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FILE TITLE: Relations Internal Situation		SERIES LEBANON
		PART: 5A
PART BEGINS: November 1983.	PART ENDS: 4 December 1983.	CAB ONE: 

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PREM 19/1076

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PART

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TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(83) 35 th Meeting, item 2	01/12/1983
CC(83) 34 th Meeting, item 2	17/11/1983
CC(83) 33 rd Meeting, item 2	10/11/1983
CC(83) 32 nd Meeting, item 2	03/11/1983

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES**

Signed *J. Gray*

Date 15/4/2013

PREM Records Team

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons HANSARD, 3 November 1983, columns 1012 to 1090: Foreign Affairs

Signed J. Gray Date 15/4/2013

PREM Records Team

E. R.
PRIME MINISTER

LEBANON

The latest information is as follows.

The attack on American reconnaissance aircraft yesterday consisted of about ten Sam missiles and 500 artillery rounds but no US aircraft were hit.

Today American aircraft attacked targets ten miles east of Beirut (not in the Beqaa as previously reported). It is believed that twenty-four carrier-based aircraft took part. Two were destroyed and one American pilot is in Syrian hands.

Michael Heseltine has had meetings in London about this today. He sent you a message describing the situation (attached) and said that he would be talking to Weinberger and that you might want to talk to President Reagan.

I have told his office that he should not get too far out in front, you were not disposed to have a row with the Americans about this. You would however like a report on his talk with Weinberger and his thoughts on the next steps. Then, you and the Foreign Secretary would let London have a clear steer from here on how this matter is to be handled.

AJC ?

4 December, 1983



10 DOWNING STREET

Joha ✓

I was informed at 06.30 this morning by MOD that the Americans launched an air strike against Syrian held positions in the Bekaa valley at 05.30 (UK time). No further details are available.

It seems the Americans (via their Embassy here) informed the CDS (MOD) at 5.15. The Commander of BRITFORCES was given a similar warning at short notice and was only able to report his knowledge PTO

of the intended air strike
to MOD at 05.25

Steve

4/12/85

SECRET

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ZZ ATHENS

ZZ DAMASCUS

GRS 92

SECRET

FM F C O 041326 DEC 83

TO FLASH ATHENS

TELERGAM NUMBER 556 OF 04 DECEMBER 1983

INFO FLASH DAMASCUS.

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM LEAHY

WE HAVE HELD A SERIES OF MEETINGS THIS MORNING ON THE US AIR
ATTACKS IN LEBANON

WITH MR HESELTINE, FIELD MARSHALL SIR EDWIN BRAMALL, EGERTON
AND OTHERS, AND I HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE PUS.

WE ALSO SET UP A SECURE CONFERENCE WITH MR LUCE IN DAMASCUS,
AND MR HESELTINE HAD A USEFUL EXCHANGE WITH HIM.

THE OUTCOME IS CONTAINED IN OUR IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TEL,
IN THE FORM OF A MESSAGE TO THE P M FROM MR HESELTINE.

HOWE

SECRET

4730 - 2

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ZZ ATHENS
ZZ BEIRUT
ZZ DAMASCUS
OO TEL AVIV
GRS 157
SECRET
FM FCO 041204Z DEC 83
TO FLASH ATHENS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 554 OF 4 DECEMBER
INFO FLASH BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, MODUK.

FOLLOWING FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY.

LEBANON: US ACTION.

1. SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS AND THOSE OF THE PRIME MINISTER WE RECOMMEND THAT THE PRESS LINE SHOULD BE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS. NEWS DEPARTMENT AND MOD HAVE MEANWHILE BEEN STALLING. FURTHER ADVICE ON THE SUBSTANCE FOLLOWS IMMEDIATELY.

2. FOLLOWING IS PROPOSED LINE:

A) WE WERE NOT (NOT) CONSULTED ABOUT AMERICAN ACTION BUT WERE INFORMED OF IT ON THE MILITARY NET VERY SHORTLY BEFOREHAND. THERE WAS NO (NO) QUESTION OF CO-ORDINATION WITH US.

B) WE SHALL BE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH OUR FRENCH AND ITALIAN MNF PARTNERS, WITH COLLEAGUES IN THE TEN AND THE AMERICANS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

C) IT IS IMPORTANT TO DO NOTHING TO FURTHER INCREASE THE TENSION THOUGH EACH MNF CONTRIBUTOR MUST BE FREE TO TAKE THE DEFENSIVE ACTION IT THINKS FIT.

HOWE

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FM WASHINGTON 041818Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 3653 OF 4 DEC 83

AND TO CABINET OFFICE (FOR ASSESSMENTS STAFF)

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV AMMAN BEIRUT CAIRO

MY TELNOS 3579 AND 3608 AND TELECON RENWICK/LONG :

US/ISRAELI STRATEGIC COOPERATION.

1. EAGLEBURGER SAID ON ABC TV ON 4 DECEMBER THAT THE US AIM HAD NOT BEEN TO SEEK A QUID PRO QUO FROM THE ISRAELIS BUT TO DEVELOP INSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNING FOR THE RELATIONSHIP AND CREATE A FRAMEWORK FOR REGULAR DISCUSSION OF POLITICO/MILITARY ISSUES. THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO INCREASE ISRAEL'S ABILITY TO HELP STABILISE THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE HAD EXPECTED MODERATE ARABS TO COMPLAIN AND CAREFUL NOTE SHOULD BE TAKEN OF WHAT THEY SAID. BUT THERE WAS A DOUBLE STANDARD: THEY MAINTAINED RELATIONS WITH OTHER ARAB STATES WHICH WERE HOSTILE TO THE US. HE REMAINED CONVINCED THAT CLOSE US/ISRAELI RELATIONS WERE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE US AND OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. IN PRIVATE EAGLEBURGER ARGUES THAT A STRONG US/ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP IS NECESSARY TO GIVE THE US LEVERAGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THAT PAST EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP IS NOT AN OBSTACLE TO US DEALINGS WITH THE ARABS.

3. SOME US OFFICIALS ARE SUGGESTING THAT THERE WILL BE MORE FORM THAN CONTENT IN STRATEGIC COOPERATION. WEINBERGER ACQUIESCED ONLY RELUCTANTLY IN THE DECISION TO MEET ISRAELI REQUESTS WITHOUT SEEKING A QUID PRO QUO, AND THERE HAVE BEEN SUGGESTIONS THAT THE PENTAGON WANT TO MOVE SLOWLY ON PRACTICAL COOPERATION WITH THE ISRAELI'S. THERE WILL BE DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS TO DEVISE A SATISFACTORY USAGE AGREEMENT TO PERMIT RESUMPTION OF THE SUPPLY OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS. BUT WE WOULD EXPECT THESE TO BE MADE AVAILABLE IN THE END.

4. SOME ADDITIONAL DETAILS EMERGED DURING A BRIEFING OF WESTERN DIPLOMATS LAST WEEK BY PENDLETON (STATE DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR FOR ISRAELI AFFAIRS). THE AMERICANS ALSO AGREED THAT UP TO 15% OF FMS FUNDS SPENT ON COMMERCIAL PURCHASES MAY BE SPENT IN ISRAEL. A DECISION ON THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY FOR PHASE III OF THE LAVI PROJECT (ASSEMBLY IN ISRAEL OF WINGS AND TAIL SECTION) HAD BEEN DEFERRED. PENDLETON EXPECTED THIS TO BE AGREED IN DUE COURSE : HE NOTED THAT 30 LICENCES FOR WORK ON THE LAVI PROJECT HAD BEEN APPROVED SINCE JULY. THE AMERICANS SEE HELP WITH THIS PROJECT AS OFFERING A MEANS OF INFLUENCING ARENS WHOM THEY CONSIDER THE MOST SYMPATHETIC OF THE ISRAELI LEADERSHIP.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 5. PENDLETON

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5. PENDLETON SAID THAT THE US DELEGATION TO THE JOINT POLITICO/MILITARY COMMITTEE WOULD BE LED BY ADMIRAL HOWE (DIRECTOR FOR POLITICO/MILITARY AFFAIRS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT) AND INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES FROM DOD, JCS AND THE NSC STAFF. LITTLE PREPARATORY WORK FOR THE DISCUSSIONS HAD YET BEEN DONE: POSSIBLE JOINT EXERCISES AND PREPOSITIONING WOULD BE ON THE AGENDA. THERE WOULD BE NO DISCUSSION OF JOINT OPERATIONS AND NO NEW MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING: ELEMENTS OF THE NOVEMBER 1981 MOU WOULD BE DISCUSSED. PENDLETON ACKNOWLEDGED, IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THESE ARRANGEMENTS AND THE 1981 MOU, THAT THE US WERE NOW FOCUSING MORE CLOSELY ON SYRIA AND THE SOVIET ROLE THERE.

COMMENT

6. WHAT THE AMERICANS ENVISAGE SEEMS TO BE IN ESSENCE THE SORT OF POLITICO-MILITARY TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS WHICH THEY ALREADY HOLD WITH US AND OTHER ALLIES. PRACTICAL COOPERATION WITH THE ISRAELIS IN THE MILITARY FIELD WILL NOT, IF THE PENTAGON HAVE THEIR WAY, INCREASE TO ANY VERY MARKED EXTENT. BUT THE AMERICANS ATTACH MORE IMPORTANCE TO THE SIGNAL THAT THE STRENGTHENED US/ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP WILL SEND TO THE ARABS, ESPECIALLY THE SYRIANS. FURTHER COMMENT ON THIS WILL FOLLOW.

7. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO SIR A DUFF (CABINET OFFICE).

WRIGHT

(ADVANCED AS REQUESTED)

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FROM WASHINGTON 041700Z DEC 83.

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3652 OF 4 DECENBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY) BEIRUT,
DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, MODUK, UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 557 TO ATHENS: LEBANON.

1. ADMIRAL HOWE (DIRECTOR OF POLITICO/MILITARY AFFAIRS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT) TELEPHONED TO EMPHASIZE THAT THIS ACTION FOLLOWED THE U.S. DEMARCHE TO THE SYRIANS ABOUT THE EARLIER INCIDENTS IN WHICH US RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHT WERE FIRED ON. THE SYRIANS WERE TOLD THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD CONTINUE TO CARRY OUT RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND THAT THEY WOULD RESPOND IF THEY WERE FIRED ON.

2. YESTERDAY A ROUTINE SMALL SCALE F14 RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHT WAS FIRED ON FROM SYRIAN POSITIONS NEAR HAMMANA WITH MISSILES AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT ROUNDS. THE SYRIANS KNEW THEY WERE FIRING ON US AIRCRAFT.

3. THE U.S. ACTION HAD BEEN DECIDED OVERNIGHT. HOWE KNEW THAT

3. THE U.S. ACTION HAD BEEN DECIDED OVERNIGHT. HOWE KNEW THAT WE HAD BEEN FOREWARNED ON THE MILITARY NET. HE REGRETTED THE VERY SHORT WARNING TIME. THE US COUNTER-STRIKE ON THE SYRIAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT POSITIONS AND BARRACKS FROM WHICH THE FIRING HAD COME APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN FAIRLY EFFECTIVE. 40 SA7 AND SA9 MISSILES AND A LOT OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE HAD BEEN DIRECTED AT THE US AIRCRAFT. TWO AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN. ONE PILOT WAS IN SYRIAN HANDS AND ONE MISSING.

4. HOWE SAID THAT THE US ACTION WAS RELATED TO THE ATTACK ON THE RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS. IT WAS NOT UNDERTAKEN WITH WIDER OBJECTIVES IN MIND, THOUGH HE REALISED IT MIGHT BE INTERPRETED THAT WAY. (THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT HOWEVER, THAT THE AMERICANS ALSO SEE THIS AS A SIGNAL TO THE SYRIANS IN THE WIDER CONTEXT.) NOR HAD IT ANYTHING TO DO WITH "STRATEGIC COOPERATION" WITH ISRAEL.

5. THE AMERICANS WERE NOW TELLING THE SYRIANS THAT THEY WOULD BE CONTINUING THEIR RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS. THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE ACTION TO DEFEND THEM; AND THEY WANTED THEIR PILOT BACK.

6. WE TOLD HOWE OF THE PUBLIC LINE YOU ARE TAKING (ATHENS TELNO. 724 TO YOU). HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THIS. WE EMPHASISED STRONGLY, HOWEVER, THAT US ACTIONS HAD IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SECURITY OF OUR MNF CONTINGENT AND EMBASSY PERSONNEL. WE HOPED THAT THOUGHT WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE AVOIDANCE OF ANY FURTHER TWIST TO THE SPIRAL. HOWE SAID THAT ALL THIS WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS MEETING IN BRUSSELS. WE ASKED ABOUT US INTENTIONS IN THE MEANTIME. HOWE SAID THAT IF FURTHER US RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS WERE FIRED ON. THE AMERICANS WOULD RESPOND. THEY HOPED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS WOULD NOT HAPPEN.

WRIGHT

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ZZ ATHENS ~~ZZ~~

00 BEIRUT DESKBY 050600Z

00 DAMASCUS

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00 TEL AVIV

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DESKBY BEIRUT 050600Z

FROM FCO 041716Z DEC 83

TO FLASH ATHENS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 559 OF 4 DECEMBER

INFO FLASH WASHINGTON, DAMASCUS (FOR MR LUCE)

IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, PARIS, ROME,

TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, MODUK (PS)

FOLLOWING FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM S/STATE FOR DEFENCE

FCO TELNO 557: LEBANON

- M
1. I SPOKE TO CASPAR WEINBERGER THIS AFTERNOON ON THE US EMBASSY'S VERY INFERIOR SECURE LINE TO PARIS. IN REPLY TO MY DETAILED QUESTIONS HE REPLIED AS FOLLOWS:
 - A. THERE HAD BEEN ~~NO~~ (NO) PENETRATION OF SYRIAN AIRSPACE YESTERDAY (3 DECEMBER) OR TODAY BY US AIRCRAFT:
 - B. YESTERDAY'S FLIGHTS DID NOT REPRESENT ANY INCREASE IN THE LEVEL OF US RECONNAISSANCE OVER SYRIAN-HELD LEBANESE TERRITORY:
 - C. THERE WOULD BE NO (NO) FURTHER US ACTION IN RETALIATION FOR PAST EVENTS: BUT IF THERE WERE TO BE FRESH SYRIAN ATTACKS ON US RECONNAISSANCE PLANES IN FUTURE, THEN THE US RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO HIT BACK, AND THE PRESUMPTION WAS THAT THEY MIGHT:
 - D. WEINBERGER DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SYRIANS COULD HAVE MISTAKEN US RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT YESTERDAY FOR ISRAELI PLANES, WHICH HAD MOUNTED SEPARATE AND EARLIER ATTACKS:
 - E.

2. I TOLD WEINBERGER THAT TWO SPECIFIC ISSUES WERE OF IMMEDIATE CONCERN TO US, VIZ THAT:
 1. THE PRESENT SERIES OF ATTACKS IN LEBANON COULD ESCALATE FURTHER: AND
 - II. ^{ROE} ~~ROE~~ THOUGH WE UNDERSTOOD HIS POINT ABOUT US ~~ROE~~ PERMITTING COUNTER-RETALIATION IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, WE HAD NOT (NOT) BEEN INFORMED OF THIS MORNING'S ATTACK BY US PLANES ON THREE SYRIAN POSITIONS UNTIL A FEW MINUTES BEFORE IT OCCURRED. COULD HE COMMENT ON THIS QUERY.
 3. AT THIS POINT RECEPTION ON THE PHONE BECAME HOPELESS AND WE AGREED TO PURSUE THE POINTS IN BRUSSELS ON 7 DECEMBER.
 4. I HAVE NOTHING AT THIS STAGE TO ADD TO THE ADVICE I SENT YOU THIS MORNING. BUT I THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT YOU SHOULD HAVE THE ABOVE CLARIFICATIONS FROM A PRIME US SOURCE. WE SHALL LOOK FOR ANY COLLATERAL FROM OUR OWN SOURCES ABOUT THE ALLEGED GENERAL ORDER TO SYRIAN GROUND FORCES.

HOWE
NNNN

GR 520

CONFIDENTIAL

PS TO PM. 10. DOWNING STREET.

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DAMASCUS 041845Z DEC 83

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 390 OF 4 DECEMBER

INFO FLASH ATHENS (PRIVATE SECRETARY) AND WASHINGTON
INFO IMMEDIATE ROME, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT AND MODUK

FROM PS/MR LUCE

MIPT: MR LUCE'S CALL ON SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

1. MR LUCE'S DISCUSSION WITH KHADDAM FOCUSED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY

ON THE LEBANON, REACTIONS TO THE US BOMBING RAID ON SYRIAN POSITIONS ARE RECORDED IN MIPT, FOR REST, KHADDAM REPEATEDLY STRESSED SYRIA'S DETERMINATION TO SEE THE RECONCILIATION TALKS RESUME, AND PEACE RETURN TO LEBANON. SYRIA HAD NO TERRITORIAL DESIGNS ON ITS NEIGHBOURS. INDEED, A STABLE AND INDEPENDENT LEBANON WAS, HE SAID, A CENTRAL SYRIAN INTEREST

2. KHADDAM SAID THAT SYRIA HAD NO INTENTION OF WITHDRAWING ITS TROOPS FROM LEBANON IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. PRECONDITIONS FOR A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL

WERE:

I. THAT A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY SHOULD BE IN PLACE FOLLOWING THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE RECONCILIATION TALKS
SEMI CLN

II. THAT ISRAELI FORCES SHOULD HAVE WITHDRAWN UNCONDITIONALLY AND WITHOUT 'GAINING ANY BENEFITS FROM THEIR PERIOD OF OCCUPATION'
SEMI CLN

III. MNF FORCES SHOULD ALSO HAVE WITHDRAWN.

AT THIS POINT, SYRIAN TROOPS WOULD NO LONGER BE NECESSARY AND THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO LEAVE 'BY THE DOOR THROUGH WHICH THEY CAME' KHADDAM STRESSED THAT THE ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS WERE IN LEBANON ON A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT BASIS AND THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL OF THE TWO FORCES TAKING PLACE SIMULTANEOUSLY, THOUGH IN ANSWER TO A DIRECT QUESTION FROM MR LUCE HE APPEARED TO RECOGNISE THAT SOME ALTERNATIVE MEANS WOULD HAVE TO BE FOUND OF MEETING ISRAELI SECURITY CONCERNS ON THEIR NORTHERN BORDER

3. KHADDAM SHOWED HIMSELF OBSESSED THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION BY THE UNITED STATES. HE READ MR LUCE A LECTURE AT SOME LENGTH ON THE DAMAGE THEY WERE DOING THROUGH THEIR POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST (SEE MIPT) WHILE EMPHASISING THAT THE DOOR REMAINED OPEN TO A BETTER RELATIONSHIP IF THE AMERICANS WERE WILLING TO MAKE THE FIRST MOVE. THE FRENCH WERE ALSO THE SUBJECT OF CONSIDERABLE OBLOQUY. BY CONTRAST THE BRITISH AND ITALIAN ROLE WAS WARMLY PRAISED. KHADDAM SAID THAT, WHILE BRITAIN AND SYRIA DISAGREED ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES, THE SYRIANS RECOGNISED THAT UK POLICY IN THE LEBANON AND IN THE REGION AS A WHOLE WAS GENERALLY CONSTRUCTIVE. THEY APPRECIATED THIS.

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4. KHADDAM MADE CLEAR THAT THE SYRIANS ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE US-ISRAEL STRATEGIC AGREEMENT. THE SYRIANS SAW THE LATEST SPATE OF INCIDENTS INVOLVING THE ISRAELIS AND THE AMERICANS AS A NATURAL CONSEQUENCE OF THIS NEW RELATIONSHIP. HE ALSO UNDERLINED SYRIAN CONCERN ABOUT THE AMERICAN DETERMINATION TO UPHOLD THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON WHICH HE INDICATED WAS QUITE INCOMPATIBLE WITH SYRIA'S CENTRAL LSECURITY INTERESTS

SYRIA'S CENTRAL SECURITY INTERESTS (ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD GIVE THE ISRAELIS AUTOMATIC RIGHT OF ACCESS TO WITHIN 23 KILLOMETRES OF DAMASCUS). HE SAID THE SIMPLE FACT WAS, THAT US INSISTENCE ON THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT BEING HONOURABLE WAS UNDERMINING THE PEACE PROCESS AND A BARRIER TO MOVEMENT AT GENEVA

COMMENT

5. THE MEETING ENDED WITH A SHORT EXCHANGE ON THE SITUATION IN THE GULF. KHADDAM SAID HE WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS

COMMENT

6. EVEN IF SYRIA'S MOTIVES ARE LESS PURE THAN KHADDAM WOULD HAVE US BELIEVE, THEIR CONCERN ABOUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IS PATENT ENOUGH. MR LUCE BELIEVES THAT THE SYRIAN ATTITUDES HE HAS ENCOUNTERED HERE FURTHER UNDERLINE THE NEED TO INCLUDE A SENSIBLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE PASSAGE ON THE LEBANON SETTING OUT OUR OWN VIEWS IN THE ATHENS COMMUNIQUE. HE BELIEVES THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING AMERICAN MISGIVINGS, WE SHOULD PRESS STRONGLY FOR THIS.

LUCAS

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TELNO 389 OF 4 DECEMBER
AND TO FLASH MOD (FOR MR HESELTINE)
INFO FLASH ATHENS (PRIVATE SECRETARY) WASHINGTON
INFO IMMEDIATE ROME AMMAN TEL AVIV BEIRUT PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK

FROM PS/MR LUCE
MY TELNO 388: AMERICAN RAID ON SYRIAN POSITIONS IN LEBANON

1. MR LUCE HAS NOW BEEN OVER THE GROUND WITH THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
2. KHADDAM'S REACTION WAS ONE OF SORROW MORE THAN ANGER. HE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD APPEARED SET ON ESCALATION EVER SINCE THE ATTACK ON THEIR MARINES. THE SYRIANS DID NOT WISH TO PROVOKE CONFRONTATION BUT HAD WARNED THE UNITED STATES ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS THAT THEY WOULD BE BOUND TO RESPOND IF US AIRCRAFT OVERFLEW THEIR POSITIONS. THIS HAD DULY HAPPENED. HE REPEATED THAT THE SYRIANS WERE NOT SEEKING TO ESCALATE THE CONFLICT BUT THAT THEY WOULD REACT PRECISELY THE SAME WAY AGAIN IF THE AMERICANS ATTEMPTED TO REPEAT THEIR PERFORMANCE.
3. OVERALL, KHADDAM SAID THAT THE US ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS SERVING ONLY SOVIET DESIGNS ('MY TWO BEST FRIENDS ARE REAGAN AND ANDROPOV. REAGAN PROVIDES THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND ANDROPOV THE AMMUNITION'). SYRIA WANTED BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND WOULD MATCH ANY POSITIVE MOVES STEP FOR STEP. THE CONVERSE, HE WARNED, WAS ALSO TRUE.
4. MR LUCE BELIEVES THAT THIS CONVERSATION, WHILE ON THE FACE OF IT REASSURING, UNDERLINES THE NEED TO URGE CAUTION ON THE AMERICANS. INCIDENTS LIKE THIS MORNUTGS WILL NOT DRIVE THE SYRIANS OUT OF LEBANON. ON THE CONTRARY, IT IS LIKELY TO LEAD THEM TO DIG IN, AND TO PUT THEM IN A POSITION WHERE THEY CAN APPEAR AS HEROES IN THE ARAB WORLD, ABLE TO COMMAND THE SYMPATHY OF GOVTS WHO HAS LITTLE TIME FOR SYRIAN ATTITUDES GENERALLY. THE AMERICANS SHOULD THEREFORE CONSIDER VERY SERIOUSLY THE EFFECT, ON THE SAFETY AND COHESION OF THE MNF AND ALSO ON THE ATTITUDES OF MODERATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS OF FURTHER INCIDENTS OF THIS SORT
5. SEE ALSO MIFT.
LUCAS
BT

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TO FLASH F C O
TELNO 724 OF 4 DECEMBER 1983
AND TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV AND MODUK.

F C O TEL NO 554 TO ATHENS AND BEIRUT TEL NO 693 TO F C O

LEBANON

THANK YOU FOR THIS ADVICE. MINISTERS ARE CONCERNED NOT TO HAVE A ROW WITH THE AMERICANS OVER THIS. WE ARE THEREFORE TAKING THE FOLLOWING LINE:-

WAS THE UK CONSULTED (UNDERLINED)

MNF CONTRIBUTORS REMAIN IN CLOSE CONTACT AND WE WERE INFORMED SHORTLY BEFORE THE US RESPONSE. IT HAS LONG BEEN THE POSITION THAT EACH CONTRIBUTOR HAS THE RIGHT TO ACT IN SELF-DEFENCE. IN A FAST MOVING SITUATION, THE IMMEDIATE MEASURES TO BE TAKEN MUST BE FOR EACH CONTRIBUTOR TO DECIDE.

(IF PRESSED. (LAST TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) THE US HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THEY SAW THE ATTACKS ON THEIR RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT AS A THREAT).

DO YOU SUPPORT THE ACTION? (UNDERLINED)

AS I HAVE SAID, WE RECOGNISE THE RIGHT OF EACH CONTRIBUTOR TO SELF DEFENCE.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BRITISH MNF CONTINGENT? (UNDERLINED)

OUR CONTINGENT IS FULLY IN THE PICTURE AND WE ARE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US AND OTHER MNF CONTINGENTS OVER THE MEASURES NECESSARY FOR THEIR SECURITY.

R H O D E S
BT

NNNN

(6)
PS/MR LUCE
PS/FUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR EBERTON
SIR J BULLARD
ED/NEPAD
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ED/UND

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TO MOD

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FROM DAMASCUS 041402Z DEC

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 388 OF 4 DECEMBER 1983

AND TO FLASH MOD (FOR PS MR HESELTINE), ATHENS (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY).

IMMEDIATE BEIPUT AMMAN TELAVIV

FROM PS/MR LUCE.

AMERICAN RAID ON SYRIAN POSITIONS IN LEBANON.

1. FOLLOWING HIS TELEX CONVERSATION THIS MORNING WITH MR HESELTINE, MR LUCE HAS SPOKEN TO THE SYRIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, SHAPA TO ESTABLISH SYRIAN REACTIONS AND TO COUNSEL RESTRAINT.

2. SHARA REACTED CALMLY . HE TOOK THE LINE THAT THIS MORNING'S RAID WAS SIMPLY THE LATEST IN A SERIES OF US AND ISRAELI PROVOCATIONS . HE CLAIMED THAT A NUMBER OF US AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN SHOT AT OR SHOT DOWN IN RECENT DAYS. THE SYRIAN AIM THROUGHOUT WAS TO AVOID ESCALATION. THIS HAD NOT CHANGED THOUGH THERE WERE QUOTE LIMITS TO OUR PATIENCE UNQUOTE. HE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD LOST THREE (THREE) AIRCRAFT IN THIS MORNING'S RAID . SYRIANS LOSSES HAD INCLUDED 2 DEAD, 10 SERIOUSLY WOUNDED AND ONE POSITION KNOCKED OUT.

3. SHARA IS EVIDENTLY NOT A CENTRAL PLAYER. BUT HE HAS SAID THAT THIS WILL FORM A CENTRAL POINT FOR DISCUSSION WHEN MR LUCE SEES THE FOREIGN MINISTER, KHADDAM, AT 1500Z THIS AFTERNOON.

LUCAS

BT

NNNN

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SECRET

4739 - 1

GRS 401
SECRET
DESKBY BEIRUT 050600Z
FROM FCO 041716Z DEC 833
TO FLASH ATHENS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 559 OF 4 DECEMBER
INFO FLASH WASHINGTON, DAMASCUS (FOR MR LUCE)
IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, PARIS, ROME,
TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NAHO, MODUK (PS)
FOLLOWING FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM S/STATE FOR DEFENCE
FCO TELNO 557: LEBANON

per

1. I SPOKE TO CASPAR WEINBERGER THIS AFTERNOON ON THE US EMBASSY'S VERY INFERIOR SECURE LINE TO PARIS. IN REPLY TO MY DETAILED QUESTIONS HE REPLIED AS FOLLOWS:
 - A. THERE HAD BEEN NO (NO) PENETRATION OF SYRIAN AIRSPACE YESTERDAY (3 DECEMBER) OR TODAY BY US AIRCRAFT:
 - B. YESTERDAY'S FLIGHTS DID NOT REPRESENT ANY INCREASE IN THE LEVEL OF US RECONNAISSANCE OVER SYRIAN-HELD LEBANESE TERRITORY:
 - C. THERE WOULD BE NO (NO) FURTHER US ACTION IN RETALIATION FOR PAST EVENTS: BUT IF THERE WERE TO BE FRESH SYRIAN ATTACKS ON US RECONNAISSANCE PLANES IN FUTURE, THEN THE US RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO HIT BACK, AND THE PRESUMPTION WAS THAT THEY MIGHT:
 - D. WEINBERGER DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SYRIANS COULD HAVE MISTAKEN US RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT YESTERDAY FOR ISRAELI PLANES, WHICH HAD MOUNTED SEPARATE AND EARLIER ATTACKS:
 - E.

2. I TOLD WEINBERGER THAT TWO SPECIFIC ISSUES WERE OF IMMEDIATE CONCERN TO US, VIZ THAT:
 - I. THE PRESENT SERIES OF ATTACKS IN LEBANON COULD ESCALATE

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FURTHER: AND

II. THOUGH WE UNDERSTOOD HIS POINT ABOUT US ROE PERMITTING COUNTER-RETALIATION IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, WE HAD NOT (NOT) BEEN INFORMED OF THIS MORNING'S ATTACK BY US PLANES ON THREE SYRIAN POSITIONS UNTIL A FEW MINUTES BEFORE IT OCCURRED. COULD HE COMMENT ON THIS QUERY.

3. AT THIS POINT RECEPTION ON THE PHONE BECAME HOPELESS AND W AGREED TO PURSUE THE POINTS IN BRUSSELS ON 7 DECEMBER.

4. I HAVE NOTHING AT THIS STAGE TO ADD TO THE ADVICE I SENT YOU THIS MORNING. BUT I THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT YOU SHOULD HAVE THE ABOVE CLARIFICATIONS FROM A PRIME US SOURCE. WE SHALL LOOK FOR ANY COLLATERAL FROM OUR OWN SOURCES ABOUT THE ALLEGED GENERAL ORDER TO SYRIAN GROUND FORCES.

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ZZ ATHENS
OO BEIRUT
GRS 123
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UK EYES ALFA
FM FCO 041326Z DEC 83
TO FLASH ATHENS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 558 OF 4 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, BEIRUT.

FOLLOWING FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE.
DISPOSITION OF FORCES.

- (1) HMS FEARLESS - S OF CYPRUS, ATTEMPTING TO MOVE AWAY FROM US FLEET. POSITIONING ITSELF TO ACT AS DORMITORY IF REQUIRED.
- (2) HMS ACHILLES AND ANDROMEDA JOINING FEARLESS APPROX 1730 BEIRUT TIME (1530Z).
- (3) 2 X PHANTOMS IN CYPRUS ON 30 MIN READINESS FOR CAP OVER FEARLESS.

THREAT TO BRITFORLEB.

COMBRITFORLEB IS SEEKING INFORMATION FROM THE CEASEFIRE COMMITTEE, AND ASSESSING WHETHER HE NEEDS TO EXERCISE DORMITORY OPTION. PRESENT VIEW IS THAT NOT NECESSARY. BRITFORLEB AT FULL STRENGTH ON LAND PLUS ADVANCE PARTY OF REPLACEMENT FORCE. NOW 130 SOLDIERS IN TOTAL.

HOWE

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GR 210
CONFIDENTIAL
FLASH F C O
FM BEIRUT 040750Z DEC 83
TO FLASH F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 693 OF 4 DECEMBER 1983
INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS (FOR SECRETARY OF STATES PARTY), MODUK,
WASHINGTON AND BRITFORLEB
INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS

LEBANON

1. COMD BRITFORLEB (AS HE HAS REPORTED TO MOD) WAS TOLD EARLY THIS MORNING BY THE AMERICANS THAT THEY WOULD BE ATTACKING POSITIONS IN THE BEKAA AT 0730 LOCAL TIME.
2. THIS WILL INEVITABLY BE SEEN HERE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CLOSER COOPERATION AGREED BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND THE U.S. DURING SHAMIR'S WASHINGTON VISIT. IT MAY ALSO BE SEEN AS A FIRST MOVE BY THE AMERICANS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL QUOTE WITHIN ONE MONTH UNQUOTE TO WHICH ALLUSION WAS APPARENTLY MADE DURING GEMAYELS VISIT TO WASHINGTON.
3. THE LOCAL MEDIA IS REPORTING THAT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT HAVE ALSO MADE STRIKES THIS MORNING IN THE MOUNTAINS ABOVE BEIRUT, LOSING TWO AIRCRAFT. IF THIS IS TRUE (AND NOT A MISTAKEN ACCOUNT OF THE U.S. RAID) THIS WILL REINFORCE THE IDEA THAT THE US ATTACK HAS BEEN MADE IN COLLUSION WITH THE ISRAELIS (WHO CERTAINLY DID MAKE ATTACKS OF THIS KIND YESTERDAY).
4. I RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD DISSOCIATE THE UK AS FIRMLY AS POSSIBLE FROM THIS US ACTION, IN TERMS AT LEAST AS CRITICAL AS THOSE WE USED ABOUT THE FRENCH ATTACK. THE US ATTACK SEEMS DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO WHAT WEINBERGER TOLD US IN WASHINGTON. AND IF IT IS INDEED PART OF A STRATEGY TO PUT DIRECT U.S. MILITARY PRESSURE ON SYRIA THIS MUST SURELY RAISE A QUESTION MARK OVER THE

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TERMS ON WHICH WE CAN CONTINUE TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE U.S. IN THE MNF. (ONLY THIS MORNING FOR INSTANCE BRITFORLEB HAVE BEEN ASKED TO GUARD AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE CEASEFIRE COMMITTEE TO DISCUSS REOPENING OF THE AIRPORT: THIS MUST NOW BE JEOPARDISED.)

MIERS
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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)
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PROTOCOL DEPT
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PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR MACINNES
MR ADAMS
MR EGERTON
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SECRET

4738 - 1

GRS 173

SECRET

FROM FCO 041617Z DEC 83

TO ROUTINE DAMASCUS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 227 OF 4 DECEMBER

INFO ATHENS (FOR PS/SECRETARY OF STATE) BEIRUT, WASHINGTON,

MODUK, PARIS, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK

FOLLOWING IS CORRECTED VERSION OF MYTEL NO 226

BEIRUT TELNO 693: LEBANON

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM GENERAL VESSEY, CHAIRMAN OF US JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, TO CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF.

BEGINS:

YESTERDAY ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS FIRED AGAINST US RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT OVER LEBANON. WE HAVE CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE SYRIANS KNEW THEY WERE FIRING ON US AIRCRAFT. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME IN FIVE DAYS THAT SUCH FIRING HAS OCCURRED AFTER OUR DEMARCHE TO THE SYRIANS. THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED TO ATTACK. WE WILL ATTACK AT 040530Z DECEMBER. OUR COMMANDER ON THE GROUND IN BEIRUT HAS BEEN INFORMED TO CO-ORDINATE WITH HIS MNF COUNTER-PARTS. I WILL PROVIDE MORE DETAILS WHEN WE MEET WITH YOU IN BRUSSELS/PARIS. ENDS

2. MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED THROUGH MILITARY CHANNELS AT 0525Z ON 4 DECEMBER. WE ARE CONSULTING URGENTLY ABOUT WHAT ACTION TO RECOMMEND AND SHALL KEEP IN TOUCH.

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ZZ DAMASCUS

OO ATHENS

OO BEIRUT

OO ROME

GRS 168

SECRET

FM FCO 041028Z DEC 83

TO FLASH DAMASCUS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 226 OF 04 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS(FOR PS/SECRETARY OF STATE) BEIRUT, WASHINGTON,
MODUK, PARIS, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK.

BEIRUT FELNO 693: LEBANON.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM GENERAL VESSEY, CHAIRMAN
OF US JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, TO CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF.

BEGINS:

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AIRCRAFT OVER LEBANON. WE HAVE CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE SYRIANS
KNEW THEY WERE FIRING ON US AIRCRAFT. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME IN
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HAS BEEN INFORMED TO CO-ORDINATE WITH HIS MNF COUNTERPARTS.
I WILL PROVIDE MORE DETAILS WHEN WE MEET WITH YOU IN BRUSSELS/
PARIS. ENDS.

2. MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED AT 0530Z ON 4 DECEMBER. WE ARE
CONSULTING URGENTLY ABOUT WHAT ACTION TO RECOMMEND AND SHALL KEEP
IN TOUCH.

HOWE

MIDDLE EAST

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10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

mf

The Ministry of Defence have just informed me that the UK Armed Forces in the Lebanon came under fire last night. They were hit by 3-4 rocket rounds and several hundred machine gun rounds. There was one very minor casualty.

The MOD believe it was a deliberate attack and are reviewing security arrangements:

Steve Geary

S.P. Geary
Duty Clerk

3 December 1983

approx 10.50am.

PRIME MINISTER

PM has seen
this

1400hrs

3/12/83

The Minister of State for the Armed Services has been in contact with the Commander of BRITFORLEB and has authorised a "dormitory operation" for this evening. This will involve the movement of 50 soldiers on to HMS Fearless.

Mr. Stanley has authorised the Commander of BRITFORLEB to take similar further action whenever he feels the need.

S. P. Geary

S. P. Geary

Duty Clerk

3 December 1983

GR 340
UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 032200Z
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 031900Z DEC 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1522 OF 3 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, JEDDA, TUNIS, THE HAGUE, PARIS, MOSCOW
INFO SAVING SANA'A

MIPT: PLO IN LEBANON

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECRETARY-GENERAL'S STATEMENT OF 3 DECEMBER

I WISH TO MAKE A FEW REMARKS IN ADDITION TO MY STATEMENT OF YESTERDAY. I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE ONLY ISSUE WHICH I HAVE RAISED IS THE REQUEST FOR THE FLYING OF THE UN FLAG, ALONGSIDE THE NATIONAL FLAG OF THE SHIP CONCERNED, ON THE SHIPS WHICH WOULD EVACUATE THE PLO ARMED ELEMENTS FROM TRIPOLI. THE REASON FOR DOING THIS WOULD BE ON PURELY HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS TO FACILITATE THE RESOLUTION OF A SITUATION WHICH HAS ALREADY COST MANY INNOCENT LIVES AND CREATED GREAT DESTRUCTION. THE PERMISSION TO USE THE FLAG WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE COUNTRIES UNDER WHOSE FLAGS THE SHIPS INVOLVED ARE OPERATING.

I UNDERSTAND THAT THE PROBABLE NUMBER OF SHIPS INVOLVED WOULD BE APPROXIMATELY 5 TO EVACUATE SOME 3,000 ARMED ELEMENTS WITH THE POSSIBLE ADDITION OF ANOTHER 1,000 MILITIA, CARRYING PERSONAL WEAPONS ONLY. THE PROBABLE DESTINATION OF THE SHIPS WOULD BE TUNIS AND THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC. THERE WOULD BE NO FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND THE ONLY PURPOSE WOULD BE TO PROVIDE SYMBOLIC PROTECTION. THE NATIONALITIES OF THE SHIPS CONCERNED AND DATES OF DEPARTURE WOULD APPARENTLY BE DECIDED AFTER MY REPLY CONCERNING THE USE OF THE FLAG IS RECEIVED.

THE ACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS EVACUATION ARE OBVIOUSLY PRIMARILY A MATTER FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND THE PARTIES CONCERNED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT THAT HAS BEEN NEGOTIATED WITH THE HELP OF SAUDI ARABIA AND SYRIA. I HAVE, YESTERDAY AFTERNOON, SPOKEN ON THE TELEPHONE TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND, AMONG OTHER ISSUES, MENTIONED THIS PROBLEM TO HIM. AS I UNDERSTAND IT, THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THE USE OF THE UN FLAG ON THE EVACUATION SHIPS, PROVIDED, AS IS THE NORMAL PRACTICE, THE LEBANESE FLAG IS ALSO FLOWN IN LEBANESE TERRITORIAL WATERS. I SHALL NATURALLY REMAIN IN CONSULTATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IN THIS MATTER WHICH OBVIOUSLY REQUIRES ITS CONCURRENCE.

I NEED HARDLY ADD THAT ANY ACTION I TAKE WILL BE IN LINE WITH THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF RESPECTING THE SOVEREIGNTY AND AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON.

/I WISH

I WISH TO REPEAT THAT THE HUMANITARIAN FACTOR IS THE ONE WHICH CONCERNS ME. I HAVE CONSULTED THE COUNCIL BECAUSE I FELT THAT THIS WAS THE RIGHT THING TO DO ON A MATTER OF SUCH IMPORTANCE. IN TAKING MY DECISION THEREFORE, I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE COUNCIL ON THIS MATTER.

2. SEE MIFT.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO SANA'A

THOMSON

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

MIDDLE EAST

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DESKBY 031100Z F C O AND DAMASCUS

FM BEIRUT 030935Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 692 OF 3 DECEMBER 1983

AND TO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, TEL AVIV

INFO SAVING BRITFORLEB

FIRING AT BRITFORLEB

1. DURING THE COURSE OF LOCALISED EXCHANGES OF FIRE LAST NIGHT BETWEEN THE RIVAL GROUPINGS BRITFORLEB ITSELF CAME UNDER FIRE. THEY ARE REPORTING DETAILS SEPARATELY TO MOD. BRIEFLY THEY SUSTAINED AT LEAST 3 RPG HITS AND SIX NEAR MISSES: AND CONSIDERABLE 0.5 CALIBRE MACHINE GUN FIRE ON THEIR BUILDING AND VEHICLE PARK. ONE SOLDIER WAS LIGHTLY WOUNDED (GRAZED FOREHEAD). A LANDROVER WAS BURNT OUT. WATER TANKS AND RADIO EQUIPMENT WERE DAMAGED.

2. COMMANDER BRITFORLEB IS CLEAR THAT THE FIRE WAS DELIBERATELY AIMED AT BRITFORLEB FROM PSP AND AMAL POSITIONS. BUT HE BELIEVES THAT THIS WAS ON LOCAL INITIATIVE NOT (REPEAT NOT) ON THE ORDERS OF THE AMAL AND PSP ORGANISATIONS AS SUCH. IN THAT CASE MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE FIRE WOULD HAVE BEEN DELIVERED.

3. I AM SURE THAT WE MUST PROTEST TO AMAL AND PSP AND HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH COMD BRITFORLEB. HE WILL PROTEST VIA THE CEASE-FIRE COMMITTEE MACHINERY. BUT IT IS NOT YET CERTAIN THAT THIS WILL REGISTER EFFECTIVELY SINCE THERE IS NO MEETING OF THE CEASEFIRE COMMITTEE AT THE BANK UNTIL MONDAY. WE ARE PROTESTING ON EMBASSY CHANNELS TO PSP AND AMAL. WE ARE TAKING THE LINE THAT THE EVENTS IN PARA ONE ARE UNACCEPTABLE. THEY CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO BRITFORLEBS ABILITY TO CARRY OUT ITS ROLE. THEY THUS JEOPARDIZE THE CEASEFIRE TALKS. AMAL AND PSP MUST INVESTIGATE TO SEE WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE. WE NEED AN ASSURANCE THAT NOTHING LIKE THIS WILL HAPPEN AGAIN.

4. WE HAVE ALREADY MANAGED TO CONTACT NABIH BERRI WHO SAID IT MUST HAVE BEEN A MISTAKE. HE WAS VERY MUCH AWARE OF THE VITAL JOB BRITFORLEB WAS DOING. HE HAS UNDERTAKEN TO INVESTIGATE. WE HAVE ARRANGED TO SPEAK TO MOHSEN DALLOUL (VICE PRESIDENT OF PSP) AT 1230 LOCAL.

5. GRATEFUL IF DAMASCUS COULD MAKE APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATIONS TO JUMBLATT (MR LUCE MAY CARE TO ADD HIS PERSONAL WEIGHT TO THIS: FCO TELNO 511 REFERS).

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6. WE SHALL REFER PRESS ENQUIRIES TO BRITFORLEB IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. I HAVE AGREED WITH COMD BRITFORLEB THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO CONFIRM THAT THERE HAS BEEN DAMAGE (EG LOSS OF LAND-ROVER), BUT HE WILL SAY THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NO CASUALTIES EXCEPT FOR ONE SOLDIER GRAZED. WE WILL TAKE THE GENERAL LINE THAT BRITFORLEB WAS THE VICTIM OF A FIREFIGHT BETWEEN THE RIVAL FACTIONS. IF PRESSED HE WILL ADMIT THAT INDIVIDUALS MAY HAVE DIRECTED FIRE AT BRITFORLEB BUT SAY THAT HE DOES NOT (NOT) BELIEVE THAT BRITFORLEB WAS DELIBERATELY ATTACKED BY AMAL OR PSP AS SUCH: WE SHALL CONFIRM IF ASKED THAT WE ARE IN URGENT TOUCH WITH AMAL AND PSP, THAT WE HAVE UNDERLINED THE GRAVITY OF THIS INCIDENT AND ASKED FOR AN ASSURANCE THAT THERE WILL BE NO REPETITION.)

MIERS
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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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PUSD
NEWS DEPT
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NAD
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SED
ECD(E)
FINANCE DEPT
PROTOCOL DEPT
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PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR MACINNES
MR ADAMS
MR EGERTON
MR JENKINS

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BUCKINGHAM PALACE

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Press Line

6. WE SHALL REFER PRESS ENQUIRIES TO BRITFORLEB IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. I HAVE AGREED WITH COMD BRITFORLEB THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO CONFIRM THAT THERE HAS BEEN DAMAGE (EG LOSS OF LAND-ROVER), BUT HE WILL SAY THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NO CASUALTIES EXCEPT FOR ONE SOLDIER GRAZED. WE WILL TAKE THE GENERAL LINE THAT BRITFORLEB WAS THE VICTIM OF A FIREFIGHT BETWEEN THE RIVAL FACTIONS. IF PRESSED HE WILL ADMIT THAT INDIVIDUALS MAY HAVE DIRECTED FIRE AT BRITFORLEB BUT SAY THAT HE DOES NOT (NOT) BELIEVE THAT BRITFORLEB WAS DELIBERATELY ATTACKED BY AMAL OR PSP AS SUCH. WE SHALL CONFIRM IF ASKED THAT ~~WE ARE IN URGENT TOUCH WITH AMAL AND PSP THAT WE HAVE UNDERLINED THE GRAVITY OF THIS INCIDENT~~ ^{the militia} (AND ASKED FOR AN ASSURANCE THAT THERE WILL BE NO REPETITION.)

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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PROTOCOL DEPT

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PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

SIR J LEAHY

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

MR MACINNES

MR ADAMS

MR EGERTON

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PS/FUS
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MR SPERTON
SIR J BULLARD
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ADVANCE COPY

DESKBY FCO 021430Z

IMMEDIATE

FROM TEL AVIV 021245Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 331 OF 02 DECEMBER 1983

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, ATHENS, PARIS AND ROME.

EC/ISRAEL/LEBANON

SUMMARY

1. ISRAELIS BELIEVE THAT SYRIA HAS LOST THE INITIATIVE IN LEBANON AND THAT IT WOULD BE A TRAGIC MISTAKE IF THE EUROPEANS HELPED SYRIA TO RECOVER IT. IN ANY DECLARATION AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL THEY HOPE THE TEN WILL THEREFORE STICK TO A COMMON LINE OF SUPPORT FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES AND FOR A STRONG INDEPENDENT LEBANON, WHICH ARE OBJECTIVES SHARED BY ISRAEL.

DETAIL

2. I WAS ASKED BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TO CALL THIS MORNING, TOGETHER WITH MY FRENCH AND ITALIAN COLLEAGUES. KIMCHE REFERRED TO THE FORTHCOMING EUROPEAN SUMMIT MEETING. HE WISHED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS WHICH HE HOPED WOULD INFLUENCE THE ATTITUDE OF OUR GOVERNMENTS TO ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT ON LEBANON:

A) IN ISRAEL'S VIEW, THERE WAS ONLY A CHANCE OF A SOLUTION TO LEBANON'S PROBLEMS IF GEMAYEL SUCCEEDED IN STANDING FIRM AGAINST SYRIAN PRESSURE.

B) THE INITIATIVE WAS NO LONGER IN SYRIAN HANDS. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO KEEP IT THAT WAY, AND NOT GIVE DAMASCUS ANY OPENING TO

- ~~TO KEEP IT THAT WAY, AND NOT GIVE DAMASCUS ANY OPENING TO~~
EXPLOIT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE.
WE SHOULD ALL WORK TOGETHER TO ACHIEVE COMMON GOALS IN LEBANON.
- C) ISRAEL HAD TOLD THE AMERICANS AND GEMAYEL THAT SHE WOULD NOT SIT IDLY BY IN THE EVENT OF A BREAKDOWN OF THE CEASEFIRE LEADING TO RENEWED FIGHTING IN WHICH SYRIA AGAIN USED HER PALESTINIAN PROXIES.
 - D) THE AMERICANS HAVE ACCEPTED AND ENDORSED ISRAEL'S ARGUMENT THAT ANY CHANGE IN THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY SYRIA AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS.
 - E) ALTHOUGH THE ISRAELIS HAD DISCUSSED AMONG THEMSELVES SOME IDEAS ABOUT FURTHER PARTIAL IDF WITHDRAWAL IN THE WESTERN PART OF SOUTHERN LEBANON, NOTHING OF THIS KIND WAS ACTUALLY ON THE CARDS FOR THE TIME BEING.
 - F) ISRAEL FAVOURED CONTINUATION OF THE GENEVA TALKS, AND WAS ENCOURAGING HER (CHRISTIAN) FRIENDS TO DO A DEAL WITH THE OTHERS (HE MENTIONED DRUSE AND SHIA) FOR THE SAKE NOT OF SYRIA BUT OF INTERNAL COHESION.
 - G) THE MNF WAS SERVING A VALUABLE PURPOSE SEMICOLON KIMCHE HOPED THERE WOULD BE NO MOVE TOWARDS PULLING OUT ANY PART OF IT AT THIS STAGE.
 - H) KIMCHE MENTIONED IN CONFIDENCE THAT THE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE (US-ISRAEL-LEBANON) FORESEEN UNDER THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT HAS MET A FEW TIMES SEMICOLON AT LEBANESE REQUEST THIS WAS BEING KEPT VERY QUIET.

3. KIMCHE CONCLUDED BY URGING THAT THE TEN SHOULD TAKE A SIMILARLY FIRM LINE AS THE US AND ISRAEL (AND HE BELIEVED INCREASINGLY GEMAYEL) OVER STANDING UP TO THE SYRIANS. HE HOPED ANY STATEMENT BY THE TEN WOULD CALL NOT FOR UNILATERAL MOVES BY ISRAEL BUT FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, SUPPORT FOR A STRONG INDEPENDENT LEBANON, AND CONDEMNATION OF RECENT BREACHES OF THE CEASEFIRE.

4. IT WAS CLEAR FROM KIMCHE'S REMARKS THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD HEARD OF A POSSIBLE BRITISH INITIATIVE AT ATHENS. I SEE THE PURPOSE OF HIS SUMMONING THE THREE AMBASSADORS AS BEING TO TRY AND ENSURE THAT THE TEN, AS HE PUT IT, GIVE THE RIGHT SIGNAL TO THE SYRIANS. INDEED THE STRESS HE LAID ON SHORT-TERM TACTICS LEFT IN MY MIND THE POSSIBILITY THAT ISRAEL COULD CONSIDER BEING MORE FLEXIBLE AT SOME LATER STAGE, EG OVER THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION ON THIS POINT, KIMCHE MERELY TOOK THE LINE THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN IN THE FUTURE. LIKEWISE THE IMPLICATION WAS LEFT THAT A FURTHER PARTIAL PULLBACK OR THINNING OUT BY THE IDF FROM THE AWALI LINE REMAINS A FUTURE OPTION.

5. IN SEPTEMBER THE 3 EUROPEAN MNF GOVERNMENTS PRESSED ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW TOTALLY FROM LEBANON WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE SYRIANS (MY TELNO 241). KIMCHE RECALLED THIS APPROACH TODAY. I JUDGE THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ARE ANXIOUS ABOVE ALL THAT WE SHOULD NOT REPEAT THE EARLIER CALL FOR UNILATERAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, OR ANY SIMILAR CONCESSIONS JUST BY ISRAEL, IN A DECLARATION WITH OUR PARTNERS AT ATHENS.

MOBERLY

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FM WASHINGTON 022350Z DECEMBER, 1983
TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3644 OF 2 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS (FOR PS/MR LUCE), TEL AVIV, AMMAN,
ROUTINE OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, ROME AND
MOSCOW.

US MIDDLE EAST POLICY

1. MINISTER ASKED MURPHY TODAY WHETHER THE WARMER US/ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP IMPLIED CHANGES IN THE OVERALL US STRATEGY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST. IT SEEMED LIKELY TO UPSET THE MODERATE ARABS AND TO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR KING HUSSEIN TO JOIN THE PEACE PROCESS.
2. MURPHY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE AMERICANS MIGHT APPEAR TO HAVE GOT VERY LITTLE IN RETURN FOR THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAELI REQUESTS, ALL OF WHICH HAD A CLEAR PRICE TAG. THE FACT WAS THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE ACHIEVED MANY OF THEIR OBJECTIVES ANYWAY THROUGH CONGRESSIONAL ACTION AND IT HAD BEEN BETTER FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO VOLUNTEER THEM. DESPITE PRESSURE FROM BOTH SHULTZ AND THE PRESIDENT, THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE ISRAELI POSITION ON THE PEACE PROCESS OR SETTLEMENTS. IN THE AMERICAN VIEW, SHAMIR'S GOVERNMENT WOULD FALL IF HE AGREED TO A SETTLEMENTS FREEZE BEFORE KING HUSSEIN INDICATED THAT HE WOULD JOIN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THE AMERICANS HAD MADE IT VERY CLEAR TO THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY INTENDED TO CONTINUE ARMS SALES TO THE MODERATE ARABS: THE ISRAELIS WOULD NEVER EXPLICITLY ACCEPT THIS BUT MURPHY THOUGHT THAT THE MESSAGE HAD GOT HOME.
3. ON THE PEACE PROCESS, MURPHY SAID THAT NOTHING HAD BEEN CHANGED BY SHAMIR'S VISIT. THE AMERICANS WERE STILL LOOKING FOR WAYS TO GET KING HUSSEIN TO MOVE. MURPHY THOUGHT THAT THE KING HAD GROWN ACCUSTOMED TO A CLOSE US/ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP AND WOULD NOT OVERREACT TO SHAMIR'S VISIT: HE HAD AS YET SAID NOTHING TO THE AMERICANS ABOUT IT. FOR THE PRESENT HE WAS WAITING TO SEE THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFRONTATION AT TRIPOLI AND HOW PLO POLICY WOULD EVOLVE. MURPHY ADDED THAT ALTHOUGH PRINCE BANDAR WAS FURIOUS AT THE OUTCOME OF SHAMIR'S VISIT, PRINCE SAUD HAD MADE LITTLE OF IT TODAY WHEN HE SAW VISITING US OFFICIALS: HE HAD SEEMED MUCH MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE GULF.
4. IN THE COURSE OF A GENERAL CONVERSATION TODAY WE MENTIONED TO SEITZ (HEAD OF SHULTZ' OFFICE) THE DANGERS OF PUSHING KING HUSSEIN TOWARDS FURTHER INITIATIVES ON THE WEST BANK WITHOUT ADEQUATE ARAB SUPPORT. SEITZ SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NOT BEEN PUSHING KING HUSSEIN. THE KING HAD TOLD PRESIDENT REAGAN OF HIS INTENTION TO RECONVENE THE JORDANIAN PARLIAMENT, INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES

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FROM THE WEST BANK, AND HAD ASKED FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW. THE PRESIDENT HAD REPLIED THAT HE FAVOURED WHAT THE KING PROPOSED TO DO, THOUGH WHETHER AND WHEN THE KING SHOULD DO IT WERE MATTERS FOR HIM TO DECIDE. TEICHER (NSC) TOLD US SEPARATELY THAT IF THE KING WENT AHEAD THE AMERICANS INTENDED TO ISSUE A STATEMENT WELCOMING THIS MOVE. HE CLAIMED THAT THE KING HAD EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.

5. SEITZ SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD ALSO NOTED KING HUSSEIN'S RECENT INTEREST IN TRYING TO RENEW CONTACTS WITH ARAFAT. THEY INTERPRETED THIS AS REFLECTING HIS DESIRE TO AVOID THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT BEING TAKEN OVER COMPLETELY BY SYRIA AND TO ACT AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO SYRIAN INFLUENCE.

WRIGHT

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FM BEIRUT 021315Z DEC 83
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 691 OF 2 DECEMBER 1983
INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS AND TEL AVIV

mt

LEBANON INTERNAL

1. THE PAST WEEK HAS SEEN A TURN FOR THE WORSE HERE, IN BOTH SECURITY AND POLITICAL TERMS AND THERE IS A DEFINITE AIR OF ANXIETY IN BEIRUT.

2. ON THE SECURITY FRONT, PSP SHELLING OF EAST BEIRUT HAS EASED OFF IN THE PAST 48 HOURS (AFTER SEVERAL BAD NIGHTS IN A ROW). BUT THE ASSASSINATION ON 1 DECEMBER (MY TELNO 688) WAS THE FIRST MAJOR SUCH INCIDENT FOR SEVERAL MONTHS AND HAS HAD A BAD EFFECT. JUMBLATT HAS ACCUSED THE PHALANGE OF RESPONSIBILITY. BEIRUT IS BRACED FOR POSSIBLE REPRISALS. BEIRUT'S MAIN LINK WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD, THE AIRPORT, HAS BEEN SHUT SINCE EARLY 30 NOVEMBER, WITH NO INDICATION WHEN IT WILL BE RE-OPENED. THE PSP HAVE LAID DOWN CERTAIN CONDITIONS, BUT A WIDESPREAD VIEW IS THAT THEY WANT TO SHOW THEIR MUSCLE BY COMPLICATING THE PRESIDENT'S RETURN (THERE ARE PLENTY OF PRECEDENTS), AND WILL NOT LET IT BE REOPENED AT LEAST UNTIL GEMAYEL IS BACK.

i.e. of the Druze leader

~~OF PRECEDENTS), AND WILL NOT LET IT BE REOPENED AT LEAST UNTIL
GEMAYEL IS BACK.~~

3. ON 30 NOV AMAL KIDNAPPED WORKERS RETURNING FROM THE AIRPORT IN REPRISAL FOR KATAEB KIDNAPPINGS IN THE MOUNTIAN. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER ALL THE VICTIMS HAVE BEEN RELEASED. EARLY ON 1 DECEMBER, 3 KM FROM THE AIRPORT, A MEMBER OF THE FRENCH MNF CONTINGENT WAS SHOT DEAD BY A SNIPER OPERATING FROM THE SHIA "NO GO" SOUTHERN AREAS. IT IS TOO EARLY TO KNOW WHETHER THIS MEANS THE MILITIAS THERE ARE ADOPTING A MORE AGGRESSIVE ROLE INSTEAD OF SIMPLY DEFENDING THEIR AREA PROPER. IF THE FORMER, THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS (INCLUDING THE AIRPORT AREA) AND FOR SECURITY GENERALLY ARE SERIOUS. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR TOLD ME ON 30 NOVEMBER THAT THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF ATTACKS ON FRENCH PATROLS: HE HOPES THEIR PRESENCE WILL CONTINUE TO BUTTRESS LAW AND ORDER AND NOT SIMPLY PROVIDE TARGETS FOR DISSIDENTS.

4. MEANWHILE IN TRIPOLI, ALTHOUGH THE FRAGILE CEASEFIRE HOLDS, THE UNCERTAINTY OVER DEADLINES FOR PLO WITHDRAWAL, OVER FUTURE MOVES GENERALLY, AND THE FACT THAT LEBANON HAS NO PART IN THE ACT, ADDS TO THE SENSE OF DRIFT, AND WORSE. THE NEWS FROM THE SOUTH IS NO BETTER (MY TELNO 686).

5. POLITICALLY, THE NEWS IS GENERALLY GLOOMY. THE MEETING OF THE SECURITY COMMITTEE UNDER THE PRESIDENT'S CHAIRMANSHIP IN ROME HAS APPARENTLY ACHIEVED LITTLE. FEW PEOPLE PIN MANY HOPES ON THE MEETING WHICH, IT HAS JUST BEEN ANNOUNCED, IS TO TAKE PLACE NEXT WEEK IN DAMASCUS. SPECULATION, FED BY THE REAGAN/SHAMIR SUMMIT, CONTINUES THAT THE ISRAELIS MAY BE PLANNING, WITH U.S. ACQUIESCENCE OR BACKING, SOME ACTION AGAINST SYRIA. ALTHOUGH NOBODY HAS SERIOUSLY SOUGHT TO UNRAVEL THE GENEVA ACQUIS, MUCH OF THE MOMENTUM BEHIND "RECONCILIATION" HAS BEEN DISSAPATED. MANY LEBANESE HOPED FOR NEWS ON WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM THE GEMAYEL/REAGAN MEETING WHICH WOULD GIVE IT A FILLIP. BUT GEMAYEL IS NOT SEEN TO HAVE MADE MUCH IMPRESSION ON THE AMERICANS SO FAR. THE POLITICAL MOOD IS LIKELY TO REMAIN GLOOMY, IF NOT APPREHENSIVE, UNLESS THE PRESIDENT CAN CONVINCCE PEOPLE ON RETURN THAT HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON HAS HAD RESULTS.

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FROM UKDEL NATO 021610Z DEC 83

pa repeated to Athens.
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 307 OF 2 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON ROUTINE TEL AVIV BEIRUT DAMASCUS AMMAN
JEDDA CAIRO BAGHDAD UKMIS NEW YORK

US/ISRAELI TALKS IN WASHINGTON
SUMMARY

1. US REPORTED TO NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC) ON SHAMIR VISIT. THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF ANY MODIFICATION OF 17 MAY LEBANON/ISRAEL AGREEMENT. JOINT POLITICAL/MILITARY GROUP (JPMG), WHICH WAS DESIGNED SOLELY TO MEET THE SOVIET THREAT, WOULD CONSIDER MILITARY PLANNING, EXERCISES ETC. US HAD STRESSED CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH MODERATE ARABS. POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES OVER THE WEST BANK RESTATED, AND US HOPE OF GETTING QUOTE ANOTHER ARAB NEGOTIATING PARTNER UNQUOTE TO THE TABLE.

DETAIL

2. AT THIS MORNING'S MEETING OF THE NAC ABSHIRE (US) MADE A STATEMENT ABOUT SHAMIR'S RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON. FULL TEXT (WHICH HE DID NOT FOLLOW EXACTLY) FOLLOWS BY BAG TO NENAD AND OTHER RECIPIENTS.
3. ABSHIRE SAID THAT THE US HAD REAFFIRMED ITS SUPPORT FOR THE AGREEMENT OF 17 MAY AS THE VEHICLE FOR THE RESTORATION OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON. THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF ANY MODIFICATION TO ITS TERMS. THE PRESIDENT HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ISRAEL AVOIDING ACTION IN SOUTH LEBANON WHICH WOULD UNDERMINE THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OR WOULD GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF PARTITION. ISRAEL QUOTE ACKNOWLEDGED UNQUOTE THIS.
4. THE PRESIDENT AND SHAMIR HAD DISCUSSED THE INCREASED SOVIET THREAT TO THE REGION AND HAD AGREED TO SET UP A JPMG TO CONSIDER WAYS OF COUNTERING IT. THERE HAD BEEN NO, REPEAT NO, DISCUSSION OF JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS. THE JPMG WOULD CONSIDER AT ITS FIRST MEETING IN EARLY JANUARY COMBINED MILITARY PLANNING, JOINT EXERCISES AND THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PREPOSITIONING OF US EQUIPMENT IN ISRAEL. ABSHIRE EMPHASISED THAT THE WORK OF THE JPMG WAS DESIGNED SOLELY TO MEET THE SOVIET THREAT AND WOULD NOT BE DIRECTED AGAINST THE ARAB STATES. IT HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR TO THE ISRAELIS THAT THE US ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO ITS RELATIONS WITH THE MODERATE ARAB STATES WHICH STRENGTHENED SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE REGION. IT WAS IN THE INTERESTS ALSO OF ISRAEL THAT THE US SHOULD HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE MODERATE ARABS. ABSHIRE REPEATED THAT ALL THE WORK OF THE JPMG WOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARDS COUNTERING THE SOVIET THREAT. SPEAKING PERSONALLY HE REJECTED ANY CONCLUSION THAT THE ROLE OF THE US MARINES IN LEBANON HAD CHANGED AS A RESULT OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS.

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5. I WAS THE ONLY ONE TO SPEAK. I SAID THAT THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT STATEMENT ON WHICH I SHOULD NOT WISH TO COMMENT OFF THE CUFF, BUT I WONDERED WHETHER IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS ANYTHING HAD BEEN SAID ABOUT THE WEST BANK. ABSHIRE SAID THAT THIS WAS COVERED IN THE FULL STATEMENT WHICH HE WOULD BE CIRCULATING (THIS READS: QUOTE WE RESTATED OUR VIEW THAT CONTINUED SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY, UNDERMINES THE CONFIDENCE OF THOSE WHOM WE ARE TRYING TO PERSUADE TO JOIN NEGOTIATIONS AND IN THAT SENSE IS AN OBSTACLE TO PEACE. WE ALSO EXPRESS THE VIEW THAT AT A TIME WHEN THERE IS CONSIDERABLE TURMOIL IN THE ARAB WORLD AND SIGNS OF RETHINKING OF POSITIONS BY JORDAN ON JOINING THE PEACE PROCESS, WE HOPE THAT ISRAEL WILL RESPOND THOUGHTFULLY TO ANY MOVES KING HUSSEIN MIGHT MAKE. WE STATED OUR STRONG HOPE THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO DEEPEN OUR CONSULTATION WITH ISREAL, JORDAN AND THE LOCAL INHABITANTS ON IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF PALESTINIAN LIFE AND EMPHASISED OUR SERIOUSNESS IN PURSUING THIS INITIATIVE. ISRAEL ACKNOWLEDGED OUR POSITIONS AND RESTATED THEIR STANCE ALONG FAMILIAR LINES. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL CAN BEST BE CHALLENGED TO RECONSIDER ITS POLICIES BY ANOTHER ARAB NEGOTIATING PARTNER AGREEING TO COME TO THE TABLE. UNQUOTE)

GRAHAM

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1516 OF 2 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, JEDDA, TUNIS, THE HAGUE, PARIS, MOSCOW

INFO SAVING SANA'A

YOUR TELNO 833 (NOT REPEATED): PLO IN LEBANON

SUMMARY

1. THE PLO REQUEST IS NOT FOR EVACUATION FROM TRIPOLI UNDER UN AUSPICES BUT FOR THE UN FLAG TO BE FLOWN ON THE SHIPS DOING THE EVACUATING. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS TOLD THE COUNCIL THAT IT IS LEGALLY JUSTIFIABLE FOR THE UN FLAG TO BE FLOWN ALONGSIDE THE NATIONAL FLAG OF THE SHIPS IN QUESTION, WHICH WILL BE PROVIDED (AND PAID FOR) BY THE SAUDIS. HE HAS ALSO STRESSED THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECT. THE LEBANESE AGREE. SO DO ELEVEN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES I HAVE SAID WE SHALL JOIN THEM. ASSUMING THE AMERICANS DO SO TOO THERE WILL NOT BE A RESOLUTION BUT SIMPLY A COMMUNICATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAYING THAT THE COUNCIL GOES ALONG WITH THE TWO-FLAG PROPOSAL. THE COUNCIL MEETS AGAIN AT 15.30Z TOMORROW SATURDAY 3 DECEMBER.

DETAIL

2. THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, VAN DER STOEL (NETHERLANDS)

CALLED FOR A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS THIS MORNING, 2 DECEMBER, TO ALLOW THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A URGENT REQUEST FROM ARAFAT, THROUGH THE PLO OBSERVER AT THE UN, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SHIPS WHICH WOULD TAKE HIM AND HIS TROOPS FROM TRIPOLI SHOULD FLY THE UN FLAG, APPARENTLY AS A FORM OF PROTECTION OR GUARANTEE. THE SECRETARY GENERAL ADDED THAT IT APPEARED THAT THIS WAS A CONDITION ON WHICH ARAFAT AND HIS TROOPS WOULD BE PREPARED TO LEAVE TRIPOLI BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE RECENT NEGOTIATIONS ON TRIPOLI. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT HE FELT OBLIGED, UNDER OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 7 OF SCR 542 (MY TELNO 1437) TO CONSULT THE COUNCIL ABOUT THIS IN THE FULL KNOWLEDGE THAT IT HAS A SIGNIFICANT BEARING ON A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE SITUATION IN TRIPOLI AND MAY WELL BE IMPORTANT AS A FACTOR IN AVOIDING FUTURE LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE IN AND AROUND THE CITY. THE REMAINDER OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S STATEMENT (THE FULL TEXT OF WHICH HAS BEEN SENT BY FACSIMILE TO NENAD) COVERED THE LEGAL SITUATION: IF THE UN FLAG FLEW ALONGSIDE THE NATIONAL FLAG IT DID NOT ALTER THE ATTRIBUTION OF THE SHIP TO THE FLAG STATE BUT INDICATED BACKING AND APPROVAL BY THE UN OF THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE SHIP WAS BEING USED: ALTHOUGH THERE WERE NO FIRM RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE USE OF FLAGS OPERATED BY OR FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS THE ICRC HAD BEEN GIVEN THE RIGHT TO

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USE ITS FLAG EXCLUSIVELY ON SHIPS AND THERE HAD BEEN CASES IN WHICH SHIPS CHARTERED OR OWNED BY THE UN AND USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR UN PURPOSES HAD NAVIGATED UNDER THE UN FLAG WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE STATES CONCERNED: IN THIS CASE IT WOULD NOT SEEM JUSTIFIABLE TO PERMIT THE USE OF THE UN FLAG ABOVE BUT "UNDER THE GENERAL LAW OF NAVIGATION IT WOULD SEEM JUSTIFIABLE TO PERMIT USE OF THE UN FLAG ALONGSIDE THE NATIONAL FLAG."

3. I ASKED FOR SPECIFIC PRECEDENTS. THE LEGAL COUNSEL QUOTED CASES IN WHICH THE UN FLAG HAD FLOWN ALONGSIDE THE NATIONAL FLAG (THE SS NORWAY IN MARCH 1980, THE EXPERIMENTAL REED SHIP TIGRIS IN APRIL 1977 AND A SCIENTIFIC OCEAN EXPEDITION). FOR THE 1956 UNEF THE UN FLAG SOMETIMES FLEW SOMETIMES ALONE AND SOMETIMES TOGETHER WITH THE NATIONAL FLAGS ON VESSELS CHARTERED TO TRANSPORT THE TROOPS AND MATERIALS. THE UN FLAG HAD FLOWN ALONE IN 1955 ON BEHALF OF THE UN/KOREAN RECONSTRUCTION AGENCY AND IN 1956/57 DURING THE UN SUEZ CANAL CLEARANCE OPERATION. I ALSO ASKED WHO OWNED THE SHIPS REFERRED TO BY TERZI: THE SECRETARY GENERAL REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN VERY SPECIFIC BUT AGREED WITH ME WHEN I SAID THAT THIS COULD NOT BE DESCRIBED AS A UN OPERATION.

4. TROYANOVSKY (USSR) ASKED ABOUT THE TIMEFRAME AND THE FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS. THE SECRETARY GENERAL REPLIED THAT TERZI HAD EXPRESSED A TREMENDOUS SENSE OF URGENCY, AS HAD THE ARAB LEAGUE REPRESENTATIVE WHO FOLLOWED HIM, AND THAT MAKSUD HAD SAID THE ARAB LEAGUE WOULD COVER THE EXPENSES.

5. MRS KIRKPATRICK (US) SHARED TROYANOVSKY'S CONCERN ABOUT THE FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND ASKED WHO WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO THE USE OF THE UN FLAG. THE LEGAL COUNSEL REPLIED THAT IN THE PRESENT CASE THERE WOULD BE FOUR CONCERNED PARTIES:

- (A) THE COUNTRY OF REGISTRATION OF THE SHIP(S):
- (B) LEBANON:
- (C) THE COUNTRY OF DESTINATION:
- (D) THE STATES THROUGH WHOSE TERRITORIAL WATERS THE SHIPS MIGHT PASS.

THE SECRETARY GENERAL COMMENTED THAT TERZI HAD NOT SPECIFIED A DESTINATION BUT TUNISIA AND ALGERIA SEEMED POSSIBLE.

6. THE PRESIDENT THEN SUSPENDED THE MEETING IN ORDER TO ALLOW BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. WHEN I SAW HIM I SAID (ON THE BASIS OF TELECONS GORE-BOOTH/LONG) THAT:

(A) IF THIS WAS AN URGENT HUMANITARIAN MATTER (FOR WHICH WE HAD ONLY TERZI'S WORD) IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE ICRC TO DEAL WITH IT: IN WHICH CASE THERE MIGHT NOT BE ANY NEED FOR THE COUNCIL TO DO ANYTHING BEYOND INVITING THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO BE IN TOUCH WITH THE RED CROSS.

(B) THE IDEA (WHICH A MEMBER OF THE DUTCH DELEGATION HAD TOLD US WAS ALREADY IN VAN DER STOEL'S MIND) OF SENDING A REPRESENTATIVE

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OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO TRIPOLI TO GUARANTEE AS MANDATE UNDER SCR 542 WAS A GOOD ONE: HE HAD NOT YET REPORTED UNDER THAT RESOLUTION AND THE COUNCIL COULD INVITE HIM TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO OBTAIN THE INFORMATION:

(C) IF THIS WAS TO BE TREATED AS A POLITICAL MATTER WE SHOULD NEED TO CONSIDER IT MORE CAREFULLY NEXT WEEK ON THE BASIS OF A PROPER REPORT WHICH FOR A START MADE IT CLEAR WHAT WE WERE PUTTING A UN FLAG ON: WE DID NOT WANT A POLITICAL PIG IN A POKE.

VAN DER STOEL AGREED THAT A STRONG CASE COULD BE MADE OUT FOR USING THE ICRC, THOUGH HE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE A PROBLEM ABOUT HAVING ARMS ON BOARD. HE AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR A UN FLAG BEYOND A 'POLITICAL FACE-LIFT' FOR ARAFAT. IF THE SECRETARY GENERAL WERE TO SEND SOMEONE TO TRIPOLI HE MIGHT APPRECIATE GUIDANCE. THIS SUGGESTED A TWO STAGE OPERATION, FIRST A FACT FINDING MISSION AND SECONDLY A DEBATE.

7. LATE THIS EVENING VAN DER STOEL ASKED ME TO CALL TO HEAR THE RESULTS OF HIS CONSULTATIONS. THESE WERE THAT ELEVEN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL FELT THAT THE IDEA OF A UN FLAG WAS A GOOD ONE. A TWELFTH MEMBER (ZAIRE) HAD ONLY SLIGHT RESERVATIONS. WHICH LEFT OURSELVES, THE AMERICANS AND (THOUGH HE DID NOT SAY SO) THE DUTCH (THE FRENCH AND RUSSIANS HAVING TOLD US EARLIER THAT THEY HAD NO OBJECTION). HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE LEBANESE WHO HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WANTED THE PLO EVACUATED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND THAT THEY COULD AGREE TO THE UN FLAG PROVIDED THAT IT WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE LEBANESE FLAG IN LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL WATERS. HE HAD ALSO SEEN TERZI WHO HAD QUOTED TO HIM ARTICLE 4 OF THE SYRIAN/SAUDI AGREEMENT COVERING THE EVACUATION AND ALSO QUOTED AN AGREEMENT WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT FOR LEBANESE POLICEMEN TO CONDUCT IDENTIFICATION OF THE PLO MEMBERS AND ESCORT THEM TO THE PORT: TERZI ADDED THAT SAUDI ARABIA WOULD PROVIDE THE SHIPS (OF WHICH 6-8 WILL BE REQUIRED) AND THE MONEY: THE PLO WILL BE TRANSPORTED TO TUNISIA AND NORTH YEMEN. HE HAD ALSO SPOKEN AGAIN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WHO HAD SAID THAT, IF COUNCIL AGREEMENT WAS FORTHCOMING, HE WOULD STRESS THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECT. VAN DER STOEL POINTED OUT THAT, IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IF WE MAINTAINED OUR POSITION WE SHOULD BE ACCUSED OF NOT BEING WILLING TO PREVENT FURTHER BLOODSHED.

8. I SAID THAT IN THE LIGHT OF THIS NEW INFORMATION THE SENSIBLE THING WAS FOR US TO GO ALONG WITH THE REST OF THE COUNCIL. WE HAD NEVER HAD A FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTION BUT HAD NOT WANTED TO BE BOUNCED. THERE WAS AN OVER-RIDING NEED TO GET THE PLO OUT AND ON THE BASIS OF A TWO FLAG SOLUTION WE WOULD NOT OPPOSE. THERE MIGHT EVEN BE ADVANTAGE TO BE GAINED IN HAVING IT PUBLICLY ESTABLISHED THAT THERE WAS A SYRIAN/SAUDI AGREEMENT WITH WHICH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS ASSOCIATED.

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9. VAN DER STOEL WILL NOW BRIEF MRS KIRKPATRICK SIMILARLY IN THE HOPE OF PERSUADING HER NOT TO RAISE OBJECTION WHEN THE COUNCIL RESUMES INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS TOMORROW MORNING. HE WILL LOOK INTO THE MODALITIES OF COMMUNICATING THE COUNCIL'S AGREEMENT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THERE WILL BE NO FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL (AND THEREFORE NO RESOLUTION). THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WILL MAKE A FURTHER STATEMENT TO THE COUNCIL TO WHICH THE COUNCIL WILL BE ASKED TO SIGNIFY THAT IT HAS NO OBJECTION. ASSUMING IT DOES SO THE PRESIDENT WILL EITHER MAKE A STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT OR WRITE A CONFIRMATORY LETTER TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

10. RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE ALERT LONG (NENAD) TO THIS TELEGRAM.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO SANA'A

THOMSON

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Agree to offer President

London SW1A 2AH

Gemayel talks at 12.15

1 December, 1983

followed by a small lunch

on Wednesday, 14 December?

A-J.C. 1.12

Yes not

Dear John,

Visit by President Gemayel of Lebanon

As you know, we have been trying to arrange suitable dates for a working visit to London by President Gemayel. Although the Prime Minister agreed while in New Delhi to see him on 30 November, this date did not in the event fit in with his plans for his current visit to Rome and Washington.

We have told the Lebanese that we nevertheless hope that President Gemayel will come to London soon and that Ministers are likely to be available in the week beginning 12 December. HM Ambassador at Beirut thinks it would help to clinch the visit if we could offer a definite time when the Prime Minister could receive President Gemayel. I enclose a copy of Beirut telno 681.

Sir Geoffrey Howe recommends that the Prime Minister receive President Gemayel. This would be a good opportunity to get over our concern at the slow rate of progress towards national reconciliation. We could also underline that it will be difficult to justify to public opinion our continued participation in the MNF unless all parties are willing to make real concessions in order to achieve a new national consensus.

If the Prime Minister were free to do so she might wish to offer some hospitality. Sir Geoffrey would propose to see President Gemayel for talks as well; HM Ambassador Beirut has suggested that Gemayel might also see the Secretary of State for Defence.

As to the rest of the programme, we know that the President would like to make contact with members of Parliament and the press. He may also ask to call on The Queen. When we know which date is suitable for the Prime Minister we shall check whether The Queen would be available to receive him. We know that The Queen is not free on 12 or 16 December.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD).

Yours ever,
Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

LUK 838/28

IMMEDIATE

Prime Minister

A.S.C. 29

FDW 0049/28
OO NEW DELHI
GR 535
CONFIDENTIAL
FM F C O 281224Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI
TELEGRAM NUMBER 924 OF 28 NOVEMBER
FOR COLES

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION NEW DELHI CHANCERY REGISTRY 29 NOV 1983 DUPLICATES OF LETTER..... OF ENCLOSURES..... LOCATION.....

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PS/PM
WAS SENT TO ROME TELEGRAM NUMBER 352 OF 25 NOVEMBER:
BEGINS:

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS, BEIRUT
INFO PRIORITY OTHER EC POSTS, DAMASCUS, UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 351: COORDINATION BETWEEN MNF CONTRIBUTORS.

1. MINISTER AT ITALIAN EMBASSY CALLED ON BULLARD AND EGERTON ON 25 NOVEMBER, ON INSTRUCTIONS. VATTANI EXPLAINED THIS HIS GOVERNMENT WAS CONCERNED 'AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL' ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THEIR MNF CONTINGENT. HE HANDED OVER A COPY OF THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER THE SUPREME DEFENCE COUNCIL'S MEETING IN ROME ON 23 NOVEMBER ON THIS SUBJECT, THE CRUX OF WHICH STATES THAT THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT WILL LEAVE BEIRUT AS SOON AS THE GENEVA RECONCILIATION TALKS END, WHATEVER THEIR RESULT. VATTANI STRESSED THAT IT WAS UNUSUAL FOR THE SUPREME DEFENCE COUNCIL TO ISSUE A COMMUNIQUE. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT SR. ANDREOTTI WAS ANXIOUS TO COMPARE NOTES WITH HIS MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR THE MNF AND SUGGESTED THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE IN THE MARGINS OF THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETINGS ON 8/9 DECEMBER, OR EARLIER IF THE SITUATION IN LEBANON SEEMED TO WARRANT IT.
2. BULLARD SAID HE FELT HE COULD ASSURE THE ITALIANS THAT I WOULD WELCOME SUCH A MEETING. HE COULD NOT SAY WHETHER I WOULD BE ABLE TO ATTEND ONE EARLIER THAN 8/9 DECEMBER, THOUGH OF COURSE THE THREE EUROPEAN MNF FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD BE ABLE TO COMPARE NOTES IN THE MARGINS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, AS NECESSARY.
3. VATTANI EXPLAINED FURTHER THAT THE ITALIANS WERE ANXIOUS TO THIN DOWN THEIR CONTINGENT EVEN IF ITS REMOVAL WAS NOT AN EARLY PROSPECT. THEY WERE DISSATISFIED WITH PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR COORDINATION BETWEEN THE MNF CONTINGENTS. AS REGARDS BULLARD'S SUGGESTION TO BOTTAI IN BRUSSELS ON 22 NOVEMBER, THAT THE ITALIANS SHOULD CALL FOR INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN OFFICIALS OF MNF STATES, THIS WAS DIFFICULT GIVEN THE COLDNESS BETWEEN THE ITALIANS AND THE FRENCH RESULTING FROM THEIR RECENT BILATERAL TALKS IN VENICE, AT WHICH NEWS OF THE FRENCH RETALIATION IN THE BEKAA HAD HIT ITALIAN MINISTER -S LIKE A BOMBSHELL.
4. EGERTON EXPLAINED THAT WE TOO INCREASINGLY FELT THE LACK OF ANY MACHINERY TO ENABLE MNF CONTRIBUTORS TO REVIEW PROGRESS AGAINST OBJECTIVES (SHORT, MEDIUM AND LONGER TERM), AND TO SERVE AS A CLEARING HOUSE FOR INFORMATION ON THREATS TO SECURITY, THE INTENTIONS OF LEBANON'S NEIGHBOURS, PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION ETC. WE BELIEVED THAT MEETINGS OF OFFICIALS IN A CONTACT GROUP, IDEALLY IN ROME, WOULD PREPARE THE GROUND FOR MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS AND MIGHT DIMINISH OUR SENSE OF SIMPLY REACTING TO EVENTS WHICH WE COULD NEITHER FORESEE NOR ADEQUATELY GUARD AGAINST. IF THE ITALIANS AGREED SUCH A CONTACT GROUP MIGHT GROW OUT OF THE MINISTERIAL MEETING IN THE MARGINS OF NATO. VATTANI SAID HE THOUGHT FRENCH OBJECTIONS WOULD BE LESS IF SUCH A GROUP WAS TOTALLY INFORMAL, AND MET IN LONDON. BUT HE WOULD REPORT OUR THINKING TO ANDREOTTI, WHO COULD THEN DISCUSS IT FURTHER WITH ME IN THE MARGINS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL. VATTANI DID NOT EXPECT OBJECTIONS FROM THE US TO THE IDEA OF A CONTACT GROUP: THE PROBLEM WAS HOW TO SELL THE IDEA TO THE FRENCH.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM BEIRUT 281210Z NOV 83

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 681 OF 28 NOVEMBER 1983

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, ROME, PARIS, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, NEW DELHI

YOUR TELNO 507: PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S VISIT

1. THE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER ARE NOW IN ROME ON THEIR WAY TO WASHINGTON. THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO RETURN BEFORE THE END OF THIS WEEK. I HAVE ACCORDINGLY TOLD THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE THAT OUR MINISTERS ARE LIKELY TO BE AVAILABLE IN THE WEEK BEGINNING 12 DECEMBER, BUT NOT IN THAT BEGINNING 19 DEC: AND ASKED HIM TO TELEGRAPH THIS TO THE PRESIDENT SO THAT WE CAN GET ON WITH FIXING DEFINITE DATES.

2. I BELIEVE IT WOULD HELP CLINCH THE VISIT IF WE COULD OFFER A DEFINITE TIME OR TIMES WHEN THE PM COULD RECEIVE THE PRESIDENT.

3. I THINK GEMAYEL'S WISH ON REFLECTION TO MAKE A MORE LEISURELY VISIT IS REAL. HE DID NOT REFUSE TO COME ON 30 NOV OUT OF PIQUE. HE MAY HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT HE WOULD DO WELL TO SEEK THE SYMPATHY OF THE BRITISH PUBLIC AND PRESS AS WELL AS OF OUR MINISTERS (HE MAY HAVE NOTICE THAT THIS IS WHAT JUMBLATT IS PLANNING).

4. ON THE PROGRAMME, I AM NOT SURE WHETHER OR NOT HE WILL NOW EXPECT TO SEE THE QUEEN. HE SOUGHT REASSURANCE FROM ME WHEN I PRESENTED CREDENTIALS THAT THE WORKING VISIT HE THEN ENVISAGED WOULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) INVOLVE THE QUEEN. BUT HE MAY HAVE BEEN EMPHASISING THAT HE WAS NOT SUGGESTING A STATE VISIT: AND AT THAT TIME HE WAS THINKING OF A 24 HOUR STOPOVER ONLY. THE POSSIBILITY OF HE SEEING THE QUEEN HAS NOW BEEN AIRED IN THE PRESS HERE, ALONG WITH OTHER SPECULATIONS ABOUT HIS VISIT. I SUGGEST THAT I BE INSTRUCTED, WHEN WE HAVE DATES TO PUT TO HIM, TO SOUND HIM OUT INDIRECTLY AND WITHOUT COMMITMENT ON WHETHER HE WOULD LIKE TO BE INVITED TO CALL BRIEFLY ON THE QUEEN IF SHE WAS AVAILABLE.

5. FOR THE REST OF THE PROGRAMME HE IS NOT EXPECTING TO SEE THE PM FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR OR SO, THOUGH I AM SURE HE WOULD BE DELIGHTED IF SHE COULD OFFER HIM A MEAL. HE WILL ALSO PROBABLY EXPECT AN HOUR EACH WITH THE F AND C SECRETARY AND THE DEFENCE SECRETARY, THOUGH THESE MEETINGS COULD BE RUN TOGETHER IF NECESSARY. I RECOMMEND THAT HMG OFFER HIM A LUNCH: IF THE PM CANNOT HOST THIS HERSELF IT WOULD HELP IF WE OFFERED A SUITABLE EXCUSE EG HER NEED TO PREPARE FOR PM'S QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE. THE REST OF THE

CONFIDENTIAL

/PROGRAMME

~~John~~ We could possibly do lunch on
14 Dec if the PM so wished, though
she has a very busy morning.
CONFIDENTIAL

DWS
29/11

CONFIDENTIAL

PROGRAMME COULD PERHAPS BE PADDED OUT WITH THINGS LIKE RECEPTIONS BY MIDDLE EAST MPS AT THE HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT (COULD LORDS DENMAN AND SELSDON STEP IN IF IPU CANNOT HELP?), A PRESS CONFERENCE, INTERVIEWS WITH JOURNALISTS, AND PERHAPS SOME INVOLVEMT WITH INDUSTRY/THE CITY (LUNCH AT THE CBI/BANK OF ENGLAND?) - THOUGH THERE IS NO POINT IN BEATING THE EXPORT DRUM FOR LEBANON AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE.

6. THE FOREIGN MINISTER TOLD ME LAST WEEK THAT GEMAYEL WAS NOT (REPEAT NOT) LINKING HIS PROPOSED JOURNEY TO LONDON WITH THE NEXT SESSION OF THE GENEVA TALKS, THE DATE FOR WHICH WAS VERY UNCERTAIN.

MIERS

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)
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ECD(E)
FINANCE DEPT
PROTOCOL DEPT
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/FUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR MACINNES
MR ADAMS
MR EGERTON
MR JENKINS

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SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

2
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IMMEDIATE

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LUK 874/23

FDW G 129/28

DD 282330Z NEW DELHI

GRS 350

RECEIVED
 BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION
 NEW DELHI
 CHANCERY HOUSE
 29 NOV 1983
 DUPLICATES

OF LETTER
 OF ENCLOSURES
 LOCATION

CONFIDENTIAL
 DESKBY 282330Z
 FM FCO 281700Z NOV 83
 TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 933 OF 28 NOVEMBER

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY/PRIME MINISTER: AND FOR PUS
 SITUATION REPORT 27/28 NOVEMBER
 LEBANON

1. BEIRUT/SHOUF REMAIN GENERALLY QUIET, WITH LIMITED CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS. HMS FEARLESS ARRIVED OFF BEIRUT ON THE MORNING OF 28 NOVEMBER. GLAMORGAN AND BRAZEN LEFT THE AREA ON THE AFTERNOON OF 28 NOVEMBER TO TAKE UP GULF PATROL DUTIES. THE PENTAGON HAS DENIED CLAIMS THAT SYRIAN AIR DEFENCES REPELLED US RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT OVER NORTH LEBANON ON 26/27 NOVEMBER.

2. PRESIDENT ASSAD MADE HIS FIRST PUBLIC APPEARANCE ON 27 NOVEMBER SINCE ENTERING HOSPITAL 2 WEEKS AGO. LENGTHY CONVALESCENCE IS LIKELY TO DELAY A MEETING WITH GEMAYEL. BUT THE LEBANESE AND SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS MET ON 26 NOVEMBER. GEMAYEL, NOW IN ROME, IS DUE TO MEET REAGAN ON 1 DECEMBER. THE US ADMINISTRATION HAS DENIED THAT CURRENT TALKS BETWEEN REAGAN AND SHAMIR WILL COVER IMPROVED STRATEGIC COOPERATION.

3. AROUND TRIPOLI, FIGHTING BETWEEN PLO REBELS AND LOYALISTS ON 27 NOVEMBER KILLED SEVERAL PEOPLE. THERE IS SOME DISPUTE OVER THE SAUDI/SYRIAN PEACE PLAN. ONE LOYALIST LEADER HAS SAID HIS MEN WILL NOT WITHDRAW FROM PALESTINIAN CAMPS NEAR TRIPOLI: AND ONE REBEL LEADER MAINTAINS THAT ARAFAT MUST RESIGN BEFORE LOYALISTS CAN LEAVE TRIPOLI. THE COORDINATION COMMITTEE IS VISITING DAMASCUS ON 28 NOVEMBER TO DISCUSS THE PLAN WITH THE FORMER LEBANESE PM KARAMI.

FALKLANDS

4. STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE CONFIRMED TO THE EMBASSY THAT BUSH WILL ATTEND ALFONSO'S INAUGURATION ON 10 DECEMBER.

BANGLADESH

5. A CURFEW HAS BEEN IMPOSED IN DHAKA FROM 1500 LOCAL TIME ON 28 NOVEMBER UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, AFTER AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION TURNED VIOLENT. POLITICAL ACTIVITY HAS BEEN SUSPENDED. MARTIAL LAW IS BEING STRICTLY ENFORCED.

UNGA: VOTING IN FIRST COMMITTEE

8. VOTING IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES) IS NOW ALMOST COMPLETE. UK RECORD (AND THAT OF MOST OF OUR ALLIES) LOOKS WORSE THAN LAST YEAR. THIS REFLECTS GREATER PROPAGANDA EFFORTS BY THE SOVIET BLOC AND MORE EXTREME RESOLUTIONS TABLED BY LEADING NON-ALIGNED STATES.

HOWE

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repeated to
Delhi

Sub
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CONFIDENTIAL

3030 - 1

OO ROME
OO BEIRUT
PP ATHENS
PP DAMASCUS
GRS 520
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 251832 NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE ROME

TELEGRAM NUMBER 352 OF 25 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BEIRUT
INFO PRIORITY OTHER EC POSTS, DAMASCUS, UKMIS NEW YORK
MY TELNO 351: COORDINATION BETWEEN MNF CONTRIBUTORS.

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ITALIANS SHOULD CALL FOR INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN OFFICIALS OF MNF STATES, THIS WAS DIFFICULT GIVEN THE COLDNESS BETWEEN THE ITALIANS AND THE FRENCH RESULTING FROM THEIR RECENT BILATERAL TALKS IN VENICE, AT WHICH NEWS OF THE FRENCH RETALIATION IN THE BEKAA HAD HIT ITALIAN MINISTERS LIKE A BOMBSHELL.

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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PROTOCOL DEPT
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PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR MACINNES
MR ADAMS
MR EGERTON
MR JENKINS

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LUK NR 782/26

FDW F 058/26

RR DELHI

GRS 67

D E D I P

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 251630Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE PARIS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 616 OF 25 NOVEMBER

INFO NEW DELHI (FOR COLES)

YOUR TELNO 1080: FRENCH COUNTER-STRIKE IN THE LEBANON.

1. I AGREE THAT WE SHOULD NOT LEAVE THE FRENCH WITH THE LAST WORD AND THAT YOU SHOULD SPEAK TO THE ELYSEE ON THE LINES YOU PROPOSE.

THE CONTRAST WITH THE ITALIANS WILL NOT BE LOST ON THE FRENCH AND MIGHT PERHAPS BEST BE LEFT TO SPEAK FOR ITSELF.

HOWE

NNNN

Pl. copy to
Sir A. Arland and
Sir J. Leahy
and return to me.

A.S.C. 22/11

CONFIDENTIAL

OG

OUT TELEGRAM

cc. LEBANON: Int. Situ. Part 5
 CYPRUS: Int. Situ. Feb 80.
 GRENADA: Int. Situ. Part 2
 SOV. UNION: Soviet Leadership June 1979

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

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1 ZCZC
 2 GRS
 3 CONFIDENTIAL
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 5 DESKBY 23.30
 6 FM FCO 241600Z NOV 83
 7 IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI
 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
 9 FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER; AND FOR PUS
 10 SITUATION REPORT 23/24 NOVEMBER
 11 Lebanon
 12 1. The Israelis have begun to release about 1100 of the
 13 Palestinian and Lebanese detainees in exchange for six
 14 Israeli prisoners held by loyalist PLO in Tripoli. A further
 15 six Israeli soldiers remain in Syrian and rebel PLO hands.
 16 2. There have been indications that President Gemayel
 17 and the Maronites are returning to the view that the
 18 withdrawal of foreign forces should precede national
 19 reconciliation. President Gemayel's planned visit to
 20 London ^{on} 30 November ~~will provide an opportunity to press~~ ^{has been cancelled.}
 21 ~~on Gemayel the need to push for reconciliation by the~~
 22 ~~early convening of Geneva II.~~ ^{but he will still be going to Rome and Washington.}
 23 3. In Tripoli, the de facto ceasefire is holding. The
 24 rebel leader has extended the deadline for Arafat's
 25 departure by one day to 26 November. Diplomatic activity

*Pa
 20/11*

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword	/continues
File number	Dept	Distribution	
Drafted by (Block capitals) <i>Planning Staff</i>		LIMITED	
Telephone number		Private Secretary	
Authorised for despatch <i>[Signature]</i> 24/11		PS/Mr Rifkind	
Comcen reference		PS/Lady Young	
Time of despatch		PS/Mr Whitney	
		PS/Mr Luce	
		PS/PUS	
		Planning Staff	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL

Page
2

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2 continues. The UN Security Council Resolution (23 November)
3 called on the parties to "settle their differences exclusively
4 by peaceful means". The Russians are pressing Damascus
5 to halt ^{the} fighting. The PLO loyalists are said to have
6 accepted a Saudi/Syrian plan for ^a ceasefire, withdrawal of all
7 PLO forces (loyalist and dissident) from North Lebanon and
8 talks to re-establish the unity of PLO. But the rebels
9 are reported to have dismissed the proposals.

10 CYPRUS

11 4. At Coreper on 24 November the Greek representative
12 called for action by the EC in the economic and social fields
13 against Turkey following the UDI by the Turkish Cypriots.
14 This is the first such call for action against Turkey.
15 The Greeks said that they had in mind that the EC should
16 freeze the current position in the EC/Turkey Association
17 Agreement (ie there should be no further liberalisation
18 as previously planned). No decisions were taken and the
19 question is likely to arise again at the Foreign Affairs
20 Council on 29 November.

21 Grenada

22 5. Motley (State Department) has reiterated to Minister,
23 Washington American concern about ^{the likely} policing problems in
24 Grenada following ^{the} withdrawal of US combat troops. Motley
25 said the Americans and the Governor-General saw a pressing
26 need for a contingent of preferably British policemen
27 to be sent to the island. He also expressed concern about
28 the situation in the prison and hoped the UK would be able
29 urgently to send trained prison warders. ~~The dispatch is drafting~~

30 Soviet Union

31 6. Moskovskaya Pravda of 23 November reported a speech
32 by Politburo member, Grishin, in which he referred to a
33 meeting he had had with Andropov on 21 November. But there
34 have still been no Western sightings of Andropov.

NNNN ends
telegram

BLANK

Catchword

PRIME MINISTER

LEBANON

I did not have time to tell you this morning that we have received a report that the Lebanese Cabinet has decided to break diplomatic relations with Iran and to "freeze" (whatever that means) relations with Libya.

A. J. C.

24 November

DD 250030Z NEW DELHI

GRS 429
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 250030Z
FM FCO 241600Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI
TELEGRAM NUMBER 900 OF 24 NOVEMBER

BRITISH
25 NOV 1983
DUPLICATES
OF LETTER
OF ENCLOSURES
LOCATION

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER: AND FOR PUS
SITUATION REPORT 23/24 NOVEMBER

LEBANON

1. THE ISRAELIS HAVE BEGUN TO RELEASE ABOUT 1100 OF THE PALESTINIAN AND LEBANESE DETAINEES IN EXCHANGE FOR SIX ISRAELI PRISONERS HELD BY LOYALIST PLO IN TRIPOLI. A FURTHER SIX ISRAELI SOLDIERS REMAIN IN SYRIAN AND REBEL PLO HANDS.
2. THERE HAVE BEEN INDICATIONS THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND THE MARONITES ARE RETURNING TO THE VIEW THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD PRECEDE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S PLANNED VISIT TO LONDON ON 30 NOVEMBER HAS BEEN CANCELLED BUT HE WILL STILL BE GOING TO ROME AND WASHINGTON.
3. IN TRIPOLI, THE DE FACTO CEASEFIRE IS HOLDING. THE REBEL LEADER HAS EXTENDED THE DEADLINE FOR ARAFAT'S DEPARTURE BY ONE DAY TO 26 NOVEMBER. DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY CONTINUES. THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION (23 NOVEMBER) CALLED ON THE PARTIES TO 'SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES EXCLUSIVELY BY PEACEFUL MEANS'. THE RUSSIANS ARE PRESSING DAMASCUS TO HALT THE FIGHTING. THE PLO LOY

LISTS ARE SAID TO HAVE ACCEPTED A SAUDI/SYRIAN PLAN FOR A CEASEFIRE, WITHDRAWAL OF ALL PLO FORCES (LOYALIST AND DISSIDENT) FROM NORTH LEBANON AND TALKS TO RE-ESTABLISH THE UNITY OF PLO. BUT THE REBELS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE DISMISSED THE PROPOSALS.

CYPRUS

4. AT COREPER ON 24 NOVEMBER THE GREEK REPRESENTATIVE CALLED FOR ACTION BY THE EC IN THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FIELDS AGAINST TURKEY FOLLOWING THE UDI BY THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS. THIS IS THE FIRST SUCH CALL FOR ACTION AGAINST TURKEY. THE GREEKS SAID THAT THEY HAD IN MIND THAT THE EC SHOULD FREEZE THE CURRENT POSITION IN THE EC/TURKEY ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT (IE THERE SHOULD BE NO FURTHER LIBERALISATION AS PREVIOUSLY PLANNED). NO DECISIONS WERE TAKEN AND THE QUESTION IS LIKELY TO ARISE AGAIN AT THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL ON 29 NOVEMBER.

GRENADA

5. MOTLEY (STATE DEPARTMENT) HAS REITERATED TO MINISTER, WASHINGTON AMERICAN CONCERN ABOUT THE LIKELY POLICING PROBLEMS IN GRENADA FOLLOWING THE WITHDRAWAL OF US COMBAT TROOPS. MOTLEY SAID THE AMERICANS AND THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL SAW A PRESSING NEED FOR A CONTINGENT OF PREFERABLY BRITISH POLICEMEN TO BE SENT TO THE ISLAND. HE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE PRISON AND HOPED THE UK WOULD BE ABLE URGENTLY TO SEND TRAINED PRISON WARDERS.

SOVIET UNION

6. MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA OF 23 NOVEMBER REPORTED A SPEECH BY POLITBURO MEMBER, GRISHIN, IN WHICH HE REFERRED TO A MEETING HE HAD HAD WITH ANDROPOV ON 21 NOVEMBER. BUT THERE HAVE STILL BEEN NO WESTERN SIGHTINGS OF ANDROPOV.

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Lebanon

10.26 pm

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Garel Jones.]

Mr. Mark Lennox-Boyd (Morecambe and Lunesdale): When I looked at my notes earlier today I saw that I had drafted four speeches on the middle east and endorsed them all "Never made". I am therefore particularly grateful to you, Mr. Speaker, for having selected my subject for debate tonight, as I am sure my hon. Friend the Minister of State is grateful for the fact that we can debate it at such a comparatively convenient hour.

The two subjects of the Lebanon and the West Bank are related, because, of course, the Palestinian question exists in each. The bloody tragedy of the Lebanon overshadows an equally ugly situation on the West Bank. The failure to secure a political solution on the West Bank precipitated—at the very least—the Israeli invasion of the Lebanon. The situation in Lebanon is a matter for our Parliament. We have a major interest because of the British troops who are serving in the multinational force.

We were reluctant participants in the MNF, for we came in later than the other parties. However, I am glad to say that our political reluctance to be involved in the initial stages has in no way undermined the great skill, forbearance, tolerance and courage of our troops who are serving there. I know that all hon. Members would like to extend their admiration to them and pay tribute to them for what they are doing.

We must analyse why they are there. I believe that the Government sent our troops to serve with the MNF for two important reasons. The primary reason was to assist a frail but friendly Government whom we thought at the time might have the support of the people of the Lebanon after a period of stability. We also thought at the time that stability was possible, because we felt that the revulsion of the people in the Lebanon after so many years of bloodshed and horror would make people feel that stability was a better way of life for them. The people were war weary.

However, there was a subsidiary reason for the MNF—not so much supported by the British Government, but certainly supported by the United States—and it was to get the Israelis off the hook. They wanted to withdraw their troops—if not completely, certainly from a large part of the Lebanon—but they were frightened of the vacuum that would be left by their departure.

From the Israeli point of view, the MNF was in some respects a buffer. It has long been Israeli policy to create buffers in southern Lebanon, but this time it was not to be Christian Arab militias, but soldiers of the West. This subsidiary reason had no merit for British interests, or indeed for United States interests. Israel is still deeply committed in the Lebanon. The Israelis occupy one third of the country, and the buffer provided by the MNF, such as it is, operates only in Beirut.

Whatever merits there were at the time for our being there, the situation in that unhappy country has so disintegrated that our present reason for being there is not as we first thought, because we believe that the Government may have the support of the people after a period of stability—which clearly does not exist at present—but because we believe that the Government may be persuaded to enlarge their constituent parts, to

widen their representation of interests in the Lebanon, so that they acquire the support of the people, and hence stability emerges. I believe that that position is fraught with danger and uncertainty, involving as it does complex political judgments into which we might most reluctantly be drawn.

Our troops should not be in the Lebanon, although I recognise that it would be most unwise to withdraw them precipitately. However, all parties have reiterated that their troops are temporarily there. I earnestly ask my hon. Friend the Minister of State, when considering these difficult matters, to face our United States allies, and other allies who are similarly exposed, with this question: in what positive circumstances do they envisage that it would be appropriate for their troops in the MNF to be withdrawn?

It is so easy to see the negative circumstances. Indeed, we have seen two examples of the negative circumstances in which public opinion in America and France might call for the withdrawal of troops. It is so much harder, even with a giant leap of optimism, to envisage the type of political stability in which the Americans could say, in a positive frame of mind, that the job is now done and our men can come home. This question must be faced if we are not prepared—and I am sure that we are not—for an MNF presence to be continued for a long time. There is a grave risk that our troops will end up like the UNIFIL troops and the other United Nations forces in Sinai, while being exposed to far greater danger.

I should like to dwell for a few moments on the position on the West Bank and how it affects the Lebanon. The terrible tragedy of the Lebanon has, since the Israeli invasion in 1982, completely overshadowed an equally grave political tragedy on the West Bank of the Jordan. The savage irony is that had Mr. Begin's Government been prepared to make practical political progress on the position on the West Bank—they had more than enough chances—they might not have found it necessary to invade the Lebanon in the first place. A further dreadful irony is being enacted before our eyes. The powerful forces of immoderation in the PLO have recently been attempting to destroy Mr. Yasser Arafat and his supporters and finish the job for their implacable enemies, the Israelis.

Those of us who know some of the sensible people from the West Bank, who supported the moderate wing of the PLO, warned that if the Israelis could not be persuaded to work on the Reagan peace initiative when it was launched in September 1982 the moderates in the PLO, who did not want to work on that plan, would be savagely exposed to the extremists in their own movement. That is precisely what we are seeing today.

It is easy, and indeed right, to condemn the Syrian involvement in this dreadful affair, but that condemnation must not divert attention from the fact that the Israeli response to the Reagan peace initiative was to tear it up, and for good measure to establish yet another handful of settlements on the West Bank of the Jordan. We all know that my hon. Friend the Minister of State has recently been in Jerusalem. I hope that when he replies to the debate he will say something about his recent visit.

I shall illustrate as graphically as I can, with a simple story, the nature of occupation. I was there just over a year ago. It is easy for the casual observer from the West to imagine that all is not too bad in the occupied territories. There is not a great deal of bloodshed. In the main, people

[Mr. Mark Lennox-Boyd]

are at work. One sees smiles — one often does in Palestine. One is also surrounded by the long tired faces of people who wish that circumstances were otherwise. However, it is not all negative, which it appears to be on the surface.

A casual observer could easily be misled, because occupation leads to duplicity. I had this little experience when I was there. I stayed in a hotel in east Jerusalem. The doorman was always polite and friendly. He opened the door of my car and fetched taxis, always smiling and helpful. He had no knowledge of my political views or allegiances, why I was in Jerusalem, or who I supported. I realised that he had to live, eat and do his job, and no doubt, as would any sensible person in his position, he was looking forward to a little present at the end of my stay.

One day the doorman turned to me and said, "Are you one of us?" With that remark, I realised something that had not struck me forcibly before. He realised that I was a friend and identified me as one of them. The duplicity that he would have maintained with most people was no longer appropriate. Those words demonstrated to me what it is like to be made to feel inferior in one's own country.

The occupation of the West Bank is not just unjust, but, much more important, these people are the living evidence, the flesh and blood testimony, of a great political opportunity that is being missed. An ancient Hebrew saying goes:

"Wanting too much leaves you with nothing."

The opportunities that have been missed in the West Bank are lost to us as well and we have every right, indeed an obligation, to condemn those who are responsible.

10.37 pm

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Richard Luce): I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Morecambe and Lunesdale (Mr. Lennox-Boyd) on initiating this Adjournment debate on what is undoubtedly a singularly important subject. My hon. Friend knows the middle east well. He has considerable experience of that area. That makes the debate all the more valuable.

I am glad that my hon. Friend opened his remarks by drawing a direct connection between the Lebanon and the Arab-Israeli problem. He is absolutely right to do so. I believe that the Lebanon would not be in the condition that it is in today had a proper solution been found years ago to the Arab-Israeli problem. I am glad that he brought that wider problem to the House's attention. I shall make a few remarks about it before I refer to my hon. Friend's points about the Lebanon.

I have started a series of visits, to which my hon. Friend referred. I have been to the Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and Egypt. Shortly I shall go to Syria, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries. My first impression, following my last visit, is that there is no movement at all in the Arab-Israeli problem—that there is stagnation and a great deal of despair; that the Israelis are deeply anxious about their security, and that includes their northern borders and their relationship with Lebanon; that the Arab Governments are deeply concerned that extremism will increase in the Arab world if no progress is made on the problem; and—I must say this in response to my hon. Friend, having made a visit to the West Bank—that the Palestinians are close to despair about their future.

We see a lack of any progress towards a peaceful settlement in the Arab-Israel problem; we see continuing internal struggles within the PLO; and we see the persistent pursuit of the construction of Israeli settlements in the West Bank area and in Gaza, which we regard as being both illegal and wrong in itself. Indeed, for any party to this problem to think that to continue along these lines is to their advantage must be totally and utterly wrong because this stagnation in the longer term can only lead to more violence, more terrorism, more extremism and to the danger of more of the wars that we have already seen in the middle east. In short, there will, if the present policy is pursued, be no winners. All—literally all—will be losers.

It is against that background that Her Majesty's Government believe that there is an urgent need for renewed vigour in the peace process. The parties themselves must take the lead, but the British Government stand ready, and are anxious, to help, in conjunction, of course, with the European Community and our allies and with other parties.

There are already a wide range of concepts and plans on the table from which enough common themes exist to enable the parties to move forward and for progress to be made. I mention, for example, the Venice declaration of the European Community in 1980, which contains the cardinal principles that we believe are essential to any solution: the right of Israel to exist within secure boundaries and the right of the Palestinians to self-determination.

We have resolution 242 which, to summarise, exchanges territory for peace. We have the Fez declaration, where the Arab countries moved forward in expressing their desire for all parties—and, by implication, we must assume Israel—to have the right to live in peace. We have the Camp David treaty between Egypt and Israel in which, I remind the House, the British are playing a modest role, with 35 soldiers, in helping to maintain the implementation of that treaty. We also have the Reagan plan, which we continue to believe is a basis on which the parties should be able to move forward.

Before coming to the question of the Lebanon, I have a point to make concerning the West Bank and Gaza, the occupied territories. The limited, but constructive, objectives of the British Government is to give some assistance to the Palestinian inhabitants in the Lebanon. Within the scope of limited resources, the Government are considering how best to direct any further bilateral and multilateral aid so as to benefit the Palestinian inhabitants in the occupied territory. I hope that that will be seen as an intimation of our desire to do something constructive, and I hope that other countries, including those in the Community, will be able to give further assistance.

I wish to respond to what my hon. Friend said about the Lebanon. He is right to put forward the anxieties of the House and many people in this country, about the situation in the Lebanon and our responsibility to our 100 soldiers who are carrying out a very remarkable task.

The debate gives me an opportunity to state what the Government are trying to achieve. First, we must go back to the beginning and ask ourselves what is the British interest and objective in the Lebanon? Surely, it is to help provide conditions whereby peace, reconciliation, territorial integrity and the full authority of a Lebanese Government throughout the whole of the Lebanon can be

created. In short, we wish to see a stable and independent Lebanon—the type of Lebanon that we saw in the 1950s and 1960s.

If that is not the objective, I suggest that the running sore of total instability in the Lebanon would pose and continue to pose a general threat to the stability of the entire middle east. The stability of the entire middle east is of grave concern to Britain and the western world, let alone to the parties to the dispute in the middle east.

Against that background, I ask the House to consider the main ingredients that we believe to be essential to achieving our objective. There must be a successful implementation of the ceasefire, a successful reconciliation between the Lebanese parties, the withdrawal of all foreign forces, the re-establishment of Lebanese authority throughout that country, and thereafter—I wish to stress this point—international support for reconstruction of that country. Britain has already announced that it stands ready to make such a contribution.

I wish to deal with the question posed by my hon. Friend about the multinational force and the British role. We must ask ourselves, why are we there at all? When we made our initial contribution in February, we thought that it was important to respond positively to a request from the Lebanese Government, which was encouraged by many of our friends in the middle east, including Arab Governments, and those in Europe. The request was one which would, in the opinion of the Lebanese Government, fulfil the principles that I have outlined to the House.

Could the House imagine what might have been the position in the Lebanon today—very serious though it is—had no multinational force from the United States, France, Italy or Britain, been in existence?

What are we doing there? The mandate for our presence in that country is confined to assisting the Lebanese Government and armed forces in the Beirut area only for the restoration of Lebanese Government Sovereignty and authority in the greater Beirut area. We are fulfilling two specific tasks. First, we are patrolling the main streets of Beirut with the use of Scout cars, and secondly, we are guarding the ceasefire commission, which I regard as of great importance. That commission continues to operate. We guard it at the request of all the parties, which is a sign of the trust that they all have in the contribution that our soldiers can make.

I was lucky enough to see our soldiers in the Lebanon for myself, and I join my hon. Friend in paying tribute to the magnificent job that they do in Beirut. They are respected by all the parties, and I have noticed in the past few months that their contribution has been warmly welcomed by many moderate Arab Governments and by Israel. Their presence enables us to play a constructive role out of all proportion to the number of our troops there.

I turn to the safety of those troops. Of course we all understand the difficulties and dangers that face them, and the Lebanon as a whole. Such matters remain uppermost in our minds, and we are always looking for ways of securing and strengthening their safety. That remains one of our priorities. The House will be aware of further measures that we have taken very recently to protect our soldiers, including additional logistic support.

However, I should like to commend the remarkable work of the British Embassy, which now has a new ambassador, Mr. David Myers. My hon. Friend asked whether we should consider leaving the Lebanon and pulling out our troops, and if so, in what circumstances. Against the background of the objectives that I have just described, we keep our presence in Beirut under constant review. We believe that there is no point in staying if we reach a point at which we are no longer carrying out a useful role. We have no intention of staying there indefinitely, but equally we have no intention of carrying out—as my hon. Friend suggested—a precipitate withdrawal. That would not be sensible. On the contrary, our desire is to do our best to help to create the conditions as rapidly as possible that will enable us to withdraw.

Therefore, all the Government's efforts must be, and are being, concentrated on working with other parties, including principally the other contributors to the multinational force, members of the EC as well as other parties to the problem, with a view to promoting the achievement of the overall objective that I have mentioned as quickly as possible. Despite all the tragic events in the Lebanon and the surrounding area, there are some signs that progress is being made. A ceasefire came into existence after my visit—although not as a result of it—and there is progress towards some reconciliation between the parties. We very much hope that President Gemayel, who is undertaking several tours, will come to Britain shortly to discuss these issues, and we can then express our views again to him.

I thank my hon. Friend for initiating this Adjournment debate. I hope that he feels reassured that the Government sense all the difficulties and dangers, but that we are at the same time continuing to fulfil a constructive role.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at six minutes to Eleven o'clock.

DIVISION LIST ERRATA

Official Report, 23 November 1983, Division No. 77, c. 416;

After "Ross, Ernest (Dundee W)" insert: "Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)".

Line 15, delete "Rost, Peter".

PS
PS/MR WCE
~~PS/PUS~~
~~SIR J LEAHY~~
MR EBERTON.
SIR J BULLARD
ED/NEHAD
ED/ED
ED/UND

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE D10

CF

FCO have now confirmed that the meeting with Gemayel arranged for 30 Nov is postponed.

IMMEDIATE
ADVANCE COPY

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ED/CONSULAR DEPT

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FM BEIRUT 240920Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 669 OF 24 NOVEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, ROME, PARIS, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV.

YOUR TELNO 693: PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S TRAVELS

1. LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER TELEPHONED ME TODAY. HE SAID GEMAYEL HAD NOW BEEN OFFERED AN APPOINTMENT ON 1 DECEMBER IN WASHINGTON BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND HAD ACCEPTED EVEN THOUGH HIS OFFER TO COME TO LONDON THEN WAS STILL OUTSTANDING. HE HOPED WE WOULD UNDERSTAND. HE NOW PLANNED TO GO TO ROME ON 28/29 NOVEMBER AND THENCE TO WASHINGTON. THEREAFTER HE WOULD RETURN, HOPEFULLY, FOR HIS SYRIAN VISIT AND PERHAPS VISITS TO OTHER ARAB CAPITALS.


2. HE WOULD LIKE TO PAY A VISIT AT LEISURE TO LONDON, PERHAPS IN MID-DECEMBER, BEFORE A SECOND SESSION OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. HE DID NOT WANT TO VISIT LONDON ON THE WAY BACK FROM WASHINGTON. HE HAD OUR QUOTE SENSITIVITIES UNQUOTE IN MIND.

3. I ASKED HIM WHETHER THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT CALLING AT LONDON BETWEEN ROME AND WASHINGTON. HE SAID THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY ON THE MORNING OF 30 NOVEMBER BUT HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT THE PRESIDENT ON THIS. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT I HAD NO AUTHORITY TO OFFER THIS DATE: I WAS JUST SEEKING TO ANTICIPATE A QUESTION FROM LONDON.

4. SALEM SUBSEQUENTLY TELEPHONED PALMER (IN MY ABSENCE FROM THE OFFICE) TO SAY THAT THE PRESIDENT DID NOT (NOT) WISH TO STOP OVER IN LONDON BETWEEN ROME AND WASHINGTON. HE CONFIRMED THAT GEMAYEL WOULD LIKE PLANNING TO GO AHEAD FOR A SEPARATE VISIT TO LONDON IN DECEMBER.

MIERS

OO BEIRUT
OO DAMASCUS
OO AMMAN
PP CAIRO
PP TEL AVIV
PP NEW DELHI (FOR SOS'S PARTY)
RR JEDDA



RR MOSCOW
GPS 300

UNCLASSIFIED
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 240205Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TEL NO 1437 OF 23 NOVEMBER 1983
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT DAMASCUS AMMAN PARIS
INFO PRIORITY CAIRO TEL AVIV TUNIS WASHINGTON ALGIERS
NEW DELHI
INFO ROUTINE JEDDA MOSCOW
INFO SAVING CG JERUSALEM

MIPT: PLO IN NORTH LEBANON

1. FOLLOWING IS SCR 542 ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 23 NOVEMBER 1983:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

HAVING CONSIDERED THE SITUATION PREVAILING IN NORTHERN LEBANON,

RECALLING THE STATEMENT MADE ON THIS QUESTION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL ON 11 NOVEMBER 1983 (S/16142),

DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE FIGHTING, WHICH CONTINUES TO CAUSE MUCH SUFFERING AND GREAT LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE,

1. DEPLORES THE LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE CAUSED BY THE EVENTS TAKING PLACE IN NORTHERN LEBANON:
2. REITERATES ITS CALL FOR THE STRICT RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY, POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON WITHIN ITS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES:
3. REQUESTS THE PARTIES CONCERNED IMMEDIATELY TO ACCEPT A CEASE-FIRE AND SCRUPULOUSLY TO OBSERVE THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES:
4. INVITES THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES EXCLUSIVELY BY PEACEFUL MEANS AND TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE:
5. PAYS TRIBUTE TO THE WORK DONE BY THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST AND BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS IN PROVIDING EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE PALESTINIAN AND LEBANESE CIVILIANS IN TRIPOLI AND ITS SURROUNDINGS:
6. CALLS UPON THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS RESOLUTION:
7. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO FOLLOW THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN LEBANON, TO CONSULT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, AND TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, WHICH REMAINS SEIZED OF THE QUESTION.

FCO PASS SAVING

THOMSON

LUK 568
W G 045/24

OO BEIRUT

OO DAMASCUS

OO AMMAN

PP CAIRO

PP TEL AVIV

PP DELHI

RR JEDDA

RR MOSCOW

GRS 850

RECEIVED
BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
CHANCERY ROOM
24 NOV 1983
DUPLICATES
LETTER.....
OF ENCLOSURES.....
LOCATION.....

ms

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 240204Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1436 OF 23 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, PARIS. PRIORITY CAIRO, TEL AVIV, TUNIS, WASHINGTON, ALGIERS, NEW DELHI (FOR S OF S'S PARTY) ROUTINE JEDDA, MOSCOW.

INFO SAVING CG JERUSALEM.

MY TELS NOS 1419 AND 1420 AND TELECONS HUMFREY/LONG, PIERCE/GORE-BOOTH: PLO IN NORTH LEBANON

SUMMARY

1. THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS EVENING (23 NOVEMBER) UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED AS SCR 542 THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN MIFT CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE IN THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN LEBANON. MY US COLLEAGUE AND I GOT THE ORIGINAL FRENCH/ALGERIAN TEXT AMENDED TO TAKE SOME ACCOUNT OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S CONCERNS.

DETAIL

2. THE LEBANESE THIS MORNING (23 NOVEMBER) EXPRESSED GREAT UNHAPPINESS AT THE FAILURE OF THE FRENCH AND ALGERIANS TO CONSULT THEM. THE LEBANESE AMBASSADOR TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD INSIST ON THREE ADDITIONAL OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN MY SECOND TUR WHICH WAS FORMALLY CIRCULATED LATE LAST NIGHT. THESE WERE A REITERATION OF THE COUNCIL'S CALL TO RESPECT LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY: A DETERMINATION THAT THE SITUATION RESULTED FROM THE PRESENCE OF UNAUTHORISED NON-LEBANESE FORCES; AND A CALL FOR THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF THESE FORCES. HE SUBSEQUENTLY SAW THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL ABOUT THIS.

3. I SPOKE TO LICHENSTEIN (US) WHO AGREED THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS UNSATISFACTORY. IT MERELY REPEATED THE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT OF 11 NOVEMBER AND DID NOTHING FOR THE COUNCIL'S PRESTIGE. IT ALSO TOOK NO ACCOUNT OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S LEGITIMATE CONCERNS NOR OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF NON-LEBANESE FORCES IN THE FIGHTING IN TRIPOLI.

WHEN THE COUNCIL MET IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS THIS MORNING, NTEUIL (FRANCE) SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WISHED IT TO TAKE THE "SOLEMN" ACTION OF FOLLOWING UP THE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT OF 11 NOVEMBER BY A RESOLUTION. HE WANTED NO SPEECHES AND NO CONTROVERSY. IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT EGYPT, NICARAGUA, PAKISTAN AND GUYANA HAD BECOME ADDITIONAL CO-SPONSORS. TROYANOVSKY (USSR) SUPPORTED THE DRAFT.

5. LICHENSTEIN AND I ARGUED AS IN PARA 3 ABOVE WITH SUPPORT FROM VAN DER STOEL (NETHERLANDS). LICHENSTEIN CALLED FOR THE ADDITION OF TWO OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS, ONE ON RESPECT FOR LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, ETC AND THE OTHER CALLING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL UNAUTHORISED NON-LEBANESE FORCES. THE FIRST WAS ACCEPTED WITHOUT DISCUSSION. BUT TROYANOVSKY IMMEDIATELY MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS TOTALLY OPPOSED TO THE SECOND WHICH HE SAID CONTRADICTED SCR 509 (WHICH CALLS FOR IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON). I PROPOSED AN ADDITIONAL OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH CALLING ON THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE RESOLUTION (IE INCLUDING WITH THE NEW PARAGRAPH ON RESPECT FOR LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, ETC). THIS WAS ACCEPTED THOUGH THE JORDANIAN LATER TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO HAVE THE COMPLIANCE REFER ALSO TO "THE OTHER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL".

6. WE BROKE FOR LUNCH AND RESUMED IN THE AFTERNOON AFTER THE AMERICANS AND LEBANESE HAD SOUGHT INSTRUCTIONS. IT WAS AGREED TO AMEND THE FINAL OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH TO ASK THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONSULT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON. LICHENSTEIN THEN PROPOSED AS A COMPROMISE ON WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES THAT THE RESOLUTION QUOTE THE PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH FROM SCR 520 WHICH TAKES NOTE OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S "DETERMINATION TO ENSURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL NON-LEBANESE FORCES". THE RUSSIANS REJECTED THIS ALSO. AFTER THE PRESIDENT PRESSED THE COUNCIL TO AGREE QUICKLY ON A TEXT AND SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE LEBANESE WERE NO LONGER MAKING A MENTION OF WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES A STICKING POINT, LICHENSTEIN GAVE WAY ON THE CONDITION THAT THE RESOLUTION SHOULD HAVE NO SPONSORS BUT BE ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL AS A WHOLE. THIS WAS AGREED AND WE PROCEEDED RIGHT AWAY TO A FORMAL MEETING WHERE THE AMENDED TEXT WAS ADOPTED AS SCR 542 WITH NO STATEMENTS.

7. THE LEBANESE MISSION TOLD US AFTERWARDS THAT THEY HAD BEEN UNDER STRONG PRESSURE FROM THE ALGERIANS AND SAUDIS TO DROP THEIR OBJECTIONS AND ALLOW THE RESOLUTION TO GO THROUGH. THEY WERE NOT HAPPY WITH THE OUTCOME BUT ACCEPTED IT. TERZI (PLO), WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM DELHI VIA MOSCOW AND PARIS, THANKED THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN OUR HEARING AFTER THE MEETING. HE TOLD US HOWEVER, THAT HE HAD HOPED THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD HAVE INCLUDED SOMETHING ABOUT THE SAFETY OF REFUGEES AND ABOUT SENDING A MISSION OF ENQUIRY TO TRIPOLI (TO INVESTIGATE SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT)

8. AS SEEN FROM HERE, THE RESOLUTION IS NOT LIKELY TO ACCOMPLISH ANYTHING EXCEPT AS A POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT FOR ITS ORIGINAL SPONSORS. PARIS TELNO 1076 HAS ALREADY SUGGESTED FRENCH MOTIVES FOR THEIR INVOLVEMENT. THE ALGERIANS LEADING ROLE HAS ALSO BEEN REMARKED ON HERE. THEIR ACTION IN BECOMING A CO-SPONSOR WITH EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN SUPPORT AGAINST IT IS ASSUMED THE WISHES OF THE SYRIANS, IS SEEN AS A SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC GESTURE OF SUPPORT FOR ARAFAT.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO CG JERUSALEM

THOMSON

LUK

540

FDW G 319/23

OO NEW DELHI

PP BEIRUT

PP DAMASCUS

PP TEL AVIV

PP AMMAN

PP CAIRO

PP JEDDA

GRS 185

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 231806Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3534 OF 23 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI (FOR PS/SECRETARY OF STATE) PRIORITY BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDA.

YOUR TEL NO 854 TO NEW DELHI: LEBANON

1. AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY, WEINBERGER SAID THAT THE 23 OCTOBER BOMB ATTACKS IN BEIRUT WERE CARRIED OUT BY IRANIANS WITH THE SPONSORSHIP, KNOWLEDGE AND AUTHORITY OF THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT. HE DESCRIBED THE EVIDENCE OF THE IRANIAN AND SYRIAN CONNECTION AS AN ACCUMULATION OF A NUMBER OF REPORTS IN WHICH THE US HAD CONSIDERABLE CONFIDENCE. HE BRUSHED ASIDE QUESTIONS ABOUT REPRISALS, SAYING THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NOT MADE QUOTE ANY PROMISE OF RETALIATION UNQUOTE.

2. QUESTIONED LATER, THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN REFUSED TO TALK FURTHER ABOUT RETALIATION. STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMEN ARE REPORTED TO HAVE STOOD BY EARLIER STATEMENTS ACCUSING SYRIA OF A DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY BUT NOT OF QUOTE SPONSORING UNQUOTE THE ATTACKS.

3. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE DENIED TO US THAT THERE HAS BEEN ANY NEW EVIDENCE OR FRESH US ASSESSMENT OF THE PRIME RESPONSIBILITY OR INSPIRATION FOR THE BOMBINGS.

WRIGHT

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RECEIVED	
BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION	
NEW DELHI	
CHANCERY BUILDING	
24 NOV 1983	
DUPLICATES	
OF LETTER
OF ENCLOSURES
LOCATION

Prime Minister.

It looks as though Weinberger
went too far. A-J-C-24

CONFIDENTIAL



MR COLES

A.S.C. 12/10

h.e.

French Counter Strike in Lebanon

As I told you on the telephone on 19 November, Monsieur Attali spoke to me on the telephone from Paris during the morning of 19 November.

2. He said that the President of the Republic had been "very upset" by the Foreign Office "statement" on the French counter strike in Lebanon (by "statement" I think he must have meant the message which the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary sent to Monsieur Cheysson).
3. Monsieur Attali reminded me that the French had lost some 60 lives in the bombing outrage against their MNF contingent. They had had to take retaliatory action. They had deliberately not forewarned us and other allies so as not to put us in the embarrassing position of fore-knowledge and perhaps feeling obliged to comment. The President hoped that from now on we would play down the line in the Foreign Office statement and he particularly hoped that the Prime Minister would not feel it necessary to make any public comment condemning the French action.
4. I promised to convey this message, which Monsieur Attali stressed came from the President himself: he had thought of speaking to the Prime Minister on the telephone but for ease of communication had decided to use this channel.
5. I recalled that the Prime Minister had been extremely grateful to the President for French abstention on the Falklands resolution at the United Nations: this had been most valuable not only in its own right but for the lead that it had given to other members of the Community.
6. I am sending a copy of this minute to Mr Fall.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

23 November 1983

LUK 361/23

PP FCO

GRS 8Ø

CONFIDENTIAL

FM NEW DELHI 230523Z NOV 83

TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 921 OF 23 NOVEMBER

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY FOR EGERTON

YOUR TELNO 845 : ARAB/ISRAEL : JORDANIAN POLICY

1. JOHN COLES AGREES THAT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES YOU SHOULD NOT (NOT) HAND OVER TO THE AMERICANS A COPY OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO KING HUSSEIN. YOU SHOULD, AS SUGGESTED, GIVE THE AMERICANS THE GIST OF IT AT THE UK/US TALKS IN LONDON ON 5 AND 6 DECEMBER.

WADE-GERY

NNNN

E. R.

PRIME MINISTER ✓

PRESIDENT OF LEBANON

As you know, President Gemayel wants to come to London. We tried to get him to come after Athens but this does not fit in with his other travelling plans.

He very much wants to come on either Wednesday, 30 November (the day we get back from CHOGM) or Thursday, 1 December. I think (and the FCO agree) that if you could give him an hour, the Foreign Secretary could look after him for the rest of the time.

You might be able to manage an hour after Cabinet on Thursday, 1 December. But this is a very full day and you may prefer to keep the time to bring yourself up to date on Questions.

The alternative is to see him on the day we get back from CHOGM. We arrive back at about 0830. Would you like to see him at, say, noon?

A. S. C.

23 November 1983

The Prime Minister will see him at noon on Wednesday, 30 November for 1 hour.

A. S. C. ²³/₁₁

~~Prime Minister~~

Sir J. Leahy will be at the
briefing meeting tomorrow and could
discuss further than A.S.C. 23.

From: Sir J Leahy

Date: 23 November 1983

cc: Private Secretary
PS/PUS

Mr Coles ✓

N.B. P.R.

[Signature] 24.
11

LEBANON

1. I understand that the Prime Minister was asking earlier today about discussions we have been having with our European partners concerning a possible public statement on the Lebanon emanating from the European Council meeting.

2. Heads of Government will inevitably have to say something on the Middle East. With that and the desirability of focussing attention on the earliest possible withdrawal of the MNF in mind, we have floated some ideas of our own about what such a statement might say. We have also consulted the Americans. They have expressed concern that a European statement would not be helpful at this point because they think it would risk easing the pressure which they believe the Syrians to be under to make concessions over the Lebanese negotiations. At the same time they have suggested some drafting changes to improve the wording from their point of view if a statement is to be made. We have now incorporated most of these, but in one important respect, namely a specific reference to the 17 May Israel-Lebanon agreement, we have not done so because we are certain that we could not get agreement on it among the Ten. Moreover the American attitude on this, which is very much influenced by the current state of their relations with Israel, is at variance with President Gemayel's decision in the Geneva talks to let the agreement be set on one side.

3. The latest position after the meeting of European Ministers yesterday (attended by Mr Rifkind) is set out in UKREP Brussels telegram number 4067.

4. If the Prime Minister wants more information perhaps this could be done orally (if you see a chance)?

John Leahy

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OO WASHINGTON
PP UKMIS NEW YORK
GRS 531
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 181345Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1948 OF 18 NOVEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS
INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, TUNIS
JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MIPT : LEBANON/MNF

1. PREAMBLE THE TEN WOULD:

(A) RECALL PREVIOUS STATEMENTS BY THE TEN, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 509 AND SUBSEQUENT CALLS BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES:

(B) RECOGNISE THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO SECURITY FOR HER NORTHERN BORDER AND LEGITIMATE SYRIAN SECURITY CONCERNS, BUT EMPHASISE THAT NEITHER CAN BE MET AT THE EXPENSE OF LEBANESE SECURITY AND INDEPENDENCE:

(C) EMPHASISE THAT THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF NORMAL CONDITIONS IN LEBANON IS ESSENTIAL, NOT ONLY FOR ITS OWN SAKE, BUT ALSO TO REMOVE A PRIMARY OBSTACLE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST, LASTING AND COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. IN THE TEN'S VIEW, THE RESTORATION OF PEACE IN LEBANON REQUIRES THAT ALL PARTIES CONCERNED AGREE TO A BALANCE OF CONCESSIONS ON THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:

(A) WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES.

STABILITY IN LEBANON CANNOT BE ACHIEVED WHILE FOREIGN FORCES OCCUPY THREE QUARTERS OF LEBANESE TERRITORY. THE WITHDRAWAL OF THESE FORCES IS THEREFORE REQUIRED, IN A PHASED SEQUENCE, PREFERABLY WITH SET TIME-LIMITS. DUE REGARD WILL HAVE TO BE PAID TO INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION OF THE WITHDRAWALS AND AGREED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS: THE TEN WOULD ALSO CALL UPON ALL SIDES TO RELEASE ANY PRISONERS

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HELD BEFORE OR WHEN THEY WITHDRAW, AND ON THE ARAB LEAGUE TO ORGANISE THE RECEPTION OF PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS FROM LEBANON IN THE TERRITORIES OF ARAB STATES:

(B) NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

THE TEN WOULD CALL UPON THE PARTIES IN LEBANON TO PRESS FORWARD THE PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION TO A CONCLUSION PERMITTING THE ESTABLISHMENT IN BEIRUT OF A GOVERNMENT EXERCISING AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT THE TERRITORY OF LEBANON AND SPEAKING FOR ALL ITS PEOPLE. THE TEN WOULD ALSO ASK THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO ACCEPT, AS AN INTERIM MEASURE PENDING RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, THAT ALL PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS NOW IN LEBANON HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN AND ENJOY APPROPRIATE RIGHTS, WHILE REMAINING FULLY SUBJECT TO LEBANESE LAWS:

(C) WITHDRAWAL OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE WOULD TAKE PLACE ~~BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN MNF CONTRIBUTORS AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT,~~ NOT REPEAT NOT LATER THAN THE LAST STAGE OF WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES. URGENT CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A WIDER MANDATE FOR UNIFIL WHICH MIGHT BE USED FIRSTLY IN THE DISENGAGEMENT OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES AND THEN IN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS NEEDED TO ENSURE THEIR SWIFT WITHDRAWAL.

3. SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS.

THE TEN WOULD MAKE CLEAR THEIR READINESS TO PARTICIPATE WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THEIR POSSIBILITIES IN SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS NECESSARY TO CONSOLIDATE THE RESTORATION OF PEACE IN LEBANON. THESE WOULD INCLUDE GUARANTEES FOR THE SECURITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON AND HER NEIGHBOURS FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS AND HELP FOR RECONSTRUCTION.

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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FINANCE DEPT
PROTOCOL DEPT
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PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR MACINNES
MR ADAMS
MR EGERTON

COPIES TO:
MOD DS11
MR GOODALL)CABINET
SIR R ARMSTRONG)OFFICE
SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1947 OF 18 NOVEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS,
INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, TUNIS,
JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 3452 AND TELECON THOMAS/BULLARD:- LEBANON/MNF

1. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN REPORT OF DISCUSSION IN ATHENS ON 14-15 NOVEMBER OF POSSIBILITIES FOR A PUBLIC STATEMENT AND FOR SOME FORM OF DIPLOMATIC ACTION BY THE TEN (FCO TEL NO 497 TO ATHENS). THE AMERICANS WILL NO DOUBT BE WONDERING WHAT THE TEN MIGHT COME UP WITH AT THE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN BRUSSELS ON 22 NOVEMBER, OR AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN ATHENS ON 4-6 DECEMBER.

2. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THESE IDEAS FURTHER. AS FAR AS THE MEETING ON 22 NOVEMBER IS CONCERNED, WE ARE NOW THINKING IN TERMS OF A SET OF PRINCIPLES WHICH THE TEN MIGHT BE INVITED TO AGREE AND WHICH MIGHT BE ISSUED AS A PUBLIC STATEMENT. AN OUTLINE OF WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND IS IN MIFT.

3. WE ARE VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED NOT TO PRESENT THE AMERICANS WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI ON AN ISSUE ON WHICH THEY ARE CLEARLY IN THE LEAD. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE ARE NOT REASSURED BY US EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO STICK TO THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT, NOR BY THEIR APPARENT WILLINGNESS TO LET THINGS DRIFT UNTIL GEMAYEL'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN EARLY DECEMBER. AS YOU KNOW, WE ALSO CONSIDER THEIR SOMEWHAT SIMPLISTIC APPROACH TO QUOTE CUTTING THE SYRIANS DOWN TO SIZE UNQUOTE UNLIKELY TO PRODUCE POSITIVE RESULTS. WHAT WE ARE PROPOSING IS NOT DESIGNED TO CUT ACROSS THE US ACTION, BUT TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO JOIN US IN PUSHING THE PARTIES IN LEBANON AND THE ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. THERE WOULD BE NO HARM IN HINTING THAT THE

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FASTER THINGS CAN BE PUSHED ALONG THE LESS SPACE THERE WILL BE FOR INITIATIVES BY THE TEN.

4. PLEASE THEREFORE GIVE A COPY OF THE TEXT IN MIFT TO MURPHY OR PELLETRQAU. YOU SHOULD TELL HIM THAT THE MIDDLE EAST WILL CERTAINLY BE ON THE AGENDA OF BOTH THE 22 NOVEMBER AND 4-6 DECEMBER MEETINGS OF THE TEN. IT IS CLEAR THAT ALL THE TEN ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AND THE MIDDLE EAST. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER A MAJORITY WILL WANT TO CONCENTRATE ON THE LEBANON ONLY OR ON THE WIDER ISSUES. NOR DO WE KNOW AT THIS STAGE, WHETHER THEY WILL BE CONTENT TO CONFINE THEMSELVES TO A STATEMENT OR WHETHER THERE WILL BE A FEELING THAT ANY STATEMENT SHOULD THIS TIME BE ACCOMPANIED OR FOLLOWED UP BY SOME COLLECTIVE ACTION BY THE TEN. WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND AT THIS STAGE IS SIMPLY A SET OF PRINCIPLES DESIGNED TO FOCUS THE ATTENTION OF ALL CONCERNED ON THE KEY ISSUES, ON WHICH CONCESSIONS FROM ALL SIDES ARE REQUIRED IF A SOLUTION IS TO BE FOUND. WE WANTED TO SHARE OUR THOUGHTS FIRST WITH THE AMERICANS. THEIR COMMENTS WOULD BE WELCOME.

5. PLEASE ENSURE THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT SEND A COPY OF THE TEXT TO RUMSFELD(AFTER THE MEETING IN LONDON ON 12 NOVEMBER, HE ASKED US TO FOLLOW UP IN WRITING IDEAS TOUCHED ON THEN).

6. EC POSTS SHOULD GIVE THE TEXT TO GOVERNMENTS EARLY ON MONDAY, 21 NOVEMBER, BUT NOT BEFORE.

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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PROTOCOL DEPT

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PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

SIR J LEAHY

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

MR MACINNES

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- PP BEIRUT
- PP CAIRO
- PP DAMASCUS
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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 TO IMMEDIATE F C O
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 3516 OF 21 NOVEMBER
 INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, OTHER E.C. POSTS, NEW DELHI (FOR
 SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
 INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, TUNIS,
 JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 1960: LEBANON/HMF

1. MINISTER TOOK MURPHY AND PELLETREAU CAREFULLY THROUGH THESE
 POINTS THIS EVENING AND GAVE THEM A COPY OF THE AMENDED DRAFT
 STATEMENT. HE STRESSED THAT OUR INITIATIVE WAS INTENDED TO PRODUCE
 A STATEMENT THAT WOULD ADD TO THE PRESSURE ON THOSE ON THE GROUND
 TO REACH A COMPROMISE. WE SEEMED TO SHARE THE SAME OBJECTIVES.
 OUR DIFFERENCES WERE OVER TACTICS.

2. MURPHY WAS CLEARLY UNHAPPY THAT WE HAD NOT FELT ABLE TO TAKE MORE ACCOUNT OF SHULTZ'S VIEWS. HE WAS CONCERNED THAT AN E.C. STATEMENT WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL AT THIS POINT: THAT WAS THE MAIN POINT OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US. HE ACCEPTED THAT RUMSFELD'S COMMENTS (NY TELNO 3508) HAD NOT REACHED US IN TIME TO INFLUENCE THE REVISED DRAFT, BUT HOPED THAT HIS VIEWS, PARTICULARLY ON UNIFIL AND INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWAL, COULD BE REFLECTED IN OUR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH OUR E.C. PARTNERS. PELLETREAU ADDED THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOW HAVE TO CONSIDER WHAT LINE TO TAKE IN PUBLIC IF AN E.C. STATEMENT WERE MADE AND, INDEED, WHETHER THEY SHOULD TRY TO LOBBY AGAINST A STATEMENT.

3. THOMAS SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE FOR THE AMERICANS TO DECIDE. BUT WHETHER OR NOT THEY MADE APPROACHES TO OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS, HE URGED THAT THEY SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT REVEAL THAT WE HAD DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION WITH THEM (YOUR TELNO 519 TO ATHENS) IN ADVANCE. PELLETREAU FULLY ACCEPTED THIS: THE U.S. TOO WOULD BE EMBARRASSED BY AN HINT THAT THEY MIGHT HAVE SEEN AND COMMENTED ON OUR TEXT, STILL LESS ENDORSED IT.

4. IN RESPONSE TO OUR ARGUMENTS ON THIS SUBSTANCE, MURPHY SAID THAT SYRAIN OBJECTIONS TO THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT WERE NOT IN HIS VIEW CONFINED TO THE SIDE LETTER. IN ADDITION TO OBJECTIONS OF PRINCIPLE THEY HAD AT VARIOUS STAGES IN DISCUSSION WITH U.S. OFFICIALS OBJECTED TO ALMOST EVERY LINE OF THE AGREEMENT. KHADDAM HAD RECONFIRMED MANY OF THESE OBJECTIONS TO RUMSFELD ON 19 NOVEMBER, STRESSING THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF THE AGREEMENT AS A WHOLE. WE WENT OVER THIS GROUND AT SOME LENGTH WITHOUT NARROWING THE GAP BETWEEN US ON THE ULTIMATE PROSPECTS FOR THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT OR ON ITS HANDLING NOW AS A MATTER OF TACTICS. MURPHY ALSO DISPUTED THE SUGGESTION THAT THE ISRAELI BOTTOM LINE WAS PROBABLY AN AGREEMENT RESTRICTED TO SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND THE LEBANESE; THIS WAS CERTAINLY NOT THE LINE THE ISRAELIS WERE TAKING WITH THE AMERICANS.

5. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT TIMING, THOMAS SAID THAT THE TEN HAD NOT YET DECIDED TO ISSUE A STATEMENT OR, IF THEY DID SO, WHETHER OR NOT TO TAKE FURTHER ACTION WITH THE PARTIES. BUT IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL WOULD WANT TO COMMENT ON THE SERIOUS SITUATION IN LEBANON. WE HAD THEREFORE TAKEN THIS INITIATIVE OURSELVES IN THE BELIEF THAT THIS WOULD BE LIKELY TO RESULT IN A MORE BALANCED AND CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH THAN IF WE LEFT IT TO OTHERS TO PRODUCE A FIRST DRAFT.

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BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
COMMUNICATIONS REGISTER
23 NOV 1983
DUPLICATES
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LUK 377/22

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FROM UKREP BRUSSELS 221630Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4067 OF 22 NOVEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON NEW DELHI (FOR SECRETARY OF STATES PARTY)

INFO ROUTINE BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE ROME DUBLIN PARTS BONN.

LUXEMBOURG ATHENS UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL NATO BEIRUT DAMASCUS CAIRO

TUNIS AMMAN JEDDA BAGHDAD TEL AVIV MOSCOW

INFO SAVING LISBON MADRID STRASBOURG OSLO ANKARA OTTAWA WELLINGTON

MEXICO CITY BAHRAIN DUBAI TRIPOLI ABU DHABI ADEN ALGIERS SANAA

RABAT KUWAIT DOHA KHARTOUM MUSCAT TEHRAN TOKYO

EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION: MEETING OF MINISTERS:
BRUSSELS 22 NOVEMBER

MIDDLE EAST

SUMMARY

1. POSITIVE REACTION FROM MOST PARTNERS TO UK IDEA OF STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON LEBANON BY EUROPEAN COUNCIL: ONLY FRENCH LUKE-WARM. GENERAL FEELING THAT ANYTHING SAID ON LEBANON SHOULD BE SET IN WIDER MIDDLE EAST CONTEXT. NO DETAILED DISCUSSION OF TEXT WHICH IS TO BE FINALISED BY POLITICAL DIRECTORS IN MARGINS OF EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON 4-6 DECEMBER.

2. FRENCH SUGGESTION THAT EUROPEAN COUNCIL SHOULD ALSO CALL FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 540 ON IRAN/IRAQ.

DETAIL

3. HARALAMBOPOULOS (PRESIDENCY) NOTED THAT POSSIBILITIES FOR COMMON ACTION BY THE TEN ON LEBANON WERE VERY LIMITED. ISRAEL WAS NOT INCLINED TO RENEGOTIATE THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT. SYRIA WAS DETERMINED TO BRING THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT UNDER HER CONTROL. THE CONFLICT IN TRIPOLI WAS TRAGIC AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF ARAFAT WOULD HAVE UNFORESEABLE CONSEQUENCES. ONE WAY OUT MIGHT BE TO REVIVE A "GLOBAL" APPROACH TO THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE BY ATTEMPTING TO COMBINE THE REAGAN AND FEZ INITIATIVES. THIS PRESUPPOSED SUFFICIENT POLITICAL WILL BY THE INSTIGATORS OF BOTH PLANS. THE TEN COULD HELP WITH DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. AFTER INITIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE IDEAS PUT FORWARD BY THE UK POLITICAL DIRECTORS COULD BE ASKED TO PRODUCE A TEXT OF A POSSIBLE STATEMENT IN THE MARGINS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL.

4. MR RIFKIND (UK) SAID THERE WERE TWO ISSUES FACING THE TEN: THE CURRENT EVENTS IN TRIPOLI, AND THE LONGER TERM QUESTION OF WHAT POSITION THE TEN SHOULD ADOPT ON LEBANON AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THE FIGHTING IN TRIPOLI MIGHT CONCLUDE SHORTLY. THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE FOR THE TEN SHOULD BE TO DO WHATEVER WAS POSSIBLE TO ENSURE THAT THE NEED FOR PROTECTION OF PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS WAS PROPERLY RECOGNISED SA AS TO AVOID ANY REPETITION OF THE SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRES.

5. AS FOR THE LONGER TERM, THERE WAS A CLEAR EXPECTATION THAT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL SHOULD SHOW ITS CONCERN ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. FOLLOWING THE DISCUSSION AMONG POLITICAL DIRECTORS ON 14/15 NOVEMBER THE UK SAW VALUE IN A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES. THE OBJECTIVES OF SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD BE:

(A) TO RESPOND TO THE WISH OF MANY ARAB GOVERNMENTS THAT EUROPE BE MORE ACTIVE;

(B) TO DEFINE MORE CLEARLY THE TENS OBJECTIVES ON LEBANON AND ON ITS PLACE IN THE WIDER MIDDLE EAST CONTEXT;

(C) TO PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A BALANCED PROGRAMME OF DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY IF THIS WAS CONSIDERED DESIRABLE.

THERE WAS NO INTENTION OF CUTTING ACROSS INITIATIVES FROM OTHER SOURCES EG UNITED STATES. BUT THERE WAS NO REASON WHY THE TEN SHOULD NOT PUT FORWARD THEIR OWN IDEAS. MR RIFKIND DESCRIBED THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE UK PROPOSAL (TEXT BEING SENT SEPARATELY TO POSTS WHO HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED IT). ONE DIFFICULT AND DELICATE POINT WAS HOW TO ADDRESS THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT OF 17 MAY WHICH WAS OF MAJOR AND CONTROVERSIAL CONCERN TO SOME PARTIES IN THE AREA. THE FORMULA IN PARAGRAPH 2A OF THE PAPER ("WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES.....IN ACCORDANCE WITH TERMS AND CONDITIONS AGREED BETWEEN LEBANON AND ITS NEIGHBOURS") WAS DELIBERATELY CHOSEN TO PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY ON HOW THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THE UK WOULD WELCOME THE VIEWS OF PARTNERS ON THIS POINT AND ON THE OTHERS COVERED IN THE BRITISH DRAFT. THE TEN WOULD ALSO NEED TO CONSIDER WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE ANY DIPLOMATIC FOLLOW-UP.

6. BARRY (IRELAND) THOUGHT THE UK PAPER VERY USEFUL. IRELAND COULD SUPPORT IT, SUBJECT TO SOME POINTS OF DRAFTING WHICH COULD BE DISCUSSED BY POLITICAL DIRECTORS. THE SITUATION IN TRIPOLI WAS CHANGING QUICKLY BUT IRELAND AGREED ON THE NEED TO ENSURE THE RIGHTS AND SAFETY OF PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS. THE TEN SHOULD KEEP THEIR SIGHTS FIXED ON 2 THINGS: THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES AND THE STRENGTHENING OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. IN THE COMING YEAR THE ROLE OF THE TEN COULD BE CRUCIAL AS THE US BECAME INCREASINGLY PREOCUPIED WITH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.

7. BOTTAI (ITALY) AND SCHAUER (FRG) BOTH AGREED THAT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL SHOULD MAKE A STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST. BOTH WELCOMED THE UK PAPER. BOTH HAD SOME AMENDMENTS TO PROPOSE AND AGREED THAT A FINAL DRAFT SHOULD BE PRODUCED BY POLITICAL DIRECTORS IN THE MARGINS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL.

8. ANDREANI (FRANCE) THOUGHT THAT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL MIGHT NOT BE IN A POSITION TO DEAL WITH IMMEDIATE EVENTS IN TRIPOLI, WHICH MIGHT WELL BE OVER BY THEN. BUT IT WAS UNTHINKABLE THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD MEET WITHOUT SAYING SOMETHING ON THE MIDDLE EAST. THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER THE TEN SHOULD CONFINE THEMSELVES TO ANOTHER GENERAL STATEMENT, WHICH WOULD PROBABLY BE IGNORED, OR GO FURTHER IN MAKING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS, WHICH WOULD RISK BEING REJECTED BY THE PARTIES IF THEY DID NOT DOVETAIL WITH THE REALITIES ON THE GROUND. HE FOUND THE BRITISH IDEAS "INTERESTING" AND A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. TIME WAS NEEDED FOR REFLECTION. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF POINTS ON WHICH THE TEN DIFFERED FROM THE UNITED STATES. THE TEN WERE, FOR EXAMPLE, A PARTY TO THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT ON WHICH MUCH OF THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY HINGED: THEY WERE THEREFORE IN A POSITION TO PROPOSE A FORMULA FOR GETTING ROUND THAT PROBLEM. THE TEN COULD NOT SPEAK ABOUT LEBANON WITHOUT MENTIONING THE REST OF THE MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. SOONER OR LATER THE TEN WOULD HAVE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE REAGAN AND FEZ PLANS. THEY SHOULD CONSIDER TAKING UP SOME OF THE IDEAS IN THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL STATEMENT OF 29 JUNE 1982. THE IDEAS CONTAINED IN THE FRANCO/EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT ALSO BE REVIVED.

NOT

9. ANDREANI ALSO SUGGESTED, RN CHEYSSON'S INSTRUCTIONS, THAT A EUROPEAN COUNCIL STATEMENT SHOULD MAKE SOME REFERENCE TO IRAN/IRAQ. FRANCE HAD BEEN ACTIVE IN GETTING A U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ADOPTED WHICH WAS BALANCED AND TOOK ACCOUNT OF THE VIEWS OF BOTH SIDES. IRAN HAD NOT (NOT) DEFINITELY REJECTED IT. THE FRENCH WERE URGING THE U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PURSUE HIS EFFORTS. THE TEN SHOULD LIKEWISE USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO GET THE RESOLUTION APPLIED.

10. TINDEMANS (BELGIUM) WELCOMED UK IDEAS ON LEBANON. THIS WAS A GOOD FORMULA FOR ADDRESSING THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WITHOUT IGNORING THE WIDER ISSUES. IT WOULD ALSO BREAK WITH THE "PLATONIC RITUAL" OF EMPTY STATEMENTS BY THE TEN. THERE WAS A RISK OF REJECTION BY THE PARTIES CONCERNED. THE TEN NEEDED TO CONSIDER WHETHER DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY WAS NEEDED BEFORE OR AT THE SAME TIME AS THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL STATEMENT: HE WAS SURE THE UK HAD SOME IDEAS ON THIS AS WELL.

11. SUMMING UP, HARALAMBOPOULOS SAID THAT IT WAS AGREED THAT THE UK DRAFT SHOULD BE STUDIED FURTHER. MEMBER STATES WOULD HAVE AMENDMENTS TO SUGGEST. ANY STATEMENT SHOULD REFER NOT ONLY TO LEBANON BUT ALSO TO THE WIDER MIDDLE EAST ISSUES. THE TEXT WOULD BE FINALISED BY POLITICAL DIRECTORS IN THE MARGINS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL. THE TEN SHOULD NOT CONFINE THEMSELVES TO A STATEMENT BUT MAKE CONCRETE PROPOSALS WHICH MIGHT THEN BE FOLLOWED UP, AS THE TEN'S CONTRIBUTION TO RESTORING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

FCO ADVANCE TO:-

FCO - PS/MR LUCE MR EGERTON MR LONG (NENAD)

FCO PASS SAVING TO LISBON MADRID STRASBOURG ANKARA OSLO TOKYO
OTTAWA WELLINGTON MEXICO CITY BAHRAIN DUBAI TRIPOLI ABU DHABI
ADEN ALGIERS SANAA RABAT KUWAIT DOHA KHARTOUM MUSCAT TEHRAN


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LEBANON

OUT TELEGRAM

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
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6 FM FCO 231630Z NOV 1983
7 TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY NEW DELHI
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

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CYPRUS: Int Sit

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9
10 FOLLOWING FOR PS TO PRIME MINISTER; FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY; AND
11 FOR PUS
12 Situation Report 22/23 November
13 Cyprus
14 1. On 22 November 1983 PoCo Foreign Ministers asked ^{the} Commission
15 to examine ^{the} possible consequences for EC trade with Northern
16 Cyprus of Turkish Cypriot UDI. Any decisions by EC Ministers
17 would be taken in the light of this. In practice it will
18 probably mean withdrawal of preferential treatment for exports
19 from northern Cyprus for the EC.
20 Brazil
21 2. Brazil's request for a revised IMF programme (an Extended
22 Fund Facility of 4.6 bn dollars) and for a buffer stock drawing
23 for 58 m dollars were approved by the IMF Executive Board on
24 22 November. This will release immediately 673 m dollars under
25 the Extended Fund Facility. This will in turn permit repayment

///
//
/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword of
File number	Dept PLANNING	Distribution LIMITED
Drafted by (Block capitals) A J COLQUHOUN		Private Secretary PS/Mr Luce PS/Mr Rifkind PS/Lady Young PS/Mr Whitney PS/PUS Planning Staff.
Telephone number 233 7888		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL

Page
2

1 <<<<

2 of the BIS bridging loan. The Deputy MD said that the commercial
3 banks had pledged sufficient new money for the programme to go
4 ahead. Commitments of 5.865 billion dollars had been pledged out
5 of the 6.5 billion dollars total. The MD expressed confidence
6 that the 2.5 billion dollars sought from governments 'would be
7 forthcoming' but did not go into details of individual country
8 contributions. ~~The Paris Club is meeting today to consider~~

9 ~~Brazil's request for restructuring of her 1983/84 debt.~~
10 Lebanon *(The Paris Club reached agreement with Brazil today (23 November) on Brazil's request for restructuring of her 1983/4 debt)*

11 3. In an exchange between ^{the} Lebanese Army and Shia in Southern
12 Beirut on 22 November one rocket-propelled grenade missed its
13 target and detonated on the rocket screen surrounding BRITFORLEB
14 HQ. ^{There were} ~~no~~ casualties and no response from BRITFORLEB. HMS Glamorgan
15 and HMS Brazen arrived off Beirut yesterday and have taken up
16 positions 15 nautical miles off coast (outside Lebanese
17 territorial waters).

18 4. There has been a lull in the fighting in Tripoli, but rebel
19 forces are reported in Northern outskirts of the city within
20 half a mile of Arafat's HQ. The rebel leader has threatened to
21 enter ^{the} city in force unless Arafat leaves within three days. The
22 loyalists have been moving artillery to new positions within
23 Tripoli to counter expected ^{an} final attack. The dominant local
24 militia (Islamic fundamentalist) is now apparently fully involved
25 on the side of the loyalists and is building barricades.
26 Diplomatic efforts to stop the fighting continue. The Saudi
27 Foreign Minister met his Syrian opposite number in Damascus on
28 22 November. The NAM Delegation have also arrived in Damascus.
29 The PLO "Foreign Minister" Farouk Qaddoumi (loyalist) has gone
30 to Moscow for talks.

31
32
33 HOWE
34

NNNN ends
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Catchword
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FM BEIRUT 230950Z NOV 83

TO PRIORITY F C O .

TELEGRAM NUMBER 664 OF 23 NOVEMBER 1983

INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, ROME, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS GENEVA, UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK, CBFC
INFO SAVING BRITFORLEB

cc New Delhi

NY TELNO 643: LEBANON INTERNAL: PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S INDEPENDENCE
DAY SPEECH

1. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON 22 NOVEMBER
WAS NOTABLE FOR ITS LACK OF ANY REFERENCE TO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.
HE CONCENTRATED INSTEAD ON WHAT HE CALLED 'THE KEY PROBLEM OF THE
OCCUPATION'. HE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD SET ITSELF 3 AIMS:
ESTABLISHING NATIONAL WILL TO END THE OCCUPATION; WORKING WITH THE
MAJOR POWERS ESPECIALLY THE US FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES;
AND ACHIEVING AN UNDERSTANDING WITH SYRIA WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE
WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES. HENCE THE INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS IN THE
WAKE OF GENEVA 1.

2. THE THRUST OF GEMAYEL'S SPEECH SUPPORTS THE GENERAL VIEW
HERE THAT THE LEBANESE ESTABLISHMENT HAVE TAKEN A STEP BACKWARDS
FROM GRASPING THE NETTLE OF DOMESTIC RECONCILIATION. SEVERAL
INDICATIONS ARE REACHING US THAT INFLUENTIAL PEOPLE ARE SLIPPING
BACK TOWARDS THE 'LIBERATION BEFORE RECONCILIATION' FORMULA - NOT
LEAST BECAUSE THIS AGAIN PUTS OFF THE EVIL DAY WHEN FACTION LEADERS
WILL HAVE TO NERVE THEMSELVES TO MAKE CONCESSIONS. THE PROCESS IS
REFLECTED IN THE REDUCED SENSE OF URGENCY HERE FOR THE CONVENING
OF GENEVA 2.

3. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S VISIT TO LONDON (YOUR TELNO 495), WILL
PRESENT A USEFUL OPPORTUNITY TO TRY TO GET RENEWED STEAM BEHIND
THE RECONCILIATION EXERCISE.

MIERS

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ECD	MR EGERTON
WED	MR THOMAS
RID	CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL



With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Duty Clerk.

*Sub
22/11*

SITREPs are despatched close of
play each evening.

Chin.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

SW1A 2AH

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File No.

Department PLANNING STAFF

OUTWARD

Drafted by

TELEGRAM

(Block Capitals) A J COLOUHOUN

Tel. Extn. 7888

Security Classification	
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Precedence	
IMMEDIATE	
DESKBY	2330 Z

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Private Secretary

S/Mr Rifkind

S/Mr Raison

S/Lady Young

S/Mr Luce

S/Mr Whitney

Planning Staff

[TEXT]

FOLLOWING FOR PS TO PRIME MINISTER; FOR PS; AND FOR PUS

SITUATION REPORT, 21 NOVEMBER

Lebanon

1. Following the Israeli and French air strikes against Iranian/Lebanese Shia extremists in the Beka'a, militia leaders have vowed revenge.

2. No apparent progress has been achieved in diplomatic efforts to end the PLO fighting in Tripoli. Water and electricity supplies have been cut and the exodus of civilians continues.

/Grenada

Grenada

3. McIntyre is due in Grenada over the weekend 26/27 November. He will be seeing Lady Young in London on 25 November.

4. US Ambassador to Grenada has said that the US Administration envisage \$15 million being made available for equipment, training and advisers for the Regional Security System. Mr Raison is considering proposals for modest immediate assistance, including further help for the police.

5. The interim administration have asked Plessey to ^{estimate} measure the extent of the work required to complete all outstanding work on the new airport (Port Salines).

Hong Kong


6. Canberra have reported that it now seems likely that Mr Hawke's visit to China will take place in February 1984. This news will be of relevance for the Prime Minister's breakfast with Mr Hawke on 23 November.

East Africa

7. As a result of the successful meeting in Arusha on 16 November between Presidents Moi, Nyerere and Obote, Tanzania has reopened its border with Kenya, closed since the collapse of the East African Community in 1977. Uganda should be the main net beneficiary from the agreement on the apportioning of the Community's assets and liabilities.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

22 NOV 1985



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DESKBY 211430Z

FM FCO 211235Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1960 OF 21 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS DESKBY 211430Z NOV 83

INFO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI (FOR S OF S PARTY), PRIORITY AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, TUNIS, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNOS 3491 AND 3500: LEBANON/MNF

1. THANK YOU FOR THESE REPORTS. WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR THIS PROMPT US RESPONSE. FOLLOWING ARE OUR COMMENTS ON THE FOUR MAIN POINTS RAISED BY THE AMERICANS.

2. TIMING OF TEN STATEMENT. WE NOTE SHULTZ'S CONCERN ABOUT A TEN STATEMENT AT THIS STAGE. BUT WE DO NOT (NOT) BELIEVE THAT THE TEN CAN REFRAIN FROM COMMENT ALTOGETHER ON THE SERIOUS SITUATION IN LEBANON. THERE WILL CERTAINLY BE PRESSURE FOR A STATEMENT AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL. OUR IDEAS ON WHAT MIGHT BE SAID ARE DESIGNED TO ADD TO, NOT DILUTE THE PRESSURE ON THOSE ON THE GROUND WHO HAVE TO COMPROMISE.

3. ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT. WE VERY MUCH DOUBT WHETHER THE TEN WILL BE ABLE TO AGREE ON A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE AGREEMENT. WE WELCOMED THE AGREEMENT AT THE TIME BUT OTHERS IN THE TEN HAVE DELIBERATELY DISTANCED THAMSELVES FROM IT. WE ARE NOT (NOT) PROPOSING TO SUPPORT OR IMPLY SUPPORT FOR THE AGREEMENT'S ABROGATION. BUT NOR CAN THE AMERICANS SERIOUSLY EXPECT THE TEN TO GO BEYOND THE FORMULA AGREED BETWEEN PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND ALL THE LEBANESE PARTIES AT THE GENEVA TALKS WHICH EFECTIVELY SET THE AGREEMENT ON ONE SIDE. WE REALISE THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE PUSHING THE AMERICANS HARD TO INSIST THAT THE FULL AGREEMENT BE RETAINED. (THEY HAVE ASKED US FOR PUBLIC REAFFIRMATION OF OUR SUPPORT FOR THE AGREEMENT: WE HAVE DECLINED). THE FACT IS THAT RECONCILIATION OF ALL THE PARTIES IN LEBANON AND FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT CANNOT SENSIBLY

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1541 - 1

BE PURSUED AS TWO SIMULTANEOUS POLICY OBJECTIVES. NO MORE BROADLY BASED GOVERNMENT EMERGING FROM THE RECONCILIATION TALKS (A STATED US OBJECTIVE) IS GOING TO RATIFY THE AGREEMENT, AT LEAST IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

ATTEMPTS TO PERSUADE PRESIDENT GEMAYEL TO REPUDIATE THE FORMULA AGREED AT GENEVA AND RECOMMIT HIS GOVERNMENT TO THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT WILL ONLY RESULT IN THE SYRIANS EXERTING FURTHER PRESSURE, INCLUDING MILITARY PRESSURE, THROUGH THEIR PROXIES IN LEBANON. THIS WILL MEAN A FURTHER SETBACK FOR THE RECONCILIATION TALKS, QUITE APART FROM HAVING UNPLEASANT CONSEQUENCES FOR THE MNF. ACCORDING TO THE LEBANESE (BEIRUT TELNO 652) THE FUNDAMENTAL SYRIAN OBJECTION IS NOT TO THE AGREEMENT AS SUCH BUT TO THE SIDE LETTER ON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. CONCESSIONS ARE NEEDED FROM BOTH SIDES: IT DOES NOT SEEM TO BE IMPOSSIBLE TO IMAGINE A SOLUTION BY WHICH THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT WOULD BE TACITLY PUT ON ONE SIDE (THE SYRIAN BOTTOM LINE) IN EXCHANGE FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF AN AGREEMENT RESTRICTED TO SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL (PROBABLY THE ISRAELI BOTTOM LINE). FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT MAY BE A WORTHY OBJECTIVE FOR THE FUTURE. IT IS NOT A REALISTIC OBJECTIVE NOW, NOR ARE WE WILLING TO SEE ATTEMPTS TO MAKE IT SO BECOME AN OBSTACLE TO RECONCILIATION AND TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES INCLUDING THE MNF.

4. AS FAR AS THE STATEMENT IS CONCERNED WE ARE PREPARED TO TRY TO GET A FORMULA ALONG THE LINES MENTIONED IN PARA 7 FIRST TUR. AGREED BY OUR PARTNERS. WE WOULD PROPOSE TO TAKE THE LINE YOU SUGGEST IN PARA 14 OF TUR IE. THAT IT IS NOT FOR THE TEN TO TAKE A FORMAL POSITION ON PAST OR FUTURE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES: THE NEED IS TO FOCUS ON THE KEY ISSUES WHICH NEED TO BE ADDRESSED.

5. LEGITIMACY OF GEMAYEL'S GOVERNMENT. WE SEE NO DIFFICULTY IN INCLUDING A REFERENCE ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED BY PELLETREAU (PARA 10 OF FIRST TUR).

6. WITHDRAWAL OF MNF. WE AGREE WITH SHULTZ (PARA 6 OF SECOND TUR) THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MNF NEEDS TO BE USED AS A LEVER IN NEGOTIATIONS TO SECURE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. THAT IS WHY WE HAVE

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1541 - 1

SUGGESTED DEPARTURE OF THE MNF WITHIN THE SAME GENERAL TIMEFRAME AS, BUT NO LATER THAN THE WITHDRAWAL OF OTHER FOREIGN FORCES, WITH NO PRECISE COMMITMENT ON DATES. IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE A BROADLY BASED LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WANTING THE MNF TO STAY LONGER THAN THAT. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO MAKE CLEAR, AS YOU TOLD MURPHY, THAT THE MNF WILL NOT STAY IN BEIRUT FOREVER. AS YOU SUGGESTED THIS IS ONE OF THE TOPICS WHICH NEEDS TO BE DISCUSSED BY MNF CONTRIBUTORS.

7. PLEASE EXPLAIN THESE POINTS TO MURPHY. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE WERE GRATEFUL FOR THEIR PROMPT RESPONSE AND WILL DO OUR BEST TO MAKE SURE THAT THEIR CONCERNS ARE ADEQUATELY CATERED FOR IN ANYTHING THE TEN MIGHT AGREE TO SAY. THE AMERICANS WILL REALIZE THAT WE ARE ONLY ONE OF TEN AND THAT SOME OF OUR PARTNERS ARE MUCH FURTHER AWAY FROM THE US POSITION THAN WE ARE. IT WILL BE FOR THE PRESIDENCY TO KEEP THEM BRIEFED ON PROGRESS WITH THE FORMAL STATEMENT. WE SHALL OF COURSE STAY IN TOUCH INFORMALLY.

HOWE

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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PROTOCOL DEPT
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PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR MACINNES
MR ADAMS
MR EGERTON
MR JENKINS

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MR GOODALL)CABINET
SIR R ARMSTRONG)OFFICE
SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

3

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T193/83



10 DOWNING STREET

file

SUBJECT

RM

cc. Raster
ops. cfo

cc AR

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 November 1983

Your Majesty,

I am grateful to you for your letter of 26 October with which you enclosed copies of your recent letters to President Reagan about the situation in Lebanon and the future of the Middle East. Richard Luce has subsequently given me an account of his discussions with you in Amman. It is most useful to have your ideas about the dangers threatening the region.

When the Foreign Ministers of the four contributors to the multi-national force met in Paris on 27 October, they reaffirmed their commitment to the MNF and stressed the urgent need for all the parties involved in the Geneva talks to take the steps necessary to achieve national reconciliation. The task is a difficult one. The first results from Geneva are not discouraging, but the news of further violence in Lebanon in recent days shows how urgent it is that a lasting political solution be reached. We shall do what we can to help the reconciliation process along and so create conditions in which the presence of the MNF is no longer necessary. I see the advantages of your idea of a framework for the withdrawal of Israeli, Syrian (and indeed PLO) forces linked to a timetable. Indeed we have been developing some thoughts of our own along similar lines.

I share your concern that the pressure of events in Lebanon has diverted attention from the need to make progress towards a wider peace in the region. Richard Luce has reported to me the

/ feelings

dg

feelings of despair and frustration which he found on his recent tour, especially in the Occupied Territories, as a result of the lack of progress towards an overall settlement. The tragic fighting now taking place in Northern Lebanon underlines the urgent need for renewed efforts to solve the Palestinian problem, and highlights the difficulties facing those who would like to make faster progress. Under the circumstances I can understand Your Majesty's wish to consider whether there are steps which Jordan might take to this end. I realise that the recall of the Jordanian Parliament would have far reaching implications. Your Majesty will no doubt be looking to other Arab countries to provide backing for such an important step.

As for Britain, you can count on our support for any move which helps to break the current deadlock. We stand ready to do all we can to help promote peace in the region.

With my warmest and deepest regards
and respects for Your Majesty at this
most difficult time;

Yours sincerely

Raymond Shalita

His Majesty King Hussein Bin Talal

SECRET



25
ls

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 November, 1983.

Lebanon

The Prime Minister was grateful for your Secretary of State's minute of 18 November describing the steps which he had put in hand to improve the security of the British contingent in the Multi-national Force.

A. J. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

BJ

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 November, 1983.

Syria's Regional Role

The Prime Minister saw over the weekend JIC(83)(N) 193 of 18 November.

With regard to paragraph 8, she has commented as follows:-

"I wonder if this is a correct assessment. It is certainly standard. But there may come a time when some of the Arab countries will have cause to be thankful for Israel's strength against Syria."

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

E. L. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



huc

da

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 November 1983

Prime Minister's reply to King Hussein's letter
of 26 October

We spoke on Friday.

I now enclose a slightly revised version
of the draft reply which you submitted earlier.
I should be grateful if you would arrange for
the signed version to be delivered.

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 5 *5*
OF 5 COPIES



24

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 November 1983

LEBANON

As you know, the Prime Minister received on 19 November a reply from President Reagan to her message of 18 November.

I enclose a copy of the President's reply. I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Janet Lewis-Jones (Lord President's Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

TOP SECRET

Ry

M. R.
PRIME MINISTER

The Duty Clerk has spoken to John Coles about the attached who is aware of the situation. He is also sending a copy to the Foreign Office.

Barbara
19 November 1983

mt.
Return to John C.
—

US Declassified

SUBJECT
C. Master, OPS.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T192/83

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FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO CABINET OFFICE
ZEM
TOP SECRET VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS
DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS WH08862

See AP

NOVEMBER 19, 1983

DEAR MARGARET:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE DELIVERED BY SIR OLIVER. WE HAVE COMPLETED A VERY THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN LEBANON WITH REGARD TO ACTIONS AGAINST THE TERRORISTS. I HAVE DECIDED NOT TO TAKE ANY MILITARY ACTIONS AT THIS TIME. WE WILL CONTINUE TO COLLECT ALL POSSIBLE INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST PLANS WITH A VIEW TOWARD PREVENTING OR DISRUPTING A FUTURE ATTACK. WE WILL KEEP OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF CARRYING OUT A FUTURE ATTACK ON VERY SHORT NOTICE AGAINST SUITABLE TARGETS IF I BELIEVE WE CAN PREEMPT OR DETER ATTACKS. I WOULD OF COURSE CONSULT WITH YOU AND THE OTHER MNF CONTRIBUTORS AHEAD OF TIME.

I WANT YOU TO KNOW HOW MUCH I APPRECIATE YOUR FRANK VIEWS ON THIS VERY DIFFICULT MATTER. BEST WISHES ON YOUR COMMONWEALTH MEETING IN DELHI.

SINCERELY,


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- mistaked to cheques at 2305
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FM WASHINGTON 182315Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3485 OF 18 NOVEMBER

Asc yu
h-c.

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 1949 OF 18 NOVEMBER: POSSIBLE U.S.
RETALIATION FOR BOMB ATTACKS

1. I CALLED ON ADMIRAL POINDEXTER, MCFARLANE'S ASSISTANT, AT THE
WHITE HOUSE THIS AFTERNOON, DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S
MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT AS IN YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 1950 AND SPOKE
IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 1949.

2. POINDEXTER SAID THAT HE REALISED THAT THE PRESIDENT OWED THE
PRIME MINISTER A MESSAGE. HE ADDED THAT THE PRESIDENT
WAS STILL STUDYING THE OPTIONS AND HAD TAKEN NO DECISION.
I SAID THAT PERHAPS AFTER THE ISRAELI AND FRENCH STRIKES THERE
WERE FEWER TARGETS LEFT. POINDEXTER THEN SAID THAT WHAT WAS
WORRYING THE PRESIDENT WAS THIS COMPARATIVELY NEW PHENOMENON OF
STATE-DIRECTED TERRORISM. HOW WAS ONE TO DETER THIS THING? THEY
HAD JUST RECEIVED THE REPORT ABOUT A POSSIBLE ATTACK ON THE US
EMBASSY IN KHARTOUM. THE PRESIDENT CERTAINLY DID NOT SEE
THE OPTIONS OPEN TO HIM AS BEING IN THE NATURE OF RETALIATION, RATHER
AS A POSSIBLE PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE IN SELF-DEFENCE. BUT HE ADDED
THAT THE PRACTICAL QUESTION OF WHAT TO DO ABOUT STATE-DIRECTED
TERRORISM WAS ONE WHICH SHOULD CONCERN US ALL.

WRIGHT

LIMITED
HD/NENAD
PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR EGERTON

COPIES TO:-
MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING STREET

TOP SECRET

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21D 8

~~TOP SECRET~~

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DD WASHINGTON 181800Z

COPY NO.....

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D E H O C

DESKBY 181800Z

FM FCO 181656Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1949 OF 18 NOVEMBER

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR

OUR TELNO 1913 OF 14 NOVEMBER: POSSIBLE US RETALIATION FOR BOMB ATTACKS

A.S.C. 2/11
h-a

1. MIPT CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. THE ORIGINAL INTENTION HAD BEEN TO PASS THIS ON THE HOT LINE (IN THE SAME WAY AS THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO WHICH IT IS A REPLY), BECAUSE WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND BY THE AMERICANS THAT KNOWLEDGE OF THE MATTER IS BEING VERY TIGHTLY RESTRICTED IN WASHINGTON. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE ARE VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED FOR CAREFUL HANDLING OF FURTHER REPRESENTATIONS TO THE AMERICANS ON THIS SUBJECT, GIVEN THE US SENSITIVITY ABOUT THE STATE OF OUR RELATIONS, SIGNS OF WHICH WE HAVE PICKED UP ON A NUMBER OF CHANNELS.
2. SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS THEREFORE WE THINK IT MAY BE BEST FOR YOU TO DELIVER THE MESSAGE YOURSELF AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND TO MAKE, AT THE SAME TIME, THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW. WE WOULD WISH YOU TO TAKE ACTION WITH THE WHITE HOUSE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL AVAILABLE, THOUGH THE OVER-RIDING CONSIDERATION IS THAT YOU SHOULD DO SO ONLY WITH SOMEONE KNOWN TO BE FULLY IN THE PICTURE.
3. WHEN HANDING OVER THE MESSAGE YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT
 - (A) WE ARE VERY GRATEFUL TO THE AMERICANS FOR THE WARNING THEY PASSED TO US YESTERDAY (17 NOVEMBER) OF POSSIBLE TARGETTING OF THE BRITISH MNF CONTINGENT: WE ARE ALSO GRATEFUL FOR THE HELP OF THE MARINES IN PROVIDING ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES AT OUR EMBASSY.
 - (B) NO DOUBT THE AMERICANS WILL BE AS CONCERNED AS WE WERE

/AT

TOP SECRET DEHOC

TOP SECRET DEHOC

1211 - 1

AT THE FRENCH RETALIATORY ACTION ON 17 NOVEMBER WHICH WAS TAKEN WITHOUT CONSULTATION OF MNF PARTNERS (AT LEAST AS FAR AS WE WERE CONCERNED). I SHALL BE MAKING MY CONCERN CLEAR TO M. CHEYSSON IN THE COURSE OF TODAY.

4. COINCIDENTALLY, THE US AMBASSADOR ASKED LEAHY THIS MORNING WHETHER WE WERE BECOMING IMPATIENT FOR A REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE OF 14 NOVEMBER (TEXT IN TUR). LEAHY SAID THAT SPEAKING PERSONALLY HE THOUGHT THAT, IF ACTION WERE ENVISAGED, IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IF A REPLY COULD ARRIVE BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTURE ON 21 NOVEMBER.

HOWE

LIMITED
HD/NENAD
PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR EDGERTON

COPIES TO:-
MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SUBJECT PRIME MINISTER'S *US Desk AP 8*
PERSONAL MESSAGE *21*

SERIAL No. *7191 B) 83*

*cc NCRS
+
Oms*

TOP SECRET DEHOC

1212 - 1

COPY NO.....

DD WASHINGTON 181800Z
GRS 204
TOP SECRET
D E H O C
DESKBY 181800Z
FM FCO 181700Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1950 OF 18 NOVEMBER
PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR
M I P T : POSSIBLE US RETALIATION FOR BOMB ATTACKS

A-t.c. 2/11.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO
PRESIDENT REAGAN.

BEGINS:

IN YOUR MESSAGE OF 14 NOVEMBER ABOUT THE LEBANON YOU KINDLY SAID
THAT YOU WOULD BE IN FURTHER TOUCH WITH ME IN ADVANCE OF ANY
ACTION YOU MIGHT DECIDE TO TAKE AGAINST THE TERRORISTS WHO WERE
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OUTRAGE AGAINST YOUR TROOPS IN THE LEBANON
(YOU WILL HAVE SEEN MY REPLY OF THE SAME DATE).
YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE KEEPING CONSTANTLY UNDER REVIEW
THE SECURITY OF OUR OWN CONTINGENT IN THE LEBANON. ON MONDAY
21 NOVEMBER I AM DUE TO LEAVE LONDON FOR THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS
OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN INDIA AND ON PRESENT PLANS WILL NOT
RETURN UNTIL EARLY ON 30 NOVEMBER. I DO NOT WANT TO PRESS YOU IN
ANY WAY BUT IT WOULD GREATLY HELP ME IN CONSIDERING MY OWN PLANS
IF YOU WERE ABLE TO GIVE ME ANY INDICATION OF WHETHER YOU HAVE
DECIDED NOT TO GO AHEAD WITH ACTION OF THE KIND YOU WERE CONSID-
ERING OR WHETHER YOU STILL EXPECT TO GO AHEAD. I WELL APPRECIATE
THE NEED FOR COMPLETE SECURITY AND UNDERSTAND THAT YOU CAN ONLY
RESPOND IN A GENERAL WAY.

HOWE

LIMITED
HD/NENAD
PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR EDGERTON

COPIES TO:-

MR COLES NO 110 DOWNING STREET

1

TOP SECRET DEHOC

OUT TELEGRAM

21B (A)

Classification and Caveats

TOP SECRET DEDIP

Precedence/Deskby

IMMEDIATE DESKBY 181700Z

ZCZC 1 ZCZC
 GRS 2 GRS
 CLASS 3 TOP SECRET
 CAVEATS 4 DEDIP
 DESKBY 5 DESKBY 181700Z
 FM FCO 6 FM FCO
 PRE/ADD 7 TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
 TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

9 PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR


10 OUR TELNO 1913 OF 14 NOVEMBER: POSSIBLE US RETALIATION FOR
 11 BOMB ATTACKS

12 1. MIFT contains the text of a message from the Prime
 13 Minister to President Reagan. The original intention had
 14 been to pass this on the hot line (in the same way as the
 15 President's message to which it is a reply), ~~not least~~ because
 16 we have been given to understand by the Americans that
 17 knowledge of the matter is being very tightly restricted in
 18 Washington. On the other hand, we are very conscious of the
 19 need for careful handling of further representations to the
 20 Americans on this subject, given the US sensitivity about the
 21 state of our relations, signs of which we have picked up on a
 22 number of channels.

23 2. Subject to your views therefore we think it may be best
 24 for you to deliver the message yourself ^{as soon as possible} and to make, at the
 25 same time, the points in paragraph 3 below. We would wish

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword you
File number	Dept	Distribution MINIMAL:
Drafted by (Block capitals) PRIVATE SECRETARY		Head, NENAD PS PS/Mr Luce Sir J Leahy Mr Egerton PS/PUS
Telephone number 2335791		PS No 10 (M Codes)
Authorised for despatch <i>[Signature]</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats		Page
	TOP SECRET DEDIP	IMMEDIATE DESKBY	2

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<<<<
to take action
 you ~~to act~~ with the White House at the highest level available,
 though the over-riding consideration is that you should do
 so only with someone known to be fully in the picture.
 3. When handing over the message you should emphasise
 that
 (a) We are very grateful to the Americans for the warning
 they passed to us yesterday (17 November) of possible
 targetting of the British MNF contingent: we are
 also grateful for the help of the marines in providing
 additional security measures at our Embassy.
 (b) No doubt the Americans will be as concerned as we were
 at the French retaliatory action on 17 November which
 was taken without consultation of MNF partners (at
 least as far as we were concerned). I shall be
 making my concern clear to M. Cheysson in the course
 of today.
 4. Coincidentally, the US Ambassador asked Leahy this
 morning whether we were becoming impatient for a reply to
 the Prime Minister's message of 14 November (text in TUR).
 Leahy said that speaking personally he thought ^{that} if action
 were envisaged, ~~it~~ ^{that} it would be very useful ^{if} ~~it~~ ^{it} could arrive
 before the Prime Minister's departure on 24 November.

HOWE
 NNNN

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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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15

Classification and Caveats TOP SECRET DEDIP	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE DESKBY 181700Z
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ZCZC
GRS
CLASS
CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

1 ZCZC
2 GRS
3 ^{TOP} SECRET
4 DEDIP
5 DESKBY 181700Z
6 FM FCO
7 TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR
10 ~~OUR TELNO~~ : POSSIBLE US RETALIATION FOR BOMB ATTACKS
11 MIPT
12 1. FOLLOWING IS text of message ^{from} of Prime Minister to
13 President Reagan.
14 BEGINS:
15 In your message of 14 November about the Lebanon you kindly said
16 that you would be in further touch with me in advance of any
17 action you might decide to take against the terrorists who were
18 responsible for the outrage against your troops in the Lebanon
19 (you will have seen my reply of the same date).
20 You will understand that we are keeping constantly under review
21 the security of our own contingent in the Lebanon. On Monday
22 21 November I am due to leave London for the Commonwealth Heads
23 of Government Meeting in India and on present plans will not
24 return until early on 30 November. I do not want to press you in
25 any way but it would greatly help me in considering my own plans

Handwritten: Mr 10/11
h-a-

///
//
/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword	if you
File number	Dept NENAD	Distribution	
Drafted by (Block capitals) E Chaplin		Minimal/Hd NENAD	
Telephone number		PS/PU	
Authorised for despatch <i>R. Dickelz</i>		Copies to: Mr Gals, N6/0	
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	PS/ Mr Luce Sir J Leahy Mr Eyster	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
SECRET DEDIP

Page
2

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1 <<<<

2 if you were able to give me any indication of whether you have
3 decided not to go ahead with action of the kind you were consid-
4 ering or whether you still expect to go ahead. I well appreciate
5 the need for complete security and understand that you can only
6 respond in a general way.

7

8 HOWE

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NNNN ends
telegram

BLANK

Catchword

XY 48 A



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

In your message of 14 November about the Lebanon you kindly said that you would be in further touch with me in advance of any action you might decide to take against the terrorists who were responsible for the outrage against your troops in the Lebanon (you will have seen my reply of the same date).

You will understand that we are keeping constantly under review the security of our own contingent in the Lebanon. On Monday, 21 November I am due to leave London for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in India and on present plans will not return until early on 30 November. I do not want to press you in any way but it would greatly help me in considering my own plans if you were able to give me any indication of whether you have decided to abandon action of the kind you were considering. I well appreciate the need for complete security and do not ask for any more detail than you feel able to give me.

With best wishes.

The President of the United States of America

OO FCO
GRS 182-

Prime Minister
As you can see
See Pres. Reagan.
has not yet come to
any decision. *Intdy desk*
1974

TOP SECRET

21A

XX

DEHOC
TOP SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 182315Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3485 OF 18 NOVEMBER

DEHOC

(3) of 4

NO

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 1949 OF 18 NOVEMBER: POSSIBLE U.S.
RETALIATION FOR BOMB ATTACKS

1. I CALLED ON ADMIRAL POINDEXTER, MCFARLANE'S ASSISTANT, AT THE
WHITE HOUSE THIS AFTERNOON, DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S
MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT AS IN YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 1950 AND SPOKE
IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 1949.

2. POINDEXTER SAID THAT HE REALISED THAT THE PRESIDENT OWED THE
PRIME MINISTER A MESSAGE. HE ADDED THAT THE PRESIDENT
WAS STILL STUDYING THE OPTIONS AND HAD TAKEN NO DECISION.
I SAID THAT PERHAPS AFTER THE ISRAELI AND FRENCH STRIKES THERE
WERE FEWER TARGETS LEFT. POINDEXTER THEN SAID THAT WHAT WAS
WORRYING THE PRESIDENT WAS THIS COMPARATIVELY NEW PHENOMENON OF
STATE-DIRECTED TERRORISM. HOW WAS ONE TO DETER THIS THING? THEY
HAD JUST RECEIVED THE REPORT ABOUT A POSSIBLE ATTACK ON THE US
EMBASSY IN KHARTOUM. THE PRESIDENT CERTAINLY DID NOT SEE
THE OPTIONS OPEN TO HIM AS BEING IN THE NATURE OF RETALIATION, RATHER
AS A POSSIBLE PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE IN SELF-DEFENCE. BUT HE ADDED
THAT THE PRACTICAL QUESTION OF WHAT TO DO ABOUT STATE-DIRECTED
TERRORISM WAS ONE WHICH SHOULD CONCERN US ALL.

WRIGHT

TOP SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

Letter to King Hussein

I attach a version which is slightly different to the one you saw this morning. He could no longer take your remarks about the recall of the Jordanian Parliament as an encouragement to go ahead with this step.

The Foreign Office have considered whether they could recommend a more substantial reply, but do not think there is really anything more that you can say.

A.J.C.

amb

18 November, 1983.



21

Prime Minister.

A.S.C. 48/11.

MO 3/7/4

Thankyou MF

PRIME MINISTERLEBANON

Following our meeting last night, you will wish to be aware of the steps I have put in hand to enhance the security of our force in Lebanon:

a. road blocks were set up last night using Ferret scout cars on the main road past HQ BRITFORLEB. Urgent action is now being taken to make these more effective. Earth mounds are also already erected to give some additional protection against truck bombs.

b. HMS Glamorgan and HMS Brazen, currently at Gibraltar en route to take up duties as the Armilla Patrol, are being despatched today to the Eastern Mediterranean; they should be off the Lebanon by 23rd November. HMS Fearless will be sailing from Portland as soon as possible to take over this role arriving by about 26th November. Since the news of these movements may well become public, a press statement will be issued (copy attached) to try to prevent undue speculation about the purpose of the deployment;

c. Major General Langley, CBF Cyprus, is today in Beirut to study any further possible enhancement of BRITFORLEB's security. He has examined in particular the possibilities for temporary overnight withdrawal of off-duty personnel (perhaps about 40) plus some personnel on a permanent basis



(about 20) to RN ships off-shore. Whether it would be wise to adopt this course of action on a regular basis or simply have it as an option, depends crucially on the assessment of the vulnerability of the helicopters to surface to air missiles and other weapons;

d. a further examination of possible alternative sites in the present area for BRITFORLEB which would be less vulnerable to suicide truck bombs has confirmed that there is no suitable alternative which would not involve greatly increased risks to other forms of attack. Once HMS Fearless is there, it may well be possible to accommodate virtually the whole force at sea each night, leaving the scout cars in a guarded compound in the dock area. We are looking at the possibilities of this and I shall report further on it.

2. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

3. In my absence in Birmingham, I have asked John Stanley to clear the text of the press statement and to sign this letter.

JAS.

Ministry of Defence
18th November 1983

DRAFT PRESS RELEASE

In order to provide improved logistical support for the British Contingent in Beirut, an RN ship is being placed off Beirut for the time being.

The programme of HMS GLAMORGAN, which has HMS BRAZEN in company, and is currently en route to take up duties in the Indian Ocean, is accordingly being amended to allow both ships to be off the Lebanon from early next week. They will be replaced in this role by HMS FEARLESS at the end of the month. The RN presence standing off the Lebanese coast will provide the Commander of the British Force in the Lebanon with additional logistical support, and will provide additional recreational and off-duty facilities for the members of the British Contingent.

DEFENSIVE SUPPLEMENTARIES

- Q. Does this mean we are preparing to pull out/reinforce our force?
- A. No. There is no change in BRITFORLEB's role or size.
- Q. Are you planning any retaliatory action following the US and French bombings?
- A. None whatsoever. FEARLESS does not have any weapons to provide Naval gunfire support.
- Q. What are the additional logistical and recreational facilities that FEARLESS can offer?
- A. Fuels, substantial food stocks, spare parts, NAAFI facilities, keep fit facilities.
- Q. Why can't you get these from Cyprus?
- A. It will be more convenient and administratively simpler to have these easily at hand offshore.
- Q. How long will FEARLESS stay?
- A. As long as necessary.
- Q. Are Royal Marines embarked?
- A. A Marine Commando is not embarked. The only Marine detachment is the normal Marine element of the ships company who are engaged in routine ship duties.
- Q. How many Marines are there?
- A. About 90.
- Q. Does this mean that you consider the security situation is worsening?
- A. There are clearly risks to all the MNF Contingents and the Government has the security of our own Contingent constantly in mind.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 November 1983

Dear Edm,

Jordan: Letter from King Hussein

We spoke about this. I enclose a draft paragraph to replace paragraph 3 of the attachment to my letter of 17 November.

with
Edm

Yours
we,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street


CONFIDENTIAL



'I share your concern that the pressure of events in Lebanon has diverted attention from the need to make progress towards a wider peace in the region. Richard Luce has reported to me the feelings of despair and frustration which he found on his recent tour, especially in the Occupied Territories, as a result of the lack of progress towards an overall settlement. The tragic fighting now taking place in Northern Lebanon underlines the urgent need for renewed efforts to solve the Palestinian problem, and highlights the difficulties facing those who would like to make faster progress. Under the circumstances I can understand Your Majesty's wish to consider whether there are steps which Jordan might take to this end. I realise that the recall of the Jordanian Parliament would have far reaching implications. Your Majesty will no doubt be looking to other Arab countries to provide backing for such an important step.'

CONFIDENTIAL

18 NOV 1983



ROYAL MAIL

PS
PS/MR WCE
PS/FUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR EBERTON
SIR J BULLARD
ED/NEAD
ED/ED
ED/UND

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE D10

ED/... ..

ED/CONSULAR DEPT

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FUSD (2)
NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

MF

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 181230Z
FM PARIS 181130Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1058 OF 18 NOVEMBER
INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
TEL AVIV, MOSCOW, ROME
INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO

MY TELNO 1050 (NOT TO ALL): FRENCH AIRSTRIKE IN LEBANON.

1. THIS MORNING'S FRENCH PRESS CONTAINS SUGGESTIONS THAT ANOTHER STRIKE MIGHT BE IN PROSPECT.

2. CHEYSSON IS IN INDONESIA, GUTMANN AND BONNEFOUS (SECRETARY GENERAL AND MIDDLE EAST DIRECTOR AT THE QUAI) ARE IN MOSCOW. I SPOKE THIS MORNING TO THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, LUCET. I SAID I HAD SO FAR RECEIVED NO INSTRUCTIONS BUT I THOUGHT THAT AFTER YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH M. CHEYSSON ON THE SUBJECT (CF YOUR TELNO 562 OF 5 NOVEMBER) YOU WOULD BE SURPRISED TO HAVE RECEIVED NO WARNING OF FRENCH ACTIONS WHICH COULD HAVE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SECURITY OF BRITISH TROOPS IN THE MNF. LUCET SAID HE HAD ABSOLUTELY NO INFORMATION TO GIVE ME ON THE SUBJECT APART FROM THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE FRENCH MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ABOUT THE RAID ITSELF (TUR) AND BY PRESIDENT MITTERRAND IN HIS TV APPEARANCE THE NIGHT BEFORE (OUR TELNO 1053 (NOT TO ALL)). ANY PRESS REPORTS ABOUT FURTHER FRENCH ACTION COULD ONLY BE PURE SPECULATION. LUCET EVIDENTLY DID NOT EXPECT ME TO BE CONTENT WITH THIS REPLY BUT SAID HE COULD NOT ADD TO IT. THE IMPLICATION WAS THAT DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN OVER THE HEADS OF THE QUAI.

FCO PASS SAVING UKDEL NATO

Lebanon

CF: no need for telegram
ATC knows that this
is now being fixed for 30/11.

DW 010

**IMMEDIATE
ADVANCE COPY**

18/1305

23/11

49

LUF 872/18

OO FCO DESKBY 181400Z

RR WASHINGTON

RR DAMASCUS

RR TEL AVIV

RR PARIS

RR ROME

GR 160

Mr. Barclay
I have asked the F.C.O.
to examine whether the word
layen after Atten instead
if not, you had better send
me a telegram.

Head NENAS
Head MED.
Head Defence
Ps (2)
Ps / Mr. Luce
Ps / Mr. S.
Sir J. Bullard
Sir J. Leahy
Mr. Egerton

A.F.C. 21/11

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 181400Z FCO

FM BEIRUT 181235Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 651 OF 18 NOVEMBER 1983

INFO WASHINGTON, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, PARIS, ROME.

MY TELNO 639: PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S TRAVELS.

1. HE WAS SUMMONED AT SHORT NOTICE TO PRESENT MY CREDENTIALS TODAY (18 NOVEMBER). WITH REFERENCE TO WHAT HE HAD TOLD THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON 15 NOVEMBER (YOUR TELNO 475), PRESIDENT GEMAYEL SAID THAT HE WOULD MUCH LIKE TO PAY A WORKING VISIT TO THE UK, NOT NECESSARILY LINKED TO HIS FORTHCOMING JOURNEY TO AMERICA (WHICH HE SAID WAS NOW UNLIKELY TO OCCUR BEFORE 5 DECEMBER). HE ASKED WHETHER A ONE DAY VISIT ON ABOUT 30 NOV OR 1 DEC WOULD BE CONVENIENT.

2. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WANTED A WORKING VISIT QUOTE WITHOUT CEREMONY UNQUOTE. FROM WHAT HE SAID AND FROM SOMETHING THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID EARLIER, HE BELIEVE HE WANTS TO VISIT THE UK AND ITALY, THE TWO MNF CAPITALS HE HAS NOT YET BEEN TO SINCE THE CURRENT CONFLICT BEGAN.

9R800
SECRET

SECRET

20

FM BEIRUT 180830Z NOV 83

TO FLASH F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 650 OF 18 NOVEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DS11), WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, DAMASCUS,
AMMAN

SAVING COMMANDER BRITFORLEB

MS

YOUR TELNO 484: BEIRUT SECURITY.

1. WE HAVE BEEN GIVING EXTENSIVE THOUGHT TO THE SECURITY OF OUR PERSONS AND PREMISES IN RECENT DAYS. THIS HAS BEEN SHARPENED BY THIS WEEK'S EARLIER ALERTS. I KNOW THAT THE SAME IS TRUE AT BRITFORLEB. I SPENT 16 NOVEMBER THERE AND WE ARE IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH FERGUSON. THE MEASURES APPROVED FOLLOWING THE KILSON VISIT ARE BEING PUT INTO EFFECT WITH UTMOST URGENCY: IN PARTICULAR THE VITAL DIVERSION ROAD WILL BE COMPLETED, AND TRAFFIC FORTHWITH DIVERTED, LATER TODAY. THE ROCKET SCREENS AT BRITFORLEB ARE ALMOST COMPLETE AND WORK WILL THEN START ON THE EMBASSY'S. FOR THE EMBASSY, THE MAIN THREAT HOWEVER STILL SEEMS TO BE A VEHICLE BOMB, POSSIBLY DELIVERED IN A CAPTURED APC. THOSE MANNING THE CHECKPOINTS HAVE BEEN WARNED AGAINST DELIVERY OF BOMBS BY SUBTERFUGE AS WELL AS BY GATECRASHING. THE DRAGONS TEETH, METAL CALTROP-STYLE OBSTRUCTIONS AND HEAVIER BARRIER POLES ARE NOW IN POSITION, THOUGH WE ARE STILL AWAITING THE CYLINDRICAL CONCRETE BARRIERS THAT THE LEBANESE ARE TO SUPPLY FOR THE FAR CARRIAGEWAY OF THE CORNICHE, AND ARE AT PRESENT RELYING ON METAL OBSTRUCTIONS. WE PLAN TO INSTAL A SMALL MARINE DETACHMENT IN SOME OF THE OUTBUILDINGS AT THE REAR WHO WOULD REINFORCE OUR PRECAUTIONS AGAINST SURREPTITIOUS PLANTING OF EXPLOSIVES NEAR OUR BUILDING. WE ALSO NOW HAVE AS FEW PEOPLE AT WORK ON THE OUTER (IE ROAD) SIDE OF OUR OFFICE BUILDING AS POSSIBLE.

2. AT MY RESIDENCE WORK STARTED ON 16 NOVEMBER ON HEIGHTENING THE WALL, IMPROVED LIGHTING AND INTRUDER ALARMS. I DO NOT FAVOUR ASKING THE LEBANESE TO PUT UP ROAD BLOCKS THERE. THE RESIDENCE DOES NOT PRESENT A 'MASS' TARGET COMPARABLE TO THE OFFICE OR THE US, FRENCH AND ISRAELI MILITARY HQS. BLOCKING THE CORNICHE HAS ALREADY CAUSED MASSIVE TRAFFIC JAMS ELSEWHERE IN THE CITY AND I HAVE NO WISH TO ADD TO THE MURMURING OF THOSE INCONVENIENCED. THE CABINET 'DECIDED' RECENTLY TO REOPEN THE CORNICHE. MY US COLLEAGUE HAD TO MAKE TOUGH REPRESENTATIONS TO KEEP IT CLOSED. WE ARE HOWEVER GIVING CAREFUL THOUGHT TO ASKING FOR A PERMANENT MILITARY PRESENCE AT MY RESIDENCE. IF A BRITISH FORCE IS TO BE INVOLVED, THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE SENT ADDITIONALLY, SINCE BRITFORLEB CANNOT SPARE ANY MEN. I SHALL TELEGRAPH SEPARATELY ON THIS.

3. I BELIEVE THAT THE MOST REALISTIC ADDITIONAL PRECAUTIONS WE CAN NOW TAKE ARE IN THE FIELD OF PHYSICAL ABSENCE AND DISPERSAL. THIS WILL HAPPEN IN ANY CASE TODAY AS A RESULT OF MY PROGRAMME (CREDENTIALS) AND AT THE WEEKEND. THEREAFTER WE SHALL GIVE ATTENTION TO THE VARIATION OF ROUTINE, AVOIDANCE OF REGULAR CONCENTRATIONS OF PERSONNEL (EG THE WEEKLY OFFICE MEETING) AND TO PROCEDURES FOR EVACUATING OUR BUILDING FAST (EG PRACTICES).

SECRET

/4

SECRET

4. WE DO NOT FAVOUR FURTHER SLIMMING DOWN OF THE EMBASSY STAFF. ALREADY WE ARE WITHOUT A COMMERCIAL SECRETARY AND OUR SUPPLEMENTARY CHANCERY OFFICER WILL BE LEAVING SOON. APART FROM THOSE DOING ESSENTIAL WORK IN THE OFFICE (ACCOUNTS, COMMUNICATIONS, VISAS), THE STAFF SPEND A LOT OF TIME OUT OF THE OFFICE. SO THE TARGET HERE IS SMALL. AS FOR BRITFORLEB, WE SEE NO POINT IN IMPOSING THE OPERATIONAL DISADVANTAGES OF SLIMMING THE FORCE AT THE MARGINS. IT IS ALREADY VERY SMALL. ALL THOSE WHO SUPPLEMENT THE BASIC SABRE SQUADRON ARE THERE BECAUSE THEY HAVE A JOB TO DO. CUTTING THE NUMBERS WOULD ONLY REDUCE THE VULNERABILITY OF THE TARGET VERY MARGINALLY (IF AT ALL). THE BAD CONSEQUENCES IF IT WAS HIT WOULD BE JUST THE SAME.

5. WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH THE BRITISH BANKS AND BRITISH COUNCIL. WE HAVE WARNED THEM OF THE RISKS. WE DO NOT THINK WE SHOULD URGE ANY OF THEM TO TAKE ANY SPECIAL MEASURES THAT THEY ARE NOT TAKING ALREADY. THE BRITISH COUNCIL COULD BE A TARGET. BUT THEY HAVE TAKEN A LOT OF PRECAUTIONS RECENTLY (THEY HAVE A REGULAR POLICE GUARD) AND CANNOT GO FURTHER WITHOUT CUTTING FUNCTIONS. STAFF NUMBERS FOR INSTANCE ARE CLOSELY RELATED TO ACTIVITY (CLASSES). WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH THE ACTING REPRESENTATIVE. HE AND WE AGREE THAT, SHORT OF CLOSING THE OFFICE, THERE IS NO MEASURE THAT COULD SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE SECURITY. IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE TO CLOSE AT PRESENT IN THE ABSENCE OF A MUCH MORE SPECIFIC THREAT AGAINST THE COUNCIL.

MTERS

BT

LIMITED
NENAD
DEF D
SECURITY D
PUS D
PS
PS/MRLUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR GERTON

COPIES TO
MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING ST

2
SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 November 1983

Dear John,

Typ letter p.

AR 12/11

Jordan: Letter from King Hussein

On 26 October King Hussein wrote to the Prime Minister enclosing 2 letters which he had written to President Reagan about Lebanon and the wider Middle East situation.

On Lebanon King Hussein's suggestion that the MNF partners should set a timetable for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon is on similar lines to our own tentative thinking of a package involving the phased withdrawal of all foreign forces. But this thinking is at an early stage, and the Foreign Secretary considers that it would therefore be appropriate for the Prime Minister to refer only in general terms to the similarity of our thinking.

In his second letter to President Reagan, King Hussein's main concern is the Syrian government's increasing control over the PLO. Following the decision of the Rabat summit of 1974 to recognise the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people King Hussein suspended the constitutional and democratic functions of the Jordanian Parliament. On 5 November in an interview with a Kuwaiti newspaper King Hussein publicly floated the possibility mentioned in his letter to President Reagan of recalling Parliament.

The recall of Parliament would amount to a formal reassertion of Jordanian authority over the West Bank, since half the seats in the former Parliament represented West Bank constituencies. Only the UK and Pakistan have formally recognised Jordanian sovereignty over the West Bank. In convening a Parliament with West Bank (Palestinian) representation, the King would be breaking ranks from the Rabat Summit agreement of 1974. For King Hussein to do so without the endorsement of a new Arab summit or at least the open support of other Arab moderates would carry high risks. Syria would be certain to oppose the move, rightly seeing it as directed against Syrian control of the PLO and would put strong pressure on other Arab countries to do the same. King Hussein is conscious of this risk and told Mr Luce on 6 November that before taking such a step he would need to

/be sure

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be sure that the Americans remained committed to the principle of Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories as prescribed in Security Council Resolution 242. In his letter to President Reagan, he seeks a US assurance not only on that point but also that the US will act to help Jordan meet "all challenges" (ie from Syria). It seems unlikely that King Hussein will receive the unequivocal assurances he is seeking, although the Americans will no doubt encourage him to pursue a policy which they might hope would produce an alternative Palestinian leadership. While the American response is unknown, Sir Geoffrey Howe does not think that the Prime Minister should make more than a passing reference to these issues in her reply.

I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to King Hussein.

Yours ever,

P F Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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DRAFT: ~~XXXXX~~ minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:
King Hussein

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

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PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I am grateful to you for your letter of 26 October with which you enclosed copies of your recent letters to President Reagan about the situation in Lebanon, and the future of the Middle East. Richard Luce has subsequently given me an account of his discussions with you in Amman. It is most useful to have your ideas about the dangers threatening the region, ~~and to know that our own thinking is very much in line with yours.~~

When the Foreign Ministers of the four contributors to the Multinational Force met in Paris on 27 October, they reaffirmed their commitment to the MNF and stressed the urgent need for all the parties involved in the Geneva talks to ~~make the sacrifices~~ ^{take the steps} necessary to achieve national reconciliation. The task is a difficult one. The first results from Geneva are not discouraging, ^{but} ~~although~~ the news of further violence in Lebanon in recent days shows how urgent it is that a lasting political solution be reached. We shall do what we can to help the reconciliation process along and so create

/conditions

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Lebanon
Int. Sit. p. 5

conditions in which the presence of the MNF is no longer necessary. I see the advantages of your idea of a framework for the withdrawal of Israeli, Syrian (and indeed PLO) forces linked to a timetable. Indeed we have been developing some thoughts of our own along similar lines

147 NOV 1983

11 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

I share your concern that the pressure of events in Lebanon has diverted attention from the need to make progress towards a wider peace in the region. Richard Luce has reported to me the feelings of despair and frustration which he found on his recent tour, especially in the Occupied Territories, as a result of the lack of progress towards an overall settlement. Under the circumstances I can understand Your Majesty's wish to consider the possibility of recalling the Jordanian Parliament. The tragic fighting now taking place in Northern Lebanon underlines the urgent need for renewed efforts to solve the Palestinian problem, and highlights the difficulties facing those who would like to make faster progress. Your Majesty will no doubt be looking to other Arab countries to provide backing for such an important step.

As for Britain, you can count on our support for any move which helps to break the current deadlock. We stand ready to do all we can to help promote peace in the region.

A. S. C. 17/11

NI1558 2 XXX 65
URGENT

MS

Prime Minister.

AR 12/11

BEIRUT, THURSDAY - GUNMEN FIRED THREE ROCKET-PROPELLED GRENADES AT FRENCH POSITIONS IN CENTRAL BEIRUT TONIGHT, SEVERAL HOURS AFTER FRENCH FIGHTERS BOMBED SHI'ITE MOSLEM MILITANTS IN EASTERN LEBANON, STATE-RUN BEIRUT RADIO SAID.

THE REPORT DID NOT MENTION CASUALTIES. IT SAID THERE WAS A CLASH BETWEEN THE FRENCH TROOPS AND THE GUNMEN, WHO WERE NOT IDENTIFIED.

172113 NOV 83

GR 380

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FM BEIRUT 171130Z NOV 83

TO PRIORITY F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 647 OF 17 NOVEMBER 1983

INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, PARIS, ROME, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS GENEVA, UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK, CBFC

SAVING BRITFORLEB

MY TELNO 643: LEBANON - RECONCILIATION

1. THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PAID A ONE-DAY VISIT TO BEIRUT ON 16 NOVEMBER. HE HAD OFFICIAL TALKS WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, FOLLOWED BY LUNCH TO WHICH PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN WAS ALSO INVITED. THE VISIT HAD APPARENTLY BEEN ADVANCED BY ONE DAY BECAUSE OF THE DETERIORATING STATE OF SECURITY IN LEBANON.
2. SECRETARY GENERAL AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TOLD COUNSELLOR THAT THE MEETING WAS A SUCCESS. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS GOOD. KHADDAM'S MAIN MESSAGE HAD BEEN TO REASSURE GEMAYEL THAT ASSAD WANTED THE SUMMIT IN DAMASCUS TO TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND THAT IN ANY CASE IT SHOULD PRECEDE GEMAYEL'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. THERE MIGHT THEN BE A FURTHER MEETING WHEN GEMAYEL RETURNED FROM THE UNITED STATES. ACCORDING TO TURK, BOTH THE LEBANESE AND SYRIANS REGARD THE MEETING AS OPENING A NEW CHAPTER IN LEBANESE/SYRIAN RELATIONS.
3. GEMAYEL AND KHADDAM AGREED THAT THE CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED TO ARREST THE CURRENT DETERIORATION. AS A CONSEQUENCE THE HEAD OF THE LEBANESE ARMY'S DEUXIEME BUREAU AND THE ARMY'S REPRESENTATIVE ON THE CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE HAVE GONE TO DAMASCUS TODAY (17 NOVEMBER) FOR TALKS WITH THEIR SYRIAN COUNTERPARTS. THEY ARE ALSO TO MEET JUMBLATT.
4. ON THE LEBANON/ISRAEL AGREEMENT, KHADDAM HAD MADE CLEAR THAT SYRIA'S MAIN OBJECTION WAS CURRENTLY THE ISRAELI SIDE-LETTER STIPULATING THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WAS CONDITIONAL ON A PRIOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. HOW TO BRING ABOUT AN UNCONDITIONAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON WOULD BE THE MAIN TOPIC OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN GEMAYEL AND ASSAD. TURK WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER OR NOT KHADDAM HAD MAINTAINED THAT LEBANESE AGREEMENT TO CANCEL THE AGREEMENT (OR SOMETHING AKIN TO IT) WAS A PRE-CONDITION FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS RECONCILIATION.

CONFIDENTIAL

15.

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5. TURK CONFIRMED THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WANTED A FURTHER ROUND OF RECONCILIATION TALKS AT GENEVA BEFORE A NEW GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY WAS FORMED. THIS WAS ALSO THE VIEW OF KHADDAM.

6. THE MAIN ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS MEETING WAS UNDOUBTEDLY THE IMPROVEMENT IN ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN LEBANESE AND SYRIAN LEADERS. THE LOCAL PRESS, NO DOUBT REFLECTING SOME OFFICIAL BRIEFING, HAVE PUT AN ENCOURAGING GLOSS ON THEIR REPORTING OF THE TALKS.

MIERS
BT

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

LIMITED
NENAD
MED
DEFENCE DEPT
PUSD
NEWS DEPT
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PROTOCOL DEPT
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
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PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
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MR ADAMS
MR EGERTON

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SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

2

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SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 November 1983

MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had a word with the Prime Minister immediately following Cabinet this morning of a new threat to the British contingent in the Multi-National Force. The Defence Secretary had mentioned this to the Prime Minister earlier.

Sir Geoffrey Howe said that he would check on the contingency measures which had been taken both by the British contingent and by the British Embassy against a possible bombing attack and would also consider whether it would be desirable to slim down the Embassy staff and the British contingent.

I know that the Secretary of State for Defence is also considering these matters at a meeting about now.

I should be grateful if the Prime Minister could be kept closely informed.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

B. Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 November, 1983

LEBANON: BRITISH CONTINGENT IN MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE

The Prime Minister held a meeting at 1935 hrs this evening to discuss the situation of the British contingent in the Multi-National Force. The meeting was attended by the Defence Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Luce, the Chief of the General Staff and Mr. Egerton.

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

Accounts of threats to the Multi-National Force were received frequently. Arrangements were being made for scout cars to be placed tonight at the three approach roads to the location of the British contingent and to be maintained there during hours of darkness. It would be difficult for a lorry carrying explosives to penetrate this barrier. He was also examining the possibility of arranging for those members of our contingent who were off-duty to be moved to a naval ship offshore. He would report further on this. In addition, our protection arrangements were being reviewed and the Commanding Officer in Cyprus would be visiting Beirut tomorrow, principally to consider the detailed planning relating to the stationing of off-duty troops on board ship.

The Chief of the General Staff then explained these arrangements in more detail.

The Defence Secretary said that there remained the political issue of whether it was right for the British contingent to remain in the Lebanon. The French air strike in the Bekaa today increased the threat to the Multi-National Force as a whole. The Prime Minister said that there was a danger that those who wished to attack the Force would go for its most vulnerable component. Were we in the

most suitable area? The Chief of the Defence Staff explained that three options for moving the Force had been considered but all had disadvantages and the Commanding Officer was in favour of staying in his present location. The Prime Minister asked whether flights by Buckaneer aircraft over Beirut would improve morale or be regarded as provocative. The Defence Secretary said that he felt that people would reach the conclusion, in the light of recent events, that the purpose of any Buckaneer flights was to prepare a strike.

The Prime Minister reverted to the question of how long it was right for our contingent to stay in Beirut. The Defence Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary agreed that by local standards the ceasefire arrangements were being maintained reasonably well. Mr. Egerton pointed out that on 16 November the Lebanese President and the Syrian Foreign Minister had agreed on arrangements to shore up the ceasefire.

The Defence Secretary said that he thought it would be unwise in the present circumstances to pull out unilaterally. The Prime Minister said that she was inclined to agree. We had had several intelligence reports of threats to our contingent and none had so far proved correct.

The Defence Secretary asked whether it would not be wise to make a further enquiry of the U.S. Administration as to their intentions. After further discussion, it was agreed that a message would be prepared for the Prime Minister's consideration - this would draw attention to the fact that she would be absent at CHOGM for a period beginning on 21 November and that it would be helpful to know before she left London whether the United States had abandoned its plans for some form of retaliation for the attack on the U.S. contingent.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the pattern of violence in the Lebanon tended to diminish the value of the Multi-National Force. Should we also raise this with the United States Administration? The Prime Minister thought that this would not be the right moment to raise this more general question with President Reagan.

The Chief of the General Staff stated that it might be necessary to send a few additional troops to join our contingent to help with the job of patrolling and guarding the ceasefire talks. The need for this was created by the new task of manning check-points. The Defence Secretary said that it would be wise to delay a decision until we could arrange for a naval ship to receive off-duty personnel. It was agreed that a suitable naval ship should be diverted to the area as soon as possible. Thought should be given to the public presentation of any such move.

Mr. Luce pointed out that H.M. Embassy in Beirut was also at risk, though certain measures of protection were in hand.

S E C R E T

- 3 -

It was agreed that the Defence Secretary would report further to the Prime Minister after tomorrow's visit to Beirut by O.C. British Forces Cyprus.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Peter Ricketts (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

A. L. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

S E C R E T

13c
Lebanon

LEBANON : SITREP 1100Z 17 NOVEMBER 1983

1. Death toll in Israeli air raid on Bekaa Valley (15 November) approximately 30 Lebanese Shia and Iranian Revolutionary Guards, with about 80 wounded. Target was two camps used by Iranian-backed Lebanese extremist militia, Islamic Amal, prime suspects for Tyre and Beirut bomb attacks on Israeli, US and French troops.

2. Americans have stressed no US planes involved. State Department spokesman stated (16 November) there had been no consultation or co-ordination between US and Israelis. He refused to comment on whether or not US approved of the Israeli raid. Asked about possible US retaliation, the spokesman quoted Mr Shultz's earlier statement that the Administration would not discuss the matter further in public.


Beirut/Chouf

3. Night of 16/17 November saw heaviest shelling since ceasefire began. Druze militiamen in Chouf apparently shelled Christian East Beirut and airport and clashed with Lebanese army. Reports on 6 dead. Attempts are being made to patch up the ceasefire: the 4-man Ceasefire Security Committee met yesterday (16 November) and will meet again today with BRITFORLEB providing guard as usual.

4. Increased violence underlines need for further progress in reconciliation talks now in recess until late November/early December. Syrian Foreign Minister, Khaddam, currently in Beirut to prepare meeting between President Gemayel and President Assad (postponed due to latter's illness). Next step will be visits by President Gemayel to MNF and Arab capitals. Commission preparing second session of Geneva talks has made encouraging progress: some agreement on difficult subject of constitutional reform. We and other MNF partners keeping up pressure on parties to reconvene talks as soon as possible.

5. PLO/Tripoli. Arafat's PLO loyalists retreated to Tripoli and

redployed heavy weapons in town, following fall of last strong-
hold, Baddawi refugee camp, on 16 November. Leader of Syrian-
backed PLO rebel forces has called on Arafat to surrender but has
said that rebel force will not enter Tripoli. Arafat has
apparently told his men to cease fighting, but has refused to
leave until safety of his troops assured. Ten issued statement
(9 November) deploring violence and reiterating commitment to a
solution to Arab/Israel problem including the Palestinians' right
to self-determination.



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
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Prime Minister.

I asked for this to be done on a contingency basis.

A.S.C. 14/11.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 November 1983

Dear John,

Lebanon: US Retaliation

With my letter of 11 November I enclosed some suggestions on how we might react publicly to news of US retaliation for the bomb attack of 23 October. Since then events have moved on, but if the President decides to go ahead, despite the Prime Minister's latest message, an attack could take place at any time, and could be a principal focus during questions in the House tomorrow. We suggest that, in deciding how to react, the Prime Minister may like to draw on the considerations set out below.

When we first hear that a retaliatory operation has been carried out we are unlikely to know clearly whether it has succeeded in eliminating a clearly identifiable target. First reports will not be a reliable guide to the extent of casualties. This points to the need for caution in commenting on the operation. There is the further consideration that although the Americans have sought our views about retaliation in principle, they have not so far discussed with us the type of operation they have in mind. We therefore suggest that in any public comment the Prime Minister might take the line that the Americans have kept us informed about their broad intention to act and asked for our views, which we gave; we fully understand President Reagan's desire to punish the perpetrators of the bomb attack on 23 October and to deter such attacks in the future; although we were informed in advance that the United States would take action, we were not given details of the specific course of action that was to be taken, nor asked to approve it. It was a decision for the US Government alone. She could add that the Government's first priorities in this situation are the safety of our men, and the urgent need to see reconciliation talks in the Lebanon succeed.

What further can or should be said will depend on the nature of the attack and the amount of information available about it at the time. Three possible scenarios are:

- (a) If we know that an attack has been made but do not have details, we propose that the Prime Minister should avoid being pressed into making substantive comment at this stage. She could take the line that we were seeking urgently to establish exactly what happened but that, in the meantime, people not in possession of the full facts would do well to avoid jumping to conclusions and leaping

/to attack



to attack the Americans as an automatic reflex.

- (b) If we can establish that the Americans have succeeded in a 'surgical' operation without civilian casualties, the Prime Minister could speak in more positive terms. She could give a warning to other outside parties not to exploit the action of the United States as a pretext for a further escalation of violence and the wrecking of the fragile reconciliation process.
- (c) If it is confirmed that the operation has not succeeded or has caused high civilian casualties, the Prime Minister is likely to be pressed on the extent of consultation which has taken place, and will be expected to say whether or not we approve the action. We recommend that if possible she should stick firmly to the line in paragraph 2 above, adding that the important point now must be to concentrate on the future: the cycle of violence must be ended if the effort to bring peace to Lebanon and make reconciliation possible is to succeed.

I enclose some notes on a line to take together with additional notes for supplementaries.

Sir Geoffrey Howe has not yet seen this letter; I am showing him a copy in parallel.

Your ever,

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

Peter Ricketts

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street



LEBANON/MNF: US RETALIATION

Line to Take

1. Much sympathy with US for enormous loss of life suffered by their barbarous attack on 23 October.
2. Each MNF contingent has right to self-defence. Fully understand US wish to deter perpetrators of 23 October attack from striking again. Their decision on how to do this. We were not asked to approve the operation.
3. Hope no-one will seek to exploit the situation. Priority for all those involved must be to help restore conditions in which reconciliation can be pursued and peace restored in Lebanon. The cycle of violence must be ended.
4. [If reports that US action has caused casualties, complications with other parties]
 - wish to have confirmation of reports before commenting.
[If confirmed]
 - Greatly regret bloodshed caused. Call on all parties to show restraint. Cycle of violence must be broken.



WERE HMG CONSULTED?

Have been in close touch with US, particularly since 23 October attack. We were consulted in general terms about US intention to retaliate. Not [told about or] asked to approve details of this operation - nor would we expect this. US decision alone.

DETAILS OF CONSULTATIONS?

Not appropriate for me to reveal details.

FUTURE OF BRITFORLEB/MNF

Consulting urgently with MNF partners. No hasty action. BRITFORLEB has been doing a valuable job. But we shall ensure that British servicemen are not exposed to unjustifiable risks. Full precautions already in force.


CONDEMN US ACTION?

No. Those who carried out terrorist attacks on 23 October and who have subjected US contingent to constant harrassment are those who should be condemned.



RE-ASSESS US/UK RELATIONS?

No. As I said in my speech last night (14 November) any differences between us are infinitely less important than the purposes and loyalties which bind us together.



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10 DOWNING STREET

15

From the Private Secretary

14 November 1983

TI 94/83

LEBANON

The Prime Minister held a meeting at No. 10 Downing Street this morning at 1115 hours to consider President Reagan's message, the text of which was enclosed with my letter earlier today to Peter Ricketts. The meeting was attended by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Lord President, and the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Luce).

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that, on the basis of the President's message, the Americans would clearly be able to say at a later stage that they had consulted us about the prospect of US military action in the Lebanon. We did not know whether the Americans had consulted the French and the Italians and, given the nature of the message, we could not ask them whether they had been consulted. A number of anxieties arose. If the United States did carry out military action, the risk to the British contingent in the Multi-National Force would be increased. In a situation where counter terrorism followed terrorism each step promoted the likelihood of a further one. In all our discussions with the United States about this matter we had talked of the desirability of confining any action to legitimate self defence. The US spoke of carrying out a surgical operation but one could not depend on any action being sufficiently surgical. The US Administration

/ might misjudge

TOP SECRET

JK

- 2 -

might misjudge the situation and attempt something too drastic. It was impossible for us to tell whether they would deal with the right people at the right time.

The Prime Minister agreed that it was desirable that any US action should be clearly in the nature of self defence. We should point out in reply to the President's message that the Americans were dealing with fanatical people to whom death was no deterrent. They would have to judge the likelihood of provoking further terrorist attacks by any step which they took. There would be an increased risk of loss of life and all MNF contingents would be in heightened danger. But we should also make it clear that the decision was for President Reagan. He alone could determine the risk to the troops involved in carrying out the action as well as the risk to others. She wondered whether the President was aware that the range of possible targets had been fully canvassed in the media in recent days and that there was unlikely to be any element of surprise. It would be a tragedy for the United States if things went badly wrong.

Mr. Luce pointed out that any action which set back the prospects for reconciliation and gave Syria the opportunity to reject that process would be regrettable.

The Lord President said that it would be extremely worrying if it emerged later that any US action had been taken in consultation with the Israelis. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the US had specifically assured us that they were not envisaging an American/Israeli action.

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The Prime Minister recalled that she had told Mr. Dam of the US State Department last week that any step taken by the Americans should not give Iran an excuse for escalating the situation in the Gulf. She noted that the President, in his message, appeared to rule out direct action against Iran or Syria.

/ Following

- 3 -

Following further discussion, the meeting considered the outlines of a possible reply to President Reagan.

After the meeting, a draft reply was considered separately by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Lord President. After amendment, the Prime Minister considered it further, and the final message was despatched at 1415 hours on the hot line. A copy of that message is enclosed with this letter.

I am sending a copy of this letter, together with its enclosure, to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Janet Lewis-Jones (Lord President's Office) and Hayden Warren-Gash (Minister of State's Office).

A. J. COLES,

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

(F) WE HAVE HAD MANY OUTRAGES IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND OVER ONE THOUSAND DEATHS TO OUR FORCES THERE - BUT WE HAVE ALWAYS CONCENTRATED ON HUNTING OUT THOSE CRIMINALS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE, AVOIDING WIDER RETALIATORY ACTION.

(G) WE WERE GLAD TO BE TOLD [REDACTED] THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE ASSOCIATED WITH YOU IN ANY STEP. I AM ALSO GLAD TO SEE FROM YOUR MESSAGE THAT DIRECT ACTION AGAINST SYRIA OR IRAN IS RULED OUT. ACTION WHICH INVOLVED THEM EVEN INDIRECTLY WOULD BE VERY DANGEROUS.

(H) WE DO NOT WISH TO GIVE ANYONE, AND SYRIA IN PARTICULAR, ANY EXCUSE FOR WITHDRAWING FROM THE CONCILIATION PROCESS.

(I) AS THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS HAVE BIGGER CONTINGENTS IN THE MNF THAN WE, I ASSUME THAT YOU ARE CONSULTING THEM.

I FULLY UNDERSTAND HOW DIFFICULT YOUR DECISION WILL BE. IT IS MY WISH TO AVOID FURTHER TRAGEDY IN THE LEBANON FOR THE UNITED STATES, FOR THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE, AND FOR OTHERS THAT MAKES ME PUT THESE POINTS TO YOU.

WITH BEST WISHES
YOURS EVER
MARGARET

BT

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS A COPY OF THE ORIGINAL WHICH IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT. THE ORIGINAL IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC.

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THIS INFORMATION IS A COPY OF THE ORIGINAL WHICH IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT. THE ORIGINAL IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC.

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE DEFENCE, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, WHITE HALL, LONDON

TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, 11, BARRINGER STREET, LONDON

JOHN BUCKLEY
DIRECTOR

1184183

06
cc: [unclear]



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Per M. Ham
Draft 13B Fall
J. Lewis-Jones
approx 1430

Dear Ron,

Thank you for your message of 14 November about the Lebanon.

You face a very difficult decision, and I can well understand all the pressures upon you to take action. In such circumstances leaders find themselves in a lonely position, and I want to let you have my frank views as ~~a friend~~ *someone who has been in a similar situation.*

The decision must be yours. We do not know what options you are considering. Only you are able to assess the risks to the people who would carry out any operation, to the civilians who may get caught up in it, to the troops of all contingents in the multi-national force and to the Lebanon more widely.

The following are the points I must ask you to consider most carefully:-

- (a) for an action to have any chance of appearing justifiable ~~it~~ ^{to world} it would have to be clearly limited to legitimate self-defence.
- (b) if we were considering such an action we would be thinking in terms of a small group of specialised troops dealing with the people who could publicly be proved to be the terrorists who mounted the outrageous assault on your troops. Our intelligence advice has not yet been able to pinpoint the guilty people with sufficient accuracy.

/ (c)

TOP SECRET
2

**THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT**

- (c) precision would be necessary both to ensure the avoidance of civilian casualties and to minimise the opportunities for hostile propaganda after the event.
- (d) I am sure you are aware that a range of possible targets has been publicly discussed by the ~~European~~ media for days past. It seems unlikely that any element of surprise can be achieved.
- (e) you would be dealing with fanatical people who have no concern for the lives of others and who appear to glory in the prospect of their own death. They have deliberately set out to provoke you into retaliatory action. Any action against them is surely certain to provoke further terrorist outrages on their part. New dangers for the multi-national force and all others in the area would be inevitable. *We should be ^{under} very heavy pressure to reconsider the future of our contingents.*
- (f) we have had many outrages in Northern Ireland and over one thousand deaths to our forces there - but we have always concentrated on hunting out those criminals directly responsible, avoiding wider retaliatory action.
- ~~(g) if you decided to go ahead, depending on the action you were envisaging, I should have to consider very urgently the safety of our troops in the multi-national force and the people in our Beirut Embassy.~~
- (h) we were glad to be told [redacted] that Israel would not be associated with you in any step.

I am also glad to see from your message that direct action against Syria or Iran is ruled out. Action which involved them even indirectly would be very dangerous

(k) we do not wish to give anyone, and Syria in particular, any excuse ^{for} ~~from~~ withdrawing from the conciliation process.

(j) as the French and Italians have bigger contingents ⁱⁿ ~~than~~ the MNF than we, I assure ^{that} you ~~we~~ are consulting them.

I fully understand how difficult your decision will be. It is my wish to avoid further tragedy ^{in the Lebanon} for the United States, for the multi-national force, and for others that makes me put these points to you. ~~I do believe that action in the immediate aftermath of the attack on your troops would have been easier to defend than action now.~~

I hope you will now consider these points very carefully and not let yourself be pressurised into action which we might all regret.

with best wishes

Yours ever

Raymond

The President of the United States of America

O 141240Z NOV 83
FM CABINET OFFICE
TO WHITE HOUSE
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L

*see Margaret
ops*

PRIME MINISTER'S

12

PERSONAL MESSAGE

DEAR RON,

SERIAL No. T184183

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 14 NOVEMBER ABOUT THE LEBANON.
WE ARE CONSIDERING IT URGENTLY NOW AND I PLAN TO LET YOU HAVE MY
VIEWS BY ABOUT 2.00 P.M. OUR TIME.

YOURS EVER,

MARGARET.

NNNN
SENT AT 1250/14

Lebanon.



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister. *Ames*

You will probably think that we ought to have a meeting soon to consider this.

2. The best time for the Foreign and Defense Secretaries will be 11.15. We would try to get Lord Whitelaw at the same time.

3. I would ask the F./C.O. to provide a draft r.d.g. for discussion.

4. Agree to meet at 11.15?

A.F.C. $\frac{16}{11}$.

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

LEBANON: MNF: DRAFT MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO
PRESIDENT REAGAN

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your message of 14 November. I appreciate
the opportunity to comment further on the action you are
contemplating in Lebanon.

①

I am frankly apprehensive about the retaliatory action
you propose. Firstly it seems to us very doubtful that,
however carefully targetted, an attack of this sort will
have the deterrent effect you are seeking. We are dealing
with terrorists who have demonstrated their fanatasicm
only too clearly. Rather than deter would not an attack
provoke further violence against the MNF? An attack on
our contingent ^{which could be portrayed} as a direct result of US retaliation would
place me in a very difficult position.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Secondly, military action now would give the Syrians
and others who may want to work against the reconciliatio
process a strong incentive to be less accommodating

in the talks which we hope will resume before long in Geneva. That too would have unwelcome consequences for all MNF contributors, and would give the Syrians, not to mention the Russians, a propaganda field-day.

I do not under-estimate how difficult this decision must be for you. I believe that retaliation in the immediate aftermath of an attack on the MNF would ~~in some ways~~ ^{have been} ~~be~~ easier to defend than retaliation now. I ask you to weigh most carefully the consequences before taking a final decision.

FILE



COPY NO 4 OF 4

COPIES

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 November, 1983

*Dear Peter,*LEBANON

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has just received from President Reagan.

The Prime Minister will chair a meeting at 1115 here this morning to consider her reply. You have kindly agreed to provide a draft.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Janet Lewis-Jones (Lord President's Office).

*Yours ever**John Major*

P. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

TOP SECRET - PERSONAL

cc MARGEN
ops

US Declassified

USA.P

10

2013/5/2

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TOO WTE24
DE WTE £8748 3180709
O 140802Z NOV 83
FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO CABINET OFFICE
ZEM

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T183183

T O P S E C R E T VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS SENSITIVE WHO8748

NOVEMBER 14, 1983

DEAR MARGARET:

I HAVE CONTINUED TO WEIGH MOST CAREFULLY THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE U.S. AND OUR MNF PARTNERS OF BOTH ACTION AND INACTION IN VIEW OF THE EVIDENCE NOW IN HAND WHICH CLEARLY IDENTIFIES THE LEBANESE TERRORISTS OF THE SO CALLED +HUSAYNI SUICIDE COMMANDOS+ OF THE SPLINTER ISLAMIC AMAL MOVEMENT. IN CONSIDERING THIS DIFFICULT DECISION, I HAVE, AS ALWAYS, GREATLY APPRECIATED YOUR COUNSEL.

ALTHOUGH I HAVE NOT YET MADE A FINAL DECISION, MY CURRENT INCLINATION IS TO TAKE DECISIVE BUT CAREFULLY LIMITED MILITARY ACTION IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. WHILE CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO AVOID A CYCLE OF VIOLENCE, MY GREATEST CONCERN IS THAT ALLOWING THIS CRIME TO GO WITHOUT ANY RESPONSE WOULD ENCOURAGE FURTHER ATROCITIES AGAINST THE MNF. THE GROWING NUMBER OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS ON PLANNING FOR OTHER TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST THE MNF IS DISTURBING. MY PURPOSE IS TO TRY TO DETER ANY SUCH ATTACKS= IN SHORT, ACTING NOW IS THE BEST MEANS OF PREVENTING FUTURE VIOLENCE. THE ACTION CONTEMPLATED WOULD BE AGAINST A DISCRETE TARGET IN LEBANON AND WOULD NOT INVOLVE DIRECT ACTION AGAINST SYRIA OR IRAN.

* ~~~~~ *
* THE EVIDENCE IS BEING REEVALUATED NOW= WE WOULD ONLY ACT IF THE TARGET IS RECONFIRMED WITH HIGH CONFIDENCE AND IF IT CAN BE ATTACKED WITHOUT UNDUE RISKS TO NON-COMBATANTS.

BEFORE MAKING A FINAL DECISION, I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL ADVICE YOU MIGHT WISH TO PROVIDE, I WOULD, OF COURSE, BE IN FURTHER TOUCH IN ADVANCE OF ANY ACTION.

BECAUSE OF THE NEED FOR ABSOLUTE SECRECY, KNOWLEDGE OF MY CURRENT THINKING IS BEING SEVERELY LIMITED WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

SINCERELY,

RON

0345
£8748

* ~~~~~ * Passage deleted and retained
under Section 3(4)

NNNN

Wayland

10 April 2014

SECRET

of Sir [unclear] 9A



Prime Minister, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

A.S.C. 1/11

11 November, 1983

Dear John,

Lebanon: US Retaliation

We have been doing further work against the possibility of a US retaliation for the bomb attack of 23 October and its likely consequences. We will take the opportunity to underline our concern once again when the new United States envoy to the Middle East, Mr Donald Rumsfeld, passes through London tomorrow morning, and will warn him that any action which damages the national reconciliation talks would make it difficult for us to justify maintaining our participation in the MNF. Moreover we are bound to take very seriously the risk of counter-retaliation, by terrorists who are not afraid to die in the attempt, extending to elements of the MNF other than the French or the Americans.

All the indications are that the US Government's political intention to retaliate is firm. They consider that they have identified the culprits, or are close to doing so. But they have so far been unable to define a satisfactory military option (if they had done so they would already have carried it out). It is not very likely that they will succeed in finding a better option now, so retaliation will in effect depend on the President's being willing to authorise a riskier course when he returns to the US on 15 November. Meanwhile the arguments against retaliation start to build up: the passage of time, the relatively successful start to reconciliation talks in Geneva, the diversion of US and world attention to Grenada (though the effect of that may now be fading).

We have had some reassurances from the Americans about their immediate intentions. President Reagan told the Prime Minister that he will keep her informed before undertaking any new initiatives. Eagleburger at the State Department, having checked back to make certain of the position, has told us that we may assume that there will be no retaliation until the President and Shultz are back on 15 November. He has also ruled out any joint operation with the Israelis, or the use of the Israelis as a US agent. But Under-Secretary Burt left us in little doubt today that retaliation will take place. He also acknowledged that while we would certainly be 'notified', the degree of consultation might well be less than we would like.

The incident on 10 November when a US aircraft overflying Syrian-occupied Lebanon was fired on from the ground, presumably by a Syrian unit (and the continuing US overflights today (11 November)) suggest that an incident could occur over the weekend, or early next week before the President's return to

SECRET

/Washington

SECRET



Washington. I therefore enclose a short paper on how we might react. It is not of course possible to envisage all the circumstances in which the US might take retaliatory action, so the alternatives will need to be refined further as the picture becomes clearer.

Sir Geoffrey Howe has not yet seen this letter or its enclosure. I shall be showing him a copy in parallel.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD).

Your ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET



US Retaliation in Lebanon

1. Given that the United States have not so far found a satisfactory military option, but that their will to do so continues strong, the list of things from which they could choose (most of which have disadvantages) is a long one. Assuming that we can accept as firm Eagleburger's assurance that there will be no collusive US-Israeli action (though the Israelis could mount a parallel 'cleaning-up' operation by land or air without informing the US of it beforehand), the Americans seem to have three broad options (all in Lebanon):
 - (a) A 'surgical' air strike against the extremist Shia faction, Islamic Amal, and/or against the pro-Iranian Lebanese Hizballahis, probably in their village hideouts south-west of Baalbek in the Beqa'a.
 - (b) A surgical air strike against the same targets, accompanied by strikes against Syrian gun positions or other installations
 - (c) A combination of air strikes with a commando operation going in by land or helicopter immediately afterwards.
2. The risk must exist that such operations, instead of being 'surgical', could become messy, ie involving civilian casualties and/or other Lebanese or Palestinian elements. These will create greater difficulties for non-US MNF contributors because of the additional publicity problem and the strong emotions that will be stirred throughout the world.
3. In the immediate aftermath of any US strike we should avoid being the first to volunteer comment. There will be a need for a pause to establish as accurately as possibly the degree of damage done; the number of casualties, and whether they include women or children. It should be clear almost immediately whether and if so how soon the Israelis or Syrians are going to become involved in taking action of their own. In any case we should compare notes urgently with our European MNF colleagues in Paris and Rome to see how they view the situation; and in particular whether they have plans for an early pull-out (unlikely).
4. As soon as the dust has settled, Ministers will then have to consider the following range of options:
 - (a) BRITFORLEB to stand fast, having redoubled security precautions etc
 - (b) Embassy to be further reduced in strength, and guard increased (a US Marine Corps responsibility at present)
 - (c) Redeployment as an interim measure of BRITFORLEB to Cyprus, accompanied by a statement that we would be ready to return to Beirut if certain conditions were



fulfilled (eg if there still seemed a chance for the reconciliation process).

- (d) Withdrawal from the MNF on the grounds that the reconciliation process has been blocked without any prospect of early revival.

5. Against this background, and since it is impossible to predict how successfully the US can mount a surgical operation, it is difficult at this stage to suggest the precise line that HMG should take with parliament and the press. The following are some suggested elements, but we should, if time allows, compare notes with European MNF partners before 'going public':

- (a) We have much sympathy, as we have repeatedly said, for the US losses as a result of the barbarous attack of 23 October.
- (b) While we accept the US right to self-defence, there is a duty on the part of all concerned in Lebanon not to contribute to the spiral of violence, and to exercise maximum restraint.
- (c) We have grave reservations about the effects of this latest action both for the prospects for peace and for Lebanese national reconciliation.
- (d) [If asked if we were consulted in advance]. No, but we had forewarning of the strike.
- (e) [If US action spills over and causes casualties, complications with other parties]. We greatly regret the bloodshed caused and call urgently on [the other parties] to show restraint. The position in Lebanon is exceptionally dangerous, and the whole effort to bring peace to Lebanon and make reconciliation and reconstruction possible will be at risk if the escalation of violence continued. The cycle must be broken.
- (f) [If asked about the future of the British MNF contingent]. We are consulting urgently with our European MNF partners. We shall take no hasty action, but we shall ensure that British servicemen are not exposed to unjustifiable risks.
- (g) Clearly the future of the MNF as a whole must now be reassessed, given the increased dangers of counter-retaliation against all elements of the force.



6. In addition to the considerations outlined above, we shall need to consider the likely impact on Anglo-US relations of whatever we do or say after a US retaliatory strike. Thus, it may be advisable in view of the strains already introduced by the Grenada action to adopt slightly less condemnatory language than would otherwise be justified. Only if, despite what we have been told, there is evidence of US-Israeli collusion (direct or indirect) in or after the strike should we be particularly outspoken.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

11 November, 1983

Lebanon; Int Sit⁵



10-1-54





10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 November 1983

WORLD MARONITE LEBANESE UNION

I enclose a message which the Prime Minister has received from the President of the above. I should be grateful if you would arrange for a suitable reply to be sent.

B/F

A. J. COLES

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

A handwritten signature, possibly 'P.F. Ricketts', written in dark ink.

PAGE 3

UNHAPPILY UNTIL NOW ARE THE GREAT LOSSERS OF THIS BATTLE OF
LIBERATION AND FREEDOM STOP THOSE ANTI TERRORIST FIGHTERS
COMMA THE LEBANESE FORCES COMMA HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE GREAT
MAJORITY OF THE LEBANESE DIASPORA STOP WE DO NOT BELIEVE IN
THE

PAGE 4

STRATEGIC RESOLVE OF SHELLING SMALL ISOLATED AREAS WHICH DO NOT
LEAD TOWARDS THE RESTABLISHMENT OF THE BALANCED FORCES ON THE
GROUND STOP THIS IS WHY WE SUPPORT FROM NOW ON ANY MASSIVE
ACTION WHICH HAS AS A GOAL THE RESTABLISHMENT OF THE BALANCE

PAGE 5

FORCES ON THE GROUND STOP THE FIRST SUCCESSFULL STEP TO GIVE
AGAINST THE PRESTIGE AND THE DIGNITY OF THE FREE WORLD IS TO
BREAK BY FORCE THE SIEGE OF DEIR AL KAMAR STOP TO LIFT THE
SIEGE DEIR AL KAMAR WILL AVOID A GREATER MASSACRE THAN HAMA STOP
IF YOU DO NOT INTERVENE ACTIVELY AND STRATEGICALLY YOUR PASI-
VITY WOULD BE THE MISUNDERSTOOD AND CHANGE MANY THINGS IN THE

PAGE 6

RECONCILIATION MEETING IN GENEVA WHICH WILL AGRINS START ON

ctions

Telegram

for enquiries dial the number
shown in your dialling instructions

British

TELECOM

for enquiries dial the number
shown in your dialling instructions

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shown in your dialling instructions
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FORCES ON THE GROUND STOP THE FIRST SUCCESSFULL STEP TO GIVE
AGAINST THE PRESTIGE AND THE DIGNITY OF THE FREE WORLD IS TO
BREAK BY FORCE THE SIEGE OF DEIR AL KAMAR STOP TO LIFT THE
SIEGE DEIR AL KAMAR WILL AVOID A GREATER MASSACRE THAN HAMA STOP
IF YOU DO NOT INTERVENE ACTIVELY AND STRATEGICALLY YOUR PASI-
VITY WOULD BE THE MISUNDERSTOOD AND CHANGE MANY THINGS IN THE

PAGE 6

RECONCILIATION MEETING IN GENEVA WHICH WILL AGAIN START ON
THE FORCING OF THIS MONTH STOP SO ANY ACTIONS MUST BE DONE
BEFORE THE 14TH COMMA AND WILL ALSO ALLOW THE LEBANESE TO
BREAK THE MENTAL AND PHYSICAL BLACKMAILING SIEGES OF THE
SYRIAN WITHIN THE CONFERENCE WHO ARE UNTIL NOW THE GREAT
WINNER IN THIS NEGOTATION

WORLD MARONITE LEBANESE UNION
IN REPRESENTATION OF SIX MILLION MARONIT
PRESIDENT SHEIKH
AMINE AWAD

COL 14TH

enquiries dial the number
shown in your dialling instructions

Telegram

for enquiries dial the number
shown in your dialling instructions

British
TELECOM
for enquiries
shown in

shown in your dialling instructions

SECRET

9



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~XXXXXX~~ 218 2111/3

MO 3/7/4

9th November 1983

Prime Minister.

For information.

AB 6.

MF

Dear Roger,

/ I attach a copy of a message from Mr Weinberger which we
received on Monday. On receiving this message Mr Heseltine
/ telephoned Mr Weinberger to indicate that we would do everything
we could to meet his request. Also attached is the text of a
formal reply to Mr Weinberger and I should be grateful if you could
arrange for it to be despatched. As you will see my Secretary of
State has agreed to provide two officers experienced in Explosives
and Ordnance Disposal techniques to advise the Americans in Beirut.
They will be able to give advice on operational tactics and
procedures for locating and neutralising devices and on protective
measures to counter attempts to plant them. Arrangements have been
made via the British Embassy in Washington for these officers to deploy
to Lebanon tomorrow for an initial reconnaissance.

I am copying this letter to John Coles.

Yours ever

Mich Evans

(N H R EVANS)
Private Secretary

R L Bone Esq

SECRET

SECRET

DRAFT FROM SECRETARY OF STATE TO MR WEINBERGER

Thank you for your letter seeking assistance in responding to terrorist devices in Beirut about which I called you immediately I received it. As you know, I was appalled by the bomb attack on your barracks at the end of last month. We have considerable expertise in dealing with this sort of threat, and I have arranged that two officers with relevant and up-to-date experience should be made available to provide advice to your contingent of the MNF.

As you suggested, the British Defence Attache in Washington will make detailed arrangements with your staff. Providing it is convenient for you, our experts would be able to arrive in Beirut on or after 10th November. I hope you will find their assistance helpful.

SECRET



SECRET

7.11.83
12

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE

24 Grosvenor Square
London W1A 1AE

The Rt Honorable Michael Heseltine, MP
Secretary of State for Defence
Ministry of Defence
Whitehall, London

Dear Mr. Heseltine,

I am pleased to pass the following message to you from our Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger:

"QUOTE: SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR BRITISH ASSISTANCE (U)

(S) DEAR COLLEAGUE:

DURING THE LAST SEVEN MONTHS, THE UNITED STATES PRESENCE IN LEBANON HAS BEEN SUBJECTED TO ATTACK BY TERRORIST ELEMENTS. THESE ATTACKS CULMINATED IN THE BLOWING UP OF THE MARINE BARRACKS AT BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON OCTOBER 23. THE OBVIOUS THRUST OF THESE ATTACKS IS TO RAISE AMERICAN CASUALTY LEVELS TO SUCH A DEGREE THAT WE MIGHT CONSIDER ALTERING OUR POSITION IN LEBANON. THIS WOULD PLACE THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE (MNF) AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IN A LESS TENABLE POSITION.

WHILE SOME US CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN AS A RESULT OF SNIPER FIRE, MOST LOSSES ARE ATTRIBUTED TO VEHICLE-DELIVERED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, EITHER REMOTELY DETONATED OR TRIGGERED BY A SUICIDE DRIVER. WITH YOUR COUNTRY'S EXPERIENCE IN RESPONDING TO SOPHISTICATED TERRORIST DEVICES, SUCH AS CAR BOMBS, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ASSISTANCE YOU COULD PROVIDE ON THIS SUBJECT.

IF YOU ARE AMENABLE TO THIS PROPOSAL, THE DETAILS CAN BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN MY STAFF AND YOUR ATTACHE'S OFFICE IN WASHINGTON.

SINCERELY, CAP

"UNQUOTE"

Original of this request being pouched through diplomatic channels.

Sincerely,

N.D. Campbell
for

ALAN B. RENSHAW
Colonel, USAF
Defense Attache

SECRET

TOP SECRET

ABC to see

file 11 RM
COPY NO 2 OF 2



COPIES

8

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 November, 1983

BF

NB
Ricketts spoke to Ase
9/11 and agreed
no reply required.
Sf.

I enclose a copy of the message received early this morning from President Reagan. This has been passed to the Prime Minister's party in Bonn.

I should be grateful for a draft reply if you consider it necessary.

(D. Barclay)

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

TOP SECRET

Bj

rcld No 10 07.10hrs

US Declassified

message passed to
pm's party in Bonn (by secure
phone) at 07.20hrs 9/11/83

cc MASTER
ops

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No: T 179/83

7

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DE WTE £8575 3130057
O 090106Z NOV 83
FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO CABINET OFFICE
ZEM

T O P S E C R E T VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WHO8575

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN
TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

NOVEMBER 8, 1983

DEAR MARGARET,

IN THE MESSAGE I SENT TO YOU SUNDAY NIGHT, I PROMISED I WOULD
GET BACK TO YOU FOLLOWING OUR MEETING REGARDING OUR RESPONSE
TO THE ATTACK ON OUR MARINES. IN VIEW OF MY CURRENT TRIP TO
THE FAR EAST, WE DID NOT COME TO ANY FINAL DECISIONS BEFORE MY
DEPARTURE. OUR DELIBERATIONS CONTINUE, BUT YOU CAN REST ASSURED
THAT I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED BEFORE WE UNDERTAKE ANY NEW
INITIATIVES.

SINCERELY,

RON

0140
£8575

NNNN

x1 Regy
x8: Party

FOBONN 74/R

OO BONN

CHANCERY SECRET DISTRIBUTION

COPY No.

IMMEDIATE

GRS
SECRET
FM FCO 082300Z NOV
TO IMMEDIATE BONN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 555 OF 8 NOVEMBER

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPT WAS
SENT TO PARIS TELEGRAM NUMBER 563 OF 8-11-83
AND TO IMMEDIATE ROME
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, DAMASCUS AND TEL AVIV

MY TELNO 1870 TO WASHINGTON: LEBANON: US RETALIATION

1. I AM STILL VERY SERIOUSLY CONCERNED AT THE POSSIBILITY OF US RETALIATION FOR THE 23 OCTOBER BOMBING. IT IS CLEAR FROM OUR RECENT EXCHANGES WITH THE AMERICANS THAT THEY ARE SET ON TAKING SOME ACTION WHICH WILL IN EFFECT BE RETALIATION, THOUGH IT WILL BE PRESENTED AS SELF DEFENCE. THEY HAVE DECIDED OR ARE CLOSE TO DECIDING THAT THE CULPRITS ARE ISLAMIC AMAL, AND ACTION IS LIKELY TO BE TARGETED AGAINST THEM.
2. MUCH WILL DEPEND ON THE FORM THEIR ACTION TAKES. THEORETICALLY IT MIGHT BE AN OPERATION OF 'SURGICAL PRECISION' BUT IN PRACTICE IT IS FAR MORE LIKELY TO SPILL OVER AND TO HAVE WIDE EFFECTS, EG CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND INVOLVEMENT OF LEBANESE, PALESTINIAN OR SYRIAN ELEMENTS. THERE IS ALSO THE MAJOR ISRAELI COMPLICATION CONSIDERED IN MY TUR.
3. PLEASE DISCUSS THIS URGENTLY WITH THE FRENCH/ITALIANS AT A HIGH LEVEL. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW IF THEY HAVE ANY ACTION IN HAND TO INFLUENCE THE US AWAY FROM THESE DAMAGING POSSIBILITIES. I SHOULD ALSO BE GLAD TO KNOW HOW THEY MIGHT REACT, FOR EXAMPLE IN CASE OF ONE OF THE FOLLOWING:
 - A) A SUCCESSFUL 'SURGICAL' ACTION BY THE US
 - B) A MESSY ACTION BY THE U.S.
 - C) ACTION BY THE ISRAELIS IN WHICH THEY APPEAR TO BE ACTING AS US AGENTS
 - D) OPEN US/ISRAELI COLLABORATION.
4. PLEASE REPEAT REPLY TO BONN (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY).

HOWE

NNNN

6
337

OBO 015/09

IMMEDIATE

OO BONN

GRS175

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 082340Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3362 OF 8 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME, BONN(FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY),
PRIORITY BEIRUT, DAMASCUS AND TEL AVIV

LEBANON: POSSIBLE US RETALIATION

1. PRESIDENT REAGAN TOLD A KOREAN BROADCASTING SYSTEM INTERVIEWER ON 7 NOVEMBER THAT HE ADMIRED THE RESTRAINT SHOWN BY THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT AFTER THE RANGOON BOMBING. IT WAS VERY EASY AND ONLY HUMAN TO WANT TO STRIKE OUT IN RETALIATION: HE HAD FELT THAT ABOUT THE TRAGEDY IN BEIRUT. "BUT GETTING THE PEOPLE DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE AND DOING SOMETHING TO INDICATE THAT TERRORISM DOES HAVE ITS PUNISHMENT IS A LITTLE DIFFERENT FROM JUST BLINDLY STRIKING OUT." THE MAIN THING WAS TO SHOW THAT TERRORISM DID NOT WORK AND THAT TERRORIST ACTS WERE NOT GOING TO DRIVE THE US AWAY.

WRIGHT

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference

Mr Coles ✓

cc: Mr Butler
Mr Fall
Mr Ingham
HM Ambassador
Mr Goulden

LEBANON: POSSIBLE MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT
REAGAN

I attach a draft message on which you and
others will certainly have comments in the
morning.

J Bullard

J L BULLARD
8 November 1983

D R A F T

MESSAGE FROM CHANCELLOR KOHL TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Since Kenneth Dam's brief but very valuable visit here on Monday I have been thinking further about the various issues which he discussed with me and with Hans Dietrich Genscher. Unquestionably the most important of these is the problem of INF deployment. As you know, I see this as the primary task of the Western alliance in the current phase. I was most grateful for the suggestions brought to me by Kenneth Dam for a possible new move to be made by the United States at the negotiations in Geneva. This is exactly what I had in mind when I sent you my recent message, and I have no doubt that a fresh and specific offer on the lines you are now considering would be valuable to me in the handling of German public opinion during the crucial next few weeks.

As part of the same exercise, it is obviously essential to frustrate the persistent efforts of the Soviet Union to split the Atlantic alliance, just at the moment when unity is more than ever needed to ensure that deployment is carried out according to plan. ~~It seems to me that~~ We are witnessing a very extensive campaign on the part of the Soviet Union to sow doubts in your country and in Western Europe about our mutual reliability. We have seen this, for example, over Grenada, and you may have noticed the efforts my Government have been making to combat the Soviet line on this issue.

A potentially even more ^{divisive} ~~explosive~~ subject is Lebanon, which came up both in my talks with Kenneth Dam and also when I saw Margaret



Thatcher here yesterday and today at our twice-yearly summit meeting. I can imagine how ~~anxious~~ anxiously you must be considering the question whether, after this lapse of time, and with the cycle of violence in Lebanon at a still higher pitch, it would still be right for the United States to respond in some way to the ~~gas~~ ghastly attack which claimed so many lives on 23 October. The decision can only be yours, and of course I fully respect your liberty to take such action as you think necessary in the exercise of your undoubted right of self-defence against the threat to your forces. I am sure, too, that you understand very well the need to use the language of self-defence rather than that of retaliation, still less revenge;+ and that you will give full weight to ^{all} the considerations which I find so powerful: the possible damage to the cause of reconciliation in Lebanon, on which so much depends; the risk of a further extension of the war in the Gulf, if an Iranian target is involved; and the opportunity for the Soviet Union to increase still further its influence in Syria, and through Syria in the entire region; ~~and~~ ~~the possible boost to the thoughtless~~ ^{anti-} Americanism which, as I found ~~on my recent trip to the area, is unfortunately still widespread.~~

Together with these thoughts I send you Margaret's and my best wishes for strength in bearing your huge responsibilities and for the success of your current visit to the Far East.

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FOBONN 063/08

00 BONN

GRS 660

SECRET/ECLIPSE

DEDIP

FM FCO 081950Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE BONN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 559 OF 8 NOVEMBER.

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPT:-
SECRET/ECLIPSE

DEDIP

DESKBY 081400Z WASHINGTON

FM FCO 081346Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1870 OF 8 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME,

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS

MY TELNO 1862, AND YOUR TELNO 3335.

LEBANON: POSSIBLE US RETALIATION IN COLLUSION WITH ISRAEL.

1. YOU ARE BEING SENT RELEVANT EXTRACTS OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND MY TALKS WITH DAM ON 7 NOVEMBER ON POSSIBLE RETALIATION IN LEBANON BY THE US. THOUGH WE TAXED HIM HARD AND POINTED TO THE EXTREME DIFFICULTY OF IDENTIFYING INDIVIDUALS AT THE ROOT OF THE 23 OCTOBER AND 4 NOVEMBER ATTACKS, DAM COULD NOT SAY WHETHER RETALIATION WOULD OCCUR OR NOT.
2. IN A FURTHER MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER DATED 6 NOVEMBER (TEXT OF WHICH IS BEING SENT YOU) PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID THAT THE US HAD NOW IDENTIFIED THE LIKELY CULPRITS. DECISIONS ON THE APPROPRIATE US RESPONSE WOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF ALL THE LIKELY CONSEQUENCES, AND MIGHT BE TAKEN AS EARLY AS 7 NOVEMBER. THE PRESIDENT PROMISED TO BE IN TOUCH WITH THE PRIME MINISTER SHORTLY AFTER A REVIEW MEETING PLANNED FOR THAT DAY. NO FURTHER MESSAGE HAS YET BEEN RECEIVED HERE.
3. I AM SERIOUSLY CONCERNED THAT, PERHAPS AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE TYRE ATROCITY WHICH CAUSED EAGLEBURGER TO EXTEND HIS STAY IN ISRAEL, THE AMERICANS MAY REVERT TO THE EARLIER STATE DEPARTMENT PREFERENCE (LEAKED TO US HERE BY THE US EMBASSY ON 2 NOVEMBER - PLEASE PROTECT) FOR AN ISRAELI COMMANDO ACTION AGAINST ISLAMIC SHIA ELEMENTS IN THE BEQAA, IN WHICH THE AMERICANS WOULD BE SEEN TO BE USING ISRAEL AS THEIR AGENTS; OR, WORSE STILL, A JOINT ACTION IN WHICH THE ISRAELIS TOOK ENTEBBE-TYPE ACTION BY LAND AGAINST THE CULPRITS, WHILE THE US PROVIDED AIR STRIKES OR POSSIBLE NAVAL BOMBARDMENT OF STRICTLY UNRELATED TARGETS, EG SYRIAN GUN EMPLACEMENTS ON THE METN. IN OTHER WORDS, US RETALIATORY ACTION AS A PRECISE SURGICAL OPERATION - ASSUMING THAT THE TARGET WAS DEMONSTRABLY THE PERPETRATORS OF THE 23 OCTOBER RAID - WOULD BE ONE THING, ALTHOUGH THE MOMENT FOR IT MAY HAVE PASSED, BUT COLLUSIVE US/ISRAELI ACTION WOULD BE ANOTHER, AND FROM THE WESTERN POINT OF VIEW MUCH MORE SERIOUS IN ITS LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS.
4. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD TAKE THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY, PERHAPS WITH MCFARLANE AT THE NSC, TO PLACE ON RECORD THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-
 - (A) WE KEENLY AWAIT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FOLLOW-UP MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE FINDINGS OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP ABOUT WHO WAS BEHIND THE 23 OCTOBER OUTRAGES.
 - (B) IF THESE FINDINGS SUGGEST THAT A CLEAR-CUT SURGICAL OPERATION AGAINST EG HUSSAIN MUSAWI MAY BE POSSIBLE, THAT WOULD BE ONE THING, THOUGH IN LEBANON NOW IT MUST BE LIKE FINDING A NEEDLE IN A HAYSTACK.
 - (C) A US OPERATION WHICH WAS NOT (NOT) VISIBLY SURGICAL WOULD BE WIDELY REPRESENTED AS DISPROPORTIONATE AND VENGEFUL.
 - (D) ANY JOINT RETALIATORY ACT BY THE US WITH THE ISRAELIS, OR ONE IN WHICH ISRAEL APPEARED TO BE ACTING AS A US AGENT, WOULD HOWEVER HAVE EVEN MORE SERIOUS EFFECTS THROUGHOUT THE REGION. IT WOULD FURTHER SHAKE THE CONFIDENCE OF MODERATE ARAB STATES IN THE US ROLES IN LEBANON, AND IN THE MIDDLE EAST GENERALLY: IT WOULD UNDERMINE THE POSITION IN LEBANON OF ALL THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS, AND LAY THEM OPEN TO COUNTER-RETALIATION, PROBABLY WITH THE SUPPORT OF LEBANESE MUSLIM ELEMENTS WHO HAVE HITHERTO REFRAINED FROM SUPPORTING MUSAWI OR THE LEBANESE HIZBULLAHIS; AND IT WOULD GIVE THE RUSSIANS AND SYRIANS GROUNDS FOR THEIR ASSERTIONS OF AN ANTI-ARAB CONSPIRACY, ETC.
 - (E) FURTHERMORE IT WOULD COMPOUND OUR OWN DIFFICULTIES, ESPECIALLY OUR DOMESTIC ONES, IN CONTINUING TO ARGUE THAT OUR MNF PRESENCE IN LEBANON WAS JUSTIFIED AND FULFILLING A USEFUL ROLE. IF THERE ARE NO EARLY PROSPECTS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN MNF BECOMES INCREASINGLY QUESTIONABLE. THE SAME WOULD APPLY TO A MAJOR BREAKDOWN OF THE CEASEFIRE.
5. PLEASE REPEAT YOUR REPLY TO BONN (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

HOWE

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SENT 2133Z/08 MBW

Minister

4

CHANCERY SECRET DISTRIBUTION
COPY No. 5

FOBONN 060/08

DD 082100Z BONN

GRS 440

SECRET

DESKBY 082100Z

FM FCO 081900Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE BONN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 560 OF 8 NOVEMBER

FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

FCO TELS NO 1870 AND 563 TO WASHINGTON AND TO PARIS RESPECTIVELY:
LEBANON

1. WHEN REPLIES TO THESE TELEGRAMS COME IN, AND IN CASE THE US SHOULD TAKE ACTION IN LEBANON, IT MAY BE HELPFUL TO HAVE SOME SUGGESTIONS ABOUT THE PRESS LINE WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN IN CASE OF RETALIATION, AND ABOUT OTHER OPTIONS OPEN TO US.
2. FOLLOWING ARE SUGGESTED ELEMENTS FOR A PRESS LINE DEPENDING VERY MUCH OF COURSE ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES: WE HAVE DISCUSSED LEBANON EXHAUSTIVELY WITH THE AMERICANS SINCE THE ATTACK ON THE MARINES ON 23 OCTOBER. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT, WITH ALL OUR SYMPATHY FOR THEM IN THE BARBAROUS ATTACK WHICH THEY SUFFERED, WE MUST NEVERTHELESS OPPOSE ANY MILITARY ACTION WHICH WOULD FURTHER RAISE TENSION AND WHICH CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED IN TERMS OF SELF DEFENCE. WE WERE NOT ASKED TO APPROVE THE PARTICULAR ACTION THEY HAVE NOW TAKEN.
3. (IF US ACTION SPILLS OVER AND CAUSES CASUALTIES, COMPLICATIONS WITH OTHER PARTIES) WE GREATLY REGRET THE BLOODSHED CAUSED AND CALL URGENTLY ON (THE OTHER PARTIES) TO SHOW RESTRAINT. THE POSITION IN LEBANON IS EXCEPTIONALLY DANGEROUS, AND THE WHOLE EFFORT TO BRING PEACE TO LEBANON AND MAKE RECONCILIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION POSSIBLE WILL BE AT RISK IF THE ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE CONTINUES. THE CYCLE MUST BE BROKEN.
4. (IF ISRAEL INVOLVED) WE ARE DETERMINED TO AVOID BEING DRAWN INTO COLLABORATION WITH ANY OF THE OCCUPYING FORCES IN LEBANON, AND REPEAT OUR VIEW THAT A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR LEBANESE RECONCILIATION IS THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM THE COUNTRY.
5. THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS COULD BE CONSIDERED, WITH OR WITHOUT PREVIOUS DISCUSSION WITH THE AMERICANS:
 - A) WITHDRAWAL FROM THE MNF ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS HAS BEEN BLOCKED AND THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE FORCE ARE NO LONGER REALISTIC.
 - B) (AS A MODIFICATION) WITHDRAWAL OF BRITFORLEB TO CYPRUS, WITH A STATEMENT THAT WE COULD BE READY TO RETURN IF CERTAIN CONDITIONS ARE FULFILLED.
 - C) A REQUEST TO THE AMERICANS TO VACATE THE BRITISH EMBASSY ON THE GROUNDS OF THE SECURITY OF OUR STAFF: THIS WOULD SERIOUSLY EMBARRASS THE AMERICANS, WHO WOULD NOT HAVE ADEQUATE ACCOMMODATION IN THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE WHICH AT PRESENT HOUSES SOME OF THEIR FACILITIES.
6. THERE ARE OBVIOUS OBJECTIONS IN TERMS OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THE LEBANESE, THE ARABS AND THE AMERICANS TO ANY OF THE ABOVE OPTIONS, AND CAREFUL THOUGHT NEEDS TO BE GIVEN TO THEM. IN PARTICULAR (C) LOOKS RATHER PETTY ALTHOUGH THE SECURITY RISK IS OF COURSE A VERY REAL ONE.

HOWE

NNNN

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SENT 2045Z/88 MBW

SECRET

FM PARIS 081810Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1000 OF 8 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
INFO PRIORITY ROME, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV



No. 10.

IMMEDIATE

3

YOUR TELNO 563 : LEBANON : US RETALIATION

Resonance
mf

1. THE QUAI SECRETARY-GENERAL BEING UNAVAILABLE I TOOK ACTION THIS EVENING WITH THE DIRECTOR FOR THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. BONNEFOUS DID NOT SEEM PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS. HE CONSIDERED AMERICAN ACTION POSSIBLE BUT NOT PROBABLE, AND AT ALL EVENTS UNLIKELY TO HAPPEN BEFORE PRESIDENT REAGAN'S RETURN FROM TOKYO AND SEOUL. HE ALSO WONDERED WHETHER THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE WILLING TO LET THEMSELVES BE USED SO TRANSPARENTLY BY THE AMERICANS.

3. BONNEFOUS MADE NO BONES HOWEVER ABOUT THE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES WHICH U S ACTION COULD HAVE. HE COMMENTED THAT A JOINT US - ISRAELI OPERATION WOULD STIR THE GHOST OF SUEZ IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WITH OBVIOUS COMPLICATIONS FOR FRANCE AND BRITAIN.

4. BONNEFOUS AGREED THAT IT WAS IN THE FRENCH AND BRITISH INTEREST TO COUNSEL CAUTION IN WASHINGTON. HE EXPECTED THAT THE FRENCH WOULD SPEAK ACCORDINGLY TO THE AMERICANS. HE HAD DOUBTS HOWEVER ABOUT JOINTLY SQUARING UP TO THE U S (I HAD NOT SUGGESTED THIS) AND THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BEST FOR THE UK TO TAKE THE LEAD, GIVEN OUR CLOSE RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON. HE AGREED THAT REPRESENTATIONS MIGHT SUCCEED IN MAKING THE AMERICANS LIMIT THEIR ACTION. IN MAKING ANY APPROACH HOWEVER IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT NOT TO HINT AT ACQUIESCENCE IN A LIMITED ACTION. THE AMERICANS MIGHT TAKE THAT AS THE GREEN LIGHT.

5. BONNEFOUS WAS AT FIRST RELUCTANT TO SPECULATE ABOUT HOW THE FRENCH MIGHT REACT TO AN AMERICAN MILITARY MOVE. AFTER SOME PROMPTING HE SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE TO ISSUE AN IMMEDIATE STATEMENT EXPRESSING SURPRISE AND PERHAPS VOICING THE HOPE THAT THE ACTION WOULD NOT HAVE TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES FOR THE CIVILIAN POLULATION OR PERTURB THE PEACE PROCESS IN LEBANON. AT NO POINT DID BONNEFOUS SUGGEST THAT FRANCE WOULD OPENLY CRITICISE U S RETALIATION.

6. COMMENT. MEMORIES OF THE BOMB ATTACK AGAINST FRENCH SOLDIERS ARE TOO FRESH HERE FOR THE FRENCH TO WORRY GREATLY AT THE PROSPECT OF POSITIVE ACTION, TELEVISION AND THE PRESS HAVE ENGRAVED THE 58 COFFINS ON THE MIND OF THE PUBLIC. ACCORDING TO THE US EMBASSY THE FRENCH DEFENCE MINISTER IS TAKING A HAWKISH LINE ON RETALIATION. THERE WOULD ALSO BE FEW REGRETS IF THE SYRIANS WERE TO TAKE A FEW BLOWS (MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 999). THE FRENCH ARE QUITE WILLING FOR THE UK TO BEARD THE AMERICANS BUT THEY ARE NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT TAKING A FIRM LINE THEMSELVES. BONNEFOUS SAID THAT THE MIDDLE EAST HAD HARDLY BEEN DISCUSSED WITH DAM WHEN HE CAME HERE YESTERDAY.

FRETWELL

NNNN

SENT AT 081932Z JW

US Declassified

SECRET



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T176100

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 November 1983

Lebanon

I enclose a message from President Reagan in response to the Prime Minister's message of 4 November. I showed copies of this to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Sir Julian Bullard before the Prime Minister's talks with Mr. Dam at Chequers this morning.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

AJK

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

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SECRET

Message from President Reagan:

"Dear Margaret

Thank you for your message of November 4. I was pleased by George Shultz's report of his talks with Geoffrey Howe and our other MNF partners in Paris last week. It is this kind of consultation effort that I particularly value and which is so important if we are to remain in step on the challenging issues we must confront together.

As you know, in my address to the American people during the week of the tragedy, I said that those responsible would be dealt justice. In the discussions in Paris, George Shultz was careful to explain that this is not a matter of revenge, but of self-defense. Those who committed this atrocity cannot be allowed to strike again if it is in our power to prevent them. At this point we are concluding our collection and assessment of the facts and we probably know as much as we can about the event and its perpetrators. The picture is reasonably clear. Decisions on the appropriate US response will give careful thought to the consequences of any actions we might consider. I intend to meet with my advisors tomorrow to review their tentative findings and will be back in touch with you after that meeting.

It was heartening indeed to hear of your efforts to press the Geneva participants in the direction of the more representative government that Lebanon so clearly needs. The ten day recess will give all of us further opportunity to pursue this course. I remain convinced that a broadly based government is key to a peaceful and stable future in Lebanon, a future in which the Lebanese no longer have a need for the presence of multinational

/forces.

forces. However, at this fragile moment, with the Lebanese nation building effort barely begun, I believe our steadfast support evidenced by military presence is essential.

I welcome your suggestion that we keep long term considerations for the MNF in sight, despite the necessary focus of all of us on the shorter term. I have, therefore, asked George Shultz to try to arrange consultations with British officials before the NATO ministerial meetings. I know George personally looks forward to talking further with Geoffrey Howe at the ministerial on an issue that has become one of central concern to my administration, to Congress, and to the American people. In the interim, I am sending Ken Dam to keep you abreast of our thinking on Lebanon and several other issues.

Sincerely,

Ron

Subject

Master
Ops

referred to Jacques
6/11
T 11

US Declassified

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T176/83

XOO WTE24

DE WTE £8500 3101817
O 061736Z NOV 83
FM WHITE HOUSE
TO CABINET OFFICE
ZEM

SECRET VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WHO8500

DEAR MARGARET:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 4. I WAS PLEASED BY GEORGE SHULTZ'S REPORT OF HIS TALKS WITH GEOFFREY HOWE AND OUR OTHER MNF PARTNERS IN PARIS LAST WEEK. IT IS THIS KIND OF CONSULTATION EFFORT THAT I PARTICULARLY VALUE AND WHICH IS SO IMPORTANT IF WE ARE TO REMAIN IN STEP ON THE CHALLENGING ISSUES WE MUST CONFRONT TOGETHER.

AS YOU KNOW, IN MY ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE DURING THE WEEK OF THE TRAGEDY, I SAID THAT THOSE RESPONSIBLE WOULD BE DEALT JUSTICE. IN THE DISCUSSIONS IN PARIS, GEORGE SHULTZ WAS CAREFUL TO EXPLAIN THAT THIS IS NOT A MATTER OF REVENGE, BUT OF SELF-DEFENSE. THOSE WHO COMMITTED THIS ATROCITY CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO STRIKE AGAIN IF IT IS IN OUR POWER TO PREVENT THEM. AT THIS POINT WE ARE CONCLUDING OUR COLLECTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE FACTS AND WE PROBABLY KNOW AS MUCH AS WE CAN ABOUT THE EVENT AND ITS PERPETRATORS. THE PICTURE IS REASONABLY CLEAR. DECISIONS ON THE APPROPRIATE U.S. RESPONSE WILL GIVE CAREFUL THOUGHT TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACTIONS WE MIGHT CONSIDER. I INTEND TO MEET WITH MY ADVISORS TOMORROW TO REVIEW THEIR TENTATIVE FINDINGS AND WILL BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH YOU AFTER THAT MEETING.

IT WAS HEARTENING INDEED TO HEAR OF YOUR EFFORTS TO PRESS THE GENEVA PARTICIPANTS IN THE DIRECTION OF THE MORE REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT THAT LEBANON SO CLEARLY NEEDS. THE TEN DAY RECESS WILL GIVE ALL OF US FURTHER OPPORTUNITY TO PURSUE THIS COURSE. I REMAIN CONVINCED THAT A BROADLY BASED GOVERNMENT IS KEY TO A PEACEFUL AND STABLE FUTURE IN LEBANON, A FUTURE IN WHICH THE LEBANESE NO LONGER HAVE A NEED FOR THE PRESENCE OF MULTINATIONAL FORCES. HOWEVER, AT THIS FRAGILE MOMENT, WITH THE LEBANESE NATION BUILDING EFFORT BARELY BEGUN, I BELIEVE OUR STEADFAST SUPPORT EVIDENCED BY MILITARY PRESENCE IS ESSENTIAL.

I WELCOME YOUR SUGGESTION THAT WE KEEP LONG TERM CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE MNF IN SIGHT, DESPITE THE NECESSARY FOCUS OF ALL OF US ON THE SHORTER TERM. I HAVE, THEREFORE, ASKED GEORGE SHULTZ TO TRY TO ARRANGE CONSULTATIONS WITH BRITISH OFFICIALS BEFORE THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETINGS. I KNOW GEORGE PERSONALLY LOOKS FORWARD TO TALKING FURTHER WITH GEOFFREY HOWE AT THE MINISTERIAL ON AN ISSUE THAT HAS BECOME ONE OF CENTRAL CONCERN TO MY ADMINISTRATION, TO CONGRESS, AND TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. IN THE INTERIM, I AM SENDING KEN DAM TO KEEP YOU ABREAST OF OUR THINKING ON LEBANON AND SEVERAL OTHER ISSUES.

SINCERELY,

RON

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 November 1983

N. S. P. R.

W 7/11

Dear John,

Lebanon

The Prime Minister asked that thought be given to what our reaction should be if the US took retaliatory action following the bombing of their marine headquarters on 23 October. A team of officials, including Mr Egerton, the Assistant Under Secretary responsible for the Middle East and Mr Goulden, the Head of News Department, are standing by over the weekend, to react quickly should the Americans decide to retaliate. They would make early recommendations on our public line in the light of the precise circumstances as they emerged.

The latest Current Intelligence Group assessment concludes that the US Government are committed to some form of response, but that they have no easy options. There are a number of factors which may restrain the Americans, including the relative success so far of the reconciliation talks in Geneva, and the possibility that President Gemayel may very shortly visit Washington. We have ourselves made repeated representations to the Americans, culminating in the Prime Minister's message despatched today to President Reagan.

If the Americans nevertheless decide that they have to retaliate for the losses they suffered on 23 October, our response would clearly need to be carefully judged in the light of the precise nature and results of the US action. At one extreme the Americans might undertake a "surgical" strike, with minimal civilian casualties, against a pro-Iran Islamic faction which could convincingly be shown to be terrorist and to be responsible for the bomb attack against the US marines. In that case it would be very badly received

/in Washington

CONFIDENTIAL



in Washington (and perhaps also in Paris) if we were to distance ourselves from what the Americans would regard as an effective blow against international terrorism. At the other end of the scale would be a naval barrage involving considerable civilian casualties, or an air strike against Syrian forces in Lebanon or in Syria itself. This would call for a much stronger reaction from us. It is difficult to make plans in advance for the entire range of possible US reactions. But in the worst case our reaction would have to include the withdrawal of our MNF contingent.

The question of whether we had been consulted in advance would certainly arise after any US retaliatory strike. We would need to make clear that we had not been consulted by the Americans in advance, and that we had taken the initiative in raising the question with them through various channels to let them know that, with all our sympathy for US feelings of outrage at the Beirut bomb attack, we hoped that they would not allow themselves to be drawn into a cycle of violence.

Sir Geoffrey Howe has not yet seen this letter: I am submitting a copy to him in parallel.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).


Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

4 NOV 1983



CONFIDENTIAL



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~2207622~~ 218 2111/3

MO 3/7/4

4th November 1983

Dear Peter,

LEBANON: UK CONTRIBUTION TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE (MNF)

Thank you for your letter of 1st November to Richard Mottram, concerning extended deployment of our contribution to the MNF beyond 7th November.

My Secretary of State agrees that under present circumstances it would not be appropriate to withdraw the British contingent, and that British participation should therefore continue for the time being, subject to review at the end of the financial year (or in response to earlier developments). He agrees also that we should continue to avoid any suggestion of a particular time limit in public.


I understand that the financing question has now been resolved as a result of the discussion between senior officials, and can confirm that future charges for our MNF contribution will be raised on the basis of short run marginal costs (provided, of course, that the commitment does not endure for so long as to necessitate investment of additional resources). I am also pleased to be able to inform you that our cost estimate to the end of 1983/84 has now been reduced to £425,000, including the estimated cost of implementing General Kitson's recommendations arising from his visit last week. A major element of the reduction stems from the resumption on an opportunity basis of resupply by Hercules aircraft in place of helicopters, depending on the security situation at Beirut airport at the time of each flight. The Chinooks must, therefore, remain in Cyprus for the time being in case Beirut airport is closed again (in which case resupply costs would go up), or for emergency withdrawal. Finally you will wish to note that we intend to rotate our personnel on a four rather than six-monthly basis in future, starting next month, in view of the very difficult circumstances under which they are now operating. This will not affect our cost estimate in 1983/84.

I am copying this letter to John Coles.

A H Lowe

(S H LOWE)

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CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

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4 November 1983

Security at the British Embassy, Beirut

Thank you for your letter of 3 November, the contents of which the Prime Minister has noted.

A J COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

US Declassified

cc MASTER OPS

THE PRIME MINISTER

4 November 1983

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T175/83

Dear Ron,

Thank you for your message of 24 October. I entirely agree that we cannot let the outrageous attacks on the Multi-National Force deflect us from our task. We must continue our efforts to enable the legitimate Government of Lebanon to pursue a peaceful solution in the reconciliation talks.

You will have had an account of the meeting which George Shultz and Geoffrey Howe attended in Paris on 27 October. I was somewhat relieved to note that George Shultz made it clear that there would be no hasty reaction on your part by way of retaliation for the attacks on your Marines. I know you will think twice and three times before doing anything which could damage the process of reconciliation and put in further danger the contingents in the MNF.

As agreed at the Paris meeting, we are putting what pressure we can on all the participants in the Geneva talks. If a more broadly based Lebanese Government can be constructed, that will be a major step forward.

As Geoffrey Howe also mentioned, we have been giving some thought to the longer term. I think we should try to agree urgently on a common approach among the Four on the future of the MNF.

da

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

We share a number of common objectives, for example, withdrawal of all foreign forces and the creation of conditions in which the MNF can itself withdraw. At the Paris meeting it was agreed that the four Foreign Ministers should look at this again in the margins of the NATO Ministerial meeting in December. But I believe that it would be worth getting US and British officials together before then to work on a common approach. There are no easy answers, but the ceasefire and the Geneva Conference represent hard won achievements, and we must work out together how to build on them.

News of further senseless bloodshed in Lebanon today only underlines the urgency of achieving a solution.

*Y
Lummen
Ragans*

The President of the United States of America

CONFIDENTIAL



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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 November 1983

Lebanon

You enclosed with your letter of 3 November a draft message for the Prime Minister to send to President Reagan in reply to his message of 24 October.

A message on the lines of your draft was approved by the Prime Minister and despatched on the hot line this afternoon. I now enclose a signed version and would be grateful if you would arrange for its delivery.

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 November 1983

Prime Minister.

Dear John,

mt

ALY/u.

Security at the British Embassy, Beirut

As the question of our Embassy in Beirut came up in Cabinet last week, you may like to know the outcome of an urgent review that we have been carrying out of security arrangements there.

We are concerned, of course, to do everything possible to prevent a suicidal attack by a lorry heavily laden with high explosives on the lines of the attacks on the American and French bases on 23 October. Defences against an attack of this kind have to go far beyond the measures that are customary at our Missions abroad: in Beirut we are fortunate in being able to get assistance from the Americans, who have been in part of our building since the destruction of their Embassy last April, as well as from the British MNF contingent and their advisers. The presence of the Americans may increase the threat to our Embassy, but we believe the guard they provide more than compensates for this.

The present position is that the Embassy is already heavily defended. It is guarded round the clock by a substantial contingent of armed US Marines in sandbagged positions around the building. We also have a team of eight NCOs from the Royal Military Police for the protection of the Head of Mission and his staff from close-range terrorist attack. The west-bound carriageway of the boulevard which the Embassy faces has been closed to ordinary traffic, as have other roads adjacent to the building.

A specialist member of our Security Department was in Beirut from 27 to 29 October to advise on further measures. Following his visit authority has been given for a number of defences designed to prevent a vehicle charging through the existing perimeter fences. These are to be installed at once by local contractors and include 'anti-tank' obstacles inside the existing fence, two chicanes at points where traffic is allowed through (concrete blocks to prevent an approach at high speed), and three strengthened tilting-arm barriers.

/Advice

CONFIDENTIAL



Advice on the second phase of external works is to be given by the Royal Engineers, who are today considering the technical aspects of possible options. Measures could include the erection of an anti-blast wall to protect the building from a vehicle bomb detonated on the highway, and provision of a screen as protection against rocket-propelled grenades.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram at the Ministry of Defence.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 November 1983

File to
FCO to Washington
tel: 1853

3/4

'T 174c/83'

We spoke about Washington telegram No. 3283 concerning the American casualties in Beirut.

This is to confirm that the Prime Minister agreed to send the following message to President Reagan:-

"I am delighted that you have asked Sir Oliver Wright to accompany you to Fort le Jeune on Friday. Britain is proud to join you in paying tribute to those who have given their lives in the cause of peace".

You agreed to arrange for the delivery of this message.

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

AO



File

HL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 November 1983

The Middle East: letter from President
Mubarak

Thank you for your letter of 1 November.

I enclose a reply, signed by the Prime
Minister, to President Mubarak's letter of
27 October. I should be grateful if you would
arrange for its delivery.

BF
H
President

ASC

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SP

CONFIDENTIAL



DSG

c. fco

cc MASTER
ops

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

3 November 1983

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No: T 1748/83

Dear Mr. President,

I am grateful to you for letting me have your thoughts about the way forward in Lebanon and the Middle East following the criminal outrage against the United States and French members of the Multinational Peace Keeping Force in Lebanon on 24 October. I entirely share your view that we must spare no effort to generate a new momentum for peace in the Middle East. It is vital that the international community makes clear to the cowardly perpetrators of this bombing that we shall not be terrorised into giving up our responsibility to help bring stability to Lebanon and a just and lasting peace to the Middle East.

Geoffrey Howe and his colleagues from the United States, France and Italy met in Paris last week to discuss the way forward. You will have seen that we reaffirmed the commitment of the contributors to the Multinational Force to help the Lebanese Government restore stability and bring about national reconciliation. We shall be urging all the parties and their supporters outside Lebanon to adopt a constructive attitude at the talks in Geneva this week. In this connection I share your view that the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon is especially important. I also agree on the importance of not allowing events in Lebanon to distract attention from the urgent need to make progress on the wider Middle East peace process. I have put this point strongly to President Reagan; there was also agreement on it among the four Foreign Ministers in Paris.

/ At this

sup

At this difficult time we should keep in touch and exchange ideas as the situation develops. I am glad that we are thinking on similar lines. Richard Luce is visiting Israel, Jordan and Egypt this week and will be glad to discuss how we can help the process forward. I hope therefore that it will be possible for you and him to talk over your ideas while he is in Cairo. I look forward to having a report about his talk with Your Excellency on his return.

Yours sincerely
Raymond Thatcher

His Excellency President Mohamed Hosni Said Mubarak.

SUBJECT

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US Declassified

REFLOG/c
RI
- 4 NOV 1983
29317-1
INDEX
1/4

CONFIDENTIAL

DD 032300Z WASHINGTON
 GRS 87
 CONFIDENTIAL
 DESKBY 032300Z NOVEMBER 1983
 FM FCO 031500Z NOV 83
 TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
 TELEGRAM NO 1853 OF 3 NOVEMBER
 US CASUALTIES IN BEIRUT

PRIME MINISTER'S
 PERSONAL MESSAGE
 SERIAL No. T174^c/83

1. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS AGREED THAT YOU SHOULD PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE CEREMONY AT FORT LE JEUNE.
 BEGINS

I AM DELIGHTED THAT YOU HAVE ASKED SIR O WRIGHT TO ACCOMPANY YOU TO FORT LE JEUNE ON FRIDAY. BRITAIN IS PROUD TO JOIN YOU IN PAYING TRIBUTE TO THOSE WHO HAVE GIVEN THEIR LIVES IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE. ENDS

HOWE

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)
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 DEFENCE DEPT
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 SED
 ECD(E)
 FINANCE DEPT
 PROTOCOL DEPT
 PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
 PS/MR LUCE
 PS/PUS
 SIR J BULLARD
 SIR J LEAHY
 MR WRIGHT
 MR CARTLEDGE
 MR MACINNES
 MR ADAMS
 MR EGERTON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

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 MR GOODALL)CABINET
 SIR R ARMSTRONG)OFFICE
 SIR P MOORE
 BUCKINGHAM PALACE

21 NOV 1983



UN DECLASSIFIED

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 November 1983

Dear John,

Type message pl.

[Handwritten signature] 3.
u

Lebanon: Message from President Reagan

We discussed the draft message contained in my letter of 31 October. Sir Geoffrey Howe has given further consideration to the terms in which the Prime Minister might reply to the President, and I now enclose a new draft.

We have also just seen Washington telegram number 3283 (copy enclosed) in which Sir O Wright recommends a message from the Prime Minister on the occasion of the ceremony at Fort Le ~~Jeune~~ in honour of the US marines killed in Beirut. I have not yet shown this telegram to the Foreign Secretary but in view of the time factor the Prime Minister might wish to add a point, along the lines suggested by Sir O Wright, to the enclosed draft. If so, you might feel that the two sentences in the Washington telegram would be better reversed.

Yours ever,

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

Peter Ricketts

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

THE PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

PRESIDENT REAGAN

Secret

Copies to:

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT: LEBANON: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your message of 24 October. ~~As you know~~
I entirely agree that we cannot let the outrageous attacks on the Multi-National Force deflect us from our task. We must continue our efforts to enable the legitimate Government of Lebanon to pursue a peaceful solution in the reconciliation talks.

CAVEAT.....

You will have ^{led} ~~seen~~ an account of the meeting which George Shultz and Geoffrey Howe attended in Paris on 27 October. I was somewhat relieved to note that George Shultz made it clear that there would be no hasty reaction on your part by way of retaliation for the attacks on your Marines. I know you will think twice and three times before doing anything which could damage the process of reconciliation ^{and put in further danger} ~~In addition, I am sure you will accept that further military action by any of the MNF contributors would endanger all the contingents in~~
~~the MNF.~~

Enclosures—flag(s).....

As agreed at the Paris meeting, we are putting what

Pressure we can on all the participants in the Geneva talks. If a more broadly based Lebanese Government can be constructed, that will be a major step forward.

As Geoffrey Howe also mentioned, we have been giving some thought to the longer term. I think we should try to agree urgently on a common approach among the Four on the future of the MNF. We share a number of common objectives, for example, withdrawal of all foreign forces and the creation of conditions in which the MNF can itself withdraw. At the Paris meeting it was agreed that the four Foreign Ministers should look at this again in the margins of the NATO Ministerial meeting in December. But I believe that it would be worth getting US and British officials together before then to work on a common approach. There are no easy answers, but the ceasefire and the Geneva Conference represent hard won achievements, and we must work out together how to build on them.

**Poor quality
text due to the
nature of the
material.**

**Image quality is
best available.**

~~MIDDLE EAST:~~ ADVANCE COPIES 16 x15

PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
~~SIR J LEAHY~~
MR EBERTON
SIR J BULLARD
ED/NENAD
ED/ED
ED/UND

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE D10

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GRS 195
CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 022359Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3283 OF 2 NOVEMBER 1983

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

US CASUALTIES IN BEIRUT

1. THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED ME AND MY FRENCH AND ITALIAN COLLEAGUES TO ACCOMPANY HIM ON FRIDAY TO A CEREMONY AT THE US MARINE HEADQUARTERS AT FORT LE JEUNE IN NORTH CAROLINA TO HONOUR THE US MARINES AND NO DOUBT ALSO THE FRENCH SOLDIERS KILLED IN BEIRUT.

2. THE PRESIDENT CLEARLY IS INTENT ON DEMONSTRATING VISIBLY ALLIED SOLIDARITY OVER THE MNF AND ALSO MENDING SOME OF THE FENCES BROKEN OVER GRENADA. HENCE, I BELIEVE, THIS INVITATION AND THE DESPATCH OF KENNETH DAM TO LONDON ON MONDAY.

3. HM THE QUEEN HAS ALREADY SENT A MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE TO THE PRESIDENT; AND YOU HAVE SENT A MESSAGE TO MR SHULTZ. UNLESS THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE ON THE DIRECT LINE, I THINK IT WOULD

~~3. NM THE QUEEN HAS ALREADY SENT A MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE TO THE PRESIDENT; AND YOU HAVE SENT A MESSAGE TO MR SHULTZ. UNLESS THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE ON THE DIRECT LINE, I THINK IT WOULD BE MUCH APPRECIATED IF THE PRIME MINISTER WERE DISPOSED TO SEND A MESSAGE WHICH I COULD GIVE TO THE PRESIDENT ON THIS OCCASION. TO BE AVAILABLE IN TIME, SUCH A MESSAGE WOULD NEED TO REACH ME BY 2300Z TOMORROW, 3 NOVEMBER. I SUGGEST SOMETHING ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:~~

QUOTE I AM DELIGHTED THAT YOU HAVE ASKED SIR O. WRIGHT TO ACCOMPANY YOU TO FORT LE JEUNE ON FRIDAY. BRITAIN IS PROUD TO JOIN YOU IN PAYING TRIBUTE TO THOSE WHO HAVE GIVEN THEIR LIVES ^{in the cause of} FOR PEACE.

~~AND IN DEMONSTRATING THAT VIOLENCE MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO SUCCEED.~~
UNQUOTE

WRIGHT

NNNN



Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

To be aware.

London SW1A 2AH

A.S.C. - 1/11

1 November 1983

Dear Richard,

[Handwritten initials]

Lebanon: UK Contribution to the Multinational Force (MNF)

On 20 July Mr Luce announced, in reply to a written question, that we were telling the Lebanese Government of our willingness to extend the deployment of the British contingent in the Multinational Force for a limited period beyond 7 August. At no time have we given any indication in public of a specific time limit for our participation in the MNF. In reply to questions following his statement to the House on 24 October, Sir Geoffrey Howe said that the British force cannot be expected to remain in Lebanon indefinitely but "it will stay for so long as it plays a useful part in promoting the peace process". He also said that at a time when the forces of other countries had suffered such a severe blow (in the attacks on 23 October) it would be quite the wrong moment for us to consider unilateral withdrawal.

When Ministers considered the extension of our contingent's deployment after 7 August they agreed nevertheless that we would for our own purposes reconsider the position after 3 months (John Holmes's letter of 5 July to John Coles). Sir Geoffrey Howe does not consider that this is an appropriate moment for us to take any long-term decision about future British participation in the MNF. He therefore proposes that we should continue to participate in the MNF after 7 November until the end of the financial year 1983/84 subject to reconsideration at any time in the light of the situation in Lebanon. We would not of course reveal the new time limit if challenged, eg in Parliament, but continue to use the 24 October line set out above.

I understand that following the discussions of senior officials chaired by Sir Robert Armstrong on 13 October it was agreed that in future the Ministry of Defence would charge the FCO marginal costs for our contribution to the MNF. Your officials estimate that for the period from 7 November until the end of the 1983/84 financial year these will amount to £461,000. We estimate that it will be possible for the FCO to meet costs of this size without recourse to the Central Contingency Reserve. But we could not find a larger sum.

/I am

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I am coping this letter to John Coles (No 10).

Yours sincerely,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

R C Mottram Esq
Private Secretary
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Type letter pl. 1 November 1983
A. J. C. 1/11

Dear John,

In your letter of 28 ^{attached} October you said that the Prime Minister wished to reply quickly to President Mubarak's letter of 27 October about Lebanon and the Middle East. I enclose a draft reply.

President Mubarak's letter contains no specific suggestions as to how the Egyptians think the Reagan plan can be revived or progress made in securing the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon. HM Ambassador at Cairo thinks that the main Egyptian motive in taking this initiative may be fear that the Americans will be tempted to join forces with the Israelis in some form of retaliation in Lebanon. A secondary motive is undoubtedly to use the initiative to draw Egypt closer to the other moderate Arabs.

Sir Geoffrey Howe thinks that it would be right to use the reply to make clear that Egyptian thinking is on similar lines to our own. Mr Luce has started a visit to Israel, Jordan and Egypt. He will be in Cairo from 6 - 8 November. Sir Michael Weir is trying to arrange a call on President Mubarak and thinks that it would be helpful in this context to refer to Mr Luce's visit in the reply to the President.

Your ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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DSF (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~XXXXX~~/letter/~~XXXXX~~/letter/~~XXXXX~~/despatch/~~XXXX~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: *HE Mohamed Hosni Said*

Your Reference

✓ President Mubarak

R T Egypt

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- Restricted
- Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I am grateful to you for letting me have your thoughts about the way forward in Lebanon and the Middle East following the criminal outrage against the United States and French members of the Multinational Peace Keeping Force in Lebanon on 24 October. I entirely share your view that we must spare no effort to generate a new momentum for peace in the Middle East. It is vital that the international community makes clear to the cowardly perpetrators of this bombing that we shall not be terrorised into giving up our responsibility to help bring stability to Lebanon and a just and lasting peace to the Middle East.

Geoffrey Howe and his colleagues from the United States, France and Italy met in Paris last week to discuss the way forward. You will have seen that we reaffirmed the commitment of the contributors to the Multinational Force to help the Lebanese Government restore stability and bring about national reconciliation. We shall be urging all the parties and their supporters outside


/Lebanon

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Lebanon : Internal Situation A+4

Lebanon to adopt a constructive attitude at the talks in Geneva this week. In this connection I share your view that the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon is especially important. I also agree on the importance of not allowing events in Lebanon to distract attention from the urgent need to make progress on the wider Middle East peace process. I have put this point strongly to President Reagan; there was also agreement on it among the four Foreign Ministers in Paris.

At this difficult time we should keep in touch and exchange ideas as the situation develops. I am glad that we are thinking on similar lines. Richard Luce is visiting Israel, Jordan and Egypt this week and will be glad to discuss how we can help the process forward. I hope therefore that it will be possible for you and him to talk over your ideas while he is in Cairo. I look forward to having a report about his talk with Your Excellency on his return.



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GR 80
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DESKBY FCO 010900Z
DESKBY BEIRUT 010600Z
FM TEHRAN 010530Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 588 OF 1 NOVEMBER 1983
AND TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT
INFO PARIS, ROME, WASHINGTON.

THREAT TO UK PRESENCE IN LEBANON.

1. AN UNKNOWN IRANIAN TELEPHONED THIS MORNING SAYING HE REPRESENTED THE ''BOILED BLOOD OF SABRA AND CHATILA''. HE SAID THAT, IF WE DID NOT GET THE BRITISH TROOPS OUT OF LEBANON, THEY WOULD BE TREATED THE SAME WAY AS THE AMERICANS AND FRENCH. SO WOULD OUR EMBASSY IN BEIRUT.

2. THE SPEAKER MADE NO DIRECT THREAT AGAINST B I S. WE HAD ALREADY INCREASED VIGILANCE SINCE THE BEIRUT BOMBING.

SIMPSON-ORLEBAR

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)
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MED
DEFENCE DEPT
PUSD
NEWS DEPT
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NAD
WED
SED
ECD(E)
FINANCE DEPT
PROTOCOL DEPT
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
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SIR J BULLARD
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