WAS THE RIGHT WAY TO PROCEED.

7. SEE MIFT

FCO PASS SAVING ATHENS ABU DHABI ADEN ALGIERS BAGHDAD BAHRAIN BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DOHA DUBAI DUBLIN JERUSALEM KHARTOUM KUWAIT LUXEMBOURG MUSCAT RABAT SA A'A THE HAGUE TRIPOLI UKREP BRUSSELS

WRIGHT

LDW Ø41/21

VLDX ØØ2

FDW G Ø93/2Ø

CYPHER

IMMEDIATE

OO TOKYO

GR 11ØØ
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 2Ø142ØZ SEP 82
TO IMMEDIATE TOKYO (FOR PMS PARTY)
TELNO 424 OF 2Ø SEP
FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPT
WAS RECEIVED FROM TEL AVIV TELNO 381 OF 2Ø SEP
INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, PRIORITY BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, UKMIS
NEW YORK, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, CAIRO AND JERUSALEM.

MASSACRE OF PALESTINIANS

1. REACTIONS HERE TO THE APPALLING EVENTS IN BEIRUT HAVE BEEN SLOWED BY THE TWO DAY JEWISH NEW YEAR HOLIDAY WHICH ENDED LAST NIGHT, DURING WHICH THERE WERE NO NEWSPAPERS AND ACTIVITY WAS AT A MINIMUM. BUT IT IS ALREADY CLEAR THAT THE MASSACRE OF PALESTINIANS WILL DEEPLY AFFECT ISRAEL'S ROLE IN LEBANON, RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON AND THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE.

2. TO JUDGE FROM THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER LAST NIGHT'S CABINET MEETING, IT LOOKS AS THOUGH THE GOVERNMENT INTEND TO BRAZEN MATTERS OUT. IT WOULD THROW THEIR WHOLE STRATEGY IN LEBANON INTO DOUBTS IF THEY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A MISTAKE HAD BEEN MADE ABOUT DEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES INTO WEST BEIRUT. THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE IDF HAS ATTEMPTED TO SHUFFLE OFF BLAME FOR THE MASSACRE ON TO THE LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER AND MORRIS DRAPER, ARGUING THAT THEY HAD BLOCKED DIRECT COORDINATION BETWEEN THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE ARMIES: HAD THERE BEEN DIRECT CONTACT, THE LEBANESE ARMY WOULD HAVE ENTERED THE CAMPS IN QUESTION AND THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO PROBLEM. EITAN EMPHASISED THAT THE IDF COULD NOT GIVE ORDERS TO THE PHALANGISTS IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY, AND THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD INTERVENED AS SOON AS THEY REALISED WHAT WAS HAPPENING. OTHER IDF SOURCEK
HAT THEIR INTERVENTION LED TO FIGHTING WITH CHRISTIAN MILITIA IN WHICH AT LEAST ONE MILITIA MAN WAS KILLED.

3. THE MASSACRE HAS BROUGHT A FIERCE REACTION FROM THE LABOUR ALIGNMENT OPPOSITION AND IN THE MORNING PRESS. WHILE REJECTING ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE IDF WAS INVOLVED, THE ALIGNMENT YESTERDAY CALLED FOR BEGIN AND SHARON TO RESIGN, FOR A SPECIALLY CONVENED SESSION OF THE KNESSET, AND FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUDICIAL COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY. THEY ALSO URGED THE GOVERNMENT TO WITHDRAW FROM BEIRUT AND TO REFRAIN FROM DIRECT OR INDIRECT INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF LEBANON.

4. THE SERIOUS MORNING PAPERS CARRY SHARPLY WORDED EDITORIALS REFERRING TO THE SHAME OR STAIN OF BEIRUT AND CALLING FOR RESIGNATIONS: DAVAR EDITOR INSISTS THAT THE ENTIRE GOVERNMENT SHOULD RESIGN SEMICOLON HAARETZ CALLS FOR AT LEAST SHARON AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO RESIGN SEMICOLON AND THE JERUSALEM POST, IN A FIERCE EDITORIAL ARGUING THAT NEITHER THE ARMY NOR THE GOVERNMENT CAN ABSOLVE THEMSELVES FROM BLAME BY PLEADING IGNORANCE OR REPROACHING OTHERS FOR THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF ''THIS DISASTROUS FAILURE OF JUDGEMENT'', CALLS FOR THE RESIGNATION OF BEGIN, SHARON, AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF. ALL THREE PAPERS HOWEVER ARE HABITUAL CRITICS OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE MORE POPULAR AFTERNOON PAPERS ARE LESS OUTSPOKEN BUT NONETHELESS CRITICAL OF THE DECISION TO MOVE INTO WEST BEIRUT.

5. IT IS TOO SOON TO ASSESS THE FULL IMPLICATIONS. THOSE IN ISRAEL WHO WERE ALREADY DOUBTFUL ABOUT GETTING DEEPER AND DEEPER INTO LEBANON WILL HAVE HAD THEIR DOUBTS STRONGLY REINFORCED. MANY OF THOSE WHO HAVE HITHERTO SUPPORTED THE GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE BEEN PROFOUNDLY SHAKEN. ONE OR TWO RELATIVE DOVES WITHIN THE CABINET MAY EVEN RESIGN. THE MASSACRE WILL CERTAINLY GIVE NEW EMPHASIS TO THE DEBATE ABOUT THE MORALITY OF ISRAELI POLICY (INCLUDING THE EFFECT ON IDF MORALE, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE EMPHASIS HERE ON THE CONCEPT OF PURITY OF ARMS). BUT I DOUBT WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT WILL RESIGN OR THERE WILL BE ANY QUICK MOVE TO NEW ELECTIONS.

6. WHOEVER ACTUALLY PERPETRATED THE MASSACRE, THE ONUS IS ON THE ISRAELIS TO EXPLAIN HOW THEY GOT INTO THIS MESS, ESPECIALLY SINCE THEY CLAIMED THAT THE IDF MOVED INTO WEST BEIRUT TO HOLD THE RING. I BELIEVE THAT THEY WERE TANTALISED BY THE PROSPECT OF STAY-BEHIND PLO STILL BEING AT LARGE IN BEIRUT AND COULD NOT RESIST SEIZING THE CHANCE TO ROUND UP THE LAST OF THEM AND THEIR ALLIES. CHRISTIAN MILITIA WERE ALMOST CERTAINLY USED FOR TWO REASONS: FIRST TO KEEP DOWN IDF CASUALTIES, AND SECONDLY TO AVOID FURTHER ACCUSATIONS THAT ISRAEL WAS TAKING MATTERS INTO ITS OWN HANDS. I SUSPECT THAT IT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN CLEAR TO THE IDF UNTIL TOO LATE THAT THE FIRING WITHIN THE CAMPS WAS NOT THE CLEANSING OF PLO WHICH THEY WERE EXPECTING. BUT IDF STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN INCONSISTANT.

7. ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, THE GOVERNMENT HAD INTELLIGENCE REPORTS BEFOREHAND THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO DISARM THE PALESTINIAN AND LEFTIST GROUPS IN BEIRUT WITHOUT TAKING STEPS TO PROTECT THEM WOULD EXPOSE SUCH PEOPLE TO THE WRATH OF THE CHRISTIANS, AND THAT IT WOULD BE DISASTROUS TO ALLOW CHRISTIAN LEBANESE FORCES, AS OPPOSED TO THE LEBANESE ARMY, TO ENTER THE REFUGEE CAMPS. EVIDENTLY SUCH WARNINGS WERE NOT HEEDED OR RATHER WERE GIVEN INSUFFICIENT WEIGHT.

8. NONE OF THIS ABSOLVES THE ISRAELIS FROM INDIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT HAPPENED. THEY HAVE NO DOUBT BEEN GUILTY OF INCOMPETENCE, MISCALCULATION, OVER EAGERNESS TO CLEAR OUT REMAINING PLO, AND UNWISE DEPENDENCE ON UNDISCIPLINED MILITIA. NEVERTHELESS, I WOULD MYSELF EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE KILLINGS. I EQUALLY DOUBT WHETHER THEY DELIBERATELY ALLOWED THEIR LEBANESE PARTNERS A FREE HAND IN A MASSACRE OF CIVILIANS SO OBVIOUSLY AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS EXTERNAL IMAGE.

9. ONE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE TRAGEDY MAY BE TO ACCELERATE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT, IF NOT FROM THE REST OF LEBANON. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER ANOTHER MAY BE TO MAKE THEM MORE CO-OPERATIVE ABOUT THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNIFIL FORCES TO BEIRUT (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1412) BUT THE SIGNS ARE NOT PROMISING.

10. I HOPE THAT IN OUR OWN PUBLIC STATEMENTS WE SHALL BE CAREFUL TO CONDEMN NOT ONLY THE ISRAELIS BUT ALSO THE LEBANESE MILITIA WHO APPEAR TO HAVE ACTUALLY CARRIED OUT THE MASSACRE. THERE ARE ALREADY REFERENCES IN THE MEDIA HERE TO HYPOCRICY ON THE PART OF THOSE WHO SEEK TO PIN SOLE BLAME FOR IT ON ISRAEL. THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT WILL BE QUICK TO EXPLOIT ANY OPENING THEY ARE GIVEN TO CHANNEL PUBLIC INDIGNATION INTO THIS SIDE STREET.

PYM

Middle East

LDW 602

TO PP TOKYO

GROUPS 100 ,APPROX

FM CENTROFORM LONDON 19 1830

UNCLASSIFIED

RETRACT 00519SEPT

LATE ITEM ONE. SUNDAY 19TH SEPTEMBER 1982.

PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT ON LEBANON KILLINGS.

IN A BRIEF STATEMENT DURING HER VISIT TO JAPAN TODAY (19 SEPTEMBER) BRITISH PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER REFERRED TO REPORTS OF MASSACRE OF HUNDREDS OF MEN WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN PALESTINE REFUGEE CAMPS IN BEIRUT. ''WE AWAIT MORE FACTS,'' SHE SAID, '' BUT WE HAVE NOTED THE STATEMENT BY THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS THAT THE DEATHS MAY BE NUMBERED IN THOUSANDS. I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT IT UNBELIEVABLE IF IT HAD NOT HAPPENED. I AM APPALLED BY THIS ACT OF SHEER BARBARISM WHICH MUST BRING TOTAL CONDEMNATION ON ITS PERPETRATORS.''

ENDS LATE ITEM ONE. L P S

CENTROFORM LONDON

NNNN

vb

Lebanon

15 September 1982

Death of Bashir Gemayel

Thank you for your letter of 15 September. The Prime Minister agrees that the proposed message of condolence to Mrs Gemayel should be despatched.

AJC

F.N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Top Copy on deaths. Sept '82. Death of Bahir Gemayel.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 September, 1982

Dear John,

Death of Bashir Gemayel

You will have seen reports of the assassination of Mr Bashir Gemayel, who was due to be sworn in as Lebanon's new President on 23 September.

The Prime Minister sent a message of congratulations to Mr Gemayel on his election (text enclosed). The Prime Minister may therefore wish to send a short message of condolence to Mrs Gemayel. I enclose a text, in the form of a telegram to Beirut. I also enclose the text of a statement which the FCO spokesman will be making at 12.30 today.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

(73)

Letter to Holmes
Ambassador

UNCLASSIFIED

20275 - 1

NEL011/1

2 SEP 1982

INDEX

OO BEIRUT DESKBY 261100Z
GRS112
UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 261100Z
FROM FCO 260915Z AUG 82
TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT
TELEGRAM NUMBER 351 OF 26 AUGUST
INFO DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, WASHINGTON
SAVING EC POSTS (63)
YOUR TELNO 530: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR GEMAYEL:-

BEGINS

A/ I SEND YOU MY CONGRATULATIONS ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR ELECTION AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON. THERE HAS BEEN GREAT SYMPATHY IN BRITAIN FOR THE RECENT SUFFERING OF THE LEBANESE PEOPLE. I EXTEND TO YOU ON BEHALF OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT MY GOOD WISHES FOR SUCCESS IN YOUR TASK OF RESTORING PEACE AND ACHIEVING THE RECONCILIATION OF ALL COMMUNITIES IN LEBANON. /B

ENDS

PYM

NNNN

DISTRIBUTION
LIMITED
NENAD
PCD
PS
PS/MR HURD
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY

UNCLASSIFIED

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
UNCLASSIFIED	IMMEDIATE

CZC 1 ZCZC
RS 2 GRS
LASS 3 UNCLASSIFIED
AVEATS 4
ESKBY 5
M FCO 6 FM FCO 151200Z SEPT 82
RE/ADD 7 TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT
EL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 ASSASSINATION OF BASHIR BEMAYEL
10 1. Please pass the following message from Prime Minister to
11 Mrs Gemayel. Begins. I was shocked to hear of the assassi-
12 nation of your husband. This crime is a cruel setback to the
13 hopes we all had that, under his leadership, Lebanon might find
14 peace again. Please accept my deepest sympathy. Ends.
15
16 PYM
17 NNNN
18
19
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/// 22
// 23
/ 24
25

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept NENAD	Distribution Limited
Drafted by (Block capitals) E G M Chaplin		Nenad PCD PS PS/Mr Hurd Sir J Bullard Sir J Leahy
Telephone number 233 4856		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

DRAFT STATEMENT BY FCO SPOKESMAN, 15 SEPTEMBER

We were shocked by the assassination of Lebanon's President-elect, Mr Bashir Gemayel, and offer our condolences to his family, and the families of other victims. We deplore this resurgence of violence and in particular the murder of a man who since his election had committed himself to the search for peace between all communities in Lebanon. We hope that all Lebanese leaders will continue to work for reconciliation and national reconstruction, and that all parties will refrain from any action which might increase tension at this difficult time.

10.9.82

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T176C/82

RESTRICTED

22473 - 1 Lebanon

Cabinet Ops

COMPARATIVE BASIS.

I INVITE YOUR GOVERNMENT TO CONTRIBUTE GENEROUSLY SO THAT THE REALITY OF OUR CONCERN WILL BE DOMONSTRATED AND SO THAT THERE IS IN BEING AN INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT COMMENSURATE WITH THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEMS IN THE LEBANON.

ENDS

2. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING REPLY TO MR FRASER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER:

BEGINS:

DEAR MALCOLM

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT LEBANON. I AGREE WITH YOU THAT A MASSIVE EFFORT OF RECONSTRUCTION WILL BE NEEDED IN LEBANON AND THAT THIS WILL BE A VITAL ELEMENT IN HELPING THE COUNTRY TO REGAIN PEACE AND STABILITY. I WAS HEARTENED TO HEAR OF YOUR GENEROUS CONTRIBUTION. WE HAVE ALREADY MADE A SUBSTANTIAL RESPONSE TO LEBANON'S IMMEDIATE NEEDS, BOTH BILATERALLY AND THROUGH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AMOUNTING IN ALL TO NEARLY POUNDS 2 AND 1/2 MILLION.

I UNDERSTAND THAT THE WORLD BANK MAY BE ASKED TO PLAY A COORDINATING ROLE IN MOBILISING AID FOR RECONSTRUCTION IN LEBANON. WE ARE CONSIDERING BOTH HERE AND WITH OUR PARTNERS WHAT FURTHER FUNDS CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR THAT UNHAPPY COUNTRY.

YOURS SINCERELY

MARGARET THATCHER

ENDS

PYM

STANDARD		ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
NENAD	SECURITY D	ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE
MED	MAED	
NAD	ES & SD	
SAD	ERD	
UND	ESID	
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ECD	CONS EM UNIT	
WED	CABINET OFFICE	
RID		

HC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 September 1982

Aid for Lebanon: Message from the Australian Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 8 September recommending a reply from the Prime Minister to Mr. Fraser.

The Prime Minister has approved the proposed text subject to two amendments:

(a) At the end of the fourth sentence substitute the words "amounting in all to nearly £2½ million" (I should be grateful if the figure could be checked);

(b) At the end of the message delete the word "reconstruction" and substitute "that unhappy country".

A.J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

(1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 September, 1982

Prime Minister

Content to send message at Flag E to Mr. Fraser?

A.J.C. 9/9.

Dear Willie,

Aid for Lebanon: Message from Australian Prime Minister

With your letter to me of 23 August you enclosed a message to the Prime Minister from Mr Fraser, urging us to match the Australian pledge of $10 million aid for reconstruction in Lebanon.

We have already provided substantial humanitarian aid to Lebanon: £386,000 bilaterally through voluntary organisations, and £1.05m through the European Community, as well as food aid worth £1 million to UNRWA for use in Lebanon. This is a respectable response to Lebanon's immediate needs. But as Mr Fraser points out, much more will be needed to rebuild the infrastructure in Lebanon which has been severely damaged not only by the Israeli invasion but by the intermittent fighting since the 1975/76 civil war.

The scale and nature of Lebanon's needs are not yet clear. There are however expected to be substantial sums available, from the OPEC states in particular, though the European Investment Bank has also been asked by the Presidency of the Council if it can provide further unsubsidised loans from its own resources. In addition some £30m remains unspent under the Community's Second Financial Protocol with Lebanon, of which a share is borne on the UK's Aid Programme. Lebanon will be discussed at the IMF/IBRD meetings taking place at the moment in Toronto, where we shall support an American proposal that the IBRD should coordinate aid for reconstruction in Lebanon. Decisions on a British contribution are not needed immediately but in due course we may need to demonstrate that we are prepared to help bilaterally. In Mr Pym's view, any British contribution would have to be substantial, not only to show that we are willing to help in reconstruction in Lebanon but also to maintain influence in the Middle East and with the Americans during the next phase of the peace process. There are of course many other urgent and competing demands on existing aid resources.

I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to Mr Fraser in the form of a telegram to Canberra.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

W Rickett Esq
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
RESTRICTED	IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
GRS
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CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM TCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

ZCZC
GRS
RESTRICTED

FM FCO SEPTEMBER 1982
TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA
TELEGRAM NUMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE OTTAWA (FOR ONWARD TRANSMISSION TO TORONTO FOR UKDEL TO IMF/IBRD MEETINGS)
ROUTINE BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK
AID FOR RECONSTRUCTION IN LEBANON: MESSAGE FROM AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER

1. Mr Fraser sent the Prime Minister the following message via High Commission on 23 August:

BEGINS:

The Australian Government and people, like the rest of the international community, have been anguished by the suffering inflicted on the people of Lebanon by the conflict there. Lebanon has been caught in the crossfire of a conflict in which it wanted no part.

We are today heartened by the major progress made in the peace plans so strenously pursued in recent days. Their implementation can provide the vital ingredients for a peaceful Lebanon free of the presence of outside armed forces and in

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
		which
File number	Dept	Distribution
	Private Office	Middle East Standard Additional Distrib:Arab/Israel dispute
Drafted by (Block capitals)		
J E HOLMES		
Telephone number		
233 4641		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

XY 46

Classification and Caveats		Page
RESTRICTED	IMMEDIATE	2

<<<<

which the sovereignty of the Lebanese people is re-established. We are mindful however of the grave risk of renewal of armed conflict.

But if the way forward is to enable Lebanon to achieve political stability and to regain its integrity there must be a simultaneous rebuilding of Lebanon's shattered infrastructure. The Lebanese people's material suffering must also be relieved.

I hope you will agree that the supporters of Lebanon should now unite to assist in the massive task of reconstruction which lies ahead. My own Government has decided to provide a special initial sum of dollars 10 million and we hope that other advanced aid donor countries might match that contribution on a comparative basis.

I invite your Government to contribute generously so that the reality of our concern will be domonstrated and so that there is in being an international reconstruction effort commensurate with the scale of the problems in the Lebanon.

ENDS

2. Please pass the following reply to Mr Fraser from the Prime Minister:

BEGINS:

Dear Malcolm

Thank you for your message about Lebanon. I agree with you that a massive effort of reconstruction will be needed in Lebanon and that this will be a vital element in helping the country to regain peace and stability. I was heartened to hear of your generous contribution. We have already made a substantial response to Lebanon's immediate needs, both bilaterally and through the European Community amounting in all to nearly £2½ million. I understand that the World Bank may be asked to play a coordinating role in mobilising aid for reconstruction in Lebanon. We are considering both here and with our partners what further funds can be made available for ~~reconstruction~~ that unhappy country.

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword Yours

Classification and Caveats		Page
RESTRICTED	IMMEDIATE	3

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Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

ENDS

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MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 17

Lebanon

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
~~MR NOBERRY~~
SIR J BULLARD
HD/NENAD
HD/MED
HD/UND
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HD/NAD
HD/CONSULAR DEPT
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PUSD (2)
NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

~~NO~~ 10 DOWNING STREET

CABINET OFFICE D10

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 080045Z SEP 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2965 OF 8 SEPTEMBER
INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT DAMASCUS AMMAN JEDDA CAIRO TUNIS PARIS
MOSCOW UKMIS NEW YORK

LEBANON

1. VELIOTES ADMITTED TO LEAHY TODAY THAT THE AMERICANS WERE WORRIED AT THE POTENTIAL FOR ISRAELI/SYRIAN CLASHES IN THE BEKA'A. DRAPER WOULD THEREFORE RETURN TO LEBANON TOWARDS THE END OF THIS WEEK TO DISCUSS THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES: THIS WAS NOW THE TOP ITEM ON THE AGENDA. HABIB WOULD REMAIN INVOLVED THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY AS A FULL TIME NEGOTIATOR: HE PLANNED TO RETURN TO BEIRUT FOR BESHIR GEMAYEL'S INAUGURATION ON 23 SEPTEMBER.

2. ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON A PEACE-TREATY WITH LEBANON WAS NOT HELPFUL. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD DRAFTED A PRESS STATEMENT APPROVING THE PRINCIPLE OF A PEACE TREATY PROVIDED THAT IT WAS FREELY NEGOTIATED, BUT POINTING OUT THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY IN LEBANON WAS THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES.

3. VELIOTES AGREED THAT BESHIR HAD DONE WELL SINCE HIS ELECTION

2. ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON A PEACE-TREATY WITH LEBANON WAS NOT HELPFUL. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD DRAFTED A PRESS STATEMENT APPROVING THE PRINCIPLE OF A PEACE TREATY PROVIDED THAT IT WAS FREELY NEGOTIATED, BUT POINTING OUT THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY IN LEBANON WAS THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES.

3. VELIOTES AGREED THAT BESHIR HAD DONE WELL SINCE HIS ELECTION, IN PARTICULAR IN KEEPING THE ISRAELIS AT A DISTANCE. THE ISRAELIS WERE EMPLOYING CLUMSY TACTICS - A PUBLIC EMBRACE AND INTENSE PRIVATE PRESSURE. IT WAS VITAL FOR THE ARABS TO HOLD OUT A HAND TO BESHIR TO COUNTER THIS. THE AMERICANS HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE SAUDIS SEND A FRIENDLY SIGNAL TO BESHIR BUT DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THEY HAD DONE SO.

4. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON BESHIR'S ABILITY TO GAIN THE CONFIDENCE OF LEBANESE MUSLIMS. WALID JUMBLATT WAS IMPLACABLY HOSTILE BUT OTHERS SEEMED WILLING TO JUDGE BESHIR BY HIS ACTIONS. IMPROVED SECURITY IN WEST BEIRUT HAD ALREADY HELPED TO IMPROVE CONFIDENCE: SOME MUSLIMS WERE BEGINNING TO COOPERATE WITH THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES, FOR EXAMPLE IN SUPPLYING INFORMATION ABOUT THE MILITIAS' ARMS CACHES.

5. VELIOTES CONFIRMED THAT CONGRESS WOULD NOT APPROVE US PARTCIPATION IN A MULTINATIONAL FORCE. UNIFIL WAS THEREFORE THE ONLY FEASIBLE BUFFER-FORCE. HE WAS RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT THAT THERE MIGHT BE A PROBLEM IN FINDING A ROLE FOR UNIFIL TO PLAY TO KEEP IT IN BEING PENDING AN AGREEMENT ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND ARGUED THAT UNIFIL TROOP-CONTRIBUTORS WERE WILLING FOR UNIFIL TO CONTINUE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED HOWEVER THAT THIS WAS ANOTHER REASON FOR DRAPER TO MAKE EARLY PROGRESS SO THAT THERE WAS AN ACTIVE PROCESS IN BEING BY THE TIME OF THE NEXT UNIFIL DEBATE. IT WOULD OF COURSE BE NECESSARY FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO REQUEST THE RENEWAL OF UNIFIL'S MANDATE: HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD TAKE ANY OPPORTUNITY TO ENCOURAGE BESHIR TO DO SO.

WRIGHT

NNNN

Lebanon
143

JP

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 September 1982

Thank you for your letter of 7 September enclosing the original of the letter from the Australian Prime Minister to Mrs. Thatcher about the situation in the Lebanon.

AJC

Miss Neroli Doust

JS

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION · LONDON
AUSTRALIA HOUSE STRAND WC2B 4LA TEL. 01-438 8209

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

7 September 1982

Dear Mr Rickett,

Please find enclosed the original of the letter from the Australian Prime Minister to Mrs Thatcher about the situation in the Lebanon, the cabled text of which was conveyed to her on 23 August 1982.

Yours sincerely,

(Neroli Doust)
Personal Secretary

Mr William Rickett,
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister,
No. 10 Downing Street,
LONDON SW1.

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES #22

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

PS (6)
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
~~MR MOBERLY~~
SIR J BULLARD
HD/NENAD
HD/MED
HD/UND
HD/SEC DEPT
HD/...NAD... ...

HD/CONSULAR DEPT

... ...

... ...

PUSD (2)
NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

~~NO~~ 10 DOWNING STREET

CABINET OFFICE D10

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 032321Z SEP 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2950 OF 3 SEPTEMBER
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK BEIRUT TEL AVIV DAMASCUS CAIRO AMMAN PARIS AND MOSCOW.

LEBANON

1. THE AMERICANS HAVE SET UP AN INTER-AGENCY WORKING GROUP UNDER DRAPER, WHO WILL HAVE THE PERSONAL RANK OF AMBASSADOR, TO DEAL WITH ALL ASPECTS OF THE LEBANESE CRISIS, INCLUDING RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION. THE GROUP WILL REPORT TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-DESIGNATE, KENNETH DAM.

2. VELIOTES TOLD SIR J THOMSON TODAY THAT SOME ISRAELI ACTION IN LEBANON IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE COULD NOT BE EXCLUDED - INDEED WAS PROBABLE. BUT HE DID NOT EXPECT THEM TO TAKE ON THE SYRIANS. THEY WERE LIKELY TO TRY TO IMPOSE A PEACE TREATY, IF NECESSARY BY FORCE, ON THE LEBANESE. BEGIN HAD HOPED TO OBTAIN BASHIR'S AGREEMENT TO THIS IN TIME FOR YESTERDAY'S ISRAELI CABINET COMMUNIQUE IN ORDER TO SHOW THE AMERICANS THAT

ISRAELI CABINET COMMUNIQUE IN ORDER TO SHOW THE AMERICANS THAT HE NEEDED NO LESSONS IN HOW TO MAKE PEACE WITH HIS NEIGHBOURS.

3. VELIOTES COULD NOT PREDICT THE NEXT STEPS. BUT HE SAW NO INDICATIONS THAT THE SYRIANS WERE WILLING TO LEAVE LEBANON. HE CONFIRMED THE AMERICAN VIEW THAT A ROLE FOR UNIFIL IN SOUTH LEBANON WAS ESSENTIAL. THE AMERICANS HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF A SINAI-TYPE FORCE WITH AMERICAN PARTICIPATION. THE ISRAELIS MIGHT LIKE A BUFFER OF LOCAL MILITIAS (HADDAD) BUT THIS WOULD OF COURSE BE UNACCEPTABLE INTERNATIONALLY AND TO THE LEBANESE.

4. KEMP (NSC) TOLD US SEPARATELY THAT BASHIR HAD EMPHASISED TO WEINBERGER THAT HE WANTED THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AMERICANS (CLEARLY IN ORDER TO ENABLE HIM TO REDUCE HIS DEPENDENCE ON THE ISRAELIS) AND THAT HE WAS WELL AWARE OF THE NEED FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS. KEMP SAW NO PROSPECT THAT BASHIR WOULD SIGN A PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL BUT POINTED OUT THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT WELL USE HADDAD AS A LEVER.

WRIGHT

NNNN

SUBJECT

c/c MASTER
OPS

A

LEBANESE REPUBLIC

STS 355/82

National Assembly

Beirut 31 August 1982

The President

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 170B/82

Her Excellency
Mrs Margaret Thatcher
British Prime Minister
London

Dear Mrs Thatcher,

I wish to thank you for having responded to our appeal by sending a Parliamentary delegation to observe the Presidential elections in Lebanon. That delegation, which consisted of those British Members of Parliament best acquainted with the problems of Lebanon and the Middle East, was able to observe a democratic ballot which resulted in the election of a new President of the Republic.

The Lebanese people, who have been informed of your efforts to ensure that the delegation was appointed at the right time and at the appropriate level, are most grateful to you, as are their representatives in the National Assembly. I should also like to convey to you my personal wishes for your success and for the prosperity of the British people of whom you are the worthy representative.

Kamel El-Assad

President of the Lebanese National Assembly.

010

T 170B/82

REPUBLIQUE LIBANAISE
ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE

Le Président

Beyrouth, le 31 Août 1982

Son Excellence Madame Margaret THATCHER
Premier Ministre de Grande-Bretagne
Londres

Madame Thatcher,

Je tiens à vous remercier d'avoir répondu à notre appel en déléguant une mission parlementaire afin de suivre le déroulement des élections présidentielles au Liban. Cette délégation formée des députés du Royaume-Uni les plus informés des problèmes du Liban et du Moyen-Orient, a pu observer le déroulement d'un scrutin démocratique qui a abouti à l'élection d'un nouveau président de la République.

Le peuple libanais qui a été informé de ce que vous avez fait pour que cette délégation soit constituée en temps opportun et au niveau requis, vous en remercie vivement ainsi que ses représentants à l'Assemblée Nationale. Je tiens aussi à vous exprimer mes voeux de succès personnels, aussi bien que de prospérité au peuple de Grande-Bretagne que vous représentez si dignement.

Kamel El-Assad
Président de l'Assemblée Nationale Libanaise

SUBJECT

cc Cps
Marles

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T170A/82

PRIME MINISTER

CANBERRA

30 AUG 1982

My Dear Margaret

The Australian Government and people, like the rest of the international community, have been anguished by the suffering inflicted on the people of Lebanon by the conflict there.

Lebanon has been caught in the cross-fire of a conflict in which it wanted no part.

We are today heartened by the major progress made in the peace plans so strenuously pursued in recent days. Their implementation can provide the vital ingredients for a peaceful Lebanon free of the presence of outside armed forces and in which the sovereignty of the Lebanese people is re-established. We are mindful, however, of the grave risk of renewal of armed conflict.

But if the way forward is to enable Lebanon to achieve political stability and to regain its integrity, there must be a simultaneous rebuilding of Lebanon's shattered infrastructure. The Lebanese people's material suffering must also be relieved.

I hope you will agree that the supporters of Lebanon should now unite to assist in the massive task of reconstruction which lies ahead. My own Government has decided to provide a special initial sum of $10 million and we hope that other advanced aid donor countries might match that contribution on a comparative basis.

...2/

I invite your Government to contribute generously so that the reality of our concern will be demonstrated and so that there is in being an international reconstruction effort commensurate with the scale of the problems in the Lebanon.

Yours sincerely

Michel Aoun

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister of Great Britain
LONDON SW1
UNITED KINGDOM

SUBJECT

Lebanon

Letter to Lebanese Ambassador

UNCLASSIFIED

20215 - 1

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T 168A/82

T 168A/82

OO BEIRUT DESKBY 261100Z
GRS112
UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 261100Z
FROM FCO 260915Z AUG 82
TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT
TELEGRAM NUMBER 351 OF 26 AUGUST
INFO DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, WASHINGTON
SAVING EC POSTS
YOUR TELNO 530: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Copies to Master

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR GEMAYEL:-

BEGINS

A/ I SEND YOU MY CONGRATULATIONS ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR ELECTION AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON. THERE HAS BEEN GREAT SYMPATHY IN BRITAIN FOR THE RECENT SUFFERING OF THE LEBANESE PEOPLE. I EXTEND TO YOU ON BEHALF OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT MY GOOD WISHES FOR SUCCESS IN YOUR TASK OF RESTORING PEACE AND ACHIEVING THE RECONCILIATION OF ALL COMMUNITIES IN LEBANON. /B

ENDS

PYM

NNNN

- -

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NENAD
PCD
PS
PS/MR HURD
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY

UNCLASSIFIED

FILE SW
Lebanon

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 August, 1982

Thank you for your letter of 25 August enclosing a draft message to the President-Elect of Lebanon, to which the Prime Minister has now agreed. I assume you will be making arrangements for its transmission.

TIMOTHY FLESHER

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Lebanon

GR 470

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PS TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET.

FM MOSCOW

TO PRIORITIY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 480 OF 25 AUG

REPEATED FOR INFO TO ROUTINE BEIRUT DAMASCUS AMMAN CAIJRO JEDDA

TEL AVIV WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, ROME, BONN

LEBANON

1. THE TERMS OF PALESTINIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT, AND IN PARTICULAR THE PARTICIPATION OF US TROOPS, HAVE PRODUCED A RATHER MUTED SOVIET REACTION. THERE HAS BEEN NO HARKING BACK TO BREZHNEV'S WARNING TO REAGAN (MY TELNO 392 OF 8 JULY) THAT IF US TROOPS WERE INTRODUCED THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ''BUILD ITS POLICY WITH DUE CONSIDERATION OF THIS FACT''. THE FIRST SOVIET COMMENT, IN PRAVDA TODAY, MERELY SPOKE IN STANDARD TERMS OF THE US EXPLOITING ISRAELI AGGRESSION TO EXPAND ITS MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE REGION.

2. THE SOVIET PRESS HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT, ''BY-PASSING THE UN'', THE DISENGAGEMENT FORCE HAS BEEN CREATED AT THE REQUEST OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, WITH PLO AND ISRAELI AGREEMENT. IT HAS NOT SOUGHT TO ALLEGE THAT THIS WAS THE RESULT OF US/ISRAELI PRESSURE AND COVERAGE OF FRENCH PARTICIPATION HAS BEEN ALMOST SYMPATHETIC. INSTEAD THE PRESS HAS SOUGHT TO DISTRACT ATTENTION BY CONCENTRATING ON:

A) THE PLO'S MORAL, POLITICAL AND EVEN MILITARY VICTORY:
B) THE THREAT OF A LEBANESE SECOND CAMP DAVID RESULTING FROM ISRAELI PRESSURE AND US CONNIVANCE:
C) THE VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION ARISING FROM ISRAEL'S CONTINUING PRESENCE IN LEBANON AND GROWING PRESSURE ON SYRIAN FORCES IN THE BEKAA VALLEY:
D) THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT, REACHED THROUGH AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE (CALLED FOR MOST RECENTLY IN BREZHNEV'S MEETING WITH MONGOLIAN PRIME MINISTER TSEDENBAL ON 20 AUGUST).

THESE POINTS ABOVE REFLECT THE CHIEF SOVIET CONCERNS. IN THE SHORT TERM THE RUSSIANS WILL BE PARTICULARLY WORRIED AT THE RISK OF AN ESCALATING CONFRONTATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, REQUIRING A CONVINCING DEMONSTRATION OF SOVIET SUPPORT FOR SYRIA. THOUGH PROCLAIMING TO THE LAST SYRIA'S RIGHT TO BE IN LEBANON, THE RUSSIANS WOULD PROBABLY BE RELIEVED TO SEE MUTUAL SYRIAN/ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THE RUSSIANS WILL ALSO BE ANXIOUS ABOUT US AND ISRAELI MANIPULATION OF LEBANESE POLITICS FOLLOWING GEMAYEL'S ELECTION, THOUGH THEY ARE NOT IN PRINCIPLE OPPOSED TO A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON. /3.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. FOR THE LONGER TERM THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE CONCERNED THAT THE PLO SHOULD SURVIVE AS AN EFFECTIVE POLITICAL FORCE (THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY WITHOUT ALTERATIONS: THE LEADER OF THE DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE, HAWATMEH, WHO HAS RECEIVED NOTICEABLY MORE SOVIET PRESS SPACE THAN OTHER PLO FIGURES, IS QUOTED BY TASS (21 AUGUST) AS SAYING THAT THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLES' STRUGGLE WILL ASSUME NEW POLITICAL AND ORGANISATIONAL FORMS). THE RUSSIANS CONTINUE TO SEE THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AS THEIR BEST MEANS OF INFLUENCING MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS, BY MAKING NECESSARY A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT REQUIRING SOVIET INVOLVEMENT. THE CHIEF SOVIET DIPLOMATIC EFFORT WILL THEREFORE CONTINUE TO BE CONCENTRATED ON BUILDING SUPPORT, PARTICULARLY AMONG MODERATE ARAB STATES, FOR AN INTERNATIONAL MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE.

KEEBLE

THIS TELEGRAM
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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

To agree to send the attached message

Andrew Cosmo
Duty Clerk
25/8

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 August, 1982

Dear Tim,

Message to the President-Elect of Lebanon

You will have seen reports of the election on 23 August of Mr Bashir Bemayel as the new President of Lebanon.

Messages of congratulation have already been sent to Mr Gemayel by President Reagan and President Mitterand. The FRG President intends to follow suit shortly.

It remains to be seen whether Mr Gemayel, leader of the Christian/Phalange militia in Lebanon and widely suspected of having colluded in the Israeli invasion, will be accepted as President by Lebanon's non-Christian communities. There have already been a number of attacks by Muslim and left-wing militias against the homes of Muslim deputies who voted for Mr Gemayel. There is, however, little doubt about the legitimacy of Mr Gemayel's election. Mr David Watkins MP, one of the UK observers who attended the election, has told us that, although there was widespread intimidation on all sides, the election was carried out in accordance with the Lebanese constitution.

The last time a Lebanese President was elected, in 1976, the then Prime Minister sent a message of congratulations when President Sarkis assumed office. Mr Gemayel will formally succeed to the Presidency on 23 September. But in view of the messages already sent by other Western leaders, we recommend that the Prime Minister should send a short message now. I enclose a draft, in the form of a telegram to Beirut.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

T Flesher Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
UNCLASSIFIED	IMMEDIATE 260600Z

ZCZC
GRS
UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 260600Z AUGUST 82
FM FCO AUGUST 82
TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT
TELEGRAM NUMBER
INFO ROUTINE DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, WASHINGTON
SAVING EC POSTS
YOUR TELNO 530: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

1. Please pass the following message as soon as possible from the Prime Minister to Mr Gemayel:-

BEGINS

I send you my ~~sincere greetings~~ congratulations on the occasion of your election as President of the Republic of Lebanon. There has been great sympathy in Britain for the recent suffering of the Lebanese people. I extend to you on behalf of Her Majesty's Government my good wishes for success in your task of restoring peace and achieving the reconciliation of all communities in Lebanon.

ENDS

~~2. Signed original follows by bag.~~

PYM
NNNN

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept NENAD	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) E G M CHAPLIN		
Telephone number 233 4856		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

FILE SW

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 August, 1982

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of 23 August, and for conveying the text of a letter from your Prime Minister about the situation in the Lebanon.

I shall place your letter before the Prime Minister as soon as possible.

W. F. S. RICKETT

H-E. The Honourable Sir Victor Garland, K.B.E.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 August, 1982

Dear John

I enclose a letter that the Prime Minister has received from Sir Victor Garland, the Australian High Commissioner, conveying the text of a letter from Mr. Malcolm Fraser. Mr. Fraser urges us to pledge aid to assist the Lebanon in its task of reconstruction.

I should be grateful for a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to Mr. Fraser by 6 September.

Yours ever

Robin Ricketts

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T162/82 Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

Lebanon

AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION · LONDON

c.c. Marks

We will let you have a reply by 23/8

Ons

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

23 August 1982

The Hon. Sir Victor Garland, KBE

Dear Prime Minister,

A telegram from my Prime Minister asks me to convey to you the following text of a letter, the original of which is en route by diplomatic bag:

Begins -

"Dear Margaret,

The Australian Government and people, like the rest of the international community, have been anguished by the suffering inflicted on the people of Lebanon by the conflict there.

Lebanon has been caught in the cross-fire of a conflict in which it wanted no part.

We are today heartened by the major progress made in the peace plans so strenuously pursued in recent days. Their implementation can provide the vital ingredients for a peaceful Lebanon free of the presence of outside armed forces and in which the sovereignty of the Lebanese people is re-established. We are mindful, however, of the grave risk of renewal of armed conflict.

But if the way forward is to enable Lebanon to achieve political stability and to regain its integrity, there must be a simultaneous rebuilding of Lebanon's shattered infrastructure. The Lebanese people's material suffering must also be relieved.

I hope you will agree that the supporters of Lebanon should now unite to assist in the massive task of reconstruction which lies ahead. My own Government has decided to provide a special initial sum of dollars 10 million and we hope that other advanced aid donor countries might match that contribution on a comparative basis.

I invite your Government to contribute generously so that the reality of our concern will be demonstrated and so that there is in being an international reconstruction effort commensurate with the scale of the problems in The Lebanon.

Yours sincerely,
Malcolm Fraser."

Ends.

Sincerely,

R.V. GARLAND

CONFIDENTIAL

The Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister,
No. 10 Downing Street,
LONDON SW1.

PRIME MINISTERIAL PRESS STATEMENT : LEBANON
ISSUED 9 AUGUST 1982

The Prime Minister, Mr Malcolm Fraser, made the following statement today on the situation in Lebanon:

"THE CONTINUED FIGHTING AND DESTRUCTION IN BEIRUT, COSTING THE LIVES AND DESTROYING THE LIVELIHOOD OF INNOCENT AND POWERLESS LEBANESE CITIZENS, IS OF THE GRAVEST CONCERN TO THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE.

AUSTRALIA HAS ALWAYS BEEN DEEPLY CONSCIOUS OF THE AGE-LONG SUFFERING OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE AND THEIR RIGHT TO A HOMELAND. AUSTRALIA HAS ALWAYS SUPPORTED, AND OF COURSE CONTINUES TO SUPPORT, ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AS A STATE WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES.

AUSTRALIA DOES UNDERSTAND ISRAEL'S CONCERN AT THE REPEATED TERRORIST ATTACKS AND THE THREATS MADE BY THE PLO. WE DEPLORE TERRORISM OF ALL KINDS.

WE DEPLORE THE UNWILLINGNESS OF THE PLO TO RECOGNISE THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST, AND ITS UNWILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE SENSIBLY IN THE CAUSE OF A LASTING PEACE.

HOWEVER, DESPITE THE PROVOCATIONS ISRAEL HAS RECEIVED, ITS PRESENT ACTIONS IN PERSISTING WITH THE USE OF ITS FORMIDABLE MILITARY STRENGTH IN BEIRUT, LONG AFTER ACHIEVING ITS INITIALLY DECLARED OBJECTIVE, ARE SHORT-SIGHTED AND FOOLISH.

LEBANON HAS BEEN CAUGHT UP IN A QUARREL OF WHICH IT HAS WANTED NO PART. THE PLO FORCES CAME TO LEBANON TO USE IT AS A SANCTUARY FOR ATTACKS ON ISRAEL, PARTICULARLY ITS NORTHERN SETTLEMENTS. ISRAEL HAS RESPONDED BY ACTIONS WHICH HAVE RESULTED IN THE DESTRUCTION OF THE LEBANESE CAPITAL AND OF SIGNIFICANT PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, AND HAVE CAUSED IMMENSE MISERY TO THE LEBANESE PEOPLE.

BY THE CONTINUATION OF ITS PRESENT ACTION ISRAEL IS SERVING ITS OWN INTERESTS AND THE INTERESTS OF THE REGION VERY BADLY INDEED. THERE CAN BE NO SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM BY DESTRUCTION, BY KILLING, BY WAR. ULTIMATELY THERE HAS TO BE A POLITICAL SOLUTION WHICH ALLOWS PEOPLE TO LIVE OUT THEIR LIVES THE BELIEF THAT MILITARY VICTORY ALONE CAN ACHIEVE SOLUTIONS IS MAKING IT DIFFICULT FOR ISRAEL'S TRADITIONAL FRIENDS TO SUSTAIN THEIR SUPPORT.

THERE ARE OVER TWO MILLION PALESTINIANS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHO HAVE NO HOMELAND. OF THESE MANY ARE NOT ACCEPTED AS FULL CITIZENS BY ANY COUNTRY IN THE REGION. THIS REPRESENTS A CONDEMNATION OF ALL COUNTRIES IN THE REGION AND OUTSIDE IT WHICH HAVE ALLOWED THIS SITUATION TO CONTINUE FOR OVER 30 YEARS.

AS A MIDDLE RANKING POWER AUSTRALIA HAS OBVIOUSLY LIMITED INFLUENCE ON EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE THINTS WE CAN DO, AND WE HAVE SOUGHT TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE. WE SAW THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL AS THOROUGHLY CONSTRUCTIVE AND WORTH SUPPORTING. THE AGREEMENT WHICH THEY REACHED HAS BEEN THE ONLY THING WHICH HAS COME FORWARD WITH ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS.

...2/

IT IS FOR THAT REASON THAT WE HAVE SENT UNITS OF OUR ARMED FORCES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS.

HOWEVER, THERE ARE COUNTRIES WHICH DO HAVE THE POWER TO EXERT GREAT INFLUENCE ON THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE ARE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE THE INFLUENCE TO WORK OUT THE FRAMEWORK OF A SOLUTION AND, AS WE BELIEVE, TO SEE THAT SUCH A SOLUTION IS ACCEPTED. AS A SIGNATORY TO THE ISRAEL-EGYPT PEACE TREATY, THE UNITED STATES IS CLEARLY PRE-EMINENT AMONG THESE COUNTRIES. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT U.S. INFLUENCE BE USED, AND BE USED TO FULL EFFECT.

THE POTENTIAL FOR A GREATER CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST REMAINS. IT IS IN NOBODY'S INTEREST TO LEAVE THE LEBANESE CRISIS AS A CAULDRON INTO WHICH MORE AND MORE COUNTRIES, POSSIBLY INCLUDING MAJOR POWERS, COULD BE DRAWN.

QUITE APART FROM THE WIDER IMPACT OF THE PRESENT EVENTS ON WORLD PEACE, BEIRUT AND LEBANON DESERVE TO BE RESCUED FROM THE TERRIBLE DESTRUCTION WHICH IS NOW ENGULFING THEM. THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE MUST COMBINE TO ESTABLISH PEACE. IT IS A SIGNIFICANT TEST OF WESTERN RESOLVE AND UNITY OF PURPOSE.

AUSTRALIA WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE INVIOLABLE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST BEHIND SECURE, DEFENSIBLE AND RECOGNISED BORDERS. BUT BECAUSE OF THE COURSE OF RECENT EVENTS, BECAUSE OF THE INADEQUATE RESPONSE TO THE TERRIBLE SUFFERING CAUSED TO INNOCENT PEOPLE, AUSTRALIA CALLS ON THE MAJOR POWERS TO USE ALL THE WEIGHT AT THEIR COMMAND TO SETTLE THE CONFLICT. COUNTRIES SUCH AS AUSTRALIA HAVE THE RIGHT TO EXPECT THAT COUNTRIES WITH GREAT INFLUENCE WILL USE IT IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE.

QUITE APART FROM THESE LARGER ISSUES, THERE IS THE PRACTICAL QUESTION OF THE REBUILDING OF LEBANON AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF BEIRUT. AUSTRALIA WILL PROVIDE A SPECIAL INITIAL SUM OF DOLLARS 10 MILLION FOR THAT PURPOSE, AND WILL BE APPROACHING ALL OTHER ADVANCED AID DONOR COUNTRIES TO MATCH THAT CONTRIBUTION ON A COMPARATIVE BASIS. I WILL APPROACH THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT DIRECTLY CONCERNED. FOR MANY OF US IT IS THE ONLY PRACTICAL WAY IN WHICH WE CAN DEMONSTRATE THE REALITY OF OUR CONCERN.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND I WILL ALSO SEEK TO DISCUSS WITH THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN AUSTRALIA THE GOVERNMENT'S CONCERNS. WE WILL SEEK TO EXPLAIN IN DETAIL WHY THIS STATEMENT OF POLICY HAS BEEN ISSUED, AND WE WILL ELICIT THEIR SUPPORT FOR POLICIES ON ISRAEL'S PARTY THAT ARE CONDUCIVE TO LASTING PEACE. WE WILL APPEAL TO JEWISH COMMUNITIES AROUND THE WORLD TO TAKE NOTE OF A VOICE THAT HAS BEEN RAISED IN FRIENDSHIP AND SUPPORT OF ISRAEL IN A WAY WHICH HAS BEEN UNEQUALLED AND UNCHALLENGEABLE.

IF AN AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS SUPPORTED ISRAEL SO STAUNCHLY BELIEVES THERE NEEDS TO BE AS COMPREHENSIVE A CHANGE IN ISRAEL'S MIND AND APPROACH AS IS CALLED FOR IN

...3/

THIS STATEMENT, THAT SURELY IS WARNING ENOUGH THAT WORLD OPINION CAN NO LONGER BE IGNORED, AND THAT THE VERY SURVIVAL OF ISRAEL ITSELF MAY BE DEPENDENT UPON EVERYONE INVOLVED BENDING THEIR MINDS AND THEIR ENERGIES AND THEIR OPINIONS TO THE SEARCH FOR A LASTING PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

THIS WILL REQUIRE A CORRESPONDING READINESS ON THE PART OF THE PLO TO ACCEPT THE REALITY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE LEBANESE PEOPLE TO REGAIN EFFECTIVE CONTROL IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY. ALL THOSE ABLE TO BRING INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON THE PLO TO ACT IN THIS DIRECTION SHOULD DO SO.

AUSTRALIA DOES NOT PRETEND TO HAVE THE DETAILS OF A SOLUTION. THAT IS NOT FOR US TO PROPOSE. WE ARE NOT PARTY PRINCIPALS TO THIS DISPUTE. WE ARE NOT A COUNTRY WITH MAJOR INLFUENCE. BUT WE ARE CONCERNED, AND OUR SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL IN THE PAST GIVES US NOT ONLY THE RIGHT BUT THE RESPONSIBILITY TO SPEAK OUR MIND BLUNTLY AND HONESTLY."

Prime Minister

RESTRICTED

GRS 1100

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RESTRICTED
FM WASHINGTON 202246Z AUG 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2794 OF 20 AUGUST
INFO PARIS, AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, TUNIS, ALGIERS, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK, SANA'A, ADEN, ATHENS, ROME, BAGHDAD.

LEBANON

1. SCHNEIDER (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, NEAR EAST) BRIEFED REPRESENTATIVES OF WESTERN EMBASSIES TODAY ABOUT THE AGREEMENT REACHED BY HABIB IN BEIRUT. HE HANDED OVER THE FULL TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT (TEXT BY BAG TO NENAD) TOGETHER WITH A SCHEDULE OF DEPARTURES STARTING TOMORROW, 21 AUGUST (TEXT IN M I F T - NOT TO ALL).

attached

2. SCHNEIDER DREW ATTENTION TO THE VERY LIMITED MANDATE OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE (MNF) AS DEFINED BY THE AGREEMENT, NAMELY TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES AS THEY CARRIED OUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES, WHICH WERE TO ASSURE THE SAFE QUOTE WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY OF THE PALESTINIAN LEADERS, OFFICES AND COMBATANTS RELATED TO ANY ORGANISATION NOW IN THE BEIRUT AREA UNQUOTE: TO ASSURE THE SAFETY OF THE PERSONS IN THE AREA: AND TO FURTHER THE RESTORATION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY AND AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON OVER THE BEIRUT AREA. THE 800 MEMBERS OF THE U.S. CONTINGENT WOULD ARRIVE IN BEIRUT 5 TO 6 DAYS AFTER THE INITIAL DEPARTURE DATE IE BETWEEN 26-28 AUGUST. THERE WAS A PROVISION IN THE TEXT WHICH COULD, IF ALL AGREED, ALLOW THE MNF TO STAY IN LEBANON FOR MORE THAN 30 DAYS. BUT THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO QUESTION OF THE AMERICAN FORCES STAYING FOR MORE THAN 30 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THEIR ARRIVAL (PRESIDENT REAGAN STATED PUBLICLY TODAY THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD U.S. TROOPS REMAIN FOR MORE THAN 30 DAYS). THE MNF ITSELF WOULD NOT GO INTO WEST BEIRUT BUT WOULD BE DEPLOYED AT CHECK POINTS AND, IF NECESSARY, ALONG THE OVERLAND ROUTE INTO SYRIA. IF DEPARTURE OF THE PLO DID NOT TAKE PLACE ACCORDING TO SCHEDULE THE MANDATE OF THE MNF WOULD TERMINATE IMMEDIATELY AND ALL ITS PERSONNEL WOULD LEAVE LEBANON FORTHWITH. IN A SEPARATE PRESS CONFERENCE, SHULTZ SAID THAT IF THE CEASE FIRE WERE BROKEN BY SOME LUNATIC FIRING OFF AT RANDOM THAT WOULD NOT BE ENOUGHHTO PROVOKE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MNF. BUT IF IT WERE CLEAR THAT THE CEASE FIRE, ON WHICH THE WHOLE ARRANGEMENT WAS PREMISED, HAD BROKEN DOWN, THEN THE MNF WOULD NOT STAY.

3. SCHNEIDER SAID THE U.S, NOW ENVISAGED TWO WEEKS OF CHAOS, THE FIRST DEPARTURES FROM BEIRUT SHOULD START AT 11 O'CLOCK ON 21 AUGUST WHEN A SHIPLOAD OF PLO WOULD LEAVE FOR CYPRUS AND THENCE BY AIR FOR JORDAN AND IRAQ. THE EXACT TOTAL OF PLO MEMBERS GOING TO RECIPEINT COUNTRIES WAS NOT CLEAR AND WOULD NOT BE MADE PUBLIC BUT THE FIGURES WERE APPROXIMATELY AS FOLLOWS: ALGERIA: 200 (POSSIBLY RISING TO 600): IRAQ: 135: JORDAN: 265: SYRIA: A TOTAL OF ABOUT 6000 CONSISTING

RESTRICTED

/OF

OF APPROXIMATELY 2,600 MEMBERS OF THE PLO AND UP TO 3,600 SYRIANS AND MEMBERS OF THE PLA. ALL SYRIAN FORCES IN BEIRUT, EVEN IF THEY WERE NOMINALLY MEMBERS OF THE ADF, MUST LEAVE. TUNISIA: 1000: NORTH YEMEN: 500 PLO AND UP TO 500 NORTH YEMENIS: SOUTH YEMEN 1000. IN ADDITION, WHILE EGYPT HAD NOT BEEN PREPARED TO TAKE ANY PLO FIGHTERS WITHOUT A POLITICAL QUID PRO QUO WHICH THE U.S. HAD NOT BEEN WILLING TO MAKE, THE EGYPTIANS MIGHT TAKE AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF SICK AND WOUNDED. GREECE HAD ALSO OFFERED TO TAKE 300 SICK AND WOUNDED. THE U.S. DID NOT YET KNOW TO WHICH ARAB COUNTRY THE PLO LEADERSHIP WOULD GO.

4. SCHNEIDER STRESSED THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN DELIBERATE U.S. POLICY TO TRY TO SPREAD THE PLO OVER A NUMBER OF ARAB COUNTRIES: THEIR ORIGINAL AIM HAD BEEN TO GET ONE COUNTRY TO TAKE THEM ALL. HOWEVER, U.S. WILLINGNESS TO COMMIT TROOPS TO THE MNF HAD EVOKED A RESPONSE IN THE ARAB WORLD AND MANY OF THE OFFERS, E G TUNISIA'S HAD COME AS A SURPRISE.

5. SCHNEIDER WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ABOUT WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN AFTER PLO WITHDRAWAL. ASKED ABOUT THE U.S. VIEW OF UNIFIL'S ROLE HE SAID THAT, FOR THE TIME BEING, THE U.S. SIMPLY WANTED TO PRESERVE UNIFIL AS AN IMPORTANT OPTION BUT HAD NOT REACHED ANY CONCLUSIONS ABOUT WHAT KIND OF PEACEKEEPING ROLE IT MIGHT FULFIL IN THE FUTURE. SHULTZ, AT A PRESS CONFERENCE THIS AFTERNOON, SAID THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES FROM LEBANON WOULD BE COMPLICATED AND DIFFICULT. SYRIA HAD PROMISED TO LEAVE WHEN ASKED TO DO SO BY THE LEBANESE. AS THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON INCLREASINGLY TOOK CONTROL, AND AS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ON ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER COULD BE ADEQUATELY DEVELOPED, THE U.S. WOULD EXPECT TO SEE FOREIGN FORCES WITHDRAWN.

6. ON THE WIDER PALESTINIAN QUESTION, THE PRESIDENT AT A PRESS CONFERENCE THIS MORNING SAID THAT AFTER THE LEBANON AGREEMENT HAD BEEN PUT INTO EFFECT THE U.S. WISHED TO MOVE QUICKLY, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS, TO RESOLVE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. SHULTZ, AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE, SUGGESTED THAT THE DISPERSAL OF THE PLO WOULD PROVIDE GREATER OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACHIEVING A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH WAS NOW MORE URGENT THAN EVER: QUOTE IF THE OPPORTUNITY IS GREATER, YOU SHOULD MOVE IN HARDER AND FASTER AND TRY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT UNQUOTE.

THOMAS

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 August 1982

PR 17/8.

Dear Tim,

Israel/Lebanon

Stephen Lamport's letter of 10 August described what we then knew of the Habib plan. The Prime Minister may like to have an account of recent developments.

Situation on the Ground

Habib's plan is now clearer, and with Syria's recent change of heart about accepting as many PLO as the PLO wish to send, has at last started to look realistic. It has already been accepted by the PLO and the Lebanese Government, and Israeli reservations about allowing any part of the International Force to be deployed until the evacuation of the PLO was well under way have been overcome in exchange for a commitment that the Force will withdraw if the PLO change their minds about leaving. Habib, now back in Beirut, is hoping to iron out remaining minor difficulties in time for the 15-day operation to begin on 21 August. The plan provides for the PLO to be evacuated mostly by sea to Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Tunis, the two Yemens, Sudan and perhaps Algeria. Egypt has continued to insist on a link with a comprehensive solution to the Palestinian question, but may not want to be left out in the end.

A ceasefire established late on 12 August has generally held after days of heavy Israeli bombing and shelling of West Beirut resulting in an unknown number of mostly civilian casualties. The Israelis claimed unconvincingly that it was necessary to keep up the military pressure. The heaviest bombardment of the war, on 12 August, elicited a tough statement by President Reagan. Meanwhile Israeli forces have deployed on the coast well to the north of Beirut, possibly in preparation for a second phase of operations against Syrian and PLO forces in Tripoli and the Bekaa Valley.

/The Lebanese

The Lebanese Speaker is formally convening the Chamber of Deputies on 19 August to elect a new President, despite doubts as to whether an election is possible in present circumstances. Bechir Gemayel, leader of the Phalange, is still the only candidate. The Speaker has invited the French, Germans and ourselves to send observers. Mr David Watkins MP is hoping to lead a small delegation which will have no official status but which will go with HMG's blessing.

UNIFIL is still sitting helplessly in Southern Lebanon. Its mandate will be renewed by the UN Security Council on 17 August for a further short interim period.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

T Flesher Esq
10 Downing Street

file

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 August 1982

Thank you for your letter of 10 August enclosing a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to the Amir of Kuwait. The Prime Minister has approved the draft and I attach the message duly signed. I should be grateful if you would make the arrangements for its despatch as proposed.

Timothy Flesher

S.M.J. Lamport, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SUBJECT

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cc Master copy

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 August 1982

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T159/82

Your Highness,

Thank you for your message of 31 July.

I share your anguish at the terrible sufferings inflicted on the Lebanese and Palestinians in Lebanon. Israel's invasion is a clear breach of international law. We have vigorously condemned it and made clear to the Israelis through every channel that they should keep to an effective cease-fire and disengage their troops from around Beirut, as a first step towards their complete withdrawal. With our partners in the Ten we have taken a number of practical measures to show the strength of our feeling. We decided at the end of June not to supply any military equipment to Israel until further notice. We have also been active in providing food and medical supplies to the victims of the war.

We support the efforts of Mr. Habib to achieve a peaceful settlement, which should involve the orderly departure of all foreign forces who are in Lebanon against the wishes of the Lebanese Government. The Lebanese people must be left in peace to rebuild their shattered land. The Ten have said that they are ready to assist in this work.

/ As you suggest,

dg

As you suggest, the Palestinian problem lies close to the heart of the conflict in the Lebanon. We have long worked for an overall peace settlement which would allow the Palestinians to exercise their right to self-determination. Despite the tragedy of Lebanon, these efforts must not be abandoned. We all have a role to play in bringing the parties to accept each others rights. Without this essential first step, negotiations cannot begin.

With every good wish
to your Royal Highness,

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Highness Shaikh Jaber Al Ahmed Al Sabah, G.C.M.G.

From: Private Secretary/Minister of State

File pse

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 August 1982

Prime Minister:
You may like to see this summary of the present position
TA 10/8.

Private Secretary
Number 10, Downing Street

Dear Tim.

LEBANON

1. There are press reports that the Israeli Cabinet have accepted in principle, though with some reservations, the Habib plan for the Palestinians to leave Beirut. The Prime Minister may like to have an idea of where this stands.

2. Our information, mostly from American sources, is not complete but we understand that a plan had been agreed with the Palestinians and the Lebanese on the following lines: the Palestinian fighters, but not their dependents and other civilians (the fighters number about 8,000) would leave Beirut partly by land, partly by sea and air for a number of Arab countries, principally Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq. Habib has been conducting detailed negotiations on three main points: the international force which would supervise the operation, the method of departure and the destination.

International Force

3. The Americans say that it is agreed in principle that this should consist of 800 US Marines, 800 French Paratroopers and 400 Italian Bersaglieri. French and Italian officers are already working on the details in Lebanon. The outline is that the French would move in on 'D-day', and the others on about D-day + 6; evacuation would be complete by D-day + 14 when the Force would leave. Among problems which have arisen, and which we do not know to have been resolved are:

a) The French have made various conditions for their participation, including some form of UN cover. This seems unlikely to be available (the Russians would not sanction US troops under the UN flag in Lebanon).

b) Sharon has adhered to the original Israeli position that no international troops should enter Lebanon until all the Palestinians have gone. He has sought to control every potential landing point to forestall French intervention without his agreement. Begin 'apparently accepts' that deployment could begin when there are only 2,500 or so PLO left in Beirut. The PLO have demanded, on the

/contrary

contrary, that the Force should come in before they begin to move; they do not trust the Israelis or the Lebanese, and of course they have good reason.

Means of Departure

4. When Habib was in London last month he was working on the basis that all would leave overland, i.e. to Syria in the first place. He had Israeli agreement that the Palestinian departure would not be under Israeli guns and that they would not be humiliated. Later the Israelis reneged on these arrangements. They also pointed out that they could not vouch for Lebanese behaviour towards the Palestinians.

5. The Americans are now apparently envisaging that the main body would leave by sea to ports in Syria, Jordan and Egypt, and they have been negotiating arrangements with the ICRC.

Destination

5. Habib's working principle has been that those Palestinians (probably the majority) who entered Lebanon as formed military units from other Arab countries should return to those countries. When he was in London he spoke of having found destinations for perhaps three-quarters of the total, but clearly there were strings attached to the agreement of some Governments.

6. Only the Jordanians have stated publicly that they would welcome some PLO from Beirut: they would take Jordanian passport holders, subject to some important reservations about those with a criminal record in Jordan. Egypt has insisted that, though they are prepared to take a share , they will only do so if withdrawal from Beirut is linked to a comprehensive settlement of the Palestine problem. The Syrians are said by the Americans and the PLO to have agreed to take a large share; in public they continue to deny this absolutely.

Conclusion

7. On the basis of incomplete information, we consider that a good deal has still to be done before Habib's plan could be put into effect. It has taken shape quite quickly in the last day or two, but the momentum could be lost if the Israelis overdo the military pressure, as seems all too likely.

Yours ever,

S M J Lamport

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FM UKMIS GENEVA 101545Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 454 OF 10 AUGUST 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TELAVIV DAMASCUS CAIRO UKMIS NEW YORK
AMMAN NICOSIA

MY TELNO 451 : ICRC/LEBANON

1. THE U S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CALLED AT 1330Z TODAY (AUGUST 10) TO BRING US UP TO DATE .

2. ON INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD JUST TOLD ICRC THAT HABIB'S PLANS ARE NOW WITH THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS. MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS ARE ALREADY UNDER DISCUSSION BETWEEN U S, FRANCE AND ITALY. ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS IS THAT WITHIN 4 (FOUR) DAYS OF AN AGREEMENT BEING REACHED , AT LEAST ONE VESSEL MUST BE AVAILABLE OFF BEIRUT TO COMMENCE THE SEA EVACUATION EXERCISE. IN VIEW OF THIS, ICRC HAD BEEN ASKED TO PROCEED (BY IMPLICATION, TO CHARTER THE APPROPRIATE SHIPS) WITHOUT WAITING FOR FURTHER DETAILS FROM HABIB. VAN HEUVEN SAID THAT ICRC TOOK THIS POINT. HE EXPECTED THEM TO CONTACT US VERY SHORTLY WITH A REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN CHARTERING SHIPS AGAINST THAT TIMETABLE. (SEE PARA 6 BELOW)

3. VAN HEUVEN ALSO TOLD ICRC THAT THE PLO WERE INSISTING THAT EVACUATION VESSELS SHOULD NOT (NOT) CARRY RED CROSS INSIGNIA. HE HAD SUGGESTED TO ICRC THAT THERE MAY BE SCOPE FOR NEGOTIATION WITH THE PLO OVER THE SIZE OF ANY SUCH EMBLEMS OR THAT EMBLEMS MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE IF THE EXERCISE WERE FORMALLY TO INCLUDE EVACUATION OF ''WOUNDED'' PLO FIGHTERS. HE WOULD BE REPORTING THAT ICRC ' S FIRST RESPONSE WAS APPARENTLY QUITE FLEXIBLE.

4. VAN HEUVEN TOLD US THAT WASHINGTON HAVE SUGGESTED THAT LIAISON ON DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN BEIRUT BETWEEN THE ICRC DELEGATION AND THE U S MISSION. HOEFLIGER, A SENIOR ICRC DELEGATE FROM GENEVA, WILL BE FLYING OUT SHORTLY TO JOIN THEIR PEOPLE ON THE SPOT. WASHINGTON'S LATEST ESTIMATES ARE THAT BETWEEN 5,000 AND 8,000 PEOPLE ARE TO BE EVACUATED BY SEA. OTHER S WILL BE GOING BY OVERLAND ROUTES. THE SHIPS' DESTINATIONS ARE LIKELY TO INCLUDE LATAKIA, AQABA AND ALEXANDRIA.

5. THE U S MISSION HAVE ALSO TOLD US THAT THE LEBANESE HAVE ASKED IF THE CHARTERED SHIPS WILL CONTAIN SMALL CRAFTX CAPABLE OF FERRYING PASSENGERS. IF NOT, THE LEBANESE HAD SUGGESTED USING LANDING CRAFT E.G. FROM BRITISH FORCES IN CYPRUS. ICRC HAVE ALREADY GIVEN SOME THOUGHT TO EMBARKING PASSENGERS BY SMALL CRAFT AND FAVOUR DOING SO FROM BEACHES ON THE WESTERN SHORE.

CONFIDENTIAL

/6.

6. IN VIEW OF THE EXPECTED EARLY ICRC APPROACH, COULD YOU PLEASE LET US HAVE AN UP TO DATE LIST OF AVAILABLE SHIPS WITH THE NECESSARY DETAIL TO ALLOW ICRC TO PROCEED TO CHARTER. THIS WOULD PRESUMABLY INCLUDE TELEX NUMBERS OF AGENTS, ETC. ALTHOUGH VAN HEUVEN WAS UNABLE TO SAY EXACTLY WHEN EMBARKATION WOULD NEED TO START, ANY SHIPS TO BE NOMINATED TO ICRC SHOULD PRESUMABLY BE AVAILABLE OFF BEIRUT WITHIN THE NEXT FIVE DAYS.

7. WHEN PESTALOZZI , THE ICRC VICE-PRESIDENT SPOKE TO ME ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PRIME MINISTERS VISIT ON 12 AUGUST , HE MENTIONED THAT THEIR EMISSARY HAD HAD SATISFACTORY DISCUSSIONS IN TEL AVIV (PARA 3 OF MY TUR).

8. FCO PLEASE PASS ADVANCE COPIES TO MCCOY DOT, AND MOD.

MARSHALL

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Lebanon

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 August 1982

Tim Flesher Esq
10 Downing Street

Dear Tim,

I enclosed with my letter of 5 August a message we had received from the Amir of Kuwait to the Prime Minister, and said that we were preparing a draft reply. This I now enclose.

When the message has been approved. I suggest that we send the original through the Kuwaiti Ambassador here, and a copy in parallel to HM Embassy Kuwait together with a copy of the Amir's message.

Yours ever

Stephen Lamport

S M J Lamport
Private Secretary to Mr Hurd

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO: Amir of Kuwait

Type

Your Reference

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CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your message of 31 July.

I share your anguish at the terrible sufferings inflicted on the Lebanese and Palestinians in Lebanon. Israel's invasion is a clear breach of international law. We have vigorously condemned it and made clear to the Israelis through every channel that they should keep to an effective cease-fire and disengage their troops from around Beirut, as a first step towards their complete withdrawal. With our partners in the Ten we have taken a number of practical measures to show the strength of our feeling. We decided at the end of June not to supply any military equipment to Israel until further notice. We have also been active in providing food and medical supplies to the victims of the war.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

We support the efforts of Mr Habib to achieve a peaceful settlement, which should involve the orderly

/ departure

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departure of all foreign forces who are in Lebanon against the wishes of the Lebanese Government. The Lebanese people must be left in peace to rebuild their shattered land. The Ten have said that they are ready to assist in this work.

As you suggest, the Palestinian problem lies close to the heart of the conflict in the Lebanon. We have long worked for an overall peace settlement which would allow the Palestinians to exercise their right to self-determination. Despite the tragedy of Lebanon, these efforts must not be abandoned. We all have a role to play in bringing the parties to accept each others rights. Without this essential first step, negotiations cannot begin.

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FM BEIRUT 291314Z AUGUST 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 437 OF 29 AUGUST 82
INFO IMMEDIATE USUAL POSTS, JEDDA AND CAIRO
INFO SAVING PARIS

MY TEL NUMBER 435:

LEBANON

1. DRAPER GAVE ME A FULL ACCOUNT EARLY THIS MORNING. PLEASE PROTECT SOURCE OF THIS AND MY TWO IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS.

2. THE AMERICANS HAD WORKED OUT A PLAN WITH THE LEBANESE AND PALESTINIANS FOR THE PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF PALESTINIANS FROM WEST BEIRUT AND THEIR REPLACEMENT BY THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE. THEY HAD DISCUSSED IT WITH SHARON ON 8 AUGUST AND FOUND HIM "PARANOIAC" (SEE MIFT).

3. THE PLAN WAS A GOOD ONE. IT CONTAINED ALL SORTS OF PRECAUTIONS INCLUDING A PROVISION WHICH TERMINATED THE MANDATE OF THE FORCE AS SOON AS THE LAST PALESTINIAN HAD LEFT. THEY WERE NOW PROVIDING A FINAL WRITTEN VERSION TO BE PUT TO THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS TODAY.

4. FORMALLY THE POSITION WAS THAT THEY AWAITED THE COMMENTS OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, SHARON HAVING SAID THAT HE WAS NOT EMPOWERED TO ACCEPT THE PLAN AND THAT IN HIS OPINION THERE WAS NOT YET A POLITICAL AGREEMENT. THE LEBANESE AND PALESTINIANS WOULD ACCEPT THE PLAN.

5. DRAPER SAID THAT HABIB HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO SHARON THAT THERE WOULD BE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES IF THE ISRAELIS ASSAULTED BEIRUT WHEN A COMPLETE PLAN HAD BEEN HAMMERED OUT. HE ADDED THAT HABIB WAS NOT BLUFFING.

6. THE PROBLEM OF PERSUADING EGYPT, OR RATHER MUBARAK, TO ACCEPT A FULL QUOTA OF PALESTINIANS REMAINED. MUBARAK WAS STILL BARGAINING FOR LINKAGE. THE AMERICANS, HOWEVER, WERE PUTTING GREAT PRESSURE ON THE EGYPTIANS DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY.

ROBERTS...

SENT 09/1246Z RDJ

16 15

9 August 1982

Thank you for your letter of 5 August enclosing a message to the Prime Minister from the Amir of Kuwait which the Prime Minister has now seen. I note that you are preparing a draft reply.

TIM FLESHER

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreignaand Commonwealth Office

HL

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TELNO 342 OF 08 AUG
INFO PRIORITY: ME POSTS AND WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 179 TO ABU DHABI: ARAB REACTIONS TO BEIRUT

1. ON WEDNESDAY OR THURSDAY 4/5 AUGUST KING FAHD WAS IN TOUCH WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN BY TELEPHONE. AFTER THE CABINET MEETING ON 5TH A STATEMENT WAS ISSUED EXPRESSING FAHD'S SATISFACTION WITH REAGAN'S RESPONSE.

2. ON FRIDAY 6TH AFTER THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE ISRAELI ATTACK AND THE AMERICAN VETO OF THE SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION A SECOND STATEMENT WAS ISSUED CONDEMNING ISRAEL AND ''THE POWERS WHICH SUPPORT HER''.

3. THIS VOLTE-FACE WAS AN UNTYPICAL MOVE BY THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT AND REFLECTS AN ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING UNANIMOUS AMONG THE SAUDI PEOPLE AND INCREASING EVEN WITHIN THE CABINET. THE FEELING IS MIXED ANGER AND SHAME. FAHD IS UNDOUBTEDLY UNDER PRESSURE TO MODIFY HIS COOPERATION WITHTHHE US.

4. I DO NOT THINK WE ARE YET NEAR THE POINT WHERE A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF POLICY CAN BE EXPECTED. BUT THE SECOND STATEMENT COULD BE THE FIRST OF THE SIGNALS TO WHICH I REFERRED IN PARAGRAPH 13 OF MY DESPATCH OF 3 AUGUST. IF THE HORRORS IN BEIRUT WERE TO INCREASE, THE OTHER SIGNALS COULD FOLLOW. IN THAT CASE, THOUGH THE REGIME IS NOT/NOT LIKELY TO BE OVERTHROWN, PUBLIC OPINION COULD FORCE THE GOVERNMENT INTO SOME OF THE MEASURES WHICH I LISTED IN MY DESPATCH.

5. FCO PLEASE CONSIDER WHETHER TO REPEAT TO BEIRUT.

CRAIG

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 062230Z AUG 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1224 OF 6 AUGUST 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, TEL AVIA, DAMASCUS, AMMAN,
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ALL OTHER ME POSTS.

MY TELS NOS 1222 AND 1223 (NOT TO ALL): LEBANON: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. IT WAS CLEAR WHEN THE COUNCIL GATHERED THIS MORNING (6 AUGUST) THAT THERE WAS A WIDESPREAD DESIRE TO AVOID A VETO ON THE SOVIET DRAFT AND A WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER ANY US COUNTER-PROPOSAL. NUSEIBEH (JORDAN) TOLD ME THAT HE WAS READY TO COOPERATE. SO WERE SPAIN AND THE NON-ALIGNED. BUT LICHENSTEIN (US) WOULD MAKE NO MOVE. OVINNIKOV (USSR) WAS ONLY PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE AMERICANS. MY EFFORTS AT COMPROMISE THEREFORE GOT NOWHERE. THE AMERICANS HAD APPARENTLY MADE UP THEIR MIND TO VETO. THE TEXT WAS PUT TO THE VOTE WITH ONE SMALL AMENDMENT TO ACCOMMODATE THE FRENCH. THE PHRASE ''AS A FIRST STEP'' WAS DELETED IN PARAGRAPH 3 AND ''UNTIL THE FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM ALL LEBANESE TERRITORY'' ADDED AT THE END.

2. BEFORE THE VOTE TUENI (LEBANON) EMPHASISED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S MAIN CONCERN WAS THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD PRESERVE UNANIMITY AND A MEASURE OF CONSENSUS IN ORDER TO INFLUENCE ISRAEL. TERZI (PLO) AND OVINNIKOV (USSR) MADE BRIEF STATEMENTS, AND LOUET (FRANCE), LING QING (CHINA) AND I MADE EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE (TEXT OF MINE IN MIFT). LOUET SAID THAT THE MEASURES PROPOSED WERE SOUND. LING QING SAID THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN STRONGER.

3. THE VOTE WAS 11-1 (US) -3 (UK, TOGO, ZAIRE). THEREAFTER NUSEIBEH (JORDAN) SAID THAT THE PUNITIVE MEASURES SHOULD HAVE BEEN NO MORE THAN A FIRST STEP TO BE FOLLOWED BY MUCH STERNER MEASURES. LICHENSTEIN (US) SAID THE US HAD WORKED HARD TO ACHIEVE CONSENSUS. IT WOULD DO NOTHING WHICH MIGHT AFFECT HABIB'S MISSION ADVERSELY. IT REAFFIRMED ITS SUPPORT FOR SCR 516 AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE OBSERVERS, WHILE EMPHASISING THAT THE MODALITIES OF SUCH DEPLOYMENT SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE RESOLUTION WAS UNBALANCED AND WOULD NOT HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO ACHIEVING A CEASEFIRE. HE REGRETTED SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO POLARISE THE COUNCIL. OVINNIKOV CHARGED THE US WITH NOT TRYING TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A TEXT.

4. BLUM (ISRAEL) THIS TIME DIRECTED HIS VENOM AT LOUET, SAYING THAT THE FRENCH VOTE REPRESENTED ''A DAY OF SHAME AND INFAMY FOR FRANCE''. HE QUOTED EXAMPLES FROM THE ALGERIAN WAR AND ACCUSED THE FRENCH OF HYPOCRISY. LOUET RESPONDED DEFTLY WITH PAINED ASTONISHMENT AT BLUM'S INTEMPERATE BEHAVIOUR: AND BY CITING A LA FONTAINE FABLE OF THE HELPFUL BEAR WHO KILLED THE GARDENER WITH A STONE AIMED TO KEEP THE FLIES FROM BUZZING ROUND HIS HEAD. AFTER

/STATEMENTS

STATEMENTS BY DORR (IRELAND), TERZI (PLO) AND MAKSOUD (ARAB LEAGUE), MOUSSA (EGYPT) SUGGESTED THAT THE AFTERNOON'S PROCEEDINGS HAD NOT BEEN THE FINEST HOUR FOR ANYBODY CONCERNED: BEIRUT WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BENEFIT. HE EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF LOOKING ONCE AGAIN AT THE FRANCO/EGYPTIAN RESOLUTION. AT THE END TUENI INTERVENED AGAIN TO INVITE THE UK TO USE ITS SKILL TO MAKE A FURTHER ATTEMPT AT A DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH MIGHT ''RESTORE UNITY AND SANITY''. (I TOOK THIS UP WITH HIM AND OTHERS AFTERWARDS: SEE MY SECOND IFT).

5. COMMENT. THIS WAS A BAD DEBATE AND A BAD OUTCOME WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED WITH MINIMUM OF DEXTERITY ON THE PART OF THE US. FOLLOWING THE US VOTE IN FAVOUR OF SCR 516 AND ABSTENTION ON SCR 517, THE SOVIET UNION WAS DETERMINED TO USE THE ISRAELI REJECTION AS A PEG ON WHICH TO HANG A US VETO. EVERYONE WAS ALIVE TO THIS AND I BELIEVE EVERY OTHER MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL, EXCEPT THE DUTIFUL POLE, WANTED TO AVOID IT. GIVEN THE SLIGHTEST SIGN FROM THE US THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO PLAY BALL, THEY COULD HAVE REGAINED THE INITIATIVE, SHUNTED THE SOVIET DRAFT TO ONE SIDE AND FINISHED UP WITH VERBIAGE THAT WOULD HAVE HAD LITTLE PRACTICAL IMPACT BUT ON WHICH CONSENSUS COULD HAVE BEEN REACHED. INSTEAD MRS KIRKPATRICK DID NOT APPEAR, OVINNIKOV GOT WHAT HE WANTED, THE MODEST IMPACT OF SCRS 516 AND 517 WAS WHITTLED AWAY AND THE US WAS AGAIN LINED UP SHOULDER TO SHOULDER WITH THE ISRAELIS.

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FM MOSCOW Ø61254Z AUG 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 465 OF 6/8
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT: LEBANON: SOVIET POLICY

1. THE ARAFAT TELEGRAM IS THE LATEST IN A SERIES OF RECENT AUTHORITATIVE SOVIET STATEMENTS WHICH TOGETHER MARK AN ESCALATION IN THE LEVEL OF SOVIET MORAL SUPPORT FOR THE PALESTINIANS. BREZHNEV'S AUTHORITY HAS NOW BEEN INVOKED THREE TIMES. THE AIM APPEARS TO BE TO UNDERSCORE THE SOVIET UNION'S ''CLEAR'' AND ''PRINCIPLED'' SUPPORT FOR THE ARAB CAUSE (INCLUDING THE CONVENING OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST IN WHICH THE RUSSIANS WOULD TAKE PART): AND TO DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM SOVIET UNWILLINGNESS TO INTERVENE MORE DIRECTLY ON THE PALESTINIAN SIDE AS THE SITUATION IN BEIRUT DETERIORATES. AS SUCH THE SOVIET POSITION HAS CHANGED LITTLE IN ITS ESSENTIALS SINCE THE START OF THE CRISIS AND STILL SEEMS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATION:

(I) THE AMERICANS' INABILITY/UNWILLINGNESS TO RESTRAIN ISRAEL WILL UNDERMINE THEIR POSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD.

(II) ONLY DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION, OR ITS THREAT, COULD TURN THE TABLES IN BEIRUT, BUT SOVIET INTERESTS ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY THREATENED TO JUSTIFY A HIGH RISK CONFRONTATION WITH THE AMERICANS.

(III) CONTINUING ARAB DISUNITY AND AMBIVALENCE TOWARDS THE PALESTINIANS PROVIDE A RESPECTABLE FIG-LEAF FOR SOVIET QUIESCENCE.

2. THE LONGER THE CRISIS GOES ON THE GREATER THE RISK TO SOVIET CREDIBILITY IN ARAB EYES AND THE SHARPER THE DILEMMA OF HOW TO PASS AS THE ARABS' FRIEND WITHOUT ACTUALLY DOING VERY MUCH FOR THEM. INCREASED SOVIET DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY, IN PARTICULAR AT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, IS A PARTIAL RESPONSE TO THIS (TODAY'S PRAVDA REPORTS AN INTERVENTION BY THE SOVIET DELEGATE POINTING CLEARLY TOWARDS A CALL FOR SANCTIONS). THOUGH THE SOVIET DILEMMA WILL BECOME ACUTE IF THE ISRAELIS STORM BEIRUT, I DO NOT SEE THE RUSSIANS GOING BEYOND AN INTENSIFIED POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN PLUS ARMS SUPPLIES FOR SYRIA AND OTHERS.

3. THE ARAFAT MESSAGE MAY ALSO REFLECT THE RUSSIANS' CONCERN THAT HABIB MAY YET PULL OFF AN AGREEMENT IN WHICH THE PLO WILL EXTRACT SOME MEASURE OF RECOGNITION FROM THE US TO THE DETRIMENT OF SOVIET POLITICAL INFLUENCE WITH THE PALESTINIANS AND IN THE ARAB WORLD GENERALLY.

4. FCO PLEASE REPEAT FURTHER AS NECESSARY.

KEEBLE

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 464 OF 6/8
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

LEBANON

1. PRAVDA TODAY CARRIED THE SUMMARY OF A TELEGRAM FROM BREZHNEV TO ARAFAT CONVEYING SOVIET ADMIRATION AT THE COURAGE OF THE DEFENDERS OF BEIRUT, AND POINTING OUTNTHAT THE SOVIET MISSION TO THE UN HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO REQUEST AN EMERGENCY SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING WITH THE AIM OF SECURING FULFILLMENT OF EARLIER RESOLUTIONS ''ABOVE ALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE, DEPLOYMENT OF UN OBSERVERS IN AND AROUND BEIRUT, AND AN END TO ISRAELI AGGRESSION''.

2. PRAVDA ALSO REPORTED A MEETING ON 5 AUGUST BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER TIKHONOV AND A DELEGATION SENT TO MOSCOW AFTER THE RECENT NICOSIA MEETING OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENTS'S (NAM) CO-ORDINATION BUREAU, AND COMPRISING THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF CUBA, NICARAGUA AND CYPRUS. MAIN POINTS OF THE REPORT WERE:

(I) CONDEMNATION IN STANDARD SOVIET TERMS OF UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL:

(II) DANGER OF US PLANS TO DEPLOY TROOPS IN THE LEBANON:

(III) NON-ALIGNED PRAISE FOR THE SOVIET UNION'S POSITION:

(IV) REFERENCES TO THE NEED FOR ARAB UNITY:

(V) REFERENCES TO THE NEED FOR PLO PARTICIPATION IN COLLECTIVE EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS AND TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

3. SEE MIFT FOR COMMENT.

4. FCO PLEASE REPEAT FURTHER AS NECESSARY.

KEEBLE

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Pre
Minister:

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5/8

5 August 1982

Dear John,

Message to the Prime Minister from
the Amir of Kuwait

The Kuwaiti Embassy called on the Department this morning to leave the attached message from the Amir of Kuwait, Shaikh Jaber al Ahmad Al Sabah, to the Prime Minister about the situation in Lebanon.

We are preparing a draft reply.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

for (J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 052320Z AUG 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2674 OF 5 AUGUST
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TEL AVIV BEIRUT
ROUTINE TUNIS AMMAN CAIRO DAMASCUS PARIS JEDDA

MY TELNO 2660: LEBANON

1. IN A BRIEFING FOR WESTERN DIPLOMATS TODAY, CLUVERIUS REFUSED TO BE DRAWN ON THE PRECISE TERMS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE TO BEGIN AND WHETHER, AS TODAY'S PRESS SPECULATES, IT HINTED AT THE POSSIBILITY OF US SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL. HE SAID HOWEVER, THAT THE MESSAGE LEFT THE ISRAELIS IN NO DOUBT OF THE AMERICAN VIEWS OF THEIR RECENT ACTION IN BEIRUT AND OF WHAT NOW NEEDED TO BE DONE.

2. CLUVERIUS SAID THAT THE PHRASE QUOTE CEASEFIRE IN PLACE UNQUOTE MEANT THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD WITHDRAW TO THE POSITIONS THEY HELD ON 1 AUGUST (IN ACCORDANCE WITH SCR 517) AND THAT THE ISRAELIS KNEW THAT THIS WAS THE AMERICAN POSITION. (THE STATE DEPARTMENT MADE THIS CLEAR PUBLICLY TODAY BUT WOULD NOT SAY WHAT THE US RESPONSE WOULD BE IF ISRAEL DID NOT COMPLY) THE PRESENT ISRAELI AND PLO POSITIONS WERE TOO CLOSE FOR A MANAGEABLE CEASEFIRE. BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO BE DISTRACTED INTO A WRANGLE OVER WHETHER THE ISRAELIS SHOULD WITHDRAW TO THE POSITIONS OF 1 AUGUST OR SOME EARLIER DATE. THE PRIORITIES WERE A CEASEFIRE AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLO FROM BEIRUT, THEN THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI AND PLO FORCES FROM LEBANON, FOLLOWED ULTIMATELY BY THE SYRIANS.

3. CLUVERIUS SAID THAT HABIB'S NEGOTIATIONS HAD MADE SOME PROGRESS DESPITE THE ISRAELI BOMBARDMENT OF WEST BEIRUT WHICH IMPEDED WAZZAN'S MOVEMENTS AND HENCE THE TRANSMISSION OF MESSAGES. THE PRINCIPLE OF PLO WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT WAS AGREED AND HABIB WAS ENGAGED IN A SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF THE MODALITIES, COVERING THE STEPS TO BE TAKEN ON EACH DAY OF THE WITHDRAWAL, WHICH ARMS SHOULD BE SURRENDERED BY THE PLO AND WHERE THEY WOULD BE STORED, AND THE TIMING AND SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS OF THE PROPOSED MULTINATIONAL FORCE. CLUVERIUS SAID THAT IT NOW LOOKED MUCH LESS LIKELY THAT THE PLO WOULD STAGE TEMPORARILY TO ANOTHER PART OF LEBANON, BUT HE ADMITTED THAT THEIR FINAL DESTINATIONS WERE STILL NOT AGREED AND THAT THIS REMAINED A DIFFICULT PROBLEM.

CLUVERIUS ADDED THAT THE MOST OPTIMISTIC TIMETABLE WOULD BE ANOTHER FOUR OR FIVE DAYS TO REACH AGREEMENT AND TWO TO THREE WEEKS THEREAFTER FOR THE PLO TO LEAVE. BUT HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE CHANCES OF ACHIEVING THIS WERE SLIM.

4. THE NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE ASKED FOR AMERICAN VIEWS OF THE FUTURE OF UNIFIL GIVEN THAT ITS MANDATE EXPIRES ON 19 AUGUST. CLUVERIUS SAID THAT THE AMERICANS FAVOURED UNIFIL'S CONTINUATION, ALTHOUGH IT WAS TOO EARLY TO SEE HOW IT MIGHT PLAY A ROLE IN SOUTH LEBANON. THERE WAS NO THOUGHT OF USING UNIFIL IN BEIRUT.

THOMAS

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PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, CAIRO, DAMASCUS
PARIS, JEDDA, JERUSALEM.

MY TELEGRAM NO 333: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. THROUGHOUT YESTERDAY THE ISRAELIS WERE AT PAINS TO EMPHASIZE THAT THEIR LATEST INCURSIONS INTO BEIRUT WERE LIMITED AND TACTICAL IN NATURE, AND IN RESPONSE TO REPEATED CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS BY THE PLO. THEY REPEATEDLY DENIED THAT THEY AMOUNTED TO AN ALL OUT ASSAULT. AN IDF SPOKESMAN SAID LAST NIGHT THAT BY CAPTURING THE EL-UZAI REFUGEE CAMP IN THE AIRPORT AREA AND TAKING THE MUSEUM AREA THE ISRAELIS HAD TIGHTENED THE SIEGE OF THE PLO. THE ISRAELI GAINS HAD GIVEN THEM DOMINANT POSITIONS WHICH WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE PLO TO FIRE AT IDF FORCES (ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, THE ISRAELIS NOW OVERLOOK THE MAIN PLO STRONGHOLDS AT BURJ EL BARHANA, SABRA, SHATILA AND SAKHANI).

2. OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS PROMINENCE HAS BEEN GIVEN IN THE PRESS TO THE EVIDENT DISQUIET OF SOME MEMBERS OF THE CABINET AT THE LACK OF MINISTERIAL CONSULTATION BEFORE THE LAST TWO ISRAELI ADVANVES . THESE ARE SEEN AS PART OF A NEW SHARON PLAN TO SQUEEZE THE PLO OUT OF THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN SOUTH BEIRUT AND FROM THE AREA AROUND THE HEART OF WEST BEIRUT. BUT THERE SEEMS TO BE DISAGREEMENT AMONG MINISTERS AS TO WHETHER THE CABINET APPROVED THE PLAN, OR IF IT WAS LEFT THAT FURTHER CONSULTATION WAS NEEDED BEFORE IT WAS IMPLEMENTED. THE HAWKS SEEM TO BE IN A SMALL MAJORITY IN THE CABINET. THEY INCLUDE MOST OF THE HEAVYWEIGHTS , BUT BEGIN HAS A HABIT OF GETTING HIS WAY ON IMPORTANT ISSUES.

3. THE QUESTION IS WHAT DOES HE WANT . THE CABINET IS DUE TO MEET LATER TODAY, PROBABLY BEGINNING AT 1600Z . THE OSTENSIBLE REASON IS TO HEAR A REPORT FROM SHAMIR ON HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON: AND ISRAELI SOURCES ARE INDICATING THAT THE QUESTION OF UN OBSERVERS HAS BEEN RELEGATED TO THE WEEKLY CABINET MEETING ON SUNDAY (AT THE SAME TIME THERE ARE SUGGESTIONS IN THE PRESS THAT THIS ISSUE PRECIPITATED YESTERDAY'S ADVANCES, SINCE THE ISRAELIS WANTED TO IMPROVE THEIR POSITIONS BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF OBSERVERS). BUT BASIC STRATEGY IS BOUND TO BE DISCUSSED . THE POLITICAL COUNSELLOR AT THE US EMBASSY CONFIRMED TO ME THIS MORNING THAT QUITE A FEW MINISTERS SEEMED TO BE IN THE DARK ABOUT RECENT ISRAELI MILITARY MOVES. HARE THOUGHT THAT , FACED WITH A HARDENING US POSITION , THERE WOULD BE PRESSURE FROM SOME HAWKS TO FINISH THE JOB QUICKLY . BUT HE SEEMED REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT THE ISRAELS WOULD ALLOW HABIB MORE TIME (SAY UNTIL THE CABINET MEETING OF 8 AUGUST) TO PGODUCE HARD EVIDENCE OF REAL PROGRESS WITH THE PLO . HARE SUSPECTED THAT THE ISSUE OF UN OBSERVERS HAD BEEN SUBMERGED BY SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS AND WAS PRETTY SURE THAT THE ISRAELIS, WHILE INDICATING READINESS TO HAVE ANOTHER CEASEFIRE , WOULD REFUSE TO WITHDRAW TO THE POSITIONS OF 1 AUGUST AS CALLED FOR BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

4. HARE SAID THAT BROWN HAD SPOKEN TO BEGIN TWICE YESTERDAY BY TELEPHONE AND HAD CALLED ON SHARON . IN ADDITON , PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE (WITH A COVERING LETTER MAKING FURTHER POINTS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF SUBSEQUENT MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS) HAD BEEN DELIVERED SOME TIME AFTER MIDNIGHT LAST NIGHT. THROUGOUT THESE EXCANGES THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN AT PAINS TO MINIMIZE THE MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN BEIRUT . HARE HIMSELF DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY NEW POLICY DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN BY THE ISRAELIS. IT WAS THE MIXTURE AS BEFORE: SALAMI TACTICS, WHICH THE ISRAELIS BELIEVED PUT PRESSURE ON THE PLO, HELPED

WHICH THE ISRAELIS BELIEVED PUT PRESSURE ON THE PLO, HELPED HABIB, AND IMPROVED THEIR OWN TACTICAL POSITION. HARE SUGGESTED THAT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ADVANCE IN THE MUSEUM AREA HAD BEEN CHIEFLY PSYCHOLOGICAL, IN THAT IT DEMONSTRATED TO THE PLO THAT THERE WAS NOTHING SACROSANCT ABOUT THE GREEN LINE.

5. ASKED WHETHER WE COULD EXPECT A DAY OR TWO OF RELATIVE CALM IN BEIRUT, HARE COMMENTED THAT MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON THE PLO. THEY AND THE IDF WERE NOW SO CHEEK TO JOWL THAT CLASHES WERE DIFFICULT TO AVOID. IF THE PLO CAUSED ISRAELI CASUALTIES, THE IDF WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY RESPOND.

6. FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH, I DISCUSSED THE SITUATION YESTERDAY WITH THE DIRECTOR OF THE EUROPE II DIVISION AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. GANOR TOOK THE LINE THAT THE PLO WERE FOOLING EVERYBODY, INCLUDING HABIB. THEY WERE STRINGING HIM ALONG, ENDLESSLY RAISING TRIVIALITIES SUCH AS WHETHER THEY SHOULD LEAVE BY SEA OR LAND. GIVEN THE COMFORT WHICH THE PLO HAD TAKEN FROM INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION AND PRESSURE ON ISRAEL, IT HAD BEEN NECESSARY TO GIVE THEM A SHARP REMINDER THAT THE IDF MEANT BUSINESS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE IDF POSITIONS WOULD BE USEFUL IF IT BECAME CLEAR THAT DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS HAD RUN THEIR COURSE.

7. ASKED WHETHER THE ISRAELIS HAD SET ANY DEADLINES, GANOR SAID THAT IF THERE WAS REAL EVIDENCE OF PROGRESS, HABIB WOULD BE GIVEN AS MUCH TIME AS HE NEEDED. BUT GANOR COULD NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT MOUNTING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE COULD CAUSE THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO GO FOR A QUICK MILITARY SOLUTION. THERE WAS A FEELING THAT THIS WOULD AT LEAST GET THE SUBJECT OFF THE FRONT PAGES. IN THIS CONNECTION, GANOR SUGGESTED THAT WEST BEIRUT HAD NOT YET BEEN SUBJECTED TO REALLY HEAVY BOMBARDMENT AND THAT ONE DOSE WOULD BE ENOUGH TO PERSUADE THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE CIVIL POPULATION TO LEAVE, THUS MINIMISING CASUALTIES IF AND WHEN AN ALL OUT ASSAULT TOOK PLACE.

8. WITH LUCK, THERE MAY NOW BE A SHORT BREATHING SPACE. BUT IT SEEMS UNLIKELY TO LAST BEYOND THE WEEKEND. I SENSE A GROWING FEELING HERE THAT ISRAEL IS LOSING THE PROPAGANDA WAR AND THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO GET THE JOB OVER WITH. BUT BEGIN IS KEENLY AWARE OF THE PENALTIES FOR ISRAEL OF AN ALL OUT ASSAULT, IN TERMS OF CASUALTIES (THEY APPARENTLY LOST 19 DEAD AND MORE THAN 80 WOUNDED IN YESTERDAY'S TRIAL RUN) AND RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. PROVIDED HABIB CAN MAINTAIN PROGRESS THE ISRAELIS ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE THE PRESENT POLICY OF SQUEEZING THE PLO. BUT IT

TO CONTINUE THE PRESENT POLICY OF SQUEEZING THE PLO . BUT IT WOULD BE CHARACTERISTIC OF BEGIN TO RESPOND TO INTENSE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE BY A SHARP GESTURE OF DEFIANCE . ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL COULD THEREFORE RESULT IN EVEN MORE BLOODSHED IN BEIRUT.

PRENDERGAST
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TELEGRAM NUMBER 476 OF 5 AUGUST 82
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MIPT

BEGINS:

1. ATTACKED BY AIR, SEA AND LAND IN RAS BEIRUT SEMICOLON FIGHTING RESUMED 0625 HOURS LOCAL, 5 AUGUST.

2. ICRC STAFF SPEND NEARLY ALL OF 4 AUGUST IN SHELTERS AND ARE STILL THERE.

3. DURING A SLIGHT LULL IN THE AFTERNOON OF 4 AUGUST, MR DESALIS VISITED NINE MAJOR WEST BEIRUT HOSPITALS AND SAW 193 WOUNDED AND 15 DEAD IN THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL (AUH) ALONE. MOST OF THESE WERE SOLDIERS BROUGHT IN BY COLLEAGUES, IT BEING IMPOSSIBLE FOR CIVILIANS TO GET TO THE AUH. DESALIS WAS UNABLE TO VISIT ANY OF THE MINOR MEDICAL CENTRES.

4. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH TRUE CASUALTY FIGURES. MANY ARE BURIED BENEATH THE RUBBLE OF HOUSES OR ARE TRAPPED IN THE BASEMENTS OF HIGH-RISE BLOCKS.

5. THE ICRC BUILDING HAS BEEN HIT BY ISRAELI FIRE AND ALL THE WINDOWS HAVE BEEN BLOWN OUT. THERE ARE 120 CIVILIANS TAKING REFUGE IN THE ICRC SHELTER WITH ICRC STAFF AND CONDITIONS ARE PRECARIOUS.

6. THE WATER AND FUEL SHORTAGE HAS REACHED A CRITICAL STAGE. THE SUPPLY OF BLOOD IS ADEQUATE AS DONORS ARE STILL COMING FORWARD BUT THERE ARE NO MEANS OF STORING/PRESERVING IT. UNLESS THERE IS A HOLDING CEASEFIRE TO ENABLE ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES TO REACH HOSPITALS, MEDICAL STATIONS AND THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, NO FURTHER RELIEF WORK WILL BE POSSIBLE.

ENDS:

ROBERTS...

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2660 OF 4 AUGUST 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV.

ROUTINE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDA, TUNIS, PARIS.

YOUR TELNO 1461: LEBANON

1. AS AGREED WITH THE DEPARTMENT I HAVE NOT TAKEN ACTION ON THESE INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WERE LARGELY OVERTAKEN BY THE ISRAELI MOVE INTO WEST BEIRUT EARLIER TODAY.

2. IN A STATEMENT ISSUED AFTER A MEETING OF THE NSC THIS MORNING, PRESIDENT REAGAN NOTED THAT THE LATEST ISRAELI OFFENSIVE CAME ONLY A DAY AFTER HE HAD MADE CLEAR TO SHAMIR THAT THE US PLACED GREAT IMPORTANCE ON THE SUSTAINED MAINTENANCE OF A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE TO AVOID FURTHER CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND TO SECURE THE PROMPT WITHDRAWAL OF PLO FORCES. THIS WAS A NECESSARY FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE GOAL OF RESTORING THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THE STATEMENT CONTINUED QUOTE THROUGH GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE PLO I HAVE EXPRESSED MY STRONG CONVICTION THAT THE PLO MUST NOT DELAY FURTHER ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. AT THE SAME TIME I HAVE EXPRESSED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF RE-ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING A STRICT CEASEFIRE IN PLACE SO THAT THIS MATTER CAN BE PROMPTLY RESOLVED UNQUOTE. REAGAN SENT A MESSAGE ON THESE LINES TO BEGIN THIS MORNING.

3. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TOLD US THAT THE PRESIDENT IS MUCH ANNOYED BY THE ISRAELI ACTION SO SOON AFTER HIS MEETING WITH SHAMIRE, AND UNDERLINED THE STRONG LANGUAGE OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO THE ISRAELIS. THEY SAID THAT THERE IS NO BASIS FOR PRESS REPORTS THAT THIS MORNING'S NSC MEETING DISCUSSED POSSIBLE SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL. BUT CLUVERIUS (PLEASE PROTECT) TOLD US THIS EVENING THAT HE AND FAIRBANKS WERE ABOUT TO BRIEF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE BEEN MISLED BY THE ISRAELIS OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS - QUOTE THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT BEGIN HAS BEEN LYING UNQUOTE. HE POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO PREPARE OPINION ON THE HILL FOR ANY DECISION TO TAKE MEASURES AGAINST ISRAEL.

4. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE UNABLE TO CLARIFY WHAT IS MEANT BY QUOTE CEASEFIRE IN PLACE UNQUOTE, BUT SUGGEST THAT REAGAN INTENDED TO COUNTER THE ISRAELI PRACTICE OF ADVANCING THEIR POSITIONS UNDER COVER OF A CEASEFIRE. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ISRAELIS' PRESENT POSITIONS INSIDE WEST BEIRUT DO NOT SEEM TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

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DESKBY 050800Z
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 050410Z AUG 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1215 OF 4 AUGUST 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, AMMAN,
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, CAIRO, JEDDA, TUNIS.

MY TELNO 1212 AND TELECONS HUMFREY/MILES: LEBANON: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. AT THE END OF ANOTHER LONG BUT EVENTUALLY PRODUCTIVE DAY THE COUNCIL ADOPTED THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN MIFT BY 14-0-1 (US) AS SCR 517. WHEN MRS KIRKPATRICK BELATEDLY APPEARED AND IN HER ERRATIC WAY BEGAN TO INDICATE U S CONCERNS THE ANGER AND IMPATIENCE OF THE ARABS AND THE OTHER NON-ALIGNED COOLED AND TIME WAS ALLOWED TO REACH A COMPROMISE TEXT ON WHICH THE U S COULD ABSTAIN.

2. THE DAY BEGAN WITH THE RUSSIANS CALLING FOR AN URGENT FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL. A SOVIET/PLO DRAFT WAS FLOATED FOR WHICH JORDAN AND SPAIN BECAME CO-SPONSORS, AND AFTER A BRIEF DISCUSSION IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS THE COUNCIL MET FORMALLY.

3. OVINNIKOV (USSR) ACCUSED BLUM (ISRAEL) OF LYING TO THE COUNCIL THE PREVIOUS EVENING ABOUT ISRAELI FORCES NOT ENTERING WEST BEIRUT. HE DEMANDED THAT THE COUNCIL TAKE EFFECTIVE AND DECISIVE MEASURES. NUSEIBEH (JORDAN) INTRODUCED THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AND SAID THAT IT WAS TIME TO INVOKE CHAPTER VII. LING QING (CHINA) ALSO CALLED FOR SEVERE SANCTIONS AND THERE WERE BRIEF STATEMENTS FROM DE PINIES (SPAIN), MOUSSA (EGYPT), NOWAK (POLAND AND TERZI (PLO).

4. BLUM (ISRAEL) DUCKED AN EXPLANATION OF HIS STATEMENT THE PREVIOUS EVENING: AVOIDED ANY REFERENCE TO THE ISRAELI ATTACK: AND CREATED A SMOKE SCREEN BY ATTACKING THE USSR, JORDAN AND OTHERS INDISCRIMINATELY. HE THEREBY SET OFF A LONG SERIOUS OF RIGHTS OF REPLY WHICH DESCENDED TO EVER LOWER LEVELS OF TRIVIALITY AND IRRELEVANCE MAKING A MOCKERY OF THE COUNCIL'S RESPONSE TO THE SITUATION IN BEIRUT. WHEN I TRIED TO BRING THE DISCUSSION BACK TO BEIRUT BY AGAIN SEEKING CLARIFICATION OF BLUM'S STATEMENT OF THE NIGHT BEFORE HE DUCKED ONCE MORE. HOWEVER THE RISK OF AN IMMEDIATE VOTE WAS AVERTED AND WE BROKE FOR LUNCH.

5. OVER LUNCH I GOT FROM THE CO-SPONSORS THE MINIMUM AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT NEEDED TO ALLOW US TO VOTE IN FAVOUR - IE THE DELETION OF ANY REFERENCE TO ISRAELI ''ATROCITIES'' IN THE PREAMBLE AND TO CHAPTER VII IN THE LAST OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH. THE U S MISSION AT THIS STAGE AND IN THE ABSENCE OF MRS KIRKPATRICK IN WASHINGTON TOOK NO PART IN THE PROCEEDINGS. WHEN SHEAT LAST GOT INTO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH NUSEIBEH (JORDAN) AND TUENI (LEBANON) HER OBJECTIVE WAS TO BALANCE CRITICISM OF ISRAEL WITH A CLEAR ENDORSEMENT THAT THE PLO SHOULD IMMEDIATELY EVACUATE BEIRUT. IN THE END WITH TERZI ACTIVE BEHIND THE SCENES A COMPROMISE WAS REACHED ON INCLUDING THE WORDING IN OPERATEIVE PARAGRAPH 5.

6. AFTER THE VOTE NISHIBORI (JAPAN), LOUET (FRANCE) AND I ALL MADE BRIEF EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE (TEXT OF MINE IN MY SECOND IFT). GERSHMAN (US) SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO SUPPORT SCR 516, WHICH WAS AN IMPORTANT STEP, AND REGRETTED THE LACK OF FULL COOPERATION WITH IT. THE U S HAD ABSTAINED ON SCR 517 BECAUSE IT DID NOT CALL FOR THE PROMPT WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLO.

7. TUENI (LEBANON) SAID FORCEFULLY THAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTIVES WERE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI AND ALL NON-LEBANESE FORCES AND THE REASSERTION OF LEBANESE AUTHORITY OVER ALL LEBANON. BLUM (ISRAEL), WHO WAS LOOKING CRESTFALLEN AFTER THE VOTE, ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH TUENI'S STATEMENT.

8. FOR TODAY WE HAVE GOT BY. BUT WE SHALL OF COURSE HAVE TO FACE TOMORROW (5 AUGUST) THE FOLLOW UP FORESHADOWED IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 8 OF SCR 517.

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DESKBY 050800Z
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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1216 OF 4 AUGUST 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, AMMAN,
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, CAIRO, JEDDA, TUNIS.

MIPT: LEBANON: SECURITY COUNCIL

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SCR 517

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

DEEPLY SHOCKED AND ALARMED BY THE DEPLORABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ISRAELI INVASION OF BEIRUT ON 3 AUGUST 1982,

1. RECONFIRMS ITS RESOLUTIONS 508 (1982), 509 (1982), 512 (1982), 513 (1982), 515 (1982) AND 516 (1982):

2. CONFIRMS ONCE AGAIN ITS DEMAND FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON:

3. CENSURES ISRAEL FOR ITS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE ABOVE RESOLUTIONS:

4. CALLS FOR THE PROMPT RETURN OF ISRAELI TROOPS WHICH HAVE MOVED FORWARD SUBSEQUENT TO 1325 HOURS EDT ON 1 AUGUST 1982:

5. TAKES NOTE OF THE DECISION OF THE PLO TO MOVE THE PALESTINIAN ARMED FORCES FROM BEIRUT.

6. EXPRESSES ITS APPRECIATION FOR THE EFFORTS AND STEPS TAKEN BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO IMPLEMENT THE PROVISIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 516 (1982), AND AUTHORIZES HIM, AS AN IMMEDIATE STEP, TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS IN AND AROUND BEIRUT:

7. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND NOT LATER THAN 10.00 HRS EDT ON 5 AUGUST 1982.

8. DECIDES TO MEET IF NECESSARY AT THAT TIME IN ORDER TO CONSIDER THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND, IN CASE OF FAILURE TO COMPLY BY ANY OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT, TO CONSIDER ADOPTING EFFECTIVE WAYS AND MEANS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

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PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN , CAIRO , DAMASCUS, PARIS , JEDDA, JERUSALEM.

MY TELEGRAM NO 332: ISRAEL /LEBANON

1. I DISCUSSED THE LATEST FIGHTING IN BEIRUT BRIEFLY AT 0700Z THIS MORNING WITH THE MINISTER/COUNSELLOR AT THE US EMBASSY. BROWN HAD JUST SPOKEN TO THE ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER, WHO HAD TELEPHONED AFTER SHULTZ HAD WEIGHED IN HEAVILY WITH SHAMIR IN WASHINGTON AND BROWN HIMSELF HAD SPOKEN STERNLY TO THE ISRAELIS HERE.

2. BROWN SAID THAT THERE WAS A DIRECT CONFLICT OF EVIDENCE . BEGIN HAD ASSURED HIM THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD NO INTENTION TODAY OF TAKING WEST BEIRUT AND HAD SAID THAT ISRAEL WAS WILLING TO HAVE A CEASEFIRE ON THE USUAL CONDITIONS. HE HAD POINTED TO THE FACT THAT THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE HAD NOT BEEN IN ACTION , AND HAD ALSO DENIED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE USING ARTILLERY (WHEREAS THE US

DENIED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE USING ARTILLERY (WHEREAS THE US EMBASSY IN BEIRUT HAD REPORTED THAT A BATTERY NEARBY WAS PUMPING ROUNDS INTO WEST BEIRUT AT THE RATE OF 8 EVERY 30 SECONDS). THE ISRAELIS ADMITTED TO HAVING TAKEN TWO SMALL AREAS OF EMPTY GROUND IN WEST BEIRUT : ONE IN THE AREA OF THE AIRPORT , THE OTHER NEAR THE MUSEUM CROSSING IN THE VICINITY OF THE HIPPODROME. BROWN COMMENTED THAT THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF SMOKE AND CONFUSION IN BEIRUT.

3. BROWN'S TENTATIVE CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE LATEST ISRAELI ADVANCE REPRESENTED A FURTHER INTENSIFICATION OF PRESSURE ON THE PLO . BEGIN'S REITERATION OF THE CABINET FORMULA (FIRST USED ON 1 AUGUST) THAT THE ISRAELIS DID NOT ''TODAY '' INTEND TO ASSAULT WEST BEIRUT COULD NOS BE DISREGARDED. NEVERTHE LESS, IT WAS BY NO MEANS IMPOSSIBLE THAT SHARON MIGHT TRY TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION , ARGUING THAT CONTIUING PLO FIRE , ISRAELI CASUALTIES ETC, MADE FURTHER ADVANCES NECESSARY.

4. WHAT IS HAPPENING IN BEIRUT IS ALSO CONSISTENT WITH THE THESIS THAT THE ISRAELIS MAY TAKE THOSE AREAS OF WEST BEIRUT IN WHICH THE PLO ARE CONCENTRATED SLICE BY SLICE AND THAT THERE WILL NO POINT AT WHICH WE CAN SEE THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE ABANDONED NEGOTIATIONS AND GONE FOR THE MILITARY OPTION-. IN EFFECT , THEY ALREADY SEEM TO BE PROCEEDING DOWN BOTH TRACKS IN PARALLEL , NO DOUBT CALCULATING THAT INCREASING MILITARY PRESSURE WILL CONCENTRATE PLO MINDS ON THE NEED TO WITHDRAW, AND THAT IF IT DOES NOT THE IDF WILL BE BETTER PLACED TO FORCE THEM OUT MILITARILY. I DOUBT WHETHER THE THREAT OF CHAPTER VII SANCTIONS WILL DETER THEM . EVEN IF THEY COULD NOT COUNT ON THE AMERICANS TO VETO , ACTION TO REASSURT THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (UKMIS NEW YORK TEL NO 1212) WOULD BE JUST AS LIKELY TO SPUR THEM ON TO FINISH THE JOB IN BEIRUT QUICKLY. THE ISRAELIS ARE GREAT BELIEVERS IN FAITS ACCOMPLIS . AND ANYWAY HAVE NO GREAT REGARD FOR THE COUNCIL.

5. NENAD PLEASE DECIDE WHETHER TO REPEAT TO BEIRUT.

PRENDERGAST
BT

BK

File Lebanon

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 August 1982

LEBANON: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

Thank you for your letter of 4 August.

The Prime Minister agrees that, provided the Resolution is amended to remove the reference to "atrocities" and the further reference to Chapter 7, we should vote in favour. If not, we should abstain.

I should add that the Prime Minister considers that the deadline of three hours imposed in paragraph 6 of the Draft Resolution is unrealistic but she would not insist on its amendment.

S.M.J. Lamport, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 August 1982

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

LEBANON: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

... I attach a draft which has been tabled in the Security Council by Spain and Jordan. UKMIS New York expect a vote to take place soon, perhaps by 5 p.m. our time.

The position of other delegations is not entirely clear. The French have not yet taken a decision on how to vote but seem prepared to vote in favour, despite the commitment in the last paragraph of the Resolution to adopt mandatory sanctions against Israel. The Americans are so far without instructions but will presumably veto.

Mr Hurd recommends that we should ~~seek to amend the Resolution~~ only support the resolution if it were amended, firstly by toning down the reference to 'atrocities' in the first paragraph and, secondly, ~~to~~ by amending the final paragraph to ~~commit the Council only to considering the adoption of effective ways and means in accordance with Chapter~~ omit the reference to Chapter VII 7 of the Charter. UKMIS New York consider that there is no chance of removing a reference to Chapter 7 altogether. If nevertheless these amendments ~~can~~ could be secured, Mr Hurd recommends that we should vote in favour. If not, we should abstain with a strong Explanation of Vote.

In Beirut, the Israelis appear to have halted their advance into West Beirut for the time being. They are from 1-2 kms. into the western half of the city. The Israeli Government is still insisting that this does not represent an all out assault on West Beirut. But this is playing with words.

I should be grateful for confirmation that the Prime Minister agrees with Mr Hurd's recommendation so that instructions can be telephoned to New York.

A draft message to President Reagan will follow later for the PM's ~~[illegible]~~ consideration.

S M J Lamport
Private Secretary/Mr Hurd

LEBANON: DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

The Security Council

Deeply shocked and alarmed by the atrocities committed by the Israeli forces in the invasion of Beirut on 3 August 1982:

1) Reconfirms its resolutions 508, 509, 512, 513, 515 and 516:

2) Confirms once again its demand for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon:

3) Condemns Israel for its failure to comply with the above resolutions:

4) Calls for the prompt return of Israeli troops which have moved subsequent to 1325 EST 1 August:

5) Expresses its appreciation for the efforts and steps taken by the Secretary General to implement the provisions of SCR 516 and authorises him as an immediate step to increase the number of UN observers in and around Beirut:

6) Requests the Secretary General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution as soon as possible and not later than 3 hours from now:

7) Decides to meet after 3 hours from now in order to consider the report of the Secretary General and in the case of failure to comply by any of the parties to the conflict, to consider adopting effective ways and means in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter.''

CONFIDENTIAL

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Lebanon

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 August 1982

The Lebanon

The Prime Minister was grateful for Mr. Hurd's minute of 4 August but decided that on balance she would prefer not to send the proposed message to President Reagan. In general she prefers to reserve her messages for those cases where they will have the desired impact. She doubts whether the proposed message would influence US policy at the present time.

A. J. COLES

Stephen Lamport, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

LEBANON

Thank you for approving so promptly the line to be taken in the Security Council. We may be harshly criticised by the Arabs for declining today to consider at three hours' notice Chapter 7 action against Israel. But no-one has thought such action through. Without the Americans it would be futile. Their attitude may conceivably change; if so, we can think again.

2. The situation is becoming more dramatic. Whatever their choice of words the Israelis are now in effect assaulting Beirut. The American attitude is shifting. Western interests in the Middle East require a clear American statement repudiating Israeli action and drawing the consequences for US military and financial support if they continue.

3. I know that you do not want to overload the traffic between yourself and the President. But this is a critical moment. I would suggest something short and specific, on the lines of the attached draft, to influence his policy when it may be in the balance.

4. There will also need to be a European response if the Israelis continue to assault. There may be pressure for purely European sanctions (but these would be ineffective and require legislation here) or for symbolic acts such as the withdrawal of Ambassadors (but ours is already home). Probably a strong statement is the right objective. So far as action is concerned, President Reagan holds the only key.

Douglas Hurd.

4 August 1982

Douglas Hurd

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

Your Reference

Copies to:

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CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

The situation in Beirut has obviously got much worse since my message to you on 29 July and Francis Pym's discussion with George Shultz the same day.

As you know, we have admired and fully supported Phil Habib's efforts to negotiate a withdrawal of PLO forces from Beirut. His task seems to have been made virtually impossible by the continued fighting. The ferocity of the Israeli bombardment of West Beirut on 1 August and the great suffering inflicted on civilians has deeply shocked people here. We may be only hours away from the final Israeli assault.

I understand of course that there are limits to what anyone, including the United States, can do to control Israeli actions in the immediate future. But the stakes are now very high. In recent weeks the Arab reaction has been hopelessly confused and divided. We cannot be sure that this will continue to be so as they understand what has happened. In

/moments

Enclosures—flag(s).....

moments of humiliation the Arabs can easily turn on their own governments.

I hope that it may be possible for you to make a clear public statement that what Israeli forces are now doing is unacceptable to the United States and cannot be regarded as self-defence. It would help if we could all at this critical moment call publicly on the Israeli Government to draw back from the assault and conform with the resolutions of the Security Council. I am always sceptical of the impact of words, however strongly expressed. Would it be possible for you at the same time to make it clear to the Israelis that their expectations of future financial and military help from the United States must depend on their response?

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2649 OF 3 AUGUST
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT,
PRIORITY PARIS, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, JEDDA, TUNIS

MY TELNOS 2640 AND 2641: LEBANON

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT TOLD US THIS EVENING THAT HABIB'S NEGOTIATIONS IN BEIRUT APPEAR TO HAVE MADE PROGRESS TODAY AND THAT THE LATEST PROPOSALS FROM THE PLO (OF WHICH THEY DID NOT YET HAVE A FULL REPORT) WERE MORE REALISTIC. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND HABIB REMAINS EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE TIMING OF ANY DEPLOYMENT OF UN OBSERVERS. HE WAS ALSO URGING WASHINGTON TO REACH EARLY AGREEMENT ON THE COMPOSITION OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE THINKING IN TERMS OF U S AND EITHER FRENCH OR ITALIAN PARTICIPATION, BUT ARE KEEPING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF GREEK INVOLVEMENT.

~~2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID TODAY THAT THE U S SUPPORTS~~

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID TODAY THAT THE U S SUPPORTS THE DEPLOYMENT OF UN OBSERVERS IN BEIRUT BUT THAT THE MODALITY OF THE DEPLOYMENT MAY TAKE SOME TIME.

3. MEANWHILE, SHAMIR MET TODAY WITH MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AND THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. HE SAID THAT ISRAEL SEEKS A PEACEFUL END TO THE PLO PRESENCE IN WEST BEIRUT BUT REPEATED ISRAEL'S THREAT TO DRIVE THEM OUT MILITARILY IF NECESSARY. ONCE THE PLO WAS OUT OF LEBANON IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PUSH FORWARD THE PEACE PROCESS. SHAMIR EMPHASISED THAT THE U S AND ISRAEL HAD SHARED GOALS IN LEBANON.

4. MEMBERS OF CONGRESS EXPRESSED OPPOSITION TO ISRAELI BOMBING OF WEST BEIRUT AND AT LEAST BY IMPLICATION CRITICISED ISRAELI POLICIES ON THE WEST BANK. BUT THE ATMOSPHERE IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN FRIENDLY, IN CONTRAST TO BEGIN'S MEETINGS ON THE HILL IN JUNE. SEVERAL MEMBERS EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE OBJECTIVE OF GETTING THE PLO OUT OF BEIRUT. A HOUSE STAFFER COMMENTED TO US THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT ISRAEL (LIKE THE ADMINISTRATION) WAS FOCUSSED ENTIRELY ON THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS AND HAD NO THOUGHT FOR WIDER ISSUES. BUT SHAMIR HAD REFERRED TO THE NEED FOR NEW MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS ON THE WEST BANK.

THOMAS

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FM WASHINGTON 030054Z AUG 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2641 OF 2 AUGUST
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT,
PRIORITY DAMASCUS, AMMAN, JEDDA, TUNIS, PARIS

LEBANON : VISITS TO WASHINGTON OF EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTERS.

1. KAMAL HASSAN ALI'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON LAST WEEK FOR TALKS WITH REAGAN AND SHULTZ, DID NOT SUCCEED IN RECONCILING EGYPTIAN AND AMERICAN DIFFERENCES ON HOW TO TACKLE THE BEIRUT CRISIS. THE EGYPTIANS CONTINUE TO INSIST ON LINKAGE BETWEEN THE WITHDRAWAL OF PLO PERSONNEL FROM BEIRUT AND THE WIDER PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. THE EGYPTIAN EMBASSY HERE SAY THAT THIS COULD TAKE THE FORM OF AN AMERICAN COMMITMENT, EVEN IN THE MOST GENERAL TERMS, TO FINDING A HOMELAND FOR THE PALESTINIANS, OR TO PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION. BUT THE AMERICANS TAKE THE LINE THAT THE WEST BEIRUT PROBLEM MUST BE SOLVED FIRST AND THAT THE WIDER PALESTINIAN ISSUE CAN BE LOOKED AT THEREAFTER.

2. THE EGYPTIANS TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT THEY WERE STILL WILLING TO TAKE THEIR SHARE OF THE PLO PERSONNEL FROM BEIRUT PROVIDED THAT THEIR LINKAGE CONDITION IS MET. THE AMERICANS SEE THIS AS EGYPTIAN REFUSAL TO TAKE ANY PLO PERSONNEL WITHOUT A MAJOR U S POLITICAL

GESTURE. MEANWHILE THE TEXT OF THE FRANCO/EGYPTIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION IS STILL UNDER DISCUSSION WITH THE AMERICANS, WHO HAVE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO WATER DOWN THE REFERENCES TO PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. THE EGYPTIAN AIM IS TO OBTAIN LANGUAGE WHICH, IF ACCEPTED BY THE PLO WOULD CONSTITUTE FULFILMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONDITIONS FOR A U S/PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE.

3. EAGLEBURGER CALLED IN THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR AFTER KAMAL HASSAN ALI'S DEPARTURE AND SUBJECTED HIM TO QUOTE TOUGHER TALK THAN ANYTHING THE EGYPTIANS HAD HEARD YET UNQUOTE. THE REASON FOR THIS IS THAT UNLESS THE EGYPTIANS ARE PREPARED TO TAKE THEIR SHARE, THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH PLACES FOR THE PLO TO GO. KEMP (NSC) SUGGESTED TO US TODAY THAT THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE FOR HABIB TO PAY A FURTHER VISIT TO CAIRO, WHEN HE COULD GET AWAY FROM LEBANON.

4. AS A CURTAIN-RAISER TO SHAMIR'S VISIT, PRESIDENT REAGAN TOLD REPORTERS YESTERDAY THAT IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT THE BEIRUT CEASEFIRE NOT BE VIOLATED. HE HAD LOST PATIENCE A LONG TIME AGO. THE BLOODSHED MUST BE STOPPED. HE WOULD BE TAKING A FIRM LINE WITH SHAMIR.

5. ACCORDING TO EAGLEBURGER AND KEMP, THE PRESIDENT WAS AS GOOD AS HIS WORD TODAY WHEN HE SAW SHAMIR. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT ISRAELI ACTIONS IN WEST BEIRUT WERE UNACCEPTABLE: THAT THEY COULD BENEFIT ONLY THE RUSSIANS: AND THAT AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION COULD NOT TAKE THE DAILY TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE ISRAELI CAMPAIGN. IT WAS PROBABLY REAGAN'S STIFFEST MEETING YET WITH AN ISRAELI LEADER.

6. IN A SEPARATE MEETING, SHULTZ EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR THE BEIRUT CEASEFIRE TO BE MAINTAINED TO GIVE HABIB'S NEGOTIATIONS A CHANCE AND FOR THE ISRAELIS TO RESTORE WATER AND ELECTRICITY SUPPLIES TO WEST BEIRUT. SHAMIR REHEARSED ISRAEL'S CONCERNS THAT HABIB'S MISSION HAD ALREADY LASTED EIGHT WEEKS WITHOUT SUCCESS: THAT PRESSURE WAS REQUIRED IF THE PLO WERE TO BE CONVINCED OF THE NEED TO LEAVE BEIRUT: AND THAT SOME SORT OF A TIME LIMIT WAS NECESSARY. HE REPEATED ISRAELI ASSURANCES ABOUT THEIR ULTIMATE INTENTION TO WITHDRAW FROM THE LEBANON. ON THE AUTONOMY TALKS THE AMERICANS HAD EXPRESSED SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT THE REMOVAL OF THE MAYORS. WHEN SHAMIR TRIED TO JUSTIFY THIS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY HAD OPPOSED CAMP DAVID AND WERE THEREFORE DISQUALIFIED, EAGLEBURGER HAD POINTED OUT THAT OPPOSITION TO CAMP DAVID HAD NOT APPARENTLY DISQUALIFIED EITHER THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON OR SHAMIR HIMSELF. DESPITE THIS, THE ISRAELIS HERE ARE MAINTAINING THAT THE ATMOSPHERE WAS GOOD. BUT THERE IS NO SIGN THAT ANY REAL PROGRESS WAS MADE.

THOMAS

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 17

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 2640 OF 2 AUGUST
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV
ROUTINE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDA, TUNIS AND PARIS

YOUR TELNO 1453: LEBANON: UN OBSERVERS

1. I HAD A WORD WITH EAGLEBURGER ABOUT THIS THIS EVENING. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS VOTED FOR THE RESOLUTION, THEY ARE NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT IT AND ARE CERTAINLY NOT PUSHING FOR OBSERVERS TO BE SENT NOW.

2. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION, HE ENLARGED ON THIS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S MAIN CONCERN IS OVER THE TIMING. ISRAELIS TAKE THE VIEW THAT THE DESPATCH OF UN OBSERVERS WOULD ENCOURAGE THE PLO TO RESIST REACHING AGREEMENT ON A PACKAGE COVERING THEIR WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT. HABIB SHARES THIS VIEW. THE AMERICANS ALSO SEE SOME RISK OF MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE FUNCTION OF UN OBSERVERS.

3. NEVERTHELESS, EAGLEBURGER TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE (AND ASKED TWICE THAT WE SHOULD KEEP THIS TO OURSELVES) THAT THE UN RESOLUTION ON

3. NEVERTHELESS, EAGLEBURGER TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE (AND ASKED TWICE THAT WE SHOULD KEEP THIS TO OURSELVES) THAT THE UN RESOLUTION ON OBSERVERS HAD ONE IMPORTANT ADVANTAGE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN EVENTUAL MULTINATIONAL FORCE FOR THE LEBANON. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE RESOLUTION CALLED FOR OBSERVERS, NOT TO OBSERVE THE CEASEFIRE, BUT EFFECTIVELY TO MONITOR THE SITUATION IN THE LEBANON. ON THE BASIS OF THIS RESOLUTION, THEREFORE, THE SECRETARY GENERAL COULD SIMPLY BE ASKED, WHEN THE MOMENT WAS RIPE, TO SEND A TEAM OF UN OBSERVERS THERE AND NO FURTHER ACTION WOULD BE NECESSARY. THE ISRAELIS MIGHT STILL OBJECT, BUT THEY COULD NOT PREVENT IT. THE DESPATCH OF UN OBSERVERS WOULD THEN PROVIDE THE NECESSARY UN COVER TO ENABLE TO FRENCH TO PARTICIPATE.

4. IN SHORT THE U S POSITION IS THAT IT WOULD BE POSITIVELY UNHELPFUL FOR UN OBSERVERS TO BE SENT BEFORE AGREEMENT WITH THE PLO HAS BEEN REACHED: AND THAT WE ARE UNLIKELY AT ANY STAGE TO GET ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL: BUT THAT THE RESOLUTION ON OBSERVERS COULD PROVIDE AN IMPORTANT KEY TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN DUE COURSE.

THOMAS

NNNN

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 17

Lebanon

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
~~SIR J LEAHY~~
MR MOBERLY
SIR J BULLARD
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ADVANCE COPY

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Deskby 021030Z

CONFIDENTIAL
FM BEIRUT 020845Z AUGUST 82
TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 021030Z FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 464 2 AUGUST 82
INFO IMMEDIATE USUAL POSTS, JEDDA AND CAIRO

LEBANON

1. I SAW HABIB THIS MORNING. HE GAVE ME WHAT FOLLOWS IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE, WHICH HE WAS SURE WOULD BE RESPECTED.

2. THE MILITARY COMMITTEE HAD BEEN RESTORED TO LIFE. ON THE LEBANESE SIDE WERE BRIGADIERS TANOUS (MARONITE) AND KHOREITEM (MUSLIM), ON THE PALESTINIAN ABU WALID AND ABU ZAIM. THE LEBANESE WERE ABOUT TO CONFER WITH THE AMERICANS TO HEAR HABIB'S PLAN AND THEN PUT IT TO THE PALESTINIANS.

3. HABIB'S PLAN WAS FOR A 14 RPT 14 DAYS' OPERATION. IT WOULD TAKE THE PALESTINIANS OUT BY LAND TO THE BEQA' FOR A VERY BRIEF STOP AND THEN TO SYRIA FOR DISPERSAL. THE PALESTINIANS WANTED TO TRAVEL ON THE ROUTE KHALDE - ARAMOUN - ALEY - SHTAURA AND THEN NORTHWARDS. NOW THAT THE AIRPORT WAS CLEAR, HOWEVER, HABIB WAS TOYING WITH THE IDEA OF EVACUATION BY AIR.

4. SO MUCH FOR DETAIL. THE PALESTINIANS SEEMED TO HAVE ACCEPTED THAT THEY HAD TO GO. BUT ''D DAY'' HAD YET TO BE FIXED AND

~~THAT THEY HAD TO GO. BUT ''D DAY'' HAD YET TO BE FIXED~~ AND THERE WERE ALL SORTS OF PROBLEMS OVER HOW MANY WERE TO GO TO EACH DESTINATION. THE MAJOR PROBLEM AT THE MOMENT WAS WITH THE EGYPTIANS, WHO WERE DEMANDING NOT MERELY AMERICAN CONTACT WITH THE PALESTINIANS BUT AMERICAN ACCEPTANCE OF SELF-DETERMINATION AS THE PRICE FOR RECEIVING THEIR QUOTA OF PALESTINIANS.

5. COMMENT. AS I SUSPECTED, HABIB IS NEAR SUCCESS SEMICOLON BUT, AS HE EMPHASIZED, IT COULD EASILY ALL GO WRONG. THE PALESTINIAN NEGOTIATORS ARE BOTH MODERATE (NOT AMONG ''THE MAD MEN'', AS SAEB SALAM DESCRIBED THEM TO ME).

6. AS I DRAFT THIS WITH MY DEFENCE ATTACHE IN AN OLIVE-GROVE NEAR YARZI, THE CEASE-FIRE IS CRUMBLING. THE ISRAELIS ARE SHELLING HADATH, WHICH IS NOW A PALESTINIAN SALIENT IF THERE ARE ANY PALESTINIANS LEFT THERE. THE ISRAELIS HAVE AGAIN CUT OFF WATER FROM WEST BEIRUT.

7. I AM SEEING SAEB SALAM TOMORROW AND HOPE TO HEAR SOMETHING OF THE PALESTINIAN POINT OF VIEW, AT FIRST OR SECOND HAND.

ROBERTS...

NNNN

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES #20

(6)

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
~~SIR J LEAHY~~
MR MOBERLY
~~SIR J BULLARD~~
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FM BEIRUT 011650Z AUG 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O DESKBY 020900Z
TELEGRAM NUMBER 462 OF 01 AUG
INFO IMMEDIATE USUAL POSTS

MT.

MY TELNO. 460: LEBANON.

1. THINGS HAVE EVIDENTLY NOT GONE QUITE AS FAR AS I THOUGHT. THERE IS ANOTHER CEASE-FIRE, NO DOUBT AS PRECARIOUS AS ALL THE OTHERS.

2. PRESIDENT SARKIS (MIFT) TOLD ME THIS EVENING THAT HE THOUGHT THE IMMEDIATE ISRAELI AIM WAS TO SEIZE THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS WITH ALL THEIR UNDERGROUND SUPPLIES. THIS WOULD REDUCE THE PALESTINIANS TO IMPOTENCE.

3. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD ADVANCED TO OUZAI AND THOUGHT THEY HAD MADE SOME ADVANCE IN THE MUSEUM SECTOR.

ROBERTS...

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES #20

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FM BEIRUT 011720Z AUG 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O DESKBY 021000Z
TELEGRAM NUMBER 463 OF 01 AUG
INFO IMMEDIATE USUAL POSTS AND JEDDA
INFO SAVING PARIS

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

MIPT. LEBANON.

1. WE HEARD ON RADIO BEIRUT TODAY THAT PRESIDENT SARKIS WAS SENDING FOR THE AMBASSADORS OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND HAD ALREADY SEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE FRENCH. OUR OFFICE WAS CLOSED FOR THE WEEK-END AND THE TELEPHONE AT AABEYH NEVER WORKS. I THEREFORE WENT DOWN TO BA'ABDA TO SEE IF THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO SPEAK TO ME.

2. HE DID. HE HAD SEEN HABIB AND THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AND THE FRENCH CHARGE', WHOM HE SOMEWHAT DISMISSIVELY DESCRIBED AS ''NEW''. HE COULD NOT FIND THE CHINESE (SEMI COLON) AND THE RUSSIAN WAS INCOMMUNICADO ALTHOUGH THEY KNEW WHERE HE WAS. HE WISHED SIMPLY TO PROTEST TO US AT THE ISRAELI BOMBARDMENT OF WEST BEIRUT. INNOCENT LEBANESE WERE PAYING WITH THEIR LIVES.

BEIRUT. INNOCENT LEBANESE WERE PAYING WITH THEIR LIVES.

3. I PROMISED TO INFORM MY GOVERNMENT WITHOUT DELAY. I ASKED WHETHER THE LEBANON CONTEMPLATED SOME ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. SARKIS WAS SURE THAT THEY DID BUT WAS VAGUE.

4. I DO NOT DOUBT THAT THE LEBANESE AUTORITIES ARE AS APPALLED AS THE REST OF US AT WHAT IS HAPPENING TO WEST BEIRUT. I NEVERTHELESS HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS ACTION, HALF HEARTED IN SUBSTANCE AND EXECUTION, WAS MORE FOR THE RECORD THAN DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE ANY DEFINITE RESULT.

ROBERTS...

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 01/1832 BM/AH

Original filed on - Lebanon.

Kenya: Situation: June 79

PRIME MINISTER

KENYA

The latest news on the tapes is that the Army has ceized power in Kenya, deposing President Moi, claiming to have done so in order to get rid of corruption and establish liberty.

The Army have called for all leaders in the previous government to report to Army chiefs - though President Moi's whereabouts are not known.

The FCO think that the High Commission has been sealed off - hence no communications.

MIDDLE EAST

The tapes carry a Beirut Radio report (which has not been confirmed by the FCO) that Israeli forces are advancing on Beirut:

> "Israeli forces have reached Beirut airport terminal in a major assault on West Beirut and are advancing on Palestinian strongholds. At the same time, Israeli troops tried to land from the sea close to the now deserted resort complex of Summerland - about halfway between the airport and the city centre - but were fought off. The Lebanese Prime Minister (Shasiq al-Wazzan) has been in contact with President Sarkis, and they have agreed to call for an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council to discuss the Israeli attack."

Debbie, 1/8

SUBJECT

cc Master
CPS

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 156/82

From: Jaber Al Ahmed Al Sabah

To : Her Excellency Mrs. Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

Your Excellency:

I extend to you warm greetings from a land that had presented to the world the mission of peace, but is now in urgent need of peace.

As Your Excellency is aware, Israel has relentlessly and stubbornly chased the Palestinian people. First it drove them out of their homeland in which they had lived for thousands of years; then it has kept harassing and fighting them wherever they sought refuge. Now, it is chasing them in Lebanon, not only killing defenseless civilians, children, women and aged men but also razing dwellings on their inhabitants for all the world to see and hear.

Isreal which has moved heaven and earth with its wails and grievances about the Diaspora will be satisfied by nothing short of a Diaspora of the Palestinians, though their own land is within their sight; their utmost hope is to return thereto and live like any other people on earth with a country and national govenment of their own.

Most sophisticated of prohibited weapons have become now available to Israeli troops who are using them to kill innocent people.

The massacre in Lebanon presents a bloody record of Israel's assassination of human rights. Israel's bombs and shells destroy man's right of life and security, while Israeli tanks march on man's holy places.

Humanity at large and all those who love peace and believe in man's dignity and right of life, do look to you for an end to such horrible carnage.

Hoping for a positive and immediate response from Your Excellency.

With my highest consideration,

(Sgd.)
Jaber Al Ahmed Al Sabah
Amir of Kuwait

11 Shawwal 1402 A.H.
31 J u l y 1982

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

من جابر الاحمد الصبـــاح

الى فخامة السيدة مرغريت ثاتشـر رئيسة وزراء المملكة المتحدة.

تحية طيبة ابعث بها اليكم من ارض اهدت الى الدنيا رسالة السلام، وهـــي الان في اشد الحاجة الى السلام.

وانتم ترون يا صاحبة الفخامة كيف تطارد اسرائيل الشعب الفلسطيـني في اصرار عنيد فانتزعته اولا من وطنه الذى عاش فيه الاف السنين، ثم اخـذت تحاربه في اى مكان يأوى اليه. وهي الان تلاحقه في لبنان، وتقتل المدنيـين العزل من اطفال ونساء وشيوخ، وتهدم المساكن على اصحابهـا تحت سمـــع العالم وبصره.

ان اسرائيل التي ملأت الدنيا بكاء وشكوى من ايام الشتات، لا ترضى للفلسطينيـين الا بالشتات، وارضهم امام ابصارهم، وكل املهم ان يعودوا اليهـا. وان يعيشوا فيها كأى شعب من شعوب العالم، له ارضه وحكومته الوطنيـة.

ان احدث الاسلحة المحرمة اصبحت الان في يد الجيش الاسرائيلـي يقتل بها الابريـــاء.

ان مجزرة لبنان سجل دموى تغتال فيه اسرائيل حقوق الانســـان، وتدمر بقذائفهـا حقه في الحياة والامن، وتزحف بدباباتها على كل مقدساته.

ان الانسانية وكل محب للسلام مؤمن بكرامته وحقه في الحياة، يتطلع اليكم لايقاف هذه المجزرة الرهيبـة.

وارجو ان تكون استجابة فخامتكم ايجابية وعاجلـة.

مع فائق التقديـــر.

جابر الاحمد الصبـــاح
امير الكويت

الكويت في : ١١ شوال ١٤٠٢هـ
الموافـق : ٣١ يوليو ١٩٨٢م

MFJ

CONFIDENTIAL

29 July 1982

Proposed Visit by Non-Aligned Movement Delegation

Thank you for your letter of 28 July about the visit to London of the nine-man committee set up by the Non-Aligned Movement on the question of the Lebanon. The Prime Minister would be grateful if an FCO Minister, rather than she herself, could receive this delegation.

JC

Francis Richards Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 July 1982

Prime Minister

Agree that an F.C.O. Minister, rather than you yourself, should receive this delegation?

Yes

A.S.C. 29/7.

Dear John,

Proposed visit by Non-Aligned Movement Delegation

The meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement in Nicosia on 15 - 17 July on the subject of Lebanon set up a nine-man Committee charged with visiting Lebanon and maintaining contact with the Permanent Members of the Security Council with a view to finding a solution to the Lebanese crisis. The members of the Committee are the Foreign Ministers of Cuba, India, Sri Lanka, Benin, Senegal, Guyana, Nicaragua, Yugoslavia and Cyprus.

The Lebanese Government have turned down a request for an early visit by the Committee. We have now received a formal request for the Committee to visit London for talks with the Foreign Secretary and if possible the Prime Minister, as part of a round of visits to the Permanent Members of the Security Council.

The Committee is unwieldy and there is no prospect that its members will make a practical contribution to solving the Lebanese crisis. The Lebanese themselves seem to be holding them at arms length. The Communique from the Non-Aligned meeting (summary enclosed) will presumably form their brief for their Meetings. It takes a hard line against Israel, including a call to the Security Council to impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions.

In the circumstances, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary does not consider that it would be worthwhile for the Prime Minister to see the Committee, even if they managed to assemble most of the Foreign Ministers for a visit to London (which we doubt). If the Prime Minister agrees, we will tell the Cypriots

/that an

that an FCO Minister would be happy to receive the Committee.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

GRS 740
UNCLASSIFIED
FM NICOSIA 190910Z JUL 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 204 OF 19 JULY
INFO ROUTINE TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK , WASHINGTON , DAMSCUS, BEIRUT

UKMIS NEW YORK TEL 1112 NON ALIGNED MEETING, NICOSIA 15-17 JULY

1. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER THE EXTRAORDINARY MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NON ALIGNED MOVEMENT CO-ORDINATING BUREAU, HELD IN CYPRUS FROM 15-17 JULY TO DISCUSS THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. FULL TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG TO FCO.

2. THE MEETING CONDEMNED THE ISRAELI AGRESSION IN THE LEBANON WHICH CONSTITUTED AN AFFRONT TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE DECISION TO CALL THE PRESENT MEETING DEMONSTRATED THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT'S CONCERN. ISRAEL'S AGGRESSIVE AND EXPANSIONIST POLICY WAS ONLY MADE POSSIBLE BY AMERICAN HELP SEMI COLON THE UNITED STATES SHOULD RECONSIDER THEIR POTIVY. THE MEETING CONDEMNED ISRAELI ATROCITIES AND ACTIONS ON THE WEST BANK AGAINST PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE , THE PLO AND SOUGHT WAYS OF FURTHER STRENTHENING THE PLO.

3. THE MINISTERS RECALLED THE DECISIONS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MEETINGS EARLIER THIS YEAR IN KUWAIT AND HAVANA, AND REAFFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE DECISIONS REACHED AT THE KUWAIT MEETING. THEY RECALLED SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 508, 509, 512 AND 513, AND DEMANDED ISRAEL'S COMPLIANCE WITH THEM. THEY CALLED ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO AUTHORISE THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL TO UNDERTAKE PRACTICAL MEASURES AIMING AT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTIONS, AND ALSO TO IMPOSE ON ISRAEL THE PUNITIVE MEASURES PRESCRIBED IN THE UN CHARTER FOR ENDANGERING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

4. THE MEETING CALLED ON MEMBER STATES AND OTHERS TO SEVER DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, AND TO REFRAIN FROM GIVING ISRAEL MILITARY OR OTHER SUPPORT. THEY EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT ISRAEL'S LINKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA. THEY CONDEMNED THE UNITED STATES' MISUSE OF THE VETO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THEY WELCOMED THE ATTITUDE OF SOME EC COUNTRIES , AND CALLED ON THE OTHERS TO ADOPT SIMILAR POSITIONS. THEY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE BY SOME STATES OUTSIDE THE NAM. THEY CALLED ON ISRAEL TO RESPECT THE 3RD AND 4TH GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND TO LIFT THE BLOCKADE OF WEST BEIRUT.

5. PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST MUST BE INDIVISIBLE , BASED ON A COMPREHENSIVE , JUST AND LASTING SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION AND THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT. THE ISRAELIS MUST WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED SINCE 1967.

/6.

6. THE MINISTERS URGED ALL COUNTRIES TO GIVE THE PALESTINIANS FULL POLITICAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT, WHILE INTENSIFYING THE CAMPAIGN FOR MANDATORY SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL AND TAKING APPROPRIATE ACTION AGATINST STATES ENCOURAGING ISRAEL. THEY APPOINTED A COMMITTEE OF 9 MEMBERS, INCLUDING CUBA, WHICH SHOULD VISIT THE LEBANON, MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE UN AND PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH A VIEW TO FINDING A SOLUTION, AND PREPARE A DECLARATION FOR THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT IN BAGHDAD CONTAINING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MEASURES OF ASSISTANCE . (A SEPARATE STATEMENT LISTED THE MEMEBERS OF THE COMMITTEE AS THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF CUBA, INDIA, SRI LANKA, BENIN, SENEGAL, GUYANA, NICARAGUA, YUGOSLAVIA AND CYPRUS.)

7. THE MEETING DEMANDED A CEASE-FIRE AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON, TOGETHER WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UN FORCE IN THE LEBANON . IT CALLED FOR A FURTHER UNGA DEBATE BEFORE THE END OF AUGUST, AND FOR THE ACCELERATION OF PREPARATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PALESTINE, SO THAT IT COULD BE HELD IN 1983. THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD RECOGNISE PALESTINIAN RIGHTS AS SET OUT AT IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION ES 7/2, AND SHOULD APPLY AS A MATTER OF URGENCY COMPREHENSIVE AND MANDATORY SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL.

8. FOREIGN MINISTER ROLANDIS , AS CHAIRMAN OF THE MEETING, WAS INSTRUCTED TO BRING THE COMMUNIQUE TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE HAS ASKED ME TO CALL TOMORROW MORNING . I WILL SEND FURTHER COMMENTS THEREAFTER.

9. FCO PLEASE REPEAT TO OTHER ADDRESSEES AS APPROPRIATE.

WILBERFORCE

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GRS 638
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FM FCO 271040 JULY 82
TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT
TELEGRAM NUMBER 299 OF 27 JULY
INFO PRIORITY: WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, UKMIS NEW YORK
DAMASCUS, JEDDA, AMMAN,BAGHDAD
INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.
CALL BY HABIB : 26 JULY.

1. HABIB CALLED ON ME ON 26 JULY. HE HAD SEEN HUSSEIN EARLIER AND INTENDED TO FLY TO JERUSALEM IN THE EVENING. HE SAID HIS PRIORITY TASK WAS TO LIFT THE SIEGE OF BEIRUT AND GET THE PLO OUT. A SECOND STAGE WOULD BE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ' EXTERNAL ' FORCES (HE USED THE TERM IN DEFERENCE TO SYRIAN INSISTENCE THAT THE ADF WAS NOT 'FOREIGN') AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WITH ACTUAL AUTHORITY EXTENDING THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

2. THE PLO HAD BEEN PREPARED TO LEAVE FOR SOME WEEKS, BUT THE QUESTION OF WHERE THEY SHOULD GO TO REMAINED. HABIB HAD PREPARED PLANS FOR THE EVACUATION OF 8000 USING A MULTINATIONAL FORCE, OBSERVERS AND THE RED CROSS.

THE FORMATION OF THE TAIF COMMITTEE AND THE VISIT OF KHADDAM AND PRINCE SAUD TO WASHINGTON HAD DEMONSTRATED ARAB WILLINGNESS TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY. 8000 COULD NOT GO TO ONE PLACE. WORK HAD BEGUN ON DIVIDING THEM UP. LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS HAD VETOED PLO'S PREFERENCE FOR A JOURNEY THROUGH BEQAA. THE SYRIANS HAD RULED OUT SYRIA AS A STAGING POST AND WANTED THE PALESTINIANS TO GO DIRECT FROM BEIRUT. ASSAD HAD AGREED TO TAKE 2600 TO 3000, THE HEADQUARTERS, SENIOR PLO OFFICERS AND THE WHOLE OF THE PLA, BUT NOT SAIQA.

3. THE SAUDIS HAD FLATLY REFUSED TO TAKE A CONTINGENT BUT KING FAHD AND PRINCE SAUD HAD AGREED TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE OTHER ARAB STATES TO ACCEPT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES. THE TAIF COMMITTEE WAS TO MEET ON 27 JULY.

4. HABIB HAD SEEN MUBARAK, KAMAL HASSAN ALI AND BOUTROS GHALI IN

CAIRO. EGYPTIANS STUCK TO THE POSITION THAT THE PLO MUST GET A POLITICAL BONUS IN RETURN FOR AN AGREEMENT TO LEAVE BEIRUT: A NEW APPROACH TO THE PEACE PROCESS, ACCEPTANCE OF SELF-DETERMINATION. HABIB HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT AMERICANS CONSIDERED THE EGYPTIAN/FRENCH WORKING PAPER AS IRRELEVANT AND ULTIMATELY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES. MUBARAK HAD ARGUED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO STOP THE PALESTINIANS BEING RADICALISED HABIB HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED BY AN EGYPTIAN OFFER TO TAKE 500 TO 1000 MEN: THE AIN JALUT BRIGADE: THEIR FAIR SHARE WOULD BE AROUND 4000. MUBARAK HAD INSISTED THAT THE AMERICANS TACKLE THE POLITICAL PROBLEM FIRST. KAMAL HASSAN ALI WAS GOING TO WASHINGTON FOR TALKS (I HAVE INVITED HIM TO CALL WHEN HE STAGES THROUGH LONDON ON 27 JULY).

5. HIS LONDON MEETING WITH HUSSEIN HAD CONFIRMED THE KING'S WILLINGNESS TO TAKE THE BRIGADE WHICH HAD COME FROM JORDAN, IN ADDITION TO PASSPORT HOLDERS (TOTAL AROUND 3000). HUSSEIN HAD SAID THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD TAKE THE BRIGADE WHICH CAME FROM IRAQ.

6. I ASKED ABOUT CONTINUING ISRAELI PRESSURE. HABIB SAID THAT THE BOMBARDMENT REMAINED HEAVY BUT IT WAS HARDLY AFFECTING THE PLO: A MEDICAL SOURCES IN BEIRUT HAD TOLD HIM THAT ONLY 10 PER CENT OF CASUALTIES WERE PLO. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE PLO WERE NOT ASKING TO TAKE THEIR FAMILIES OUT (IF THEY DID NUMBERS WOULD INCREASE BY A FACTOR OF 8 TO 10).

7. DURING HIS TALKS IN JERUSALEM HE WOULD BE GIVING THE ISRAELIS A ROUGH IDEA OF PROGRESS BUT WITHOUT FIGURES. IF THE PLO AGREED TO LEAVE THE WAY WOULD BE OPEN FOR STAGE TWO WHICH THE AMERICANS SAW AS THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF AL EXTERNAL FORCES. ASSAD WAS ONLY PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITHDRAWAL OF THE ADF ON THE STANDARD BASIS OF A REQUEST FROM LEBANON AND THE ARAB LEAGUE. ISRAELI POSITION WAS THAT THEY WOULD NOT WITHDRAW ONE INCH UNTIL THE PLO WERE GONE AND THEN INTENDED TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE HYPOTHETICAL NEW LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

8. AFTER JERUSALEM HE WOULD BE RETURNING TO BEIRUT TO CONTINUE HIS ATTEMPTS TO PIN THE LEBANESE DOWN AND THROUGH THEM THE PALESTINIANS ON DETAILS OF THE NEGOTIATION. THE GAP REMAINED WIDE, FOR EXAMPLE SHARON HAD SAID THAT THE MULTI-

NATIONAL FORCE SHOULD NOT ENTER BEIRUT UNTIL THE LAST PALESTINIAN HAD LEFT: THE PLO TOOK THE REVERSE VIEW.

9. HABIB SAID HE WAS SPEAKING FREELY TO US BECAUSE HE KNEW WHAT HE SAID TO US WOULD REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM WASHINGTON 232200Z JUL 82
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2537 OF 23 JULY
INFO UKMIS VIENNA, UKMIS GENEVA, BEIRUT, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS AND PARIS

YOUR TELNO 624 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: LEBANON: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

1. KEMP (NSC) (PLEASE PROTECT) TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE TODAY THAT AMBASSADOR DILLON VISITED SIDON THIS WEEK AND ESTIMATED THAT AT LEAST 1,000 LEBANESE HAD BEEN KILLED IN SOUTHERN LEBANON (IE EXCLUDING BEIRUT AND ITS SUBURBS). IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO FORM ANY ACCURATE ESTIMATE OF PALESTINIAN CASUALTIES SINCE THE ISRAELIS WERE CONTROLLING VERY TIGHTLY ACCESS TO THE FORMER PALESTINIAN CAMPS WHERE THEY WERE DOING THEIR OWN QUOTE CLEARING UP UNQUOTE.

2. KEMP SAID THAT ON THE BASIS OF THIS AND OTHER REPORTS THE AMERICANS PUT TOTAL CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AT BETWEEN 2,000 AND 3,000. HE STRESSED THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS ESTIMATE GIVEN THAT ISRAELI OFFICIAL CASUALTY FIGURES ARE MUCH LOWER.

HENDERSON

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FM WASHINGTON 222335Z JUL 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2527 OF 22 JULY
INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, JEDDA, AMMAN, TUNIS, BEIRUT, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK AND MODUK

MY TELNO 2512: LEBANON

1. IN A BRIEFING FOR WESTERN DIPLOMATS TODAY CLUVERIUS (STATE DEPARTMENT) SAID THAT BOTH SAUD AND KHADDAM HAD EMPHASISED THAT THE ARABS WOULD FULFIL THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES IN RESPECT OF PLO PERSONNEL IN BEIRUT. IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT HABIB SHOULD WORK WITH SAUD AND KHADDAM ON SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ONWARD MOVEMENT OF PLO PERSONNEL. HABIB WOULD BE TRAVELLING TO DAMASCUS TODAY TO DISCUSS THIS.

2. CLUVERIUS SAID THAT THE ONLY FIRM OFFER SO FAR WAS THAT FROM SYRIA TO ACCEPT THE PLO LEADERSHIP AND THEIR ENTOURAGE, TOTALLING ABOUT 1,000 PEOPLE. THE POSSIBILITY OF JORDAN AND EGYPT ACCEPTING OTHER PLO PERSONNEL HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. IRAQ HAD ALSO BEEN RAISED BUT WAS NOT CONSIDERED A SERIOUS POSSIBILITY AT PRESENT. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TOLD US SEPARATELY THAT THE JORDANIANS ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT JORDANIAN PASSPORT HOLDERS FROM BEIRUT AND THAT THE JORDANIANS THEMSELVES ESTIMATE THAT THESE MAY INCLUDE AS MANY AS

[illegible] THAT THE JORDANIANS ARE WILLING ~~TO ACCEPT JORDANIAN PASSPORT HOLDERS FROM BEIRUT AND THAT THE JORDANIANS THEMSELVES ESTIMATE THAT THESE MAY INCLUDE AS MANY AS~~ 2,500 OF THE PLO GUERILLAS THERE. THE AMERICANS HOPE THAT THE JORDANIANS WILL BE PREPARED TO HELP PERSUADE THE EGYPTIANS TO ACCEPT THE GREATER PART OF THE REMAINDER. KING HUSSEIN HAS AGREED TO SEE HABIB IN LONDON.

3. CLUVERIUS SAID THAT TODAY'S FIGHTING WAS THE PREDICTABLE ISRAELI REACTION TO REPEATED INCIDENTS RESULTING FROM THE INFILTRATION OF PALESTINIANS MAINLY DFLB, THROUGH THE SYRIAN LINES IN THE BEQA'A. THE AMERICANS HAD ALREADY WARNED THE SYRIANS AGAINST ALLOWING THIS.

4. CLUVERIUS CONFIRMED THAT THE AMERICANS KNEW OF THE REPORTS THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD CONFISCATED SOME LEBANESE ARMY WEAPONS (YOUR TELNO 1355) AND THAT THEY HAD TAKEN THE MATTER UP WITH THE ISRAELIS. NO REPLY HAD YET BEEN RECEIVED. THE ISRAELI EMBASSY SAY THAT THERE WAS IN FACT ONLY ONE SUCH INCIDENT AND THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY UNIT CONCERNED HAD BEEN BEHAVING IN A LAWLESS MANNER. NEVERTHELESS, ACCORDING TO THE ISRAELIS, THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN QUOTE ANGRY UNQUOTE ABOUT IT.

5. THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ANNOUNCED HERE YESTERDAY THAT ITALY WAS WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN A MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN BEIRUT PROVIDED THAT ALL THE PARTIES AGREED AND THAT THERE WAS SOME KIND OF U.N. LINKAGE. ACCORDING TO THE ITALIAN EMBASSY THE LATTER POINT WAS LEFT DELIBERATELY VAGUE.

HENDERSON

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15528 - 1

Prime Minister

This is difficult to reconcile with other accounts of the talks in Washington.

A. & C. 22/7

GRS 835
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FM FCO 211530Z JUL 82
TO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 165 OF 21 JULY
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND JEDDA: PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV, PARIS, BEIRUT, TUNIS
WASHINGTON TELNO 2500: LEBANON: MR HURD'S CALL ON THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

1. MR HURD SPENT 30 MINUTES WITH KHADDAM AT HEATHROW THIS MORNING DURING THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S BRIEF TRANSIT BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND DAMASCUS.

2. KHADDAM SAID THAT HE AND PRINCE SAUD HAD DONE THEIR BEST TO MAKE THEIR VISIT TO WASHINGTON FRUITFUL. THE DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN FRANK. THEY HAD STRESSED IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE LEBANON: FOR THEIR PART THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN INSISTENT ON WITHDRAWAL BY THE PLO FROM BEIRUT. KHADDAM HAD TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT THE PLO WAS WILLING TO LEAVE BUT HAD NOWHERE TO GO. THE AMERICANS HAD SAID THAT THEY WOULD DO WHAT THEY COULD TO FIND A SUITABLE STATE, AND THAT THEY WOULD BE DISCUSSINQ THIS WITH THEIR ARAB FRIENDS. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD AGREED THAT ISRAEL SHOULD WITHDRAW ENTIRELY FROM THE LEBANON BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION ON A TIMETABLE OR A CLEAR FORMULA. NOR DID THE AMERICANS ACCEPT A CLEAR LINK BETWEEN THE CONFLICT IN THE LEBANON AND THE WIDER PALESTINIAN QUESTION. KHADDAM AND PRINCE SAUD WOULD BE REPORTING BACK TO THE ARAB LEAGUE AFTER THE EID HOLIDAY.

3. KHADDAM TOLD MR HURD THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT (NOT) BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE 'THE PLO FIGHTERS'. THIS WOULD SIMPLY MOVE THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM TO ANOTHER ARAB COUNTRY: WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO ACKNOWLEDGING ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO INVADE THE LEBANON: AND COULD POSE A SERIOUS DANGER TO SYRIA ITSELF. KHADDAM WAS NOT CLEAR, IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, WHETHER SYRIA WOULD TAKE NON-FIGHTING MEMBERS OF THE PLO IF THEY COULD BE

/SPLIT

SPLIT UP: HE REPEATED THAT SYRIA WOULD ACCEPT NONE OF THEM HOWEVER LONG THE FIGHT CONTINUED.

4. MR HURD ASKED ABOUT PRESS REPORTS THAT THE PLO WOULD BE READY TO ACCEPT THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL ON THE CONDITION THAT ISRAEL ACCEPTED PALESTINIAN RIGHTS: AND THAT IN RETURN FOR THIS UNDERTAKING THEY EXPECTED DIRECT TALKS WITH THE AMERICANS. KHADDAM SAID THAT THIS HAD NOT COME UP IN WASHINGTON. THE PLO HAD TAKEN NO SUCH DECISION. NOR COULD THEY WITH SOME OF THEIR LEADERS BESIEGED IN BEIRUT AND SEPARATED FROM THEIR COLLEAGUES. NOR WAS IT OPEN TO ONE MAN OPEN SQUARE BRACKETS PRESUMABLY ARAFAT CLOSE SQUARE BRACKETS TO TAKE DECISIONS ON SUCH MATTERS. KHADDAM DID NOT AGREE THAT OUT OF THEIR PRESENT MILITARY REVERSE THE PLO WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE POLITICAL PROGRESS. ANY POLITICAL MOVE IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD AMOUNT TO A POLITICAL DEFEAT. THE PALESTINIANS WERE NOW FACED WITH A NEW PERIOD OF CONTINUED OPPRESSION. PEOPLE DID NOT UNDERSTAND SUFFICIENTLY THAT RECENT EVENTS HAD BROUGHT TO AN END MODERATE PLO LEADERSHIP AND MADE INEVITABLE THE APPEARANCE OF MORE RADICAL LEADERS.

5. ON THE QUESTION OF A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE TO SUPERVISE WITHDRAWAL KHADDAM INSISTED THAT THIS MUST BE UNDER UN AUSPICES. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ALREADY PROVIDED A LEGITIMATE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR A FORCE. IF UNIFIL HAD BEEN INEFFECTIVE AGAINST THE ISRAEL INVASION, THEN DIFFERENT AND MORE EFFECTIVE RULES SHOULD BE DRAWN UP FOR THE FUTURE.

6. MR HURD ASKED WHETHER SYRIA WAS READY TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON. MR KHADDAM SAID THAT AFTER AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL THE SYRIANS WOULD AT ONCE WITHDRAW IF ASKED TO DO SO BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND AN ARAB SUMMIT.

7. KHADDAM WAS NOT DISTURBED BY THE PROSPECT OF A BLOODY BATTLE IF THE PLO DID NOT WITHDRAW FROM BEIRUT: 'THOSE WHO FIGHT FOR THEIR RIGHTS MUST MAKE GREAT SACRIFICES'. MR HURD SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE A CATASTROPHE FOR EVERYONE, IN PARTICULAR FOR THE ARABS WHO WOULD HAVE SHOWN THEMSELVES DISUNITED AND UNABLE TO SAVE ON ARAB CAPITAL. KHADDAM RETORTED THAT IT WAS BETTER FOR THE ARABS TO SUFFER ENORMOUS CASUALTIES THAN FOR

/ARAFAT

ARAFAT TO BE FORCED TO LEAVE BEIRUT IN IGNOMINY. THE SHOCK OF THOUSANDS OF DEATHS WOULD FURTHER THE CAUSE OF ARAB UNITY AND HASTEN ISRAEL'S DEFEAT. HE ACCEPTED THAT THE INVASION HAD CREATED A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE IN THE WEST AND A NEW OPPORTUNITY. HE ACCEPTED TOO THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO THROW THIS AWAY. BUT HE DID NOT SEE THIS AS A REASON TO RUSH INTO AN AGREEMENT.

8. THERE WAS A BRIEF DISCUSSION ON IRAN/IRAQ. KHADDAM REFERRED TO KHOMEINI IN TERMS OF A SAVIOUR TO THE TRUE ARAB CAUSE. IF IRAN WISHED TO SEND 'A MILLION MEN' TO JERUSALEM SYRIA WOULD WELCOME THEM IRRESPECTIVE OF THE ROUTE THEY CHOSE TO REACH THEIR OBJECTIVE.

9. COMMENT: KHADDAM THOUGH GOOD HUMOURED WAS AS OBDURATE, HARD-LINE AND PARADOXICAL AS EVER. HIS CONVERSATION BECAME MORE IMPASSIONED THE FURTHER THAT ARAB PROBLEMS WERE EXAMINED. HE APPEARED AS CONVINCED AS EVER THAT A LONG DRAWN-OUT STRUGGLE REMAINED INEVITABLE. BY CONTRAST IN A PRIVATE WORD WITH MR HURD AFTERWARDS HE SAID THAT THE TALKS IN WASHINGTON HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE AND HE HOPED SOMETHING WOULD COME OF THEM. HE ADDED THAT SYRIA APPRECIATED THE STAND WHICH HMG HAD TAKEN OVER THE LEBANON. MR HURD MENTIONED THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S HOPE TO VISIT SYRIA BEFORE LONG: KHADDAM WELCOMED THIS.

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FM BEIRUT 211316Z JULY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 434 OF 21 JULY 82
INFO USUAL POSTS AND JEDDA
AND SAVING TO UK REP BRUSSELS, PARIS.
UKREP BRUSSELS TEL. NO. 2951

LEBANON

1. AFTER BRUSSELS AND WASHINGTON IT MAY BE TIME TO TAKE STOCK.

2. FIRST, EVEN THE HARD-LINE PALESTINIANS (FOLLOWING TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) IN BEIRUT ADMIT THAT THE GAME IS UP AND THAT THEY MUST GET OUT. THE QUESTION IS HOW AND WHERE. OF COURSE THEY WILL TRY TO WRIGGLE OUT OF IT, GIVEN HALF THE CHANCE.

3. SECONDLY, IT WOULD BE FATAL TO THROW AWAY THIS ADVANTAGE BY MIXING UP BEIRUT WITH THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION AT LARGE. THE AMERICANS MIGHT WITH ADVANTAGE, HOWEVER, PROMISE THE SYRIANS AND PALESTINIANS THAT THEY WOULD TACKLE THE WHOLE ARAB/ISRAEL QUESTION PROVIDED THE LATTER WERE OF GOOD BEHAVIOUR OVER THE LEBANON.

4. THIRDLY, THE AMERICANS MUST SOMEHOW TALK DIRECTLY TO THE PALESTINIANS. INABILITY TO DO SO HAS BEDEVILLED NEGOTIATIONS HERE. PERHAPS THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE ASSUAGED BY DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN '' TALKING TO '' AND ''RECOGNIZING''. IT IS AFTER ALL NORMAL AFTER A WAR TO TALK TO A PARTY WHOM BY DEFINITION YOU DO NOT AT THAT MOMENT ''RECOGNIZE'' IN A DIPLOMATIC SENSE. THEOLOGY MUST NOT OBSTRUCT COMMON SENSE.

5. WHEN SHOULD THE AMERICANS DO THIS? I SHOULD HAVE THOUGHT (BUT THIS MUST BE A MATTER FOR JUDGEMENT BY OTHERS) THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO ACCEPT IT WHEN THE PALESTINIANS WERE AS FAR AWAY AS THE NORTH BEKA'A AND THE SYRIANS OFF SANNINE/DHAHR AL BAIDAR/BAROUK. WE ARE NOT FAR FROM THAT NOW.

6. THE CRUX, HOWEVER, IS THAT, ONCE THE LEBANON IS CLEAR, THE SYRIANS, PALESTINIANS, (AND RUSSIANS) WILL BE ROBBED OF THEIR MAIN SOURCE OF BLACKMAIL. THE AMERICANS WILL THEN HAVE A MUCH CLEARER RUN AT THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM AT LARGE.

7. I SHOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR COMMENTS.

ROBERTS

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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FROM TEL AVIV 211045Z JUL 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 318 OF 21 JULY 1982
INFO PRIORITY MODUK, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, CAIRO AND JEDDA.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 317: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. THE MINISTER/COUNSELLOR AT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO BELIEVE, FOLLOWING LAST NIGHT'S MEETING BETWEEN LEWIS AND BEGIN, THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD ALLOW A LITTLE MORE TIME FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF WEST BEIRUT. LIKE HARE (PARAGRAPH 1 OF TUR REFERS), BROWN EXPECTED A TOUR BY HABIB OF THOSE ARAB CAPITALS AMONG WHOM THE PLO IN BEIRUT MIGHT BE PARCELLED OUT. IT WAS ALSO TIME THAT HABIB VISITED ISRAEL AGAIN. ALL THIS WAS BOUND TO TAKE AT LEAST A WEEK.

2. ASKED HOW THE PLO MIGHT BE DISPERSED, BROWN SAID THAT THE FOCUS WAS ON THOSE COUNTRIES IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF ISRAEL. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS ABOUT JORDAN AND EGYPT, HE CONFIRMED THAT THEY WERE INCLUDED.

3. BROWN SAID THAT THE PRESENT MOOD OF ISRAELI MINISTERS WAS [illegible] THE CEASEFIRE WHICH HAD

3. BROWN SAID THAT THE PRESENT MOOD OF ISRAELI MINISTERS WAS PESSIMISTIC, SCEPTICAL AND CYNICAL. THE CEASEFIRE, WHICH HAD LASTED SINCE 11 JULY, WAS FRAYING BADLY AT THE EDGES. THE ISRAELIS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY WISH TO RETALIATE SHARPLY, AND SOON, FOR THE AMBUSH EAST OF LAKE KAROUN YESTERDAY BY PLO WHO HAD INFILTRATED FROM TERRITORY UNDER SYRIAN CONTROL, IN WHICH 5 MEMBERS OF THE IDF HAD BEEN KILLED, AND FOR ANOTHER AMBUSH SOUTH OF TYRE LAST NIGHT IN WHICH 5 ISRAELI SOLDIERS WERE WOUNDED. RETALIATION WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE IN THE AREA IN WHICH THE INCIDENTS TOOK PLACE (RATHER OMINOUSLY, SHARON YESTERDAY DREW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE CITY OF BEIRUT AND THE PLO CAMPS TO THE SOUTH, WHICH HE DEFINED AS BEING OUTSIDE BEIRUT).

4. BROWN COMMENTED THAT AT BEST THE COURSE OF EVENTS WOULD CONTINUE TO RESEMBLE A FEVER CHART. THE ISRAELIS WERE ALSO EXTREMELY EDGY ABOUT ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT IMPLY A POSSIBLE CHANGE OF US POLICY TOWARDS THE PLO. THEY HAD EARLIER ENQUIRED ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF KHALID EL HASSAN IN THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION IN WASHINGTON AND ABOUT REPORTS THAT HABIB HAD ASKED FOR AUTHORITY IN EXTREMIS TO TALK TO THE PLO DIRECT. THE INADVERTENT MEETING YESTERDAY BETWEEN ABRAMS AND HATEM HUSSAINI HAD NOT HELPED.

5. BROWN HAD NO FURTHER NEWS ABOUT A POSSIBLE VISIT BY SHAMIR TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK, THOUGH THE STATE DEPARTMENT WERE EVIDENTLY DRAFTING SOME SORT OF MEMORANDUM. NOR DID HE HAVE ANY INFORMATION ABOUT REPORTS ON ISRAELI RADIO THIS MORNING THAT SHAMIR HAD RETURNED YESTERDAY FROM A SECRET VISIT SOMEWHERE IN EUROPE, EXCEPT TO CONFIRM THAT SHAMIR HAD NOT BEEN PRESENT AT THE MEETING BETWEEN LEWIS AND BEGIN AND SHARON LAST NIGHT, WHICH IS UNUSUAL.

6. MEANWHILE, IT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED THAT A SINGLE KATYUSHA ROCKET WAS FIRED INTO UPPER GALILEE FROM LEBANON ON THE EVENING OF 20 JULY, AND THAT THOSE CONCERNED HAVE BEEN CAUGHT.

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FM WASHINGTON 212330Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2512 OF 21 JULY

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, JEDDA, TUNIS, PARIS, BEIRUT, AMMAN AND UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 2500: LEBANON

1. KEMP (NSC) TOLD US TODAY THAT REAGAN'S MEETING WITH THE SAUDI AND SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD BEEN MORE PRODUCTIVE THAN HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED.

2. AFTER PREDICTABLE POLEMICS, KHADDAM HAD SHOWN HIMSELF PRACTICAL ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES. THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT TAKE ALL THE PLO PERSONNEL FROM BEIRUT FOR REASONS OF INTERNAL SECURITY, THEIR NUMBERS, AND BECAUSE IT WAS NOT A SYRIAN PROBLEM. BUT THE SYRIANS WOULD ACCEPT THE PLO LEADERSHIP. KEMP BELIEVED THAT THIS COULD BE FLEXIBLY DEFINED TO INCLUDE UP TO 1000 PERSONNEL PROVIDED THAT OTHER ARAB STATES WERE WILLING TO TAKE THE REST.

3. SAUD HAD BEEN LOW KEY AND CONSTRUCTIVE. THE SAUDIS WERE LOOKING FOR TOKEN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN PARALLEL WITH THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO FROM BEIRUT. THEY THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO GET THE WITHDRAWAL

PLO FROM BEIRUT. THEY THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO GET THE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS UNDER WAY AND CLAIMED THAT THE ULTIMATE DESTINATION OF THE PLO WOULD CEASE TO BE A PROBLEM ONCE THE ARABS SAW THAT THE AMERICANS WERE SERIOUSLY COMMITTED TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 508 A[illegible] 509.

4. KEMP COMMENTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A REMARKABLE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON LONG-TERM GOALS FOR LEBANON. ON THE NEXT STEPS, HE SAID (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT HABIB MIGHT VISIT LONDON IN THE NEXT DAY OR SO TO SEE KING HUSSEIN. (COMMENT: IF HE DOES YOU WILL NO DOUBT WISH TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DE-BRIEF HIM ON HIS EFFORTS SO FAR (YOUR TELNO 290 TO BEIRUT)).

5. KHALED EL HASSAN (PLO) TOLD QUANDT (EX-NSC) THAT THE PLO WOULD BE WILLING TO ACKNOWLEDGE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AND TO ACCEPT SCR 242 AND 338 PROVIDED THAT PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL RIGHT ARE RESPECTED. QUANDT MADE IT CLEAR TO HIM THAT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES NOTHING LESS THAN AN UNAMBIGUOUS STATEMENT FROM ARAFAT WILL SUFFICE IF THERE IS TO BE A US/PLO DIALOGUE. QUANDT COMMENTED THAT KHALED EL HASSAN APPEARS TO HAVE AN EXAGGERATED IDEA OF THE STRENGTH OF THE PLO BARGAINING POSITION AND TO DISCOUNT THE VERY REAL RISK THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL TAKE FURTHER MILITARY ACTION IN WEST BEIRUT. KEMP CONFIRMED TO US THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S LINE IS UNCHANGED.

HENDERSON

NNNN

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20 July 1982

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 8 July conveying a message from the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

I now enclose the Prime Minister's reply to the President and should be most grateful if you could arrange for its delivery.

JOHN COLES

His Excellency Mr. Ali Arshad

JR

bc: FCO
Kimbaddy.

file

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T145/82

SUBJECT

10 DOWNING STREET

See Master Ops

THE PRIME MINISTER

19 July 1982

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your message, which your Ambassador delivered on 8 July. I fully share your alarm at the tragic events in the Lebanon. We in Britain have also been appalled by the civilian casualties and the widespread destruction.

We and our partners in the Ten have continued to press for an immediate and unconditional Israeli withdrawal, in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 508 and 509, in order to prevent further bloodshed. We support the efforts of Mr. Habib to achieve a negotiated solution to the crisis in West Beirut. His efforts seem to hold out the best hopes of a rapid end to the sufferings of that beleaguered city. Priority must then be given to bringing about the emergence of an effective Lebanese Government ruling in peace over the whole of its territory.

The Ten have also taken concrete steps to underline our concern that Israel has so far failed to comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions. We have suspended the signature of the second Financial Protocol with Israel and have postponed a Ministerial meeting of the EC/Israel Cooperation Council. We have made it clear that Israel is not receiving any arms supplies from the Ten. We have also been actively providing humanitarian assistance to the innocent victims of this conflict.

/ I share

BK

I share your view that the rights of the Palestine people lie at the heart of the problem of a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement. The Heads of Government of the Ten made clear in a statement of 29 June that in our view Israel can only find the security to which she is entitled by satisfying the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination, with all that this implies.

I assure you that we shall continue to do all we can, in conjunction with all the parties concerned, to bring about an early end to this dangerous conflict, and progress towards a just and lasting peace in the region.

With warm personal regards.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq

Lebanon

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cc FCO

SUBJECT

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

19 July 1982

cc Master
cps

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T144A/82

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your recent message about the grave situation in Lebanon. I share your concern. The principles of international law have been violated and Security Council resolutions ignored. We and our European partners have condemned the Israeli action. Israel has, of course, often been the target of terrorist attacks and I join you in upholding all her rights as a state, including that of self-defence against such attacks. But self-defence is no justification for the invasion of a neighbouring country's territory, the destruction of people's homes and the enormous number of innocent civilian casualties which has been inflicted upon Lebanon.

These recent tragic events have once more underlined the urgent need to find a solution to the Palestinian problem as part of a comprehensive peace settlement. The Palestinian people are entitled to their right to self-determination. My Government and our European partners are working to bring all the parties to the negotiating table on the basis of the mutual acceptance of each other's rights. The Ten have said that the PLO will have to be associated with negotiations.

/We also

We also are fully aware of our responsibilities as a permanent member of the Security Council. We have taken every opportunity to urge Israel to comply with the relevant resolutions on the situation in Lebanon. The measures which we and our European partners have taken can have left the Israeli Government in no doubt about the strength of our feeling. We are continuing to watch the situation closely and you can be sure that we will not hesitate in our efforts to help bring about an acceptable settlement and thus reduce the terrible human suffering.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Mwalimu Dr. Julius K. Nyerere

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FM JEDDAH 181035Z JUL 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 306 OF 18 JULY

REPEATED ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, TUNIS.

MY TEL NO 297: THE LEBANON.

1. THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONFIRMED TO ME YESTERDAY WHAT CHATTI HAD TOLD ME ABOUT SAUDI CONTACTS WITH THE AMERICANS (PARA 6 OF TUR). IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS THE US AND ISRAEL WERE INSISTING THAT THE PLO PRESENCE IN BEIRUT SHOULD BE A PURELY POLITICAL ONE. BUT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO PERSUADE THE PLO TO ADOPT A PURELY POLITICAL ROLE UNLESS THEY COULD BE CONVINCED THAT SUCH A ROLE WOULD PRODUCE RESULTS. ACCORDINGLY THE SAUDIS WERE TRYING TO PERSUADE THE AMERICANS TO ACCEPT TWO POINTS WHICH WERE ESSENTIAL IF THE PLO WAS TO BE BROUGHT TO AGREE TO AN EVACUATION:

(A) AMERICAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION,

(B) AMERICAN RECOGNITION OF THE PLO AS A LEGITIMATE SPOKESMAN OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE (THE SAUDIS RECOGNISED THAT IT WAS TOO MUCH TO ASK THE AMERICANS TO SAY THE LEGITIMATE SPOKESMAN).

2. MANSOURI WAS VAGUE ON THE AMERICANS' REACTION TO THE SELF-DETERMINATION POINT. ON RECOGNITION OF THE PLO HE SAID SIMPLY THAT THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR HAD ARGUED ON A PERSONAL BASIS THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE AMERICANS TO TAKE THIS STEP NOW, THOUGH AFTER A FEW WEEKS OR MONTHS IT MIGHT BECOME EASIER. MANSOURI'S OWN VIEW WAS THAT IT WOULD BE EASIER NOW THAN IN THE FUTURE: THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE PERSUADED TO SWALLOW AN AMERICAN CHANGE OF POLICY NOW IN RETURN FOR THEIR IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE OF A PLO EVACUATION.

3. I HAVE SEEN MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE THIS MORNING. HE CONFIRMS THE GENERAL ACCURACY OF MANSOURI'S AND CHATTI'S ACCOUNTS. HE IS HIMSELF PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE LIKELIHOOD AND EVEN THE WISDOM OF CONCESSIONS BY THE AMERICANS TO THE PLO UNLESS THE PLO THEMSELVES PLAY THE CARD OF RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AND RESOLUTION 242. HE ARGUES THAT THE PLO HAVE SAID FOR YEARS THAT THEY WOULD NOT PLAY THIS CARD UNTIL IT WAS CLEAR THAT IT WOULD PRODUCE A SUBSTANTIAL GAIN FOR THEM: NOW, IF EVER, THAT TIME HAS COME.

4. MURPHY ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THE SAUDIS ARE PURSUING A POLICY WITH THE AMERICANS OF ''QUIET DIPLOMACY'' AND HAVE SET THEIR FACES AGAINST SUMMIT MEETINGS.

CONFIDENTIAL

/5. HE

5. HE BELIEVES THAT THE SAUDIS ARE STILL MAKING A SUSTAINED EFFORT TO PERSUADE ASAD TO ACCEPT THE PLO FIGHTERS INTO SYRIA (THE AMERICANS ESTIMATE THAT THESE NUMBER 8,000). HE DOUBTS WHETHER ASAD HAS BEEN PAID ANY MONEY YET BUT IS SURE THAT MONEY IS AVAILABLE IF IT WOULD CLINCH A DEAL. MANSOURI HAS MADE IT QUITE CLEAR TO MURPHY THAT THE SAUDIS THEMSELVES WILL NOT ACCEPT THE PLO IN THE KINGDOM.

6. FCO PLEASE PASS TO BEIRUT IF NECESSARY.

CRAIG

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C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM BEIRUT 171310Z JULY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 426 OF 17 JULY
INFO USUAL POSTS

MY TELNO. 412 OF 14 JULY: LEBANON

1. I PASSED HABIB'S MESSAGE TO SAEB SALAM.

2. THIS MORNING I SAW THE UNITED STAES AMBASSADOR AND DRAPER. THEY SAID THAT FOR THE TIME BEING THEY HAD REACHED AN IMPASSE. SYRIA'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE PALESTININANS WAS CATEGORICAL. THEY WOULD APPARENTLY ACCEPT THE LEADERSHIP AND OFFICERS, A FEW HUNDRED ALL TOLD, BUT NOT THE MAIN BODY. ARAFAT HAD NOT YET SENT THE LETTER ASKING THE SYRIANS TO GIVE THEM SANCTUARY.

3. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THEY WERE EXPLORING THE OPTION OF SENDING THE PALESTINIANS IN PENNY PACKETS TO THOSE ARAB STATES WHICH WOULD ACCEPT THEM. DRAPER THOUGHT THAT IN THE LAST RESORT THEY MIGHT HAVE TO FALL BACK ON THE NORTH BEKA'A SOLUTION ALTHOUGH IT BRISTLED WITH DIFFICULTIES.

MIGHT HAVE TO FALL BACK ON THE NORTH BEKA'A SOLUTION ALTHOUGH IT BRISTLED WITH DIFFICULTIES.

4. MEANWHILE THE ISRAELIS WERE IMPATIENT. THEY HAD TIGHTENED THEIR SIEGE OF WEST BEIRUT AND WERE STILL HOLDING UP ESSENTIAL FOOD -STUFFS AND EVEN RED CROSS SUPPLIES.

ROBERTS...

NNNN

SENT AT 16///17/1411Z JAC

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 17

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IMMEDIATE

GR 550
CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 171555Z JUL 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2470 OF 17 JULY
INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDA, TUNIS, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK.
INFO SAVING BEIRUT

ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. STOESSEL REPORTED TO CONGRESS ON 15/16 JULY THAT A QUOTE SUBSTANTIAL VIOLATION BY ISRAEL UNQUOTE OF THE US ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT QUOTE MAY HAVE OCCURRED UNQUOTE IN LEBANON. HIS LETTER WAS CLASSIFIED IN ORDER TO AVOID PUBLIC DEBATE WHICH MIGHT AFFECT THE NEGOTIATIONS. THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN CONGRESSIONAL CRITICISM OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FAILURE TO MAKE A MORE DEFINITE FINDING.

2. STOESSEL'S LETTER DID NOT REFER TO ISRAELI USE OF CLUSTER-BOMBS WHICH IS SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL BILATERAL AGREEMENTS. AN ISRAELI REPLY TO THE AMERICAN APPROACH ABOUT THE ALLEGED USE

BOMBS WHICH IS SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL BILATERAL AGREEMENTS. AN ISRAELI REPLY TO THE AMERICAN APPROACH ABOUT THE ALLEGED USE OF CLUSTER-BOMBS IN LEBANON IS STILL AWAITED. MEANWHILE A FURTHER SHIPMENT OF CLUSTER-BOMBS TO ISRAEL IS BEING HELD UP.

3. KEMP (NSC) HAS CONFIRMED THAT A VERY SHARP ORAL MESSAGE WAS DELIVERED TO BEGIN EARLIER THIS WEEK, MAKING CLEAR THE PRESIDENT'S DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ISRAELI INTERPRETATION OF CEASEFIRES, AND THE SEVERE CONSEQUENCES FOR US/ISRAELI RELATIONS IF THE ISRAELIS DID NOT GIVE TIME FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO BE FOUND AND PROCEEDED INSTEAD TO LAUNCH A MAJOR ASSAULT ON WEST BEIRUT.

4. THE AMERICANS ARE UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE PROPOSAL TO MOVE ARMED PLO PERSONNEL FROM BEIRUT TO TRIPOLI OR THE NORTHERN BEKA'A AS THE FIRST STAGE OF WITHDRAWAL WHICH THEY REGARD VERY MUCH AS A LAST RESORT. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO IMPOSE A GREATER PLO PRESENCE ON OTHER PARTS OF LEBANON AND THAT THEY WOULD BE UNABLE TO CONTROL THE PLO IN THOSE AREAS. THE PLO WOULD NOT MOVE ON FROM NORTH LEBANON, RATHER THEY WOULD SEEK TO INFILTRATE BACK INTO BEIRUT AND THE SOUTH. ANY SUCH STAGED WITHDRAWAL WOULD REQUIRE AN UNEQUIVOCAL COMMITMENT FROM OTHER ARAB STATES TO ACCEPT THE PLO IN THE SECOND STAGE: ARAB RELUCTANCE TO DO THIS REMAINS THE MAIN IMMEDIATE PROBLEM.

5. HILL (STATE DEPARTMENT) TOLD US TODAY THAT THE US ATTITUDE TO THE FRANCO-EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE WAS UNCHANGED, THE AMERICANS WANTED NOTHING TO DO WITH IT AND THOUGHT IT RIDICULOUS AT THIS MOMENT IN EFFECT TO REWRITE SCR 242. THE FRENCH KNEW THIS. MRS KIRKPATRICK'S APPARENTLY MORE FORTHCOMING LINE (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1134) REFLECTED A MISUNDERSTANDING OF A CONVERSATION WITH THE EGYPTIANS FROM WHICH SHE HAD GAINED AN INACCURATE IMPRESSION OF WHAT THEY WERE PROPOSING.

FCO PASS SAVING BEIRUT

HENDERSON

PASSED BY C.O.D.

NNNN

16 July 1982
Policy Unit

PRIME MINISTER

THE LEBANESE CONFLICT

I had an hour's talk with Walid Khalidi, arranged by Dennis Walters. Khalidi is one of the leading Palestinian intellectuals, presently Professor of political studies at the American University, Beirut, and holds a chair at Harvard's Centre for Middle East Studies. Although not a member of the PLO, he is an influential adviser to Yassir Arafat. He seemed a thoughtful and straightforward man.

Khalidi believes that the first step in the Lebanon must be a multi-national force to prevent further slaughter of civilians and to begin a process of general disengagement. Sharon, he believes, would never drive his tanks through American, British and French troops. And Israel cannot hope to destroy the 6,000-strong core of PLO (which, he says, is so far intact and in tolerably good heart) without complete control, and in effect virtual demolition, of West Beirut. Once a multi-national force was present, it would be possible to begin reactivating the Fahd plan.

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I pointed out that, whatever the humanitarian virtues of this plan, it could be represented as a Western conspiracy to save the PLO. No Western government would be eager to commit troops to keep apart two highly aggressive and well armed adversaries, each of which would gladly fight on to the death. A firm assurance from the PLO that it would withdraw all its men to Syria within a short and specific timetable would surely be a minimal precondition for a multi-national force. Then, and only then, the Syrians could quietly withdraw too, and the Americans would be able to maximise the pressure on the Israelis to pull back, and the reconstruction of Lebanese democracy could begin.

Khalidi agreed, and said that he was sure Arafat would be willing to give such a promise. He had already done so informally. Khalidi said that time was running desperately short, not only for the unfortunate inhabitants of West Beirut, but also for the Middle East in general. The whole region was now threatened by the prospect of fusion between the Arab-Israel conflict and the impact of Khomeini's fundamentalism which has spread far beyond the borders of Iran.

If Arafat and his immediate lieutenants were killed, the hope of an increasingly moderate organisation to speak for the Palestinians would recede for years to come. Arafat dead was a far more potent symbol of Palestinian resistance.

He thought Britain and Western Europe might be able to take a more independent initiative which the US government, particularly with the arrival of George Shultz, would privately welcome, particularly now that there were signs of a change in US public opinion, especially in the Jewish community, as a result of Israeli behaviour in the Lebanon. He agreed, however, that any permanent shift in American public opinion would be a slow process.

I said I would pass on what he had said to me.

FM

FERDINAND MOUNT

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 17

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BEIRUT 141755Z JUL 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
INFO USUAL POSTS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 411 OF 14 JULY

MY TEL. NO. 409: LEBANON

1. SAEB SALAM SENT A MESSAGE ON 14 JULY ASKING ME TO SEE HIM AGAIN URGENTLY IN WEST BEIRUT. WHEN I GOT THERE HE HAD A MESSAGE WHICH HE WANTED DELIVERED AS FAST AS POSSIBLE MMTO HABIB.

2. HE HAD BEEN VISITED IN THE SMALL HOURS OF THE MORNING OF 14 JULY BY 4 PALESTINIANS IN ARAFAT'S ENTOURAGE WHOM HE TRUSTED. THEY WERE ABU JIHAD, ABU ZAIM, ABUL WALID AND HANI AL HASSAN.

3. THEY SAID THAT THEY WISHED TO AVOID DESTRUCTION AND BLOODSHED IN WEST BEIRUT BUT WERE BEING PUSHED BY EXTREMIST PALESTINIANS AND THE SYRIANS. THEY HAD IN THE EVENT NOT SENT ARAFAT'S LETTER TO ASAD BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED THAT A MESSAGE IN RETURN WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. IT WAS NOT IN ANYONES INTEREST THAT THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD BE A CARD IN SYRIA'S HANDS LATER. THE SYRIANS WERE ALREADY WORKING HARD TO CREATE A LEADERSHIP OF THEIR OWN CHOICE. KHALED FAHOUM'S RECENT SPEECH WAS AN INDICATION

OWN CHOICE. KHALED FAHOUM'S RECENT SPEECH WAS AN INDICATION OF THIS.

4. THEY WERE NOW PREPARED TO QUIT BEIRUT AND GO TO THE BEKA'A AND THROUGH THE BEKA'A TO THE HERMEL AREA. THERE THEY WOULD WAIT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR FURTHER TRAVEL WHICH WOULD NOT THEN BE TOTALLY AC SYRIA'S TERMS EVEN IF THEY EVENTUALLY DID GO TO SYRIA. IF ON THE OTHER HAND THE WASHINGTON MEETING OF SYRIA, SAUDIA ARABIA AND THE UNITED STATES DECIDED THEY SHOULD GO TO SYRIA THEN THEY WOULD WILLINGLY GO THERE STRAIGHTAWAY SINCE THEIR PRESENCE IN SYRIA WOULD HAVE, AS IT WERE, THE SANCTION OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED STATES.

5. IF THEY WERE ALLOWED TO STAKGE IN THE HERMEL AREA THEY WERE PREPARED TO GIVE WRITTEN GUARANTEES OF GOOD BEHAVIOUR WHILE THEY WERE THERE TO FRANCE, SAUDI ARABIA (AND THE UNITED KINGDOM IF WE WISHED IT), AND TO THE ISLAMIC LEAGUE OF WHICH SAEB SALAM WAS CHAIRMAN.

6. IN SHORT THEY WERE PREPARED TO GO STRAIGHT TO SYRIA UNDER SAUDI AND UNITED STATES PRESSURE. OTHERWISE THEY WANTED TO STAGE AND BARGAIN WITH THE SYRIANS.

7. ACTION ON EITHER OF THESE LINES WOULD SOLVE THE BEIRUT PROBLEM PROVIDED THE AMERICANS GOT THE SYRIANS IN THE BEIRUT AREA OUT AT THE SAME TIME. BY THIS THEY MEANT THE 2000 SYRIANS IN BEIRUT PLUS THE 4000 UNDER SYRIAN COMMAND IN THE BEIRUT AREA.

8. ON THE TIMING OF THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE THEY PROPOSED THAT, IF THEY AGREED NOT TO WAIT FOR THE ENTRY OF THE MARINES BEFORE QUITTING BEIRUT, THE FRENCH OR THE ITALIANS OR A MIXTURE OF OTHER FORCES COULD GO IN FIRST AND THE MARINES COULD FOLLOW.

9. I DID NOT KNOW THE BACKGROUND OF ARAFAT'S LETTER TO ASAD AND DID NOT THEREFORE FULLY UNDERSTANDPARAGRAPH THREE ABOVE. I MADE A CAREFUL WRITTEN NOTE HOWEVER AT THE TIME OF WHAT SAEB SALAM WAS SAYING. INDEED HE ALMOST DICTATED IT TO ME.

10. I UNDERTOOK TO PASS THIS MESSAGE TO HABIB AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND DID SO TODAY.

ROBERTS...

GRS187
UNCLASSIFIED
FM FCO 141420Z JULY 82
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1326 OF 14 JULY
INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS
INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, TUNIS.
MIPTS: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS FROM RECENT STATEMENTS BY ARAFAT AND SARTAWI:

(A) ARAFAT ON WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS LEADERS' STATEMENT OF 2 JULY (PARIS TELNO 694): QUOTE THIS CONSTITUTES A POSITIVE INITIATIVE TOWARDS A JUST AND LASTING PEACE UNQUOTE.

(B) ARAFAT TO AVNERI, LONDON TIMES 8 JULY: QUOTE WE HAVE DECLARED OUR APPROVAL FOR THE AMERICAN-SOVIET STATEMENT OF 1977..... WHEN WE HAVE SAID OK TO THIS INITIATIVE, THIS MEANS WE HAVE ACCEPTED ALL ITS ITEMS UNQUOTE (IE INCLUDING TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NORMAL PEACEFUL RELATIONS ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE).

(C) SARTAWI IN PARIS 13 JULY: QUOTE THE PLO HAS FORMALLY CONCEDED TO ISRAEL IN THE MOST UNEQUIVOCAL MANNER THE RIGHT TO EXIST ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS IN SOVEREIGNTY AND WITHIN SECURE BORDERS UNQUOTE. (PARIS TELNO 725 ALSO BEING COPIED TO YOU.)

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 July 1982

Type letter please.

A.J.C. 15/7

Dear John,

Thank you for your letter of 8 July enclosing a message from President Zia to the Prime Minister.

I enclose a draft reply for signature by the Prime Minister. You may wish to forward the original of the Prime Minister's reply via the Pakistan Ambassador. We would also propose to send the text by telegram to HM Ambassador, Islamabad.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

D[illegible]11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

President Zia-ul-Haq

Your Reference

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.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your message, which your Ambassador delivered on 8 July. I fully share your alarm at the tragic events in the Lebanon. We in Britain have also been appalled by the civilian casualties and the widespread destruction.

We and our partners in the Ten have continued to press for an immediate and unconditional Israeli withdrawal, in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 508 and 509, in order to prevent further bloodshed. We support the efforts of Mr Habib to achieve a negotiated solution to the crisis in West Beirut. His efforts seem to hold out the best hopes of a rapid end to the sufferings of that beleaguered city. Priority must then be given to bringing about the emergence of an effective Lebanese Government ruling in peace over the whole of its territory.

[check spelling] →

Enclosures—flag(s).....

The Ten have also taken concrete steps to underline our concern that Israel has so far failed to comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions. We have

/suspended

suspended the signature of the second Financial Protocol with Israel and have postponed a ministerial meeting of the EC/Israel Cooperation Council. We have made it clear that Israel is not receiving any arms supplies from the Ten. We have also been actively providing humanitarian assistance to the innocent victims of this conflict.

I share your view that the rights of the Palestine people lie at the heart of the problem of a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement. The Heads of Government of the Ten made clear in a statement of 29 June that in our view Israel can only find the security to which she is entitled by satisfying the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people, including the right to self determination, with all that this implies.

I assure you that we shall continue to do all we can, in conjunction with all the parties concerned, to bring about an early end to this dangerous conflict, and progress towards a just and lasting peace in the region.

MBL 15/7

GRS 210

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 132343Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2415 OF 13 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, ROUTINE AMMAN, JEDDA, CAIRO, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, TUNIS

MY TELNO 2404: LEBANON

1. THE SYRIANS CONFIRMED TODAY TO THE U S AMBASSADOR IN DAMASCUS THEIR REFUSAL TO ACCEPT PLO PERSONNEL FROM BEIRUT. THE AMERICANS HAVE NOT YET DECIDED HOW TO PROCEED. THE OPTIONS THEY ARE CONSIDERING, NONE OF THEM VERY PROMISING, INCLUDE FURTHER PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS, ANOTHER APPROACH TO MUBARAK AND A MESSAGE TO THE ARAB LEAGUE ASKING THEM TO PRODUCE A SOLUTION. MEANWHILE THE AMERICANS ARE CONTINUING TO DO WHAT THEY CAN TO RESTRAIN THE ISRAELIS FROM PRECIPITATE ACTION.

2. THE PRESIDENT IS TO BRIEF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS THIS EVENING ON HIS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO SEND U S TROOPS TO BEIRUT AS PART OF A MULTINATIONAL PEACE KEEPING FORCE. THE ROLE OF SUCH U S FORCES IS STILL NOT CLEAR. KEMP (NSC) TOLD US TODAY, IN CONTRAST TO WEINBERGER'S REMARKS ON 11 JULY, THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD PREFER THEIR FORCES TO ARRIVE AFTER THE PLO HAD LEFT BEIRUT. THERE WAS SOME FLEXIBILITY OVER TIMING: THE FRENCH CONTINGENT MIGHT BE IN PLACE BEFORE AMERICAN FORCES ARRIVED.

3. EAGLEBURGER TOLD ME THIS EVENING THAT THE SYRIAN REFUSAL HAD CHANGED THINGS FOR THE WORSE. HE THOUGHT QUOTE THE ROOF WOULD CAVE IN UNQUOTE BEFORE THE END OF THE WEEK: THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY MOVE INTO WEST BEIRUT, BUT WOULD CERTAINLY RESUME THEIR SHELLING.

HENDERSON

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to see
the Legal
Subject
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FM DAMASCUS 121030Z JUL 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 193 OF 12 JULY
INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, JEDDA
INFO ROUTINE CAIRO, UKMIS NEW YORK AND PARIS.

MY TELNO 192: LEBANON.

1. I UNDERSTAND FROM MY US COLLEAGUE THAT DRAPER DID NOT SUCCEED IN PERSUADING THE SYRIANS TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS ABOUT ACCEPTING PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS (THOUGH THEY DO NOT OBJECT TO ACCOMMODATING THE LEADERSHIP). THE PROBLEM OF WHERE THE LATTER ARE TO GO REMAINED IN PAGANELLI'S VIEW THE CRUX OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THERE IS ALSO, ACCORDING TO THE AMERICANS HERE, THE PROBLEM OF IDENTIFYING THE PALESTINIANS EVEN IF AGREEMENT WERE REACHED ON EVACUTATING THEM.

2. PAGANELLI (PLEASE PROTECT) WAS FRANKLY CRITICAL OF US POLICIES LEADING UP TO THE PRESENT SITUATION, BUT HE SEEMED TO THINK THAT THE POSITION WOULD BE IMPROVED IF THE PLO WERE TO MAKE THE BEST OF A BAD JOB BY SOME MOVE TANTAMOUNT TO RECOGNISING ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. I SAID I THOUGHT THAT PSYCHOLOGICALLY THIS WOULD BE QUITE IMPOSSIBLE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT PERHAPS THE BOOT WAS ON THE OTHER FOOT AND NOW WAS THE TIME FOR THE AMERICANS TO TALK

EXIST. I SAID I THOUGHT THAT PSYCHOLOGICALLY THIS WOULD BE QUITE IMPOSSIBLE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT PERHAPS THE BOOT WAS ON THE OTHER FOOT AND NOW WAS THE TIME FOR THE AMERICANS TO TALK TO THE PLO. PAGANELLI DID NOT DISAGREE IN PRINCIPLE BUT NATURALLY POINTED OUT THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES. I UNDERSTAND THESE, BUT WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT THE AMERICANS COULD REASONABLY SAY TO THE ISRAELIS THAT SINCE BOTH ISRAELIS AND AMERICANS WANTED THE PLO OUT OF BEIRUT AND THE COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS TO THIS END WERE BEING EVEN FURHTER COMPLICATED BY AMERICAN INABILITY TO TALK DIRECT TO THE PALESTINIANS IT WAS IN BOTH THEIR INTERESTS THAT THEY SHOULD DO SO.

3. THE SYRIANS HAVE WARNED THE AMERICANS TO EXPECT A DEMONSTRATION BY ''ARAB WRITERS'' OUTSIDE THE EMBASSY ON 13 JULY.

LUCAS

NNNN

THAT UN O ??

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 17

IMMEDIATE

Prime Minister
to see
Alan Lee
Duty Clerk
12/7

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CONFIDENTIAL
FROM AMMAN 121200Z JUL 1W
TEL NO 304 OF 12 JULY 882

AND TO INFO IMME4DIATE DAMASCUS JEDDA, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON

AND TO ROUTINE CAIRO, UKMIS NEW YORK AND PARIS.

DAMASCUS TELNO 192: LEBANON.

1. THE US AMBASSADOR TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT DRAPER WHO HAD SEEN KHADDAM IN DAMASCUS BUT NOT ASAD, HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD TAKE THE PLO POLITICAL LEADERSHIP BUT, IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES, THE PLO COMBATANTS. KHADDAM HAD CLAIMED TO DRAPER THAT ASADS NRWSITION ON THIS WAS NOT NEGOTIABLE.

2. WHEN THE US AMBASSADOR TOLD KING HSSEIN OF THIS OVER THE WEEKEND, THE KINGS REACTION, ACCSDDING TO VIETS, WAS ONE OF CONSIDERABLE DISTRESS. THE KING REITERATED THAT

2. WHEN THE US AMBASSADOR TOLD KING HUSSEIN OF THIS OVER THE WEEKEND, THE KINGS REACTION, ACCSDDING TO VIETS, WAS ONE OF CONSIDERABLE DISTRESS. THE KING REITERATED THAT EGYPT WAS MUCH PREFERABLE AS A DESTINATION FOR THE PLO AND THAT THE ARABS MUST LOOK AT THIS POSSIBILITY AGAIN, RATHER THAN ALLOW THE PLO TO FALL TOTALLY UNDER SYRIAN INFLUENCE. VIETS COMMENTED TO ME THAT ONE MAJOR DIFFICULTY ABOUT THE IDEAOF THE PLO'S GOING TO EGYPT WAS THAT THE SAUDIS GAVE NO IMPRESSION OF BEING INTERESTED IN SUCH A SOLUTION, DESPITE JORDANIAN PLEADING, AND CONTINUED TO FAVOUR SYRIA AS A DESTINATGPN.

3. PRESIDENT MUBARAK 'S SPECIAL EMISSARY, OSAMA AL BAZ, HAS BEEN IN AMMAN OVER THE WEEKEND, WITH A MESSAGE FOR KING HUSSEIN, AND I SHALL BE REPORTING SEPARATELY ON THIS.

SINDALL

NNNN

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 17

Prime Minister
To see.
Mr Legge
Butler
12/7

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PS/PUS
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FM PARIS 1215Ø5Z JUL 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 719 OF 12 JULY 1982
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, AMMAN AND JEDDA

YOUR TELNO 421: LEBANON

1. THIS MORNING'S PRESS RECORDS THE CONDITIONAL FRENCH AGREEMENT TO THE LEBANESE REQUEST FOR FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE. IT REPORTS CHEYSSON AS SAYING ON 1Ø JULY THAT FRANCE IS ''NOT YET CERTAIN'' ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF THE PLO AND ISRAEL TO SUCH PARTICIPATION. HOWEVER AN OFFICIAL SOURCE WAS LATER QUOTED AS SAYING THAT WHILE THEIR AGREEMENT DID NOT SEEM TO BE IN DOUBT THE SAME WAS NOT NECESSARILY TRUE OF THEIR ATTITUDE TO THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN TROOPS. IN THIS CONNECTION A FRENCH DIPLOMATIC SOURCE CLAIMED THAT ''THERE ARE SEVERAL POSSIBLE WAYS IN WHICH THE UN CAN GIVE THE APPROVAL WHICH PARIS NEEDS WITHOUT NECESSARILY ACTING BY A DECISION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHERE THE SOVIET UNION HAS THE POWER OF VETO.''

2. THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL ASPECTS OF FRENCH INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON HAVE AGAIN ASSUMED PROMINENCE. REPLYING TO A QUESTION FROM A PALESTINIAN JOURNALIST IN BUDAPEST ON 9 JULY MITTERRAND DREW A PARALLEL BETWEEN THE MASSACRE OF ORADOUR (A FRENCH VILLAGE WHOSE

PALESTINIAN JOURNALIST IN BUDAPEST ON 9 JULY MITTERRAND DREW A PARALLEL BETWEEN THE MASSACRE OF ORADOUR (A FRENCH VILLAGE WHOSE INHABITANTS WERE KILLED BY GERMAN TROOPS DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR) AND THE POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF A BATTLE FOR BEIRUT. THIS HAS ALREADY DRAWN PROTESTS FROM JEWISH ASSOCIATIONS IN FRANCE, AN OPPOSITION DEPUTY, AND THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT: THE LAST OF THESE HAS BEEN SHARPLY REJECTED BY THE ELYSEE. THIS WEEK, IN ADDITION, THERE FALLS THE 4ØTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ROUND-UP AND DEPORTATION OF JEWS BY THE PARIS POLICE DURING THE GERMAN OCCUPATION. BOTH EVENTS ARE AROUSING BITTER DEBATE: ON THE ONE HAND THE ACCUSATION IS MADE THAT THE JEWISH PEOPLE, VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, IS NOW PERPETRATING GENOCIDE AGAINST THE PALESTINIANS, WHILE ON THE OTHER THE ACCUSATION IS MADE THAT ANTI-SEMITISM IN FRANCE LIVES ON.

3. AMID THESE DOMESTIC CONTROVERSIES THE PRESS DISPLAYS RENEWED MISGIVINGS ABOUT FRENCH INVOLVEMENT IN THE ''HORNETS' NEST'' OF LEBANON. A TENTATIVE CONCLUSION APPEARS TO BE THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IS WELL PLACED TO PLAY A ROLE AND HAS AN OBLIGATION TO DO SO, BUT THAT IN DOING SO FRANCE IS MORE LIKELY TO INCUR BLAME THAN PRAISE.

4. ON 1Ø JULY DR SARTAOUI OF THE PLO (MY TELNO 694) RENEWED HIS CALL FOR AN ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE ON THE BASIS OF COEXISTENCE AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION.

FRETWELL

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 12

1555Z JC/HD

Lebanon

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 July, 1982

Pl. type reply in letter form for signature by the P.M.

AR 13/7

Dear John,

Message from President Nyerere

, 4 July, at flap (P7.2)

The Prime Minister recently received a message from President Nyerere of Tanzania about the situation in Lebanon.

I attach a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Nyerere, cast in the form of a telegram to Dar es Salaam. We have recently received a typed copy of President Nyerere's message by bag, and it would be appropriate if a signed copy of the Prime Minister's reply could likewise follow to Dar es Salaam by bag.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
UNCLASSIFIED	IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
GRS
CLASS
CAVEATS
DESKBY
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TEL NO

ZCZC
GRS
UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO July 1982
TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM
TELEGRAM NUMBER
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON
INFO SAVING PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS
YOUR TELNOS 270 AND 271

1. Please pass the following message to President Nyerere from the Prime Minister in reply to his recent message on Lebanon as soon as possible.

BEGINS:

Mr President, Thank you for your recent message about the grave situation in Lebanon. I share your concern. The principles of international law have been violated and Security Council resolutions ignored. We and our European partners have condemned the Israeli action. Israel has, of course, often been the target of terrorist attacks and I join you in upholding all her rights /// as a state, including that of self-defence against such attacks. // But self-defence is no justification for the invasion of a / neighbouring country's territory, the destruction of people's homes and the enormous number of innocent civilian casualties

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword which
File number	Dept Private Office	Distribution Middle East STandard and EAD
Drafted by (Block capitals) J E HOLMES		
Telephone number 233 4641		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

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UNCLASSIFIED	IMMEDIATE	2

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which has been inflicted upon Lebanon.

These recent tragic events have once more underlined the urgent need to find a solution to the Palestinian problem as part of a comprehensive peace settlement. The Palestinian people are entitled to their right to self-determination. My Government and our European partners are working to bring all the parties to the negotiating table on the basis of the mutual acceptance of each other's rights. The Ten have said that the PLO will have to be associated with negotiations.

We also are fully aware of our responsibilities as a permanent member of the Security Council. We have taken every opportunity to urge Israel to comply with the relevant resolutions on the situation in Lebanon. The measures which we and our European partners have taken can have left the Israeli Government in no doubt about the strength of our feeling. We are continuing to watch the situation closely and you can be sure that we will not hesitate in our efforts to help bring about an acceptable settlement and thus reduce the terrible human suffering.

With best wishes. Margaret Thatcher.

ENDS

2. Signed copy of the message follows by bag.

PYM

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PART 2 ends:-

Beirut tel 399 10.7.82

PART 3 begins:-

FCO to AJC 12-7-82

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

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