


TOP SECRET

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FILE TITLE: <i>Relations / Internal Situation</i>		SERIES <i>LEBANON</i>
		PART: <i>SB</i>
PART BEGINS: <i>4 DECEMBER 1983.</i>	PART ENDS: <i>30 DECEMBER 1983.</i>	CAB ONE: 

PREM 19/1077

TOP SECRET

PART

CLOSED

● PART Pt 5 ends:-

Cairo tel 579 30/12/83

~~Beirut tel 746 29/12/83~~

PART Pt 6 begins:-

Beirut tel 3 3-1-84
~~ACO to AJC 4/1/84~~

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 16

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PS/FUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR SPERTON
SIR J BULLARD
ED/NEWSAD
ED/ED
ED/UND

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CABINET OFFICE D10

Prime Minister ①

*This telegram contains a message
to you from President Mubarak.
FCO advice will follow shortly.*

ED/.....
ED/CONSULAR DEPT

FUSD (2)
NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE
ADVANCE COPY

*DMB
30/12*

GRS 990
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM CAIRO 301219Z DEC 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 579 OF 30 DECEMBER

mf

MIPT

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE.
BEGINS

1. PRESIDENT MUBARAK WOULD LIKE TO INFORM THE PRIME MINISTER OF CERTAIN RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HE FINDS OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE TO THE PROCESS OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. WHEN PLO CHAIRMAN ARAFAT AND HIS LOYALISTS DECIDED TO LEAVE TRIPOLI, HE REQUESTED EGYPT TO TAKE PART IN GUARANTEEING SAFE PASSAGE FOR THE DEPARTING MEN AND FAMILIES.

3. PRESIDENT MUBARAK SENT URGENT MESSAGES TO PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR RESPECTIVELY, ASKING THEM TO GIVE ASSURANCES THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT INFLICT ANY HARM ON THE DEPARTING PALESTINIANS. ANY ACT OF AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF ISRAEL WOULD REFLECT QUITE NEGATIVELY ON THE ISRAELI INTENTIONS VIS-A-VIS THE ARABS AND PUT TO QUESTION ITS DESIRE TO COEXIST PEACEFULLY WITH THE PALESTINIANS.

4. THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED SOME ENCOURAGING REPLIES. MOREOVER, HE AGREED TO A PALESTINIAN REQUEST THAT SOME UNITS OF THE EGYPTIAN NAVY PARTAKE OF THE PROTECTION OF THE CONVOY.

5. PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF CHAIRMAN ARAFAT TO EGYPT, HE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN PAYING A BRIEF VISIT TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK.

THAT JUNCTION. FURTHERMORE, HE NEEDED SOME TIME TO SET HIS HOUSE IN ORDER BEFORE EMBARKING ON ANY ACTION.

12. PRESIDENT MUBARAK SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD SUCH NEED AND THE LIMITATIONS ON MR ARAFAT'S FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. IT IS TRUE THAT THE FEZ RESOLUTIONS ARE IN CONFORMITY WITH RESOLUTION 242 BUT CHAIRMAN ARAFAT MAY DEEM IT USEFUL, AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME, TO TAKE NEW STEPS AND BUILD UPON THE PALESTINIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE FEZ FORMULA.

13. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PRESIDENT BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY USEFUL TO RESUME THE JORDANIAN PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE. EGYPT WAS WILLING TO DO ALL THAT IT COULD TO STIMULATE THIS DIALOGUE. SUCH STEPS WOULD HELP REGENERATE THE PEACE MOMENTUM AND WOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR MOVEMENT. THE DYNAMICS OF THE SITUATION ARE APT TO CREATE NEW REALITIES THAT WOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR A GENUINE CHANGE CONDUCTIVE TO ENABLING THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION.

14. CHAIRMAN ARAFAT RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR SEIZING THE INITIATIVE AND MAINTAINING THE MOMENTUM IN THE COMING FEW MONTHS.

15. THE PALESTINIAN LEADER SAID THAT THE FORTHCOMING MEETING OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL WOULD BE RENDERED MORE FRUITFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE IF ATTENDED BY MEMBERS RESIDING IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. SINCE ISRAEL DENIES THEM THE RIGHT TO ATTEND COUNCIL MEETINGS UNDER THE PRETEXT THAT THE PLO IS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, IT WOULD BE A MATTER OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO PERSUADE ISRAEL NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THEIR ATTENDANCE OF THE COMING SESSION. IF THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE REMAINS UNCHANGED, THE UNESCAPABLE CONCLUSION WOULD BE THAT IT DOES NOT ENCOURAGE PALESTINIAN MODERATION.

16. PRESIDENT MUBARAK SENT ANOTHER MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ON THAT POINT. ISRAEL WAS CONTACTED AS WELL IN THE HOPE THAT IT WOULD APPRECIATE THE DESIRABILITY OF ALLOWING THOSE MEMBERS, WHO NUMBER A HUNDRED AND SIXTY, TO ATTEND THE MEETING AND GO BACK TO RESUME THEIR RESIDENCE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY.

THE PRESIDENT WISHES THE PRIME MINISTER A HAPPY NEW YEAR."

ENDS

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HNNN



HL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 December 1983

Proposed Prime Ministerial message to the
Secretary-General

We spoke on the telephone about the timing of the proposed message from the Prime Minister to the Secretary-General about the Lebanon, in the light of the advice in UKMIS telegram No. 927.

This is just to confirm that the Prime Minister agrees that consideration of the message may be postponed until next week.

David Barclay

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

NR

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PS/MR WCE
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SIR J LEAHY
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RESIDENT CLERK



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Prime Minister
To See paras 4-6 overleaf.

Jack
29/12

GR 440

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 291000Z FCO

FM BEIRUT 290910Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 746 OF 29 DECEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK

INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, PARIS, ROME, WASHINGTON AND CBFC

INFO SAVING BRITFORLEB

MY TELNO 737: LEBANON

MS

1. AMAL AND LEFT-WING MUSLIM LEADERS HAVE PREDICTABLY CONDEMNED THE OPERATIONS DESCRIBED IN PARAS 2 AND 3 OF TUR. THEIR CRITICISMS HAVE SINCE BEEN WIDELY REPORTED IN THE LOCAL PRESS. THE FOREIGN AND INFORMATION MINISTERS CALLED A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 27 DECEMBER TO DENY THAT THE OPERATIONS WERE PART OF A GOVERNMENT PLAN TO 'INVADE' THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS. WAZZAN IS REPORTED TO BE SATISFIED, FOLLOWING A TALK WITH TANNOUS, THAT THE ARMY HAVE NO INTENTION OF ENTERING THE NO GO AREAS AND HAS REASSURED THE SHI'ITE RELIGIOUS LEADERS ACCORDINGLY.

RELIGIOUS LEADERS ACCORDINGLY.

2. MEANWHILE, BEHIND THE SCENES PREPARATIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE NEW SECURITY MEASURES - NOW CALLED THE "SECURITY PLAN" - AGREED IN DAMASCUS ON 16 DECEMBER (MY TELNO 732) CONTINUE. SINCE THEY MAINLY AFFECT AREAS OUTSIDE BEIRUT, PROGRESS/TOWARDS THEIR IMPLEMENTATION IS THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE EVEN IF THE STATE OF SECURITY IN THE CITY CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE. HOWEVER, AMAL'S ASSENT TO THEM (BY VIRTUE OF THEIR PRESENCE ON THE CEASEFIRE COMMITTEE) WILL BE NECESSARY AND THAT ASSENT MUST FOR THE TIME BEING BE IN DOUBT FOLLOWING AMAL'S RECENT CONFRONTATION WITH THE ARMY. MOREOVER, I NOTE FROM TODAY'S PRESS THAT JUMBLATT IS REPORTED FROM DAMASCUS AS HAVING DECLARED THAT RECONCILIATION WITH THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT WAS IMPOSSIBLE.

3. BEIRUT ITSELF REMAINS TENSE, ALTHOUGH THE CEASEFIRE GENERALLY IS HOLDING. LAST NIGHT'S SERIES OF BOMB ATTACKS AGAINST SHOPS (ONE WAS A SUPERMARKET KNOWN TO BE PATRONISED EXTENSIVELY BY FOREIGNERS) WILL BE KEEPING PEOPLE INDOORS.

4. MANY PEOPLE FEAR THAT THE ARMY WILL ATTEMPT TO ENTER THE NO GO AREAS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF WHICH WOULD BE UNPREDICTABLE, BUT PROBABLY DISASTROUS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE GOVERNMENT ARE PROBABLY RIGHT IN THEIR ASSESSMENT THAT IF THE GUNMEN IN THE NO GO AREAS ARE NOT CONTAINED WITHIN THEM, THEY COULD PROGRESSIVELY EXTEND THEIR AREA OF CONTROL TO EMBRACE MUCH OF WEST BEIRUT. I BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A DANGER THAT THE AMERICANS (WHO ARE UNDERSTANDABLY IMPATIENT AT CURRENT LACK OF PROGRESS) WILL PUSH THE GOVERNMENT INTO TOUGHER MEASURES AGAINST THE MILITANT SHI'A.

5. ALL MNF CONTINGENTS ARE TAKING SERIOUSLY THE THREAT FROM "ISLAMIC JIHAD" THAT IF THE FRENCH AND AMERICANS DO NOT WITHDRAW THEIR CONTINGENTS BY THE END OF THE YEAR, THEY CAN EXPECT SERIOUS TROUBLE. THE FRENCH AND THE ITALIANS CAN BE SEEN AROUND THE CITY DIGGING THEMSELVES IN BEHIND EVEN GREATER EARTHWORKS, AND THE AMERICANS ARE INVISIBLE OUTSIDE THEIR AIRPORT FORTRESS. BRITFORLEB ARE TAKING ALL NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS, AND SO ARE WE.

6. THERE WILL BE NO "FEUX DE JOIE" HERE TO USHER IN 1984.

PALMER

BT



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 December 1983

I have written to you separately giving the Prime Minister's response to the note on Lebanon enclosed with your letter of 23 December to John Coles.

One of the attachments to that note was UKMIS telegram 1717 of 22 December. The Prime Minister has noticed the reference to the Secretary General being engaged in secret negotiations on Cyprus. She would be grateful for further elucidation of this remark.

David Barclay

Peter Ricketts Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

*BT
on Cyprus
1/4 5/11 1/2*

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 December 1983

Role of UN Forces in Lebanon

The Prime Minister has seen a copy of UKMIS telegram 1723 of 23 December. In paragraph 2 of that telegram it is recorded that "the Secretary General sees no way (rightly) of getting round the Syrian/Soviet roadblock in terms of UN procedures or manoeuvres". The Prime Minister has commented on this passage: "Then we should bring it into the open".

DB

Peter Ricketts Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

NR

Prime Minister

GPS 200

CONFIDENTIAL

You wanted to write to the Secretary General before the New Year. In view of this advice, and the fact that Sir John Thomson is away from New York, FCO would prefer to delay until early next week.

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 290900Z
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 282017Z DEC 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TEL NO 1724 OF 28 DECEMBER 1983
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS ROME
INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW TEL AVIV CAIRO BEIRUT
THE HAGUE

YOUR TELNO 927: LEBANON

FOLLOWING FROM MARGETSON

Content? Yes

Dub
29/12

I HAVE DISCUSSED TUR WITH SIR J THOMSON WHO IS OUT OF NEW YORK FOR A FEW DAYS. HE WELCOMES THE IDEA OF A PRIME MINISTERIAL MESSAGE, BUT THINKS THAT ONE AT SUCH AN EARLY STAGE IN THE PROCESS WOULD PROBABLY BE PREMATURE. THE TACTICS TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE STRATEGY OUTLINED IN PARAS 3 TO 5 OF HIS TEL NO 1723 NEED TO BE CONSIDERED CAREFULLY. PERHAPS DISCUSSION WITH FRENCH AND ITALIANS WOULD BE A NECESSARY FIRST STAGE WITH WIDER CONSIDERATION AMONGST THE TEN SUBSEQUENTLY. THE QUESTION OF WHEN TO BRING IN THE AMERICANS WOULD BE IMPORTANT. SIR J THOMSON WILL CONSIDER ALL THIS FURTHER (INCLUDING WHEN TO ENGAGE THE SECRETARY GENERAL) AND FOLLOW UP WITH A TELEGRAM PROBABLY EARLY NEXT WEEK.

THOMSON

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GPS 1000

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FROM WASHINGTON 282255Z DEC 83.

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3882 OF 28 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AV.IV, PARIS, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK, ROUTINE AMMAN, JEDDA, CAIRO, THE HAGUE.

LEBANON

SUMMARY

1. RUMSFELD MADE LITTLE PROGRESS IN DAMASCUS THOUGH KHADDAM AGREED TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE. NO CHANGE LIKELY IN BROAD LINES OF US POLICY.

DETAIL

mt

2. PELLETREAU TOLD US TODAY THAT RUMSFELD HELD TWO MEETINGS EACH LASTING MORE THAN TWO HOURS, WITH KHADDAM DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO DAMASCUS. THE ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN CORDIAL AND THEY HAD HAD A USEFUL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. VERY LITTLE PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE, BUT RUMSFELD HAD LAID A SOUND FOUNDATION FOR FURTHER TALKS. KHADDAM HAD AGREED TO KEEP THE DIALOGUE GOING, IMPLICITLY RECOGNISING THAT IT WAS ONLY THE AMERICANS WHO TALKED TO THE ISRAELIS. HE HAD ADMITTED, INCIDENTALLY, THAT ASAD HAD SUFFERED A HEART ATTACK BUT HAD BRUSHED ASIDE RUMSFELD'S OFFER OF MEDICAL HELP.

3. KHADDAM HAD INSISTED THAT SOMETHING MUST BE DONE ABOUT THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT. RUMSFELD HAD REFUSED TO BE DRAWN INTO DETAILED DEBATE ON ITS PROVISIONS AND HAD TRIED TO FOCUS DISCUSSION ON MECHANISMS FOR WITHDRAWAL. KHADDAM HAD BEEN NON-COMMITTAL BUT HAD SHOWN SOME INTEREST IN 'DISENGAGEMENT'. PELLETREAU REPEATED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT AGREE TO THE ABROGATION OF THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT, OR, EXPLICITLY, TO LAYING IT ON THE SHELF. BUT THE MECHANISMS FOR WITHDRAWAL FORMULA COULD CERTAINLY INCLUDE THE SECURITY PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. HE DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ISRAELIS COULD BE BROUGHT TO AGREE TO SOME MODIFICATION OF THEM AS PART OF A PACKAGE UNDER WHICH THE SYRIANS ALSO WITHDREW, BUT THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT THEY WOULD MAKE ANY SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS. SHAMIR MEANWHILE WAS STICKING TO THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT. RUMSFELD HAD LEFT WITH KHADDAM A LIST OF QUESTIONS ON WITHDRAWAL DESIGNED TO ESTABLISHED WHAT SYRIAN OBJECTIVES WERE. IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHETHER ANSWERS WOULD BE FORTHCOMING AT THEIR NEXT MEETING.

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4. KHADDAM HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF TRYING TO MAINTAIN THE CEASEFIRE IN LEBANON, AND THAT THE SYRIANS WISHED TO BE HELPFUL OVER THIS. ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION HE HAD WELCOMED THE GENEVA TALKS, BUT MAINTAINED THAT GEMAYEL HAD NOT CARRIED OUT HIS ''INSTRUCTIONS''. RUMSFELD HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND BROADENING THE BASE OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT,

5. PELLETTREAU SAID THAT RUMSFELD HAD PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT THE AGREEMENT TO LIFT THE SEIGE OF DEIR EL QAMAR - BY PERSUADING GEMAYEL TO DROP SOME OF HIS DEMANDS, BY GETTING JUMBLATT (IN AMMAN OUTSIDE THE SYRIANS' CLUCHES) TO ISSUE CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS FOLLOWERS AND BY BRINGING ABOUT A LEBANESE/ISRAELI MEETING TO DISCUSS THE ISRAELI ROLE. HE HAD ALSO TRIED TO INJECT MORE LIFE INTO THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROCESS. IN SEPARATE TALKS WITH PIERRE GEMAYEL AND CHAMOUN HE HAD DISCOURAGED THEIR IDEA OF A PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT AND SAID THAT REPRESENTATIVE SHIA AND DRUZE LEADERS HAD TO BE INCLUDED. HE HAD ALSO CALLED ON NABIH BERRI WHOSE PRINCIPAL CONCERN APPEARED TO BE ISRAELI RECRUITMENT OF SHIAS INTO LOCAL MILITIAS IN THE SOUTH. RUMSFELD HAD ARGUED THAT A MORE VIGOROUS ASSERTION OF LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN THE SOUTH, WITH SHIA SUPPORT, COULD HELP TO DIMINISH THE INFLUENCE OF THE ISRAELIS. BERRI HAD BEEN RECEPTIVE.

6. AS TO THE NEXT STEPS PELLETTREAU SAID THAT RUMSFELD HAD NOT YET DECIDED HIS COURSE OF ACTION BUT WOULD PROBABLY RETURN TO THE MIDDLE EAST EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR. HE DID NOT EXPECT ANY MAJOR CHANGES IN THE BROAD LINES OF US POLICY. THE MARINES' SECURITY PRECAUTIONS HAD BEEN GREATLY IMPROVED AND PELLETTREAU DID NOT EXPECT THEM TO BE REDEPLOYED UNLESS THEY WERE GIVEN SOME SPECIFIC NEW TASK. THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF US POLICY WOULD THEREFORE CONTINUE TO BE TO ENCOURAGE POLITICAL RECONCILIATION AND THE FORMATION OF A MORE BROADLY-BASED GOVERNMENT: TO PROMOTE LEBANESE/ISRAELI CONTACTS WITH A VIEW TO EXTENDING LEBANESE CIVILIAN AUTHORITY TO THE SOUTH: TO ENCOURAGE EFFORTS TO BUILD ON THE DEIR EL QAMAR AGREEMENT, INITIALLY TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF LF PERSONNEL FROM THE KHARROUB: TO CONTINUE TO BUILD UP THE LAF: AND TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS. THE US HAD FIRMLY DISCOURAGED IDEAS OF THE LAF ADVANCING UNDER MNF COVER: THE LAF WAS NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO IMPOSE ITSELF ON THE CHOUF WITHOUT A PRIOR POLITICAL AGREEMENT. PELLETTREAU EMPHASISED THAT THE US WOULD CONTINUE TO TALK TO THE SYRIANS: THE POLITICAL ROUTE OFFERED THE ONLY FEASIBLE OPTION. BUT IT WAS HELPFUL TO MAINTAIN THE ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY AND, IF POSSIBLE, TO TIGHTEN THE PRESSURE ON DAMASCUS, THOUGH HE PERSONALLY HAD NO GREAT HOPES THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD PLAY THEIR PART IN THIS.

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7. WE ASKED ABOUT A POSSIBLE ROLE FOR UN FORCES OR OBSERVERS PELLETREAU SAID THAT THE US HAD NO OBJECTION TO SOUNDINGS BEING TAKEN WITH THE SYRIANS OR RUSSIANS, BUT DID NOT WANT TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THEM, LEST THIS BE TAKEN AS A SIGN OF EAGERNESS TO WITHDRAW THE MARINES. THEY WERE UNLIKELY TO BE PRODUCTIVE AT PRESENT, NOT LEAST BECAUSE NOBODY HAD YET DEFINED A PRECISE TASK FOR THE UN. UNIFIL CONTRIBUTORS DID NOT SEEM INTERESTED IN TAKING ON A WIDER ROLE IN LEBANON. BUT THE AMERICANS HAD SUGGESTED TO THE DUTCH THAT, AS AN INITIAL STEP, THEY EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF DEPLOYING A UN PEACE KEEPING FORCE OR OBSERVERS TO TRIPOLI, PRIMARILY TO PROTECT THE REMAINING PALESTINIANS THERE.

WRIGHT

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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3
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Prime Minister

RESTRICTED

GR 500

RESTRICTED

FM WASHINGTON 282252Z

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3881 OF 28 DECEMBER 1983

INFO BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, ROME.

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Dus
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mt

LEBANON: BEIRUT BOMBINGS

1. PRESIDENT REAGAN ISSUED A STATEMENT ON 27 DECEMBER (TEXT BY BAG) ON THE REPORT OF THE LONG COMMISSION'S INVESTIGATION OF THE 23 OCTOBER ATTACK ON THE MARINES' HEADQUARTERS IN BEIRUT.

2. THE PRESIDENT AGREED WITH THE REPORT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE US AND ITS MILITARY INSTITUTIONS WERE BY TRADITION AND TRAINING INADEQUATELY EQUIPPED TO DEAL WITH THE FUNDAMENTALLY NEW PHENOMENON OF STATE-SUPPORTED TERRORISM. QUOTE THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM WILL NOT DISAPPEAR IF WE RUN FROM IT. UNQUOTE. CIVILIZED COUNTRIES SHOULD BEGIN A NEW EFFORT TO WORK TOGETHER TO SHARE INTELLIGENCE, TO IMPROVE TRAINING, SECURITY AND THEIR FORCES TO DENY A HAVEN OR LEGAL PROTECTION FOR TERRORIST GROUPS AND, MOST IMPORTANT, TO HOLD ACCOUNTABLE THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH SPONSORED TERRORISM AROUND THE WORLD. THE US WOULD BE IN THE FOREFRONT OF THIS EFFORT.

3. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT ACTION WAS BEING TAKEN URGENTLY TO ENSURE THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE SECURITY OF US FORCES IN LEBANON. THE MARINES' MISSION WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, BUT HE BELIEVED THAT WE WERE ON THE VERGE OF PROGRESS TOWARDS NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES. HE HAD CONSIDERED THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS ABOUT THE ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES. BUT THE COMMANDERS ON THE GROUND SHOULD NOT BE PUNISHED FOR NOT FULLY COMPREHENDING THE NATURE OF TODAY'S TERRORIST THREAT. IF THERE WERE TO BE BLAME, IT PROPERLY RESTED WITH THE PRESIDENT QUOTE I ACCEPT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BAD AS WELL AS THE GOOD UNQUOTE.

COMMENT

4. THE DECISION HIMSELF TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY IS VERY MUCH IN THE REAGAN STYLE. ONE OF HIS ACHIEVEMENTS AS PRESIDENT HAS BEEN TO DO MUCH TO IMPROVE THE MORALE OF THE US ARMED FORCES AND THEIR STANDING WITH THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. IT IS ALSO A SHREW POLITICAL MOVE. NO-ONE IS GOING TO HOLD THE PRESIDENT RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT CLEARLY WERE ERRORS OF OMISSION ON THE GROUND. BUT THE PRESIDENT HAS INHIBITED THE SEARCH FOR SCAPEGOATS AMONG THE MILITARY. ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES RECOMMENDED BY THE LONG COMMISSION HAVE ALREADY BEEN TAKEN.

RESTRICTED

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5. THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT WAS ALSO DESIGNED TO DEAL WITH CRITICISM FROM CONGRESS, WHERE A HOUSE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE CONCLUDED LAST WEEK THAT THERE HAD BEEN SERIOUS ERRORS OF JUDGEMENT BY OFFICERS ON THE GROUND AND UP THROUGH THE ENTIRE CHAIN OF COMMAND. PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN ABOUT THE MARINES ROLE IN THE LEBANON, HOWEVER, IS INCREASING AND WILL BECOME MORE SHARPLY FOCUSED IF THERE IS NO PROGRESS BY THE TIME CONGRESS REASSEMBLES IN LATE JANUARY.

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DESKBY FCO 290900Z

FROM TEL AVIV 281405Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 351 OF 28 DECEMBER 1983

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, DAMASCUS
AND BEIRUT.

INFO SAVING CAIRO, MOSCOW AND THE HAGUE.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 927 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: LEBANON: UN FORCES

1. THE IDEA OF UN COVER FOR ISRAELI AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM
LEBANON HAS CERTAIN OBVIOUS ATTRACTIONS FOR OURSELVES AND OTHERS.
BUT THE ISRAELIS ARE LESS LIKELY TO SEE UN INVOLVEMENT ON THE GROUND
IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AS A CONVENIENT WAY OUT.

2. I AM CLEAR IN MY OWN MIND THAT THE ISRAELIS MEAN IT WHEN THEY
SAY THEY WANT TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON. THEY WOULD HAVE NO DIFF-
CULTY WITH THE IDEA (PARAGRAPH 3 OF UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1723)
OF SYRIAN AND ISRAELI MUTUAL AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS,
PROBABLY IN STAGES. IT IS BASICALLY WHAT THEY HAVE BEEN ASKING FOR.

3. THE OFFICIAL LINE HERE IS STILL THAT ISRAELI AND SYRIAN
WITHDRAWAL MUST BE SIMULTANEOUS, AS ENVISAGED IN ONE OF THE CON-
FIDENTIAL SIDE LETTERS TO THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT. BUT THE
ISRAELIS ARE NOW CONVEYING THE IMPRESSION BY NODS AND WINKS THAT
SIMULTANEOUS SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL IS NO LONGER A SINE QUA NON, AND
THEY SEEM TO BE WORKING TOWARDS A FURTHER PARTIAL UNILATERAL
WITHDRAWAL IN THE SPRING (PERHAPS TO THE ZAHRANI), ON THE
ASSUMPTION THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY WILL BE IN A POSITION BY THEN TO
FILL THE RESULTING VACUUM.

4. THIS RAISES A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS:

- A) WHY SHOULD THE SYRIANS AGREE TO A UN PACKAGE OF MUTUAL
WITHDRAWALS IF THEY JUDGE THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE ON THE RETREAT
IN LEBANON ANYWAY AND ARE MEANWHILE TAKING CASUALTIES WHICH
DAMAGE IDF MORALE?
- B) FAILING SYRIAN AGREEMENT, WILL THE ISRAELIS EVENTUALLY WITHDRAW
UNILATERALLY TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER?
- C) IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT THERE BE A ROLE FOR AN UNDOF
TYPE FORCE IN SOUTH LEBANON (PARA 3 OF UKMIS TUR)?

CONFIDENTIAL

/5.

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5. HM AMBASSADOR DAMASCUS IS BETTER PLACED THAN I AM TO ANSWER THE FIRST QUESTION. AS REGARDS TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, MY GUESS IS THAT THE IDF WILL EVENTUALLY PULL OUT COMPLETELY WHETHER OR NOT THE SYRIANS GO TOO, PROVIDED (AND THIS IS A PREREQUISITE) THEY ARE SATISFIED AS TO THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS THEY LEAVE BEHIND THEM IN SOUTHERN LEBANON.

6. I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT (NOT) REGARD AN UNDOF TYPE FORCE ON THE LEBANESE SIDE OF THE BORDER AS ASSURING THE SECURITY OF THE TOWNS AND SETTLEMENTS OF NORTHERN ISRAEL. SOUTHERN LEBANON IS NOT THE GOLAN. SYRIA DOES NOT CONTROL THE AREA. THE TOPOGRAPHY IS VERY DIFFERENT (THE GOLAN IS FOR THE MOST PART A TREELESS PLAIN AND THE ISRAELIS CAN SEE MOST OF THE WAY FROM HIT TO DAMASCUS). MOREOVER, WHEREAS THE ISRAELI-OCCUPIED GOLAN IS VIRTUALLY UNINHABITED, SOUTH LEBANON IS HEAVILY POPULATED AND, FROM ALL REPORTS, ARMED TO THE TEETH.

7. THE ISRAELIS NEVER ALLOWED UNIFIL TO DEPLOY TO THE ISRAEL/LEBANON BORDER, PREFERRING TO RELY ON MAJOR HADDAD AND HIS MILITIA. I AM SURE THEIR STRONG PREFERENCE IS STILL TO DEPEND ON LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS (EG THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE ENVISAGED IN THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT). QUITE APART FROM THEIR ROOTED DISTRUST OF THE UN, THEY WILL TAKE SOME MOVING OFF THEIR BELIEF THAT LOCAL FORCES ARE FAR BETTER PLACED AND MOTIVATED THAN OUTSIDERS TO DETECT AND PREVENT INFILTRATION INTO SOUTH LEBANON. OF COURSE IT MAY HAPPEN THAT, LIKE SO MUCH ELSE, ISRAELI HOPES IN THIS RESPECT EVENTUALLY CRUMBLE AWAY, IN WHICH CASE AN UNDOF TYPE ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE BETTER THAN NOTHING. BUT NOT YET.

8. THE SAME OBJECTIONS DO NOT APPLY TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF UN FORCES ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON. FOR EXAMPLE THE ISRAELIS SUPPORT THE IDEA OF UN OBSERVERS IN THE CHOUF, AND THEY MIGHT COME ROUND TO ACCEPTING AN UNDOF TYPE FORCE IN THE BEKAA OR ALONG, SAY, THE ZAHRANI RIVER, TO PROVIDE AN EXTRA LAYER OF PROTECTION AGAINST PLO INFILTRATION. BUT I CANNOT MYSELF SEE WHY THE SYRIANS OR RUSSIANS SHOULD ACCOMMODATE THE ISRAELIS IN THIS WAY, AND SUCH A FORCE WOULD ALSO HAVE THE DISADVANTAGE OF APPEARING TO PARTITION LEBANON.

9. THE ISRAELIS HAVE HAD TO LOWER THEIR SIGHTS IN LEBANON CONSIDERABLY OVER THE PAST YEAR. FROM WHAT WE HEAR, THE IDF WANT TO GET OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, ALTHOUGH THE LIKUD GOVERNMENT ARE STILL LOOKING FOR A FIG LEAF TO JUSTIFY THE HEAVY TOLL OF THE WAR. SYRIAN AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON WOULD THEREFORE HAVE STRONG ATTRACTIONS FOR THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. BUT I JUDGE THAT AT LEAST AT PRESENT THE PRICE THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO PAY WOULD NOT INCLUDE SUBSTITUTION OF A UN FORCE FOR THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS SET OUT IN THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT AS REGARDS THE VITAL AREA NEAR THEIR BORDER.

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10. TO SUM UP, ISRAELI/SYRIAN AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON WOULD BE WELCOME HERE WITH OR WITHOUT A UN LABEL. BUT NO DOUBT IF AT PRESENT THE ISRAELIS WOULD ACCEPT AN UNDOF PRESENCE ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THEIR BORDER WITH LEBANON AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO INDIGENOUS FORCES. ANY PLAN MIGHT STAND MORE CHANCE WITH THE ISRAELIS IF UN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT WERE DIRECTED PRIMARILY TO CENTRAL AND EASTERN LEBANON, WHILE LEBANESE ARMY AND LOCAL FORCES WERE SEEN AS RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY IN THE AREAS NEAREST TO THE ISRAELI BORDER.

11. FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

MOBERLY

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
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From the Private Secretary

28 December 1983

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 23 December to John Coles about Lebanon.

The Prime Minister has noted that the Americans are not opposed in principle to an extended role for UNIFIL. Whilst noting also that the current Soviet position appears negative, she considers that it would be far too early to give up the attempt to persuade the Russians to agree. She therefore supports the conclusion of your covering letter.

As regards the attitude of President Gemayel, the Prime Minister has commented that although he may well prefer to rely on the MNF in its present form, he would probably not hold to this position if pressed with sufficient firmness. The Prime Minister has also suggested that there may be some inconsistency between the argument attributed to the Russians and Syrians in paragraph 6 of your note (that the problems of Lebanon are an internal matter and not appropriate for the UN) and their attitudes towards the UN presence in Cyprus.

The Prime Minister has indicated that she sees merit in the idea in paragraph 3 of Washington telegram 3852 that the Israelis might be persuaded to make a further partial withdrawal, if necessary unilaterally.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

MR. D. BARCLAY

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

6

SECRET

Note PM's comments
on FCO 552
relayed by phone.



Emv
29/12

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Prime Minister

LEBANON

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I understood that the Foreign Secretary discussed with you at Chequers the possibility that we might be asked to allow a "Violations Subcommittee" to meet inside Britforlab's HQ.

Subsequent developments are set out in the attached telegrams:

FCO 552 seeks clarification on various points, which presumably reflect your discussion with the FCS

PTO

Beirut 742 contains responses
from the Post.

No final request has yet
been received from the
Lebanese government (see para
4 of Beirut telegram).

Further developments are not
expected before tomorrow.

JMS

28/12

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FM BEIRUT 281010Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 742 OF 28 DECEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME

SAVING BRITFORLES

YOUR TELNO 552; LEBANON - CEASEFIRE COMMITTEE

1. THE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 3 ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THE CEASEFIRE COMMITTEE FORESAW THE NEED SOME WEEKS AGO FOR A VIOLATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A PERMANENT MECHANISM BY WHICH INCIDENTS AND VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE COULD BE RESPONDED TO ON THE SPOT. HENCE THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE SUB-COMMITTEE SHOULD FUNCTION ROUND THE CLOCK. THIS PROMPTED THE LEBANESE REQUEST TO US AND THE ITALIANS IN OCTOBER/NOVEMBER TO SHARE THE TASK OF GUARDING THE TRAD BANK 24 HOURS A DAY. THE NEED FOR A VIOLATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE ON THIS BASIS HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED FOLLOWING THE RE-DEFINITION OF THE ROLE OF THE MAIN CEASEFIRE COMMITTEE AT THE DAMASCUS MEETING ON 16 DECEMBER (PARA 2 OF MY TELNO SIC 19E OF 24 DECEMBER).

(B) AT PRESENT, WHEN INCIDENTS OCCUR OUT OF MEETING HOURS, THE MEMBERS OF THE CEASEFIRE COMMITTEE TRY TO COPE WITH THEM BY TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION WITHOUT ANY CENTRAL FOCAL POINT. THE VIOLATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE IN A FIXED LOCATION IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE THIS.

(C) THE CEASEFIRE COMMITTEE'S FIRST CHOICE FOR LOCATING THE VIOLATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE REMAINS THE TRAD BANK. HOWEVER, SINCE WE AND THE ITALIANS ARE NOT ABLE (OR WILLING) TO PROVIDE GUARDING AT THE BUILDING TO ENABLE THE SUB-COMMITTEE TO FUNCTION THERE ROUND THE CLOCK, SITING IT AT AL HADATH SEEMS TO THE COMMITTEE THE NEXT BEST OPTION. OTHER LOCATIONS, EG THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE, THE AIRPORT AND THE OLD MINISTRY OF HEALTH BUILDING NEAR THE MUSEUM (WHERE THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR GENEVA MET IN OCTOBER) HAVE BEEN REJECTED AS UNACCEPTABLE BY ONE OR OTHER OF THE PARTIES. IN

BEEN REJECTED AS UNACCEPTABLE BY ONE OR OTHER OF THE PARTIES. IN ANY CASE 24 HOUR GUARDING BY THE MNF WOULD STILL BE REQUIRED.

(D) SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS HAVE NOT (NOT) YET BEEN FULLY WORKED OUT. COMMANDER BRITFORLEB ENVISAGES ALLOCATING A PART OF HIS BASE (SEE (E) BELOW) EQUIPPED WITH COMMUNICATIONS, WASHING AND COOKING FACILITIES TO ENABLE THE MEMBERS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE (EIGHT - TWO PER FACTION) TO OPERATE 24 HOUR SHIFTS. BRITFORLEB WOULD ROTATE THESE SHIFTS DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS BY ESCORTING EACH GROUP OF 8 TO AND FROM THE TRAD BANK. (THEY WOULD THEREFORE HAVE REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL FOUR FACTIONS ON BOARD AT ANY ONE TIME AS HOSTAGES FOR THEIR SECURITY.) THE SUB-COMMITTEE ARE NOT EXPECTED TO RECEIVE VISITORS (OTHER THAN PERHAPS CEASEFIRE COMMITTEE MEMBERS). THEY EXPECT TO DO THEIR WORK BY TELEPHONE/RADIO. THE REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE PARKING FACILITIES SHOULD NOT THEREFORE ARISE AND "UNEXPECTED VEHICLES" WOULD BE DEALT WITH IN THE SAME WAY AS ANY OTHER "UNEXPECTED VEHICLES".

(E) FERGUSON PROPOSES TO ALLOCATE TO THE SUB-COMMITTEE AN UNOCCUPIED ROOM ON THE FOURTH FLOOR OF HIS BASE IN THE WING USED BY HIS LEBANESE LIAISON OFFICERS. THE SUB-COMMITTEE WILL THUS NOT BE TAKING UP SPACE WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE BE USED BY BRITFORLEB FOR RECREATIONAL PURPOSES.

2. FERGUSON HAS ALREADY PUT THE SUGGESTIONS IN (D) AND (E) ABOVE INFORMALLY TO THE CEASEFIRE COMMITTEE, WHO HAVE BROADLY ACCEPTED THEM. HE HAS ALSO DISCUSSED IN GENERAL TERMS THE PROPOSAL WITH HIS SUCCESSOR, BUT WILL BRIEF HIM MORE FULLY ON ARRIVAL.

3. IF THIS PROPOSAL PRESENTS YOU WITH TOO MANY DIFFICULTIES, AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY WOULD BE TO PERSUADE THE ITALIANS TO BE MORE COOPERATIVE OVER GUARDING THE TRAD BANK ON A 24 HOUR BASIS. THE LEBANESE UNDERSTAND THAT BRITFORLEB ARE NOT EQUIPPED FOR NIGHT GUARDING DUTIES. THE ITALIANS APPEAR NOT TO. BOTH THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR AND FORCE COMMANDER TELL US THAT THE ISSUE IS CURRENTLY VERY DIFFICULT FOR THEIR GOVERNMENT. IF YOU DECIDE TO PURSUE THIS COURSE, I RECOMMEND THAT ACTION WITH THE ITALIANS BE TAKEN IN ROME OR LONDON RATHER THAN HERE.

4. ON TIMING, THE LEBANESE ARE NOT READY TO PUT A PROPOSAL TO US BECAUSE THE PSP HAVE NOT YET ASSENTED TO IT. I SUSPECT THAT THE EVENTS OF 24-26 DECEMBER WILL HAVE MADE AGREEMENT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THEM. IF THEY TURN IT DOWN, AMAL ARE LIKELY TO FOLLOW SUIT. NONETHELESS, I CONSIDER THAT IT WOULD STILL BE RIGHT TO HAVE AN ANSWER READY IN THE EVENT THAT THE LEBANESE DO PUT A FORMAL REQUEST TO US.

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Prime Minister

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FROM CAIRO 281000Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 567 OF 28 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, BEIRUT, JEDDA, DAMASCUS, SAMA'A , TEL AVIV,
WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, MOSCOW.

*DMS
28/12*

MY TELNO 563: MEETING BETWEEN ARAFAT AND MUBARAK

SUMMARY.

1. BOUTROS-GHALI CALLED IN MYSELF AND THE US, FRENCH AND ITALIAN
AMBASSADORS IN THAT ORDER ON CHRISTMAS EVE TO BRIEF US ON THE
ARAFAT MEETING. ALTHOUGH HE SAID HE HAD SPENT FIVE HOURS TETE-
A-TETE WITH ARAFAT THE PREVIOUS DAY HELICOPTERING TO AND FROM
THE SUEZ CANAL AND SO ON, BOUTROS'S BRIEFING WAS UNCHARACTERIST-
ICALLY THIN ON SUBSTANCE. I JUDGE THAT THE EXCHANGES WITH ARAFAT
MAY HAVE BEEN EQUALLY NEBULOUS. THE MAIN THRUST OF BOUTROS'S
MESSAGE SEEMED TO BE AN APPEAL TO THE WEST TO HELP EGYPT MAKE THE
MOST OF THE VISIT.

DETAIL.

2. BOUTROS SAID ARAFAT HAD MADE ONE PARTICULAR REQUEST,
IN CONNECTION WITH THE MEETING OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL
WHICH WAS TO TAKE PLACE IN TWO MONTHS TIME. IT WAS THAT EGYPT AND
HER FRIENDS SHOULD USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS
TO ALLOW THE 160 ODD MEMBERS OF THE PNC FROM THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES TO ATTEND. THE ISRAELIS HAD ALWAYS REFUSED IN THE
PAST AND BOUTROS-GHALI SAW NO CHANCE OF THEIR RELENTING ON THIS
OCCASION, BUT BELIEVED IT WAS STILL WORTH A TRY IF ONLY TO OBLIGE
ARAFAT. OTHERWISE ARAFAT HAD TAKEN THE LINE THAT HE NEEDED TIME
TO PREPARE HIS POSITION BEFORE HE COULD CONTEMPLATE RE-ENTERING
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, AND HE ASKED THE EGYPTIANS NOT TO PRESS HIM.

ARAFAT. OTHERWISE ARAFAT HAD TAKEN THE LINE THAT HE NEEDED TIME TO PREPARE HIS POSITION BEFORE HE COULD CONTEMPLATE RE-ENTERING PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, AND HE ASKED THE EGYPTIANS NOT TO PRESS HIM.

3. BOUTROS-GHALI WENT ON TO OUTLINE THE MESSAGE THAT KEMAL HASSAN ALI HAD TAKEN TO WASHINGTON EARLIER IN THE WEEK. HE HAD EXPLAINED THAT EGYPT WAS STRIVING TO FIND SOME COMPROMISE, AS HE PUT IT, BETWEEN THE REAGAN INITIATIVE, THE FEZ PLAN AND THE FRANCO/EGYPTIAN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, ABOVE ALL ON THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF PALESTINIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT. IF A NEW FORMULA COULD BE FOUND WHICH WOULD SAVE ARAFAT'S FACE IT SHOULD THEN BE POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO PICK UP THE THREADS WHERE HE LEFT OFF WITH KING HUSSEIN. ARAFAT'S MEETING WITH MUBARAK, WHICH HAD NOT BEEN FORESEEN WHEN KEMAL HASSAN ALI LEFT FOR WASHINGTON, ONLY LENT ADDED POINT TO THE EGYPTIAN ARGUMENT. EGYPT DID NOT OF COURSE EXPECT EARLY RESULTS, AND INDEED THE GOVERNMENT WERE STILL DEBATING THE NEXT MOVES.

4. I SUGGESTED THAT THIS SEEMED AN OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO IN VIEW OF THE HOSTILE REACTIONS THE ARAFAT VISIT HAD EVOKED EVEN FROM HIS PLO COLLEAGUES, BUT BOUTROS-GHALI DID NOT AGREE. ARAFAT HAD BEEN FULL OF CONFIDENCE AND RECKONED HE COULD HANDLE ANY DISSENT AMONG HIS OWN SUPPORTERS. AS FOR THE US, KEMAL HASSAN ALI HAD NOT RECEIVED AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO MUBARAK'S MESSAGE, BUT THE EGYPTIANS WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE ADMINISTRATION'S SUBSEQUENT WELCOME FOR THE MEETING WITH ARAFAT. THEY DOUBTED WHETHER KING HUSSEIN WOULD BE ABLE TO MOVE WITHOUT A GREEN LIGHT FROM THE SAUDIS AND THIS SEEMED NO NEARER THAN EVER. I ASKED ABOUT KING HUSSEIN'S RECENT CONVERSION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE APPROACH. BOUTROS DID NOT SEE HOW THIS IDEA COULD USEFULLY BE INTRODUCED INTO THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE PEACE PROCESS, BUT INDICATED THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD NOT COMPARED NOTES WITH KING HUSSEIN SINCE HE LEFT AMMAN. I ALSO ASKED WHETHER EGYPT WAS UP TO ANYTHING WITH THE FRENCH, WITH A VIEW TO THEIR EC PRESIDENCY AND EGYPTIAN MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BOUTROS SAID THEY HAD NO SPECIFIC PLANS, BUT THAT MRS JEANNE KIRKPATRICK IN DISCUSSION WITH KEMAL HASSAN ALI IN NEW YORK HAD SEEMED TO FAVOUR SOME KIND OF ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ACCOMPANY WHATEVER DIPLOMATIC PROCESS WAS TAKING PLACE ELSEWHERE, EG WITH ARAFAT.

5. BOUTROS-GHALI REPEATED THAT THE EGYPTIANS' IMMEDIATE CONCERN WAS THAT THE ARAFAT VISIT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO FADE AWAY AS A NINE-DAYS WONDER. HE HOPED THAT ALL THOSE GENUINELY INTERESTED IN A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WOULD HELP EGYPT IN HER EFFORTS TO TURN IT TO POSITIVE ACCOUNT. THE PRESS HAD SINCE PUBLICISED CABINET MEETINGS CHAIRED BY MUBARAK TO DISCUSS THE RELAUNCHING OF THE SEARCH FOR PEACE, DETAILS TO BE REVEALED LATER. I SHALL SEE WHETHER I CAN GET ANYTHING MORE SPECIFIC OUT OF OSAMA AL BAZ, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT THE EGYPTIANS ARE STILL CASTING ABOUT FOR IDEAS AND WOULD WELCOME ANY FROM OTHERS.

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TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT
TELEGRAM NUMBER 552 OF 27 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME
INFO MODUK

YOUR TELNO SIC19E TO RESIDENT CLERK (NOW BEING REPEATED FOR COPY ADDRESSEES): LEBANON CEASE-FIRE COMMITTEE

1. WE ARE NATURALLY KEEN TO BE HELPFUL OVER ANY REQUEST WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE AND HENCE CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE-MAKING IN LEBANON. WE MUST, HOWEVER, IN THE PRESENT DANGEROUS SITUATION TAKE ALL POSSIBLE PRECAUTIONS TO ENSURE THAT ANY NEW DEPARTURES DO NOT CONTRADICT OUR OVERALL POLITICAL AND MILITARY STANCE AND THOSE OF OUR MNF PARTNERS. DECISIONS ON MATTERS OF THIS KIND HAVE TO BE TAKEN AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL.

2. A GOOD DEAL MUST ALSO CLEARLY DEPEND ON THE FORM AND SOURCE OF THE FORMAL REQUEST WHICH YOU WILL ULTIMATELY RECEIVE AND THE POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AT THE TIME.

3. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, WE SHOULD WELCOME CLARIFICATION OF THE FOLLOWING POINTS.

(A) WHY IS IT CONSIDERED NECESSARY FOR THE NEW SUB-COMMITTEE TO MEET ON A 24-HOUR BASIS? A 24-HOUR SYSTEM COULD BE LESS EFFECTIVE BY REMOVING NATURAL DEADLINES AND THUS REDUCING TIME PRESSURES FOR AGREEMENT. MORE MEETING TIME MIGHT DELIVER LESS AND NOT (NOT) MORE AGREEMENT.

(B) DEPENDING ON THE ANSWERS TO (A), WHY SHOULD THE SUB-COMMITTEE NOT MEET AT THE TRAD BANK OR SOME OTHER VENUE THAN INSIDE BRITFORLEB'S HQ? WHAT ALTERNATIVES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED?

(C) HAVE THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BEEN FULLY WORKED OUT, NOTABLY THE REQUIREMENT FOR CONTROL AND PARKING AT A

To deal with
immediately with
a branch

Because we can't
depend on Trad on
we have our own
The President
mentioned this
where we have

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SAFE DISTANCE OF VEHICLES ARRIVING AND DEPARTING THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT? UNEXPECTED VEHICLES AND VISITORS WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE CATERED FOR. ALL THIS WOULD SEEM TO REQUIRE A SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE OF EFFORT: COMMANDER BRITFORLEB HAS PRESUMABLY ALSO PUT HIS SUCCESSOR IN THE PICTURE.

(D) WOULD THE CONSTANT PRESENCE OF SUB-COMMITTEE MEMBERS IN PRACTICE MAKE BRITFORLEB HQ NOT USUABLE FOR OFF-DUTY PURPOSES AND THUS ENTAIL REGULAR COMMUTING OF BRITFORLEB PERSONNEL BY LANDING CRAFT OR HELICOPTER TO HMS FEARLESS?

4. GRATEFUL FOR ANSWERS ON THESE POINTS DESKBY 290900Z, TOGETHER WITH ANY FURTHER NEWS OF WHEN THE FORMAL REQUEST CAN BE EXPECTED. IF ONE IS RECEIVED MEANWHILE, YOU SHOULD DRAW ON THE POINTS IN PARA 1 ABOVE AND REPORT.

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FM BEIRUT 271635Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 738 OF 27 DECEMBER 1983

INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, PARIS, ROME, WASHINGTON, MODUK

Prime Minister

To confirm.

*2ms
28/12*

LEBANON: MNF

1. AS COMMANDER BRITFORLEB HAS REPORTED ON HIS CHANNELS, TWO SOLDIERS FROM OUR MNF CONTINGENT WERE SLIGHTLY INJURED THIS MORNING (27 DECEMBER) WHEN A BRITFORLEB PATROL WAS THE SUBJECT OF A BOMB ATTACK.

2. THE INCIDENT TOOK PLACE IN AN AREA OF SEMI-DERELICT BUILDINGS TO THE EAST OF THE ST GEORGES AND PHOENICIA HOTELS ON A ROUTE USED REGULARLY BY ALL FOUR MNF CONTINGENTS. A DEVICE PLACED IN A BUILDING (OR A PARKED CAR) DETONATED (ALMOST CERTAINLY BY REMOTE CONTROL) AS THE REAR VEHICLE OF A THREE-CAR PATROL PASSED BY IT. THE TWO SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN TREATED AT THE US MARINE BASE AND ARE NOW SAFELY BACK AT AL HADATH. THEY WERE LUCKY TO GET AWAY SO LIGHTLY.

3. THE FORCE COMMANDER AND I CONSIDER THAT THIS ATTACK WAS AIMED AT THE MNF IN GENERAL AND NOT NECESSARILY AGAINST THE BRITISH CONTINGENT IN PARTICULAR. IT TOOK PLACE IN AN AREA WHERE SUPPORTERS OF AMAL AND KURDS PREDOMINATE.

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Prime Minister

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FM BEIRUT 271615Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 737 OF 27 DECEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, PARIS, ROME, WASHINGTON, MODUK

PRIORITY CBFC

SAVING BRITFORLEB

LEBANON

1. THE PRESIDENT, FLANKED BY THE PRIME MINISTER, CHAIRED THE MNF COORDINATION MEETING ON 27 DECEMBER. WE WERE GIVEN AN ACCOUNT OF THE FIGHTING IN BEIRUT OVER THE LAST THREE DAYS, DETAILS OF WHICH BRITFORLEB HAVE BEEN REPORTING ON THEIR CHANNELS TO MOD.

2. FIGHTING STARTED ON THE NIGHT OF 23/4 DECEMBER WHEN AMAL CHALLENGED THE OCCUPATION BY THE LEBANESE ARMY OF THREE POSITIONS ON THE NORTH-WESTERN EDGE OF THE 'NO GO' AREA WHICH THE FRENCH HAD HANDED OVER TO THE LAF EARLIER THAT DAY. THE LAF MAINTAIN THESE POSITIONS AND HAVE RE-INFORCED THEIR HOLD ON THE MAIN ROUTES LINKING THEM. THEY CLAIM TO HAVE SEALED OFF THE 'NO GO' AREA FROM THE REST OF THAT PART OF THE CITY, INCLUDING THE ADJACENT AREAS OF SABRA AND SHATILA.

3. WITH THE ISF THE ARMY ARE CURRENTLY SEARCHING THE SABRA AND SHATILA CAMPS FOR ARMS AND INFILTRATORS. SO FAR, ACCORDING TO THE LEBANESE, 92 HAVE BEEN ARRESTED, INCLUDING 52 NON-LEBANESE (MOSTLY PALESTINIANS). MEANWHILE A PRECARIOUS CEASEFIRE IS IN BEING.

4. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR COMPLAINED ABOUT THE LACK OF ANY PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH HIS FORCE COMMANDER BEFORE THE LAF BEGAN THE OPERATION IN PARA 3 ABOVE. HE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE LAF SHOULD HAVE SELECTED FOR SUCH AN OPERATION THE AREA OF THE REFUGEE CAMPS WHICH THE ITALIANS CONTROL RATHER THAN PARTS OF THE 'NO GO' AREA ITSELF. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL EXPLAINED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT

OPERATION IN PARA 3 ABOVE. HE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE LAF SHOULD HAVE SELECTED FOR SUCH AN OPERATION THE AREA OF THE REFUGEE CAMPS WHICH THE ITALIANS CONTROL RATHER THAN PARTS OF THE 'NO GO' AREA ITSELF. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL EXPLAINED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WANTED TO PREVENT THE ANARCHY IN THE 'NO GO' AREA FROM SPREADING TO THE REST OF WEST BEIRUT. DESPITE EFFORTS BY THE LAF AND MNF TO STEM THE FLOW THE CAMPS HAD BEEN RE-INFILTRATED BY GUNMEN. THESE HAD TO BE REMOVED, OTHERWISE THE CANCER WOULD CONTINUE TO SPREAD. THE OPERATION, ACCORDING TO GEMAYEL, HAD THE SUPPORT OF MAINLINE SUNNI OPINION AND THAT OF MODERATE SHIA, BOTH GROUPS FEARING AN EVENTUAL TAKE-OVER OF LARGE PARTS OF THE CITY BY ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS. THE LEBANESE ARMY WOULD BE TAKING OVER FURTHER POSITIONS FROM THE MNF, MOSTLY IN WEST BEIRUT; BEFORE THEY COULD DO SO THEY NEEDED TO SEAL OFF AREAS FROM WHICH RESISTANCE TO THAT TAKEOVER COULD BE EXPECTED TO COME. (TWO MORE FRENCH POSITIONS - IN RAOUCHE AND ON CORNICH MAZRAA - HAVE BEEN HANDED TO THE LAF SINCE THE WEEKEND'S FIGHTING.)

5. COORDINATION BETWEEN THE LEBANESE ARMY AND THE MNF CONTINGENTS HAS ONCE AGAIN BEEN LESS THAT SATISFACTORY. BUT THE FAULT MAY NOT BE ALL ON THE SIDE OF THE LEBANESE. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE DOUBT ABOUT THE DEGREE OF COORDINATION BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND LEBANESE ON 23 DECEMBER. THE FRENCH CERTAINLY DID NOT ALERT THEIR MNF PARTNERS OF THEIR INTENTION TO WITHDRAW FROM THEIR POSITIONS ON THAT DAY. THE ITALIANS HAVE SOME GROUNDS FOR COMPLAINT. EQUALLY THE LEBANESE HAVE SOME JUSTIFICATION FOR THEIR PLEA (WHICH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HIMSELF MADE) THAT MNF CONTRIBUTORS SHOULD KEEP THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES FULLY INFORMED OF ANY PLANS FOR RE-DEPLOYING THEIR FORCES IN AND AROUND BEIRUT.

6. THE LEBANESE ARMY APPEAR TO HAVE SURVIVED ANOTHER ATTEMPT BY THE SHIA TO KNOCK THEM OFF THEIR PERCH. SO LONG AS THERE IS NO CONSENSUS IN FAVOUR OF THE ARMY RE-OCCUPYING THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS THEY WILL CONTINUE TO FACE SUCH CHALLENGES FROM THEM. THE ARMY CAN MAINTAIN A TIGHT CORDON ROUND THE AREA FOR ONLY LIMITED PERIODS MEANWHILE AND OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THE 'NO GO' AREA (AS IN PARA 3 ABOVE) CAN ONLY BE TEMPORARY PALLIATIVES. THERE IS YET NO SIGN OF A POLITICAL WILL AMONG THE VARIOUS LEBANESE PARTIES TO CONFRONT THE SHI'ITE EXTREMISTS IN THEIR REDOUBT. THE SITUATION IS, AND IS LIKELY TO REMAIN FOR SOME TIME TO COME, EXTREMELY VOLATILE.

PALMER
BT

NNNN

O R 241640Z DEC 83
FM BRITFOR LEBANON (ATTN FCO FROM MODUK)
TO RBDWC/MODUK FCO LONDON
INFO RBDWDFG/BEIRUT

SECRET

45

BT

S E C R E T

SIC 19E

FOR DUTY OFFICER FROM COMD. HAVE JUS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM CHARGE. PLEASE PASS AS DIRECTED TO RESIDENT CLERK. LEBANON: CEASE FIRE COMMITTEE.

FOLLOWING FOR RESIDENT CLERK

1. I UNDERSAND FROM

COMMANDER DRITFORLEB THAT THE PARTIES TO THE CEASEFIRE COMMITTEE WISH URGENTLY TO SET UP A VIOLATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE LOCATED IN THE BRITISH BASE AT AL HADATH. THE MAIN COMMITTEE WOULD CONTINUE TO MEET AT THE TRAD BANK, BUT LESS FREQUENTLY.

2. THIS PROPOSAL (OR SOMETHING SIMILAR) HAS BEEN FLOATED BEFORE BUT NEVER PUT TO US FORMALLY. IT HAS NOW BEEN REVIVED BECAUSE THE PARTIES HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY RECOGNISED THAT THEY ARE NO GOING AGAINST 24 - HOUR GUARDING, GIVEN OUR FIRM POSITION ON NO NIGHT GUARDING

AND THE FORTHCOMING REDUCTION OF THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT. THIS PROPOSAL ALSO ACCORDS WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS DISCUSSED AT THE SECURITY MEETING ON 16 DECEMBER IN DAMASCUS - NAMELY THAT THE SECURITY COMMITTEE SHOULD CONCERN ITSELF WITH STRATEGY AND POLICY (EG DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES ON THE GROUND) WHILST A SUB COMMITTEE SHOULD HANDLE ROUTINE INCIDENTS.

3. COMMANDER BRITFORLEB CONSIDERS THAT HE HAS THE MANPOWER RESOURCES TO UNDERTAKE THIS TASK. I CONSIDER THAT THE PROPOSAL HAS

THE

FOLLOWING ADVANTAGES

A) ENHANCING THE PRESTIGE AND WORK OF THE CEASEFIRE COMMITTEE REMAINS THE BEST HOPE OF IMPROVING HOWEVER SLIGHTLY, SECURITY ON THE GROUND - WHICH SHOULD BENEFIT THE MNF AS A WHOLE. IF SITING THE VIOLATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE IN THE HADATH BASE IS THE ONLY WAY OF GETTING IT OFF THE GROUND (AND THIS APPEARS TO BE THE CASE) WE WOULD BE MAKING AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO SECURITY BY AGREEING TO IT.

B) WE WOULD BE SEEN TO BE EVEN MORE CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH MOVES TOWARDS RECONCILIATION WHICH ACCORDS WITH OUR CURRENT POLICY AND BRITFORLEB'S MISSION. IN DOMESTIC POLITICAL TERMS IT WOULD BE DEFENSIBLE.

C) THE PERMANENT PRESENCE IN THE BASE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH OF THE 4 PARTIES TO THE CEASEFIRE SHOULD LESSON THE RISK TO OUR CONTINGENT OF ATTACK BY ANY ONE OF THEM - AND PERHAPS TOO OF THE BASE BEING CAUGHT IN INTER-FACTIONAL CROSSFIRE. THE VIOLATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE WOULD IN A SENSE BE A HOSTAGE TO OUR OWN SECURITY.

4. AGAINST THIS THERE ARE DISADVANTAGES:

A) WE WOULD BE RAISING OUR CONTINGENT'S PROFILE WHEN OUR MNF PARTNERS ARE REDUCING (OR HAVE TOLD US THEY WISH TO REDUCE) THEIRS.

B) AS A CONSEQUENCE WE RISK BEING THE TARGET OF ATTACK BY GROUPS (EG ISLAMIC AMAL AND THE COMMUNISTS) WHO ARE OPPOSED TO RECONCILIATION ALTOGETHER.

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C) IN THE EVENT OF OUR WANTING TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON OR FROM THE HADATH BASE WE WOULD HAVE MORE DIFFICULTY IN THAT OUR DEPARTURE WOULD BRING ABOUT THE COLLAPSE OF THE VIOLATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE. ON (A) WE WOULD BE RAISING OUR PROFILE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION (UNLIKE THE FRENCH AND THE AMMMMMERICANS WHO ARE BEING MMMORE AGGRESSIVE IN SUPPORT OF ONE PARTY - THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT). AS FOR (B) WE RUN THAT RISK ALREADY AS AN HIGHER PROFILE COULD INCREASE THE RISK, BUT I BELIEVE ONLY MARGINALLY. (C) could BE A PROBLEM. WE SHOULD TRY TO SOLVE IT BY ENCOURAGING THE LEBANESE TO THINK MORE SERIOUSLY ABOUT GUARDING THEMSELVES. I KNOW WE HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL SO FAR, BUT WE SHOULD KEEP TRYING.

5. ON BALANCE I RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL WHEN IT IS PUT TO US. I GATHER THAT THE SECURITY COMMITTEE ARE WAITING FOR PSP AGREEMENT BEFORE THEY DO SO. COMMANDER BRITFORLEB (WHO WILL NO DOUBT BE ASKED BEFORE I SHALL) SHOULD INSIST THAT THE PROPOSAL IS PUT TO US FORMALLY BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL. BUT WE NEED TO BE READY WITH OUR ANSWER VERY SOON.

6. I UNDERSTAND FROM FERGUSON THAT THE PROPOSAL IS BEING STUDIED WITHIN MOD. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE RESIDENT CLERK COULD PASS THE CONTENTS OF THIS TELEGRAM URGENTLY TO EGERTON AND LONG (NEWAD). AND TO THE AMBASSADOR CURRENTLY ON LEAVE IN HAMPSHIRE, WHOSE VIEWS SHOULD BE SOUGHT.

SIGNED PALMER

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

LIMITED

NEWAD

MED

DEFENCE DEPT

FUSD

NEWS DEPT

UND

NAD

WED

SFD

ECD(E)

FINANCE DEPT

PROTOCOL DEPT

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

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FM U K MISSION NEW YORK 232003Z DEC '83

TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO.1723 OF 23 DECEMBER 1983

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME

ROUTINE MOSCOW TEL AVIV CAIRO DAMASCUS BEIRUT THE HAGUE.

Prime Minister

Constructive

MY I P T : LEBANON : ROLE OF UN FORCES.

Dmb

28/12

1. I TAKE UP WITH SOME DIFFIDENCE THE REQUEST IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF YOUR TELNO.923 FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WE MIGHT BUILD ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REMARKS. I AM NOT IN TOUCH WITH ANY POLICY MAKERS EXCEPT FOR YOU. FOR BETTER OR WORSE THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS NOT, AT LEAST ON THIS QUESTION, A POLICY MAKER. BUT HE IS A SHREWD OBSERVER AND LIKE THE REST OF US IN THE INNER CIRCLE IN NEW YORK HEARS A GREAT DEAL DAILY ABOUT THE ATTITUDES OF A WIDE VARIETY OF GOVERNMENTS.

mt

Note: Paris comment accords with view

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL DOES NOT SEE ANY SIGN OF THE RUSSIANS OR SYRIANS BUDGING ON THE PROPOSITION THAT HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY CANVASSED FOR A UN PRESENCE IN THE CHOUF, THE BEKAA OR IN THE BEIRUT AREA. VAN DER STOEL SHARES THIS ANALYSIS, SEE MIPT. NOBODY IN THE INNER CIRCLE HERE WOULD SHARE CHEYSSON'S SUSPICION (PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TELNO.924) THAT SOVIET SUPPORT FOR A CEASE-FIRE IN TRIPOLI AND SUPPORT FOR THE USE OF THE UN FLAG BETOKENS A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH.

MY SOVIET COLLEAGUE WITH WHOM I HAVE DISCUSSED THE SITUATION GIVES NO SUPPORT FOR THE CHEYSSON VIEW. (THE SOVIET POSITION IS ENTIRELY EXPLAINABLE IN TERMS OF THE TACTICAL HANDLING OF THE SYRIANS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL.) THE SOVIET REBUFF TO THE FRENCH REPORTED IN PARIS TELNO.1198 IS UNSURPRISING : THE FRENCH ARE RIGHT TO THINK THEY WILL NEED TO BE MORE 'IMAGINATIVE'. WE ARE STUCK WITHOUT A PROSPECT OF PROGRESS IF THE PRESENT PROPOSITIONS ARE MAINTAINED. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SEES NO WAY (RIGHTLY) OF GETTING ROUND THE SYRIAN/SOVIET ROADBLOCK IN TERMS OF UN PROCEDURES OR MANOEUVRES.

Then we should bring it into the open

3. THE CONCLUSION IS THAT WE HAD BETTER TRY ANOTHER ROAD. THE SIGNPOST TO IT IS THE UNIVERSAL AGREEMENT IN THEORY THAT ALL FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD LEAVE THE LEBANON. IF THE SYRIANS AND THE ISRAELIS COULD MUTUALLY AGREE TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS, PROBABLY IN TWO STAGES, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT IT WOULD BE VETOED BY EITHER THE RUSSIANS OR THE AMERICANS. A FORMAL CAMP DAVID TYPE OF AGREEMENT IS OF COURSE OUT OF THE QUESTION. BUT THE SYRIANS AND THE ISRAELIS HAVE THROUGH DEVIOUS CHANNELS REACHED AGREEMENT IN THE PAST AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NOW POSSIBLE (PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE

SYRIAN VICTORY OVER ARAFAT) FOR THEM TO DO IT AGAIN. THIS IS WHERE THE UNITED NATIONS CAN PLAY A CRUCIAL ROLE: NOT IN BRINGING THE AGREE-

MENT ABOUT BUT IN PROVIDING THE GLUE TO MAKE IT STICK. I HAVE PARTICULARLY IN MIND THE PRECEDENT OF UNDOF IN GOLAN WHICH SHOWS THAT IF THE SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS REALLY WANT IT THEY CAN REACH A LASTING AGREEMENT TO RESPECT THE ROLE OF A UN FORCE. THE SITUATION IN LEBANON IS VASTLY MORE COMPLICATED BUT THE PRINCIPLE STILL APPLIES

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THERE COULD ALSO BE A NEED FOR UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS TO MONITOR WITHDRAWALS THOUGH SYRIAN SUSCEPTIBILITIES ABOUT OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY OF ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO BE OBSERVED. PART OF THE PACKAGE DEAL WOULD BE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MNF AND A ROLE FOR UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN THE BEIRUT AREA. THIS WOULD BE UNWELCOME TO GEMAYEL BUT HE WOULD HAVE NO OPTION BUT TO LUMP IT IF IT WAS PART OF THE SYRIAN/ISRAELI DEAL. IT MIGHT WELL LEAD TO AGREEMENT OR RECONCILIATION. A SCHEME ON THESE LINES WOULD MEET A BASIC AMERICAN REQUIREMENT IN KEEPING THE SOVIETS PRETTY MUCH ON THE SIDELINES.

4. THE TEN UNDER AN ACTIVE FRENCH PRESIDENCY COULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN PERSUADING THE SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS INTO SUCH A DEAL. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MIGHT BE PREPARED TO HELP UP TO A POINT. BUT SINCE MY SYRIAN AND ISRAELI COLLEAGUES ARE EACH UNSUITED TO SUCH A NEGOTIATION HE MIGHT HAVE TO GO TO THE AREA OR MEET EMISSARIES ELSEWHERE. ONCE THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE APPROACHING AGREEMENT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO BOUNCE THE PARTICIPANTS INTO FINAL AGREEMENT THROUGH SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION. IRRESPECTIVE OF THIS, A NEGOTIATION OF THE SORT SUGGESTED WILL NEED SECURITY COUNCIL RATIFICATION. THIS WOULD BE EASIEST DURING THE NEXT THREE MONTHS SINCE THE PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL DURING APRIL AND MAY WILL UNFORTUNATELY BE IN THE HANDS OF UKRAINE AND THE SOVIET UNION. IN THE THREE INTERVENING MONTHS THE PRESIDENTS WILL BE NICARAGUA, PAKISTAN AND PERU. ON THE QUESTION OF LEBANON, NICARAGUA WOULD PROBABLY BEHAVE REASONABLY

AND THE OTHER TWO COULD BE HELPFUL.

5. IF AND WHEN WE FINALLY REACHED THE STAGE OF A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, THE THREE WESTERN EUROPEAN MEMBERS (PERHAPS ALONG WITH EGYPT) WOULD HAVE A CRUCIAL ROLE TO PLAY IN ANY FINAL NEGOTIATIONS ON A TEXT. AT THIS STAGE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DEFINE EXACTLY WHAT THE CONTENT OF THE RESOLUTION SHOULD BE. BUT THE DRAFT IN MY TELNO 895 (TO FCO ONLY) REMAINS IN MY VIEW, A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THE BALANCE WHICH WE MIGHT SEEK TO ACHIEVE.

THOMSON

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

LEMMED

MEMAD

MEMD

DEFENCE DEPT

FUSD

NEWS DEPT

UND

NAD

WED

SED

ECD(E)

FINANCE DEPT

PROTOCOL DEPT

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BUCKINGHAM PALACE

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 232000Z DEC 83

Prime Minister

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1722 OF 23 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME

INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, THE HAGUE

MY TELNOS 1717 AND 1718: LEBANON: ROLE OF UN FORCES

1. VAN DER STOEL CONFIRMED TO ME THIS MORNING THE ACCOUNT WHICH HIS MISSION HAD GIVEN US ON HIS MEETINGS WITH FATTAL (SYRIA), TROYANOVSKY (USSR) AND FAKHOURY (LEBANON) (MY TELNO 1718). MIFT CONTAINS, AS SUGGESTED, MY OWN ASSESSMENT OF WHERE WE NOW STAND IN THE LIGHT OF HIS SOUNDINGS AND OF THE SECRETARY-GENERALS REMARKS, AND OF THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR BUILDING ON THEM. VAN DER STOELS OWN CONCLUSIONS WERE AS FOLLOWS.
2. HE SAID THAT AS PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HE HAD APPROACHED THE LEBANON PROBLEM WITH THE VIEW THAT IT NEEDED TO BE TACKLED IN TWO STAGES. THE FIRST STAGE WOULD BE TO GET AGREEMENT IN THE COUNCIL ON AN EXPANDED ROLE FOR UN OBSERVERS. THE SECOND STAGE WOULD BE TO MOVE ON TO EXPLORE WAYS OF REPLACING THE MNF BY UN FORCES. DURING HIS PRESIDENCY HE HAD CONCENTRATED ENTIRELY ON THE FIRST STAGE, GETTING UN OBSERVERS, AND ON DISCOVERING WHETHER THE SYRIAN AND SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO THEIR DEPLOYMENT COULD BE OVERCOME.
3. HE HAD APPROACHED BOTH FATTAL AND TROYANOVSKY TWICE. ON THE SECOND OCCASION HE HAD TRIED OUT SEPARATELY ON THEM A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT FORMULAS ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF OBSERVERS BOTH WITHIN THE BEIRUT AREA AND/OR ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON. BOTH THE SYRIAN AND THE RUSSIAN RESPONSE HAD BEEN NEGATIVE. THE SYRIANS HAD ENUNCIATED A LARGE NUMBER OF TACTICAL OBJECTIONS. BUT THEIR MAIN POINT AND THAT OF THE RUSSIANS WAS THAT A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE LEBANON PROBLEM HAD TO COME FIRST.
4. VAN DER STOEL HAD CONCLUDED THAT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE NO PROGRESS WAS POSSIBLE IN THE COUNCIL ON THE QUESTION OF UN OBSERVERS. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHARED THIS CONCLUSION. IF IT WAS PRESSED IN THE COUNCIL THE RUSSIAN TACTICS WERE LIKELY TO BE NOT TO CONFRONT IT HEAD ON BUT TO AMEND ANY DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (EG WITH REFERENCES TO IMMEDIATE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL ETC) UNTIL IT WAS NO LONGER ACCEPTABLE TO THE WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.

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5. VAN DER STOEL THOUGHT THAT THE SYRIAN AND RUSSIAN POSITIONS WERE NOT NECESSARILY IDENTICAL. THEY HAD BOTH MADE CLEAR TO HIM THAT THEY WERE NOT TAKING THE SAME VIEW, THOUGH THE RUSSIANS HAD SAID THAT THE SYRIAN POSITION WAS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR FOR THEM. HE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY STRUCK BY TROYANOVSKY SAYING TWICE TO HIM THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT GOING TO DO ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT HELP THE AMERICANS. VAN DER STOEL HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS WAS CENTRAL TO THEIR POSITION. HE THOUGHT, PERSONALLY, THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE SEEING THE SITUATION IN TERMS OF TWO ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS BOTH FAVOURABLE TO THEMSELVES. THE FIRST WAS THAT THE MNF WOULD REMAIN IN LEBANON, AND THAT THE US FORCES WOULD PAY A HEAVY PRICE FOR THIS WITH DAMAGING REPERCUSSIONS FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN'S RE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN: THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING THE PRESIDENT LOSE THE ELECTION WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT TO THEM. THE SECOND WAS THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD FEEL OBLIGED TO WITHDRAW US FORCES FROM LEBANON THEREBY PRESENTING THE SOVIET UNION WITH A VICTORY. VAN DER STOEL HAD HOPED THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE SUFFICIENTLY WORRIED ABOUT THE RISKS OF AN ESCALATION IN LEBANON LEADING TO SUPER POWER CONFRONTATION THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO RECONSIDER THEIR POSITION. BUT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF THIS. HE CONCLUDED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN RUSSIAN OPPOSITION TO EXPANDED UN INVOLVEMENT UNTIL EITHER A SUFFICIENTLY FRIGHTENING ESCALATION TOOK PLACE OR THE US WAS PREPARED TO BRING THE RUSSIANS INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

6. SEE MIFT

THOMSON

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

LIMITED

NEWAD

MED

DEFENCE DEPT

FUSD

NEWS DEPT

UND

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SED

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FINANCE DEPT

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 December 1983

Prime Minister

DMS
23/12

Dear John,

Lebanon: MNF

We are following up the question of a UN force in the light of discussion in Cabinet yesterday. Meanwhile, you may find helpful the enclosed note which summarises the attitudes of those most closely concerned, including the UN Secretary-General. This is based on soundings taken in the past few days by Sir J Thomson in New York, which have helped to clarify the background to the UN Secretary-General's remarks and the present state of play in New York. As the note indicates, the Soviet position still appears fairly negative. We are not disposed to take this as the end of the matter.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD).

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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LEBANON: REPLACEMENT OF MNF BY UN FORCES OR OBSERVERS

1. Mr Coles' letter of 19 December reports some ideas put to the Prime Minister by Sir Anthony Parsons.

2. These ideas are not entirely new. For many months we ^{and done nothing!} have been considering the possibility of broadening UNIFIL's mandate, notably to help provide physical protection for Palestinians on Lebanese territory. The French have also been thinking on similar lines to Sir A Parsons: M Cheysson told Sir Geoffrey Howe on 19 December that they proposed to discuss with a Soviet visitor to Paris ideas of handing over to UN forces some of the MNF tasks. HM Ambassador in Rome also elaborated on the same theme in his telegram number 695 of 20 December.

3. The basic requirements which need to be fulfilled before a UN force can take on new tasks are well summed up by the Secretary-General in para 3 of UKMIS New York telegram number 1714. The following are required:

- a) A request from the host Government,
- b) Approval of the Security Council,
- c) Agreement from countries providing contributions to the operation and
- d) 'The support of the interested countries'.

If these conditions are met, the UN are ready to help: the UN 'always had contingency plans ready'. But none of the MNF contributors has yet put forward 'any official concrete request'.

4. It is clear from Washington telno 3852 para 6, that the Americans are in principle not opposed to extending the role for UNIFIL 'if anyone can get the Syrians and Russians to agree'.

It is equally clear from Paris telno 1198 that the French approach Mr Polyakov on 22 December produced nothing. The French believe

/that it

that it will be necessary to tackle the Russians at a more imaginative level. The Soviet Ambassador in New York, Mr Troyanovsky, who has some reputation for flexibility, has said that he would not object in principle to a UN role to strengthen the ceasefire, and to help the reconciliation process, but that he saw practical difficulties. He added that the Soviet Union would not be keen to help the Americans out of a political difficulty. The omens are therefore poor as far as Soviet agreement is concerned.

Not to be in bold otherwise.

5. The first step is however that Lebanon should request UN involvement. President Gemayel would probably prefer to rely on the MNF in its present form, and shelter for as long as possible behind the fire-power provided by the US contingent. While he might welcome an expanded role for UNIFIL in areas vacated by the Israeli and Syrian forces, he might not welcome UN involvement in keeping the peace between different Lebanese factions, which he regards as a proper role for the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces. But if presented with a united front from the four MNF contributors he would probably acquiesce. A Lebanese request for UN involvement would clearly carry more weight with all concerned if it had the backing of not only the Government of President Gemayel but also the other main factions. The UN Secretary-General appears to detect signs that the Lebanese attitude to Soviet Observers in Lebanon may be changing. This might give the Russians some incentive to be helpful, subject to Syrian views.

cf Cyprus?

6. Syria refused to agree to the deployment of UN observers in the Chouf in September. The Syrians have given no indication that they are ready to change their attitude. Like the Russians they have hitherto argued that the problems of Lebanon are an internal matter and not appropriate for the UN. They would also resist a UN role in a disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces on terms which specifically put their own forces in Lebanon on the same footing as those of Israel. But the Syrians are clearly concerned about the risks of confrontation with the United States, and might be persuaded to modify their objections. They also wish to see the MNF depart and might agree to a UN role as a way of achieving this.

7. As longstanding sceptics about the UN in any form, the Israelis would not welcome the replacement of the MNF by a UN force. But they would find it hard to resist if everyone else agreed. There have recently been signs of a softening in their attitude on an expanded role for UNIFIL in the South and East of Lebanon. They might not object to a wider mandate for UNIFIL in South Lebanon and the Shouf provided that they were satisfied that their own needs could be met by the presence of the Lebanese Army or by other security arrangements.

23 December 1983

MNF

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FM ROME
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 695
OF 201715Z DECEMBER 1983

UKREP BRUSSELS TELNO 4543: LEBANON

1. I WAS INTERESTED TO READ THIS ACCOUNT OF WHAT CHEYSSON HAD SAID ABOUT THE NEED TO APPROACH THE RUSSIANS ABOUT A UN PRESENCE IN BEIRUT. I HAVE NOT SPOKEN TO THE ITALIANS ABOUT THIS, BUT I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT ANDREOTTI WOULD FIND AN APPROACH TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DESIGNED TO FACILITATE THE PASSAGE OF A NEW UN SECURITY RESOLUTION THE RATIONAL WAY OF DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM. THE ITALIANS FEEL INCREASINGLY EXPOSED IN LEBANON, AND AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN HAVE NOW DECIDED TO REDUCE SUBSTANTIALLY THE NUMBER OF THEIR TROOPS. THERE IS A GENERAL FEELING THAT HAD THE IRANIAN TERRORISTS ATTACKED THE ITALIANS RATHER THAN THE FRENCH AND AMERICANS, THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT WOULD HAVE LEFT BY NOW. YET ITALY, LIKE THE OTHER MNF PARTNERS, IS RELUCTANT TO WITHDRAW IN THE FACE OF EXISTING U S OPPOSITION. A DIPLOMATIC APPROACH TO THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE THE OBVIOUS ROUTE TO ANDREOTTI, AND WOULD ALSO BE WELCOME TO SPADOLINI, WHO HAS FOR SOME TIME WANTED TO SEE MORE UN INVOLVEMENT.
2. THE MOST DIFFICULT ASPECT FOR ITALY, AS I PRESUME FOR OURSELVES, IS WHETHER WE TRY TO PERSUADE THE U S GOVERNMENT TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH AN ENQUIRY IN MOSCOW. IF I AM RIGHT IN BELIEVING THAT THE U S WOULD INSTINCTIVELY OPPOSE ANY MOVE WHICH INCREASED THE ROLE OF THE USSR IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IT MIGHT BE OPEN TO BRITAIN AND ITALY TO GIVE SOME DISCREET ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE FRENCH TO CONTINUE THEIR EXISTING CONTACTS WITH THE RUSSIANS.
3. TO ILLUSTRATE THE KIND OF APPROACH WHICH MIGHT BE MADE, WE COULD CONSIDER SOMETHING ON THE FOLLOWING LINES. THE THREE EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS IN THE MNF HAD (THE FRENCH WERE SURE) NO DESIRE TO BECOME INVOLVED IN FIGHTING, IN SENDING THEIR CONTINGENTS TO THE LEBANON. THEIR MOTIVES HAD BEEN SOLELY TO ENCOURAGE THE PROCESS OF INTERNAL PACIFICATION, WHICH THEY HOPED WAS POSSIBLE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES A YEAR AGO. THESE HOPES HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED. BUT TO WITHDRAW THESE FORCES NOW WOULD SOLVE NOTHING, AND MIGHT INDEED AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION, BY CAUSING SYRIAN FORCES AND THOSE UNDER HER CONTROL TO STRENGTHEN THEIR HOLD ON CENTRAL AND NORTHERN LEBANON.

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WERE THAT TO HAPPEN, THERE WOULD BE A REAL RISK OF ISRAELI INTERVENTION AGAINST SUCH FORCES: AND EVEN IF CONFINED TO LEBANESE TERRITORY, THE BLOODSHED AND DAMAGE WOULD CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR USSR, IN ITS ROLE AS A TREATY PARTNER OF SYRIA, AS WELL AS FOR EVERYBODY ELSE. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE PASSAGE OF A NEW SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WOULD BE THE BEST WAY OF KEEPING THE COMBATANTS APART AND ENCOURAGING RECONCILIATION.

4. I HOPE YOU WILL FORGIVE ME FOR MAKING THIS SUGGESTION, IN AN AREA OF NO DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY OF MINE. BUT I PUT FORWARD THE IDEA IN CASE YOU WOULD LIKE ME TO SPEAK VERY INFORMALLY TO A SENIOR MFA OFFICIAL. I COULD DO THAT BUT WOULD HAVE TO GO BEFORE THE END OF THIS WEEK, BEFORE ITALIAN OFFICIALS CLOSE DOWN FOR THE HOLIDAY.

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 221805Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1714 OF 22 DECEMBER

INFO WASHINGTON PARIS ROME BEIRUT DAMASCUS MOSCOW THE HAGUE

TEL AVIV *CAIRO*

TELECON NIXON/HUMFREY: LEBANON: SECRETARY GENERAL'S REMARKS.

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REMARKS ON LEBANON IN THE COURSE OF HIS END OF YEAR PRESS CONFERENCE ON 21 DECEMBER.

2. IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT HE SAID:

THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF VIOLENCE AND REPRISAL IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND IN LEBANON IN PARTICULAR NEEDS TO BE ENDED URGENTLY. THEREAFTER IS A PALPABLE NECESSITY TO GET TO THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM AND WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL CONCERNED, TO INSTITUTE A NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT. ONLY SUCH A SETTLEMENT CAN BRING CO-EXISTENCE AND PEACE TO THIS VITAL PART OF THE WORLD AND AVERT A CONFLICT WHICH MIGHT BE FAR MORE FUNDAMENTAL AND DESTRUCTIVE THAN WHAT THE REGION HAS SUFFERED SO FAR.

3. SUBSEQUENTLY, HE REPLIED TO TWO QUESTIONS ON THE SUBJECT AS FOLLOWS:

QUESTION: IS AN EXPANDED UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING ROLE IN LEBANON MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARTIES NOW THAN WAS THE CASE A YEAR AGO: AND HOW DO YOU GAUGE THE PROSPECTS IN THE COMING YEAR FOR THE UNIFIL TROOPS REPLACING MULTINATIONAL TROOPS IN THE BEIRUT AREA?

THE SECRETARY GENERAL: THAT IS A VERY INTERESTING AND TIMELY QUESTION.

I CANNOT PASS JUDGEMENT ON THE BASIS OF WHAT I HAVE LEARNED FROM THE PAPERS, WHICH SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT ALL PARTIES CONCERNED ARE AGAIN THINKING OF THE BENEFITS OF HAVING A UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE IN LEBANON INSTEAD OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES. OF COURSE IT IS NOT FOR ME TO PASS ANY JUDGEMENT ON THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES. I REGRET THE LOSSES THEY HAVE HAD, BUT I CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THAT THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCES ARE PERHAPS THE BEST WAY OF PRESERVING PEACE IN THE LEBANON AREA - AND NOT ONLY IN LEBANON BUT IN THE WHOLE MIDDLE EAST AREA. WHY? BECAUSE THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCES OPERATE UNDER SOME CONDITIONS WHICH ARE IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY OTHER GROUP OF COUNTRIES TO MEET. FOR INSTANCE, THEY HAVE A BROAD BASE BY VIRTUE OF THE SIMPLE FACT THAT THEY NEED THE SUPPORT OF THE 15 MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. SECONDLY, THEY HAVE A UNIFIED COMMAND. THIRDLY, THEY CAN EMBARK ON HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES. ALSO THEY CAN ACT ONLY IN SELF-DEFENCE AND HAVE ONLY /LIGHT.

LIGHT ARMS. THEN THE POSSIBILITY OF PASSING THROUGH WHAT THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES HAVE ENDURED IS ALMOST NON-EXISTENT. AS YOU KNOW, IN THE 13 OPERATIONS THAT THE UNITED NATIONS HAS MOUNTED SINCE ITS EXISTENCE WE HAVE HAD ONLY A FEW LOSSES AS COMPARED WITH THE HEAVY LOSSES THAT THE AMERICAN AND FRENCH SOLDIERS HAVE HAD. THAT IS WHY I THINK THE UNITED NATIONS IS IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE LEBANON WITH THE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE.

BUT OF COURSE THIS IS SOMETHING WE CANNOT DECIDE BY OURSELVES. WE NEED, FIRST OF ALL, A REQUEST FROM THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT: SECONDLY, WE NEED THE APPROVAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL: THIRDLY WE NEED THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF COUNTRIES TO OUR PEACE-KEEPING FORCE OPERATION: AND LAST BUT NOT LEAST, WE NEED THE SUPPORT OF THE INTERESTED COUNTRIES.

IF ALL THESE CONDITIONS ARE MET, WE ARE ALWAYS PREPARED TO HELP. DO NOT FORGET THAT THE UNITED NATIONS ALWAYS HAS CONTINGENCY PLANS. IF WE ARE ASKED TO HELP, EVEN FOR HELPING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS FROM LEBANON OR FOR ANY OTHER EXERCISE, WE ARE ALWAYS PREPARED WITH CONTINGENCY PLANS.

QUESTION: ABOUT THE REPLACEMENT OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE BY UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN LEBANON: YOU SAID EARLIER THAT YOU HAD HEARD ABOUT THIS IN THE PAPERS. DO YOU MEAN TO SAY THAT THIS WAS NEVER RAISED WITH YOU BY ANY OF THE CONTRIBUTORS TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE? SECONDLY, IN THAT CASE, HOW CAN THE CONTINGENCY PLANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS POSSIBLY BE REALISTIC IN THE LIGHT OF THE MOVEMENT ON THE GROUND BY THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE? CAN YOU EXPLAIN THAT?

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: WELL, FIRST OF ALL, I HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED ANY OFFICIAL, CONCRETE REQUEST FROM ANY OF THE FOUR PARTICIPANTS IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE, AND SECONDLY, WE ARE RATHER USED TO THIS KIND OF EXERCISE AND WE THINK THAT THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND RIGHT NOW DOES NOT AFFECT OUR PLANS. WE HAVE OUR CONTINGENCY PLANS, WHICH ARE FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO ACCOMMODATE THE SITUATION IF WE ARE EVER ASKED TO REPLACE THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE.

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3852 OF 22 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, CAIRO,

TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS.

MY TELNO. 3826: LEBANON.

1. KEMP (NSC STAFF) TOLD US TODAY THAT RUMSFELD'S FIRST ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAD NOT CARRIED MATTERS MUCH FURTHER FORWARD. HE WOULD BE RETURNING TO THE AREA IN THE NEW YEAR AND WOULD NEED THEN TO TAKE WITH HIM SOME MORE SPECIFIC IDEAS.

2. WE ASKED ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S REFERENCE DURING HIS PRESS CONFERENCE TO THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE 'MOVING BEHIND' THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES AS THEY SOUGHT TO EXPAND THE AREAS UNDER THEIR CONTROL. WERE THE AMERICANS SERIOUSLY THINKING OF ENCOURAGING THE LAF TO TRY TO ASSERT THEIR CONTROL IN THE SHOUF AND/OR THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS OF BEIRUT? THIS SEEMED TO US WELL BEYOND THEIR CAPACITY. KEMP SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT THE US INTENTION, EXCEPT IN THE CONTEXT OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, WHICH WAS AS FAR OFF AS EVER.

3. WE ASKED WHAT SORT OF IDEAS RUMSFELD WAS LIKELY TO TAKE BACK. KEMP SAID THE OPTIONS WERE STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION HERE. ONE IDEA BEING CANVASSED, HOWEVER, WAS THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE PERSUADED TO MAKE A FURTHER PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL, IF NECESSARY UNILATERALLY. THIS SHOULD BE DONE IN A WAY WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE LAF TO MOVE INTO THE AREA THUS VACATED. WE ENCOURAGED KEMP TO PURSUE IDEAS OF THIS KIND.

4. WE ASKED WHETHER THE AMERICANS HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT GEMAYEL WAS MAKING A SERIOUS ENOUGH EFFORT TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE OTHER FACTIONS. KEMP (PLEASE PROTECT) SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT SATISFIED THAT HE WAS TRYING HARD ENOUGH. WHEN RUMSFELD WENT BACK TO THE AREA. HE WOULD LEAN ON GEMAYEL TO MAKE A MORE POSTIVE ATTEMPT TO CO-OPT OTHER CONFESSIONAL LEADERS. THE PROBLEM REMAINED, HOWEVER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SYRIAN PRESSURE ON THEM NOT TO PARTICIPATE.

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5. WE NOTED THAT TWO THIRDS OF THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE HAD BEEN TAKEN UP WITH QUESTIONS ABOUT LEBANON. DID NOT THE WHITE HOUSE SEE A SERIOUS RISK OF THE FURTHER EROSION OF PUBLIC SUPPORT IF THERE WERE NO SIGNS OF PROGRESS NEXT YEAR? KEMP SAID THAT EVERYONE IN THE WHITE HOUSE WAS CONSCIOUS OF THIS DANGER. BUT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE AMERICANS OR, HE HOPED, THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS SIMPLY TO PACK THEIR BAGS AND LEAVE. THE OBJECT HAD TO BE TO GET THE SYRIANS TO ALLOW THE LEBANESE FACTIONS ENOUGH LEEWAY TO COBBLE TOGETHER SOME SORT OF COMPROMISE WHICH WOULD GIVE A PROSPECT OF REASONABLE STABILITY, AT ANY RATE FOR SOME TIME.

6. ON THE FRENCH CONTRIBUTION TO THE MNF KEMP SAID THAT THE AMERICANS CONTINUED TO GET VERY DIFFERENT ABOUT FRENCH INTENTIONS FROM THE QUAI D'ORSAY ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE ELYSEE AND HERNUON ON THE OTHER. THE AMERICANS DID NOT RULE OUT AN EXPANDED ROLE FOR UNIFIL IF ANYONE COULD GET THE SYRIANS AND RUSSIANS TO AGREE TO THIS.

7. KEMP SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME LIVELY EXCHANGES WITH THE ISRAELIS ABOUT THE EVACUATION OF THE PLO FROM TRIPOLI, WITH THE ISRAELIS INITIALLY DECLINING TO GIVE ANY ASSURANCES THAT THEY WOULD NOT ATTACK DURING THE EVACUATION.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 1718 OF 22 DECEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS ROME

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW TEL AVIV CAIRO DAMASCUS BEIRUT

THE HAGUE

MIPT: LEBANON: ROLE OF UN FORCES

1. THE DUTCH MISSION HAVE GIVEN US THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF THE MEETINGS WHICH VAN DER STOEL HAD YESTERDAY AND TODAY, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, WITH THE SYRIAN, LEBANESE AND RUSSIAN AMBASSADORS. THE MEETINGS FOLLOWED EARLIER INFORMAL SOUNDINGS WHICH HE HAD MADE WITH THE SYRIANS AND RUSSIANS NEARER THE BEGINNING OF THE DUTCH PRESIDENCY THIS MONTH ABOUT THEIR ATTITUDE TO UN OBSERVERS IN LEBANON (MY TELNO 1529, NOT TO ALL).

2. VAN DER STOEL SAW FATTAL (SYRIA) ON 21 DECEMBER. THIS TIME HE, APPARENTLY, PUT MORE SPECIFIC IDEAS TO HIM ABOUT INCREASING THE PRESENCE OF UN OBSERVERS IN THE BEIRUT AREA. THEY DISCUSSED THE MATTER FOR ABOUT AN HOUR. FATTAL HAD ASKED A LOT OF QUESTIONS. HE HAD NOT REPEATED THE SYRIAN POSITION THAT IT WAS PURELY AN INTERNAL LEBANESE MATTER. HE HAD SHOWN SOME INTEREST IN WHAT VAN DER STOEL SAID AND HAD PROMISED TO CONVEY THE DUTCH IDEAS TO DAMASCUS. BUT HE HAD INDICATED THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT A CHANGE IN THE SYRIAN POSITION.

3. VAN DER STOEL NEXT SAW FAKHOURY (LEBANON) TODAY (22 DECEMBER) WHO CONFIRMED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS IN FAVOUR OF INCREASING THE NUMBER OF UN OBSERVERS. WHEN VAN DER STOEL ASKED FOR HIS REACTION TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REMARKS ON REPLACING THE MNF BY UN FORCES (MY TELNO 1714), FAKHOURY WAS HESITANT, BUT SAID THAT HE WOULD ASK FOR INSTRUCTIONS FROM BEIRUT ON THIS POINT.

4. VAN DER STOEL SUBSEQUENTLY TALKED TO TROYANOVSKY (USSR). WHEN HE BROACHED THE QUESTION OF UN OBSERVERS, TROYANOVSKY REPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE SUCH AN EXPANDED UN ROLE SINCE IT COULD ONLY BE LIMITED TO THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE LEBANESE SITUATION WHICH WERE VERY DIFFICULT TO SEPARATE FROM THE INTERNAL ASPECTS. (IT IS PERHAPS SIGNIFICANT THAT TROYANOVSKY, LIKE FATTAL, DID NOT TRY TO SUGGEST THAT THE SITUATION IN LEBANON WAS A PURELY INTERNAL MATTER). HE SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT OBJECT IN PRINCIPLE TO A UN ROLE TO STRENGTHEN THE CEASEFIRE AND HELP THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS BUT HE SAW ALL KINDS OF PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN ACHIEVING THIS. MORE OMINOUSLY, HE SAID THAT QUITE FRANKLY THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT GOING TO HELP THE AMERICANS (BY IMPLICATION TO GET OUT OF LEBANON). HE WAS NEGATIVE ABOUT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S COMMENTS ON A ROLE FOR UN FORCES, SAYING THAT THE SOVIET OBJECTIONS AGAINST UN OBSERVERS WOULD BE EVEN STRONGER IN RELATION TO UN FORCES.

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5. THE DUTCH MISSION THOUGHT THAT TROYANOVSKYS POSITION HAD HARDENED SOMEWHAT SINCE THEY LAST SPOKE TO HIM EARLIER THIS MONTH. HE HAD TAKEN THE LINE THEN THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY PROPOSAL PUT TO HIM. THE DUTCH HAD NOT BEEN SURE AT THE TIME WHETHER THIS MERELY REFLECTED TROYANOVSKYS MORE CONCILIATORY MANNER OR SOMETHING MORE.

6. THE DUTCH HAVE ALSO SPOKEN TO THE AMERICANS HERE. AFTER TAKING SOME TIME TO RESPOND, THE AMERICANS WERE APPARENTLY NON-COMMITTAL BUT SUPPORTED VAN DE STOELS EFFORTS TO SOUND OUT THE RUSSIANS AND SYRIANS. IN CONVERSATION WITH ME L'ICHENSTEIN (US) SAID THAT HE WAS NOT CLEAR ABOUT WHAT PROPOSITIONS WERE UNDER DISCUSSION AND IN WHAT SETTING. HE SPOKE CALMLY ABOUT THE IDEA OF SOVIET OBSERVERS IN THE LEBANON (PARA 5 OF MY IPT AND SEEMED TO THINK (PROBABLY CORRECTLY) THAT IT HAD ARISEN IN CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND MY NETHERLANDS COLLEAGUE.

7. MY ITALIAN COLLEAGUE SAYS THAT WHEN ANDREOTTI IS HERE FOR A COUPLE OF SPEAKING ENGAGEMENTS IN MID-JANUARY HE WILL VISIT WASHINGTON PRINCIPALLY IN ORDER TO DISCUSS THE LEBANON.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1717 OF 22 DECEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME

PRIORITY MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, THE HAGUE.

YOUR TELNO 923 (NOT TO THE HAGUE): LEBANON: ROLE OF UN FORCES

1. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS ENORMOUSLY BUSY (WITH THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AMONGST OTHERS) BUT AT MY URGENT REQUEST HE GAVE ME 20 MINUTES THIS EVENING (22 DECEMBER).
2. I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY MINISTERS TO PROBE THE THINKING BEHIND HIS REMARKS TO THE PRESS YESTERDAY (THE TEXT OF WHICH I SENT TO YOU EARLIER TODAY AS MY TELNO 1714).
3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD NOTHING OFFICIAL OR CONCRETE FROM ANY OF THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS ON THEIR INTEREST IN UN INVOLVEMENT ADDITIONAL TO THE OBSERVER GROUP IN BEIRUT. HE HAD READ OF ITALIAN INTENTIONS IN THE NEWSPAPERS AND HAD HAD AN INFORMAL APPROACH FROM MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE. BUT THESE WERE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR A FORMAL REQUEST FROM THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND THE APPROVAL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS AND THE PARTIES. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SYRIANS.
4. I ASKED WHETHER HE HAD HEARD ANYTHING MORE POSITIVE RECENTLY FROM THE RUSSIANS AND THE SYRIANS. HE SAID NOT. THE ONLY HOPEFUL SIGN WAS THAT, ACCORDING TO MY LIBYAN COLLEAGUE (WHOM HE ALSO SAW THIS AFTERNOON ON ANOTHER MATTER) GEMAYAL HAD HAD A GOOD MEETING WITH QADDAFI WHICH MIGHT IMPROVE THINGS WITH THE SYRIANS.
5. I SAID THAT IN THAT CASE THE SITUATION SEEMED VERY SIMILAR TO WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER SAW HIM ON 30 SEPTEMBER AND EXPLAINED OUR POSITION (MY TELNO 982, NOT TO ALL). TO DRAW HIM OUT I SAID THAT MY PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT A GREATER UN INVOLVEMENT IN PEACEKEEPING IN LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO FORM PART OF A PACKAGE. IT WAS NOT OVERLY IMPORTANT WHETHER THE INCREASED UN INVOLVEMENT TOOK THE FORM OF MORE OBSERVERS OR UNIFIL UNDER A DIFFERENT MANDATE. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO MIX THE TWO. PEREZ DE CUELLAR REPLIED THAT FROM THE UN POINT OF VIEW OBSERVERS WOULD BE ADEQUATE BUT HE WAS FLEXIBLE AND WOULD BE READY TO HELP WITH ANY FORMULA WHICH WAS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED. HE NOTED THAT FORMALLY SPEAKING THERE WERE SOME SOVIET OFFICERS IN THE U.N. OBSERVER GROUP FOR THE LEBANON BUT IN PRACTICE THEY WERE ALL IN CAIRO OR DAMASCUS. THE LEBANESE DID NOT WANT THEM IN LEBANON BUT HE WONDERED WHETHER THIS ATTITUDE MIGHT BE CHANGING AND IF SO WHETHER IT WOULD HELP. IN TURN I WONDERED WHETHER THE PRESENCE OF A FEW SOVIET OFFICERS WOULD MAKE A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE TO THE SYRIANS. AS I LEFT, PEREZ DE CUELLAR APOLOGISED FOR NOT HAVING BEEN MORE INFORMATIVE AND REMARKED THAT THE REAL PROBLEM WAS WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE PREPARED TO HELP THE AMERICANS OUT OF LEBANON IN THE PRESENT SUPERPOWER CLIMATE. HE DID NOT THINK THEY WOULD.

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6. THE QUESTION OF LEBANON IS VERY MUCH IN PEOPLE'S MINDS HERE. I HAVE HAD FRAGMENTARY DISCUSSIONS ABOUT IT WITH MY ITALIAN COLLEAGUE AND AMBASSADOR LICHENSTEIN (US) AND AM DUE TO SEE MY NETHERLANDS COLLEAGUE TOMORROW MORNING (23 DECEMBER) IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE HAS SEEN MY SYRIAN, LEBANESE AND RUSSIAN COLLEAGUES: AN ACCOUNT OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM IS IN MIFT. I SHALL REPORT FURTHER WHEN I HAVE SEEN HIM BUT HE HAS ALREADY WARNED ME THAT HIS CONCLUSION FROM HIS SOUNDINGS IS THAT THERE IS NO REASON TO BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT A POSSIBLE BREAKTHROUGH ON THE QUESTION OF UN INVOLVEMENT AND THAT HE DOES NOT INTEND TO TAKE THE MATTER ANY FURTHER DURING THE REMAINDER OF HIS PRESIDENCY.

7. I DO NOT HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS ENGAGED IN SOME SECRET NEGOTIATION ON THE LEBANON AS HE HAS BEEN ON CYPRUS. HE IS OPEN TO SUGGESTIONS AND WOULD LIKE TO BE HELPFUL. BUT HE REMAINS VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATE AND OF THE DIFFICULTY OF SECURING ONE. AFTER SPEAKING WITH THE NETHERLANDS AMBASSADOR I WILL ATTEMPT AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WE MIGHT BUILD ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REMARKS.

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FM PARIS 221714Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1198 OF 22ND DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, ROME, WASHINGTON, BEIRUT.

MOSCOW TELNO 1462 AND YOUR TELNO 686: LEBANON/MNF.

1. BONNEFOUS (DIRECTOR MIDDLE EAST) TOLD ME THIS EVENING THAT POLYAKOV, WHOM HE HAD SEEN THIS AFTERNOON, HAD STUCK TO THE RIGID SOVIET LINE THAT A UNIFIL PRESENCE IN BEIRUT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE, SINCE THE UNIFIL MANDATE DID NOT EXTEND TO LEBANESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS; AND THAT ALL THAT WAS NEEDED TO RESTORE PEACE IN THE LEBANON WAS FOR THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW AND THE LEBANESE PARTIES TO BRING THEIR DISCUSSIONS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. BONNEFOUS COMMENTED THAT THE FRENCH WOULD HAVE TO TACKLE THE RUSSIANS AT A MORE IMAGINATIVE LEVEL IF THEY WERE TO GET THEM TO ACCEPT OR EVEN TO UNDERSTAND WHAT WAS BEING PROPOSED, THOUGH HE DID NOT AT PRESENT KNOW HOW THEY WOULD DO THIS. THEY HAD NOT YET HAD ANY FURTHER REACTION FROM GEMAYEL. THE FRENCH WOULD NOW NEED TO REFLECT FURTHER OVER THE HOLIDAYS.

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INFO WASHINGTON PARIS ROME BEIRUT DAMASCUS MOSCOW THE HAGUE
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TELECON NIXON/HUMFREY: LEBANON: SECRETARY GENERAL'S REMARKS.

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REMARKS ON
LEBANON IN THE COURSE OF HIS END OF YEAR PRESS CONFERENCE
ON 21 DECEMBER.

2. IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT HE SAID:
THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF VIOLENCE AND REPRISAL IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AND IN LEBANON IN PARTICULAR NEEDS TO BE ENDED URGENTLY. THEREAVER
A PALPABLE NECESSITY TO GET TO THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM AND
WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL CONCERNED, TO INSTITUTE A
NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST
AND LASTING SETTLEMENT. ONLY SUCH A SETTLEMENT CAN BRING
CO-EXISTENCE AND PEACE TO THIS VITAL PART OF THE WORLD AND AVERT
A CONFLICT WHICH MIGHT BE FAR MORE FUNDAMENTAL AND DESTRUCTIVE
THAN WHAT THE REGION HAS SUFFERED SO FAR.

3. SUBSEQUENTLY, HE REPLIED TO TWO QUESTIONS ON THE SUBJECT
AS FOLLOWS:

QUESTION: IS AN EXPANDED UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING ROLE IN
LEBANON MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARTIES NOW THAN WAS THE CASE A
YEAR AGO; AND HOW DO YOU GAUGE THE PROSPECTS IN THE COMING YEAR
FOR THE UNIFORM TROOPS REPLACING MULTINATIONAL TROOPS IN THE

YEAR AGO; AND HOW DO YOU GAUGE THE PROSPECTS IN THE COMING YEAR FOR THE UNIFIL TROOPS REPLACING MULTINATIONAL TROOPS IN THE BEIRUT AREA?

THE SECRETARY GENERAL: THAT IS A VERY INTERESTING AND TIMELY QUESTION.

I CANNOT PASS JUDGEMENT ON THE BASIS OF WHAT I HAVE LEARNED FROM THE PAPERS, WHICH SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT ALL PARTIES CONCERNED ARE AGAIN THINKING OF THE BENEFITS OF HAVING A UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE IN LEBANON INSTEAD OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES. OF COURSE IT IS NOT FOR ME TO PASS ANY JUDGEMENT ON THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES. I REGRET THE LOSSES THEY HAVE HAD, BUT I CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THAT THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCES ARE PERHAPS THE BEST WAY OF PRESERVING PEACE IN THE LEBANON AREA - AND NOT ONLY IN LEBANON BUT IN THE WHOLE MIDDLE EAST AREA. WHY? BECAUSE THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCES OPERATE UNDER SOME CONDITIONS WHICH ARE IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY OTHER GROUP OF COUNTRIES TO MEET. FOR INSTANCE, THEY HAVE A BROAD BASE BY VIRTUE OF THE SIMPLE FACT THAT THEY NEED THE SUPPORT OF THE 15 MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. SECONDLY, THEY HAVE A UNIFIED COMMAND. THIRDLY, THEY CAN EMBARK ON HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES. ALSO THEY CAN ACT ONLY IN SELF-DEFENCE AND HAVE ONLY LIGHT ARMS. THEN THE POSSIBILITY OF PASSING THROUGH WHAT THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES HAVE ENDURED IS ALMOST NON-EXISTENT. AS YOU KNOW, IN THE 13 OPERATIONS THAT THE UNITED NATIONS HAS MOUNTED SINCE ITS EXISTENCE WE HAVE HAD ONLY A FEW LOSSES AS COMPARED WITH THE HEAVY LOSSES THAT THE AMERICAN AND FRENCH SOLDIERS HAVE HAD. THAT IS WHY I THINK THE UNITED NATIONS IS IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE LEBANON WITH THE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE.

BUT OF COURSE THIS IS SOMETHING WE CANNOT DECIDE BY OURSELVES. WE NEED, FIRST OF ALL, A REQUEST FROM THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT; SECONDLY, WE NEED THE APPROVAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL; THIRDLY WE NEED THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF COUNTRIES TO OUR PEACE-KEEPING FORCE OPERATION; AND LAST BUT NOT LEAST, WE NEED THE SUPPORT OF THE INTERESTED COUNTRIES.

IF ALL THESE CONDITIONS ARE MET, WE ARE ALWAYS PREPARED TO HELP. DO NOT FORGET THAT THE UNITED NATIONS ALWAYS HAS CONTINGENCY PLANS. IF WE ARE ASKED TO HELP, EVEN FOR HELPING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS FROM LEBANON OR FOR ANY OTHER EXERCISE, WE ARE ALWAYS PREPARED WITH CONTINGENCY PLANS. QUESTION: ABOUT THE REPLACEMENT OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE BY UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN LEBANON: YOU SAID EARLIER THAT YOU HAD HEARD ABOUT THIS IN THE PAPERS. DO YOU MEAN TO SAY THAT THIS WAS NEVER RAISED WITH YOU BY ANY OF THE CONTRIBUTORS TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE? SECONDLY, IN THAT CASE, HOW CAN THE CONTINGENCY PLANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS POSSIBLY BE REALISTIC IN THE LIGHT OF THE MOVEMENT ON THE GROUND BY THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE? CAN YOU EXPLAIN THAT?

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: WELL, FIRST OF ALL, I HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED ANY OFFICIAL, CONCRETE REQUEST FROM ANY OF THE FOUR PARTICIPANTS IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE, AND SECONDLY, WE ARE RATHER USED TO THIS KIND OF EXERCISE AND WE THINK THAT THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND RIGHT NOW DOES NOT AFFECT OUR PLANS. WE HAVE OUR CONTINGENCY PLANS, WHICH ARE FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO ACCOMMODATE THE SITUATION IF WE ARE EVER ASKED TO REPLACE THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE.

THOMSON

NNNN

CABINET, 22 NOVEMBER: LEBANON/MNF

Additional Points

1. Two bomb attacks in West Beirut, 21 December: lorry loaded with explosives detonated near French MNF HQ (one French soldier and 15 civilians killed, 17 wounded). Second bomb detonated in Pickwick Bar, often used by US Marines and Europeans (3 killed, several wounded). British Embassy have reported no British casualties.

2. UN Secretary-General reported to have advocated replacing MNF by a UN force. In line with proposal which French due to discuss yesterday with Russians.

Lebanon

PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/FUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR SPERTON
SIR J BULLARD
ED/NEWAD
ED/ED
ED/UND
HO/NAO

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE D10

ED/... ..
ED/CONSULAR DEPT
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IMMEDIATE

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RESIDENT CLERK

GRS 788
UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON 210330Z DEC 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3826 OF 21 DECEMBER
INFO PRIORITY MIDDLE EAST POSTS, PARIS, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK
AND UKDEL NATO

ADVANCE COPY

mt

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PRESS CONFERENCE, 20 DECEMBER : MIDDLE EAST.

1. AFTER A BRIEF OPENING STATEMENT ON THE ECONOMY PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS CLOSELY QUESTIONED ABOUT HIS MIDDLE EAST POLICY.
2. HE SAID THAT STRATEGIC COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL WOULD NOT JEOPARDISE THE U S ROLE AS PEACEKEEPER. IT WAS NOTHING MORE THAN A REAFFIRMATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP DATING FROM 1948. HE EMPHASISED TO SHAMIR THAT HE WOULD GO FORWARD WITH RELATIONS WITH THE MODERATE ARABS IN ORDER TO ACT AS A CATALYST IN BRINGING PEACE TO THE MIDDLE EAST.
3. THE MIDDLE EAST WAS A TINDERBOX, OF IMPORTANCE TO THE FREE WORLD, WHERE AN UNWANTED WAR COULD START. THE U S WAS DETERMINED TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT PEACE. PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE WITH THE MODERATE ARABS: SOME HAD ABANDONED THEIR REFUSAL TO LET ISRAEL EXIST. SADAT - GOD REST HIS SOUL - HAD BROKEN THE MOULD. THE GOAL WAS NOW TO FIND MORE LEADERS AND GOVERNMENTS TO QUOTE BECOME EGYPTS UNQUOTE.
4. ASKED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF MARINES DYING IN LEBANON ON U S PUBLIC OPINION, THE PRESIDENT SAID HE UNDERSTOOD PUBLIC CONCERN WHICH HAD BEEN SWAYED BY ATTACKS, SOME POLITICALLY - MOTIVATED, ON THE MARINES PRESENCE. HE LAUNCHED INTO A SOMEWHAT DISJOINTED AND SELECTIVE ACCOUNT OF RECENT HISTORY.

~~THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD COME UNGLUED SEVERAL YEARS AGO. MORE THAN 1 MILLION PALESTINIAN REFUGEES WHO HAD BEEN IN~~

5. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD COME UNGLUED SEVERAL YEARS AGO.
MORE THAN 1 MILLION PALESTINIAN REFUGEES WHO HAD BEEN IN
LEBANON FOR DECADES HAD SET UP THEIR OWN MILITIA - THE PLO
MILITARY AND TERRORIST GROUP - WHO HAD NOT ONLY CAUSED TROUBLE
IN LEBANON BUT HAD CROSSED INTO NORTHERN ISRAEL AND PREYED ON
CIVILIANS THERE. FINALLY THE ISRAELIS HAD CROSSED INTO LEBANON.
THEIR FIRST GOAL HAD BEEN TO PUSH THE PLO BACK 25 MILES. BUT THEY
HAD KEPT ATTACKING, SO THE ISRAELIS HAD PUSHED FORWARD TO THE EDGE
OF BEIRUT WHERE THOUSANDS HAD DIED IN THE FIGHTING. DURING ALL
THIS THE LEBANESE HAD ASKED THE SYRIANS TO COME IN TO HELP PRESERVE
ORDER AMONG THE RELIGIOUS AND OTHER RIVAL FACTIONS.

6. ONCE A LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN FORMED AND THE PLO HAD BEEN
REJECTED THE MNF HAD GONE IN. THE ISRAELIS, HAVING COMPLETED THEIR
MISSION, HAD ANNOUNCED THEIR WILLINGNESS AND INTENTION TO WITHDRAW,
AS HAD THE SYRIANS. BUT THE SYRIANS HAD QUOTE FOR SOME REASON UNQUOTE
RENEGED ON THEIR PROMISE DESPITE A FORMAL LEBANESE REQUEST THAT THEY
SHOULD LEAVE. THE MNF'S MISSION WAS UNCHANGED. THEY HAD
HELPED TO ARM AND TRAIN THE LAF WHICH WAS NOW A CAPABLE FORCE.
WHEN OTHER FOREIGN FORCES WITHDREW AND THE LAF ADVANCED TO ESTABLISH
ORDER THE MNF WAS SUPPOSED TO GO BEHIND THEM TO TRY TO HELP ACHIEVE
STABILITY AND ORDER. THE ISRAELIS HAD AGREED TO WITHDRAW: SYRIA
WAS THE STUMBLING-BLOCK. GEMAYEL WAS MEANWHILE TRYING TO BRING IN
OTHER LEBANESE FORCES TO BROADEN THE BASE OF HIS GOVERNMENT.

7. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SAFETY OF THE MARINES REAGAN SAID
THAT HE WAS NOT PURSUING A POLICY OF ESCALATION BUT THAT U S FORCES
WOULD SHOOT BACK IF ATTACKED. THIS HAD GIVEN PAUSE FOR THOUGHT
TO THOSE WHO HAD CONSIDERED THE MNF FAIR GAME. THEY WOULD TRY MORE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES BUT TERRORISM COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO WIN.
FIELD COMMANDERS WERE DOING ALL THEY COULD TO ENSURE THE
MARINES' SAFETY. THE REPORTS OF THE PENTAGON INVESTIGATION AND
A HOUSE ARMED SERVICES SUB-COMMITTEE ON THE ATTACK ON THE MARINES
HQ WOULD BE CONSIDERED BY WEINBERGER IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. THE
PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE STILL HAD FULL CONFIDENCE IN THE MARINE
COMMANDANT: THE HQ BUILDING HAD BEEN THE SAFEST PLACE FOR THE
MARINES GIVEN THE WEAPONS WHICH HAD BEEN USED AGAINST THEM PRIOR
TO 23 OCTOBER.

8. ASKED ABOUT LT GOODMAN, REAGAN SAID THAT HE WAS NOT A PRISONER
OF WAR AS THE SYRIANS CLAIMED SINCE NO WAR HAD BEEN DECLARED. HE
DID NOT THINK THE SYRIANS WOULD USE HIM AS A HOSTAGE OR
BARGAINING CHIP. THE U S WAS DOING ALL IT COULD TO SECURE HIS
RELEASE: THIS HAD BEEN HIGH ON THE AGENDA OF RUMSFELD'S TALKS IN
DAMASCUS.

9. REAGAN CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT THE MARINES WOULD BE BROUGHT
HOME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER ACCOMPLISHING THEIR MISSION.
HE REPEATED THAT HE WOULD TAKE NO DECISION INVOLVING THE LIVES
OR SAFETY OF U S SERVICEMEN FOR POLITICAL OR ELECTORAL REASONS.

WRIGHT

NNNN



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01- 233 8798

BF?

F Gallagher Esq

Your reference

BEIRUT

Our reference

Date

20 December 1983

Dear Francis

*Dub
22/12*

PERMANENT BUREAU FOR THE DRUZE INSTITUTIONS

1. I enclose a message which the Prime Minister has received from the above. Subject to your views I should be grateful if you could arrange for onward transmission of a reply along the lines of the enclosed draft.

Yours ever

J D Bevan

J D Bevan
Near East and North Africa Dept

→ cc Mr. Bourger, Print Office



NENAC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 December, 1983

PS
PS/Mr W.C.
Mr. E. J. P. O.

Mr. Bevan

Handwritten scribbles and initials

See ltr,

Lebanon

I enclose a message which the Prime Minister has received from the Permanent Bureau for the Druze Institutions. I should be grateful if you would arrange for an appropriate reply to be sent.

for ev
for ltr.

P. F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

10 DEC 1983/1952
ZCZC DLM4486 BTR970 0050
GEMM CO LEBN 140
RS BEYROUTH 140 10 1500

M. Cabas
12/12

✓
THE RIGHT HON.
PRIME MINISTER
MARGARET THATCHER
10 DOWNING ST. LONDON

THE PERMANENT BUREAU FOR THE DRUZE INSTITUTIONS PRESENTS TO
THE RIGHT HON. PRIME MINISTER ITS BEST RESPECTS AND TAKES THE
OPPORTUNITY TO INFORM YOU THAT THE DESPITE THE PERPETRATED MURDER
OF THE HEAD OF THE DRUZE RELIGIOUS COURTS THE HON. SHEIKH HALIM
TAKIEDDINE THE DRUZE RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL LEADERS COMPLIED WITH
THE WISHES OF YOUR GOVERNMENT AND THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH OF LEBANON
AND LIFTED THE SIEGE OF DEIR-EL-KAMAR IN ORDER TO ALLOW ITS BESIGED
REFUGEES INCLUDING 4000 PHALANGISTS MILITIAMEN TO CELEBRATE
CHRISTMAS AND NEW YEAR WITH THEIR FAMILIES
WE ONLY HOPE THAT THIS GESTURE WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A QUICK RETURN
TO PEACEFUL AND FRIENDLY CO-EXISTENCE AMONG THE DRUZE AND CHRISTIAN
COMMUNITIES IN LEBANON

VERY RESPECTFULLY

THE PERMANENT BUREAU
FOR THE DRUZE INSTITUTIONS
BEIRUT LEBANON P.O. BOX: 2500

COL BTR970 10 4000 2500 ✓

for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions
TELEGRAMS shown in your dialling instructions
TELECOM shown in your dialling instructions

	DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note	TYPE: Draft/Final
	FROM: F H Gallagher, British Embassy, Beirut. DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:	Reference
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted Unclassified	TO: Permanent Bureau for the Druze Institutions, Beirut, Lebanon. PO BOX 2500	Your Reference Copies to:
PRIVACY MARKING	SUBJECT:	
.....In Confidence	Thank you for your message of 10 December to the Prime	
CAVEAT.....	Minister. I have been asked to reply.	
	<p>The British Government thoroughly condemns the murder of the Hon Sheikh Halim Takieddine. We welcome the restraint shown by the Druze forces in the aftermath of this deplorable incident. The British Government is convinced that Lebanon's problems cannot be solved by violence.</p> <p>We recognise the decision to lift the seige of Deir al Kamar as an important humanitarian gesture. We too hope that this will facilitate a speedy return to peaceful co-existence among all communities in Lebanon. The British Government ^{intends} wishes to contribute, within the limits of its resources, to the process of reconstruction and rehabilitation in the Beirut and Shouf area. We shall continue to do all we can to help the Lebanese people work out a peaceful solution to their problems.</p>	
Enclosures—flag(s).....		

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T2231



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OPS

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Free access

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 December 1983

Dear Mr. President,

I am grateful for your message of 5 December in which you set out your view of recent developments in the Middle East.

I think it important that we should explain our thinking to each other in order to increase mutual understanding. Richard Luce has given me an account of the interesting talks which he had in Damascus on 4 December. Only through constructive dialogue can we hope to make progress towards solving the acute problems of the region. I am encouraged that despite your disagreements with the United States, President Reagan's special representative in the Middle East, Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, was in Damascus on 14 and 15 December for talks, and I hope that these talks too were fruitful.

The role of the Multinational Force in Lebanon, and the British contribution to it, is clear. It is a peacekeeping force. We agreed to contribute to it on the basis that its purpose was to assist the Lebanese Government and the Lebanese armed forces in the Beirut area to facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government authority over that area. Our aim is to help restore conditions in which the people of Lebanon themselves can settle their internal differences. I believe that this objective is shared by all the contributors to the MNF. Above all our presence is intended to help end the cycle of violence which has caused so much suffering in Lebanon and to promote reconciliation among the people of Lebanon.

We also support President Gemayel's efforts to reach agreement on the early withdrawal of outside forces. I am conscious

/ of Your

Of Your Excellency's view that Syrian forces are in Lebanon on a different basis from those of Israel, whose invasion of Lebanon last year the United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned. I hope nevertheless that it will be possible to reach an agreement which will allow the withdrawal of both Israeli and Syrian forces, while meeting the essential and different security requirements of both countries.

It is not our intention to become involved in internal Lebanese quarrels, and we do not intend that our forces should do anything which might have the effect of exacerbating tensions within Lebanon. Naturally our troops must have the right to defend themselves if attacked, but they will exercise this right with deliberation and responsibility. We shall continue to play our part in Lebanon so long as we think we have a useful contribution to make. Both President Gemayel and Mr. Walid Jumblatt have assured us during recent visits to London that all communities welcome the presence of the British contingent, and value the role it is playing, notably in providing a neutral guard for the vitally important ceasefire commission.

If the suffering in Lebanon is to be brought to an end, all of us who have the interests of the Lebanese people at heart must work together constructively for peace and reconciliation. I am sure that we share the same objective. I hope, therefore, that we can continue to keep in touch.

With my personal good wishes for a speedy recovery from your recent illness,

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

President Hafez el Asad

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GR600

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FM UKREP BRUSSELS 191440Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4543 OF 19 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ROME WASHINGTON BEIRUT PRIORITY MOSCOW

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

DISCUSSIONS WITH CHEYSSON ON THE LEBANON/MNF

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD A WORD WITH CHEYSSON IN PRIVATE IN THE MARGINS OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD VERY LITTLE TO ADD TO THE MESSAGE HE HAD SENT CHEYSSON ON 16 DECEMBER ABOUT GEMAYEL'S VISIT TO LONDON. GEMAYEL HAD SOUNDED OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE, BUT IT HAD NOT BEEN VERY CONVINCING. WE HAD PRESSED HIM HARD TO PUSH AHEAD WITH THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS. IT WAS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR WHAT HE THOUGHT OF THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT. CHEYSSON SAID THAT HE HAD NOTHING TO ADD TO THE REPORT WE HAD RECEIVED OF GUTMANN'S VISIT TO BEIRUT. SO FAR AS THE FRENCH MNF CONTINGENCY WAS CONCERNED, CHEYSSON THOUGHT IT WAS NOW TIME TO 'START RESHUFFLING'. THE FRENCH FORCE NUMBERED 2,000: THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT NOW WANTED THAT CONSIDERABLY REDUCED. AS A FIRST STEP, FRANCE PROPOSED TO RETURN 480 SOLDIERS TO UNIFIL, FROM WHICH THEY HAD BEEN BORROWED. THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD ALREADY BEEN SO INFORMED. IT WAS TOO EARLY TO SAY WHEN THAT WOULD HAPPEN. PRESIDENT MITTERRAND WAS HOLDING A MEETING ON THIS POINT IN PARIS THIS AFTERNOON.

3. CHEYSSON SAID THAT THE MOST URGENT QUESTION WAS THE POSSIBILITY OF A UNIFIL PRESENCE ON THE GROUND IN BEIRUT: IN SABRA AND CHATILA. HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT SHULTZ HAD NOT OBJECTED TO THE IDEA OF A UN PRESENCE IN BEIRUT. THE FRENCH THEREFORE THOUGHT IT WAS NOW TIME TO APPROACH THE RUSSIANS ON THIS POINT. THERE WOULD BE A MEETING WITH KOVALYEV IN PARIS IN TWO DAYS TIME. CHEYSSON SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD HAD FREQUENT CONTACT WITH THE RUSSIANS ABOUT THE LEBANON. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED HOW, IN CHEYSSON'S VIEW, THE RUSSIANS WOULD REACT. CHEYSSON SAID THAT A MONTH AGO THEY WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED A UNIFIL PRESENCE. BUT HE SUSPECTED THEY MIGHT NOW BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER IT. THEY HAD RECENTLY SHOWN SIGNS OF A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH EG VOTING FOR THE CEASEFIRE IN TRIPOLI, AND IN NOT OBJECTING TO THE USE OF THE UN FLAG FOR GREEK SHIP INVOLVED IN THE EVACUATION OPERATIONS. CHEYSSON WAS SURE THE APPROACH TO THE RUSSIANS WAS WORTH A TRY. IF IT WORKED, THEN THE FRENCH WOULD FORMALLY APPROACH BOTH US AND THE AMERICANS. CHEYSSON ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT GEMAYEL MIGHT ALSO CONSIDER THIS IN HIS OWN INTERESTS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHETHER CHEYSSON HAD DISCUSSED THIS

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/ WITH

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WITH SHULTZ. CHEYSSON SAID THAT HE HAD NOT. HE DID NOT WISH TO BE SEEN TO BE TOO CLOSE TO THE U S.

4. CHEYSSON ASKED WHAT OUR INTENTIONS WERE CONCERNING THE UK MNF CONTINGENT. HE COMMENTED THAT THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT WERE KEEPING A VERY LOW PROFILE, SPENDING BY FAR THE GREATER AMOUNT OF ITS TIME WITHIN BARRACKS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE ALL FOUR MNF CONTRIBUTORS TAKING THE SAME LINE, HENCE OUR ANXIETY ABOUT THE SCALE OF U S ACTIVITY. THAT WAS WHY WE HAD WANTED AN EARLY MEETING INVOLVING SHULTZ. OUR FEELING HAD BEEN THAT THE MEETING WITH SHULTZ IN BRUSSELS HAD NOT REALLY ELICITED A CONSIDERED REACTION TO FRENCH, ITALIAN AND UK COMMENTS. CHEYSSON SAID HE THOUGHT THERE WAS LITTLE POINT IN HAVING A THIRD MEETING JUST FOR THE SAKE OF IT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD ALSO CONSIDERED THE IDEA OF AN EARLY MEETING OF SENIOR OFFICIALS IF A MINISTERIAL MEETING WAS NOT POSSIBLE. IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT CHEYSSON HAD SAID, PERHAPS THE BEST WAY FORWARD WOULD BE TO WAIT FOR THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE FRENCH APPROACH, AND FOR GEMAYELS REACTION AND THEN CONSIDER WHETHER RUMSFELD'S PRESENCE IN EUROPE MIGHT BE EXPLOITED FOR A MEETING OF SENIOR OFFICIALS LATER THIS WEEK. CHEYSSON SEEMED INTERESTED IN THIS, BUT DID NOT DIRECTLY COMMIT HIMSELF.

5. NENAD: PLEASE DISTRIBUTE FURTHER AS NECESSARY.

FCO ADVANCE TO:
FCO - NENAD

BUTLER

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

LIMITED

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DEFENCE DEPT

FUSD

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ECD(E)

FINANCE DEPT

PROTOCOL DEPT

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/FUS

SIR J BULLARD

SIR J LEAHY

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

MR MACINNES

MR ADAMS

MR EGERTON

MR JENKINS

COPIES TO:

MOD DS11

MR GOODALL) CABINET
SIR R ARMSTRONG) OFFICE

SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

2
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 December 1983

Dear John,

Type letter pl.

A.J.C. 19/12

Letter from President Asad of Syria

With my letter of 8 December I enclosed the text of a message from President Asad.

President Asad's message consists entirely of an attack on the policies of the United States in Lebanon and towards Syria. Sir Geoffrey Howe thinks that in her reply the Prime Minister will not wish to become too directly involved in defending the actions of the United States. To do so would overemphasise the identification of the British Government with US policies and undermine any chance we may have of being able to influence the Syrians towards more constructive policies now or in future. For the same reasons, the draft reply includes a reference which acknowledges, without accepting it, the Syrian position that her forces in Lebanon should not be equated with those of Israel. We should, nevertheless, make clear that we and our partners share the same overall objectives in Lebanon. Sir Geoffrey therefore recommends that the Prime Minister should in her reply concentrate on explaining how we see the mandate of the MNF and the role of the British contingent.

/ I enclose a draft for the Prime Minister's consideration.

Yours ever,

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

Peter Ricketts

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry
No.

DRAFT LETTER

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret,
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:-
President Hafez el Asad

From

Prime Minister
Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

I am grateful ~~to you~~ for your message of 5 December in which you set out your view of recent developments in the Middle East.

I think it important that we should explain our thinking to each other in order to increase mutual understanding. Richard Luce has given me an account of the interesting talks which he had in Damascus on 4 December. Only through constructive dialogue can we hope to make progress towards solving the acute problems of the region. I am encouraged that despite your disagreements with the United States, President Reagan's special representative in the Middle East, Mr Donald Rumsfeld, was in Damascus on 14 and 15 December for talks, and I hope that these talks too were fruitful.

The role of the Multinational Force in Lebanon, and the British contribution to it, is clear. It is a peacekeeping force. We agreed to contribute to it on the basis that its purpose was to assist the Lebanese Government and the Lebanese armed forces in the Beirut area to facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government authority over that area. Our aim is to help restore conditions in which the people of Lebanon themselves can

settle their internal differences. I believe that this objective is shared by all the contributors to the MNF. Above all our presence is intended to help end the cycle of violence which has caused so much suffering in Lebanon, and promote reconciliation among the people of Lebanon.

We also support President Gemayel's efforts to reach agreement on the early withdrawal of outside forces. I am conscious of Your Excellency's view that Syrian forces are in Lebanon on a different basis from those of Israel, whose invasion of Lebanon last year the United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned. I hope nevertheless that it will be possible to reach an agreement which will allow the withdrawal of both Israeli and Syrian forces, while meeting the essential and different security requirements of both countries.

It is not our intention to become involved in internal Lebanese quarrels, and we do not intend that our forces should do anything which might have the effect of exacerbating tensions within Lebanon. Naturally our troops must have the right to defend themselves if attacked, but they will exercise this right with deliberation and responsibility. We shall continue to play our part in Lebanon so long as we think we have a useful contribution to make. Both President Gemayel and Mr Walid Jumblatt have assured us during recent visits to London that all communities welcome the presence of the British contingent, and value the role it is playing, notably in providing a neutral guard for the vitally important ceasefire commission.

/If the

If the suffering in Lebanon is to be brought to an end, all of us who have the interests of the Lebanese people at heart must work together constructively for peace and reconciliation. I am sure that we share the same objective. I hope, therefore, that we can continue to keep in touch.

With my personal good wishes for a speedy recovery from your recent illness,

Lebanon: Int Sit P.S.

119 DEC 1983

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GRS 460

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FROM DAMASCUS 191130Z DEC

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 425 OF 19 DECEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, JEDDA, WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE TEL AVIV, AMMAN, CAIRO, PARIS, ROME, ATHENS

MT

SYRIA/LEBANON/SAUDI ARABIA

1. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF SYRIA, LEBANON AND SAUDI ARABIA MET IN DAMASCUS ON 18 DECEMBER AS FORESHADOWED BY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE IN LONDON LAST WEEK. THERE WERE TWO SESSIONS OF TALKS EITHER SIDE OF LUNCH AT THE END OF WHICH LITTLE PROGRESS APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN MADE. KHADDAM SPOKE TO THE PRESS AFTERWARDS AND SAID THE TALKS HAD BEEN AIMED AT PAVING THE WAY FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF LEBANESE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION TALKS BUT THEIR DISCUSSIONS HAD NOT BEEN CONCLUDED AND A FURTHER MEETING WOULD BE HELD IN SAUDI ARABIA IN EARLY JANUARY.

2. CONCERNING THE NEW CEASEFIRE KHADDAM MERELY COMMENTED THAT THE SECURITY COMMITTEE (WHICH HAD MET IN DAMASCUS ON 16 DECEMBER) HAD ARRIVED AT CERTAIN PRINCIPLES AIMED AT REINFORCING THE CEASEFIRE SEMICOLON THESE PRINCIPLES WERE NOW TO BE DISCUSSED BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND THE LEADERSHIPS OF AMAL AND THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT. KHADDAM PARRIED OTHER QUESTIONS BY SAYING THAT ALL MATTERS HAD BEEN OPEN TO DISCUSSION.

3. THE SAUDI EMBASSY HAVE PLAYED DOWN PRINCE SAUD'S PART IN THE TALKS ON LEBANON. THE FIRST SECRETARY STRESSED TO US ON 19 DECEMBER THAT THE SAUDI ROLE WAS NO MORE THAN THAT OF A MEDIATOR. THEY WERE NOT PUTTING FORWARD ANY CONCRETE PROPOSALS OF THEIR OWN BUT FELT OBLIGED TO ACT AS INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS GIVEN THE LACK OF ANY OTHER PARTY WILLING AND ABLE TO DO SO. THE SAUDI CONFIRMED THAT THERE WOULD BE A FURTHER MEETING OF THE THREE MINISTERS IN THE FIRST HALF OF JANUARY AND THAT THERE COULD BE NO FURTHER ROUND OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION TALKS BEFORE THEN. HE ADDED THAT PRINCE SAUD'S EARLIER VISIT TO DAMASCUS (MY TELNO 416) HAD BEEN SOLELY CONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE PLO IN TRIPOLI IN WHICH THE SAUDIS WERE TAKING A MORE ACTIVE PART.

CONFIDENTIAL

/COMMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMENT .

4. I HOPE TO GET AN OFFICIAL SYRIAN VIEW OF THESE AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS ON 20 DECEMBER. MEANWHILE, AS SEEN FROM HERE THE PROSPECTS FOR LEBANON LOOK BLEAK INDFED, AND I DETECT NO FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN SYRIAN POSITIONS AS DISTINCT FROM A DEGREE OF TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY. THE LEISURELY APPROACH TO THE RESUMPTION OF RECONCILIATION TALKS MAY SUIT THE SYRIAN GAME BUT CARRIES THE RISK OF COMPLETE BREAKDOWN OR WORSE IN THE CONTINUED FAILURE OF THE AMERICANS TO SUCEED IN PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS OR EVEN TO TRY TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS.

LUCAS

MIDDLE EAST

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

19 December 1983

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T222/83

Dear President Gemayel,

I write to thank you most warmly for the beautiful table-cloth and place settings which you presented to me during your visit. It was very kind of you to leave with me such a delightful gift.

I much enjoyed our talks and wish you well in your efforts to bring about reconciliation and stability in the Lebanon.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Sheikh Amin Gemayel

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FILE

87

67

cc: Sir A Parsons

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 December, 1983

LEBANON

The Prime Minister has asked me to bring to the attention of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary some ideas which Sir Anthony Parsons has put to her about the situation in the Lebanon.

The heart of Sir Anthony Parsons' idea is that an initiative should be taken designed to replace all foreign forces in the Lebanon by UN forces/observers pending national reconciliation and the creation of a capability of the Lebanese Armed Forces to look after the security of their own country.

In more detail, he envisages the negotiation of an overall package which would secure the replacement of the MNF by a UN force with additional observers in the Chouf, and the replacement of Israeli forces in South Lebanon and Syrian forces in East Lebanon by an expanded UNIFIL with a different mandate. This mandate would have to include a pro-Israeli element, for example ensuring the integrity of Israel's Northern border. Tactically, the objective would be the implementation seriatim of the three parts of the package - i.e. the withdrawal of the MNF would come first, the Israelis second and the Syrians third. The last two would in practice have to be virtually simultaneous and would be the most difficult to achieve. Even if we failed on the total package, we might succeed over replacement of the MNF. At worst, we would oblige the Syrians and the Russians to stand up and be counted as the principal opponents of a proposal which would have the support of most of the world community.

Brian Urquhart told Tony Parsons on 15 December that he thought that the Israelis would be much less hostile than in the past to ideas of this kind, although they would be obliged to continue to harp on the 17 May agreement. Three senior Israelis including Sharon and Kimche had told him privately in recent weeks

CONFIDENTIAL

/that

A handwritten signature in the bottom right corner of the page.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

that they had changed their view about UNIFIL. They now realised that UNIFIL had done a good job and they would like to see its mandate resumed and extended.

One means of floating this idea might be to put it to the MNF contributors if and when a further meeting between them is arranged.

In any event, the Prime Minister would be most grateful for the views of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on these ideas.

A. J. COLES

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

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FM ROME

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 691

OF 171110Z DECEMBER 1983

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BEIRUT

INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV

MY TELNO 688: ITALY/LEBANON

REDUCTION OF ITALIAN CONTINGENT

1. BARTOLUCCI, THE ITALIAN CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF, HAS WRITTEN TO SIR EDWIN BRAMALL TO CONFIRM THAT THE ITALIAN MNF CONTINGENT WILL BE REDUCED. TEXT OF LETTER FOLLOWS BY BAG (NOT TO ALL). MY DA HAS REPORTED ITS CONTENTS BY SECURE TELEPHONE TO MODUK.
2. BARTOLUCCI SAYS THAT THE REDUCTION WILL BEGIN IN JANUARY, IN THE MANNER DESCRIBED TO SIR EDWIN BRAMALL IN PARIS. IT WILL NOT AFFECT THE TASKS ALREADY ASSIGNED TO THE ITALIANS, AND THEIR CONTINGENT WILL REMAIN LARGER THAN ENVISAGED IN THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENTS (1100 MEN). THE ITALIAN COMMANDER IN LEBANON WILL DISCUSS THE IMPLICATIONS WITH HIS MNF COLLEAGUES.
3. BARTOLUCCI SAYS THAT THE ITALIAN DECISION MUST BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL ANNOUNCED BY HIS GOVERNMENT.

MEETING OF OFFICIALS ON 19/20 DECEMBER

4. WE TOLD FRANCESCHI (MFA) LAST NIGHT THAT NO MEETING COULD BE HELD ON 19 OR 20 DECEMBER. HE COMMENTED THAT HE WOULD GLADLY HAVE ATTENDED: ONLY PARLIAMENTARY COMMITMENTS HAD PREVENTED BOTTAI FROM PARTICIPATING. IN FRANCESCHI'S VIEW THE REFUSAL OF THE U S AMBASSADOR IN SYRIA TO SAY ANYTHING TO HIS MNF COLLEAGUES INCREASED THE ARGUMENT FOR MAINTAINING DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE AMERICAN PROTAGONISTS.

BRIDGES

BT

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/FUS

SIR J BULLARD

SIR J LEAHY

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

MR MACINNES

MR ADAMS

MR EGERTON

MR JENKINS

COPIES TO:

MOD DS11

MR GOODALL) CABINET
SIR R ARMSTRONG) OFFICESIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

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~~WHOLE PART: ADVANCE COPIES~~ #

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*This bill at the time
being the idea of an
MNF meeting.*

A-F-C 19/12

CONFIDENTIAL
FM PARIS 161730Z DEC 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1179 OF 16 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, ROME, UKREP BRUSSELS

ADVANCE COPY

mt

MY TELNO 1166 AND TELECONS NIXON/FORD: LEBANON: MNF CONSULTATIONS

1. AS INSTRUCTED BY TELEPHONE, WE PUT TO THE QUAI THE PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING AT DIRECTOR LEVEL IN LONDON ON 19 OR 20 DECEMBER. PAVEC, HEAD OF NEAR EAST DEPARTMENT AT THE QUAI, TOLD US AFTER SUBMITTING THE PROPOSAL, THAT CHEYSSON CONSIDERED THAT A MEETING OF THE FOUR SO SOON AFTER THE BRUSSELS MEETING WOULD BE TOO EARLY, WHATEVER THE LEVEL AT WHICH IT WERE HELD. EXPECTATIONS MIGHT BE AROUSED, LEAKS MIGHT OCCUR (SUCH AS THAT IN LE MONDE REPORTED IN MY TELNO 1170 - NOT TO ALL) AND AN EXTREMELY DELICATE SITUATION MIGHT BE UPSET.

2. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION, PAVEC SAID HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT WHAT THE FRENCH ATTITUDE MIGHT BE TO A MEETING AFTER THE HOLIDAY BREAK. HIS TONE, HOWEVER, WAS NOT ENCOURAGING.

FRETWELL

NNNN
SENT AT 161818Z JW

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister.

①

MR. COLES ✓

LEBANON

Yes not

If you agree I shall convey this to the Foreign Secretary.
A-J.C. 16/12

Every time the guns of the USS New Jersey open fire, I become more than ever convinced that the time has come to play the UN card. That is to say, an initiative should be taken designed to replace "all foreign forces" in Lebanon by UN forces/observers pending "national reconciliation" and the creation of a capability by the Lebanese Armed Forces to look after the security of their own country.

I got support from a slightly unexpected quarter yesterday - Brian Urquhart, who has been visiting Britain for his mother's 100th birthday. He was very encouraging. He thought that the Israelis would be much less hostile than they had been, although they would be obliged to continue to harp on the 17 May agreement. Three senior Israelis including Sharon and Kimche, had told him privately in recent weeks that they had changed their view about UNIFIL. They now realised that UNIFIL had done a good job and would like to see its mandate resumed and extended. This is only a straw in the wind, but I doubt if anything like this would have been said even six months ago.

Specifically, I would envisage negotiating an overall package which would bring about the replacement of the MNF by a UN force with additional observers in the Chouf, the replacement of Israeli forces in South Lebanon and Syrian forces in East Lebanon by an expanded UNIFIL with a different mandate. This mandate would have to include a pro-Israeli element eg to ensure the integrity of Israel's Northern border. Tactically, the objective would be for the three parts of the package to be implemented seriatim, ie the withdrawal of the MNF to come first, of the Israelis second and of the Syrians third. The last two would in practice have to be virtually simultaneous and would be the most difficult to achieve. Even if we failed on the total package, we might succeed over replacement of the MNF. At worst, we would oblige the Syrians and the Soviet Union to stand up and be counted as the principal opponents of something which would have the support of most of the world community.

I am sure that the experts will be able to find a thousand reasons, including timing, against our launching such an initiative. I can think of most of the objections myself. But I would find them more convincing if anyone could suggest an alternative to the present situation.


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/My recommendation

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- 2 -

My recommendation is that whoever represents us at the meeting of MNF contributors next week (I gather that it will be at senior official level not at the level of Foreign Ministers) should be briefed to have a first discussion of this idea with our MNF partners.



A.D. PARSONS
16 December 1983

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 December 1983

Sir Antony Acland asked me this morning how the Prime Minister's message of 23 October to President Mitterrand about the attack on French soldiers in the Lebanon had been conveyed.

The evidence of my files shows that on Sunday, 23 October the Foreign and Commonwealth Office provided draft messages to both President Mitterrand and President Reagan.

These were despatched (the one to President Reagan in a slightly amended form) on the hot line. I confirm that the Cabinet Office has a teleprinter link with the Elysee.

The normal practice, whereby such messages are copied in their final form to the FCO, was not followed on this occasion - perhaps because it all happened on a Sunday. I shall take steps to ensure that this does not occur again.

A. J. COLES

Michael Jay, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 17

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PS/FUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR EBERTON.
SIR J BULLARD
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FM PARIS 151430Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1166 OF 15 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, ROME, UKREP BRUSSELS

YOUR TELNO 2089 TO WASHINGTON : LEBANON : MNF CONSULTATIONS

1. DELAYE IN CHEYSSON'S CABINET SAID THAT CHEYSSON WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO STAY FOR DINNER ON 19 DECEMBER BECAUSE HE HAD AN UNBREAKABLE COMMITMENT IN PARIS AT 5.00 IN THE AFTERNOON. NOR COULD HE BE IN BRUSSELS ON THE FOLLOWING MORNING.

2. DELAYE WONDERED IF AN ALTERNATIVE MIGHT NOT BE FOR SENIOR OFFICIALS TO MEET RUMSFELD SOMEWHERE IN EUROPE IN THE NEXT WEEK OR SO. HE SAID HE WOULD IN ANY CASE TRANSMIT YOUR PROPOSAL TO CHEYSSON (CURRENTLY WITH MITTERRAND VISITING YUGOSLAVIA) AND COME BACK TO US WHEN HE HAD CHEYSSON'S REACTION.

FRETWELL

16

PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/US
SIR J LEAHY
MR EBERTON
SIR J BULLARD
ED/NEAD
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FM BEIRUT 151140Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 722 OF 15 DECEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS, MODUK (D14 AND PS/S OF S)

SAVING BRITFORLEB

DAMASCUS TELNOS 412 AND 413 TO FCO: BRITFORLEB/PSP.

1. A PSP REPRESENTATIVE (SALLOUM) RANG EMBASSY AT 1145 HOURS LOCAL TODAY TO WARN US THAT LEBANESE FORCES (KATAEB) HAD MOVED UP UNDER COVER OF BRITFORLEB UNIT GUARDING TRAD BANK. PSP WISHED TO FIRE ON KATAEB BUT WERE VERY ANXIOUS NOT TO ENDANGER BRITFORLEB. BY ARRANGEMENT BRITFORLEB WITHDREW FROM TRAD BANK AREA, BEFORE PSP OPENED FIRE (BUT NOT BEFORE KATAEB HAD DONE SO.)

2. IT IS ENCOURAGING THAT PSP LEADERS APPROACHED US IN THIS WAY. SALLOUM SAID PSP DEEPLY APPRECIATED BRITFORLEB'S ROLE.

PALMER

BT

~~Mr. Coles~~

BRIEFING DICTATED OVER THE TELEPHONE FROM NICK EVANS MOD FOR
DAVID BARCLAY

Lebanon Cease-fire Discussions

Ad hoc talks have been underway in Damascus over the past week or so on means of consolidating the cease-fire. Most of the major factions in the Lebanon have been represented. The level and frequency of the meetings has varied: a major discrete session was held on 9 December. We have no knowledge of any further sessions being planned for today or tomorrow.

Meetings of the Cease-fire Committee in Beirut have not been held since 2 December, largely because of a dispute over hostages. It is hoped that the Committee will start meeting again shortly.

Line to take:

Cease-fire talks have been held both in Beirut (where the British contingent has provided guards) and in Damascus, involving all main factions. Welcome any move to consolidate the cease-fire and reduce tension.

15.12.83



10 DOWNING STREET

I agree Report

but can I be

told if the

Security talks have

begun in Damascus

or forecast?

s/s Defence.

BRITFORLETS.

Some sporadic firing in vicinity of HQ this morning. Two RPG 7 rocket shells hit the tobacco factory. Also some bursts of small arms fire from inter-factional fighting has now stopped. COM-Britforlets believes that firing was not directed at his HQ and he is relaxed. Incident was

been reported by media
as Keith Graves (BBC)
was in vicinity at the
time.

Further request from
BBC TV news for
interview but would have
to be done before 12.50pm.

Suggest reject.

Duty Clerk

for: NICK EVANS

15.12.83

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Prime Minister.

①

MR. COLES

If you agree I shall ask the F.I.C.O. to consider this idea.

LEBANON

A.J.C. 4/12.

The Syrian/Soviet attitude towards the deployment of UN observers in the Chouf has discouraged us from serious consideration of the possibility of replacing the MNF and the Israeli presence in South Lebanon, as well as the Syrian presence in the Bekaa, by UN forces. Something of the kind has been touched on lightly in recent discussions, eg by the French, but it has not been explored. Perhaps we should do so, although I would not rate the chances of success above .1% and it would take a long time to negotiate, if at all. But what is the alternative?

A major UN presence in Lebanon is not as inconceivable as it was a year ago. The Americans would not be so hostile since they want to withdraw their troops. The Israelis are uncomfortable in South Lebanon, suffering casualties and unable to control the local Shi'ite population. There is strong pressure in Israel for withdrawal. The Israelis would no longer have the excuse used for hostility to UNIFIL, namely that UNIFIL did not prevent the PLO from infiltrating South Lebanon and firing on Israeli settlements. The PLO is no longer there. Equally, the Israelis now know that Major Haddad's militia is incapable of controlling the local indigenous populace. Hence, the Israelis might be a fraction less implacably opposed to a UN presence than they have been in the past.

So far, the Syrians and Russians have effectively blocked any UN deployment in and around Beirut. The Syrians would not, of course, block a move to deploy UNIFIL in the area of South Lebanon running up to the Israeli border. If the Israelis withdrew the Syrians would probably be less reluctant to see UN forces deployed in the Bekaa and around Beirut. I do not believe that it would be possible to extend the operation to the whole country ie to replace the Syrians in North Lebanon by UN forces.

The objections to this scheme are obvious. The Americans are deeply suspicious of the UN, particularly since any action in the Security Council would involve a measure of cooperation with the Soviet Union. Israeli hackles would rise high and Shamir would be likely to stand pat on the 17 May agreement, although he knows perfectly well that it will never be implemented. The Syrians would react badly at the outset since any UN presence would inhibit their freedom of action in Lebanon.

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
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- 2 -

The Moslem factions might feel the same. In Third World terms, ever since Nasser's fiasco in 1967, it has been considered off-side to make life difficult for UN troops. The Third World regard this kind of behaviour as the prerogative of eg Israelis and South Africans. Hence, the Syrians and the Moslem factions would feel more inhibited than they do vis a vis the MNF.

The real point is that all of us have run out of ideas and the situation continues to deteriorate. American policy has failed. I find it impossible to believe that the Americans could bring about the total withdrawal of both Syrian and Israeli forces. Failing this, we shall continue to hang about until something happens which precipitates the withdrawal of the MNF. There will then be a vacuum which will be filled by the Syrians. A war between Syria and Israel will become a virtual certainty.

I suggest therefore that, with all scepticism, the FCO should consider discussing the UN card with the MNF partners. The very fact of such a negotiation being in train might help to defuse some of the tensions. Even if it only partially succeeded, we might get far enough to enable the MNF to withdraw.



A.D. PARSONS
14 December 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

Robin Butler.

MR. HESELTINE'S PHONE CALL TO MR. JUMBLATT

Speaking on BBC Radio 4's World at One today, Thursday 15 December, Mr. Heseltine denied that he had made the phone call public. Asked whether his independent action was unorthodox, he said that in the light of reports of shells landing near British troops he had to make a judgement about the safety of them and had asked someone to get Mr. Jumblatt on the phone quickly to stop the threat to the contingent and to seek an assurance for their safety.

He agreed that he had ignored protocol by phoning direct, but was concerned about the safety of the troops.

The Druse leader had given Mr. Heseltine an assurance over further firing which seems to have been observed.

Asked whether he warned Mr. Jumblatt about the consequences of shell firing on the British troops, Mr. Heseltine said Mr. Jumblatt was well aware of the seriousness of the situation.

Asked whether the troops could deal with retaliation, Mr. Heseltine replied that "we don't want to get into that language, we are there to ensure the maximum commitment to a peace-keeping role. Of course we are in a position to defend ourselves if we have to. Their role is respected".

Asked whether the Prime Minister had given prior approval for the phone call, he said that he was standing with her when the reports of firing were received and he had said he would immediately make the call and she had approved that action. She did not join in the conversation. The phone call was made at No.10. The Foreign Secretary was not present - a Minister of State was - but was subsequently informed.

SW

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file TWP

*cc MASTER
for*

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 December 1983

Dear Peter,

VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT OF LEBANON

I enclose a record of the conversation between the Prime Minister and President Gemayel which took place here this morning and a note of the main points made at the working lunch which followed.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

for Colas.

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

A handwritten signature, possibly 'PFR', written in dark ink.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT
OF LEBANON AT 1215 HOURS ON WEDNESDAY 14 DECEMBER 1983, AT
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

Present

Prime Minister	President Gemayel
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	Lebanese Ambassador
Defence Secretary	Mr. Farouk Jabre
Mr. Coles	Col. Muhammad Al-Khalil

* * * * *

The Prime Minister said that it would be useful first to establish the latest military situation. The Secretary of State for Defence said that shells had fallen this morning near the headquarters of the British contingent of the MNF. They had apparently been fired from Druze positions. President Gemayel said that he had just taken a telephone call from Beirut where the situation was calm. The various factions in the Lebanon wished to reach an agreement but there was a fifth column which always prevented this. That was the main problem.

The Prime Minister said that we had naturally been worried about the position of the British contingent. It was isolated and near a no-go area, but we believed that our troops were very highly regarded and that they had won respect from all quarters. In an incident two days ago, three British soldiers had been surrounded in the no-go area, but then were released when it was realised that they were British. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the President had already emphasised to him that this was in a sense encouraging.

The Prime Minister said that our contingent had two main roles. It guarded the bank where the cease-fire committee met, though there had been no meetings for 11 days. It also carried out patrols. We would naturally continue to keep under review the safety of our contingent, following the terrible attacks on the American and French contingents. If anything happened to the British contingent, there would be strong Parliamentary criticism.

CONFIDENTIAL

/And if

And if the cease-fire talks did not start again, questions would be asked as to whether the role of the British contingent was useful.

The Secretary of State for Defence asked whether the President believed that the shells which landed near the British contingent were ^{fired by} Druze forces. President Gemayel said he was not sure whether this was the case. The Druze had nothing against the British contingent. Perhaps the fifth column of which he had talked was the source of the firing. Colonel Al-Khalil said that there were two possible explanations. The shells might have been fired in Bhamdoun. Or it was possible that the Amal had asked for artillery support and the initial shots had landed near the British contingent. He doubted whether the shells had been deliberately aimed at our troops. It was not true to say that the British contingent was isolated. It was in contact with the Lebanese army lines at Hadath. The Secretary of State for Defence asked whether the Lebanese armed forces were able to enter the no-go area. Colonel Al-Khalil said that they could not do so. The area was controlled by Amal.

President Gemayel said that Lebanon would always be grateful to the United Kingdom for its participation in the MNF. The British contingent was small in size but, because of its efficiency and conduct, big in impact. Its role was accepted by all Lebanese, irrespective of their differing positions. That was why the British contingent was chosen to protect the cease-fire talks. This role signified that our contingent really was a peace-keeping force. Its efficiency in carrying out its duties reflected the quality of the British armed forces. Lebanon felt very comfortable with the British contingent which was the guarantee that the cease-fire talks could continue. He would like the cease-fire committee to work for 24 hours a day, but the British contingent was too small to manage to guard the venue for that length of time and the parties to the cease-fire talks did not wish any other contingent to protect them. So effectively the committee could not operate after 5 p.m.

/The

The Prime Minister commented that at present the cease-fire committee was not meeting at all. President Gemayel replied that on 15 December certain Lebanese officers would visit Damascus to try to reconstitute the cease-fire committee. They would see Mr. Khaddam with whom the Lebanese Government was in permanent contact. The purpose of the visit was to restore a permanent cease-fire and establish the best way of maintaining it. He would be able to solve the various problems with Walid Jumblatt and the Shi'a quickly. But the fifth column - whether Syrian or Iranian - was an obstacle. Colonel Al-Khalil said that the fifth column was composed of many groups, controlled variously by the Syrians, the Iranians and the Palestinians. President Gemayel said that in the suburbs of Beirut near the British contingent, there were Palestinian troops who were manipulated by Syria. The various clashes which occurred resulted from conflicting interests of foreign parties.

Syria wished to reach an agreement with the Lebanese Government but only under certain circumstances and provided that the Lebanese Government were ready to give Syria certain concessions and advantages. The Prime Minister asked what kind of concessions were involved. President Gemayel replied that it had not yet been possible to start a real negotiation. But in September Syria had been determined to destroy the Lebanese Government and had carried out a war by proxy. In November the Syrian attitude had changed and become more positive. He had telephoned President Asad before the latter had become ill and had had a quiet and friendly conversation. He had received the Foreign Minister and his own Foreign Minister had visited Damascus. Then President Asad had succumbed to his illness. There had not therefore been time to determine the Syrian attitude and the concessions which would be necessary.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary emphasised that we attached great importance to success in the reconciliation talks. When could we expect a resumption? President Gemayel said that the situation was very complex. Lebanon's problems had begun in 1975 - or even in 1969 when the Lebanese Government, by signing the Cairo agreement which gave the PLO the right to establish a military infrastructure in the Lebanon, had taken the first

step towards abdicating Lebanese sovereignty. In 1973, the first serious clash between the PLO and the Lebanese army had occurred. The Prime Minister asked how one could envisage progress now and the re-establishment of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity. President Gemayel said that there were two kinds of problems - the domestic and the foreign - and they were connected. The Lebanese Government had to seek to rebuild a national consensus through the Geneva Conference, to maintain security through the cease-fire committee and to handle the problem of foreign intervention.

As regards the national consensus, Lebanese leaders had been united in voting for him in September 1982 when he was elected. On 17 May, 1983 two-thirds of the Lebanese Parliament had approved the agreement with Israel. There had been a new feeling of unity. Unfortunately, after 17 May the Syrians had begun to put strong pressure on Walid Jumblatt, the former President Franjieh and Rashid Karamé. Before 17 May he himself had had good relations with Jumblatt and Franjieh but after that date, owing to Syrian pressure, deterioration had set in. Syria had wanted the Lebanese agreement abrogated and had decided to destroy Lebanese integrity. He was working hard to handle the Syrians and re-build relations with Asad. If the Syrian problem could be handled, the Lebanon would be easier. The Prime Minister said that she believed the President to be saying that in order to achieve reconciliation he needed Syrian co-operation.

/President Gemayel

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- 5 -

President Gemayel said that this was correct. The Geneva Conference had been very fruitful. All Lebanese leaders except Eddé, who was no longer seriously involved in Lebanese politics, and Hussein Mussawi, who had not been invited, had taken part. The Prime Minister asked whether it would be possible to resume the talks. President Gemayel replied that he had spoken to Beirut this morning with the aim of trying to resume the reconciliation talks in Geneva next week. His adviser, Dr. Haddad, would visit Franjieh on 15 December to discuss this possibility. But a failure could not be afforded. It was therefore necessary to reach agreement on the outcome of the conversations before it started. The Lebanese Foreign Minister had had positive talks with Walid Jumblatt two days ago. It was to be hoped that something could be accomplished before Christmas. A committee was working on preparations for Geneva, in particular, the resolution of internal Lebanese differences. There was already a "specific file" on the domestic problems. But that left the Syrian problem and the question of how Syrian pressure on Lebanese leaders could be minimised. He would now be visiting certain Arab countries. He would see King Hassan of Morocco on 15 December and would also visit Saudi Arabia. He had close personal contact with the Syrian Foreign Minister and believed an understanding could be reached with him. Khaddam had become more pragmatic. The Syrian attitude was now much more positive. They had decided to have new contacts with the Lebanon. Khaddam had told him that the Syrian Government had taken a new decision to help his administration. He did not know whether this was genuine or simply a tactic but he would in any case make the best possible use of it. He had told the Syrians that he was ready to discuss with them how to secure Syrian borders and prevent the Lebanon being used as a base against Syria. The presence of the Multinational Force in Lebanon was a determining factor in helping to change the attitude of the Syrian Government. Damascus had realised that the Lebanon was backed by important western countries. The Prime Minister said that this would suggest that it was important to continue to show firmness

/towards

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- 6 -

towards Syria. It was important to put this point positively in public by talking of western support for the integrity of the Lebanon and for a Government of reconciliation.

At this point Mr. Luce (the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary having left earlier), Sir Anthony Parsons and Mr. Miers joined the conversation which continued over a working lunch. The following were the main points made.

Mr. Gemayel said that he had no precise information on the health of President Asad but Asad was a diabetic and had had a heart attack. He was not expected to be well for several more weeks yet.

Sir Anthony Parsons asked whether it would be possible to put to one side the Lebanese/Israeli agreement. President Gemayel said that when outsiders looked at the problem of the Lebanon, everything seemed black. But from the inside there were a number of positive signs. He knew the real feelings of Jumblatt, Franjeh and Karamé. Their public pronouncements, often unhelpful, were due to Syrian pressure. But their private views had enabled him to make useful public statements at the Geneva Conference. And it had been Franjeh who had suggested at Geneva that he (Gemayel) should be given carte blanche to represent the Conference in further negotiations. These Lebanese leaders were ready to deliver when the Syrian pressures upon them were removed. And, as he had already said, the Syrian attitude had changed. Last September Syria had talked about cancellation of the 17 May agreement. But Khaddam had visited him without any decision on the part of the Lebanese to cancel the agreement. This was a positive development.

He was now trying to put aside the 17 May agreement. The Israelis were ready to withdraw from some positions, e.g. in Sidon and some parts of the south, without reference to the 17 May agreement. This would encourage Syria to withdraw

/because

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- 7 -

because it would be the first sign of withdrawal outside the terms of the 17 May agreement. People were beginning to talk about withdrawal by stages, a concept which Syria was willing to envisage. Then it would be necessary to see how one could manage those provisions of the agreement which the Syrians saw as a threat.

Sir Anthony Parsons asked whether, if the Israelis withdrew from some positions, the Syrians would too. President Gemayel said that the position in Syria was very different. The pressures from the West were worrying for the Syrians. Much of the Arab world was against them. They were isolated. Mr. Luce said that when he had seen the Syrian Foreign Minister last week he had said that he would not wish to link any Syrian withdrawal with Israeli withdrawal, because the basis for their intervention in the Lebanon had been quite different. But if the two withdrawals were distinct and the Israelis moved first, Syrian withdrawal would be possible.

The Secretary of State for Defence asked when the President expected to announce the reconvening of the Geneva Conference. President Gemayel said that it would be necessary to prepare heads of agreement first. An announcement might depend on the answer from Franjeh to the approach which would be made tomorrow.

The Prime Minister asked how the President's talks with President Reagan had gone. President Gemayel said that they had been very successful. The establishment of the new Lebanese/United States Committee would be very helpful. Co-ordination between Israel and the United States was now much better. The two sides had discussed the mechanism to promote the implementation of the 17 May agreement and the Americans had begun to discuss specific points with the Israelis. He now felt he had real American backing.

/The Secretary

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- 8 -

The Secretary of State for Defence stated that he had just spoken to Mr. Walid Jumblatt and had received an assurance that he would do what he could to ensure that the shelling of the British contingent's headquarters would stop. Mr. Luce, who had also spoken to Jumblatt, said that he had been asked to pass a message to President Gemayel that the sooner the head of Lebanese intelligence went to Damascus in order to get the ceasefire talks started, the better.

There was then a brief discussion of the line to be taken with the press. President Gemayel said that if we wished to designate someone to be in touch with the Lebanese Ambassador before his own press conference on 15 December he would be glad to make any points which we would find helpful.

The working lunch ended at 1435.

A.J.C.

14 December, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

19/12
 Israelis - shelling
 Tripoli

LEBANON: SITREP 10 00Z 14 DECEMBER

1 Beirut/Shouf. Quiet night 13/14 December. Usual sporadic small arms fire in Southern Beirut suburbs this morning. Airport remains closed but signs that agreement may soon be reached to re-open. Ceasefire committee failed to meet again yesterday (13 December); another meeting planned for today. 50 members of BRITFORLEB embarked on HMS Fearless night of 13/14 December; Commander BRITFORLEB has discretion to do this while threat to BRITFORLEB remains high. Reports that Druze siege of Deir al Kamar to be lifted 15 December: evacuation of 20,000 Christian refugees likely to take 4 to 5 days; majority are homeless and will go to reception centres in Christian East Beirut. Five-thousand residents will remain. Details of evacuation still under discussion. Unconfirmed suggestions that Israelis or Italian members of MNF may guarantee safe passage.

2 US shelling of Syrian Positions in Shouf. On 13 December two US ships shelled Syrian positions approximately 20 miles north-east of Beirut after two unarmed US F14s carrying out reconnaissance in the Metn area came under fire from Syrian SAM and anti-aircraft fire. No details of Syrian casualties or damage.

3 Kuwait bombings (13 December). Death toll has risen to 6 with over 60 injured (no American or French casualties). Iran has denied responsibility. US Secretary of State Shultz has said that the Kuwait and Beirut suicide bombings are linked. He refused to speculate about possible retaliation.

4 South Lebanon. Attacks continue on Israeli troops. Three wounded in roadside explosion South of Sidon on 13 December.

5 PLO/Tripoli. Israeli gunboats shelled Tripoli port 13 December. PLO loyalists returned fire. No casualties reported on either side and little apparent damage, although PLO claim one Israeli

/ship

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ship was hit (denied by Israelis). Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Levy quoted yesterday as saying Israelis would not give blessing to evacuation but would not interfere. US have reiterated support for evacuation without interference. PLO rebels have reportedly warned of new hostilities if Arafat and loyalists have not left by 21 December. Greek search for guarantees of safe passage continues.

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VISIT OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL

Press Line

Plenary session with the Prime Minister (attended by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Defence Secretary), followed by working lunch.

The discussion focussed on the present situation in the Lebanon. President Gemayel described his efforts to achieve the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Lebanon except those there at the invitation of the Lebanese Government. He also described the efforts to carry forward the reconciliation process begun at Geneva and to restore the Government's authority throughout the country. The President made clear the importance he attached to HMG's support for the Lebanese Government and to the key peace-keeping role of the British contingent with the Multinational Force. He expressed his great appreciation for the conduct and professionalism of the British contingent.

The Prime Minister told President Gemayel that HMG would continue to support the Government of Lebanon in the essential task of reconciliation and in its efforts to restore Lebanese Sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

file

BRIEFING DICTATED OVER THE TELEPHONE FROM NICK EVANS MOD FOR
DAVID BARCLAY

Lebanon Cease-fire Discussions

Ad hoc talks have been underway in Damascus over the past week or so on means of consolidating the cease-fire. Most of the major factions in the Lebanon have been represented. The level and frequency of the meetings has varied: a major discrete session was held on 9 December. We have no knowledge of any further sessions being planned for today or tomorrow.

Meetings of the Cease-fire Committee in Beirut have not been held since 2 December, largely because of a dispute over hostages. It is hoped that the Committee will start meeting again shortly.

Line to take:

Cease-fire talks have been held both in Beirut (where the British contingent has provided guards) and in Damascus, involving all main factions. Welcome any move to consolidate the cease-fire and reduce tension.

LEBANON

A few questions for Gemayel:

1. When will Geneva talks resume? Will Syrians allow Jumblatt to attend? What are Gemayel's present relations with the Syrians? How does he see time scale? We will not withdraw precipitately but obviously cannot stay for ever. Has US/Israeli agreement made his life more difficult?
2. How does he intend to deal with the problem of the 17 May agreement? Will the Americans persuade the Israelis not to insist on it?
3. Who is behind the car bombings? Shi'ite militia on their own? Syrian Government? Iranian Government? Qaddafi? Does the Lebanese Deuxieme Bureau have any firm intelligence?

The Cases 14/12

14/12



file

43.

Bce

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 December 1983

Your Secretary of State and Mr. Luce spoke to Mr. Jumblatt this afternoon at 1415 hours.

Your Secretary of State said that he was ringing Mr. Jumblatt personally because he had been informed that four rounds of shells had landed near the Headquarters of Britforleb at 9.45 local time this morning. The view was that the shells must have come from Druze positions six kilometres away. This was a matter of the greatest concern to the British Government. Your Secretary of State asked for Mr. Jumblatt's assurance that he would do all that he could to stop the shelling.

Mr. Jumblatt said that although he was speaking from Jordan he would check out the position and call back within two hours. He agreed that there was no justification for shelling the British Headquarters and he said that he would "try to fix it." He added that the situation on the ground in Lebanon was becoming more dangerous and loose and that classic military rules were not being followed.

Mr. Luce recalled that Mr. Jumblatt had offered to look into a previous incident involving Britforleb, and he asked him to do all that he could to put a stop to this latest shelling. He asked Mr. Jumblatt what would be the best way of restoring the ceasefire. Mr. Jumblatt replied that it would be helpful if President Gemayel could send his Chief of Intelligence to Damascus to follow up last week's discussion. Mr. Luce undertook to put this proposal to the President immediately. Mr. Jumblatt added that there would be a need for observers. Mr. Luce enquired whether he referred to the Italians and the Greeks - Mr. Jumblatt confirmed this but said that he personally would have no objection to others. Finally Mr. Luce reiterated his request that Mr. Jumblatt should do all that he could to bring an end to the shelling near Britforleb.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Peter Ricketts (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

(David Barclay)

Nick Evans, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~2307022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 3/7/4

14th December 1983

Dear Sir,

LEBANON

I understand that you have asked for a note on events in the Lebanon yesterday. Following unsuccessful attacks from Syrian positions in the Metn Area on two US F-14 reconnaissance aircraft, a swift US response was mounted from two US ships which are understood to have fired about 50 rounds against pre-planned Syrian targets at Dahr al Baida. The US action is believed to have taken place at about 1530 hours local time, and its effectiveness is not yet known.

Also yesterday, Israeli ships shelled Tripoli from which the Arafat PLO forces hope to be evacuated. They are understood to have fired on both Syrian and Fatah loyalists targets. In a separate incident in Beirut, a French member of the MNF was shot in the course of patrolling and subsequently died.

Off-duty members of the British contingent were withdrawn onto HMS FEARLESS last night, and the same is planned for tonight.

*Yours ever
NHR*


(N H R EVANS)

A J Coles Esq

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WITNESS LONDON SW1

14 DEC 1983



GIVE

54

13 December, 1983

Lebanon

BT
I enclose a message which the Prime Minister has received from the Permanent Bureau for the Druze Institutions. I should be grateful if you would arrange for an appropriate reply to be sent.

A. J. COLES

P. F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

MR

ial the number
dialling instructions

T 1291

Telegram for enquiries dial the number
shown in your dialling instructions

British
TEL.ECCOM for enquiries dial the number
shown in your dialling instructions

DEC 1983/1652

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GBXX CO LEBH 140

AS BEYROUTH 140 10 1500

Mr Coles
13/12

THE RIGHT HON.
PRIME MINISTER
MARGARET THATCHER
10 DOWING ST. LONDON

R.12

THE PERMANENT BUREAU FOR THE DRUZE INSTITUTIONS PRESENTS TO
THE RIGHT HON. PRIME MINISTER ITS BEST RESPECTS AND TAKES THE
OPPORTUNITY TO INFORM YOU THAT THE DESPITE THE PERPETRATED MURDER
OF THE HEAD OF THE DRUZE RELIGIOUS COURTS THE HON. SHEIKH HALIM
TAKIEDDINE THE DRUZE RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL LEADERS COMPLIED WITH
THE WISHES OF YOUR GOVERNMENT AND THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH OF LEBANON
AND LIFTED THE SIEGE OF DEIR-EL-KAMAR IN ORDER TO ALLOW ITS BESIGED
REFUGEES INCLUDINV 4000 PHALANGISTS MILITIAMEN TO CELEBRATE
CHRISTMAS AND NEW YEAR WITH THEIR FAMILIES

WE ONLY HOPE THAT THIS GESTURE WILL CONSTRIBUTE TO A QUICK RETURN
TO PEACEFUL AND FRIENDLY CO-EXISTENCE AMONG THE DRUZE AND CHRISTIAN
COMMUNITIES IN LEBANON

VERY RESPECTFULLY

THE PERMANENT BUREAU
FOR THE DRUZE INSTITUTIONS
BEIRUT LEBANON P.O.BOX: 2500

COL BTA970 10 4000 2500

for enquiries dial the number
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 December 1983

Dear John,

A.S.C. $\frac{14}{12}$
L.A.

Visit of President Gemayel to London, 13-15 December 1983

/ In preparation for President Gemayel's visit tomorrow,
/ I enclose a brief for the Prime Minister, together with a
/ copy of the programme. I also enclose a suggested press
/ line, personality notes on President Gemayel and the Lebanese
/ Ambassador, a note on the other main political figures in
/ Lebanon and a map. You will have seen Beirut telno 713
/ (copy also enclosed) on President Gemayel's present strategy.

We have been told that the President would like to be accompanied at the plenary session and the lunch by (in protocol order) the Lebanese Ambassador General Ahmed Al-Hajj, Mr Farouk Jabre (the President's diplomatic adviser) and Col Muhammad Al-Khalil (a staff officer and expert on the Multinational Force).

We hope to dispose of any discussion President Gemayel may want of bilateral issues during the meeting with Sir Geoffrey Howe at 1145. The one exception to this is the possible Lebanese request for the sale of RAF Hunters, which President Gemayel may wish to raise over lunch in the presence of the Defence Secretary.

I am sending a copy of this letter and the brief to Richard Mottram (MOD).

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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FM BEIRUT 130745Z DEC 83
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 715 OF 13 DECEMBER 1983
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, PARIS, ROME AND WASHINGTON

Read in full
mf

MY TELNO 709: MNF

1. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR BRIEFED THE AMBASSADOR LAST NIGHT (12 DECEMBER) ON GUTMAN'S CALL ON PRESIDENT GEMAYEL.
2. GUTMAN HAD SET THE SCENE WITH AN EXPANSIVE INTRODUCTION ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FRANCE'S PARTICIPATION IN THE MNF AND FRANCE'S COMMITMENT TO THE FUTURE OF LEBANON, COUPLED WITH AN EXPOSE OF FRENCH ANXIETIES ABOUT CASUALTIES. THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID THAT HE KNEW REDEPLOYMENT AND REDUCTIONS WERE THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION IN THE MNF COUNTRIES. NOW WAS THE WORST POSSIBLE TIME TO DO ANYTHING OF THIS KIND. IT WOULD BE MISREAD AS A SIGNAL OF LESSENERD SUPPORT FOR LEBANON AND ADD TO THE BURDEN OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES. HE HOPED THE FRENCH WOULD REFLECT WITH QUOTE GREAT PRUDENCE AND CARE UNQUOTE BEFORE TAKING ANY SUCH DECISIONS.
3. AFTER SOME INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION IT WAS AGREED TO LEAVE THE MATTER OVER QUOTE UNTIL NEXT YEAR UNQUOTE (IE FOR ANYTHING BETWEEN 2 WEEKS AND 12 MONTHS).

PALMER

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)
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MED PS/PUS
DEFENCE DEPT SIR J BULLARD
FUSD SIR J LEAHY
NEWS DEPT MR WRIGHT
UND MR CARTLEDGE
NAD MR MACINNES
WED MR ADAMS
SED MR EGERTON
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MIPT: PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S VISIT

1. LIST OF THOSE ACCOMPANYING THE PRESIDENT TO WHOM WE HAVE ISSUED VISAS IS AS FOLLOWS:

FAROUK JABRE

COLONEL MOHAMAD ADNAN EL KHALIL

SAIFEDDINE FEHMI

SAMI JOSEPH SFEIR

RAFIC CHELELA

MISS LAMA SAID HASSAN

BASSAM BECHARA BEYROUTHY

IBRAHIM JALKH

ELIAS ROBERT HELOU

ANTOINE HABIB DALATI

AGOP KEVORK TARKHONIAN

2. JABRE AND KHALIL ARE MENTIONED IN MY TUR. RAFIC CHELELA IS A SENIOR OFFICIAL AT THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND ANTOINE DALATI IS THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL PHOTOGRAPHER. I SUSPECT THAT THE REMAINDER ARE SECRETARIES OR BODYGUARDS.

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SIR J LEAHY
MREGERTON

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FROM: C W LONG, NENAD
DATE: 13 DECEMBER 1983

PS

cc: PS/Mr Luce
Sir J Leahy
Mr Egerton or
News Dept.

LEBANON: VISIT OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL

1. I submit a brief for use by the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of State for Defence during the discussions with President Gemayel on 14 December. I submit also a draft covering letter to Mr Coles.

C W Long

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VISIT OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL TO LONDON 13 - 15 DECEMBER 1983

Points to Make

1. Glad that British contingent of Multinational Force welcomed by all. Have been able to extend original 3 month commitment. But cannot remain indefinitely.

SECURITY SITUATION

2. President Gemayel will be aware of anxiety here about safety of British soldiers. Public need to be reassured that the risks to which they are exposed are worth taking. This requires continuous evidence that the presence of the Multinational Force as a whole is still helping, not hindering reconciliation process. Redeployment may be needed. Further help from UN forces may also be necessary.

RECONCILIATION

3. Most important therefore to restore momentum of national reconciliation process. Encouraging progress at Geneva under President Gemayel's chairmanship, but stagnation since. We would like to see Geneva talks reconvened at earliest opportunity. What are President Gemayel's plans for this? Are there plans to form a national government of unity? When?

WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES

4. Syria clearly has key role. She sees Israel/Lebanon agreement as harmful to her interests. We were encouraged that all parties at Geneva had apparently agreed on a formula to get round this problem. But public statements since then (eg Gemayel's own in Washington) have given an opposite signal. How will President Gemayel play this with Syrians? Outcome of visit to Damascus by Foreign Minister Salem (8 December)? Plans for meeting with President Asad?

MNF

5. All MNF contributors share common objectives, and have given strong public support to restoration of Lebanese independence,

territorial integrity and full withdrawal of all foreign forces. But we do not (not) fully agree (for example) with American methods. Misguided to use pressure tactics in an explosive situation. Only patience, negotiation and steadiness can succeed. Level of violence must be lowered: Christian militias must set example. Lebanese Government must come to terms with opposition parties; and neighbours as they (not Americans) think fit.

6. MNF to stay? Multinational Force can only contribute usefully while steady progress towards reconciliation is being made. If prospects of early progress vanish, we shall have to reconsider presence of our contingent. Believe other contributors share this view. If MNF becomes identified with one side only, or is sucked into hostilities, its early withdrawal would be required.

7. Bilateral issues. Hope to strengthen bilateral relations in other fields (eg commercial links) as conditions return to normal in Lebanon.

8. (Defensive: Financial Protocol/Soft Credit). Regret no concessional finance available, but short and medium-term credit cover available from ECGD - little yet taken up.

9. (Defensive: Reconstruction aid). We are committed to contributing with EC partners to reconstruction in Lebanon within limits of our resources. What are Lebanon's priorities?

10. (Defensive: Sale of RAF Hunters to Lebanese airforce). No aircraft available for sale immediately. Fully committed for training purposes, or sales elsewhere. Some may become available in due course.

11. (Defensive: PLO in Tripoli). On humanitarian grounds we support orderly evacuation of PLO under UN flag to avoid further casualties. But do not want to build up status of Arafat.

Background

1. Sitrep on latest developments in Lebanon attached (Annex A).
2. National Reconciliation. President Gemayel has nearly completed his round of talks with American, European and Arab leaders. He has seen President Mitterrand, King Fahd, Signor Craxi and President Reagan. Plans are in hand to reinstate the postponed visit to Damascus as soon as President Asad's health allows. But Gemayel is no nearer completing the terms of the mandate given him at the first session of the Geneva National Reconciliation talks (31 October - 4 November): 'to undertake the necessary contacts to end the Israeli occupation'. The stumbling block remains the 17 May Israel/Lebanon agreement which the United States and Israel wish to see implemented but which Syria and the Lebanese opposition want set aside if not abrogated. Gemayel apparently aims to seek a form of words which avoids the question of implementation/abrogation while offering to respect the political and security concerns of Syria and Israel.
3. Geneva Process. There are signs that the modest gains made at Geneva are beginning to slip away. President Gemayel and the Christians appear to be taking the view that further efforts at reconciliation should await withdrawal of foreign forces. But Gemayel is pressing ahead with consultations on the formation of a new government of national unity. The hardline Christians (Phalange) have denounced the formula agreed at Geneva reaffirming Lebanon's Arab identity. There has been a corresponding hardening of Druze and Muslim attitudes: Jumblatt's suspicions of Gemayel and the actions of the Lebanese Army and the Multinational Force were evident from his recent call on Mr Luce (28 November). The loss of confidence is reflected on the ground: the Lebanese Army has been increasingly involved in clashes with the Druze and Muslim militias. Gemayel apparently aims to arrange for the weak but uncontroversial Internal Security Forces to take on security in the Shouf and the southern suburbs of Beirut where the Army is unacceptable. The Airport remains closed under threat of Druze shelling and the Quadripartite Ceasefire Committee has not met since 2 December due to the kidnapping of hostages by both Christian and Shia militias.

Despite some progress towards reconciliation (apparent consensus on Druze and Shia ideas for constitutional reform reached in the Commission preparing Geneva II, and the Druze decision to release the remaining Christians held in Deir al Kamar), there has been a loss of momentum. Prospects for reconvening the Geneva talks by the end of December are poor; aside from the political constraints, the Geneva site, which is the only one acceptable to all parties, will be unavailable.

4. US/Israeli Attitudes. President Gemayel came away with little from his recent meeting with President Reagan (1-2 December) except for promises of increased military and economic assistance. He apparently made no attempt to convince the Americans that the Agreement should be left on one side (without abrogation or amendment), allowing himself instead to be associated with a US statement that the agreement was still the "best and most viable basis" for Israeli withdrawal. He was told that he should negotiate direct with the Syrians to expedite their withdrawal, attempt to extend his authority outside the Beirut area and pursue national reconciliation. The Americans seem to have accepted the Israeli argument that a move away from the 17 May agreement will be interpreted as a sign of weakness. President Reagan did not press Mr Shamir for modification of the agreement or withdrawal of the side letter making Israeli withdrawal contingent on simultaneous Syrian withdrawal during the Israeli Prime Minister's visit (23-30 November). The Americans believe that a tough line with Syria and steadfast support for Gemayel will enable Gemayel to wean the Druze/Muslim opposition away from Syria, into a Government of National Unity. But plans to develop US/Israeli strategic cooperation, announced on 29 November, have upset the moderate Arabs and hardened the attitude of Syria and the Lebanese opposition.

5. Syrian Attitudes. At Geneva I the Syrians showed some flexibility, indicating informally that they might be prepared to accept the setting aside of the 17 May agreement (without formal abrogation) and the working out of new Israeli/Lebanese security arrangements. Much now hangs on President Gemayel's meeting with President Asad. Contacts continue: the Lebanese Foreign Minister Dr. Salem most recently had talks in Damascus with his Syrian

opposite number on 8 December. But Syria will not accept implementation of the 17 May agreement and the recent US air strikes on Syrian positions in Lebanon appear to have hardened her attitude. The Syrians' ability to switch the fighting on and off at will, demonstrated most recently by the sudden drop in violence after talks among the factions in Damascus on 9 December, further strengthens Asad's hand.

6. Multinational Force. MNF Foreign Ministers met in the margins of the NATO ministerial in Brussels on 8 December. Little impact made on US views, but all agreed to give priority to urging all Lebanese parties to work for national reconciliation and to achieve the withdrawal of all foreign forces. It was also decided to improve consultation on political (although not military) matters, and to work towards the eventual replacement of the Multinational force by some kind of UN force. All MNF contributors face public disquiet at home. The US is reportedly considering ways of safe-guarding the marines, perhaps by stationing them on the 6th Fleet off shore or by moving them south of Beirut. The Italians have announced their intention to reduce their contingent by roughly half (from 2000 to 1100). The French have tried to persuade President Gemayel to propose a reduction in their contingent, during a visit to Beirut on 12 December by M Gutmann, Secretary General of the Quai. Gemayel's response was that this was the worst possible moment to reduce MNF contingents, which would be misread as a signal of lessened support for Lebanon and add to the burden of the Lebanese Army. Gutmann agreed that the matter should be shelved 'until next year'.

7. UK/Lebanon trade. Exports to Lebanon last year £70m., with low market share, mostly consumer goods and supply with no projects. Exports up 24% in first 6 months of this year. Imports negligible. Short and medium-term ECGD credit (up to £30 million) available, though ECGD reconsidering in light of recent deterioration. Lebanese have pressed for a financial 'protocol'. Most see this as code word for concessional finance/aid - of which none available. If and when prospects for trade improve, we may have to consider a purely cosmetic protocol if Lebanese government attach particular importance to it. Our main competitors (US, France, Italy) have all

offered loans, some on "soft" terms for defence purchases and civil projects. British firms are competing for two major reconstruction projects: the supply of generators for the Zouk B power station (NEI Parsons, worth £50m) and design, construction and equipping of a hospital (John Laing, worth £55m). Neither contract is likely to be awarded until a degree of political stability is restored. The Lebanese economy has been surprisingly resilient in recent years. Reserves are still strong, but the currency has weakened recently as optimism about the future has faded, and as the recession in the Gulf has begun to affect Lebanon's principal export earnings.

8. Reconstruction aid. There is no aid programme for Lebanon (which by normal development criteria does not qualify for ODA assistance). But HMG have pledged £2 million for aid for reconstruction. This remains provisionally pledged to an EC project for a water pipeline from Damour (5 miles south of the capital) to Beirut. The project has been delayed by the recent fighting. It is not yet known how much of the £2 million will be required for the project during this year's Community aid framework.

9. Sale of RAF Hunters. Earlier this year the Lebanese authorities approached us to seek supply of Mark 9 Hunters for their Air Force from the RAF. They were told that the RAF had no such aircraft available, although there were (and still are) a number of Mark 6A Hunters available for sale which would meet their requirements. Cabinet decided in September that the balance of argument lay against sale because of the delicate state of ceasefire negotiations and the danger of adding to the risks facing the British contingent of the MNF. It was left that if the Lebanese raised the matter again they should be stalled pending further ministerial discussion. Since then the Lebanese have continued their search for Hunters, approaching Qatar and Chile, but have not given up the prospect of obtaining Hunters direct from the RAF. President Gemayel raised the issue at an eve-of-visit press conference on 12 November. But the arguments against remain valid.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
13 December 1983

LEBANON: SITREP 1200Z 13 DECEMBER 1983

Military Situation

Beirut/Shouf. French member of MNF killed in Muslim West Beirut this morning when French Army convoy fired upon. Usual sporadic clashes between Lebanese Army and Druze in Shouf and between Lebanese Army and Shia militia in South Beirut. Otherwise generally quiet with reduced level of violence maintained following 9 December agreement to strengthen ceasefire. Lebanese Army representatives to return to Damascus soon for further ceasefire talks. Ceasefire Committee has not met since 2 December due to continued dispute over hostages. Another meeting planned for today. Airport remains closed.

South Lebanon remains tense. Israeli authorities yesterday reported to have summoned about 2,000 Lebanese and Palestinians formerly held in Ansar detention camp to warn them against hostile activity. Israelis are holding 30 people suspected of attacks on Israeli troops and arrested a further 8 at Palestinian refugee camp south of Sidon on 11 December. Isolated protests continue against detention.

PLO/Tripoli

Tripoli port reportedly cleared of ordnance by Lebanese authorities in preparation for evacuation of PLO loyalists. Lebanese authorities say 400 members of the internal security force and 300 men drawn from a local force will oversee operation. Arafat has apparently asked Syria and Saudi Arabia for air cover. The co-ordinating committee supervising the evacuation visited Damascus 11 December; received assurances that Syria would not disrupt operation. US has reiterated its support despite continued Israeli refusal to give guarantees of safe passage. But four Greek ships due to carry out evacuation have apparently still not left for Tripoli: Greeks still seeking guarantees.

VISIT TO UK BY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL OF LEBANON: 13 - 15 DECEMBER

- 13 December pm : Arrive Heathrow.
- 14 December 1145 : Meeting with Foreign Secretary and Minister of State, Mr Luce, FCO.
- 1215 : Plenary with Prime Minister, followed by lunch with Prime Minister, Defence Secretary and Mr Luce.
- 1445 : Audience with HM the Queen.
- 1700 : Meeting with leaders of the Opposition, Rt Hon Neil Kinnock, MP, and Rt Hon Dennis Healey, MP.
- 1745 : Meeting with British-Lebanese Parliamentary Group.
- 15 December 1015 : Meeting with Rt Hon David Steel, MP.
- 1100 : Meeting with Rt Hon Dr David Owen, MP.
- 1300 : Meeting with press.

CALL BY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, 14 DECEMBER

Press Line

1. Plenary session with Prime Minister, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Defence Secretary, followed by working lunch.
2. Discussion focussed on present situation in Lebanon. Full account by President Gemayel of efforts being made by Lebanese Government to carry forward reconciliation process begun at Geneva and to restore the government's authority throughout the country. The President also made clear importance he attached to HMG's support for the Lebanese government and to the peacekeeping role of the British contingent with the Multinational Force.
3. Prime Minister told President Gemayel that HMG would continue to support the Government of Lebanon in the essential task of reconciliation and in its efforts to restore Lebanese Sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

GEMAYEL, SHEIKH AMIN

President of the Republic of Lebanon
Born 1942. Son of Pierre Gemayel
Maronite

Studied Law at the Jesuit Université Saint Joseph, Beirut. Practised as a lawyer. Elected Deputy for Metn 1970. Re-elected 1972. Until 1982 a member of the Kataib Politbureau and a member of the Party's Standing Committee for Co-ordination with the Syrians. Director of the Party's Financial and Commercial Affairs. He ran an elaborate Research Organisation 'The House of the Future'.

A moderate and cautious man who tried to counter the militant influence of his late brother Bashir. A sort of 'Maronite Fabian', but his approach is conservative rather than radical. An astute politician who nurses his constituency carefully and takes out insurance on all sides. He has always kept his links with the Palestinians and the more sortable elements of the National Movement and was careful to see that he was not regarded as implicated in the murder of Suleiman Frangieh's son Tony in 1978. These are not necessarily the marks of a resolute man and in terms of political will he is still largely an unknown quantity.

A civil man with an agreeable and reasonable personality. He will listen to an argument before countering it. Does not instinctively begin by attacking the opposing attorney.

An effective orator. Speaks excellent French. His English is quite good but he has been rather shy about using it.

Married with two children. His wife, Joyce, is an attractive and charming woman who speaks good English as well as excellent French.

Major General Ahmed Al-Hajj

Born about 1924. Sunni Muslim.

Educated at the Ecole Superieure de Guerre in Paris. Also holds degree in Political Science and Economics from University of Lebanon.

Entered Lebanese Military Academy, 1948 (of which he was Commandant in 1969.) Has held several important military positions, including Head of the Military Office at the Presidential Palace and Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Promoted Major General 1980. Last full-time military post was as Director General of the Internal Security Forces (a para-military force under the authority of the Minister of the Interior.) His only post abroad was as Military Attache at the Lebanese Embassy in Buenos Aires in the early 1970s.

A serious man, dedicated to the service of his country and one of Lebanon's best generals. It was largely due to his reputation for strictly fair dealing that the ISF avoided accusations of sectarian bias and was therefore able to operate in areas where the Lebanese armed forces were not acceptable to the local population.

Pleasant if somewhat severe manner with an underlying sense of humour. Married with 3 grown-up daughters. He and his wife speak French and English. He also speaks Spanish.



LEBANON: LEADING PLAYERS, POLITICAL PARTIES AND MILITIAS

POLITICIANSA. Participants at Geneva talks

- Opposition: (i) Walid Jumblatt. Druze. Leader of PSP (Progressive Socialist Party).
- (ii) Suleiman Franjeh. Maronite. Former President. Long-standing ally of Syria and sworn enemy of the Gemayel family.
- (iii) Rashid Karamé. Sunni. Former Prime Minister. Elder statesman of Tripoli, currently supervising PLO evacuation.
- (iv) Nabbih Berri. Shia. Leader of AMAL.
- Others : (v) Saeb Salam. Former Prime Minister. Leading exponent of Sunni 'establishment' view, and head of Rassemblement Islamique, a Sunni political organisation.
- (vi) Camille Shamoun. Maronite. Former President. Political rival of the Gemayels but in weakened position following liquidation of his militia.
- (vii) Pierre Gemayel. Maronite. Leader of the Phalange (Kata'eb) party.

B. Not represented at Geneva

- (viii) Raymond Eddé. Maronite. Preferred candidate for presidency of Muslim left. Opposed to the Gemayels, now living in self-exile in Paris.
- (ix) Hussein Mussawi. Radical Shia. Leader of breakaway Islamic AMAL based in Northern Bekaa, among chief suspects for recent suicide bomb attacks on US, French and Israeli troops.

PARTIES/MILITIAS


- (i) Kata'eb (also known as Phalange).
 Leader: Pierre Gemayel.
 Militia: Lebanese Forces (led by Fadi Frem).
 Most powerful political group in Lebanon. Membership predominantly Maronite. Close links with government and Lebanese Army.
- (ii) AMAL.
 Leader: Nabih Berri.
 Shia Militia and political grouping with widespread

/support



support amongst Lebanese Shia but losing some ground to fundamentalists.

- (iii) Islamic AMAL
Leader: Hussein Mussawi.
Favours creation of Islamic Republic in Lebanon.
Cooperates closely with Iran Revolutionary Guards based in Northern Bekaa. Attracting increased support from Lebanese Shia.
- (iv) Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)
Leader: Walid Jumblatt
Druze militia and political organisation.
- (v) National Liberal Party
Leader: Camille Shamoun
Predominantly Maronite. Favours de-centralisation.
- (vi) National Salvation Front (NSF)
Coalition composed of Jumblatt, Franjieh and Karamé which together with Nabbih Berri's Amal constitutes main opposition at Geneva talks.



General Staff Map Section, GSGS 11045, Edition 32-GSGS July 1983

GP 590

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FM BEIRUT 121350Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 713 OF 12 DECEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, DAMASCUS, AMMAN,
JEDDA, TEL AVIV AND CBFC

INFO SAVING COMMANDER BRITFORLEB

LEBANON: PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S VISIT

SUMMARY

1. EXTERNALLY, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IS CAUGHT BETWEEN THE SYRIANS AND THE ISRAELIS: INTERNALLY HE CONTROLS ONLY ABOUT 10 PER CENT OF THE NATIONAL TERRITORY AND IS THE VICTIM OF RELENTLESS SELFISH PRESSURES FROM LEBANON'S WARRING FACTIONS. NEVERTHELESS HE AND FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM PERHAPS HAVE SOME CONSTRUCTIVE IDEAS ABOUT HOW TO PLAY THEIR TRUMPLESS HAND. IF WE PROPOSE TO KEEP BRITFORLEB HERE WE SHOULD GIVE THEM BROAD ENCOURAGEMENT DURING THEIR FORTHCOMING VISIT.

DETAIL

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- (A) TO SQUEEZE BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS OVER IMPLEMENTATION/ABROGATION OF THE 17 MAY ACCORD BY SEEKING A FORM OF WORDS THAT AVOIDS THE ISSUE WHILE OFFERING TO RESPECT THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONCERNS OF EACH INTRANSIGENT NEIGHBOUR.
 - (B) TO PURSUE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION BY PERSUADING THE SYRIANS TO LIFT THEIR VETO ON JUMBLATT AND KARAME ATTENDING GENEVA II AND PRESSING AHEAD WITH DISCUSSIONS FOR FORMING A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY IN WHICH ALL TRENDS WOULD BE REPRESENTED. (PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS AND KEY FIGURES ARE BEING KEENLY LOBBIED NOW.)
 - (C) TO DO A DEAL WITH THE KATAEB, PSP AND AMAL OVER SECURITY WITHIN THE NON-OCCUPIED AREAS, UNDER WHICH THE WEAK BUT POLITICALLY NON-CONTROVERSIAL INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE WOULD BE INTRODUCED INSTEAD OF THE ARMY INTO SENSITIVE AREAS IN THE SHOUF AND THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS. THIS WOULD PROVIDE NOMINAL GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL OF THESE AREAS WITHOUT THE NEED TO TRY (YET) TO DISARM THE MILITIAS ACTUALLY IN CHARGE.

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PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

SIR J LEAHY

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

MR MACINNES

MR ADAMS

MR EGERTON

MR JENKINS

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BUCKINGHAM PALACE

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FM BEIRUT 121000Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 711 OF 12 DECEMBER 1983

INFO ROUTINE MODUK, ROME, PARIS, WASHINGTON

MS

MY TELNO 709: **LEBANON/MNF**

1. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT GUTMAN IS SEEING THE PRESIDENT ONLY AT MIDDAY TODAY 12 NOVEMBER ON A FLYING VISIT.
2. SPEAKING IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE HE SAID THAT HE DOUBTED WHETHER GEMAYEL WOULD AGREE TO MAKE THE QUOTE SUGGESTION UNQUOTE ENVISAGED. HE WOULD FEEL BADLY LET DOWN. THE ARMED FORCES WERE IN NO WAY YET STRONG ENOUGH TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR ORDER IN BEIRUT, NOR TO TACKLE THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS OR EVEN SEAL THEM OFF. THE FRENCH CONTINGENT'S TASK COULD NOT REALISTICALLY BE DESCRIBED AS ACHIEVED (WHAT EVER THE TERMS OF THE ORIGINAL EXCHANGE OF LETTERS, UKDEL NATO TEL NO 344, PARA 6).
3. HE COMMENTED ON THE WITHDRAWAL TO THEIR SHIPS OF 350 US MARINES AND ANDREOTTI'S STATEMENT IN BRUSSELS THAT ITALY'S CONTINGENT MIGHT BE REDUCED TO ITS ORIGINAL NUMBER OF 1100: IE CUT BY HALF. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ITALIAN PLAN WAS TO REDUCE BY SMALL UNANNOUNCED STAGES. HE SAID THAT IF THE MNF TIPTOED OUT NOW HE FEARED THAT SERIOUS DISORDER AND BLOODSHED IN BEIRUT WOULD FOLLOW WITHIN MONTHS IF NOT SOONER.
4. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR EQUALLY THINKS VERY LITTLE OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S PROJECTED SECURITY PLAN (DAMASCUS TELNO 403) UNDER WHICH THE GOVERNMENT, KATAEB, PSP AND AMAL WOULD AGREE NEW ARRANGEMENTS FOR RESTORING ORDER, WITH THE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE (ISF) AND NOT THE ARMY BEING INTRODUCED BY JOINT ACCORD INTO SENSITIVE AREAS IN THE SHOUF AND SOUTHERN SUBURBS.

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5. THIS IS ALL VERY PESSIMISTIC. BUT I FEAR THAT SOME OF WHAT HE SAYS MAY BE RIGHT. YOU WILL WANT TO GO OVER THE GROUND CAREFULLY WITH GEMAYEL DURING HIS VISIT. IF IN THE MEANTIME WE HAVE TO COMMENT IN PUBLIC ON THE IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR OWN CONTINGENT OF OUR PARTNERS' TROOP WITHDRAWALS, WE COULD PERHAPS DEFLECT PRESSURE BY POINTING OUT (A) THAT OUR NUMBERS ARE ALREADY MUCH LOWER THAN OUR PARTNERS', (B) OUR CONTINGENT IS OCCUPIED ON THE CRUCIALLY USEFUL TASK OF GUARDING THE CEASEFIRE COMMITTEE AND (C) IT WOULD OF COURSE BE APPROPRIATE TO REVIEW OUR NUMBERS AND THEIR DEPLOYMENT IF AND WHEN THAT TASK ENDED.

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PROTOCOL DEPT
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PS/PUS
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MR WRIGHT
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BUCKINGHAM PALACE

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PS/ MR LUCE
PS/ OUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR SPERTON
SIR J BULLARD
ED/ MENAD
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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 December 1983

Dear Peter,

MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE: BRITISH CONTINGENT

The Prime Minister held a meeting here this afternoon to consider the position relating to the British contingent in the MNF in the Lebanon. I enclose a copy of the record of the meeting.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

JR Col.

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RECORD OF A MEETING HELD AT 1445 HOURS ON MONDAY 12 DECEMBER AT
10 DOWNING STREET

Present: The Prime Minister
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
Secretary of State for Defence

Mr. Luce
Chief of the Defence Staff
Mr. Coles

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
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* * * * *

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that his meeting with the Foreign Ministers of the other countries participating in the Multi-National Force which had been held in Brussels last week had lasted for only one hour. The impression had been that the Americans had deliberately arranged things so that discussion could not be satisfactorily pursued. He had seen the French Foreign Minister later that day who had told him of the French intention to send a senior official to the Lebanon to invite President Gemayel to request France to reduce the size of its contingent in various ways. Cheysson had appeared to wish to involve other participants in concerted moves to persuade President Gemayel in this direction. The French wished to have the best of both worlds - to appear to be remaining in the Force while in fact reducing the exposure of their contingent to the maximum extent. At that point, Cheysson had not spoken to Secretary Shultz, but had said that he intended to do so.

Recent United States' actions, including the announcement of the Strategic Cooperation Agreement with Israel, had changed Arab perceptions of the role of the MNF. Mr. Rumsfeld had recently said that he had found some Arabs rather disturbed by the new US posture but believed that this situation was manageable. Reports from Egypt and Jordan suggested that this was far too optimistic. American actions had made it much more difficult for President Gemayel to further the reconciliation process. That process had to involve the Syrians but the American attitude towards Syria made Syrian cooperation much less likely.

/ Views within

Views within the US Government appeared to be divided. Mr. Shultz was taking a hard line in defending the agreement between Lebanon and Israel. We had explained to Shultz that we had some experience of peace-keeping roles and knew that they involved unpleasant events. Shultz said that the US Government had decided that the American contingent must "lean forward" more. The Americans thought that by cutting the Syrians down to size they were making it easier to persuade the Syrians to cooperate. The Prime Minister asked whether there was any substance in that view. It was easier for the Syrians to yield to the Americans than to the Israelis. Mr. Luce said that lost lives were not very important to Syria. The Syrian Foreign Minister had described Andropov and President Regan as his two best friends; American action had rallied Arab support for Syria.

The Prime Minister said that if we had lost 250 troops, we would be likely to have conducted aircraft reconnaissance missions as the Americans had done - and if they had been attacked, we would have attacked back. Without such measures, the MNF could probably not be maintained. The Defence Secretary said that he agreed with this analysis but the American action had been linked in Arab eyes with the new US/Israeli agreement which was greatly resented in the Arab world.

The Prime Minister said that if it was clear that the US and Israel were concerting their actions, we might have to re-think our position in order to maintain our relations with the Arab world. Her impression from her talk with the French President was that France would not withdraw its contingent. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that Italy was looking for any pretext to withdraw. He believed that France would reduce its contingent. Britain should not lead the pack but there was great anxiety owing to the change in the American position. One interesting question was what the preferred election posture of the United States would be. Would the Administration wish to proclaim that it had brought the boys back home - or rather that it had taught the Syrians a lesson and given them a bloody nose?

/The Defence Secretary

The Defence Secretary said that the position of the British troops was very dangerous. There was a no-go area between them and the American contingent. If anything went wrong, our political exposure was very high.

All the options for deployment of the Force had been looked at once again. The local Commander's view was that our troops should stay where they were. But if anything did happen to our contingent, it would be hard to justify their continuing role. Public opinion was not yet aware of the information revealed by private contacts among the participating countries. There was no agreement among the participants as to the aims of the Force. The Geneva talks had been adjourned. Even the local security talks had failed to take place yesterday. So the original purpose of promoting stability while Israeli and Syrian forces withdrew from the Lebanon was increasingly difficult to sustain. All the contributing countries, perhaps even including the Americans, were looking for ways out.

The Prime Minister asked what the options were. The Defence Secretary said that the MNF situation was now essentially a political one. It should be treated on a political basis and we should insist that the four contributing countries pursue their discussion to the point where the issues were resolved. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he had more than once urged this kind of discussion but the French had been reluctant to participate. The Prime Minister commented that this was an unsatisfactory situation. The MNF contributors must clarify their thinking and reach conclusions by Christmas. Mr. Luce said that in his view regular meetings between the four should be a pre-condition for our staying in the Lebanon. The Prime Minister asked the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to contact Mr. Shultz and urge that the four meet as soon as possible.

With regard to the forthcoming visit of President Gemayel, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that our general aim

/ should be

should be to make plain to him the extent to which he must go to promote reconciliation. The Prime Minister said that we would need to add that unless there was clear progress, we could not see a role for the MNF and we believed that other contributors felt the same. We should also ask Gemayel how far he felt inhibited by the American attitude towards Syria.

The Defence Secretary said that he believed that there was a sense in which the MNF was now a harmful feature. Although there was major tension between Syria and Israel, the presence of the MNF, which was increasingly drawing the fire of the local population, meant that they were not faced with the direct threat of a major deterioration in the situation.

Mr. Luce said that he had recently asked Walid Jumblatt what the effect of MNF withdrawal would be. The reply had been "tremendous bloodshed".

The Chief of the Defence Staff said that from his contacts with his opposite numbers in the contributing countries, he believed that the French wished to reduce their contingent from 2,000 to 1,200, keeping some of the latter on board ship.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether we should pursue with the Lebanese President the line adopted by M. Cheysson - i.e. should we persuade Gemayel to ask us to reduce our contingent? The Prime Minister thought that this approach had little merit. The President would not make such a request. We should also avoid saying that we would remove our contingent when the reconciliation process was complete. For this would in turn remove the incentive to complete that process and would also preclude us from pulling out if the threat to the Force markedly increased. Every time we addressed these issues, we were faced with the serious implications of unilateral withdrawal. The effect on our relations with the United States could be particularly serious. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that it was possible to mount a respectable argument that if the MNF were properly conducted, it would still have a worth-while contribution

/ to make.

to make. But the American attitude and style made this very much more difficult. It was unlikely that we would change the American posture - and therefore the other three contributors might have to consider withdrawing their contingents. It was essential to tell Mr. Shultz that our pre-condition for remaining in the Lebanon was agreement on the framework for the MNF. The Chief of the Defence Staff commented that, although the situation in the Lebanon was very difficult, the military task which our contingent was being asked to perform was not unreasonable so long as there was a possibility of President Gemayel making progress.

The Defence Secretary said that it would be possible to move our contingent on to HMS FEARLESS. But there would then be a formidable problem of getting them back to their base. The Chief of the Defence Staff said that the local Commander had authority to put part of the Garrison into FEARLESS overnight. This had been tried and was practicable. The option could be repeated during the visit of President Gemayel to London. But the local Commander might well feel safer from a military point of view in his present position. In response to a question from the Prime Minister, the Defence Secretary said that alternative sites for the present Headquarters had been considered but rejected. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether we could consider abandoning our contingent's patrolling function and putting the surplus men on board FEARLESS. The Defence Secretary pointed out that if the remainder of the contingent was then attacked, we should be blamed for reducing its defences. The Chief of the Defence Staff said that the functions of guarding the security talks and of patrolling tended to go together. The practice of patrolling was welcomed by the local population. The Defence Secretary said that if British lives were lost, this would be associated with the current state of UK/US relations. The Prime Minister said that she accepted that point but did this mean that we were to move out without consulting the United States? The Defence Secretary said that that was not his view. The Prime Minister commented that this reinforced the need for an early

/meeting of

meeting of the four. The Defence Secretary said that we had to do everything to promote momentum towards peace. The Prime Minister said that that implied the resurrection of the reconciliation process. The Syrians were needed in this. So they should not be alienated.

The Chief of the Defence Staff stated that at a recent meeting with his US opposite number the latter had made it plain that the American contingent did not wish to go to war with Syria but it would defend itself vigorously and if intelligence of new threats was obtained, there would be retribution. It was not proposed to increase the numbers of the US force but Saceur was to investigate how its security could be improved by placing some or all of the force on board ship. Later in the conversation there had been a reference to partial withdrawal.

Returning to the need for an early meeting of the contributors, the Prime Minister said that she hoped a paper could be prepared to serve as a basis for discussion. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he was anxious to avoid the impression of a UK initiative. He believed that the best time for a meeting of the four would be after Gemayel's visit to London.

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The local Commander might consider thinning out the troops during the period 13 to 15 December. But if all the contingent were removed, the task of getting them back in would be very difficult. He recalled that it was the view of the local Commander that his troops should stay where they were. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that this was also the advice of HM Ambassador in Beirut. In response to a

/ question

question from the Prime Minister, the Defence Secretary confirmed that the local Commander had discretion how best to protect his troops and this included using the option of moving a number of them to HMS FEARLESS. The Vice-Chief of the General Staff would be visiting Beirut later today to discuss the latest situation with the Commanding Officer.

The Defence Secretary said that there was a difficulty with the argument that we could not lead a retreat. This implied that if we lost twenty soldiers we should have to reinforce the contingent. Politically, it was doubtful whether we could do that. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that it was possible that if Britain, France and Italy put pressure on the United States, the latter might be persuaded to adopt a better posture.

Reverting to the specific threat to the British contingent, the Prime Minister said that she thought it would be reasonable to minimise the danger by removing to HMS FEARLESS as many of our contingent as possible. The Chief of the Defence Staff and the Defence Secretary pointed out, however, that we needed to retain sufficient troops both to guard the Headquarters and to guard the local security talks. It was agreed that, since the local Commander had complete discretion to make arrangements (short of pulling out the force entirely), it should be left to the Vice-Chief of the General Staff and the Commanding Officer to consider the matter and provide further advice tomorrow if they so wished. The Prime Minister asked that General Glover should be informed of the Government's great concern about the safety of the British contingent.

At this point in the meeting an unconfirmed report was received that Lebanese local radion had broadcast information to the effect that three British soldiers had been captured by Shi'a troops. Following investigation, it emerged that three soldiers in a Land Rover had strayed into a no-go area, and had been stopped; but, when it was learnt that they were not Americans, they had been released and were now back at the Headquarters of the British contingent.

The meeting ended at 1615.

12 December 1983

A & C.



10 DOWNING STREET

file 1/10
cc Coeline
me by goodchild

From the Private Secretary

12 December 1983

VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE LEBANON

The Prime Minister has considered the arrangements for this visit.

She understands that President Gemayel will be seeing the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary at 1145 on Wednesday, 14 December and that it is Sir Geoffrey Howe's intention to confine the discussion to bilateral issues, avoiding the main questions of the reconciliation process and matters relating to the Multi National Force.

The Prime Minister will receive President Gemayel at 1215. For the talks between then and 1300 hours, she would be grateful if the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence could be present.

The lunch will be a working lunch. The Prime Minister would be grateful if, on our side, the following could attend: the Defence Secretary, Mr. Luce (I understand that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has another engagement), H.M. Ambassador in Beirut and Sir Anthony Parsons (I shall also be present). You told me that President Gemayel would have with him his Foreign Minister, his Ambassador and two or three others. I should be grateful if you would let me know whom the President wishes to attend the talks at 1215 and whom he wishes to be present at the lunch - in the latter case, up to a maximum of six.

Finally, the Prime Minister believes that there should be a preliminary meeting to decide precisely what questions we should put to President Gemayel and what answers we may expect. The only time when we can arrange such a meeting is at 0915 on Wednesday, 14 December. I hope that it will be possible for all those involved in the talks and/or the lunch with President Gemayel to be present at that meeting.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD)

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 170
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM DAMASCUS 100950Z DEC
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 406 OF 10 DECEMBER 1983
INFO ROUTINE BEIRUT , WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME.

CONFIDENTIAL

SYRIA/MNF

1. RECENT BRITISH MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS HAVE GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT SYRIA FAVOURS THE PRESENCE OF OUR MNF CONTINGENT IN BEIRUT. GUIDANCE TELNO 162 HAS NOW ENSHRINED THIS DOCTRINE IN SAYING (PARA 6) THAT "ALL THE MAIN PARTIES IN LEBANON AND MANY ARAB GOVERNMENTS INCLUDING SYRIA, HAVE RECENTLY CONFIRMED THAT THEY WELCOME OUR CONTINUING PRESENCE IN THE MNF".
2. WITH RESPECT, I DO NOT THINK THAT THIS IS STRICTLY TRUE. IT COMPOUNDS THE RECENT MISUNDERSTANDING OF ANDREOTTI ON A SIMILAR POINT. WHAT THE SYRIANS HAVE TOLD US (AND REPEATED TO MR LUCE ON 4 DECEMBER) IS THAT THEY RECOGNISE THE NEUTRALITY OF OUR CONTINGENT AND WELCOME THE FACT THAT IT HAS NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN THE INTERNECINE QUARRELS OF THE LEBANESE FACTIONS. THIS IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM SAYING THAT THEY WELCOME OUR CONTINGENT'S PRESENCE PER SE (LAST TWO WORDS UNDERLINED). INDEED KHADDAM MADE CLEAR THAT WITHDRAWAL OF THE MNF AS A WHOLE WAS NOW A PRECONDITION OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.
3. NO DOUBT IT SUITS US TO PLAY UP THE DEGREE OF SYRIAN UNDERSTANDING OR OUR MNF ROLE. BUT IT WOULD BE WRONG TO DECEIVE OURSELVES ABOUT THE EXTENT OF THAT UNDERSTANDING.

LUCAS

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR MACINNES
MR ADAMS
MR EGERTON
MR JENKINS

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MR GOODALL)CABINET
SIR R ARMSTRONG)OFFICE

SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

AJC
we agreed;
0915 on Wednesday
you will get name.
CR.

VISIT OF THE LEBANESE PRESIDENT

You have agreed to have talks at 1215 on Wednesday,
14 December followed by lunch.

President Gemayel is seeing the Foreign Secretary at
1145. They will discuss bilateral issues and keep off the
main questions of reconciliation and the Multi-National Force.

I suggest that at your talks at 1215 you are accompanied
by the Foreign and Defence Secretaries.

Agree?

The lunch is to be a working lunch. I suggest that on
our side it is attended by the Defence Secretary, Richard Luce
(the Foreign Secretary has another engagement), Mr. Miers
(our Ambassador in Beirut), Tony Parsons and myself.
President Gemayel will have his Foreign Minister, his
Ambassador and two or three others with him. Agree?

A.J.C. Yes not

We need a preparatory meeting
to decide precisely what questions
to put - and what answers
we may expect
not

9 December 1983



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 December 1983

Dear John,

MS

Lebanon: Multi-National Force

In preparation for the meeting which the Prime Minister is holding on the afternoon of 12 December, you may find useful a note on some of the factors which are of particular concern and some suggestions on the questions which the meeting might address. This letter reflects a general discussion with Sir Geoffrey Howe following his return from Brussels today, but he has not yet seen the text of it.

FLAG A | You will have seen the reports of Sir Geoffrey's meetings with the US Special Envoy to the Middle East, Mr Rumsfeld, on 7 December and with the other three MNF Foreign Ministers in Brussels on 8 December. He also spoke separately to Shultz and Cheysson on this subject.

Three points seem to us to emerge clearly from these meetings:

(i) the gap between the US posture in Lebanon and that of the three European MNF contributors has widened. The US have shown that they are prepared to interpret their right to self-defence more widely and more vigorously than we believe to be justified. They consider that a hardline approach to the Syrians will pay dividends, and claim to be unconcerned about the evident damage to their relations with the Arab world which will result from what is widely perceived to be a shift towards closer US/Israel relations following Shamir's visit to Washington. For example, Mr Rumsfeld told us on 7 December that although the Egyptians had initially been upset by the outcome of Shamir's visit, they had now calmed down; reports from our Embassy in Cairo indicate that the opposite is true. Our view would be that, in pursuing their policy of closer cooperation with Israel and direct pressure on the Syrians, the Americans are in practice making President Gemayel's task of achieving national reconciliation in Lebanon more difficult.

(ii) The Italians, and particularly the French, are now looking actively at ways of reducing their MNF contingent in the near future. Cheysson has told us that he intends to start discussions immediately with the Lebanese on reducing the French MNF contingent, partly by recalling troops to France, or at least accommodating them afloat, and

/partly



partly by transferring some units to the French UNIFIL contingent. The French may well present the Americans with a fait accompli. This could leave us with the worst of all worlds: the French would then have effectively decoupled their contingent from the Americans leaving us with an awkward choice; at the same time Cheysson may well claim to the Americans that they had done so with our acquiescence.

(iii) There is a real risk that in the short term there will be no progress towards reconciliation in Lebanon.

Against this background, there are a number of specific issues which might be addressed at the meeting on 12 December:

(i) should we reconsider the present size and functions of our contingent? Could we, for example, consider dropping the patrolling function but continue with the guarding of the ceasefire talks? This might allow us to abandon the base at Hadath, leaving a residual presence at the Embassy with the remainder spending each night on board HMS Fearless. Is their scope to involve UNIFIL in taking up some MNF tasks?

(ii) What should our tactics be during President Gemayel's visit on 14 December? We must clearly press him hard on the need to make progress in the reconciliation talks. Cheysson clearly hopes that we will put additional pressure on him by discussing the French ideas on thinning out MNF contingents. Sir Geoffrey has been careful to avoid commitment.

(iii) There is also the question of consultation among MNF contributors. Such political consultation as there has been to date is largely the result of our prompting, but it remains inadequate in the light of the task we are engaged on. At the meeting in Brussels, Shultz showed himself reluctant to be drawn into consultations in which US policies would, inevitably, be under close scrutiny. The French have their own reasons for wishing to avoid political consultations of a kind which would tie them in more closely to the Americans. Better coordination at the political level remains, however, a priority; and we shall continue to do what we can to bring it about.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD).

Yours ever,

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

Peter Ricketts

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street



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Prime Minister.

To be aware.

MO 3/7/4

A.S.C. 1/2.

MF

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

You will wish to be aware of recent developments concerning Lebanese Government attempts to procure additional Hunter aircraft for their small Air Force. I understand that Richard Luce has already been consulted about them.

2. For some time now the Lebanese have been trying to obtain Hunters from any available source. They initially approached us about the possibility of purchasing Hunters direct from the RAF. We have so far stalled on this request because of the possibility that the risk to our MNF contingent might be increased if we were seen to be augmenting the strength of the Lebanese Air Force. We have however been reluctant to give them an outright refusal since the purpose of the deployment of the MNF is to support the Lebanese Government. The Lebanese have not dropped the idea: they are now well aware of the availability for sale of RAF Hunters of the type they require, including two which they know to be earmarked for the Chileans plus four others. They are already commenting on our reluctance to sell them aircraft known to be available, and may find our attitude particularly inconsistent with our willingness to supply them with ammunition and rockets. Nevertheless despite the presentational difficulties, I believe that we must remain firm in declining to sell them RAF Hunters.
3. More recently, having failed to obtain two Hunters from Qatar, the Lebanese have turned to the Chileans, who are prepared to consider selling them twelve of their Hunters. The Chilean authorities approached us last month to seek our reactions to such a sale. Even



though they are not necessarily bound to consult HMG before resale (because only eleven of their fleet of thirty-two Hunters were supplied sufficiently recently to require our approval for their resale), the Chileans made it clear that they would not sell the aircraft to the Lebanese if to do so would be contrary to British interests. We still owe them a response, which has assumed some urgency now because the Commander of the Lebanese Air Force has gone to Chile to pursue negotiations. He might also discuss with the Chileans the possibility of Chilean release of their option to buy the two RAF Hunters in favour of the Lebanese, which would of course place us in an even more difficult position with the Lebanese Government.

4. There would be some advantage in permitting the Chilean sale to proceed in that it would ease the continued Lebanese pressure on us to supply RAF Hunters whilst also allowing greater scope for us to distance ourselves from the sale. With the latest deterioration of the situation in the Lebanon, however, I am of the view that this advantage is now outweighed by the possible risk to our MNF contingent ensuing from Lebanese Air Force acquisition of a large number of aircraft of identifiably British origin. I therefore believe that we should discourage the Chileans from allowing the sale to proceed at this time.

5. If you agree, I suggest that we might convey this message to the Chileans by thanking them for consulting us, and explaining in confidence that the present deeply unstable situation in the Lebanon gives us cause for concern at the prospect of a number of aircraft of British origin being added to the military resources in the country. We might add that this could also heighten the risk to the British element of the MNF. I think we shall have to give the Chileans some explanation of the nature for our unwillingness to sanction the sale, even though there must be some risk that they may convey the reasons to the Lebanese.

6. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

WRA
Ministry of Defence

9th December 1983

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FM UKDEL NATO 090130Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 354 OF 9 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON ROME PARIS BEIRUT MODUK

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MY TEL NO344: LEBANON MNF

1. CHEYSSON SPOKE TO SECRETARY OF STATE IN PRIVATE THIS EVENING AND BRIEFED HIM ON A PROPOSAL WHICH HE HAD ALREADY MADE TO ANDREOTTI BUT WHICH HE DID NOT (REPEAT NOT) PROPOSE TO INFORM SHULTZ OF UNTIL MONDAY OR TUESDAY.
2. GUTMAN, WHO IS OFF TO BEIRUT TOMORROW (9 DECEMBER), HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SAY TO GEMAYEL THAT THE SITUATION OF THE MNF CONTINGENTS IS NOW SUCH THAT ONE MORE SERIOUS INCIDENT COULD LEAD TO THEIR PRECIPITATE WITHDRAWAL. HE WILL THEREFORE PUT IT TO GEMAYEL THAT IT MIGHT BE BEST FOR HIM TO SUGGEST A CHANGE, NOT IN THE MANDATE BUT IN THE STRUCTURE AND SIZE OF THE MNF, AND TO PROPOSE REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD AMOUNT, IN THE CASE OF THE FRENCH, TO KEEPING A PRESENCE IN SABRA AND CHATILA, TRANSFERRING 500 MEN TO UNIFIL, HAVING THE REST OF THE CONTINGENT ACCOMMODATED AFLOAT OR RETURNED TO FRANCE ON 24 HOUR RECALL, AND MAINTAINING A RESIDUAL PRESENCE IN AND AROUND THE EMBASSY. CHEYSSON SAID THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF PRESENTING GEMAYEL WITH AN ULTIMATUM: THE PURPOSE WAS MERELY TO EXPLAIN THE REALITIES AND THE RISKS TO HIM AND TO INVITE HIM TO CONSIDER AND MAKE PROPOSALS.
3. CHEYSSON UNDERTOOK TO REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE WHEN GUTMAN HAD REPORTED TO HIM ON GEMAYEL'S RESPONSE. HE ASKED THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO SPEAK ON THE SAME LINES TO GEMAYEL WHEN HE VISITED LONDON AND TO REPORT THE REACTION TO CHEYSSON. ANDREOTTI'S RESPONSE HAD BEEN VERY FORTHCOMING. (CHEYSSON ADDED THAT ANDREOTTI WAS JUST WAITING FOR AN INCIDENT WHICH WOULD GIVE HIM A PRETEXT TO WITHDRAW).
4. SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE WOULD REFLECT ON THE MATTER BUT WAS CAREFUL TO MAKE NO COMMITMENT. HE ASKED HOW GEMAYEL COULD BE EXPECTED TO FULFIL THE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RECONCILIATION PLACED ON HIM IF EUROPEAN CONTINGENTS WITHDREW AND THE AMERICANS WERE LEFT ALONE FACING THE SYRIANS. CHEYSSON SAID THAT THERE WAS NO DANGER OF THE UNITED STATES GOING TO WAR AGAINST SYRIA: THE ISRAELIS WOULDN'T LET THEM.

SECRET

15.

SECRET

5. ON A SEPARATE POINT, CHEYSSON SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD PROMISED TO GIVE NAVAL COVER FOR THE EVACUATION OF THE PLO. THE PROMISE WOULD BE KEPT. IT WAS HOWEVER AN EMBARRASSING MATTER: THE ISRAELIS MIGHT NOT LIKE IT, AND THERE WAS A DANGER OF A FRENCH ESCORT SHIP BEING FIRED UPON BY THE ISRAELIS OR EVEN THE AMERICANS.

GRAHAM

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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BUCKINGHAM PALACE

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SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Prime Minister.

London SW1A 2AH

A.J.C. ^a/₁₂.

8 December 1983

Dear John,

Syria

The Syrian Embassy this afternoon delivered to the department the enclosed text of a message to the Prime Minister from President Asad dated 5 December.

We shall let you have a draft reply as soon as possible.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street



EMBASSY OF THE
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

CC MIASTR
OFS
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T203^{MA}/83

Dear Prime Minister,

In the present critical circumstances which the world in general, and the Middle East in particular, are undergoing, and what they entail in terms of aggression and development and widening of this aggression, I write to you to point out a number of grave developments in our region. Such developments have become a threat to peace and security, not only to this sensitive region, but also to peace and security in the world at large. The gravest of these developments are the following:

1. The U.S. military escalation in the Lebanon, and the involvement of the U.S. forces in the internal Lebanese problem, and their participation in the fighting against some parties.

2. The development of U.S. military escalation from involvement in the internal fighting to launching aggression against Syrian forces in the Lebanon. The last of such acts of aggression were the air Raids which the U.S. air crafts carried out yesterday against our forces positions in the Lebanon, and the consequent declarations that were characterized by threats to continue such aggressive acts against our forces.

The U.S. forces have come to Lebanon under the pretext of helping in establishing peace in this country, but no sooner they turned to forces that threaten peace and security in the Lebanon and the region. What we fear is that the region has come to be on the brink of another Vietnam.

3. The strategic agreement concluded between the American President, Ronald Reagan, and the Prime Minister of Israel, Itzhak Shamir, during the latter's visit to Washington. According to this agreement, the interests of the United States, a Super power, have been linked to those of Israel, in a way that the huge potentialities and capabilities of the United States are put in the service of the Israeli expansionist aggressive projects. It has become clear that the two sides have agreed to launch a direct aggressive action



EMBASSY OF THE
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

against Syria and her forces in the Lebanon, and to take other actions that violate the unity of Lebanon and destroy its future. The Israeli air raids against some lebanese towns and villages, and the raids against the Syrian positions the next day, were the first stage of a joint American - Israeli aggressive plan.

4. The pressures exerted by the American and Israeli governments to hamper the process of national reconciliation, and to push some lebanese parties to aggravate the internal situation in the Lebanon in order to frustrate the possibility of achieving reconciliation among the lebanese parties, so as to keep Lebanon an explosive hot bed of tension.

Referring to these developments and to their grave consequences that threaten Syria's security and future and the people of Lebanon, I would like to draw your attention to them because they constitute a serious threat to peace and security in our region and to the world at large. Moreover, these developments reveal the United States aggressive method and its policy that looks down upon peoples, as if the world has become a jungle where might and aggression prevail.

I am sure that you are aware of the dangers of the continuation of this aggressive method and the threats against a United Nations member State which has always tried to maintain its independence, defend its territory and its national interests against any aggression.

I am also confident that once your government realizes the danger of this explosive situation, it will take every measure to help us put an end to this aggressive policy and will help us defend our independence, sovereignty and national dignity.

Finally please accept my deepest regards and best wishes hoping that your people will always enjoy prosperity and progress.

Hafez Assad
President of the Syrian Arab Republic

Damascus,
5 December 1983

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FM FCO 080935Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT

TELEGRAM NUMBER 526 OF 8 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO (FOR SEC OF STATE'S PARTY),

WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME

LEBANON/MNF

CALL AT FCO BY US SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, 7 DECEMBER.

1. SUMMARY. AN HOUR'S DISCUSSION GAVE ME AND MR LUCE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SET OUT OUR CONCERNS ABOUT US POLICY. WE STRESSED THE NEED FOR CONSIDERABLE RESTRAINT EVEN IN LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENCE. THE PERCEIVED SHIFT IN US/ISRAELI RELATIONS HAD DAMAGED THE AMERICANS' NEUTRAL STANCE AND BY EXTENSION THAT OF THE OTHER MNF CONTRIBUTORS. RUMSFELD'S REPLIES WERE NOT (NOT) ENTIRELY REASSURING ON EITHER POINT. BUT HE WILL HAVE TAKEN THE MESSAGE. WE AGREED ON THE NEED FOR CLOSER CONSULTATION AMONG MNF PARTNERS.

DETAIL.

2. RUMSFELD ACCOMPANIED BY PELLETREAU (STATE DEPT) AND PRICE (US AMBASSADOR) CALLED ON MR LUCE BRIEFLY AND ALL THEN JOINED ME FOR AN HOUR. FOLLOWING WERE MAIN POINTS DISCUSSED.

3. RUMSFELD'S ITINERARY. RUMSFELD SAID THAT AFTER A BRIEF STOP IN PARIS HE WOULD REACH BEIRUT ON 8 DECEMBER. HIS PLANS AFTER THAT WOULD INCLUDE ISRAEL AND SYRIA. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER THE RUMOURED RECONVENING OF THE GENEVA RECONCILIATION TALKS COME TRUE.

4. US/ISRAEL. MR LUCE SAID THAT IN SYRIA, KUWAIT AND BAHRAIN HE HAD MET WIDESPREAD CONCERN AT THE APPARENT US SHIFT TOWARDS AN EVEN CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL. TO THE ARABS THIS LOOKED ONE-SIDED, PARTICULARLY SINCE ISRAEL HAD GIVEN NOTHING IN RETURN. RUMSFELD REPLIED THAT CLOSE US/ISRAEL RELATIONS WERE NOT NEW. THEY HAD DETERIORATED DURING 1982, AND RECENT

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CONTACTS CULMINATING IN SHAMIR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO GET THINGS BACK TO NORMAL. STRATEGIC COOPERATION WAS A MISLEADING EXPRESSION. NO QUID PRO QUO HAD BEEN SOUGHT. ARAB REACTIONS WERE NOT SURPRISING. PRESIDENT MUBARAK HAD BEEN WORRIED, BUT AFTER A MEETING IN WASHINGTON WITH AL-BAZ THE EGYPTIANS HAD CALMED DOWN. HEAT GENERATED IN OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES BY PRESS REPORTS WOULD SOON PASS. NOTHING IN THE SHAMIR VISIT OUGHT TO WORRY AMERICA'S ARAB FRIENDS. IT WAS IN THEIR INTERESTS AS WELL THAT THE US SHOULD RESTORE ITS NORMAL STABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL.

5. MNF. I STRESSED OUR CONCERN IN ALL ISSUES OF COMMON INTEREST TO MAKE SURE THAT WE UNDERSTOOD AND WHERE POSSIBLE AGREED WITH EACH OTHER. WE HAD GONE INTO THE MNF WITH AGREED OBJECTIVES. THERE WAS NOW INCREASING ANXIETY IN BRITAIN ABOUT IT. WE NEEDED TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCES OF ANXIETY AND ACT TO CORRECT THEM. IF WE FAILED WE SHOULD INEVITABLY HAVE TO RECONSIDER THE MNF'S ROLE.

6. RUMSFELD REAFFIRMED THE US VIEW OF THE MNF AS A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE SUPPORTING THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND A FACTOR FOR STABILITY. THE AMERICANS WOULD CONTINUE TO URGE GEMAYEL TO FORM A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY, AND HOPED WE WOULD DO THE SAME. THE ENVIRONMENT WAS DIFFICULT GIVEN THE NUMBER OF MILITIAS AND SYRIAN PRESSURE ON KEY PLAYERS NOT TO HELP. GEMAYEL MUST MAKE 'POLITICAL DEALS' IF THE LEBANESE ARMY WAS TO BE DEPLOYED MORE WIDELY. THE FIRST ROUND OF RECONCILIATION TALKS AT GENEVA HAD LEFT LOOSE ENDS. GEMAYEL COULD EITHER REPORT BACK TO A SECOND SESSION OR GET POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS UNDERWAY WITH INDIVIDUAL FACTIONS. IN WASHINGTON GEMAYEL HAD BEGUN BY VOLUNTEERING IN PUBLIC HIS SUPPORT FOR THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT, AND HAD THEY TALKED ABOUT MECHANISMS FOR ISRAELI AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT WAS THE BEST WAY TO GET THE ISRAELIS OUT. WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM HAD TO BE PURSUED TOGETHER.

7. I SAID THAT THE MNF COULD ONLY BE JUSTIFIED ON THE BASIS THAT IT WAS HELPING TO ENABLE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO PURSUE RECONCILIATION. THE NEED FOR PROGRESS IN THIS COULD NOT BE

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STRESSED TOO STRONGLY, (RUMSFELD AGREED). THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER OUR ACTIONS CONTRIBUTED TO THAT PROCESS. THREE MAJOR QUESTIONS NEEDED TO BE RESOLVED:

(A) 17 MAY AGREEMENT. THIS HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. AT THE MEETING OF MNF CONTRIBUTORS IN PARIS ON 27 OCTOBER SHULTZ HAD AGREED WITH ME THAT IT MUST NOT BECOME AN OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS OF RECONCILIATION, BUT COULD BE 'PASSED OVER IN SILENCE'. THE FORMULA AGREED AT GENEVA HAD BEEN TO LEAVE IT ON ONE SIDE FOR THE SAKE OF PURSUING RECONCILIATION. RUMSFELD SAID THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO ABROGATE OR REJECT IT. WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON BRINGING ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES IN PRACTICE. I SAID THAT IT WAS A MATTER OF EMPHASIS AND TO CONTINUE EVEN TO TALK ABOUT THE AGREEMENT TOO MUCH SEEMED COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE:

(B) RELATIONS WITH SYRIA. RECONCILIATION NEEDED SYRIA'S COOPERATION. PUSHING SYRIA INTO HOSTILITY AGAINST US MADE IT HARDER. IT WAS CRUCIAL TO GO ON TRYING TO PERSUADE SYRIA TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE. US POLICY SEEMED SET ON DEALING WITH SYRIA IN A WAY WHICH MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR HER TO TAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE PART:

(C) ROLE OF THE MNF. THE TOP PRIORITY WAS TO REDUCE TENSION AND TURN BACK THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE. LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENCE MUST NOT SPILL OVER INTO SOMETHING ELSE. LONG BRITISH EXPERIENCE OF HOLDING THE RING IN SUCH SITUATIONS SHOWED THAT IMMENSE EVEN SUPERHUMAN SELF-RESTRAINT WAS REQUIRED, TO AVOID SUSPICIONS THAT PEACEKEEPERS WERE DEPARTING FROM THAT ROLE, WITHOUT SUCH RESTRAINT THE WHOLE PROCESS WOULD BE AT RISK.

7. RUMSFELD AGREED THAT THE MNF WAS A PEACEKEEPING FORCE (WITH THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENCE). IT WAS NO PART OF US INTENTIONS TO BECOME A PROTAGONIST, BUT TO CONTRIBUTE, THROUGH THE MNF, AND THROUGH DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT, TO AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH GEMAYEL COULD PURSUE RECONCILIATION. GEMAYEL COULD NOT RECONQUER LEBANESE TERRITORY BY FORCE AND NO ONE COULD HELP HIM DO SO. THE MNF MUST BE MEASURED AND STEADY AND NOT 'FLAP' ABOUT WITHDRAWAL. EC STATEMENT CRITICAL OF THE MNF OR AIMED AT DISTANCING THE TEN FROM THE US IN ARAB EYES WOULD NOT HELP.

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THE MNF MUST NOT ALLOW SYRIA TO DISRUPT THE PROCESS WE ALL WISHED TO SUPPORT. IT WOULD BE NOTABLY UNHELPFUL IF ANY MEMBER OF THE MNF SUDDENLY ALTERED ITS POSITION. SYRIA WOULD SEE THAT ALL SHE NEED DO WAS TO WAIT. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE TEN HAD NO (NO) WISH TO CUT ACROSS US POLICY, BUT NOTED THE CLEAR UNHAPPINESS (FOR EXAMPLE) IN THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AT THE PERCEIVED DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE PURPOSE OF THE MNF AND US ACTIONS.

8. MNF CONSULTATIONS. I SAID WE REGRETTED THE ABSENCE OF CONSULTATION. THE AMERICANS HAD WARNED THE SYRIANS THAT ATTACKS ON RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT WOULD PRODUCE A US RESPONSE: BUT THEY HAD NOT TOLD US OR OTHER MNF PARTNERS OF THIS WARNING, DESPITE ITS POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR US ALL. WE DID NOT EXPECT CONSULTATION OVER IMMEDIATE RESPONSES TO PARTICULAR INCIDENTS. BUT WE MUST ALL EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT IN DECIDING THE SCALE OF OUR REACTIONS.

BOMBING AND SHELLING WERE BLANKET RESPONSES. RUMSFELD ARGUED THAT THE US ACTION HAS BEEN 'MODEST' AND USEFUL. HE AGREED ON THE NEED FOR CLOSER CONSULTATION.

9. RELATIONS WITH SYRIA. MR LUCE REMARKED THAT WE BOTH ACKNOWLEDGED SYRIA'S KEY ROLE AND THE NEED FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE SYRIAN CONTRIBUTION. BUT HIS TALK WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM HAD SHOWN THAT THE US ACTION HAD PLAYED INTO SYRIAN HANDS BY RALLYING MODERATE ARABS UNTIL RECENTLY CRITICAL OF SYRIAN POLICY. KHADDAM HAD SAID THAT ANDROPOV AND REAGAN WERE HIS TWO BEST FRIENDS: REAGAN SUPPLIED THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND ANDROPOV THE AMMUNITION. THE SYRIANS HAD BEEN REASONABLY CONSTRUCTIVE AT GENEVA. MILITARY ACTION AGAINST SYRIA RISKED BEING COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. WE SHOULD SEEK DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL WAYS OF PERSUADING SYRIA TO CONTINUE TO BE HELPFUL.

10. RUMSFELD AGREED ON THE NEED FOR DIALOGUE WITH SYRIA AND SAID IT HAD BEEN HELPFUL THAT KHADDAM SHOULD HAVE VISITED BEIRUT RECENTLY. SYRIAN RESTRAINT ON LEBANESE FACTIONS DEMONSTRATED THE CONTROL THEY COULD EXERCISE WHEN THEY CHOSE. BUT THE MNF MUST BE QUOTE STEADFAST UNQUOTE. ITS PRESENCE MIGHT BE USEFUL IN BRINGING ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES: ITS DEPAR-

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TURE WAS A SYRIAN AND SOVIET INTEREST.

11. FURTHER DISCUSSION AGAIN STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING ACTIONS WHICH UNDERMINED THE MNF'S CREDIBILITY AS A PEACEKEEPING FORCE BY APPEARING TO TAKE SIDES. WE NEEDED TO AGREE NOT ONLY ON OBJECTIVES BUT ON HOW TO ACHIEVE THEM. AMBASSADOR PRICE ASKED WHETHER WE THOUGHT THE US ACTION OF 4 DECEMBER HAD BEEN SEEN AS ESCALATION BEYOND THE NEEDS OF SELF-DEFENCE. MR LUCE SAID THAT THIS WAS INDEED HOW IT WAS SEEN IN THE ARAB WORLD. IT LOOKED AS IF THE US HAD BEEN TAKING SIDES BY GETTING INTO DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE SYRIANS. RUMSFELD ASSERTED THAT GEMAYEL BELIEVED THAT THE PRESENT POSTURE OF THE MNF, INCLUDING THE RECENT US ACTION, WAS HELPFUL TO HIM. THE MODERATE ARABS HAD NEVER PUT EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON SYRIA. SAUDI ARABIA HAD PAID FOR SYRIA'S ARMS FROM THE SOVIET UNION OUT OF FEAR.

12. SUMMING UP, I SAID THAT IF THE FOUR CONTRIBUTORS TO THE MNF WERE TO REMAIN THERE WAS A CLEAR NEED FOR A MORE CONTINUOUS PATTERN OF CONSULTATION. IT WAS OF OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE TO JUDGE EVERY ACTION BY THE EFFECT IT MIGHT HAVE ON LOWERING OR RAISING THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE. WE NEEDED TO EXERCISE MASSIVE RESTRAINT IN ANY ACTS OF SELF-DEFENCE. UNLESS WE AGREED ON HOW TO ACHIEVE OUR SHARED OBJECTIVES THE FUTURE OF THE MNF WOULD INEVITABLY BE IN JEOPARDY.

HOWE

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

LIMITED

HEWAD

MED

DEFENCE DEPT

PUSD

NEWS DEPT

UND

NAD

WED

SED

BCD(B)

FINANCE DEPT

PROTOCOL DEPT

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

SIR J LEAHY

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

MR MACINNES

MR ADAMS

MR EGERTON

MR JENKINS

COPIES TO:

MOD DS11

MR GOODALL)CABINET
SIR R ARMSTRONG)OFFICE

SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

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FROM UKDEL NATO 081250Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 344 OF 8 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON ROME PARIS BEIRUT PRIORITY MODUK
 ABU DHABI ADEN ALGIERS AMMAN BAGHDAD BAHRAIN BEIRUT CAIRO
 DAMASCUS DOHA DUBAI JEDDA JERUSALEM KHARTOUM KUWAIT
 MUSCAT RABTA SANAA TEL AVIV TRIPOLI TUNIS UKMIS GENEVA
 UKMIS NEW YORK

LEBANON: MNF FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING, 8 DECEMBER

SUMMARY

1. A SCRAPPY MEETING, DEMONSTRATING CONSIDERABLE EUROPEAN ANXIETY. IT WAS AGREED TO KEEP IN TOUCH ON POLITICAL MATTERS MORE FREQUENTLY THAN IN THE PAST, WITH RUMSFELD'S PARTICIPATION AS CONVENIENT. IT WAS ACCEPTED THAT SUCH CONSULTATION COULD NOT BE ON OPERATIONAL MILITARY MATTERS. LEBANESE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION SHOULD BE A MAIN PRIORITY AND WE SHOULD URGE THE NEED FOR THIS MORE STRONGLY ON GEMAYYEL AND THE LEADERS OF THE OTHER FACTIONS. ON THE OTHER MAIN PRIORITY, WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES, SHULTZ STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT PICKING OUT THE MORE AGREEABLE ELEMENTS OF THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT, OR ABANDONING IT AS A WHOLE. AGREED THAT WE SHOULD WORK TOWARDS THE REPLACEMENT OF THE MNF BY SOME SORT OF UN PRESENCE BUT THAT THIS COULD NOT BE DONE IMMEDIATELY. CHEYSSON'S SUGGESTION THAT ELEMENTS OF INDIVIDUAL MNF CONTINGENTS SHOULD BE THINNED OUT, BY AGREEMENT WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, WAS SEIZED ON EAGERLY BY ANDREOTTI.
2. OPENING THE MEETING, SHULTZ SAID THAT RECENTLY THERE HAD BEEN ANXIETY ABOUT THE MNF, ESPECIALLY AMONGST THOSE CONTRIBUTORS WHO HAD SUFFERED CASUALTIES. THE NEXUS OF PROBLEMS IN LEBANON WAS A DIFFICULT ONE, BUT ALL CONTRIBUTORS HAD VAST INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND TO SOME EXTENT THE REGION'S PROBLEMS NOW CENTRED ON LEBANON. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD EVERY INTENTION OF SEEING US POLICY IN LEBANON THROUGH. TO ALLAY ANXIETIES IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO CREATE AN INTERMEDIATE TIER OF CONSULTATION, PERHAPS AT POLITICAL DIRECTOR LEVEL, THOUGH CONSULTATION ON THE GROUND IN BEIRUT AND AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL WAS GOOD. RUMSFELD INTENDED TO SPEND MUCH OF HIS TIME IN THE REGION OR IN EUROPE BETWEEN VISITS TO WASHINGTON, AND COULD STAY IN MORE REGULAR TOUCH WITH CONTRIBUTORS IF THIS WOULD HELP.
3. AS REGARDS THE INTENTIONS OF PARTIES IN THE AREA, AFTER SHAMIR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON THE US FELT THAT THERE WAS MORE AWARENESS IN ISRAEL OF ITS STAKE IN THE EMERGENCE OF A STRONG CENTRAL LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, AND OF THE NEED TO WORK ACTIVELY TOWARDS ONE. ISRAEL HAD NOW AGREED TO HELP THE US TO MOVE TOWARDS ITS OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON. GEMAYYEL NEEDED TO WORK HARD TO BROADEN THE BASE OF HIS GOVERNMENT, BUT THAT WAS EASIER SAID THAN DONE, SINCE VARIOUS LEBANESE FACTIONS WERE SYRIAN SURROGATES AND PERIODICALLY QUOTE RAISED CAIN UNQUOTE. HOWEVER THE US

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Believed.

BELIEVED THERE WAS ROOM FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS COMMON OBJECTIVES, WHICH SHULTZ DEFINED AS WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, ESTABLISHMENT OF A BROADER-BASED LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND STEPS TO STABILISE THE SITUATION IN GREATER BEIRUT. ALL THIS MEANT THAT THE GEMAYYEL GOVERNMENT NEEDED THE FULL SUPPORT OF ALL MNF MEMBERS AND SHOULD NOT BE UNDERMINED. PATIENCE AND GREATER COORDINATION WERE CALLED FOR.

4. AS TO SYRIA, SHULTZ SAID THAT A STRONG US DIALOGUE WITH DAMASCUS EXISTED. THE US AIR STRIKE OF 4 DECEMBER HAD NOT BEEN AGAINST SYRIA, BUT AGAINST THOSE WHO HAD FIRED AT US RECONNAISSANCE PLANES ON TASKS WHICH HAD BEEN AUTHORISED BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT SINCE SEPTEMBER. THE US HAD EVIDENCE THAT THEY KNEW THEY WERE FIRING ON US AIRCRAFT ON 3 DECEMBER: IT WAS THAT KNOWLEDGE WHICH HAD OCCASIONED THE NEXT DAY'S RESPONSE. THE US INTENDED TO CONTINUE TAKING MILITARY ACTION WHICH WAS AUTHORISED AND EXPECTED. AS TO SELF-DEFENCE, THE MARINES IN THEIR COMPOUND HAD HITHERTO DEFENDED THEMSELVES FROM A POSITION OF QUOTE LEANING BACK UNQUOTE. NOW THEY HAD BEEN AUTHORISED TO QUOTE LEAN FORWARD UNQUOTE, AND THINGS HAD SETTLED DOWN. THE PARADOX WAS THAT THE MNF AND US TASK WAS TO TRY AND ACHIEVE PEACE AND STABILITY IN LEBANON: BUT WHEN ITS TROOPS WERE FIRED ON, THE US WOULD OF COURSE RESPOND. THE CONTRADICTION WAS MORE APPARENT THAN REAL.

5. CHEYSSON SAID THE SITUATION OF THE FRENCH FORCES WAS WORRYING. THEY WERE LIKE SITTING DUCKS WAITING TO BE SHOT AT. THEY NOW HAD AN OFFSHORE WORRY. VERY RECENTLY A SUBMARINE HAD BEEN DETECTED RECONNOITRING THE FRENCH AIRCRAFT CARRIER. SO ON 7 DECEMBER THE FRENCH HAD WARNED GADAFI THAT IF THIS HAPPENED AGAIN THE FRENCH WOULD STRIKE PRE-EMPTIVELY. AS REGARDS SELF DEFENCE IN GENERAL, IF FRENCH FORCES WERE FIRED UPON THEY WOULD STRIKE BACK. SINCE SUCH STRIKES WERE RISKY OPERATIONS, HE REGRETTED THAT PARTNERS COULD NOT (NOT) BE INFORMED IN ADVANCE, FOR OPERATIONAL REASONS.

6. CHEYSSON MAINTAINED THAT THE MISSION OF THE FRENCH FORCES UNDER THE ORIGINAL EXCHANGE OF LETTERS WAS NOW FULFILLED. THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES WERE NOW STRONG ENOUGH TO CONTROL THE SITUATION IN THE BEIRUT AREA. FRANCE WOULD MAINTAIN A TOKEN MILITARY PRESENCE AS LONG AS NECESSARY. BUT FRANCE WAS CONSIDERING THINNING OUT NUMBERS, AND CENTRING HER CONTINGENT FOR EXAMPLE ON THE EMBASSY. IN OTHER WORDS FRANCE WOULD LIKE TO RE-DEPLOY THE GREATER PART OF ITS FORCES EITHER OFFSHORE ON NAVAL VESSELS, OR AT HOME ON VERY SHORT STANDBY. THIS WOULD NOT MEAN ANY CHANGE IN THE MANDATE, WHICH WOULD REMAIN AS REAFFIRMED AT LA CELLE ST-CLOUD ON 27 OCTOBER.

7. CHEYSSON AGREED WITH SHULTZ'S DEFINITION OF CONTRIBUTORS' OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON. ON SYRIA, WITH WHOM THE FRENCH REMAINED IN CLOSEST TOUCH, THE PROBLEM WHICH MIGHT HAVE ARISEN HAD ASAD BEEN SERIOUSLY INCAPACITATED NOW SEEMED LESS. AS TO THE PLO, HE EXPLAINED THAT THE FRENCH HAD INTERVENED A NUMBER OF TIMES ON BEHALF OF ARAFAT IN TRIPOLI BECAUSE THE WORLD NEEDED A MODERATE SPOKESMAN FOR THE PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS: BECAUSE SUCH ACTION EMBARRASSED SYRIA: AND BECAUSE THE PLO WOULD ONE DAY BE NEEDED AT OR NEAR THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN THE MAIN PALESTINE NEGOTIATIONS. SO FRANCE WOULD SUPPORT CURRENT PLANS TO EVACUATE UP TO 4000 PALESTINIANS FROM TRIPOLI.

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8. ON UN ASPECTS, CHEYSSON INVITED VIEWS ON THE SURPRISING SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF TWO RECENT MOVES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL: THE CEASE FIRE RESOLUTION COVERING THE TRIPOLI AREA (WHICH THE RUSSIANS WOULD UNTIL RECENTLY HAVE ARGUED WAS AN INTERNAL QUESTION), AND THE SG'S PROPOSAL TO FLY THE UN FLAG ON THE EVACUATING SHIPS. CHEYSSON WONDERED WHETHER THIS COULD PRESAGE AN EVENTUAL SOFTENING IN THE SOVIET LINE TOWARDS UNIFIL, WHICH FRANCE AND OTHERS MAINTAINED SHOULD HAVE A WIDER MANDATE IN LEBANON. IF THE RUSSIANS COULD BE BROUGHT TO ACCEPT THE NEED FOR UN OBSERVERS IN DIFFICULT AREAS OF LEBANON, OR AN EXPANSION OF THE UNIFIL MANDATE TO TAKE IN AT LEAST THE SABRA AND SHATILA REFUGEE CAMPS, THE MNF'S PRESENCE COULD INDEED BECOME TOKEN. FRANCE WAS READY EITHER TO TRANSFER HER CONTINGENT'S RESPONSIBILITY TO THE UN OR TO WITHDRAW COMPLETELY. FINALLY, CHEYSSON POINTED TO THE MISLEADING IMPRESSIONS CONVEYED BY THE MEDIA ABOUT THE UPSHOT OF SHAMIR'S RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON, WHICH MANY HAD PRESENTED AS THE BEGINNING OF A NEW US-ISRAELI MILITARY ALLIANCE. FRANCE KNEW FROM OFFICIAL BRIEFING THAT THIS WAS NOT TRUE, BUT THE IMPRESSION WAS UNFORTUNATE.

9. FOR THE UK, YOU RECALLED THE BASIS OF ALL MNF CONTRIBUTORS' PRESENCE IN THE LEBANON. WE ALL HAD A COMMON INTEREST IN STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS A WHOLE, AND THE LEBANESE OPERATION WAS A PART OF THIS. THE MNF WAS ONLY CREDIBLE IF IT WAS FULFILLING ITS ORIGINAL MISSION AS DEFINED IN THE EXCHANGES OF LETTERS. ALTHOUGH THE UK WAS THE SMALLEST CONTRIBUTOR AND THEREFORE SPOKE WITH SOME DIFFIDENCE, PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY INTEREST IN BRITAIN WAS VERY GREAT AND WAS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED THAT THE LEBANESE EXERCISE MIGHT BE GOING OFF COURSE. YOU STRONGLY AGREED WITH THE NEED TO SET UP A MORE REGULAR SYSTEM OF CONSULTATIONS: NOT TO EXCHANGE MILITARY INFORMATION OR PLANS BUT TO REVIEW PROGRESS TOWARDS POLITICAL OBJECTIVES, AND CONTRIBUTORS' TACTICAL POSTURE. (I INSTANCED WHAT SHULTZ HAD SAID ABOUT THE US HAVING MADE IT CLEAR TO THE SYRIANS WHAT THEIR RESPONSE WOULD BE IF THEY SHOT AT US RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT. IF CLOSE CONSULTATIONS COULD ELICIT THIS SORT OF BRIEFING, OTHER CONTRIBUTORS WOULD UNDERSTAND THE REASONS FOR US ACTIONS BETTER, AND PERHAPS QUESTION THEM LESS).

10. YOU AGREED THAT WE MUST ALL PRESS GEMAYYEL TO GET ON WITH NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. TO DATE, NONE OF US HAD PRESSED HIM STRONGLY ENOUGH. NOR HAD WE PERHAPS HELPED HIM ENOUGH TO DEAL WITH SYRIAN SURROGATES, SINCE THESE FACTIONS WOULD HAVE TO COOPERATE IN SUCCESSFUL NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. WE WOULD DISCUSS THESE POINTS WITH GEMAYYEL ON HIS VISIT TO LONDON ON 14 DECEMBER.

11. AS TO WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES, YOU SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN REGARDED AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AS CONTRIBUTING TO RECONCILIATION. SHULTZ HAD SAID ON 27 OCTOBER THAT THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE PASSED OVER IN SILENCE. YOU FELT STRONGLY THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO BE AN OBSTACLE TO THE PROCESS OF RE-ESTABLISHING NATIONAL UNITY.

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12. YOU EXPRESSED ANXIETY ABOUT PERCEPTIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD OF THE NEWLY STRENGTHENED US/ISRAEL RELATIONSHIP. IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO POSE AS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRIBUTOR TO THE RESTORATION OF PEACE IN LEBANON IF MODERATE ARABS (FOR EXAMPLE EGYPT) PERCEIVED THE US TO BE ADOPTING A STRONGER RELATIONSHIP WITH ONE OF THE MAIN PARTIES. THIS WAS WHY YOU WERE ANXIOUS ABOUT SHULTZ'S MENTION OF A FIRMER POLICY TOWARDS SYRIA, SINCE WHETHER OR NOT THE NEW DIRECTION IN US POLICY WAS CONFIRMED, IT COULD SLOW DOWN PROGRESS TOWARDS RECONCILIATION, THEREBY UNDERMINING THE MNF'S WIDER PURPOSE.

13. ON SELF-DEFENCE YOU SAID THAT EACH CONTRIBUTOR HAD TO TAKE ITS OWN DECISIONS. YOU RECALLED THAT WHEN YOU SAW RUMSFELD ON 7 DECEMBER YOU HAD TOLD HIM THAT BECAUSE OF BRITAIN'S EXPERIENCE OF EX-COLONIAL SITUATIONS, WE HAD COME TO KNOW THE NEED TO SHOW ABSOLUTE PATIENCE AND SELF-RESTRAINT IN A PEACEKEEPING ROLE, EVEN UNDER THE SEVEREST PROVOCATION. SO SHULTZ'S REMARKS ABOUT NEW INSTRUCTIONS TO US MARINES IN BEIRUT GAVE YOU CAUSE FOR ALARM.

14. YOU ADDED THAT WHEN MR LUCE HAD MET KHADDAM IN DAMASCUS ON 4 DECEMBER, HE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE IMPACT OF THE US DEFENSIVE STRIKE THAT DAY HAD BEEN WHOLLY HELPFUL TO SYRIA, SINCE MANY MODERATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS HAD IN CONSEQUENCE RALLIED TO SYRIA'S SUPPORT. YOU COUNSELLED AGAINST ANY CHANGE IN THE MNF'S ROLE AS ORIGINALLY DEFINED, SINCE THIS WOULD LEAD TO ITS WITHDRAWAL BECOMING MORE DIFFICULT. YOU AGREED THAT IDEALLY THE SUBSTITUTION OF A U.N. PRESENCE FOR THE MNF WAS DESIRABLE, BUT PROBABLY SOME WAY OFF. WE SHOULD CONSIDER SERIOUSLY WHETHER WE WOULD REALLY BE HELPING GEMAYYEL BY ALLOWING THE MNF'S ROLE TO CHANGE, HOWEVER INADVERTENTLY: WE MUST NEVER FORGET FIRST PRINCIPLES.

15. ANDREOTTI, IN A CONFUSED INTERVENTION, SAID THAT LITTLE HAD CHANGED SINCE CHEYSSON HAD SUMMARISED CONTRIBUTOR'S ACTIONS AND OBJECTIVES AT THE 27 OCTOBER MINISTERIAL MEETING (PARIS TELNO 971). THAT STATEMENT HAD PROVED EFFECTIVE IN OVERCOMING SOME INITIAL DIFFICULTIES AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. MINISTERS SHOULD REAFFIRM ITS CONTENT TODAY. SYRIA COULD DAMAGE PROGRESS TOWARDS LEBANESE RECONCILIATION AND WE SHOULD THEREFORE NOT (NOT) ADOPT AN AGGRESSIVE POLICY TOWARDS SYRIA. AS REGARDS A UN FORCE, ITALY WOULD WELCOME UNIFIL OR ANY OTHER FORCE TAKING OVER RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SABRA AND SHATILA CAMPS, BUT IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT THE MNF CAME INTO EXISTENCE BECAUSE A UN PRESENCE IN BEIRUT IN 1982 COULD NOT BE ARRANGED. ANDREOTTI ALSO AGREED ON THE NEED FOR MORE COORDINATION BETWEEN MNF MEMBERS, BUT SAID IT SHOULD BE PURELY POLITICAL AND FOCUSED FOR EXAMPLE ON HOW TO ADVANCE RESUMPTION OF TALKS AT GENEVA AND MONITOR THEIR PROGRESS. IT WAS RIGHT TO REAFFIRM EACH CONTRIBUTOR'S RIGHT TO SELF DEFENCE, BUT IT WAS NOT HELPFUL IF REPRISALS WERE CARRIED OUT AFTER MUCH DELAY (HE MENTIONED A PERIOD OF 20 DAYS).

16. ON PALESTINE, ANDREOTTI SAID WE MIGHT BE WITNESSING A LIFE AND DEATH STRUGGLE WITHIN THE PLO. IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO SEE WHETHER AN ALTERNATIVE PALESTINIAN VOICE COULD BE FOUND AMONGST LEADING PALESTINIAN PERSONALITIES ON THE WEST BANK, WHO COULD THEN HELP KING HUSSEIN TO LAUNCH SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. US PRESSURE OVER ISRAEL TO SLOW DOWN OR HALT HER PROGRAMME OF SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WOULD HELP GREATLY TOWARDS RE-ESTABLISHING STABILITY IN THE AREA. **CONFIDENTIAL**

17. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION, SHULTZ STRESSED THAT SOVIET DISLIKE OF THE MNF WOULD BE DECISIVE IN THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS UNIFIL. THOUGH THE SUBSTITUTION OF A UN FORCE FOR MNF WAS A DESIRABLE STRATEGIC AIM FOR ALL FOUR CONTRIBUTORS, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE PRECEDED BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STRONGER AND MORE BROADLY BASED LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS A GENUINE PROSPECT OF WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES. FURTHERMORE THE MANDATE OF SUCH A UN FORCE SHOULD HAVE A QUOTE LONG LEASE UNQUOTE, NOT JUST THREE OR SIX MONTHS, SO AS TO PRE-EMPT A SOVIET CHANGE OF MIND AS SOON AS THE MNF HAD DEPARTED. IN SHORT, SUCH A SUBSTITUTION WOULD NOT WORK UNLESS THE MNF'S MANDATE WAS FULLY COMPLETED. SHULTZ STRESSED THAT THE US STOOD BY THE 17 MAY ISRAEL-LEBANON AGREEMENT: IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO EXPECT A TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL UNDER ITS PROVISIONS WHILE THROWING AWAY ITS OTHER CONTENTS ON E.G. NORMALISATION. IT WOULD BE TRAGIC IF ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION, WHICH NOW FAVOURED TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON IN DUE COURSE, WERE TO CHANGE BACK TO ITS EARLIER VIEW. SO WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO TALK ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES AS AN AIM, WHILE PUTTING THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT ON THE SIDE FOR THE TIME BEING. BOTH THE ISRAELIS AND THE US WOULD BE TOTALLY AGAINST ITS FORMAL ABROGATION.

18. ANDREOTTI MISUNDERSTOOD THE PURPOSE OF CHEYSSON'S REMARKS ABOUT THINNING DOWN THE FRENCH MNF PRESENCE ON THE GROUNDS THAT ITS MANDATE HAD NOW BEEN LARGELY ACHIEVED. HE WONDERED WHETHER, BY THE SAME LOGIC, THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT MIGHT SOMEHOW BE WITHDRAWN. SHULTZ AND CHEYSSON BOTH SAID THAT ONLY REDEPLOYMENT WAS INTENDED, AND IN ANY CASE ANY THINNING DOWN WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREED WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

19. YOU SUGGESTED THAT IN ANY STATEMENT TO THE PRESS WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR OUR VIEW THAT THE MNFS MISSION WAS A PEACEFUL ONE, AIMED AT HELPING TO RESTORE STABILITY AND CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE LEBANESE COULD SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCE PEACEFULLY. FURTHERMORE WE SHOULD AGREE THAT THE TWO MAIN PRIORITIES WERE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. THE NEED FOR MORE FREQUENT CONSULTATIONS REMAINED. CHEYSSON SAID THAT HE COULD NOT AGREE TO ANY SUGGESTION THAT WE WERE SETTING UP A NEW CONSULTATIVE CAUCUS ON MIDDLE EAST MATTERS GENERALLY. AS A COMPROMISE, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE FOUR WOULD STAY CLOSELY IN TOUCH, USING RUMSFELD'S TRAVELS TO AND FROM THE REGION TO STRENGTHEN THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS.

20. A BRIEF PRESS LINE WAS AGREED AND SUBSEQUENTLY USED HERE. IT HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED SEPARATELY.

GRAHAM

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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GRS 330
RESTRICTED
FROM DAMASCUS 081030Z DEC
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 404 OF 8 DECEMBER 1983
INFO ROUTINE BEIRUT

MS

MIPT: DRUZE

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER TO INTER ALIOS (LAST TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) MRS THATCHER AND MR KINNOCK

BEGINNING. THE DRUZE COMMUNITY WHICH REMAINS FAITHFULLY ATTACHED TO THE UNITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF LEBANON AND WHICH HAS FOUGHT ITS HARDEST BATTLE TO PRESERVE THE DEMOCRATIC AND PLURALISTIC CHARACTER OF THE LEBANESE SYSTEM CONJURES YOU AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO PUT A STOP TO THE AGRESSION THAT HAS BEEN CONDUCTED AGAINST IT IN THE LAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS. ATTACKED BY THE PHALANGIST MILITIA, SHELLED BY THE LEBANESE ARMY, BOMBARDED BY THE AMERICAN FORCES, THE DRUZE COMMUNITY IS THREATENED IN ITS VERY EXISTENCE. ITS VILLAGES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED, IT POPULATION DISPLACED, ITS ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL LIFE PARALYSED. FURTHERMORE, AND ALONG WITH THE DRUZE, ALL OTHER DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN LEBANON HAVE BEEN SYSTEMATICALLY DECIMATED WHICHEVER FAITH THEY MAY BELONG TO THROUGH INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE ATTACKS, BUOMBARDMENTS, REPRISALS FOR NON-COMMITTED ACTS, INTIMIDATION AND SEGREGATIONIST PRACTICE. AFTER HAVING AGREED TO A CEASEFIRE, TAKEN PART IN THE GENEVA DIALOGUE, ACCEPTED DISENGAGEMENT PROPOSITIONS, LIFTED THE BLOCKADE ON DEIR EL KAMAR, WE ARE PAID BACK IN TURN BY A PURSUIT OF THE BOMBARDMENT BY THE PRO-PHALANGIST LEBANESE ARMY AND A DIRECT INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, NAVAL AND GROUND FORCES AGAINST OUR CITIES AND VILLAGES.

YOUR INTERVENTION IN ORDER TO PUT A STOP TO THIS ESCALATION, REESTABLISH THE DIALOGUE AND SAVE THE POPULATION OF LEBANON IN THEIR VERY LIFE AND LIBERTY IS OF THE DIREST NECESSITY.

ENDS.

LUCAS

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TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT
TELEGRAM NUMBER 526 OF 8 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO (FOR SEC OF STATE'S PARTY),
WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME

mb

LEBANON/MNF

CALL AT FCO BY US SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, 7 DECEMBER.

1. SUMMARY. AN HOUR'S DISCUSSION GAVE ME AND MR LUCE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SET OUT OUR CONCERNS ABOUT US POLICY. WE STRESSED THE NEED FOR CONSIDERABLE RESTRAINT EVEN IN LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENCE. THE PERCEIVED SHIFT IN US/ISRAELI RELATIONS HAD DAMAGED THE AMERICANS' NEUTRAL STANCE AND BY EXTENSION THAT OF THE OTHER MNF CONTRIBUTORS. RUMSFELD'S REPLIES WERE NOT (NOT) ENTIRELY REASSURING ON EITHER POINT. BUT HE WILL HAVE TAKEN THE MESSAGE. WE AGREED ON THE NEED FOR CLOSER CONSULTATION AMONG MNF PARTNERS.

DETAIL.

2. RUMSFELD ACCOMPANIED BY PELLETREAU (STATE DEPT) AND PRICE (US AMBASSADOR) CALLED ON MR LUCE BRIEFLY AND ALL THEN JOINED ME FOR AN HOUR. FOLLOWING WERE MAIN POINTS DISCUSSED.

3. RUMSFELD'S ITINERARY. RUMSFELD SAID THAT AFTER A BRIEF STOP IN PARIS HE WOULD REACH BEIRUT ON 8 DECEMBER. HIS PLANS AFTER THAT WOULD INCLUDE ISRAEL AND SYRIA. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER THE RUMOURED RECONVENING OF THE GENEVA RECONCILIATION TALKS COME TRUE.

4. US/ISRAEL. MR LUCE SAID THAT IN SYRIA, KUWAIT AND BAHRAIN HE HAD MET WIDESPREAD CONCERN AT THE APPARENT US SHIFT TOWARDS AN EVEN CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL. TO THE ARABS THIS LOOKED ONE-SIDED, PARTICULARLY SINCE ISRAEL HAD GIVEN NOTHING IN RETURN. RUMSFELD REPLIED THAT CLOSE US/ISRAEL RELATIONS WERE NOT NEW. THEY HAD DETERIORATED DURING 1982, AND RECENT

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CONTACTS CULMINATING IN SHAMIR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO GET THINGS BACK TO NORMAL. STRATEGIC COOPERATION WAS A MISLEADING EXPRESSION. NO QUID PRO QUO HAD BEEN SOUGHT. ARAB REACTIONS WERE NOT SURPRISING. PRESIDENT MUBARAK HAD BEEN WORRIED, BUT AFTER A MEETING IN WASHINGTON WITH AL-BAZ THE EGYPTIANS HAD CALMED DOWN. HEAT GENERATED IN OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES BY PRESS REPORTS WOULD SOON PASS. NOTHING IN THE SHAMIR VISIT OUGHT TO WORRY AMERICA'S ARAB FRIENDS. IT WAS IN THEIR INTERESTS AS WELL THAT THE US SHOULD RESTORE ITS NORMAL STABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL.

5. MNF. I STRESSED OUR CONCERN IN ALL ISSUES OF COMMON INTEREST TO MAKE SURE THAT WE UNDERSTOOD AND WHERE POSSIBLE AGREED WITH EACH OTHER. WE HAD GONE INTO THE MNF WITH AGREED OBJECTIVES. THERE WAS NOW INCREASING ANXIETY IN BRITAIN ABOUT IT. WE NEEDED TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCES OF ANXIETY AND ACT TO CORRECT THEM. IF WE FAILED WE SHOULD INEVITABLY HAVE TO RECONSIDER THE MNF'S ROLE.

6. RUMSPELD REAFFIRMED THE US VIEW OF THE MNF AS A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE SUPPORTING THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND A FACTOR FOR STABILITY. THE AMERICANS WOULD CONTINUE TO URGE GEMAYEL TO FORM A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY, AND HOPED WE WOULD DO THE SAME. THE ENVIRONMENT WAS DIFFICULT GIVEN THE NUMBER OF MILITIAS AND SYRIAN PRESSURE ON KEY PLAYERS NOT TO HELP. GEMAYEL MUST MAKE 'POLITICAL DEALS' IF THE LEBANESE ARMY WAS TO BE DEPLOYED MORE WIDELY. THE FIRST ROUND OF RECONCILIATION TALKS AT GENEVA HAD LEFT LOOSE ENDS. GEMAYEL COULD EITHER REPORT BACK TO A SECOND SESSION OR GET POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS UNDERWAY WITH INDIVIDUAL FACTIONS. IN WASHINGTON GEMAYEL HAD BEGUN BY VOLUNTEERING IN PUBLIC HIS SUPPORT FOR THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT, AND HAD THEY TALKED ABOUT MECHANISMS FOR ISRAELI AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT WAS THE BEST WAY TO GET THE ISRAELIS OUT. WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM HAD TO BE PURSUED TOGETHER.

7. I SAID THAT THE MNF COULD ONLY BE JUSTIFIED ON THE BASIS THAT IT WAS HELPING TO ENABLE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO PURSUE RECONCILIATION. THE NEED FOR PROGRESS IN THIS COULD NOT BE

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STRESSED TOO STRONGLY, (RUMSFELD AGREED). THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER OUR ACTIONS CONTRIBUTED TO THAT PROCESS. THREE MAJOR QUESTIONS NEEDED TO BE RESOLVED:

(A) 17 MAY AGREEMENT. THIS HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. AT THE MEETING OF MNF CONTRIBUTORS IN PARIS ON 27 OCTOBER SHULTZ HAD AGREED WITH ME THAT IT MUST NOT BECOME AN OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS OF RECONCILIATION, BUT COULD BE 'PASSED OVER IN SILENCE'. THE FORMULA AGREED AT GENEVA HAD BEEN TO LEAVE IT ON ONE SIDE FOR THE SAKE OF PURSUING RECONCILIATION. RUMSFELD SAID THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO ABROGATE OR REJECT IT. WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON BRINGING ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES IN PRACTICE. I SAID THAT IT WAS A MATTER OF EMPHASIS AND TO CONTINUE EVEN TO TALK ABOUT THE AGREEMENT TOO MUCH SEEMED COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE:

(B) RELATIONS WITH SYRIA. RECONCILIATION NEEDED SYRIA'S COOPERATION. PUSHING SYRIA INTO HOSTILITY AGAINST US MADE IT HARDER. IT WAS CRUCIAL TO GO ON TRYING TO PERSUADE SYRIA TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE. US POLICY SEEMED SET ON DEALING WITH SYRIA IN A WAY WHICH MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR HER TO TAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE PART:

(C) ROLE OF THE MNF. THE TOP PRIORITY WAS TO REDUCE TENSION AND TURN BACK THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE. LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENCE MUST NOT SPILL OVER INTO SOMETHING ELSE. LONG BRITISH EXPERIENCE OF HOLDING THE RING IN SUCH SITUATIONS SHOWED THAT IMMENSE EVEN SUPERHUMAN SELF-RESTRAINT WAS REQUIRED, TO AVOID SUSPICIONS THAT PEACEKEEPERS WERE DEPARTING FROM THAT ROLE, WITHOUT SUCH RESTRAINT THE WHOLE PROCESS WOULD BE AT RISK.

7. RUMSFELD AGREED THAT THE MNF WAS A PEACEKEEPING FORCE (WITH THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENCE). IT WAS NO PART OF US INTENTIONS TO BECOME A PROTAGONIST, BUT TO CONTRIBUTE, THROUGH THE MNF, AND THROUGH DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT, TO AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH GEMAYEL COULD PURSUE RECONCILIATION. GEMAYEL COULD NOT RECONQUER LEBANESE TERRITORY BY FORCE AND NO ONE COULD HELP HIM DO SO. THE MNF MUST BE MEASURED AND STEADY AND NOT 'FLAP' ABOUT WITHDRAWAL. EC STATEMENT CRITICAL OF THE MNF OR AIMED AT DISTANCING THE TEN FROM THE US IN ARAB EYES WOULD NOT HELP.

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THE MNF MUST NOT ALLOW SYRIA TO DISRUPT THE PROCESS WE ALL WISHED TO SUPPORT. IT WOULD BE NOTABLY UNHELPFUL IF ANY MEMBER OF THE MNF SUDDENLY ALTERED ITS POSITION. SYRIA WOULD SEE THAT ALL SHE NEED DO WAS TO WAIT. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE TEN HAD NO (NO) WISH TO CUT ACROSS US POLICY, BUT NOTED THE CLEAR UNHAPPINESS (FOR EXAMPLE) IN THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AT THE PERCEIVED DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE PURPOSE OF THE MNF AND US ACTIONS.

8. MNF CONSULTATIONS. I SAID WE REGRETTED THE ABSENCE OF CONSULTATION. THE AMERICANS HAD WARNED THE SYRIANS THAT ATTACKS ON RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT WOULD PRODUCE A US RESPONSE: BUT THEY HAD NOT TOLD US OR OTHER MNF PARTNERS OF THIS WARNING, DESPITE ITS POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR US ALL. WE DID NOT EXPECT CONSULTATION OVER IMMEDIATE RESPONSES TO PARTICULAR INCIDENTS. BUT WE MUST ALL EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT IN DECIDING THE SCALE OF OUR REACTIONS. BOMBING AND SHELLING WERE BLANKET RESPONSES. RUMSFELD ARGUED THAT THE US ACTION HAS BEEN 'MODEST' AND USEFUL. HE AGREED ON THE NEED FOR CLOSER CONSULTATION.

9. RELATIONS WITH SYRIA. MR LUCE REMARKED THAT WE BOTH ACKNOWLEDGED SYRIA'S KEY ROLE AND THE NEED FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE SYRIAN CONTRIBUTION. BUT HIS TALK WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM HAD SHOWN THAT THE US ACTION HAD PLAYED INTO SYRIAN HANDS BY RALLYING MODERATE ARABS UNTIL RECENTLY CRITICAL OF SYRIAN POLICY. KHADDAM HAD SAID THAT ANDROPOV AND REAGAN WERE HIS TWO BEST FRIENDS: REAGAN SUPPLIED THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND ANDROPOV THE AMMUNITION. THE SYRIANS HAD BEEN REASONABLY CONSTRUCTIVE AT GENEVA. MILITARY ACTION AGAINST SYRIA RISKED BEING COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. WE SHOULD SEEK DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL WAYS OF PERSUADING SYRIA TO CONTINUE TO BE HELPFUL.

10. RUMSFELD AGREED ON THE NEED FOR DIALOGUE WITH SYRIA AND SAID IT HAD BEEN HELPFUL THAT KHADDAM SHOULD HAVE VISITED BEIRUT RECENTLY. SYRIAN RESTRAINT ON LEBANESE FACTIONS DEMONSTRATED THE CONTROL THEY COULD EXERCISE WHEN THEY CHOSE. BUT THE MNF MUST BE QUOTE STEADFAST UNQUOTE. ITS PRESENCE MIGHT BE USEFUL IN BRINGING ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES: ITS DEPAR-

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TURE WAS A SYRIAN AND SOVIET INTEREST.

11. FURTHER DISCUSSION AGAIN STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING ACTIONS WHICH UNDERMINED THE MNF'S CREDIBILITY AS A PEACEKEEPING FORCE BY APPEARING TO TAKE SIDES. WE NEEDED TO AGREE NOT ONLY ON OBJECTIVES BUT ON HOW TO ACHIEVE THEM. AMBASSADOR PRICE ASKED WHETHER WE THOUGHT THE US ACTION OF 4 DECEMBER HAD BEEN SEEN AS ESCALATION BEYOND THE NEEDS OF SELF-DEFENCE. MR LUCE SAID THAT THIS WAS INDEED HOW IT WAS SEEN IN THE ARAB WORLD. IT LOOKED AS IF THE US HAD BEEN TAKING SIDES BY GETTING INTO DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE SYRIANS. RUMSFELD ASSERTED THAT GEMAYEL BELIEVED THAT THE PRESENT POSTURE OF THE MNF, INCLUDING THE RECENT US ACTION, WAS HELPFUL TO HIM. THE MODERATE ARABS HAD NEVER PUT EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON SYRIA. SAUDI ARABIA HAD PAID FOR SYRIA'S ARMS FROM THE SOVIET UNION OUT OF FEAR.

12. SUMMING UP, I SAID THAT IF THE FOUR CONTRIBUTORS TO THE MNF WERE TO REMAIN THERE WAS A CLEAR NEED FOR A MORE CONTINUOUS PATTERN OF CONSULTATION. IT WAS OF OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE TO JUDGE EVERY ACTION BY THE EFFECT IT MIGHT HAVE ON LOWERING OR RAISING THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE. WE NEEDED TO EXERCISE MASSIVE RESTRAINT IN ANY ACTS OF SELF-DEFENCE. UNLESS WE AGREED ON HOW TO ACHIEVE OUR SHARED OBJECTIVES THE FUTURE OF THE MNF WOULD INEVITABLY BE IN JEOPARDY.

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TO ROUTINE FG
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MS

LEBANON

→ Druze leaders.

1. WALID JUMBLATT AND MARWAN HAMADE TOOK TEA AT THEIR REQUEST ON 7 DECEMBER WITH EC HEADS OF MISSION.
2. THEY EXPLAINED AT SOME LENGTH THE PRESENT PLIGHT OF THE DRUZE COMMUNITY IN LEBANON AS THEY SAW IT, AND HANDED OVER LETTERS ADDRESSED TO A WIDE RANGE OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL LEADERS, INCLUDING THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR KINNOCK (TEXT IN MIFT, ORIGINALS IN NEXT BAG).
3. THE LETTERS, SIGNED BY JUMBLATT AND ABU SHAKRA, CONTAIN AN APPEAL FOR INTERVENTION. IT IS NOT CLEAR EXACTLY WHAT THEY HAVE IN MIND, THOUGH THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OVER THE TEACUPS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A EUROPEAN FACT FINDING MISSION SEMICOLON NOR WHY THEY HAVE CHOSEN THIS PARTICULAR TIME TO APPROACH US, UNLESS THEY EXPECT SOME KIND OF QUID PRO QUO (LAST THREE WORDS UNDERLINED) FLF LIFTING THE BLOCKADE ON DEIR EL QAMAR.
4. EC HEADS OF MISSION HAVE ALSO BEEN SENT BY HAMADE THROUGH THE GREEK AMBASSADOR COPIES OF A "PROJET DE RESOLUTION POUR LA SITUATION MILITAIRE DANS LES REGIONS CHOUF-ALEY ET BAYIEU DE BEYROUTH". THIS PURPORTS TO BE A DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IN THE COURSE OF THE POST - GENEVA 1 DELIBERATIONS AND AGREED (WITH SOME DETAILED AMENDMENTS) BY ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED. JUMBLATT NEVERTHELESS APPEARS TO REGARD IT AS A DEAD LETTER. I HAVE GIVEN A COPY TO PALMER.

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 570 OF 7 DECEMBER 1983

REPEATED ROUTINE FOR INFO TO MOSCOW , PARIS, ROME, UKMIS
NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND ALL MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

NY TELNO 557 : US MIDDLE EAST POLICY

1. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN THIS AFTERNOON, HE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS IN DSPAIR WITH THE AMERICANS FOLLOWING THE RECENT AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL AND THAT THE LATEST EVENTS IN LEBANON WERE UNFORTUNATELY IN LINE WITH WHAT HE HIMSELF HAD PREDICTED WOULD HAPPEN. HE HAD NOT YET MADE UP HIS MIND HOW TO REACT, BUT WAS CONTEMPLATING TELLING PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT HE SHOULD FORGET HIS MIDDLE EAST PEACE INITIATIVE. THE KING SPOKE VAGUELY OF THE NEED FOR A WIDER CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT DID NOT SPELL OUT WHAT HE HAD IN MIND SEMI COLON HE SAID HOW MUCH HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON 16 DECEMBER, AND HE WILL NO DOUBT SPELL OUT HIS THOUGHTS MORE FULLY WHEN HE SEES HER.

2. EARLIER IN THE DAY, THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TOLD ME HE WOULD AWAIT THE FULL TEXTS OF WHITE HOUSE STATEMENTS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS ON SHAMIR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON BEFORE PUTTING OUT AN OFFICIAL FOREIGN MINISTRY COMMENT ON THE US/ ISRAELI AGREEMENTS. QASEM SAID HE HAD TOLD A VISITING DELEGATION OF US CONGRESSMEN THAT AS THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF JORDAN, A COUNTRY WHICH HAD ALWAYS LOOKED FOR GENUINE CO-OPERATION WITH THE US AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES, HE HAD NOW RUN OUT OF XCUSES TO JUSTIFY JORDAN'S CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES. GIVEN THE STRONG JEWISH INFLUENCE IN THE MEDIA IN THE US, QASEM FORESAW THAT THE STRATEGIC AGREEMENTS WOULD GRADUALLY BECOME ACCEPTED AS PART OF US MIDDLE EAST POLICY. THIS WAS WHAT HAD HAPPENED OVER SETTLEMENTS. ALL US PRESIDENTS UP TO CARTER HAD DENOUNCED ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS AS ILLEGAL SEMI COLON NOW UNDEP REAGAN THE PRESIDENTIAL POSITION HAD CHANGED, AS A RESULT OF A CONTINUOUS CAMPAIGN THROUGH THE MEDIA OVER MANY YEARS. QASEM SAID HE HAD TOLD THE AMERICAN VISITORS THAT HE DID NOT SEE HOW IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN JORDAN'S CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US IN THE FACE OF THE NEW AGREEMENTS WITH ISRAEL.

3. QASEM THEN READ ME SOME EXTRACTS FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LAST LETTER TO KING HUSSEIN (SEE MY TELNO 550) AND IN PARTICULAR WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAD HAD TO SAY ABOUT THE LINKAGE BETWEEN CAMP DAVID, THE REAGAN INITIATIVE AND RESOLUTION 242 WHICH QASEM DESCRIBED AS "RUBBISH".

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 4. QASEM

4. QASEM WAS QUALLY GLOOMY ON LEBANON. HE SAID THAT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE MNF WERE REMINISCENT OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO THE ARAB DETERRENT FORCE IN LEBANON IN THE LATE 1970S, WITH THE AMERICANS CAST IN THE SAME ROLE AS THE SYRIANS AT THAT TIME. GRADUALLY THE OTHER ARAB PARTICIPANTS HAD FELT OBLIGED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE DETERRENT FORCE, BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT GO ALONG WITH SYRIAN POLICIES.

5. THE US AMBASSADOR MET WITH SIMILAR REACTIONS WHEN HE SAW KING HUSSEIN ON 4 DECEMBER. VIETS TELLS ME THAT HE HAD WARNED THE KING REPEATEDLY OVER THE PREVIOUS THREE WEEKS OF WHAT WAS COMING. NONETHELESS, KING HUSSEIN HAD BEEN ENORMOUSLY DISTRESSED, NOT BECAUSE HE BELIEVED THE WORST SCENARIO OF US/ISRAELI INTENTIONS PAINTED BY SOME ARAB COMMENTATORS BUT BECAUSE HE FELT THAT AS A RESULT OF THE US/ISRAELI AGREEMENTS IT WOULD BE ALL TOO EASY FOR THE RADICALS TO PRESENT THE US AS THE ENEMY OF THE ARABS AND BECAUSE THE KING BELIEVED THE AGREEMENT ERODED AMERICAN CAPACITY TO ACT INDEPENDENTLY IN THE AREA. HE WAS ALSO DEEPLY UPSET BECAUSE NOTHING HAD BEEN SAID DURING THE SHAMIR VISIT ABOUT WHAT THE ARABS MIGHT HOPE TO GAIN BY ENTERING THE PEACE PROCESS E.G. ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, SETTLEMENTS OR ARMS FOR JORDAN.

6. THE ONLY CRUMB OF COMFORT VIETS PERSONALLY FELT HE COULD FIND WAS THAT HE KNEW THE PRESIDENT HAD PUT SHAMIR ON NOTICE THAT, IF KING HUSSEIN WERE TO AGREE TO ENTER THE PEACE PROCESS, THE US WOULD DROP 'LIKE A TON OF BRICKS' ON ISRAEL WITHIN 24 HOURS (PLEASE PROTECT). VIETS HIMSELF IS GOING TO WASHINGTON ON 10 DECEMBER FOR CONSULTATIONS AND TO BE ON HAND FOR THE VISIT REFERRED TO IN MY TELNO 548 (NOT TO ALL). HE WILL BE RETURNING TO JORDAN VIA LONDON JUST BEFORE CHRISTMAS.

URWICK

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MIPT: LEBANON: ITALIAN VIEWS

1. THE PRESS COMMUNIQUE ON LEBANON, ISSUED AFTER TODAY'S
INNER CABINET MEETING, READS AS FOLLOWS:-

"THE INNER CABINET HAS GIVEN A MANDATE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO EXAMINE MORE DEEPLY THE POLITICAL PROSPECTS FOR THE LEBANESE CRISIS AND THE INITIATIVES NECESSARY TO ADVANCE THE PROCESS OF INTERNAL PACIFICATION AND OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. THIS SHOULD BE DONE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONSULTATION WITH ALLIED COUNTRIES WHICH THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT. THE MINISTER ALSO HAS A MANDATE TO EXAMINE THE ROLE OF THE MULTINATIONAL PEACE FORCE IN THE LIGHT OF THE DEVELOPING SITUATION. IN THIS CONTEXT, AFTER HEARING A STATEMENT BY THE DEFENCE MINISTER, THE INNER CABINET HAS EXAMINED THE ROLE OF THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT: IT HAS UNDERTAKEN TO LOOK FOR EVERY POSSIBLE WAY OF CONSOLIDATING THE UN PRESENCE IN LEBANON, BOTH BY ENLARGING THE DUTIES OF UNIFIL AND THROUGH NEW INITIATIVES."

2. WHEN LEAVING THE MEETING ANDREOTTI STRESSED TO THE PRESS THAT UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON POLICY TOWARDS LEBANON.

3. THERE HAS BEEN NO FURTHER INDICATION OF WHETHER THE WHOLE CABINET OR PARLIAMENT WILL DISCUSS LEBANON AFRESH WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

BRIDGES

pressure in the build-up to Brussels — ourselves or countries whose Governments oppose significant reforms in the system of financing?

Will the Prime Minister tell the House what response she made in Athens to the positive proposals put to her for joint action by member Governments to raise falling investment and to reduce unemployment across the whole continent of Europe? Will she accept that, especially in the light of our own prolonged slump under her Government — [Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Mr. Kinnock: Certain hon. Members could not give any demonstrations of democracy to our partners in Europe.

In the light of the perpetuated slump in this country under her Government, does the Prime Minister not recognise that the continent must invest, trade and produce its way out of depression and thus avoid the waste and horror of 20 million unemployed in Europe by the 1990s? What constructive response has the Prime Minister given to those proposals? Few authorities in this country or among our partners could have thought that she was serious about advancing British interests in Athens, when, in his autumn statement, her own Chancellor budgeted for an increase of £420 million, or 50 per cent., in United Kingdom spending on agricultural intervention next year? Was not that a clear signal to everyone, including those with whom the right hon. Lady was negotiating, that the Government either had no clear intention of securing reform or had given up on it altogether? Was the Chancellor giving a signal? [Interruption.] Apparently the right hon. Gentleman does not understand what I mean. Was it deliberate, or was it just stupid? In either case, does the Prime Minister recognise that the publication of those figures undermined her negotiating posture at the summit? Do not all those considerations—[HON. MEMBERS: "Get on with it."] Hon. Members are going to get it. Our country has been let down again, and they are going to get more of it.

The fact that the right hon. Lady has fallen into the period of the French presidency, the failure of Athens itself, the rebate problem and the incompetence of her negotiating stature leave us even worse off now than when she went to Athens.

In a spirit of helpfulness and without resorting to any short-term expedients—[Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. A certain latitude is always allowed to the Leader of the Opposition, but I hope that he will come to his conclusion soon.

Mr. Kinnock: I shall seek earnestly to respond to your request, Mr. Speaker, but we have just heard one of the most superficial and inadequate statements — [HON. MEMBERS: "Yes—yours!"] If the right hon. Lady will not volunteer any matters of substance, we will get the answers out of her, even if it takes longer, by asking questions.

In a spirit of helpfulness and without resorting to any short-term expedients—which I abominate as much as the right hon. Lady does—I suggest that the Prime Minister could gain much greater progress by the time of Brussels, first, by assuring the House that there is no question now of asking us for any increase in our own resources VAT contributions to the EC. [HON.

MEMBERS: "She said that."] Hon. Gentlemen were not listening. The choice of words in the Prime Minister's statement was a great deal more delicate than it had to be.

Secondly, will the Prime Minister insist at the farm price review next year, if no progress has been made, that there will be a reduction in British farm prices in order to reduce the cost to the common agricultural policy?

Finally, will the right hon. Lady now declare her determination to withhold all or part of our contributions until agreement is reached upon fundamental changes in the Common Market which remove the persistent disadvantages of British membership? Will she accept that, unless she is prepared to take such action, none of her tantrums or posturing will impress the British people in the slightest?

The Prime Minister: The right hon. Gentleman's first point was about Cyprus. I had discussions in the margins with the Greek Prime Minister. There is of course nothing new to report on Cyprus. We fully support the activities of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is using his good offices to try to bring the two communities together in a unitary Cyprus. We drafted the United Nations Security Council resolution and worked very hard to get it a very good vote. The right hon. Gentleman will be aware of its wording. The matter is in the hands of the Secretary-General and we support his activities.

As a guarantor power, we have twice contacted the other two guarantor powers in an attempt to set up talks. So far we have not succeeded, because the conditions set by the two parties for sitting down together are at present inconsistent. We shall persist in our efforts.

There were talks between the countries represented in the multinational force in the Lebanon. We are in the multinational force together and we believe that we must continue to consult each other and to make decisions together. [Interruption.] There is to be a meeting tomorrow of the Foreign Ministers of the four countries in the multinational force. It is clear that the services of the British contingent are much valued locally by, I believe, all parts of the Lebanon community—

Mr. Andrew Faulds (Warley, East): The Druze and the Moslems?

The Prime Minister: —and I believe that they would be upset or even dismayed if our small but valuable force pulled out. It is a force of total integrity, in which we can take pride. It has two jobs: guarding the building where the security and truce talks are taking place, and engaging in reconnaissance in Beirut. I believe that there would be considerable repercussions not only among the communities in the Lebanon and the Arab and Jewish communities beyond it, but also within the Alliance, if there were any suggestion that we intended unilaterally to pull out or to lead a retreat. We do not. We are trying to carry out our duties well in the Lebanon.

The particular matter under consideration was the whole Stuttgart agenda. The right hon. Gentleman has no idea how difficult it is to reach agreement among 10 countries when what is under discussion is the whole matter under the purview of the European Community.

Mr. Gerald Kaufman (Manchester, Gorton): You said you could.

The Prime Minister: Yes, of course, we always try, and many countries agreed. However, when fundamental

I believe that we shall meet in March. Whether we shall concentrate on this or on the normal subjects that we discuss has yet to be seen.

Dr. David Owen (Plymouth, Devonport): The stand adopted at Athens by Her Majesty's principal Minister has, I believe, the support of the vast majority of the British people, and, what is more, is in the interests of the European Community. It deserves and will therefore receive our support.

On the Lebanon, the right hon. Lady has rightly rejected the unilateral cutting and running of the peacekeeping force as suggested in the House on Monday. I believe that she is right to do so. Will she assure the House that we shall take a diplomatic initiative with our two European partners to establish the independence of the peacekeeping force in the restoration of peace in the Lebanon, and specifically urge on our United States allies the need to study the Lebanese-Israeli agreement again, and to take account of the feelings of the Moslem population in Lebanon and the Syrian Government's position?

The Prime Minister: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his support on European Community matters. As I said, the four Foreign Secretaries will be meeting on Thursday when there is a NATO meeting. They will also be having separate meetings. I am sure that the points made by the right hon. Gentleman will be pursued vigorously at that meeting. We are very much aware of them.

Sir Peter Blaker (Blackpool, South): With regard to the Lebanon, is not closer consultation between the Governments who contribute to the multinational force the one objective that we should seek to achieve? If we were to withdraw our contribution to that force unilaterally, would it not defeat that objective?

The Prime Minister: Yes. We have no intention of withdrawing unilaterally, for the reasons that I have given. Our force is valued. If we want to exert maximum influence on Lebanese affairs, we must continue to be part of that multinational force. I agree with my right hon. Friend, that we need closer consultations with the United States. We meet frequently with our European partners, but not so frequently with the United States. That will be one of the valuable assets of the NATO meeting and the meeting of Foreign Secretaries, including Mr. Shultz, to which it will give rise.

Mr. Jack Ashley (Stoke-on-Trent, South): Is the Prime Minister aware that she deserves the support of both sides of the House for the efforts that she has made to defend British interests in the EC? Our support should be expressed clearly and unambiguously. Having said that, will the Prime Minister consider two matters—first, the withdrawal of British payments to the EC and, secondly, making contingency arrangements for its break-up? That will show that she means business when she fights for British interests in Europe.

The Prime Minister: With regard to the part of the right hon. Gentleman's question about contingency arrangements, it would not be right to prepare for an event that I believe will not occur.

We are at present negotiating for enlargement of the EC to include Spain and Portugal, and those negotiations must

continue. It is in the interests of Europe, and of democracy everywhere, that they succeed and we have an enlarged European Community.

With regard to the right hon. Gentleman's question about withholding, the European Community is not in default with us on its obligations. Were it to default on its obligations, then we would have to take steps to safeguard our position.

Mr. Robert Jackson (Wantage): Since the Community's failure at Athens is clearly not the fault of the British Government, would my right hon. Friend make it clear that when the European Parliament votes on the budget next week it would be wrong and mistaken for it to take any action that would discriminate against Britain?

The Prime Minister: Yes, I wholly agree with my hon. Friend. It would be wrong for the European Parliament to discriminate against Britain. It would not be helpful. We are as usual taking a very positive position on the Community and a very positive position on solving our problems, but we do insist on solving the long-term problems. Judging by the position so far taken up by the Parliament, it also desires the solution of that problem on a long-term basis.

Mr. Roy Jenkins (Glasgow, Hillhead): Will the Prime Minister accept that, while I thought she threw away a good solution three years ago in Brussels, there was nothing on which she should have settled at Athens? There was no serious resolve to get hold of agricultural expenditure and she was right in the circumstances to play for time. Will she accept that the stakes are very high for March or June 1984, particularly at a time when there is increasing distrust across the Atlantic? If the Community were to begin to disintegrate, the dangers in terms of money and security in Europe would far exceed even the issues that she was discussing at Athens.

The Prime Minister: I noted the right hon. Gentleman's preliminary statement. He will remember that, when he thought I threw away the chance of a good solution, I actually went on a got a better one. I remember the occasion very well.

With regard to what he said about the stakes being high in March of June, yes, they are high, but that is an extra reason why the Community should be prepared to have strict financial guidelines, to have a fair sharing of the burden and to key that new system into a possible agreement to extend own resources. We cannot have an agreement to increase own resources unless we simultaneously get an agreement on a fairer sharing of the burden. Then we shall get a lasting solution and not otherwise.

Mr. Teddy Taylor (Southend, East): As the common agricultural policy has been a constant source of conflict between the nations of Europe and will continue to be so even if the proposed modifications succeed, would it not be wiser for the Government to try to discuss informally with the other leaders of Europe the possibility of a looser association that would ensure the continuance of the Common Market and of unity without having a policy that surely is contrary to all the excellent economic policies pursued by Her Majesty's Government?

The Prime Minister: Obviously there are some conflicts among the 10 members and many of them were discussed during the past two or three days. I think there

The Prime Minister: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for those remarks. Undoubtedly, some of the decisions that each of us were required to take at Athens would be very difficult politically. We shall not get a change in the practice of the Community in regard to surpluses—not only milk surpluses but, for example, olive oil and wine, and there are great intervention funds for rice and tobacco—without there being considerable difficulty in taking some of the decisions that we must take. Therefore, each country was bound to have to take some penalties and get some gains from the many decisions that we had to take. How far we shall get them in the next six months I do not know—the European elections come up in June—but I believe that it is to our advantage to go ahead and make difficult decisions. I have always taken the view that we must not run away from long-term decisions. However, that view is not at present universally shared. The coalition Governments are often those in most difficulty. It says a lot when one has a good majority from a good two-party system.

Mr. Dafydd Wigley (Caernarfon): With the European elections coming in June, there may be pressure to delay an agreement. Is the right hon. Lady aware that many commentators fear that a financial crisis could come considerably earlier than the autumn? Will she give an assurance that the Government will bring forward contingency arrangements to ensure that those who are dependent for their cash flow on European funds will have their needs met and that there will not be a loss of confidence in the intervening period?

The Prime Minister: Some Heads of Government and some Heads of State may take the view that it would be more difficult, with the European elections coming up, to take the necessary steps required to carry out the Stuttgart decision. That may be right, in which case it would be delayed even longer.

As for a financial crisis, that will depend, of course, on the amount produced and on world prices. We could come into crisis earlier or later, and if we have any real difficulties on the budget, that would be the strongest factor that one could adduce to get agreement on reducing surplus production.

Mr. Richard Body (Holland with Boston): Is there any hope that my right hon. Friend will come just a little closer to the view that has been expressed on these Benches that there will continue to be friction and discord in the Common Market so long as it remains a customs union instead of a free trade area and so long as it insists on being a supranational authority instead of a partnership of nation states, as some on these Benches wish it to be?

The Prime Minister: I do not think that we could change from the kind of Community that we are now to the kind of Community that my hon. Friend wishes to see. I am the first to admit that there are considerable arguments, conflicts and discords, as there are bound to be in a relationship of that kind. I do not believe that those would be reduced if we went to the other kind of community, and our influence throughout the world would be substantially reduced were we not a full partner in the Community.

Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow): If, as in her answer to the Leader of the Opposition, the Prime Minister attaches so much importance to consultation with the

United States, why does she think that Washington treated us so cavalierly over the Lebanon air strike? Could it possibly have been tit for tat for her disgraceful attitude towards Washington in not consulting them on sending the battle fleet or sinking the *Belgrano*?

The Prime Minister: The United States did not treat us in a cavalier fashion over the air strike. Decisions on self-defence must be taken on the spot, and co-operation between the commanders of the multinational force on the spot is excellent.

Mr. David Crouch (Canterbury): I greatly valued my right hon. Friend's statement this afternoon about maintaining the British presence, our forces, in Lebanon at this critical time. It was not only a careful and considered statement by her but a courageous one, because uppermost in our minds must be the safety of those men in that dangerous situation. May I suggest that so long as their role as an interposition force—a peace-keeping role—is not changed, they should remain? When anarchy and lawlessness break out on the streets, that is not the time to remove the police force.

The Prime Minister: I thank my hon. Friend for those remarks. We are, of course, daily concerned with the safety of our forces. That is why some weeks ago we sent a force of Buccaneers to Cyprus—to be there should we need them—and a few days ago HMS *Fearless* arrived to help should her services be needed; and sometimes the forces can spend some time on *Fearless*. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for taking the view that he expressed. It is a genuine peacekeeping role. It is highly valued and I believe that if the multinational force were to come out now, the consequences would be severe indeed. So far it has not proved possible to get a United Nations truce supervisory force to take its place. That in theory is technically possible and there is nothing to stop it, except that so far the Soviet Union has not given its agreement.

Mr. Peter Hardy (Wentworth): As apparently it takes nearly 400 people on the Conservative Benches to effect the ruin of this country, is the right hon. Lady satisfied that less than one quarter of that number of young soldiers can be left in an exposed position to carry out a task which, I think, she described as "extremely valuable"?

As the right hon. Lady mentioned the European elections, is she prepared now wholeheartedly to endorse those Conservative Members of the European Assembly who have not only voted against the national interest in regard to the budgetary contributions but also appear to believe overwhelmingly in the principle of unlimited food surplus?

The Prime Minister: I do not accept the strictures of the hon. Gentleman on our membership of the European Assembly. It is working both for British interests and for the interests of the European Community as a whole.

Frequently, I am afraid, we put our soldiers in an exposed position, nowhere more so than in Northern Ireland, where—whether in the Lebanon or in Northern Ireland—they also carry out their role extremely well. I have given my views on the force in Lebanon; it is doing an excellent job and will continue to do so unless all four members of the multinational force come to some different arrangement, and there is no sign of that yet.

Mr. Peter Temple-Morris (Leominster): While accepting utterly what my right hon. Friend said about the

[Mr. Peter Temple-Morris]

British peacekeeping force in the Lebanon, does she appreciate that there are people both inside and outside the House who have increasing and reluctant reservations about the drift of United States policy in the middle east and who fear that if that drift is allowed to continue unchecked, that fact alone could represent the greatest danger in the future—however much we may dislike that fact—to the British peacekeeping force? Will my right hon. Friend therefore confirm that she is in constant contact with Washington over these important matters?

The Prime Minister: We share my hon. Friend's concern at any increase in violence, first because of the violence itself, which is horrific, and secondly because it is not conducive to the reconciliation talks that the President of Lebanon must soon continue again in Geneva. Thus, I understand my hon. Friend's concern. We should also understand that if, by any terrible mishap, we had lost a large number of soldiers in the Lebanon in the same way as the United States has, we should rightly think that our first duty was reconnaissance—

Mr. J. Enoch Powell (Down, South): When were we told about that?

The Prime Minister:—we should rightly tell the Syrians that we would be undertaking reconnaissance and we would expect our planes not to be shot at; but if they were, we might also rightly think to take certain action in self-defence. I am sure that my hon. Friend, while I understand his concern, would not want us ever to consider even pulling out unilaterally or leading a retreat from the Lebanon.

Several Hon. Members *rose*—

Mr. Speaker: Order. This is a very important matter. Therefore, I propose to allow questions to run until half past four, which will mean that the House will have spent about an hour on this important statement.

Mr. Robert Kilroy-Silk (Knowsley, North): Given the threat to British forces in the Lebanon, does the Prime Minister not accept that she has a clear responsibility either to reinforce that garrison or, preferably, to withdraw it?

The Prime Minister: I do not think there is anything I can usefully add to what I have already said. We have a small force there. When we were originally asked to join the force I said that we could put in only a very small force because we are stretched militarily around the world. That small force is valuable.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: How can it protect itself?

The Prime Minister: If it needed to have more for its own protection, that would be made available. If one turns around the argument and says that they ought not be there—as I gather the hon. Gentleman thinks—then it would be unwise to put more there. I am not sure which case he is arguing.

Mr. Timothy Yeo (Suffolk, South): Bearing in mind that it was the Labour Government which conducted a so-called renegotiation of the terms of British membership of the Common Market, may I ask if my right hon. Friend agrees that it is shameful for the Opposition now to be glorying in the difficulties with which the EC is faced and, indeed, ludicrous for them to direct criticism at those

member states which are trying to resolve the difficulties. By doing those two things, are they not making even harder, the urgent task which we face in the first half of next year?

The Prime Minister: Yes. I think that even the Labour party would not seek to come out of the Common Market.

Mr. Paddy Ashdown (Yeovil): The Prime Minister has mentioned the European Community running out of money in certain areas. While it is probably true that the funding of the EC is sufficient to last until August, does she not accept that there will be a considerable temptation for the Community to dip into the regional and social funds to fund the deficit in agriculture and other areas? Would she agree with us—would she agree with me—[HON. MEMBERS: "Ah!"]—would she agree with us—[HON. MEMBERS: "Which?"]—that the maintenance of the integrity of those two funds and their enlargement are in large measure essential for the future development of the Community? Will she give an undertaking that she will resist any attempts by the Community to dip into those two funds to fund profligacy in agriculture and other areas?

The Prime Minister: Community funds will have to act in accordance with the rules, but they will be in difficulty if the surpluses go on increasing. While we have tried to get limitations on those surpluses we have not so far been successful. As the hon. Gentleman knows, it takes time to achieve that. A lot depends on prices policy too during the next review. It will be difficult. I hope that the two funds will be kept separate.

I would not necessarily agree with the hon. Gentleman that we must have an enlargement of the funds at any price. I firmly set my face against enlargement except at a price. That price is strict guidelines on financial control, which are embodied in the budgetary procedure. It is no good having political guidelines. They must be in the budgetary procedure so that they are observed. Also, we are not prepared to pay more unless there is a fairer sharing of the burden. It seems intolerable for other countries to say to the two main contributors, Germany and ourselves, "We have not got enough. We know you are the main contributors. Now you have to pay some more." I am saying that, if there is to be more, there must be a fairer sharing and it must be based on ability to pay, not contributions.

Mr. Dennis Walters (Westbury): Did my right hon. Friend have an opportunity to discuss with her colleagues the recent accord between the United States and Israel which has opened a new and dangerous dimension in the situation in the Middle East? Would she exercise her influence on President Reagan to point out that he should be more even-handed and that in committing himself to supporting one of the parties in the dispute, which incidentally is still illegally occupying large tracts of Arab land, he cannot help to bring about a comprehensive peace settlement?

The Prime Minister: We are all naturally anxious, as is my hon. Friend, to bring about a comprehensive peace settlement and to secure conditions under which both Israel and Syria can withdraw from the Lebanon and the President of the Lebanon can go ahead with seeking a reconciliation between the many factions in the Lebanon, which is a difficult enough job on its own. We have to consider how best to go about that very delicate task.



with the compliments of
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

A J Coles Esq
Nº 10

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r.a.

Bearing in mind the current interest in the Middle East, CBS thought you may wish to pass-on the attached information. I have not told anyone I am sending you this - to avoid ripples!

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
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VISITS ABROAD BY CDS: JAN - MAR 84

1. You will wish to note that CDS will be out of the country on official visits on the following occasions during the first quarter of 1984:

13 Jan - 25 Jan	Jordan Sudan Lebanon (plus transits through Cyprus and Egypt)
14 Feb - 19 Feb	Norway
24 Feb - 9 Mar	Saudi Arabia Dubai Abu Dhabi Oman Bahrain Kuwait (plus transits through Cyprus)



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MR. COLES

A. & C. 6.
12LEBANON

The Prime Minister may wish to have the following in mind when considering the pressing question whether or not we should withdraw our contingent from the MNF. On the face of it, there is no clear justification for our stay. Both sides of the House of Commons are beginning to argue that the MNF is no longer a peace-keeping force. American and, to a lesser extent, French action has turned it into an intervention force, directed against the Syrians and the Moslem factions in Lebanon. This is a very powerful argument, quite apart from the question of the safety of our troops.

The counter-arguments include the following:-

1. The British and Italian contingents are the only two which are in practice still carrying out a peace-keeping role. The Italians are guarding the Palestinian refugee camps and we are guarding the building in which the cease fire talks are taking place.
2. If we pull out, there will be a major Anglo-American row, particularly if the Americans see us as having led the pack in breaking up the MNF, ie if Italian and French withdrawal follow or coincide with ours.
3. If we withdraw, we will certainly be excluded from any future influence with the Americans over the Lebanon. It is, of course, arguable that our influence has proved negligible.
4. Apart from the reaction of the Americans and the Lebanese Government, we might find that a decision to withdraw would be greeted with dismay from the Moslem factions, the Druzes, Shi'ites and others. They would not fancy being left at the mercy of the Americans with or without the French. They might bring powerful pressure on us to reverse our decision.


With these considerations in mind, we must think very hard before coming to a final conclusion. Whatever decision we make, we must be prepared to stick to it in the light of all the consequences. We cannot for example decide to withdraw and then be blown back on course by outside pressures.

SECRET

- 2 -

A major problem is that I cannot see any substitute for the MNF. Unless the Americans are prepared to work with the Russians, which seems inconceivable, the Syrians will block any attempt to transform the MNF into a UN force. This precludes either a change in UNIFIL's mandate and the deployment of UNIFIL around Beirut, or the recruitment of a new force from eg Scandinavian, smaller European and respectable Third World countries, to be deployed in place of the MNF. Equally, I cannot see such countries being prepared to participate in a force unless it was under a UN umbrella.

On balance, I still believe that we should stay, for the reasons given above. Or, if we go, we should go in company with both the other Europeans. The Americans are different. Their Middle East policies are driven by their own private demons. The right thing now would be for the three European governments concerned to form up with the Americans and to tell them that we can only stay if the Americans are prepared to modify their present dangerous, partisan policies, thus enabling the MNF to regain peace-keeping credibility.



A.D. PARSONS
6 December 1983

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT ON EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 7 DECEMBER

LEBANON: SITREP 1700Z 6 DECEMBER

1. Military situation. Beirut quiet with some shelling in Shouf and minor clashes between Lebanese Army and militias. Airport remains closed. Death toll in 5 December car bomb now 16. An anti-Palestinian group has claimed responsibility. Protest strike took place in Muslim West Beirut on 6 December. No independent assessment of effect of 4 December US air raid on Syrian-held territory, although Mr Shultz has called it a 'technical success'. Two Syrians died. The body of the US airman killed is to be returned 6 December. The Syrians have said they will not release the captured US airman until the United States leaves Lebanon; the Americans are making strong diplomatic representations and have asked the UN Secretary-General to use his good offices. Reports that one or two unmanned Israeli drones shot down in the Bekaa 6 December. Israelis have confirmed loss of one. Druze announced intention 4 December to release remaining 20,000 Christians held hostage in Deir al Kamar. South Lebanon remains tense with sporadic attacks on Israeli patrols and restrictions on passage across Awwali Line into Israeli-controlled territory.

2. BRITFORLEB sustained one minor casualty (now back at work) 3 December when HQ deliberately targeted, apparently on local initiative. We have spoken to leaders of Druze and Shia militias involved, who have promised no recurrence. Ceasefire Committee continues to meet with BRITFORLEB guard. BRITFORLEB roulement due for completion 7 December.

3. Diplomatic reactions to US raids. The United States has claimed raids were purely defensive and necessary to protect MNF and said it will continue reconnaissance flights and retaliate again if fired upon. Mr Shultz has said the US will 'see through' its role in Lebanon and has urged Moscow to press the Syrians to withdraw. Israel has affirmed that it was not involved in the raids and Mr Shamir has denied rumours of a secret pact with the US to oust Syria by military means. The Lebanese Prime Minister has implicitly condemned the US air raids: 'we reject

/whatever

whatever turns our land into an area of conflict'. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have voiced concern, and Egypt, whilst stopping short of outright condemnation, has asked all parties to exercise self-restraint. The UN Secretary General has also called on all parties to refrain from the use of force. Syria has claimed the incident demonstrates concerted US/Israeli action and in a letter to Arab and other states President Asad has called the US action 'direct military aggression ... that requires serious confrontation'. The USSR has accused the US of violating UN Security Council decisions and has promised material assistance to those opposing the US and Israel. Of the MNF contributors, Italy has evinced the most concern and appears to be reconsidering the position of its contingent: the Italian Cabinet is to meet 7 December. France has avoided direct comment.

4. National reconciliation. President Gemayel has nearly completed his talks aimed at finding a way round the 17 May Israel/Lebanon Agreement, to which the US and Israel remain committed as the only basis for withdrawal of foreign forces, and which the Syrians and most Lebanese parties oppose. Plans are in hand for a visit to the UK on 14 December. But reports from Washington indicate that President Gemayel came away with little from his meeting with President Reagan except promises of increased financial and military aid. Much now depends on his planned visit to Syria next week although President Asad's state of health remains uncertain. The prospects for reconvention of the Geneva talks by the end of December are fading: apart from political constraints, the location used last time, the only one to which all participants could agree, will be unavailable.

5. Mr Rumsfeld's call on the Secretary of State on 7 December will provide an opportunity to stress our concerns at recent US military action and the danger of the Geneva process going off the rails.

REFERENCES

Hansard House of Commons 5 December: Volume 50
Columns 19-27

NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES

LEBANON

INFORMED IN ADVANCE, SUPPORT US ACTION?

Informed shortly beforehand. US have said action taken in self-defence after attacks on their forces. Each MNF contributor has right to self-defence and to decide what measures necessary.

FRENCH, ISRAELI RETALIATION

Not informed in advance.

MEETINGS WITH MNF PARTNERS

Meeting of MNF Foreign Ministers in Brussels on 8 December.

ROLE OF BRITFORLEB

Peacekeeping. Guarding Ceasefire Commission. Help Lebanese Government restore stability and create conditions in which Lebanese sort out differences free from outside interference.

WHY NOT WITHDRAW?

- BRITFORLEB particularly welcomed by all Lebanese communities, moderate Arabs and Israel.
- Withdrawal would undermine Lebanese government, destabilize country, damage reconciliation.

Syrian appreciation of our policies made clear to Mr Luce on 4 December.

WHAT ARE YOU DOING TO PROMOTE PROGRESS?

Working hard to urge maintenance of ceasefire, end to cycle of violence, pressing for speedy progress in reconciliation talks, promoting conditions in which MNF no longer necessary.

Hope to see President Gemayel here shortly, and reconvening of reconciliation talks as soon as possible.

GOVERNMENT NO LONGER ENJOYS MAJORITY SUPPORT?

Majority of Lebanese share President Gemayel's objectives of restoring Lebanon's independence and securing withdrawal of foreign forces. Where there are differences eg over power sharing, institutional reform, these need to be sorted out by Lebanese themselves, without outside interference. Not for us to get involved. Encouraging progress at Geneva talks. Broadly based Lebanese Government able to exercise authority throughout territory shared objective of all MNF contributors.

WHY IS STABLE/PEACEFUL LEBANON SO IMPORTANT TO US?

Because search for settlement of Arab/Israel dispute (important British/Western interest) is made much more difficult without resolution of Lebanese crisis.

RISKS TOO GREAT?

Won't minimise danger. Safety of our soldiers uppermost in our minds: additional logistic support (HMS Fearless arrived 28 November), Buccaneers on hand if needed for self-defence.

AMERICAN POLICY ON THE WRONG TRACK IN THE LIGHT OF
REAGAN/SHAMIR TALKS IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK?

Not for me to answer for the US. Our objectives in Lebanon are the same, though idle to pretend that we do not differ from time to time on methods. Constantly in touch (several opportunities this week).



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

6 December 1983

Dear Brian,

LEBANON

During the Prime Minister's working breakfast with President Mitterrand, the Prime Minister said that she would like to discuss with the President the situation in Lebanon. I am recording this part of the discussion separately in this letter. The Prime Minister has asked that the passage about the events leading up to the French retaliatory action in Lebanon in particular should be made available only to the most limited number of people who need access to it.

The Prime Minister opened the discussion by saying that she would particularly value President Mitterrand's views on Lebanon, in view of France's historical connections both with Syria and Lebanon. She was the first to stand up for the right of self defence, but she felt that the present situation was giving President Gemayel no hope of achieving a successful outcome to the reconciliation talks. A successful outcome could only be achieved with the co-operation of Syria, and this was impossible when President Gemayel was being made to look like a puppet of the United States. So the reason for sending the Multi-National Force into Lebanon - to assist the reconciliation process - was looking incapable of fulfilment, and the general situation became more menacing as it looked more and more like a battle between the United States and Israel on the one hand and Syria on the other. The British had begun to receive demarches from the Arabs about the situation.

President Mitterrand said that he shared the Prime Minister's analysis. He recalled that the original purpose of sending in the Multi-National Force had been partly to assist the reconciliation process and partly humanitarian, to save lives when the PLO were being bombarded by the Israelis in West Beirut. What had started as a friendly gesture to the Arabs was now being seen as hostile to them, and the Multi-National Force was seen more and more to support the Christians. It had now become a question of how the Multi-National Force could leave Lebanon with dignity. This had to be a matter of consultation between the four contributor countries, and the difficulty was that people would say that the Multi-National Force had been there in vain and that lives had been lost for nothing.

/ One

SUBJECT

lec Master

cc MOD

CO

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JP

One possibility would be to leave the French ships off the coast, perhaps with a few forces dispersed among the diplomatic Residences, and to try to instal a UN force. But the latter course would be obstructed by the Russians.

The Prime Minister commented that the Multi-National Force had been a failure, although it was difficult to say this: but following the events of the last few days the Multi-National Force were in danger of becoming prime targets.

She was sympathetic towards the suggestion that a UN force might be substituted: UNIFIL were already there and might be converted into a UNTSO force. But the United States' attitude towards Syria remained critical, since the Syrians could overturn any settlement. It was ironic that, when the Syrians were engaged in a battle, they were invariably defeated; but they nevertheless remained central to efforts to achieve peace.

President Mitterrand asked the Prime Minister whether this meant that she accepted that Syria should stay in Lebanon: they would not withdraw without a war. The Prime Minister replied that she did not accept the Syrian presence, but the present United States' attitude was not bringing the prospect of Syrian withdrawal nearer. Even with a continuing Syrian and Israeli presence in Lebanon, a UN force would be preferable to the present Multi-National Force. The present situation was seriously damaging the relations of the contributor countries with the Arabs. President Mitterrand commented that the Arab world was divided. The Prime Minister said that they were uniting on this issue. She had always regretted that the Saudi Arabian Government were not prepared to be more active, for example in putting pressure on the Iraqi Government to open the Iraqi pipeline. The immediate question was whether a war was to be fought against Syria: this would have the effect of making the US and the French prime targets for retaliation, and history showed that guerillas won such actions. Members of the Multi-National Force had reason to ask what their political leaders were doing. She did not regard Syria as a puppet of Russia but thought that Syria would not hesitate to seek support from the Russians and it would probably suit the Russians to foster a situation in Lebanon which would be a gaping wound to the United States.

President Mitterrand gave the Prime Minister an account of events leading up to the retaliatory action taken by the French following the bombing of the military garrison, saying that he had not previously revealed these facts to anybody outside France. He had received a letter from President Reagan saying that the President wanted to retaliate and proposed to attack between 16 and 19 November. There had been contacts between the United States and French military headquarters which had resulted in a decision on joint military action on 17 November between 0400 and 0900. At 0400 he had

/ been invited

been invited by his military commanders to authorise action and, believing that this corresponded with the wishes of the Americans, he had given his authority. By 0900 nothing had happened and he had therefore tried to telephone President Reagan in Washington: he had been told that the President was sleeping but that the orders for action would be given at noon. At noon M. Attali had telephoned Mr. MacFarlane and had been told that the US were not ready: on the President's instructions, M. Attali had said that there must be agreement by 1430, since the President could not give orders and then countermand them three times. At 1400 the Americans had sent a message saying that they did not want the French to act but would understand if they did so. Yet this action had been initiated at the behest of the Americans and he had a letter from President Reagan urging that military action in retaliation should not involve the Syrians: this had prompted the French to choose as a target a training camp belonging to those who had taken part in organising the bomb attack, which contained some Iranians but no Syrians.

The Prime Minister commented that she understood why President Mitterrand should think it difficult to rely on the United States in these circumstances: part of the problem was that the allies did not have enough direct contact with President Reagan. President Mitterrand said that his impression was that there were many factions in the US Administration, and the President could not choose between them. In order to obliterate the impression of uncertainty, he was prone to take sudden and brutal decisions, and he regarded the decisions to invade Grenada and to authorise the latest bombing raids on Syrian posts as falling into this category. The Prime Minister commented that she shared President Mitterrand's concern, but thought that Mr. Shultz was disposed to take measured decisions. She commented that the meeting in Brussels on Thursday between the Foreign Secretaries of the contributor nations to the Multi-National Force would be very important; and President Mitterrand assented.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Robin Butler

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

1. John Galt - to see ^{A.S.C.7/a.}

2. File ^{CORRECTED}
^{VENISON}
^{SEW}

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OO WASHINGTON

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S E C R E T

D E H O C

FM ATHENS φ61φ1φZ DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO.,

TELNO 735 OF 6 DECEMBER 1983.,

REPEATED AS IMMEDIATE INFO TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME
(PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS/MINISTERS).

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

LEBANON

1. THE PRIME MINISTER RAISED THIS TODAY WITH MITTERRAND. SHE SAID THAT SHE WAS THE FIRST TO STAND UP FOR THE RIGHT OF SELF DEFENCE, BUT THE SITUATION IN LEBANON WAS INCREASINGLY STARTING TO LOOK LIKE THE UNITED STATES PLUS ISRAEL VERSUS SYRIA, WITH GEMAYEL AS AN AMERICAN PUPPET. THERE COULD BE NO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN LEBANON WITHOUT SYRIAN CONSENT, AND SO LONG AS SYRIA WAS SEEN BY THE UNITED STATES IN ITS PRESENT COLOURS, RECONCILIATION WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE. THE US VIEW OF SYRIA WAS THEREFORE CRRITICAL. SHE FORESAW A RISK OF A SITUATION IN WHICH THE US AND FRENCH CONTINGENTS IN THE MNF WOULD BE THE MAIN TARGETS. WHAT DID MITTERRAND THINK?

Friend)

2. MITTERRAND SAID HIS ANALYSIS WAS THE SAME. THE ORIGINAL AIMS OF THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS WERE NO LONGER VALID: INSTEAD OF APPEARING AS A FRIEND OF THE ARABS WE WERE STARTING TO LOOK LIKE THE OPPOSITE. THE ONLY QUESTION WAS HOW WE COULD LEAVE WITH DIGNITY. HAVING LOST 77 DEAD, FRANCE COULD NOT HAVE IT SAID THAT THE INTERVENTION HAD BEEN IN VAIN. MITTERRAND SPECULATED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF REPLACING THE MNF BY A UN FORCE (BUT HE FEARED THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD VETO THIS) OR REDUCING ITS NUMBERS AND DISPERSING IT IN DIPLOMATIC RESIDENCES IN BEIRUT. THE PRIME MINISTER ADDED THE THOUGHT THAT UNIFIL MIGHT BE CONVERTED FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

3. LATER THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAW ANDREOTTI, WHO EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE ANXIETY ABOUT THE WAY THINGS WERE GOING AND REPEATED THAT ITALY INTENDED TO WITHDRAW HER CONTINGENT AT THE END OF THE GENEVA TALKS. HE ALSO SPOKE TO CHEYSSON, WHO SAID THAT THE FRENCH WISH WAS TO REDUCE THE SIZE OF A FRENCH CONTINGENT BY THE END OF THE YEAR. HE HAD PLANS WHICH WENT INTO CONSIDERABLE DETAIL, INVOLVING DISPERSAL OF SMALL NUMBERS OF TROOPS IN DIFFERENT LOCATIONS, MOVING THE BULK OF THEM TO THE CARRIER, AND LEAVING ONLY A TOKEN FORCE AND THE FLAG AT THE EMBASSY. CHEYSSON HOPED THAT THE 4 FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD AGREE AT THEIR MEETING IN BRUSSELS ON 8 DECEMBER TO SEND A MESSAGE TO GEMAYEL REMINDING HIM THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE MNF WAS TO ASSIST THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS AND THAT THE LATTER COULD NOT CONTINUE INDEFINITELY.

R H O D E S

NNNN

File No.

OUTWARD

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL

Department

TELEGRAM

Precedence

Drafted by

IMMEDIATE

(Block Capitals)

Tel. Extn.

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FOR
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Despatched (Date)
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(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.)

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(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL

(Caveat/
Privacy marking)

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TO IMMEDIATE
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FCO LONDON
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AND TO (precedence/post)

File 10

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info)

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:--

[TEXT]

FOLLOWING FOR SIR ANTHONY PARSONS; NO. 10 DOWNING STREET; FROM COLES

Thank you for the message contained in FCO tel no 576. This was considered at a meeting here last night. While the Prime Minister is of course concerned about developments in the Lebanon her present inclination is to avoid public criticism of US actions. She was not ^{repeat not} disposed to send a message to President Reagan about the Lebanon, partly because she is concerned that the currency of these messages is becoming somewhat devalued. But it was agreed that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should send a message to Shultz which you will see in a separate telegram.

Copies to:--

A. S. C. 6/12

6 December 1983

leb

LLG NR307.
FDW G 038/05

X DD 060630Z ATHENS X

OO BEIRUT

OO DAMASCUS

OO TEL AVIV

OO ROME

GRS 200

IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 060930Z FCO

DESKBY 060630Z ATHENS

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 060040Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1530 OF 5 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, ATHENS (DESKBY 060630Z),
PARIS, ROME, WASHINGTON, MODUK.

MIPT : LEBANON : US ACTION

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECRETARY GENERAL'S STATEMENT:

THE DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON OVER THE WEEK-END HAVE BEEN BOTH ALARMING AND TRAGIC. THE PROCESS OF ACTION AND REPRISAL HAS NOT ONLY TAKEN A TERRIBLE TOLL OF HUMAN LIFE: IT REPRESENTS A MOST DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENT IN THE ALREADY VIOLENT CIRCUMSTANCES OF THAT AREA: AND THE ACTIONS TAKEN ON ALL SIDES, WHATEVER THE CAUSE FOR THEM, CAN ONLY MAKE THE SITUATION MORE DANGEROUS AND LEAD TO FUTURE TRAGEDIES, AND EVEN TO A MAJOR CONFLICT.

I NOW EARNESTLY APPEAL TO ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED TO REFRAIN FORTHWITH FROM THE USE OF FORCE. ONLY IF THIS IS DONE CAN THE PROCESS OF CONCILIATION AND NEGOTIATION HAVE A CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING. I THEREFORE CALL FOR A GENERAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, AND A REDOUBLING OF EFFORTS FOR CONCILIATION AND PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION.

THOMSON

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LG 687/5

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PP BEIRUT

GROUPS 50

CONFIDENTIAL

FM ATHENS 051958Z DEC 1983

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 730 OF 5TH DECEMBER 1983

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

BEIRUT TELNO 696 : PRESIDENT GEMAYEL

THE SECRETARY OF STATE DOES NOT WISH TO GO BEYOND TELLING GEMAYEL THAT WE SHALL OF COURSE DO OUR BEST TO RECEIVE HIM APPROPRIATELY IF HE COULD GIVE US AN INDICATION OF WHEN HE WISHES TO COME TO LONDON.

R H O D E S

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RR ATHENS

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM BEIRUT 051250Z DEC 83

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 696 OF 5 DECEMBER 1983

INFO ROUTINE ATHENS (FOR SECRETARY OF STATES PARTY)

MY TELNO 689: PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S TRAVELS

1. I PURSUED THIS AGAIN WITH MAKKAWI TODAY. HE SAID THE PRESIDENT RETURNED THIS MORNING DESPITE CLOSURE OF THE AIRPORT. HE WOULD LET ME KNOW HIS PLANS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. I DETECTED A SLIGHT SUGGESTION THAT GEMAYEL MIGHT FIND IT TOO DIFFICULT TO COME TO LONDON. IS THERE ANY CHANCE OF TRYING TO CLINCH THIS VISIT BY NOW OFFERING FIRM DATES TO GEMAYEL?

MIERS

NNNN


William C. McCahill, Jr.

United States

Mission to the European Communities

Tel. 513 44 50

513 61 58

Boulevard du Régent 40

1000 Brussels

St. George Lykensettos

105

SECRET

34A handed in* on 5/12.
+ seen by AOC. No
further action taken.

UNITED STATES AIRSTRIKES ON SYRIAN POSITIONS IN LEBANON

* at Athens

AT 0900 ON SATURDAY, DECEMBER 3, TWO U.S. F-14 AIRCRAFT ON A ROUTINE RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHT OVER LEBANESE TERRITORY WERE FIRED UPON BY ANTI-AIRCRAFT EMPLACEMENTS (SOME 500 ROUNDS) AND SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES (AT LEAST TEN SA-7S) FROM A NUMBER OF POSITIONS CLEARLY BEHIND SYRIAN LINES IN LEBANON.

DURING THE EARLY DAYLIGHT HOURS OF SUNDAY, DECEMBER 4, U.S. NAVY AIRCRAFT FROM THE SIXTH FLEET CARRIED OUT AIR STRIKES AGAINST SYRIAN ARMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT CONCENTRATIONS, WHICH HAD BEEN THE SOURCE OF THE ATTACKS AGAINST OUR AIRCRAFT, IN THE NORTHERN METN EAST OF BEIRUT. APPROXIMATELY, 28 U.S. AIRCRAFT WERE INVOLVED.

THE MISSION WAS CARRIED OUT SUCCESSFULLY DESPITE THE FACT THAT SOME 40 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES AND THOUSANDS OF ROUNDS OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT ORDINANCE WERE FIRED AT OUR PLANES.

TWO U.S. AIRCRAFT WERE HIT. THE PILOT OF ONE AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN RECOVERED SAFELY. WE HAVE INFORMATION THAT THE TWO-MAN CREW OF THE OTHER AIRCRAFT EJECTED SAFELY OVER SYRIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS. WE HAVE ASKED THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT THAT THEY BE PROMPTLY HANDED OVER TO U.S. AUTHORITIES.

PURPOSES OF AND AUTHORITY FOR U.S. ACTIONS:

THIS ACTION WAS A DISCRETE SELF-DEFENSE MEASURE TAKEN IN DIRECT RESPONSE TO SYRIA'S UNPROVOKED ATTACK ON THE U.S. RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS. WE HAVE NO DESIRE OR INTENTION OF ESCALATING THE LEVEL OF TENSION. WE HAVE INFORMED THE SYRIANS THAT OUR RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS WILL CONTINUE AND IF THEY ARE AGAIN FIRED UPON WE WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION. BUT SO LONG AS SYRIA REFRAINS FROM FURTHER ATTACKS, THEY HAVE NOTHING TO FEAR FROM THE U.S.

THE PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES IN LEBANON -- LIKE THAT OF EACH OF THE MNF PARTNERS -- IS AUTHORIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON UNDER AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO IN SEPTEMBER 1982. THAT AGREEMENT EXPRESSLY PROVIDES FOR MNF FORCES TO TAKE MEASURES IN SELF DEFENSE.

THE CONDUCT OF RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER LEBANESE TERRITORY WAS AUTHORIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON. THESE ROUTINE FLIGHTS ARE DESIGNED AS PRUDENT MEASURES TO PROTECT MNF FORCES, AND THREATEN NO ONE.

SECRET

THE GOVERNMENT OF SYRIA WAS NOTIFIED LESS THAN A MONTH AGO OF THE DEFENSIVE AND NON-THREATENING NATURE OF THESE ROUTINE FLIGHTS AND WAS WARNED OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF FIRING ON OUR AIRCRAFT.

WE ARE CONFIDENT THE SYRIAN MILITARY KNEW THAT THEY WERE FIRING ON U.S. AIRCRAFT ON DECEMBER 3. THE FIRE WAS EXTREMELY HEAVY. THE ACTION WE HAVE TAKEN IN RESPONSE IS LIMITED AND PROPORTIONATE TO THE SYRIAN ATTACK AND IS DESIGNED TO PREVENT REPETITION OF SUCH ATTACKS.

SPECULATION THAT THIS ACTION WAS THE CONSEQUENCE OF AGREEMENTS REACHED BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ISRAEL DURING PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR'S RECENT VISIT OR WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL DURING HIS VISIT IS INCORRECT. THE ACTION WAS DECIDED UPON BY THE USG AS A DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO YESTERDAY'S ATTACKS ON OUR RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT AND IS INTENDED TO DETER FUTURE ATTACKS. IT HAS NO BROADER PURPOSE.

AS LIMITED, PROPORTIONATE AND TIMELY RESPONSE TO AN ARMED ATTACK AGAINST U.S. FORCES, THE U.S. ACTION FALLS SQUARELY WITHIN THE INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE RECOGNIZED IN ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

THERE WAS NO ROOM FOR MISUNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF SYRIA. THEY WERE WELL AWARE OF THE NON-HOSTILE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF OUR RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS. THEY CANNOT CREDIBLY CLAIM THAT THEY WERE ENTITLED TO FIRE AT OUR AIRCRAFT NOR CAN THEY ASSERT THAT THE U.S. HAS VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EXERCISING ITS RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST SUCH ATTACKS.

LIKewise, THE BASIS FOR RESOLUTION OF THIS INCIDENT IS CLEAR. SYRIA SHOULD IMMEDIATELY RETURN OUR PILOTS, REFRAIN FROM FURTHER ATTACKS, AND COOPERATE WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IN PURSUING PEACEFUL MEANS OF RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF LEBANON.

OO BEIRUT
OO ATHENS
RR WASHINGTON
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RR ROME
RR TEL AVIV

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FROM DAMASCUS 051320Z DEC
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 396 OF 5 DECEMBER 1983
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DI4DELN KUWAIT (FOR PS/MR LUCE), BEIRUT,
ATHENS (FOR S OF S PARTY)
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, TEL AVIV

BEIRUT TELNO 692: FIRING AT BRITFORLEB

1. MR LUCE SPOKE TO JUMBLATT BY TELEPHONE THIS MORNING AND, INTERALIA (LAST WORD UNDERLINED), MENTIONED THE INCIDENT REPORTED IN TUR, SAYING THAT THE FIRING APPEARED TO EMANATE FROM PSP CONTROLLED AREAS. IN THE LIGHT OF JUMBLATT'S POSITIVE COMMENTS ABOUT BRITFORLEB DURING THEIR MEETING ON 28 NOVEMBER, MR LUCE ASKED HIM TO DO ALL HE COULD TO ENSURE THAT THIS SORT OF INCIDENT WAS NOT REPEATED.
2. WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGING ANY PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE INCIDENT, JUMBLATT REGRETTED THAT BRITFORLEB SHOULD HAVE BEEN FIRED ON AND UNDERTOOK TO DO WHAT HE COULD, BUT WARNED THAT THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND AROUND BEIRUT WAS VERY CONFUSED AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION WERE UNRELIABLE.
3. I HOPE TO SEE JUMBLATT IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS AND SHAFI MAKE THE POINT AGAIN.

LUCAS

BT

NNNN

MR. COLLES

Prime Minister.

Mr. Rifkind's answer to the Draft Notice Question in the House of Commons this afternoon.

The mood in the House this afternoon was very strongly critical of American policy in the Lebanon. This extended to both sides of the House. There was no support at all even on Conservative benches for American policy which was criticised by, amongst others, Sir Frederick Bennet, Sir Anthony Buck, Patrick Cormack, Anthony Kershaw, John Stokes, George Walden, Robert Adley and Mark Lennox-Boyd. Dennis Healey called for the withdrawal of the British contingent. The tone of much of what was said on the Government backbenches implied support for withdrawal. Mr. Rifkind was very isolated and received practically no support apart from a Liberal spokesman who hoped that before any withdrawal took place there would be consultation with other MNF contributors. Overall, it was a very uncomfortable Parliamentary occasion and the pressure is likely to increase and Mr. Biffen is likely to be closely questioned about this tomorrow.

TIM FLESHER

5 December 1983

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 16

PS
PS/MR WCE
PS/FUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR SPERTON.
SIR J BULLARD
ED/NEWAD
ED/ED
ED/UND

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

CABINET OFFICE D10



ED/... Def. Dept. ...

ED/CONSULAR DEPT

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RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPY

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FM BEIRUT 051145Z DEC 83
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 694 OF 5 DECEMBER 1983
INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, PARIS AND ROME

MY TELNO 692: FIRING AT BRITFORLEB

1. WE SPOKE LATER ON 3 DECEMBER TO MOHSEN DALLOUL, (VICE PRESIDENT PSP) HE INSISTED PSP COULD NOT KNOWINGLY HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE: "WE REGARD YOU AS FRIENDS. I SHALL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO INVESTIGATE THIS."

2. MEANWHILE BEIRUT PRESS ON 4 DECEMBER REPORTED NABIH BERRI, LEADER OF AMAL, AS SAYING (IN THE CONTEXT OF AMAL'S LACK OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR ESCALATION IN SOUTH BEIRUT), "THE MNF, IN PARTICULAR THE BRITISH CONTINGENT, WHICH HAS PRESENTED EVIDENCE TO THE CEASEFIRE COMMISSION, KNOWS VERY WELL WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR STARTING BOMBARDMENTS IN THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS". THIS WAS A HELPFUL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF BRITFORLEB'S ROLE AS NEUTRAL REFEREE. (THE REMARKS SEEM TO HAVE BEEN MADE AFTER OUR TALK WITH BERRI ON 3 DECEMBER.)

MIERS

NNNN



SITUATION REPORT ON THE LEBANON

HMS FEARLESS is off Cyprus moving away from USfleet. Still in a position where it can act as dormitory for British forces in the Lebanon. ACHILES and ANDROMEDA joining FEARLESS at 1730 hours Beirut time. Phantoms on Cyprus on 30 minute readiness to provide CAT(?) for FEARLESS. Commander of British Forces in the Lebanon is seeking further information from ceasefire committee. On basis ~~of~~ currently available information does not think it will be necessary to exercise dormitory option. British forces in the Lebanon currently at full strength - the actual strength of troops is 130 at the moment.

3/12/72
5/12

SECRET

SECRETARY OF STATE

Lebanon

We agreed to meet after the Prime Minister's briefing meeting tomorrow morning to discuss a possible message to / Shultz about the MNF. I attach a short draft to serve as a basis for discussion.

L. Fall

(B J P Fall)

5 December 1983

cc: Sir J Bullard
Mr Coles

SECRET

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO MR SHULTZ

Thank you for your message of 3 December about the Lebanon, which gave me a helpful summary of your views before the meeting of the European Council. Since then, of course, the headline news has been your response to the attacks on your reconnaissance aircraft and ^{the} subsequent developments. I am sure that your people will have reported to you the public line which we have taken: ~~in sum~~, that it has long been the position that each contributor to the MNF has the right to act in self-defence and that, in a fast-moving situation, the immediate measures to be taken must be for each contributor to decide.

At the same time, it is clear that there is very real disquiet in Britain at the way things are going in the Lebanon and increasing doubts are expressed about the purpose and value of the MNF. It was noticeable that, when Malcolm Rifkind was called upon to defend both the MNF and the British contribution to it in Parliament yesterday, he came under critical cross-examination from both sides of the House and received no support from our back benchers.

/As you

SECRET

As you will recall from our meeting at La Selle St Cloud, I would very much like to see closer and more effective political consultation between the four contributors to the MNF. This is particularly important in a situation where the actions of one have direct implications for the position of other contingents. And I continue to think that we must make it clear to Gemayel that our support for him is not unconditional and that we expect him to pursue vigorously and with flexibility the search for national reconciliation.

I look forward to the opportunity to discuss all this with you and with our French and Italian colleagues in Brussels on Thursday morning. Margaret Thatcher, who shares my concern about aspects of the present situation, has asked me to report to her in the light of our meeting.

[LORD MCCARTHY.]

What is meant by "other market forces"? If we are talking about skill differences, surely skill differences can be taken into account, if they are significant enough, in the job evaluation, if they are part of the job specification. But if the skill differences are personal they are surely covered by the Clay Cross rule. If, on the other hand, we allow general market forces, then we are allowing much wider factors to be taken into account.

What, after all, are market forces in this context? They are a difference in price, or pay, which is assumed to be due to a difference in the conditions of supply and demand. If one allows an employer merely to say it was due to market forces, and this is not examined by the tribunal, then it justifies any kind of discrimination or prejudice which is the result either of worker prejudices or employer prejudices, or both, if it is to be quite unexamined by the tribunal. But, if the tribunal tries to examine it on the basis of what the Parliamentary Secretary says, and to some extent what the noble Earl says, they may very well find that, in the short term at least, a shortage, for example, arises because there are no trained women to do this job or because there is a surplus because there are a large number of untrained, unemployed women; so they may say "Well, this is a market factor". But we all know, if we know anything about the labour market, that such shortages derive from earlier institutional or social barriers to the progress of women, their training, their appointment, their recruitment, their placement in the labour market. So behind these short-term market reasons are longer-term factors which most of us would say were at least partly sex based. Is the tribunal to be allowed to go into all of these; are they to be allowed to judge them and award accordingly? I do not think that is a practical way to look at it.

It is quite right, and I accept this, that a simple application of the like work test as developed in the *Clay Cross* case would take us further than recent European court decisions—for example, *Jenkins v. Kingsgate*. That went beyond the personal equation and suggested a commercial benefit to the employer kind of defence. But I suggest that, if that is admitted, it is not a general market defence. What is being said there is that one would need to look and see what the consequence of granting equal pay for equal value in this particular case would be for the employer's business—for example, for his pay structures, for his general structure of costs, for his industrial relations. These are internal factors which a court might be able to assess, but they are not the kind of general factors which the Parliamentary Secretary in another place says would be perfectly possible under the present regulation. Of course, they would be possible under the present regulation because it does not specify any grounds at all. It merely says you may use the defence which is used in the like work comparison, but then again you may not. So I am suggesting that the Government should, before they ask us to accept this order, modify that general passage and place in it some more objective, limited qualification.

I come to my final point, which is the question of the way in which this is generally related. We feel that this is a highly complicated and extremely difficult regulation to understand. We believe that, although

the procedures are in many ways better than they were, there remain very considerable deficiencies in the regulations. Therefore, we shall be asking the House to divide. We shall be asking the House to support our amendment. We believe that, on the first major issue left, the Government have done extremely well. We believe that, on the second major question and the third major question, they have done virtually nothing. They do not provide in terms of the EEC Equal Pay Directive for the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of sex, and they do not provide even in the terms of Article 2 a solution by judicial process. Therefore, we ask the House to reject these regulations.

Moved, as an amendment to the above Motion, at the end to insert "but that this House believes that the regulations do not adequately reflect the 1982 decision of the European Court of Justice and Article 1 of the EEC Equal Pay Directive of 1975."—(Lord McCarthy.)

The Lebanon

3.40 p.m.

Baroness Young: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I should like to repeat a Statement now being made in another place.

"On 3rd December anti-aircraft guns and missiles were fired at United States reconnaissance aircraft over Lebanon. Early on 4th December United States aircraft bombed Syrian military targets in Lebanon. Two United States aircraft were shot down. Syrian losses have been reported as two dead and 10 seriously wounded. Last night eight United States marines were killed by shell fire. United States naval vessels then opened fire in response.

"We are in close contact with other contributors to the MNF. We share the objective of helping the Lebanese Government restore stability and create conditions in which the Lebanese people can themselves sort out their differences free from outside interference.

"All the parties welcome the role of the British contingent, which has the vital task of guarding the meetings of the Cease-fire Commission. The safety of our men is kept under constant review.

"It is vital that all parties in Lebanon show restraint and work together to make further progress towards national reconciliation. The cycle of violence must be broken".

My Lords, that completes the Statement.

Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, we are grateful to the noble Baroness for repeating that Statement. We also sympathise with the United States on the loss of eight marines killed in the shelling outside Beirut. However, does not the noble Baroness agree that the developments of the past 48 hours, where the United States and Syrian forces have clashed in the Lebanon, constitute a significant escalation of the conflict and that that could have far-reaching implications?

We welcome the assurance in the Statement that the Government are in close contact with the other contributors to the multinational force. Can the noble

procedural rules dealing with the role of the expert.

It is now clear that the expert can be cross-examined. It is now clear that the expert can be challenged by at least one expert witness. I readily admit that, in broad terms, those parts of the procedures now comply with at least Article 2 of the EEC directive and represent a fair judicial process. But that was not all we said. We said many other things. We did not simply say that we wanted to do something about the procedures. We said that we wanted to do something about the regulations themselves. I and my noble friends will no doubt mention many of the respects in which the regulations themselves, as against the procedures (although they are not completely correct and appropriate), are still defective. In the time available to me, I wish to deal with two of the major ways in which the regulations are defective still.

The first of these I call the device of the *a priori* pre-hearing pre-hearing. That is to say, that there is in these regulations set out in Paragraph 3, to provide a new subsection (3)(b) of the Equal Pay Act 1970, a strange kind of *a priori* special check before the process begins. Indeed, it is stated there that the tribunal can dismiss a case altogether if it considers that there are no reasonable grounds.

I wish to ask three questions about that point and I hope that the noble Earl will be able to answer them when he comes to reply to this debate. How does that strange additional pre-hearing pre-hearing relate to the existing pre-hearings which are perfectly normal in industrial tribunal procedures? It is now the case that if one of the parties before an industrial tribunal on an unfair dismissal case, let us say, asks for a pre-hearing to see whether there is a *prima facie* case, then that takes place. If it turns out that the tribunal believes that no case has been made, then the tribunal's members will report on that fact.

The difference is—and this brings me to my second question—that in the case of the present pre-hearings, the appellant or the defendant, if they want to, can say that they nevertheless want to go on to a full hearing. But that does not seem to be the case with this regulation. My question is: is this strange extra pre-hearing a substitute for the existing pre-hearing, and can it result in the case being dismissed without any appeal and without any reasons being given? What is the purpose of that strange procedure if it is not to make it much more difficult for any applicant to sustain a case?

Another question I should like to ask about the *a priori* pre-hearing pre-hearing is: what evidence can be advanced at this stage? Presumably—although it was not completely clear from the speech made by the Parliamentary Secretary in another place—one cannot really at this stage discuss whether or not there is in fact equal work of equal value. That would be to prejudge the work of the expert; that is his job; that is a question of fact; that cannot be rehearsed at the pre-hearing, can it?

So maybe the employer will be able to recite his defence. He will be able to say that, even if there is subsequently proved equal work of equal value, he has a non-sexist justification. What kind of evidence will he pray in aid at that point? And is he not in fact having two bites at the cherry? Cannot he try out his

defence at this stage, at a time when the applicant has very little evidence to rebut it, and knowing very well that if he falls at this hearing he can come back subsequently if the expert decides in the applicant's favour? So why do we have this strange, weird, and, I am told by my lawyer friends, totally unprecedented *a priori* pre-hearing pre-hearing put into the regulation?

Secondly, I come to the nature of the defence, which comes up, I would remind noble Lords, in the third case. In the first case the applicant has to establish that she has a reasonable case under the new Section 2A(1)(a). Secondly, the expert has to come along and has to regard the work as of equal value and being paid less. That is the second test. Thirdly, the employer has a defence; he has to say, perhaps for the second time, that there is a difference which is not sex based. He then prays in aid a material factor defence which is not a material difference.

Now, what I want the noble Earl to tell me is how far this new subsection (3)(b) takes us beyond the existing defence in like work comparisons, which continues in the regulation and is provided in the new subsection (3)(a)? Because, as we know, the old defence to the like work comparison was narrowed significantly by the decision in the *Clay Cross* case. It was decided in that case that a material difference defence is restricted to what was called the personal equation; that is to say, it is not to include extrinsic factors, objective, measurable factors, such as length of service, level of performance, red circling arrangements and so on. Because to go further than that, said the court, would be to allow the employer to say, "I paid her less because she was willing to come for less". But, of course, if such an excuse were permitted, the Act, said the court, "would be a dead letter".

After all, those are the very reasons why there was unequal pay before the statute; they are the very circumstances in which the statute was intended to operate. The court said that if the employer was allowed to say, "I asked her to come, but for that sum, which was what she was getting in her previous job, because she was the only applicant for the job, so I had no option", then, if such an area were permitted as an excuse, the door would be wide open and every employer who wished to avoid the statute could walk straight through.

My question is, do the Government intend by the new subsection (3)(b) to allow the employer to walk straight through? If they do not, then what is the meaning of the statement made in another place by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Department of Employment about the "labour market defence"? He spoke as though the new subsection (3)(b) was to provide the employer with a very broad labour market defence. He said:

"What we have in mind are circumstances where the difference in pay is not due to personal factors between the man and the woman, but rather to skill shortages or other market forces"—

that is the significant phrase, "other market forces".

"If a man is paid more than a woman for work of equal value because his skills are in short supply"—

as the noble Earl suggested—

"that is not sexually discriminatory, provided that the reason is genuine and the employer can show that".—[Official Report, House of Commons, 20/7/83; col. 486.]

Baroness say whether this included consultations with the United States before its aircraft bombed Syrian military targets? Were we informed of this and, if so, what was the response of Her Majesty's Government? Moreover, will the noble Baroness confirm once again that the treaty governing the presence of British troops in the Lebanon permits their use only in the Beirut area? Will she assure the House that they will not be allowed to become involved in a wider conflict with Syria but rather that they would be withdrawn?

Finally, we support the plea that all parties in the Lebanon should show restraint. Does the noble Baroness agree that this is a further argument for a meeting between the leaders of the United States and Soviet Union? Will the Government use all their endeavours to bring about such a meeting?

Lord Kennet: My Lords, can the Government confirm that the greater part of Lebanon is under the military control of its two neighbours, Syria and Israel? Can they also confirm that Syrian forces are there by invitation of the Lebanese Government as members of an Arab League multinational force, albeit a shadowy one, and that the Israeli forces are there by right of invasion alone, and in defiance of United Nations resolutions?

Can the Government also confirm that the Western multinational force went by invitation to keep peace between the two sides? Now that Israel and the United States, bound together in a new alliance, have both attacked Syrian forces on the ground, what is the continuing purpose of the Western multinational force? Are the Government aware that as long as our little contingent confines itself to guarding the Cease-fire Commission it will have the country with it, but if it is allowed to be dragged behind President Reagan in an attempt to expel Syria from the Lebanon it will have the country against it?

Baroness Young: My Lords, I thank both the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, and the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, for the way they have received this Statement? To answer the first question put by Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos on consultation with the United States, I can confirm that we were informed shortly beforehand, but, as he will understand, each multinational force contributor has the right to self-defence and to decide what measures it deems to be necessary.

It might be helpful if I were to set out once again the conditions for keeping our multinational force in the Lebanon because this answers a question put by both noble Lords. I should make clear that the presence of our contribution to the multinational force helps the Lebanese Government and the army. It reassures the Beirut public and helps to restore stability and to create conditions for reconciliation, which is what we wish to see.

We believe that our forces have been welcomed by all the communities and that they have an important role in guarding cease-fire talks. Further, I think that they demonstrate our commitment to promote peace in the Lebanon which is, of course, important for wider stability in the Middle East. It is something which has been welcomed both by moderate Arabs and by Israel. The fact that the Syrians are

appreciative of our policies was made clear to my right honourable friend Mr. Luce on 4th December.

I have, of course, noted the concluding remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, and I should like to confirm what I have already indicated today, that we ourselves believe there should be a constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union and that is something we shall be continuing.

Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, may I pursue the point about consultation a step further in view of its importance, and in order that there may be no doubt about it? Is the noble Baroness saying that Her Majesty's Government were consulted by the United States about the proposed bombing but that the Government did not demur or object to this further escalation in the Lebanon? Is that the position? Is it also the case that the different parties to the MNF can, in fact, go off on adventures of their own without the agreement of the other parties? If so, that is a very serious statement.

Baroness Young: My Lords, the position is as I described it in my original answer to the noble Lord. We were informed by the United States shortly before it took action. But I must reiterate that each contributor has the right to self-defence and to decide what measures are necessary. In fact, in the case of the French retaliation we were not informed in advance. I can perhaps go on to confirm that there could be no possible use of the British forces unless the British Government wish them to be used in some way.

Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, is the noble Baroness saying that military aggression of the type involved in the bombing is self-defence in the terms of the understanding between the parties?

Baroness Young: My Lords, it is not for me to speak for the American Government in this particular matter. It was for the American Government to determine what they felt was right for their self-defence in the circumstances of the case.

Lord Mayhew: My Lords, does the noble Baroness agree that from the point of view of future peace-keeping it is essential that the European countries at least should maintain the confidence of both sides? Will the noble Baroness reaffirm that, when the United States and Israel are engaged in hostilities with Syria and the Lebanese Moslems, the position of the United Kingdom is uncommitted to either side?

Baroness Young: My Lords, as I think I have already indicated to the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, the British contingent enjoys the confidence of both sides in this particular circumstance. On the question of consultations, I can confirm that there will be a meeting of the MNF Foreign Ministers in Brussels later this week.

Lord Mishcon: My Lords, would the noble Baroness agree that there can be no peace in Lebanon until all foreign forces have withdrawn? Will she further agree that there was a pact between the Israeli and Lebanese Governments which called for a withdrawal of Israeli forces, with which the Israeli Government have

[LORD MISHCON.]
 complied, and that that pact was subject to Syria also withdrawing? Is not Syria's failure to withdraw the cause of the present unhappy situation?

Baroness Young: My Lords, I should like to confirm that we see an urgent need for the full withdrawal of all foreign forces in Lebanon. At the time we welcomed the agreement as a commitment by Israel to the full withdrawal of her forces from Lebanon. Clearly there have been difficulties about the implementation of that. We should not object to alternative arrangements which had the agreement of all parties. We recognise the Israeli concern about security for her northern border. But what we really want to see is the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

Baroness Gaitskell: My Lords, in the muddled situation that we have in the Lebanon, are not the true enemies the Druze and the Syrians, and is it not really these people who have to be dealt with and not the Israelis or the Americans? It is these people, with Russia, who we think are our enemies and who are our enemies.

Baroness Young: My Lords, I should rather not be drawn down the particular path that the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, has outlined. We believe that the majority of Lebanese share the objectives of President Gemayel to restore Lebanese independence and secure the withdrawal of foreign troops.

Lord Gladwyn: My Lords, rightly or wrongly the newspapers are full of rumours to the effect that, profiting apparently from the illness of President Assad, the American and Israeli Governments have come to some agreement to use force to compel the evacuation of the Lebanon by the Syrian army. While I have no reason to suppose that these reports are accurate, will the noble Baroness say that, if by any chance they are, the Government will make it clear at once that they are entirely opposed to such a dangerous policy, which could very possibly lead to an armed confrontation between the two super-powers?

Baroness Young: My Lords, I should not like to speculate on any view that the press may take now or some time in the future. Any agreements or arrangements between President Reagan and Mr. Shamir are for them. In the answers that I have given to the other questions I think I have made clear what is the policy of Her Majesty's Government.

Lord Paget of Northampton: My Lords, what we are concerned about now is surely the steps taken by our leading ally to protect its own troops. Is not our interest in that respect that it should succeed in protecting its troops? Will the Government make that point clear to them, and that this is not a carping expedition?

Baroness Young: My Lords, in my answer to the first supplementary question asked on this Statement I made it clear that each contributor to the multinational force—to which the United States is a major contributor—has the right to decide on its own

self-defence and what measures it regards as necessary to achieve that end.

The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, can my noble friend possibly help us a little on this? Part of the instability of the present Lebanese Government is created by the 1943 agreement partitioning jobs between Sunni Moslems and Maronite Christians. The numbers in the population have changed very much since then. Can my noble friend confirm, or comment upon, whether any pressure has been put on President Gemayel by ourselves or, above all, by the American Government to make concessions to the Sunni Moslems, who I know feel threatened by the Maronite superiority in the present Lebanese Government?

Baroness Young: My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Onslow will be aware, there have been discussions in Geneva with President Gemayel on the future of Lebanon. We think that the majority of Lebanese share his objective of restoring Lebanon's independence and securing the withdrawal of foreign forces. There are differences between the parties over power sharing and institutional reform, but we believe that these need to be sorted out by the Lebanese themselves without outside interference. It is not for us to be involved in this. There has been some encouraging progress in the Geneva talks. Indeed, President Gemayel is to come here to see us in the near future with the object of discussing the reconvening of the reconciliation talks, which we must all hope will be successful.

Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 1983

3.56 p.m.

Debate resumed.

Baroness Seear: My Lords, I, too, should like to thank the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, for introducing these regulations and for his explanation of the changes that have taken place in the procedural rules. There is no doubt that mark 3, which we have now arrived at in these regulations, is a very great improvement on mark 1 and an improvement on mark 2. In particular, we are very glad that the Government have seen fit in the procedural regulations to make it possible for plaintiffs to cross-examine the expert. The extraordinary proposal under the previous arrangement that an expert should give a report but should not be cross-examined by the tribunal was, I believe, contrary to all precedents as to the use of specialists in British tribunals or courts. So far so good, but I fear only so far.

One cannot but regret that the Government have not seen fit to withdraw these gamma 3 regulations which are again presented to us—and in my view gamma 3 is a rather generous marking for them. The complexity and inadequacy of the drafting, quite apart from the contents, alone justify a rewrite of the whole exercise. I should like to ask your Lordships to play the parlour game of writing down without consulting your neighbour what you think is meant by the new Section 2A:

"Where on a complaint or reference made to an industrial tribunal under section 2 above, a dispute arises as to whether any work is of equal value as mentioned in section 1(2)(c) above the

The Lebanon

3.31 pm

Mr. Denis Healey (Leeds, East) (*by private notice*) asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the situation in the Lebanon.

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Malcolm Rifkind): On 3 December anti-aircraft guns and missiles were fired at United States reconnaissance aircraft over the Lebanon. Early on 4 December United States aircraft bombed Syrian military targets in Lebanon. Two United States aircraft were shot down. Syrian losses have been reported as two dead and 10 seriously wounded. Last night eight United States marines were killed by shell fire. United States naval vessels then opened fire in response.

We are in close contact with other contributors to the multinational force. We share the objective of helping the Lebanese Government restore stability and create conditions in which the Lebanese people can themselves sort out their differences free from outside interference.

All the parties welcome the role of the British contingent, which has the vital task of guarding the meetings of the Ceasefire Commission. The safety of our men is kept under constant review.

It is vital that all parties in the Lebanon show restraint and work together to make further progress towards national reconciliation. The cycle of violence must be broken.

Mr. Healey: I think the Minister must be aware that hon. Members on both sides of the House agree that the cycle of violence must be broken? However, does the hon. Gentleman agree that all justification for the presence of the multinational force in the Lebanon has disappeared now that President Reagan has formed a military axis with the Government of Israel against Syria and the Soviet Union in the middle east and intervened on a massive scale in the internal conflict in the Lebanon, while refusing a reasonable request from President Gemayel for help in revising his unequal agreement with Israel which he regards as an obstacle to the type of settlement which the hon. Gentleman said he favours?

Will the Government therefore remove the British troops forthwith from a position in which they are serving no useful purpose and are at increasing risk? Will the Minister seek the agreement of the French and Italian Governments to withdraw their forces, since the new United States middle east policy—its third this year—is totally inconsistent with the policy which the Prime Minister and other European leaders adopted at the summit conference in Venice not long ago?

Mr. Rifkind: As the right hon. Gentleman knows, the multinational force is there for peacekeeping purposes. The United States Government have said that the incidents during the past couple of days have been in self-defence under the terms of the mandate agreed when American forces went to the Lebanon.

The right hon. Gentleman has called for the withdrawal of United Kingdom forces. I remind him that all sections of the community in Lebanon not only welcomed the arrival of the British contingent, but continue to emphasise that it forms a desirable component of the

peacekeeping force. Not only do all the communities in the Lebanon welcome the continuing presence of the British force, but so do all the Governments in the region.

Mr. Healey: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the Israeli Defence Minister, while visiting Washington to make the agreement with the American Government to which I referred, said that they had been discussing joint military action against the Syrians? In the light of that statement, how can the hon. Gentleman believe the American claim that there has been no collusion between the United States and Israel on this matter?

Mr. Rifkind: I have no details of the discussions that may have taken place earlier this week between the Israelis and the United States. The House is concerned about the developments during the past 48 hours. On Saturday, the Americans found their forces under attack. They have emphasised that their response was in self-defence in accordance with the mandate between themselves and the Lebanese Government.

Mr. Healey rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I think that it would be more appropriate if I asked the right hon. Member to respond at the end of questions on the statement.

Sir Frederic Bennett (Torbay): Will my hon. Friend reflect on the fact that on this occasion the concern about the situation of British forces is not limited to one side of the House? Whatever role they are or are not fulfilling—I am not referring to the conduct of our men, who are doing a splendid job—no one reading the newspapers could call it peacekeeping. In those circumstances, would it be better to have second thoughts about the role of the peacekeeping force? What is the present position of the Italians? The latest news is that they have announced that they are withdrawing their forces at the conclusion of the Geneva talks, irrespective of the outcome.

Mr. Rifkind: We all share my hon. Friend's anxiety and the primary concern of the British Government is the security and well-being of the British force. It is only if and when we come to the conclusion that British troops cannot perform a useful role that the question of their withdrawal will become relevant. I have emphasised that all the communities in the Lebanon believe that they continue to play an important role.

My right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary is in Athens at the moment with the Foreign Ministers of two of the other countries that are involved, and he will have an opportunity to discuss with them their contributions to the peacekeeping force. On Thursday there will be a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the NATO countries, and there will be an opportunity to discuss this matter on a slightly wider front.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell (Down, South): Will the Government take steps at the earliest possible opportunity to dissociate this country from the insanity and inhumanity of American actions in the Lebanon?

Mr. Rifkind: Where actions are taken for proper reasons of self-defence we would have no hesitation in giving our support. If British troops were in danger and the need for self-defence required a response, it would be proper for the British forces to take such action.

Mr. Dennis Walters (Westbury): I fully understand the American concern for the security of its peacekeeping

force, but will the British Government exercise all the influence at their command to prevent the Americans from escalating the conflict with Syria and warn them that if a further escalation takes place we shall have to withdraw our small peacekeeping force?

Mr. Rifkind: I assure my hon. Friend that the Government consider the proper role of the multinational force to be that of peacekeeping and that we would not support the use of British or other forces in the multinational force for other than peacekeeping purposes, in accordance with the original mandate.

Mr. Ken Weetch (Ipswich): Does the Minister agree that United States neutrality in the middle east was flawed right from the start when it attempted to prop up the Gemayel regime, which was one of the factions in the civil war? Does the Minister further agree that, with the further agreement with Israel and the shelling of the Druze positions by the United States, American neutrality is now a complete travesty?

Mr. Rifkind: The Government's main concern is to ensure peace and the removal of tension from the Lebanon. We believe that the multinational force has been instrumental to a substantial degree in reducing tension in much of the Lebanon. The British contingent in particular is making an important contribution to the safety of the ceasefire mission. We believe that all members of the multinational force should concentrate their activities on that aspect.

Sir Antony Buck (Colchester, North): Is my hon. Friend aware that we are all proud of the way in which our forces are performing, as is shown by the fact that they received nothing but acclaim from all sides? However, does he recognise that both sides of the House are deeply concerned about their safety because those 100 men are in an isolated position? Can he tell us something about the back-up role of our forces in Cyprus?

Mr. Rifkind: I agree that the safety of the British troops is the Government's paramount consideration. Following incidents earlier this year, steps were taken to increase the security of the British contingent. HMS Fearless is stationed off the Lebanese coast and is a useful measure of support for the British contingent.

My hon. and learned Friend referred to Cyprus. Buccaneers are based there, and they could be used to assist the British contingent in the Lebanon if necessary.

Mr. Donald Stewart (Western Isles): Is the Minister aware that the present turmoil in the Lebanon stems from the aggression of the state of Israel and that the situation has been made worse by American unilateral aggression against Syria? Is there any point in keeping British forces in the Lebanon as a cosmetic cover for an alleged peacekeeping force?

Mr. Rifkind: Most fair-minded people will accept that the causes of the present troubles in the Lebanon are far more complex than the right hon. Gentleman suggests. The British contingent has been welcomed by the various communities in the Lebanon. There is precious little upon which all the factions can agree, but they are unanimous in their view that the British contingent is playing an important and useful role. I am sure that both sides of the House will take that fact into account.

Mr. Patrick McNair-Wilson (New Forest): As the United States Administration appear determined to use

their role in the multinational force to drive the Syrians from the Lebanon, what action is the MNF taking to remove the Israelis from the south of the country?

Mr. Rifkind: The Government could not support the use of the MNF to remove the Syrians or anyone else from the Lebanon. Its purpose is to help to keep the peace within the Lebanon. That was its original purpose and can be its only legitimate function.

Mr. Ernie Ross (Dundee, West): Does the Minister accept that the whole purpose of President Gemayel's visit to the United States was to set aside the accord forced on the Lebanese Government? Unless that accord is set aside, the conciliation talks—which the Minister says our troops are protecting—have no chance of success. Rather than launching attacks on the Lebanese people, should not President Reagan stress to the Israeli Prime Minister the need to ease the pressure on the Lebanese President?

Mr. Rifkind: The hon. Gentleman has gone slightly wider than previous comments. The British contingent is involved with the protection of the Ceasefire Commission. The communal talks in Geneva do not come under the responsibility of any part of the MNF. We hope that the talks will make further progress.

Mr. Patrick Cormack (Staffordshire, South): Is my hon. Friend aware that many of us fear that there are two American forces in the Lebanon—one as a part of the MNF and the other acting in a trigger-happy way on its own? Is my hon. Friend entirely satisfied that the level of consultation between the American and British Governments is sufficiently close?

Mr. Rifkind: It is appropriate that the MNF is answerable to the national Governments who sent it there, in with full consultation with the Lebanese Government. The British Government are in consultation with the American Government, but it is important to remember that in operational matters the situation in the Lebanon moves quickly from hour to hour, as well as from day to day.

Mr. Russell Johnston (Inverness, Nairn and Lochaber): In the current difficult position, will the Minister assure us that if the Government finally contemplate withdrawal of the British contingent—which many of us fear they will have to do—they will not do so without having the fullest consultation with our Community partners, the French and Italians?

Mr. Rifkind: The hon. Gentleman is correct to emphasise that unilateral action would be harmful to the interests that hon. Members wish to protect. There will be a continuing opportunity for the closest discussions, not only with the Americans, but with the Italians and the French.

Sir Anthony Kershaw (Stroud): Will my hon. Friend bear in mind that, while it is always desirable to march in step with the Americans, British troops are in the Lebanon to help the Lebanese and no one else?

Mr. Rifkind: My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The British troops have two specific functions—to help protect the Ceasefire Commission and to take part in reconnaissance in Greater Beirut. Those are the specific functions allocated to them, and it is right and proper that they should concentrate on them.

Mr. Andrew Faulds (Warley, East): Will the Minister ask the Foreign Secretary to make it clear to the United States that taking sides and then seeking revenge in the complex Lebanese situation, and establishing a strategic arrangement with Israel and stockpiling material in Israel, are recipes for disaster, not only for Syria and the Lebanon, but in the long-term, for America and Israel as well?

Mr. Rifkind: I have no doubt that for any member of the MNF to take sides or to seek revenge would be a gross and serious mistake. I must emphasise that the United States Government have stated categorically that their action during the weekends was in self-defence, arising from attacks on their forces.

Mr. John Stokes (Halesowen and Stourbridge): Is my hon. Friend aware that those of us who have wholeheartedly supported the United States in Europe, and are close friends of the alliance with America look with horror at the American bombing in the Lebanon? Can my hon. Friend and his colleagues in the Foreign Office urge upon the American State Department that it must give up the Israeli alliance—which is disastrous for Israel, the Middle East and the world—and try, by sensible diplomacy, to detach Syria from the Russian influence?

Mr. Rifkind: We naturally share the concern about any loss of life as a result of actions by any of the parties in the dispute. I agree that the best way to make progress in an issue as difficult, complex and tense as that in the Middle East is by diplomatic means, not by military action.

Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow): I wish to ask a straightforward question of fact. At what point in time did British Ministers first learn of the American air strike? Was it before, or after, the event?

Mr. Rifkind: The United Kingdom was informed shortly before the initial intervention by the United States.

Mr. George Walden (Buckingham): I agree that insufficient tribute has been paid to the achievements of the British troops guarding the Ceasefire Commission. Does my hon. Friend recognise that there are genuine concerns on both sides of the House about their present and future safety? Will he tell us more about their specific functions. What proportion of the 100 troops guarding the Ceasefire Commission, and what proportion are doing other things?

Mr. Rifkind: As I said earlier, the British contingent has two main functions—the protection of the Ceasefire Commission and reconnaissance in Greater Beirut. I cannot give specific figures, but I shall ensure that my hon. Friend receives information about the numbers involved in each of the tasks.

Mr. John Cartwright (Woolwich): Does the Minister accept that the cycle of violence will not be broken if retaliation is constantly followed by counter-retaliation, and if peace keeping is used as an excuse for playing an active and enthusiastic role in the hostilities? Will the Government now try to bring to bear some collective European influence to bear on the United States to counter the obviously dangerous influence of Israel?

Mr. Rifkind: I agree with the hon. Gentleman that a policy of retaliation followed by counter-retaliation would be negative and harmful to the prospects in the Lebanon.

We have specifically encouraged all parties in the Lebanon to eschew violence as a means of solving the problem and to concentrate on diplomatic means gradually to achieve a greater degree of consensus among the various communities which would lead to the withdrawal of foreign forces.

Mr. Robert Adley (Christchurch): Is there not a sickening inevitability about American policy in the Middle East in the run up to yet another American presidential election? Is my hon. Friend aware that many Conservative Members fear that the British contingent in the Lebanon is being used to add a cloak of respectability to American policy, which many of us regard as dangerous and stupid? Will my hon. Friend note the strong views expressed by Conservatives as well as Opposition members?

Mr. Rifkind: I am aware of the strong concern on both sides of the House about the physical safety and role of the British contingent in the MNF. I emphasise that the United States and other countries in the MNF must have their sole objective the restoration and preservation of peace in the Lebanon. Anything that is conducive to the achievement of that objective should have the support of the whole House.

Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. As the House knows, private notice questions are an extension of Question Time, but I sense the mood of the House that this is a matter of considerable interest and importance. Therefore, I propose to call those hon. Members who have been rising to ask questions, but I ask them to have regard to the business that is to follow.

Mr. Martin Flannery (Sheffield, Hillsborough): Is it not a fact that both sides of the House are deeply worried about the situation, and will the Minister reflect that in his answers? Is it not clear to the whole world that the role of the Americans in the Lebanon is interventionist and intimidatory, and that the presence of Gemayel and Shamir in Washington makes many of us think that an attack on Syria by the Americans is now imminent? Is there not a danger of bringing the other major power into this situation? Is it not clear that that is what we are all frightened of?

Mr. Rifkind: The hon. Gentleman is justified in saying that there is real concern and worry on both sides of the House—and, indeed, throughout the middle east and the world—about what is happening in the Lebanon. It is a tense and difficult situation. Not only the British Government but all the parties involved in the Lebanon must take into account, in considering any action or responses, whether their actions are likely to increase or reduce tension. We should all seek to concentrate our activities and initiatives on aspects of policy that will reduce rather than increase tension in the area.

Mr. Mark Lennox-Boyd (Morecambe and Lunesdale): Will my hon. Friend reassure those of us who are worried about the presence of British troops in the Lebanon that the criticisms voiced by some leading Lebanese politicians about the American retaliatory action will not be extended and get worse and thus undermine the whole credibility of the multinational force?

Mr. Rifkind: I agree with my hon. Friend that the presence of the multinational force in the Lebanon can

arise only in the context where the Lebanese Government themselves want it to continue to play an important role in peacekeeping in their country. It is very much in accordance with the wishes of the Lebanese Government and the various communities in the Lebanon that the United Kingdom is at present involved in that country. Clearly, if their wishes were to change significantly that would have a profound effect on the utility of any United Kingdom contribution.

Mr. D. N. Campbell-Savours (Workington): If the British Government were informed before the American attack took place, were we asked for our views, did we object, and did a conversation take place between the Foreign Secretary and his American counterpart?

Mr. Rifkind: The information was received by the United Kingdom on the Military network very shortly before the action commenced.

Mr. Michael Latham (Rutland and Melton): Does it remain our diplomatic objective to bring about the removal of all foreign forces from the Lebanon? If so, how can there be any talk of abrogating the 17 May agreement?

Mr. Rifkind: It remains our objective to have all foreign troops removed from the Lebanon, and we are willing to give continuing support to any measures that may play a part in contributing to the achievement of that objective.

Mr. Jack Straw (Blackburn): May we take it from the answers that the Minister gave to my hon. Friends the Members for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) and for Workington (Mr. Campbell-Savours) that we were informed only a few minutes—by the sound of it—before the attack took place, and that the Americans once again treated their principal ally with contempt and failed to consult us in any way? As our men were bound to be militarily at greater risk from any further American escalation is it not outrageous that the Americans did not consult us and allow enough time for us to express our view?

Mr. Rifkind: The hon. Gentleman's question is fundamentally absurd, because the various forces in the multinational force have an inherent right of self-defence, and that right is specifically mentioned in the mandate. When the forces of any member state in the multinational force exercise that right, it is an operational matter. The situation in the Lebanon changes from day to day and from hour to hour. If the American forces are used for proper means of self-defence, that is an operational matter which it is for the American forces and authorities themselves to determine.

Mr. Tony Marlow (Northampton, North): My hon. Friend makes a lot of the statements of the United States Government and their purported motives. May we deal instead with the realities? Can my hon. Friend tell the House how we can detach ourselves from the mistaken and dangerous policies of the United States, the anti-Arab policies of the United States, in the region, without at the same time endangering the fabric of the NATO Alliance?

Mr. Rifkind: My hon. Friend should appreciate that Her Majesty's Government will support American policy when it is in accordance with our own views about the proper way of resolving international problems. [Interruption.] We share the United States' desire for

peace in the middle east. The particular manner in which that should be advanced has to be considered on its merits in each case. We shall take into account British interests in the British perspective and if that coincides with the American perspective we shall give that policy our full support. If it does not coincide, we shall not support it.

Mr. Dick Douglas (Dunfermline, West): Further to the Minister's last answer, do the Government share the phobia of the United States Government that the Syrians are the agents of the Soviet Union in the Lebanon? Or, notwithstanding the presence of Soviet advisers and arms in Syria, do we take the view that Syria is performing a policy in the Lebanon to suit its own national interests? If it is the latter, and if we want to distance ourselves from the United States, is it not better that we intimate, albeit in harmony with our European Colleagues, that it is our intention to withdraw our support from the international peacekeeping force?

Mr. Rifkind: There is no doubt that the Syrian Government receive an enormous amount of material and logistic support from the Soviet Union. I assume that the Syrian Government will apply their interpretation of Syrian interests in pursuit of their policies, as would most Governments. My answer to the hon. Gentleman's final question is that I have said before that the presence of the British contingent is welcomed by all sections of the community in the Lebanon. It is welcomed by the Syrian Government and by other Governments in the region, and anyone who is interested in genuine peacekeeping in the Lebanon has to take that into account.

Mr. Patrick Nicholls (Teignbridge): Does my hon. Friend accept that even those of us who had considerable sympathy with the Americans when they found that an unarmed reconnaissance plane was being fired on feel that, nevertheless, the action that was taken marks an escalation, and that there must inevitably be greater pessimism that the peacekeeping force will not be able to keep the peace? Does he further accept that an early and immediate decision may therefore have to be made to pull out our contingent? Can my hon. Friend assure us that if that happens, sooner rather than later, that decision will be speedily made?

Mr. Rifkind: We would not welcome any escalation of tension in the Lebanon. We are in constant contact with the other member Governments in the multinational force. If it were ever believed that the British contingent in the multinational force could no longer perform the role for which it was sent to the Lebanon, our withdrawal would of course become a prime objective of British policy.

Mr. Kevin Barron (Rother Valley): As it is likely that the escalation will carry on in the Lebanon, what will the British Government's reaction be if our troops suffer loss of life similar to that of the Americans in the past four days?

Mr. Rifkind: The hon. Gentleman is right to draw attention to the heavy loss of life that the Americans have suffered, not just in the past four days, but in the past few weeks. Clearly we are all anxious to ensure that the security of the small British contingent is of a kind to guarantee their physical safety, in so far as that is possible.

Mr. Mark Fisher (Stoke-on-Trent, Central): The Minister has mentioned American self-defence four times. Will he tell us how he can describe the actions of the

[Mr. Mark Fisher]

United States air force, its bombings and its raids, as self-defence? Does he not accept, after this series of questions, that hon. Members on both sides of the House do not see the American action as self-defence?

Mr. Rifkind: The United States Government have emphasised clearly and unequivocally that their action over the weekend was—[*Interruption.*] It is not my job to explain—[*Interruption.*]

Mr. Speaker: Order. The Minister is attempting to reply.

Mr. Rifkind: If the hon. Gentleman is asking me about the explanation that the Americans have given—[*Interruption.*] I should be grateful if the hon. Gentleman would allow me to answer in my own way if he wants me to outline the explanation that the Americans gave of why they reacted as they did at the weekend. The American Government's view is that it was self-defence following the attacks on their aircraft.

The precise details of what took place over the weekend are matters that the American Government themselves have taken into account. When we are considering the proper means to ensure the defence of our troops, we shall take into account those actions that are thought to be necessary to ensure their physical safety. The American Government have taken into account the factors which they believe are essential for the security of their men. It is for them to explain and justify to the world whether that is a proper course of action.

Mr. Healey: Does the right hon. Gentleman recognise that the view that the United States has embarked on a catastrophic course in the Lebanon is now held unanimously? Not one right hon. or hon. Member has expressed a different view in the last half hour. That view is widely held in Europe, by a large body in Israel, and even in the United States. In the light of the United States' failure once again to consult its major ally and to give Britain any opportunity to express a political view on military action which was bound to have a direct consequence on the safety of British troops in the Lebanon, the Minister's defence of American action is profoundly repugnant to hon. Members on both sides and all too reminiscent of the Government's initial reaction to the invasion of Grenada. Will the Government now abandon their doormat diplomacy, stand up for British interests and protect British lives?

Mr. Rifkind: I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman has got that off his chest. Any self-respecting Government, when taking into account the needs to protect the physical safety and well-being of their troops, will apply the criterion that a measure of self-defence is necessary. That is exactly the approach that this Government will apply and we should not expect any other Government to apply a different criterion.

Greenham Common

4.3 pm

Mr. Roland Boyes (Houghton and Washington): I beg to ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House, under Standing Order No. 10, for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter that should have urgent consideration, namely,

"the success of women this weekend in penetrating the cruise missile base at Greenham common."

The matter is important because it demonstrates once again the terrible threat that the installation of cruise missiles poses, first, because we can be the subject of early strike by our enemies. The magnificent, courageous, self-sacrificing women at Greenham common have brought to our attention a further reason for concern—that missiles or missile aids cannot be protected all the time and could fall into the hands of our enemies. By that I do not mean the present Government because they have declared a lack of interest. That was confirmed by a Ministry of Defence spokesman at the weekend who, in the *Sunday Telegraph*, had the audacity to say:

"All we know is we arrested the women at the place as stated. They could have roamed around the base, we just do not know." On one of the towers someone had painted the important notice "Greenham women are everywhere".

The matter is specific because it relates directly to events this weekend at the Greenham common cruise missile base. The matter is urgent because events this weekend demonstrate the failure of the Secretary of State's policies. It is urgent because it demonstrates how wrong it is arrogantly to ignore the opinions of the British people as shown in opinion polls. It demonstrates how wrong it is to believe that the military can defend such bases 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. The matter is urgent because the Secretary of State should resign since he is completely ignoring our wishes. The Secretary of State's incompetence is putting our lives in jeopardy. He should order U.S. commanders to collect their forces and missiles together and get the hell out of Britain.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member for Houghton and Washington (Mr. Boyes) asks leave to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 10 to discuss a specific and important matter that he thinks should have urgent attention, namely,

"security at Greenham common."

I have listened carefully to the hon. Member, but I regret that I do not consider that the matter that he has raised is appropriate for discussion under Standing Order No. 10 and therefore I cannot submit his application to the House.

OCCUPIERS' LIABILITY BILL [*Lords*]

Ordered,

That, the Occupiers' Liability Bill [*Lords*] be referred to a Second Reading Committee.—[*Mr. Donald Thompson.*]

MERCHANT SHIPPING (MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) BILL [*Lords*]

Ordered,

That, the Merchant Shipping (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill [*Lords*] be referred to a Second Reading Committee.—[*Mr. Donald Thompson.*]

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FROM F C O 051612Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE ATHENS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 576 OF 5 DECEMBER

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR COLES PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY, FROM PARSONS:

LEBANON

AS THE PRIME MINISTER KNOWS, MY MAIN WORRY HAS FOR SOME WEEKS BEEN THAT THE AMERICANS AND THE ISRAELIS ARE PLANNING SOME ACTION TO QUOTE CUT THE SYRIANS DOWN TO SIZE UNQUOTE. I HAVE SEEN WHAT THE AMERICANS HAVE TOLD US ABOUT THE EVENTS OF THE WEEKEND. THIS HAS NOT ALLAYED MY ANXIETIES. IT CANNOT BE A COINCIDENCE THAT THE SUNDAY TIMES AND THE OBSERVER CARRIED IDENTICAL STORIES ABOUT AMERICAN/ISRAELI INTENTIONS. IT IS ON THE CARDS THAT THESE STORIES ORIGINATED IN AMERICAN BRIEFING GIVEN BY SOMEONE IN THE ADMINISTRATION WHO IS OPPOSED TO SUCH ACTION.

2. IF HOSTILITIES ESCALATE BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE SYRIANS, WITH OR WITHOUT ISRAELI PARTICIPATION, I CANNOT SEE HOW WE CAN CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THAT OUR CONTINGENT IN LEBANON FORMS PART OF A QUOTE PEACEKEEPING FORCE UNQUOTE. I HAVE BEEN FIRMLY OPPOSED TO A UNILATERAL BRITISH WITHDRAWAL BUT, IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, OUR PARTICIPATION COULD BECOME DIFFICULT IN TERMS OF OUR OWN PUBLIC OPINION. I WOULD NOT LIKE TO PREDICT FRENCH REACTIONS BUT THE ITALIANS ARE OBVIOUSLY LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT. THE MNF COULD BECOME AN AMERICAN OR A FRANCO-AMERICAN INTERVENTION FORCE. NEITHER WOULD BE DESIRABLE. THIS IS QUITE APART FROM THE WIDER DANGERS INHERENT IN THE PRESENT SITUATION.

3. OVER THE PAST 20 YEARS OR SO, THE AMERICANS AND OURSELVES HAVE ISSUED COUNTLESS STATEMENTS AND VOTED FOR COUNTLESS RESOLUTIONS IN THE UN CONDEMNING QUOTE CYCLES OF VIOLENCE UNQUOTE ALL OVER THE

WORLD, PARTICULARLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA. ON EVERY OCCASION, EACH SIDE HAS BLAMED THE OTHER FOR STARTING AND INTENSIFYING THE CYCLE, BE IT ISRAELIS, ARABS, SOUTH AFRICANS, RHODESIANS, ANGOLANS ETC. DO THE AMERICANS NOT REALISE THAT THEY ARE NOW PARTICIPATING IN PRECISELY SUCH A CYCLE?

BOTH OF US HAVE CONSISTENTLY TAKEN THE VIEW THAT IT IS UP TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE AND LEAST INSECURE PARTY TO BREAK THE CYCLE. WE HAVE URGED THIS TIME AND AGAIN ON EG THE SOUTH AFRICANS. SHOULD THE AMERICANS NOT LEARN THEIR OWN LESSON? SHOULD THEY NOT CONSIDER A HIGH LEVEL TALK WITH THE SYRIANS DESIGNED TO COOL THINGS DOWN?

4. I KNOW THAT THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND DEFENCE SECRETARY ARE IN TOUCH WITH SHULTZ AND WEINBERGER RESPECTIVELY, AND THAT RUMSFELD WILL BE IN LONDON ON WEDNESDAY. BUT EVENTS ARE MOVING SO QUICKLY THAT I WONDER IF THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD NOT SEND A MESSAGE TO REAGAN FROM ATHENS.

HOWE

File No.

OUTWARD

Security Classification
SECRET

Department

Drafted by

(Block Capitals)

TELEGRAM

Precedence
Immediate

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Despatched (Date)
(Time)Z

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(Caveat/
Privacy marking).....

(Codeword).....

(Deskby).....Z

TO..... *ATHENS IMMEDIATE ATHENS*
(precedence) (post)

Tel. No. *576* of *5 Dec*

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND TO SAVING.....

INFO.....

INFO SAVING.....

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

Personal PRIME MINISTER'S PART-1,

Following *for Coles* from Parsons:

LEBANON

has for some weeks been

No 10 DS.

As the Prime Minister knows, my ~~most~~ ^{main} immediate worry ^{is}

that the Americans and the Israelis are planning some

action to "cut the Syrians down to size". I have seen

what the Americans have told us about the events of the

weekend, ~~but~~ This has not allayed my anxieties. It

cannot be a coincidence that the Sunday Times and the

Observer carried ^{identical} similar stories about American/Israeli

intentions. ^{IC is on the cards} The likelihood is that these stories originated

in American briefing given by someone who is opposed to

such action.

Copies to:-

in the Administration

2. If ~~serious~~ ^{escalate} hostilities ~~break out~~ between the Americans and the Syrians, with or without Israeli participation, I cannot see how we ^{can} ~~could~~ continue to maintain that our contingent in Lebanon ^{forms ed} ~~form~~ part of a "peacekeeping force".

/I have been

I have been ~~consistently~~ ^{firmly} opposed to a unilateral British withdrawal but, in such circumstances, our ~~continued~~ participation could become ~~untenable~~ ^{difficult} in terms of our own public opinion. I would not like to predict French reactions but the Italians are obviously looking for a way out. The MNF could become an American or a Franco-American intervention force. Neither would be desirable. This is quite apart from the wider dangers inherent in the ~~outbreak~~ ^{present} of ~~serious hostilities~~ ^{situation}.

3. Over the past 20 years or so, the Americans and ourselves have issued countless statements and voted for countless resolutions in the UN condemning "cycles of violence" all over the world, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. On every occasion, each side has blamed the other for ~~intensifying~~ ^{starting and} the cycle, be it Israelis, Arabs, South Africans, Rhodesians, Angolans etc. Do the Americans not realise that they are now participating in precisely ~~this~~ ^{such a} ~~process~~ ^{cycle}? Both of us have consistently taken the view that it is up to the more responsible and least insecure party to break the cycle. We have urged this time and again on eg the South Africans. Should the Americans not ~~draw~~ ^{learn} ~~the~~ ^(own) ~~right~~ ^{lessons}? ~~in the present situation?~~ ^{Should they not consider a high level talk with the Syrians designed to cool things down?}

4. I know that the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary are in touch with Shultz and Weinberger respectively, and that Rumsfeld will be in London on Wednesday. But events are moving so quickly that I wonder if the Prime Minister should not send a message to Reagan from Athens.

AD 5/12.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

c.c. Mrs. Goodchild



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 December, 1983.

Visit by President Gemayel

B/P/1 Thank you for your letter of 1 December to John Coles. The Prime Minister agrees to talks with President Gemayel at 1215 on Wednesday, 14 December, followed by lunch.

David Barclay

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

NP

PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/FUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR SPERTON
SIR J BULLARD
ED/NEWAD
ED/ED
ED/UND

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ADVANCE COPY

FROM KUWAIT 051340Z DEC 83

IMMEDIATE

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 313 OF 5 DECEMBER

FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV,
ATHENS (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY).

FROM PS/MR LUCE.

US/SYRIA.

1. MR LUCE HAS BEEN TACKLED BY THE PRESS BOTH IN DAMASCUS AND ON HIS ARRIVAL AT KUWAIT ABOUT HMG'S ATTITUDE TO THE US RAND ON SYRIAN POSITIONS ON 4 DECEMBER. HE TOOK THE LINE THAT THE IMPORTANT THING NOW WAS TO END THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE AND TO WORK FOR RECONCILIATION THROUGH AN EARLY RESUMPTION OF THE GENEVA TALKS.

2. REACTION IN THE ARAB WORLD TO THE PRESS LINE BEING USED IN LONDON, WHICH IS BEING INTERPRETED AS INDICATING SUPPORT FOR THE AMERICAN RAND, HAS BEEN VERY STRONG. BOTH SYRIAN AND KUWAITI MINISTERS HAVE MADE CLEAR THEIR DISAPPOINTMENT AT A LINE WHICH THEY BELIEVE IDENTIFIES US FIRMLY WITH US ACTIONS IN THE LEBANON. MR LUCE BELIEVES THAT THE FORMULA HE HAS WHICH SEEKS TO RETAIN OUR CREDIBILITY IN THE ARAB WORLD AT A TIME WHEN ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING IS RUNNING HIGH, BUT AVOIDS APPORTIONING BLAME FOR THE WEEKEND'S EVENTS, IS THE MOST BALANCED AND SENSIBLE LINE. HE VERY MUCH HOPES THAT IN ANSWERING ANY FURTHER QUERIES WE CAN STICK TO THIS FORMULA.

MELHUSH

NNNN

TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI
FROM THE SAC, NEW YORK
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

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RE NEW YORK TELETYPE TO BUREAU
ON [Illegible]

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PS/MR LUCE
PS/FUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR EBERTON
SIR J BULLARD
ED/RENAD
ED/ED
ED/UND

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NR ROME

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FM DAMASCUS 051145Z DEC 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 393 OF 5 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV KUWAIT (FOR PS/MR LUCE)
ATHENS (FOR S OF S PARTY)
INFO ROUTINE AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDA, PARIS AND ROME

US/SYRIA

1. AT THE AIRPORT IMMEDIATELY BEFORE MR LUCE'S DEPARTURE, THE SYRIAN MINISTER OF STATE SAID THAT THE MOST WORRYING ASPECT OF THE AMERICAN STRIKES ON SYRIAN POSITIONS ON 4 DECEMBER WAS THE AMERICANS' JUSTIFICATION FOR THEM. CLAIMING THAT THEIR ACTION WAS IN SELF-DEFENCE IMPLIED THAT THE AMERICAN CRITERIA FOR EXERCISING THIS RIGHT WAS NOW THE SAME AS THE ISRAELIS'S
2. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE MR LUCE WAS ASKED BY THE SYRIAN NEWSAGENCY CORRESPONDENT WHAT THE BRITISH STANCE WAS TOWARDS THE AMERICAN ATTACKS. MR LUCE REPLIED THAT THE OVERRIDING NEED IN LEBANON WAS FOR EVERYONE TO EXERCISE THE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT IN ORDER TO BREAK THE SPIRAL OF VIOLENCE SEMI CLN THE RECONVENING OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE WOULD BE A WELCOME AND MUCH NEEDED STEP TO REDUCE TENSION AND TO SOLIDIFY THE CURRENT VERY FRAGILE CEASEFIRE.
3. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION SHARA' QUESTIONED MR LUCE ABOUT THE FCO SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENT IN ATHENS ABOUT THE RIGHT OF MNF CONTRIBUTORS TO ACT IN SELF DEFENCE. HE THOUGHT THIS AMOUNTED TO JUSTIFICATION OF THE AMERICAN ACTION. MR LUCE REPLIED THAT THE COMMENT SHOULD BE SEEN IN A BROADER CONTEXT.


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MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 18

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GRS 213

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 051515Z

FM MOSCOW 051442Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1395 OF 5 DEC

INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS (DESKBY 051515Z) (FOR S OF S'S PARTY)

UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON,

INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, AMMAN, TUNIS, TEL AVIV, CAIRO,
JEDDA

MIPT (NOT TO ALL): SOVIET PRESS CONFERENCE: MIDDLE EAST

1. AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE ON 5 DECEMBER ZAMYATIN (HEAD OF THE INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION DEPARTMENT OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE) WAS ALSO ASKED ABOUT RECENT EVENTS IN LEBANON. HE DESCRIBED THE AMERICAN ATTACKS ON SYRIAN POSITIONS AS A "BANDIT ACT" AIMED AT WIDENING US/ISRAELI INTERVENTION. IN A LENGTHY, UNTEMPERATE REPLY HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION CONDEMNED THESE ATTACKS. "ALL NECESSARY STEPS" BY THE ARABS WOULD BE TAKEN "WITH SOVIET SUPPORT AND SYMPATHY." THE SOVIET UNION WOULD GIVE ASSISTANCE AND AID ("SODEISTVIYE POMOSHCH") TO THOSE FIGHTING AGAINST (US AND ISRAELI) AGGRESSION.
2. OTHERWISE THERE HAS SO FAR BEEN LITTLE DIRECT COMMENT IN THE SOVIET PRESS ON THE WEEKEND'S EVENTS WHICH HAVE, HOWEVER, BEEN WIDELY REPORTED. THE US AIR STRIKE AND SHELLING BY WARSHIPS POSITIONED OFF THE LEBANESE COAST HAVE BEEN LINKED WITH ISRAELI AIR STRIKES IN CENTRAL LEBANON AND PRESENTED AS THE RESULT OF AGREEMENTS, MADE DURING SHAMIR'S WASHINGTON VISIT, TO COORDINATE MORE CLOSELY MILITARY ACTION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE US.

SUTHERLAND

Dictated to party 5/12

CB1

Head of NENAD

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION

For ORAL ANSWER on 5 December 1983

Please submit :-
a draft Answer
& background
& supplementary notes
to Parliamentary Unit
before 1pm TODAY
MONDAY 5 DECEMBER

Text of Question

BY PRIVATE NOTICE

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Mr Denis Healey (Leeds East): To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, if he will make a statement on the situation in Lebanon.

1. On 3 December anti-aircraft guns fired at US reconnaissance aircraft over Lebanon. Early on 4 December US aircraft bombed Syrian military targets in Lebanon. 2 US aircraft were shot down. Last night 8 US marines were killed by shell fire.
2. We are in close contact with other contributors to the MNF. We share the objective of helping the Lebanese Government restore stability and create conditions in which the Lebanese people can themselves sort out their differences free from outside interference.
3. All the parties welcome the role of the British contingent, which has the vital task of guarding the meetings of the Ceasefire Commission. The safety of our men is kept under constant review.
4. It is vital that all parties in Lebanon show restraint and work together to make further progress towards national reconciliation. We shall continue to urge this on President Gemayel.

NOT YET APPROVED BY A
MINISTER



MOD have now confirmed via No. 10 that eight American marines have been killed and two injured. Attack took place at 2300 Beirut time. At 2400 US Fleet responded, 86 salvos were fired at the Shouf Mountains. As at 0100 all reported to be quiet. At 0800 a car bomb exploded in South West Beirut - some distance from British forces. It is reported that there were 20 casualties, all believed to be Lebanese civilians.

4/12

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TO FLASH ATHENS

TELERGAM NUMBER 557 OF 04 DECEMBER 1983

INFO FLASH DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, BEIRUT,
IMMEDIATE ROME, PARIS, TEL AVIV, MODUK, UKMIS NEW YORK.
FOR SECRETARY OF STATES PARTY

FOLLOWING FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM HESELTINE.

BEGINS,

I AM TRYING AS AN IMMEDIATE STEP TO FIND OUT FROM CAP WEINBERGER THE PRECISE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE AMERICAN ACTION. I HAVE ALSO BEEN IN TOUCH WITH RICHARD LUCE IN DAMASCUS, WHO WAS NOT FULLY AWARE OF EVENTS. I BRIEFED HIM APPROPRIATELY AND HE IS TO SEE THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SHORTLY AND WILL REPORT. HIS IMMEDIATE REACTION WAS THE NEED TO CONTACT AMERICANS AT HIGHEST LEVEL TO URGE RESTRAINT.

I AGREE WITH THIS. WE NEED TO PERSUADE THE AMERICANS THAT THERE SHOULD BE A PAUSE FOR URGENT CONSULTATIONS BEFORE ANY FURTHER ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH WOULD GIVE ANOTHER TWIST TO THE SPIRAL. I HAVE ARRANGED TO TALK TO WEINBERGER ON A SECURE LINK THROUGH THE U S EMBASSY AT 1415Z. GEOFFREY HOWE WILL NO DOUBT WANT TO TELEPHONE SHULTZ AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND IF FEASIBLE FIX UP A MEETING WITH HIM EITHER BILATERALY OR WITH OTHER MNF FOREIGN MINISTERS. YOU YOURSELF MAY WISH TO TALK TO THE PRESIDENT. A COMPLICATING FEATURE FOR ALL OF US WITH THIS IS THE FRONT PAGE STORIES IN THE SUNDAY TIMES AND OBSERVER SUGGESTING JOINT US ISREAL PLANS TO DRIVE SYRIA OUT OF LEBANON. WE ARE ONCE AGAIN IN THE POSITION OF APPEARING TO BE SUCKED INTO A DANGEROUS SITUATION OVER WHICH WE DO NOT HAVE CONTROL. I AM CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED NOT TO EXACERBATE UNDULY THE ALREADY RUFFLED STATE OF ANGLO AMERICAN RELATIONS BUT IN ONE M WAY OR ANOTHER WE MUST INSIST ON THE AMERICANS TELLING US FRANKLY WHAT THEIR INTENTIONS ARE. YOU ARE AWARE WE WERE INFORMED OF ATTAACK ONLY MINUTES BEFORE IT TOOK PLACE.

A KEY JUDGEMENT HINGES ON THE U S

JUSTIFICATION FOR RETALIATION. SO FAR

INTELLIGENCE SUPPRTS THE VIEW THAT ONLY LIMITED U S RECCE FLIGHTS TOOK PLACE ON SATURDAY. I AM TRYING TO CONFIRM THIS FROM OUR OWN SOURCES. THESE U S FLIGHTS ATTRACTED ATTACKS BY 10 SAM MISSILES AND 500 ARTILLERY ROUNDS BUT NO U S AIRCRAFT WAS HIT. U S TODAY ATTACKED TARGETS 10 MILES EAST OF BEIRUT AT HAMMAN AND NOT IN THE BEQAA. 24 CARRIER BASED AIRCRAFT ARE REPORTED TO HAVE TAKEN PART OF WHICH TWO WERE DESTROYED : ONE AMERICAN PILOT IS IN SYRIAN HANDS.

WE SHALL REPORT WITH LATER INFORMATIONM AS APPRIPIATE
PARLIAMENTARY INTEREST TOMORROW IS CERTAIN
BRITFORLEB REPORTS THAZT BEIRUT IS RELATIVELY QUIET.

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