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
The Situation in the Middle East

MIDDLE
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AT 1 MAY 1979

PART 10

PHIO APRIL 1982

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
2.2.82		8.9.82		1.1.82			
26.4.82		9.9.82		17.1.83			
4.5.82		10.9.82		21.1.83			
25.8.82		13.9.82		25.1.83			
13.5.82		14.9.82		28.1.83			
6.6.82		29.9.82		31.1.83			
8.6.82		1.10.82		- Part Ends -			
13.6.82		22.10.82		 PREM 19/1087			
15.6.82		12.11.82					
17.6.82		16.11.82					
18.6.82		18.11.82					
24.6.82		18.11.82					
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6.7.82		9.12.82					
11.7.82		16.12.82					
16.7.82		20.12.82					
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29.7.82		28.12.82					
3.8.82		30.12.82					
9.8.82		9.1.83					
29.8.82							

●PART 10 ends:-

AJC to FCO 31/1/83

PART ~~10~~ 11 begins:-

Sir-A. Parsons to AJC 3/2/83

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC (82) 38th Conclusions, Minute 2	15.7.82
CC (82) 41st Conclusions, Minute 1	9.9.82
CC (82) 43rd Conclusions, Minutes 1 & 2	14.10.82
CC (82) 49th Conclusions, Minute 2	18.11.82
CC (82) 51st Conclusions, Minute 2	2.12.82
CC (82) 52nd Conclusions, Minute 3	9.12.82
CC (82) 53rd Conclusions, Minute 2	16.12.82

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed *A Wayland*

Date 7 May 2013

PREM Records Team

HL

MIDDLE EAST

31 January 1983

The PLO

This is just to say that the Prime Minister has now been able to read your letter of 6 January, together with its various enclosures.

JOHN COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM WASHINGTON 282309Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 229 OF 28 JANUARY 1983,

INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK,
 DAMASCUS, AMMAN, JEDDA, TUNIS, MOSCOW,
 INFO SAVING TRIPOLI, ADDIS ABABA, MOGADISHU, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN,
 PARIS, ROME.

PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON **SUMMARY**

1. AMERICANS SATISFIED THAT VISIT REPAIRED BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP STRAINED BY ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON. PREDICTABLE EGYPTIAN PRESSURE FOR EARLY PROGRESS TOWARDS WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON, A PRECONDITION INTER ALIA, FOR IMPROVED EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI RELATIONS.

DETAIL

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND KEMP (NSC) BRIEFED US TODAY ON THE VISIT OF MUBARAK AND FIVE OF HIS MINISTERS TO WASHINGTON FROM 26 TO 28 JANUARY. IN ADDITION TO TWO HOURS OF TALKS AND LUNCH WITH THE PRESIDENT AND HABIB, MUBARAK HAD SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH SHULTZ, WEINBERGER, REGAN, BROCK, THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, THE IMF, THE US/JEWISH LEADERS AND MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS.

3. THE STATE DEPARTMENT BELIEVE THAT THE VISIT BUILT ON THAT BY KHAL HASSAN ALI LAST NOVEMBER, IN REPAIRING THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAD BEEN STRAINED BY THE ISRAELI INVASION AND CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF LEBANON. MUBARAK HAD BEEN FORCEFUL AND IMPRESSIVE, ESPECIALLY IN HANDLING TOUGH QUESTIONING FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP AS A CORNERSTONE OF U S POLICY AND THE PEACE PROCESS. MUBARAK DESCRIBED THE DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO CLOSER RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL BUT HAD UNDERTAKEN TO SEND HIS AMBASSADOR BACK TO TEL AVIV ONCE THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON A TIMETABLE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. MUBARAK HAD PREDICTABLY URGED CONTINUED AMERICAN PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS TO THIS END, BUT HAD PUT FORWARD NO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. HE STRESSED THAT GEMAYEL WANTED THE AMERICANS TO PLAY A FULL PART IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. MUBARAK HAD BEEN CONFIDENT THAT EGYPT'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES WOULD IMPROVE ONCE PROGRESS WERE MADE ON LEBANON. HE SHOWED SOME RESENTMENT OF THE SAUDI ATTITUDE ON THIS ISSUE AT THE FEZ SUMMIT, AND HINTED THAT A RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS WITH IRAQ WAS A REAL POSSIBILITY. THE EGYPTIANS EXPRESSED CONTINUED CONCERN ABOUT LIBYAN SUBVERSION IN CHAD AND THE SUDAN AND ABOUT THE SOVIET/CUBAN PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA. THEY WERE TRYING DISCREETLY TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS WITH MENGISTU AND HAD URGED THE SOMALIS TO SEEK TO REPAIR THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE ETHIOPIANS.

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5. CONTRARY TO A STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY KAMAL HASSAN ALI PRIOR TO THE VISIT HUBARAK DID NOT DELIVER ANY SPECIFIC MESSAGE FROM ARAFAT. ACCORDING TO THE EGYPTIAN EMBASSY, HOWEVER, ARAFAT HAD SIGNALLED TO THE EGYPTIANS HIS READINESS TO BE FLEXIBLE AND TO COOPERATE OVER IMPLEMENTATION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE. BUT HE STILL WANTED AMERICAN GUPANTEES, FOR EXAMPLE OVER SETTLEMENTS. THE EGYPTIANS WERE URGING ARAFAT TO TAKE A CHANCE AND GO AHEAD, IF NECESSARY WITH FATAH ONLY.

6. THERE WAS EVIDENTLY LITTLE DISCUSSION OF THE SOVIET ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE AMERICANS EXPECT THE EGYPTIANS TO ALLOW A SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO IN DUE COURSE. THE EGYPTIANS HAD ASKED THEM NOT TO OVERREACT TO SUCH A DEVELOPMENT.

7. TELELETTER FOLLOWS (NOT TO ALL) ON BILATERAL ISSUES.

FCO PASS SAVING: TRIPOLI, ADDIS ABABA, MOGADISHU, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, PARIS AND ROME.

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[PASSED] AS REQUESTED]

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FROM TEL AVIV 291112Z JAN 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 30 OF 23 JANUARY 1983

INFO BEIRUT, AMMAN, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS
NEW YORK AND MODUK.

INFO SAVING PARIS AND ROME.

MY TELNO 24: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. WITH NEGOTIATIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL LOOKING DEADLOCKED ALMOST BEFORE THEY HAVE GOT OFF THE GROUND, IT MAY BE USEFUL TO TRY AND ASSESS WHERE THE ISRAELIS STAND.

2. WE KNOW THAT ISRAEL IS PUTTING FORWARD A NUMBER OF CONDITIONS WHICH THE LEBANESE AND ALSO THE AMERICANS FIND UNREASONABLE. IN ESSENCE THE ISRAELI CASE IS THAT SECURITY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON SHOULD BE LEFT TO HADDAD'S FORCES BACKED BY A SMALL IDF RESIDUAL PRESENCE. NO ROLE IS SEEN FOR UNIFIL OR THE MFO IN THE PROPOSED 45 KM SECURITY ZONE SEMICOLON RECENT EXPERIENCE OF THE MFO'S INABILITY TO PREVENT SOME PLO FILTERING BACK NEAR BEIRUT IS ADDUCED IN SUPPORT. THE ISRAELIS ARE FURTHER INSISTING ON A POINT-BY-POINT COMMITMENT IN WRITING FROM THE LEBANESE ABOUT NORMALISING RELATIONS.

3. ON THE FACE OF IT, THESE DEMANDS CONFLICT WITH THE GENERAL MOOD IN ISRAEL OF WISHING TO SEE THE ARMY BROUGHT HOME FROM LEBANON, WHICH IS INCREASINGLY SEEN AS AN UNREWARDING PLACE FOR THE IDF TO BE STUCK IN. BUT THIS MOOD DOES NOT EXTEND TO WITHDRAWAL AT ALL COSTS, ONLY IF NORTHERN ISRAEL CAN CONTINUE TO BE ASSURED OF FREEDOM FROM PLO ATTACK. SHARON HAS STATED PUBLICLY THIS WEEK THAT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON ARE A HIGHER PRIORITY THAN THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. THE IMPLICATION IS THAT UNLESS ADEQUATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE NEGOTIATED, ISRAEL WOULD PREFER TO STAY INDEFINITELY THAN WITHDRAW UNILATERALLY. IN THIS I BELIEVE HE ACCURATELY REFLECTS ISRAELI OPINION, WHATEVER ONE MAY THINK OF HIS NEGOTIATING DEMANDS IN DETAIL.

4. THE QUESTION IS WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE REASONABLE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. ISRAELIS ARGUE THAT IT WILL BE A SOURCE OF ENDLESS TROUBLE FOR EVERYONE CONCERNED WITH MIDDLE EAST PEACE TO ALLOW A RETURN TO ANYTHING LIKE THE PREVIOUS SITUATION WHEN THE PLO MANAGED ALL TOO EASILY TO GET WITHIN RANGE OF SETTLEMENTS IN NORTHERN ISRAEL. ONLY FORCES WITH LOCAL KNOWLEDGE AND LOCAL PEOPLE ARE SEEN AS BEING ABLE TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE BARRIER TO PLO RE-INFILTRATION. HENCE THE ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON HADDAD'S FORCES BEING GIVEN A PRIMARY ROLE AT THIS STAGE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, ALTHOUGH SOME FORM OF RE-INTEGRATION INTO THE LEBANESE ARMY IS ACCEPTED AS BEING NECESSARY FOR PRESENTATIONAL PURPOSES. BOTH GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION HERE AGREE ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF HADDAD FORCES HAVING THIS ROLE.

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5. THE LABOUR ALIGNMENT PART COMPANY WITH THE GOVERNMENT ON 3 POINTS:

- (A) THEY DISAGREE ABOUT IDF-MANNED STATIONS, BELIEVING THEM TO BE UN-NEGOTIABLE WITH A LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WHOSE OBLIGATIONS TO THE ARAB WORLD, ACCORDING TO LABOUR, ARE UNDER-ESTIMATED BY LIKUD SEMICOLON
- (B) LABOUR WOULD WELCOME AN MFO PRESENCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, NOT AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR HADDAD'S FORCES BUT AS A MARK OF POLITICAL COMMITMENT BY THE AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS SEMICOLON
- (C) LABOUR WOULD SETTLE FOR INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS TO PERMIT FREE TRAFFIC ACROSS THE ISRAEL/LEBANON FRONTIER WITHOUT INSISTING ON WRITTEN ARRANGEMENTS WHICH IN THE LABOUR VIEW ARE HARDER TO NEGOTIATE AND NOT NECESSARILY BETTER CAPABLE OF STANDING THE TEST OF TIME.

IN MAKING THESE POINTS TO ME THIS WEEK, ABBA EBAN COMMENTED THAT LEBANON IS INCREASINGLY DISTRACTING ATTENTION FROM EVEN MORE IMPORTANT ISSUES FROM ISRAEL'S POINT OF VIEW, NAMELY THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK AND RELATIONS WITH EGYPT AND THE UNITED STATES.

6. THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT'S TOUGH NEGOTIATING LINE IS PARTLY A MATTER OF HABIT. ISRAELIS GO FOR THE MAXIMUM, AND ONLY SLOWLY CONCEDE LESS ESSENTIAL POINTS UNDER PRESSURE. BEGIN AND SHARON HAVE EVERYTHING TO GAIN HERE FROM BEING SEEN TO HAVE SECURED GREATER SECURITY ON ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER THAN BEFORE THE INVASION OF LEBANON. MOREOVER, THE SHADOW OF A POSSIBLY CRITICAL REPORT ON THE BEIRUT MASSACRES NOW LOOMS ACROSS THE DOMESTIC SCENE. THE GOVERNMENT MAY WELL FEEL THE NEED TO BE OCCUPYING THE POLITICAL HIGH GROUND WHEN THE REPORT IS PUBLISHED, PROBABLY IN FEBRUARY.

7. IT IS OF COURSE A HIGH RISK POLICY. IT MAY PARTLY REFLECT ISRAELI UNCERTAINTY AS TO SYRIAN INTENTIONS. THE ISRAELIS ARE PERHAPS ALSO BEING MISLED AS TO HOW FAR THE LEBANESE CAN GO BY RELYING TOO MUCH ON WHAT THEY HEAR FROM THE PHALANGISTS, WITH WHOM PEOPLE LIKE KIMCHE HAVE BEEN WORKING CLOSELY SINCE THE MID-1970'S. SHARON MAY BE PARTICULARLY PRONE TO THIS ERROR.

8. HARD AS IT IS TO FORECAST, I DO NOT THINK WE HAVE HEARD THE LAST ISRAELI WORD. NOR I IMAGINE WILL THE US ADMINISTRATION LEAVE IT AT THAT. I WOULD JUDGE THERE IS STILL ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE IN THE ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS. BEGIN HAS SHOWN HIMSELF QUITE SKILFULL IN THE PAST AT JUDGING WHAT HE CAN AND CANNOT GET AWAY WITH. BUT THEY ARE MAKING IT VERY DIFFICULT BOTH FOR THEMSELVES AND FOR OTHERS AND WILL NOT EASILY BE BUDGED FROM POSITIONS THEY JUDGE ESSENTIAL FOR SECURITY. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS IT WILL BE BEGIN RATHER THAN SHARON WHO DECIDES THE ISRAELI BOTTOM LINE.

9. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING PARIS AND ROME.

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FM WASHINGTON 282315Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 230 OF 28 JANUARY 1983,

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, PRIORITY JEDDA,
CAIRO, TUNIS, RABAT, PARIS, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW.

ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. WE ASKED CLUVERIUS (STATE DEPARTMENT) AND KEMP (NSC) SEPARATELY TODAY ABOUT THE STATE OF PLAY. THE AMERICANS HAVE NOT YET DECIDED THEIR NEXT STEPS. HABIB IS UNLIKELY TO RETURN TO THE MIDDLE EAST BEFORE THE END OF NEXT WEEK.

2. CLUVERIUS SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS CONTINUED TO ESCALATE UNREASONABLY THEIR SECURITY AND POLITICAL DEMANDS. YESTERDAY, THEY HAD PROPOSED THAT, EVEN AFTER WITHDRAWAL, THE LEBANESE ARMY SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO STRICT RESTRICTIONS AS TO THE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT IT COULD DEPLOY IN THE PROPOSED SECURITY ZONE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. THE ISRAELIS HAD ALSO DEMANDED THAT LEBANESE USE OF THE AIR SPACE

SUBJECT TO STRICT RESTRICTIONS AS TO THE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT IT COULD DEPLOY IN THE PROPOSED SECURITY ZONE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. THE ISRAELIS HAD ALSO DEMANDED THAT LEBANESE USE OF THE AIR SPACE ABOVE THE SECURITY ZONE BE SUBJECT TO PRIOR APPROVAL BY ISRAELI AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL. ALL THIS WAS, OF COURSE, UNACCEPTABLE. THE ISRAELIS EVIDENTLY SAW NO URGENCY IN REACHING AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD ONLY EXPOSE THEM TO PRESSURE TO GO ALONG WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PEACE INITIATIVE, AND BELIEVED THAT A WAITING GAME WOULD ENABLE THEM TO ACHIEVE MOST OF THEIR OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON. THEY HAD BEEN MISLED BY THEIR BACK CHANNEL CONTACTS WITH THE PHALANGISTS, BUT THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE AT LAST NOW MAKING THEIR POSITION CLEAR.

3. NEITHER CLUVERIUS NOR KEMP POLED OUT ANY MEANS OF BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE ISRAELIS. THEY BELIEVE THAT POSTPONEMENT OF HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON WILL HAVE SOME EFFECT ON BEGIN, WHO NEVERTHELESS REMAINS CONFIDENT THAT HE CAN HANDLE THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AS SUCCESSFULLY AS HE DID CARTER. BUT KEMP STRESSED THAT THE PRESIDENT WISHED TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION WITH BEGIN IF POSSIBLE. IF SUCH A CONFRONTATION OCCURRED IT WOULD HAVE TO BE ON THE BASIS OF A CLEAR CONFLICT BETWEEN AMERICAN AND ISRAELI INTERESTS. THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN FORCES IN LEBANON WAS A CLEAR DEMONSTRATION TO AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION OF THE US STAKE IN THE REGION. THE ISRAELI EMBASSY WERE TRYING HARD TO RALLY THE US JEWISH COMMUNITY WHOSE INITIAL CAUTIOUS WELCOME FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE HAD COOLED CONSIDERABLY.

4. KEMP SAW THE AMERICANS IMMEDIATE TASK AS TO CONVINCING THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY COULD NOT POSSIBLY OBTAIN WHAT THEY WERE DEMANDING IN LEBANON AND THAT THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS FOR A TIMETABLE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES AND FOR WATER TIGHT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON OFFERED THEM THE BEST HOPE OF AN HONOURABLE OUTCOME. THERE WAS NO PROSPECT OF CONVINCING SHARON OF THIS. BUT KEMP SAW GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM IN THE FORTH-COMING REPORT OF THE MASSACRE INQUIRY, WHICH MIGHT DISCREDIT SHARON, AND IN GROWING OPOSITION TO SHARON WITHIN THE ISRAELI ESTABLISHMENT. HIS RELATIONS WITH MOSSAD AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, ESPECIALLY SHAMIR, WERE BAD. FOR EXAMPLE, KIMCHE HAD TOLD THE AMERICANS YESTERDAY THAT HE HAD KNOWN NOTHING ABOUT THE LATEST ISRAELI SECURITY PROPOSALS BEFORE THEY WERE PUT TO THE LEBANESE. KEMP ADDED THAT BEGIN SEEMED TO BE EXERTING LITTLE CONTROL OVER SHARON: HE HAD BEEN UNCHARACTERISTICALLY SUBDUED DURING HIS MEETINGS WITH HABIB AND HAD ALLOWED SHARON AND SHAMIR TO DO MOST OF THE TALKING.

WITH HABIB AND HAD ALLOWED SHARON AND SHAKIR TO DO MOST OF THE TALKING. DURING HIS MEETINGS

5. HABIB'S VIEW IS THAT THE LEBANESE SHOULD BE LEFT TO TAKE THE LEAD IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS, NOT LEAST SO THAT THE LATTER REALISE THAT THE LEBANESE POSITION IS THEIR OWN AND NOT SOMETHING WISHED ON THEM BY THE AMERICANS.

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Middle East

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TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 33 OF 25 JANUARY 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, DAMASCUS

ROUTINE CAIRO, JEDDA, CBFC

SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, ROME, TUNIS.

MY TELNO 29 OF 24 JANUARY (NOT TO ALL) LAST SENTENCE:

LEBANON-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS. *mr*

1. DRAPER GAVE ME THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT ON 24 JANUARY.
2. THERE WAS LITTLE GROUND FOR OPTIMISM AT THE MOMENT. HABIB MIGHT BE BACK FROM WASHINGTON AS SOON AS THE END OF THE WEEK, AFTER REPORTING TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. MEANWHILE THEY WOULD GO ON HAMMERING AWAY, BUT THE GAPS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES WERE SO FAR TOO WIDE FOR THE AMERICANS TO BRIDGE.
3. ON THE ONE HAND, THE LEBANESE SUNNI MUSLIMS, INCLUDING SAEB SALAM (WHO SAID NOTHING OF THIS WHEN I SAW HIM ON 19 JANUARY) AND SHAFIQ WAZZAN WERE HOLDING OUT AGAINST ANY SORT OF "NORMALIZATION". THE SAUDIS AND SYRIANS WERE THREATENING GRAVE ECONOMIC DAMAGE TO THE LEBANON, INCLUDING CLOSURE OF THE SYRIAN-LEBANESE FRONTIER, IF THE LEBANON MADE TOO MANY CONCESSIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, EXTREME MARONITES WERE PRESSING FOR SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS. IN THE MIDDLE WERE PEOPLE LIKE AMIN GEMAYEL WHO WERE HARRIED BY BOTH SIDES. THEY WANT PRACTICAL BUT BARELY VISIBLE CONCESSIONS IN RETURN FOR WITHDRAWAL.
4. DRAPER CONFIRMED THE ACCOUNT OF TWO SETS OF NEGOTIATIONS GIVEN IN PARA 2 OF MY TUR. HABIB WAS LOOKING FOR AN AGREEMENT ON BROAD PRINCIPLES FIRST, WITH NEGOTIATIONS ON DETAILS TO FOLLOW SEMI COLON BUT EVEN THIS IDEA WAS SUBJECT TO THE LIMITS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE. DRAPER ADDED THAT VERY FEW PEOPLE (BUT THEY INCLUDED AMIN GEMAYEL AND ELIE SALEM) KNEW OF THESE SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS.
5. DRAPER HAD NO OBJECTION TO BEING CITED AS THE SOURCE IN CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE AMERICANS. IT WOULD BE WRONG TO TAKE TOO TRAGIC A VIEW AT THIS STAGE. I HAVE SEEN DRAPER IN A STATE OF CIVILIZED, AND HABIB IN A STATE OF EXPLOSIVE, DESPAIR BEFORE. THEY PULL OUT OF IT.
6. FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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FROM TEL AVIV 241440Z JAN 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 024 OF 24 JANUARY 1983

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, AMMAN, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK, JEDDA, PARIS AND ROME.

ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. THE MINISTER/COUNSELLOR AT THE US EMBASSY CONFIRMED TO US TODAY THAT PRESS REPORTS OF DEADLOCK BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS, LEBANESE AND AMERICANS OVER SECURITY ISSUES WERE ABOUT RIGHT. YESTERDAY'S MEETINGS IN JERUSALEM BETWEEN HABIB AND ISRAELI MINISTERS HAD GONE BADLY. HABIB, WHO IS RETURNING TO WASHINGTON FOR FURTHER CONSULTATIONS HAD MADE LITTLE OR NO PROGRESS BUT REMAINED HOPEFUL THAT SOMETHING COULD BE WORKED OUT ON THE ISRAELI DEMAND FOR THREE IDF MANNED EARLY WARNING STATIONS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. FLATEN, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, WAS LESS OPTIMISTIC.

2. FLATEN SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD NOT SUBMITTED A DETAILED BLUEPRINT OF THEIR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, WHICH WERE TRICKLING OUT IN NEGOTIATION PIECEMEAL. THROUGHOUT THE AUTUMN THE AMERICANS HAD ASSUMED THAT THEY WANTED THREE ELECTRONIC EARLY WARNING STATIONS IN SOUTH LEBANON. ONLY IN THE PAST FEW DAYS HAD IT BECOME CLEAR THAT THEY WANTED 3 BASE CAMPS (CHRISTENED BY SHARON 'ANTI-TERRORIST SUPERVISION STATIONS'), EACH MANNED BY 250 IDF PERSONNEL. AT THE MOMENT THE ISRAELIS WERE SAYING NOTHING ABOUT ELECTRONIC DEVICES. NOR HAD THEY SO FAR MADE ANY DEMAND FOR JOINT IDF/LEBANESE PATROLLING. BUT IN THEIR PROPOSALS OF 11 OCTOBER THEY HAD ALREADY ASKED THE LEBANESE FOR THE RIGHT TO MONITOR THE AREA FROM THE AIR, PRINCIPALLY BY USING DRONES, AS WELL AS TO PATROL THE SEA OFF THE LEBANESE COAST. THEY ALSO PLANNED TO MAKE CONTINUED USE OF THE HADDAD FORCES, AND TO RECRUIT AN EXTENSIVE NETWORK OF INFORMERS.

3. ASKED WHY THEY WERE NEGOTIATING SO AGGRESSIVELY, FLATEN SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS WANTED PEACE. ACCEPTING THAT A FORMAL PEACE AGREEMENT WAS NOT FEASIBLE, THEY WISHED TO CONCLUDE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM TO DOMINATE SOUTH LEBANON AND TO CONTINUE TRADING WITH THE LEBANESE. SHARON BELIEVED THAT IF SUFFICIENT PRESSURE WAS PUT ON THE LEBANESE THEY WOULD GIVE THE ISRAELIS WHAT THEY WANTED. THE ISRAELIS WERE BEING ENCOURAGED IN THIS PRIVATELY BY THE MARONITES. HABIB REMAINED HOPEFUL THAT SOME SORT OF ARRANGEMENT COULD BE HAMMERED OUT. BUT FLATEN HIMSELF DID NOT SEE HOW THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT COULD POSSIBLY ACQUIESE IN ISRAELI DEMANDS.

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4. IN REPLY TO A FURTHER QUESTION, FLATEN SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW PRECISELY WHERE THE ISRAELI BOTTOM LINE LAY. THE IMPORTANT THING FOR SHARON WAS THAT IN THE END THE INVASION OF LEBANON SHOULD TURN OUT TO BE A DEMONSTRABLE ISRAELI SUCCESS. WITH BEGIN SUBDUED AND SOUR, SHARON WAS CURRENTLY DOMINATING CABINET. NO-ONE WAS PREPARED TO STAND UP TO HIM WHEN HE CLAIMED THAT A PARTICULAR SET OF ARRANGEMENTS WAS ESSENTIAL TO ASSURE THE SECURITY OF NORTHERN ISRAEL.

5. FLATEN AGREED THAT IT LOOKED AS IF WE WERE IN FOR A LONG NEGOTIATING HAUL. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN AT THE LIKELY CONSEQUENCES IN TERMS OF THE PEACE PROCESS. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT KING HUSSEIN COULD BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS SO LONG AS ISRAEL/LEBANON TALKS REMAINED STALLED. CONVERSLY, THE PROGRESSIVE DETERIORATION IN EGYPT/ISRAEL RELATIONS REDUCED THE ATTRACTIONS OF NEGOTIATING PEACE ARRANGEMENTS WITH ANOTHER ARAB COUNTRY.

6. IN A FINAL COMMENT, FLATEN SAID THAT SHARON WAS OPENLY CONTEMPTUOUS OF AMERICAN OFFICIALS AND BELIEVED THAT THE JEWISH LOBBY IN THE UNITED STATES COULD BE RELIED UPON TO LOOK AFTER ISRAELI INTERESTS. THE RECENT CONGRESSIONAL DECISION ON AID FOR ISRAEL ONLY CONFIRMED HIM IN THIS BELIEF.

7. ALL THIS SUGGESTS THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE TORN BETWEEN A WISH TO GET OUT OF LEBANON AND THEIR DETERMINATION TO DO SO ON ADEQUATE TERMS. SHARON IS MAKING THE RUNNING. THE AMERICANS WILL BE HARD PUT TO IT TO COME UP WITH A CONVINCING PACKAGE ON SECURITY WHICH IS SELLABLE TO ISRAELIS, LEBANESE AND SYRIANS.

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DESKBY 211100Z JAN - FCO

FM AMMAN 210850Z JAN 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 29 OF 21 JAN

INFO IMMEDIATE RABAT, TUNIS: ROUTINE OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS,
BRUSSELS, MADRID, UKMIS NEWYORK, WASHINGTON
AND INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DI4).

MF

MY TELNO 26 (NOT TO ALL): JORDAN/MIDDLE EAST

1. ALTHOUGH I WAS NOT ACCORDED A SEPARATE AUDIENCE (KING HUSSEIN IS RECOVERING FROM A BAD COLD AND HAS BEEN REDUCING OFFICIAL ENGAGEMENTS TO A MINIMUM), WE DINED WITH THE KING AND QUEEN LAST NIGHT WITH ONLY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND HIS WIFE AND ONE OTHER COUPLE PRESENT. KING HUSSEIN MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN THE COURSE OF MORE GENERAL DISCUSSION.

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT TO LONDON.

2. THE KING HOPED AND TRUSTED THAT OUR DIFFICULTIES WERE NOW AT AN END AND THAT THE VISIT WOULD TAKE PLACE AS PLANNED. HE PERSONALLY WONDERED WHAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO DISCUSS SEMICLN THE SITUATION HAD CHANGED SINCE FEZ. WHEN I SAID THAT I HOPED THE PROPOSAL THAT MILHEM SHOULD BE THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE, WHICH HAD ORIGINALLY COME FROM THE ARAB SIDE, WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO GET IN THE WAY OF THE DELEGATION'S VISIT THE KING DID NOT REPEAT HIS EARLIER OBJECTIONS TO MILHEM (MY TELNO 9) AND SAID WITH EMPHASIS THAT HE HAD URGED EVERY ARAB RULER WITH WHOM HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH (HE HAS OF COURSE RECENTLY SEEN BOTH PRESIDENT SADDAM AND KING FAHD) TO GET THE VISIT TO LONDON OVER SO THAT ATTENTION COULD BE CONCENTRATED ON THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING FOR THE RECOVERY OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. I SAID THAT WE TOO WERE MOST ANXIOUS THAT THE VISIT SHOULD GO AHEAD AND WERE NOT OF COURSE INSISTING ON MILHEM IF THE ARABS WANTED TO PROPOSE ANOTHER SUITABLE PERSONALITY SEMICLN THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF NAMES OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES, BUT THE KING WELL UNDERSTANDS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE QUEEN WOULD NOT WISH TO RECEIVE SOMEONE WHO WAS OPEN TO ACCUSATIONS OF PAST INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM.

3. MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE KING WILL CONTINUE TO USE HIS INFLUENCE TO PRESS FOR AN EARLY VISIT TO LONDON AND TO SMOOTH OVER ANY FURTHER DIFFICULTIES WHICH MAY ARISE. THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAS ALREADY LEFT FOR RABAT FOR THE MEETINGS OF THE JERUSALEM COMMITTEE AND OF THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION FOREIGN MINISTERS.

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GULF WAR

4. COMMENTING ON HIS RECENT VISIT TO IRAQ, THE KING SAID HE HAD FOUND THE IRAQIS CONFIDENT OF THEIR ABILITY TO REPEL THE LONG-EXPECTED IRANIAN OFFENSIVE. THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF SAID THAT THE ATTACK MUST NOW BE IMMINENT: WITHIN THE PREVIOUS 48 HOURS THE IRANIANS HAD MOVED FORWARD 2 ARMoured BRIGADES AND WERE IN POSITION TO LAUNCH THEIR OFFENSIVE AT ANY MOMENT.

SYRIA/IRAQ

4. THE KING SAID PRESIDENT SADDAM HAD TELEPHONED HIM ON 20 JANUARY CONCERNING SAUDI EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN SYRIA AND IRAQ (MY TELELETTER TO MR MILES OF 19 JANUARY REFERS). THE SYRIANS HAD PROPOSED TO THE SAUDIS A SECRET MEETING SOMEWHERE IN EUROPE 'SO THAT THEIR IRANIAN FRIENDS WOULD NOT HEAR ABOUT IT' BETWEEN SYRIAN, IRAQI AND SAUDI REPRESENTATIVES. BOTH PRESIDENT SADDAM AND KING HUSSEIN HAD REJECTED THE IDEA OF A MEETING IN EUROPE AND HAD SUGGESTED THAT IT SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN SAUDI ARABIA.

KING HUSSEIN'S TRAVEL PLANS

5. KING HUSSEIN TOLD ME HE WOULD BE PAYING A SERIES OF RAPID VISITS TO GULF STATES ON 22 AND 23 JANUARY, INCLUDING KUWAIT BAHREIN AND OMAN (BUT EXCLUDING ABU DHABI BECAUSE THE RULER WAS AWAY). HE WOULD RETURN TO AMMAN FOR ONE DAY AND THEN PAY A BRIEF VISIT WITH QUEEN NOOR TO SPAIN TO SEE KING JUAN CARLOS AND QUEEN SOPHIA BEFORE VISITING BELGIUM AS THE GUESTS OF THE KING AND QUEEN. HE SAID HOW SAD HE WAS NOT TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO VISIT BRITAIN ON THIS OCCASION, BUT THAT HE FELT HE SHOULD WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION'S VISIT 'ALTHOUGH IF THEY HAVE NOT SORTED THEMSELVES OUT SOON, I SHALL VISIT LONDON IN ANY CASE.'

6. THIS PROGRAMME WOULD SEEM TO PRECLUDE A FURTHER MEETING BETWEEN THE KING AND ARAFAT AT LEAST UNTIL THE END OF JANUARY. KING HUSSEIN SAID HE WAS SENDING THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF TO SAUDI ARABIA AT THE END OF THIS WEEK. FROM THE WAY THEY SPOKE, I OBTAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT GENERAL SHAKER'S PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO OBTAIN MUCH-NEEDED FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR JORDAN FROM THE SAUDIS.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 057 OF 19 JANUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
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INFO ROUTINE BEIRUT DAMASCUS JEDDA CAIRO ATHENS EMBASSY BRUSSELS
COPENHAGEN DUBLIN THE HAGUE LUXEMBOURG PARIS ROME UKREP BRUSSELS
UKNIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING MOSCOW ABU DHABI ADEN ALGIERS BAGHDAD BAHRAIN DOHA
DUBAI JERUSALEM KHARTOUM KUWAIT MUSCAT RABAT SANA'A TRIPOLI
UKDEL NATO

EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION: POLITICAL COMMITTEE: BONN
18/19 JANUARY: ARAB/ISRAEL

SUMMARY

1. POLITICAL COMMITTEE AGREED THAT:

(A) IN A MUCH MORE REAL SENSE THAN HITHERTO, THE TIME AVAILABLE FOR
AN ARAB/ISRAEL SETTLEMENT WAS RUNNING OUT FAST:

(B) IT WAS ESSENTIAL AND URGENT TO TAKE UP GUMUTZIS SUGGESTION OF

~~AN ARAB/ISRAEL SETTLEMENT WAS RUNNING OUT FAST.~~

(B) IT WAS ESSENTIAL AND URGENT TO TAKE UP SHULTZ'S SUGGESTION OF CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE TEN ON THE MIDDLE EAST (PRESIDENCY WILL SEEK TO ARRANGE THIS DURING BUSH'S VISIT AND/OR OTHERWISE): THE MAIN POINTS SHOULD BE THE READINESS OF THE TEN TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE ESPECIALLY WITH JORDAN AND THE PLO, BUT ALSO THE COMPLEMENTARY NEED FOR THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE STEPS TO REINFORCE JORDAN/PLO CONFIDENCE IN ITS COMMITMENT TO A PEACE SETTLEMENT, EG BY SOME SHIFT IN ITS POSITION ON PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND/OR SOME MORE EFFECTIVE MOVE AGAINST ISRAELI POLICY ON SETTLEMENTS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES:

(C) PRESIDENCY SHOULD ACT ON AMERICAN REQUEST FOR APPROACHES TO SAUDIS AND OTHER MODERATE ARABS IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE PLO TO LOSE NO MORE TIME IN FINALIZING DETAILS OF THEIR COOPERATION WITH JORDAN IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE:

(D) DURING SHAMIR'S VISIT TO BONN ON 7-8 FEBRUARY THE GERMAN PRESIDENCY SHOULD SPEAK TO HIM NO LESS FRANKLY THAN DID THE DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER WHEN HE VISITED ISRAEL LAST YEAR:

(E) THE PRESIDENCY AND THE TEN INDIVIDUALLY SHOULD POINT OUT TO THE PLO THE DAMAGING EFFECT OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS (SUCH AS THE ATTACK ON A BUS IN TEL AVIV ON 8 JANUARY) ON PALESTINIAN INTERESTS.

DETAIL

2. PFEFFER (GERMAN PRESIDENCY) SAID ALL PARTNERS WERE AGREED THAT CONSTANT COORDINATION WITH THE US WAS VERY IMPORTANT SINCE ONLY THE US COULD PLAY A DECISIVE ROLE. THIS COORDINATION SHOULD TAKE PLACE THROUGH THE PRESIDENCY'S DIALOGUE WITH THE AMERICANS, A TROIKA MEETING (SEE MY TELNO 38) AND MINISTERIAL CONTACTS EG DURING VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S VISIT TO EUROPE LATER THIS MONTH. EUROPEAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST SHOULD BE COMPLEMENTARY TO US POLICY, WITH THE SHARED OBJECTIVE OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. AN INDEPENDENT INITIATIVE BY THE TEN SHOULD NOT BE EXPEDIENT AT PRESENT. HE WOULD LIKE TO PUT TO THE US THE IDEA PROPOSED BY THE ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL (MY TELNO 33) THAT SELF-DETERMINATION SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE REAGAN PLAN, WHILE MAKING CLEAR THAT IN THE EUROPEAN VIEW THIS WOULD NOT AUTOMATICALLY LEAD TO A PALESTINIAN STATE: THE OUTCOME OF SELF DETERMINATION COULD NOT BE ANTICIPATED. THE EUROPEANS SHOULD ALSO URGE ON THE US THE NEED FOR A MORATORIUM ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS. OTHERWISE KING HUSSEIN WOULD BE UNABLE TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS AND THERE WOULD SOON BE LITTLE LEFT TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT. EUROPEANS SHOULD ALSO ENCOURAGE US EFFORTS TO BRING WEST BANK POLITICIANS INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS EVEN IF THEY WERE CLOSE TO THE PLO (THOUGH NOT ACTUAL PLO REPRESENTATIVES). PFEFFER WOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE US THE TEN'S DESIRE FOR AN EARLY TROIKA MEETING AT POLITICAL DIRECTOR LEVEL.

PLO REPRESENTATIVES). PFEFFER WOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE US THE TEN'S DESIRE FOR AN EARLY TROIKA MEETING AT POLITICAL DIRECTOR LEVEL.

3. DYVIG (DENMARK) EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF AN EARLY TROIKA MEETING BUT FELT THAT THE WORKING GROUP REPORT WAS TOO SPECIFIC IN SPEAKING OF RECONCILING THE REAGAN AND FEZ PLANS. HE WOULD PREFER A MORE GENERAL APPROACH. HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT THE US WOULD AGREE TO ADOPT THE CONCEPT OF SELF DETERMINATION BECAUSE OF ITS IMPLICATIONS IN OTHER AREAS EG PUERTO RICO.

4. BULLARD (UK) SAID THAT THE TEN MUST ENSURE AT ALL COSTS THAT SHULTZ'S PROPOSAL OF US/EUROPEAN TALKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST WAS TAKEN UP URGENTLY. THE OBJECTIVES OF SUCH TALKS WERE USEFULLY SET OUT IN THE WORKING GROUP REPORT THOUGH HE HOPED IT WAS SELF EVIDENT BY NOW THAT EUROPEANS WISHED TO COMPLEMENT AND NOT RIVAL US EFFORTS. KING HUSSEIN WAS RIGHT TO SEE THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY CLOSING FAST, WITH CONTINUING ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS AND THE APPROACH OF THE US ELECTION CAMPAIGN. THE KING HAD TOLD THE PLO THAT THEY MUST DECIDE BY 1 MARCH ON THE MECHANICS OF THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND THE WAY IN WHICH AN EVENTUAL PALESTINIAN POLITICAL UNIT SHOULD BE ASSOCIATED WITH JORDAN. IT WAS ALWAYS EASY IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO SAY THAT SOMEBODY ELSE SHOULD MOVE. BUT THE SITUATION NOW REQUIRED EVERYBODY TO THINK WHAT THEY THEMSELVES COULD DO. EUROPEANS SHOULD SAY TO THE US THAT, THOUGH THEY DID NOT HAVE MUCH INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL, THEY DID HAVE SOME WITH JORDAN AND THE PLO, BUT THAT NEITHER OF THE LATTER WERE FULLY CONVINCED OF US COMMITMENT TO THE REAGAN PLAN, AND ASK IF THE US COULD PRODUCE A NEW FORMULA ON SELF DETERMINATION, ADJUST ITS POSITION ON CONTACTS WITH THE PLO AND/OR MOVE BEYOND THE STATEMENT OF 1 SEPTEMBER 1982 TO PRACTICAL (PROBABLY FINANCIAL) MEASURES AGAINST ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS POLICY.

5. DE LA BATIE (FRANCE) URGED THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE CONTACT WITH THE US BY ALL MEANS AVAILABLE TO MAKE THE POINTS SUGGESTED BY BULLARD, AND TO COORDINATE VIEWS ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM AS A WHOLE. A GENERAL SETTLEMENT WOULD PROBABLY BE FOUND SOMEWHERE HALF WAY BETWEEN THE REAGAN AND FEZ PLANS. RECONCILIATION OF THESE TWO WAS WHAT WAS NEEDED. SELF DETERMINATION WAS AN IMPORTANT POINT BUT IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY LEAD TO A PALESTINIAN STATE. IT WAS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR THE US TO BRING ABOUT A FREEZE ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS.

6. MCKERNAN (IRELAND) AGREED ON THE NEED FOR EARLY CONTACTS WITH THE US, INCLUDING THE POINT ABOUT SELF DETERMINATION (KLIBI HAD BEEN IN DUBLIN AS WELL AS BONN). HE AGREED THAT THERE WAS

THE US, INCLUDING THE POINT ABOUT SELF DETERMINATION (KLIBI HAD BEEN IN DUBLIN AS WELL AS BONN). HE AGREED THAT THERE WAS SUSPICION OF THE US IN JORDAN AND THE PLO, AND THAT A US GESTURE WAS PARTICULARLY NEEDED BEFORE THE MEETING OF THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL ON 14 FEBRUARY. BURT'S MEETING WITH THE EUROPEAN TROIKA IN NEW YORK LAST SEPTEMBER HAD SHOWN US INTEREST IN EXPLOITING EUROPEAN CONTACTS WITH THE PLO.

7. KATAPODIS (GREECE) FELT THAT CONTACT SHOULD BE MADE IN ALL POSSIBLE WAYS WITH THE AMERICANS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND AGREED WITH THE UK, FRANCE AND IRELAND ON THE SUBSTANCE OF SUCH CONTACTS. THE US HELD THE KEY. THE TEN DID NOT, BUT COULD HELP. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF STATEMENTS BY THE TEN WHICH COULD FORM THE BASIS FOR THE TALKS WITH THE US, NOT LEAST THAT OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1982. REFERENCES TO SELF-DETERMINATION SHOULD AT LEAST NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF A PALESTINIAN STATE.

8. WIJNAENDTS (NETHERLANDS) SAID THAT THE TEN SHOULD STICK TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE VENICE DECLARATION AND THE STATEMENT OF 20 SEPTEMBER AS A BASIS FOR TALKS WITH THE AMERICANS.

9. CAHEN (BELGIUM) AGREED THAT EARLY TALKS WITH THE US WERE NEEDED AND THAT THE US MUST RESTORE ITS CREDIBILITY WITH JORDAN AND THE QUOTE ARAFAT WING UNQUOTE OF THE PLO.

10. PFEFFER SUMMED UP THAT THE TEN WANTED EARLY TALKS WITH THE US AT BOTH MINISTERIAL AND SENIOR OFFICIAL LEVEL TO DISCUSS THE WHOLE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM INCLUDING SELF DETERMINATION AND SETTLEMENTS. AT UK INSTIGATION HE ADDED THE POINT THAT TIME WAS RUNNING OUT: IT WAS A MATTER OF MONTHS RATHER THAN YEARS.

11. PFEFFER RECALLED THAT THE US HAD ASKED THE PRESIDENCY ON BEHALF OF THE TEN TO URGE THE SAUDIS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO ENSURE THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS GIVEN ENOUGH ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS. PFEFFER PREFERRED AN INFORMAL TO A FORMAL APPROACH.

12. KATAPODIS (GREECE) FELT AN APPROACH WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE TEN COULD TELL THE SAUDIS THAT THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE US HAD BORN SOME FRUIT. PFEFFER SAW MERIT IN THIS IDEA.

13. BULLARD SUGGESTED THAT CONTACTS WITH MODERATE ARABS MIGHT ALSO BE USED TO REINFORCE THE POINT ABOUT TIME RUNNING OUT. A FURTHER POSTPONEMENT OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL WOULD LOSE VALUABLE WEEKS.

POSTPONEMENT OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL WOULD LOSE VALUABLE WEEKS.

14. BOTTAI (ITALY) SAW NO REASON TO DELAY CONTACT WITH THE SAUDIS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE OUTCOME OF THE TALKS WITH THE US. WIJNAENDTS PREFERRED INDIVIDUAL DEMARCHES TO THE SAUDIS RATHER THAN ONE BY THE PRESIDENCY. THIS IDEA DID NOT FIND FAVOUR WITH OTHERS THOUGH IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT PARTNERS MIGHT ACT SEPARATELY AS WELL IF THEY WISHED. DYVIG (DENMARK) DID NOT WANT TOO FORMAL OR TOO SPECIFIC A DEMARCHE. KATAPODIS AGREED BUT DID WANT THE PRESIDENCY TO SAY THAT THE TEN WERE DOING WHAT THEY COULD TO PERSUADE THE US OF THE MERITS OF SOME ARAB DESIDERATA.

15. PFEFFER CONCLUDED THAT THE PRESIDENCY WOULD SPEAK IN GENERAL TERMS TO THE SAUDIS AND OTHER ARAB MODERATES.

16. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION OF LEBANON DYVIG DESCRIBED HOW THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN TAKEN ABACK BY THE FIRMNESS OF THE LINE WHICH THE DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER HAD TAKEN WITH THEM AS PRESIDENCY. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE GERMAN PRESIDENCY'S LINE SHOULD BE AS FIRM AND SHOULD DEMONSTRATE THE CONTINUITY OF EUROPEAN POLICY. PFEFFER ACCEPTED THIS.

17. DULLARD SAID THAT THE UK BELIEVED THAT THE DAMASCUS ARM OF THE PLO WAS PROBABLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TERRORIST ATTACK ON A BUS IN TEL AVIV ON 8 JANUARY. THIS WAS THE WORST POSSIBLE TIME FOR THE PLO TO MOUNT TERRORIST INCIDENTS AGAINST ISRAEL. THE TEN SHOULD USE ANY CONTACTS WITH THE PLO TO GET THIS MESSAGE ACROSS. PFEFFER AGREED THAT THE PRESIDENCY WOULD USE SUCH MEANS AS WERE OPEN TO THEM AND SUGGESTED THAT OTHERS MIGHT ACT SIMILARLY.

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FROM WASHINGTON 172350Z JAN 83.
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 126 OF 17 JANUARY
INFO AMMAN, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, TUNIS,
JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, MOSCOW.

ISRAEL/LEBANON.

1. MINISTER CALLED TODAY ON VELIOTES (ASSISTANT SECRETARY, MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS) FOR AN UP DATE ON THE ISRAEL/LEBANON TALKS. THE MAIN POINT THAT VELIOTES WANTED TO GET ACROSS WAS THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS PAYING VERY CLOSE ATTENTION TO THIS SUBJECT AND PUTTING A GREAT DEAL OF EFFORT INTO IT. HE DID NOT MEAN TO LET HIS MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE OF LAST SEPTEMBER LAPSE AND SAW PROGRESS TOWARDS SECURITY IN THE LEBANON AS BEING A REQUIREMENT BEFORE ANYTHING MUCH COULD BE ACHIEVED ON THE WIDER PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. THE MESSAGE VELIOTES WANTED THOMAS TO TAKE AWAY WAS THAT HABIB HAD BEEN SENT BACK WITH A BROAD MANDATE BUT WITH A GREAT SENSE OF URGENCY. HE HAD TAKEN WITH HIM A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO BEGIN WHICH, THOUGH POLITE, WAS VERY POINTED. IT WAS AFTER THIS HAD BEEN DELIVERED LAST WEEK THAT THE ISRAELIS, DESPITE SHARON'S OBSTRUCTIONIST TACTICS, HAD AGREED TO AN AGENDA BASED ON HABIB'S IDEAS. HABIB HAD BEEN ABLE TO GET GEMAYEL TO ACCEPT THIS FAIRLY EASILY AND HAD THEN FOUND HIMSELF HAVING TO SELL IT TO WAZZAN.

2. VELIOTES WAS KEEN TO STRESS THAT HABIB WAS NOT INTENDING TO REPLACE THE KAHLE/KIRAT SHIMONA TALKS WHICH WOULD CONTINUE AS BEFORE WITH DRAPER'S PARTICIPATION. HABIB'S ROLE WOULD BE TO CONCENTRATE ON THE ISRAELIS AND TO TRY TO FORCE THE PACE ON THE MAJOR ISSUES: NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS; THE SECURITY ZONE AND ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN IT; THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONTINGENTS (UNIFIL, MNF); AND WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLO. NEITHER VELIOTES NOR PENDLETON (DIRECTOR FOR ISRAEL) COULD SAY PRECISELY WHAT HABIB'S OBJECTIVES WERE FOR HIS TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS OTHER THAN TO REACH AGREEMENT. THIS SEEMED TO BE AT LEAST PARTLY BECAUSE THEY DID NOT THEMSELVES KNOW EXACTLY WHERE HABIB HAD COME DOWN IN HIS OWN MIND ON THE VARIOUS ISSUES. A GREAT DEAL OF LEEWAY WAS BEING LEFT TO HIM. THE ONE POINT ON WHICH THEY WERE CLEAR WAS THAT HE WAS AIMING TO GET SOME RESULTS BY THE END OF THIS WEEK. THEY RECOGNISED THAT THIS WAS OPTIMISTIC, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THAT SHARON WAS SPENDING THE FIRST PART OF THE WEEK IN ZAIRE AND HAD TAKEN WITH HIM THE ONLY MAN WHO, IN HIS ABSENCE WOULD HAVE BEEN CAPABLE OF MAKING ANY CONCESSIONS ON SECURITY ISSUES.

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3. VELIOTES ADDED LITTLE ON THE PROSPECTS FOR RENEWAL OF UNIFIL'S MANDATE. HE EXPRESSED PLEASURABLE SURPRISE AT THE APPARENT AGREEMENT OF THE ISRAELIS WHO HAD IN THE PAST ALWAYS FOUGHT TOOTH AND NAIL AGAINST ANY PROLONGATION OF UNIFIL'S LIFE. HE COULD ONLY SUPPOSE THAT THEY HAD BEEN CHASTENED BY THE LEBANESE PLOY OF PRESSING FOR AN ENLARGEMENT OF UNIFIL'S ROLE. PERHAPS THE LEBANESE WERE SMARTER PLAYERS THAN WE HAD REALISED.

4. VELIOTES SPOKE WARMLY OF THE EFFORTS OF KING HUSSEIN TO WORK ON ARAFAT. HE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE JORDANIANS WERE APPROACHING THEIR ROLE DURING KING HUSSEIN'S RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND SINCE. THOMAS TOLD HIM ABOUT ALAN URWICK'S TALK WITH HANNA NASSER ON 16 JANUARY (AMMAN TELEGRAM NO 21) WHICH HE FOUND ENCOURAGING.

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 140043Z JAN 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 23 DATED 13 JANUARY 83

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, DAMASCUS, THE HAGUE,
ROUTINE UKMIS GENEVA, TUNIS, AMMAN, PARIS, ROME, OSLO, DUBLIN,
MOSCOW, SUVA

MY 2IPTS: UNIFIL: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. URQUHART SAID THAT ACCORDING TO DRAPER, WHOM HE HAD SEEN DURING HIS VISIT, THE ISRAELIS WERE RUNNING RINGS ROUND THE LEBANESE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY HAD EARLIER PERSUADED GEMAYEL TO SEND AN OLD FRIEND OF THE FAMILY FOR SECRET NEGOTIATIONS (WITH SHARON). THIS NEGOTIATOR (WHOSE NAME URQUHART DOES NOT KNOW,) HAD BEEN ILL-INFORMED AND HAD SIGNED A DOCUMENT GIVING A GREAT DEAL AWAY. FOR EXAMPLE THE DOCUMENT HAD REFERRED TO UN FORCES REMAINING ON THE FRONTIER, BUT THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATOR HAD NOT REALISED THAT IN AGREEING TO THIS THE ISRAELIS WERE ONLY AGREEING TO THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THE HANDFUL OF UNTSO OBSERVERS ALREADY THERE AND NOT TO UNIFIL AS HE HAD MISTAKENLY THOUGHT. DRAPER WAS HAVING TO PULL ALL THESE LEBANESE CHESTNUTS OUT OF THE FIRE. ISRAELI DEMANDS WERE SWEEPING. THEY WERE TRYING FOR FULL NORMALISATION: FOR A 45 KILOMETER SECURITY ZONE MEASURED FROM METULLAH; AND FOR AN EARLY WARNING STATION ON JEBEL BAROUK (NOT FAR FROM ZAHLE) WHICH GIVEN THE TOPOGRAPHY WOULD ENABLE THEM TO MONITOR AIR ACTIVITY AS FAR AS THE GULF. BOTH UNIFIL AND THE MNF WERE TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE SECURITY ZONE WHICH WAS TO BE RUN IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE IDF (PRESUMABLY WITH THE HELP OF HADDAD).

2. MEANWHILE, THE ISRAELIS WERE EXPLOITING LEBANON ECONOMICALLY. BY MAKING HAIFA A FREE PORT, THEY WERE DRAINING CARGOES AWAY FROM THE PORT OF BEIRUT, THEREBY DEPRIVING THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OF A VERY LARGE PART OF THEIR CUSTOM DUTIES WHICH WAS A MAIN ITEM IN THEIR INCOME. THEY WERE ALSO FLOODING LEBANESE MARKETS WITH CHEAP AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE.

3. URQUHART DESCRIBED GEMAYEL AS A NICE YOUNG MAN BUT SAID THAT HE HAD LITTLE GRIP ON THE SITUATION. IT WAS WAZZAN WHO KEPT THE NEGOTIATIONS ON TRACK. PEOPLE HAD NOT FOCUSED ON THE EXTENT OF ISRAELI DEMANDS PARTICULARLY OVER THE SECURITY ZONE. AS THINGS STOOD, IT LOOKED AS IF IT WOULD TAKE MONTHS TO GET THE ISRAELIS OUT. THERE WAS A SERIOUS RISK OF WAZZAN RESIGNING. IF HE DID THE WHOLE GOVERNMENT WOULD COLLAPSE AND IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO REPLACE IT. IT WAS ALSO QUESTIONABLE WHETHER GEMAYEL WOULD SURVIVE. THERE WERE NUMEROUS RUMOURS OF ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS.

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4. DRAPER HAD TOLD URQUHART THAT HE WAS TRYING TO PROMOTE THE IDEA THAT UNIFIL SHOULD GUARD THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES. THIS WOULD HELP PERSUADE THE PLO TO LEAVE THE CAMPS WHICH THEY CURRENTLY OCCUPIED IN SYRIAN CONTROLLED NORTHERN LEBANON. URQUHART HAD SAID TO HIM THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO APPLY TO THE SOUTHERN CAMPS AS WELL AS TO THE NORTHERN ONES. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD OPPOSE THIS. IRONICALLY, THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES NOW TRUSTED THE IDF AND WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR LEAVING BECAUSE OF THEIR FEARS OF THE LEBANESE ARMY. URQUHART HAD ASKED CALLAGHAN TO MAKE A STUDY OF HOW MANY TROOPS UNIFIL WOULD NEED TO PROTECT ALL THE CAMPS.

5. I SOUNDED OUT URQUHART ON THE POSSIBILITY OF UNIFIL HELPING TO TRAIN THE LEBANESE ARMY. URQUHART THOUGHT THE PROBLEM WOULD BE THAT IT NEEDED ONE COUNTRY TO DO THE JOB IF THERE WAS NOT TO BE CONFUSION BECAUSE OF DIFFERING NATIONAL STANDARDS. BUT HE DID NOT RULE IT OUT. I ALSO PUT TO HIM ADMIRAL HOWE'S IDEA OF UNIFIL HELPING TO ESTABLISH "PILLARS OF SOLIDARITY" AT VARIOUS POINTS IN LEBANON (WASHINGTON TELNO 64, NOT TO ALL), URQUHART THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS A GOOD IDEA. HE NOTED HOW EFFECTIVE THE SMALL FORCE OF UN OBSERVERS IN BEIRUT WAS BEING IN PROVIDING LOCAL RE-ASSURANCE. I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE STILL THOUGHT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO INCREASE UNIFIL TO AROUND 20,000 (MY TELNO 4). HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT 12,000 AT LEAST WOULD BE POSSIBLE.

THOMSON

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DESKDY 101015Z JAN 83

FROM AMMAN 100915Z JAN 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 9 OF 9 JAN 83

AND TO INFO IMMEDIATE RABAT AND PRIORITY OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON AND ROUTINE BRUSSELS MOSCOW AND PARIS.

YOUR TELNO 3 AND MY TELNO 6: ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION.

1. KING HUSSEIN ASKED ME TO SEE HIM LATE THIS MORNING SEMICOLON CROWN PRINCE HASSAN WAS WITH HIM. HE HAD JUST COME OUT OF A LONG BRIEFING SESSION WITH HIS CABINET AND WAS ABOUT TO START TALKS WITH ARAFAT AND HIS DELEGATION. HE THEREFORE ONLY HAD A FEW MINUTES AVAILABLE AND SAID HE WOULD PREFER TO PUT OFF GIVING ME AN ACCOUNT OF HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES UNTIL AFTER HIS TALKS WITH ARAFAT WERE OVER, WHEN HE WOULD BRIEF ME FULLY ON BOTH SETS OF TALKS. THE KING SAID THAT IN ANY CASE IT WAS AT THE MOMENT QUITE IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO TELL HOW THINGS WOULD GO AND WHETHER HE WOULD BE ABLE TO SELL WHAT HE HAD OBTAINED IN THE US TO THE PLO. HE ALSO SEEMED VERY UNCERTAIN ABOUT HIS FUTURE TRAVEL PLANS SEMICOLON BUT HE DID NOT THINK THAT (CONTRARY TO PRESS REPORTS) HE WAS LIKELY TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES AGAIN BEFORE THE END OF THE MONTH. HE HAS ON THE STOCKS A POSSIBLE VISIT TO BELGIUM (AS GUEST OF KING BAUDOUIN) FROM 27 TO 31 JANUARY AND INDICATED THAT HE MIGHT ALSO VISIT LONDON AT THAT TIME. BUT EVERYTHING DEPENDED ON HOW THINGS EVOLVED.

2. THE KING THEN TURNED TO OUR DIFFICULTIES OVER THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION (THANKS TO THE VERY RAPID RESPONSE TO MY TUR, I HAD RECEIVED A COPY OF RABAT TELNO 90N MR CAMBRIDGE'S TALKS WITH BOUCETTA BEFORE SEEING THE KING). KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT BOUCETTA HAD SEEN HIM RECENTLY (PRESUMABLY IN AUSTRIA) AND HAD TOLD HIM THAT A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM HAD BEEN FOUND ON THE BASIS THAT MILHEM WOULD BE A MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION. THE KING THEN ASKED WHAT DATES WE HAD IN MIND FOR THE ARAB LEAGUE VISIT AND I TOLD HIM THAT 7/8 FEBRUARY SEEMED MOST LIKELY. AT THIS HIS FACE FELL: WERE WE NOT LEAVING THINGS RATHER LATE? IF HIS TALKS WITH ARAFAT WENT WELL, WE MIGHT FIND THAT WE HAD BEEN LEFT BEHIND BY EVENTS. I EXPLAINED THE DIFFICULTIES OVER PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S VISIT TO MOROCCO. THE KING THEN SAID THAT HE MIGHT WELL NEED MILHEM HIMSELF AT THAT TIME (MILHEM IS OF COURSE THE PREFERRED CANDIDATE FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE PALESTINIAN/JORDANIAN NEGOTIATING TEAM TO FOLLOW UP THE REAGAN INITIATIVE) AND ENQUIRED WHETHER MILHEM WAS THE ONLY CANDIDATE WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER: I SAID THAT I DID NOT THINK SO, ALTHOUGH HE WAS OBVIOUSLY HIGHLY SUITABLE.

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13.

3. THE KING, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT HIS IMPATIENCE WAS DIRECTED AS MUCH AGAINST HIS FELLOW ARAB MONARCHS AS AGAINST US FOR HAVING DISREGARDED HIS ADVICE, LEFT ME IN NO DOUBT THAT HE WANTED WHAT HE REGARDED AS AN IRRELEVANT SQUABBLE OUT OF THE WAY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE LEST IT SHOULD DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM PURSUIT OF THE REAGAN INITIATIVE. HE ADDED FOR GOOD MEASURE THAT IF THE ARABS HAD NOT SORTED THEMSELVES OUT BY THEN, HE HAD A GOOD MIND TO COME LONDON HIMSELF ANYWAY. HE AND THE CROWN PRINCE THEN MADE A SERIES OF JOCLAR REMARKS ABOUT KING HASSANS INABILITY TO COMMUNICATE WITH HIS MINISTERS AND THE QUITE FALSE ACCOUNT HE HAD GIVEN KING FAHD OF HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH US. I TOLD THE KING THAT IT WAS ALSO YOUR OWN HEARTFELT WISH TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR THE VISIT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, THAT A CONTINUATION OF THE ROW WAS NEITHER IN THE ARAB INTEREST NOR OURS, AND THAT THE PUBLIC PRESSURE BEING PUT ON US WAS ONLY MAKING A SOLUTION MORE DIFFICULT. THE KING UNDERTOOK TO LISTEN CAREFULLY TO ANYTHING ARAFAT HAD TO SAY ON THE SUBJECT AND TO URGE A RAPID SOLUTION. IF THERE SEEMED ANY DANGER THAT THE IMPASSE MIGHT CONTINUE, HE WOULD TRY TO THINK OF AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL; BUT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE NEED TO AVOID CROSSING WIRES WITH KING HASSAN. THE IDEA REFERRED TO IN YOUR TELNO 5 TO AMMAN ONLY DID NOT COME UP.

4. IF MILHEM IS INDEED TO BE THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE WITH THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION THIS MAY CUT ACROSS THE PROPOSAL FOR HIM TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE AT WILTON PARK (MY TELNO 7). I STRONGLY SUPPORT THE RECOMMENDATION IN PARA 12 OF RABAT'S TUR THAT MILHEM SHOULD IF AT ALL POSSIBLE BE INCLUDED IN THE RECEPTION AT BUCKINGHAM PALACE. I FULLY UNDERSTAND MINISTERS WISH TO AVOID INVOLVING HER MAJESTY IN POLITICAL CONTROVERSY. HOWEVER A GESTURE OF THIS KIND WOULD DO MUCH TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE DONE TO OUR RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS IN RECENT WEEKS AND WOULD ALSO DEMONSTRATE OUR SUPPORT FOR THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS TO A SAY IN DETERMINING THEIR OWN FUTURE. MILHEM IS A MODERATE, INTELLIGENT AND DECENT MAN WHO HAS, AS FAR AS I KNOW, NEVER BEEN INVOLVED IN TERRORISM AND INCIDENTALLY SPEAKS EXCELLENT ENGLISH. AS A MAYOR ELECTED UNDER ISRAELI AUSPICES, HE HAS AS GOOD A CLAIM AS ANY TO BE AN AUTHENTIC REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. THE PALESTINIAN MODERATES NEED EVERY CUNCEOF ENCOURAGEMENT WE CAN GIVE THEM AT PRESENT TO PURSUE THE PATH OF PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS. A FURTHER PUBLIC REBUFF AT THIS TIME COULD HAVE PRECISELY THE OPPOSITE EFFECT.

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PIECE/ITEM <i>1087</i> (one piece/item number)	
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TELEGRAM NUMBER 09 OF 08 JANUARY
INFO PRIORITY ALL MIDDLE EAST POSTS, WASHINGTON
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW
INFO SAVING MADRID, UKDEL NATO

YOUR TELEGRAMS 13 AND 14: ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT TO LONDON SUMMARY

1. I HAD AN HOUR WITH BOUCETTA THIS MORNING. SOME PROGRESS. KING HASSAN IS READY TO RECEIVE MOHAMED MILHEM AS THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE ON THE DELEGATION AND WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR GETTING THE OTHER ARABS TO ACCEPT THIS. BOUCETTA ARGUED STRONGLY FOR ALLOWING MILHEM TO BE RECEIVED BY THE QUEEN ALONG WITH THE REST OF THE DELEGATION. ON DATES, WE ARE VIRTUALLY AGREED ON 7 AND 8 FEBRUARY. I AM TO SEE BOUCETTA AGAIN ON TUESDAY 11 JANUARY AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR FURTHER VIEWS BEFORE THEN.

DETAIL

DETAIL

I FIRST HANDED OVER YOUR MESSAGE. BOUCETTA READ IT AND ASKED ME TO THANK YOU WARMLY FOR IT. I ASKED WHETHER HE HAD NEWS ABOUT THE COMPOSITION OF THE DELEGATION. HE SAID THAT, AS WE KNEW, KING HASSAN DID NOT WANT TO MAKE DIFFICULTIES FOR US. UNLESS WE HAD A BETTER OFFER, THE KING WOULD AGREE TO TAKE MILHEM WITH HIM AS THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE. I ASKED IF THE OTHER ARABS AND THE PLO HAD AGREED TO THIS. (THE LOCAL MEDIA HAVE PUBLISHED AN AFP REPORT THAT QUOTE ARAB SOURCES IN LONDON UNQUOTE HAD REJECTED THE IDEA). BOUCETTA WAS EVASIVE. HE SAID SOME HAD AGREED TO THE MILHEM IDEA: OTHERS HAD NOT YET REPLIED. HE HAD HIMSELF SEEN KING HUSSEIN IN VIENNA, WHO HAD BEEN HAPPY TO GO ALONG WITH WHATEVER KING HASSAN DECIDED. KING FAHD HAD TAKEN THE SAME LINE.

3. I SAID THAT WE HAD EXPLAINED TO THE OTHER ARABS, AND THE PLO AS WELL, THAT WE WOULD DEAL EXCLUSIVELY WITH KING HASSAN OVER ALL MATTERS REGARDING THE DELEGATIONS'S VISIT TO LONDON. THIS HAD NOT OF COURSE MEANT A TOTAL SUSPENSION OF OUR DEALINGS WITH THE OTHER ARABS (BOUCETTA ENTIRELY ACCEPTED THIS) BUT WE LOOKED TO THE MOROCCANS TO ENSURE THAT THE OTHERS CONCERNED IN THE VISIT WERE KEPT FULLY INFORMED OF THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WE AND THE MOROCCANS WERE MAKING AND AGREED TO THEM. BOUCETTA ASSURED ME THAT KING HASSAN FULLY RECOGNISED THAT THIS WAS THE MOROCCANS' RESPONSIBILITY.

4. AT THIS POINT, BOUCETTA SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE A PERSONAL APPEAL TO YOU AND MRS THATCHER TO BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE QADDUMI. WITHIN TWO OR THREE MONTHS, THE PLO WOULD SET UP A GOVERNMENT OF THEIR OWN WHICH WOULD OF COURSE BE WIDELY RECOGNISED. HE HINTED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE LONG BEFORE THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES WOULD HAVE DIRECT DEALINGS WITH THE PLO. IF WE WERE TO MAKE A MOVE OURSELVES IN THIS DIRECTION NOW WE WOULD REAP INCALCULABLE BENEFITS WITH THE ARABS. AS THINGS WERE, WE RISKED BEING LEFT BEHIND.

5. I SAID THAT I WOULD OF COURSE CONVEY THESE VIEWS TO YOU. BUT I DOUBTED VERY MUCH WHETHER WE WOULD MAKE ANY CHANGE IN OUR POSITION UNTIL THERE WERE GOOD REASON TO. OUR POLICY REGARDING MINISTERIAL CONTACTS WITH THE PLO HAD BEEN CONSISTENT THROUGHOUT AND WAS WELL KNOWN TO THE ARABS. I REMINDED BOUCETTA THAT IT WAS KING HASSAN HIMSELF WHO HAD SUGGESTED THAT ONE WAY FORWARD MIGHT BE FOR QADDUMI TO BE INCLUDED IN THE DELEGATION BUT RECEIVED ONLY BY A MINISTER NOT IN THE CABINET. AS I HAD TOLD HIM ON 26 DECEMBER, WE WERE READY TO GO ALONG WITH THIS PROPOSAL. BOUCETTA SAID THAT IT WAS NOT A STARTER NOW: IF QADDUMI CAME, HE WOULD HAVE TO COME AS A FULL MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION.

6. I THEN RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE RECEPTION OF THE DELEGATION BY THE QUEEN. I SAID THAT I WANTED TO AVOID POSSIBLE FUTURE MISUNDERSTANDINGS. THE QUEEN HAD AGREED TO RECEIVE THE WHOLE DELEGATION BEFORE, WHEN IT HAD CONSISTED OF FOREIGN MINISTERS. BUT THERE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES IN TREATING MILHEM IN THE SAME WAY. IT WOULD BE QUITE WRONG TO INVOLVE THE QUEEN IN MATTERS OF POLITICAL CONTROVERSY. THIS WAS AN ESSENTIAL POINT FOR US, AND WAS ONE WHICH I BELIEVED KING HASSAN HIMSELF WELL UNDERSTOOD. BOUCETTA LOOKED UNHAPPY. HE SAID THIS WOULD GIVE A LOT OF DIFFICULTY TO THE KING. HE ARGUED THAT MILHEM WAS AN ELECTED MAYOR SEMICOLON NOT A MEMBER OF THE PLO SEMICOLON WOULD BE PRESENT AS PART OF THE DELEGATION OF THE ARAB LEAGUE WITH WHOM OF COURSE WE HAD NORMAL DEALINGS SEMICOLON AND HAD EVEN BEEN RECEIVED AT THE WHITE HOUSE. HE URGED US TO RECONSIDER, AND SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT MENTION THIS DIFFICULTY TO THE KING OR INDEED ANYONE ELSE UNTIL HE HAD HEARD FROM ME AGAIN.

7. WE MOVED ONTO DATES. I PRESSED BOUCETTA TO RECONSIDER JANUARY 31/FEBRUARY 1. HE CONTINUED TO INSIST THAT THESE WERE NO GOOD BECAUSE MITTERRAND WOULD BE STAYING IN MOROCCO UNTIL THE EVENING OF 30 JANUARY. I TOLD HIM THAT 7 AND 8 FEBRUARY WERE A POSSIBILITY FOR US. HE SAID THAT THE MOROCCANS COULD ACCEPT THESE DATES STRAIGHT AWAY, AND HE WAS PRETTY CERTAIN THAT THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION WOULD ALSO AGREE. HE WILL CHECK WITH THEM.

8. I TOLD BOUCETTA OF MOULAY HAFID'S TELEPHONE ENQUIRY (MY TELEGRAM 1, NOT TO ALL) AND SAID I OUGHT NOW TO BE IN CONTACT WITH HIM. I ADDED THAT WE HAD NOT FORGOTTEN KING HASSAN'S SUGGESTION THAT A HIGH LEVEL COURT OFFICIAL SHOULD AT SOME STAGE COME OUT TO DISCUSS DETAILS. BOUCETTA SUGGESTED THAT, FOR THE NEXT STEP, HE AND I SHOULD MEET AGAIN ON TUESDAY 11 JANUARY AT MIDDAY SO THAT I COULD GIVE HIM YOUR VIEWS ABOUT (A) ACCEPTING QADDUMI, (B) HAVING MILHEM RECEIVED BY THE QUEEN. HE WILL THEN REPORT TO THE KING IN MARRAKECH. THEREAFTER, PERHAPS ON THURSDAY 13 JANUARY, I COULD GO DOWN TO MARRAKECH AND DISCUSS DETAILS WITH HIM AND MOULAY HAFID QUOTE WITH THE KING IN THE NEXT ROOM UNQUOTE. I WELCOMED THIS.

9. I SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN TOO MANY MISLEADING REPORTS IN THE PAPERS RECENTLY ABOUT THE DELEGATION'S VISIT. BOUCETTA AT ONCE OFFERED AN EXPLANATION OF HIS QUOTE AL RIYADH UNQUOTE INTERVIEW (JEDDA TELEGRAM NUMBER 10, NOT TO ALL). HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN MISREPORTED. HE HAD NOT SPOKEN OF THE PLO, BUT MERELY OF OUR READINESS TO RECEIVE THE WHOLE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION INCLUDING A PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE.

10. IN TALKING EARLIER ABOUT HIS VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA, BOUCETTA SAID THAT KING FAHD HAD MADE A PARTICULAR POINT OF TELLING HIM

10. IN TALKING EARLIER ABOUT HIS VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA, BOUCETTA SAID THAT KING FAHD HAD MADE A PARTICULAR POINT OF TELLING HIM THAT YOUR VISIT HAD NOT (NOT) BEEN CANCELLED, ONLY POSTPONED. WE HAVE OF COURSE HAD THIS MESSAGE OURSELVES FROM THE SAUDIS, BUT BOUCETTA ESPECIALLY ASKED ME TO CONVEY IT TO YOU.

COMMENT

11. BOUCETTA HAS NOW FIRMLY COMMITTED KING HASSAN TO SELLING THE MILHEM FORMULA TO THE OTHER ARABS. IT WILL NOT BE EASY, AND WE ARE STILL NOT OUT OF THE WOOD - FOR IF KING HASSAN FAILS, HE WILL OF COURSE WANT THE BLAME TO REST WITH US. IT IS IN OUR INTERESTS THEREFORE TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO MAKE THINGS EASIER FOR HIM. I FULLY REALISE WE CANNOT MEET THE MOROCCANS ON THE QADDUMI POINT, AND I DO NOT THINK BOUCETTA SERIOUSLY EXPECTS US TO. I THINK HE ONLY ASKED US SO AS TO BE ABLE TO ARGUE WITH THE OTHER ARABS WHEN TELLING THEM OF KING HASSAN'S DECISION TO TAKE MILHEM, THAT THE MOROCCANS HAD DONE THEIR UTMOST TO GET THE BRITISH TO BUDGE.

12. I APPRECIATE THE AWKWARDNESS OF INCLUDING MILHEM IN THE RECEPTION AT BUCKINGHAM PALACE AND I LEFT BOUCETTA IN NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR VIEWS ON THIS. ALL THE SAME, IF WE WERE ABLE TO AGREE TO THIS REQUEST, IT WOULD I THINK REMOVE MUCH OF THE ACRIMONY WHICH HAS BUILT UP OUTSIDE MOROCCO OVER THIS VISIT. IT WOULD ALSO HELP HASSAN EXPLAIN TO THE PLO WHY HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO TAKE QADDUMI.

13. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS FIRST THING TUESDAY MORNING COVERING THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) REAFFIRMATION THAT WE CANNOT GO FURTHER THAN WE HAVE ON THE QUESTION OF PLO REPRESENTATION

(B) ANY FLEXIBILITY I CAN HAVE REGARDING MILHEM AND THE PALACE.

14 FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING MADRID AND UKDEL NATO.

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perograph

From The Minister of State

Thursday January 6.

Dear Prime Minister,

This is a line

to thank you for your generosity
in finding time for me to come to
Chequers on Tuesday. I much enjoyed
our talk, and am now wiser as to
your own views.

Sadly the PLO, despite their
military defeat, are well entrenched
at the heart of Middle East politics,
and likely to remain so, for the reasons
which we discussed. This means, again
unfortunately, that however terrible the

most of our policies in the area, they
are at risk unless we can handle
the PLO point adequately. It suits the
Israeli to claim that the PLO are simply
a terrorist organisation. ~~But~~ But it does
seem crucial that our own policy should
be based on our own up to date assessment,
of that confused and unsatisfactory organisation.

I entirely agree that it is not
enough to coast along from day to day,
and that we need as clear an idea as
possible of the outcome which is best
suit our interests. Although 1983 won't
be a year in which (I imagine) you
will have much time for long term analysis,
it would be splendid if before too long you
could hold the longer meeting on the
long term which you foreshadowed.

With many thanks for your
kindness and hospitality.

Yours
Daryl

OMF G 058/06

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Middle East

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RR ABU DHABI

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Sr. Lt. Bullard, Sr. Lt. Leahy

RR DOHA

Ms. Egerton

RR MUSCAT

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GROUPS 420

CONFIDENTIAL

FM KUWAIT 060936Z JAN 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 4 OF 6 JANUARY 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE BAHRAIN

INFO ROUTINE JEDDA, ABU DHABI, DOHA, MUSCAT

YOUR GULF VISIT

BBC REPORTED THIS MORNING YOUR DECISION TO POSTPONE FIRST LEG OF GULF VISIT BUT DID NOT MENTION SECOND LEG TO KUWAIT AND BAHRAIN IN EARLY FEBRUARY. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT YOU HAVE NOT YET DECIDED ABOUT FEBRUARY VISIT, SOME COMMENT FROM HERE MAY BE OPPORTUNE.

2. THE KUWAIT ARABIC PRESS HAS BEEN RUNNING HOSTILE ARTICLES AND EDITORIALS FOR THE PAST THREE DAYS. ARAFAT, WHO IS STILL IN TOWN (NY TELNO 3 OF 5 JANUARY), IS QUOTED TODAY AS REPEATING HIS CLAIM THAT JOINT ARAB PROTEST ACTION AGAINST THE BRITISH WOULD BE TAKEN LATER THIS MONTH. WHETHER OR NOT THE SAUDIS HAVE BEEN PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE OTHER GCC STATES (ABU DHABI TELNO 5 AND JEDDA TELNO 11), THE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT NOW KNOW THAT, IF THEY DO

JEDDA TELNO 11), THE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT NOW KNOW THAT, IF THEY DO NOT ASK FOR POSTPONEMENT, KUWAIT (AND BAHRAIN) WILL BE ONLY GULF STATES TO RECEIVE YOU.

3. I BELIEVE THAT, LEFT TO THEMSELVES, THE KUWAITIS WOULD RESIST ALL THESE PRESSURES AND WOULD PREFER YOUR VISIT TO CONTINUE. THEY ARE AN INDEPENDENT (AND OFTEN BLOODY-MINDED) LOT WHO LIKE TO MAKE UP THEIR OWN MINDS. THEY DO NOT LIKE PETULANT GESTURES AND ARE FOND OF SAYING THEY SEE ADVANTAGE IN TALKING ABOUT POINTS OF DIFFERENCE (C.F. THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET BLOC). ABDUL AZIZ HUSSEIN IS REPORTED IN TODAY'S AL ANDA AS SAYING THAT KUWAIT'S ACCEPTANCE OF YOUR VISIT STILL STANDS. AN UNNAMED MFA OFFICIAL COMMENTED THAT KUWAIT'S FOREIGN POLICY WAS NOT "A CARBON COPY OF SAUDI ARABIA'S". AT LUNCH AT MY HOUSE YESTERDAY, SHAIKH NASSER, THE INFLUENTIAL INFORMATION UNDERSECRETARY, REACTED MILDLY WHEN I RAISED THE SUBJECT OF THE PLO DELEGATION AND TODAY THE KUWAITI MINISTER FOR ELECTRICITY AND WATER TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD EXPECT THE CABINET TO WANT THE VISIT TO GO AHEAD.

4. BUT THE KUWAITIS HAVE NOT BEEN RENOWNED IN THE PAST FOR THEIR STRENGTH IN ESPOUSING UNPOPULAR CAUSES AND I FEEL SURE THAT, IF SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER GCC STATES REALLY PUT THE PRESSURE ON AND IF ARAB STATES MADE A DECISION ON YOUR VISIT AN ACID TEST OF KUWAITI SOLIDARITY WITH THE PALESTINIANS, KUWAIT WOULD SIMILARLY ASK FOR POSTPONEMENT. SO FAR, HOWEVER, THEY SEEM TO BE HOLDING OUT AND MY INCLINATION WOULD BE TO DELAY TAKING ANY DECISION ON THE SECOND LEG FOR A FEW DAYS. THE DUST MAY HAVE SETTLED A BIT. YOU HAVE TO GO TO BANGKOK ANYWAY, AND I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT BAHRAIN MIGHT ALSO CONTINUE TO WELCOME YOU. IF I WERE TO ASK THE KUWAITI MFA NOW FOR THEIR VIEWS, I MIGHT GET THE WRONG ANSWER. I AM IN ANY CASE DUE TO SEE THE HEAD OF PROTOCOL THERE NEXT WEEK TO DISCUSS DETAILS OF THE PROGRAMME.

5. ALL THIS FLOWS FROM MY STRONG WISH TO SEE THE VISIT CONTINUE. IT WILL OF COURSE NOT BE AN EASY ONE, AND THE PRESS WILL BE VERY TIRESOME. MOREOVER, A GULF VISIT WITHOUT CALLS ON SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UAE WOULD NOT HAVE THE SAME APPEAL. BUT I VERY MUCH HOPE WE WILL PRESS ON WITH OUR PLANS FOR YOUR VISIT.
MELHUSH

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FM KUWAIT 051047Z JAN 83
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELNO 3 OF 5 JANUARY 1983
AND SAVING TO MIDDLE EAST POSTS

ARAFAT IN KUWAIT

1. ARAFAT ARRIVED IN KUWAIT FROM ADEN ON 4 JANUARY TO DISCUSS WITH THE AMIR AND OFFICIALS THE QUOTE GRAVE CHALLENGES CONFRONTING THE ARAB NATION UNQUOTE. HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID ON ARRIVAL THAT THERE IS COMPLETE ARAB COORDINATION AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL REGARDING THE ARAB ATTITUDE TOWARDS BRITAIN. HE ATTACKED BRITAIN FOR ITS 'STRANGE ATTITUDE AND FOR EVADING ITS HISTORIC, MORAL AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CRIME IT COMMITTED AGAINST PALESTINE, ITS PROTECTORATE.

2. HE SAID THAT THE SEVEN MAN ARAB LEAGUE COMMITTEE WOULD MEET AT FOREIGN MINISTERS LEVEL ON 21 JANUARY IN RABAT TO DISCUSS THE ARAB STANCE TOWARDS BRITAIN, AND WOULD CALL FOR A SUMMIT MEETING IF THE SITUATION CALLED FOR IT.

(3. FCO REGISTRY PLEASE PASS COPIES TO ME POSTS.).

MELHUIH

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 09 OF 5 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI, MUSCAT, DUBAI AND JEDDA

INFO PRIORITY OTHER MIDDLE EAST POST, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS AND MOSCOW

ABU DHABI TELNO. 005: POSTPONEMENT OF YOUR GULF VISIT

1. I SAW SHAIKH AHMED BIN SAIF AT HIS REQUEST IMMEDIATELY HE LEFT THIS MORNING'S COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. EVIDENTLY EMBARRASSED, HE ASKED IF YOUR VISIT COULD BE POSTPONED UNTIL THE AIR HAD CLEARED. HE FOLLOWED A SIMILAR LINE TO THAT REPORTED IN PARA. 3 OF T.U.R.
2. I EXPRESSED REGRET, REFERRING TO OUR EARLIER DISCUSSIONS AND DRAWING HIS ATTENTION TO A PUBLIC STATEMENT MADE YESTERDAY BY THE QATAR MINISTRY OF INFORMATION TO THE EFFECT THAT THE VISIT WAS ON. HE SAID THE ISSUES HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT LENGTH BY THE AMIR AND HIS MINISTERS. THEY HAD NOT BEEN PRESSURISED BY THE SAUDIS. THE DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN BECAUSE -
 - (A) A VISIT AMIDST THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY WOULD DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, TO WHICH QATAR ATTACHED IMPORTANCE (SEMI COLON)
 - (B) THE MOROCCANS HAD BEEN UNHAPPY AT THE PROSPECT OF YOUR VISITING THE GULF, WHILE NOT VISITING THE COUNTRY WHOSE KING WAS CHARGED WITH RESOLVING THE PROBLEM (SEMI COLON)
 - (C) ARAFAT HAD CALLED THIS MORNING FOR AN ARAB SUMMIT TO DISCUSS BRITAIN'S POSITION (SEMI COLON)
 - (D) YESTERDAY'S FOREIGN OFFICE STATEMENT THAT BRITAIN WOULD NOT CHANGE ITS POLICY ON CONTACTS WITH THE PLO WAS UNHELPFUL AND EMBARRASSING TO BRITAIN'S FRIENDS. SHAIKH AHMED SAID HE HAD ACCEPTED MY EARLIER ARGUMENT THAT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US MADE IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT OUR LEADERS SHOULD MEET. THE FCO STATEMENT HAD DEMONSTRATED THAT WHATEVER QATAR SAID, OUR MINDS WERE MADE UP.
3. WE WENT AGAIN THROUGH THE ARGUMENTS ON RECOGNITION AND RECEIVING THE LEAGUE MISSION AND SHAIKH AHMED READILY ACCEPTED THAT THE MORE STRIDENT THREATS AGAINST BRITAIN, THE LESS LIKELY OUR POLICIES WOULD BEND. HE SAID THAT QATAR WOULD AVOID ADDING FUEL TO THE MEDIA CAMPAIGN. THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH US WERE UNAFFECTED. BUT HE URGED WITH GREAT FEELING THAT WE SHOULD

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APPRECIATE THE SITUATION OF MODERATE ARABS FRIENDLY TO BRITAIN. FOR THE PAST YEAR THEY HAD ARGUED WITH THE RADICALS THAT DIPLOMACY SHOULD BE GIVEN A CHANCE. THEY HAD TRIUMPHED AT FEZ AND THERE WAS A WINDOW OF 6 MONTHS IN WHICH PROGRESS MIGHT BE MADE BEFORE THE AMERICAN ELECTORAL PROCESS AGAIN INTERVENED. THE RADICALS WERE NOW TELLING THE CONSERVATIVES THAT THE CONSERVATIVES' OWN FRIENDS (~~THESE~~), HAD BLOCKED THE ROAD. IF THE LEAGUE TEAM FAILED TO VISIT LONDON, THERE COULD BE NO CONTINUATION OF THE FEZ PROCESS. THE WILD MEN WOULD TAKE OVER AGAIN AND THE ARAB WORLD WOULD SET OFF IN YET ANOTHER FRUITLESS PURSUIT OF THE WRONG TARGET.

4. WE AGREED, IN THE LIGHT OF QATAR'S STATEMENT OF 4 JANUARY, THAT WE SHOULD SAY AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE IN PUBLIC, POIYMING IF NECESSARY TO THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF AGREEING ACCEPTABLE DATES AND SAYING THAT BOTH SIDES HOPED A VISIT COULD BE ARRANGED BY THE SPRING.

DAY

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PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR EGERTON

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GRS 390

DESKBY FCO 050915Z JAN 83
DESKBY MUSCAT AND DOHA 050930Z JAN 83

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FM ABU DHABI 050813Z JAN 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 005 OF 5 JAN 83

RPTD FOR INFO IMMEDIATE MUSCAT AND DOHA AND ALL OTHER MIDDLE EAST
POSTS AND PRIORITY TO UK MIS NY , PARIS AND MOSCOW.

YOUR TELNOS 1 TO US (NOT TO ALL) AND 3 TO DOHA:

POSTPONEMENT OF YOUR GULF VISIT.

1. THIS MORNING I ARGUED IN DETAIL OVER THE TELEPHONE WITH
THE UNDER-SECRETARY AT THE MFA THAT YOUR VISIT SHOULD TAKE
PLACE. I TOO SENT A MESSAGE TO SUWAIDI.
2. TWO AND A HALF HOURS LATER THE UNDER-SECRETARY TELEPHONED ME
BACK TO SAY THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TELL ME THAT THE
UAE WISHED TO POSTPONE THE VISIT UNTIL THE BRITISH ATTITUDE TO
THE VISIT OF AN ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO LONDON HAD BEEN
CLARIFIED. ABDUL RAHMAN AL JARWAN WAS UNWILLING TO ENTER INTO
FURTHER DISCUSSION BUT SAID THERE WOULD BE NO OBJECTION TO MY
CONTACTING THE MINISTER OF STATE, WHICH I HAVE DONE.
3. RASHID ABDULLA SAID HE WAS VERY SORRY ABOUT THE DECISION AND
HE HOPED THE SHADOW OVER UK/UAE RELATIONS WOULD BE TRANSIENT.
THE SUBJECT IN QUESTION, HE STRESSED, WAS NOT A BILATERAL ONE BUT
ONE THAT CONCERNED ALL THE ARABS: IT HAD BEEN TAKEN AFTER INTER-
ARAB CONSULTATION AND HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THE SAME DECISION
HAD BEEN REACHED BY QATAR YESTERDAY. THE UAE DECISION HAD NOT
BEEN TAKEN WITHOUT REFERENCE TO SHAIKH ZAID. WHAT WAS AT ISSUE
WAS NOT THE UK'S RELATIONS WITH THE PLO GENERALLY BUT JUST
THE MATTER OF THE VISIT OF A SEVEN-MAN ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO

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/ LONDON.

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LONDON. HE MUCH HOPED THAT WE COULD REACH A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THE NEGOTIATIONS WE WERE CONDUCTING WITH KING HASSAN AND THAT YOU WOULD BE ABLE TO VISIT THE UAE ON THE GULF TRIP THAT HE UNDERSTOOD YOU WOULD BE MAKING LATER IN THE YEAR.

4. WE UNDERSTAND FROM A NORMALLY RELIABLE PRESS SOURCE THAT THE SAUDIS CONTACTED RASHID ABDULLA ON 3 JANUARY TO ASK THAT YOUR VISIT BE POSTPONED. THE MINISTER OF STATE PUT THIS REQUEST TO THE CABINET THE SAME DAY, APPARENTLY SUPPORTING IT HIMSELF. THE CABINET APPROVED IT, BUT ASKED RASHID ABDULLA TO ALLOW TWENTY-FOUR HOURS FOR LONDON TO COME UP WITH A CONCILIATORY OFFER TO RIYADH.

5. I DO NOT CONSIDER THERE IS ANY CHANCE THAT WE COULD REVERSE THE UAE DECISION. I WILL RECOMMEND SEPARATELY STEPS WE MIGHT TAKE TO MINIMISE THE DAMAGE TO UK/UAE RELATIONS.

WALKER

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PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR EGERTON

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TUNIS

SANAA

PP WASHINGTON

PP UKMIS NEW YORK

PP PARIS

PP MOSCOW

PP RIYADH (ACTIONED)

GRS 350

CONFIDENTIAL

D E S K B Y 051500Z

FM JEDDAH 051313Z JAN 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 011 OF 5 JANUARY 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI, DOHA, MUSCAT AND KUWAIT AND OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS AND MOSCOW AND RIYADH

YOUR TELNO 001 TO ABU DHABI OF 4 JANUARY (NOT TO ALL): YOUR GULF VISIT.

1. I CALLED ON THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT 2 PM LOCAL TIME TODAY (1100Z). I SAID I WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND AS A FRIEND. I BELIEVED THAT THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT HAD MEANT TO MAKE THEIR GESTURE AND BE DONE WITH IT. BUT WHAT I HAD FEARED WOULD HAPPEN HAD NOW HAPPENED. THE BRITISH PRESS HAD TAKEN UP THE ISSUE AND THE SAUDI PRESS HAD FOLLOWED SUIT. SO HAD OTHER COUNTRIES' PAPERS, NOTABLY KUWAIT. THEY WERE NOW FUELLING EACH OTHER AND WE HAD ALL THE ATMOSPHERE OF A CRISIS. HERE MANSOURI INTERRUPTED WITH: "WHEN THERE IS IN FACT NO CRISIS".

2. SAUDI ARABIA, I WENT ON, WAS NOW BEING PRESENTED AS RIDING A WHITE STEED AT THE HEAD OF THE ARAB LINE OF BATTLE. WAS THIS WHAT SHE WANTED? MANSOURI SAID THAT THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT HAD MADE NO STATEMENT WHATSOEVER. INDEED, WHEN THE QATARI MFA HAD TELEPHONED HIM, HE HAD SIMPLY CONFIRMED THAT YOUR VISIT WAS POSTPONED AND HAD REFUSED TO MAKE ANY COMMENT. TELEGRAMS OF ENQUIRY FROM THE UAE AND OMAN STILL REMAINED UNANSWERED.



IMMEDIATE

(+7)

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ADVANCE COPY

[Hd of MED] Passed to MED
 " NE NAB
 " News
 " PCB
 PS
 PS/PUS
 Sir J Leahy
 Mr Egerton

PS/MHurd

read in full.

[Handwritten signature]

OF ENQUIRY FROM THE UAE AND OMAN STILL REMAINED UNANSWERED.
I SAID THAT MY COLLEAGUE IN ABU DHABI HAD FORMED THE IMPRESSION
THAT THE UAE GOVERNMENT WAS UNDER PRESSURE
FROM THE SAUDIS. MANSOURI SAID THAT WAS NOT/NOT TRUE.

3. I SAID THE SITUATION WAS RUNNING AWAY FROM US BOTH.
SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS I WOULD LIKE
TO SUGGEST THAT THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT SHOULD ISSUE A STATEMENT
TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY HAD ASKED FOR THE POSTPONEMENT OF
YOUR VISIT (BUT, MANSOURI INTERRUPTED, THE INVITATION STILL STOOD)
BUT THAT PRESS SPECULATION ABOUT FUTHER MEASURES AGAINST
BRITAIN WAS ENTIRELY FICTIOUS. MANSOURI SAID HE WOULD PUT
THIS IDEA TO HIS SUPERIORS. HE WOULD ALSO CONTACT THE MINISTER
OF INFORMATION AND SEE WHETHER SOMETHING COULD BE DONE TO REIN
IN THE SAUDI PRESS.

4. MANSOURI WAS WHOLLY FRIENDLY AND UNDERSTANDING. I CAME AWAY
FEELING CHEERED. BUT I HAVE NOW SEEN ABU DHABI TELEGRAM NO 5.
THERE ARE TWO POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS, AS SEEN FROM HERE:

(A) THAT THOUGH THE SAUDIS HAVE NOT/NOT PUT PRESSURE ON THE UAE,
THE UAE HAVE ASSUMED THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD BE ANNOYED IF THE VISIT
WENT AHEAD (SEMICOLON) OR

(B) THAT KING FAHD HAS BEEN APPLYING PRESSURE DIRECT WITHOUT
TELLING THE MFA. AS FAR AS I KNOW, PRINCE SAUD IS NOT YET
BACK FROM HIS HOLIDAY.

3. I SHALL TRY TO GET CLARIFICATION FROM MANSOURI. BUT THE
WEEKEND IS NOW UPON US. IN ANY CASE I FEAR THE DAMAGE HAS BEEN
DONE. IT IS A TYPICAL EPISODE OF THE KIND WHICH MAKES ME WISH
I HAD SPECIALISED IN OLD ICELANDIC.

~~_____~~

CRAIG

~~_____~~

NNNN

JIC(82)(N) 116 - "The 4

threat to Europe from
~~the~~ Middle-East inspired
Terrorism" has been

returned to Rm 203

FCO Downing St (EAST)

as requested.

Duty Clerk

1/1/83

Foreign and Commonwealth Office



Prime Minister

*I delayed submitting this because
I thought you would not have time
to read it pre - Franks.*

London SW1A 2AH

6 January, 1982

A.J.C. 28. 4
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Dear John, The PLO

The recent difficulties over the Arab League Delegation's visit to London have shown that the PLO remain an important element in the Middle East problem. Events of the last six months have had a considerable impact on the PLO. The Prime Minister might be interested to see the enclosed paper which provides a brief assessment of how these developments have affected the Organisation's aims and tactics.

A recent JIC Note entitled 'The Threat in Europe from Middle-East inspired Terrorism' is also attached and may be of interest to the Prime Minister.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

THE PLO: A STOCKTAKING

1. The PLO have been divided and weakened by the dispersal from Beirut. They claim a historic victory in holding the Israelis at bay for 80 days, but any pretence to military comparability with Israel has been shattered. Some 8,000 of their fighters were split up among eight Arab countries, but some 6-8,000 remain in North and East Lebanon under the military wing of the Syrians. Arafat has chosen Tunis as his temporary headquarters, but Damascus remains the focal point for the radicals. Arafat's task of maintaining a semblance of cohesion has become harder.

2. The Reagan initiative posed an awkward choice for the PLO. It marked a welcome step forward in the US position by accepting the centrality of the Palestinian problem. It also offered the only realistic prospect of Israeli withdrawal (Arafat knows that). But it challenged many of the PLO's long held views about the nature of an acceptable settlement: in particular their demand for an independent state. The Fez Summit produced a classic statement of Arab demands and in effect endorsed (Syria included) a political solution, but the 8 points do not amount to a realistic negotiating position (Arafat knows that, too). Saudi prestige is linked with Fez and they are not encouraging Arafat to address himself to the Reagan points as much as the US would wish. King Fahd feels he must keep his options open.

3. Arafat's decision to explore the opportunity opened up by Reagan and move towards closer relations with Jordan has led to an increasingly open dispute within the PLO. The Syrians have promoted this for their own ends. The meeting of the Palestine Central Council in Damascus in November (the best test of PLO opinion we have had since Lebanon) suggested that Arafat and his moderate group within Fatah had attracted sufficient support within the PLO to allow his policy towards Jordan to continue but within limits. Considerable opposition remains. This ranges from the overtly pro-

/Syrian

Syrian factions such as Saiqa and some small splinter groups, who remain committed to the 'armed struggle', reject any cooperation with Jordan and are generally suspicious of moves towards a political solution, to those such as Qaddumi in Fatah, and the leaders of the Democratic Front (DFLP) and the Popular Front (PFLP) who reject Reagan, suspect compromise, and favour unyielding commitment to the Fez principles. The Syrians have ensured a steady flow of condemnation from their surrogates for Arafat's opening towards Jordan.

4. The Jordan/PLO talks continue to make progress, more so far on the nature of future Jordan-Palestinian relations than on a negotiating strategy. Arafat himself sees that time is short: progress must be made, if at all, before President Reagan gets immersed next autumn in the US Presidential campaign. So he apparently recognises the need for a statement accepting Israel's rights. In the mid-December round of talks in Amman the Jordanians also gained the impression that Arafat would drop the PLO's insistence on the establishment of a Palestinian State as a precondition for entering negotiations. But he is a practised PLO infighter and will not declare his hand publicly until he is sure of majority support. He has postponed the holding of a Palestine National Council (expected since November), and taken refuge in ambiguous statements in public, while he works to muster support for his line. He seems to have accepted that King Hussein should put a range of options to the Americans on Palestinian participation in the negotiations; but has probably not yet given the King a mandate, and will want to judge the American reaction before committing himself further. In particular he wants to see evidence of US preparedness to put 'real pressure' on Israel.

5. Arafat's task has been made significantly more difficult by the Sabra and Chatila massacres. The PLO fighters who left Beirut after the leadership had accepted assurances from the US about the safety of their own families remaining behind and feel bitter

/and

and betrayed. The longer term effect may be to alienate many of the younger PLO members from the leadership as a whole. It will certainly make the PLO even more wary about accepting assurances from the US. One of Arafat's constant themes in recent months has been his distrust of the US, and his worry that if he plays his recognition of Israel card, the US may still let him down. If that happened, he believes his future as leader of the PLO would be nil. This is an area where a European role could help.

PLO and Terrorism

6. Fatah, the dominant PLO group, has not mounted terrorist operations outside Israel and the Occupied Territories since 1974. It is possible that following the traumatic events of recent months dissident factions or embittered individuals within Fatah will mount official operations, particularly if Arafat's efforts to make progress by political means should fail. There have been occasional reports of renewed interest within Fatah in establishing a terrorist network on a contingency basis. The JIC, however, in their latest assessment (paragraph 3 of their paper 'The Threat in Europe From Middle East-Inspired Terrorism' at Annex A), doubts that Arafat has given sanction for renewed terrorist operations.

7. The smaller groups within the PLO possess in varying degrees the capacity to mount terrorist operations, but the frequency of attacks outside Israel and the Occupied Territories has declined markedly over recent years with the growth of interest in political solutions. Since 1980, only one such terrorist attack can be confidently attributed to a member organisation of the PLO: a Jewish travel agent was killed in July 1981 by the PFLP. PLO groups have continued to mount attacks within Israel and the Occupied Territories.

8. The great majority of international terrorist attacks attributable to Palestinians in recent years (Annex B) have been committed by the Abu Nidhal Group or the '15 May Arab Organisation' both of whom are extremist Palestinian organisations outside the PLO. The Abu Nidhal Group, three of whose members are awaiting trial for the shooting of the Israeli Ambassador to London, is violently opposed

to the PLO, and has assassinated numerous PLO officials in European capitals in recent years.

9. The PLO also face the threat of terrorist attack from other quarters. The Syrians are reported to have plans to kill Arafat. PLO officials have also been the subject of attack by Jewish terrorist organisations: the "'Jewish Armed Resistance of the Jewish Defence League'" claimed responsibility for the killing of a PLO official and a Palestinian student in Rome in June 1982: and the killing of two PLO officials in Beirut during 1982 have been attributed to MOSSAD (the question of Jewish and Israeli terrorism was not addressed in the JIC paper, which dealt with the Middle East terrorist threat in Europe).

10. Alternative Palestinian representation. The Americans have hinted that if the PLO under Arafat fail to give King Hussein a mandate to negotiate, the US will expect the Jordanians to look elsewhere for Palestinian representatives, and in particular to place greater emphasis on West Bank Palestinians. Such a course would entail serious risks for Jordan, as she lacks the independent strength of Egypt. But King Hussein is anxious that progress towards negotiation should be made and may feel that he has no alternative should the PLO continue to stall. The Palestinian diaspora (who broadly support the PLO) are most unlikely to accept that West Bank figures should speak for the Palestinian people without the PLO's approval. Also, West Bank personalities themselves will remain reluctant to come forward against the wishes of the PLO, both for reasons of personal safety, and because they will not wish to open themselves to charges of betrayal.

Conclusions

11. (i) There is now a significant trend within the PLO in favour of a negotiated settlement, and a growing acceptance that the price of Israeli withdrawal may have to be agreement to some form of association with Jordan. This is supported by West Bank opinion and much of the Palestinian diaspora;

(ii) The opposition comes from a) some tiny but vocal splinter /groups



groups, whose only real threat to the leadership is the assassin's bullet; and b) a larger group who could mount a challenge, should Arafat's strategy fail, on the basis of the Fez principles and probably with Saudi support. This opposition is strong enough to oblige Arafat to qualify his more moderate utterances;

(iii) Syria is encouraging opposition to Arafat and would like to reassert control over the PLO as a whole. But that would be a real setback to the prospects for peace;

(iv) Arafat has shown that, despite his infuriating ambiguities, he is prepared to work towards a negotiated settlement, despite considerable opposition within the PLO. But he will not commit himself decisively to a Jordanian/Palestinian approach to negotiations until he is certain that it will bring concrete gains for the PLO, and allow him to protect his own position;

(v) Terrorism. Arafat and the mainstream PLO have not been involved in international terrorism since 1974. Attacks within Israel and the occupied territories have continued with declining frequency. Some within the PLO may contemplate a resumption of international terrorism should the political approach fail. But Arafat understands the damage this would do to the PLO's standing, and has kept these forces in check. Meanwhile PLO leaders themselves are subject to terrorist threats from extremist Palestinians and other political opponents.

Near East and North Africa Department
6 January 1983

MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM: WHO ARE THE KILLERS?

1. Attached is a list of terrorist incidents in the last two years outside Israel itself which have been attributed to Groups from the Middle East. Where the responsibility for an attack remains in doubt this has been indicated by a question mark, but in most cases a best guess has been given.
2. Only one attack in the period covered can confidently be attributed to a group which is a member of the PLO: the killing of a Jewish travel agent in Piraeus in July 1981 by the PFLP. Two other attacks in the same period may have been the responsibility of the PFLP. Its leader, George Habash, has said following Beirut that he would not indulge in international terrorism but he would continue the armed struggle in Israel and the Occupied Territories (although there is an unconfirmed report that in October the PFLP Central Committee secretly affirmed its support for the use of terrorism against Zionism.) The majority of other attacks were carried out by the following groups:
 - (i) Abu Nidhal, also known as Black June, and by other names. An extremist dissident group which split from the PLO in 1974, it has assassinated several PLO officials in recent years (including the previous PLO representative in London, in 1978). Poses a threat to Jewish, Israeli and possibly US targets in Europe as well as to the PLO and moderate Arabs. Members of the Abu Nidhal Group are awaiting trial for the attempted murder of the Israeli Ambassador to London in June.
 - (ii) 15 May Arab Organisation. A Palestinian splinter group outside the PLO and based in Iraq. It specialises in using increasingly sophisticated explosives against Jewish, and Israeli targets. It has recently also attacked US-owned aircraft, and may in future attack PLO and moderate Arab targets in Europe and elsewhere.
3. The PLO leadership have consistently condemned attacks carried out against Jewish civilian targets, and the assassination of Israeli diplomats serving abroad. PLO officials have themselves frequently been the victim of terrorist attack, either by extremist Palestinian groups or on occasions by other Arab Governments - there have been recent reports that Arafat himself may be under threat from the Syrians.
4. A JIC paper on the Threat From Middle East Terrorism is at Annex A.



TERRORIST ATTACKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PALESTINIANS 1980-82

1980

17 January	Explosion at Mount Royal Hotel, London.	15 May Arab Organisation
17 January	Palestinian bookshop owner killed, Paris.	Abu Nidhal Group (?)
3 March	Lawyer killed in mistake for Jewish businessman, Madrid.	Abu Nidhal Group
24 July	Kuwaiti airliner hijacked to Kuwait.	2 Palestinians, private grudge
27 July	Grenade attack against Jewish teenagers, Antwerp.	15 May Arab Organisation(?)
27 July	Iraqi diplomat killed in UAE.	Martyr Arif Bassari Commando
25 November	Jewish Travel Agent killed, Paris.	PFLP (?)
31 December	Explosion at Norfolk Hotel Nairobi.	PFLP - Special Command

1981

1 May	Chairman of Austria-Israel Soc. <u>killed</u> , Vienna.	Abu Nidhal
1 June	PLO representative killed, Brussels.	Abu Nidhal
22 July	Jewish travel agent killed, Piraeus.	PFLP
25 June	Five explosions in Kuwait.	PFLP (?)
14 July	Military Governor of Rafah killed, Gaza Strip.	Unknown
1 August	Attempt to assassinate Abu Daud, PLO Official, Warsaw.	Abu Nidhal (?)



	9 August	Explosion at El Al Office, Rome.	15 May Arab Organisation
	10 August	Explosion at Israeli Embassy, Vienna.	15 May Arab Organisation
	10 August	Explosion at Israeli Embassy, Athens.	15 May Arab Organisation
	29 August	Gun and grenade attack on central Synagogue, Vienna.	Abu Nidhal
	7 October	Bomb at Israel Tourist Office, Rome.	15 May Arab Organisation (?)
	7 October	Bomb at Post Office frequented by Jewish emigres, Ostia.	Unknown
	19 October	Majid Abu Sharer (PLO Director of Information) killed bomb explosion. Rome.	?Mossad
	20 October	Explosion in Jewish Quarter, Antwerp.	Dutch Neo Nazis (?) or PFPL - Special Command (?)
	7 December	Abdul Wahab Kayyali former Secretary-General Arab Liberation Front, killed Beirut.	?Mossad
1982	9 January	Attack on El Al office, Istanbul.	15 May Arab Organisation
	15 January	Attack on Jewish Restaurant, West Berlin.	15 May Arab Organisation
	4 February	Explosion at Chief Rabbi's House, Vienna.	15 May Arab Organisation (?)
	31 March	Machine gun attack on Israeli Embassy, Paris.	Unknown
	3 April	Israeli diplomat, Yacov Barsimantov, killed, Paris.	Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction
	3 June	Israeli Ambassador shot, London.	Abu Nidhal members awaiting trial
	7/8 June	Israeli Consulate General bombed, Zurich.	Revolutionary Cells
	17 June	Deputy Director PLO office, and Palestinian student, killed Rome.	Jewish Armed Resistance of Jewish Defence League
	19/20 July	Bomb at Bank Leumi Le Israel branch, Paris.	Action Directe
	23 July	Deputy head of PLO office killed, Paris.	Abu Nidhal



9 August	Gun and grenade attack at Jewish Restaurant, Paris	Abu Nidhal or Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions
24 August	UAE Charge wounded, Kuwait	?Probably Abu Nidhal
16 September	Kuwaiti diplomat killed, Madrid.	Abu Nidhal
16 September	Kuwaiti Consul General killed, Karachi.	Abu Nidhal
9 October	Gun and grenade attack on Synagogue, Rome.	Abu Nidhal

NEPAD, FCO

10 December 1982

Middle East.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 January 1983

Dear John,

A.J.C. 6
A.A.

Chancellor of the Exchequer's Visit to Saudi Arabia

I enclose defensive briefs on the postponement of the Arab League Delegation's visit to London and the cancellation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's visit to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf which was to have begun on 7 January, in case these subjects are raised with the Chancellor by his Saudi hosts.

Stephen Egerton and Jeremy Greenstock will be calling on the Chancellor at No 11 tomorrow morning to discuss the briefing, supplement it as necessary and answer any questions which the Chancellor may have.

You will have seen from John Coles' letter of 4 January to John Holmes a summary of the general line which it was agreed yesterday would be appropriate to take with the Saudis. Since then of course there has been a major development in that Qatar and the UAE, apparently under Saudi pressure, have called off the visit by Mr Pym to which they had previously agreed in full knowledge of the initial Saudi reaction. Mr Pym's view is that, while we should continue to emphasise our desire for good relations with Saudi Arabia, it would be appropriate also to make it clear to the Saudis that we take exception to the way they have acted to escalate the matter in a way which could hardly have caused more embarrassment to Britain (and for that matter to the Gulf States concerned) had it been so calculated. The point is obviously one which would have to be put across with care in order to avoid exacerbating the situation, but there would be tactical advantage in building up something of a counter grievance. Briefing on these lines has therefore been added to the set.

I am sending a copy of this letter to John Coles (No 10). ←

Quigley,
Z.

(B J P Fall)

Private Secretary

John Kerr Esq
Private Secretary
Chancellor of the Exchequer

Spare set

CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA:
POSTPONEMENT OF ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT

Defensive Points to Make

1. As Prime Minister said in message to King Fahd, very disappointed that Delegation's visit did not prove possible in December. Attach importance to Fez Summit results and to close consultations with Arab side.
2. Our policy towards the PLO not intended to be discourteous or negative. We have a well-established policy on Ministerial contacts with the PLO: our position cannot have come as a surprise to the Arab side, after our explanations to the Moroccans early in October. We firmly believe that the PLO must make a clearer statement on Israel's right to exist and on terrorism if they are to play their full part in negotiations. Our objective was to encourage them to move forward in company with Arab governments.
3. We much regret that our compromise proposal caused offence in the Arab world. It was intended to be constructive, but we will of course not pursue that route to a satisfactory PLO statement if unacceptable to the Arabs. We are in touch with King Hassan about other possible solutions which could be mutually acceptable. We want the visit to go ahead in due course.
4. [Why did Britain allow this issue to blow up so late?] Until one week before the Delegation were due to arrive, we were working on the basis of Moroccan assurances that the PLO would not form part of the Delegation. Formal request on 22 November therefore left us very little time to look for compromise.
5. [British demand that Arab Governments reject terrorism was insulting] Certainly not our intention to insult Arab governments.

/We

We are well aware that many are strongly opposed to terrorism, as we are. But the position of the PLO remains ambiguous. We were asking all concerned to confirm their rejection of terrorism.

6. [British position is damaging peace prospects by interfering with Fez follow-up] We have made clear that we see the Fez Communique as important. We worked hard to accommodate the Arab League Delegation's requirements (5 changes of date). Still looking forward very much to the visit when mutually acceptable basis can be found. Determined to remain actively involved in search for peace. Very much hope this incident can soon be closed and energies directed to making real progress towards a Palestinian settlement.

CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA

Background

1. The proposal for visits by an Arab League Delegation to the Permanent Members of the Security Council flowed from the Arab League Summit meeting in Fez (6-9 September). The Fez Summit reached agreement on a set of 8 principles for a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute (attached). These principles are important as the first-ever united Arab approach to a peace settlement. The seventh principle marks an implicit acceptance of Israel's right to exist (although we have said that a more explicit statement on this point remains necessary). The principles are largely based on a set of 8 points put forward by the then Crown Prince Fahd in August 1981. The Saudis therefore have a vested interest in the success of the Fez initiative, and worked hard to bring the more reluctant Arab states (eg Syria) to join the consensus.
2. King Hassan of Morocco, Chairman of the Fez Summit, announced at the conclusion of the meeting that a seven member follow-up Committee comprising Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan and the PLO would visit the UN Permanent Members. The King added that they would not press the Americans to receive a PLO representative, and a Delegation minus the PLO duly visited Washington in late October and held cordial, though inconclusive, talks with President Reagan. The full Delegation including the PLO has since also visited Paris, Moscow and Peking.
3. The US position on contacts with the PLO is still regulated by clear conditions laid down by Kissinger in 1975, that the US would not recognise or negotiate with the PLO until the latter accepted Israel's right to exist and endorsed Security Council Resolution 242. Britain's position is different. We have accepted, together with the Ten, that the PLO will have to be associated with negotiations

/to

to achieve a comprehensive settlement. We have contacts with the PLO at official but not Ministerial level (except that Mr Hurd, in the absence abroad of Mr Pym received an earlier Arab League mission which included the Foreign Minister equivalent of the PLO, Mr Qaddumi). We have said that we would be prepared to meet PLO Representatives at Ministerial level provided that such a meeting would contribute to the cause of peace. We have explained that the kind of step which would make such a meeting possible would be a clear statement from the PLO accepting Israel's right to exist, if necessary on condition that Israel accepted legitimate Palestinian rights; and confirming that they had renounced terrorism.

4. We were in contact with the Moroccans (King Hassan was to lead the Delegation to London) from mid-October about arrangements for the visit. Some of the difficulties resulted from King Hassan's hypersensitivity on protocol points. The Moroccans raised early on, and in a tentative way, the question of PLO representation, and were at once given a clear steer that it would raise very serious difficulties. We were given assurances by the Moroccan Ambassador that the Delegation would come without a PLO representative, and a Moroccan Minister who came to London in mid-October to plan the visit did so on the basis of no PLO representation. But a week before the Delegation were due to arrive, the Moroccans put a formal request to us to receive a PLO representative at the talks with the Prime Minister. This was swiftly followed by strong representations from other Arab leaders, including King Fahd.

5. There was no prospect of a change in our well-established policy on contacts with the PLO, especially at that late stage. In an effort to avoid an outright rejection, we put forward to all the members of the Delegation a compromise which was intended to provide a mutually acceptable basis for the Delegation including the PLO to come to London. We invited all participants in the Delegation to agree that we would publish a statement in advance of the visit making clear inter alia Israel's right to exist and confirming that all concerned

/had

had rejected terrorism. The statement would have indicated that all concerned, ie including the PLO, agreed with its terms.

6. Our compromise proposal was rejected by the Arab side and King Hassan announced the postponement of the visit. The Saudis reacted particularly strongly, reflecting the extent of King Fahd's personal commitment to the Fez approach. Senior Saudis expressed their dismay to Lord Carrington, who was in Riyadh at the time. The Foreign Minister, Prince Saud, denied any knowledge of an understanding that the Delegation should come to London without a PLO representative (this suggests a failure of communication by the Moroccans). He was also angered by our proposal that all concerned should confirm their rejection of terrorism.

7. As regards threats to British trade, the Saudi Minister of Commerce (Dr Solaim) told Lord Carrington that the British position could be affected: the Saudis would not make trouble but if the bandwagon started rolling, they could not stop it. Since then there has been no hard evidence to suggest that Saudi leaders are considering specific measures against British commercial interests. Crown Prince Abdullah told HM Ambassador on 11 December that the question of measures was 'newspaper talk' and that there was no question of sanctions against Britain. But the depth of Saudi anger has been demonstrated by the postponement of Mr Pym's visit to Saudi Arabia, which has since been followed by the cancellation of his visits to the UAE and Qatar, apparently at Saudi behest. Our commercial interests could still be affected, particularly in marginal cases or when companies are being invited to tender for contracts. The Algerians, for instance, have shown a disinclination to enter into commercial discussions because of this dispute.

8. The Prime Minister sent a message to King Fahd on 8 December (copy attached) in order to clear up any misunderstandings about the objectives of our policy. But the Saudis are still looking to us to find a solution to the PLO problem. We have been trying to do so principally through the Moroccans. King Hassan is anxious that we

/should

should use him as the sole channel of communication on this problem. Lord Chalfont saw King Hassan on 9 December as the Prime Minister's personal emissary on a fence-mending mission. This improved the atmosphere, and HM Ambassador in Rabat has since begun discussions with the Moroccans both on new dates for the visit, and on possible ways of solving the problem of Palestinian representation. The options include one which was floated with us by the Saudi Minister of Commerce (but probably without the authority of other Ministers): that the PLO slot in the Delegation could be taken by a prominent Palestinian who was not a member of the PLO. The Moroccans have undertaken to put our ideas to the PLO. We have not yet had a response, and in view of King Hassan's sensitivities, it would be advisable to avoid detailed discussion of possible solutions to the PLO problem with Saudi leaders.

9. A defensive line to take is provided should the subject be raised by Saudi ministers. If the Chancellor sees King Fahd, the latter may well set out his views at length. In that case, the Chancellor might wish to undertake to report, but to make clear that he is not the Minister directly concerned. Prince Saud, the Foreign Minister, may however seek an explanation of the British attitude and put more detailed questions.

Near East and North Africa Department
5 January 1983

Eight Principles Agreed at Fez Summit

1. The withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 including Arab Jerusalem.
2. The dismantling of settlements established by Israel on the Arab territories after 1967.
3. The guarantee of freedom of worship and practice of religious rites for all religions in the holy shrines.
4. The reaffirmation of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and the exercise of its imprescriptible and inalienable national rights under the leadership of the PLO, its sole and legitimate representative and the compensation of all those who do not wish to return.
5. Placing the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the control of the United Nations for a transitional period not exceeding a few months.
6. The establishment of an independent Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital.
7. The Security Council guarantees peace among all states of the region including the independent Palestinian State.
8. The Security Council guarantees the respect of these principles.

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TO IMMEDIATE JEDDA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 400 OF 8 DECEMBER
INFO AMMAN RABAT DAMASCUS WASHINGTON TUNIS ALGIERS

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

PLEASE NOW PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO KING FAHD

BEGINS: I THOUGHT I SHOULD LET YOU KNOW HOW DISAPPOINTED I AM
THAT IT DID NOT PROVE POSSIBLE FOR THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION
TO VISIT LONDON LAST WEEK. LORD CARRINGTON HAS TOLD ME OF HIS
CONVERSATIONS WITH CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH AND PRINCE SULTAN
DURING HIS RECENT VISIT AND I KNOW HOW DISAPPOINTED YOU WERE TOO.
THE BRITISH POSITION IS NOT MEANT TO BE RESTRICTIVE OR
NEGATIVE. OVER THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS WE HAVE CONTRIBUTED AS
MUCH AS ANY WESTERN COUNTRY TO THE NOW ALMOST UNIVERSAL
RECOGNITION THAT THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE HAVE A RIGHT TO SELF-
DETERMINATION. THE SOONER ALL THE PARTIES TO THE ARAB-ISRAEL
DISPUTE, AND THOSE WHO WISH TO HELP THEM, CAN SIT DOWN TOGETHER
AND DISCUSS THE NEXT STEPS WITHIN A REALISTIC AND POSITIVE
FRAMEWORK, THE SOONER THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WILL BE PUT IN A
POSITION TO EXERCISE THAT RIGHT. I DO NOT BELIEVE A CHANGE
IN BRITISH POLICY OR MINISTERIAL CONTACTS WITH THE PLO, IN THE
ABSENCE OF STEPS BY THE PLO WHICH WE BELIEVE WOULD GREATLY
STRENGTHEN THEIR DIPLOMATIC POSITION, ARE LIKELY TO HELP TO
BRING THIS ABOUT. OUR POSITION ON CONTACTS WITH THE PLO IS
BASED ON OUR CONVICTION THAT PLO ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF
ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST IN PEACE AND SECURITY, IF ISRAEL IS
PREPARED TO ACCEPT LEGITIMATE PALESTINIAN RIGHTS, AND OF THE
NEED FOR A SETTLEMENT TO BE REACHED BY PEACEFUL MEANS, IS

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40905 - 1

A NECESSARY STEP IF THERE ARE TO BE REALISTIC NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF THE PALESTINIANS. IT IS VITAL FOR BOTH SIDES TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR MAKING PROGRESS TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

I BELIEVE THAT THERE IS BROAD AGREEMENT BETWEEN US ON MANY ASPECTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM: AND I AM SADDENED THAT THIS PRESENT DISAGREEMENT SHOULD HAVE ARISEN WHEN I WAS SO MUCH LOOKING FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE ISSUES WITH KING HASSAN AND HIS DELEGATION. I HOPE A WAY CAN BE FOUND, CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES OF OURSELVES AND THE ARAB PEOPLES, FOR THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO COME TO LONDON AND FOR US TO HAVE THE PLEASURE OF RECEIVING THEM. I SHOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU IN ANY EVENT THAT WE SHALL CONTINUE TO PLAY AS ACTIVE A PART AS WE CAN IN THE SEARCH FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE. WE HAVE FOR EXAMPLE BEEN PRESSING THE AMERICANS HARD ON THE URGENT NEED FOR ISRAEL TO IMPLEMENT THE SETTLEMENTS FREEZE PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT I ATTACH THE GREATEST POSSIBLE IMPORTANCE TO HAVING THE VIEWS OF YOUR MAJESTY ON THIS AND OTHER MATTERS OF SUCH CONCERN TO BOTH OUR COUNTRIES. ENDS

PYM

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CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

CONFIDENTIAL

CHANCELLOR OF EXCHEQUER'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA: 8 JANUARY

POINTS TO MAKE

1. We were surprised and disturbed at your decision to postpone the Foreign Secretary's visit. We have been still more concerned at your apparent encouragement of the UAE and Qatar to follow their example. You will be aware of the sensational press coverage of all this in Britain. We need to look at things coolly and avoid any precipitate action if our relationship - which is historically very important to both countries - is not to be permanently damaged.
2. In view of the widespread speculation about boycotts we hope you will state publically the assurances already made by the Crown Prince to the Ambassador that there is no question of any sort of economic boycott of Britain.

BACKGROUND

3. The Foreign Secretary was invited by the Saudi Foreign Minister to visit Saudi Arabia in September. At the last moment the Saudis proved unable to agree mutually convenient dates. We suggested to them in December that the invitation be taken up during a visit Mr Pym had long been planning to the Gulf States in January 1983. On 28 December the Saudis informed us that the invitation stood, but that the proposed timing was not convenient: they wished to wait until the problem of Palestinian representation in the Arab League Delegation was resolved.
4. The story broke in the UK press on 2 January and since there have been headlines speculating inter alia on dangers to Anglo-Saudi trade and the possibility of a boycott, encouraged by a letter - unauthorised by the Saudi Government - from an Assistant Deputy Minister in the Ministry of the Interior urging economic measures against Britain. In fact Crown Prince Abdullah told Sir J Craig soon after postponement of the Arab League Delegation visit that there was no question of economic

/sanctions

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sanctions against Britain.

5. Some evidence that the Saudis encouraged the UAE and Qatar to follow their example and postpone the visits that the Foreign Secretary was to pay there on 10/12 January and 14/15 January.

Middle East Department

5 January 1983

MUHAMMAD ABA AL-KHAIL

Minister of Finance and National Economy.

Born about 1930 - brother of Abdul Rahman, Ambassador to Egypt until the break in diplomatic relations in 1979.

Graduate (1956) of the University of Cairo, where he was a contemporary of Abdul Aziz al Quraishi. A long serving member of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, which he now heads. Director General of the Institute of Public Administration in 1962, Deputy Minister of Finance from 1964-70 and Vice-Minister from 1970-2. Minister of State for Finance and National Economy and member of the Council of Ministers February 1972. Appointed Minister October 1975 in succession to Musaid bin Abdul Rahman. Chairman of the boards of the Saudi Development Fund, the Saudi Industrial Development Fund, the Public Investment Fund, the IPA, and the Saudi International Bank: member of the Supreme Petroleum Council, the committee set up to follow up implementation of the Second Five Year Plan, PETROMIN and SAUDIA.

Capable, and with a quiet style. Has the reputation of being one of the few technocrats who can stand up to the Royal Family. Seems to be favourably disposed towards Britain.

Speaks good English.

ABDUL AZIZ AL QURAIISHI

Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency.

Born about 1940 in Taif; his brothers are wealthy merchants (the foundations of their fortune were laid by his eldest brother Ali).

Educated in Cairo and at the University of Southern California. Chairman of the General Personnel Bureau (roughly equivalent to the Civil Service Department) from 1968 and a Minister of State and member of the Council of Ministers from June 1971. Appointed to his present post in November 1974.

An able administrator. As Chairman of the General Personnel Bureau he introduced some order into the selection, appointment and training of civil servants and acted as Minister of State for Finance in the absence of Aba al-Khail. He has proved himself an able and effective Governor and must now be considered one of Saudi Arabia's most powerful commoners. Intelligent, courteous and approachable.

Has a flat in Brighton, where he spends as much time as he can with his family.

Speaks good English.

KING FAHD BIN ABDUL AZIZ

King and Prime Minister since 13 June 1982.

Born 1921. The eldest of King Abdul Aziz's seven sons by Hassa bint Sudairi. Educated in Saudi Arabia.

Appointed Minister of Education in December 1953. At the same time he was Amir of al-Jauf and Um Laj. He represented his father at The Queen's Coronation.

Minister of the Interior in 1962 and Second Deputy Prime Minister in 1967. In November 1970 led a delegation to London to discuss Anglo/Saudi relations and the future of the Gulf. In March 1975, on the assassination of King Faisal, he was appointed Crown Prince, and in September of the same year First Deputy Prime Minister. He became King on the death of his brother Khalid, in June 1982. He was in practice Prime Minister throughout his brother's reign, though the title was held by Khalid. His position was strengthened by the support of his full brothers, the so-called 'Sudairi Seven'.

Fahd's formal education was modest and his is no intellectual. But he is shrewd and has learned by experience. He has now been in politics for 30 years and has met most the world's leaders. He talks fluently though not always profoundly (and he is no orator). He is a moderate, prefers agreement to disagreement, but can be tough when necessary. Progressive within the limits imposed by the Islamic nature of Saudi Arabia. Firmly committed to the West and especially to the U.S.A. Tends to be his own Foreign Minister, to the occasional annoyance of Saud bin-Faisal.

*Paragraph deleted and closed, 40 years, under
FOI Exemption. AWayland
7 May 2013*

PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ

Crown Prince. First Deputy Prime Minister and Commander of the National Guard.

Born 1923: son of Abdul Aziz by a mother from the Shammari tribe. Educated in Saudi Arabia. Appointed Commander of the National Guard in January 1963. In July 1973 he paid an official visit to Britain as the guest of Lord Carrington, then Minister of Defence. Second Deputy Prime Minister in March 1975, on the death of King Faisal. Crown Prince and First Deputy Prime Minister since June 1982. GCMG 1979.

At first showed little sign of interest in public affairs, but he was in 1962 a tepid supporter of the quasi-Nasserist 'Free Princes'. He abandoned them when offered the National Guard. He and the Guard played an important role in the crisis between Faisal and Saud in 1963 and again in 1964.

His long term with the National Guard (the para-military counter-weight to the Army and drawn from the Beduin) has given Abdullah special influence with the tribes, to whom by birth and temperament he is anyway close: he is related by marriage to the Shaalan, the ruling family of the Ruwala beduin confederation.

*Passage deleted and closed, 40 years, under
FOI Exemption. OWayland, 7 May 2013*

Although the main training of the Guard was given in 1971 to the American Vinnell Corporation, he is in private critical of American policy and inclined to praise the British - for their past rather than their present. The Guard retain a British Military Mission, and two big contracts are operated under agreements with HMG: communications and a hospital.

Abdullah gained in public prominence during the seventies. As Second Deputy Prime Minister he withdrew somewhat from the day-to-day running of the National Guard, which is now largely in the hands of the Assistant Deputy Commander, Abdul Aziz al Tuwaijiri.

Because of his contacts he is often used as an emissary to Iraq, Jordan and, especially Syria. Abdullah is second in the hierarchy, sandwiched between the full brothers Fahd and Sultan - perhaps rather uncomfortably.

*Passage deleted and closed. 40 years, under
FOI Exemption. CWayland, 7 May 2013*

He is likely to have increasing difficulty coping with the growing complexity of government. His principle pleasures are hunting trips and horse racing. He is very interested in bloodstock and is Chariman of the Riyadh Horsemanship Club, where he entertained The Queen during her visit in 1979. The Prime Minister has invited him to pay an official visit to Britain some time in 1983, but dates have yet to be fixed.

He speaks no English and his Arabic is difficult to follow since he stammers, at times badly. His sons are Khalid, Mit'ab, Turki, Faisal, Abdul Aziz and two infants. Mit'ab and Turki trained at Sandhurst and both are in the National Guard.

CHANCELLOR OF EXCHEQUER'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA: 8 JANUARY

POINTS TO MAKE

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4. The story broke in the UK press on 2 January and since there have been headlines speculating inter alia on dangers to Anglo-Saudi trade and the possibility of a boycott, encouraged by a letter-unauthorised by the Saudi Government - from an Assistant Deputy Minister in the Ministry of the Interior urging economic measures against Britain. In fact Crown Prince Abdullah told Sir J Craig soon after postponement of the Arab League Delegation visit that there was no question of economic

/sanctions

PRINCE SAUD BIN FAISAL BIN ABDUL AZIZ

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Born 1941. Third son of King Faisal. Studied in USA and one year at Cambridge. Deputy Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources 1971-75. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs March 1975. Minister of Foreign Affairs October 1975.

Appointed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the assassination of his father. At the time it was generally predicted that his appointment would bring reforms to a body which had become increasingly second-rate. These expectations have been only partially fulfilled.

The guiding hand in Saudi foreign policy is that of King Fahd. Though Saud is firmly anti-Soviet, his views on, in particular, the Arab/Israel dispute are closer to those of his own generation of young Arab nationalists and he can sound more intransigent than Fahd. There has been occasional evidence of strain between the two.

While at the Ministry of Petroleum Saud was considered by a leading British economist good enough to have reached the top, even if he had not been a prince. He is tall, handsome and articulate. Very bright but perhaps not so bright as he thinks. He speaks excellent English. The Saudis appreciate that this makes him an asset with the Western media. Rumours that he may be moved (perhaps to Petroleum) in expected cabinet reshuffle, but Embassy tend to discount this.

Married to Jauhara bint Abdullah bin Abdul Rahman, he has two sons and three daughters. Plays tennis well.

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FM BEIRUT 041115Z JAN 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2 OF 4 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, AMMAN

INFO SAVING PARIS AND ROME.

lead in file.

MY TELNO 359 OF 31 DECEMBER (NOT TO ALL) AND HUMFREY'S
TELELETTER TO CHAPLIN NO LO20/1 OF 23 DECEMBER:

ms

UNIFIL

1. LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER SENT FOR ME THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS TWO TOPICS, THE FIRST OF WHICH WAS UNIFIL.
2. ELIE SALEM SAID THAT THEY HAD NOW DEFINITELY DECIDED TO ASK FOR A STRONGER MANDATE FOR UNIFIL. THEY DID NOT AT THE MOMENT WISH TO INCREASE THE NUMBERS OF THE FORE, BUT THE WISHES TO BE ABLE TO USE IT ANYWHERE IN THE LEBANON AND TO GIVE IT GREATER POWERS OF ACTION. HE HOPED WE WOULD HELP.
3. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT CONFINED TO THE SOUTH AND WITH ITS PRESENT MANDATE THE FORCE WAS USELESS AND DEMORALISED. THE ISRAELIS TREATED IT WITH CONTEMPT, AND HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT AS CONSITUTED AT PRESENT IT WOULD SIMPLY DWINDLE AWAY AS THE RATS LEFT THE SINKING SHIP.
4. I SAID THAT I WAS CONFIDENT THAT WE WOULD SUPPORT HIM, BUT HAD HE THOUGHT OF THE SOVIET REACTION? SALEM SAID THAT HE HAD JUST HAD THE SOVIET CHARGE D'AFFAIRS IN AND HAD TOLD HIM THAT UNIFIL WAS VITAL TO THE INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY OF LEBANON. THE SOVIET UNION HAD OFTEN PROCLAIMED ITSELF IN FAVOUR OF LEBANESE INDEPENDENCE. NOW WAS THE TIME TO SHOW IT.
5. I ASKED WHAT THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE. SALEM SAID THAT THE LEBANESE DELEGATION IN NEW YORK WOULD BE CONFERRING WITH THEIR COLLEAGUES, PARTICULARLY WITH THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

CONFIDENTIAL

/6.SALEM

CONFIDENTIAL

6. SALEM MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE REGARDED UNIFIL AS SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE MNF AND NOT A SUBSITUTE. HE REITERATED HIS GRATITUDE FOR OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE MNF AND SAID IT WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE WANTED.

7. THE LEBANESE PROPOSAL BRISTLES WITH DIFFICULTIES, OF WHICH NO DOUBT EVEN MORE ARE APPATENT IN NEW YORK THAN HERE. I RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD :

- (A) GENTLY POINT OUT THE SNAGS, BUT
- (B) OFFER OUR WHOLE-HEARTED SUPPORT IF THE LEBANESE DECIDE TO TAKE THE PLUNGE.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

ROBERTS

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CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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SUBJECT

cc. Madris



BF

file Lb

blind copy to

Sir A Parsons

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 January 1983

MIDDLE EAST

Mr. Hurd called on the Prime Minister at Chequers today for a discussion of certain problems affecting our policy towards the Middle East, in particular the current difficulties surrounding the proposal that an Arab League Delegation should visit London. Sir Anthony Parsons was also present.

Mr. Hurd emphasised the danger posed to our interests in the Middle East by our present attitude towards the PLO. This problem could have, and was perhaps already beginning to have, an adverse effect on our commercial and other interests in the area. He did not wish to suggest that the Prime Minister should receive a PLO representative but he believed that in due course we should need to show more flexibility in our attitude to the PLO.

The Prime Minister said that she did not believe it would be right for a Cabinet Minister to receive a PLO representative, but we should look for other ways of enabling the Arab League visit to proceed.

It was agreed that we should seek now to achieve a lessening of public interest in the proposed visit and should avoid giving any impression that we were running after the Arabs. In public we should take the line that we were in contact with Arab Governments about the problem and hoped that it would be possible for the visit to take place, if not in the immediate future, then a little later in the year. Meanwhile, we should continue to negotiate the arrangements with King Hassan, whose definitive response to our latest proposals was still awaited.

There was also some discussion of ways of improving the atmosphere of our relationship with Saudi Arabia. It would be helpful if the Chancellor of the Exchequer would take any opportunity during his forthcoming visit to Riyadh to emphasise our desire for good relations and our wish that suitable arrangements can be made for an Arab League Delegation to be received in London as soon as possible (though Sir Geoffrey Howe would not wish to enter into discussion of the nature of the arrangements).

/Two other

de

Two other matters were also discussed:-

- (a) On Oman, Mr. Hurd said that a recent conversation with General Creasey had shown that there were still problems to be settled regarding British personnel serving with the Sultan's Armed Forces. The Prime Minister said that it was imperative that these long-standing problems should be sorted out very quickly indeed.
- (b) It was agreed that a further meeting should be arranged at which our policy towards the general Arab/Israel problem and our strategy in the Middle East as a whole should be discussed (it is unlikely to be possible to find a suitable time for such a meeting until next month).

Finally, the Prime Minister asked Mr. Hurd to brief the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on the various matters discussed at the meeting.

I am copying this letter to John Kerr (H.M. Treasury).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RS 363

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Middle East

SKBY 301100Z DEC 82

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FM DOHA 300925Z DEC 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 262 OF 30 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE JEDDA, MUSCAT, ABU DHABI AND DUBAI

INFO ROUTINE KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, RABAT AND TUNIS

ms

YOUR TELNO. 439: YOUR VISIT

1. SINCE QATARIS ARE TRADITIONALLY THE MOST INCLINED OF ALL ARABS TO FOLLOW THE SAUDIS AND LEAST RESOLUTE ON PUBLIC CONTROVERSIES, I THOUGHT IT BEST TO PUT THE SITUATION FRANKLY TO ISSA KAWARI (AMIR'S CHEF DE CABINET) AND SHAIKH AHMED BIN SAIF (MINISTER OF STATE, MFA). I SAID I HOPED THE VISIT COULD GO AHEAD AS PLANNED AND STRESSED THE CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY NEGOTIATIONS WITH KING HASSAN AND THE DIFFICULTY OF PREDICTING THE OUTCOME OF THE ARAB LEAGUE VISIT ISSUE. I ALSO UNDERLINED THE NUMBER OF BILATERAL MATTERS WORTHY OF DISCUSSION AND THE NEED TO SEE THE ARAB LEAGUE VISIT IN A WIDER CONTEXT.

2. ISSA IMMEDIATELY WENT IN TO SEE THE AMIR, RETURNING A FEW MINUTES LATER TO ASK IF WE COULD GIVE THE QATARIS 48 HOURS BEFORE DECIDING. HE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN FURTHER.

3. WHEN I SAW SHAIKH AHMED TEN MINUTES LATER, HE HAD ALREADY SPOKEN WITH THE DIWAN AND WAS MORE FORTHCOMING. HE SAID THAT, WHILE THE QATARIS HAD BEEN MUCH LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT, IT WAS INEVITABLE THE AMIR WOULD WISH TO FOCUS DISCUSSION ON THE ARAB LEAGUE VISIT. EQUALLY INEVITABLY, HE WOULD CONCERT WITH THE MOROCCANS AND SAUDIS BEFORE AND AFTER. THE AMIR WISHED TO CONSULT HIS CLOSE ADVISERS AND SLEEP ON THE ISSUES. WHATEVER HIS DECISION, SHAIKH AHMED WISHED ME TO PASS TO YOU HIS ASSURANCE THAT THE QATARIS WERE MOST ANXIOUS TO MINIMISE CONTROVERSY AND TO MAINTAIN WARM RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM.

4. I FEAR THE QATARIS WILL PROBABLY SEEK POSTPONEMENT. THEY WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY CONSULT THE SAUDIS AND I WOULD EXPECT THEM TO SAY LITTLE OR NOTHING IN PUBLIC (PARTICULARLY SINCE THE VISIT HAS NOT BEEN ANNOUNCED HERE).

5. I HAVE NOW SEEN JEDDA TELNO. 632 AND AGREE THAT THE DANGER IS AS PRESENTED IN PARA. 1. GIVEN QATAR'S RELIANCE ON SAUDI ARABIA AND HER ANXIETY TO AVOID THE LIMELIGHT, I THINK IT WAS NECESSARY TO AIR THE ISSUES PRIVATELY TODAY RATHER THAN RISK CANCELLATION IN THE FACE OF PUBLIC CONTROVERSY NEXT WEEK. I HOPE WE CAN GIVE THE QATARIS THE 48 HOURS THEY ASK FOR.

DAY
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NENAD
P.C.D
NEWSD
PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS

SIR J LEAHY
SIR J BULLARD
MR GOODISON
MR EGERTON
LORD N. G. LENNEX

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No. 10 DOWNING STREET

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MR COLES - o.r.

A.J.C. 5/11.

LORD CARRINGTON'S VISIT

Lord Carrington called on the Prime Minister today to report on his final hearing before the Franks Committee, and I have recorded that conversation separately. He made two other points which it is worth recording:

(i) He said that King Hassan had an interesting theory about the Israelis. It was that the Israeli policy on the West Bank was part of a deliberate plan to drive the Arabs from there into Jordan and create a Lebanon-type situation in Jordan, which would give the Israelis a pretext for going into Jordan. King Hassan believed that the Israelis ultimate aim was a border with the Saudis with whom they thought they could get on with. Lord Carrington said that he found the last proposition plausible, if not the easier part.

Lord Carrington also said that there was much feeling in the Arab world that the Americans had been very feeble with the Israelis in not urging them to withdraw from Lebanon: if they could not even do that, what hope was there for the Reagan peace plan. Lord Carrington remarked, and the Prime Minister agreed, that the Americans clout with the Israelis was very slight because the only instruments at their disposal - cutting off money or cutting off weapons - could not be used without endangering the whole State of Israel.

(ii) Lord Carrington said that he had paid a visit on Mr Saddam Hussein, whom he had found "less of a thug than he had previously thought". There was an astonishing lack of any guilt or even recognition that he had started the war with Iran, and Lord Carrington's impression was that the war would continue in much like its present state for some time, in a form of stalemate.

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COLOMBO'S MEETING WITH ARAFAT

1. THE MFA (MOSCATO) GAVE A COMMUNITY BRIEFING ON 23 DECEMBER ON COLOMBO'S TALK WITH ARAFAT IN TUNIS ON 21 DECEMBER. COLOMBO WAS IN TUNIS TO DISCUSS FISHING PROBLEMS, AND HE CONCLUDED TWO AGREEMENTS ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION (SEPARATE REPORT ON THIS FOLLOWS BY BAG, NOT TO ALL).

2. MOSCATO SAID THAT THE MEETING WITH ARAFAT WAS AT PLO REQUEST AND TOOK PLACE LATE AT NIGHT. ARAFAT WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE PLO REPRESENTATIVE IN ROME

AND OTHER ADVISERS: COLOMBO HAD OFFICIALS WITH HIM. MOSCATO STRESSED THAT THE MEETING FOLLOWED NATURALLY FROM THE ONE IN ROME ON 15 SEPTEMBER (ROME TELNO 467) AND DID NOT IMPLY ANY CHANGE IN ITALY'S POSITION ON RECOGNITION OF THE PLO. WE KNOW FROM THE US EMBASSY THAT THE AMERICANS WERE WARNED IN ADVANCE ABOUT THIS MEETING. IT HAS SO FAR NOT PROVOKED POLITICAL CONTROVERSY IN ITALY.

3. ARAFAT TOOK A MODERATE LINE, DESPITE SHOWING HIS RESENTMENT OF US INFLEXIBILITY. THE FEZ SUMMIT HAD BEEN A GREAT STEP FORWARD, AND THE PLO REMAINED COMMITTED TO A PEACEFUL AND JUST SETTLEMENT. THEY HAD SHOWN THEIR QUOTE OPENNESS UNQUOTE TOWARDS ISRAEL BY DECLARING WILLINGNESS TO CREATE A PALESTINIAN STATE IN PART OF THE FORMER BRITISH MANDATE TERRITORY, THUS IMPLYING THAT ISRAEL WOULD CONTINUE TO OCCUPY THE REST. DESTRUCTION OF THE JEWISH STATE WAS NOT (NOT) PART OF PLO POLICY. POINT 7 OF THE FAHD PLAN, REFLECTED IN THE FEZ COMMUNIQUE, ALSO CONSTITUTED IMPLICIT RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL. MORE RECENTLY, ARAFAT HAD RESPONDED TO REAGAN'S IDEA OF LINKAGE BETWEEN THE WEST BANK AND JORDAN BY ADVANCING THE HYPOTHESIS OF A CONFEDERATION. (MOSCATO COMMENTED THAT ARAFAT USED THE WORDS FEDERATION AND CONFEDERATION INDISCRIMINATELY, UNLESS THE INTERPRETATION WAS FAULTY). FINALLY, KING HUSSEIN HAD BEEN AUTHORISED TO CONFIRM PLO WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN TALKS EITHER AS PART OF AN ARAB DELEGATION OR IN A JOINT PALESTINIAN/JORDANIAN DELEGATION: IN EITHER CASE, ARAFAT WOULD INSIST NOT THAT THE PALESTINIAN SPOKESMEN BE PLO MEMBERS BUT ONLY THAT THEY BE NOMINATED BY THE PLO. THE WESTERN RESPONSE TO ALL THIS PLO FLEXIBILITY HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTING. TO MAKE PLO RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL A PRECONDITION OF TALKS WAS TO FORGET THAT ARAFAT'S POSITION WAS MUCH WEAKER THAN SADAT'S AT THE TIME OF CAMP DAVID. THE PLO HAD TO KEEP THIS CARD IN RESERVE UNTIL THEY WERE SURE OF A SATISFACTORY (UNDERLINE NEXT THREE WORDS) QUID PRO QVO. FINALLY ARAFAT EXPRESSED HIS BITTERNESS AT THE US REFUSAL TO PUT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL: THIS HAD MADE THE LEBANESE MASSACRES POSSIBLE. THE ISRAELIS WERE STILL OCCUPYING LEBANON, AND PHALANGE EXTREMISTS IN THE LEBANESE ARMY WERE HELPING THEM IN THE ANTI-PALESTINIAN CAUSE.

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4. COLOMBO SAID THAT REAGAN'S SEPTEMBER SPEECH DID REPRESENT AN EVOLUTION OF US THINKING ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. HE URGED ARAFAT TO CONSIDER AT LEAST CONDITIONAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL, WHICH WOULD HAVE THREE BENEFICIAL EFFECTS:

- A) ISRAEL WOULD LOSE HERE MAIN PRETEXT FOR NOT BEGINNING NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
- B) THE US WOULD BE ABLE TO DEAL WITH BOTH SIDES IN THE DISPUTE
- C) THE TEN COULD INTERVENE MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH THE US AND ISRAEL.

ARAFAT REPEATED THAT THE PLO COULD ONLY PLAY THIS TRUMP CARD IF THERE WERE THE PROSPECT OF A GLOBAL SETTLEMENT. THE TEN COULD HELP BY EXPLAINING THIS IN WASHINGTON AND BY SPELLING OUT IN PUBLIC HOW THEY WOULD RESPOND TO PLO RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL. MOSCATO SAID THAT COLOMBO AND ARAFAT WENT ROUND THIS COURSE SEVERAL TIMES WITHOUT MAKING FURTHER PROGRESS: COLOMBO THOUGHT IT WISER THIS TIME NOT TO SPEAK OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION BY THE PLO AND ISRAEL (PARA 5 OF TUR), SINCE BEGIN'S ATTITUDE MADE THIS A NON-STARTER.

5. THERE WAS NO TIME FOR SUBSTANTIAL DISCUSSION OF LEBANON.

6. SUMMING UP, MOSCATO SAID THAT COLOMBO WAS STRUCK BY ARAFAT'S APPRECIATION OF EUROPE'S EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF THE PALESTINIANS SINCE THE VENICE DECLARATION. THE ITALIAN ASSESSMENT WAS THAT ARAFAT'S OWN POSITION WAS SECURE AT PRESENT AND THAT HE HAD GIVEN HUSSEIN A MANDATE FOR WASHINGTON WHICH WAS DESIGNED TO BE HELPFUL. EVERYTHING DEPENDED ON THE US RESPONSE: AN OFFER BY THEM TO BEGIN DIRECT TALKS WITH THE PLO WOULD NOT SUFFICE TO SECURE EXPLICIT PLO RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL: FOR THIS THE US WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT SOME FORM OF PLO PARTICIPATION IN NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO A GLOBAL SETTLEMENT, AND TO URGE TEL AVIV TO DO LIKEWISE.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

SIMPSON-ORLEBAR

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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I have explained to the F.C.O. that this does not really cover the point which the P.R. has in mind. And that I may wish to commission a new paper after the meeting we are to have on our strategy in the Middle East. A.J.C. 5/1.

Dear John,

Israel: Bastion of the West?

I understand that the Prime Minister, in a recent conversation with Mr Pym, argued that we should not forget the usefulness of Israel to the West in a crisis. It occurred to me that you might like to see, for your own information, a copy of a paper produced in the FCO in 1980 which addresses this proposition. The conclusions of the paper seem to have stood the test of time pretty well. Since it was written the US Administration have gone through something of a U-turn in their attitude to Israel. The Reagan Administration, in its first year or so, laid considerable stress on the advantages of a strategic relationship with Israel, in line with the campaign rhetoric of President Reagan. Since then this idea has been quietly dropped, particularly since General Haig left office.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

THE VALUE OF ISRAEL TO THE WEST IN A CRISIS SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED

1. It is frequently argued, particularly in the US, that Israel is a strategic asset to the West which we would be ill-advised to jeopardise. The Israelis, who long ago concluded that equating the Arab/Israel conflict with the East-West conflict was in their strategic interest, have been assiduous in pushing the view that Israel is both an extension of European civilization in the Middle East and a strategic asset. Governor Reagan has been a prominent convert. In an article in the Herald Tribune last year he described Israel as a 'stabilising force' in the region, a 'deterrent to radical hegemony' and a 'military offset to the Soviet Union'. He went on to argue that Israel's value to the West derived from the reliability of her affinity with the West, in contrast with autocratic and capricious Arab regimes, whose allegiance depended on their survival, and to ascribe to Israel the 'democratic will, national cohesion technological capacity and military fibre' to be 'America's trusted ally'. As examples of her usefulness in a crisis he gave the possession of regional intelligence, the provision of servicing and staging facilities and the effective dominance of Israeli forces, particularly in the air, over critical zones of areas and transit which restrict Soviet options.

2. How far does this view stand up to analysis? There are perhaps four different questions to answer:

i) what military assistance, direct or indirect, could Israel in practice provide in a crisis?

ii) What could Israel provide that others cannot?

iii) How far and under what circumstances would the West be able/willing to take advantage of them?

iv) Would Israel's willingness to provide them be jeopardised by likely developments in Western policy in the area?

What could Israel provide?

3. This has to be related to likely Western military action, in particular to the US ability to fulfil its recent pledge to repel by any means necessary an attempt to gain control of the Gulf region by an outside force. The tentative conclusions of our Embassy in Washington are that the US can, without much assistance, project in the area some naval and air power, mainly for political effect, and could also provide at short notice token ground forces. However, the ability to build up and sustain any substantial forces will require improved earmarking of forces, lift capability and access to a network of regional supply and logistic facilities which does not at present exist. The situation could be improved by 1985 but would presumably still fall short of the capability to match Soviet deployments in a crisis. The allies' main contribution would be in political support, provision of facilities and perhaps naval assistance.

4. In this context Israel's assets can be summarised as follows:

- (a) likely readiness to respond quickly and decisively to a Western call for help;
- (b) a well-equipped and relatively well-trained army with combat experience, one of the best air forces in the world and a small but effective navy. All with Western equipment and trained in Western military thinking;
- (c) geographical position as a forward base with good port facilities and military airfields equipped to sustain intensive activity by combat and transport aircraft.

The Israelis could therefore offer virtually guaranteed political co-operation, staging/base facilities and possibly actual fighting forces.

5. However, this might not prove so straightforward as it looks on paper. In the first place the Israelis could not provide independently sustained units overseas, since their military effort is not geared to such an effort. It could well be argued that the transport and supply facilities necessary to utilise Israeli fighting forces should be used to move Western, not Israeli, units. Moreover, in a situation where a general regional conflagration would presumably be on the cards, how many of their own units would the Israelis be prepared to provide? Even assuming the continuation of the current Israeli military superiority over the Arabs, most of the army and air force strength would have to remain in place to provide a credible deterrent to Israel's Arab neighbours. Finally, the extent to which Israel's contribution would be genuinely effective would depend to a large extent on the degree of pre-planning. Since a crisis is by definition likely to arise very quickly and since forward planning for military co-operation (which would inevitably leak) would almost certainly be politically unthinkable, pre-planning is unlikely. This applies also to the contribution Israeli staging/base facilities could make. Use of airfields and fuelling facilities, etc., would clearly be valuable but what would be needed more than anything else would be prepositioned stores, spares, equipment, etc. Such prepositioning would again be politically virtually impossible. This greatly reduces the practical contribution that Israel could make to a Western military response.

6. Israel is unlikely to have much to offer in the way of regional intelligence which is not already known to the West. However, her ability, by her regional military dominance, to inhibit Soviet options and assistance from neighbouring states (eg. Syria) to the Soviet Union could be important in certain circumstances, particularly in the air. Certainly a militarily strong Israel with

/ close

close links with the West would be a complicating factor for Soviet planners thinking of military action in the region.

What could Israel offer that others cannot?

7. Several other states in the area offer the same geographical forward base advantages as Israel. The Americans have been seeking facilities in Kenya, Oman, and Somalia and improved military relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Israel can offer greater technological capability, but her main asset must be her political reliability. For example, both Somalia and Egypt were until relatively recently providing facilities to the Soviet Union and could presumably reverse their alliances once more; Oman's political future is uncertain, as is Saudi Arabia's. Egypt's readiness to co-operate depends on the survival of Sadat (the example of Iran sounds a caution). As far as the provision of base and prepositioning facilities is concerned, this advantage is of little significance because of the difficulty of advance arrangements with Israel. But Israel would not suffer from the same inhibitions about offending regional/world opinion as any of her rivals and in circumstances where speed and possibly direct military assistance were needed could be the only state in a position to offer what the West might want.

How far is Israel usable?

8. The political difficulties of co-operation with Israel crop up from whichever side the problem is considered. It is significant that the US (which has a closer relationship with Israel than any other Western country and which might be thought to be least vulnerable to Arab pressure) has, in considering its military options and capability in South-West Asia, more or less disregarded Israel entirely. The Americans appear to regard participation by Israeli forces in fighting against a Soviet or Soviet-backed enemy outside Israel as inconceivable, short of a general holocaust, and American use of Israeli facilities, as opposed to others they are working to establish, as highly unlikely except in the most dire circumstances (cf. the non-use of Israel in the Iran rescue attempt). This highlights the overwhelming nature of the political arguments against Israel.

9. The arguments can be illustrated by considering Israel's possible role in a variety of crises:

- i) Serious internal unrest/civil war/coup, whether or not fo. mented from outside, in Saudi Arabia or another Gulf country: Israeli forces could be useful if a very swift reaction were needed, and Israeli staging facilities could be of great value, but the use of Israeli forces to support an Arab regime or Israel's involvement in Western support would almost certainly be the kiss of death for the regime in foreseeable circumstances. More widely, immediate military advantage would be far outweighed by the universal outrage throughout the Arab world and much of the rest of the Third World.

/ ii)

- ii) Seizure of another Western Embassy on the US Embassy in Tehran analogy: use of Israel, eg. to rescue hostages would tend to turn local and Third World opinion in favour of any 'militants' and severely jeopardise wider relations both with the country involved and with other Arab countries. In any event, Israeli help is not necessary for this kind of operation, eg. the US attempt in Iran.
- iii) Attack by Soviet Union on Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, etc: direct Israeli military usefulness would be limited in the face of a full-scale attack but Israeli support for a token US force could be important in the early stages. Israel could be of enormous assistance as a forward base. However, use of Israel could rule out co-operation of other regional countries whose military facilities and/or contribution might be as great or greater, taken collectively, and whose impact on wider Third World opinion could be vital. Nevertheless, depending on the country involved and on the scale of the attack, the West could be at the brink of full-scale confrontation. It could therefore be a question of all hands to the pumps to provide a swift and credible conventional military response in order to avoid a nuclear confrontation. Israel might be the only country in the area ready to commit her own forces to fight against the Soviet Union or to offer her facilities in the face of a Soviet threat to declare war on any state helping the West.
- iv) Action to seize the Gulf oilfields, whether in the face of a Soviet attack on them or a concerted Arab move to withhold oil supplies: such a decision could be taken by the West only in the most extreme circumstances in which either we had decided that good relations with the Arabs were secondary to the protection of our vital interests or general holocaust was thought likely to break out. In such circumstances, the political arguments against use of Israel, while they would probably not disappear entirely, since we might wish to retain the goodwill of non-oil-producing regional states, would be much reduced.

10. Other scenarios can be thought up but the general principle is clear: in situations short of major confrontation involving the Soviet Union, the political arguments against making use of Israel are very strong indeed, and other alternatives are available. In extremis the political objections dwindle rapidly and Israel could be very useful indeed in such circumstances.

/ Israel's

Israel's willingness to help

11. As far as we are aware there has been very little, if any, discussion between the US and Israel over the willingness of Israel to support the West, military or logistically, in a crisis, no doubt largely because of political sensitivity. There is of course no formal alliance or defence agreement between the US and Israel of any kind. The Americans have on the whole been very careful to avoid the use of the word 'ally' about Israel. Nevertheless, it can be safely assumed that in most circumstances Israel would see considerable advantage in demonstrating in a concrete way her value to and affinity with the West. Mr Begin said recently in public that he believed America needed to station conventional forces in the area to check possible Soviet expansion and that he would personally endorse any request by the United States to locate a military base in his country. However, it cannot be taken for granted that Israel would involve herself in a conflict from which she herself stood little to gain when one of the consequences of her involvement could be her own destruction.

12. Israel will certainly continue to see her future as lying in as close a relationship with the West, and particularly the US, as possible (although this will not prevent her from jeopardising these relations where she considers her own vital interests are at stake). The chances of an Israeli-Soviet rapprochement are very small indeed. Would Israel's future usefulness in a crisis therefore be affected by Western political policy towards Israel, eg. a further move towards acceptance of Palestinian claims, 'recognition' of the PLO, overt pressure on Israel over the Palestinian issue, etc? It is probable that, despite fierce Israeli resentment of such Western shifts in policy, they would nevertheless be ready to set aside such differences in order to prove their worth and resist a common threat. Indeed, in some respects their readiness to help could be increased, since any assistance offered would be a most valuable bargaining counter for their dealings with the West. Conversely, the Israelis would be aware that refusal to help would be seen in the West as an act of gross ingratitude given consistent Western political and military support for Israel. (The possibility of Western/US policies which would leave Israel politically in complete isolation or militarily weak, thereby affecting either her political readiness to help or physical capacity to do so, is too remote to deserve serious consideration.)

Conclusions

13. Israel can theoretically offer the West a good deal but the political arguments against involving Israel on the West's side in a Middle East crisis are overwhelming. Except in the most extreme circumstances involving major military confrontation with the Soviet Union, when all options would be open, it would be counterproductive to use facilities in Israel. Moreover, other countries in the

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area, while less politically reliable and less technologically advanced, can offer much of what Israel offers. Their value is also considerably enhanced by the possibility of pre-planning and prepositioning of material, an option ruled out for political reasons in Israel's case. Israel is likely to respond favourably to a Western request for help, irrespective of Western policies in the Arab/Israel dispute (within certain limits).


Near East and North Africa Department

9 May 1980

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(PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR).

PERSONAL FOR SIR JOHN LEAHY OR MR ECERTON.

MY TELNO 580: PLO ATTITUDES.

1. AS YOU WILL HAVE REALISED FROM THE FINAL PARAGRAPH OF MY TUR, I WAS PRESSED VERY HARD BY DR HANNA MASSER ON THE BRITISH ATTITUDE TO RECEIVING A PLO REPRESENTATIVE WITHIN THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION AND IN PARTICULAR ON WHETHER WE WERE LIKELY TO PUT FORWARD TO THE MOROCCANS A FORMULA WHICH THE PLO WOULD FEEL ABLE TO ACCEPT.

I GOT THE STRONG IMPRESSION FROM HIM (ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SAY SO IN TERMS) THAT THIS QUESTION HAD BEEN EXTENSIVELY DISCUSSED AT THE RECENT PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING IN TUNIS AND THAT THE MODERATES IN THE PLO, INCLUDING MASSER HIMSELF, ARE LOOKING FOR A WAY TO GET OFF THE HOOK. THIS IS ENCOURAGING AS FAR AS IT GOES, BUT OF COURSE ALSO DEPENDS ON WHETHER, AND IF SO HOW FAR, WE ARE PREPARED TO MOVE FORWARD TO MEET THEM.

2. THE SORT OF FORMULA WHICH MASSER THOUGHT MIGHT DO THE TRICK WOULD BE IF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS AND THE PLO REPRESENTATIVE TOGETHER WERE RECEIVED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE WHILE MEETINGS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE QUEEN WERE CONFINED TO KING HASSAN, IN THIS WAY PUTTING THE PLO ON AN EQUAL FOOTING WITH THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES AS FAR AS THEIR RIGHT TO A ROLE IN THE SEARCH FOR A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT WAS CONCERNED. BUT I HAVE NO IDEA WHETHER MASSER WAS SPEAKING ONLY FOR HIMSELF IN SAYING THAT A COMPROMISE ON THESE LINES, IF IT WERE ACCEPTABLE TO US, MIGHT BREAK THE IMPASSE.

3. IN INTERESTING CONTRAST TO ARAFAT AND QADDOUMI (TUNIS TELNO 281) AND ALTHOUGH HE PREFACED ALL HIS REMARKS BY ASSERTING AS AN ESSENTIAL CONDITION THAT THE AMERICANS MUST DEMONSTRATE BEYOND DOUBT THEIR DETERMINATION TO SEE THROUGH THE REAGAN INITIATIVE, HANNA MASSER PRESSED ME HARD FOR MY PERSONAL (REPEAT PERSONAL) VIEWS ON THE SORT OF POSITION THE PLO SHOULD ADOPT AT THE OUTSET OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD FEW PERSONAL THOUGHTS ON THIS OTHER THAN THE OBVIOUS ONES. THE PLO SHOULD SURELY BASE THEIR POSITION ON RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, CALLING FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL BEHIND THE 1967 LINES AND OFFERING IN RETURN A CLEAR RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO PEACE AND SECURITY.

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IF THEY COULD AT THE OUTSET EXPRESS READINESS TO DISCUSS MINOR (REPEAT MINOR) FRONTIER RECTIFICATIONS (EG LATROUN SALIENT), THIS WOULD BE GOOD FOR THEIR IMAGE AND ALSO IMPROVE THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITION. THEY SHOULD ALSO, IN MY OWN PERSONAL VIEW, SHOW READINESS TO UNDERSTAND ISRAEL'S GENUINE SECURITY CONCERNS, WHICH WERE PERHAPS THE MIRROR IMAGE OF THEIR OWN. THEY MIGHT BEGIN BY OFFERING A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD UNDER UNITED NATIONS AUSPICES, AND ALSO BY ACCEPTING AT THE OUTSET THE NEED FOR A PERMANENT UN PRESENCE ON EITHER SIDE OF THE ISRAEL/ARAB BORDER. THE ISRAELIS WOULD PRESUNABLY START BY ASKING AT THE VERY LEAST FOR PERMANENT MILITARISED SETTLEMENTS ALONG THE JORDAN RIVER, ON THE LINES OF THE ALLON PLAN, AND WOULD CERTAINLY NOT ACCEPT A UN FORCE ON THEIR SIDE OF THE FRONTIER: THE LATTER POINT WAS SOMETHING THE PLO COULD AFFORD GRACIOUSLY TO CONCEDE IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHILE INSISTING FOR THEIR PART THAT THERE COULD BE NO ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE WITHIN THE FORMER OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THIS BROUGHT NASSER TO THE QUESTION OF SETTLEMENTS: I SUGGESTED THAT THERE MIGHT BE A TRADE-OFF SOMEWHERE BETWEEN ARABS LIVING WITHIN ISRAEL AND ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK. NASSER AGREED WITH THIS, BUT SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY WOULD NOT BE TOO WORRIED BY ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON LEAVING A LIMITED NUMBER OF CIVILIAN SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK, AS HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD WITHER AWAY IN DUE COURSE (THE FIRST TIME I HAVE EVER HEARD THIS FROM A SENIOR PLO REPRESENTATIVE).

4. I REPORT THIS EXCHANGE ONLY BECAUSE IT SHOWS THAT AT LEAST SOME MEMBERS IN THE HIGHER COUNCILS OF THE PLO ARE BEGINNING TO THINK HARD ABOUT THE COURSE NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT TAKE. BUT NASSER KEPT COMING BACK TO THE QUESTION OF US CREDIBILITY AND THE DEEP SHOCK WHICH THE PLO HAD SUFFERED FOLLOWING WHAT THEY REGARDED AS US BETRAYAL OF THEIR ASSURANCES TO PROTECT THE PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS IN LEBANON. HE ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE PLO WERE KEENLY AWARE OF THE DANGER FOR THEM OF BEING SUCKED INTO A CAMP DAVID-TYPE SITUATION, IN WHICH THEY WOULD COME UNDER IRRESISTIBLE PRESSURE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO YIELD TO UNACCEPTABLE ISRAELI DEMANDS IN THE RUN-UP TO THE US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.

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AND ROUTINE MOSCOW, PARIS, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK AND OTHER
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MY TELNO 573 PARAGRAPH 4 AND TUNIS TELNO 278:

JORDAN/PLO.

1. I SAW DR HANNA NASSER TODAY AT MY HOUSE ON HIS RETURN FROM ATTENDING THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING IN TUNIS (HANI EL HASSAN IS IN DAMASCUS). NASSER SAID THAT THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING HAD GONE WELL: ARAFAT HAD WON A LARGE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT FOR PURSUING THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS, ALTHOUGH EVERYTHING WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT KING HUSSEIN BROUGHT BACK FROM WASHINGTON. THE FACT THAT KHALED EL FAHOUM HAD BEEN ABLE TO ANNOUNCE THAT THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL WOULD MEET IN ALGIERS IN THE FIRST HALF OF FEBRUARY (NASSER THOUGHT 14 FEBRUARY THE MOST LIKELY DATE) WAS AN INDICATION OF ARAFAT'S CONFIDENCE THAT HE COULD NOW CARRY THE DAY WITHIN THE PLO.
2. NASSER SAID THAT OPINION WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE HAD COME DOWN FIRMLY IN FAVOUR OF AN ARAB NEGOTIATING TEAM TO FOLLOW UP THE REAGAN INITIATIVE, BUT THAT THE DETAILS OF WHAT FORM THIS WOULD TAKE AND WHETHER IT SHOULD BE ON THE SAME LINES AS THE POST-FEZ COMMISSION OR A REVERSION TO THE KIND OF FORMULA AGREED FOR PLO PARTICIPATION IN 1978 HAD NOT BEEN MUCH DISCUSSED. NOR HAD THERE BEEN ANY FIRM IDEAS ABOUT WHO MIGHT REPRESENT THE PLO IN SUCH A DELEGATION, ALTHOUGH IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT WHOEVER DID SO SHOULD BE PLO NOMINEES (YOUR TELNO 341 TO AMMAN REFERS).
3. NASSER SAID THAT , SUBJECT TO THE ALL-IMPORTANT PROVISIO THAT KING HUSSEIN BROUGHT BACK THE RIGHT ANSWERS FROM WASHINGTON, HE BELIEVED THE PLO SHOULD AND WOULD AGREE TO MOVE FORWARD INTO NEGOTIATIONS. ARAFAT WOULD OF COURSE FACE DIFFICULTIES WITHIN THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT, BUT THESE COULD BE SURMOUNTED.
4. NASSER THOUGHT IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY VALUABLE IF THE EUROPEANS AT THIS TIME COULD PUBLICLY REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND THEIR OPPOSITION TO SETTLEMENTS AND THE FORCIBLE ANNEXATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BY ISRAEL. THE PALESTINIANS REQUIRED ENCOURAGEMENT,

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(AND)

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AND NASSER SAW NO NEED FOR THE EUROPEANS TO GET INTO THE CONTROVERSIAL AREA OF WHETHER OR NOT THERE SHOULD BE AN INDEPENDANT PALESTINIAN STATE. SIMILARLY NASSER CLAIMED TO HAVE ARGUED WITHIN THE PLO COUNCILS AGAINST BEING DEMUSED BY THE QUESTION OF FORMAL RECOGNITION OF THE PLO AND THAT IT WAS SURELY ENOUGH FOR THEIR RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO BE RECOGNISED SEMICOLON FORMAL RECOGNITION COULD COME LATER.

5. THIS LED NASSER TO ENQUIRE WHETHER A FORMULA HAD YET BEEN FOUND TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO VISIT LONDON. HE SAID THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE IRRITATION WITHIN THE PLO OVER THE BRITISH ATTITUDE, HE PERSONALLY MUCH REGRETTED THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO ARISE. WHEN I MENTIONED THAT OUR AMBASSADOR IN TUNIS MIGHT SHORTLY BE SEEING ARAFAT ON ANOTHER MATTER, NASSER SAID HE HOPED HE WOULD ALSO BE ABLE TO PUT A FORMULA TO HIM FOR THE SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM. I EMPHASISED THAT THE WHOLE QUESTION OF THE VISIT OF THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO LONDON WAS UNDER DISCUSSION WITH THE MOROCCANS, THAT THEY MUST REMAIN THE PRIMARY CHANNEL AND THAT I WAS NOT AUTHORISED TO DISCUSS FORMULAE. NASSER REPLIED THAT THE PLO WERE THE PARTY ON WHOM THE DISPUTE CENTRED AND REITERATED THAT IT OUGHT SURELY TO BE POSSIBLE TO FIND A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION. THE ESSENTIAL THING WAS THAT THE PLO'S RIGHT TO BE INVOLVED IN THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM SHOULD BE RECOGNISED IN WHATEVER FORMULA WE PROPOSED. IT WAS THIS RATHER THAN RECOGNITION WHICH WAS THE KEY ISSUE, AND HE SEEMED TO THINK THAT THE PLO WOULD SETTLE FOR SOMETHING SHORT OF WHAT THE FRENCH HAD DONE PROVIDED THAT WE COULD MEET THEM ON WHAT THEY REGARDED AS THIS CENTRAL POINT. I TOLD HIM THAT I DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE LATEST STATE OF PLAY WAS.

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Middle East

23 December 1982

Thank you for your letter of 21 December enclosing a report of Mr. Macfarlane's visit to the Middle East which the Prime Minister was interested to see.

Tim Flesher

W.L. Smith, Esq.,
Department of the Environment.

GR 300

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D E D I P

FM WASHINGTON 222100Z DEC 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4018 OF 22 DEC

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, AMMAN

PRIORITY CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK

US MIDDLE EAST POLICY

1. WE HAVE ASKED KEMP (NSC) ABOUT THE ACCURACY OF PRESS REPORTS SUGGESTING THAT IN HIS MESSAGE TO BEGIN LAST WEEK ABOUT LEBANON, THE PRESIDENT HAD THREATENED IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES TO WITHHOLD FINANCIAL OR MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

2. KEMP SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD INDEED SENT A FIRM MESSAGE BUT - AS WE SUPPOSED - THIS DID NOT INCLUDE ANY EXPLICIT THREATS ABOUT THE WITHHOLDING OF US ASSISTANCE. KEMP ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT WITH THE PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL, HABIB HAD BEEN AUTHORISED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT IF THERE WERE NO PROGRESS ON LEBANON THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT WELCOME A VISIT TO WASHINGTON WHICH BEGIN IS HOPING TO MAKE IN THE NEW YEAR. FOR OUR STRICTLY PRIVATE INFORMATION HABIB WAS ALSO AUTHORISED TO MAKE USE AT HIS DISCRETION, IF HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD HAVE THE DESIRED EFFECT, OF THE POINT THAT ISRAELI FORCES IN LEBANON WERE, AS THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID, TAKING ON THE CHARACTER OF AN OCCUPYING POWER: AND THAT THE CONTINUANCE OF SUCH A SITUATION HAD IMPLICATIONS FOR THE KIND OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE THE US WAS ABLE TO GO ON PROVIDING.

3. KEMP ADDED THAT THE DISCUSSIONS SO FAR WITH HUSSEIN HAD BEEN CORDIAL AND POSITIVE IN TONE: BUT THAT HUSSEIN (PREDICTABLY) REMAINED VERY EVASIVE ABOUT PARTICIPATING IN THE PEACE PROCESS. THE AMERICANS WERE TRYING TO GET IT ACROSS TO HIM THAT IT WOULD SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE CHANCES OF FOLLOWING THROUGH ON THE REAGAN/SHULTZ INITIATIVE IF HE FELT UNABLE TO DO SO.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 281 OF 22 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE RABAT

INFO PRIORITY OTHER ME POSTS UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

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INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO

YOUR TELS NOS 293 TO DAMASCUS AND 111 TO TUNIS:

UK CONTRIBUTION TO MNF IN LEBANON AND ARAB/ISRAEL.

SUMMARY

1. I SPOKE TO ARAFAT ON THE LINES OF YOUR FIRST TUR ON 21 DECEMBER. QADDUMI WAS PRESENT. ARAFAT HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO THE MNF THAT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDED THE PROTECTION OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES, THAT WE WOULD PRESS ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW AND THAT WE WOULD PROMOTE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN MNF ON THE WEST BANK. HE SAID THAT THE PLO STOOD BY THE AGREEMENT WHEREBY THE PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON WAS SUBJECT TO BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT: THESE WERE CONTINUING.

2. ARAFAT WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT PROGRESS TOWARDS A GENERAL SETTLEMENT BUT WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON DETAILS OF THE DISCUSSIONS WITH JORDAN. QADDUMI ASKED FOR BRITISH HELP IN SECURING AMERICAN PRESSURE ON ISRAEL AND A MORE EXPLICIT RECOGNITION OF THE PALESTINIAN RIGHT TO AN INDEPENDENT STATE. THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION WAS NOT DIRECTLY MENTIONED. THE MEETING WAS FRIENDLY.

DETAIL

3. I SAW ARAFAT AND QADDUMI YESTERDAY EVENING. I EXPLAINED THE REASONS FOR OUR DECISION TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE MNF AND SAID THAT THIS HAD FURTHER INCREASED OUR CLOSE INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON AND IN LOOKING FOR AN EARLY START TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF NON-LEBANESE FORCES. I SAID THAT WE CONSIDERED IT MOST IMPORTANT FOR THE REGION THAT THE LEBANESE SHOULD BE ABLE TO ASSUME THEIR PROPER RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MAINTAINING ORDER IN THEIR OWN TERRITORY. WE WERE STRONGLY URGING THE ISRAELIS TO EVACUATE LEBANON AND, WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT AND REINFORCEMENT OF THE MNF, WE HOPED THAT THE PALESTINIAN FORCES WOULD SOON BEGIN THE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL. I SAID THAT WE WERE SPEAKING SIMILARLY TO THE SYRIANS. I NOTED THAT THE PLO HAD ALREADY STATED THEIR READINESS TO MOVE OUT AND SAID THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION, WITH EVERYONE WAITING FOR SOMEBODY ELSE TO MAKE THE FIRST MOVE WAS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS. ARAFAT HIMSELF HAD MORE THAN

ONCE POINTED OUT THE RISKS OF RENEWED HOSTILITIES. THESE COULD ONLY CAUSE FURTHER SERIOUS HARM TO ALL CONCERNED AND WE TRUSTED THAT THE SITUATION WOULD NOW BE DEFUSED BY A GENERAL DISENGAGEMENT.

4. ARAFAT LISTENED ATTENTIVELY. HE SAID THAT HE WANTED TO MAKE THREE POINTS:

- (I) HE HOPED THAT YOU WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO THOSE TAKING PART IN THE MNF THAT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDED THE PROTECTION OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES. SINCE THE WITHDRAWAL OF PALESTINIAN TROOPS FROM BEIRUT, PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS HAD BEEN HARRASSED BY LEBANESE GROUPS, INCLUDING PHALANGISTS WHO NOW FORMED PART OF THE LEBANESE ARMY. THIS SHOULD CEASE.
- (II) BRITAIN SHOULD DEMONSTRATE ITS INTEREST IN LEBANESE PEACE AND STABILITY NOT ONLY BY CONTRIBUTING TO THE MNF, BUT ALSO BY PRESSING EFFECTIVELY FOR AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THIS WOULD HELP PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, SINCE THE ISRAELIS WERE ENCOURAGING THE DRUZE/MARONITE CLASHES IN CENTRAL LEBANON AND WERE CONSOLIDATING THEIR HOLD ON THE SOUTH. QADDUMI COMMENTED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD PROMISED THE AMERICANS THAT THEY WOULD WITHDRAW BY THE END OF THE YEAR, BUT THERE WAS NO SIGN OF THEM DOING SO AND GEMAYEL HAD RECENTLY TOLD ABU IYAD THAT ISRAEL WAS PUMPING WATER FROM THE LITANI. (I REMINDED THEM THAT I HAD JUST SAID THAT WE WERE PRESSING URGENTLY FOR ISRAELI TROOPS TO LEAVE. I ADDED THAT WE HAD BEEN DOING THIS FROM THE TIME THAT THE INVASION BEGAN.)
- (III) SINCE THERE WAS NOW AN MNF IN LEBANON AS WELL AS IN SINAI, BRITAIN SHOULD SERIOUSLY PROMOTE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN MNF ON THE WEST BANK. THIS WOULD COMPLETE THE CHAIN. IT WOULD BE AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF PRESERVING PEACE AND STABILITY AND IT WOULD ALSO GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL'S EASTERN BORDER (IE ALONG THE 1967 BOUNDARY).

5. ARAFAT AND QADDUMI WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE PLO STOOD BY THE

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AGREEMENT REACHED AT THE MEETING OF THE SIX-MEMBER ARAB COMMITTEE IN JEDDA (SEE JEDDA TEL NO 278 OF 1 JULY AND RELATED TELEGRAMS) WHEREBY THE PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON WAS SUBJECT TO BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PLO AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THESE DISCUSSIONS WERE CONTINUING, CLOSE CONTACT WAS BEING MAINTAINED WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND A LEBANESE DELEGATION WAS DUE TO SEE ARAFAT LATER THAT EVENING.

6. IN GENERAL CONVERSATION, ARAFAT REMARKED THAT WHILE THE UNITED STATES WERE NOW THE MAIN CAUSE OF THE DANGEROUS SITUATION IN THE ME, BRITAIN WAS AT THE ROOT OF THE PALESTINIANS' PRIGHT AS IT HAD ABANDONED THE RESPONSIBILITIES TOWARDS THEM WHICH HAD BEEN IMPOSED BY THE MANDATE. ARAFAT RECALLED THAT AT TITO'S FUNERAL HE HAD POINTED OUT TO MRS THATCHER THAT OF THE LEADERS OF FORMER BRITISH-CONTROLLED TERRITORIES WHO WERE PRESENT, HE WAS THE ONLY ONE WHO HAD LOST HIS COUNTRY AND PALESTINE HAD NOT EVEN BEEN A COLONY. (CF ALGIERS TEL NO 286).

7. I ASKED ARAFAT HOW THE TALKS WITH JORDAN WERE PROGRESSING AND WHAT PROSPECTS HE SAW FOR A GENERAL SETTLEMENT. HE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC. HE WAS SURE THAT KING HUSSEIN WOULD DO HIS BEST AND THE TALKS HAD GONE ENTIRELY SATISFACTORILY. (HE WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON DETAILS). HOWEVER THE PROBLEM WAS NOT WITH THE JORDANIANS BUT WITH THE AMERICANS. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO EXERT EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON ISRAEL OR TO TREAT SERIOUSLY WITH THE PALESTINIANS. QADDUMI SAID THAT THE US SHOULD ENGAGE IN A DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO AND RECOGNISE THE PALESTINIAN RIGHT TO A SOVEREIGN STATE. ARAFAT COMMENTED THAT HE HAD ALREADY HAD BITTER EXPERIENCE OF CONDUCTING INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH PHILIP HABIB THROUGH WAZZAN, SAEB SALAM AND OTHERS. IT HAD BECOME CLEAR THAT HABIB WAS COMPLETELY BIASED. THE AMERICANS WERE PREPARED TO SUPPORT SELF-DETERMINATION FOR 1800 FALKLANDERS, BUT NOT FOR FIVE MILLION PALESTINIANS (CF AGAIN ALGIERS TEL NO 286).

8. QADDUMI SAID THAT BRITAIN WAS SHOWING ITS READINESS TO HELP IN LEBANON: THE EUROPEANS AND BRITAIN IN PARTICULAR COULD ALSO GIVE

INVALUABLE HELP TOWARDS A JUST AND PEACEFUL GENERAL SETTLEMENT. HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD SUPPORT TO THE FULL THE PALESTINIAN RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND SPELL OUT MORE EXPLICITLY THAN HITHERTO THE PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO A STATE OF THEIR OWN. BRITAIN SHOULD ALSO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE US TO INDUCE IT TO TAKE A STRONGER LINE WITH ISRAEL. I SAID THAT WE WERE ARGUING HARD WITH THE AMERICANS, MOST RECENTLY WITH SHULTZ ON 17 DECEMBER TO TAKE FIRM ACTION WITH THE ISRAELIS ON SETTLEMENTS AND OTHER PRACTICES ON THE WEST BANK AND TO RECOGNISE THE PALESTINIAN RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION (YOUR SECOND TUR).

9. THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION'S VISIT TO LONDON WAS NOT DIRECTLY MENTIONED. ARAFAT MADE A PASSING ALLUSION TO IT, WHICH I DID NOT PICK UP.

10. THE MEETING LASTED 45 MINUTES AND WAS VERY FRIENDLY. EXCEPT FOR THE REFERENCE TO HABIB, ARAFAT AND QADDUMI SPOKE CALMLY AND WITHOUT RANOUR, THOUGH THE CONVERSATION WAS DISJOINTED AND OCCASIONALLY REPETITIVE. THEY WELCOMED THE CONTINUED CONTACTS AT OFFICIAL LEVEL WITHOUT MENTIONING POSSIBLE MINISTERIAL CONTACT. ARAFAT SEEMED WEARY AND DEPRESSED AND HE SPOKE BROADLY OF CONTINUING PROBLEMS, AGAIN AVOIDING BEING DRAWN INTO DETAIL.

11. THERE WAS A PHOTOGRAPHER PRESENT ON MY ARRIVAL AND THE MEETING MAY BE MADE PUBLIC.

FCO PSE PASS SAVINGS.

STIRLING



DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
2 MARSHAM STREET LONDON SW1P 3EB
01-212 3434

My ref:

Your ref:

John Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

mf
21 December 1982

Prime Minister

A.S.C. 22.

Dear John

As promised, I enclose a copy of the draft summary report of Mr Macfarlane's visit to the Middle East last week, together with a copy of the itinerary.

Mr Macfarlane has asked me to stress not only the warmth of the welcome he received, but also the high regard in which HMG - including the Prime Minister personally - and our Ambassadors are held in the countries which he visited. My Minister will of course be following up the excellent personal contacts which he made with letters confirming the agreement reached, and repeating his invitation to his hosts, and others, to visit the UK.

Mr Macfarlane feels that the countries he visited offer considerable opportunities for the UK, not only in the more obvious areas of construction etc, but also in management advice and so on. The attached report deals more fully with the areas in which Mr Macfarlane reached agreement on cooperation in management and training.

Yours ever
W L Smith

W L SMITH
Private Secretary

VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST BY MR NEIL MACFARLANE MP (UK MINISTER FOR SPORT) 10-15 DECEMBER 1982

SUMMARY REPORT

Delegation

The delegation comprised of -

Mr Neil Macfarlane MP	-	Minister for Sport
Mr Ian McCallum	-	Vice Chairman of the Sports Council, Chairman of the Association of District Councils.
Mr Bernard Warden	-	Chief Leisure Services Officer, Dacorum District Council
Mr Norman Palmer	-	Department of the Environment
Mr Warwick Smith	-	PS/Mr Macfarlane

Mr Warden was alternatively referred to as an adviser on leisure management.

Itinerary

Three countries were visited - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar. A detailed itinerary is at Annex 1. The proposed programme had to be cut short by two days to enable the Minister to return for a crucial vote in the House of Commons. This meant that one day was lost from the original programme in Qatar, and a proposed day in Bahrain was omitted altogether.

Saudi Arabia

The delegation was greeted at 1 am on Saturday 11 December by an extremely large Saudi reception committee, headed by HRH Prince Feisal. This was the first indication of the great importance with the Saudis (and, to a lesser extent, the other

countries visited) attached to Mr Macfarlane's trip. Mr Macfarlane and Prince Feisal appeared immediately to get on well together and the relaxed atmosphere thus created continued for the duration of the stay.

The programme consisted of a tour of sports facilities and institutions, and a formal meeting with Prince Feisal in his role as President, Youth Welfare. A basis for co-operation between the two countries was agreed in that formal meeting (see Annex 2), and it was agreed then to set up a small working group of experts to firm up details on the proposed areas of co-operation (see Annex 4).

The agreement reached by the group of experts may be summarised as follows -

- a. that there should be a Memorandum of Understanding between the two Governments on co-operation in the fields of sport and youth welfare;
- b. that the British Council should liaise with the soon to be appointed Saudi Director of the Riyadh Sports Institute on the appointment of a British Adviser to the Institute's Board of Trustees. The adviser's major function would be to advise on organisation and staffing of the Institute;
- c. that the Saudis would request Mr Macfarlane to provide a policy adviser to Prince Feisal to be a member of HRH's full-time Board of Advisers. His major task would be to co-ordinate the advice from other members of the board, and to act as overall policy adviser to Prince Feisal;
- d. that Saudi sports club staff (managers, coaches etc) should visit the UK to learn from the British experience, and be accompanied by their British counterparts on their return to Saudi Arabia to help them implement British techniques as far as possible;

- e. that Mr Macfarlane would discuss with his colleagues the idea of youth exchanges. Cultural and outward bound courses were particularly favoured;
- f. that Mr Macfarlane would discuss with his colleague the need for administrative and medical specialists from the UK to work in the sports hospital in Riyadh;
- g. that the British Council would organise as necessary English Language Courses;
- h. that the Saudis would approach the British Council for any other exchanges between the two countries;
- i. that the British Council would be the UK contact point in Saudi Arabia on all these matters;
- j. that a more detailed record of this agreement would be placed in the minutes of the Joint Economic Commission which was to be held on Monday 13 December.

Mr Warden remained in Riyadh whilst the rest of the delegation moved on to Kuwait to negotiate, with the British Council, a draft Memorandum of Understanding. This at Annex 5. It has been placed before Prince Feisal for his agreement, on the understanding that Mr Macfarlane will also need the approval of his colleagues.

The sports facilities in Riyadh were impressive by virtue of their size and luxury. Two sports cities had been built, and could accommodate virtually any sport. They were, however, very much underutilised. The delegation visited one which had been built for two years where the squash courts had obviously not been used, where the enormous and well-equipped kitchens had obviously never been used, where the design of sports halls was incredibly inefficient in terms of space utilisation and sharing, and where we were proudly told that 100 children per day used the swimming pool. The sports city which the delegation visited was some little distance out of the city centre, but free transport was provided and, indeed, participants were

given an expenses allowance in an effort to encourage them to use the centre. This obviously explains why the Saudis were very keen on obtaining British management expertise.

That these tremendous facilities had been built without a market being identified, or their efficiency maximised, is due perhaps not only to a lack of management skills, but also to a lack of need to obtain maximum cost-effectiveness. If a facility does not work well, there is not problem in knocking it down and starting again. The life expectancy of buildings is only 20 years anyway. Money is not so much unimportant, as irrelevant.

During the delegation's visit to the Saudi Arabian National Centre for Science and Technology, presentations were given of a solar energy experiment on a village-wide sale, and of the Centre's new accommodation. The director expressed a particular desire for co-operation with the UK on astronomy, and also in the fields of agriculture and medical research.

At the Ministry of Planning, the delegation was treated to a presentation of the 5-year plan.

Kuwait

The delegation was treated to a more muted but extremely cordial welcome.

The programme again involved a (necessarily shorter) tour of sporting facilities in Kuwait city, and meetings with the Minister for Social Affairs and Labour (HE Mr Hamad Issa al Rujuib) and the Chairman of the Kuwait Olympic Committee and Football Association (HE Shaikh Fahad al Ahmed al Jabir). The delegation was also invited to attend a race meeting at the Hunting and Equestrian club - this is apparently considered to be something of an honour.

The formal meetings did not produce the same sort of formal agreement as those in Saudi Arabia had. This was to be expected, since a good deal of ground work had already been carried out in Saudi Arabia, but not in Kuwait. There was general agreement in Mr Macfarlane's meeting with the Minister for Social Affairs and Labour that the UK might be able to help with the training of sports officials. It was agreed that the British Council would follow this up with officials (Annex 6).

Shaikh Fahad (Annex 7) said that he had had difficulties in easily fixing soccer tours of the UK. It was agreed that he should approach the British Council in future. Mr Macfarlane also asked him to let the Embassy know when he would next be in London, so that the Minister could meet him, and show him Lilleshall.

Kuwait's sports facilities, in contrast to Saudi Arabia's, were better designed, better managed, and more effectively used. They were lavish by British standards and the facilities provided for children and the handicapped were impressive.

A record of Mr Macfarlane's Press conference is at Annex 8.

Qatar

The delegation was warmly welcomed on arrival at Doha Airport by Shaikh Thamer - Vice President of the Youth Welfare Supreme Council. The programme again consisted of a mix of visits to sports facilities, and formal meetings.

The call on HH The Amir was very relaxed. Mr Macfarlane was warmly greeted and a photograph has been published in the Qatari Press showing The Amir smiling at Mr Macfarlane. This is, apparently, an expression of a particularly warm welcome. During the discussion, The Amir said that he was interested in birds, particularly those of Scotland, and said that he would be pleased to receive a book on these. Mr Macfarlane has since sent him one.

The call on Shaikh Thamer consisted of a small, semi-private, discussion with Mr Macfarlane, during which no matters of substance were raised.

The call on the Under Secretary of Education was, again, unexceptional. He welcomed exchanges of experts in all fields between Qatar and the UK and pointed out that physical education was a compulsory part of the curriculum, and that his Department worked closely with the Youth Welfare Supreme Council in providing facilities at schools.

At the formal meeting with representatives of the Supreme Council (whose delegation was lead by Shaikh Abdulla and Shaikh Thamer) the Qataris presented the meeting with a unilaterally produced agenda, and draft agreement. The areas which the agenda covered were welcome to the delegation, but the draft agreement was, in the delegation's view, too specific. (Annex 9)

After a short discussion, the following was agreed -

- a. Mr Macfarlane would approach his colleagues at the DHSS in the hope of organising youth exchanges through CBEVE;
- b. Mr Warden would stay behind for a further day after the rest of the delegation left for home to discuss in more detail plans for an exchange of technical and administrative expertise between Qatari and UK sports officials. Mr Warden would also discuss the question of training of Qatari managers in the UK;
- c. that Mr Macfarlane had no locus to agree to co-operation in international meetings and conferences involving the autonomous governing bodies and national organisations of sport in the UK and that, if they wished, the Qataris should write to the Chairmen of the bodies;

d. that Mr Macfarlane would raise with his colleagues the Qatari suggestion of a youth week involving exchange of young people between the two countries so that they would better understand each others culture;

e. that a very informal liaison committee between the two countries should be established to arrange and monitor progress on co-operation in the fields of sport and youth. The British Council would continue to be the UK's representative;

f. the British Council would arrange English Language Courses as necessary.

Mr Macfarlane issued an invitation to Shaikh Thamer to visit London, and tour some British facilities; Shaikh Thamer was non-committal in his reply.

During his remaining day in Doha, Mr Warden, with the British council produced a draft Memorandum of Understanding. It was decided, however, that it would be best not to attempt to "push this through" the Qataris but that more would be achieved by presenting it to them a little later. This task will be taken on by the British Council and Embassy.

The sports facilities which the delegation toured were perhaps the least luxurious of those seen on the entire tour but they were still well appointed by British standards. They seemed to be well used. The most interesting feature, however, was the six major new sports centres presently under construction which would be handed over to existing clubs. These would be very luxuriously appointed centres, and there was, again, a danger of their being under-used. It is in respect of these centres that the Qataris, presumably, wished to tap into British expertise.

Follow up

Although pleased with the apparent success of its visit, the delegation was aware that progress in implementing the

understanding reached in all three countries might be slow. The delegation was also aware that this should not be regarded as a set back, and that it would be necessary to keep up a quiet enthusiasm and continue to press gently for implementation. The delegation was aware, too, of the serious repercussions of failure to deliver on any of the points where agreement had been reached. The delegation has considered, therefore, how best its work might be followed up.

Take in here the results of the follow up meeting held on Friday afternoon 17 December.7

Private Office
Department of the Environment

17 December 1982

VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST BY MR NEIL MACFARLANE MP (UK MINISTER FOR SPORT) 10-15 DECEMBER 1982

INTINERARY

Friday 10 December 1982

15.40 Depart Heathrow SV03

Saturday 11 December 1982

i. SAUDI ARABIA

01.00 Arrive Riyadh
09.00 Briefing meeting with Embassy and British Council staff.
10.00 Visit to the Saudi Arabian National Centre for Science and Technology (host Dr Rida Obiad).
11.00 Meeting at Ministry of Planning.
12.00 Meeting with HRH Prince Feisal bin Fahad (President, Youth Welfare).
14.00 Working lunch (with Embassy and British Council staff - joined by HMA).
15.15 Visit youth and sports facilities in Riyadh area.
20.00 Dinner at Guest Palace, Sulaimaniyya hosted by HRH Prince Feisal bin Fahad.

Sunday 12 December 1982

a. Minister, Mr McCallum, Mr Palmer, HMA

09.00 Visit King Saud University; host Dr Mansour Turki.
12.15 Call on HRH Prince Fahad bin Sultan (Deputy Minister for Social Welfare; Vice President, Saudi Olympic Committee).
13.00 Lunch at Marriatt Hotel.

b. Mr Muir (British Liaison Office, Riyadh), Mr Warden, Mr Smith

- 11.00 "Group of experts" meeting with Saudi officials.
13.45 Join main party for lunch.
15.00 Depart Riyadh SV208 (Mr Warden remains to form part of the British Delegation to the Joint Economic Commission meeting on Monday 13 December).

ii. KUWAIT

- 16.20 Arrive Kuwait.
18.30 Attend official reception at HMA's residence.
21.00 Informal supper at residence.

Monday 13 December 1982

- 09.00 Visit the "Arab Sports Club".
10.00 Meeting with HE Mr Hamad Issa al Rujaib (Minister for Social Affairs and Labour, and Minister for Housing).
11.30 Meeting with HE Shaikh Fahad al Ahmed al Jabir (Chairman of the Kuwait Olympic Committee).
13.30 Lunch at the Hunting and Equestrian Club, host HE Mr Hamad Issa al Rujaib.
14.45 Attend first three races at the Hunting and Equestrian Club.
16.00 Visit a children's park.
16.45 Visit the Kuwait Handicapped Club.

a. Minister and Private Secretary

- 17.30 Press conference at Hilton Hotel for local sports journalists.

b. Mr McCallum and Mr Palmer

- 17.30 Visit to a Kuwait Youth Centre.
19.00 Party reassembles at residence.
22.20 Depart Kuwait GF234.

iii. QATAR

21.30 Arrive Doha.

Tuesday 14 December 1982

09.15 Briefing meeting at HMA's residence.
10.00 Call on HH The Amir.
10.45 Call on Shaikh Thamer (Vice President of the Youth Welfare Supreme Council).
11.30 Visit al Ahli Sports Club.
12.00 Call on Sayyed Abdul Aziz bin Turki (Under Secretary of Education).
13.00 Lunch at Doha Club; host Shaikh Thamer. (Joined by Mr Warden)
15.30 Tour of National Museum followed by interview with Ken Whittingham (Arabian Press Agency).
16.30 Visit Khalifa Stadium.
17.30 Meeting at Youth Welfare Supreme Council.
20.00 Tour of Rayyan Sports Club.

Wednesday 15 December 1982

01.20 Depart Doha; BA144.
06.00 Arrive Heathrow. (Mr Warden remains for further detailed discussions).

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FROM TEL AVIV 201500Z DEC 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 478 OF 20 DEC 82

REPEATED TO (FOR INFO) PRIORITY: BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, DAMASCUS,
CAIRO, AMMAN, JERUSALEM (ACTIONED), PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK,
RABAT, JEDDA, TUNIS.

K

MY TELNO 476: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. THE WAY NOW SEEMS CLEAR FOR ISRAELI-LEBANESE TALKS. NEVERTHELESS
ISRAELI CLAIMS OF A DRAMATIC BREAKTHROUGH IN THEIR
DEALINGS WITH THE LEBANESE SHOULD PROBABLY BE TAKEN
WITH A PINCH OF SALT. ALTHOUGH US AMBASSADOR
HAS YET TO LEARN THE DETAILS, HE BELIEVES LEBANESE MAY NOT
HAVE DONE MUCH MORE THAN AGREE TO

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HAVE DONE MUCH MORE THAN AGREE TO
TREAT AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION MOST OF THE
POINTS ON THE DOCUMENT WHICH THE ISRAELI
CABINET ADOPTED YESTERDAY.

2. WITH ISRAELIS NO LONGER INSISTING ON JERUSALEM AS A
VENUE FOR NEGOTIATIONS, BOTH THE ISRAELIS AND
US EMBASSY EXPECT DIRECT TALKS, WITH THE
AMERICANS PRESENT, TO START SOON. AS REGARDS
VENUE, THE US EMBASSY ARE TALKING IN TERMS
OF EUROPE, OR SOMEWHERE IN LEBANON,
OR ALTERNATING VENUES IN THE AREA OTHER
THAN BEIRUT AND TEL AVIV.

3. CABINET SOURCES ARE QUOTED AS DESCRIBING THE ISRAELI
DOCUMENT AS A PACKAGE DEAL CONSISTING OF THREE ELEMENTS:
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, NORMALIZATION AND WITHDRAWAL.
THE ISRAELI CLIMBDOWN OVER JERUSALEM
HAS BEEN EXPLAINED AWAY HERE BY REFERENCE
TO THE "TOTALLY DIFFERENT ATMOSPHERE"
CREATED BY LEBANESE FLEXIBILITY ON SOME OF THE OTHER
ISSUES.

4. THE ISRAELIS ARE SEEKING TO GIVE
THE IMPRESSION THAT THEIR DOCUMENT (WHICH MY
US COLLEAGUE BELEIVES IS A MODIFIED VERSION OF THE PRINCIPLES
WHICH ISRAEL PRESENTED TO THE AMERICANS AND THE LEBANESE IN
OCTOBER: WASHINGTON TELNO 3361 REFERS)
HAS BEEN AGREED WITH THE LEBANESE. THE US
EMBASSY HERE, WHILE ACCEPTING THAT SOME
PROGRESS ON SUBSTANCE MUST HAVE BEEN MADE IN
RECENT ISRAELI-LEBANESE CONTACTS ARE UNSURE HOW FAR THE LEBANESE ARE
COMMITTED TO IT OTHER THAN AS A BASIS FOR
DISCUSSION. PCESS REPORTS IN PARTICULAR ABOUT DISENGAGEMENT
OF FORCES BEING ALREADY AGREED SEEM PREMATURE.

5. THE ISRAELIS ARE ALSO STILL TAKING A HARD LINE PUBLICLY
ON SUBSTANCE. THEY CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THE PLO SHOULD FIRST
WITHDRAW COMPLETELY FROM LEBANON, AND THAT THEIR OWN
PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL MUST BE SIMULTANEOUS
WITH A SYRIAN PULLBACK INTO THE BEKAA
VALLEY. THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE IS QUOTED
AS ARGUING THAT A POLITICO-MILITARY
AGREEMENT WITH LEBANON MUST BE CONCLUDED
AND SIGNED BEFORE ANY PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL
OR SEPARATION OF FORCES CAN BE CONSIDERED BY THE

OR SEPARATION OF FORCES CAN BE CONSIDERED BY THE ISRAELIS. HOWEVER THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TOOK A MORE NUANCE LINE WITH MY GERMAN COLLEAGUE THIS MORNING. BAR-ON TOLD HIM THAT DISENGAGEMENT DID NOT DEPEND ON SIGNATURE OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT, BUT ONCE ISRAELI-LEBANESE TALKS BEGAN THIS SHOULD HELP TO PRODUCE MOMENTUM FOR DISENGAGEMENT SEMICOLON AND HE CHARACTERISED THE INSISTENCE ON PGIOR PLO WITHDRAWAL AS BEING ISRAEL'S POSITION "FOR THE MOMENT".

6. I AM INCLINED TO SEE THE RATHER MELODRAMATIC ISRAELI HANDLING OF THIS DEVELOPMENT IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS:

(A) THE ISRAELIS NO DOUBT CALCULATED THAT SOONER OF LATER THEY WOULD HAVE TO GIVE WAY OVER THE JERUSALEM ISSUE. MAKING A VIRTUE OF NECESSITY, THEY ARE NOW SEEKING MAXIMUM CREDIT FOR THEIR "CONCESSION". THEY WANT TO GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF MOVEMENT AND FLEXIBILITY, WHILE RESERVING THEIR POSITION

BOTH ON DISENGAGEMENT AND FUTURE RELATIONS WITH LEBANON (INCLUDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR A SECURITY ZONE IN SOUTH LEBANON) SEMICOLON

(B) THERE HAS FOR SOME TIME BEEN A DISPOSITION ON THE PART OF THE ISRAELIS TO BELEIVE THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN OBSTRUCTING DIRECT TALKS AND THAT, LEFT TO THEMSELVES, THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE COULD SWIFTLY REACH AGREEMENT SINCE THEIR POSITIONS ON THE UNDERLYING ISSUES WERE VERY CLOSE. SHARON IN PARTICULAR, WHO HAS BEEN HOGGING THE CREDIT FOR THE ALLEGED BREAK-THROUGH, IS FAR FROM ADVERSE TO COCKING A SNOOK AT THE AMERICANS. MEMBERS OF THE US EMBASSY HERE NOW SUSPECT THAT THE JERUSALEM ISSUE MAY EVEN HAVE BEEN ERECTED AS AN OBSTACLE TO FORMAL TALKS PRECISELY IN ORDER TO FACILITATE PROGRESS THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS WHICH THE ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN PURSING WITH THE LEBANESE SEMICOLON

(C) BY CREATING THE APPEARANCE OF FLEXIBILITY ISRAEL IS NOW IN A MUCH BETTER TACTICAL POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE SYRIANS. AT A MEETING OF COMMUNITY AMBASSADORS THIS MORNING IT WAS REPORTED THAT FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS HAVE PRIVATELY EXPRESSED SOME DOUBTS WHETHER THE SYRIANS WILL FOLLOW SUIT AND AGREE

WHETHER THE SYRIANS WILL FOLLOW SUIT AND AGREE
TO WITHDRAWAL. IF SO, THEY RATHER THAN THE
ISRAELIS WILL BE SEEN AS HOLDING UP AGREEMENT.

7. I HOPE TO PROBE THE ISRAELI POSITION FURTHER
TOMORROW WHEN I SEE THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR-
GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. MEANWHILE, SOME
OF MY EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES ARE SPECULATING THAT IT
IS THE LEBANESE WHO MIGHT STAND TO LOSE MOST FROM
DISENGAGEMENT, ON GROUNDS THAT THIS COULD LEAVE SYRIA
AND THE IDF IN INDEFINITE OCCUPATION OF THE REMAINING
AREAS OF LEBANON, UNLESS DISENGAGEMENT FORMED PART OF
A BROADER AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW ALTOGETHER.

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FM TEL AVIV 081230Z DEC 82

TO ROUTINE F C O

TELNO 473 OF 08 DEC 82

UK/ISRAEL

1. KIMCHE (DIRECTOR-GENERAL MFA) TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT YOUR RECENT SPEECH TO COMMONWEALTH JEWISH LEADERS HAD BEEN READ WITH INTEREST, INCLUDING THE PASSAGE ON PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION. BRITAIN AND ISRAEL OBVIOUSLY DISAGREED ON SOME FUNDAMENTAL POINTS. BUT THIS PRESENTATION OF BRITISH VIEWS STRUCK HIM AS REASONABLE AND THOUGHTFUL.

2. I TAKE THIS AS A COMPLIMENT, JUDGING BY ISRAELI REACTIONS TO SOME BRITISH STATEMENTS IN THE PAST.

3. KIMCHE ALSO MENTIONED A FAVOURABLE REFERENCE BY SHAMIR AT LAST SUNDAY'S CABINET MEETING TO HMG'S FIRM STAND OVER INCLUSION OF A PLO REPRESENTATIVE IN THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION FOR LONDON. THIS HAD NOT GONE UNNOTICED HERE.

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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SIR J LEAHY
MR EGERTON
SIR J BULLARD
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See para. 3 overleaf.

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FM AMMAN 011600Z DEC 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 541 OF 01 DEC

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEWYORK, WASHINGTON. ROUTINE MIDDLE EAST
POSTS, MOSCOW, PARIS, PEKING, ROME.

MY TELSNOs 535 AND 536: JORDAN/PLO

1. I SAW KING HUSSEIN TODAY PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE ON 2 DECEMBER FOR MOSCOW AND PEKING LEADING THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION. ON HIS RECENT TALKS WITH HABIB AND ARAFAT, THE KING REPEATED TO ME MUCH OF WHAT HE HAD TOLD THE US AMBASSADOR EMPHASISING THAT THE TWO PLO/JORDANIAN COMMITTEES WOULD PURSUE THEIR WORK IN HIS ABSENCE. IT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED IN THE PRESS HERE THAT THE NEXT MEETING OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE CHAIRED BY ARAFAT AND THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER WILL TAKE PLACE ON 11 DECEMBER. BUT THE KING CONFIRMED PRESS REPORTS THAT MANY OF THE PLO REPRESENTATIVES WERE STAYING ON IN AMMAN AFTER ARAFAT'S DEPARTURE AND THAT THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATION WOULD THEREFORE BE A CONTINUING ONE. HE ALSO SAID HE WOULD BE SENDING HIS FOREIGN MINISTER BACK TO JORDAN TO TAKE PART IN THESE DISCUSSIONS AFTER THE ARAB LEAGUE VISITS TO MOSCOW AND PEKING.

2. THE KING CONFIRMED TO ME THAT HE HAD SPOKEN VERY PLAINLY TO ARAFAT AND HAD TOLD HIM THAT, IF HE HAD SET HIS HEART ON AN INDEPENDENT STATE AND THOUGHT HE COULD GET ONE THROUGH HIS OWN EFFORTS, HE NEED NOT TROUBLE THE JORDANIANS SEMICLN BUT THAT IF HE WISHED TO WORK WITH THE JORDANIANS, HE MUST DO SO WHOLEHEARTEDLY AND BE PREPARED TO MOVE QUICKLY. THE KING SAID THAT HE WAS ABOVE ALL AFRAID OF COMMITTING HIMSELF TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND THEN FAILING: THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE DEVASTATING. HENCE HIS OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE WHEN HE VISITED THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE TO SATISFY HIMSELF THAT THE AMERICANS WERE INDEED DETERMINED TO SEE THROUGH WHAT THEY HAD BEGUN.

3. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH ARAFAT THE BRITISH REFUSAL TO RECEIVE THE ARAB LEAGUE

3. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH ARAFAT THE BRITISH REFUSAL TO RECEIVE THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION. THE KING SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY WAS NOW NO LONGER GREATLY CONCERNED WHETHER THE DELEGATION'S VISIT TO LONDON TOOK PLACE OR NOT (HE HAS ALWAYS REGARDED THE WHOLE POST-FEZ EXERCISE AS A DIVERSION FROM THE ESSENTIAL BUSINESS OF TRYING TO FOLLOW UP THE REAGAN INITIATIVE). HOWEVER HE DID ATTACH CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO RE-ESTABLISHING A GOOD RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BRITAIN AND THE PLO SINCE OUR REFUSAL TO RECEIVE THE DELEGATION HAD CAUSED SERIOUS MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND HE WOULD LIKE TO TRY TO REMOVE THEM WHEN HE NEXT VISITED THE UK. ARAFAT HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE WAS HAPPY TO LEAVE THIS MATTER TO THE KING.

4. KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT HIS TALKS WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S ADVISER, OSAMA AL BAZ, ON 29 NOVEMBER HAD BEEN VERY SATISFACTORY AND THAT HE AND THE EGYPTIANS SAW EYE TO EYE ON ALMOST EVERYTHING. THIS HAD BEEN HIS FIRST CONTACT WITH THE EGYPTIANS FOR QUITE SOME TIME AND WAS THEREFORE VERY WELCOME (I WONDER IF AL BAZ'S SUDDEN VISIT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN ARRANGED BY HABIB DURING HIS VISIT TO CAIRO: SEE PARA 6 OF MY TELNO 535). THE KING TOLD ME, AS HE HAD ALSO TOLD VIETS, THAT ARAFAT WAS BEWILDERED BY THE CONFLICTING SIGNALS HE WAS RECEIVING FROM BOTH THE ARABS AND AMERICAN SOURCES, SUCH AS KING HASSAN'S PROPOSAL THAT THE PLO SHOULD NOW FORM A GOVERNMENT IN EXILE. ARAFAT HAD TOLD THE KING THAT HIS OVERRIDING AIM WAS NOT TO DO ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT OBSTRUCT THE PEACE PROCESS OR ANTAGONISE WASHINGTON. THE KING ALSO REFERRED TO WHAT HE TERMED THE WHOLLY UNREALISTIC MOROCCAN SUGGESTION THAT THERE SHOULD BE A PLEBISCITE ON THE WEST BANK WHILE ISRAEL REMAINED IN OCCUPATION TO FIND OUT WHETHER THE INHABITANTS SUPPORTED THE PLO OR JORDAN.

5. SUMMING UP HIS TALKS WITH THE PLO, THE KING SAID HE FELT REASONABLY HOPEFUL THAT ARAFAT WOULD BE ABLE TO BRING HIS OWN PEOPLE, OR AT LEAST A MAJORITY OF THEM, ROUND TO SUPPORT ENTRY INTO THE PEACE PROCESS AND THAT ARAFAT HIMSELF SEEMED DETERMINED TO MAKE THE ATTEMPT.

6. HOWEVER THE KING QUALIFIED THIS BY SAYING THAT ANY TIME SOME NEW EVENT COULD THROW EVERYTHING BACK INTO THE MELTING POT. HE WAS, FOR EXMAPLE, VERY DISTURBED BY THE LATEST NEWS OF IRANIAN MILITARY CONCENTRATIONS AGAINST IRAQ: IF THE IRANIANS SUCCEEDED IN INFLECTING A SEVERE DEFEAT ON THE IRAQIS, THE CONSEQUENCES WERE DIFFICULT TO CALCULATE. HE HAD HEARD FROM PALESTINIAN SOURCES THAT THE SYRIANS HAD RECENTLY SOLD LARGE QUANTITIES OF AMMUNITION TO IRAN, AT THREE TIMES THE MARKET PRICE, AND THAT PRESIDENT ASAD ALLEGEDLY SAW A SUCCESSFUL IRANIAN OFFENSIVE AS A WAY OF BREAKING UP THE MOVES TOWARDS PEACE.

7. AS FAR AS HIS OWN TRAVEL PLANS WERE CONCERNED (SEE MY TELNO 519), THE KING SAID THAT HE THOUGHT HE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY NOW HAVE TO RETURN TO JORDAN DIRECTLY FROM THE UNITED STATES ALTHOUGH HE WAS STILL HOPING TO SPEND A FEW DAYS SKIING WITH THE FAMILY IN AUSTRIA ON HIS WAY HOME. HE MIGHT NOT, THEREFORE, BE ABLE TO VISIT BRITAIN UNTIL AFTER THE NEW YEAR.

8. FCO ONLY. PLEASE COPY MY TELSNOs 535 AND 536 TO MOSCOW AND PEKING, AS BACKGROUND TO THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION'S VISIT. I AM REPORTING BY TELELETTER PLO REACTIONS TO THE HUSSEIN/ ARAFAT TALKS.

[NOT PASSED BY G.O.D.]

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Middle East

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

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SIR J LEAHY
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 536 OF 29 NOV
INFO PRIORITY RABAT, UKMIS NEWYORK, WASHINGTON. ROUTINE OTHER
MIDDLE EAST POSTS, PARIS, ROME

MY TELNO 535: PLO/JORDAN

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS UNDERTAKING TO HABIB DURING THEIR RECENT TALKS, KING HUSSEIN ON 29 NOVEMBER GAVE THE US AMBASSADOR AN ACCOUNT OF THE TALKS HE HAD HAD WITH ARAFAT EARLIER IN THE DAY. VIETS HAS SINCE GIVEN ME A FULL BRIEFING.
2. THE KING TOLD VIETS THAT ARAFAT HAD BEEN ANXIOUS TO REASSURE THE JORDANIANS THAT THE STATEMENT ISSUED AFTER THE MEETING OF THE PALESTINE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN DAMASCUS (DAMASCUS TELNO 333 REFERS) DID NOT CONSTITUTE A REJECTION OF THE REAGAN INITIATIVE, BUT SIMPLY RESTATED THE FACT THAT UNFORTUNATELY THE REAGAN PROPOSALS DID NOT MEASURE UP TO THE CLEAR EXPECTATIONS...

TO THE PLO'S EXPECTATIONS. ARAFAT HAD GONE ON TO SAY THAT IN HIS VIEW THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT OF 1 SEPTEMBER CONTAINED MANY POSITIVE ELEMENTS, AND THAT MORE AND MORE PEOPLE IN THE PLO WERE COMING TO RECOGNISE THIS. ARAFAT HAD PROPOSED THAT TWO JOINT PLO/JORDANIAN COMMITTEES BE ESTABLISHED IMMEDIATELY TO STUDY ALL THE AVAILABLE POSSIBILITIES FOR A JOINT APPROACH TO THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. ONE COMMITTEE WOULD ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PLO AND JORDAN WHILE THE SECOND, CALLED BY ARAFAT THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE, WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL QUESTIONS RELATING TO A JOINT PLO/JORDANIAN APPROACH TO THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. BOTH COMMITTEES WOULD BE REQUIRED TO SUBMIT REPORTS FOR REVIEW BY ARAFAT AND CROWN PRINCE HASSAN (KING HUSSEIN WILL BE IN THE FAR EAST AT THE TIME) AT A MEETING IN AMMAN IN MID-DECEMBER, SO THAT THEIR CONCLUSIONS WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR KING HUSSEIN'S TALKS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN ON 21 DECEMBER.

3. ARAFAT HAD CLAIMED TO KING HUSSEIN THAT HE WAS CONFUSED BY THE MANY CONFLICTING SIGNALS EMANATING FROM THE AMERICANS AND THE ARABS ON THE NATURE OF THE FUTURE POLITICAL ROLE ENVISAGED FOR THE PLO. FOR EXAMPLE, SOME US CONGRESSMEN HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE PLO SHOULD FORM PART OF A JOINT ARAB DELEGATION TO THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THERE WAS ALSO A MOROCCAN PROPOSAL THAT THE PLO SHOULD FORM A GOVERNMENT IN EXILE, WHICH ARAFAT SAW AS A POSSIBLE OPTION MERITING FURTHER STUDY. IN HIS TALKS WITH THE KING ARAFAT HAD, HOWEVER, REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO DO ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT INHIBIT PROGRESS IN THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. KING HUSSEIN SAID HE HAD REVIEWED WITH ARAFAT WHAT HE TERMED THE UNHELPFUL ATTITUDE OF BOTH SAUDI ARABIA AND MOROCCO TOWARDS JORDAN OVER THE REAGAN INITIATIVE. ARAFAT HAD ALSO, ACCORDING TO THE KING, SAID HE WAS RECEIVING CONFLICTING SIGNALS FROM THE SAUDIS AND WAS NOT QUITE SURE WHAT GAME THEY WERE PLAYING. THE KING AND ARAFAT HAD AGREED THAT THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE POSITION FOR THE OTHER ARAB STATES TO ADOPT WAS TO GIVE FULL BACKING TO WHATEVER AGREEMENTS JORDAN AND THE PLO COULD WORK OUT BETWEEN THEM.

5. ARAFAT HAD EXPRESSED INTEREST TO THE KING IN US REFERENCES TO THE "POLITICAL BONUS" OWED TO THE PLO FOLLOWING THEIR WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT. HE ALSO WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER THE AMERICANS WOULD CONSIDER STATIONING A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD FOLLOWING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

6. THE KING TOLD VITETS HE HAD PRESSED ARAFAT VERY HARD ON THE IMPERATIVE NEED FOR THE PLO TO ACCEPT RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST IN PEACE. HE HAD REPEATED TO ARAFAT WHAT HABIB HAD TOLD HIM THE PREVIOUS DAY: THAT THERE WOULD BE NO GIVE ON THE PART OF THE US IN FACE OF ATTEMPTS FURTHER TO

be no give on the part of the U.S. in face of attempts further to

REFINE OR REDEFINE THESE COMMITMENTS, BUT THAT BY PLAYING THIS CARD THE PLO WOULD "OPEN THE GATES TO EVERYTHING." THE KING BELIEVED ARAFAT HAD UNDERSTOOD THIS, BUT THE KING REMAINED UNCERTAIN HOW MUCH SUPPORT ARAFAT WOULD RECEIVE FROM THE OTHER LEADING MEMBERS OF THE PLO IF HE TOOK THE PLUNGE.

7. THE KING SAID HE HAD ALSO TOLD ARAFAT THAT VERY LITTLE TIME REMAINED IN WHICH TO DECIDE WHETHER THE PLO SHOULD JOIN THE REAGAN INITIATIVE, AND THAT HIS AMBITION FOR AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE WAS UNREALISTIC AND UNREALISABLE. THE KING HAD ALSO EMPHASISED TO ARAFAT THAT, WHEN HE SAW REAGAN IN WASHINGTON, HE WOULD BE LOOKING FOR STRAIGHT ANSWERS ON WHETHER THE US WAS PREPARED TO COMMIT ALL ITS RESOURCES TO REGAINING ARAB SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THAT HE ALSO INTENDED PRESSING THE AMERICANS FOR A FREEZE ON SETTLEMENTS. HE ALSO WANTED TO SHORTEN THE TIME ALLOTTED IN THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS TO THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD LEADING TO AGREEMENT ON FINAL STATUS, SO THAT A REAL PEACE COULD BE ACHIEVED IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE PERIOD. THE KING TOLD ARAFAT HE SAW A VERY SERIOUS DANGER IN ALLOWING THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS TO EXTEND INTO THE PERIOD OF A NEW US ADMINISTRATION. KING HUSSEIN CLAIMED THAT ARAFAT HAD GIVEN HIM FULL SUPPORT IN PUTTING ALL THESE POINTS TO THE AMERICANS.

8. ARAFAT HAD COMPLAINED BITTERLY TO THE KING ABOUT HIS TREATMENT AT THE HANDS OF THE SYRIANS AND HAD REFERRED TO THE "POISONOUS ATMOSPHERE" OF HIS RECENT VISIT TO DAMASCUS. THE SYRIANS HAD TRIED HARD TO FORCE THE PALESTINE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO ADOPT MORE EXTREME LANGUAGE IN THEIR STATEMENT. THE SYRIANS HAD MADE VIOLENT PERSONAL ATTACKS ON HIMSELF AND HAD ALSO EXPRESSED SCORN FOR THE FEZ DECLARATION AND ESPECIALLY FOR ARTICLE 7: THEY HAD IN ADDITION ATTACKED THE PLO'S CLOSER RELATIONS WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT.

9. SUMMING UP HIS TALKS WITH ARAFAT TO VIETS, THE KING HAD DESCRIBED THEM AS "PRETTY GOOD:" THE ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN POSITIVE AND ARAFAT NOW SEEMED PREPARED TO GET DOWN TO SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF THE DETAILS OF A JOINT JORDANIAN/PLO APPROACH TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THE KING HAD EMPHASISED TO ARAFAT HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS FOR HIM TO BE ABLE TO SPEAK AUTHORITATIVELY IN WASHINGTON ABOUT HOW FAR THE PLO WAS PREPARED TO GO IN CO-OPERATING WITH THE REAGAN INITIATIVE SINCE HE THEREFORE NEEDED DEFINITE ANSWERS FROM THE PLO NO LATER THAN THE MIDDLE OF DECEMBER.

10. I HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO SEE THE KING MYSELF, BUT HOPE TO DO SO BEFORE HE LEAVE FOR MOSCOW, PEKING AND TOKYO ON 4 DECEMBER. NOR HAVE WE YET BEEN ABLE TO SPEAK TO ANY OF THE PALESTINIAN PARTICIPANTS IN THE TALKS. NO DOUBT THE KING WAS PUTTING AS POSITIVE AN INTERPRETATION AS POSSIBLE ON HIS TALKS WITH

SAW EARLIER TODAY, WAS CAUTIOUS AND DID NOT THINK ARAFAT HAD YET DECIDED TO TAKE THE PLUNGE.

11. ARAFAT WAS ACCOMPANIED ON HIS 3-DAY VISIT TO JORDAN BY KHALIL AL WAZIR, HANI AL HASSAN, HAMED ABU SITTA AND OTHER LEADING PLO OFFICIALS. HE AND KING HUSSEIN JOINTLY OPENED THE MEETING OF THE PLO HIGHER COUNCIL FOR EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SCIENCE SEMICLN IN HIS SPEECH (THE FULL TEXT IS NO DOUBT AVAILABLE TO YOU) ARAFAT REFERRED TO THE "BROTHERLY WARMTH" WHICH THE PALESTINIANS FELT FOR JORDAN, THE COMMON FATE BINDING THE PALESTINIAN AND JORDANIAN PEOPLES AND THE UNITY OF POSITION BETWEEN HIMSELF AND KING HUSSEIN. ALTHOUGH HE HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN INTENDING TO LEAVE EARLIER IN THE DAY FOR SOUTH YEMEN, ARAFAT STAYED ON IN AMMAN FOR THE WHOLE OF 29 NOVEMBER AND HAD MEETINGS WITH MEMBERS OF THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL AND THE PLO CENTRAL COUNCIL RESIDING IN JORDAN. AT THESE MEETINGS THERE IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN A LENGTHY DIALOGUE ON THE SITUATION FACING THE PALESTINIANS FOLLOWING THE EVACUATION FROM BEIRUT AND ALSO ON HOW FAR THE REAGAN INITIATIVE WAS COMPATIBLE WITH PALESTINIAN ASPIRATIONS SEMICLN DEMANDS FROM THE US "AND SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES" FOR THE PLO TO RECOGNISE ISRAEL ARE ALSO SAID TO HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED.

12. THE PRESS HERE HAS REPORTED THE DECISION TO FORM A JOINT JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN COMMITTEE TO DISCUSS FUTURE JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN RELATIONS "AND THE ISSUES RELATED TO THIS AS WELL AS THE REQUIREMENTS OF POLITICAL MOVES IN THE CURRENT STAGE," AND THAT THIS COMMITTEE HELD ITS FIRST MEETING ON 29 NOVEMBER CHAIRED BY ARAFAT AND THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER. NO MENTION HAS BEEN MADE PUBLICLY OF THE SECOND COMMITTEE (SEE PARA 2 ABOVE). I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER KING HUSSEIN HAD A FURTHER MEETING WITH ARAFAT IN THE COURSE OF 29 NOVEMBER, BUT SUSPECT HE DID NOT AS HE WAS INVOLVED IN TALKS WITH THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER, OSAMA AL BAZ.

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MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

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MR EGERTON
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 535 OF 29 NOV
INFO PRIORITY RABAT, UKMIS NEWYORK, WASHINGTON: ROUTINE OTHER
MIDDLE EAST POSTS, PARIS, ROME.

JORDAN/MIDDLE EAST

1. THE US AMBASSADOR (WHO WAS PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE TALKS) HAS GIVEN ME THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF MR PHILIP HABIB'S DISCUSSIONS IN AMMAN ON 27 NOVEMBER WITH KING HUSSEIN AND HIS PRINCIPAL ADVISERS, WHICH FOCUSED MAINLY ON THE REAGAN INITIATIVE AND THE KING'S FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN IN WASHINGTON ON 21 DECEMBER.
2. KING HUSSEIN SOUGHT CLARIFICATION FROM HABIB ON THE REMAINING OBSTACLES TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE PLO AND THE US ADMINISTRATION AND ALSO ON THE ROLE ENVISAGED BY THE AMERICANS FOR THE PLO IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HABIB RECALLED TO THE KING THE TERMS FOR A US/PLO DIALOGUE WHICH PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD SET OUT IN A LETTER TO KING FAHD WHICH HE ALSO READ OUT TO THE KING THE

IN A LETTER TO KING FAHD SEMICLN HE ALSO READ OUT TO THE KING THE FORMULA ON RECOGNITION WHICH HAD BEEN PROPOSED BY KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO: "ALL STATES IN THE AREA, INCLUDING ISRAEL, HAVE THE RIGHT TO LIVE AS SOVEREIGN NATIONS WITHIN SECURE BORDERS." HABIB TOLD THE KING THAT A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THESE LINES, PLUS ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, WOULD ENABLE THE AMERICANS TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO. BUT THE POINTS MUST BE STATED CLEARLY BY ARAFAT, WITHOUT AMBIGUITY AND AND WITHOUT ANY CONDITIONS BEING ATTACHED.

3. HABIB HAD ALSO URGED THAT THE PLO SHOULD NOT BE "HUNG UP" ON THE NEED FOR A PLO NAME-PLATE TO BE DISPLAYED AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT KING HUSSEIN WOULD EXPLAIN THE LIMITS OF THE US POSITION TO THE PLO AND WOULD URGE THEM NOT TO PRESS FOR EXCESSIVE AND UNREALISTIC DEMANDS. HABIB SAID IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF KING HUSSEIN COULD BRING WITH HIM TO WASHINGTON SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE FORMULAE FOR PLO PARTICIPATION, SO THAT HE COULD DISCUSS WITH THE AMERICANS WHICH OF THEM HAD THE BEST CHANCE OF ACCEPTANCE. HABIB HAD IN ADDITION TOLD THE KING IN TERMS THAT A PLO STATEMENT ON RECOGNITION WOULD NOT BE RECIPROCATED BY ISRAEL: INSISTENCE ON MUTUAL RECOGNITION WOULD THEREFORE GIVE ISRAEL A VETO ON THE US/PLO DIALOGUE AND WOULD NOT IN ANY CASE MEET US CONDITIONS FOR OPENING IT (SEE PARA 6 OF MY TELNO 517 FOR AN ACCOUNT OF EARLIER US/JORDANIAN DIFFICULTIES ON THIS POINT).

4. KING HUSSEIN HAD ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN TO HABIB THAT, ONCE JORDAN HAD JOINED IN A MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE, HE MIGHT DISCOVER THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT WILLING TO SEE IT THROUGH. HE HAD STRESSED HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE PROGRESS ON THE EVACUATION OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON, AS LACK OF IT WAS UNDERMINING US CREDIBILITY. HE HAD, HOWEVER, AGREED WITH HABIB THAT A DIRECT LINK BETWEEN PROGRESS OVER THE LEBANON AND THE WIDER PEACE PROCESS SHOULD NOT BE MADE. HABIB HAD TOLD THE KING THAT, EVEN IF IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO SECURE FULL EVACUATION FROM LEBANON BY THE END OF 1982, HE STILL BELIEVED THAT SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS WOULD HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE END OF THE YEAR.

5. KING HUSSEIN HAD ALSO SAID THAT HE WANTED A FREEZE ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS BEFORE HE COULD ENTER NEGOTIATIONS. HABIB HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SETTLEMENTS ISSUE WAS CRITICAL FOR US CREDIBILITY. BUT ONLY THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF COULD REALLY TACKLE MR BEGIN ON THIS. HE WOULD ALREADY HAVE DONE SO BUT FOR THE CANCELLATION OF HIS MEETING WITH BEGIN DURING THE LATTER'S LAST VISIT TO WASHINGTON. HABIB CLAIMED THAT THE PRESIDENT SHARED THE KING'S VIEW ON THE IMPORTANCE OF A FREEZE ON SETTLEMENTS SEMICLN AT THE SAME TIME HABIB URGED THE KING NOT TO MAKE IT A PRE-CONDITION FOR ENTERING INTO NEGOTIATIONS. THE KING HAD REPLIED THAT IT WAS HARD FOR HIM TO ASSEMBLE A NEGOTIATING TEAM IN THE ABSENCE OF A

HARD FOR HIM TO ASSEMBLE A NEGOTIATING TEAM IN THE ABSENCE OF A FREEZE: WHILE HE DID NOT SEE IT AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS, IT WAS A CRITICAL ISSUE IN THE DEBATE GOING ON WITHIN THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT BETWEEN THOSE WHO FAVOURED ENTERING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND THOSE WHO WERE OPPOSED TO DOING SO.

6. KING HUSSEIN HAD ALSO RAISED WITH HABIB THE DIFFICULTIES HE WAS HAVING WITH THE OTHER MODERATE ARAB LEADERS, CLAIMING THAT KING FAHD, KING HASSAN AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK HAD DONE LITTLE OR NOTHING TO TRY TO CONVINCE THE PLO TO BE REASONABLE. KING HASSAN, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD PROPOSED A VOTE BY THE WEST BANK INHABITANTS UNDER UNITED NATIONS AUSPICES TO DETERMINE WHETHER KING HUSSEIN OR THE PLO WAS THEIR LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE. MUBARAK HAD NOT BEEN IN CONTACT WITH JORDAN SINCE THE WEST BANK CRISIS (ALTHOUGH OSAMA AL BAZ IS DUE IN AMMAN TODAY). KING FAHD WAS NOT BEING HELPFUL OVER JORDAN'S FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES: ALTHOUGH THE SAUDIS HAD PAID WHAT THEY OWED JORDAN UNDER THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT ARRANGEMENTS, THEY HAD NOT USED THEIR INFLUENCE TO MAKE OTHERS PAY. THE TOTAL SHORT-FALL ON MONEY PLEDGED TO JORDAN AT BAGHDAD IN 1978 WAS NOW DOLLARS 360 MILLION SINCE THE GULF STATES WERE HEAVILY IN ARREARS, TO THE TUNE OF DOLLARS 290 MILLION (THESE FIGURES ARE FAR HIGHER THAN ANY YET PUBLICLY RELEASED BY THE JORDANIANS). HABIB HAD UNDERTAKEN TO URGE FAHD, HASSAN AND MUBARAK TO GIVE MORE ACTIVE SUPPORT TO JORDAN.

7. KING HUSSEIN HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HIS MAIN OBJECTIVE DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON WOULD BE TO SEEK CLARIFICATION OF THE US POSITION AND TO SATISFY HIMSELF THAT THE AMERICANS WERE COMMITTED TO ENTER FULLY INTO THE PEACE PROCESS AND SEE IT THROUGH RATHER THAN JUST INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS. HE WOULD REGARD THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE TO JORDANIAN ARMS REQUESTS AS AN IMPORTANT INDICATOR OF US RESOLVE TO SUPPORT JORDAN. HE SAID HE WOULD ALSO PREPARE IN ADVANCE A PAPER SETTING OUT THE POINTS WHICH HE WISHED TO TAKE UP WITH THE PRESIDENT. HABIB HAD TOLD THE KING THAT IT WAS OF COURSE FOR THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF TO GIVE THE KING THE ANSWERS HE WAS SEEKING, BUT HE URGED THE KING TO CONCENTRATE IN HIS TALKS IN THE US ON THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND TO SEEK MORE SPECIFIC US VIEWS ON THEM. IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE AMERICANS TO BE MORE PRECISE AT THIS STAGE ON THE FINAL STATUS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AS THAT WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT HAPPENED DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE KING HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO HABIB THAT HE HELD STRONG VIEWS REGARDING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD: IN PARTICULAR, HE FELT THAT 5 YEARS WAS FAR TOO LONG. HABIB HAD EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE FOR THE AMERICANS OF NOT BREACHING THEIR COMMITMENTS TO ISRAEL, BUT THOUGHT THE FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE (UNDER CAMP DAVID, THEY ARE DUE TO START NOT LATER THAN THE THIRD YEAR OF

CAMP DAVID, THEY ARE DUE TO START NOT LATER THAN THE THIRD YEAR OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD).

8. KING HUSSEIN UNDERTOOK TO HABIB TO GIVE THE US AMBASSADOR HERE A FULL ACCOUNT OF HIS TALKS WITH ARAFAT ON 28 NOVEMBER SINCE AN ACCOUNT OF THESE IS CONTAINED IN MIPT. I HAVE NOT YET HEARD THE KING'S VERSION OF HOW HIS TALKS WITH HABIB AND ARAFAT WENT.

9. THE US AMBASSADOR TOLD ME THAT HE HAD STRESSED TO HABIB THE IMPORTANCE HE SAW IN KEEPING US VERY FULLY IN THE PICTURE CONCERNING HIS DISCUSSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST (AND I ASSUME THE VERY FULL BRIEFING I HAVE BEEN GIVEN ON HABIB'S TALKS IS A DIRECT RESULT OF THIS). ACCORDING TO VIETS, HABIB'S PLAN AFTER VISITING EGYPT AND MOROCCO (TO SEE KING FAHD AND POSSIBLY KING HASSAN) WAS TO SPEND A FEW DAYS IN FLORENCE BEFORE MEETING SHULTZ IN BRUSSELS, HIS INTENTION BEING TO LEAVE THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS TO DRAPER FOR THE MOMENT SINCE BUT HABIB REALISED THAT IT MIGHT WELL BE NECESSARY FOR HIM TO RETURN TO LEBANON SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. VIETS TOLD ME HE HAD URGED HABIB TO STOP OFF IN LONDON TO GIVE YOU AN ACCOUNT OF HIS MIDDLE EAST DISCUSSIONS, BUT VIETS REMAINED UNCERTAIN WHETHER HABIB'S SCHEDULE WOULD ALLOW HIM TO DO THIS. IT WOULD PRESUMABLY BE OPEN TO US TO INVITE HABIB TO COME TO LONDON, ALTHOUGH I THINK THAT IN DOING SO IT WOULD BE BEST TO OMIT ANY REFERENCE TO VIETS' ROLE. QUITE SEPARATELY, HABIB TOLD ME WHEN I SAW HIM ON 27 NOVEMBER (MY TELNO 533 REFERS) THAT HE WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO ACCEPT AN INVITATION HE HAD RECEIVED TO VISIT DITCHLEY AT THE END OF THE YEAR.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1099 OF 18 NOVEMBER 1982

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INFO ROUTINE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, RABAT, TUNIS, CAIRO, WASHINGTON,
TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK.

INFO SAVING TO MOSCOW.

AMMAN TEL NO 490: VISIT TO PARIS BY ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

1. KING HUSSEIN LED A DELEGATION TO MEET MITTERRAND ON THE MORNING OF 16 NOVEMBER. IT INCLUDED THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA, ALGERIA AND TUNISIA, THE MOROCCAN MINISTER OF EDUCATION (LARAKI), KADDOUMI (PLO) AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE. HUSSEIN STAYED ON AFTER THE MEETING FOR A PRIVATE LUNCH WITH MITTERRAND.

2. AFTERWARDS THE ELYSEE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT MITTERRAND HAD TOLD THE DELEGATION THAT THERE WAS 'CONVERGENCE' BETWEEN THEIR ACTION AND THAT OF FRANCE. HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE DELEGATION AS HE HAD SPOKEN IN THE KNESSET. THE SPOKESMAN RECALLED THAT ON THAT OCCASION MITTERRAND HAD SAID THAT DIALOGUE REQUIRED MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF OTHERS' RIGHT TO EXISTENCE.

3. HUSSEIN TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE TALKS HAD BEEN 'VERY ENCOURAGING AND USEFUL' AND THAT THERE WERE MORE POINTS OF AGREEMENT THAN DISAGREEMENT. FRANCE REGARDED THE FEZ INITIATIVE AS 'POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE'. HE PLAYED DOWN REPORTS OF DIFFERENCES OVER THE QUESTION OF RECOGNITION (FRENCH SOURCES HAD BEEN REPORTED AS SAYING THAT FRANCE WANTED THE ARABS TO RECOGNISE ISRAEL MORE EXPLICITLY THAN IN THE FEZ PLAN).

4. KADDOUMI DESCRIBED THE MEETING WITH MITTERRAND AS 'POSITIVE AND FRUITFUL' BUT KHADDAM SAID THAT FEZ WAS A 'MINIMUM PLAN'.

5. THE DEPUTY DIPLOMATIC ADVISER AT THE ELYSEE HAS TOLD US THAT THE FULL TALKS HAD BEEN A SET PIECE WITH EACH SIDE SETTING OUT ITS WELL KNOWN POSITIONS. HUSSEIN HAD SPOKEN ALONG THE SAME LINES AS HASSAN IN WASHINGTON. THE FRENCH HAD PUT THE ACCENT ON RECOGNITION BECAUSE THAT WAS THE POINT IN THE PRESENT SITUATION WHERE THERE MIGHT BE MOST GIVE. GAILLARD SAID THAT HUSSEIN DID NOT SEEM TO REGARD THIS FRENCH APPROACH AS UNHELPFUL.

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6. THERE WAS A HINT OF THIS LAST POINT IN THE SECTION ON THE VISIT IN THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER THE FRENCH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING ON 17 NOVEMBER. AFTER DESCRIBING NEUTRALLY THE CONTACT WITH THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION THE COMMUNIQUE ADDED THAT THE PRIVATE MEETING WITH HUSSEIN HAD SHOWN "AN INTERESTING IDENTITY OF VIEWS BETWEEN JORDAN AND FRANCE".

7. THE WEEKLY NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR REPORTED ON 13 NOVEMBER THAT HUSSEIN, HASSAN AND FAHD HAD DECIDED TO HASTEN THE RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL BY THE PLO, BACK THE REAGAN PLAN AND HELP GEMAYEL, AND THAT MITTERRAND, BOURGUIBA AND MUBARAK HAD BEEN INFORMED OF THIS (CF PARA 1 OF TUR).

8. AT A FINAL PRESS CONFERENCE HUSSEIN SAID THAT "EVIDENTLY THE GENERAL FEELING IS THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME FORM OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION". HOWEVER THE ARABS DID NOT KNOW WHAT BORDERS THEY WERE BEING ASKED TO RECOGNISE. THE DIFFERENCES WITH FRANCE WERE MORE A MATTER OF FORM THAN OF SUBSTANCE. THE REAGAN PLAN CONTAINED SOME "VERY POSITIVE" POINTS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO MOSCOW.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 485 OF 16 NOVEMBER 1982
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, KHARTOUM AND CAIRO.
PRIORITY TEL AVIV.

MS

MR HURD'S VISIT: ARAB/ISRAEL

- MR HURD HAD A PRIVATE TALK YESTERDAY WITH EAGLEBURGER, WHO WAS VISITING PAKISTAN AS PART OF A TOUR OF THE AREA.
- MR HURD ASKED HIM ABOUT PRESS REPORTS THAT HABIB WAS RETURNING TO THE MIDDLE EAST. WHERE DID THIS LEAVE DRAPER? EAGLEBURGER (PLEASE PROTECT) SAID THAT HABIB WAS NOW RETURNING TO THE AREA TO RESUME CHARGE OF BOTH LEBANON AND ARAB/ISRAEL CONTACTS. THIS REFLECTED THE WORRIES OF BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND SCHULZ THAT THE PROBLEM OF LEBANON WAS DRAGGING ON. DRAPER WAS A GOOD SECOND-IN-COMMAND BUT COULD NOT DO THE NEGOTIATIONS HIMSELF. HE WOULD NOW CONCENTRATE ON LEBANON UNDER HABIB; AND FAIRBANKS WOULD CONTINUE TO DO ARAB/ISRAEL UNDER HABIB.
- MR HURD COMMENTED THAT THE TIME MUST NOW BE RIGHT FOR PRESSURE TO BE PUT ON THE ISRAELIS BY WITHHOLDING FUNDS OR IN SOME OTHER PRACTICAL WAY. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY WAS AGAINST EXERTING PRESSURE NOW. FOR THE FIRST TIME, AMERICAN JEWISH OPINION WAS DIVIDED. THIS GAVE THE ADMINISTRATION SOME FLEXIBILITY. THERE WAS ALSO A GENUINE DEBATE IN ISRAEL. TO LEAN ON THE ISRAELIS WOULD, HOWEVER, RE-UNITE OPINION, AND THE OPPORTUNITY WOULD BE LOST. HE PREFERRED TO KEEP THE OPTION FOR LATER. BUT HE STRESSED THAT THIS WAS A PERSONAL VIEW WHICH HE DID NOT THINK WAS WHOLLY SHARED BY SCHULZ OR THE PRESIDENT.
- EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE KEEN TO REBUILD EGYPT'S RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. CONTACTS WERE LIKELY TO BEGIN SOON BETWEEN KIMCHE AND SOMEONE CLOSE TO GEMAYEL. THE AMERICANS

SOON BETWEEN KIMCHE AND SOMEONE CLOSE TO GEMAYEL. THE AMERICANS WOULD TRY TO USE THIS AS A LEVER ON THE EGYPTIANS TO RETURN THEIR AMBASSADOR TO TEL AVIV.

5. EAGLEBURGER WAS GOING ON SHORTLY TO SUDAN. HE WOULD SEE NIMEIRI. BUT HE WAS WORRIED HOW LONG THE PRESIDENT COULD LAST, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE US AID PROGRAMME NEXT YEAR MIGHT BE CUT TO ALMOST NOTHING BY SEVERE BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS IN WASHINGTON. THE AMERICAN PROGRAMMES FOR SPAIN, PORTUGAL AND TURKEY WOULD PROBABLY SUFFER SIMILARLY. PRESIDENT REAGAN MIGHT BE FORCED TO TELL CONGRESS THAT AS A RESULT, AID TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL COULD NOT REMAIN UNTOUCHED. MR HURD SAID THAT SUDAN COULD NOT CONTINUE INDEFINITELY ITS PRESENT RELIANCE ON INTERMITTENT HELP FROM OTHERS. NO PROPER SOLUTION TO ITS PROBLEMS WOULD BE FOUND UNTIL ALL POTENTIAL AID DONORS, THE IMF, THE BANKS AND GOVERNMENTS, GOT TOGETHER TO DISCUSS A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3704 OF 15 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT DAMASCUS AMMAN TEL AVIV JEDDA RABAT TUNIS
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US MIDDLE EAST POLICY.

1. MINISTER ASKED HABIB TODAY HOW HE INTENDED TO HANDLE HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. HABIB STRESSED THE URGENCY OF MAKING PROGRESS ON BOTH LEBANON AND PALESTINE. HIS APPOINTMENT AS THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED DELIBERATELY, BEFORE BEGIN'S VISIT TO THE US, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM AND CREATE SOME ADDITIONAL LEVERAGE ON BEGIN. THIS OPPORTUNITY HAD UNFORTUNATELY BEEN LOST: A FURTHER REMINDER OF THE DANGER OF PROCRASTINATION IN DEALING WITH THE MIDDLE EAST.

3. HABIB PLANS TO ARRIVE IN LEBANON ON 19 NOVEMBER AND TO CONCENTRATE ON GETTING THE ISRAELI/LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS SUFFICIENTLY ADVANCED TO BE ABLE TO LEAVE DRAPER TO HANDLE THE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS OF IMPLEMENTATION, ROLE OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND LEBANESE ARMY, DISENGAGEMENT AND A SECURITY ZONE IN THE SOUTH. HE HOPED THAT LEBANESE/ISRAELI TALKS ON POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY ISSUES WOULD BEGIN THIS WEEK. THE ISRAELIS RECOGNISED THAT THEY COULD NOT OBTAIN A PEACE TREATY, BUT WANTED TO EXPLOIT THEIR MILITARY PRESENCE TO OBTAIN AS MUCH QUOTE NORMALISATION UNQUOTE AS POSSIBLE. THE LEBANESE WERE BEING VERY CAUTIOUS BUT MIGHT PROVE TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE.

4. HABIB ARGUED FOR A BRITISH CONTRIBUTION, PREFERABLY A BATTALION, TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE. THE FORCE WOULD BE NEEDED FOR TWO TO THREE MONTHS PRIMARILY AS A GUARANTEE THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD

THREE MONTHS PRIMARILY AS A GUARANTEE THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT REOCCUPY POSITIONS FROM WHICH THEY HAD WITHDRAWN AND TO PREVENT INFILTRATION. EVEN IF THE LEBANESE ARMY WERE TRAINED AS THE AMERICANS HAD PROPOSED (FOUR BRIGADES AT 70 PERCENT STRENGTH TO BE DEPLOYED BY FEBRUARY), IT COULD NOT IMMEDIATELY CARRY OUR THIS TASK. HABIB COMMENTED THAT QUOTE THE WAY IT IS NOW PEOPLE AREN'T TAKING YOU VERY SERIOUSLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST UNQUOTE: WE SHOULD SURELY WELCOME THE CHANCE TO PLAY OUR PART.

5. THOMAS SAID THAT WE WERE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING THE LEBANESE REQUEST, BUT THAT WE WERE ALREADY IN THE SINAI AND OUR RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE FALKLANDS AND BELIZE, IN ADDITION TO OUR NATO COMMITMENTS, WOULD MAKE THE PROVISION OF A BATTALION EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. AS MR HURD HAD TOLD DAM, WE WERE KEEN TO HELP WHERE POSSIBLE, ESPECIALLY OVER TRAINING. HE TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESS FOR A COPY OF GENERAL BARTLETT'S REPORT. HABIB NOTED THAT THE US, AND PROBABLY FRANCE AND ITALY, WERE PREPARED TO INCREASE THEIR CONTINGENTS, AND THAT THE BELGIANS MIGHT BE WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE DESPITE FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES. IT WOULD MAKE AN ENORMOUS DIFFERENCE TO HAVE AN ADDITIONAL RELIABLE BATTALION.

6. HABIB HOPED THAT AFTER A FEW DAYS ON THE LEBANON PROBLEM HE WOULD BE ABLE TO TURN TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. HIS OBJECTIVE WAS SIMPLE: TO GET A NEGOTIATION GOING ON THE BASIS OF THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK AND PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE. HE WOULD HAVE TALKS WITH THE JORDANIANS, SAUDIS, ISRAELIS AND EGYPTIANS. THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS TO PERSUADE THE JORDANIANS TO JOIN IN. THE SAUDIS WERE CAUTIOUS BUT HELPFUL. THE AMERICANS HAD URGED KAMAL HASSAN ALI TO GIVE KING HUSSEIN FULL SUPPORT. ARAFAT SEEMED TO BE MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION OF ACCEPTING BOTH PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN A JORDANIAN DELEGATION AND THAT THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES MIGHT BE PLO SYMPATHISERS FROM THE WEST BANK RATHER THAN PLO MEMBERS AS SUCH.

7. HABIB ADMITTED THAT ISRAELI REJECTION OF REAGAN'S INITIATIVE AND PRESSURE FROM THE ARABS, INCLUDING THE EGYPTIANS, FOR A DEMONSTRATION OF AMERICAN GOOD FAITH OVER SETTLEMENTS WERE SERIOUS OBSTACLES. REAGAN HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE SETTLEMENTS FROZEN, BUT HE WAS NOT GOING TO GET TOUGH WITH THE ISRAELIS OVER THIS. THE ISRAELIS DID NOT SEE WHY THEY SHOULD MAKE CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO OBTAIN NEGOTIATIONS THEY DID NOT REALLY WANT: ONCE THEY WERE IN NEGOTIATIONS THEY MIGHT DO SO TO OBTAIN SOMETHING FROM THE ARABS. THE ONLY WAY TO AFFECT ISRAELI OPINION WAS FOR THE ARABS TO MAKE CLEAR THEIR WILLINGNESS TO MAKE PEACE WITH ISRAEL.

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Middle East

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

12 November 1982

Dear Julian

Thank you so much for your fascinating letter of 11 November about your visit to Israel with Bill McLean. It is very valuable to have these clear views and I have noted what you say in your second enclosure.

Yours ever

Margaret

The Rt. Hon. Julian Amery, M.P.

LPO

SECRET (see last page).

FROM: THE RT. HON. JULIAN AMERY, M.P.

112, EATON SQUARE,
SW1W 9AA
TEL: 01-235 1543
01-235 7409



Confidential

11th November, 1982.

Dear Margaret,

I was in Israel last week with Bill McLean as guests of the Israeli Foreign Office and to address the Annual Balfour Dinner.

In the course of the visit I had full and frank talks, separately, with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Director General of the Foreign Office, the head of the Mossad, two leaders of the Labour Party (Mr. Peres and Mr. Eban), and General Ezer Weizmann, the former Minister of Defence. We also had talks with the acting head of the West Bank civilian administration, the Mayor of Jerusalem and the Chairman of the Arab "Village League" which cooperates with the Israelis. I have not thought it worth bothering you with a separate note on each of these conversations particularly as they all covered much the same ground. Instead I attach an account of the principal impressions which Bill McLean and I formed at the end of our stay.


Both of us were mainly concerned with listening to Israeli views; but in my speech at the Balfour Dinner and in all our conversations I went out of my way to urge the importance of the Reagan proposals and the need to give them the most serious consideration.

It may be wishful thinking on my part, but I have a slight feeling that Mr. Begin may not be quite as inflexible^{as he seems} and may realise that a deal with King Hussein, if he can get one, would by virtue of Israel's military, technical and financial superiority, go a long way to extending Israeli influence into the Arab world. Moreover, if King Hussein can get the necessary Arab support to offer to negotiate it would, I think, be very difficult, as well as very unwise, for Mr. Begin to refuse.

2.
Passage deleted and retained under
Section 3(4). *Wayland, 7 May 2013*

I am copying this correspondence to Francis Pym and
John Nott.

gr am,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Julian', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Julian Amery

The Rt.Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP

Report of a visit to Israel by the Rt.Hon. Julian Amery, M.P.
2nd - 7th November, 1982

I. The Consequences of Beirut

Seen from Jerusalem the outcome of the Israeli campaign in Lebanon looks distinctly favourable.

Egypt

Egypt stood by its Treaty with Israel. Mubarak naturally took the opportunity to strengthen his links with other Arab countries but did nothing practical to hinder Israeli operations or to encourage the PLO. This has convinced the Israelis that they were right to withdraw from Sinai in return for peace with Egypt. They recognise that Egypt faces great difficulties economically but feel that peace between the two countries has stood up to the test of a war between Israel and other Arabs and is therefore secure.

Syria

The Syrian armed forces, the only ones to intervene against Israel, took a tremendous beating on the ground and in the air. U.S. (and Israeli) weapons were probably superior to Syria's Soviet equipment. Certainly they were much better handled. Syrian losses have probably been made good by the Soviets but the Israelis believe that the Syrians will withdraw from Lebanon rather than risk another confrontation. The Israelis say that for their part they have no intention of withdrawing unless the Syrians do so and the remnants of the PLO as well. The PLO forces in the Bekaa are entirely dependent on the Syrians for their infrastructure. If the Syrians go, they will have to go. The PLO forces around Tripoli have some local support and might try to hang on.

The PLO

As a military force the PLO is seen as virtually destroyed, its arsenal of weapons has been captured. Most of its fighting units have been dispersed to several countries where they are likely to be kept under tight control by their host governments. Much the same is true of its political leadership. Without Beirut it cannot exist as the State within a State which it previously was

with its own schools, law courts, hospitals and tax gathering officials. Its different factional leaders will come more than ever under the control of their different patrons - Iraq, Syria, Saudi etc. - who will use them for their own rather than for Palestinian purposes. Even in relatively liberal Tunisia, Arafat cannot hope to enjoy the same freedom he had in Beirut. One result of all this will be that the PLO will lose much of their ability to blackmail or cajole other Arab governments.

*Passage deleted and retained under
Section 3(4) O'Wayland, 7 May 2013*

No doubt some sections of the PLO will continue terrorist activities but this option is scarcely open to Arafat if he continues to project himself as a moderate.

The Lebanon

The Israelis had set great store by their relationship with Beshir Gemayel as the strong man among the Maronites, as their friend, and as perhaps the only man capable of again forming an effective Lebanese state. They had hoped to conclude a peace treaty with him, though they recognise that they tried to press for this too quickly. They are much less sure of Amin's friendship or of his effectiveness. Nevertheless, the Phalangists remain Amin's power base and his father's influence (Pierre Gemayel) should be beneficial from the Israeli point of view. They are thus reasonably confident of arriving at a working agreement with Amin and at least of ensuring that Lebanon is denied to a potential enemy.

General

In the context of Arab/Israeli relations generally, the Lebanon campaign is seen as a turning point in two respects. First it confirms Israel's invincibility. Second it confirms the overwhelming superiority of American over Soviet influence in the area.

II. The Reagan Plan

The events which have strengthened the state of Israel have also accentuated the divisions between Israelis. They no longer feel threatened as in the past. Instead they feel free to indulge their natural talent for political infighting. Criticism of the conduct of the war and the enquiry into the killings in the camps, are the superficial expression of this. But the underlying issue is the future of the West Bank and Gaza. Even here there is a virtual identity between the Government and the Opposition on certain key points. The chief of these are the determination a) to keep Jerusalem as their undivided capital, b) to extend their territory so that Tel Aviv can no longer be within range of medium artillery and c) to establish some Israeli settlements on the West Bank.

The main difference arises over what to do about the bulk of the occupied territories and the 1½ million Arabs who inhabit it.

The Government view is that the Arab population are Jordanian citizens free to live and work in the Occupied Territories, in Jordan, and in Israel as indeed they do. They can have their own municipal and village government and their own law courts but for security reasons the overall administration of the occupied territories must remain with the Israeli dominated civilian administration until the end of the period of autonomy. No decision was reached at Camp David as to what would happen after the 5 years of autonomy. The Egyptian negotiators thought self-determination should be the goal. The Israeli Government reserved their right to claim the "return of Judea, Samaria and Gaza".

The Opposition view is that the State of Israel cannot afford to have a minority of some 2 million Arabs, (1½ million in the occupied territories, plus ½ million already citizens of the state). This number is too large to digest or to expel. Nor could Israeli democratic traditions allow them to be permanently treated as second class citizens. They would therefore like to see them hived off so long as they were not hived off to become a PLO state.

They have therefore always hankered after a deal with Jordan. Hitherto King Hussein has been less than enthusiastic about the kind of terms he was likely to get from any Israeli Government. The Opposition hope, however, that now that the PLO has been cut down to size, he may be readier to take half a loaf.

It is against this background that Government and Opposition are considering the Reagan proposals. Mr. Begin sees merit in some parts of the proposals notably the statement that the US "would not support a Palestinian state". He argues however, that even if King Hussein could get a mandate from the Arab States for the Reagan plan, the Palestinians and, therefore quite likely the PLO, would end up by dismantling the Hashemite monarchy and confronting Israel with a dangerous neighbour. He recognises however that the monarchy proved very successful in dealing with the PLO in 1970 and that King Hussein ranks as the outstanding survivor in the Middle East. The furthest Mr. Begin has so far been prepared to go to meet President Reagan is to offer talks with King Hussein without conditions but in the framework of Camp David. Mr. Shamir repeated this explicitly too. This could mean that there is rather more flexibility in the official Israeli position than has so far appeared.

The Opposition leaders on the other hand welcome the President's proposal as a realistic basis for negotiation with King Hussein over the future of the occupied territories. But they see hard bargaining ahead - if negotiations begin at all - on the delimitation of the frontier, on the future of the settlements already established in the occupied territories, and over Jerusalem.

Both parties, however, still do not know whether King Hussein will receive the necessary mandate from other Arab states (or from the PLO) to undertake negotiations with Israel. To that extent the debate between them and the Reagan proposals themselves are still academic. This of course favours the Government. They are in office and in possession of the West Bank. The autonomy provided for under Camp David which is part of the President's proposal still has 5 years to run; and much can happen in five years.

On the other hand if King Hussein can muster sufficient support to offer to negotiate many Israelis believe that it would be very difficult for Mr. Begin to refuse.

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Section 3(4)

Wayland
7 May 2013

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/MR HORD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR MOBERLY
SIR J BULLARD
HD/NENAD
HD/MED
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HD/N.A.D

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IMMEDIATE

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMMAN 110935Z NOV 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 498 OF 11 NOV
INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS, CAIRO, BAGHDAD, JEDDA, BEIRUT, TEHRAN.
TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, TUNIS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEWYORK, UKDEL NATO,
MOSCOW, EC POSTS, MODUK

MIPT: SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO JORDAN

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD AN HOUR'S TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN BEFORE LUNCH WITH HIM ON 10 NOVEMBER. HE WAS FRIENDLY AND FORTH-COMING. MAIN POINTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

ARAB/ISRAEL

2. THE KING GAVE A POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE FEZ DECLARATION BUT STRESSED THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS AN ARAB ANSWER TO THE REAGAN INITIATIVE. THE REAGAN INITIATIVE HAD MANY POSITIVE ASPECTS (AS WELL AS SOME NEGATIVE ONES) AND HE HOPED THAT IT WOULD OPEN THE WAY FOR DIALOGUE. HE WELCOMED THE FACT THAT THE AMERICANS HAD FINALLY BEEN ABLE TO MAKE A MOVE OF THEIR OWN. IF THE INITIATIVE WAS TO FAIL IT SHOULD NOT BE BECAUSE OF THE ARABS. ISRAEL WAS MEANWHILE IN THE FINAL STAGES OF TAKING OVER THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. AFTER THAT HER NEXT OBJECTIVE WOULD BE JORDAN. IT WAS THEREFORE VITAL TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE BASIS OF THE PEAGAN INITIATIVE AND IT WOULD CLEARLY BE HELPFUL IF THE PLO WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT

ALBEIT CONDITIONALLY, THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO PEACE AND SECURITY.

3. HE HAD DECIDED THAT, RATHER THAN WAIT FOR OTHERS TO DICTATE MATTERS, IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO HAVE TALKS WITH THE PLO. IF THE TWO COULD REACH AGREEMENT, THE PEOPLE OF JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS COULD GIVE EXPRESSION TO THEIR SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE CONTEXT OF TWO UNITS WITH THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT AND THEIR OWN ASSEMBLY, LINKED AT A HIGHER LEVEL AND ON AN EQUAL BASIS IN A JOINT

OF TWO UNITS WITH THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT AND THEIR OWN ASSEMBLY, LINKED AT A HIGHER LEVEL AND ON AN EQUAL BASIS IN A JOINT ASSEMBLY WHICH WOULD EXERCISE POWER IN THE FIELDS OF FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENCE AND WOULD PROMOTE COOPERATION IN OTHER AREAS. THIS IDEA HAD BEEN ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE AND THE DETAILS NOW NEEDED TO BE WORKED OUT. HE HAD TOLD ARAFAT THAT JORDAN WOULD BE PREPARED TO HELP THE PLO WITHIN REASON ON SUCH MATTERS AS PRESSURE ON THE PLO FROM SYRIA AND INDIVIDUAL PALESTINIANS COULD RETURN TO JORDAN. BUT THE UNITY AND SECURITY OF JORDAN COULD NOT BE JEOPARDISED. HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT ARAFAT WAS MATURING POLITICALLY BUT HE HAD LOST CREDIBILITY AS A RESULT OF EVENTS IN BEIRUT.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN RESPONSE OUTLINED HIS POSITION. THE CHANGE IN US POLICY WAS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND THE OPPORTUNITY THUS CREATED HAD TO BE TAKEN. THE AMERICANS HAD TO DO MORE TO PRESS A CHANGE OF DIRECTION ON ISRAEL. THERE WAS NOT MUCH TIME, AND THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE WOULD NOT BE THERE UNLESS THE ISRAELIS STOPPED TRYING TO TAKE OVER THE WEST BANK. KING HUSSEIN MADE CLEAR THAT HE REGARDED ISRAELI SETTLEMENT POLICY AS A CLEAR CHALLENGE TO THE US ADMINISTRATION WHO MUST SHOW WHETHER OR NOT THEY WERE IN EARNEST. HE ALSO DISAGREED WITH THE US POSITION THAT THE PLO HAD NO RIGHT TO BE IN NEGOTIATIONS. THIS MADE NO SENSE: WHY SHOULD THEY NOT BE THERE IF THEIR PURPOSE WAS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SEARCH FOR PEACE? HE HIMSELF REMAINED COMMITTED TO THE RABAT DECISION BUT THERE CAME A POINT WHEN JORDAN'S RIGHT TO SURVIVE HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. HE HOPED THAT THE PLO WOULD MAKE THE RIGHT CHOICE. THERE WAS CERTAINLY PRESSURE FROM THEIR OWN PEOPLE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANYTHING MORE WHICH BRITAIN MIGHT USEFULLY DO IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. HE WOULD BE SPEAKING TO SHULTZ TO URGE HIM TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON ISRAEL. THE KING SAID THAT THE POSITION WHICH BRITAIN AND THE COMMUNITY HAD TAKEN HAD BEEN A VERY CONSIDERABLE HELP BOTH WITH THE US AND IN AVERTING FURTHER POLARISATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE MAIN THING NOW WAS TO MAINTAIN THE PRESSURE ON THE AMERICANS.

LEBANON

6. THE KING FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES COULD BE ACHIEVED BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. MEANWHILE JORDAN WOULD SEE WHAT THEY COULD DO TO HELP PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. HE FEARED THAT THE ISRAELI OBJECTIVE WAS TO KEEP THE SITUATION AS IT WAS IN ORDER TO DIVERT THE ATTENTION FROM THE SEARCH FOR AN OVERALL PEACE SETTLEMENT.

IRAN/IRAQ

THE KING SAID THAT HE WAS SENDING THE PRIME MINISTER TO IRAQ ON 11 NOVEMBER TO HAVE TALKS WITH THE IRAQIS. IF IRAQ WERE DEFEATED THE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GULF WERE CLEAR TO ALL AND WE SHOULD ALL DO WHAT WE COULD TO AVERT THIS RISK BEFORE IT WAS TOO LATE. BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD HOLD THE POSITION

NOVEMBER TO HAVE TALKS WITH THE IRAQIS. IF IRAQ WERE DEFEATED THE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GULF WERE CLEAR TO ALL AND WE SHOULD ALL DO WHAT WE COULD TO AVERT THIS RISK BEFORE IT WAS TOO LATE. BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD HOLD THE POSITION PROVIDED THAT THEY CONTINUED TO GET THE NECESSARY SUPPLIES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT THE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GULF WERE SERIOUS. WE WERE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE GULF STATES.

BILATERAL RELATIONS

THE KING CONFIRMED THAT EVERYTHING WAS NOW ALL RIGHT WITH THE KHALID TANKS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RAISED THE POSSIBLE PURCHASE OF HAWK. THE KING WAS NON-COMMITTAL BUT MADE IT CLEAR IN GENERAL THAT JORDAN WOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH BRITAIN IN THE DEFENCE FIELD AND THAT HE WAS VERY HAPPY WITH EXISTING CO-OPERATION. THE KING CONCLUDED BY SENDING HIS BEST WISHES TO THE PRIME MINISTER, WHICH THE SECRETARY OF STATE RECIPROCATED ON HER BEHALF.

URWICK

NNNN

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middle East

T 198/82.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 October, 1982

King Hussein's Message to
the Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 20 October. I enclose a letter to King Hussein which the Prime Minister has signed and which follows closely the draft which you submitted. I should be grateful if you would arrange for this letter to be delivered.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT.



FILE LPO
cc: FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

22 October, 1982

✓ Master set
✗

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 198/82**

Your Majesty,

I am most grateful to you for your letter of 13 October and for the care you have taken to keep me informed of the progress of your discussions with the Americans and the Palestinians. The present phase of Middle East diplomacy has placed a great burden of responsibility upon you and the Jordanian people. I should like you to know not only that you have our continued support and admiration, but that we are prepared to help as actively as we can in turning the present opportunity into positive results.

Mr. Urwick has reported fully on your important discussions about future Jordanian/Palestinian relations. I am glad to hear that you regard them as a good start. We recognise the very difficult obstacles that you face, even if you succeed in agreeing with Palestinian leaders on a political strategy. I remain convinced that no real progress can be made until the PLO commits itself unequivocally to recognition of Israel's right to live in peace and security as an essential part of a settlement which would also cover Palestinian rights. I am sure you were right to put this to Mr. Arafat in forthright terms. The PLO are now at a

/crossroads.

sw

crossroads. It is essential that they recognise that a failure to take up the political alternative whole-heartedly may simply condemn the Palestinians to many more years of frustration and misery. Your discussions are most important in bringing the PLO to face the reality of their position, and to think constructively about how they can best exercise their rights in the light of all the circumstances. I have no doubt that if they make the unequivocal statement you urged on Mr. Arafat, the rewards will be significant.

I too look forward to discussing these and other issues with you at the earliest opportunity. I should be delighted if your travel plans enabled you to visit London during the autumn.

With my kindest regards,

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Majesty King Hussein Bin Talal.

①



10 DOWNING STREET

Prima Divita

You may like to read this
letter and then consider
signing the attached letter
to King Hussein.

A.J.C. $\frac{20}{6}$



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 October 1982

*Dear John,*King Hussein's Message to the Prime Minister

// King Hussein gave HM Ambassador Amman on 13 October a letter to the Prime Minister together with a folder of the King's correspondence with the Americans since June. These were reported in Amman telegrams 427 - 9. I now enclose the originals, together with copies of the telegrams.

The correspondence with the Americans covers Lebanon and exchanges over President Reagan's initiative. Mr Urwick telegraphed the two most revealing messages; we have not had time to study the remainder in detail, but they appear to add little to our knowledge of US/Jordanian relations. In particular, there is nothing in the King's messages which amount to a substantive rejection of any part of President Reagan's proposals.

Two main themes predominate in the messages from the King. First, he repeatedly makes clear Jordan's willingness to participate in the new peace process on the basis of Resolution 242, but that in order to do so he needs the support of the Palestinians and other Arabs. Secondly, he indicates lingering doubts about the American determination to follow through the process launched by President Reagan. The King's purpose in passing these papers to us is presumably to show us the basis on which he has agreed to co-operate with the Americans, and the pressure he is under from the American side to move rapidly towards negotiations.

All this provides useful background to the King's account of his discussions with Arafat in Amman. The King was evidently encouraged by this first round of talks. Arafat appears to be showing realism on several points:

/i) On a



- (i) On a Palestinian state, the King told the US Ambassador in Amman that Arafat had said that while he was obliged to maintain his support in public for the immediate establishment of a state, he would in practice quietly drop this (easier said than done);
- (ii) Arafat accepted that some form of unity between Jordan and the Palestinian entity was the only sensible foundation on which to build; this is to be the subject of the follow-up Jordanian/PLO discussions;
- (iii) Arafat had ruled out the military option, and had given a firm commitment to stop all military operations into the Occupied Territories from Jordan, or mounted through Jordan;
- (iv) The King considered that he had made some impact on Arafat in arguing that it was essential for the PLO to make a clear statement recognising Israel's right to exist, and that this was the only obstacle in the path of a US/PLO dialogue.

This is as much as could have been expected from the initial round of talks, and in itself marks a considerable improvement in Jordan's relations with the PLO under Arafat. If further progress is to be made, Arafat must now unite the PLO leadership around a political strategy based on closer co-operation with Jordan, in preparation for the meeting of the Palestine National Council expected within the next month. There have already been rumblings of dissent from PLO factions in Damascus, undoubtedly stimulated by the Syrians, who are nervous about the increased warmth of relations between Jordan and the PLO.

The King believes that he has done well to bring the PLO to accept that Jordan/Palestinian relations are a matter to be decided by the two peoples 'within the context of the family that both form'. But unless he and the other Arab moderates can keep up the pressure on the PLO, the 'heads of agreement' he seems to have reached with Arafat may start to unravel. At the same time, he is concerned that the Americans are expecting him to move too far too fast, and he cannot afford to be seen as the agent of the US in the Arab world. He is therefore subject to pressure from both sides and deserves encouragement, particularly in his effort to persuade Arafat of the central importance of a statement recognising Israel's rights.

/I enclose



/ I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to King Hussein's letter. The King said that he was 'looking forward to meeting the Prime Minister at the earliest opportunity'. He has told the US Ambassador in Amman that he is thinking of visiting Washington shortly after the visit of the Arab League team led by King Hassan on 22 October (though we have since heard that the Americans may be encouraging a later date). He may therefore already be thinking of stopping over in London on his way to or from Washington. We should encourage him to do this.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: King Hussein

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I am most grateful to you for your letter of 13 October and for the care you have taken to keep me informed of the progress of your discussions with the Americans and the Palestinians. The present phase of Middle East diplomacy has placed a great burden of responsibility upon you and the Jordanian people. I should like you to know not only that you have our continued support and admiration, but that we are prepared to help as actively as we can in turning the present opportunity into positive results.

Mr Urwick has reported fully on your important discussions about future Jordanian/Palestinian relations. I am glad to hear that you regard them as a good start. We recognise the very difficult obstacles that you face, even if you succeed in agreeing with Palestinian leaders on a political strategy. I remain convinced that no real progress can be made until the PLO commits itself

unequivocally to negotiations based on the mutual acceptance *recognition of Israeli right to live in peace and security* as an essential part of a settlement which would also cover Palestinian *of* rights. I am sure you were right to put this to

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/Mr

Mr Arafat in forthright terms. The PLO are now at a crossroads. It is essential that they recognise that a failure to take up the political alternative wholeheartedly may ^{simply} /condemn the Palestinians to many more years of frustration and misery. Your discussions are most important in bringing the PLO to face the reality of their position, and to think constructively about how they can best exercise their rights in the light of all the circumstances. I have no doubt that if they make the unequivocal statement you urged on Mr Arafat, the rewards will be significant.

I too look forward to discussing these and other issues with you at the earliest opportunity. I should be delighted if your travel plans enabled you to visit London during the autumn.

AMMAN TL NR 780

GR 1300

CONFIDENTIAL

TELELETTER

FROM A B URWICK AMMAN

NFR DATED 14 OCTOBER 1982

FOLLOWING FOR R O MILES ESQ, NENAD, FCO.

D J MOSS ESQ PUSD.

COPY TO CHANCERIES BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, RABAT,
TEL AVIV, TUNIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON CG JERUSALEM.

JORDAN/PLO

1. MY TELEGRAMS NOS 426-429 REFER.

2. I SAW THE US AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING TO COMPARE
NOTES. VIETS HAD SEEN KING HUSSEIN IMMEDIATELY BEFORE ME
ON 13 OCTOBER AND HAD GRILLED HIM FOR OVER AN HOUR ON VARIOUS ASPECT
S OF HIS TALKS WITH ARAFAT, BUT HAD FOUND THE KING DIFFICULT
TO PIN DOWN. IT WAS NOT ALTOGETHER SURPRISING, THEREFORE, THAT
THE KING WAS EXHAUSTED BY THE TIME I SAW HIM AND IN NO
MOOD TO BE SUBJECTED TO A FURTHER BARRAGE OF QUESTIONS.

3. VIETS (WHOSE CONFIDENCE SHOULD BE RESPECTED) BEGAN
BY TELLING ME THAT THE BRIEFING OF THE KING PRIOR TO THE
ARAFAT VISIT, WHICH HE HAD CARRIED OUT ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM
WASHINGTON (SEE THE SPEAKING NOTES LEFT WITH THE KING
ON 4 OCTOBER IN MY TELEGRAM NO 428) HAD BEEN A
FAIRLY DISASTROUS EXERCISE AND HAD AROUSED THE KINGS
STRONG RESENTMENT:

THE KING SIMPLY REFUSED TO BELIEVE THAT THE AMERICANS WERE BEING
EVEN-HANDED. VIETS HAD ADVISED WASHINGTON TO PUT THE KINGS
REPLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN (MY TELEGRAM NO 429) TO ONE
SIDE RATHER THAN PROLONG THE ARGUMENT SEMICOLON
VIETS BELIEVES THAT CROWN PRINCE HASSAN MAY HAVE DRAFTED THE KINGS
REPLY .

Done.
PS/ni 1420
PS/PUS
Sir J Beland
Sir J Leahy
Mr Ejection

07041

Mr Ridetts
Mr Chepki
Mr Miles

Important extra gloss

EJW

Dept Pass

Dept Pass

MED

4. THE KING TOLD VIETS THAT HE WISHED TO VISIT THE US IN ORDER TO SEE PRESIDENT REAGAN AND MR SHULTZ SHORTLY AFTER THE VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON 22 OCTOBER BY KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO AND THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF COUNTRIES ON THE FEZ FOLLOW UP COMMISSION. YOU WILL ALSO HAVE NOTED THE REFERENCE IN KING HUSSEIN'S MESSAGE TO MRS THATCHER TO HIS HOPES OF AN EARLY MEETING WITH HER. IF THE AMERICANS ARE THEREFORE ABLE TO AGREE TO RECEIVE KING HUSSEIN IN WASHINGTON LATER THIS MONTH, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE KING WILL ASK TO STOP OFF IN LONDON FOR TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, EITHER ON HIS WAY TO OR FROM WASHINGTON OR POSSIBLY BOTH. THIS COULD POSSIBLY HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TIMING OF THE SECRETARY OF STATES VISIT TO JORDAN.

5. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS FROM VIETS, KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT ARAFAT HAD CLEARLY RULED OUT THE MILITARY OPTION AND THAT, WHILE PUBLICLY MAINTAINING HIS SUPPORT FOR THE IMMEDIATE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE, HE WOULD IN PRACTICE QUIETLY DROP THIS. VIETS WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN A CLEAR ANSWER ON THE LIKELY COMPOSITION OF THE THE PLO DELEGATION WHICH WOULD RETURN TO JORDAN FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS, ALTHOUGH THE KING HAD SAID THAT WALID KHALIDI WOULD BE A PROMINENT MEMBER VIETS BELIEVES, AS I DO, THAT THE DELEGATION WILL BE SOMETHING RATHER DIFFERENT FROM THE EXISTING JOINT PALESTINE/JORDAN COMMITTEE WHOSE PRIME FUNCTION WAS HITHERTO BEEN TO DISTRIBUTE THE STEADFASTNESS FUND ON THE WEST BANK. BUT NO FIRM DECISIONS SEEM TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN YET ABOUT THIS. THE KING ALSO TOLD VIETS THAT NOTHING HAD YET BEEN DECIDED ON FEDERATION OR CONFEDERATION. THE KING USED THE SAME LANGUAGE TO VIETS AS HE HAD WITH ME, REFERRING TO TWO SEPARATE 'UNITS' WITH THEIR OWN ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES SEMICOLON BUT HAD BEEN VERY VAGUE ABOUT WHAT SORT OF SUPERSTRUCTURE THERE WOULD BE.

CCN LINE 17 BUT HE HAD BEEN VERY ...

6 . PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT, ARAFAT HAD GIVEN A FIRM COMMITMENT THAT HE WOULD STOP ALL MILITARY OPERATIONS INTO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES FROM JORDAN OR MOUNTED FROM THIRD COUNTRIES THROUGH JORDAN. HE HAD ALSO GIVEN SPECIFIC UNDERTAKING THAT ABU JIHAD (KHALIL AL WAZIR) WOULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY SUCH ACTIVITIES WHEN HE TOOK UP RESIDENCE IN AMMAN (PARAGRAPH 5 OF MY TELEGRAM NO 426) . I UNDERSTAND FROM VIETS THAT ABU JIHAD ALSO HAS FAMILY REASONS FOR WISHING TO SETTLE IN AMMAN.

7. AGREEMENT WAS APPARENTLY REACHED ON A MODEST INCREASE IN THE

7. AGREEMENT WAS APPARENTLY REACHED ON A MODEST INCREASE IN THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY PRESENCE IN JOREA (RADIO MONTE CARLO QUOTED ABU JIHAD IN THIS SENSE ON 13 OCTOBER AND SAID THAT DECISIONS WOULD TAKEN BY A COMMITTEE JOINTLY CHAIRED BY THE JORDANIAN COMMANDER IN CHIEF AND ABU JIHAD HIMSELF). ARRANGEMENTS WOULD ALSO BE MADE TO ALLOW EGYPTIAN VOLUNTEERS WITH THE PLO WHO WERE PRESENT IN LEBANON OR SYRIA TO COME TO JORDAN.

8. KING HUSSEIN HAD CONFIRMED TO VIETS ARAFATS EXTREME SUSPICION AND FEAR OF THE SYRIANS, WHICH HAS ALSO BEEN A THEME OF OUR RECENT REPORTING. ARAFAT WAS ANXIOUS TO BRING AS MANY OF THE PLO FROM SYRIA TO JORDAN AS POSSIBLE, BUT KING HUSSEIN HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE A MAJOR INFLUX OF PALESTINIANS FROM OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES INTO JORDAN.

9. IN REPLY TO VIETS QUESTION, KING HUSSEIN HAD SAID THAT HE BELIEVED ARAFAT REMAINED IN CONTROL OF THE PLO AND THAT HE ALSO RECOGNISED HOW MUCH OF ITS CREDIBILITY AS A MOVEMENT THE PLO HAD LOST THROUGH THE EVACUATION AND DISPERSAL FROM BEIRUT. VIETS HAD THEN ASKED THE KING WHETHER HE FELT HE COULD REALLY TRUST ARAFAT: AFTER A LONG PAUSE, THE KING HAD REPLIED THAT IT WAS MORE A QUESTION OF PLACING RELIANCE ON THE POSITION IN WHICH ARAFAT NOW FOUND HIMSELF IE HE HAD NOWHERE ELSE TO TURN.

10. COMMENTING ON THE SAUDI PRINCE BANDAR'S VISIT TO JORDAN DURING THE ARAFAT TALKS, KING HUSSEIN TOLD VIETS THAT HE HAD BEEN REASONABLY SATISFIED WITH HIS ASSURANCES BUT THAT 'THE TIME HAD COME FOR THE SAUDIS TO PUT THEIR MONEY WHERE THERE MOUTH IS'.

11. I HOPE TO SEE CROWN PRINCE HASSAN, THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND A NUMBER OF PROMINENT PALESTINIANS OVER THE WEEKEND AS PART OF A PROGRAMME BEING ARRANGED FOR MR LENNOX-BOYD MP AND SHOULD THEN HAVE MORE TO REPORT.

12. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN (ALAN CHARLTONS TELELETTER OF 13 OCTOBER TO IAN LOCKHART) THAT THE KING RECENTLY SENT ALI GHANDOUR (THE LEBANESE -BORN CHAIRMAN OF ALIA) TO SEE THE LEBANESE PRESIDENT AND I HAVE SEEN GHANDOUR SINCE HIS RETURN. I UNDERSTAND THE MAIN MESSAGE GHANDOUR BROUGHT BACK WAS THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL FELT VERY UNSURE OF HIMSELF AND NEEDED ALL THE SUPPORT AND HELP HE COULD GET FROM HIS FRIENDS. ONE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE OF THIS IS THAT THE JORDANIANS WANT

ONE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE OF THIS IS THAT THE JORDANIANS WANT TO SEND A REALLY GOOD AMBASSADOR TO BEIRUT: THERE WAS AN ANIMATED DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE CANDIDATES FOR THE JOB IN MY PRESENCE BETWEEN GHANDOUR AND THE HEAD OF ROYAL PROTOCOL EXCLAM.

MENAD REGISTRY

~~FOO~~ PLEASE PASS RABAT. **AND TUNIS**

A B URWICK

*copied
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d*

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CONFIDENTIAL

GR 1000
CONFIDENTIAL
FM AMMAN 140845Z OCT 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 429 OF 13 OCT
INFO WASHINGTON

MY 3 IPTS: JORDAN/PLO
TEXT OF LETTER FROM KING HUSSEIN TO PRESIDENT REAGAN DATED
11 OCTOBER.
BEGINS

I WRITE TO THANK YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, FOR YOUR LETTER OF 16 SEPTEMBER WHICH I RECEIVED UPON MY RETURN FROM FEZ. I APPRECIATE YOUR ASSURANCES OF THE SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER FRIENDS OF JORDAN. I, HOWEVER, AND IN ALL CANDOUR, DO NOT FEEL HAPPY WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD MOVE TO MOBILIZE SUCH SUPPORT SHOULD WE DECIDE TO ANNOUNCE OUR WILLINGNESS TO JOIN THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

OUR ATTEMPTS TO SECURE A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE OVER MANY YEARS HAVE BEEN BORN OUT OF OUR FIRM COMMITMENT TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE. WE HAVE NEVER, NOR WILL WE EVER, BE INFLUENCED BY ANY OTHER CONSIDERATIONS. JORDAN HAS FACED, AND WILL PROBABLY BE CALLED UPON AGAIN BY ITS OWN CONSCIENCE, TO FACE VERY REAL THREATS AND CHALLENGES WHILE SEEKING TO FULFIL ITS COMMITMENT.

THE TALKING POINTS IN AUGUST GAVE US HOPE. I FEEL, HOWEVER, THAT I SHOULD ACQUAINT YOU WITH OUR FUNDAMENTAL RESERVATIONS OVER CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE "POINTS FOR DISCUSSION" WHICH WERE RECENTLY RAISED WITH ME BY AMBASSADOR VIETS.

AS A RESULT TALKS WITH THE PLO AT THIS POINT ARE DIFFICULT. THEY ARE JUSTIFIABLY CONCERNED, AFTER THE LEBANON, THAT THE WORDS AND GUARANTEES OF THE UNITED STATES CARRY LITTLE WEIGHT. THEY FEEL THAT THE LEBANON EPISODE HAS SEVERELY DAMAGED US CREDIBILITY IN THE AREA AND THEIR LEADERSHIP'S OWN CREDIBILITY WITH THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, FOR IT HAVING ACCEPTED IN GOOD FAITH US ASSURANCES, COMMITMENTS AND GUARANTEES FOR THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF THEIR FAMILIES AND PEOPLE IN RETURN FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR FIGHTERS FROM BEIRUT, WITH SUCH A DEVASTATING RESULT AS THE BEIRUT MASSACRES.

AS WE PURSUE OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PLO LEADERSHIP TO TRY, IN YOUR OWN WORDS, MR PRESIDENT (IN YOUR LETTER OF 20 AUGUST), "TO INFLUENCE THEM TO OPT CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY FOR THE PATH TO PEACE," I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS ON THE POINTS FOR DISCUSSION RAISED BY AMBASSADOR VIETS PRIOR TO THIS SENSITIVE VISIT BY CHAIRMAN ARAFAT.

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IN THE TALKING POINTS OF THE 18 AUGUST, YOU REAFFIRM US COMMITMENT TO THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. THE PREAMBLE OF THE ACCORDS STATES: 'TO ACHIEVE A RELATIONSHIP OF PEACE, IN THE SPIRIT OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE UN CHARTER, FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ANY NEIGHBOUR PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE PEACE AND SECURITY WITH IT, ARE NECESSARY FOR THE PURPOSE OF CARRYING OUT ALL THE PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338.'

IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT, AND NOT ONE OF VOICING ARAB 'CONCERNS,' WHICH WOULD INVITE ISRAELI 'OBJECTIONS.' THAT I WISH TO CLARIFY THE FOLLOWING.

1. PLO/JORDANIAN TALKS

(A) LEGITIMACY AND SECURITY

WHEREAS THE US INITIATIVE IS CLEAR IN ITS RECOGNITION OF THE LEGITIMACY OF ISRAEL, AS REAFFIRMED IN YOUR STATEMENT OF 1 SEPTEMBER, 1982, THE REFERENCE OF THE TALKING POINTS (28 AUGUST) TO THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF 'PEACEFUL AND ORDERLY TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY FROM ISRAEL TO THE PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS,' IS NOT BORN OUT BY THE 1 SEPTEMBER 'MIDDLE EAST ADDRESS.' IT OVERLOOKS THE ILLEGAL NATURE OF SETTLEMENTS AND DOES NOT EMPHASIZE THE NECESSARY 'CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES' OF A SETTLEMENT FREEZE, CALLED FOR BY EGYPT AS EARLY AS 13 OCTOBER, 1978. ISRAEL HAS VIOLATED THE US CALL FOR A FREEZE ON SETTLEMENTS. THE ABOVE PLACES A MAJOR CONSTRAINT ON THE CREDIBILITY OF THE JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN POSITION WHICH AIMS AT ESTABLISHING DIALOGUE WITH THE US PRIOR TO ADDRESSING 'NEGOTIATING POSITIONS' AMONG THE PARTIES.

(B) UN RESOLUTION 242

'IT IS OUR POSITION THAT RESOLUTION 242 APPLIES TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND REQUIRES ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN RETURN FOR PEACE.' (TALKING POINTS, 18 AUGUST)

UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 242 CALLS UPON THE 'WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL ARMED FORCES FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN THE RECENT CONFLICT.' IN THAT CONTEXT IT IS TO JORDAN THAT THESE TERRITORIES WOULD HAVE BEEN RETURNED. AS A RESULT OF UN RESOLUTION 338, HOWEVER, SYRIAN TERRITORY WAS PARTIALLY RETURNED SEMICL N ITS SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS TERRITORY IS STILL IN ABEYANCE. THE SAME WOULD APPLY IF PARTIAL WITHDRAWALS, WITH 'EVERYTHING OPEN TO NEGOTIATION,' WERE TO CHARACTERIZE THE COMING PHASE. HENCE THE UNACCEPTABLE AMBIGUITY IN THE INTERPRETATION OF THESE BASIC RESOLUTIONS.

'WE BASE OUR APPROACH SQUARELY ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SHOULD BE RESOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING AN EXCHANGE OF TERRITORY FOR PEACE. THIS EXCHANGE IS ENshrINED IN UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, WHICH IS, IN TURN, INCORPORATED IN ALL ITS PART IN THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS. UN RESOLUTION 242 REMAINS WHOLLY VALID AS THE FOUNDATION STONE OF AMERICA'S MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORT.'

YET, IF WITHDRAWAL FOR PEACE IS UNATTAINABLE, AND THE FUTURE CHARACTER OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IS TO BE PREJUDGED BY ISRAEL, THE PLO ARE JUSTIFIED IN ASKING 'WHAT HAS JORDAN'S ADOPTION OF AND RECOGNITION OF UN RESOLUTION 242 SINCE 1967 ACHIEVED?'

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WHEREAS, INVOLVEMENT OF 'WEST BANK RESIDENT' IS A MAJOR TOPIC OF INTER-PALESTINIAN AND JORDANIAN DISCUSSIONS, THE FOLLOWING MUST BE CLARIFIED.

'THE PALESTINIANS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP NEED TO BE RELIEVED OF THE BURDENS OF MILITARY OCCUPATION SO THAT THEY CAN, THROUGH NEGOTIATION, PARTICIPATE IN DETERMINING THEIR OWN FUTURE.' (YOUR LETTER OF 20 JULY).

NEGOTIATING WITH THE CIVILIAN/MILITARY OCCUPATION COMPROMISES, BY DEFINITION, THE INTERIM AND FINAL STATUS OF THESE TERRITORIES. IF 'A METHOD' IS TO BE FOUND TO ENCOURAGE WEST BANK AND GAZA RESIDENTS 'TO BE A PARTY TO FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS IN SOME MANNER,' COMPREHENSIVE ISRAELI DISENTANGLEMENT OF MEASURES TAKEN SINCE JUNE 1967 HAS TO BE SECURED BY THE US AND A PRIOR COMMITMENT IS VITAL TO REASSURE US OF WHERE WE STAND.

THE US, HAS, AFTER ALL, 'INTERPOSED' ITSELF IN SINAI AND THE LEBANON AND A MULTINATIONAL PRESENCE COULD OFFER THE VITAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PROTECTION TO THESE INHABITANTS.

2. NEGOTIATING POSITIONS

(A) CONFEDERATION AND SELF DETERMINATION

PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION WAS EFFECTED THROUGH AN ACT OF UNION OF THE EAST AND WEST BANKS IN APRIL, 1950, WHICH CONFIRMED:-

'...THE RESERVATION OF ALL ARAB RIGHTS IN PALESTINE, THE DEFENCE OF SUCH RIGHTS BY ALL LEGITIMATE MEANS AND WITH FULL COMPETENCE, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THEIR JUST CASE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE PEOPLE'S ASPIRATIONS AND OF ARAB CO-OPERATION AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE.'

BUT JORDAN DID NOT FORECLOSE THE ISSUE OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES. WHAT THE PALESTINIANS DECIDED ONCE THEY MAY WELL DECIDE AGAIN. BUT IT IS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO IGNORE THE RIGHT AND PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION 'IN THAT IT CONTRIBUTES DIRECTLY TO 'SELF-GOVERNMENT' .' SELF-DETERMINATION ECLIPSES, AS A MATTER OF LAW AND HUMANITY, THE LEGAL COUNTER-CLAIMS OF JORDAN AND ISRAEL. THE FORM OF SELF-DETERMINATION IS AN INTER-FAMILY JORDANIAN/PALESTINIANS ISSUE.

(B) FINAL STATUS REFERENCE TO ISRAEL

THE PLO'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE FEZ SUMMIT RESOLUTIONS IS BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF THE 1947 PARTITION PLAN AND THE AGGREGATE OF ALL UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION, INCLUDING, IN PARTICULAR, SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND OTHER RESOLUTIONS, WHICH EMPHASIZED THE RIGHT OF RETURN, OR COMPENSATION, FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEES, AS WELL AS FREEDOM OF WORSHIP IN JERUSALEM AND THE HOLY LAND. ALL OF THE ABOVE CONCEDES 'FINAL STATUS' AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL. THE 1947 PARTITION PLAN IS THE ONLY LEGAL FOUNDATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE CONCEPT OF TWO STATES IS IMPLICIT IN IT. THE FEZ RESOLUTIONS

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FROM AMMAN 140700Z OCT 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 428 OF 13 OCT 1982
AND TO INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

MY 2 IPT'S : JORDAN/PLO

TEXT OF SPEAKING NOTES LEFT WITH KING HUSSEIN BY US AMBASSADOR
ON 4 OCTOBER REGARDING ARAFATS VISIT TO AMMAN.

BEGINS.

ARAFAT TALKS

THE US POSITIONS OUTLINED BY THE PRESIDENT REPRESENT
A STATEMENT OF WHAT THE UNITED STATES WILL SUPPORT IN NEGOTIATIONS.
THE UNITED STATES HAS SET FORTH ITS POSITIONS IN ORDER TO MOVE
THE PARTIES TO BEGIN NEGOTIATING WITH EACH OTHER ABOUT ABOUT
TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. THE UNITED
STATES WILL NOT CHANGE ITS STATED POSITIONS PRIOR TO NEGOTIATIONS
AMONG THE PARTIES. TO DO SO TO ACCOMMODATE ARAB CONCERNS WOULD
ONLY INVITE PRESSURE FOR OTHER CHANGES TO MEET ISRAELI OBJECTIONS.

-- WE HOPE THAT IN TALKS WITH ARAFAT HIS MAJESTY WILL WORK TO
ACHIEVE ULTIMATE AGREEMENT ON TWO MATTERS: (1) AGREED NEGOTIATING
POSITIONS THAT WOULD CONSTITUTE THE JORDAN-PLO POSITION GOING
INTO TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS SEMICLN AND (2) A METHOD TO PERMIT
JORDAN AND PALESTINIAN RESIDENTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA TO BEGIN
NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL IN SOME MANNER.

NEGOTIATION POSITIONS:

-- CONFEDERATION - THE U.S. POSITION ON THE ISSUE OF SELF-
DETERMINATION IS CLEAR AND WILL NOT BE CHANGED, ABSENT AGREEMENT
BY ALL OTHER PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATION. AN ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY
THE PALESTINIANS WOULD FIRST HAVE AN INDEPENDENT STATE AND THEN
MOVE QUICKLY TO AN ACT OF CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN IS NOT
CONSISTENT WITH THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION. A JORDANIAN-PLO AGREE-
MENT TO PROPOSE THIS APPROACH IN NEGOTIATIONS
IS A DECISION FOR JORDAN AND THE PLO. IF ISRAEL WERE TO ACCEPT
THIS CONFEDERATION APPROACH, US ACCEPTANCE WOULD NOT BE
PRECLUDED. HOWEVER, THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT CHANGE ITS POSITION
AT THIS STAGE.

-- JORDAN AND THE PLO CANNOT RESOLVE THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST
BANK AND GAZA WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE ISRAELIS. THE NATURE OF
THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND JORDAN WILL
HAVE TO BE DETERMINED IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS AND OTHER
PARTIES DIRECTLY ENGAGED IN THE NEGOTIATION. IT CANNOT BE
DETERMINED FINALLY EITHER BY THE PLO AND JORDAN ALONE OR THROUGH
TALKS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JORDAN.

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-- WE THINK IT IS VITAL IN TALKS WITH ARAFAT THAT JORDAN LOOK NOT ONLY FOR AGREEMENT ON FINAL STATUS ISSUES. IT IS THE US POSITION THAT THE NEXT STAGE IN THE PEACE PROCESS SHOULD BE FOCUSED ON NEGOTIATING TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TERRITORIES. THE UNITED STATES HOPES TALKS BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE PLO WILL BE DIRECTED TOWARD FORMULATING NEGOTIATING POSITIONS REGARDING TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. SUCH POSITIONS TO BE REALISTIC SHOULD INCLUDE IDEAS ON HOW TO MEET THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS OF BOTH ISRAEL AND THOSE STATES CONTIGUOUS TO ISRAEL.

THE ISSUE OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION IN NEGOTIATIONS:

-- THE US POSITION ON A DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO IS CLEAR AND HAS NOT CHANGED. UNAMBIGUOUS PLO ACCEPTANCE OF UNSC RESOLUTION 242 AND RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST IN PEACE IS THE PREREQUISITE FOR A DIRECT PLO-US DIALOGUE. EVEN THEN, HOWEVER, HIGH LEVEL PLO REPRESENTATION IN DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL, EITHER AS AN INDEPENDENT DELEGATION OR AS PART OF A JORDANIAN OR EGYPTIAN DELEGATION, IN OUR JUDGEMENT, IS NOT A REALISTIC POSSIBILITY AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT.

-- WE HOPE THAT JORDAN AND THE PLO WILL FOCUS ON PROCEDURES FOR INVOLVING BONA FIDE RESIDENTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IN NEGOTIATIONS. SUCH RESIDENTS CAN REPRESENT THE PLO ON SUBSTANCE AND CAN JOIN THE JORDANIAN AND/OR EGYPTIAN DELEGATIONS WITH ISRAELI OR US VETTING. RECENTLY EXILED WEST BANK MAYORS COULD BE AMONG SUCH REPRESENTATIVES.

-- WE BELIEVE IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR JORDAN AND THE PLO TO AVOID STATEMENT WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE ISRAELIS TO ARGUE CREDIBLY THAT JORDAN IS ACTING ONLY AS AN AGENT FOR THE PLO.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3361 OF 15 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TEL AVIV BEIRUT DAMASCUS ROUTINE CAIRO

AMMAN JEDDA TUNIS RABAT PARIS ROME MOSCOW

INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

US/ISRAEL : SHAMIR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

1. SHAMIR SPENT FOUR HOURS WITH SHULTZ ON 14 OCTOBER AND HAD SEPARATE SHORTER MEETINGS WITH BUSH AND WEINBERGER TODAY. HE IS EXPECTED TO HAVE ANOTHER MEETING WITH SHULTZ BEFORE HE LEAVES WASHINGTON. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN AMERICAN AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. HILL (STATE DEPARTMENT) AND TEICHER (NSC) HAVE GIVEN US A PRELIMINARY BRIEFING.

2. THE ISRAELIS APPEAR TO HAVE TAKEN A DELIBERATE DECISION TO ABANDON THE CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH ASSOCIATED WITH SHARON AND TO ATTEMPT TO RESTORE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE ADMINISTRATION.

~~2. THE ISRAELIS APPEAR TO HAVE TAKEN A DELIBERATE DECISION TO ABANDON THE CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH ASSOCIATED WITH SHARON AND TO ATTEMPT TO RESTORE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE ADMINISTRATION. SHARON HIMSELF WROTE TO WEINBERGER EARLIER THIS WEEK TO INVITE HIM, WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS, TO SEND A TEAM TO ISRAEL FOR A BRIEFING ON THE PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT IN LEBANON. SHAMIR WAS CONCILIATORY AND WORKMANLIKE THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSIONS WITH SHULTZ, WHICH CONCENTRATED ON LEBANON.~~

3. THE ISRAELIS PUT FORWARD A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, WHICH THEY WERE ALSO PUTTING TO THE LEBANESE, FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM LEBANON. HILL DESCRIBED IT AS BASICALLY WORKABLE BUT HEDGED WITH UNACCEPTABLE PRECONDITIONS. THE ISRAELIS ARE INSISTING THAT THE FIRST STAGE SHOULD BE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL PLO FORCES FROM NORTHERN LEBANON. THE SECOND STAGE WOULD BE THE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES FROM MOUNT LEBANON TO THE BEKA'A VALLEY, AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF ELEMENTS OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE ALONG THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS ROAD AS FAR AS CHTAURA AND ZAHLE. ONCE THIS WAS COMPLETED THE ISRAELIS WOULD WITHDRAW SOUTH TO THE DAMOUR RIVER. IN THE THIRD STAGE THE ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS WOULD WITHDRAW THE REMAINDER OF THEIR FORCES IN PARALLEL.

4. THE AMERICANS POINTED OUT THAT THE PLO WERE ALREADY COMMITTED, AS PART OF THE AGREEMENT WORKED OUT BY HABIB IN AUGUST, TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM LEBANON WHEN OTHER FOREIGN FORCES WITHDREW, AND TO BEGIN WORK IMMEDIATELY ON WHERE THEY SHOULD GO. THE PHASING OF THE SECOND STAGE WOULD ALSO PROVE DIFFICULT: THE SYRIANS WOULD CERTAINLY NOT WITHDRAW BEFORE THE ISRAELIS DID. THE AMERICANS WERE RESERVING JUDGEMENT ON THE PLAN AS A WHOLE UNTIL THEY HAD ASCERTAINED LEBANESE VIEWS, (DRAPER IS TO SEE GEMAYEL IN NEW YORK ON 17 OCTOBER); OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE HAD NOT YET BEEN CONSULTED.

5. ON SOUTH LEBANON, SHAMIR REPEATED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT ACCEPT UNIFIL OR A MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN THE BORDER AREA. THE SECURITY ZONE (25 MILES FROM THE BORDER) SHOULD BE KEPT FREE OF HEAVY WEAPONRY (ARTILLERY, ROCKET LAUNCHERS ETC) AND PATROLLED BY THE LEBANESE ARMY. ADMITTEDLY THIS WAS NOT YET UP TO THE TASK, BUT IT COULD BE REINFORCED BY INCORPORATING UNITS OF HADDAD'S MILITIA. (CAMILLE CHAMOUN TOLD AMERICAN OFFICIALS EARLIER THIS WEEK THAT HE WOULD NOT OBJECT TO THIS PROPOSAL). SHAMIR IMPLIED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT OBJECT IF A ROLE WERE TO BE FOUND FOR UNIFIL NORTH OF THIS SECURITY AREA. THE ISRAELIS REGARDED THE NEGOTIATION OF QUOTE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS UNQUOTE WITH THE LEBANESE, AS ESSENTIAL BEFORE THEIR FORCES WITHDREW, BUT SHAMIR

NEGOTIATION OF QUOTE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS UNQUOTE WITH THE
LEBANESE, AS ESSENTIAL BEFORE THEIR FORCES WITHDREW, BUT SHAMIR
DID NOT RAISE THE QUESTION OF A PEACE TREATY.

6. THE AMERICANS MADE CLEAR THEIR OPPOSITION TO ANY ROLE FOR HADDAD AND THEIR BELIEF THAT UNIFIL COULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY AND SHOULD BE PRESERVED. HILL SUGGESTED TO US THAT IT MIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, POLICE THE NORTHERN PERIMETER OF THE 25 MILE SECURITY ZONE.

7. SHAMIR STRESSED THE ISRAELIS' DETERMINATION TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM LEBANON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND INDICATED THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE OVER THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS. THE AMERICANS HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HADDAD WILL NOT PROVE TO BE A STICKING POINT BUT THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD DROP THEIR DEMAND FOR PRIOR WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLO FORCES.

8. ON THE PEACE PROCESS, SHAMIR TOOK THE LINE THAT THE DIFFERENT PROPOSALS SHOULD BE SET ASIDE FOR THE MOMENT AND THE AUTONOMY TALKS RESUMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO PROCEED TO SETTLE THE FUTURE OF THE DISPUTED TERRITORIES AND, TO THIS END, TO CONCENTRATE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, RATHER THAN THE FINAL STAGE WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY LEAD TO DEADLOCK. THE PARTICIPATION OF JORDAN AND SOME PALESTINIANS WOULD BE WELCOME. SHAMIR DID NOT MENTION THE VILLAGE LEAGUES IN THIS CONNECTION. THE AMERICANS WERE ALSO STRUCK BY THE ABSENCE OF ANY REFERENCE TO THE ISRAELIS' BIBLICAL CLAIM TO JUDEA AND SAMARIA. TEICHER ATTRIBUTED SHAMIR'S MORE MODERATE ATTITUDE TO THE EFFECT OF THE POLITICAL FERMENT INSIDE ISRAEL AND TO THE CARE THE AMERICANS HAD TAKEN TO AVOID GIVING BEGIN A PRETEXT TO RALLY PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST AMERICAN PRESSURE.

9. SHULTZ TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE THE AMERICAN POSITION ON SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA. SHAMIR'S RESPONSE WAS LOW-KEY: JEWS LIVING IN THOSE SETTLEMENTS SHOULD NOT NOW BE ASKED TO LEAVE. HE DID NOT RESPOND TO SHULTZ'S PRESSURE FOR A FREEZE ON SETTLEMENTS, BUT NOR DID HE SAY THAT THEY WOULD BE FURTHER EXPANDED.

10. SO FAR THE AMERICANS ARE PLEASED WITH THE WAY THE TALKS HAVE GONE. THEY SEE SHAMIR'S ATTITUDE AS AN INDICATION THAT THE STRATEGY UNDERLYING REAGAN'S PEACE INITIATIVE - OF MOBILISING ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION - MAY BE WORKING. THEY DO NOT FOR THE MOMENT INTEND TO RELAX THE PRESSURE: DESPITE ISRAELI HINTS, THEY HAVE MADE NO COMMITMENT TO PRESS AHEAD WITH THE NOTIFICATION TO

~~MOMENT INTEND TO RELAX THE PRESSURE. DESPITE ISRAELI HINTS, THEY~~
~~HAVE MADE NO COMMITMENT TO PRESS AHEAD, WITH THE NOTIFICATION TO~~
CONGRESS OF THE SUSPENDED SALE OF 75 F 16'S, NOR HAVE THEY YET
RESPONDED TO THE RECENT ISRAELI REQUEST FOR US DOLLARS 3.3 BILLION
AID FOR FY84.

FCO PASS SAVING ABU DHABI ADEN ALGIERS BAGHDAD BAHRAIN CAIRO
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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1826 OF 14 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, UKREP BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN,
MIDDLE EAST POSTS, MOSCOW

MY VISITS TO SYRIA AND EGYPT

1. I SHOULD LIKE SHULTZ TO HAVE A FULL ACCOUNT OF MY VISITS TO
DAMASCUS AND CAIRO (9/10 AND 11/12 OCTOBER RESPECTIVELY).

PLEASE THEREFORE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO SHULTZ.
YOU SHOULD ALSO BRIEF THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN MORE DETAIL AT A
SENIOR LEVEL, DRAWING ON REPORTING TELEGRAMS FROM DAMASCUS
(284) AND CAIRO (468).

BEGINS: DEAR GEORGE, I THOUGHT YOU MIGHT LIKE TO HAVE MY
IMPRESSIONS OF MY RECENT MIDDLE EAST TRIP TO DAMASCUS AND CAIRO.
THE AIM OF THE VISIT WAS PARTLY TO GET TO KNOW A LITTLE MORE OF
MY OPPOSITE NUMBERS IN BOTH COUNTRIES AND MEET THEIR RESPECTIVE
PRESIDENTS, BUT IT WAS ALSO AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE
VIEWS AT FIRST HAND AT A CRUCIAL TIME IN MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY,
WHEN SO MUCH IS AT STAKE.

I WAS MADE VERY WELCOME IN BOTH COUNTRIES, PERHAPS
SURPRISINGLY SO IN SYRIA, GIVEN THE TRADITIONALLY HARDLINE APPROACH
WHICH SHE HAS ADOPTED TO MOST OF THE PROBLEMS WE DISCUSSED.
NATURALLY I FOUND MANY MORE POINTS OF CONVERGENCE WITH THE
EGYPTIANS, WHOSE VIEW IS VERY CLOSE TO OURS ON MOST ISSUES. BUT
I WAS STRUCK BY THE INTEREST SHOWN BY THE SYRIANS IN THE VARIOUS
PROPOSALS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE, AND THEIR APPARENT
READINESS TO AVOID STRIKING WHOLLY NEGATIVE ATTITUDES. ON ISSUES
OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THEM, THERE WERE FEW SIGNS OF REAL
FLEXIBILITY, BUT THEY MAY BE READY TO GIVE PEACE EFFORTS A CHANCE.

ON LEBANON, KHADDAM WAS FIRM THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT LEAVE
BEFORE THE ISRAELIS, BUT MADE IT CLEAR THEY HAD NO WISH TO STAY

Prime Directive

*You may like to read Dr. Lynn's
message to Shultz about his
Middle East trip.*

A. J. C. 15/10

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INDEFINITELY THEMSELVES. NOR WOULD SYRIA ACCEPT ANY MORE PLO FIGHTERS OR PALESTINIAN FAMILIES FROM LEBANON. MUBARAK ALSO POINTED TO THE DISPERSAL OF THE REMAINING PLO FIGHTERS AS ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT PARTS OF THE LEBANON PROBLEM.

HOSTILITY WAS EVIDENT BETWEEN THE SYRIANS AND ARAFAT. I WAS REMINDED SHARPLY THAT ARAFAT DID NOT REPRESENT ALL SHADES OF PALESTINIAN OPINION, AND THE SYRIAN MACHINE BEGAN ATTACKING ARAFAT IN PUBLIC AS SOON AS THE AMMAN TALKS GOT GOING ON 10/11 OCTOBER. THE EGYPTIANS THOUGHT THAT ARAFAT SHOULD BE SUPPORTED, BUT THAT HIS POSITION WAS CURRENTLY WEAK. I BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A GREATER RISK THAN FOR SOME TIME OF A MAJOR SPLIT IN THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT IF EARLY PROGRESS TOWARDS A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IS NOT ACHIEVED SOON. I AM SURE THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE IN WESTERN INTERESTS.

THE SYRIANS AND EGYPTIANS DIFFERED SHARPLY ON FEZ. THE SYRIANS SAID THAT IT WAS THE MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS. THE EGYPTIANS CLEARLY REGARDED IT AS AN IRRELEVANCE. BUT THERE WAS SOME SIMILARITY BETWEEN SYRIAN AND EGYPTIAN CRITICISMS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSALS. KHADDAM REELED OFF TO ME EIGHT QUOTE FUNDAMENTAL GAPS UNQUOTE WHICH HE HAS PROBABLY ALREADY MENTIONED TO YOU AND WILL NO DOUBT WISH TO EXPLORE FURTHER IN WASHINGTON. I TRIED TO ASSURE HIM, ON THE BASIS OF WHAT YOU HAVE TOLD ME, THAT SOME OF HIS ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE US POSITION, PARTICULARLY ON THE NATURE OF YOUR VIEWS ABOUT SELF-DETERMINATION WERE MISTAKEN. FOR HIS PART HASSAN ALI DREW ON THE LETTER HE HAD SENT YOU SETTING OUT EGYPTIAN VIEWS IN DETAIL. AGAIN THE MAIN POINT HE STRESSED WAS THE LACK OF MENTION OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS. BUT HE WAS VERY POSITIVE ABOUT YOUR INITIATIVE AS A WHOLE: AND MUBARAK WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT THE PROPOSALS WERE THE ONLY ONES WITH ANY CHANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION. BOTH BELIEVED PROGRESS MUST BE MADE VERY SOON, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHAT HAPPEND IN LEBANON. KHADDAM AND ASSAD ALSO SAW THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD PUT FORWARD A FIRM POSITION AS POSITIVE. BUT OF COURSE THEY WANTED US TO PUT PRESSURE ON YOU TO MOVE CLOSER TO FEZ AND TO ENCOURAGE YOU TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS.

I MADE IT CLEAR TO BOTH SYRIANS AND EGYPTIANS THAT I

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BELIEVED THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS, DESPITE SOME DIFFERENCES WITH VENICE, DESERVED STRONG SUPPORT BECAUSE THEY OFFERED A REALISTIC CHANCE OF PROGRESS. I STRESSED THAT TIME WAS NOT ON THE ARABS' SIDE (A POINT WITH WHICH THE SYRIANS DISAGREED, THOUGH THEY SAID AT ONE POINT THAT THEY WERE READY TO GIVE QUOTE MODERATION UNQUOTE A YEAR OR TWO TO SUCCEED).

MY REMARKS IN DAMASCUS ABOUT PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE ATTRACTED SOME PRESS INTEREST. IN FACT I MADE CLEAR THAT THERE WERE OTHER OPTIONS, AND THAT IT WAS FOR THE PALESTINIANS TO MAKE THEIR CHOICE, TAKING ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES INTO ACCOUNT.

IN THAT CONTEXT YOU MAY BE INTERESTED THAT KHALID FAHOM, CHAIRMAN OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, TOLD A MEMBER OF MY TEAM WHILE WE WERE IN DAMASCUS THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE PALESTINIANS (ESPECIALLY THOSE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA) WOULD PROBABLY NOT INSIST ON A PALESTINIAN STATE, BUT THEY COULD NOT YET AFFORD TO SAY SO PUBLICLY: ARAB GOVERNMENTS (BY WHICH HE CLEARLY MEANT SYRIA) WOULD NOT ALLOW THEM TO GIVE UP THIS CARD EARLY ON. HE NEVERTHELESS HOPED THAT THE MOMENTUM CREATED BY THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE WOULD BE SUSTAINED.

NEITHER THE SYRIANS NOR THE EGYPTIANS SAW AN EARLY END TO THE GULF WAR, BUT NEITHER SEEMED TO THINK IT LIKELY TO SPREAD. KHADDAM GAVE AS HIS OPINION THAT IT WOULD GO ON UNTIL THE FALL OF EITHER SADDAM HUSSEIN OR KHOMEINI.

MY CONCLUSION, THOUGH OF COURSE IT CAN ONLY BE A PRELIMINARY ONE, IS THAT THE COMBINATION OF THE FEZ SUMMIT AND THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE HAS CREATED A CLIMATE OF EXPECTATION AND FERMENT IN THE REGION. FIRST REPORTS SUGGEST THAT THE HUSSEIN/ARAFAT TALKS WENT AS WELL AS COULD BE EXPECTED AND THAT THERE MAY WELL BE A REAL OPENING THERE. BUT THIS CLIMATE MUST BE EXPLOITED QUICKLY IF ANYTHING LASTING IS TO COME OUT OF IT.

OTHERWISE THERE IS A RISK THAT POSITIONS WILL OSSIFY ONCE MORE AND THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESS, EVEN A LIMITED MOVE FORWARD, WILL BE LOST AND THE ISRAELIS WILL SIMPLY TAKE THE CHANCE TO MAKE THEIR CONTROL OF THE WEST BANK

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

29214 - 1

AND GAZA IRREVERSIBLE. I AM NOT SURE THAT THERE IS MUCH THE EGYPTIANS, DESPITE THE HELPFULNESS OF THEIR ATTITUDE, CAN DO TO HELP IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. IT WAS A PITY THAT I WAS IN THE EVENT UNABLE TO GO ON TO JEDDA TO TALK TO THE SAUDIS, WHO HAVE A KEY ROLE TO PLAY. BUT THE POSITION OF THE SYRIANS WILL AS ALWAYS BE VITAL. THE LIKELY INCLUSION OF KHADDAM IN THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO VISIT WASHINGTON AND LONDON SOON OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE SYRIAN AND OTHER ARAB VIEWS OF THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE IN A FAVOURABLE DIRECTION. THE SYRIANS CLEARLY ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO THE VISIT.

AS YOU MAY KNOW, I SHALL BE VISITING AMMAN IN A FEW WEEKS' TIME, AND WE SHALL BE SEEING THE ARAB FOLLOW UP COMMISSION AFTER THEY VISIT YOU. I HOPE WE CAN STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH, THEREFORE. MEANWHILE WE MUST DO ALL WE CAN TO KEEP DOORS OPEN AND ENCOURAGE THE ARABS AS A WHOLE TO BELIEVE THAT A MOVE FORWARD IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE. ENDS

PYM

STANDARD

NENAD	SECURITY D
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NAD	ES & SD
SAD	ERD
UND	ESID
EESD	CONS D
ECD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE
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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

4

CONFIDENTIAL

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELNO 420 OF 14 OCT 81

REPEATED TO (FOR INFO) PRIORITY AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS,
WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

SAVING TO (FOR INFO) PARIS, ROME, JERUSALEM.

MY TELEGRAM NO 407 : ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. THE BROAD LINES OF PROPOSALS WHICH THE ISRAELIS INTEND TO PRESENT TO THE AMERICANS AND LEBANESE MORE OR LESS SIMULTANEOUSLY (SHAMIR IN WASHINGTON, KIMCHE IN BEIRUT) HAVE BEEN WELL AIRED PUBLICLY. THE LATEST ACCOUNTS CONTAIN NO SURPRISES. IN ESSENCE, THEY AMOUNT TO THE FOLLOWING:

- A) A 40-50 KILOMETRE BUFFER ZONE IN SOUTH LEBANON SEMI COLON
- B) FORMAL LEBANESE ASSURANCES, GIVEN DIRECT TO THE ISRAELIS, THAT THEY WOULD PREVENT THE RETURN OF FOREIGN FORCES OR IRREGULAR UNITS TO THIS ZONE SEMI COLON
- C) A ROLE FOR THE HADDAD MILITIA IN POLICING THE BUFFER ZONE SEMI COLON
- D) THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON, WITH THE PLO LEAVING FIRST (BUT HINTS OF ACCEPTANCE DESPITE DENIALS TO THE CONTRARY THAT IN PRACTICE SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL BY THE PLO, SYRIANS AND IDF IS PROBABLY THE BEST THAT CAN BE NEGOTIATED).

THE ISRAELIS SEE NO ROLE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE, WHETHER UN OR MULTINATIONAL (BUT SEE PARAGRAPH 4 BELOW). WHILE THEY ARE ASKING FOR A FORMAL PEACE TREATY WITH LEBANON, THE INDICATIONS ARE THAT THEY WOULD SETTLE FOR A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES AND WRITTEN UNDERTAKINGS ABOUT THE BUFFER ZONE.

2. THE FACT THAT IT TOOK TWO SESSIONS OF THE ISRAELI CABINET TO AGREE FORMAL GUIDELINES FOR SHAMIR IN WASHINGTON SUGGESTS THAT SOME MINISTERS BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS A NEED TO REFINE ISRAELI THINKING, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE AMERICAN ROLE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS MODERATED HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS RECENTLY, SHARON CONTINUES TO ARGUE SOMEWHAT DELPHICLY THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE DOING MORE TO PROMOTE PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. WHAT THIS APPEARS TO MEAN IS THAT HE AND SOME OTHER MINISTERS FEEL THAT THE UNITED STATES ARE INSISTING ON ACTING AS GO-BETWEEN, THEREBY KEEPING ISRAEL AND LEBANON APART RATHER THAN HELPING THEM TO CONDUCT THEIR BUSINESS DIRECTLY AND OPENLY.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF ISRAELI IDEAS CONTAINS A GOOD DEAL THAT IS BLURRED AT THE EDGES. FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD MAINTAIN A RESIDUAL MONITORING ROLE IN THE BUFFER ZONE. AAERIAL OVERFLIGHTS, JOINT PATROLS AND OTHER JOINT SUPERVISORY ACTIVITIES WITH THE LEBANESE ARMY ARE ALL MENTIONED. THE POLITICAL COUNSELLOR AT THE US EMBASSY TOLD US TODAY THAT, PENDING SHAMIR'S TALKS IN WASHINGTON, HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE ISRAELIS HAD MORE SPECIFIC AND DETAILED PROPOSALS TO MAKE. HARE SUSPECTED HOWEVER THAT THEY THOUGHT IN TERMS OF A RANGE OF AOPTIONS. THE MAIN EMPHASIS IN THEIR IDEAS WAS ON POLICING OF THE BUFFER ZONE BY THE LEBANESE ARMY AND HADDAD MILITIA. HADDAD'S OWN ROLE WAS ANOTHER MATTER. SOME FACE SAVING JOB FOR HIM WOULD HAVE TO BE FOUND (ONE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL HAS SUGGESTED TO US PRIVATELY THAT HE MIGHT BE SENT ABROAD AS LEBANESE MILITARY ATTACHE SOMEWHERE). IT WAS CLEAR TO THE AMERICANS IF NOT ISRAELIS THAT AN OVERT ROLE FOR HADDAD PERSONALLY WAS UNACCEPTABLE IN TERMS OF LEBANESE INTERNAL POLITICS.

4. HARE CONFIRMED THAT THE ISRAELIS REMAIN DISTINCTLY UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT A ROLE FOR A UN OR MULTINATIONAL FORCE. AMONG OTHER REASONS, SUCH A FORCE WOULD BE LESS MALLEABLE AND LESS SUBJECT TO ISRAELI PRESSURE. BUT HE DOUBTED WHETHER THE ISRAELIS HAD PRIVATELY RULED IT OUT OF COURT IN CASE IT TURNED OUT THAT THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE.

5. ASKED ABOUT ACCUSATIONS THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN KEEPING THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE APART, HARE THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS RESENTED THE FACT THAT THE CLOSE DIRECT RELATIONSHIP THEY HAD ENJOYED WITH BASHIR HAD WITHERED AFTER HIS DEATH AND THE RETURN OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE TO BEIRUT. AMIN WOULD WANT UNDOUBTEDLY WANT A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ISRAELIS, BUT ITS FORM AND EXTENT REMAINED TO BE DETERMINED. HE AGREED THAT THE PROSPECT OF SEPERATE ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS WITH BOTH AMERICANS AND LEBANESE SOUNDED A RECIPE FOR CONFUSION. BUT HARE HOPED THAT THE FORTHCOMING MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON WITH SHAMIR AND THEN AMIN GEMAYEL WOULD PRODUCE A WORKABLE BUREAUCRATIC FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS SEMICOLON AND IN ANY CASE AMERICAN AND LEBANESE VIEWS ON SUBSTANCE WERE CLOSE.

6. AS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, HARE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE MOST DIFFICULT REMAINING PROBLEM WAS HOW TO REMOVE THE REMAINING PLO FROM NORTHERN AND EASTERN LEBANON.

F C O PLEASE PASS ALL ADDRESSEES EXCEPT JERUSALEM
MOBERLY

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

STANDARD

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CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

2
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 191 AA/SZ

S E C R E T

13 October, 1982

L. Taylor sek
2/1

Dear Prime Minister,

In the spirit of true friendship and confidence which I treasure, and which happily exists between us, I am pleased to place before you the details of our ongoing dialogue with our mutual friends in Washington, as it has evolved over the recent months.

I have always appreciated your interest and concern over the problems of this area and their impact on our mutual interests as well as on world peace. I have always valued your understanding and support, as I have your advice and the frequent opportunities you afforded me to exchange views with you on all matters of mutual interest.

I am looking forward to meeting you at the earliest opportunity when I may have the occasion of an exchange of views, should your time and responsibilities permit me the pleasure and privilege. I am, unfortunately, not to have the pleasure of such a meeting when the Arab Summit Delegation visits London shortly, as I have been assigned other missions within that context.

Following the Fez Summit I have tried to initiate positive movement in our area, despite the terrible effects of the Beirut massacres. My current meetings with the P.L.O. Chairman Yasser Arafat have been positive and show promise for the future. I have urged Chairman Arafat to come out clearly, and soon, on accepting Security Council Resolution 242 and the right of Israel to exist within the 1967 borders. We have also begun a process to define future links and relations between Palestine and Jordan. The formula would then be the essence of the exercise of self-determination under conditions of freedom by both Jordanians and Palestinians, within the context of the family that both form. This concept is derived from the historic, real, current and future ties which exist between its respective members.

Continued/... 2



S E C R E T

- 2 -

I am convinced that addressing these two subjects adequately may remove some of the obstacles in the path of progress towards peace, and in any event would represent yet another positive Arab contribution for the establishment of a just and durable peace.

I send you with my highest esteem my warmest personal wishes.

I am

Your sincere friend,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be "J. F. Kennedy".

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom
10 Downing Street
London
England



- 3 -

A N N E X

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

1. Letter from President Reagan to His Majesty dated 14 June, 1982
2. Letter from His Majesty to President Reagan dated 14 June, 1982
3. Letter from His Majesty to President Reagan dated 4 July, 1982
4. Letter from President Reagan to His Majesty dated 18 August, 1982
5. Letter from His Majesty to President Reagan dated 24 August, 1982
6. Letter from President Reagan to His Majesty dated 28 August, 1982
7. Letter from His Majesty to President Reagan dated 29 August, 1982
8. Letter from President Reagan to His Majesty dated 4 September, 1982
9. Brief from HRH Crown Prince Hassan, on instructions from His Majesty King Hussein, following the Fez Summit, dated 11 September, 1982
10. Letter from President Reagan to His Majesty dated 16 September, 1982
11. Letter from His Majesty to President Reagan dated 11 October, 1982

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12. Proposed U.S. position to be conveyed to His Majesty on behalf of the President
13. Points for discussion with King Hussein
14. Talking Points

Group/Class..... PREM 19.....

Piece..... 1087.....

Letter from President Reagan
to King Hussein dated
14 June 1982.

Paper extracted and
temporarily retained
under Section 3(4)
pending completion of
review.

(date)..... 7 May 2013.....

(Signed)..... Wayland.....

Group/Class..... PREM 19.....

Piece..... 1087.....

Letter from King Hussein
to President Reagan dated
14 June 1982

Paper extracted and
temporarily retained
under Section 3(4)
pending completion of
review.

(date)..... 7 May 2013.....

(Signed)..... W. Dayland.....

Group/Class..... PREM 19.....

Piece..... 1087.....

Letter from King Hussein to
President Reagan dated
4 July 1982

Paper extracted and
temporarily retained
under Section 3(4)
pending completion of
review.

(date)..... 7 May 2013.....

(Signed)..... Wayland.....

Group/Class..... PREM 19.....

Piece..... 1087.....

Letter from President Reagan
to King Hussein dated
18 August 1982.

Paper extracted and
temporarily retained
under Section 3(4)
pending completion of
review.

(date)..... 7 May 2013.....

(Signed)..... Wayland.....

Group/Class..... PREM 19.....

Piece..... 1087.....

Letter from King Hussein
to President Reagan dated
24 August 1982

Paper extracted and
temporarily retained
under Section 3(4)
pending completion of
review.

(date)..... 7 May 2013.....

(Signed)..... Wayland.....

Group/Class PREM 19

Piece 1087

Letter from President Reagan
to King Hussein dated
28 August 1982.

Paper extracted and
temporarily retained
under Section 3(4)
pending completion of
review.

(date) 7 May 2013

(Signed) O'Wayland

SECRET

SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION WITH
MR. VELIOTES

Proposed U.S. Positions to be Conveyed
to King Hussein on Behalf of the
President

GENERAL POINTS:

- A) We will maintain our commitment to Camp David.
- B) We will maintain our commitment on the conditions we require for recognition of and negotiation with the PLO.
- C) We can offer guarantees on the positions we will adopt in negotiations. We will not be able, however, to guarantee in advance the results of those negotiations.

Final Status Issues:

- a) UNSC Resolution 242: It is our position that Resolution 242 applies to the West Bank and Gaza and requires Israeli withdrawal in return for peace. Negotiations must determine the borders. The U.S. position in these negotiations on the extent of withdrawal will be significantly influenced by the extent and nature of the peace and security arrangements being offered in return.
- b) Israeli Sovereignty: It is our belief that the Palestinian problem cannot be resolved through Israeli sovereignty or control over the West Bank and Gaza. Accordingly, we will not support such a solution.
- c) Palestinian State: The preference we will pursue in the final status negotiations is association of the West Bank and Gaza with Jordan. We will not support the formation of a Palestinian state in those negotiations. There is no foundation of political support in Israel or the United States for such a solution. The outcome, however, must be determined by negotiations.
- d) Self-Determination: In the Middle East context, the term "self-determination" has been identified exclusively with the formation of a Palestinian state. We will not support this definition of self-determination. We believe that the Palestinians must take the leading role in determining their own future and fully support the provision in Camp David providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement in the final status negotiations.
- e) Jerusalem: We will fully support the position that the status of Jerusalem must be determined through negotiations.

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-2-

- f) Settlements: The status of Israeli settlements must be determined in the course of the final status negotiations. We will not support their continuation as extraterritorial outposts.

Transitional Measures:

- a) Our position is that the objective of the transitional period is the peaceful and orderly transfer of authority from Israel to the Palestinian inhabitants.
- b) We will support:
- The definition of full autonomy as giving the Palestinian inhabitants real authority over themselves, the land, and its resources subject to fair safeguards on water.
 - Economic, commercial, social and cultural ties between the West Bank, Gaza and Jordan.
 - Participation by the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem in the election for the West Bank/Gaza authority.
 - A real settlements freeze.
 - Progressive Palestinian responsibility for internal security based on capability and performance.
- c) We will oppose:
- Dismantlement of the existing settlements.
 - Provisions which represent a legitimate threat to Israel's security, reasonably defined.
 - Isolation of the West Bank and Gaza from Israel.
 - Measures which accord either the Palestinians or the Israelis generally recognized sovereign rights with the exception of external security which must remain in Israel's hands during the transitional period.

SECRET

TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH KING HUSSEIN

-- The President and the Secretary have been engaged over the past few weeks in a comprehensive reassessment of our approach to the peace process, our objectives, and our ability to achieve those objectives.

-- They have asked me to convey to you their conclusions underlining what we are prepared to do now as well as what we cannot do in the present context.

-- They asked that we meet out of the glare of the public spotlight since we have not yet consulted with Israel or Egypt. The President felt it was important to discuss these matters first with you.

-- The President has made extremely difficult decisions in the last few days. He is fully aware that the course I am about to outline to you will put us into a severe and protracted controversy with Israel. He knows full well the impact this can have in an election year but felt strongly that our vital interests dictate urgent movement. He is prepared for the political risks--and he is ready to see the process through in spite of opposition at home and in Israel.

-- The first commitment I am to convey to you is that the United States will lead the peace process through to its

objective which is to divest Israel of its occupation and authority in territories occupied in 1967.

-- We fully understand your concern that this is a process that will take time and about the nature of the American political process which can lead to a change in Administrations. For this reason our commitment must be based on broad American domestic support for our policies.

-- We have already begun consultations with the Members of Congress and the support we need is present. Nevertheless, there are a few lines we cannot cross, prominent among them Israel's legitimate security concerns reasonably defined.

-- The President has asked me to reaffirm our position that UNSC Resolution 242 applies to the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights and that it requires Israeli withdrawal in return for peace.

-- Our position remains that definition of the borders must be the product of negotiations, but in the negotiations our attitude and posture on the extent of withdrawal will be significantly influenced by the extent and nature of the peace and security arrangements that are being offered in return.

-- I am instructed to make clear to you the US position that the Palestinian problem cannot be solved through Israeli

sovereignty or permanent control over the West Bank and Gaza. We will not support such a solution.

-- But I must also make clear that we do not believe the formation of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza would be a practical or viable solution. There are three reasons for this.

-- A ministate between Jordan and Israel would be inherently unstable.

-- There would be little support in the Congress or public for any Administration policy that supported creation of a Palestinian states. We would not have the required stable domestic base of support for our policies.

-- Finally, such a policy would unite the Israeli people behind Begin in opposition. This would frustrate our goal of generating internal pressure in Israel that help in changing Israel's policies.

-- Our preference as we have indicated to you ever since 1967 is for association of the West Bank and Gaza with Jordan. This is a solution which has support in Israel.

-- This raises the question of self-determination. As you are aware, in his speech to the OAS, the President expressly stated that self-determination is at the heart of American foreign policy. He firmly believes this.

-- However, in the context of the Middle East the term has become synonymous with a Palestinian state. We cannot be identified with this exclusive meaning of self-determination not only for reasons I have mentioned, but also because of

of its implications for our position in Puerto Rico and in other areas.

-- The President fully understands your reasons for urging such a move on our part, but has determined that this is a non-starter for us.

-- What we can support is the leading role the Palestinians must play in the determination of their own future and the ultimate responsibility of the Palestinians for deciding how they shall govern themselves within the framework of a negotiated settlement.

-- There are two other issues relating to the final settlement which I have been asked to deal with.

-- Our position on Jerusalem requires that the final status of Jerusalem is determined in negotiations. We do not recognize unilateral Israeli actions in Jerusalem. We will support this position fully, and we recognize that is the question.

-- We do not underrate the critical importance of this issue to you. Nevertheless in the short term at least, our tactical objectives dictate that we not get into debates with Begin which unify the Israelis behind him. We prefer to defer this issue and if we cannot, we will not go beyond our currently expressed policy regarding the requirement to resolve this issue in negotiations.

-- This is not to say that we will stand by if Begin takes significant symbolic acts affecting the city's final status. The move of his office to East Jerusalem, for example, would generate a significant problem between us and he knows this.

-- On settlements, the President's position is that their legal status must be determined in the final status negotiations. But, he recognizes how harmful this issue is in the context of building Arab confidence in the peace process since settlements have come to symbolize the Likud Government's claim to Israeli sovereignty.

-- Your Majesty, these are the positions on final status that the President and Secretary asked me to make clear to you. We are convinced that these are just positions within which an equitable solution can be found and Palestinian and Arab aspirations realized. They are also positions which are entirely consistent with the Camp David Framework Agreement.

-- The President asked me to tell you that he has studied your letters to him and he is fully aware of the problems you have with the Camp David Accords. He has asked that you not ask him to abandon this framework. He cannot for the following reasons:

-- The American people support Camp David. They will not accept an Administration policy which turns its back on the Framework.

-- Israel is equally committed to the Framework. We must keep Israel in a legal negotiating context to protect against an unlimited unilateral policy of annexation and to develop support in Israel in opposition to Begin's policies in the

occupied territories and his reading of
Camp David.

- If we release Begin from his commitments we will have eliminated a major legal constraint and have cut the ground out from under his opposition.
- Egypt is legally committed to Camp David. We cannot abandon or amend it without calling into question this commitment which is viewed in the U.S. as the foundation of our relationship.
- We are determined to make use of its provisions to return it to its original purpose--resolution of the Palestinian problems.
- We have to move now and Camp David is available. To recreate it would require years of effort with no guarantee of greater success.
- The President is not asking you to sign on to Camp David today. He is asking that you understand our position and that together we consider how we can overcome this problem.
- In the interim we will avoid linking our consultations with you to Camp David. By the same token we must respond to questions that we adhere to the Accords and intend to pursue peace in this context.
- In the context of Camp David the President has asked me to give you our views of the meaning of a transitional phase.

- The objective of a transitional phase is the peaceful and orderly transfer of authority from Israel to the Palestinians.
- We will support the definition of full autonomy as giving the Palestinian inhabitants authority over themselves, the land, and its resources subject to fair safeguards on the use of water.
- We will also support the concept of progressive Palestinian responsibility for internal security based on capabilities and performance.
- We will seek provisions which encourage economic, commercial, social and cultural ties between the West Bank, Gaza and Jordan.
- We will support participation by the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem in the elections for the West Bank/Gaza authority.
- And we will seek a real settlement freeze for the period of the transition.
- You must also know, Your Majesty, what we will not support:
 - o dismantlement of the settlements;
 - o provisions which represent a legitimate threat to Israel's security, reasonably defined
 - o total isolation of the West Bank and Gaza from Israel; and
 - o according the Palestinians or Israelis authority

in areas which are generally recognized as the responsibility of a sovereign^{state} with the exception of external security which must be in Israel's hands.

-- We will want to discuss all these issues in more detail with you and your advisors as we move forward.

-- Ultimately, Your Majesty, once we have developed a framework for a moderate consensus we will be asking you to join us--not alone--but with key Arab backing.

-- As you consider this you should keep in mind the following:

- We cannot secure guarantees in advance about the results of negotiations. We can only guarantee what the U.S. will support.
- Our stated objective cannot be a Palestinian State or self-determination in the present context.
- The Arabs cannot deny Camp David and we will have to find a way to reconcile Arab participation in the negotiations with the Camp David provisions and the continuing Egyptian and U.S. commitment to it.

-- While we intend to develop the backing of Arab moderates, we will not be able to prevent radical opposition. We understand the risks and we are prepared to discuss ways to reduce them and to reinforce our security commitments. We will not allow Syria to challenge you militarily.

-- Your Majesty, we want your support. We welcome your counsel and we seek your reactions both now and as we proceed.

-- If I may be allowed to personal note. Never in our time together, have you received such a broad commitment of the United States on the terms of peace in the Middle East. Never has a commitment been made that has so carefully taken account of the reality of what we can achieve and the risks involved. And based on that fact never has a President been so determined to push his policy through.

-- I have spent many hours together with the Secretary and the President in preparing for this initiative. We have turned our back on the narrow focus on autonomy in negotiations between Egypt and Israel. We are reaching out to you and all Arab moderates.

-- We have an opportunity today that is unlikely to repeat itself. We must work together to seize that opportunity and make our stand for peace.

Group/Class..... PREM 19.....

Piece..... 1087.....

Letter from King Hussein
to President Reagan dated
29 August 1982

Paper extracted and
temporarily retained
under Section 3(4)
pending completion of
review.

(date)..... 7 May 2013.....

(Signed)..... Wayland.....

Group/Class..... PREM 19
Piece..... 1087

Letter from Shultz to
King Hussein dated
4 September 1982

Paper extracted and
temporarily retained
under Section 3(4)
pending completion of
review.
(date)..... 7 May 2013
(Signed)..... D. Wayland

11 September, 1982

SECRET & SENSITIVE

BRIEF BY
HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS CROWN PRINCE HASSAN ON
INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN
FOLLOWING THE FEZ SUMMIT

The Summit concluded its agreement over the eight published points based on its suspended agenda carried over from last year's meeting. It convened to discuss these points which were accepted by consensus as the joint foundation and basis for the goal of the long sought after just and durable peace.

The American initiative on the one side and the eight Arab points on the other are both limits of the Arab position. Yet the Summit's conclusions that have evolved over the past year should not be regarded as a riposte to the recent American initiative. The American initiative was, in any event, a set of starting points. We are, however, aware that Soviet surrogates in the area, as well as others, will not resist the hypocrisy of attempting to portray them in this light.

The Fez Summit has delegated to a number of Arab leaders the task of presenting and defending its eight points. It has also empowered them to initiate a dialogue with Washington on what, to most of us, is the most welcome American understanding of the gravity of the situation in our area, in its clearer dimensions expressed through the American initiative.

Palestinian/Jordanian links in the future are to be worked out as an inter-Family issue which, if agreed upon and finalized soon, would be publicized as the framework for a proposed referendum in the future, involving both Jordanians and Palestinians. The context of the Rabat decisions governed Jordan's ability to move further at the Fez Summit. None, repeat none, of the participants indicated the slightest inclination there that events should move otherwise. This position included not only Soviet surrogates but Arab moderates as well. Soviet surrogates, working jointly with their usual aggressiveness, included Syria, South Yemen, Algeria and Mauritania. Yasser Arafat was weak and frightened and, despite the Syrian affront, appeared unable to be his own master.

Continued/... 2

The Lebanese problem was addressed in a manner that spells imminent and long-term disaster to Arab interests. With the combination of Syrian pressures and Arafat's role on the one hand, and the unyielding and legitimate Lebanese attitude on the other, the die was cast. These serious implications, with the presence of the Israeli dimension and of unclear and sinister Syrian objectives, are shades of Jordan in 1970. Jordan worked in unison with Morocco, Tunisia, Iraq and Sudan. The Saudis were unclear and not sure of themselves. Substantial Saudi material assistance to Syria was secretly agreed upon. There was no material support forthcoming from the Conference to Jordan, on a clear basis in the future, not even the substitution of the terminated Algerian and Libyan assistance previously agreed upon at the Amman Summit Conference. Kuwait's position was negative on most issues.

Over relations with Egypt - Jordan, Iraq, Sudan and Morocco were involved in heated exchanges with Soviet surrogates and it was agreed that this topic would not be publicized. His Majesty King Hussein appraised the Summit on his contacts with President Mubarak since he took office, and his intention to continue with such contacts until conditions permitted a full revival of diplomatic relations.

The Summit managed to declare its moderate support of Iraq if Iranian aggression persists.

The Summit expressed support for Somalia on the basis of respect for its old borders by both sides, failing which doors would be opened for assistance to Somalia if the aggression was not contained.

Despite heated exchanges no progress was made on Jordanian/Iraqi/Syrian relations. Syrian intent was sinister and insincere. Short of destroying the Arab League and the Summit, which Jordan and Morocco came close to doing by declaring a freeze on their participation in the League, nothing more could have been done than to avert another final failure. His Majesty King Hussein felt that although he was almost on the line to do so that King Hassan and Morocco were at stake.

The cowardly and ambiguous performance of Arab moderates and the surrogate role of Moscow's clients

created a feeling that we might have done better to have negotiated directly with the Soviets. It was, in His Majesty's words, the most taxing and frustrating Summit he has ever attended, despite certain positive aspects which fell far shorter than what had been hoped for.

His Majesty feels that a complete reassessment is required of relations within our Arab world and their future conduct. A clearer internal and Arab policy is indicated to mobilize and organize the majority of our people based, in part, on the readiness of our friends to provide us with the means to augment our capabilities to face these challenges.

Group/Class..... PREM 19

Piece 1087

Letter from President Reagan
to King Hussein dated
16 September 1982

Paper extracted and
temporarily retained
under Section 3(4)
pending completion of
review.

(date)..... 7 May 2013

(Signed)..... [Signature]

Group/Class..... PREM 19.....

Piece..... 1087.....

Letter from King Hussein
to President Reagan
dated 11 October 1982

Paper extracted and
temporarily retained
under Section 3(4)
pending completion of
review.

(date)..... 7 May 2013.....

(Signed)..... Wayland.....

SECRET

POINTS FOR DISCUSSION WITH KING HUSSEIN

Arafat Talks:

-- The U.S. positions outlined by the President represent a statement of what the United States will support in negotiations. The United States has set forth its positions in order to move the parties to begin negotiating with each other about transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza. The United States will not change its stated positions prior to negotiations among the parties. To do so to accommodate Arab concerns would only invite pressure for other changes to meet Israeli objections.

-- We hope that in talks with Arafat His Majesty will work to achieve ultimate agreement on two matters: (1) agreed negotiating positions that would constitute the Jordan-PLO position going into talks with the Israelis; and (2) a method to permit Jordan and Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza to begin negotiations with Israel in some manner.

Negotiating Positions:

-- Confederation - The U.S. position on the issue of self-determination is clear and will not be changed, absent agreement by all other parties to the negotiation. An arrangement whereby the Palestinians would first have an independent state and then move quickly to an act of confederation with Jordan is not consistent with the President's position. A Jordanian-PLO agreement to propose this approach in negotiations is a decision for Jordan and the PLO. If Israel were to accept this confederation approach, U.S. acceptance would not be precluded. However, the United States will not change its position at this stage.

-- Jordan and the PLO cannot resolve the final status of the West Bank and Gaza without reference to the Israelis. The nature of the association between the West Bank and Gaza and Jordan will have to be determined in negotiations with the Israelis and other parties directly engaged in the negotiation. It cannot be determined finally either by the PLO and Jordan alone or through talks between the United States and Jordan.

-- We think it is vital in talks with Arafat that Jordan look not only for agreement on final status issues. It is the U.S. position that the next stage in the peace process should be focused on negotiating transitional arrangements

for the territories. The United States hopes talks between Jordan and the PLO will be directed toward formulating negotiating positions regarding transitional arrangements. Such positions to be realistic should include ideas on how to meet the legitimate security concerns of both Israel and those states contiguous to Israel.

The Issue of Palestinian Representation in Negotiations:

-- The U.S. position on a direct dialogue with the PLO is clear and has not changed. Unambiguous PLO acceptance of UNSC Resolution 242 and recognition of Israel's right to exist in peace is the prerequisite for a direct PLO-U.S. dialogue. Even then, however, high level PLO representation in direct negotiations with Israel, either as an independent delegation or as part of a Jordanian or Egyptian delegation, in our judgment, is not a realistic possibility at least for the present.

-- We hope that Jordan and the PLO will focus on procedures for involving bona fide residents of the West Bank and Gaza in negotiations. Such residents can represent the PLO on substance and can join the Jordanian and/or Egyptian delegations without Israeli or U.S. vetting. Recently exiled West Bank mayors could be among such representatives.

-- We believe it will be important for Jordan and the PLO to avoid statements which would allow the Israelis to argue credibly that Jordan is acting only as an agent for the PLO. -----

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PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR MOSELEY
SIR J BULLARD
HD/NENAD
HD/MED
HD/UND
HD/SEC DEPT

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No.

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(attachments in folder attached to back of file)

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM AMMAN 131610Z OCT 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 427 OF 13 OCT 1982
AND TO INFO ROUTINE BEIRUT, CAIRO,
DAMASCUS, JEDDA, RABAT, TEL AVIV, TUNIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON
AND CG JERUSALEM.

MIPT: JORDAN /PLO.

TEXT OF LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM KING HUSSEIN DATED
13 OCTOBER.

BEGINS.

IN THE SPIRIT OF TRUE FRIENDSHIP AND CONFIDENCE WHICH I TREASURE,
AND WHICH HAPPILY EXISTS BETWEEN US, I AM PLEASED TO PLACE BEFORE
YOU THE DETAILS OF OUR ONGOING DIALOGUE WITH OUR MUTUAL FRIENDS
IN WASHINGTON, AS IT HAS EVOLVED OVER THE RECENT MONTHS.

I HAVE ALWAYS APPRECIATED YOUR INTEREST AND CONCERN
OVER THE PROBLEMS OF THIS AREA AND THEIR IMPACT ON OUR MUTUAL
INTERESTS AS WELL AS ON WORLD PEACE. I HAVE ALWAYS

~~INTERESTS AS WELL AS ON WORLD PEACE.~~ I HAVE ALWAYS VALUED YOUR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT , AS I HAVE YOUR ADVICE AND THE FREQUENT OPPORTUNITIES YOU AFFORDED ME TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH YOU ON ALL MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO MEETING YOU AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY WHEN I MAY HAVE THE OCCASION OF AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, SHOULD YOUR TIME AND RESPONSIBILITIES PERMIT ME THE PLEASURE AND PRIVILEGE. I AM, UNFORTUNATELY, NOT TO HAVE THE PLEASURE OF SUCH A MEETING WHEN THE ARAB SUMMIT DELEGATION VISITS LONDON SHORTLY, AS I HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED OTHER MISSIONS WITHIN THAT CONTEXT.

FOLLOWING THE FEZ SUMMIT I HAVE TRIED TO INITIATE POSITIVE MOVEMENT IN OUR AREA, DESPITE THE TERRIBLE EFFECTS OF THE BEIRUT MASSACRES. MY CURRENT MEETINGS WITH THE P.L.O CHAIRMAN YASSER ARAFAT HAVE BEEN POSITIVE AND SHOW PROMISE FOR THE FUTURE. I HAVE URGED CHAIRMAN ARAFAT TO COME OUT CLEARLY, AND SOON, ON ACCEPTING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST WITHIN THE 1967 BORDERS.

WE HAVE ALSO BEGUN A PROCESS TO DEFINE FUTURE LINKS AND RELATIONS BETWEEN PALESTINE AND JORDAN. THE FORMULA WOULD THEN BE THE ESSENCE OF THE EXERCISE OF SELF DETERMINATION UNDER CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM BY BOTH JORDANIANS AND PALESTINIANS, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE FAMILY THAT BOTH FORM.

THIS CONCEPT IS DERIVED FROM THE HISTORIC, REAL, CURRENT AND FUTURE TIES WHICH EXIST BETWEEN ITS RESPECTIVE MEMBERS.

I AM CONVINCED THAT ADDRESSING THESE TWO SUBJECTS ADEQUATELY MAY REMOVE SOME OF THE OBSTACLES IN THE PATH OF PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE, AND IN ANY EVENT WOULD REPRESENT YET ANOTHER POSITIVE ARAB CONTRIBUTION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE.

I SEND YOU WITH MY HIGHEST ESTEEM MY WARMEST PERSONAL WISHES.

I AM YOUR SINCERE FRIEND HUSSEIN.

ENDS.

URWICK

ADVANCE COPY

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
~~MR MOBBLEY~~ *M Egan*
SIR J BULLARD
HD/NENAD
HD/MED
HD/UND
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RESIDENT CLERK

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM AMMAN 131715Z OCT 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 426 OF 13 OCT 1982

AND TO INFO ROUTINE BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, RABAT,
TEL AVIV, TUNIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND CG JERUSALEM.

AND SAVING TO OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, MOSCOW AND PARIS.

MY TELNO 423: JORDAN/PLC.

1. I SAW KING HUSSEIN EARLY THIS AFTERNOON, A FEW HOURS AFTER ARAFAT'S DEPARTURE FROM AMMAN. HE BEGAN BY HANDING ME A LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON HIS TALKS WITH ARAFAT (TEXT IN MIFT) TOGETHER WITH A FOLDER CONTAINING COPIES OF HIS EXCHANGES WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN BETWEEN 14 JUNE AND 11 OCTOBER (WHICH THROW MUCH INTERESTING LIGHT ON THE ORIGINS OF THE REAGAN INITIATIVE, ALTHOUGH A GOOD DEAL OF THE GROUND HAS ALREADY BEEN COVERED IN OUR EARLIER REPORTING). I PROPOSE SENDING THE ORIGINAL OF THE KINGS LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE OTHER DOCUMENTS BY CASUAL COURIER TO REACH THE FCO ON 17 OCTOBER (ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE SEPARATELY WITH THE COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT).

WILL BE MADE SEPARATELY WITH THE COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT). I AM HOWEVER TELEGRAPHING IN FULL (MY SECOND AND THIRD IFTS TO THE FCO AND WASHINGTON ONLY) SPEAKING NOTES LEFT WITH THE KING BY THE US AMBASSADOR HERE ON 4 OCTOBER, SETTING OUT US DESIDERATA FOR HIS TALKS WITH THE PLO, AND KING HUSSEIN'S COMMENTS ON THEM IN A LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN DATED 11 OCTOBER, AS THESE ARE OF IMMEDIATE RELEVANCE TO KING HUSSEIN'S TALKS WITH ARAFAT.

2. KING HUSSEIN MADE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL COMMENTS TO ME ON HIS TALKS WITH ARAFAT. HE FELT THESE HAD GONE WELL AND REPRESENTED A GOOD START. THEY HAD GOT TO KNOW EACH OTHER MUCH BETTER SEMICOLON INDEED THERE HAD NOT BEEN SUCH FRANK EXCHANGES BETWEEN THEM FOR A VERY LONG TIME. AS HE HAD SAID IN HIS LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER, HE HAD CONCENTRATED ON TWO MAIN THEMES ON WHICH HE FELT PROGRESS MUST BE MADE SOON:

A) THAT ARAFAT SHOULD COME OUT WITH A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL ACCEPTANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST WITHIN HER 1967 BORDERS, GOING BEYOND ANY OF HIS PREVIOUS STATEMENTS OR THE PRINCIPLES AGREED AT THE FEZ SUMMIT SEMICOLON

B) DEFINITION OF THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PALESTINE AND JORDAN.

IF PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN RELATIONS COULD BE HANDLED AS A FAMILY MATTER BETWEEN THEMSELVES, THEY WOULD BE LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO OUTSIDE PRESSURES.

3. THE KING SAID HE HAD TOLD ARAFAT THAT A CLEAR STATEMENT OF RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST FROM THE PLO WOULD BE OF IMMENSE HELP NOT ONLY VIS-A-VIS THE AMERICANS, BUT ALSO IN ENABLING FRIENDLY COUNTRIES TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE US. THE AMERICANS HAD SAID THAT THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A STATEMENT WAS THE ONLY OBSTACLE IN THE WAY OF A US-PLO DIALOGUE. IF ON THE OTHER HAND THE AMERICANS WERE BLUFFING, THEN THEIR BLUFF SHOULD BE CALLED. KING HUSSEIN THOUGHT HE HAD MADE SOME IMPACT ON ARAFAT.

4. ARAFAT HAD ALSO AGREED THAT SOME FORM OF UNITY BETWEEN JORDAN AND PALESTINE WAS THE ONLY SENSIBLE FOUNDATION ON WHICH TO BUILD. IT HAD THEREFORE BEEN LEFT THAT ARAFAT WOULD ARRANGE FOR A PLO DELEGATION TO RETURN TO JORDAN SOON FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. KING HUSSEIN TOLD ME THAT HIS CONCEPT OF A FUTURE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JORDAN AND PALESTINE WAS TWO SEPARATE "UNITS" EACH PRESERVING ITS OWN IDENTITY AND

SEPARATE UNITS, EACH PRESERVING ITS OWN IDENTITY AND HAVING ITS OWN ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES, BUT JOINED TOGETHER IN SOME FORM OF UNION WITH A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY. IT MIGHT EVEN IN DUE COURSE FORM THE NUCLEUS FOR A WIDER ARAB UNITY, WHICH OTHER COUNTRIES COULD JOIN.

5. THE KING EMPHASISED THAT, WHILE HE AND ARAFAT HAD AGREED ON THE PATH THEY SHOULD PURSUE, THEY HAD ALSO RECOGNISED THAT THEY FACED FORMIDABLE OPPOSITION NOTABLY FROM SYRIA AND ISRAEL AND THAT IT WAS THEREFORE NECESSARY TO ACT WITH GREAT CAUTION AND TO SAY AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE

PUBLICLY ABOUT HOW THEY INTENDED TO PROCEED. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, THE KING TOLD ME THAT HE THOUGHT ARAFAT WOULD PROBABLY KEEP HIS HEADQUARTERS IN TUNIS FOR THE TIME BEING. IT WAS NECESSARY GRADUALLY TO BUILD UP TRUST AND CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE PLO AND THE JORDANIANS, BUT THE KING DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PLO MIGHT AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE TRANSFER THEIR HEADQUARTERS TO JORDAN SEMICOLON HE READILY ADMITTED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE POPULAR WITH EAST BANKERS, WHOSE MEMORIES OF THE EVENTS OF 1970 WERE STILL FRESH.

HE MENTIONED IN PASSING THAT ABU JIHAD (KHALIL AL WAZIR, ARAEITS RIGHT HAND MAN ON THE FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND HEAD OF THE MILITARY WING OF FATAH) WOULD BE ALLOWED AS AN EXCEPTION TO SETTLE IN AMMAN IMMEDIATELY, AS HE WAS IN ACUTE DANGER FROM THE SYRIANS.

KB6. KING HUSSEIN SAID THE MOST DIFFICULT ASPECT OF HIS TALKS WITH ARAFAT HAD BEEN TO TRY TO CONVINCHE HIM THAT THE AMERICANS WERE IN EARNEST AND THAT ARAFAT AND THE PLO WERE NOT BEING ASKED TO RUN VERY HIGH RISKS TO NO PURPOSE. THE KING SAID HE HAD NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, DARED TELL ARAFAT THE CONTENTS OF THE POINTS FOR DISCUSSION LEFT WITH HIM BY THE US AMBASSADOR ON 4 OCTOBER (TEXT IN MY SECOND IFT) LEST HE DISCOURAGE HIM COMPLETELY. THE KING EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF TRYING TO PERSUADE THE AMERICANS TO MAKE SOME MOVE TOWARDS THE PLO IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE THEM ON THE RIGHT PATH.

7. I ASKED THE KING ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF THE OTHER ARABS. HE SAID THE SAUDIS (WHO SENT PRINCE BANDAR HERE DURING THE KINGS TALKS WITH ARAFAT-SEE MY TELNO 417) WERE BEING QUITE HELPFUL AND HE WAS ALSO BEING GIVEN EXCELLENT SUPPORT BY IRAQ SEMICOLON PRESIDENT SADDAM HAD URGED ARAFAT STRONGLY TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE. I ASKED THE KING WHAT THE LATEST NEWS WAS ON THE FEZ FOLLOW UP COMMISSION. HE SAID HE NOW UNDERSTOOD THAT KING HASSAN WOULD BE LEADING A DELEGATION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION

NOW UNDERSTOOD THAT KING HASSAN WOULD BE LEADING A DELEGATION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION TO WASHINGTON ON 22 OCTOBER AND THAT THEY WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE VISITING LONDON (THIS IS AT VARIANCE WITH WHAT HE SAYS IN HIS LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER). THE KING SEEMED VERY SCEPTICAL OF THE VALUE OF THE EXERCISE, BUT EXPRESSED RELIEF THAT AT LEAST HE PERSONALLY MIGHT NOT NOW BE INVOLVED AND WOULD THEREFORE BE FREE TO PURSUE WHAT HE FELT WAS THE MORE IMPORTANT TASK OF TRYING TO CONCERT HIS POLICY FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE WITH THE PLO.

8. I AM HOPING TO SEE OTHER JORDANIAN AND PALESTINIAN PARTICIPANTS IN THE TALKS OVER THE NEXT DAY OR TWO, AND WILL THEN BE BETTER PLACED TO OFFER A CONSIDERED ASSESSMENT. BUT THE KING CLEARLY WANTED US TO KNOW THAT HE FELT HE HAD DONE AS WELL AS COULD BE EXPECTED IN THE OPENING ROUND OF WHAT WOULD INEVITABLY BE A DRAWN OUT PROCESS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

URWICK

NNNN

Ric

B17

CF

12 October 1982

MIDDLE EAST

4/10/82. I enclose a copy of a Telemessage which the Prime Minister received in Brighton last week from the Secretary General of the Arab League.

I should be grateful for a draft reply and for advice on whether the Prime Minister should reply personally or through a Private Secretary.

A J COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

256

GR 500

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DESKBY 111200Z - CAIRO

FM AMMAN 111100Z OCT 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 418 OF 11 OCT

AND TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

INFO BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, RABAT, TEL AVIV, TUNIS, UKMIS NEW YORK,
WASHINGTON AND CG JERUSALEM

SAVING INFO OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, MOSCOW, PARIS.

MIPT: JORDAN/PLO

1. THE JORDANIAN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, WHO HAS BEEN CLOSELY INVOLVED IN JORDANIAN DISCUSSIONS WITH ARAFAT AND THE PLO, GAVE ME HIS OWN IMPRESSIONS THIS MORNING OF HOW THINGS HAD GONE SO FAR (EMPHASISING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING IN STRICT PERSONAL CONFIDENCE AND PARTICULARLY DID NOT WANT TO BE QUOTED TO OTHER ARABS AT THIS EXTREMELY DELICATE AND DIFFICULT JUNCTURE IN INTER-ARAB RELATIONS). GENERAL SHAKER STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT ARAFAT WOULD NOT BE LEAVING JORDAN UNTIL 13 OCTOBER. IT WAS THEREFORE TOO SOON TO GIVE ANY CONSIDERED VERDICT ON THE JORDANIAN/PLO TALKS, ON WHICH KING HUSSEIN WOULD IN ANY CASE WISH TO BRIEF ME HIMSELF.

2. THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF SAID THAT, WHEN HE HAD SEEN KING FAHD ON 7 OCTOBER (SEE MY TELNO 419), HE HAD TOLD THE SAUDIS ON BEHALF OF KING HUSSEIN THAT JORDAN'S SOLE OBJECTIVE IN THE TALKS WITH ARAFAT WAS TO SECURE A SUFFICIENT DEGREE OF AGREEMENT WITH THE PLO TO ENCOURAGE THE AMERICANS TO PRESS FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967. WHO RULED THOSE TERRITORIES THEREAFTER WAS NOT A MATTER OF GREAT CONCERN TO THE JORDANIANS SEMICLN THEY WANTED TO CO-OPERATE, NOT COMPETE, WITH THE PLO. KING FAHD HAD PRIVATELY EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE ENTHUSIASM FOR THE REAGAN PROPOSALS AND SAID THAT THE GREAT MISTAKE OF THE FEZ SUMMIT HAD BEEN NOT TO ACCEPT THEM IN TOTO. GENERAL SHAKER REMARKED TO ME THAT IT WAS A GREAT PITY THE SAUDIS HAD NOT PLUCKED UP SUFFICIENT COURAGE TO SAY SO AT FEZ. GENERAL SHAKER HAD TOLD THE SAUDIS THAT THE JORDANIANS WOULD PUT THEIR VIEWS FRANKLY TO THE PLO ON THE NEED TO MAKE THE MOST OF WHAT THE AMERICANS WERE OFFERING. IT WAS THEN UP TO THE PLO TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY BEING OFFERED TO THEM. ON BEHALF OF KING HUSSEIN, HE HAD ASKED THE SAUDIS TO PUT WHATEVER PRESSURE THEY COULD ON THE PLO. THE SAUDIS HAD UNDERTAKEN TO DO THIS, BUT GENERAL SHAKER SEEMED SCEPTICAL WHETHER THEY WOULD PROVE AS GOOD AS THEIR WORD. PRINCE BANDAR HAD ARRIVED IN AMMAN ON 10 OCTOBER BRINGING A MESSAGE FROM KING FAHD TO KING HUSSEIN IN THE MIDDLE OF THE TALKS WITH ARAFAT SEMICLN HOWEVER SHAKER SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH HE HAD LUNCHEDED WITH THE KING AND PRINCE BANDAR, HE DID NOT YET KNOW PRECISELY WHAT THE MESSAGE HAD CONTAINED. PRINCE BANDAR HAD SEEN ARAFAT LATER IN THE DAY (SEE PARA 2 OF MY TUR).

3. SHAKER SAID THAT KING HUSSEIN'S MAIN AIM IN THE TALKS WITH ARAFAT WAS TO SEEK TO PERSUADE HIM TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE PLO ACCEPTING THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL WITHIN ITS 1967 BORDERS. BUT IT WAS TOO SOON TO TELL WHETHER ARAFAT WOULD HAVE THE COURAGE TO DO THIS. ACCORDING TO SHAKER, ARAFAT WAS OBSESSED OVER HIS OWN SECURITY (THE DATE OF HIS DEPARTURE FROM JORDAN WAS BEING TREATED AS TOP SECRET) AND WAS IN CONSTANT FEAR OF ASSASSINATION

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BY THE SYRIANS. ARAFAT HIMSELF WAS COMPLETELY CONVINCED THAT BRIGADIER-GENERAL SA'AD SAYL, HEAD OF PLO MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LEBANON, HAD BEEN MURDERED ON SYRIAN ORDERS. EVEN WHEN TALKING PRIVATELY TO THE KING, ARAFAT DROPPED HIS VOICE WHENEVER HE MENTIONED THE SYRIANS AS IF HE WERE FRIGHTENED THAT THEY COULD SOMEHOW OVERHEAR HIM. BUT THERE WERE ALSO PERHAPS HOPEFUL SIGNS. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON ARAFAT, IN SHAKER'S VIEW, HAD FOR A WHILE INHABITED AN UNREAL WORLD OF 21-GUN SALUTES WITH HEADS OF STATE AT AIRPORTS TO MEET HIM (A TASK ENTRUSTED TO THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER WHEN ARAFAT CAME TO AMMAN). BUT THE REALITY OF HIS OWN AND THE PLO'S TRUE SITUATION MIGHT BE BEGINNING TO SINK IN AND IT WAS JUST POSSIBLE THAT, ONCE FULLY AWARE OF THE PLO'S REAL WEAKNESS, ARAFAT MIGHT BE PREPARED TO MAKE THE NECESSARY COMPROMISES. HOWEVER, SHAKER DID NOT THINK THIS WOULD COME QUICKLY: IT WAS LIKELY TO BE QUITE A LONG PROCESS WITH MUCH DISCUSSION AND ARGUMENT WITHIN THE PLO ALONG THE WAY.

4. GENERAL SHAKER'S STRONG PERSONAL ADVICE TO ME WAS NOT TO SEEK AN AUDIENCE WITH THE KING BEFORE ARAFAT HAD LEFT. HE SAID HE THOUGHT I WOULD GET A MUCH MORE WORTHWHILE VIEW IF I WERE PREPARED TO WAIT UNTIL THE KING HAD HAD TIME TO REFLECT ON HIS DISCUSSIONS AND GIVE US A CONSIDERED JUDGEMENT ON THEM.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

URWICK

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DESKBY 111115Z - CAIRO
FM AMMAN 111030Z OCT 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 417 OF 11 OCT
AND TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
INFO BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, RABAT, TEL AVIV, TUNIS, UKMIS NEW
YORK, WASHINGTON, CG JERUSALEM
SAVING INFO OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, MOSCOW, PARIS.

MY TELNO 415: JORDAN/PLO

1. KING HUSSEIN AND ARAFAT HELD A SECOND ROUND OF TALKS ON THE EVENING OF 10 OCTOBER. ACCORDING TO PLO SOURCES QUOTED IN TODAY'S PRESS, THEY DISCUSSED FURTHER A PLAN FOR JOINT JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN ACTION SAID TO HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT DURING THE FIRST SESSION OF TALKS ON 9 OCTOBER. THE PLAN REPORTEDLY INVOLVES THE FORMATION OF SEVERAL JOINT JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN COMMITTEES (AS FORECAST IN PARA 3 OF MY TUR) SEMICLN THEREAFTER THE NEW JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN STRATEGY WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL IN TUNIS FOLLOWING A MEETING IN LATE OCTOBER OF THE FEZ COMMISSION OF SEVEN.
2. ARAFAT CONFERRED EARLIER ON 10 OCTOBER WITH A NUMBER OF LEADING PLO FIGURES ALREADY HERE (INCLUDING SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE). OTHER MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE HAVE SINCE ARRIVED OR ARE DUE TO ARRIVE TODAY, BRINGING THE TOTAL PRESENT IN AMMAN TO NINE OUT OF FIFTEEN SEMICLN KHALIL WAZIR (FATAH CENTRAL

ARRIVED OR ARE DUE TO ARRIVE TODAY, BRINGING THE TOTAL PRESENT IN AMMAN TO NINE OUT OF FIFTEEN SEMICLN KHALIL WAZIR (FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE) IS ALSO EXPECTED HERE TODAY TO ATTEND A MEETING OF THE JORDAN/PLO STEADFASTNESS COMMITTEE, WHICH HAS NOT MET FOR NEARLY THREE MONTHS. A NUMBER OF PROMINENT PALESTINIANS RESIDENT IN JORDAN CALLED ON ARAFAT ON 10 OCTOBER: THESE INCLUDED EXILED WEST BANK MAYORS OR FORMER MAYORS QAWASMEH, MILHEM, RUHI KHATIB AND NADIM ZAROU AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS BISHOP ELIA KHOURY AND SHEIKH RAJAB TAMIMI. ACCORDING TO THE ARABIC PRESS, ARAFAT ALSO RECEIVED A HIGH-LEVEL SAUDI ENVOY WHO DELIVERED A LETTER TO HIM FROM KING FAHD (SEE MIFT).

3. SHORTLY BEFORE HIS SECOND MEETING WITH THE KING YESTERDAY, ARAFAT ADDRESSED A CHEERING CROWD IN FRONT OF THE PLO OFFICE IN AMMAN. HE BEGAN BY SAYING THAT THE FIGHTING IN LEBANON HAD DISPELLED THE MYTH OF ISRAELI MILITARY INVINCIBILITY. HE THEN BLAMED THE MASSACRES AT SABRA AND CHATILA ON MR HABIB, WHO ARAFAT CLAIMED HAD GIVEN ASSURANCES THAT PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS IN BEIRUT WOULD BE SAFE AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLO FIGHTERS, AND ON BASHIR GEMAYEL. ARAFAT PRAISED THOSE ISRAELI CIVILIANS AND SOLDIERS WHO HAD PROTESTED AGAINST ISRAELI ACTIONS IN LEBANON AND SAID THEIR PROTESTS WERE CONSISTENT WITH THE TRUE SPIRIT OF THE ARTICLE IN THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL CHARTER WHICH CALLS FOR A DEMOCRATIC STATE IN PALESTINE. ASKED EARLIER IN THE DAY BY A REPORTER ABOUT JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN RELATIONS, ARAFAT SAID THAT THE PLO "HAS A STRONG RELATION WITH JORDAN, ITS KING AND GOVERNMENT, AND ESPECIALLY ITS PEOPLE" AND ADDED THAT THE JORDANIANS AND PALESTINIANS WERE "HISTORICALLY ONE PEOPLE AND ONE NATION."

5. ARAFAT IS SCHEDULES TODAY TO VISIT THE MEMBERS OF THE JORDAN BASED PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY WHO RETURNED HERE IN LATE AUGUST FROM LEBANON.

6. SEE MIFT.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

URWICK

NNNN

Office

R 4 Grand Hotel, Brighton

04 October 1982

NOT P.O

TELEMESSAGE
THE PRIME MINISTER THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
MARGARET THATCHER MP GRAND HOTEL
BRIGHTON

Dear Prime Minister I send you my warmest good wishes on the occasion of your party's conference, and for successful worthwhile deliberations. May I also at this critical time in the affairs of the Middle East - appeal to you to embark upon positive action to elevate the plight of the Palestinian People. This, I believe, can be achieved via realistic implementation of the United Nations Resolutions this is doubtless the only way in which a just, secure, and lasting peace can be obtained, and I earnestly request of you to exercise your world renowned position to help to obtain the United Nations desires. To achieve this end I hope we can count on your valid help and support, and at the same time urge you to initiate at the earliest possible moment top level talks with the leaders of the PLO who are the soul legitimate representative of the Palestinian People. This has now been acknowledged by the other British Political Parties and I trust that your conference will make a similar pronouncement
Kindest regards yours sincerely

Chadli Klibi Secretary General League of Arab States
Tunis

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GRS 700

PS TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET.

Middle East

UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON 290435Z SEP 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3180 OF 29 SEPTEMBER



INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
ROUTINE OTTAWA CAIRO TEL AVIV, AMMAN BEIRUT JEDDA DAMASCUS
TUNIS PARIS ROME MOSCOW

INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PRESS CONFERENCE: THE MIDDLE EAST.

1. DURING HIS NATIONALLY TELEVISED PRESS CONFERENCE ON 28 SEPTEMBER, PRESIDENT REAGAN ANSWERED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST:

(A) LEBANON. WHEN US TROOPS HAD FIRST GONE INTO BEIRUT THEY HAD DONE SO ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THEIR ONLY TASK WOULD BE TO SUPERVISE PLO WITHDRAWAL. WHEN THAT TASK WAS COMPLETED SUCCESSFULLY THEY HAD WITHDRAWN. UNFORESEEABLE EVENTS, INCLUDING THE ASSASSINATION OF GEMAYEL, HAD CHANGED THE PICTURE SUBSEQUENTLY. THE MARINES WHO WOULD BE RETURNING TO BEIRUT WOULD NOT BE ENTERING A VIETNAM SITUATION. THEIR TASK WAS TO SUPPORT THE STABILITY OF LEBANON WHILE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT REUNITED ITS PEOPLE AND CREATED A SITUATION IN WHICH THE LEBANESE ARMY COULD PRESERVE ORDER. AT THE SAME TIME, THE WITHDRAWAL TO THEIR OWN BORDERS OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES SHOULD TAKE PLACE. BOTH COUNTRIES CONCERNED HAD SAID THIS WAS THEIR INTENTION. THE MARINES WOULD COME HOME WHEN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TOLD THE UNITED STATES THEY FELT THEY WERE IN CHARGE. HE THOUGHT THAT THE MARINE WOULD REMAIN UNTIL ALL FOREIGN FORCES HAD WITHDRAWN BECAUSE THAT WOULD HAPPEN RAPIDLY.

(B) ARAB/ISRAEL. NOTHING THAT HAD HAPPENED IN RECENT WEEKS HAD ALTERED US INTENTIONS. ON ONE SIDE OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE, TERRITORY WAS THE GOAL, WHILE ON THE OTHER IT WAS SECURITY. WHAT HAD TO BE NEGOTIATED WAS AN EXCHANGE OF TERRITORY FOR SECURITY. THE US WAS DOING ALL IT COULD TO PERSUADE ISRAEL'S ARAB NEIGHBOURS TO NEGOTIATE A PERMANENT PEACE WHICH WOULD MAKE IT UNNECESSARY FOR ISRAEL TO REMAIN AN ARMED CAMP. AT THE SAME TIME, A JUST AND FAIR ANSWER WAS NEEDED TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE PALESTINIANS. THE PRESIDENT DENIED THAT HE HAD ACCUSED ISRAEL OF SABOTAGING THE US INITIATIVE OR OF TURNING FROM A DAVID INTO A GOLIATH IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE HAD OBSERVED THAT ISRAEL, WHICH HAD ALWAYS BEEN A TINY COUNTRY SURROUNDED BY HOSTILE NEIGHBOURS, WAS NOW FEARED BY SOME ARABS AS AN EXPANSIONIST MILITARY POWER. HE LIKENED INITIAL RESPONSES TO HIS INITIATIVE TO THE STAKING OUT OF POSITIONS WHICH WAS FAMILIAR IN TRADE UNION NEGOTIATIONS.

/ (c)

75 TO HQ IN DOWNING STREET.
(C) RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. AMERICA'S OBLIGATIONS TO ISRAEL
WERE UNCHANGED. THE SALE OF F16S WAS STILL ON TAP THOUGH IT HAD BEEN
DECIDED NOT TO SEND FORMAL NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS GIVEN THE
RECENT CLIMATE. THE ONLY EQUIPMENT IN THE PIPELINE WHICH HAD
BEEN WITHHELD WAS THE CLUSTER SHELL.

THE PRESIDENT DENIED SUGGESTIONS THAT THE US GOVERNMENT
WAS TRYING TO UNDERMINE OR OVERTHROW THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT.
THEY HAD NEVER INTERFERED, AND WOULD NOT DO SO.
HE EXPECTED TO GO ON DOING BUSINESS WITH MR BEGIN
ACCORDING TO THE DECISION OF THE ISRAELI PEOPLE, WHO HAD SHOWN
BY THEIR RESPONSE TO RECENT EVENTS THAT THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN
THEIR NATIONAL SPIRIT.

FCO PASS SAVING ABU DHABI ADEN ALGIERS BAGHDAD BAHRAIN DOHA
DUBAI JERUSALEM KHARTOUM KUWAIT MUSCAT RABAT
SANA-A TRIPOLI

WRIGHT

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

FO HO 030/25 SEP

OO HONG KONG

GRS 533

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 241736Z SEP 82

TO IMMEDIATE PEKING

TELEGRAM NUMBER 451 OF 24 SEPTEMBER

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PLANNING STAFF WAS RECEIVED FROM AMMAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 394 OF 23 SEPTEMBER.

AND TO INFO ROTUINE BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, RABAT, TEL AVIV, TUNIS, UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON AND SAVING FOR INFO OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

JORDAN/MIDDLE EAST.

1. WHEN RECEIVING THE LORD PRIVY SEAL THIS AFTERNOON, KING HUSSEIN REVIEWED RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SPOKE WARMLY OF THE ROLE WHICH EUROPE AND IN PARTICULAR THE UK HAD PLAYED IN AVERTING POLARISATION IN THE AREA AND ALSO IN INFLUENCING THE UNITED STATES IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

2. THE KING SAID THAT THE ARABS WERE STILL EXCHANGING IDEAS AMONG THEMSELVES AND THAT THEY HAD YET TO REACH A FIRM DECISION ON HOW BEST TO PROCEED IN THE COMING WEEKS. HE REFERRED TO A SUGGESTION THAT THERE SHOULD BE A FURTHER MEETING OF ARAB LEADERS IN MOROCCO IN EARLY OCTOBER: THE KING DID NOT SAY WHO WAS TO ATTEND IT AND GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE DID NOT THINK THE MEETING WOULD IN FACT HAPPEN. THE LATEST SUGGESTION FROM THE MOROCCANS ABOUT THE PROPOSED COMMISSION FROM ARAB COUNTRIES TO EXPLAIN THE DECISIONS OF THE FEZ SUMMIT WAS THAT IT SHOULD DIVIDE INTO TWO GROUPS, WITH THE MOROCCAN, SAUDI TUNISIAN AND SYRIAN REPRESENTATIVES VISITING LONDON AND WASHINGTON, WHILE A SECOND GROUP COMPRISING THE PLO, ALGERIA AND JORDAN WOULD GO TO FRANCE, THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA SEMICOLON HOWEVER THE SYRIANS NOW WANTED TO BE REPRESENTED ONLY AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL, WHICH WAS CONTRARY TO WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED AT FEZ. THE KING EXPRESSED REGRET THAT JORDAN MIGHT NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE DELEGATION VISITING LONDON, EMPHASISING THAT NOTHING HAD YET BEEN FIRMLY AGREED.

3. THE KING MENTIONED THAT ARAFAT'S VISIT TO JORDAN HAD NOW BEEN POSTPONED UNTIL AFTER THE EID HOLIDAY, IE UNTIL EARLY OCTOBER. HE UNDERSTOOD IT WAS ARAFAT'S INTENTION TO SPEND SOME DAYS IN JORDAN.

4. THE KING SAID HE VERY MUCH HOPED IT WOULD PROVE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE SOMETHING CONTRUCTIVE IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND AGREED WITH BARONESS YOUNG THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE US ELECTIONS. AN ADDITIONAL REASON FOR NOT LOSING TIME WAS THE THAT HE THOUGHT IT QUITE PROBABLE THAT JORDAN WOULD BE ISRAEL'S NEXT TARGET AFTER LEBANON. HE THOUGHT IT REGRETTABLE THAT MR BEGIN SEEMED FOR THE TIME BEING TO HAVE OVERCOME HIS NTERNAL PROBLEMS, AS IT SEHOWED THAT HS POLICIES CONTINUED TO ENJOY A LARGE MEASURE OF POPULAR SUPPORT WITHIN ISRAEL THE KING SA^W RECENT ISRAELI ACTJONS IN LEBANON AS AIMED PRIMARILY AT HUMILIATING THE AMERICANS AND DESTROYING THEIR CREDIBIILITY IN THE AREA.

BUT NO FIRM DECISIONS HAD YET BEEN TAKEN AND HE AND THE OTHER ARABS NEEDED MORE TIME TO PULL THEIR THOUGHTS TOGETHER.

5. IN A BRIEF REFERENCE TO THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR, THE KING SAID HE REGARDED A MAJOR IRANIAN OFFENSIVE AS IMMINENT SEMICOLON HE VERY MUCH HOPED THE IRAQIS WOULD PROVE ABLE TO WITHSTAND IT.

6. IN EXPRESSING HIS APPRECIATION OF BARONESS YOUNGS VISIT, THE KING SAID HOW IMPORTANT HE REGARDED IT IN THE DIFFICULT TIMES THROUGH WHICH THE AREA WAS PASSING THAT THE JORDANIANS SHOULD KEEP IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH WITH THEIR FRIENDS.

ENDS

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CONFIDENTIAL



FILE SW

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

m/ask
14 September, 1982

The Prime Minister has seen the unnumbered telegram of 11 September from Rabat reporting on King Hassan's press conference following the Arab League Summit. The King apparently stated that the Summit has mandated a group of seven, including Yasser Arafat, to present the Arab peace plan to permanent members of the Security Council. Mrs. Thatcher has commented that we must not receive Arafat in London. The idea, referred to in the telegram, that the delegation to Washington should number six, not seven, should also, in the Prime Minister's view, apply to London.

AJ COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

S

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR MOBERLY
SIR J BULLARD
HD/NENAD
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CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMMAN 141000Z SEP 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 377 OF 13 SEP

INFO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI (FOR PS/MR HURD) WASHINGTON

PRIORITY BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, MOSCOW, RABAT,
TEL AVIV, TUNIS, UKMIS NEWYOR.

INFO SAVING TO OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

FEZ SUMMIT

1. CROWN PRINCE HASSAN SAW THE US AMBASSADOR ON THE EVENING OF 11 SEPTEMBER AND ASKED HIM TO CONVEY A MESSAGE TO THE US ADMINISTRATION CONCERNING THE FEZ SUMMIT MEETING SEMICLN THE MESSAGE WAS BASED ON TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WHICH THE CROWN PRINCE HAD HAD WITH KING HUSSEIN FOLLOWING THE SUMMIT MEETING AND QUOTES THE KING DIRECTLY IN A NUMBER OF PLACES. FOLLOWING WERE ITS MAIN POINTS:

A. THE AMERICANS WERE URGED NOT TO REGARD THE SUMMIT'S CONCLUSIONS AS A RIPOSTE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE EVEN THOUGH THE ARAB COUNTRIES WHICH WERE SOVIET SURROGATES, SYRIA, SOUTH YEMEN, ALGERIA, AND MAURITANIA, MIGHT TRY TO PORTRAY IT AS SUCH.

B. FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS HAD BEEN LEFT TO BE WORKED OUT 'WITHIN THE ARAB FAMILY.' ANY AGREEMENT REACHED WOULD BE MADE PUBLIC AND MIGHT PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR A REFERENDUM IN WHICH THOSE CONCERNED WOULD BE FREE TO MAKE THEIR

REACHED WOULD BE MADE PUBLIC AND MIGHT PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR A REFERENDUM IN WHICH THOSE CONCERNED WOULD BE FREE TO MAKE THEIR CHOICE. NONE (REPEAT NONE) OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE SUMMIT MEETING, WHETHER MODERATE OR OTHERWISE, HAD GIVEN THE LEAST INDICATION THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO SET ASIDE THE DECISIONS REACHED AT THE RABAT SUMMIT OF 1974 CONCERNING THE PALESTINIANS (IE TO ALLOW THE JORDANIANS TO NEGOTIATE ON THEIR BEHALF) SEMICLN THIS HAD LIMITED JORDANIAN ABILITY TO MOVE THINGS FORWARD. ARAFAT'S CONDUCT AT THE SUMMIT HAD BEEN THAT OF A WEAK AND FRIGHTENED MAN WHO WAS NOT HIS OWN MASTER: HE APPEARED TO HAVE LEARNED NOTHING FROM RECENT EVENTS.

C. THE PROBLEMS OF LEBANON HAD BEEN ADDRESSED IN A MANNER WHICH SPELT BOTH IMMEDIATE AND LONGER-TERM DISASTER FOR ARAB INTERESTS. THIS HAD BEEN DUE TO A MIXTURE OF SYRIAN PRESSURE, ARAFAT'S POWERLESSNESS AND THE 'UNYIELDING AND LEGITIMATE LEBANESE ATTITUDE.' IN KING HUSSEIN'S VIEW 'THE DIE WAS CAST' FOR LEBANON SEMICLN HE RECALLED IN THIS CONTEXT THE TRAGIC EVENTS WHICH OCCURRED IN JORDAN IN 1970. IN TACKLING THE PROBLEMS OF LEBANON, JORDAN HAD WORKED IN UNISON WITH MOROCCO, TUNISIA, IRAQ AND SUDAN SEMICLN THE SAUDIS HAD BEEN UNSURE OF THEMSELVES AND OBSCURE SEMICLN THEY HAD SECRETLY PROMISED SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL FUNDS TO SYRIA.

D. ON THE RENEWAL OF ARAB TIES WITH EGYPT, JORDAN, IRAQ, SUDAN AND MOROCCO HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN HEATED EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIET SURROGATES. KING HUSSEIN HAD GIVEN THE SUMMIT AN ACCOUNT OF THE CONTACTS HE HAD HAD WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND HAD AFFIRMED HIS INTENTION TO CONTINUE THESE UNTIL THE TIME CAME FOR THE RESTORATION OF FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

E. NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA ON THE ONE HAND AND JORDAN AND IRAQ ON THE OTHER (CF THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER'S PUBLIC COMMENTS QUOTED IN MY TELNO 375).

F. NO NEW FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR JORDAN HAD BEEN OFFERED AT THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE SEMICLN EVEN THE PROMISE MADE AT THE AMMAN SUMMIT IN NOVEMBER 1980 TO MAKE GOOD THE PAYMENTS DUE FROM ALGERIA AND LIBYA UNDER THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT AGREEMENTS HAD NOT BEEN RENEWED.

G. SUMMING UP HIS VIEWS ON THE MEETING, KING HUSSEIN DESCRIBED IT AS 'THE MOST TAXING AND FRUSTRATING SUMMIT HE HAD EVER ATTENDED, DESPITE SOME POSITIVE ASPECTS WHICH FELL FAR SHORT OF HIS HOPES.'

FOR THIS HE BLAMED IN PARTICULAR THE VICIOUS CONDUCT OF THE SYRIANS AND ALSO THE GENERALLY COWARDLY AND AMBIGUOUS PERFORMANCE OF THE ARAB MODERATES SEMICLN THE KUWAITIS IN PARTICULAR HAD BEEN NEGATIVE ON MOST ISSUES AND SAUDI CONDUCT HAD BEEN UNCLEAR AND AMBIVALENT.

H. KING HUSSEIN FELT THAT A COMPLETE REASSESSMENT WAS NOW REQUIRED OF JORDAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD AND THEIR FUTURE CONDUCT. SUCCESS WOULD DEPEND ON HIS ABILITY TO 'MOBILISE AND ORGANISE THE MAJORITY OF OUR PEOPLE' AND ON 'THE READINESS OF OUR FRIENDS TO PROVIDE US WITH THE MEANS TO AUGMENT OUR CAPABILITIES TO FACE THESE CHALLENGES.'

THESE CHALLENGES.''

2. MUCH OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE MESSAGE IS, AS USUAL IN THESE COMMUNICATIONS, RATHER OBSCURE (INDEED THE TEXT AMBASSADOR VIETS WAS ORIGINALLY ASKED TO DELIVER BY THE CROWN PRINCE WAS SO CONVOLUTED IN ITS PHRASING THAT AMBASSADOR VIETS HAD TO ASK FOR A REVISED VERSION AND PRINCE HASSAN HAD A FURTHER TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH KING HUSSEIN BEFORE DELIVERING THE FINAL TEXT). IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH THE CROWN PRINCE, VIETS WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATION ON SOME POINTS. ACCORDING TO THE CROWN PRINCE, KING HUSSEIN HAD REPEATEDLY STATED ON THE TELEPHONE THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE RESULTS OF THE FEZ SUMMIT HE INTENDED TO MOVE AHEAD ON THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON THE BASIS OF THE POSITION HE HAD OUTLINED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN (PRESUMABLY WHEN VELIOTES AND VIETS PAID THEIR SECRET VISIT TO AMMAN IN LATE AUGUST). KING HUSSEIN AND KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO WOULD TOGETHER HAVE TO TRY TO DEVELOP A JORDANIAN FRAMEWORK ON WHICH JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE BASED (SEE PARAGRAPH 1.B ABOVE). IN TALKING TO PRINCE HASSAN, KING HUSSEIN HAD APPARENTLY REPEATEDLY SPOKEN OF ARAFAT'S GUTLESSNESS AND DUPLICITY. THE KING HAD ALSO EXPRESSED GREAT CAUTION ABOUT POSSIBLE JORDANIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE COMMISSION NOMINATED BY THE SUMMIT TO VISIT WASHINGTON. HE WANTED TO KEEP A FREE HAND TO ACT IN JORDAN'S BEST INTERESTS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND NOT BE TIED BY THE DECISIONS OR TACTICS ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION SEMICLN HE WOULD WELCOME US ADVICE ON WHETHER JORDAN SHOULD JOIN THE COMMISSION OR NOT.

3. KING HUSSEIN ALSO SPOKE OF HIS DEEP REGRET THAT THE SOVIET SURROGATES HAD WON THE DAY IN REJECTING THE READMISSION OF EGYPT TO THE ARAB LEAGUE. HE BLAMED THE FAILURE TO MAKE ANY PROGRESS ON STEPS TO BRING THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR TO AN END ON SYRIA'S 'ENDLESS MANOEUVRING ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET UNION.'

KING HUSSEIN THOUGHT THE SYRIANS AND RUSSIANS WERE CALCULATING ON AN IRANIAN VICTORY AND THE DOWNFALL OF THE IRAQI REGIME WITHIN TWO MONTHS. THE KING HAD CASTIGATED SAUDI PERFORMANCE AT THE SUMMIT AS COWARDLY AND TWO-FACED AND HAD TOLD PRINCE HASSAN THAT HE HAD ALMOST TORPEDOED THE SUMMIT BY WALKING OUT AND FREEZING JORDAN'S TIES WITH THE ARAB LEAGUE. HE HAD BEEN RESTRAINED FROM DOING SO ONLY BY HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH KING HASSAN AND THE DAMAGE SUCH A MOVE WOULD HAVE DONE TO JORDANIAN/MOROCCAN RELATIONS.

4. THE KING HAD ALSO REAFFIRMED HIS INTENTION TO CONDUCT A COMPLETE REASSESSMENT OF HIS RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD FOLLOWING WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE SUMMIT 'FIASCO' AND, IF NEED BE, TO GO IT ALONE IN FOLLOWING UP PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE. BUT IF HE DECIDED TO DO SO HE WOULD NEED FAR MORE MATERIAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FROM THE US THAN HE WAS OBTAINING AT PRESENT. PRINCE HASSAN HAD ENDED BY URGING VIETS TO ARRANGE FOR A QUICK MESSAGE OF SUPPORT TO BE SENT FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO KING HUSSEIN, CLAIMING THAT THE KING WAS DETERMINED TO PROCEED IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE US AND THAT

TO BE SENT FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO KING HUSSEIN, CLAIMING THAT THE KING WAS DETERMINED TO PROCEED IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE US AND THAT IT WAS THEREFORE VITAL FOR HIM TO GET A STRONG AND CLEAR SIGNAL OF US BACKING AND ADMIRATION FOR HIS STAND. IN HIS REPORTING TELEGRAM VIETS ADDED HIS OWN PLEAS TO THOSE OF PRINCE HASSAN FOR SUCH A MESSAGE.

5. PRINCE HASSAN ALSO BRIEFED THE HEAD OF THE EGYPTIAN INTERESTS SECTION AND THE ITALIAN AND GERMAN AMBASSADORS JOINTLY (THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR WAS NOT AVAILABLE AND I HAD NOT YET RETURNED) ON HIS MESSAGE TO THE AMERICANS. THE BRIEFING GIVEN TO THE GERMAN AND ITALIAN AMBASSADORS WAS IN EVEN STRONGER AND MORE EMOTIVE TERMS THAT THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE FINALLY SENT BY VIETS AND MAY HAVE BEEN BASED ON THE EARLIER VERSION OF THE MESSAGE. BUT THE MAIN POINTS WERE THE SAME AS IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE.

QQ6. FOR THE MOMENT KING HUSSEIN'S VIEWS ARE ONLY REACHING US THROUGH THE CROWN PRINCE, BASED ON TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS AND IN A VERSION INTENDED FOR AMERICAN EYES, ONE OF THE KING'S OBJECTIVES BEING TO FIND OUT WHAT ADDITIONAL US SUPPORT, BOTH POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL, MIGHT BE AVAILABLE IF HE SHOULD DECIDE TO GO IT VIRTUALLY ALONE. HE IS CLEARLY ANXIOUS TO LET THE AMERICANS KNOW THAT HE IS NOT WAVERING IN HIS DETERMINATION TO MAKE THE MOST OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE. HE ALSO TOOK MUCH THE SAME LINE IN HIS INTERVIEW ON PANORAMA, OF WHICH I ASSUME YOU HAVE THE FULL TEXT. SIMILAR VIEWS ARE BEING EXPRESSED HERE BY ABU ODEH, THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER, WHO IS PRIVATELY SAYING THAT THE US INITIATIVE IS THE ARAB'S LAST CHANCE TO RECOVER THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. BUT THIS VIEW IS HOTELY DISPUTED IN, FOR EXAMPLE, AN EDITORIAL IN THIS MORNING'S LOCAL ENGLISH-LANGUAGE DAILY AND, AS SOON AS THE KING RETURNS TO AMMAN, HE IS LIKELY TO BE EXPOSED TO OTHER COUNSELS. HIS OWN INNATE CAUTION MAY ALSO INCLINE HIM, ONCE THE DUST HAS SETTLED AND HIS IMMEDIATE ANGER OVER THE PROCEEDINGS AT FEZ HAS RECEDED, TO HIS TRADITIONAL RELUCTANCE TO BREAK RANKS WITH THE OTHER ARABS. YOU WILL HAVE NOTED HIS REMARKS IN HIS PANORAMA INTERVIEW THAT "I AM GOING TO PLAY A VERY ACTIVE PART IN HELPING... THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE BUT, BEYOND THAT, THERE ARE LIMITATIONS WHICH I RECOGNISE AND WHICH I HOPE THE WORLD RECOGNISES."

7. SINCE THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED I HAVE SEEN CROWN PRINCE HASSAN MYSELF (WITH ONLY THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TO LONDON PRESENT) AND HE READ OVER TO ME MOST OF HIS MESSAGE TO THE AMERICANS. HE ALSO UNDERTOOK TO ARRANGE WITH KING HUSSEIN, WHO RETURNS TO AMMAN THIS EVENING, FOR MR HURD TO PAY AN EARLY VISIT TO AMMAN: MR HURD WILL THEREFORE SHORTLY BE ABLE TO OBTAIN THE KING'S VIEWS AT FIRST HAND. OTHERWISE THE CROWN PRINCE HAD LITTLE TO ADD TO WHAT I HAVE REPORTED ABOVE. HE REPEATED HIS BELIEF IN THE SINCERITY AND COURAGE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN, SAID WHAT A DISAPPOINTMENT KING FAHD HAD BEEN AT FEZ (AT THE KEY POINT IN THE DISCUSSION ON ARAB RELATIONS

COURAGE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN, SAID WHAT A DISAPPOINTMENT KING FAHD HAD BEEN AT FEZ (AT THE KEY POINT IN THE DISCUSSION ON ARAB RELATIONS WITH EGYPT, FAHD HAD CALLED FOR AN ADJOURNMENT FOR FOOD AND SLEEP) AND SAID THAT AMERICAN/JORDANIAN DISCUSSIONS TO ELABORATE A FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE ACTION (SEE PARA 2 ABOVE) WOULD NEED TO BE PURSUED IN A "SMALLER, LIKE-MINDED CLUB" (IMPLYING THAT THE JORDANIANS ARE HOPING TO INVOLVE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES AS WELL).

8. ALTHOUGH CROWN PRINCE HASSAN HAS NOW TOLD ME OF THE US/JORDANIAN EXCHANGES DIRECTLY, THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES ARE HOLDING THIS EXERCISE VERY CLOSELY AND AMBASSADOR VIETS' OWN REPORTING TELEGRAM WAS COPIED TO 2 OR 3 POSTS "FOR AMBASSADORS' EYES ONLY." I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL, THEREFORE, IF WE COULD AVOID REVEALING TO AMERICAN POSTS OVERSEAS JUST HOW FULLY VIETS IS KEEPING US IN THE PICTURE.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

URWICK

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Middle East

JL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 September 1982

OUTCOME OF THE ARAB SUMMIT MEETING

Thank you for your letter of 10 September, the contents of which have been noted by the Prime Minister.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JL

UNCLASSIFIED

FM RABAT 111150Z SEP
TO IMMEDIATE FCO LONDON
TEL U/N OF 11.9.82

*We must not
renew Arafat.
b/c to us as well
as to U.S.
Mf*

ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT: KING HASSAN'S PRESS CONFERENCE.

AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN FEZ ON FRIDAY 10TH AFTERNOON, KING HASSAN MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

1. THE SUMMIT HAS MANDATED A GROUP OF SEVEN, INCLUDING YASSER ARAFAT, TO PRESENT THE PLAN TO PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. "WE HAVE ADMITTED AND HE HIMSELF HAS ADMITTED THAT WE COULD GO AS SIX AND NOT SEVEN TO THE WHITE HOUSE".
2. THE FEZ PLAN IS AN IMMENSE STEP FORWARD, THE FIRST TIME THE ARAB STATES HAVE COLLECTIVELY ADMITTED THAT THE HIGHEST INTERNATIONAL BODY SHOULD ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR PEACEFUL AND LASTING CO-EXISTENCE BETWEEN ALL STATES IN THE REGION...THE POSITIVE ACTION OF THE ARABS LIES IN THEIR PROGRAMME, THEIR WILLINGNESS TO SEEK A SOLUTION EMBRACING THE CONTRADICTION OF BOTH PARTIES, AND THESE ARE FORMS OF POLITICAL PRESSURE WHICH SHOULD NOT BE SPURNED AND WHICH WILL BEAR FRUIT IN DUE COURSE.
3. IT IS BECAUSE ARABS HAVE OFTEN SPOKEN OF ECONOMIC WAR, PETROL WAR, AND NEVER SPOKEN OF CO-OPERATION THAT THE WORLD HAS HAD ENOUGH OF ARAB BLACKMAIL...WE THINK WE HAVE ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF PRESSURE.
4. AFTER A PERORATION ON THE SUFFERINGS ISRAEL HAS CAUSED IN LEBANON AND THE TERRORIST REACTION THIS WILL PROVOKE IN THE 1990S, KING HASSAN ENDED BY APPEALING EVEN TO ISRAEL TO ACCEPT THAT THE ARAB WORLD, WITHOUT SURRENDERING ANY OF ITS RIGHTS OR OTHER WAYS AND MEANS OF ATTAINING ITS OBJECTIVES, HAS DECIDED TO OPEN A NEW CHAPTER IN ITS HISTORY. HE HOPED IT WOULD ELICIT A POSITIVE RESPONSE.
5. IRAQ/SYRIA. PRESIDENTS ASSAD AND SADDAM HUSSEIN WILL MEET WITHIN A MONTH UNDER KING FAHD'S AUSPICES TO RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES.
6. OAU: NOT MOROCCO'S RESPONSIBILITY TO PICK UP PIECES BUT A SPECIAL CONFERENCE IN NEW YORK OR GENEVA COULD BREAK THE DEADLOCK.

DAWBARN

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

GPS 180

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 101030Z

FM RABAT 100910Z SEP 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 356 OF 10 SEPTEMBER

AND TO MIDDLE EAST POSTS EXCEPT BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW,
UKMIS NEW YORK

ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT

1. SUMMIT CLOSED LATE LAST NIGHT WITH THE PUBLICATION OF THE
MAIN POINTS OF AN ARAB PEACE PLAN. AS REPORTED IN LOCAL
PRESS THESE ARE:

A) ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED AFTER
JUNE 1967, INCLUDING THE ARAB SECTOR OF JERUSALEM:

B) DISMANTLING OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS BUILT AFTER 1967:

C) GUARANTEED FREEDOM OF WORSHIP FOR ALL RELIGIONS IN THE
HOLY AREAS OF JERUSALEM.

D) REAFFIRMATION OF PALESTINIAN RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
AND TO THE EXERCISE OF THEIR INALIENABLE NATIONAL RIGHTS
UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE P.L.O, THEIR SOLE AND
LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE:

E) WEST BANK AND GAZA TO BE PLACED UNDER TRUSTEESHIP OF UN
SECURITY COUNCIL FOR A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING
A F_W MONTHS:

F) CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE WITH
JERUSALEM AS CAPITAL:

G) UN SECURITY COUNCIL TO PROVIDE GUARANTEES OF PEACE FOR
ALL STATES OF REGION, INCLUDING AN INDEPENDENT
PALESTINIAN STATE:

H) GUARANTEE OF THESE PRINCIPLES BY UN SECURITY COUNCIL.

2. COMMENT TO FOLLOW.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3007 OF 10 SEPTEMBER

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV AMMAN CAIRO BEIRUT
ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW

INFO SAVING OTHER EC POST AND OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

MY TELNO 2995: US MIDDLE EAST POLICY

1. SHULTZ GAVE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE TODAY A VERY SIMILAR BRIEFING TO THE ONE HE GAVE THEIR OPPOSITE NUMBERS IN THE HOUSE YESTERDAY. HE COMMENTED THAT THE INITIAL FORMAL REACTIONS FROM BOTH SIDES SHOWED THAT THEY WERE OPPOSED TO THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION: THE ARAB SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE WAS AT VARIANCE WITH AMERICAN VIEWS ON SEVERL KEY ISSUES. BUT THESE WERE OPENING POSITIONS. THE NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS WAS CLEAR. NOW WAS THE TIME FOR QUIET DIPLOMACY TO PURSUE THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE AND BRING IT TO FRUITION.

THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE WORKING HARD TO TAKE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD.

2. ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS IN FACT ANY COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE PARTIES, SHULTZ INSTANCED THE GENUINE, IF UNSPOKEN, DESIRE FOR PEACE ON ALL SIDES, THE GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE NEED FOR SOME TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AS REGARDS THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND, POSSIBLY, RECONGNITION OF ISRAEL. IF THE 7TH POINT OF THE ARAB SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE IN FACT IMPLIED RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL, THIS WAS A REAL BREAK THROUGH. THE MAIN QUESTION WAS WHETHER THE ARBAS WERE NOW PREPARED TO BROADED THE PEACE PROCESS BY COMING TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

3. SHULTZ ANSWERED CRITICISM OF THE LACK OF PRIOR CONSULTATIONS WITH ISRAEL BY REFERRING TO HIS OWN LENGTHY CONVERSATIONS WITH SHAMIR AND SHARON AND TO THE PROLONGED AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. MOST OF THE POSITIONS OUTLINED BY THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH HAD BEEN CONVEYED BY FAIRBANKS TO THE ISRAELIS DURING THE AUTONOMY TALKS AS AMERICAN QUOTE BRIDGING IDEAS UNQUOTE. ISRAELI VIEWS WERE THUS WELL KNOWN TO THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE ISRAELIS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SURPRISED BY THE CONTENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH. ASKED HOW THE ISRAELIS WERE TO BE PERSUADED TO MODIFY THEIR POSITION, SHULTZ STRESSED THE ATTRACTIONS TO THEM OF A LONG TERM PEACE. HE DISCLAIMED ANY INTENTION OF INTERFERING IN ISRAELI INTERNAL POLITICS: THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD OF COURSE CONTINUE TO DEAL WITH BEGIN AND HIS GOVERNMENT.

4. CONGRESSIONAL REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE HAS BEEN GENERALLY FAVOURABLE AND THE ADMINISTRATION ARE CLEARLY ANXIOUS TO MAINTAIN BIPARTISAN SUPPORT FOR IT. THE PRESIDENT OF THE INFLUENTIAL AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE HAS MEANWHILE JOINED OTHER JEWISH-AMERICAN LEADERS IN GIVING THE INITIATIVE A QUALIFIED ENDORSEMENT.

5. WHEN I CALLED ON SENATOR PERCY (CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE) THIS AFTERNOON HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN AMAZED BY THE SUPPORT OF JEWISH GROUPS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE AND SINGLED OUT THE PRESIDENT OF THE ARAB/ISRAELI PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (APAC) WHOSE COMMENDATION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT HAD BEEN UNPRECEDENTED. PERCY WENT ON TO SAY HOW PLEASED HE HAD BEEN TO SEE YOUR STATEMENT WELCOMING THE AMERICAN INITIATIVE IN TERMS WHICH REFLECTED HIS OWN VIEWS PRECISELY. HE WAS CONVICTED FROM HIS MANY CONVERSATIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN THAT WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAD PROPOSED WAS EXACTLY WHAT HUSSEIN WANTED TO ACHIEVE THOUGH HUSSEIN COULD NEVER ENDORSE THE CONCEPT OF FEDERATION IN PUBLIC. PERCY ALSO ADDED THAT HE HAD DINED WITH THE CYPRIOT FOREIGN MINISTER, ROLANDIS, SHORTLY BEFORE THE LATTER HAD BEEN DUE TO SEE ARAFAT. HE HAD URGED ROLANDIS TO TELL ARAFAT THAT IF HE WANTED TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL POWER HE SHOULD GRASP THE OPPORTUNITY WHICH THE US INITIATIVE HAD PRESENTED.

FCC PASS SAVING TO
ABU DHABI ADEN ALGIERS BAGHDAD BAHRAIN DAMASCUS DOHA DUBAI
JEDDA JERUSALEM KHARTOUM KUWAIT MUSCAT RABAT SANA'A TRIPOLI TUNIS

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 September 1982

Prime Minister

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AB 10/9

Dear Sir,

Outcome of the Arab Summit Meeting

The Prime Minister will have seen press reports that the Fez Summit ended late on 9 September with the adoption of an "Arab peace plan". All Arab States (except Libya) and the PLO attended the Summit. The fact that the Arabs have at last reached agreement on a policy towards the Palestinian problem is in itself a welcome development. We have limited our initial public reaction to this point.

I enclose a summary of the proposals taken from the Moroccan press. We have not yet received a definitive text. But it is evident that they are based closely on the Fahd principles, which we welcomed as a basis for discussion when they were put forward in August 1981 but which the Arabs themselves could not agree on at that time. Since then, important developments have occurred, notably the invasion of Lebanon and the appearance of President Reagan's proposals. The significance of the present Arab proposals will turn on the manner in which they are interpreted by the Arabs. If they can be used by King Hussein as an agreed Arab platform for the negotiations envisaged in President Reagan's initiative, then they will represent a constructive contribution. If, on the other hand, King Hussein has had his hands firmly tied to these proposals as preconditions for any negotiation, prospects for progress on the basis of President Reagan's proposals will be much less good.

We will be discussing all this fully with King Hussein and other Arab leaders in the coming days. Different interpretations may well surface quickly, and we do not wish to get drawn into public comment at this stage on the significance of new elements in the peace plan. There are reports that the Summit has decided to despatch teams to the Permanent Members of the Security Council to present the Arab peace plan. If this is confirmed, we could maintain the line in public that we cannot comment on the substance of the proposals until we have discussed them with the Arab League team.

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At first sight, the outcome of the Summit is encouraging. An unprecedented degree of unanimity has been achieved on a set of political objectives which include implicit acceptance of Israel's right to live in peace. It is likely to mark the beginning at least of a dialogue between the US and the Arabs on specific issues. Much of the substance will be unacceptable to Israel and the US; and first reports indicate that Washington had hoped for a more direct response to the Reagan speech. But if these objectives are put forward by the Arabs as a basis for negotiation, the process launched by President Reagan may gain momentum.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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FOLLOWING ARE EIGHT PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN CROWN PRINCE FAHD'S INTERVIEW WITH SAUDI NEWS AGENCY PUBLISHED ON 8 AUGUST:

PRINCIPLES

- FIRST: Israel should withdraw from all Arab territory occupied in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem.
- SECOND: Israeli settlements built on Arab land after 1967 should be dismantled.
- THIRD: A guarantee of freedom of worship for all religions in holy places.
- FOURTH: An affirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to return to their homes and to compensate those who do not wish to return.
- FIFTH: The West Bank and the Gaza Strip should have a transitional period, under the auspices of the UN, for a period not exceeding several months.
- SIXTH: An independent Palestinian state should be set up with Jerusalem as its capital.
- SEVENTH: All states in the region should be able to live in peace.
- EIGHTH: The UN or member states of the UN should guarantee to execute these principles.

HL

Middle
East

10 September 1982

President Reagan's Middle East Peace Initiative

The Prime Minister was grateful for your letter of 3 September explaining the current situation relating to the American initiative. She has noted its contents.

JOHN COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 17

ADVANCE COPY

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~~MR MODERLY~~
SIR J BULLARD
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ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW EC POSTS AND OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

U S MIDDLE EAST POLICY

1. WHEN I CALLED ON EAGLEBURGER YESTERDAY, HE WELCOMED OUR REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT AND SAID THAT WE COULD DO A LOT TO HELP WITH KING HUSSEIN.

2. EAGLEBURGER RECOGNISED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE IN FOR A LONG HAUL. IT WOULD TAKE TIME TO STIMULATE DEBATE IN ISRAEL: YESTERDAY'S KNESSET VOTE HAD, PREDICTABLY, BEEN ON PARTY LINES. SHULTZ AND THE PRESIDENT WERE WILLING TO AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF THE FEZ SUMMIT AND TO ALLOW TIME FOR REFLECTION. THERE WOULD BE NO RUSH TO SEND EMISSARIES TO THE MIDDLE EAST. THE AMERICANS HAD TO AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION OF WANTING TO PUT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL, BUT, ON THE OTHER HAND, SHOULD NOT ALLOW THE ARABS TO CONCLUDE THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD 'MADE A NICE SPEECH AND THEN GONE BACK TO SLEEP'.

'MADE A NICE SPEECH AND THEN GONE BACK TO SLEEP''.

3. EAGLEBURGER FEARED THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT SEEK TO PLAY GAMES OVER LINKAGE WITH THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. THE PRIORITY THERE WAS TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES. ISRAEL COULD NOT AFFORD TO MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENT FORCE LEVELS FOR LONG. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE DANGER OF FURTHER CLASHES IN THE BEKA'A, BUT THOUGHT THAT ASAD'S INTEREST WAS IN SAVING FACE.

4. EAGLEBURGER THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT THE FAVOURABLE RESPONSE IN THE UNITED STATES TO THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH SHOULD CONTINUE IN ORDER TO AVOID ENCOURAGING HARD LINERS IN ISRAEL. AT THE MOMENT THE JEWISH AMERICAN COMMUNITY WAS CONFUSED: MANY WERE NERVOUS ABOUT THE EFFECTS ON ISRAEL IF IT PROGRESSIVELY ABSORBS THE WEST BANK. THE ADMINISTRATION HAD TO AVOID A PROCESS OF TIT FOR TAT IN US/ISRAEL RELATIONS WHICH WOULD CREATE DOMESTIC PROBLEMS WITHIN THE US. THIS LIMITED THEIR ABILITY TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS.

5. A NUMBER OF PROMINENT JEWISH AMERICAN LEADERS HAVE MEANWHILE GIVEN THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT A CAUTIOUS WELCOME. THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE AMERICAN/ISRAELI PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HAS SAID THAT THERE IS 'A LOT OF VALUE' IN THE REAGAN PLAN. THE INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT OF B'NAI B'RITH HAS COMMENDED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PLAN AS 'WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION'. THE CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANISATIONS HAS WELCOMED THE PRESIDENT'S EFFORTS TO REVIVE THE PEACE TALKS AND STRESSED THE NECESSITY FOR ARABS TO RECOGNISE ISRAEL, THOUGH IT OBJECTED TO REAGAN'S PROPOSAL TO LINK THE WEST BANK TO JORDAN.

6. SHULTZ BRIEFED THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE TODAY (TEXT OF HIS STATEMENT FOLLOWS BY BAG). HE CONFIDENTLY EXPECTED DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PARTIES TO CONTINUE : IT WOULD BE SURPRISING IF EITHER THE ISRAELIS OR ARABS LIKED OR DISLIKED ALL THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS. BUT THEY REPRESENTED A REASONABLE BASIS FOR A NEGOTIATED COMPROMISE. THE PRESIDENT WAS DETERMINED TO REMAIN FULLY INVOLVED AND COMMITTED TO THE PRINCIPLES HE HAD ENUNCIATED. SHULTZ ACKNOWLEDGED THE POSITIVE BIPARTISAN SUPPORT FOR REAGAN'S INITIATIVE AND APPEALED FOR CONTINUED SUPPORT IN THE EFFORT TO LOOK FOR THE LONG TERM JUST SOLUTION.

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FROM AMMAN 041915Z SEP 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 366 OF 04 SEP 1982

AND TO INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON MIDDLE EAST POSTS PARIS
 BCNN ROME COPENHAGEN UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW AND ROUTINE DUBLIN
 BRUSSELS UKDEL NATO ATHENS LUXEMBOURG AND THE HAGUE.

YOUR TELNO 208 : US REVIEW OF MIDDLE EAST POLICY.

1. I SAW KING HUSSEIN EARLY THIS AFTERNOON AND ACTED
 AS INSTRUCTED. THE KING LOOKED TIRED BUT WAS IN A
 DETERMINED MOOD. IT WAS CLEAR FROM WHAT HE HAD TO SAY
 THAT HE INTENDS TO MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT AT THE FORTHCOMING
 ARAB SUMMIT TO SEEK THE PLO AND ARAB ENDORSEMENT HE REQUIRES
 IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD ALONG THE LINES
 ENVISAGED IN THE NEW AMERICAN PEACE PLAN.

2. KING HUSSEIN SAID HE WOULD BE MORE THAN HAPPY TO RECEIVE
 MR HURD IN AMMAN FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON CURRENT POLITICAL
 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE SAID THAT , HOWEVER ,
 HE WOULD BE LEAVING FOR MOROCCO EARLY TOMORROW MORNING, SUNDAY
 5 SEPTEMBER, AND ENVISAGED BEING AWAY FROM AMMAN FOR ANYTHING
 UP TO SEVEN OR EIGHT DAYS SEMICOLON HE THOUGHT THE DISCUSSIONS
 AT THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE WOULD TAKE AT LEAST TWO OR
 THREE DAYS AND HE MIGHT WELL WANT TO STAY ON IN MOROCCO FOR A DAY
 OR SO AFTERWARDS OR, DEPENDING ON HOW EVENTS TURNED OUT
 GO ON ELSEWHERE FOR FURTHER CONSULTATIONS. MR HURD WOULD THERE
 FORE BE MOST WELCOME TO COME TO AMMAN AT ANY TIME AFTER, SAY ,
 12 OR 13 SEPTEMBER. I EXPLAINED THAT MR HURD HAD COMMITMENTS IN THE
 GULF DURING THAT WEEK .

WE LEFT IT THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WOULD KEEP IN TOUCH OVER A
POSSIBLE VISIT TO JORDAN BY MR HURD IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS
OVER THE NEXT WEEK OR SO (SEE ALSO PARA 1 BELOW) .

KING HUSSEIN ADDED THAT HE WAS AWARE OF, AND MOST GRATEFUL
 FOR THE CONTRIBUTION, WHICH HE KNEW THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOU,
 SIR, HAD MADE OVER THE COURSE OF THIS YEAR TO THE EVOLUTION
OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THINKING ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST .

AS SOON AS HE WAS BACK IN JORDAN HE INTENDED TO PREPARE A "PACKAGE"
 " FOR THE PRIME MINISTER WHICH WOULD EXPLAIN IN DETAIL
HOW HIS CONTACTS WITH THE AMERICANS OVER THEIR NEW INITIATIVE
HAD BEGUN AND THE COURSE WHICH HIS EXCHANGES WITH THEM HAD
TAKEN UP UNTIL THE PRESENT TIME.

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3. KING HUSSEIN WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN HIS PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS ON THE NEW PEACE PLAN HE HAD STRESSED TWO PARTICULAR POINTS TO THE AMERICANS. FIRST, HE HAD SAID THAT UNLESS PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS DETERMINED TO BE ABSOLUTELY FIRM IN THE FACE OF INEVITABLE ISRAELI PRESSURES AND WAS WHOLLY RESOLVED NOT TO BE BLOWN OFF COURSE, THERE WAS LITTLE POINT IN EMBARKING ON THIS INITIATIVE AT ALL. INSTEAD, THE AMERICANS WOULD DO BETTER TO THINK OF ADOPTING THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO DEBATE THE MIDDLE EAST. THE AMERICANS, SAID THE KING, HAD GIVEN HIM THE FULL ASSURANCES HE WANTED ON THIS POINT. SECONDLY, HE HAD TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT THEY HAD TO UNDERSTAND JORDAN'S LIMITATIONS. SHE REMAINED HONOUR BOUND BY THE RABAT SUMMIT DECISIONS OF 1974 UNTIL OTHERWISE MANDATED. UNTIL THAT HAPPENED JORDAN'S POSITION WAS SIMPLY THAT OF A SUPPORTER OF THE PALESTINE CAUSE AND A COUNTRY

WHICH HAD ITS OWN SET OF PROBLEMS IN RELATION TO THE STATE OF ISRAEL DERIVING FROM A CONFRONTATION BORDER WHICH RAN DOWN FROM JORDAN VALLEY TO AQABA. THE KING SAID THE AMERICANS HAD ASSURED HIM THEY UNDERSTOOD THIS CLEARLY. KING HUSSEIN ADDED THAT HE HAD ALSO MADE IT CLEAR TO THE AMERICANS THAT THERE WOULD HAVE, IN THE LONG TERM, TO BE A WEST BANK:GAZA LINK SEMICOLON THAT EAST JERUSALEM HAD TO BE ARAB WHATEVER THE OVERALL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CITY WERE DECIDED SEMICOLON AND THAT HE DID NOT RULE OUT MINOR 1967 BORDER RECTIFICATIONS IN THE TRUE SPIRIT OF SCR 242.

4. KING HUSSEIN THEN SPOKE OF THE CONTACTS HE HAD ALREADY HAD WITH OTHER ARAB STATES. HE SAID HE HAD HAD ENCOURAGING CONTACT WITH THE EGYPTIANS. HE HAD GIVEN SADAM HUSSEIN A GENERAL IDEA OF WHAT WAS AFOOT DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO IRAQ, WHO HAD SAID THAT IN THE IRAQ WOULD GO ALONG WITH WHATEVER THE PALESTINIANS DECLARED THEY WANTED. THE KING SAID HE HAD GONE TO SOME LENGTHS DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO JEDDA (MY TELNO 361) TO "PUSH THE RATHER RELUCTANT SAUDIS" IN THE DIRECTION OF LOOKING FAVOURABLY UPON THE NEW US INITIATIVE. FINALLY HE WAS IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH KING HASSAN OVER TACTICS AT THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT.

5. AS REGARDS THE PLO THE KING SAID HE HAD FIRST BEEN ABLE TO DO SOME RATHER USEFUL GROUNDWORK WITH FAROUQ QASSOUMI WHEN HE HAD VISITED AMMAN LAST WEEK. HERE, HE HAD BEEN HELPED BY THE FACT THAT QASSOUMI HAD HIMSELF COME TO AMMAN TALKING IN TERMS OF THE NEED TO DEVELOP CLOSER AND FULLER RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PLO AND JORDAN. HE HAD THEN SENT THE FOREIGN MINISTER TOGETHER WITH AHMAD LAWZI TO TALK TO YASSER ARAFAT IN ATHENS. THEY HAD RETURNED "CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTICALLY". KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT HE WAS, HOWEVER, AWARE THAT THE PLO'S OWN INTERNAL DISCUSSIONS WERE ONLY NOW BEGINNING IN TUNIS AND THAT ARAFAT AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD IN ATHENS SHOWN THEMSELVES STILL SO BEMUSED THE EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEKS IN BEIRUT, THAT IT WOULD BE A DAY OR TWO BEFORE

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THEY COULD START TO THINK CLEARLY AGAIN. THE KING ADDED THAT HE HAD BEEN EXTREMELY IRRITATED WITH THOSE ELEMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHO HAD EARLIER , TRIED TO STEER THE PLO LEADERSHIP TOWARDS SYRIA SEMICOLON IF THAT HAD HAPPENED THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO CHANCE NOW OF ANY SERIOUS CONSTRUCTIVE POLICIES EMERGING FROM THE PLO. KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT , FORTUNATELY HE COULD NOW WORK FOR A CLOSER AND MORE DIRECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE PLO AND ADDED 'I KNOW THAT IS GOING TO CAUSE ME HEADACHES INTERNALLY-BUT I AM READY FOR THAT'.

6. I ASKED THE KING HOW HE SAW THE CHANCES OF HIS OBTAINING , AT THE ARAB SUMMIT, THE MANDATE HE SOUGHT. HE REPLIED THAT IT WOULD FIRST BE ESSENTIAL TO HAVE THE FULL ENDORSEMENT OF THE PALESTINIANS SEMICOLON IT WAS AFTERALL THEIR FUTURE RATHER THAN ANYONE ELSE'S THAT WAS AT ISSUE. HE SAID HE WOULD ALSO BE LOOKING FOR AS FULL AN ARAB SUMMIT ENDORSEMENT AS POSSIBLE BUT THAT, ON THIS, HE ENVISAGED A 'BITTER FIGHT'. THE SYRIANS HAD NOT BEHAVED TOO BADLY AT THE ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE BUT HE EXPECTED TROUBLE AT THE SUMMIT. HE ALSO DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS 'NOT VERY OPTIMISTIC ' THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD PROVIDE THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT HE WANTED. HE THOUGHT THAT, HOWEVER, WITH THE HELP OF KING HASSAN AND, HOPEFULLY , THE PLO AND THE IRAQIS, THE SAUDIS MIGHT BE INDUCED TO PLAY A MORE POSITIVE ROLE. HE WOULD BE LEAVING EARLY FOR THE SUMMIT SO AS TO HAVE DETAILED TALKS WITH KING HASSAN, KING FAHD, AND YASSER ARAFAT BEFORE THE FORMAL PROCEEDINGS GOT UNDER WAY.

7. ON EGYPT, KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT PRESIDENT MUBARAK REMAINED IN VERY CLOSE TOUCH WITH KING HASSAN. MUBARAK WAS URGING KING HASSAN TO ENSURE THAT THE SUMMIT CONCENTRATED ON THE NEW US PEACE PLAN AND, IF MAJOR DIFFICULTIES AROSE ON THAT SCORE, TO PREVENT THE SUMMIT LATCHING ON TO SOME ALTERNATIVE FORMULA SUCH AS THE FAHD PLAN. KING HUSSEIN SAID HE WAS ENTIRELY IN AGREEMENT WITH THIS APPROACH AND WOULD HELP KING HASSAN IN WHATEVER WAY HE COULD TO ENSURE THAT THE SUMMIT TOOK THIS COURSE AND THAT, AT THE VERY LEAST, THE SUMMIT CLOSED WITH THE US PEACE PLAN STILL ON THE TABLE.

HE DID NOT THINK, UNFORTUNATELY, THAT THERE WOULD BE MUCH PROGRESS AT THE SUMMIT TOWARDS THE REINTEGRATION OF EGYPT INTO THE ARAB FOLD. THE SAUDIS , IN PARTICULAR, THOUGHT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT PREMATURE . THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER HAD INDEED WARNED HIMSELF PERSONALLY AGAINST MOVING FORWARD TO FAST ON THE TWO OCCASIONS WHEN HE HAD COME THROUGH AMMAN RECENTLY. THE KING ADDED , WRYLY, THAT HE HAD LONG WONDERED WHAT WENT ON BETWEEN THE SAUDIS AND THE SYRIANS (COMMENT: THESE REMARKS RATHER CONFIRM THAT IT WAS THE SAUDIS WHO PREVENTED THE KING MEETING PRESIDENT MUBARAK IN OMAN LAST MONTH (MY TELNO 351).

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/8. I HAVE

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8. I HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY COMPARED NOTES WITH THE US AMBASSADOR WHO HAS HAD TWO FINAL MEETINGS TODAY WITH KING HUSSEIN BEFORE HE LEAVES FOR THE ARAB SUMMIT. VIETS SAID THAT THE KING'S ACCOUNT TO ME OF HIS PRESENT THINKING FOLLOWED CLOSELY THE LINE HE HAD TAKEN WITH THE AMERICANS. WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED KING HUSSEIN THIS MORNING WHAT HE WOULD DO IF HE DID NOT SECURE PLO ENDORSEMENT THE KING HAD FIRMLY SIMPLY REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO ROOM AT PRESENT FOR SUCH NEGATIVE THINKING SEMICOLON HE WAS DETERMINED TO GET WHAT HE WANTED OUT OF THE SUMMIT. KING HUSSEIN HAD ALSO TOLD VIETS THAT HE WAS THINKING OF A JOINT STATEMENT WITH ARAFAT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE PLO AND JORDAN WOULD, HENCEFORTH, WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER .
FOR OBVIOUS TACTICAL REASONS, AND GIVEN PLO SENSITIVITIES, SUCH A DECLARATION WOULD NOT HOWEVER BE DIRECTLY LINKED TEXTUALLY TO THE NEW US INITIATIVE WH

9. VIETS ALSO ADMITTED TO ME THAT HE HAD "WONDERED ALOUD" TO THE CHIEF OF ROYAL PROTOCOL YENAL MIKMAT WHETHER AFTER THE SUMMIT , THE KING MAY NOT BE SO ATTRACTED BY A "FEW DAYS REST IN LONDON" MIKMAT SAID HE THOUGHT THE KING WOULD WANT TO GET BACK TO AMMAN .
WE SHALL PRESUMABLY HEAR MORE OF THIS PARTICULAR PLOT BUT THE AMERICANS MAY WELL CONTINUE TO TRY TO ENGINEER A UK/JORDAN MEETING.
SINDALL

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

A summary of the
state of play on Reagan's
initiative.

3 September 1982

A. J. C. 1/2.

MT

Dear John,

President Reagan's Middle East Peace Initiative

President Reagan's speech on 1 September launched a major new Middle East peace initiative.

The main points of the new US ideas are as follows: Camp David remains the foundation of US policy. But Israel's security can only be assured by broader participation in the peace process, in particular by the inclusion of Jordan and the Palestinians. The President spelt out US views on both the transitional and final arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza. The purpose of the transitional period was 'the peaceful and orderly transfer of domestic authority from Israel to the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza'. The US would not support further settlement activity during the transitional period and recommended a 'settlement freeze'. As for the final status, the US rejected both a Palestinian state and annexation by Israel. Their preferred solution was 'self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan'. The withdrawal provision of Resolution 242 applied to the West Bank and Gaza; the extent of Israeli withdrawal would be heavily affected by the extent of peace and normalisation offered in return.

These proposals mark a major step forward and clarify the US position on a number of key issues. The new US policy is not fully consistent with Venice. For instance Mr Shultz explained in a message to Mr Pym, received on 1 September, informing us of the US proposals, that the US was not prepared to use the word 'self-determination' as this had become a codeword for a Palestinian state. The Americans have also indicated that it remains the US position that the PLO can have no independent status in the negotiations and that they will not have direct contact with the PLO until PLO policy towards Israel changes. But the President has personally committed himself to a serious and realistic attempt to find a new ground between the parties. I enclose a copy of the statement made by the FCO spokesman on 2 September. FCO Ministers have given interviews on similar lines.

/In addition

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In addition to making public statements, we have sent instructions to our Ambassadors in the major Arab posts, asking them to pass on our initial reaction and to argue that the Arabs should not kill this positive US initiative by rejecting it at the Arab Summit meeting planned for 6 September. Mr Pym has sent a brief and warm reply to the message from Mr Shultz and Sir John Leahy will be travelling to Washington for further discussion with the Americans on 7 September. In his message to Mr Pym, Mr Shultz suggested that Mr Hurd should include a visit to Amman in his forthcoming trip to the Middle East. We are conscious of the need not to be seen to be acting as a messenger for the Americans, and would therefore prefer an invitation to come from King Hussein. Mr Pym has told the King in a short personal message that Mr Hurd would be happy to go to Amman if the King were to find this useful. As for a public reaction from the Ten, we will be working for a positive statement from the ministerial meeting on 9 September.

The categorical Israeli rejection of the American proposal has dominated news of international reactions. The Israeli cabinet meeting on 2 September issued a formal statement detailing the points at which the US ideas deviated in their view from Camp David. Reactions in the Arab World have so far been cautious but reasonably positive. The Jordanians, whose response to the American ideas is crucial, said that they contain a number of positive elements which deserve to be studied by the Arabs. King Hussein is faced with difficult choices; he will not want to get ahead of Palestinian opinion in responding to the US, and the Jordanians have already stressed in public the need for consultations with the PLO. The Egyptians have responded positively in private, describing the President's speech as a major improvement in US policy, for which they take some of the credit. The Syrians and some of the extreme factions of the PLO have predictably rejected the proposals, although Qaddumi has described them as something to argue about. Most other Arab moderates have indicated that the proposals are a considerable improvement, although several have added that it is up to the PLO to decide whether they are acceptable. European reactions have so far been low key. The French Government have not put out an official statement but appear to have made some rather grudging comments off the record.

Mr Pym is in no doubt that this is an American initiative in earnest: the US is bracing itself for a prolonged conflict

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with the Begin Government, which will inevitably change the character of Middle East politics over the coming period.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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President Reagan's initiative offers a new opportunity to rebuild confidence between the parties in a politically realistic way. We welcome it as a constructive and imaginative step. The new US ideas represent a serious attempt to take account of the concerns of the interested parties and recognise that the future of the Palestinians is central to Middle East peace. None of the parties concerned will find them wholly to their liking, but it would be a tragedy if they were rejected out of hand.

We hope very much that real progress can now be made towards a comprehensive settlement.



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Prime Minister

*Interesting background to
the Reagan initiative.*

A. J. C. - 6/2

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2951 OF 3 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS,
TEL AVIV, PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

MY TELEGRAM NOS 2932 AND 2933: U.S. REVIEW OF MIDDLE EAST POLICY

1. VELIOTES TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF SIR J THOMSON'S CALL TODAY TO EXPRESS WARM APPRECIATION OF YOUR MESSAGE TO SHULTZ AND OF THE F C O'S PUBLIC STATEMENT YESTERDAY. HE LOOKED FORWARD TO HIS TALK WITH LEAHY NEXT WEEK. HE HAD PREDICTED TO THE PRESIDENT THAT EUROPEAN, AND IN PARTICULAR BRITISH, REACTION TO HIS SPEECH WOULD BE FAVOURABLE.

2. VELIOTES WELCOMED THE ACTION WE WERE TAKING WITH THE ARABS. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE ARAB SUMMIT SHOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE. THE AMERICANS WERE SENDING MESSAGES TO SELECTED ARAB LEADERS - FAHD, HUSSEIN, HASSAN AND BOURGUIBA, WHOSE OWN PLAN IS ON THE SUMMIT AGENDA. KEMP (NSC) TOLD US LATER THAT THE AMERICANS WERE CONFIDENT THAT HASSAN WAS ON BOARD, AS WERE THE SAUDIS WHO HAD BEEN MORE DIFFICULT TO PERSUADE. VELIOTES SAID THAT THE SAUDIS HAD VOLUNTEERED TO BRIEF THE PLO, THOUGH KEMP REPORTED THAT ARAFAT WAS APPARENTLY PUT OUT AT NOT HAVING BEEN KEPT IN THE PICTURE.

3. VELIOTES SEEMED REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT THE EGYPTIAN REACTION WOULD BE POSITIVE AND THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO DROP THEIR INSISTENCE ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR THEIR PARTICIPATION IN PEACE TALKS. THIS, AFTER ALL, WAS TANTAMOUNT TO GIVING THE ISRAELIS A VETO.

4. ON THE ORIGINS OF THE INITIATIVE, VELIOTES SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED IN MAY THAT AMERICAN POLICY COULD NO LONGER BE DICTATED BY BEGIN'S ACTIONS. THE ADMINISTRATION IN THE PAST HAD REFRAINED FROM TAKING ACTION OR MAKING STATEMENTS FOR FEAR OF THE ISRAELI RESPONSE. THIS WAS SELF-IMPOSED BLACKMAIL: THE ISRAELIS WOULD ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR OWN OBJECTIVES, FOR EXAMPLE IN EXTENDING THEIR LAW TO THE WEST BANK OR BUILDING MORE SETTLEMENTS AND WOULD NOT TAKE SUCH ACTION MERELY IN RESPONSE TO THE AMERICANS. ON THE CONTRARY, A CLEAR STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN POSITION MIGHT HAVE SOME DETERRENT EFFECT.

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/S. VELIOTES

5. VELIOTES SAID THAT HE AND SHULTZ HAD PREDICTED THAT THERE WOULD BE WIDE DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION. THIS WAS PROVING TO BE TRUE. NEVERTHELESS, IT WAS REMARKABLE THAT AT NO TIME HAD THE PRESIDENT REFERRED TO THE MID-TERM ELECTIONS. HIS ADVISERS HAD DONE SO ONCE BUT THE PRESIDENT HAD BRUSHED THEIR COMMENTS ASIDE.

6. KEMP TOLD US THAT ONE OF THE AMERICANS' STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES WAS TO DETACH BEGIN FROM THE U.S. JEWISH COMMUNITY AND FROM PUBLIC OPINION IN ISRAEL. THEY WANTED TO STIMULATE THE LONG OVERDUE DEBATE IN ISRAEL ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND ISRAEL'S RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS IN THE LONG TERM. THE WHITE HOUSE WERE MAKING A PARTICULAR EFFORT TO BRIEF JEWISH-AMERICAN LEADERS. SPIEGEL, CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR U.S./ JEWISH ORGANISATIONS, HAD BEEN SHOWN THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH IN ADVANCE AND HAD NOT DISSENTED. IN ISRAEL, PERES, DINITZ AND WEIZMAN WERE QUOTE ON BOARD UNQUOTE. VELIOTES TOLD US, HOWEVER, THAT THE JEWISH-AMERICAN LEADERS WHO SAW SHULTZ YESTERDAY HAD BEEN UNANIMOUS IN BACKING THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S POSITION (EVEN TO THE EXTENT OF QUOTING THE ISRAELI CABINET COMMUNIQUE AS AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S POSITION SHOULD BE). BUT HE DOUBTED WHETHER THIS REPRESENTED THEIR PRIVATE VIEWS. THE TROUBLE WAS THAT WHEN THEY MET BEGIN THEY ALL BECAME WEAK-KNEED.

7. STOESSEL CONFIRMED THIS GENERAL ACCOUNT WHEN I PAID MY INITIAL CALL ON HIM THIS AFTERNOON. HE HIMSELF HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN SEEKING PRESIDENT CARTER'S SUPPORT FOR THE INITIATIVE, THE TIMING OF WHICH WAS DECIDED ONLY ON 30 AUGUST. THE AMERICANS WERE NOT UPSET BY THE PREDICTABLE ISRAELI RESPONSE (WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE CABINET COMMUNIQUE WAS DRAFTED BY BEGIN HIMSELF). BUT MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON THE REACTION OF MODERATE ARABS. IF THIS WERE REASONABLE, THE ISRAELIS COLLECTIVELY COULD NOT REJECT THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE OUTRIGHT AND THE NECESSARY INTERNAL DEBATE WOULD BE STIMULATED.

8. KEMP EMPHASISED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH HAD BEEN VERY CAREFULLY DRAFTED. IT DID NOT FORECLOSE OPTIONS BUT WAS A STATEMENT OF THE CURRENT VIEWS OF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION. HE DREW ATTENTION IN PARTICULAR TO THE STATEMENT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION DID NOT (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE OR ISRAELI ANNEXATION OR CONTROL OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THIS MEANT EXACTLY WHAT IT SAID: THE AMERICANS WERE NOT SPECIFICALLY RULING OUT THESE OPTIONS AND ACCEPTED THAT IT WAS CONSISTENT WITH CAMP DAVID FOR THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS RESPECTIVELY TO ASPIRE TO THEM AS THE OUTCOME OF THE EVENTUAL NEGOTIATIONS. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, KEMP CONFIRMED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD BE MAKING THIS POINT AS NECESSARY TO THEIR ARAB CONTACTS.

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9. PUBLIC REACTIONS TO THE INITIATIVE HAVE BEEN GENERALLY FAVOURABLE. CARTER AND BRZEZINSKI HAVE EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT THOUGH MONDALE, WITH HIS SIGHTS ON THE DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION, HAS COME OUT AGAINST IT. IN AN EDITORIAL ON 3 SEPTEMBER THE WASHINGTON POSTS SAYS THAT FINALLY PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS A MID-EAST POLICY WORTHY OF THE NAME. THE NEW YORK TIMES DESCRIBES HIS FORMULA FOR NEW ARAB-ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS AS REASONABLE AND WELL-TIMED AND THE ISRAELI REJECTION AS LAMENTABLE BUT NOT UNCHANGEABLE. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL DOUBTS WHETHER KING HUSSEIN IS WILLING TO ENTER PEACE TALKS BUT CONCLUDES GRUDGINGLY THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS EARNED THE RIGHT TO SOME BACKING: IF HE CAN HELP DELIVER PEACE WITH ANOTHER OF ISRAEL'S NEIGHBOURS, THE ISRAELIS SHOULD BE THE LAST TO OBJECT.

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Middle
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Prime Minister

These telegrams report the US
middle East initiative:

- a) Some background briefing
from the State Department;
- b) an exchange of letters between
Mr Pym and Secretary Schultz;
- c) a detailed report on President
Reagan's statement.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2933 OF 2 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS,
TEL AVIV, AND PRIORITY TO PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, OTHER MIDDLE EAST
POSTS

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MIPT: US REVIEW OF MIDDLE EAST POLICY

1. EAGLEBURGER HAS TOLD US THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD MORE OR LESS REACHED THE POSITION NOW STATED BY HIM AS LONG AGO AS MAY. BUT IT WAS SHULTZ WHO GAVE THE REVIEW REAL IMPETUS. HE CONCLUDED IN INITIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH KISSINGER AND OTHERS THAT THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS IN THE FORM IN WHICH IT THEN STOOD WAS GOING NOWHERE: THAT THE MAIN ELEMENTS NEEDED TO BE SET FORTH IN A NEW WAY: AND THAT THIS MUST BE DONE BY THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF. WE WERE TOLD THAT SHULTZ WARNED THE PRESIDENT THAT THE PROPOSED STATEMENT WOULD PRODUCE SHARP ISRAELI REACTIONS: THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO FACE THESE.

2. AS VELIOTES SAID, THERE IS LITTLE THAT IS NEW IN SUBSTANCE. BUT THE CARRYING FORWARD OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS IS PUT MUCH MORE FIRMLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, WHICH WILL PRESUMABLY BE WELCOME TO THE JORDANIANS. AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE US PURPOSE IS TO TRY TO AVOID CONTINUING ISOLATION OF THE EGYPTIANS BY BRINGING THE JORDANIANS INTO THE PEACE PROCESS, THOUGH IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THEY WILL SUCCEED IN THIS. THE SUGGESTION THAT THE LOCATION OF ISRAEL/JORDAN BORDER MIGHT DEPEND ON DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IS NEW, THOUGH QUANDT (EX-NSC) HAS TOLD US THAT IT IS ONE OF THE IDEAS CONSIDERED BY THE LAST ADMINISTRATION.

3. THE AMERICANS SEE THIS INITIATIVE AS BEING A LONG HAUL, RATHER THAN A BLUEPRINT FOR EARLY IMPLEMENTATION. THEY DO NOT AS YET HAVE FIRM PLANS FOR CARRYING MATTERS FORWARD. THEIR IMMEDIATE TASK WILL BE TO ABSORB THE ISRAELI REACTIONS AND TO TRY TO WIN THE SUPPORT, OR AT LEAST ACQUIESCENCE, OF THE JEWISH AMERICAN COMMUNITY, WHOSE INITIAL REACTIONS HAVE BEEN CAUTIOUS. PRESIDENT CARTER'S CONFIRMATION TODAY THAT REAGAN'S STATEMENT IS CONSISTENT WITH HIS OWN INTERPRETATION OF CAMP DAVID SHOULD BE HELPFUL IN THIS CONTEXT.

4. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE BEEN WORRIED LEST THE ISRAELIS RESPONDED TO REAGAN'S STATEMENT WITH SOME ACT OF DEFIANCE, SUCH AS THE EXTENSION OF ISRAELI LAW TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MORE SETTLEMENTS. WEINBERGER, WHO WAS CONSULTED IN ADVANCE, HAS - WE ARE TOLD - BEEN SENT A MESSAGE ON THE PRESIDENT'S BEHALF ASKING HIM NOT TO GET DRAWN INTO DISCUSSION OF THE INITIATIVE WHILE HE IS IN ISRAEL. THE AMERICANS WILL HAVE BEEN

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RELIEVED THAT THE ISRAELI'S CABINET STATEMENT TODAY INCLUDED AT LEAST AN EXPRESSION OF WILLINGNESS TO RESUME THE AUTONOMY TALKS.

5. REAGAN'S MESSAGE TO BEGIN EARLIER THIS WEEK WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A SPEAKING NOTE COVERING AMERICAN VIEWS ON SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED: IT IS THESE WHICH THE ISRAELIS CONSIDER TO BE AT VARIANCE WITH CAMP DAVID. THE AMERICANS STATED INTER ALIA THAT THE ARAB INHABITANTS OF EAST JERUSALEM SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN AUTONOMY, THAT THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD ASSUME PROGRESSIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNAL SECURITY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, DEPENDING ON THEIR PERFORMANCE, AND THAT THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY SHOULD HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAND AND RESOURCES (IE QUOTE TERRITORIAL UNQUOTE AUTONOMY RATHER THAN AUTHONOMY QUOTE OF THE PEOPLE UNQUOTE). THE AMERICANS ALSO FAVOURED THE RIGHT OF JEWS TO LIVE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES PROVIDED THAT THEY DID NOT DO SO ON ANY BASIS OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY. (THIS WILL PLEASE AMERICAN JEWS, IF NOT THE ISRAELIS). THE AMERICANS MADE NO MENTION OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS OR A PEACE WITH SYRIA (WHICH, OF COURSE, FALLS OUTSIDE CAMP DAVID).

6. A GREAT DEAL WILL NOW DEPEND ON THE ARAB REACTIONS - IN PARTICULAR WHETHER MUBARAK WILL ABANDON HIS INSISTENCE THAT THE ISRAELIS MUST LEAVE LEBANON BEFORE HE TAKES PART IN FURTHER PEACE TALKS: AND WHETHER THE JORDANIANS WILL STEEL THEMSELVES TO PARTICIPATE. IF THE ARABS RESPONDED POSITIVELY, THE AMERICANS WILL BE BOUND TO SEEK TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY WITH THE ISRAELIS ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT: IF THE ARABS DO NOT, THE ISRAELIS WILL BE ABLE TO EXTRICATE THEMSELVES FROM THIS DIFFICULTY. THE ISRAELI EMBASSY HERE ARE MAKING NO SECRET OF THEIR HOPE THAT THE ARABS, BY SEEKING TO LAY DOWN ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS, WILL ENABLE THEM TO DO THIS.

7. EAGLEBURGER HAS TOLD US THAT THE SAUDIS SEEM DISPOSED NOT TO PRESS THE FAHD PLAN AT THE ARAB SUMMIT. THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THE EGYPTIANS WILL REFRAIN, FOR THE PRESENT, FROM PRESSING THE FRANCO-EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE, BUT ARE LESS CERTAIN ABOUT THE FRENCH ATTITUDE. IT WAS NO DOUBT WITH AN EYE ON THE FRENCH THE EAGLEBURGER STRESSED, AT THIS MORNING'S BRIEFING, THE NEED TO AVOID GIVING THE

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ARABS THE SLIGHTEST ENCOURAGEMENT TO HOLD OUT FOR SOME ADDITIONAL
MOVEMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES. THE AMERICANS HAVE NO INTENTION OF
BEING PUSHED BY EITHER SIDE OFF THE POSITION STAKED OUT BY THE
PRESIDENT YESTERDAY. THEY HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES
OF FOLLOWING THROUGH AND ACHIEVING PROGRESS TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION.
BUT SHULTZ HAS ACHIEVED A MAJOR SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING A FAR MORE
COHERENT APPROACH THAN HAS BEEN EVIDENT SINCE THE BEGINNING OF
THIS ADMINISTRATION.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2920 OF 2 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV,
PRIORITY MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, BONN, ROME, ABU DHABI,
ADEN, ALGIERS, BAGHDAD, BAHRAIN, DOHA, DUBAI, JEDDA,
JERUSALEM, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, MUSCAT, RABAT, SANA'A, TRIPOLI,
TUNIS.
INFO SAVING OTHER EC POSTS

U S REVIEW OF MIDDLE EAST POLICY.

SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT REAGAN MADE A STATEMENT ON TELEVISION ON 1 SEPTEMBER ON U S MIDDLE EAST POLICY (FULL TEXT BY BAG). THE PLO EVACUATION FROM BEIRUT CREATED A NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR A MORE FAR-REACHING PEACE EFFORT. CAMP DAVID REMAINED THE FOUNDATION OF AMERICAN POLICY. AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY WAS IRON-CLAD BUT THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE WAS MORE THAN THAT OF REFUGEES. BROADER PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS WAS NECESSARY.
2. A CLEARER STATEMENT OF THE U S POSITION WAS NEEDED TO ENSURE THIS. THE PURPOSE OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD PROVIDED IN CAMP DAVID WAS THE PEACEFUL TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY FROM ISRAEL TO THE PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WITHOUT INTERFERING WITH ISRAEL'S SECURITY REQUIRMENTS. AN IMMEDIATE SETTLEMENT FREEZE BY ISRAEL WOULD DO MORE THAN ANYTHING TO CREATE CONFIDENCE. THE U S DID NOT SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA NOR ANNEXATION OR FULL CONTROL OF THOSE TERRITORIES BY ISRAEL. SELF-GOVERNMENT BY THEIR PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS IN ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN OFFERED THE BEST CHANCE FOR A DURABLE, JUST AND LASTING PEACE. SCR 242 WAS WHOLLY VALID AS THE FOUNDATION-STONE OF U S POLICY. JERUSALEM MUST REMAIN UNDIVIDED AND ITS FINAL STATUS BE DECIDED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. THE PRESIDENT HOPED THAT JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS WOULD SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO JOIN THE PEACE PROCESS.

DETAILS

3. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE PLO EVACUATION FROM BEIRUT HAD BEEN COMPLETED THANKS TO THE EFFORTS OF HABIB AND THE U S MARINES CONTINGENT, WHO SHOULD BE OUT OF LEBANON WITHIN TWO WEEKS. AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT WAS NEEDED TO HELP THE LEBANESE REBUILD THEIR COUNTRY. A STABLE AND REVIVED LEBANON WAS ESSENTIAL TO U S HOPES FOR PEACE IN THE REGION. THERE WAS NOW AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A MORE FAR-REACHING PEACE EFFORT.

/ H. AMERICAN

4. AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE PEACE PROCESS WAS NOT A MATTER OF PREFERENCE BUT OF MORAL IMPERATIVE. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE REGION WAS WELL-KNOWN, BUT U S POLICY WAS MOTIVATED BY THEIR IRREVERSIBLE COMMITMENT TO THE SURVIVAL AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF FRIENDLY STATES: THE WORLD ECONOMY WAS TIED TO STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND TRADITIONAL HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS DICTATED A CONTINUING EFFORT TO RESOLVE CONFLICT IN THE REGION.

5. THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED IN JANUARY 1981 TO FOLLOW THE BROAD OUTLINES OF HIS PREDECESSOR'S POLICY. HE HAD STRENGTHENED EFFORTS TO DETER THE RUSSIANS AND THEIR SURROGATES FROM FURTHER EXPANSION IN THE REGION. THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK REMAINED THE FOUNDATION OF U S POLICY. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EGYPT-ISRAEL PEACE TREATY HAD BEEN THE FIRST STEP BUT HE HAD NEVER LOST SIGHT OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS.

6. CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN DEVELOPING AN AMERICAN APPROACH WHICH WAS TO HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL AFTER APRIL 1982. THE LEBANESE CONFLICT HAD PRE-EMPTED THIS. OVER THE PAST TWO WEEKS THE GROUNDWORK HAD BEEN LAID, THROUGH MISSIONS TO MIDDLE EAST CAPITALS AND EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH FORMER U S OFFICIALS, MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND INDIVIDUALS, FOR A RENEWED PEACE EFFORT. THE U S HAD TO MOVE TO RESOLVE THE ROOT CAUSES OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS: THE QUESTION NOW WAS HOW TO RECONCILE ISRAEL'S LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS WITH THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS.

7. THE PRESIDENT CALLED FOR A FRESH START: ALL PARTIES SHOULD RECOGNISE THAT THE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL AND THAT TRUE PEACE REQUIRED COMPROMISES. THE LANGUAGE OF CAMP DAVID PROVIDED ALL PARTIES WITH THE LEEWAY THEY NEEDED FOR SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS. THE U S HAD A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY AS NO OTHER NATION WAS IN A POSITION TO DEAL WITH THE KEY PARTIES ON A BASIS OF TRUST AND RELIABILITY.

8. ISRAEL HAD A RIGHT TO EXIST BEHIND SECURE AND DEFENSIBLE BORDERS AND TO DEMAND THAT ITS NEIGHBOURS RECOGNISED THAT RIGHT. ISRAEL SHOULD NOT BE ASKED TO LIVE AGAIN AS BEFORE 1967 WITH MUCH OF ITS POPULATION IN RANGE OF HOSTILE ARTILLERY. HE AGREED THAT THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE WAS MORE THAN THAT OF REFUGEES. CAMP DAVID SPOKE OF QUOTE THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR JUST REQUIREMENTS UNQUOTE. ONLY THROUGH BROADER PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS, ESPECIALLY BY JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS, WOULD ISRAEL BE ABLE TO REST CONFIDENT THAT ITS SECURITY AND INTEGRITY WERE RESPECTED BY ITS NEIGHBOURS.

9. THE U S HAD SO FAR PLAYED THE ROLE OF MEDIATOR AND AVOIDED PUBLIC COMMENT ON THE KEY ISSUES. BUT A CLEARER SENSE OF THE U S POSITION WAS NOW NEEDED TO ENSURE WIDER SUPPORT FOR THE PEACE PROCESS.

FIRSTLY THERE MUST BE A PERIOD DURING WHICH THE PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WOULD HAVE FULL AUTONOMY OVER THEIR OWN AFFAIRS, DUE CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT AND TO THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS OF THE PARTIES. THE FIVE-YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, WHICH WOULD BEGIN AFTER FREE ELECTIONS TO A SELF-GOVERNING PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY, WOULD PROVE TO PALESTINIANS THAT THEY COULD RUN THEIR OWN AFFAIRS AND THAT SUCH PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY POSED NO THREAT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY.

10. THE US WOULD NOT SUPPORT THE USE OF ANY ADDITIONAL LAND FOR SETTLEMENTS DURING THIS PERIOD. AN IMMEDIATE SETTLEMENT FREEZE BY ISRAEL WOULD DO MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE TO CREATE THE CONFIDENCE NEEDED FOR WIDER PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS. THE PURPOSE OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD WAS THE ORDERLY AND PEACEFUL TRANSITION OF AUTHORITY FROM ISRAEL TO THE PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. SUCH A TRANSFER MUST NOT INTERFERE WITH ISRAEL'S SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

11. BEYOND THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD THE US WOULD NOT SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, NOR THEIR ANNEXATION OR PERMANENT CONTROL BY ISRAEL. IT WAS THE FIRM AMERICAN VIEW THAT SELF-GOVERNMENT BY THE PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IN ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN OFFERED THE BEST CHANCE FOR A DURABLE, JUST AND LASTING PEACE. THE CONFLICT SHOULD BE RESOLVED ON THE BASIS OF NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING THE EXCHANGE OF TERRITORY FOR PEACE, ENSHRINED IN SCR 242 AND INCORPORATED IN CAMP DAVID. SCR 242 REMAINED WHOLLY VALID AS THE FOUNDATION-STONE OF US PEACE EFFORTS. ITS WITHDRAWAL PROVISION APPLIED TO ALL FRONTS INCLUDING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA (THE PRESIDENT DID NOT MENTION THE GOLAN HEIGHTS). WHEN THE BORDER WAS NEGOTIATED BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL, THE US VIEW ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH ISRAEL SHOULD BE ASKED TO GIVE UP TERRITORY WOULD BE HEAVILY AFFECTED BY THE EXTENT OF TRUE PEACE AND NORMALISATION AND BY THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS OFFERED IN RETURN.

12. JERUSALEM MUST REMAIN UNDIVIDED BUT ITS FINAL STATUS SHOULD BE DECIDED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

13. THE US WOULD SUPPORT FAIR AND REASONABLE COMPROMISES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND PUT FORWARD ITS OWN PROPOSALS WHERE IT THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL. IT WOULD OPPOSE ANY PROPOSAL WHICH THREATENED THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL. AMERICA'S COMMITMENT TO THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL WAS IRON-CLAD, AS WAS THE PRESIDENT'S.

14. US AMBASSADORS IN EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA HAD PRESENTED THESE PROPOSALS IN FULL DETAIL TO THEIR HOST GOVERNMENTS. THE PROPOSALS WERE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH ISRAEL'S SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PALESTINIANS. THE US WOULD WORK HARD TO BROADEN PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CAMP DAVID: THE PRESIDENT FERVENTLY HOPED THAT JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS WITH THE SUPPORT OF THEIR ARAB COLLEAGUES WOULD ACCEPT THIS OPPORTUNITY.

FCO PASS SAVING TO ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE AND UKREP BRUSSELS.

THOMAS

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1612 OF 2 SEPT

INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 2910: US REVIEW OF MIDDLE EAST POLICY

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO SHULTZ, IN
REPLY TO HIS OF 1 SEPTEMBER.

BEGINS:

I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR YOUR FULL AND CLEAR MESSAGE.

I HAVE READ IT AND THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH WITH GREAT CARE.

I BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS TAKEN

A COURAGEOUS STEP, WHICH CREATES A NEW OPPORTUNITY

TO REBUILD CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND TO MAKE REAL
PROGRESS TOWARDS MIDDLE EAST PEACE. YOUR EMBASSY WILL HAVE

REPORTED OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS HERE TODAY WHICH WELCOME THE
PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE AS A CONSTRUCTIVE AND IMAGINATIVE STEP

AND CALL UPON THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO RESPOND TO IT SERIOUSLY
AND POSITIVELY.

OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS WE SHALL BE HAVING DISCUSSIONS WITH OUR
EUROPEAN PARTNERS ABOUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AND WE SHALL BE ENCOURAGING AS FORTHCOMING A REACTION AS
POSSIBLE FROM THEM TO THESE PROPOSALS.

THERE ARE POINTS IN THE PROPOSALS AND IN YOUR MESSAGE ON WHICH
IT WOULD BE MOST USEFUL TO HAVE FURTHER CLARIFICATION. I WOULD
WELCOME EARLY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS AND I AM
ASKING SIR JOHN LEAHY TO GO TO WASHINGTON EARLY NEXT WEEK FOR A
GOOD TALK WITH NICHOLAS VELIOTES. I WOULD RATHER NOT COME TO A

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FINAL DECISION ABOUT A VISIT TO AMMAN BY DOUGLAS HURD UNTIL WE HAVE STUDIED SOME OF THE REACTIONS FROM THE PARTIES. BUT I AM SENDING A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN TODAY AND IF HE INDICATES THAT HE WOULD LIKE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS I AM SURE IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE A VISIT. THE JORDAN FACTOR IS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE. KING HUSSEIN, FOR ALL HIS COURAGE, KNOWS THE LIMITS OF WHAT IS POLITICALLY POSSIBLE FOR HIM. I BELIEVE THAT, BEFORE HE TAKES ANY DECISION, HE WILL WISH TO BE SURE THAT THERE IS PALESTINIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE IDEA THAT JORDAN SHOULD TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE TERRITORIES FROM WHICH ISRAEL WITHDRAWS.

I HAVE ASKED OUR AMBASSADORS IN THE MAJOR MIDDLE EAST POSTS TO PASS ON OUR FIRST POSITIVE REACTIONS TO THE US PROPOSALS AND TO ARGUE FOR SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF WHAT IS NOW ON OFFER. I HOPE JOHN LEAHY WILL BE IN A POSITION TO REPORT ON THE RESPONSE WE RECEIVE.
ENDS.

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FROM FCO 021615 SEPTEMBER 82

TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 208 OF 2 SEPT

AND TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, JEDDA, TUNIS, RABAT, TEL AVIV.

INFO IMMEDIATE OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, PARIS, BONN, ROME, COPENHAGEN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW. INFO ROUTINE DUBLIN, BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, ATHENS, LUXEMBOURG AND THE HAGUE WASHINGTON TELNO 2920 : US REVIEW OF MIDDLE EAST POLICY

1. NEWS DEPARTMENT MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON THE RECORD IN RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT ON 1 SEPTEMBER: BEGINS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE OFFERS A NEW OPPORTUNITY TO REBUILD CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN A POLITICALLY REALISTIC WAY. WE WELCOME IT AS A CONSTRUCTIVE AND IMAGINATIVE STEP. THE NEW US IDEAS REPRESENT A SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE CONCERNS OF THE INTERESTED PARTIES AND RECOGNISE THAT THE FUTURE OF THE PALESTINIANS IS CENTRAL TO MIDDLE EAST PEACE. NONE OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED WILL FIND THEM WHOLLY TO THEIR LIKING BUT IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY IF THEY WERE REJECTED OUT OF HAND. WE HOPE VERY MUCH THAT REAL PROGRESS CAN NOW BE MADE TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. ENDS.

2. THIS RESPONSE WAS CAREFULLY JUDGED AND YOU SHOULD STICK CLOSELY TO IT IN ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS. ALTHOUGH THE NEW AMERICAN POLICY IS NOT FULLY CONSISTENT WITH VENICE, IT MARKS A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD BY THE AMERICANS OF A KIND WE HAVE BEEN URGING ON THEM FOR A LONG TIME. WE WISH TO ENCOURAGE IT WITHOUT SEEMING TO ABANDON VENICE, AND PARTICULARLY OUR COMMITMENT TO PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION.

3. YOU SHOULD SEEK AN APPOINTMENT AT A HIGH LEVEL WITH YOUR HOST GOVERNMENT, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE BEFORE DELEGATIONS LEAVE FOR THE ARAB SUMMIT IN MOROCCO (IF THIS IS HELD). YOU SHOULD HAND

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OVER THE TEXT OF OUR STATEMENT AND MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

I) WE RECOGNISE THAT THE NEW US POLICY DOES NOT MEET ALL ARAB REQUIREMENTS: NOR IS IT FULLY CONSISTENT WITH EUROPEAN POLICY. BUT IT MARKS AMERICAN DETERMINATION TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, AND CONTAINS MANY POINTS WHICH SHOULD BE WELCOME TO THE ARABS.

II) BOTH THE ARABS AND THE EUROPEANS HAVE FREQUENTLY SAID THAT THE US HAVE A KEY ROLE IN PROMOTING A SETTLEMENT. THE US HAVE NOW FACED UP TO THESE RESPONSIBILITIES AND HAVE NERVED THEMSELVES FOR A MAJOR ROW WITH THE ISRAELIS. IT IS AN OPPORTUNITY WHICH IS MOST UNLIKELY TO BE IMPROVED UPON, OR EVEN REPEATED.

III) IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT THE US INITIATIVE SHOULD NOT BE KILLED AT BIRTH BY A NEGATIVE REACTION FROM THE ARABS. IF APPROPRIATE YOU COULD POINT TO THE HOSTILE ISRAELI REACTION AND DRAW ATTENTION TO THE OPPORTUNITIES THIS CREATES FOR A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ARAB RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AMERICANS.

IV) WE VERY MUCH HOPE THAT THE ARAB SUMMIT IF IT MEETS WILL BE ABLE TO SAY THAT THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS ARE INTERESTING AND DESERVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION, EVEN THOUGH THEY DO NOT GO FAR ENOUGH.

4. IF YOU ARE ASKED WHETHER WE WERE CONSULTED IN ADVANCE, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE HAVE BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE AMERICANS THROUGHOUT THE SUMMER AND THAT THEY WERE VERY MUCH AWARE OF OUR THINKING ON THE NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. BUT WE WERE NOT GIVEN ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE DETAILS OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT.

5. FOR AMMAN: YOU SHOULD SEEK A MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN TO PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME:

BEGINS: MR SINDALL WILL BE GIVING YOU THE TEXT OF OUR PUBLIC REACTION TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT. BUT I WANTED TO LET YOU KNOW PERSONALLY THAT I AM GREATLY ENCOURAGED BY THIS EVIDENCE OF US COMMITMENT TO A POLICY WHICH FACES UP TO ISRAELI INFLEXIBILITY. YOU WILL NOT HAVE MISSED THE ISRAELI REASON FOR REJECTING THE PROPOSALS, THAT THEY BELIEVE THEY WILL LEAD TO A PALESTINIAN STATE. I RECOGNISE THAT NOT EVERYTHING IN THE US APPROACH IS CONSISTENT WITH YOUR THINKING: NOR IS IT WITH OURS. BUT THERE

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IS MUCH THAT IS POSITIVE, INCLUDING A GENUINE ATTEMPT TO TACKLE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE DIRECTLY AND THE REAFFIRMATION OF US SUPPORT FOR RESOLUTION 242 AND THE PRINCIPLE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WHICH I KNOW IS SOMETHING YOU HAVE LONG SOUGHT. IT SEEMS TO ME VITAL THAT WE SHOULD ALL LOOK FOR WHAT IS POSITIVE AND TRY TO BUILD ON THAT RATHER THAN REJECT THE INITIATIVE BECAUSE IT DOES NOT MATCH ALL OUR REQUIREMENTS. THE US APPROACH GIVES JORDAN A KEY ROLE IN THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, ALTHOUGH IT LEAVES THE DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT IN SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS. YOU WILL CLEARLY WISH TO WEIGH ALL THIS VERY CAREFULLY. BUT I BELIEVE IT MAY OFFER A REALISTIC PROSPECT OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A PALESTINIAN SETTLEMENT, IN PLACE OF THE DEADLOCK OF THE LAST THREE YEARS. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT THE INITIAL REACTIONS FROM THE ARAB SIDE AND ESPECIALLY FROM THE PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES, WILL ENCOURAGE THE AMERICANS TO DEVELOP THEIR INITIATIVE. IF YOU THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL, I WOULD GLADLY ASK DOUGLAS HURD TO COME TO AMMAN TO DISCUSS ALL THIS WITH YOU WHILE HE IS IN THE REGION NEXT WEEK. I LOOK FORWARD TO MY OWN VISIT IN NOVEMBER. ENDS.

6. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 2910 (NOT TO ALL) THAT MR SHULTZ SUGGESTED THAT MR HURD SHOULD INCLUDE AMMAN IN HIS MIDDLE EAST ITINERARY. WE DO NOT WISH TO APPEAR TO BE ACTING AS A MESSENGER FOR THE AMERICANS, AND WE WOULD THEREFORE PREFER THE INITIATIVE TO COME FROM THE JORDANIAN SIDE. IF THE KING RESPONDS FAVOURABLY WE SHALL BE IN TOUCH SEPARATELY ON PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

7. FOR CAIRO: IN PASSING ON OUR COMMENTS IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT MR HURD IS LOOKING FORWARD TO DISCUSSING ALL THIS AND THE EGYPTIAN ROLE IN THE NEW ROUND OF PEACE EFFORTS DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT.

8. FOR TEL AVIV: YOU SHOULD TELL THE MFA THAT WE WERE DISAPPOINTED BY ISRAEL'S INITIAL REJECTION OF THE US IDEAS: THAT THIS IS IN OUR VIEW A SERIOUS AMERICAN EFFORT TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPREHENSIVE PEACE: AND THAT AS SUCH IT DESERVES CAREFUL CONSIDERATION FROM ALL PARTIES. WE HOPE THAT ON REFLECTION THE ISRAELIS WILL CONCLUDE THAT IT IS BETTER TO WORK TO MAKE PROGRESS

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DESPITE WHAT THEY SEE AS THE DEFECTS RATHER THAN REJECT THE US PACKAGE OUT OF HAND.

9. INFO ADDRESSEES MAY EXPLAIN OUR THINKING TO HOST GOVERNMENTS ON THE LINES OF PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE AT THEIR DISCRETION.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2910 OF 1 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO TEL AVIV AMMAN UKMIS NEW YORK
(PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS)

MY TELNO 2784: U.S. REVIEW OF MIDDLE EAST POLICY

1. THE PRESIDENT WILL BE MAKING A STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST ON TELEVISION THIS EVENING. EAGLEBURGER HAS GIVEN, ME THE FOLLOWING ADVANCE TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM SHULTZ TO YOU WHICH THE US EMBASSY ARE BEING INSTRUCTED TO DELIVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE:

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

AS YOU MAY BE AWARE, THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN A MAJOR REVIEW OF OUR MIDDLE EAST POLICY OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS. WE HAD BEEN PLANNING A SIGNIFICANT EFFORT ON THE PEACE PROCESS BEFORE THE LEBANON WAR INTERVENED. THAT CONFLICT ONLY ACCENTUATED THE URGENT NEED TO PRESS FORWARD. IN THE COURSE OF OUR POLICY REVIEW, WE TOOK INTO CAREFUL CONSIDERATION THE VIEWS WHICH HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED BY HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT OVER THE PAST MONTHS ON THE PEACE PROCESS. WE VALUE YOUR GOVERNMENT'S COUNSEL AND THE DEPTH OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S LONG EXPERIENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. OUR REVIEW IS NOW COMPLETED AND THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED ME TO SHARE WITH YOU OUR CONCLUSIONS, MANY OF WHICH HE WILL BE ANNOUNCING IN A MAJOR STATEMENT THIS EVENING.

THE LEBANON CONFLICT WAS A KEY FACTOR IN OUR DELIBERATIONS, BOTH BECAUSE IT STRESSED THE URGENCY OF MOVING FORWARD, AND BECAUSE IT FOCUSED THE WORLD'S ATTENTION ON THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF THE PEACE PROCESS -- THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. IN ADDITION, THE DEPARTURE OF THE LAST PLO FIGHTERS FROM WEST BEIRUT IS RENEWED TESTIMONY TO THE FACT THAT DIPLOMACY CAN SUCCEED IN REACHING SOLUTIONS TO HIGHLY COMPLEX DISPUTES IN THIS AREA. MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE IN LEBANON AND WE MUST CONTINUE AND INTENSIFY THE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION NECESSARY TO REBUILD LEBANON AND RESTORE ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. BUT WE MUST NOT ALLOW THE PROBLEMS OF LEBANON TO DEFLECT US FROM SEEKING A RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM.

THE PRESIDENT HAS ESTABLISHED AS HIS FIRM OBJECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD A JUST, HONORABLE AND DURABLE PEACE WHICH RESOLVE THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ALL ITS ASPECTS AND PROVIDE FOR THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. IT IS ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF GENUINE PEACE THAT THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL, JORDAN AND THE OTHER STATES IN THE AREA CAN BE ASSURED. THE POLICY THE PRESIDENT

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OUTLINES THIS EVENING WILL GUIDE OUR COURSE TOWARD THOSE OBJECTIVES IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS TO COME. HE BELIEVES THAT AMERICA, IN PARTNERSHIP WITH ITS ALLIES, THE MODERATE ARAB STATES, AND ISRAEL HAS A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY AT THIS MOMENT TO FURTHER THE CAUSE OF PEACE IN THIS REGION WHILE AT THE SAME TIME PROMOTING THE NATIONAL INTEREST OF OURSELVES AND OUR ALLIES.

THE PRESIDENT AND I HAVE GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT IN THE PAST WEEKS ABOUT HOW THE U.S. CAN BEST PLAY ITS ROLE IN THIS PROCESS, AND WHAT NEW INITIATIVES WE MIGHT UNDERTAKE. WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT WE MUST MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO EXPAND THE NEGOTIATIONS BY INVOLVING JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS. THEIR INVOLVEMENT WILL CLEARLY HAVE TO BE BASED ON A SUPPORTIVE MODERATE ARAB CONSENSUS IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN OUR EFFORTS. MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, WE HAVE ALSO CONCLUDED THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN NO LONGER REMAIN SILENT ON THE CRITICAL ISSUES INVOLVED IF WE ARE TO RESTORE CREDIBILITY TO THE PEACE PROCESS, WHILE DEVELOPING UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT AT HOME AND ABROAD. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED TODAY TO LAY HIS THOUGHTS BEFORE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE WORLD.

AS THE PRESIDENT COMMITS THE UNITED STATES TO A FRESH START ON THE ROAD TO PEACE, WITH ALL OF THE PROBLEMS AS WELL AS PROMISE THIS WILL ENTAIL, IT IS IMPORTANT THE U.S. STAND FIRMLY ON THE COMMITMENTS IT HAS ALREADY MADE. THEREFORE, WE WILL MAINTAIN OUR ALLEGIANCE TO CAMP DAVID, AS WELL AS REMAIN FIRM ON THE CONDITIONS WE REQUIRE FOR RECOGNITION OF AND NEGOTIATION WITH THE PLO. THE PRESIDENT IS AWARE OF THE DOUBTS EXPRESSED BY HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE PAST ABOUT THE CONTINUING VALIDITY OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. NEVERTHELESS, HE FEELS STRONGLY THAT THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT IS RICH IN ITS LANGUAGE AND THAT IT CAN ACCOMMODATE THE ASPIRATIONS OF ISRAEL FOR PEACE AND OF THE PALESTINIANS FOR IDENTITY. THROUGH A FIRM U.S. STAND BEHIND ITS OWN INTERPRETATIONS AND ITS POSITIONS, WE CAN GIVE THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT NEW MEANING AND A NEW DYNAMIC.

AMERICA'S COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY REMAINS THE FOUNDATION OF OUR PEACE POLICY. REAL, DURABLE PEACE, HOWEVER, CANNOT BE ACHIEVED UNLESS THERE IS A JUST, HONORABLE AND EQUITABLE SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. IT IS OUR POSITION THAT SUCH A SOLUTION MUST REST FIRMLY ON RESOLUTION 242, WHICH IN OUR VIEW REQUIRES ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN RETURN FOR PEACE, AND APPLIES TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AS WELL AS THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. NEGOTIATIONS MUST DETERMINE THE BORDERS, BUT OUR POSITION IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE EXTENT OF WITHDRAWAL WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCED BY THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BEING OFFERED IN RETURN.

IT IS OUR STRONG BELIEF THAT THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM CANNOT BE RESOLVED THROUGH ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY OR CONTROL OVER THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. ACCORDINGLY, WE WILL NOT SUPPORT SUCH A SOLUTION.

NEITHER CAN IT BE RESOLVED, HOWEVER, THROUGH THE CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THERE IS NO FOUNDATION OF POLITICAL SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES FOR SUCH A SOLUTION, AND ISRAEL IS ADAMANTLY OPPOSED. WE WILL NOT SUPPORT THE CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE.

THE TERM "SELF-DETERMINATION" HAS, IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONTEXT, BECOME A CODEWORD FOR THE FORMATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE. WE WILL NOT SUPPORT THIS EXCLUSIVE DEFINITION OF SELF-DETERMINATION. NEVERTHELESS, THE PRESIDENT IS TOTALLY COMMITTED TO THE PROPOSITION THAT THE PALESTINIANS MUST TAKE A LEADING ROLE IN DETERMINING THEIR OWN FUTURE. HE ALSO FULLY SUPPORTS THE PROVISION IN THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA TO DECIDE HOW THEY SHALL GOVERN THEMSELVES, CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THEIR AGREEMENT IN THE FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS. OBVIOUSLY, THE PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES ARE KEY TO OUR EFFORT.

THE PREFERENCE WE INTEND TO PURSUE IN THE FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS IS ASSOCIATION OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WITH JORDAN. WE BELIEVE SUCH A RESULT WOULD PROVIDE JUSTICE FOR THE PALESTINIANS IN THE CONTEXT OF ASSURED SECURITY FOR ISRAEL AND JORDAN. ABOVE ALL, IT IS A REALISTIC AND FAIR SOLUTION.

REGARDING THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS, THEIR ULTIMATE FUTURE MUST BE DETERMINED IN THE COURSE OF THE FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS. WE WILL NOT SUPPORT THEIR CONTINUATION AS EXTRATERRITORIAL OUTPOSTS, BUT NEITHER WILL WE SUPPORT EFFORTS TO DENY JEWS THE OPPORTUNITY TO LIVE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA UNDER THE DULY CONSTITUTED GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY THERE, AS ARABS LIVE IN ISRAEL.

AS WE HAVE INFORMED THE PARTIES, OUR POSITION ON JERUSALEM HAS BEEN STATED MANY TIMES IN THE PAST AND WAS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT IN THE FORM OF A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CARTER. WE WILL FULLY SUPPORT THE POSITION THAT THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM MUST BE DETERMINED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

THESE ARE ALL POSITIONS ON FINAL STATUS ISSUES WHICH WE ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT IN THE FINAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND WHICH, IN OUR VIEW, ARE REALISTIC, ATTAINABLE AND JUST. BUT TO REACH SUCH A RESOLUTION, A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IS NECESSARY. OUR POSITION IS THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IS THE PEACEFUL AND ORDERLY TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY FROM ISRAEL TO THE PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS. IN THIS REGARD, WE WILL SUPPORT:

--THE DEFINITION OF FULL AUTONOMY AS GIVING THE PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS REAL AUTHORITY OVER THEMSELVES, THE LAND, AND ITS RESOURCES, SUBJECT TO FAIR SAFEGUARDS ON WATER.

--ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL TIES BETWEEN THE WEST BANK, GAZA AND JORDAN.

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--PARTICIPATION BY THE PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS OF EAST JERUSALEM IN THE ELECTION FOR THE WEST BANK/GAZA AUTHORITY.

-- A REAL SETTLEMENTS FREEZE.

--PROGRESSIVE PALESTINIAN RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNAL SECURITY BASED ON CAPABILITY AND PERFORMANCE. WE WILL OPPOSE:

-- DISMANTLEMENT OF THE EXISTING SETTLEMENTS.

--PROVISIONS WHICH REPRESENT A LEGITIMATE THREAT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY, REASONABLY DEFINED.

--ISOLATION OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA FROM ISRAEL.

--MEASURES WHICH ACCORD EITHER THE PALESTINIANS OR THE ISRAELIS GENERALLY RECOGNIZED SOVEREIGN RIGHTS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF EXTERNAL SECURITY WHICH MUST REMAIN IN ISRAEL'S HANDS DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

WE HAVE DISCUSSED EACH OF THE ABOVE POSITIONS IN DETAIL WITH KING HUSSEIN. HE HAS EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT THIS IS A SERIOUS PROPOSAL WHICH HE IS GIVING SERIOUS ATTENTION. WE HAVE ALSO OUTLINED OUR POSITIONS IN ISRAEL, EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA AND IN OTHER CONCERNED CAPITALS. IN THIS CONNECTION, I UNDERSTAND THAT DOUGLAS HURD WILL BE TRAVELLING IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO THE MIDDLE EAST. I WOULD HOPE THAT HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WOULD SUPPORT US IN THE EFFORT WE ARE UNDERTAKING. I ALSO WOULD HOPE THAT MR. HURD'S SCHEDULE WOULD PERMIT A STOP IN AMMAN FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN, DURING A TIME WHICH COULD BE CRITICAL TO OUR EFFORTS. AS WE PROCEED, IT IS VITAL THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS, AND YOU AND I, STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH. I WILL WELCOME FURTHER PERSONAL DISCUSSION OF THESE INITIATIVES BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER MR. HURD'S TRIP.

THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES AND ACCEPTS ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO SEIZE THIS HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY: THE PRESIDENT WANTS YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER TO KNOW THAT HE IS PERSONALLY COMMITTED TO THE COURSE UPON WHICH HE IS NOW EMBARKED. HE INTENDS TO STAND BY THE POSITIONS I HAVE DESCRIBED, WHATEVER THE REACTION FROM ANY QUARTER. HE WILL BE PROCEEDING WITH BOLDNESS AND DETERMINATION, RECOGNIZING THE RISKS, SO THAT WE MAY SUCCEED IN RESURRECTING THE SPIRIT OF PEACE AND HOPE FOR A JUST SOLUTION FOR THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ALL OF ITS ASPECTS. I BELIEVE THAT OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS AND RESPONSIBILITY TO FUTURE GENERATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST DEMAND NO LESS. SINCERELY, END TEXT.
THOMAS

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 158/87

Top Copy on Soviet Union, Credit Terms, Pt 2

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cc Master
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J. J. J.

I have discussed with the fco (Stephen Haupt). No further action is needed

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DEAR MARGARET:

Soviet Union: Pipeline, Pt 2

I MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR JULY 29 LETTER ON THE SUBJECT OF NIGHT BOMB ENGINEERING AND THE CO-STRUCTIVE FRAMEWORK IN WHICH YOU HAVE PLACED OUR DIFFERENCES CONCERNING THE SANCTIONS ISSUE. I AM IN THOROUGH AGREEMENT WITH YOU THAT ON THE BROADER SECURITY CONCERNS POSED BY SOVIET BEHAVIOR AND THE CRISIS IN POLAND WE THINK ALIKE. IN CASES WHERE WE DO DISAGREE, I BELIEVE THAT YOUR LETTER EXEMPLIFIES THE TONE AND SPIRIT WHICH OUGHT TO GUIDE U.S.-U.K. RELATIONS.

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LET ME ADD HOW MUCH I ALSO APPRECIATED YOUR JULY 29 LETTER AND THE INFORMATION YOU SHARED WITH ME ON YOUR TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN. THESE VIEWS PROVIDED TIMELY BACKGROUND FOR MY OWN MEETING LAST WEEK WITH EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHAL HASSAN ALI, AND WITH HIS ISRAELI COUNTERPART, FOREIGN MINISTER YITZCHAK SHARIP, ON TODAY.

THE TALKS WITH ALI WERE USEFUL, ALTHOUGH THE EGYPTIANS HAVE HARDENED THEIR POSITION TOWARD ACCEPTING PLO FIGHTERS. ALI'S PRESENTATION WAS SIMILAR TO HIS EXCHANGE WITH FRANCIS PYLE, AS HE EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO SEIZE THIS MOMENT TO RESOLVE THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. WHILE THERE IS SOME EGYPTIAN THINKING ON THE MIDDLE EAST IS SIMILAR TO THE U.S. AND BRITISH, WITH ALI'S VIEW THAT THE SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS SHOULD BE EXPLICITLY LINKED TO THE BROADER PALESTINIAN PROBLEM.

FOR THE MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHARIP, I MADE CLEAR TO HIM HOW STRONGLY WE FEEL ABOUT THE DISPROPORTIONATE AND DISCRIMINATE ISRAELI ATTACKS ON WEST BEIRUT. I ALSO EMPHASIZED OUR OPPOSITION TO ISRAELI PRESSURE TACTICS INCLUDING THE CUT-OFF OF FOOD, WATER, ELECTRICITY AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES. SHARIP REITERATED THE ISRAELI POSITION THAT SUCH TACTICS WERE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO ENSURE PLO WITHDRAWAL. I STATED THAT SUCH ACTS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH CONTINUING LEVELS OF EXCESSIVE VIOLENCE, WERE MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR PHIL HABIB TO EXTRACT THE PLO BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS AND THAT THIS COULD HAVE THE GRAVEST POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL.

CLEARLY THE ROAD AHEAD REMAINS FRAUGHT WITH DANGER, BUT

I SEE NO ALTERNATIVE TO WORKING AS HARD AS WE CAN TO BRING ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLO FROM LEBANON, AS WELL AS ALL OTHER FOREIGN FORCES, AND A RETURN TO CONDITIONS WHICH WILL PERMIT THE LEBANESE TO FUNCTION AS AN INDEPENDENT PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT.

SINCERELY,

RON

THE RIGHT HONORABLE
MARGARET THATCHER
10 DOWNING STREET
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From the Private Secretary

30 July 1982

The Middle East

The Prime Minister has received a number of letters from constituents criticising the Government's policy with regard to the Israeli invasion of the Lebanon. Some of the draft replies which she has been advised to send have been found here to be rather insensitive to constituents' views. I have therefore tried my hand at the enclosed draft which would be drawn on in case of need. Could you kindly let me know by close of play on Monday 2 August whether you see any serious objection to it?

LEJ

Aje received
comms
from FC,
2/8/82.

A. J. COLES

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

RM

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO

Thank you for your letter of 11 June about my TV interview in Bonn. I should like to explain my remarks more fully than time allowed in that interview.

Although no two situations are ever the same, there are similarities between the Argentine invasion of the Falklands and Israel's invasion of the Lebanon. Both Argentina and Israel broke international law by invading the sovereign territory of another nation. In both cases a Resolution of the Security Council was passed calling for the withdrawal of the occupying forces. In the first case Argentina did not comply with Resolution 502. In the Lebanon, Israel has not yet complied with Resolution 509.

But there are also major differences. The Falklands posed no threat to Argentina; there were no forces on the Islands engaged in activities against Argentina. I recognise the strong feeling in Israel that measures of self-defence against the threat posed from Lebanese soil were legitimate. But most of the international community feel that a massive invasion of the sovereign territory of another country, including an attack on its capital, goes beyond the legitimate exercise of self-defence (in the case
/of the Falklands

of the Falklands we were compelling an invader to leave British territory).

I have been personally committed to friendship with Israel since its foundation and I remain so today. I believe profoundly in its right to security and peace. In my view, that can best be guaranteed by the restoration of an independent, sovereign state of Lebanon and by negotiations to bring about an overall peace settlement involving a solution to the Palestinian problem and permitting normal relations between Israel and its Arab neighbours. [The events of the last few months in the Middle East have been discouraging but the peace efforts must be resumed as soon as possible.]

da

MR. WOLFSON

As you know, I am consulting the FCO about a draft letter on the Middle East which could serve as a basis for replies by the Prime Minister to her constituents.

Dr. R. KOHN

I attach to this minute a recent letter which the Prime Minister specifically authorised me to send. You may find some of this phraseology useful as well.

A. J. COLES

30 July 1982

SUBJECT
Mark
9ps.

1087

Middle East

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T.124/82

OO WHITEHOUSE

GRS 400

US Declassified

CONFIDENTIAL
FROM CABINET OFFICE 290940Z JUL 82
TO IMMEDIATE WHITEHOUSE
TELEGRAM NUMBER MISC 175 OF 29 JULY 1982

FROM . PRIME MINISTER
TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

DEAR RON,
KING HUSSEIN CALLED ON ME IN LONDON ON 22 JULY AND ALSO TALKED TO FRANCIS PYM THE FOLLOWING DAY. YOU MAY LIKE TO KNOW THE MAIN POINTS WHICH THE KING MADE IN THESE DISCUSSIONS:-
I) HE WAS WORRIED THAT THE PRESENT NEGOTIATING EFFORT WAS FOCUSED TOO NARROWLY ON THE PLIGHT OF BEIRUT, AND NOT ON THE WIDER QUESTION OF THE FUTURE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.
II) HE STRONGLY BELIEVED THAT THE HUMILIATION OF THE PLO IN BEIRUT SHOULD BE AVOIDED IF THERE WAS TO BE A CHANCE OF A MODERATE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP IN THE FUTURE.
III) JORDAN WAS PREPARED TO TAKE JORDANIAN PASSPORT HOLDERS, BUT HE SHARED PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO TACKLE THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IF THE MODERATE ARABS WERE TO TAKE IN LARGE NUMBERS OF PLO FIGHTERS.
IV) HE CLAIMED THAT SYRIA ALREADY HAD PLANS TO CHANGE THE PLO INTO A MORE EXTREME FORM.
V) HE WAS CONCERNED THAT FOLLOWING LEBANON, ISRAEL MIGHT TURN ITS ATTENTION TO JORDAN, AND NOTED GROWING ISRAELI PRESSURE ON THE ARABS OF THE WEST BANK TO MOVE INTO JORDAN.
VI) ON IRAN/IRAQ HE NOTED THAT ISRAEL WAS SUPPLYING ARMS, SPARE PARTS AND PROBABLY SOME EXPERTS TO IRAN. HE ADDED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WERE VERY CONTENT WITH THE SITUATION IN IRAN, AND POINTED OUT THAT THE LOSS OF IRAQ WOULD BE A SERIOUS BLOW.
VII) HE SAID THAT HE WAS TRYING TO ARRANGE AN ARAB SUMMIT WITH AS MANY AS POSSIBLE OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING. HE WAS WORKING WITH THE SAUDIS FOR EGYPT TO REJOIN THE ARAB WORLD.
2. WE WERE MOST GRATEFUL TO PHIL HABIB FOR TAKING THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF FRANCIS PYM ABOUT THE BEIRUT NEGOTIATIONS ON 26 JULY, AS HE TOLD US HE IS CONCENTRATING ON THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF BEIRUT, BUT THERE ARE WIDER CONSIDERATIONS WHICH ARE AS IMPORTANT. THE CHALLENGE REMAINS HOW TO BRING ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLO IN CONDITIONS WHICH WILL INCREASE THE CHANCES OF A PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP PURSUING MODERATE AND SENSIBLE POLICIES IN THE FUTURE. I HAVE TO SAY FRANKLY THAT I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT SENDING THE BULK OF THE PLO, INCLUDING THE LEADERSHIP, TO SYRIA WILL SERVE WESTERN INTERESTS BY PERMITTING A GENUINELY MODERATE LEADERSHIP TO EMERGE. FRANCIS PYM WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS ALL THIS FURTHER WITH GEORGE SHULTZ ON 29 JULY.

YOURS EVER

MARGARET.

NNNN

MFJ

29 July 1982

Middle East: Message to President Reagan

Thank you for your letter of 28 July. The Prime Minister approved the draft message to President Reagan which you enclosed, subject to a few minor amendments. It has been despatched and a copy will reach you separately.

JC

F.N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

/ h

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WONNY 007/30

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OO UKMIS NEW YORK

IMMEDIATE

OO F C O (DESKBY 300830Z)

OO TEL AVIV

OO BEIRUT

PP CAIRO

PP AMMAN

PP DAMASCUS

PP JEDDA

PP BAGHDAD

PP TEHRAN

PP MOSCOW

PP PARIS

PP TUNIS

GPS 650

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 300830Z

FROM WASHINGTON 300240Z JUL 82.

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2610 OF 29 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, UKMIS NEW YORK PRIORITY

CAIRO, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, PARIS, TUNIS, BAGHDAD,

TEHRAN, MOSCOW,

INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

M.I.P.T.: (NOT TO ALL): MEETINGS WITH SHULTZ: MIDDLE EAST.

1. SHULTZ BEGAN THE DISCUSSION BY ASKING YOU ABOUT EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN ATTITUDES. YOU SAID THAT THE ABSENCE OF

Ps
Ps/mc
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McGifford
McUre
McDonald
McMoberly
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McMey
McNew
McNo. 6
P. S. H.

10

1. SHULTZ BEGAN THE DISCUSSION BY ASKING YOU ABOUT EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN ATTITUDES. YOU SAID THAT THE ABSENCE OF PROPOSALS FOR PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION WAS WORRYING. THE EGYPTIANS WERE WILLING TO TAKE THE PLO LEADERSHIP BUT FEARED THAT A LONG-TERM SOLUTION WAS FURTHER OFF THAN EVER BECAUSE OF ISRAELI POLICIES ON THE WEST BANK. THEY DOUBTED WHETHER THE PALESTINIANS WERE WILLING TO LEAVE BEIRUT AND WORRIED ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE 400,000 PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS WHO WOULD REMAIN IN LEBANON. THE ARAB WORLD AS A WHOLE WAS IN A GREAT STATE. KING HUSSAIN DID NOT WANT TO TAKE MORE PALESTINIANS AND WAS WORRIED ABOUT POSSIBLE ISRAELI ATTACKS ON JORDAN.

2. VELIOTES SUMMARISED THE CURRENT POSITION. WHEN HABIB HAD REACHED ISRAEL ANOTHER SHOOTING WAR, FOR WHICH THE PLO WERE AT LEAST PARTIALLY TO BLAME, WAS IN PROGRESS. HABIB HAD COME UNDER GREAT PRESSURE FROM BEGIN AND SHARON TO PROVE THAT THE PLO WERE READY TO LEAVE BEIRUT. ARAFAT'S STATEMENT TO MCCLOSKEY AND THE FRANCO/EGYPTIAN RESOLUTION HAD ENCOURAGED UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS FROM THE PLO LEADERSHIP OF A CHANGE IN THE US APPROACH TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THE PRESIDENT'S REITERATION IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY OF THE LONG-STANDING U.S. CONDITIONS FOR DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO WAS INTENDED TO MAKE THE POSITION CLEAR BEYOND DOUBT VELIOTES COULD NOT CONFIRM RUMOURS FROM BEIRUT THAT HABIB WAS ON THE VERGE OF A BREAKTHROUGH.

3. EVEN IF THE PLO AGREED TO LEAVE, THE MODALITIES REMAINED TO BE SETTLED. BUT UNTIL THE BEIRUT PROBLEM WAS DEALT WITH IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO MOVE AHEAD ON THE BROADER ISSUES OF THE DEPARTURE OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON AND THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF SOME INTERNATIONAL FORCE FOR THE SOUTH. THERE WAS NO NEWS FROM THE ARAB LEAGUE MEETING. HABIB EXPECTED THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO MAKE ANOTHER TOUR OF ARAB CAPITALS BEFORE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED.

4. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE ARABS WERE SENDING A POWERFUL MESSAGE THAT THEY DID NOT WANT TO ACCEPT THE PLO AND WERE THUS DELEGITIMISING THE ORGANISATION. YOU NOTED THE EGYPTIAN VIEW THAT IF THE US WERE TO TALK TO THE PLO AND GIVE SOME GENERAL UNDERTAKING ABOUT PALESTINIAN RIGHTS, THE PLO WOULD AGREE TO LEAVE BEIRUT. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE PROBLEM REMAINED OF WHERE THEY WERE TO GO.

5. SHULTZ AGREED THAT THE INHERENT DANGERS IN IRAN/IRAQ SITUATION HAD INCREASED. THE IRANIANS SEEMED UNABLE TO BREAK THROUGH THE IRAQI LINE AND THERE WAS A MILITARY STALEMATE. IRAN MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO ATTACK ELSEWHERE: THE KUWAITIS COULD

~~THROUGH THE IRAQI LINE AND THERE WAS A MILITARY STALEMATE.~~

● IRAN MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO ATTACK ELSEWHERE: THE KUWAITIS COULD NOT DEFEND THEMSELVES. YOU SUGGESTED THAT THE IMMEDIATE IRANIAN OBJECTIVE WAS TO ATTACK THE IRAQIS AND THAT THEY WERE NOT YET THINKING IN TERMS OF WIDENING THE WAR TO OTHER GULF STATES.

6. SHULTZ SAID THAT HE HAD DRAWN TWO LESSONS FROM RECENT EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IN HIS VIEW THAT AMERICANS NEEDED TO GET BACK ON SOME SORT OF WORKING BASIS WITH IRAN. SECONDLY, THE ISRAELI MILITARY SUCCESS AGAINST THE SYRIANS SUGGESTED, EVEN ALLOWING FOR THE HIGH QUALITY OF ISRAELI PERSONNEL, THAT SOVIET WEAPONS WERE INFERIOR TO AMERICAN AND THAT THE AMERICANS MIGHT BE DOING BETTER THAN THEY HAD THOUGHT. SHULTZ CONFIRMED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD PUT DOWN A MARKER WITH THE RUSSIANS ABOUT ESCALATING THE GULF WAR. HE THOUGHT THAT THEY MIGHT BE BIDDING THEIR TIME AND LETTING THE AMERICANS STEW IN THEIR MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS.

7. SHULTZ SAID THAT HIS PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT THE MESSAGE OF THE LEBANESE CRISIS WAS THAT SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE ABOUT THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM OF THE NEED TO FACE UP TO THE JUST CLAIMS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. SURELY IT MUST BE POSSIBLE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAL TO THE SENSE IN ISRAEL, AS WELL AS THE ARAB STATES, THAT ENOUGH WAS ENOUGH AND THAT MILITARY CONFRONTATION COULD NOT OFFER A LONG-TERM ANSWER. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS COULD BE DONE, BUT THE AMERICANS WOULD MAKE THE EFFORT AND WOULD LOOKING FOR BRITISH SUPPORT. THEY COULD NOT WAIT FOR THE HUGE PROBLEMS OF LEBANON TO BE SOLVED BEFORE TACKLING THE WEST BANK AND RELATED ISSUES.

FCO PASS SAYING:-

ABU DHABI, ADEN, ALGIERS, BAHRAIN, DOHA, DUBAI, JERUSALEM, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, MUSCAT, RABAT, SANA'A TRIPOLI.

HENDERSON

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Duty level
Please send message on
hot line, with immediate copies
to Francis Richards (F/C.O.) and
me. A.F.C. 29/7

28 July 1982

Dear John. Yes not

Prime Minister
Content to send this message to
President Reagan A.F.C. 29/7

The Prime Minister asked for a draft message to President Reagan after meeting with King Hussein on 22 July. This meeting and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's on 23 July produced a number of points on the situation in Lebanon and US policy towards the Palestinians which are worth passing on in advance of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's discussions in Washington on 29 July.

I accordingly enclose a draft message from the Prime Minister which might be passed across the hot line. We have taken the opportunity to include a paragraph about Mr Habib's negotiating efforts. Following Mr Pym's talks with Mr Habib on 26 July we remain convinced that the preferred American option of moving the bulk of the PLO, including the leadership, to Syria is misguided, because it is likely (if successful) to lead to a more radical and intractable Palestinian organisation in the future.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

'DSR 11 (Revised)

MESSAGE

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/teletype/despatch/note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:
President Reagan

Your Reference

Top Secret
~~Secret~~
Confidential
~~Restricted~~
~~Unclassified~~

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:
Dear Ron,

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

King Hussein called on me in London on 22 July and also talked to Francis Pym the following day. ~~I believe it is important that we should continue to keep in close touch over developments in the Middle East, and I would therefore like to pass to you the main points which the King made in these discussions:~~
You may like to know

- i) He was worried that the present negotiating effort was focused ^S too narrowly on the plight of Beirut, and not on the wider question of the future of the Palestinian people.
- ii) He strongly believed that the humiliation of the PLO in Beirut should be avoided if there was to be a chance of a moderate Palestinian leadership in the future.
- iii) Jordan was prepared to take Jordanian passport holders, but he shared President Mubarak's view that it would be important to make a major effort to tackle the Palestinian problem if the moderate

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/Arabs

Arabs were to take in large numbers of PLO fighters.

- iv) He claimed that Syria already had plans to change the PLO into a more extreme form.
- v) He was concerned that following Lebanon, Israel might turn its attention to Jordan, and noted growing Israeli pressure on the Arabs of the West Bank to move into Jordan.
- vi) On Iran/Iraq he noted that Israel was supplying arms, spare parts and probably some experts to Iran. He added that the Russians had made it clear that they were very content with the situation in Iran, and pointed out that the loss of Iraq would be a serious blow.
- vii) He said that he was trying to arrange an Arab Summit with as many as possible of the Arab countries participating. He was working with the Saudis for Egypt to rejoin the Arab world.

2. We were most grateful to Phil Habib for taking the opportunity to brief Francis Pym about the Beirut negotiations on 26 July. As he told us [redacted] he is concentrating on the immediate problem of Beirut, [redacted] But there are [redacted] wider considerations which are as important. The challenge remains how to bring about the withdrawal of the PLO in conditions which will increase the chances of a Palestinian leadership pursuing moderate and sensible policies in the future. I have to say frankly that I do not believe that sending the bulk of the PLO, including the leadership, to Syria will

/serve

serve Western interests by permitting a genuinely moderate leadership to emerge. Francis Pym will have an opportunity to discuss all this further with George Shultz on 29 July.

Yours ever

Margaret.

28 JUL 1982



MFJ

Middle East

22 July 1982

Statement by PLO on Acceptance of
Israel

The Prime Minister has noted the contents
of John Holmes' letter of 21 July.

JC

Francis Richards Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

B



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 July 1982

Prime Minister

to note.

A.F.C. 21/7

Dear John,

Statement by PLO on Acceptance of Israel

There have been a number of statements from leading figures in the PLO in recent days setting out the PLO's position on acceptance of Israel.

The Prime Minister will have seen Arafat's interview with Avneri, an Israeli journalist, as reported in "The Times" on 8 July. I now enclose the full text of the interview. The main points of substance are on pages 3 and 4, although the interview is worth reading in full for the flavour of the exchange. Arafat comes over as a man under pressure and with solid reasons of his own for wanting a peaceful solution.

In addition, Dr Sartawi (a member of the Palestinian National Council and a leading PLO dove) has given press conferences in Paris on 13 July and London on 14 July. I enclose a copy of Paris telegram number 725 reporting that Sartawi had said on the first occasion that the PLO had "formally conceded to Israel in the most unequivocal manner its right to exist on a reciprocal basis". A COI journalist who attended the London press conference on our behalf has reported that he said the same thing there. Both Arafat and Sartawi point to three main texts to justify their claim:

- (i) the PLO's acceptance of the joint US/USSR statement of 1 October 1977 in all its parts. I enclose a copy: you will see that it refers explicitly to the need for measures to ensure the security of the borders between Israel and her neighbours;
- (ii) the statement issued following the Palestine National Council's meeting in April 1981, which "welcomed" Brezhnev's speech to the 26th CPSU Congress in February 1981. Brezhnev's speech had included a passage calling for measures to ensure the security and sovereignty of all states in the area, including Israel;

/(iii)



- (iii) Arafat's acceptance of the Fahd principles last year (although it is not explicit on Israel's rights, nor was it in the event translated into PLO support for the principles at Fez).

To carry any real weight, Sartawi's statements would require specific public endorsement by Arafat. They are nonetheless pointers in the direction in which we have at official level for some time been urging the PLO to move. The FCO spokesman has taken the following line in response to questions:

"We welcome the statement made by Dr Sartawi in London on 14 July in which he made clear that the PLO had formally conceded Israel's right to exist on a reciprocal basis. This statement, taken together with the points made by Mr Arafat in an interview with Mr Averni published in "The Times" on 8 July, marks a constructive step towards the mutual acceptance by Palestinians and Israelis on which a settlement of the Arab/Israel problem will have to be based. But the statement is not authoritative, and we would wish to see confirmation from the PLO leadership that they share Dr Sartawi's interpretation of the PLO's policy on this critical point, and that they intend to use political, not violent, means in pursuit of their objectives."

Yours ever,

for (J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

The American-Soviet statement on the Middle East of
1 October 1977

The statement issued by the United States and the Soviet Union in their capacity as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference was aimed at resumption of the conference in December 1977 at the latest. The first paragraph of the statement reads as follows:

"Both governments are convinced that vital interests of the peoples of this area as well as the interests of strengthening peace and international security in general urgently dictate the necessity of achieving as soon as possible a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This settlement should be comprehensive, incorporating all parties concerned and all questions.

"The United States and the Soviet Union believe that, within the framework of a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem, all specific questions of the settlement, should be resolved, including such key issues as withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict; the resolution of the Palestinian question including ensuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, termination of the state of war and establishment of normal peaceful relations on the basis of mutual recognition of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.

"The two governments believe that, in addition to such measures for ensuring the security of the borders between Israel and the neighbouring Arab states as the establishment of demilitarised zones and the agreed stationing in them of United Nations troops or observers, international guarantees of such borders as well as of the observance of the terms of the settlement can also be established, should the contracting parties so desire. The United States and the Soviet Union are ready to participate in these guarantees subject to their constitutional processes."

8 Jul 82

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MIDDLE EAST & AFRICA
ANNEX

ANNEX CONTENTS

ISRAEL

PLO Chairman 'Arafat Interviewed by Uri Avneri
[HA'OLAM HAZE 7 Jul]

1

CHAD

Hissein Habre Views Prospects for Peace
[Paris MATCH 2 Jul]

12

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ISRAELPLO CHAIRMAN 'ARAFAT INTERVIEWED BY URI AVNERI

TA071135 Tel Aviv HA'OLAM HAZE in Hebrew 7 Jul 82 pp 6, 7, 72, 73 -- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Report on interview with PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat by Uri Avneri in 'Arafat's headquarters in east Beirut on 3 July 1982]

[Text] Uri Avneri phoned Yasir 'Arafat's office in east Beirut. The number, which is constantly changed for security reasons, was given to him by 'Isam as-Sartawi's office in Paris; this, too, via a telephone call from Beirut. Avneri told an official in 'Arafat's office that he wanted to cover the situation in west Beirut and interview the PLO chairman. The man promised a quick response and indeed, within an hour he phoned Avneri's room in the Alexander Hotel in east Beirut and announced that the request had been granted. Avneri was asked to go to the PLO roadblock near the museum at 1000 local time. He was told that a member of 'Arafat's office would be waiting for him there.

On Saturday 3 July at 1000 Avneri, accompanied by correspondent Sarit Yishay, photographer Anat (Sergusti) and a German television crew, reached the roadblock where he was received by a member of 'Arafat's office and by (Madi), who was 'Isam as-Sartawi's secretary and whom he has known for several years. The three Israelis were taken in 'Arafat's car to a private apartment where the PLO man's family from Galilee lives. A few minutes later Yasir 'Arafat himself arrived.

After a few minutes of conversation, Avneri asked if he would be permitted to use the tape recorder and 'Arafat willingly agreed. The following transcription begins at this point. The conversation was conducted in English, and the last part of it was filmed by the German television crew that had been taken to the spot at the same time. Present at the meeting, apart from 'Arafat, Avneri, Yishay and (Sergusti), were the poet Mahmud Darwish, 'Arafat's aide on Israeli affairs 'Amad Shaqur, spokesman Mahmud Labadi and As-Sartawi's former aide, 'Azi Khuri. The PLO ambassador in Bierut, Shafiq al-Hut, arrived later.

The rights to the entire interview are reserved to HA'OLAM HAZE and no use may be made of it as a whole or any part of it without its permission.

[Avneri] I am happy you received me for an interview after so many years although I regret it is under these circumstances.

['Arafat] I am also happy to meet you personally. I have been reading your articles since 1967.

[Avneri] In the Arabic edition (of HA'OLAM HAZE, then published)?

['Arafat] Yes, in the Arabic edition.

[Avneri] He 'Amad Shaqur worked on the editorial board of that edition.

['Arafat] [laughs] Really?

[Avneri] It is really amusing. (Shaqur left Israel a short time after that and since then has not seen Avneri and did not know he would be appointed to 'Arafat's team of aides.) I have known 'Azi for about 5-6 years now, because he was 'Isam as-Sartawi's aide.

[Khuri] Seven years.

[Avneri] At first I used to meet with Sa'id Hamami.

['Arafat] Please, greet all the friends, Mati Peled and the others.

[Avneri] All of them are shocked at this war.

['Arafat] I follow what they are doing and I am very grateful to them for what they are doing.

[Avneri] They are doing this for the sake of our people no less than for the sake of your people.

['Arafat] The Israeli military does not understand what it is doing (to your people). In my opinion, they are very stupid. You cannot rule another people by force of arms. I will give you examples from all over the world. Where is Hitler, with all his power? Where is Attila (the king of the Huns, who put Europe to the sword), with all his power? Perhaps you can rule by force for some time, for a very short time, but what then?

[Avneri] The trouble is that some of our people have become intoxicated with power because the Jewish people had no power for such a long period of time. After they gained power, it made them intoxicated and they think problems can be resolved by force.

['Arafat] That is the arrogance of power, an arrogance that has no value.

[Avneri] Today there will be a Peace Now demonstration in Tel Aviv and it will be attended by thousands of demonstrators. If you were able to make a speech at that demonstration, what would you tell the peace-loving demonstrators who are opposed to the war?

['Arafat] We, too, are human beings. We have the right to live.

[Avneri] That is a very short message and a very strong one. What, in your opinion, must they do?

['Arafat] They must see to it that the UN resolutions are implemented. We are not asking for the moon.

[Avneri] The genuine problem facing peacelovers in Israel is to convince the Israeli public that if a Palestinian state is really established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with east Jerusalem as its capital this will be the solution to the problem. How would you reply to this?

['Arafat] The genuine solution lies in the UN resolutions.

[Avneri] Resolution 242?

['Arafat] No, 242 was rejected by our National Council.

[Avneri] Because it did not mention the Palestinians?

['Arafat] Because it completely ignored the Palestinian people. It was passed after the 1967 war with the Arab armies, although the Palestinian problem existed then, and it also today represents the heart of the whole matter. We are here. That is truth. Three formations are besieging Beirut, threatening to invade, in addition to the navy and the air force. But can they resolve the problem with this enormous force? Let them try!

[Avneri] This being so, when you say "UN resolutions," do you mean all the UN resolutions?

['Arafat] Certainly, we must refer to all the resolutions. You know, Israel is the only country in the world that was established in accordance with a UN resolution and it is the only country that does not honor even one UN resolution. I will give you another shameful example. The current invasion of Lebanon was carried out across the UN lines. They (the IDF) did not in the least honor the UN flag. That international flag was collusion (he said this in Arabic: "tawatu'," hunting for the right word in English).

[Khuri] (in English) They made a plot.

[Avneri] (in Hebrew) Collusion? [qenunya]

[Shaqr] (in Hebrew) Yes, collusion! Exactly: collusion.

['Arafat] Several UN leaders and commanders conspired to let (the IDF) pass via the UNIFIL lines. Well, Israel does not honor the United Nations -- neither the UN flag. The UN forces, nor the UN resolutions. I ask and I appeal to all the Israelis with this question: How long can you follow this arrogant path. How long? Ten years? Twenty years? Fifty years? Fine! We have the ability to suffer and to survive. But the results will be a catastrophe. And not for us. I am a man who is aware of history. I can see this, what will happen. I see it clearly. It is very important. Everyone must think, and think well, about the future.

[Avneri] I think many Israelis understand this.

['Arafat] So you think. It seems the majority is incapable of seeing what the future will bring.

[Avneri] If I may say why this has happened: It happened because many Israelis, who are basically peace-loving, were convinced by our government's information that the PLO does not really want peace.

['Arafat] The PLO?

[Avneri] How to persuade....

['Arafat] The PLO? That is not true! We have declared that we accept the U.S.-Soviet announcement of 1977. We announced our acceptance of it. (The reference is to an announcement issued in the fall of 1977, a short time before Anwar as-Sadat went to Jerusalem, in which the two superpowers expressed their support for peace based on the independence of the existing countries and the fulfillment of the Palestinians' rights. The Americans cancelled their support for this announcement after some time, following Moshe Dayan's visit to Washington.)

We have declared our acceptance of President Brezhnev's initiative (from last year)....

[Avneri] Which said that the security of all countries in the area is to be safeguarded, specifically mentioning by name the State of Israel.

8 Jul 82

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MIDDLE EAST & AFRICA
ANNEX

['Arafat] You see, when we say we approve the initiative, we approve all its details. We have said this is a good basis for a peace arrangement, a just arrangement, to bring peace to the Middle East.

And you remember, I myself declared that the Fahd plan was a very good basis for a solution in the Middle East.

Well, we have given many signs that we want peace. However, I regret to say that the military in Israel is behaving in an arrogant way. I regret that they are incapable of learning from history. It appears that we do not learn enough from history.

[Avneri] There are very few people who are capable of learning from history.

['Arafat] But I am not at all worried.

[Avneri] My friend would like to ask a question.

[Yishay] I think the Israeli public does not believe the Palestinians truly want peace. There are two very widely circulated reasons for this. First, you have in the Palestinian charter a clause stating that there is no Jewish nation, that there is no Jewish people.

['Arafat] No. I am sorry, but this is incorrect. We know the charter well -- it is our constitution -- and there is nothing in it about that. We said nothing in it about the Jews. All that is said in it...

[Avneri interrupts] Every Israeli believes...

[Yishay] It is not said...

['Arafat interrupts] I must remind you that our famous resolution, passed at the 15th -- or 13th -- session of our National Council, says that we must begin a dialogue with all the democratic and progressive forces in Israel.

[Avneri] The trouble is, Mr Chairman, that there were also a few words in it about Zionism that bothered, in my opinion, many Israelis. All Israelis are Zionists; they define themselves as Zionists -- even if they do not know exactly the meaning of this concept and what its significance is today. We are not asking you to be a Zionist, of 'Azi to be a Zionist. However, the Israelis -- they are Zionists.

['Arafat] But this is not the same thing for me. I do not accept all your theories.

[Avneri] You do not have to.

['Arafat] You have your theories. Some of the Israelis have their own theories. But we must speak frankly. Not all Jews are Zionists. I will give you an example: His excellency Chancellor Kreisky has said that he is not a Zionist. We respect him and we have good relations with him.

[Avneri] But in Israel...

['Arafat interrupts] You cannot expect me to accept Zionist theories.

[Avneri] No, no, certainly not. But...

['Arafat interrupts] From a religious point of view, at least, I cannot accept them. Judaism is part of our tradition. It is impossible to say that I am anti-Semitic. And so, Judaism is part of our tradition; Islam is part of our tradition; and Christianity is part of our tradition.

(At this point the poet, Mahmud Darwish, who grew up in Israel and then joined the PLO, enters the room. Those present burst into laughter at his look of astonishment when he sees Avneri.)

[Yishay] Unfortunately, this is what they [the Israelis] believe. A Palestinian once said the Jews must be thrown into the sea.

['Arafat] No! Who said that?

[Yishay] This is what the Israelis think.

['Arafat] No! Who said that? That is a great lie, a very great lie. No a single Palestinian has told this great lie! Tell me, who said this? This military government in Israel repeats this lie. Give me one proof that this was ever said by Palestinians!

[Avneri] Perhaps Ahmad Shuqairi said it at the time.

['Arafat] No, no, not him either. We have investigated this matter. This is one of the great lies!

[Yishay] Were you aware of this lie? Were you aware of the fact that it is widely believed in Israel?

[Shaqur] I remember that once, before the war (meaning the Sinai war), I had an argument with Dr Shlomo Avneri [a former director general of the Foreign Ministry and a professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem], and I proved to him that no Palestinian ever said this. At the time I was his student, and I told him that he will not find any proof of that. And supposing that someone did say it once -- so what? Suppose that one of us did say it!

[Khuri] However, the truth is that no one ever said it.

[Avneri] The great damage has been done.

['Arafat] Do you mean to say that they (the IDF) are here because of those great lies?

[Avneri] Yes!

[Yishay] Yes!

[Avneri] Exactly!

['Arafat] On the battlefield...

[Avneri -- interrupts] I would say they (the Israeli Government) would have been unable to reach here had the majority of the Israeli people and the soldiers who fought not believed that.

Arik Sharon has his own ideas, very clear ideas about what he wants to do. He wants to annex the West Bank to Israel and to do this he wants to destroy the PLO.

['Arafat] Sharon (he says a few words in Arabic). Translate this for him from Arabic.

[Shaqur -- in Hebrew] A blood merchant.

['Arafat -- says a few words in Arabic]

[Shaqur -- in Hebrew] He profiteers in blood.

[Avneri] He would not be able to do what he does were it not for the soldiers' wholehearted belief that the PLO wants to destroy the State of Israel.

['Arafat] Look. [Some illegible words] you will not convince me that this intelligent people, this clever people, the Jewish people, could believe such lies!

[Avneri] They believe it.

[Yishay] The simple people believe it.

['Arafat] Look, this is very important. You are not from the Third World.

[Yishay] We have many Jews from the Third World.

[Avneri] Half the Jews in the State of Israel came from Arab countries.

['Arafat] But they have been living in Israel for 33 years.

[Yishay] But the Jews who came from the Arab countries hate the Arabs more than the others.

['Arafat] I do not understand that.

[Avneri] Incidentally, 'Anat's parents came from Morocco and Sarit is the daughter of a Sephardic family from Yugoslavia. They are both Sephardic. I am an Ashkenazi.

[Yishay] My family had already been in Israel for several generations. I am a Palestinian.

[Shaqur] We are all Palestinians.

['Arafat] Yes, we are all Palestinians.

[Shaqur] And Sharon is fighting all of us.

[Avneri] I waited many years for this interview, because this is exactly what I wanted to tell you: The real problem is that many Israelis sincerely believe these stories, that the Palestinians will never be willing to recognize the State of Israel, not even in the framework of peace between a Palestinian state and the State of Israel. This is the one point that must be made absolutely clear in a way that every Israeli in the street will be able to understand: that you want peace based on mutual understanding, mutual respect and mutual recognition.

['Arafat] Leave the political formulations aside for a moment. What about the people? What about the Palestinian people? I must ask you: What about the Palestinian people who live in this region? I must ask every Jew, not only the Israelis, in the entire world, all the Jews, what will come of the Palestinian people? What is to be the fate of four million Palestinians?

[Avneri] They have to return to the Palestinian state.

['Arafat] What will their future be? To be refugees? And now Sharon has become the dictator of this region and is demanding that we leave. To where? To Crete? To where? To where must I go? To Crete? To Cyprus? To where?

I am a human being! And our children have the right to live! This is very simple. But it seems that this military government in Israel is insisting on not seeing reality, the facts and the future.

[Avneri] I believe...

['Arafat -- interrupts] I am not worried, I am not worried at all about the future, in spite of this large invasion.

This is one Israeli-U.S. march, eight divisions. This is a disgrace for the Israeli army. Even from a military-technical point of view, this is a disgrace.

I will not speak about a bloodbath, about the genocide that has been perpetrated against the Palestinians in the south, in Ar-Rashidiyah, in Burj ash-Shamali, in 'Ayn al-Hulwah. I hope you will have the opportunity to go there. Every Israeli must go there and see for himself the disgrace, the filthy war.

(PLO spokesman Mahmud al-Labadi enters)

[Avneri] I was in Sidon.

['Arafat] That is very important. I ask every person, everywhere in the world, to come and see this superpower, this great power, the Israeli army, what it has done to the Palestinians, to our refugees, our children, our women.

Do they think they can resolve the problem with such acts of genocide? Okay, they can kill half a million Palestinians here, but three and a half million of us will remain.

This operation is shameful, today, if that is the way.... History is not comprised of battles. History is not battles!

[Shaqr] Chairman 'Arafat has already denied that one of us ever said that the Palestinians want to throw the Jews into the sea. But what is General Sharon doing now? He is sending us to graves in the desert!

['Arafat] To graves in the desert!

[Al-Labadi] I want to ask you a question: Does this meeting between Chairman 'Arafat and you not prove that we want to live together with the Jews?

['Arafat] (raising his voice) Yes! We have declared this in our resolutions, that we want to live with all the Jews. We are not against the Jews.

[Al-Labadi] Here, yesterday there was a representative of the Israeli peace movement in Brussels at a demonstration against the war.

[Avneri] As I just finished telling Chairman 'Arafat, a large peace demonstration against the war is taking place today in Tel Aviv. Many people in Israel do not support the war.

If I may be allowed to say so, the situation in Israel today -- and has been for a long time -- is this: There is a minority in Israel that would support Begin and Sharon always, that would destroy the Palestinian national entity and annex the West Bank. But this is a minority. On the other side, is a minority that opposes the war and wants to resolve the Palestinian problem. In the middle, between these two minorities, is the majority of the public that can be influenced one way or the other, and it must be influenced in the direction of peace.

['Arafat] The Jews are a religious people, a nation adhering to religion. The Israeli military spoils all aspects of life and it also absolutely spoils the spirit of Judaism in a very shameful fashion.

[Avneri] Both nations must be persuaded that peace is possible between Palestinians and Israelis after 100 years of war. This is the one important thing. If the Israeli masses realize....

['Arafat] Not with cannons!

[Avneri] Not with cannons.

['Arafat] Neither through cannons, nor through tanks. Do you see? If this is done by cannons and tanks, sooner or later we will find a way to overcome the cannons and tanks. We are here. You know, this is the longest war between Arabs and Jews.

[Avneri] Yes.

['Arafat] It is the longest war. I challenge this general, the generals, to publish the exact number of casualties. For my part, I have announced the number of our casualties: 30,000 people were killed or wounded.

[Yishay] How many were killed?

['Arafat] Some 10,000 or 11,000 were killed and approximately 18,000 to 19,000 were wounded; some 30,000 Arabs were killed or wounded.

[Avneri] How many Palestinian fighters were killed?

['Arafat] We do not announce such a thing in the course of a war. The number of (military) casualties cannot be announced during a war. Some 10,000 people are still missing. This is very important. Hundreds of thousands of refugees, both Palestinian and Lebanese, women and children....

[Al-Labadi] Refugees for the third time!

['Arafat] For the third time. Some of them for the third time, others for the fifth time, from the south to the north, from the north to the south.

(The little daughter of the houseowner went to 'Arafat and embraced him. He sat her next to him and caressed her.)

[Shaqur] (in Hebrew) He likes children, you know that.

[Yishay] I would like to know, if possible of course -- and I hope it is possible -- are you holding just one prisoner?

[Annex continues on back pages of report]

V. 8 Jul 82

9

MIDDLE EAST & AFRICA
ANNEX

[Shaqur] There is only one, the pilot; he is a prisoner of war.

[Yishay] There are no others?

['Arafat] No, I am sorry to say.

[Shaqur] We only have one in Beirut.

[Yishay] Because there are several soldiers missing.

[Shaqur] There are several bodies, two or three.

['Arafat] Four bodies.

[Shaqur] No, there are four bodies from the previous war (the Litani operation).

['Arafat] And there are two bodies, two captains.

[Yishay] From this war?

['Arafat] Yes, the helicopter crew, from the second day of the war, the second day near the castle (Beaufort), the fifth day of the war. (Note: The PLO members count the days of the war with the beginning of the bombardments of Beirut, on 4 June.)

[Yishay] Maybe I should not ask but I dare ask anyway because of your fair attitude: Maybe we can get the names of the soldiers whose bodies are in your possession?

['Arafat] Yes, yes, we have them. We will willingly give them to you, we have them. Maybe you would like to meet the pilot?

[Avneri] We would like that very, very much!

['Arafat] We can arrange it for you. You will meet him and you will ask him how we have been treating him, you will ask him.

Israeli aircraft yesterday dropped pamphlets, an Israeli army pamphlet, which stated: We know that you are holding prisoners...

[Shaqur] (in Hebrew) It was stated in the pamphlets: We know you are holding prisoners and we warn you to tell us where those prisoners are, otherwise it will be so and so and so.

['Arafat] I would like to spend more time with you but, I am sorry, I have to go. I came here although I have to meet with the (Lebanese) prime minister. (Note: In this meeting, held after the interview took place, 'Arafat and Al-Wazzan formulated the written document in which the proposal for resolving the problem of Beirut through political means was specified.)

[Avneri] Were the Israeli Government to come to you today and say: All right, we had a war, you fought very courageously, our soldiers also fought very bravely....

['Arafat] We know that.

[Avneri] ...let us make peace now, a peace based on mutual respect among people who fought. You will have a Palestinian state and we will have the State of Israel, we will live together in peace. What would you say?

['Arafat] Look, you know that we would have given a positive answer although such an appeal has not been put to us.

[Avneri] I know, but I would like the Israeli people to know.

['Arafat] Because we want to live and let live.

[Avneri] That is very important.

(At this point Avneri asked 'Arafat to allow a German television crew to join the meeting and 'Arafat acceded to the request. 'Arafat's bodyguards left to bring over the television crew, which was waiting elsewhere.

[Avneri] I would like to ask them (the Germans) to prepare a second cassette so I can take it with me to Israel. After all, this is an unbelievable sight.

[Yishay] We feel if we were dreaming.

['Arafat] (Laughs)

[Al-Labadi] Mr Avneri, do you remember giving a lecture in Berlin in 1970? I was still a student then and you spoke about the unification of the Semitic peoples (he explains to 'Arafat, in Arabic, the context of Avneri's lecture).

[Shaqur] I have here Avneri's book on that issue.

[Avneri] What I said then -- and I still believe today -- is that, at the end of the process, there must be a State of Israel and a Palestinian state and a comprehensive regional organization -- all of them together, in a joint economic and political framework.

['Arafat] Abba Eban spoke about Benelux.

[Avneri] Had the Labor Party been braver, the current situation would not have evolved. Today, the man in the street is more courageous than the Labor Party.

['Arafat] This morning I read a commentary by Ze'ev Schiff, he made a very good analysis of the war.

[Avneri] He is a very good man, a serious man, and he has written very good things on this war.

['Arafat] I was very surprised. I have read some of his books but none of his commentaries. This commentary gave a very accurate analysis of the situation.

[Yishay] Did you read it in Hebrew?

['Arafat] No, I read a translation.

[Yishay] Do you know any words in Hebrew?

['Arafat] (in Hebrew) How do you do? I love you. (general laughter)

[Darwish] (in Hebrew) You have made changes, he is single. (translation into Arabic follows, laughter)

[Avneri] That could be a solution, 'Arafat marrying an Israeli girl and thus solving the entire problem.

['Arafat] No....(laughing) However, if that would resolve it I would do it today.

[Yishay] But today it is Ramadan. (turning to the members of 'Arafat's entourage): Would you like him to get married?

[Darwish] Yes!

[Yishay] Why?

[Darwish] So that we would have more time to work. (general laughter)

At this point there was an interval in the talk, while several documents were brought to 'Arafat for him to sign. Afterwards, Avneri asked about the chances of resolving the problem of Beirut through political means.

['Arafat] There are several points here which must be stressed. I am ready, for the sake of the well being of 600,000 Lebanese living in west Beirut and 200,000 Palestinians who are here, to find a political solution. We are conducting negotiations with the Lebanese authorities to find a solution. The matter was also discussed at that conference (meaning the meeting held in Saudi Arabia a day earlier, to which Bashir al-Jumayyil was summoned).

[Avneri] Where would it be possible to go if there is a chance of leaving here in an honorable manner?

['Arafat] To Palestine!

[Avneri] I am talking about tomorrow, not next year.

['Arafat] To Palestine, that is my right. Are you going back there?

[Avneri] Yes, I am, today.

['Arafat] Do you think you have the right to go there whereas I do not have the right to return there? It is very simple, I am also a human being! Where would I go except for my motherland? I want to go back to my motherland!

[Yishay] When you say Palestine, which part do you mean?

['Arafat] For all of us? The whole land, for both you and us.

[Yishay] You mean, together?

['Arafat] Together, why not?

[Yishay] Are you not referring to a separate state?

['Arafat] You know our famous slogan: a democratic and secular state and if this solution is unacceptable, then two separate states.

[Sergusti] And what kind of government would there be?

['Arafat] You know that we have a democratic system, at least better than yours, there is no doubt about it. With us, at least there are no such examples of military arrogance.

[Yishay] When you say that we cannot talk about living in one state and we talk about two states, to which part of the country are you referring when you speak about the second state?

['Arafat] We proposed -- we, the victims -- two solutions; some 60 percent of my brethren are refugees, homeless and without a country, and we proposed two solutions: The first proposal, which we made in 1969, was that we all live together in the same democratic and secular state, a Jewish-Christian-Muslim state but this proposal was rejected. In 1974 the Palestinian National Council proposed a second solution: All right, we are ready to live in any place in Palestine from which the Israelis will withdraw or which will be liberated.

[Avneri] This in fact means the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

['Arafat] Any place, I am giving you the exact formulation, the exact wording of our decision. Do not forget that I was elected to my post according to these decisions. Well, we declared -- our Palestinian National Council made these proposals, these two solutions -- whereas the other side -- what has it offered us? (the German television crew walks in at this point.)

['Arafat] This war has shocked the volcanoes [zi'az'a et hareyhaga'ash] in this area, it has shocked them to their bottom and that is their fatal mistake. The battle continues to this moment. Maybe, maybe, we will succeed in reaching a compromise. However, the most important historical fact is that they shocked the volcanoes. They (the reference is to the Israeli Government) are very narrow-minded.

(The recording ended at this point. Henceforth, 'Arafat addressed German television. He repeated the two proposals the PLO has offered to the State of Israel and the PLO's readiness for peace with Israel. At the end of the talk, 'Arafat presented Avneri with an album of pictures of Eretz Yisra'el of various periods which he autographed.)

CHAD

HISSEIN HABRE VIEWS PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

PMO21607 Paris MATCH in French 2 Jul 82 p 109 -- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Interview Chadian Northern Armed Forces leader Hissein Habre granted to Isabel Ellsen in Ndjamena -- date not given]

[Text] Paris MATCH: Mr President, do you think you can finally restore peace in Chad after 17 years of war and intervention?

Hissein Habre: That, of course, is my objective. But in the short term it would not be realistic to say the war is completely over. A great step has undoubtedly been taken toward restoring order and security. And we must combine our efforts with the inter-African forces to achieve national reconciliation and peace which the whole country deeply desires.

The most complicated thing now will be to rebuild this country. But, in order to undertake that essential task, it was first necessary to fight an effective and rapid war.

Paris MATCH: How are the people reacting to your seizure of power?

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FROM AMMAN 201650Z JUL 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 320 OF 20 JULY 1982

AND TO INFO PRIORITYMODUK (D14) BAGHDAD, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA,
TEL AVIV

BIS TEHRAN, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND CG JERUSALEM.

JORDAN MIDDLE EAST

1. IN A SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL ON 19 JULY, THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER ANNOUNCED THE FORMATION OF A COMMITTEE TO BEGIN WORK ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JORDANIAN "POPULAR ARMY" WHICH WOULD GIVE TRAINING TO ALL CITIZENS CAPABLE OF CARRYING ARMS. BADRAN ADDED THAT THE JAF HAD ALSO BEGUN CALLING UP A NUMBER OF RESERVISTS TO ATTEND A TRAINING COURSE "TO RAISE THE STANDARD OF THEIR PERFORMANCE". BADRAN CLAIMED THAT THE AIM OF THESE MEASURES WAS TO ENABLE JORDAN TO CONFRONT AGGRESSION FROM ANY EXTERNAL SOURCE SEMICOLON JORDAN WOULD NOT BE AN EASY TARGET FOR ANY OF THOSE WHO HARBOURED DESIGNS AGAINST HER.
2. BADRAN SAID THAT JORDAN WOULD CONTINUE TO EXTEND A HELPING HAND TO THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO WORK TOGETHER FOR THE DEFENCE OF JORDAN AND FOR PALESTINIAN NATIONAL RIGHTS. HE REPEATED THE INFORMATION MINISTER'S DESCRIPTION OF MR BEGIN'S OFFER TO JORDAN OF A CONFEDERATION (MY TELNO 315) AS "RIDICULOUS." HE ATTACKED AT LENGTH SHARON'S SUGGESTION THAT JORDAN SHOULD BE THE PALESTINIANS' HOMELAND. HE INSISTED THAT JORDAN WOULD REMAIN JORDAN AND THAT THE PALESTINIANS WOULD NOT SO EASILY FORGET THEIR OWN HOMELAND. BADRAN ALSO CRITICISED ISRAEL'S ATTEMPT TO SIDE-STEP THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION BY RESTRICTING CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS ON LEBANON TO THE MODALITIES OF A PALESTINIAN WITHDRAWAL. HE REGRETTED THAT SOME ARABS HAD BEEN IMPLICATED IN THIS CONSPIRACY AND WERE PREPARED TO BARGAIN OVER THE NUMBER AND KIND OF PALESTINIANS THEY WOULD ACCEPT IN THEIR COUNTRY IN RETURN FOR SUMS OF MONEY (A CLEAR REFERENCE TO SYRIA). BADRAN ALSO TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO CRITICISE THE UNITED STATES FOR ACCEPTING ISRAEL'S RULES FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND CALLED ON THE AMERICANS TO TURN THEIR ATTENTION TO THE CENTRAL PALESTINIANS QUESTION.

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3. NEITHER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A POPULAR MILITIA NOR THE CALL-UP OF RESERVISTS FOR FURTHER TRAINING ARE NEW IDEAS: BOTH HAVE BEEN MOOTED SINCE LATE 1980 WHEN THE SYRIANS WERE THREATENING TO INVADE. THE CONSENSUS AT THE MEETING OF EC HEADS OF MISSION THIS MORNING WAS THAT NOT TOO MUCH SHOULD BE MADE OF THE PRIME MINISTERS ANNOUNCEMENT. THE IDEA OF A PEOPLE'S ARMY IS STILL ONLY AT THE COMMITTEE STAGE, ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN EARLIER REPORTS OF SOME ARMS BEING GIVEN TO BEDOUIN TRIBES, RETIRED ARMY OFFICERS AND FARMERS IN THE JORDAN VALLEY. THE CALL- UP OF RESERVISTS HAD ALREADY BEEN PLANNED TO START AROUND NOW SEMICLN THE JAF HAVE FOR SOMETIME BEEN PREPARING A GENERAL SCHEME TO CALL UP FORMER NATIONAL SERVICEMEN ON A ROTA BASIS IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM REFRESHER COURSES. THERE IS CLEARLY SOME REAL ADVANTAGE TO JORDAN IN TROUBLED TIMES IN ENHANCING HER MILITARY PREPAREDNESS. BUT THE TIMING AND FORM OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT SEEMS EQUALLY INTENDED AS A PIECE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS DESIGNED TO REASSURE THE POPULACE THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS TAKING SERIOUSLY THE TASK OF DEFENDING THE REALM.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2500 OF 20 JULY

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, JEDDA, TUNIS, PARIS,
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INFO SAVING TO BEIRUT

LEBANON: VISIT OF ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION
RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/MR HURD

1. THE SAUDI AND SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS MET SHULTZ AND PRESIDENT REAGAN TOGETHER ON 19 AND 20 JULY RESPECTIVELY. BOTH MINISTERS HAD SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH SHULTZ AND ON THE HILL. KHALID EL HASSAN (PLO), TRAVELLING ON A KUWAITI DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT, IS IN WASHINGTON AS AN ADVISER TO THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION, BUT HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVED BY ANY AMERICAN OFFICIAL.

2. IN A BACKGROUND PRESS BRIEFING AT THE WHITE HOUSE AMERICAN OFFICIALS SAID THAT REAGAN HAD DISCUSSED WITH THE TWO MINISTERS NEW IDEAS WHICH MIGHT FORM THE BASIS OF POSSIBLE MOVEMENT IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THEY GAVE NO FURTHER DETAILS. THE OFFICIALS EMPHASISED THAT THE US REMAINED COMMITTED TO THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS AND THAT POLICY ON TALKING TO THE PLO WAS UNCHANGED.

THE US REMAINED COMMITTED TO THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS AND THAT POLICY ON TALKING TO THE PLO WAS UNCHANGED.

3. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TOLD US THAT THE TALKS WENT REASONABLY WELL BUT, AS THE AMERICANS HAD EXPECTED, THEY DID NOT GET VERY FAR. KHADDAM WAS ADAMANT THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD ACCEPT THE PLO LEADERSHIP BUT NOT THE QUOTE FIGHTERS UNQUOTE, WHOM HE EQUATED WITH ALL PALESTINIANS. THE ARAB SIDE HAD RAISED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PLO MIGHT MOVE FROM BEIRUT TO NORTH LEBANON AS AN QUOTE INTERIM UNQUOTE MEASURE. THE AMERICANS SAID THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WERE OPPOSED TO THIS IDEA. IT WAS A NON STARTER UNLESS THE ULTIMATE DESTINATIONS FOR THE PLO WERE FIRST AGREED. SAUD AND KHADDAM AGREED TO CONSULT FURTHER WITH THEIR ARAB COLLEAGUES ON THE DESTINATION PROBLEM.

4. ACCORDING TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT, THE TALK'S FOCUSSED ESSENTIALLY ON THE IMMEDIATE WEST BEIRUT ISSUE, THOUGH THE AMERICANS SAID THAT THEY INTENDED, ONCE THAT WAS OUT OF THE WAY, TO TRY TO TACKLE THE BASIC PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. THERE WAS APPARENTLY NO DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSAL, REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN CARRIED TO WASHINGTON BY KHALID EL HASSAN, THAT THE PLO SHOULD ACCEPT AN AMENDED VERSION OF SCR 242 ACKNOWLEDGING THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO SELF-DETERMINATION.

FCO PASS SAVING TO BEIRUT

HENDERSON

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Middle East

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2951 OF 19 JULY 1982

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AMMAN DAMASCUS CAIRO

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INFO SAVING BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE DUBLIN LUXEMBOURG
ATHENS UKDEL NATO

MINISTERIAL POLITICAL COOPERATION MEETING 19 JULY
MIDDLE EAST

SUMMARY

1. VAN AGT AND GENSCHER REPORTED ON THEIR RECENT VISITS TO
THE MIDDLE EAST, EMPHASIZING THE DEGREE OF CONCERN FELT BY
KING HUSSEIN AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK. CHEYSSON SPOKE AT LENGTH
ON CURRENT FRENCH POLICY. ON GENSCHER'S SUGGESTION, OLESEN

ON CURRENT FRENCH POLICY. ON GENSCHER'S SUGGESTION, OLESEN AGREED TO INSTITUTE CONTACTS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENCY AND JORDAN AND EGYPT TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS. PRESIDENCY TO REPORT BACK ON THIS TO POLITICAL DIRECTORS ON 9 SEPTEMBER.

DETAIL

2. MEETING HELD IN THE MARGINS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL.

OLESEN (PRESIDENCY) EXPLAINED THAT IT HAD BEEN CONVENED BECAUSE OF THE VERY SERIOUS SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND TO ENABLE GENSCHER AND VAN AGT TO REPORT ON THEIR RECENT VISITS.

3. VAN AGT (WHO HAD VISITED ONLY CAIRO) SAID THAT IN HIS TALK WITH MUBARAK THE PRESIDENT HAD EMPHASISED THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A) ARAB PUBLIC OPINION WAS INCREASINGLY ANTI-AMERICAN BECAUSE OF U S SUPPORT FOR THE ISRAELIS. BUT A SOLUTION COULD ONLY BE FOUND WITH U S COOPERATION, AND THE COMMUNITY COULD ONLY MAKE A CONTRIBUTION IN COLLABORATION WITH THE AMERICANS.

B) IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO SPLIT UP THE PLO. UNLESS A PROPER POLITICAL SOLUTION WERE FOUND PALESTINIANS WOULD RESORT INCREASINGLY TO TERRORISM. WEST EUROPEANS AMONG OTHERS WOULD BE THE VICTIMS.

C) DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD A PALESTINIAN FORCE OF SOME 2,000 - 3,000 SHOULD BE STATIONED IN N. LEBANON, UNDER LEBANESE ARMY CONTROL.

D) THIS PRE-SUPPOSED THE RE-CREATION OF A FREE AND INDEPENDENT LEBANON, WHICH IN TURN INVOLVED THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS. HE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY SCATHING ABOUT THE LATTER.

E) UNIFIL WOULD HAVE A KEY ROLE TO PLAY IN ANY INTERIM ARRANGEMENT. IT SHOULD HAVE A STRENGTHENED MANDATE, MORE TROOPS AND OPERATE THROUGHTOUT THE COUNTRY.

F) MUBARAK HAD AT NO STAGE SPOKEN OF A PALESTINIAN "STATE". RATHER HE HAD USED THE WORD "HOMELAND" OR REFERRED TO FULL AUTONOMY.

4. GENSCHER (WHO HAD VISITED AMMAN FROM 13-14 JULY AND CAIRO FROM 15-16 JULY) REPORTED THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD SAID THAT THE

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

5. POINTS MADE TO GENSCHER BY MUBARAK NOT ALREADY COVERED BY VAN AGT WERE,

- A) A REFUGE FOR THE PALESTINIANS WAS IMPORTANT. BUT HE HAD REFUSED TO OFFER THIS HIMSELF SINCE THIS WOULD OPEN EGYPT TO THE ACCUSATION OF ACTING AS A LACKEY OF THE AMERICANS AND OF A "CAMP DAVID CONSPIRACY".
- B) THE AMERICANS WANTED BASES IN THE AREA; BUT IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY SUICIDAL FOR ANY ARAB REGIME TO OFFER THESE.
- C) LIKE KING HUSSEIN, HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS BACKING IRAN IN THE GULF. HE ADDED THAT SOVIET ARMS WERE ALSO BEING SUPPLIED THROUGH N. KOREA (AN ALLEGATION WHICH CHEYSSON SUBSEQUENTLY ENDORSED).
- D) A PITCHED BATTLE IN BEIRUT TO ANIHILATE THE PALESTINIANS WOULD BE DISASTROUS POLITICALLY; IT WOULD MERELY LEAD TO THE EXTREME ELEMENTS ASSUMING CONTROL AND, AS HE HAD EMPHASISED TO VAN AGT, AN INCREASE IN INTER-NATIONAL TERRORISM.
- E) HE HOPED TO PRODUCE A PLAN FOR A SETTLEMENT. THE KEY ELEMENT WOULD BE TO PROVIDE SOME HOPE TO THE PALESTINIANS, WHO HAD NOW SHOWN THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO COMPROMISE.
- F) THE TIME HAD COME TO PUSH FOR MUTUAL RECOGNITION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PLO (GENSCHER HERE COMMENTED THAT THE JORDANIANS HAD BEEN LESS SPECIFIC ON THIS POINT).

6. GENSCHER DESCRIBED MUBARAK AND HUSSEIN AS SPEAKING OF EACH OTHER IN GLOWING TERMS AND AS IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER AND WITH THE SAUDIS. EGYPT WAS BACK IN THE ARAB CAMP. BOTH HEADS OF STATE WANTED A SUMMIT, BUT ONE THAT MUST BE PROPERLY PREPARED. BOTH WERE SERIOUSLY WORRIED BY THE THREAT TO THE STABILITY OF MODERATE REGIMES. HE (GENSCHER) HAD BEEN STRUCK BY THE FACT THAT MUBARAK HAD OPENED THEIR JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE IN ARABIC RATHER THAN IN ENGLISH, AS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS. THIS INDICATED HOW SERIOUSLY MUBARAK TOOK THE NEED TO WOO ARAB PUBLIC OPINION.

7. GENSCHER CONCLUDED THAT THE COMMUNITY HAD TO SHOW UNDERSTANDING FOR THE CONCERNS OF ARAB PUBLIC OPINION, SHOULD EXERCISE WHAT INFLUENCE IT COULD OVER THE AMERICANS AND SHOULD NOT (NOT) GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS TO ACHIEVE PALESTINIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST BEIRUT IN A VACUUM. THE PRESIDENCY SHOULD MAKE CONTACT WITH THE ARAB MODERATES.

8. CHEYSSON SAID THAT THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR RAISED SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR ALL REGIMES IN THE AREA. THERE WAS THE DANGER OF A BROADER SHI'ITE-SUNNI CONFLICT AND OF FUNDAMENTALIST PASSIONS BEING UNLEASHED AS FAR AFIELD AS ALGERIA. HE DID NOT AGREE WITH EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN VIEWS, AS REPORTED BY GENSCHER, THAT THE SOVIER UNION WAS WHOLLY ON IRAN'S SIDE; THE RUSSIANS WERE PROVIDING ARMS TO BOTH SIDES. FRANCE HAD GOOD REASON TO KNOW THAT THE IRAQI ARMY HAD A VERY CONSIDERABLE INITIAL ABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF; IT WAS NOT SURPRISING THAT INITIAL IRANIAN ATTACKS HAD PROVED VERY COSTLY. BUT IF THE IRANIANS PERSISTED THEY WOULD SUBMERGE THE IRAQIS.

9. ON THE LEBANON CHEYSSON RESTATED RECENT FRENCH POLICY AT SOME LENGTH, EMPHASISING THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION. WEST BEIRUT WAS IN ANY CASE SO HEAVILY FORTIFIED THAT IT COULD NOT BE TAKEN IN LESS THAN TWO WEEKS HEAVY FIGHTING. FRANCE WAS WILLING TO PROVIDE TROOPS IF THE RIGHT CONDITIONS WERE MET. THE RUSSIANS HAD SO FAR BEEN PASSIVE, BUT WISHED AT ALL COSTS TO AVOID A U S FORCE BEING SENT TO BEIRUT. THE FRANCO-EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE WAS NOW SUPPORTED BY ALL ARAB COUNTRIES.

10. MR HURD SAID THAT THE UK WERE IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE AMERICANS AND URGING THEM TO OPEN UP TO THE GREATEST DEGREE POSSIBLE THE LINK BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN QUESTIONS. IN PARTICULAR WE WERE URGING THAT A HOME SHOULD BE FOUND IN EGYPT FOR THE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP (AS OPPOSED TO ARMED FORCES, ON WHICH WE HAD HEARD MUBARAK'S VIEWS). THIS WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE THE RE-OPENING OF SENSIBLE

MOBARAK'S VIEWS). THIS WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE THE RE-OPENING OF SERIOUS
DISCUSSION ON PALESTINE. SO FAR HOWEVER THE U S HAD NOT
REACTED POSITIVELY. HE AGREED ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE GULF WAR.
ALTHOUGH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL WAS NOT AT PRESENT INTENDING TO
ASK PALME TO RENEW HIS EFFORTS IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE IRANIANS
SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PACKAGE AVAILABLE. WE
WERE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE GULF MODERATES, WHO WANTED TO KEEP OPEN
THE DOOR TO IRAN AND WERE ALSO WORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF
SUPER-POWER CONFRONTATION. WE WERE TRYING TO REASSURE THE STATES
CONCERNED. OTHERS IN THE TEN WOULD SHARE THIS OBJECTIVE.

11. COLOMBO SUGGESTED THAT THE MOMENT HAD COME FOR THE COMMUNITY,
PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY, TO EXERCISE PRESSURE ON BOTH IRAN AND
IRAQ AND AGREED ON THE NEED TO REASSURE THE GULF STATES. ITALY,
LIKE FRANCE, WAS READY TO PARTICIPATE IN AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE
UNDER THE RIGHT CONDITIONS.

12. SUMMARISING THE DISCUSSION, OLESEN SAID THAT THE PRESIDENCY
WOULD FOLLOW UP GENSCHER'S PROPOSAL THAT THEY SHOULD MAKE CONTACT
WITH EGYPT AND JORDAN TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF FINDING
SOLUTIONS TO OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS, AND WOULD REPORT TO POLITICAL
DIRECTORS ON 9 SEPTEMBER. IN CONTACTS WITH THE PRESS, THE
PRESIDENCY WOULD REFER TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL COMMUNIQUE,
EMPHASIZE THAT THE QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST
BEIRUT COULD NOT BE SETTLED IN ISOLATION, THAT PROGRESS TOWARDS
A SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WAS ESSENTIAL, AND THAT
IF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS WERE OVERLOOKED FURTHER RADICALISATION COULD
OCCUR. SUPPORT WOULD BE REITERATED FOR THE FRENCH-EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE
AND SERIOUS CONCERN EXPRESSED AT THE RECENT ESCALATION OF FIGHTING
BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ.

FCO ADVANCE TO:

FCO - PS/SOFS PS/MR HURD MR T MOBERLLEY SIR J BULLARD NENAD

CAB - GOODALL

FCO PASS SAVING:

COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE DUBLIN LUXEMBOURG ATHENS

BUTLER

NNNN

Middle East

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR MOBERLY
SIR J BULLARD
HD/NENAD
HD/MED
HD/UND
HD/SEC DEPT
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TELEGRAM NUMBER 311 OF 16 JULY
INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD, AMMAN, BEIRUT, ADDIS ABABA
MOGADISHU, TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BONN.

MUBARAK CALLS FOR AN ARAB SUMMIT

1. IN A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE END OF GENSCHER'S 2 DAY VISIT, MUBARAK MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) THE ONLY WAY TO CONFORMT THE PRESENT CONFLICTS IN THE ARAB WORLD - LEBANON, IRAN/IRAQ AND ETHIOPIA/SOMALIA -- WAS FOR ARAB LEADERS TO BURY THEIR DIFFERENCES, FACE CURRENT REALITIES, AND GET TOGETHER FORTHWITH TO FORMULATE A UNIFIED POLICY.

(B) HE WAS PERSONALLY READY TO GO ANYWHERE IN THE ARAB WORLD TO ATTEND SUCH A MEETING.

(C) GETTING THE PALESTINIANS OUT OF BEIRUT WAS NOT THE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM IF IT MEANT THAT THEY WOULD BE SPLIT UP AROUND THE ARAB WORLD WITHOUT ANY PROSPECT OF ANY OVERALL SETTLEMENT. IF THE PALESTINIANS HAD AGREED TO JOIN IN THE AUTONOMY TALKS THE PRESENT SITUATION WOULD NOT HAVE ARISEN.

(D) MUTUAL RECOGNITION BETWEEN THE PLO AND ISRAEL WOULD

IN THE AUTONOMY FROM THE PRESENT SITUATION WOULD NOT HAVE
ARISEN.

(D) MUTUAL RECOGNITION BETWEEN THE PLO AND ISRAEL WOULD
INEVITABLY COME, AS WOULD A PALESTINIAN STATE. THE
AMERICANS SHOULD OPEN A DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO. THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SHOULD EXERT PRESSURE ON THE AMERICANS TO
THIS END.

(E) AS TO THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR, EGYPT HAD DENOUNCED THE
CONFLICT FROM THE START, AND NOW CONDEMNED IRANIAN SEIZURE
OF IRAQI TERRITORY AS IT HAD CONDEMNED THE REVERSE. SHE WAS
HELPING THE IRAQIS IN THE FACE OF IRANIAN AGGRESSION BUT
CALLED ON THE PARTIES TO SETTLE THEIR DISPUTE BY
NEGOTIATION.

REEVE

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FM PARIS 131500Z JUL 82

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 725 OF 13 JULY 1982

INFO ROUTINE CAIRO, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD, JEDDA

PLO

1. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN PARIS TODAY SARTAQUI OF THE PLO APPEALED TO THE US TO RECOGNISE THE PLO AND TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS WITH IT. HE CALLED ON WEST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS TO USE THEIR GOOD OFFICES TO PERSUADE THE US TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THIS APPEAL. HE SAID THAT HE HAD ORIGINALLY INTENDED TO SPEAK ALONG THESE LINES IN EARLY JUNE FOLLOWING SECRET DISCUSSIONS WITH WEST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS AND THE US CONDUCTED THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF THE PRESIDENT OF TUNISIA. BUT THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON HAD HAD PREVENTED HIM FROM DOING SO.
2. SARTAQUI SAID THAT SINCE 1975 THE US HAD REFUSED TO HAVE CONTACT WITH THE PLO SO LONG AS IT DID NOT RECOGNISE ISRAEL. VARIOUS DECLARATIONS OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL HAD HOWEVER REMOVED THE OBSTACLES TO US RECOGNITION. SARTAQUI CLAIMED THAT THE PLO HAD "FORMALLY CONCEDED TO ISRAEL IN THE MOST UNEQUIVOCAL MANNER ITS RIGHT TO EXIST ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS". ARAFAT HAD ALREADY MADE THIS CLEAR IN HIS RECENT INTERVIEW WITH AN ISRAELI JOURNALIST.
3. SARTAQUI HAD LITTLE TO SAY ABOUT THE PRESENT ISRAELI BLOCADE OF WEST BEIRUT. HIS PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT THE PLO SHOULD REMAIN IN BEIRUT. HE PAID TRIBUTE TO THOSE ISRAELIS WHO HAD OPPOSED THE INVASION BUT MADE PLAIN THAT THE PLO COULD EXPECT LITTLE ASSISTANCE FROM ARAB GOVERNMENTS. SARTAQUI CLAIMED THAT ISRAELI ACTION HAD STRENGTHENED THE PLO'S POSITION. IT HAD HELPED UNITE THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AROUND THE PLO AS NEVER BEFORE. BEIRUT WAS AN IMPREGNABLE CITADEL WHICH WOULD BECOME THE PLO'S STALINGRAD.

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THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 July 1982

CONTACTS WITH THE PLO

The Prime Minister has considered the recommendation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary (your letter of 28 June) that the PLO should be told by officials that a British Minister would be prepared to meet Qaddumi provided that the latter agreed in advance to a satisfactory statement of the PLO's commitment to the security of the border between Israel and the territories in which, as a result of negotiations, the Palestinians would exercise their right to self-determination.

Mrs. Thatcher does not, however, consider that Qaddumi should be received by a British Minister. She feels that, as a result of the recent events in Lebanon, the PLO will continue their terrorist activities, possibly in London as well as elsewhere, and that such a meeting would have far-reaching political consequences.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 17

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
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MR MOBERLY
SIR J BULLARD
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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 278 OF 30 JUN

INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DI4), MOSCOW, WASHINGTON. ROUTINE BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, MUSCAT, TEL AVIV, B I SECTION TEHRAN, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO.

MOSCOW TELNO 367: JORDAN/SOVIET UNION

1. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN TODAY, HE SPOKE ABOUT HIS RECENT VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION FROM 23-28 JUNE. AFTER SPENDING 2 OR 3 DAYS IN THE CRIMEA, HE HAD VISITED MOSCOW AND LENINGRAD AND HAD HAD TWO WORKING SESSIONS WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER. HOWEVER THE MEETING HE HAD BEEN PROMISED WITH

WORKING SESSIONS WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER. HOWEVER THE MEETING HE HAD BEEN PROMISED WITH MR BREZHNEV HAD BEEN CANCELLED SEMICLN IN VIEW OF THIS AND OF DETERIORATING SITUATION IN LEBANON HE HAD CUT SHORT HIS VISIT AND RETURNED HOME. SOVIET OFFICIALS HAD TOLD HIM IN CONFIDENCE THAT MR BREZHNEV HAD HAD ANOTHER "FAILURE OF THE HEART" AND COULD NOT NOW BE EXPECTED TO LIVE LONG.

LEBANON

2. THE KING SAID HE HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE DETERMINED TO EXPLOIT THE ISRAELI INVASION OF THE LEBANON TO THE LIMIT. THEY HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO HIM THAT THEIR RELATIONS WITH SYRIA WERE SOMETHING VERY SPECIAL AND CLAIMED TO HAVE REPLACED ALL THE LOSSES OF EQUIPMENT REPORTED BY SYRIA SEMICLN THE KING SAID HE HAD NO IDEA WHETHER BY THIS THE RUSSIANS MEANT THAT THE EQUIPMENT IN QUESTION HAD ALREADY BEEN SENT OF MERELY PROMISED.

3. IN CLAIMING THAT THEY HAD DONE EVERYTHING THEY COULD TO PREVENT THE ISRAELI ATTACK ON LEBANON, THE RUSSIANS HAD BITTERLY CRITICISED US POLICIES AND IN PARTICULAR HAD ALLEGED THAT THE US CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PEACEKEEPING FORCE WAS AN ADVANCE ELEMENT OF THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE WHICH COULD BE REINFORCED QUICKLY. THE KING SAID HE HAD REPLIED THAT THE AMERICANS HARDLY NEEDED THIS, AS THEY ALREADY HAD ALL THE FACILITIES THEY REQUIRED AVAILABLE TO THEM IN ISRAEL. THE KING ALSO CLAIMED THAT HE HAD DEFENDED EGYPT AGAINST SHARP SOVIET CRITICISM ON SEVERAL COUNTS. HE MENTIONED THAT A VERY IMPORTANT SYRIAN (POSSIBLY PRESIDENT ASAD HIMSELF, ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIANS HAD TAKEN GREAT CARE TO KEEP THE VISIT SECRET) HAD VISITED MOSCOW ON 26 JUNE.

IRAQ/IRAN

4. THE RUSSIANS SAID THEY HAD OPPOSED THE IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT FROM THE OUTSET, AND NOW THOUGHT THAT IRAN WOULD NOT STOP AT THE IRAQI FRONTIER. THEY GAVE THE IMPRESSION TO THE KING THAT THEY WERE VERY SATISFIED WITH THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE IRANIAN REGIME, CLAIMING THAT WHATEVER THEIR IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES KHOMEINI HAD REMOVED US BASES AND MADE OTHER GESTURES TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION WHICH MERITED SPECIAL TREATMENT IN RETURN.

5. THE KING SAID HE ALSO FELT THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE IRAQ AND THE GULF STATES. WHEN HE HAD EXPRESSED INCOMPREHENSION TO THE RUSSIANS THAT THEY COULD HAVE A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP WITH IRAQ AND YET ALLOW SOVIET ARMS TO REACH IRAN EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH THIRD PARTIES, REGARDLESS OF END-USER AGREEMENTS FORBIDDING THE TRANSFER OF ARMS OF SOVIET ORIGIN TO OTHERS WITHOUT THE EXPRESS AGREEMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE RUSSIANS HAD TRIED TO SHRUG THIS OFF. THEY HAD CLAIMED THAT, IF THEY REALLY WISHED TO PUT THE PRESSURE ON IRAQ, THEY WOULD REMOVE SOVIET FORCES FROM THE IRANIAN BORDER AND RELEASE MORE

IF THEY REALLY WISHED TO PUT THE PRESSURE ON IRAQ, THEY WOULD REMOVE SOVIET FORCES FROM THE IRANIAN BORDER AND RELEASE MORE IRANIAN TROOPS FOR THE GULF WAR SEMICLN WHEN THE KING SUGGESTED THAT THEY HAD ALREADY DONE JUST THIS, THE RUSSIANS HAD REPLIED THAT THEY COULD GO A LOT FURTHER THAN THEY HAD ALREADY (''AS WE DID FOR TURKEY AT THE TIME OF THEIR DISPUTE WITH GREECE OVER CYPRUS'').

6. AT THE SAME TIME THE RUSSIANS HAD ALSO TOLD THE KING THAT THEY VERY MUCH WANTED TO ESTABLISH FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BOTH SAUDI ARABIA AND OMAN (THE KING REFERRED AT THIS POINT TO A RUSSIAN WHO HAD GOT LOST IN THE DESERT AND WHOSE CAR AND CORPSE HAD BEEN FOUND BY THE OMANI AUTHORITIES SEMICLN HE SAID HE HAD ACTED AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE RUSSIANS AND OMANIS IN THIS CASE, AND THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD EXPRESSED THEIR GRATITUDE TO THE OMANIS THROUGH HIM AND THEIR WISH FOR CLOSER RELATIONS).

MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT

7. KING HUSSEIN SAID THE RUSSIANS HAD NEEDED HIM ON THE POSSIBILITY THAT JORDAN MIGHT JOIN THE CAMP DAVID NEGOTIATIONS IN SOME NEW FORM. THE KING SAID HE HAD TRIED TO EXPLAIN WITH AS MUCH PATIENCE AS HE COULD MUSTER THAT JORDAN, WHICH WAS A SMALL COUNTRY, HAD IN THE PAST WITHSTOOD VERY GREAT PRESSURE TO FORCE HER INTO THE CAMP DAVID NEGOTIATIONS AND WAS NOT ABOUT TO CHANGE HER POSITION NOW. IT WOULD BE BEST TO FORGET ABOUT CAMP DAVID AND AIM FOR A COMPREHENSIVE MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT, TO WHICH HE BELIEVED THE RUSSIANS WERE ALSO COMMITTED.

8. WHILE THE KING EMPHASISED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD, AS ALWAYS, BEEN GENEROUS AND CONSIDERATE HOSTS, HE ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT HIS TALKS HAD LEFT HIM UNEASY ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES, PARTICULARLY IN REGARD TO SOVIET INTENTIONS TOWARDS IRAQ AND THE GULF STATES AND THEIR SUPPORT FOR IRAN. CROWN PRINCE HASSAN TOLD MY GERMAN COLLEAGUE OF HIS ANNOYANCE THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD DRAFTED THE TASS STATEMENT ABOUT THE KING'S VISIT (SEE MOSCOW'S TUR) IN SUCH A WAY AS TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS A JOINT COMMUNIQUE, WHEREAS IN FACT IT WAS THEIR OWN ACCOUNT OF THE VISIT WHICH INCLUDED PHRASES WHICH THE JORDANIANS WOULD NEVER HAVE ACCEPTED.

CCN PARA 5 LINE 4 FIRST WORD... TREATY

URWICK

BT



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 June, 1982

*Dear John,*Contacts with the PLO

The PLO Representative in London called on FCO officials on 21 June to convey a request from Qaddumi, the PLO's Foreign Minister equivalent, for a meeting with the Foreign Secretary or Mr Hurd.

Qaddumi has recently been received in Paris by M. Mauroy (for the first time) and M. Cheysson. There are a number of arguments for our agreeing to see him at Ministerial level also at this time.

Under Arafat, Qaddumi is the most representative member of the mainstream PLO leadership. It is this group which the Israelis are seeking to break, or at least discredit. The consequences if they succeed would be unpredictable. Palestinians may well be pushed out of desperation towards international terrorism, and the whole Palestinian movement could come under the control of its radical elements.

A gesture to the present PLO leadership in their moment of distress might have more effect than one made at a time of prosperity. It would underline our rejection of the Israeli argument that the Palestinian problem will be made easier by crushing the PLO's political structure in Beirut. Precisely for that reason and because it showed his strategy was not working it would, of course, infuriate Begin. It would be controversial in this country, even though the Commons debate on 22 June showed strong all-party support for our own policy of condemnation of the Israeli invasion and emphasis on Palestinian rights. A meeting with Qaddumi would be in line with the entreaties we have been hearing from the Egyptians, Saudis and Jordanians.

In order to defend it here and in the US, we would need to be able to show that it had been helpful to the cause of peace. This would be consistent with the line we have always taken on Ministerial contact with the PLO.

Mr Pym therefore considers that the PLO should be told by officials that a British Minister would be prepared to meet Qaddumi, but that we should need advance agreement that we should be able to confirm after a meeting something on the following lines: the PLO accepted that a Middle East peace would require negotiations leading to a comprehensive settlement, in which the PLO would accept arrangements guaranteeing the security of the border between Israel and the territories in which, as a result of negotiations, the Palestinians would exercise their right to self-determination.

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Such a statement could be based for example on a reaffirmation by Qaddumi of acceptance of the US/Soviet statement of 1 October 1977. Alternatively, it could be based on the Fahd plan (I / enclose copies of both)

We would in short continue to ask the PLO to pay a stiff price in terms of accepting Israel in return for a meeting with a British Minister. If they refused no harm would be done. If they agreed, it would represent an important step forward, and would have a useful effect in the US. I would be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister is content with this course of action.

Yours ever

J E Holmes
(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

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The Resolution is rejected by the PLO, on the grounds that the expression "the refugee problem" is no substitute for "the national rights of the Palestinian people"

After the October 1973 hostilities, the content of Resolution 242 was confirmed by Resolution 338 of 22 October 1973.

Declaration on the Middle East by the European Council
29 June 1977

At a meeting of the European Council in London, the 9 European Community governments adopted a declaration confirming previous statements and emphasising their belief that a peace settlement should be based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Paragraph 3 of the declaration reads as follows:

"The Nine have affirmed their belief that a solution to the conflict in the Middle East will be possible only if the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to its national identity is translated into fact, which would take into account the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people. They consider that the representatives of the parties to the conflict, including the Palestinian people, must participate in the negotiations in an appropriate manner to be worked out in consultation between all the parties concerned. In the context of an overall settlement, Israel must be ready to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people: equally, the Arab side must be ready to recognize the right of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. It is not through the acquisition of territory by force that the security of the states of the region can be assured: but it must be based on commitments to peace exchanged between all the parties concerned with a view to establishing truly peaceful relations".

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The European Council confirmed this position at its meeting in Copenhagen on 3 April 1978.

The American-Soviet statement on the Middle East of
1 October 1977

The statement issued by the United States and the Soviet Union in their capacity as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference was aimed at resumption of the conference in December 1977 at the latest. The first paragraph of the statement reads as follows:

"Both governments are convinced that vital interests of the peoples of this area as well as the interests of strengthening peace and international security in general urgently dictate the necessity

of achieving as soon as possible a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This settlement should be comprehensive, incorporating all parties concerned and all questions.

"The United States and the Soviet Union believe that, within the framework of a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem, all specific questions of the settlement, should be resolved, including such key issues as withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict; the resolution of the Palestinian question including ensuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, termination of the state of war and establishment of normal peaceful relations on the basis of mutual recognition of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.

"The two governments believe that, in addition to such measures for ensuring the security of the borders between Israel and the neighbouring Arab states as the establishment of demilitarised zones and the agreed stationing in them of United Nations troops or observers, international guarantees of such borders as well as of the observance of the terms of the settlement can also be established, should the contracting parties so desire. The United States and the Soviet Union are ready to participate in these guarantees subject to their constitutional processes."

Palestinian representation at the Geneva conference

According to Israel, a combined delegation including Palestinian Arabs would take part in the Geneva conference, the problem of the Left Bank and Gaza would be considered by a group including representatives of Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Arabs.

Egypt would agree to the formation of a single Arab delegation.

The PLO accepted the American-Soviet statement, provided it was regarded as a Security Council document; on this condition, the PLO would agree to representatives of the Palestinian people (without being more specific) taking part in the "Arab delegation".

President Sadat's initiative

On 20 November 1977, in his address to the Knesset, President Sadat invited Israel to live "in complete security" with her Arab neighbours; he stressed that the price to be paid for erecting a "colossal edifice of peace" must be Israel's

FOLLOWING TELECON WITH HEAD OF SHIFT HERE IS TELEGRAM
REQUESTED

OO BRUSSELS

GR 230

CONFIDENTIAL
FM BEIRUT 181225Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 309 OF 18 JUNE
INFO PRIORITY MODUK CBFC DAMASCUS TEL AVIV AMMAN NICOSIA
ANKARA.

IMMEDIATE

INWARD TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

MY TEL NO 293 OF 16 JUNE : MOVE TO EAST BEIRUT.

1. MY PARAGRAPH 3B. I HAVE DECIDED TO TIGHTEN UP OUR PRECAUTIONS
A NOTCH OR TWO.

2. IF THE SITUATION IN WEST BEIRUT DETERIORATED TOT THE POINT
WHERE THE EMBASSY COULD NOT FUNCTION AT ALL AND WAS IN DANGER,
WE SHOULD LOCK UP AND LEAVE. IN THAT EVENT, I SHOULD ASK THAT
THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE, SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS, SHOULD BE BROADCAST
ON THE BBC WORLD SERVICE :

QUOTE BRITISH SUBJECTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN ADVISED OFFICIALLY TO
LEAVE WEST BEIRUT FOR EAST BEIRUT. THIS ADVICE IS REPEATED. THE
EMBASSY IS UNABLE TO FUNCTION IN WEST BEIRUT AND IS ACCORDINGLY
MOVING TO EAST BEIRUT. IT MAY BE CONTACTE AT THE OFFICES OF
CYPRUS AIRWAYS IN EAST BEIRUT UNQUOTE.
I WOULD MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS TO APPEAR ON THE RADIO
AND IN THE PRESS HERE.

3. IN EXTREME URGENCY, AND ONLY THEN, I.E. IF WE HAD ONLY A
FEW MINUTES BEFORE FINAL DESTRUCTION OF CYPHER MATERIAL AND
CLOSING DOWN I SHOULD TELEGRAPH THE SINGLE WORD QUOTE CLARET
UNQUOTE. I TRUST THAT THIS DOES NOT INFRINGE ANY EXISTING
CODEWORD ARRANGEMENTS.

4. THE CONSULAR UNIT IN EAST BEIRUT WILL ALSO BE AWARE OF
THE CODE-WORD AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE. I PRESUME THAT YOU WOULD IN
SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH THE CONSULAR UNIT
TO ALERT THEM (I MIGHT BY THEN NOT BE ABLE TO DO SO).

ROBERTS

NNNN

SENT AT 28/0903Z JGV

RESTRICTED

GRS 245

RESTRICTED

FM UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK 181730Z JUNE 82
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 71 OF 18 JUNE
INFO TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON.

UNSSD II: GENERAL DEBATE: ISRAEL.

1. BEGIN WAS THE FIRST SPEAKER ON THE MORNING OF 18 JUNE. KITTANI (IRAQ) ASKED ANDERSON (AUSTRALIA) TO DEPUTIES FOR HIM AS PRESIDENT. THE MUSLIMS WALKED OUT EN MASSE AS SOON AS BEGIN ENTERED THE CHAMBER AND THE COMMUNISTS DID NOT TURN UP AT ALL. ONLY 55 DELEGATIONS (BARELY A QUORUM) WERE PRESENT FOR BEGIN'S SPEECH: WEOG, MOST OF THE LATINS, THE NON-MUSLIM PACIFICS AND A HANDFUL OF BLACK AFRICANS. VERY FEW OF THEM WERE REPRESENTED AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL (AMONGST THE TEN, ONLY DENMARK, IRELAND AND THE NETHERLANDS). APPLAUSE FROM DELEGATIONS (EXCEPT THE USA) WAS PERFUNCTORY BUT IT WAS VOCIFEROUS FROM THE PUBLIC GALLERIES, ALL THE TICKETS FOR WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN IN ADVANCE BY THE ISRAELI MISSION.

2. BEGIN'S SHORT STATEMENT ADDED NOTHING TO ISRAEL'S KNOWN POSITION ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES. A THIRD OF IT WAS DEVOTED TO TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF ISAIAH 2.2-4 (SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES ETC). HE DESCRIBED THE INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF DEFENCE AS "THE NOBLEST CONCEPT OF THE HUMAN MIND". ISRAEL SUPPORTED THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY OF RENUNCIATION OF AGGRESSIVE WAR (WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS A CORRECT VERSION OF THE KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT), A NUCLEAR NON-AGGRESSION PACT AND NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES ON THE TLATELOLCO PATTERN. CAMP DAVID POINTED THE WAY TO PEACE.

SUMMERHAYES

LIMITED

DEFENCE D

ACDD

NED

EESD

NAD

WED

PS

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIRJ BULLARD

MR WRIGHT

MR GILLMORE

MR GOODISON

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

START

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

RESTRICTED

*WV
2/16*

THE MIDDLE EAST

It is hoped that Members will find the following notes helpful for the debate on Tuesday, 22nd June 1982, on the Middle East.

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RT/CDB

17th June, 1982

Conservative Party International Office,
Conservative Research Department,
32 Smith Square,
London SW1

THE MIDDLE EAST

1) The Venice Declaration and British Policy towards the Arab/Israeli dispute

For many years, the Conservative Party has supported a balanced and even-handed policy towards the Arab/Israeli problem, and since coming into office, it has continued and developed this tradition. The Conservative Government is playing a major role in the diplomatic efforts of the European Community, based on the Venice declaration.

The Venice Declaration was issued by the Prime Minister and the other EEC Heads of Government on 13th June 1980. It was a response to the deadlock which had developed in the talks on Palestine autonomy within the Camp David peace process. The key passages of the declaration were as follows:

"The time has come to promote the recognition and implementation of the two principles universally accepted by the international community: the right to existence and to security of all the states in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." The first principle means that "all of the countries in the area are entitled to live in peace within secure, recognized and guaranteed borders", while the second means that "the Palestinian people ... must be placed in a position ... to exercise fully its right to self-determination". A later paragraph emphasized that: "these principles must be respected by all the parties concerned, and thus by the Palestinian people, and by the PLO, which will have to be associated with negotiations".

The Venice declaration has been much criticized and much misunderstood. It has, for example, been asserted that it runs contrary to the Camp David peace process, which was set in motion by President Carter, the Israeli Prime Minister, Mr. Begin, and the Egyptian President Sadat. This is not correct. As Mr. Douglas Hurd, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, has said:

"... our aim has been not to contradict but to complement Camp David. Camp David was a historic achievement, for it brought peace between Egypt and Israel. It is crucial that this peace should not be undermined. But the process needs to move on if it is to be secure" (Strasbourg, 12th March 1981).

Secondly, it has been suggested that the Venice declaration is in some way biased against Israel. In fact, as the quotations given above from the declaration demonstrate, it is rigorously balanced and makes clear the absolute commitment of the United Kingdom and the other members of the EEC to the existence and security of the state of Israel. .../ As

As Lord Carrington said in his speech to the Conservative Party Conference on 10th October 1980:

"... could anything be more even-handed, more sensible or more just than that each party should recognize and agree to live with each other?"

Thirdly, the Venice declaration has been attacked for its reference to the Palestine Liberation Organization. The British Government abhors the violence and terrorism with which PLO groups continue to be involved and deplores statements of PLO leaders which often deny the right of Israel to exist. Until such time as the PLO agreed to alter these policies, one cannot expect Israel to agree to negotiate with its representatives. Nevertheless, it is an undoubted fact that the PLO enjoys wide support among the Palestinian population and there is indeed no other organization which claims to represent the Palestinians. Accordingly, if the Palestinians are ever to be brought into negotiations, it is inevitable that the PLO will have to be involved in some way. It is a prime aim of the European initiative to persuade the PLO and its backers in the Arab world that destructive and negative policies will never achieve anything but endless confrontation and suffering. The statements issued by PLO spokesmen are contradictory. Some are utterly intransigent, but others are more conciliatory and offer some hope that in time sustained diplomatic pressure may have a positive effect.

2) The Saudi Initiative

In the second half of 1981, there was some hope that there might be a softening in the Arab position, through a peace plan put forward by Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia. This was significant because of its implicit acceptance of the need for the Arab states and the PLO to recognise the right of Israel to exist. During a visit by Lord Carrington to Riyadh on 5th November, Prince Saud, the Saudi Foreign Minister, said:

"there would not be any negotiations between Palestine and Israel unless they mutually recognized each other and that is the important factor" (Times, 6th November 1981)

Mr. Hurd described his statement as "a substantial move" and "something to be welcomed" (Hansard, 18th November 1981, col. 270). It had been intended to carry forward the Saudi plan at a summit conference at Fez on 25th November. Unfortunately this conference came to an abrupt end, largely because of the absence of the Presidents of Syria and Iraq.

3) The Annexation of the Golan Heights

On 14th December, Israel unexpectedly annexed the Golan Heights. Speaking to the Board of Deputies of British Jews on 15th December, the Prime Minister said that: "such an extension is contrary to international law and therefore invalid in our eyes ... this latest move is harmful to the search for peace". .../ She

She also pointed out that it was contrary to UN resolution 242. On the general issue she said:

"The fundamental principle of Israeli policy is the security of the state of Israel. We - and not just Britain but all the members of the European Community - are equally committed to that principle. Our resolve that Israel should live in security and peace will not weaken. It is indispensable to our approach to the problems of the area. But if we demand these rights for one country and people, we must be prepared to accord them to others. For justice and truth know no boundaries.

... Real security can come only from a lasting peace recognised to be just and defended because it is just - to Israel, just to her neighbours and just to the Palestinians."

4) The Israeli Withdrawal from Sinai

On 27th April 1982, Israel withdrew from the last sector of occupied Egyptian territory in the Sinai desert and the Egyptian part of the Camp David agreement was successfully completed. A 2500 strong Multinational force (MFO) including a small British component has been stationed there and will maintain peace on the Egyptian/Israeli border.

The withdrawal was completed in the face of bitter opposition by settlers in the area, abetted by extremist Israeli groups. It also coincided with extensive rioting in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by the Palestinian Arab population, which met a draconian response from the Israeli authorities. The Heads of Government of the European Community issued a statement on 30th March condemning the dismissal of democratically elected Palestinian mayors in the West Bank by the Israeli authorities as well as "the violation of the liberties and rights of the inhabitants of these territories".

On 3rd May, Mr. Begin said that Israel would never agree to any removal or withdrawal of Jewish settlements in Gaza or the West Bank.

At the beginning of May, Mr. Leo Tindemans, Belgian Foreign Minister and President in Office of the Council of Ministers, visited Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in furtherance of EEC policy towards the Arab/Israeli dispute. He was quoted as saying that Arab countries hoped for a new initiative from the European Community and were disappointed that the latter had not followed up the Venice Declaration. It has been reported in the press that the European Community is contemplating a new policy statement to follow the Venice Declaration.

5) The Israeli invasion of the Lebanon

On 3rd June 1982, the Israeli Ambassador to Britain was shot and seriously wounded by gunmen in London. The following day Israeli aircraft bombed Palestinian positions in the Lebanon and on 6th June, Israeli forces invaded Southern Lebanon. The

.../possibility

possibility of an Israeli invasion had been widely predicted for some weeks and the attack on the Israeli ambassador may have been the spark which set off the Israeli advance.

Since the last ceasefire on the Lebanese front, negotiated by the American emissary Mr. Habib in July 1981, there was always the probability that hostilities would break out again while Israeli settlements remained within artillery range of Palestinian positions. When the Israeli invasion began, Mr. Begin announced that Israeli forces would drive the Palestinians at least 25 miles back, out of range of the Israeli border. The Israelis swept through both the Christian (pro-Israeli) buffer strip of Major Haddad and the UN occupied area and captured the Palestinian stronghold of Beaufort castle and the area around Tyre, which had been held by the PLO. However, they then advanced considerably further right up to the outskirts of Beirut. There was heavy fighting against the PLO forces and the Syrian army and air force.

A ceasefire came into effect with the Syrians, who had suffered heavy air losses, on 12th June and with the Palestinians the following day. But the ceasefire with the PLO broke down very quickly and the Israelis advanced into parts of Beirut, cutting off the PLO strongholds in the West of the city. There has been speculation that the severe defeat suffered by the PLO may have the side-effect of enabling the Lebanese Government to re-establish its political authority which has been virtually non-existent since 1975.

6) British reactions to the Israeli invasion

On 8th June, the Prime Minister said that the Government:

"supported the motion in the Security Council that respects the Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity, which we wish to see restored. With regard to ... self-determination we believe in it as a principle. It is important both for the Falklands and for the Palestinian people" (Hansard, col. 15).

Later she added: "we condemn all aggressive activity, whether within the Lebanon, on the Israel/Lebanon border or across that border into Israel. We condemn it all equally" (Ibid.)

Referring to the appalling suffering caused to the civilian population in the Lebanon, as a result of the Israeli invasion, Mr. Hurd said:

"The suffering of innocent people has now reached intolerable proportions. We have told the Lebanese ambassador here that if there are specific humanitarian needs which the Lebanese Government can identify and with which they think we could help, he should let us know" (Hansard, 9th June 1982, Col. 195).

In an Early Day Motion (No. 519), Mr. Foot, Mr. Healey and other leading members of the Parliamentary Labour Party moved that:

"This House is gravely disturbed by the situation in the Middle East, and the rapidly escalating level of conflict; condemns the attempted assassination of Shlomo Argov, Israeli Ambassador to Great Britain, as a barbaric terrorist act; further condemns the Israeli invasion of the Lebanon which has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians and threatens to drag the region into full scale war; endorses the call of the United Nations Security Council for an immediate ceasefire; and demands the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from the Lebanon."

7) The Iran/Iraq war

The Arab world has seen itself as suffering defeat on two fronts in recent weeks. Not only has there been the Israeli advance into Lebanon, but the Iranians have gained a number of decisive victories in their war with Iraq.

This war began in the autumn of 1980 and the Iraqis at first made considerable advances, occupying a substantial slice of Iranian Khuzestan, including the cities of Khorramshahr and Abadan. Then for many months there was stalemate, following this spring by dramatic Iranian counter attacks leading to the recapture of Khorramshahr on 24th May. In recent days, the Iraqis have been desperately trying to arrange a ceasefire, but at the time of writing the Iranians appear unwilling to agree, unless Iraq agrees to humiliating conditions.

The Iranians would plainly like to bring about the fall of the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and there has been much speculation that they may invade Iraq. There is also considerable nervousness that the Iranian victory may lead to a threat to the conservative states of the Gulf, flowing from the religious split in the Islamic world between the traditionalist Sunni muslims (who are politically dominant in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf and Iraq etc.) and the fundamentalist and radical Shia muslims, inspired by the Ayatollah Khomeini.

RT/CDB

17th June, 1982

GRS 900

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FROM AMMAN 131200Z JUNE 1982

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 256 OF 13 JUNE 1982

AND TO INFO PRIORITY MODUK (D14) , UKMIS NEW YORK
AND WASHINGTON AND TO ROUTINE BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS
JEDDA, PARIS AND TEL AVIV.

YOUR TELNO 140: JORDAN MIDDLE EAST.

1. I SAW KING HUSSEIN AT HIS HOME ON THE AFTERNOON OF 12 JUNE AND DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE, FOR WHICH HE EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE. HE MADE NO REFERENCE TO THE LETTER HE WAS SENDING TO THE HEADS OF STATE OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (MIFT) ABOUT LEBANON, PERHAPS BECAUSE AT THE TIME HE HAD NOT YET FINALLY DECIDED TO SEND IT.

2. THE KING SAID HE HAD NOT ASKED TO SEE ME SINCE THE ISRAELIS HAD ATTACKED LEBANON, BECAUSE IT WAS SOMETHING " YOU AND WE HAD LONG FORESEEN" . NONETHELESS HE HAD BEEN APPALLED BY THE EVENTS OF RECENT DAYS AND FOUND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCEPT THE HUMAN SUFFERING INVOLVED. MANY PEOPLE WERE GOING TO LOSE FROM WHAT HAD HAPPENED BUT THE PRINCIPAL LOSERS WOULD BE THE AMERICANS, AND THE ONLY COUNTRIES WHICH STOOD TO GAIN WERE THE SOVIET UNION AND ISRAEL. THE DOUBLE STANDARDS BEING APPLIED BY THE AMERICAN AND ISRAELI CONDUCT DESERVED THE STRONGEST CONDEMNATION. HE WAS PROFOUNDLY UNHAPPY BOTH WITH THE US VETO AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND WITH SUBSEQUENT US ACTIONS: IT WAS CLEAR TO EVERYONE IN THE AREA THAT THE AMERICANS WERE PLAYING ISRAEL'S GAME AND IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE ISRAELI ATTACK HAD TRIED TO GAIN TIME FOR HER. IT WAS ALSO OBVIOUS THAT THE ATTEMPT ON ARGOV'S LIFE HAD BEEN AN EXCUSE RATHER THAN A REASON FOR THE ISRAELI ATTACK, WHICH HAS BEEN PREPARED OVER A LONG PERIOD. US POLICY WAS MAKING THE POSITION OF THE MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES UNTENABLE (CF THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS COMMENTS TO SIR ANTHONY PARSONS QUOTED IN PARA 5 OF HIS TELNO 983).

3. THE KING SAID HE DID NOT EXPECT THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW QUICKLY FROM THE PARTS OF LEBANON THEY WERE NOW OCCUPYING. THE MAIN PRESSURE WOULD NOW BE ON THE PALESTINIANS , AND HE EXPECTED THE ISRAELIS TO TRY IN THE COMING MONTHS TO DRIVE AS MANY PALESTINIANS AS THEY COULD BOTH FROM LEBANON AND FROM THE OCCUPIED WEST BANK INTO JORDAN. ALL THIS FORMED PART OF THEIR LONG TERM THINKING, UNDER WHICH JORDAN WOULD BECOME A PALESTINIAN STATE AND THE ARAB INHABITANTS ON THE WEST BANK WOULD GRADUALLY BE REDUCED TO A MINORITY, AT WHICH POINT THE ISRAELIS WOULD CALL FOR SELF-DETERMINATION ON THE WEST BANK.

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4. IN THE COURSE OF OUR DISCUSSION I REFERRED TO THE STATEMENT BY THE KING, WHICH THE KING SAID HE HAD NOTED WITH APPROVAL, AND ALSO TO YOUR RECENT TALKS WITH THE EGYPTIAN AND SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTERS (YOUR TELNOS 204 TO CAIRO AND 168 TO JEDDA). I BRIEFED HIM IN DETAIL ON THE POINTS MADE BY PRINCE SAUD AND HOW THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF RESPONDED.

5. KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT HE FOUND SYRIAN CONDUCT BAFFLING. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT INITIALLY THE RIGHT FLANK OF THE ISRAELI ADVANCE HAD BEEN CONDUCTED BY ONLY ONE BATTALION, AND THAT IT WAS NOT UNTIL THE SYRIANS HAD REINFORCED THEIR OWN TROOPS THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD ENLARGED THE SCALE OF THEIR ATTACK ON SYRIAN POSITIONS IN LEBANON. SYRIAN AIR LOSSES WERE ALSO INCOMPREHENSIBLE SEMICOLON IN ANY OTHER COUNTRY A DISASTER OF THIS MAGNITUDE WOULD HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED BY AN IMMEDIATE ENQUIRY INTO WHY SUCH LARGE LOSSES HAD BEEN INCURRED. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION REACHING THE JORDANIANS, THE PLO HAD ASKED THE SYRIANS FOR HELP FROM THE BEGINNING, BUT THE SYRIAN RESPONSE HAD BEEN SLOW AND UNIMPRESSIVE. THE SYRIANS HAD TURNED BACK VOLUNTEERS FROM JORDAN AT THE JORDANIAN/SYRIAN BORDER SEMICOLON UNITS FROM THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY FROM JORDAN HAD REACHED LEBANON, BUT HAD BEEN PREVENTED BY THE SYRIANS FROM GOING TO THE FRONT LINE. THE KING UNDERSTOOD THAT AN IRANIAN BRIGADE HAD BEEN TRANSPORTED BY AIR FROM IRAN TO SYRIA.

6. KING HUSSEIN SAID HE HAD BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS, AND THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE NOW SENDING EMISSARIES TO JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND IRAQ. HE WAS HELPING WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS AND HAD SPOKEN TO PRINCE FAHD ON THE EVENING OF 11 JUNE AND WAS IN TOUCH WITH THE IRAQIS. THE KING SAID MUBARAK WAS PROFOUNDLY UPSET AND DISAPPOINTED BY US POLICY.

7. AS I WAS LEAVING, THE KING SAID HE WAS TAKING NO CHANCES AS FAR AS JORDAN WAS CONCERNED AND WAS KEEPING A PARTICULARLY SHARP WATCH ON THE AREA OF JORDAN ADJACENT TO SOUTHERN GOLAN, JUST IN CASE THE ISRAELIS WERE TEMPTED TO TRY SOMETHING THERE.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

8. IN A BRIEF REFERENCE TO HIS RECENT VISIT TO BAGHDAD, THE KING CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE LATEST IRAQI OFFER OF WITHDRAWAL AND CEASEFIRE FULLY WITH THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP BEFORE IT WAS MADE. HE DISMISSED LORD GEORGE BROWNS ASSERTION THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM WAS LOSING HIS GRIP AS WIDE OF THE MARK AND CLAIMED THAT ON THE CONTRARY THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP HAD SEEMED TO HIM UNITED IN THEIR RESPONSE TO RECENT MILITARY SETBACKS.

9. THE KING WAS IN A THOROUGHLY GLOOMY MOOD AND SEEMED COMPLETELY DISOLLUSIONED WITH THE AMERICANS. OUR CONVERSATION OF COURSE TOOK PLACE BEFORE THE NEWS OF A CEASEFIRE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PLO WAS KNOWN.

URWICK

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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CONFIDENTIAL



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מ.א.
לונדון

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN
LONDON W8 4QB
Telephone: 01-937 8050

שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

HOW MUCH MORE CAN WE TAKE?!

Following violent PLO initiated activities along Israel's Northern frontier in 1981, Israel in July of that year responded positively to an American proposal and agreed to the cessation of hostile activities on the Israel-Lebanon border. While assuming considerable military risks, Israel also made it clear that it would defend itself if the terrorists broke the cease-fire either in Lebanon or anywhere else.

As subsequent events have shown, Israel's concern was well founded. The assassination attempt on Israel's Ambassador to London is the climax to a long series of murderous cowardly acts which typify Palestinian terror in Israel and abroad. Since July 1981 more than 150 terrorist attacks have been launched; 24 people were killed.

The PLO clearly took advantage of the cease-fire to reinforce its deployment in South Lebanon. Command posts were rebuilt, approach roads constructed and well camouflaged arms and munition dumps established. Since July 1981 the PLO has received 15,000 tons of military equipment from Syria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union and its proxies. This includes heavy artillery, light tanks, ammunition and rockets. In the light of all these violations, and as indicated before, the dastardly shooting of the Ambassador in London, Israel's air force was instructed to carry out air-raids against Palestinian military targets in Lebanon, including a combat training school and an ammunition and combat material depot.

In those air-raids, civilians were apparently killed. While regretting this loss of life, it should be understood that the responsibility for this lies squarely on the shoulders of those who have sited their headquarters and operation rooms in the midst of civilian populations.

There is nothing easier than heaping abuse and censure on Israel for allegedly waging an indiscriminate war against innocent civilians. Israel has never had or can ever have a deliberate policy of victimising the innocent. On the other hand the list of the innocent victims of the PLO's indiscriminate violence is long and known to all. These include aircraft passengers, Christian pilgrims, Olympic athletes and above all children. In the light of this week's assassination attempt in London it may be worthwhile noting that Palestinian terror has a long standing and notorious record of murderous attacks on the Israeli diplomatic corps. Since 1969 the PLO and its accomplices have attacked Israeli diplomats or embassies more than 40 times. To mention just a few cases:- In May 1970 two armed Palestinian terrorists broke into the Israeli Consulate in Asuncion, Paraguay - killing one Israeli secretary. In September 1972, an Israeli Embassy official was wounded in Brussels. In the same month, the Agricultural Counsellor at the Embassy in London was killed by an explosion while opening a letter-bomb. In December 1972, the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok was occupied for 19 hours by a killer-squad. In June 1973, the Israeli Air Attaché in Washington was murdered on his doorstep. In November 1979 Israel's Ambassador to Lisbon was wounded by Palestinian gunmen and, most recently, in April 1982 a Second Secretary of the Embassy of Israel in Paris was murdered.

- 3 -

Israel continues to fight a vicious enemy whose aspiration is the liquidation of the State and people of Israel. The recent despicable event outside the Dorchester Hotel has shown again the real nature of those who claim to represent the Palestinian people. There will be no appeasement on the part of Israel with such elements whether in their strongholds or anywhere else.

SUNDAY, JUNE 6, 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMMAN 061150Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 234 OF 6 JUN

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL VERSAILLES (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
AND UKMIS NEWYORK

UKDEL VERSAILLES TELNO 01 TO GEORGETOWN AND YOUR TELNO 33 TO
UKDEL VERSAILLES: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. I CONVEYED YOUR THANKS AND APPRECIATION IN A WRITTEN MESSAGE TO THE ACTING JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER DELIVERED EARLY THIS MORNING (WITH A COPY TO THE PALACE). SIR ANTHONY PARSONS MAY ALSO WISH TO CONVEY YOUR THANKS TO MR MARWAN QASEM, THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO IS DUE IN NEW YORK FROM HAVANA TODAY.
2. I THINK A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO KING HUSSEIN WOULD ALSO BE APPROPRIATE. JORDAN'S POSITION HAS NOT BEEN AN EASY ONE FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS:
 - A. SHE REPRESENTS THE ARAB GROUP IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE WISHES OF OTHER ARAB STATES SEMICLN
 - B. KING HUSSEIN WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY UNDER STRONG SPANISH PRESSURE TO VOTE FOR THE RESOLUTION AND KING JUAN CARLOS, WHO TELEPHONED HIM SHORTLY BEFORE THE VOTE, IS A CLOSE PERSONAL FRIEND (SEE MY TELNO 228) SEMICLN
 - C. KING HUSSEIN IS SEEKING SPAIN'S GOOD OFFICES ON BEHALF OF IRAQ IN BRINGING A RESOLUTION ON THE GULF CONFLICT BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
3. IT IS ALL THE MORE GRATIFYING THAT, IN FACE OF THESE PRESSURES (WHICH SHOULD NOT OF COURSE BE REFERRED TO IN ANY MESSAGE), HE STUCK TO HIS GUNS.

URWICK

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Middle East

7 May, 1982

ARAB/ISRAEL

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mr Begin in reply to her message to him of 5 May.

J Holmes, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

7 May, 1982

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 7 May enclosing a message from the Prime Minister of Israel.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency Mr Shlomo Argov

010



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN
LONDON W8 4QB
Telephone: 01-937 8050

שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

7th May 1982

Dear Prime Minister,

I have been instructed to transmit to you the enclosed message from Mr. Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel.

Sincerely

Shlomo Argov

Shlomo Argov
Ambassador of Israel

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, PC, MP,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, SW1

SUBJECT.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN
LONDON W8 4QB
Telephone: 01-937 8050



PRIME MINISTER'S (2)

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T100/82

שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

M

*Mr. Markov set
up.*

Jerusalem, May 6, 1982

"The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, PC, MP
Prime Minister of Great Britain,
10 Downing Street,
London.

Prime Minister

A.Y.C. 7/5

ל. וקני 15 F/C.O. (Dr. Holman)

A.Y.C. 10/5

My dear Madam Prime Minister,

I have just received your message of May 5, 1982.

Your moving words of appreciation are very dear to me. Indeed we face difficulties since the Ides of March both from without and from within. But we have overcome them and so we have been able to fulfil, to the dot and the date, our international commitment.

I will look forward, Madam Prime Minister, to friendly co-operation between our nations.

With my best wishes,

Menachem Begin"

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T94A/82

T

PS TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET

cc make
of

Middle
East

CONFIDENTIAL

3257 - 1

OO TEL AVIV DESKBY 041300Z
RR CAIRO
GRS 103
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 041300Z
FM FCO 041000Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV
TELEGRAM NUMBER 150 OF 4 MAY
INFO WASHINGTON, CAIRO

YOUR TELNO 180: SINAI WITHDRAWAL

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME
MINISTER TO MR BEGIN:

BEGINS. I KNOW THAT THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE
RETURN OF SINAI HAS BEEN VERY DIFFICULT FOR YOU. I WANTED YOU
TO KNOW HOW MUCH I HAVE ADMIRERD YOUR DETERMINATION IN CARRYING
IT THROUGH. PLEASE BE ASSURED OF THE CONTINUING SUPPORT AND
COOPERATION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN THE SEARCH FOR A
COMPREHENSIVE AND LASTING PEACE IN YOUR REGION, BUILDING ON
WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. ENDS.

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T93A/82

T

SUBJECT

cc Mubarak
cjs

CONFIDENTIAL

3256 - 1

OO CAIRO DESKBY 041300Z

RR TEL AVIV

GRS105

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 041300Z

FM FCO 041015Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 143 OF 4 MAY

REPEATED FOR INFO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV

YOUR TELNO 180: SINAI WITHDRAWAL

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK:

BEGINS. I WAS DELIGHTED TO HEAR THAT THE HISTORIC
MILESTONE OF THE FULL RECOVERY OF SINAI HAS NOW BEEN SUCCESSFU-
LLY PASSED. EGYPT'S DEDICATION TO PEACE HAS BEEN REWARDED. I
HOPE THIS WILL OPEN UP ENHANCED OPPORTUNITIES FOR PURSUING THE
SEARCH FOR A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE, IN WHICH YOU MAY BE ASSURED
OF THE CONTINUING SUPPORT AND COOPERATION OF THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT. ENDS.

PYM

STANDARD

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

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CONFIDENTIAL

File

059

[Handwritten signature/initials inside a large oval]

4 May 1982

ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI

Thank you for your letter of 27 April. As I told you earlier, the Prime Minister is content that the telegrams to President Mubarak and Mr. Begin should be despatched as drafted.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

[Handwritten mark]



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 April 1982

Dear John,

Yes not

Prime Minister
Content that there two telegram
be sent to President Mubarak and
Mr. Begin?
M.P.

Israeli Withdrawal from Sinai

/ HM Ambassador Cairo has recommended in his telegram No 180 (copy enclosed) that the Prime Minister should send a short message to President Mubarak marking the successful completion of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.

We have consistently recognised the Egypt/Israel Peace Treaty, and the withdrawal from Sinai that flowed from it, as important steps forward. The final stages of the withdrawal were a difficult period for both sides, and it is satisfactory that the exercise was brought to a successful conclusion. President Reagan has already sent his congratulations to both sides, and as HM Ambassador Cairo points out, other Governments are likely to follow suit.

// Mr Pym recommends that the Prime Minister agree to send a message to President Mubarak along the lines of that contained in Cairo telno 180. It would also be appropriate to send a parallel message to Mr Begin. I enclose appropriate draft telegrams to Cairo and Tel Aviv.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing St

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/Deskby
IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
 GRS
 CLASS
 CAVEATS
 DESKBY
 FM FCO
 PRE/ADD
 TEL NO

///
 //
 /

1-	ZCZC
2	GRS
3	CONFIDENTIAL
4	
5	
6	FM FCO Z APRIL 82
7	TO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV
8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
9	REPEATED FOR INFO WASHINGTON, CAIRO
10	YOUR TELNO 180: SINAI WITHDRAWAL
11	1. Please pass the following message from the Prime
12	Minister to Mr Begin:
13	Begins. I know that the successful completion of the
14	return of Sinai has been very difficult for you. I wanted you
15	to know how much I have admired your determination in carrying
16	it through. Please be assured of the continuing support and
17	cooperation of the British Government in the search for a
18	comprehensive and lasting peace in your region, building on
19	what has been achieved. Ends.
20	
21	PYM
22	NNNN
23	
24	
25	

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept S/S OFFICE	Distribution Middle East Standard
Drafted by (Block capitals) J E HOLMES		
Telephone number *// 4641		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM

	↓	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
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ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO Z APRIL 82
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	REPEATED FOR INFO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV
	10	YOUR TELNO 180: SINAI WITHDRAWAL
	11	1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister
	12	to President Mubarak:
	13	Begins. I was delighted to hear that the historic
	14	milestone of the full recovery of Sinai has now been successfu-
	15	lly passed. Egypt's dedication to peace has been rewarded. I
	16	hope this will open up enhanced opportunities for pursuing the
	17	search for a comprehensive peace, in which you may be assured
	18	of the continuing support and cooperation of the British
	19	Government. Ends.
	20	
	21	PYM
///	22	NNNN
//	23	
/	24	
	25	

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept S/S OFFICE	Distribution Middle East Standard
Drafted by (Block capitals) J E HOLMES		
Telephone number 233 4641		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

ADVANCE COPY

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 15

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR MOBERLY

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

HD/NENAD ✓
HD/MED
HD/UND

CABINET OFFICE D10

*Perched message to
Israelis?*

HD/

HD/

..

..

PUSD (2)
NEWS D

*Mr Greenstock
Mr Ricke
I suppose so*

*Ram
28/4*

GRS 180

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CAIRO 260900Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 180 OF 26 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON

SINAI WITHDRAWAL

1. I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY ON THE FINAL STAGE OF WITHDRAWAL AND ON THE TABA NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WERE THE MAIN CAUSE OF THE LAST MINUTE UNCERTAINTIES. THE LATTER MAY ALSO HELP TO EXPLAIN WHY THE WITHDRAWAL CEREMONIES WERE IN SUCH LOW KEY. NOW THAT ALL DOUBTS ARE RESOLVED I AM SURE PRESIDENT MUBARAK WOULD WELCOME A SHORT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER. REAGAN HAS TELEPHONED CONGRATULATIONS TO MUBARAK AND OTHER MESSAGES WILL NO DOUBT BE FLOWING IN. GRATEFUL FOR EARLIEST POSSIBLE AUTHORITY TO DELIVER A MESSAGE, I SUGGEST ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:

"WARMEST CONK SATULUTIONS ON THE FINAL RECOVERY OF SINAI. I AM DELIGHTED THAT THIS HISTORIC MILESTONE HAS NOW BEEN SUCCESSFULLY PASSED. I HOPE IT WILL OPEN UP ENHANCED OPPORTUNITIES FOR PURSUING THE SEARCH FOR A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE, IN WHICH YOU MAY BE ASSURED OF THE CONTINUING SUPPORT AND CO-OPERATION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT."

VEIR

28 APR 1982



FWO letter is CF.

File

RM

BR
1/10/82
AJ 26/4



cc: FCO

M/ast

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

26 April 1982

Dear Mr. Chatty,

Thank you for your letter of 15 April on behalf of the 43 member states of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, asking Her Majesty's Government to intervene in the case of Mr Lubisi, Mr Mashigo and Mr Manana condemned to death in South Africa.

As you may know, in February 1981 we associated ourselves with a statement by the President of the United Nations Security Council expressing concern over the sentences imposed on these three men. We also supported Security Council Resolution 503, adopted unanimously on 9 April this year, which called upon the South African authorities to commute the death sentences and urged all states to use their influence and to take urgent measures to save these men's lives.

In the light of Resolution 503 we, like other governments, have let the South African Government know of the deep public concern that has been expressed on this matter.

Yours sincerely

Raymond Shabeta

M. Habib Chatty

255

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 April 1982

*lets
Type please*

Mr 23/4.

Dear John,

Reply to the Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference Organisation

/ PEG
I enclose a letter to the Prime Minister of 15 April from M Habib Chatty, Secretary-General of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, together with a suggested draft reply.
/

The Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) is an essentially political organisation, founded in 1972 with the principal aims of promoting Islamic solidarity and consolidating co-operation among its member states. Largely Saudi financed, it now has 43 members (including 21 African states and the PLO), encompassing almost all countries with a substantial muslim population. It has developed a degree of political muscle in focussing the attention of the Islamic world on contemporary political social and economic problems.

The three ANC men to whom M Chatty refers were sentenced to death in November 1980 at Pretoria Supreme Court. The Appeal Court upheld the death sentence on 7 April this year. The three were convicted of high treason, attempted murder and robbery with aggravating circumstances in respect of their participation in an attack on a police station in January 1980 in which no-one was injured.

In addition to the steps outlined in the draft reply, the Belgian Ambassador delivered an appeal for clemency on behalf of the Ten on 8 April in Cape Town. Sir J Leahy also made a humanitarian appeal for clemency when the South African Ambassador called on 19 April. Both these appeals were made on the understanding that their substance would be kept confidential.

Yours ever

J E Holmes
(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT: ~~minute~~/letter/teletype/despatch/notes

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:
M Habib Chatty
Secretary General of the Islamic
General Secretariat
PO Box 178
Jeddah

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Conference Organisation

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your letter of 15 April on behalf of the 43 member states of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, asking Her Majesty's Government to intervene in the case of Mr Lubisi, Mr Mashigo and Mr Manana condemned to death in South Africa.

CAVEAT.....

As you may know, in February 1981 we associated ourselves with a statement by the President of the United Nations Security Council expressing concern over the sentences imposed on these three men. We also supported Security Council Resolution 503, adopted unanimously on 9 April this year, which called upon the South African authorities to commute the death sentences and urged all states to use their influence and to take urgent measures to save these mens lives.

Resolution

Enclosures—flag(s).....

In the light of ~~SCR~~ 503 we, like other governments, have let the South African Government know of the deep public concern that has been expressed on this matter.

23/4

PART 9 ends:-

FCO to ASC

2/4

PART 10 begins:-

FCO to ASC + att 22/7/82

